

Tuesday, February 27, 1968
8:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

**You may wish to treat this as
Tab D, under Other.**

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

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Pres file

In the oral message, conveyed through Ambassador Thompson on January 22, you touched upon the question, which has been already within our sight and on which the position of the USSR was laid down in the Soviet draft resolution of the Security Council of November 20, 1967, concerning the questions of political settlement in the Middle East. Had the Government of the United States wished to put the discussion of this matter on the practical plane then a proper opportunity would have been presented by the provisions of the Soviet draft, which stated, in particular, about taking measures for limitation of useless and wasteful arms race on the condition of withdrawal of the Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories.

The Soviet Government, as before, agrees under certain conditions to an exchange of views on the question of limiting the delivery of arms to the Middle East and would be ready to discuss this matter with the leaders of the friendly Arab states. However, we are deeply convinced that the main link of the whole complicated knot of the Middle East problems does not lie now in this. The clue to a settlement of the present crisis in the Middle East is in the speediest withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories, in the elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression. You will agree, Mr. President, that it would be pointless to speak of ending arms race in the Middle East while Israel, using armed force, is retaining and even trying to secure the occupation of Arab territories

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-249
By Cb , NARA Date 11-5-97

seized by her.

Certainly, if the United States also adopted the position answering the interests of peace in the Middle East and supported the legitimate demands for the withdrawal of the Israeli troops to the lines existed before June 5, 1967, Israel would - and there is no doubt about it - release the seized territories, the Suez canal would be opened and the unsolved problems would be settled. There can be neither peace nor political settlement in the Middle East without the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories. This is the first and basic point regarding which there must be full clarity. Without it the wishes for the limitation of arms race in the Middle East have no real ground. So long as the Israeli leaders, enjoying the support from the outside, adhere to the position of annexation of the Arab territories the friends of the Arab countries and the partisans of lasting peace in the Middle East will help the victims of aggression, since in doing so they are fulfilling their duty in accordance with the U.N. Charter and the interests of maintaining peace.

At the same time we would like to stress at this instance again that, as before, we are firmly standing for lessening tension in the Middle East, for turning this area into a zone of lasting peace, and no one should have any doubts about that.

~~SECRET-NOBIS~~

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 27, 1968
5:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Middle East

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Deputy Under Secretary Charles E. Bohlen
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

COPIES TO:

Ambassador Dobrynin came in at his own request to deliver to the Secretary an oral statement in reply to the one Ambassador Thompson had made on January 20th. The Russian copy with English translation is attached.

In reply to the Secretary's question, the Ambassador said he had no instructions to add any comments to this communication. The Secretary after reading the communication said he wondered if the statement "the Suez Canal would be opened and the unresolved questions would have been settled" to mean that the Egyptians were now prepared to open the Canal to Israel, assuming the settlement of all the territorial questions and that of the refugees. Ambassador Dobrynin said that he had understood that the Egyptians had told Jarring that they accepted the Security Council resolution, which would imply that the Canal would be opened to Israel as well once all the questions named in the resolution had been settled. He went on to say that Israel had made no positive answer to Jarring in regard to the Suez Canal resolution. The Secretary said it was his impression that Israel had used words such as respect for the resolution and positive statements of a similar nature.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-248

By *ijp*, NARA Date 2-25-97

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Ambassador Dobrynin said that statements of that nature were too ambiguous and what was required was a simple acceptance by Israel.

The Secretary then sent for the telegram reporting a conversation with Jarring on the subject of the Israeli response. He read from the cable the following point, which was the Israeli reply to Jarring, which Jarring in turn had passed on to the Egyptians on February 19th: "The Government of Israel out of respect for the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and responding affirmatively thereto, assures you of its full cooperation in your efforts with the states concerned to promote agreement and to achieve an accepted settlement for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in accordance with your mandate under the resolution".

Ambassador Dobrynin said that this coincided to some extent with their information from the Egyptians and that according to this information Jarring had agreed with the Egyptians in the statement that the Israeli attitudes on the resolution were ambiguous. Jarring apparently was to have another try with the Israelis, but he did not know whether he had been back to Tel Aviv.

The Secretary pointed out the many positive expressions in the Israeli language, but Dobrynin still said it was not clear despite the fact that a clear acceptance should be possible for the Israelis. The Secretary said that he had always understood there were two questions most difficult in this situation, and one was that the Suez Canal and the other that of Jerusalem. He said that one of the difficulties was that the Arabs constantly supported each other in everything; for example, assuming Israel and Egypt might reach a solution on their common problems Egypt would probably attempt to satisfy all of Jordan's problems with Israel. He then asked if it was the Soviet contention that Israeli withdrawal would have to occur prior to solution of any other questions. The Ambassador replied that the original intent of the Soviet resolution in June had been that Israel

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would withdraw and the Arabs would immediately accept the existence of Israel and (after the Secretary's question) this would also be the end of belligerency. He went on to say that the Arabs couldn't agree and since that time there had been different interpretations by the Soviets and the U.S.

He then asked what the U.S. would consider a basis for settlement. The Secretary said that what the U.S. might accept and what could be accomplished were two different things. He went on to say that they were merely talking informally and what he was saying was not a reply to Kosygin's message. The Ambassador said he fully understood.

The Secretary said that one of the problems was the internal situation in various countries, including Israel. He would like to draw the Ambassador's attention to one very dangerous element and that was the operation of terrorists against Israel, which Jordan apparently was unable to stop. These terrorist activities could easily lead to a renewal of fighting. Dobrynin did not question the Secretary's analysis of the danger of the terrorist matter.

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~~NO DIS~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 27, 1968
5:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Pueblo

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Deputy Under Secretary Charles E. Bohlen
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

COPIES TO:

During the course of Ambassador Dobrynin's visit today the Secretary took occasion to state that he hoped that the Pueblo incident could be settled and that the U. S. had come just about as far as it could at Panmunjom. He then handed Dobrynin a copy of the transcript of the Ninth Meeting at Panmunjom.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-248
By ig, NARA Date 2-25-97

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 27, 1968
5:00 p.m.

41d

SUBJECT: Bombing of Soviet Embassy

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Deputy Under Secretary Charles E. Bohlen
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

COPIES TO:

Ambassador Dobrynin said that he had given to the Soviet Desk a copy of a Spanish language newspaper which claimed that Cuban refugees had been the instigators of the bombing of the Soviet Embassy. He then asked the Secretary if there were any further developments in the case. The Secretary said no, that they were still looking for the man who had placed the bomb.

(Ambassador Dobrynin still maintained to Mr. Bohlen that the word: "popustitel'stvo" did not mean connivance despite the fact that all dictionaries carry it as the standard meaning).

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-248
By 48, NARA Date 2-25-97

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INFORMATION

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Tuesday, February 27, 1968
7:20 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA's appreciation of
Communist military strategy in the weeks
and months ahead.

There is a summary (pp. 1-3) with
key passages marked.

W. W. Rostow

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Cy 3, SC NO. 01933/68 Revised
"Future Communist Military Strategy in South Vietnam"

WWRostow:rla

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Authority CA 100 26 80; NSC 10-25-78

By wsp/rg NARA, Date 3-3-92

INFORMATION

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Pres file

Tuesday, February 27, 1968
7:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

This is a cool, cold turkey appraisal of the ARVN as of 12 February -- two weeks out of date -- and based on very incomplete evidence.

It suggests that we shall need a good deal of buddying to get the ARVN fully back on their feet; although they did not perform badly.

W. W. Rostow

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TS-123/DD, 12 February 1968
Memo for Dep Sec of Def
from V. L. Lowrance, Vice Adm, Act Dir, DIA
"Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces RVNAF"

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 3-24-92



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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

MR. NITZE HAS SEEN

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
TS-123/DD

12 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Attached Report

This report is based primarily on CIA field reporting, General Westmoreland's EYES ONLY dispatches, and some further background furnished by General Abrams. This report is only tentative in nature. The report has been coordinated with CIA.


V. L. LOWRANCE
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
Acting Director

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-264
By us, NARA Date 4-16-98

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24 FEB 1968

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43b

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES RVNAF

1. Pre-TET Situation

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) combat forces prior to TET consisted of 120 Infantry, 20 Ranger, nine Airborne, and six Marine Battalions. The operating field strength of the infantry battalion, that is the number of troops that could be put in the field to fight, averaged about 400. Since the average operating strength desired was 450, the pre-TET strength of ARVN forces was somewhat less than desired. A battalion with an operating field strength of 450 would have an overall authorized strength of about 650-700.

2. Strengths During TET

a. RVNAF commanders had authority to grant leaves up to 50 per cent of the assigned strengths of their units. Accordingly, the ~~operating field strengths of many battalions at the onset of TET~~ dropped to an average of 200. In a few instances, a unit commander ~~knew an attack was coming in that area and did not grant leave for~~ TET. Battalion strengths in these cases remained at 400 or at 500 ~~if a ranger or airborne battalion.~~

b. ~~At least in some divisions, ARVN troops began to return to~~ their units on 3 February. For example, in the 7th Division, it was reported that 250 troops returned on 3 February and 100 more on the 4th. In one case, Go Cong, they were formed into a provisional reaction company. How general this return of troops to their units has been is not known.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-264

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By jis, NARA Date 7-16-98

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3. Reductions in RVNAF Strengths

a. Casualties During the TET Offensive

Reported casualties for ARVN units for the period 291800 January to 101200 February consisted of ~~1,900 killed, 7,135 wounded,~~ and ~~86 missing in action.~~

~~The total of approximately 9,100 casualties represented about three per cent of the total ARVN force.~~

b. Desertions

~~There have been few reports received of desertions or defections.~~

Elements of the ARVN 45th Regiment in Ban Me Thuot may have joined the Viet Cong; troops in ARVN uniforms and in vehicles of that unit fired on a US civilian compound, and the Communists claim the defection of parts of that unit. No information is available to confirm Communist claims of defections of elements of the 1st Division in Hue, or of troops in Ba Xuyen Province; however, due to the confused situation in Hue, their claims cannot be either confirmed or denied and remain "possibly true." Various Government of Vietnam (GVN) officials have mentioned defections by individual officers assigned to headquarters and support units in the Saigon area, but details on identifications and circumstances are lacking. In Sa Dec Province, however, the VC reportedly occupied a number of outposts (presumably Regional Force (RF) and Popular Force (PF)) in rural areas, and Liberation Front flags were reported flying.

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over them. Also in that province, RD cadres reportedly "melted away." In Chau Doc, some officials reportedly doffed their uniforms when the VC entered the city, but put them back on after the enemy was driven off. There is almost no information available on the status of RVNAF elements at the district village, and hamlet level, where the VC have been active in several provinces, nor on the status of RVNAF (RF and PF) elements on leave in rural areas during TET. These elements would seem to be vulnerable to local VC propaganda claims of success.

4. Performance During the TET Offensive

a. Although the data are incomplete, reflecting the fragmentary reporting, the effectiveness of RVNAF in combating enemy attacks during this period varied markedly. In general, the data reflect a mixed situation, with GVN forces reacting aggressively and courageously in some areas, but ineffectively and with malfeasance in others. No clear-cut geographic patterns are evident, except that most reports of ineffective performance come from IV Corps. Generally, however, the reaction of GVN forces seems to have varied in direct relation to the professional competence and performance of their leaders.

b. Leadership at the national and Corps levels apparently was effective. General Vien himself was reportedly being steady and dedicated, and the Commanders of the Rangers and National Police effectively led their forces in the Saigon fighting. The III Corps Commander, General Khang, reportedly performed well, but the I Corps,

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~~Commander General Lam~~ has been implicitly criticized for an overly defensive posture in I Corps. The 22d and 23d Division Commanders in II Corps reportedly had their troops on alert during TET, and had restricted TET leaves; there are indications, however, that this alert was not fully honored in at least one province (Khanh Hoa).

c. ~~At lower levels, the Commander of the 24th Special Sector~~ (Kontum) reportedly performed very poorly, drawing criticism for his preoccupation with his personal safety and for the destruction caused by his heavy reliance on armor. The Province Chief in Ba Xuyen reportedly became hysterical and lost control, and the Chief of Quang Tri Province was ineffective. The ~~Kien Hoa Province Chief, however, reportedly~~ performed creditably even after receiving news that his family had been murdered by the Viet Cong in Saigon. In Binh Thuan, the Province Chief and his Police Chief squabbled and blamed each other for deficiencies in security before the attack. ~~The Kontum Province Chief reacted quickly and effectively, demonstrating excellent leadership.~~ The Thus Thien Province Chief was forced to hide for several days when ^{the} Viet Cong occupied his house. The Quang Nam Chief was quite effective in organizing and directing his forces and in attempting to maintain civil morale. No specific reports have been received on other officials at that level.

d. ~~The alert posture of RVNAF elements varied but seems to have been generally adequate, considering their normal standards observed during the TET holidays.~~ Major deficiencies were noted in Chau Doc

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Province, where defenses apparently were totally relaxed for TET. Quang Ngai forces, on the other hand, reportedly were not granted TET leave.

e. ~~Some ARVN infantry units were effective in managing to resist repeated assaults of the enemy. However, it was reported that other units, after initial pin-down by sniper fire, maneuvered only slightly or not at all, but called in armor or armed helicopter strikes often resulting in heavy volumes of fire being directed into civilian dwellings causing resentment against RVNAF troops.~~ The initial reaction of RVNAF and other security elements to the Viet Cong attacks were generally described as fair to good with the notable exception of the forces in Vinh Long, Chau Doc, and Sa Dec Provinces. There was no organized resistance to the attack in Chau Doc, and Rangers in Vinh Long were slow in reacting and unaggressive afterwards. In Sa Dec, provincial authorities initially "refused to operate." Considerable confusion was reported in the early defense of Vinh Long. ARVN units in Ba Xuyen were reported ineffective. ~~In Phong Dinh, the reaction was slow but once the troops rallied, they displayed exceptional bravery and esprit.~~ Outstanding defensive performances were recorded by ARVN units in An Xuyen, Khanh Hoa, Dinh Tuong, and Kien Hoa. A lack of planning and organization was reported, however, in Kien Hoa.

f. ~~ARVN's performance, after the initial enemy attacks were repelled and the cities were secured, seems generally to have lacked aggressiveness.~~ In only a few Provinces (Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and

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Dinh Tuong) were there indications of reasonably aggressive pursuit and a determination to maintain pressure on the enemy. In Quang Tri, ARVN units reacted slowly to attacks on district towns near the province capital, and their tactics tended to maximize property damage. "Over-reaction" or excessive destruction was reported in other areas, including Kontum, Vinh Long, and Chau Doc. In IV Corps, ARVN forces were generally described as passive, unaggressive, and preoccupied with defensive -- rather than offensive -- operations, except in those areas where US troops were brought in to assist in clearing the provincial capitals. In one instance, the presence of US forces was described as "electrifying" in its impact on ARVN. The ARVN 7th Division (colocated with a brigade of the US 9th Division in My Tho), however, has had its troops out on operations during the past few days.

