

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#4 memo <i>More info released 7-16-03 NY 96-216 appeal</i>	Rostow to President, 1:45 p.m. sanitized 4-30-98 S 1 p NY 96-216 [Duplicate of #48a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, (sanitized NY 96-216 5/98) "2C(6), 2/13-20/68, General Military Act"]	2/16/68	A
#4a cable	Intelligence Cable S 1 p <i>sanitized 4-30-98 NY 96-215</i> [Duplicate of #48b, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(6), 2/13-20/68, General Military Act"]	2/16/68	A
#4b cable	Intelligence Cable <i>sanitized 4-30-98 NY 96-215</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #48 and #52, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(6), 2/13-20/68, General Military Act"]	2/16/68	A
#5 memo	Rostow to President, 1:30 p.m. S 2 p <i>open 2-28-97 NY 96-212</i>	2/16/68	A
#7a cable	USUN 3794 <i>open 4-3-98 NY 96-211</i> S 3 p [Duplicate of #1a-1, NSF, NSCH, March 31 Speech, Volume 3; exempt 1979]	2/16/68	A
#13 memo	Rostow to President, 8:35 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 2-28-97 NY 96-212</i>	2/16/68	A
#13a cable	Seoul 4304 <i>open 4-3-98 NY 96-211</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #201, NSF, NSCH, Pueblo Crisis, Volume 16]	2/16/68	A
#14 memo	Rostow to President, 8:30 a.m. <i>open 2-28-97 NY 96-212</i> S 1 p <i>(dup. of # 38, Pakistan, US)</i>	2/16/68	A
#14a cable	Rawalpindi 3421 <i>open 4-3-98 NY 96-211</i> S 2 p <i>(dup. of # 35a, Pakistan, US)</i>	2/16/68	A
#17b ltr	Burnham to President PCI 1 p <i>open 4/30/96</i> [Duplicate of #73a]	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 62, February 14-16, 1968 Box 29

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12358 governing access to national security information.
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#18 memo	Califano, Rostow and Zwick to President C 2 p <i>open 12-17-93 NLS 92-484</i> [duplicate in WHCF, CF, FO3-a]	2/16/68	A
#19 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 4/30/96</i> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 2/16/68]	2/16/68	A
#19a memo	Black to President PCI 5 p <i>open 4/30/96</i> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 2/16/68]	undated	A
#21 memo	Rostow to President, re: Panama S 1 p <i>open 5/98 NLS 96-216</i>	2/16/68	A
#22 memo	Rostow to President, 8:45 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 2-28-97 NLS 96-212</i>	2/15/68	A
#22a cable	Deptel 116188 to Seoul (work copy) S 4 p <i>open 4-3-98 NLS 96-211</i> [Duplicate of #39] [Duplicate of #158, NSF, NSCH, Pueblo Crisis, Volume 14]	2/15/68	A
#22b cable	Deptel to Seoul (work copy) S 2 p <i>open 4-3-98 NLS 96-211</i>	2/15/68	A
#23a cable	Saigon 19428 " " S 8 p [Sanitized 1979]	2/15/68	A
#25a memo	"Draft The President wants General..." S 1 p <i>open 4/30/96</i>	2/15/68	A
#27a memo	Dean to President <i>empt 3-28-95 NLS 94-252</i> S 1 p <i>(dup of #570, Spec head of St Corresp UK, Box 56)</i>	2/15/68	A
#29 memo	Rostow to President, 2:40 p.m. S 1 p <i>(dup of NLS 96-216 5/98)</i>	2/15/68	A
<i>open 7-16-03 NLS 96-216 appeal</i> #29a cable	Intelligence Cable S 2 p <i>sanitized 4-30-98 NLS 96-215</i>	2/15/68	A

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#31 memo	Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 4/30/96</i>	2/15/68	A
#31a cable	Seoul 4244 S 1 p <i>open 4/30/96</i> [Duplicate of #182, NSF, NSCH, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 16]	2/15/68	A
#31b cable	Seoul 4261 S 6 p <i>open 4/30/96</i> [Duplicate of #184, NSF, NSCH, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 16]	2/15/68	A
#31c cable	Seoul 4262 S 2 p <i>open 4/30/96</i> [Duplicate of #185, NSF, NSCH, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 16]	2/15/68	A
#33 memo	Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m. S 1 p <i>(dup. of #80, India, V10)</i>	2/15/68	A
#33a cable	New Delhi 193 S 2 p <i>(dup of #80a, India, V10)</i>	2/15/68	A
#34 memo	Rostow to President, 11:00 a.m. S 1 p <i>(dup of #23, Pueblo, Vol I-B)</i>	2/15/68	A
#34a cable	Intelligence Cable S 2 p <i>exempt 7-11-96 NLS 96-217 sanitized 3/13/03 NLS 01-211</i>	2/15/68	A
#38 memo	Rostow to President, re: Dominican Republic C 1 p <i>open 4/96</i>	2/15/68	A
#39 cable	Duplicate of #22a <i>open 4-3-98 NLS 96-211</i>		
#40 memo	Rostow to President, re: Turkey C 1 p <i>open 2-28-97 NLS 96-212</i>	2/15/68	A
#40a memo	Zwick to President, re: Turkey C 2 p " "	2/9/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#40b memo	Gaud to President, re: Turkey C 5 p. <i>open 3-25-97 NLJ 96-208</i>	2/2/68	A
#40c rpt	"Attachment A" C 1 p. " "	undated	A
#40d table	"Defense Expenditures..." C 1 p. " "	undated	A
#40e rpt	"Attachment B" C 1 p. " "	undated	A
#40f rpt	"Balance of Payments: Turkey" C 1 p. " "	undated	A
#40g rpt	"Balance of Payments 1968" C 1 p. " "	undated	A
#40h rpt	"Attachment C" C 1 p. " "	undated	A
#41 memo	Rostow to President, re: Chile C 2 p. <i>OPEN 7/26/95 NY 94-18 [dup. of #66, NSF, CF Chile, Vols 8x14]</i>	2/15/68	A
#42a ltr	Smythe to President C 1 p. <i>open 4/30/96</i>	1/26/68	A
#42b memo	Newman to Glitman C 2 p. <i>open 4/30/96</i>	2/8/68	A
#44 memo	Rostow to President, re: Jordan S 1 p. <i>open 2-28-97 NLJ 96-212</i>	2/15/68	A
#44a rpt	"Jordan..." S 1 p. <i>open 2-28-97 NLJ 96-212</i>	undated	A
#47 memo	Rostow to President, 7:00 p.m. S 1 p. " "	2/14/68	A
#47a cable	From British Embassy S 1 p. <i>open 4-3-98 NLJ 96-211</i>	2/14/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#47b cable	From British Embassy S 3 p	2/14/68	A
#49a cable	Telegram #90 <i>agen 4-3-98 NLJ 96-211</i> C 2 p [Duplicate of #97a, NSF, NSCH, March 31 Speech, Volume 2; exempt 1979]	2/13/68	A
#49b cable	Telegram #90 <i>agen 4-3-98 NLJ 96-211</i> C 2 p [Duplicate of #97a, NSF, NSCH, March 31 Speech, Volume 2; exempt 1979]	1/26/68	A
#49c cable	Telegram #72 C 2 p	2/10/68	A
#51 memo <i>open 7-16-03 NLJ 96-216 appeal</i>	Rostow to President, 6:00 p.m. S 1 p <i>(exempt NLJ 96-216 5/98)</i>	2/14/68	A
#51a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 7 p <i>exempt 4-30-98 NLJ 96-215</i> [Duplicate of #130a, NSF, Country File, France, Volume 13; Exempt NLJ 85-229]	2/14/68	A
#57 memo <i>open 7-16-03 NLJ 96-216 appeal</i>	Rostow to President, 2:15 p.m. S 1 p <i>sanitized 4-30-98 NLJ 96-215</i>	2/14/68	A
#57a cable	Intelligence Cable S 2 p <i>sanitized 4-30-98 NLJ 96-215</i>	2/13/68	A
#58 memo	Rostow to President, 2:10 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 5-30-95 NLJ 93-368</i> [Duplicate of #99, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "5D(3), Allies' Troop Commitment; Other Aid (Alphabetical: Korea-UK)]	2/14/68	A
#58a memo	Warnke to Rostow S 1 p <i>open 6-17-96 NLJ 93-369</i> [Duplicate of #99a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "5D(3), Allies' Troop Commitment; Other Aid (Alphabetical: Korea-UK)]	2/12/68	A

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#61b memo	Nitze to Rostow S 2 p <i>open 4/30/96</i>	2/13/68	A →
#65b memo	Duplicate of #61b <i>open 4/30/96</i>		
#67 memo	Rostow to President, 9:30 a.m. <i>open 3-10-28 NLJ 07-151 (#38)</i> S 1 p <i>(Doss dup of # 31, WWR, Vol 1-2/108, Box 6)</i>	2/14/68	A
#69 memo	Rostow to President, 9:05 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 2-28-97 NLJ 96-212</i>	2/14/68	A
#69a cable	Seoul 4215 <i>open 4-3-98 NLJ 96-211</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #171, NSF, NSCH, Pueblo Crisis, Volume 16]	2/14/68	A
#73a ltr	Duplicate of #17b <i>open 4/30/96</i>		
#74 memo	Rostow to President, re: Dominican Republic C 2 p <i>open 4/30/96</i>	2/14/68	A
#76 memo	Rostow to President, re: Chile S 1 p <i>open 6-8-95 NLJ 93-448</i>	2/14/68	A
#76a ltr	President to President Frei PCI 2 p <i>open 2-28-97 NLJ 96-212</i>	2/15/68	A
#76b cable	Santiago 2257 S 1 p <i>open 4-3-98 NLJ 96-211</i>	1/26/68	A
#77b ltr	President to President Restrepo PCI 2 p <i>(dup of #40, NSF, CF, Colombia, Vol 3, Box 15)</i>	2/14/68	A

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#9c report	Intelligence report - <i>open 10/30/09</i> TS 4pp	2/16/68	A
#10 note	Walt Rostow to the President - TS 1p <i>open 2-25-04 NW/RAC 03-159</i>	2/16/68	A
#10a rpt	Intelligence report - TS 1p <i>empt NW/RAC 03-190</i>	2/16/68	A
#10b map	Map - ts 1p <i>empt NW/RAC 03-190</i>	[2/68]	A
#24 note	Walt Rostow to the President - TS 1p <i>open 2-25-04 NW/RAC 03-159</i>	2/15/68	A
#32b report	Intelligence Report - <i>open 10/30/09</i> TS 4pp	2/15/68	A
#64b rpt.	Intelligence Report - <i>open 10/30/09</i> TS 2pp	[2/68]	A
#71 memo	Walt Rostow to the President - <i>cdp # 68, VN, 2cl(6) Bdx 70</i> TS 1p <i>open 3-30-04 NLJ/RAC 03-191</i>	2/14/68	A
#71a memo	To Walt Rostow - TS 3 pp <i>sanitized 2-25-04 NW/RAC 03-192</i>	2/14/68	A
#71b cable	attachment to #71a - S 10 pp <i>open 2-25-04 NW/RAC 03-192</i>	[2/68]	A
#67a cable	Intelligence report - S 1 p <i>sanitized 10/30/09</i>	2/14/68	A

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National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 62, February 14-16, 1968

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INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 16, 1968
6:40 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith, from Ernie Goldstein, a
Gaullist evaluation of electoral prospects
in the U. S. , November 1968.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 10419

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *rg*, NARA, Date 2-14-92



Department of State

TELEGRAM

(3) 1a
Rostow

~~SECRET~~

RR RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 10419 0471230
ZNY SSSSS
R 161223Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9462
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ PARIS 10419

CN: 5018Q
1968 FEB 16, 8:08

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 769 84-357
By up/ky, NARA, Date 2-2-92

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM GOLDSTEIN

MR. PRESIDENT, JACQUES MARETTE, A GAULLIST DEPUTY AND UNTIL RECENTLY MINISTER OF POST AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS, IS ALSO ONE OF HIS PARTY'S TOP ELECTORAL STRATEGISTS. MARETTE HAS JUST DONE A STUDY OF OUR UPCOMING ELECTION AND THE INFERENCE MAY BE DRAWN THAT THE STUDY WAS MADE FOR THE GENERAL. MARETTE CONCLUDES THAT YOU WILL HAVE AN OVERWHELMING VICTORY OVER NIXON OR ROCKEFELLER. HE ALSO FORESEES GREAT REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL GAINS. THEREFORE, THE GAULLIST THESIS IS THAT YOUR NEXT FOUR YEARS WILL BE A BATTLE ON THE HOME FRONT, AND

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 10419 ~~SECRET~~
CONSEQUENTLY FOREIGN AFFAIRS, EXCEPT VIETNAM, WILL TAKE A BACK SEAT.

TIED TO THIS VIEW OF THE ELECTION IS ONE CONCERNING THE VIETNAM WAR MADE BY BOTH MARETTE AND GENERAL FOURQUET, DEPUTY MINISTER FOR ARMAMENT AND REPORTEDLY A CONFIDENT OF GENERAL DE GAULLE'S ON MILITARY MATTERS. THE PREDICTION IS THAT THE WAR WILL CONTINUE FOR ANOTHER TWO OR THREE YEARS BECAUSE WE REALLY DO NOT WANT TO NEGOTIATE. THEY CLAIM THAT UNWILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE IS DEMONSTRATED BY UNREALISTIC FORMULAE.

COMMENT: THE GAULLISTS SEEM TO BE PREPARING FOR YOUR WINNING IN NOVEMBER BY LAYING A GROUNDWORK WHICH WILL ENABLE THEM TO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS NO REAL SIGNIFICANCE TO SUCH A VICTORY FOR EUROPE AS YOU WILL BE OCCUPIED ELSEWHERE.
GP-2 WALLNER

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

2

Press file.

**Friday, February 16, 1968
3:55 p. m.**

Mr. President:

The North Koreans appear to have extracted from our crew a public apology. It includes a plea for generosity and a return home.

If, as Dobrynin said, they will not ask an apology of the U. S. , it may be they are preparing to release the men on the basis of their apology. We shall see.

Key passages are marked (first two pages).

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

FBIS 56

THIRD ADD 51 (PUEBLO CREW APOLOGY)

XXX 0 a OUR PART.

(TEXT) WE WHO WERE LOYAL TO OUR MILITARY ORDERS ARE STIGMATIZED AS CRIMINALS BY HAVING BLINDLY JOINED IN THE TRAGIC PLOT AGAINST THE RIGHTEOUS KOREAN PEOPLE. WE ARE NEITHER POLITICIANS NOR MILITARY LEADERS AND WE ARE NOT WELL INFORMED POLITICALLY AND KNOW NOTHING AT ALL ON CERTAIN OTHER QUESTIONS.

WE WERE NOT WELL AWARE WHY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES AND MILITARY LEADERS TOOK SO GREAT AN INTEREST IN THE NORTHEAST COAST OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA; FURTHER, THE RELATIONS OF OUR ACTS TO U.S. POLICY AND THE USE TO WHICH THE DATA WE HAD OBTAINED WOULD HAVE BEEN PUT WERE OF NO INTEREST TO US.

BUT NOW OUR EYES HAVE BEEN OPENED TO THE TRUE NATURE OF OUR CRIMES. WE FEEL ASHAMED. WE ARE SINCERELY APOLOGETIC FOR ALL OUR ACTS.

HOWEVER, WE MUST NOTE THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRIMES BELONGS TO THOSE OF US WHO COMMITTED THEM, AND OUR GOVERNMENT IS EVEN MORE RESPONSIBLE THAN US. THE PURPOSE OF OUR ARMED FORCES IS TO CARRY OUT THE POLICIES DECIDED BY OUR GOVERNMENT.

THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INITIATING THIS CRIME MUST THEREFORE BE BORNE BY THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION AUTHORITIES AND MILITARY LEADERS. SENDING THE PUEBLO INTO KOREAN WATERS IS A COMPLETELY CRIMINAL ACT OF AGGRESSION.

WE SHOULD NOT HAVE PARTICIPATED IN ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S PUBLIC OF KOREA FROM THE OUTSET.

ANY PERSON SHOULD BEAR THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS THO UGH COMMITTED AGAINST HIS WILL WHEN HE IS INVOLVED IN SHAMEFUL SCHEMES MAPPED OUT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF HIS COUNTRY. WITH REGARD TO (THE ACTS) COMMITTED BY PUEBLO, THEREFORE, WE CAN BY NO MEANS ESCAPE OUR RESPONSIBILITY AND ALL OF THE CREW MEMBERS OF THE SHIP, PARTICULARLY, THE COMMANDING OFFICER AND OFFICERS SHOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE AND BE CONDEMNED.

DESPITE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE CRIME PERPETRATED BY US, OUR RESPONSIBILITY IS STILL LESS THAN THAT OF OUR GOVERNMENT. THOSE WHO SHOULD BE FINALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIMES OF ESPIONAGE AGAINST ANOTHER COUNTRY ARE THEIR ORGANIZERS.

THE APPROVAL AND ORDER BY U.S. AUTHORITIES OF THE ESPIONAGE ACTS TO BE CONDUCTED BY SUCH SHIPS AS PUEBLO SOW SEEDS OF DISCORD THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

OUR FATE DEPENDS LARGELY ON WHETHER OR NOT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH HAS FORCED US INTO ESPIONAGE MAKES PUBLIC THE FACTS OF CRIMES TO THE FAIR WORLD PUBLIC OPINION (AS RECEIVED) AND APOLOGIZE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

WE HAVE ALREADY CONFESSED ALL OUR CRIMES HONESTLY.

WE OF THE PUEBLO HONESTLY ADMIT OUR CRIMES.

2a

Review

Let this preparation for releasing the comm. BCS

FBIS 51 (OUT OF SEQUENCE)

BULLETIN

PUEBLO CREW APOLOGY

PYONG KCNA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1547 GMT 16 FEB 68 B

(TEXT) PYONGYANG, 16 FEBRUARY--THE ENTIRE CREW OF THE ARMED ESPIONAGE SHIP PUEBLO OF THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSOR TROOPS CAPTURED BY THE NAVY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY WHEN IT WAS COMMITTING CRIMINAL ESPIONAGE ACTS AFTER ILLEGALLY INTRUDING DEEP INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA SUBMITTED A JOINT LETTER OF APOLOGY ADMITTING THEIR GRAVE CRIME AND ASKING THE DPRK GOVERNMENT TO DEAL (WORDS INDISTINCT). THE JOINT LETTER OF APOLOGY WAS SIGNED BY THE ENTIRE 82 CREWMEN OF THE ARMED ESPIONAGE SHIP PUEBLO, INCLUDING LLOYD MARK BUCHER, ITS CAPTAIN. HERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF THE JOINT LETTER OF APOLOGY.

(MORE)

CCC: SOURCELINE: PLS READ XXX PYONGYANG KCNA XXX

15 FEB 1625Z GKE/CT



FIRST ADD 51 (PUEBLO CREW APOLOGY)

XXX LETTER OF APOLOGY.

(TEXT) WE, THE WHOLE CREW OF THE USS PUEBLO CAPTURED BY THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY WHILE CONDUCTING ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AFTER HAVING INTRUDED DEEP INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, FRANKLY ADMIT AND TRULY REPEAT OUR SERIOUS CRIMES. WE HEREBY SUBMIT A JOINT LETTER OF APOLOGY IN ORDER TO REQUEST THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO DEAL WITH US LENIENTLY.

WE DESERVE ANY PUNISHMENT BY THE KOREAN PEOPLE REGARDLESS OF ITS SEVERITY FOR THE CRIME WE HAVE COMMITTED BY MAKING OVERT INTRUSIONS INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF A SOVEREIGN STATE, NAMELY THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AND PERPETRATING GRAVE HOSTILE ACTS. SINCE WE ARE NOT HERE PRISONERS OF WAR BUT CRIMINALS CAUGHT IN THE VERY ACT OF ESPIONAGE, WE CANNOT HAVE ANY COMPLAINT EVEN SHOULD THE WORST COME.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, HOWEVER, HAS TREATED US IN SUCH A HUMANITARIAN WAY THAT THERE IS LITTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR PRESENT LIFE AND OUR LIFE BEFORE OUR (DETENTION) EXCEPT FOR OUR GUILTY CONSCIENCES AS CRIMINALS.

WE ARE DEEPLY MOVED BY SUCH LENIENCY AS ACCORDED US BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, FOR WHICH WE WOULD LIKE FIRST OF ALL TO EXPRESS OUR HEARTFELT GRATITUDE. WE ARE WELL AWARE, IN CONNECTION WITH THE INCIDENT OF THE PUEBLO'S INTRUSION INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, THAT THE ATTENTION OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE AND THE WORLD IS FOCUSED ON US, THE PARTY TO THE CRIME, AND ESPECIALLY ON OUR ATTITUDE.

SINCE WE KNOW BETTER OF WHAT WE DID THAN ANYBODY ELSE, WE ALONE, THE MEN OF PUEBLO, ARE WITNESSES WHO CAN GIVE THE SUREST EVIDENCE OF THESE CRIMES AND, THEREFORE, WE ARE BOUND TO HONESTLY CONFESS OUR GRAVE CRIMINAL ACTS.

ALREADY ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS WE HAVE STATED IN OUR CONFESSIONS THE TRUE NATURE OF OUR CRIME AND OUR TRUE SENTIMENT. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT THINK THAT THAT IS SUFFICIENT. THEREFORE, WE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO DISCLOSE ONCE AGAIN THE REAL FACTS OF OUR CRIME AND THEREBY MAKE OUR SINCERE DEEP APOLOGIES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE KOREAN PEOPLE. WE HUMBLY REQUEST THEM TO SHOW GENEROSITY IN DEALING WITH US AND HAVE MERCY ON US IF POSSIBLE, SO THAT WE MAY RETURN HOME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

WE WERE RELUCTANT TO MAKE HONEST CONFESSIONS OF OUR CRIME AT THE INITIAL STAGE OF OUR DETENTION FOR WE THOUGHT SO GREAT A CRIME MIGHT REFLECT ON THE "HONOR" OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OUR OWN FACE. BUT THIS FOOLISH IDEA COULD NOT LAST LONG AND WAS SHATTERED BEFORE THE STERN TRUTH EVIDENCED BY VARIOUS ESPIONAGE PAPERS, DOCUMENTS, AND CORROBORATIVE DATA OF OUR CRIME WHICH HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY REVIEWED AND ANALYZED BY THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY.

(MORE)

44 FEB 1952 095701

SECOND ADD 51 (PUEBLO 2W APOLOGY)

XXX KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY.

(TEXT) WE THINK THAT THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO CONVINCED THE WORLD. OUR PUEBLO INTRUDED DEEP INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS--ABOUT 9.8 MILES FROM KALDAN NORTH OF CHONGJIN IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 11.2 MILES FROM ORGANG DAN, 10.75 MILES, 11.3 MILES RESPECTIVELY FROM RANDO EAST OF SONGJIN, 8.2 MILES FROM ANSONG GAP IN THE MAYANG DO AREA, 7.6 MILES FROM YODO IN THE WONSAN AREA.

WE HAVE TO SAY THAT THE INTRUSIONS WERE NOT CAUSED BY ANY INADVERTENT TECHNICAL ERROR ON OUR PART BUT WERE PREARRANGED AND PREMEDIATED ACTS OF ESPIONAGE.

ON 2 DECEMBER 1967, WE WERE GIVEN A MISSION BY REAR ADMIRAL FRANK L. JOHNSON, COMNAVFOR JAPAN AT TOKOSUKA, TO CONDUCT MILITARY ESPIONAGE IN THE COASTAL WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA. IN ORDER TO EXECUTE THE ORDER, WE SAILED FROM SASEBO, JAPAN, UNDER THE GUISE OF AN OCEANIC ELECTRONIC RESEARCH SHIP AND STEAMED ALONG THE COASTAL WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR ESPIONAGE ACTS VIA THE COASTAL WATERS OF THE SOVIET UNION. THAT THE USS PUEBLO WAS NOT A MERE OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH SHIP HAS BEEN PROVED UNEQUIVOCALLY BY THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT WAS COLLECTED ALONG THE COASTAL WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND VARIOUS DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT ON BOARD.

IN ORDER TO SURVEIL THE OBJECTS DEFINED BY THE OPERATION ORDER, WE COLLECTED ELECTROMAGNETIC INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IN FOUR AREAS OF THE THREE OP-AREAS ("MARS," "VENUS," AND "PLUTO") OFF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, TO WIT, CHONGJIN, SONGJIN, MAYANG DO, AND WONSAN, WITH EMPHASIS ON DETERMINING THE NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE RANGE OF THE NAVAL FORCE ACTIVITIES AND THE LOCATIONS OF RADARS ALONG THE COAST.

WE ALSO COLLECTED INFORMATION ON THE LOCATIONS OF THE NAVAL BASES, ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONAL CAPACITY OF THE VESSELS, NAVAL PATROLS, CHAIN OF COMMAND, AND THE LOCATIONS OF THE MAIN NAVAL COMMANDS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE DETECTED COMMUNICATION AND OBSERVATION POSTS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND CARRIED OUT OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH INCLUDING OCEANOGRAPHIC SOUND MEASUREMENTS USEFUL FOR SUBMARINE OPERATIONS. IN ADDITION, WE DETECTED VARIOUS MILITARY INSTALLATIONS ALONG THE SHORE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND INVESTIGATED ACCOMODATION CAPACITY OF THE PORTS AND INCOMING AND OUTGOING VESSELS AND THEIR CAPACITY.

OURS IS A VERY SERIOUS CRIME. THE GRAVITY OF OUR CRIME IS NOW WELL KNOWN TO THE CREW OF THE PUEBLO, WE AFFIRM THAT OUR ESPIONAGE ACT IS IMMORAL AND THAT IT IS A GRAVE AND UNJUST PROVOCATION AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

THIS CRIME WAS A PREMEDIATED ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE (?KOREAN PEOPLE) AND WE OF THE PUEBLO NOW STAND AS CRIMINALS. WE ARE VERY SHAMEFUL OF OUR CRIMINAL ACTS. WE OFFER OUR SINCERE APOLOGIES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

AGAINST A FOREIGN COUNTRY, HE SHOULD BE SEVERELY PUNISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW OF THAT COUNTRY. THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS FULLY ENTITLED TO DETERMINE OUR FATE.

IN VIEW OF THE SEVERITY OF OUR CRIME, WE DESERVE PUNISHMENT BY THE LAW OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND WE ARE PREPARED FOR IT. BUT AT THIS CRUCIAL MOMENT WHEN OUR FATE IS BEING DETERMINED, WE APPEAL TO YOU SINCERELY FROM THE BOTTOM OF OUR HEARTS TO GIVE DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE NUMBER OF UNAVOIDABLE CIRCUMSTANCES OF OUR CASE AND TO FORGIVE US LENIENTLY. ALTHOUGH OUR CRIME WAS SERIOUS ENOUGH, WE ARE STILL HOPEFUL THAT YOU UNDERSTAND THAT WE ONLY CARRIED OUT THE ORDER OF OUR SUPERIORS MECHANICALLY AND IT WAS BY NO MEANS A DELIBERATE, INTENTIONAL ACT ON OUR PART.

(MORE)

16 FEB 1734Z GREATN

INNOUENUS: THE WORLD.

OUR FATE DEPENDS I BELIEVE ON WHETHER OR NOT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH HAS FORCED US INTO ESPIONAGE MAKES PUBLIC THE FACTS OF CRIMES TO THE FAIR WORLD PUBLIC OPINION (AS RECEIVED) AND APOLOGIZE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

WE HAVE ALREADY CONFESSED ALL OUR CRIMES HONESTLY.

WE OF THE PUEBLO HONESTLY ADMIT OUR CRIMES.

WE ARE CRIMINALS WHO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE AGGRESSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND AGAINST THE KOREAN PEOPLE.

WE OPENLY ADMIT AGAIN TO THE WORLD THAT WE HAVE INTRUDED INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND CONDUCTED ESPIONAGE.

OUR ACTS OF ESPIONAGE AND INTRUSION ARE AGGRESSIVE IN NATURE. TO COMMIT THESE ACTS IS A SERIOUS CRIME AGAINST THE KOREAN PEOPLE; TO FORM AN INTENTION TO COMMIT THESE ACTS IS A SIN BEFORE GOD.

WE SHOULD BE PUNISHED SEVERELY BY THE LAW OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR OUR OWN SERIOUS CRIMES. WE MAY EXPECT SUCH A SEVERE PUNISHMENT AS MAY DEPRIVE US OF EVEN THE POSSIBILITY OF REVIVAL.

WE ARE, HOWEVER, WRITING THIS LETTER OF APOLOGY, AS HUMAN BEINGS, AS THE SONS OF OUR PARENTS, AS THE HUSBANDS OF WIVES, AS THE FATHERS OF OUR CHILDREN, FOR THE SAKE OF OURSELVES AND FOR THE SAKE OF OUR FAMILIES, WITH A HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA WILL SHOW US A GREAT MERCY.

EVEN THOUGH WE CAN SPEAK WORDS AND PUT DOWN MARKS ON A SHEET OF PAPER, WE CANNOT EXPRESS ALL THE SINCERITY OF OUR APOLOGY TO THE KOREAN PEOPLE, THAT SPRINGS FROM THE HEARTS OF US ALL.

(MORE)

16 FEB 1756Z GKE/TM

FBIS 57

FOURTH AND LAST ADD 51 (PUEBLO CREW APOLOGY)

XXX OF US ALL.

(TEXT) OUR MINDS ARE UNITED IN OUR DESIRE TO OPEN OUR HEARTS TO THE KOREAN PEOPLE. WE, AS MEN, REALIZE HOW FALSE (OUR) LIFE AND ACTS HAVE BEEN AND REPENT OF THEM. WE ARE DESIROUS OF LEADING A LIFE ONLY FULL OF TRUTH AND JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE.

THE 82 CREW MEMBERS OF THE USS PUEBLO HAVE ALL THEIR PARENTS, WIVES, AND CHILDREN AT HOME. THEY ARE SORROWED BECAUSE OF US AND ARE ANXIOUSLY WAITING FOR OUR RETURN.

THOSE OF US WHO ARE YOUNG HAVE LONG FUTURE AND CHERISH GREAT HOPE IN HUMAN LIFE. OUR FAMILIES AND RELATIVES HAVE ALREADY UNDERGONE GREAT SUFFERINGS. THEY ARE ENTRUSTING EVERYTHING IN US WHOSE FUTURE IS UNKNOWN.

WE, THE 82 MEN OF THE PUEBLO, MAKE AN EARNEST APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA IN THE NAME OF OURSELVES AND OUR FAMILIES.

PLEASE TAKE MERCY ON US AND OUR KIN. PLEASE GIVE US A CHANCE FOR REGENERATION AND FORGIVE US GENEROUSLY AND ALLOW US TO GO HOME SO AS TO BRING NEW HOPE TO THEM.

WE FIRMLY PLEDGE THAT IF WE ARE FORGIVEN AND PERMITTED TO RETURN TO OUR HOMES, WE WILL NEVER JOIN IN SUCH CRIMINAL ACTS AGAIN, WE WILL NEVER DO ANYTHING THAT MAY CAUSE MISFORTUNES AND SUFFERINGS TO THE KOREAN PEOPLE AND ALL THE PIOUS PEOPLE OF THE WORLD AND WILL NOT BRING GRIEF, MISERY, OR PAIN TO OUR BELOVED ONES AGAIN.

