

~~1. Profile~~  
2. Profile

Thursday - February 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Congratulatory Messages to New OAS  
Secretary General and Assistant  
Secretary General

I recommend that you send the attached congratulatory messages to the newly elected Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General of the OAS. They will assume office in May.

Secretary Rusk is sending messages of his own.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Suggested messages

45a

February 15, 1968

Dear Dr. Urquiza:

I congratulate you on your election as Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States. You enter this high office at an important juncture in the history of the Organization of American States. Best wishes for success in your new responsibilities.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B Johnson

The Honorable  
Dr. M. Rafael Urquiza  
C o Inter-American Development Bank  
608 - 17th Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

LBJ/WGB:mmm  
2 15/68

February 15, 1968

Dear Dr. Plaza:

I congratulate you on your election as Secretary General of the Organization of American States. The office is one of special challenge and opportunity as the regional body enters a new phase under its own Charter and the Alliance for Progress. I wish you every success. You can count on our cooperation.

Sincerely,

*15/ Lyndon B. Johnson*

His Excellency  
Dr. Galo Plaza Lasso  
Avenida 6 de diciembre 1300  
Quito, Ecuador

LBJ/WGB:mm  
2/15/68

46

Thursday - February 15, 1968

~~Aug.~~  
a. Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Personal Gift from President Diaz Ordaz

President Diaz Ordaz has sent you a half-hour color documentary, entitled "A Most Friendly Visit". It covers the state visit to Washington last October and the trip to Chamizal. The film is in the Theater ready for you to see when you wish.

Bill Bowdler has viewed it and says it is a first-class job. Bill thinks it could be useful with many different audiences:

- the Latin American ambassadors, the next time you have them in for a social function;
- at Hemisfair, for public showing;
- at the Ranch to the Latin American Presidents who come to the opening of Hemisfair;
- political audiences in the Southwest and other parts of the country;
- Len Marks may have ideas for use by USIA overseas.

At Tab A is a suggested letter to President Diaz Ordaz thanking him for the gift.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Tab A - Suggested letter to President Diaz Ordaz.

46a

February 15, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

Lady Bird and I have just come from seeing "A Most Friendly Visit". It is a beautiful film and magnificent pictorial history. We are deeply grateful.

Your visit last October was a memorable one. The movie will help to keep it fresh in our minds. Future generations in both our countries viewing "A Most Friendly Visit" and "A Day in April" will be able to recapture the warmth, enthusiasm, and respect which united our two peoples during our presidencies.

I hope you will not mind if I make extensive use of the film.

Warmest personal regards to you and Dona Guadalupe.

Sincerely,

(S) Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency  
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz  
President of the United Mexican States  
Mexico, D. F.

LBJ/WGB:mmm  
2/15/68

INFORMATION

47

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, February 14, 1968  
7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a British account of  
U Thant's conversation with Mai Van Bo  
in Paris.

*Pres file*

It adds up to exactly what Mai Van  
Bo has told everyone else; that is,  
they will not accept the "assumption"  
of the San Antonio formula. They are  
merely prepared to talk for a cessation  
of bombing while maintaining complete  
freedom of action for themselves.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-212  
By WJ, NARA Date 2-14-97

WWRostow:rla



ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TEL NO 1609 OF 14 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR  
INFORM TO UKHIS NEW YORK (FOR LORD CARADON) AND SAVING TO PARIS  
(FOR AMBASSADOR).

BY TEL NO 1574 (NOT TO ALL)

FOLLOWING FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.

VIETNAM.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WOULD LIKE YOU TO PASS ON THE REPORT IN PARIS

TELEGRAM NO 150 <sup>(below)</sup> AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO MR. RUSK.

2. IN DOING SO YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT MR BROWN HAS ASKED YOU TO  
PASS THIS ON IN CASE MR RUSK HAS NOT HAD THE REPORT THROUGH  
HIS OWN SOURCES. PLEASE ADD THAT IT SEEMS TO MR BROWN THAT THE ONLY  
ANSWER GIVEN TO U THANT WAS THAT IN PARA 5. AND THIS HE FEARS MAY  
REPRESENT HANOI'S REAL POSITION.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 96-211

By us, NARA Date 12-24-97

~~SECRET~~  
ADDRESSED TO FO NO. 150 OF 14 FEBRUARY RELTD FOR INFO TO  
UKHIS NEW YORK (FOR LORD CARADON) AND WASHINGTON (FOR AMBASSADOR).

47b

FOLLOWING FOR PRIVATE SECRETARY,  
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 524.  
VIETNAM,

U THANT RECEIVED ME AT 15.00 (PARIS TIME). HE SAID THAT HE  
HAD HAD A LONG TALK WITH MAI VAN BO THIS MORNING AND THAT HE  
WOULD BE SEEING THE GENERAL AT 16.00 AND COUVE LATER THIS  
EVENING.

2. U THANT SAID THAT THE FIRST QUESTION WHICH HE HAD PUT  
TO THE NORTH VIETNAM CONSUL GENERAL AT NEW DELHI WAS: HOW  
SOON AFTER THE BOMBING STOPS CAN TALKS BE EXPECTED TO BEGIN?  
WOULD IT BE IN LESS THAN THREE TO FOUR WEEKS? MAI VAN BO'S ANSWER  
WAS THAT THE WORDS QUOTE AS SOON AS UNQUOTE MEANT QUOTE AN  
APPROPRIATE TIME UNQUOTE ( UN TEMPS CONVENABLE). HE EXPLAINED THAT  
THIS MEANT A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH NORTH VIETNAM WOULD HAVE PROOF  
THAT THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WAS QUOTE EFFECTIVE UNQUOTE AND THE  
UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE QUOTE REALITY UNQUOTE  
OF THIS CESSATION. U THANT SAID THAT IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT MAI  
VAN BO HAD NO PRECISE IDEA OF THE TIME INVOLVED IN TERMS OF DAYS  
OR WEEKS: BUT HIS OWN GUESS WAS THAT IT WAS LESS THAN TWO WEEKS.

...../3/ U THANT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-211  
By us, NARA Date 12-24-97



3. U THANT SAID THAT ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT QUESTIONS WHICH HE HAD PUT AT NEW DELHI WAS WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT AFTER THE MEETING BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF HANOI AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, THE GENEVA CONFERENCE COULD BE CONVENED. MAI VAN BO'S ANSWER WAS THAT THIS WOULD BE A MATTER TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE MEETING OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES. ALL QUESTIONS COULD BE RAISED AT IT. BOTH SIDES WOULD BE FREE TO PROPOSE ANY ITEMS FOR DISCUSSION.

4. U THANT SAID THAT A THIRD QUESTION WHICH HE HAD PUT AT NEW DELHI WAS WHETHER THE LEVEL OF HOSTILITIES (PRESUMABLY HE MEANT IN THE SOUTH) WOULD BE REDUCED ONCE A MEETING TAKES PLACE. MAI VAN BO HAD NOT ANSWERED THIS QUESTION DIRECTLY. HE SAID THAT WHEN AND IF DISCUSSIONS START, THE WHOLE VIETNAM PROBLEM CAN BE DISCUSSED AND ANY POINTS RAISED BY EITHER SIDE CAN BE TAKEN UP. U THANT COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS THUS NO PRIOR COMMITMENT. HANOI'S POSITION WAS IN FACT THAT THIS QUESTION WAS A MATTER FOR THE NATIONAL LIBERAL FRONT AND NOT FOR HANOI.

5. U THANT HAD ASKED MAI VAN BO WHETHER PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SAN ANTONIO FORMULA WAS ACCEPTABLE TO HIS GOVERNMENT. THE ANSWER WAS THAT IT WAS NOT, SINCE THE OFFER TO STOP BOMBING WAS CONDITIONAL.

6. SUMMING UP HIS CONVERSATION WITH MAI VAN BO, U THANT SAID  
THAT THE FORMER HAD BEEN VERY ENPHATIC THAT A MEETING WILL TAKE  
PLACE AS SOON AS THE EFFECTIVE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND OF OTHER  
ACTS OF WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM (E.G. NAVAL BOMBARDMENT) HAS  
BEEN PROVED TO BE A REALITY. U THANT ADDED THAT HE REMAINED  
CONVINCED THAT TO ACCEPT A MEETING ON THESE TERMS WAS THE ONLY WAY  
TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS A SOLUTION.

~~6.../7... I SAID~~

-3-

7. I SAID THAT I KNEW THE SECRETARY OF STATE WOULD BE GRATEFUL  
TO HIM FOR GIVING ME THIS ACCOUNT OF HIS TALK WITH MAI VAN BO.  
WE AGREED THAT HE WOULD NOT, REPEAT NOT,  
ANNOUNCE THAT HE HAD SEEN ME.

INFORMATION

Wednesday, February 14, 1968 -- 7:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

*For file*

Joe Alsop came in today. I let him read some of the information on Vietnam, especially prisoner of war interrogations which he had not seen.

I talked to him about my respect for the South Vietnamese performance in all this, given their history and stage of development. He said, knocking on wood, that if it goes on this way, the war might be over in July. I said I didn't think things were going badly but I would have to know a lot more than I do now before I would agree.

Jack Sutherland, U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, came in. I took the offensive with him, as an old friend, by telling him that the story last week was in part grossly inaccurate; in other parts grossly misleading; and a dreadful performance for men who regard themselves as patriots.

I told him that I had, in some way or other, known something of Washington since 1941. There was no period, in my judgment, of better civil-military relations than at present; and that included the period when Acheson was Secretary of State and Lovett was at Defense. He told me that he had protested the story, but failed to get it changed. He offered no defense.

We then went on to Vietnam and checked out where we were with the four elements I had talked about last week, on which I thought the future depended:

- Second wave of attacks: we are still watching but there are some who think they may not come in in a big way if they do not come within the next few days. So far as Washington is concerned, we are alert and wary.
- Performance of the South Vietnamese government: by no means perfect but, in all the circumstances, remarkably good.
- The I Corps offensive: Still to be fought although our forces and the ARVN have done some useful chewing away at the enemy outside of Hue and Danang.
- U. S. public opinion: somehow managing to survive NEWSWEEK and U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT.

He then asked me if I could verify the AP story that Gen. Westmoreland was to be brought back to a post in Washington. I said that so far as I know, it was flatly untrue. On a strictly off-the-record basis, I let him read your message to Wasty.

In my 7 years here, Sutherland has never violated the rules. He asked if he could file a top secret memorandum to his boss in order to kill the story. I said "no" but he could tell his boss that he read the message on an absolutely off-the-record basis; but put nothing in writing.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla



INFORMATION

*Pres file*  
49

Wednesday, Feb. 14, 1968  
6:05 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a grim -- but possibly realistic --  
assessment from London's man in Hanoi  
(filed from Singapore).

He says Hanoi is not interested in negotiations;  
and it is prepared for a protracted war.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RR WASHINGTON 54913

RR OTTAWA 36413

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-211  
By us, NARA Date 12-24-97

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V G  
SATI  
fu! Ed Hunt  
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Seedef.  
NFI-Restor  
INR  
CIA  
Helm  
BHR

CYPHER CAT A

PRIORITY POLAD SINGAPORE

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 090

13 FEBRUARY 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

08

ADDRESSED FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 90 OF 13 FEBRUARY REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION SAIGON, WASHINGTON, AND OTTAWA.

FOLLOWING FROM STEWART. (IN SINGAPORE)

YRTEL 243.

~~WHEN PIER AND I LEFT HANOI ON EVENING 9 FEBRUARY WE WERE IN GENERAL~~  
~~AGREEMENT.~~ I HAD SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM AND HE SAW MOST OF  
MY MATERIAL ON THE SUBJECT.

2. ON REFLECTION I ~~REGRET THAT THERE IS NOTHING SUBSTANTIAL TO ADD~~  
~~TO MY PREVIOUS REPORTING THAT I CAN OBSERVE NO EVIDENCE OF A FUNDAMENTAL~~  
~~MENTAL OR BEHAVIORAL CHANGE OF MOOD. THE PEOPLE WITH WHOM I WERE IN GOOD~~  
~~SPIRITS BEFORE THE SET OFF OF THE VIET CON WAR WERE ENCOURAGED~~  
~~THE REACTION.~~

3. I AM PERSONALLY CONVINCED FROM WHAT LITTLE EVIDENCE OF MOOD AND  
APPEARANCES IS AVAILABLE TO ME THAT ~~THE VIET CON WAR WOULD BE~~  
~~DELIGHTED TO JOIN THE U.S. AT THE TABLE OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, THEY~~  
~~ARE NOT PREPARED TO MAKE ANY KIND OF CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO~~  
~~REACH THE TABLE. AND THEY ARE SURELY READY TO KNOW THAT~~  
~~THIS PROBABLY MEANS A PROLONGED WAR FOR WHICH, IN THE MEANTIME,~~  
~~THEY ARE FULLY PREPARED AT WHATEVER COST AND SACRIFICE.~~

CHANCERY GENERAL  
Chancery Action  
338:CHV:6c

/4. FOR IE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

4. ~~FOR THE PRESENT OFFENSIVE ITS FOREGOING GENERAL PROPAGANDA EXERCISE WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON SINCE 29 DECEMBER. ON THE ONE HAND THE D R V MAKES SEMANTIC CONCESSIONS TO PUT THE PROPAGANDA BALL IN THE WASHINGTON COURT. ON THE OTHER HAND IT TRIES TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD, THE VIETNAMESE AND THE U.S. THAT THEY ARE READY TO NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH AND NOT FROM WEAKNESS OR FUNDAMENTAL CONCESSIONS.~~

5. ~~WERE THERE THE SLIGHTEST INDICATION OF A WILL TO COMPROMISE IN HANOI I WOULD TAKE THE FINAL FLYING THEATRE MORE SERIOUSLY. I CAN FIND NONE. I EXPECT THEREFORE THAT WHATEVER THE RESULT OF THE SPRING OFFENSIVE WILL BE IT WILL BE A LONG WAR.~~

F O PASS W'TON 1 AND OTTAWA 1.

WATSON

SOSFA/CROSEC

GRS265A

SENT AT 1151Z/13/2/68 RYM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
PRIORITY MAIL

TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

496

TELEGRAM NUMBER 9

26 FEBRUARY 1963

V

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WV

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 9 OF 26 JANUARY  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION UNNUMBERED TO SAIGON, WASHINGTON,  
MOSCOW AND POLAD SINGAPORE AND SAVING PEKING.

jud.

PEACE.

MY UNNUMBERED TELEGRAM OF 26 JANUARY VIA SAIGON TELNO 79 TO  
FOREIGN OFFICE. I AM EXPANDING ON THE POINTS IN THIS NECESSARILY  
POTTED VERSION SINCE I THINK THAT THE FRENCH ACCESS TO DRV OFFICIALS  
IS IMPORTANT. I DO NOT HOWEVER THINK THAT THIS INFORMATION  
JUSTIFIES A CHANGE IN MY ASSESSMENT THAT THE SEMANTIC  
CHANGE WAS INTENDED TO MAKE A PROPAGANDA POINT RATHER  
THAN TO INDICATE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE DRV APPROACH.  
INDEED, THE SUMMONING OF DIPLOMATS FOR PRIVATE BRIEFINGS FITS  
WELL INTO THIS ASSESSMENT.

2. ~~MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT PROVE THE~~  
~~ANXIETY TO GET TO THE TABLE BRINGS WITH IT THE OPINION THAT THE DRV~~  
~~WERE MORE ANXIOUS THAN BEFORE. HE THOUGHT THEY MIGHT BE MORE~~  
~~CONFIDENT. IT IS EQUALLY POSSIBLE THAT THEY HAVE RECOGNISED~~  
~~A MILITARY STALEMATE.~~

3. TIME OF THE TALKS. THE DRV HAD EXPLAINED THAT IT WOULD  
TAKE SOME TIME TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVELY THAT BOMBING HAD REALLY  
STOPPED, AND TO ARRANGE FOR TALKS. THIS WAS THE MEANING OF  
BO'S STATEMENT IN PARIS.

4. IT WAS POINTLESS TO TALK OF DEFINITIVE STOPPING OF BOMBING  
AND EQUALLY POINTLESS TO INSIST ON MEANINGFUL TALKS. THE  
MEANING WOULD DEPEND ON THE ACTIVITIES OF BOTH PARTIES.

5. SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION. THE DRV SPOKESMAN DID NOT  
EMPHASISE EITHER THE FOUR POINTS OR THE PROGRAMME OF THE FRONT.  
THERE WERE THREE SUBJECTS: PLACE, LEVEL OF NEGOTIATIONS AND

AGENDA TO BE SETTLED.

CH/NOVEX GENERAL  
Chancery Action

311: CHY: ad

16.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-211**  
**By us, NARA Date 12-24-97**



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

6. THE DRV WERE DISPLEASED THAT THEIR RUDE REMINDERS TO THE STATE OF UNION MESSAGE HAD BEEN INTERPRETED AS A CLOSING OF THE DOOR. ON THE CONGRARY THE MESASAGE WAS NOT A FINAL FULL ANSWER TO TRINHS SPEECH. THE DRV REACTION WAS NOT THEREFORE RELATED TO TRINHS SPEECH. THE DRV STILL WAITED FOR WASHINGTONS REPLY.

7. THE DRV SPOKESMAN REITERATED THAT TRINHS SPEECH WAS A CLARIFICATION OF DRV INTENT. THIS WAS THE POSITIVE POINT TO EMPHASISE NOT (AS IN THE CZECH NEWS REPORT) THE NEGATIVE FACT THAT FUNDAMENTAL DRV POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED. BUT IT WAS STILL TRUE THAT DRV COULD ACCEPT NO PRECONDITIONS BEFORE TALKS.

8. ALTHOUGH MY FRENCH COLLEAGUE CONSIDERS THAT THE DRV HAVE EXTRACTED MUCH DIPLOMATIC ADVANTAGE FROM TRINHS SPEECH HE IS INCLINED TO BE LESS CYNICAL THAN ME IN HIS INTERPRETATION AND THINKS THAT SPEECH REPRESENTED MORE THAN A PROPAGANDA STUNT. HOWEVER HE AGREES THAT DRV DO NOT HAVE HIGH HOPES THAT US WILL WRITE THEM A BLANK CHEQUE IN AN ELECTION YEAR.

9. ~~WITH THE SOLITARY EXCEPTION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN I CAN FIND NO ONE IS HARMED WHO BELIEVES IN THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO MAIN PARTIES AND WOULD BE WISE TO PERMIT TALKS.~~

F O PASS WASHINGTON U/N.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HAGLEHOSE/SOSFA

GRPS 430

SENT AT 12/2027Z TWW

INFORMATION

*Pres file*  
50

Wednesday, Feb. 14, 1968  
6:00 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a new pattern for B-52 attacks  
in support of Khe Sanh (27 sorties); plus  
some Hanoi targets.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 19, NARA, Date 2-14-92

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2030114 February 1968  
4:30 PM EST

50a

Kestow

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR: Senior Watch Officer, White House Situation  
Room  
Mr. Benjamin H. Read, Executive Secretary,  
Department of State, c/o Operations Center

Subject: Operational Highlights

SOUTHEAST ASIA

The following US Air Force B-52 missions are now scheduled  
to be flown during the next 24 hours:

<u>MISSION &amp; NR OF ACFT</u>	<u>TIME (EST) ON TARGET</u>	<u>TARGET LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION</u>
VICTOR 85 (3 B-52s)	7:10 PM 14 February 8:10 AM 15 February Saigon time	In South Vietnam, 3 miles southeast of Khe Sanh; contains fortified areas and supply bases.
VICTOR 39 (3 B-52s)	10:10 PM 14 February 11:10 AM 15 February Saigon time	Same as VICTOR 85
VICTOR 78 (3 B-52s)	8:40 PM 14 February 9:40 AM 15 February Saigon time	In South Vietnam, 3 miles south of Khe Sanh; contains elements of the NVA 304th Division.
VICTOR 26 (3 B-52s)	11:40 PM 14 February 12:40 PM 15 February Saigon time	Same as VICTOR 78

TOP SECRET/LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/88  
By rg NARA, Date 2-18-92

TOP SECRET/LINDIS

<u>MISSION &amp; NR OF ACFT</u>	<u>TIME (EST) ON TARGET</u>	<u>TARGET LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION</u>
VICTOR 62 (3 B-52s)	2:40 AM 15 February 3:40 PM 15 February Saigon time	Same as VICTOR 78
VICTOR 96 (3 B-52s)	5:40 AM 15 February 6:40 PM 15 February Saigon time	Same as VICTOR 78
VICTOR 70 (3 B-52s)	1:10 AM 15 February 2:10 PM 15 February Saigon time	In Laos, 12 miles south-southwest of Khe Sanh; contains troop concentrations and supply areas.
VICTOR 43 (3 B-52s)	4:10 AM 15 February 5:10 PM 15 February Saigon time	Same as VICTOR 70
VICTOR 64 (3 B-52s)	7:10 AM 15 February 8:10 PM 15 February Saigon time	Same as VICTOR 70

The following ROLLING THUNDER 57 ALFA strikes are now  
scheduled during the next 24 hours:

<u>TARGET AND LOCATION</u>	<u>TIME (EST) ON TARGET</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRIKE FORCE</u>	<u>SAIGON TIME</u>
Chuc Son Barracks 10 miles southwest of Hanoi	9:10 PM 14 February	7 AF	12 F-105	10:10 AM 15 February

NMCC - 14 FEBRUARY 1968, 4:30 PM EST

TOP SECRET/LINDIS



TOP SECRET/LINDIS

<u>TARGET AND LOCATION</u>	<u>TIME (EST)</u> <u>ON TARGET</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRIKE FORCE</u>	<u>SAIGON</u> <u>TIME</u>
Kinh No Railroad Yard, 9 miles north of Hanoi	9:21 PM 14 February	7 AF	12 F-4	10:21 AM 15 February
Hanoi Motor Vehicle Maintenance Facility 7 miles west of Hanoi	9:41 PM 14 February	7 AF	8 F-105	10:41 AM 15 February
Ha Dong Army Barracks 8.6 miles southwest of Hanoi	9:43 PM 14 February	7 AF	12 F-105	10:43 AM 15 February

DDO 

ADDO 

CCOC 

NMCC - 14 FEBRUARY 1968, 4:30 PM EST

TOP SECRET/LINDIS

51

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, February 14, 1968  
6:00 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This report of a conversation with  
Gen. de Gaulle has some observations  
on pages 3-4 which may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

TDCS 314/02729-68

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-216 Appeal  
By SJ, NARA, Date 7-8-03

INFORMATION

52

Wednesday, February 14, 1968  
5:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Ernie Goldstein will be home  
February 22.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

Paris 10313

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

<sup>52a</sup>  
TELEGRAM

(4)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RR RUEHC  
DE RUFNCR 10313 0451538  
ZNY CCCCC  
R 141537Z FAB 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASH 9391  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CONTROL; 4267Q  
Received: February 14, 1968  
11:09 a.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PARIS 10313

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM GOLDSTEIN

MR. PRESIDENT I HAVE DECIDED TO CANCEL MY BRUSSELS  
TRIP AND WILL BE COMING HOME THURSDAY NIGHT, FEBRUARY 22.  
WALLNER  
BT

NNNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, February 14, 1968 -- 5:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

The orders have been communicated successfully to the Seventh Fleet; and are fully understood.

No word yet on the position of the pilot.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 74290-143

By usp/4, NARA, Date 2-24-92



54

Wednesday, Feb. 14, 1968  
5:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Since I rarely receive a communication to you from Sect. Rusk in this form -- sealed -- I assume it to be personal, and forward as delivered.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment- sealed envelope

SECRET

Wednesday, February 14, 1968  
2:55 p. m.

*Pres. file*

55

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Gen. Eisenhower initiates a conversation  
which ends with his support for a reserve call-up.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24  
By RG/ash NARA, Date 2-21-92



~~SECRET~~  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

55~

14 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached Memorandum for Record  
reports phone conversations I had with General  
Eisenhower at noon today.

1 Att  
as

*A. J. Goodpaster*  
A. J. GOODPASTER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY *ly* ON *2-21-92*

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

55b

14 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Telephone conversation with General Eisenhower,  
14 February 1968

General Eisenhower phoned me this morning to raise several questions, discussed below. My responses, indicated below, were given in part during the initial phone call, and in part during a second call after I had discussed the matter by phone with General Wheeler.

