

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#1a memo</del>	<del>Rostow to Vance <i>open 4-28-97 NLT 96-202</i> TS 2 p</del>	<del>2/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#3 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 8:15 p.m. <i>open 4/30/96</i> S 1 p <i>(dup. of #60b, Spc. Head of State, NK, Box 56)</i></del>	<del>2/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#3b rpt</del>	<del>"Text of Message - Vietnam" <i>exempt 3-28-95 NLT 94-252</i> S 4 p <i>(dup. of #3b, see above) open 4/16/02 NLT 01-162</i></del>	<del>2/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#5 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 8:00 p.m. S 1 p <i>not OPEN 6-28-95 NLT 94-457</i> <i>(Dup of #26, WUL - VN: 1-2/68)</i></del>	<del>2/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#5a memo</del>	<del>Dean to Rusk S 1 p <i>open 2-26-97 NLT 96-197</i></del>	<del>2/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#5b rpt</del>	<del>"Text of Message" <i>exempt 2-26-97 NLT 96-197</i> S 3 p <i>open NLT 96-197 Appeal 4/98</i></del>	<del>2/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#8a cable</del>	<del>Bonn 8270 S 3 p <i>open 2-27-97 NLT 96-197</i> <i>(Dup of #27, NSF CF Germany, Vol 14)</i></del>	<del>2/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#8b cable</del>	<del>Bonn 8265 C 2 p <i>open 2-27-97 NLT 96-197</i> <i>(Dup of #11a) (Dup of #25b, Germany, Vol 14)</i></del>	<del>2/12/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#9 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 7:00 p.m. S 1 p <i>Dup of #110, NSF CF Germany, Vol 14</i> <i>exempt 8-31-98 NLT 96-199</i></del>	<del>2/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#9a cable</del>	<del>Intelligence Information Cable S 2 p <i>Dup of #110a, NSF CF Germany, Vol 14</i> <i>exempt 1-5 (c)(d) 3-4 (b) (1,6) NLT 96-200 7-10-98</i></del>	<del>2/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#11a cable</del>	<del>Duplicate of #8b</del>		
<del>#12a cable</del>	<del>Salgon 19239 S 4 p <i>open 2-27-97 NLT 96-197</i></del>	<del>2/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#14 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 5:15 p.m. <i>open 11-10-97 NLT 96-206</i> C 1 p <i>Dup of #26, NSF CF Germany, Vol 14</i></del>	<del>2/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#14a cable</del>	<del>Bonn 8266 C 3 p <i>open 2-27-97 NLT 96-197</i> <i>(Dup of #26, NSF CF Germany, Vol 14)</i></del>	<del>2/12/68</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 61, February 10-13, 1968 Box 29

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#19 memo	Rostow to President, 3:30 p.m. <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 8-21-96 gp/rq</i>	<del>2/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#19a cable	Seoul 4207 <del>S</del> 2 p <i>open 2-27-97 NLJ 96-197</i> [Duplicate of #168, NSF, NSCH, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 16]	2/13/68	A
#19b cable	Seoul 4208 <del>S</del> 5 p " " [Duplicate of #169, NSF, NSCH, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 16]	2/13/68	A
#19c cable	Deptel 114006 to Seoul <del>S</del> 2 p " " [Duplicate of #169, NSF, NSCH, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 16]	2/12/68	A
#20a cable	Saigon 19196 <del>S</del> 3 p " "	2/13/68	A
#25a cable	Intelligence Cable C 2 p [Duplicate of #89a, NSF, NSCH, March 31, Box — Vol. 2; Sanitized 1979] <i>sanitized 7.10.98 NLJ 96-200</i> [dupl #54, NSF CF - Vietnam, ZA 2 - I Corps + DMZ 2/68 br 66]	2/13/68	A
#27a cable	Saigon 19205 <del>C</del> 4 p <i>open 2-27-97 NLJ 96-197</i>	2/13/68	A
#31 memo	Rostow to President, 9:15 p.m. <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 4/30/96</i> [Duplicate of #106a, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Seoul Cables, Vol. II]	<del>2/12/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#31a cable	Seoul 4180 S 1 p [Duplicate of #106b, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Seoul Cables, Vol. II] <i>(sanitized 5/94)</i>	2/12/68	A

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#34 memo	Rostow to President, 8:05 p.m. <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 8-21-96 QP/rg</i>	<del>2/12/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#34a cable	Seoul 4090 <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 2-27-97 NLJ 96-197</i>	2/8/68	A
#35 memo	Rostow to President, 8:00 p.m. <del>S</del> 1 p <i>OPEN 6/28/95 NY 94-457</i>	<del>2/12/68</del>	A
#35a memcon	"Vietnam Peace Talks" <del>S</del> 3 p <i>open 12-15-95 NLJ 94-460</i>	2/12/68	A
#36 memo	Rostow to President, 7:50 p.m. PCI 1 p <i>open 11-10-97 NLJ 96-200</i>	2/12/68	A
#36b cable	Deptel to Seoul (work copy) <del>TS</del> 2 p <i>open 2-27-97 NLJ 96-197</i>	2/12/68	A
#37a cable	Paris 10198 <del>S</del> 2 p <i>open 2-27-97 NLJ 96-197</i> [Duplicate of #141b, NSF, Country File, France, Vol. 13; exempt NLJ 84-357]	2/12/68	A
#45a memo	Rostow to SecState and SecDef <del>TS</del> 1 p <i>open 4-25-97 (Dup of #71) NLJ 96-202</i>	2/12/68	A
#46 memo	Rostow to President, 4:50 p.m. S 1 p <i>sanitized 8-19-98 NLJ 96-199</i> [Duplicate of #34, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"] Box 70	2/12/68	A
#46a cable	Intelligence Cable S 1 p <i>sanitized 7-10-98 NLJ 96-200</i> [Duplicate of #34a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"] Box 70	undated	A
#47 memo	Rostow to President, 4:50 p.m. <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 6-1-98 RAC</i> [Duplicate of #33, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"] Box 70	<del>2/12/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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**NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 61, February 10-13, 1968 Box 29**

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#47a cable	Intelligence Cable S 12 p <i>Open 7.10.98 NLJ 96-200</i> [Duplicate of #33b, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"]	1/28/68	A
#49 memo	<del>Rostow's Mtg with the President agenda</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>DUPE IN FILES OF DWR, BOX 1, MTGS JAN APRIL 68</i> <i>Dec 450, 51, 53</i>	<del>2/12/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#52 memo	Rostow to President, 12:20 p.m. C 1 p <i>open 8-21-96 9/2/98</i> [Duplicate of #35, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"]	2/12/68	A
#52a cable	Intelligence Cable C 1 p <i>sanitized 7.10.98 NLJ 96-200</i> [Duplicate of #35a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"] <i>Box</i>	2/12/68	A
#53a cable	Seoul 4178 <i>open 4/30/96</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #162, NSF, NSCH, Pueblo Crisis, Volume 16]	2/12/68	A
#53b cable	Seoul 4176 <i>open 4/30/96</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #160, NSF, NSCH, Pueblo Crisis, Volume 16]	2/12/68	A
#54a cable	Saigon 19121 S 3 p <i>open 2-27-97 NLJ 96-197</i>	2/12/68	A
#66 memo	Rostow to President, 8:35 a.m. C 1 p <i>open 8-21-96 9/2/98</i> [Duplicate of #42, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"]	2/12/68	A
#66a cable	Saigon 19005 <i>open 8-21-96 9/2/98</i> C 5 p <i>open 2-27-97 NLJ 96-197</i> [Duplicate of #42a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"]	2/11/68	A

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#67 memo	Rostow to President, 8:30 a.m. <del>Open 11-10-97 NLJ 96-200</del> S 1 p	2/12/68	A
#69b ltr	President to President Leoni PCI 2 p <i>open 4/30/96</i>	2/12/68	A
#70 memo	Rostow to President C 2 p <i>open 8/21/96 8/ug</i>	2/12/68	A
#71 memo	Rostow to SecState and SecDef TS 1 p ( <i>dup of #45a</i> ) <i>open 4-25-97 NLJ 96-200</i>	2/12/68	A
#72 memo	Rostow to President, 6:30 p.m. TS 1 p <i>open 8-30-95 NLJ 91-448</i>	2/11/68	A
#72a memo	McClendon for the Record S 1 p <i>open 3-19-95 NLJ 96-198</i>	2/11/68	A
#73a cable	Deptel to Seoul (work copy) S 3 p <i>open 8-19-97 NLJ 96-29</i> <i>Duplicate in FJS of WWR ROSTOW, BOX 16</i> <i>NON-VN JAN-FEB 1968, Doc #27a</i> <i>ALSO WWR, BOX 1, MTGS JAN-APRIL, Doc #55b</i>	undated	A
#73b cable	Deptel 110828 to Seoul S 3 p <i>open 4/30/96</i> <i>Duplicate of doc #27b</i> <i>DUPEN WWR, BOX 1, MTGS JAN-APRIL, Doc #55c</i>	2/6/68	A
#73c cable	From Westmoreland S 2 p <i>open 4-1-97 NLJ 96-35</i> <i>[Duplicate of #34c, NSF, NSCH, "March 31," Vol. 6]</i> <i>[Sanitized 1980] ALSO FILES OF WWR, BOX 16, NON-VN JAN-FEB 1968, Doc #27c</i> <i>ALSO TT WWR, BOX 1, MTGS JAN-APRIL 1968 Doc #55d</i> <i>#68a, NSF Country File, Vietnam, bx66, ZAZ-1 Corpst BMT, 2/68</i>	2/11/68	A
#75 memo	Rostow to President, 3:30 p.m. <i>open 6-1-98 RAC</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #45, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"]	2/11/68	A
#75a cable	Intelligence Cable S 4 p <i>sanitized 7-10-98 NLJ 96-200</i> [Duplicate of #45a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"]	2/11/68	A

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#76 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 3:15 p.m.</del> <i>open per RAC 1/2018</i> <del>S 1 p</del> [Duplicate of #46, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"]	2/11/68	A
#76a cable	Intelligence Cable S 2 p - <i>sanitized 7.10.98 NLJ 96-200</i> [Duplicate of #46a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"]	2/11/68	A
#79b rpt	<del>Intelligence Report</del> <i>open 3-25-97 NLJ 96-204</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#79c rpt	<del>Intelligence Report</del> " " <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#79d rpt	<del>Intelligence Report</del> " " <del>S 1 p</del> <i>(dup of #79c, NLJ, Vol 60)</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#79e rpt	<del>Intelligence Report</del> " " <del>S 1 p</del> <i>(dup of #79d, NLJ, Vol 60)</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#83 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 6:30 p.m.</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>Open 11/6/92</i>	<del>2/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#84 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 6:00 p.m.</del> <i>open 11-10-97 NLJ 96-206</i> <del>S 1 p</del> [Duplicate of #51, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"]	<del>2/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#84a cable	Intelligence Cable S 1 p <i>sanitized 7.10.98 NLJ 96-200</i> [Duplicate of #51a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"]	2/10/68	A
#88 memo	Rostow to President, 5:45 p.m. S 1 p <i>sanitized NLJ 96-199 8.19.98</i> [Duplicate of #52, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"]	2/10/68	A

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#88a cable	Intelligence Cable S 2 p <i>sanitized 7-10-98 NLJ 96-200</i> [Duplicate of #52a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"]	2/10/68	A
<del>#89 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 5:40 p.m.</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 11-10-97 NLJ 96-206</i>	<del>2/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#89a cable</del>	<del>Oslo 3275</del> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 2-27-97 NLJ 96-197</i>	<del>2/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#90a cable</del>	<del>Saigon 18905</del> <del>C 3 p</del> <i>open 2-27-97 NLJ 96-197</i>	<del>2/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#93a ltr</del>	<del>"Text of Message"</del> <i>open 4/30/96</i> <del>C 1 p</del> <i>(dup of SBA, NSF, Spec. Head of State Corresp. U.K., Box 56)</i>	<del>2/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#94a cable</del>	<del>Seoul 4131</del> <del>S 3 p</del> <i>open 11-10-97 NLJ 96-206</i> [Duplicate of #139, NSF, NSCH, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 16 and #82a, Vol. 6, Part 11]	<del>2/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#94b cable</del>	<del>Seoul 4142</del> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 2-27-97 NLJ 96-197</i> [Duplicate of #148, NSF, NSCH, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 16 and #82b, Vol. 6, Part 11]	<del>2/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#95a cable</del>	<del>Saigon 18892</del> <del>S 4 p</del> " " "	<del>2/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#97 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 10:30 a.m.</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 8-21-96 80/49</i>	<del>2/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#98 memo	Rostow to President, 10:00 a.m. <i>withdrawn per DOE Audit</i> TS 1 p <i>Sanitized NLJ 96-202 (2/98)</i> <i>Sanitized 6/20/01 NOJ 96-202 Appnet</i>	2/10/68	A
#98a memo	Ginsburgh to Wheeler TS 1 p <i>Sanitized 3/14/05 NLJ 96-198</i>	1/31/68	A

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#99a cable	From Westmoreland <i>OPEN 314-05NLJ 96-198</i> <del>S 2 p</del> [Duplicate of #33a, NSF, NSCH, "March 31," Vol. 6, Khe Sanh Reports] [Sanitized 1980] <i>[Appt #69a, NSF Country File, Vietnam, Box 66, 2AZ, I Corps DMZ, 2/68]</i>	<del>2/10/68</del>	A
#100 memo	Rostow to President, 9:05 a.m. S 1 p <i>sanitized NLJ 96-199 8.19.98</i>	2/10/68	A
#100a cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>more info released 1-6-86 RAC 001-258-2-24 and NLJ 96-200</i> S 2 p <i>sanitized 7.10.98 NLJ 96-200</i>	2/9/68	A
#101 memo	Rostow to President, 9:00 a.m. <i>exempt NLJ 96-199 8.31.98</i> S 1 p <del><i>sanitized NLJ 96-199 8.19.98</i></del> <i>semi NLJ 019-020-1 (1/02)</i>	2/10/68	A
#101a cable	Intelligence Cable <i>7.10.98 exempt RAC 8/05</i> S 2 p <i>exempt 1.5(c)(d) 3.4(b)(1,6) NLJ 96-200</i>	<del>2/10/68</del>	A
#102 memo	Rostow to President, 9:00 a.m. C 1 p <i>sanitized NLJ 96-199 8.19.98</i> [Duplicate of #54, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"]	2/10/68	A
#102a cable	Intelligence Cable C 1 p <i>sanitized NLJ 96-200</i> [Duplicate of #54a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"] <i>Box —</i>	1/27/68	A
#103 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 9:00 a.m.</del> <del>C 1 p</del> <i>open 8-21-96 08/10/97</i> [Duplicate of #55, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"]	<del>2/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#103a cable	Intelligence Cable C 1 p <i>sanitized NLJ 96-200 7.10.98</i> [Duplicate of #55a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), 2/6-12/68, General Military Activity"] <i>Box —</i>	2/10/68	A
#104 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 7:55 a.m.</del> <i>open 11-10-97 NLJ 96-206</i> <del>C 1 p</del>	<del>2/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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#22b rpt	Intelligence Report - <i>sanitized 10/30/09</i> ts 3pp	2/13/68	A
<del>#55 memo</del>	<del>Walt Rostow to the President</del> <del>TS 1p</del> <i>OPEN 5/24/05 NW/RAC 03.186</i>	<del>2/12/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#55a cable	Intelligence Report - TS 1p <i>exempt 3.1.04 NW/RAC 03.187</i>	2/12/68	A
<del>#82 memo</del>	<del>Walt Rostow to the President - 6:40 p.m.</del> <del>TS 1p</del> <i>OPEN 5/24/05 NW/RAC 03.186</i>	<del>2/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#82a cable	Intelligence Report - TS 1p <i>exempt 3.1.04 NW/RAC 03.187</i>	2/10/68	A'
#86 memo	Walt Rostow to the President - 5:45 p.m. TS 1p <i>(Dup. in NSF, Intell. File, 303 Committee, Box 3)</i>	2/10/68	A
#86a cable	Intelligence Report - <i>(Dup. #73, NSF, CF, VN, 7F(2)B, Box 102 - sanitized 4-28-98 NLT 95-299)</i> TS 2pp <i>exempt 3.1.04 NW/RAC 03.187</i>	2/10/68	A
#87 memo	Walt Rostow to the President - 5:45 p.m. TS 1p <i>(Dup. of #73, VN, 7F(2)B, Box 102)</i> <i>open 3-29-04 NLT/RAC 02-225, dated 4-24-98 NLT 95-299</i> <i>[Dup. #16, NSF, Intelligence File, "303 Committee," Box 2]</i>	2/10/68	A

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INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 13, 1968  
10:05 p.m.

*For file*

Mr. President:

Here is the exact message as I  
read it to Cy and he will receive it.

The Situation Room will forward  
his response when it is received.

I will be informed at home.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By reg, NARA, Date 2-7-92



~~TOP SECRET FLASH~~  
- VIA CAS CHANNELS

February 13, 1968

FOR MR. CYRUS VANCE, SEOUL, FROM WALT ROSTOW

*Chen*

This is a back up message in case our telephone circuit does not work.

1. President wishes me to make a final check on your judgment concerning a stop in Saigon before you return to Washington.

2. The purpose of the trip would be:

-- To assess the military and political situation and report to the President;

-- To underline for Thieu the urgent need for vigorous action on certain fundamental problems;

-- To join with colleagues in Washington in assessing the need for a call up of reserves in the wake of the dispatch to Westmoreland of 6 battalions. On this matter the clock is ticking. Congress will be back next Tuesday.

3. Although the President would value greatly your judgment on the Vietnamese situation, he does not wish to endanger or diminish the results of your effort in Seoul. On Balance, Sec. Rusk believes it unwise for you to go to Saigon. Secretary McNamara, on balance, supports the trip to Saigon. The President is not asking you to go. He does not wish to overrule your judgment on the spot or Sec. Rusk's judgment here. He wishes, however, your assessment as of this moment before making a final decision. Would your going on to Saigon significantly endanger or

~~TOP SECRET~~

*sent LDX eyes only to Sec Rusk 2/14/68*



3

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

diminish the value of what you have been able to achieve in Seoul or might be able to achieve there?

4. Seen from this distance, it seems possible that President Park might wish you to visit Vietnam: in the end, his stake there is at least as great as ours.

5. But what we want is your completely candid and unencumbered net judgment as of this time.

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~



2

**INFORMATION**

**Tuesday, February 13, 1968  
8:30 p.m.**

**Mr. President:**

**Denis Warner is as good and  
dispassionate a reporter on Vietnam  
as there is.**

**This essay on Khe Sanh and Dien  
Bien Phu will interest you.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**February 22, 1968  
THE REPORTER**

**WWRostow:rlm**

*Pres file*





# Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu

DENIS WARNER

TO MOST WESTERNERS, Dien Bien Phu was simply a battle that lost the Indochina War for the French. To General Vo Nguyen Giap, who won that battle and has now launched his divisions against the allied forces on an all-embracing front ranging from the swamps of the Camau Peninsula to the green mist-covered mountains of Khe Sanh and including every city and town of note in the land, it has a much more complex meaning.

As major battles of history go, Dien Bien Phu was no great shakes. It was no Mukden or Passchendaele or Stalingrad. The French toll was 16,200 troops killed or captured, a cruel blow by any standards but far short of total military disaster.

As a battle fought for political gain, however, it succeeded beyond measure for Giap. Diplomats gathered in Switzerland for the first session of the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference opened their newspapers at their breakfast tables to read that Dien Bien Phu had fallen. The French had lost a major negotiating asset.

As a backdrop to the Geneva deliberations, the long, tragic lines of French Union prisoners began their forced march across the mountains to the coast. Wounded and weary men dropped in hundreds along the jungle tracks and thousands more were taken by sickness and disease. French planes caught occasional glimpses of the limping columns

and of new heavy batteries of anti-aircraft guns and artillery rolling down the Tonkin roads from China, whose principal target was the conference table in Geneva rather than the high-flying fighter planes and bombers. "Every Communist must grasp the truth: political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," Mao Tse-tung had dictated. Political shells from Giap's new guns burst among the faltering statesmen of the West and shot them down.

Giap has neither forgotten the lesson nor for a moment abandoned his hopes of another, if different, Dien Bien Phu. He believes that in a small colonial or semi-colonial country such as Vietnam, a war of national liberation should not be



fought to the bitter end in the field but only to the point where the enemy can be brought to the conference table and there decisively defeated. Politics, in effect, is the logical extension of war. To win a great political victory, however, there must first be a big military success, and of this there has never been a better example anywhere than Dien Bien Phu.

### Repetition and Surprise

All recent talk from Hanoi and the National Liberation Front of fighting while negotiating, of a coalition government, and such developments as the united-front policy that was announced by the NLF last August have their origins in the Dien Bien Phu concept. What we are seeing now in Vietnam is history being re-enacted by one of the principals. To carry the general offensive from the jungles and paddy fields into the heart of every city and town while enveloping the U.S. Marines at Khe Sanh is a tactic that differs only in detail from the one Giap employed in the general offensive against the French.

This is not to suggest that it has been without surprise. Giap's military accomplishments, and they are many, have of necessity depended significantly on his use of surprise. Against the French he had neither tanks nor planes. He acquired real artillery support only for the terminal battle at Dien Bien Phu. Circumstances forced him to fight the overt with the covert.

As Giap interpreted French plans in 1953, General Henri Navarre, the French commander-in-chief, intended to concentrate his forces in the Red River Delta of Tonkin during the fall and winter of 1953 with the object of destroying the Vietminh's guerrilla bases and of coupling this activity with a major attack in less firmly held Vietminh

zones in the south. Thereafter, if this proved successful, he intended to move his main forces back to the north for a set-piece showdown with the Vietminh battle corps. This was a somewhat more ambitious interpretation of Navarre's hopes than the general would have been tempted to venture himself, but it was basically accurate. In broad outline, the Navarre plan did not differ very substantially from General William C. Westmoreland's campaign to search out and destroy the main-force Vietcong and North Vietnamese units, while Revolutionary Development teams under the protection of South Vietnamese government forces went about the task of pacification.

BY THE SUMMER of 1953, General Navarre had eighty-four mobile battalions under his command, more than half of which were concentrated in the Red River Delta, where a pacification offensive was in full swing. By the fall he had taken the initiative, seizing Dien Bien Phu, the gateway to Laos, and staging a dramatic paratroop action against the Vietminh's main China supply base at Langson.

If Giap had been a more con-

ventional soldier, he would have been primarily concerned to counter the French moves. But he was highly unconventional, and this was a critical moment of the war. By meeting the French challenge in the Delta, he knew he would have run grave risk of defeat. By an immediate attack on Dien Bien Phu with his main forces, he would have risked leaving the way open for French mobile units to invade his own free zones. He decided therefore to seize his own initiative in different fields by wide-ranging attacks against unsuspecting French positions while he prepared carefully and slowly for the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.

Giap struck at and won the remaining French positions near the Chinese border. While the French were still recovering from these shocks, another Vietminh column, working in conjunction with Laotian Prince Souphanouvong's newly formed Pathet Lao, suddenly turned up in central Laos and seized the Mekong River town of Thakhek. The dismay in Saigon was absolute. Worse was still to come. To the French, the jungle-matted and seemingly impenetrable mountains of southeastern Laos were a terra incognita fit only for beasts and the few primitive tribesmen who inhabited it. That a Vietminh division could make its way through this country and emerge to fight was considered pure fantasy. Without warning, however, the Vietminh sprang from the jungle in late December, 1953, and overran a French Union battalion. Other Vietminh battalions marched on the Central Highlands of what is now South Vietnam for attacks on Kontum and Pleiku. Although a decade later there were still many newcomers in Vietnam who refused to believe it existed, the Ho Chi Minh Trail had become a reality. The Vietminh struck here, there, everywhere. Each time a fire





alarm sounded, General Navarre lost more of his reserves and his hopes for pacifying the Red River Delta. All that remained was the hope of winning a set-piece battle.

Just before Christmas, 1953, a Vietnamese named Nguyen Van Huong, who looked like a beardless Ho Chi Minh and was serving as chief of police in Tonkin, told me that the Vietminh had built a new road to Dien Bien Phu under cover of the jungle and that anti-aircraft guns and artillery were coming in from China. Huong had long been a trustworthy source and friend, and I saw no reason to disbelieve him. But the French Deuxième Bureau dismissed his report as rubbish: General Giap had had no artillery before.

### The Final Victory

Above all, Giap had sought consistently to establish and to meet his needs. This time he had learned his needs at Nasam, the dress rehearsal for Dien Bien Phu. Nasam was seventy miles from the Red River Delta, about halfway to Dien Bien Phu. I spent a night there during the opening phase of the attack. Vietminh mortar shells crumped among the barbed wire and trenches by the airfield in the center of a natural amphitheatre that formed the French defense position. Answering French guns brought a trickle of dirt onto the tables in the headquarters dugout, and wine bottles danced and rattled on the dinner table. My hosts had confidence in positional warfare and contempt for "*les jaunes*" skulking in the hills. "Let us catch them in conventional battle," said a French captain, drawing his hand across his throat. "Just give us a set-piece battle and we will beat them every time."

Giap's troops broke through the wire and on the night of November 30-December 1, 1952, it was touch and go. But the Vietminh's heaviest weapon was the 85-mm. mortar and clearly it was not heavy enough. The Vietminh also lacked any significant anti-aircraft capability, and when daylight came French fighter-bombers drenched the hilltop they had won with napalm. The French counted a thousand Vietminh dead against four hundred killed and

wounded in their own ranks, and once again the cry was victory.

If a victory it was, it was also the last. When the battle for Dien Bien Phu opened a little more than a year later, Giap had both artillery and anti-aircraft guns and the surprised French were beaten before close-quarter fighting had begun.

**D**URING the past two years of campaigning on and south of the Demilitarized Zone, Giap has gone through the same sort of trial-and-error period. Starting with light infantry weapons, the North Vietnamese have developed an arsenal that includes some sophisticated barrage rocketry, artillery, flame-throwers, tanks, and the whole family of automatic weapons, and they return to battle each time as a more dangerous force.

At the same time, Giap has succeeded in maintaining a high element of surprise. In the face of concentrated U.S. firepower available



from the air, from the fleet, and from interlocking artillery positions at Gio Linh, the Rockpile, Cam Lo, Camp Carroll, and Dong Ha, the weight and persistence of North Vietnamese attacks through the Demilitarized Zone shocked the Marines and others last summer and fall. In places where the Marines confidently predicted that the North Vietnamese guns would be knocked out in five minutes, they continued to fire and fire through raids of B-52s that came in to wipe out whole map squares.

On balance the victory lay with the Marines. For every man they lost they could count two or three North Vietnamese dead. This is nevertheless both a risky and an expensive way to win. Giap needs no encouragement to try and try again.

A more mobile and aggressive form of defense in the coastal lowlands would have been more in keeping with the Marines' psychological approach to war. They were not trained to become guinea pigs for Giap's trial and error. Yet Khe Sanh and all the rest of this interlocking chain of defense posts have now acquired a significance far beyond their tactical importance. Having been created, they cannot be abandoned. The colors have been nailed to the masthead, automatically conferring the initiative upon Giap, who has nothing here he cannot afford to lose and nothing he must defend. To wonder whether the forces that may eventually be committed to the static defense of Khe Sanh and other positions along the Demilitarized Zone would not have been more gainfully employed in other ways is not to question the U.S. ability to hold them. But Giap's catalogue of surprise is by no means exhausted. His weapons may be expected to reflect a steadily improving pattern, with 152-mm. artillery pieces, anti-aircraft guns, more and better rockets, and more tanks where the terrain is suitable.

Once again, as in the case of the battles waged in Saigon and Hué, Giap's objective here is to use military means for political purposes and by so co-ordinating his three-level offensive with main forces, regional units, and guerrillas that the residual authority of the government of South Vietnam will be destroyed and Washington will be unable to resist pressures to go to the conference table on highly disadvantageous terms.

### Predicting the Plot


To their eternal credit, a group of staff officers in Saigon have for the past year been predicting just such a scenario as this and buttressing it, moreover, with hard intelligence which, it must be added, was not always or easily accepted. They watched and accurately reported the buildup on the Demilitarized Zone. They plotted the movement of supplies to buildup areas opposite the Central Highlands and into Cambodia. They observed such developments as a trebled movement of sampans on Cambodian rivers close to the Vietnamese border. Their es-

time more than a year ago, confirmed month by month thereafter, was for a major Communist offensive this year. They went further and predicted enough local Communist successes to justify a Communist peace offensive backed by a "victory," which, though illusory in terms of American counteroffensive capabilities, would seek to exploit general war-weariness and disillusionment just as Giap used Dien Bien Phu to such political purpose in 1954.

Only in Giap's current seeming rejection of the doctrinaire Maoist rule of revolutionary warfare—that cities must be surrounded and strangled, not turned into battlefields—is this group likely to have been surprised by recent events. With hindsight, even this now appears as an expedient adaptation of the master strategist's works to suit the local environment.

Days before the Vietminh entered Hanoi to take over from the French in October, 1954, two underground regional battalions suddenly identifiable by their white hats and authority were openly in the streets. No one has ever doubted that Saigon, Hué, or any other South Vietnamese city had a similar apparatus waiting for the signal to perform its assigned task. In the Indochina War, cities could be left to wither on the vine: the struggle was against the French alone. In this war, the Thieu-Ky government shares with the United States and its other allies the status of the designated enemy. To raid provincial capitals and to kill senior officials and to press the attack into the capital and major cities was not merely the best way of striking against the government; it was also an adequate substitute for the war of maneuver used by Giap to dissipate and "fix" French reserves at the end of 1953, a task now made more difficult in conventional ways by American helicopter mobility.

At this stage of the battle when so much is obscure, what is unmistakably clear is the depth of Giap's commitment. There can be no pulling back to fight another day. This is the ultimate bid to win the big military success that Giap counts on to produce the great political victory.



## Behind North Korea's New Belligerence

JOSEPH C. KUN

THE MOST IMPORTANT question to be answered about the *Pueblo* incident is what led the North Koreans to carry out their daring and successful raid on a U.S. Navy ship. This question is heightened by the fact that North Korea, in spite of its sizable land forces and its Soviet-built air force, remains a third-rate conventional military power only recently recovered from the destruction of the Korean War. Its factories, hydroelectric plants, railways, and airfields are highly concentrated and vulnerable targets well known to American intelligence. There is, of course, no complete and satisfactory answer; but a close look at North Korea's current position in the international Communist movement, the country's domestic problems, and the views of its leaders on the problem of Korean reunification can give some insight into the origins of the episode.

North Korea's stand in the international Communist movement has been characterized by its striving for noncommitment between the Soviet Union and China. But noncommitment has been elusive because of a variety of factors: the country's size

(a territory of only 46,800 square miles with a population of less than thirteen million), its location (the only Communist country besides Mongolia having common borders with both China and the Soviet Union); and its status as a divided country with U.S. forces stationed immediately to the south.

In the face of this American presence, the North Korean régime could only have been irritated by Khrushchev's views on peaceful coexistence as enunciated at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956. Pyongyang-Moscow relations were worsened, too, by Khrushchev's advocacy at the same meeting of the elimination of the cult of personality, which prompted a number of ambitious North Korean Communists to attempt in vain to undermine the position of party boss Kim Il Sung. And in the example of Khrushchev's roughness toward smaller Communist parties such as the Albanian, the North Korean leadership saw a potential menace to the independence of the Korean Workers' Party (kwp).

In 1962, shortly after Albania's expulsion from the Communist com-



*Pres. file*

*3*

**Tuesday, Feb. 13, 1968**  
**8:15 p. m.**

**~~SECRET~~**

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

**Herewith Harold Wilson on that world statesman,  
U Thant.**

**Sect. Rusk tells me that he has put both George  
Brown's and Wilson's memoranda in Arthur  
Goldberg's hands, because he believes Arthur  
will have to work U Thant over pretty hard upon  
his return.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**~~SECRET~~ attachment**

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 94-252  
By sp/cb, NARA, Date 7/30/96



BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

13. ii. 68.

Dear Mr President,  
I have been asked  
to pass to you at  
once the enclosed  
message from the  
Prime Minister.

