

**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#4 memo	Rostow to President (CAP 80461) <del>C</del> <del>1 p</del> <i>open 4/30/96</i>	2/21/68	A
#7a rpt	Draft Statement by Admiral Smith <del>S</del> <del>2 p</del> <i>open 10-24-97 NLS 96-217</i>	2/21/68	A
#8 memo	Rostow to President, 2:30 p.m. <del>TS</del> <del>1 p</del> <i>with guide 3/28/94</i>	2/21/68	A
#8a memo	DePuy to Joint Staff Director <i>NLS 82-290, 3/28/94, JOW</i> <del>TS</del> <del>6 p</del>	undated	A
#8b index	"Maps" <del>PCI</del> <del>1 p</del> <i>1/</i>	undated	A
#8c map	"Indochina" <del>PCI</del> <del>1 p</del> <i>1/</i>	undatd	A
#8d map	"Air Distance..." <del>PCI</del> <del>1 p</del> <i>1/</i>	undatd	A
#8e map	"General Area" <del>PCI</del> <del>1 p</del> <i>1/</i>	undatd	A
#8f map	"General Area" <del>PCI</del> <del>1 p</del> <i>1/</i>	undatd	A
#8g map	"Battle Area..." <del>PCI</del> <del>1 p</del> <i>1/</i>	undatd	A
#8h map	"Battle Area..." <del>PCI</del> <del>1 p</del> <i>1/</i>	undatd	A
#8i rpt	"Annex A" <del>C</del> <del>4 p</del> <i>1/</i>	undatd	A
#8j rpt	"Annex B" <del>TS</del> <del>7 p</del> <i>1/</i>	undatd	A
#8k rpt	Intelligence Report <i>SA 471 CC 0-94-966 (also 87-95)</i> <del>C</del> <del>5 p</del> <i>more info released 6-10-98 NLS 10-113</i> <i>Ed #329, NSF Country File, Vietnam, b666</i>	2/20/68	A

**FILE LOCATION**

*DUPLS FOR 8L 8M  
at all the same places  
DUPL IN PAPERS OF C. CLIFFORD  
BOX 2 "THE WHITE HOUSE (UNWR)"*

*"ZAR, I Corps + AMZ, 2/68"*  
*ALSO FILES OF UNWR, BOX 7, "THE SANH..." doc. 1g*

**NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 63, February 17-21, 1968 Box 29**

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<del>* See 8 for duplicate</del> #8l rpt	Intelligence Report <i>SANITIZED 94-466 (also 89-75)</i> C 4 p [dupl # 321, NSF Country File, Vietnam, bx66, "ZAZ I Corps DMZ, 2/68"]	2/20/68	A
#8m rpt	Intelligence Report <i>SANITIZED 94-466 (also 89-75)</i> C 2 p [dupl # 321, NSF Country File, Vietnam, bx66, "ZAZ - I Corps DMZ, 2/68"]	2/20/68	A
#12 memo	Rostow to President, re: Pakistan <i>open 8-19-97 NLS 96-214</i> C 2 p <i>(Dup of #102c &amp; 1978, Pakistan, V8)</i>	2/21/68	A
#14a memo	Rusk to President S 11 p <i>open 9-2-97 NLS 96-213</i> [Duplicate of #20a, NSF, NSCH, "March 31 Speech," -Volume 3, Sanitized 1980]	2/20/68	A
#15 memo	Rostow to President, 4:45 p.m. TS 1 p <i>open 6-27-94 NLS 92-190</i> [Duplicate of #78, NSF, Country File, China, Vol. 12]	2/20/68	A
#15a memo	McNamara to President S 1 p <i>open 5-13-93 NLS 92-187</i> [Duplicate of #78a, NSF, Country File, China, Vol. 12]	2/19/68	A
#15b memo	Wheeler to McNamara S 3 p <i>open 5-13-93 NLS 92-187</i> [Duplicate of #78b, NSF, Country File, China, Vol. 12]	2/17/68	A
#15c rpt	"Enclosure A" <i>open 5-13-93 NLS 92-187</i> S 7 p [Duplicate of #78d, NSF, Country File, China, Vol. 12]	2/14/68	A
#15d rpt	"Enclosure B" <i>open 5-13-93 NLS 92-187</i> S 3 p [Duplicate of #78f, NSF, Country File, China, Vol. 12]	undated	A
#15e rpt	"Enclosure C" <i>open 5-13-93 NLS 92-187</i> S 3 p [Duplicate of #78h, NSF, Country File, China, Vol. 12]	undated	A
#17 memo	Rostow to President, 3:15 p.m. <i>open 8-19-97 NLS 96-214</i> S 1 p <i>(Dup of #102c &amp; 1978, Pakistan, V8)</i>	2/20/68	A

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#17a msg	"Proposed Message from Rusk to Oehlert" <i>open 8-19-97 NLS 96-213</i> <del>S 1 p (dup of #178a, Pakistan V2)</del>	<del>undated</del>	A
#20 memo	Rostow to President, 11:55 a.m. <i>open 8-19-97 NLS 96-214</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	2/20/68	A
#20a cable	Seoul 4391 <i>open 9-2-97 NLS 96-213</i> <del>S 3 p</del> [Duplicate of #2, NSF, NSCH, Pueblo Crisis, Volume 17]	2/20/68	A
#26a cable	Seoul 4321 <i>open 9-2-97 NLS 96-213</i> <del>S 2 p</del> [Duplicate of #210, NSF, NSCH, Pueblo Crisis, Volume 16] <i>(Dup of #8a, Korea VS, 8x255)</i>	2/18/68	A
#27 memo	Rostow to President, 10:00 a.m. <i>open 8-19-97 NLS 96-214</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	2/20/68	A
#27a cable	Saigon 19925 <i>open 9-2-97 NLS 96-213</i> <del>S 7 p</del>	2/20/68	A
#28 memo	Rostow to President, 9:55 a.m. <i>open 8-19-97 NLS 96-214</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	2/20/68	A
#29 memo	Rostow to President " " <del>S 1 p</del>	2/20/68	A
#29a rpt	"Near East Region" <i>open 9-2-97 NLS 96-213</i> <del>S 3 p</del>	2/18/68	A
#30 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 8-19-97 NLS 96-214</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	2/20/68	A
#32 memo	Rostow to President " " <del>C 1 p</del> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 2/20/68]	2/20/68	A

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#32b rpt	Bio Sketch <i>exempt 4-30-98 NLJ 96-215</i> C 2 p [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 2/20/68]	1/19/68	A
#32c rpt	Bio Sketch <i>exempt 4-30-98 NLJ 96-215</i> C 1 p	1/19/68	A
<del>#34a cable</del>	<del>Deptel 117432 to Moscow <i>open 9-2-97 NLJ 96-213</i></del> <del>S 3 p</del> <del>[Duplicate of #18a, NSF, NSCH, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 7, Part 13] DATE IN FILES OF WWR, BOX 1, MTGS... JAN. APRIL 1968, Doc #48 d</del>	<del>2/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#34b cable</del>	<del>Moscow 2848 <i>open 9-2-97 NLJ 96-213</i></del> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>2/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#35a memo</del>	<del>McNamara to President</del> <del>C 1 p <i>open 10-26-93 NLJ 93-33</i></del>	<del>2/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#36 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 4:45 p.m. <i>open 8-19-97 NLJ 96-214</i></del> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>2/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#36a memo</del>	<del>Saunders to Rostow</del> <del>S 1 p <i>open NLJ 96-216 5/98</i></del> <del>[Duplicate in Saunders Name File]</del>	<del>2/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#36c cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 5 p <i>sanitized 4-30-98 NLJ 96-215</i>	2/14/68	A
<del>#39 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 4:25 p.m. <i>open 8-19-97 NLJ 96-214</i></del> <del>TS 1 p</del>	<del>2/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#39a cable</del>	<del>Saigon 19824 <i>open 7-2-97 NLJ 96-213</i></del> <del>TS 3 p</del>	<del>2/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#43 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 10:35 a.m. <i>open 8-19-97 NLJ 96-214</i></del> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>2/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#43a cable	Seoul 4326 <i>open 9-2-97 NLJ 96-213</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #213, NSF, NSCH, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 16]	2/19/68	A

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#44 memo	Rostow to President, 10:30 a.m. <i>open 9-19-97 NLS 96-214</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	2/19/68	A
#44a cable	Rawalpindi 3451 <i>open 9-2-97 NLS 96-213</i> <del>S 2 p (dup of #26, Pakistan, V8)</del>	2/18/68	A
#47 memo	Rostow to President <del>C 2 p</del> <i>open 4/30/96</i>	2/19/68	A
#48 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 8-19-97 NLS 96-214</i> <del>S 3 p</del>	2/19/68	A
#60 memo	Rostow to President, 10:10 a.m. <i>open 8-19-97 NLS 96-214</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	2/17/68	A
#62 memo	Rostow to President, 8:45 a.m. " " <del>S 1 p</del>	2/17/68	A
#62a cable	Rawalpindi 3451 3448 <i>open 9-2-97 NLS 96-213</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	2/17/68	A
#63 memo	Rostow to President, 8:45 a.m. <i>open 8-19-97 NLS 96-214</i> <del>C 1 p (dup. of #144, Germany, V14)</del>	2/17/68	A
#64a cable	Saigon 679 <i>open 9-2-97 NLS 96-213</i> <del>S 1 p</del> [Duplicate of #32a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(6), 2/13-20/68, General Military Activity"]	2/17/68	A
#64b cable	Intelligence Cable <i>sanitized 4-30-98 NLS 96-215</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #32b, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(6), 2/13-20/68, General Military Activity"]	2/17/68	A
#67 memo	Rostow to President <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 4/30/96</i> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 2/17/68] (Dup in IT 34 WHCF, CF)	2/17/68	A

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#67a memo	<del>Rusk to President</del> <i>open 4/30/96</i> <del>S 2 p</del> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 2/15/68] <del>(Dup in WHCF, CF, IT 34)</del>	<del>2/15/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#67b rpt	<del>Talking Points</del> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 4/30/96</i> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 2/15/68] <del>(Dup in WHCF, CF, IT 34)</del>	<del>2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#67c rpt	Bio Sketch S <i>1 p</i> <i>(Dup in WHCF, CF, IT 34)</i>	undated	A
#68 memo	<del>Rostow to President, re: Haiti</del> <i>open 8-17-97 NLT 96-214</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>2/17/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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#9b rpt.	Intelligence report - <i>exempt VOC</i> TS 9pp	2/21/68	A
#19 note	Walt Rostow to the President - S 1 p <i>Sanitized 31-04 NW/RAC 03-193</i>	2/20/68	A
<del>#19a rpt.</del>	<del>Intelligence Report - S 1p <i>open 31-04 NW/RAC 03-194</i></del>	<del>[2/68]</del>	<del>A</del>
#13 memo	Walt Rostow to the President - TS 1 p <i>Sanitized 31-04 NW/RAC 03-193</i>	2/21/68	A
#22c rpt.	Intelligence Report - <i>exempt 3/04</i> TS 8 pp	2/20/68	A
<del>#41 note</del>	<del>Walt Rostow to the President - TS 1p <i>open 31-04 NW/RAC 03-195</i></del>	<del>2/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del><sup>b</sup>#41rpt.</del>	<del>Intelligence Report - TS 5pp <i>open 2-25-04 NW/RAC 03-196</i></del>	<del>2/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#54 note</del>	<del>Walt Rostow to the President - S 1p <i>open 2-25-04 NW/RAC 03-197</i></del>	<del>2/17/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#54a memo	Intelligence report - S 2pp <i>Sanitized 5-30-04 NW/RAC 03-198</i>	2/17/68	A
#57a memo	Wheeler to the President - TS 3pp	2/17/68	A
<del>#57b rpt</del>	<del>Intelligence report - <i>open 10/30/09</i> TS 3pp</del>	<del>2/17/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#58 note</del>	<del>Walt Rostow to the President - S 1p <i>open 2-25-04 NW/RAC 03-197</i></del>	<del>2/17/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#58a rpt	Intelligence report - S 1 p <i>Sanitized 5-30-04 NW/RAC 03-198</i>	2/17/68	A
#58b cable	re Vietnam - S 1p <i>Sanitized 5-30-04 NW/RAC 03-198</i>	[2/68]	A

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NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 63, February 17-21, 1968

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ACTION

Wednesday  
February 21, 1968

*Free file  
to Robert.  
2/23/68*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Request that you present awards to outstanding foreign service officers -- April 18

Attached is a letter from Phil Habib, Bill Bundy's Deputy for Vietnam and a real asset to us. Phil is writing in his capacity as President of the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) which is the professional association of the government's foreign service personnel. The association is presenting two awards of \$1,000 each to a junior officer and a middle-level officer who have made an extraordinary contribution to our foreign affairs. Vice President Humphrey is in charge of selecting one of the recipients and Ambassador Sol Linowitz, the other. You are being asked to present the awards at a luncheon held at your convenience, but preferably on April 18.

I think this is a good occasion. It need not take more than a few minutes of your time, if you are pressed. The emphasis on the awards is on youth, merit, dedication in public service, etc. The occasion would be a good one for almost any foreign policy pronouncement you might wish to make -- but no speech is required unless you wish to give one. I understand John Roche is separately suggesting that this would be a good appearance for you to make.

Finally, the association itself has received a good deal of favorable publicity in the past year when its direction was taken over by a dynamic group of young foreign service officers with an avowed aim of breathing more life and vigor into foreign service operations.

I recommend you accept the invitation. You can decide later whether you want to use the occasion for a speech.

*cc: John Roche*

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

MWright:wpt      Call me \_\_\_\_\_



1a

February 14, 1968

Mr. President:

To stimulate intellectual courage and creativity in the conduct of foreign affairs, the American Foreign Service Association plans to establish this year two awards of \$1,000 each. Mid-career and Junior officers in the Foreign Services of the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, the United States Information Agency, and the Peace Corps are eligible.

Mid-career officers compete for the William R. Rivkin Award, donated in honor of the late Ambassador to Luxembourg and Senegal and administered by the Adlai Stevenson Institute. The recipient of this annual award will be selected on the basis of his imaginative and original ideas or other contributions to foreign affairs. Junior officers are eligible for the Harriman Award, donated by Ambassador-At-Large W. Averell Harriman, to be presented each year to a Junior officer who makes an extraordinary intellectual or operational contribution in the field of foreign affairs.

A Committee under Vice President Humphrey is now choosing the recipient of the first Rivkin Award, and a Committee under Ambassador Linowitz is choosing the recipient of the first Harriman Award. Nominees come from all four agencies with officers currently assigned to Vietnam and Africa in the majority.

The Association plans to present the first Rivkin and Harriman Awards at a luncheon ceremony during April. It would be honored if you could attend the luncheon and make the presentations to those younger officers who set such a fine example for the foreign affairs community. The ceremony is tentatively scheduled for 12:30 P.M., April 18, but could be changed to accord with your wishes.

When the Awards Committees have completed their work, I shall forward the names of the recipients and the texts of the citations.

Faithfully yours,

Philip C. Habib  
President

The President,  
The White House.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1968

*Pres file  
sent Rusk via  
pouch 2/23/68*

Mr. President:

You may be interested to learn that you have ratified 60 treaties following the advice and consent of the Senate. In addition, there have been 4 international agreements approved by you pursuant to Congressional legislation.

Attached is a list divided into sessions of the Congress with an asterisk by certain of the more important items.

Faithfully yours,

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

The President,  
The White House.



TREATIES RATIFIED BY  
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Treaty	Approved by Senate	Ratified by the President
<u>(88th Congress, 1st Session)</u> (Jan. 9, 1963 - Dec. 30, 1963)		
* Convention with Mexico for Solution of the Problem of <u>Chamizal</u> , signed at Mexico City Aug. 29, 1963	Dec. 17, 1963	Dec. 20, 1963
* International Coffee Agreement, signed at New York Sept. 28, 1962	May 21, 1963	Dec. 20, 1963
<u>(88th Congress, 2d Session)</u> (Jan. 7, 1964 - Oct. 3, 1964)		
Protocol Amending the Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, signed at Washington Oct. 8, 1963	Jan. 30, 1964	Feb. 6, 1964
Protocol for the Prolongation of the International Sugar Agreement, 1958, signed at London Aug. 1, 1963	Jan. 30, 1964	Feb. 10, 1964
Agreement Regarding Return of Austrian Property, Rights and Interests, signed at Washington Jan. 30, 1959	Feb. 25, 1964	Mar. 4, 1964
Partial Revision of the Radio Regulations (Geneva 1959) with Annexes and Additional Protocol, signed at Geneva Nov. 8, 1963	Feb. 25, 1964	Mar. 16, 1964
International Agreement Regarding Maintenance of Certain Lights in the Red Sea, signed at London Feb. 20, 1962	Feb. 25, 1964	Mar. 16, 1964

<u>Treaty</u>	<u>Approved by Senate</u>	<u>Ratified by the President</u>
<u>(88th Congress, 2d Session)</u> <u>(Jan. 7, 1964 - Oct. 3, 1964)</u>		
Protocol Modifying and Supplementing the Convention on Estate Taxes with Greece, signed at Athens Feb. 12, 1964	June 23, 1964	July 7, 1964
Protocol to International Convention for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Relating to Harp and Hood Seals, signed at Washington July 15, 1963	June 23, 1964	July 13, 1964
Protocol to Income-Tax Convention with Japan, signed at Tokyo May 7, 1960	July 29, 1964	Aug. 5, 1964
Protocol to Income-Tax Convention with Japan, signed at Tokyo Aug. 14, 1962	July 29, 1964	Aug. 5, 1964
Income-Tax Convention with Luxembourg, signed at Washington Dec. 18, 1962	July 29, 1964	Aug. 5, 1964
Protocol Modifying and Supplementing the Extension to the Netherlands Antilles of the Income-Tax Convention with the Netherlands, signed at The Hague Oct. 23, 1963	July 29, 1964	Aug. 5, 1964
Supplementary Income-Tax Convention with Sweden, signed at Stockholm Oct. 22, 1963	July 29, 1964	Aug. 5, 1964
Supplementary Extradition Convention with Belgium signed at Brussels Nov. 14, 1963	Aug. 6, 1964	Aug. 12, 1964



<u>Treaty</u>	<u>Approved by Senate</u>	<u>Ratified by the President</u>
<u>(89th Congress, 1st Session)</u> (Jan. 4, 1965 - Oct. 23, 1965)		
United Nations Charter Amendments, adopted at New York Dec. 17, 1963	June 3, 1965	June 11, 1965
Protocol for the Extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962, signed at Washington Mar. 22, 1965	June 15, 1965	June 21, 1965
Gut Dam Claims Agreement with Canada, signed at Ottawa Mar. 25, 1965	Aug. 30, 1965	Sept. 3, 1965
Protocol to the Convention with Germany Relating to Double Taxation, signed at Bonn Sept. 17, 1965	Oct. 22, 1965	Nov. 15, 1965
Supplementary Income-Tax Protocol with Belgium, signed at Brussels May 21, 1965	Oct. 22, 1965	Nov. 22, 1965
<u>(89th Congress, 2d Session)</u> (Jan. 10, 1966 - Oct. 22, 1966)		
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, signed at Washington Mar. 18, 1965	May 16, 1966	June 1, 1966
Supplemental Convention with the Netherlands Relating to Taxes on Income and Certain Other Taxes, signed at Washington Dec. 30, 1965	June 21, 1966	June 25, 1966

<u>Treaty</u>	<u>Approved by Senate</u>	<u>Ratified by the President</u>
(89th Congress, 2d Session) (Jan. 10, 1966 - Oct. 22, 1966)		
Amendments of Convention of Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, adopted at London Sept. 15, 1964	June 21, 1966	July 6, 1966
Supplemental Protocol Regarding the Convention with Great Britain Relating to Double Taxation, signed at London Mar. 17, 1966	June 21, 1966	July 6, 1966
Protocol for the Further Extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1962, signed at Washington Apr. 4, 1966	July 14, 1966	July 15, 1966
Protocol with Mexico Amending the Agreement Concerning Radio Broadcasting in the Standard Broadcast Band, signed at Mexico City Apr. 13, 1966	June 21, 1966	Aug. 9, 1966
Protocol to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Relating to Measures of Control, signed at Washington Nov. 29, 1965	July 19, 1966	Aug. 16, 1966
Protocol to International Convention for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Relating to Entry into Force of Proposals, signed at Washington Nov. 29, 1965	July 19, 1966	Aug. 16, 1966
Amendments to the International Convention for Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954, signed at London Apr. 11, 1962	Feb. 25, 1964	Sept. 9, 1966