General Eisenhower recalled that he had several times said he thought it was necessary for General Westmoreland to have a "corps of maneuver" of about one corps in size. He could use this force if ever he got the enemy into a position where he could really do a job on them. Now he has noticed that we are finding it necessary to send an additional 10,500 troops suddenly to Vietnam. This suggests to him that we may not have enough troops there to fight the kind of campaign we want to fight, and are so much scattered and committed that we can not hit the enemy when he concentrates, for example, around Khe Sanh. His questions were: Has Westmoreland really been given the forces he is asking for; if he has asked for 525,000 men why didn't we send them sooner, and are we going to have enough in the area to provide a "corps of maneuver"? He said that moving a relatively small force of this size sounds as though we have been on a shoestring, suggests weakness on our part to the enemy, and gives the critics of what we are doing in Vietnam a target.

I told him that General Westmoreland has had in mind freeing one division as a maneuver force in the northern half of the country and one in the southern half of the country, and had in fact done so. I added that General Westmoreland has in fact an excess of one division (actually, nearly two) poised to counter the enemy in the Khe Sanh area at an appropriate moment.

With regard to the question of forces, General Westmoreland

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71C9 82-289  
By lch/rg, NARA, Date 2-21-92

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

agreed to the 525,000. He was still four battalions short of this figure, and these were scheduled in late March or early April, since they are being formed and would not be ready until that time. To avoid the delay, he has now asked for the brigade from the 82nd Division and a Marine Regional Landing Team. (He has also indicated that he is not binding himself, that he will not ask for the remainder of the 82nd Division and an additional RLT at a later time, if needed).

One of his problems in the 1st Corps is logistics. He is very limited in road net and is working to improve the road and the railroad from the main supply base at Danang. At the moment he is waiting for the enemy to commit himself in the Khe Sanh area. Elsewhere in the country U. S. forces are on the offensive in several areas.

As to further forces available in the U. S., I told General Eisenhower that we have essentially exhausted our reserves. I told him this matter is under urgent study at the present time. He said he would certainly support calling up reserves, if necessary. He thought that we should have a combat-ready corps ready for deployment at all times.

h.

A. J. GOODPASTER  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army

~~SECRET~~



*Pres file*

56

SECRET

Wednesday, February 14, 1968  
2:20 p. m.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith General Taylor sets down for you  
his views on Khe Sanh.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 2-18-92

56...

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

February 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Khe Sanh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS Ltr 10-2-78  
By gpl/y, NARA, Date 2-20-92

I know that Khe Sanh is very much on your mind as it is on mine. It may be too late to do anything about the situation; if so, we should put all doubts behind us and prepare for the fight. On the other hand, if there is still time to exercise a useful influence, we should move quickly.

I have reviewed what General Westmoreland has said about Khe Sanh in his recent messages. To paraphrase his cables, he points out that the original occupation of the position was justified by the need to establish a forward operating base to permit operations against the key infiltration routes in Eastern Laos. More importantly, he also considers that its occupation has blocked the route of enemy advance into Quang Tri and has kept the fighting away from the populated coastal belt of I Corps. He concedes that Khe Sanh has not had much effect on infiltration from Laos and it is not clear whether he regards the role of blocking the Quang Tri approach as of current or of past importance.

Thus, General Westmoreland does not appear to argue strongly for the defense of Khe Sanh because of its present value either in relation to the infiltration routes in Laos or in the defense of major areas of the northern provinces. Although he mentioned to General Wheeler in a telephone conversation his belief that the maintenance of our position in the Khe Sanh area would offer us the opportunity at some time of dealing the enemy a severe blow, he has not amplified this point and, in his cables, he stresses rather the difficulty of getting out of Khe Sanh at the present time and the adverse psychological effects of a withdrawal upon South Viet-Nam and upon the American public.

My review of Westy's cables does not convince me of the military importance of maintaining Khe Sanh at the present time if it is still feasible to withdraw. Whatever the past value of the position, it is a positive liability now. We are allowing the enemy to arrange at his leisure a set-piece attack on ground and in weather favorable to him and under conditions which will allow us little opportunity to punish him except by our air power. The latter can be neutralized to some degree by the favorite Communist tactic of closing tightly around our positions in areas which our air forces, particularly the B-52s, can not attack with safety to our own forces.

General Westmoreland recognizes the difficulties of air supply of Khe Sanh and indicates an intention to open Highway 9 to provide an overland line of communication. To do so will require a large number of troops to keep Highway 9 open in the face of the intermittent road-cutting operations which can be expected from the enemy.

~~SECRET-EYES ONLY~~

My present opinion is that Khe Sanh probably can be held but that it will be at a heavy price in terms of casualties and in terms of other ground troops necessary to support and reinforce it. I have real doubt that we can afford such a defense in view of the limited reserves which General Westmoreland is likely to have in the time frame during which these events may take place.

I make the foregoing comments in full realization of how wrong one can be at a distance about a military situation such as this. I have the utmost confidence in General Westmoreland and am sure that he sees possibilities in the situation which are not visible from here. Nonetheless, I would feel greatly relieved if the Joint Chiefs of Staff would see fit to send General Westmoreland guidance which would contain some of the following points:

"In view of the strong likelihood of a heavy enemy attack along the DMZ and against Khe Sanh, accompanied possibly by other attacks in the cities and along the Kontum-Pleiku border, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to provide the following comments for your guidance (i.e., General Westmoreland's). They are impressed with the many tasks which you may be called upon to perform concurrently with limited reserves and appreciate your problem in establishing priorities among these tasks as they arise. To assist you in making your decisions, they wish you to understand that, in their opinion, you should not hesitate to give up terrain in remote areas in order to meet the enemy on ground favorable to your scheme of maneuver, in favorable weather and under conditions offering you the opportunity of inflicting decisive blows upon his main forces.

"In this connection, Khe Sanh appears to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be an exposed position difficult to supply by air and expensive to supply overland in terms of lines of communication forces. Khe Sanh has already well fulfilled the purposes which you mention in your cable MAC-02018 of impeding infiltration from Laos and closing the northwest route into Quang Tri. However, it is less clear that its present value now justifies the cost of an all-out defense.

"While the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the adverse psychological consequences of a withdrawal which you mention, the effect of a costly defense absorbing forces badly needed elsewhere could in the end be far more disadvantageous to our cause than a withdrawal now. Indeed, the latter could prove to be a useful stratagem nullifying the laborious logistical build-up of the enemy around Khe Sanh and upsetting his winter-spring schedule.

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff are not prepared to assess the feasibility or the desirability of a withdrawal at this late date but wish you to know that they will support you completely if you decide to pull back from what may prove to be a disadvantageous position. They will support you equally in a decision to defend Khe Sanh."

*M.D.T.*  
M. D. T.

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

*57*

Wednesday, Feb. 14, 1968  
2:15 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith, for political reasons, probably wise,  
Ky may have decided to recommend to Thieu  
that he disband the Saigon recovery task force,  
not later than 18 February.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (TDCS DB-315/00548-68 advance)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-216 Appeal  
By Sj, NARA, Date 7-8-03

OSOMARLINGTON HALL STATION  
AFSSG USAF  
CNO  
DIA/ISIC  
JCS  
NIC  
DIRNSA COMMAN CENTER  
STATE (RCI)  
CIA-OCI  
ZEM

SANTIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 76-215  
By us, NARA Date 4-27-98

57a

Reston

~~SECRET~~

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM  
DOI 13 FEBRUARY 1968  
SUBJECT VICE PRESIDENT KY'S INTENTION TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT THIEU THAT TASK FORCE BE ABOLISHED

1.5(c)  
3.4(d)(1)

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (14 FEBRUARY 1968)  
SOURCE [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(d)(1)

SUMMARY: VICE PRESIDENT KY HAS DECIDED TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT THIEU NO LATER THAN 18 FEBRUARY THAT THE TASK FORCE BE ABOLISHED. KY WILL ARGUE THAT THE TASK FORCE HAS ACCOMPLISHED ITS OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING BASIC POLICES AND PROCEDURES FOR RELIEF AND THAT THE MINISTRIES SHOULD NOW BE ALLOWED TO TAKE OVER. HE IS ACTUALLY MOTIVATED BY FEAR OF ACCUSATIONS THAT HE IS USING THE TASK FORCE TO GRAB POWER. KY WILL TELL THIEU THAT IF THE TASK FORCE IS TO BE RETAINED, ITS NAME AND CHARTER SHOULD BE CHANGED. KY'S AIDES ARE DISTURBED BY KY'S DECISION, FEELING THAT WITHOUT KY'S HAND, RELIEF WORKS WILL FALTER. BEFORE KY TALKS WITH THIEU, HE WILL PROBABLY TRY TO INITIATE SOMETHING SPECTACULAR WITH REGARD TO ARMING THE PEOPLE. END SUMMARY.

1. [REDACTED] ON 13 FEBRUARY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION OF RECOMMENDING TO PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU NO LATER THAN 18 FEBRUARY THAT THE TASK FORCE BE DISSOLVED. KY'S RATIONALE, AS HE PLANS TO PRESENT IT TO THIEU, IS THE FOLLOWING:

1.5(c)  
3.4(d)(1)

A. SINCE THE TASK FORCE WAS DESIGNED FOR EMERGENCY RELIEF PUPOSES, IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN EXISTENCE ONLY UNTIL THE BASIC POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR RELIEF HAVE BEEN SETTLED. THIS HAS NOW BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.

B. THE GOVERNMENT HAS A DULY CONSTITUTED STRUCTURE OF MINISTRIES WITH ASSIGNED PROPER RESPONSIBILITIES. THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOW BE PERMITTED TO RUN IN A MORE NORMAL FASHION.

2. ALTHOUGH KY SEEMS TO BELIEVE THE ABOVE RATIONALE TO SOME EXTENT, HE IS MOTIVATED MORE BY A FEAR OF BEING ACCUSED OF GRABBING POWER IN THIS CRISIS FOR REASONS OF PERSONAL AMBITION. CRITICISMS FROM HIS CRITICS IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT HAVE REACHED HIM TO THE EFFECT THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT HAS ESTABLISHED A SUPERMINISTRY AROUND HIS OWN PERSON AND IN THE FORM OF THE TASK FORCE. KY INSISTS THAT HE IS NOT INTERESTED IN ASSUMING POWER IN THIS INDIRECT WAY AND THAT, REALIZING THE NEED FOR HIS SERVICES IN THE EMERGENCY, HE WAS PLEASED TO HAVE OFFERED THEM AND NOW WISHES TO STEP DOWN.



~~NO STEP DOWN.~~

3. KY WILL PROBABLY ATTEMPT TO DISCUSS HIS TENURE WITH THE PRESIDENT PRIVATELY AND WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT HE WILL DEFER TO THE PRESIDENT'S WISHES. HE WILL REMIND THE PRESIDENT THAT WHILE HIS OWN IDEA OF THE TASK FORCE REVOLVED AROUND A CONCEPT OF "NATIONAL RECOVERY," THE PRESIDENT'S STAFF HAD ALTERED BOTH THE CONCEPT AND THE TITLE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO "EMERGENCY RELIEF." THIS IS, IN FACT, THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW OF THE COMMITTEE'S FUNCTION, THEN ITS MISSION HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. IF THIEU WISHES KY TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE LEADERSHIP AND ENERGY TO THE COMMITTEE, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO CHANGE ITS FRAME OF REFERENCE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE ON-GOING AND LENGTHIER PROCESS OF RECOVERY IN THE LARGER SENSE OF THE WORD. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] KY SEEMS TO BE ATTRACTED TO THE IDEA OF CONTINUING IN A POWERFUL EXECUTIVE ROLE BUT IS HOLDING HIMSELF VERY MUCH IN CHECK AGAINST ANY TEMPTATION TO "GRAB" THAT ROLE. HE FEELS STRONGLY THAT IT MUST BE GIVEN HIM BY THE PRESIDENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONSTITUTION.)

4. SOME OF KY'S AIDES HAVE EXPRESSED SYMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING WITH KY'S REASONING AND, THEREFORE, HIS INTENTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY PREDICT THAT THE EMERGENCY RELIEF WORK, HARDLY COMPLETED, WILL SUFFER IF KY WITHDRAWS AND THE COMMITTEE IS DISSOLVED. SUCH A DISSOLUTION WOULD, OF COURSE, ALSO REMOVE THANG FROM DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE RELIEF ACTIVITIES, UNLESS HE WERE ASSIGNED SOME NEW ROLE BY CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN. THE BUSINESS OF RELIEF WOULD BE UNDOUBTEDLY DISCUSSED IN A DAILY MEETING OF THE CABINET UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF PRIME MINISTER LOC. THESE MEETINGS WOULD, LIKE MOST CABINET MEETINGS, INDULGE IN ENDLESS TALK AND FEW DECISIONS WITHOUT THE FIRM HANDS OF KY AND THANG BEING APPLIED. THUS, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD SOON BE FLOODED WITH UNSOLVED PROBLEMS AND UNFINISHED BUSINESS AND COULD PROBABLY TAKE TWO WEEK'S TIME. THE EARLY RUMBLINGS IN THE ASSEMBLY AGAINST PRIME MINISTER LOC'S APPARENT HELPLESSNESS IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE VIET CONG ATTACK WOULD RESUME AND BECOME AGGRAVATED.

5. ONE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE OF KY'S INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TASK FORCE ON 13 FEBRUARY IS AN APPARENT FEELING OF URGENCY ON HIS PART TO INITIATE SOMETHING SPECTACULAR AND CONCRETE WITH REGARDS TO "ARMING THE PEOPLE." PARTLY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF GENERAL THANG, KY MAY BE MOVED TO BESTOW ARMS ON THE ALREADY WELL-ORGANIZED CATHOLIC PARISHES IN SOME OF THE MORE DIFFICULT AREAS OF SAIGON AND ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE CITY. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE RECEIVED 14 PRIESTS ON 13 FEBRUARY. [REDACTED] IT IS NOT KNOWN JUST WHAT SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS, IF ANY, WERE MADE TO THE CATHOLIC REPRESENTATIVES.) WHILE KY HAS INDICATED HIS APPRECIATION OF SOME OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN HASTY ACTION IN THIS FIELD, HE NEVERTHELESS IS INTENT ON EXPLOITING THE UPSURGE OF ANTI-VIET CONG FEELING AND BELIEVES THE CATHOLICS TO BE MOST READILY ABLE TO ABSORB AND USE ARMS AGAINST THE VC. [REDACTED] KY'S DESIRE TO BE PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN INITIATING SUCH A PROGRAM AMONG THE CATHOLICS DOES HAVE POLITICAL OVERTONES.)

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

6. (FIELD COMMENT: ANOTHER VERSION OF THE 13 FEBRUARY MEETING AND ANALYSIS OF KY'S PLANS WAS PUBLISHED AS [REDACTED])

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER, CHIEF OF STAFF, J-2) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL MONYER ONLY) DIS/JUSPAD (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

Wednesday, February 14, 1968  
2:10 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Defense (Warnke) reports that we are  
locked into mid-July as the earliest possible  
date for the new Thai deployment.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 93-368  
By Cb, NARA, Date 5-12-95

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (log 622)

~~SECRET~~

6-52

58a



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

12 FEB 1968

In reply refer to:  
I-20427/68

Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 93-369  
By cb, NARA Date 6-5-96

Dear Walt:

This responds to your memorandum of January 22 to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara concerning the assurances the President desires relative to the Thai deployment to Vietnam.

Equipment for the Thai force is being delivered to Thailand on an accelerated basis. Items are being airlifted when necessary to meet the training schedule. While there may be certain temporary shortages of minor items, there is no possibility that these could be a cause or an excuse for delay.

Target dates for the deployment of the Thai force have been set and are clearly understood by both sides. The first of the two increments commenced training earlier this month and will deploy in mid-July. The second increment will begin training immediately thereafter and will deploy in January 1969.

The Thai have made clear publicly from the beginning that this deployment shall not be to the detriment of their internal security capability and that it shall consist of volunteers from the active forces, the reserves, and civilian life. Deploying an existing unit would run directly counter to this firm public commitment of the RTG to their people, and to His Majesty's insistence that the force be composed of volunteers. An attempt at this juncture to induce the RTG to change our jointly agreed-upon plans would be not only to no avail but might cause considerable political damage. Bill Bundy concurs in this judgment.

Please be assured that all levels of the Department of Defense recognize the importance of early deployment of additional Thai forces to Vietnam.

Sincerely,

cc: The Secretary of Defense  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Mr. William P. Bundy

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Wed., Feb. 14, 1968  
12:40 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Nitze reports:

1. Seventh Fleet Commander optimistic on rescue, if beeper continues to beep -- even though it's a night job.
2. The protective fighter CAP of six aircraft will be held 25 miles off shore unless the chopper is attacked.
3. The rescue chopper -- and the whole rescue party -- are under strict instruction to initiate no hostile action.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71CJ 90-143

By del/ry, NARA, Date 2-24-92

INFORMATION

60

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, February 14, 1968 -- 12:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Communications difficulties prevent our getting through promptly to the Seventh Fleet. Nitze will keep trying; but you may wish to make your decision on the basis of present evidence, given shortness of time.

*Profile*

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 749 90-143

By WPH, NARA, Date 2-24-92



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, February 14, 1968  
12:10 p. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Relations between the President and the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Press critics who are trying to drive a wedge between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief by overstating and oversimplifying differences should be reminded of the way our Government is organized.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the individual Chiefs of Staff are responsible for the conduct of the war under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief. Their recommendations are made to the President who takes into account military requirements in arriving at decisions based on the national interest. Military recommendations are a basic part of an integrated policy. The President has the responsibility to see to it that every consideration is properly weighed.

A recent effort has been made to confuse relations between civilian and military authorities. These relations have been better in recent years than in any period in recent history. Premature attempts to argue the rightness or wrongness of policy decisions on the basis of military considerations alone prevents us from looking at our problems honestly and leads us into sterile debate which could better be left to the historians who will have all the facts and can see the situation in full perspective.

For example:

Allegations that there were major differences of view between the President and the Joint Chiefs concerning the number of U. S. troops to be sent to Vietnam; the strategy of fighting the war there; and the command relationships are, in essence, false and could be rebutted in detail.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ALG CBS 20  
By ws/rq, NARA, Date 2-18-92

As to the call up of reserves, the Chiefs did recommend such a call up. However, it was possible to provide General Westmoreland with all his essential requirements even though Congress was not requested in 1965 for authority to call up reserves.

Allegations that our forces were not given all the weapons they requested is answered by General Westmoreland's statement, repeated over and over again, that he has been given all the material he needs.

The Chiefs recommended a more concentrated and massive bombing attack in Vietnam when this question was first discussed. The decision to authorize a gradual rather than a 'paralyzing' air campaign can be easily defended but no one can now say what would have happened had the decision been otherwise.

Little purpose is served in dealing with this subject in generalities. There may be differences of opinion about the conduct of the war, but it is a disservice to the country to report inaccurately about military advice which was or was not accepted in reaching an overall decision affecting not only the conduct of the war but also our relations with other nations, the health of our economy and our efforts to achieve peace in Vietnam.

Attached is an analysis prepared in the Department of Defense which is the basis for the judgments given above. It provides facts which could be used in a detailed rebuttal of the U. S. News and World Report allegations if you decide it is wise to do so. (Tab A)

You will recall that last September you made an extensive statement about the relations between the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs. It is attached at Tab B.

*Walt* Rostow

P.S. In my judgment, under no circumstances should we use the Systems Analysis (SA) comments. They would split rather than unite the government.

*W*

~~TOP SECRET~~

61a

U. S. NEWS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG-CBS5

By ispy, NARA, Date 2-18-92

1. BOMBING

Military Proposal: When President Lyndon Johnson decided to bomb North Vietnam in February, 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed a paralyzing air campaign, striking 94 major targets in 16 days. The aim: to stun the Communists militarily, economically and politically -- then keep the pressure up.

White House Decision: President Johnson rejected military's advice, settled for strategy of "gradualism." New targets were added piecemeal over next three years, long after North Vietnam had opportunity to build up air defenses. Pentagon plan to close port of Haiphong is still vetoed by White House.

JCS COMMENT

In November 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a two to three week period of strikes against 94 targets in Laos, North Vietnam, and along the infiltration routes for a controlled program of intense military pressure against NVN swiftly applied. Again in February 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended air strikes against North Vietnam. The actual air campaign strikes were begun on 2 March 1965 against selected NVN targets. The targets selected were from the 94 target list.

(Systems Analysis)

SA COMMENT

The charge is true. In retrospect, a faster escalation of the bombing might have been wiser. However, it also might have substantially hastened the build-up in the amount and sophistication of Soviet and CHICOM aid to NVN.

Further, the gradual escalation in the bombing did not result in increased US aircraft losses -- as implied by the statement "long after NVN had opportunity to build up air defenses." The NVN loss rate as late as July-September 1965 was over 5.0 losses per 1,000 attack sorties. It is now half that rate (about 2.5 per 1,000).

Finally, both the Chinese and Russians have reacted strongly to accidental damage to their ships in NVN ports. The reaction -- including a direct confrontation between the US and USSR -- over closing Haiphong would be dangerous to US world-wide interests. And closing Haiphong would probably be ineffective in any case since the bulk of military goods enters NVN from China via railroad. The lighterage capability of

all documents of attachments  
this document becomes 2nd

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NVN is also large enough to allow offloading ship cargoes without using Haiphong port facilities. Closing the port would complicate the NVN logistic problem, but it would not force NVN to cease support for the VC.

*(International Security Affairs)*  
ISA COMMENT

The memorandum containing the complete SecDef action has been sent to Cameron Station for filing and cannot be recovered in time to be of use in this analysis. However, from an earlier summary, it appears that the JCS comment contains the key points. This same summary indicates that the SecDef reply to the JCS paper containing the recommendations stated he had noted the contents and had furnished these views to the State Department.

The JCS 94 target, intense pressures against NVN proposal of November 1964 must be put in context. The consensus in Washington was against this course of action for three reasons: (1) reports from the field in SVN were relatively optimistic so that it seemed drastic overt actions by the U. S. could not be justified; (2) punitive action against NVN was seen, at best, as complementary to successful counterinsurgency in South Vietnam, that the South Vietnamese themselves had to demonstrate that they could or could not do the job before any direct, and potentially dangerous, U. S. actions were desirable; and (3) intensified U. S. actions of the kind recommended by the JCS were viewed as probably causing Hanoi to doubt the limited U. S. aims; moreover, the focus was on the prospects of bringing about negotiations; taking all-out actions against NVN, it was generally agreed, would incline Hanoi to dig in its heels.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

U. S. NEWS

2. TROOP STRENGTH

**Military Proposal:** When the President decided to send American combat units into the war in 1965, the Joint Chiefs urged a rapid buildup to 400,000 men in the first six months -- hoping to overwhelm the enemy. Top military men said a total of 750,000 Americans in all would be needed to make real progress in Vietnam.

**White House Decision:** A slow, gradual buildup over a three year period, to reach 525,000 this summer. Reds' own continuing buildup has barely been offset. Latest presidential decision is to hold at a deliberately measured pace, advise General Westmoreland to struggle along with the men he has.

JCS COMMENT

Beginning in June 1965, a series of requests by MACV to increase forces from 70,000 to 219,000 resulted in a recommendation by the Secretary of Defense to the President for approval of an in-country strength of 210,000 (CY 65 - Phase I). Beginning in October 1965 (CY 66-Phase II), force requirements for CY 66 were developed by CINCPAC/COMUSMACV culminating in February 1966 in a stated requirement for a total of 238,000 additional personnel for a cumulative total force requirement of 459,000. On 4 April 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, based on Service capability without callup of Reserves (as directed by the Secretary of Defense), recommended a deployment schedule that would provide 437,000 personnel in CY 66/67. The Secretary of Defense approved this schedule on 11 April 1966. On 18 June 1966 (CY 66/67 - Program #4), CINCPAC stated a requirement for additional forces providing an in-country strength of 558,000 by end CY 67. On 4 November 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended approval of 558,500; on 11 November 1967, the Secretary of Defense approved 469,300. In March 1967, (FY 68 - Program #5), MACV recommended an increase to a minimum essential force of 565,000, and proposed an optimum force of 678,000. On 12 July 1967, the President approved 525,000. - 66

SA COMMENT

The JCS did not recommend a rapid buildup of 400,000 men in 6 months, in 1965. In July they recommended that 175,000 U. S. troops (34 U. S. plus 10 Free World battalions) be deployed by the end of the year. The request was later refined to raise the package to 193,000. This force was approved

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~~TOP SECRET~~

and the 44 battalions were in Vietnam by early November. By the end of the year, 185,000 troops had closed, 96% of the plan.

