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Tuesday, February 20, 1968 -- 10:05 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

I asked Gen. Taylor to formulate for your use at lunch today some of the questions which you may wish Gen. Wheeler and his party to answer upon their return.

One important question he did not include is: What are GVN and U.S. plans for assuring that we regain population control in the countryside and resume momentum in revolutionary development?

As I read the intelligence, it seems more and more likely that they are going to try to pin us cheaply in the cities with mortar and harassing attacks in II, III and IV Corps and build up VC control over the population in the countryside.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rla

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Authority 71983-24  
By esky, NARA, Date 3-24-92

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25a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 19, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: General Wheeler's Visit to Vietnam

Reflecting on the possible objectives of General Wheeler's visit, I would hope that he would obtain answers to some of the fundamental questions which are troubling us, derived from detailed private discussions with General Westmoreland and his staff. The questions which need exploring appear to me to include the following:

- a What are Westy's operational plans, force requirements, and force availabilities for the following contingencies?
  - (1) A renewal of the attack of the cities accompanied by simultaneous or successive enemy offensives against Khe Sanh, the eastern DMZ and the Darlac-Kontum border.
  - (2) A spring-summer offensive by friendly forces to regain the initiative and to exploit the weakened condition of the enemy when his offensive has run out of steam.
  - (3) An evacuation of Khe Sanh under attack.
- b How will the defense of Khe Sanh contribute to a major defeat of the enemy? What will be the scheme of maneuver of the reinforcements brought into the Khe Sanh area?
- c Taking the foregoing contingencies into account, what reinforcements will General Westmoreland need during this calendar year?
- d What enemy units have been identified in the attacks on the cities? What uncommitted units are available for a second cycle?
- e What grounds are there for the allegation of an "intelligence failure" at the time of the first wave of attacks on the cities? How does General Westmoreland feel about the functioning of his own and the Vietnamese intelligence services in connection with this situation?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Jes ltr 10-2-78  
By ip/ly, NARA, Date 2-20-92

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f What has been the nature of our psychological warfare activities directed at North Vietnam and the VC since January 30?

These are all hard questions for which there are probably no final answers at this time but whatever Bus can bring back will be most helpful.

MD2  
MDT

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

26

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 20, 1968  
10:00 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Porter's scenario  
for putting pressure on North Korea if  
they do not move.

I am not at all sure that his  
particular scenario is the right one;  
but we had better get a scenario soon.

Key passages marked.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 4321

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WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By RG, NARA, Date 2-21-92

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-213

By iss, NARA Date 8-22-97

26a  
Sunday, February 18, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR PORTER (Seoul 4321)

1. The following is in response to your request for an assessment of the outlook for the Pueblo case and contains my advice as to the next steps. I have no doubt that you have considered all the possibilities I list below in the form of gradually increasing pressure on North Korea. They seem to contain, up to a point at least, a useful course of action short of open conflict which may change the North Korean attitude. However, such actions as I list would lead inevitably to even greater engagement of U. S. prestige and therefore, if they fail to achieve the desired result, to a hard decision whether to strike a blow. They also involve the fate of the crew, the reaction of North Korean allies, and the problem of deciding and coordinating the South Korean role.
2. The North Korean's are now fully aware of the value of the men and are undoubtedly extracting very valuable information from them through use of hypnotic drugs and perhaps other devices. It would seem that this process could go on for some time and that, consequently, we will be kept waiting, cap in hand, at Panmunjom. It is but a short step from general "confession" to "request" of some crew members at least (probably the most valuable) to be allowed to remain in North Korea and serve the people in atonement for "past crimes." In fact, almost anything can be expected from a regime like that of North Korea, whose super-Maoist outlook requires that the leader's name be mentioned at least once in practically every sentence of hours-long broadcasts.
3. Your latest instructions to the U. S. senior representative at Panmunjom contained a fairly obvious warning to the North Koreans that seven meetings have proved unsatisfactory. That will not move them. They are fully aware of our dissatisfaction, but as long as we are meeting and doing nothing else, they will not be moved by our views about progress or lack of it.
4. If it is now decided to apply other measures, I would begin by not responding for the time being to the next North Korean request for a closed meeting. I would not refuse a meeting -- I would simply not respond. A brief message could be sent to North Korea through another channel to the effect we have had enough, that seven closed and three open meetings have proved useless. A clear warning about welfare of crew and responsibility of highest North Korean level should be included.
5. We could then commence a series of non-decisive measures, without verbal threats, which would engage North Korean attention. The first of these would be cancellation of leaves of all UN military elements along the DMZ.

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6. After a short period (two or three days) to permit us to note any North Korean reaction, we could announce a black list of shipping to and from North Korean ports. The effect would be more psychological than substantial.
7. The next step would be to alert American dependents and non-essential personnel in Korea that the situation is not improving and that we advise visitors not to make plans to come to Korea for the time being. This would cause considerable comment and might have adverse effect on investment in Korea.
8. This could be followed by an air demonstration well inside Korea, so handled as to have high press visibility.
9. At this point we would assess the North Korean reaction, if any, and decide in light of intelligence gathered through other sources whether to resume private meetings. This decision could of course be made anywhere along the line. If it seemed necessary to continue the process cited above, other measures such as blockade, closer-in naval/air demonstrations and actual evacuation of non-essential Americans here could be considered. Certainly, the last mentioned step would have ominous overtones.
10. I suggest serious consideration be given to the steps listed, in paragraphs 4 through 8, at the present time. If and as such a procedure is approved, we should take steps concurrently at the UN and elsewhere, to make known our feeling that we have done our best with the North Koreans who do not wish to settle the matter in a peaceful or honorable way.
11. I recommend this course of action because I have always felt it desirable to look and plan beyond what we are actually doing, especially with dealing with Communists. For understandable reasons, we have been a little too eager in this case and they have made us dance to their tune. As the process of recovering the men and ship now seems likely to be long drawn out for the reasons I have cited, I think our people would support a change of roles.

INFORMATION

*Pres. file*

27

Tuesday, Feb. 20, 1968  
10:00 a. m.

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MR. PRESIDENT:

You will be interested in this discussion between  
Amb. Bunker and Thieu.

It includes:

- Thieu's analysis of enemy intentions;
- his plans for recovery;
- his intention to remove the two weak Corps  
Commanders (II and IV Corps);
- his efforts to pull the various political groups  
and the nation together, including support  
for the new "People's Congress to Save  
the Nation";
- and his plans for his Face the Nation broadcast  
next Sunday, which will be taped this Friday.

In general, Thieu seems to keep his poise and  
perspective well under pressure.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Saigon 19925)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-214  
By CL5, NARA Date 8-4-97

cy Jackson  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-213

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By us, NARA Date 8-22-97

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

EXDIS

1. I SPENT AN HOUR AND TWENTY MINUTES WITH PRESIDENT THIEU LATE AFTERNOON ON FEBRUARY 19. HE WAS RELAXED AND CONFIDENT AND IN A CHEERFUL MOOD.

2. I OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING THAT APPARENTLY HIS FORECAST OF ENEMY TACTICS HAD BEEN CORRECT AND THAT WE WERE APPARENTLY NOW IN THE SECOND PHASE OF THE VIET CONG'S FIRST OFFENSIVE. THIEU AGREED AND SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE SECOND

~~PAGE 2 RUMJIR 19955/1 SECRET~~

OFFENSIVE MIGHT COME LATER, PERHAPS AROUND MAY TO JULY. HE

THEN GAVE ME AN ANATOMICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE ENEMY'S OBJECTIVES. FIRST, "TO TIE THE LEGS;" THIS MEANT TO PIN DOWN OUR TROOPS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE IN THE NORTH, IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS AND IN DEFENSE OF THE CITIES. SECOND, "TO CUT THE ARMS;" BY THIS HE MEANT THE MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS ON CITIES AND AIR

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~~PAGE 23 SAIGON 19925 31 07 69 231315Z~~

FIELDS, ESPECIALLY THE EFFORT TO REDUCE OUR AIR CAPACITY. THIRD, "TO BEAT THE HEAD;" IN OTHER WORDS TO DO AWAY WITH THE LEADERSHIP, THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, BY ASSASSINATION AND OTHER METHODS. FOURTH, "TO TIGHTEN THE BELT;" THIS WOULD INVOLVE CUTTING OFF SUPPLIES FOR THE POPULATED AREAS FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE, THE COUNTER-PACIFICATION EFFORT THAT HE HAD DESCRIBED EARLIER. THIEU CONCLUDED THIS EXPLANATION BY SAYING THAT HE THOUGHT THE MAIN ENEMY OBJECTIVE WAS STILL THE COUNTRYSIDE, PARTLY TO CHOKE OFF SUPPLIES TO THE CITIES BUT PRIMARILY BECAUSE THEY WISHED TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT THEY CONTROLLED 40 TO 50PERC OF THE TERRITORY BEFORE GOING INTO NEGOTIATIONS, EVEN THOUGH IT MIGHT BE ONLY 20PERC OF THE PEOPLE.

3. I RAISED A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC POINTS WITH THIEU RELATING

~~PAGE 3 RVN 19925 31 07 69 231315Z~~

TO THE RECOVERY EFFORT, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF RESTORING GENERAL CONFIDENCE AND GETTING THE COUNTRY BACK TO WORK AGAIN. I MENTIONED THE DESIRABILITY OF SETTING A STANDARD CURFEW COUNTRY-WIDE FROM 7AM TO 7PM, IN ORDER TO GET THE ECONOMY FUNCTIONING, AND OPENING UP THE ROUTES FOR SUPPLIES TO COME TO THE MARKET, ESPECIALLY FROM THE DELTA TO SAIGON, IN ORDER TO NORMALIZE PRICES ON BASIC COMMODITIES.

4. THIEU AGREED ABOUT THE CURFEW AND SAID THAT IT COULD BE EXTENDED THROUGHOUT SAIGON. IN THE PROVINCES IT WOULD HAVE TO BE APPLIED ON A TIME-PHASED DEPENDING ON CONDITIONS, BUT HE AGREED THAT IT SHOULD BE DONE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND SAID HE WOULD REVIEW THE SITUATION AND GIVE ORDERS TO RELAX THE CURFEWS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND WHEREVER POSSIBLE. THIEU ADDED THAT THERE WAS STILL APPREHENSION IN SOME OF THE PROVINCES ABOUT SECURITY BUT HE INTENDED TO MOVE AS QUICKLY AS CONDITIONS WOULD PERMIT.

5. WITH RESPECT TO PACIFICATION AND VIET CONG OBJECTIVES IN

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~~PAGE 03 SAIGON 19925 01 OF 02 261315Z~~

~~PAGE 4 RUMJIR 19925/1 SECRET~~

THIS FIELD, THIEU SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED VIEN TO GIVE MORE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY IN THE CITIES TO THE POLICE, USING RVNAF TO HELP CLEAN UP THE SUBURBAN AREAS.

SECONDLY, RVNAF SHOULD BE RE-FORMED TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE ENEMY AROUND THE CITIES AND PUSH THEM BACK INTO THE JUNGLE. THIRD, PACIFICATION SHOULD NOT BE NEGLECTED; IF A BATTALION WERE NEEDED FOR A FEW DAYS FOR OPERATIONS AROUND CITIES, FOR EXAMPLE, THIS WOULD BE ALL RIGHT, THE MAIN VC OBJECTIVE REMAINS THE COUNTRYSIDE AND OUR TACTICS MUST TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT.

6. I THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF PRIORITY FOR LOW-COST HOUSING, TO RECONSTRUCT SPEEDILY THE BURNED OUT URBAN AREAS, AND SUGGESTED THAT A COMPLETE BAN ON PRIVATE LUXURY CONSTRUCTION WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION. I SAID I HAD TALKED WITH OUR USAID AND ECONOMIC PEOPLE AS WELL AS KOMER, AND THAT ALL OF THEM FELT THIS WAS THE ONLY WAY TO GET RECONSTRUCTION MOVING RAPIDLY. AT THE PRESENT TIME THE BIDS FOR SUCH CONSTRUCTION ARE TOO HIGH AND THEY WILL REMAIN SO UNLESS SUCH A BAN ON PRIVATE CONSTRUCTION

~~PAGE 5 RUMJIR 19925/1X SECRET~~

IS IMPOSED. THIEU NOTED THIS DOWN AND SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS A GOOD IDEA. HE AGREED THAT THERE WAS A NEED FOR DOING SOMETHING LIKE THIS.

7. I REFERRED TO THIEU'S RECENT TALK WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND GENERAL VIEN AND SAID THAT WESTMORELAND AND I HAD ALSO DISCUSSED THE NEED TO MOVE AHEAD RAPIDLY ON GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION. WE AGREED THAT NOW WAS THE OPPORTUNE MOMENT TO MOVE SINCE THE GVN HAS INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM THE PAST FEW WEEKS TO EVALUATE THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS OFFICIALS. THIEU AGREED AND SAID THAT HE DID NOT PLAN TO WAIT FOR THE PROVINCE CHIEFS TRAINING SCHOOL TO COMPLETE ITS WORK BEFORE APPOINTING NEW PROVINCE CHIEFS, BUT TO APPOINT THEM IMMEDIATELY AND TRAIN THEM LATER. HE SAID HE HADN'T EXPECTED TOO MUCH TO COME OUT OF THE TRAINING

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COURSE ANYWAY, AND HE WOULD PUSH VIEN TO MOVE AHEAD IN THIS SENSE. HE ADDED THAT HE PLANNED TO SEND GENERAL THANG TO IV CORPS AND GENERAL LAN TO II CORPS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO REPLACE GENERAL MANH AND GENERAL VINH LOC. IN CONNECTION WITH THE CHANGES IN PROVINCE CHIEFS, HE SAID THAT THE PRO-

PAGE 5 RUNJIR 19925 1 ~~SECRET~~

INCE CHIEF IN LAM DONG HAD ALREADY BEEN REMOVED AND THAT HE PLANS TO GO AHEAD WITH OTHERS.

8. I ASKED THIEU HOW HE FELT ABOUT THE NEW "PEOPLE CONGRESS TO SAVE THE NATION," AND HOW HIS MEETING WITH SENATOR TRAN VAN DON HAD GONE ON FEBRUARY 17. THIEU SAID IT HAD GONE VERY WELL. BUT HE WARNED DON THAT SUCH EFFORTS IN THE PAST HAD NEVER LED TO PRACTICAL RESULTS AND THEY MUST SEE THAT IT DOES THIS TIME. DON HAD GIVEN THIEU A COPY OF THE RESOLUTION AND A LIST OF MEMBERS FOR THE CONGRESS AND OF THE COMMITTEES WHICH HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. I WENT OVER OUR REPORT OF THE SUNDAY MEETING WITH THIEU SINCE HE DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE FULL DETAILS ABOUT IT.

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INFO CINCPAC/HAWAII

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 19925

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

~~EXDIS~~

9. THIEU COMMENTED THAT IT WAS UNFORTUNATE DANG DUC KHOI HAD SPOKEN AT THE CONGRESS SINCE HE WAS A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL AND THE CONGRESS SHOULD BE KEPT NON-GOVERNMENTAL IN NATURE. THE OTHER POINT THAT STRUCK HIM WAS THAT THE HOA HAO WERE NOT ADEQUATELY REPRESENTED AS THE ORGANIZERS HAD INVITED SOMEONE TO THE CONGRESS WHO WAS NOT IN FAVOR WITH THE CHIEF OF THE HOA HAO SECT., WITH WHOM HE (THIEU) HAD MET THIS MORNING. I SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE A GOOD IDEA

~~PAGE 2 RUMJIR 19925/2 SECRET~~

TO INVITE THE MEMBERS OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE AND THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO MEET WITH HIM AT THE PALACE, TO ENCOURAGE THEM, AND TO STIMULATE ACTION ON THEIR PART. HE SAID HE WOULD DO THIS AS SOON AS THEY HAD GOTTEN ORGANIZED.

10. THIEU SAID THAT HE WAS IN ANY CASE PROCEEDING WITH HIS SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH POLITICAL LEADERS, FOLLOWING ON THE TALKS WITH RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHICH HAD ALREADY TAKEN PLACE. HE FEARED THAT IN THE LARGER ORGANIZATION IT WOULD NOT BE

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 19925 02 OF 02 201345Z

POSSIBLE TO GET EVERYBODY TO WORK TOGETHER, AND HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO DEVELOP SMALLER GROUPS WHOSE MEMBERS WOULD BE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER. HE HAD SENT WRITTEN INVITATIONS TO THE INDIVIDUALS TO MEET WITH HIM AND THEY HAD BEEN PLEASED BY THIS ATTENTION. HE SAID THAT ALL OF THE RELIGIOUS GROUPS WITH WHOM HE HAD MET HAD AGREED THAT HIS APPROACH WAS BEST. HE HAD SPENT SEVERAL HOURS WITH EACH ONE AND THEY HAD BEEN VERY RELAXED AND BROUGHT OUR POINTS OF VIEW WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT IN A MORE FORMAL MEETING. THIEU SAID THAT ON HIS SIDE, HE HAD EXPLAINED TO THESE LEADERS WHAT HIS INTENTIONS AND THE GOVERNMENT'S PUR-

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 19925/2 ~~SECRET~~

POSES WERE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. HE CITED AS AN EXAMPLE HIS EXPLANATION OF THE REASONS WHY IT WAS NECESSARY TO DRAFT YOUNGER MEN FOR MILITARY SERVICE AND THAT IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO LOWER THE DRAFT AGE FURTHER. THIEU SAID THAT IN GENERAL THE RESULTS HAD BEEN VERY GOOD, THE CRITICISM HAD BEEN GENERALLY CONSTRUCTIVE, AND THERE WAS BROAD AGREEMENT THAT MORE SACRIFICES WERE NEEDED FOR THE NATIONAL EFFORT.

11. THIEU ADDED THAT HE HAD MET WITH CAO DAI REPRESENTATIVES THAT SAME DAY AND THEY HAD REPORTED VERY FULLY TO HIM AND HAD MADE VERY FRANK RECOMMENDATIONS AS WELL. THIEU, IN COMMENTING ON THESE TALKS WITH RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND THE PROMISES OF SUPPORT WHICH HAD BEEN FORTHCOMING, CITED AS AN EXAMPLE THE FACT THAT HE HAD TOLD THE CAO DAI THAT IF THE VC ATTACKED TAY NINH AND ATTEMPTED TO USE THEIR CHURCH AS A SANCTUARY, IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO ROOT THE VC OUT. THEY REPLIED THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD THIS AND COULD NOT OBJECT IF THE GVN FORCES FOUND IT NECESSARY TO ATTACK THE VC IN THE SANCTUARY. HE MENTIONED ALSO THAT MAI THO TRUYEN HAD BEEN VERY FRANK IN HIS PERSONAL ADVICE ABOUT TV AND RADIO APPEAR-

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 19925/2 ~~SECRET~~

ANCES AND PUBLIC INFORMATION EFFORTS. THIEU SAID HE PLANNED TO CONTINUE HIS TALKS THIS WEEK WITH VARIOUS POLITICAL GROUPS

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~~PAGE 03 SAIGON 19905 02 OF 02 201345Z~~

WHICH HE THOUGHT COULD WORK TOGETHER. AFTER THESE TALKS WERE CONCLUDED HE WOULD SEE WHAT MIGHT BE DEVELOPED, POSSIBLY INCLUDING COOPERATION BETWEEN THESE GROUPS ON THE PEOPLES' CONGRESS, AND THE SETTING UP OF AN ADVISORY COUNCIL. HE MENTIONED ONCE AGAIN THE GROUP OF 12 OR 14 "MEN OF GOOD WILL", INCLUDING TRAN VAN AN AND DR. SUNG ( PRESUMABLY DAN VAN SUNG).

12. I ASKED THIEU WHEN HE PLANNED TO GIVE ANOTHER ADDRESS ON TV AND RADIO, INFORMING THE PEOPLE OF THE CURRENT SITUATION, THE GVN'S RECOVERY PLANS, AND WHAT PROGRESS IS BEING MADE. HE REPLIED THAT HE PLANNED TO VISIT HUE ON WEDNESDAY AND AFTER THAT WOULD SPEAK TO THE PEOPLE. HE REMARKED THAT HE WOULD BE ON "FACE THE NATION" NEXT SUNDAY, AND WOULD MAKE THE RECORDING ON FRIDAY. HE ASKED ME WHAT KIND OF QUESTIONS I THOUGHT HE WOULD BE ASKED, REMARKING THAT A HALF HOUR WAS TOO SHORT A TIME TO COVER ALL THE THINGS HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS. I REPLIED THAT I WOULD SEND HIM THE TAPE OF

~~PAGE 5 RUMJIR 19925/2 SECRET~~

MY RECORDING WHICH WOULD PERHAPS GIVE HIM SOME IDEAS AND THAT WE WOULD TRY TO THINK UP SOME OTHER POSSIBILITIES. I FOLLOWED UP BY SUGGESTING THAT HE MEET WITH A SELECTED GROUP OF THE MORE RESPONSIBLE AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS, QUITE A NUMBER OF WHOM ARE HERE AT PRESENT. HE SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO DO THIS AND WOULD TRY TO WORK OUT SOME MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TIME.

13. I GAVE THIEU A COPY OF SECRETARY RUSK'S FEBRUARY 14 STATEMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS AND BRIEFED HIM ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE APPROACHES TO THE ITALIAN AND DANISH GOVERNMENTS. THIEU EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THIS INFORMATION BUT HAD NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT.

14. I ALSO TOLD THIEU THAT GENERAL WHEELER WOULD BE COMING HERE THIS WEEKEND FOR A BRIEF PRIVATE VISIT. THIEU SAID HE LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING HIM. [BUNKER]

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~~EXDIS~~

INFORMATION

28

~~SECRET~~--CACTUS

Tuesday, February 20, 1968  
9:55 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

At the 8th session the North Koreans said they would let the crew go if we "apologize" for intruding into their territorial waters and give assurance that we will "never again commit such an act."

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 4391

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-214  
By CB, NARA Date 8-4-97

WWRostow:rla

*Pres file*~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 20, 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NSC Discussion of the Near East--Noon, Wednesday,  
February 21, 1968

The attached State paper is a good overall sketch of our objectives and problems in the Near East this year. But it is too much to discuss at one meeting. Therefore, I suggest you focus on the two questions indicated below.