<u>Treaty</u>	<u>Approved by Senate</u>	<u>Ratified by the President</u>
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(89th Congress, 2d Session)  
(Jan. 10, 1966 - Oct. 22, 1966)

Agreement Relating to International Circulation of Visual and Auditory Materials of an Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Character, signed at Lake Success July 15, 1949

May 26,  
1960

Sept. 30,  
1966

Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations with Togolese Republic, signed at Lome Feb. 8, 1966

Sept. 28,  
1966

Oct. 6,  
1966

Agreement on Importation of Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Materials, signed at Lake Success Nov. 22, 1950

Feb. 23,  
1960

Oct. 14,  
1966

International Convention on Load Lines, 1966, signed at London Apr. 5, 1966

Oct. 13,  
1966

Nov. 4,  
1966

(90th Congress, 1st Session)  
(Jan. 10, 1967 - Dec. 15, 1967)

Convention of Mar Del Plata on Facilitation of International Waterborne Transportation, signed at Mar Del Plata June 7, 1963

Mar. 1,  
1967

Mar. 9,  
1967

Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, signed at London Apr. 9, 1965

Mar. 1,  
1967

Mar. 9,  
1967

\* Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, adopted at London Nov. 30, 1966

Mar. 21,  
1967

Mar. 28,  
1967

<u>Treaty</u>	<u>Approved by Senate</u>	<u>Ratified by the President</u>
<u>(90th Congress, 1st Session)</u> (Jan. 10, 1967 - Dec. 15, 1967)		
* Consular Convention with USSR, signed at Moscow June 1, 1964	Mar. 16, 1967	Mar. 31, 1967
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, signed at Rio de Janeiro May 14, 1966	Mar. 1, 1967	Apr. 24, 1967
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, signed at The Hague Nov. 15, 1965	Apr. 14, 1967	Apr. 24, 1967
Exploration of the Sea Conven- tion, signed at Copenhagen Sept. 12, 1964	Mar. 1, 1967	Apr. 24, 1967
Notes Amending the Convention with Canada on Great Lakes Fisheries, signed at Ottawa Apr. 5, 1966 and May 19, 1967	Mar. 1, 1967	Apr. 24, 1967
International Telecommunication Convention, 1965, signed at Montreux Nov. 12, 1965	Apr. 18, 1967	Apr. 25, 1967
Customs Convention on Containers, signed at Geneva May 18, 1956	Mar. 1, 1967	May 3, 1967
Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Professional Equipment, signed at Brussels June 8, 1961	Mar. 1, 1967	May 3, 1967
Customs Convention on the A.T.A. Carnet for the Temporary Admission of Goods, signed at Brussels Dec. 6, 1961	Mar. 1, 1967	May 3, 1967

<u>Treaty</u>	<u>Approved by Senate</u>	<u>Ratified by the President</u>
<u>(90th Congress, 1st Session)</u> (Jan. 10, 1967 - Dec. 15, 1967)		
Customs Convention on the E.C.S. Carnets for Commercial Samples, signed at Brussels Mar. 1, 1956	Mar. 1, 1967	May 3, 1967
Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets and Protocol, signed at Geneva Jan. 15, 1959	Mar. 1, 1967	May 3, 1967
* Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, signed at New York Mar. 30, 1961	May 8, 1967	May 15, 1967
Amendment to Article 109 of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted at New York Dec. 20, 1965	May 8, 1967	May 15, 1967
* Treaty on Outer Space, signed at London, Moscow and Washington Jan. 27, 1967	Apr. 25, 1967	May 24, 1967
Conventions Concerning the International Exchange of Publications and Documents, signed at Paris Dec. 3, 1958	May 8, 1967	May 24, 1967
Convention Concerning the Exchange of Official Publica- tions and Government Documents Between States, signed at Paris Dec. 3, 1958	May 8, 1967	May 24, 1967
Partial Revision of Radio Regulations (Geneva 1959), with Additional Protocol, signed at Geneva Apr. 29, 1966	Aug. 2, 1967	Aug. 10, 1967



<u>Treaty</u>	<u>Approved by Senate</u>	<u>Ratified by the President</u>
<u>(90th Congress, 1st Session)</u> (Jan. 10, 1967 - Dec. 15, 1967)		
Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations with Thailand, signed at Bangkok May 29, 1966	Sept. 11, 1967	Oct. 24, 1967
Consular Convention with France, signed at Paris July 18, 1966	Sept. 18, 1967	Sept. 22, 1967
Supplemental Income Tax Convention with Canada, signed at Washington Oct. 25, 1966	Nov. 2, 1967	Nov. 8, 1967
Income-Tax Convention with Trinidad and Tobago, signed at Port of Spain Dec. 22, 1966	Nov. 2, 1967	Nov. 8, 1967
Supplementary Slavery Convention, signed at Geneva Sept. 7, 1956	Nov. 2, 1967	Nov. 9, 1967
Protocol for the Further Prolongation of the International Sugar Agreement of 1958, signed at London Nov. 14, 1966	Dec. 6, 1967	Dec. 11, 1967
Amendment to Article 28 of the Convention of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, signed Sept. 28, 1965	Dec. 11, 1967	Jan. 8, 1968

February 20, 1968

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS  
APPROVED BY PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON  
PURSUANT TO LEGISLATION

<u>Agreement</u>	<u>Legislation</u>	<u>Approved by President</u>
<u>(88th Congress, 2d Session.</u> <u>Jan. 7, 1964 - Oct. 3, 1964)</u>		
* Agreement with Canada Relating to the Estab- lishment of the Roosevelt Campobello International Park, signed by the President at Washington January 22, 1964	Implementing legislation required for entry into force of agreement approved July 7, 1964 (P.L. 88-363)	President signed the agreement Jan. 22, 1964 and approved implementing legislation July 7, 1964
Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, formulated at the Seventh Session of the Conference held at The Hague Oct. 9-31, 1951	U.S. membership authorized by Public Law 88-244, approved Dec. 30, 1963 (77 Stat. 775)	Membership accepted by the President Oct. 2, 1964
International Regula- tions for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1960, approved by the Inter- national Conference on Safety of Life at Sea held at London May 17- June 17, 1960	Proclamation of Regula- tions authorized by Public Law 88-131, approved Sept. 24, 1963 (77 Stat. 194)	Regulations proclaimed by the President Dec. 29, 1964
<u>(89th Congress, 2d Session</u> <u>Jan. 10, 1966 - Oct. 22, 1966)</u>		
* Articles of Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank, signed at Manila Dec. 4, 1945	U.S. participation authorized and \$200,000,000 author- ized for purchase of shares by Public Law 89-369, approved Mar. 16, 1966 (80 Stat. 71)	Membership accepted by the President Aug. 9, 1966
February 20, 1968		

Wednesday, February 21, 1968

*Pres file*

**Mr. President:**

**Sec. Rusk makes these two suggestions about your meeting with U Thant this morning, based on painful past experience:**

- You should have a notetaker present at all times. (Joe Sisco will be available and would be good.)**
- If U Thant makes any proposal to you, ask him to put it in writing.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**wwrostow:rla**



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 21, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
FOR THE PRESIDENT

CAP 80461

Sen. Mondale called to say he's just back from Minneapolis and it's "rough, real rough" on Vietnam.

He fears John Cowles may get off the bandwagon which would be very damaging.

I said that we are in the middle of a tough battle and he should stay steady.

He said: I will. I just wanted you to know it's rough.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.1(c)

BY phg ON 4/30/96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT

Feb. 21, 1968  
Free file  
WH 80460 <sup>5</sup>

The Delta Airlines jet with 109 passengers aboard which was hijacked earlier today landed safely in Havana at about 4:30 EST.

The plane was on route from Tampa to West Palm Beach when the Captain radioed to Miami that a passenger had entered the cockpit, held a gun at his head and demanded that the plane fly to Havana. The passenger who held the gun is so far unidentified

U.S. interceptor planes rose to the vicinity of the airliner and flew alongside, out of sight, until the plane entered Cuban territorial waters.

The State Department has asked the Swiss, who represent our interests in Cuba, to obtain the return of the plane and its passengers.

Best estimate of Cuban response is that the plane will be allowed to return to Miami.

6  
Febr. 21, 1968

pres file

(on wire to plane)

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT

The Delta Airlines jet with 109 passengers aboard which was hijacked earlier today landed safely in Havana at about 4:30 EST.

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The State Department has asked the Swiss, who represent our interests in Cuba, to obtain the return of the plane and its passengers.

Best estimate of Cuban response is that the plane will be allowed to return to Miami.



*Profile*

Wednesday, February 21, 1968  
2:50 p. m.

7

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a draft instruction for the ninth meeting with the North Koreans.

Nick K. called to say:

- this draft is not cleared with Sect. Rusk;
- it is not cleared with Defense;
- in his view the draft needs more work;
- BUT -- it would be helpful to know if you are prepared to move in the direction of para. 4 or wish to try some other direction.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

7a  
REVISION 5  
2/21/68

DRAFT STATEMENT BY ADMIRAL SMITH

1. I have noted all the statements you have made and particularly your statements at the last meeting. I have also noted the statements which you have given us signed by the crew and by individual officers of the USS Pueblo, and the photographic copies of logs, maps and other records.

2. I have informed you of our hope that this matter can be settled peacefully. I have further informed you of our intentions to hold an inquiry when the officers and men are released. Clearly, the documents you have submitted will be pertinent to that inquiry.

3. I have informed you that the results of the inquiry will be published and that the United States will express its regrets, if the facts revealed by the inquiry justify our doing so.

4. You have requested an apology as a condition of release. We have offered to express regrets if an official inquiry warrants such action. Consistent with that offer, and concurrent with the release,

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-217  
By cb, NARA Date 8-4-97

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

2

I express regrets for any hostile acts ~~which~~, contrary to international law, <sup>which</sup> may have been committed by the USS Pueblo.

Signed: \_\_\_\_\_

John V. Smith  
Rear Admiral, USN



8  
Vol 63

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, February 21, 1968 -- 2:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

I believe you should read the attached documents:

1. Gen. DePuy's rather brilliant comparison of Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu -- at least the first six pages. On page 5 (marked by me in red) are the major differences. On page six (marked by me in green) are his predictions of future enemy tactics.

2. Three most persuasive interrogation reports on the enemy's campaign plan, from a high level prisoner held at Danang.

Taken together, they define what we are up against.

My judgment is we can deal with it in the weeks and months ahead; but we shall need:

- a plan to take the offensive;
- probably more troops in a hurry.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993  
By JDN, NARA, Date 3/28/94

WWRostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET~~



THE JOINT STAFF

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR  
COUNTERINSURGENCY AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

*Excluded*

*8a*  
*---*  
*---*  
*---*

# MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Subject: Comparison of the Khe Sanh Campaign with  
Dien Bien Phu

## I. General

1. Now that the battle of Khe Sanh seems about to enter the critical phase, it may be worthwhile to compare both the general and local situations with the battle of Dien Bien Phu. General Westmoreland has made a decision to defend Khe Sanh. By this decision he is accepting battle on terrain and at a time selected by the enemy. There are those who doubt the wisdom of his decision. It seems highly likely that the critics and doubters will increase in numbers as costs, casualties and battlefield equipment losses are revealed during the course of the battle. We always know about our own losses from the beginning stages of the battle. It will be many months, perhaps years, before the full extent of enemy losses will be known to us. Because of this, criticism and second guessing comes easily. For these reasons, it seems important to draw a comparison between Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu to provide background for a military judgment which has already been taken by the commander on the ground and endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. In the brief report which follows, there is a statistical comparison of the forces involved in terms of their strength, firepower, mobility and support and the physical environment in the area of the two battles. However, before we examine those comparisons it should be established that there is an overall similarity between Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu in the eyes of the enemy. The following subparagraphs

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 82-290

By SP4/ics, NARA, Date 3/28/94

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP - 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

endeavor to outline the enemy view of the general situation in South Vietnam and the importance of Khe Sanh to his apparent strategy:

a. In 1953 General Navarre replaced General Salar as the French Commander. The forces available to him numbered about 522,000. Of these forces approximately forty seven percent or 245,000 were local auxiliaries including Vietnamese, Thai and Cambodians. The Government of Vietnam which had been thrown together as a political expedient under Bao Dai was weak politically and administratively. Corruption was rampant and subversion and penetration widespread. The Viet Minh had captured the patriotic theme of national independence.

b. Widespread guerrilla attacks from the Tonkin Delta to Cau Mau had tied down in defensive bases the bulk of the French Union Forces and their local auxiliaries. De Lattre had left behind a fortified line in the Tonkin Delta manned by auxiliaries and second line troops. It was the opinion of General Giap that the opponent was on the horns of a dilemma. 1/ If he concentrated his forces by withdrawing them from the defense of the populated areas, he contributed to the vulnerability of the rear, stopped pacification operations, and accelerated the possibility of an early takeover by the Communists leading to a "mass uprising". Alternatively, if he remained spread out in a defensive posture then the Viet Minh regiments and Divisions could concentrate at will and destroy his forces piecemeal.

c. ~~In order to shake loose some mobile forces Navarre planned to turn over the "pacification" task to the Vietnamese troops.~~ Giap calculated that these were neither inspired nor reliable and would pose no serious obstacle to the Viet Minh strategy.

d. ~~As soon as Navarre assembled his mobile forces, Giap ordered an immediate offensive by guerrillas throughout the country.~~ When French forces were committed at Dien Bien Phu, Giap ordered an offensive in Laos at Seno, Thakek and Luang Prabang and in Vietnam at Tuy Hoa, Pleiku and An Khe. ~~In February, the Viet Minh seized forty-five strong points in the Tonkin Delta and most of these through defections.~~

e. The Viet Minh had long been convinced that they would not succeed unless and until they achieved a

1/ For compendium of NVN statements and analysis see Annex A



significant military victory, which they believed would demoralize French forces, remove the last vestige of hope from the weak government of Vietnam and finally persuade metropolitan France that the cost of the war was disproportionate to the objectives thereof. Therefore, ~~while recognizing their deficiencies in military power and the formidable logistic problems involved, they nonetheless decided upon a heroic and national effort involving the use of 260,000 porters in order to achieve a major tactical success at Dien Bien Phu.~~

3. It is interesting to note that ~~after the arrival~~ ~~of~~ ~~Dien Bien Phu~~ by four reinforced divisions over a period of ~~almost three months~~ passed before they initiated their major assault on the city of March. Presumably, as any military headquarters or staff would do, the Viet Minh deployed around Dien Bien Phu the largest force they could hope to supply and sustain in intensive combat. It is noteworthy that the enemy force at Xhe Sanh and at Dien Bien Phu ~~are~~ ~~to be~~ ~~of~~ ~~almost~~ ~~identical~~ ~~in~~ ~~strength~~ and ~~surprisingly~~ ~~similar~~ ~~in~~ ~~organization~~. It is rumored that Giap himself is in command at Xhe Sanh as he was at Dien Bien Phu.

4. Although the strategic situation in South Vietnam today differs substantially from the situation in 1953 and 1954, there are enough similarities so that the North Vietnamese might well construct in their own minds, with some wishful thinking, a reasonable parallel.

5. One last general point, prior to Dien Bien Phu, the French Government had decided to negotiate an end to the war. The Viet Minh were aware of this, and in fact, ~~contacts were under way and negotiations had started while~~ ~~Dien Bien Phu was under siege.~~

## II. Comparison (For comprehensive statistical comparison see Annex B) (For Maps, See Appendix 1)

### 6. Location - Setting

	<u>Dien Bien Phu</u>	<u>Xhe Sanh</u>
a. <u>Terrain</u>	Open valley with jungle covered mountains on 2 sides	Open plateau with overlooking jungle covered mountains.
b. <u>Access</u>	No open roads	No open roads



~~TOP SECRET~~

	<u>Dien Bien Phu</u>	<u>Khe Sanh</u>
c. Distances	250 KM to nearest air and log base (Hanoi)	64 KM to Quang Tri; 160 KM to Danang
d. Weather	NE monsoon rain-reduced visibility	NE monsoon rain-reduced visibility

7. Opposing Forces (See Annex 3)

	<u>Dien Bien Phu</u>	<u>Khe Sanh</u>
<u>a. Troops</u>		
(1) Infantry	5 Divs (-) <del>(4,000)</del>	4 Divs (+) <del>5,000</del>
(2) Artillery**	56 Tubes 48 120" mortars 16 122mm rockets	48 120" (+) (Est) 24 mortars (Est) 120" 36 122mm rocket launchers 105 Recoilless (75 or 90mm)
(3) AAA**	36-37" 80 12.7" machine-gun	24-37" 84 12.7" machine-gun
<u>b. Personnel</u>		
(1) Infantry	7,235 French and African 3,579 Auxiliaries (VN, Thai)	5,906 USMC 400 VN Rangers 500 Irregulars
Total	<del>4,000</del>	<del>16,000</del>
(2) Artillery On Position	28 Howitzers 24 120 mm mortars	24 Howitzers 6 4.2 mortars
(3) Armor	10 Lt tanks	None
(4) Other Artillery In Range	None	12 - 175 mm guns

\*\* Estimated on basis OS and TOLZ

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## 8. Supporting Reinforcing Forces

<u>a. <del>Combat air</del></u>	<u>Dien Bien Phu</u>	<u>Khe Sanh</u>
(1) Fighters/ Fighter bombers	77	200+ 200 (+) or ca.:
(2) Bombers	47 (B-26)	B-52 (30/day)
(3) Sorties (Maximum in one day)		
(a) Fighter	99	500 (+)
(b) Bomber	38	40
(4) <del>Ratio bomb tonnage delivered per day approx</del>	<del>1:1</del>	<del>1:1</del>
 <u>b. <del>Log Air</del></u>		
(1) <del>FW</del>	43 C-119 29 C-47 (Maximum one day delivery 123 tons)	60 C-123 108 C-130 + necessary cargo helicopte augmentation (up to 1,000 tons)
(2) Helicopter	Utility only	50 including CH-54 CH-56 Heavy lift as req.
 <u>c. <del>Mobile Reserves</del></u>	<del>600</del> Infantry Bns ( <del>peak</del> delivery only)	17 USMC Bns 22 USA Bns All capable airmobile introduction

*41-4  
Let's consider  
to what is it  
Tons: delivery  
H*

*How many  
times the capacity?  
B*

## III. Campaign Scenario (To Date) (Annex C, Scenario)

9. The sequence of events and preparations are similar in many respects. In both cases the buildup of enemy forces over a period of about a month was followed by a slow encirclement. Prior to the air attack there was prolonged supply activity and just prior to the attack a series of

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coordinated attacks against population centers and support facilities, particularly airfields and LOCs. If the premise in this report is correct -- that is that Khe Sanh is a Dien Bien Phu in the eyes of the NVA, then the evaluation below is probably close to the mark as an extrapolation from the past.

#### IV. Evaluation

##### 10. Probable enemy course of action:

- a. ~~Attempt to strangle Khe Sanh by "axis" or feeder trenches via Dien Bien Phu.~~
- b. ~~Deny use of Khe Sanh airfield.~~
- c. ~~Dig antihillery into crevasses with overhead cover.~~
- d. ~~Ambush air traffic LZs and fortify all commanding terrain.~~
- e. ~~Attack supporting artillery and airfields as far south as Cam Ranh Bay, Tuy Hoa, perhaps Phan Rang and Dien Hoa.~~
- f. ~~Interdict route north of Danang.~~
- g. ~~Raise level guerrilla and sapper activity throughout country.~~
- h. ~~Initiate negotiations.~~

W. E. DePUY  
Major General, USA

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~~TOP SECRET~~

**MAPS**

- I. INDOCHINA
- II. AIR DISTANCE FROM SUPPORT BASES
- III. GENERAL AREA - DIEN BIEN PHU
- IV. GENERAL AREA - KHE SANH
- V. BATTLE AREA - DIEN BIEN PHU
- VI. BATTLE AREA - KHE SANH & DMZ






81:50 2-65


# AIR DISTANCE FROM SUPPORT BASES

8a




# GENERAL AREA - DIEN BIEN PHU

8e




# GENERAL AREA - KHE SANH




8-67 Printed by Army Map Service



# BATTLE AREA - DIEN BIEN PHU



BATTLE AREA - KHE SANH - DMZ



The North Vietnamese View of the "Strategically  
Decisive Battle of Dien Bien Phu

On May 7, 1964 the North Vietnamese celebrated the tenth anniversary of the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Minister of Defense Vo Nguyen Giap, Lt Gen Hrang Van Thai, Deputy Defense Minister and Maj Gen Vuong Thua Vu each published long articles in Nhan Dan which explained the strategy which had led to the decision, and the logic of the dialectic which made victory inevitable. Though replete with the usual Marxian doggerel, excerpts from these articles are probably descriptive of the current North Vietnamese thinking on the role of the "Strategically Decisive Battle," and are quoted and paraphrased below.

