

File

52

Monday, February 12, 1968  
12:20 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith an anxious situation in Tra Vinh city,  
in the Delta.

The fear of re-attack on or about Feb. 15 remains  
real.

I'm sure Giap wishes to minimize the possibility  
that Westy can move safely north with battalions  
from the 9th Division.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By plg, NARA, Date 6/25/96

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
By plg, NARA, Date 6/25/96

DLA064  
00 YEKADS  
DE YEKADL 6938 0431459  
ZKZK 00 ZSL DE  
O 121442Z ZYH  
FM CIA  
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM  
SSO ACSI DA  
SSO ARLINGTON HALL STATION  
AFSSO USAF  
CNO  
DIA/ISIC  
JCS  
NIC  
DIRNSA COMMAND CENTER  
STATE (RCI)  
CIA-OCI  
ZEM

52a  
**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-200**  
**By us, NARA Date 7-10-98**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CITE [REDACTED]  
REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM DATE: 12 FEBRUARY 1968  
DOI 12 FEBRUARY 1968  
SUBJECT SECURITY SITUATION IN THE PROVINCES OF IV CORPS  
AS OF 2400 HOURS ON 12 FEBRUARY 1968

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

ACQ VIETNAM, CAN THO (12 FEBRUARY 1968)  
SOURCE [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

1. SINCE THE LAST REPORT PUBLISHED AT 1200 HOURS, 12 FEBRUARY 1968, THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTED ATTACKS AGAINST ANY OF THE SIXTEEN PROVINCES IN IV CORPS. REPORTS ARE BEING RECEIVED, HOWEVER, OF REGROUPMENT BY THE VIET CONG (VC) AND FUTURE ATTACKS ARE EXPECTED AGAINST MANY OF THE PROVINCE CAPITALS ON OR BEFORE THE 15TH OF THE MONTH.

2. THE FOLLOWING STATISTICS WERE ISSUED BY VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS IN VINH LONG PROVINCE TODAY PERTAINING TO THE NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND THE DAMAGE DONE TO THE CITY DURING THE ATTACK WHICH BEGAN ON THE 31ST. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT 1,587 HOUSES WERE DESTROYED, 2,228 HOUSES WERE DAMAGED BETTER THAN 50 PERCENT, 112 CIVILIANS WERE KILLED, 1,300 CIVILIANS WERE WOUNDED, AND THERE ARE BELIEVED TO BE ABOUT 20,000 REFUGEES IN VINH LONG CITY, 10,000 OF WHICH ARE STAYING AT THE REFUGEE CENTERS. ALSO VINH LONG REPORTED TODAY THAT THE PRICES OF COMMODITIES, ESPECIALLY RICE, HAVE BEGUN TO FALL FROM THE HIGH OF 100 PIASTRES PER LITER WHICH WAS THE GOING PRICE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ATTACK ENDED.

3. WHILE THE SITUATION IN TRA VINH CITY, VINH BINH PROVINCE, WAS QUIET TODAY, THERE REMAINS A GREAT DEAL OF TENSION AMONG THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY AS AT LEAST THREE VC MAIN FORCE BATTALIONS AND TWO LOCAL FORCE COMPANIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED STILL IN THE AREA. THE GREATEST FEAR IS THAT THE VC MAY BE ABLE TO PENETRATE THE CITY IN LARGE NUMBERS IN ANY FUTURE ATTACK WHICH WOULD MAKE THE DEFENSE MORE DIFFICULT AND COULD LEAD TO THE VC COMPLETELY TAKING CONTROL OF THE CITY. THERE IS MUCH DISCONTENT AMONG U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS OVER THE LACK OF SUPPORT THE CITY IS RECEIVING FROM THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) 9TH DIVISION. THEY FEEL THERE IS A DEFINITE NEED FOR MORE TROOPS TO DEFEND THE CITY AND BETTER LOGISTICAL SUPPLY FOR THE TROOPS ALREADY THERE. CREDIT WAS GIVEN TO THE ARVN

TROOPS WHO DEFENDED THE CITY AGAINST THE FIRST ATTACK, HOWEVER THE LARGE NUMBER OF VC FORCES WHICH REPORTS INDICATE MAY TAKE PART IN A FUTURE ATTACK IS CAUSING CONCERN AMONG THE KNOWLEDGEABLE AMERICAN AND VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, MACV, 7TH AF, CINCPAC A. AC, PACAF, PACFLT, (ALSO SENT SAIGON).

GP-1  
450

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

53

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/CACTUS

Monday, February 12, 1968  
12:00 noon

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Cy Vance's proposed communique and an account of his first discussion with President Park.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 4178  
Seoul 4176

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993  
By *Ry/sd*, NARA, Date *2/10/92*



Department of State

TELEGRAM

53a

12

~~SECRET~~

.....ZZ RUEHC  
DE RUALOS 4178E 0431447  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
Z 121445Z FEB 68  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9023  
STATE GRNC  
BT

3545Q

RECD: FEB 12, 1968  
10:32AM

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 4178

MODIS/CACTUS

VANTO 07

SUBJ: DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE

VANCE PROPOSES TO TABLE FOLLOWING DRAFT COMMUNIQUE TOMORROW MORNING WHEN HE MEETS WITH KOREAN CABINET. ~~LE DEPART~~ <sup>VEMENT</sup> ~~MENT~~  
CONCURS. THIS DRAFT WILL FALL FAR SHORT OF ROK AMBITIONS AND A SUBSTANTIAL WRANGLE IS IN THE OFFING.

PRESIDENT PARK RECEIVED MR. CYRUS R. VANCE, SPECIAL ENVOY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON FEBRUARY 11

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4178E ~~SECRET~~  
AND FEBRUARY 12, 1967. CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT PARK AND MR. VANCE WERE CARRIED ON IN THE PRESENCE OF O3 43077)8: 91 (943-4 048.3 .8,8534, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. PORTER AND GENERAL C.H. BONESTEEL, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, ALSO PARTICIPATED.

PRESIDENT PARK AND MR. VANCE FULLY EXCHANGED VIEWS CONCERNING THE PROBLEMS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE INCREASING AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS OF NORTH KOREA INCLUDING THE ATTACK DIRECTED AT THE PRESIDENTIAL MANSION AND THE SEIZURE OF THE U.S.S. PUEBLO. THEY ALSO AGREED THAT ANY FUTURE INCIDENT OF SUCH NATURE WOULD SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZE PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY AGREED THAT THE TRUST AND UNDERSTANDING WHICH HAVE CHARACTERIZED THE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 89-173  
By *dlp*, NARA, Date 4/30/96

~~SECRET~~

-2- SEOUL 4178, FEBRUARY 12

RELATIONS BETWEEN THEIR COUNTRIES, WOULD ENABLE THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO MEET THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY SUCH NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE

PAGE 3 RUALOS 4178E ~~SECRET~~  
REPUBLIC OF KOREA. THEY REAFFIRMED THE COMMITMENT OF THE TWO COUNTRIES TO UNDERTAKE IMMEDIATE CONSULTATIONS IN THE EVENT THE SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS THREATENED. 2

THE PRESIDENT AND THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY ALSO DISCUSSED THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ADDITIONAL \$100 MILLION OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA RECOMMENDED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS SHOULD BE ALLOCATED TO BEST ENHANCE THE CAPABILITY OF THE KOREAN MILITARY FORCES TO DEFEND THEIR HOMELAND.

PORTER  
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

12

~~SECRET~~

536

VV CRA178  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUALOS 4176E 0431205  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 121147Z FEB 68 ZFF-1  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9021  
STATE GRNC  
BT

3 5 4 6 9

12 Feb 68 - 10:39 AM

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 4176

NODIS/CACTUS

VANTO 05

CYRUS VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR PORTER, GENERAL BONESTEEL, AND JOHN WALSH, CONFERRED WITH PRESIDENT PARK FOR 5 1/2 HOURS TODAY. PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER, DEFENSE MINISTER AND CIA DIRECTOR ALSO PARTICIPATED.

LENGTHY SESSION PROVIDED USEFUL RELIEF VALVE FOR ROK EMOTIONS. TENSIONS GRADUALLY EASED AS DIALOGUE WAS ESTABLISHED. PARK REITERATED AT LENGTH THEMES MADE FAMILIAR BY REPORTS OF AMBASSADOR PORTER AND GENERAL BONESTEEL IN FATALISTIC AND

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4176E ~~SECRET~~

SIMPLISTIC TERMS. WHILE THE PRESIDENT'S SINCERITY WAS NOT IN DOUBT IT WAS EVIDENT THAT HIS SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WERE THE PRODUCT OF EMOTION RATHER THAN FINISHED STAFF WORK.

PARK CHARGED WITH DEEP CONVICTION THAT KIM IL SUNG IS ON PATH OF WAR. THE RATE OF VIOLATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT HAS INCREASED MARKEDLY. THE ATTACK ON THE BLUE HOUSE DESIGNED TO KILL HIM AND HIS FAMILY AND THE SEIZURE OF THE PUEBLO WERE ACTS OF WAR. THE NORTH KOREANS HAVE THOUSANDS OF TRAINED INFILTRATORS AND FURTHER SERIOUS PENETRATIONS ARE INEVITABLE IN THE SPRING. THEY INTEND TO HARASS THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE, DISRUPT THE ECONOMY AND, WHEN THE COUNTRY IS SUFFICIENTLY WEAKENED, RESORT TO ALL OUT WAR. THEY WILL ONLY RESPECT COUNTER-FORCE. THEY SHOULD BE WARNED OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF FURTHER VIOLATIONS, ASKED TO APOLOGIZE FOR PAST ACTIONS, AND REQUESTED TO PROMISE NOT TO VIOLATE THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IN THE FUTURE. IN ADDITION WE SHOULD PUBLICLY STATE THAT ANY FUTURE VIOLATIONS WILL BE MET BY IMMEDIATE RETALIATION. ALL COURSES OF ACTION IN THE PRESENT SITUATION ARE DANGEROUS BUT PARK DID NOT BELIEVE THAT RETALIATION WOULD PROVOKE THE DRNK TO WAR. FIRMNESS AND

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 89-73

8/1/96 NARA Date 4/30/96

~~SECRET~~

(WNS)

PAGE 3 RAULSO 4172E ~~SECRET~~  
RESOLUTION ARE IMPERATIVE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. THE US  
WORLD POSITION DEPENDS UPON FIRMNESS IN FACE OF COMMUNIST PRESSURE.  
IF WE ARE WEAK HERE WE WILL PAY FOR IT IN THE FORM OF COMMUNIST  
AGGRESSION ELSEWHERE.

ON THE PANMUNJOM ISSUE, PARK FEARED KIM IL SUNG WOULD  
DELAY AND STALL THE NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO HUMILIATE THE US  
AND THEREFORE ROK. HE WISHED TO KNOW ~~WHAT~~ THE US WOULD DO UNDER  
THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES IN ORDER TO CALM HIS PEOPLE. HE WAS WORRIED  
AND DISPLEASED BY THE INDICATIONS BY HIGH OFFICIALS THAT THE PUEBLO  
COULD HAVE BEEN IN NORTH KOREAN TERRITORIAL WATERS AND BY SENATOR  
MANSFIELD'S RECOMMENDATIONS THAT THE ISSUE BE SUBMITTED TO THE ICJ.  
THESE STATEMENTS AND THE ABSENCE OF ROK PARTICIPATION AT PANMUNJOM  
AROUSED ROK SUSPICIONS ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS. NEVERTHELESS, HE  
WOULD NOT OPPOSE THE CONTINUATION OF SECRET TALKS PROVIDING HE  
HAD AN ASSURANCE THAT INFILTRATION WOULD STOP.

THROUGHOUT THE LENGTHY DISCUSSION VANCE CALMLY AND SYMPATHET-  
ICALLY STROVE FOR A DIALOGUE WITH THE PRESIDENT, PROBED FOR SPECI-  
FICITY, POINTED OUT THE WEAKNESS AND DANGERS OF PARK'S OPTIONS,

PAGE 4 RUALOS 4172E ~~SECRET~~  
EXPLAINED US POLICY, REITERATED THE COMMONALITY OF US-ROK INTERESTS,  
WARNED OF THE DANGERS OF PRECIPITATE AND UNILAYERAL ACTION, AND  
SOUGHT FOR A COMMON, SATISFACTORY COURSE OF ACTION.

WHILE THE JURY REMAINED OUT AT THE END OF THE SESSION, THE  
ATMOSPHERE WAS FRIENDLY AND THE ROKS APPEARED TO RECOGNIZE THAT  
WE WOULD NOT AGREE TO A POLICY OF RETALIATION. DESPITE PRESS  
REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY, THE ROKS DID NOT RAISE ISSUE OF REVISION  
OF MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY OR OF SEEKING TO DISENGAGE FROM THE  
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CINCUNC. CLEARLY, HOWEVER, WE HAVE MUCH  
SERIOUS TALK AHEAD OF US BEFORE WE WILL KNOW THE OUTCOME OF THIS  
MISSION. WE WILL SUBMIT A DRAFT COMMUNIQUE TONIGHT. TOMORROW  
MORNING WE WILL MEET WITH THE FOREIGN AND OTHER MINISTERS AND  
PROBABLY IN THE LATE AFTERNOON WITH THE PRESIDENT.

PORTER  
BT

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

54

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Monday, February 12, 1968  
12:00 noon

Mr. President:

Herewith the Thang-Komer brother  
act makes some progress; although  
they've obviously got to get the ports  
moving.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 19121

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rin

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *kg*, NARA, Date 2-10-92

VV EHA250

1968 FEB 12 16 10

592

RR RUEHEX  
DE RUMJIR 19121 0431515  
ZNY SSSSS  
R 0431500Z FEB 68  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6492  
INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEPJS/DOD WASHDC  
RUEHLG/CIA

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-197**  
**By           , NARA Date 11-26-96**

RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 4635  
RUHHHQ/CINCPAC FOR POLAD  
STATE GRNC

BT  
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 19121

STATE PASS AID

SUB/ SITUATION REPORT PROJECT RECOVERY -- 1800 HOURS,  
12 FEBRUARY

1. THANG IN FULL CHARGE OF COORDINATING GROUP TODAY ACTING WITH AUTHORITY AND USUAL DRIVE. HE HAS REGULARIZED COORDINATING GROUP OPERATION. AT DAILY 1700 MEETING, MINISTERIAL REPRESENTATIVE

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 19121 ~~SECRET~~  
WILL REPORT ON DAY'S ACTIVITIES AND RAISE PROBLEMS OR PLANS REQUIRING COMMITTEE ACTION. MINISTERS MEET, WITH KY IN CHAIR, AT 0900 EVERY MORNING.

2. SEVERAL DEFINITE STEPS TAKEN AT TODAY'S MORNING MEETING. ADDITIONAL RED AREAS TURNED BLUE IN SAIGON. NOW 1700 TO 0730 CURFEW AND MINIMUM RESTRICTIONS APPLY TO ALL OF DISTRICTS 1, 2 AND 4 PLUS ABOUT TWO-THIRDS OF DISTRICTS 3 AND 5. KY SET BACK CURFEW FROM 1400 TO 1500 IN ALL RED AREAS. DESPITE OUR PROPOSAL TO HAVE UNIFORM CURFEW STARTING AT 1700. STARTING THURSDAY, 144 SAIGON RICE RETAILERS WILL BE SUPPLIED WITH RICE WITH TWO RD CADRE STATIONED AT EACH RETAIL OUTLET TO CHECK THAT SALES ARE CORRECT AND PRICES RIGHT. SIXTY-SIX HAVE ALREADY EITHER BEGUN RICE SALES OR HAVE LAID TO SUFFICIENT STOCKS TO BE ABLE TO START TOMORROW OR THURSDAY. THANG SAYS HE WILL HAVE LICENSES WITHDRAWN FROM DEALERS WHO REFUSE TO COOPERATE. REMAINDER OF RD CADRE WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO MSWR TO HELP STAFF 108 REFUGEE CENTERS IN SAIGON/GIA DINH.

3. PORT OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN SLOWED TO SNAIL'S PACE BY CURFEW AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS. TWENTY SHIPS SITTING IDLE IN PORT TODAY; 20 HOLDING AT VUNG TAU; 15 MORE SITTING AT SUBIC BAY.

had

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 19121 ~~SECRET~~  
HOPING TO GIVE THANG LEVER, WE HAVE PASSED RUMOR TO GVN THAT NO SHIPS LEAVING US PORTS BECAUSE OF TIE-UP AND RESULTING UNBEARABLE DEMURRAGE CHARGES.

4. ACCORDING TO GENERAL FORSYTHE, OUR MAN AT THE PALACE, COMMITTEE REALLY FUNCTIONING MUCH BETTER. THREE LIAISON OFFICIALS BETWEEN KEY MINISTRIES AND COMMITTEE WERE APPOINTED

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 19121 ~~SECRET~~  
HOPING TO GIVE THANG NEVER, WE HAVE PASSED RUMOP TO GVN THAT  
NO SHIPS LEAVING US PORTS BECAUSE OF TIE-UP AND RESULTING  
UNBEARABLE DEMURRAGE CHARGES.

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COMMITTEE REALLY FUNCTIONING MUCH BETTER. THREE LIAISON  
OFFICIALS BETWEEN KEY MINISTRIES AND COMMITTEE WERE APPOINTED  
TODAY -- COLONAL NGIEU BROUGHT IN BY THANG FROM I CTZ WITH  
MSWR, HUONG (NUMBER TWO AT FINANCE MINISTRY) WITH MINISTRY OF  
ECONOMY, AND AN UNDESIGNATED INDIVIDUAL WITH MINISTRY OF  
PUBLIC WORKS.

5. THE MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION AND ECONOMY ANNOUNCED THAT  
CLEARANCE HAS BEEN OBTAINED TO PUT COASTER FLEET BACK INTO  
OPERATION. EARLY SHIPMENTS SCHEDULED FORDANANG, NHA TRANG  
AND CAN THO CARRYING HEAVY TONNAGE RELIEF AND CONSTRUCTION  
MATERIALS.

6. TWO FIELD INSPECTION TEAMS WILL BE SENT OUT BY COORDINATING  
GROUP -- PROBABLY GOING TO II AND IV CTZ ON FRIDAY. PUBLIC  
WORKS, HEALTH AND REFUGEE MINISTRIES WILL BE REPRESENTED.  
MACCORV INVITED TO SEND REPRESENTATIVE.

7. AS OF 10 FEBRUARY, RATHER LARGE QUANTITIES OF COMMODITIES

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 19121 ~~SECRET~~  
AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES HAD ALREADY BEEN DISTRIBUTED FROM CENTRAL  
AND REGION WAREHOUSE. SO FAR SHORTAGES HAVE BEEN RESULT OF ISOLATED  
LOW STOCK LEVELS OR PROBLEM OF DISTRIBUTION CAUSED  
BY POOR SECURITY RATHER THAN OVERALL SUPPLY SHORTAGES.  
664 METRIC TONS OF SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN SUPPLIED THROUGH MACCORDS  
CHANNELS FROM CPSA WAREHOUSES TO FULFILL NEEDS IN SAIGON.  
110 TONS WENT TO III CTZ. I CTZ SUPPLIED 117 TONS FROM ITS  
REGIONAL WAREHOUSE; II CTZ SUPPLIED 230 TONS. 60 TONS OF  
MEDICAL SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN SHIPPED FROM SAIGON. PROVINCE  
WAREHOUSES HAVE ISSUED OUT AS MUCH AS 75 TONS IN SOME CASES.  
PRE-PACKAGE STOCKS WHICH WILL BE SHIPPED WITHOUT REQUISITION  
ARE BEING BUILT UP AT THE AIR AMERICA TERMINAL IN SAIGON.

8. PROVINCE REPORTS ALMOST UNIVERSALLY COMPLAIN OF TRAVEL  
RESTRICTIONS ON ROADS, CURFEWS, AND LARGE NUMBER OF EVACUEES  
HAMPERING RETURN TO NORALCY. HOWEVER, IN DANANG, MARKETS  
OPENED YESTERDAY AND CURFEW RELAXED TO 1900 TO 0700. GENERALLY  
FOOD PRICES IN THE COUNTRYSIDE DID NOT SPIRAL UPWARD TO THE  
SAME EXTENT AS IN SAIGON. FOR THE MOST PART PRICES AVERAGE  
20-40 PERCENT HIGHER THAN BEFORE TET.

9. IN MANY AREAS RD CADRE, CAUGHT IN CITIES ON TET LEAVE

PAGE 5 TUMJIR 191221 ~~SECRET~~  
OR PULLED BACK HASTILY TO MAN DEFENSES OR FOR THEIR OWN  
PROTECTION, ARE WORKING AS REFUGEE TEAMS OR HELPING WITH  
OTHER RECONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES. AMBASSADOR KOMER, DESIROUS  
OF CAPITALIZING ON ENEMY'S REPULSE AND HEAVY LOSSES AND  
PREVENTING VC FROM HOLDING SWAY IN HAMLETS, IS PUSHING TO GET  
TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES BACK IN PLACE AND RD CADRE WORKING  
IN ASSIGNED HAMLETS. HE HAS DIRECTED COUNTRYSIDE SURVEY OF  
STRENGTH AND LOCATION OF TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES --  
RF/PF UNITS, RD CADRE TEAMS, POLICE FORCES, PRU'S, ETC.

*forced*

*good*

WAREHOUSES HAVE ISSUED OUT AS MUCH AS 10 TONS OF PRE-PACKAGE STOCKS WHICH WILL BE SHIPPED WITHOUT REQUISITION ARE BEING BUILT UP AT 'THE AIR AMERICA TERMINAL I' SAIGON.

8. PROVINCE REPORTS ALMOST UNIVERSALLY COMPLAIN OF TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ON ROADS, CURFEWS, AND LARGE NUMBER OF EVACUEES HAMPERING RETURN TO NORMALCY. HOWEVER, IN DANANG, MARKETS OPENED YESTERDAY AND CURFEW RELAXED TO 1900 TO 0700. GENERALLY FOOD PRICES IN THE COUNTRYSIDE DID NOT SPIRAL UPWARD TO THE SAME EXTENT AS IN SAIGON. FOR THE MOST PART PRICES AVERAGE 20-40 PERCENT HIGHER THAN BEFORE TET.

9. IN MANY AREAS RD CADRE, CAUGHT IN CITIES ON TET LEAVE

PAGE 5 TUMJIR 191221 ~~SECRET~~  
OR PULLED BACK HASTILY TO MAN DEFENSES OR FOR THEIR OWN PROTECTION, ARE WORKING AS REFUGEE TEAMS OR HELPING WITH OTHER RECONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES. AMBASSADOR KOMER, DESIROUS OF CAPITALIZING ON ENEMY'S REPULSE AND HEAVY LOSSES AND PREVENTING VC FROM HOLDING SWAY IN HAMLETS, IS PUSHING TO GET TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES BACK IN PLACE AND RD CADRE WORKING IN ASSIGNED HAMLETS. HE HAS DIRECTED COUNTRYSIDE SURVEY OF STRENGTH AND LOCATION OF TERRITORIAL SECURITY FORCES -- RF/PF UNITS, RD CADRE TEAMS, POLICE FORCES, PRU'S, ETC.

10. POLICE CASUALTIES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WERE SURPRISINGLY LIGHT. WITH 75 PERCENT OF PROVINCES REPORTING 220 POLICE WERE KIA, 175 WIA, AND 17 MIA.

11. CHIEU HOI CENTERS SEEMED TO BE TARGETS OF ATTACKS. TWO CENTERS IN I CTZ, TWO IN II CTZ AND TWO IN IV CTZ WERE HEAVILY DAMAGED. COUNTS OF HOI CHANH CAPTURED BY THE ENEMY AND NEW HOI CHANH COMING IN ARE NOT YET AVAILABLE, ALTHOUGH NUMBER OF NEW ~~REFUGEE~~ <sup>Returnees</sup> IN KNOWN TO BE LOW.

12. WILD FLUCTUATIONS IN EVACUEE FIGURES OVER PAST TWO OR THREE DAYS SHOW HOW TENUOUS NUMBERS ARE. BEST NUMBER TONIGHT IS 457,000 (DOWN FROM LAST NIGHT'S 527,000) -- 65,000 IN I CTZ

PAGE 6 RUMJIR 19121 ~~SECRET~~  
66,000 IN II CTZ, 247,000 IN III CTZ (205,000 IN SAIGON/GIA DINH ACCORDING TO MSWR), AND 79,000 IN IV CTZ. COUNT OF HOUSES DESTROYED IS BACK UP TO ABOUT 22,000. CIVILIANS DEAD TOTAL APPROXIMATELY 3,600 WITH ANOTHER 19,000 WOUNDED. GP-4 BUNKER  
BT

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

55

Monday, February 12, 1968  
12:00 noon

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Mr. President:

Herewith an ominous indication of a possible North Korean air attack on Seoul 14 February; although it could be merely a training mission.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-186  
By ius, NARA, Date 5-24-05

P file

Mon 5, February 12, 1968  
11:45 a. m.

56

TOP SECRET

MR. PRESIDENT:

For what it may be worth, here are my thoughts.

1. As Westy said today, and you understood for a long time, the enemy decided to abandon his attritional strategy and go for broke. In strategic terms, Saigon and Washington understood this. Tactically, it was understood with respect to I Corps and the DMZ offensive. What was not understood and budgeted for was an attack on the cities and towns on the scale, with the concentration, and with the timing that it occurred.

2. The enemy failed in his maximum objective. But he achieved these secondary objectives:

- he shook U. S. public opinion;
- he shook world opinion;
- he shook the governmental structure;
- he shook the RF and PF and imposed high casualties on the ARVN;
- he forced a significant piecemeal diversion of Westy's slim reserve forces for the I Corps offensive.

3. He now evidently hopes to force a major setback on us in I Corps while continuing to harass the cities, pick up pieces of the countryside, and prevent Westy from concentrating sufficient force in I Corps.

4. So far as U. S. and world opinion are concerned, there is only one satisfactory answer: a clear defeat of the enemy in I Corps, while rallying the South Vietnamese to get back on their feet elsewhere. Moreover, I Corps is -- or should be -- our kind of battle. It has guerrilla elements, but is much more nearly conventional war. It should be our kind of war if Westy is not strapped for men, aircraft, and supplies.

5. Only such a demonstration is likely to permit us to end the war on honorable terms.

6. Therefore, I am for a very strong response to Westy's cable. Only you can make the political assessment of what it would cost to call up the reserves; but that would be the most impressive demonstration to Hanoi and its friends.

7. As for the issue Clark Clifford raised -- how do you explain this in terms of past statements of progress -- I believe the outline for a talk I gave you yesterday handles it with one exception.

We begin by explaining the kind of rural war it was since 1965 and the

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-25-78; NSC 8-1480

By JK/ly, NARA, Date 2-12-92

progress we were making. Evidently, Hanoi decided that this attritional war was not moving its way: they were losing population; a legitimate constitutional government was being created. They thought their position would be worse a year from now than at present.

Therefore, they designed this go-for-broke offensive. We knew about it; but they achieved tactical surprise in the cities.

They failed at the frontier (Loc Ninh and Dak To).

They hit the government and ARVN and urban population hard; but they failed.

Now they are rounding on I Corps; and we're not going to let them have it.

We are sending men to assure Westy the reserves he needs; we are calling up reserves to make sure no one gets the idea that we can't handle our other world commitments.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

57

*Pres file*

Monday, February 12, 1968  
11:30 a. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mr. President:

Herewith Bus Wheeler's supplement and commentary to Westy's cable of this morning.

Para. 5 is interesting. We'll get the full text soonest.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~ attachment (CM-3003-68 12 Feb 68)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *mg*, NARA, Date 2-10-92



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

NODIS

CM-3003-68  
12 February 1968

57a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Reinforcements for South Vietnam

1. General Westmoreland's message (MAC 01975) which I furnished to you earlier today is not in response to a message I sent to him last night, copy of which is attached hereto. General Westmoreland is drafting now a response to my message.