You might open the meeting by saying that Gene Black and others have reported to you that our position in the Near East is at a low point. Critics are beginning to say that we're losing the Middle East to the Russians. You'd like to go around the room and hear answers to these two questions:

1. Is our position in the Arab world as serious as these reports make out?

2. What can we do?

Taking these questions one at a time you might first ask Secretary Rusk, Luke Battle and Dick Helms whether they agree with these reports.

Then you might say you are especially concerned about the Jarring mission and Jerusalem and ask for views on what more we can do:

- Secretary Rusk
- Ambassador Goldberg
- Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler, if they have anything to add.

In ending the meeting, you could say you will expect Secretary Rusk to come back to you with specific recommendations for action as needed.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-214

By CB, NARA Date 8-4-97

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-213

By isa, NARA Date 8-22-97

February 18, 1968

Our major policy objectives and problems for 1968 can be summarized under four major headings.

#### I. Arab-Israel Problem.

Our objective is to achieve a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute along the lines of the President's five points of June 19, 1967. Short of a general settlement, we would like to see progress on some of the major points at issue.

The main issue we face is how actively to involve ourselves. On the one hand, we worked hard to put Ambassador Jarring in the middle. On the other, his mission may not even get off the ground unless we persuade the Israelis to take a step toward the Arabs or persuade Jarring to listen less and begin injecting some ideas of his own. We may soon have to decide such questions as the following:

--To what extent are we prepared to weigh in with suggestions, encouragement and political suasion to sustain and support Jarring's effort? Is now the time to surface suggestions on the substance, strategy and tactics on issues such as the status of Jerusalem, refugees, termination of the state of belligerency, steps toward withdrawal and the economic aspects of a Middle East settlement including desalting? Is now the time for us to become more active behind the scenes?

--If the Jarring mission founders, we shall have to consider whether and how to continue the search for some early progress on individual issues, (e.g., reopening Suez, Arab acceptance of right of passage through Straits of Tiran, at least limited Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory). Should another effort be made through the UN? Should the USG itself take the lead in sponsoring some limited effort toward accommodation? Will there be an opportunity for some limited collaboration with the Soviets in bringing the Arabs and Israelis closer on any of the outstanding issues?

#### II. Soviet Threat.

Our objective is to counter Soviet influence in the Near East and Mediterranean. We cannot avoid facing the question of whether we are losing the Near East to the Russians.

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GROUP 1

Exempted from automatic downgrading  
and declassification

The main issue is that the Arab defeat in June broadened opportunities for Soviet influence at a time when our resources and maneuverability are increasingly restricted. While the Soviets are more active--their recent firmer involvement in the Yemen has larger implications for their relations in the Arabian Peninsula, and beyond--we are for the moment increasingly passive whether we want to be or not. The questions are how much more we would like to do and how hard we are able--given other priorities--to fight for Congressional support of a more vigorous effort.

--We have been consulting with our NATO allies on the Soviet threat in the Mediterranean area. We are aiming for some common view of the threat and, hopefully, for some useful exchange of views on how our policies might be attuned to the common Western interest with hopes of increasing Western European involvement. But progress is slow, and there is some question whether this is not too weak a reed to lean on.

--We are keeping in close touch with the Governments of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Britain particularly with a view to countering Soviet (and Chinese) ambitions in Yemen, South Yemen, and the Persian Gulf. But without a peace settlement our position with the Arabs continues to erode, and the British seem determined to withdraw from their position in the Gulf.

### III. Relations with the Arabs

Our objective is to retain our friendly ties with the Arab moderates at least, and to improve our relations with the other Arab states to the extent opportunities and our interests permit.

The main issue is how actively we should try to resume relations with the states that broke with us last June. On the one hand, there is much to be said for a low-key diplomatic relationship without aid ties to broaden our presence as widely as possible. On the other, there is something to be said for the argument that a constructive Arab attitude will not be possible until the radicals come to their senses and that we should concentrate on our moderate friends and just leave the radicals to themselves (and the Soviets for the time being).

--We must certainly be sensitive to the need to indicate our desire to remain on good terms with the Arab moderates, giving them a clear alternative to casting their lot increasingly with the radical states of the area and with the Soviets. This may require actions by us in the political, economic and military supply fields, depending on individual requirements. Now that Israel seems more conscious of the need to block the Soviet thrust, our hands seem freer, especially in Jordan. What more can we do? Should we, for example, seek a more meaningful US military presence in the Arabian Sea area?

--The question of how to deal with Nassar stands out as a special problem. On the one hand, it is tempting to argue that the sooner he disappears from the scene, the sooner the Middle East can get down to constructive regional efforts--and therefore we should just let him stew in his own juice. On the other, there is sound argument for keeping our lines open to the more reasonable pro-western elements in the UAR.

#### IV. Arms Limitation

Our objective is to slow down or stop the Near East arms race.

The main issue is that an honest try for arms limitation will require a dogged effort to bring the USSR aboard, as well perhaps as some parallel effort with the regional states to avoid another round in the arms race. We have a better opportunity than ever to achieve some sort of limitation in the next few months, but if we are not prepared to make a major effort, we should accept the consequences of a new round.

--We can continue to seek opportunities for multilateral agreement to limit shipments, such as by registration with the UNSYG as the President has proposed. But we have met little success so far.

--We can continue a policy of restraint in our own arms supply to the area, but unless the USSR restrains its shipments we will soon have to meet Israel's needs. Therefore, we may have a last opportunity this spring to engage the USSR in some limitation arrangement.

--French decisions on arms supply may well assume increasing importance in the area. It seems doubtful at this point that we can count on influencing the French one way or the other, in the absence of major developments also involving Soviet policy.

--We are concerned over Israel's retaining its options to produce nuclear weapons and to procure strategic missiles. Despite their immediate deterrent effort, Israeli following up on either of these options would undercut any chances of limiting the arms race. We should press for Israel's adherence to the NPT at the appropriate time, exploring the possibility of some useful collaboration with the Soviets in that connection with a view to general restraint in supplying arms to the region.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-214

By Cb, NARA Date 8-4-97 Tuesday, February 20, 1968~~SECRET~~

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NSC Discussion of the Near East--Noon, Wednesday,  
February 21

You have heard Gene Black's description of how our position in the Near East is eroding. Your ambassadors agree, and critics are playing up Soviet gains in the area. The purpose of this meeting is to review the situation and to discuss what more we can do to reverse the trend.

We can take some steps like sending arms to Jordan or renewing relations with Cairo. But the Arabs will mainly measure us by our success in promoting an Arab-Israeli arrangement which would lead to Israeli withdrawal. In this quarter there are two main issues:

1. How to get the Jarring mission moving. Jarring is trying to persuade the Israelis and Egyptians to "accept" the November 22 UN resolution as a basis for talks. The Israelis are evasive because they fear Cairo will interpret their acceptance as agreement to withdraw before negotiating other issues like permanent boundaries. Israel wants to be sure talks will follow their acceptance. The Egyptians say they "accept" the whole resolution but won't commit themselves to talks until Israel "accepts" the resolution. Ambassadors Goldberg and Barbour and Joe Sisco are discussing the problem in detail with the Israelis, and Secretary Rusk has written Abba Eban. We don't think you need to weigh in yet, but the question is how much harder we press Israel to break this impasse.

2. How to stop Israeli incorporation of Jerusalem. The Arabs see Israeli acts in Jerusalem as proof that Israel doesn't intend to negotiate an honest settlement. The Jordanians threaten to bring the matter to the Security Council in the next few days. Secretary Rusk wrote to Abba Eban; a few days later President Shazar said publicly that Israel would never give up Jerusalem. Entirely apart from Israel's eventual negotiating position on Jerusalem, we want them to lie low on moves that further alienate the Arabs, upset Jarring and make it more difficult for us to play a constructive role. State may possibly ask you soon to weigh in with Eshkol asking him to lay aside plans for developing land in former Arab Jerusalem which Israel expropriated. There is no recommendation yet, but this discussion will give you the full picture of how these issues all fit together.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

31

Tuesday, February 20, 1968

*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

You have agreed to give a lunch for former Chancellor Erhard on March 18 at 1:00 p.m. Mrs. Erhard will not accompany him on his visit here. When Erhard was last here, you gave him a stag luncheon for about 40.

Would you prefer:

A stag lunch for 30-40\_\_\_\_\_

A mixed lunch for 30-40\_\_\_\_\_

A stag lunch for 10-20\_\_\_\_\_

Other\_\_\_\_\_.

W. W. Rostow

*WWR*  
MWG:mst

Mr. Rostow

INFORMATION

32

*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, February 20, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Turgut Menemencioglu, 1:30 p.m. on  
February 21, 1968

We asked you to see Menemencioglu (pronounced Men-eh-men-jo-lu) to give him a good send-off in his new job as CENTO Secretary General. CENTO's original military purpose is less important today than in the 1950s. However, as we grope toward new regional arrangements in the Middle East, we are in no hurry to abandon an organization which has provided a pattern of regional cooperation that is now beginning to pay off in non-military fields.

This is billed largely as a courtesy call, but a short pep talk on the importance of regionalism would be worthwhile. I suggest the following points:

1. Welcome to an old friend (he was Turkish ambassador here 1962-66). You wish him well in his new job. You are pleased that he is devoting his well-known abilities to building regional initiatives in the Middle East.
2. The main hope for progress in the world is the kind of regional cooperation which permits people to tackle their own problems. You have seen this at work in Asia. You realize this is just getting started in the Middle East. CENTO started out as a military organization, but you hope he can use it as a foundation for building new regional cooperation in other fields.
3. Please carry your best wishes to Turk President Sunay (Soo-nye).

Sid Sober, Luke Battle's outstanding director of regional affairs, will be escorting Menemencioglu.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-214  
By CB, NARA Date 8-4-97

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

32a

February 14, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Talking Points for the President  
During Courtesy Call by CENTO  
Secretary General, February 21, 1968  
at 5:30 p.m.

Mr. Turgut Menemencioglu (pronounced Men-eh-men-jo-lu), who speaks English fluently, is making his first official visit to Washington February 19-21 as the new Secretary General of CENTO. He assumed this position on January 1, 1968. He is one of our oldest Turkish friends and was Turkey's Ambassador to the United States from 1962 to 1966. A biography and photograph of Mr. Menemencioglu are enclosed.

The situation prevailing in the early 1950's when CENTO was conceived has changed in various respects, notably in the regional countries' views of the imminence of the Soviet threat. Today CENTO has only limited military significance, and its military value has been publicly questioned, particularly by Pakistan. Nevertheless, in providing a defensive shield for the region CENTO has also helped to stimulate regional cooperation.

Mr. Menemencioglu has the ability to give CENTO the realistic leadership it needs under today's conditions. We believe the new Secretary General is disposed to take a leading role in getting Iran, Pakistan and Turkey to shoulder more of the burden for regional initiatives within CENTO and to find ways to increase its value to them as a regional organization.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;  
declassified after 12 years

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Your brief meeting with him will underscore our support for his efforts in these directions. To this end, you may wish to make the following points:

1. We are very glad that Mr. Menemencioglu's considerable abilities, well known to us, are now at the service of CENTO, and we wish him success in his new work.

2. We are gratified that CENTO has stimulated the growth of regional planning and institutions for development among Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. The experience of regional cooperation is creating new sources of strength among these countries. We believe the defensive shield provided by CENTO has been a useful factor in this regard.

3. We hope that with Mr. Menemencioglu's leadership in these years of transition even more will be done by our regional allies to exploit the potential of regional cooperation for economic and social progress.

4. If Mr. Menemencioglu asks for a message to take back to the CENTO representatives in Ankara, you may wish to tell him you believe that CENTO's continued encouragement of progress for its peoples on a regional basis is one of the alliance's finest objectives.

5. You may wish to ask Mr. Menemencioglu to convey your respects to President Sunay of Turkey, who made a state visit here last April, when the Secretary General returns to Ankara.



Dean Rusk

Enclosure:  
Biography and photograph

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 19, 1968 , Monday, 6:30 P.M.

**INFORMATION MEMORANDUM**

**SUBJECT: Tonkin Gulf Incident**

*fr. file*

The first attack on the Destroyer, USS MADDUX, operating in the Gulf of Tonkin, took place on Sunday, August 2, 1964.

On August 3 the President instructed that the Navy continue the patrols in the Gulf and issued orders that combat aircraft and the two destroyers attack any force which attacked them in international waters with the objective not only of driving off the force, but of destroying them.

On Tuesday, August 4 in mid-morning, Secretary McNamara reported a second attack on the USS MADDUX.

There followed a noon meeting, a luncheon with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. McCone, Mr. Vance and Mr. McGeorge Bundy during which the entire situation was reviewed and a course of action decided upon.

At 6:15, the National Security Council met to discuss the proposed action.

At 6:45 the Leadership was informed.

The Defense Department sent the necessary military orders for the reprisal attack.

At 11:40 the President made a statement to the nation via television at which time he not only announced the second attack, but also the actions taken in reprisal against gunboats and supporting facilities in North Vietnam which had been used in launching the hostile operations against U.S. naval vessels.

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Bromley Smith

INFORMATION

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*fr.*

**SECRET/CACTUS**

**Monday, February 19, 1968 - 6:25 pm**

**Mr. President:**

As background to Tuesday's lunch discussion of Pueblo, herewith a draft Rusk-Gromyko letter, tried out on Thompson, on the assumption that tonight's (midnight) meeting falls.

Obviously, before sending something like this, we'd better decide what we are going to do.

I believe Sec. Rusk will be prepared to address himself to this tomorrow at lunch.

**W. W. Rostow**

State 117432 to Moscow  
Moscow 2848

~~**SECRET**~~

**WWRostow:rla**

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By lg, NARA, Date 2-21-92

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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FOR AMBASSADOR

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-213  
By us NARA Date 8-22-97

*Postov*

1. We believe that it is important that Soviets have full and accurate information on our talks with North Koreans. We have therefore passed to Dobrynin verbatim transcripts of all seven meetings at Panmunjom.

Summaries of these meetings have been cabled to you.

2. We are also considering possible desirability of letter on Pueblo case from Secretary to Gromyko. Your comments are requested on the wisdom of such a letter at this time and on draft which follows: ~~QUOTE~~  
Quote

*my* 3. / Dear Mr. Gromyko: I am sure that Ambassador Dobrynin has reported to you our conversation of February 14 in which I briefed him on recent developments in Korea, but I thought it best to write you directly as well.

*my* 5. It is now more than three weeks since North Korean patrol boats forcibly seized the USS Pueblo in ~~int~~ international waters. Despite the clear illegality of this action and despite the strong emotions which it has

Drafted by: KTF:JAYager/mam 2/19/58

Tel. Ext. 3263

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

G- Charles E. Bohlen *CS*

Clearances

KTF - Mr. Berger *SATS.*

EUR/SOV - Mr. Toon *W*

S/S - Mr. Read

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Classification

aroused in the US, we have agreed with the Soviet Government's view that we should bend every effort to arrive at a peaceful solution. We have, therefore, taken action to quiet domestic pressures for a strong response. We have stopped further deployments into the area and moved the carrier Enterprise some distance south.

5.8 We have now had seven private meetings in direct talks at Panmunjom. I do not know how fully the North Koreans may have informed you of the substance of these meetings, and to be certain that you have the full facts, copies of the verbatim transcripts of all seven ~~meetings~~ meetings were sent to Ambassador Dobrynin on 19 February 1975. You will note from these transcripts that the North Koreans have not given the slightest indication that they will turn over the crew at an early date, and at the seventh meetings they made it clear that they have no intention of ever returning the vessel.

6.8 The transcripts demonstrate that we have adopted a moderate and reasonable position. We have offered to conduct a full and impartial inquiry after the ship and its personnel have been returned to us. We have further offered to express our regrets if that inquiry develops facts which would warrant our doing so.

7.8 We have now reached the end of what we can say to the North Koreans and what we can concede.

8.8 Our public and our Congress are waiting to hear the results of these talks. Unless the crew and vessel are released, we shall in a few days have to break our silence on

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Classification



INFORMATION

*Pres file*

35

Monday, Feb. 19, 1968  
5:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a self-explanatory report to  
you from Sect. McNamara.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (log 685)



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

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N O D I S / CACTUS

REF: STATE 117432

1. BELIEVE SITUATION FULLY WARRANTS LETTER TO GROMYKO.  
HAVE ONLY FOLLOWING NITPICKS ON TEXT.
2. IN ORDER THAT FIRST PARAGRAPH NOT RPT NOT APPEAR REFLECT  
ON DOBRYNIN'S REPORTING, SUGGEST SUBSTITUTING SOMETHING ALONG  
FOLLOWING LINES: QUOTE: I SHOULD LIKE TO SUPPLEMENT MY DIS-  
CUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ON FEBRUARY 14 WITH THE FOL-  
LOWING APPRAISAL OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN KOREA. UNQUOTE.
3. IN PARAGRAPH 4, TO AVOID CONFIRMING SOVIET CONVICTION THAT  
WE CAN CONTROL OUR PUBLIC OPINION, PENULTIMATE SENTENCE MIGHT  
READ QUOTE: WE HAVE ENDEAVORED TO HANDLE THE PROBLEM IN A  
MANNER WHICH WOULD AVOID STIRRING UP DOMESTIC PRESSURES FOR  
A STRONG RESPONSE. UNQUOTE.
4. SUGGEST ADDING SENTENCE AT END OF LETTER STATING QUOTE:  
THIS SITUATION IS OF SUCH SERIOUSNESS THAT I FELT I SHOULD  
PERSONALLY BRING IT TO YOUR ATTENTION. UNQUOTE.

GP-3. THOMPSON

*Rostow*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-213  
By us NARA Date 8-22-97

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

19 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I understand that Drs. Killian, Kistiakowsky and Rabi expressed concern to President Eisenhower about the possible use of nuclear weapons in South Vietnam. I have today called each of the three men to tell them that:

1. The JCS have not even discussed the use of such weapons in South Vietnam.
2. Because of terrain and other conditions peculiar to our operations in South Vietnam, it is inconceivable that the use of nuclear weapons would be recommended there against either Viet Cong or North Vietnamese forces.

They expressed appreciation for my calls. Kistiakowsky stated that their telegram was inspired in part by a newspaper report in which President Eisenhower was reported to have left the door open for the use of nuclear weapons in South Vietnam.

*Robert S. McNamara*  
Robert S. McNamara

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 93-33  
By 128, NARA, Date 10-7-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X-\_\_\_\_\_

INFORMATION

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~~SECRET~~

Monday, February 19, 1968  
4:45 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith our Hal Saunders underlines how closely Nasser and his people are watching our performance in Asia in relation to their future policy towards Israel and peace in the Middle East.

The attachments are provided only in case you care to go into more detail.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-214  
By CB, NARA Date 8-4-97

WWRostow:rin

~~SECRET~~

February 19, 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Effect of Pueblo and Vietnam on the Near East

We don't bother you often with Muhammad Haykal's Friday sermons, but the attached reveals how our position in the Far East may encourage some Arabs to another round with Israel.

The first lesson Haykal learns from Vietnam is that military and technological supremacy--either ours or Israel's--don't guarantee victory over a determined people. While recognizing that the "people's war" won't work against Israel, he feels that with better organization like the NLF's the Arabs could get world opinion behind them and even wear the Israelis down militarily if they could blunt the initial blitzkrieg. There's still hope for the long haul!

The second lesson Haykal draws from the Far East is that the US took no military action after the Pueblo seizure because American forces are tied down in Vietnam. He uses this example to advocate several fronts with Israel, but he may also be implying that the US can't and won't use force in the Near East and so is no longer a factor there. We've seen clandestine evidence of this interpretation (e. g. TDCS attached).

The third lesson Haykal draws is that it is possible by determined resistance for an underdog people to convince even the mighty US that we cannot win a military victory and to collapse allied regimes, when they realize they can't count on us to preserve them forever. He makes the amazing statement that Israel likewise is about to collapse from within--and was well on its way even before the June war.

Haykal's illogic suggests that any failure of US power to produce decisive results in Asia--whatever the reason--may bolster some Arab hopes that they can wait Israel out. Eppie will say this proves that power is the only language the Arabs understand.

*John Foster*  
John Foster

*Hal Saunders*  
Hal Saunders

cc: Harry McPherson  
Al Jenkins  
Nat Davis

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-216  
By jis, NARA Date 4-27-98

~~SECRET~~

## HAYKAL ARTICLE

*Sanders*

CAIRO DOMESTIC SERVICE IN ARABIC 1430 GMT 16 FEB 68 M

(WEEKLY ARTICLE "FRANKLY SPEAKING" BY AL-AHRAM'S CHIEF EDITOR MUHAMMAD HASANAYN HAYKAL)

(EXCERPTS) THE FOLLOWING LESSONS CAN BE LEARNED FROM THE VIETNAMESE WAR.

1--NO ARMED FORCE, HOWEVER SUPERIOR, CAN SUBDUCE OR INTIMIDATE THE WILL OF A PEOPLE OR NATION DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, TO LIQUIDATE ANY AGGRESSION IN WHOLE OR IN PART, AND TO ACHIEVE THE NATIONAL ENTITY AND UNITY. AN ARMED MILITARY FORCE CANNOT DO SO NO MATTER WHAT INTIMIDATION OR METHODS IT USES. THE UNITED STATES HAS FAILED TO BLOCKADE CHINA AND SUBDUCE VIETNAM. IN THE CASE OF CHINA, THE 200 MILLION AMERICANS, NO MATTER HOW WEALTHY THERE ARE, CANNOT IMPOSE THEIR WILL ON 800 MILLION CHINESE. OVER 500,000 U.S. SOLDIERS OF THE MOST MODERN ARMY IN THE WORLD HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO VANQUISH 16 MILLION VIETNAMESE IN THE SOUTH. THE BALANCE OF MANPOWER HAS A ROLE, BUT THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO ENABLE THE MANPOWER TO ACT. THEREFORE, 2 MILLION ISRAELIS CANNOT INTIMIDATE 80 MILLION ARABS.