Yours Sincerely  
Patrick Dean.



TEXT OF MESSAGE

13 February, 1968

VIETNAM

George Brown and I have spent a pretty disheartening two and a half hours today with U Thant. George took him first for three-quarters of an hour at the Foreign Office and then brought him round here for a very small working lunch. As George arrived he said to me, "This man is wet, repeat wet". He was. Pat Dean can give your people the details of our exchanges. In this message I want to give you our personal impressions: and the line I felt obliged to take with him. Briefly, he claims to have put a number of questions in Delhi to the DRV Consul General, deriving from the account of your position allegedly given to him by Arthur Goldberg (between ourselves we got the impression either that this was a slightly out-of-date briefing or that he had not fully taken aboard whatever Goldberg had said to him). The Hanoi man was naturally unable to answer his questions and promised him a reply either in Moscow or subsequently. The answers have now turned up in Paris, as you will see from a later paragraph in this message. But what thoroughly disturbed us both was the pathetically weak-kneed and biased posture of U Thant. The Russians have clearly put him through the wringer in Moscow. He is still quivering gently from the after-effects of his interview with Brezhnev. He told me that Brezhnev had spoken to him in such violent terms about yourself and the whole American position that he hesitated to dictate it to his secretary - I asked "Woman or man?" and he said "Man". I told him that this was nothing less than he should expect from Brezhnev. My own first interview with the latter two years ago had been very similar: even on my latest visit,

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as you know, we had had a tough exchange, But I had taken a good deal of the steam out of it by telling Brezhnev at the outset that I saw no point in us both simply re-stating our known positions. If he had taken the same line he might have fared better. At all events, the upshot of this is that, even before he receives Hanoi's answers to his questions and despite his evident desire to help, Thant is again ruling himself out as an interlocutor by the total one-sidedness of his approach. We had a long theological exposition from him at lunch of Hanoi's view that, because the North Vietnamese were not bombing the United States, thereby balancing your bombing of North Vietnam, it was perfectly reasonable that they should expect you to stop the bombing unconditionally without the slightest hint from Hanoi that there would not immediately be a further military build-up in the South. We then had some pretty sick-making criticism of the last South Vietnamese elections because, for reasons beyond his understanding, Communists and neutralists (to say nothing of Big Minh) had been forbidden to stand. At this point I thought it desirable to have a reasonably controlled burst of temper. And I put, in terms more forceful than I have ever before used with him, three main points. First, that, while we were all sitting around a well loaded table, innocent people were dying daily: and that the task of all of us who wished to work for peace was not to indulge in public and one-sided appeals for an unconditional end to the bombing (the position which he had just said that he would feel obliged to take) but to pursue discreetly, objectively and in private all possible ways of narrowing the gap between the two sides. Secondly, that I was unaware that the Conservatives, Liberals

/or



or Democratic Socialists had ever been permitted to stand for election in North Vietnam, or in other communist countries, and that if he adopted double standards of the kind he had implied he was destroying his own credibility either as a mediator or as a world statesman. Finally, if it were correct, as he had claimed, that Ho Chi Minh really wanted to be independent of Peking, but that every day the war continued increased his dependence, the sooner all concerned got down from the pulpit and around the negotiating table the better. Moreover, if he really wished to play a helpful part in fruitful secret exchanges - and without such exchanges one could hardly see the way forward at all - it was thoroughly counter-productive to emerge from secrecy at intervals to make ex cathedra statements setting out a view point on which his mind was already made up before he had begun secret talks. He did not like any of this, but I hope he took the point. As I have said, he now has an answer to his questions awaiting him with the North Vietnamese representative in Paris. But you will be interested to know how we learned of this. Harold Davies, my Parliamentary Private Secretary, who, as you will remember, carried out an exploratory mission to Hanoi for me in 1965 and has many Vietnamese contacts, was telephoned early this morning by one of the North Vietnamese "journalists" in London, who have kept in touch with him from time to time to ask where they could find U Thant to let him know that an answer to his questions was available if he cared to go to Paris and collect it. Since U Thant's address in London was public knowledge, we must conclude that Hanoi were concerned to keep us in the picture on this exchange, and I find this mildly encouraging. We of course put them in touch with

/Thant

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Thant at once, and offered to put a plane at his disposal to fly him to Paris this afternoon. He had in the end decided to stay here overnight and fly to Paris tomorrow morning to see the DRV man before going to New York. We will do our best to de-brief him in Paris or New York, For our part, we are considering how far we might try discreetly to pump the North Vietnamese in London since they are clearly, to some extent at least, in the know.

Meanwhile, I now intend to follow up with Kosygin as you suggested. I am sure that the best way of doing this is, at least at this stage, to discount U Thant completely - the Russians have given him the works and it would only be counter-productive to play their game - and to address Kosygin along the lines you and I agreed. I will let you know the outcome.

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4

INFORMATION

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Tuesday, February 13, 1968  
8:10 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

You will wish to read Cabot Lodge's memorandum on the minuses and plusses of the attack on the cities.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 2-7-92

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 13, 1968

SECRET - NODIS

To: The President  
From: H. C. Lodge *H.C. Lodge*  
Subject: Some lessons to be learned from the recent  
Viet Cong raids.

1. On the MINUS side are the following:
  - a. The great degree of surprise achieved by the Viet Cong confirms the suspicion expressed in my memorandum to you of February 5 that there simply was not enough proficiency in police-type procedures. Had this existed, preparations for many raids would have been discovered and the raids prevented. Those that could not have been wiped out immediately would have been easier to handle. The Australian Ambassador in a perceptive telegram says this:

"We need not be surprised about the success of the infiltrations. The enemy had time and circumstances going for him, particularly the laxity and corruption of the police and the inefficiency of the Government's intelligence machine...

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority State ltr. 3-6-79  
By uphs, NARA, Date 2-14-92



~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

- 2 -

"What, then, was at fault? Not under-  
estimation of the Viet Cong strength, I  
suggest, but failure to insist that the  
Vietnamese make a genuine effort to pro-  
tect themselves against insidious infiltra-  
tion, for only the Vietnamese can do this  
work. . ."

- b. The pacification program has suffered a big setback. This underscores the need for making it as realistic and as effective as possible and also getting the very best men involved in it. The newspaper story reporting that "no one talks about pacification any more" is fallacious. Undoubtedly greater emphasis on the policing phase of pacification at the precinct level will be needed, but pacification itself is more necessary than ever.
- c. Another "minus" is the psychological distress which the Viet Cong raids have caused in this country -- on which the hand has not yet been played out.
- d. Unfortunate, too, is the government's decision not to collaborate with private organizations in refugee relief work. This is a typically Vietnamese example of

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

medieval behavior plus French bureaucratic influence. The "true revolution" which you personally authorized me to mention in my arrival statement in the summer of 1965 is still the most needed single thing to win the people over -- and when the people are won over, the war is won. Such a "true revolution" cannot be done by GVN or AID but by the people themselves, through non-governmental organizations. The notion that problems must be solved by working through government -- which worked in Europe under the Marshall Plan -- cannot work in an underdeveloped country such as Viet-Nam in which there is no local government in our meaning of the word. Government cannot be said to exist when there is no administrative competence, when the confidence of the people is lacking and when the so-called local government does not identify with the people.

- e. The final "minus" are, of course, the killed and wounded on our side.
- 2. On the PLUS side are the following rather remarkable things which were not at first evident:
  - a. To the best of my knowledge there has nowhere been any recurrence of the "struggle" movement which almost



~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

- 4 -

lost us the war in the first half of 1966. I'm sure you remember how, in Hue and Danang, the police marched down the street carrying anti-government signs and how the government had completely lost jurisdiction over both cities -- which would be comparable to the President of the United States losing jurisdiction over Chicago and Detroit. Similar "inside jobs" were impending in other cities when Prime Minister Ky with great skill and courage finally put the "struggle" down. If there had been a well-organized "struggle" movement in all of the cities which the Viet Cong recently attacked, we would now be very close indeed to a Communist takeover. Our military strength simply would not be applicable in such a situation -- just as our Marine force outside of Danang was not applicable in 1966 when our concern was to keep them out of the way. It was a large-meshed net with which to catch whales -- not the fine meshed net with which to catch the small but deadly fish of terrorism.

- b. This interesting development could mean the growth of what you once referred to in a telegram to me in 1964

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- 5 -

as the growth of "political energy" -- a dividend from all the work we have done to bring about constitutional government and a sense of civic consciousness.

- c. It appears there was much good fighting by the ARVN, the Regional Forces and the Popular Forces, which reflects great credit on General Westmoreland and General Abrams. It is a pity that the police-type techniques were not as good or as widespread. If they had been, there would have been less need to fight since many of the raids would have been nipped in the bud.
- d. The high Viet Cong casualties are another plus.
- e. Remarkable too is the lack of back biting and the degree of unity in governmental circles. In 1963-1965, a blow like this would have been considered ample grounds for a "coup."
- f. It is often said that Viet-Nam is drowning in good advice and starving for effective action. The placing of Vice President Ky and General Thang in charge of reconstruction is the best guarantee of getting some action.

*W. C. Dodge*

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

5

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Tuesday, February 13, 1968  
8:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith George Brown's message to Sec. Rusk about U Thant who is now clearly a cannon ball rolling around the deck.

Pat Dean is sending over shortly to me a message to you in the same vein from Prime Minister Wilson. I will, of course, send it to you as soon as it gets here.

We may have to tell off U Thant very hard, indeed, before this is over.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-457  
By CB, NARA, Date 6-2-95

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla



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~~SECRET~~



BRITISH EMBASSY.  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

IMMEDIATE

13 February, 1968

*Dear Secretary of State,*

I have been asked by the Secretary  
--- of State to pass to you the enclosed  
message.

*Yours Sincerely,  
P. V. Dean.*

---

The Honorable Dean Rusk,  
Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-197  
By ing, NARA Date 11-26-96

~~SECRET~~

56

TEXT OF MESSAGE

13 February, 1968

I have come away from lunch at No. 10 with U Thant, profoundly depressed by his total inability to see reason. I hope he will not worry you as much as he worries me, but I must warn you that in my opinion he is not going to be helpful over Vietnam in the foreseeable future. He is completely sold on the line which the North Vietnamese and Russians have put over to him, which he has in turn repeated to me and the Prime Minister with the fervour of an Asian prophet laying down the law on an Asian war which only he can understand.

He told us that he had put some questions to the North Vietnamese Consul-General in Delhi, on what might happen following a cessation of bombing, but declined to tell us what precisely he had asked, though one of the questions concerned the recall of the Geneva Conference. While he was here this morning we got a circuitous message that the North Vietnamese "Journalist" based in London had a message for U Thant. This turned

/out

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ

96-197 appeal

By ms, NARA Date 4-3-98

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out to be to the effect that the answers were awaiting him with Mai Van Bo in Paris. After much hesitation, a talk with the North Vietnamese and an offer from us to fly him to Paris this afternoon, he thought he would return first to New York and go there on Friday, But I pointed out by telephone, just before he was due to leave, that this special journey would set the world agog. So he changed his mind, is staying overnight in London, and will go to Paris tomorrow morning.

In general his line was that the attitude of the North Vietnamese and Russians (particularly Brezhnev) was very hard, that the Russians were supporting North Vietnam up to the hilt and thus opening the way to escalation with sophisticated weapons, that the opposing policies of the two sides offered no change of ending the war and thus, illogically, that the only solution was for the US to take the "limited risk" of stopping the bombing unconditionally. Talks will follow in his opinion after 7-10 days.

The most important point, however, was his firm belief, planted by the North Vietnamese and Russians, that the San Antonio formulation imposes a pre-condition

/because

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

because of the assumption about "no advantage" he refuses to admit that it is reasonable to ask the North Vietnamese to allow the US to make the assumption that no military advantage would be taken of a bombing cessation. Both the Prime Minister and I went at him hard on this, asking him to realise that under the San Antonio formulation, as further explained by Clark Clifford the North Vietnamese are not being asked to change anything that they would normally be doing but simply not to step up their activities in a way directly attributable to their freedom from bombing, thus creating a new and serious situation. He was impervious to all argument.

The Prime Minister and I both urged him to say as little as possible in public at this time. He was noncommittal but showed some appreciation of the problem.

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

**Tuesday, Feb. 13, 1968**  
**8:00 p. m.**

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

Attached is the condensed version of the Cabinet briefing notes on Vietnam. Copies of this will be distributed by Secretary Rusk at tomorrow's Cabinet meeting. The Secretary will also discuss the larger companion volume which expands and documents each of the 6 questions dealt with here in summary form.

**W. W. Rostow**

**Attachment**

7

/

INFORMATION

Tuesday, February 13, 1968 -- 7:25 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

*Profile*

Chuck Roberts and Henry Hubbard, NEWSWEEK, came in today. I briefed them on present state of the battle in Vietnam, emphasizing the fact that:

- The second wave of attacks had not yet taken place;
- Recovery was proceeding with some continued governmental energy in Saigon;
- We were prepared for the I Corps battle, although it had not yet begun; and
- Despite NEWSWEEK, the situation in Vietnam appeared to be falling into better perspective in this country. (This was not quite as brash as it sounds because they began the conversation by apologizing for the fact NEWSWEEK had not used all the good materials I had given them last week.)

I made available to them some prisoner of war interrogations and other documents which would give them a feel for the situation.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm



8,

Tuesday, February 13, 1968

7:20pm

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

In the attached telegrams Gene Rostow reports his conversation with Chancellor Kiesinger on the balance of payments, Germany's eastern policy, the NPT, France-German relations, and the state of the German coalition government. The Chancellor asked that his remarks be transmitted to you.

W. W. Rostow

MWG

MWG:mst  
2/13/68



Department of State

8a  
TELEGRAM  
5

~~SECRET~~ 726

PAGE 01 BONN 08270 131156Z

2  
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

O 130948Z FEB 68 ZFF-6  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7007  
INFO USMISSION BERLIN IMMEDIATE 2246

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-197  
By ing, NARA Date 11-26-96

~~SECRET~~ BONN 8270

EXDIS

BERLIN FOR AMB MCGHEE

SUBJECT: ROSTOW MEETING WITH THE CHANCELLOR

1. DURING UNDER SECRETARY ROSTOW'S MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH CHANCELLOR KIESINGER, THE CHANCELLOR WAS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN PROVIDING INFORMATION AND VIEWS CONCERNING GERMAN EASTERN POLICY, THE NPT, RELATIONS WITH FRANCE, AND THE STATE OF HIS COALITION GOVERNMENT. THESE ARE REPORTED IN THIS TELEGRAM.

PAGE 2 RUFHOL 8270 ~~SECRET~~

THE CHANCELLOR REQUESTED THAT HIS REMARKS BE TRANSMITTED TO THE SECRETARY AND TO THE PRESIDENT. THE PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION DEVOTED TO THE US BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM IS REPORTED BY SEPTEL.

1. EASTERN POLICY -- THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT THE SPD IS CURRENTLY HAVING SERIOUS INTERNAL TROUBLE. THE PARTY MEMBERSHIP FEELS INCREASINGLY THAT THEY ARE GOING TO LOSE THE NEXT ELECTION. THE WEHNER SCHOOL OF RESPONSIBLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE GRAND COALITION HAS LOST OUT. REAL DIVERGENCIES WITHIN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 BONN 08270 131156Z

THE PARTY HAVE DEVELOPED PARTICULARLY ON THE SUBJECT OF EASTERN POLICY. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED DIRECTLY TO BRANDT, WEHNER, AND HELMUT SCHMIDT AND ALL THREE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DANGEROUS FOR THE FRG TO TALK DIRECTLY WITH THE SOVS CONCERNING BERLIN. THERE IS, HOWEVER, A STRONG GROUP IN THE SPD THAT FEELS OTHERWISE. THE CHANCELLOR EXPECTED THAT WITHIN THE COALITION IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO "HAVE IT OUT" WITH THE SPD ON

PAGE 3 RUFHOL 8270 ~~SECRET~~

EASTERN POLICY IN GENERAL AND THAT THIS WILL BE DONE OVER THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. UNDER SECRETARY ROSTOW ASSURED THE CHANCELLOR OF US SUPPORT FOR GERMAN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING WITH THE USSR AND WITH THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. HE SAID THAT WE ARE QUITE WILLING TO SEE THE GERMAN SIDE GO AHEAD WITH TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS AS INITIATED BY BRANDT AND TSARAPKIN. ROSTOW MADE CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOW QUITE SATISFIED THAT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE OF VIEW BETWEEN US AND THE FEDERAL GOVT ON THE HANDLING OF THE SOV MEMORANDUM CONCERNING BERLIN. THE CHANCELLOR, WHILE MAKING CLEAR THAT REAL TROUBLE WAS TO BE EXPECTED IN THE COALITION CONCERNING EASTERN POLICY, STRESSED THAT HE DID NOT WISH US TO THINK THAT IT WOULD CAUSE A REAL COALITION CRISIS.

2. NPT -- STILL IN THE CONTEXT OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SPD AND THE CDU/CSU, THE CHANCELLOR TURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF NPT.

PAGE 4 RUFHOL 8270 ~~SECRET~~

HE SAID THAT THE TREATY STILL PRESENTS PROBLEMS. ROSTOW COMMENTED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT IT WAS A GOOD LETTER WHICH BRANDT HAD JUST SENT TO THE SECRETARY ON THE SUBJECT. THE CHANCELLOR, AFTER CONSULTING WITH THE INTERPRETER SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE LETTER WAS "A LITTLE SOFTLY FORMULATED". HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS LATEST LETTER SHOULD BE READ IN THE CONTEXT OF BRANDT'S EARLIER LETTER TO THE SECRETARY CONCERNING THE NPT.

3. RELATIONS WITH FRANCE -- THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT DE GAULLE OBVIOUSLY POSES A VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR HIM. HE HAD HEARD THAT CONCERN MAY EXIST IN THE US ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME SECRET

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



## Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 BONN 08270 131156Z

UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN FRANCE AND GERMANY. THE CHANCELLOR COULD ASSURE US THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. HE NOTED THAT A RECENT PUBLIC OPINION POLL SHOWED THAT 75 PERCENT OF THE GERMANS CONSIDER THE GERMAN ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES AS THE MOST IMPORTANT

PAGE 5 RUFHOL 8270 ~~SECRET~~

ELEMENT OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE HAS EXPLAINED TO DE GAULLE IN THE PAST AND WILL DO SO AGAIN THAT BY PURSUING A STRONG ANTI-AMERICAN LINE DE GAULLE IS ONLY ANTAGONIZING GERMAN OPINION AGAINST FRANCE. THE CHANCELLOR ADDED THAT IT IS NEVERTHELESS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE FOR A POSITIVE GERMAN-FRENCH RELATIONSHIP TO BE PRESERVED. IF NEW ANTAGONISM AGAIN ARISES AFTER THIS "SECOND EFFORT" TO OVERCOME IT (THE CHANCELLOR WAS PRESUMABLY REFERRING TO ADENAUER'S EFFORTS AND HIS OWN) THIS WOULD BE A MOST GRAVE DEVELOPMENT FOR THE TWO COUNTRIES AND FOR EUROPE. KIESINGER THOUGHT THAT DE GAULLE TOO UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT. ON THE QUESTION OF UK-EC ENTRY, THE CHANCELLOR REPEATED HIS WELL-KNOWN VIEWS THAT DE GAULLE COULD NOT BE FORCED TO CHANGE HIS OPINION. UNDER SECRETARY ROSTOW TOLD THE CHANCELLOR THAT THE UNITED STATES FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FRENCH-GERMAN RELATIONSHIP. HE SAID THAT THE LAST THING WHICH WE WANTED WAS TO FORCE GERMANY INTO ANY KIND OF A CHOICE BETWEEN

PAGE 6 RUFHOL 8270 ~~SECRET~~

PARIS AND WASHINGTON. THIS TELEGRAM WAS NOT CLEARED WITH THE UNDER SECRETARY. MCGHEE





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 712

PAGE 01 BONN 08265 122112Z

87

ACTION EUR 20

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 03, H 02, IND 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,  
RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, TRRY 08, E 15, COM 08,  
FRB 02, CEA 02, STR 08, RSR 01, 132 W

P 121955Z FEB 68  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7001  
INFO USRER BERLIN PRIORITY 2241

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-197  
By sig, NARA Date 11-26-96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 8265

BERLIN FOR AMBASSADOR MCGHEE

DEPT PASS TREASURY AND DEFENSE

SUBJECT: ROSTOW TALK WITH CHANCELLOR.

1. UNDER SECRETARY ROSTOW, ACCOMPANIED BY DCM FESSENDEN THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE PERIOD AND BY UNDER SECRETARY DEMING AND AMBASSADOR TREZISE AS WELL DURING THE LATTER PART OF IT, MET TODAY WITH CHANCELLOR KIESINGER.

2. AT THE OUTSET, THE UNDER SECRETARY MADE A CONDENSED PRESENTATION ALONG THE LINES OF THE REMARKS REPORTED SEPARATELY BY AIRGRAM WHICH HAVE BEEN CENTRAL TO THE DISCUSSIONS IN BONN.

PAGE TWO RUFHOL 8265 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. THE CHANCELLOR SAID HE PLANNED TO ANSWER THE PRESIDENT'S FEBRUARY 7 LETTER AFTER HIS RETURN FROM PARIS. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY TO COVER THE CONTENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



## Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 RONN 08265 122112Z

PARIS AND, IN ADDITION, WOULD WISH TO REPORT WHAT TOOK PLACE THERE.

4. ON OFFSET THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT THE GERMANS WOULD DO THEIR BEST. THE UNDER SECRETARY ANSWERED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS MUCH LARGER THAN OFFSET ALONE. IT WAS THE WHOLE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM AND AN EXPANSIONIST POLICY IN GERMANY WAS IMPORTANT IF THE PROBLEM WAS TO BE SOLVED. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE WAS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE QUESTION WITH SCHILLER BEING VERY EXPANSIONIST MINDED BUT OTHERS NOT. NOT ONLY WAS HE HIMSELF IN THE MIDDLE, BETWEEN THE OPPOSING FACTIONS, BUT HE WAS ALSO IN THE MIDDLE INTELLECTUALLY BEING NEITHER EXPANSIONIST NOR THE OPPOSITE. HE ADDED THAT FORMER CHANCELLOR ERHARD WAS GOING ALL OVER GERMANY CONTENDING THAT THERE WAS NO LONGER AN ECONOMIC PROBLEM. THAT DID NOT MAKE THE MATTER ANY EASIER FOR THE PRESENT CHANCELLOR.

PAGE THREE RUFHOL 8265 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. HE MADE NO COMMENT IN RESPONSE TO A STATEMENT REGARDING THE VALUE OF KENNEDY ROUND CUTS UNILATERALLY MADE BY THE COMMON MARKET.

6. THE UNDER SECRETARY REFERRED TO HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH DEBRE AND NOTED THAT THE LATTER HAD SAID HE WOULD WORK FOR FUTURE EXPANSION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY IF GERMANY AND ITALY WOULD ALSO DO THIS.  
MCGHEE

9

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Tuesday, February 13, 1968  
7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an account of Kiesinger's  
objectives [REDACTED]

3.3  
(b)(1)

W. W. Rostow

[REDACTED]

3.3  
(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 04-25  
By no, NARA, Date 10-22-04

WWRostow:rlh

INFORMATION

*Pres. file*

10

Tuesday, Feb. 13, 1968  
7:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith strikes for the next 24 hours.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment (NMCC 13 Feb 68 4 30 pm est)



~~TOP SECRET/LIMDIS~~



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

13 February 1968  
4:30 PM EST

*Rortow*  
*10a*

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR: Senior Watch Officer, White House Situation Room  
Mr. Benjamin H. Read, Executive Secretary,  
Department of State, c/o Operations Center

Subject: Operational Highlights

SOUTHEAST ASIA

The following US Air Force B-52 missions are now scheduled to be flown during the next 24 hours:

<u>MISSION &amp; NR OF ACFT</u>	<u>TIME (EST) ON TARGET</u>	<u>TARGET LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION</u>
VICTOR 04 (6 B-52s)	11:50 PM 13 February 12:50 PM 14 February Saigon time	In South Vietnam, <u>5 miles south-southwest of Khe Sanh</u> ; contains troop concentrations and AA positions.
VICTOR 55 (6 B-52s)	2:10 AM 14 February 3:10 PM 14 February Saigon time	In South Vietnam, <u>3 miles east-northeast of Khe Sanh</u> ; contains a staging area with troop concentrations.
VICTOR 48 (6 B-52s)	6:45 AM 14 February 7:45 PM 14 February Saigon time	In South Vietnam, <u>6 miles north-northwest of Khe Sanh</u> ; contains troop concentrations and supply areas.

The following ROLLING THUNDER 57 ALFA strikes are now scheduled during the next 24 hours:

<u>TARGET AND LOCATION</u>	<u>TIME (EST) ON TARGET</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRIKE FORCE</u>	<u>SAIGON TIME</u>
Hanoi Railroad/Highway	3:16 AM	7 AF	12 F-105	4:16 PM
Bridge Canal (JCS 13),	14 Feb			14 Feb
6 miles northeast of	3:21 AM		12 F-105	4:21 PM
Hanoi	14 Feb			14 Feb

~~TOP SECRET/LIMDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/88  
By *rq* NARA, Date *2-25-92*

TOP SECRET/LIMDIS

<u>TARGET AND LOCATION</u>	<u>TIME (EST) ON TARGET</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRIKE FORCE</u>	<u>SAIGON TIME</u>
Phuc Yen Airfield (JCS 6), 13.2 miles north of Hanoi	8:10 PM 13 Feb 3:00 AM 14 Feb	7 AF	4 F-4  4 F-4	9:10 AM 14 Feb 4:00 PM 14 Feb
Haiphong Cat Bi Airfield (JCS 8), 4.2 miles east- southeast of Haiphong	7:00 AM 14 Feb	77.4	1 A-6A	8:00 PM 14 Feb

DDO

ADDO

CCOC

NMCC - 13 FEB 68, 4:30 PM EST

TOP SECRET/LIMDIS

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, Feb. 13, 1968  
6:55 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Gene and Kiesinger.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (Bonn 8265)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 2-7-92



Department of State

1102  
**TELEGRAM**

47

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 712

PAGE 01 BONN 08265 122112Z

87

ACTION EUR 20

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 03, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,  
RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, TRSY 08, E 15, COM 08,  
FRB 02, CEA 02, STR 08, RSR 01, 132 W

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-197**  
**By sig, NARA Date 2-28-97**

P 121955Z FEB 68  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7001  
INFO USBER BERLIN PRIORITY 2241

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 8265

BERLIN FOR AMBASSADOR MCGHEE

DEPT PASS TREASURY AND DEFENSE

SUBJECT: ROSTOW TALK WITH CHANCELLOR.

1. UNDER SECRETARY ROSTOW, ACCOMPANIED BY DCM FESSENDEN THROUGHOUT THE WHOLE PERIOD AND BY UNDER SECRETARY DEMING AND AMBASSADOR TREZISE AS WELL DURING THE LATTER PART OF IT, MET TODAY WITH CHANCELLOR KIESINGER.

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PAGE TWO RUFHOL 8265 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BONN 08265 122112Z

~~PARIS AND IN ADDITION, WOULD WISH TO REPORT WHAT TOOK PLACE THERE.~~

4. ~~ON OFFSET THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT THE GERMANS WOULD DO THEIR BEST.~~ THE UNDER SECRETARY ANSWERED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS MUCH LARGER THAN OFFSET ALONE. IT WAS THE WHOLE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM AND AN EXPANSIONIST POLICY IN GERMANY WAS IMPORTANT IF THE PROBLEM WAS TO BE SOLVED. ~~THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE WAS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE QUESTION WITH SCHILLER BEING VERY EXPANSIONIST MINDED BUT OTHERS NOT. NOT ONLY WAS HE HIMSELF IN THE MIDDLE, BETWEEN THE OPPOSING FACTIONS, BUT HE WAS ALSO IN THE MIDDLE, INTELLECTUALLY BEING NEITHER EXPANSIONIST NOR THE OPPOSITE.~~ HE ADDED THAT FORMER CHANCELLOR ERHARD WAS GOING ALL OVER GERMANY CONTENDING THAT THERE WAS NO LONGER AN ECONOMIC PROBLEM. THAT DID NOT MAKE THE MATTER ANY EASIER FOR THE PRESENT CHANCELLOR.

PAGE THREE RUFHOL 8265 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. ~~HE MADE NO COMMENT IN RESPONSE TO A STATEMENT REGARDING THE VALUE OF KENNEDY ROUND CUTS UNILATERALLY MADE BY THE COMMON MARKET.~~

6. THE UNDER SECRETARY REFERRED TO HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH DEBRE AND NOTED THAT ~~THE LATTER HAD SAID HE WOULD WORK FOR FUTURE EXPANSION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY IF GERMANY AND ITALY WOULD ALSO DO THIS.~~  
MCGHEE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 13, 1968  
6:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Ky, Tang, Kemer, and others in  
the recovery business are clearly  
feeling better today.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 19239

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

12  
Pres file

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 2-7-92

JORDEN

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VV EHA287

RR RUEHGX  
DE RUMJIR 19239 0441645  
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6562  
INFO RUEHGX/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEPJS/DOD  
RUEHLC/CIA  
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 4654  
RUHHHQ4/CINCPAC FOR POLAD  
STATE GRNC  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-197  
By isp, NARA Date 12-4-96

Rostow

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 19239

STATE PASS AID

SUB: SITUATION REPORT PROJECT RECOVERY -- 1800 HOURS,  
13 FEBRUARY.

1. GVN OFFICIALS EXHIBITED NEW CONFIDENCE AND MORE OPTIMISM  
AT TODAY'S

Y-2 CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING. VICE PRESIDENT KY  
CHANGED HIS VIEW ON LIKELIHOOD OF SECOND WAVE ATTACK. ENEMY  
FIRST WAVE OFFENSIVE BROKEN. APPARENTLY BADLY HURT. HE HAS  
MOVED BACK FROM LOGICAL ATTACK POSITIONS. KY STILL GIVES  
ENEMY CAPABILITY OF LIMITED ATTACKS. GENERAL LOAN FEELS THAT  
SAIGON SITUATION WELL IN HAND. GENERAL VIEN INDICATED HIS  
INTENTION OF TURNING SAIGON SECURITY CAMPAIGN OVER THE III CTZ/  
CAPITAL MILITARY REGION TO COMMANDER KHANG. AS A RESULT,  
COMMITTEE REALLY FOR FIRST TIME BEGAN TO APPROACH RECOVERY  
PROBLEMS LOGICALLY.

2. THANG WAS IN GOOD FORM MAKING MANY SUGGESTIONS. HE FAVORS  
UNIFORM CURFEW IN ALL SAIGON DISTRICTS WITH A FEW DAYS. HE  
URGED GREATER ATTENTION BY CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON PROVINCES  
WHICH FACE PROBLEMS EQUALLY AS LARGE AS DOES SAIGON. HE RAISED  
PROBLEM, WHICH WE FED HIM YESTERDAY, OF PORT CONGESTION. THANG  
WANTS 3,000 RD CADRE TO ORGANIZE AP DOI MOI AROUND SAIGON WITH  
TRUSTED PRUSTED PEOPLE, LIKE CATHOLICS.