2. General Westmoreland repeated over the telephone to me at 0815 hours the gist of his earlier message; namely, he believes the VC struck out in Phases 1 and 2 of their offensive. He considers he has opportunities available to exploit the enemy's failures. He needs soonest one brigade of the 82d Airborne Division and a Marine Corps Regiment. He considers that he can hold off on a decision to request the remainder of the 82d Airborne Division and the other three battalions of Marines until later. He can absorb logistically the troops that he asks for now. It is conceivable that the troops he asks for will be needed only for six months; he will not bind himself that he will not need more troops at a later time. He pointed out that the forces he is requesting are within the 525,000 ceiling to which he agreed. Parenthetically, he commented that he doesn't know how sacrosanct that figure is. In response to the questions posed in my message to him, attached hereto, he made the following comments:

a. He does not anticipate "defeat," but he desperately needs the troop elements requested in order to capitalize on opportunities available to him. The enemy has been repulsed in II, III and IV Corps areas, but I Corps must be reinforced. If requested troops are not made available, he would have to undertake an unacceptably risky course of drawing additional forces

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Authority gestor 10-10-78  
By iply, NARA, Date 2-12-92

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from elsewhere in South Vietnam.

b. On balance the ARVN has done a good job. He does not know the status of Regional Force and Popular Force troop elements. He believes it will be 1 April before the status of ARVN is known.

c. He can support logistically the forces he has requested; however, it is mandatory that he open and keep open Highways 1 and 9 and this will cost troops.

d. Additional forces will give him increased capability to regain the initiative and go on the offensive at an appropriate time.

3. As to paragraph 2 of my cable regarding strategy, General Westmoreland says they are good questions which he will respond to more fully in a message now being drafted. His brief responses to the thoughts expressed in paragraph 2 of my message are as follows:

a. His Priority One objective is to clear the cities.

b. He agrees with the expressed Priority Two of giving away no territory of value but he points out that sometimes he must fight in unfavorable terrain and weather in order not to give up important ground.

c. As to holding Khe Sanh, he has prepared on a close hold basis contingency plans to execute a tactical withdrawal if this becomes desirable and necessary. However, he believes strongly that retention of Khe Sanh will afford him in future opportunities to exploit the enemy's commitment of troops in and around Khe Sanh and deal him a severe and perhaps a knock out blow.

d. As to the Delta, he does have contingency plans to move forces from there as required. He points out that the battalions committed (US) in the Delta have stiffened the ARVN and have helped them to repulse the enemy with heavy losses. His Riverine Force is now being used in the vicinity of Can Tho with good effect.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. He reports that the damaged C-130 at Khe Sanh Airfield is undergoing repair and he hopes to get it out today. He intends to use C-123s and Caribou aircraft from now on to resupply Khe Sanh in order to conserve his C-130 assets. He is disseminating gravel in large quantities in and around Khe Sanh in those areas which he does not anticipate his forces will have to enter; there is evidence that the gravel is giving the enemy trouble. He is employing his B-52s with effect in bombing enemy forces and installations in the Khe Sanh area.

5. A senior VC political cadre was captured yesterday at Danang. This man had on him a long document, now being translated, which apparently represents the results of a high level conference of VC officials. The first quick examination of the document indicates that its contents reflect the view that the VC made a mistake in launching their Tet offensive at the time and in the manner they did. Specifically, the country was not ready for a mass uprising and US/ARVN military strength was seriously underestimated by VC/NVA forces.

6. While the decisions and requests made in his message of today are his, he has consulted closely with Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams and Mr. Komer who all agree as to the validity of his assessments and request for additional troop strength.

*Earle G. Wheeler*

EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

576

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# EYES ONLY

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COMMUNICATIONS BOOK COPY

JOINT MESSAGE CENTER

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TYPE MSG	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE
		X	

PRECEDENCE

ACTION IMMEDIATE

INFO IMMEDIATE

DTG

FROM: General Wheeler, CJCS

TO: General Westmoreland, COMUSMACV

INFO: Admiral Sharp, CINCPAC

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

CJCS

SECRET - EYES ONLY - JCS # 61635 Feb 68

(DELIVER SOONEST DURING WAKING HOURS)

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority JCS 10-10-78

By WJH, NARA, Date 2-12-92

# EYES ONLY

# MODIS

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DATE	TIME
11	2008
MONTH	YEAR
Feb	1968
PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES

# EYES ONLY

DRAFTER	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE
	<del>SECRET</del>	<i>Paul M. Kearney</i>
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE	
	Mr. Paul M. Kearney, AdmAsst CJCS	
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS		

DD FORM 1 NOV 63 173

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 65 WHICH WILL BE USED.

57c!

OK  
W

EYES ONLY

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SECRET - CABLE - EYES ONLY - IMMEDIATE

FM GEN EARLE G. WHEELER, CJCS  
TO GEN W. C. WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV  
INFO: ADM U.S.G. SHARP, CINCPAC

DELIVER SOONEST DURING WAKING HOURS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority yes to 10-10-78  
By sp/jd, NARA, Date 2-12-92

REF: MAC. 01858

1. At a meeting at the White House this afternoon attended by Secy Rusk, Secy McNamara, Mr. Helms, General Max Taylor, Mr. Clark Clifford, Walt Rostow and myself there was ~~was~~ much discussion of the referenced message. The critical question addressed centered around paragraph 9 of the reference which leads off that you would welcome reinforcements at any time they can be made available and stated the purposes to which you would put these forces. Specifically, your message is interpreted here as expressing the following:

- a. You could use additional U.S. troop units, but you are not expressing a firm demand for them; ~~you~~ <sup>in sum,</sup> you do not fear defeat if you are not reinforced.
- b. You are concerned as to the possible status of the ARVN as a result of recent combat actions.
- c. You are concerned about the reliability of your logistic system into northern I Corps Tactical Zone and believe that you must control and use Highway 1 through the Ai Van Pass.
- d. Additional forces would give you increased capability to regain the initiative and go on the offensive at an appropriate time.

EYES ONLY

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2. ~~There was~~ Considerable discussion of the situation centered about the change in enemy strategy, its effect, and why the change was instituted. The question arose as to whether or not we too should not change our strategy. For example, one conferee stated that priority 1 should be to clear the cities; priority 2, give away no territory of value but avoid combat with the enemy in terrain and weather favoring him. You will perceivethe thought in priority 2 that perhaps we are making a mistake by attempting to hold the Khe Sanh area and perhaps should concentrate our defenses further to the east. A further thought cited by the same conferee concerned the desirability of using U.S. troops now in the Delta as your reserve, leaving IV Corps operations to the ARVN.

3. I will telephone you at the usual time tomorrow. I would particularly appreciate having your views at that time ~~on~~ <sup>regarding</sup> to the content of paragraph 1 of this message. Moreover, I would appreciate having your views by return message on all of the questions raised in this message.

4. FYI: I am considering a trip to visit with you sometime in the next few days in order to obtain at firsthand your thoughts as to the situation and corrective measures needed. If the trip comes off, I will quite probably stop in Hawaii en route to South Vietnam for about a half day to talk things over with you, Oley. Warm regards to you both.

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EYES ONLY

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~~EYES ONLY~~

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FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON

TO ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII

GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH

ZEM

NODIS

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Authority OSD ltr 11/20/78

By up/rs, NARA, Date 7-12-92

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMITED DISTRIBUTION MAC @1975 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION AND REQUIREMENTS

1. SINCE LAST OCTOBER, THE ENEMY HAS LAUNCHED A MAJOR CAMPAIGN SIGNALING A CHANGE OF STRATEGY FROM ONE OF PROTRACTED WAR TO ONE OF QUICK MILITARY/POLITICAL VICTORY DURING THE AMERICAN ELECTION YEAR. HIS FIRST PHASE, DESIGNED TO SECURE THE BORDER AREAS, HAS FAILED. THE SECOND PHASE, LAUNCHED ON THE OCCASION OF TET AND DESIGNED TO INITIATE PUBLIC UPRISING, TO DISRUPT THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT AND COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE VIETNAMESE FORCES, AND TO ISOLATE THE CITIES, HAS ALSO FAILED. NEVERTHELESS, THE ENEMY'S THIRD PHASE, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO SEIZE QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES HAS JUST BEGUN. THIS WILL BE A MAXIMUM EFFORT BY THE ENEMY, CAPITALIZING ON HIS SHORT LINES OF COMMUNICATION, THE POOR WEATHER PREVAILING IN THE AREA FOR THE NEXT TWO MONTHS, AND HIS ABILITY TO BRING ARTILLERY AND ROCKET FIRE TO BEAR ON INSTALLATIONS FROM POSITIONS IN THE DMZ AND NORTH AND FROM LAOS TO THE WEST. FURTHERMORE, HE CAN BRING ARMOR TO BEAR ON THE BATTLEFIELD. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ENEMY HAS DECIDED HE CAN NOT "STRIKE OUT" IN THIS PHASE AS A MATTER OF FACE. WE CAN THEREFORE EXPECT HIM TO EXERT ON THE BATTLEFIELD THE MAXIMUM MILITARY POWER AVAILABLE

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TO HIM. IN ADDITION, WE MUST EXPECT HIM TO TRY TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE IN ALL OTHER AREAS.

2. IF THE ENEMY HAS CHANGED HIS STRATEGY, WE MUST CHANGE OURS. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT IT IS OUR NATIONAL POLICY TO PROHIBIT THE ENEMY FROM SEIZING AND PERMANENTLY OCCUPYING THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES, I INTEND TO HOLD THEM AT ALL COST. HOWEVER, TO DO SO I MUST REINFORCE FROM OTHER AREAS AND ACCEPT A MAJOR RISK, UNLESS I CAN GET REINFORCEMENTS, WHICH I DESPERATELY NEED.

3. TO BRING THE MAXIMUM MILITARY POWER TO BEAR ON THE ENEMY IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN AND TO PREVENT THE GRADUAL EROSION OF THESE TWO PROVINCES, I MUST OPEN UP HIGHWAY 1 FROM DANANG AND HIGHWAY 9 TO KHE SANH. THESE TWO TASKS ARE NOT UNREASONABLE, PROVIDED THAT I CAN DIVERT THE TROOPS TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND COMMIT THE ENGINEERS TO THE TASK. I THEREFORE MUST MAKE A DOWN PAYMENT IN TROOPS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE LOGISTICS TO SUPPORT IN FULLY ADEQUATE FASHION TROOPS NOW DEPLOYED AND REINFORCEMENTS THAT WILL BE REQUIRED. FIRST, IT WILL REQUIRE A MARINE REGIMENT OR AN ARMY BRIGADE TO SECURE THE AI VAN PASS FROM QUANG TRI TO HUE/PHU BAI. ANOTHER REGIMENT OR BRIGADE WILL BE REQUIRED BETWEEN HUE AND QUANG TRI. FINALLY, A THIRD REGIMENT OR BRIGADE WILL BE REQUIRED TO SECURE HIGHWAY 9 TO THE KHE SANH AREA. I CANNOT AFFORD TO DIVERT TROOPS NOW DEPLOYED IN THAT AREA FOR THE PURPOSE AND AM THEREFORE FORCED TO DEPLOY THE 101ST ABN DIV FROM THE III CORPS; THIS IS NOW IN THE PROCESS AND WILL BE DONE AS FAST AS TRANSPORTATION CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE. EVEN THE COMMITMENT OF THE 101ST WILL

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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PUT ME IN NO BETTER THAN A MARGINAL POSTURE TO COPE WITH THE SITUATION AT HAND.

4. THIS HAS BEEN A LIMITED WAR WITH LIMITED OBJECTIVES, FOUGHT WITH LIMITED MEANS AND PROGRAMMED FOR THE UTILIZATION OF LIMITED RESOURCES. THIS WAS A FEASIBLE PROPOSITION ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ENEMY WAS TO FIGHT A PROTRACTED WAR. WE ARE NOW IN A NEW BALL GAME WHERE WE FACE A DETERMINED, HIGHLY DISCIPLINED ENEMY, FULLY MOBILIZED TO ACHIEVE A QUICK VICTORY. HE IS IN THE PROCESS OF THROWING IN ALL HIS "MILITARY CHIPS TO GO FOR BROKE." HE REALIZES AND I REALIZE THAT HIS GREATEST OPPORTUNITY TO DO THIS IS IN QUANG TRI-THUA THIEN. WE CANNOT PERMIT THIS. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE MUST SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CRUSH HIM. AT THE SAME TIME, WE CANNOT PERMIT HIM TO MAKE GAINS IN THE OTHER CORPS AREAS, AND I AM OBLIGATED TO MAINTAIN THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL TROOPS IN THESE AREAS TO INSURE STABILITY OF THE SITUATION AND TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE. EQUAL IN PRIORITY TO THE ENEMY IS THE SAIGON AREA AND A HIGH RISK IN THIS AREA IS UNACCEPTABLE. I NOW HAVE APPROXIMATELY 500,000 US TROOPS AND 60,981 FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE TROOPS. FURTHER CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE THAIS AND KOREANS ARE MONTHS AWAY. I HAVE BEEN PROMISED 525,000 TROOPS, WHICH ACCORDING TO PRESENT PROGRAMS WILL NOT MATERIALIZE UNTIL 1969. I NEED THESE 525,000 TROOPS NOW. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS CEILING ASSUMED THE SUBSTANTIAL REPLACEMENT OF MILITARY BY CIVILIANS, WHICH NOW APPEARS IMPRACTICAL. I NEED REINFORCEMENTS IN TERMS OF COMBAT ELEMENTS. I THEREFORE URGE THAT THERE BE

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DEPLOYED IMMEDIATELY A MARINE REGIMENT PACKAGE AND A BRIGADE PACKAGE OF THE 82D ABN DIV AND THAT THE REMAINING ELEMENTS OF THOSE TWO DIVISIONS BE PREPARED TO FOLLOW AT A LATER TIME. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE.

5. I MUST STRESS EQUALLY THAT WE FACE A SITUATION OF GREAT OPPORTUNITY AS WELL AS HEIGHTENED RISK. HOWEVER, TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE HERE, TOO. I DO NOT SEE HOW THE ENEMY CAN LONG SUSTAIN THE HEAVY LOSSES WHICH HIS NEW STRATEGY IS ENABLING US TO INFLICT ON HIM. THEREFORE, ADEQUATE REINFORCEMENTS SHOULD PERMIT ME NOT ONLY TO CONTAIN HIS I CORPS OFFENSIVE BUT ALSO TO CAPITALIZE ON HIS LOSSES BY SEIZING THE INITIATIVE IN OTHER AREAS. EXPLOITING THIS OPPORTUNITY COULD MATERIALLY SHORTEN THE WAR.

6. IF CINCPAC CONCURS, REQUEST THAT THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF BE INFORMED OF MY POSITION.

7. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS MESSAGE IN DETAIL WITH AMB BUNKER AND HE CONCURS.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

*Pres Jell*

58

Monday, February 12, 1968  
11:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

Assuming, as I do, that we have to write off, virtually, the 513 severely damaged aircraft, these losses seem somewhat more serious than we first thought.

The proportion of weapons captured to estimated enemy killed in action is under 4/1, and, therefore, reasonable on past experience.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (NMCC 2/12/68 0600 EST Casualties, Weapons Seized, and Aircraft Losses in SVNam)

CONFIDENTIAL

58a



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

12 February 1968  
0600 EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Casualties, Weapons Seized and Aircraft  
Losses in South Vietnam

This memorandum is the latest significant information on casualties, weapons seized, and aircraft losses in South Vietnam during the enemy Tet offensive.

JAMES A. SHANNON  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

- 2 Atchs:
  1. Casualties & Weapons Seized
  2. Aircraft Losses

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DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
 DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988  
 By: lg NARA Date 2-10-97

586

SVN AIRCRAFT LOSS/DAMAGE FROM 290300 EST JAN TO 110300 EST FEB

The following report reflects a refinement in the loss/damage figures resulting from detailed reports submitted by the subordinate commands within MACV.

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USAF	C-130	0	15	15
	F-100	2	39	41
	C-123	0	19	19
	C-7A	0	7	7
	A-37	2	12	14
	O-1	7	36	43
	AC-47	0	5	5
	F-4	3	29	32
	O-2	5	14	19
	U-10	0	7	7
	C-47	0	4	4
	HH-43	0	5	5
	EC-47	0	9	9
	C-54	0	1	1
	RF-101	0	2	2
	A-1	1	0	1
	RF-4	0	1	1
	<u>SUB-TOTAL</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>205</u>	<u>225</u>
US ARMY	UH-1B	4	63	67
	UH-1C	13	211	224
	UH-1D	7	92	99
	UH-1H	23	144	167
	AH-1G	0	18	18
	CH-47	2	28	30
	CH-54	0	2	2
	OH-6A	2	14	16
	OH-13	2	26	28
	OH-23	1	8	9
	O-1	7	55	62
	OV-1	0	13	13
	U-1	0	1	1
	U-6	1	0	1
	U-21	0	6	6
	<u>SUB-TOTAL</u>	<u>62</u>	<u>681</u>	<u>743</u>
US NAVY	UH-34	1	17	18
	<u>SUB-TOTAL</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>18</u>

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USMC	C-130	1	1	2
	C-117	0	2	2
	A-4	1	5	6
	F-8	0	5	5
	F-4	6	28	34
	RF-4B	0	2	2
	A-6	1	5	6
	O-1C	0	2	2
	CH-53	0	13	13
	CH-46	2	60	62
	UH-1E	0	51	51
	UH-34	1	39	40
		<u>SUB-TOTAL</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>213</u>
	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>1,116*</u>	<u>1,211</u>

1116  
603  
513

\*603 of this total were classified as minor/limited damage.

Attack/fighter	16	123	139
Other fixed wg	22	189	211
Helicopters	57	804	861
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>95</u>	<u>1,116</u>	<u>1,211</u>

58c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Casualties by Corps for the period 290500 EST January to 112300 EST February

1ST CORPS

<u>US</u> <u>KIA/WIA/MIA</u>	<u>ARVN</u> <u>KIA/WIA/MIA</u>	<u>FW</u> <u>KIA/WIA/MIA</u>	<u>ENEMY</u> <u>KIA/DET</u>
505/2,554/0	632/1,980/0	24/113/0	10,324/2,249

2D CORPS

114/550/2	360/1,123/4	20/47/0	5,440/1,684
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3D CORPS

310/1,630/1	668/3,095/53	16/92/0	10,908/1,165
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4TH CORPS

83/410/7	445/1,650/77	2/0/0	5,144/730
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TOTALS

1,012/5,144/10	2,105/7,848/134	62/252/0	31,816/5,828
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Civilian casualties throughout SVN are estimated to be about 2,700 killed with 12,500 wounded. SOURCE: Saigon Embassy message #19004 dated 111522Z.

Weapons seized by Corps for the period 290500 EST January to 112300 EST February:

	<u>1ST CORPS</u>	<u>2D CORPS</u>	<u>3D CORPS</u>	<u>4TH CORPS</u>
Individual weapons	2,013	1,647	2,463	1,397
Crew-served weapons	495	170	384	230
Totals:	2,508	1,817	2,847	1,627
Grand total:	8,799			

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988  
By af NARA Date 2-10-92

INFORMATION

Monday, February 12, 1968  
11:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

As I understand it, the Cabinet acted definitively on Vietnamese mobilization.

The 18 and 19 year olds are obscure in this communique. I'll find out.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 19104

*Pres file*

WWRostow:rla

*Jordan* 59a

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PAGE 01 SAIGON 19104 121217Z

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RSR 01,L 03,H 02,P 04,INR 07,/114 W

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O R 121105Z FEB 68 ZFF-1  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6466  
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 5850  
CINCPAC  
AMCONSUL DANANG 1740  
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 3535

UNCLAS SAIGON 19104

*Roston*

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION

THE FOLLOWING COMMUNIQUE FROM THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE  
WAS MONITORED BY FBIS FEB. 11 FROM SAIGON RADIO (FBIS TRANSLATION):

QUOTE TO MEET THE NATIONAL DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS DURING THE  
EMERGENCY SITUATION OF THE COUNTRY, THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM'S

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 19104 UNCLAS  
ARMED FORCES MUST BE RAPIDLY REINFORCED AND STRENGTHENED  
NUMERICALLY WITHIN A VERY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. TO ANSWER THE  
NEEDS OF THE WAR SITUATION, THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE  
MADE THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS:

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 19104 121217Z

1) TO CALL TO THE COLORS ALL VETERANS BELONGING TO VARIOUS ARMY BRANCHES AND SERVICES, FROM 33 YEARS OLD DOWNWARD, THAT IS, BORN DURING AND AFTER 1935, AND HAVING SERVED IN THE ARMY FOR LESS THAN FIVE YEARS, REGARDLESS OF THE YEAR OF THEIR DEMOBILIZATION. THEY MUST REPORT FOR RE-ENLISTMENT BETWEEN FEBRUARY 15 AND MARCH 15, 1968. THOSE WHO REPORT BEFORE FEBRUARY 29 WILL HAVE A CHOICE OF THE UNIT AND PLACE OF SERVICE WHERE THE NUMBER OF TROOPS MUST BE INCREASED AND MAY REJOIN THEIR FORMER ARMY BRANCHES AND SERVICES.

2) TO CALL ON VETERANS ABOVE 33 YEARS OF AGE TO EARNESTLY AND VOLUNTARILY REJOIN THE ARMY. IF THEY VOLUNTEER TO RE-ENLIST, THEY CAN CHOOSE TO BE ASSIGNED TO THEIR FORMER UNITS AND ORGANS.

3) TO ALLOW THE VETERANS WHO ARE ORDERED TO REJOIN THE ARMY TO REPORT TO SECTORS, SERVICE GARRISONS, REGIMENT COMMAND

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 19104 UNCLAS  
HEADQUARTERS, OR PARENT UNITS FROM THE REGIMENTAL LEVEL UPWARD, WITHIN THIS DEADLINE AND TO CARRY WITH THEM THEIR INDIVIDUAL MILITARY BOOK OR DEMOBILIZATION CERTIFICATE. VETERANS WHO ARE NOW WORKING IN THE ARMY UNITS AND ORGANS AS CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES CAN REPORT FOR RE-ENLISTMENT TO THEIR PRESENT OFFICES.

4) AFTER THE AFOREMENTIONED DEADLINE, ALL VETERANS 33 AND UNDER WHO FAIL TO REPORT FOR RE-ENLISTMENT WILL BE CONSIDERED INSUBORDINATE AND WILL BE SEVERELY PUNISHED ACCORDING TO LAW.

WITH THE RELEASE OF THIS COMMUNIQUE, THE DEFENSE MINISTRY'S COMMUNIQUE OF DECEMBER 15, 1967, IS CANCELLED. UNQUOTE

COMMENT: THIS COMMUNIQUE GIVES EFFECT TO THE MOBILIZATION MEASURES ANNOUNCED BY PRESIDENT THIEU IN HIS FEBRUARY 9 MESSAGE TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THE DEFENSE MINISTRY COMMUNIQUE OF DECEMBER 15, REFERRED TO ABOVE, DEALT WITH THE POSTPONEMENT OF DEMOBILIZATION OF SERVICEMEN; IT IS NOW SUPERSEDED BY THE PRESENT COMMUNIQUE.

SUNKER

UNCLASSIFIED

Monday, February 12, 1968, 10:45 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR MRS. JOHNSON

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Visit of Austrian Chancellor Klaus

Chancellor Josef Klaus of Austria will arrive at the White House on Wednesday, April 10, at 11:30 A. M. The President is scheduled to talk to him between noon and 1:00 P. M. in his office. A black tie dinner is scheduled for 8:00 P. M.

The visit was announced on January 12 and there have been no developments since then which would alter the schedule.

The Chancellor will be accompanied by Mrs. Klaus and the Austrian Foreign Minister. Following his Washington visit Dr. Klaus will visit several other cities in the United States.

Walt Rostow

BKS:amc

-----  
Monday, February 12, 1968  
10:30 a. m.

P file

61

Mr. President:

Herewith today's Khe Sanh supply situation  
as compared to yesterday.

We shall file each day in this form.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (NMCC Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 112300 EST 12 Feb)

~~SECRET~~



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

61a

12 February 1968  
0930 EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 112300 EST  
(121200 SVN)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump or Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)  
status as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>Days supply on hand</u>	<u>Previous status</u> 102300 EST (111200 SVN)
Class I (Rations) (Meal, individual, combat)	<u>9</u> days	10 days
Class III (Fuel)		
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	12 days	12 days
JP-4 (Jet fuel)	4 days	4 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	<u>5</u> days	6 days
Diesel	<u>5</u> days	6 days
Class V (Ammunition)		
a. High explosive		
60 mm mortar	+ 15 days	12 days
81 mm mortar	<u>12</u> days	17 days
90 mm recoilless rifle	+ 109 days	94 days
4.2" mortar	30 days	36 days
105 mm howitzer	+ <u>12</u> days	10 days
155 mm howitzer	<u>23</u> days	25 days
b. Anti-tank	<u>Rounds on hand</u>	
90 mm recoilless rifle	478	478
60 mm rocket (light anti-tank weapon - LAW)	190	190

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Authority OSD ltr 11/22/79

By uply, NARA, Date 2-12-92

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Anti-tank mines (M-19)	100	100
106 mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T) (High explosive plastic - tracer)	316	316

<u>Class V (COFRAM)</u>	<u>Days supply on hand</u>	<u>Previous status</u>
		<u>102300 EST</u> <u>(111200 SVN)</u>
105 mm howitzer	5 days	5 days
155 mm howitzer	5 days	5 days
40 mm grenade launcher	5 days	5 days
Hand grenades	10 days	10 days

2. The foregoing information has been extracted from Gen Westmoreland's eighth report to Gen Wheeler on the Khe Sanh area covering the period 102300 EST (111200 SVN) to 112300 EST (121200 SVN).

*W. R. Mc Clendon*

W. R. MC CLENDON  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution

CJCS  
DJS  
VDJS  
J-4  
J-30  
J-31  
J-32  
J-33  
CT Force  
MCCP  
AWR  
DDO  
ADDO  
CCOC  
PAC Div  
PAC DESK

~~SECRET~~

62

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Profile*

Monday, February 12, 1968  
9:50 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Adm. Sharp concurs  
in Westy's analysis and request of  
this morning.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

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Authority OSD / 10-25-78; NSC 8-14-80

By SK/ry, NARA, Date 2-12-92

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 OO YEKADS  
 DE YSNKQA 5 0431343  
 O 121330Z ZYH ZFF-5  
 FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC  
 INFO MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE WASH DC  
 MR RUSK STATE DEPT WASH DC  
 GEN JOHNSON CSA WASH DC  
 GEN MCCONNELL CSAF WASH DC  
 ADM MOORER CNO WASH DC  
 ZEN/GEN CHAPMAN CMC WASH DC  
 O P 120850Z ZYH ZFF6  
 FM ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII  
 TO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC  
 INFO GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON  
 ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION AND REQUIREMENTS

A. MACV 01975/120612Z FEB 68

1. I DO INDEED CONCUR IN YOUR ANALYSIS IN REF A  
 AND HAD ALREADY RELEASED A MESSAGE CONFIRMING OUR  
 CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT ADDITIONAL FORCES SOUTH OF  
 AI VAN PASS. I RECOMMEND THEY BE AUTHORIZED FOR  
 DEPLOYMENT AT ONCE.

2. IF ENEMY ACTIONS REFLECT HIS DESPERATION, THESE  
 ADDITIVE FORCES CAN ASSIST IN DELIVERY OF A DECISIVE  
 BLOW. IF HIS STRENGTH AND DETERMINATION HAVE BEEN  
 UNDERESTIMATED WE WILL NEED THEM EVEN MORE. WARM  
 REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

225

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Authority god ltr 10-10-78

By uply, NARA, Date 2-12-92

NNNN

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EYES ONLY

63

INFORMATION

Monday, February 12, 1968 -- 9:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

The next meeting with the North Koreans will be tomorrow,  
13 February, at 9:00 p.m. our time.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

INFORMATION

64

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

*Pres file*

Monday, February 12, 1968  
9:35 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy's message:

loud and clear and, in my judgment,  
correct.