5. Current Situation

a. ~~There are few reports indicative of current RVNAF combat effectiveness. In Quang Tri, concern has been expressed about dwindling ammunition, gasoline and other supplies and the absence of resupply movements from the beleaguered 1st Division headquarters in Hue.~~ Reports on casualties in individual units have been rare. ~~In two instances, ARVN units are reported at considerably reduced strength; one battalion reinforcing Vinh Long reportedly had only 90 men, while another battalion in Chau Doc reportedly had only 200 men present for duty of an assigned strength of 600.~~ Many units are considerably below strength because of the apparently widespread disruption of communications and

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transportation facilities which probably has delayed the return of troops from TET leave. Moreover, ~~the psychological impact of the Viet Cong offensive may add to the normally high AWOL and desertion rates associated with TET.~~

b. ~~There are virtually no reports, specifically describing RVNAF morale as other than fair to good.~~ Other indicators -- lack of aggressiveness, indiscipline in the form of looting and pilfering -- *may* suggest ~~that morale has been shaken to some extent.~~ Moreover, some officers have expressed concern at the lack of US military support in certain areas, and others have repeated rumors prevalent among the civil populace alleging US collusion in various forms with the Viet Cong. Vietnamese Marines fighting in Saigon have expressed dissatisfaction with the US M-16 rifle, alleging it is inferior to the AK-47 automatic rifles with which the Viet Cong are equipped. This concern has not been reported elsewhere, but other RVNAF elements, not so well-equipped as the Marines, may be once again apprehensive over their relatively limited firepower as they were when they first encountered enemy units armed with the new family of 7.62-mm small arms in 1964-65. The Vietnamese Marines have also reflected concern with the apparently plentiful supply of B-40 and B-41 rocket launchers in the hands of Viet Cong units in Saigon; they have also been used extensively in other areas and may have adversely impressed other RVNAF elements.

c. ~~Popular reactions to ARVN performance have been mixed.~~ In two instances (Quang Tri and Khanh Hoa), the populace reportedly

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indicated gratitude or appreciation for ARVN's performance. In most areas, the people are reported to be confused, frightened, traditionally passive or non-committal, while in other areas (Quang Tri, Phan Thiet, Long Khanh, Vinh Binh, Vinh Long, Ba Xuyen, and Chau Doc) the popular reaction has been generally unfavorable to RVNAF. A mixture of these reactions has been reported in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area. Criticism of the RVNAF ranges from complaints about the lack of security to bitterness at the allegedly wanton destruction of property. In several areas (Vinh Long, Ba Xuyen, and Saigon) looting and pilfering by ARVN and police elements has been charged.

d. ~~There are no uncommitted RVNAF forces in RVN at this time. At present, four RVNAF battalions are technically listed as uncommitted. In point of fact in each Corps tactical zone one battalion is held as a reaction force.~~

The RVNAF response to the current emergency situation is summarized in the battalion mission assignments as of 29 January and 10 February.

	<u>29 January</u>	<u>10 February</u>
Combat Operations	62	90
Security	24	29
Training	3	0
Reserve	15	4
Pacification	51	32
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TOTAL	155	155

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e. An assessment of ARVN battalion effectiveness at this time is complicated by several factors: the reduction in strength of approximately 9,100 troops killed, wounded or missing; the aftermath of the TET holiday leave situation (3,000 have been given transportation back to their units, many others await transportation); an untabulated number of unauthorized absences stemming from TET leave; and continuing recruiting problems. Using a criteria of a minimum of 60 per cent personnel present for duty constituting an effective unit, RVNAF battalion effectiveness is indicated as:

ARVN Infantry (120 Battalions)	* Effective
Ranger (20 Battalions)	* Effective
Airborne (9 Battalions)	4 Effective
VN MC (6 Battalions)	6 Effective

..... Battalion strength breakdowns for ARVN Infantry and Ranger Battalions are not available at this time, but based on authorized strengths, the over-all per cent for duty level on 7 February was: ARVN Infantry 50 per cent, Ranger 43 per cent. As of 7 February, the average present-for-duty strength of RVNAF Battalions was:

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Present</u>
ARVN Infantry	639	320
Ranger	755	320
Airborne	836	350
VNMC	876	500

As an example of unit strength deficiencies, the 9th Airborne Battalion

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present for duty totals range from a low of 157 to a high of 500 out of the authorized strength of 836.

f. In sum, in view of the incomplete information available it is difficult to generalize with confidence. It does appear that most ARVN units reacted reasonably well to the initial attacks. Subsequently there seemed generally to have been a lack of aggressiveness, and some breakdowns in discipline were reported. Although morale and confidence seem to have been shaken, morale does not appear to have collapsed. Because of the disruption of communications, RVNAF units are probably not well informed of the situation and thus susceptible to the same rumors that seem to be upsetting the civil populace. Thus their vulnerability to Viet Cong propaganda has probably increased. ~~ALL~~

~~factors considered, some ARVN elements would seem to be ill-prepared for sustained or renewed pressure without a respite for several weeks or even months, and some in isolated areas operating without close US support might disintegrate. However, many of the units can be expected to still give a good account of themselves.~~

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INFORMATION

Tuesday, February 27, 1968
7:15 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Taylor accepts
with appreciation his new appointment.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

44a


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 27, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to you for my appointment as Chairman of your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to succeed Clark Clifford. I have long been impressed with the importance of the mission of this Board and have enjoyed serving twice as a member. I now welcome this opportunity to chair this group of very able citizens and hope that the Board will continue to prosper as it has under the leadership of Clark Clifford.

Respectfully,


Maxwell D. Taylor

The President
The White House

45

**Tuesday, February 27, 1968
7:10 p.m.**

Mr. President:

**I gather from Paul Nitze's office
that Sec. McNamara evidently invited
him to the breakfast meeting.**

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

INFORMATION

46

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday
February 27, 1968 -- 6:45 p. m.

Free file

Mr. President:

I have marked the key passages in this CIA document on the outlook in Vietnam. So far as the decisions before you are concerned, paragraphs 11 and 13, sidelined in red (pp. 5-6), are critical.

Whether "the U. S. and ARVN regain the initiative" is really what your decision in the days ahead is about.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 2-27-92

WWRostow:rlm

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46a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

26 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The Outlook in Vietnam

1. This Memorandum does not seek to explore all aspects of the situation in Vietnam, or its probable development over a long term. It is addressed only to the specific question put to us, i.e., whether developments in Vietnam are apt to involve a continuation of combat into the indefinite future at a level comparable or higher than current levels, or whether it is more probable that either the VC or the GVN will be unable to sustain such a level beyond a few months.

2. The current phase of combat will have a critical bearing on the further course of the war and may even prove to be decisive. We cannot be sure how long this phase will last, but it seems likely that by early summer the immediate results and the longer term implications will be fairly clear to Hanoi, Saigon, and Washington. At present, the key questions concern:

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Authority 769 81-91
By 100/18, NARA, Date 3-3-92

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downgrading and
declassification

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(1) the capabilities of the Communist forces to sustain their current challenge, and whether they can continue the fighting thereafter, and (2) the capabilities of the South Vietnamese political and military establishment to cope with the tasks imposed by the present Communist offensive.

Communist Plans and Prospects

3. Hanoi's aims in the present offensive phase are: ~~to~~ register significant military successes against US and especially ARVN forces, and to inflict such heavy losses, physical destruction and disorganization on the GVN as to produce a total situation favorable to a negotiated settlement on Communist terms. The Communists are not likely to have a rigid timetable, but they probably hope to achieve decisive results during the course of the summer. The high importance which Hanoi now attaches to forcing the issue is evident from the risks and costs of the enterprise.

4. The toll on Communist forces has been considerable, even if reported casualties are greatly inflated by inclusion of low level recruits and impressed civilians. To some extent these losses have been offset by measures already taken. Heavy

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infiltration of both new units and replacements from the North is continuing. A strenuous, last minute recruitment effort was made prior to the Tet attacks. A significant part of the guerrilla and Main forces could still be committed. And, at present, the Communists enjoy fuller access to the rural areas, where they are recruiting heavily. They will probably be able to recoup their recent losses, though at some sacrifice in quality.

5. In any case, the Communists probably will maintain their offensive for the next several months and be prepared to accept the high losses this entails. They cannot accept such losses indefinitely, however, and they probably will not be capable soon again of launching repeated mass attacks of the magnitude and widespread scale of 30-31 January. But they are almost certainly capable of sustaining a high level of combat, including major battles with US forces, assaults on selected cities, and rocket and mortar attacks on urban areas and military installations.

6. It is possible that the Communists regard the present campaign as so critical to the outcome of the war that they will commit their full resources to a maximum effort in the near term. ~~On balance, however, we think it likely that even if their present~~

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~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~push falls short they will wish to be able to sustain a~~
~~protracted struggle. Hence they will probably not exercise~~
~~their capabilities in such a profligate manner as to deny~~
~~themselves the possibility of continuing the struggle should~~
~~the present phase fail to produce a decisive result.~~

GVN/ARVN Prospects

7. ~~The ability and capability of the GVN and its armed forces~~
~~remain the keys to the eventual outcome.~~

8. ~~In the main, the ARVN has acquitted itself fairly well~~
~~since 30 January, though the record is uneven.~~ Morale has held
up on the whole, and we know of no unit defections. However,
the ARVN is ~~showing signs of fatigue and~~ in many areas it has now
~~lapsed into a static defensive posture.~~ ~~Security in the country~~
~~side has been sharply reduced.~~ A long and costly effort would
have to be undertaken to regain the pre-Tet position. It is
highly unlikely that the ARVN will be inspired enough or strong
enough to make such an effort -- certainly not in the near future.

9. ~~The GVN also performed adequately in the immediate~~
~~emergency, particularly in the Saigon area.~~ There now appears

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~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

to be a greater recognition of the need to push forward with additional measures, but the Communist challenge has not yet proved a catalyst in stimulating an urgent sense of national unity and purpose.

10. ~~The overall position of the government has been weakened. Its prestige has suffered from the shock of the Tet offensive; its control over the countryside has been greatly reduced. Popular attitudes are confused and contradictory; the Viet Cong received virtually no popular support, but nevertheless there is rallying to the government side.~~ Passivity is likely to continue as the dominant attitude in most of the population, but further military defeats could cause a sudden swing away from the government. While the central authority in Saigon is unlikely to collapse, its ability to provide energetic leadership throughout the country and all levels is in serious doubt. It is possible that over the next few months certain provinces, especially in I and IV Corps, will be lost to Saigon's effective authority.

11. ~~The psychological factor is now critical for South Vietnam's whole political-military apparatus.~~ The widespread rumors that the US conspired with the Communists are symptomatic

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

of popular anxieties over the future course of the war and US attitudes toward a political settlement. As yet, however, there are no signs of a crisis of confidence within the government.

12. ~~If major military reverses occur, the political and military apparatus could degenerate into general ineffectualness. If, on the other hand, US and ARVN regain the initiative and inflict some conspicuous setbacks on the Communists and the general offensive appears to be contained, then the GVN might manifest new energy and confidence and draw new support to itself. On balance, we judge that the chances are no better than even that the GVN/ARVN will emerge from the present phase without being still further weakened.~~

Alternative Outcomes of Present Phase

13. We believe that the Communists will sustain a high level of military activity for at least the next two or three months. It is difficult to forecast the situation which will then obtain, given the number of unknowable factors which will figure. Our best estimate is as follows:

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

a. The least likely outcome of the present phase is that the Communist side will expend its resources to such an extent as to be incapable thereafter of preventing steady advances by the US/GVN.

b. Also unlikely, though considerably less so, is that the GVN/ARVN will be so critically weakened that it can play no further significant part in the military and political prosecution of the struggle.

c. More likely than either of the above is that the present push will be generally contained, but with severe losses to both the GVN and Communist forces, and that a period will set in during which neither will be capable of registering decisive gains.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



ABBOT SMITH
Chairman

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

February 27, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~*from file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands

When Prime Minister Sato was here, you and he agreed to establish an Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands. The United States, Japan and the Government of the Ryukyus are represented.

The first meeting of the Committee will take place March 1.

The attached draft message to the High Commissioner could be read at that first meeting and be released to the press. Defense and State agree that this expression of Presidential interest in the Committee will have political benefits in the Ryukyus. Ambassador Johnson concurs.

We understand that Prime Minister Sato plans to send a similar message.

If you approve, the message should reach Okinawa in time for the meeting which will be 9:00 p.m. on February 29. We will send it by cable.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Message approved _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *rg*, NARA, Date *2-27-92*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWR:WJJ:pas:2/27/68

Message for the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands

As the Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands meets for the first time, I extend my congratulations to each member and wish them every success in carrying out their important mission. The significance of the task upon which you are embarking today was underlined by the Prime Minister of Japan and myself last November, when we agreed to establish the Committee with the participation of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands. We anticipated that the Committee would develop meaningful proposals further identifying the Ryukyuan people and their institutions with Japan, and that its efforts would advance still further the economic and social welfare of the Ryukyuan people. I sincerely hope that the cooperative efforts of all concerned will help achieve these important objectives.

#

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 27, 1968

~~SECRET~~

*For the President
From Walt Rostow*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Troop Contributions in Viet-Nam : *Background for breakfast.*

The present status as far as we know is:

South Viet-Nam

Pre-Tet

~~Present~~ strength

ARVN (including RF/PF) 630,000

Armed police and CIDG 120,000

TOTAL 750,000

We hope to have post Tet - offensive evaluation by 29 Feb.

Plans

To raise ARVN strength by 65,000 men by the end of June.

New strength will come from:

- call-back of veterans in the 20-33 year age group who have served less than 5 years
- draft of 19-year-olds (to begin March 1)
- draft of 18-year-olds (to begin May 1)

Numbers in each category not known.

Additionally, President Thieu has talked to Bunker and Westmoreland of perhaps an additional 30,000 but has noted problems of equipment, training, etc. No details available.