PRESERVATION COPY

[1]

3. KY ACTED LIKE EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN GIVING POSITIVE INSTRUCTION TO ASSEMBLED MINISTERS. EXPRESSING HIS CONCERN ABOUT SANITARY CONDITIONS IN REFUGEE RECEPTION CENTERS, HE DIRECTED MINISTER OF HEALTH TO INSPECT ALL CENTERS. KY SAID HE WOULD VISIT RANDOMLY-SELECTED CENTERS AT END OF THE WEEK. HE AGREED THAT ARVN SHOULD START HELPING THE PEOPLE MORE. HE SAID THE GOVERNMENT

WOULD CANCEL LICENSES OF RICE DEALERS WHO WON'T OPEN THEIR STORES. ON THE PORT PROBLEM, HE TOLD THE MINISTER OF ECONOMY TO PRESS MERCHANTS TO UNLOAD SHIPS. THOSE WHO REFUSE TO PICK UP CONSIGNED CARGO WOULD LOSE THEIR IMPORT LICENSES. WHEN SUBJECT OF HIGHER INDEMNITY PAYMENTS WAS RAISED (QUE PROPOSED 12,000 PIASTER RESETTLEMENT ALLOWANCE COUNTRY WIDE), KY DIRECTED DR. QUE TO PRESENT PLAN BY SUNDAY GIVING NEW SCHEDULE, NUMBER OF FAMILIES INVOLVED, AND TOTAL COST. THANG ESTIMATED 30,000 HOMELESS FAMILIES WOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR HIGHER PAYMENTS; QUE THOUGHT NUMBER WOULD BE MUCH LESS. THE VICE PRESIDENT ALSO DIRECTED THAT COMMITTEES ESTABLISHED IN PROVINCES SHOULD DECIDE ON USE OF COLLECTED DONATIONS -- GVN SHOULD NOT INTERVENE. T

4. MINISTER BUU DON, ARMED WITH CHARTS AND SKETCHES, DESCRIBED APARTMENT CONSTRUCTION PLANS. THREE AREAS BEING CONSIDERED. TOTAL ESTIMATED COST IN THREE BILLION PIASTERS. DETAILED DESIGN DRAWINGS WILL TAKE ONE MONTH TO PREPARE. BUILDINGS CAN BE PUT UP IN TWO OR THREE MONTHS AFTER CONSTRUCTION STARTS. FIFTY CONTRACTORS TURNED UP TO REVIEW PLANS. MOST THINK SHORTAGE OF LABOR WILL BE PRINCIPAL CONSTRAINT. IN ANSWER TO THIS, KY SAID THAT KOMER PLAN FOR FREEZING PRIVATE CONSTRUCTION MIGHT BE BEST SOLUTION. LAND OWNERSHIP WAS RAISED AS POTENTIAL STICKY PROBLEM. HE ALSO SAID THAT SQUATTERS SHOULD BE KEPT OFF CONSTRUCTION SITES, USING POLICE IF NECESSARY. THE VP AGREED WITH MRW'S REQUEST TO SET UP A SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON APARTMENT CONSTRUCTION. HE ALSO APPRECIATES THAT GVN WILL HAVE TO RE-EXAMINE ITS BUDGET IN LIGHT OF URGENT NEW NEEDS. SOME TRANSFERS OF FUNDS TO URGENT PRIORITY PROGRAMS MAY BE NECESSARY. TO END THE DISCUSSION, KY TOLD MPW TO GET STARTED RIGHT AWAY, EVEN IF IT ONLY MEANT SENDING A BULDOZER WITH A BANNER TO START CLEARING RUBBLE. HE SAID HE IS CONSIDERING PRESENTING THE PLAN TO THE NATION ON TELEVISION.

5. MOBILIZATION WAS A HOT TOPIC AT MORNING AND AFTERNOON SESSIONS. MINISTERS ALL COMPLAINED THAT NEW MOBILIZATION PLANS WOULD STRIP THEIR MINISTRIES OF ESSENTIAL TALENT. KY

PAGE 7 RUMJIR 19507 ~~SECRET~~

DEIDED IN PRINCIPLE THAT EXPERTS WOULD BE DRAFTED IN PLACE  
ND, AFTER RECEIVING MILITARY TRAINING, WOULD REMAIN IN THEIR  
JOBS. THANG SUGGESTED A THREE-DAY TRAINING PROGRAM. THE  
MINISTER OF DEFENSE WILL DRAFT A PLAN.

6. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE DIRECTED THAT COUNTRYSIDE ALL  
FISHING BOATS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO FISH DURING DAYLIGHT.;

7. AIR VIETNAM PLANS TO RESUME SCHEDULED ICOUNTRY FLIGHTS  
TO QUI NHON, BAN ME THUOT, AND PHAN THIET ON 15 FEBRUARY, AND  
TO TUY HOA ON 16 FEBRUARY. SPECIAL CARGO FLIGHTS CAN BE SET  
UP BY REQUEST.

8. THE MINISTER OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS ANNOUNCED  
THAT THE SAIGON-CHOLON TRAIN WHICH CARRIES LARGE NUMBERS OF  
COMMUTERS WAS READY TO GO INTO OPERATION. THE COMMITTEE  
REQUESTED MAYOR CUA TO AUTHORIZE RESUMPTION OF REGULAR DAYTIME  
SCHEDULES.

9. KOMER VISITED PHAN THIET, TUY HOA, BAN ME THUOT AND DALAT

~~PAGE 6 RUMJIR 19239 SECRET~~

IN II CTZ TO ASSESS DAMAGE, REVIEW RECOVERY ACTIVITIES AND  
DETERMINE CRITICAL NEEDS.

A. PHAN THIET PROGRESSING WELL. -- EVACUEES BEING AMPLY  
CARED FOR, CLEAN-UP WELL UNDERWAY, RELAXED 1800 TO 0730 CURFEW  
IN EFFECT, MARKET OPEN, FOOD PRICES DOWN TO NEAR NORMAL,  
FISHING FLEET ACTIVE, PUBLIC SPIRIT HIGH WITH LOCAL MERCHANTS  
AND SURROUNDING HAMLETS HAVING CONTRIBUTED

PPROXI

ITELY 500,000.

PIASTERS TO REBUILDING FUND, FINANCE CHIEF HEADING PROVINCE  
RECOVERY COMMITTEE WHILE PROVINCE CHIEF PUSHING MILITARY  
OPERATIONS.

EVACUEES NOW NUMBER 72,00; 6,000 MORE ARE EXPECTED AS  
RESULT OF CLEARING OPERATIONS INVOLVING HEAVY USE OF AIR AND  
ARTILLERY IN HAMLETS WEST OF TOWN. ABOUT 1,300 HOUSES HAVE  
BEEN DESTROYED OR HEAVILY DAMAGED. PSA DOES NOT BELIEVE VC  
CAN MOUNT SERIOUS SECOND WAVE ATTACK WITH FORCES AVAILABLE  
IN PROVINCES SINCE VC LOST MORE THAN 1,000 MEN IN THE FIRST  
ATTACKS.

BUNKER

BT

~~SECRET~~

[3]

NNNN



1968 FEB 13 19 52

RR RUEHEX  
DE RUMJIR 19239 0441815  
ZNY SSSSS  
R 131755Z FEB 68  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6563  
INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEPJS/DOD  
RUEHLG/CIA  
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 4655  
RUHHHQA/CINCPAC FOR POLAD  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 19239

B. TUY HOA WAS ONLY LIGHTLY DAMAGED. EVEN THOUGH ENEMY DID NOT GET A STRONGFOOTHOLD IN THE CITY, THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE SURFACED TO ASSIST THE ATTACKERS. MANY WERE GIVEN WEAPONS AND TOLD TO FIGHT ALONGSIDE MILITARY UNITS. PROVINCE OFFICIALS, WITH HELP OF ADVISORS, ARE EXPLOITING. PROVINCE CHIEF AND PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR ARE CONFIDENT THEY CAN COPE WITH PROBLEMS WITH THENORMAL AMOUNT OF OUTSIDE SUPPORT.

C. BAN ME THUOT IS IN BAD SHAPE. CITY HAS JUST BEGUN

~~PAGE 2 RUMJIR 19239 SECRET~~

TO GET MOVING AFTER SHOCK OF PROLONGED HEAVY FIGHTING AND WIDESPREAD DESTRUCTION. MORE THAN 21,000 EVACUEES ARE ALREADY IN TEMPORARY CENTERS. CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS GOING ON IN CITY. PROVINCE TREASURY WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED SO THAT PROVINCE CHIEF IS WITHOUT FUNDS EXCEPT FOR PROCEEDS FROM SALE OF GOVERNMENT RICE. MORE THAN 4,200 HOMES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. MASSIVE OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE WILL BE REQUIRED. NEVERTHELESS, A RECOVERY COMMITTEE HAS BEEN SET UP UNDER CHAIRMAN OF THE PROVINCE CONCIL, WHO VOLUNTEERED TO TAKE ON THE JOB.

D. LAST REMAINING ENEMY FORCES WERE EXPELLED FROM DALAT TODAY. DOWNTOWN IS PRACTICALLY UNTOUCHED. SOME DESTRUCTION -- PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR ESTIMATES THREE PERCENT OF HOMES IN CITY -- IN OUTSKIRTS, PARTICULARLY IN NORTHEAST PORTION OF TOWN WHERE ENEMY HELD OUT LONGEST. THERE ARE REPORTS OF LOOTING BY MILITARY FORCES. TODAY THE MAYOR ORDERED LOOTERS SHOT ON SIGHT. DALAT, RICH AS IT IS, SHOULD BE ABLE TO RECOVER WITH MINIMUM OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE.

~~PAGE 3 RUMJIR 19239 SECRET~~

12. LATEST FIGURES ON EVACUEES SHOW THAT NUMBER CLIMBED TO 485,000 (VERSUS 457,000 REPORTED YESTERDAY) -- 65,000 IN I CTZ (NO CHANGE) 66,000 IN II CTZ (NOTMKQQJNX 38,000 IN III CTZ (196,000 IN SAIGON/GIA DINH), AND 116,000 IN IV CTZ (UP FROM 79,000). AFTER MORE COMPLETE COUNT OF HOUSES DESTROYED, NUMBER NOW HAS REACHED ALMOST 37,000. CIVILIAN DAD (3,600) AND WOUNDED (19,000) FIGURES ARE SAME AS REPORTED ON 12 FEBRUARY.

GP-4 BUNKER

{4}

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

Tuesday, February 13, 1968  
6:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

This is a summary of the captured  
document we have been waiting for.  
You will wish to read every word.

W. W. Rostow

MAC 02063

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

13  
*Free file*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12355, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White H. C. Holmes, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *HQ*, NARA, Date *2-10-92*

1968 FEB 13 22 17

ZCZCGAA987

00 YEKADS

DE YSNKQA 45 0442043.

O 132036Z ZYH ZFF-5

FM GEN WHEELER, CJCS, WASH DC

TO MR ROSTOW, WHITE HOUSE, WASH DC

MR CLIFFORD, WHITE HOUSE, WASH DC

MR RUSK, STATE DEPT, WASH DC

MR HELMS, CIA

GEN JOHNSON, CSA, WASH DC

GEN MCCONNELL, CSAF, WASH DC

ADM MOORER, CNO, WASH DC

ZEN/GEN CHAPMAN, CMC, WASH DC

O 131411Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV

TO ADM SHARP CINCPAC

GEN WHEELER CJCS

SMB BUNKER SAIGON

GEN ABRAMS (MACV FWD)

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ MAC 02063 EYES ONLY

1. A DOCUMENT DATED 9 FEB, PROBABLY WRITTEN BY RANKING CADRE OF MR 5, WAS TAKEN FROM SENIOR CAPTAIN PHAN DUY DAI, A SENIOR MILITARY MEMBER OF THE QUANG NAM PROVINCE COMMITTEE CAPTURED AT DANANG. THIS DOCUMENT IS ESSENTIALLY A CRITIQUE OF THE ENEMY'S TET OFFENSIVE THROUGH 9 FEBRUARY.

2. THE FIRST PARAGRAPHS REITERATE THE STANDARD CURRENT CLAIMS OF VC PROPAGANDA. THE AUTHOR CLAIMS A BRILLIANT VICTORY, DESTRUCTION OF 1500 AIRCRAFT, HUNDREDS OF ARTILLERY PIECES, LIBERATION OF TOWNS AND CITIES AND SO FORTH. HOWEVER, THE REST OF THE DOCUMENT IS DEVOTED TO A MORE REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF THE SITUATION.

3. THE DOCUMENT ADDRESSES THE TWO MAIN TASKS OF THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN--THE "GENERAL COUNTERATTACK" AND THE "GENERAL UPRISING." THE AUTHOR REFERS TO THESE AS "T NO. 1" AND "T NO. 2" RESPECTIVELY. HE DESCRIBES THE ANALYSIS BY THE CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF MR 5 OF THE DEFICIENCIES IN CONCEPT AND TIMING OF THE TET OFFENSIVE.

4. THE DOCUMENT ADMITS TO A FAILURE OF THE VC TO GAIN POPULAR SUPPORT "...A BIG MISTAKE." IT ALSO ADMITS TO A FAILURE TO DEFECT RVNAF TROOPS ("MILITARY PROSELYTING" IN VC TERMS), AND TO A FAILURE IN COORDINATING THE ATTACK RESULTING IN PREMATURE ATTACKS.

5. THE AUTHOR ATTRIBUTES THE FAILURES TO WEAKNESSES IN BOTH PREPARATION AND EXECUTION. HE STATES THAT THE POPULACE WAS PASSIVE BECAUSE THEY HAD NOT BEEN POLITICALLY MOTIVATED AND ORGANIZED. HE ATTRIBUTES MILITARY FAILURE TO THE TIMIDITY OF MAIN FORCES WHO SHOULD HAVE BEEN USED FOR "CLOSE ATTACKS," I.E., IN THE CITIES. THEY STAYED "OUTSIDE" AND FAILED TO "SERVE THE IMPORTANT POINT." EXECUTION OF THE OFFENSIVE WAS "STAGGERED" BECAUSE SOME UNITS DID NOT RECEIVE A DELAY ORDER FOR "N DAY." (THIS IS OUR FIRST INFORMATION EXPLAINING THE 24-HOUR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MR 5 ATTACKS AND ATTACKS ELSEWHERE.) THE AUTHOR CLAIMS THAT "MILITARY PROSELYTING" WAS "WELL DEVELOPED," BUT UNCOORDINATED.

~~6. MR 5 ANALYSIS OF THE OVERALL STRATEGY~~  
~~OF THE TET OFFENSIVE AND THE OVERALL STRATEGY ARE NOW~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988

By del/ry NARA, Date 2-12-92

~~EXECUTION OF THE OFFENSIVE WAS DELAYED FOR "N DAY."~~  
~~SOME UNITS DID NOT RECEIVE A DELAY ORDER FOR "N DAY."~~  
~~(THIS IS OUR FIRST INFORMATION EXPLAINING THE 24-~~  
~~HOUR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 5 ATTACKS AND ATTACKS~~  
~~ELEMENTS.) THE AUTHOR CLAIMS THAT "MILITARY~~  
~~PROSELYTING WAS WELL DEVELOPED, BUT UNCOORDINATED.~~

6. MR 5 ANALYSIS OF THE OVERALL STRATEGY  
CONSIDERED THAT THREE OPTIONS OR "CIRCUMSTANCES" ARE NOW  
OPEN.

A. CONTINUE WITH ATTEMPT TO GAIN POPULAR  
UPRISING ("2T").

B. GET GENERAL COUNTERATTACK PROCEEDING  
"TO SOME DEGREE" AND THEN TRY UPRISING AGAIN.

C. GET GENERAL COUNTERATTACK UNDERWAY  
WITH GENERAL UPRISING STILL NOT POSSIBLE; RETREAT,  
CONSOLIDATE AND TRY AGAIN AT A LATER DATE.  
THE AUTHOR STATES THAT THERE WERE A FEW CASES IN  
WHICH THE GENERAL UPRISING WAS PROCEEDING, E. G.,  
TAM KY. AT SAIGON AND HUE, THE SECOND "CIRCUM-  
STANCE" PERTAINED, I. E., GENERAL COUNTERATTACK AND  
GENERAL UPRISING. IN MOST AREAS, HOWEVER, THE  
THIRD CIRCUMSTANCE, GENERAL ATTACK AND NO UPRISING  
OCCURRED.

7. MR 5 CONCLUDES THAT STRATEGY MUST BE BASED  
ON THE FIRST CIRCUMSTANCE. THE "GENERAL UPRISING"  
MUST BE ACHIEVED WHILE RELATIVELY STRONG FORCES  
STILL EXIST, RURAL BASES ARE INTACT AND ADMINISTRA-  
TION STILL EFFECTIVE. SPECIFICALLY, MR5 ADVOCATES  
KEEPING UP TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN THE CITIES,  
RESTORING GUERRILLA WARFARE OUTSIDE THE CITIES, AND  
LAUNCHING CONTINUOUS WAVES OF BIG ATTACKS. POLITI-  
CALLY THE NEW FRONT ORGANIZATION SHOULD BE CONSOLI-  
DATED AND EXPLOITED. THE PROBLEM OF PREVENTING A  
DROP IN MORALE IS TO BE CONSIDERED "IN A CRITICAL  
AND CONTINUOUS MANNER" BY POINTING OUT RECENT  
EVENTS AS VC VICTORIES AND EXPLAINING THE RECENT  
ATTACKS IN THE CONTEXT OF A SERIES OF EVENTS.

8. OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE DOCUMENT CARRIES THE  
USUAL HAZARDS OF INTERPRETING THE TURGID COMMUNIST  
STYLE OF EXPRESSION. FURTHER, IT SHOULD BE  
NOTED THAT THE DOCUMENT EXPRESSES THE VIEWS OF BUT  
ONE IMPORTANT HEADQUARTERS; MR 5'S ANALYSIS MAY NOT  
PREVAIL IN THE OVERALL REEVALUATION THAT IS  
CERTAINLY UNDERWAY WITHIN THE ENEMY LEADERSHIP.  
NEVERTHELESS, WE FIND THESE POINTS PARTICULARLY  
SIGNIFICANT AND FAIRLY CLEAR:

A. "T NO. 1", THE GENERAL COUNTERATTACK,  
AND "T NO. 2", THE GENERAL UPRISING, WERE TO BE  
SIMULTANEOUS, NOT CONSECUTIVE. IT IS NOT SO CLEAR  
WHETHER THE KHE SANH, DMZ, AND B-3 FRONT ATTACKS  
WERE TO BE PART OF "T NO. 1." WE BELIEVE FROM  
OTHER EVIDENCE THAT THEY PROBABLY WERE; THE LACK OF  
SEPARATE TREATMENT OF THOSE AREAS IN THE DOCUMENT  
ALSO SUGGESTS THEY WERE TO BE PART OF THE "GENERAL  
COUNTERATTACK." WE HAVE NO GOOD CLUE AS TO THE  
REASON FOR THE LAST MINUTE POSTPONEMENT ORDER FOR  
"N DAY", BUT IT COULD HAVE BEEN DUE TO PROBLEMS IN  
GETTING THE NVA ATTACKS IN REMOTE AREAS UNDERWAY.

B. THE ENEMY REALIZES THAT HIS EFFORTS  
HAVE LARGELY FAILED. MR 5 SEES NO REAL ALTERNATIVE  
TO CONTINUATION OF ATTEMPTS TO ACHIEVE A GENERAL  
UPRISING AND IS WORRIED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF RECENT  
EVENTS ON THE MORALE OF CADRE AND THE RANK AND FILE.

C. ~~THE DOCUMENT PROVIDES CONVINCING~~  
~~EVIDENCE THAT A GENERAL UPRISING WAS EXPECTED AT~~

SIMULTANEOUS, NOT CONSECUTIVE. IT IS NOT SO CLEAR WHETHER THE KHE SANH, DMZ AND B-3 FRONT ATTACKS WERE TO BE PART OF "T NO. ." WE BELIEVE FROM OTHER EVIDENCE THAT THEY PROBABLY WERE; THE LACK OF SEPARATE TREATMENT OF THOSE AREAS IN THE DOCUMENT ALSO SUGGESTS THEY WERE TO BE PART OF THE "GENERAL COUNTERATTACK." WE HAVE NO GOOD CLUE AS TO THE REASON FOR THE LAST MINUTE POSTPONEMENT ORDER FOR "N DAY". BUT IT COULD HAVE BEEN DUE TO PROBLEMS IN GETTING THE NVA ATTACKS IN REMOTE AREAS UNDERWAY.

B. THE ENEMY REALIZES THAT HIS EFFORTS HAVE LARGELY FAILED. MR 5 SEES NO REAL ALTERNATIVE TO CONTINUATION OF ATTEMPTS TO ACHIEVE A GENERAL UPRISING AND IS WORRIED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF RECENT EVENTS ON THE MORALE OF CADRE AND THE RANK AND FILE.

C. THE DOCUMENT PROVIDES CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT A GENERAL UPRISING WAS EXPECTED AT HIGH LEVELS, AND WAS NOT MERELY A CYNICAL PROPAGANDA PLOY TO INSPIRE THE LOWER ECHELONS.

D. IF MR 5'S VIEWS PREVAIL, THE ENEMY WILL STRIVE TO KEEP UP CHAOS WITHIN THE CITIES, PREVENT THE RETURN OF STABILITY, AND LAUNCH ADDITIONAL LARGE-SIZED ATTACKS--ALL STILL DESIGNED TO PROVOKE A GENERAL UPRISING. HOWEVER, MR 5 MAY BE ADVOCATING A COURSE OF ACTION WHICH IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO COSVN OR HANOI.

9. INTERROGATION OF SENIOR CAPTAIN PHAN DUY DAI IS PROCEEDING AND, IF APPROPRIATE, WILL BE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE MESSAGE.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

900

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

NNNN



14

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, February 13, 1968  
5:15 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith E. V. Rostow and Deming have a friendly and constructive chat with Schiller in Bonn; but they are still some distance from a hard policy on: EEC accelerating Kennedy Round reductions; a full financial offset; and accelerating the bringing in of the new IMF reserve unit (Special Drawing Rights).

W. W. Rostow

Bonn 8266

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-206  
By cb, NARA Date 11-3-97



# Department of State

<sup>14a</sup>  
**TELEGRAM**

47

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 703

*Rostow*

PAGE 01 BONN 08266 122103Z

80

ACTION EUR 20

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 03, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, COM 08, E 15, FRB 02,

TRSY 08, XMB 06, STR 08, CEA 02, RSR 01, SSO 00, /163 W

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P 121956Z FEB 68

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7002

INFO USMISSION BERLIN PRIORITY 2242

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 8266

DEPARTMENT PASS TREASURY AND DEFENSE

SUBJECT: ROSTOW-DEMING-TREZISE-SCHILLER TALK

BERLIN FOR AMBASSADOR MCGHEE

1. UNDER SECRETARY ROSTOW, UNDER SECRETARY DEMING, AMBASSADOR TREZISE, AND DCM FESSENDEN MET THIS MORNING WITH ECONOMICS MINISTER SCHILLER, UNDER SECRETARY SCHOELLHORN, AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHLECHT.

2. SCHILLER STATED THAT AN INCREASE IN DOMESTIC DEMAND IN GERMANY WAS DESIRABLE AND ADVISED THE UNDER SECRETARY, IN HIS LATER

PAGE TWO RUFHOL 8266 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
MEETING WITH THE CHANCELLOR, TO MAKE THIS ARGUMENT AS HIS OWN VIEW OF THE SITUATION. SCHILLER SAID THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO RUN DOWN THE CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS. SCHOELLHORN ALSO STRESSED THIS POINT BUT ARGUED THAT THE PROCESS, ON THE BASIS OF DECEMBER,

**DECLASSIFIED**

**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLJ 96-197**

**By sig NARA Date 11-26-96**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BONN 08266 122103Z

FIGURES, IS WELL UNDERWAY. COMMENT: THE DECEMBER FIGURES MAY WELL HAVE BEEN SO MUCH AFFECTED BY THE VALUE ADDED TAX AS TO BE QUITE UNREPRESENTATIVE.)

3. MINISTER SCHILLER ARGUED THAT U.S. PROTECTIONISM IS VERY DANGEROUS. HE SAID THAT DEBRE, WITH WHOM HE HAD FLOWN FROM NEW DELHI TO PARIS, HAD SAID THAT IF THE U.S. TOOK RESTRICTIVE MEASURES ON TRADE ACCOUNT, FRANCE WOULD NOT RATIFY THE KENNEDY ROUND. SCHILLER ADDED, "HE SCHOCKED ME." HE THEN READ A SENTENCE FROM THE PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC REPORT SAYING THAT PROTECTIONISM IS NO ANSWER TO THE U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM.

4. IN COMMENTING ON THE DEBRE CONVERSATION, ~~SCHILLER SAID THAT HE FOUND HIM HARDENING ON SDR'S.~~

5. ON UNILATERAL KENNEDY ROUND ACCELERATION, WHICH THE UNDER SECRETARY MENTIONED AS ~~ONE SPECIFIC THING WHICH THE FEC MIGHT~~

PAGE THREE RUFHOL 8266 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~DO TO BE HELPFUL. SCHILLER RESPONDED VERY POSITIVELY. HOWEVER, IN THIS CONVERSATION WE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP SPECIFICS OF WHAT GERMANS MIGHT DO.~~

6. THE FINAL TEN MINUTES WAS SPENT ON OFFSET. SCHILLER STRESSED THE HELPFULNESS OF THE BUNDESBANK IN THE GOLD POOL OPERATIONS AND OTHER MONETARY MEASURES OF RECENT MONTHS. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT FREE RESERVES OF DOLLARS NOW ONLY AMOUNTED TO ABOUT DM 5 BILLION AND CLAIMED THAT OFFSET ON MORE THAN HALF THAT AMOUNT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT. LIKewise, A TWO-YEAR AGREEMENT WOULD BE DIFFICULT. HE CONTENDED THAT MULTILATERALISM HAD DOUBTEFUL MERIT IN DEALING WITH THE OFFSET PROBLEM.

7. DURING CONVERSATION, SCHOELLHORN SAID THAT BUNDESBANK WAS GIVING SOME THOUGHT TO DIVIDING UP FINANCIAL NEUTRALIZATION REQUIREMENT. ACCORDING TO THIS PROPOSAL, BUNDESBANK WOULD COVER PART OF GAP BY BOND PURCHASES, WHILE PUTTING UP REMAINDER TO GOVERNMENT TO COVER BY BOND PURCHASES OF ITS OWN (PRESUMABLY BY APPROPRIATION). ~~THIS IS FIRST WE HAVE HEARD OF THIS NOTION AND ARE UNABLE TO EVALUATE IT.~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 BONN 08266 122103Z

8. COMMENT: AS IN NEW DELHI, MINISTER SCHILLER CONVEYED A SENSE

PAGE FOUR RUFHOL 8266 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM AND PROGRAM,  
AND A DESIRE THAT THE FRG BE HELPFUL IN REGARD THERETO. MCGHEE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Tuesday, February 13, 1968 -- 4:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

I believe you will wish to read this summary of information on the ARVN. In short:

- They were about 40-50% strength on 29 January because of Tet leaves;
- They may now be back to about 75% of strength;
- There are still some soldiers who have not been able to get back to their units, particularly in IV Corps;
- Komer is working on getting pacification going again;
- Westy has issued an excellent order in the same direction.

The full text that follows will give you a more precise feel for a somewhat uncertain and incomplete picture.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Clark Clifford  
General Maxwell D. Taylor

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-25-78, NSC 8-480

By JR/kg, NARA, Date 2-14-92

WWRostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

15a



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-2973-68  
13 February 68

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Status of RVNAF

1. The attached report represents a compilation of information on the status and general condition of RVNAF through 12 February. The information on which this report is based is, of course, fragmentary and therefore must be considered extremely tentative in nature. General Westmoreland has requested a complete report on RVNAF units by 29 February. By then, the situation should have stabilized sufficiently to obtain a better picture. This report will be provided to you when received.

2. In addition, the information set forth below was received in a late message from General Palmer.

a. ARVN

(1) Advisors in II, III and IV CTZ's rate all maneuver battalions as combat effective. On the basis of information available at this point, most of the units were at about 40-50 percent of strength on 29 January because of Tet leaves. Reports indicate that of those personnel present for duty when the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) offensive started, their alert posture varied from no preparation at all to those units in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces which were fully prepared for an enemy attack. At this point in time the consensus seems to be that ARVN units are at about 75 percent of strength. Soldiers are finding it difficult to get back to their units because of transportation problems, especially in IV Corps.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCSLtr 10-10-78  
By wpj, NARA, Date 2-13-92

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

GROUP - 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

(2) Advisors report generally that ARVN units, though understrength, performed as well or better than was expected of them. These units took the brunt of the initial attack against the urban areas and in many of the smaller cities they were able to keep the enemy from taking control. It is significant, however, that in all the larger province capitals which came under attack, as well as in Saigon, US forces had to be employed. Dalat, the only major province capital in which US forces were not used, is still in dispute as of this morning (12 February).

(3) The leadership of ARVN during this crisis cannot be completely assessed. There have been actions in which units were aggressive and decisive. In others, leaders have been criticized for lack of aggressiveness, and some commanders and province chiefs were relieved.

(4) Commanders of US units tend to report less favorably than advisors on the combat actions of ARVN units in their area. This is only natural.

b. RD and RF/PF. Information on pacification in the countryside is necessarily spotty because the focus has been first on defense of cities, emergency actions, and recovery measures. Now that the crisis has passed and communications no longer are loaded with 100 percent operational traffic, district advisors have been instructed to urge district chiefs to move forces out beyond the confines of district towns. Ambassador Komer has directed a quick assessment of the territorial security situation, to include locations, strengths, current missions of RF/PF units, RD support battalions, RD cadre teams of all types, National Police Field Force companies, province and district police and Provincial Reconnaissance Units. The first assessment is to be submitted by 15 February. Ambassador Komer is also taking steps to recover the pacification initiative. General Westmoreland's message to senior corps and province advisors states: "Wherever the tactical situation is so justified in your judgment, US advisors at all levels should exert maximum advisory pressure to get RVNAF moving out again to resume its

~~SECRET~~ ~~TOP~~ ~~SECRET~~

territorial security role. RD battalions should be returned to their areas soonest, RF/PF should be urged to seek out the enemy, and RD teams should return promptly to their assigned hamlets. Otherwise a major pacification set-back could occur largely through default." Current information indicates more than half of the 55 RD support battalions have been withdrawn for defense of cities. By and large, RF/PF are defending their outposts, securing district towns, and maintaining guard of bridges and critical installations. In many cases, RF/PF are reinforcing ARVN battalions to beef up low strengths resulting from Tet leave and the continuing inability of soldiers to rejoin their units. For the most part, RD hamlets have not been objectives of VC Tet actions. MACV's efforts to assess conditions accurately and in detail should produce a reasonably accurate picture soon.

3. As a matter of further interest, General Vien is reported to be encouraged by the absence of VC penetration into RVNAF units; the generally effective performance of ARVN division commanders; and the number of troops that are voluntarily reporting into various headquarters from leave status to take their places in provisional units while awaiting return to their own organizations.

*Earle G. Wheeler*

EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~  
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES RVNAF

156

1. Pre-TET Situation

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) combat forces prior to TET consisted of 120 Infantry, 20 Ranger, nine Airborne, and six Marine Battalions. The operating field strength of the infantry battalion, that is the number of troops that could be put in the field to fight, averaged about 400. Since the average operating strength desired was 450, the pre-TET strength of ARVN forces was somewhat less than desired. A battalion with an operating field strength of 450 would have an overall authorized strength of about 650-700.

2. Strengths During TET

a. RVNAF commanders had authority to grant leaves up to 50 per cent of the assigned strengths of their units. Accordingly, the operating field strengths of many battalions at the onset of TET dropped to an average of 200. In a few instances, a unit commander knew an attack was coming in that area and did not grant leave for TET. Battalion strengths in these cases remained at 400 or at 500 if a ranger or airborne battalion.

b. At least in some divisions, ARVN troops began to return to their units on 3 February. For example, in the 7th Division, it was reported that 250 troops returned on 3 February and 100 more on the 4th. In one case, Go Cong, they were formed into a provisional reaction company. How general this return of troops to their units has been is not known.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 11-22-78, State 4-25-79  
By wp/ky, NARA, Date 2-14-92

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

### 3. Reductions in RVNAF Strengths

#### a. Casualties During the TET Offensive

Reported casualties for ARVN units for the period 291800 January to 101200 February consisted of 1,900 killed, 7,135 wounded, and 86 missing in action.

The total of approximately 9,100 casualties represented about three per cent of the total ARVN force.