W. W. Rostow

MAC 01975

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By kg, NARA, Date 3-10-92

~~TOP SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

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12 FEB 1968  
Z 120612Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON

TO ADM STARP CINCPAC HAWAII

GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMITED DISTRIBUTION MAC 01975 EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION AND REQUIREMENTS

1. SINCE LAST OCTOBER, THE ENEMY HAS LAUNCHED A MAJOR CAMPAIGN SIGNALING A CHANGE OF STRATEGY FROM ONE OF PROTRACTED WAR TO ONE OF QUICK MILITARY/POLITICAL VICTORY DURING THE AMERICAN ELECTION YEAR. HIS FIRST PHASE, DESIGNED TO SECURE THE BORDER AREAS, HAS FAILED. THE SECOND PHASE, LAUNCHED ON THE OCCASION OF TET AND DESIGNED TO INITIATE PUBLIC UPRISING, TO DISRUPT THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT AND COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE VIETNAMESE FORCES, AND TO ISOLATE THE CITIES, HAS ALSO FAILED. NEVERTHELESS, THE ENEMY'S THIRD PHASE, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO SEIZE QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES HAS JUST BEGUN. THIS WILL BE A MAXIMUM EFFORT BY THE ENEMY, CAPITALIZING ON HIS SHORT LINES OF COMMUNICATION, THE POOR WEATHER PREVAILING IN THE AREA FOR THE NEXT TWO MONTHS, AND HIS ABILITY TO BRING ARTILLERY AND ROCKET FIRE TO BEAR ON INSTALLATIONS FROM POSITIONS IN THE DMZ AND NORTH AND FROM LAOS TO THE WEST. FURTHERMORE, HE CAN BRING ARMOR TO BEAR ON THE BATTLEFIELD. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE ENEMY HAS DECIDED HE CAN NOT "STRIKE OUT" IN THIS PHASE AS A MATTER OF FACE. WE CAN THEREFORE EXPECT HIM TO EXERT ON THE BATTLEFIELD THE MAXIMUM MILITARY POWER AVAILABLE

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Authority OSD/la 11/22/78

By isp/ja NARA, Date 7-12-92

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TO HIM. IN ADDITION, WE MUST EXPECT HIM TO TRY TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE IN ALL OTHER AREAS.

2. IF THE ENEMY HAS CHANGED HIS STRATEGY, WE MUST CHANGE OURS. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT IT IS OUR NATIONAL POLICY TO PROHIBIT THE ENEMY FROM SEIZING AND PERMANENTLY OCCUPYING THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES, I INTEND TO HOLD THEM AT ALL COST. HOWEVER, TO DO SO I MUST REINFORCE FROM OTHER AREAS AND ACCEPT A MAJOR RISK, UNLESS I CAN GET REINFORCEMENTS, WHICH I DESPERATELY NEED.

3. TO BRING THE MAXIMUM MILITARY POWER TO BEAR ON THE ENEMY IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN AND TO PREVENT THE GRADUAL EROSION OF THESE TWO PROVINCES, I MUST OPEN UP HIGHWAY 1 FROM DANANG AND HIGHWAY 9 TO KHE SANH. THESE TWO TASKS ARE NOT UNREASONABLE, PROVIDED THAT I CAN DIVERT THE TROOPS TO PROVIDE SECURITY AND COMMIT THE ENGINEERS TO THE TASK. I THEREFORE MUST MAKE A DOWN PAYMENT IN TROOPS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE LOGISTICS TO SUPPORT IN FULLY ADEQUATE FASHION TROOPS NOW DEPLOYED AND REINFORCEMENTS THAT WILL BE REQUIRED. FIRST, IT WILL REQUIRE A MARINE REGIMENT OR AN ARMY BRIGADE TO SECURE THE AI VAN PASS FROM QUANG TRI TO HUE/PHU BAI. ANOTHER REGIMENT OR BRIGADE WILL BE REQUIRED BETWEEN HUE AND QUANG TRI. FINALLY, A THIRD REGIMENT OR BRIGADE WILL BE REQUIRED TO SECURE HIGHWAY 9 TO THE KHE SANH AREA. I CANNOT AFFORD TO DIVERT TROOPS NOW DEPLOYED IN THAT AREA FOR THE PURPOSE AND AM THEREFORE FORCED TO DEPLOY THE 101ST ABN DIV FROM THE III CORPS; THIS IS NOW IN THE PROCESS AND WILL BE DONE AS FAST AS TRANSPORTATION CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE. EVEN THE COMMITMENT OF THE 101ST WILL

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~~TOP SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

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C PUT ME IN NO BETTER THAN A MARGINAL POSTURE TO COPE WITH THE  
C SITUATION AT HAND.

C 4. THIS HAS BEEN A LIMITED WAR WITH LIMITED OBJECTIVES,  
C FOUGHT WITH LIMITED MEANS AND PROGRAMMED FOR THE UTILIZATION  
C OF LIMITED RESOURCES. THIS WAS A FEASIBLE PROPOSITION ON THE  
C ASSUMPTION THAT THE ENEMY WAS TO FIGHT A PROTRACTED WAR. WE ARE  
C NOW IN A NEW BALL GAME WHERE WE FACE A DETERMINED, HIGHLY  
C DISCIPLINED ENEMY, FULLY MOBILIZED TO ACHIEVE A QUICK VICTORY.  
C HE IS IN THE PROCESS OF THROWING IN ALL HIS "MILITARY CHIPS TO  
C GO FOR BROKE." HE REALIZES AND I REALIZE THAT HIS GREATEST  
C OPPORTUNITY TO DO THIS IS IN QUANG TRI-THUA THIEN. WE CANNOT  
C PERMIT THIS. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE MUST SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY  
C TO CRUSH HIM. AT THE SAME TIME, WE CANNOT PERMIT HIM TO  
C MAKE GAINS IN THE OTHER CORPS AREAS, AND I AM OBLIGATED TO  
C MAINTAIN THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL TROOPS IN THESE AREAS  
C TO INSURE STABILITY OF THE SITUATION AND TO REGAIN THE INITIATIVE.  
C EQUAL IN PRIORITY TO THE ENEMY IS THE SAIGON AREA AND  
C A HIGH RISK IN THIS AREA IS UNACCEPTABLE. I NOW HAVE APPROXIMATELY  
C 500,000 US TROOPS AND 60,981 FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
C TROOPS. FURTHER CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE THAIS AND KOREANS ARE  
C MONTHS AWAY. I HAVE BEEN PROMISED 525,000 TROOPS, WHICH  
C ACCORDING TO PRESENT PROGRAMS WILL NOT MATERIALIZE UNTIL  
C 1969. I NEED THESE 525,000 TROOPS NOW. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT  
C THIS CEILING ASSUMED THE SUBSTANTIAL REPLACEMENT OF MILITARY  
C BY CIVILIANS, WHICH NOW APPEARS IMPRACTICAL. I NEED REINFORCEMENTS  
C IN TERMS OF COMBAT ELEMENTS. I THEREFORE URGE THAT THERE BE

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DEPLOYED IMMEDIATELY A MARINE REGIMENT PACKAGE AND A BRIGADE PACKAGE OF THE 82D ABN DIV AND THAT THE REMAINING ELEMENTS OF THOSE TWO DIVISIONS BE PREPARED TO FOLLOW AT A LATER TIME. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE.

5. I MUST STRESS EQUALLY THAT WE FACE A SITUATION OF GREAT OPPORTUNITY AS WELL AS HEIGHTENED RISK. HOWEVER, TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE HERE, TOO. I DO NOT SEE HOW THE ENEMY CAN LONG SUSTAIN THE HEAVY LOSSES WHICH HIS NEW STRATEGY IS ENABLING US TO INFLICT ON HIM. THEREFORE, ADEQUATE REINFORCEMENTS SHOULD PERMIT ME NOT ONLY TO CONTAIN HIS I CORPS OFFENSIVE BUT ALSO TO CAPITALIZE ON HIS LOSSES BY SEIZING THE INITIATIVE IN OTHER AREAS. EXPLOITING THIS OPPORTUNITY COULD MATERIALLY SHORTEN THE WAR.

6. IF CINCPAC CONCURS, REQUEST THAT THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF BE INFORMED OF MY POSITION.

7. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS MESSAGE IN DETAIL WITH AMB BUNKER AND HE CONCURS.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

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65

**ACTION**

**Monday, February 12, 1968 -- 9:35 a.m.**

*P. ...*

**Mr. President:**

**Bill Bundy suggests -- and I agree-- you should call Sen. McGee; congratulate him on his TV performance yesterday and for his speaking program all over the country.**

**He has been -- and remains -- a good soldier: perhaps the most articulate on our side.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**WWRostow:rla**

INFORMATION

66

*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, February 12, 1968  
8:35 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a first detailed provincial report  
of which we should be getting more.

A very mixed picture; although the Australians  
did well.

Phuoc Tay province is on the coast, east of  
Saigon.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 19005, 2 sections

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By SP/ncg, NARA, Date 11/25/96

WWRostow:rlh

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-197  
By sig, NARA Date 12-4-96

PAGE 01 SAIGON 19005 01 OF 02 111859Z

47  
ACTION EA 15

INFO CIAE 00,DODE 00,NSAE 00,NSCE 00,SSO 00,USIE 00,GPK 03,NSC 10,  
SC 01,SP 02,SS 20,RSC 01,L 03,H 02,SAH 03,SAL 01,IO 13,P 24,  
INR 07,NIC 01,AID 28,SR 01,ORM 03,/118 V

P 111735Z FEB 68  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6422

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 19005

SUB: SITUATION IN PHUOC TUY PROVINCE

1. PROCLAIMING THAT " THE TIME WHICH COMES ONCE IN A THOUSAND YEARS HAS COME," REINFORCED VIET CONG PROVINCIAL UNITS ATTACKED KEY TARGETS IN PHUON TUY PROVINCE ON 1 FEBRUARY. ALTHOUGH REPELLED AT THE VAN KIEP MILITARY TRAINING CENTER THREE MILES EAST OF THE PROVINCE TOWN, BA RIA, THE ENEMY WAS ABLE TO HOLD MUCH OF BA RIE FOR TWO DAYS. DURING THIS TIME, TOWNSPEOPLE SAY, THE VIET CONG CLAIMED THAT THEY ALSO HELD VAN KIEP AND LONG DIEN DISTRICT TOWN, FIVE KILOMETERS EAST, CAUSING CONSIDERABLE ANXIETY WHICH ENDURED UNTIL ARVN REINFORCEMENTS RELIEVED THE TOWN ON THE MORNING OF 3 FEBRUARY. NOW, IT IS REPORTED THAT THE PEOPLE SAY THAT THE VIET CONG HAVE BEEN BADLY BEATEN.

~~PAGE 2 BUNNICK 19005 02 OF 02 CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. IN A PROPAGANDA LEAFLET, THE ENEMY CALLED ON THE POPULATION AND RVANF TO RISE UP AGAINST THE "AMERICAN AGGRESSORS AND THE NATION-SELLING VIET-TRAITORS." THE BA RIE POPULATION, LARGELY THE FAMILITES OF CIVIL SERVANTS AND SOLDIERS, REMAINED PASSIVE.

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 19035 01 OF 02 111859Z

NO GVN SOLDIERS ARE KNOWN TO HAVE DESERTED. HOWEVER, IN LONG DIEN, WHICH WAS ATTACKED ON 7 AND 8 FEBRUARY, THE VIET CONG ARE SAID BY CIVIL SERVANTS THERE TO HAVE HAD PLenty OF POPULAR SUPPORT. TOWNSPEOPLE ALLEGEDLY SHOWED ENEMY TROOPS WHERE GVN CIVIL SERVANTS, CADRE AND SOLDIERS LIVED, AND HID THE VIET CONG WHEN AUSTRALIAN TROOPS ENTERED LONG DIEN. THE SAME SOURCES SUGGEST THAT MISRULE BY A SUCCESSION OF CORRUPT DISTRICT CHIEFS HAD DONE MUCH TO FOSTER ANTI-GOVERNMENT SENTIMENT IN THE TOWN.

3. INFORMED AMERICANS IN PHUOC TUY BELIEVE THAT THE VIET CONG ATTACK ON BA RIA AND THE VAN KIEP CAMP WAS INTENDED ONLY TO BE A HIT AND RUN SHOW OF FORCE. THE ENEMY EXPECTED, THEY SUGGEST, TO ATTACK BEFORE DAWN, REMAIN THROUGHOUT THE DAY, AND PULL OUT IN THE EVENING. HOWEVER, THE ATTACK ON VAN KIEP WAS DELAYED WHEN THE ENEMY GUIDES WENT ASTRAY, AND DID NOT BEGIN BEFORE RANGER UNITS DEFENDING THE CAMP WERE ON FULL ALERT. THE ATTACK WAS A FIASCO;

~~PAGE 03 NUMBER 15885 01 OF 02 111859Z~~  
ABOUT 50 OF AN ATTACKING FORCE ESTIMATED AT 200 WERE KILLED.

4. BA RIA WAS NO. SO FORTUNATE. THERE ENEMY TROOPS DUG IN ON THE EAST END OF TOWN WHILE HARASSING THE PROVINCE AND SECTOR HEADQUARTERS, CORDS COMPOUND AND OTHER ISLANDS OF RESISTANCE TO THE NORTH OF THE MARKET. MEANWHILE, THE BULK OF THE FRIENDLY TROOPS, TOGETHER WITH THE PROVINCE CHIEF, MARINE MAJOR NGUYEN BA TRUOC, WITHDREW TO VAN KIEP. AT THE CAMP, IT SEEMS FROM FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION AND RUMOR, THE PROVINCE CHIEF LOCKED HORNS WITH THE CAMP COMMANDER, LTC LE TRINH QUY. TRUCE, IT IS HINTED, FELT THAT HE HAD LOST FACE WHEN FORCED TO ABANDON BA RIA AND WISHED TO USE TROOPS IN TRAINING AT THE CAMP TO RELIEVE THE TOWN; QUY STEADFASTLY REFUSED TO RELEASE THEM. THE IMASSE WAS FINALLY BROKEN WHEN ARVN REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVED FROM XUAN LOC (18TH DIVISION HQ). THE ENEMY HAD BEEN UNDER CONTINUOUS PRESSURE FROM AMERICAN GUNSHIPS, BUT IT RESISTED FIERCELY IN HOUSE TO HOUSE FIGHTING. THE WELL-TRAINED AND WELL-EQUIPPED ENEMY TROOPS WERE FINALLY CLEARED OUT BY THE MORNING OF 3 FEBRUARY, LEAVING BEHIND PERHAPS A HUNDRED DESTROYED OR BADLY DAMAGED HOUSES.

5. PRISONERS TAKEN INCLUDED A NUMBER OF RECENT NVA REINFORCEMENTS.

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PAGE 03 SAIGON 19005 01 OF 02 111859Z

~~PAGE 1 RUMJIR 19005 001 CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE ENEMY FORCE WAS ESTIMATED AT SIX HUNDRED MEN. ENGAGEMENTS DURING THE PAST WEEK HAVE, ACCORDING TO REPORTS, LINED OUT HALF OF THIS FORCE

S BUT PROVINCIAL ADMISORS BELIEVE THE TOTAL OF ENEMY DEAD IS MORE LIKELY ABOUT TWO HUNDRED. THERE WERE 15 TO 20 CIVILIANS KILLED IN THE BA RIA FIGHTING, AND AS MANY MORE WOUNDED. ABOUT FIVE HUNDRED FAMILIES, FLEEING FROM THE FIGHTING OR THE PERIL OF IT, HAVE BECOME TEMPORARY REFUGEES. THE FIGURE INCLUDES THE FAMILIES OF MOST OF THE CIVIL SERVANTS, WHO HAVE IN THE MAIN STUCK TO THIER POSTS WHILE EVACUATINGG THEIR DEPENDENTS TO THE SAFETY OF NEARBY VUNG TAU.

6. THE CRISIS HAS REVEALED BOTH HEROES AND GOATS. AT SUOI NGHE, A REFUGEE HAMLET, AN RF PLATOON LOOKED ON PASSIVELY FROM ITS POST WHILE TEN VIET CONG HELD A KANGAROO COURT AND EXECUTED THE HAMLET CHIEF AND HIS DEPUTIES. AN ARMED PROPAGANDA TEAM HELD OFF ENEMY PROBES AGAINST THE CHIEU HOI CENTER THROUGHOUT 1 AND 2 FEBRUARY AND ON THE NIGHT OF 2 ND EVACUATED ALL OF THE HOI CHANH TO THE CHIEU HOI VILLAGE TWO KILOMETERS EAST OF BA RIA. THE 52ND RANGER BATTALION FOUGHT WELL, AND THERE IS REPORTED TO HAVE SYSTEMATICALLY LOOTED THE PROVINCE TOWN OF ELECTRICAL

~~PAGE 2 RUMJIR 19005 002 CONFIDENTIAL~~

AND HOUSEHOLD APPLIANCES. VIETNAMESE NURSES LIED THEMSELVES BLUE IN THE FACE WHILE A KOREAN MEDICAL TEAM HID IN A BACK ROOM OF THE HOSPITAL. AFTER HIDING FOR THIRTY HOURS, TWO OF THE KOREANS DASHED OUT AMONG SIXTY VIET CONG WHO HAD OCCUPIED THE HOSPITAL TO SECURE ASSISTANCE FROM A PASSING AUSTRALIAN COLUMN. PROVINCE CHIEF TRUOC, SAYING THAT HE NOW KNOWS WHOM HE CAN COUNT ON AMONG HIS STAFF, IS THREATENED TO HAVE DO-NOTHING OFFICERS TRANSFERRED TO THE FRONT LINES IN I CORPS.

7. MORALE IS STILL QUITE SHAKY, AND IS PERHAPS BEST ILLUSTRATED BY THE CURRENT REOR THAT, SINCE THE VIET CONG HAD BEEN DEFEATED ELSEWHERE, THEY WOULD CONCENTRATE THEIR EFFORTS ON PHUOC TUY

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PAGE 04 SAIGON 19005 01 OF 02 111859Z

AND LONG KHANH, WHERE THEY HAD DONE RELATIVELY BETTER. NONETHELESS, RECOVERY SEEMS TO BE UNDERWAY. MAJOR TRUOC TOLD HIS SERVICE CHIEFS AT THEIR FIRST MEETING AFTER THE ATTACK ON BA RIA THAT ALL OF THEIR REPUTATIONS, AND ESPECIALLY HIS, WERE SUFFERING. THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO SUFFER, HE ADDED, EVERY DAY THAT PASSED BEFORE ORDER AND PUBLIC SERVICES WERE RESTORED.

8. ADVISORS FEEL THAT THE PUBLIC WORKS, HEALTH AND INFORMATION

~~PAGE 6 RUMJIR 19005 01 OF 02 CONFIDENTIAL~~

SERVICES ARE PERFORMING VERY WELL. THEY ARE VEHEMENT IN THEIR CONDEMNATION OF A LACKLUSTER REFUGEE/SOCIAL WELFARE CHIEF WHO SEEMS TO HAVE DONE LITTLE BUT PAD THE LISTS OF REFUGEES WITH PHONIES. ON 9 FEBRUARY THE MARKET IN BA RIA WAS OPERATING AS USUAL FOR THE FIRST TIME. PRICES HAD STARTED TO FALL BUT WERE STILL TWO AND THREE TIMES NORMAL. BUS TRANSPORT TO SAIGON, NORMALLY EIGHTY PIASTRES, COSTS SEVEN HUNDRED.

9. DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF FOR ADMINISTRATION PHAM VAN KHA, WHO REMAINED WITH HIS FAMILY IN THE PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS COMPOUND THROUGHOUT THE BATTLE, EXPECTS THE PHUOC TY ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY TO BE BACK TO NORMAL, EXCEPT IN LONG DIEN, WITHIN A WEEK. HE FEELS THE FIGHT RESULTED IN CLEAR-CUT PSYCHOLOGICAL GAINS FOR THE GVN. NOTING THAT MOST OF THE TOWNSPEOPLE WERE PRO-GVN, HE ADDED THAT THE ATTACK MUST HAVE DISABUSED ANY WHO HAD PRO-COMMUNIST SYMPATHIES. THE VIET CONG DID NOTHING POSITIVE, KHA STRESSED, BUT ONLY BROUGHT HARDSHIP ON THE TOWNSPEOPLE, REVEALING TO MOST OF THEM FOR THE FIRST TIME THE TRUE FACE OF THE ENEMY. ATTACKING DURING TET ONLY ADDED INSULT TO INJURY.

BUNKER

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PAGE 01 SAIGON 19005 02 OF 02 111825Z

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ACTION EA 15

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SC 01,SP 02,SS 20,RSC 01,L 03,H 02,SAH 03,IO 13,P 04,INR 07,  
NIC 01,AID 28,SR 01,ORM 03,RSR 01,SAL 01,/119.W

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P 111740Z FEB 68  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6423

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 19005

10. VIETNAMESE SURVEY PERSONNEL REPORT THAT THE PEOPLE ACCEPT DESTRUCTION OF THEIR HOUSES AS NECESSARY BECAUSE VIET CONG WERE FIGHTING FOR THEM. NEVERTHELESS, THEY HOPE FOR COMPENSATION-- A SUBJECT ON WHICH THE GVN HAS YET TO REVEAL ITS INTENTIONS. THOSE UNABLE TO GET ON THE LIST FOR FREE COMMODITIES DISTRIBUTION ARE FEELING THE PINCH OF HIGH PRICES. THE AUSTRALIAN TROOPS (TWO COMPANIES REMAINED IN PHUOC TUY; THE REST WERE MOVED TO SUPPORT SWEEPS IN THE BIEN HOA AREA) RECEIVE THE HIGHEST PRAISE. THE PEOPLE OF BA RIA ARE SAID TO HOPE THAT THE AUSSIES WILL RETURN TO PHUOC TUY AND REESTABLISH SECURITY, AT WHICH POINT THE REFUGEES IN VUNG TAU WILL ALL RETURN. RANGER LOOTING IS, OF COURSE, VIEWED VERY DIMLY, BUT THIS DID NOT STOP SOME CIVILIANS FROM SIMILARLY STRIPPING A

~~PAGE 2 RUMOR 19005 CONFIDENTIAL~~  
PARTIALLY DESTROYED AMERICAN PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVE'S HOUSE, APPARENTLY ACCORDING TO THE MAXIM "ANYTHING AMERICAN IS FAIR GAME." THE TORTUOUS RUMORS REPORTED ELSEWHERE AS WELL REGARDING SOME SORT OF UNDER-HANDED COLLUSION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE VIET CONG ARE ALSO CURRENT IN PHUOC TUY. BUNKER

67

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Monday, February 12, 1968 -- 8:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith two charts which show, via daily casualties and casualty ratios, how the enemy concentrated his effort and how it has gradually subsided in the direction of the pre-Tet "normal" level.

It will be an important fact if they decide not to mount a second major wave of attacks on the cities.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-206  
By Cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

information

68

~~SECRET~~

Monday, February 12, 1968  
8:30 a. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy's daily report on  
Khe Sanh.

We will send up shortly a table on  
the supply situation.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By tg, NARA, Date 2-10-92

~~SECRET~~

68a

Monday, February 12, 1968, 8:20 AM

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is the eighth report on the Khe Sanh area and covers the 24-hour period of February 11, 1968.

During the period the Khe Sanh Combat Base and the surrounding area continued to receive heavy enemy shelling by mortars, rockets, and artillery. By 1:00 AM the shelling had subsided to sporadic incoming and terminated at 3:00 AM. Early Sunday morning a 122MM rocket impacted 15 feet away from a Air Force C-130 in the process of off-loading troops, resulting in one killed and four wounded and evacuated. The aircraft was damaged, but repairs are underway and hopefully it can be flown out today.

A helicopter conducting medical evacuation on Hill 861 received small arms fire resulting in one wounded and evacuated.

Two Navy aircraft dropped eight tanks of tear gas on a village eight kilometers southwest of Khe Sanh and followed with air strikes. No movement was observed from the village.

For the period there were four Marines killed and eight wounded, including those mentioned above. Two thousand two hundred and five rounds of mortar and artillery were fired by friendly forces. Tactical air sorties for the period totalled 258, Marine Tactical Air flew 75 sorties, and reported one road cut, four secondary fires, and one tank destroyed. The Air Force and Navy Tactical flew 88 and 95 sorties respectively, reporting six road cuts, four military structures destroyed, one secondary explosion, eight secondary fires, and one bridge damaged. Five ARC LIGHT strikes (33 sorties) were flown in the Niagara area.

Aerial resupply of Khe Sanh increased to 83 short tons on February 11. Ammunition and engineer bunkering material accounted for 40 and 25 short tons respectively. Seventeen short tons of replacement were delivered along with one short ton of medical supplies. C-123 Aircraft are providing air landed delivery to the Khe Sanh Airfield and air drops from C-130 Aircraft began at 11:00 hours.

No COFRAM Type Ordnance was used during the period.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD W 1/3/79  
By ip/rs, NARA, Date 2-10-92

For the next 24 hours Marine Air Plans 44 Tactical Air Sorties, the Air Force will run 74, while the Navy plan 100, for a total of 218 tactical air sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area. I have just instructed Momyer to increase the above with emphasis in the B-52 ring.

The Marines will have 16 aircraft on call. The Air Force will have 120 sorties on call. There will be five ARC LIGHT strikes (36 sorties) run in the Niagara area.

There is no change in enemy unit identification in the area.

The weather was poor on the afternoon of February 11. Cloud ceilings were 500 to 700 feet and visibilities were 3 to 5 miles in fog. By 6:00 PM the fog increased and visibility was reduced to 1/16 of a mile. The weather remained poor all night and through the morning hours. The weather is forecast to remain poor until about mid-morning on February 13. During this period cloud ceilings will remain 600 feet or lower and visibilities will be near zero at night. Late on the morning of the 13th weather should improve to marginal.

69

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - February 12, 1968

~~copy~~  
Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

ACTION

SUBJECT: Message to the Fifth Inter-American Cultural Council.  
Letter to President Leoni

Dr. Eisenhower leaves on Wednesday, February 14, for Venezuela. He will head the U. S. Delegation to the Fifth Inter-American Cultural Council. This meeting will consider action programs to carry out the OAS Summit decisions on education and science and technology. The specific programs are the work of two task forces which met following Punta del Este. Dr. Hornig and Dr. Killian played a big role in these groups.

Two of the items on the program to dramatize our Latin American policy which you approved last week are:

1. a special message to the Cultural Council which Dr. Eisenhower could incorporate in his plenary speech.
2. an invitation to President Leoni to visit Washington this year.

I recommend that you approve the suggested message to the Cultural Council at Tab A.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

I also suggest you make use of Dr. Eisenhower's trip to send President Leoni the letter at Tab B.

W. W. Rostow

**Attachments**

- Tab A - Message to the Inter-American Cultural Council.
- Tab B - Proposed Presidential letter to Venezuelan President Leoni.

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)  
 White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1985  
 By kg, NARA, Date 2-10-92

Message

to the Fifth Meeting of the Inter-American Cultural Council

If man is to achieve his fullest potential, he must have the freedom to learn -- and he must have learning to be truly free.

You meet to put into action the purposes of the Punta del Este Declaration of Presidents. There is no more important work facing our hemisphere. Together, we must:

- assure basic education for all our people;
- make our secondary schools and universities centers of excellence; and
- harness science and technology in the work of education and development.

The largest share of what must be done, you must do. But I want you to know that we in the United States will help -- with our resources, our technology, and the enthusiastic support of our people.