"Victory in the strategically-decisive battles will go to the side whose leadership has seized the strategic initiative. It will go to the force which can force the enemy to fight according to his strategic desires and on an advantageous battlefield of his own choosing."

In order to carry out his plan of offensive Navarre planned to concentrate his force and turn the defense of cleared areas to newly created VN units. "He planned to use puppet troops for pacification and his European and African troops for the mobile attack...against our main forces in the North. The planned grand total of enemy forces would then have been about 500,000,"

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 82-290  
By SPW/lcs, NARA, Date 3/28/94



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

One of the weaknesses of the Navarre plan was the "...basic contradiction between dispersal and concentration."

When the initial concentration of almost half of the French strength into Tay Bac (South and east of Dien Bien Phu) was opposed by "our main force attack in Tay Bac the enemy parachuted into Dien Bien Phu with the intention of occupying a position which they said was 'centrally located for offensive strategic purposes' from which they could operate into Lao tribal regions and establish a connection for strategic purposes with Tay Bac."

On 6 December 1953 Giap issued a mobilization order for the movement of three divisions to Dien Bien Phu. With the occupation of Dien Bien Phu it was decided that the French had "...spread out in a number of disconnected places. If we step up our attacks on the enemy's weak points we will force them to disperse their mobile attacking forces. Because the mobile attack forces were dispersed, and because a large part had to protect the various base areas...against the guerrilla effort which was growing daily in strength; therefore (his) problem did not admit a solution. The enemy had become submerged in his own sea of defensive measures."

"To force the enemy to keep an important part of his forces in Dien Bien Phu we surrounded the position but did

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

not attack. They became afraid that we would attack... so they determined not to pull out. They saw it as an ideal place for us to be defeated. If the enemy lost he would lose a decidedly important portion of his force. His strategic capability would be surely weakened and in a larger sense he would suffer an irretrievable political setback."

"Furthermore the struggle movement of the French people in opposition to the Indo China war would be encouraged and the internal contradiction within French ruling circles would grow apace.

"The battle of Dien Bien Phu had already been decided. This was a strategic determination that was carried to fruition by an iron will which did not flinch from difficulties. Our leadership had to dig hundreds of meters of communications trenches under heavy enemy fire. More than 260,000 people gathered together to carry thousands of tons of food supplies to the front. For seven years the French army wished to have a decisive and major combat so as to destroy General Giap's military force. For seven years (we) avoided such an encounter because we lacked the necessary capabilities."

"While not realizing the enemy's strong points, we had to make the most of his weak points. His greatest weakness lay in his supply. Our tactics were from the very

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beginning to use our artillery fire to destroy the air strips, and our anti aircraft guns to cope with his planes. Three months had passed from the occupation of Dien Bien Phu to the launching of our campaign. The historic campaign ended in our complete victory. Our troops had fought 55 days and 55 nights."

History seldom repeats itself in detail. At the same time the appraisal which the NVN strategists made of the French predicament is probably very close to their current appraisal of political conditions in South Vietnam, and the home front situation of the United States. So much so that one can predict, with a good deal of assurance, that the NVN will be deterred from an attempt to bill Khe Sanh as a "second Dien Bien Phu" only by being conclusively defeated in that area.

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ANNEX B

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

84

DBP

KHE

1. Friendly Strength

a. Battle Area  
(Personnel)

(1) (March 13)

(January 29)

French 1412  
For Leg 2969  
Africans 2854  
VN Reg 2151  
VN Aux 1428

10,814

USMC  
4 Yr Bns  
1 Rcn Co

Total 5906

ARVN (Khe-Sanh)  
1 Ranger Bn 400  
RF/PF 97  
USMC & Navy 50  
Advisors 557

CIDG (Lang Vei) 333  
USSF 16  
354

Laos-BV33 552


Refugees  
Bru 5500  
Laos 2270  
7770

(2) (Mar 13-May 6)

4291 Reinforce-  
ments

French 1398  
For Leg 962  
VN & Afr 1931  
4291

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 82-290

By JOH/ICS, NARA, Date 3/28/94

DBP

(3) Casualties  
(Mar 13-May 6)

French	1423
For Leg	2322
Africans	1676
VN	1585
VN Aux	178
	<u>7184</u>

KHE

(4) (Apr 24-Effectives-  
5300 Troops)

(5) Total Casualties

DBP (Mar 13-May 9)

KIA	1980
WIA	5013
MIA	1795
POW (May 7-8)	6500

b. Battle Area  
(Support)

(1) Arty

24 105 How  
4 155 How  
24 120 Mort

18 105 How  
6 155 How  
6 4.2 Mort  
2 175 guns (Rockpile)  
10 175 Guns (Camp  
Carroll)  
Variable

(2) Helicopters  
& Light Air

5 S-55 Helo  
17 Xorane "Crickets"  
(Based both at DBP  
& Muong Sai, Laos)

(3) Armor

2 Platoons of  
Light Tanks

FF NVN

3 MA7  
(24 Jan 68)

c. Support Area  
(Excluding Battle Area)

(1) Ground Force

185,000  
(Includes units  
of all types,  
similar to the  
garrison of DBP)

(1) 17 USMC Bns  
22 USA Inf Bns  
18 Arty Bns (US)  
14 Combat  
Spt Bns (US)

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~~TOP SECRET~~



FF NVN

3 MAP  
(24 Jan 62)

(2) ROK Marines  
4 Bns

(3) ARVN  
35 Bns

(2) Helicopter Support      2 Squadrons  
(24 January)              Sikorsky  
                                 S-55

(1) USMC - 316 UE

(2) USA - 233 UE  
(Considerably  
understated due  
to recent  
deployments to  
I Corps, parti-  
cularly the  
1st Air Cav)

(3) Fighter Aircraft  
(A total of 3700  
support missions  
were flown during  
the 167 day seige.  
Daily sortie rate  
never exceeded  
fifty)  
(The B-26 strength  
is the highest  
operational figure  
attained. Some  
losses were replaced  
by US transfers to  
attain this figure.  
The average number  
available was less  
than this figure.)

32 Fighters  
(Bear Cats)

USMC \*

45 Fighter-Bombers  
(Hell divers,  
Hellcats, Corsairs)

142 Fighter-Bombers

47 Bombers (B-26)

USAF

6 C-119 (equipped  
for napalm  
bombing.)

58 Fighter-Bombers

Navy

Variable

\* Note: The total of 200 Fighter-Bombers currently deployed in  
1st Corps understates the sortie support available from  
other SVN locations.

48 Aircraft were shot down at DBP and 14 destroyed on the  
ground. An additional 167 suffered flak damage. The VC  
also claimed 78 planes destroyed in raids on Gia Lam  
(6 March 1954) and Cat Bi (7 March 1954). Their claim is  
an exaggeration, although this number was probably damaged  
by the raids.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

FF NVN3 XAF  
(24 Jan 63)

(4) Logistic Air Support 43 C-119  
(Total lift during 29 C-47  
the 55 day period A few each of  
(Mar 13-May 8) was miscellaneous  
6,410 tons, with a other types.  
maximum one day  
delivery of 123  
tons)

60 C-123  
108 C-130  
Many other of  
mixed types,  
capable of  
lifting in from  
any of the nine  
major air bases  
of SVN, including  
the helicopter  
support cited  
above:

(5) Heavy Bombardment 5 Privateer  
Bombers  
(2-4 tons)  
These were usually  
used to interdict  
major supply lines  
into DBP.

B-52 as scheduled.

Sortie rate since  
19 January as  
follows:

19	6
20	27
21-22	45
23	24
24	33
25	33
26	33
27	33
28	33

Average - 27/Day

DBPKhe

## 2. Enemy Strength

a. Battle Area  
(Personnel)

308 Div  
316 Div  
304 Div  
312 Div  
351 Div (H)

Total 43,000

325C (5400)  
324B (7800)  
304 (10000)  
320 (7500)  
Separate  
Regiments (7890)

Total 38,590  
(Not all of the above  
have been positively  
identified in the Khe  
Sanh area. A total of  
nine regiments are  
currently carried as  
an immediate threat  
to Khe Sanh)

DAP

Khe

b. Battle Area  
(Support)

(1) Arty

48	75mm How
48	105 mm How
48	120 Mort
36	37mm AA
80	AAMG
12-16	Katyusha Rocket Launchers

(Estimated)

5	152 How
48	85, 105 or 122mm How
105	RR (75 or 90mm)
24	120mm Mort
36	122mm RL
24	37mm AA
84	12.7mm MG

3. Log & Support Rates  
(Friendly)

a. Arty (75 Cal or larger)

93,000  
during the 55 day  
battle

(Viet Minh fired between 103,000 ~~French est~~ and 350,000 ~~VM claim~~. The latter figure is probably correct for total shells of all types, i.e., including organic mortars.)

Variable. Arty and mortars at Khe Sanh are capable of a daily rate in excess of 5000 rounds. Reinforcement or replacement relatively easy.

b. Tac Air

Sortie rate of about 40/day.  
Normal load about one ton plus guns.

Sortie rate  
19 Jan - present

19	0
20	4
21-22	84
23	102
24	144
25	123
26	92
27	74
28	76

Average 70/day.  
Normal load of 3,000 lbs with 1 hour loiter time.

c. Heavy Air

None except occasional use of 6 converted C-119 for napalm and 5 Privateers on route interdiction.

19-28 Jan sortie rate of 27/day.

DBP

K42

d. Air Transport

(1) Helo

Negligible and for utility only.

In excess of 500 UH are in supporting range for both troop movement and resupply.

(2) Fx

About 100 tons/day. Even if other airlift had been available this figure was close to the garrison's cargo handling ability for air-dropped loads.

At least 1000 tons per day. Rate subject to weather, enemy AA defense, and the cargo handling ability of the Khe Sanh garrison.

4. Description of Support Area and Battle Area

a. Terrain

Similar. Each is relatively lower than surrounding terrain which is hilly jungle. See maps for relative terrain.

b. Distance and Displacement

See maps for distances from support bases.

c. Weather.

Dry Season, changing to Monsoon rain in April.

Monsoon, with heavy fog in morning and evening.

5. Scenario of major events, 1 January 1954 - 8 May 1954:

January

Medium level action around Seno, Thakek, Tuy Hoa, Kontum, Pleiku, An Khe and Quang Prabang. All actions VX initiated and moderately successful, except at Tuy Hoa. French claim heavy Viet Minh casualties.



February

- 2 First use of 75mm how by VM at DBP.
- 5. Action in Laos vicinity Luang Prabang drops off. Minor action in Highlands continues.
- 8-20 French initiate heavy action in Red River Delta. Minor action in DBP primarily initiated by French patrols in force.
- 14 French report loss of 45 strong points in Tonkin Delta, mostly through defections.

March

- 6. VM attack Gia Lam. Damage 10 planes.
- 7 VM attack Cat Bi. Damage 68 planes. (VM claim. No detailed estimate of level of damage available.)
- 13 VM attack posts on Hanoi-Haiphong Highway. Capture or destroy 10 posts. Destroy 400 yards of Hanoi-Haiphong Railway. VM initiate final phase of siege on DBP. VM attack northern outpost of DBP. French claim 1500 KIA.
- 15 VM attack Lac-Dao on Hanoi-Haiphong Highway. VM lose 200 KIA.
- 20 French seek US military cooperation.
- 26 VM intensify small unit action in Delta.

April

- 3 Minor VM attacks on 2 towns and trains in Cambodia.
- 7 Small action in Tonkin Delta increases. French consider Hanoi threatened.
- 13 Military train ambushed in Cambodia.
- 20 Heavy action against Tonkin outposts continues.
- 26 GENEVA CONFERENCE BEGINS
- 30 Pressure in Tonkin Delta subsides.

May

- 5. VM renew activity in Tonkin Delta.
- 7-8 Dien Bien Phu falls.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8k

Tuesday, February 20, 1968

TEXT OF CIA REPORT [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: General Giap's Strategy for the Communist General Offensive

The following information was received from interrogation of a Viet Cong prisoner [REDACTED]

He was captured [REDACTED] in Danang.

Summary -- Plans for the VC Tet attack on Danang City were outlined to a group of select cadres on 22 January by Ho Phuoc, Secretary of the Quang Da-Danang Special Zone Committee. Although the VC realized they would be outnumbered and would be wiped out if they attempted to stay in the city, they felt they had to make the attack to carry out their part of the overall plan for the general offensive. The strategy for the offensive was devised by General Vo Nguyen Giap and approved by the Hanoi Cabinet. The USSR later also approved the plan and speeded up delivery of arms and armor so that the VC/NVA would be prepared before October 1967. Giap's strategy entailed two phases and, since Phase 1 failed, Phase 2 (Plan No. 2) will now be placed in effect. The big action will occur in the western highlands and Khe Sanh. Giap's plan is to force the GVN to sue for peace under Hanoi's conditions. -- End Summary

At 1000 hours on 22 January 1968, Ho Phuoc, alias Nghinh, Secretary of the Quang Da-Danang Special Zone Committee, convened a meeting in an uninhabited house in Dien Phuoc village, Dien Ban District, Quang Nam Province. Present were high-ranking cadres in touch with underground elements in Danang City; these cadres had been selected to infiltrate Danang with the task of inciting the masses and penetration agents to support the Communist troops' general offensive to seize power. [REDACTED] This was called the "76-day plan." During the meeting, Phuoc made the following disclosures and assignments in connection with the planned attack on Danang:

A. Senior Colonel Vo Thu, would be in overall command, while his deputy, Senior Captain Hien, would be in charge of special action. Political officer Lieutenant Colonel Duc would serve as Chief of Staff and Captain Pham Duy Dai, member of Special Zone Headquarters, as officer in charge of military affairs and sappers.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 10-113  
By [REDACTED], NARA, Date 6-10-16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 12958  
3.3(b)(1)

B. For the purpose of the attack, Danang would be divided into three operational districts, each headed by a District Committee member. Secretary Sau Hung was placed in charge of District 2 (Danang center), which had the key role of taking over the Government of Vietnam administrative installations. Thus, District 2 VC cadres would automatically constitute the Danang City provisional executive committee, with Sau Hung as Mayor, once the GVN administration had fallen.

As explained by Phuoc, the plan of action for the attack on Danang was the following: Captain Hien had 40 youths aged 16 to 17 of both sexes and carrying birth certificates to avoid the need for GVN identity cards who would infiltrate the city, led by liaison agents, during the period 24-29 January. They would be armed with silencer-equipped pistols, submachine guns and TNT and their mission would be to reconnoiter ARVN and GVN civil installations and to observe GVN intelligence personnel. The latter were to be captured or killed during the general offensive. The VC recognized they would be greatly outnumbered by the ARVN and allied forces in Danang and would probably be wiped out if they drove deep into the city and stayed there a long while. However, if they did not attack the city, they would lose face with the masses and would fail to carry out their part of the general offensive. Therefore, the following plan for the attack on Danang was adopted:

A. Two local main force battalions, R. 20 and Q. 16, would attack and occupy GVN posts around the city. One infiltrated North Vietnamese Army battalion belonging to worksite 2 would be held in reserve.

B. Only a few elements would thrust deeply into the city. These would then immediately withdraw to the city's outskirts to rejoin the above-mentioned units for a prolonged siege of the city designed to pressure the local authorities into negotiating.

C. In the meantime, the special action unit would coordinate with other specialized elements in inciting the population to go out into the streets to 1) struggle against the GVN, 2) demand the creation of a coalition government, 3) destroy fuel dumps and power plants, and 4) steal weapons and ammunition to arm young men and women who had distinguished themselves in previous struggles. These developments would result in the formation of a "dissident army" headed by Pham Duy Dai. Thus, the "uprising" in Danang would appear to be a mass movement against the GVN.

D. The attack would begin on the night of 29/30 January 1968. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] A later order changed the date to the night of 30/31 January, but for some unknown reason the attack was launched as originally scheduled.)

According to Phuoc, the attack of Danang was part of the plan (Plan 2T) for a general offensive and general uprising. He explained that from September 1967 to January 1968, the VC forces suffered many heavy reverses, particularly in



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Khanh Hoa, Phu Yen and Binh Dinh Provinces, where the "liberated" areas shrunk. GVN and allied forces were not as active in the Quang Ngai, Quang Tin, Quang Nam and Danang areas, but they still inflicted such high casualties on the VC that heavy infiltration of NVN troops was still not enough to fill the gaps. As a result, Communist Chinese and Cuban missions made urgent visits to war theater B and returned with the opinion that the Communists could not hold out against the material strength of the GVN and its allies. [REDACTED] The [REDACTED] did not explain the import of "war theater B.") Hanoi therefore decided it would have to negotiate as the USSR had been advising it to do.

General Nguyen Chi Thanh, [REDACTED] was called back to NVN many times to discuss action plans. After Thanh's death, General Vo Nguyen Giap asserted that Thanh's strategy of occupying the rural areas inch by inch and setting up defensive installations was in error, since the Viet Cong installations would be worn down by the Government of Vietnam and allies and sooner or later eliminated. Giap decided that before peace talks were held, it was necessary to hit hard militarily to get the upper hand. Giap thereupon devised the following strategy:

A. The Communists did not need to attack, take and defend the rural area, since the rural population and territory could be won by (1) sending all regular North Vietnamese Army units to the south and (2) using half the communist strength, namely, those units previously infiltrated into South Vietnam, to launch the general offensive against the South Vietnamese cities, with the newly infiltrated units being kept in reserve. This would compel Government of Vietnam forces to pull back to defend the cities, thus leaving the rural areas in communist hands without a fight. This comprised Giap's Plan No. 1.

B. Plan No. 2: If the general offensive against the cities should fail, the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces would pull back and encircle the provincial towns. This would keep the Government of Vietnam and the population under intense strain, the economy would be paralyzed, and foreign aid would have to fill the food supply gap. The piastre would depreciate because the rural areas could no longer supply the cities. The combination of communist military pressure, economic paralysis and popular complaints would force the Government of Vietnam to sue for peace under North Vietnam's conditions.

C. In the meantime, the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army would fight the decisive battle. The western highlands (precise province not specified) would be the main theater of battle, while U.S. forces would be lured into the Khe Sanh area and wiped out. To accomplish this, the communists planned the following:

1. Strong harassment in Southern Laos to permit the shifting of all North Vietnamese Army troops to South Vietnam.
2. Movement of Communist troops and armor into southern Laos across from the western highlands (Khe Sanh area).



3. Surprise intervention by the NVA Air Force to support ground action against ARVN and U. S. troops.

██████████ Giap's strategy was approved by the Hanoi Cabinet, and Le Duan and a Cabinet Minister (name unknown) were sent to Moscow to present the plan to the Soviets and request aid. The USSR accepted the plan and changed its aid policy from a passive one to one of accelerated dispatch of weapons, armor and experts to NVN before October 1967 so that the plan could be put into effect. Since that time, the NVN defense ministry has been directing the war and Giap has personally been commanding the fighting. ██████████

██████████ since the VC attack on Danang has completely failed, the VC will now apply Plan No. 2. Thus, in the days ahead, they will probe GVN/allied reactions by 1) maintaining encircling forces around the city and impose an economic blockade, 2) create extreme tension to arouse popular unrest, and 3) hit the Danang Airbase with heavy rocket attacks. If U. S. and Korean forces cooperate with ARVN and fight the VC actively, the Communists will maintain their encirclement and wait for the big action to begin in the western highlands and Khe Sanh. Only then will they decide whether to continue with the offensive or negotiate from a position of strength. However, if the U. S. and Korean forces support ARVN only with air and artillery, the Communists will quickly intensify their artillery (rocket) firepower and prepare for the general offensive.