2--ISRAEL'S TECHNOLOGICAL OR CULTURAL SUPREMACY, WHICH WE OFTEN TALK ABOUT, HAS AN EFFECT ON THE BALANCE OF POWER, BUT THIS EFFECT IS LIMITED. THE TECHNOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ARABS AND ISRAEL IS DEFINITELY MUCH SMALLER THAN THAT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA OR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM. THE PROBLEM IS HOW TO NEUTRALIZE THE ENEMY'S TECHNOLOGICAL SUPREMACY.

THE VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION HAS ACHIEVED THIS THROUGH A PEOPLE'S WAR. THE SAME RESULT MAY NOT BE ACHIEVED IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION. IN ALL OF SINAI, FOR EXAMPLE, THERE ARE NO MORE THAN 20,000 EGYPTIANS--MOST OF THEM NOMADIC BEDOUINS. IT IS DIFFICULT TO DECLARE A PEOPLE'S WAR USING THESE BEDOUINS OR TO DECLARE A WAR WITH THEM AS ITS FOUNDATION.

I CAN SAY--AND THIS IS MY OWN OPINION, DESPITE EFFORTS IN PERSONAL OPINIONS--THAT A LONG WAR CAN NEUTRALIZE ISRAEL'S TECHNOLOGICAL SUPREMACY. AN OBJECTIVE STUDY OF CONDITIONS IN ISRAEL WILL CONFIRM THAT IT CAN ONLY LAUNCH A BLITZKRIEG WAR. IF WE CAN PREVENT ISRAEL FROM RESORTING TO THIS METHOD OF WARFARE AND IF WE CAN WAGE OUR LEGITIMATE WAR IN LONG BATTLE, ISRAEL WILL LOSE ITS STRATEGY AND WILL BE FORCED TO USE METHODS LESS COMPATIBLE WITH ITS PREPARATIONS.

3--IN OPENING SEVERAL FRONTS, THE POWER OF ANY AGGRESSION WILL BE PARALYZED PROVIDED THERE ARE ACTUALLY SEVERAL ACTIVE AND COHESIVE FRONTS. THE MORE THE ENEMY IS ENTANGLED ON ONE FRONT THE EASIER IT CAN BE DEFEATED ON OTHER FRONTS.

X WITH ALL THE POWER AT ITS DISPOSAL, THE UNITED STATES WAS COMPLETELY PARALYZED IN THE CASE OF THE SPY SHIP PUEBLO CAPTURED BY NORTH KOREA. UNDER ORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES, THE INCIDENT WOULD HAVE SUBJECTED NORTH KOREA TO A DREADFUL U.S. VENGEANCE. BUT THE UNITED STATES, WITH ALL ITS MIGHT, COULD DO NO MORE THAN PROTEST. IT CALLED UP ITS RESERVE FORCES IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXERT PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE RATHER THAN LAUNCHING A MILITARY OFFENSIVE. THIS IS BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAS NO AVAILABLE LAND FORCES WITH WHICH TO

3--IN OPENING SEVERAL FRONTS, THE POWER OF NY AGGRESSION WILL BE PARALYZED. PROVIDED THERE ARE ACTUALLY SEVERAL ACTIVE AND COHESIVE FRONTS. THE MORE THE ENEMY IS ENTANGLED ON ONE FRONT THE EASIER IT CAN BE DEFEATED ON OTHER FRONTS.

X WITH ALL THE POWER AT ITS DISPOSAL, THE UNITED STATES WAS COMPLETELY PARALYZED IN THE CASE OF THE SPY SHIP PUEBLO CAPTURED BY NORTH KOREA. UNDER ORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES, THE INCIDENT WOULD HAVE SUBJECTED NORTH KOREA TO A DREADFUL U.S. VENGEANCE. BUT THE UNITED STATES, WITH ALL ITS MIGHT, COULD DO NO MORE THAN PROTEST. IT CALLED UP ITS RESERVE FORCES IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXERT PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE RATHER THAN LAUNCHING A MILITARY OFFENSIVE. THIS IS BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAS NO AVAILABLE LAND FORCES WITH WHICH TO STRIKE. EXPERIENCES IN NORTH VIETNAM HAVE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT AIR RAIDS, HOWEVER INTENSIVE, CANNOT VANQUISH AN ENEMY OR FORCE HIM TO SURRENDER. THE THREAT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FACES MANY RESTRICTIONS AND OBJECTIONS. ALL U.S. MILITARY POWER WAS COMMITTED TO VIETNAM. DESPITE THE BLOW DEALT TO ITS PRIDE, THE UNITED STATES COULD DO NORTH WITH NORTH KOREA EXCEPT TO CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN PANMUNJOM.

4--THE GREAT SUCCESS ACHIEVED BY ISRAEL WAS ITS INFLUENCE ON WORLD OPINION, PARTICULARLY IN THE WEST WHERE IT WAS ABLE TO POISON THE WESTERN MIND ABOUT PALESTINE. IT IS SUFFICIENT THAT ISRAEL WAS ABLE TO TURN FACTS UPSIDE DOWN. ISRAEL, WHICH IS THE AGGRESSOR ON ARAB TERRITORY IN PALESTINE, APPEARED AS THE VICTIM THREATENED WITH THE LOSS OF ITS TERRITORY. THE ARAB SIDE, WHICH LOST ITS HOMELAND, APPEARED AS THE INVADER SEEKING TO OCCUPY THE HOMELAND OF OTHERS.

VIETNAM HAS REALIZED THE VALUE OF THE IMPRESSION OF WORLD OPINION. THE VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION HAS ASKED ITS FRIENDS IN ASIA AND AFRICA ONLY ONE THING: WE DO NOT WANT ARMS, MEDICINES, OR CONTRIBUTIONS, ALL WE ASK IS THAT YOU PUBLISH OUR ISSUE IN THE PRESS, DISCUSS IT AT PEOPLE'S CONFERENCES, AND BROADCAST IT ON THE RADIO. TALK ABOUT IT CONTINUOUSLY--THIS IS ALL THAT WE NEED OF YOU.

IN OUR CASE, WE CANNOT PLACE ALL THE BLAME ON ISRAEL'S CLEVERNESS. UP TO NOW WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO DRAW A PICTURE OF OUR ISSUE THAT WE CAN PRESENT TO THE WORLD. WE CANNOT RELAY THIS PICTURE TO THE WORLD IN AN ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE, ESPECIALLY TO THE EDUCATED PEOPLE WHO LEAD A CAMPAIGN OF CONSCIENCE IN FAVOR OF VIETNAM EVERYWHERE, EVEN IN THE WHITE HOUSE ITSELF.

(MORE)

17 FEB 0125Z DF/BG

FRIS 04

ONLY ADD 03 (HAYKAL ARTICLE)

XXX WHITE HOUSE ITSELF.

(EXCERPTS) 5--SO FAR WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO MAP OUT THE STRATEGY FOR OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE NFLSV IS CLEAR. THE ROLE PLAYED BY NORTH VIETNAM IS CLEAR. CHINA'S ROLE IN HALTING A U.S. INVASION OF NORTH VIETNAM BY LAND IS CLEAR. THE SOVIET UNION'S ROLE IN PREVENTING THE UNITED STATES FROM USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS EVEN TACTICAL ONES, IS CLEAR, THE ROLE OF WORLD OPINION, EVEN IN THE UNITED STATES ITSELF, IS ALSO CLEAR.

WE NEED A COMPLETE MAP OF STRATEGIC SECURITY TO DEFINE THE ROLE OF THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE, THE ROLE OF EVERY ARAB STATE BORDERING PALESTINE, THE COLLECTIVE ROLE OF ALL THE STATES SURROUNDING ISRAEL, AND THE ROLE OF THE ENTIRE ARAB NATION. WE MUST ALSO DEFINE THE ROLES TO BE PLAYED WITH RESPECT TO ASIA, AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, THE NONALIGNED STATES, AND THE WEST ITSELF, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES AND EVEN THE JEWS OF THE WORLD.

6--WE HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED A SOUND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PALESTINE STRUGGLE, WHICH IS THE FOREFRONT, AND THE ARAB STRUGGLE WHICH IS THE BROAD FRONTLINE. IN VIETNAM, FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN THE HANOI GOVERNMENT IS ASKED ABOUT CONDITIONS TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE OVER SOUTH VIETNAM, IT ONLY SAYS: THE NFLSV IS THE PARTY CONCERNED--GO AND CONTACT IT. CHINA, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE REST OF THE EASTERN CAMP DO NOT SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION OR IMPOSE A TRUSTEESHIP ON IT. MEANWHILE, THE NFLSV IS A COHESIVE ORGANIZATION HAVING ONE POLITICAL SHOW WINDOW FOR THE WORLD--A PEOPLE'S ARMY AND BASES AMONG THE MASSES OF PEOPLE.

7--THE VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION HAS DEFINED ITS GOALS AND THE STAGES THAT LEAD TO THEM. IT ORGANIZED MILITARY AND POLITICAL ACTION. IT DID NOT RESORT TO BARGAINS OR BIDDING, WHICH ARE THE ILLS OF NATIONAL AND DOMESTIC STRUGGLE. THE REVOLUTION RESORTED TO FACTS, AND WITH ITS CONSCIOUSNESS AND FIRMNESS SET A COURSE FOR ITSELF BASED ON FACT AND RIGHT.

8--NO MILITARY POWER CAN IMPOSE ON ANY TERRITORY SUCH CONDITIONS THAT CONFLICT WITH THE NATURE OF THAT TERRITORY AND WHICH RUN COUNTER TO THE DEMANDS OF THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE THERE. THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT IMPOSE THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. THE UNITED STATES HAS OVER 500,000 SOLDIERS BACKING ITS SUPPORT FOR THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT. THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT ITSELF HAS AN ARMY OF OVER 500,000 SOLDIERS PAID BY THE UNITED STATES. MILITARY FORCE CAN KEEP PEOPLE QUIET, BUT IT CANNOT CHANGE THEIR MINDS.

9--WE NEED TO EXERT A GREAT EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF A PLAN AIMED AT CAUSING THE ENEMY IN ISRAEL, OR AT LEAST SOME OF ITS PEOPLE, TO LOSE CONFIDENCE IN A POSSIBLE CONTINUED EXISTENCE.

THE MOST PROMINENT FEATURE OF SUCCESS IN VIETNAM IS THE FACT THAT THE STEADFASTNESS OF THE VIETNAMESE HAS CONVINCED, OR IS ABOUT TO CONVINCE, THE UNITED STATES THAT IT CANNOT ACHIEVE A REAL MILITARY VICTORY. THIS SUCCESS IS SUPPORTED BY ANOTHER NO LESS IMPORTANT SUCCESS--THE REGIME WHICH IS LIVING UNDER U.S. PROTECTION IN SAIGON

GOVERNMENT ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE  
OVER 500,000 SOLDIERS BACKING ITS SUPPORT FOR THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT.  
THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT ITSELF HAS AN ARMY OF OVER 500,000 SOLDIERS  
PAID BY THE UNITED STATES. MILITARY FORCE CAN KEEP PEOPLE QUIET,  
BUT IT CANNOT CHANGE THEIR MINDS.

9--WE NEED TO EXERT A GREAT EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF A PLAN  
AIMED AT CAUSING THE ENEMY IN ISRAEL, OR AT LEAST SOME OF ITS PEOPLE,  
TO LOSE CONFIDENCE IN A POSSIBLE CONTINUED EXISTENCE.

THE MOST PROMINENT FEATURE OF SUCCESS IN VIETNAM IS THE FACT  
THAT THE STEADFASTNESS OF THE VIETNAMESE HAS CONVINCED, OR IS ABOUT  
TO CONVINCE, THE UNITED STATES THAT IT CANNOT ACHIEVE A REAL MILITARY  
VICTORY. THIS SUCCESS IS SUPPORTED BY ANOTHER NO LESS IMPORTANT  
SUCCESS--THE REGIME WHICH IS LIVING UNDER U.S. PROTECTION IN SAIGON  
HAS ALSO BEGUN TO REALIZE THAT NO MATTER HOW LONG THIS PROTECTION  
LASTS, ITS FUTURE IS HANGING IN MIDAIR.

WE ARE ABOUT TO REACH THIS POINT IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT  
AS WELL. I MAY SAY THAT WITHOUT ANY EFFORT ON OUR PART, WE WERE  
NEAR IT AT THE TIME OF THE ISRAEL ECONOMIC DEPRESSION IN 1966.  
AT THAT TIME EMIGRATION FROM ISRAEL EXCEEDED IMMIGRATION. THIS  
POINT IS SIGNIFICANT.

THE WAR IN THE FAR EAST IS NOT FAR REMOVED FROM THE WAR IN  
THE MIDDLE EAST DESPITE THE THOUSANDS OF MILES SEPARATING THEM.  
THERE IS A NECESSARY UNITY AMONG THE FORCES HOSTILE TO IMPERIALISM,  
AND THERE IS A NATURAL SYMPATHY AMONG HEROIC, STEADFAST PEOPLE.  
(SENTENCE INDISTINCT)

(ENDALL)

17 FEB 0145Z DF/BG

W

ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AG CY  
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 49185

36c

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (REF) JCR ARMY NAVY AIR CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SOO ONE CRS  
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Information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C.  
transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS IS AN INFORMATIONAL REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

FEB 16 00 02 Z

CITE

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

DIST 14 FEBRUARY 1968

SANITIZED

COUNTRY ARAB STATES/ISRAEL/USSR

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

DOI 5 FEBRUARY 1968

NLJ 96-215

By us, NARA Date 4-27-98

SUBJECT COMMENTS BY SOVIET OFFICIAL ON THE POSSIBLE RENEWAL  
OF ARAB-ISRAELI HOSTILITIES AND SOVIET INTENTIONS

ACQ

SOURCE

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

See page 5

1. COMMENT: THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS  
THE FIRST INFORMATION RECEIVED  
REGARDING SOVIET PLANS TO PARTICIPATE IN A LIMITED ARAB  
OFFENSIVE AGAINST ISRAEL.

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3.4(b)(1)

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(dissem controls)

THE

SOVIETS NOW BELIEVE A RENEWAL OF ARAB-ISRAELI HOSTILITIES WILL  
OCCUR IN LATE SPRING. [REDACTED] HOSTILITIES

ARE INEVITABLE SINCE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ARRANGE A VEHICLE FOR  
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE ARABS. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

COMMENT: A SIMILAR REPORT FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN BEIRUT  
WAS RECEIVED IN LATE JANUARY [REDACTED]

ACCORD-

ING TO THIS REPORT, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EGYPT WAS PREPARING A LIMITED ATTACK AGAINST  
ISRAELI FORCES IN LATE FEBRUARY TO DRIVE THE ISRAELI FORCES  
BACK "THREE OR FOUR MILES" FROM THE SUEZ CANAL. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

SEE BEIRUT EMBASSY

AIRGRAM A-639 DATED 31 JANUARY 1968. ANOTHER REPORT ON THE  
POSSIBLE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES [REDACTED] RECEIVED IN LATE JANUARY

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1.5(c)  
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(dissem controls)

1.5(c)  
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[REDACTED] STATED THAT THE UAR IS PLANNING TO RESUME HOSTILITIES BECAUSE OF THE EXTREME PESSIMISM OVER THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION OF UN SPECIAL ENVOY GUNNAR JARRING. MINISTER OF WAR FAWZI REPORTEDLY FAVORS AN ATTACK ON 5 JUNE 1968 WHILE PRESIDENT NASIR PREFERS AN EARLIER DATE, LATE MARCH OR EARLY APRIL, IF POSSIBLE. IN VIEW OF THE LACK OF IDENTIFICATION OF THE [REDACTED] INFORMANTS, THE REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO THE UAR LEADERS SHOULD BE TREATED WITH CIRCUMSPECTION.)

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

3. [REDACTED] WHEREAS PREVIOUSLY SOVIET ADVISORS [REDACTED] STAYED IN THE BACKGROUND AND [REDACTED] PLAYED A LIMITED ROLE IN SHAPING AND ORGANIZING ARAB ARMIES, THEY ARE NOW ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN REORGANIZING ARAB FORCES AND ENGAGING IN SOME COMMAND FUNCTIONS. [REDACTED] WHEN THE FIGHTING IS RENEWED, THE SOVIETS WILL ACTIVELY AID THE ARABS IN GAINING BACK THE TERRITORY LOST IN THE JUNE 1967 WAR. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] SOVIET ASSISTANCE, HOWEVER, WILL BE LIMITED TO REGAINING ONLY THAT TERRITORY LOST IN THE JUNE WAR. [REDACTED]

COMMENT: THE SAME EMBASSY AIRGRAM CITED IN PARAGRAPH 2

ALSO STATED SOVIET ADVISORS WOULD DIRECT A LIMITED ATTACK AGAINST ISRAEL FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF IMPROVING EGYPT'S BARGAINING POSITION WITH ISRAEL. THE SAME [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] ALSO CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE ASSISTING THE UAR IN PLANNING AND TRAINING FOR A RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES. [REDACTED] THE SOVIETS

HAVE ADVISED THE UAR THEY WILL SUPPORT AN ATTACK AGAINST ISRAEL TO RECOVER THE TERRITORY LOST DURING THE JUNE WAR IF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS FAIL; BUT THE SOVIETS MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT ISRAEL IS HERE TO STAY AND THAT THEY WILL NOT ACQUIESCE IN OR FACILITATE ISRAEL'S DESTRUCTION. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)4. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]1.5(c)  
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(dissem controls)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

THE "PUEBLO"  
INCIDENT DRAMATICALLY DEMONSTRATED THAT THE UNITED  
STATES HAS MADE IT CLEAR IT WILL AVOID A COMMITMENT OF ITS  
FORCES ELSEWHERE. THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT  
THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT INTERVENE ON ISRAEL'S BEHALF UNLESS  
THE PRE-JUNE 1967 BORDERS ARE CROSSED. IN VIEW OF THIS,  
THE ARABS SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION TO  
REGAIN THEIR LOST LANDS.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

A REASSESSMENT OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN  
POWER POSITIONS MAY RESULT IN A MAJOR ARAB MILITARY  
OFFENSIVE AGAINST ISRAEL BY JUNE 1968.)

5. DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSOUTH (PERSONAL)

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

37

Monday, Feb. 19, 1968

4:35 p. m.

*Pres. file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*sent via Marvin Watson*

SUBJECT: Austrian newsman's suggestion regarding the Vietnam war

You asked Marvin to show me the Austrian newsman's suggestion that we ask the Soviets to cut off assistance to North Vietnam in exchange for a cessation of bombing of North Vietnam.

As you know, we have had no response to Sect. Rusk's repeated inquiry: "What would you do if we stopped bombing?"

We could, however, make this proposition to Moscow for the record before we engaged in either heavier bombing of Haiphong or the mining of Haiphong -- if we ever undertook it.

There is, however, a booby-trap which, if memory serves me, was once suggested by a Soviet diplomat. The Russians can say: A great deal of our aid is because you are bombing (anti-aircraft, SAM's, etc.); if you stop, our aid will decrease. They would be correct. But that kind of decrease would help us not at all.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

I

37a

RICHARD E. BERLIN  
959 EIGHTH AVENUE  
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10019

*Mr. Marvin Watson*  
*To*  
*Walt*  
*C*

February 9, 1968

Mr. Marvin Watson,  
Special Assistant,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Marvin:

Attached, is a Xerox of a letter from Hugo Portisch who, until recently, was Editor-in-Chief of the largest Austrian newspaper. He has resigned to take charge of the Austrian Television and Radio which is State controlled.

On pages two and three, I have marked his suggestion which may or may not have any merit and in all probability, it seems so simple that I would almost be certain it would have been tried before. Nevertheless, I send it along for what it is worth.

My best to the President.

Sincerely,

*[Signature]*

REB:lm  
Att:

Vienna, January 29, 1968

Mr. Richard Berlin  
Hearst Corporation  
959 8th Avenue  
New York  
N.Y. 10029, U.S.A.

Dear Dick,

Forgive me for not having written to you for such a long time but when we returned from our winter holiday I was thrown into some very exciting adventures.

The Austrian Chancellor (Prime Minister) asked me to join the Government as Secretary of State for Information which would have been the equivalent of Mr. Christian's and Leonard Marks' jobs combined, spokesman for the Government but also Head of the complete Austrian Information Service at home and abroad. Furthermore as a member of the Government I would also have had a say in all government decisions, especially foreign policy. After long discussions I turned the job down because I do not want to sacrifice my independence and I do not want to lose my image as an editor and journalist. Unlike the United States, here in Europe you must identify yourself sooner or later with the party in power, become a member of the party and - in order to secure your future career - you must run for parliament. All this would have meant goodbye to journalism once and for all and becoming a professional politician.

I hope you will agree that it was better to remain in the profession which is so dear to my heart. But it was not easy to refuse such an offer. It was also not easy to refuse the offer to go to Germany and take over a very important and large newspaper as editor in chief. In the past few days I finally made up my mind. I accepted the job of chief commentator - for all foreign and domestic affairs - for the Austrian TV and radio networks. As you know we have the same set-up as the British here, a kind of BBC only with the difference that the Austrian Broadcasting System has a full monopoly and is in fact without competition. In my case this means that I will have a full monopoly for all domestic and foreign affairs commentaries on TV and on the radio. In this respect it is almost an overwhelming position and reaches by far more people than even the largest newspaper, everybody in fact. It is a great responsibility and an even greater challenge.

I will have a regular TV show each week, I will have all news commentaries from day to day and - that's the fun of it - I will also travel as much as I can in order to comment on the really great developments in world politics on the spot, e.g. if the Pound is devaluated I would immediately fly to London, try to get hold of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, interview him staging a show either in front of Big Ben or in the Houses of Parliament. Two American trips have already been scheduled: in April I

- 2 -

will accompany Chancellor Klaus on his state visit to Washington which for the Austrians is a very important event and I will also cover the two presidential conventions as well as the presidential election itself later on.

Although this seems to be - and really is - a full time job, it will still give me time to write books and also write syndicated columns. All these contracts are under discussion. Also the German and Swiss TV networks would like to cut in on at least one of my shows which, of course, would give me tremendous exposure in both Germany and Switzerland.

I wish I could have discussed all that with you and could have got your experienced advice, but all these things developed in such a rush and required quick decisions so that I could only try to follow your general advice to stay in my profession and do approximately what I have done so far. Traudi and I think that it was an excellent decision and by the way in this job I still have all possibilities in the future.