In preparing your programs you will use the tools that are at hand. But I hope your vision also will extend to the tools of tomorrow. I am particularly enthusiastic about the possibilities of combining advanced technology with advanced methods of teaching and research. Educational television already points the way. We are not far from

the day when the satellite will help us

- leap across the barriers that today deny good education to millions of citizens, and
- unlock the doors to hidden natural resources on land and the surrounding seas.

With warm and vivid memories of my meetings with your Presidents last April, I send you greetings and best wishes for success in your deliberations.

# # # # #

Dear Mr. President:

I am taking advantage of Dr. Milton Eisenhower's trip to Venezuela to send you this letter. Dr. Eisenhower has recently agreed to serve as Special Advisor for Latin American Affairs to the Department of State. In this capacity, he is heading our delegation to the Fifth Meeting of the Inter-American Cultural Council. We are proud to have so distinguished an educator representing the United States at this important meeting.

The Cultural Council's principal task will be to put our Punta del Este decisions into practical action programs. There is no more urgent business in this hemisphere than to move forward quickly with those decisions. What you are doing in Venezuela to expand the opportunity and quality of education is in keeping with this grand design. Your example should be an added incentive to the delegates. I am pleased that your country is host to this particular session of the Cultural Council.

You are moving into the last year of your term in office. Between now and December I know you will be heavily engaged in preparations for national elections. Nevertheless, I hope you will find time to come to Washington for an official visit. Ambassador Bernbaum will be ready to discuss dates, if you feel you can make the journey.

The other day, I reviewed the list of countries participating in HemisFair. I was so pleased to find that Venezuela will be represented. The Fair offers a unique opportunity for the millions of persons who

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Authority NSC 10/5/79 rNW 79-26  
By g/mie, NARA, Date 4/30/96

-2-

will see the exhibits to become better acquainted with our sister republics to the South and to see the contribution which Hispanic America has made in our country.

With warm personal regards,

**Sincerely,**

**His Excellency  
Dr. Raul Leoní  
President of the Republic of Venezuela**

**LBJ/WGB:mmm  
2/12/68**

Monday,  
February 12, 1968

*Pres file*

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Status of the Draft in South Viet-Nam

You asked for a status report on the draft in South Viet-Nam with particular reference to action by the Legislature.

The original Mobilization Decree was issued October 25, 1967. It was signed by Ky as Prime Minister.

It lowered the draft age from 20 to 18. It also provided for a recall of some veterans, mobilization of specialists and technicians and a tighter deferment policy.

When the new Assembly took office, there was criticism in both Houses of the previous Government's action. The criticism mainly focused on the legality of the Government's action before there was a legal legislature. There was no disagreement in either House as to the necessity of some kind of mobilization decree.

Minister of National Defense Vy appeared before both Houses on December 18, the Upper House in the morning had an open session, the Lower House had a closed session in the afternoon. He described the Decree and answered questions in both Houses. He announced the Government's intention to begin drafting 19 year olds on July 1, 1968 and 18 year olds on December 1, 1968.

Both Houses have since debated the mobilization question. The Upper House passed a resolution on December 28. It supported the need for mobilization measures. It asked the Executive to make the terms of its Decree more specific. It asked the drafting of 18 and 19 year olds be ~~done only after the 20-33 year old manpower pool was exhausted.~~ done only after the 20-33 year old manpower pool was exhausted.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
F. *alg*, NARS, Date 6/25/96

CONFIDENTIAL

On January 6, the Lower House adopted a similar resolution using most of the same words. It did state the intention of the Lower House to draft a new mobilization law but nothing has been done on that.

In effect, these were "sense of the House" resolutions and did not alter the legal provisions of the Decree. On February 7, President Thieu told Ambassador Bunker he intended to begin drafting 19 year olds on April 1 and 18 year olds on July 1.

On February 9, in his State of the Nation address, President Thieu announced his intention to "strictly enforce the Decree law on partial mobilization" and to "carry out immediately the military build-up plan ahead of schedule."

We have a report today that the Government has pushed its schedule further forward and plans to draft 19 year olds beginning March 1 and 18 year olds beginning May 1.

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

LDX'6

71

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Eye only~~

February 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense

For whatever assistance they may be, here are the action items which the President indicated we should have Cy Vance take up in Seoul, and in Saigon if he goes.

1. In Seoul

- Underline urgency of military situation and U. S. decision to deploy extra battalions;
- In particular, request Korean permission for Westy to redeploy Korean forces if necessary; and indicate urgency of requirement for extra Korean division in Viet Nam.

2. In Saigon.

- Get full details on whether 65,000 target will be reached; when it will be reached; when 18- and 19-year-olds will be called up;
- Explore if civilian contractor force in Viet Nam cannot be used fully and intensively now, releasing military engineering units for highest priority engineering tasks, notably in I Corps;
- Discuss with Bunker and Westy whether advantages would outweigh disadvantages in setting up a new combined command structure, with Thieu as Commander in Chief, Westy as Deputy, Koreans and Australians to participate along with Vien;
- Discuss with Westy and Bunker whether strategic guidance to Westy, based on priority tasks in period of crisis, would be helpful, including willingness to take setbacks in certain secondary areas;
- Have Vance review state of BUTTERCUP.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-202  
By is, NARA Date 4-8-97

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

72

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Free file*

Sunday, February 11, 1968 -- 6:30 pm

Mr. President:

Just for information, you might want to know that the two U. S. ships in the Mediterranean were overflown by some UAR bombers, some 45-50 nautical miles offshore.

Also attached: the 33 B-52 strikes schedule in support of Khe Sanh, plus a major strike on the Hanoi Canal bridge.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 91-448  
By CG, NARA, Date 8-21-95

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

*cy BKS*

11 February 1968  
1700 EST

72a

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: USS GEORGETOWN Operations Summary

1. The USS GEORGETOWN (AGTR-2) escorted by the USS LAWRENCE (DDG-4), is presently located approximately 50 nautical miles northwest of Alexandria.

2. Since 110426 EST the two ships have reported being overflown three separate times by United Arab Republic IL-28 Beagle aircraft. The two ships were located at the following distances from the coast when overflown:

<u>OVERFLIGHT</u>	<u>DISTANCE</u>
1	46 nautical miles
2	49 nautical miles
3	47 nautical miles

3. Commander Sixth Fleet has directed the following precautionary measures:

a. The USS ROOSEVELT, located in Athens, and three escorting destroyers have assumed a one hour alert for getting underway to escort.

b. One patrol aircraft on station continuously providing radar coverage for GEORGETOWN operations. In addition one Electronic Warfare (EW) aircraft is providing EW support for GEORGETOWN operations during daylight hours. These aircraft have been directed to remain at least 50 miles from the coast of Egypt, Israel, Lebanon and Syria.

c. The TALLAHATCHI COUNTY (AVB-2) is on a two hour notice to establish advance base operations.

*W. R. McCleendon*

W. R. MCCLENDON  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:  
(See page 2)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 96-198  
By *us*, NARA, Date *8-12-04*

NMCC - 11 FEB 68, 4:30 PM EST

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

11 February 1968  
4:30 PM EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR: Senior Watch Officer, White House Situation Room  
Mr. Benjamin H. Read, Executive Secretary,  
Department of State, c/o Operations Center

Subject: Operational Highlights

SOUTHEAST ASIA

The following US Air Force B-52 missions are now scheduled to be flown during the next 24 hours:

<u>MISSION &amp; NR OF ACFT</u>	<u>TIME (EST) ON TARGET</u>	<u>TARGET LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION</u>
UNIFORM 74 (6 B-52s)	6:10 PM 11 February (120710 SVN)	In South Vietnam, 2 miles east-northeast of Khe Sanh; contains elements of the NVA 304th Division and supplies.
VICTOR 91 (6 B-52s)	9:50 PM 11 February (121050 SVN)	In South Vietnam, 38 miles north-northwest of Saigon; contains elements of the NVA 165th Regiment, base camps, bunkers, and storage areas.
VICTOR 08 (6 B-52s)	4:40 PM 11 February (120540 SVN)	In South Vietnam, 30 miles northwest of Kontum; contains an enemy battalion of the NVA 66th Regiment.
VICTOR 60 (9 B-52s)	3:25 AM 12 February (121625 SVN)	In South Vietnam, 9 miles north of Khe Sanh; contains a way station and extensive storage facilities supporting NVA action against Khe Sanh.
VICTOR 88 (6 B-52s)	5:45 AM 12 February (121845 SVN)	In South Vietnam, 7 miles northwest of Khe Sanh; contains an NVA Regiment of the 325C Division.

The following ROLLING THUNDER 57 ALFA strikes are now scheduled during the next 24 hours:

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/88  
By rg NARA, Date 2-25-92

TARGET AND LOCATION	TIME (EST) ON TARGET	UNIT	STRIKE FORCE	SAIGON TIME
Hanoi Railroad/Highway Bridge Canal (JCS 13), 6 miles northeast of Hanoi	7:16 PM 11 Feb	7 AF	12 F-105	120816
	7:21 PM 11 Feb	7 AF	12 F-105	120821
	3:16 AM 12 Feb	7 AF	12 F-105	121616
	3:21 AM 12 Feb	7 AF	12 F-105	121621

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief Watch Officer, White House Situation Room  
 Mr. Benjamin M. Reba, Executive Secretary,  
 Department of State, c/o Operations Office

Subject: Operational Highlights

SOUTHEAST ASIA

DDO WRM  
 ADDO JG  
 CCOC JA

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NMCC - 11 FEB 68, 4:30 PM EST		
VICTOR 88 (TOP-SECRET/LIMDIS)	5:45 AM 12 February (121845 SVN)	In South Vietnam, 7 miles northwest of Khe Sanh; contains an NVA Regiment of the 325C Division.

The following ROLLING THUNDER 57 ALFA strikes are now scheduled during the next 24 hours:

~~TOP SECRET~~

73

Meeting With the President  
Sunday, February 11, 1968 -- 4:30 p.m.

*Pres file*

AGENDA

1. Supplementary Instruction to Mr. Vance. (Sec. Rusk)  
Sec. Rusk's draft at Tab A.
2. Response to Gen. Westmoreland's Indication that Troop Reinforcements Would be Helpful. (Sec. McNamara and Gen. Wheeler)
3. Increasing Supply Levels at Khe Sanh. (Sec. McNamara and Gen. Wheeler)  
Data at Tab B.
4. Draft Instruction for Emissary to Saigon. (The President)  
Draft at Tab C.
5. Other Military Problems. (Sec. McNamara and Gen. Wheeler)
  - Frog missiles?
  - Tanks?
  - Enemy aircraft?
6. What Military Initiatives Can We Undertake? (Sec. McNamara and Gen. Wheeler)
7. Speech.  
I shall try to get you before 4:30 an outline of a Presidential speech.
8. Other.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *kg*, NARA, Date 2-10-92

~~SECRET~~

(A)

73a

DRAFT

Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE

STATE \_\_\_\_\_

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR VANCE FROM RUSK

(attached)

Please ask Ambassador Porter to show you my NODIS 110828 as background for your talk with President Park.

The views contained therein are a fair reflection of the problems of public and Congressional opinion toward Korea which we would have here if the Koreans themselves are not careful. This type of material should not be used by you as a direct threat from one President to another but it should be used with great force to expose the kinds of problems which our President will face in trying to maintain our support for the Republic of Korea. On that basis, you can be very tough indeed because the problems are real.

If the matter of reduced ROK participation in Viet-Nam comes up, you should not hesitate to point out that that would require a reduced US participation in Korea. A ROK division in Viet-Nam can only be replaced by a US division now in Korea. Further, Viet-Nam is where the battle is, and from a military point of view the problem of infiltration can be handled by the large forces present in South Korea. Of course, if North Korea launches an all-out invasion, that is another ballgame.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-29

~~SECRET~~

By Cb, NARA Date 7-22-97

~~SECRET~~

-2-

But it is not in our interest, or in the interest of the Republic of Korea, to have another all-out war in Korea. Hence, it is folly for the South Koreans to take steps which would translate an infiltration problem into general hostilities. It's easy to get into such hostilities but very hard to bring them to a successful conclusion.

If President Park attempts to extract commitments which go beyond the terms of our Treaty of Alliance, you should state quite simply that no alteration of that treaty lies within the constitutional power of our President. The treaty stands as agreed and is the primary source of the Republic of Korea's ability to maintain itself as a secure and independent nation. It is elementary, for example, that our President cannot remove the phrase "in accordance with its constitutional processes" from a Treaty of Alliance. We cannot entertain suspicions about the loyalty of the United States to its alliances at a time when we have just lost 900 killed in a ten-day period in Viet-Nam in the course of demonstrating our fidelity.

Your object is to combine an assurance to President Park of our steadiness and seriousness of purpose with an understanding on his side that we, too, have national interests engaged in the safety of his country and in peace in Northeast Asia. We expect from him the same

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

degree of cooperation that he expects from us. If we each have internal public problems, which differ somewhat, the point is that our two Presidents should in consultation decide how to proceed in a way to deal with both sets of problems. We cannot give overriding priority to his problems. If, by doing so, we undermine the very basis of US support to the Republic of Korea.

All this means (a) we must maintain our war effort in Vietnam (b) we must use available channels at Panmunjon to free Pueblo and crew (c) we must act together to insure security of Korea (d) we must not take action on our side to convert infiltration problem into a major war if it can be avoided and (e) we must each give leadership in our own countries to press and public opinion in the interest of our common purposes.

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

110828

73b

INDICATE:  CONCERN  
 CHANGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Origin ACTION: Amembassy, SEOUL PRIORITY 870513 21 31z

Info STATE 110828

NODIS

PERSONAL AND EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

As one who has been intimately involved with Korea since the drafting of Japanese surrender terms, I am deeply disturbed by the present atmosphere of our relations. I know that we are dealing with an especially sensitive people, sometimes called the QUOTE Irish of the Far East UNQUOTE. I also am aware of other moments of tension even worse than the one we have today, particularly when I think back to the Syngman Rhee period. I think I understand fully the genuine concerns of the South Koreans even though I get impatient about their super sensitivity.

The one thing which is not tolerable back here is their suspicion about our basic motives and purposes. We have invested over 33,000 battle deaths, 20,000 non-battle

Dictated by: Dean Rusk:mab 2/6/68	Tel. No. 5171	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary
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Character: S/S - Mr. Read

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 93-367  
By: gip, NARA, Date 4/26/96

~~SECRET~~

deaths, maimed and over 100,000 wounded in the security of an independent Republic of Korea. We have maintained large forces in that country for 17 years. We have invested over six billion dollars (almost half the total Marshall Plan) in economic and military assistance. We have recently massively reinforced our air power in Korea and the immediate adjoining areas. We have carried the banner for Korea in the UN over and over again. You should find ways to make it clear that Korean suspicion against this record is simply incomprehensible to the American people. The danger is that it will be deeply resented back here with potentially disastrous results for both countries.

We do not expect the Republic of Korea to be a satellite of the United States nor do we expect the United States to be a satellite of Korea. We have elementary and basic common interests and the United States has done its full share in supporting these common interests. We expect no less from the Koreans.

I assume that the South Korean press has had its attention called to everything I have said about Korea in my QUOTE Meet the Press UNQUOTE interview. If they got mad because I could not swear in blood what happened to the Pueblo during a ten-day period of radio silence, they must not be angry because I cannot pledge in advance to be a liar. I have no doubt that they have been misled by some of the excessive

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~~SECRET~~

speculation by some American reporters on that particular point. But I thought I hit hard on those subjects of direct interest to the Republic of Korea, including the infiltration and other threats by North Korea during recent weeks and months.

By separate cables we are sending you another letter from the President to Park and answers to other specific questions you have raised.

I would appreciate any further suggestions you have as to what can be done to clarify these matters with key Korean leaders. I have just seen tickers of a backgrounder someone out there apparently held ~~which~~ <sup>which</sup> was helpful. Keep giving us your best judgment and we will give you our best from this end. With warm regards. END

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

(B)

73c

Sunday, February 11, 1968

Following is the text of a cable sent by General Westmoreland this morning.

This is the seventh report on the Khe Sanh area and covers a period of 24-hours ending at midnight last night.

During the reporting period the Khe Sanh combat base and the surrounding area continued to receive sporadic shelling from mortars, rockets and an occasional artillery round. Between 7:17 February 10 and noon February 10 units had brief exchanges of small arms fire and grenades on the western end of the perimeter and western outposts resulting in three enemy killed. At 7:15 February 10 a trip flare exposed 14 enemy just west of Khe Sanh near the wire. An exchange of fire resulted in one enemy killed. At noon February 10 lights were spotted moving between Hills 861 and 881S, and metallic noises were heard. Lights and noises were fired on with unknown results. Tactical air strike runs during the period resulted in four secondary explosions.

Several enemy encroachments toward friendly positions and increasing enemy pressure was noted during the period. Marines in the area continued to improve their defensive positions with emphasis on anti-tank defense. On February 10, 136 mines were emplaced southwest of the airfield. A review of all 106mm recoilless rifle, 3.5 rocket launchers, light-antitank weapon, and tank positions has been conducted to ensure complete coverage of all likely tank approaches.

Latest information received on the Marine C-130 crash which was reported yesterday reveals that the aircraft is believed to have received 50-caliber machine gun fire on its approach. The aircraft was loaded with POL which caught on fire and burned upon landing resulting in two killed and four wounded in critical condition and three missing. Search continues for the missing. During the period a total of 2,985 rounds of various caliber and types of mortar/artillery was fired in response to enemy efforts in the area.

Marine tactical air flew 64 sorties, and the Navy flew 102 missions for a total of 287 sorties. Aside from the tactical strikes mentioned, there were five additional secondary explosions, 14 secondary fires, 42 enemy killed, two bridges damaged, and 193 military structures destroyed.

Weather continues to hamper visual reconnaissance and strikes. There were no sightings of enemy vehicles.

Thirty-eight B-52 aircraft ran six strikes during the period delivering a total 975 tons of ordnance in the Niagara area.

The airfield at Khe Sanh is back in operation following the C-130 crash of yesterday, and received a total of 53 short tons of supplies. The resupplies

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-35**  
**By Cb, NARA Date 2-11-97**

represented four of the five classes, class I, rations, excepted. Unfavorable weather continues to effect air resupply in the northern highlands; however, early sorties were able to land on February 11, without the aid of the ground control facility. Requisitions received from Khe Sanh on the night of February 10 are being scheduled for air delivery or air drop on February 11.

The Khe Sanh dump or ammo supply point status reported as number of days on hand on February 11 is as follows: Class I: Rations, 10 days on hand; Class III: Aviation fuel, 12 days on hand, jet fuel, 4 days on hand; motor fuel, 6 days on hand and diesel fuel, 6 days on hand; Class V: ammunition, 60mm and high explosive, 12 days on hand; 81mm, 17 days on hand; 90mm, 94 days on hand; 4.2 inch shells, 36 days on hand; 105mm, 10 days on hand and 155mm, 25 days on hand. Class V (firecracker). 105 mm, 5 days on hand; 155mm, 5 days on hand; 40mm, 5 days on hand and hand grenades, 10 days on hand. The ammo supply point status of anti-tank ordnance, not including basic loads on position is as follows: 90mm head, 478 rounds; 66mm rocket, 190 rounds; M19 mines, 100 mines and 106mm head, 316 rounds. NOTE: Firecracker ammo is COFRAM.

No COFRAM type ordnance was used during the period.

For the next 24-hour period Marine tactical air plans 44 sorties in support of Khe Sanh, while the Air Force has 76 scheduled and the Navy has 100, for a total of 220 sorties. The Marines will have 16 aircraft on call for additional runs, and the Air Force will have 120 alert sorties on call. Five Arc Light strikes (33 sorties) are scheduled in support of the Khe Sanh area.

The weather for the afternoon of February 10 was marginal and deteriorated to poor after noon EST with zero visibility in fog by 3:00 PM EST, February 10. Weather conditions continued to be poor through the morning of February 11. The forecast for the afternoon of February 11 is for marginal weather conditions. By 8:00 AM EST fog and low clouds will cause poor weather which will last until 10:00 AM EST on the 12th of February. Conditions should improve to marginal with cloud ceilings increasing to 1,200 feet by mid-night February 11.

~~There is no change in enemy unit identification in the area.~~

Lao personnel evacuated from Khe Sanh and now located at DaNang for on-shipment to Laos, total 114. Four persons remain to be evacuated on February 11, including the BV-33 battalion commander. Arrangements are underway to transport the Lao personnel to ultimate destination by Lao aircraft.

~~SECRET~~

Draft Instruction for Emissary to Saigon

You will make an independent assessment of the military and political situation, with special reference to the following.

1. The situation of the ARVN, including the RF and PF.

--- How many of the 50% who were on leave during Tet have returned?

--- What measures are being taken to assemble the rest?

--- With maximum effort, how rapidly could the rest be assembled?

--- What is the situation with respect to the RF and PF?

What efforts are being undertaken to reestablish their links with the central government and to insure that they hold a maximum part of the countryside and engage, along with ARVN forces, in exploiting the possible weakness in certain areas of Viet Cong, guerrilla and provincial main force units?

-- How soon can Hue and Saigon be thoroughly cleaned up?

-- When are the weak corps commanders, divisional commanders, and province chiefs to be removed?

-- What is the earliest possible date when they can get through the new provisions for drafting of 18 and 19 year olds?

-- In the light of the changed situation, does some redeployment of U.S. forces within South Vietnam make sense? For example, movement of some battalions of the 9th Division out of the Delta make sense?

2. In general, you will convey the view from Washington that the enemy is putting us to the maximum military test of which he is now capable. He may have other surprises for us aside from the scale and weight of the attack on the cities. He may be planning to achieve a situation of maximum advantage and then try to force us into a negotiation on his terms. It therefore seems essential to us that every military and political resource inside South Vietnam be pushed to the limit, not merely to survive his attacks but to present to the enemy and the world a picture of:

-- Military initiative with respect to both the cities and the countryside;

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Authority State let 5-7-79  
By 109/128, NARA, Date 2-10-92

~~SECRET~~

-2-

- Political vitality on the part of the government; and
- Maximum political unity between the government and non-Communist political groups.

3. In talking with Thieu and Ky, you should make clear that we wish to see it through at their side. If we are to be permitted to do so by American public opinion, they must move fast to bring their forces back to strength; wherever possible to get the forces <sup>not</sup> under direct pressure into an active role to exploit the weakened position of the enemy; to assure that those who did not perform well in the current crisis are promptly replaced; to exploit the present crisis for a ruthless attack on corruption; to reestablish total security in the cities.

The enemy is obviously involved in a do-or-die offensive. He may confront us soon with a diplomatic offensive. No one can do the job for the Vietnamese that must be done in the days ahead. They must do it for themselves. If the Vietnamese can act with political and military vigor, we can stay together and turn the enemy's urban offensive to our advantage.

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, February 11, 1968  
4:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Here is the kind of reporting and  
rallying speech you may wish to make.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Outline of Speech for the President

1. The Enemy's Winter-Spring Offensive

- What we knew beforehand: Maximum enemy effort, then negotiate on his terms.
- What actions we took: 102 of 106 battalions by Christmas; warning allies (Canberra); reject enemy 7-day truce and cancelled I Corps truce; U. S. forces on full alert.
- Nevertheless, by secrecy and violating Tet, important tactical surprise was achieved in the cities.

2. Results thus far.

- Positive: -- The people did not revolt;  
-- cities and towns held by the government;  
-- ARVN fought well;  
-- Government united and worked well with people on relief;  
-- very heavy enemy casualties inflicted and weapons lost by enemy. Two figures wholly consistent. Also many prisoners taken.
- Negative: -- troops concentrated on city protection;  
-- civilian casualties, destruction, and refugee. (Appeal for private relief aid?)
- severe ARVN and U. S. casualties, although better than 10/1;
  - some temporary disruption of pacification;
  - DMZ-Khe Sanh battle still to be fought.

3. Where are We?

We are in the midst of a great battle, perhaps the climactic battle of the Vietnamese war. We Americans have been there before: from Saratoga to Gettysburg; from the Battle of the Bulge to the Communist offensives in Korea in April and May 1951. We keep our heads; we put the handwringers aside; and get on with the business.

4. What Shall We Do?

- Work with the Vietnamese to expand and modernize their forces?
- Work with the Vietnamese in relief and recovery of the cities and towns?

- Move rapidly to the 525,000 men we planned.
- Make sure Westy and our men go into the battles ahead with everything they need at hand and a united America back home.

5. Negotiate?

Of course, we want peace. Hanoi knows the kind of peace we want and are prepared to negotiate. But we shall make sure that, having failed in his ruthless and brutal assault on the life of the cities and towns, the enemy does not achieve by diplomacy and political pressure and soft headness what he failed to achieve in the Tet attacks. We shall not abandon the people who voted for a Constitution, who voted for President and Vice President, who voted for a Senate and a Lower House, who turned their backs on the Communists when they appealed for an uprising.

When the other side is ready to talk about peace, we shall be ready. But we have had enough of phoney peace feelers and chicanery. It must be the real thing.

INFORMATION

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~~SECRET~~

Sunday, February 11, 1968  
3:30 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This is the military-political assessment of probably the best (or one of the two best) Vietnamese Corps commanders.

As in the U.S., the lower house is O.K.; the Senate is giving trouble.

W. W. Rostow

REF  
TDCS 315/00511-68 (advance)

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Authority RAC 09736  
By RD/w NARA, Date 4-16-98

WWRostow:rla

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Sunday, February 11, 1968  
3:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

This is the military-political assessment of probably the best (or one of the two best) Vietnamese Corps commanders.

As in the U.S., the lower house is O.K.; the Senate is giving trouble.

W. W. Rostow

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**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-200**  
**By is, NARA Date 7-10-98**

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SECTION ONE OF TWO CITE [REDACTED]  
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM  
DOI 11 FEBRUARY 1968  
SUBJECT III CORPS [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

ANALYSIS OF GOALS OF VIET CONG TET OFFENSIVE AND OF THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF THE PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE ATTACKS

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (11 FEBRUARY 1968) [REDACTED]  
SOURCE [REDACTED]

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

SUMMARY: AS OF 11 FEBRUARY, III CORPS [REDACTED] WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE GENERAL SITUATION AND DOBUTED THERE WOULD BE A SECOND VIET CONG (VC) ATTACK ON SAIGON. HE FEELS VC LOSSES WERE HEAVIER THAN STATISTICS WOULD INDICATE, SINCE MANY OF THE VC WHO WERE LOST WERE OFFICERS, CADRES AND HIGHLY TRAINED SAPPERS. HE BELIEVES THE HIGH PERCENTAGE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AMONG THE ATTACKERS INDICATES VC RECRUITMENT DIFFICULTIES. ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY HAS NOT GIVEN UP HIS PLAN

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

FOR VICTORY, HE WILL HAVE TO CHANGE HIS STRATEGY, [REDACTED] IS CONVINCED THAT THE ATTACK ON SAIGON WAS NOT A DIVERSIONARY EFFORT BUT RESULTED FROM A GENUINE VC BELIEF THAT THEY COULD TAKE OVER THE CITY AND SET UP A PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THE VC WERE CORRECT IN THEIR BELIEF THAT THE PEOPLE DISLIKE THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AND THE LEADERSHIP IS DIVIDED, THEY FAILED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF VARIOUS COMPENSATING FACTORS; INCLUDING THE FOLLOWING: (1) DESPITE THEIR DISLIKE OF THE GVN, THE PEOPLE STILL PREFER IT TO THE VC; (2) THE MILITARY STANDS BEHIND THE GVN AND IN TIMES OF CRISIS THE MILITARY IS UNITED. THE VC WERE ALSO MISTAKEN ABOUT THE MORALE OF ARVN, WHICH FOUGHT VERY WELL. IN FACT, [REDACTED] THINKS THE FIGHTING MAY HAVE SERVED AS A TURNING POINT, SINCE ARVN NOW KNOWS IT CAN DEFEAT THE VC IN BATTLE. [REDACTED] IS LESS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PRESENT STATE OF GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS AND IS DUBIOUS ABOUT THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS OF THE NEW TASK FORCE

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

BECAUSE OF ITS DOMINATION BY CIVILIANS WHO, IN HIS OPINION, ALWAYS HAVE DIFFICULTY IN GETTING THINGS DONE AND ARE HOPELESSLY LOST IN A CRISIS. ALTHOUGH HE HAS NO PLANS TO TAKE STEPS TO ACCOMPLISH SUCH A THING, [REDACTED] THINKS THE BEST SOLUTION TO THE GVN'S PROBLEMS WOULD BE TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION TO ALLOW VICE PRESIDENT KY TO SERVE ALSO AS PRIME MINISTER. [REDACTED] APPROVES OF THE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE GVN OF THE LOWER HOUSE SINCE THE CRISIS BEGAN BUT IS VERY CRITICAL OF THE SENATE'S ATTITUDES, INCLUDING

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

ITS PRETENSION OF BEING COMPETENT TO INVESTIGATE AND DETERMINE IF THE ARMED FORCES DEFENDED THE PEOPLE PROPERLY. END SUMMARY.