With some attrition, GVN expects to have 800,000 men under arms by mid-year. That would be the equivalent of about 9 million Americans, given the population difference.

Thailand

Now has about 2,500 men (1 regiment plus air transport unit). They will complete their tour in September.

Thai have undertaken to send a light division (11,000). Will go in two groups -- first of 6,000 began training January 22 and

~~SECRET~~

48
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-274
By up, NARA Date 2-10-97

1 Aug 1968

~~SECRET~~

scheduled to arrive Viet-Nam no later than July 15. Second group (5,000) will be activated August 5 and are scheduled to arrive Viet-Nam by January 27, 1969.

Korea

Now has 48,800 men in Viet-Nam.

We had been negotiating with them for 5,000 logistic support troops and for an additional division. Talks have been put on the back burner because of the recent DMZ incidents and the Pueblo affair. Korean Government has made no public statements regarding additional forces for Viet-Nam.

Australia

Now has 8,000 men in Viet-Nam. No immediate plans for more.

New Zealand

Now has 576 men. No plans for more.

Philippines

2,000-man Civil Assistance Group (engineers and security force).

PHILCAG bill now before Phil Congress for renewal of funds for next fiscal year will probably pass, but with a fight.

No additional Phil contribution now in sight.


William J. Jordan

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Tuesday, February 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with the Inter-American Council of
Commerce and Production on February 28

The Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production (CICYP) with whom you will be meeting is an association of the leading Latin American and US businessmen and industrialists. The Latin members are a particularly important group because of their influence on governmental attitudes toward economic integration.

The President of the CICYP is Roberto Campos of Brazil. The group has just met for two days in New York and is here in Washington today under the auspices of the Council of Latin America. A list of those expected to be present for the meeting with you is attached.

After greeting the group and referring to their two days of discussions in New York, you might stress the importance of their leadership in achieving the economic, social and political aspirations of the people of this Hemisphere. You might then underline two Johnsonian dimensions of the Alliance for Progress:

-- Economic integration. The necessity to follow-through on the decision taken by the Latin American Presidents at Punta del Este to establish progressively, beginning in 1970, the Latin American Common Market.

-- Opening the inner frontiers of South America.

In closing, I suggest you refer to the significant role of private enterprise in securing Alliance objectives and the need for Latin American Governments to encourage and attract outside investment as a vital supplement to their own public efforts.

W. W. Rostow

Moose 2/27

Expected Attendance at President's Meeting with Executive Committee
of the Inter-American Council for Commerce and Production,
(11:15 a.m., February 28, 1968)

Executive Committee

Dr. Roberto de Oliveira Campos (Brazil)
Mr. John P. Phelps, Jr. (Venezuela)
Mr. Carlos Ons Coteló (Uruguay)

Presidents of the Advisory Committees

Ing. Romulo Ferrero (Paru)
John D. J. Moore
Dr. Sergio Gutierrez Olivos (Chile)

MEMBERS

Argentina:

Dr. Alejandro Frers
Mr. Ovidio Gimenez
Dr. Abraham Scheps
Mr. Alejandro Orfila

Brazil:

Dr. Jose E. Mindlin
Mr. Plinio Salles Souto
Mr. Luis Eduardo Campello
Mr. Sergio P. Mellao
Mr. Paulo Ayres Silho
Mr. Gilberto Huber
Mr. Sebastian Camargo
Mr. Geraldo Dannemanos
Mr. Jose S. Monteiro

Chile:

Mr. Jorge Ross
Mr. Carlos Urenda

Colombia:

Mr. Manuel Trujillo Vanegas

Dominican Republic:

Mr. Antonio Najri
Mr. Manuel Diez
Mr. Gustavo Tavaréz

Honduras:

Mr. Armando San Martín

Panama:

Ing. Eduardo A. Vallarino
Mr. Jorge M. Arias
Mr. Manuel J. Castillo

United States:

Mr. Henry R. Geyelin
Mr. William J. Hickey
Mr. George S. Moore
Mr. Jack D. Neal
Mr. Alan R. Hadden
Mr. Norman Carignan

Uruguay:

Dr. Jorge Peirano Facio
Mr. Víctor Paullier

Venezuela:

Dr. Enrique Sánchez
Dr. Carlos Lander

Spain:

Mr. Enrique León

For the Council for Latin America

Dr. Esteban Ferrer
Miss Marie de Santis

Department of State

Anthony Solomon
Donald Palmer

Tuesday, February 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter of Instruction to U.S. Ambassadors

*1. [unclear]
2. Pres file*

Secretary Rusk recommends that the attached draft letter be sent by you to every United States Ambassador.

The purpose of the letter is two-fold:

1. To state clearly the Ambassador's responsibility as your agent to supervise and coordinate all the work of his Embassy.
2. To instruct each Ambassador to speak up often and firmly about our role in Southeast Asia and the importance to the entire Free World of our commitments in Vietnam.

If you approve the draft, letters ready for your signature will be sent promptly.

W. W. Rostow

_____ Draft approved

_____ Prefer not to send letter

BKS:amc

2/15/68

50a

DRAFT

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

This year will be a time of testing for the United States: testing of our courage on the battlefield; testing of our national resolve to keep fundamental commitments; and testing of our ability to explain our national purpose in a complex situation in which our basic policies tend to be obscured.

But times of stress are also times of opportunity. Whether we as a nation have the wisdom to perceive and make the most of our opportunities will depend in no small measure on the effectiveness of our representatives abroad.

I have asked much of you as your country's chief representative abroad. The nature of our times insures that more will be expected. I count on you to provide the sound judgment and vigorous leadership required.

In fifty months as President, I have been able to meet with almost every one of you. In many cases we have discussed the current problems involving our relations with the countries to which you are assigned. At this time I think it may be useful to sum up my thinking about some of the basic attributes of the office which you hold and my expectations for the days ahead.

As you know, in 1966 I assigned to the Secretary of State as my agent "authority and responsibility to the full extent permitted by law for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of inter-departmental activities of the United States Government overseas." This organizational

action in Washington was modeled in large measure on the concept of the United States Ambassador as the head of the Country Team but went further in giving executive authority of decision to the Chairman of the Senior Interdepartmental Group and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Regional Groups on all interdepartmental matters within their purview.

You as the Ambassador now have parallel authority and henceforth you are responsible as my representative for the overall direction, coordination and supervision of your mission and of all interdepartmental activities of the United States Government in the country in which you serve other than the activities of the United States forces operating under the command of the U. S. area military commander. By interdepartmental activity is meant one involving more than a single department or agency or which is of such a nature as to affect significantly the overall U. S. program in your country.

In the case of the military forces, I ~~shall~~ expect you to be fully aware of military activities affecting U. S. relations with the country to which you are assigned, to discuss such matters regularly with the ~~area~~ commander, and, as necessary, to report any recommendations concerning those activities to the Secretary of State. Likewise, I consider it the responsibility of the commander to keep you informed of those activities. As you know, the line of authority to the military forces runs from me to the Secretary of Defense, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, and to the area commander in the field.

Our resources are heavily taxed. Economy must always be the watchword of our missions. We have special problems at this time because of our adverse balance of payments. The Secretary of State has given you specific instructions in connection with my directives on reducing the balance of payments costs of our operations overseas. In your review, I expect you to insure that all our operations are performed with maximum efficiency and that the resources available to all elements of the mission are effectively harnessed to the achievement of U. S. policies and objectives. You should see to it that good use is made of the talents and energies of all personnel of your mission and that each individual is challenged to perform to the best of his capabilities. I expect you to maintain a continuous review of all operations for which you are responsible and to take appropriate steps to streamline operations and to eliminate any duplicate or unnecessary tasks.

In your work and decisions involving senior officers of agencies in your mission, other than the State Department, you will, of course, take into account their individual responsibilities and role. They have the right to communicate directly with their respective superiors and to ask that your decisions be reviewed by higher authority. Nevertheless, they are obligated to keep you fully informed of their activities, reports, and recommendations and to abide by your decisions unless and until they may be modified by higher authority.

When acting as Charge d'Affaires in your absence, your deputy chief of mission will exercise the full authority and responsibility vested in you.

I have informed all heads of departments and agencies of the Government of the responsibilities of the chiefs of American Diplomatic Missions for our combined operations abroad, and I have asked them to instruct their representatives in the field accordingly.

At this time, when our Nation's resolve to stem aggression in Southeast Asia continues to be strongly contested by Communist forces and strenuous efforts are made to distort our objective, I charge you and the other members of the mission to redouble your efforts to explain our role in Southeast Asia. This country and its representatives abroad can well be proud of what we are attempting to do in South Vietnam to defeat a determined Communist effort to overcome a small nation by force and thus to weaken the security of the free world.

All too frequently of late, I have heard doubts expressed that our concern with commitments in Southeast Asia may have weakened our interest in and commitment to other areas. I want you to lose no opportunity to rebut this line of thought. Just the opposite is the case. You should point out that unless we were willing to live up to our commitments in Southeast Asia, our commitments in other areas might indeed be called into question. Our security commitments to others remain as strong today as they have from the start, and this is attested to by our whole post-war history of meeting our responsibilities to others.

At the same time I want you, whenever appropriate to stress the gains we have made at home in advancing the Great Society goals of a better life

for our people. Since 1960 our gross national product has gained by a quarter trillion dollars and now exceeds \$800 billion, while our economy has enjoyed a record-breaking 82 months of expansion. During the same period American living standards as measured by consumer expenditures per person rose 25%; our employment rolls rose by 9 million persons while the number of unemployed dropped by 1.6 million; Federal spending for health, education and welfare needs expanded almost four-fold. The strong advance in the economy and new social programs have rescued ten million Americans from poverty. Civil rights have been strengthened by passage of strong legislation. As I stated in the State of the Union message: "We have the physical strength to hold the course of decency and compassion at home" as well as "the moral strength to support the cause of peace in the world."

In your many tasks ahead, you have my full support and confidence and that of the Secretary of State.

Sincerely,

5!

Pres file

Tuesday, February 27, 1968

Mr. President:

In the attached memo Secretary Rusk recommends that you and Mrs. Johnson attend a reception for 30 influential European journalists being held at the State Department from 6:00 to 8:00 p.m. on Thursday, April 4.

The journalists will be in the U. S. as part of a program sponsored by Trans World Airlines and other domestic air carriers, and arranged in cooperation with the U. S. Travel Service and other government agencies to promote travel to the U. S.

If you agree to attend, it is hoped you could make a few informal remarks to the group.

W. W. Rostow

Approve_____

Disapprove_____

Call me_____

cm

MWG:mst

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

51a

February 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Reception for Visiting European
Journalists

Recommendation:

That you attend a reception for 30 influential European journalists in the Department of State on Thursday evening, April 4, 1968.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Discussion:

For the past three years, Trans World Airlines and other domestic air carriers have sponsored tours of the U.S. by some 30 influential journalists from ten European countries. This program, which is arranged in cooperation with the U.S. Travel Service and other interested Government agencies, is part of the air transportation industry's support of your efforts to alleviate our balance of payments problem by encouraging foreigners to visit the United States. Last year, the journalists visited Washington, Cape Kennedy, San Francisco, Las Vegas, and New York. When they returned to their home countries, according to a TWA report, "the editors' articles unanimously put forward a very positive image of the United States and its attractions."

In 1966 and 1967 our Public Affairs Bureau hosted successful receptions here for the visitors.

This year, we plan to hold the same type of function. We are inviting the Vice President, members of the Diplomatic Corps, U.S. Government officials, representatives of the foreign and domestic news media and of the U.S. transportation and publishing industries. Unfortunately, I will be in Wellington, New Zealand, for the SEATO Conference, and cannot attend. However, Under Secretary Katzenbach will be here and has been asked to attend in my absence.

In view of your program to improve our balance of payments problem, I hope that you and Mrs. Johnson can come and that you will make a few informal remarks. The reception is from 6:00 to 8:00 p.m.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

FROM WALT ROSTOW

2/27/68

52

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Herewith Komer's evaluation of the pacification situation as presented
in a backgrounder widely reported in U. S. press.

n (quote Saigon 20402)

2/27/68

53

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

The following had lunch today to consider the tentative proposals of General Westmoreland and General Wheeler for additional troops: Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Clifford, Under Secretary Katzenbach, W. Bundy, H. McPherson, J. Califano, and myself.

Although we had a fresh McPherson draft of a speech available, the lunch was taken up with an extended substantive discussion of the troop issue itself.

The following key questions were raised:

- the military strategy and tactics underlying the troop requests;
- the budgetary and balance of payments problems that would be raised;
- the rationale for public presentation in the U. S. ;
- reactions in Europe, as well as reactions in Moscow, Peking and Hanoi;
- what sort of peace proposals, if any, should be included in the

Presidential statement;

- the state of the GVN and its capacity to carry the load in the days ahead;
- the state of the ARVN as well as regional and popular forces: an

assessment is promised us from Saigon on Feb. 29, although

Bus Wheeler may be bringing back such a detailed assessment.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority CSO 10/11/78; NSC 8/12/80
By g/lap, NARA, Date 4/16/96

A wide range of views were stated and explored. The only firm agreement among Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Katzenbach, and Clifford was this: the troop issue raises many questions to which you ought to have clear answers before making a final decision. Therefore, it is recommended that you not make a final decision at breakfast tomorrow but, after listening to General Wheeler, order a team to go to work full time to staff out the alternatives and their implications (perhaps Clark Clifford could chair this intensive working group). They ought to report in a very few days.

I will have waiting for you on your return tonight an agenda and set of questions for the breakfast meeting tomorrow morning.

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Received 03:30
Sent to Pres 54
Department of State

TELEGRAM

TOP SECRET

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Free file

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CONCUR IMMEDIATE ISSUANCE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT.
AUTONOMOUS CITY OF HUE NOW HAS BEEN FULLY CLEARED.
BUNKER
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State memo 9/11/95
By SP/rg NARA, Date 6/25/96

TOP SECRET

Draft

(2/27/68)

55

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I was greatly encouraged to have Under Secretary Rostow's report of his talk with you on balance of payments policy, and the report from him and Ambassador Trexise about their conversations on the same subject with members of your government and administration. If the European Community accepts your strong and constructive lead, I believe you will have made a major contribution not only to our common economic welfare, but to the solidarity of the Alliance, and the improvement of political relations between Europe and the United States. The test will come in the days ahead, as we move from general words to concrete actions.