Do you remember the Austrian Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Waldheim, who once gave a luncheon for me which you also attended? This Mr. Waldheim, an old friend of mine, has now become Austria's Foreign Minister in the same government shake-up in which I was supposed to join the government. Several other friends of mine also became ministers, so that my access to the Austrian Government, which was always very good, has become even better.

In the last few days I have also had quite some discussions with many of the Austrian Ambassadors who were all called to Vienna in order to meet the new Foreign Minister and to get new instructions. As usual these days our discussions circled around Vietnam. The main question was how to test the attitude of North Vietnam and also the Soviet Union's attitude. In the course of these discussions an idea entered my mind: As the North Vietnamese have asked for an almost unconditional cessation of American bombing without any guarantee for peace talks later on, it will be pretty hard to find out what they really have in mind and there is the great danger that they will use the cessation to their advantage. But how about the Russians? President Johnson for instance could ask the Russians to promise that as soon as the Americans stop bombing North Vietnam the Soviet Union should stop its aid to them. Without Soviet weapons, Soviet advisors and many other Soviet assets the North Vietnamese could not go on supplying the Viet-Kong or even fighting with their own troops. As Hanoi obviously wants to save its face and would not guarantee anything, I think that the key to the whole problem lies in Moscow. If the Soviet Union is really interested in peace in Southeast Asia as the Soviet leaders always claim, the Soviets could easily guarantee such a complete stop of their aid to Vietnam.

There would also be an excellent explanation for their acting like this: the Soviets supply Hanoi under the pretext that North Vietnam as an ally of the Soviet Union is being attacked by the United States. Therefore the Soviet Union must rush to their aid. But if American bombing were to stop, North Vietnam would no longer be under American attack. Logically the Soviet Union has no commitment to aid North Vietnam after the cessation of bombing.

On their own or with only the aid of the Chinese I doubt whether the North Vietnamese could go on fighting on such a large scale.

There are even further advantages to this idea: if the Russians refuse to accept such an American proposal it would be clear once and for all that Moscow is not interested or at least not very keen to have peace in Vietnam. This knowledge alone could be a great advantage to the American situation. In case the Russians agree and the North Vietnamese still plan to betray the United States they could only do so against Soviet advice and this would mean to bring about a deep rift between North Vietnam and the Soviet Union. As in the case of India, the Soviets then would not side with the pro-Chinese communists. The North Vietnamese would have to lean entirely on the Chinese and this would mean that they would have to share the same isolation China faces right now.

This idea came to me when all professionals I talked to expressed their conviction that the Vietnam war has essentially become a war between the United States and the Soviet Union. They all stated that North Vietnam could not go on for a single week without tremendous Russian supplies. If that is true, what would be more logical than to find a way to stop these supplies? And what would be the best guarantee for future peace negotiations than a Soviet commitment to stop its aid?

I do not know whether an idea like that has already been suggested to the President or by the President to the Soviets. Maybe the whole theory has its faults and maybe people in the White House and the State Department already know whether such a thing could work or not. But I also know from long experience that sometimes very simple ideas escape the minds of people who are concerned with very complicated political matters.

I thought I ought to tell you about this since the last time we saw each other you asked me whether I had any suggestions as to how to end the Vietnam war. Since then I have thought very often about your question and could not give up the idea that there must be some foolproof device to overcome all this talk about prestige, fear etc. I wonder what you think of it?


I read your interview about the Hearst Empire with greatest interest and even more pleasure and want to congratulate you on this marvellous job. I was also very grateful for those articles which King's Features ran about Austria. I hope we deserve such a wonderful write-up. I have shown these articles to all people concerned here who were very enthusiastic about them.

If everything works out alright I will see you - if not sooner here in Vienna - in April in New York. Although I shall only be staying a few days I hope your time will permit you to have a long chat with me.

Please let me know how you and Honey are. Traudi sends her love to both of you. So do I.

With all my best wishes

Sincerely,



INFORMATION

Monday, February 19, 1968  
4:30 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker responds  
affirmatively to your injunction to try  
to cut down U. S. civil personnel in  
Saigon.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

38a

Saigon, Viet-Nam  
February 14, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you very much for your letter of February 2 concerning the problem of United States personnel in Viet-Nam. I greatly appreciate the fact that because of the special situation here, you have exempted Viet-Nam from the overall program to reduce our personnel overseas and that you want us to have the resources necessary for the tasks ahead.

But I also understand and heartily agree with your desire to have these tasks accomplished with the minimum number of Americans possible. I believe that the overwhelming presence of Americans in Viet-Nam is going to become an increasingly difficult, and in many ways irksome, problem for us. It will become more so the more we achieve our objectives here in building up self-confidence and self-reliance in the Vietnamese.

I believe, therefore, that we should concentrate on those priority programs that are most essential to getting the job done here. As I have previously reported to you, we have eliminated 329 positions in our AID table of organization. But the present situation gives us an opportunity to take another hard look at our programs, to cut out any fat, and to slim down our organization. We shall get at this promptly and cover all elements other than those directly associated with combat activities.

The President  
The White House

-2-

I recall our discussion of this problem when I was in Washington last November and simply want to say again I am in complete sympathy with your objectives. We shall meet your deadline of June 1 for submitting our findings and recommendations.

With deepest appreciation for the wonderfully steadfast support you have given me and all of us here and with warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ellsworth Bunker". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

Ellsworth Bunker

INFORMATION

39

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, February 19, 1968 -- 4:25 pm

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Ellsworth, with Westy's concurrence, expresses a strong negative view, on political grounds, to a more explicit authority for Westy over Vietnamese and third country forces.

Westy will address himself to the strictly military aspects of such a change; but, clearly, they would have to be very substantial to outweigh Ellsworth's array of political disadvantages.

The key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 19824

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-214  
By CG, NARA Date 8-4-97

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

39a#11  
TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

OO RUEHC  
DE RUMJIR 19824 0501120  
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O 191050Z FEB 68 ZFF1  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6968  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CONTROL: 5610Q  
RECD: FEBRUARY 19, 1968  
7:21 A.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~ SAIGON, 19824

NODIS

REF: STATE 114390

SUBJ: COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 96-213

By us, NARA Date 8-22-97

1. I HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE SUGGESTION THAT A NEW COMMAND ARRANGEMENT BE DEVELOPED HERE TO INCREASE THE AUTHORITY OF COMUSMACV OVER RVNAF AND THIRD COUNTRY FORCES. WHILE I AGREE THAT WE WANT TO CONSIDER MEASURES TO MAKE OUR PROSECUTION OF THE WAR MORE EFFECTIVE, I THINK WE MUST AVOID ADOPTING SOLUTIONS WHICH MAY IN THEMSELVES CREATE MORE PROBLEMS THAN THEY SOLVE. THIS SUMS UP MY REACTION TO THE IDEA PROPOSED. IN SAYING THIS, I RECOGNIZE THAT

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 19824 ~~TOP SECRET~~

THE MAIN REASONS FOR SUCH A CHANGE IN COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS ARE MILITARY AND I AM NOT IN THE BEST POSITION TO JUDGE THE MERITS OF THIS PROPOSAL FROM THIS VIEWPOINT. I HAVE, OF COURSE, TALKED WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND WHO IS DEVELOPING HIS OWN THOUGHTS ON REFTEL, AND WILL ADDRESS THIS PARTICULAR ASPECT OF THE QUESTION IN HIS REPLY. OUR REPLIES WILL NATURALLY BE CLOSELY COORDINATED BUT I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS MYSELF PRIMARILY TO THE OBVIOUSLY SENSITIVE POLITICAL FACTORS WHICH WOULD BE INVOLVED IN ANY SUCH PROPOSAL.

2. AS WE HAVE EMPHASIZED IN NUMEROUS MESSAGES OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS, VIETNAMESE SENSITIVITIES ABOUT REAL OR IMAGINED ENCROACHMENTS ON THEIR SOVEREIGNTY AND ALLEGATIONS OF US DOMINATION OF THEIR GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITIES HAVE INCREASED SLIGHTLY. THE LIFTING OF CENSORSHIP ON THE PRESS LAST SUMMER, THE ELECTION CAMPAIGNS, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAVE ALL AFFORDED WIDER MEANS VOICING THESE VIEWS. THEY HAVE OFTEN TAKEN THE FORM OF HIGHLY CRITICAL AND EVEN VITRIOLIC COMMENT ON OUR MASSIVE PRE-

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 19824, FEBRUARY 19

SENCE HERE AND ITS OVERWHELMING EFFECT ON VIETNAMESE SOCIETY AND POLITICAL LIFE. NO MATTER HOW WE MIGHT SEEK

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 19819 ~~TOP SECRET~~

TO DISGUISE SUCH A COMMAND ARRANGEMENT, I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE VIETNAMESE WILL SEE IT FOR EXACTLY WHAT IT IS INTENDED TO BE, AND THIS WILL ONLY ADD TO THE HUE AND CRY.

3. IN ADDITION TO THIS INTERNAL POLITICAL FACTOR, SUCH A CHANGE IN COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS WOULD LEND ITSELF READILY TO PROPAGANDA EXPLOITATION BY HANOI AND THE NLF, AND INDEED ALL CRITICS OF THE PRESENT VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND OF OUR EFFORTS HERE. HANOI'S CONSTANT REITERATION OF THE PHRASE "PUPPETS" AND THE "THIEU-KY-US CLIQUE" WOULD BE GIVEN ADDED FORCE AND INDEED SUBSTANCE. TWO OF OUR BASIC AND URGENT OBJECTIVES HERE ARE TO BUILD UP CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES AND TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE AND COMPETENCE AMONG THE LEADERS OF THE NEW VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. IN MY OPINION SUCH A CHANGE WOULD TEND TO UNDERMINE BOTH OF THESE OBJECTIVES. IF THERE WERE SOME INTERNATIONAL UMBRELLA, SUCH AS THE UNITED NATIONS AFFORDED FOR THE KOREAN WAR COMMAND STRUCTURE, THIS MIGHT MAKE THE PROPOSAL MORE DIGESTIBLE, BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT EITHER THE FACADE OF A VIETNAMESE OVERALL COMMANDER FOR THE SEVEN NATIONS GROUPING WOULD BE ADEQUATE TO THIS PURPOSE. MOREOVER, THE KOREANS THEMSELVES WOULD WANT HIGH-LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE COMMAND

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 19819 ~~TOP SECRET~~

STRUCTURE AND THIS WOULD ONLY COMPLICATE PRESENT RELATIONSHIPS, WHICH ARE SATISFACTORY.

4. AN ADDED POINT RELATED TO THE NAMING OF PRESIDENT THIEU AS OVERALL FORCE COMMANDER WOULD BE THAT SUCH A MOVE RUNS IN THE FACE OF OUR EFFORT TO EMPHASIZE HIS CIVILIAN PRESIDENTIAL ROLE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. I RECOGNIZE THAT HE IS ALSO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF VIETNAMESE FORCES, BUT THE PUBLIC IMPRESSION THAT HE IS FIRST AND FOREMOST A GENERAL WOULD BE STRENGTHENED. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE NAMING SOMEONE WITH LESSER STATURE TO THIS POSITION.

5. A FURTHER CONSIDERATION ON THE POLITICAL SIDE IS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT A FUNDAMENTAL REVISION OF COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS WILL STIMULATE ALREADY EXPRESSED GVN DESIRES FOR A MORE FORMAL STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. THIS OPENS A CAN OF WORMS WHICH WE ALL

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 19824, FEBRUARY 19

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 19819 ~~TOP SECRET~~  
WANT TO AVOID.

6. IN-SUM, I CAN SEE NO RPT NO POLITICAL ADVANTAGES FROM SUCH A REVISION IN COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS, AND VERY CONSIDERABLE DISADVANTAGES. SUBJECT TO MORE EXPERT VIEWS ON THE MILITARY PURPOSES WHICH WOULD BE SERVED BY THIS CHANGE, WOULD URGE THAT IT NOT BE CONSIDERED AT THE PRESENT TIME, OR IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

7. GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAS SEEN THIS MESSAGE AND CONCURS WITH IT. BUNKER  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

Monday, February 19, 1968  
11:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

As usual, THE ECONOMIST  
this week is lucid and good on  
Vietnam.

I have marked key passages,  
in case you don't have time to read  
the full texts.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

40

*Pres. file*

ing a genuinely representative government in charge of South Vietnam is really Sisyphean, this does not mean that President Johnson has to give up. It is quite likely that public opinion in the United States will react to the latest shock by asking for a bigger military effort. In military terms the United States can wage a hundred years' war.

This explains the Russians' mood of anxious hope. They seem to think that a conference held at this stage would reach a settlement closer to Hanoi's terms than to those of Washington. The policy of the present Russian leaders would thus be vindicated. They would be able openly to resume closer collaboration with the United States, while simultaneously making a bid to reassert Russian leadership in the communist movement. They would be able to answer critics like Fidel Castro by arguing that coexistence is consistent with successes in revolutionary wars provided these take place only where "objective conditions" are ripe. But if the glimmer of hope fades, if the war goes on with increasing intensity, then the pressure will grow stronger for Moscow to break its links with Washington and to step up its military aid to Vietnam. It talks darkly but unspecifically of the weapons it might send.

The pressure will be all the stronger because communist parties all over the world are now more committed on Vietnam than they used to be. The Russian press has written too much about the success of its "brothers" for the government to be able to let them down. Communists in western Europe, frightened lest they be overtaken on their left, have switched their slogan from "Peace in Vietnam" to "Victory for the NLF." North Vietnam and the Vietcong have given Mr Kosygin and Mr Brezhnev their second chance, but they have also limited their ability to manoeuvre outside the confines prescribed by Hanoi. This is probably the message that U Thant brought back from Moscow this week.

## The war

### But where's the second punch?

With the end of the first stage of his winter-spring offensive, part success, part failure, General Giap now has to make his next move. The initiative is still his, but what has happened over the last fortnight has begun to limit his options. He can hardly let matters stand where they are. Fighting is still going on in Hué and Saigon (and early this week in Dalat too). But the other 36 provincial capitals and 70-odd district towns which the Vietcong attacked at the end of January are all more or less back under the control of the South Vietnamese and their allies.



Are the Vietcong coming again? Refugees run for shelter

With their eyes and minds fixed on Khe Sanh, the Americans badly underestimated the ability of General Giap's forces to storm into so many towns. When the attacks went in they shattered the illusion of urban security. More than 5,000 civilians have been killed, the majority of them possibly in the allied counter-attacks; more than 30,000 homes have been destroyed; food prices have soared; the number of refugees may well have doubled. This, and not the number of planes his forces destroyed on the airfields, was General Giap's real success. His failure came when his men proved unable to hold the towns. With the hope of a popular uprising punctured, Giap's problem is how to capitalise on the undoubted disruption his forces have created.

Three obvious choices face him. First, he could send two divisions of about 10,000 men apiece (with two more divisions in support) into a direct assault on Khe Sanh. If the attacks on the towns had been more successful this might have been well worth while as the second blow in a two-handed offensive. He could still take the gamble. His forces around Khe Sanh may have been damaged by the Americans' bombing; but they must still be reckoned to have the power to launch and sustain a direct assault.

Perhaps they are simply waiting for low clouds to close in; but no general planning a headlong battle could afford to assume that the weather would run persistently in his favour. And General Giap must know that the Americans can probably bring forward as many as 25,000 of the 40,000 men they have in the area to the aid of the 5,000 marines in Khe Sanh. So he may still be prepared simply to threaten Khe Sanh, keeping the 45,000 American troops in the north pinned down, rather than bring that particular battle to the boil.

The present deployment of the four North Vietnamese divisions in the

northern part of South Vietnam opens up a second possibility. These divisions might strike across the demilitarised zone ten miles or so from the coast before the "McNamara line" is finished. That would outflank Khe Sanh and threaten the roads to Hué and Da Nang. But this is an area where the Americans might be able to use their tanks. General Westmoreland would be even happier to fight there than he is at Khe Sanh.

The third possibility open to Giap is to launch a second assault against the towns (and possibly against tactically important targets like road junctions in the countryside as well) in an attempt to damage civilian morale and discredit the South Vietnamese government still further. The obvious targets would be Saigon again and the towns in the Mekong delta (where the Vietcong, without North Vietnamese cadres, would be up against the South Vietnamese, without the Americans). This is reckoned by the Americans to be the best of Giap's choices.

He may now be regrouping his forces to make just such an attack. It is estimated that he has 50,000 fresh Vietcong troops ready to unleash in the south, over and above the survivors from the first assaults. He has the power to create more chaos in the towns and cities, while still retaining the ability to roll the campaign forward by following these attacks up with a set-piece battle against the Americans in the north. But there would be no surprise this time. The Americans and the South Vietnamese are better prepared and deployed to meet Vietcong assaults on the cities than they were a fortnight ago. By flying in 10,500 fresh men (see page 43) the Americans are more than making good their recent casualties. Half the South Vietnamese army is not on leave now, as it was then.

And the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese (who may account for two-thirds of the Vietcong's assault units any-

where north of the Mekong delta) have suffered heavy casualties. Not as many as the 32,000 claimed as killed (ten to one for the allies' dead) but certainly at least half that number. These include some of the spearhead cadres and possibly one leading North Vietnamese general.

There appears to be no easy solution for General Giap. But he could still spring a surprise, by avoiding any of these three obvious striking-points. And if the Americans feel optimistic because none of

his options is an easy one they had better reflect that the choice is still his—where and how to deliver more blows, in what order and in what strength. But, like any other general who has scored a partial success, he dare not stand pat. If he goes on, the risks are high. If he pulls back, it will look like an admission of military failure. And that, with talk of negotiations in the air, is surely the last impression that General Giap would want to give.

## Korea

### Shaking the smaller fist

President Johnson has made at least three concessions to outraged South Korean sensibilities since the anti-American demonstrations in Seoul last week. On February 8th he asked Congress for an immediate appropriation of \$100 million of military aid—on top of the \$150 million to \$200 million that Korea gets already. On February 11th he despatched his personal trouble-shooter, Mr Cyrus Vance, to talk soothing words to President Park Chung-hee about the "grave threat" from the north. On February 14th he ordered his spokesmen at Panmunjom to break off their closed-door negotiations with the North Koreans and to start discussing South Korean grievances at an open meeting of the armistice commission. He is also reported to have sent as many as 200 jet aircraft to reverse the balance of air power between the two Koreas.

But the South Koreans are not yet fully appeased. They are very much afraid that America's cool-tempered handling of the *Pueblo* crisis will allow Marshal Kim Il-sung to emerge unscathed and unrepentant as the hero of the day. So they want America to shake its fist at him—either by threatening to repudiate the 1953 armistice pact or by issuing an angry warning against continuing communist sabotage. What they would like

most of all is for America to sanction punitive raids across the 38th parallel. The North Koreans claim it has already done this. But Thursday's statement showed that Mr Vance has not given the South Koreans all they want. America needs to keep on talking terms with North Korea.

So far all that the talks with the North Koreans have produced are the names of the one sailor killed and the three injured when the *Pueblo* was captured on January 23rd. A South Korean newspaper reported this week that the American prisoners had been moved from Pyongyang to a village near Panmunjom in readiness for their return. Meanwhile the North Koreans have continued to accumulate propaganda points by releasing "confessions" from the ship's officers.

While attempting to prod or blackmail the Americans into taking up a more militant stance, South Korea's leaders have been doing what they can to strengthen their own defences. President Park has added six months to the terms of duty of all 600,000 men in his armed forces. He now proposes to arm the 2.5 million reservists in his national militia. Whatever Washington decides, Seoul is determined to go on shaking its own fist in North Korea's direction.

## Germany

### Pilgrims in pursuit of clarity

FROM OUR BONN CORRESPONDENT

Departmental experts had some respite from briefing a fidgety chancellor and eight cabinet ministers for their pilgrimage to Paris on February 15th and 16th. Comparatively little tension was observed at the ministries of economics, transport, scientific research, development aid, family affairs. In these fields Franco-German collaboration takes the tame and minimally controversial form of Herr Brandt spoke of with approval at Ravensburg on February 14th. But at the foreign, defence, and finance ministries, and at the chancellery, nerves were at their edgiest.

Even the starrer-eyed francophiles, notably Freiherr von Guttenberg (who nowadays the chancellor's parliamentary state secretary) took a gloomy view of prospects of reconciling the two governments' concepts about the future of a common market, European defence policy towards eastern Europe, blueprints of processes for enlarging the European community would be flowing at Paris. At the most, Herr von Guttenberg suggested, it might be possible to ascertain more precisely what the Germans had in mind when he talked of making some kind of provisional arrangements with Britain and the other candidates for membership.

The Germans were hoping to clarify the French position sufficiently to attend the scheduled meeting of the four ministers on February 29th worth. They particularly wanted to know whether the French would be ready to agree to:

1. A regular exchange, through the European commission at Brussels, of information and ideas between the German and French present four candidates for membership.
2. The institutionalisation, in accordance with the Benelux memorandum, of collaboration outside the common market. In practice this would mean enlarging the council of association between Britain and the European Coal and Steel Community to bring in Ireland, Denmark, and Norway, and to embrace the common market and Euratom.
3. Development of technological and nuclear collaboration. Here General de Gaulle would have no ground for complaining of British immaturity.

A recent study put out by the Centre d'Etudes de politique étrangère on the possibility of creating a new centre of security in central Europe, was cropped up more than once in Franco-German deliberations on *Ostpolitik*. Since the centre has





## If He Gets to Saigon

The trouble with Vietnam is that there can be no such thing as a neutral solution to this war. One side must win, and the other lose, and the result will have an ideological impact far beyond Vietnam. That is what plagues the peacemakers: U Thant, hustling from Moscow to London and from London to the North Vietnamese mission in Paris; Mr Wilson, telling the House of Commons on Tuesday that the gap between the two sides is "very narrow indeed"; and everybody else who just wants the war to stop. They would all like to find a way of ending the fighting that did not require either side to accept defeat. The men who are conducting the war, President Ho Chi Minh and President Johnson, know that this is impossible. On everything except the central issue of the war they can and should offer each other liberal terms. The ultimate acceptance of defeat, by one side or the other, will come sooner if the winner is magnanimous about non-essentials. But both President Ho and President Johnson know that the central issue is who will dominate the government in Saigon after the war: the communists, or the non-communists. And there is no way of fudging the answer to this question. It has got to be one or the other.