1. ON 11 FEBRUARY 1968, [REDACTED] III CORPS [REDACTED] WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN). HE FEELS THAT THE ENEMY MADE AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO CAPTURE SAIGON AND THAT HIS DECISIVE DEFEAT HAS SHORTENED THE WAR BY AT LEAST SIX MONTHS AND WILL BRING AN ALLIED MILITARY VICTORY IN 1968.

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

2. [REDACTED] CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE A SECOND ATTACK, SIMILAR TO THE FIRST, ON SAIGON, IF AN ATTACK SHOULD COME IT WILL BE ESSENTIALLY AN ATTACK BY FIRE, IN WHICH THE ENEMY WILL UTILIZE HEAVY MORTARS AND PROCKETS BUT NO MAJOR GROUND FORCES. THE HEAVY LOSSES SUSTAINED BY THE ENEMY DURING THE FIRST ATTACK WILL MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO MOUNT ANOTHER MAJOR OFFENSIVE AGAINST SAIGON FOR AT LEAST THREE OR FOUR MONTHS AND POSSIBLY NOT BEFORE THE WAR ENDS. (FIELD COMMENT. [REDACTED] 7 FEBRUARY, ALSO REPORTED THAT [REDACTED] CONSIDERED IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE VC WOULD LAUNCH A SECOND ATTACK ON SAIGON.)

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

3. [REDACTED] FEELS THAT, IN SOME RESPECTS, ENEMY LOSSES ARE EVEN HEAVIER THAN THE STATISTICS INDICATE. THE ENEMY NOT ONLY LOST OVER HALF OF HIS ATTACK FORCE, BUT SUFFERED AN ESPECIALLY SERIOUS BLOW IN HEAVY LOSSES AMONG THE OFFICERS AND LEADER CADRES. A LARGE NUMBER OF SAPPERS, WHO WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO REPLACE, WERE KILLED. MORALE OF ENEMY TROOPS UNDOUBTEDLY HAS DROPPED SHARPLY DESPITE EFFORTS BY THE VIET CONG (VC) AND THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM (DRV) TO KEEP THE CADRES AND TROOPS FROM LEARNING THE FULL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DEFEAT.

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

4. [REDACTED] SAID THAT THE FACT THAT ENEMY TROOPS WHICH ATTACKED SAIGON WERE, ON THE WHOLE, VERY YOUNG AND POORLY TRAINED AND THAT MANY WERE NEW RAQLACEMENTS IN THEIR UNITS DID NOT INDICATE THAT THE ENEMY HAD COMMITTED POOR TROOPS WHILE HOLDING THE GOOD ONES IN RESERVE. A REPRESENTATIVE CROSS SECTION OF THE ENEMY TROOPS KILLED AND CAPTURED IN THE SAIGON CAMPAIGN DOES NOT DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THOSE CAPTURED IN OTHER MAJOR ENGAGEMENTS. HOWEVER, THE HIGH PERCENTAGE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) REPLACEMENTS IN VC UNITS IS SIGNIFICANT. THE VC ARE FINDING IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO GET INDIGENOUS REPLACEMENTS AND ARE BECOMING MORE DEPENDENT ON NVA PERSONNEL.

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

5. [REDACTED] SAID THAT THE ENEMY OBVIOUSLY HAS NOT GIVEN UP HIS PLAN FOR VICTORY BUT WILL CHANGE ITS STRATEGY. THE ACTIVITY WILL BE DESIGNED TO WORSEN THE LIFE OF THE PEOPLE; ESPECIALLY THE REFUGEES, IN THE HOPE THAT THEY WILL CAUSE ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS FOR THE GOVERNMENT. [REDACTED] EXPECTS THAT THE ENEMY WILL:

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

A. MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO CUT ROUTES LEADING INTO SAIGON IN ORDER TO DISRUPT THE ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE CAPITAL.

B. LAUNCH A MAJOR POLITICAL OFFENSIVE DESIGNED TO SOW DISUNITY AMONG THE PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN THE REFUGEE CENTERS IN THE CAPITAL.

C. POSSIBLY LAUNCH TERRORIST ATTACKS ON

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FINAL SECTION OF TWO CITE [REDACTED]  
VITAL INSTALLATIONS IN SAIGON, SUCH AS THE WATER  
WORKS AT THU DUC.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

6. [REDACTED] SAID THAT THE NUMBER OF ENEMY TROOPS  
REMAINING IN SAIGON PROPER IS VERY SMALL AND THAT  
ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS WILL BE MAINLY  
LIMITED TO SNIPER AND POSSIBLY TERRORIST ACTIVITY.  
HOWEVER, [REDACTED] FEELS THAT THE PRESENT CURFEW SHOULD,  
AND WILL, BE EXTENDED FOR AT LEAST ONE MONTH OR LONGER.  
THE HOURS OF CURFEW WILL BE REDUCED GRADUALLY, BUT IT  
WILL BE SOME TIME BEFORE THE MORE LIBERAL HOURS OF  
THE PRE-CURFEW IS JUSTIFIED BECAUSE SECURITY IS  
PREDOMINANT IN THE MINDS OF THE PEOPLE AND THEY FIND IT  
REASSURING TO SEE SOLDIERS AND POLICEMEN, SIDE-BY-SIDE,  
WATCHING OVER THE EMPTY STREETS AT NIGHT.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

7. [REDACTED] IS CONVINCED THAT THE VC ATTACK ON SAIGON WAS NOT SIMPLY  
A DIVERSIONARY EFFORT OR DESIGNED TO PRODUCE A PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY  
ONLY HE IS CERTAIN IN HIS OWN MIND THAT THE VC GENUINELY BELIEVED  
THEY COULD TAKE OVER SAIGON AND SET UP A REVOLUTIONARY "PEOPLE'S  
GOVERNMENT" HE HAS, FOR EXAMPLE, SEEN A NUMBER OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS  
AND PROCLAMATIONS WHICH THIS PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT WAS TO PROMULGATE  
AFTER IT TOOK OVER. [REDACTED] FEELS THE VC BASED THEIR HOPES FOR SUCCESS ON  
THREE IDEAS:

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

- A. THE PEOPLE HATED THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AND WOULD RISE  
UP AND OVERTHROW IT IF THE MEANS TO DO SO WERE AT HAND.
- B. GVN LEADERSHIP WAS SO SERIOUSLY DIVIDED THAT IT WOULD COLLAPSE  
COMPLETELY IF CONFRONTED BY A SERIOUS AND CONTINUING CRISIS.
- C. THE MORALE OF ARVN OFFICERS AND MEN WAS VERY LOW, AND THE TROOPS  
WOULD GIVE UP OR FLEE WHEN CONFRONTED WITH A DETERMINED ENEMY  
FORCE.

8. [REDACTED] SAID THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF TRUTH IN THE ENEMY ANALYSIS.  
THE ENEMY'S MISTAKE WAS TO OVERLOOK A NUMBER OF COMPENSATING FACTORS.  
WHILE MOST PEOPLE DO NOT LIKE OR AT BEST ARE INDIFFERENT TO THE GVN,  
MANY STRONGLY DISLIKE THE VC. IF COMPELLED TO MAKE A CHOICE, A  
MAJORITY WOULD CHOOSE THE GVN OVER THE VC. HATRED OF THE VC  
INVOLVES A NUMBER OF FACTORS. CATHOLICS, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE STRONGLY  
OPPOSED TO ANY COMMUNIST REGIME AND WILL TAKE ACTIVE STEPS TO AVOID  
ONE. ALTHOUGH THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE IN SAIGON MAY NOT LIKE  
THE GVN, THEY DO LIKE THE STANDARD OF LIVING IT PROVIDES. A CYCLO  
DRIVER, FOR EXAMPLE, MAY BE POOR BUT HE ENJOYS A HIGH STANDARD OF  
LIVING COMPARED TO THAT OF A NORTH VIETNAMESE.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

9. [REDACTED] NOTED THAT THE ENEMY ALSO ERRED IN PLACING TOO MUCH IMPOR-  
TANCE ON THE REPUTED FRICTION BETWEEN PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU AND  
VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY AND THE INCOMPETENCE OF PRIME MINISTER  
NGUYEN VAN LOC. IN DOING SO, HE OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE MILITARY  
INSTITUTION LENDS BEHIND-THE SCENES COHESIVENESS TO THE GVN APPARATUS  
AND THAT IN TIMES OF CRISIS THE MILITARY IS ALWAYS FIRMLY UNITED.  
[REDACTED] ALSO FEELS THE ENEMY PUT TOO MUCH CREDENCE IN FOREIGN PRESS

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

ACCOUNTS ABOUT THE UNWILLINGNESS OF ARVN UNITS TO FIGHT. IN THE ACTUAL EVENT, BOTH OFFICERS AND MEN FOUGHT WELL EVEN WHEN FACING SUPERIOR FORCES. [REDACTED] FEELS, IN FACT, THAT THE RECENT VC ATTACKS MAY BE A TURNING POINT SINCE MORALE IS NOW HIGH AND THE OFFICERS AND MEN KNOW THEY CAN DEFEAT THE ENEMY EVEN IN AN ALL-OUT ATTACK. [REDACTED] ADDED THAT HE WAS PLEASANTLY SURPRISED BY THE REACTION OF THE PEOPLE. THEY DID NOT PANIC, THEY GAVE SURPRISINGLY GOOD COOPERATION TO THE MILITARY, AND THEY SHOWED NO INTEREST WHATEVER IN A "PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT."

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

10. ALTHOUGH HE EXUDED CONFIDENCE OVER THE MILITARY SITUATION, [REDACTED] WAS RATHER PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PRESENT STATE OF GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS. HE FELT THIEU HAD NOT DISPLAYED DYNAMIC LEADERSHIP. HE HELD LITTLE HOPE FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE COMMITTEE FOR PEOPLE'S RELIEF (JOINT GVN/U.S. TASK FORCE) BECAUSE IT WAS DOMINATED BY CIVILIANS. HE NOTED THAT MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG, THE COMMITTEE'S CHIEF OF STAFF, HAD ANNOUNCED HE WAS RESIGNING BECAUSE THE CIVILIANS WERE "ALL TALK AND NO ACTION." [REDACTED] ADDED HE HAD BEEN ADVISED BY THANG THAT MORNING THAT THE LATTER HAD NOT ATTENDED THAT MORNING'S COMMITTEE MEETING. [REDACTED] SAID HE HAD ARRANGED TO SEE THANG LATER IN THE DAY IN AN EFFORT TO RESOLVE HIS PROBLEMS. [REDACTED] FELT THAT ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION WOULD BE THE APPOINTMENT OF CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN AS DEPUTY TO KY, WHO CHAIRS THE COMMITTEE. VIEN COULD THEN ISSUE THE NECESSARY ORDERS ON BEHALF OF THE COMMITTEE TO THE MILITARY WHICH, IN [REDACTED] VIEW, IS THE ONLY GRUP EQUIPPED TO GET A JOB DONE IN A HURRY. CIVILIANS, [REDACTED] SAID, HAVE DIFFICULTY GETTING THINGS DONE AT ANY

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

TIME AND ARE HOPELESSLY LOST IN A CRISIS. AS AN ILLUSTRATION, [REDACTED] NOTED THAT SINCE HE HAD SUPPLIES OF A NUMBER OF COMMODITIES IN LONG AND HE HAD TELEPHONED THE HEAD OF THE GVN SUPPLY DIRECTORATE AND OFFERED TO MAKE THESE SUPPLIES AVAILABLE FOR THE RELIEF OF THE PEOPLE. IN REPLY, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL HAD GIVEN HIM NUMEROUS EXCUSES AS TO WHY HE WAS UNABLE TO PICK UP AND USE THE FOODSTUFFS. [REDACTED] SAID HE HAD THEN CALLED THE DIRECTOR OF ARVN COMMISSARIES, WHO IMMEDIATELY MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO BRING THE SUPPLIES TO SAIGON.

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

1. [REDACTED] INDICATED HE FELT THE ANSWER TO THE PRESENT DILEMMA IS TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION TO PERMIT THE VICE PRESIDENT TO SERVE CONCURRENTLY AS PRIME MINISTER. WHAT IS NEEDED IS TO CONCENTRATE GOVERNMENT POWERS IN THE HANDS OF ONE MAN WHO CAN GIVE ORDERS AND CUT THROUGH THE EXISTING MAZE OF REDTAPE. THUS, REMOVAL OF LOC WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT IN ITSELF SINCE THERE WOULD STILL BE DIVIDED AUTHORITY. [REDACTED] SAID HE DID NOT THINK THE APPOINTMENT OF A MILITARY MAN--THANG OR VIEN, FOR EXAMPLE--AS PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE AN ANSWER. THE NEED IS FOR UNIFIED LEADERSHIP AT THE TOP AND, UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THIS COULD BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY VESTING POWERS IN KY. [REDACTED] EMPHASIZED HE DID NOT PLAN TO TAKE STEPS TO BRING ABOUT THIS CHANGE. HE SAID HE KNEW

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

VIEN AND DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE BRIGADIER GENERALY NGUYEN NGOC LOAN ALSO FAVORED THIS SOLUTION.

12. [REDACTED] EXPRESSED APPROVAL OF THE ATTITUDE OF THE LOWER HOUSE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE VC TET OFFENSIVE, BUT HE WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF MANY SENATORS. HE SAID HE WAS PARTICULARLY DISTURBED BY THE SENATE'S PRETENSIONS TO HAVING SUFFICIENT COMPETENCE AND KNOWLEDGE TO INVESTIGATE THE VC ATTACK AND DETERMINE IF THE ARMED FORCES HAD DONE A GOOD JOB IN DEFENDING THE PEOPLE. HIS SUBORDINATE OFFICERS, [REDACTED] CONTINUED, FEEL THAT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD VOTE THEM AN UNQUALIFIED EXPRESSION OF THANKS. INSTEAD, THE SENATE APPEARS TO BE SAYING THAT THE ARMED FORCES HAVE ITS THANKS AS LONG AS THE FIGHTING CONTINUES BUT THAT AS SOON AS THE CRISIS SUBSIDES IT WILL CHARGE INCOMPETENCE ON THE PART OF MANY ARMED FORCES LEADERS. KHANG SINGLED OUT SENATORS TRAN VAN DON, TON THAT DINH AND TRAN NGOC NHUAN FOR PARTICULAR CRITICISM. [REDACTED] ADDED THAT WHILE HE HIMSELF WAS SURPRISED BY THE ENEMY'S ABILITY TO LAUNCH SUCH WIDESPREAD COORDINATED ATTACKS, IT WAS NOT TRUE THAT THE ATTACK ON SAIGON WAS A SURPRISE. IT HAD BEEN KNOWN THAT SUCH AN ATTACK WAS POSSIBLE, AND A NUMBER OF STEPS TO CUT OFF THE ENEMY'S ACCESS TO SAIGON HAD BEEN TAKEN SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE THE OFFENSIVE BEGAN.

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

13. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER, CHIEF OF STAFF, J-2) 7TH AIRFORCE (GENERAL MOMYER) DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC FACAF

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

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INFORMATION

SECRET

Sunday, February 11, 1968  
3:15 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith the latest Saigon  
situation report.

W. W. Rostow

TDCS 314/02577-68 (advance)

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ - 014B-29-1-3

By LCH NAR, Date 12-08-2017

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INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, February 11, 1968  
3:15 p.m.

Mr. President: 1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

Herewith the latest Saigon  
situation report.

W. W. Rostow

[Redacted]

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CITE [Redacted]  
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM  
DOI 11 FEBRUARY 1968  
SUBJECT SITUATION REPORT AS OF 2400 HOURS  
LOCAL TIME

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (11 FEBRUARY 1968) [Redacted]  
SOURCE THIS IS A VIETNAM SITUATION REPORT PREPARED  
AT 2400 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 11 FEBRUARY 1968.

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-200**  
**By isa, NARA Date 7-10-98**

1. DURING THE TWELVE HOUR PERIOD ENDING AT 2400 HOURS 11 FEBRUARY THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE SIGNIFICANT CONTACT IN SAIGON WITH THE VC. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE STATED AT 2240 HOURS THAT THE SITUATION APPEARS TO BE QUIET AND UNDER CONTROL. AT 2145 HOURS THE VC FIRED AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF B-40 ROCKETS INTO THE NGUYEN VAN PHU POLICE SUB-STATION IN THE SEVENTH PRECINCT. EARLIER TODAY, POLICE MADE CONTACT WITH A VC FORCE AT THE INTERSECTION OF VINH VIEN AND TRIEU DA STREETS NEAR THE CONG HOA STADIUM IN THE FIFTH PRECINCT. A FIRE ALSO WAS REPORTED AT THIS LOCATION. AT 2357 HOURS THE RESULTS OF THE POLICE CLEARING ACTION IN THIS OPERATION INCLUDED ONE ARVN KIA AND SIX WOUNDED; THE ENEMY HAD FOUR KIA AND FIVE CAPTURED. ARVN FORCES CAPTURED ONE SUB-MACHINEGUN AND ONE PISTOL, AND CONFISCATED 100,000 PIASTERS.

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

2. INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED AT 1400 HOURS 11 FEBRUARY 1968 FROM TRAVELLERS WHO CAME TO SAIGON FROM BINH DUONG PROVINCE ON 11 FEBRUARY THAT TWO VIET CONG UNITS, DESCRIBED AS "DIVISIONS", ARE MOVING TOWARD SAIGON TO ATTACK THE CITY WITHIN A FEW DAYS. ONE OF THESE TWO VC "DIVISIONS" IS MOVING FROM BINH DUONG PROVINCE, NORTH OF SAIGON, AND WILL ATTACK SAIGON FROM THE DIRECTION OF XOM MOI VILLAGE, GO VAP DISTRICT IN GIA DINH PROVINCE. THE "DIVISION" COMMAND POST WILL BE LOCATED IN THE VILLA OF PACIFIST LAWYER TRIN DINH TAO AT HANH THANG TAY LOCATED ON THE ROAD FROM XOM MOI TO QUANG TRUNG. SCOUTS WHO HAVE ALREADY INFILTRATED INTO SAIGON AND THE SURROUNDING AREAS WILL REPORT TO THE COMMAND POST. THE OTHER "DIVISION" WILL ATTACK SAIGON FROM THE DIRECTION OF PHU LAM OR THU THIEK, WEST OF THE CITY. (SOURCE COMMENT: VC CADRES PASSING THROUGH BINH DUONG INDISCREETLY REVEALED THIS INFORMATION TO THE LOCAL POPULACE).

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

~~500~~  
500

~~SECRET~~  
1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

NNNN

INFORMATION

77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sunday, February 11, 1968  
12:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

This Komer backgrounder will  
interest you.

*Profile*

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 18999

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED  
E. O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
BY kg, NARA, Date 2-10-92

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1968 FEB 11 15

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PAGE 01 SAIGON 18999 111439Z

42  
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INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 03, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,  
RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, SAL 01, SAH 03, SR 01, ORM 03, AID 28,  
IGA 02, SSO 00, NSCE 00, IO 13, RSR 01, /120 W

R 111402Z FEB 68  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6420  
INFO USIA WASHDC 4624

Rostow

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IN BACKGROUND PRESS BRIEFING ELEVENTH, AMBASSADOR TOMER  
AND HIS DEPUTY, MR GEORGE FORSYTHE MADE FOLLOWING POINTS RE AFTERMATH  
VC TET OFFENSIVE:

1. SAIGON RETURNING TO NORMAL. CREDITED PRESIDENT THIEU AND VP KY,  
HEAD OF "OPERATION RECOVERY" TASK FORCE, WITH FORCEFUL ACTION TO BRING  
ABOUT RECONSTRUCTIVE, CARE FOR REFUGEES AND MAINTENANCE OF ESSENTIAL  
UTILITIES IN SAIGON, AUTONOMOUS CITIES AND PROVINCIAL CAPITALS. NOTED  
HIGHWAY 15 NMV OPEN TO SAIGON: HIGHWAY 4 OPEN TO THO: LINES OF  
COMMUNICATION IN BETTER SHAPE THAN FIRST THOUGHT TO BE.

~~PAGE 2 RUMJIR 18999 C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

2. FIRST ESTIMATES HOUSES DESTROYED, DAMAGED THROUGHOUT SOUTHVIETNAM  
100 HIGH. WITHOUT COMPLETE REPORTS FROM HUE, TOTAL HOUSES KNOWN TO BE  
DESTROYED PLACED AT 19,750. REFUGEES NOW TOTAL 347,000, WITH MANY OF  
THESE BEING DESPLACED PERSONS WHO WILL RETURN TO HOMES WHEN VILLAGES

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 18999 111439Z

SECURED.

3. NO COMPLETE CASUALTY FIGURES FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT TEAMS BUT APPARENTLY LIGHT, ATTRIBUTING THIS TO GENERAL VC TET OFFENSIVE AIMED AT CITIES RATHER THAN SECURE HAMLETS. ENEMY THIS TIME APPEARED TO TRY TO GAIN FIRM HOLD ON CITIES DEPARTING FROM PREVIOUS HIT AND RUN TACTICS. NOTED ENEMY PRISONERS SAID THEY HAD NO RPT NO ORDERS TO WITHDRAW, TOLD THEY WOULD BE REINFORCED. VC COUNTED ON GENERAL UPRISING AGAINST GVN, AMERICANS TO SUPPORT OFFENSIVE BUT THIS FAILED COMPLETELY.

4. PERFORMANCE OF GVN RECOVERY EFFORTS COMMENDED: GVN HAS RISEN TO CRISIS AND PERFORMANCE SINCE FEB. 2 HAS BEEN MUCH MORE RAPID, MORE DYNAMIC. MINISTRIES FOR REFUGEES, HEALTH ESPECIALLY CITED FOR PROMPT ACTION. KY TASK FORCE MEETS EVERY MORNING TO PLAN NEW RECOVERY OPERATIONS, FOLLOW UP ON OPERATIONS ALREADY UNDERWAY. TASK FORCE

~~PAGE 3 RUMJIR 18999 C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~  
HAS DEVELOPED SENSIBLE PLANS TO DIVIDE SAIGON INTO LESS RESTRICTED "BLUE" AREAS AND MORE RESTRICTED "RED" ZONES SO THAT NORMAL CITY FUNCTIONS CAN BE RESTORED BY STAGES.

5. PACIFICATION PROSPECTS? UNDOUBTEDLY SOME SHORT TERM SETBACK. HOW BAD ENEMY HAS BEEN HURT AND HOW MUCH SECURITY HAS DETERIORATED IN THE COUNTRYSIDE MUST FIRST BE DETERMINED BEFORE ADEQUATE ASSESSMENT CAN BE MADE. APPEARS ENEMY HAS USED UP MUCH OF HIS STRENGTH, WHICH CHANGES "THE NAME OF THE GAME" FROM ONE OF ATTRITION TO LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVES SUCH AS THAT WHICH APPEARS TO BE SHAPING UP AT KHE SANH IN I CORPS.

6. WILL NEED FOR GREATER SECURITY AROUND CITIES REDUCE PACIFICATION SECURITY FORCES FOR COUNTRYSIDE? NO DOUBT MORE SECURITY IN OFFING FOR CITIES, BUT WHETHER THIS WILL WEAKEN SECURITY IN CONTRYSIDE IS AN IMPONDERABLE AT THIS TIME UNTIL ASSESSMENT MADE HOW HARD ENEMY HIT TOO.

7. GVN, ALLIED FORCES ON ALERT FOR POSSIBLE SECOND VC WAVE, BUT THIS

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PAGE 03 SAIGON 18999 111439Z

SIGNIFICANTLY DID NOT RPT NOT MATERIALIZE AS MANY VIETNAMESE EXPECTED ~  
LAST NIGHT (11TH NIGHT OF THE LUNAR MONTH.) IN SAIGON-CHOLON, VC STARTED  
~~NO~~

PAGE 4 ~~RUMJIR 18999 C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
FIRES TO COVER ESCAPE : THREE VC PRISONERS TOLD OF MISSION TO FIRE ON  
AIRCRAFT HOPING TO DRAW ALLIED FIRED AND BOMBS ON CITY. ALSO STRONG  
POSSIBILITY EXISTS VC HAVE TAKEN REFUGE IN REFUGEE CAMPS WHERE THEY  
HARD  
TO DETECT BUT GVN IS ALERT TO THIS AND IS CAREFULLY REGISTERING AND  
IDENTIFYING  
ALL REFUGEES. BUNKER

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INFORMATION

78

Sunday, February 11, 1968  
12:50 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith some surface reflection of what U Thant, the Indians, the North Vietnamese, and Moscow may be cooking up for us.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

78a

*Ristor*

FBIS 32 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

U THANT PEACE EFFORTS

BOMBAY PII IN ENGLISH 1510 GMT 11 FEB 68 B

(TEXT) NEW DELHI--UN SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT, NOW IN MOSCOW, IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE AWAITING THERE A REPLY FROM HANOI TO HIS SO UNDINGS TO NORTH VIETNAM MADE THROUGH ITS CONSUL GENERAL IN NEW DELHI, WHOM HE MET LAST THURSDAY. IT IS NOW KNOWN THAT U THANT'S TALKS WITH NGUYEN HOA WERE WIDE RANGING AND EXHAUSTIVE, LASTING ABOUT 90 MINUTES.

U THANT APPEARS TO BE CONVINCED THAT NORTH VIETNAM'S ATTITUDE TO HIS PEACE EFFORTS IS REASONABLE AND POSITIVE AND THAT IF THE UNITED STATES STOPS BOMBING UNCONDITIONALLY, TALKS ARE LIKELY TO START WITHIN 10 DAYS OR TWO WEEKS.

THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE MORE WORRIED ABOUT THE U.S. RESPONSE, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF THE MILITARY REVERSE THE UNITED STATES HAS CURRENTLY SUFFERED IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

U THANT'S DOUBTS ABOUT THE U.S. RESPONSE PRESUMABLY ARISE FROM THE REALIZATION THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON, WHO LATER THIS YEAR HAS TO FIGHT FOR HIS ELECTION TO ANOTHER TERM OF OFFICE, IS UNLIKELY TO SET ASIDE THE "PRESSURE FROM THE HAWKS" AT HOME AND MAKE A MOVE FOR CESSATION OF BOMBING IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT MR JOHNSON WOULD ALSO LIKE TO BRING ABOUT PEACE IN VIETNAM BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT THERE IS NOW A REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF THE VIETNAM SITUATION BY THE AMERICANS. IF THESE INDICATIONS PROVE REAL, DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES SEE A RAY OF HOPE FOR U THANT'S PEACE EFFORT COMING TO FRUITION. IF THE U.S. REACTION TURNS OUT TO BE MORE ESCALATION, THEN THE RESISTANCE FROM THE OTHER SIDE MAY ALSO ESCALATE.