I know I don't have to stress to you the reciprocal dangers of isolationism on both sides of the Atlantic in this period of stress and transition. Success in the approach you discussed with Under Secretary Rostow, Mr. Chancellor, would be a tonic for the Alliance, and a very great achievement on a most critical and sensitive front. I have no doubt its beneficent effects would be felt in many areas, and for a long time. It is a goal worth a great deal of effort.

I was pleased to learn that your government agrees that an expansionary solution in Western Europe to improve our balance of trade would be desirable. Members of your government have suggested as one possibility that the surplus countries of Europe might accelerate their Kennedy Round tariff reductions. This is one example of an expansionary measure which would help to achieve equilibrium in the balance of payments as a whole.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-249
By Cb, NARA Date 11-5-97

It could facilitate the adjustment of surpluses and deficits through enlarging trade, and strengthening the integrated world economy on which we all depend. There are other promising trade steps which Ambassador Trexise has discussed. But as Ambassador Trexise said in his meetings in Bonn, we shall soon have to make a decision here among the alternative ways of improving our trade account.

Action to influence the flow of trade should of course go beyond trade measures as such. Rates of economic growth are the most important factor influencing the level of trade between our countries and with the rest of the world. If the surplus countries take measures to accelerate their growth while the deficit countries act to restrain their economies, our actions should lead harmoniously and directly to an improved international payments situation. This is why both our countries actively supported the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Ministerial resolution of last December calling for intensified cooperation between surplus and deficit countries.

But we must now move out of the realm of theory and general resolutions and down to the level of concrete policy recommendations to member countries. Your reflationary policies instituted last fall, and the recent decisions of the French government are steps in the right direction. But we are inclined to think they will not be sufficient in themselves to bridge the gap.

We have before us an opportunity to examine these questions together, and to take appropriate action in concert, at the high level meetings of the

OECD to be held in Paris during the first week in March. We must seize this opportunity. It is a test of the ability of the United States and Europe to work together to preserve the international trade and monetary system which we so laboriously created from the ashes of war.

There is a natural tendency in the face of a complex problem to adopt the easiest solution. I fear that in the case of trade the seemingly easiest solution may ultimately cause us the most difficulty. The time, therefore, has come for us to break new ground in international cooperation which would turn the problem of restoring equilibrium into a challenge rather than a pitfall. It would be entirely fitting to do this in the same house in Paris so closely associated with an earlier bold experiment in international cooperation -- the European Recovery Program. If we achieve such cooperation at the forthcoming meetings, it would be most helpful in overcoming the difficult problem related to international trade which I have previously outlined and which Under Secretaries Katzenbach and Rostow, and Ambassador Trenise have discussed in Bonn.

In my judgment, such cooperation can only be achieved with the active leadership of the German representatives. I shall ask Mr. Okun, the head of our delegation to the Economic Policy Committee, and Under Secretary Deming, the head of our delegation to Working Party 3 on International Payments Equilibrium, to work especially closely with the German representatives.

With cordial good wishes,

Sincerely,

His Excellency

Dr. Kurt Georg Kiesinger

Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Lyndon B. Johnson

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP30584

1968 FEB 26 19 05

~~SECRET~~

FEBRUARY 26, 1968

1. HERewith THE NORTH KOREAN RECEIVES OUR LATEST PROPOSALS IN SURPRISE AND VIRTUAL SILENCE. THE NEXT MEETING WILL BE CRITICAL. TEXT FOLLOWS:

2. SMITH:

A. IN PREVIOUS MEETING, I HAVE MADE A SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FOR RESOLVING THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE PUEBLO AND ITS CREW. I HAVE MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT THE US GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED UPON THE RETURN OF THE SHIP AND ITS CREW TO CONDUCT A FULL INQUIRY AND TO MAKE THE RESULTS PUBLIC. WE HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF THE VARIOUS PHOTOGRAPHS OF DOCUMENTS WHICH YOU HAVE HANDED OVER IN THESE MEETINGS. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THESE PHOTOGRAPHS OF DOCUMENTS ARE PERTINENT TO THE PROPOSED INQUIRY AND WILL BE SUBMITTED TO IT. IT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE IMPORTANT TO AUTHENTICATE THESE DOCUMENTS BY TESTIMONY OF THE CREW MEMBERS INVOLVED.

B. AS I HAVE ALSO PREVIOUSLY MADE CLEAR, WE ARE WILLING TO EXPRESS REGRET IF THE INQUIRY WOULD JUSTIFY OUR DOING SO.

C. AN EXPRESSION OF REGRET BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE PHOTOGRAPHS OF DOCUMENTS YOU HAVE PROVIDED MIGHT LATER PROVE INCONSISTENT WITH THE FACTS WHICH A FULL AND IMPARTIAL INQUIRY WOULD DISCLOSE. MOREOVER, UNTIL THE OFFICERS AND THE MEN OF THE PUEBLO HAVE BEEN RELEASED, THE EVIDENCE WHICH YOU HAVE SUBMITTED IS UNVERIFIABLE EITHER BY US OR BY ANYONE ELSE. IN ANY EVENT AN EXPRESSION OF REGRET ON OUR PART PRIOR TO FULL INQUIRY INTO THE FACTS AND IN ADVANCE OF THE RELEASE WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

D. OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS IN THESE MEETINGS INDICATE THAT FACTUAL QUESTIONS DIVIDE US. THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT THE PUEBLO'S MISSION WAS TO GATHER INTELLIGENCE. WE DISAGREE AT TO PRECISELY WHERE THIS MISSION WAS CARRIED OUT AND WHERE THE PUEBLO WAS SEIZED. THE U.S. IS NOT RELUCTANT TO HAVE THESE FACTUAL ISSUES RESOLVED.

E. WE WOULD WELCOME ANY IMPARTIAL RESOLUTION OF THIS DISAGREEMENT AND WOULD BE WILLING TO HAVE THE FACTS REVIEWED BY ANY IMPARTIAL, INTERNATIONAL, FACTFINDING BODY. FOR EXAMPLE, WE WOULD ACCEPT ASSIGNMENT OF THIS TASK TO ANY PERSON OR PERSONS NAMED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.

F. WE ARE PREPARED TO EXPRESS REGRETS, IF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY SHOULD FIND THAT, IN VIOLATION OF ITS ORDERS, THE PUEBLO ENTERED WATERS CLOSER THAN 12 NAUTICAL MILES TO NORTH KOREA.

SENT
MONDAY

68 FEB 26 PM 2:12

Pres file

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-249

By CB, NARA Date 11-5-97

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

6. WHATEVER THE BODY AGREED UPON, WE DO NOT SEE HOW AN IMPARTIAL INQUIRY INTO THE FACTS COULD BE CONDUCTED WITH THE CREW STILL IN NORTH KOREAN HANDS. WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO RETURN THE CREW IMMEDIATELY TO THE UNITED STATES. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, ACCEPT RELEASE OF THE CREW TO THE CUSTODY OF A NEUTRAL PARTY, FOR EXAMPLE THE SWISS GOVERNMENT.

H. I URGE YOU TO CONSIDER MOST SERIOUSLY ADOPTING ONE OF THE CONCRETE APPROACHES TO SETTLING THIS MATTER WHICH WE HAVE PLACED BEFORE YOU.

3. PAK: (NOTE: PAK READ AND CONSIDERED THESE STATEMENTS VERY CAREFULLY. AFTER DISCARDING THREE OF HIS OWN STATEMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN PREPARED PRIOR TO THE MEETING, PAK WROTE AND READ THE FOLLOWING:)

I HAVE RECEIVED TWO COPIES OF THE STATEMENT YOU HAVE JUST MADE. I HAVE HEARD YOUR LAST STATEMENT. I RESERVE MY RIGHT TO MAKE A STATEMENT AT THE NEXT MEETING. HAVE YOU ANYTHING FURTHER TO STATE?"

4. SMITH:

A. AS YOU CAN SEE WE HAVE GIVEN MOST SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO EVERYTHING YOU HAVE SAID IN THESE MEETINGS. WE HAVE PLACED BEFORE YOU CONCRETE PROPOSALS WHICH, IF ACCEPTED BY YOU, WOULD PERMIT SETTLEMENT OF THE MATTER BEFORE US.

B. YOU HAVE NOW HELD THE CREW OF THE PUEBLO FOR OVER A MONTH. WE CAN SEE NO REASON WHY YOU SHOULD WANT TO DETAIN THEM FURTHER.

C. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL GIVE ME AN ANSWER TO OUR PROPOSALS AT OUR NEXT MEETING WHICH WILL RESULT IN AN IMMEDIATE RELEASE.

5. PAK: (NOTE: PAK AGAIN CAREFULLY READ AND CONSIDERED UNCMAC STATEMENT AND REPLIED AS FOLLOWS:)

HAVE YOU ANYTHING FURTHER TO STATE? THEN PROCEED.

6. SMITH:

I HAVE NOW READ AND GIVEN YOU COPIES OF STATEMENTS WHICH CONSTITUTE MY OFFICIAL REPLY TO YOU. I ASSUME YOU WILL CALL THE NEXT MEETING WHEN YOU ARE READY TO REPLY. IS THAT CORRECT?

7. PAK:

I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOUR SUGGESTION.

8. SMITH:

I PORPOSE WE RECESS.

9. PAK:

I AGREE TO YOUR PROPOSAL TO RECESS.

10. THE MEETING ENDED AT 1626.

PORTER

DTG: 261759Z FEB 68

OPS: 889

AEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

1968 FEB 26 17 39

57

VZCZCEEA238
OO WTE13
DE WTE 866

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80577

~~SECRET~~

FEBRUARY 26, 1968

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD to 1/3/79

By ply, NARA, Date 3-3-92

68 FEB 26 PM 12:45

SENT
MONDAY

HERewith WESTY'S DAILY KHE SANH REPORT. GENERAL IMPRESSION:
THEY ARE INCREASING THEIR PRESSURE ON THE BASE, WITH BOTH ARTILLERY
AND GROUND PROBES.

THIS IS REPORT NUMBER TWENTY-TWO ON THE SITUATION
IN THE KHE SANH/DNZ AREA AND COVERS THE 24 HOUR PERIOD
FEBRUARY 25, 1968.

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY DURING THE PERIOD WAS LIMITED
TO ENEMY INCOMING ARTILLERY, ROCKET AND MORTAR ROUNDS,
WITH SPORADIC GROUND CONTACTS. A TOTAL OF 689 ENEMY
ROUNDS WERE FIRED AGAINST FRIENDLY POSITIONS IN NORTHERN
QUANG TRI PROVINCE. 350 ROUNDS FELL AT KHE SANH, IN
POSITIONS HELD BY THE 26TH MARINES, RESULTING IN THREE
MARINES KILLED, 52 WOUNDED (32 EVACUATED). MATERIEL
DAMAGE INCLUDED TWO HELICOPTERS DESTROYED, AND
TWO DAMAGED. CONDITION OF THE KHE SANH RUNWAY
WAS REPORTED TO BE POOR.

CAMP CARROLL RECEIVED FOUR ARTILLERY ROUNDS. AT
DONG HA, 22 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY FELL AT NOON, INFLECTING
SERIOUS INJURIES TO ONE MARINE. EXTENSIVE DAMAGE WAS
CAUSED TO THREE COBRAS AND FOUR LIGHT OBSERVATION PLANES.
AT C-2 AND SURROUNDING AREAS, THE MARINES RECEIVED 18 ROUNDS OF
MIXED ARTILLERY AND MORTAR. 260 ARTILLERY ROUNDS AND 25 ROUNDS
OF MORTAR FELL AT CON THIEN. LIGHT SHELLING OCCURRED
AT CUA VIET AS THE 1ST AMTRAC BATTALION RECEIVED TEN
ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY IN EARLY AFTERNOON SHELLING.

IN GROUND CONTACT DURING THE PERIOD, A SWEEP BY THE
3D BATTALION, 1ST MARINES, IN THE VICINITY OF THANH
XUAI RESULTED IN ONE ENEMY KILLED, AND ONE MARINE RECEIVED
MINOR WOUNDS.

IN ANOTHER GROUND CONTACT, A MID-MORNING PATROL FROM
B COMPANY, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES ENGAGED AN ESTI-
MATED NVA COMPANY JUST SOUTH OF THE KHE SANH BASE. THE
CONTACT BROKE AT NOON WITH ONE MARINE KILLED, 21 WOUNDED
AND 25 MISSING. ENEMY CASUALTIES ARE UNKNOWN.

IN OTHER ACTION WITHIN NORTHERN DMZ OPERATIONS, A MEDEVAC HELICOPTER CRASHED OUTSIDE HILL 881 (SOUTH) PERIMETER. PILOT AND CREW ARE SAFE WITHIN THE PERIMETER. IN THE LATE AFTERNOON, THREE ENEMY SELF-PROPELLED GUNS WERE REPORTED 10 KILOMETERS WEST OF HILL 881. AIRSTRIKES WERE CONDUCTED BUT WEATHER PREVENTED DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. IN ANOTHER SIGHTING, THREE TANKS WERE REPORTED IN THE VICINITY OF KHE SANH AND WERE TAKEN UNDER FIRE BY AIR STRIKES WITH UNDETERMINED RESULTS.

A TOTAL OF 229 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES WERE FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF KHE SANH. MARINE AIRCRAFT FLEW 85 SORTIES. BOMB DAMAGE INCLUDED TWO SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS, ONE SECONDARY FIRE AND ONE ROCKET POSITION DESTROYED. THE AIR FORCE FLEW 110 SORTIES, AND THE NAVY FLEW 34 SORTIES. BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT INCLUDED 30 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS, ONE ROCKET POSITION DESTROYED, SEVEN SECONDARY FIRES, TWO TRUCKS DESTROYED. FIVE ARC LIGHT STRIKES (30 SORTIES) WERE FLOWN IN THE NIAGARA AREA.

AIR RESUPPLY FOR KHE SANH DURING THE PERIOD AMOUNTED TO 162 SHORT TONS. IN ADDITION, 27 PASSENGERS WERE AIR LANDED. RESUPPLY SORTIES TOTALLED 15 ON 25 FEBRUARY. NINE C-130 AIRCRAFT COMPLETED NINE AIR DROPS. ONE C-123 LANDED AT THE AIRFIELD, WHILE TWO C-123 AIRCRAFT AIR-DROPPED MATERIAL AT THE DROP ZONE. THREE MARINE HELICOPTERS LANDED AT THE AIRFIELD.