It is necessary to say this, because the beastliness of the past two weeks has driven many people to hope for the impossible. The war cannot just be switched off, by the flick of a master-finger, before the question it is being fought to answer has been answered. On Wednesday night Mr Dean Rusk gave a chilling reminder of how little real progress there has been towards negotiations while the peacemakers have been making the headlines. The North Vietnamese still seem to see negotiations primarily as a device that will stop them being bombed. The Americans see no advantage in talking for talking's sake. So the war goes on.

This does not mean that the two sides will not meet to negotiate some time this year. It could even happen quite soon. The great battle that opened on January 30th with the Vietcong's attacks on the towns looks more and more like the knife-edge of the war. If General Giap beats General Westmoreland at Khe Sanh, and if the Vietcong show that they can continue to dispute the allies' control over the towns, it is unlikely that the Americans will have the heart for the total military campaign that would then be needed to regain the upper hand. If the communists achieve neither of these things, the casualties they have suffered in this offensive—the loss of key men like General Tran Do as well as many of their best troops—will make it harder for them to fall back on the strategy of a "protracted war." When this

battle has been fought to a finish (see page 28) both sides may at last be ready to negotiate. But that moment will not come—they will not meet to talk, or the talks would be no more than a verbal tennis match if they did—until one of them is ready to give the other best on the heart of the matter. There is no reason to think that the battle has yet produced the evidence that will bring that about.

There is one way, and one way only, in which the war could be ended in anything like a draw. That is by a physical division of the country, as Ireland was divided in 1921 and Korea in 1945 and Laos in 1962. But it is very difficult to believe that Ho Chi Minh will agree to that. The Irish formula might give him the northern provinces around the old imperial capital of Hué. The Laos formula, which began as an attempt to share the country's government among the contending parties but almost immediately broke down into a partition based on the areas each army occupied, has even less to offer him. It would leave the communists running part of the Mekong delta and very little else except large stretches of almost uninhabited back-country. Ho is an old man and, according to some communists who have recently been in Hanoi, a sick one. His aim is to bring the whole of Vietnam, and probably the whole of Indochina, under a communist government. That means establishing the communists in Saigon; and, if he wants to live to see it, doing it soon. It is desperately hard to see him settling for a few fragments of his life's dream.

The real issue is who controls Saigon, and here the result cannot be a draw. The South Vietnam that emerges from the war may be neutral in a military sense, as Austria and Finland are. It cannot be politically neuter. It will either be a society organised on a marxist basis, or it will not. There is no third option. The peace settlement may give certain secured positions to the people on the losing side. They may be allowed the right to operate as a tolerated opposition; they may even be given a few junior jobs in what will politely be called a coalition government. But the commanding heights—which means the ministries that regulate the armed forces and the economy—will be controlled by men who speak for one system or the other. Until there is at least a tacit agreement about which way the commanding heights will go a negotiation will be a dialogue between people speaking different languages. Can anyone imagine the two sides seriously sitting down to persuade each other of the relative merits of communism and capitalist pluralism for the South Vietnam of the future? It is the balance of military



*Bus file*

41

Monday, Feb. 19, 1968  
11:15 a. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

General Bruce Clarke's soldierly, terse, but interesting report will interest you -- as well as this general daily sitrep from Westy and Bus.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET and~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ attachments

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-195  
By js, NARA, Date 2-17-04



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

41a

CM-2980-68  
19 Feb 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJ: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND

1. You will have received General Westmoreland's 15th report on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. Attached hereto is an operations/intelligence summary of events of the past two days. I have also attached a copy of the trip report of General Bruce C. Clarke, U.S. Army (Retired) giving his impressions during his recent trip to South Vietnam. General Clarke was accompanied by Mr. Frank W. Mayborn of Temple, Texas whom I am sure you know.

2. Due to communications difficulties between Washington and Hawaii my telephone conversation with General Westmoreland was not possible until 0830 hours. He provided the following information:

a. Yesterday an OP-2E aircraft with a crew of 9 was shot down in the MUSCLE SHOALS area while laying sensors.

b. The ground control approach equipment was knocked out at Khe Sanh yesterday; there is a backup set available and it is being installed.

c. Light contact continues with the enemy in the vicinity of Dalat.

d. The stickiest situation at present is at Phan Thiet. The enemy force which penetrated the town, seized the jail and the hospital, still occupies about one-third of the town. It continues to hold the hospital area and occupied bunkers outside of town. Despite the fact the force has lost 103 men killed, the going to clear the town is tough and proceeding slowly.

e. There continue to be contacts with the enemy north of Saigon and south of Saigon. In a heavy contact south of Saigon Vietnamese Marine Corps units killed 144 enemy.

f. North of Tay Ninh City an enemy force apparently preparing rocket positions was discovered and attacked, resulting in 60 enemy KIA.

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Authority JCS Ltr 10-3-78

By ip/ky, NARA, Date 2-20-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

g. Certain new units of the enemy have been identified near Song Be. These appear to be groups of replacement which have been formed into combat units to continue enemy pressure in the Song Be area.

h. The enemy has been driven out of Vinh Long. There was some damage to the Cathedral in the town and 58 enemy were killed.

i. The Riverine force had a contact with the enemy south of Can Tho. Results are not yet known.

3. He anticipates that there may be additional enemy activity in the Khe Sanh area tonight; however, this is not positive information.

4. The additional battalion of the First Cavalry Division which I reported yesterday as moving to the Quang Tri area began closing into Quang Tri today.

5. As a general observation, General Westmoreland stated that the enemy continues to hang in close to the cities. The enemy is apparently attempting to resupply his forces and bring up replacements and reinforcements.

*Earle G. Wheeler*

EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

<sup>2</sup>  
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

41-2

OPERATIONAL/INTELLIGENCE BRIEFS

SOUTH VIETNAM

I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE:

The scope of the overall coordinated enemy activity on population centers and military bases since 18 February cannot be interpreted as a "second wave." His widespread fire attacks were accompanied but with few ground assaults. Several reports allege, however, that attacks in the "second phase" were to continue from 18 February to 1 March. The current attacks, therefore, may be introductory to additional attacks of greater intensity.

On 18 February, 175 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery were distributed among friendly elements bordering the DMZ. 40 rounds of mortar and 35 rounds of artillery impacted on Khe Sanh combat base wounding 1 US Marine. 358 tactical air sorties were flown in support of Khe Sanh.

On 17 February, an enemy message passed between unidentified elements in Khe Sanh area reported on Allied use of gas between 26 January and 14 February. The message instructed all units to be issued gas masks.

Intercepted message continue to point up the enemy's antiaircraft threat in the Khe Sanh area. One message revealed that the 14th AAA Battalion in the region had 16,434 rounds (caliber not specified) on hand.

Camp Carroll received a midday barrage of 42 x 82-mm mortars and 2 rounds of 82-mm artillery. Friendly casualties were 1 killed and 9 wounded.

Marines at Con Thien and Gio Linh received 33 and 8 mortar rounds respectively, none of which inflicted casualties nor caused significant damage.

Ground contacts in northern Quang Tri Province were limited to 2 light skirmishes which resulted in 13 enemy killed and 1 US Marine wounded.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-196  
By iss, NARA, Date 2-12-04

19 February 1968

Page 1

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Several messages reveal that the enemy is moving to reinforce his forces in the vicinity of Hue. An enemy message of 18 February indicated that Headquarters NVA 812 Regiment along with its attached companies would be moving from the Quang Tri City area to the Hue region. An earlier message suggested that the Headquarters 6th Battalion would meet it en route. Other messages disclosed plans to resupply enemy units in the Hue area. The above reminds that a new enemy command and control terminal was identified inside Hue Citadel on the 17th.

Aerial reconnaissance of 16 February disclosed that all 3 airfields in the A Shau Valley are unusable. The airfields could, however, be used as drop zones.

#### II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE:

Additional reports on the action at Phan Thiet indicate that the jail was retaken and an unknown number of the 500 prisoners released by the enemy were recaptured. On 18 February, at 9:45 AM EST, a helicopter landing zone occupied by elements of a US Army battalion received 5 x 60-mm mortar rounds which heavily damaged a CH-47 helicopter. An hour later contact was light and sporadic. Cumulative results are 5 South Vietnamese (ARVN) troops killed, 1 US and 34 ARVN wounded; 102 enemy killed, 6 detained and 39 individual and 5 crew-served weapons seized. A late report indicates that the enemy occupies the province hospital as of 10:00 PM EST on the 18th.

#### III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE:

On 17 February at 12:15 PM EST, 14 miles north-northwest of Saigon, a Vietnamese Army battalion sustained a rocket and mortar-supported ground attack from an estimated enemy battalion. Eight South Vietnamese Army were killed and 19 wounded (1 US, 18 ARVN). Enemy losses were 25 killed and 5 individual and 4 crew-served weapons seized.

On 18 February, 11 rockets hit Tan Son Nhut in 4 separate attacks. 1 round hit the civilian terminal. Cumulative results are 1 US killed, 35 wounded (34 US, 1 unidentified), and 1 Vietnamese Air Force fire truck destroyed.

1 mile east of Saigon on 17 February at noon EST, a South Vietnamese Marine Corps battalion engaged an unknown-size enemy force killing 80; 5 South Vietnamese Marines were

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killed and 11 wounded. An enemy truck with 2 .50 caliber machine guns and a quantity of small-arms ammunition were seized.

On 17 February at 11:45 AM EST 5 miles east of Saigon, the Cat Lai ammunition offloading berth sustained a mortar/rocket attack. There were 2 MSTs contract ships, the SS ANEVA WEST and SS EXPLORER, at the berth. 2 barges alongside ANEVA WEST received the majority of rocket rounds. There was a fire but no secondary explosions. The SS EXPLORER received the majority of the mortar rounds. Results were 19 merchant seamen wounded and minor damage to the EXPLORER and 2 barges.

On 17 February, at 9:33 PM EST, an enemy battalion attacked Song Be 60 miles north-northeast of Saigon. A US Army company reinforced by a US Army battalion defended and the enemy broke contact after 10 hours. There are an estimated 100 enemy still in the city. Results were 5 US killed, 26 wounded; enemy, 25 killed.

On 17 February at 1:27 PM EST, 8 miles northeast of Saigon, the South Vietnamese Army Quang Trung training center at Thu Duc came under an enemy attack resulting in 12 ARVN killed, 101 wounded, 5 missing, and 1 individual weapon lost. The enemy suffered 16 killed and 1 crew-served weapon seized.

On 17 February, at noon EST, 2 miles northwest of Tan Son Nhut, elements of a South Vietnamese Army battalion received 20 mortar rounds and the ARVN unit engaged an unknown-size enemy force. Interim results are 7 ARVN killed, 32 wounded; 75 enemy killed and 13 individual and 16 crew-served weapons seized.

An ARVN company was ambushed by an estimated enemy battalion 10 miles south of Saigon on 17 February. Artillery supported and the enemy broke contact after 2½ hours, leaving 19 dead, 8 individual and 4 crew-served weapons. Friendly losses were 36 ARVN killed and 47 wounded.

Enemy communications of 16 February indicate that a terminal serving a high-level command element is located about 5 miles from Saigon. A prisoner captured in nearby Binh Duong Province on 18 February said he was from the 2d Battalion of

the North Vietnamese 141st Regiment. He claimed 1st and 3d Battalions of the Regiment had departed for Saigon. This is the first suggestion that elements of the 141st Regiment are located in the capital area. The above reports, alongside current firings and skirmishes in the outlying areas of Saigon, are indicative that increased military pressure on Saigon is in the offing.

IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONE:

At 12:10 PM EST on 17 February Soc Trang Airfield received mortar and small-arms fire resulting in 1 US killed, 7 US wounded, 2 warehouses and 1 3/4-ton truck and 2 unknown-type helicopters damaged; enemy losses are 45 killed, 4 detained, and 16 individual weapons seized. At 12:50 PM EST on 18 February, Soc Trang Airfield received 35 rounds of recoilless rifle fire. Friendly losses were 10 US wounded, 3 buildings, 4 UH-1s, 1 O-1, 1 fuel truck, and one 2 1/2-ton truck damaged. Enemy losses are unknown. As of 3:05 PM EST, the airfield was operational.

Again at 12:10 PM EST on 17 February, Vinh Long received an estimated 75 rounds of B-40 rocket and 50 rounds of 81-mm mortar fire. An unknown number of Viet Cong infiltrated into the city, and, as of 5:00 AM EST on 18 February, held the cathedral. Contact is continuing. Interim results are: friendly, 10 ARVN killed, 30 wounded (4 US, 26 ARVN); enemy, 45 killed, 12 detained, 2 sampans destroyed, 25 weapons (23 individual, 2 crew-served) and 5 B-40 rockets seized.

On 18 February, at 6:15 AM EST, the Vinh Long Airfield received an estimated 45 82-mm mortar rounds. Results: friendly, 1 US killed, 23 wounded (20 US, 3 ARVN), 8 helicopters and 3 hangars damaged.

DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES: The deployment status (airlift) of the 3rd Brigade, 82d Airborne Division from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina to Chu Lai as of 1:00 AM EST 19 February; 53.3 percent of troops and 39.3 percent of cargo have departed. Planned closure date is 10:35 PM EST 24 February.

The deployment status (airlift) of 2d and 3d Battalions, 27th Marines from El Toro Marine Corps Air Station, California to Da Nang as of 1:00 AM EST 19 February; 72.6 percent of troops and 30.4 percent of cargo have departed. Planned closure date

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is 7:50 AM EST 23 February.

The 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, with a strength of 1,995 men, is moving by sea in 6 ships from Kaneohe, Hawaii to Da Nang. The first ship is scheduled to arrive Da Nang at 11:00 AM EST 22 February and the last at 7:00 PM 28 February. Variance of arrival times is due to difference of individual ship's speed capability.

ARC LIGHT OPERATIONS: In support of Khe Sanh, 14 missions (41 sorties) struck troop concentrations, fortified positions, and supply/storage areas. 12 other missions (48 sorties) struck enemy troop concentrations, base camps and supply/storage areas near Pleiku, Kontum, Tay Ninh, and Saigon.

#### NORTH VIETNAM

ROLLING THUNDER OPERATIONS: Of the 119 sorties flown 112 were on armed reconnaissance. 1 sortie struck the Bai Thuong Airfield hitting the runway and revetments; 1 sortie struck the Cat Bi Airfield cutting the runway; 5 sorties struck the Phuc Yen Airfield with adverse weather precluding results; 4 SAMs were fired at the strike force. 9 other SAMs were sighted by US pilots over North Vietnam.

STATUS OF IL-28s: Two North Vietnamese IL-28s returned to Phuc Yen from China yesterday. An IL-28 that was damaged by US air strikes in early February is still believed to be at Phuc Yen. There have been no firm indications that the North Vietnamese plan to use the IL-28s in tactical activity.

#### LAOS

BARREL ROLL OPERATIONS: On 18 February, 27 sorties were flown; 1 F-105 was hit by ground fire and could not lower the landing gear; the crewmembers ejected 10 miles south of Udorn, Thailand and were recovered.

STEEL TIGER OPERATIONS: On 18 February, 229 sorties were flown; 185 in the area in Laos adjacent to Khe Sanh.

#### KOREA

KOREAN SITUATION: On 18 February, 18 F-106s of the 318th Fighter Interceptor Squadron closed at Osan, Korea, and 24 F-102s of the 82nd Fighter Interceptor Squadron closed at Naha, Okinawa. 1 F-102 aborted and remains at Suwan, Korea.

19 February 1968

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~~TOP SECRET TRINI~~

*Sp-11 11/11/68*

**41c**

DRAFT

**General Impressions of:**

**General Bruce C. Clarke (USA-Retired)**

**Mr. Frank W. Mayborn, Publisher, Temple, Texas**

**COL James R. Hillard, Armor, Escort**

**On their trip to Vietnam, 1 - 16 February 1968**

ITINERARY

**Left Washington DC and Texas 1 Feb 68**

**Arrived in Honolulu 1 Feb 68**

**Left Honolulu 4 Feb, via Tokyo, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Saigon -**

**Arrived Saigon 7 Feb 68**

**Travelled in Vietnam 8 - 13 Feb**

**Returned home 14 - 16 Feb**

**Brief en route by:**

**General Beach - CINCUSARPAC**

**Admiral Sharp - CINCPAC**

**Major General McCown - JUSMAG, Thailand**

**Persons and units visited in Vietnam:**

**Ambassador Bunker**

**General Westmoreland**

**General Abrams**

**Staff Officers of USMACV**

**I Field Force**

**II Field Force**

**Senior Advisor IV ARVN Corps**

**Commander of Riverine Force**

**9th ROK Division**

**4th Inf Div**

**Dak To battlefield**

**9th Inf Div**

**US Army, Vietnam Headquarters**

**US Engineer Command**

**US Logistics Command**

**1st Aviation Brigade**

**1st Signal Brigade**

**Saigon City Command U. S.**

**25th Inf Div**

**21st ARVN Div**

**9th ARVN Div**

**Quang Tin Province Commander**

**Royal Thai Unit**

**Americal Division**

**In addition, we visited many subordinate units in the field.**

**We covered Vietnam from Bac Lieu in the Delta to Tam Ky near Danang and from the coast to the Cambodian border.**

**General Situation in Vietnam at this time.**

**The US buildup, started in 1965, has achieved a force of over 475,000 plus about 50,000 allied troops.**

A huge logistics complex necessary to support this force has been constructed.

Bombing of the North has been in effect for some time with several pauses.

The "Prolonged Conflict" policy of NVN gave way last summer to a new policy under General Giap because the allied strategy was causing the NVN-VC continually to lose ground.

Phase I of Giap's New Strategy. Artillery attacks on Con Thien; attacks from Laos on Loc Ninh and Dak To on the Cambodian border. These attacks were beaten off.

Phase II of Giap's strategy. Purposes of TET offensive of early February against SVN cities:

1. Secure surprise.
2. Win psychological and political victory.
3. Cause ARVN units to defect.
4. Cause people to rise up to support VC.
5. To show up inability of US and SVN Government to protect the people.
6. To take over SVN control structure.
7. Disrupt flow of food to Saigon. The long range results of the VC attacks will not show many substantial gains but will show many losses. The VC lost 30,000 killed, several thousand arms captured as well as several thousand prisoners.

The people did not defect but feel a bitterness toward the VC for their acts at TET.

The ARVN Army, in general, acquitted itself well. We found no reports of defections.

The VC has lost resources and prestige. In several cases the VC Infrastructure surfaced and was destroyed.

The enemy units that carried out the TET offensive were not all VC. Some had as high as 70% NVN fillers.

Many of the prisoners captured were boys 12-14 years of age; some having been in the units only a few days.

There were even women in their ranks - some were captured.

These factors go to show the dwindling resources of the VC and how more and more this is becoming a NVN war.

Since the TET offensive there has been an opening up of the local people on information about the location of the VC. This is a result of the reduced fear of VC reprisals.

An example of the planning of the VC for the TET offensive was the systematic cratering of roads and destruction of bridges on routes leading from the Delta area and other food-producing areas to Saigon.

#### Phase III of Giap's Strategy.

Phases I and II having produced no material results, Giap is turning to Phase III apparently.

At the west end of the DMZ, blocking the invasion routes over the trails leading from Laos, lies the Marine major outpost of Khe Sanh. It is important to our holding the two Northern Provinces of SVN.

For some time Giap has been building up his NVN forces around Khe Sanh with a view to its capture with a resultant military and psychological victory. It is the key to his Phase III strategy.

The allies are aware of the threat and are reacting to it to be well prepared. They fully expect to defeat this Phase III also.

Advantages to the allies in VN.

Strategic air power

Close air support

Great fire power

Mobility

Naval support

Communications

Medical support

Logistics support

Strategic intelligence

Armor units

Mechanical support equipment

It is obvious that these advantages will play a great part in Phase III and should be decisive.

The expected attack is now several days delayed because of measures taken to disrupt the buildup. All echelons of the command effected are leaving nothing to chance to be ready. There will be no surprise.

What will NVN do if Phase III fails?

1. Start a preliminary peace offensive.
2. Offer to negotiate, or
3. Withdraw the NVN troops into Laos and Cambodia and into NVN and break off the war. It will be recalled that Ho Chi Minh has never admitted any NVN troops in SVN.

With this background we will now set forth very briefly our general impressions on many of the factors looked for and about which we asked questions:

Command and leadership. Practically all of the general officers have had experience in two wars before Vietnam. They are highly schooled, selected, dedicated and motivated. They believe strongly in what they are doing.

General Westmoreland has been in command four years. He, assisted by Generals Abrams, Momyer and other senior generals, make up a winning team.

As you progress down the echelons of command you find the same relative professional competence.

The company grade officers and the NCO corps are probably the best in our Army's history. The result is confidence

in the leadership all through the ranks.

#### Personnel.

Morale is high by any test. The righteousness of our cause in Vietnam is not questioned. Dedication at all levels is high. The one year tour is a strong morale factor. The medical service is the best we have ever had in war. Integration is believed in and practiced at all levels.

Because there are no front or rear areas there are no "front line" and "rear area" soldiers. All are of equal status and prestige. This is a favorable morale factor.

Replacements are reported to be well trained and to quickly fit into the teams.

#### Equipment for US Troops.

There appears to the visitor to be no material equipment shortages.

The M-16 rifle is reported to be the best in the world for the Vietnam environment. Its reported problems are or have been solved effectively.

#### Armor Units.

These appeared to be highly valuable and much used. The terrain is not near as difficult in many places as is picture in photos and TV coverage.

The new foot gear is very effective and comfortable.

The helicopter is the great mobility producer of this war.

Artillery Support.

This is good, prompt, accurate and flexible.

Communications.

Never did a force in the field enjoy so extensive communications. Still there is a need to perfect the radio for use in the infantry squad and get it in the hands of troops.

Logistics.

The logistics systems appear to be effective, flexible, mobile and adequate.

Close air support.

This is prompt, accurate and effective. This accuracy combined with that of our artillery has not only given outstanding support to our troops but has reduced the inadvertent casualties on friendly troops and civilians.

Engineer support.

In an undeveloped country such as Vietnam there is great need for engineer support. This has been met in a big way.