#### b. Desertions

There have been few reports received of desertions or defections. Elements of the ARVN 45th Regiment in Ban Me Thuot may have joined the Viet Cong; troops in ARVN uniforms and in vehicles of that unit fired on a US civilian compound, and the Communists claim the defection of parts of that unit. No information is available to confirm Communist claims of defections of elements of the 1st Division in Hue, or of troops in Ba Xuyen Province; however, due to the confused situation in Hue, their claims cannot be either confirmed or denied and remain "possibly true." Various Government of Vietnam (GVN) officials have mentioned defections by individual officers assigned to headquarters and support units in the Saigon area, but details on identifications and circumstances are lacking. In Sa Dec Province, however, the VC reportedly occupied a number of outposts (presumably Regional Force (RF) and Popular Force (PF)) in rural areas, and Liberation Front flags were reported flying

~~TOP SECRET~~  
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~~TOP SECRET~~

over them. Also in that province, RD cadres reportedly "melted away." In Chau Doc, some officials reportedly doffed their uniforms when the VC entered the city, but put them back on after the enemy was driven off. There is almost no information available on the status of RVNAF elements at the district village, and hamlet level, where the VC have been active in several provinces, nor on the status of RVNAF (RF and PF) elements on leave in rural areas during TET. These elements would seem to be vulnerable to local VC propaganda claims of success.

4. Performance During the TET Offensive

a. Although the data are incomplete, reflecting the fragmentary reporting, the effectiveness of RVNAF in combating enemy attacks during this period varied markedly. In general, the data reflect a mixed situation, with GVN forces reacting aggressively and courageously in some areas, but ineffectively and with malfeasance in others. No clear-cut geographic patterns are evident, except that most reports of ineffective performance come from IV Corps. Generally, however, the reaction of GVN forces seems to have varied in direct relation to the professional competence and performance of their leaders.

b. Leadership at the national and Corps levels apparently was effective. General Vien himself was reportedly being steady and dedicated, and the Commanders of the Rangers and National Police effectively led their forces in the Saigon fighting. The III Corps Commander, General Khang, reportedly performed well, but the I Corps

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Commander, General Lam, has been implicitly criticized for an overly defensive posture in I Corps. The 22d and 23d Division Commanders in II Corps reportedly had their troops on alert during TET, and had restricted TET leaves; there are indications, however, that this alert was not fully honored in at least one province (Khanh Hoa).

c. At lower levels, the Commander of the 24th Special Sector (Kontum) reportedly performed very poorly, drawing criticism for his preoccupation with his personal safety and for the destruction caused by his heavy reliance on armor. The Province Chief in Ba Xuyen reportedly became hysterical and lost control, and the Chief of Quang Tri Province was ineffective. The Kien Hoa Province Chief, however, reportedly performed creditably even after receiving news that his family had been murdered by the Viet Cong in Saigon. In Binh Thuan, the Province Chief and his Police Chief squabbled and blamed each other for deficiencies in security before the attack. The Kontum Province Chief reacted quickly and effectively, demonstrating excellent leadership. The Thua Thien Province Chief was forced to hide for several days when <sup>the</sup> Viet Cong occupied his house. The Quang Nam Chief was quite effective in organizing and directing his forces and in attempting to maintain civil morale. No specific reports have been received on other officials at that level.

d. The alert posture of RVNAF elements varied, but seems to have been generally adequate, considering their normal standards observed during the TET holidays. Major deficiencies were noted in Chau Doc

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Province, where defenses apparently were totally relaxed for TET. Quang Ngai forces, on the other hand, reportedly were not granted TET leave.

e. Some ARVN infantry units were effective in managing to resist repeated assaults of the enemy. However, it was reported that other units, after initial pindown by sniper fire, maneuvered only slightly or not at all, but called in armor or armed helicopter strikes often resulting in heavy volumes of fire being directed into civilian dwellings causing resentment against RVNAF troops. The initial reaction of RVNAF and other security elements to the Viet Cong attacks were generally described as fair to good with the notable exception of the forces in Vinh Long, Chau Doc, and Sa Dec Provinces. There was no organized resistance to the attack in Chau Doc, and Rangers in Vinh Long were slow in reacting and unaggressive afterwards. In Sa Dec, provincial authorities initially "refused to operate." Considerable confusion was reported in the early defense of Vinh Long. ARVN units in Ba Xuyen were reported ineffective. In Phong Dinh, the reaction was slow but once the troops rallied, they displayed exceptional bravery and esprit. Outstanding defensive performances were recorded by ARVN units in An Xuyen, Khanh Hoa, Dinh Tuong, and Kien Hoa. A lack of planning and organization was reported, however, in Kien Hoa.

f. ARVN's performance, after the initial enemy attacks were repelled and the cities were secured, seems generally to have lacked aggressiveness. In only a few Provinces (Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and

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Dinh Tuong) were there indications of reasonably aggressive pursuit and a determination to maintain pressure on the enemy. In Quang Tri, ARVN units reacted slowly to attacks on district towns near the province capital, and their tactics tended to maximize property damage. "Over-reaction" or excessive destruction was reported in other areas, including Kontum, Vinh Long, and Chau Doc. In IV Corps, ARVN forces were generally described as passive, unaggressive, and preoccupied with defensive -- rather than offensive -- operations, except in those areas where US troops were brought in to assist in clearing the provincial capitals. In one instance, the presence of US forces was described as "electrifying" in its impact on ARVN. The ARVN 7th Division (colocated with a brigade of the US 9th Division in My Tho), however, has had its troops out on operations during the past few days.

#### 5. Current Situation

a. There are few reports indicative of current RVNAF combat effectiveness. In Quang Tri, concern has been expressed about dwindling ammunition, gasoline, and other supplies and the absence of resupply movements from the beleaguered 1st Division headquarters in Hue. Reports on casualties in individual units have been rare. In two instances ARVN units are reported at considerably reduced strength; one battalion reinforcing Vinh Long reportedly had only 90 men, while another battalion in Chau Doc reportedly had only 200 men present for duty of an assigned strength of 600. Many units are considerably below strength because of the apparently widespread disruption of communications and

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transportation facilities which probably has delayed the return of troops from TET leave. Moreover, the psychological impact of the Viet Cong offensive may add to the normally high AWOL and desertion rates associated with TET.

b. There are virtually no reports specifically describing RVNAF morale as other than fair to good. Other indicators -- lack of aggressiveness, indiscipline in the form of looting and pilfering -- *may* suggest that morale has been shaken to some extent. Moreover, some officers have expressed concern at the lack of US military support in certain areas, and others have repeated rumors prevalent among the civil populace alleging US collusion in various forms with the Viet Cong. Vietnamese Marines fighting in Saigon have expressed dissatisfaction with the US M-16 rifle, alleging it is inferior to the AK-47 automatic rifles with which the Viet Cong are equipped. This concern has not been reported elsewhere, but other RVNAF elements, not so well-equipped as the Marines, may be once again apprehensive over their relatively limited firepower as they were when they first encountered enemy units armed with the new family of 7.62-mm small arms in 1964-65. The Vietnamese Marines have also reflected concern with the apparently plentiful supply of B-40 and B-41 rocket launchers in the hands of Viet Cong units in Saigon; they have also been used extensively in other areas and may have adversely impressed other RVNAF elements.

c. Popular reactions to ARVN performance have been mixed. In two instances (Quang Tri and Khanh Hoa), the populace reportedly



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indicated gratitude or appreciation for ARVN's performance. In most areas, the people are reported to be confused, frightened, traditionally passive or non-committal, while in other areas (Quang Tri, Phan Thiet, Long Khanh, Vinh Binh, Vinh Long, Ba Xuyen, and Chau Doc) the popular reaction has been generally unfavorable to RVNAF. A mixture of these reactions has been reported in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area. Criticism of the RVNAF ranges from complaints about the lack of security to bitterness at the allegedly wanton destruction of property. In several areas (Vinh Long, Ba Xuyen, and Saigon) looting and pilfering by ARVN and police elements has been charged.

d. There are no uncommitted RVNAF forces in RVN at this time. At present, four RVNAF battalions are technically listed as uncommitted. In point of fact, in each Corps tactical zone one battalion is held as a reaction force.

The RVNAF response to the current emergency situation is summarized in the battalion mission assignments as of 29 January and 10 February.

	<u>29 January</u>	<u>10 February</u>
Combat Operations	62	90
Security	24	29
Training	3	0
Reserve	15	4
Pacification	51	32
TOTAL	<u>155</u>	<u>155</u>

~~TOP SECRET~~

e. An assessment of ARVN battalion effectiveness at this time is complicated by several factors: the reduction in strength of approximately 9,100 troops killed, wounded or missing; the aftermath of the TET holiday leave situation (3,000 have been given transportation back to their units, many others await transportation); an untabulated number of unauthorized absences stemming from TET leave; and continuing recruiting problems. Using a criteria of a minimum of 60 per cent personnel present for duty constituting an effective unit, RVNAF battalion effectiveness is indicated as:

ARVN Infantry (120 Battalions)	* Effective
Ranger (20 Battalions)	* Effective
Airborne (9 Battalions)	4 Effective
VN MC (6 Battalions)	6 Effective

---

\* Battalion strength breakdowns for ARVN Infantry and Ranger Battalions are not available at this time, but based on authorized strengths, the over-all per cent for duty level on 7 February was: ARVN Infantry 50 per cent, Ranger 43 per cent. As of 7 February, the average present-for-duty strength of RVNAF Battalions was:

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Present</u>
ARVN Infantry	639	320
Ranger	755	320
Airborne	836	350
VNMC	876	500

As an example of unit strength deficiencies, the 9th Airborne Battalion

present for duty totals range from a low of 157 to a high of 500 out of the authorized strength of 836.

f. In sum, in view of the incomplete information available it is difficult to generalize with confidence. It does appear that most ARVN units reacted reasonably well to the initial attacks. Subsequently there seemed generally to have been a lack of aggressiveness, and some breakdowns in discipline were reported. Although morale and confidence seem to have been shaken, morale does not appear to have collapsed. Because of the disruption of communications, RVNAF units are probably not well informed of the situation and thus susceptible to the same rumors that seem to be upsetting the civil populace. Thus their vulnerability to Viet Cong propaganda has probably increased. All factors considered, some ARVN elements would seem to be ill-prepared for sustained or renewed pressure without a respite for several weeks or even months, and some in isolated areas operating without close US support might disintegrate. However, many of the units can be expected to still give a good account of themselves.

14

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 13, 1968  
4:00 p. m.

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

You should know:

*Pres file*

General Taylor again raised the question of whether we should hold Khe Sahn. He believes we could protect the coastal cities of I Corps further to the west.

(Incidentally, we now have in the Situation Room a terrain map that suggests how tough the situation is there. You may wish to drop down and see it.)

If we decide to pull out, he believes we should not pull out when Khe Sahn is under maximum siege, but sooner -- to upset the enemy's plan by moving west after he's dug in, emplaced his guns, and then has to follow westward.

He does not recommend we instruct Westy to get out.

He does recommend:

- another round of questioning of our Khe Sahn strategy, led by yourself;
- on the basis of that, the raising of any questions we may have in a way that doesn't leave Westy feeling either out on a limb or mistrusted -- but, perhaps, with more flexibility.

If we did such a thing we would, in my judgment, require a plan to attack his force, at our initiative, at a time and place of our choice.

*the enemy's I Corps*

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD-10-25-78, NSC 8-480

By JK/ly, NARA, Date 2-14-92

CONFIDENTIAL

17

**Tuesday, Feb. 13, 1968**  
**3:45 p. m.**

**Mr. President:**

**You may have forgotten our attempt to get  
Senator Curtis last Saturday.**

**He was in a plane all afternoon; but Paul Warne  
nailed him ten minutes before he made his  
speech.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**Attachment (A/SecDef 10 Feb 68 memo to WWR)**

*Pres file*





INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

10 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW ←

As you requested, I called Senator Carl T. Curtis (Nebr.) and reached him at 6:20 p.m. at the Booth Hotel in Independence, Kansas. I referred to UPI 51 and said that I wanted to be sure that he had the facts before he made his proposed reference to the PUEBLO incident.

I explained to Senator Curtis that Secretary McNamara had never said that the PUEBLO was not at all times in international waters and that, on the contrary, we had every reason to believe that the commanding officer of the PUEBLO had followed his clear instructions to stay a minimum of 13 miles from North Korean land. I suggested that it would be a disservice to Commander Bucher for anyone to imply that he had disobeyed these instructions.

Senator Curtis said that he was making no such implication but that he was referring to "press accounts" of Mr. McNamara's comments on "Meet the Press." I agreed that some of the press accounts might have been misleading, but this was no basis for attributing to Secretary McNamara a statement that the PUEBLO was not at all times in international waters. I further explained that Secretary McNamara's remarks had only referred to the fact that, because the PUEBLO was in radio silence from January 10 to January 22, we will not be able to prove conclusively that it was in international waters throughout that period until the commanding officer and crew of the PUEBLO are returned.

Senator Curtis reiterated his reliance on the press accounts and said that the matter had been discussed in Congress on Monday. I again suggested that the press accounts were not justification for attributing to Secretary McNamara a statement he had never made and requested that the Senator consider the facts that I had given him before making his speech. He said that he would do so.

PAUL C. WARNKE

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INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Tuesday, February 13, 1968 -- 3:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a detailed account of the effect of weather on enemy operations in I Corps. I have marked the critical passages. It comes to this:

-- The enemy prefers to conduct operations in the Western DMZ (Khe Sanh area) in the period of the northeast monsoon and transition (November-May).

-- The enemy prefers to conduct operations in the eastern part of the DMZ during the period of the southwest monsoon and transition (May-October).

His present plans seem to envisage operating from now forward at both ends of the DMZ; for example, just now a report came in of a second regiment putting itself in a position to attack the somewhat wobbly city of Quang Tri on Route 1, which is near the coast.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSW 10-25-78; NSC 8-14-80

By JR/ly, NARA, Date 2-14-92

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

19

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 13, 1968  
3:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith cables from Vance and the proposals of the South Koreans which are, evidently, a maximum position Cy will have to whittle down.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 4207  
Seoul 4208  
State 114006 to Seoul

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By SP/ry, NARA, Date 6/25/96

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

TELEGRAM

19a

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL 3874Q

REC'D FEBRUARY 13, 1968  
8:53 AM

.....ZZ RUEHC

DE RUALOS 4207E 0441330

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

Z 131316Z FEB 68 ZFF1

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9245

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 4207

MODIS/CATUS

VANTO 8

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-197

By 128, NARA Date 11-26-96

CYRUS VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR PORTER, GENERAL BONESTEEL, JOHN WALSH AND COLONEL GREENLEAF MET FOR 2 AND 1/2 HOURS THIS MORNING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER, DEFENSE MINISTER, INFORMATION MINISTER, CIA DIRECTOR, AND CHIEF JCS. SESSION WAS INTENSE, FRANK, SPIRITED, AND WE BELIEVE HELPFUL TO BOTH SIDES. UNDER EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES EACH SIDE FELT CONSTRAINED TO GET CERTAIN ISSUES OUT ON THE TABLE. THIS WAS DONE WITHOUT EXCESSIVE RANCOR.

THE DISCUSSION, WHICH WAS IDENTIFIED BY THE MINISTERS AD

PAGE 3 RUALOS 4207E ~~SECRET~~

CONSULTATIONS UNDER OUR JOINT MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY, RANGED WIDELY OVER VARIED ASPECTS OF US COMMITMENTS AND PERFORMANCE IN THE POSTWAR WORLD, THE ORIGINS OF THE KOREAN WAR, US-KOREAN RELATIONS, US ASSISTANCE TO KOREA, KOREAN PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM STRUGGLE, PROBLEMS OF KOREAN PUBLIC OPINION, PANMUNJOM COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES, OVERT AND COVERT COMMUNIST THREATS TO KOREA, AND THE TACTICS OF DEALING WITH INDIRECT NORTH KOREAN AGGRESSION. AFTER SEVERAL HOURS OF GIVE-AND-TAKE, THE ROKS EXPRESSED FULL CONFIDENCE THAT THE US WOULD RESPOND IN THE EVENT OF OVERT AGGRESSION AND THAT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE LIMITED TO THE PROBLEM OF INDIRECT AGGRESSION AND THE METHOD OF DEALING WITH IT.

VANCE AT THIS POINT SAID THE NEXT QUESTION TO BE ADDRESSED WAS WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE TO DEFINE IN ADVANCE WHAT DEGREE OF INDIRECT AGGRESSION REQUIRED COUNTER REACTION WHICH OF COURSE CARRIES WITH IT THE RISK OF WAR. VANCE SAID HE HAD LONG REFLECTED ON THIS PROBLEM AND HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DO SO. HE HAD THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT THE BEST COURSE TO PURSUE IN THE EVENT OF

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~~SECRET~~

-2- SEUL 4207, FEBRUARY 13

~~FURTHER INCIDENTS OF INDIRECT AGGRESSION IS TO CONSULT AND  
THEN JOINTLY DETERMINE WHAT ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN~~

PAGE 3 RUALOS 4207E ~~SECRET~~

IN LIGHT OF ALL EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES. FURTHERMORE, HE  
SAID, IN OUR DEMOCRACY WE MUST OPERATE UNDER  
THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY RATIFIED BY CONGRESS. PRESIDENT  
CAN ONLY TAKE ACTION UNDER THIS TREATY. ~~FOR THE MOMENT,  
AT LEAST, THE KOREANS SEEMED TO AGREE.~~

AT THE END OF THE MEETING THE FOREIGN MINISTER PRESENTED TWO  
DOCUMENTS TO VANCE, AN "AGREED MINUTES" AND A "JOINT DEFENSE  
DECLARATION". THESE DOCUMENTS WHICH ARE TRANSMITTED IN SEPTEL  
RAISE MOST SERIOUS LEGAL AND FUNDING ISSUES. AFTER POINTING  
OUT THE SERIOUS LEGAL PROBLEMS EMBODIED IN THESE  
DOCUMENTS, VANCE AGREED TO STUDY THEM AND DISCUSS THEM IN  
A MEETING SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW. ~~WE INTEND REJECT THESE  
DOCUMENTS FOR THE REASONS CITED AND ENDEAVOR REACH AGREEMENT  
ON THE DRAFT COMMUNIQUE CONTAINED STATE'S 114006--VANCE  
COULD LIKE YOUR VIEWS BY 0900 LOCAL TOMORROW WHETHER,  
IF NECESSARY FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON OUR COMMUNIQUE, WE COULD  
AGREE TO AN ANNUAL DEFENSE MEETING AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL  
WITH FIRST MEETING BEGINNING 1969.~~

A DETAILED REPORT ON THIS MEETING WILL BE SUBMITTED  
SEPARATELY. PORTER  
BT

~~SECRET~~





# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

196

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 3890Q

REC'D : FEBRUARY 13, 1968

9:34AM

OO RUEHC

DE RUALOS 4208E/1 0441345

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 131340Z FEB 68 ZFF-1

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9046

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SEOUL 4208

NODIS/CACTUS

VANTO 09

REF: SEOUL'S 4207 VANTO 08

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-197

By ing NARA Date 11-26-96

AS MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER CABINET MINISTERS REPORTED REFTEL DREW TO CLOSE, FONMIN PRESENTED TO VANCE TWO DOCUMENTS, AN "AGREED MINUTES" AND A "JOINT DEFENSE DECLARATION". AFTER A QUICK READING, VANCE TOLD THE MINISTERS WE WOULD CAREFULLY STUDY THEM AND COMMENT AT OUR NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED TOMORROW MORNING. HOWEVER, HE DID WISH THEM TO KNOW THAT HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD RAISE GRAVE LEGAL PROBLEMS, HAVING PLANTED

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4208E/1 ~~SECRET~~

THIS SEED OF LEGAL DOUBT, AMBASSADOR PORTER THEN ASKED, WITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE ROX RESPONSE, WHAT THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE MINUTES WOULD BE IN RESPECT TO THE KOREAN ASSEMBLY. THE MATTER WAS LEFT REST AT THIS POINT.

WE COULD NOT JUDGE FROM MANNER OF PRESENTATION OR REACTIONS TO VANCE/PORTER COMMENTS HOW SERIOUS THE MINISTER'S WERE ABOUT THESE DOCUMENTS. FOR OUR PART WE INTEND REJECT THESE DOCUMENTS ON LEGAL GROUNDS.

BEGIN TEXT:

JOINT DEFENSE DECLARATION (JOINT WARNING STATEMENT) (DRAFT)  
FEBRUARY , 1968

1. EVER SINCE THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED IN 1953, THE NORTH KOREAN PUPPET REGIME, IN WANTON DISREGARD OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, HAS REPEATEDLY PERPETUATED FLAGRANT ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

THESE ACTS OF LAWLESSNESS AND ATROCITY BY THE NORTH KOREAN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SEOUL 4208, FEBRUARY 13 SECTION 1 OF 2

PAGE 3 RUALOS 4208E/1 ~~SECRET~~

COMMUNISTS CULMINATED IN SUCH VICIOUS ACTS AS THERECENT DISPATCH OF 31 ARMED TERRORISTS INTO SEOUL IN AN ATTEMPT TO ASSAULT THE OFFICIAL RESIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE PIRATIC SEIZURE OF USS PUEBLO ON THE HIGH SEAS, WHICH CLEARLY CONSTITUTE ACTS OF OPEN AGGRESSION.

2. IN SPITE OF THE ABOVE, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, ALTHOUGH NOT BOUND BY THE SAID ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AS SHE IS NOT A SIGNATORY THEREOF, HAS DEMONSTRATED UTMOST PATIENCE AND SELF-RESTRAINT BY REFRAINING ITSELF FROM TAKING ANY RETALIATORY MEASURE. IT HAS DONE SO IN ITS RESPECT FOR THE SPIRIT AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN MAINTAINING THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE WORLD, AND IN ITS EARNEST ASPIRATION FOR ATTAINING PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA.

3. IT IS NOTED THAT THE NORTH KOREAN PUPPET REGIME, HOWEVER, IN PREPARATION FOR SUCH SCHEME OF AGGRESSION, AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, SET UP GROUPS OF SPECIAL COMMANDO FORCES COMPRISING OF SOME 20,000 "REGULAR ARMY OFFICERS" WHO HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN SPECIAL GUERRILLA WARFARE, AND THAT THE NORTH KOREAN PUPPET REGIME

PAGE 4 RUALOS 4208E/1 ~~SECRET~~

IS OBVIOUSLY PLANNING TO FURTHER INTENSIFY SUCH PATTERN OF AGGRESSION.

4. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES DO HEREBY SOLEMNLY ISSUE A STERN WARNING TO THE NORTH KOREAN PUPPET REGIME IN UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS THAT, UNLESS THE NORTH KOREAN PUPPET REGIME SHOULD CEASE TO COMMIT SUCH ACTS OF AGGRESSION, IT WILL BE COUNTERED BY CORRESPONDING AND COMMENSURATE PUNITIVE ACTIONS BY THE JOINT FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES DEFENDING THE SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. END TEXT

BEGIN TEXT:

AGREED MINUTES BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (DRAFT)

WHEREAS THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNIST REGIME HAS, FOR THE LAST ONE AND A HALF YEARS, DISPATCHED AN INCREASED NUMBER OF

ARMED INFILTRATORS TO THE SOUTHERN PART OF KOREA, SUCH INFILTRATIONS CULMINATING IN THE INTRUSION INTO SEOUL OF A PARTY OF 31

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~~SECRET~~

-3- SEOUL 4208, FEBRUARY 13

SECTION 1 OF 2

PAGE 5 RUALOS 4208E ~~SECRET~~

NORTH KOREAN ARMED INFILTRATORS ON JANUARY 21, 1968 AND IN THE

WANTON SEIZURE OF USS PUEBLO ON THE HIGH SEAS ON JANUARY 23, 1968;

WHEREAS BOTH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH AN ACT AS THE CASE OF THE ARMED INTRUSION INTO SEOUL BY THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNIST REGIME ON JANUARY 21, 1968, CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS MENACE TO THE SECURITY OF THE ROK:

WHEREAS THE AVOWED FINAL OBJECTIVE OF THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNISTS IS TO COMMUNIZE THE WHOLE OF KOREA BY INTENSIFYING SUCH AGGRESSIVE MILITARY ACTIVITIES:

AND WHEREAS THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNIST REGIME IS INTENT TO CARRY OUT SUCH SCHEME:

CONSIDERING THAT STRENGTHENING FURTHER THE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AGAINST POSSIBLE FUTURE INTRUSION INTO THE SOUTH OF THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNISTS WHICH WILL HEREAFTER CONTINUE, IS A MATTER OF URGENT NECESSITY, AND

PAGE 6 RUALOS 4208E/1 ~~SECRET~~

BY SO DOING, THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNISTS' INTENTION TO INVADE TO THE SOUTH COULD BE CHECKED:

WITH A VIEW TO REAFFIRMING THE SPIRIT OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY SIGNED ON OCTOBER 1, 1953, AND TO SUPPLEMENTING THE AGREED MINUTES SIGNED BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS ON NOVEMBER 17, 1954;

THE PLENIPOTENTIARIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES, MEETING IN SEOUL FROM FEBRUARY TO FEBRUARY

AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

BT

~~SECRET~~



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 3899Q

REC'D : FEBRUARY 13, 1968  
9:58AM

CO RUENC

DE RUALOS 4208E/2 0441405

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 131343Z FEB 68 ZFF-1

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9047

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SEOUL 4208

MODIS/CACTUS

VANTO 09

REF:I

EOULS 4207 VANTO 08

1. IN THE EVENT OF AN ARMED ATTACK AS DEFINED IN ARTICLE III OF THE ROK-US DEFENSE TREATY OF 1953 JXD OR IN CASE OF DISPATCH OF ARMED INFILTRATORS INTO THE SOUTHERN PART OF KOREA BY THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNISTS, IF SUCH ACT IS CONSIDERED TO CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WILL INDIVIDUALLY AND JOINTLY TAKE

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4208E/2 ~~SECRET~~  
IMMEDIATE COUNTER-ACTION AND/OR EFFECTIVE PUNITIVE MEASURES, CORRESPONDING TO AND COMMENSURATE WITH SUCH ACT OF AGGRESSION.

2. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES SHALL EXTEND TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOLLOWING SPECIAL MILITARY AIDS AND EXPAND AND STRENGTHEN THE FACILITIES RELATED THERETO:

THE SPECIAL MILITARY AID UNDER REFERENCE SHALL BE GRANTED APART FROM THE ORDINARY ANNUAL MILITARY AID, OF U.S. FISCAL YEAR 1968 AND THEREAFTER WILL NOT BE LESS THAN THOSE OF U.S. FISCAL YEAR 1967.

A. AUGMENTATION OF SIX (6) PHANTOM FIGHTER-BOMBER SQUADRONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

AIR ORCE AND SUPPORT THEREFOR:

U.S. FY 1968 TWO (2) SQUADRONS

U.S. FY 1969 TWO (2) SQUADRONS

U.S. FY 1972 TWO (2) SQUADRONS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SEOUL 4208, FEBRUARY 13

SECTION 2 OF 2

B. SUPPLY OF SMALL ARMS AND EQUIPMENT FOR  
ONE MILLION (1,000,000) MEN OF THE VETERANS

PAGE 3 RUALOS 4208E/2 ~~SECRET~~  
COPRS.

U.S. FY 1968	FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND (400,000)
U.S. FY 1969	THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (300,000)
U.S. FY 1970	THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (300,000)

C. THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN KOREA SHALL  
EXPAND AND AUGMENT THE EXISTING UNITED  
STATES AIR FORCE BASES IN KOREA, AND CONSTRUCT  
FOUR (4) ADDITIONAL TACTICAL AIR FORCE BASES  
IN KOREA DURING THE SAME PERIOD (FY 1968-1970).

3. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WILL  
CONSULT WITH, AND OBTAIN THE CONSENT OF, THE GOVERNMENT OF  
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, PRIOR TO MAKING ANY SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES  
IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF MEN AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES OF  
THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA OR CLOSE THERETO.

4. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE MINISTER OF

PAGE 3 RUALOS 4208E/2 ~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AND THE SECRETARY OF  
STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES ARE  
HEREBY DESIGNATED TO REPRESENT THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS AT  
A JOINT DEFENSE COUNCIL TO BE FORMED AS AN ORGAN FOR CONSULTATION  
ON THE MATTERS AS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE II OF THE SAID DEFENSE  
TREATY. THEY WILL MEET REGULARLY AT LEAST ONCE A YEAR FOR THE  
ABOVE PURPOSE, WHILE THEY MAY MEET FROM TIME TO TIME AS MAY BE  
REQUIRED.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (SIC)

PORTER

BT

~~SECRET~~



## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET~~Origin ACTION: AMEMBASSY SEOUL ~~XXXXX~~ IMMEDIATE

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Info

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-197

By sig, NARA Date 4-26-96

The following language has been cleared and may be useful to you in working up Joint Communique with Koreans:

Qte

1. President Park received Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, Special Envoy of the President of the United States of America on February 11 and February 12, 1968. Conversations between President Park and Mr. Vance were carried on in the presence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of National Defense, and other high officials of the Government. The American Ambassador William J. Porter and General C.H. Bonesteel, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command, also participated.
2. President Park and Mr. Vance fully exchanged views concerning the extremely grave situation that has arisen as a result of the increasingly aggressive and violent actions of North Korea over the last fourteen months in violation of the Armistice Agreement, and most recently the attack

Drafted by: KTF:JAYager/SDBerger/mam

Tel. Ext. 3263

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

U - The ~~XXXXX~~ Secretary

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Read

DOD/Mr. ~~XXXXXX~~ Warnke (draft)~~SECRET~~

L - Mr. Aldrich (draft)



Page 2 of telegram to SEOUL

~~SECRET~~

directed at the Presidential Mansion and the seizure of the USS Pueblo. They agreed that these actions of the North Koreans must be condemned by all civilized peoples. They also agreed that these aggressive actions seriously jeopardize the security of the area and if persisted in can lead to renewed hostilities in Korea. They agreed that a peaceful solution to these problems should be sought, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, but if the aggression continued, the two countries would need to consider what action should be taken under the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea.

3. President Park and Mr. Vance reaffirmed the commitment of the two countries to undertake immediate consultations between themselves and with other governments in the event the security of the Republic of Korea is threatened. They noted the extraordinary measures which had been taken within the last few weeks to strengthen the Korean and American forces in the area so as to leave them in a state of readiness to deal with any contingency which might arise.

4. The President and the United States Presidential Envoy also discussed the manner in which the additional \$100 million of the United States military assistance to the Republic of Korea recommended by President Johnson to the United States Congress should be allocated to best enhance the capability of the Korean military forces to defend their homeland. Unqte.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

20  
*Pres file*

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 13, 1968  
11:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker indicates that he would welcome a brief visit from Cy Vance; but he points to certain problems and suggests how they would be handled.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 19196

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 17796, Sec. 3.4(b)  
Site Mark Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
*RG*, NARA, Date 2-10-92



# Department of State

## TELEGRAM

200 # 4

Rostow

~~SECRET~~

OO RUEHC  
DE RUMJIR 19196 0441117  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 131100Z FEB 68  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6526  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CONTROL: 3868Q  
REC'D : FEB 13, 1968  
7:51 AM

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 19196

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 96-157

By ug, NARA Date 11-26-96

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BUNKER

MODIS

REF: STATE 113839

1. I WOULD WARMLY WELCOME A BRIEF VISIT TO VIETNAM BY CYRUS VANCE FOLLOWING HIS CURRENT KOREAN VISIT. I HAVE TALKED TO GENERAL WESTMORELAND WHO JOINS ME IN THESE VIEWS.

2. I SEE NO INSUPERABLE PROBLEMS ABOUT SUCH A VISIT IN TERMS OF THE GVN OR VIETNAMESE OPINION, PROVIDED VANCE'S VISIT IS CAREFULLY PLANNED AND EXPLAINED. I BELIEVE THE BASIC EXPLANATION SHOULD BE A VERY SIMPLE ONE, NAMELY THAT

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 19196 ~~SECRET~~  
SINCE HE WAS IN THE AREA THE PRESIDENT ASKED HIM TO STOP BY SAIGON TO TALK WITH THE TOP GVN LEADERS AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND MYSELF IN ORDER TO GIVE THE PRESIDENT THE BENEFIT OF HIS PERSONAL APPRECIATION OF RECENT EVENTS HERE, THE CURRENT SITUATION, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS. VANCE'S VISIT TO KOREA HAS BEEN PLAYED HERE AS THE PRODUCT OF A CRISIS IN US/ROK RELATIONS AND WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO AVOID ANY IMPLICATION OF "CRISIS" OR MAJOR DIFFICULTIES IN VIETNAM, EITHER WITH THE GVN OR IN BROADER TERMS. THE MORE ROUTINE "AD INFORMATION GATHERING" THE VISIT CAN BE MADE, THE BETTER.