FOR THE NEXT 24 HOURS, A TOTAL OF 286 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES ARE PLANNED IN SUPPORT OF THE KHE SANH AREA. FIVE ARC LIGHT STRIKES (21 SORTIES) WILL BE FLOWN IN THE NIAGARA AREA.

KHE SANH WEATHER DURING THE MORNING OF FEBRUARY 25, WAS MARKED BY LOW CLOUDS AND FOG UNTIL 10:00 A.M. AT THAT TIME THE FOG DISSIPATED AND THE CLOUD CEILINGS IMPROVED TO 1600 FEET. VISIBILITY THEN REMAINED GOOD. THE FORECAST FOR 26 - 27 FEBRUARY IS FOR GOOD VISIBILITY UNTIL ABOUT 9:00 P.M. 26 FEBRUARY WHEN FOG WILL FORM AND CAUSE LOW VISIBILITY AGAIN. THE CLOUD CEILINGS DURING DAYLIGHT OF 27 FEBRUARY ARE EXPECTED TO BE UP NEAR 2500 FEET BUT LOWERING AT NIGHT TO 300 FEET OR LESS WITH FOG FORMATION.

THE KHE SANH DUMP AND AMMUNITION SUPPLY POINT (ASP) STATUS AS OF 8:00 P.M. FEB. 25 IS AS FOLLOWS:

		PREVIOUS STATUS	
		DAYS SUPPLY	8:00 P.M. 24 FEB EST
		ON HAND	(9:00 A.M. 25 FEB SVN)
CLASS I	(RATIONS)		
	MEAL, COMBAT,		
	INDIVIDUAL	12	4 DAYS
	B RATIONS	9	9 DAYS

CLASS III (FUEL)

AVIATION GAS (AVGAS)	7.2	7.2 DAYS
JP-4 FUEL (JET FUEL)	1	1 DAY
MOTOR GASOLINE (MOGAS)	8.7	7.2 DAYS
DIESEL	6.8	5 DAYS

CLASS V (AMMUNITION)

A. HIGH EXPLOSIVE

60-MM MORTAR	23	23 DAYS
81-MM MORTAR	13	14 DAYS
90-MM (TANK)	33	30 DAYS
4.2" MORTAR	21	22 DAYS
125-MM HOWITZER	18	19 DAYS
155-MM HOWITZER	19	16 DAYS

B. ANTI-TANK

ROUNDS ON HAND

90-MM HEAT	89
66-MM ROCKET (LAW)	1,386
ANTI-TANK MINES (M-15)	234
ANTI-TANK MINES (M-19)	334
ANTI-TANK MINES (M-21)	100
106-MM HEAT	144
106-MM RECOILLESS RIFLE (HEP-T)	866
3.5" ROCKET	950

	PREVIOUS STATUS
DAYS SUPPLY ON HAND	8:00 P.M. 24 FEB EST (9:00 A.M. 25 FEB SVN)

CLASS V (COFRAM)

105-MM HOWITZER	5	5 DAYS
155-MM HOWITZER	5	5 DAYS
40-MM GRENADE LAUNCHER	5	5 DAYS
HAND GRENADES	10	10 DAYS

2. ON 25 FEBRUARY KHE SANH WAS RESUPPLIED WITH 162 TONS AS FOLLOWS:

CLASS I	32.5	TONS
CLASS III	22	TONS
CLASS IV	17.25	TONS
CLASS V	90	TONS
CLASS VII	2.25	TONS

DTG: 261538Z FEB 68

~~SECRET~~

1968 FEB 26 18 02

EEA239
CO WTE13
DE WTE 871

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP80582

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCSM 10-4-78, NSC 68-79-80
By ap/ly, NARA, Date 3-3-92

Pres file

68 FEB 26 PM 1:07

SENT
MONDAY

~~TOP SECRET~~

FEBRUARY 26, 1968

HEREWITH WESTY REPORTS HIS NEW DISPOSITIONS:

- TO DEAL WITH A PROBABLE ATTACK (FEB. 27 OR 28) IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS (DAK TO-KONTUM-PLEIKU);
- AND TO GET THE ARVN BACK ON THEIR FEET AND MOVING, WHICH WILL HAVE GEN. ABRAMS' FULL ATTENTION, WITH GEN. CUSHMAN TAKING OVER THE I CORPS.

SUBJECT: GENERAL JOHNSON'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND

1. GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S DAILY REPORT NUMBER 22 COVERS THE SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM. GENERAL WESTMORELAND IS NOW TURNING HIS ATTENTION TO BOTH THE NEAR-TERM AND LONGER-TERM FUTURE. IN THE I CORPS AREA HE INTENDS TO CONVERT MACV FORWARD TO A PROVISIONAL CORPS HEADQUARTERS TO COMMAND OPERATIONS NORTH OF AI VAN PASS. WHEN THIS CONVERSION TAKES PLACE, THE PROVISIONAL CORPS, THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION IN THE DA NANG-AI VAN PASS AREA AND THE AMERICAL DIVISION WILL BE SUBORDINATE TO III MAF HEADQUARTERS, COMMANDED BY GENERAL CUSHMAN. IT IS THE INTENTION TO CONCENTRATE NOW IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE FIRST ARVN DIVISION IN CLEARING THE ENEMY FROM THE COASTAL AREAS AND AS THE MONSOON SHIFTS, TO WORK AGAINST THE ENEMY AND HIS BASE AREAS TO THE WEST AWAY FROM THE COASTAL AREAS. IN THE MEANTIME, B-52 STRIKES WILL BE EMPLOYED AGAINST ENEMY TROOP CONCENTRATIONS IN THE A SHAU VALLEY. INTELLIGENCE TEAMS ARE STANDING BY WAITING FOR A WEATHER BREAK TO BE INSERTED IN THE VICINITY OF THE A SHAU VALLEY, TO GET BETTER INTELLIGENCE OF ENEMY ACTIVITIES IN THAT AREA.

2. SOME TROOP ADJUSTMENTS ARE TAKING PLACE IN THE II CORPS AREA. TWO BATTALIONS OF THE 173RD BRIGADE HAVE BEEN MOVED TO THE VICINITY OF KONTUM AND THE BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS WILL MOVE TO THIS AREA FROM BAN ME THUOT WITHIN THE NEXT 48 HOURS. THE ENEMY WHO HAVE THREATENED BAN ME THUOT (THE 33D NVA REGIMENT) APPEARS TO HAVE WITHDRAWN TO THE WEST. GENERAL WESTMORELAND ESTIMATES THAT THEY HAVE ONE OR TWO COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALIONS; THAT THEY ARE NOW ENGAGED IN RESTORING THEIR COMBAT STRENGTH; AND HE EXPECTS CONTACT WILL BE GAINED AGAIN WITH THIS UNIT THREE OR FOUR WEEKS FROM NOW. GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAS DISCUSSED THE FRIENDLY TACTICAL POSTURE IN II CORPS WITH GENERAL ROSSON, AND THE TWO OF THEM BELIEVE THAT FORCES ARE WELL DISPOSED TO MEET ANY ATTACK IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS, IF SUCH ATTACK TAKES PLACE.

3. GENERAL WESTMORELAND MET TODAY WITH GENERAL WEYAND AND GENERAL KHANG IN THE III CORPS AREA. FRIENDLY FORCES ARE DISPOSED TO MEET ATTACKS ON PROVINCE AND DISTRICT TOWNS IN THE CORPS AREA, ALTHOUGH NEITHER GENERAL WEYAND NOR GENERAL KHANG ARE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT PREVENTING FUTURE ROCKET ATTACKS. THEY BOTH BELIEVE THAT THE FORCES CAN REACT RAPIDLY BUT CANNOT PREVENT THE EARLY ROCKET ROUNDS FROM BEING LAUNCHED.

4. GENERAL WESTMORELAND IS PLANNING TO ASSIGN GENERAL ROSSON TO REPLACE GENERAL ABRAMS WHEN MACV FORWARD IS CONVERTED TO A PROVISIONAL CORPS HEADQUARTERS UNDER GENERAL CUSHMAN'S COMMAND. GENERAL ABRAMS WILL THEN RESUME HIS FULL-TIME DEPUTY RESPONSIBILITIES AND RENEW HIS FOCUS ON ARVN AND POPULAR AND REGIONAL FORCES. GENERAL WESTMORELAND IS PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO RETURN GENERAL ABRAMS TO THE PRIMARY TASK OF RESTORING FULL COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS IN THE ARVN.

DTG: 261700Z FEB 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

59

1968 FEB 26 16 49

Pres file

68 FEB 28 PM 12:04

SENT
MONDAY

EEA235
OO WTE10
DE WTE 867

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80578

~~SECRET~~

FEBRUARY 26, 1968

HEREWITH WESTY SUMMARIZES AN IMPORTANT CAPTURED DOCUMENT WHICH UNDERLINES THE URGENCY OF OUR GOING OVER TO THE OFFENSIVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

1. ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. 9TH DIVISION RECENTLY CAPTURED A DOCUMENT OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE IN ASSESSING THE ENEMY SITUATION. IT IS A COSVN (POLITICAL ARM OF THE NLF) ORDER PUBLISHED ON 1 FEBRUARY, CRITIQUING THE FIRST DAYS' DEVELOPMENTS AND DIRECTING CONTINUATION OF ATTACKS. IT IS DEFINITELY NOT A PROPAGANDA INSTRUMENT. THE FULL TRANSLATION OF THE DOCUMENT IS BEING PROVIDED BY ELECTRONIC MEANS TO ADDRESSEES.

2. THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD LAY TO REST ONCE AND FOR ALL THE SPECULATION THAT THE ENEMY LEADERSHIP DID NOT BASE HIS PLANS ON A SUCCESSFUL "GENERAL UPRISING." IN THIS DOCUMENT, COSVN POINTS TO THE LACK OF AN UPRISING AND ARVN DEFECTION AS KEY FAILURES. HE FURTHER STATES THAT PURSUIT OF THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE AND GENERAL UPRISING IS THE OBJECTIVE OF HIS CURRENT OPERATIONS.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988

By kg NARA, Date 3-26-92

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

3. IN THIS DOCUMENT THE ENEMY FACES UP TO HIS PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF FIGHTING. HE WAS WELL AWARE THAT GENERAL UPRISINGS AND ARVN DEFECTIONS WERE FAR BELOW EXPECTATIONS. HE REALIZES THE NEED TO OFFSET THE LETDOWN DUE TO HIS PREVIOUS "QUICK AND DECISIVE VICTORY" PROMISES, STRETCHING "V-DAY" OUT TO 3 OR 4 MONTHS IN THE FUTURE. WHILE HE DOES NOT REFER TO HIS HEAVY LOSSES DIRECTLY, HE DOES NOTE THAT HE HAS A "PERSONNEL PROBLEM." HE STATES HIS CONCERN FOR THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE WHICH WOULD, AS HE DELICATELY PUTS IT, "LIMIT OUR VICTORIES" AND "CREATE NEW DIFFICULTIES."

4. COSVN DOES NOT LAY OUT A DETAILED MASTER PLAN TO REACT TO THE NEW SITUATION. HE GIVES GENERAL GUIDANCE TO PRESS ON WITH THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE AND GENERAL UPRISING, EXHORTING HIS PEOPLE TO BE FLEXIBLE AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES SUCH AS THE "DEFENSIVE" ATTITUDE OF U.S. AND REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (RVNAF). HE PLACES THE USUAL EXHIBITANT DEMANDS ON HIS FORCES SUCH AS DESTROYING EVERY UNIT OF RVNAF, BUT HE CAUTIONS MAIN FORCES NOT TO ATTACK U.S. UNITS "TO AVOID CASUALTIES."

5. THIS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS GIVE US INCREASED INSIGHT INTO THE ENEMY'S CURRENT STRATEGY. IT APPEARS TO BE THIS: FIRST, THREATEN SEVERAL LOCALITIES (KHE SANH, HUE, DANANG, DAK TO, SAIGON). IF WE OVER-COMMIT IN ONE AREA, HE STRIKES IN ANOTHER. OR HE CAN STRIKE IN ONE AREA IN AN EFFORT TO MAKE US OVER-COMMIT, AND THUS PREPARE THE WAY FOR AN ATTACK IN ONE OR MORE DIFFERENT PLACES. THE SECOND PART OF HIS STRATEGY CALLS FOR HIM TO EXERT PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE ON RVNAF AND ON THE PEOPLE BY THE PRESENCE OF ENEMY TROOPS NEAR CITIES AND TOWNS AND BY ATTACK BY FIRE AND SMALL GROUND PROBES. THE SECOND WAVE OF ATTACKS, THEN, DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE SET TO ANY TIME TABLE, BUT TO DEPEND UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF BOTH THE FRIENDLY AND ENEMY SITUATION. IT IS A STRATEGY OF GREAT FLEXIBILITY.

6. THE ENEMY IS URGENTLY TRYING TO REBUILD HIS FORCES. IN ESSENCE, THE SIDE WHO CAN REBUILD FASTEST AND TAKE THE OFFENSIVE AROUND THE CITIES AND TOWNS WILL WIN THE NEXT ROUND. SINCE FRIENDLY FORCES APPEAR TO BE IN A WELL-BALANCED POSTURE TO RESIST HIS MAJOR ATTACKS WITHOUT OVER-COMMITMENT, OUR FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS MUST BE TO REBUILD RVNAF, AND TOGETHER WITH THEM, TAKE THE OFFENSIVE AROUND THE CITIES. HERE IS A TREMENDOUS OPPORTUNITY, FOR THIS DOCUMENT (AND OTHERS) REVEALS THAT THE ENEMY WILL FIGHT. WHEN HE DOES, WE CAN DESTROY HIM.

DTG: 261545Z FEB 68

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

60

1968 FEB 26 16 34

Pres file

EEA234
OO WTE12
DE WTE 868

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82579

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-249

By CB, NARA Date 11-5-97

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

FEBRUARY 26, 1968

1968 FEB 26 AM 11:43

SENT
MONDAY

HEREWITH AN INTERIM REPORT ON THE SWISS BUSINESSMAN'S (UNBRICHT) HONG KONG MEETING WITH HANOI OFFICIALS. IN SHORT: NO NEGOTIATION NOW; WAIT UNTIL THE END OF APRIL OR EARLY MAY. (THAT IS WHEN WEATHER GETS GOOD IN I CORPS AND HANOI-HAIPHONG. ALSO TIME GENEVA CONFERENCE OPENED IN 1954 AND DIEN BIEN PHU FELL.)