Much of the engineer work will long endure to the benefit of Vietnam, heretofore a country with but one port and few good roads or clearings.

### Intelligence.

Tactical intelligence in all units has gradually been perfected. In each tactical unit's area we found a clear and up-to-date knowledge of the enemy they were responsible for. This in spite of the fluid nature of the war.

### Civic Action.

All units have programs in many fields in their areas such as medical assistance, shelter, refugee care, water supply, roads, schools, food, materials, etc.

The key to long range help of villages and hamlets is security that is dependable. It is necessary to destroy the fear of the VC coming in and destroying what has been done and harassing the villagers. With security and a modest scale of help in materials and services the country can progress very rapidly. But security must come first.

The terms "Pacification" and "Revolutionary Development" are not popularly understood and are not indicative of the two factors needed which are:

Security followed by

Development assistance

The Reserve call up should consider civil affairs units. They are needed to assist in the development of city and provincial governments.

### The Vietnamese Armed Forces.

In the Army these fall into three categories.

Mainline units under the central government.

Regional Forces under the province chiefs.

Popular Forces under the local officials.

They are all important and must have training, mobility, weapons, equipment, morale, confidence, leadership, support to carry out adequately their missions.

Excellence in a new military unit comes slowly.

The first requirement is good leadership at all levels to include the NCO's. This requires time, schooling and experience. This leadership is coming in the VN Army but slowly.

During the TET offensive there were many examples of good leadership.

The experiences of the TET offensive have added to their confidence, morale, esprit and experience. They will perform even better next time.

Fifteen years ago the Korean Army was in the same stage of development. Today, two very effective Korean divisions are doing well in Vietnam. They are equipped equally to US units, well-trained, with high morale.

But the Vietnamese units are still on a very austere priority for equipment to include weapons. This affects their

morale, effectiveness and their ability to supply the first essential ingredient of success - security. This should be corrected as a matter of urgency. Troops know and feel it when they are poorly equipped.

#### CONCLUSIONS:

These conclusions are drawn from our discussions and observations:

1. Phases I and II of Giap's strategy have failed.
2. The TET offensive will be a long-range set-back for the VC.
3. The future of Vietnam is based upon security and development assistance especially on the District level. This security which must come first is dependent upon the ability of the Vietnamese Army units to perform their missions. This requires their adequate equipping and rapid development.
4. Long range thought on the military, political and diplomatic levels should be given to what to do next after the pending battle of Khe Sanh. Any victory should be promptly exploited.
5. The bombing should be continued until its halting will not lower the threshold of infiltration of ammunition, men and supplies into SVN. Unless this is done, the price will be greatly increased allied casualties.
6. The enclave theory has few supporters. It would not provide security in outlying hamlets or districts. It would present

a passive posture to the enemy. It would give up the initiative to him also. Our posture along the Laos and upper Cambodian borders and along the DMZ is one of defending an enclave. Giap's strategy takes advantage of this at Khe Sanh to our disadvantage.

7. All commanders we interviewed were aware of the necessity of avoiding inadvertent casualties among the civilian population. Such casualties are relatively small unless brought about by VC action jeopardizing our security.

8. And finally, our troops in Vietnam represent the best of dedicated American manhood. They deserve our whole-hearted support. To add to their casualties by statements or actions is both immoral and unjustified by any US citizen. They have unity and morale on a high order. If the same were true at home the outcome of their efforts would not be in any doubt and the war might soon be over. --

42

INFORMATION

*for file*

Monday, February 19, 1968 -- 11:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

As you requested, information on Ayub and Dr. Goodwin's report were passed on to Dr. Hurst.

Dr. Hurst stated that he knows Dr. Goodwin well and has the highest regard for him; he is "one of the world's best." Dr. Hurst stated that he remains ready to help if necessary.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Monday, Feb. 19, 1968  
10:35 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Porter finds Park considerably  
settled down in the wake of the Vance visit.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Seoul 4326)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-214  
By CB, NARA Date 8-4-97



Department of State

43a  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

VV CRA359  
PP RUEHC  
DE RUALOS 4326E 0500130  
ZNY SSSSS ZZN  
P 190109Z FEB 68  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9147  
STATE GRNC  
BT

5541Q  
1968 FEB 18 PM 9 36

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 4326

NODIS/CACTUS

1. I CALLED ON PRESIDENT SATURDAY WITH COSTANZO AND HIGHWAY CONSULTANT WILBUR SMITH, PURPOSE BEING TO PRESENT SMITH WHO HAD JUST FINISHED PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF PRESIDENT PARK'S FAVORITE PROJECT, I.E., SEOUL-PUSAN HIGHWAY.

2. EARLIER IN DAY I INQUIRED OF PRIME MINISTER CONCERNING PRESIDENT'S FRAME OF MIND AFTER DEPARTURE OF VANCE. PRIME MINISTER SAID PRESIDENT NOW FEELING VERY MUCH BETTER. HAD QUIETED DOWN CONSIDERABLY "AFTER GETTING HIS THOUGHTS OFF HIS CHEST."

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4326E ~~SECRET~~

3. I FOUND PRESIDENT IN GOOD HUMOR HE RECEIVED SMITH WITH COURTESY AND COMMENTED APPRECIATIVELY ON HIS ADVICE CONCERNING HIGHWAY.

4. PRESS AND RADIO HAVE ALSO CONTINUED TO TAPER OFF, AND EVERYTHING CONSIDERED IT LOOKS AS THOUGH GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC DREW CONSIDERABLE REASSURANCE FROM VANCE MISSION.

GP-4 PORTER  
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-213  
By us, NARA Date 8-22-97

*Pres. file*

44

Monday, Feb. 19, 1968  
10:30 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Pakistan's Defense Minister, one of the three acting during Ayub's illness, suggests that Ayub might wish to make a trip to the United States in the course of his recuperation.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Pindi 3451)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-214  
By CG, NARA Date 8-4-97



# Department of State

## TELEGRAM

440/6

~~SECRET~~ 444

2

PAGE 01 RAWALP 03451 181007Z

9  
ACTION SS 30

INFO NSCE 00,SSO 00,CCO 00,/030 W

O 180735Z FEB 68  
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3152

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-213  
By ins NARA Date 8-22-97

~~SECRET~~ RAWALPINDI 3451

EXDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR. PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE.

1. IN A PRELIMINARY BUT IN DEPTH DISCUSSION OF PESHAWAR RENEWAL WITH DEFENSE MINISTER ADMIRAL KHAN, ONE OF THE TROIKA HOLDING REINS DURING AYUB'S ILLNESS, HE OBSERVED THAT OF COURSE OUR TWO HEADS OF STATE WOULD MAKE THE ULTIMATE DECISION ON THIS ISSUE AND SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR THEM TO DO SO FACE TO FACE. HE ~~SUGGESTED THAT IT COULD BE USEFUL FOR AYUB TO MAKE A TRIP TO THE UN AND THE US AS PART OF HIS RECUPERATIVE MEASURES AND THAT A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON MIGHT BE ARRANGED IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH A TRIP.~~

2. IT IS MY OPINION THAT THIS ~~IS A MATTER OF CONJECTURE~~ CONJECTURE OF

PAGE 2 RUQVGM 3451 ~~SECRET~~

KHAN'S BUT RATHER THAT HE WAS ACTING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS.

3. TODAY'S PAPERS CARRY PICTURES OF AYUB IN PAJAMAS AND ROBE SITTING IN AN EASY CHAIR WITH A NEWSPAPER IN HIS LAP, AND STANDING.

4. WHILE I OF COURSE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND AYUB

~~SECRET~~



*Department of State*

**TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 RAWALP 03451 181007Z

WOULD MAKE THE FINAL DECISION IN SUCH A DELICATE AND IMPORTANT MATTER,  
I WAS COMPLETELY NONCOMMITTAL ABOUT A US TRIP BOTH GENERALLY OR  
DURING ANY PARTICULAR TIME FRAME.

S. REQUEST GUIDANCE RE:

A) WOULD AN AYUB TRIP BE WELCOME IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE?

B) IF YES, THEN WHAT GENERAL TIME FRAME WOULD BE PREFEREABLE?  
GP-1 OEHLERT

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

45  
**INFORMATION**

~~SECRET~~

**Monday, February 19, 1968  
10:10 a.m.**

**Mr. President:**

**In I Corps (attached):**

-- shelling and light ground  
contact;

-- 160 tons delivered by air  
drop despite continued bad weather.

**W. W. Rostow**

~~SECRET~~

**wwrostow:rla**

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority OSI 10-18-78

By up/ky, NARA, Date 2-20-92

SECRET

45a

Monday, February 19, 1968, 10:00 AM

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This report is number fifteen on the situation in the Khe Sanh area and covers the 24-hour period of February 18, 1968.

Activity in the northern First Corps continued to focus on enemy shelling, as 175 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery rounds were distributed among friendly elements bordering the DMZ. Forty rounds of mortar and 35 rounds of artillery impacted at Khe Sanh Combat Base in positions occupied by the 26th Marines, which resulted in one Marine wounded.

Marines positioned at Camp Carroll, received a mid-day barrage of 42 rounds of mortar with two intermediate rounds of artillery. Friendly casualties were: one killed, nine wounded (four evacuated).

Three small craters were caused at C-2 outside Con Thien, as three rounds of mortar were aimed at friendly elements. Marine elements at Con Thien and Gio Linh received 33 and 8 rounds respectively, none of which inflicted casualties nor caused significant damage.

Ground contacts in northern Quang Tri were limited to two light skirmishes, both inflicting moderate enemy losses while causing only minor injuries to friendly elements. Five North Vietnamese Army were killed at the hands of a 37th ARVN Ranger Patrol east of Khe Sanh, in an early morning contact which inflicted no friendly casualties.

There were a total of 358 tactical air sorties flown in the Khe Sanh area during the period. Marine tactical air flew 78 sorties, reporting four secondary explosions and one secondary fire. The Air Force flew 215 sorties, and the Navy flew 65. The weather was workable only for combat sky spot strikes, with a few isolated attempts to put in visual strikes. Bomb Damage Assessment was correspondingly bad. There were 12 ARC LIGHT strikes (35 sorties) flown in the Niagara area. For the next period, 19 - 20 February, 354 tactical air sorties will be flown in the Khe Sanh and surrounding areas. The Marines will fly 44, the Air Force 210, and the Navy 150. There will be 15 ARC LIGHT strikes (45 sorties) flown in the Niagara area.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD Ltr 11/3/79

By up/hy, NARA, Date 2-20-92

SECRET

- 2 -

Air resupply for the reporting period amounted to 160 short tons of which 133 short tons was ammunition.

No COFRAM type ordnance was used during the period.

Weather at Khe Sanh during the period was bad. Low clouds and dense fog reduced the ceiling and visibility to less than 500 feet and one mile throughout the period. Most of the time the ceiling and visibility were near zero. Little change is expected on 19 - 20 February. The sky will be obscured by low stratus clouds and fog. Ceilings and visibilities will be near zero except for a slight improvement to a ceiling of 400 feet and visibility of 1/2 mile from 2 PM to 6 PM on 20 February.

SECRET



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

19 February 1968  
7:00 AM EST

456

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST,  
18 February (9:00 AM 19 February, SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)  
status as of the above time is as follows:

PREVIOUS STATUS  
DAYS SUPPLY 8:00 PM 17 FEB EST  
ON HAND (9:00 AM 18 FEB SVN)

Class I (Rations)  
Meal, Combat  
Individual  
B Rations

2 2 days  
8 8 days

Class III (Fuel)  
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)  
JP-4 (Jet Fuel)  
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)  
Diesel

9 9 days  
2.5 7.5 days  
2 4 days  
2.5 2.5 days

Class V (Ammunition)

a. High explosive:

|                 |              |         |
|-----------------|--------------|---------|
| 60-mm mortar    | Not reported | 25 days |
| 81-mm mortar    | Not reported | 18 days |
| 90-mm (Tank)    | 87           | 87 days |
| 4.2" mortar     | 30           | 31 days |
| 105-mm howitzer | 20           | 18 days |
| 155-mm howitzer | 17           | 21 days |

2. On 18 February Khe Sanh was resupplied with 160 tons as follows:

|           |          |
|-----------|----------|
| Class I   | 12 tons  |
| Class III | 15 tons  |
| Class V   | 133 tons |

DISTRIBUTION:

|           |          |         |
|-----------|----------|---------|
| SECDEF    | CT FORCE | J-30    |
| DEPSECDEF | AWR      | J-31    |
| CJCS (3)  | MCC      | J-32    |
| DJS (3)   | DDO      | J-33    |
| J-4       |          |         |
| PAC DIV   | ADDO     | CCOC    |
|           |          | Pac Div |

SECRET

*Marshall B. Garth*  
MARSHALL B. GARTH  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988

By *123* NARA Date *2-20-92*

## SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REY

Free file

Dear President Rey:

Thank you for your kind message following your visit to Washington.

I enjoyed the opportunity to meet with you and your colleagues and to discuss topics of interest to both of us.

I understand the meeting you and your party had with an inter-agency group chaired by Under Secretary Katzenbach on the balance of payments was particularly timely and useful. I am pleased that your Commission will be able to continue these discussions with Ambassador Trexise this week.

These meetings point the way in which we might consult together in the future to seek mutually acceptable solutions to common problems.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

se t 2/19/68

MWG

ERF:MWG:mst

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**Monday - February 19, 1968**

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Invitation to Latin American Presidents to Hemisfair Opening**

*Pres file*

In the list of actions to dramatize our Latin American policy which you approved for planning purposes on February 5, there is the proposal that Hemisfair officials invite the Presidents of the participating countries to the opening on April 6 and that you have them out to the Ranch on the same or following day.

Ten countries, plus the OAS, will have separate or collective pavilions. They are: Mexico, the five Central American countries, as a group, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Ecuador is sending some tourist promotion material for exhibition, but will not have a pavilion. Hence, it does not fall into the category of a participating country and President Arosemena would not be invited.

Subject to your approval, I propose the following procedure for extending the invitations:

1. Consult Governor Connally about inviting the Presidents and availability of facilities to house them and their staffs.
2. Assuming a favorable response, ask him to prepare letters of invitation on behalf of Hemisfair to each participating-country President.
3. These letters would be carried by a personal emissary of the Governor to each of the Presidents. We would instruct our Ambassadors to make an appointment for the emissary and accompany him for the presentation of the letters.
4. Our Ambassadors would follow up this appointment with a subsequent private call on the President to extend your

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *MSg*, NARA, Date 4/29/96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

personal invitation to the Ranch while they are in San Antonio.

Approve \_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_.

W. W. Rostow

cc - Jim Jones  
Bob Sayre

~~SECRET~~

Monday, February 19, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Status of Pueblo Case

*Pres file*

The following summary of the current status of the Pueblo case may be of use to you in your discussions with callers:

1. The Pueblo and its crew, seized by North Korea on January 23 in international waters, remain in North Korean custody. The North Koreans have informed us of the identity of one dead and three injured crewmen.

2. We have had seven private talks at Panmunjom on February 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 14 and 18. North Korea has been represented by General Pak Chung-kuk and our side by Rear Admiral John V. Smith of the Military Armistice Commission. An eighth meeting will probably be held tonight at midnight Washington time, which is 2:00 p.m. tomorrow in Korea.

3. Each side has now stated its position. The North Korean position is that release of the crew will be considered only after the United States:

-- has apologized for sending into North Korean territorial waters an armed ship carrying out espionage and engaging in provocative acts; and

-- has promised not to repeat this intrusion.

The North Koreans have indicated that they have no intent of returning the ship.

4. To support their position, the North Koreans have published alleged "confessions" by Pueblo officers and crew members, including one alleged joint confession by the entire crew. These so-called "confessions" used phraseology and concepts which no American would use. The North Koreans have also released photographs of what they claim to be documents found on board the Pueblo, containing portions of the ship's log and its navigational plot. These allegedly show several penetrations into waters claimed by North Korea as territorial. The North Koreans have made known their intent to publish additional documents, including intelligence materials.

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- 2 -

5. Our position is that the Pueblo and crew must be released immediately. In support of this we have made the following points:

-- we have positive information both from the Pueblo and from a North Korean source that the seizure of the vessel occurred in international waters beyond the 12-mile limit, which North Korea seems to claim;

-- even if the Pueblo had been in North Korean territorial waters, seizing it, instead of escorting it from those waters, violates international law and practice;

-- the Pueblo's sailing orders were to stay at least 13 miles from land. We have no information indicating that those orders were violated. However, following release of the ship and crew, we are willing to hold an impartial inquiry and make public the results of that inquiry;

-- we have no evidence to support the North Korean claim that the Pueblo fired on North Korean patrol craft. Information from the Pueblo at the time of capture was that her two machine guns had not been uncovered and that she did not intend to resist.

6. At the last meeting we reiterated our offer to hold an inquiry following release of the crew and vessel and to express regret if justified by results of the inquiry, and we gave assurances that U.S. naval ships will continue to be ordered to remain more than 12 nautical miles from the coast. The North Korean representative characterized these as "preposterous assertions." Lack of progress after seven meetings seems to indicate that we are close to an impasse.

7. The regular series of open Military Armistice Commission meetings have continued, but the Pueblo case has been mentioned only in passing at these sessions.

8. Meanwhile, we have gone through a difficult period with our South Korean ally. During Vance's recent mission he applied his considerable skills toward gaining an understanding of our position on the part of President Park and his associates. He was largely successful in this and the atmosphere in Seoul is much less tense than it was a few days ago. The South Koreans continue to feel that we have placed

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

emphasis upon the Pueblo case at the expense of attention to the North Korean raiders' attempts on President Park's life. They also feel that, in general, we are too patient in the face of North Korean provocations and that this is giving misleading and possibly very dangerous signals to North Korea and her allies. Vance and Park agreed that if North Korean aggression continued, our two countries would promptly determine what action should be taken under our Mutual Defense Treaty. We are also taking steps designed to strengthen South Korean forces. We have Park's promise that at least for the time being, he will not take unilateral action but will keep in close consultation with us.

9. We have engaged in a series of third country diplomatic efforts, particularly with the Soviet Union, in hopes of influencing favorably developments in the Pueblo case. So far, nothing of promise has come from these efforts.

10. We still have under consideration other moves which might be taken in the Pueblo affair. However, the hostile and potentially hostile forces ranged against us are formidable and it behooves us to exercise prudence.

W. W. Rostow

AJ:mm

cc: Mr. Jorden

~~SECRET~~



49

*Pres file*

Monday - February 19, 1968

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT- ACTION**

**SUBJECT: Visit with the Inter-American Council of Commerce  
and Production**

On Wednesday, February 28, the Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production (CICYP) meets in Washington at the F Street Club under the auspices of the Council for Latin America.

The CICYP, whose President is Roberto Campos of Brazil, is an association of the leading Latin American and U.S. businessmen and industrialists. The Latin members are a particularly important group because of their influence on governmental attitudes toward economic integration.

Given the influence of this audience, I suggest you consider dropping in to meet them and review with them the Johnsonian dimension to the Alliance for Progress: economic integration and opening of the inner frontiers of South America.

If you decide to meet with the group, I will prepare some talking points.

*This could be important in substance as well as in giving vitality to your Latin American Policy.*

W. W. Rostow

I will meet with them \_\_\_\_\_

Prefer not to \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

cc - Jim Jones

# THE COUNCIL FOR LATIN AMERICA, INC.

680 PARK AVENUE  
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021

① RMT  
② FXL  
JAN 22 1968  
49a

PHONE: (212) 620-3200

CABLE: COLAYAM

January 17, 1968

Mr. Covey T. Oliver  
Assistant Secretary of State  
for Inter-American Affairs  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Covey:

As you know, Dr. Roberto Campos last September succeeded George Moore in the Presidency of the Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production (CICYP). One of Dr. Campos' principal objectives, in addition to strengthening CICYP itself, will be to develop a closer relationship between the Hemisphere's business community and the U.S. government. This is an objective fully shared by the CICYP Executive Committee, on which I represent the Council for Latin America, the U.S. Section of CICYP.

The CICYP Executive Committee will hold its next meeting in New York on February 26 and 27, 1968. On February 28, the Committee will be in Washington.


Dr. Campos is most anxious to have the CICYP Executive Committee meet with you, your staff and, if at all possible the President of the United States on that day. Some members of the CLA Executive Committee will also be present and the total number of business participants may run to 40 people. Do you think this could be arranged? We would very much appreciate your sympathetic consideration of this request.

Lists of the members of the CICYP and CLA Executive Committee are attached.

If such a meeting could be arranged, may we suggest the first part of the morning or the middle or latter part of the afternoon? We are trying to arrange another session with the inter-American agencies for late morning and lunch, and in the evening there will be a dinner at the Brazilian Embassy for members of the Congress and the Executive Committee.

We would be most grateful for whatever you could do on this matter, and look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

  
William E. Barlow

WEB:tm

Chairman David Robinson; 1st Vice Chairman John Gallagher; President William E. Barlow; Executive Vice President Henry R. Geyelin; Vice Chairman H. W. Gotsdiner, Harold S. Gerson,

COUNCIL FOR LATIN AMERICA - EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

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Senior Vice-Chairman.....John F. Gallagher

President.....William E. Barlow

Executive Vice President.....Henry R. Geyelin

Vice-Chairmen.....Henry W. Balgooyen, Harold S. Geneen,  
George S. Moore, John D. J. Moore,  
John R. White (Treasurer), William S.  
Youngman, Jr.

Other Members of the Executive Committee:  
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S. Maurice McAshan, Jr., Robert W. Purcell  
(Secretary), J. Howard Rabin, Jr., Thomas  
E. Sunderland, A. Thomas Taylor, Rawleigh  
Warner, Jr.