3. YOU SHOULD HAVE IN MIND THAT THE AMERICAN AND FOREIGN PRESS CORPS HERE HAS BEEN GREATLY AUGMENTED DURING THE PAST WEEK OR SO, AND NO MATTER HOW THE VISIT IS HANDLED IT WILL RECIEVE TREMENDOUS NEWS PLAY. NO MATTER WHAT WE SAY, THERE WILL BE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF READING "CRISIS" INTO THE VISIT, BUT I BELIEVE THAT WE CAN COPE WITH THIS IN TERMS OF VANCE'S OWN STATEMENTS, AS WELL AS OUR BRIEFING OF THE PRESS HERE IN ADVANCE OF HIS ARRIVAL. VANCE'S ARRIVAL REMARKS AND ANSWERS TO PRESS QUERIES AT THE AIRPORT WILL PROBABLY BE THE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 19196, FEBRUARY 13

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 19196 ~~SECRET~~

BEST VEHICLE FOR DEALING WITH THIS PROBLEM BEFORE IT ACTUALLY BECOMES ONE.

4. HAVING IN MIND THIS PARTICULAR POINT I RECOMMEND THAT WE DEFER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS ARRIVAL UNTIL ABOUT 24 HOURS BEFORE HE IS DUE HERE. WE WOULD WANT TO INFORM THE TOP LEADERSHIP OF THE GVN, HOWEVER, AS SOON AS A DECISION IS MADE FOR HIM TO COME. ONCE THAT DECISION IS MADE I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING AUTHORIZATION TO TALK WITH THIEU AS SOON AS I CAN SEE HIM, SINCE HE IS SPENDING MOST OF THIS WEEK TRAVELING WIDELY THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND HE MAY BE RATHER DIFFICULT TO TRACK DOWN ON SHORT NOTICE. I WOULD PLAN TO EXPLAIN THE VISIT TO HIM VERY MUCH IN THE TERMS DESCRIBED ABOVE, EMPHASIZING THE PRESIDENT'S DESIRE TO HAVE A DIRECT PERSONAL APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION AND A REPORT ON THIEU'S OWN THOUGHTS ABOUT HOW WE MIGHT BE OF ASSISTANCE TO THEM IN HELPING THEM SOLVE THEIR PRESENT PROBLEMS AND MOVE AHEAD.

5. ~~CONSIDERATION MIGHT ALSO BE GIVEN TO HAVING VANCE BRING WITH HIM A WARM PERSONAL LETTER OR MESSAGE OF SUPPORT AND ENCOUR~~

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 19196 ~~SECRET~~

AGEMENT FROM THE PRESIDENT, DESIGNED FOR PUBLICATION UPON DELIVERY PROVIDED THIEU DESIRES THIS. I SUGGEST THAT ANY SUCH MESSAGE OR LETTER CONTAIN PRAISE FOR THE GVN'S AND THE RVNAF'S PERFORMANCE UNDER EXTREMELY DIFFICULT CONDITIONS, EXPRESS OUR DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL IN WHATEVER WAY WE CAN TO THE GVN, AND NOTE THE OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED BY THESE DEVELOPMENTS IN TERMS OF MOBILIZING AND PULLING TOGETHER THE NATIONALIST SPIRIT OF THE VIETNAMESE NATION AND PEOPLE. A REAFFIRMATION OF OUR GENERAL COMMITMENT TO THE FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE OF VIETNAM WOULD BE A NATURAL PART OF ANY SUCH COMMUNICATION.

6. IN TERMS OF THE VISIT ITSELF, I RECOMMEND THAT IT BE BRIEF, AS PROPOSED IN REFTTEL. I WOULD THINK THAT TWO TO THREE DAYS WOULD BE ADEQUATE. THIS WOULD ALLOW ONE FULL DAY IN SAIGON FOR BRIEFING ON THE U.S. SIDE AND MEETINGS WITH THE TOP LEADERSHIP OF THE GVN. ANOTHER FULL DAY MIGHT BE DEVOTED TO A FIELD TRIP TO VARIOUS I CORPS AREAS. ANY REMAINING TIME WOULD BE DEVOTED TO FINAL CONSULTATION IN SAIGON.

7. AS YOU INDICATED IN YOUR MESSAGE, ~~WE WILL WANT TO HAVE A~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 19196, FEBRUARY 13

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 19196 ~~SECRET~~

FURTHER EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON QUESTIONS THAT VANCE WILL WANT TO PURSUE WITH BOTH WESTMORELAND AND ME, AS WELL AS WITH THE GVN. IN TERMS OF TALKS WITH THE GVN, SUPPLEMENTING THE MAIN THEMES CONTAINED IN ANY MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, I THINK WE WOULD WANT TO LAY EMPHASIS ON A NUMBER OF POINTS WHICH I HAVE BEEN MAKING TO PRESIDENT THIEU DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS AND ON WHICH I BELIEVE WE ARE IN BROAD AGREEMENT. THESE WOULD INCLUDE: A) THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES, WHILE RECOGNIZING THE NECESSITY FOR CERTAIN URGENT SECURITY MEASURES; B) THE OPPORTUNITY OFFERED FOR THE NATIONALIST CAUSE IN VIETNAM PROVIDED THE GOVERNMENT EXHIBITS LEADERSHIP AND INSPIRATION FOR THE PEOPLE, WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT WE DO NOT EXPECT MIRACLES; C) THE IMPORTANCE OF RAPIDLY RETURNING CONDITIONS TO AS CLOSE TO NORMAL AS POSSIBLE AND MOVING AHEAD WITH PRIORITY PROGRAMS ALREADY AGREED BETWEEN US; D) OUR WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST IN EVERY WAY WE CAN IN URGENT RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS, SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITIES THAT RECENT EVENTS OFFER FOR IMPROVING LIVING AND HOUSING CONDITIONS FOR THE PEOPLE IN THE DESTROYED AREAS. THIS WOULD MEAN FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL AID IN CONSIDERABLE MEASURE.

PAGE 6 RUMJIR 19196 ~~SECRET~~

THIS MIGHT ALSO INVOLVE INCREASED ASSISTANCE IN TERMS OF IMPROVED MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE RVNAF, RF/PF AND POLICE FORCES TO MEET THEIR INCREASED NEEDS AND TO COMPENSATE FOR THE SUPERIOR WEAPONRY OF THE ENEMY. E) IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR VANCE TO DESCRIBE THE PROBLEMS CREATED FOR US BY U.S. PUBLIC REACTIONS TO RECENT EVENTS HERE, PARTICULARLY THE PRESSURE OF CRITICS WHO FEEL THE ENEMY MAY HAVE GOTTEN THE UPPER HAND PSYCHOLOGICALLY AS THE RESULT OF THEIR ATTACKS. ONCE AGAIN HE COULD STRESS THE NEED FOR BROAD NATIONALIST COOPERATION AND IMAGINATIVE LEADERSHIP BY THE GVN AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO COUNTER THIS IMPRESSION. F) IT WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO MAKE THE GENERAL POINT TO THIEU THAT WITH THE ENEMY'S MAXIMUM USE OF HIS RESOURCES FOR THIS RECENT SOLUTION TO VIETNAM AND NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE OR SAID WHICH MIGHT STAND IN THE WAY OF FRUITFUL TALKS OR OTHER ACCEPTABLE MEANS TO THIS END.

8. THERE ARE A FEW VIEWS WHICH OCCUR TO US AT THE MOMENT AND WESTMORELAND AND I WILL TRY TO ELABORATE ON THEM AFTER RECEIVING FURTHER COMMENTS FROM WASHINGTON. SPECIFICALLY, WESTMORELAND WILL WISH TO DISCUSS HIS OWN URGENT REQUIREMENTS WHICH HE SUBMITTED IN HIS TELEGRAM OF FEBRUARY 12. BUNKER

BT

~~SECRET~~



Pres. File

21

Tuesday, Feb. 13, 1968  
11:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

I asked Ben Read who, in State, had talked to Pucinski. Ben said that the story is perfectly straightforward. Last Wednesday, Sect. Rusk briefed a good many members of the House in one of his off-the-record morning sessions. He stated that there had been an emissary in Hanoi.

Macomber reports that Pucinski decided he would be "doing the Administration a favor" by revealing this information imparted to him in confidence. No one in State told him he could do this.

W. W. Rostow

P. S. Sect. Rusk spoke in response to a question from Representative Carey. The Secretary indicated the emissary was "foreign." Representative Carey is now calling into the State Department to find out what results we had from the emissary.

*Pres Lee*

*22*

Tuesday, Feb. 13, 1968  
11:30 a. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mr. President:

Herewith Bus Wheeler's supplementary report  
from Westy.

Westy's cheering up a bit.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachments (CM 3007-68 13 Feb 68)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By af, NARA, Date 2-10-92



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3007-68  
13 February 1968

22a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Telephone Conversation with General Westmoreland

1. I conferred by telephone with General Westmoreland at 0800 hours. In addition to the brief of operations attached hereto and his ninth report on the Khe Sanh area which has already been provided to you, he provided the following comments on the situation:

a. A rallier from the 812th Regiment of the NVA 324B Division, currently located south of Quang Tri, stated that enemy propaganda to North Vietnamese troops emphasizes four points: (1) 80% of South Vietnam has been liberated by the enemy during the Tet offensive; (2) the war will end if every man and unit put forth maximum effort; (3) the ARVN is deserting to the enemy in large numbers; (4) the United States has no more troops to furnish to the South Vietnamese conflict.

b. The situation is looking better to him in all areas. US Marines had a heavy contact during the day near Hue, and the 1st Cavalry Division had a heavy contact north of Hue. He does not have details of this action as yet.

c. The Soviet model 120 mm mortar was employed yesterday near Can Tho in the Delta for the first time.

d. Dalat has been cleared of enemy forces.

e. Enemy elements still hang on in the Citadel in Hue. The third of the three ARVN Marine Battalions which will replace the ARVN Airborne Battalions in this action will move into Hue tomorrow. The situation in the Hue area was

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Authority JCS 10-378  
By sp/rg, NARA, Date 2-10-91

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better today enabling air support to be employed; the forecast is that the weather will be better tomorrow also.

f. In Saigon, small enemy groups continue to be encountered in Cholon, but there appears to be no organized resistance. There have been sporadic contacts with enemy groups of 20 to 30 men to the north of Saigon.

g. The C-130 which was damaged by enemy fire while delivering supplies in Khe Sanh has been repaired and flown out. This was a gallant, dangerous, and tough effort because the repair crews had to work all night with lights shielded in order to avoid enemy fire.

h. The Riverine Force moved by water to the vicinity of Can Tho yesterday afternoon (Saigon time). Its objective is an enemy force south of Can Tho. He ordered this deployment in order to demonstrate that US forces are helping the ARVN in the area because VC propaganda directed at the population has stated that US forces have joined with VC forces to destroy the ARVN and overthrow the Saigon government.

i. He is employing additional barrier sensors and gravel in the Khe Sanh area. Preliminary information indicates that this effort is being helpful.

2. General Bruce Clarke and Mr. Frank Mayborn of Temple, Texas, met with General Westmoreland yesterday. Both seemed to be impressed by what they had seen.

3. He regrets that I cannot come to Saigon and visit with him now; he hopes that I can come later when things have quieted down so that he can discuss the over-all situation with me.

4. General Westmoreland raised with me rather diffidently the quantity and the detail of reports being requested of him from Washington. Back channel traffic has been extremely heavy and

~~SECRET~~

duplicative requests for information are frequent. A recent request for much detail to be on the wires from his headquarters at 0400 hours in the morning is requiring him to change his reporting cycle in order to honor the request. He expressed the hope that, except for the daily telephone conversations with me, requests for information can be handled through the NMCC in order to preclude duplication and reduce volume. Note: The NMCC has constantly opened and manned at both ends a voice circuit to the MACV Combat Operations Center as well as a teletype service.

*Earle G. Wheeler*

EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

*P.S. Inadvertently omitted from the above:  
General Westmoreland expressed his  
gratitude at the prompt affirmative  
response to his request for troop  
reinforcements.*

*W*



~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~Operational/Intelligence Briefs

A lull in significant military activity continues in all Corps areas. Determined enemy pockets are still holding out in Hue and Saigon.

I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE: On 11 February, 12 nautical miles Northwest of Hue, elements of the 1st Cavalry Division received 100 rounds of 82-mm mortar fire. Losses -- US: 3 KIA, 28 WIA.

Khe Sanh Combat Base received 32 rounds of 60/82-mm enemy mortar fire. A US Marine company outpost also received 5 rounds of 82-mm mortar fire. Losses -- 2 US WIA.

An ARVN 37th Ranger Battalion patrol engaged an unknown size enemy force 500 meters Southeast of Khe Sanh Airfield. No further information is available at this time.

House-to-house fighting continues in Hue in an effort to eliminate enemy resistance.

On 12 February, a Highway 1 bridge 11 nautical miles Northwest of Da Nang was destroyed.

On 12 February, 6 nautical miles Northeast of Quang Ngai, elements of 2 US Army infantry companies engaged an enemy force of unknown size. Losses -- US: 1 KIA, 4 WIA; VC/NVA: 78 KIA, 3 detained.

23 small-unit contacts were reported. Losses -- US: 1 KIA, 12 WIA; VC/NVA: 31 KIA, 8 detained.

II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE: A US Army airborne company engaged a reinforced enemy company 7 nautical miles South Southwest of Ban Me Thuot. Losses -- US: 2 KIA, 20 WIA, 6 MIA; VC/NVA: unknown.

III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE: On 11 February, 17 nautical miles East Northeast of Saigon, a US Army light fire team made contact with an enemy force of unknown size. A US Army platoon and 2 ARVN companies reinforced the fire team. Losses -- US: 10 KIA, 4 WIA; ARVN: 4 KIA, 3 WIA; VC/NVA: unknown.

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-141-021-025/1  
By jc, NARA, Date 10-30-09

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Enclosure to  
CM-3007-68 of  
13 Feb 1968

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

On 12 February, the Bien Hoa Air Base was hit by 10 rounds of 122-mm rocket fire. Losses -- US: 1 WIA. Two C-123s and one C-130 were damaged.

Clearing operations continue in Saigon with reduced number of contacts.

On 11 February, 15 nautical miles Southwest of Saigon, a US Army infantry company engaged an enemy force of unknown size. Losses -- VC/NVA: 9 KIA, 2 detained. 26,000 rounds of small arms ammunition were seized.

On 12 February, 25 nautical miles Southwest of Saigon, a Regional Force company engaged an enemy force of unknown size. Losses -- US: 1 WIA; Regional Force: 4 KIA, 12 WIA, 1 MIA; VC/NVA: 22 KIA, 24 detained.

IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONE: On 12 February, 4 nautical miles North Northwest of My Tho, ARVN 7th Division continued its search and destroy operation. Losses since 11 February -- ARVN: 3 KIA, 15 WIA; VC/NVA: 30 KIA, 1 detained.

An ARVN search and destroy operation 3 nautical miles Southwest of My Tho terminated on 12 February. Losses -- ARVN: 1 KIA, 5 WIA; VC/NVA: 42 KIA.

On 11 February, the Can Tho Airfield received 15 rounds of 82-mm fire. Six AH-1G helicopters received minor damage. There were no personnel casualties.

On 11 February, 33 nautical miles East Southeast of Can Tho, two ARVN battalions reported heavy contact with two enemy companies. Losses -- ARVN: 3 WIA; VC/NVA: 40 KIA, 26 detained.

At a special cabinet meeting on 11 February, President Thieu made the following points, 25x1

25x1 (1) He is going to ask the National Assembly for emergency powers for one year; (2) the government plans to mobilize 65,000 troops in the next six months rather than in the next 12 months as first planned, with a 20,000 troop

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

call-up before 1 March; (2) civil defense training and weapons will be given to civil servants; (4) self-defense units will be issued side arms, but political or religious groups will not be armed; (5) ministers were told to be tightfisted with expenditures; (7) excise and sales tax is to be increased immediately; (8) dance halls/bars are to be closed permanently.

Four USAF F-4Ds engaged two MIG-21s 73 nautical miles Northeast of Hanoi. COMINT confirms 1  MIG-21 was shot down in this engagement.

25x3

The three IL-14s that took off from Gia Lam Airfield on the evening of 12 February reached the Vinh area, then turned back, apparently landing at Gai Thuong. Shortly after transports were airborne from Gia Lam, Vinh had suggested the mission be cancelled because of weather. Still later, Vinh advised Hanoi that the aircraft could not land at Vinh because of delayed action and antipersonnel bombs which had been dropped on the field. Vinh Airfield was bombed by US aircraft on the 12th. There was no indication as to the mission of the IL-14s.

The discovery of SAM Site 278 (occupied) a few miles North of the central DMZ area, along with the nearby Site 274 (occupied), emphasizes the continuing SA-2 threat in the region. Both sites have unrevetted positions and are located in an abandoned orchard. There are also nine other suitable sites for firing positions in this area. Seven other SAM sites above the DMZ have been abandoned after US air strikes.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

INFORMATION

23

Tuesday, February 13, 1968 - 11:15 am

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

The Economist continues to be the best balanced, coolest commentator on the Battle of Vietnam.

The marked quotation from Napoleon is highly relevant. As supply movements down the Laos trails indicate, they are going to put their stack into the I Corps offensive. We've got to be ready to do the same.

W. W. Rostow

The Economist  
The Battle Decides  
February 10, 1968

WWRostow:rla



## The Battle Decides

23a

General Westmoreland is hard pressed, all right—  
but can North Vietnam and the Vietcong pull  
a political victory out of their military gamble?

Never claim that a battle is won or lost when three-quarters of the fighting is still to come. The men who fight wars know better than that. They leave it to the armchair strategists to announce in March 1918 that this time the Germans really have broken through in France, or in September 1950 that the Inchon landing has virtually wound up the Korean war. The history of war is studded with battles that didn't end the way they started.

The armchair strategists are now having a field day with Vietnam. But the fact is that the great battle which opened on January 30th has run only a fraction of its course. By Thursday General Giap had not yet committed himself at Khe Sanh, up in the corner between the demilitarised zone and the Laos border. His North Vietnamese regulars, using tanks for the first time, have overrun one outpost manned by South Vietnamese irregulars. Those tanks must be worrying the Americans; even a few of these surprise arrivals can do a lot under cover of the monsoon clouds. But it is taking General Giap a long time to make up his mind for a go at the main American position at Khe Sanh. Nor has the fight for the towns reached an end. General Westmoreland's forces have reoccupied most of the coastal cities, and part of the citadel at Huế. The Vietcong is still holding out in parts of Saigon, and in a number of towns in the southern delta and the central hills. The full evidence is simply not in yet. It will not be in until 20 or 30 separate actions, probably including the set-piece slogging match at Khe Sanh, have been fought through to a finish. And until the evidence is in, hasty political conclusions are hostages to the battle itself.

The conclusion the North Vietnamese and their allies want

people to draw is plain enough. They are claiming that, whatever happens in the towns and at Khe Sanh, they have as good as won the war. By carrying the fighting from the countryside into the towns, they say, they have destroyed such credibility as the South Vietnamese government won from last year's elections. The quarter of South Vietnam's population that has been living in the relative security of the towns will be so frightened of another attack that it will be ready to pack the whole thing in. The allies, having been challenged in the towns, will conclude that the slow but steady gains they have been making in the countryside since 1965 have been wiped out. They will reckon that the clock has been pushed back three whole years or more. And the Americans will feel so depressed that they will wash their hands of Vietnam and go home.

This is the communist claim, and it has already been accepted by some people without demur. The Vietcong have plainly done very well. Their attacks on the towns have turned out to be something considerably bigger than a diversion by suicide squads to pull American troops away from the confrontation at Khe Sanh. It is still unlikely that it was the other way round—that Khe Sanh is the actual diversion—if only because it has not diverted anything very much. The Americans seem to have moved no more than one brigade of troops from farther south to support the beleaguered marines in the north. No matter: there is no dodging the fact that the move against the towns caught the allies unprepared.

Yet there is something curious about the communists' claim. What they are claiming is essentially a psychological more

than a military victory. They are saying that this battle will force the allies to reassess their attitude to the war, and they are saying it before they know how the battle ends. This suggests that the communists are not at all confident that they are going to get the best of the present test of arms: that they suspect they may neither take Khe Sanh nor hold the towns. It reinforces the belief that they are staking a great deal on an attempt to rattle the allies into making concessions before the fighting has yielded its own verdict. It is rather as if the Kaiser had announced early in his March 1918 offensive that France and Britain now had no choice but to negotiate on his terms.

But this is not how wars are decided. The war in Vietnam is unusual in many ways. It is a strange combination of guerrilla tactics and science-fiction technology; it is unique in the fact that it is being fought out under the television camera's eye. But for all that it is going to be decided by the criteria that govern how all wars are won or lost: by who holds the ground; by who suffers the fewer casualties; by who can replace his casualties best. Sooner or later in every war one combatant, measuring it in these terms, decides that he has had enough. And it is by these criteria, not by premature claims of victory by either side, that the present battle will have to be judged.

There are two things in particular that are worth pointing out. The first is about the towns. If the allies succeed in clearing the Vietcong out of the towns—and they must, if they want to keep the upper hand—the situation the retreating guerrillas leave behind will not be what the communists claim it will be. The Vietcong will have intimidated many people. They will have demonstrated that the towns are no havens of security. That is a score to them. But they have not managed to whistle up any sign of the “general uprising” they called for, except in the Chinese township of Cholon (which is an odd achievement for a movement that claims to be a Vietnamese nationalist one) and perhaps in Hué too. And the frightened townspeople they leave behind will not want to see them come back. It is often said that the allies’ sweeps through the countryside turn the local people against them. The people who say that cannot now say that the Vietcong’s sweep through the cities will work any differently. People who want no more than to keep the war out of their homes will go along with whoever is trying to ward the other side off. It is the old war rule: what counts is control of the ground.

The second point is about the situation in the countryside after the towns have been cleared. It is a grisly near-certainty that Vietcong execution squads have taken their chance

during the confusion in the towns to kill a lot of village officials and a lot of the young idealists who work in the Revolutionary Development teams. It will be another score to them. But against this must be set the swathe that the town fighting has cut through the Vietcong’s ranks. The allied estimates—25,000 Vietcong dead by Thursday—are doubtless too high. They presumably include many civilians found in the ruins, as well as guesswork by platoon commanders who haven’t the time to stop and count. But even if that figure is halved the attackers’ casualties have been enormous.

The Vietcong have put something like half of their available main-force units into this offensive. It was probably the better half, and included many of the North Vietnamese who have been sent south to stiffen the already battered guerrilla battalions. Half this attacking force will very likely never get back to base. That would be the equivalent of nearly a year’s local supply of recruits. This grinding in the town battle is bound to tell if the war goes on. It will affect the Vietcong’s hold on its own part of the countryside as well as its ability to move back into the areas it has lost in the past 18 months. The communists can make these calculations too. They presumably made them in 1965, when an attack on the towns would have been much easier because they were stronger and the Americans were weaker. The fact that they are doing now what they refrained from doing in 1965 is another reason for thinking that they are now betting very heavily indeed on pulling a political victory out of a military gamble.

Napoleon said that providence is always on the side of the last reserve. President Johnson is playing his Far East crisis as cool as he can: in Korea (see page 26) as well as Vietnam. Mr Wilson, visiting Washington, does not need to urge any restraint on him. But there has been a touch of something close to mysticism in what some other people have been claiming. They have decided that the communists are invincible because their reserves are limitless and they can go on raising new armies as long as they like. Marxists who believe that people are neatly divided into “the people” and a handful of oppressors may accept this. Non-marxists are under no obligation to believe anything of the sort. And if the North Vietnamese themselves believed it, it is odd that they should have risked so much on this cataclysmic push for a quick decision. Life is more complicated than that, and so is war. What is at stake now in Vietnam is not whether there should be negotiations, or who should take part in them. It is whether the communists should come to the negotiating table claiming the right to name their terms. That will be decided by the battle—and not just by its first few days.



**Tuesday, February 13, 1968  
10:35 a.m.**

*Pres file*

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith nine questions you may  
wish to use at lunch today.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**WWRostow:rlm**

QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE CALL-UP OF RESERVE UNITS  
AND INDIVIDUALS

1. Why is it necessary to call up reserve units at this time?
  - a. To be ready for further reinforcement of Viet-Nam?
  - b. To be ready for other contingencies outside Viet-Nam?
  - c. To reassure allies such as NATO to whom we have military commitments?
  - d. To contribute to our overall deterrent posture by adding to our visible strength in being?
2. How large should the call-up be to satisfy the foregoing requirements? Can the call-up be diminished by such devices as a reduction in our overseas garrisons in Europe or Korea?
3. Why is it necessary to call up individual reservists at this time? Can't it be avoided or postponed? If not, how many must be called? When? From what sources?
4. What will happen to the reserve units and individuals called up? Where will they go? How long will they serve? Are the necessary housing, equipment, and training facilities ready for them?
5. What are the budgetary implications of these actions?
6. What must be requested from the Congress? What can be avoided or delayed?
7. What will be the manpower requirements for maintaining these increased forces? What will the effect be on draft calls?
8. What will be the domestic and international reactions to these decisions?
9. How should our decision be explained to the domestic and international public? What should be the timing of our statement?

February 13, 1968

*Prepared by  
Gen Taylor*

INFORMATION

25

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*

Tuesday, February 13, 1968  
10:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Quang Tri is a quite exposed city  
in I Corps.

This report -- like others --  
shows it continues to be wobbly.

W. W. Rostow

TDCS 314/02654-68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

Authority CIA letter 9/79

By isp/rg, NARA, Date 2-14-92

STATE (RCL)  
CIA-OCI  
ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO  
CITE TDCS-314/02654-68 (ADVANCE)  
REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM  
SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT IN I CORPS  
AS OF 0900 HOURS ON 13 FEBRUARY.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-200

By us, NARA Date 7-10-98

25a

1.5c

3.4(b)(1)

ACQ: VIETNAM, DANANG (11-13 FEBRUARY 1968)  
SOURCE: THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT ON 13 FEBRUARY  
PREPARED BY CAS

1.5(c)

3.4(b)(1)

SUMMARY: CONDITIONS WERE QUIET WITH A CONTINUING NORMAL TREND IN I CORPS. ONLY SMALL-SCALE ENEMY ACTION WAS REPORTED. MORALE HAS DECLINED IN QUANG TRI CITY AS A RESULT OF RUMORS THAT THERE ARE VC INSIDE THE CITY AND THAT NVA UNITS ARE MOVING TOWARD THE CITY, MOSTLY UNTRUE. OTHER FACTORS WERE THE 11 FEBRUARY ROCKET ATTACK ON THE CITY, WHICH COST NO LIVES BUT PROVED THE ENEMY CAN STILL ATTACK, AND THE DEPARTURE OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS EMPLOYED BY THE AMERICANS. IN DANANG RESIDENTS HAVE FORTIFIED THEIR HOUSES IN MANY INSTANCES, EVEN THOUGH THE PRESSURE IS AT LEAST TEMPORARILY OFF. SOME ARE CONCERNED THAT BUDDHIST UNREST WILL FOLLOW THE LIFTING OF THE CURFEW, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE BUDDHISTS ARE PLANNING ANY ACTION. LEAFLETS RECOVERED IN QUANG TIN ANNOUNCED THE FORMATION OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY AND APPEAL FOR NEGOTIATION WITH THE NLSV TO RESTORE PEACE. AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT FROM QUANG TIN ALLEGES THAT A VC CADRE SAID THAT THE SECOND AND THIRD PHASES OF VC ATTACKS WILL BE FROM 20 FEBRUARY TO MARCH AND FROM MARCH TO MAY RESPECTIVELY. END SUMMARY.

1. ON 12 FEBRUARY FREE WORLD AND ALLIED FORCES MADE A SWEEP OF THE RD AREA IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, RESULTING IN 12 ENEMY KIA, ONE A RANKING OFFICER OF THE 808TH VC MAIN FORCE BATTALION, ATTACHED TO THE 5TH NVA REGIMENT. BEFORE DAWN A FORCE OF UNKNOWN SIZE WAS BEING ENGAGED WEST OF AI TU WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS. THE ENEMY IS STILL EXERTING PRESSURE ON LINES OF COMMUNICATION, MOSTLY BY INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS. HAI LANG DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS RECEIVED A FEW MORTAR ROUNDS WITHOUT SUFFERING MAJOR DAMAGE. QUANG TRI CITY SPENT A QUIET NIGHT.

2. BY 11 FEBRUARY THE MORALE OF THE PEOPLE IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE HAD BEGUN TO DETERIORATE WITH RUMORS OF VC INSIDE THE CITY, A ROCKET ATTACK ON THE CITY, ALLEGED MOVEMENT OF NVA TROOPS TOWARD THE CITY, THE DEPARTURE OF THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS (FILIPINOS) WHO WORK FOR THE AMERICANS, AND CONTINUED VC CONTROL OF PARTS OF HUE CITY. ON 11 FEBRUARY THE PROVINCE CHIEF ORDERED A DAILY 1400 TO 0900 HOURS CURFEW IN QUANG TRI CITY "TO CONTROL THE POPULATION." THE PROVINCE CHIEF AND MOST ARVN AND GVN OFFICIALS HAVE A PASSIVE ATTITUDE, AND IN THE FACE OF REPORTS THAT TRIEU PHONG DISTRICT WAS TO BE ATTACKED, THE VIETNAMESE LITERALLY JUST FILLED MORE SANDBAGS, GIVING IN TO THE INEVITABLE.

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS HAVE INDICATED THAT THE VC WERE GOING TO DISGUISE THEMSELVES AS REFUGEES, ARVN SOLDIERS, AND SO FORTH TO INFILTRATE THE CITY. THERE IS HOWEVER, NO EVIDENCE THAT MANY HAVE SUCCEEDED, AND REGULAR POLICE CHECKS OF POPULATION MOVEMENTS HAVE TURNED UP RELATIVELY FEW SUSPECTS. ENEMY ROCKETS WERE THROWN INTO THE CITY ABOUT 0130 ON 11 FEBRUARY, RESULTING IN NO INJURIES, BUT THE DAMAGE TO THE MOVIE THEATRE WAS DRAMATIC PROOF THAT THE CITY WAS STILL NOT SAFE. THERE WERE RUMORS THAT THE 95TH NVA REGIMENT WAS MOVING FROM WEST OF AI TU AIRSTRIP TOWARD QUANG TRI CITY. THE 95TH WAS SUPPOSED TO BE ONE OF THE UNITS (MISSING PORTION) ON TWO OCCASIONS RUMORS OF NVA UNITS IN OTHER AREAS WERE SPIKED WHEN IT WAS LEARNED THAT U.S. TROOPS HAD BEEN OPERATING FOR TWO DAYS IN EACH OF THE AREAS WITHOUT CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY.

4. IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE HOI AN AND DANANG CITIES HAD QUIET NIGHTS, WITH BOTH CONTINUING TO RETURN TO NORMAL. IN DANANG, ALTHOUGH THE PRESSURE IS TEMPORARILY OFF, LOCAL CITIZENS HAVE BEEN SANDBAGGING THEIR HOMES AND TAKING PRECAUTIONS IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER ENEMY ATTACK. A RESIDENT OF A VILLAGE AT THE NORTHWEST EDGE OF DANANG SAID THAT THE PEOPLE ANTICIPATE BUDDHIST UNREST AFTER THE CURFEW IS LIFTED. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS THAT THE BUDDHISTS ARE PLANNING SUCH MOVES, CONCERN PROBABLY IS TO BE EXPECTED AFTER THE DISRUPTION OF THE 1966 BUDDHIST STRUGGLE. A VNQDD MEMBER HAS STATED THAT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO JUDGE THE ATTITUDES OF THE PEOPLE. THEY ARE NOT TALKING VERY MUCH AND EVIDENTLY ARE KEEPING THEIR OPINIONS TO THEMSELVES. BEGINNING ON 13 FEBRUARY THE CURFEW IN DANANG IS RELAXED FROM 0800 TO 1200 HOURS, GIVING THE PEOPLE FOUR HOURS FOR BUSINESS AND SHOPPING.

5. IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE THE VC MORTARED 6TH ARVN REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS THE NIGHT OF 12/13 FEBRUARY. THE OLD USAID COMPOUND IN TAM KY CITY RECEIVED TWO B-40 ROCKET ROUNDS AND ONE MORTAR ROUND OF UNKNOWN CALIBER. THERE WAS SOME PROPERTY DAMAGE BUT NO PERSONAL INJURIES. CONDITIONS IN TAM KY AND QUANG NGAI CITY REFLECTED A CONTINUING NORMAL TREND.

6. VC LEAFLETS RECOVERED IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE AFTER THE ATTACK OF 31 JANUARY CALL UPON THE PEOPLE TO STRIVE FOR PEACE, DEMOCRACY AND HAPPINESS. A NUMBER OF VC SAFE-CONDUCT PASSES WERE FOUND AROUND THE CITY. A LEAFLET DATED 31 JANUARY 1968 IS SIGNED BY THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES. ANOTHER, UNSIGNED, STATES THAT INFORMATION FROM SAIGON TELLS OF THE FORMATION OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY (LIEN MINH CAC LU LUONG DAN TOC VA HOA BINH).



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TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM  
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STATE (RCI)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FINAL SECTION OF TWO  
CITE TDCS-314/02654-68 (ADVANCE)

SEVERAL BUSINESSMEN AND REPRESENTATIVES OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND RELIGIONS SUPPORT THE APPEAL OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS AND NEGOTIATION WITH THE NFLSV TO RESTORE PEACE. THE LEAFLET SAYS THAT A DECLARATION HAD BEEN RELEASED IN HUE CALLING UPON ALL PEOPLE TO SUPPORT THE ORGANIZATION, WHICH WAS READ BY LE VAN HAO.

7. (COMMENT: THE CONSULATE IN DANANG REPORTED ON THE BROADCAST ANNOUNCING THE FORMATION OF THE ALLIANCE. REGIONAL POLICE IN DANANG HAVE STATED THAT LE VAN HAO, PROFESSOR AT HUE UNIVERSITY, AND HOANG PHU NGOC TUONG, A 1966 STRUGGLE MOVEMENT LEADER WHO FLED TO A VC ZONE AFTER THE MOVEMENT WAS CRUSHED, HEAD THE ALLIANCE. TUONG AND HIS BROTHER HOANG PHU NGOC PHAN, WERE MILITANT LEADERS IN THE 1966 BUDDHIST STRUGGLE MOVEMENT AND CONSIDERED BY MANY TO BE COMMUNIST. THEY ADVOCATED A PEACEFUL, NEUTRALIST SOLUTION TO THE WAR. IN EARLY 1967, THEY WERE INVOLVED IN AN EFFORT TO RENEW THE STRUGGLE.

REPORTED THAT HAO OBTAINED A MASTERS DEGREE IN LETTERS IN FRANCE, WAS A STRONG SUPPORTER OF THE BUDDHIST STRUGGLE, AND WAS BEING SOUGHT BY POLICE IN NOVEMBER 1966 TO CLARIFY HIS ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE STRUGGLE.)

8. A POLICE INFORMANT WHO LIVES IN KY NGHIA VILLAGE, IN A VC-CONTROLLED AREA OF TAM KY DISTRICT, QUANG TIN PROVINCE, REPORTED THAT ON 6 FEBRUARY A VC PROVINCIAL PUBLIC SECURITY CADRE SAID THAT THERE WERE TO BE THREE LARGE ATTACKS BY THE VC. THE FIRST WAS CARRIED OUT DURING THE TET FESTIVAL, THE SECOND WILL BE CARRIED OUT BETWEEN 20 FEBRUARY AND MARCH, AND THE THIRD WILL OCCUR BETWEEN MARCH AND MAY. THE VC PLAN IS TO ISOLATE U.S. TROOPS IN ORDER TO LAUNCH SUCCESSFUL ATTACKS ON GVN FORCES.

(COMMENT: NO ADDITIONAL DETAILS WERE PROVIDED ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ACQUISITION.)

9. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV CORDS III MAF 7TH AF  
USARV COMNAVFORV USAID DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY)  
CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF (ALSO SENT SAIGON)  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Tuesday, February 13, 1968  
10:05 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith reports on Route 1 and Route 4.

Clearly, Route 1 is not open and it will take a sustained security effort to open it and keep it open. Route 4 is also going to take some sustained effort.

Also attached is the weather report for I Corps during the next 24 hours.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By reg, NARA, Date 2-10-92

~~SECRET~~



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

*Ristow*  
*Hea*  
13 February 1968  
0900 EST

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Status of Routes 1 and 4 in South Vietnam

1. Latest information received from MACV indicates that the status of Route 1 between Da Nang and Hue as of 2:15 AM EST on 12 February (3:15 PM, 12 February Saigon time) is as follows:

Seven bridges are reported out, trenches and road blocks are reported in four separate locations and culverts are blown in three places. It is estimated that the road can be made passable in four to seven days provided security can be maintained.

2. The status of Route 4 in IV Corps area is as follows:

The road is open from the IV Corps boundary to Giao Duc, 63 miles southwest of Saigon, where a bridge is out. Additionally, four segments are closed south of the river. Providing security can be maintained, it is estimated that the road will be repaired by 15 February.

*James A. Shannon*  
JAMES A. SHANNON  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
By *18* NARA Date *2-09-92*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301


13 February 1968  
0600 EST

*Feb*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Weather Report - Khe Sanh, Hue and Da Nang  
Areas

1. Attached are weather reports for the Khe Sanh, Hue and Da Nang areas for the period 7:00 AM EST today (8:00 PM today, South Vietnam time) to 7:00 AM EST 14 February (8:00 PM South Vietnam time, 14 February).
2. Khe Sanh area - The weather forecast indicates that helicopter and fixed wing aircraft operations can be conducted during the 24 hour forecast period except during the periods of darkness and the early morning daylight hours (dawn to 10:00 AM South Vietnam time).
3. Hue and Da Nang areas - The weather forecast, for the next 24 hours, indicates that helicopter and fixed wing aircraft operations can be conducted into and out of Hue and Da Nang airports.
4. The outlook for the following 24 hour period, beginning at 7:00 AM EST on Wednesday, 14 February 1968 is for cloudiness and little change.

  
JAMES A. SHANNON  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

3 Atch  
a/s

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E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5 1988

By *18* NARA, Date 2-10-92

266

KHE SANH WEATHER

1. Latest observation:

Cloudy. 800' broken, 1200' broken. Visibility 7 miles.

2. Forecast (by periods):

- a. From 7:00 AM EST 13 Feb (8:00 PM 13 Feb SVN time) to 9:00 PM EST 13 Feb (10:00 AM 14 Feb SVN time)

200' obscured, visibility 1/2 mile with drizzle and fog. Wind calm.

- b. From 9:00 PM EST 13 Feb (10:00 AM 14 Feb SVN time) to 5:00 AM EST 14 Feb (6:00 PM 14 Feb SVN time)

500' scattered variable to broken, 1500' overcast. Visibility 5 miles, haze. Occasional rainshowers.

- c. From 5:00 AM EST 14 Feb (6:00 PM 14 Feb SVN time) to 7:00 AM EST 14 Feb (8:00 PM 14 Feb SVN time)

300' broken, 1500' overcast. Visibility 1 to 3 miles with fog and haze. Wind east 5 knots.

3. The outlook for the 24-hour period beginning at 7:00 AM EST on Wednesday, 14 February (8:00 PM 14 Feb SVN time), is for continued cloudy and little change from the above forecast,

26d

## HUE WEATHER

### 1. Latest observation:

Cloudy. 1200' scattered, 4000' broken, 12,000 broken.  
Visibility 7 miles. Wind northwest 10 knots.

### 2. Forecast (by Periods):

- a. From 7:00 AM EST 13 Feb (8:00 PM 14 Feb SVN time) to  
10:00 PM EST 13 Feb (11:00 AM 14 Feb SVN time)

500' broken, 2000' overcast. Visibility 5 miles, in  
fog, occasionally 2 miles in drizzle. Wind northwest  
5 knots.

- b. From 10:00 PM EST 13 Feb (11:00 AM 14 Feb SVN time) to  
7:00 AM EST 14 Feb (8:00 PM 14 Feb SVN time)

1000' scattered, 2500 overcast. Visibility 7 miles and  
occasionally 5 miles in rain showers.

3. The outlook for the 24 hour period beginning at 7:00 AM  
EST on Wednesday, 14 February 1968 (8:00 PM Feb SVN time), is  
for little change from the above forecast.

24c

DA NANG WEATHER

1. Latest observation:

Mostly cloudy. 2000' broken, 3500' scattered. Visibility 6 miles. Wind north-northwest 8 knots.

2. Forecast (by periods)

- a. From 7:00 AM EST 13 Feb (8:00 PM 13 Feb SVN time) to 5:00 PM EST 13 Feb (1:00 AM 14 Feb SVN time)

1000' scattered, 2500' broken, 3000' broken. Visibility 6 miles.

- b. From 5:00 PM EST 13 Feb (1:00 AM 14 Feb SVN time) to 7:00 AM EST 14 Feb (8:00 PM 14 Feb SVN time)

2000' scattered, 3000' broken. Visibility 6 miles. Wind northwest 5 knots.

3. The outlook for the 24 hour period beginning at 7:00 AM EST on Wednesday, 14 February (8:00 PM 14 Feb SVN time), is for little change from the above forecast. Possible scattered afternoon rain showers.



INFORMATION

*Pres. file*

*27*

Tuesday, Feb. 13, 1968  
10:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the parliamentary response to  
President Thieu's Feb. 9 proposals. Sounds  
constructive, on the whole, and familiar.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (Saigon 19205)

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WHCA~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 01 SAIGON 19205 131254Z

1968 FEB 13 13 22

45  
ACTION EA 15

INFO SAL 01,CIAE 00,DODE 00,NSAE 20,NSCE 20,SSO 00,USIE 00,CCO 00,  
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O R 131200Z FEB 68 ZFF-1  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6533  
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CINCPAC  
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*Rostin*  
**DECLASSIFIED**  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-197  
By *sig*, NARA Date 11-26-96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SAIGON 19205

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJ: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY REACTION TO PRES THIEU'S FEB 9 SPEECH

REF: SAIGON 13701

1. ON BASIS OF A NUMBER OF CONVERSATIONSWITH DEPUTIES AND  
SENATORS OVER PAST SEVERAL DAYS, IT APPEARS THAT NATIONAL  
ASSEMBLY IS BASICALLY SYMPHETIC TO MEASURES OUTLINED BY  
PRES THIEU IN HIS SPEECH OF FEB 9 (FEFTEL). ASSEMBLY MEMBERS  
TEND TO AGREE THAT SPEECH SET FORTH THREE SEPARATE ITEMS  
SPECIFICALLY REQUIRING ASSEMBLY CONSIDERATION: 1) STEP-UP

PAGE 1RUMJIR 19205 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
IN MOBILIZATION SCHEDULE; 2) QUICK APPROVAL OF 1968  
BUDGET AS PRESENTED BY GVN; AND 3) ALLOWING PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 19205 131254Z

DECREES IN AREA OF ECONOMY AND FINANCE. SENATORS AND DEPUTIES SEEM SOMEWHAT LESS INTERESTED IN WHAT WOULD APPEAR TO BE EQUALLY IMPORTANT ISSUES OF "STATE OF WAR", MARTIAL LAW, AND PRESS CENSORSHIP, ALTHOUGH THESE TOO ARE CERTAIN TO BE FULLY DISCUSSED IN COMING DAYS, PARTICULARLY IN LOWER HOUSE.

2. UPPER HOUSE CHAIRMAN NGUYEN VAN HUYEN HAS EXPRESSED APPROVAL OF THIEU'S PROPOSALS RE MOBILIZATION AND SPEEDY PASSAGE OF BUDGET, BUT IS LESS FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD REQUEST FOR ECONOMY AND FINANCE DECREE POWER, ON BASIS THAT THIS WOULD BE UNNECESSARY USURPATION OF ASSEMBLY AUTHORITY. SEN NGUYEN GIA HIEN HAS TAKEN SIMILAR LINE, SAYING THAT UPPER HOUSE WOULD PROBABLY AGREE TO GIVE QUICK APPROVAL TO ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MEASURES PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT, BUT IS UNLIKELY TO FOREFEIT ITS AUTHORITY ENTIRELY IN THOSE AREAS. SENATOR PHAM NAM TRUONG, MEMBER OF TRAN VAN DON SLATE AND CHAIRMAN OF PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE, IS SOMEWHAT MORE WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH DECREE POWERS FOR PRESIDENT. HE NOTES THAT

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 19205 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE BRANCH IN ANY COUNTRY USUALLY ASSUMES EXTRAORDINARY POWERS IN TIME OF CRISIS. HOWEVER, WITH REGARD TO ECONOMY AND FINANCE DECREE AUTHORITY, TRUONG EMPHASIZED THAT IT MUST BE CLEARLY LIMITED AND DETAILS THOROUGHLY SPELLED OUT. IF THAT IS DONE, TRUONG BELIEVES ASSEMBLY COULD GO ALONG.

3. UPPER HOUSE ADMINISTRATOR NGUEN THANH LUONG PREDICTS THAT HOUSE REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS WILL BE SIMILAR TO THAT OUTLINED BY CHAIRMAN NGUYEN, I.E. APPROVING STEP-UP IN MOBILIZATION, GIVING RELATIVELY QUICK APPROVAL OF BUDGET, BUT GIVING AT PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR DECREE POWER. LUONG BELIEVES BUDGET MAY BE COMPLETED IN AS LITTLE AS ONE MONTH (THIEU REQUESTED APPROVAL BY END OF FEB). WITH REGARD TO ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MEASURES, LUONG VERY MUCH DOUBTS THAT UPPER HOUSE WILL GRANT DECREE POWER TO PRESIDENT, BUT BELIEVES THAT SENATORS WILL TRY TO APPROVE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MEASURES PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT IN SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME.

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PAGE 03 SAIGON 19205 131254Z

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 19205 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. **MUCH** THE SAME PICTURE EMERGES IN LOWER HOUSE. LOWER HOUSE DEPUTYCHAIRMAN HO VAN MINH BELIEVES MAJORITY OF LOWER HOUSE, AS WELL AS UPPER HOUSE, WILL OPPOSE GRANTING DECREE AUTHORITY TO PRESIDENT. PRIMARY REASON FOR RELUCTANCE TO DO SO IN MINH'S OPINION, IS THAT SUCH POWER WOULD BE CLEARLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL. HE BELIEVES SENATORS AND DEPUTIES ARE SENSITIVE TO NEED TO RESPECT CONSTITUTION, AND FOR THAT REASON WILL NOT GO ALONG WITH PRESIDENT'S REQUEST. HOWEVER, MINH AGREES WITH SENATORS HUYEN AND HIEN THAT ASSEMBLY WILL BE INCLINED TO GIVE QUICK APPROVAL TO ESSENTIAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MEASURES PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT.

5. OPPOSITION DEPUTY DUONG VAN BA, WHO IS IN TRUCULENT AND PESSIMISTIC MOOD (HIS FAMILY HOME WAS DESTROYED IN FIGHTING IN BAC LIEU), IS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF ALLEGED GVN SHORTCOMINGS, BUT ADMITS THAT GVN MUST NOW TAKE STRONG ACTION AND NEEDS SUPPORT OF ASSEMBLY. BA SOMEWHAT RELUCTANTLY STATED THAT ASSEMBLY WOULD PROBABLY SEE FIT TO APPROVE PRESIDENT THIEU'S PROPOSALS, INCLUDING HIS REQUEST FOR DECREE POWER IN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AREAS. HOWEVER, LIKE PHAM NAM TRUONG, BA

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 19205 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STRESSES THAT DECREE-MAKING AUTHORITY MUST BE CLEARLY DEFINED AND DELIMITED. SOMEWHAT SURPRISINGLY, HO HUU TUONG HAS EXPRESSED SIMILAR VIEW.

6. LOWER HOUSE ADMINISTRATOR LE CONG THANH, WHO IS EXPERIENCED AND USUALLY ACCURATE OBSERVER, ALSO BELIEVES THAT MATTER OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE AUTHORITY MAY ENCOUNTER SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION IN LOWER HOUSE. ACCORDING TO THANH, THAT OPPOSITION IS LARGELY BASED ON VIEW THAT DECREE AUTHORITY WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. THANH BELIEVES THAT FOR SAME REASON, THERE WILL BE SOME CRITICISM OF STATE OF WAR AND IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW, DESPITE GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT STRONG EXECUTIVE ACTION IS REQUIRED NOW. (AS NOTED ABOVE,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 04 SAIGON 19205 131254Z

PARA ONE, REMARKABLY FEW ASSEMBLY MEMBERS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN TO EMBOFFS REGARDING THREAT TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT POSED BY STATE OF WAR.)

7. BOTH HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY WILL PROBABLY BEGIN DISCUSSING MEASURES SET FORTH IN PRESIDENT'S SPEECH IN SESSIONS LATER THIS WEEK. (LOWER HOUSE MET ON FEB 12 TO COMPLETE SELECTION OF STANDING COMMITTEE MEMBERS. IT WILL RECONVENE FEB 14

PAGE 6 RUMJIR 19205 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
TO HEAR REPORTS BY ITS AD HOC SPECIAL COMMITTEES, ON ILLEGAL DETAINEES, DRAFTING OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATORS, ETC., AND WILL REPORTEDLY DECIDE WHETHER WORK OF THOSE COMMITTEES SHOULD CONTINUE.) IN BOTH HOUSES RESPONSIBILITY FOR VARIOUS ASPECTS OF PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS HAS BEEN DELEGATED TO COMMITTEES FOR PRELIMINARY STUDY. LOWER HOUSE HAS ESTABLISHED AN ALL-INCLUSIVE JOINT COMMITTEE, BRING TOGETHER DEFENSE, INTERIOR, ECONOMY, FINANCE AND ONE OR TWO OTHERS TO TAKE AN OVERALL LOOK AT PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS. (IN ADDITION, LOWER HOUSE FINANCE COMMITTEE HAS BEGUN ITS CONSIDERATION OF NATIONAL BUDGET.) CLEARER PICTURE OF ASSEMBLY RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT THIEU'S ADDRESS WILL EMERGE WHEN FLOOR DISCUSSION BEGINS.  
BUNKER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*

28

**SECRET**

**Tuesday, Feb. 13, 1968  
9:45 a. m.**

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith Westy's Khe Sanh daily, plus the  
supply table.**

**You will note he plans to move to a daily  
air drop of 140 tons.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**SECRET attachment**

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority OSD Ltr 3-16-78  
By g/ry, NARA, Date 2-10-92



SECRET

28a

Tuesday, February 13, 1968, 9:00 AM

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is the ninth report on the Khe Sanh area and covers the 24-hour period of February 12, 1968.

During the reporting period the Khe Sanh Combat Base continued to receive incoming enemy artillery, rockets, and mortars. A total of 65 rounds impacted at the Khe Sanh of which 55 were mortars and five each were artillery and rocket rounds. Six Marines were wounded as a result.

Elsewhere along the DMZ moderate concentrations fell upon Marine elements. Mid-afternoon barrages dropped 24 mortar rounds on Camp Carroll, 19 at Ca Lu, and eight rounds at Con Thien. While Con Thien and Ca Lu had no casualties, the incoming at Camp Carroll resulted in injuries to 13 Marines (nine were med-evacuated). Farther north, elements of the 3d Marines in the vicinity of Gia Linh received 35 rounds of mortar fire, causing major injuries to four Marines. Gia Linh itself received 19 rounds of mixed mortar and rockets with negative casualties. Finally, Lima 31 in Operation Saline received four rounds of artillery. Damage resulting from the days shelling was minimal, and casualties were light with no fatalities recorded. In total, 23 Marines were injured, 14 of whom required med-evacuation. Other than incoming activity at Khe Sanh and bordering areas of the DMZ, activity was light with no significant ground contact reported.

Marine Tactical Air flew 65 sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area, with 16 aircraft on call. The Air Force flew 88 and the Navy flew 85 sorties, for a total of 238 sorties flown. Bomb Damage Assessment reports 18 secondary explosions, 31 secondary fires, 9 military structures destroyed, 10 enemy killed, 11 trucks destroyed, two 37MM guns silenced, one bridge partially destroyed. Five ARC LIGHT strikes (36 sorties) were run in the Niagara area. One thousand six hundred and thirty seven rounds of assorted caliber mortar and artillery were fired in the Khe Sanh and DMZ areas.

No COFRAM type ordnance was used.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 Dec 5 (AD10)

By sp/sg, NARA, Date 2-10-92

SECRET

- 2 -

During the period, a total of 34.5 short tons were delivered. The resupply included 24 short tons of ammunition. Six short tons of engineer equipment, .5 short tons of Class 11 supplies (clothing and spare parts) and four short tons of mail. The C-130 that was disabled by enemy fire on February 11 was repaired today and flown out of the Khe Sanh.

On February 12 enemy fire was received at the airfield. Offloading in one case was conducted at the end of the runway, vice the loading ramp. A new air drop area has been secured at Khe Sanh with implementation plans, weather permitting, to air drop 140 short tons daily from C-130 Aircraft. Air delivery by C-123 and CH-53 Aircraft, to be offloaded on the airfield, will continue.

For the next 24-hour period Marine Tactical Air plans 44 sorties in support of Khe Sanh with 15 aircraft on call, the Air Force will fly 148 sorties, the Navy will fly 100 sorties for a total of 292 planned sorties. ARC LIGHT will run four strikes (33 sorties) in the Niagara area.

The weather at Khe Sanh continues to be characterized by low clouds and heavy night and morning fog. The weather from noon to 5:00 PM on February 12 was 500 foot ceilings and visibilities ranging from two to four miles in fog. The fog increased by 8:00 PM and the visibilities during the rest of the night of the 12th and through the morning of the 13th ranged from zero to one-half mile. The weather forecasted for the afternoon of February 13 is for cloud ceilings to raise to 1,000 feet and visibilities to improve to five miles in haze by 3:00 PM. Conditions will begin to deteriorate by 6:00 PM and by 8:00 PM cloud ceilings will be 400 feet and visibilities will be near one mile, occasionally going to zero. Starting about 9:00 AM on the morning of February 14, conditions will begin to improve and cloud ceilings will raise to 1,500 feet and visibilities will be five miles in haze.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

28b

13 February 1968  
0800 EST

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 122300 EST  
(131200 (SVN))

1. The Khe Sanh Dump or Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)  
status as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>Days Supply</u> <u>on Hand</u> <u>122300 EST</u> <u>(131200 SVN)</u>	<u>Previous Status</u> <u>112300 EST</u> <u>(121200 SVN)</u>
Class I (Rations)		
Meal, Individual, combat	9 days	9 days
B Rations	9 days	--
Class III (Fuel)		
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	12 days	12 days
JP-4 (Jet Fuel)	4 days	4 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	4 days	5 days
Diesel	5 days	5 days
Class IV (Ammunition)		
a. High explosive		
60 mm mortar	15 days	15 days
81 mm mortar	21 days	12 days
90 mm recoilless rifle	90 days	109 days
4.2" mortar	35 days	30 days
105 mm howitzer	10 days	12 days
155 mm howitzer	21 days	23 days
b. Anti-tank		
	<u>Rounds on hand</u>	
90 mm HEAT	478	478
66 mm rocket (LAW)	190	190
Anti-tank mines (M-19)	100	100
106 mm recoilless rifle	316	316

~~SECRET~~


DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
By Mg, NARA Date 2-10-92

SECRET

Class V (COFRAM)	Days Supply on hand <u>122300 EST</u> <u>(131200 SVN)</u>	<u>Previous Status</u> <u>112300 EST</u> <u>(121200 SVN)</u>
105 mm howitzer	5 days	5 days
155 mm howitzer	5 days	5 days
40 mm grenade launcher	5 days	5 days
Hand grenades	10 days	10 days

2. Early deterioration of the weather at Khe Sanh allowed aerial delivery of only 34.5 short tons during the past twenty-four hours. A break out of this total reveals 24 tons of Class V, six tons of Class IV, one-half ton of Class II, and four tons of mail-off loaded.

3. The foregoing information covers the period 112300 EST (121200 SVN) to 122300 EST (131200 SVN).

  
JAMES A. SHANNON  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution

SECDEF  
DEPSECDEF  
CJCS  
DJS  
VDJS  
J-4  
J-30  
J-31  
J-32  
J-33  
CT Force  
MCCC  
AWR  
DDO  
ADDO  
CCOC  
PAC DIV  
PAC DESK

SECRET



*Pres file*

Tuesday - February 13, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Election of OAS Secretary General

Sol Linowitz informs us that the OAS Council this evening elected Galo-Plaza of Ecuador to succeed Dr. Mora as Secretary General, and Rafael Urqia of El Salvador to succeed Bill Sanders as Assistant Secretary General.

The vote on Galo-Plaza was 16 to 5 for the Venezuelan candidate Falcon Briceno, with ~~H~~Peru abstaining. The vote for Urqia was 21 in favor, with Barbados absent.

The new OAS team is scheduled to assume office in mid-May.

W. W. Rostow

30

*Pres file*

Tuesday -  
February 13, 1968

Mr. President:

Covey Oliver put out his statement on Nixon's comments on our Latin American policy. The Baltimore Sun put it on the front page (see attached clipping), but other coverage was disappointing.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Clipping from Baltimore Sun,  
2/10/68 edition.



THE SUN, BALTIMORE.

February 10, 1968

## NIXON'S LATIN PLAN CALLED NOTHING NEW

### U.S. Says Alliance Is Already Working For Peaceful Change

By NATHAN MILLER

(Washington Bureau of The Sun)

Washington, Feb. 9 — The State Department went to unusual lengths today to deal with a statement by Richard M. Nixon calling for a peaceful revolution in Latin America.

The normally reticent Covey T. Oliver, Assistant Secretary of State for inter-American affairs, issued a special statement outlining what the Johnson Administration is doing to bring about peaceful change and with obvious irony welcomed Nixon "as a supporter of the Alliance for Progress."

"Mr. Nixon has been out of the mainstream of activity for some time, but he has recently begun to acquaint himself with our activities under the Alliance," Oliver said.

#### "Radical Social Change"

During a campaign appearance at the Wisconsin State University earlier in the week, the Republican presidential hopeful was asked to detail his program for "revolution" in Latin America.

"Latin America needs radical social change," Nixon said. "It needs a revolution. What it does not need is what Fidel Castro imposed on Cuba."

Nixon called for the opening

(Continued)

Selected by ARA/PAF for

## U.S. Discounts Latin Formula (Continued)

of the still largely unpopulated interior of the continent by constructing a highway as suggested by President Fernando Belaunde Terry of Peru, that would connect the neighboring countries.

"With a half billion dollars we could do more to lift the standard of living for Latin Americans than we have done with our billions in aid in the last ten years. We could open up the heartland, unite these people and make the common market a possibility..."

#### Unusual Statement

The former Vice President, who visited Latin America last year, also called for "revolutions" in agriculture and education.

While Oliver's statement was not unprecedented, it was considered unusual because ranking State Department officials rarely reply directly to political campaign statements.

Asked why he had issued the statement, Oliver said later that "I am trying to set the record straight. I think it is my duty to make sure that the people of the whole hemisphere know what we are doing—and accomplishing."

#### Approval Urged

"The United States, under the leadership of President Johnson, is working with our Latin American friends to achieve a peaceful but far reaching social revolution in Latin America," he said. "In this effort we have firm bipartisan support."

"I hope that Congress this year will approve the strong recommendations that the President is making to further the objectives of the Alliance for Progress. We welcome whatever support we can get."

Turning to the point which Nixon had made in Wisconsin, Oliver said:

1. On August 17, 1966, the President urged the Alliance nations to press forward in de-

veloping the "inner frontiers" of Latin America and the Inter-American Development Bank is giving priority to such projects.

The United States has pledged \$50,000,000 to be matched by an equal sum from the Latin Americans to help finance this opening of frontiers, while several countries have taken steps to develop such areas.

"The fact is that we have been moving ahead in these areas vigorously since the Alliance was launched in 1961," the official added.

2. While it is difficult to make advances in education and agriculture, Oliver pointed out, in fiscal 1967 loans totaling \$200,000,000 were made in these fields, and at last April's summit conference the presidents agreed to give these two areas the highest priority.

He also noted that next week the Inter-American Cultural Council will meet in Venezuela to launch "significant multi-lateral programs in science and education."

31

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Monday, February 12, 1968  
9:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

In the attached message Cy Vance states his reluctance to go on from Seoul to Saigon.

Mr. Rostow believes a decision on this can wait until lunch tomorrow, but he wanted you to have Mr. Vance's message this evening.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 4180

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 92-154  
By grip, NARA, Date 4/30/96

WWRostow:rla



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

SANITIZED

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STATE GRNC  
BT  
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1968 FEB 12 PM 7 33

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM VANCE

THERE COULD ONLY BE ONE ANSWER IF THE PRESIDENT REALLY  
WANTS ME TO GO. I HAVE SERIOUS RESERVATIONS. HOWEVER, ABOUT  
GOING ON TO SAIGON FROM HERE.

BT

GP-2. PORTER

1.3(a)(5)

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-157appa

By HW, NARA, Date 5-13-94

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, February 12, 1968  
9:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Here is Gen. Westmoreland's  
further reply to the questions asked  
by Gen. Wheeler.

Bromley Smith

~~TOP SECRET~~

BKS;rlm

*Pres file*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By mg, NARA, Date 2-10-92

1968 FEB 13 01 11

32a

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 DE YSNKQA 56 0432336  
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 FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC  
 INFO MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE WASH DC  
 MR RUSK STATE DEPT WASH DC  
 MR HELMS CIA  
 GEN JOHNSON CSA WASH DC  
 GEN MCCONNELL CSAF WASH DC  
 ADM MOORER CNO WASH DC  
 ZEN/GEN CHAPMAN CMC WASH DC  
 O 121823Z ZYH ZFF-3  
 FM GEN WESTMORELAND  
 TO GENERAL WHEELER CJCS  
 INFO ADMIRAL SHARP CINCPAC  
 ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAC 02018 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO  
REF: JCS 01695

1. FIRST, WITH REGARD TO THE INTERPRETATION WHICH YOU HAVE PLACED ON MY EARLIER MESSAGE.

A. I AM EXPRESSING A FIRM REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TROOPS, NOT BECAUSE I FEAR DEFEAT IF I AM NOT REINFORCED, BUT BECAUSE I DO NOT FEEL THAT I CAN FULLY GRASP THE INITIATIVE FROM THE RECENTLY REINFORCED ENEMY WITHOUT THEM. ON THE OTHER HAND A SET BACK IS FULLY POSSIBLE IF I AM NOT REINFORCED AND IT IS LIKELY THAT WE WILL LOSE GROUND IN OTHER AREAS IF I AM REQUIRED TO MAKE

SUBSTANTIAL REINFORCEMENT TO I CORPS.

B. THE STATUS OF THE ARVN IS HARD TO DETERMINE AT THIS TIME. VIEN IS ENCOURAGED BY THE ABSENCE OF PENETRATION; BY THE EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DIVISION COMMANDERS; AND BY THE NUMBER OF TROOPS THAT ARE VOLUNTARILY REPORTING INTO ARVN HEADQUARTERS FROM A LEAVE STATUS, TO TAKE THEIR POSITIONS IN PROVISIONAL UNITS WHILE AWAITING RETURN TO THEIR OWN ORGANIZATION. THE BIG QUESTION MARK IS THE RF/PF. I HAVE ASKED FOR A COMPLETE STATUS REPORT BY 29 FEB. BY THIS TIME THE TRUE ARVN SITUATION SHOULD BE SIFTED OUT. IN THE MEANWHILE, I AM HOPING FOR THE BEST BUT RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WILL BE MANY DIFFICULTIES.