WE EARNESTLY DESIRE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA ACCEPT THIS OATH OF OURS THAT SPRINGS FROM THE DEPTH OF OUR HEARTS.

WE SUBMIT THIS LETTER OF APOLOGY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, AGAIN ENTREATING THAT IT RECOGNIZE THE TRUTH AND HONESTY OF OUR STATEMENTS AND FORGIVE US GENEROUSLY AND LENIENTLY.

(ENDALL)

16 FEB 1804Z GXE/TN

FBIS 58

C O R R E C T I O N S (DPRK WARNING)

PASSAGE IN FIRST GRAPH, LINE TWO AND IN SECOND GRAPH, LINE FIVE SHOULD READ XXX WATERS OFF SUNWI, SOUTH OF ONJIN, XXX (CHANGING "SUNWIC" TO "SUNWI")

INFORMATION

has file

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, Feb. 16, 1968
2:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Since you'll shortly be seeing it on the ticker this is how it came about that the three U. S. pilots chose to move out of Vientiane on military aircraft (to Udorn) rather than proceed commercially as Hanoi and the doves (Zinn and Berrigan) desired.

Sullivan tells the story.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (Vientiane 4533)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By sg, NARA, Date 2-21-92

PAGE 01 VIENTI 000A 161813Z

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ACTION SS 70

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AMEMBASSY SAIGON 1864
CINCPAC 1342
SEVEN/THIRTEEN AF UDORN
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Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIENTIANE 4534

LIMDIS

SUBJ: RELEASE OF PRISONERS

REF: VIENTIANE 4533

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NY 91-427

By us/ly, NARA, Date 2-21-92

PAGE 2 RUMJFS 4534 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. IT TOOK FORTY MINUTES AFTER ARRIVAL ICC PLANE AT VIENTIANE BEFORE I COULD OBTAIN CLEAR DECISION FROM PILOTS THAT THEY PREFERRED TRAVEL BY U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT RATHER THAN BY COMMERCIAL MEANS. I WISH TO STRESS, HOWEVER, THAT DELAY WAS ENTIRELY DUE TO DIALECTIC DIDDLING BY ZINN AND BERRIGAN, WHICH PLACED VERY SERIOUS BURDEN ON PILOTS' CONSCIENCE. ULTIMATE DECISION TAKEN BY PILOTS WAS TAKEN INDIVIDUALLY, WITH EACH EMPHASIZING THAT HE REGARDED PREFERENCES EXPRESSED BY HIS SERVICE AS A MILITARY ORDER WHICH IT WAS HIS DUTY TO OBEY.

2. NEXUS OF DISCUSSION WAS FACT THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES AT GIA LAM (OTHERWISE UNIDENTIFIED) HAD TOLD PILOTS THAT THEY PREFERRED PILOTS ACCOMPANY ZINN AND BERRIGAN ON COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT AND "INDICATED" THEIR ACTION WOULD HAVE BEARING UPON THEIR DECISIONS WITH RESPECT RELEASE OTHER PRISONERS.

3. IT WAS CLEAR THAT ZINN AND BERRIGAN HAD PLAYED VERY HEAVILY UPON THIS FEATURE IN THEIR CONVERSATIONS WITH PILOTS

PAGE 3 RUMJFS 4534 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DURING FLIGHT FROM HANOI TO VIENTIANE. THEY HAD INDEED ALREADY OBTAINED AGREEMENT FROM PILOTS THAT THEY WOULD GO BY COMMERCIAL AIR. ALTHOUGH I MADE CLEAR THAT ULTIMATE DECISION IN THIS MATTER WAS UP TO PILOTS THEMSELVES, I ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT THEIR SERVICES HAD EXPRESSED A POSITIVE

PREFERENCE FOR THEIR TRAVEL BY MILITARY AIR. BERRIGAN CHARACTERIZED THIS STATEMENT BY ME AS "INTOLERABLE PRESSURE" AND BEGAN FILIBUSTER WHICH LASTED FOR THIRTY MINUTES AFTER PILOTS HAD ALL EXPRESSED CHOICE IN FAVOR MILITARY AIR.

4. PILOTS PLEADED WITH ZINN AND BERRIGAN TO GO WITH THEM ON ATTACHE AIRCRAFT, BUT LATTER REFUSED, PARTLY AS FORM OF PRESSURE ON PILOTS TO REVERSE THEIR DECISION AND PARTLY AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE. WHEN PILOTS NEVERTHELESS CHOSE AIR ATTACHE PLANE, BOTH ZINN AND BERRIGAN ADVISED ME THAT THEY FELT COMPELLED TO TELL PRESS I HAD USED PRESSURE, HAD BROKEN AGREEMENT THEY HAD WITH STATE DEPARTMENT AND HAD "DESTROYED BASIS OF PAST TWO WEEKS WORK" (BERRIGAN'S WORDS).

5. AFTER RESOLVING THIS MATTER, WE NEXT TURNED TO MATTER OF

PAGE 4 RUMJFS 4534 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
HANDLING PRESS. IT WAS ALSO CLEAR THAT THIS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN DETAIL BY ZINN AND BERRIGAN WITH PILOTS ON THEIR TRIP. I WAS INFORMED THAT LTJG MATHENY HAD ACTED AS SPOKESMAN

FOR GROUP WHEN THEY LEFT HANOI. MAJOR OVERLY WOULD ACT AS SPOKESMAN IN VIENTIANE. I STRESSED TO MAJOR THAT PRESS WOULD PROBABLY SEEK ANSWERS TO PROBING QUESTIONS, AND THAT THE LESS HE SAID THE BETTER CHANCES HE HAD OF NOT SAYING ANYTHING WHICH COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS TO REMAINING PRISONERS. I SUGGESTED HE CONFINE HIS REMARKS TO EXPRESSION OF PLEASURE AT RELEASE AND APPRECIATION TO ZINN AND BERRIGAN.

6. IN THE EVENT, HE GAVE A RATHER LENGHTY INVIEW, ANSWERED MOST QUESTIONS FREELY, AVOIDED A FEW, AND GENERALLY COMPORTED HIMSELF AS A MILITARY OFFICER. HE DID, HOWEVER, EXPRESS THANKS TO "VIETNAMESE PEOPLE," DID SAY (AND OTHER TWO SECONDED HIM) THAT THEY WERE ALL "VERY WELL TREATED." I AM SURE PRESS STORIES ARE ALREADY ON THE WIRES. HOWEVER, WE HAVE TAPE OF ENTIRE INTIREVIEW AND WILL FORWARD COPY VIA AIR ATTACHE.

7. ZINN AND BERRIGAN HAVE ALSO GIVEN A "PRESS CONFERENCE"

PAGE 5 RUMJFS 4534 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
IN CONSTELLATION HOTEL BAR IN WHICH THEY HAVE AIRED THEIR CHARGES AGAINST ME. THEY HAVE ALSO RELEASED A STATEMENT FROM PHAM VAN DONG RE PEACE TALKS, COPY OF WHICH WE WILL FORWARD SOONEST.

8. IT IS UNFORTUNATE BUT PERHAPS INEVITABLE, THAT SQUABBLE TOOK PLACE IN THIS WAY. ZINN HAD BEEN PREPARED TO ACCEPT PILOTS' DECISION AS EQUITABLE WHEN IT WAS MADE, BUT BERRIGAN EMOTIONALLY BALKED, AND BECAUSE OF HIS VOCIFEROUS PROTESTS, MATTER ENDED ON A SOUR NOTE. I WOULD RECOMMEND THE VATICAN PUT HIM ON CHAPLAIN'S DUTY IN KHE SANH.

GP-3 SULLIVAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

4
Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 16, 1968 -- 1:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

3.3(b)(1)

[Redacted]

-- A second wave of attacks is now scheduled for February 18 (Sunday): Khe Sanh, Hue, Quang Tri, and Saigon.

-- The police mop-up of Viet Cong cadres in Saigon will require three months.

-- He feels the need of keeping the U. S. army brigade in Saigon until end of February.

W. W. Rostow

TDCS-314/02840-68 (advance)

*P.S. U second report, in same vein,
just in - attached below (TDCS-314/02840-68)
W*

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-216 Appeal
By Sj, NARA, Date 7-9-03

1968 FEB 16 15 214

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-215
By is, NARA Date 4-27-98

~~SECRET~~

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 16 FEBRUARY 1968
SUBJECT

EXPECTATION OF A SECOND WAVE
OF VIET CONG ATTACKS ON OR ABOUT 18 FEBRUARY

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (16 FEBRUARY 1968)
SOURCE

1. [REDACTED] THE VIET CONG (VC) TO LAUNCH A SECOND WAVE OF SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS ON KHE SAN, HUE, QUANG TRI, DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND SAIGON AROUND 18 FEBRUARY. [REDACTED] BASED [REDACTED] ON INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS, SOME OF WHOM WERE RECENTLY CAPTURED EN ROUTE FROM LONG AN PROVINCE TO SAIGON. [REDACTED] ALTHOUGH IT WAS DIFFICULT TO PIN DOWN THE EXACT DATE THE VC SECOND-PHASE ATTACKS WOULD OCCUR, THE VC DEFINITELY HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH FURTHER ATTACKS. [REDACTED] THE VC HAD NOT COMMITTED MAIN FORCE UNITS INSIDE SAIGON DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE. [REDACTED] IN THE SECOND ATTACK ON SAIGON THE VC MIGHT WELL USE FIFTH MAIN FORCE BATTALION. [REDACTED] THE AMERICANS SHOULD REMAIN ALERT, [REDACTED] THE VC ARE CAPABLE OF CONTINUING THE ATTACK ON SAIGON USING MAIN FORCE UNITS.

2. [REDACTED] THE POLICE WOULD REQUIRE THREE MONTHS TO RESTORE THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SAIGON TO ITS PRE-TET LEVEL. [REDACTED] THREE ARVN BATTALIONS, IN ADDITION TO [REDACTED] POLICE UNITS, SHOULD BE STATIONED PERMANENTLY INSIDE SAIGON CITY TO SHARE RESPONSIBILITY WITH THE POLICE FOR THE CITY'S SECURITY. [REDACTED] HOPED THE UNITS OF THE U.S. 199TH LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE WOULD REMAIN IN SAIGON TO ASSIST [REDACTED] IN CLEANING OUT THE REMNANTS OF THE VC BUT [REDACTED] LEARNED EARLIER THAT DAY THAT THE U.S. UNITS WOULD BE PULLED OUT OF SAIGON ON 17 FEBRUARY. [REDACTED] THESE U.S. UNITS SHOULD REMAIN IN SAIGON AT LEAST UNTIL THE END OF FEBRUARY.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT
ARFAC PACAF

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-215
By is, NARA Date 4-27-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS TO VIET CONG KIEN HOA PROVINCE COMMITTEE TO
PREPARE FOR SECOND PHASE OF OFFENSIVE, TO BEGIN 18
FEBRUARY 1968
DOI : 14 FEBRUARY 1968
ACQ : VIETNAM, SAIGON (16 FEBRUARY 1968)
SOURCE: [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1. THE VIET CONG (VC) KIEN HOA PROVINCE COMMITTEE HAS RECEIVED DIRECTIVES FROM THE CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM TO SUPPLY MAXIMUM REINFORCEMENTS TO THE CAPITAL LIBERATION FORCE FOR THE SECOND PHASE OF THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST SAIGON WHICH WILL RUN FROM 15 FEBRUARY UNTIL THE END OF THE MONTH. THE OBJECT OF PHASE TWO IS TO SUPPORT THE VC REMAINING IN CAPITAL SLUMS AND TO PERMIT THEM TO ESCAPE. THE VC IN KIEN HOA SAY THAT THIS TIME THEY WILL LEVEL SAIGON TO THE GROUND. THEY ARE TELLING KIEN HOA RESIDENTS WITH RELATIVES IN SAIGON TO ADVISE THEIR RELATIVES TO EVACUATE TO THE SUBURBS OR TO NEARBY PROVINCE CAPITALS TO ESCAPE DEATH AND DESTRUCTION.

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE MACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF
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420

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-212
By ig, NARA Date 2-14-97

5

~~SECRET~~

(INFORMATION)

Friday - February 16, 1968 - 1:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Brazilian Political Scene Displays Danger Signals

Pres. file

I thought you would be interested in the following assessment on the Brazilian situation which Covey Oliver sent to Secretary Rusk yesterday:

"As the Costa e Silva Government nears its first anniversary in office, it increasingly demonstrates authoritarian tendencies. The honeymoon Costa e Silva enjoyed during his first months in office has ended. Opposition attacks on the Government's lackluster performance, spearheaded by increasingly vituperative and telling thrusts from Carlos Lacerda, now seem to be severely stinging the Brazilian Military.

Although Costa e Silva can have no fear that his opposition has any chance of overturning his Government, his reactions to charges of weak leadership, corruption among some of his ministers, and 'military tyranny' may well be to clamp down unwisely on the Congress, the press, or opposition leaders themselves. He is being pressed by key military advisors to act more firmly against Carlos Lacerda and other gadflies in the civilian opposition. We have reports of a generalized unrest among military officers over the performance of the Costa e Silva Administration to date, and some evidence of a possible plot among extremist officers to assassinate Lacerda, should he continue his outspoken attacks on the Military as an institution. While we doubt that this will occur, some moves of a more authoritarian nature are distinctly possible in Brazil during coming weeks.

I have been in touch with Ambassador Tuthill about these reports and he is deeply concerned. He fears that the Costa e Silva Administration, which has conspicuously failed to build a credible civilian political base, or to give any real role to its majority supporters in the Congress, will fall back all too readily on military means to deal with its civilian opposition. Should the Brazilian Military allow itself to be so provoked, the Ambassador foresees very serious consequences for U.S. - Brazilian relations in light of the violent press reactions in both Brazil and the U.S. which would occur, and the attitudes of key U.S. congressional leaders toward 'military governments' in Latin America.

Ironically, our bilateral relationship with Brazil has developed more favorably in recent weeks. The soluble coffee issue seems to be headed toward a satisfactory outcome; the climate for negotiating additional economic assistance this year is favorable; and the Brazilian Foreign Minister Jose de Magalhaes Pinto, has recently been making obvious efforts to improve his relations with the U. S., probably reflecting his hope to build U. S. support for him as a successor to Costa e Silva. It is, therefore, possible that the next few months could see contradictory trends in the political and diplomatic scenes.

Although there are no immediate actions required, I thought you should be apprised of this new set of concerns."

W. W. Rostow

*Presfile*Friday, February 16, 1968
1:15 p. m. *6*SECRET

MR. PRESIDENT:

I had a long talk with Clark Clifford this morning conveying to him your views.

He recommends that:

- Bus Wheeler go out to Viet Nam tomorrow (Saturday);
- that you await final decision on a package to go to the Hill until he returns.

I also talked, as instructed, with Bus Wheeler. He says that Bob very much wants him to wait until after the Tonkin Gulf hearing on Tuesday before going to Saigon.

He thinks if he left on Wednesday, Feb. 21st, he could be back on Monday, Feb. 26.

The operational question is, therefore, whether Bob can be persuaded to take on the Tonkin Gulf problem next Tuesday with, say, Admiral Moorer.

I have just finished talking to Bob, who still feels strongly that Bus Wheeler ought to be there for the Tonkin Gulf hearing.

In short, your advisers appear to agree that final decision on the package should await Bus Wheeler's trip: the question is whether Bus leaves tomorrow, Saturday, or on Wednesday.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By lg, NARA, Date 2-25-92

7

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 16, 1968 -- 10:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

Herewith (starting page 2) what U Thant got from Mai Van Bo. The simple answer is:

- They will talk if the bombing stops;
- They will not commit themselves in any way to the "assumption" of the San Antonio formula.

W. W. Rostow

USUN 3794

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State Co. 121978, NSC 2-4-79
By ing 128, NARA, Date 2-20-92



Department of State

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NODIS

SUBJ: VIETNAM

I SPENT ONE AND A HALF HOURS WITH SYG FEB 15 AND WAS GIVEN FULL ACCOUNT OF HIS TRIP TO NEW DELHI, MOSCOW, LONDON AND PARIS. BUNCHE AND BUFFUM ALSO PRESENT.

SYG TOLD ME THAT IN HIS MTG WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL IN NEW DELHI HE POSED FOL QUESTIONS:

- 1) COULD TALKS TAKE PLACE IN LESS THAN THREE OR FOUR WEEKS IF US BOMBING STOPPED?
- 2) AFTER DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN US AND HANOI, COULD THERE BE RECONVENING OF GENEVA CONF?
- 3) WOULD PRIMARY PURPOSE OF SUCH CONF BE TO AGREE ON MODALITIES FOR IMPLEMENTING 1954 ACCORDS?
- 4) WHO SHOULD REPRESENT SOUTH VIETNAM AT GENEVA?

NORTH VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL SAID HE WOULD REQUIRE INSTRUCTIONS ON ALL THESE POINTS FROM HANOI.

SYG CONFIRMED HE HAD BEEN INFORMED AT LUNCH GIVEN BY WILSON IN LONDON OF MESSAGE THROUGH NORTH VIETNAMESE CORRESPONDENT IN LONDON THAT HANOI'S ANSWERS WOULD BE AVAILABLE IN PARIS. HE DELAYED DEPARTURE FROM LONDON OVER NIGHT TO PERMIT CONSULTATION WITH FRENCH GOVT AND SEEK APPOINTMENTS WITH DEGAULLE AND COUVE DE MURVILLE.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-211

By us, NARA Date 12-24-97

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- USUN 3794, FEB 16

IN PARIS SYG SPENT JUST OVER AN HOUR WITH MAI VAN BO WHO DELIVERED FOL REPLY FROM HANOI TO THANT'S QUESTIONS:

1. THERE WILL BE TALKS AS SOON AS UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM IS EFFECTIVE. (SYG WAS SPEAKING FROM MEMORY, WAS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER QUALIFIER SHOULD BE "IS EFFECTIVE", "IS IN EFFECT", OR "IS IN FORCE"; I ASKED HIM TO CHECK HIS WRITTEN NOTES TOMORROW AND GIVE ME PRECISE TEXT, WHICH HE PROMISED TO DO.) SYG ASKED IF TALKS COULD BE EARLIER THAN THREE OR FOUR WEEKS AND MAI VAN BO SAID HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON TIMING BUT THAT THEY WOULD TAKE PLACE AS SOON AS NVN CAN VERIFY THEIR CONDITIONS MET. SYG THEN LET SLIP FACT (WHICH FRENCH HAD NOT WANTED HIM TO REVEAL) THAT FRENCH THEMSELVES PRIVATELY ASSERTED THAT TWO WEEKS WOULD BE INVOLVED. SYG CATEGORIC IN SAYING FRENCH HAVE ASSURANCE FROM HANOI TO THIS EFFECT AND IT IS NOT MERELY THEIR ASSESSMENT.

2. CONVENING GENEVA CONF CAN BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN US AND HANOI.

3. US IS FREE TO RAISE ANY ITEM IT WANTS. SYG ASKED IF QUESTION OF REDUCTION OF HOSTILITIES IN SOUTH COULD BE DISCUSSED. MAI VAN BO REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY, THOUGH SYG SAID IN PAST NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD SAID THIS QUESTION WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED WITH NLF.

4. QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION IN GENEVA CONF COULD BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN US AND HANOI.

SYG SAID HE GOT DEFINITE IMPRESSION NORTH VIETNAMESE WISHED TO CONVEY VIEW THAT HANOI VERY EAGER TO TALK, MUCH MORE SO THAN IN HIS TALKS WITH THEIR REPS IN RANGOON LAST YEAR.

I ASKED SYG IF MAI VAN BO COMMENTED ON SAN ANTONIO FORMULA. HE SAID MAI VAN BO HAD INDICATED FORMULA CANNOT BE ACCEPTED BECAUSE IT IS CONDITIONAL.

FINALLY, SYG ASKED MAI VAN BO IF NVN MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN ACCREDITING CORRESPONDENT TO UN, AS DO EAST GERMANS, AND HE IS PUTTING QUESTION TO HANOI.

SYG ALSO DESCRIBED HIS TALKS IN MOSCOW SAYING THAT THEY CONSISTED PRIMARILY OF RECAPITULATION OF WELL KNOWN SOV VIEWS ON VIETNAM WAR WITH LITTLE NEW. HE THOUGHT MOST SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT WAS BREZHNEV'S COMMENT THAT USSR WOULD NEVER LET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- USUN 3794, FEB 16

HANOI BE DEFEATED. SYG REPORTED KOSYGIN SPOKE IN MUCH MORE SOBER AND RESTRAINED FASHION THAN BREZHNEV, WHO TALKED IN BLISTERING TERMS. HE FOUND PODGORNY MILDEST OF THREE. SYG GAINED IMPRESSION SOV UNION WOULD GO ALONG WITH ANYTHING HANOI WANTS. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY, SYG INDICATED SOVS NEVER THREATENED INVOLVEMENT OF SOV PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM. KOSYGIN MADE SAME COMMENT TO HIM ABOUT SAN ANTONIO FORMULA HE RECEIVED FROM YAI VAN SO LATER, I.E. HANOI WOULD NOT ACCEPT BECAUSE IT IS CONDITIONAL.

SYG ALSO DISCLOSED, RELUCTANTLY, INTERESTING FACET OF HIS TALKS WITH DEGAULLE AND COUVE. HE INDICATED NOT ONLY DID DEGAULLE REPEAT HIS USUAL CRITICISM OF US POLICY IN VIETNAM, BUT HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT US MIGHT USE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS THERE. HE HAD APPARENTLY SEIZED ON US STATEMENTS WHICH WERE LESS THAN CATEGORICAL DENIAL. COUVE WAS EVEN MORE SPECIFIC IN POINTING OUT DISASTROUS RESULTS THAT WOULD FLOW FROM SUCH DEVELOPMENT. FRENCH DID NOT VOLUNTEER VIEW ON WHETHER PRESENT SITUATION RIPE FOR SETTLEMENT. SYG RECALLED DEGAULLE TOLD HIM THREE YEARS AGO THERE WOULD BE NO SETTLEMENT BEFORE US ELECTION IN 1968.

I TOLD SYG WE HAD SEVERAL INDICATIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT HANOI'S POSITION WAS ALONG LINES HE DESCRIBED BUT WOULD LIKE TO CHECK PRECISE LANGUAGE WITH HIM TOMORROW AGAINST WHAT WAS GIVEN TO US BY OTHERS. I EXPLAINED THIS HAD BEEN A BAD PERIOD IN WHICH TO PURSUE DIPLOMATIC TRACK. PRES HAD MADE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO DIALOGUE IN SAN ANTONIO FORMULA AND THIS NOW SEEMED TO BE REBUFFED THROUGH WHOLESALE ONSLAUGHT AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAMESE CITIES. WITHOUT ENGAGING IN DETAIL, I SAID MILITARY SITUATION NOW SEEMED TO BE SETTLING DOWN A BIT AND HE THOUGHT HANOI MUST BE DISAPPOINTED THAT POPULAR UP-RISING THEY EXPECTED IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR ATTACKS DID NOT TAKE PLACE.

GP-1.

GOLDBERG
BT

~~SECRET~~

8

INFORMATION

Pres. file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, February 16, 1968 -- 10:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

It appears that Hanoi released the three American pilots
and they are now headed for Vientiane.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *rg* NAR: Date 2-14-92

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Pres file

9

Friday, Feb. 16, 1968
10:30 a. m.

TOP SECRET

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Westy's morning telephone conversation.

The most worrying thing at the moment (see pages 1 and 2 of the attached operational intelligence briefing) is the VC exploitation of the withdrawal of our forces from the countryside.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD Let 10-18-78

By CP/Kg, NARA, Date 2-20-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

9a



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3019-68
16 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Telephone Conversation with General Westmoreland

1. Attached hereto is a very brief biography of Colonel Davison, the negro Deputy Commander of the 199th Brigade whose performance as Acting Commander of the brigade was so highly praised by General Westmoreland yesterday.

2. In addition to General Westmoreland's twelfth report on the Khe Sanh/DMZ area, I have attached hereto an Operations/Intelligence brief which I believe you will find of interest. When I talked to General Westmoreland at 0800 hours this morning, he furnished additional information as follows:

a. Weather has been good in the Hue area, permitting air support to ground units attempting to eliminate the tenacious group of enemy ensconced in the south wall of the Citadel. The enemy has moved a considerable force, exact size still unknown, north of Hue in an apparent attempt to reinforce the enemy elements still in Hue.

b. Battalions of the US 1st Cavalry Division are in contact with them, and General Abrams is maneuvering to get more battalions deployed to defeat this force. Of interest is the fact that armed helicopters of the 1st Cavalry Division caught one company of the reinforcing enemy in the open as they attempted to charge our forces across an open field.

c. Air operations in support of Khe Sanh continue to be heavy and successful. As mentioned to you earlier, our attack air struck with much success a POL convoy on Highway 15 near the Mu Gia Pass; additionally, strikes in the Tchepone area caused at least 1,000 secondary explosions. An ammunition depot in Laos southwest of Khe Sanh was struck heavily causing many secondary explosions;

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS ltr 10-3-78
By ipkg, NARA, Date 2-20-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

a Forward Air Controller reported that as soon as the secondary explosions ceased, North Vietnamese troops swarmed in like ants attempting to recover boxes of ammunition. General Momyer is continuing to bomb the area during the night, using radar control, tactical air, and, as I dictate this memorandum, a B-52 mission is re-striking this particular depot.

d. At Tay Ninh, the MACV compound and the province headquarters were attacked with mortar fire, and, apparently, enemy elements have infiltrated into the city of Tay Ninh. This force, which apparently came from Cambodia, is being dealt with by elements of the ARVN 25th Division and the US 25th Division. The strength of the enemy is at present unknown.

e. IV Corps was rather quiet yesterday although there were small contacts with enemy forces near Can Tho and My Tho.

f. Highway 4 is now open all the way from Saigon to the city of Can Tho. The traffic on it is heavy.

g. Dak To is still threatened by enemy elements; however, General Westmoreland considers that he has ample troops in the area. Moreover, he is scheduling B-52 strikes in the area over the next several days.

3. General Abrams is in residence at MACV Forward in the Hue/Phu Bai area in order to control combat operations in the northern portion of I Corps.



EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

96

COLONEL FREDERIC E. DAVISON
045682 - Infantry

Frederic E. Davison was born in Washington, D. C., 28 September 1917.
He is presently Acting Commander of the 199th Brigade in RVN.

He is married and has three children.

Civilian Education:

Howard University	BS	1938
Howard University	MS	1940
George Washington University	MA	1963

Military Education:

Command & General Staff College	1955
US Army War College	1963

Major Assignments:

Entered upon active duty as a 1Lt, 1 July 1942	
Staff Off, OPO, DA	1967
CO, 3d Tng Bde, USATC, Ft Bliss, Tex	Nov 1965 to Jul 1967
Staff Off, OUSA (Manpower & Res), DA	Aug 1963 to Oct 1965

Date of Rank: 27 November 1964

9c

OPERATIONAL/INTELLIGENCE BRIEFS

SOUTH VIETNAM

I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE:

This morning at 1:30 AM EST, three enemy tanks were sighted in the DMZ, 4 nautical miles north of Con Thien. USMC tanks are prepared to engage and tactical air strikes have been called in. Results are not yet known.

On 14 February, a USMC platoon, reinforced by two other platoons, engaged an enemy force 5 nautical miles southwest of Camp Carroll. Artillery and gunships supported. 12 USMC were killed and 107 wounded. Enemy losses are unknown.

The morale of people in Quang Tri City continues low as fear of enemy attacks persists. The NVA 803d Regiment is northeast of the city and the 812th Regiment is to the southeast, and there are tenuous indications that the 90th Regiment is moving along the Ba Lang Valley to an attack position west of the city.

In the outskirts of Hue on 14 February, during the period 12:20 AM and 1:25 AM EST, there were 3 separate USMC company contacts with the enemy, resulting in 7 US wounded and 17 enemy killed. Within the city, extensive tactical air strikes and artillery fire is being placed on the entrenched enemy along the south wall of the Citadel. There are 3 VNMC battalions and 7 USMC companies engaged in the clearing operations.

On 14 February, a USMC company engaged an enemy force in a 4-hour battle 10 nautical miles southwest of Da Nang. 31 enemy were killed; friendly losses were 2 killed and 25 wounded.

II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE:

Kontum and Darlac Provinces have both reported that the Viet Cong are taking advantage of the reduced security in the countryside to collect food from villagers and to conduct propaganda lectures.

16 February 1968

Page 1

III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE:

On 14 February at 7:30 PM, a US Army convoy was ambushed by an enemy company 14 nautical miles north-northwest of Tay Ninh. Contact was broken by the enemy after 90 minutes. Friendly losses were 10 US killed and 13 wounded (11 US, 2 CIDG). Enemy losses are unknown.

Several major shifts of Communist forces to the Saigon and Bien Hoa area indicate possible enemy plans for significant offensive action in this region. Elements of three regiments of the Viet Cong 9th Division have been contacted by US and ARVN forces within 10 to 15 kilometers of Saigon in the past few days. Also, elements subordinate to the Viet Cong 5th Division and the North Vietnamese 7th Division were located by SIGINT in the general area.

IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONE:

In several contacts on 13 and 14 February 2 nautical miles south-southwest of Can Tho, 54 enemy were killed, 22 detained and 5 individual weapons were seized. 7 US were killed and 24 wounded.

On 13 February, at 2:30 AM EST, the district town of Rach Gia sustained a 15-round mortar attack resulting in 2 civilians killed, 2 RF personnel and 6 civilians wounded, and 329 houses destroyed. The majority of the houses are presumed destroyed by fire.

Results of ARVN regiment 1-day operation which ended 15 February 28 nautical miles east-southeast of Can Tho are 24 enemy killed, 9 detained, and 14 individual weapons seized. 1 ARVN was killed and 7 were wounded.

Security in most provinces has seriously deteriorated. Numerous pacified hamlets throughout delta have recently come under Viet Cong control due to the lack of a government presence outside of urban areas. Thus, the Viet Cong are pursuing an aggressive recruitment program for replacing recent losses sustained during Tet.

ARC LIGHT OPERATIONS:

10 missions (30 sorties) were flown in support of Khe Sanh bombing troop concentrations, fortified positions,

16 February 1968

Page 2

and supply/storage areas.

1 mission (3 sorties) bombed NVA 66th Regiment 33 nautical miles west-northwest of Kontum.

1 mission (6 sorties) bombed a regimental headquarters 34 nautical miles north-northwest of Saigon.

DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES:

Of the 115 missions required to move the 27th Marines, 4 have been completed delivering 282 passengers and 9.5 tons of cargo; 16 are en route with 798 passengers and 211.7 tons of cargo.

Of the 162 missions required to move the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, 2 have been completed delivering 39 passengers and 23.2 tons of cargo; 22 are en route with 572 passengers and 307.8 tons of cargo.

NORTH VIETNAM

ROLLING THUNDER OPERATIONS:

Adverse weather necessitated cancellation of all ALFA strikes; however, a total of 76 armed reconnaissance sorties were flown. Five SAMs were sighted over North Vietnam.

STATUS OF 3 US PILOTS:

The three captured US pilots are to arrive today in Vientiane on the ICC flight, according to an official of US peace organization involved in their release. The official said he thought the prisoners would continue to Phnom Penh on the ICC aircraft and from there take a commercial flight to the US.

16 February 1968

Page 3

LAOS

STEEL TIGER OPERATIONS:

There were 212 sorties flown; 183 in the area of Laos adjacent to Khe Sanh.