400,000 men could not have been supported in Vietnam in December 1965, given the state of the ports, roads, and other logistic facilities. The 185,000 men deployed by December 1965 were about all that could be supported. No recommendation has been made to the President by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or General Westmoreland to deploy 750,000 men to Vietnam. Nor did any "top military man" suggest in 1965 that 750,000 men might be required.

The buildup to 525,000 was not slow. In October 1965 General Westmoreland said that he wanted 72 US and Free World Maneuver battalions and 325,000 US troops by December 1966. In fact, he received 102 such battalions and 385,000 troops by December 1966. This was more men and battalions than the JCS thought possible, with a reserve call-up, when they made their recommendations in February 1966.

COMUSMACV has been given all of the combat forces he has requested. Program #5 (525,000 troops) provided him what he said he needed at the time. In early 1967, COMUSMACV proposed (and the JCS endorsed) the deployment of 2 1/3 div, 8 tac fighter squadrons and miscellaneous other forces by end FY 68--a total of 85,000 men over the 470,000 then approved. He was given 5 of the 8 fighter squadrons and all of the added ground combat forces. Through divilization and a careful review of the forces already provided, the total force level was held to 525,000. In this regard, COMUSMACV on 12 July 1967, stated:

"Despite many speculations as to the number of troops that I have asked for, the fact is that I have not asked for any specific number of troops.

"I have recommended a deployment to Vietnam of a certain number of combat units that would comprise a part of a balanced force. I am being provided the forces, as I have recommended."

The Communists have not been able to match the US/GVN/Free World buildup in SVN. At the low point of March 1965, the ratio of friendly to enemy strength was 3.4 to 1; today it is about 6.0 to 1. In fact, MACV estimates the enemy has not been able to maintain his strength in SVN since September 1966.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

ISA COMMENT

The allegation of "top military men saying a total of 750,000 Americans in all would be needed to make real progress" is not mentioned in JCS comments and is probably not a matter of official record. Except for one instance, there was no complete turndown of a recommendation at OSD level. In his reply to the 4 November 1966 recommendation, the Secretary of Defense disapproved substantial forces that had been recommended for deployment.

Discounting the issue of the Guard and Reserve callups, there has been no serious dispute between the JCS and the White House on U. S. troop buildups. In 1965, there was no JCS proposal for buildup to 400,000 men in 6 months. It is not clear as proposed by JCS how much more rapidly U. S. troops could have been deployed to Vietnam with a Reserve and Guard callup. It is clear, however, that U. S. troops were deployed to SVN in time and in number in proximate accordance with JCS recommendations. There is no evidence of anyone's claiming that a faster buildup would have "overwhelmed" the enemy.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

U. S. NEWS

3. MOBILIZATION

Military Proposal: Joint Chiefs advised Mr. Johnson to call up National Guard and Reserves in 1965, 1966 and 1967 to provide psychological support for a "winning strategy" in Vietnam, relieve pressures on the active services, and help meet other global commitments.

White House Decision: Services were ordered to expand through increased draft calls and intensified recruiting. President Johnson in January, 1968, agreed to limited call-up of some air reservists, but tied it directly to USS PUEBLO crisis.

JCS COMMENT

The Joint Chiefs of Staff first recommended a selected Reserve callup in September 1965 in a memo (JCSM-721-65, 24 Sep 65) to the Secretary of Defense. Subsequently in November 1965, they reaffirmed the need for selected reserves. (JCSM-814-65, 10 Nov. 65).

In October, 1966, in connection with increased deployments to SVN, although noting that the U. S. reserve would be deficient without a selected reserve mobilization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not specifically recommend callup. (JCSM-646-66, 7 Oct. 66).

In May, 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended mobilizing certain Army, Navy, and Marine units for deploying, and sustaining the Program 5 forces and to reconstitute the Strategic Reserve. (JCSM-288-67, 20 May 67).

SA COMMENT

In retrospect it appears to have been a wise decision not to call the Reserves. Had they been recalled in 1965, they would have completed their tours of duty in mid-1967 and been released. While the active forces would have been expanded to replace the reserve units, our overall posture would have been weaker than it is today.

Based on our experience in 1961-62, when reserve units return to reserve status they suffer heavy losses of personnel severely degrading readiness. Since they were not called (steps were taken, however, to improve their readiness) they are available today should they be needed, thus providing a large and capable back-up to our regular forces.

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ISA COMMENT

To the best we can determine, none of the JCSM's referred to in the JCS Comment came to ISA for action. Therefore, specific SecDef action is unknown, but could probably be determined by detailed research. One point worthy of mentioning is that the specific JCS recommendation in May 67 was to accomplish, inter alia, "An immediate decision regarding selective callup of reserves and extension of terms of service for 12 months." Although this implies a callup recommendation, it is not a strong one.

Up until the summer and fall of 1967, in connection with Program V, there is no evidence that the JCS believed the National Guard and Reserve callup to be necessary psychological support for a "winning strategy" in Vietnam. The JCS position on call-ups was argued on the basis of force requirements for global commitments being drawn down as a result of the build-up in Vietnam. When the psychological support argument was used with respect to Program V, the thrust was the U. S. needed to show greater determination. The policy consensus in Washington was that the expenditure of \$25 billion per year and 525,000 troops in-country were sufficient demonstration of the U. S. resolve.

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U. S. NEWS

4. WEAPONS

Military Proposal: Military services repeatedly asked for more and newer planes, helicopters, guns, other materiel - especially in early stages of war. Servicemen complained they were flying World War II bombers and carrying Korean War radios and that other obsolescent equipment was being used up to save money.

White House Decision: Civilian analysts at Pentagon each year cut back budget requests of services, with support of Defense Secretary McNamara and Budget Bureau. Administration was forced to return to Congress for supplemental appropriations for Vietnam to make up for original cutbacks.

JCS COMMENT

Generally speaking, the approved logistics guidance of the Secretary of Defense is more restrictive than that recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While forces in Southeast Asia have been authorized support in accordance with their anticipated needs, budget guidance has limited forces not engaged in Southeast Asia to peacetime activity levels or other restrictive criteria.

Equipment on hand was used during the early stages of the war. This, of course, would necessitate the use of older equipment until such time as decisions could be implemented to increase production of the newer and more modern equipment.

SA COMMENT

The Services were authorized all of the funds needed to support the war in Vietnam which could be spent. There was no shortage of logistic material which impeded operations, and aircraft and guns were fully adequate. -- We dropped 33,000 tons of bombs as early as October 1965, compared to a Korean war peak of 25,000 tons and an average of 17,000 tons.

We have not had as many helicopters as we have wanted, but we still have been able to send more Army and Marine Corps helicopters to SVN (3,000) than existed in their world-wide 1961 inventories, and we now have 8500 helicopters with about 9 times the trooplift capability of the 1961 inventory. Additional helicopters in SVN would not have won the war.

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The "World War II bombers" and other "obsolescent equipment" has been sent to SVN only if it can do the job required. In fact, the A-1 and B-26 propeller aircraft have been more effective in certain key missions than jets.

Supplemental budget submissions were used to prevent the build-up of huge unnecessary inventories of materiel. At no time did we have to ask for a supplemental to cover items that were requested and denied in the basic budget and that should have been funded earlier.

#### COMPTROLLER COMMENT

In all budgets since Vietnam buildup began, the budget provided enough funds for the forces and the time period planned for in the budget.

The supplementals were not to "make up for original cutbacks;" they were for a combination of additional forces and/or an additional combat consumption time period beyond that explicitly set forth in the original budget.

Secretary McNamara clearly described this budgeting policy in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on 10 March 1966. He stated:

"I want to make clear again the basic assumptions on which the 1966 and 1967 budgets were based; that is, that the conflict would proceed through June of 1967, and we funded only through that point. If it looks as though the conflict is going to extend beyond that date we will need more money in 1967, or, if it looks as though the rate of activity of that conflict will be higher than we estimated, we will need more money."

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U. S. NEWS

5. STRATEGY

Military Proposal: Military wanted to send troops into Laos to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail from North Vietnam into the South, still want to attack the Reds' "privileged sanctuary" in Cambodia. Commanders wanted to carry war into the Mekong Delta in 1966 to cut off the flow of rice and recruits, weaken the enemy further north.

White House Decision: Interdiction of Ho Chi Minh Trail is limited to air attacks. Cambodia is off limits except for restricted cases of "hot pursuit." Initial Mekong campaign, calling for 100,000 troops, was vetoed and General Westmoreland told to go in with less than a division, if he insisted.

JCS COMMENT

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not recommended sending troops into Laos. Neither have they recommended attacking the sanctuaries in Cambodia. They have recommended and were granted permission for U. S. forces, under emergency conditions to take the necessary counter-action in exercise of the right of self defense against VC/NVA attacks directed to US/RVNAF forces from locations inside Cambodia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not recommend the deployment of 100,000 troops into the Mekong campaign in 1966.

SA COMMENT

Extending the area of search and destroy operations would not have halted infiltration, nor seriously impeded the NVA--we have not had appreciable success interdicting their movements within SVN. Further, the key problem in SVN is building a viable GVN while destroying the Viet Cong political and military apparatus. Extending the war would not have achieved these objectives either.

With regard to Mekong Delta operations, COMUSMACV requested one division in the Fall of 1965 to be deployed in late 1966. This division (the 9th) was deployed in December 1966 and is presently operating in the Delta (1 brigade is still northeast of Saigon near Bear Cat). General Westmoreland has not requested any other sizable forces for use in the Delta and the claim that 100,000 troops were requested is erroneous. It should be noted that the Mission Council in Saigon had serious doubts about the wisdom of putting US units into the Delta. Ambassador Lodge did not give his approval to this action until October 1966, only two months before the division arrived.

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ISA COMMENT

The JCS asked for and received approval in principle for a 2-3 ARVN battalion operation against base area 607 in Laos as part of the CY 1968 campaign. The JCS themselves, however, did not press hard for this operation. They talked about the proposal having "merit" and they added, very uncharacteristically, that such an operation "will become public and attendant with political problems." Recent JCS proposals for ground reconnaissance operations and limited sabotage operations in Cambodia were rejected on the grounds that the political losses from spreading the war into Cambodia outweigh possible military benefits. Moreover, the diplomatic activities underway with Sihanouk would have been compromised by such actions.

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U. S. NEWS

6. COMMAND

Military Proposal: Military men wanted to take over the war from South Vietnamese and run it through a joint command. These officers, anxious for a forceful approach instead of "gradualism," asked Washington for permission to run the war the way they saw it.

White House Decision: Idea of joint command was vetoed in 1965, is still vetoed. Command decisions, except for secondary operations, still comes in the form of management directives from civilian superiors in Washington, 8,000 miles from the scene of battle.

JCS COMMENT

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have never recommended establishing a combined command under a U. S. Supreme Commander. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not recommended any change in the command organization of COMUSMACV that would have given COMUSMACV authority to run the war divorced from Washington decisions.

SA COMMENT

General Westmoreland himself has turned down the Joint Command Concept. In mid-1965, Secretary McNamara approved the Joint Command Concept. But COMUSMACV and the Ambassador (Gen. Taylor) said it would be totally unacceptable to the Vietnamese and should be dropped. The idea, as far as we know has never been formally recommended to the President.

Command decisions, except for a handful of targets in NVN and questions of cross-border operations, have been and are in the hands of responsible military commanders.

ISA COMMENT

In 1963, 1964 and 1965, MACV advanced several proposals for establishing a combined military command in Vietnam. These proposals were apparently motivated by a desire to associate the South Vietnamese and U. S. efforts more closely in the prosecution of the war, and not by any MACV wish to override the GVN or Washington. The JCS informed

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the Secretary of Defense of MACV's proposals, but did not back them. Compared to other conflicts, this one has been relatively free of charges, especially with respect to ground operations, of civilians disregarding military advice.

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U. S. NEWS

7. ADDITIONAL ALLEGATIONS BY "TOP MILITARY AUTHORITY IN WASHINGTON"

The White House has had no plan for winning the war in any realistic period of time. Most of the hard-rock recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dating back to 1965, still are unfulfilled. Fear of bringing Russia and China into the war has limited us but not them -- they are providing between 6 and 8 billion a year to the enemy. Another 200,000 men and three more years are required to bring the war to manageable proportions. Otherwise, get out and let the diplomats salvage what they can, and suffer results of defeat.

SA COMMENT

No US official, civilian or military, has a plan guaranteed to win the war in specific period of time. General Westmoreland has not said that any number of troops would make him confident of victory: More troops might speed up the process of victory, but he would not say how much. The US cannot win this war with US forces regardless of size -- victory requires a strong GVN, and building that requires time. If we swamp SVN with US forces, we will tear the SVN society apart and undermine the nation-building essential to a VC defeat. Note that even the US News "expert" didn't predict victory with 200,000 more troops, costing \$10 billion more per year, and taking 3 more years. Three more years of a \$35 billion per year war "to bring the war to manageable proportions" is a far cry from quick victory.

CIA/DIA estimates of Soviet/Chicom aid to NVN are about \$1 billion per year now.

8. ADDITIONAL ALLEGATIONS BY "VETERAN CORRESPONDENT IN SAIGON"

President deeply distrusts the military's judgment. General Taylor, not Westmoreland, made the recommendations from Saigon early in 1965. The 1st Infantry Division was not combat-ready when deployed in 1965, but the President refused to deploy the combat-ready 82nd and 101st Airborne. The Honolulu conference gave American pacification civilians first call on all military assets, and shortage of troops led to clashes over priority. McNamara offered B-52 sorties instead of troops. All this interference from Washington has beaten down military efforts to put together a grand strategy.

SA COMMENT

The President has repeatedly stated that General Westmoreland will be provided everything he needs. The General has repeatedly stated that he has been

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given all of the forces and materiel he needs. He has received the best forces we have had in our inventory -- including the combat-ready 1st Infantry Division. General Westmoreland was not refused the 82nd and 101st airborne divisions as he did not ask for them by name. In fact, he normally did not even specify nationality -- Korean, Australian or other Free World forces would be satisfactory.

Pacification has never been given first priority on military assets if General Westmoreland felt there was a better use for the forces -- and civilians have had no say in the use of those forces.

B-52 sorties have been increased on several occasions at the request of General Westmoreland -- and never as a substitute for requested forces.

The military in Vietnam have a campaign plan or "grand strategy" for the war. The plan is purely the work of the US and SVN military forces. To argue that our military leaders would be beaten down by civilian interference in military affairs is to be totally ignorant of our military leaders and of the civilian officials.

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13 February 1968

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-458

By plip, NARA, Date 4/30/96

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Walt Rostow

SUBJECT: U.S. News and World Report Article, February 19

We have had a rapid survey done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Systems Analysis, and ISA on the main allegations contained in the article. The results of this survey are attached.

The allegations on troop strength, strategy and command are, in essence, false and could be combatted in detail. The issue on mobilization is more complex in that the JCS did recommend the selective call-up of Reserves but, in fact, it was possible to provide General Westmoreland all his essential requirements even though this authority was not requested of the Congress. The issue on weapons really relates to non-Southeast Asia requirements. With respect to Southeast Asia, General Westmoreland has repeatedly stated that he has been given all the material he needs. With respect to bombing, the issue is more difficult. It is true that the Chiefs recommended a more concentrated and massive attack in the first instance than was authorized. It is almost impossible to reconstruct now what would have been the likely course of events had such a more massive and concentrated attack taken place. The North <sup>Vietnamese</sup> [Koreans] could have dug in their heels and the assistance from other Communist countries could have been more rapid and more far

reaching. This cannot, however, be proven nor can the consequences

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of closing the Port of Haiphong be demonstrated one way or the other.

We doubt the utility of drawing an issue as to whether military versus civilian advice has been proven correct by hindsight. It would seem wiser to focus upon misstatements in the article with respect to issues where divergence between military advice and civilian decision is asserted but was not so. Perhaps the best way of getting at this would be either in a speech in which one could concentrate on those selected points on which we choose to focus or else a letter from a friendly Congressman asking questions on those issues to which we could then reply for the record.

*Paul H. Nitze*

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# THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1967

*Including a Statement by the President on Additional  
Wheat Shipments to India.*

## QUESTIONS

### BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

Q. Mr. President, there seems to be, at least in public, some dispute going on within the administration on bombing policy in North Vietnam, with Secretary McNamara's representatives taking one position and the military another.

First, if such a dispute exists, could you sort of define it for us and, second, has Secretary McNamara—

THE PRESIDENT. Let's take one at a time, Smitty. I will give you another chance.

MERRIMAN SMITH (UPI). All right.

THE PRESIDENT. The President is the Commander in Chief under the Constitution. His principal deputy in military matters is the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs are his military advisers.

The Joint Chiefs are a group of very able men. They are the finest in character and the best trained soldiers and sailors that we have. Their judgment is requested and respected, and certainly always carefully considered.

No two men ever see everything alike. Throughout our history there have been differences among Army leaders and naval leaders, between members of the Joint Chiefs and the civilians, between the civilians and the Congress. That is really the strength of our system.

The Congress, in writing the National Security Act of 1947, in which I played some part as a member of the Armed Services Committee, provided that the individual judgments of members of the Joint Chiefs would be available to the Congress on request. As advisers to the President, of course, they are always available to him.

I have been here 36 years. During that period I have been intimately associated with the Armed Services. I have never known a period during that time when I thought there was more harmony, more general agreement, and a more cooperative attitude, or when there were more able men in control.

That is not to say that they all agree. It is very rare when the President finds that the men around the table are all in agreement. If all agree, I usually adjourn the meeting and send for somebody to give me the other viewpoint.

I did that last week on the question involving Indian wheat. I asked that the other side be given to me.

Roughly speaking—and this is subject to some adjustment—there are in the neighborhood of some 350 principal, significant targets that the President has seriously

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1967

considered from the JCS list. Approximately 300 of those have been authorized. So six out of seven have been authorized.

Of those 300 authorized, all the civilians and all the military have agreed on them. Their opinion has varied from time to time. There has been some little difference of opinion—the President may feel this way and the Secretary of State may feel another way; or they may agree and the Secretary of Defense agrees with them, and maybe the Joint Chiefs feel that this is more important than the other.

Some of them don't have the viewpoint on how it might affect our overall political situation in the world, and so forth. All of those things are considered.

But in 300 of the 350 instances there has been general agreement.

The 50 left are in very strategic areas, primarily the port of Haiphong, Hanoi, and the buffer zone. The decisions to bomb those other 50 targets have not been made.

Before the President acts on them, he will carefully consider the views of his principal military advisers, such as the Joint Chiefs, and his principal political adviser, the Secretary of State; his principal deputy in military matters, the Secretary of Defense.

I think it is fair to give you my impression that while the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State and the President, are not in complete agreement on everything, there is no deep division. The viewpoints of all are carefully considered and weighed, with decisions made on what we believe to be in the national interest. There is a very surprising and very agreeable amount of unanimity, with men of the same general opinion.

There are no quarrels, no antagonisms. I think the Joint Chiefs have acted very ably. From their viewpoint they have expressed themselves thoroughly. They are available to come to the President any time they choose without coming through the Secretary of Defense. They have been requested to do that any time they want to.

I think at least the implications of the testimony before the committee is somewhat blown out of proportion. That has always been true, though.

I remember when we were fighting for a 70 group Air Force when the then Secretary of Air, Mr. Symington, asked if he would not be permitted to give his own personal opinion before a Congressional committee of which I was a member. Very frequently you find that men of strong minds do not always agree. When they do, you have to consider their individual viewpoints and then act in the way you think is in the best interest of the Nation. That is what we have done.

But six out of every seven targets recommended have been authorized. As of now, I think that we are operating effectively, efficiently, and in the national interest.

Now I will take your next question.

#### SECRETARY McNAMARA'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Q. Has Secretary McNamara recommended to you that the rate of bombing in the north be reduced?

THE PRESIDENT. The recommendations that we get from time to time are to authorize specific targets. When those meetings conclude, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the President have as of now been in agreement with each other.

#### STATEMENTS OF STENNIS COMMITTEE ON CONDUCT OF THE WAR

Q. Mr. President, I wonder if you would address yourself perhaps to a couple of specific statements by the Stennis Committee. One, their assertion that the present policy has not done the job and it has been contrary to the best military judgment; and second, their assertion that it is necessary to bomb Haiphong now?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I don't want to get in an argument with the Senate committee. They have their responsibility to get as much information as they can get and to express their views. You will find that in every struggle that this country has gone through, various committees of the Congress do that.

That is their privilege. I don't care to argue with them. I believe our policy is a sound one. It is based on the best judgment that we have.

Every decision is going to be made after we get all the facts and then we are going to do what we think is in the national interest. I am sure the committee wants to do the same thing.

Wednesday, February 14, 1968  
12:00 noon

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SECRET

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Hainan Territorial Waters Rescue Operation1. Facts

The Seventh Fleet would like to launch its rescue chopper from the Kearsage at 0400 its time (3-3/4 hours from now). It would take 45 minutes to get to the scene. They hope to complete the operation before dawn (0615 their time). Despite night operations, the Coral Sea would mount a protective fighter CAP against MIG's. Nitze is awaiting a final assessment from the Commander of the 7th Fleet before coming to the Cabinet meeting to answer this question: What are the chances of success?

2. Sect. Rusk. He does not believe the operation should be undertaken:

- the risks to the helicopter crew are too great;
- the man is in territorial waters: we would not attempt rescue if he were on Hainan or the China mainland.

3. Sect. McNamara. The rescue attempt should not be made.

4. Gen. Wheeler. The risks of an air engagement are high against a sizable force. Nevertheless, his gut feeling is the rescue should be attempted; although much depends on whether the 7th Fleet Commander believes the chances of successful rescue are good, in the light of weather and other factors determining whether the man can be found.

5. Mr. Clifford. Rescue the man. It is a mission of mercy. He feels Hainan is in a somewhat different status -- in fact, if not in law -- than the Chinese mainland.

W. W. Rostow

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Authority 71-890-143By del/pz, NARA, Date 2-24-92

INFORMATION

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Wednesday, February 14, 1968  
11:25 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's personal  
statement on negotiations, designed  
to pre-empt U Thant's believed position.

W. W. Rostow

wwrostow:rla

2/14/68 63a

Questions have been asked about the connection between the possibility of negotiations for a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam and the military operations now in progress. It should be obvious that there is a connection since both are involved in moving from hostilities to peace.

Hanoi has repeatedly refused to take steps to reduce the scale of violence in Southeast Asia. They have refused to respect the territorial integrity and neutrality of Cambodia, despite intensive international effort to respond to Cambodia's own wishes in the matter.

Hanoi has repeatedly rejected any efforts to bring about a full compliance by all parties with the Geneva Accords of 1962 on Laos. Today their forces are increasing their operations in Laos itself and are stepping up their illegal infiltration through Laos into South Viet-Nam.

Hanoi has treated with contempt the demilitarized character of the DMZ between North and South Viet-Nam and has rejected all efforts to restore the demilitarization of that area.

Hanoi rejected the three-part proposal of Secretary General U Thant in March 1967 calling for a military



standstill, preliminary discussions and the convening of the Geneva Conference.

Repeated periods of bombing cessation or reduction in North Viet-Nam have elicited no corresponding action by North Vietnamese forces in South Viet-Nam. Quite the contrary, such periods have been used to build up their military forces in South Viet-Nam. Cease-fire periods have been marked by hundreds of cynical violations by North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces--and on a massive scale during the recent Tet holidays.

At no time has Hanoi indicated publicly or privately that it will refrain from taking military advantage of any cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam. Nor has it shown any interest in preliminary discussions to arrange a general cease-fire.

In recent weeks Hanoi knew that discussions of a peaceful settlement were being seriously explored; they also knew that there was a reduction of bombing attacks on North Viet-Nam, specifically in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas during these explorations. Their reply was a major offensive through South Viet-Nam to bring the war to the civilian population in most of the cities of that country. Their preparations for a major offensive in the northern provinces of South Viet-Nam continue unabated.

In assessing, therefore, whether Hanoi's alleged interest in political talks has anything to do with making peace, one must take into full account the negative meaning of their recent escalation.

All of the proposals made by the United States for peace in Southeast Asia continue to be valid; specifically, the San Antonio formula put forward by President Johnson in September remains the basis of our position.

We are not interested in propaganda gestures whose purpose is to mislead and confuse; we will be interested in a serious move toward peace when Hanoi comes to the conclusion that it is ready to move in that direction. Hanoi knows how to get in touch with us.