██████████ if the offensive is resumed, the VC/NVA tactic will be to attack, occupy and pull out fast. If possible, they will take and hold some positions around Danang, since it will be imperative to take heavily populated areas that will provide shelter and a long-range food supply and will permit the VC/NVA troops to dig in. Simultaneously, a province mobile battalion would be sent to reinforce sapper battalion 402 for an attack on Hoi An City.

██████████ the recent VC attack on Lang Vei was for the purpose of testing allied strength and to lure the U. S. into concentrating its artillery, Marines and airpower in the Khe Sanh area. When the offensive resumes, the Communists will start the battle for Khe Sanh and the western highlands, at which time the Quang Tri Airbase will be shelled while one regiment will attack and occupy Quang Tri City.

██████████ The applicability to Danang of the above-described Plan No. 2 has been confirmed by a document which the Special Zone current affairs section sent ██████████ and which was captured. The document indicates the following Communist intentions:

A. Military: Increase military forces; send one unit to attack deeply into Danang; increase special action activity; assassinate GVN personnel; develop agents and bases inside Danang; launch continuous attacks, both large and small, all over to prevent GVN forces from having enough time to stabilize the situation.

B. Political: Intensify political struggle activity; incite the population to oppose the GVN security measures and to demand its democratic and economic rights; organize the people, prepare them for the struggle and forge organized ranks plus core cadres to lead them with a view to sending the people into the streets in armed revolt; stress the political struggle to smash the GVN administrative apparatus; kill nationalists; seize control neighborhood by neighborhood; introduce the "alliance for democracy and peace" as has already been done in Saigon and Hue.

C. Military proselyting: Proselyte GVN troops and strive to foment rebellion and mutiny.)

comment: statements concerning the Communist strategy and tactics for the offensive against SVN cities and particularly against Danang agree to some extent with what has actually taken place.)

~~SANITIZED~~

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Tuesday, February 20, 1968 1.3(a)(4)

TEXT OF CIA REPORT [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

SUBJECT: Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Tactics and Strategy for the Tet General Offensive

The following information was received from interrogation of a Viet Cong prisoner [REDACTED]

He was captured [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in Danang.

1.3(a)(4)

Summary: According to Ho Phuoc, political officer of Viet Cong Quang Da-Danang Special Zone, General Nguyen Chi Thanh was recalled to Hanoi because of the failure of his strategy in South Vietnam. General Vo Nguyen Giap revised the new strategy, which was to be carried out in three phases, with the ultimate aim of forcing the Government of Vietnam to accept a coalition government with the National Liberation Front. Phase 1 called for a general offensive against the cities. If this failed, Viet Cong troops during Phase 2 would besiege the cities and, at the same time, lure U.S. troops into the Khe Sanh area. Phase 3, which was expected to coincide with the establishment of a coalition government, would involve a decisive battle in the Kontum-Pleiku or Saigon area. In support of this new strategy, the North Vietnamese/Viet Cong planned to increase activities in southern Laos to permit the infiltration into South Vietnam of most Regular North Vietnamese Army units. The latter would try to avoid pitched battles with U.S. troops and, instead, to confine them in their bases. End Summary.

During 1967, the Viet Cong acted as though they were weakening in order to mislead the Government of Vietnam and its allies. In reality, men and weapons were moved in South Vietnam in considerable quantity. The Viet Cong anticipated that the U.S. would increase its strength in South Vietnam during the summer of 1968 and they wanted to increase their own strength first. The Viet Cong also planned to put the greatest possible pressure on the U.S. during 1968, the year of the U.S. Presidential elections.

~~SANITIZED~~

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-466

By inf, NARA, Date 6-15-95

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED]  
Ho Phuoc, political officer with field grade rank of the Quang Da-Danang Special Zone and a member of Viet Cong Military Region 5 Committee, told [REDACTED]

1.3(a)

[REDACTED] that General Nguyen Chi Thanh had been recalled to North Vietnam because of the failure of his strategy, Phuoc quoted General Vo Nguyen Giap as having said that the South Vietnamese battlefield had to be reconsidered because Thanh had made a mistake in applying the strategy of occupying rural areas, establishing organization in those areas and trying to hold on to them. This had resulted in Viet Cong troops being eliminated by Government of Vietnam troops and B-52 bombers. [REDACTED] delegations from Communist China, North Korea and Cuba had visited the South Vietnamese battlefields and, upon returning to North Vietnam, had reported unfavorably on the situation in South Vietnam. [REDACTED] he learned during November 1967 from Colonel Vo Thu, alias Ngoc, Chief of the Quang Da-Danang Special Zone, that Giap had also said there had to be an acid test prior to negotiations.

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] the following factors were taken into consideration in planning the new strategy for South Vietnam.

1.3(a)(4)

A. Coordination between Allied and Government of Vietnam troops was loose and Allied troops only tried to protect their own bases. The wanton killings by Korean troops had caused the people to lose confidence in the Allied troops.

B. Government of Vietnam troops were widely scattered because of their use in the rural reconstruction program and could, therefore, easily be separated and destroyed. The U.S. would support Government of Vietnam troops only with air and artillery, not with infantry troops.

On the basis of these factors and the failure of Thanh's strategy, the following new three-phase strategy was formulated:

A. Phase 1: Attacks on, and protection of, rural areas would be limited. At an opportune time, a general offensive against South Vietnamese cities would be launched. Except in important cities like Saigon and Hue, only one half of available forces, namely, the local combat

[REDACTED]  
1.3(a)(4)



1.3(a)(4)

experienced units, would be committed. This general offensive would cause the Government of Vietnam troops to pull back to protect the cities, leaving the rural areas to the Viet Cong. Thus the Viet Cong would achieve a complete victory in the rural areas without the necessity of fighting there.

B. Phase 2: If the general offensive should fail, Viet Cong troops would retreat and surround the cities and villages to create an intense and serious situation and to exhaust the economy. At the same time, the Viet Cong would use decoy tactics to lure as many U. S. troops as possible into the Khe Sanh area, thus reducing U. S. strength in other areas.

C. Phase 3: Because of the pressures generated by Phase 2, the Government of Vietnam would probably agree to accept a coalition government with the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. Simultaneously with the demand for a coalition government, North Vietnam would launch a decisive battle with a view to providing political support to the Front element in such a Government. This battle would occur in either the Kontum-Pleiku area or the area around Saigon. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] during indoctrination lectures given in November-December 1967, Colonel Thu said that the Saigon battle area (i. e., Binh Long, Phuoc Long, Phuoc Tuy, Bien Hoa, Tay Ninh and Gia Dinh provinces) would be an important battlefield because of the proximity of the supply route from Cambodia. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Thu went on to say that if the B3 Front were chosen, the Viet Cong would fight only in Kontum and Pleiku provinces because of the strong U. S. /Government of Vietnam forces in those areas and because the North Vietnamese High Command could easily support that area across the Laotian/Vietnamese border.)

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] in order to carry out the new strategy, it was planned that all activities in the southern part of Laos would be increased so that most regular North Vietnamese Army units other than coastal defense units, anti-aircraft units and units guarding important installations, could infiltrate into South Vietnam. All forces would be used to attack U. S. troops and to lure them to the Khe Sanh area and away from the decisive battle areas. [REDACTED] although in the past, Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army troops had fought against U. S. troops, the new surprise strategy required them to avoid such combat and to try only to besiege and hold U. S. troops in defensive positions at their bases.

[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

According to [REDACTED] Ho Phuoc [REDACTED] the U.S. Government had requested the Government of Vietnam to accept a coalition government with the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam but that the Government of Vietnam had refused. The U.S. , Phuoc said, wants to bring the war to an honorable end in 1968. It also wants to resolve the problem of the almost 1,000 pilots captured by North Vietnam. Both the U.S. and North Vietnam, Phuoc continued, realize that neither side can win the war and they, therefore, both want a coalition government as a means of ending the conflict.

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1.3(a)(4)

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

94-466

By 1-8, NARA, Date 6-15-95 Tuesday, February 20, 1968

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TEXT OF CIA REPORT

1.3(a)(4)

SUBJECT: Viet Cong General Offensive Plans for Danang, Hue, Quang Tri and Other Centers in Viet Cong Military Region 5

The following information was received from interrogation of a Viet Cong prisoner

He was captured in Danang.

1.3(a)(4)

From briefings he received during November-December 1967,

learned that the Viet Cong planned to take the following steps in Danang City in connection with the projected general offensive:

- A. Besiege the city and prevent resources from entering it.
- B. Wage a war of nerves against the city.
- C. Attack the airfield by rockets to blockade Government of Vietnam and allied troops within the city.
- D. Increase shelling of the airfield should allied troops provide only artillery and air support for Government of Vietnam troops and try to protect their own bases.
- E. Should allied troops be deployed to reinforce Government of Vietnam troops retreat from the city and try to besiege the surrounding area while awaiting the outcome of the Khe Sanh and western highlands (Pleiku-Kontum) battlefields. The Viet Cong would then launch a general offensive or ask for negotiations, depending on their position.

1.3(a)(4)

indications of a general offensive on Danang were to be: The shelling of Danang and Nhon Nuoc airfields for two consecutive nights; the shelling of fuel storage facilities, I Corps headquarters, and ordnance installations; and attacks by Sapper Battalion 2 on the Lien Chieu fuel storage area, the Nam O bridge and ships moored in the Hoa Khanh area. Viet Cong forces reserved for the offensive against Danang would be one regiment of the North Vietnamese army 2nd division (the other two regiments would be held for possible use in a very decisive battle), one mobile battalion of the Quang Nam Province main forces, one Sapper element, and newly infiltrated Regiment 31 of North Vietnamese Army 341st division

1.3(a)(4)

in Hue, Viet Cong forces were to overrun the city and to hold it by all means. If attacked by Government of Vietnam/allied forces, they were to move from one house to another but were not to be allowed to retreat from the city, even if this meant the sacrifice of the entire regiment. Thus, the Viet Cong forces would have to hold Hue until the battle broke out in the Khe Sanh area, the Pleiku-Kontum area or the Saigon area.

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED]

In Quang Tri Province, the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army planned to eliminate the Lang Vei post as a means to lure the U.S. into concentrating all of its power--artillery, marines, aircraft--in the Khe Sanh area. When the plan had worked out properly, the Viet Cong planned to launch a decisive battle in either the Pleiku-Kontum area or the Saigon area. Once this was begun, the Viet Cong would then shell the airfields. One regiment would attack Quang Tri City and try to hold it at all costs.

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] in other areas of Viet Cong military region 5, specifically in the provincial capitals where the allies are weak and have no large military bases such as Hoi An, Tam Ky, Bong Son, Hue and Kontum, the Viet Cong planned to use military forces to liberate the people; in the strongly defended cities, the Viet Cong would employ political means as the main force, although they would also fight militarily if possible.

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] If Government of Vietnam/allied troops wish to fight successfully against the Viet Cong attack on Danang, they must helilift their troops behind Viet C lines and attack from the rear. They should outnumber the Viet Cong three to one and be prepared to fight not only the Viet Cong retreating from the city but also the Viet Cong reserve forces trying to penetrate the city. At the present time, Government of Vietnam regular forces should be used to conduct operations to observe and discover the movement of Viet Cong units and front line laborers. At the same time, the Government of Vietnam troops should be allowed to rest and recuperate so as to be prepared for the coming decisive battle.)

[REDACTED]

INFORMATION

9

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, February 21, 1968  
10:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bus Wheeler's report on today's call to Westy.

Main item: firepower now allocated to try to clean up Hue by the end of this week.

Gen. Johnson will report the daily phone call in Bus' absence.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

Authority PC 10-2-78

By iply, NARA, Date 2-20-92





~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3032-68  
21 Feb 1968

~~This document contains CODE WORD material.~~  
9a  
**DECLASSIFIED**  
Authority JCS Ltr 10-3-78  
By ip/ky, NARA, Date 2-25-92

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND

1. You will have already received General Westmoreland's 17th report on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. Additionally, I am attaching hereto a copy of the Presidential operations/intelligence brief of salient activities over the past twenty-four hours, together with a sheet of recent items which you will find of interest.

2. General Westmoreland reported that the situation was generally quiet and that he had little of significance to add to what is in the operational/intelligence brief. He made really only two points:

a. General Abrams, located at Headquarters MACV Forward in the Hue/Phu Bai area, conferred today with General Cushman, over-all Marine Commander; General Lam, the Vietnamese I Corps Tactical Zone Commander; and General Tolson, Commander of the U.S. First Cavalry Division. The subject of their conference was the situation in Hue and how best to deal with it. General Westmoreland has agreed to send one troop of U.S. armored cavalry (units such as this are equipped with medium tanks) to Hue tomorrow to provide additional armored firepower to friendly forces operating against a heavily dug-in enemy. Moreover, he is providing an additional ten 106 mm recoilless rifles to the Vietnamese Marine Corps battalions which are fighting in the Citadel in order to give them more mobile destructive power against enemy bunkers. He thinks that with the added firepower Hue can be cleaned out by the end of this week.

b. Another new weapon, a 107 mm rocket made by the CHICOMS has been picked up in-country. He describes the projectile as being about 42 inches long and weighing 40-odd pounds; no launcher has yet been captured. The technical intelligence people estimate that this weapon would have a range of between 8,000 to 9,000 meters. Samples of this weapon will be provided to technical intelligence agencies in the United States for further evaluation.

3. General Westmoreland has arranged for me to see President Thieu, Vice President Ky, and General Vien during my stay in Vietnam. Ambassador Bunker has also made arrangements for me to confer with him and key members of the mission

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~57~~ of ~~7~~ copies

~~TOP SECRET~~

staff.

4. During my absence General Johnson, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, will talk by telephone to General Westmoreland each morning to provide you with the updates of the situation. I shall, of course, communicate with you and the Secretary of Defense promptly any significant items which cannot await my return next week.



EARLE. G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff.

~~TOP SECRET~~

10

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, February 21, 1968  
8:55 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Another quiet day at Khe Sanh/DMZ:

- mortar fire less;
- 143 tons delivered;
- weather continues poor.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *gs/bc 10-2-78*

By *ip/ky*, NARA, Date *2-20-92*

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, February 21, 1968, 8:40 AM

## TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number seventeen on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area and covers the 24-hour period of February 20, 1968.

A small unit encounter and intermittent enemy shelling constituted the principal activity in northern First Corps yesterday. The pace of enemy incoming fire slackened somewhat during the period. Incoming to friendly forces bordering the DMZ totaled 124 rounds of mixed caliber mortar and artillery.

A marked decline in enemy efforts was evident yesterday as only 69 rounds of mortar fell at Khe Sanh. Five kilometers east of Ca Lu, the Marines received six rounds of mortar and an equal amount of artillery rounds. The ramp at Dong Ha received six mid-afternoon rounds of artillery, causing minor injuries to two Marines. Elements of the Marines at Camp Carroll bore 13 enemy rounds of mortar; and finally Marines, at Con Thien received 28 rounds of mortar in an early morning barrage. Casualties attributed to the shelling: 10 Marines wounded (five evacuated).

In ground contact during the day, a contact at Thon Le Xuyen confirmed nine North Vietnamese Army killed and captured seven POW's, two recoilless guns, one mortar and nine individual weapons. Casualties to friendly forces were: three killed, eight wounded (evacuated).

There were a total of 296 tactical air sorties flown. The Marine aircraft wing flew 64 sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area. Bomb Damage Assessment included three secondary explosions, two secondary fires. The Air Force flew 146 and the Navy flew 86. The weather was still unsuitable for any but combat sky spot missions.

Thirty-nine B-52's flew 13 strikes in the Niagara area.

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Authority OSD Ltr 1/3/79  
By ip/ry, NARA, Date 2-20-92

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- 2 -

Aerial resupply for the reporting period amounted to 143 short tons. In addition, 90 passengers were flown into the airfield in three C-123 aircraft. Eleven C-130 completed 11 airdrops.

There was one COFRAM mission of 15 rounds fired on the basis of a sensor report of enemy troop movement. Results were unobserved.

For the next 24-hour period, the Marines will fly 44 tactical air sorties in support of Khe Sanh, the Air Force will fly 148, and the Navy plans 100, for a total of 292 sorties. There will be nine ARC LIGHT strikes (27 sorties) flown in the Niagara area.

Weather at Khe Sanh during the period produced low clouds and dense fog and reduced the ceiling and visibility to near zero except from 2:00 PM to 4:00 AM when the ceiling improved to 100 - 500 foot overcast and the visibility from 1/4 to five miles in fog. The forecast for Khe Sanh for the next 24 hours is for little change.

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THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

106

21 February 1968  
5:00 AM EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST,  
20 Feb (9:00 AM 21 Feb, SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) status  
as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>DAYS SUPPLY</u> <u>ON HAND</u>	<u>PREVIOUS STATUS</u> <u>8:00 PM 19 Feb EST</u> <u>(9:00 AM 20 Feb SVN)</u>
Class I (Rations)		
Meal, Combat Individual	1.5	2 days
B Rations	9	9 days
Class III (Fuel)		
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	9	9 days
JP-4 (Jet Fuel)	4	3.6 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	1.7	2.6 days
Diesel	4	6 days
Class V (Ammunition)		
a. High explosive:		
60-mm mortar	26	20 days
81-mm mortar	15	17 days
90-mm (Tank)	92	93 days
4.2" mortar	24	24 days
105-mm howitzer	21	21 days
155-mm howitzer	16	16 days
b. Anti-Tank:		<u>ROUNDS ON HAND</u>
90-mm HEAT		385
66-mm rocket (LAW)		1,385
Anti-tank mines (M-15)		48
Anti-tank mines (M-19)		334
Anti-tank mines (M-21)		100
106-mm HEAT		144
106-mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T)		991
3.5" rocket		690

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
By 14 NARA, Date 2-20-92

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	<u>DAYS SUPPLY ON HAND</u>	<u>PREVIOUS STATUS</u> 8:00 PM 19 Feb EST (9:00 AM 20 Feb SVN)
Class V (COFRAM)		
105-mm howitzer	5	5 days
155-mm howitzer	5	5 days
40-mm grenade launcher	5	5 days
Hand grenades	10	10 days

(Transmission difficulties have prevented complete up-dating. Additional data on Classes I, III and V will be furnished in tomorrow's report.)

2. On 20 February Khe Sanh was resupplied with 143 tons as follows:

Class I	78.5 tons
Class III	44 tons
Class V	20.5 tons

*Marshall B. Garth*  
MARSHALL B. GARTH  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:

SECDEF  
DEPSECDEF  
CJCS (3)  
DJS (3)  
J-30  
J-31  
J-32  
J-33  
J-4  
AWR  
MCCC  
DDO  
ADDO  
CCOC  
PAC DIV  
CT FORCE  
PAC DESK

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*Profile*

INFORMATION

Wednesday

February 21, 1968 - 8:35 a.m.

SITUATION ROOM MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Explosion at Soviet Embassy

State reports that a State representative went to the Soviet Embassy to view the damage and one room on the ground floor, in the front of the building, sustained considerable amount of damage. Additionally, 20 to 30 windows were knocked out -- there were no injuries. The explosion occurred at the front of the building, instead of the rear.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, February 21, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Wheat for Pakistan

*over*  
12  
*Pres file*  
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-214

By ck, NARA Date 8-4-97

We have one small issue outstanding with respect to the wheat deal with Pakistan that you discussed with President Ayub. I hate to drag you through it, but Joe Fowler is holding out for a ruling from you. The facts are as follows:

1. PL 480 requires that we make a five-year transition from local currency sales of food to long-term dollar credits (10 years grace, 40 years to repay). This is designed (a) to ~~help~~<sup>help our</sup> long-term balance of payments, (b) to relieve us of the burden of excess currencies, and (c) to add the discipline of a dollar debt to enforce the self-help conditions attached to the food.
2. We are therefore increasing the percentage of dollar credit in each PL 480 agreement by 20% per year, starting with CY 1967. Thus, for example, 1966 agreements with Pakistan were all local currency sales; 1967 agreements have a 20% dollar credit component; and 1968 agreements will have a 40% dollar component. By 1971 the transition required by law will be complete.
3. The issue on this Pakistan agreement is whether we use the 1967 rule (20% dollar credit) or whether, since it will be signed in 1968, we apply the 40% requirement.
4. All the relevant agencies except Treasury recommend the more lenient 20% treatment. They argue that the real negotiation of this package happened between October and December 1967. The Paks are doing us the favor of buying 100,000 tons of wheat. Nothing was said throughout the negotiations --including your talk with Ayub--about hardening the terms. The Paks certainly won't agree and they will think they have been double-crossed.
5. Joe Fowler maintains that the rule is that we will apply 40% to any agreement signed in 1968 and that we should stick by it. He is worried that if we make an exception here we will not hold the line elsewhere, and that an exception could cause trouble on the Hill.
6. We worked out a compromise in January whereby we would put the agreement before the Paks with the 40% component, but if they objected we would immediately fall back to 20%. This compromise was conveyed to Ben Oehlert.