STATUS OF SARAVANE:

The city was not under attack but was encircled by at least 3 North Vietnamese battalions on 15 February. Meanwhile, there is a possibility that the ICC in meeting today may agree by a majority vote to visit Saravane.

16 February 1968

803518

Page 4//

Friday, Feb. 16, 1968
9:20 a. m.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

The undramatic but not trivial Soviet military build-up along the Chinese Communist border during 1967 may interest you.

The following map indicates locations.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ attachment (copy 1 16 Feb 68 SC No. 00757/68) Weekly Review

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 03-189
By is, NARA, Date 12-18-03

INFORMATION

Pres. file

11

Friday, February 16, 1968
9:15 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

In DMZ:

- scattered shelling;
- an incredible number of secondary explosions (p. 2);
- 119 tons delivered.

We have a firm report that one enemy unit around Khe Sanh has 193 combat-ready men from an original 289. How they lost 96 is not indicated.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

11a

SECRET

Friday, February 16, 1968, 8:40 am

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is the twelfth report on the Khe Sanh - DMZ area and covers the 24-hour period of February 15, 1968.

Enemy shelling continued throughout much of northern First Corps yesterday as Khe Sanh Combat Base and neighboring areas in proximity to the DMZ received scattered incoming rocket, artillery and mortar rounds. Latest information received indicates that the enemy fired 14 rocket rounds and 110 rounds of mixed caliber mortar at the Khe Sanh Combat Base, resulting in two Marines killed, 28 wounded (16 evacuated). While Khe Sanh bore the heaviest barrage, moderate concentrations fell upon other friendly locations, as Marine elements at Camp Carroll received five mid-afternoon mortar rounds and 9 rounds of 152 artillery. Fifty-two additional mortar rounds impacted four kilometers southwest of Gio Linh, in the area occupied by the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, in the vicinity of Quang Tri Airfield, received five mortar rounds and at noon, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, at Con Thien, received 30 rounds of mortar.

In Operation Lancaster, elements of K Company, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines engaged an unknown size enemy force 12 kilometers northeast of Khe Sanh. Relief force of I Company, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines arrived to render support. Contact broke at 3:45 PM but resulted in 12 Marines killed, 107 wounded (37 evacuated). Enemy casualties are unknown at this time.

In other action in northern Quang Tri Province, small unit contacts in Operation Kentucky accounted for three North Vietnamese Army killed; two additional North Vietnamese Army were confirmed as a result of mortar mission on an enemy location. No significant contacts were reported in either the Napoleon or Saline Operations.

Disposition of friendly forces and allied armament in the Khe Sanh area did not change during the period.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD ltr 1/31/79

By sp/ig, NARA, Date 2-20-92

In all, there were 317 tactical air sorties flown in support of the Khe Sanh area and the adjacent Niagara area. Marine aircraft flew 111 sorties in support of Khe Sanh delivered 282 tons of ordnance. Bomb Damage Assessment included five structures damaged, (3 - 50 caliber machine gun position destroyed, and two tanks destroyed. The Air Force flew 166 sorties and the Navy flew 40, reporting the attack onto two major supply areas. One supply area six nautical miles south of Tchepone had a total of 89 sorties with over 500 secondary explosions and fires. A second storage area had 23 sorties with the Forward Air Control reporting over 1000 secondary explosions. B-52's flew 15 ARC LIGHT strikes (45 sorties) on Niagara targets.

Khe Sanh was resupplied with 119 short tons during the period. A total of 19 sorties (Air Force: five C-130 air drops; 11 - C-123 airlanded) (Marines: one C-130; two CH-53 airlanded) delivered the material.

For the next 24 hours the Marine Tactical Air Sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area will total 44. The Air Force plans 202, and the Navy plans 100. ARC LIGHT planning calls for 15 strikes (45 sorties) continuing the Bugle Note Series in the Niagara area.

Regarding the weather for the period in the Khe Sanh area, the sky was mostly cloudy with ceilings near 2000 feet during the daylight hours of February 15 but lowering to 1500 feet broken after sunset, and remaining so throughout the night. For the next 24-hour period, the morning visibility will be restricted to 1 - 3 miles with ground fog beginning about 6 AM, and will gradually improve to 7 miles by noon. The sky will be mostly cloudy with the lower ceiling near 1000 feet, but improving to 1000 feet scattered, 2500 feet broken from 1 PM to 7 PM.



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

116

16 February 1968
7:00 AM EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM,
15 February EST (9:00 AM 16 February, SVN Time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) status as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>DAYS SUPPLY</u>	<u>PREVIOUS STATUS</u>
	<u>ON HAND</u>	<u>8:00 PM 13 FEB EST</u> <u>(9:00 AM 14 FEB SVN)</u>
Class I (Rations)		
Meal, Combat Individual	7	8 days
B Rations	9	9 days
Class III (Fuel)		
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	9	10 days
JP-4 (Jet Fuel)	2	3 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	4	4 days
Diesel	2	4 days
On-hand amounts do not include 22 short-tons delivered during this period.		
Class V (Ammunition)		
a. High Explosive		
60-mm mortar	15	15 days
81-mm mortar	19	18 days
90-mm (Tank)	87	87 days
4.2" mortar	32	33 days
105-mm howitzer	12	11 1/2 days
155-mm howitzer	21	20 days
b. Anti-Tank		
		<u>Rounds on Hand</u>
90-mm HEAT		385
66-mm rocket (LAW)		1,226
Anti-tank mines (M-15)		48
Anti-tank mines (M-19)		334
Anti-tank mines (M-21)		100
106-mm recoilles rifle (HEP-T)		520
3.5" rocket		690

SECRET

	PREVIOUS STATUS
DAYS SUPPLY	8:00 PM 13 FEB EST
<u>ON HAND</u>	<u>(9:00 AM 14 FEB SVN)</u>

Class V (COFRAM)

105-mm howitzer	5	5 days
155-mm howitzer	5	5 days
40-mm grenade launcher	5	5 days
Hand grenades	10	10 days

2. On 15 February Khe Sanh was resupplied with 114 tons as follows;

Class I	5 tons
Class II & IV	18 tons
Class III	22 tons
Class V	69 tons

Marshall B. Garth
MARSHALL B. GARTH
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

DISTRIBUTION

SECDEF
DEPSECDEF
CJCS
DJS
VDJS
J-4
J-30
J-31
J-32
J-33
CT FORCE
AWR
MCCC
DDO
ADDO
CCOC
PAC DIV
PAC DESK

SECRET

12

INFORMATION

Pres file

Friday, February 16, 1968 -- 8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

You should know: we shall be conducting an experiment in fog dispersal at Khe Sanh. It consists of dumping salt out of a C-123 transport aircraft.

It worked in California. Khe Sanh is elsewhere, but it is judged worth trying.

W. W. Rostow

WWRosto@:rla

INFORMATION

13

Free file

~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 16, 1968
8:35 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the report of last night's meeting
with the North Koreans.

They passed certain photostats which we
shall have to examine carefully.

In essence, their position is:

- a U. S. apology;
- the ship cannot be returned.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 4304

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-212
By ujg, NARA Date 2-14-97

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

13a
TELEGRAM
12

~~SECRET~~

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03:31 050010

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-211
By us, NARA Date 12-24-97

NODIS/CACTUS

SUBJECT: SEVENTH SENIOR MAC MEMBER'S MEETING
PANNUNJOM, FEBRUARY 16

1. IN ESSENCE, PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF ATTENDEES' NOTES AND TAPE RECORDING REVEALS TODAY'S MEETING PRODUCED VERY LITTLE IN THE WAY OF PROGRESS. PAK WAS NOTABLY LESS TRUCULENT TODAY BUT STATED HIS POSITION FIRMLY. THAT POSITION WAS:

(A) IF PUEBLO CREW IS TO BE RETURNED AT EARLY DATE US SIDE MUST CHANGE ITS ATTITUDE AND PROVIDE APOLOGY AND ASSURANCES OF NATURE PAK DEMANDED AT SIXTH MEETING.

(B) RETURN OF SHIP CANNOT BE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION ON GROUNDS THERE IS NO PRECEDENT FOR RETURN OF EQUIPMENT USED IN ESPIONAGE. PAK STATED IT "THEREFORE WILL BE BETTER NOT TO MENTION SHIP AGAIN."

2. AT TODAY'S MEETING PAK SHOWED PHOTOSTATS OF ALLEGED CONFESSIONS PUEBLO CREW AND OF VARIOUS SHIP DOCUMENTS AS EVIDENCE TO PROVE HIS ASSERTION THAT "ARMED SPY SHIP PUEBLO" HAD INTRUDED INTO NKOREAN TERRITORIAL WATERS TO COMMIT ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE AND AGGRESSIVE ACTS ON ORDER OF US GOVERNMENT. RADM SMITH REQUESTED AND RECEIVED COPIES OF THESE PHOTOSTATS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SEOUL 4304, FEBRUARY 16. NODIS/CACTUS

3. RADM SMITH READ BOTH STATEMENTS CONTAINED STATE 116188 AS AMENDED. PAK SUMMARILY REJECTED THESE AS "PREPOSTEROUS ASSERTIONS" AND SEVERAL TIMES PLAYED ON THSME THAT TO CLING TO THIS ATTITUDE WILL NOT BE BENEFICIAL TO US SIDE. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS HE ALSO REQUESTED CAREFUL STUDY OF STATEMENTS HE MADE AT SIXTH MEETING. HE DID, HOWEVER, EXPRESSLY RESERVE RIGHT TO COMMENT ON SMITH'S STATEMENTS OF TODAY AT NEXT MEETING AND AGREED TO CALL NEXT MEETING AS SOON AS HE HAD RECEIVED REPLY TO SMITH'S STATEMENTS. SMITH GAVE HIM WRITTEN COPIES OF HIS TWO STATEMENTS BUT PAK DID NOT REQUEST COPY OF STATEMENT SMITH WOULD BE ABLE TO SIGN.

4. NK ATTENDEES AT SEVENTH MEETING WERE SAME AS FOR SIXTH WITH EXCEPTION ABSENCE ONE JR. LIEUTENANT.

5. VERBATIM TEXT WITH LANGUAGE OFFICER'S COMMENTS ON ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF PAK'S STATEMENTS FOLLOWS BY IMMEDIATE CABLE. GP-3. PORTER
BT

~~SECRET~~

14

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Friday, February 16, 1968
8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Oehlert reports on the state of Ayub and some of the problems that are being generated by his illness.

W. W. Rostow

Rawalpindi 3421

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-212
By lip, NARA Date 2-14-97



Department of State

14a
TELEGRAM
2

~~SECRET~~ 579

PAGE: 01 RAWALP 03421 160500Z

ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, CCO 00, NSCE 00, /030 W

0 160440Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3139

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-211
By us, NARA Date 12-29-97

~~SECRET~~ RAWALPINDI 3421

EXDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR: PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE

1. AFTER DINNER LAST EVENING, MY ORIGINAL UNIMPEACHABLE SOURCE INFORMED ME THAT PRESIDENT AYUB HAS INDEED HAD A SECOND HEART ATTACK AND THAT THE LONDON SPECIALIST HAS RETURNED. THERE IS NO RPT NO FIRM PROGNOSIS AT THIS TIME.

2. IT IS BEGINNING TO BE REALIZED HERE, ALTHOUGH THE TRUE FACTS ARE NOT PRT NOT KNOWN, THAT AYUB IS MUCH MORE ILL THAN ORIGINALLY INDICATED. AS A CONSEQUENCE:

A. THE SCHEMERS ARE SCHEMING AND THE PLOTTERS ARE PLOTTING;

~~PAGE 2 RUCVGM 3421 SECRET~~

B. POWER STRUGGLES ARE BEGINNING TO TAKE PLACE;

C. THE FISHERS IN TROUBLED WATERS ARE BAITING THEIR HOOKS.

3. I CANNOT AVOID THE CONCLUSION THAT AYUB'S ILLNESS AND THE SCIENCE DIGEST ARTICLE ARE BEING TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF BY COMMUNIST FORCES AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO STIR UP STRIFE AND DISSENSION.

4. IT IS MY CONSIDERED JUDGEMENT THAT DESPITE THE HANDICAP

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 02 RAWALP 03431 160500Z~~

OF AYUB'S ABSENCE FROM OPERATIONS THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN HAS EVERY INTENTION OF KEEPING THE LID ON AND HAS SO FAR MOVED WITH POSITIVE EFFECTIVENESS DESPITE THE OCCURRENCES IN LAHORE YESTERDAY. SECTION 144 HAS AS OF LAST NIGHT BEEN IMPOSED IN THIS AREA AND OTHERS AROUND THE COUNTRY SO THAT NOW IT IS INVOKED IN ALL PRINCIPAL CITIES AND TOWNS. NEVERTHELESS, I DO NOT RPT NOT INTEND TO RELAX MY FIRM INSISTENCE ON THE CONTINUATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF EFFECTIVE MEASURES.

S. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY GUIDANCE YOU MAY CARE TO GIVE ME.
GP-1
OEHLERT

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

15

Pres file

Friday, February 16, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Enemy strengths in South Vietnam are shown below. These figures have not been adjusted to take into account the recent heavy enemy losses.

	<u>NVA</u>	<u>VC</u>	Total VC/NVA Main & Local <u>Forces</u>	Administrative <u>Service</u>	<u>Guerrilla</u>	<u>Total</u>
I Corps	47,200	11,300	58,500	7,600	17,400	83,800
II Corps	21,100	10,800	31,900	5,600	23,400	60,900
III Corps	11,000	19,200	30,200	16,200	7,600	54,000
IV Corps	---	18,200	18,200	8,300	23,300	49,800
<u>Total</u>	79,300	59,500	138,800	37,700	71,700	248,500

W. W. Rostow

AmeC:jjs

SECRET

Friday, February 16, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: VC Critique of Their Tet Offensive

This summarizes VC document dated 9 February. It was taken from a VC Captain captured at Danang. It analyzes the tet offensive from the viewpoint of VC Military Region 5 (parts of First and Second Corp -- see map attached).

The document notes three failures:

- (1) failure of the VC to get popular support -- "a big mistake";
- (2) failure to defect South Vietnamese troops;
- (3) failure in coordinating attacks.

It attributes military failure to the timidity of main forces which should have been used in the cities and the fact that the offensive was "staggered." On the latter point, it had been planned for all attacks to occur at the same time but units in MR 5 did not get delay orders and attack one day early.

The document lists three options now open:

- (1) continue to try to get a "popular uprising";
- (2) launch military attacks, then try an uprising;
- (3) launch military attacks but defer any popular uprising.

MR 5 concluded that option one -- the general uprising -- must be their target while relatively strong forces still exist, their rural bases are intact and administration is still effective. MR 5 advocates continued terrorism in the cities, renewed guerilla warfare outside the cities, and new waves of major military attacks.

The document indicates clearly that the Communists realize their efforts have largely failed so far. They see no real alternative to try to achieve a popular uprising. They are worried about the effect of their offensive on the morale of their own forces and cadre.

This is an MR 5 view. The analysis and recommendations may or may not be acceptable to the Front headquarters in Hanoi.


W. W. Rostow

Att.

WTT:mas-2/16/68

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18, NARA, Date 2/14/92



DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988
 By rg NARA, Date 2-14-92

12 FEB 68
CONFIDENTIAL
 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
 U. S. UNITS/INSTALLATIONS
 0 25 50 75 100
 STATUTE MILES

166

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

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1968 FEB 13 22 17

ZCZCQAA987
 OO YEKADS
 DE YSNKGA 45 0442043
 O 132036Z ZYH ZFF-5
 FM GEN WHEELER, CJCS, WASH DC
 TO MR ROSTOW, WHITE HOUSE, WASH DC
 MR CLIFFORD, WHITE HOUSE, WASH DC
 MR RUSK, STATE DEPT, WASH DC
 MR HELMS, CIA
 GEN JOHNSON, CSA, WASH DC
 GEN MCCONNELL, CSAF, WASH DC
 ADM MOORER, CNO, WASH DC
 ZEN/GEN CHAPMAN, CMC, WASH DC
 O 131411Z ZYH ZFF-1
 FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV
 TO ADM SHARP CINCPAC
 GEN WHEELER CJCS
 SMC BUNKER SAIGON
 GEN ABRAMS (MACV FWD)
 ZEM

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3
 DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
 By del/sg, NARA, Date 2-14-92

*military Region 5 (see map attached)
 (Parts of I Corps and II Corps)*

~~SECRET~~ MAC 02063 EYES ONLY

1. A DOCUMENT DATED 9 FEB, PROBABLY WRITTEN BY RANKING CADRE OF MR 5, WAS TAKEN FROM SENIOR CAPTAIN PHAN DUU DAI, A SENIOR MILITARY MEMBER OF THE QUANG NAM PROVINCE COMMITTEE CAPTURED AT DANANG. THIS DOCUMENT IS ESSENTIALLY A CRITIQUE OF THE ENEMY'S TET OFFENSIVE THROUGH 9 FEBRUARY.
2. THE FIRST PARAGRAPHS REITERATE THE STANDARD CURRENT CLAIMS OF VC PROPAGANDA. THE AUTHOR CLAIMS A BRILLIANT VICTORY, DESTRUCTION OF 1500 AIRCRAFT, HUNDREDS OF ARTILLERY PIECES, LIBERATION OF TOWNS AND CITIES AND SO FORTH. HOWEVER, THE REST OF THE DOCUMENT IS DEVOTED TO A MORE REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF THE SITUATION.
3. THE DOCUMENT ADDRESSES THE TWO MAIN TASKS OF THE CURRENT CAMPAIGN--THE "GENERAL COUNTERATTACK" AND THE "GENERAL UPRISING." THE AUTHOR REFERS TO THESE AS "T NO. 1" AND "T NO. 2" RESPECTIVELY. HE DESCRIBES THE ANALYSIS BY THE CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF MR 5 OF THE DEFICIENCIES IN CONCEPT AND TIMING OF THE TET OFFENSIVE.
4. THE DOCUMENT ADMITS TO A FAILURE OF THE VC TO GAIN POPULAR SUPPORT "...A BIG MISTAKE." IT ALSO ADMITS TO A FAILURE TO DEFECT RVNAF TROOPS ("MILITARY PROSELYTING" IN VC TERMS), AND TO A FAILURE IN COORDINATING THE ATTACK RESULTING IN PREMATURE ATTACKS.

5. THE AUTHOR ATTRIBUTES THE FAILURES TO WEAKNESSES IN BOTH PREPARATION AND EXECUTION. HE STATES THAT THE POPULACE WAS PASSIVE BECAUSE THEY HAD NOT BEEN POLITICALLY MOTIVATED AND ORGANIZED. HE ATTRIBUTES MILITARY FAILURE TO THE TIMIDITY OF MAIN FORCES WHO SHOULD HAVE BEEN USED FOR "CLOSE ATTACKS," I. E., IN THE CITIES. THEY STAYED "OUTSIDE" AND FAILED TO "SERVE THE IMPORTANT POINT." EXECUTION OF THE OFFENSIVE WAS "STAGGERED" BECAUSE SOME UNITS DID NOT RECEIVE A DELAY ORDER FOR "N DAY." (THIS IS OUR FIRST INFORMATION EXPLAINING THE 24-HOUR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MR 5 ATTACKS AND ATTACKS ELSEWHERE.) THE AUTHOR CLAIMS THAT "MILITARY PROSELYTING" WAS "WELL DEVELOPED," BUT UNCOORDINATED.

6. MR 5 ANALYSIS OF THE OVERALL STRATEGY CONSIDERED THAT THREE OPTIONS OR "CIRCUMSTANCES" ARE NOW OPEN.

A. CONTINUE WITH ATTEMPT TO GAIN POPULAR UPRISING ("2T").

B. GET GENERAL COUNTERATTACK PROCEEDING "TO SOME DEGREE" AND THEN TRY UPRISING AGAIN.

C. GET GENERAL COUNTERATTACK UNDERWAY WITH GENERAL UPRISING STILL NOT POSSIBLE; RETREAT, CONSOLIDATE AND TRY AGAIN AT A LATER DATE.

THE AUTHOR STATES THAT THERE WERE A FEW CASES IN WHICH THE GENERAL UPRISING WAS PROCEEDING, E. G., TAM KY. AT SAIGON AND HUE, THE SECOND "CIRCUMSTANCE" PERTAINED, I. E., GENERAL COUNTERATTACK AND GENERAL UPRISING. IN MOST AREAS, HOWEVER, THE THIRD CIRCUMSTANCE, GENERAL ATTACK AND NO UPRISING OCCURRED.

7. MR 5 CONCLUDES THAT STRATEGY MUST BE BASED ON THE FIRST CIRCUMSTANCE. THE "GENERAL UPRISING" MUST BE ACHIEVED WHILE RELATIVELY STRONG FORCES STILL EXIST, RURAL BASES ARE INTACT AND ADMINISTRATION STILL EFFECTIVE. SPECIFICALLY, MR 5 ADVOCATES KEEPING UP TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN THE CITIES, RESTORING GUERRILLA WARFARE OUTSIDE THE CITIES, AND LAUNCHING CONTINUOUS WAVES OF BIG ATTACKS. POLITICALLY THE NEW FRONT ORGANIZATION SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED AND EXPLOITED. THE PROBLEM OF PREVENTING A DROP IN MORALE IS TO BE CONSIDERED "IN A CRITICAL AND CONTINUOUS MANNER" BY POINTING OUT RECENT EVENTS AS VC VICTORIES AND EXPLAINING THE RECENT ATTACKS IN THE CONTEXT OF A SERIES OF EVENTS.

8. OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE DOCUMENT CARRIES THE USUAL HAZARDS OF INTERPRETING THE TURGID COMMUNIST STYLE OF EXPRESSION. FURTHER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE DOCUMENT EXPRESSES THE VIEWS OF BUT ONE IMPORTANT HEADQUARTERS; MR 5'S ANALYSIS MAY NOT PREVAIL IN THE OVERALL REEVALUATION THAT IS CERTAINLY UNDERWAY WITHIN THE ENEMY LEADERSHIP. NEVERTHELESS, WE FIND THESE POINTS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT AND FAIRLY CLEAR:

A. "T NO. 1", THE GENERAL COUNTERATTACK, AND "T NO. 2", THE GENERAL UPRISING, WERE TO BE SIMULTANEOUS, NOT CONSECUTIVE. IT IS NOT SO CLEAR WHETHER THE KHE SANH, DMZ, AND B-3 FRONT ATTACKS WERE TO BE PART OF "T NO. 1." WE BELIEVE FROM OTHER EVIDENCE THAT THEY PROBABLY WERE; THE LACK OF SEPARATE TREATMENT OF THOSE AREAS IN THE DOCUMENT ALSO SUGGESTS THEY WERE TO BE PART OF THE "GENERAL COUNTERATTACK." WE HAVE NO GOOD CLUE AS TO THE REASON FOR THE LAST MINUTE POSTPONEMENT ORDER FOR "N DAY", BUT IT COULD HAVE BEEN DUE TO PROBLEMS IN GETTING THE NVA ATTACKS IN REMOTE AREAS UNDERWAY.

B. THE ENEMY REALIZES THAT HIS EFFORTS HAVE LARGELY FAILED. MR 5 SEES NO REAL ALTERNATIVE TO CONTINUATION OF ATTEMPTS TO ACHIEVE A GENERAL UPRISING AND IS WORRIED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF RECENT EVENTS ON THE MORALE OF CADRE AND THE RANK AND FILE.

C. THE DOCUMENT PROVIDES CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT A GENERAL UPRISING WAS EXPECTED AT HIGH LEVELS, AND WAS NOT MERELY A CYNICAL PROPAGANDA PLOY TO INSPIRE THE LOWER ECHELONS.

D. IF MR 5'S VIEWS PREVAIL, THE ENEMY WILL STRIVE TO KEEP UP CHAOS WITHIN THE CITIES, PREVENT THE RETURN OF STABILITY, AND LAUNCH ADDITIONAL LARGE-SIZED ATTACKS--ALL STILL DESIGNED TO PROVOKE A GENERAL UPRISING. HOWEVER, MR 5 MAY BE ADVOCATING A COURSE OF ACTION WHICH IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO COSVN OR HANOI.

9. INTERROGATION OF SENIOR CAPTAIN PHAN DUY DAI IS PROCEEDING AND, IF APPROPRIATE, WILL BE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE MESSAGE.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

900

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

NNNN

17

~~1. Pres file~~
2. Pres file

Limited Official Use

Friday - February 16, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Prime Minister Burnham

Earlier this week I sent you Prime Minister Burnham's letter of appreciation (Tab B) and indicated that an autographed picture from him was on its way.

The photo has not arrived yet, but I thought you might send him the acknowledgement at Tab A and combine it with a birthday greeting. He will be 45 next Tuesday, February 20.

The picture is a large colored photo, inscribed "To President Johnson, a distinguished friend of mine and of Guyana. With best wishes."

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Suggested letter to Prime Minister Forbes Burnham

Tab B - Letter from Burnham

17a

February 16, 1968

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter and the fine photograph. I was happy to see you again and to be reassured on your good health.

I take this occasion to send you warmest greetings on your 45th birthday and to congratulate you on your achievements as Prime Minister of Guyana. You have led Guyana through nearly two years of peaceful progress since its independence. The vitality of your young nation lies in its spirit of freedom and self-help -- a spirit which we share with you.

Sincerely,

LBJ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Forbes Sampson Burnham, Q. C.
Prime Minister of Guyana
Georgetown

LBJ/WGB:mm

Letter from Prime Minister Burnham of Guyana to President
in Appreciation for Attentions Received in Washington
During Medical Stay

"Dear Mr. President:

It was a pleasure meeting you again on Monday, January 22 and to recognize your continued interest in and enthusiasm over my country of Guyana in spite of the many problems which you are at this moment facing at home and abroad.

I should like to express my personal gratitude to you and all of your officials who made my recent stay in Washington so pleasant and in every respect, reassuring.

While wishing you every success during 1968 as a politician and as a statesman, may I take the opportunity of assuring you of my personal admiration and appreciation for all that you are doing in the cause of world progress, and I hope that the association between your country and mine will continue to be as close and mutually felicitous as it has been in recent years.

Kindest regards.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ L. F. S. Burnham
Prime Minister"

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989
By plg, NARA, Date 4/29/90

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18

Friday, February 16, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Joe Califano
Walt Rostow
Charles Zwick

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-484
By ju, NARA, Date 12-17-93

Pres file

SUBJECT: Thinking about Foreign Aid

You will recall that Jim Perkins told Bill Gaud he would be writing you to acknowledge your decision against a general study of foreign aid and to ask you what you would like the Perkins Committee to do next. His letter has now arrived (Tab A). He puts the alternatives quite clearly: the Committee can disband, or it can proceed to study whatever you want it to.

We need to decide: (1) how to answer Perkins' letter, and (2) how to do some serious thinking about a 1969 foreign aid package.

We believe that there should be a hard, quiet look at foreign aid in preparation for the campaign and your 1969 legislative program. But we also think it important to keep the Perkins Committee in existence and relatively happy. This combination will require both a reasonably interesting assignment for the Perkins Group and careful camouflage of any quiet general study you authorize.

Reply to Perkins

At Tab B, for your signature, is a reply to Perkins' letter. Besides pleasantries, it suggests that the Committee address itself to one or two major questions in the foreign aid area and that Perkins and Gaud work out the precise issues to be chosen.

The real question is what you want to authorize Gaud to offer. Perkins' own preference would be to study the administration of technical assistance. This is a worthy enterprise, but there is a good chance that a he won't be able to convince people like Eugene Black and David Rockefeller that it is worth their time; and b) he would emerge recommending that technical assistance be split off from AID and operated by a new government corporation. What Black and the others would probably most like to study are possibilities for faster movement toward multilateral aid. Here again, there is the risk that the Committee might recommend something radical, e. g., elimination of bilateral lending in favor of a much expanded IDA.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

We have examined alternative topics and we can find none which is likely to satisfy the Committee which does not present some risk. On balance, we would recommend that you authorize Gaud to offer the study of technical assistance that Perkins prefers. Gaud would emphasize that the Committee's deliberations must be absolutely confidential and that their report should go to you and no one else. This offer would also give us the strongest basis on which to argue that you don't want the Committee to disband.

How to Put Together a Real Study

Our review of the possible alternatives suggests that we should set up a very small (4-5 members) task force to study foreign aid, headed by somebody like Mac Bundy. (It might include such people as Francis Bator and Charlie Schultze.) Each member would be absolutely dependable from the standpoint of security.

The group should be assigned to study the full range of foreign aid issues -- philosophy, techniques, Congressional tactics, and public relations -- with a preliminary report to you by June 1 and a final report by December 1. It would be staffed by a hand-picked group installed in the Budget Bureau under cover of the Bureau's Program Evaluation Staff. If the press noticed, we could say that these people were working on standard program analysis, which is the ongoing job of that staff. The operation would be covered very much in the way the wage-price task force was handled. We think there is an excellent chance we could manage the study without publicity.

The question remains whether we could do this job without the knowledge of the Perkins Committee. We think Bundy -- or whoever is Chairman of the study group -- might handle this by quietly seeking the advice and counsel of the individuals on the Perkins group who care most and have the most to offer. But this will take a very delicate touch.

I have signed Perkins letter; go ahead and sound out Bundy _____

I have signed Perkins letter; come back to me with list of names for quiet study group _____

Califano call me _____

7

18a

CORNELL UNIVERSITY
ITHACA, NEW YORK

K

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

January 31, 1968

Dear Mr. President:


I have, of course, been informed that you did not wish to proceed with the full-dress critique of our foreign assistance programs. In the circumstances, I am not completely clear as to how your advisory committee can be of help to you.

As an interim measure, I have asked Mr. Tyler Wood of the AID agency to prepare a synopsis of our deliberations to date. This summary will be the basis for our next meeting on Monday, March 4. At that time the committee must decide its future course.

We can disband. Or we can await further instructions. Or we can proceed on a limited basis to round out our recommendations calling on private sources of funds where necessary.

If you have any advice to me as the chairman of this committee, I would surely welcome it.

Very respectfully,


James A. Perkins

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

February 21, 1968

Dear Jim:

Many thanks for your gracious letter of January 31.

I have followed your Committee's work and the important contributions it has made. I very much hope that you and your fellow members will find it possible to continue.

I have asked Bill Gaud to discuss with you important questions of foreign aid philosophy and programming to which the Committee might address itself in the coming months. I know that you and Bill will be able to put together a program of work which will utilize the enormous capacities of your members to full and mutual advantage.

I want you to know, Jim, that you and your colleagues are performing a great public service on behalf of a program vital to the national security. You have my deep appreciation and that of every American concerned with his nation's future.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

LBJ Lyndon B. Johnson

Dr. James A. Perkins
President
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York

JAC
LBJ/WWR/EKH/vmr 2/16/68
CJW

CC; Wm. Gaud

*Pres file*SECRET

Friday, February 16, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Gene Black--Noon Today

I assume you will be mostly listening to Gene Black's report on his findings in the Mid-East. But you might want to have these two thoughts:

1. From all our ambassadors' reports, we know that the Arab leaders he talked to all came away impressed with his sympathy for their problems. His impact was all the greater because they knew that he would report directly to you. His visits, therefore, helped to bolster our position in the Arab world at a time when many Arab leaders feel we have washed our hands of the Middle East. He deserves our thanks.