S:DRusk:ml 2/14/68

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INFORMATION

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Wednesday, February 14, 1968  
11:25 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Wheeler's report  
of his daily conversation with  
Gen. Westmoreland.

As you will see, a number of  
offensive operations are under way.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rlm

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Authority JSR 10-2-78

By Phg, NARA, Date 2-20-92



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

64a  
CM-3010-68  
14 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Telephone Conversation with General Westmoreland

1. I talked to General Westmoreland for some forty minutes beginning at 0800 hours this morning. In addition to his tenth report on the Khe Sanh area which you have already received, and the attachment to this memorandum setting forth combat operations throughout the country, General Westmoreland reported several interesting developments:

a. He spent yesterday (last night Washington time) visiting the I Corps Tactical Zone. He met with General Lam, Commander I Corps; General Cushman, and other senior US and ARVN commanders. He also visited the ARVN 51st Infantry Regiment and the American 7th Marine Regiment. He says that the ARVN troops have their tails up; they are proud of themselves because of the way they defeated the enemy.

b. General Lam had been marked for assassination at the outset of the attack on Danang when he was scheduled to visit a pagoda to pay his respects to his ancestors. Lam got wind of this, went to another pagoda to worship and arranged for a force to seize the assassination group.

c. Lam states that the young VC captured (mostly NVA) have been propagandized that the South Vietnamese wouldn't fight and that there would be an uprising; also that there would be peace in six months under a coalition government. As a matter of fact, there was no uprising and in certain instances some South Vietnamese civilians actually captured NVA soldiers and turned them over to the authorities.

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Authority 10-3-78

By plg, NARA, Date 2-20-92

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d. The attack on Danang, according to General Lam, was poorly planned, hastily put together, and not too well executed. Regional Force and Popular Force units acquitted themselves well.

e. The food situation in Danang is satisfactory. The local citizens have voluntarily donated 600,000 piasters to provide assistance to the homeless.

2. In Hue, the remaining enemy is bottled up in three or four strong points; they are short of food. The weather is better today and flyable, and General Westmoreland has ordered General Cushman to use Napalm on these strong points in order to reduce them. The people in Hue have been generally cooperative with US and ARVN troops; they have voluntarily provided food and water to friendly forces. The radio station is operating and electricity is available throughout the town. There was no uprising in Hue.

3. As to ARVN combat effectiveness, General Westmoreland reports that in the First ARVN Division, which is an excellent fighting outfit, the 1st Regiment has an average strength present of 420 per battalion; the 2d Regiment an average of 320 per battalion; the 3d Regiment (which was heavily engaged) has only about 200 effective per battalion. The Ranger Battalions in I Corps are in good shape as are the 2d ARVN Division and the 51st ARVN Regiment. The Vietnamese Joint General Staff is taking extraordinary actions to provide replacements for under-strength units.

4. The elements of the Americal Division, which attacked the 2d NVA Division south of Danang, is still finding additional dead enemy in the very extensive area over which they fought. Westmoreland still does not have an accurate estimate of the very heavy losses sustained in that area by the enemy. Parenthetically, he remarked that he saw 500 POWs being held in a compound at General Lam's I Corps Headquarters. Lam states that the people are indignant at the violation of Tet by the VC and the brutality they have displayed towards civilians and their homes.

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5. General Abrams has been at Headquarters MACV Forward, located in the Hue/Phu Bai area, for a couple of days. The headquarters has been operational for several days, has a strong staff, and is prepared to control all military operations north of the Ai Van Pass.

6. On his return to Saigon late yesterday, after consulting with Ambassador Bunker, he informed President Thieu, in the presence of General Vien, of the additional US reinforcements being sent. Both were very happy to learn of this fact. President Thieu has agreed to replace General Vinh Loc, Commander II CTZ, this week. Westmoreland has urged, and Thieu has agreed, that General Thang should assume command of IV CTZ at an early date.

7. Yesterday, near Quang Ngai, a refugee center was overrun and burned. Casualties and destruction are unknown at this time. Moreover, there was a contact in this area with the NVA 33rd Regiment resulting in 30 enemy KIA. General Westmoreland has instructed General Rosson, Commander II FFV, to seek out and destroy this already battered enemy unit.

8. North of Saigon, an ARVN unit searching for the enemy made a rather heavy contact in which they killed 70 enemy while losing four of their own men.

9. The Riverine Force, which, as I reported to you yesterday, had moved into the Can Tho area in the Delta, had a light contact with the enemy yesterday. However, they located and captured a cache of large quantities of ammunition to include rocket and mortar rounds.

10. The weather opened up briefly in the Mu Gia Pass area and a North Vietnamese POL convoy was seen in the open. General Momyer put 36 tactical air sorties on it. Results not yet known.

11. The Army Engineer Battalion is working to open Highway 1 through the Ai Van Pass. General Westmoreland believes he can restore the railroad part way to the north and establish a rail head from which he can shuttle supplies by truck.

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12. He is moving an Armored Cavalry Battalion from the II Corps area into the northern I CTZ in order to provide additional highway security as well as an anti-tank capability in the Con Thien/Gio Linh area where he anticipates the enemy may employ PT-76 light Soviet tanks.

13. General Westmoreland discussed with Ambassador Bunker yesterday the establishment of a Tet Assistance Relief Fund (TARF) to be funded by donations from American troops in South Vietnam, to provide relief to those unfortunate South Vietnamese who were made homeless and destitute by the recent enemy attacks. General Westmoreland considers that this fund will not only create good will between the people and the US Military Forces, but will help to establish a good image of the American soldier - that is, that he is not a cold blooded killer but is compassionate to the unfortunate. Ambassador Bunker may well query State on this matter in order to receive guidance of a policy nature.



EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

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TOP SECRET TRINEOperational/Intelligence Briefs

Enemy military activity remains at a low level in all corps areas. Elements of the NVA 325C Division continue to reconnoiter/maneuver in the Khe Sanh area. Resupply activity from Laos was noted in support of the 325C Division's 95 Regiment located Northwest of Khe Sanh. North Vietnamese units in central and eastern portions of the DMZ are also being resupplied. SIGINT indicates that the NVA 324B Division's 803d and 812th Regiments have moved closer to Quang Tri City and may be preparing for offensive actions. Hue is still not secured, but urban centers elsewhere in the I Corps Tactical Zone remain under control. There are indications of impending attacks in western Pleiku and Kontum Provinces with Dak To particularly under threat but timing is not known. In Saigon, 700 to 1,000 VC are believed to be hiding in the Phu Tho racetrack area.

I Corps Tactical Zone: Khe San received sporadic mortar and artillery fire resulting in light casualties and minor damage.

Cumulative losses in Hue from 29 January to 11 February -- US: 44 KIA, 372 WIA; ARVN: 193 KIA, 785 WIA; VC/NVA: 1,178 KIA, 95 detained.

II Corps Tactical Zone: On 11 February, two contacts were reported eight and two nautical miles North of Dak To. Losses -- US: 1 KIA, 14 WIA; VC/NVA: 12 KIA.

On 11 February, 25 nautical miles North Northwest of Qui Nhon, an ARVN unit engaged an enemy company. Losses -- US: 3 WIA; ARVN: 1 KIA, 3 WIA; VC/NVA: 91 KIA.

III Corps Tactical Zone: On 13 February, the MSTs SS TOURIST came under mortar and rocket attack while unloading at Cat Lai. The ship received six hits disabling one boiler and injuring one crew member.

On 13 February, ARVN units maintained light-to-heavy enemy contact near the Phu To racetrack in Saigon. Losses -- ARVN: 11 KIA, 18 WIA; VC/NVA: 58 KIA, 170 detained.

On 11 February, elements of a US Army infantry battalion engaged an enemy force of unknown size seven nautical miles Northwest of Saigon. Losses -- US: 5 KIA, 31 WIA; VC/NVA: 47 KIA.

Enclosure to CM-3010-68

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Authority MLJ-141-021-026/6  
By jc, NARA, Date 10-30-09

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IV Corps Tactical Zone: On 12 February, Binh Thuy Airfield received 40-43 rounds of 120-mm mortar fire. Losses -- VNAF: 1 KIA, 12 WIA; US: 4 WIA. Four buildings, six vehicles, and 14 aircraft were damaged.

ARC LIGHT Operations, 13 February: Five B-52 missions (36 sorties) bombed elements of the NVA 304 and 325 Divisions within an 8 nautical mile radius of Khe Sanh in support of Operation NIAGARA. One B-52 mission (5 sorties) struck a regimental staging area 5 nautical miles North of Saigon. The Forward Air Controller reported 70 percent of the ordnance impacted Southeast of the target box in a populated civilian area. 25 civilians were KIA, 37 WIA, 52 buildings were destroyed and 66 damaged. Elements of the US 25th Division entered the area immediately to assist in the medical evacuation.

At least two North Vietnamese IL-28s departed Phuc Yen 20 minutes before the airfield was attacked by US aircraft. IL-28s were indicated landing at Nanning rather than recovering at the North Vietnamese airfields as they have done on three recent occasions.

MIG Engagements: Four USAF F-4Ds engaged four enemy MIG-17s 17 nautical miles North Northwest of Hanoi. One MIG-17 was downed.

Four USAF F-4Ds engaged four enemy MIG-17s 19 nautical miles North Northwest of Hanoi. One MIG-17 was downed.

Truck Activity North Vietnam/Laos: Roadwatch teams in North Vietnam reported that 500 trucks moved south through the Mu Gia Pass from 1 - 10 February, almost double the daily average in January. Traffic analysis indicates that most trucks did not proceed to the upper Panhandle, but rather moved their supplies below the Mu Gia Pass for possible stockpiling. Another roadwatch team located about 50 nautical miles Northwest of Khe Sanh claimed that over half of some 50 trucks that traveled south on 4 - 6 February carried troops and were towing artillery. Aerial observations tend to support the total number reported, but no artillery pieces were noted.

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Wednesday, February 14, 1968  
10:30 a. m.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Relations between the President and the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Press critics who are trying to drive a wedge between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief by overstating and oversimplifying differences should be reminded of the way our Government is organized.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the individual Chiefs of Staff are responsible for the conduct of the war under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief. Their recommendations are made to the President who takes into account military requirements in arriving at decisions based on the national interest. Military recommendations are a basic part of an integrated policy. The President has the responsibility to see to it that every consideration is properly weighed.

A recent effort has been made to confuse relations between civilian and military authorities. These relations have been better in recent years than in any period in recent history. Premature attempts to argue the rightness or wrongness of policy decisions on the basis of military considerations alone prevents us from looking at our problems honestly and leads us into sterile debate which could better be left to the historians who will have all the facts and can see the situation in full perspective.

For example:

Allegations that there were major differences of view between the President and the Joint Chiefs concerning the number of U. S. troops to be sent to Vietnam; the strategy of fighting the war there; and the command relationships are, in essence, false and could be rebutted in detail.

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Authority NLS-CBS 20

By isa, NARS, Date 6-25-84

As to the call up of reserves, the Chiefs did recommend such a call up. However, it was possible to provide General Westmoreland with all his essential requirements even though Congress was not requested in 1965 for authority to call up reserves.

Allegations that our forces were not given all the weapons they requested is answered by General Westmoreland's statement, repeated over and over again, that he has been given all the material he needs.

The Chiefs recommended a more concentrated and massive bombing attack in Vietnam when this question was first discussed. The decision to authorize a gradual rather than a paralyzing air campaign can be easily defended but no one can now say what would have happened had the decision been otherwise.

Little purpose is served in dealing with this subject in generalities. There may be differences of opinion about the conduct of the war, but it is a disservice to the country to report inaccurately about military advice which was or was not accepted in reaching an overall decision affecting not only the conduct of the war but also our relations with other nations, the health of our economy and our efforts to achieve peace in Vietnam.

Attached is an analysis prepared in the Department of Defense which is the basis for the judgments given above. It provides facts which could be used in a detailed rebuttal of the U.S. News and World Report allegations if you decide it is wise to do so. (Tab A)

You will recall that last September you made an extensive statement about the relations between the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs. It is attached at Tab B.

W. W. Rostow

*P.S. In my judgment, under no circumstances should we use the Systems Analysis (SA) comments. They would split rather than unite the government.*  
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Authority NLS-CBS 5  
By is, NARS, Date 8-27-84

U. S. NEWS

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By \_\_\_\_\_, NARS, Date \_\_\_\_\_

1. BOMBING

Military Proposal: When President Lyndon Johnson decided to bomb North Vietnam in February, 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed a paralyzing air campaign, striking 94 major targets in 16 days. The aim: to stun the Communists militarily, economically and politically -- then keep the pressure up.

White House Decision: President Johnson rejected military's advice, settled for strategy of "gradualism." New targets were added piecemeal over next three years, long after North Vietnam had opportunity to build up air defenses. Pentagon plan to close port of Haiphong is still vetoed by White House.

JCS COMMENT

In November 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a two to three week period of strikes against 94 targets in Laos, North Vietnam, and along the infiltration routes for a controlled program of intense military pressure against NVN swiftly applied. Again in February 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended air strikes against North Vietnam. The actual air campaign strikes were begun on 2 March 1965 against selected NVN targets. The targets selected were from the 94 target list.

SA COMMENT

The charge is true. In retrospect, a faster escalation of the bombing might have been wiser. However, it also might have substantially hastened the build-up in the amount and sophistication of Soviet and CHICOM aid to NVN.

Further, the gradual escalation in the bombing did not result in increased US aircraft losses -- as implied by the statement "long after NVN had opportunity to build up air defenses." The NVN loss rate as late as July-September 1965 was over 5.0 losses per 1,000 attack sorties. It is now half that rate (about 2.5 per 1,000).

Finally, both the Chinese and Russians have reacted strongly to accidental damage to their ships in NVN ports. The reaction -- including a direct confrontation between the US and USSR -- over closing Haiphong would be dangerous to US world-wide interests. And closing Haiphong would probably be ineffective in any case since the bulk of military goods enters NVN from China via railroad. The lighterage capability of

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have been removed from this document because of

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NVN is also large enough to allow offloading ship cargoes without using Haiphong port facilities. Closing the port would complicate the NVN logistic problem, but it would not force NVN to cease support for the VC.

ISA COMMENT

The memorandum containing the complete SecDef action has been sent to Cameron Station for filing and cannot be recovered in time to be of use in this analysis. However, from an earlier summary, it appears that the JCS comment contains the key points. This same summary indicates that the SecDef reply to the JCS paper containing the recommendations stated he had noted the contents and had furnished these views to the State Department.

The JCS 94 target, intense pressures against NVN proposal of November 1964 must be put in context. The consensus in Washington was against this course of action for three reasons: (1) reports from the field in SVN were relatively optimistic so that it seemed drastic overt actions by the U. S. could not be justified; (2) punitive action against NVN was seen, at best, as complementary to successful counterinsurgency in South Vietnam, that the South Vietnamese themselves had to demonstrate that they could or could not do the job before any direct, and potentially dangerous, U. S. actions were desirable; and (3) intensified U. S. actions of the kind recommended by the JCS were viewed as probably causing Hanoi to doubt the limited U. S. aims; moreover, the focus was on the prospects of bringing about negotiations; taking all-out actions against NVN, it was generally agreed, would incline Hanoi to dig in its heels.

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U. S. NEWS

2. TROOP STRENGTH

**Military Proposal:** When the President decided to send American combat units into the war in 1965, the Joint Chiefs urged a rapid buildup to 400,000 men in the first six months -- hoping to overwhelm the enemy. Top military men said a total of 750,000 Americans in all would be needed to make real progress in Vietnam.

**White House Decision:** A slow, gradual buildup over a three year period, to reach 525,000 this summer. Reds' own continuing buildup has barely been offset. Latest presidential decision is to hold at a deliberately measured pace, advise General Westmoreland to struggle along with the men he has.

JCS COMMENT

Beginning in June 1965, a series of requests by MACV to increase forces from 70,000 to 219,000 resulted in a recommendation by the Secretary of Defense to the President for approval of an in-country strength of 210,000 (CY 65 - Phase I). Beginning in October 1965 (CY 66-Phase II), force requirements for CY 66 were developed by CINCPAC/COMUSMACV culminating in February 1966 in a stated requirement for a total of 238,000 additional personnel for a cumulative total force requirement of 459,000. On 4 April 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, based on Service capability without callup of Reserves (as directed by the Secretary of Defense), recommended a deployment schedule that would provide 437,000 personnel in CY 66/67. The Secretary of Defense approved this schedule on 11 April 1966. On 18 June 1966 (CY 66/67 - Program #4), CINCPAC stated a requirement for additional forces providing an in-country strength of 558,000 by end CY 67. On 4 November 1966, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended approval of 558,500; on 11 November 1967, the Secretary of Defense approved 469,300. In March 1967, (FY 68 - Program #5), MACV recommended an increase to a minimum essential force of 565,000, and proposed an optimum force of 678,000. On 12 July 1967, the President approved 525,000. - 66

SA COMMENT

The JCS did not recommend a rapid buildup of 400,000 men in 6 months, in 1965. In July they recommended that 175,000 U. S. troops (34 U. S. plus 10 Free World battalions) be deployed by the end of the year. The request was later refined to raise the package to 193,000. This force was approved

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and the 44 battalions were in Vietnam by early November. By the end of the year, 185,000 troops had closed, 96% of the plan.

400,000 men could not have been supported in Vietnam in December 1965, given the state of the ports, roads, and other logistic facilities. The 185,000 men deployed by December 1965 were about all that could be supported. No recommendation has been made to the President by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or General Westmoreland to deploy 750,000 men to Vietnam. Nor did any "top military man" suggest in 1965 that 750,000 men might be required.

The buildup to 525,000 was not slow. In October 1965 General Westmoreland said that he wanted 72 US and Free World Maneuver battalions and 325,000 US troops by December 1966. In fact, he received 102 such battalions and 385,000 troops by December 1966. This was more men and battalions than the JCS thought possible, with a reserve call-up, when they made their recommendations in February 1966.

COMUSMACV has been given all of the combat forces he has requested. Program #5 (525,000 troops) provided him what he said he needed at the time. In early 1967, COMUSMACV proposed (and the JCS endorsed) the deployment of 2 1/3 div, 8 tac fighter squadrons and miscellaneous other forces by end FY 68--a total of 85,000 men over the 470,000 then approved. He was given 5 of the 8 fighter squadrons and all of the added ground combat forces. Through divilization and a careful review of the forces already provided, the total force level was held to 525,000. In this regard, COMUSMACV on 12 July 1967, stated:

"Despite many speculations as to the number of troops that I have asked for, the fact is that I have not asked for any specific number of troops.

"I have recommended a deployment to Vietnam of a certain number of combat units that would comprise a part of a balanced force. I am being provided the forces, as I have recommended."

The Communists have not been able to match the US/GVN/Free World buildup in SVN. At the low point of March 1965, the ratio of friendly to enemy strength was 3.4 to 1; today it is about 6.0 to 1. In fact, MACV estimates the enemy has not been able to maintain his strength in SVN since September 1966.

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ISA COMMENT

The allegation of "top military men saying a total of 750,000 Americans in all would be needed to make real progress" is not mentioned in JCS comments and is probably not a matter of official record. Except for one instance, there was no complete turndown of a recommendation at OSD level. In his reply to the 4 November 1966 recommendation, the Secretary of Defense disapproved substantial forces that had been recommended for deployment.

Discounting the issue of the Guard and Reserve callups, there has been no serious dispute between the JCS and the White House on U.S. troop buildups. In 1965, there was no JCS proposal for buildup to 400,000 men in 6 months. It is not clear as proposed by JCS how much more rapidly U.S. troops could have been deployed to Vietnam with a Reserve and Guard callup. It is clear, however, that U.S. troops were deployed to SVN in time and in number in proximate accordance with JCS recommendations. There is no evidence of anyone's claiming that a faster buildup would have "overwhelmed" the enemy.

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U. S. NEWS

3. MOBILIZATION

Military Proposal: Joint Chiefs advised Mr. Johnson to call up National Guard and Reserves in 1965, 1966 and 1967 to provide psychological support for a "winning strategy" in Vietnam, relieve pressures on the active services, and help meet other global commitments.

White House Decision: Services were ordered to expand through increased draft calls and intensified recruiting. President Johnson in January, 1968, agreed to limited call-up of some air reservists, but tied it directly to USS PUEBLO crisis.

JCS COMMENT

The Joint Chiefs of Staff first recommended a selected Reserve callup in September 1965 in a memo (JCSM-721-65, 24 Sep 65) to the Secretary of Defense. Subsequently in November 1965, they reaffirmed the need for selected reserves. (JCSM-814-65, 10 Nov. 65).

In October, 1966, in connection with increased deployments to SVN, although noting that the U. S. reserve would be deficient without a selected reserve mobilization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not specifically recommend callup. (JCSM-646-66, 7 Oct. 66).

In May, 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended mobilizing certain Army, Navy, and Marine units for deploying, and sustaining the Program 5 forces and to reconstitute the Strategic Reserve. (JCSM-288-67, 20 May 67).

SA COMMENT

In retrospect it appears to have been a wise decision not to call the Reserves. Had they been recalled in 1965, they would have completed their tours of duty in mid-1967 and been released. While the active forces would have been expanded to replace the reserve units, our overall posture would have been weaker than it is today.

Based on our experience in 1961-62, when reserve units return to reserve status they suffer heavy losses of personnel severely degrading readiness. Since they were not called (steps were taken, however, to improve their readiness) they are available today should they be needed, thus providing a large and capable back-up to our regular forces.

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ISA COMMENT

To the best we can determine, none of the JCSM's referred to in the JCS Comment came to ISA for action. Therefore, specific SecDef action is unknown, but could probably be determined by detailed research. One point worthy of mentioning is that the specific JCS recommendation in May 67 was to accomplish, inter alia, "An immediate decision regarding selective callup of reserves and extension of terms of service for 12 months." Although this implies a callup recommendation, it is not a strong one.

Up until the summer and fall of 1967, in connection with Program V, there is no evidence that the JCS believed the National Guard and Reserve callup to be necessary psychological support for a "winning strategy" in Vietnam. The JCS position on call-ups was argued on the basis of force requirements for global commitments being drawn down as a result of the build-up in Vietnam. When the psychological support argument was used with respect to Program V, the thrust was the U. S. needed to show greater determination. The policy consensus in Washington was that the expenditure of \$25 billion per year and 525,000 troops in-country were sufficient demonstration of the U. S. resolve.

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U. S. NEWS

4. WEAPONS

Military Proposal: Military services repeatedly asked for more and newer planes, helicopters, guns, other materiel - especially in early stages of war. Servicemen complained they were flying World War II bombers and carrying Korean War radios and that other obsolescent equipment was being used up to save money.

White House Decision: Civilian analysts at Pentagon each year cut back budget requests of services, with support of Defense Secretary McNamara and Budget Bureau. Administration was forced to return to Congress for supplemental appropriations for Vietnam to make up for original cutbacks.

JCS COMMENT

Generally speaking, the approved logistics guidance of the Secretary of Defense is more restrictive than that recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While forces in Southeast Asia have been authorized support in accordance with their anticipated needs, budget guidance has limited forces not engaged in Southeast Asia to peacetime activity levels or other restrictive criteria.

Equipment on hand was used during the early stages of the war. This, of course, would necessitate the use of older equipment until such time as decisions could be implemented to increase production of the newer and more modern equipment.

SA COMMENT

The Services were authorized all of the funds needed to support the war in Vietnam which could be spent. There was no shortage of logistic material which impeded operations, and aircraft and guns were fully adequate. -- We dropped 33,000 tons of bombs as early as October 1965, compared to a Korean war peak of 25,000 tons and an average of 17,000 tons.

We have not had as many helicopters as we have wanted, but we still have been able to send more Army and Marine Corps helicopters to SVN (3,000) than existed in their world-wide 1961 inventories, and we now have 8500 helicopters with about 9 times the trooplift capability of the 1961 inventory. Additional helicopters in SVN would not have won the war.

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The "World War II bombers" and other "obsolescent equipment" has been sent to SVN only if it can do the job required. In fact, the A-1 and B-26 propeller aircraft have been more effective in certain key missions than jets.

Supplemental budget submissions were used to prevent the build-up of huge unnecessary inventories of materiel. At no time did we have to ask for a supplemental to cover items that were requested and denied in the basic budget and that should have been funded earlier.

#### COMPTROLLER COMMENT

In all budgets since Vietnam buildup began, the budget provided enough funds for the forces and the time period planned for in the budget.

The supplementals were not to "make up for original cutbacks;" they were for a combination of additional forces and/or an additional combat consumption time period beyond that explicitly set forth in the original budget.