DIPLOMATIC CIRCLES IN THE CAPITAL FEEL THAT THE LATEST STATEMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM FOREIGN MINISTER NGUYEN DUY TRINH THAT HANOI IS PREPARED TO OPEN TALKS IS A "STEP FORWARD." THE APPROPRIATE TIME AT WHICH TALKS CAN OPEN WILL, IT IS BELIEVED, BE DETERMINED BY THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CESSATION OF BOMBING.

PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE INDICATED TO U THANT DURING HIS TALKS WITH HER THAT INDIA IS ENTIRELY IN AGREEMENT WITH THE APPROACH OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT INDIA, WHICH IS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION FOR VIETNAM, IS IN TOUCH THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS WITH WARSAW, CANADA, LONDON, PARIS, MOSCOW, AND WASHINGTON ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN VIETNAM.

11 FEB 1627Z AM/TN

79

INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

*Pres file*

Sunday, February 11, 1968  
11:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Wheeler's supplementary report from Westy, including the possibility of their using ground-to-ground missiles on their tanks.

They have a 400 lb. warhead.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

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Authority JCS ltr 10-2-78  
By rgl/jd, NARA, Date 2-10-92



~~TOP SECRET~~

79a

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3001-68  
11 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in Vietnam

You have received General Westmoreland's seventh report on the situation in the Khe Sanh area for the period through 11:00 PM EST, 10 February 1968. I talked to General Westmoreland at 8:15 AM EST this morning and obtained the information on the situation in Vietnam which is contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

As General Westmoreland's report indicated, Khe Sanh airfield was shelled yesterday. A C-130 aircraft was hit by fragments of a mortar shell upon landing, damaging its hydraulic system; they may be able to repair this aircraft tomorrow. General Westmoreland plans to use C-123 and Caribou aircraft in resupplying Khe Sanh and, to meet this need, has had General Momyer convert for airlift use some C-123s used in the defoliation effort.

Sniper fire continued in Hue. The first of the three Vietnamese Marine Battalions to reinforce in Hue arrived there yesterday; in addition, elements of a US Marine Battalion were moved in. There was heavy fighting south of Danang, resulting in 195 enemy killed. There was light contact on the outskirts of Dalat.

The attack on Tan Son Nhut did materialize as General Westmoreland expected, resulting in 196 enemy killed and 170 or so weapons captured.

In the IV Corps area there was light contact in several towns.

A rallier (defector) taken at Khe Sanh gave information on the following order of enemy attack: (1) Lang Vei; (2) Con Thien; (3) Khe Sanh. He stated also that he had seen near Thanh Hoa several weeks

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Authority JCS ltr 10-3-78

By iply, NARA, Date 2-10-92

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1 of 1 copies

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ago about 20 missiles mounted on PT-76 Amphibious Tank chassis (the PT-76 was used at Lang Vei). General Westmoreland indicated these could be FROG missiles (see attachment) and that this could be the "big surprise" which the Soviet correspondent in Hanoi wrote about recently. Other possibilities for the "big surprise", in General Westmoreland's view, could be the use of SA-2 missiles near the DMZ, air strikes in the DMZ area by IL-28s, and MIG attacks against B-52s. General Westmoreland and his commanders are alert to all of these possibilities and taking appropriate measures.

In addition, General Westmoreland provided me the following assessment of South Korean and Australian troops in Vietnam:

"South Korean and Australian forces have aggressively and professionally fought the enemy wherever and whenever encountered. In addition to providing very capable defense of their own tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR) the presence of these allies has provided us the flexibility for redeployment of our own more mobile forces to contend with other threat areas. It is also significant that Highway 1 has remained open through the length of the Korean TAOR during the current situation. The fact that the more dramatic events of well coordinated enemy attacks have bypassed Korean and Australian areas is attributable to an extent to the emphasis of enemy strategy."



EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff



Attachments

FROG Missile

PT-76 Amphibious Tank


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796



5-53

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**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-204**  
 By CG, NARA Date 3-2-97



### FREE ROCKET OVER GROUND (FROG-6)

The first sighting of the FROG-6 was with Soviet troops in East Germany on 17 February 1965. FROG-6 is the first Soviet departure from track-mounted, single-launch rocket systems. Although similar in appearance to the FROG-3, the rocket and launcher of FROG-6 are about one-half the size of those of FROG-3 and are mounted on the 2½-ton ZIL-157 truck. The small FROG-6 warhead section, which also resembles the larger FROG-3 warhead section, appears to be designed to carry a nuclear payload to approximately 85 per cent of the range of FROG-3. A training version of FROG-6 is currently employed with the East German Army. The possibility exists that all of the FROG-6 launchers sighted to date have been training systems and that the FROG-6 system is, in fact, a training device.

The rocket is fin- and spin-stabilized. The probable role of the FROG-6 launcher system, if, in fact, it is a valid system, is to provide short range, close nuclear fire support at divisional level.

The characteristics listed below are preliminary and are obtained from photographic scaling.

#### CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE

Vehicle:	ZIL-157 truck	
Weight, complete system (less crew)	8.7 short tons	7.9 mt
Speed	40 mph	64.3 km/h
Cruising range	400 miles	643 km
Launcher:		
Elevation	0° to +60°	
Firing quadrant limits	+8° to +50°	
Traverse	5° left; 5° right	
Rocket:		
Length	21.4 ft	6.5 m
Weight	1,940 lb	880 kg
Range - maximum (Nuc)(HE)	18.0 nm	31,000 m
- minimum (Nuc)(HE)	5.8 nm	10,000 m
Warhead		
Weight (Nuc)(HE)	400 lb	181.6 kg
Maximum diameter	21.04 in	535 mm
Accuracy (CEP)(at 2/3 max range)	438 yd	400 m
Propellant	Solid	
Reaction time	15-30 minutes from arrival at presurveyed site.	

5-54

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
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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-204

By C6, NARA Date 3-2-97

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T-34/85 MEDIUM TANK

The T-34 medium tank was the principal Soviet combat vehicle in World War II. The original version (T-34/76) mounted a short-barreled 76-mm gun, giving way later to a longer barreled version. In 1944, an 85-mm weapon was mounted in an improved turret. Although outmoded and to a large extent replaced by more modern tanks, the T-34/85 is still found in some Soviet units as well as in other Communist armies. In addition, it has also been supplied to many non-Communist forces.

From a technical standpoint, the T-34 remains an interesting example of excellent tank design, featuring low silhouette, sloped armor, a cast turret, relatively heavy main armament, and good over-all cross-country performance. It employs a flat track suspension system with large individually suspended road wheels which serve as a principal recognition feature.

## CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE

Vehicle:		
Weight	35.2 short tons	32 mt
Length over-all (w/gun)	26.5 ft	8.08 m
Width	9.8 ft	3 m
Height	7.9 ft	2.4 m
Engine	493-hp @ 1,800 rpm, V-12 Diesel	
Crew	5	
Speed	35 mph	56 km/h
Cruising range	190 miles (on main fuel tanks)	306 km
Maximum gradeability	35°	
Trench crossing ability	7.5 ft	2.29 m
Vertical obstacle ability	2.3 ft	0.7 m
Fording depth	4.2 ft (12-15 ft w/snorkel)	1.28 m
Infrared	No (can be added)	
Maximum armor (hull)	1.8 in (46 mm) @ 60°	
(turret)	3.25 in (83 mm) @ 20°	
Armament:		
Main	85-mm Tank Gun M1944 (ZIS-S53)	
Muzzle velocity (AP-T)	2,670 fps	815 m/s
(HVAP-T)	3,380 fps	1,030 m/s
Armor penetration	550 yd (500 m)	1,100 yd (1,000 m)
0° obliquity (AP-T) (BR-365K)	4.4 in (111 mm)	4.0 in (102 mm)
(HVAP-T)(BR-365P)	5.6 in (143 mm)	4.1 in (103 mm)
Secondary armament	Two 7.62-mm DTM machineguns (one coaxial and one front hull mounted)	

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
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-204

By cb, NARA Date 3-2-97

2-37

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### PT-76 AMPHIBIOUS TANK

The PT-76, introduced in 1952, is the standard tactical reconnaissance tank of the Soviet and some Eastern European Communist armies. It has been supplied to Cuba and has also appeared in Laos. The chassis has proven to be rather versatile, being used for the BTR-50P armored personnel carrier and, in a non-amphibious mode, for the FROG-2, 3, 4, and 5 rocket launchers. Propulsion in the water is achieved by a hydrojet system with intake ports on both sides of the hull bottom and exhaust ports in the rear.

The PT-76 pictured above has the 76-mm gun D-56TM which was installed in the PT-76 after 1957. Earlier PT-76 tanks mount the 76-mm gun D-56T with a multibaffle muzzle brake. Performance figures for the two guns are the same.

Although classified by the Soviets as a tank, the PT-76 is very lightly armored (only 0.63 inch maximum) and mounts only a moderately effective 76-mm weapon which makes it undergunned by present standards. Essentially, the tank is a member of the Soviet light armored vehicle family, which includes armored personnel carriers (BTR-40, BTR-152), amphibious armored personnel carriers (BTR-50P, BTR-60P), and an amphibious armored reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM).

#### CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE

Vehicle:		
Weight	15.4 short tons	14 mt
Length over-all (w/gun)	25.0 ft	7.6 m
Width	10.29 ft	3.14 m
Height <sup>1/</sup>	7.4 ft	2.2 m
Engine	237-hp @ 1,800 rpm, in-line 6 Diesel	
Crew	3	
Speed (land)	27.3 mph	44 km/h
(water)	6.3 mph	10.1 km/h
Cruising range	149 miles (on main fuel tanks)	239.7 km
Maximum gradeability	38°	
Trench crossing ability	9.2 ft	2.8 m
Vertical obstacle ability	3.6 ft	1.09 m
Fording depth	Amphibious	
Infrared	Yes (on some models)	
Maximum armor (hull)	0.56 in (14 mm) @ 45°	
(turret)	0.63 in (16 mm) @ 33°	
Armament:		
Main	76-mm Tank Gun D-56T or (after 1957) D-56TM	
Muzzle velocity (AP-T)(BR-350B)	2,172 fps	663 m/s
(HVAP-T)(BR-354P)	3,167 fps	965 m/s
(HEAT)(BP-354)	1,065 fps	325 m/s
Armor penetration	550 yd (500 m)	1,100 yd (1,000 m)
0° obliquity (AP-T)(BR-350B)	2.7 in (69 mm)	2.40 in (61 mm)
(HVAP-T)(BR-354P)	3.6 in (92 mm)	2.3 in (58 mm)
(HEAT)(BP-354)	4.7 in (120 mm)	4.7 in (120 mm)
Secondary armament	One 7.62-mm SGM machinegun (coaxial)	

<sup>1/</sup> For PT-76 constructed after 1957.

4:20 p.m., 2.11.68.

Mr. President  
Herewith  
the CIA  
order of battle  
estimate.

~~SECRET~~

80

11 February 1968

W.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Increase in Enemy Forces in Vietnam Since December

1. A review of COMUSMACV's order of battle figures for the period December-January reflects no significant change in the confirmed strength of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Main Force and Local Force combat units. There have been changes in the listing of non-combat elements (combat support and administrative support, etc.) of a bookkeeping character which do not really reflect changes in the enemy's combat potential.

2. In early December, COMUSMACV listed the enemy strengths as follows:

	<u>Combat</u>	<u>Support Personnel</u>	<u>Total</u>
Main and Local Force	109,860	25,653	134,513
Paramilitary	<u>112,760*</u>	<u>39,165**</u>	<u>151,925</u>
Total	222,620	64,818	286,438

\*Included Self-Defense Militia

\*\*Political cadre

3. As of January, COMUSMACV shifted to the new basis, dropping the Self-Defense Militia and the Political cadre from the accounting, establishing new categories for support personnel, and significantly increasing the strength of the latter. The 22 January figures reported by COMUSMACV are as follows:

	<u>Combat</u>	<u>Combat Support</u>	<u>Admin Support</u>	<u>Total</u>
Main and Local Force	110,286	14,155	38,000	162,441
Guerrillas	<u>73,500</u>	<u>-----</u>	<u>-----</u>	<u>73,500</u>
Total	183,786	14,155	38,000	235,941

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Authority NLS/CBS 1

By is, NARS, Date 5-7-84

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4. A comparison of the two tables reflects an increase of 28,828 in total Main Force and Local Force strength in January over December. This increase results, as indicated above, from changes in accounting techniques for support elements -- it does not represent an increase in combat strength.

5. COMUSMACV has not yet, to our knowledge, added to his confirmed order of battle holdings for combat forces those North Vietnamese Army units known to have infiltrated into South Vietnam since November. These include the 304th and 320th Divisions, which have moved into the area south of the DMZ, and the 31st Regiment of the 341st Division, which has moved down into Quang Nam province from its former location north of the DMZ. These units represent from 22,000 to 27,000 troops which should be considered as additional to the 110,286 Main Force and Local Force elements listed in paragraph 3 above.

6. Because of numerous indications of significant increases in the strength of enemy combat units throughout the country just prior to and since the beginning of the Tet offensive, we believe it would be premature to attempt any recomputation of enemy combat strength on the basis of the casualties reported since 29 January. These indications suggest a widespread recruiting campaign to bring all units up to full strength (significantly above MACV's "confirmed" figure) just before the offensive, and the creation and arming of substantial numbers of guerrillas in populated areas into which the enemy has moved since the offensive began. Thus, while the enemy KIA figures reported from Saigon almost certainly have resulted in a qualitative decrease in the enemy's combat potential, we are not confident that there has been a significant quantitative decrease.

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 10, 1968  
6:45 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith George Carver's  
perceptive analysis of the situation  
in Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By aj, NARA, Date 2-10-92

~~SECRET~~

8/a

10 February 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Current VC Campaign

Recent enemy activity must be reviewed within the framework of the overall aims of his winter-spring campaign -- to break the will of U.S. to continue the war, and to create conditions favorable for a settlement on Communist terms. In this context, the winter phase of the campaign (October - January) was intended to set the stage for a "decisive" period of the war during the spring phase. The winter phase was characterized by major operations in outlying areas (Dak To, DMZ, Loc Ninh) to draw out and engage U.S. mobile forces, coupled with attacks on US-GVN bases and administrative centers and intensive guerrilla pressure against the pacification program to tie down allied forces. It also included preparation for a major (conventional) warfare campaign of potentially climactic character in the Khe Sanh and general DMZ area. These activities were accompanied by political and subversive actions preparatory to a "general uprising" in urban areas.

The Tet offensive represents the beginning of the spring phase -- which our adversaries have described as the decisive phase of the war. There is abundant evidence to demonstrate that this phase aims at a "general offensive" combined with a "general uprising." The VC hope that this offensive will inflict major defeats on U.S. forces, disintegrate the Vietnamese forces, and collapse the GVN. The Communists evidently believe that major successes along these lines will create irresistible international and domestic pressures on the U.S. to open negotiations on Communist terms.

The evidence available suggests that the Communists hoped to accomplish a great deal more than they did in their initial assaults on the cities. They had made arrangements to seize control of the radio stations, seize key officials, destroy the local GVN apparatus, and organize and manipulate the populace. This they failed to accomplish except in portions of a handful of cities. This failure, coupled with the heavy losses they have suffered, must be regarded as a setback to their campaign.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD/NA 11/22/78

By ip/hg, NARA, Date 2-12-92

~~SECRET~~

On the other hand, other reports, the basic documents pertaining to the winter-spring campaign, and analysis of the pattern of recent operations, suggest that the Tet offensive may have been only the spectacular initial onslaught of a sustained offensive, with a successful uprising as an ultimate, rather than the immediate goal.

Although they probably are disappointed to some extent with the results, they probably also believe that they have created conditions favorable for the attainment of the basic objectives of their winter-spring campaign. They have dealt a severe psychological blow to the urban population -- much of which had sought sanctuary in the cities from the terrors of the war in the provinces. Although it is true that the urban populace did not rise against the GVN, it did not depart from its normally passive, neutral stances. The Communist attacks have resulted in widespread devastation and imposed substantial new economic and social burdens on an already overtaxed GVN administration. They have also inflicted significant damage on US and ARVN military installations and materiel, and tied allied military forces down to an effort to restore security to urban areas, to some degree at the expense of protecting pacified areas. These limited accomplishments may satisfy the minimum objectives of the Tet offensive and encourage the Communists to pursue their basic strategy.

There are numerous indications that the Communists intend to continue their pressure in many areas, probably in concert with major operations in the Khe Sanh - DMZ region. In that sector, North Vietnamese units comprising two divisions are probing outposts of the Khe Sanh base camp while extending their entrenchments in siege-like fashion. Another two divisions remain capable of attacking U.S. positions in the central and eastern DMZ area.

In the coastal plain, strong Communist forces -- two or three regiments -- remain in the districts surrounding Quang Tri city, and U.S. officials expect further attacks there. Another regiment or two are in the vicinity of Hue, and may attempt to reinforce those units still contesting allied control for that city. In Quang Nam province, the North Vietnamese 2d Division, reinforced by the 31st Regiment of the 341st Division and possibly the 4th Regiment, has moved into the area between Hoi An and Danang, and may attempt strong attacks against either or both of these cities. Strong Communist forces reportedly remain close to the cities of Tam Ky and Quang Ngai.

In II Corps, all three regiments of the North Vietnamese 1st Division are now located near Dak To, and major action appears imminent. Reports from Darlac province indicate that the North Vietnamese 33d Regiment is

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~~SECRET~~

being reinforced from Pleiku and that new attacks are expected. In the central coastal provinces, Qui Nhon and Nha Trang anticipate mortar attacks, but no major ground assaults. Two or three battalions are reported west of Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen province, however, and new attacks are expected.

In III Corps, the 7th Division apparently remains in northern Binh Duong province with the mission of maintaining pressure on bases of the U.S. 1st and 25th Divisions. The status of the 9th Division is not clear; major elements have been reported in action in the area north of Saigon, but there are indications that others are located further north in Binh Long province. The 5th Division, which attacked Bien Hoa, has disengaged and may have withdrawn temporarily to regroup.

In IV Corps, Viet Cong concentrations continue to be reported in the immediate vicinity of several province capitals, maintaining limited pressure through sporadic mortar attacks.

Numerous reports from various parts of South Vietnam indicate that many of the threats enumerated above will result in new attacks in the period between 9 and 15 February; the most frequently mentioned date is the 10th. These actions would be intended to further disrupt allied control in the cities, to demonstrate the ability for repeated attacks, to further intimidate the populace, and thus contribute to the ultimate goal of a general uprising.

One ominous aspect of the current posture of the enemy military forces is their apparent implantation in the immediate vicinities of the district towns and province capitals. This pattern, reported in many parts of the country, suggests that the Communists have moved into and reasserted authority over the rural populace in formerly pacified areas. The current flow of refugees into district and provincial capitals would seem to be further evidence of this; the refugees could be fleeing their homes for fear of allied air attacks on the Communist forces occupying their hamlets.

Several documents have suggested that the winter-spring campaign entailed the creation of new guerrilla forces. A number of recent reports indicate that the Viet Cong are organizing and arming new guerrilla elements, both in the cities and in adjacent hamlets. Since Communist plans for the general uprising must have provided for arming additional guerrilla and militia elements, these reports are plausible. Some reports have suggested that these newly organized guerrillas will be used in renewed attacks on the cities. The fragmentary nature of available information precludes a firm estimate of the numbers that may be involved, but it is

~~SECRET~~

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conceivable that they may be sufficient to offset, at least in part, the heavy losses incurred by the Viet Cong in their recent attacks. While the quality of such elements would be low, they could be used as replacements for the depleted main and local force units.

There is also a disturbing lack of information on the status of RVNAF soldiers who were home on leave during Tet, and hence possibly trapped in hamlets now occupied by the Viet Cong. We also have received little information on the status of RF and PF outposts in the areas engulfed by the Viet Cong. These isolated elements would seem to be vulnerable to Communist propaganda claims of urban successes, and hence another source of potential manpower for depleted Viet Cong units.

There are indications that the intensified offensive in South Vietnam may be coupled with some form of air action by the North Vietnamese Air Force, by ground attacks in Laos, and possibly by terrorist attacks on U.S. bases in Thailand. Recent unusual flight activity by North Vietnamese MIG-21's and IL-14's and the movement of IL-28's from China back into the Hanoi area could be indicative of preparations for some new form of hostile air action. Reports from Laos indicate impending Communist attacks against government installations in the North (e.g. Site 85) and South (e.g. Saravane). Some reports say Saravane is to be attacked on the 10th or 12th -- a timeframe coinciding with the indicated new wave of attacks in South Vietnam. Reports from Thailand reflect rumors of impending terrorist action against U.S. air bases. While the Communists have not previously reflected the interest in, or the capability for such far-flung coordinated actions, an attempt in this direction would not be inconsistent with the general concept of distracting attention from the main theater of operations and exercising all available capabilities in order to decisively alter the situation in the Communists' favor.

The Communists, in the weeks ahead, thus seem likely to confront the U.S. and the GVN with the most serious political-military challenge since the introduction of our combat forces in 1965. We cannot be certain how the initial phase of the spring offensive has affected Communist plans and capabilities. The evidence, however, strongly suggests there will be renewed and repeated attacks on some urban areas and nearby military installations, and a major campaign against Khe Sanh and along the DMZ. If this effort materializes, it will indicate the Communists remain committed to pressing an "all out" endeavor to bring the war to an early and favorable conclusion.

-4-

~~SECRET~~

## INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Saturday, February 10, 1968  
6:40 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith the third reference  
to a cease-fire.

Be clear: I don't think this  
is good; it is simply how the busy  
minds of Hanoi are working.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-186  
By is, NARA, Date 5-24-05

83

**ACTION**

~~SECRET~~

**Saturday, February 10, 1968  
6:30 p. m.**

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By spldch NARA, Date 11/6/92

**Mr. President:**

**To make the Jordan arms  
package legal, your signature is  
required at the indicated place.**

**W. W. Rostow**

~~SECRET~~

**WWRostow:rlh**

INFORMATION

84

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 10, 1968  
6:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Westy is laying for this expected  
attack on Tan Son Nhut air base  
(marked passage).

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-206  
By CB, NARA Date 11-3-97

WWRostow:rla

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**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-200**  
**By us, NARA Date 7-10-98**

~~SECRET~~

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~  
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM  
DOI 10 FEBRUARY 1968  
SUBJECT SITUATION REPORT AS OF 24 HOURS  
LOCAL TIME, 10 FEBRUARY 1968

*Posters*

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (10 FEBRUARY 1968)  
SOURCE THIS IS A VIETNAM SITUATION REPORT PREPARED  
AT 2400 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 10 FEBRUARY 1968

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

1. AT THE TIME OF THIS REPORT, SAIGON REMAINS RELATIVELY QUIET EXCEPT FOR REPORTS OF A SMALL VC FORCE IN PRECINCT FIVE AND ONE IN THE SIXTH PRECINCT. A NUMBER OF REPORTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED OF ACTIVITY BY VC UNITS OF VARIOUS SIZES RANGING UP TO BATTALION IN THE GO VAP DISTRICT OF GIA DINH PROVINCE ON THE NORTHERN PERIMETER OF SAIGON. A STATE OF ALERTNESS IN SAIGON IS BEING MAINTAINED IN VIEW OF NUMEROUS UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT THE VC MAY LAUNCH ANOTHER ATTACK. REPORTS ON THE TIMING OF THIS NEW ATTACK VARY FROM TONIGHT TO THE FIFTEENTH OF FEBRUARY.

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

2. A REPORT RECEIVED AT 2320 HOURS ESTIMATES VC STRENGTH ASSEMBLED FOR THE TET OFFENSIVE AGAINST SAIGON TO BE FOUR REGIMENTS OF 18 BATTALIONS. ONLY ONE REGIMENT HAS BEEN EMPLOYED DURING THE INITIAL ATTACK, WITH THE REMAINING FOURTEEN BATTALIONS BEING DEPLOYED INTO SMALL SIZE GROUPS SCATTERED IN SUBURBAN AREAS OF THE CITY SUCH AS PHU LAM AND BINH THOI. THE LARGEST CONCENTRATION IS BELIEVED TO BE IN THANH LOC THON VILLAGE OF GO VAP DISTRICT IN GIA DINH PROVINCE. THESE UNITS ARE REPORTED TO BE AWAITING ORDERS TO LAUNCH PHASE TWO OF THE ATTACK ON SAIGON, PROBABLY 11 FEBRUARY.

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

3. AT 2230 HOURS IT WAS REPORTED THAT FIVE BATTALIONS OF VC WERE GOING THROUGH AN PHU DONG IN GO VAP DISTRICT OF GIA DINH PROVINCE, WITH THE POSSIBLE MISSION OF ATTACKING TAN SON NHUT AIRBASE

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

~~SECRET~~  
500

Saturday, February 10, 1968 -- 6:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Yesterday, February 9, and today, February 10, I met with John Scall, ABC News; Robert Spivack, The Spivack Report; Charles Bartlett, News Focus; Joseph Fromm and Jack Sutherland, U. S. News and World Report.

I took them all through the documents on Vietnam: prisoner of war reports; cooperation and revival in the Delta; casualties; reorganization of the Vietnamese government; etc. I took my usual line: we are in the middle of an important battle; the first stage has not gone badly for our side; the battle is not yet over and its outcome would depend on the scale of further attacks on the cities and how they are handled; the continued vitality of the Vietnamese government; the outcome of Khe Sanh and other frontier battles; and the steadiness of U. S. public opinion.

W. W. Rostow

March 29, 2004

Processing Note

A sanitized copy of document #86 has been misnumbered and misfiled as document #87 since April 1998. Document #86 is the February 10, 1968 memo that begins, "This is an odd way for you to receive reports on U.S. public opinion—but interesting."

Document #87, is the February 10, 1968 memo that begins "Sec. Rusk wants you to see...." It has been declassified in full. On this date, document #87 was placed in the open file, and the redacted version of document #86 was renumbered and filed in the correct place.

Shannon Jarrett  
Archivist

INFORMATION

86

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Saturday, February 10, 1968  
5:45 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This is an odd way for you to  
receive reports on U. S. public  
opinion -- but interesting.

[REDACTED]

3.3  
(b)(1)

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

WWRostow:rla

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 03-186  
By na, NARA, Date 5-24-05

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

~~TOP SECRET COMINT~~

Saturday, February 10, 1968  
5:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk wishes you to see his review of 303 approval of the mission of an intelligence ship off Cuba; and why he approved it.

W. W. Rostow

P. S. Air and naval protection for this mission is on alert.

~~TOP SECRET COMINT~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 02-225 (#16)  
By Sj, NARA, Date 3-29-04

WWRostow:rla

INFORMATION

88

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Saturday, February 10, 1968  
8:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Just after reading the Norwegian piece, here in the middle of an I Corps report emerges the notion for a "cease-fire to establish a coalition government."

W. W. Rostow

[Redacted]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-199  
By us, NARA Date 8-19-98

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1968 FEB 10 19 45

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DIRNSA COMMAND CENTER  
STATE (RCI)  
CIA-OCI  
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**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-200**  
**By us, NARA Date 7-10-98**

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]  
REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~  
COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM  
SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT IN I CORPS AS OF 2400 HOURS ON  
10 FEBRUARY

*Review*

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

ACQ: VIETNAM, DANANG (10 FEBRUARY 1968) [REDACTED]  
SOURCE: THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT ON 10 FEBRUARY PREPARED BY  
CAS, [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

1. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE CHANGE IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE DURING THE PAST 12 HOURS. QUANG TRI CITY REMAINS SECURE. ONE SWEEP OPERATION WAS RUN WITHOUT CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY, WHO CONTINUES TO EXERT PRESSURE ON LINES OF COMMUNICATION, HIGHWAY NO. 9, AND THE CUA VIET RIVER TOURE.