2. Gene may mention to you the importance of getting on with a \$100 million potash project in Jordan. This is an excellent project planned before the war to involve the Jordan government, the World Bank, two private US firms (Grace and Tenneco) and AID. The war scared off, at least temporarily, the private firms, and AID and the World Bank have just arranged a way to get the project started without them. I understand confidentially that Kaiser may be interested, and this would have extremely interesting political overtones because Kaiser is already involved in the Israeli potash works right across the Dead Sea. But the important point today is to encourage Gene's interest in the project and to promise our enthusiastic cooperation--to the extent AID appropriations allow.

For your background, we still have no word of further progress toward resuming relations with the UAR. The ball is still in Nasser's court.

Gene wanted you to see the attached before his talk with you.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 82-210

By *plcs*, NARA, Date *4/29/96*

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

19a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
FROM: Eugene R. Black
SUBJECT: RECONNAISSANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

I have met with the Heads of State in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. I saw all Prime, Foreign and Finance Ministers. I met with leaders in public and private sectors plus officials of the USG and other US nationals residing in these countries.

I emphasized that I was on a "private trip" through the area. However, I told the leaders that I would be seeing you upon my return to Washington and therefore would appreciate their candid expressions concerning:

1. The current stand of this government on the Arab-Israeli question.
2. The posture of the individual and/or his government towards the USG.

My soundings may be summarized as follows:

- A. The prevailing mood in the Arab states is one of bitter frustration. It is at the moment a negative and destructive mood and therefore a dangerous one.
- B. I am personally deeply discouraged by the reactions I received on the trip and feel violence lurks just beneath the surface.
 1. All the principals in the Arab states referred to the USG policy in the Middle East as the "No Policy." (non-existent policy.) From the socio-economic-political points of view this region is in turmoil and the USG position is at a nadir.
 2. Israel on the other hand is strong, resilient and enjoying the fruits of victory. Israel is far ahead of her neighbors on all fronts - especially the personal motivation quotient which has made this small state a remarkable example of "self help."
- C. The Arab world is far from monolithic. A degree of political solidarity was achieved at Khartoum, however this was short-lived and the old divisions and some new ones are evident. This disarray is leading directly into the hands of the USSR.* (* See J.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

-2-

- D. The Arabs hold the USG as the scapegoat. Note: No one of importance any longer believes the USG intervened directly in the war but everyone - including the most pro-western (Feisal-Hussein) believes the USG does and can control Israel and Israeli policy.
- E. Nasser, Feisal, Hussein, Emir of Kuwait and Crown Prince Jaber of Kuwait (Jaber is real power in Kuwait) feel that there is a widespread revulsion among all classes against what seems to them a complete identification of the USG with Israel. Each have specific grievances. The grip of each of the above remains strong with their rule appearing to be highly personal.
- F. The "Refugee Problem" in Jordan is appalling. There is nothing that I have seen in any country on this globe which is as tragic as the destitute condition these hundreds of thousands of persons are living in and under. I visited a number of camps in the Valley and was shocked at the bitterness expressed by old and particularly young refugees against the USG. (See Recommendation Number 2.)
- G. Old Jerusalem is an "open sore" with all Arabs in all Arab states. GOI's posture on this is inflammatory. Mayor Kolleck seems an able administrator. However, there are numerous complaints from the Arabs re the Israeli occupation - both in Jerusalem as well as on the West Bank. The shut down of the commercial banks has caused hardship and is a festering problem. Border incidents are up markedly and the action by the GOI is directed at and into the refugee camps. GOI Chief of Staff Bar Lev admits this is ugly but a necessary measure in order to stop provocative acts by Arabs.
- H. The attitude throughout area towards the "Jarring Mission" is one of doom. Little hope is given for a meaningful solution that will provide the so-called "lasting peace." Note: I met with Jarring in Cairo and he gave me impression he, too, was most discouraged. I fervently pray that this Mission will be successful because if it fails the reaction would/could be disastrous.
- I. Israel - I met with all the leaders. I will not report on this section as I feel you must be fully cognizant of the positions and posture of the GOI after the visit by Eshkol in January. In short, their attitudes represent the "other side of the coin."

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

-3-

J. Military - see "C"

1. USSR has substantially rebuilt her position in Arab world by rearming Egypt, Syria and Iraq.
2. The USSR naval buildup in eastern Mediterranean is new factor and a dangerous one.
3. The strategic aim of USSR is to thrust south through the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The USSR is actively working at establishing and maintaining a "presence" in Yemen and South Arabia (Aden). The closing of the Canal is a major deterrent to this scheme.
4. The USSR buildup is patently political. It is designed to capitalize on the continued USG association with Israel in the eyes of the Arabs and the weakness of the UK.
5. All Arabs spoke of their concern about the increasing Russian "presence". The flow of "technicians" and "advisors" into region is alarming even to Nasser. This is, of course, anathema to Kuwait, Feisal and Hussein.

K. Suez Canal - Estimates vary from man to man.

1. M. Younes who is Minister in charge stated Canal could be open in 50-60 days to free the 15 ships. However, to be fully open for business it would require 4-6 months. General Dayan disagrees with this and believes Canal could be open much sooner.
2. Plans are being studied by Egypt to deepen/widen Canal to handle 200,000 ton tankers. Also authorities studying feasibility of constructing 42 inch pipeline from Suez to Port Said.
3. Shooting incident on January 30 was ugly and bad omen for early opening of Canal. I visited Ismailia and saw UAR boat which had been fired on. Also saw damage to city which is extensive.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Conclusions:

- A. The Arab world is desperately in need of high level attention by the President and the USG. Time is of the essence in making some positive forward gesture.
- B. Israel is far ahead of her neighbors on all fronts.
- C. The UK withdrawal from the Gulf is alarming. The vacuum must be filled before the USSR gains the advantage.

Recommendations:

- 1. You appoint a high level, experienced and internationally prominent US citizen to act as a "Personal Representative of the President of the USA" or a "Special Ambassador" to the Arab States.
 - A. This person would not undercut the existing USG Ambassadors but would complement the USG team.
 - B. The Representative should make periodic "hand holding" missions to the area and review with each Head of State their individual problems. This would be a manifest example of good faith and intentions of USG.
- 2. Dispatch at an early opportunity, if available, Ambassador Graham Martin (Secretary Rusk's Special Assistant for Refugee Affairs) to the area. Time is short on the "human bomb" with these hundreds of thousands of homeless, helpless people. Action is needed immediately on this problem - perhaps (hopefully) the action would be independent of UNRWA which is now a bureaucracy within a bureaucracy. If Martin not available then someone of his caliber.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

BRIEF SKETCH

1. Economies:

- A. Kuwait Booming - in spite of heavy losses due to devaluation.

- B. Saudi Arabia Continues to develop but a critical shortage of trained manpower has slowed the implementation of the development programs. These programs also being slowed due to large financial assistance being given to Egypt and Jordan.

- C. Egypt Taking a nose-dive. USSR seems ready to provide assistance. However, situation appears hopeless. UAR is highly dependent on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya for financial assistance.

- D. Jordan In a state of flux due to occupation of West Bank. USG's decision to give GOJ military assistance was very wise and timely.

- E. Israel In relatively A-1 condition although naturally GOI suffered financially from war.

20
Pre file

February 16, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agreement with the Government of Japan Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy

The Atomic Energy Commission in the attached letter to you (Tab A) recommends that you approve an "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy," determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution. The Department of State concurs in the Commission's recommendation. This proposed agreement would supersede the existing agreement that was signed in June 1958, and subsequently amended several times. The present agreement expires on March 4, 1968. The new agreement is the one mentioned favorably in the communique issued upon conclusion of Prime Minister Sato's visit last year.

As is set forth in some detail in the Commission's letter, the primary purpose of this proposed agreement is to provide the framework for assuring the long-term supply of enriched uranium fuel for thirteen Japanese nuclear power projects identified in the appendix to the agreement. The new agreement also incorporates the provisions of the 1964 "Private Ownership" legislation with respect to privately-arranged transfers of special nuclear material. These are standard provisions which are being inserted in all of our new or renewed agreements.

I recommend that you sign the attached letter to the AEC (Tab B). The Japanese Government has completed its review of the agreement, except for ratification by the Diet which cannot take place until after signature. Japan is ready to sign, as are we, and we expect this to take place in the very near future and if possible, no later than March 1.

_____ Approved

W. W. Rostow

_____ Disapproved

_____ Call me

✓ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20a
-

2/19/68

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

In accordance with Section 123a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Atomic Energy Commission has submitted to me by letter dated February 15, 1968, a proposed superseding Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy and has recommended that I approve the proposed Agreement, determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security and authorize its execution.

Pursuant to the provisions of 123b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and upon the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission, I hereby:

- (a) approve the proposed Agreement and determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States of America;

- (b) authorize the execution of the proposed Agreement on behalf of the Government of the United States of America by appropriate authorities of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely,
LBS

The Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington

AEC:CEJ:feg



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

206

FEB 15 1968

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

The Atomic Energy Commission recommends that you approve the enclosed proposed superseding "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy", determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution. The Department of State supports the Commission's recommendation. This is the agreement with respect to the negotiation of which you and Prime Minister Sato expressed satisfaction upon the conclusion of the Prime Minister's visit in November of last year.

The proposed agreement, which has been negotiated by the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, would supersede the Agreement for Cooperation between the United States of America and the Government of Japan which was signed at Washington on June 16, 1958. The agreement has been amended by Protocols signed on October 9, 1958, and August 7, 1963, and is scheduled to expire on December 4, 1968.

The primary purpose of the proposed agreement is to provide the framework for assuring the long-term supply of enriched uranium fuel required for the thirteen Japanese power projects identified in the appendix to the agreement. The agreement also incorporates the benefits of the 1964 "Private Ownership" legislation respecting privately-arranged transfers of special nuclear material, which is regularly being accomplished with other bilateral partners when preparing new agreements or amendments.

In order to cover the fueling requirements of the Japanese power reactors over the economic life of the projects, the agreement would have a term of thirty years. The quantity of U-235 estimated to be necessary to fuel the thirteen identified reactors over the period of the agreement is 154,217 kilograms; an additional amount

for research purposes has also been included in the overall U-235 estimate, bringing the net ceiling provided in Article IX to 161,000 kilograms. As in the case of Euratom, plutonium could be transferred under the new Japanese Agreement for fueling reactors and reactor experiments. Article VII provides the basic authority for such transfers and Article IX specifies a ceiling of 365 kilograms. This amount is to cover the short-term requirements of Japan in connection with its research and reactor development programs. The provision by the United States of enrichment services for the total 161,000 kilograms of U-235 under the proposed agreement would, under current prices, result in an export benefit to the United States of approximately 620 million dollars over the period of the agreement. Additionally, the 365 kilograms of plutonium would, at the current United States Atomic Energy Commission price, have a value of approximately 14 million dollars.

There are several features of the proposed agreement upon which I would like to comment. Provision would be made for Japan to receive materials for the performance of conversion and fabrication services for users in third countries, as is allowed in several other agreements, and also for users in the United States as is the case under the cooperation agreement with Canada. The proposed agreement does not contain an option for the United States to acquire special nuclear material produced in material obtained from the United States and is similar in this respect to the current agreements with Canada and the United Kingdom. Transfers of produced material outside Japan would require the approval of the United States. In addition to a guarantee by the United States of the peaceful use of produced material and equipment and devices transferred from Japan to the United States, the proposed agreement would extend this peaceful uses guarantee by the United States, as has been done in the case of the United Kingdom, to materials transferred to the United States. The peaceful uses guarantee of the United States in the agreement would thus be similar to that of Japan.

Consistent with the "Private Ownership" legislation of 1964, Article VII of the agreement would permit arrangements to be made between either Party or authorized persons under its jurisdiction and authorized persons under the jurisdiction of the other for transfers of special nuclear material. Such arrangements would be in addition to

the government-to-government transactions currently allowed and would be subject to the ceiling limit of 161,000 kilograms of U-235 in enriched uranium and 365 kilograms of plutonium which may be transferred to Japan under the agreement.

Pursuant to proposed Article VII, as regularly incorporated in similar Agreements for Cooperation, the basic method for the supply of enriched uranium as to which there would be a transfer of title would, after December 31, 1968, be through uranium enrichment services for the account of the Japanese transferee requiring such service. Sale would continue to be possible under the proposed agreement if the Parties so desire. With respect to the provision of the enriching services, in the unlikely event the natural uranium required should not be reasonably available to Japan on the world market, the United States would be prepared under the proposed agreement to procure the necessary natural uranium on behalf of Japan. The amount of natural uranium which corresponds to the 161,000 kilograms of U-235 provided for in the agreement and which could be procured by the United States anywhere in the world, is approximately 30,500 short tons. Presently known and estimated United States reserves of natural uranium which can be produced at a price of \$15 or less per pound are about 850,000 short tons. World reserves are, of course, much larger.

In addition, uranium enriched to more than twenty percent in the isotope U-235 may be made available to Japan, at the discretion of the Commission, when there is an economic or technical justification for such a transfer. In keeping with stated Commission policy, Article VII also includes language which assures comparability for domestic and foreign users of prices for enriched uranium and of charges for enrichment services performed, as well as of the advance notice required for delivery.

The International Atomic Energy Agency is currently applying safeguards to materials and facilities transferred under the present Agreement for Cooperation and the proposed new agreement would provide that the International Atomic Energy Agency be requested to continue its application of safeguards to materials and facilities which would be subject to safeguards under the agreement. This would be accomplished through a revised safeguards agreement currently being negotiated among the United States, Japan, and the Agency.

The President

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Following your approval, determination, and authorization, the proposed agreement will be formally executed by appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan. In compliance with Section 123c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the agreement will then be submitted to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Respectfully yours,

W. E. JOHNSON

Acting
Chairman

Enclosure:

Proposed Superseding Agreement for
Cooperation Between the Government
of the United States of America and
the Government of Japan

AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF
JAPAN CONCERNING CIVIL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Whereas the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan signed an "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy" on June 16, 1958, which was amended by the Protocol signed on October 9, 1958 and the Protocol signed on August 7, 1963; and

Whereas the Parties desire to pursue a research and development program looking toward the realization of peaceful and humanitarian uses of atomic energy, including the design, construction and operation of power reactors and research reactors, and the exchange of information relating to the development of other peaceful uses of atomic energy; and

Whereas the Parties are desirous of entering into this Agreement to cooperate with each other to attain the above objectives; and

Whereas the Parties desire this Agreement to supersede the "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy" signed on June 16, 1958, as amended;

The Parties agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

For the purposes of this Agreement:

A. "United States Commission" means the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

B. "Parties" means the Government of the United States of America, including the United States Commission on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, and the Government of Japan. "Party" means one of the above "Parties".

C. "Atomic weapon" means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

D. "Byproduct material" means any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special nuclear material.

E. "Equipment and devices" and "equipment or devices" means any instrument, apparatus, or facility and includes any facility, except an atomic weapon, capable of making use of or producing special nuclear material, and component parts thereof.

F. "International organization" includes a group of nations associated for a common purpose.

G. "Person" means any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, government agency, or government corporation but does not

include the Parties to this Agreement.

H. "Reactor" means an apparatus, other than an atomic weapon, in which a self-supporting fission chain reaction is maintained by utilizing uranium, plutonium, or thorium, or any combination of uranium, plutonium, or thorium.

I. "Restricted Data" means all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from the category of Restricted Data by the appropriate authority.

J. "Source material" means (1) uranium, thorium, or any other material which is determined by the United States Commission or the Government of Japan to be source material; or (2) ores containing one or more of the foregoing materials, in such concentration as the United States Commission or the Government of Japan may determine from time to time.

K. "Special nuclear material" means (1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material which the United States Commission or the Government of Japan determines to be special nuclear material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing.

L. "Superseded Agreement" means the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy signed on June 16, 1958, as amended by the Protocol signed on October 9, 1958 and the Protocol signed on August 7, 1963.

M. "Safeguards" means a system of controls designed to assure that any materials, equipment and devices committed to the peaceful use of atomic energy are not used to further any military purpose.

ARTICLE II

A. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the availability of personnel and material, and the applicable laws, regulations, and license requirements in force in their respective countries, the Parties shall assist each other in the achievement of the uses of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

B. Restricted Data shall not be communicated under this Agreement, and no materials or equipment and devices shall be transferred, and no services shall be furnished, under this Agreement, if the transfer of any such materials or equipment and devices or the furnishing of any such services involves the communication of Restricted Data.

C. This Agreement shall not require the exchange of any information which the Parties are not permitted to communicate.

ARTICLE III

Subject to the provisions of Article II, the Parties shall exchange unclassified information with respect to the application of atomic energy to peaceful uses and the problems of health and safety connected therewith. The exchange of information provided for in this Article shall be accomplished through various means, including reports, conferences, and visits to facilities, and shall include information in the following fields:

(1) Development, design, construction, operation, and use of research, materials testing, experimental, demonstration power, and power reactors and reactor experiments;

(2) The use of radioactive isotopes and source, special nuclear, and byproduct material in physical and biological research, medicine, agriculture, and industry; and

(3) Health and safety problems related to the foregoing.

ARTICLE IV

A. Materials of interest in connection with the subjects of agreed exchange of information, as provided in Article III and subject to the provisions of Article II, including source material, heavy water, byproduct material, other radioisotopes, stable isotopes, and special nuclear material for purposes other than fueling reactors and reactor experiments, may be transferred between the Parties for defined applications in such quantities and under such terms and conditions as may be agreed when such materials are not commercially available.

B. Subject to the provisions of Article II and under such terms and conditions as may be agreed, specialized research facilities and reactor materials testing facilities of the Parties shall be made available for mutual use consistent with the limits of space, facilities, and personnel conveniently available when such facilities are not commercially available.

C. With respect to the subjects of agreed exchange of information as provided in Article III and subject to the provisions of Article II, equipment and devices may be transferred between the Parties under such terms and conditions as may be agreed. It is recognized that such transfers will be subject to limitations which may arise from shortages of supplies or other circumstances existing at the time.

ARTICLE V

The application or use of any information (including design drawings and specifications) and any material, equipment and devices, exchanged or transferred between the Parties under this Agreement or the superseded Agreement shall be the responsibility of the Party receiving it, and the other Party does not warrant the accuracy or completeness of such information and does not warrant the suitability of such information, material, equipment and devices for any particular use or application.

ARTICLE VI

A. With respect to the application of atomic energy to peaceful uses, it is understood that arrangements may be made between either Party or authorized persons under its jurisdiction and authorized persons under the jurisdiction of the other Party for the transfer of materials, other than special nuclear material, equipment and devices and for the performance of services with respect thereto.

B. With respect to the application of atomic energy to peaceful uses, it is understood that arrangements may be made between either Party or authorized persons under its jurisdiction and authorized persons under the jurisdiction of the other Party for the transfer of special nuclear material and for the performance of services with respect thereto for the uses specified in Articles IV and VII and subject to the relevant provisions of Article VIII and to the provisions of Article IX.

C. The Parties agree that the activities referred to in paragraphs A and B of this Article shall be subject to the Provisions of Article II and to such contracting policies generally applicable to private transactions as the Parties may adopt.

ARTICLE VII

A. During the period of this Agreement, the United States Commission will supply to the Government of Japan or, pursuant to Article VI, paragraph B, to authorized persons under its jurisdiction, under such terms and conditions as may be agreed, all of Japan's requirements for uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 for use as fuel in the power reactor (including merchant marine propulsion) program described in the Appendix to this Agreement, which Appendix, subject to the quantity limitation established in Article IX, may be amended from time to time by mutual consent of the Parties without modification of this Agreement.

(1) The United States Commission will supply such uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 by providing after December 31, 1968, for the production or enrichment, ^{with,} of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 for the account of the Government of Japan or such authorized persons. (Upon timely advice that any natural uranium required with respect to any particular delivery of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 under such service arrangements is not reasonably available to the Government of Japan or to such authorized persons, the United States Commission will be prepared to furnish the required natural uranium under such terms and conditions as may be agreed.)

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph A(1), if the Government of Japan or such authorized persons so request, the United States Commission, at its election, may sell the uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 under such terms and conditions as may be agreed.

B. As may be agreed, the United States Commission will transfer to the Government of Japan or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 for use as fuel in defined research applications, including research, materials testing, and experimental reactors and reactor experiments. The terms and conditions of each transfer shall be agreed upon in advance, it being understood that, in the event of transfer of title of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235, the United States Commission shall have the option of limiting the arrangements to undertakings such as those described in paragraph A(1) of this Article.

C. The United States Commission may also transfer to the Government of Japan or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction, under such terms and conditions with respect to each transfer as may be agreed, special nuclear material for the performance in Japan of conversion or fabrication services, or both, and for subsequent return to the United States of America or for subsequent transfer to another nation or international organization in accordance with the provisions of Article X, paragraph A(3). It is understood that, in the event of

transfer of title of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 by the United States Commission, it shall have the option of limiting the arrangements to undertakings such as those described in paragraph A (1) of this Article.

D. As may be agreed, the United States Commission will transfer to the Government of Japan or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction plutonium for use as fuel in reactors and reactor experiments. The terms and conditions of each transfer shall be agreed upon in advance.

ARTICLE VIII

A. With respect to transfers by the United States Commission of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 provided for in Article VI, paragraph B and Article VII, it is understood that:

(1) Contracts specifying quantities, enrichments, delivery schedules, and other terms and conditions of supply or service will be executed on a timely basis between the United States Commission and the Government of Japan or persons authorized by it.

(2) Prices for uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 sold or charges for enrichment services performed will be those in effect for users in the United States of America at the time of delivery. The advance notice required for delivery will be that in effect for users in the United States of America at the time of giving such notice. The United States Commission may agree to supply uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 or perform enrichment services upon shorter notice, subject to assessment of such surcharge to the usual base price or charge as the United States Commission may consider reasonable to cover abnormal production costs incurred by the United States Commission by reason of such shorter notice.

B. Should the total quantity of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 which the United States Commission has agreed to provide pursuant to this Agreement and other Agreements for Cooperation reach the maximum quantity of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 which the United States Commission has available for such purposes, and should contracts covering the

adjusted net quantity specified in Article IX not have been executed by the Government of Japan or persons authorized by it, the United States Commission may request, upon appropriate notice, that the Government of Japan or such persons execute contracts for all or any part of such uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 as is not then under contract. It is understood that, should contracts not be executed in accordance with a request by the United States Commission hereunder, the United States Commission shall be relieved of all obligations with respect to the uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 for which contracts have been so requested.

C. The uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 supplied hereunder may contain up to twenty percent (20%) in the isotope U-235. A portion of the uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 supplied hereunder may be made available as material containing more than 20% in the isotope U-235 when the United States Commission finds there is a technical or economic justification for such a transfer.

D. It is understood, unless otherwise agreed, that in order to assure the availability of the entire quantity of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 allocated hereunder for a particular reactor project described in the Appendix, it will be necessary for the construction of the project to be initiated in accordance with the schedule set forth in the Appendix and for the Government of Japan or persons authorized by it to execute a contract for that quantity in time to allow for the United States Commission to provide the material for the first fuel

loading. It is also understood that if the Government of Japan or persons authorized by it desire to contract for less than the entire quantity of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 allocated for a particular project or terminate the supply contract after execution, the remaining quantity allocated for that project shall cease to be available and the maximum adjusted net quantity of U-235 provided for in Article IX shall be reduced accordingly, unless otherwise agreed.

E. Within the limitations contained in Article IX, the quantity of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 transferred under Article VI, paragraph B or Article VII and under the jurisdiction of the Government of Japan for the fueling of reactors or reactor experiments shall not at any time be in excess of the quantity necessary for the loading of such reactors or reactor experiments, plus such additional quantity as, in the opinion of the Parties, is necessary for the efficient and continuous operation of such reactors or reactor experiments.

F. When any special nuclear material received from the United States of America requires reprocessing, or any irradiated fuel elements containing fuel material **received from the United States of America** are to be removed from a reactor and are to be altered in form or content, such reprocessing or alteration may be performed in Japanese facilities upon a joint determination of the Parties that the provisions of Article XI may be effectively applied, or in such other facilities as may be mutually agreed.

G. Special nuclear material produced, as a result of irradiation processes, in any part of the fuel leased by the United States Commission under this Agreement or the superseded Agreement to the Government of Japan or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction shall be for the account of the Government of Japan or such authorized persons and, after reprocessing as provided in paragraph F of this Article, shall be returned to the Government of Japan or such authorized persons, at which time title to such material shall be transferred to the Government of Japan or such authorized persons.

H. No special nuclear material produced through the use of material transferred to the Government of Japan or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction, pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement, will be transferred to any other nation or international organization, except as the United States Commission may agree to such a transfer.

I. Some atomic energy materials which the Government of Japan may request the United States Commission to provide in accordance with this Agreement, or which have been provided to the Government of Japan under the superseded Agreement, are harmful to persons and property unless handled and used carefully. After delivery of such materials to the Government of Japan, the Government of Japan shall bear all responsibility, insofar as the Government of the United States of America is concerned, for the safe handling and use of such materials. With respect to any special nuclear material or fuel elements which the United States Commission may lease pursuant to this Agreement, or may have leased pursuant to the superseded Agreement, to the Government of Japan, the Government of Japan shall indemnify and save harmless the Government

of the United States of America against any and all liability (including third party liability) for any cause whatsoever arising out of the production or fabrication, the ownership, the lease, and the possession and use of such special nuclear material or fuel elements after delivery by the United States Commission to the Government of Japan or to any person acting on its behalf.

ARTICLE IX

A. The adjusted net quantity of U-235 in uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 transferred from the United States of America to Japan under Article IV, Article VI, paragraph B and Article VII during the period of this Agreement or under the superseded Agreement shall not exceed in the aggregate one hundred and sixty-one thousand (161,000) kilograms or such quantity as may be agreed between the Parties in accordance with their statutory and constitutional procedures. The following method of computation shall be used in calculating transfers, within such ceiling quantity, made under the said Articles or the superseded Agreement:

From:

- (1) The quantity of U-235 contained in uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 transferred under the said Articles or the superseded Agreement, minus
- (2) The quantity of U-235 contained in an equal quantity of uranium of normal isotopic assay.

Subtract:

- (3) The aggregate of the quantities of U-235 contained in recoverable uranium of United States origin either returned to the United States of America or transferred to any other nation or international organization with the agreement of the Government of the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement, minus
- (4) The quantity of U-235 contained in an equal quantity of uranium of normal isotopic assay.

B. The quantity of plutonium transferred from the United States of America to Japan under Article IV, Article VI, paragraph B and Article VII during the period of this Agreement or under the superseded Agreement shall not exceed a net amount of three hundred and sixty-five (365) kilograms or such quantity as may be agreed between the Parties in accordance with their statutory and constitutional procedures. The net amount of plutonium shall be the gross quantity transferred to the Government of Japan or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction less the quantity which has been returned to the United States of America or transferred to any other nation or international organization with the agreement of the Government of the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement.

ARTICLE X

A. The Government of Japan guarantees that:

(1) Safeguards provided in Article XI shall be maintained.

(2) No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to the Government of Japan or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction by purchase or otherwise pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, including equipment and devices, will be used for atomic weapons, or for research on or development of atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose.

(3) No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to the Government of Japan or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement will be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of Japan, except as the United States Commission may agree to such a transfer to another nation or international organization, and then only if, in the opinion of the United States Commission, the transfer of the material is within the scope of an Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the other nation or international organization.

B. The Government of the United States of America guarantees that:

(1) No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to the Government of the United States of America or authorized persons under its jurisdiction by purchase or otherwise pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, including equipment and devices, or an equivalent amount of material of the same type as such transferred or produced material substituted therefor, will be used for atomic weapons, or for research on or development of atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose.

(2) No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to the Government of the United States of America or authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, equipment or devices, will be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of the United States of America, except as the Government of Japan may agree to such a transfer to another nation or international organization.

ARTICLE XI

A. The Parties emphasize their common interest in assuring that any material, equipment or devices transferred under this Agreement or the superseded Agreement shall be used solely for civil purposes.

B. Except to the extent that the safeguards provided for in this Agreement are supplanted, by agreement of the Parties as provided in Article XII, by safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Government of the United States of America, notwithstanding any other provisions of this Agreement, shall have the following rights:

(1) With the objective of assuring design and operation for civil purposes and permitting effective application of safeguards, to review the design of any

(a) reactor, and

(b) other equipment and devices the design of which the United States Commission determines to be relevant to the effective application of safeguards,

which are, or have been, made available to the Government of Japan or to any person under its jurisdiction under this Agreement or the superseded Agreement, or which are to use, fabricate or process any of the following materials so made available: source material, special nuclear material, moderator material, or other material designated by the United States Commission;

(2) With respect to any source or special nuclear material made available to the Government of Japan or to any person under its jurisdiction under this Agreement or the superseded Agreement and any source or special nuclear material utilized in, recovered from, or produced as a result of the use of any of the following materials, equipment or devices so made available:

(a) source material, special nuclear material, moderator material, or other material designated by the United States Commission,

(b) reactors, and

(c) any other equipment or devices designated by the United States Commission as items to be made available on the condition that the provisions of this paragraph B (2) will apply,

(i) to require the maintenance and production of operating records and to request and receive reports for the purpose of assisting in ensuring accountability of such material; and

(ii) to require that any such material in the custody of the Government of Japan or any person under its jurisdiction be subject to all of the safeguards provided for in this Article and the guarantees set forth in Article X;

(3) To approve facilities which are to be used for the storage of any of the special nuclear material referred to in

paragraph B (2) of this Article which is not required for atomic energy programs in Japan and which is not transferred beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of Japan or otherwise disposed of pursuant to an arrangement mutually acceptable to the Parties;

(4) To designate, after consultation with the Government of Japan, personnel who, accompanied, if either Party so requests, by personnel designated by the Government of Japan, shall have access in Japan to all places and data necessary to account for the source and special nuclear materials which are subject to paragraph B (2) of this Article, to determine whether there is compliance with this Agreement and to make such independent measurements as may be deemed necessary;

(5) In the event of non-compliance with the provisions of this Article or the guarantees set forth in Article X and the failure of the Government of Japan to carry out the provisions of this Article within a reasonable time, to suspend or terminate this Agreement and to require the return of any materials, equipment and devices referred to in paragraph B (2) of this Article;

(6) To consult with the Government of Japan in the matter of health and safety.

C. The Government of Japan undertakes to facilitate the application of the safeguards provided for in this Article.

D. The personnel designated by the Government of the United States of America in accordance with paragraph B (4) of this Article shall not, except pursuant to their responsibilities to that Government, disclose any industrial secret or other confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of their official duties under that paragraph.

ARTICLE XII

A. The Parties, bearing in mind that by an agreement signed by them and the International Atomic Energy Agency on September 23, 1963, the Agency has been applying safeguards to materials and facilities subject to the superseded Agreement and recognizing the desirability of continuing to make use of the facilities and services of the Agency, agree that the Agency will be requested to continue its application of safeguards and to apply them to materials and facilities subject to safeguards under this Agreement. The necessary arrangements will be effected without modification of this Agreement through an agreement to be made between the Parties and the Agency.

B. In the event the Parties do not reach a mutually satisfactory agreement on the terms of the trilateral arrangement envisaged in paragraph A of this Article, either Party may, by notification, terminate this Agreement. Before either Party takes steps to terminate this Agreement, the Parties will carefully consider the economic effects of such termination. Neither Party will invoke its termination rights until the other Party has been given sufficient advance notice to permit arrangements by the Government of Japan, if it is the other Party, for an alternative source of power and to permit adjustment by the Government of the United States of America, if it is the other Party, of production schedules. In the event of termination by either Party, the Government of the United States of America may require the Government of Japan to effect the return of all special nuclear material supplied pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement and still in Japan, provided that the Government

of the United States of America will compensate the persons, including the Government of Japan, returning such material for their interest in such material so returned at the United States Commission's schedule of prices then in effect in the United States of America.