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**Miembros: (Presidentes de Secciones Nacionales)**

Dr. ALEJANDRO FRERS (Argentina)

Sr. MANUEL GRANIER BERTINI (Bolivia)

Dr. JOSÉ E. MINDLIN (Brasil)

(La correspondencia con CANADA, se mantiene con el Vicepresidente Ejecutivo y Director General de The Canadian Manufacturers' Association Inc.,  
Sr. J. C. WHITE LAW

Ing. JOSÉ GÓMEZ PINZÓN (Colombia)

Sr. ERNESTO LARA DUSTAMANTE, (Costa Rica)  
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Sr. JORGE ROSS (Chile)

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Sr. CONSTANT ELIE JOSEPH, (Haití)  
Presidente de la Chambre de Commerce

Sr. GABRIEL A. MEJIA (Honduras)

Sr. EUSTAQUIO ESCANDON (México)

Sr. JORGE A. MONTEALEGRE (Nicaragua)

|                                                                                                                                                                          |                             |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <b>Dr. CALOS QUIJANO, Jr.</b>                                                                                                                                            | <b>( <u>Hanania</u> )</b>   |
| <b>Dr. PASCUAL SCAVONE</b>                                                                                                                                               | <b>( <u>Paraguay</u> )</b>  |
| <b>Ing. CARLOS FERREYROS R.</b>                                                                                                                                          | <b>( <u>Perú</u> )</b>      |
| <b>Dr. JORGE PEIRANO FACIO</b>                                                                                                                                           | <b>( <u>Uruguay</u> )</b>   |
| <b>Dr. ENRIQUE SANCHEZ</b>                                                                                                                                               | <b>( <u>Venezuela</u> )</b> |
| <b>Sr. KEN GORDON, Director Ejecutivo, ( <u>Trinidad-Tobago</u><br/>The Incorporated Chambers of Commerce<br/>of the British Caribbean.<br/>( Sección en formación )</b> |                             |
| <b>Sr. JOSÉ LUIS DE AZCÁRRAGA Y<br/>BUSTAMANTE, Presidente del<br/>Comité Español del CICYP.</b>                                                                         | <b>( España )</b>           |

**Sr. CARLOS ONS COTELO, Secretario General**

**Ex-Presidentes del CICYP:**

|                                                              |                         |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| <b>Sr. JOSE BRUNET (Presidente Honorario)</b>                | <b>( Uruguay )</b>      |
| <b>Sr. CARLOS SANGUINETTI (Vicepresidente<br/>Honorario)</b> | <b>( Uruguay )</b>      |
| <b>Sr. JAMES S. KEMPER</b>                                   | <b>(Estados Unidos)</b> |
| <b>Sr. AGUSTIN LEGORRETA</b>                                 | <b>( México )</b>       |
| <b>Sr. PEDRO IBÁÑEZ OJEDA</b>                                | <b>( Chile )</b>        |

**( A salvo de la provisión que en definitiva haga la Comisión  
Ejecutiva en la Reunión de Nueva York, de las Presiden-  
cias de los Comités Asesores, invitaremos a los presi-  
dentes actuales, Sres:**

**Ing. Rómulo A. Ferrero, Presidente del  
Comité de Política Económica**

**Dr. Gustavo J. Vollmer, Presidente del  
Comité para la Promoción de la Empresa Privada**

**Sr. John D. J. Moore, Presidente del  
Comité de Finanzas y Operaciones**

Comité de Acción para la Integración Económica y la ALA1

Dr. Sergio Gutiérrez Olivos, Presidente del  
Comité de Relaciones Interamericanas

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, Feb. 19, 1968

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Attached is a revised press statement on your meeting with Brosio that State has worked out with him. Brosio is agreeable to its release, if it meets with your approval.

W. W. Rostow

ERF:mst

**PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT FOLLOWING CALL BY  
NATO SECRETARY GENERAL MANLIO BROGIO, MONDAY,  
FEBRUARY 19, 1968**

The President met with NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio at noon today. The President and Mr. Brosio examined questions of mutual interest concerning the NATO Alliance. They agreed that the adoption by Allied Ministers last December of a constructive program for carrying out the future tasks of the Alliance provided evidence of the continuing vitality of NATO. The President and Mr. Brosio also concurred that the Allies must consult closely and continuously on East-West relations and the achievement of a durable peace in Europe. They considered ~~the~~ the maintenance of NATO's strength, including the US commitment, as necessary to continuing stability and security in the North Atlantic area. This stability and security provides the basis for exploring with the USSR the possibility of mutual force reductions.

**INFORMATION**

57

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 17, 1968  
2:30 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith answers to the three  
questions you put to Bob Ginsburgh  
last night.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority NSC ltr 2-4-79

By ep/y, NARA, Date 2-20-92

WWRostow:rla

SECRET

5/a

SUPPLY CONSUMPTION DATA IN KHE SANH

In reply to the question as to daily consumption (on gross basis) of Class I (Rations), Class III (POL), and Class V (Ammo) supplies at Khe Sanh, the following is submitted:

|           |                    |
|-----------|--------------------|
| Class I   | 7-1/2 tons per day |
| Class III | 14 tons per day    |
| Class V   | 73 tons per day    |

The above data is an estimate only, based on available information from reports covering the period 11-16 February 1968, representing days of supply on hand and receipts in the Khe Sanh area. More detailed information would require a query direct to III MAF.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSR Ltr 10/25/78

By cap/ly, NARA, Date 2-20-92

SECRET

SECRET

576

17 February 1968

FACT SHEET

Subject: Deployability Status of Personnel in the 82nd  
Airborne Brigade Task Force and the 27th USMC RL

The percentage of individuals that deployed to South Vietnam having less than one year since their return and the percentage of individuals who have less than 120 days service remaining at time of departure from CONUS or Hawaii is as follows:

|             | <u>Less Than<br/>One Year</u> | <u>Less Than<br/>120 Days</u> | <u>Personnel<br/>Deployed</u> |
|-------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 82nd A/B TF | 27.8%                         | 8.6%                          | 3,610                         |
| 27th RL     | 0                             | 0                             | 7,363                         |

Prepared by:  
Colonel L. V. Hoyt  
J-3 Pacific Division  
Extension 53031

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD ltr 10/25/78

By cap/ly, NARA, Date 2-20-92

SECRET

512

SECRET

COMBAT STATUS OF THE THIRD BRIGADE  
TASK FORCE, 82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION  
AND THE MARINE RLT (S)

1. The Third Brigade Task Force, 82nd Airborne Division, moving by air to CHU LAI, closes at 250335Z Feb 1968. It plans for a two-week orientation program after arrival in-country; however, the unit is capable of initiating combat operations upon closure if required.

2. The Marine Regimental Landing Team 27 (-), moving by air to DANANG, closes at 231250Z Feb 1968. It will be ready to initiate combat operations upon closure if required.

3. The Battalion Landing Team 1/27, moving by sea to DANANG, closes at 282400Z Feb 1968. It will be ready to initiate combat operations upon closure if required.

COORDINATION

Army - Col. Grimsley  
Marine Corps - Brig. Gen. Owens/Col. Peal  
SASM - Col. Delmar

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD Dec 10/25/78  
By ip/eq, NARA, Date 2/20/92

ACTION

Saturday, February 17, 1968 -- 2:30 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

State would like to issue the attached statement warning the North Koreans about punishing the members of the Pueblo crew.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rla

681  
*for clearance  
from Korean Tech 7  
52a*

PRESS STATEMENT

On February 16, the North Korean Radio broadcast what it claimed was a "joint letter of apology" signed by the 82 surviving members of the crew of the USS PUEBLO.

From both the substance and language of the statement, it is clear that these are the words of the North Korean authorities, not of the crew of the PUEBLO.

According to the broadcast, the alleged "joint letter" included statements such as the following:

"We deserve any punishment by the Korean people regardless of its severity for the crime we have committed by making overt intrusions into the territorial waters of a sovereign state, namely the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and perpetrating grave hostile acts. Since we are not mere prisoners of war but criminals caught in the very act of espionage, we cannot have any complaint even should the worst come."

"We know that when one is captured for conducting espionage against a foreign country, he should be severely punished in accordance with the law of that country. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is fully entitled to determine our fate."

"We should be punished severely by the law of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for our own serious crimes. We may expect such a severe punishment as may deprive us of even the possibility of revival."

On January 26, the spokesman of the Department of State noted a North Korean broadcast which referred to the crew of the PUEBLO as

"criminals," and which stated, "the criminals who have violated the sovereignty of another country and precipitated a provocative act must receive due punishment." The spokesman said at that time, "I am authorized to say that the United States Government would consider any such move by North Korea to be a deliberate aggravation of an already serious situation."

I am authorized to reaffirm that statement.

INFORMATION

Pres. file

53

Saturday, Feb. 17, 1968  
2:05 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the 1:15 p. m. round-up.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

53a

Saturday, February 17, 1968

Information from Saigon as of 1:15 pm

Tan Son Nhut received 20 rounds of Mortar fire. Vietnamese Air Force conducted strikes against the area where the mortar fire originated -- results are not known.

The Chapel area and three buildings were hit; one round hit just outside MACV headquarters. Several fires were reported on the flight line. Three persons have been reported wounded and three buses damaged. The Joint General Staff compound received two hits.

Approximately 4 miles east of Saigon, Tu Duc city was also reported under fire, with a water plant and an ARVN Infantry School being hit.

Nha Be, 5 miles south of Saigon, reported a tank farm was reported under attack. (presumably POL)

#### First Corps

Khe Sanh reported sporadic mortar fire.

#### Second Corps

Gia Nhea airfield in Quang Duc Province reported under attack.

Kontum airfield under attack.

Dai Linh district headquarters under attack.

Dalat under attack.

#### Third Corps

Long Binh under attack.

Lai Khe under attack.

Phu Loi under attack.

#### Fourth Corps

Chau Phu, Cao Lai, Soc Trang , and Rach Gia under attack.

INFORMATION

*Pres. file*

54

Saturday, Feb. 17, 1968  
12:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith CIA Washington joins in the emerging  
consensus that the second round of fireworks  
will start this afternoon our time.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ SAVIN attachment SC 01929

p. s. handwritten The ticker indicates it's begun with airfield attacks.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-197  
By iso, NARA, Date 2-12-04

~~SECRET~~ [ ]

54a

17 FEB 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Impending Viet Cong Attacks

1. We have received from our Station in Saigon their response to our request for an evaluation of yesterday's reports of an impending second attack on Saigon and possibly other urban areas. A summary of that evaluation, which is being disseminated electrically, follows:

(a) The information reported yesterday concerning an impending attack on Saigon was from different sources -- one report was based on prisoner interrogations, and the other from a source who has previously provided good information.

(b) Documents, prisoners, and agent reports have referred to second phase attacks, with the latter giving conflicting dates.

(c) Enemy tactical and political considerations weigh heavily toward the initiation of attacks on Khe Sanh, Quang Tri, Hue, Danang, Dak To, Saigon, and delta towns. As noted in the 9 February document captured in Danang, the enemy's Military Region V has called for "intensified guerrilla attacks, small and medium attacks and preparations for a series of big actions." The longer the enemy waits, the more tenuous becomes his position as the allies continue to mount operations and employ air and artillery against his massed forces. Thus coordinated attacks on selected key targets appear in order, but the improved allied alert posture should contain and make them extremely costly to the enemy.

2. We have subsequently received the following additional reports on the subject:

(a) A CAS report from [ ] attributed to a [ ] that Hanoi has directed

EO 12958  
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(S)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-198  
By nc, NARA, Date 3-8-04

~~SECRET~~ [ ]

[ ]  
Copy No.

~~SECRET~~

the Liberation Front "to launch a second general attack on Saigon and all provincial capitals at 0200 Hanoi time (1400 EST) on 18 February." While CAS Saigon is dubious of the authenticity of this report, it notes that it coincides with recent information which places the renewal of offensive action between 17 and 20 February, and this is the only report giving a precise date and hour for the offensive.

(c) A report from CAS Saigon, as of 0900 EST  states that: "Indications have been received in past two hours that the Viet Cong second phase attack will be launched on 18 February. Various hours from midnight to 0430 local have been mentioned in the reports. The Chief of Saigon Municipal Police expects an attack on Saigon to begin at midnight. The likely area of attack to be in the sixth or seventh precincts."

3. We generally agree with CAS Saigon's assessment, as outlined in paragraph 1. The enemy poses significant threats in the areas cited, and attacks in at least some of those areas may occur in the immediate future. While the enemy may attempt coordinated actions in a number of areas simultaneously, the form, scale, and intensity of his attacks may vary widely in view of his losses and the disruptions resulting from recent allied operations. The success of the enemy's efforts will also be limited because of the improved alert posture of friendly forces.

Copy No.           

~~SECRET~~

*Saturday*  
~~Friday~~ February 16, 1968 - 12:15pm

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Attached for your approval is a draft message to President Rey in response to his warm note of thanks to you (Tab A).

Your reply would:

- affirm the usefulness of regular consultations between the US and the Commission in the balance of payments area, and
- highlight the importance we attach to the Commission's balance of payments discussions with Ambassador Trenise next week.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

ERF:mst

55a

**SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REY**

**Dear President Rey:**

**Thank you for your kind message following your visit to Washington.**

**I enjoyed the opportunity to meet with you and your colleagues and to discuss topics of interest to both of us.**

**We found the meeting you and your party had with an inter-agency group chaired by Under Secretary Katzenbach on the balance of payments particularly timely and useful. It points the way in which we might consult together in the future to seek mutually acceptable solutions to common problems.**

**I am pleased that your Commission will be able to continue balance of payments discussions with Ambassador Tresise next week and I look forward to hearing the results.**

**Sincerely,**

**Lyndon B. Johnson**

Sent 2/10  
EF mail  
556 ↑

1968 FEB 10 AM 11 37

WC062 PDF

NEW YORK NY FEB 9 515P EST

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

MR PRESIDENT ON THE EVE OF MY DEPARTURE FROM THE UNITED STATES  
MAY I AGAIN EXPRESS MY WARMEST THANKS AND THOSE OF MY COLLEAGUES  
TO YOU FOR THE VERY KIND WELCOME WE RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON AND  
FOR THE FRUITFUL TALKS WE HAVE HAD WITH YOUR ADMINISTRATION  
LEADERS STOP I RETURN TO BRUSSELS AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES  
MORE CONVINCED THAN EVER THAT THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED STATES

AND OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES MUST RENEW THEIR RESOLVE TO  
SEEK COMMON SOLUTIONS TO THE COMMON PROBLEMS WE FACE AND ACCEPT  
JOINTLY THE RESPONSIBILITIES WE SHARE

JEAN REY.

## INFORMATION

Saturday, February 17, 1968 -- 12:15 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

I transmitted to Cabot Lodge yesterday precisely the message you gave me to deliver.

Cabot called back this morning and said the following:

1. Above all, he values his tie to you and the confidence he hopes has been built up between himself and you.
2. He understands the kind of problem you have in seeing whether you an appointment for him will open up. He knows that, under these circumstances, a President can make no guarantee.
3. Nevertheless, he has decided that he will "sweat it out."

If you come to a point where a possible appointment for him must be ruled out, he will fully understand but he would be grateful if he could then be informed so that he could proceed with other plans.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

information

57

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Saturday, February 17, 1968 -- 12:10 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy's report to Bus Wheeler.

You will note that Westy now concludes that "the long-heralded second wave of enemy attack may start tonight; i. e., today Washington time."

You will note also (para 5) Westy's concern about the NEWSWEEK leak on Abrams' new headquarters. This raises the question of whether we cannot clamp down military censorship at least in I Corps.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD ltr 10-18-78

By ply, NARA, Date 2-20-92

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

576

OPERATIONAL/INTELLIGENCE BRIEFS

SOUTH VIETNAM

I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE:

The lull in northern Quang Tri Province continues. During the period 8:00 PM EST 15 February to 8:00 PM EST 16 February, the Khe Sanh combat base sustained 85 mortar and 7 rocket rounds resulting in 1 US killed and 10 wounded.

Communications between two unidentified elements believed to be serving an artillery function indicated that Khe Sanh Airfield "must be dominated" continuously. Requests for the exact location where allied aircraft land and take-off were noted. This may portend concerted effort by the Communists in the near future to interdict the air resupply of US forces at Khe Sanh.

Clearing activity in Hue continues. The enemy controls half of the west wall and all of the south wall of the Citadel and maintains a line of positions around the palace grounds. On 16 February at 5:30 AM EST, a Vietnamese Marine unit sustained 8 mortar-delivered tear gas cannisters. There were no casualties. On 16 February, at 8:30 PM EST, elements of a USMC battalion sustained a mortar and rocket attack resulting in two US killed and four wounded. Two enemy were also killed.

On 13 February, 12 nautical miles north-northwest of Quang Tri, a USMC patrol engaged 20 enemy in an ambush site. The contact lasted for approximately 15 minutes when the enemy broke the contact leaving 7 dead and 2 individual weapons. 1 person was detained. 1 US was killed.

COMINT continues to indicate that NVA units are preparing for large-scale attacks on Quang Tri City. Elements of the NVA 812th and 803d Regiments continue to reconnoiter the city.

On 16 February, elements of a US Army battalion engaged an enemy force in a bunker complex. Tactical air strikes and artillery supported the friendly unit. Friendly losses were 4 killed and 7 wounded; enemy losses were 15 killed.

17 February 1968

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLS 141-027-11  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 10-30-09

Page 1

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

803597

# ~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

## II CORPS TACTICAL ZONE:

On 15 February, an ARVN battalion, supported by artillery, engaged an estimated 2-company enemy force 18 nautical miles north-northwest of Qui Nhon. The enemy broke contact after 4 hours leaving 7 dead and 1 individual and 1 crew-served weapon. There were no friendly casualties.

## III CORPS TACTICAL ZONE:

In Tay Ninh City, 3 US Army companies engaged an enemy force on 16 February killing 40. 2 US were killed and 20 were wounded.

Reports continue that a new wave of Communist attacks is in the offing. National Police Director General Loan warned on 16 February that he expected the Communists to launch a second wave of attacks in the DMZ, Khe Sanh, Hue, Quang Tri City, and Saigon about 18 February. Loan based his assessment on information obtained from prisoners. Possibly related, a source who travels between Kien Hoa Province and Saigon reported that COSVN has directed the Viet Cong in Kien Hoa to supply maximum reinforcements for a second phase attack on Saigon which is scheduled to begin on 18 February and continue to the end of the month. The object of the attack is to help the remaining Viet Cong in the city to escape.

## IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONE:

On 15 February, a USN light fire team attacked 2 enemy squads 17 nautical miles west-southwest of My Tho killing 10.

ARC LIGHT OPERATIONS: 10 missions (28 sorties) were flown in support of Operation NIAGARA against enemy troop concentrations, fortified positions, and supply/storage areas.

5 additional missions (20 sorties) were flown in other areas of South Vietnam against enemy troop concentrations, base camps, and supply/storage areas.

DEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES: Of the 110 missions required to move the 27th Marines, 17 have been completed delivering 783 passengers and 151.3 tons of cargo; 14 are en route with 783 passengers and 175.4 tons of cargo.

17 February 1968

Page 2

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

## ~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Of the 162 missions required to move the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, 15 have been completed delivering 460 passengers and 165.3 tons of cargo; 27 are en route with 590 passengers and 376.8 tons of cargo.

### NORTH VIETNAM

ROLLING THUNDER OPERATIONS: Of 91 sorties flown over North Vietnam, 77 were armed reconnaissance. 8 sorties struck Phuc Yen Airfield; results unknown due to weather. 4 sorties struck Hoa Lac Airfield with damage to main runway, cross over, and taxiway. 1 sortie struck Kien An Airfield damaging runway and revetments. 1 sortie struck the Uong Bi Thermal Power Plant -- damage not observed due to darkness and weather. 8 SAMs were sighted by US pilots 23 nautical miles north of Hanoi and 6 SAMs were sighted 4 nautical miles east of Vinh.

SAM THREAT TO DMZ: A third SAM site (unoccupied) has been discovered in the proximity of two occupied sites just north of the central DMZ. There have recently been numerous SPOON REST and FLAT FACE radar emissions from this area.

### LAOS

STEEL TIGER OPERATIONS: There were 165 sorties flown; 133 in the area of Laos adjacent to Khe Sanh.

STATUS OF SARAVANE: The city is braced for an attack and civilians are being evacuated. The some 4 NVA battalions in the area may be using tactics that worked so well at Nam Bac -- exert steady pressure at little cost until army breaks and runs. Another military defeat so soon after the Nam Bac debacle could cause the Lao Government some difficulty. ICC still has not agreed to make a trip to Saravane, but the Indians might agree to make a trip with the Canadians.

INFORMATION

58

~~SECRET CODEWORD~~

Saturday, February 17, 1968  
11:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA concludes that a new phase in the Viet Cong offensive may well begin at 2:00 p. m. EST this afternoon.

further  
The attached note from the CIA Station Chief, Saigon, to Dick Helms indicates that all hands are on the alert in Saigon.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:ln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-197  
By isa, NARA, Date 2-12-04

*Free file*

Clear Copy Rostow

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

58a

CIA OPERATIONS CENTER FEB 17 10 29 AM '68  
SELECT FOR THE DCI

CIA OPS CEN.

SUBJECT: INDICATIONS OF NVN OFFENSIVE BEGINNING AROUND

SOURCE : 2:00PM EST, 17 FEB. 1968

FM: SSO MACV

TIME STAMP

DTG :

17 FEB. 8:23AM EST, 1968

DISTO : DCI, DDCI, EX/DIR, DDI(2), DDP(VIA C6DO), DDS&T(VIA D/OSI),  
D/OCI(5), D/ONE, D/OSI, D/OSR, CH/WATCH COM, MR, HAND, C/IRS,  
SAYA, OCI(4), C/OPSCEN, C6DO, PDB, INDICO, ORR/C6S, RAD, SDO,  
DD/S. ADDED:

SUBJECT : HOTSIT

1. Within the past few hours a number of indications have been received suggesting enemy offensive activity beginning early tomorrow morning(18 Feb.) Saigon time.

2.

EO 12958  
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(S)

3. [redacted] reported that on 12 Feb., VC transported 3 tons of ammo to WR 090 149. This ammo was ~~NOT~~ divided among the units to participate in the second attack of CA MAU, which was reported to come before 18 February 1968.

4. On 17 Feb., VC in Bien Hoa area conducted propaganda lecture and stated that the POL Farms at NA DHE will be attacked in the near future.

5. Employees of Everett Shipping Company in the Commercial Dock area of Saigon refused to come to work on 18 February. Employees were offered double wages and still refused to work.

6. Your attention is invited to the J-2 estimate recently forwarded for your comment (EO MACV 2213 NOTOAL). Above cited evidence plus that set forth in estimate suggests that the indication of the described second phase of the offensive activity is imminent.