2. DANANG CITY HAS REMAINED QUIET DURING THE DAY. VC JUNIOR CAPTAIN PHAM DUY DAI WHO WAS ARRESTED ON 7 FEBRUARY BY DANANG POLICE DURING A RAID CONDUCTED BY DANANG SPECIAL SECTOR, SAID IN HIS PRELIMINARY INTERROGATION (CONDUCTED BY ARVN) THAT THE VC HAD TWO DIFFERENT TACTICS TO USE IN THEIR PLANS FOR WRESTING POLITICAL POWER FROM THE GVN.

A. THE VC ARE TO USE MAIN AND LOCAL FORCES TO GAIN POLITICAL POWER IN CITIES WHERE THERE ARE FEW OR NO AMERICAN TROOPS, LIKE HUE CITY. AFTER TAKING COMMAND OF THE CITY THE VC WOULD TRY TO KILL ALL DANGEROUS ELEMENTS IN THE CITY ARVN OFFICERS, VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS, VIETNAMESE WHO WORKED WITH AMERICAN AGENCIES, AND ALL ELEMENTS WHO OPPOSE THE VC.

B. IN CITIES WHERE THERE ARE AMERICAN TROOPS IN FORCE, FOR EXAMPLE, DANANG, THE VC TACTIC IS TO HARASS THE ENVIRONS OF THE CITY. AT THE SAME TIME THEY WILL SEND MANY SAPPERS INTO THE CITY. THE SAPPERS ARE TO GUIDE THE LOCAL PEOPLE IN SURPRISE ATTACKS ON AMMUNITION AND WEAPONS DEPOTS AND THEN ISSUE THE CAPTURED WEAPONS

TO LOCAL PEOPLE. AFTER THIS, THE VC WILL ATTEMPT TO GAIN POLITICAL POWER IN THE CITY. (VC JUNIOR CAPTAIN PHAM DUY DAI WAS FORMERLY CHIEF OF STAFF, 402ND SAPPER BATTALION (1-9) OF DANANG, THEN AN INSTRUCTOR AT THE VC MR-5 SAPPER TRAINING SCHOOL. IN OCTOBER 1967 HE WAS ASSIGNED AS MILITARY CADRE AND CONCURRENTLY SAPPER CHIEF OF THE QUANG DA (GVN QUANG NAM AND DANANG CITY) HEADQUARTERS. ON 29 JANUARY DAI INFILTRATED INTO DANANG CITY TO LEAD THE MOVEMENT OF THE "REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY POPULAR FORCES.")

3. HOI AN, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, PRESENTED A QUITE NORMAL APPEARANCE ON 10 FEBRUARY. MANY PEOPLE WERE MOVING ABOUT THE CITY AND THE MARKET AREA WAS IN BUSINESS, ALTHOUGH MAJOR STORES WERE STILL CLOSED. APC'S UNDER ESCORT CONVOY BEGAN TEMPORARY REPAIR OF THE ROAD BETWEEN HOI AN AND DANANG ON 10 FEBRUARY. THE CONVOY REACHED DANANG CITY WITHOUT INCIDENT, ALTHOUGH SNIPER FIRE CAN STILL BE EXPECTED TO OCCUR ON THE ROUTE.

4. REPORTS FROM QUANG TIN AND QUANG NGAI WERE NEGATIVE. CENSUS GRIEVANCE REPORTS OF 7 FEBRUARY FROM THANG BINH AND TAM KY DISTRICTS, QUANG TIN PROVINCE, STATE THAT THE VC CONTINUE TO HOLD INSTRUCTION CLASSES ON POLITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS. VILLAGERS ARE INSTRUCTED TO ARM WITH MACHETES, SPEARS, OR KNIVES AND TO PREPARE FOOD FOR TEN DAYS FOR A STRUGGLE AT THANG BINH DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS UNDER THE SLOGANS "UNION," "FORWARD," AND "ASULT," AND A DEMAND FOR A CEASE FIRE TO ESTABLISH A COALITION GOVERNMENT. IN TAM KY DISTRICT THE VC WERE TO PREPARE A SEVEN-DAY SUPPLY OF FOOD AND HAND WEAPONS FOR AN ATTACK ON QUANG TIN PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS. A VIETNAMESE SECURITY SERVICE REPORT STATES THAT THE VC ESTABLISHED A HOSPITAL IN THE THANH TRUOC AREA (BT184005 - 190003 - 197000) IN PHUONG DONG VILLAGE, HAU DUC DISTRICT. THE HOSPITAL APPARENTLY WAS BUILT SOME TIME AGO AND REACTIVATED RECENTLY. AFTER THE VC ATTACK ON TAM KY CITY, THE VC TOOK 300 WOUNDED TO THE HOSPITAL FOR TREATMENT. THE HOSPITAL HAD THREE DOCTORS, AND 20 MEDICS.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV III MAF CORDS 7TH AF USARV COMNAVFORV CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF (ALSO SENT SAIGON)

~~GP-1~~  
900

SECRET  
[REDACTED]

1.5(L)  
3.4(Lb)(L)

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~--OHIO

Saturday, February 10, 1968  
5:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith still another signal from Hanoi that they are still interested in negotiations.

There is one interesting and new point which I have been waiting for; that is, the notion of a cease-fire (marked passage). They may well think that, having failed to knock off the government and the ARVN, the best thing they could do would be have a cease-fire on a what-we-have-we-hold basis.

W. W. Rostow

Oslo 3275

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-206  
By cb, NARA Date 11-3-97



Department of State

TELEGRAM

DECLASSIFIED

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~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 3220Q  
RECD: FEBRUARY 10, 1968  
7:25 A.M.

OO RUEXC  
DE RUDKSO 3275 241115Z  
ZNY SSSSS  
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FM AMEMBASSY OSLO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1486  
STATE GRUC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ OSLO 3275

NOVIS-0HIO

REF: OSLO 2930

1. BOYZ AND AMSTEENSEN CALLED ME IN MORNING FEBRUARY 10 AND PASSED ME FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ALGARD IN PEKING RECEIVED LATE FEBRUARY 9 IN OSLO:

2. QUOTE AMBASSADOR NGO WHO HAS JUST RETURNED FROM HANOI TODAY (FEBRUARY 9) CONVEYED A MESSAGE FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT ALGARD WOULD BE WELCOME HANOI WHENEVER CONVENIENT. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE VISIT SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. AMB NGO ALSO REQUESTED THAT A VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVE, PRESUMABLY AN AMBASSADOR IN EASTERN EUROPE, SHOULD VISIT NORWAY. ALGARD ASKED FOR FURTHER DETAILS CONCERNING THE CHARACTER OF THIS VISIT AND EMPHASIZED THAT NORWAY IS ONLY INTERESTED TO ASSIST IN

PAGE 2 RUDKSO 3275 ~~SECRET~~

ESTABLISHING POSSIBLE CONTACT BETWEEN THE COMBATANT PARTIES. NGO PROMISED DETAILS AND STATED THAT THE VISIT WAS NOT RPT

NOT INTENDED AS PROPAGANDA. NGO EMPHASIZED THAT LAST WEEK'S EVENTS HAD NOT RPT NOT CHANGED HANOI'S DESIRE FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT OF DEC 29, 1967 WAS STILL VALID. HE SAID THAT HANOI PRESUPPOSED (ASSUMED) THAT THE MILITARY OPERATIONS BE STOPPED WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED. CABLE SOMETIMES WHETHER IN PRINCIPLE NORTH VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVE WELCOME IN OSLO. SUGGEST I LEAVE PEKING FEBRUARY 14 FOR CONSULTATIONS OSLO. UNQUOTE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-197

~~SECRET~~

By us, NARA Date 11-26-96

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- OSLO 3275, FEBRUARY 10 (NODIS/OHIO)

3. BOYE SAID WITH RESPECT TO FOREGOING THAT IF US GOVT FEELS NORWEGIAN FOREIGN SERVICE CAN BE OF ANY HELP IN ESTABLISHING CONTACTS WITH HANOI, THEY ARE PREPARED TO DO SO BUT, OF COURSE, GON DOES NOT RPT NOT WANT TO MESS UP ANYTHING WHICH MAY BE IN PROGRESS. IF USG CONSIDERS IT DESIRABLE, GON PREPARED TO ASK ALGARD TO COME TO OSLO FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH A US REP EITHER FROM EMBASSY OR FROM WASHINGTON IN MIDDLE OF FEBRUARY. ALGARD COULD THEN BE ASKED TO PROCEED TO HANOI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ALTHOUGH GON WILL HAVE TO THINK HARD AS TO WHAT WOULD

PAGE 3 RUDKSO 3275 ~~SECRET~~  
BE APPROPRIATE COVER STORY FOR SUCH VISIT AT THIS TIME. AS REGARDS PROPOSAL FOR ARRANGING A JOURNEY TO OSLO FOR SOME NORTH VIETNAMESE REP, FURTHER INFO WILL BE PASSED ON TO USG AS SOON AS RECEIVED FROM NORWEGIAN EMBASSY PEKING AS INDICATED ALGARD'S TEL, BUT IN MEANTIME GON WOULD APPRECIATE ANY VIEWS AND COMMENTS USG MIGHT HAVE ON THIS SUBJECT. NORWEGIANS STANDING BY FOR EARLIEST POSSIBLE REPLY FROM WASHINGTON. GP-1. TIBBETTS  
BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

INFORMATION

90

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, February 10, 1968  
6:35 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Bob Kemer reports his gallant work in recovery -- and that is said without irony or humor.

You will wish to note the last paragraph.

W. W. Rostow

Salgen 18905

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *ag*, NARA, Date 2-26-92

JORDEN

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RR RUEHEX  
DE RUMJIR 18905 0411740  
ZNY CCCCC  
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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
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INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE  
RUEPJS/DOD  
RUEHLG/CIA  
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 4613  
RUHHHQ/CINCPAC  
STATE GRNC  
BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-197  
By ijp, NARA Date 11-26-96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SAIGON 18905

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

STATE PASS AID

SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT PROJECT RECOVERY -- 1800 HOURS,  
10 FEBRUARY

*Reston*  
*Note last sentence*  
*BCG*

1. SAIGON CONTINUED ITS RETURN TO NORMALCY. MASSIVE TRAFFIC JAMS DOWNTOWN BY MID-MORNING CAUSED BY LARGE NUMBER OF VEHICLES AND BLOCKED-OFF MAIN ARTERIES -- HAI BA TRUNG STREET AND ROUTE THROUGH VIETNAMESE NAVY HEADQUARTERS. KOMER VISITED CHOLON

~~PAGE 2 RUMJIR 18905 CONFIDENTIAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~  
AND PORT AREA. REPORTS RICE DISTRIBUTION GOING FULL BLAST TWELVE NEWSPAPEPS PUBLISHED TODAY VERSUS 10 YESTERDAY. TWO HUNDRED VOLUNTEERS ORGANIZED BY YOUTH DIRECTORATE TURNED OUT TO ASSIST IN PICKING UP SAIGON'S GARBAGE.

2. YESTERDAY'S DISCUSSIONS ON SAIGON REDEVELOPMENT RESULTED IN WORKING GROUP BEING PULLED TOGETHER OUT OF MPW DIRECTORATE OF RECONSTRUCTION AND URBAN PLANNING. QUE, OF MSWR, IS ALSO CONSIDERING PLANS FOR TWO MODEL, TEMPORARY REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS (ONE AT PHU THO RACETRACK AND ONE NEAR NEWPORT) TO HOLD EVACUEES UNTIL BURNED-OUT SECTIONS OF TOWN CAN BE RESTORED BY REDEVELOPERS.

3. DESPITE OFFICIAL EXPANSION OF BLUE AREAS TO ALL OF DISTRICT 4 AND PART OF 3 AS WELL AS SHORTENING CURFEW HOURS, SAIGON'S MILITARY GOVERNOR HAS NOT ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE WHICH WILL ALLOW ANNOUNCING THESE RELAXATIONS ON RADIO, TV AND IN NEWSPAPERS. WE WILL RAISE ISSUE AT TOMORROW'S COMMITTEE SESSION.

4. VICE PRESIDENT KY AND PRIME MINISTER LOC WENT TO PLEIKU TO GIVE PEP TALK TO ASSEMBLED II CTZ PROVINCE CHIEFS. DEPCORDS MATTESON REPORTS KY CHARGED THEM WITH GETTING ON URGENTLY TO MEET CIVILIAN RECOVERY NEEDS. SIMILAR VISIT TO IV CTZ ON 7 FEBRUARY GOT RESULTS. CTZ AND PROVINCE ASSISTANCE COMMITTEES

~~PAGE 3 RUMJIR 18905 C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~  
WHICH HAD SHOWN LITTLE SENSE OF URGENCY, SHIFTED INTO HIGHER GEAR ALMOST IMMEDIATELY. SAME CHANGE NEEDED IN II CTZ WHERE GENERAL VINH LOC APPARENTLY IS NOT EXERTING MUCH OVERALL LEADERSHIP. DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY HE WAS REPORTED LEADING PLATOON-SIZE FORCES IN DALAT. NOW HE IS WORRYING ABOUT ENEMY ARMOR ATTACK FROM CAMBODIAN SANCTUARY AGAINST PLEIKU.

5. VIETNAMESE AND US HEALTH OFFICIALS HAVE SOME CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE CHOLERA OUTBREAK IN CROWDED, UNSANITARY SAIGON REFUGEE CENTERS. CENTRAL COMMITTEE INSTRUCTED TASK FORCE FROM SAIGON MAYOR'S OFFICE, MSWR AND MINISTRY OF HEALTH TO WORK ON COUNTER-PROGRAM WITH USAID HELP.

6. STILL LITTLE CIVILIAN TRAFFIC ON MOST MAIN HIGHWAYS OUTSIDE OF TOWNS. LAST NIGHT'S ATTACK ON TAN AN IN LONG AN CERTAINLY DEPRESSED CIVILIAN USE OF ROUTE 4, WHICH IS STILL OPEN TO MY THO. ROUTE 1 WAS OPENED TO PHAN THIET BUT CIVILIAN TRAFFIC NOT MOVING YET. ENEMY DESTRUCTION OF BRIDGES AND CRATERING OF ROADWAY CLOSE ROUTE 11 BETWEEN PHAN RANG AND DALAT. TRAFFIC STILL NOT ALLOWED TO MOVE ON ROUTE 20.

7 SHORTAGE OF POL APPEARING IN MANY DELTA AND III CTZ PROVINCES -- E.G., TAY NINH, BIEN HOA, LONG KHANH, HAU NGHIA AND BINH DUONG

~~PAGE 4 RUMJIR 18905 C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~  
ALL REPORT REAPIDLY DWINDLING STOCKS -- BECAUSE OF ABSENCE OF RESUPPLY. EVEN THOUGH ROADS MAY BE OPEN, VIETNAMESE DRIVERS CAN'T GET TO WORK BECAUSE OF CURFEW AND CHECKPOINTS AROUND SAIGON STOP TRAFFIC IN AND OUT TH THE CITY.

8. EMERGENCY SUPPLIES SHIPPED TO VINH LONG CITY YESTERDAY. NEW 100 KW GENERATOR TO REPLACE ON DAMAGED IN ATTACK SENT TODAY. AIR AMERICA, WITH HELPFROM MILITARY AIRLIFT, IS KEEPING UP WITH EMERGENCIES.

9. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR HAS INSYRUCTED CITY MAYORS AND PROVINCE CHIEFS TO ORGANIZE CIVIL DEFENSE UNITS TO ASSIST GOVERNMENT FORCES IN MAINTAINING SECURITY AND ORDER. MANY DIFFERENT IDEAS FLOWTING. ON AMRING AND OTHER DETAILS.

10. CONDITIONS OF OUTLYING TELEPHONE AND POWER SYSTEM GRADUALLY BEING ASSESSED. PTT OFFICE AT HUE REPORTED DESTROYED. NO CIVILIAN TELEPHONE CIRCUITS OPERATING OUT OF QUI NHON AND OFFICE THERE ALSO DESTROYED. HALF THE TELEPHONE FACITILITES IN QUANG NGAI HAVE BOON KNOCKED OUT. IN CAN THO THE ELECTIRC PARTIALLY DESTROYED. IN MY THO AND QUANG NGAI CITY POWER PLANTS WERE DAMAGED BUT BOTH ARE OPERATING. EMERGENCY LIFT OF

DIESEL HAS KEPT BEN TRE PLANT GOING. NINETY PERCENT OF BAN ME THUOT'S POWER IS OUT. ALL POWER AND WATER ARE OUT IN KONTUM. AT PHAN THIET THERE IS NO WATER SERVICE, BUT REPAIRS ARE EXPECTED TO PUT SYSTEM BACK IN TOMORROW. FIFTY PERCENT OF THE POWER IS OUT.

11. LATEST FIGURES SHOW POST-TET EVACUEES NOW NUMBER ABOUT 345,000 -- 32,000 IN I CTZ, 66,000 IN II CTZ, 162,000 IN III CTZ (INCLUDING 120,000 IN SAIGON/GIA DINH), AND 85,000 IN IV CTZ. ALMOST 22,000 HOUSES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. CIVILIAN

DEAD TOTAL ABOUT 1,600 WITH ANOTHER 9,700 WOUNDED.

12. NEXT INSTALLMENT PERILS OF PAULINE AVAILABLE TOMORROW IF 9TH VC DOESNT ATTACK TONIGHT.

BUNKER  
BT

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INFORMATION

SECRET

Saturday, February 10, 1968  
6:35 p.m.

*Profile*

Mr. President:

You will wish to read this  
most interesting memorandum by  
General Taylor.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

WWRostow:rin

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ng, NARA, Date 2/10/92

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

91a

~~SECRET~~

February 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Further Reinforcements for Viet-Nam

Bob McNamara and Walt Rostow have given me the gist of the matters discussed at your meeting Friday with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have had the opportunity to study General Westmoreland's cable (091633Z) to General Wheeler. In the latter, Westy sets forth his estimate of the situation in the four corps areas, his problems there, and his need for further reinforcements from the U.S. He also gives a general indication of how he would use these reinforcements if he gets them.

With regard to the broad overall question of whether we should send additional forces to Southeast Asia at this time, my answer would be affirmative. The situation in South Viet-Nam is too precarious and the possibilities of an unpleasant surprise in Korea or elsewhere in the Far East sufficiently acute that it is an act of prudence to move additional ground forces to the area as rapidly as possible. As for numbers, I understand that the Joint Chiefs have recommended a force of some 15 battalions totalling about 45,000 men which would seem to me to be a reasonable increment at this time.

I have given some thought to the desirability of putting some strings on these forces if they are sent. They might be kept partly afloat, partly on Okinawa pending further verification of their need in South Viet-Nam. I think we should recognize that once they are on the soil of Viet-Nam they are likely to be there for keeps.

Although my initial reaction was favorable to exploring the possibility of keeping them as an offshore reserve, after reading Westy's cable I am convinced that the need for these troops is so evident that he should have them, in South Viet-Nam as soon as we can transport them there. Their use can be controlled or at least influenced by the issuance of new strategic guidance to General Westmoreland, a matter which I shall discuss below.

If we decide to send these reinforcements, then the next question is their replacement in the strategic reserve at home. I would support the argument which I understand the Chiefs have made that three reserve divisions be called to active duty and I would hope that they would be a balanced force in the sense of having the necessary supporting units to permit their prompt deployment overseas if required. I think this call-up is justified by the military requirement and that, in addition, it would have some political-psychological value in demonstrating to the world, including Hanoi, that we mean business. It would also serve as a reminder to our people at home that, while we are not technically at war, we are in a situation of similar emergency which places on our citizens duties and responsibilities analogous to those in a state of declared war.

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Authority JCSG 10-2-78

By WJH, NARA, Date 270-912

I am told that the Chiefs also want an extension of tours and a call-up of individual reservists, actions which will require Congressional approval. Unless the military need for these actions can be demonstrated to be truly overriding, I would advise against any measure requiring Congressional action.

Passing now to Westy's cable, I found much of interest in it, some of which I had not appreciated before. In particular, I was struck by the weakened condition of ARVN as he describes it and his estimate that it would take about six months to restore it to full strength. I did not find in the cable how he expects to react to the offensive in the north which may strike the Third Marine Division units across their forty-mile front from the coast to Khe Sanh, using North Vietnamese units totalling about 35,000 and supplied for 60-90 days of intensified combat (See CIA document "Construction and Logistic Activities in the Khe Sanh Area"). If the enemy uses this imposing force with full effectiveness in a battle of attrition for the widely separated Marine positions, he can seriously disrupt the plans which Westy describes in his cable.

Whether or not you decide to send further reinforcements, I would recommend consideration of conveying new strategic guidance to Westy and Admiral Sharp, setting forth in broad terms the way the campaign should be conducted during the coming months.

Such a document, I believe, should include the following points in ample detail to give a clear picture of the results which we would like to achieve in the coming campaign. My views on this matter are influenced by the short paper which I passed to you today, "Enemy Scenario of the Future?"

a. The most pressing matter at this moment is the suppression of the attacks on the cities and the restoration of order throughout the areas of South Viet-Nam under attack.

b. During this period of crisis in the cities and during the unfavorable weather along the frontier, our forces should avoid major actions under disadvantageous conditions of weather and/or terrain. Every effort should be made to avoid giving the enemy a "victory" (real or propaganda) during the winter-spring offensive which seems to have begun. We should not seek battle close to the cross-border sanctuaries of the enemy but rather try to entice him out of the sanctuaries even at the sacrifice of some terrain in order to get him into favorable killing zones. We should not undertake to hold exposed outposts unless their value is equal to the anticipated cost and unless reinforcements are available if needed for the defense.

c. While avoiding combat at a disadvantage, we should build up mobile reserves in readiness to pass to a vigorous offensive with the resumption of favorable weather in March. In the meantime, much of our current military activity should be directed at setting up main enemy elements for a decisive blow during our offensive.

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- 3 -

d. Throughout the coming months, we should maintain the bombing of the north at maximum levels of effectiveness. If we can find North Vietnamese command and control centers, they should be attacked.

Recognizing that it is the goal of the enemy to initiate negotiations under conditions of no bombing of North Viet-Nam for the purpose of reaching agreement on a coalition government, we should devise a political track parallel to the military which would include a joint US/GVN assertion of the principles which must govern any terminal settlement to which we would agree. Such a statement of principles would rule out any coalition government based upon the arbitrary inclusion of members of the National Liberation Front in the Saigon government and would reject any action tending to nullify the new constitutional government but would offer participation in elections to all Viet Cong who will pledge allegiance to the Constitution. The exact terms of such an offer need a careful elaboration which I shall not attempt here.

In a short summary, my recommendation is that we start reinforcing at once but, concurrently, review and clarify our military and political objectives for the remainder of this year.

*M.D.T.*  
M. D. T.

SECRET

INFORMATION

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, February 10, 1968  
1:45 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Wheeler's  
latest situation report.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 19, NARA, Date 2-10-92



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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CM-2999-68  
10 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in Vietnam

You have received General Westmoreland's sixth report on the situation in the Khe Sanh area for the period through 11:00 PM EST, 9 February 1968. I talked to General Westmoreland at 8:00 AM EST this morning and obtained the information on the situation in Vietnam which is contained in the succeeding paragraphs.

General Westmoreland assesses the current situation as similar to that which prevailed in China in 1948, in that the Red Chinese moved their people into the cities and then besieged the cities. In this connection, he is continuing his preparations for an anticipated second cycle of attacks. He is also striving to reopen the roads, so as to permit the resupply of food. He reports that there is plenty of rice in Saigon and Danang.

General Westmoreland considers that the enemy may use tanks in the eastern part of the DMZ area, and he is sending General Abrams to talk to the commanders in that area about this potential threat. General Westmoreland is concerned about the impact a tank attack might have upon the ARVN units, and accordingly, General Momyer is developing plans for the use of Napalm and Zuni rockets against any tank attack in that area.

The Hue/Phu Bai area is, as was reported yesterday, being reinforced by three Vietnamese Marine Battalions. Presently, three-fifths of the city is controlled by South Vietnamese forces; however, General Westmoreland estimates that there are some 2,000 Viet Cong still in Hue.

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Authority JCS ltr 10-3-78

By iply, NARA, Date 2-10-92

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There are five battalions of the Americal Division south of Danang. There was heavy fighting there yesterday, and it is reported that elements of the 2d North Vietnamese Division are now pulling back.

The KC-130 which was destroyed in Khe Sanh was hit on landing by a 12.7 mm machine gun; as the aircraft landed, the POL aboard exploded.

The II Corps area was relatively quiet. There is still fighting in Dalat, but we are making headway there. Elements of the 33d North Vietnamese Regiment have been located south of Ban Me Thuot along the river. Kontum is quiet. In Dak To, a lieutenant who defected from the 174th North Vietnamese Regiment reported that one-third of his regiment had been killed. In Binh Dinh Province, the ROK forces have been doing well, killing some 800 members of the 3d North Vietnamese Division in the Qui Nhon area.

In Long An Province, 123 enemy were killed and 17 captured, one of whom was a North Vietnamese from Cambodia - - significantly, several brand new weapons, of Red Chinese make (still in cosmoline) were captured. In the capital, Viet Cong assassins killed eight policemen.

General Westmoreland has intelligence of an expected attack on Tan Son Nhut tonight, and has made preparations for this.

The IV Corps area was also relatively quiet. The Riverine Force killed 83 enemy in the My Tho area, where there is an enemy build-up. General Westmoreland hopes to reopen Highway 4 by Sunday night.

MACV Forward, the Provisional Field Army Headquarters which I mentioned in my memorandum to you yesterday, has opened. General Abrams will operate from that headquarters from time to time.



EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

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Saturday, February 10, 1968  
12:50 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a final message to you  
from Prime Minister Wilson.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

CONFIDENTIAL

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TEXT OF MESSAGE

10 February, 1968.

This is to bring you briefly, but with heartfelt warmth and sincerity, my thanks and deep appreciation for the cordiality of your welcome and for the openhearted way in which, as always, you developed your thinking. My thoughts and wishes go out to you for the difficult days that lie ahead. Many thanks again and warmest regards to Mrs. Johnson and yourself. I shall be acting in London on the suggestions you made at our short final talk yesterday, and will be in touch with you further about it.

Harold

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-252  
By gpc/b, NARA, Date 7/29/96

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION

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*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 10, 1968  
12:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

We first received an unsigned copy of President Park's letter to you. It was modified in the light of discussion with Amb. Porter. Attached (Tab A) is the final version.

Also attached (Tab B) is a message from Seoul indicating the three critical issues that Vance will face.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 4131  
Seoul 4142

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *lg*, NARA, Date 2-14-92

WWRostow:rla

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~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 10, 1968

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR PORTER (Seoul 4131)

The ~~en~~signed copy of President Park's letter to President Johnson dated February 9 was delivered to me at 4:00 AM EST today. Text as follows.

Dear Mr. President:

Yesterday, I received your kind letter which has given details of your views again through Ambassador Porter.

I understand your view that the Pueblo incident, a question of immediate concern to you, should be dealt with separately "in somewhat different perspectives" and with differing tactics from the longer run question of ensuring the security of the Republic of Korea as you have termed.

However, the North Korean Commandos' intrusion into Seoul has given such a particular and serious impact upon my people that an alien would find it hard to grasp it fully and the indignant feelings of my people against the North Korean Communists seem to have reached the apex.

Although it is understandable to me that you are seeking an earliest possible solution to the question of the Pueblo, you will no doubt know that my personal understanding cannot be equated with that of my fellow countrymen as you may have experienced yourself in dealing with various problems such as the Vietnam War. If your excellency considers it absolutely necessary to have further closed meetings with the North Koreans in order to have the crew of the Pueblo back, it is likewise necessary for us to have your assurances on the following points:

1. The problem of the North Korean Raiders' incursion on Seoul, as separate from the question of the Pueblo, will be brought before the Military Armistice Commission meetings in the immediately near future.