ARTICLE XIII

The rights and obligations of the Parties provided for under this Agreement shall extend, to the extent applicable, to cooperative activities initiated under the superseded Agreement, including, but not limited to, material, equipment and devices and information transferred thereunder.

ARTICLE XIV

A. The "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy", signed on June 16, 1958, as amended, is superseded by this Agreement on the date this Agreement enters into force.


B. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for the entry into force of such Agreement and shall remain in force for a period of thirty (30) years.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at **Washington** , in duplicate, in the English and Japanese languages, both texts being equally authentic, this **14th** day of **February** , 1968.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:


Donovan O. Zook
Dir., Atomic Energy Aff./State
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN:


William L. Yeomans
Assist. Dir. for Agreements & Liaison
Atomic Energy Commission


Masao Sawaki
Minister
Embassy of Japan

APPENDIX

JAPAN'S ENRICHED URANIUM POWER REACTOR PROGRAM

<u>CLASSIFICATION</u>	<u>REACTORS</u>	<u>START OF CONSTRUCTION</u>	<u>TOTAL KGS U-235 REQUIRED</u>
Under Construction	A. TSURUGA 322 MWe (Japan Atomic Power Co.)	1966	8,314
	B. FUKUSHIMA 400 MWe (Tokyo Electric Power Co.)	1966	10,383
	C. MIHAMA 340 MWe (Kansai Electric Power Co.)	1966	7,678

Under Planning	D. CHUBU No. 1 350 MWe	1968	10,921
	E. TOKYO No. 2 750 MWe	1968	16,556
	F. KANSAI No. 2 500 MWe	1968	12,026
	G. KANSAI No. 3 750 MWe	1970	16,797
	H. CHUGOKU No. 1 500 MWe	1970	11,198
	I. TOKYO No. 3 750 MWe	1970	16,797
	J. CHUBU No. 2 500 MWe	1971	11,198
	K. KYUSHU No. 1 500 MWe	1971	10,783
L. TOHOKU No. 1 500 MWe	1971	10,783	

Under Consideration	-- 500 MWe	1970-72	10,783

<u>TOTAL</u>			<u>154,217</u>

~~SECRET~~

Friday - February 16, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Panamanian Electoral Picture

The battle lines for the May 16 national elections are drawn between David Samudio -- the Government's hand-picked man -- and Arnulfo Arias -- the popular opposition candidate, who would undoubtedly win in a free election.

These disturbing developments have occurred in recent weeks:

1. Samudio is moving to get control of the electoral machinery.
2. Government employees known to be pro-Arias are being sacked.
3. CIA says both sides are organizing armed goon squads.

This is a formula for deep trouble.

Bill Bowdler has asked Covey Oliver to think in terms of preventive medicine. While the treaties are not involved, any electoral bloodshed is bound to splash on us.

Covey has asked the Embassy for a plan of action by March 1 to encourage peaceful, honest elections and an orderly transition. A key element is Col. Vallarino -- head of the National Guard -- who has not committed himself to either side.

This situation bears close monitoring -- and we shall do so.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-216

W. W. Rostow

By is, NARA Date 4-27-98

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

**Thursday, February 15, 1968
8:45 p. m.**

Mr. President:

These are the instructions for the next meeting with the North Koreans. We wished you to see them. They have been pre-positioned in Seoul. But they require your approval.

The Situation Room is prepared to transmit your clearance to State, with changes or without.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-212
By ng, NARA Date 2-14-97

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

22a

~~SECRET~~

AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-211

By js, NARA Date 12-24-97

STATE 116188

NCLB/CACTO

for Seventh Closed Meeting

FLASH

Following instructions ~~not repeat not yet cleared.~~ Will send/execute
~~instructions for Seventh Closed Meeting~~ message when
clearance obtained.

/ 1. Admiral Smith should open with statement along following lines:

a. The statement which you handed me at our last meeting, has
been studied by the proper authorities. I have a number of comments:

1) I cannot understand your dismissal of my earlier offer to
give you a written assurance that impartial inquiry will be held promptly
into all the facts of the matter when the officers and crew of the Pueblo
have been returned to the US. Quite apart from the interest which your
side should have in such an impartial inquiry, the US government must
of necessity determine whether, contrary to its orders, the Pueblo
approached closer than 15 nautical miles to the coast of North Korea
at any time during its voyage. Those orders were issued to prevent
international misunderstanding or tension and their violation would not
be lightly regarded by the US Government.

RTF/JA/Taper/dm 2/16/88 3263

S/S - Benjamin H. Read
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

RTF - L.A. Berger (draft)

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

L - Mr. Mosher (draft)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2) You claim to possess evidence that the Pueblo intruded several miles into your claimed territorial waters. We cannot be ~~disputed~~ expected to weigh the validity of your asserted evidence without being able to question the officers and crew of the ship ourselves. We would of course be greatly assisted in a future inquiry into the facts of the case by regaining possession of the ship's papers, including the ship log and navigational plot which you say you possess.

3) You charge that the Pueblo fired first on your patrol craft and imply that this action justified your seizure of the ship and its crew. This claim is not supported by messages received from the Pueblo at the time of its capture.

4) Your statement raised a number of legal points which have been carefully considered and which appear to be without merit. Thus we find no basis for your interpretation of Article 23 of 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea; that article applies to any violation of a coastal state's regulations, and there is no support either in the text or in the practice of States for your more limited interpretation. The sole remedy for a violation of territorial waters and regulations of coastal states by a warship is to require it to leave the territorial sea; by your own admission the Pueblo was attempting to move farther out to sea when it was seized. Also we find ^{nothing} ~~nothing~~ in the Hague Convention or any other international agreement requiring a ^{surface} warship to fly its flag, except when going into battle. Messages received from the Pueblo however explicitly stated that the US flag was raised when your patrol craft asked the Pueblo to identify itself. Finally, we are not aware of

SEOUL

~~SECRET~~

any ~~his~~ historical basis for your apparent assertion that the Bay of East Korea is an "historical bay," and therefore internal waters. In fact, your statement at our last meeting is the first occasion of which we are aware that any such claim was ever made.

5) I might take issue with a number of other points in your statement but I shall confine myself to only one. Any doubt concerning whether or not voyages such as that of the Pueblo are in accord with standard practice could be easily resolved by consulting Soviet authorities who pioneered this kind of activity and who engage in it more than any other government. (FYI DEPTTEL 106055, Jan 27, 1968 contains summary of relevant Soviet and US practice.)

b. At the end of your statement, you said that your side would give consideration to the issue of returning the crew members only when the US "apologizes for the fact that the US Government dispatched the armed spy ship 'Pueblo' to the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, conducted espionage activities and perpetrated hostile acts, assuring that it will not commit such criminal acts again."

~~c. Note that you did not refer to return of the ship, but only the crew. I must make clear to you that the US expects the immediate return of both.~~

~~d. With respect to your proposal for an apology and assurance, I am authorized to state the following: The USG is prepared, upon return of the Pueblo and its crew, to state that if the Pueblo, in violation of its instructions, entered waters closer than twelve nautical miles to your coast, the USG regrets that this occurred~~

~~SECRET~~

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

4

SEOUL

~~SECRET~~

~~incorporation of orders~~ and will take additional precautions to ensure that such violations do not occur in the future.

2. After listening to what North Korean has to say about foregoing, and if he is not ~~NPT~~ forthcoming on release of crew and vessel, you have authority to say following:

~~Quote - We have now had seven meetings. It is quite clear from these meetings that further meetings will only be repetitious on both sides. We have stated our proposal for the release of the crew and vessel. We have indicated our willingness to express regrets if the inquiry which will be held ^{would just on this so} ~~side to the other~~ failed to comply with the clear and specific ^{orders which were given him} ~~orders~~ which were given him. We are prepared to ^{five additional} ~~do~~ additional ^{inquiries} ~~inquiries~~ ^{to ensure} ~~to ensure~~ that our naval ships ^{will remain within twelve nautical miles} ~~do not~~ ^{of your coast.} ~~enter~~ ^{of your coast.}~~

3. I ask you now if you are prepared to inform me that the crew and vessel and relevant logs and data will be released on the basis of these assurances, and give me the date and place of that release. If you are not prepared to reply affirmatively today and set the date and place, will you be able to do so at the next meeting? I am under instruction to say that as soon as you do so, I will give you a signed statement of what I have ^{just said (in a above).} ~~said~~

~~If you are not prepared to give us a clear indication at this or the next meeting,~~

~~SECRET~~

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

22b~~SECRET~~

Amembassy SEOUL

FLASH

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-211

By is, NARA Date 12-24-97

STATE _____

MODIS/CACTUS

You may execute instructions contained in State 116188 with paragraphs 1c, 1d, 2a and 2b revised as follows:

1.c. While you did not explicitly refer to the return of the ship as well as the crew, I assume you understand that

the U.S. expects the immediate return of both. to your proposal for an apology and assurance, I am authorized to state the

1.d. With respect to the following: The USG is prepared, upon the return of the Pueblo and the crew, to conduct a full and impartial inquiry. The facts developed in that inquiry will be made public and if the Pueblo, in violation of its orders, ~~has~~ entered waters closer than twelve nautical miles to your coast, that fact will be made public. The USG is prepared to express regrets if any facts revealed by this inquiry would justify its doing so. I have no hesitation in assuring you that U.S. Naval vessels will continue to be ordered to remain more than twelve nautical miles from your coast.

S/S:BRRead:hbb 2/15/68

5831

The Secretary
The Under Secretary

~~SECRET~~

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Ambassy SEOUL

~~SECRET~~

2. Quote a. We have now had seven meetings. It is quite clear from these meetings that further meetings will only be repetitious on both sides. We have stated our proposal for the release of the crew and vessel. We have indicated our willingness to express regrets if the inquiry which will be held would justify our doing so. We are prepared to give assurances that our naval ships will remain more than twelve nautical miles from your coast.

XX Paragraph 2.b. remains the same as in 116188, except for last sentence which is changed to read as follows: "If you are not prepared to give us a clear indication at this or the next meeting, the only conclusion I can draw is that you do not repeat not wish an immediate settlement of this matter.---You must realize this is a wholly unsatisfactory result from the point of view of the United States."

END

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

23

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, February 15, 1968
6:00 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker's weekly. I believe you will wish to read all of it, but the main themes are summarized in the first 6 paragraphs.

In any case, you will not wish to miss the last paragraph.

W. W. Rostow

Salgon 19428

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rla, NARA, Date 2-14-92

Thursday, February 15, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 19428)

Herewith my thirty-ninth weekly message:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-211
By ics, **NARA Date** 12-24-97

General

As the massive Viet Cong Tet offensive subsides, it becomes increasingly possible to draw certain conclusions. What was blurred a week ago begins to come more clearly into focus. Although it will be several days before we have a fairly accurate country-wide assessment of the physical and material damages, certain things are now fairly evident:

A. The enemy has suffered a heavy military setback with nearly 33,000 killed, over 5,600 detained, and the loss of more than 8,000 individual and 1,250 crew-served weapons. A large part of the force he had committed, estimated at about 60,000, has been put out of action. A second wave of attacks against Saigon and some other major cities, which it was feared for some time might take place, has not materialized and there is increasing evidence, for the present at least, that it may not.

B. That Hanoi and the Viet Cong made a major miscalculation in expecting uprisings among the people and defections among the Vietnamese forces. While the Government of Vietnam may not enjoy great popularity among the people in general, there is strong evidence that in the city and countryside alike the Viet Cong attacks during the last two weeks have caused widespread resentment and bitterness toward the Viet Cong.

C. That it seems apparent that Hanoi's maximum objective was to take and hold many of the cities, thereby creating a political situation which would compel the Government of Vietnam and the U. S. to virtual surrender. The second and fallback objective (and this is Thieu's opinion also) was probably to put themselves in a strong position for negotiations, one in which they could insist, at a minimum, a coalition government.

D. That despite the heavy military defeat suffered by the enemy, much damage has resulted throughout the country. The number of evacuees which had climbed to 485,000 yesterday showed a decline to 457,000 today, probably an indication that people are beginning to return to their homes. The number of houses destroyed has now been reported at 48,000, although on the basis of our observations, we believe the figure may be exaggerated. The figures on civilian deaths increased to almost 3,800, and the wounded to nearly 21,000. In addition, there has been substantial damage to industry and to lines of communication. Commercial activity has been slowed, at least temporarily, and will take some time to recover.

E. The economic situation in Saigon and in most of the country is improving. Food prices, which rose rapidly in the first days of the attack, are coming down. Lines of communication are beginning to be opened up. In looking beyond the immediate crisis, economic prospects are less bright than they appeared a few weeks ago. It will take time to restore damage to industry and the loss of confidence in the business community which the attacks have caused. The Vietnamese economy, however, has demonstrated powers of recuperation in the past and hopefully, these negative factors may prove short lived.

F. That the predominant reaction of the people is that of anger, indignation, and a sense of outrage at the Viet Cong, especially its treachery in attacking during the Tet holidays, although there is also apprehension and fear of the possibility of future attacks. There is, too, surprise that the enemy was capable of attacking on such a wide scale in such force, and criticism of Government of Vietnam intelligence capabilities. But there is also a feeling of pride in the performance of the Vietnamese forces, a new confidence in the Government of Vietnam, and a welling up of support for it from many quarters. I think it is fair to say, therefore, that the Government of Vietnam is facing a crisis of confidence. If it reacts quickly and effectively, moves ahead with reconstruction and other constructive programs, the resentment of the people at the losses they have suffered will be replaced by confidence and gratitude; if not, the Government of Vietnam can be seriously weakened.

It is to meet the crisis of confidence to which I have referred that I have been pressing, as strongly as I know how, on Thieu and other leaders in the government the idea that there is a great opportunity to be seized in this situation; that if the government moves quickly to help the victims, to move ahead vigorously with recovery and reconstruction, if it mobilized the potential support available to these efforts, it can score a very significant political as well as military success. I am glad to be able to report that the government has moved ahead on a number of fronts and has received encouraging evidence of support from a good many sources, from both Houses of the Assembly, from organized labor, from the intellectual community, from other organizations (it has listed thirty-seven organizations who have offered assistance in the work or reconstruction), and from individuals.

On February 9, Thieu addressed a joint session of the National Assembly. His speech was well received both by the Assembly and the public. He asked for support in general and specifically for the special security measures now required; informed the Assembly of the need to speed up mobilization; to accomplish in six months what had been originally planned for a year; to request that the budget be approved before the end of February; and to request power to enact by decree urgent financial and economic measures for a period of one year. Reaction from members in both Houses seems to indicate that Thieu's proposals regarding mobilization and speedy passage of the budget will have little difficulty, but that the Assembly is less favorably disposed to his request for decree power over economy and finance, and that it will want to see this clearly limited and the details spelled out.

Thieu also took an active and effective role in the Cabinet meeting on February 11. It is reported by one of the members present that he ran the meeting well, was in full command at all times, and knew what he was talking about. He announced that mobilization will be speeded up, and the bases on which civil defense units would be formed; that he would request the Assembly for emergency powers for one year in order to deal quickly with situations and to avoid debate over potentially unpopular measures such as tax increases; announced that there would be an immediate increase in excise and sales taxes; and asked for cuts in all but absolutely essential expenditures. Thieu also said that he planned to give top priority to implementation of the provisions of the constitution and will ask the Assembly to provide enabling legislation for the establishment of a national security council and armed forces council, as well as laws governing the press and political parties. And he emphasized the fact that he did not want the crisis used as an excuse to prevent action on the regular program of the government.

In an effort to build confidence, Thieu is getting out in the provinces this week. He is visiting one corps area each day, talking with the officials and people and making an on-the-spot personal assessment of the situation. This is the sort of thing I have been urging him to do, and I am sure it will have a beneficial effect.

I have made the same point in talking with Ky and with Prime Minister Loc. Loc noted that he will be appearing on TV today to talk about the situation and the government's response to it. He mentioned that he has himself visited four of the most affected provinces the day before, and that he plans additional trips through the country.

I have also been advising Thieu to try to broaden the political base of support for his government, that by forming something akin to a government of national union, he could mobilize enthusiasm for the recovery program, for the fight against aggression and for the government's top priority programs. I suggested several names, which he noted down, including people such as Tran Van Huong, Nguyen Luu Vien, Ha Thuc Ky, and Phan Quang Dan. On a second visit, Thieu told me that he is planning to call in various leaders, one at a time, to get their views and seek their support. After he has done this, he may ask some of them to join in an advisory council.

I have also been continually urging Thieu to make frequent appearances on radio and TV, to inform the people of what the government is doing, and to show its concern for them, to take them into his confidence.

The recovery program. In the meantime, the central people's recovery committee is moving quickly and effectively in its efforts to provide for the evacuees and in getting Saigon and the countryside back to normal. A shrewd Vietnamese observer told us that the new committee under Ky had accomplished more in ten days than the Government of Vietnam normally could have managed in two months. This may be exaggerated, but I am convinced that this group, with quiet U. S. participation and prodding, has been the prime mover of the Government of Vietnam's relief and recovery effort. Without it, we would not be as far along toward restoring the situation as we are today.

The central committee, with Ky and Thang as its sparkplugs and Komer and his able deputy as behind-the-scenes expeditors, has:

1. Arranged special distribution of over 8,000 tons of rice in Saigon, till commercial channels took over yesterday; this has also stabilized the price;
2. Provided 77 Saigon refugee centers and 40 in Gia Dinh Province to care for an estimated 196,000 refugees;
3. Divided Saigon into blue (secure) and red (insecure) zones as a device for phased return to normalcy;
4. Set up countrywide recovery committee operations on the Saigon model;
5. Laid plans for urban reconstruction to replace destroyed housing; and
6. Has moved out on a host of other pressing emergency problems.

From a series of inspection visits to the provinces, Bob Komer is convinced that initial evacuee and damage estimates were somewhat exaggerated. Many so-called refugees, for example, did not have their homes destroyed but rather left insecure areas for safety's sake or to get food. They are now trickling back to their homes. While we still face plenty of acute relief problems, we are more hopeful now than a week ago of a relatively fast recovery. To this end, the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam is placing great emphasis on reopening key roads. Many of them have already been repaired.

Meanwhile, it will take at least two weeks or so to get a good picture of what has happened to pacification in the countryside. Our recent focus naturally has been on the towns and cities. Many Revolutionary Development battalions, Regional and Popular Forces and Revolutionary Development teams were called in from the hamlets to assist in their defense and are now in relief activities. Though the enemy does not appear to have hit the Revolutionary Development hamlets, but rather to have by-passed them en route to the towns, Bob Komer is concerned that a vacuum has developed which the Viet Cong could easily fill. At any rate, the longer the Viet Cong are allowed a free hand in the countryside, the greater the set-back to pacification.

Therefore, we are pressing our advisors to get out and assess the situation, encourage the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and Revolutionary Development teams to get back on their rural jobs as fast as possible, and push out the Viet Cong where it has moved in. This may prove a lengthy process in some areas, though we have firm reports that yet others were untouched.

Along this same line, the Viet Cong Tet offensive offers another opportunity we are trying to seize. In many areas the elusive Viet Cong infrastructure surfaced to propagandize people, assist attacking units as guides and in some cases join them as fighters. Now they are known to the populace and ripe for picking by police-type operations.

In Nha Trang, for example, the Viet Cong city committee emerged from hiding almost to the man and joined the invading forces. Alertly, the Government of Vietnam city police chief sent his special police in civilian clothes to roam the city and spot enemy agents. Once enemy military forces were driven out, police and friendly army units cleaned up the infrastructure which had exposed itself.

The economic situation. We have been trying to make some assessment to both the immediate economic situation and of the impact of the Tet attacks beyond the immediate economic crisis.

The economic situation in Saigon is much improved over the near chaos of the first few days after the attack. Government rice distribution to the public picked up last week and in Saigon at least has been more than adequate to meet requirements. In Cholon, distribution has been far less satisfactory although it should show rapid improvement with improved security conditions. Sales of rice through commercial channels have been resumed and, with the exception noted of Cholon,

the rice distribution crisis appears to be a thing of the past. The government has also begun to release significant quantities of frozen pork from its stocks. Other foods are available but in limited supply and prices are still substantially higher than before Tet. A crude price index indicates that retail prices are about 80 percent above their level of late January. Food is coming in from the nearby countryside and small quantities are arriving from the traditional coastal and Delta sources of supply.

In other cities both the problem of food distribution and the manner of coping with it has followed much the same pattern as in Saigon. In many places the food situation is better than in Saigon. In the countryside, the peasants seem to have resumed their economic activities. Transportation remains a serious problem as much for security reasons as because of physical damage to roads.

In looking beyond the immediate economic crisis, no economic collapse appears likely, barring a major deterioration in security, but economic prospects are less bright today than they appeared a few weeks ago. In cities there has been significant destruction of industrial facilities. The largest and most modern of the textile factories have suffered extensive damage.

Significant stocks of raw materials and inventories of imported goods have also been destroyed. Perhaps of most concern is the effect the attacks have had on business and commercial confidence. Saigon had been viewed by the commercial community as a safe area where the risk of war damage seemed relatively slight. This confidence has now been badly shaken and it is unlikely that the importer business community will function with as much vigor as it has in the past for some time to come.

The inflationary problem is likely to become more serious because of increased government spending to cope with the emergency, a loss of confidence in the currency, less importer activity, and less rapid growth in domestic production. How serious the stabilization problem will be is not yet possible to ascertain. President Thieu's determination to increase taxes and his request for emergency powers to implement these measures should help. Finally, the remarkable technical and economic revolution which had begun to take place in the rural economy may be slowed. It is unlikely that the burgeoning commercial distribution system in the countryside will operate as effectively as we had previously hoped it would. This was an important element in the continuation and acceleration of the rural economic progress that was such a notable feature in 1967. The rural economy of the Delta has performed as well as it has over the past half decade because military activity there has been limited. If the Viet Cong offensive in the Delta is maintained or if it signals a shift by the Viet Cong to a policy of cutting the flow of goods between Saigon and the Delta, it could prove costly to the rural economy.

Nevertheless, one must remember that the Vietnamese economy has demonstrated time and again in the past a remarkable resiliency. As time goes on, if the commercial community regains its confidence in the security situation, these negative factors may prove shortlived and the basic strengths of the economy reassert themselves.

It is still too early to tell what motivations, if any, there will have to be in the aid program as a result of the Viet Cong Tet offensive. We are beginning to make an assessment of this problem and should have a better picture of it in the next week or so.

In the days ahead, we shall be continuing to make further assessments of the situation, of the material and physical damage countrywide, an estimate of both time and resources required for reconstruction, and the effect of the Tet offensive on other priority programs; and we shall especially want to see what the effect has been on pacification. It is apparent that there are minuses in the situation but I believe there are also many pluses. In the field of both the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces reorganization and civil administration there should be an excellent opportunity to evaluate performance, to reward those who have performed well, to get rid of the incompetent and corrupt. This will be one means of speeding up the attack on corruption. Thieu's prompt move on speeding up mobilization is a constructive development, as are the other measures he proposed to the Assembly and to the Cabinet at its meeting on February 11. There is an opportunity to do something positive about the situation in the overcrowded cities, especially to provide better housing in the destroyed areas.

In all of this, the psychological factor is the most important. The mood of the people is always difficult to assess but so far as we can determine the Tet attacks have resulted in a widespread reaction against the Viet Cong. The destruction caused by the attacks is not always blamed on the enemy but there is near universal condemnation of the Communist exploitation of Tet. In Saigon, those not directly caught in the fighting tend to see the attacks as an impressive demonstration of Communist strength, but also as a major defeat for the enemy. In areas still more or less contested by Viet Cong forces, people are understandably apprehensive about the possibility of further Viet Cong attacks. The Viet Cong have frightened them and shaken their confidence in the government and the United States to provide security.

Most important in the psychological picture, however, is the fact I have mentioned previously that nowhere did any significant numbers of people respond to Communist appeals for voluntary support. With the right kind of action to meet this crisis, if the government acts promptly and vigorously (and I believe it has made a good beginning), it should be possible to improve its popular image and to increase the degree of positive, active support which it can call on in any emergency. There is a long way to go in this respect, and I believe Thieu and the other top leaders understand and agree with this analysis. It is now a question of what they are capable of doing. But I have impressed on them, and will continue to impress on them, that this is a golden opportunity.

A final question relates to the enemy's intentions. General Westmoreland believes that the enemy may be preparing to go all out militarily in the next few months in a continuation of his efforts to end the war on his own terms. I have reported Thieu's views that Hanoi's principal objective in the recent Tet offensive was to put itself in an advantageous position for negotiations so that it could demand

recognition of the Front and its inclusion in a coalition government. Failing in this immediate objective, he believes that Hanoi's plans will include three major elements: a) an effort to launch major attacks in the northern provinces of the First Corps and in the central highlands in order to tie down as many U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam troops as possible; b) to continue efforts at harassment and infiltration of the cities, including political "spoiling" operations, i. e., propaganda and subversion efforts; and c) an effort to regain and hold territory lost to pacification.

Thieu believes that Hanoi's objectives are the same as those of his Tet attack, to put itself in a strong position for negotiations by demonstrating at a minimum that militarily, the situation has reached a stalemate. In carrying out this plan, he believes the enemy, as in the Tet attack, will be ready to accept heavy losses, commenting that Giap did this in the siege of Dien Bien Phu. But failing in this effort as he did in the Tet offensive, Thieu believes that Hanoi may well begin to withdraw or "fade away." It seems to me that General Westmoreland's views and Thieu's theory about enemy intentions are not contradictory, for Hanoi may well be ready to gamble heavily on the possibility of either military victory or the belief that they can attain equivalent results through negotiations; it is certainly consistent with Communist philosophy and strategy to mesh military with political and psychological aims.

I do not want to get into the business of prophesying, but I believe we have never been in a stronger position than now to meet anything the enemy can throw at us. Our own forces have performed magnificently and are being strengthened. The Vietnamese forces have been alerted by their preliminary intelligence failure and have proved their mettle in combat, have taken heavy losses (more than twice ours), and they have gained confidence in themselves. The Government of Vietnam is showing energy and effectiveness in getting the country back to normal. If it seizes the opportunities now on the other fronts I have mentioned, it should gain wider and stronger support from the people.

In retrospect we may well look back on these recent events as a turning point in the war, when the people in the heretofore relatively secure cities realized it was their war too; and that out of it has come a sense of national unity, or nationhood, that under other circumstances would have been long in developing. But this will depend, in great measure, on how well Thieu and the other leaders seize the occasion. From the earliest days of the Tet attack, I have tried about everything on him I know except Shakespeare; "There is a tide in the affairs of men which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune: omitted, all the voyage of their life is bound on shallows and in miseries." But as always the gap between the ideal, what we want to attain, and what actually is achieved is affected by, and dependent on, the limitations of the human resources with which we have to work. But we shall keep pushing.

24
✓

Thursday, Feb. 15, 1968
4:30 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the advance of the Gallup poll of Feb. 18,
from an odd source.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 03-189
By js, NARA, Date 12-18-03

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, Feb. 15, 1968
4:20 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a redraft which Mr. Clifford
and I would commend to you.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *mg* , NARA, Date 2-14-92

~~SECRET~~

February 15, 1968

25a

DRAFT

The President wants General Westmoreland to know that he has freedom of action to conduct his military operations as he thinks wise from a military point of view without being inhibited by political or psychological factors originating in the United States. To the extent that such factors in South Vietnam itself are an important part of the struggle, General Westmoreland should take these into account in close consultation with Ambassador Bunker and President Thieu.

Specifically with regard to Khe Sanh, the President does not wish to inhibit General Westmoreland's judgment as to when, where and under what circumstances he wishes to fight his battles. If General Westmoreland wishes to defend Khe Sanh, he will be supported; if he wishes to avoid a major engagement there, the President will also support him.

In short, General Westmoreland has the President's complete confidence.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-188
By Jasp, NARA, Date 4/30/96

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

26

Thursday, February 15, 1968
3:45 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THRU: George Christian

Paul Nitze called me, at the instigation of his Public Affairs people, to say that they are beginning to face pressure on the following question: Are any men being sent back to Viet Nam who have been there less than two years ago?

In fact, some of the men going back have served there more recently.

He says that if we do not acknowledge that our policy has been temporarily modified in some respects, we shall be getting adverse press stories.

I told him to put it in writing, and I would transmit the matter to you, since I knew you had strong views on all publicity aspects of these troop movements.

W. W. Rostow



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

February 15, 1968

Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Walt:

Following up on our phone conversation, I believe we face a barrage of criticism in the press and on the Hill if we do not answer a number of queries we now have from both sources concerning deployment modifications in our Vietnam assignment policies related to the deployment of 10,500 troops. As you know, our Public Affairs people have been declining to provide such information, because to do so would confirm officially what is widely known -- namely that both Army and Marine Corps units are involved. If there are overriding requirements to maintain our position, we shall certainly do so.

But I suggest that otherwise we would be much better off to make available to newsmen on a "Response to Queries" basis, the following information:

"We have been asked for the policy modifications which apply to the deployment to South Vietnam of approximately 10,500 additional ground forces.

"These forces are composed of both Army and Marine Corps personnel.

"The Army objective is to provide 25 months between tours in Vietnam or other short tour areas. Individuals who will have 60 days remaining in their terms of service and who may have returned from Vietnam not less than 60 days at the time their unit is ready for deployment will deploy with their unit in this case.

"The Marine Corps objective is to provide 24 months between assignments to Vietnam. Temporarily, and for a limited number of units, this policy has been changed reducing the CONUS tour to 12 months before reassignment overseas. Personnel with over four months obligated service remaining are eligible for assignment overseas."

Sincerely,

Paul

27

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, February 15, 1968
3:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

The attached note from Pat Dean
will be clear to you.

Pres file

W. W. Restow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rlg, NARA, Date 2-14-92

INFORMATION

Thursday, February 15, 1968 -- 2:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

I sent, at your instruction, a letter from Chet Hollifield to Bob McNamara and informed him you wished him to discuss the matter with the Congressman.

Bob called to say he will have to do it towards the end of next week since Hollifield is away until February 21 or 22.

W. W. Rostow

wwRostow:rla

INFORMATION

21

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, February 15, 1968
2:40 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This report of Ky's frustration with the bureaucracy is disturbing. Bill Jordan has the same message from Amb. Bui Diem here, who is also concerned.

I'm sure Ellsworth will do all he can to keep the show together -- and moving -- but it's not going to be easy.