Secretary McNamara clearly described this budgeting policy in his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on 10 March 1966. He stated:

"I want to make clear again the basic assumptions on which the 1966 and 1967 budgets were based; that is, that the conflict would proceed through June of 1967, and we funded only through that point. If it looks as though the conflict is going to extend beyond that date we will need more money in 1967, or, if it looks as though the rate of activity of that conflict will be higher than we estimated, we will need more money."

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U. S. NEWS

5. STRATEGY

Military Proposal: Military wanted to send troops into Laos to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail from North Vietnam into the South, still want to attack the Reds' "privileged sanctuary" in Cambodia. Commanders wanted to carry war into the Mekong Delta in 1966 to cut off the flow of rice and recruits, weaken the enemy further north.

White House Decision: Interdiction of Ho Chi Minh Trail is limited to air attacks. Cambodia is off limits except for restricted cases of "hot pursuit." Initial Mekong campaign, calling for 100,000 troops, was vetoed and General Westmoreland told to go in with less than a division, if he insisted.

JCS COMMENT

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not recommended sending troops into Laos. Neither have they recommended attacking the sanctuaries in Cambodia. They have recommended and were granted permission for U. S. forces, under emergency conditions to take the necessary counter-action in exercise of the right of self defense against VC/NVA attacks directed to US/RVNAF forces from locations inside Cambodia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not recommend the deployment of 100,000 troops into the Mekong campaign in 1966.

SA COMMENT

Extending the area of search and destroy operations would not have halted infiltration, nor seriously impeded the NVA--we have not had appreciable success interdicting their movements within SVN. Further, the key problem in SVN is building a viable GVN while destroying the Viet Cong political and military apparatus. Extending the war would not have achieved these objectives either.

With regard to Mekong Delta operations, COMUSMACV requested one division in the Fall of 1965 to be deployed in late 1966. This division (the 9th) was deployed in December 1966 and is presently operating in the Delta (1 brigade is still northeast of Saigon near Bear Cat). General Westmoreland has not requested any other sizable forces for use in the Delta and the claim that 100,000 troops were requested is erroneous. It should be noted that the Mission Council in Saigon had serious doubts about the wisdom of putting US units into the Delta. Ambassador Lodge did not give his approval to this action until October 1966, only two months before the division arrived.

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ISA COMMENT

The JCS asked for and received approval in principle for a 2-3 ARVN battalion operation against base area 607 in Laos as part of the CY 1968 campaign. The JCS themselves, however, did not press hard for this operation. They talked about the proposal having "merit" and they added, very uncharacteristically, that such an operation "will become public and attendant with political problems." Recent JCS proposals for ground reconnaissance operations and limited sabotage operations in Cambodia were rejected on the grounds that the political losses from spreading the war into Cambodia outweigh possible military benefits. Moreover, the diplomatic activities underway with Sihanouk would have been compromised by such actions.

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U. S. NEWS

6. COMMAND

Military Proposal: Military men wanted to take over the war from South Vietnamese and run it through a joint command. These officers, anxious for a forceful approach instead of "gradualism," asked Washington for permission to run the war the way they saw it.

White House Decision: Idea of joint command was vetoed in 1965, is still vetoed. Command decisions, except for secondary operations, still comes in the form of management directives from civilian superiors in Washington, 8,000 miles from the scene of battle.

JCS COMMENT

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have never recommended establishing a combined command under a U. S. Supreme Commander. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not recommended any change in the command organization of COMUSMACV that would have given COMUSMACV authority to run the war divorced from Washington decisions.

SA COMMENT

General Westmoreland himself has turned down the Joint Command Concept. In mid-1965, Secretary McNamara approved the Joint Command Concept. But COMUSMACV and the Ambassador (Gen. Taylor) said it would be totally unacceptable to the Vietnamese and should be dropped. The idea, as far as we know has never been formally recommended to the President.

Command decisions, except for a handful of targets in NVN and questions of cross-border operations, have been and are in the hands of responsible military commanders.

ISA COMMENT

In 1963, 1964 and 1965, MACV advanced several proposals for establishing a combined military command in Vietnam. These proposals were apparently motivated by a desire to associate the South Vietnamese and U. S. efforts more closely in the prosecution of the war, and not by any MACV wish to override the GVN or Washington. The JCS informed

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the Secretary of Defense of MACV's proposals, but did not back them. Compared to other conflicts, this one has been relatively free of charges, especially with respect to ground operations, of civilians disregarding military advice.

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U. S. NEWS

7. ADDITIONAL ALLEGATIONS BY "TOP MILITARY AUTHORITY IN WASHINGTON"

The White House has had no plan for winning the war in any realistic period of time. Most of the hard-rock recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dating back to 1965, still are unfulfilled. Fear of bringing Russia and China into the war has limited us but not them -- they are providing between 6 and 8 billion a year to the enemy. Another 200,000 men and three more years are required to bring the war to manageable proportions. Otherwise, get out and let the diplomats salvage what they can, and suffer results of defeat.

SA COMMENT

No US official, civilian or military, has a plan guaranteed to win the war in specific period of time. General Westmoreland has not said that any number of troops would make him confident of victory: More troops might speed up the process of victory, but he would not say how much. The US cannot win this war with US forces regardless of size -- victory requires a strong GVN, and building that requires time. If we swamp SVN with US forces, we will tear the SVN society apart and undermine the nation-building essential to a VC defeat. Note that even the US News "expert" didn't predict victory with 200,000 more troops, costing \$10 billion more per year, and taking 3 more years. Three more years of a \$35 billion per year war "to bring the war to manageable proportions" is a far cry from quick victory.

CIA/DIA estimates of Soviet/Chicom aid to NVN are about \$1 billion per year now.

8. ADDITIONAL ALLEGATIONS BY "VETERAN CORRESPONDENT IN SAIGON"

President deeply distrusts the military's judgment. General Taylor, not Westmoreland, made the recommendations from Saigon early in 1965. The 1st Infantry Division was not combat-ready when deployed in 1965, but the President refused to deploy the combat-ready 82nd and 101st Airborne. The Honolulu conference gave American pacification civilians first call on all military assets, and shortage of troops led to clashes over priority. McNamara offered B-52 sorties instead of troops. All this interference from Washington has beaten down military efforts to put together a grand strategy.

SA COMMENT

The President has repeatedly stated that General Westmoreland will be provided everything he needs. The General has repeatedly stated that he has been

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given all of the forces and materiel he needs. He has received the best forces we have had in our inventory -- including the combat-ready 1st Infantry Division. General Westmoreland was not refused the 82nd and 101st airborne divisions as he did not ask for them by name. In fact, he normally did not even specify nationality -- Korean, Australian or other Free World forces would be satisfactory.

Pacification has never been given first priority on military assets if General Westmoreland felt there was a better use for the forces -- and civilians have had no say in the use of those forces.

B-52 sorties have been increased on several occasions at the request of General Westmoreland -- and never as a substitute for requested forces.

The military in Vietnam have a campaign plan or "grand strategy" for the war. The plan is purely the work of the US and SVN military forces. To argue that our military leaders would be beaten down by civilian interference in military affairs is to be totally ignorant of our military leaders and of the civilian officials.

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13 February 1968

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NJ 92-458

By g/, NARA, Date 4/30/96

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Walt Rostow

SUBJECT: U.S. News and World Report Article, February 19

We have had a rapid survey done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Systems Analysis, and ISA on the main allegations contained in the article. The results of this survey are attached.

The allegations on troop strength, strategy and command are, in essence, false and could be combatted in detail. The issue on mobilization is more complex in that the JCS did recommend the selective call-up of Reserves but, in fact, it was possible to provide General Westmoreland all his essential requirements even though this authority was not requested of the Congress. The issue on weapons really relates to non-Southeast Asia requirements. With respect to Southeast Asia, General Westmoreland has repeatedly stated that he has been given all the material he needs. With respect to bombing, the issue is more difficult. It is true that the Chiefs recommended a more concentrated and massive attack in the first instance than was authorized. It is almost impossible to reconstruct now what would have been the likely course of events had such a more massive and concentrated attack taken place. The North <sup>Vietnamese</sup> [Koreans] could have dug in their heels and the assistance from other Communist countries could have been more rapid and more far reaching. This cannot, however, be proven nor can the consequences

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of closing the Port of Haiphong be demonstrated one way or the other.

We doubt the utility of drawing an issue as to whether military versus civilian advice has been proven correct by hindsight. It would seem wiser to focus upon misstatements in the article with respect to issues where divergence between military advice and civilian decision is asserted but was not so. Perhaps the best way of getting at this would be either in a speech in which one could concentrate on those selected points on which we choose to focus or else a letter from a friendly Congressman asking questions on those issues to which we could then reply for the record.

*Paul H. Nitze*

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# THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1967

*Including a Statement by the President on Additional  
Wheat Shipments to India.*

## QUESTIONS

### BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

Q. Mr. President, there seems to be, at least in public, some dispute going on within the administration on bombing policy in North Vietnam, with Secretary McNamara's representatives taking one position and the military another.

First, if such a dispute exists, could you sort of define it for us and, second, has Secretary McNamara—

THE PRESIDENT. Let's take one at a time, Smitty. I will give you another chance.

MERRIMAN SMITH (UPI). All right.

THE PRESIDENT. The President is the Commander in Chief under the Constitution. His principal deputy in military matters is the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs are his military advisers.

The Joint Chiefs are a group of very able men. They are the finest in character and the best trained soldiers and sailors that we have. Their judgment is requested and respected, and certainly always carefully considered.

No two men ever see everything alike. Throughout our history there have been differences among Army leaders and naval leaders, between members of the Joint Chiefs and the civilians, between the civilians and the Congress. That is really the strength of our system.

The Congress, in writing the National Security Act of 1947, in which I played some part as a member of the Armed Services Committee, provided that the individual judgments of members of the Joint Chiefs would be available to the Congress on request. As advisers to the President, of course, they are always available to him.

I have been here 36 years. During that period I have been intimately associated with the Armed Services. I have never known a period during that time when I thought there was more harmony, more general agreement, and a more cooperative attitude, or when there were more able men in control.

That is not to say that they all agree. It is very rare when the President finds that the men around the table are all in agreement. If all agree, I usually adjourn the meeting and send for somebody to give me the other viewpoint.

I did that last week on the question involving Indian wheat. I asked that the other side be given to me.

Roughly speaking—and this is subject to some adjustment—there are in the neighborhood of some 350 principal, significant targets that the President has seriously

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1967

considered from the JCS list. Approximately 300 of those have been authorized. So six out of seven have been authorized.

Of those 300 authorized, all the civilians and all the military have agreed on them. Their opinion has varied from time to time. There has been some little difference of opinion—the President may feel this way and the Secretary of State may feel another way; or they may agree and the Secretary of Defense agrees with them, and maybe the Joint Chiefs feel that this is more important than the other.

Some of them don't have the viewpoint on how it might affect our overall political situation in the world, and so forth. All of those things are considered.

But in 300 of the 350 instances there has been general agreement.

The 50 left are in very strategic areas, primarily the port of Haiphong, Hanoi, and the buffer zone. The decisions to bomb those other 50 targets have not been made.

Before the President acts on them, he will carefully consider the views of his principal military advisers, such as the Joint Chiefs, and his principal political adviser, the Secretary of State; his principal deputy in military matters, the Secretary of Defense.

I think it is fair to give you my impression that while the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State and the President, are not in complete agreement on everything, there is no deep division. The viewpoints of all are carefully considered and weighed, with decisions made on what we believe to be in the national interest. There is a very surprising and very agreeable amount of unanimity, with men of the same general opinion.

There are no quarrels, no antagonisms. I think the Joint Chiefs have acted very ably. From their viewpoint they have expressed themselves thoroughly. They are available to come to the President any time they choose without coming through the Secretary of Defense. They have been requested to do that any time they want to.

I think at least the implications of the testimony before the committee is somewhat blown out of proportion. That has always been true, though.

I remember when we were fighting for a 70 group Air Force when the then Secretary of Air, Mr. Symington, asked if he would not be permitted to give his own personal opinion before a Congressional committee of which I was a member. Very frequently you find that men of strong minds do not always agree. When they do, you have to consider their individual viewpoints and then act in the way you think is in the best interest of the Nation. That is what we have done.

But six out of every seven targets recommended have  
now, I think that we are operat-  
the national interest.

#### SECRETARY McNAMARA'S RECOMMENDATIONS

Q. Has Secretary McNamara recommended to you that the rate of bombing in the north be reduced?

THE PRESIDENT. The recommendations that we get from time to time are to authorize specific targets. When those meetings conclude, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the President have as of now been in agreement with each other.

#### STATEMENTS OF STENNIS COMMITTEE ON CONDUCT OF THE WAR

Q. Mr. President, I wonder if you would address yourself perhaps to a couple of specific statements by the Stennis Committee. One, their assertion that the present policy has not done the job and it has been contrary to the best military judgment; and second, their assertion that it is necessary to bomb Haiphong now?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I don't want to get in an argument with the Senate committee. They have their responsibility to get as much information as they can get and to express their views. You will find that in every struggle that this country has gone through, various committees of the Congress do that.

That is their privilege. I don't care to argue with them. I believe our policy is a sound one. It is based on the best judgment that we have.

Every decision is going to be made after we get all the facts and then we are going to do what we think is in the national interest. I am sure the committee wants to do the same thing.

## The Real Reason War Has Dragged On?

### BIG DIFFERENCES BETWEEN U.S. MILITARY BOMBING

**MILITARY PROPOSAL:** When President Lyndon Johnson decided to bomb North Vietnam in February, 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed a paralyzing air campaign, striking 94 major targets in 16 days. The aim: to stun the Communists militarily, economically and politically—then keep the pressure up.

**WHITE HOUSE DECISION:** President Johnson rejected military's advice, settled for strategy of "gradualism." New targets were added piecemeal over next three years, long after North Vietnam had opportunity to build up air defenses. Pentagon plan to close port of Haiphong is still vetoed by White House.

### TROOP STRENGTH

**MILITARY PROPOSAL:** When the President decided to send American combat units into the war in 1965, the Joint Chiefs urged a rapid build-up to 400,000 men in the first six months—hoping to overwhelm the enemy. Top military men said a total of 750,000 Americans in all would be needed to make real progress in Vietnam.

**WHITE HOUSE DECISION:** A slow, gradual build-up over a three-year period, to reach 525,000 this summer. Reds' own continuing build-up has barely been offset. Latest presidential decision is to hold at a deliberately measured pace, advise General Westmoreland to struggle along with the men he has.

### MOBILIZATION

**MILITARY PROPOSAL:** Joint Chiefs advised Mr. Johnson to call up National Guard and Reserves in 1965, 1966 and 1967 to provide psychological support for a "winning strategy" in Vietnam, relieve pressures on the active services, and help meet other global commitments.

**WHITE HOUSE DECISION:** Services were ordered to expand through increased draft calls and intensified recruiting. President Johnson in January, 1968, agreed to limited call-up of some air reservists, but tied it directly to U.S.S. *Pueblo* crisis.

[continued from preceding page]

ging out the war is more likely to bring the U. S. to the edge of a nuclear conflict than any other course.

*This authority goes on to say:*

The Administration never has given the American public a detailed summary of what the enemy is getting from Soviet Russia and Communist China by way of aid. This aid is immense—between 6 and 8 billion dollars a year—and is a major factor in keeping the war going. What the public knows, it has learned through press reports. The military feels that it is wrong for their civilian superiors to keep relatively silent on this issue, out of a desire by the State Department not to irritate Russia.

**What's needed to win.** Can anything be done now, at this critical point, to achieve real progress in Vietnam?

It is too late for a quick, decisive victory unless nuclear weapons are used, and the Joint Chiefs have never recommended that. Nor have they ever recommended an invasion of the heartland of North Vietnam.

What is required is another 200,000 American combat troops, immediately, which means mobilizing the National Guard and certain other reserve forces, both Army and Marines.

The air war would have to be intensi-

fied, and include the closing of Haiphong to cut off further supplies, even food supplies, to drive the war home to the civilian population in North Vietnam.

The Joint Chiefs have not recommended bombing of the Red River dams and dikes, but that may become necessary as North Vietnamese power becomes more evident in the South.

With 200,000 more men—that is, a new manpower total of about three quarters of a million—General Westmoreland would be able to give the attention needed to pacification of the countryside with "clear and hold" operations. The Mekong Delta could be entered in force and pacified. Until that is done, talk of real progress in Vietnam is empty. Pacification alone can confirm victory.

Also required would be three more years of patience on the part of the American people. It would take that long to bring the war to manageable proportions.

The alternative to more manpower and a greater effort now, it seems to many military men, is to get out of the war and let the diplomats salvage what they can. But a unilateral withdrawal, it must be made clear, would represent a major defeat for the United States and create immense domestic and international consequences.

Events are moving fast in Vietnam, and the need for realistic decision-making was never more urgent.

*A veteran correspondent in Saigon, who has covered the war from the start, sends the following report:*

From the very beginning of his Presidency, Mr. Johnson has ignored advice and some urgent military requests from the field. It seems to officers in Vietnam that the President still deeply distrusts the military's judgment.

The fact is that the U. S. military advisers in Saigon first urged combat troops for South Vietnam in 1964. LBJ vetoed that because of presidential elections that year. He also vetoed bombing of North Vietnam—in retaliation for Viet Cong terrorist attacks—in November, 1964, and again in December.

By February, 1965, the military was warning in the strongest possible terms that the White House must do something to prevent South Vietnam from being cut in two along Route 19—from the port of Qui Nhon west to the Cambodian border in the central highlands.

**A fateful delay.** The decision to bomb the North in February, 1965, was made after the President's chief White House adviser, McGeorge Bundy, then visiting Vietnam, conferred with General Westmoreland. Mr. Bundy telephoned LBJ urging strong retaliatory action for the Viet Cong attack on a U.S. Army advisers' billet at Qui Nhon, and a mortar attack on Pleiku.

*(continued on page 38)*

# MEN AND THEIR CIVILIAN SUPERIORS

## WEAPONS

**MILITARY PROPOSAL:** Military services repeatedly asked for more and newer planes, helicopters, guns, other matériel—especially in early stages of war. Servicemen complained they were flying World War II bombers and carrying Korean War radios and that other obsolescent equipment was being used up to save money.

**WHITE HOUSE DECISION:** Civilian analysts at Pentagon each year cut back budget requests of services, with support of Defense Secretary McNamara and Budget Bureau. Administration was forced to return to Congress for supplemental appropriations for Vietnam to make up for original cutbacks.

## STRATEGY

**MILITARY PROPOSAL:** Military wanted to send troops into Laos to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail from North Vietnam into the South, still want to attack the Reds' "privileged sanctuary" in Cambodia. Commanders wanted to carry war into the Mekong Delta in 1966 to cut off the flow of rice and recruits, weaken the enemy further north.

**WHITE HOUSE DECISION:** Interdiction of Ho Chi Minh Trail is limited to air attacks. Cambodia is off limits except for restricted cases of "hot pursuit." Initial Mekong campaign, calling for 100,000 troops, was vetoed and General Westmoreland told to go in with less than a division, if he insisted.

## COMMAND

**MILITARY PROPOSAL:** Military men wanted to take over the war from South Vietnamese and run it through a joint command. These officers, anxious for a forceful approach instead of "gradualism," asked Washington for permission to run the war the way they saw it.

**WHITE HOUSE DECISION:** Idea of joint command was vetoed in 1965, is still vetoed. Command decisions, except for secondary operations, still come in the form of management directives from civilian superiors in Washington, 8,000 miles from the scene of battle.

## BRUSHING OFF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF—

### "A Sad Business Indeed"

Senator Stuart Symington (Dem.), of Missouri, former Secretary of the Air Force, made these remarks during recent hearings of the Senate's Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, of which he is a member:

It is a sad business indeed when such a wide difference of opinion has developed between the civilian leadership and the military as to how to conduct a war. I only hope, if we do ever get into another war, which God forbid, there will be more true teamwork on how to handle the hostilities. No one believes more in civilian control than I do, but, when it comes to tactical execution of military decisions, I would hope that in the future more respect is given to the opinions of the military people.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are supposed to be the best of all the tens of thousands of young men in our country who went to the military academies. If they are going to be constantly brushed off as saber-rattling warmongers, men not capable of having constructive opinions on the subject they have spent their lives to learn, the future of this country in the world as it is today is dismal indeed.

## MILITARY MEN WHO TRIED TO ADVISE ON VIETNAM—

### A Total of 180 Years of Experience

Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 1965 and 1967, when many critical decisions on the Vietnam war were made:

- Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, 60, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. West Point graduate, 1932. Subsequent service: 35 years.
- Gen. Harold K. Johnson, 55, Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. West Point graduate, 1933. Subsequent service: 34 years.
- Adm. David L. McDonald, 61, Chief of Naval Operations until retirement in July, 1967; Annapolis graduate, 1928. Subsequent service: 39 years.
- Gen. John P. McConnell, 59, Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force. West Point graduate, 1932. Subsequent service: 35 years.
- Gen. Wallace M. Greene, Jr., 60, Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps until retirement in December, 1967. Annapolis graduate, 1930. Subsequent service: 37 years.

In all, these military leaders have had 180 years of military experience, including a total of 50 years of war—in World War II, Korea and Vietnam. Yet their recommendations were often overruled by civilians in the critical years of the Vietnam build-up.



66  
**INFORMATION**

~~Secret~~

Wednesday, February 14, 1968  
10:05 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Khe Sanh daily.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ecj, NARA, Date 2-18-92

SECRET

Wednesday, February 14, 1968, 9:30 AM

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is the tenth report on the Khe Sanh - DMZ area and covers the 24-hour period of February 13, 1968.

During the reporting period Khe Sanh Combat Base and surrounding areas received over 200 rounds of mixed mortars, artillery and rocket fire. Neighboring elements at Camp Carroll received 10 rounds of mortar fire while Marines in the vicinity of A-3 (5 kilometers northeast of Con Thien) received three consecutive afternoon barrages of 30 rounds of enemy mortar and 70 rounds of artillery. Seven mortar rounds impacted within the perimeter at Con Thien. Concluding the day's bombardment, shortly after noon, elements at Gio Linh received nine rounds of artillery.

Although damage attributed to the shelling was minimal, one Marine was killed and 12 Marines wounded, 6 of whom required medical evacuation.

In Operation Scotland in the Khe Sanh area, a 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion Patrol encountered a small enemy force at mid-afternoon, killed two North Vietnamese Army and captured an 82MM recoilless gun.

Elsewhere in northern I Corps, at 7:45 AM a Marine unit ambushed a 20 man North Vietnamese Army Patrol around Gia Linh and counted 7 North Vietnamese Army bodies and 1 detainee resulting from the engagement. One Marine was killed, and one Marine was wounded.

Other elements along the DMZ reported no significant contact for the period. Total casualties for the period in the Khe Sanh area were: friendly, killed 1, wounded 10; enemy, killed 2. Elsewhere along the DMZ one Marine was killed and three Marines were wounded; nine North Vietnamese Army were killed.

Marine aircraft flew 65 sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area, the Air Force flew 192 tactical air sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area, the Navy flew 51, for a total of 308 sorties. Bomb Damage Assessment included 4 secondary explosions (one extremely large), 6 artillery positions were destroyed, 5 artillery positions damaged, there were 2 secondary fires, and 250 meters of trench were destroyed. ARC LIGHT ran 4 strikes (30 sorties) in the Niagara area in support of Khe Sanh.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-2-78

By ip/rj, NARA, Date 2-20-92



Khe Sanh was resupplied with 83 short tons on February 13. Ammunition amounted to 50 short tons. There were 16 short tons of vehicles and 4 short tons of general supplies delivered. In addition, 175 replacements were air lifted into the Khe Sanh Airfield.

Air operations on February 14 began at 9:00 AM with air drops from C-130 aircraft. So far today, some 76 short tons have been air dropped. C-123 aircraft are enroute for air delivery to the airfield. Present weather looks favorable for air resupply operations.

For the next 24 hours Marine Tactical Air plans 44 sorties in support of Khe Sanh, the Air Force will have 150 sorties, and the Navy 100 sorties, for a total of 294 sorties planned. There will be 16 additional Marine aircraft and 120 Air Force sorties on call for Khe Sanh. There will be six B-52 strikes (27 sorties) run in the Niagara area.