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**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-206**  
**By CG, NARA Date 11-3-97**

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2. And we lodge a protest with the North Koreans; press them to admit the aggressive act, apologize for it and pledge that such an act will not be repeated in the future.

3. In case the North Koreans refuse to accept this and change their attitude:

A. The Republic of Korea and the United States forces take an immediate retaliatory action in accordance with the provisions of the mutual defense treaty between the two countries:

B. And at the same time, issue a formal warning to them that the Republic of Korea and the United States forces will take immediate punitive action, if the North Koreans make resort to such actions again in the future.

These, I believe, are the minimum measures required for ensuring the security of the Republic of Korea.

I know your excellency is concerned with the security of our country more greatly than anyone else and have taken measures to strengthen our national defense. This I appreciate always.

But a fact remains that the infiltrations by the North Koreans into the South have increased, not decreased, since the Armistice although we have done our utmost to strengthen our defense capability. Therefore, I want you to understand the increasingly keener awareness among my people that strengthened defense alone will not be complete in solving the problem of our security.

If we are to dissuade the North Koreans from their aggressive acts, simultaneously assuaging the wrath of my people, we should make the North Koreans fully recognize our resolute determination that we will not allow them to commit an aggressive act without subjecting themselves to our immediate punitive action.

What I have so far outlined above is related to the measures for ensuring the security of my country, for which you have shown such a great concern, and I do not think that there may be any point of disagreement with you.

In summation, I am sure, that the security of the Republic of Korea rests on:

1. Strengthening of our defense capability to such an extent where we maintain an absolute supremacy over the North, and

2. Driving it home to the North Koreans that an aggressive act will be met with immediate, stern punitive action.

If the North Koreans feel free that they can act on a premise that aggression against the South can be committed with impunity, no increase in our defense capability will give complete solution to our cardinal problem, an effective guarantee against any re-invasion by the North.

94-8

~~SECRET-NODIS/CACTUS~~

February 10, 1968

Text of Message from Ambassador Porter (Seoul 4142)

Subject; Korean Government Plans for Vance Visit

Stating he was acting on instructions from the Foreign Ministry, the Minister of Foreign Affairs International Affairs Bureau Director called the Political Counselor to his office to discuss subjects the Korean Government will wish to raise with Vance.

He lead into this subject by stating that the Korean Government is placing great expectations on Vance's visit, which could be the real turning point in Korean Government-US relations. He said the Korean Government and the entire Korean people hoped that Vance, a special emissary of President Johnson, would not let the Korean Government down, and in this context he referred to the "failure" of the 1953 visit under similar tense circumstances by Assistant Secretary Walter Robertson.

He then alluded to the fact that Minister of Foreign Affairs had been instructed by the Blue House to prepare a position paper for Vance and a general outline of a joint Park/Vance communique and US-Korean joint declaration. He said that the latter two should deal with three major points:

The question of operational control: He said that the Korean Government understood the need to have CINCUNC retain operational control of Korean forces but that there should be some change in the rules of game. It seemed strange, he said, to the Korean Government that when intruders penetrated deep into Korean territory, the Korean military commanders should have to seek the CINCUNC's permission to use Korean combat troops to destroy intruding forces. The system should be changed to permit Korean commanders immediately to deploy against intruders, perhaps notifying CINCUNC that Korean forces had been withdrawn from his operational control for such purposes. Furthermore, when intruders ventured into Korean territory and were engaged by Korean and US forces, the rules of the game should permit application of the principle of hot pursuit; Korean Government should not have to stop south of Military Demarcation Line (MDL).

Punitive measures: US and Korea should make it clear to the enemy and to rest of world that they will not permit North Korea to conduct aggressive acts against Korea without fear of retaliation. The US and South Korea should announce that if intrusions continue, they will physically punish North Korea by striking at the root source of North Korean aggression. Not only should this warning be made unequivocally clear in words of the Governments, but some punitive action must be taken the next time

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-197

~~SECRET-NO DIS/CACTUS~~

By rip, NARA Date 11-26-96

North Koreans strike. He suggested that North Korean guerrilla training camps might make suitable targets and said that if they were wiped out it would not mean local, much less general war.

US commitment: He said that most sophisticated Koreans are aware that President Johnson has authority to order US forces into combat without explicit Congressional approval and that South Korea and South Vietnam would not exist today were this not so. The Korean populace, however, suffers from a trauma from the Korea War which has been reopened by US unwillingness to take military action following the Blue House raid and the Pueblo incident. The people doubt that the US will actually commit its forces to defend them in case North Korean aggression continues and are especially concerned over language in the Mutual Defense Treaty which says that each party will act in "accordance to its constitutional process." What is needed, he said, is some flat statement in the document to which the U. S. Government is party which spells out the fact that President Johnson can commit US forces without time-consuming Congressional debate and approval.

The Political Counselor lead him carefully through all the difficulties which surround each of the propositions. The Director agree that the Korean Government was aiming high, but held firmly to the position that something dramatic of the nature he had described must come out of Vance's visit.

INFORMATION

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**SECRET**

**Saturday, February 10, 1968  
10:55 a.m.**

*Pres file*

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith Amb. Bunker guides  
Thieu further down the path of national  
leadership.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**Saigon 18892**

**SECRET**

**WWRostow:rla**

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White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 2-26-92

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NLJ 96-197  
By isp, NARA Date 11-26-96

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

EXDIS

1. I MET WITH PRESIDENT THIEU MORNING FEB 10 TO GO OVER THE CURRENT SITUATION.

2. I COMPLIMENTED THIEU ON HIS SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THIEU SAID HE HAD HAD FOUR MAIN PURPOSES BEHIND HIS SPEECH. FIRST, TO ASK FOR THE ASSEMBLY'S SUPPORT IN GENERAL AND SPECIFICALLY FOR THE SPECIAL SECURITY MEASURES NOW REQUIRED, WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE RELAXED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THIEU SAID HE ALSO WANTED TO REASSURE THE ASSEMBLY THAT HE WOULD ACT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THAT THESE MEASURES WERE ONLY FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES. SECOND, TO INFORM THE ASSEMBLY OF THE NEED TO SPEED UP MOBILIZATION PLANS AND TO REQUEST SPECIFIC authority FOR THE DEFENSE MINISTER TO ACCOMPLISH IN SIX MONTHS WHAT had BEEN

~~PAGE 2 RUMJIR 18892 SECRET~~

ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR A YEAR; FURTHER, TO PROPOSE THE MILITARY TRAINING OF CIVIL SERVANTS FOR SELF-DEFENSE and ROTC TRAINING FOR STUDENTS. THIRD, TO REQUEST THAT THE BUDGET BE APPROVED BEFORE THE END OF FEBRUARY. FOURTH, TO ASK THE ASSEMBLY

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TO DELEGATE TO HIM THE POWER TO PASS URGENT FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC MEASURES FOR A PERIOD OF UP TO ONE YEAR. THIEU SAID HE MIGHT HAVE TO COMPROMISE WITH A SHORTER PERIOD. HE ADDED THAT HE PLANNED TO DISCUSS THESE MEASURES WITH THE APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES BEFORE PASSING DECREE LAWS OR, IF THE MATTER WAS TOO SENSITIVE FOR PUBLIC DISCUSSION, WITH THE SPEAKERS OF THE TWO HOUSES.

3. I THEN ASKED THIEU IF HE PLANNED TO INSPECT SOME OF THE MOST DAMAGED AREAS AROUND THE COUNTRY AND SAID THAT WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO PROVIDE A PLANE IF THAT WOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE TO HIM; AND THAT PERHAPS HE MIGHT WISH TO TAKE THE AMBASSADORS OF THE TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES WITH HIM. THIEU SAID THAT HE PLANNED TO MAKE SUCH AN INSPECTION DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS. THERE WOULD BE A CABINET MEETING ON SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 11, AND THEN HE PLANNED TO SPEND ONE DAY EACH BEGINNING FEBRUARY 12 IN EACH CORPS REGION TO GET BRIEFED

~~PAGE 3 RUMJIR 18892 SECRET~~

ON THE MILITARY SITUATION, TRY TO MAKE SOME ASSESSMENT OF THE DAMAGE AND THE SITUATION OF THE POPULATION, AND TALK TO PEOPLE ABOUT THEIR IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS. WE DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE AMBASSADORS FROM THE OTHER TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS ACCOMPANYING HIM. I SUGGESTED THAT ON THESE INITIAL TRIPS HE DO IT ALONE IN ORDER TO MAKE IT A PURELY VIETNAMESE EXERCISE. THE TCC AMBASSADORS COULD PERHAPS MAKE TRIPS AROUND, EITHER WITH THE PRESIDENT IF HE SO DESIRED OR ON THEIR OWN. THIEU AGREED THAT THIS WOULD BE A GOOD PROCEDURE. HE CONFIRMED THAT HIS WIFE WAS IN SAIGON VISITING REFUGEE CENTERS AND HOSPITALS AS WELL AS CONTRIBUTING BLOOD AND AIDED THAT ON MONDAY SHE WOULD BE MAKING VISITS TO A NUMBER OF CIVILS IN THE DELTA SUCH AS CAN THO AND SOC TRANG. THEREAFTER SHE WOULD CONTINUE SUCH ACTIVITIES IN THE SAIGON AREA. I TOLD THIEU THAT MY WIFE WAS HERE AND WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO BE OF ANY HELP SHE COULD TO MRS. THIEU.

4. I ASKED THIEU HOW HIS THINKING HAD DEVELOPED ON THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ADVISORY COUNCIL OF PROMINENT REPRESENTATIVES

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OF VARIOUS RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL GROUPS. THIEU SAID HE HAD

~~PAGE 4 RUMJIR 18892 SECRET~~

BEEN GIVING FURTHER THOUGHT TO THIS IDEA AND TO HIS EARLIER SUGGESTION FOR A CONGRESS OF NOTABLES. HE HAD DECIDED THAT THE LATTER PROPOSITION WAS NOT VERY PRACTICABLE SINCE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO GET AN AGREED RESOLUTION OF THE SORT HE DESIRED FROM SUCH A VARIED GROUP OF POLITICAL FIGURES AND HE ALSO FEARED IT MIGHT CREATE MISUNDERSTANDING AND DISSENSION WITHIN THE ASSEMBLY. HE WAS NOW THINKING OF CALLING IN SEPARATE LEADERS OF VARIOUS RELIGIOUS GROUPS, SUCH AS THE CAO DAI, HOA HAO, THE CATHOLICS AND THE BUDDHISTS, TO GET THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT. FOLLOWING THIS HE WOULD CALL IN LEADERS OF POLITICAL GROUPS ONE AT A TIME FOR THE SAME PURPOSE. SUBSEQUENTLY HE WOULD ASK THEM TO JOIN IN AN ADVISORY COUNCIL TO THE PRESIDENT.

5. I REMARKED TO THIEU THAT THE CONDITIONS IN CHOLON WERE VERY DISTURBING AND I ASKED FOR HIS VIEWS ABOUT WHAT SHOULD BE DONE THERE. I NOTED ALSO THAT REPORTS OF POSSIBLE ENEMY ATTACKS IN THE DANANG, KONTUM AND CAN THO AREAS APPEARED TO CONFIRM THE SECOND POINT HE HAD MADE TO ME THE OTHER DAY, NAMELY THAT THE ENEMY WOULD SEEK TO KEEP UP HARASSMENT, INFILTRATION AND POLITICAL ~~SPOTTAGE~~ IN KEY *pressure*

~~PAGE 5 RUMJIR 18892 SECRET~~

CITIES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THIEU SAID THIS WAS CLEARLY PART OF GENERAL GIAP'S STRATEGY, AS HE HAD ALSO EMPLOYED IT IN 1954, WHICH INVOLVED HOLDING TENACIOUSLY TO TERRITORY GAINED NO MATTER WHAT CASUALTIES MIGHT BE INVOLVED AND THE MOVING FORWARD BIT BY BIT TO TAKE ADDITIONAL AREAS. HE SAID THAT HE ESTIMATED GIAP HAD ACCEPTED LOSSES EQUIVALENT TO TWO DIVISIONS IN FOLLOWING THIS STRATEGY BEFORE DIEN BIEN PHU. HE SAID THAT IN TERMS OF CHOLON, THE ENEMY PLANNED TO MAINTAIN THEMSELVES THERE AS A REAR BASE TO ATTACK SAIGON. I NOTED THAT THEY HAD REPORTEDLY BEEN MELTING INTO THE POPULATION AS CIVILIANS AND HAD BEEN BEHAVING VERY WELL

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 SAIGON 18392 101246Z

TOWARD THE PEOPLE. THIEU SAID THAT IT WAS VITAL TO CLEAR OUT THE INFRASTRUCTURE IN CHOLON AND ALSO TO IMPROVE THE VIETNAMESE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES WHICH ARE OBVIOUSLY INADEQUATE AT PRESENT. HE BELIEVED THAT IN THIS RESPECT THE CHINESE EMBASSY MIGHT BE OF ASSISTANCE.

6. IN CONCLUDING OUR CONVERSATION I REITERATED MY FEELING THAT IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT FOR THE PEOPLE TO SEE THIEU FREQUENTLY AND BECOME AWARE OF HIS CONCERN FOR THEM AND HIS INTENTION TO HELP THEM. I URGED HIM ONCE AGAIN TO USE THE RADIO AND TV FREQUENTLY IN BRIEF REPORTS TO THE PEOPLE.

BUNKER

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, February 10, 1968  
10:45 a. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

I am sure you will wish to read carefully this imaginative memorandum of Gen. Taylor's and wish I had been bright enough to write it.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *rg*, NARA, Date 2-10-92

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

9600

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 9, 1968

Enemy Scenario of the Future?

Although it is always dangerous to indulge in prediction, it is fairly evident that the enemy in Viet-Nam have embarked upon a program which is reasonably predictable in the sense that we know pretty well how they wish the future to unfold. We can expect them to act in a way consistent with their wishes--unless we prevent them.

I would guess that, several months ago, the enemy high command abandoned any thought of continued reliance upon prolonged conflict and the progressive attrition of our forces and our will. Instead, they decided "to go for broke" prior to our national election, taking advantage of the turmoil of an election campaign and the anticipated difficulties for the Administration in taking critical decisions in the election atmosphere. They may even hope to influence the choice of a peace-candidate if their spring activities are sufficiently successful.

In laying out their schedule, one can guess at some of the factors which the enemy leaders must be taking into account in establishing their calendar. For example, TET afforded an excellent opportunity for a surprise attack on the cities under the cover of their announced cease-fire. The monsoon weather is another factor affecting their plans since they should stage their much advertised winter-spring offensive under weather conditions most favorable to their side. These will obtain from now until about March 1, when the weather should change to our advantage. Finally, there is the Presidential election in the U.S. by which time Hanoi would hope to present the new administration with a coalition government in Saigon as a fait accompli.

Assuming the validity of the foregoing hypothesis, one can show in chart form the possible course of events. Such a chart is attached which accounts for the five phases which information leads us to believe to be in their plans.

- a. The attack of the cities.
- b. The winter-spring offensive in the North and Northwest.
- c. Negotiations while fighting (they would hope to take place under conditions of no bombing in North Viet-Nam).
- d. A coalition government emerging from negotiations, under Communist domination.
- e. The eventual withdrawal of the U.S. military presence from South Viet-Nam following our elections.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Josette 10-2-78  
By kg, NARA, Date 2-10-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

While the foregoing is largely speculation, it has enough plausibility to warrant reflection. We should be looking for ways to upset such a scenario.

MD2  
M. D. T.

Attachment:

Chart.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VC/NLF WAR TIME SCHEDULE

January 31, 1968  
(TET)

March 1, 1968  
(Weather changes)


November 1, 1968  
(US elections)

January 1, 1969

Attack on the cities



Winter-Spring Offensive




Negotiations while Fighting



Coalition Government



US goes home



ACTION

SECRET

Saturday, February 10, 1968 -- 10:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Sec. Rusk just called me to say that he now has grave misgivings about sending Cy Vance on to Saigon. He feels that the effectiveness of his mission in Seoul would be greatly diminished if Cy then proceeded on a grand tour. A great deal rides on the success of the Vance mission.

Sec. Rusk suggests that Nick Katzenbach or Paul Nitze do the job in Saigon on a wholly separate mission.

W. W. Rostow

*You may wish to consider sending to Saigon: Bus Wheeler  
max Taylor  
W*

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 0/18 NARA, Date 6/25/96

SECRET

WWRostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET~~



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Joint Chiefs of Staff

31 January 1968

98a

MEMO TO: GENERAL WHEELER

If, despite General Westmoreland's best estimate, the situation at Khe Sanh should become desperate, the issue of using [redacted] will be raised.

3.4  
(b)(4)

If for no other reason, it would be raised because the subject was considered at the time of Dien Bien Phu.

Query: Would some contingency target analysis be in order?

*[Handwritten mark]*

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

*Phil = prepare draft back channel to CINCPAC & MACV on this. Caution that plans should very very very closely held.*

*(Handwritten note in a circle)*

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 96-198

By *iss*, NARA, Date 8-12-04

INFORMATION

99

*Pres file*

**SECRET**

**Saturday, February 10, 1968  
9:25 a.m.**

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith Westy's latest on Khe Sanh.**

**W. W. Rostow**

~~**SECRET**~~

**WWRostow:rla**

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *AG*, NARA, Date 2-10-92

99a

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 10, 1968, 9:15 AM

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is the sixth report on the Khe Sanh area and covers the 24-hour period of February 9, 1968 (Washington time).

During the reporting period the Khe Sanh Combat Base and the outlying areas continued to receive sporadic shelling from mortars, with occasional rocket rounds reported.

The night of February 9 - 10 was characterized by brief contacts with exchanges of small arms fire and grenades. At 10:15 AM EST a Marine Listening Post about three kilometers northwest of the Khe Sanh Base received small arms fire and grenades in conjunction with a ground attack by an estimated 35 to 40 enemy. The Listening Post withdrew to the company perimeter and the Marine Company then received seven satchel charges in the perimeter wire, with two enemy penetrating the outer wire. In the face of the defense action, the enemy did not press the attack. This action resulted in two Marines killed and three other receiving minor wounds. The extent of the enemy casualties is unknown.

At midnight last night C-130 aircraft received enemy fire about two miles southwest of the Khe Sanh airstrip while approaching for a landing. The aircraft caught fire and was completely destroyed, resulting in two killed, four critically injured, and three missing.

During this period Marine Tactical Air flew 34 sorties. The Air Force flew 66 sorties, the Navy flew 63, for a total of 163 sorties in the Khe Sanh Area. The Marine air strikes produced several secondary explosions while the Air Force reported three secondary explosions, four secondary fires, and three trucks destroyed.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 96-198  
By ms, NARA, Date 8-22-04

~~SECRET~~

Photo reconnaissance obtained confirms the presence of several PT-76 tanks in the Lang Vei area. There were four ARC LIGHT strikes (27 sorties) run in the Niagara area in support of the Khe Sanh Base and its environs.

On February 9 the Ground Control Facility at the Khe Sanh was rendered inoperative due to enemy fire. As a result only three C-130 aircraft were able to resupply with 32 short tons of cargo. Twenty-two short tons of the resupply was petroleum, oil, and lubricants, and the remaining ten short tons were individual combat rations. The level of stocks of all classes remains adequate. The Ground Control equipment was back in operation today. No COFRAM type ordnance was used during the period. For the period midnight Friday to midnight Saturday EST, there will be six ARC LIGHT strikes (39 sorties) flown in the Niagara area. Marine tactical air plans 44 sorties in support of Khe Sanh, while the Air Force has 88 sorties planned, and the Navy has 100 planned, for a total of 232 sorties. The Air Force has 120 additional sorties on alert.

There is no change in enemy unit identification in the area.

On February 9 the weather was poor in the afternoon with cloud ceilings of 700 feet and fog. By 4:00 PM the weather conditions began to deteriorate with zero visibility by 8:00 PM. The weather improved to marginal early Saturday morning and there was good visibility. The weather then remained marginal the rest of the morning. The forecast for the period noon Saturday to noon Sunday is for marginal weather to continue until about 8:00 PM. At this time the formation of fog will make the weather poor with visibilities of less than 1 mile. Conditions will improve to marginal by 11:00 AM on February 11 with ceilings of 1200 feet.

The first two groups of Lao personnel (83 total) arrived in Danang. All are personnel of the BV-33 Battalion. They are housed on the Danang Air Base. Rations are being furnished. U. S. and local relief officials have made arrangements for sanitation, water, and other necessities. Embassy Vietiane has responded in this matter and we expect that either Lao Aircraft or Air America will eventually transport the Laotians to their destination.

INFORMATION

100

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 10, 1968  
9:05 p.m.

*Per file*

Mr. President:

Here is how the Soviet Foreign Office  
circularized its missions on the Pueblo.

W. W. Rostow

[Redacted]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

**SANITIZED**  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-199  
By ica, NARA Date 8-19-98

WWRostow:rla

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

o ROUTINE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

100a

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA  
EXO DD1 XCES FBIS CCS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

CITE

DIST 9 FEBRUARY 1968

3.3  
(b)(1)

COUNTRY USSR/NORTH KOREA

**SANTIZED**

DOI UP TO 30 JANUARY 1968

Authority NLI-RAC 001-258-2-20 a n d  
By sl NARA, Date 12-13-03  
RAC 96-200

SUBJECT SOVIET CIRCULAR TELEGRAM ON THE PUEBLO INCIDENT

ACQ (EARLY FEBRUARY 1968)

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

3.3  
(b)(1)



1. ON ABOUT 30 JANUARY 1968 THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SENT OUT A CIRCULAR TELEGRAM TO INFORM SOVIET AMBASSADORS ABOUT THE PUEBLO INCIDENT. THIS TELEGRAM STATED THAT THE VESSEL HAD BEEN SEIZED BY NORTH KOREA AND THAT ON 23 JANUARY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW HAD REQUESTED SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO OBTAIN RELEASE OF THE VESSEL. THE SOVIETS REPLIED THAT NORTH KOREA WAS A SOVEREIGN STATE AND THAT THE USSR COULD NOT RENDER ANY ASSISTANCE.

2. THE TELEGRAM WENT ON TO SAY THAT A FEW DAYS LATER PRESIDENT JOHNSON SENT A LETTER ON THE MATTER TO PREMIER KOSYGIN. THIS LETTER

5  
4  
3  
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1

5  
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3  
2  
1

~~SECRET~~  
(classification)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/  
(dissem controls) BACKGROUND USE ONLY

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND  
(classification) (dissem controls) USE ONLY

ALSO REQUESTED SOVIET ASSISTANCE IN GETTING THE VESSEL RELEASED. THE USSR FORWARDED THE CONTENTS OF THIS LETTER TO THE NORTH KOREANS AND ASKED THEM TO PROVIDE DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING SEIZURE OF THE VESSEL. THE NORTH KOREANS DID NOT PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION, SO SOVIET REACTION TO THE INCIDENT HAD TO BE BASED ON INFORMATION WHICH APPEARED IN THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS.

3. THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THE MATTER AS OUTLINED IN THE TELEGRAM IS TO PREVENT DISCUSSION OF THE INCIDENT IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. IF IT IS DISCUSSED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE WILL SPEAK ALONG THE LINE OF UNMASKING U.S. POLICY IN KOREA, SUPPORTING NORTH KOREA IN EVERY RESPECT. THIS IS THE SAME POSITION WHICH HAS BEEN TAKEN IN THE SOVIET PRESS.

COMMENT: THIS INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED

3.3  
(b)(1) [REDACTED] UNWARE THAT (THE PUEBLO INCIDENT HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.)

4. [REDACTED] DISSEM: NONE.

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND  
(classification) (dissem controls) USE ONLY

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 10, 1968  
9:00 a. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith -- in Djakarta -- an NLF representative says there "would be no principal attack on Khe Sanh now."

Interesting, but certainly not definitive.

W. W. Rostow

25X1A



~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
Auth: NLJ 019-029-1-3  
By 9, NARA, Date 1/15/02

INFORMATION

102

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*

Saturday, February 10, 1968  
9:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a summary of nine  
more prisoner of war interrogations.

W. W. Rostow

[Redacted signature block]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-199  
By us, NARA Date 8-19-98

WWRostow:rlm

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TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM  
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STATE (RCI)  
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
*03/1/68* *102a*  
**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-200**  
**By ia, NARA Date 7-10-98**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CITE

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM  
DOI: 27 JANUARY 1968 - 5 FEBRUARY 1968  
SUBJECT: VIEWS OF THREE VIET CONG AND NINE NORTH VIETNAMESE  
ARMY PRISONERS CONCERNING THE PLANS AND OBJECTIVES  
OF THE TET OFFENSIVE, AND POPULAR SUPPORT FROM THE  
SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE DURING THE OFFENSIVE.

1.5(e)  
3.1(b)(1)

ACQ: BIEN HOA (9 FEBRUARY 1968)  
SOURCE:



1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

INFORMATION

103

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**Saturday, February 10, 1968  
9:00 a. m.**

**Mr. President:**

**Fourteen days, in the attached report,  
would end on 11 February, tomorrow.**

**You will have noticed yesterday that  
at least one report mentioned a time up  
to 15 February for the second wave of  
attack on the cities.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**WWRostow:rln**

**DECLASSIFIED**  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By dlr, NARA, Date 6/25/96

103a

RECEIVED  
WHCA

1968 FEB 10

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*[Handwritten signature]*

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DIRNSA COMMAND CENTER  
STATE (RCI)  
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**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-200**  
**By us, NARA Date 7-10-98**

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [redacted] CITE [redacted]  
REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [redacted]  
COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM  
DOI: 4 FEBRUARY 1968  
SUBJECT: ALLEGED VC EXTENSION OF TIME PERIOD FOR OCCUPYING  
CITIES OF SOUTH VIETNAM FROM SEVEN TO FOURTEEN DAYS

ACQ: VIETNAM, DANANG (9 FEBRUARY 1968) [redacted]  
SOURCE: [redacted]

1. [redacted]

NVN PREMIER PHAM VAN DONG  
JUST ORDERED THE NFLSV TO EXTEND TO 14 DAYS THE PERIOD TO ACCOMPLISH  
THE OCCUPATION OF ALL TOWNS AND CITIES IN SVN. A THREE-MONTH  
PERIOD WAS GIVEN TO OVERTHROW THE GVN. ORIGINALLY THE PERIOD FOR  
OCCUPATION OF SVN TOWNS WAS ONE WEEK. LATER, AFTER OVERTHROWING  
THE GVN THE NFLSV IS TO SET UP A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT TO  
PROCEED TO A SOLUTION FOR PEACE AND A COALITION GOVERNMENT. IN  
QUANG NGAI PROVINCE THE VC HAD BEGUN MOBILIZING ALL LABORERS  
FOR BATTLEFIELD SUPPORT. [redacted]

2. [redacted]

AN NVA POW SAID THAT BEFORE THE ATTACK ON  
HUE THE TROOPS WERE TOLD THAT THEY WERE TO ATTACK AND HOLD THE  
CITY WITHIN SEVEN DAYS. IF THIS WERE NOT ACCOMPLISHED IN SEVEN  
DAYS ADDITIONAL TROOPS WOULD BE SENT TO HUE.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV CORDS III MAF 7TH AF USARV  
COMNAVFORV USAID DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC ARPAC  
PACFLT PACAF (ALSO SENT SAIGON)  
REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [redacted]

GP-1

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PACKERS

Saturday, February 10, 1968 -- 7:55 a. m.

Mr. President:

Averell Harriman and I last night had what turned out to be a simple family dinner with the Romanian Ambassador.

After dinner he took us aside. Averell asked: What do you hear from our traveller?

He replied:

- He returned to Bucharest last Monday;
- You will probably be hearing from him "next week";
- "From our point of view, the recent events in South Vietnam do not alter our objective."

Averell probed him on whether he had anything of substance. He said he knew nothing more than that.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
 NLJ 96-206  
 By cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~