W. W. Rostow

TDCS 314/02793-68 (advance)

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-216 Appeal
By SJ, NARA, Date 7-8-03

RECEIVED
WHCA

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)
292

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1968 FEB 15 15 56

Rostow

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-215
By us, NARA Date 4-27-98

~~SECRET~~

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 14 FEBRUARY 1968
SUBJECT VICE PRESIDENT KY'S INTENTION TO
RELINQUISH HIS SPECIAL POWERS BECAUSE
OF DISCOURAGEMENT WITH GOVERNMENT'S
PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT CRISIS

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (15 FEBRUARY 1968)

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

SUMMARY: VICE PRESIDENT KY [REDACTED]
ON 14 FEBRUARY [REDACTED] WAS BITTER AND DISCOURAGED AT THE
GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM'S PERFORMANCE IN THE CURRENT CRISIS. HE
THEREFORE HAD DECIDED TO RETURN TO PRESIDENT THIEU THE SPECIAL
POWERS GIVEN HIM AS HEAD OF THE TASK FORCE. KY RESENTS CHARGES
BY THIEU-SUPPORTERS THAT HE IS ATTEMPTING TO USE HIS TASK
FORCE POWERS FOR PERSONAL ADVANTAGE. HE IS ALSO FRUSTRATED
BY PRIME MINISTER LOC'S POOR SHOWING AND BY THE TENDENCY OF
CABINET MINISTERS TO INSIST ON BUREAUCRATIC PROPERITIES.
END SUMMARY.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1. [REDACTED] 14 FEBRUARY 1968,
VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WAS "BITTER AND
DISCOURAGED" AT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM'S (GVN) PERFORMANCE
IN THE CURRENT CRISIS. KY [REDACTED] HAD DEFINITELY DECIDED THAT
THE NEXT FEW DAYS HE WILL RETURN TO PRESIDENT NGUYEN

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS BITTER AND DISCOURAGED" AT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM'S (GVN) PERFORMANCE IN THE CURRENT CRISIS. KY [REDACTED] HAD DEFINITELY DECIDED THAT WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS HE WILL RETURN TO PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU ALL THE "SPECIAL POWERS" CONFERRED ON HIM BY THIEU. COMMENT: KY WAS REFERRING TO HIS CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED BY THIEU TO COPE WITH THE AFTERMATH OF THE VIET CONG (VC) TET OFFENSIVE.)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

2. KY SAID THE GVN HAD BEEN TOTALLY AND UNNECESSARILY PARALYZED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE VC ATTACKS. HE FELT THAT, GIVEN THE DESTRUCTION WROUGHT BY THE ATTACKS, IT WAS STILL MOVING WITH TOO LITTLE EFFECTIVENESS AND SENSE OF URGENCY. KY SAID THAT WHILE HE HAD ATTEMPTED AS CHAIRMAN OF THE TASK FORCE AND OTHERWISE WITHIN THE POWERS CONFERRED ON HIM BY THE CONSTITUTION TO MOVE RAPIDLY TO RETURN THE SITUATION TO NORMAL, ALMOST EVERY MOVE HE HAD MADE HAD COME UNDER FIRE FROM THIEU'S SUPPORTERS WHO CLAIMED THAT HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO SET HIMSELF UP AS A SECOND GOVERNMENT.

[REDACTED] HE EVEN HIS OWN "ANTI-FRAUD YOUTH CORPS", WHICH HE HAD HOPED COULD BE USED IN THE PRESENT EMERGENCY, WAS DOING LITTLE BUT COLLECTING ITS SALARIES.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)

3. [REDACTED] IT WAS NOW OBVIOUS TO EVERYONE THAT PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN VAN LOC IS A "DISMAL FAILURE." HE ADDED WITH CONSIDERABLE BITTERNESS THAT SINCE HE, KY, HAD BEEN THE CHIEF PROPONENT OF LOC FOR THE POSITION, HE FELT THAT LOC HAD LET HIM DOWN BADLY. KY ALSO COMPLAINED THAT MOST OF THE CABINET MINISTERS, DESPITE THE PROBLEMS FACING THE COUNTRY, SEEMED MORE CONCERNED WITH BUREAUCRATIC PROPRIETY THAN WITH PROVIDING MEANINGFUL ASSISTANCE TO THOSE DISPLACED BY THE FIGHTING.

4. COMMENT: WHILE [REDACTED] KY NOW APPEARS TO RECOGNIZE THE ROLE [REDACTED] PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS CAN PLAY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, [REDACTED] IT DISTURBING THAT KY SHOULD FEEL COMPELLED TO COMPLAIN AT SUCH LENGTH TO SOMEONE OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

5. COMMENT: [REDACTED] KY TOLD SOME CLOSE ASSOCIATES ON 13 FEBRUARY THAT HE INTENDED TO RECOMMEND [REDACTED] TO THIEU, PROBABLY ON 18 FEBRUARY, THE TASK BE ABOLISHED. [REDACTED] SOURCES NOTED KY'S IRRITATION WITH CRITICISM BY THIEU SUPPORTERS AND WITH THE DIFFICULTY OF GETTING CABINET MINISTERS TO DO THINGS,

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR, MR. ZORTHIAN) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER, CHIEF OF STAFF, J-2) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL MOMYER ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

800

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

INFORMATION

Pres file

30

Thurs., Feb. 15, 1968
11:55 a. m.

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. PRESIDENT:

No beeper heard from the downed flier off Hainan.
Makes the decision of yesterday easier.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71CJ90-143
By isp/y, NARA, Date 2-24-82

INFORMATION

1. ~~Sensitive~~
2. Pres file
31

Thursday, Feb. 15, 1968
11:30 a. m.

SECRET

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached reports on the last private meeting with the North Koreans indicate:

- they were tough;
- they presented a carefully prepared legal case on our guilt;
- they demand apology for return of men -- no mention of ship.

Not hopeful.

Sect. Rusk has a meeting at 3 p. m. to consider next steps.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-70
By gls NARA, Date 4/30/96



Department of State

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**TELEGRAM
ACTION COPY**

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DE RUALOS 4244E 0460627
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Z 150624Z FEB 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9076
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 4244

NODIS:CACTUS

1. MEETING BEGAN AT 1400 HRS AND ENDED AT 1422 HRS LOCAL.
2. PRELIMINARY REPORT INDICATES MOST OF BRIEF MEETING WAS DEVOTED TO GEN PAK'S READING OF DPRK POSITION, WHICH IN SUBSTANCE IS THAT US MUST APOLOGIZE FOR ALL CRIMINAL ACTS. PAK'S STATEMENT AND ATTITUDE WERE REMINISCENT OF TRUCULENT TONE AND WORDS OF HIS SUMMARY STATEMENT AT YESTERDAY'S OPEN MEETING.
3. WILL FOREGO FURTHER COMMENT UNTIL WE HAVE HAD OPPORTUNITY

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4244E ~~SECRET~~
TO REVIEW TRANSCRIPT AND TAPE RECORDING. WILL, OF COURSE, TRANSMIT TRANSCRIPT OF PAK'S STATEMENT BY FLASH.

GP-3 PORTER
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
By *[Signature]* NJ 89-73
NARA, Date 4/30/96

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

316

~~SECRET~~

12

.....ZZ RUENC
DE RUALOS 4261/1 0460930
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9088
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BT
SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 SEUL 4261

260 FEB 15 AM 4 57

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 89-73
By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 11/29/90

NODIS/CACTUS

SUBJECT: SIXTH SENIOR MEMBERS CLOSED MEETING
AT PANMUNJOM, FEB 15

1. FOLLOWING IS VERBATIM TEXT OF TODAY'S MEETING.
PAK'S OPENING STATEMENT IS BASED ON ENGLISH TRANS-
LATION OF REMARKS HE MADE IN KOREAN. THIS
TRANSLATION WAS READ BY HIS INTERPRETER AND
HANDS TO ADMIRAL SMITH AT CLOSE OF MEETING.
SUSSEQUENT REMARKS BY BOTH SMITH AND PAK ARE
TAKEN FROM NOTES OF ATTENDEES OF WHAT SMITH
SAID AND WHAT PAK'S INTERPRETER SAID IN ENGLISH.

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4261/1 ~~SECRET~~

2. WRITTEN KOREAN TEXT HANDED ADMIRAL SMITH WAS
HEADED "STATEMENT BY PAK CHUNG-KUK, THE REPRESENTA-
TIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA."
THIS DID NOT RPT NOT APPEAR ON ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

3. PARENTHESIS CONTAIN WHAT UNCMAC LANGUAGE
PERSONNEL BELIEVE IS MORE ACCURATE TRANSLATION
OF PAK'S KOREAN.

4. BEGIN TEXT: GENERAL PAK.

A. I HAVE HEARD ON MANY OCCASIONS YOUR SIDE'S
ALLEGATION ON THE CASE OF US ARMED SPY SHIP "PUEBLO."

B. YOU REQUESTED THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE
SHIP AND ITS CREW, ALLEGING THAT THE PUEBLO HAD BEEN
SEIZED ON THE "HIGH SEAS" AND COMMITTED NO HOSTILE ACTS
AND WENT SO FAR AS TO MAKE THE PREPOSTEROUS ASSURANCE
THAT AN IMPARTIAL INQUIRY WOULD BE HELD INTO ALL THE
FACTS OF THE MATTER WHEN THEY HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO
THE UNITED STATES.

C. THIS IS A BRIGANDISH LOGIC COMPLETELY REVERSING

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SEOUL 1 of 2 SEOUL 4261 NODIS CACTUS

PAGE 3 RUALOS 4261/1 ~~SECRET~~

BLACK AND WHITE DESIGNED TO COVER UP THE CRIME OF THE CRIMINALS CAUGHT RED-HANDED, WHICH CONVINCE NOBODY.

D. THE FALSITY AND UNWARRANTEDNESS OF THE ALLEGATION ON THE PART OF YOUR SIDE IS THOROUGHLY EXPOSED BY VARIOUS DOCUMENTARY PHOTOGRAPHS SUCH AS CONFESSIONS OF THE CREW MEMBERS OF THE ARMED SPY SHIP PUEBLO AND SHIP'S POSITION LOG, AND NAVIGATIONAL PLOT, AS WELL AS BY ALL THE OTHER MATERIAL EVIDENCE INCLUDING INTELLIGENCE DATA.

E. AS WAS UNDENIABLY ESTABLISHED THROUGH CONFESSIONS OF THE CAPTAIN OF THE ARMED SPY SHIP "PUEBLO" AND HIS CREW MEMBERS AND ALL THE MATERIAL EVIDENCE, THE "PUEBLO," WHICH HAS DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE US CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE US ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AND US NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, INTRUDED UNDER THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE COMMANDER US NAVAL FORCES, JAPAN, INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DPRK ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS ALONG THE PREPLANNED NAVIGATIONAL COURSE, DETECTING FOR A LONG PERIOD IMPORTANT STATE AND MILITARY

PAGE 4 RUALOS 4261/1 ~~SECRET~~

SECRETS, SUCH AS VARIOUS MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, DEPLOYMENT OF ARMED FORCES OF OUR COUNTRY, MANEUVERABILITY OF THE NAVY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY, LOCATIONS OF VARIOUS RADAR SITES, ACCOMODATION CAPACITIES OF PORTS AND DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES. THE SHIP INTRUDED AS DEEP AS UP TO A POINT 39 DEGREES 17.4 MINUTES N, 127 DEG 46.9 MIN E, 7.6 MILES FROM RYU DO (NOTE: KK SPELLING FOR YODO ISLAND IN WONSAN BAY) IN THE WATERS OF THE BAY OF EAST KOREA, A BAY OF OUR COUNTRY HISTORICALLY, ON JANUARY 23 WHEN IT WAS SEIZED.

F. THE ARMED SPY SHIP "PUEBLO" DID NOT HOIST THE FLAG OF THE COUNTRY TO WHICH IT BELONGS TO CONCEAL ITS IDENTITY IN VIOLATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION THE US GOVERNMENT SUBSCRIBED.

G. AT THAT TIME, THE NAVAL VESSELS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY PERFORMING THEIR ROUTINE PATROL DUTY REPEATEDLY SIGNALLED (TO THIS UNIDENTIFIED ARMED SPY SHIP) FOR ITS NATIONALITY. HOWEVER, THE "PUEBLO" DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE SIGNAL, INSTEAD, ATTEMPTED TO HURRIEDLY MAKE ITSELF AWAY (GET AWAY) FROM OUR WATERS WHILE COMMITTING PROVOCATIVE FIRINGS.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3- SEOUL 1 of 2 SEOUL 4261 NODIS CACTUS

PAGE 5 RUALOS 4261/1 ~~SECRET~~

H. OUR NAVAL VESSELS RETURNED THE FIRE FOR SELF-DEFENSE MEASURES AND CAPTURED THE "PUEBLO".

I. THEY EXERCISED THE RIGHTFUL SOVEREIGN POWER OF THE DPRK, METING OUT A PUNISHMENT (AND IT IS THE PROPER PUNISHMENT) THE AGGRESSORS DESERVE.

J. YOUR SIDE ARBITRARILY DISTORTED THE MARITIME LAW IN AN ATTEMPT TO MISUSE IT FOR YOUR AGGRESSIVE PURPOSES, ALLEGING THAT IN CASE ANY SHIP (WARSHIP) ENTER THE TERRITORIAL WATERS, THE COASTAL STATE IS NOT ENTITLED TO ASSERT ANY JURISDICTION OVER IT OTHER THAN TO REQUIRE THE SHIP (WARSHIP) TO LEAVE THE TERRITORIAL WATERS.

K. THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1958 CONCERNING THE TERRITORIAL WATERS AND THEIR ADJACENT WATERS YOU CITED (SO AS) TO COVER UP YOUR SIDE'S CRIME REFERS TO THE VIOLATIONS OF ORDER IN NAVIGATION. THEREFORE, IT CANNOT BE APPLIED TO THE CASE OF ARMED SPY SHIP

PAGE 6 RUALOS 4261/1 ~~SECRET~~

WHICH INTRUDED INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF OTHER'S COUNTRY FOR THE ESPIONAGE PURPOSE, COMMITTING (AND COMMITTED) PROVOCATIVE ACT.

L. THE "PUEBLO" IS NEITHER A MERCHANT SHIP NOR A FISHING BOAT BUT AN ARMED SPY SHIP AND ITS CREW MEMBERS ARE CRIMINALS CAUGHT IN THE ACT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST THE DPRK.

M. ANY SOVEREIGN STATE HAS THE RIGHT TO CLOSE-UP ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS AGAINST ANY WARSHIP OF FOREIGN STATE TO INSURE HER SECURITY AND DEFENSE.

N. THE LAW ESTABLISHED IN OUR COUNTRY STRICTLY PROHIBITS ANY FOREIGN WARSHIP FROM ENTERING THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DPRK WITHOUT ADVANCE PERMISSION.

BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

2

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ZNY 33558 ZZH
Z 120342Z FEB 65 ZFF1
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9089
STATE GRNC

04570

53 FEB 15 10 5 11

BT
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SEOUL 4261

XODIS/CACTUS

O. WE HAVE WARNED YOUR SIDE MANY TIMES NOT TO VIOLATE THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DPRK, LODGING SERIOUS PROTEST ON EACH OCCASION WHEN YOUR SIDE'S NAVAL CRAFT INTRUDED INTO OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS, DECLARING THAT YOUR SIDE SHOULD BEAR THE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONSEQUENCES ARISING FROM SUCH INTRUSIONS.

P. YOUR SIDE, HOWEVER, DISPATCHED THIS TIME

PAGE 2 RUALUS 42612 ~~SECRET~~
EVEN THE ARMED SPY SHIP BELONGING TO THE US PACIFIC FLEET TO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS TO CONDUCT ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AND COMMIT PROVOCATIVE ACTS IN DISREGARD OF OUR REPEATED WARNINGS.

Q. TODAY, INTERNATIONAL LAWS REGARD INTRUSIONS INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF ANY SOVEREIGN STATES AS AN ACT OF AGGRESSION AND AS A SERIOUS CRIME.

R. YOUR SIDE ALSO RECOGNIZES "THE INVIOLABILITY OF TERRITORY OF STATES" IN THE TREATIES TO WHICH IT ATTACHED ITS SIGNATURES AND HAS THE OBLIGATION TO HONOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

S. NEVERTHELESS, YOU HAVE CONTINUOUSLY ATTEMPTED SO FAR TO COVER UP THE CRIMINAL ACTS COMMITTED BY THE ARMED SPY SHIP AND ITS CREW.

T. YOU WENT SO FAR AS TO ALLEGE THAT THE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES BY SUCH VESSELS AS "PUEBLO" IS A "STANDARD" PRACTICE.

U. YOU CALLED IT A "STANDARD" PRACTICE TO COMMIT SUCH A CRIMINAL ACT OF DETECTING MILITARY AND STATE SECRETS OF OTHER SOVEREIGN STATES WHILE INTRUDING

~~SECRET~~

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~SECRET~~

2 of 2 4261 NODIS CACTUS CN 4570Q

PAGE 3 KUALOS 4261/2 ~~SECRET~~

THEIR TERRITORIAL WATERS. THIS IS A VERY BRIGANDISH LOGIC OF AGGRESSORS.

V. THE US SIDE CAN BY NO MEANS JUSTIFY THE CRIME COMMITTED BY THE CREW MEMBERS OF THE PUEBLO NOR ABSOLVE ITSELF FROM THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT.

W. IT IS AN INDISPUTABLY STERN FACT ESTABLISHED BY THE CONFESSIONS OF THE CRIMINALS, THE CREW OF THE ARMED SPY SHIP, THAT THE US ARMED SPY SHIP "PUEBLO" INTRUDED INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE D.P.R.K., CONDUCTED ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AND PERPETRATED HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST OUR COUNTRY.

X. THEREFORE, WE WILL GIVE CONSIDERATIONS TO (WILL BE ABLE TO CONSIDER) THE ISSUE OF RETURNING THE CREW MEMBERS ONLY WHEN YOUR SIDE APOLOGIZES FOR THE FACT THAT THE US GOVERNMENT DISPATCHED THE ARMED SPY SHIP "PUEBLO" TO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA, CONDUCTED ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AND PERPETRATED HOSTILE ACTS, ASSURING (AND ASSURE) THAT IT WILL NOT COMMIT SUCH ORIGINAL ACTS AGAIN.

Y. I ONCE AGAIN STRESS THAT IT COMPLETELY DEPENDS

PAGE 4 KUALOS 5261/2 ~~SECRET~~

UPON THE ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF YOUR SIDE WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUE OF THE CREW OF THE US ARMED SPY SHIP WILL BE SETTLED AT AN EARLY DATE.

Z. I REQUEST YOU TO GIVE A SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THIS STATEMENT OF MINE.

5. PAK: THIS IS THE STATEMENT. (NOTE: PAK PASSED ONLY A KOREAN LANGUAGE VERSION OF HIS STATEMENT. IT SEEMED APPARENT THAT PAK WANTED ADMIRAL SMITH TO REQUEST AN ENGLISH LANGUAGE COPY).

Y. ADMIRAL SMITH: DO YOU HAVE AN ENGLISH COPY OF THIS STATEMENT?

7. PAK: WE HAVE TRANSLATED AN ENGLISH VERSION. (NOTE: AT THIS POINT PAK DIRECTED COL. SIN TO PAS HIS ENGLISH LANGUAGE COPY ACROSS THE TABLE).

8. SMITH: I HAVE RECEIVED A COPY OF YOUR STATEMENT. DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS OR INFORMATION?

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

31c p.

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 OO RUEHC
 DE KUALOS 4262E 0460925
 ZNY SSSSS ZZII
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 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9090
 STATE GRXC
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DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NJ 89-73
 By glw, NARA, Date 7/30/96

04565

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 4262

FEB 15 11 5 03

MODIS/CACTUS

SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON SIXTH SENIOR MEMBER'S CLOSED
 MAC MEETING AT PANMUNJOM, FEBRUARY 15

REF: SEOUL 4261

1. ATTENDING TODAY'S MEETING FOR NKOREAN SIDE WERE
 GENERAL PAK, JR., COL. HAN (CPA/KPV ASSISTANT MAC SECRETARY),
 JR. COL. SKIN (INTERPRETER), AND THREE KPA JR. LIEUTENANTS
 (NAMES UNKNOWN, BUT ALL HAVE ATTENDED PREVIOUS OPEN MAC
 MEETINGS). US ATTENDEES FOR US SIDE WERE SAME AS FOR PREVIOUS
 CLOSED MEETINGS, WITH ADDITION COL. J. P. LUCAS, UNCMAC

PAGE 2 KUALOS 4262E ~~SECRET~~
 SECRETARY.

2. IN CONTRAST TO HIS COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE AT FIVE
 PREVIOUS CLOSED MEETINGS, PAK TODAY REVERTED TO TRUCULENT
 ATTITUDE AND HARSH TONES OF VOICE WHICH CHARACTERIZE HIS
 BEHAVIOR AT OPEN MAC MEETINGS. HE WAS DELIBERATELY
 UNCOOPERATIVE IN PETTY WAYS, AS IN MANNER IN WHICH HE
 RELUCTANTLY PROVIDED KOREAN TEXT AND LATER ENGLISH TRANSLATION
 OF HIS PREPARED STATEMENT. HE ALSO RESUMED HIS ACTOR'S
 POSE OF GRIMACES, GESTURES, AND SNEERS AT APPROPRIATE
 MOMENTS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS CHANGE OF ATTITUDE
 REPRESENTS EXPRESSION OF ANNOYANCE OVER HAVING HAD TO GO
 THROUGH OPEN MAC MEETING YESTERDAY AND DIFFICULT PREPARATION
 THIS ENTAILS FOR ALL CONCERNED. MORE LIKELY, HOWEVER,
 THAT HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO BE COOPERATIVE IN PREVIOUS CLOSED
 MEETINGS UNTIL WE HAD AGREED ON FORMAT AND THAT HIS
 INSTRUCTIONS CALLED FOR HIM TO TAKE BELLIGERENT STANCE AT
 FIRST SUBSTANTIVE MEETING TO UNDERLINE FIRMNESS OF NK
 POSITION ON DISPOSITION OF PUEBLO CASE. IN ANY EVENT, IN
 VIEW HIS ATTITUDE, SMITH SAW NO POINT TO REITERATION OF US

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2- SEOUL 4262 NODIS CACTUS CN 4565Q

PAGE 3 RUALOS 4262E ~~SECRET~~
POSITION OR DEMANDS.

3. FROM LEGAL POINTS CONTAINED THEREIN, IT APPEARS PAK'S JUDIC STATEMENT WAS CAREFULLY PREPARED IN PYONGYANG. QUALITY OF ENGLISH TRANSLATION HE PROVIDED ALSO REVEALS GREATER COMPETENCE THAN KPA/CPV MAC TRANSLATORS ARE CAPABLE OF. ABSENCE OF ASSISTANT REPRESENTATIVE WHICH THEY HAVE REQUESTED IS FURTHER INDICATION THAT PAK WAS NOT PREPARED TODAY FOR REAL DISCUSSION BUT WAS UNDER ORDERS ONLY TO READ HIS STATEMENT. IT MAY TAKE SEVERAL ADDITIONAL MEETINGS TO TELL WHETHER THERE CAN BE REAL DISCUSSION OR WHETHER NKOREANS HOPE TO CONFINE US TO LABORIOUS POINT-BY-POINT, STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH. CERTAINLY THERE WILL BE NO REAL DISCUSSIONS UNTIL NK ASSISTANT REPRESENTATIVE SHOWS UP.

4. NOTEWORTHY THAT IN TODAY'S MEETING PAK MENTIONED TERMS FOR RETURN OF CREW BUT NOT RPT NOT SKIP. HE ALSO DID NOT RPT NOT CHARGE THAT PUEBLO CASE WAS VIOLATION OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, MAKING INSTEAD MANY REFERENCES TO CRIMES, CRIMINALS, HOSTILE ACTIONS AND ESPIONAGE, AND

PAGE 4 RUALOS 4262E ~~SECRET~~

CHALLENGING US POSITION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE. BRIEF REFERENCE TO "BAY OF EAST KOREA" AS "A BAY OF OUR COUNTRY HISTORICALLY" SUGGESTS NKOREANS MAY PLAN TO PLAY UP "HISTORIC BAY" CONCEPT. AS IS OBVIOUS FROM TEXT, PAK ALSO VOLUNTEERED NO INFORMATION ON CONDITION OF CREW.

5. PARAGRAPH X (REFTEL), OF COURSE, CONTAINS ESSENCE OF NK POSITION ON DISPOSITION OF CASE. PAK CAREFULLY AVOIDED SPECIFYING WHO SHOULD SIGN APOLOGY THEY ARE DEMANDING. BEYOND THIS, POSITION CONTAINS VERY LITTLE EVIDENCE OF GIVE AND ENTIRE STATEMENT AND MANNER IN WHICH IT WAS GIVEN REVEAL NO RPT NO WILLINGNESS TO CONCEDE TO US POSITION. FACT THAT PAK STATEMENT DID NOT CONTAIN ANY THREATS TO SAFETY OF CREW OR REFERENCE TO US MILITARY BUILD-UP, COUPLED WITH FACT THAT THEY CALLED THIS MEETING IMMEDIATELY AFTER YESTERDAY'S OPEN MEETING, IS PERHAPS ENCOURAGING BUT ONLY MINIMALLY SO.

6. GP-3. PORTER

BT

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, February 15, 1968
11:30 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy's daily report via Bus Wheeler. Its tone and substance continue to be optimistic.

Aside from the unresolved situation in Hue today, my major concern, arising from current reports, is the enemy is exploiting the loose situation in the countryside to take back some villages where we had established security, and is probably trying to recruit men to make up their losses. Aside from the I Corps battle, I suspect getting pacification back on its feet will gradually become a number one task.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS ltr 10-18-78

By ip/ly, NARA, Date 2-20-92



~~TOP SECRET~~

32a

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3016-68
15 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Telephone Conversation with General Westmoreland

1. In addition to General Westmoreland's eleventh report on the Khe Sanh/DMZ area, I have attached hereto a summary of the more significant actions in South Vietnam yesterday. At 0800 this morning I talked with General Westmoreland on the telephone, and he made the following comments:

a. Weather in the Khe Sanh area was generally good yesterday, permitting air operations, both tactical and logistic, to be accomplished. However, the weather was not good enough to permit him to distribute gravel in certain areas north of Khe Sanh as he would like to do.

b. Our air had a good day yesterday. They destroyed a large ammunition cache southwest of Khe Sanh, struck a large storage area near Tchepone in Laos, with smoke rising 6,000 feet in the air. The tactical air strike reported to you yesterday near Mu Gia Pass uncovered a North Vietnamese storage area which was also attacked during the period.

c. The Vietnamese Ranger Battalion at Khe Sanh carried out an excellent small unit operation yesterday. They moved a platoon outside of the perimeter during darkness to a hilltop; as day broke, they sent out a small patrol which deliberately exposed itself. The North Vietnamese troops came out of their holes to attack the patrol, and the whole Ranger platoon attacked them, inflicting casualties, and captured an 82 mm mortar.

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Authority JCS 10-3-78
By sp/ly, NARA, Date 2-20-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 of 1 copies

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d. At Hue, the enemy is still dug into the south wall of the Citadel. General Westmoreland plans to use air strikes again today, employing high explosives, white phosphorous, and Napalm weapons. He now has three ARVN Marine Corps Battalions (which replaced the understrength ARVN Airborne Battalions in Hue). There are also seven companies of US Marines engaged in the operation. He anticipates that the enemy can hold out for about three more days.

e. North of Saigon, armed helicopters and tactical air caught a large force of the enemy in the open, inflicting about 120 casualties on them. General Westmoreland thinks that the enemy's command and control system has broken down in the Saigon area. At any rate, the enemy seems to be confused and apparently has no orders or plans to withdraw. He considers this a satisfactory situation since it will permit him to destroy them element by element.

f. As reported to you yesterday, the Riverine Force operating near Can Tho discovered and captured a very sizeable enemy ammunition depot containing large quantities of grenades, 120 mm mortar rounds, etc.

2. General Westmoreland yesterday (last night Washington time) visited the 1st US Infantry Division, the 25th US Infantry Division and the 199th Infantry Brigade. These units have done and are doing extremely well. He stated that the 199th Brigade, located near Bien Hoa, has been commanded during the recent heavy fighting by a negro colonel named Davidson who did a splendid job in leading and commanding his forces. General Westmoreland believes that in the first two or three days of the fighting, this brigade killed over 1,100 of the enemy.

3. I discussed the Khe Sanh situation at some length with General Westmoreland. I conveyed to him the message which you transmitted to me through Secretary McNamara. General Westmoreland told me that he understands and appreciates greatly your firm support.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Pertinent to this aspect of the war, he stated that all events support the belief that the pounding from the air and from our artillery is having a good effect from our point of view on enemy capabilities in the area; i. e., his supply and command system is being constantly disrupted, and casualties are being inflicted on enemy troops in the Khe Sanh area.

4. General Westmoreland reported that except for the foregoing, the situation was quiet elsewhere.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

Operational/Intelligence Briefs

I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE:

On 14 February, the US Marine combat base at Khe Sanh continued to receive mixed rocket and mortar fire. The damage was minimal and casualties were light. The airfield was closed for two hours.

On 14 February, in Hue, clearing operations continued with US Marine units meeting stiff resistance along the south wall of the Citadel. Tactical air, gunships and artillery supported.

At 121330 EST, 10 nautical miles north of Quang Ngai, the An Chau refugee camp, defended by two Popular Force platoons and two pacification support teams, was attacked by an estimated enemy platoon. The enemy overran and destroyed the camp. 59 pacification cadre and 35 Popular Force are MIA and 1 ARVN WIA; enemy losses unknown.

II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE:

On 13 February, 5 nautical miles north of Qui Nhon, a CIDG company had a 3-hour engagement with an enemy company. Losses -- Friendly: 7 CIDG and 1 US KIA, 3 CIDG WIA; VC/NVA: 4 KIA.

At 131145 EST, 6 nautical miles southwest of Ban Me Thuot, a US Army fire support base sustained a 2-hour attack by an estimated enemy platoon. AC-47s and armed helicopters supported. At 131450 EST, a US Army 3-man patrol attempting to capture wounded enemy came under automatic weapons fire. Reaction force supported and the enemy broke contact. Cumulative losses -- US: 1 KIA, 12 WIA; VC/NVA: 15 KIA.

III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE:

On 14 February, 25 nautical miles north of Saigon, a US Army company had a 2-hour engagement with an enemy force. Two US Army platoons reinforced and tactical air, gunships, and artillery supported. Losses -- US: 4 KIA, 18 WIA; 1 armored personnel carrier destroyed, 1 OH-13 and 1 armored personnel carrier damaged; VC/NVA: 16 KIA, 1 person detained.

Encl to CM 3016-68
15 Feb 68

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 115.141.021-026/5
By je, NARA, Date 10-30-09

At 130020 EST, 12 nautical miles north of Saigon, an ARVN armored cavalry battalion engaged a reinforced enemy company for five hours. Artillery and tactical air supported. Losses -- ARVN: 4 KIA, 12 WIA; VC/NVA: 71 KIA, 11 persons were detained.

On 13 February, 13 nautical miles northwest of Saigon, elements of a US Army battalion engaged enemy force, killing nine; 4 US KIA and 48 WIA.

On 14 February, 9 nautical miles northwest of Saigon, a US Army company engaged the enemy. Losses -- US: 6 KIA, 11 WIA, 1 armored personnel carrier was destroyed; VC/NVA: unknown.

On 13 February, 8 nautical miles northwest of Saigon, a US Army company engaged an enemy force, killing 40. Gunships and artillery supported. On 14 February, the same unit engaged a large enemy force in the same area killing 127; no US casualties in either engagement.

At 140235 EST, 2 nautical miles southwest of Saigon, a US Army company engaged a 2-company enemy force. A second US Army company reinforced; tactical air, AC-47s, and armed helicopters supported. CS agents were dispensed by aircraft on enemy. Losses -- US: 2 KIA, 11 WIA, 3 UH-1s were downed (1 recovered, 2 secured); VC/NVA: unknown. Contact is continuing.

IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONE:

CORONADO X, a 2-battalion search and destroy operation, 35 nautical miles southwest of Saigon, was terminated after 27 days. Losses -- US: 12 KIA, 190 WIA; VC/NVA: 344 KIA, 280 persons were detained; 61,500 piasters, 8 tons rice, 2,665 rounds of small arms ammunition, 120 individual weapons, 116 mortar rounds, 105 grenades, 67 RR* rounds, 11 radios, and 3 phones were lost. Also 510 bunkers, 87 structures, and 4 sampans were destroyed.

At 132230 EST, 5 nautical miles southwest of Can Tho, a US Army company discovered an enemy arms cache containing 460 x 80-mm rockets, 56 x 10-kilo mines, 56 antitank mines,

* recoilless rifle

TOP SECRET TRINE

249 charges for 40-mm rockets, 3 x 82-mm mortar rounds, 360 pressure grenades, 59 x 40-mm grenade charges, numerous medical supplies, and small amount of small arms ammunition.

From 121900-131900 EST, there were 18 enemy initiated incidents. Losses -- Friendly: 4 KIA (2 ARVN, 2 civilians), 42 WIA (12 US, 30 ARVN), 21 ARVN MIA, 17 individual weapons, 1 radio, 1 phone, and 329 houses burned by enemy; VC/NVA: unknown.

On 14 February, 12 nautical miles southwest of Phan Rang, a USAF AC-47D was downed due to unknown causes. Rescue helicopters at the scene report no signs of survivors and the aircraft destroyed. The number of crew members aboard aircraft is unknown; however, aircraft normally carries a crew of six.

BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT:

Field readout of mission against Phuc Yen shows 2 damaged MIG-21s, 2 damaged MIG-15/17s, 3 small unidentified aircraft destroyed. Damage to runway was light.

AIRCRAFT LOSSES: USAF F-105D downed by SAM 18 nautical miles southeast of Hanoi at 140345 EST. There was no chute, beeper, or search and recovery.

A US Navy F-8E was downed by SAM 6 nautical miles northeast of Vinh at 140430 EST. Good chute, search and recovery in progress.

A US Air Force F-4D went down in the vicinity of Dong Hoi due to unknown causes at 141905 EST. Two good chutes were observed and voice contact was made. Search and recovery operation in progress.

HELICOPTER TRANSPORT MIGS:

Intercepted conversation between a Gia Lam controller and a MI-6 pilot on 9 December and a Kep controller and a MI-6 pilot on 1 February confirm that helicopters are being

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used in North Vietnam to disperse MIG aircraft. Photos over the past nine months have shown MIGs dispersed in remote, camouflaged areas 4 to 9 nautical miles from Phuc Yen, Gia Lam, and Hoa Lac. North Vietnam is estimated to have 4 MI-6s located in the vicinity of Hanoi.

TRUCK ACTIVITY NVN/LAOS:

In yesterday's brief on this subject, the statement that aerial observations tend to support the presence of 500 trucks in the Mu Gia Pass area and 50 trucks northwest of Khe Sanh is not correct. Aerial observations do support the presence of the 50 trucks 50 nautical miles northwest of Khe Sanh but as of the writing of yesterday's brief aerial observations accounted for much less than 500 trucks in the Mu Gia Pass area.

LAOS

SARAVANE:

Expected attack on Saravane apparently began on 14 February. Radio contact with the town is still broken. Two government battalions are believed to be out-numbered by mixed Pathet Lao-NVA units. The capture of Saravane would enable the enemy to move supplies to central highlands of South Vietnam and into the I Corps Tactical Zone via the A Shau Valley.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

INFORMATION

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Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, February 15, 1968
11:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Chet Bowles proposes a step beyond the Johns Hopkins speech. I am having it staffed out, but you may wish to consider it.

As you know, one of the possible ideas for an international conference in 1968 would be a gathering of the nations of Asia -- perhaps all the members of the Asian Development Bank -- to consider the long-run future of development in the area, including, of course, Vietnam and Laos.

W. W. Rostow

New Delhi

3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NJ/RAC 01-34
By SJ, NARA, Date 1-25-02

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

Thursday, February 15, 1968

NLJ 96-211

By isa, NARA Date 8-24-98

TEXT OF CABLE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BOWLES
(New Delhi, 1963)

1.5(c)
3.4 (b)(1)

Although I realize your personal attention must now largely be focused on military aspects of the Vietnam struggle, I would like to suggest an economic-political exercise which would spell out in more precise terms your widely-applauded speech at Johns Hopkins Univeristy in April 1965.

The first step would be well-staged announcement that you are setting up a committee of outstanding individuals skilled in Asian economic development to proceed as rapidly as possible to put together "postwar peace plan" for Southeast Asia. This study would explore how, once the fighting ceases, Southeast Asia as a whole can be transformed, after a generation of bloody violence, into an area of indigenous strength, stability and steadily growing prosperity.

The second step would be a timely presentation by the committee to you of realistic but imaginative program for reaching those objectives.

The third step would be commitment by Administration and Congressional leaders to work with other nations, including the U. S. S. R., to implement this program as soon as the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army permit us to do so.

This approach would have the following advantages:

A. It would once again demonstrate to the American people and indeed to the entire world your deep personal desire for peaceful settlement.

B. It would underscore our intention to begin to withdraw U. S. military as soon as such settlement is achieved.

C. It would bring home to the Government and people of North Vietnam the economic opportunities that peace will bring, and thus give them a greater stake in peace.

D. It would dramatize to all people in Southeast Asia magnificent opportunity for economic progress which will become possible as soon as the fighting has stopped.

~~SECRET~~

The political-military effectiveness of such an approach is underscored by a comparison of our differing political strategies in World Wars I and II.

A. Shortly before we entered war in January 1917, Woodrow Wilson announced his Fourteen Points. These proposals were a decisive influence in persuading the German people and their Government that peace would bring not punishment but opportunity, thereby shortening the war. Indeed, it was on the basis of Wilson's Fourteen Points that the German military asked for an armistice 20 months later.

B. If in World War II we and our Allies had similarly pledged our support for constructive postwar policy for Europe, the world might have been spared a year or two of extremely costly fighting. An announcement following the fall of Stalingrad, that we were prepared to give massive support to European reconstruction, as we actually did do in 1947, would certainly have had far reaching political effect in Germany and elsewhere. Since both Stalin and Churchill resisted this approach, the announced goals of the Allies were rigidly limited to "unconditional surrender." This enabled Hitler to rally a desperate German nation behind a last ditch effort to avoid what they assumed would be utter destruction.

A "postwar peace plan" for Southeast Asia would state that once the fighting ceases, we are prepared to cooperate with others, including the Soviets, in a coordinated program of power and irrigation development on the Mekong and Red Rivers, in programs of housing, medical care and schools, in special trade agreements, establishment of a common market, etc. This dramatic announcement would have a major impact not only on the people of Vietnam, both North and South, but also on the newly-developing nations such as India, on our Allies and on the American people as well. In the present atmosphere of Tet violations and the Pueblo affair, such statesmanship by you would provide hopeful contrast to the grim prospect of an unending and very possibly expanding war in Asia.

Pres file
34

Thursday, Feb. 15, 1968
11:00 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith General Bonesteel does an absolutely first-class job of getting the South Korean military men to settle down. If, as I assume, Cy did the same with President Park, we may have turned a corner.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~ attachment (Korea 0596)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-212
By rij, NARA Date 2-14-97

DE YSNKQA 13 0461417

O 151408Z ZYH ZFF5

FM GEN WHEELER CJCS

INFO MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE

MR CLIFFORD WHITE HOUSE

MR RUSK STATE

Z 150857Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM GEN BONESTEEL KOREA

TO ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII

INFO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASHINGTON

MR CYRUS VANCE PRES ENVOY ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN KRA 0596 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF TWO

TACTICS AND PURPOSE OF MEETING AND CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION OUTLINED BELOW WAS DEVELOPED IN MEETING OF MR. VANCE, AMBASSADOR PORTER AND MYSELF AFTER THEIR ALL NIGHT SESSION WITH ROK MINISTERS, AND JUST PRIOR TO MR. VANCE'S FINAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARK AT 1030 HOURS THIS MORNING. AS A RESULT OF OUR US MEETING I CALLED ROK CHIEFS TOGETHER FOR SESSION WHICH BEGAN AT 1115 HOURS. PRESENT WERE GENERAL KIM KAE WON, CHIEF OF STAFF, ROKA; ADMIRAL KIM, CNO; GENERAL CHANG, CHIEF OF STAFF, ROKAF; GENERAL KANG, MARINE COMMANDANT; LIEUTENANT GENERAL SHIM, DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF AND GENERAL FRIEDMAN, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNC. MND AND GENERAL IM, CJCS, WERE AT BLUE HOUSE FOR VANCE MEETING.

AFTER REMINDING ALL ONCE MORE OF LONG HISTORY OF US DEFENDING FREEDOM, INCLUDING HERE IN KOREA, AND OUR MUTUAL TRUST AND WORK TOGETHER FOR KOREA'S DEFENSE AND KOREAN ECONOMY, I STATED SITUATION TODAY SOMEHOW SEEMED TO HAVE BECOME ONE OF MOST PROFOUNDLY SERIOUS FOR KOREA AND FREE ASIA SINCE KOREAN WAR. DESPITE ASSURANCES MR. VANCE HAD GIVEN THAT TERMS OF MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WOULD BE HONORED BY U.S.,

RETAIATION AGAINST FORTH KOREA IF NKS MADE FURTHER SERIOUS RAIDS. IN DEFINING THESE U.S. ASSURANCES IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT ROKS UNDERSTAND THEY COULD NOT DRAG THE U.S. WITHOUT ITS CONSENT INTO WAR PROVOKED BY

THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION STEMMED IN MY MIND FROM AN APPARENT OBSESSION ON PART OF TO RETALIATE AND U.S. DIFFICULTY IN GETTING CLEAR COMMITMENT FROM ROKG THEY WOULD NOT DO SO WITHOUT CONSULTATION AND AGREEMENT OF USG. APPEARANCES WERE THAT SOME IN ROKG WERE OBSESSED WITH A NEED FOR OVERT ACTION TO PUNISH KIM IL SUNG, PARTICULARLY IF FURTHER NK MAJOR RAIDS TOOK PLACE. I STATED I FOUND THIS PREOCCUPATION INCONGRUOUS SINCE MR. VANCE (AND THE USG) WERE WORKING DAY AND NIGHT TO ASSURE FULL US SUPPORT OF THE ROK. I INFORMED THEM THAT JOINT COMMUNIQUE BEING DISCUSSED AT BLUE HOUSE PROVIDES VERY STRONG WARNINGS TO NORTH KOREA BUT THIS DOES NOT IMPLY A US COMMITMENT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN

WHICH CARRIED ANY RISK OF MAJOR NK REACTION WHICH COULD, IN TURN, LEAD TO WAR. I POINTED OUT THAT ROK CHIEFS KNEW WE ARE TOGETHER IN OPPOSING INDIRECT AS WELL AS DIRECT AGGRESSION BUT TIME WAS NOW FOR VERY FRANK TALK AND I THEN MADE IT CLEAR THAT U.S. DID NOT BELIEVE AUTOMATIC RETALIATION AGAINST RAIDS WAS REQUIRED.

IN DISCUSSING OUR INABILITY TO UNDERSTAND WHY SOME ROKS INSISTED ON IMMEDIATE RETALIATORY RAIDS, I POINTED OUT GREAT STRENGTH OF THE 30 MILLION ANTI-COMMUNIST ROK PEOPLES, WITH ARMED FORCES IN KOREA OF 600,000 WHO ARE WELL TRAINED AND EQUIPPED, AND THIS STRENGTH WAS FACING THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER RAIDS BY UP TO 2,400 WELL TRAINED GUERRILLAS -- A POSSIBILITY WE ALL HOPED THE WARNING IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE WOULD LESSEN. I SAID THAT DESPITE THESE ODDS, THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNISTS SEEMED TO HAVE ACHIEVED A GOOD PART OF THEIR STRATEGY OF DIVISION BETWEEN US AND ROK BECAUSE OF

AND THAT THIS, IF NOT CORRECTED, COULD LEAD ON TO SECOND OBJECTIVE OF NORTH KOREANS, I.E., TO GET US FORCES PULLED OUT OF KOREA.

DURING DUTY HOURS.

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

EYES ONLY

34a

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-211

By us, NARA, Date 2-28-03

CO, YEKADS

E YSNKQA 14 0461417

O 151408Z ZYH ZFF5

FM GEN WHEELER CJCS

INFO MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE

MR CLIFFORD WHITE HOUSE

MR RUSK STATE

Z 150857Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM GEN BONESTEEL KOREA

TO ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII

INFO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASHINGTON

MR CYRUS VANCE PRES ENVOY ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA

ZEM

~~S E C R E T~~ NOFORN KRA 0596 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF TWO

I POINTED OUT THAT MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISJUDGMENTS GROWING OUT OF THE CURRENT ROK OBSESSION COULD FACE ME AS CINCUNC/COMUSFK WITH A MOST ANGUISHING DECISION. THIS DECISION WOULD BE TO CONSIDER WHETHER OR NOT TO RECOMMEND TO MY SUPERIORS THAT U.S. MILITARY FORCES (LESS THE MAAGS) BE WITHDRAWN FROM KOREA TO AVOID BEING DRAWN INTO A WAR PROVOKED BY ROK [REDACTED]. I SAID THIS SEEMED LIKE A BAD DREAM WHICH I KNEW WE ALL HOPED WOULD QUICKLY PASS AWAY AND LET US GET BACK TO OUR GOOD AND SOUND WORKING RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE THE MAJOR ARGUMENT BETWEEN US POSITION AND SOME ROKS WAS NOT ON QUESTION OF SUCCESSFULLY COPING WITH NK SUBVERSIVE AGGRESSION BUT ONLY ON THE METHOD OF DOING SO.

I SAID ROK CHIEFS KNEW THE U.S. IS NOT SITTING BY DOING NOTHING AGAINST THE THREAT OF NK INCREASING AGGRESSIVENESS. I KNEW WE ALL UNDERSTOOD EACH OTHER AS SOLDIERS (AND WERE NOT POLITICIANS) AND THEY KNEW I HAD FULL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THEM. WHAT WE NEEDED TO DO NOW WAS NOT JUST TO ASK FOR MORE EQUIPMENT BUT WE HAD TO QUIT WORRYING ABOUT RETALIATION AT THIS TIME AND DO EVEN MORE WITH WHAT WE HAD TO MAKE SURE ROK AND UN FORCES WERE TRAINED, ORGANIZED, COORDINATED, AND LED SO WE COULD HALT FURTHER NORTH KOREAN RAIDERS, IF THERE WERE ANY, IN THEIR TRACKS BEFORE THEY COULD SUCCEED. I URGED THEM AS MILITARY LEADERS TO INCREASE THEIR SENSE OF URGENCY IN USING WHAT WE HAVE NOW.

FOLLOWING MY TALK, WHICH CHIEFS TOOK SERIOUSLY, SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND, AND SHOWED NO UNDUE CONCERN, GENERAL KANG POSED THEIR ONLY SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION. HE ASKED WHY I WAS TELLING THIS TO THEM INSTEAD OF TO THE HIGHER LEVEL? WAS ANYBODY TELLING THE HIGHER LEVELS? I INDICATED I COULD NOT SAY PRECISELY BUT POINTED OUT THAT MR. VANCE WAS EVEN THEN DISCUSSING BASIC MATTERS WITH PRESIDENT PARK AT BLUE HOUSE. I SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE ROK CHIEFS UNDERSTAND THE POTENTIAL SERIOUSNESS [REDACTED]

I WARNED ALL THAT ANY LEAK OF THE CONJECTURAL PROBLEMS I HAD DISCUSSED TO THE PRESS OR PUBLIC WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC AND JUST WHAT THE COMMUNISTS WANTED. I SAID THEY SHOULD TELL NO ONE OF OUR TALK EXCEPT MND AND GENERAL IM, CJCS, TO WHICH THEY WHOLEHEARTEDLY AGREED.

I REPORTED ON MY MEETING FULLY TO MR. VANCE AND AMBASSADOR PORTER WHEN WE GOT TOGETHER AFTER THEIR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARK. THEY FULLY ENDORSED WHAT I HAD SAID AND BELIEVED IT FITTED IN COMPLETELY WITH PROBLEM OF OBSESSION FOR RETALIATION STILL BEING SHOWN BY PRESIDENT PARK AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR MEETING WITH HIM. IT WAS DECIDED BY THE THREE OF US I SHOULD CALL MND AND SUGGEST HE BE BRIEFED BY GENERAL SHIM ON MY MEETING WITH CHIEFS. THIS HAS BEEN DONE. MR. VANCE ASKED THAT I GET THIS REPORT BACK TO WASHINGTON BEFORE HE ARRIVED SO THAT THOSE CONCERNED WOULD KNOW OF THIS ACTION WHICH WE HAD FELT IT NECESSARY TO TAKE.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

475

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Thursday, February 15, 1968
10:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the current supply
situation at Khe Sanh.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By hg, NARA, Date 2/4/92

35a

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988

By NARA, Date 2-14-92

~~SECRET~~

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

15 February 1968
10:00 AM EST



THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM 14
February EST (9:00 AM 15 February SVN Time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)
status as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>Days Supply on hand</u>	<u>Previous Status</u> 8:00 PM 13 Feb EST (9:00 AM 14 Feb SVN)
Class I (Rations)		
Meal, Combat, Individual	8	8 days
B Rations	9	9 days
Class III (Fuel)		
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	10	10 days
JP-4 (Jet Fuel)	3	5 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	4	4 days
Diesel	Not reported	4 days
Class V (Ammunition)		
A detailed breakdown by type was not re- ported for 15 Feb 68.		
a. High explosive		
60 mm mortar		16 days
81 mm mortar		15 days
90 mm (tank)		86 days
4.2" mortar		33 days
105 mm howitzer		9 days
155 mm howitzer		20 days
b. Anti-tank		
		<u>Rounds on hand</u>
90 mm HEAT		978
66 mm rocket (LAW)		190
Anti-tank mines (M19)		100
106 mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T)		316

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SECRET

Class V (COFRAM)

105 mm howitzer	5	5 days
155 mm howitzer	5	5 days
40 mm grenade launcher	5	5 days
Hand grenades	10	10 days


2. On 14 February Khe Sanh was resupplied with 187 tons as follows:

Class I (Rations) 5 tons

Class II & IV
(Fortification materials, ambulance) 41 tons

Class V (Ammunition) 141 tons
TOTAL 187 tons

Additionally, 17 tons of Class III supplies were delivered. A breakdown of these supplies is as follows: AVGAS 10 tons, JP-4 3 tons, MOGAS 4 tons, and Diesel fuel - not reported.


SHANNON D. CRAMER JR.
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director
for Operations (NMCC)

DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF
DEPSECDEF
CJCS
DJS
VDJS
J-4
J-30
J-31
J-32
J-33
CT FORCE
MCCC
AWR
DDO
ADDO
CCOC
PAC DIV
PAC DESK

SECRET

36

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, February 15, 1968
9:20 a. m.

from file

Mr. President:

They really get some supplies
into Khe Sanh yesterday -- 188 tons.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By lg, NARA, Date 2-14-92

36a

SECRET

Thursday, February 15, 1968, 8:45 AM

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is the eleventh report on the Khe Sanh - DMZ area and covers the 24-hour period of February 14, 1968.

Significant activity yesterday in the First Corps continued to center in northern Quang Tri Province as renewed enemy shelling impacted at Khe Sanh Combat Base and outlying areas bordering the DMZ.

At Khe Sanh, elements of the 26th Marines received 65 rounds of mortars and 13 rounds of rocket scattered throughout the day and night. Friendly casualties for the period amounted to three Marines killed, 10 wounded (nine evacuated). The 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines in the vicinity of Camp Carroll counted 30 rounds of mortars during mid-day shellings. Friendly casualties were one killed, nine wounded (seven evacuated).

A noontime barrage of 13 rounds of mortar at Con Thien inflicted no casualties or damage on the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines. Twenty additional mortar rounds fell at Cl, seven kilometers south of Gio Linh, causing minor injuries to four ARVN soldiers.

Marine aircraft flew 106 tactical air sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area, the Air Force flew 98 sorties and the Navy flew 39, for a total of 243 tactical air sorties. Bomb Damage included 15 bunkers destroyed, six anti-aircraft positions destroyed, numerous secondary fires, 10 secondary explosions, 14 killed by air, one rocket position destroyed. Twenty-one B-52's flew four ARC LIGHT strikes delivering 525 tons of ordnance in the Niagara area.

Khe Sanh was resupplied with 188 short tons during the period, with 80 short tons being air dropped from Air Force C-130 aircraft. Nineteen C-123 and helicopters airlanded the additional 107.5 short tons. A total of 141 short tons of ammunition and 31 short tons of engineering equipment were included.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD ltr 1/3/79

By ep/af, NARA, Date 2-20-92

For the next 24-hour period Marine Tactical Air plans 44 sorties in support of Khe Sanh, the Air Force plans 150, and the Navy 100, for a total of 294 sorties. Sixteen Marine aircraft and 120 Air Force sorties will be on call. ARC LIGHT will run 15 strikes (45 sorties) in the Niagara area, commencing the Bugle Note Program of three-aircraft strikes with time over targets' each 1 1/2 hours.

Weather at Khe Sanh throughout the period was favorable for most military operations. The visibility was greater than five miles except for a short period near midnight due to ground fog. During most of the afternoon the sky condition was 2500 foot broken. By early evening cloudiness decreased and remained scattered throughout the night. Valley stratus formed after sunrise 1500 to 2000 feet producing a broken ceiling which remained in the area throughout the morning.

Forecast for Khe Sanh during the next period is for generally good visibility in daytime. After sunset, fog and stratus will gradually form lowering the ceiling to from 200 - 500 feet and the visibility to one mile or less by sunrise. Shortly thereafter, the ceiling will gradually improve to 100 broken and the visibility to five miles.

Thursday, February 15, 1968

Mr. President:

Everyone was out to lunch, so I wrote this possible Senate draft myself.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

February 15, 1968

I read recently an assertion that our alliances around the world are crumbling and our world position is undermined.

Politicians sometimes seek to advance their interests by making statements like that. It is not the highest form of politics nor the highest form of patriotism.

In this case, it is simply not true.

We have had no new alliances in the 1960's. NATO and SEATO and ANZUS were sanctioned in earlier years, as was the Organization of American States.

Looked at closely, all of these alliances, as well as certain of our bilateral security arrangements, have met the test under President Johnson, which measures the vitality of any alliance: can it successfully grip new problems and move forward.

In the case of NATO, for example, we have faced the defection of France from the integrated military defense of Europe. This was a serious decision. But what happened? All the other members of the alliance stayed together. They moved to Brussels. SHAPE, the integrated command in the field, is as vital as ever. The effectiveness of the deterrent in Europe has been maintained and even strengthened.

More than that, freed of the backward looking French, NATO has plowed new ground. There is now, for the first time, an agreed strategic concept in NATO and agreed force levels. There is an agreed procedure for neutralizing the foreign exchange costs that arise from the location of forces within the alliance. And now NATO is considering joint work on certain major political

issues where there is a common interest, notably East-West relations.

In non-military fields our cooperation with Europe has become more intense and more effective. It was essentially European cooperation with the U. S. that made possible the success of the Kennedy round negotiation. Europeans have for the first time accepted a regular responsibility in food aid.

Europe and the United States worked together to produce the new International Monetary Fund Reserve Unit. Right now Europeans and Americans are cooperating to deal with our policy of improving our balance of payments in ways which expand and do not contract the world trade -- which lead to greater liberalization rather than a protectionist spiral.

With respect to Latin America, the Alliance for Progress -- born at Bogota, carried forward by President Kennedy -- has never been more vital than in recent years. The Latin Americans have come to accept what they had to accept if they were to succeed; namely, that it was mainly their job, with the U. S. as junior partner. At the Summit conference at Punta del Este, they undertook to move in the 1970's towards an effective common market. In the meanwhile, they are working together on many multinational projects to open up the inner frontiers of South America, to exploit natural resources, to improve communications, and to bind their destinies closer together.

Now what about Asia?[?] It is true that certain members of SEATO have, for whatever reasons, decided that they could not put their forces into the battle in Vietnam. But the Australians are there and the Thais and the Filipinos and the New Zealanders. The South Koreans, in a remarkable effort,

have sent more than 50,000 of their men to fight the aggression against South Vietnam. From Djakarta and Singapore to Tokyo and Seoul there are 300 million Asians who know that their independence and freedom depend on our seeing it through-- whether their forces are engaged or not.

And, whether they acknowledge it publicly or not, the leaders of India and Pakistan also know that it is the simple truth for them and their nations.

In these past few years under President Johnson's leadership a wholly new pattern of cooperation has emerged in Asia. Nations which had never worked together before are now joined together in the tasks of economic development through the Mekong Committee and Asian Development Bank and special programs in education, transportation and other fields.

In Southeast Asia, for example, there is ASPAC -- the Asian and Pacific Council -- in which ten countries have joined together to examine their political problems. There is also a new grouping of 5 nations -- the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, including Indonesia and some of its neighbors.

This new sense of common destiny and cooperation throughout Asia -- this conviction that, because we are seeing it through in Vietnam, they have a common future to build -- is one of the most heartening and important events in the postwar years.

It is too bad that some Europeans have turned their backs on the New Asia. It is too bad that some Americans do not understand how important it is for the future of this country -- for our children and grandchildren -- that free and independent Asian nations join together in this way.

But Asia is where two-thirds of humanity lives. An Asia in chaos and war, in stagnation and poverty, nations split among themselves and vulnerable as the play things of other powers, would surely endanger the security and the prosperity of the United States.

Yes, the battle in Vietnam is hard. We all wish it would go away tomorrow.

Yes, there are dangers still ahead. And the outcome for Asia and the world cannot be predicted with certainty. But the simple truth is that the world position of the United States remains strong; our alliances are active and vital; and, in a complex, revolutionary era, we are working with others to widen the area of security and order.

Let us, then, have less hand wringing. Let us remember that every day that passes makes isolationism less possible as a basis for the policy of America. Let us recognize that in Europe, Latin America and Asia there are those who not only depend upon us but, every day, are willing to move a step away from dependence, a step nearer true partnership.

That is the road President Johnson has taken in these four years. It is a record of which every American can be proud and for which every American should be thankful.

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Thursday - February 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: DR Status Report

Pres file

As of noon today, the Embassy reported the situation in Santo Domingo as follows:

1. The crisis seems to be passing.
2. An agreement has been reached between University authorities and the government by which students will be allowed to leave the campus after identifying themselves and being searched.
3. Government security officials will then go into the campus to search for weapons. By agreement these officials are to be out of the campus by next Wednesday, after which classes will resume.
4. The atmosphere in Santo Domingo is quiet and business is proceeding as usual.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
By NU 93-340
By JP, NARA, Date 4/29/96

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39

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

IMMEDIATE

STATE 116188

NODIS/CACTUS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-211
By is, NARA Date 12-24-97

*sent to Pres. 2/15/6.
for clearance*

Following instructions for Seventh Closed MAC Meeting have been cleared by the Secretary and sent to Seoul.

1. Admiral Smith should open with statement along following lines:

a. The statement which you handed me at our last meeting has been studied by the proper authorities.

I have a number of comments:

1) I cannot understand your dismissal of my earlier offer to give you a written assurance that impartial inquiry will be held promptly into all the facts of the matter when the officers and crew of the Pueblo have been returned to the US. Quite apart from the interest which your side should have in such an impartial inquiry, the US government must of necessity determine whether, contrary to its order, the Pueblo approached closer than 13 nautical miles to the coast of North Korea at any time during its voyage. Those orders were issued to prevent international misunderstanding or tension and their violation would not be

lightly regarded by the US Government.

2) You claim to possess evidence that the Pueblo intruded several miles into your claimed territorial waters. We cannot be expected to weigh the raw validity of your asserted evidence without being able to question the officers and crew of the ship ourselves. We would of course be greatly assisted in a future inquiry into the facts of the case by regaining possession of the ship's papers, including the ship log and navigational plot which you say you possess.

3) You charge that the Pueblo fired first on your patrol craft and imply that this action justified your seizure of the ship and its crew. This claim is not supported by messages received from the Pueblo at the time of its capture.

4) Your statement raised a number of legal points which have been carefully considered and which appear to be without merit. Thus we find no basis for your interpretation of Article 23 of 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea; that article applies to any violation of a coastal state's regulations, and there is no support either in the text or in the practice of States for your more limited interpretation. The sole remedy for a violation of territorial waters and

regulations of coastal states by a warship is to require it to leave the territorial sea; by your own admission the Pueblo was attempting to move farther out to sea when it was seized. Also we find nothing in the Hague Convention or any other international agreement requiring a surface warship to fly its flag, except when going into battle. Messages received from the Pueblo however explicitly stated that the US flag was raised when your patrol craft was asked the Pueblo to identify itself. Finally, we are not aware of any historical basis for your apparent assertion that the Bay of East Korea is an "historical bay," and therefore internal waters. In fact, your statement at our last meeting is the first occasion of which we are aware that any such claim was ever made.

5) I might take issue with a number of other points in your statement but I shall confide myself to only one. Any doubt concerning whether or not voyages such as that of the Pueblo are in accord with standard practice could be easily resolved by consulting Soviet authorities who pioneered this kind of activity and who engaged in it more than any other government.

(FYI DEPTTEL 106055, Jan. 27, 1968 contains summary

of relevant Soviet and US practice.)

b. At the end of your statement, you said that your side would give consideration to the issue of returning the crew members only when the US "apologizes for the fact that the US Rgx Government dispatched the armed spy ship 'Pueblo' to the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, conducted espionage activities and perpetrated hostile acts, assuring that it will not commit such criminal acts again."

c.

d.

2. After listening to what North Korea has to say about foregoing, and if he is not RPT not forthcoming on release of crew and vessel, you have authority to say following:

a. We have now had seven meetings. It is quite clear from these meetings that further meetings will only be repetitious on both sides. We have stated our proposal for the release of the crew and vessel. We have indicated our willingness to express regrets if the inquiry which will be held would justify our doing so. We are prepared to give assurances that our naval ships will remain more than twelve nautical miles from your coast.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, February 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Handwritten: 2. Pres/ple

SUBJECT: \$40 Million Loan for Turkey

Attached is a Zwick-Fowler-Gaud recommendation that you now approve this year's non-project loan for Turkey. The \$40 million proposed is \$25 million less than our comparable loan last year, and a further cut in our project loans will bring our total economic aid to Turkey down by \$80 million altogether. We are also planning a \$48 million cut in military aid.

Therefore, the only objection to the attached is that it is too little. Turkey, despite its difficulties, is doing a generally good economic job and deserves better.* However, AID in apportioning this year's Congressional cuts just cannot manage more.

State has been paving the way to minimize the political impact of these cuts, but knows its job will be difficult.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓ 4/15/68
Disapprove _____
Call me _____

Handwritten notes:
x 6.2% GNP increase in 1967
11.7% industrial output increase
19.6% of GNP invested - remarkable
They deserve more.
W

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-212
By WJ, NARA Date 2-14-97

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-212

By WJ, NARA Date 2-14-97

FEB 9 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed \$40 Million Program Loan to Turkey

In the attached memorandum Bill Gaud requests your authorization to negotiate a \$40 million loan to help cover Turkey's non-project import requirements in 1968.

This loan level is \$25 million less than our 1967 program assistance, while total economic aid to Turkey in 1968 will be down \$80 million. Including a planned \$48 million drop from 1967 in our MAP program, total 1968 dollar support will be down \$127.8 million against 1967.