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7. Ben came back with a very strong cable in which he said that tabling this package would (a) put him in an "extremely awkward and embarrassing position" with Ayub because this escalation of terms had not been discussed when Ayub was making up his mind on our proposal, and (b) jeopardize chances of a second 500,000 ton arrangement you authorized us to negotiate after this one is signed. He urgently requested reconsideration and reversal of the terms decision.

I think Ben is right. It is only because the bureaucracy grinds so slowly that this agreement will be signed in 1968 rather than 1967. We shouldn't penalize the Paks for that. More important, they almost certainly wouldn't accept the grain on these terms (their bumper crop gives them this option) and they would be in a very poor frame of mind to consider the further package we hoped to negotiate. The balance of payments advantage Joe is worried about amounts to about \$5 million which we would get over 30 years starting in 1978. And I am less than impressed by his worries on the Hill when Orville Freeman -- who will manage the renewal of PL 480 -- favors the softer terms because it is more important to move wheat to Pakistan than to hold them up for slightly more dollar credits.

After more than a week of deliberation, Fowler has decided that he can't clear a message authorizing 20% terms unless you authorize it.

W. W. Rostow

Go ahead with 20% terms (Rowtow, Gaud, Freeman, Battle, Oehlert position) \_\_\_\_\_

Go ahead with 40% terms (Fowler position) \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

EKH/vmr

CONFIDENTIAL



Mr. Rostow 13

*Pres file*


~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, February 21, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U Thant and the Middle East

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(6)  
(1,3,6)

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1. We've had a lot of reports on the Jarring from both Arabs and Israelis. But we haven't heard anything from Jarring directly.
  2. Some of the parties seem to have started out with Jarring from the positions they held before the November 22 resolution. Kosygin also seems to have gone back to talking about withdrawal first.
  3. Our position is still that all elements of the resolution must be dealt with as a package. We have been urging both Israel and the UAR to accept that position and get on with whatever talks Jarring can arrange.

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-193  
By is, NARA, Date 2-13-04

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 20, 1968  
9:15 PM

14  
*Pres. file*

Mr. President,

Herewith, talking points and agreed press statement (tab C) for U Thant session 11:00 AM tomorrow Wednesday.

We learned from intelligence sources he will make a statement of his own Friday. You may-- or may not--wish to probe him or attempt to influence him in your session tomorrow.

We know he would like some part of his time with you alone.

  
W.W. Rostow



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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~~SECRET-NOBIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Talk with UN Secretary-General  
U Thant, February 21

Your meeting with U Thant will: (a) afford him the opportunity to give you a first-hand account of his recent meetings with the North Vietnamese, Soviets, UK and De Gaulle; (b) afford you the opportunity to impress U Thant with the numerous steps you have taken to get negotiations started, particularly the step forward embodied in the San Antonio formula. (TAB A contains a useful summary of the San Antonio formula. TAB B is the paper given to you by Governor Harriman which summarizes United States peace efforts and which you may wish to draw upon.)

We understand the Secretary-General will not make any new, formal proposal to you, and we presume he will convey substantially the information given Arthur Goldberg last week about Hanoi's responses to his questions as relayed through Mai Van Bo in Paris. According to U Thant the North Vietnamese made the following responses:

1. Mai Van Bo indicated that the San Antonio formula could not be accepted because it posed conditions to the cessation of bombing.

2. In answer to U Thant's question whether talks could take place in less than three or four weeks if the U.S. stopped bombing, Hanoi said they "will hold talks with the U.S. at the appropriate time; that is as soon as the unconditional cessation of

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-213

By us, NARA Date 8-22-97

~~SECRET-NOBIS~~



~~SECRET-NODIS~~

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bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV becomes effective." U Thant understands that the French have been informed by Hanoi that only two weeks would be required to verify that Hanoi's conditions that the cessation be "effective". (We have not had verification of this from the French.)

3. As to whether there could be a reconvening of the Geneva Conference following discussions between the U.S. and Hanoi, Hanoi stated that convening of the Geneva Conference could be discussed between the U.S. and Hanoi;

4. Hanoi also indicated that the U.S. would be free to raise any item in talks with the DRV, including the question of reduction of hostilities in South Vietnam. The Secretary-General points out that in the past Hanoi has said this latter question would have to be discussed with the NLF;

5. As to who should represent South Vietnam at Geneva, Hanoi responded that the question of participation could also be discussed between the United States and Hanoi.

In your responses we suggest you may wish to make the following points:

1. There can be no question of our deep interest in achieving prompt and productive negotiations;

2. The key problem is that the other side must not take advantage of a bombing cessation;

3. The San Antonio formula and the Clifford statement constitute the most flexible possible position consistent with minimum security for United States and allied forces;

Mr. President:  
Here I  
would  
refer to  
Airborne +  
Marines  
you saw  
over  
week-end.

W -

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~~SECRET-NODIS~~

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4. Following the Trinh statement of December 29, 1967, we promptly explored Hanoi's position through intermediaries;

5. Hanoi has responded with a clear rejection which it communicated privately through the intermediaries, publicly through editorial comments and militarily through heavy attacks on South Vietnam's cities;

6. Despite Hanoi's response, all our proposals made for peace in Southeast Asia remain valid;

7. We are prepared to continue our cooperation with the Secretary-General's efforts toward a peaceful settlement.

Although we understand U Thant will make a statement of his own views later this week, we have obtained his agreement to a low-key statement (attached) to be issued by George Christian after your meeting with the Secretary General.

*WLS*  
*for*

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

- TAB A - San Antonio Formula
- TAB B - "Our Efforts to seek a peaceful  
Settlement of the Vietnam Conflict"
- TAB C - Press Statement
- TAB D - Schedule



~~SECRET~~SAN ANTONIO FORMULA

The U.S. position on the cessation of the bombardment of North Viet-Nam was set forth in President Johnson's September 29, 1967 speech in San Antonio. As the President said:

"The U.S. is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Viet-Nam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Viet-Nam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation."

The U. S. is not assuming that North Vietnam will cease its support to its forces in the South. On the contrary, as Secretary of Defense designate Clark Clifford testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we assume that until a cease-fire is agreed on, Hanoi "will continue to transport the normal amount of goods, men and munitions."

In setting forth its assumption, the U.S. is not setting a condition, but attempting to make clear to North Vietnam that any cessation of U. S. bombing followed by actions by Hanoi taking advantage of the cessation (such as an increase by Hanoi of its infiltration of men and supplies or attacks in the area of the DMZ) would constitute such bad faith on Hanoi's part as to make continued U. S. forbearance impossible. If Hanoi, by taking advantage, forces the U. S. to resume bombing the possibilities of a negotiated solution would drastically recede. Under such circumstances calls for intensified U. S. military action would increase and the possibility of another halt in the bombing would be low. The U. S. is trying to ascertain whether Hanoi appreciates this vital fact and fully understands the importance the U. S. attaches to the no-advantage assumption.

At San

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-213

By us, NARA Date 8-22-97~~SECRET~~

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At San Antonio the President, in addition to setting forth his assumption, stated his readiness to stop the bombing when such action would lead "promptly to productive discussions." "Productive discussions" are serious exchanges in which either side will be able to put forward for full consideration in good faith its position on any matter. "Prompt" of course refers to a willingness by Hanoi to begin discussions with the U. S. immediately after cessation of bombing.

It is worth noting that Hanoi is unwilling to give a clear response to questions as to the length of time between a U. S. bombing cessation and the beginning of talks. If Hanoi were serious in desiring talks then surely its response would have been one of unequivocal readiness to begin immediately.

The U. S. evaluation of Hanoi's current position takes into account Hanoi's actions as well as its words. The unprecedented offensive against most of South Viet-Nam's urban centers, which Hanoi treacherously launched in the midst of the traditional Tet holidays, causing widespread civilian casualties and suffering, was made notwithstanding the fact that we were still exploring with Hanoi its position through diplomatic channels, and that we had exercised restraint in bombing targets in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong. In this context, we cannot but weigh Hanoi's words with great skepticism and caution. These actions carry a harsh political message:

The U. S. favors every effort to obtain clarification of Hanoi's position. We shall continue to evaluate all information and to pursue every possible avenue which promises to bring us closer to the resolution of this conflict through serious negotiations.

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~~SECRET~~OUR EFFORTS TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT

There follows a brief recapitulation of our efforts, over the past few years, to seek a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam. This review merely gives the highlights of our own many direct and indirect initiatives and the responses we have made to the initiatives of others. Each incident or event alluded to below can be documented in detail.

The efforts of the United States to bring about negotiations started even before the introduction of American combat troops into Vietnam. In early April 1965, the President in a speech at Johns Hopkins stated that the U. S. remains "ready for unconditional discussions". At about the same time we told a group of Seventeen Unaligned Nations that we approved of its efforts and would welcome "negotiations without preconditions". For almost three years, this has been the keynote of all American initiatives and of its responses to the initiatives of others. This remains our position at the present time.

The United States position on the cessation of the bombardment of North Vietnam was set forth in San Antonio by President Johnson on September 29, 1967: "The United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation".

The United States is not assuming that North Vietnam will cease its support to its forces in the South. Rather, we assume that until a cease-fire is agreed on, Hanoi (as stated by Mr. Clark Clifford) "will continue to transport the normal amount of goods, men and munitions". The United States is not setting a condition here, but attempting to make clear that any cessation of United States bombing followed by actions by Hanoi taking advantage of the cessation (such as

an increase

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-213

By us, NARA Date 8-22-97

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an increase by Hanoi of its infiltration of men and supplies or attacks in the area of the DMZ) would constitute such bad faith on Hanoi's part as to make continued United States forbearance impossible.

At San Antonio the President also stated his readiness to stop the bombing when such action would lead "promptly to productive discussions." "Productive discussions" are serious exchanges in which either side will be able to put forward for full consideration in good faith its position on any matter. "Prompt", of course, refers to a willingness by Hanoi to begin discussions with the United States immediately after cessation of bombing.

This position has been conveyed to Hanoi through a private, confidential channel -- a channel which Hanoi has every reason to believe is reliable and sympathetic. This will be described in further detail below.

Over the past several years we have made repeated efforts to refer the Vietnam issue to the United Nations Security Council and have responded to the Secretary General's initiatives. In August 1964, we requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the North Vietnamese torpedo boat attack on United States ships in international waters. Ambassador Goldberg made several efforts throughout the summer and fall of 1965 to engage the United Nations in a search for peace in Vietnam and on January 31, 1966 and again on August 8, 1967 we reiterated our desire for an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the situation in Vietnam. None of these efforts has been successful -- because of the obstruction of the Communist delegations and the refusal of North Vietnam to recognize the competence of the United Nations.

The Secretary General, recognizing the difficulties of working directly through the United Nations, has taken many steps on his own initiative to bring about negotiations or at

least

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least preliminary talks. Three such efforts warrant special mention.

In late 1964 and early 1965 U Thant had several conversations with Ambassador Stevenson to the effect that the North Vietnamese were prepared to meet with United States representatives secretly in Rangoon. The terms of such a meeting were never reported to Washington with any precision. U Thant's reports were assessed in the light of available intelligence information and the offers then being made by various hopeful intermediaries. We doubted that U Thant's approach contained substantive value and recognized that, to the extent Ho Chi Minh was involved, it could have been designed to embarrass us with Saigon. We did not reject the Secretary General's offer: we simply indicated that we were not ready to proceed at that time. Nevertheless, U Thant later claimed that we rejected this opportunity for direct negotiations with Hanoi.

On August 31, 1966 U Thant made a three-point proposal to halt bombing, scale down the fighting and enter into discussions and on March 15, 1967 he proposed a general ceasefire, preliminary talks and reconvening the Geneva Conference. The United States and the GVN welcomed both proposals and agreed to discuss them seriously and promptly. Hanoi rejected both.

The United States on its own, or in response to initiatives by allied, unaligned and Communist countries, has made many attempts to engage Hanoi in meaningful discussions. Some of these efforts, while public knowledge now, were kept highly secret at the express request of the North Vietnamese. One of the events in this category was the one that culminated in Warsaw in late December 1966, but which had its beginning in Saigon in late June. The United States was led to believe that the North Vietnamese would be in Warsaw to meet the American representatives, but they did not appear. In

retrospect,

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retrospect, it seems evident that they never intended to do so short of further United States concessions to be made in Warsaw well beyond what the United States originally understood to be the terms of a meeting. The Warsaw talks broke down despite a United States proposal that there would be "no bombing within 10 miles of Hanoi City Center . . . for an indefinite period if talks can be gotten underway shortly." The United States also suggested that talks could occur in Warsaw or in any third country, secretly or openly.

In the course of January and February 1967, United States representatives had a number of contacts with North Vietnam officials in Moscow. During these sessions the United States made several substantive proposals including suggestions of a broad agenda, indications of our willingness to consider measures of de-escalation (over and above the 10-mile bombing limit on Hanoi which was still in effect), and agreement to a prior cessation of bombing upon private assurances that the North Vietnamese would subsequently de-escalate its military actions. This series of meetings was climaxed by a personal letter from President Johnson to President Ho, offering to stop bombing and United States troop reinforcements upon assurances that North Vietnamese infiltration was stopped. Ho Chi Minh rejected the President's proposals on February 15 (on March 21, Hanoi made public the texts of both messages).

In early February 1967 (just prior to, during, and shortly after Tet), Mr. Kosygin was in London for high-level talks. We were in close touch with Mr. Wilson and took three separate occasions to ask Mr. Wilson to pass on to Kosygin our deep concern that the North Vietnamese not take advantage of the bombing pause to send men and materiel South. We pointed out to Mr. Wilson, who in turn informed Mr. Kosygin, that prospects for any extension of the bombing pause and the likelihood of talks leading to a settlement hung on our conviction that Hanoi was not taking advantage of our restraint. But Hanoi sent 3 divisions and vast supplies just north of the DMZ. This posed a grave threat to our forces. Nevertheless we extended the Tet pause for the better part of 2 days to permit Mr. Kosygin to communicate to Hanoi a last-minute message from Mr. Wilson.

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In April of 1967, we agreed to a Canadian proposal to restore the integrity of the Demilitarized Zone. More than this; we proposed that the Demilitarized Zone be expanded by ten miles North and South of the present lines, providing the ICC would be able to supervise the Zone. We indicated that this could be regarded as a first step in phased de-escalation. Hanoi rejected both the Canadian proposal and our own.

In late August of 1967, the United States sent a special emissary to Paris to serve as a direct channel to two private French citizens who had established direct contact with the North Vietnamese regime. These Frenchmen went to Hanoi, having first been carefully informed of the U.S. position. On the basis of their report we then delivered a message through our emissary that the United States would agree to stop all military actions against North Vietnam if Hanoi would agree to engage in prompt talks regarding a political settlement of the war. The message was, in fact, consistent with Foreign Minister Trinh's statement that "talks could start" if the bombing stopped. Hanoi rejected the U.S. offer as containing "conditions" and this dialogue ended on October 20.

In late 1967, as a result of discussions with the President, the leaders of a foreign state decided that the U.S. was sincerely interested in a negotiated solution and that their Government would approach Hanoi to explain the U.S. position and to attempt to arrange talks between the U.S. and the North Vietnamese.

A high-ranking official of that foreign state, with our encouragement, went to Hanoi in December and came to Washington in early January. His report made to the Secretary of State and Governor Harriman included the essence of the December 29 Trinh statement, which was released subsequent to his departure from Hanoi. He was given a written message to take back to Hanoi explaining in detail the U.S. position based on the San Antonio formula and asking for clarification of Hanoi's position. He was also informed that the U.S. would exercise certain restraints in bombing targets in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong. He agreed to return to Hanoi as he regarded the U.S. response as a step towards peace.

However,

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- 6 -

However, on February 12, after his return to his own capital, he reported by teletype that Hanoi rejected the San Antonio formula contending that it contained conditions, a principle that was unacceptable. Before his message was received and notwithstanding the fact that Hanoi knew we were still exploring its position and still exercising certain bombing restraints, Hanoi treacherously launched in the midst of the Tet holidays an unprecedented offensive against most of South Vietnam's urban centers which caused widespread civilian damage and suffering. Our Ambassador at the foreign capital has been instructed to obtain fuller details of the official's impressions, but there is no doubt that Hanoi has rejected the U.S. position based on the San Antonio formula.

In addition to the events described above there have been indirect contacts, with our encouragement, with North Vietnamese representatives through the Italians, French, Swedes, Norwegians, Romanians, Indonesians, Burmese, Swiss, Japanese, Indians, Canadians, Egyptians, Russians and others. We have given encouragement to the efforts of the International Red Cross, the Quakers, journalists (Communist and non-Communist), businessmen, pacifists, clergymen, and parliamentarians. Since May of 1965 we have instituted a number of bombing pauses (one in January-February 1966 lasting 37 days).

We are still continuing every effort to find a path towards a peaceful settlement.

*Walt*

February 20, 1968

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VISIT TO WASHINGTON, D.C., OF HIS EXCELLENCY U THANT, SECRETARY  
GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
Wednesday, February 21, 1968

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 21

6:30 a.m.	USAF Aircraft will depart from Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland
7:30 a.m.	Arrival at LaGuardia Airport, New York, New York
9:05 a.m.	Secretary General U Thant will arrive at LaGuardia Airport. Marine Air Terminal
9:15 a.m.	Departure from LaGuardia Airport.
10:15 a.m.	Arrival at MAC Terminal, Washington National Airport, Washington, D.C.
10:20 a.m.	Departure from the Washington National Airport.
10:35 a.m.	Arrival at Blair House.
10:55 a.m.	Departure from Blair House
11:00 a.m.	Arrival at the Southwest Gate of the White House
	The President will greet the Secretary General at the Diplomatic Entrance.
12:00 noon	Departure from the White House.
12:05 p.m.	Arrival at Department of State to meet with Secretary Rusk, Amb. Goldberg and other senior Department officers.
12:30 p.m.	Luncheon by the Secretary of State.
2:15 p.m.	Departure from the Department of State.
2:30 p.m.	Arrival at Washington National Airport, MAC Terminal.
2:40 p.m.	USAF Aircraft will depart from Washington National Airport, Washington, D.C.
3:40 p.m.	Arrival at LaGuardia Airport, New York, N.Y.

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INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Tuesday, February 20, 1968  
4:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the report of Chicom airspace violations you requested, including:

- a debrief of the pilot who transited Hainan airspace (Tab A);
- new CINCPAC measures to prevent likelihood of future violations (pp. 4-5, Tab A).

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 92-190  
By ju, NARA, Date 6-21-94

WWRostow:rla



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

687

15a

19 FEB 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Violations of Communist China Airspace

1. In response to Mr. Rostow's memorandum of 14 February 1968, I am forwarding General Wheeler's reply. This includes his summary of the reasons for the 8 confirmed violations since 1 January 1967; the EA-1F pilot's report of the 14 February 1968 incident; and CINCPAC's existing measures and his corrective action which are designed to prevent future occurrences of this nature.
2. I remain concerned over the possible magnitude of airspace violations over Communist China. The procedures and equipment designed by the JCS and CINCPAC to prevent airspace violations have no doubt prevented many more serious incidents. They are by no means perfect. Malfunctioning equipment and pilot error will prevent the complete eradication of violations so long as our air operations in Southeast Asia continue in the geographical area required by existing circumstances.
3. The determination of when an airspace violation occurs is not an exact science. DIA maintains a summary of incidents divided into three categories -- "confirmed," "probable" and "possible." From 1 January 1967 until 15 February 1968, DIA carried:  
  
8 Confirmed  
8 Probable  
64 Possible
- DIA's criteria suggest that an undetermined number of violations not confirmed may also have occurred. I believe, therefore, that it would be inadvisable to conclude publicly that only 8 violations of CHICOM airspace have occurred since 1 January 1967.
4. I plan to ask the Chairman and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering for a more thorough review of existing measures to prevent violation of CHICOM airspace.