"THE HONG KONG CONFERENCE WAS HELD WITH TWO UNNAMED HANOI REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SWISS AMBASSADOR TO PEKING WHO HAD GONE TO HANOI TO ESCORT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVES TO HONG KONG. NO CHINESE REPRESENTATIVES WERE PRESENT. THE CONFERENCE WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL AS THE HANOI REPRESENTATIVES SAID THEY WERE NOT READY TO NEGOTIATE NOW BUT SAID THEY WOULD BE READY IN TWO MONTHS IF THE U.S. BOMBING CEASED, AT WHICH TIME HANOI WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE CERTAIN CONCESSIONS WHICH DR. UNBRICHT DID NOT EXPLAIN. THE HANOI REPRESENTATIVES ALLUDED TO THE GREAT DESTRUCTION RESULTING FROM THE BOMBING AND THE SWISS AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED THIS SINCE HE WAS IN HANOI OSTENSIBLY ON RED CROSS BUSINESS DEALING WITH HOMELESS CIVILIANS. WHILE DR. UNBRICHT DID NOT NAME THE HANOI REPRESENTATIVES, HE SAID THEY REPRESENTED THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE HANOI GOVERNMENT AND BELIEVED THEY WERE SINCERE IN THE SUGGESTION THAT HANOI WOULD BE READY FOR NEGOTIATIONS BY THE END OF APRIL OR EARLY MAY."

DTG: 261600Z FEB 1968

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

61

Pres file

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~--SENSITIVE

Monday, February 26, 1968
7:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the full text of my conversation with Rainer Barsel.

I would say the main point of his coming over -- clearly with the full knowledge of Kiesinger -- was to try to open up the NPT issue.

Perhaps the most important statement he made was that "right now, the majority in the DDU is against signing the NPT before additional clarification and assurances are obtained from Washington." (p. 3)

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-116
By lip, NARA, Date 5-15-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(2/26/68)

6/1a

Memorandum of conversation between Messrs. Walt Rostow and Rainer Barzel at the White House, February 23, 1968, 5 p.m.
(not verbatim; approximate account from interpreting notes)

Mr. Barzel: We have the impression the other side is marshaling all their forces in one concerted offensive all over Vietnam and should have little left to strike with when this is over. Is that how you see it?

Mr. Rostow: Yes, the war has entered a climactic period. We have experienced the first wave of that offensive. Though it brought a great deal of human suffering, it has failed in its objective to bring down the South Vietnamese government and its army and to leave the U. S. alone to defend the country. The enemy has yet to commit one-half of its forces and may employ them to force a major battle in the Khe Sanh - Quang Tri area and perhaps at Saigon. This may well put the war into its decisive phase.

Mr. Barzel: Have you heard of Kiesinger's statement on Vietnam last Tuesday? We had a meeting of the executive committee Tuesday morning. We thought it was high time to speak up on Vietnam in view of some of the growing anti-U. S. feelings. Mr. Gerstenmaier and myself made a strong plea in that direction. The Chancellor then made a declaration in which he stressed Germany's gratitude to the U. S. for its valiant defense of good causes around the world. He denounced anti-American sentiments as "stupid." Germany and others had much to be thankful for to the United States. German policy was sympathetic of the U. S. effort in Vietnam.

He sent Prince Botho (himself an M. D.) to Vietnam to check on the performance of the German assistance program there. I myself have sent telegrams to our people in Vietnam, voicing appreciation for their efforts there and urging them to stay on at this difficult time.

President Johnson has told Chancellor Kiesinger he would be glad to talk any matter over with him, as long as the Press could be kept out of the discussion. The Chancellor was happy about that suggestion and would like to take advantage of it from time to time.

Did you receive McGhee's telegram on his talk with Kiesinger regarding the Chancellor's meeting with de Gaulle?

Mr. Rostow: I have not seen it yet.

Mr. Barzel: Let me try to summarize the five major points from my notes. As you know, Mr. Johnson had urged Mr. Kiesinger to play the role of "harmonizer." This is what he is trying to do.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-116
By lip, NARA, Date 5-15-95

(1) With regard to Britain's entry into the EEC, Kiesinger was able to move only a small step further, but it was a step in the right direction.

(2) On NATO, de Gaulle said, as matters were standing now, he felt he could say that France will remain in NATO.

(3) In the area of the dollar discussions, Mr. Kiesinger is trying to get the Kennedy Round moved up. This is our policy now. I don't know how you feel about it.

Mr. Rostow: We are in favor of it. It would provide us some compensation for the losses we have taken from the "harmonization" of the border taxes which, in effect, represented a devaluation of the mark vis-a-vis the dollar.

Mr. Barzel:

(4) De Gaulle said this twice to Kiesinger and with emphasis: He (de Gaulle) had reason to believe that if the U. S. should resort to tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam, the U. S. could expect that an atomic bomb of unknown origin would hit a city in the United States.

(5) On German policy towards the U. S., de Gaulle said, he would make no move to oppose it and would not put pressures on the FRG in this regard at this time.

You see, the Chancellor is doing his best to play the part of the harmonizer.

As you know, we had a huge pro-American demonstration in Berlin this week in response to a demonstration against the U. S. Vietnam policy there earlier. 150,000 people demonstrated their goodwill for the United States.

I had a meeting with Mr. Kiesinger on February 16, and he asked me to relay the following thoughts to you:

There could be a political crisis coming on in Germany if the following four matters should become acute at the same time:

1. the offset and dollar question
2. the NPT
3. the UN move to forbid legal time-limits on persecution for genocide and mass murder
4. a quarrel between the CDU and the SPD-FDP on Eastern policy.

A convergence of these four factors would result in a strong political tremor that could possibly bring down the government. However, the fact that re-elections now would benefit the CDU and the fact that the SPD-FDP together command more votes in the Bundestag speaks against the likelihood of toppling the government now. But there could be a severe political crisis. The SPD and FDP are united in their stand on Eastern policy and in their stand against the war in Vietnam.

It is impossible to get money appropriated for the offset agreement without the help of the SPD, and some people in that party contend it amounts to an indirect subsidy of the Vietnam war.

As it stands right now, the majority in the CDU is against signing the NPT before additional clarification and assurances are obtained from Washington.

Should there be a political crisis, it would arrest or reverse the modest economic upturn we are now experiencing. This in turn would make it harder for the Bundesbank to come up with the money for offset, etc.

I do not know if there are solutions to all these problems. But I thought it best to come here and tell a friend about these possible difficulties, as they might in turn affect the U. S. , particularly in an election year.

Mr. Rostow: I appreciate your coming here and informing me on your problems in Bonn. I know enough about politics to know I should not advise someone from another country about his politics. Moreover, I cannot respond substantively to your points with any new U. S. policy formulations. But I can comment.

I do not know the status in the UN of time limits for genocide, etc. But I shall look into the issue.

As far as offset is concerned, I think we clearly have an arrangement here which favors Germany. We are maintaining strong military resources in Germany for the joint defense of Europe and this is being offset by bonds which bear interest. This means that in addition to holding the Central Front with our resources we help Germany accumulate additional surplus in its balance of payments. Any thinking politician can recognize the imbalance in this arrangement. This helps to buttress the arguments of those people who say we should bring our troops home from Europe. The argument that the German offset finances the war in Vietnam is nonsense. It could only be made by Germans who, in fact, wish the U. S. to withdraw its forces from Europe.

As regards the NPT, the difficulties we experienced at one time on consultations resulted from the timing of the change in the German government. Ever since then, I believe our NPT consultations have been a model for what such consultations should be between friends. We have reviewed with you intensively and we have defended vigorously the German national interests. We managed to clear up a number of small matters. Then remained the Chancellor's two big demands:

- (1) to find an acceptable formula for Euratom
- (2) the matter of a time limit on the treaty.

Despite the fact that NATO was not united on this matter, we pressed the German Euratom formula and essentially the Soviets took the idea.

On point two, where you have said eternity is too long a time and you want a less rigid clause on duration, I think we are making some headway, too; and the Soviets may meet that demand.

I know the arguments of the opposition, and I can understand what makes some men feel so deeply about this matter. At the time of the Adenauer funeral, I spent a good deal of time conferring with Strauss and von Guttenberg. I know this is a difficult issue for some Germans; but it is a great issue for the entire world. Important common interests are at stake. I am sure there is no group in Germany that wants to manufacture nuclear arms. Reliance on a system of collective security appears to be the common interest -- including the German interest -- as opposed to the fragmentation and danger of further nuclear proliferation.

On the matter of German contacts with the East, we have always regarded this as a matter for Germans to settle. We did not press you to take up such contacts in the past when you were hesitant to do so, and we shall not stand in your way now if you want to pursue them further.

I, personally, always thought that it was right of you not to take up these contacts years ago, as I did not think it promising for you to negotiate out of a sense of uneasiness and weakness. Such talks should be held from a basis of strength and confidence, such as you now possess. But that is for you to judge.

Our problem is that we have profound commitments towards Berlin and Germany including their defense against nuclear arms. This is a heavy responsibility. I lived through the '61-'62 crisis when we had to honor our pledge to defend Berlin, and I remember that we did not get much support from the rest of Europe then.

Offset and cooperation on monetary matters are intimately locked to our security commitments. It would be viewed as intolerable here to fulfill our security commitments and subsidize German foreign exchange at the same time.

Mr. Barzel: We do not really fear too much that the government may fall if what I mentioned happens, but we fear that a strong political tremor might result with an adverse impact on the economy.

I know that offset and the state of the Alliance are closely interlocked. I have discussed this in detail with your brother Eugene.

In the arena of Eastern policy there is much illusion, in my opinion, and little reality. As regards Berlin, you can rest assured that we will not stray from the path of virtue.

Is it true that the NPT is scheduled to go to the UN as early as March? If this is the case, I should like to say a few more words about it.

Mr. Rostow: (after inquiring on the telephone) It is scheduled to go to the UN about March 15 and to the individual governments shortly afterwards. A special session of the General Assembly should be called about April to debate the treaty. We would hope that the debate would end some time in May so that the treaty can then go to the individual governments for ratification. This is how the people that work on the NPT see the time schedule.

Mr. Barzel: I do not think we would sign the treaty before some other matters are made clear, like the Euratom question, for instance. We are grateful to you for getting the 18-month verification provision into the treaty. But what if Euratom and the IAEA cannot reach an agreement? Our American friends tell us, "Do not worry, everything will continue like in the past." But then the Soviets tell us something else again. What if we shall find ourselves unable to procure peaceful nuclear fuel?

Mr. Rostow: Do I understand that you are worried about being supplied with fuel for peaceful nuclear purposes?

Mr. Barzel: Yes, exactly. We now get our fuel from you via Euratom. If Euratom bows out or collapses one day, which is quite possible, as the French do not want to sign the treaty, we would have to turn to the IAEA, and if we apply there the Soviets are bound to say: "Now, wait a minute. Don't you know what the Germans would use this fuel for?"

Mr. Rostow: I don't know a specific answer to your question offhand, but I would say, since we have found answers to the other questions in the past, we should find a solution here also.

Some countries have said they will sign the treaty but delay ratification until a Euratom-IAEA accord has been reached. We understand their concern. However, in some countries the pressure to ratify is strong. What, then, if they ratify and later no accord is reached? The outcome would depend on the nature of the difficulty. If it were a serious political matter it might hold up application of the treaty; if it were a question of technical details, perhaps the 18 months might be extended. I can tell you that those who work on this matter do not see great difficulties in the EEC-IAEA negotiation. The scientists are not half as worried about this as are the lawyers and politicians.

If Euratom should dissolve for some reason, bear in mind that past history shows the generous attitude of this country in the supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes to others. We recently passed legislation increasing the amounts of fuel for foreign consumption. We make fuel available to countries that are not very friendly to us, because there is a certain responsibility involved in being a nuclear power. After signing the treaty, our responsibility for supplying for peaceful purposes would become even greater. Your question about fuel supply in the event of a Euratom collapse is fair. You understand you and I cannot settle it here. But if your government wishes to pose the matter, it should be discussed in the spirit of the Chancellor's talks with the President. The history of the Johnson-Kiesinger meetings has shown that the President listens to these questions with attention and sympathy.

To summarize: I think you should clearly define the specific questions that still concern you. Then you should bring them before us or raise them in a multilateral forum. Then we can work together to find answers.

Mr. Barzel: I understand and I will pass along your advice. We want to remove the uncertainty. We do not want to sign any treaties con dolus (in bad faith) as we did after World War I. We have to worry about the security of Europe in the '70's, in the post-de Gaulle nuclear period. You say the double-key system will not be touched by the treaty. The Soviets refuse to confirm that to us. We know what the situation is in Scandinavia. These questions are hotly debated in my party and must be cleared up to have the majority endorse the NPT.

Mr. Rostow: Surely the Soviets tried in the first phase of the NPT talks to bring about the destruction of NATO, to do away with the McNamara committee and the double-key system. We made it clear to them that we would have none of that. We agreed in the second phase, about September 1966, after the Rusk-Gromyko talk, that the treaty would narrowly concern what was required to avoid nuclear proliferation. What it didn't forbid was not forbidden. That is not just our understanding, that is the Soviets' as well. They know that they cannot raise the double-key question or the question of nuclear consultation. That is fundamental to our understanding. We will tell that to our Congress and you can say that to the Bundestag.

Mr. Barzel: This interpretation is all right for the present situation, but what may happen 5 or 10 years from now? The situation may be different then. Scandinavia, Greece, Turkey may then be unreliable or the U.S. may turn its interests away.

Mr. Rostow: First, you know that in our constitutional system any treaty that passed the Senate is binding on all subsequent administrations. Vietnam illustrates this point. President Johnson was prepared to honor President Eisenhower's commitment on the Gulf of Aqaba.

Second, if you were faced with a critical situation where your national security would be at stake -- should the U.S. move its nuclear arms out of Europe, for instance -- I assure you we do not intend to do that -- then you would be able to denounce the treaty under the supreme national interest clause.

So you have one check against your fear in our constitutional system and another in the supreme-national-interest clause of the treaty. We understand that the position of the non-nuclear-weapons countries is vital for the future of the world; and we intend to find solutions that allow these countries to live in dignity with this treaty. We understand that we assume grave responsibilities with this treaty.

Mr. Barzel: Let me bring up one more point before leaving one of the busiest and most important men in the world. In the military area I have few doubts, but I have one political worry. You know we have a very progressive nuclear institution in Karlsruhe. In some small areas we may even be ahead of you.