During the period the weather at Khe Sanh was characterized by low clouds and heavy night time and morning fog. Until 5:00 PM on February 13 the ceiling was 500 feet and visibility 3 - 7 miles in fog. After 5:00 PM the ceiling was 100 feet and the visibility 1/4 mile in fog. Low ceilings and visibilities continued throughout the remainder of the night and early morning with an improving trend beginning after 2:00 AM on the 14th. By 9:00 AM the ceiling had improved to 2,000 foot overcast with the visibility to 7 miles. By noon the ceiling was 2,000 foot broken.

The forecast is for partly cloudy skies and visibility 6 miles by early afternoon on the 14th. The sky will continue to be partly cloudy throughout the afternoon and evening and continuing through noon on the 15th. The visibility will continue to be 6 miles throughout the period except lowering to 5 miles in smoke and haze near sunrise on the 15th.

~~SECRET~~



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

666

14 February 1968  
7:00 AM EST

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 13200 EST  
(140900 SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump or Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)  
status as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>Days Supply</u> <u>on hand</u> <u>132000 EST</u> <u>(140900 SVN)</u>	<u>Previous Status</u> <u>122300 EST</u> <u>(131200 SVN)</u>
Class I (Rations)		
Meal, Individual, combat	8 days	9 days
B Rations	9 days	9 days
Class III (Fuel)		
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	10 days	12 days
JP-4 (Jet Fuel)	5 days	4 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	4 days	4 days
Diescl	4 days	5 days
Class V (Ammunition)		
a. High explosive		
60 mm mortar	16 days	15 days
81 mm mortar	15 days	21 days
90 mm (tank)	86 days	90 days
4.2" mortar	33 days	35 days
105 mm howitzer	9 days	10 days
155 mm howitzer	20 days	21 days
b. Anti-tank	<u>Rounds on hand</u>	
90 mm HEAT	978	478
66 mm rocket (LAW)	190	190
Anti-tank mines (M-19)	100	100
106 mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T)	316	316

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988

By af, NARA, Date 2-20-92


SECRET

<u>Days Supply</u>	<u>Previous Status</u>
on hand	122300 EST
132000 EST	(131200 SVN)
(140900 SVN)	

Class V (COFRAM)

105 mm howitzer	5 days	5 days
155 mm howitzer	5 days	5 days
40 mm grenade launcher	5 days	5 days
Hand grenades	10 days	10 days

2. On 13 February Khe Sanh was resupplied with 83 tons as follows, Class I, rations, 13 tons, and Class V, ammunition, 50 tons. Also, 16 tons of vehicles and 4 tons of general supplies were delivered. It was reported that present weather conditions at Khe Sanh look favorable for continued air resupply operations.

  
JAMES A. SHANNON  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:

SECDEF  
DEPSECDEF  
CJCS  
DJS  
VDJS  
J-4  
J-30  
J-31  
J-32  
J-33  
CT FORCE  
MCCC  
AWR  
DDO  
ADDO  
CCOC  
PAC DIV  
PAC DESK

SECRET

67

INFORMATION

~~SECRET--BUTTERCUP~~

Wednesday, February 14, 1968  
9:30 a.m.

*Pres. file*

Mr. President:

Herewith some concern by Vien  
(Minister of Interior) of the political  
effect of releasing Viet Cong political  
cadre, if it becomes known.

Thieu and Ky, however, have agreed  
if, in fact, the three Americans come out  
of Hanoi.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 634

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 07-151 (#38)

By *iol*, NARA, Date *2-25-08*

WWRostow:rlh

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WHITE HOUSE

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~~SECRET SAVIN~~

3/0/ R36-68 FLASH RPT

NSA-25x3

FOLLOW-UP NO 35 TO 2/0/ R32-68

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FOLLOW-UP NO. 35 TO

FOIA-3/PL 86-36

COORDINATED VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE EVIDENCED  
IN SOUTH VIETNAM (252332Z)

EARLY IN THE EVENING OF 13 FEBRUARY A DISCUSSION BETWEEN TWO UNIDENTIFIED PAVN ENTITIES IN THE GENERAL KHE SANH VICINITY INDICATED THAT ATTACKS WERE PLANNED FOR THE NIGHTS OF 13 AND 14 FEBRUARY AGAINST KHE SANH. AT 1255Z ON 13 FEBRUARY, AN UNIDENTIFIED ENTITY WAS QUESTIONED AS TO WHEN THE "CONCERT" WOULD BEGIN AT "STAGE ONE." IN REPLY THE OTHER ENTITY REPLIED "ON THE NIGHTS OF 13 AND 14" AND FURTHER STATED "YOU ARE TO GET READY AT THE AIRFIELD." MINUTES LATER THE STATEMENT, "TONIGHT THERE WILL PROBABLY BE A CONCERT AT A1," WAS NOTED. A1 IS THE COMMUNIST COVER DESIGNATOR OR THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE.

THESE MESSAGES WERE ALL NOTED IN TACTICAL VOICE COMMUNICATIONS. POSSIBLY RELATED TO THIS ACTIVITY WAS THE OBSERVANCE OF THREE MESSAGES OF A TYPE WHICH HAVE BEEN NOTED BEING ORIGINATED IN THE DMZ AREA ONLY BY ELEMENTS OF THE PAVN 304TH DIVISION BEING PASSED EARLIER ON 13 FEBRUARY OVER VOICE FACILITIES. THESE SAME TYPE MESSAGES WERE NOTED PRIOR TO THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE LANG EI SPECIAL FORCES CAMP ON 6 AND 7 FEBRUARY.((1))

NO OTHER TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS HAVE REFLECTED PAVN PLANS OR AN ATTACK IN THE KHE SANH AREA ON THE DATES NOTED ABOVE.

((1)) 3/0/ R34-68

NSA-25x3

00

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 141.021.026/7  
By jc, NARA; Date 10-30-09

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

NNN

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

Wednesday, February 14, 1968  
9:10 a. m.

*68*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Nick reports relatively hopeful consultations on Conte-Long and suggests we await Covey Oliver's return from Latin America Feb. 28 before mounting a White House meeting.

He suggests a list for such a meeting.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment (log 617)

617  
68a  
/

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

February 13, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Report on Our Hill Consultations on  
the Conte-Long and Symington Amendments

At Tab A is a detailed report on the consultations that Bill Gaud, Bill Macomber (and members of his staff) and I have had on the Conte-Long and Symington Amendments. (On Thursday I sent you a report on our consultations on the Jordanian arms issue; this is a report on our consultations on the broader question of the general effects of Conte-Long and Symington.)

My general impression is a relatively hopeful one. While I think we will continue to get a certain amount of general static from the Hill on arms sales to LDCs, I also believe that there is a better understanding of the kinds of tough problems these Amendments give us. We are now far less likely to get serious adverse reaction from the Hill if we decide to move on a number of the really difficult cases. To assure continued calm, I recommend that we consult key Congressmen and Senators, as we did on Jordan, prior to decisions on key cases where we anticipate possible trouble.

The next step in educating the Hill on the Amendments should be--as you suggested to me the other day--a White House meeting with you and a number of the key senators and congressmen. I have attached (Tab B) a suggested list. As to timing, I think that it would be best for you to schedule this meeting

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-2-

after the current recess and after Covey Oliver's return from his talks in Lima, Santiago and Rio. He is scheduled to be back on February 28.

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Attachments:

- Tab A - Detailed Report on  
Consultations
- Tab B - Suggested List of Key  
Senators & Congressmen

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686  
A

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Conte-Long and Symington Amendments - Congressional  
Consultations (February 7, 8 and 9)

HOUSE

The Speaker -- He recommended that we put our major consultation effort on the proponents of the amendments in the hope of getting them to go along with the most liberal possible interpretation. He thinks Mr. Conte in particular will be reasonable.

Majority Leader, Carl Albert -- He expressed the opinion that the clear defeat of the Widnall Amendment to delete the Presidential determination from the arms sales prohibition in the Export-Import Bank Bill might indicate some sentiment in the House which would permit modification of the Conte-Long amendments. He does not feel that Conte and Long had very wide support for their basic idea, so that legislative action was more a matter of mood than conviction.

Minority Leader, Gerald Ford -- In briefing Mr. Ford the point was made that we were not requesting legislative action at this time but were seeking helpful advice on the proper way of interpreting each problem as it came up. He said he would be talking to Conte and others and might be in touch with us further.

Congressman Silvio Conte -- Conte said that when he proposed his amendments he was interested primarily in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, although he realized that it would apply elsewhere and might give us difficulties. He agrees that it is reasonable to interpret the amendment as applying only to transactions entered into after its effective date, and to base reductions of economic aid on the amounts spent each year for sophisticated weapons rather than on amounts committed each year for that purpose. He is also prepared to consider the question of whether it might not be possible to modify or rewrite the amendment somewhat in next year's appropriation act.

Insofar as individual countries are concerned, he said he will say nothing if a waiver is granted for Jordan; he believes a waiver would be appropriate for Ethiopia because of our communications facilities in that country; he is less sure on Morocco, but Mr. Katzenbach received the impression that Conte would not say anything if we went ahead with arms sales to Morocco; he might

go along

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- 2 -

go along with C-130's for the Congo; and he would apply the amendments strictly to small sub-Sahara African countries. He feels the amendment should apply to India and Pakistan if they buy sophisticated military equipment during the balance of this fiscal year.

With respect to South America, he is delighted that we have held back our program loan to Peru and feels the amendment should be applied to other Latin American countries if they buy either F-5's or Mirages. If it must be one or the other, he agrees that we should sell F-5's rather than let them buy Mirages -- although in either case we should deduct the amount spent on their purchase from our economic aid.

Congressman Clarence Long (Md.) -- Long's overall reaction was relatively reasonable. He recognized that the Administration had a difficult time in interpreting and reconciling the Conte/Long and Symington Amendments. He said that he thought his amendment would make it easier for the US to "stop the next level of arms purchases, or the one that would follow that". He admitted that he has little hope that the amendments will hold off any of the present round of arms purchases. He also said he believed his amendment -- since it is nondiscriminatory -- made it easier for the Administration to reduce aid to arms purchasing countries ("We are not discriminating against you, since the Amendment applies to all countries in similar circumstances").

Long asked a number of questions on Indian-Pakistani arms purchases, but made no commitment to look on arms sales to them with favor. He was adamantly against arms sales to Latin America (he said that his Amendment had been principally aimed at the Latins and sub-Sahara Africa). Long did recognize, however, that we have real problems in the Middle East. He said that during the drafting of the Amendment he and his colleagues had recognized that Middle East arms sales might be necessary, but that it was politically impossible for them to exclude any Arab country from the effects of the Amendment. He said he "would be willing to consider exceptions" for the Middle East.

Congressman Henry Reuss -- After the Under Secretary explained in some detail the technical difficulties that we faced in applying the Conte-Long and Symington Amendments, Congressman Reuss indicated

that he

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- 3 -

that he would support the Executive Branch against unfair attacks over the way it applied the Amendments as long as he was convinced that Executive Branch officials were honestly and consistently pursuing the spirit and objectives of these Amendments. By way of illustration of his "flexibility", Reuss indicated that he had no difficulty over our decision to proceed now to supply arms to Jordan. Reuss' "flexibility" ceased, however, when the subject turned to F-5s for Brazil. He was adamantly opposed to our countenancing such a transaction and deeply disturbed that we should be agonizing over the decision.

On the afternoon of February 7, Bill Gaud met informally with the House Foreign Affairs Committee to give them an advance briefing on the economic aid program for the coming year. In the course of this meeting he discussed the Conte-Long amendments and the Symington amendment at some length, outlining the way in which the Administration is proceeding under them and describing some of the problems which have arisen. A number of the members present stated that they had been opposed to the Conte-Long amendments in the first instance and still were opposed to them. There was no indication that any of the members present disagreed with the way in which the Administration is proceeding. Present at the meeting were:

Democrats

Chairman Morgan  
Zablocki  
Hays  
Murphy (Ill.)  
Culver  
Hamilton

Republicans

Bolton  
Adair  
Frelinghuysen  
Berry  
Morse  
Thompson  
Buchanan  
Taft

Congressman Jonathan Bingham -- Department representatives spent about an hour with Mr. Bingham reviewing the policies and procedures the Department is following in implementing the Conte-Long and Symington Amendments. He is very much concerned with this

issue

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- 4 -

issue and sympathetic with the problems we face in both the substantive area and the specific problems related to these amendments. He approved of the Department's approach.

Congressman Dante Fascell -- Mr. Fascell stated he supports the sale of US military equipment (to nations wishing to tie their military equipment procurement program to the United States) and wished us "good luck" in implementing the provisions under reference. He did not care for a briefing at this time.

Congressman Jeffery Cohelan -- Expressed mixed feelings, appeared less hostile to arms sales to developing countries than he was when the issue was before the House in the last session. Has just returned from India and believes it will be necessary for us to supply India with military equipment in the future.

Congressman Otto Passman -- Mr. Gaud talked to Chairman Passman Friday about these amendments. He is satisfied with the way we are handling them. He says he did not realize that the waiver provision was as tight as it is, and does not believe it should be that tight. He volunteered the information that he would do his best to get these amendments out of his bill altogether next year, and said he would strongly recommend this to Chairman Mahon.

He added that it would be much easier for him to get rid of them - and maybe he could only get rid of them - if the President told the Congress (or Mahon) that the amendments impaired the ability of the Administration to protect the national interest.

SENATE

Senators Mansfield and Dirksen -- In separate meetings both Senators Mansfield and Dirksen were advised that while the Conte-Long and Symington Amendments created considerable substantive and technical difficulties for us, we took them seriously and were doing our best to apply them conscientiously. Certain of the difficulties these amendments created were explained, including, as a case immediately in point, the matter of a waiver for Jordan at this time. Both Senators focussed on the Jordan problem rather than on the more general problems inherent in the amendments. Their acquiescence in our proceeding with a Jordan waiver at this time would indicate a pragmatic approach, but neither was specific regarding his current or future attitude toward the amendments themselves.

Mansfield has said publicly, however, that the President's proposal for continuing credit arm sales to under-developed countries "is in trouble." This reaction may have been due to uncertainty on the military sales bill and particularly whether we were attempting to by-pass the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees. Mr. Katzenbach will assure the committee chairmen that this is not our intention.

Senator Fulbright -- Senator Fulbright displayed no sympathy with respect to the problems created for the Administration by the Symington and Conte-Long Amendments. He indicated that he understood the Executive was going to try to weaken these Amendments in the next session of Congress and he expressed considerable unhappiness over this. He thought we should be spending our energies in applying these amendments, rather than getting them altered or removed.

Senator Hickenlooper -- In the course of stating his support for our proposal to proceed with the supply of arms to Jordan, he was highly critical of his colleagues in the Congress who support amendments which he considers to be unrealistic and incompatible with the world situation.

Senator Stuart Symington -- Symington told the Under Secretary that it was "up to the President to decide if a Presidential determination should be made, and that he "would not be terribly concerned" about any of the President's decisions. He also said he would be willing to see what he could do to lessen the impact of Conte-Long if it gives us real problems.

The

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- 6 -

The Senator recognized that his Amendment was most useful as leverage in persuading countries to limit arms expenditures, and that it was of less use after decisions had been taken on the arms purchase and expenditure; therefore, he left it up to the President.

Symington was greatly impressed with Dayan's statement that US arms for Jordan were preferable to Soviet arms. He said that this should go far toward meeting criticism on arms sales to Jordan. He also said that if it were a choice between French Mirages for Brazil or F-5s, he would far prefer F-5s.

The Senator said that he would never have introduced his Amendment in the first place if he had not been misled about F-4 sales to Iran.

In discussing a proposed IDB loan to Peru, Symington said he saw no problems with it if it is a "hard" loan, but would object if it is a "soft" loan -- but not primarily because of the Amendment -- he is simply opposed to "soft loans" in general.

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SUGGESTED LIST OF KEY SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN

The following Congressmen and Senators are those who have the strongest interest in the issues raised by the Conte-Long and Symington Amendments:

Senate

Mansfield  
Sparkman  
Symington  
Church  
Ellender  
Jackson  
Muskie

Dirksen  
Hickenlooper  
Mundt  
Smith  
Tower

House

Albert  
Morgan  
Mahon  
Passman  
Long  
Rivers  
Reuss

Arends  
Adair  
Conte  
Bates  
Widnall

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Wednesday, February 14, 1968  
9:05 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Cy makes progress and (p. 2) let's  
fly with his haymaker, when they suggest  
withdrawing troops from Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Seoul 4207 and 4208, Vanto 8 and 9)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-212  
By lip, NARA Date 2-14-97



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-211  
By ins, NARA Date 12-28-97

NOVIS/CACTUS

VANTO 12

REF: SEOUL 4207 AND 4208, VANTO 8 AND 9

SUBJECT: VANCE MEETING WITH KOREAN CABINET: 1200,  
FEBRUARY 14, 1968

CYRUS VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR PORTER, GENERAL BONESTEEL, JOHN WALSH, AND COLONEL GREENLEAF MET THIS MORNING FOR 1-1/2 HOURS WITH PRIME MINISTER CHUNG, FOREIGN MINISTER CHOI, DEFENSE MINISTER KIM, INFORMATION MINISTER HONG, PRINCIPAL PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY YI HU-RAK, DIRECTOR ROK CIA KIM, GENERAL IM, C.I.C.S. AND SEVERAL OF THEIR STAFF ASSISTANTS. THE MEETING, WHICH WAS AGAIN FRANK AND CANDID, SEEMED TO RESULT IN FACIT AGREEMENT BY THE KOREANS THAT THE "JOINT DEFENSE STATEMENT" AND "AGREED MINUTES" WHICH THEY TABLED YESTERDAY WERE NOT NEGOTIABLE (SEE SEOUL 4208). ALTHOUGH THEIR REACTION WAS SUBDUED WHEN VANCE TABLED OUR DRAFT COMMUNIQUE (STATE-114006), THEY DID NOT TAKE ISSUE WITH ITS SUBSTANCE IN PART BECAUSE THE PRIME MINISTER CLEARLY INTENDS TO SUBMIT IT TO PRESIDENT PARK.

THE MOST SIGNIFICANT EXCHANGES TOOK PLACE IN A SHORT PRIVATE SESSION BETWEEN VANCE, PORTER, PRIME MINISTER AND PRINCIPAL PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY YI HU-RAK. AT THIS SESSION, PRIME MINISTER RECOMMENDED THAT VANCE MEET ALONE WITH PRESIDENT PARK AND EXPLAIN TO HIM THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS GRAVE DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, SIMILAR TO PARK'S, AND TWO PRESIDENT'S SHOULD STAND TOGETHER AT THIS TIME. YI HU-RAK AND CHUNG URGED VANCE TO MAKE CLEAR TO PARK THAT HE MUST NOT TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION AGAINST NORTH KOREA. SUCH ACTION WOULD ONLY DESTROY THE ECONOMY AND HOPES OF KOREA. FURTHERMORE, VANCE SHOULD EMPHASIZE TO PARK THAT UNILATERAL ACTION WOULD SERIOUSLY ENDANGER CONTINUING US SUPPORT.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SEOUL 4215, FEBRUARY 14. N O D I S/CACTUS

WHEN CHUNG STATED THAT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PRESSURE MIGHT FORCE HIS GOVERNMENT TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS FROM VIETNAM, VANCE TOLD HIM FLATLY WE WOULD RECIPROCATATE BY WITHDRAWING OUR TROOPS FROM KOREA. HE GASPED, SPUTTERED AND IMMEDIATELY WENT OUT AND BROUGHT YI HU-RAK INTO THE MEETING. VANCE ALSO MADE IT QUITE CLEAR TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT, IF WE FAIL TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUES BEFORE US, THERE WOULD BE SERIOUS US DOMESTIC REACTIONS IN RESPECT TO KOREA.

AFTER RETURNING TO THE FULL SESSION, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD CONVEY THIS AFTERNOON TO THE MISSION THE CABINET'S REACTION TO THE COMMUNIQUE. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT VANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY PORTER, WOULD MEET WITH PRESIDENT PARK TOMORROW MORNING, HOPEFULLY AT 1000 HOURS.

A DETAILED REPORT FOLLOWS SEPTTEL. PORTER

BT

~~SECRET~~

## INFORMATION

*Pres file*

Wednesday, February 14, 1968 -- 8:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

I have informed Sec. Rusk, who will be working on the lines of the proposed backgrounder to take the initiative away from U Thant.

Here are my initial thoughts which I shall make available to Sec. Rusk.

1. As you know, since last summer we have been ~~exploiting~~<sup>exploiting</sup>, through various intermediaries, the terms under which peace might be negotiated in Vietnam. In particular, an effort was made to see if the so-called Trinh formula was consistent with the President's San Antonio formula.

2. Those efforts have yielded no constructive result.

3. In particular, Hanoi apparently is not prepared to accept our assumption that, if bombing of the north should stop, no advantage would be taken of that situation.

4. In this connection, we must take fully into account what has gone on since the attack on the cities during Tet and what is happening right now. The Communists, exploiting the Tet holiday, sought to overthrow the government in the cities and towns and to disintegrate the armed forces of Vietnam. They tried to kill the military commanders, hoping that their forces, somewhat depleted by Tet leave, would melt away. They hoped that the people in the cities would join in a general uprising against the government. None of these things happened: the people did not join the VC; the government behaved with unity and vigor; the attack on the cities was turned back mainly by the efforts of the armed forces of Vietnam, who took two-thirds of the casualties and fought exceedingly well.

5. Meanwhile, Hanoi has been assembling, day after day, very large forces south of the demilitarized zone, for what Ho Chi Minh calls the Route 9 offensive. Its objective is clearly to take and hold the northern part of South Vietnam. We are not going to let this happen. These forces are not South Vietnamese; they are North Vietnamese. They are not guerrilla or Popular Forces ~~working reform~~. They are regular army troops under Hanoi's direct control.

6. Any proposals for negotiation at the present time must take fully into account the illegal infiltration of forces going on through Laos and the flagrant violation of the demilitarized zone as well as the clear ~~intent~~<sup>intent</sup> of Hanoi in the DMZ area as well as elsewhere along the borders of South Vietnam.

wwrostow:rlh

W. W. Rostow



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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-191  
By ice, NARA, Date 2-12-64

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

*Per file*

Wednesday, February 14, 1968 -- 8:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the first quick overnight CIA assessment of the "Danang document" and the text itself. It will take much more analysis before we get to the bottom of it.

Reading it through quickly, I find these things of interest, aside from the underlying assumption of failure once they complete their initial self-congratulation:

-- Something, indeed, went wrong with "T No. 1"; that is, the Khe Sanh, DMZ, Western highlands attacks with respect to timing;

-- The reference to "during the last ten days" dates the document round about February 9;

-- At the time they met, they still had high hopes in Hue and Saigon;

-- They appear to be advocating (marked passage, page 5) a second wave of attacks, to be timed with the big offensive in the DMZ, Khe Sanh, Western highlands areas at the frontiers;

-- They are obviously thinking (marked passage, pages 7 & 9) of trying to exploit the situation in the countryside on the basis of guerrilla forces; to acquire control of more rural population;

-- This was a preliminary meeting: they envisaged another meeting on 12 February to analyse their situation and options further;

-- Their grandiose hopes are suggested by their references to the Chinese Communists and Soviet revolutions (see reference, page 5, to October 5 revolutions).

My operational conclusion is this: This is a moment of great and unresolved disarray on the other side. Thieu ought to issue an order of the day praising the people, the ARVN, and the police; ordering his forces to take the offensive wherever possible; and Westy ought to do the same thing. I feel in my bones this is not a time merely to wait for the enemy to come at us or to huddle in the towns waiting for the next blow, but to go out and face these nice liberal agrarian reformers.

WWRostow:rla

WWRostow

71a  
~~TOP SECRET~~ [ ]

3.4(b)(1)

14 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Walt Rostow

SUBJECT : Assessment of the "Danang Document"

CIA has prepared the following assessment of the "Danang Document" in response to your request to Mr. Helms last night. You will have received, via the White House Situation Room, a full translation of the document.

1. Our examination of the document (in translation) suggests that it is probably a communication originating from Viet Cong Military Region Five. It is an assessment of the failure of the Tet offensive intended for subordinate authorities--possibly a tactical command center--and contains instructions for future operations. The original document, however, is still in I Corps, and US officials in Saigon state that they are unable at this time to make an accurate determination of its authenticity. Moreover, some questions remain unanswered as to date of document and circumstances of its capture.