PAGE 1 OF 1

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RA C 03-198

By ms, NARA, Date 3-8-04

~~SECRET~~

586

1. APPRECIATE YOUR MESSAGE. GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND  
AMBASSADOR BUNKER ALREADY HAD IT, AND SEVERAL OTHER INDICATORS.  
SEE SSO MACV MESSAGE SUBJECT HOTSIT SAVIN MACV 05275 INTEL WHICH  
SENT SSO DIA AND OTHERS.

2. WE ARE ON ALERT, AND HAVE ALERTED ALL REGIONS.

~~SECRET~~



EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs  
(C)

*Above is reply to FLASH  
outgoing to Saigon which  
you have.*

1

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-198  
By no, NARA, Date 3-8-04

INFORMATION

*Pres. file*

Saturday, February 17, 1968 -- 10:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

In response to your instruction, we have two jobs in hand:

-- Bill Jorden is working quietly with Amb. Bui Diem on a speech on the "Illusions of U.S. critics" of our Vietnam policy. He will have an audience of 1500 in the Shoreham.

-- Marshall Wright is working on a major speech for the Senate.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

## INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~*Pres file*

Saturday, February 17, 1968 -- 10:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Here is a summary appraisal of the behavior of the militant Buddhists during the recent attacks on the cities.

"Despite various charges to the contrary, there is no hard evidence that militant Buddhist leaders gave active support to the Viet Cong Tet offensive. The failure of anti-government Buddhists to form the nucleus of a popular demonstration of support for the Viet Cong during this period may have represented a major miscalculation in the Viet Cong's political planning. On the other hand, the attitudes of the militant Buddhist leaders confirm that even in the face of a national crisis, they are unable to rise above their intransigent opposition to the central government and their almost psychopathic xenophobia. In the provinces, including the historical militant strongholds of I Corps and Northern II Corps, there have been no reliable reports of Buddhist support for the Viet Cong. In Saigon, despite their political negativism, both militant and moderate Buddhist organizations are participating in relief operations in cooperation with the government."

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-214  
By CG, NARA Date 8-4-97

WWRostow:rlm

~~SECRET~~

*Pres. file*  
61

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, Feb. 17, 1968  
9:15 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Today's DMZ report shows (marked passages);

- light mortaring;
- 191 tons of resupply;
- Khe Sanh attack expected "within a week";
- enemy 324B division heading for Quang Tri.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (MAC 02269)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD let 10-18-78

By up/af, NARA, Date 2-20-92

61a

SECRET

Saturday, February 17, 1968

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND (MAC 02269)

This is report number thirteen on the Khe Sanh/DMZ area and covers the 24-hour period of February 16, 1968.

During the reporting period the relative lull continued in northern Quang Tri province with interruptions caused by enemy shelling. While ground contacts were minimal, the Khe Sanh combat base and neighboring areas bordering the DMZ received a total of 222 rounds of mixed mortar, artillery and rocket rounds.

Characteristic of enemy shelling, Marine elements at Khe Sanh combat base bore the heaviest concentration as 85 mortar rounds and seven rounds of rocket impacted in the area. Casualties attributed to the shelling were one killed, 10 wounded (8 evacuated).

A mid-afternoon barrage brought 40 rocket rounds, 31 rounds of mortar and three artillery rounds to friendly elements at Camp Carroll, resulting in five wounded (two evacuated). The 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines at the rockpile counted two additional rounds of artillery in late evening. At Con Thien, the 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines was the recipient of 18 rounds of mixed caliber mortars. Eight additional rounds of mortar were received by friendly elements at C-3 causing major injuries to three Marines.

Harassment moved northeasterly as a mid-day artillery barrage brought 14 rounds to friendly elements positioned at Gio Linh. Fourteen additional mortar rounds were received near the Cua Viet, at positions occupied by the 1st AMTRAC Battalion. Casualties attributed to the day's incoming were light and damage was reported minimal.

Significant contacts in northern Quang Tri centered in the DMZ with sightings of three reported enemy tanks 12 kilometers north of Con Thien. Reaction was instantaneous as friendly tanks and artillery fired several missions earmarked for their locations. Results are unknown at this time.

No COFRAM type ordnance was used during the period. There were no changes in the dispositions of friendly forces and Allied armament.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD ltr 13-79

By ip/rg, NARA, Date 2-20-92

In the Khe Sanh area, the enemy still threatens with two divisions, and most evidence points to an attempted assault within a week. Friendly firepower, however, is undoubtedly hurting the enemy there and may further disrupt his timing. New instructions to the 324B Division apparently committed it to a new assault on Quang Tri and they are moving in that direction. The 320th seems to have backed off from Camp Carroll to fill the void created by the departure of the 324B. Threat of major ground assault against Camp Carroll is apparently reduced.

Tactical Air Support for the Khe Sanh totalled 388 sorties. Marine aircraft flew 80 sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area. Bomb damage included one secondary explosion and one secondary fire. The Air Force flew 232 sorties and the Navy flew 76 (27 Navy sorties were diverted because of weather). Bomb Damage Assessment included 35 secondary explosions, eight secondary fires, and 10 mortar positions damaged. The secondary explosions and fires resulted from strikes put in against a supply area. The Forward Air Control reported yesterday that the enemy had made attempts to remove munitions and weapons from the area, however, there were still areas where supplies of weapons, munitions and rice remain. ARC LIGHT strikes for the period in the Niagara area totalled 16 strikes (44 sorties).

Khe Sanh was resupplied with 191 short tons on February 16. A total of 21 sorties were delivered, including seven air drops by C-130 aircraft. Seven Air Force C-123 aircraft landed at the airfield as did Marine helicopters.

During the next 24-hour period, the Marine Air Wing will fly 44 tactical air sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area, with 16 additional aircraft on call to run sorties as the situation indicates. The Air Force plans to run 150 sorties, and the Navy schedules 100 sorties. Total tactical air effort will be 294 sorties. The ARC LIGHT effort will total 16 strikes (48 sorties) in the Niagara area.

The weather for the period resulted in fog and stratus on both days reduced the ceiling and visibility to zero during the morning hours. The visibility improved to seven miles by noon of the 16th but was again lowered by fog after 11:00 p.m. Ceilings improved to 500-1000 feet during the afternoon and early evening hours. During the next 24-hour period, in the mornings of both days the visibility will be restricted to less than one mile by fog, but will increase to five miles or more from 12:00 Noon to 9:00 p.m. Ceilings will be 1000 feet or less except from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.

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INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 17, 1968  
8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the latest on Ayub's  
medical problem -- an embolism.

W. W. Rostow

Rawalpindi 3448

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-214  
By CG, NARA Date 8-4-97

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-213  
By us, NARA Date 8-22-97

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~~EXDIS~~

FROM AMBASSADOR. PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE.

SUBJ: AYUB'S HEALTH

REF: RAWALPINDI 3421

1. THE ENGLISH SPECIALIST TREATING AYUB IS A DR. GOODWIN OF HAMMERSMITH HOSPITAL.
2. MY INFORMANT TELLS ME THAT DR. GOODWIN SAYS THAT:
  - A. AYUB IS CURRENTLY SUFFERING FROM AN EMBOLISM;
  - B. HE IS PROGRESSING WELL BUT GOODWIN STAY ON QUOTE SEVERAL

PAGE 2 RUQVGM 3448 ~~SECRET~~  
WEEKS END QUOTE.

C. GOODWIN KNOWS DR. HURST, HAS THE HIGHEST REGARD FOR HIS PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND SKILL, WOULD MOST HAPPILY SEEK CONSULTATION WITH HIM IF INDICATED, BUT FEELS THAT PRESENT INDICATIONS DO NOT REPEAT NOT CALL FOR SUCH AN EFFORT ON DR. HURST'S PART.

GP-1. OEHLERT

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 02 RAWALP 03448 170751Z

INFORMATION

63

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, February 17, 1968  
8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

You should know the following.

Several days ago Walther Casper called with a message from Rainer Barzel, Parliamentary leader of the CDU.

Casper said Barzel wished to come over briefly next week and meet me privately and confidentially in New York to inform me of the struggle within the German government and its relation to: NPT; economic negotiations with the U. S.; and "other matters" -- presumably, German policy towards Eastern Europe. Casper said the conflict was more serious than is publicly known.

I did not accept the invitation, but discussed it with Sec. Rusk. We agreed that a clandestine meeting would be bad for us and probably Barzel; but that if he wished to call on me in a normal way in my office -- as he does on any other trip to the U. S. -- I should receive him.

I so informed Casper.

Barzel will drop in next Friday at 5:30 p.m. I will have a State Department interpreter and note-taker.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLI 96-214  
By CL, NARA Date 2-4-97

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

64  
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 17, 1968 -- 8:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Here with two Saigon responses to Loan's judgment that a coordinated attack on Saigon and elsewhere should be expected for February 18:

-- Bunker says that Westy regards it as probable that there will be further attacks between February 18 and 23, with the principal targets being Saigon, Hue, Quang Tri, and Can Tho.

-- The CIA reports that there are no "firm indications" of an imminent attack on Saigon.

In any case, you will note Westy's judgment that "both U.S. and ARVN forces are fully alert and prepared to deal with any emergency."

Thieu's assessment is as follows, in a talk with Bunker on February 15:

"I asked Thieu how he assessed the Tet offensive from the perspective of about two weeks. Thieu remarked that he was increasingly impressed with the indication it gave of the price the enemy was willing to pay for its political and psychological objectives. He thought it would take them quite some time to recover from the high losses they had suffered both in men and weapons. He anticipated that they will continue to try to apply pressure wherever possible, seeking to pin down our troops to the maximum extent while continuing their build up for possible future offensives. He expected they would make use of mortar attacks, harassments, attacks on air fields, and a general build up of tension among our troops. Their hope would be to prevent us from using our forces elsewhere and he thought this might go on for some time, maybe 3 to 4 months. Anticipating a major offensive in the north, during the dry season there, perhaps beginning in April or May, he predicted that its timing and duration would be designed to have the maximum effect during our summer political conventions."

DECLASSIFIED

W. W. Rostow

050 etc 4/13/78  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By mg/ig, NARA, Date 22/92

WWRostow:rla

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~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~ 170232Z FEB 68 VIA CAS CHANNELS

FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 679

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY WALT ROSTOW

I HAVE DISCUSSED YOUR QUESTION ABOUT LOAN'S REPORT OF A SECOND WAVE OF ATTACKS ON 18 FEBRUARY WITH WESTY. THERE HAVE BEEN, AS YOU KNOW, A WHOLE SERIES OF SUCH PREDICTIONS ABOUT A SECOND WAVE ATTACK, ESPECIALLY DIRECTED AT SAIGON, SINCE THE FIRST WAVE DREW TO A CLOSE. WESTY SAYS THAT THE LATEST READING FROM HIS J-2 IS THAT THERE IS PROBABILITY THERE WILL BE FURTHER ATTACKS BETWEEN FEBRUARY 18 AND 23, AND THAT PRINCIPAL TARGETS WILL BE SAIGON, HUE, QUANG TRI, AND CAN THO. HE ALSO MENTIONED REPORTS EMANATING FROM HANOI OF A POSSIBLE "SURPRISE," WHICH MAY BE THE USE OF ONE OF THE NEW WEAPONS SUCH AS THE "FROG" MISSILE. HE THINKS THERE IS POSSIBILITY "SURPRISE" MAY BE UNVEILED DURING SECOND WAVE ATTACKS, IF THEY DO INDEED OCCUR AS FORECAST. IN ANY CASE, BOTH U.S. AND ARVN FORCES ARE FULLY ALERT AND PREPARED TO DEAL WITH ANY EMERGENCY. YOU HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY SEEN THIEU'S ANALYSIS OF ENEMY INTENTIONS AS REPORTED IN MY LAST WEEKLY MESSAGE (SAIGON 19428) AND MY FEBRUARY 15 TALK WITH HIM (SAIGON 19537).

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~ VIA CAS CHANNELS

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-213  
By is, NARA Date 8-22-96

FM CIA  
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM  
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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLS 96-215  
By us, NARA Date 4-27-98

~~SECRET~~

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM  
DOI 17 FEBRUARY 1968  
SUBJECT SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1300 HOURS  
LOCAL TIME 17 FEBRUARY 1968

ACQ VIETNAM SAIGON (17 FEBRUARY 1968)

SOURCE THIS IS A VIETNAM SITUATION REPORT PREPARED  
AT 1300 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 17 FEBRUARY 1968.

1. NUMEROUS UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF VARYING RELIABILITY SUGGEST THAT A RENEWED ATTACK ON SAIGON IS IMMINENT. SOME REPORTS POINT TO THE 18TH FEBRUARY AS THE DATE, OTHER REPORTS HAD INDICATED THE 11TH, 12TH, 13TH AND 15TH. FIRM INDICATIONS FROM ALL SOURCES, HOWEVER, DO NOT AT THIS TIME SUGGEST THE IMMINENCE OF AN ATTACK UPON SAIGON. (SOURCE: COMPETENT AMERICAN OBSERVERS)

2. A REFLECTION OF THE FOREGOING IS THE STATEMENT [REDACTED] THAT THE PRESENT CURFEW PREVAILING IN PRECINCTS ONE THROUGH FIVE MAY BE MODIFIED SOMETIME NEXT WEEK TO ALLOW MOVEMENT BY THE POPULACE UNTIL 2100 HOURS. (SOURCE: AMERICAN OBSERVER [REDACTED])

3. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN FURTHER SIGNIFICANT VIET CONG / NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY ACTIVITY CAN BE EXPECTED. MOREOVER, STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS WEIGH HEAVILY IN FAVOR OF A QUICK FOLLOW-UP TO THE TET OFFENSIVE. IN THIS REGARD, HOWEVER, THE ENEMY MUST REALIZE THAT THE LONGER HE WAITS, THE MORE DIFFICULT MILITARY TASK HE WILL HAVE. THE FIRST ATTACK, THE TET OFFENSIVE, WAS LAUNCHED UNDER THE COVER OF THE TET HOLIDAY, A KNOWN PERIOD OF SECURITY RELAXATION AND COUNTRYWIDE CONCERN ONLY WITH CELEBRATION. WHILE THE GENERAL OUTLINES OF THE TET OFFENSIVE WERE DESCRIBED TO ENEMY CADRES IN SOME CASES LONG BEFORE THE ATTACK WAS LAUNCHED, THE SPECIFIC DETAILS OF TIME AND PLACE WERE NOT PASSED OUT UNTIL THE FINAL MOMENT. WITHIN THE GENERAL PLAN, IT NOW APPEARS FROM PRISONER INTERROGATIONS THAT A SECOND ATTACK WAS ENVISIONED. WHETHER THE PLAN NOW REMAINS IN EFFECT, FOLLOWING THE MILITARY FAILURE OF THE FIRST STAGE, IS NOT KNOWN. (SOURCE: AMERICAN OBSERVER)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT  
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~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

65

Saturday - February 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

ACTION

SUBJECT: Letter of Congratulations to The Johns Hopkins University

*1. susp  
2. Pres. file*

On February 22 Linc Gordon will be installed as President of The Johns Hopkins University. The day also marks the 92nd anniversary of the founding of the University.

I thought you might want to send a letter to the Chairman of the Board of Trustees congratulating the University and Linc Gordon. A suggested letter is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Suggested Presidential letter of congratulations to The Johns Hopkins University

WGB:mm

65a

February 17, 1968

Dear Mr. Garland:

I congratulate The Johns Hopkins University on the 92nd year of its founding as you install the ninth President, Dr. Lincoln Gordon. Your University has a proud record of service to this nation and to the world.

Your new President typifies the close link of consultation and service I have sought to maintain between government and the academic community. So does your past President, Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, who has agreed to contribute his vast experience in education and other fields as an adviser to me and to the Department of State. I welcome and shall continue to encourage this interchange because I firmly believe that it strengthens both the government and the universities.

I wish your University and its new President every success.

Sincerely,

*Lyndon B. Johnson*

Mr. Charles S. Garland  
Chairman  
The Board of Trustees  
The Johns Hopkins University  
Baltimore, Maryland

LBJ/WGB:mm

~~SECRET~~

66  
INFORMATION

Saturday, February 17, 1968

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Between 0100 this morning and 0100 tomorrow morning, the following troop movements by air to Vietnam are scheduled:

- 27th Marines, El Toro, California, 12 flights with 648 passengers;
- 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne, Fort Bragg, 18 flights, 564 passengers.

After today's departures, there will still be 1594 Marines still to go from the West Coast and 2185 Airborne troops still to go.

Therefore, there would seem to be no problem about arranging a departing group as a backdrop for your presence at either place.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By RG, NARA, Date 2-25-92

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
By lg, NARA, Date 2-25-92

WWRostow:rlm

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

67

Saturday, February 17, 1968

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with NATO Secretary General  
Manlio Brosio, Monday, February 19, 12:00 Noon

Attached is Secretary Rusk's briefing memo for your meeting, along with talking points and biographic material. (Tab A)

Brosio is here on one of his regular working visits to discuss NATO affairs with Secretaries Rusk, McNamara and Fowler. He will also meet Clark Clifford. He is unlikely to raise specific problems with you. Your meeting with him will underscore the continued importance we attach to NATO.

\* \* \* \* \*

Our Ambassador to NATO, Harlan Cleveland, will be here from State. I will be standing by with Ed Fried.

It would be useful if you had the photographers in at the end of the meeting to give Brosio some exposure. If you approve, we could also issue the brief statement on your meeting with Brosio (at Tab B) in which you would reaffirm NATO's importance to western security.

W. W. Rostow

Approve Statement at Tab B \_\_\_\_\_

No Statement \_\_\_\_\_

Call Me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By gldch, NARA, Date 7/30/96

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*Enr*

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 15, 1968

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with NATO Secretary General  
Brosio on February 19, 1968

You have agreed to see NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio at twelve noon on Monday, February 19.

The current visit was scheduled after Brosio's expected visit last November was cancelled due to the Cyprus crisis. You most recently saw Brosio in April, 1967, along with Allied Defense Ministers who were attending a Washington meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group; but you last met with him privately in September 1964.

Brosio, who has been Secretary General of NATO for nearly four years, has been effective in helping maintain Alliance solidarity in the face of recent strains. He has been understanding and helpful within NATO on issues of particular interest to us including Vietnam and Korea, Cyprus, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Balance of Payments Program. Brosio is especially interested in discussing East-West relations and German policy. His Washington visit should serve to encourage him by making clear our undiminished support for the Alliance.

You will probably wish to:

- congratulate Brosio on the effective role he played in supporting the Vance mission on Cyprus (you sent a note of appreciation to him on December 5, 1967);

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-216  
By *[signature]*, NARA, Date 4/30/96

- affirm our resolve to support the Alliance for as long as needed to preserve Western security;
- remind Brosio that our efforts in Vietnam provide solid assurance of our determination to meet our Alliance commitments;
- express our confidence that Brosio will successfully continue his efforts to maintain Allied unity in the face of France's negative policy.

These are the principal themes. Additional talking points are enclosed.

*Dean Rusk*  
Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Talking points.

676~~SECRET~~

VISIT OF  
NATO SECRETARY GENERAL BROGIO  
February 1968

TALKING POINTS

POINTS YOU MAY WISH TO RAISE

1. Vietnam

- Express appreciation for Brosio's understanding and support on this issue.

2. Future of the Alliance

- Express satisfaction that all fifteen Allies in the Harmel Report defined the future tasks of the Alliance and adopted a constructive program for consulting on them.
- State that we must maintain a position of strength while seeking ways to resolve East-West differences.

3. Soviet Union and Germany

- Note that, despite lessened tensions in Europe, Soviet policy on Germany and Central Europe remains unchanged.
- Indicate our support for the Federal Republic's efforts to improve relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe.
- State our view that the growth of Soviet influence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, together with increasing Soviet military capabilities generally, presents a new and serious problem for Allied security.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-216  
By plw, NARA, Date 4/30/96

4. France

- Express appreciation for Brosio's assistance in NATO's smooth adjustment to French withdrawal.
- Note our hope that France will stay in the Alliance after 1969 and our confidence that the other Allies will do so.
- Affirm our interest in efforts by the fourteen Allies to press the NATO financial claim against France for losses incurred in relocating facilities.

5. US Balance of Payments Program and NATO Defense Effort

- Confirm our determination to take every step to reduce our balance of payments deficit without injuring our security.
- Indicate that, should the Allies cut back their forces on the Continent, our force commitments would come under renewed Congressional criticism.

**PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT FOLLOWING CALL  
BY NATO SECRETARY GENERAL MANLIO BROSIQ, MONDAY,  
FEBRUARY 19, 1968**

The President met with NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio at noon today. The President expressed appreciation to Mr. Brosio for his effective assistance to Mr. Vance's mission to Cyprus last November. The President and Mr. Brosio examined questions of mutual interest concerning the NATO Alliance. They agreed that the adoption by Allied Ministers last December of a constructive program for carrying out the future tasks of the Alliance provided evidence of the continuing vitality of NATO. The President and Mr. Brosio also concurred that the Allies must consult closely and continuously on East-West relations and the achievement of a durable peace in Europe as well as on other matters of common interest. They shared the conviction that NATO remains the cornerstone of Western security.

68

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

Saturday - February 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Haiti: OAS Presence

One of the helpful actions to come from the recent CIAP (Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress) country review of Haiti was a formal Haitian Government request that OAS/CIAP send a technical assistance mission of 30 people to Port-au-Prince. The experts are now being recruited.

The mission is the OAS "presence" we have wanted to establish as a hedge against an emergency requiring collective action. It will also be instructive to the participating Latin American governments.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-214  
By CB, NARA Date 8-4-97

69

*Pres file*

Limited Official Use

INFORMATION

Saturday - February 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Mutual Help Among Latin American  
Countries

In your message to the Third Special Inter-American Conference in 1965 announcing extension of the Alliance for Progress beyond the first decade, you called for increased mutual assistance among the Latin Americans.

A recent example is Argentina's decision to lend hard-pressed Uruguay \$15 million. This includes a \$10 million credit for purchase of Argentine capital goods, and a \$5 million deposit in the Uruguayan Government's bank account in New York to help meet its foreign exchange commitments.

W. W. Rostow

WGB:mmm