Enclosure

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~~TOP SECRET~~

*Robert S. McNamara*

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-187

By 10, NARA, Date 5-13-93

Sec Def Cont Nr. X- 1182

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Page 1 of 1 Pages



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y 1 of 12 copies 687  
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3024-68  
17 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Chinese Communist Airspace Violations (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to a White House memorandum, dated 14 February 1968.
2. (S) This memorandum informs you of the results of the investigation of Chinese Communist airspace violations during the last year and actions designed to avoid the likelihood of future violations.
3. (S) Enclosure A is a report of the 14 February 1968 airspace violation at Hainan Island, including a report of the debrief of the pilot of the surviving aircraft. The attached maps show the planned route of flight and the reconstructed flight track of the A-1 aircraft. The pilot debrief describes the sequence of events which led to the violation and loss of a US pilot and aircraft.
4. (S) I concur with the conclusions contained in Enclosure A, and consider that the action taken by CINCPAC in establishing more southerly boundaries for transiting single engine aircraft will assist in reducing the likelihood of future violations of Hainan Island airspace.
5. (S) Enclosure B contains a chronological listing of four Hainan Island airspace violations during the last 12 months. A review of these incidents clearly reveals, in each instance, human error to be the primary cause. Two of the incidents occurred during ferry flights from the Philippine Islands to the Republic of Vietnam. The corrective measure of moving transit corridors farther south will assist in preventing future incidents of this

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By lig, NARA, Date 5-13-93

GROUP - 3 Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified
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type. The two other violations involved aircraft launched from YANKEE STATION aircraft carriers. Both aircraft were conducting Gulf of Tonkin support missions. They experienced equipment malfunctions and committed navigation errors. Fleet regulations governing air operations in the area require all aircraft to be under positive radar surveillance. Additionally, all aircraft are prohibited from approaching Hainan Island closer than 20 miles. The control procedures are being expanded which will enhance aircraft control and improve radar coverage.

6. ~~(TS)~~ Enclosure C lists three CHICOM/NVN border violations during the past 12 months. The pattern established by these violations is related to US offensive air activities (ROLLING THUNDER) in the northeast section of NVN. A contributing factor in two of the three incidents was weather conditions that required the pilots to deviate from planned routes. Their situation was further aggravated by the attendant degradation of radios and navigation aids caused by thunderstorms, and by actions to evade NVN air defenses. In the other instance, the pilot violated the CHICOM/NVN border while in process of escorting a damaged strike aircraft.

7. ~~(TS)~~ Our radar and communications systems for providing warning to friendly aircraft approaching the CHICOM border, have been progressively improved during the past 14 months. The operational intelligence gathered is now channeled to a central facility located on Monkey Mountain near Danang. Additional operational data became available to the Control Center when the Positive Identification and Radar Advisory Zone (PIRAZ) ship was tied into this system. Then, a radio relay aircraft (KC-135) was positioned in the Gulf of Tonkin to give the Battle Commander at Monkey Mountain the capability to provide warning against border violations direct to friendly aircraft. By the end of January 1968, computerized facilities at the centers were operational and scheduled improvements to the electronic system were installed and became operational. Since 24 August 1967, there have been no violations of the NVN/CHICOM border.

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8. ~~(TS)~~ I believe that adequate steps are being taken to prevent future violations of CHICOM airspace. All personnel are aware of the extreme sensitivity of this subject.



EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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15c

ENCLOSURE A

HAINAN ISLAND INCIDENT - 14 FEBRUARY 1968

BACKGROUND

- On 14 February 1968, two US Navy A-1 type aircraft overflew the southeast coast of Hainan Island. The flight was attacked by MIG aircraft. One US aircraft was shot down and one landed safely at Danang AB, Republic of Vietnam.

FROM DEBRIEF OF SURVIVING PILOT

- Two A-1 type aircraft were scheduled for a routine ferry flight from Cubi Point NAS, Philippine Islands, to the aircraft carrier USS CORAL SEA. ROBINSON 777, the call sign of the surviving pilot, was lead aircraft and CANASTA 404 was the wingman.

- The flight plan route was as depicted by TRACK #1 on the attached map, Tab A. The flight plan conformed to standard operating procedures established by Commander, US Seventh Fleet. The reconstructed track is depicted on Tab A as TRACK #2. The flight departed Cubi Point NAS and proceeded on planned heading to first visual check-point, Scarborough Shoal. The pilot informed the navigator of sighting the Shoal 6-8 miles to the south of his position.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 92-187  
By lip, NARA, Date 5-13-93



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He set his autopilot to the planned course and subsequently checked and reset it every 30 minutes. He estimated his time to Bombay Reef as one hour plus 34 minutes. En route, towering cloud buildups necessitated a gradual climb to 12,500 feet. An undercast cloud deck precluded a visual sighting of his next checkpoint, Macclesfield Bank. After passing the cloud buildup a gradual descent was made and at the estimated time of arrival over Bombay Reef he saw an elliptical shaped reef through a break in the clouds approximately 20 miles to the south. He reported this reef to the navigator as Bombay Reef (suspected position, 20 miles north of LINCOLN ISLAND, 60 miles north of planned course, TRACK #1) and turned to his new heading. The navigator obtained a radar picture of an island which confirmed his belief that they were on course. It is believed he erroneously identified Rocky Island (Amphitrite Group) as Drummond Island (Crescent Group). At this point he was approximately 60 miles northeast of intended track. Approximately 30 minutes later the pilot attempted to contact Danang and the USS CORAL SEA with no success. He then attempted to determine his position from navigational aids without success. A gradual descent was begun and approximately one hour later he sighted land through a break in the clouds, about eight miles ahead. The estimated

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time en route was near that planned and the pilot believed his position to be off the coast of southern North Vietnam. He turned north to find a familiar landmark from which to proceed to the CORAL SEA. Shortly thereafter, he saw CANASTA 404 in a 70° dive, observed a parachute and heard an emergency rescue radio signal (beeper) The pilot, ROBINSON 777, saw a MIG aircraft to his left rear and immediately descended into the clouds to escape attack. ROBINSON 777 successfully evaded the MIG aircraft and landed at Danang AB. (ROBINSON 777 and his navigator were unable to give exact location of the bail-out but estimated it as approximately 8 miles east of Hainan.)

#### DISCUSSION

- A reconstructed track, TRACK #2, indicates that ROBINSON 777 was approximately 8 miles north of his intended track, TRACK #1, at the first checkpoint, Scarborough Shoal. He sighted this point at the proper elapsed time of flight. He subsequently encountered clouds and climbed to a higher altitude. At the correct elapsed time, he saw what he thought to be a scheduled checkpoint, Bombay Reef, TRACK #1. He was actually 20 miles north of Lincoln Island, TRACK #2, approximately 60 miles north of course. His navigator incorrectly identified another island checkpoint and confirmed his position. At this time, the pilot turned to a northerly heading, 3° more than

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planned, and flew toward Hainan Island. ROBINSON 777 thought he was near the coast of North Vietnam and was trying to orient himself when his wingman was shot down.

#### CONCLUSIONS

- This incident occurred because of poor navigation by ROBINSON 777 and his navigator. Contributing factors were weather, an undercast which permitted only an occasional view of the ground/water, and marginal operating efficiency of his radar (range was only 40 miles versus normal range of 100 miles). ROBINSON 777 experienced a change in wind direction and increased velocity during his climb and cruise at a higher altitude. This could have contributed to his being north of course.

#### ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT THE LIKELIHOOD OF FUTURE VIOLATIONS OF HAINAN ISLAND AIRSPACE

- On 16 February 1968, CINCPAC directed the following action be taken:

a. CINCPAC component commanders will take immediate action to revitalize measures to prevent future Chinese Communist border violations by aircraft transiting from the Philippine Islands to the Republic of Vietnam.

b. CINCPACFLT will modify procedures to conform to more southerly boundaries for flights of single engine

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aircraft flying from the Philippine Islands to RVN or to aircraft carriers on YANKEE STATION. (New boundary is depicted in red on Tab B. Previous corridor is depicted in green on Tab B).

c. CINCPACAF will ensure that PACAF single engine aircraft flying from the Philippine Islands to RVN do not fly north of present boundaries. (PACAF boundary, established 2 July 1967, is depicted in blue.)

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












TAB B  
TO ENCLOSURE A



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ENCLOSURE B

HAINAN ISLAND INCIDENTS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 92-187  
By L-0, NARA, Date 5-13-93

1. The following violations of Hainan Island airspace by US aircraft have occurred since 1 February 1967:

a. Background:

- On 9 February 1967, a US Navy E-1B from the aircraft carrier USS BENNINGTON overflew the southern tip of Hainan Island. The aircraft was on a routine communications relay mission with instructions to remain 200 miles from the USS BENNINGTON and a minimum of 20 miles from Hainan. Antiaircraft artillery fire was received but there were no hits on the aircraft. Two MIG fighters reacted to this flight but no intercept occurred. The aircraft recovered with no damage or injury to crew members.

Cause:

- The USS BENNINGTON was operating under EMCON (Electronic Emission Control - all radars, communications and navigational equipment off for a specified time). The aircraft's radar was out of commission and the pilot was navigating by DF (Direction Finding) fixes using radio beacons located in northern South Vietnam. Navigation by this system is considered an emergency category aid. The flight was conducted at 5,000' above an undercast. The primary cause of this violation was determined to be navigation error by the pilot, the contributing factor was weather.

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Enclosure B

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b. Background:

- On 2 June 1967, a US Marine Corps A-4E flew over the east coast of Hainan Island. The aircraft was on a ferry flight from Cubi Point, Philippine Islands, to Chu Lai Air Base, Republic of Vietnam. The radar control station at Danang, Panama Control, observed the aircraft on radar, alerted the pilot, and vectored him away from the island. The aircraft landed at Chu Lai without further incident. There was no CHICOM reaction.

Cause:

- The aircraft TACAN (Tactical Air Navigation) system malfunctioned resulting in a navigational error by the pilot.

c. Background:

- On 26 June 1967, a USAF F-4C flew within five to eight miles of Hainan Island. The aircraft was on a ferry mission from Clark Air Base, Philippine Islands, to Danang AB, Republic of Vietnam. Friendly radar observed the aircraft and vectored the pilot away from the island. MIG-17 aircraft intercepted and downed the F-4C with cannon fire, approximately 20 miles south of the island. The two crew members successfully ejected and both were recovered.

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Cause:

- Investigation determined that the aircraft navigation system had failed and that the pilot's problem was further compounded by radio interference which delayed his reception and understanding of the radar operator's instructions.

d. Background:

- On 31 January 1968, a US Navy EA-1F aircraft flew within five miles of Hainan Island. The aircraft was on a passive ECM (Electronic Countermeasure) mission, with a planned track to remain 20 miles off Hainan in accordance with Commander, US Seventh Fleet regulations. The aircraft was under positive radar/NTDS tracking throughout the flight, and numerous unsuccessful attempts were made to contact him. Another aircraft on a combat support mission intercepted the EA-1F aircraft, flew alongside and waved him away. Both US aircraft recovered aboard safely.

Cause:

- The incident resulted from navigation error by the pilot.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-187

ENCLOSURE C

By mg, NARA, Date 5-13-93

CHICOM/NVN BORDER INCIDENTS

1. The following violations of the CHICOM/NVN border by US aircraft have occurred since 1 February 1967:

a. Background:

- On 26 May 1967, a US Navy F-8E penetrated the CHICOM border to a depth of approximately eight miles in the area southeast of Ningming Airfield. The aircraft was performing fighter escort in support of a carrier based strike against Kep Airfield. There was no CHICOM reaction and the aircraft returned safely. During the attack on the airfield, a strike aircraft was damaged by antiaircraft artillery fire and departed the target area to the northeast and subsequently headed southeast. While concentrating on providing cover for the damaged, egressing aircraft, the F-8E penetrated the border.

Cause:

- The primary cause of this violation was determined to be navigation error compounded by a friendly aircraft emergency situation.

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Enclosure C

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b. Background:

- On 21 August 1967, three US Navy A-6 aircraft penetrated the CHICOM border to a probable depth of five to eleven miles in the area southeast of Ningming Airfield. The incident occurred during egress following a four A-6 aircraft strike against the Duc Noi POL depot, seven miles northeast of Hanoi. Prior to reaching the target the leader's wingman was hit by antiaircraft artillery fire but continued to attack. In the target area the lead A-6 was hit and downed by a surface-to-air missile. Upon departing the target area, the three remaining A-6s, including one with battle damage to the flight controls, turned northeast to circumnavigate thunderstorms and evade missile activity and antiaircraft artillery fire. (Commander Task Group 77.4 estimated that a total of 23 surface-to-air missiles were fired at the strike group.) The flight was tracked approaching the border by US air and shipborne radar and numerous warnings were transmitted. Two of the A-6s were attacked and downed by CHICOM MIGs after penetration of the border. The third A-6 evaded the MIGs by entering a thunderstorm.

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Cause:

- The primary cause of this incident was determined to be navigation error, compounded by evasive maneuvering, necessitated by intense enemy defenses and thunderstorm activity which contributed to poor radio reception.

c. Background:

- On 24 August 1967, two US Navy F-8C aircraft, on a weather reconnaissance mission, penetrated the CHICOM border to a depth of 25 miles, approximately 10 miles east southeast of Ningming Airfield. US shipborne radar tracked the flight approaching the border; border warnings were transmitted followed by an advisory to the flight to turn to a heading of 180 degrees. There was no CHICOM reaction and the aircraft recovered aboard without further incident.

Cause:

- The primary cause of this violation was determined to be navigational error. A contributing factor was the weather, thunderstorms, and multiple layer clouds necessitating numerous course changes.

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ACTION

*Pres file*

Tuesday, February 20, 1968 -- 4:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Water for Peace

I recommend that you approve the following proposal of Sec. Rusk, set forth in his memorandum of January 28 to you: that you authorize Secretary Rusk to encourage the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) in their efforts to develop model methods for community water systems by conveying your willingness to make a congratulatory statement at an appropriate time.

This proposal has been reviewed by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget and your Science Advisor, as well as by my staff, and they concur in the recommendation.

A memorandum from the Director of the Bureau of the Budget summarizing the proposal is attached. The proposal is also supported by Treasury, Interior, and all other interested agencies.

A proposed Presidential statement is at Tab A.\*

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

\* AEC, AID, Commerce, HEW, and HUD.

CEJ:feg:WWRostow:rla

16a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

FEB 15 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Water for Peace

Secretary Rusk requests, as an interim measure in the Water for Peace program, that you authorize him to inform the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) that you are willing to make a statement congratulating them for their programs to develop community water supply systems in Latin America. Treasury, Interior, and other interested agencies concur in this request.

This proposed action would encourage the IDB and PAHO to cooperate in a project to develop model methods of designing, financing, installing, and operating small community water systems. This important innovation could bring piped potable water to isolated villages throughout Latin America. If successful, the model techniques developed in Latin America could be extended to Asia and Africa.

The actual timing and occasion for your congratulatory statement would depend on the progress of the project and the development of other possible Water for Peace or Alliance for Progress initiatives. More extensive Water for Peace proposals are now being considered for submission to you.

Recommendation

I recommend that you authorize Secretary Rusk to encourage IDB and PAHO in their efforts to develop model methods for community water systems by conveying your willingness to make a congratulatory statement at an appropriate time. Don Hornig concurs in this recommendation.

Attachments

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*Charles J. Zwick*

Charles J. Zwick  
Director

## ATTACHMENT

SUMMARY OF INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF  
WATER FOR PEACE

On May 22, 1967, responsibility for overall direction and coordination of the Water for Peace program was assigned to the Secretary of State. A Water for Peace Office was established immediately and Ambassador Robert F. Woodward was appointed Interim Director.

The Office has promoted the expansion and improvement of regional water resource centers in Asia and Latin America, and the establishment of such centers in the Middle East and Africa. AID plans to allocate over \$1.7 million in FY 1969 for this purpose. In addition, as part of the United States effort in the International Hydrological Decade, training for hydrologists and other water resource specialists will be increased under existing State Department and AID training and scholarship programs.

Community water supply has been identified as a priority area and the Office of Water for Peace has encouraged U.S. Government agencies and international institutions to cooperate in developing model methods for establishing simple and efficient community water supply systems. Latin America was selected as a "demonstration area" primarily because of the existence of regional goals and competent regional institutions in the field of community water supply.

A preliminary survey of the international water-related activities being carried out or supported by the U.S. Government has been made. In summary, it indicates that 950 projects, carried out by 12 U.S. Government agencies and 12 international organizations to which we contribute, constitute the U.S. portion of the Water for Peace program. Expenditure of U.S. funds for these activities, both bilateral and multilateral, total over \$400 million annually. Although most projects serve more than one purpose, an approximate breakdown of U.S. expenditures shows 18% for water supply and sewer systems, 17% for irrigation and drainage, about 55% for hydropower, and 10% for other uses.

The Office has played a useful role in coordinating the participation of U.S. Government agencies in water-related programs directed primarily at scientific or foreign policy objectives other than economic assistance. In particular, the Office has worked with the Department of the Interior and the Atomic Energy Commission on cooperative arrangements with the governments of several Middle Eastern countries.

As the Office acquires greater expertise, it expects to do long-term planning to determine world water needs and methods of meeting those needs. In particular, it will explore alternative ways of utilizing U.S. scientific and technological progress in areas such as desalting and weather modification to help meet global water requirements.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 28, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Program of Water for Peace

Recommendation

That, as an interim measure in the Water for Peace Program, you express your willingness to make a statement, at an appropriate time, congratulating the Inter-American Development Bank and the Pan American Health Organization for their programs to develop community water systems in Latin America, particularly stressing their technical innovations in this field.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion

The Office of Water for Peace, other interested United States agencies, and the Pan American Health Organization are working to develop model techniques to meet the great need for community water systems. The Inter-American Development Bank is now considering how best to participate in this effort. The purpose of the project is to develop model methods of designing, financing, installing and operating water systems which could be used by medium-sized and small towns throughout Latin America.

The model methods project would make it possible to use more effectively loan funds provided by the Inter-American Development Bank and other institutions for community water systems. It would help to bring potable water to small rural communities which would otherwise be unable to meet the requirements for obtaining water system loans. If this effort is successful in Latin America, the techniques could be utilized by communities in all developing countries of the world and by regional development banks in Africa and Asia to bring potable water supply systems to small communities.

A statement by you along the lines of the draft I enclose would highlight this important innovation. The statement could be made after sufficient progress in the project has



been achieved, perhaps in connection with other Water for Peace or Alliance for Progress initiatives. If you could authorize me informally to convey to the Inter-American Development Bank and the Pan American Health Organization your willingness to make such a statement at an appropriate time, it would provide significant encouragement to their efforts to develop model methods for community water systems.

The United States departments and agencies participating in international water-related activities, as well as Treasury, have concurred in this memorandum. The Secretary of the Interior concurs in this proposal, although he believes that, in addition, we should consider a more extensive Water for Peace program. Interior, with the Office of Water for Peace and other offices, is now considering other possible proposals for submission to you.

In addition to the draft Presidential statement, I am having forwarded to Walt Rostow background papers on the Community Water System project, an interim progress report on the activities of the Office of Water for Peace (including specific recommendations regarding its program) and background papers on the United States role in water-related activities.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Dean Rusk", with a stylized, cursive script.

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Draft Presidential Statement

PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF POSSIBLE STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

(It is recommended that you make this statement when the group of technical experts is combining ideas in Washington under the PAHO-IADB project)

Last May, here in Washington, we had a massive exchange of information on all subjects related to water and its many uses. Never before had so many men from so many nations met together to discuss this vital subject. Over 2700 people took part in the Conference on Water for Peace.

This great exchange of information stimulated the serious thinking of thousands of citizens. The huge Conference was not convened for the purpose of formal conclusions, but many points of agreement were clear. All left this meeting with an awareness of the need in every country for men who can appraise total water resources in river basins and whole nations - for men who can help us with the foresight to use our precious resources in orderly and healthful ways to satisfy growing human needs.

Among all convictions shared by these thousands of men, however, none was more fundamental than the vital importance to all men on this earth of pure water to drink.

Today, I am very glad that we have the opportunity to show our admiration for the great work that is being done by a group of men who have helped millions of their fellow men to obtain healthful drinking water. I believe it is fitting

that we should give recognition to men and institutions who are helping to meet this basic human need -- who are making this most fundamental contribution to progress -- who are laying this solid foundation for Peace. I congratulate you. And I congratulate all of your fellow workers who could not be with us here today.