2. The document appears generally to agree with other evidence gleaned from interrogations of prisoners taken during the Tet offensive and on what is known of the enemy's advance planning, that the Communists achieved less than they had anticipated. This evidence has suggested that the enemy believed they would meet greater success in sparking a "general uprising," although the extent to which they expected genuine popular support is still not clear. Prisoners of officer rank have stated that they believed most of the population would support them, but their own statements and documents from the pre-Tet period indicate rather strongly that the uprising was to be "motivated and organized" rather than spontaneous.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [ ]

3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-192  
By SJ, NARA, Date 12-18-03



3. Although the exact sequence in time of the "general offensive" and the "general uprising" has not been fully clear, there are strong suggestions in statements by other prisoners and in captured documents that the two were to be simultaneous, with the "uprising" at least being initiated during the Tet attacks. Certain troops or cadres apparently were specifically assigned to organize support, to begin in the form of public demonstrations. We know that such demonstrations were started during attacks on several cities in the central coastal area--including Tam Ky--but that they were dispersed by police. Some prisoners have linked the public's lack of cooperation to the failure of the attacks themselves.

4. There has been no evidence as to whether the Communists actually intended attacks throughout the country to be simultaneous or to take place on successive days. ~~If valid, this document provides the first good indication that "N-Day" was intended to be nationwide and that the full impact may have been dissipated through poor coordination. It also raises the possibility that US bombing attacks successfully threw off the timetable in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area.~~ Had the Communists genuinely expected to score complete successes in some areas, they almost certainly would have had to act everywhere at once.

5. The document, however, ~~does not appear conclusive as to whether larger North Vietnamese units were to participate in the initial attacks, or were to be committed in follow-up efforts where success loomed promising.~~ Neither does it make clear whether all North Vietnamese units or only some elements were to have been committed.

6. Although the document clearly suggests failure and the need for decision on a future course of action, it does not seem to rule out the possibility that the Communists had maximum and minimum goals, at least by area, nor does it necessarily indicate a "go for broke" effort. All of the future courses cited in the document point to continuing the struggle in Military Region Five, particularly in the urban areas. Although as might be expected, the dangers to morale and resources are highlighted, relatively strong assets are deemed still in place.

7. We would concur with COMUSMACV's cautionary advice concerning both snap interpretations of Communist verbiage, especially in translation, and the possible relevance or significance of this document to the thinking and overall strategic planning of high-level Communist authorities in COSVN or Hanoi.

8. US officials in Saigon are endeavoring to clarify the circumstances surrounding the capture of the document and to establish as precisely as possible its authenticity.

BY DIRECTION OF THE DCI:



Senior Duty Officer  
CIA Operations Center

6.1(c)

FOLLOWING IS FULL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT. TRANSLATION WAS  
PERFORMED IN I CORPS:

QUOTE: TO: CO (MISS) DUNG AND "ALL BROTHERS)

THE ESTIMATION AND EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION FROM "N" HOUR TO  
DATE HAVE BEEN CLEARLY MADE BY HANOI AND LIBERATION RADIOS AND THE  
LETTER OF MR. BAI TO MISS DUNG AND YOU. THIS IS A GREAT SUCCESS OF OURS  
AND A GREAT FAILURE OF THE ENEMY. OUR GREAT VICTORY HAS  
OPENED A NEW PERIOD OF THE RESISTANCE AGAINST THE AMERICANS TO SAVE  
THE COUNTRY OF OUR PEOPLE. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME WE SIMULTANEOUSLY  
AND SURPRISINGLY ATTACKED SIX BIG CITIES AND THIRTY-SEVEN PROVINCIAL  
CAPITALS OVER SOUTH VIETNAM. KEY AGENCIES OF PUPPET ARMY AND  
ADMINISTRATION IN SAIGON, THE U.S. EMBASSY, FOUR CORPS HEADQUARTERS  
AND TENS OF DIVISION AND REGIMENT HEADQUARTERS OF PUPPET ARMY.

TO DESTROY A LARGE PORTION OF ENEMY MANPOWER (FIFTY THOUSAND

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4, DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
By sj/dch, NARA, Date 12-24-03

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 SAIGON 8569 ~~SECRET~~

DESTROYED AND TWENTY THOUSAND DISINTEGRATED) AND TECHNICAL FACILITIES. TO ATTACK THIRTY AIRFIELDS INCLUDING ELEVEN OF FOURTEEN BIG ONES OVER SOUTH VIETNAM. TO DESTROY ONE THOUSAND AND FIVE-HUNDRED AIRPLANES AND MANY BIG DEPOTS OF ENEMY. TO DESTROY HUNDREDS OF ARTILLERY GUNS. COMPLETELY AND PARTIALLY LIBERATE A NUMBER OF DISTRICT SEATS, TOWNS, CITIES AND PROVINCE CAPITALS. HUE AND SAIGON ARE STILL MAINTAINED AND THE MOVEMENT IS IN GOOD DEVELOPMENT.

TO NEUTRALIZE A LARGE NUMBER OF AIRFIELDS AND IMPORTANT STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AXES.

IN A NUMBER OF CITIES AND PROVINCE <sup>CAP</sup>ITALS, THE POPULATION BEGINS TO TAKE TO THE STREET. THE PRIDE OF SUCCESSIVE ATTACK OF OUR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PEOPLE IS SPREADING OVER ALL BATTLEFIELDS. ENEMY IS VERY DEMORALIZED AND IN GREAT CONFUSION.

IN OUR Z AND OUR SPECIAL SECTOR, THE CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF 2 EVALUATES THAT OUR GREAT VICTORY HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE GREAT VICTORY OVER SOUTH VIETNAM, AND DRIVEN ENEMY FARTHER BACK TO THE DEFENSE OF CITIES AND TOWNS AND RURAL AGENCIES TO MAKE ENEMY MORE DEMORALIZED IN THEIR AGGRESSIVE INTENTION. MR. TAN, MR. CHI AND I HAVE MET TOGETHER TO EVALUATE THAT THE VICTORY OF FRONT 4 DESERVES HIGH DEGREE, FIND THAT THE SITUATION HAS BEEN BRILLIANT. WE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3 SAIGON 8569 ~~SECRET~~

DETERMINE TO CORRECT DEFICIENCIES AND GAIN VICTORIES.

ON OUR SIDE, THE CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF Z HAS ANALYZED THE FOLLOWING DEFICIENCIES:

ARMED FORCES IN THE INSIDE WERE TOO WEAK, THOSE IN THE OUTSIDE MADE CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS BUT DID NOT YET WELL SERVE THE IMPORTANT

POINT. WE OVERESTIMATED THE ENEMY SO WE DARED NOT SEND IN BIG FORCES AND USE BIG FORCES FOR CLOSE ATTACKS.

THERE WERE MANY GAPS IN THE THOUGHT MOTIVATION AND PREPARATION FOR GRIEVANCE FORCE AMONG THE POPULATION. IT IS RIGHT TO ~~REMEMBER THE~~ POPULATION BUT WE HAVE NOT UNDERSTOOD EVERYTHING AND ALL ASPECTS OF THE PASSIVENESS OF THE POPULATION TO MAKE POSITIVE SOLUTION. THIS MUST BE A BIG MISTAKE. ORGANIZATION OF KEY ELEMENTS AND FORMATION OF THE MASSES DID NOT YET PROVIDE APPROPRIATE INSURANCE FOR ~~THE NO-23~~. ~~(THIS IS THE SECOND PHASE OF THE ENEMY'S WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN CALLING FOR GENERAL UPRISING BY THE CIVILIAN POPULACE)~~

MILITARY PROSELYTING ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO "N HOUR" WERE WELL DEVELOPED, BUT WHEN "N HOUR" BEGAN THEY WERE NOT RYTHMICALLY COORDINATED. GENERALLY, WE WERE UNABLE TO COORDINATE THEM.

POSTPONEMENT OF "N HOUR" CAME LATE. SOME PLACES EXECUTED THE ORDER, SOME PLACES DID NOT. THEREFORE, WE WERE IN A <sup>RIA</sup> SUGGERING MANNER

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

PAGE 4 SAIGON 8569 ~~SECRET~~

AND UNABLE TO CREATE THE STRONG PRIDE IN THE FIRST MOMENT. ON OUR BATTLE FRONT, WE MUST OVERCOME ALL DEFICIENCIES SO THAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO WELL DEVELOP IT.

PRIOR TO "N HOUR", MR. BA AND THOSE AT MR BA'S PLACE DID<sup>T</sup> THE DEVELOPMENT AND "2.<sup>T</sup>" (THE TWO PHASES OF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN CALLING FOR, FIRST, A ~~GENERAL OFFENSIVE~~, AND SECOND, ~~AND GENERAL UPRIS-~~ ~~ING BY THE CIVILIAN POPULACE~~), AND DID SEND THEIR WOMEN TO MAKE LIAISON. ACCORDING TO MR. BA AND THOSE MEN OF HIS WE PROCEEDED TO "2.T" IN THE SITUATION THAT THE <sup>ENE</sup> ~~ENEMY~~ WAS DEMORALIZED IN THEIR AGGRESSIVE INTENTION AND NOT TO ~~OPPRESS THE AGGRESSIVE INTENTION AS~~ ~~01P43-513-24438;3-8,53,55,,~~ WE DID TO THE JAPANESE IN THE AUGUST REVOLUTION. WE PROCEEDED TO "2.T" WHILE THE ENEMY STILL HAD ONE MILLION AND TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND TROOPS. THOUGH THEY WERE DEMORALIZED AND WEAK.

THEREFORE, "2.T" IS A COURSE OF EVENTS, A PHASE OF PROTRACTED AND SUCCESSIVE STRIKE TILL COMPLETE VICTORY. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE IT DONE IN A MOMENT OR A DEFINITE TIME PERIOD. THE LENGTH OF THE TIME, QUICK OR SLOW, RELIES ON OUR SUBJECTIVE EFFORTS AND OUR LEADERSHIP.

THE RECENT VICTORY IS THE FIRST VICTORY, A VICTORY TO OPEN GREAT PLAN "2.T" WHICH HAS VERY IMPORTANT STRATEGIC MEANING.

MR. BA HAS MADE AN ANALYSIS OF THE METHOD OF EXECUTION. THERE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 5 SAIGON 3539 ~~SECRET~~

ARE THREE DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

A. ~~"C.T." PROCEEDS AT THE SAME TIME.~~

~~"T NO. 1" PROCEEDS TO SOME DEGREE THEN "T NO. 2" UPRISES TO  
COORDINATE WITH "T NO. 1" TO STRUGGLE FOR VICTORY.~~

C. ~~"T NO. 1" PROCEEDS BUT THE POPULATION STILL UNABLE TO  
UPRISE WE RETREAT TEMPORARY TO CONSOLIDATE AND DO THE MISSION AGAIN.~~

~~FOR IN THE PAST FEW DAYS,~~ ON ALL BATTLEFIELDS OVER SOUTH VIETNAM,  
THE FIRST CIRCUMSTANCE TOOK PLACE SPORADICALLY AT TAM KY, I CORPS  
HEADQUARTERS ETC. BUT THEY WERE NOT YET IN HARMONY AND STRONG SO THEY  
HAD TO WITHDRAW FROM SOME PLACES. ~~THE SECOND CIRCUMSTANCE TOOK PLACE  
IN SAIGON AND THE THIRD CIRCUMSTANCE HAPPENED AT MANY CITIES  
AND TOWNS.~~

ACCORDING TO THE ABOVE ANALYSIS DISCLOSES THAT ~~"T" PROCEED AT THE  
SAME HE WILL SUCCEED AND WILL NEVER FAIL THIS WILL BRING  
EITHER BIG VICTORY, MEDIUM VICTORY OR SMALL VICTORY, AND IF  
THERE IS ANY LOSS, IT WILL BE ONLY SMALL LOSS AND PARTIAL LOSS.~~

IT PROCEED TO "2.T" WHILE WE HAVE RELATIVELY STRONG ~~FORCES~~ <sup>FORCES</sup>  
RURAL <sup>S</sup>BASES AND DEFINITE FORM OF ADMINISTRATION IS THAT "2.T" IS  
COMPLETELY DIFFERENT WITH THE ~~OCTOBER AND AUGUST REVOLUTIONS.~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

PAGE 6 SAIGON 8569 ~~SECRET~~

OUR COMING WORK:

MON 12 ~~1969~~ <sup>1970</sup> (NOTE: PROBABLY INTENDED FEBRUARY) POLITICAL OFFICERS WILL MEET TOGETHER, SURELY NOT ALL OF THEM CAN MAKE, TO MAKE PRELIMINARY RECAPITULATION OF THE SITUATION AND DISCUSS ON ACTIVITIES TO CONTINUE WITH "2.1".

1. MILITARY

CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF Z HAS DISCUSSED AND PROVIDED REINFORCEMENTS FOR ACTIVITIES ON OUR BATTLEFIELD. THE CURRENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF Z HAS HAD THREE COMPLETE UNITS OF MR. TRUC GO OPERATING ON OUR BATTLEFIELD, THOUGH IT HAS NOT BEEN WELL PREPARED. ONE OF THEM IS OPERATING OVER THE AREA BETWEEN MR. HUY'S PRONG AND MR. THANG'S PRONG AND A PORTION OF MRS. HIEU AND MR. TRUNG'S PRONGS. THE TWO PRONGS OF MR. NGO (87-89) AND TWO PRONGS OF MR. TRUC HAVE BEEN SHAPED UP THOUGH THE MOVEMENT TO THE AREA <sup>H</sup>~~HS~~ MET DIFFICULTIES <sup>I</sup>~~BECAUSE~~ OF INCREASING VIGILANCE OF ENEMY.

THE REMAINING TWO UNITS OF MR. TRUC WHICH OPERATED ON AXIS NO 1 OF MR. THANG RECENTLY ARE RETURNING TO AREA K AND THE DIRECTION OF MR. LAI FOR COUNTER-OPERATION. BRIGADE 196 IN QUANG NAM IS CONDUCTING AN OPERATION OVER THE AREA OF MR. LAI AND AREA K.

INSIDE, WE MUST STEP UP THE ACTIVITIES OF SPECIAL ACTION TEAMS TO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 7 SAIGON 8569 ~~SECRET~~

DESTROY TYRANTS AND BREAK THE GRIP OF CONTROL, ESTABLISH PENETRATION BASE AND STRIVE FOR BUILDING UP OF INNER FORCES.

OUTSIDE, DURING THE RECENT TIME, WE MADE A MISTAKE THAT IN THE GUERRILLA WARFARE OUR FORCES WERE TOO WIDELY DISPERSED SO OUR ACTIVITIES REDUCED. ~~GUERRILLA FORCES ARE NOW REORGANIZED TO RESTORE THE GUERRILLA WARFARE MOVEMENT AS IT WAS IN THE PAST, AND BRING THEM UP TO ATTACK ENEMY CONTINUOUSLY.~~

MILITARY FORCES MUST STRIKE CONTINUOUSLY IN SMALL, MEDIUM AND OVERSPREADING BATTLES, AND , AT THE SAME TIME, PREPARE A SERIES AND WAVE OF BIG ATTACKS TO MAKE ENEMY UNABLE TO RESTORE THEIR STABLE SITUATION.

## 2. POLITICAL

THE IMMEDIATE PURPOSE IS TO <sup>FL</sup>PLACE EMPHASIS ON PUSHING FORWARD THE <sup>is</sup>POLITICAL STRUGGLE BEING POSITIVE TO COUNTER AGAINST ENEMY TERRORISM TO PROTEST THE CURFEW ORDER OF ENEMY WHICH HAS MADE THE PEOPLE'S LIVING DIFFICULT AND HARD, AND TO ASK FOR SOLUTION OF PEOPLE'S DIFFICULTIES IN THEIR LIVING. TO BRING UP THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE TO MORE DECISIVE STAGE. TO INCITE ARMED STRUGGLE OF THE POPULATION IN ORDER TO FORGE THEIR STRUGGLING SPIRIT, TO TRAIN THE FORMATION AND KEY COMMANDING ELEMENTS. EXPERIENCE <sup>C</sup>EXTRACTED FROM THE RURAL AREAS

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PAGE 8 SAIGON 8569 ~~SECRET~~

HAS CLEARLY DISCLOSED THIS MATTER. SIMULTANEOUSLY, WE MUST BE POSITIVE IN INCITING THE PEOPLE'S THROUGH IN ORDER TO MAKE TIMELY PREPARATION FOR TAKING TO THE STREET OF THE MASSES IN THE FORMED UPRISING.

WE MUST PAY THE BEST OF ATTENTION TO POLITICAL STRUGGLE FOR BREAKING THE GRIP OF CONTROL, PUNISHING TYRANTS AND, STEP BY STEP, WE MUST MASTER THE SITUATION OF SECTIONS AND <sup>5</sup>LOCS IN CITIES AND TOWNS.

3. MILITARY PROSELYING

IN THE RECENT TIME, ELEMENT OF MR. QUOE WAS WELL ACTIVE IN THIS AREA. NOW IT MUST STRIVE FOR CONSOLIDATION AND BRINGING UP ITS ACTIVITIES, AND CONCENTRATE ITS EFFORTS ON INCITING A MOVEMENT OF MILITARY EVENTS AND NONALIGNMENT.

4. UNIT NO 2:

AT THE PRESENT TIME, THERE ARE IN SAIGON A UNITED FRONT OF PEACE AND PEOPLE'S FORCES, AND HUE A UNITED FRONT OF DEMOCRATIC AND PEACEFUL PEOPLES, NOW, WE MUST BRING UP THE ORGANIZATION OF DEMOCRACY AND PEACE UNITED FRONT (DECLARATION HAS BEEN CORRECTED AND SENT TO YOU (MISS INUG AND ALL BROTHERS)). YOU MUST SELECT A PRESIDENT A GENERAL SECRETARY TO BRING THEM UP SOON AND PLAN FOR THEIR PROTECTION MUST BE AVAILABLE.

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 9 SAIGON 8569 ~~J L C R I T~~

5. RURAL AREAS:

~~BUT ENEMY LOOSE IN THE RURAL AREAS AROUND CITIES AND TOWNS SO WE  
MUST STRIVE FOR BREAKING THE GRIP OF CONTROL AND BRINGING BACK TO  
PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATED TO THEIR OLD PLACES~~

TO BUILD UP AND DEVELOP THE PEOPLE'S GUERRILLA WARFARE.

TO PROMOTE THE PRODUCTION

TO SERVE THE FRONT LINE, TO SERVE ARMED ACTIVITIES.

TO CONSOLIDATE AND IMPROVE THE PARTY CHAPTERS AND ASSOCIATIONS

TO BE READY IN FORMATION TO SUPPORT THE URBAN MASSES IN CITIES  
IN THEIR ARMED UPRISING AND TO PARTICIPATE IN THE UPRISING IN CITIES.

6. IDEOLOGICAL ORGANIZATION:

IN THE AREA OF IDEOLOGY, WE MUST MAKE ALL PARTY COMMITTEES UNDER-  
STAND THOROUGHLY THE RECENT VICTORY, AWARE CK AND KN WERE OF COURSE  
OF EVENT. WE HAVE OPENED THE "2.T" PHASE WE MUST SECURE IT IN A  
CRITICAL AND CONTINUOUS MANNER, RAISE THE INTERNAL UNIFICATION,  
DETERMINE TO BELIEVE IN THE ABSOLUTE LEADERSHIP OF THE PARTY, ~~RIGHT~~  
~~AND DECREASE OF DETERMINATION~~

IN THE AREA OF ORGANIZATION, WE MUST MAKE TIME PROMOTION,  
AWARDS, AND MOBILIZATION AND IMPROVE THE LEADERSHIP OF ALL RANKS.

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PAGE 10 SAPBON SITYO ~~SECRET~~

INSIDE, MISS DUNG AND BROTHERS MUST RESORT<sup>TO</sup> THE DISTRICTS AND MAKE THEM VERY STRONG, AND SHAPE UP THE CADRE COMMITTEE OF THE SPECIAL SECTOR TO DIRECTLY COMMAND IT. THE COMMITTEE WILL BE COMPOSED OF MR. THANH, HUNG, THONG, AND THANH BAC.

YOU (MISS DUNG) AND MR. THAN MUST DISCUSS IN A POSITIVE MANNER WITH OUR BROTHERS IN THERE ON ALL MATTERS THEN TRY TO RETURN TO TAKE CARE OF THE GENERAL COMMAND. YOU MUST GATHER A NUMBER OF TRUSTED LIAISON AGENTS TO PROVIDE SAFETY FOR YOUR MOVEMENT TO AND FROM. YOU CAN GO THROUGH THE DIRECTION OF MR. THONG TO RETURN.

UPON COMPLETION OF THE POLITICAL OFFICER MEETING, I WILL RETURN TO A.15 TO CONVEENE A CONFERENCE AND RUN THE OPERATION. ALL AFFAIRS WILL BE TEMPORARILY HANDLED BY MR. QUOC, THE STANDING MEMBER AND MR. NHO AND BAC, THE CHIEF SECRETARY. I WILL TELL YOU (MISS DUNG) AND OTHER BROTHERS THE RESULT OF THE CONFERENCE.

WELL WISHES FOR YOUR SAFETY AND HEALTH.

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72

Free file

Wednesday, February 14, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached for your approval is a brief message to President Kekkonen of Finland congratulating him on his re-election.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

*WWR*  
*MWG*

MWG:em



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**SUGGESTED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO PRESIDENT KEKKONEN OF FINLAND**

Dear Mr. President:

It is a pleasure to send you my congratulations on your re-election as President of Finland. Relations between our two countries are marked by a traditional friendship which has prospered during your terms of office. I know the American people share my hope and confidence that this friendship will continue to flourish.

I wish you every success in your new term.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

  
MWC:em





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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February 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Suggested Congratulatory Message to  
President Kekkonen on Occasion of  
His Re-election

The Finnish Electoral College will meet on February 15 to elect the President of Finland. The incumbent, Urho Kekkonen, is virtually assured of re-election. We have determined that it is the customary practice for congratulations to be extended following the meeting of the Electoral College, rather than the March 1 inauguration, and suggest the enclosed congratulatory message from the President for your consideration.

*for Alan Parker*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Suggested message.

Exempted from automatic downgrading.

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724

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Ambassy HELSINKI

## STATE

1. Upon confirmation reelection President Kekkonen by Electoral College, pass following message from President Johnson to President Kekkonen:

QUOTE Dear Mr. President: It gives me great pleasure to extend warm congratulations on the occasion of your reelection as President of Finland. Finnish-American friendship has prospered during the first twelve years of your Presidency, and I have no doubt it will continue to do so in greater measure throughout the next six years.

All Americans, Mr. President, share your goals of peace, liberty, and progress, and we wish you every success in their continued achievement. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson  
UNQUOTE

2. We do not plan to release text, but have no objection to GOF doing so.

Exempt.

End

UE/SCAN:PAD:wyer:nbw 2/12/68

4203

EUR/SCAN - David H. McKillop

EUR/P - Mr. Gehron (phone)  
S/CPR - Mrs. Johnson (phone)  
P - Mr. Coates (phone)

EUR - Mr. Stoessel  
S/S - Mr. Stoessel  
White House -

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FORM DS-322  
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Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other  
flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

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Wednesday - February 14, 1968

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Prime Minister Burnham has sent you the attached letter of appreciation for your attentions during his recent visit to Washington for a medical check-up.

Ambassador Carlson is pouching the signed original together with an autographed picture. When these arrive, I will prepare a short acknowledgement for you.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Letter from Prime Minister Burnham of Guyana to President  
in Appreciation for Attentions Received in Washington  
During Medical Stay

"Dear Mr. President:

It was a pleasure meeting you again on Monday, January 22 and to recognize your continued interest in and enthusiasm over my country of Guyana in spite of the many problems which you are at this moment facing at home and abroad.

I should like to express my personal gratitude to you and all of your officials who made my recent stay in Washington so pleasant and in every respect, reassuring.

While wishing you every success during 1968 as a politician and as a statesman, may I take the opportunity of assuring you of my personal admiration and appreciation for all that you are doing in the cause of world progress, and I hope that the association between your country and mine will continue to be as close and mutually felicitous as it has been in recent years.

Kindest regards.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ L. F. S. Burnham  
Prime Minister"

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White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By SP/g, NARA, Date 4/29/96

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday - February 14, 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Situation

*Pres file*

This is the background and present status of the shooting at the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo (UASD).

Background

President Balaguer and the University management have been at sword-points for weeks over the issue of increased government subsidies to the University. A student protest march on the Presidential Palace in support of the University demands was set for yesterday, but called off by UASD authorities when President Balaguer refused to grant permission. (Balaguer had earlier stopped an extreme right public demonstration, showing his even-handed treatment of the extremists.) A group of 150-200 students -- we assume extreme left elements which control the student government -- refused to accept the UASD decision. After demonstrating in the downtown area, they retired to the University grounds. Shooting broke out around 1:45 am today.