C. THE CAPACITY OF OUR LOGISTIC SYSTEM IN NORTHERN I CTZ MUST BE BUILT UP AS WE INCREASE THE TROOP DENSITY. WE HAVE HAD VERY LITTLE MARGIN OVER OUR REQUIREMENTS. THEREFORE, A FIRMLY CONTROLLED LAND LOC IS A NECESSARY ADJUNCT TO THE SEA AND AIR LOC'S. HIGHWAY ONE IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO SUSTAIN ADDITIONAL TROOPS NORTH OF AI VAN PASS. MY PLANS FOR REINFORCING NORTHERN I CTZ INCLUDE OPENING THIS LOC.

D. THE NEED FOR TROOPS TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE WAS EXPRESSED

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority 0512 ltr 11/22/70

By ply, NARA, Date 2-12-92

IN PARAGRAPH A ABOVE.

2. THE FOLLOWING IS IN RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT WE SHOULD CHANGE OUR STRATEGY

3. I DO NOT PLAN TO CHANGE MY LOCAL STRATEGY. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN CENTERED ON DEFEATING THE ENEMY MAIN FORCES WHILE PROVIDING A SHIELD OF SECURITY BEHIND WHICH THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY COULD BE RE-ESTABLISHED. THIS HAD TO BE TIED IN CLOSELY-- PARTICULARLY IN THE SECOND ASPECT--WITH THE ARVN FORCES.

4. CERTAINLY, THE MAJOR POLITICO - MILITARY OFFENSIVE WHICH THE ENEMY LAUNCHED AT TET HAS CAUSED US TO RE-EVALUATE OUR PRIORITIES. WE HAVE HAD TO REVISE OUR OFFENSIVE PLANS, ESPECIALLY IN III CTZ, AND FACE THE REALITIES OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. WE HAVE BEEN OBLIGED TO DIVERT MORE SUPPORT TO THE ARVN IN PROTECTING THE POPULATED AREAS. THIS WAS DONE BEFORE THE TET AGGRESSION BASED ON INTELLIGENCE AND M ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION.

5. I AGREE WITH THE OBSERVATION THAT CLEARING THE CITIES IS OF HIGHEST PRIORITY. TO THIS END THE ARVN ARE DEVOTING A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THEIR ASSETS. THIS IS REFLECTED IN THE DELTA WHERE A LARGE NUMBER OF CITIES HAVE BEEN ATTACKED, BUT HAVE BEEN CLEARED; IN SAIGON WHERE UP TO SIXTEEN GENERAL RESERVE BATTALIONS HAVE

BEEN EMPLOYED; THROUGHOUT II CTZ WERE ALL OF THE CITIES HAVE BEEN CLEARED OF VC UNITS, AND IN HUE. IN MANY OF THESE ACTIONS, US FORCES HAVE BEEN COMMITTED. IN THE DELTA, AN ADDITIONAL US BRIGADE OF TWO BATTALIONS WAS REQUIRED TO SAVE THE SITUATION AT BEN TRE AND AT MY THO. THE MRF TONIGHT IS HEADING TOWARDS CAN THO TO STAVE OFF A THREAT TO THE CAPITOL. THIS IS THE FARTHEST SOUTH THAT THE MRF HAS BEEN COMMITTED. IN SAIGON, ONE OF OUR BATTALIONS IS IN THE CITY AND SEVERAL OTHERS ARE MANEUVERING AGAINST THE ENEMY FORCES THAT ARE IN THE AREA. DANANG IS ALMOST ENTIRELY PROTECTED BY US FORCES. IN HUE AND QUANG TRI, US ELEMENTS PARTICIPATED HEAVILY IN THE CLEARING OPERATIONS.

6. DESPITE THE HIGH PRIORITY ACCORDED TO THE CITIES, I STILL SEE THE ENEMY POSITION IN THE KHE SANH/DMZ AREA AS THE GREATEST SINGLE THREAT. IT MUST BE STOPPED OR ALL OF NORTHERN I CTZ WILL BE IN JEOPARDY. TO DEFEAT THIS ENEMY, WHO HAS CLOSE TO 50,000 TROOPS IN THE AREA, WE HAVE BEEN OBLIGED TO DEPLOY 28 US BATTALIONS PLUS HEAVY COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES TO THAT SECTOR.

7. ALL OF THIS BRINGS US TO KHE SANH. SHOULD WE DEFEND THERE, OR WITHDRAW?

8. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE MAINTAINED OUR POSITION IN KHE SANH

SO THAT WE WOULD HAVE A FORWARD OPERATING BASE FROM WHICH WE COULD CONDUCT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE KEY INFILTRATION ROUTES IN EASTERN LAOS. TO BE SURE, OUR POSITION THERE HAS NOT STOPPED INFILTRATION, BUT THERE IS GOOD EVIDENCE TO INDICATE THAT IF WE HADN'T HELD AT KHE SANH THE ENEMY WOULD HAVE HAD CLEAR SAILING STRAIGHT DOWN TO QUANG TRI AND EVEN HUE WITH ALUTELY NOTHING IN HIS PATH FROM THE NORTH-WEST. THE WHOLE QUANG TRI POSITION WOULD HAVE BEEN FLANKED AND THE VERY BATTLE FOR WHICH WE ARE NOW GIRDING AT KHE SANH WOULD BE ON OUR HANDS ALONG THE POPULATED BELT OF I CTZ. THIS IS NOT THE PREFERRED PLACE TO FIGHT SUCH BATTLES AS EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEK HAVE INDICATED

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS



~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

RECEIVED  
WHCA

1968 FEB 13 01 15

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O 122259Z ZYH ZFF-5  
FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC  
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MR RUSK STATE DEPT WASH DC  
MR HELMS CIA  
GEN JOHNSON CSA WASH DC  
GEN MCCONNELL CSAF WASH DC  
ADM MOORER CNO WASH DC  
ZEN/GEN CHAPMAN CMC WASH DC  
O 121823Z ZYH ZFF-5  
FM GEN WESTMORELAND  
TO GENERAL WHEELER CJCS  
INFO ADMIRAL SHARP CINCPAC  
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAC 02018 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO

9. TWICE BEFORE KHE SANH HAS BEEN THREATENED. LAST SPRING AT LEAST TWO REGIMENTS MOVED AGAINST IT BUT WERE DRIVEN OFF. THIS TIME THE ENEMY BUILD UP HAS BEEN GREATER THAN BEFORE WHICH HEIGHTENS THE RISK. HOWEVER, TO WITHDRAW FROM KHE SANH WOULD HAVE CERTAIN TACTICAL DISADVANTAGES, AND WOULD BE A DIFFICULT MANEUVER. MUCH OF THE HEAVY EQUIPMENT ON BASE CAN ONLY BE EXTRACTED BY ROAD. FINALLY, THERE IS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF A WITHDRAWAL. TO DO SO NOW, AFTER THE RECENT VC SPLURGE IN THE CITIES, AND THE LOSS OF LANG VEI WOULD BE A HEAVY BLOW TO THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF SVN, AND POSSIBLY TO A LARGE SEGMENT OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. I

MUST HOLD THE POSITION AND I THINK WE WILL HOLD IT. ON THE OTHER HAND AS REPORTED TO YOU, I INTEND TO OPEN KY 9 WHICH WILL GIVE US A NUMBER OF OPTIONS AND COMPLICATE THE ENEMYS' PROBLEM.

10. LASTLY, WITH REGARD TO THE SUGGESTION THAT I PULL MY TROOPS OUT OF THE DELTA TO USE THEM AS A RESERVE, LEAVING THE DELTA TO ARVN. RIGHT NOW, AS I EXPLAINED ABOVE, WE ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN PROTECTING THE POPULATION CENTERS OF THE DELTA WITH THE COMBINATION OF US/ARVN FORCES. I HAD HOPED TO MOVE A TWO BATTALION BRIGADE UP TO LONG AN PROVINCE TODAY, BUT THE THREAT TO CAN THO CHANGED MY MIND. AS YOU ARE AWARE, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ONE TO BE VERY FAR FROM THIS BATTLEFIELD AND MAKE FINITE SUGGESTIONS AS TO WHAT SHOULD BE IN RESERVE. THE SITUATION CHANGES TOO RAPIDLY. I FIND THAT I MUST WEIGH EVERY PIECE OF EVIDENCE CAREFULLY AND CONTINUALLY RE-EVALUATE THE ALTERNATIVES. I CAN REINFORCE ONE AREA FROM ANY OTHER AND THE DELTA IS NO EXCEPTION.

11. I WOULD BE PLEASED TO HAVE YOU VISIT

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

33

Monday, Feb. 12, 1968  
8:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to consider adding to the third paragraph of Sect. McNamara's proposed statement -- after the word "area" --  
"and the possibility of renewed attack on the cities."

Reason:

-- It is true, since Westy needs his reserve for either purpose;

-- It avoids the charge that he was fooled on the cities and now he's about to be fooled on I Corps.

W. W. Rostow

*Secret attachment*

~~SECRET~~

33a

DRAFT - 12 Feb 1968

1. Six additional battalions of combat troops are being deployed to South Vietnam, totaling approximately 10,500 men.
2. Three battalions are army units from the 82d airborne division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Three are Marine Corps units from the 5th Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, California, and the 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
3. These forces are being deployed at the request of General William C. Westmoreland as insurance against the threat of the North Vietnamese regular Army's campaign in the DMZ-Quang Tri-Thua Thien area.
4. The North Vietnamese have introduced some 24,000 additional regular Army troops -- the 304th and 320th Divisions -- into the Khe Sanh area in December and January.
5. There are currently approximately 500,000 U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam. The deployment of 525,000 has been authorized.
6. No decision has yet been made on whether these will eventually be in addition to the 525,000 or part of that total.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 20

By us, NARS, Date 6-25-84

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

34

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Monday, February 12, 1968  
8:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a suggestion that Cy is  
making some small progress with  
President Park.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 4090  
CACTUS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By plg, NARA, Date 6/25/94

WWRostow:rlm



Department of State

34a  
TELEGRAM

4

~~SECRET~~

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\*\*\*\*\*ZZ RUEHC  
DE RUALOS 4090E 0391430  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
Z 081415Z FEB 68 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8944  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CONTROL: 2448Q

RECD: FEBRUARY 8, 1968

9:39 A.M.

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 4090

REPUBLIC OF KOREA GOVERNMENT

NODIS/CACTUS

PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY GENERAL YI HU-RAK PHONED DCM TONIGHT AND THROUGH RATHER STRAINED ENGLISH INDICATED RELUCTANT RECOGNITION OF FACT THAT CLOSED MEETINGS AT PANMUNJOM MUST GO ON. STATED ROKG PUBLIC POSITION AGAINST FURTHER CLOSED MEETINGS CREATES MAJOR PROBLEM AND HE SEEKING WAYS OVERCOME PROBLEM. SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY OF SPECIAL ASSURANCES AND JOINT ROK/US STATEMENT ABOUT FUTURE RAIDS. DCM EXPRESSED APPRECIATION THAT YI HU-RAK RECOGNIZED THAT CLOSED MEETINGS MUST GO ON AND SAID PRES JOHNSON AND OTHER US OFFICIALS HAD MADE MANY STATEMENTS GIVING ASSURANCES WHICH PARK AND ROKG COULD USE EFFECTIVELY. WE PREPARED HELP WHERE WE CAN WITHIN

~~PAGE 2 RUALOS 4090E SECRET~~

THESE LIMITS AND OFFERED MEET YI FOR FURTHER TALKS. YI SAID HE COULDN'T SINCE HE HAD TO SEE PARK.

THIS PHONE CALL AFTER MY MEETINGS TODAY WITH PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER MAY REPEAT MAY INDICATE THEY GETTING READY TO SWALLOW HARD AND FACE UP TO SITUATION. WE WILL CLARIFY AS SOON AS WE CAN WHAT THEY WANT BUT BELIEVE FACT OF CALL ITSELF SIGNIFICANT. GP-3. PORTER  
BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-197  
By sig, NARA Date 11-26-96

~~SECRET~~

*Pres. file*

*35*

Monday, February 12, 1968

~~SECRET~~-PACKERS

8:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the Roumanian message delivered to Governor Harriman. As Harriman correctly notes, they "paid no attention to the cigars;" that is, there is no suggestion of response to the assumption in the San Antonio formula.

When reporting on this, Sect. Rusk said to me:

"If you have any good targets around Hanoi or Haiphong, by all means recommend them."

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~-PACKERS attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 94-457  
By CB, NARA, Date 6-2-95



*Postair*  
35a

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: February 12, 1968  
Time: 11:30 a.m.  
Place: Governor's Office

SUBJECT: Viet-Nam Peace Talks

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

W. Averell Harriman  
Ambassador at Large  
Daniel I. Davidson,  
Special Assistant to  
Amb. Harriman

Romania

Corneliu Bogdan, Ambassador  
to the U.S.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-460  
By ip, NARA, Date 6-23-95

Ambassador Bogdan telephoned the Governor's office at about 10:30 a.m. and made an appointment to see the Governor at 11:30.

When he arrived at 11:30, Bogdan told the Governor that he had received from Macovescu some information which he wished to convey. Macovescu had been in Hanoi between the 22nd and 28th of January and had had conversations with Prime Minister Dong and Foreign Minister Trinh. Macovescu expounded largely the point of view of the U.S. Government. Then he stated Romanian considerations, the essence of which is that new conditions have been created for a new step towards a solution / negotiations. through

After studying the U.S. Government proposals and the Romanian considerations the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam asserted that ~~it did not consider the proposals of the U. S. Government an answer to the Trinh declaration~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~NODIS/PACKERS~~

of 28 December. They asserted that the U. S. proposals are in fact conditions while they had asked for unconditional cessation of bombing and other acts of war.

At this point the Ambassador said he would quote a long paragraph which he was translating from Romanian. A stenographer was called in and before the Ambassador left he reviewed and corrected the transcription. The following paragraph is the paragraph Ambassador Bogdan translated, dictated and reviewed.

"The position of the Vietnamese people and of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is very clear. There are the four points of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the political program of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. This is the basis for the solution (reglementation) of the Vietnamese problem. We stated clearly: ~~if in actuality the United States Government desires~~ conversations, ~~as it says it does, it must in the first place~~ stop unconditionally the bombardment and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. After a convenient period of time, following the unconditional cessation of bombardment and all other American acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will start conversations with the United States of America on the questions of interest to the two parties. ~~The Ambassador understands this to mean the interest of either side, not a common interest. The convenient period of time is the time necessary to prove that the United States has really and without conditions stopped bombardment and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.~~ After the unconditional cessation of the bombardment and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam a meeting will take place.

- 3 -

between the two sides to reach an agreement on the place, the level, and the contents of the conversation. The right position and the correct attitude of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have been warmly welcomed and supported by the peoples of the world. The attitude of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is serious. If the conversations are leading or not to results, this depends on the United States."

The Ambassador added two things: 1) the Romanian government is ready to transmit communications to either side; 2) when Ambassador Davis returns to Bucharest he might obtain further details from Macovescu.

Ambassador Bogdan also said that Macovescu was in Peking on January 31 and that he informed the Chinese government through the same Deputy Foreign Minister as previously of the U. S., the Romanian and the North Vietnamese positions. The Chinese position remained the same--that it was up to North Vietnam. The Soviet Union was informed on January 23 about Macovescu's visit to Washington and the positions of the U. S. and Romanian governments but not of what Hanoi said on this trip. Moscow will be informed soon of what happened in Hanoi though Ambassador Bogdan has the personal impression that they already have been told by Hanoi.

The Governor said that we would like to study this message before making any official comment though it is obvious Hanoi is taking an arbitrary line. He said that Hanoi should realize that when they are attacking U. S. positions across the DMZ it is unthinkable for the U. S. to stop bombing. The Governor stated his unofficial reaction is that Hanoi does not wish talks and he commented that Hanoi had paid no attention to the cigars.

The Governor expressed his gratitude for the Romanian effort though he remarked that it does not seem to have brought fresh hope.

Monday, February 12, 1968  
7:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, in the light of discussion at lunch, a  
draft cable to Cy Vance.

*Pres file*

It is Sect. Rusk's judgment that it would be  
"overloading the circuit" at this time to have Cy  
put the question of the extra light division to  
President Park. (*para. 3*)

There is some urgency in getting this cable off  
to Cy tonight, our time.

W. W. Rostow

Cable cleared as drafted \_\_\_\_\_

Cleared without instruction to raise  
problem of light division \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

Note: A copy of this cable will be in the Situation  
Room for dispatch as you direct.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-206  
By CB, NARA Date 11-3-97

36a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 12, 1968

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~ ENCLOSURE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Secretary Rusk suggests that  
this cable go tonight, but that  
Paragraph 3 be omitted and reserved  
for discussion tomorrow. Could you  
let me know at once.

*WB by apah*  
William Bundy

Enclosure:

Telegram to AmEmbassy Seoul

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~ ENCLOSURE

346~~TOP SECRET~~Ambassy SEOUL ~~XXXX~~ IMMEDIATE

STATE

TOBAN/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 56-197  
By ing, NARA Date 11-26-96

1. In your talk with Park, you should explain that latest messages from Westmoreland indicate clear need for additional forces to secure vital communication lines in northern area of SVN (Routes 1 and 9) and to permit our forces there to go over to the offensive against weakened NVA/VC. ~~xxxx~~ In response to this, we have today decided to send at once a Marine regiment and an airborne brigade, totalling together six additional top-notch combat battalions.

2. In describing situation, you should request in strongest terms that Park give permission for Westmoreland to redeploy ROK forces as necessary in current situation, which has difficulties but also great opportunities. (FYI: ~~XXN~~ We understand ROK commanders on the spot have been somewhat reluctant to redeploy rapidly at our request. End FYI).

3. Finally, you should indicate that over-all situation

EA: WPBundy:bmm 2/12/68 4235  
White House - Mr. Rostow (subs.)  
DOD - Secretary McNamara

The Secretary  
S/S- Mr. Read

~~TOP SECRET~~



2

Seoul

~~TOP SECRET~~

9.

indicates redoubled urgency in requirement for additional Korean forces in Vietnam as soon as possible, at least the light division already suggested and hopefully more. Porter is of course fully familiar with support and other undertakings connected with proposed light division deployment.

GP-3

END

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, February 12, 1968  
7:15 p.m.

*Profile*

Mr. President:

Herewith two cables from Ernie Goldstein in Paris:

1. On the French political scene. -- including a Presidential dark horse named Sudreau.
2. A conversation with Israeli Ambassador-designate Rabin.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Paris 10199  
Paris 10198

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 2-21-92



# Department of State

37a  
**TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

(2)

(2)

*Rostow*

RR RUEHC  
DE RUFNCR 10198 0431103  
ZNY SSSSS  
R 121030Z FEB 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9348  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CN: 3543Q  
1968 FEB 12 7:17AM

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 10198

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-197  
By *isp*, NARA Date 11/26/96

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM GOLDSTEIN

1. SATURDAY NIGHT SPENT WITH GENERAL RABIN, NEW ISRAELI AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON AND ADMIRAL LIMON WHO HEADS ISRAELI ARMS PROCUREMENT IN EUROPE.
2. GENERAL RABIN SAID THAT IRAQ PRESIDENT AREF LEFT PARIS WITHOUT AGREEING TO GIVE OIL CONCESSIONS TO THE FRENCH. FRENCH ALSO UNABLE THUS FAR TO SELL MIRAGES TO IRAQ.
3. MIRAGE DEAL HELD UP BECAUSE RUSSIANS NOW OFFERING MIG 21S FOR 300,000 DOLLARS.
4. ACCORDING TO LIMON, ISRAEL TRYING TO PREVENT BELGIAN MIRAGE PURCHASE. KEY ARGUMENTS AGAINST MIRAGE ARE LACK OF ENGINE RELIABILITY AND HIGH MAINTENANCE COST ALONG WITH SPARE PARTS DIFFICULTIES.
5. BY CONTRAST IRAQI MIG DELIVERED TO ISRAEL BY DEDECTING PILOT STILL FUNCTIONS WITH ONLY TIRE REPLACEMENTS.
6. ISRAELIS HAVE ASKED BELGIANS TO COME TO ISRAEL TO SEE MIRAGE MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS, BUT SO FAR INVITATION NOT ACCEPTED.
7. LIMON SAYS U.S. AND NORTHROP NOT REALLY TRYING HARD ENOUGH TO SELL F-5S TO BELGIUM. TWO STRONG ARGUMENTS FOR F-5 ARE TRADITION THAT HOLLAND AND BELGIUM HAVE THE SAME EQUIPMENT AND WELL KNOWN EASY AVAILABILITY OF U.S. SPARE PARTS. ISRAEL TRIED TO DISSUADE PERUVIAN AND BRAZILIAN MIRAGE PURCHASES.
8. BELGIAN CARETAKER GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO BELIEVE IT HAS THE RIGHT TO MAKE AIRCRAFT DECISION, ACCORDING TO LIMON. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE A MISTAKE TO SUSPEND F-5 EFFORTS NOW.
9. LEBANESE HAVE NOT TAKEN DELIVERY OF THEIR 12 MIRAGES BECAUSE PILOTS NOT CAPABLE OF COPING WITH 160 KNOT LANDING SPEED.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2- PARIS MRN 10198

10. LIMON SAYS ISRAEL HAS GIVEN UP ATTEMPT TO BUY GERMAN SURPLUS PLANES VIA IRAN AND PAKISTAN PHONEY LICENSES.

11. GENERAL AND MRS. RABIN REPRESENT A NEW BREED OF ISRAELI DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION. EDGES ARE HARD, OPINIONS ARE BLUNT AND TONE IS AGGRESSIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, RE VIETNAM HE BELIEVES WE ARE RIGHT TO BE THERE, BUT WE ARE NOT FIGHTING TO WIN. SAYS VIET CONG SUCCESS IN CITIES IS PROOF THAT WE HAVE NOT EXPLAINED THE WAR TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE. RE PUEBLO HE SAYS WE DID NOT LEARN FROM THE LIBERTY INCIDENT. SAYS WE WERE TOO CLOSE AND RABIN CLAIMS RUSSIANS TO HIS KNOWLEDGE ALWAYS KEEP THEIR DISTANCE.

12. LIMON SAYS HE BELIEVES NASSER IS ON THE WAY OUT. SUCCESSOR WILL FOLLOW GENERALLY SAME POLICY BUT WILL KNOW LESS ABOUT THE WEST. IF HUSSEIN FALLS, A NASSER FOLLOWER WILL COME INTO POWER IN JORDAN. ISRAEL DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS WILL BE A BIG CHANGE, SAYS LIMON.

13. LIMON BELIEVES SECRETARY CLIFFORD'S ASSOCIATION WITH PRESIDENT TRUMAN WILL MAKE HIM MORE SYMPATHETIC TO ISRAEL THAN WAS MCNAMARA.

14. COMMENT: LIMON OBVIOUSLY IS TRYING TO MAKE POINTS FOR FUTURE ARMS DEALS. RABIN IS LESS CLEAR. BEST GUESS IS THAT HE IS MERELY EXPRESSING HIS OPINION ON MATTERS CURRENTLY CONCERNING HIM. HE IS NOT HAPPY WITH VIEWS DISAGREEING WITH HIS OWN.

GP-2 WALLNER  
BT

~~SECRET~~



①  
Department of State

376

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

~~ACTING COPY~~

*Postow*

DE RUFNCR 10199 0431115  
ZNY SSSSS  
R 121032Z FEB 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9349  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ PARIS 10199

CONTROL : 3497Q  
RECEIVED : Feb. 12, 1968  
7:21A.M.

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM GOLDSTEIN

1. MR. PRESIDENT, OVER THE WEEK END I RENEWED MY TIES WITH A GROUP OF TRUSTWORTHY POLITICAL OBSERVERS WHOM I HAVE KNOWN AND TRUSTED SINCE 1952. I SAW THEM IN SEVERAL GROUPS, BUT THEIR VIEWS ARE SO UNIFORM THAT I AM REPORTING THEM AS A SINGLE CONSENSUS.

2. THE PEOPLE I SAW INCLUDED: A GAULLIST FORMER MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT WHO IS A CLOSE PERSONAL FRIEND OF THE GENERAL BUT, NEVERTHELESS, IS ONE OF THE FEW WITH COURAGE TO BREAK WITH THE GENERAL OVER ISRAEL; A TELEVISION NEWS COMMENTATOR ON THE GOVERNMENT NETWORK; A TOPFLIGHT CIVIL SERVANT WHO HEADS ALL OF FRANCE'S SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND WHO ALSO IS A LEADING MEMBER OF A SORT OF SUPREME COURT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS - A COMBINED WEBB, SEABORG AND JERRE WILLIAMS; A BANKER AND A LAWYER WHO ARE OPPOSED TO THE GOVERNMENT.

3. THE CONSENSUS IS THAT THERE IS AN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER POMPIDOU AND THE GENERAL THAT POMPIDOU AND THE CABINET HAVE A FREE HAND DOMESTICALLY AND THE GENERAL DOES AS HE PLEASES RE FOREIGN POLICY.

4. IT IS A MISTAKE FOR AMERICANS TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE RE FOREIGN POLICY. THE FRENCH SUGGEST THAT THEY COLLECTIVELY VOTED FOR THE GENERAL KNOWING HIS FOREIGN POLICY, BUT WERE WILLING TO SWALLOW IT FOR HIS DOMESTIC POLICY. MY FRENCH FRIENDS SAY IT IS ABSURD TO SAY THAT THE GERMANS DID NOT KNOW WHAT THEY WERE DOING WHEN THEY ELECTED HITLER. THEY SAY THAT THE SAME APPLIES TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NL 84-357

By sp/ly, NARA, Date 2-21-92



~~SECRET~~

-2-Page, PARIS 10199, February 12, 1968 NODIS

5. PARADOXICALLY, THE LEFTIST OPPOSITION, MITTERRAND'S FEDERATION, INCLUDING THE COMMUNISTS, IS BELIEVED TO BE 100 PERCENT BEHIND THE GENERAL'S ANTI-AMERICAN POLICY, BUT THE LEFT SAYS IT WOULD DO IT DIFFERENTLY. THE RIGHT AND CENTER, INCLUDING THE GAULLISTS, ARE ESTIMATED TO BE BETWEEN 80 PERCENT AND 90 PERCENT PRO-AMERICAN DESPITE THE GENERAL'S POLICY. THIS MAY BE SIGNIFICANT FOR THE FUTURE.

6. IF AN ACCIDENT BEFALLS THE GENERAL BEFORE THE 1972 ELECTION, AND HE MIGHT RUN AGAIN IN 1972, TWO CANDIDATES ARE CONSIDERED CERTAIN: POMPIDOU AND THE LEADER OF THE LEFT OPPOSITION, MITTERRAND. EACH HAS HIS LIABILITIES. MITTERRAND HAS AN AIR OF SCANDAL FROM THE FOURTH REPUBLIC PLUS HIS ALLIANCE WITH THE COMMUNISTS. POMPIDOU IS IDENTIFIED WITH THE UNPOPULAR ASPECTS OF DE GAULLE'S REGIME. THERE IS MUCH TALK OF AN OUTSIDER - A DARK HORSE - PIERRE SUDREAU - NOW A CENTER PARTY DEPUTY.

7. SUDREAU HAS A FINE RECORD AS A FORMER MINISTER OF CONSTRUCTION AND A FORMER MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE. HE IS KNOWN FOR HIS COURAGE DURING WORLD WAR II WHEN HE WAS DEPORTED TO GERMANY. THIS EXPERIENCE MARKS HIM AS A MAN OF COURAGE AND COMPASSION.

8. PRESENTLY HE IS PUBLISHING A BOOK, ENCHAINEMENT, MEANING THE "CHAIN" FOR "FETTER". ITS THEME IS THAT FRANCE MUST ABANDON ITS ATOMIC SEPARATISM AND COME INTO THE TEST BAN AND NON-PROLIFERATION TREATIES. THE BOOK ITSELF IS AN ACT OF COURAGE.

9. SUDREAU IS NOT AN INTELLECTUAL. HE IS A SOLID, PRACTICAL MAN WITH A GOOD POLITICAL SENSE AND A REPUTATION FOR HONESTY AND INTEGRITY.

10. THE REASONING IS THAT IN AN ELECTION MITTERRAND AND THE LEFT WOULD POLL 40 PERCENT. THE BALANCE WOULD BE DIVIDED BETWEEN SUDREAU AND POMPIDOU, WITH SUDREAU HAVING THE EDGE. THE RUN-OFF WOULD GIVE SUDREAU THE PRESIDENCY.

11. I LUNCH WITH SUDREAU NEXT WEEK. ALTHOUGH TALK OF HIS CANDIDACY IS FORBIDDEN, IT WILL BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MAN. NATURALLY, I WILL REPORT FULLY.

GP-2 WALLNER  
BT

~~SECRET~~



Monday, Feb. 12, 1968  
7:15 p. m.

*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Sect. McNamara's proposed press  
statement on the battalions.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

38a

DRAFT - 12 Feb 1968

1. Six additional battalions of combat troops are being deployed to South Vietnam, totaling approximately 10,500 men.
2. Three battalions are army units from the 82d airborne division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Three are Marine Corps units from the 5th Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, California, and the 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
3. These forces are being deployed at the request of General William C. Westmoreland as insurance against the threat of the North Vietnamese regular Army's campaign in the DMZ-Quang Tri-Thua Thien area.
4. The North Vietnamese have introduced some 24,000 additional regular Army troops -- the 304th and 320th Divisions -- into the Khe Sanh area in December and January.
5. There are currently approximately 500,000 U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam. The deployment of 525,000 has been authorized.
6. No decision has yet been made on whether these will eventually be in addition to the 525,000 or part of that total.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD ltr 11/24/78

By sig/ly, NARA, Date 2-12-92

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

*Pres File*

39

Monday, February 12, 1968  
7:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

I will send up detailed questions tomorrow  
morning for Item 1.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

Luncheon with the President  
Tuesday, February 13, 1968, 1:00 p.m.

AGENDA

1. Reserve Call-Up and Congressional Action (Sect. McNamara & Gen. Wheeler)
  - Which units?
  - Which powers to be requested from Congress?
  - Consequences for budget?
  - Public presentation and rationale?
2. Instruction to Vance (Sects. Rusk and McNamara)  
Text will be available.
3. PUEBLO: Next Steps (Sect. Rusk)
4. The Roumanian (Sect. Rusk)  
End of the line.
5. Other

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 120, NARA, Date 2-25-92

Monday, February 12, 1967  
7:00 p. m.

40

pres  
file

MR. PRESIDENT:

A philosophical note.

When Karl Marx tried in the First International to translate his theories into practice, he found that the workers on whom he relied for revolution did not want bloody revolution: they wanted higher wages and better food, better housing and better education for their children. The First International broke up on that issue. Marx went off and tried to finish Das Kapital, but he was never able to do so because of this unresolved fact.

Lenin set up the Russian Communist Party -- and broke up the Social Democratic Party on exactly the same issue: the majority of those in the Social Democratic Party wanted democracy and gradual reform. Lenin responded by creating the highly disciplined conspiratorial minority which he believed could overcome the majority by seizing what he called "the commanding heights of power."

I believe that, if we stay the course in Viet Nam, we shall look back on the attack on the cities by the Communists as a demonstration of the same simple underlying fact about human beings and their view of Communism.

These folk turned their backs on the Communists. They were frightened. They did not love their government. Their loyalty to nation -- and to anything beyond their family -- is not highly developed. But they did not wish to be pushed around and taken over. They want a life of increasing welfare; a government increasingly honest and concerned with them; and they want the most fundamental right which Communists deny in politics; namely, the right to change your mind about a government.

And so what they did in the cities by not joining in the uprising may turn out to be as important politically for the future as what they did when they took part in the elections.

Of course, in some cases Communists have succeeded in seizing the commanding heights and locking the people into a structure which they could not change. But somewhere down the line we ought to take after those who claim to be liberals, but who, in fact, are willing to see a purposeful minority take over the majority by force and lock them up in a society which denies every objective in which liberals profess to believe.

W. W. Rostow

Monday, February 12, 1968  
5:20 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

As of February 11, enemy killed in action since 29 January is estimated at 31,816. U. S. killed in action 1012; ARVN 2105; other free world forces 62. Total friendly killed in action 3179.