One day, maybe when we file a fuel application in Vienna, the Soviets will denounce our efforts as military research. They have constantly tried to get at us in the past and would not be likely to pass up such an opportunity. You know we deliver reactors to other countries. We are living on a small area and have to make a living from technology.

At this time when ABMs and FOBs are already realities, we are supposed

to have our hands bound. This could put us into enough of a predicament one day that it may cause some type of explosion.

Mr. Rostow: These are two separate matters here. First, there is nothing in the treaty that prevents peaceful research. The treaty is concerned with non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Second, of course, the treaty cannot prevent the Soviets from mounting a propaganda attack against Karlsruhe or anything else. Nobody here at the White House believes that the Soviets wish either of us well.

I think I know how the President feels with regard to the defense of Europe. With all the heavy pressures from Vietnam, and with not a damn bit of help from Europe, he has not withdrawn any of our troops from Europe. In 1961 he was at the Wall in Berlin when it went up. We may have to stand together against propaganda attacks on Karlsruhe, or worse. Under pressure, our defense is not the NPT. It is that we remain partners that trust each other. To quote from Benjamin Franklin, "We must all hang together or surely we will all hang separately."

The simple fact is that Germany depends, and must depend, on collective nuclear defense. If you would not sign, and decided to defend yourself with your own nuclear weapons, you would

- (a) tear apart the Alliance
- (b) face a very difficult period during which you might well be destroyed.

We need a free and secure Germany. It is in our interest and yours. So let us find the answers to these specific questions together in the spirit of Benjamin Franklin. This spirit has prevailed between President Johnson and Chancellor Kiesinger so far. I see no salvation any other way. We have now lived together as friends and partners successfully for 25 years. So let us take these questions one by one and find common answers to them.

Mr. Barnet: I agree with you. No agreement or treaty will be any good unless we can trust each other.

Just one final point before I leave. A lot will depend on the manner in which the NPT report is presented to the UN. Will it be a case of "Bird eat or die!" (Vogel frisst oder stirbt), as we say in Germany, or will the birds be offered the food with an option to eat or not? Will there be a chance for any changes at the UN in the package sent up by Messrs. Foster and Roschin?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Mr. Rostow: (after consulting on the telephone) I am told that the debate in the UN will not be just pro forma. I do not see how it could be, anyhow. There will be some opportunity for changes at the UN level.

Mr. Barnet: I want to thank you, Walt, for giving me so much of your precious time. You may take the fact that I made this long trip solely to talk with you as a sign that we regard these questions with great seriousness.

(By Harry Obst
State Department Staff Interpreter)

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f

Monday, February 26, 1968 -- 6:00 PM

Mr. President:

You will recall your conversation with Frank Williams, our Ambassador to Ghana. He has now definitely decided to leave his post and accept appointment as director of a new center for the study of urban affairs at Columbia.

At Tab A is Frank's letter of resignation, effective June 1. It makes a point of the fact that he is leaving in part because he wants to work "as a valuable ancillary instrument of your own domestic concerns." But the letter does not mention precisely where he is going because the bargain with Columbia has not yet been finally struck.

This makes it a little awkward to release the letter unless we are prepared to stonewall on the question of Williams' destination. And we can be certain that this question will be asked because Williams, as one of the best-connected and highest ranking negroes in the Administration, will make more news than most departees.

At Tab B, for your signature, is a possible response to Williams' letter. You could:

- sign it now but hold the release until Williams is set at Columbia (probably about March 15) _____
- sign it now and release both letters _____
- hold the entire package for later signature and release (Williams has no problem with waiting, but the fact of his departure will certainly leak) _____
- sign it now but make no release. _____

W. W. Rostow

EKH/vmr

62a

FEB 29 1968

Dear Frank:

It is with sincere regret that I accept your resignation as United States Ambassador to Ghana. We will miss your wise counsel and the deep understanding you brought to the difficult and complex problems of the new Africa. I hope that your private capacity will permit us to draw on your experience and expertise from time to time as new problems and opportunities arise in the years ahead.

You have served your country and your President with great distinction. I know I speak for all your countrymen in wishing you every success as you turn your attention to the urgent problems we face at home.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

15/Lyndon B. Johnson

The Honorable
Franklin H. Williams
American Ambassador
American Embassy
Accra

LBJ/EKH/vmr 2/26/68



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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February 15, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

It is with reluctance and anticipation that I tender to you my resignation as Ambassador to Ghana, effective June 1, 1968. Reluctance, because it has been enormously gratifying to me to have served you and my country as Ambassador at the United Nations and to Ghana; and anticipation because I envision my impending role as a valuable ancillary instrument of your own domestic concerns.

My experiences over the past several years have been exciting and rewarding. I am especially pleased to have had the opportunity to serve in Accra during the time when this renascent African republic was reversing its economic and political ideologies and embarking with integrity on a path embracing democratic ideals and close friendship with our country and people. I am convinced that with our continued support and encouragement Ghana will succeed in implementing those ideals to the benefit of its own people and of the Free World generally.

I am aware of the confidence you placed in me by appointing me to serve as your personal representative to Ghana at this crucial time in history. I thank you for this confidence and sincerely hope that I have proved worthy of it.

That I have now decided to leave the Foreign Service is, in considerable measure, an indication of my support of the goals you have set for yourself on the domestic scene. My anticipation, therefore, is that now I shall have a chance to implement, in however modest a way, the domestic program you have envisioned. Before leaving your Administration, however, I must express my admiration and gratitude for the manner in which you have demonstrated through your appointments at high levels of government that your belief in equal opportunity is more than a platitude.

The President,

The White House.

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Please be assured that my allegiance is firm and I shall
respond in every way available to me to whatever service is
asked of me in the future.

In deepest gratitude, I am,

Sincerely,

Franklin H. Williams

Franklin H. Williams

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 26, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: U.S. Voluntary Agency Campaign for Vietnam Relief.

1. On February 10 Mr. Katzenbach recommended that the President approve Bill Gaud's convening of the Voluntary Agencies to launch a nationwide campaign to raise cash donations for relief in Vietnam. The President wished the views of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

2. Secretary Rusk has reviewed and recommends a quiet, selective approach to the whole problem, encouraging voluntary agencies to raise funds where they volunteer to do so. At some later time other contributions might also be quietly encouraged. AID will take administrative responsibility for this selective approach. Bill Gaud concurs.

3. Secretary McNamara agrees.

4. We understand CARE and Catholic Relief Service have already begun fund-raising drives for Vietnam relief.

5. Unless you rule to the contrary, we shall proceed on this low-key basis.

Rusk-McNamara approach approved _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

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C A P 80580
Pres file

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-249
By Cb, NARA Date 11-5-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Monday, February 26, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

I recommend that you sign the attached reply to President Nyerere's latest letter which you have read.

It sets him straight on the meaning of "no advantage" which he was misinterpreting.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-249
By CG, NARA Date 11-5-97

February 26, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you very much for your letter of January 20 in which you set forth some further thoughts on Viet-Nam arising from our earlier exchange of letters. I have read your most recent letter with great interest and appreciate very much that you have once again taken the time to write me as fully as you did.

I noted with interest your observations on Hanoi's recent statements in relation to the formulation I put forward at San Antonio, to which I drew your attention in my last letter. Without going into details with which I know you are familiar, I can only emphasize the importance of approaching a solution on the basis of the San Antonio formula, which we consider both reasonable and realistic.

We have sought through a variety of channels to explore Hanoi's reaction to this formula. These efforts have produced only negative results. The recent brutal attacks on the cities of South Viet-Nam -- with all the destruction and loss of life that went with them -- were a far more eloquent answer to the question of whether Hanoi truly wants peace than any diplomatic contacts have provided.

As you point out one of the cardinal elements of the San Antonio formula is our assumption that while discussions proceed North Viet-Nam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation. Or as I put it in my State of the Union message, to which you also refer, the other side must not take advantage of our restraint as they have in the past. I should point out that it is not tantamount, as you put it, "to demand that all supplies and reinforcements from the North should cease..." In point of fact, as Clark Clifford, our Secretary of Defense-designate, stated in reply to a question during hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we assume that Hanoi will "continue to transport the normal amount of goods, munitions and men to South Viet-Nam." Not to take advantage means just that, and there are available means for Hanoi to obtain clarification on how this might be interpreted under any given set of circumstances.

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Again let me thank you for your thoughtful letter and let me assure you that, as always, I value very highly your desire to make a constructive contribution to the cause of finding a just and durable peace settlement in Viet-Nam.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Julius K. Nyerere
President of Tanzania
Dar es Salaam

LBJ:WJJ:State:pas

2/13/68

20th January 1966

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President Lyndon Johnson,
The White House,
Washington D.C.,
United States of America.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-249
By CB, NARA Date 11-5-97

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 15th January, and your clear exposition of America's position on the possibility of opening talks with the Government of North Vietnam. I have studied this with care, and also your discussion of this subject in your State of the Union Message to the United States Congress. It is this study, together with the intensity of my desire to see peace in South East Asia, which has encouraged me to write further on the same matter.

As I think you are aware, I had written to His Holiness Pope Paul VI in December after he had announced his willingness to mediate in this conflict, and before the Foreign Minister of North Vietnam spelled out publicly the current position of his country - after which I wrote direct to you. After receiving my letter, His Holiness this week sent one of his Officials to see me, and we discussed at length the position of North Vietnam. I then called in the Charge d'Affaires of the North Vietnamese Embassy in Dar es Salaam and further pressed him on the points which seemed to be giving rise to doubt.

The position as I understand it therefore, is that the North Vietnamese are most certainly genuine in their desire for peace. As America is also genuine, it seems to me that our task is to translate this mutual desire into a chance of life for the Vietnamese people and the 500,000 American soldiers who are now in that country - for all of these people are now in danger of death or injury or misery.

The North Vietnamese have said they will talk if the bombing ceases; in your letter you say "the United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions"; and in your State of the Union Message, "The bombing would stop if talks would take place promptly and with reasonable hopes they would be productive".

In this there are thus two points of apparent difference. The first is how quickly the talks would start after the bombing had stopped. You say it must be 'promptly'; the North Vietnamese in their discussions with me have indicated that they would need an 'appropriate' period in which to convince themselves and the world that the bombing had really stopped and that they are therefore not talking under duress. I am not in a position to say

exactly what 'appropriate' means in this context; my impression, however, is that it would be something like three to four weeks. Let me repeat that this is just an impression; if you were interested I have no doubt but that you would be able to get more precise information on this point.

Your second point is that of 'reasonable hopes' that the talks would be productive. Here I do not know how anyone can answer. You and the North Vietnamese are certainly a long way apart in your interpretation of the war. To them it is a war of national liberation and a civil war within Vietnam; and to you it is a question of 'self-determination for South Vietnam'. Yet even here it seems to me that there is a basis for discussion if both sides are genuine, and that is the Geneva Agreement of 1954. The United States was involved in the Cease Fire Agreement, and Secretary of State Mr. Dulles was a member of the Conference which drew it up. Mr. Ho Chi Minh's Government was also involved in these discussions. Is this not a possible point of departure?

But the only way in which conflicting groups can really see whether there are 'reasonable hopes of productive discussions' is to enter into them with a determination to make them fruitful. I have no doubt but that at the beginning the North Vietnamese and yourselves would enter the Conference Room with wildly conflicting demands. I have equally no doubt but that in keeping with the United States principles of equality and self-determination these conflicting stands could be brought together. This is only an expression of opinion, but I do not see how it is possible for anyone to say more at this stage. If there were a mutually accepted mediator such as Pope Paul or U Thant it might be possible to find out more; but it appears to me to be unlikely that anyone could adopt such a role until after the bombing had stopped!

The American stand, however, goes one stage further. In your letter you say "We assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation"; and in your Message, "the other side must not take advantage of our restraint as they have in the past".

As I understand it, this demand is the real stumbling block on the road to peace. The North Vietnamese 50,000 or so troops, and the Vietcong, are largely supplied with arms and ammunition, and with some food, by the North; just as the American troops are supplied from the United States. Despite the bombing the supplies still continue, but it is obvious that your opponents do not have the same kind of reserves at the front line as the American troops do. To demand that all supplies and reinforcements from the North should cease is therefore tantamount to demanding that the opposition be allowed to run out of food and weapons while the fighting continues, and while the American troops continue to get normal supplies. With this fact in mind, I was not surprised when the North Vietnamese Charge d'Affaires indicated that his Government could not accept this American condition.

The point at issue, Mr. President, is the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam; not the cessation of bombing within South Vietnam - much as I personally long for the day when this happens. At present there are two

supply points for the war - North Vietnam and the United States. The condition for talks is that both the United States and North Vietnam should be equally free from bombardment. Is this really unreasonable?

Let me say again that I do realise the political difficulties you will face within the United States if you order the bombing to stop. But despite the fact that Ho Chi Minh's Government is a Communist one, that President too must have his political problems. There are North Vietnamese 'hawks' as well as American ones. Somehow a break-through has to be achieved. It is true that if the bombing stops the North Vietnamese people will repair their bridges and their roads, mend their houses and get their factories going. They are doing this all the time now; the difference will be that they will not be destroyed again. North Vietnam is a poor and undeveloped country; its people live at subsistence level. The restoration of motorised transport may make it easier for them to convey supplies to the border with South Vietnam - as easy as it is for America to transport her supplies there. But it will also make it possible for them to ensure that their citizens are fed and housed, and have minimal medical treatment, and so on. It is very evident now that they earnestly desire this.

Mr. President, you will see that I have taken full advantage of the kindness with which my last letter was received. But my objective is still the same - to contribute towards the development of peace in Vietnam. To this end I have abjured any discussion about the origins and the growth of this dreadful war, because I believe we know one another's attitude on this, and because arguments about the past do not matter now - what matters is the future. If these confidential communications between us can make any constructive contribution to that future I shall be well content.

Yours sincerely,

Julius K. Nye

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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February 26, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested Response to President Park

At Tab A is a suggested response to President Park's letter of February 9 (Tab B). It explains that you have delayed replying to his letter pending Mr. Vance's report on his discussions in Seoul of those questions raised in Park's letter. It expresses your appreciation for the frank and productive exchange of views with Mr. Vance, reiterates your concern about the situation presented by North Korean actions, and expresses your desire to keep in touch.

I recommend that you sign the letter.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

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NLJ 96-249
By CB, NARA Date 11-5-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

67a

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of February 9, 1968 reached me immediately before my personal representative, Mr. Cyrus Vance, left Washington for Seoul to confer with you on our common problems and to convey to you my views of the matters raised. I have delayed replying to your letter until after Mr. Vance had returned and reported to me on his talks with you.