The Incident

We do not know who started the shooting. Police were already stationed on the perimeter of the University. Ambassador Crimmins reports that they had been circumspect and were under strict orders to act with restraint.

The shooting went on intermittently until dawn. Special riot police ringed the campus at daybreak. This afternoon they were replaced by some 500 troops and several armored vehicles. The police were repositioned throughout the city to deal with disturbances which the extreme left might start in support of the students.

Reported casualties stand at:

- 2 policemen wounded.
- 1 student wounded.
- 1 youth killed (engaged in arson downtown).

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 93-340

By *[signature]*, NARA, Date *4/30/96*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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The Situation at 5:00 pm

Ambassador Crimmins reports the situation around the university is quiet. He does not rule out disturbances tonight, but the security forces are poised to meet them.

The Minister of Interior is meeting with students on the campus in an effort to work out a settlement. Balaguer has made clear he wants the arms surrendered, but apparently has not given an ultimatum. Crimmins said rumors that an understanding has been reached may be true, but he has no confirmation.

Ambassador Crimmins saw Balaguer this morning. He found him determined to remain firm with the students, but flexible in the handling of the situation and desirous to avoid a clash.

I will let you know if there is any deterioration in the situation. Much depends on how the talks with the students go and what the extremists may try to do tonight.

W. W. Rostow



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Wednesday, February 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Where We are on Gold

As requested, I have outlined below some brief notes on the gold problem and our broad choices in gold policy, along with recommendations on next steps.

The Gold Problem

The international monetary system is based on two major forms of international money -- gold and foreign exchange. Central banks now hold as reserves about \$40 billion in gold, \$16 billion in dollars and \$9 billion in other currencies (mostly sterling).

This system is now in difficulty. One basic reason is that new gold production is not large enough to meet world liquidity needs, and the dollar is no longer available or universally acceptable to fill the gap.

The supply of monetary gold has been a problem because:

- new gold production has leveled off;
- industrial use of gold is rising;
- speculative demand for gold is high.

In the past two years, speculative demand for gold became so heavy that the total private demand for gold could not be met from new gold production. As a result, monetary gold stocks, mostly U.S. gold reserves, were drawn down to meet demand on the London market and to keep the price from rising much above \$35 an ounce.

Gold operations, therefore, served to contract, rather than add to, international liquidity. In 1967 world monetary gold holdings -- and hence international reserves -- were reduced by \$1.5 billion. This shrinkage in gold reserves, in itself, greatly increased the balance of payments problem throughout the world. That it could happen and that it could have this effect are evidence of a serious weakness in the system.

Pressures on the U.S. gold stock create a special problem for the international monetary system. U. S. gold reserves are visible evidence of our

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Authority *NSC 2-2980*  
*Treasury 10-27-78, FR's 7-19-79;*

By *sp/16*, NARA, Date *2-21-92*

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**SECRET/SENSITIVE**

ability to keep the dollar convertible into gold, which, in itself, is key to the operation of the system.

As our gold stock goes down:

- foreign monetary authorities become worried about whether we will continue to stand ready to convert their dollar holdings into gold and, therefore, become nervous about keeping reserves in dollars; and
- speculators become more confident the U.S. will have to raise the official price for gold and therefore see gold as an attractive investment.

This situation could turn into a crisis of confidence and feed on itself -- much like a run on a bank. The end result could be a serious contraction of international liquidity and pressure on all countries to adopt restrictive economic policies -- at home and abroad -- to preserve their gold holdings. But all this can be avoided if the major countries work closely together.

The world faces a choice:

- either to create soon an international paper reserve to substitute for gold and provide regular additions to liquidity,
- or, to raise the price of gold and provide a one-shot addition to liquidity,
- or, to abandon the system of stable exchange rates altogether.

The speculators are betting that the U.S. -- and, therefore, all monetary authorities -- will be forced to raise the price of gold.

The alternative way of keeping the present system is the early activation in sufficient quantity of the IMF Special Drawing Rights. This will require the full cooperation of all industrial countries.

Our gold policy will influence how this issue turns out and how much disruption occurs in the interim.

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**Our Policy Choices**

1. **Maintain Our Present Policy**

We now supply gold on the London market through the Gold Pool whenever the price gets close to \$35.20. (Our nominal share in the Gold Pool is 60%. In fact, it comes closer to 70-75% because we make good some of the losses of Belgium, Italy, and The Netherlands.)

We have no obligation to feed gold to speculators at \$35 an ounce. Our commitment to convert dollars to gold is only to central banks. But controlled feeding of the London market has proved to be the best way to maintain confidence and manage the system.

The basic advantage of holding the free market price at \$35 an ounce is that it keeps the official holders of dollars from getting nervous. If the Gold Pool closed, the London price would go up substantially, because, under current conditions, speculation would feed on itself. The smart money holders would be confident we would have to raise the official price. And foreign monetary authorities would be at our door asking to convert dollars into gold.

The disadvantage of supplying gold to the free market is that gold bought and held by speculators is lost to monetary reserves. Furthermore, as our reserves are drawn down, doubts grow about the dollar's convertibility -- and this weakens the system.

The key to the success of this policy is keeping speculation in check. We believe we can do two things to strengthen the Gold Pool operation -- once we get a period of quiet in the market.

- a. Get our Gold Pool partners to agree to our gold certificate proposal. Under this plan, the members would supply gold to the Pool in exchange for gold certificates issued by the members as a group. These certificates would be guaranteed against a change in the price of gold, transferable among members, and usable as reserves. This would make it possible for the Pool to supply gold to the market without reducing the monetary reserves of its members. As this happens, speculators would become convinced they are battling the combined \$26 billion gold stock of all the Gold Pool members -- not the \$12 billion of the U. S. alone -- and thereby become discouraged about the prospects of forcing an increase in the official price of gold.

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- b. Gradually change the rules under which the Gold Pool buys and sells gold in London so as to put the speculator under greater risk. We are looking into the possibilities of operating in the market so as to have the price fluctuate between \$32 and \$38. If so, we could penalize the speculator, curb the volume of speculation, and reduce the incentive of foreign central banks to convert dollars into gold.

2. Close the Gold Pool and let the London Price go

We could close the Gold Pool and let the London price seek its own level. The basic problem then would be how to prevent official holders of dollars from coming to us to convert their dollars into gold at \$35 an ounce when they see the free market value gold at a higher price.

Our preferred way of operating such a two-price system would be the following:

- The Gold Pool members and such other countries that wanted to join would agree neither to buy nor to sell gold on the free market. In effect, they would announce to the world that the present supply of monetary gold is enough and that they would rely on creating new reserves to meet additional liquidity requirements.
- We would agree on rules to redistribute gold within the system. For example, if the U.S. continued to have deficits, we would agree to finance a negotiated portion in gold.
- The U.S. would continue to convert to gold official dollar holdings of countries outside the system who become nervous about their dollars when the London price goes up. And we would have to deal with the French if they once again came into surplus.
- We would refuse to sell gold to any central bank that tried to profit by selling in London at the higher price. (This is administratively possible.)

The advantages:

This plan would still keep the main elements of the present international monetary system in operation, would still be based on cooperation with

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other governments, and would stop the loss of monetary reserves into speculative holdings.

If it worked well, the price in London would at first go up and then fall. The key would be the number of countries that cooperated both in keeping their dollar holdings intact and in refraining from buying gold on the free market.

The disadvantages:

The risk is that a high free market price would cause countries outside the system to come to us to convert their official dollar holdings to gold. We would also lose some gold to countries within the system if we continued to have deficits. We could end up losing considerably more gold under this arrangement than if we kept the Gold Pool going, but the loss would be to official holders rather than to speculators. If U. S. gold losses were not contained, the system would be seriously threatened.

3. Embargo Gold

We could disavow our commitment to convert official dollar holdings to gold. There are two general ways of carrying out such a gold embargo.

A. Gold Embargo within IMF Rules -- We could announce to the IMF that henceforth we would no longer buy and sell gold but would maintain the par value of the dollar against other currencies by buying and selling currencies in the exchange markets.

This is what every other country does to maintain the parity of its rates and it would be legal under the IMF rules.

We would get the currencies to support the dollar rate by drawing on the IMF, by selling gold, or both.

The advantages are:

- we would be insulated from speculation in gold,
- we would be insulated, in part, from the pressure of outstanding dollar balances since they would no longer be convertible into gold,
- we would have increased our bargaining position in financial negotiations.

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The disadvantages are:

- we would have reneged on our commitment to convert dollars to gold,
- the outstanding dollar balances would still be a threat to us. If the general view was that we could not hold the present dollar exchange rate, holders of dollars would try to switch into other currencies. In the event of such a flight from the dollar, we would have to sell gold to get enough other currencies to support the rate,
- we would be less able to finance any future deficits with dollars.

B. Gold Embargo Outside IMF Rules -- In this case we would announce that we are no longer buying or selling gold and would let the dollar rate seek its own level. This is known as "floating". It would mean the end of our international financial cooperation with Europe.

We would force on the European surplus countries a hard choice:

- either to support our exchange rate and in the process accumulate more dollars,
- or to let our exchange rate depreciate in relation to theirs and thus improve our trade position in relation to their trade position.

The likelihood is they would first put restrictions on our capital and direct investments and then look into exchange controls. In the end world trade would decline and many countries would be under pressure to follow deflationary policies.

One outcome might be the formation of separate monetary blocs -- for example, a dollar bloc, a gold bloc, and possibly a sterling bloc. Another would be an international monetary conference -- where it would be possible to negotiate new exchange rates and a new system for creating international reserves and for adjusting exchange rates or taking other actions to keep the system in balance.

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In the meanwhile the economic and possibly the political costs to the world would be very great. It is difficult to judge how long it would take to pick up the pieces and put them together again.

Recommendations

All these policy options involve difficult choices and serious risks. My assessment is:

1. Our present course of continuing the Gold Pool and holding the free market price to near \$35 offers the best prospect of taking us on an evolutionary route to a stronger monetary system. If the market gets quiet, we can improve present procedures. We have to be willing to ride out squalls but we have two factors going for us:

- Our balance of payments program will cut the outflow of dollars and create a good psychological effect on the gold market. The Europeans generally support our program. More important, the Germans, Italians, and the French are taking action to expand their economies even if it costs them reserves. This is essential to the success of our program.
- The Agreement on IMF Special Drawing Rights. If the plan can get into operation within about a year and Special Drawing Rights are issued at a rate of at least \$2 billion a year, gold will come close to being dethroned. The better our balance of payments program works, the sooner we will get the Europeans to agree to early activation of the IMF Special Drawing Rights plan.

2. If we come under unacceptable pressure, we can either close the Gold Pool or embargo gold. Which course would be preferable depends on what we can work out with the Europeans. They know they have a serious responsibility to help. At the last OECD meeting, the Dutch, Germans, Italians and British had a very private dinner session with Deming. They organized themselves into a group to work out a better system for gold and to see what can be done to fund sterling balances. This could lead to real progress.

3. We are reviewing these and other contingency policies on an urgent basis. Fred Deming, Ed Fried and Dewey Daane (Federal Reserve Board)

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have started. Art Okun and Tony Solomon will be brought in as soon as the preliminary review is completed. We should soon have ready for you a new assessment of the options along with our recommendations. We should also have at that time a rundown of what the Europeans are prepared to do and the direction in which they believe we should all move.

4. I suggest we try out our next version of policy choices on a rump session of the Dillon Committee (e. g., Dillon, Reosa, Heller, Gordon, Bator).

\* \* \* \* \*

At Tab A is a brief summary of how the system works.

At Tab B are some specific comments on the Notes on Gold you sent me.

W. W. Rostow

  
ERF:mst

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Authority Treasury 11-27-78 CEA 6-8-79  
By led/ly, NARA, Date 2-21-92

Tab A

HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS NOW

1. The U.S. serves as banker to the world. Other countries have official dollar holdings of \$16 billion and there are private dollar holdings abroad of another \$16 billion. The U.S. stands ready to convert official holdings into gold at \$35 an ounce. That is a major reason most foreign central banks are willing to keep and to add to their holdings of dollars.

2. But there are other reasons:

- the dollar has maintained its purchasing power better than other currencies;
- dollar holdings earn interest, whereas gold does not;
- the U.S. is the major capital market in the world.

3. To back our conversion pledge, we have a total gold stock of \$12 billion. This is equal to about 75% of the outstanding official dollar holdings and 38% of the combined official and private dollar holdings. In banking terms, this is a high ratio to prevent or to stop a run on a bank.

4. Confidence plays a key role in this as in any banking system -- a more important role than reserves themselves. The British were able to maintain the pound despite relatively limited reserves because of confidence. When confidence collapsed, the pound fell. Even with large reserves, the dollar can be shaken by a drop in confidence. Should foreign holders of dollars believe that the dollar will be devalued (which would mean an increase in the price of gold), they would want to turn in their dollars to us for gold. Similarly, an inflationary rise in our prices can make them shift out of dollars:

- because the dollar's purchasing power is reduced;
- because they know inflation can lead to devaluation.

5. Our willingness to convert dollars into gold for monetary authorities at \$35 an ounce is a major element in maintaining confidence. Most big countries have recognized their responsibilities and have not pressed us hard for gold conversion when their dollar holdings increased. (As part of the trilateral agreement, Germany specifically committed itself not to convert dollars into gold.) France is the key exception, although some smaller European countries -- Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, Spain and The Netherlands -- follow a policy of converting most

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of their additions to dollar holdings into gold. Almost all developing countries prefer to hold dollars rather than gold simply because it is a better investment. Some sophisticated developed countries (e. g., Japan, Sweden) take the same view.

6. The need to maintain confidence is also why we try to keep the free market price of gold from going higher than \$35. If it does go higher, foreign government holders of dollars will become nervous because they fear an increase in the official price of gold. In addition, they could benefit by turning in their dollars to us for gold at \$35 and then selling the gold on the free market for a higher price.

7. Because the dollar was convertible into gold, others were prepared to hold increased amounts of dollars and, in that way, we have financed a large part of our deficits. Our total balance of payments deficits on a liquidity basis since 1960 amount to \$19 billion. We financed about \$7 billion through gold sales and \$12 billion through an increase in private and official dollar holdings abroad.

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Tab B

COMMENTS ON MR. X'S VIEWS

1. On Gold Cover Removal

A. Mr. X argues that removing the gold cover:

- is a sign of weakness and therefore will increase speculative demand for gold;
- will lead dollar holders to ask for more gold once they see that we have more "free" gold available.

I believe that:

- Removing the gold cover will increase confidence in the dollar abroad. No bank ever prevented a run by closing its doors to customers who wanted to withdraw deposits. Keeping the gold cover is like closing the door to depositors.
- The European central banks (excluding France) are careful about demanding gold from us because they are worried about causing a breakdown in the system. They will act the same way if the cover is removed. They believe it should be removed to increase confidence in the dollar and convince the speculators we mean business.
- The gold cover will in any event have to be removed soon -- quite apart from gold policy considerations. As our note issue increases in response to the needs of our growing economy, we will not have enough gold to meet the gold backing requirements in the law.

B. X also argues that the gold cover law exerts discipline on the amount of increase in our note issue and therefore protects the value of the dollar.

I see it differently. The value of the dollar depends on what it can buy and this depends on our overall monetary and fiscal policies. The gold cover requirement does not -- and should not -- influence these policies. Bill Martin -- the leading spokesman for careful monetary management -- is also the leading advocate for removing the gold cover.

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Authority Treasury 11-27-78  
By sp/ce, NARA, Date 2-21-92

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- C. Third, X argues that the U.S. and other countries need gold for basic security because only gold is universally acceptable.

The point here is that a country needs adequate international reserves -- or the ability to borrow them -- if it is to have flexibility in pursuing its internal and external policies. Gold is one form of reserves and now makes up almost 60% of total world reserves. Creation of new international reserves -- such as the IMF Special Drawing Rights -- could serve the same purpose and ultimately will be interchangeable with gold.

2. If the Gold Cover is Removed:

X warns that:

- We should put pressure on friendly countries not to convert their dollar holdings into gold.
- We should stop the leakage of gold reserves into the free market and from there to hoarding and speculative holdings. He suggests, in effect, that we dissolve the Gold Pool and no longer try to hold the free market price at \$35. The free market price would then fluctuate and make it more costly to speculate in gold.

With regard to the first point, my memo explains the pressures that now operate on some of these countries to keep them from converting their dollars to gold and the limits of applying more pressure under the present system.

The point about disassociating the free market from official transactions in gold is one of the options we have open to us and is explained as such in the memo.

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday - February 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

*from file*

SUBJECT: Letter to President Frei

You will have gathered that letters from you to selected Latin American Presidents are part of our dramatization strategy.

At Tab A is a suggested letter to President Frei pegged on the energetic action he personally took in calling in the Soviet Ambassador to talk tough about the USS Pueblo incident. Ed Kerry's report on this conversation is at Tab B.

We have checked with Ed on the letter and he thinks a few words of encouragement from you to President Frei at this juncture when he is facing major internal difficulties would be most helpful.

We have a letter to President Costa e Silva in preparation. We are awaiting successful conclusion of negotiations on the soluble coffee problem before sending it to you.

W. W. Rostow

**Attachments**

Tab A - Suggested Presidential letter to Chilean President Frei

Tab B - Report from Ambassador Kerry in Santiago, 1/26/68 ~~(SECRET)~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 93-448  
By CB, NARA, Date 5-26-95

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*B...*

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ** 96-212  
**By** uip **NARA Date** 2-14-97

*February 15, 1968*

Dear Mr. President:

Ambassador Korry keeps me informed of his periodic contacts with you and developments in your country. I appreciate the confidence you have placed in him.

He recently reported the help you have given us in the USS Pueblo incident. I am sure your forthright remarks to the Soviet Ambassador had their impact in Moscow. By reaffirming Chile's responsibilities for preventing the reopening of hostilities in Korea, you have rendered an important service to the cause of peace in that area. We continue our diplomatic efforts to obtain release of the ship and the crew. We hope the North Korean authorities see the importance of reaching a prompt solution.

There are other activities by the North Koreans directed against the South which cause us deep concern. I hope Chile will continue to use its influence as a member of the United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to discourage these adventures. There is a tendency today to think that the destiny of the world rests exclusively with the super powers. I disagree. The timely exercise of statesmanship by leaders such as you can have great force in the shaping of events.

-2-

Ambassador Korry has written me about some of the difficult political and economic problems you face. I value his counsel. You may also find his insights helpful.

Sincerely,

*(S) Lyndon B. Johnson*

*Please give my best regards to your son -  
I enjoyed so much my meeting.  
L.*

His Excellency  
Eduardo Frei Montalva  
President of the Republic of Chile  
Santiago

LBJ/WGB:mm  
2/14 68



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~~SECRET~~

Message from Ambassador Korry in Santiago (no. 2257), January 26, 1968

SUBJECT: Korea

1. Foreign Minister Valdez, in a telephone conversation, reported that President Frei, upon being informed of my demarche this morning, summoned the Soviet Ambassador, Anikin, to his office early this afternoon to urge that the Soviets exercise maximum pressure on the North Koreans.
2. Valdez first told Ambassador Anikin of United States concerns as expressed by me. He added that in the Chilean point of view there was good cause for very great concern. Such escalation could not be permitted. The Soviets had to control their friends. Chile is very directly involved as a member of the United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) and therefore it had the feeling of a special responsibility.
3. When Ambassador Anikin said he knew nothing beyond what he read in the papers here, President Frei for the first time to the best knowledge of this Embassy lambasted the Soviets directly. He recalled that he had been a member of the Chilean UN Delegation in 1950 and had participated in the drafting of the UN Korean Resolution. He told Anikin that he could not tolerate the idea of a reopening of hostilities there and a new front in Asia. He very much welcomed the US demarche so that he could reinforce to the USSR his and the Government of Chile's grave view. Chile was politically and morally involved in Korea. The Soviets had to act as responsible great power with a full awareness of the UN involvement in Korea and of the risks to all mankind. As the head of a government which had sought to maintain good relations with the Soviets, he hoped that the sincerity of his views would be given the fullest consideration by the USSR.
4. Ambassador Anikin promised to cable and to furnish Moscow's reply.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-211  
By js, NARA Date 12-24-97

Limited Official Use

Wednesday - February 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Letter to President Lleras of Colombia

In the memorandum at Tab A Secretary Rusk recommends that you invite Colombian President Carlos Lleras for an official visit. President Lleras will visit Central America and Europe in late April and May and could probably come to Washington in late May on his return journey.

In my list of recommended actions to dramatize our Latin American policy, you approved several more state visits by Latin American heads of state. This would be one of them.

Approve Lleras visit ☒

Disapprove ☐

Call me ☐

Covey Oliver will visit Bogota later this month on his South American tour. This affords an opportunity for him to hand-carry a personal letter from you to President Lleras. The letter could cover these points:

1. the invitation to visit Washington.
2. Colombia's help in talking to the Soviets on the USS Pueblo.
3. President Lleras's decision to participate in Hemisfair.

A suggested letter for your consideration is at Tab B.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Secretary Rusk's recommendation.

Tab B - Suggested Presidential letter to Colombian President Lleras.

cc - Dick Moose

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1968

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposal for Official Visit to Washington  
of President Lleras of Colombia

Recommendation:

That you invite President Lleras of Colombia for an  
official visit to Washington in May of this year.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

President Lleras plans official visits to Central America and to Europe in late April or May 1968. His travel might take him by way of the United States, which would require that we extend some courtesies to him in any event. We understand Lleras is concerned that his efforts towards social and economic reforms are unappreciated in the United States. Mr. David Rockefeller, in encouraging me to explore possibilities of a visit at this time, indicated that Lleras would welcome an opportunity for himself and his programs to become better known in the United States.

Lleras has been in office since August 1966. His term ends August 1970. Under his guidance Colombia has enjoyed a year and a half of increasing political and economic stability. A firm base has been established for more rapid development, to which Lleras is dedicated.

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-2-

This is the kind of Latin American leadership with which it is useful to identify the United States. Continued developmental progress under Alliance and Punta del Este concepts, to which Colombia is committed, would encourage democratic forces throughout Latin America.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

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*[Handwritten signature]*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-212  
By rip, NARA Date 2-14-97

*February 19, 1968*

Dear Mr. President:

I am taking advantage of Assistant Secretary Covey Oliver's visit to Bogota to send you this letter.

Ambassador Carlson has told me of your plans to visit Central America and Europe in late April or May of this year. I hope your schedule will permit you to visit Washington, perhaps on your way back to Bogota. Ambassador Carlson will be in a position to discuss dates.

I am most grateful for the action you took in the USS Pueblo incident. Ambassador Turbay's expression of serious concern to the Soviet Ambassador in the United Nations over seizure of the ship and the danger this creates for world peace undoubtedly had an impact in Moscow. The authority of your representations is strengthened by Colombia's participation in the United Nations Force during the Korean conflict. I am concerned over other indications of North Korean aggressive intentions toward the Republic of Korea. I believe that reminders of the continued interest of countries such as yours in the peace of that area will help dissuade the North Korean Government from adventures which could lead to a reopening of hostilities.

Ambassador Carlson also has informed me of your decision to participate in Hemisfair. The Fair offers a unique opportunity for the millions of persons who will see the exhibits to become better acquainted with Colombia and to have a deeper appreciation of the contribution of Hispanic America to our country.

-2-

I hope we will have the pleasure of having you and Mrs. Lleras as our guests in the near future.

Sincerely,

*Lyndon B Johnson*

His Excellency  
Dr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo  
President of the Republic of Colombia  
Bogota

LBJ/WGB:mm  
2/14/68

Wednesday - February 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

*1. [Signature]  
2. Profile*

SUBJECT: Birthday Greetings to Sir Alexander Bustamante

On February 24 Sir Alexander Bustamante, former Prime Minister of Jamaica celebrates his 84th birthday.

State recommends that you send him birthday greetings, as you have done in previous years. I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove    

Call me    

Attachment - Suggested Presidential birthday greeting  
to Sir Alexander Bustamante



78a

Proposed Presidential Birthday Greetings to Sir Alexander  
Bustamante of Jamaica on February 24

Dear Sir Alexander:

I join with your countrymen in honoring you on this happy  
occasion of your eighty-fourth birthday.

With best wishes and warm regards.

Lyndon B. Johnson

The Right Honorable  
Sir Alexander Bustamante  
Irish Town Post Office  
St. Andrew, Jamaica