The ratio over the whole period is, then, almost exactly 10 to 1.

Total enemy weapons captured is 8799. The proportion between enemy killed in action and weapons captured is 3.6 to 1.

This is approximately in the range of previous experience. For example, in 1967 the average enemy killed in action per week was 1690. Average weekly weapons captured 598. The proportion: 2.84 to 1.

In addition, 5828 of the enemy were detained. The exact number who were Communist military has not yet been established.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By RG, NARA, Date 2-10-92

DECLASSIFIED


E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988

By RG, NARA, Date 2-10-92



# South Vietnam: Daily Casualties



SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
By 12 NARA, Date 2-10-92

41a


DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan 5, 1988

By hgy NARA, Date 2-10-92

## South Vietnam: Ratio of Enemy Killed to Friendly Killed



DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3  
 DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
 By h8 NARA, Date 2-10-92

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988

By lg NARA, Date 2-10-92

INFORMATION

Monday, February 12, 1968 -- 6:25 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Today Jim Lucas, Scripps-Howard Newspapers Syndicate, and Boyd France, BUSINESS WEEK, came in. I took them both through the latest prisoner of war reports; casualty figures; reorganization of the Vietnamese government; cooperation and revival in the Delta; etc.

As opposed to the newsmen I saw last week, Lucas and France had a clear picture of how the battle went. They asked about:

- the second wave of attack on the cities;
- whether the GVN could keep up the good work;
- when we thought the Khe Sanh offensive would begin.

I detected somewhat less running in circles and a clearer focusing on what we face.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Mr. Rostow

~~Confidential~~  
2. Pres. file  
43

Mon. - February 12, 1968 - 6:00 p.m.  
INFORMATION

Mr. President:

It's always nice to get a thank-you.  
Ave and Eppie do appreciate the albums  
you sent.

Hal Saunders tells me, too, that  
Ave was obviously touched by your warm  
words during your good-bye chat--and he  
isn't easily moved.

W. W. R.



43a

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL

WASHINGTON D.C.

February 5, 1968

Dear Mr. President,

I am very grateful to  
you for your letter of January  
31, 1968 and for the beautiful  
album of photographs.

I am particularly touched  
by your kind and gracious personal  
note which I shall always cherish.

With my very best wishes,

Sincerely

  
Ephraim Evron

The Honorable  
Lyndon B. Johnson,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

436  
שגרירות ישראל  
ושינגטון

February 5  
1968

Dear Mr. President,

I am very grateful to you for your kind letter of January 31, 1968, and for the beautiful album of photographs of Prime Minister Eshkol's visit to the Ranch with you.

I shall treasure this as a memory of your friendship for my country and of the great privilege which was accorded to me of representing my country in Washington during part of the period of your Presidency.

As I take leave of you I would like to use this opportunity, Mr. President, of expressing to you my deep appreciation of your personal kindness and my heartfelt thanks for the understanding, concern and help which the problems and needs of my country have always received from you.

Please accept, Mr. President, the renewed assurances of my highest esteem and regard.

Sincerely yours,

  
Avraham Harnan

The Honorable  
Lyndon B. Johnson  
President of the United States,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

*1. Suspense*  
*2. P. file*

*44*

Monday, February 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Relief Assistance to Viet-Nam

The attached memorandum from Under Secretary Katzenbach recommends our helping launch a campaign by Voluntary Agencies for relief in Viet-Nam. It proposes that Bill Gaud call a meeting in Washington this week with Voluntary Agencies. This would demonstrate our interest and attract public attention.

As you know, the GVN has asked some of its Ambassadors to request help from other Governments. State and AID report that several Voluntary Agencies and other groups want to provide commodities for the victims *of* recent VC attacks.

Saigon tells us they have enough food, medicine and other supplies on hand. The major bottleneck is transportation. The Mission is warned about receiving large shipments of goods that are not useable. If a drive is held in this country, our Mission recommends it be only for cash contributions. The Voluntary Agencies could use the funds to buy what is needed and get it to Viet-Nam.

Bill Gaud will provide guidelines reflecting the Mission's views at the proposed meeting. It seems timely that a campaign of this kind by private groups would stimulate a great deal of sympathetic interest among many Americans and increase their identification with our cause in Viet-Nam.

I recommend that you approve the suggested course of action.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Special Campaigns by Voluntary Agencies for  
Viet-Nam.

Recommendation:

That you approve Bill Gaud's convening of the Voluntary Agencies to kick off a campaign to raise cash donations for relief in Viet-Nam.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

The Government of Viet-Nam has recently requested their Ambassadors to request the help of other governments in providing relief supplies. Similarly, several Voluntary Agencies and other groups have offered to provide commodities to the victims of the recent Viet Cong attacks. For example, CARE has suggested a special national campaign.

The Saigon Mission states that their stocks of foodstuffs and relief supplies are adequate; their major problem is the internal distribution of goods. The Mission is concerned that the Voluntary Agencies will ship over goods they cannot use and this will tie up scarce port capacity and warehouse space. For these reasons the Mission does not favor nationwide drives by the Voluntary Agencies at this time. If such drives are held, the Mission recommends that only cash contributions be accepted. The Voluntary Agencies could then use the funds to buy needed commodities in countries near Viet-Nam and put the commodities to use promptly.

A public appeal by the Voluntary Agencies would provide an opportunity for widespread popular contributions by the American people to help the Vietnamese stricken by recent Viet Cong attacks. Such participation would not only help the Vietnamese people, it should serve to increase popular identification with our cause in Viet-Nam.

AID is prepared to work closely with the Voluntary Agencies and indicate help is needed, but that only cash contributions from the American public are desired at this time. A meeting of the Voluntary Agencies could be called in Washington next week to provide general guidance. To demonstrate our interest and obtain public attention, I propose that Bill Gaud convene the meeting.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Under Secretary" or similar, written in a cursive style.

Under Secretary

45

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Free file*

Monday, February 12, 1968  
4:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Just to see if I have them right,  
here are the action items for Cy in  
Seoul and Saigon, as I communicated  
them to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rh, NARA, Date 2-10-92



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45a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

February 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense

For whatever assistance they may be, here are the action items which the President indicated we should have Cy Vance take up in Seoul, and in Saigon if he goes.

1. In Seoul

- Underline urgency of military situation and U. S. decision to deploy extra battalions;
- In particular, request Korean permission for Westy to redeploy Korean forces if necessary; and indicate urgency of requirement for extra Korean division in Viet Nam.

2. In Saigon.

- Get full details on whether 65,000 target will be reached; when it will be reached; when 18- and 19-year-olds will be called up;
- Explore if civilian contractor force in Viet Nam cannot be used fully and intensively now, releasing military engineering units for highest priority engineering tasks, notably in I Corps;
- Discuss with Bunker and Westy whether advantages would outweigh disadvantages in setting up a new combined command structure, with Thieu as Commander in Chief, Westy as Deputy, Koreans and Australians to participate along with Vien;
- Discuss with Westy and Bunker whether strategic guidance to Westy, based on priority tasks in period of crisis, would be helpful, including willingness to take setbacks in certain secondary areas;
- Have Vance review state of BUTTERCUP.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-202  
By is, NARA Date 4-8-97

W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

4/6

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, February 12, 1968  
4:50 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith [REDACTED] view of the  
situation in Saigon. - Not bad.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

W. W. Rostow

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

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SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-199  
By ica, NARA Date 8-19-98

WWRostow:rln

CITE [REDACTED]  
REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~  
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM  
SUBJECT COMMENTS [REDACTED]  
ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SAIGON  
DOI 11 FEBRUARY 1968

46a 1.5(c)  
3.4(b)  
Roston

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (12 FEBRUARY 1968) FIELD NO.  
SOURCE [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

1. [REDACTED] THE CURRENT

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

SITUATION IN SAIGON:

A. THE WORST OF THE CRISIS IS OVER. SAIGON IS QUIET AND THE SITUATION IS UNDER CONTROL. CLEARING OPERATIONS WILL BE CONTINUED TO ELIMINATE SINGLETON VIET CONG (VC) ACTION ELEMENTS REMAINING IN SAIGON. AND TO DISPERSE VC TACTICAL UNITS INVOLVED IN HARASSMENT IN SAIGON-GIA DINH PRECINCTS 5, 6, 7, AND 8. THE POPULATION IS COOPERATING WELL WITH THE AUTHORITIES BY DENOUNCING VC SUSPECTS AND ACTIVITIES. THE CURFEW WILL CONTINUE THROUGH THE WEEK OF 12 FEBRUARY IN ORDER TO FACILITATE CLEARING AND MOPPING UP OPERATIONS. AFTER THE CURRENT SITUATION IS OVER, THE VC WILL PROBABLY REVERT TO POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE SAIGON METROPOLITAN AREA.

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-200**  
**By iso, NARA Date 7-10-98**

B. OVER 200 POLICEMEN HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE CURRENT FIGHTING. THERE HAS BEEN NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY OF THE POLICE DESERTED TO THE ENEMY DURING THE CRISIS.

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

C. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE MACV 7TH AIR FORCE  
CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.  
REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

INFORMATION

47

~~SECRET~~

Monday, February 12, 1968  
4:50 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This is an extremely well balanced CIA assessment from Saigon of what the Communists have gained and lost; and what our problems are. We are unlikely to have anything better right away.

W. W. Rostow

Vietnam Station Report No. 7/68  
(28 January-10 Feb 1968)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 09724  
By us NARA, Date 4-16-98

WWRostow:rla

47a

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-200**  
**By isa, NARA Date 7-10-98**

VIETNAM STATION REPORT NO. 7/68 (28 JANUARY - 10 FEBRUARY 1968)  
THE TET OFFENSIVE -- A PLUS OR A MINUS?

THE YEAR OF THE MONKEY HAD AN INAUSPICIOUS BEGINNING FOR THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AS THE VC/NVA FORCES VIOLATED THE SACRED TET HOLIDAYS AND LAUNCHED VIRTUALLY SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS AGAINST 36 PROVINCE CAPITALS, FIVE OF THE SIX AUTONOMOUS CITIES, AND NUMEROUS OTHER POPULATION CENTERS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THEIR OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN CLEARLY SPELLED OUT IN CAPTURED DOCUMENTS -- TO DESTROY OR SUBVERT THE GVN/ALLIED FORCES, ELIMINATE THE GVN GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, CREATE A GENERAL UPRISING AMONG THE PEOPLE, AND ESTABLISH A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT DOMINATED BY THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT. IN WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN ALMOST INCREDIBLE MISCALCULATION OF THEIR OWN MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT THEY COULD COMMAND FROM THE PEOPLE, THE COMMUNISTS FAILED TO ACHIEVE THESE STATED OBJECTIVES. IT HAS COST THEM

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PAGE 2 SAIGON 8420 ~~SECRET~~

DEARLY IN MANPOWER -- IN 12 DAYS SOME 31,000 KILLED, 5,700 DETAINED, PROBABLY ANOTHER 10,000 DEAD FROM WOUNDS, AN UNKNOWN NUMBER DEAD FROM AIR AND ARTILLERY STRIKES -- A TOTAL PROBABLY AMOUNTING TO MORE THAN HALF OF THE FORCES USED IN THIS ATTACK. NEVERTHELESS, THE ENEMY'S WELL-PLANNED, COORDINATED SERIES OF ATTACKS WAS AN IMPRESSIVE DISPLAY OF STRENGTH WHICH HAS GIVEN HIM A MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY ABROAD, DEALT A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM, AND CREATED PROBLEMS THAT WILL TAX THE ENERGIES AND RESOURCES OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR MANY MONTHS TO COME.

THE ENEMY'S MILITARY STRATEGY CONSISTED OF A TWO-PHASE OFFENSIVE. WHEREVER POSSIBLE, THE FIRST PHASE ASSAULTS WERE CONDUCTED BY VC LOCAL FORCES. PSYCHOLOGICALLY, THIS WAS MORE APPROPRIATE THAN USING NVA UNITS, GIVEN THE ENEMY'S OBJECTIVE OF WINNING THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE. NVA FORCES WERE USED IN I AND II CORPS WHERE VC FORCES WERE INADEQUATE, BUT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY MOST VC/NVA MAIN FORCES WERE WITHHELD FOR THE SECOND PHASE WHEN THEY WOULD MOVE IN TO CAPITALIZE ON THE EXPECTED CHAOS AND GENERAL UPRISING.

THE PASSIVE REACTION OF THE POPULATION, THE FIERCENESS OF FREE WORLD AND ARVN COUNTEROFFENSIVES AFTER THE INITIAL SURPRISE

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PAGE 3 SAIGON 8420 ~~SECRET~~

AND CONFUSION, AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MASSIVE AIR AND ARTILLERY FIRE OBVIOUSLY FORCED CANCELLATION OF THE COMMITMENT OF VC/NVA MAIN FORCES. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT SLIGHTLY LESS THAN HALF OF THE ENEMY'S MAIN FORCE MANEUVER UNITS OUTSIDE OF THOSE IN THE DMZ, BUT WELL OVER HALF OF HIS LOCAL FORCE UNITS, PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACKS. THUS, HE STILL HAS SUBSTANTIAL UNCOMMITTED FORCES AVAILABLE FOR A NEW "SECOND PHASE" ATTACK.

IN SPITE OF THE ENEMY'S HEAVY LOSSES, HE APPARENTLY STILL PLANS A RESUMPTION OF THE OFFENSIVE ON A LARGE SCALE IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE FAILURE OF COMMITTED FORCES TO WITHDRAW COMPLETELY TO SAFEHAVENS AND CURRENT DISPOSITION OF PREVIOUSLY UNCOMMITTED UNITS LEND CREDENCE TO PRISONERS' STATEMENTS THAT THE SECOND PHASE OFFENSIVE WILL SOON BE INITIATED. ALTHOUGH THE VC/NVA MAIN FORCES WOULD SUPPOSEDLY BE BETTER EQUIPPED, TRAINED, AND DISCIPLINED THAN THE PRIMARILY LOW-LEVEL TROOPS (CANNON FODDER) WHICH LAUNCHED THE FIRST OFFENSIVE, THE ENEMY HAS LOST THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE, DOES NOT HAVE THE COVER OF A TET TRUCE, AND HAS ALREADY EXPENDED A GREAT DEAL IN THE WAY OF MEN AND MATERIEL. THE CONSEQUENCE OF A SECOND "ALL-OUT" SERIES OF ATTACKS WOULD PROBABLY BE AS DISASTROUS MILITARILY AS THE FIRST PHASE. IF, INDEED, THE ENEMY

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PAGE 4 SAIGON 8420 ~~SECRET~~

IS PREPARING FOR LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS AT KHE SANH, QUANG TRI, HUE, DANANG, DAK TO, PHU MY, TUY HOA, SAIGON, CAN THO, AND MY THBIV THEN HE MUST STRIKE QUICKLY. THOUGH STRETCHED THIN, ALLIED FORCES HAVE CONSOLIDATED THEIR GAINS, REGROUPED, AND INITIATED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ENEMY'S MASSED MAIN FORCES WITH NOTABLE SUCCESS. AS TIME PASSED, HIS POSITION IS BECOMING MORE TENUOUS AND THERE WILL BE LESS AND LESS OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE HIS IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES.

ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY WEAKENED, HE IS NOT ON THE VERGE OF DESPERATION. HE HAS OVER HALF OF HIS MAIN FORCES BASICALLY INTACT WITH MORE MEN AND MATERIEL ENROUTE OR AVAILABLE FROM NVN. HE HAS TAKEN SUBSTANTIAL LOSSES IN THE PAST AND SHOWN AN AMAZING DEGREE OF RESILIENCY. ON THE OTHER HAND, HIS LOGISTICS AND RECRUITMENT PROBLEMS WILL BE GREATLY INCREASED WITH SUCH HEAVY LOSSES FROM THE LOCAL AND GUERILLA FORCES WHO PROVIDE MANPOWER FOR SUPPORT AND COMBAT.

AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO A SECOND ASSAULT AGAINST THE CITIES, THE ENEMY COULD ELECT TO CUT HIS LOSSES BY REVERTING TO MORE TRADITIONAL HARASSING ATTACKS WHILE ATTEMPTING TO IMPROVE HIS POSITION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. THE RECENT WELL-COORDINATED ATTACKS

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PAGE 5 SAIGON 8420-~~SECRET~~

OVER WIDESPREAD AREAS PROVED THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY TO UTILIZE THIS TACTIC. SUCH ATTACKS ON A SMALLER SCALE WOULD STILL GAIN HEADLINES AND HAVE CONSIDERABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPEAL AND VALUE TO THE ENEMY AS THEY RE-RAISE QUESTIONS IN SVN AND THE WORLD AS TO THE ABILITY OF THE ALLIES TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO THE PEOPLE. HOWEVER, AFTER SUCH EXTENSIVE INDOCTRINATION ON THE INEVITABILITY OF IMMINENT VICTORY, A REVERSION TO ESSENTIALLY GUERRILLA WARFARE WOULD PROBABLY CAUSE SEVERE PROBLEMS OF MORALE AMONG THE CADRES AND A LOSS OF IMPETUS FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY EFFORT.

IT IS NOT YET POSSIBLE TO MAKE A FIRM ASSESSMENT OF THE DAMAGE WHICH HAS BEEN CAUSED TO THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM, BUT IT PROBABLY HAS BEEN EXTENSIVE. THE PACIFIED AREAS DID NOT AT LEAST INITIALLY APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN A PRIORITY TARGET, PROBABLY BECAUSE MOST OF THE VC GUERRILLAS WERE DRAWN INTO LOCAL FORCE UNITS FOR THE CITY BATTLES OR WERE ENGAGED IN INTERDICTION LOC'S. HOWEVER, GVN FORCES PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE PACIFIED AREAS AND THE RD TEAMS WERE IN MANY CASES WITHDRAWN TO ASSIST IN THE DEFENSE OF URBAN AREAS, LEAVING THE VC FREE TO PENETRATE PREVIOUSLY SECURED HAMLETS AND CONDUCT PROPAGANDA, RECRUIT, ACQUIRE FOOD, ELIMINATE THE GVN ADMINISTRATION, AND OCCASIONALLY TERRORIZE THE POPULATION. THE

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PAGE 6 SAIGON 3420 ~~SECRET~~

IMPACT OF THE VC PRESENCE WAS ESPECIALLY SEVERE IN THE LARGER HAMLETS WHICH GENERALLY ARE LOCATED CLOSE TO THE POPULATION CENTERS AND WERE ON THE VC ROUTE OF ENTRY. THIS ACTIVITY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PART OF THE LARGE REFUGEE FLOW INTO THE CITIES.

WITH MANY OF THE CITIES IN SHAMBLES AND REQUIRING PRIORITY RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION EFFORTS, THE DEVELOPMENT ASPECTS OF THE PROGRAM ALMOST INEVITABLY WILL SUFFER. IN ANY EVENT, IT WILL BE MANY MONTHS BEFORE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE PREVIOUSLY SECURED HAMLETS CAN BE RESTORED, <sup>0</sup> ~~SOME~~ OF WHOM FELT THE VC PRESENCE FOR THE FIRST TIME. ONE POSSIBLY HOPEFUL SIGN IS THAT MANY OF THE VC EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT THE RELATIVE PROSPERITY OF THE PEOPLE IN THE GVN AREAS, CONTRARY TO WHAT THEY HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE. THIS, TOGETHER WITH THE MILITARY DEFEAT AND HEAVY LOSSES, SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO SOME FUTURE DEFECTIONS.

THERE HAS NATURALLY BEEN A MIXED REACTION FROM THE PEOPLE TO THE COMMUNIST ONSLAUGHT -- INITIALLY. IT WAS ONE OF SHOCK AT THE

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PAGE 7 SAIGON 8420 ~~SECRET~~

STRENGTH OF THE ATTACK, AND ANGER AT ITS PERFIDY. HOWEVER, EVEN THOSE SKEPTICS WHO WOULD NOT PREVIOUSLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE LARGE ELECTORAL TURNOUTS, THE INABILITY OF THE VC TO GET A RESPONSE TO CALLS FOR A GENERAL STRIKE, AND THE ALMOST TOTALLY CONSCRIPT NATURE OF THE VC FORCES WERE PROOF THAT THE VC LACKED POPULAR SUPPORT, CAN HARDLY DENY IT NOW. DESPITE THE CREATION OF A REVOLUTIONARY ADMINISTRATION, SUPPOSEDLY UNTAINTED BY ASSOCIATION WITH THE NLF, NO SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT OF THE POPULATION OR OF THE ARMED FORCES DEFECTED. THE REFUSAL OF THE PEOPLE TO RESPOND TO THE VC CALL FOR AN UPRISING, AND IN FACT OFTEN TO RENDER ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT FORCES, WAS THE KEY TO THE FAILURE OF THE VC PLAN, AND IS ONE OF MOST ENCOURAGING ASPECTS OF THE WHOLE AFFAIR.

THERE ARE NEGATIVE FACTORS, OF COURSE -- THE PEOPLE NOW HAVE A GREATER RESPECT FOR THE CAPABILITIES OF THE VC, AND THIS WILL PROBABLY RESULT IN SOME CASES IN A MORE CAUTIOUS ATTITUDE TOWARD OPEN SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT. THERE IS CRITICISM OVER THE GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF PREPAREDNESS, CHARGES OF EXCESSIVE PROPERTY DAMAGE AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, AND LOOTING BY THE COUNTERREACTION FORCES, AND A PERSISTENT BELIEF THAT SOMEHOW THE U.S. WAS IN

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PAGE 8 SAIGON 8420 ~~SECRET~~

COLLUSION WITH THE VC. HOWEVER, THE POPULATION IS UNIVERSALLY ANGRY AT THE VC FOR VIOLATING BOTH A SACRED HOLIDAY AND THEIR OWN TRUCE, AND THE BLAME FOR ALL OF THE ILLS IS GENERALLY PLACED ON THE VC. THERE WAS LEFT NO DOUBT IN THE MINDS OF THE PEOPLE AS TO THE SUPERIORITY OF THE GOVERNMENT FORCES AND AS TO WHO WON THIS ENGAGEMENT. ON BALANCE, WE FEEL THAT IN THE CONTEST FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE PEOPLE, THE VC HAVE SO FAR SUFFERED A SEVERE LOSS. IN COMMON DANGER, THERE WAS A TENDENCY TO UNITE BEHIND THE GOVERNMENT. WITH A RESIDUE OF ILL WILL TOWARD THE VC WHICH WILL NOT BE EASILY ERASED, THE TASK OF NATION-BUILDING, AT LEAST IN THOSE AREAS STILL UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL, SHOULD BECOME A LITTLE EASIER. MUCH WILL DEPEND, HOWEVER, ON THE SKILL AND ALACRITY WITH WHICH THE GOVERNMENT HANDLES THE SEVERE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IT FACES.

THE DAYS AHEAD CONSTITUTE A SEVERE TEST FOR THE GVN, THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT SUFFERED A SERIOUS LOSS OF PRESTIGE BY ITS INABILITY TO DEFEND ITS CITIES. NOTWITHSTANDING, THERE HAS BEEN AT LEAST A TEMPORARY TENDENCY ON THE PART OF NATIONALIST ELEMENTS TO SET ASIDE THEIR PAROCHIAL INTERESTS AND RALLY BEHIND THE LEADERSHIP. THIS IS BY NO MEANS UNIVERSAL --

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PAGE 9 SAIGON 8420 ~~SECRET~~

THE MILITANT BUDDHISTS, THE DAI VIETS, AND SOME OTHERS STILL HAVE REFUSED EITHER PUBLICLY TO CONDEMN THE VC OR TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT ACTIVELY. ALTHOUGH IT WAS AN AMERICAN IDEA, CLEARLY THE MOST EFFECTIVE ACTION BY THE GOVERNMENT SO FAR WAS THE CREATION OF THE JOINT VIETNAMESE /AMERICAN TASK FORCE UNDER VICE PRESIDENT KY TO HANDLE THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS OF REHABILITATION. WHATEVER CLOSING OF RANKS BEHIND THE GOVERNMENT THAT HAS ACCRUED CAN BE CREDITED LARGELY TO KY, WHO HAS EMERGED AS THE "MAN OF THE HOUR." DESPITE AGGRAVATING AND BUREAUCRATIC PROBLEMS, SOME FORWARD MOVEMENT HAS BEEN MADE IN REESTABLISHING ESSENTIAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES. KY MAY WELL HAVE SAVED THE GVN FROM PROJECTING ITS USUAL IMAGE OF INACTIVITY.

WE ARE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT FUTURE POLITICAL PROBLEMS. THE SCHISMS WHICH DIVIDE THIS SOCIETY ARE DEEPLY ROOTED, AND WILL INEVITABLY ARISE AGAIN AS THE FIRST FLUG<sup>S</sup>H OF UNITY BEGINS TO FADE. DEMANDS WILL BE MADE FOR THE REMOVAL OF OFFICIALS, BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL, WHO PROVED UNEQUAL TO THE TASK IN A CRISIS, AND THIS WILL BE CERTAIN TO RESTORE THE ENDEMIC FACTIONAL INFIGHTING. THE MILITARY, SOME OF THE CATHOLICS, AND THOSE FAVORING A ROUGH, DIRECTED SYSTEM WILL FAULT THE GOVERNMENT FOR ~~NOT~~ BEING TOUGH

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PAGE 10 SAIGON 8420 ~~SECRET~~

ENOUGH, WHILE OTHERS WILL BE CONCERNED OVER EVEN THE TEMPORARY SACRIFICE OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES AND THE CONTINUED PREEMINENT ROLE OF THE MILITARY. THE CRISIS HAS IGNITED A SPARK OF UNITY, BUT TO SUSTAIN IT WILL REQUIRE A SUCCESSFUL RELIEF AND RECOVERY OPERATION, AND A SUBLIMATION OF PERSONAL AND PARTISAN POLITICAL INTERESTS WHICH THIS SOCIETY HAS NEVER BEFORE DEMONSTRATED.

THE COMMUNISTS CAN BE CREDITED WITH HAVING MAINTAINED EXCELLENT SECURITY FOR SUCH A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, BUT THEY ARE GUILTY OF A MASSIVE INTELLIGENCE FAILURE. DOCUMENTS CAPTURED OVER THE PAST FOUR MONTHS AND INTERROGATIONS OF THE PRISONERS INVOLVED IN THE RECENT ATTACKS INDICATE QUITE CLEARLY THAT THE VC DID INTEND TO TAKE AND HOLD THE CITIES, DID EXPECT A GENERAL UPRISING, AND DID PLAN TO INSTALL A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, AS EVIDENCED BY THE PRESENCE OF A STANDBY VC ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE IN THE MAJOR CITIES. IT MAY SEEM INCREDIBLE THAT VC EXPECTATIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SO DIVORCED FROM REALITY, BUT THERE ARE THREE FACTORS WHICH PROBABLY EXPLAIN THIS. FIRST, THE COMMUNISTS ARE AND ALWAYS HAVE

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PAGE 11 SAIGON 3420 ~~SECRET~~

BEEN VITIMS OF THEIR DOCTRINE, AND IN THE PRESENT CASE THE ARTICLES OF FAITH WERE: "THE LONGER WE FIGHT, THE STRONGER WE BECOME;" AND, "THE MORE VICIOUSLY THE ENEMY FIGHTS, THE CLOSER HE IS TO COLLAPSE;" AND, "THE PEOPLE SUPPORT US AND WHEN. THE URBAN PEOPLE HAVE THE CHANCE TO RISE UP, OUR VICTORY WILL BE ASSURED." SECOND, THE LEADERS HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY AND GREATLY MISINFORMED BY LOWER CADRES. GIVEN THE DOCTRINAL BIAS ALLUDED TO ABOVE AND THE ORIENTAL PENCHANT FOR TELLING PEOPLE WHAT THEY WANT TO HEAR, THE REPORTS GOING UPWARD HAVE BEEN SO MISINTERPRETED THE FACTS THAT THE LEADERS COULD NOT BASE THEIR DECISIONS ON REALITY. THIRD, THE NEED FOR A SIGNIFICANT VICTORY AFTER TWO YEARS OF DROUGHT MAY HAVE INTRODUCED A LACK OF PRUDENCE. BY ANY RATIONAL STAND, NORTH VIETNAM HAS BEEN LOSING TOO MUCH IN ORDER TO GAIN TOO LITTLE. FOR TOO LONG, VC STRNGTH AND SUPPORT HAS BEEN DWINDLING. THE ENTIRE NATURE OF THE WAR, THE ENTIRE ENVIRONMENT OF THE STRUGGLE, CHANGED WITH THE MASSIVE U.S. INVOLVEMENT. THE TET ASSAULT MUST

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PAGE 12 SAIGON 8420 ~~SECRET~~

HAVE BEEN PART OF AN EXPECTED VC PLAN TO INFLICT HEAVY PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DAMAGE IN HOPE OF GAINING, IF NOT ALL THEIR OBJECTIVES, SOMETHING WHICH COULD BE CONSTRUED AS A VICTORY.

WE ARE VERY MUCH AWARE THAT WE HAVE PROBABLY SEEN ONLY THE FIRST OF A TWO-ACT DRAMA. IF THE SECOND ACT REPEATS THE SCENARIO, WE WILL SERIOUSLY QUESTION THE ABILITY OF HANOI TO CONTINUE TO CARRY ON THIS KIND OF CONVENTIONAL WARFARE FOR A PROTRACTED PERIOD. WHATEVER ELSE MAY FOLLOW, THE TET OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM, CONTRARY TO MUCH FOREIGN OPINION, IS NOT POPULARLY REGARDED HERE EITHER AS A VC VICTORY OR EVEN AS AN INDICATION OF THEIR EVENTUAL SUCCESS. THERE IS A SOBERING THOUGHT FOR THE FUTURE, HOWEVER -- IF IT WERE NOT FOR THE PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES, THE VC FLAG WOULD BE FLYING OVERMUCH OF SOUTH VIETNAM TODAY.

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ACTION

~~1. Rusk~~  
2. Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

4.15 pm  
Monday, February 12, 1968

SUBJECT: Condolence Message to Eshkol on Submarine Loss

As you know from the press, no one has ever been able to locate the Israeli submarine which disappeared in the Mediterranean two weeks ago. In a small country like Israel, the loss of more than sixty men hits especially hard. State recommends you send the following to Prime Minister Eshkol:

"I have been deeply saddened over the presumed loss of the crew of the submarine DAKAR. The sympathy of my country goes out to the people of Israel in this tragedy. "

Foreign Minister Eban wrote Secretary Rusk thanking us for our help in the search, and the Secretary will reply.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

Meeting with the President

*changed to 1:30 lunch*

Monday, February 12, 1968, 4:30 p.m.

AGENDA

1. Gen. Westmoreland's Request for Troops (Sect. McNamara and Gen. Wheeler)

Note: Gen. Taylor's analysis of Westy's cable will be available to you before the meeting.

2. Instructions for Mr. Vance in Saigon (Sects. Rusk and McNamara)

Note: Include instruction on BUTTERCUP, although latest cables indicate this is in quite good shape.

3. A Speech (The President)

Note: As instructed, I have spoken to Sect. Rusk and Mr. Clifford.

4. Other

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-206

By Cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

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Monday, Feb. 12, 1968  
1:10 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith General Taylor's comment which  
you wanted before the 1:30 meeting.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

51

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, February 12, 1968  
1:00 p. m.

*For file*

Mr. President:

Herewith fairly clear information  
that the road from Danang to Hue is  
open.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rf, NARA, Date 2-10-92

SECRET



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

57a

12 February 1968  
1105 EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: I Corps Road Status

The following information is provided in response to Mr. McCafferty's questions:

a. The Hai Van (Ai Van) Pass is open. The bridge reported blown at 080800 EST has been repaired. No enemy activity reported near the pass.

b. Highway 1 from Da Nang to Dong Ha is open, except at a point just north of the Ai Van Pass. There, a large culvert was reported destroyed at 112000 EST (120900 SVN). The estimated time for completion of repairs is unknown. However, MACV advises that it is a relatively small engineering task.

*W. R. Mc Clendon*

W. R. MC CLENDON  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution

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SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988  
By *128* NARA Date *2-10-92*