Much excellent work is being done, all over the world, in improving water supplies. Progress is being made, even though it is made more difficult by steadily mounting population. Nowhere in the great regions of the world has such rapid progress been made in the vital effort to reduce debilitating illness and death from water-borne diseases as in the American Republics of this Hemisphere. Over 50 million individual citizens have benefitted from better water since the goals of the Alliance for Progress were fixed in 1961. I am glad that the United States has been able to contribute to this great effort, and I am proud of the part our own men have carried out in this work. But I take this occasion to congratulate, first, the men of the Inter-American Development Bank and the Pan American Health Organization, and all of those authorities and citizens and international organizations who have worked with them in the countries in which their united efforts have been so successful.

It has been encouraging to see how much the people and governments of these neighbor countries have done themselves.

They have invested much more in these health-giving water supplies than the total amount of external assistance.

The peoples and governments of this Hemisphere have made such formidable progress, with your help, that I am led to the conviction that all of you together now have a great opportunity. You are now confronted with the dramatic challenge to simplify and improve and speed up the methods of installing water supply systems in small cities, towns and villages so that people all over the world will find it easier and more economical to obtain 'water for living.' You have the opportunity to inspire other nations with the example you can achieve. You have the challenge to show what good institutions and organizations can do - to show how local citizens can join effectively in this great effort. You will not only make it much easier to finish the job completely in your own countries. But, more and more, I believe you will find yourselves called on to give advice to your fellow men in other parts of the world. I cannot think of any greater and more fundamental contribution than this to a true world-wide program of Water for Peace.

We in the United States have not entirely completed the task in our own small communities. But I am happy to report that the Farmers' Home Administration and many other governmental and private organizations are doing much to meet this



remaining need. And much of their success is due to enthusiastic local participation in planning, installation and maintenance. We can hope that it will not be long before even the smallest communities in our country will have water that comes up to healthful standards.

I express to you today the earnest hope that all of us working together can reach the goals of the Alliance for Progress for potable water supply.

I joined with the Presidents of our sister countries of this Hemisphere, at our meeting in April, in a Declaration in which we reaffirmed the importance of community water supply. Likewise, I applaud the recent initiative of the Directing Council of the Pan American Health Organization, when they resolved a few weeks ago to accelerate our Hemisphere-wide effort to improve water supply.

We must recognize that this will require special, added effort - even beyond the superb work that has been done. It is natural that, as the needs for improved water systems are met, the more difficult problems - the more complex and time-consuming problems - tend to be left until last. Great progress has been made in urban water supply, but progress has come harder in helping small towns and villages.

It will be a real achievement to reach the goal of potable water supply for 70% of the people living in cities since almost 30 million more people will need to be supplied to reach

that goal. It will take an even greater effort to reach the goal of potable, piped water for 50% of the rural people. Forty million more of these people in small towns and villages must be helped if the goal is to be reached.

Goals of this kind serve as a challenge and a spur, and we hope that they are realistic guidelines. But all of the people of our communities - 100% - need healthful water. The real object of our efforts is to develop methods that will make it easier - that will give us some real, practical possibility of meeting this total fundamental need. All citizens should be spared the age-old handicaps of weakness and inertia; all should be able to turn their energies toward building better lives for their families and themselves.

Now, we can be encouraged by the promise that more efficient methods and more economical standard equipment can be devised. The long experience, the practical wisdom, the ingenuity of hundreds of practical men are now being combined in this effort. One of the most significant objectives is to consolidate into standard practices the many successful lessons of genuine community participation. The most successful small-town water systems have been those where the citizens themselves have taken part in the decisions - where they have done much of the installation - where they have taken responsibility for maintenance and for deciding upon water rates.

I wish you great success in combining the practical lessons of the past with modern materials and training methods.

When I think of the old methods of getting water, I am reminded of the committee of townspeople in Texas who were interviewing new candidates to be their village preacher. They asked one of the young ministers if he was by any chance a Baptist. He replied, "No." "Why?" "Well," the committee spokesman said, "we have to haul our water 12 miles."

Permanent peace will come to this world only when men and women satisfy their essential needs for a decent life. In the long struggle to reach this happy condition, many ways will be found to meet these needs. We have high hopes for steadily greater economies in the new science of desalting, and we are making excellent progress with hundreds of research and engineering projects that are working to this end. The technology and economics of large nuclear desalting plants should take a major step forward with the construction and operation of the project for the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. We look forward to greater accomplishments in weather modification. Solid advances in the collection of basic information about water resources all over the world are being spurred by the program of the International Hydrological Decade. The science of using water more effectively for irrigation to grow food is steadily progressing. The use of the

water resources of great river basins for many different purposes is becoming more of an exact science.

But nothing is more important than water to drink. Though we must forge ahead on all fronts, pure water for health - for living - is unquestionably vital to all progress. This has been one of the important uses that has been made of the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank. I can assure you that the United States will continue to give active support to use of this Fund for community water supply projects that meet the reasonable standards of shared investment established by the Inter-American Development Bank. But most important, we look forward to better methods and the kind of community participation which may enable these funds to accomplish more.

I am confident that you can break new ground - that you can make outstanding new progress. We can reach the ultimate goal of healthful water for all. This should be the most fundamental objective of a world-wide Program of Water for Peace, and I support your efforts in working toward that objective.

I have faith in you: together, I know that we in the American family of nations can lead the way. We can show how it is possible to meet the need for healthful drinking water for all. We - in this region - can make a model for the world.

0355

May 22, 1967

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE**

**SUBJECT: Water for Peace**

In order to provide a central point within the government for leadership and coordination of the Water for Peace program, I hereby assign to you responsibility for overall direction and coordination of the international water-related activities of the United States Government under the Water for Peace program.

In fulfilling this responsibility, I expect that you will carry out the following functions on a continuing basis:

- Formulate comprehensive policy, plans and evaluations of the international water-related activities of the government.
- Assist in the formulation, presentation, and review of program and budgetary requirements for such activities.
- 
- Assure appropriate consideration of Water for Peace programs in foreign policy decisions.
- Maintain liaison with inter-governmental bodies and non-governmental organizations dealing primarily with international water-related programs.
- Provide information on Water for Peace activities to the Congress and the public and take appropriate action on their requests.

I would like you to survey all of the international water-related activities currently being carried out or supported by the government, to identify needs which are not being met, and to recommend to me by October 1, new measures required to meet those needs. Therefore, I would like to have an annual report on the Water for Peace program, including recommendations for improving the coordination and effectiveness of our various bilateral and multilateral efforts.



In carrying out these functions you should work closely with the Secretary of the Interior and heads of other agencies having responsibilities and technical competence in the water resources field.

I request that you establish adequate organizational and staffing arrangements within the Department of State to assist you in fulfilling this assignment.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Richard B. Good", with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

SEP 17 1957

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, February 20, 1968 -- 3:15 pm ~~12:30 Noon~~

17

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Possible Ayub Visit

Ben Oehlert has had a feeler -- which he thinks is premeditated and serious -- from one of the caretaker military leaders who is minding the store in Pakistan while President Ayub recovers from what we now believe were two successive heart attacks. The suggestion is that Ayub would make a visit to Britain and the United States during his convalescence.

The public reason for the trip here would be medical, but the private reason would be a face-to-face negotiation with you about renewal of our important intelligence facility at Peshawar.

Oehlert reports he was "completely non-committal about a U.S. trip both generally and during any particular time frame." He has asked for guidance on whether we would welcome such a trip and, if so, when.

At Tab A, for your approval, is a draft reply which says:

- We would be happy to provide Ayub with any medical help he wants in the United States.
- The President would want to see Ayub.
- For Oehlert's information, we would prefer a private visit as part of Ayub's recuperation, but we would try to arrange an official visit if Ayub strongly prefers it.
- In any event, we want to avoid the impression that we are deeply worried about the Peshawar negotiation. (The renewal need not be effective until the end of June. We should try to keep our cool as long as we can.)

I think this is about right. Ben is certain to deliver the message with the warmth I know you would want.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-214  
By Cb, NARA Date 8-4-97

W. W. Rostow

Approve message \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call --

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

17a

Proposed Message from Secretary Rusk to Ambassador Cohlert

1. Should Ayub wish visit US in course his recuperation, we would be happy facilitate anything he might want do here, including further medical check-up. Opportunity could undoubtedly be found for discussions with Secretary and other top officials.
2. President would, of course, see him. However, extremely crowded White House schedule in upcoming weeks might require some negotiation over exact dates after Ayub decides approximate time and period he wishes spend here. Above based on assumption that what Ayub has in mind is "private visit" which would take place in next month or so as part recuperative program.
3. FYI: We would prefer above approach. However, should Ayub feel strongly in favor of official visit, we would attempt arrange it. In either case, in welcoming Ayub visit, we would like avoid impression (which might arise from context in which Admiral Khan made visit suggestion) that we unduly anxious over Peshawar, although we would, of course, be prepared discuss subject here. END FYI.
4. You authorized convey paras 1 and 2 above to Ayub in manner you deem most appropriate, adding warmest personal wishes from President and expressing pleasure which President and Mrs. Johnson would take in seeing President Ayub here. END

~~SECRET -- EXDIS~~

~~SECRET~~Luncheon with the PresidentTuesday, February 20, 1968, 1:00 p.m.AGENDA1. Viet Nam: Sitrep

- Intelligence evaluation of enemy intentions (Mr. Helms)
- Situation on the ground (Gen. Wheeler)

2. Gen. Wheeler's Trip (The President)

- Objectives.
- Query: Should Katzenbach go from State Or Habib? The question is one of high or low State visibility.
- Time of return (February 26?).
- Planning that should go forward in preparation for General Wheeler's return and recommendations.

3. PUEBLO. (Sects. Rusk and McNamara)

- Documents: What do they show?
- Latest meeting with North Koreans (midnight Monday): a report)
- Diplomatic prospects.
- Next steps.
- Task force on South Korea, as recommended by Vance.

4. Other.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

3-27-80  
Authority State for 3-13-79, NSC  
By ip/18, NARA, Date 2-20-92

IN ORIGIN


*Plus late*

19

Tuesday, Feb. 20, 1968  
11:55 a. m.

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~

MR. PRESIDENT:



3.3 (b)(1, 3)

As you know, North Vietnamese forces are  
poised in I Corps and along the frontier opposite  
Kontum-Pleiku.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~ attachment

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-193  
By iss, NARA, Date 2-13-04



19a

Available SIGINT evidence suggests the Vietnamese Communists are in position to resume offensive operations in the III and IV Corps areas which were initiated during the TET holidays. This is particularly true in the area north of Saigon. SIGINT continues to reflect the locations of the Hq, VC 5th LID; the Hq, VC 274th Regiment; and recently, the possible Hq, 275th Regiment in the area east-northeast of Saigon-Bien Hoa. Recent SIGINT locations also suggest that the Hq, VC 9th LID and the possible Hq, unidentified Front have moved to positions northeast and north of Saigon, respectively. The possible, Hq, PAVN 7th Division and its tentative forward element moved by early February from northeastern Tay Ninh Province to northern Binh Duong Province and are currently located 20-30 km north of Saigon-Bien Hoa. SIGINT locations indicate that a number of unidentified tentative PAVN 7th Division-associated elements are located in Binh Duong Province in proximity to the PAVN 7th Division Headquarters.

Latest SIGINT information indicates Vietnamese Communist units are located near major cities in the IV Corp area; for example, near My Tho city in Dinh Tuong Province and Vinh Long city in Vinh Long Province.

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ / RAC 03-174  
By            NARA Date 2-13-04

INFORMATION

*Pres. file*

*20*

Tuesday, Feb. 20, 1968  
11:55 a.m.

~~SECRET~~ *CACTUS*

MR. PRESIDENT:

In this follow-on cable on the PUEBLO, the issue is narrowed to a question of whether we are prepared to "make an apology" after the return of the crew, or on the basis of their "unanimous confessions". I have marked the key passage.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-214  
By CG, NARA Date 8-4-97



Department of State

200  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

10

00 RUEHC  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9199  
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1968 FEB 20 AM 7 48

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-213  
By ics, NARA Date 8-22-97

~~SECRET~~ SECTION TWO OF TWO SEOUL 4391

NODIS/CACTUS

SUBJECT: EIGHTH SENIOR MAC MEMBERS MEETING AT  
PANMUNJOM, FEBRUARY 20, 1200-1226 HOURS

S. AS A MATTER OF COURSE, (OF COURSE) YOU  
WOULD FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT OUR SIDE IS NOT  
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE (#)

T. IT IS ATQIBUTABG TO THIS ESSENTIALLY HOSTILE  
RELATIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES SIDE INFILTRATED ITS ARMED  
SPY SHIP INTO OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS, WHICH COMMITTED GRAVE  
HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC  
OF KOREA.

U. IT IS A IRREFUTABLY STERN FACT THAT YOUR

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4391/2 ~~SECRET~~  
SIDE DISPATCHED THE ARMED SPY SHIP NOT FOR THE FRIENDLY  
PURPOSES. (DID NOT DISPATCH THE ARMED SPY SHIP FOR THE  
PURPOSE OF FRIENDSHIP)

V. IT IS ABSOLUTELY JUSTIFIABLE (APPROPRIATE)  
FOR THE MASTER TO TAKE SELF-DEFENSE ACTION NECESSARY  
FOR PROTECTING HIS LIFE AND WEALTH WHEN A ROBBER  
BREAKS INTO HIS HOUSE.

W. THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA,  
AS A SOVEREIGN STATE, HAS MERELY EXERCISED HER DUE  
RIGHT AGAINST AGGRESSORS.

X. YOU INTERPRETED INTERNATIONAL LAWS IN YOUR  
OWN WAY IN A HARD ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY THE CRIMINAL  
ACTS COMMITTED BY THE "PUEBLO." (YOU HAVE ATTEMPTED  
IN EVERY WAY TO JUSTIFY THE CRIMINAL ACTS COMMITTED  
BY THE PUEBLO BY MEANS OF YOUR SELF-STYLED INTERPRETA-  
TION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS).

Y. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, HOWEVER, YOUR ASSERTION  
ON INTERNATIONAL LAWS HAS NO VALIDITY AT ALL.

Z. IN CASE YOUR SIDE WANTS TO REFER TO  
INTERNATIONAL LAWS, YOU SHOULD PROCEED FROM

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2-, SEOUL 4391, FEBRUARY 20, (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

THE FACT THAT THE "PUEBLO" ILLEGALLY INTRUDED INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AS AN ARMED ESPIONAGE SHIP AND COMMITTED HOSTILE ACTS.

AA. YOU TOOK ISSUE WITH (RAISED AN ISSUE ABOUT) THE HISTORICAL BAY OF EAST KOREA. HOWEVER, THE BAY OF EAST KOREA HAS SOUND BASIS AS AN HISTORICAL BAY. WHAT MATTERS LIES NMT IN THE MATTER (THIS ISSUE) BUT IN THE FACT THAT YOUR ARMED SPY SHIP INTRUDED INTO OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS, CONDUCTED ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AND PERPETRATED HOSTILE ACTS.

BB. IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACTS AND LAW, YOU WILL IN NO WAY BE ABLE TO COVER UP THE HOSTILE ACTS COMMITTED BY THE ARMED SPY SHIP "PUEBLO" NOR JUSTIFY THE UNWARRANTABLE STAND OF YOUR SIDE.

CC. I HAVE NOTED YOUR STATEMENT MADE AT THE PREVIOUS MEET DG THAT YOUR SIDE WILL ASSURE THAT QUOTE UNITED STATES NAVAL VESSELS WILL CONTINUE TO BE ORDERED TO REMAIN MORE THAN TWELVE NAUTICAL MILES FROM YOUR COAST UNQUOTE.

DD. I HAVE ALSO NOTED THE INDICATION OF THE WILLINGNESS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO MAKE AN APOLOGY.

EE. SUCH BEING THE CASE, I CONSIDER THAT THE ISSUE OF THE CREW WILL BE EASILY SOLVED IN CASE YOUR SIDE DOES NOT TRY TO MAKE THE APOLOGY AFTER THE RETURN OF THE CREW BUT MAKES A PROPER APOLOGY ON THE BASIS OF THE CONFESSIONS MADE UNANIMOUSLY BY ALL THE CREW MEMBERS INCLUDING (HEADED BY) THE CAPTAIN OF THEIR INTRUSIONS INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND OF THEIR HOSTILE ACTS.

FF. AT THE PREVIOUS MEETING, YOU ASKED ME WHEN THE CREW OF THE "PUEBLO" WOULD BE RETURNED.

GG. MY ANSWER TO THE QUESTION IS THAT IT COMPLETELY DEPENDS UPON YOUR SIDE WHICH WILL TAKE ITS POSITION (WHAT SORT OF A POSITION YOU WILL TAKE) WITH REGARD TO THE MATTERS RAISED BY ME IN THE ABOVE.

HH. THEREFORE, YOUR SIDE SHOULD (WILL HAVE TO) SERIOUSLY STUDY THE STATEMENT I HAVE MADE TODAY.

II. I NOW PASS YOUR STATEMENT WHICH I HAVE JUST MADE TO YOU. (NOTE: UUU USED HONORIFIC ENDING).

ARE. SMITH: I NOTE YOUR STATEMENT YOU HAVE JUST MADE AND I HAVE RECEIVED THE COPY WHICH YOU PROVIDED. DO YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS OR INFORMATION?

4. PAK: I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER. I ASK YOU TO CAREFULLY STUDY THE STATEMENT I HAVE JUST MADE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-, SEOUL 4391, FEBRUARY 20 (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

5. SMITH: I NOTE WHAT YOU HAVE SAID TODAY. I WILL REFER THIS TO APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY. WHEN WE HAVE A REPLY, I WILL ADVISE YOU.

6. PAK: IF YOU HAVE NOTHING FURTHER TO SAY, I PROPOSE TODAY'S MEETING BE CONCLUDED.

7. SMITH: I AGREE.

MEETING RECESSED AT 1226 HOURS.

PORTER

BT

(#) OMMISSION . CORRECTION TO FOLLOW .

\* AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW .

~~SECRET~~



21

Tuesday, February 20, 1968 - 11:00 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

You asked for the figures on the number of wounded American soldiers who returned to duty within 30 days. Through December 1967, the relevant figures are as follows:

--total combat injuries	--	99,817
--no hospitalization required	--	48,565
--hospitalized but returned to duty within 30 days	--	23,539

About 46 per cent of all those requiring hospitalization returned to duty within 30 days. Of the total wounded, about 72 per cent either required no hospitalization or returned to duty within 30 days.

W. W. Rostow

*Out of action more than 30 days 27,714*

WWR:WMW:pas:2/20/68

INFORMATION

22

*Pres file*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 20, 1968  
10:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

The first two pages are Bus  
Wheeler's report of his morning  
conversation with Westmoreland.  
I have marked the key elements.

Attached is a full length NMCC  
(National Military Command Center)  
report which you saw early this morning  
in summary form.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

Authority GS Ltr 10-2-78

By ip/rs, NARA, Date 2-20-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

22a



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3031-68  
20 Feb 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND

1. You have already received General Westmoreland's 16th report on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. In addition, I am attaching hereto the Presidential operational/intelligence brief (you may have already seen this but I wish to make sure that it comes to your personal attention). Moreover, I am attaching a sheet setting forth two or three late items of interest.

2. I talked to General Westmoreland at 0810 hours this morning. He made the following comments:

a. After talking to General Vien and analyzing information from intelligence reports, he has called a full alert tonight in the Saigon area, and he is particularly arranging to defend the Tan Son Nhut airbase. There is a reported increased threat north of Saigon with fresh elements of the 7th NVA and 9th VC Divisions moving into the area. It is also reported that villagers are fleeing to get out of the way of their advance. Among other precautionary measures, General Westmoreland has organized a provisional defense battalion from the MACV Staff.

b. A few rocket rounds were fired in the direction of Tan Son Nhut today; one fell on the runway; one landed in an open field, and one apparently went into the city. He now has complete aerial photographic reconnaissance of the rocket site area and the photo interpreters have picked up several suspected rocket sites for attack by air.

c. A new rocket round was found north of Saigon today; it is a 170 mm round in diameter and has a range of about 9,000 meters.

d. In general, the enemy is hanging in close to Saigon and gives no indication of withdrawal.

e. The Song Be situation has cleared up; the enemy has been driven out of the town.

f. The city of Phan Thiet has been cleared of the enemy after a hard fight.