	1967 Actual	1968 Proposed	Difference
Program lending	65.0	40.0	- 25.0
Project lending	69.9	15.0	- 54.9
MAP grants	134.9	87.0	- 47.9
Total	269.8	142.0	-127.8

The sharp reduction in 1968 assistance is largely the result of Congressional cuts. This reduction will come as a shock to the Turks and may cause some political waves.

Turkey has been facing the problem of steady inflationary pressure and a chronic exchange gap. AID forecasts a Turkish exchange shortage of between \$7-\$42 million for 1968. This estimate includes all donor aid. It is a conservative estimate and well below Turkey's own projection.

AID hopes that the foreign exchange shortage for 1968 will force the Turkish Government to take some positive steps to improve their balance of payments position. However, AID does not expect that Turkey is yet ready to face devaluation.

Self-help. Gaud points out that Turkey has made real progress in the past year, but continuing efforts are needed to prevent inflation and to increase foreign exchange availabilities. The conditions proposed for the present loan would encourage important steps in these directions, including adherence to a new IMF price stabilization program, steps to

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increase earnings from tourism and increased export incentives. The proposed loan level is too low to provide sufficient leverage for AID to press for currency devaluation. AID is, however, supporting the DEF in its discussion of this subject and trying to persuade the Turks that such a step would be in their own best interests.

Military Expenditures. A discussion of the Turkish military budget is attached at Tab A. It indicates that, although defense expenditures are high (over 20% of the budget), they are necessary to Turkey's NATO obligations. They do not "materially interfere" with her development. Accordingly, it is not necessary for you to take any action under the terms of the Symington amendment. Turkey is one of the seven countries excluded from the provisions of the Conte amendment.

Balance of Payments. The reduction in our aid to Turkey, while other donors provide roughly the same amount, will reduce our share of total consortium assistance from 65% of program aid in 1967 to 53% in 1968, while our share of total aid will drop from 53% to 30% for these two years. Although we do not yet have final figures for 1967, it appears that the additionality of tied aid to Turkey is quite high and that Turkey is allocating an increasing proportion of her free foreign exchange to imports from the U. S. Secretary Fowler agrees that the size of this loan and the safeguards involved will minimize its impact on our balance of payments.

Recommendation. I recommend that you authorize this \$40 million program loan to Turkey for 1968.

(signed) Charles J. Zwick
Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

FEB 2 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: FY 1968 Assistance for Turkey

I request your authorization to conclude a \$40 million production loan for capital goods, raw materials, and spare parts imports with the Government of Turkey.

This loan is \$25 million less than was provided in 1967, but is the most we can provide given the substantial reduction in A.I.D. appropriations. In economic terms, we hope the loan is adequate to meet Turkish needs, though it risks a slowdown in the growth curve. The amount will surely disappoint the Turkish Government and with the MAP reduction, it could create political problems during the coming years.

In addition to the project loan of \$7.5 million for the Turkish Industrial Bank from FY 1968 appropriations which is already approved, we expect to authorize \$7.5 million for other project loans. Consequently, total U. S. lending to Turkey in FY 1968 will be approximately \$55 million, \$80 million less than authorized in FY 1967.

Self-Help Performance

Turkish economic advance in 1967 continued at the high rate evidenced over the past few years.

In 1967:

- GNP increased 6.2%, which is only slightly below the Plan target of 7% and follows a 10% increase in 1966.
- Industrial output increased 11.7%, compared with a 10.6% increase in 1966.
- 19.6% of GNP was devoted to investment and domestic savings financed 90% of these investment expenditures.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-218

By cb, NARA Date 3-3-97

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified

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- 2 -

- Government revenues for Turkish fiscal year 1967 (ending February 29, 1968) are estimated to increase 23%. Revenue from direct taxes are estimated to increase 26%.
- Defense expenditures in 1967 as a percent of the National Budget are estimated to fall from 24.8% to 23.2% and the 1968 program projects a continuation of this reduction. (Turkey is exempted from the provisions of the Cents Amendment and the issues raised by the Symington Amendment--Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act--are discussed in Attachment A).

In addition, significant reforms and other measures to assist the private sector have been instituted:

- The Council of Ministers has greater flexibility in appointing and paying key executive personnel in the State Economic Enterprises and other Government agencies. Special incentives, including tax rebates and reducing customs duties, can now be given investments in high priority industries and to encourage exports.
- The State Planning Organization has been given authority for approving foreign investments and has been acting expeditiously to clear the backlog of earlier proposals.
- A government fund for loans to and equity investment in private sector enterprises has been created, which is a departure from previous policies which emphasized total government ownership.

Despite Turkey's commendable economic performance, and the institution of policy reforms which lay the basis for even more rapid progress in the future, we are still concerned with recurring inflationary pressures and convinced that a substantial reform of the exchange rate is needed if Turkey is to achieve balance of payments equilibrium compatible with a high rate of economic growth and achieve full integration in the European Common Market.

The balance of payments position of Turkey is serious. Reserves at the end of 1967 amounted to \$55 million, enough to finance four weeks of imports. Tourist receipts in 1967 were up only slightly and workers' remittances fell some \$20 million to \$95 million due to a downturn in the German economy. Exports increased about 5%, but little progress has been made in developing new export industries, and agricultural exports still account for about 85% of export earnings. Equilibrium was maintained only by restricting the already inadequate flow of essential imports.

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- 3 -

A.I.D. Strategy and Self-Help for 1968

If the goal of satisfactory growth without concessional assistance by 1973 is to be attained, a major revision of Turkey's economic policies is required. Measures to accelerate the growth of foreign exchange earnings and to increase the competitiveness and efficiency of the economy are most essential. Consequently, our strategy continues to emphasize the need for exchange reform and the reduction or removal of quantitative restrictions on imports although we recognize that cuts in aid may limit the ability of the Government of Turkey to take such actions.

A devaluation sufficient to permit meaningful import liberalization would entail political as well as economic risks and we really lack the leverage needed to induce the Government of Turkey to undertake such major reforms at this time. In view of our limited aid appropriations and a number of political and military issues now dominating U.S.-Turkish relations, e.g., renegotiation of the military bilateral agreements with Turkey and resolution of the Cyprus problem, we do not intend to take the lead in pressing for these reforms.

The IMF shares our conviction that these reforms are necessary and has been discussing them with the Government of Turkey for the past two years. The Turkish Government is aware of our interest as is the IMF. We intend to let the IMF continue as the principal negotiator.

We expect to see continued Turkish progress with respect to the problems and conditions specified in last year's loan: (a) the maintenance of internal price stability; (b) efforts to raise foreign exchange earnings; (c) a reduction in the substitution of aid financed for commercial imports; (d) an increase in the share of aid supplied by other Consortium members.

In connection with this loan, we expect the Turkish Government to:

- 1) Adhere to the conditions of a new IMF stabilization program should this be forthcoming and, in any event, domestic monetary and fiscal policies designed to prevent undue inflationary pressures.
- 2) Implement measures to divert tourist exchange transactions from the free market to official channels. Indications are that the Government of Turkey will adopt a special exchange rate for tourists and at the same time raise the current rate for workers' remittances.
- 3) Increase financial incentives for exporting.

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- 4 -

- 4) Implement measures to facilitate private sector investment, both foreign and domestic, including expeditious approval of foreign investment applications, larger foreign exchange allocations, the granting of credits when appropriate and new special incentives.

In addition, we expect the other aid donors to bear a larger proportionate share of the aid burden. Initial indications are that other donors will not reduce their aid commitments as we are compelled to do.

The 1968 Turkish Request

For 1968 the Government of Turkey has requested \$184 million in program assistance and debt relief. We feel that a more reasonable estimate of the Turkish financing requirement is \$99-\$134 million. To meet this requirement, we estimate that disbursement from prospective pledges of other Consortium members will be \$72 million and disbursements from this A.I.D. loan will be \$20 million. Total financing available should reach \$92 million. (A further description of the balance of payments is contained in Attachment B).

In view of our reduced appropriations a deficit which could be as large as \$42 million is unavoidable. This deficit will put added strain on the already tight foreign exchange reserves of Turkey and may retard economic growth as Turkey will, in all probability, compensate by curtailing imports. This shortfall is, in our judgment, manageable and should underline for the Government of Turkey the seriousness of its foreign exchange problems.

Additionality and Burden Sharing

We have been increasingly concerned with the balance of payments effect of our aid program in Turkey. We have been carrying a disproportionate share of the aid burden and, at least partly as a consequence, some commercial exports have been displaced by A.I.D.-financed exports. In 1965 substitution losses of commercial exports may have reached \$30 million. Indications are that since then U.S. commercial exports have increased.

In May of 1967, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John Petty headed an interagency study of export additionality in Turkey. Its principal recommendation was that certain commodities, in which the U.S. was the principal competitive source, should no longer be eligible for A.I.D. financing. Two categories of commodities -- hides and skins, and kraft paper -- which accounted for about \$3 million in the 1967 production loan were specifically mentioned and they are no longer eligible. Additional commodities are under review as are revised procedures which would facilitate use of Turkish foreign

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- 5 -

exchange for purchasing small orders of essential raw materials and spare parts from the U.S.

A substantial shift of the aid burden to the other Consortium members is a simple and direct way to limit the adverse effect of the A.I.D. program on the U.S. balance of payments. We expect the other Consortium members to maintain the program pledge levels of previous years and, consequently, with this year's reduction of our program loan from \$65 million to \$40 million, there should be such a substantial shift.

Last year the U.S. program loan of \$65 million represented 65% of total bilateral program loan pledges of \$100 million. We expect the other members of the Consortium will again pledge \$35 million so that our lower pledge will be only 53% of the total. The total A.I.D. loan program in 1967 was \$135 million or 53% of total bilateral Consortium assistance. The anticipated aid program in FY 1968--a production loan of \$40 million and project loans of \$15 million may be no more than 30% of total Consortium pledges (project and program loans and debt relief). (Attachment C contains the record of Consortium shares.)

Recommendation:

I recommend that you authorize A.I.D. to conclude from FY 1968 appropriations a production loan of up to \$40 million to the Government of Turkey.

/s/ William S. Gaud
William S. Gaud

Enclosures:

- A. Defense Expenditures - Symington Amendment
- B. Balance of Payments
- C. Consortium Pledges

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ATTACHMENT A

DEFENSE EXPENDITURES - SYMINGTON AMENDMENT

Turkey's defense expenditures do not, in the judgment of the A.I.D. Administrator, require withholding of economic aid under the Symington Amendment. Though the burden of domestic military expenditures are relatively heavy, recent levels of military expenditures have been judged necessary by State and Defense to meet—or partially meet—its NATO obligations. Turkey has not diverted significant amounts of foreign exchange to military imports. Trends in budget allocations show a rising proportion devoted to economic and social development and declining proportions devoted to defense.

Total security (Ministry of Defense, Gendarmerie, Police) expenditures reported in the 1968 Draft Turkish Budget are \$533 million, \$22 million higher than in the 1967 Approved Budget. Ministry of Defense expenditures increase only slightly and the major share of the increase in security expenditures is due to a pay increase for personnel.

Compared to the last two years (1966-1967), the proposed 4.4% growth in security expenditures in 1968 is modest. As a proportion of GNP, which is forecast to increase 5.4%, security expenditures drop from 4.9% to 4.8%. As a proportion of total budget expenditure the decline is from 23.2% to 21.4%, mainly reflecting the faster rise in development related expenditures. Of the increments in total budget outlays defense related expenditures take 7.6% in 1968 against 15.2% in 1967 and 27.8% in 1966.

GNP has grown rapidly in recent years (between 1963 and 1966 GNP increased at an average annual rate of about 6%). Defense outlays have taken an almost constant proportion of the total GNP and there is a modest downward trend in the defense share of the budget. At the same time, investment expenditures have increased rapidly from 16.4% of GNP in 1965 to 18.1% of GNP in 1967. Thus expenditures for defense did not significantly affect overall economic growth.

Turkey has used only modest amount of its foreign exchange resources to acquire military equipment since this is provided under MAP. Total Turkish military foreign exchange purchases were about \$6 million annually between 1964 and 1966 and are believed to have risen to \$8 million in 1967 or less than 2% of export earnings. About one-third of these sums were spent for consumables (petroleum, raw rubber); which were formerly financed under MAP and which were deliberately transferred to the Turkish account.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 96-218
By CB, NARA Date 3-3-97

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DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, TOTAL CONSOLIDATED BUDGET EXPENDITURES, AND GNP
(In Current Prices)

	Actual		Prelim.	Approved	Budget
	1964	1965	Actual 1966	Budget 1967	Draft ^{a/} 1968
(TL Billion)					
Ministry of Defense	3.0	3.1	3.5	3.9	4.0
Gendarmerie	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5
Security (Police)	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4
Total Security Related Expenditures	3.5	3.6	4.1	4.6	4.8 ^{b/}
Total Central Government Consolidated Budget Expenditures	14.0	14.7	16.5	19.8	22.4
GNP	68.0	73.2	84.8	94.6	99.7
			(percent)		
Defense Related Expenditures as Proportion of:					
Total Consolidated Budget Expenditures	25.0	24.5	24.8	23.2	21.4
GNP	5.1	4.9	4.8	4.9	4.8
(Chain Index = Previous Year = 100)					
Defense Related Expenditures	116.7	102.9	113.9	112.2	104.4
Total Central Government Consolidated Budget Expenditures	114.8	105.0	112.2	120.0	113.1
GNP	107.4	107.6	115.8	111.6	105.4
Absolute Increments:					
Defense Related Expenditures	0.5	0.1	0.5	0.5	0.2
Total Consolidated Budget Expenditures	1.8	0.7	1.8	3.3	2.6
GNP	4.7	5.2	11.6	9.8	5.1
			(percent)		
Increments in Defense Related Expenditures as Proportion of:					
Total Consolidated Budget Expenditures	27.8	14.3	27.8	15.2	7.6
GNP	10.6	0.2	4.3	5.1	3.9

a/ Draft budget presumably is in 1967 prices; 1968 GNP figure in USAID estimate in 1967 prices.

b/ Total does not add because of rounding. Actual total is TL 4,824 million.

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NLJ 96-218
By cb, NARA Date 3-3-97

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ATTACHMENT B

THE 1968 TURKISH REQUEST

For 1968 the Government of Turkey projects an increase in exports of 6% and imports of 16%. Tourist receipts are to increase from \$18 million to \$28 million and workers' remittances, resuming their upward trend, are projected to increase from \$95 million to \$120 million. The resulting current account deficit is -\$229 million. When debt repayments are added to this deficit the resulting financing requirement is \$334 million. It is estimated that \$50 million of this requirement will be financed by private foreign capital and \$100 million by official project credits. The remaining gap--\$184 million--represents the Turkish request for program assistance and debt relief.

The Turkish export estimates are slightly pessimistic but their import estimates are reasonable; about half of the increase in imports is attributable to an increase disbursement from project aid committed in prior years and to a return to previous levels of private investment. We feel that a more reasonable financing requirement estimate is \$294 million to \$319 million. Assuming private foreign capital of \$50 million and drawing from existing official credits of \$135-\$145 million, the remaining request for new financing is \$99-\$134 million.

To meet this requirement we estimate that the following will be available:

	<u>Disbursements</u> (<u>\$ Million</u>)
Non-U. S. Consortium Aid	
Debt Relief	27
Program Aid Pledge	18
(50% disbursements from	
estimated \$35 million pledge)	
U. S. Program Assistance	20
(50% disbursements from \$40	
million pledge)	
IMF Drawing	<u>27</u>
Total	92

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By Cb, NARA Date 3-3-97

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BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: TURKEY
(Millions of Dollars)

	Actual 1966	USAID Est. 1967	OECD Est. 1967	Annual Program 1968	USAID 1968
I. Current Account	<u>-164</u>	<u>-147</u>	<u>-145</u>	<u>-229</u>	<u>-214/-189</u>
a. Foreign Trade	<u>-228</u>	<u>-180</u>	<u>-190</u>	<u>-295</u>	<u>-280/-255</u>
Imports (c.i.f.)	-718	-690	-700	-835	-815/-825
Exports (f.o.b.)	490	505	510	540	535/570
b. Other (net) ^{1/}	<u>64</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>66</u>	<u>66</u>
Interest	- 31	- 41	- 40	- 47	
Tourism & Travel	- 14	- 14	- 12	- 2	
Workers' Remittances	115	93	100	120	
Profit Transfers	- 16	- 25	- 20	- 23	
Other (net)	10	25	15	18	
II. Repayments of Principal ^{1/} on External Debts	-146	-131	-131	-105	-105
III. Total (I + II)	-310	-278	-276	-334	-319/-294
IV. Capital Inflow	320	295/315	297		
a. Private	<u>41</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>50</u>
Direct Investment	30		15	35	
Imports without Exchange Allocation	11		16	15	
b. Official	<u>279</u>	<u>265/285</u>	<u>266</u>	<u>314</u>	
Project Assistance	56	70/80	60	100	
Program Credits	111	120/125	131)	214	
Debt Relief	73	48/53	48)		
c. P.L. 480 Deliveries	17	-	-	-	
d. IMF Drawings (gross)	22	27	27	-	
V. Overall Balance (III + IV)	10	17/37	21	30	

Notes:

1/ Before debt relief. Includes IMF.

2/ Items do not add to total, but total is consistent with other portions of the Table.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-218
By cb, NARA Date 3-3-97

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BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 1968
(\$ Millions)

	<u>Estimate A</u>	<u>Estimate B</u>
I. Current Account	<u>-214</u>	<u>-189</u>
Foreign Trade	-280	-255
Imports (c.i.f.)	<u>-815</u>	<u>-825</u>
Program	-700	-700
Self-financed	-115	-125
Exports (f.o.b.)	535	570
Other (net)	66	66
II. Repayments of Principal on External Debt	-105	-105
III. Total (I + II)	-319	-294
IV. Capital Inflow	319	294
Self-Financed & Existing Commitments	<u>185</u>	<u>195</u>
Private Capital	50	50
Project Aid	80	90
Program Credits	52	52
Debt Relief	3	3
Remainder to be Covered by New Action	<u>134</u>	<u>99</u>

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-218
By CG, NARA Date 3-3-97

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ATTACHMENT C

SHARES OF TURKEY CONSORTIUM PLEDGES
(Percent)

	U.S.	Other Bilateral	Multi- lateral	U.S. Share of Total Bilateral	Total Pledges (\$ Mil)
1963	29.7	37.9	32.4	43.9	224
1964	46.4	32.5	21.1	58.8	280
1965	37.0	30.6	32.4	54.7	371
1966	42.0	32.7	25.3	56.2	320
1967	39.7	37.5	22.8	51.5*	326
1963/66	39.3	33.9	26.8	53.6	1,520

* Actual A.I.D. program was \$15 million larger than pledge.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-218
By ct, NARA Date 3-3-97

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-18
By WJ, NARA, Date 5-22-95

41

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - February 15, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT -- INFORMATION

SUBJECT: The Cabinet Resignation in Chile

Ambassador Korry reports that President Frei's Cabinet resigned last night. He accepted the resignations and is expected to announce a new slate of Ministers by tomorrow.

This is the long-expected Cabinet reshuffle. It is designed to give Frei a free hand in shaping new policies for coping with mounting political and economic problems.

To continue his stabilization program, Frei needs new legislation regulating wage increases covering last year's inflation (about 22%) and some retrenching of his more ambitious programs. His wage readjustment proposal, which would have substituted bonds for most of the cash, was withdrawn after the Senate made clear it would not approve. Prospects for getting any non-inflationary proposal through are not encouraging.

The Senate opposition comes not only from the "outs" on the right and left, but from elements inside his own party. In his three years in office, Frei has not cultivated support from the non-communist parties. On the contrary, he has alienated them. He now finds he has less support in the Congress than he did when he started out.

Complicating matters further, a President in Chile begins suffering from "lame-duckitis" after he passes the half-way mark in his term. Ed Korry in a cable today describes the situation in these terms:

"Chilean politics have descended into pre-electoral arena with all parties maneuvering for advantages prior to the 1969 Congressional elections. It is painfully clear that all opposition parties are putting partisan interests ahead of the country's; their determination is to discredit Frei as a governing force; their belief is that the PDC can be blocked from renewing its mandate in the 1970 presidential vote. If Frei is paralyzed or severely limited from executing his proposals."

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-2-

Korry is working closely with those who will form the new economic team. How they will work out a sound economic program for 1968 within the existing framework is not clear. It is reassuring to have a smart operator on the scene.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file

Thursday, February 15, 1968

Mr. President:

In the attached letter Ambassador Smythe asks you to give serious consideration to Bob Anderson's views on Malta.

I understand Anderson plans to recommend to you that we reconsider our present policy toward Malta presumably in the direction of doing more to strengthen the island's economy. Among his other activities, Anderson is Chairman of the Board of the Medport Company which is interested in developing a free port in Malta.

W. W. Rostow

MW
MWG:em

42a

American Embassy,

Valletta, Malta,

January 26, 1968.

PERSONAL AND

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. President:


Your very good friend, Mr. Robert B. Anderson, has come and gone from Malta. Just before he left, and following the Board meeting of the Medport Company, which is interested in developing a free port in this country, he talked with me and said that he was going to make certain recommendations to you as soon as he returned to the United States.

I am simply writing to ask that you please pay the most serious attention and give the utmost consideration to what he has to say about Malta and its significance in the perspective of larger United States interests, especially here in the Mediterranean area.

Since I know you are aware of certain new developments that have taken place here in the Mediterranean, I am sure you will realize why your friend, Mr. Anderson, and the Embassy feel that we ought to take another look at Malta and the role that we would like to see it play within NATO, as well as otherwise in relation to our over-all world policy and program.

Thanking you in advance for your courtesy and consideration, and extending best wishes and warmest regards to both you and Mrs. Johnson, I am

Very sincerely yours,



Hugh H. Smythe

The President,

The White House.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 95-55
By , NARA, Date 4/30/96

42b

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE REFERENCE SLIP			DATE Feb. 8, 1968			
TO:	Name or Title	Organ. Symbol	Room No.	Bldg.	Initials	Date
1.	Mr. Maynard Glitman			The White House		
2.					EF	
3.						
4.						
5.						
<input type="checkbox"/>	Approval		Initial for Clearance	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Per Conversation	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	As Requested		Necessary Action		Prepare Reply	
<input type="checkbox"/>	Comment		Note and Forward		See Me	
<input type="checkbox"/>	For Your Information		Note and Return		Signature	
REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING						
<p>Enclosed is a copy of page 2 (page 1 not pertinent) of <u>Ambassador Smythe's letter</u> to Mr. Leddy concerning Mr. Robert B. Anderson's plans to see the President to discuss Malta.</p> <p>Please let us know if and when such a meeting takes place.</p> <p>Thanks.</p>						
FROM: (Name and Org. Symbol)			ROOM NO. & BLDG.	PHONE NO.		
J. K. Newman EUR/BMI			5511 N.S.	4038		

FORM DS-10
2-64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

* GPO : 1965 O - 202-217 (204)

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

By JLW NJ 95-55, NARA, Date 4/30/90

For Mr. h add

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- 2 -

Mr. Robert B. Anderson, former Secretary of the Treasury under President Eisenhower, was recently here in connection with his chairmanship of the Board of Directors of the MEDPORT Company. The latter is interested in developing a free port here in Malta. Mr. Anderson plans to make certain recommendations to his close and long-time friend, President Johnson, re the significance of Malta's role in the Mediterranean and relate this to its importance to the U.S.A. I hope that you will be able in one way or another to either get in touch with Mr. Anderson and have a talk with him, or at least have someone find out what he discusses with the President. I do know that he plans to make a very strong recommendation that our present policy towards Malta will be reconsidered, and he feels that the island can be very useful to our over-all plans in this part of the world. Of course, I am mindful of Mr. Anderson's commercial interest here in this regard. Nevertheless, I feel that what he has to say is worth listening to.

Hoping all is going well with you and your family, with warmest regards, I am

Very cordially,



Hugh H. Smythe
Ambassador

CONFIDENTIAL

(extra copy)
? Prestice

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February 15, 1968

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Mr. Clark Clifford

The President asked me to send you a copy of the attached memorandum -- for your eyes only.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By mg, NARA, Date 2-14-92

43a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Further Reinforcements for Viet-Nam

Bob McNamara and Walt Rostow have given me the gist of the matters discussed at your meeting Friday with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have had the opportunity to study General Westmoreland's cable (091633Z) to General Wheeler. In the latter, Westy sets forth his estimate of the situation in the four corps areas, his problems there, and his need for further reinforcements from the U.S. He also gives a general indication of how he would use these reinforcements if he gets them.

With regard to the broad overall question of whether we should send additional forces to Southeast Asia at this time, my answer would be affirmative. The situation in South Viet-Nam is too precarious and the possibilities of an unpleasant surprise in Korea or elsewhere in the Far East sufficiently acute that it is an act of prudence to move additional ground forces to the area as rapidly as possible. As for numbers, I understand that the Joint Chiefs have recommended a force of some 15 battalions totalling about 45,000 men which would seem to me to be a reasonable increment at this time.

I have given some thought to the desirability of putting some strings on these forces if they are sent. They might be kept partly afloat, partly on Okinawa pending further verification of their need in South Viet-Nam. I think we should recognize that once they are on the soil of Viet-Nam they are likely to be there for keeps.

Although my initial reaction was favorable to exploring the possibility of keeping them as an offshore reserve, after reading Westy's cable I am convinced that the need for these troops is so evident that he should have them, in South Viet-Nam as soon as we can transport them there. Their use can be controlled or at least influenced by the issuance of new strategic guidance to General Westmoreland, a matter which I shall discuss below.

If we decide to send these reinforcements, then the next question is their replacement in the strategic reserve at home. I would support the argument which I understand the Chiefs have made that three reserve divisions be called to active duty and I would hope that they would be a balanced force in the sense of having the necessary supporting units to permit their prompt deployment overseas if required. I think this call-up is justified by the military requirement and that, in addition, it would have some political-psychological value in demonstrating to the world, including Hanoi, that we mean business. It would also serve as a reminder to our people at home that, while we are not technically at war, we are in a situation of similar emergency which places on our citizens duties and responsibilities analogous to those in a state of declared war.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority JCS LA 10-2-78
By Wph/ry, NARA, Date 2-20-92

I am told that the Chiefs also want an extension of tours and a call-up of individual reservists, actions which will require Congressional approval. Unless the military need for these actions can be demonstrated to be truly overriding, I would advise against any measure requiring Congressional action.

Passing now to Westy's cable, I found much of interest in it, some of which I had not appreciated before. In particular, I was struck by the weakened condition of ARVN as he describes it and his estimate that it would take about six months to restore it to full strength. I did not find in the cable how he expects to react to the offensive in the north which may strike the Third Marine Division units across their forty-mile front from the coast to Khe Sanh, using North Vietnamese units totalling about 35,000 and supplied for 60-90 days of intensified combat (See CIA document "Construction and Logistic Activities in the Khe Sanh Area"). If the enemy uses this imposing force with full effectiveness in a battle of attrition for the widely separated Marine positions, he can seriously disrupt the plans which Westy describes in his cable.

Whether or not you decide to send further reinforcements, I would recommend consideration of conveying new strategic guidance to Westy and Admiral Sharp, setting forth in broad terms the way the campaign should be conducted during the coming months.

Such a document, I believe, should include the following points in ample detail to give a clear picture of the results which we would like to achieve in the coming campaign. My views on this matter are influenced by the short paper which I passed to you today, "Enemy Scenario of the Future?"

a. The most pressing matter at this moment is the suppression of the attacks on the cities and the restoration of order throughout the areas of South Viet-Nam under attack.

b. During this period of crisis in the cities and during the unfavorable weather along the frontier, our forces should avoid major actions under disadvantageous conditions of weather and/or terrain. Every effort should be made to avoid giving the enemy a "victory" (real or propaganda) during the winter-spring offensive which seems to have begun. We should not seek battle close to the cross-border sanctuaries of the enemy but rather try to entice him out of the sanctuaries even at the sacrifice of some terrain in order to get him into favorable killing zones. We should not undertake to hold exposed outposts unless their value is equal to the anticipated cost and unless reinforcements are available if needed for the defense.

c. While avoiding combat at a disadvantage, we should build up mobile reserves in readiness to pass to a vigorous offensive with the resumption of favorable weather in March. In the meantime, much of our current military activity should be directed at setting up main enemy elements for a decisive blow during our offensive.

d. Throughout the coming months, we should maintain the bombing of the north at maximum levels of effectiveness. If we can find North Vietnamese command and control centers, they should be attacked.

Recognizing that it is the goal of the enemy to initiate negotiations under conditions of no bombing of North Viet-Nam for the purpose of reaching agreement on a coalition government, we should devise a political track parallel to the military which would include a joint US/GVN assertion of the principles which must govern any terminal settlement to which we would agree. Such a statement of principles would rule out any coalition government based upon the arbitrary inclusion of members of the National Liberation Front in the Saigon government and would reject any action tending to nullify the new constitutional government but would offer participation in elections to all Viet Cong who will pledge allegiance to the Constitution. The exact terms of such an offer need a careful elaboration which I shall not attempt here.

In a short summary, my recommendation is that we start reinforcing at once but, concurrently, review and clarify our military and political objectives for the remainder of this year.

M.D.T.
M. D. T.

W. W. Rostow
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~~SECRET~~

Thursday, February 15, 1968

Leung
2. Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Jordan Arms Package

This is to refresh your memory as to the details of the proposed arms agreement with Jordan. There are three main parts to the package: (1) about \$10 million worth of equipment we had agreed to send to Jordan before the war broke out last June; (2) about \$38 million in new ground equipment including 88 Patton tanks; and (3) 18 F-104 jet fighters (\$33 million). Just in case you want more details, I've attached a more complete list. On a lot of the smaller items there are specifics which no one has yet tried to work out.

King Hussein has expressed initial disappointment with the package and the draft memo of understanding we proposed. Our first response will be to help out with his problems in the wording of the memo and to urge him to accept the package as is and get on with delivery. However, we may have a little more bargaining to do yet. He is obviously relieved that we have come this far, and we should be able to bring him around.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-212
By sig, NARA Date 2-14-97 W. W. Rostow

Attachment.

HS:sln

~~SECRET~~

JORDAN ARMS PACKAGEEquipment under FY 1966-67 MAP Grant (\$3.8 million)

61 radios and related equipment
Public address systems
Parachutes
30 vehicles
20 target drones
mortar sites
1 million rounds of small arms ammunition
miscellaneous spare parts

Remainder of equipment from 1965, delivery of which was suspended (\$7.0 million)

293 radios and related equipment
protective clothing
parts for armored personnel carriers, M-48 tanks, vehicles, weapons and electronic equipment

Ground Forces equipment newly agreed to (\$30.5 million)

88 M-48A1 Tanks
23 105mm Howitzers
43 Armored Personnel Carriers
4 40 mm self propelled anti-aircraft guns
138 106 mm jeep mounted recoilless rifles
40 2-1/2 ton trucks
3 81 mm mortars
\$3 million in 1 and 3 ton vehicles
\$2 million in small arms
\$12.8 million in ammunition
Engineering equipment
spare parts
Radios and related equipment
Telephones and related equipment

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NLJ 96-212
By uj, NARA Date 2-14-97

Air Force equipment (\$33.3 million)

18 F-104 aircraft with necessary auxiliary equipment and spare parts
Ground control radar system worth approximately \$2.8 million
An agreement to consider the supply of 18 additional aircraft at some future date