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

12 copies

Authority JS LA 10-378

By sp/y, NARA, Date 3-20-92


~~TOP SECRET~~

g. The enemy has been cleared out of Vinh Long, but there seems to be a buildup commencing south of Can Tho by a new enemy battalion of picked-up troops.

3. He conferred with General Vien today. The latter is concerned about the fatigue factor on the ARVN. They have been fighting continuously now for over two weeks. He has been trying to push the ARVN out into the country, but this is difficult to do when the enemy continues to stay in close to the populated areas.

4. Enemy KIA now stands at over 38,000. General Westmoreland recognizes that some of them are undoubtedly porters and other support elements. He has charged his J-2 with trying to get a break out of the enemy casualties so that he will be able to estimate the effect of enemy losses on his combat elements.

5. As a general observation, after visiting all of the Corps Areas and senior commanders, if General Westmoreland had to make an estimate now as to further troop reinforcements he will need, he will probably require the remainder of the 82d Airborne Division. He is not asking for it at this time because he believes that he will have a better feel for the problems facing him when I visit him within the next couple of days.



EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

226



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

20 February 1968  
0830 EST

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Update Information on Ground Operations in  
South Vietnam


2D CORPS

In Phan Thiet as of 192210 EST, the province hospital was recaptured and the city was reported quiet except for sporadic firing in northwest and northeast outskirts. Cumulative results of the Phan Thiet action (17 February through 19 February) are: Friendly - 35 killed (10 US, 24 ARVN, 1 CIDG), 223 wounded (34 US, 157 ARVN, 25 CIDG, 7 NSF), one C-47 helo damaged, 40,000 gallons POL destroyed; Enemy - 266 killed, 18 persons detained, 54 individual and 15 crew-served weapons seized.

3D CORPS


An update on the elements of 2 US battalions and 1 ARVN battalion contact northwest of Song Be indicates the following casualties: Friendly - 14 killed (8 US, 6 ARVN), 56 wounded (26 US, 30 ARVN); Enemy - 253 killed, 24 persons detained, 3 individual and 24 crew-served weapons seized.

At 192355 EST, an ARVN Ranger Battalion engaged an unknown size enemy force. A helicopter light fire team supported and the enemy broke contact after 45 minutes. An additional Ranger Battalion moved in from the south and both battalions are maneuvering in an attempt to trap the enemy force. No results are available in this contact 2 nautical miles west of Saigon.

  
MARSHALL B. GARTH  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:  
(see page 2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988  
By  NARA Date 2-20-92



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

20 February 1968  
0830 EST

22d

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Update Information on Ground Operations in  
South Vietnam


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3D CORPS

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MARSHALL B. GARTIN  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:  
(see page 2)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
By ng, NARA, Date 2-25-92

## INFORMATION

Tuesday, February 20, 1968  
10:55 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a factual hatchet job  
on Ho Chi Minh, done by Marshall  
Wright at my direction.

It would be a good thing if this  
were spoken in the Senate.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Marshall Wright  
February 19, 1968

## HO CHI MINH

Mr. President:

The debate on Vietnam continues -- and unfortunately it continues most of the time to shed more heat than light. I can think of few important issues in which so many people insist on ignoring the facts in favor of the fantasies, in which so many people insist on believing to be true things which are obviously untrue.

Mr. President, my main purpose in speaking today is to address myself to one of the most curious of these fantasies. That is the myth that Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the Vietnamese Communists, is a kindly old patriot. According to this myth, Ho Chi Minh is a kind of Vietnamese George Washington, beloved by all his people, less a Communist than a nationalist, a genial and benevolent old fellow who loves children and doubtless is kind to animals. According to this myth, Ho Chi Minh, usually referred to under the appealing name of "Uncle Ho," cooperates with the Communists only because a stubborn and foolish U.S. Government forces him to do so. If only we would stop fighting him, he would soon leave the Communist camp, show himself to be a genuine Vietnamese nationalist, unite all the happy Vietnamese under his kindly rule and everyone would live happily ever after.

Mr. President, I propose to review briefly and factually the career of this man.

He was born in 1890, and his name was Nguyen Tat Thanh. He left Vietnam when he was twenty years old and spent the next twelve years in Europe. When he was twenty-six he adopted an alias, Nguyen Ai Quoc, and he lived under that name for the next sixteen years -- until he found it expedient for Nguyen Ai Quoc to die. Obediently, Nguyen Ai Quoc did die. There were other aliases for a few years. Then Ho Chi Minh was born -- full-grown and fifty-three years of age.

Now, how had Nguyen Tat Thanh, alias Nguyen Ai Quoc, alias Ho Chi Minh, spent the first fifty-three years of his life?

Well, the French Communist Party was founded in December 1920. And who do you think was there and became a charter member of the French Communist Party? Good old Vietnamese nationalist Ho Chi Minh, alias Nguyen Ai Quoc.

In 1920 the Russians held in Baku their first conference for Asian Communists. And one of the delegates was Nguyen Ai Quoc.

In 1923 the Comintern in Moscow organized a Communist apparatus for controlling the various Communist movements of Asia. Nguyen Ai Quoc represented the French Communist Party.

That same year, Ho Chi Minh moved to Moscow and spent the next two years being trained in Communist techniques.

By 1925 he was an important figure in the Comintern. That year Michael Borodin went to China to capture the Chinese nationalist movement and bring it under Communist domination. Nguyen Ai Quoc went with him

as a key member of the Comintern team. In 1927, the genuine Chinese nationalists under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek broke with the Communists. The nationalists stayed in China. But Ho Chi Minh promptly fled to Moscow.

By 1929 he was back in Asia representing the Third Communist International. He went to Thailand and organized a Communist Party, among Vietnamese refugees. He also visited Malaya and what is now Indonesia as the Comintern's organizational specialist.

In 1930 he was operating out of Hong Kong. He called a meeting of the three different factions of Vietnamese Communists and merged them into one party under his leadership. The name of the party was the Indochinese Communist Party.

He was arrested in 1931 by the British in Hong Kong and convicted of subversion. He was released in 1933, and the rumor spread throughout the Communist world that he was dead. He remained underground for several years during which time he helped form the Thai Communist Party and the Malayan Communist Party. In 1935 he attended the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, which inaugurated the Popular Front policy. Communist movements all over the world were ordered to make common cause with genuinely nationalist movements in order to help Russia meet the threat of Hitlerism. One result of that decision was that anti-colonialism should be abandoned and that the Communist parties in the colonial possessions of European powers should be run by the European party. Ho Chi Minh at that time was head of the IndoChinese



Communist Party. He agreed to abandon the struggle against French rule of Vietnam and to take orders from Maurice Thorez, the head of the French Communist Party.

Ho himself claims to have been on the famous Long March by which the Chinese Communists escaped from Chiang Kai-Shek. He also claims to have worked with the Chinese Communist Eighth Route Army in the late thirties and to have been a political commissar of a Chinese Communist guerrilla training school. I see no reason not to take Ho's word for it.

In any event, he convened in China in 1941 the Conference which created the Viet Minh, a United Front movement which included both the nationalist and Communist movements of Vietnam. It was about this time that for the first time he used the alias, Ho Chi Minh. Ho headed this movement which in 1945 set up a Provisional Government in North Vietnam with Ho Chi Minh as its President. With great fanfare, Ho dissolved the Indochinese Communist Party and assembled a Popular Front Government. The next seven years were spent in jungle warfare with the French and an equally vicious and much more treacherous kind of jungle political warfare within the Popular Front. By 1951 most of the nationalists were dead and the Vietnamese Communist Party was re-established in unchallenged control of the Viet Minh. Indeed, shortly thereafter, the Viet Minh itself was abolished and replaced by the miraculously reborn Vietnamese Communist movement. And who presided over this change? Ho Chi Minh.

The above should convince anyone who is interested in fact rather

than fiction that Ho Chi Minh is a Communist. He has been a Communist all his life, and he is now almost 78 years old. He helped start at least five Communist parties that we know of, -- in France, Malaya, Thailand, Indonesia, and IndoChina -- and that hardly sounds like a fellow whose only interest is Vietnamese nationalism. He has, at various times, been a full-time agent of the Russian Communist Party, the French Communist Party, and the Chinese Communist Party. That hardly sounds like a simple Vietnamese nationalist. When Russia became fearful of the Fascist movement in Europe it ordered the end to anti-colonial activity and told the Vietnamese movement to obey the orders of the French Communist Party. Ho Chi Minh carried out that order. Where does that fact leave the notion that Ho Chi Minh is a nationalist first and a Communist second?

Mr. President, there is no doubt about what Ho is. He is a disciplined, professional Communist. He has been one for over fifty years, and he has been in the top rank of the Communist Movement for over thirty-five years. Uncle Ho rose to eminence in the ranks of International Communism under the rule of that equally benign old gentleman whom people once liked to call Uncle Joe. We all know what Uncle Joe was and what the Communist movement was under him. Purges came as regularly as the spring and only the toughest and most subservient survived. Uncle Ho survived. Uncle Ho prospered.

Now, I would like to examine for a minute why it was that Nguyen Ai Quoc found it convenient to die in the 1930s and why he reappeared in

the Forties with a different name. Why was it that Ho Chi Minh did not admit for many years that he was, in fact, Nguyen Ai Quoc?

It was because there was a stench to the name of Nguyen Ai Quoc, a stench that was known throughout Vietnam and Asia. Nguyen Ai Quoc was known to the Vietnamese movement as an informer, as a fanatical and ruthless Communist who specialized in getting rid of nationalist rivals by turning them in to the French secret police. Fresh from his training in Moscow, Ho Chi Minh invited the leading Vietnamese nationalist to a meeting in Canton, China, in 1925. The man's name was Phan Boi Chau (Fahn Boy Chow). He was the leader of the Vietnamese independence movement and had been its leader for years. But he was a nationalist, not a Communist. Phan Boi Chau went to Canton, where Ho promptly disclosed his presence to French security agents. Phan Boi Chau spent the remaining 16 years of his life as a French prisoner. This piece of treachery was a little strong even to some of Ho's fellow Communists. Ho was asked to account for his action and he did: he gave three reasons:

First, Phan was a nationalist, not a Communist. He was therefore a rival and not an ally.

Second, Ho needed the reward money from the French to finance his activities on behalf of the Vietnamese Communist movement.

Third, the trial of Phan by the French would generate resentment among Vietnamese, and the Communists could capitalize

on that sentiment.

Good old kindly, benevolent, patriotic Ho Chi Minh.

The betrayal of Phan Boi Chau was not an isolated incident in Ho's career. It was the pattern. Ho set up a channel by which Vietnamese revolutionaries were brought to China for training. Each candidate submitted two photographs to Ho's agent in Hong Kong. The second photograph was for forwarding to the French police if the candidate did not pledge allegiance to Communism during the training or if he became an awkward rival at a later date. Thus it was that by 1933, when Nguyen Ai Quoc was released from a Hong Kong jail, his name had become a symbol of Communist betrayal of Vietnamese nationalism. So Nguyen Ai Quoc died and for the next ten years Ho Chi Minh stayed constantly underground and used a long series of aliases.

During the 1940s he surfaced again. The need was for a new united front of the Communist and nationalist groups in Vietnam. Nguyen Ai Quoc could certainly not have led such a group. And so was born Ho Chi Minh, the nationalist leader. What happened to the nationalists who joined Ho's movement?

It can best be told with statistics. In 1945, Ho Chi Minh created a National Assembly. It included representatives of most Vietnamese non-Communist movements. It had a total membership of 444. By 1946 the membership had shrunk to 291 members, of whom only 37 members were non-Communist. One member asked about this curious situation, and was coolly informed that 33 opposition members had been arrested for common

law crimes. Eleven days later when the Assembly voted on the Constitution, 49 more members had disappeared. The membership was down to 242, and only two were opposition members. The Constitution was adopted by a vote of 240 to 2. The Assembly did not meet again for seven years. It had served its purpose. It had enabled Ho Chi Minh to identify and get within his hands a large part of the non-Communist nationalist leadership of Vietnam. As a result, the Communists were in firm control of the Viet Minh.

The next stage of Ho's career as a benign and kindly nationalist leader started in 1954 after the Geneva Conference gave him complete control over North Vietnam. Almost one million North Vietnamese voted with their feet as soon as they heard that North Vietnam was to be ruled by the kindly Ho. They left their homes and all their belongings and they moved South, out of Ho's reach, for awhile at least. This million Vietnamese had a good deal of experience with the kindly old land reformer. They dropped everything and got out rather than stay and enjoy the "benefits" of his benevolent rule. I can think of no other example in history of a million people fleeing in terror from a kindly old man.

And they were wise to flee, for this kindly old man unleashed on his countrymen a blood-bath in which more than 50,000 people were killed in two years and an estimated half million were jailed or persecuted. It became so intolerable that a major peasant revolt started. In October of 1956, in the official newspaper of the North Vietnamese Government,



Uncle Ho's Defense Minister, General Giap, officially called an end to the blood-letting by admitting, and I am quoting, "We executed too many honest people. We attacked on too large a front and, seeing enemies everywhere, we resorted to terror which became far too widespread." Please note that it was not the terror which was bad, as such. It was the fact that it was too widespread. General Giap continued: "Worse still, torture came to be regarded as a normal practice during party reorganization." Those are the words of General Giap, number two hero of North Vietnam. The number one hero, of course, is good old kindly fun-loving Ho Chi Minh who was in undisputed control of North Vietnam throughout the terror and under whose leadership "torture became a normal practice" as General Giap so neatly puts it.

Finally, I would like to call attention, Mr. President, to two final facts which provide a basis for judging what kind of man Ho Chi Minh is. Since the late 1950s, the Viet Cong has been fighting not only the armed forces of the Saigon Government but the people of South Vietnam themselves. In its attempt to conquer the South Vietnamese people Ho's Communists have made a deliberate, massive, and constantly increasing use of out-and-out terror. From 1960 through 1967, 14,626 South Vietnamese civilians were assassinated, murdered, by the Viet Cong. During the same period of time, over 40,000 South Vietnamese civilians were kidnapped. And it is worth noting that last year, 1967, was the worst year yet for terrorism. Last year alone, 3,708 South Vietnamese

civilians were murdered by Communist terrorists -- and over 5,000 were kidnapped. As Uncle Ho gets more and more control over the Communist movement in the South, the actions of that movement become more and more abominable.

That is no accident, Mr. President.

That is the pattern of Ho Chi Minh's life.

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INFORMATION

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*Pres file*

Tuesday, February 20, 1967  
10:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy's Khe Sanh-DMZ report:

- rather heavy shelling;
- the first report on effectiveness of COFRAM;
- aerial resupply, 126 tons;
- weather continues bad at Khe Sanh.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 128, NARA, Date 2-24-92

~~SECRET~~

24a

Tuesday, February 20, 1968, 9:10 AM

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number sixteen on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area and covers the 24-hour period of February 19, 1968.

Enemy shelling intensified yesterday in First Corps zone as a total of 576 rounds of mixed mortar, artillery, and rockets landed among friendly unit positions throughout the reporting period. Northern First Corps bore the brunt of the shelling as units from Khe Sanh to the Cua Viet received 291 rounds of artillery, 125 rounds of mortar and 30 rocket rounds. Moving along the DMZ, Khe Sanh Combat Base received 60 rounds of mixed shelling; Camp Carroll counted a mixture of 104 rounds. Seventy-two artillery rounds impacted in areas within and surrounding Dong Ha Combat Base. Con Thien and A-3 received 56 and 20 rounds of mixed incoming respectively. Friendly elements at Gio Linh took nine rounds of artillery, and at the Cua Viet, in the vicinity of the 1st Amtracs Command Post, a total of 92 rounds of artillery fell during four mid-day barrages.

Ground activity during the reporting period was limited to small unit contacts. In three observed fire missions yesterday, friendly forces accounted for 18 North Vietnamese Army killed. Casualty figures for northern First Corps for the reporting period were: friendly, six killed, 58 wounded (38 evacuated). Enemy: 18 killed. All friendly casualties were attributed to enemy incoming fire.

The first 20 rounds of incoming artillery at Dong Ha landed outside the Camp perimeter in a neighboring village killing three civilians and injuring 31.

Damage as a result of the period's activity was moderate including a direct hit on the tower at Khe Sanh that damaged the ground control. At Cua Viet, artillery rounds struck five 10,000 gallon fuel tanks setting them on fire.

At 2:20 PM on February 19, the Marines at Con Thien fired six rounds of 105MM COFRAM on 15 North Vietnamese Army in the open, resulting in 13 North Vietnamese Army killed. An additional 30 rounds of COFRAM were fired in five other missions with undetermined results.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988

~~SECRET~~

By 19, NARA, Date 2-24-92

Aerial resupply for the reporting period amounted to 126 short tons. In addition, 20 passengers were landed by helicopter at the airfield. Nine C-130 sorties were flown providing seven air drops. Three helicopters delivered both cargo and passengers.

A total of 306 tactical air sorties were flown in support of the Khe Sanh area during the period. The Marines flew 70 sorties, the Air Force flew 166 sorties, while the Navy flew 70. Marine Bomb Damage Assessment reports include four roads cut, and two secondary explosions. The weather continued to be bad and suitable only for combat sky spot sorties in the Niagara area.

There were 12 ARC LIGHT strikes (35 sorties) run in the Niagara area.

For the next 24-hour period the Marines plan 44 tactical air sorties, the Air Force will fly 144 sorties and the Navy plans 100 sorties for a total of 288 sorties. The Marines will have 16 additional aircraft on call for the Khe Sanh area while the Air Force will have 120 sorties on call for the same purpose.

The weather at Khe Sanh during the period February 19 - 20 continued to be bad. Low clouds and dense fog reduced the ceiling and visibility to near zero except from 10:00 AM to 8:00 PM when the ceiling improved to 400 - 600 foot broken and the visibility to 4 - 7 miles in fog. The forecast for Khe Sanh for February 20 - 21 is for little change. The sky will be obscured by low clouds and fog. The ceiling and visibility will be near zero except from 11:00 AM to 8:00 PM on February 20 when the ceiling will improve to 500 foot broken and the visibility to two miles. Intermittently periods will occur when the ceiling will increase to 1200 foot broken and the visibility to seven miles.



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THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

246

20 February 1968  
7:00 AM EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST,  
19 Feb (9:00 AM 20 Feb, SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) status  
as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>DAYS SUPPLY ON HAND</u>	<u>PREVIOUS STATUS 8:00 PM 18 Feb EST (9:00 AM 19 Feb SVN)</u>
Class I (Rations)		
Meal, Combat Individual	2	2 days
B Rations	9	8 days
Class III (Fuel)		
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	9	9 days
JP-4 (Jet Fuel)	3.6	2.5 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	2.6	2 days
Diesel	6	2.5 days
Class V (Ammunition)		
a. High explosive:		
60-mm mortar	20	25 days
81-mm mortar	17	18 days
90-mm (Tank)	93	87 days
4.2" mortar	24	30 days
105-mm howitzer	21	20 days
155-mm howitzer	16	17 days
b. Anti-Tank		<u>Rounds on Hand</u>
90-mm HEAT		385
66-mm rocket (LAW)		1,226
Anti-tank mines (M-15)		48
Anti-tank mines (M-19)		334
Anti-tank mines (M-21)		100
106-mm HEAT		20
106-mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T)		927
3.5" rocket		690

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
By 18 NARA, Date 2-24-92

SECRET

DAYS SUPPLY  
ON HAND

PREVIOUS STATUS  
8:00 PM 18 Feb EST  
(9:00 AM 19 Feb SVN)

Class V (COFRAM)

105-mm howitzer	5	5 days
155-mm howitzer	5	5 days
40-mm grenade launcher	5	5 days
Hand grenades	10	10 days

2. On 19 February Khe Sanh was resupplied with 126 tons as follows:

Class I	17.5 tons
Class II	1 ton
Class III	36 tons
Class IV	15 tons
Class V	56.5 tons

DISTRIBUTION

SECDEF  
DEPSECDEF  
CJCS (3)  
DJS (3)  
J-30  
J-31  
J-32  
J-33  
J-4  
AWR  
MCCC  
DDO  
ADDO  
CGOC  
PAC DIV  
CT FORCE  
PAC DESK

*Marshall B. Garth*  
MARSHALL B. GARTH  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

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