Immediately upon his return I met at some length with Mr. Vance, who reported the thoroughness with which the points raised in your letter were gone into during his visit, and the common positions which were reached.

I want you to know how much I appreciate the frank and productive exchange of views which Mr. Vance had with you and senior officials of your government. This is the type of meaningful consultation which should always mark our relationship as friends and allies.

Mr. Vance reported to me in detail about your concerns and views with respect to the situation created by the threats and aggressive actions of the Pyongyang government. As you know, I am also deeply concerned over this situation. There are

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many things which we must consider in connection with it. I am studying carefully Mr. Vance's recommendations, and wish to remain in close contact with you through Ambassador Porter about these matters.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Chung Hee Park
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul

LBJ:State:AJ:mm:26 Feb 68



676

*Office of the President
Republic of Korea*

~~SECRET~~

(Translation)

February 9, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

Yesterday, I received your kind letter which has given details of your views again through Ambassador Porter.

I understand your view that the Pueblo incident, a question of immediate concern to you, should be dealt with separately "in somewhat different perspectives" and with differing tactics from the longer run question of ensuring the security of the Republic of Korea as you have termed.

However, the north Korean commandos' intrusion into Seoul has given such a particular and serious impact upon my people that an alien would find it hard to grasp it fully and the indignant feelings of my people against the north Korean Communists seem to have reached the apex.

Although it is understandable to me that you are seeking an earliest possible solution to the question of the Pueblo, you will no doubt know that my personal understanding cannot be equated with that of my fellow countrymen as you may have experienced yourself in dealing with various problems such as the Vietnam War.

If Your Excellency consider it absolutely necessary to have further closed meetings with the north Koreans in order to have the crew of the Pueblo back, it is likewise necessary for us to have your assurances on the following points:

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

1. The problem of the north Korean raiders' incursion on Seoul, as separate from the question of the Pueblo, will be brought before the Military Armistice Commission meetings in the immediately near future.
2. And we lodge a protest with the north Koreans; press them to admit the aggressive act, apologize for it and pledge that such an act will not be repeated in the future.
3. In case the north Koreans refuse to accept this and change their attitude:
 - A. The Republic of Korea and the United States Forces take an immediate retaliatory action in accordance with the provisions of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries;
 - B. And at the same time, issue a formal warning to them that the Republic of Korea and the United States Forces will take immediate punitive action, if the north Koreans make resort to such actions again in the future.

These, I believe, are the minimum measures required for ensuring the security of the Republic of Korea.

I know Your Excellency is concerned with the security of our country more greatly than anyone else and have taken measures to strengthen our national defense. This I appreciate always.

But a fact remains that the infiltrations by the north Koreans into the south have increased, not decreased, since the Armistice although we have done our utmost to strengthen our defense capability. Therefore, I want you to understand the increasingly keener awareness among my people that strengthened defense alone will not be complete in solving the problem of our security.

If we are to dissuade the north Koreans from their aggressive acts, simultaneously assuaging the wrath of my people, we should make the north Koreans fully recognize our resolute determination that we will not allow them to commit an aggressive act without subjecting themselves to our immediate punitive action.

What I have so far outlined above is related to the measures for ensuring the security of my country, for which you have shown such

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

a great concern, and I do not think that there may be any point of disagreement with you.

In summation, I am sure, that the security of the Republic of Korea rests on:

1. Strengthening of our defense capability to such an extent where we maintain an absolute supremacy over the north, and
2. Driving it home to the north Koreans that an aggressive act will be met with immediate, stern punitive action.

If the north Koreans feel free that they can act on a premise that aggression against the south can be committed with impunity, no increase in our defense capability will give complete solution to our cardinal problem, an effective guarantee against any re-invasion by the north.

With my warmest good wishes,

Sincerely,

/s/ Park Chung Hee

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

Feb. 26, 1968

Pres file

68

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Herewith an interim report on the Swiss businessman's (Umbricht) Hong Kong meeting with Hanoi officials. In short: no negotiation now; wait until end of April or early May. (That is when weather gets good in I Corps and Hanoi-Haiphong. Also time Geneva Conference opened in 1954 and Dien Bien Phu fell.)

"The Hong Kong conference was held with two unnamed Hanoi representatives and the Swiss Ambassador to Peking who had gone to Hanoi to escort the North Vietnamese representatives to Hong Kong. No Chinese representatives were present. The conference was not successful as the Hanoi representatives said they were not ready to negotiate now but said they would be ready in two months if the U. S. bombing ceased, at which time Hanoi would be willing to make certain concessions which Dr. Umbricht did not explain. The Hanoi representatives alluded to the great destruction resulting from the bombing and the Swiss Ambassador confirmed this since he was in Hanoi ostensibly on Red Cross business dealing with homeless civilians. While Dr. Umbricht did not name the Hanoi representatives, he said they represented the highest levels of the Hanoi government and believed they were sincere in the suggestion that Hanoi would be ready for negotiations by the end of April or early May."

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By Cb, NARA Date 11-5-97

SENT
1968 FEB 25 18 17 58

Sent 12:58

68 FEB 25 PM 1:15

SUNDAY

69

VV EEA225
OO WTE13
DE WTE 551

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority CSO ltr 10-11-78, NSC ltr 8-11-80
By wp/12, NARA, Date 3-4-92

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP 80566

~~TOP SECRET~~

HEREWITH BUS WHEELER'S TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ON THREE
ADDITIONAL TROOP PACKAGES TO CLOSE AT LATEST BY MAY 1,
SEPT. 1, AND DEC. 31, 1968, TOTTALLING 205,179.

HE UNDERLINES TENTATIVE CHARACTER OF FIGURES.

HIS BASIC ANALYSIS LEADING TO THESE RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOWS
IMMEDIATELY.

1. AS PER OUR TELECON THIS MORNING, MY IMPRESSIONS ON THE
SITUATION IN SVN ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE ENEMY MADE A MAJOR AND POWERFUL MILITARY EFFORT AT
THE BEGINNING OF TET. HIS CAMPAIGN WAS WELL PLANNED BUT, IN SOME
INSTANCES, POORLY TIMED AND EXECUTED. FORTUNATELY, BASED ON INTEL-
LIGENCE, WESTY STARTED TO DEPLOY AMERICAN TROOP ELEMENTS FROM BORDER
AREAS TO THE URBAN CENTERS ABOUT MID-JANUARY; HAD HE NOT DONE SO, I
AM CONVINCED THAT WE WOULD HAVE SUFFERED SEVERE SETBACKS IN II
CORPS AND III CORPS. IT WAS A VERY NEAR THING. I WILL HAVE ON MY
RETURN EXAMPLES OF HOW NARROW THE MARGIN WAS BETWEEN VICTORY
AND DEFEAT IN CERTAIN KEY AREAS.

B. THE ENEMY HAS SUFFERED VERY SUBSTANTIALLY, BUT HE STILL
HAS SIZEABLE UNCOMMITTED RESERVES. HE DISPLAYS A TENACITY WHICH WE
HAVE NOT SEEN BEFORE IN THIS WAR; INTELLIGENCE REVEALS THAT HE IS
CLINGING CLOSE TO URBAN PERIMETERS IN ORDER TO HARASS AND INTIMIDATE
THE POPULATION BY BOTH RUMOR AND GUERRILLA ACTION. HIS TACTICS MAY
BE DESCRIBED AS AN ATTEMPT TO STRANGLE THE CITIES BY DISRUPTING
THE FLOW OF FOOD, DESTROYING THE ECONOMY, AND SHAKING THE CONFIDENCE
OF THE PEOPLE. IT IS MY BELIEF HE HAS FORCES AVAILABLE FOR A SECOND
ROUND OF ATTACKS AGAINST SELECTED URBAN AREAS, INCLUDING SAIGON,
AND THE DISPOSITION OF HIS FORCES AND HIS ACTIONS SUBSTANTIATE HIS
INTENTION TO DO SO.

C. CONTRARY TO MANY NEWS MEDIA ACCOUNTS, ALL AMERICAN
OFFICERS STATE THAT THE ARVN FOUGHT VERY WELL, SOMETIMES UNDER
ADVERSE CIRCUMSTANCES. THERE WERE EXCEPTIONS BOTH WAYS; I.E., A FEW
REGULAR ARVN UNITS PERFORMED POORLY BECAUSE OF SUBCALIBER
LEADERSHIP (COMMANDERS INVOLVED HAVE BEEN OR ARE BEING RELIEVED),
WHILE CERTAIN RF AND PF UNITS BORE THE BRUNT OF EARLIER ATTACKS
AGAINST URBAN AREAS BY LARGE ENEMY FORCES AND ACQUITTED THEMSELVES
WELL.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

D. A CURRENT TROUBLESOME FACT IS THAT THE ARVN IS TOO MUCH CONCENTRATED ON SECURING THE URBAN AREAS AND IS NOT PUSHING OUT INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE TO FIND AND DESTROY THE ENEMY ENGAGED IN THE HARASSING, TERRORISM, AND STRANGULATION ACTIVITIES MENTIONED ABOVE. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH PRESIDENT THIEU, VICE PRESIDENT KY, AND GENERAL VIEN. WESTY IS WORKING WITH VIEN ON A PROGRAM WHICH WOULD HAVE VIETNAMESE POLICE FORCES GENERALLY CHARGED WITH SECURITY IN THE CITIES, SUPPORTED BY SMALL, MOBILE REGULAR ARVN TROOP ELEMENTS.

2. IT IS MY JUDGMENT THAT WESTY'S FORCES ARE STRETCHED TOO THIN. HE HAS HAD TO DRAW OFF AMERICAN TROOPS FROM II AND III CORPS AREAS IN ORDER TO MEET THE ENEMY THREAT IN NORTHERN I CORPS. HE HAS NO THEATER RESERVE WITH WHICH TO MEET CONTINGENCIES. I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST REINFORCE HIM PROMPTLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY. WHILE WE HAVE NOT FINISHED OUR DETAILED PLANNING, THE BROAD OUTLINE OF HIS REQUIREMENTS IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. NOT LATER THAN 1 MAY 1968, HE WANTS AN ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT, THE REMAINDER OF THE 5TH MARINE DIVISION, A BRIGADE OF THE 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECH) COMPRISED OF ONE TANK, ONE MECH, AND ONE INFANTRY BATTALION. HE ALSO WANTS AN ADDITIONAL EIGHT TAC FIGHTER SQUADRONS, THREE OF WHICH WOULD BE THOSE SQUADRONS INCLUDED IN PROGRAM 5 BUT WHOSE DEPLOYMENT WAS DEFERRED.

B. ASAP BUT PRIOR TO 1 SEPTEMBER 1968, HE WANTS THE REMAINDER OF THE 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECH), COMPRISED OF ONE TANK, ONE MECH, AND FOUR INFANTRY BATTALIONS, AND THE LIGHT ROK DIVISION. HE ALSO WANTS FOUR MORE TAC FIGHTER SQUADRONS WITH THIS PACKAGE.

C. HE WANTS NOT LATER THAN 31 DECEMBER 1968 ONE INFANTRY DIVISION AND THREE ADDITIONAL TAC FIGHTER SQUADRONS.

3. THE FOREGOING REQUESTS, PLUS COMBAT AND SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS AND OTHER BITS AND PIECES, WOULD RESULT IN A COMBAT FORCE STRUCTURE OF 133 US MANEUVER BATTALIONS, 37 FREE WORLD MILITARY ARMED FORCES MANEUVER BATTALIONS, AND 47 US TAC FIGHTER SQUADRONS. WE ESTIMATE THE US PORTION WILL REQUIRE ABOUT 200,000 ADDITIONAL US TROOPS.

4. AS POINTED OUT ABOVE, WE ARE STILL WORKING ON MACV'S REQUIREMENTS AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO, BOTH HERE AND IN HAWAII. I AM CONFIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT THE MAJOR STRUCTURE WILL NOT DEVIATE GREATLY FROM THAT OUTLINED.

5. IN SUMMARY, THE MILITARY SITUATION CONTINUES TO BE FLUID; THE ENEMY IS DETERMINED AND TENACIOUS; TROOP MORALE, BOTH US AND ARVN, IS GOOD; WESTY'S FORCES ARE STRETCHED THIN IN VIEW OF THE ENEMY THREAT AND THE COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO THE ENEMY. I DO NOT HAVE ANY APPREHENSION THAT WE WILL BE RUN OUT OF THE COUNTRY BY MILITARY ACTION, BUT I DO BELIEVE THAT TO ACHIEVE VICTORY WE MUST EXPAND OUR EFFORT SUBSTANTIALLY AND PROMPTLY.

WARM REGARDS.

THIS CABLE IS READDRESSSED WITH THE FOLLOWING NOTE OF CAUTION: IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL WHEELER AT 6:40 P.M., 24 FEB 1968, WASHINGTON TIME, GENERAL WHEELER INDICATED TO ME (GENERAL JOHNSON) THAT HIS FINAL REPORT MIGHT WELL ALTER THE VIEWS EXPRESSED HEREIN. HE RECOMMENDED THAT NO SPECIFIC ACTION BE TAKEN UNTIL HE RETURNED TO WASHINGTON AND PRESENTED HIS FINAL WRITTEN REPORT.

1. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH WESTY, SPIKE MOMYER, CUSHMAN, PEERS, WEYAND AND ECKHART, MY IMPRESSIONS ARE:

A. THE FIGHTING IS BY NO MEANS OVER.

B. LARGE ACTIONS ARE IN THE OFFING AT KHE SANH AND/OR HUE AND IN THE HIGHLANDS FROM DAK TO BAN ME THUOT.

C. THE ENEMY HAS SNUGGLED UP TO SAIGON WITH ELEMENTS OF SIX REGIMENTS AND STILL POSES A THREAT IN THE CAN THO AREA.

D. THE LOGISTICS SITUATION IN I CORPS IS MARGINAL AND STEPS TO IMPROVE IT ARE UNDERWAY.

E. ARVN HAS HELD UP EXTREMELY WELL BUT IS GENERALLY IN A DEFENSIVE ATTITUDE, AND THERE ARE SOME SOFT SPOTS. IN THIS CONNECTION, WESTY IS FINDING IT NECESSARY TO PICK UP SOME OF THE TAB FOR ARVN AROUND SAIGON AND IS CONTINUING TO DO SO AT HUE AND IN THE DELTA.

F. IF EXPECTED ENEMY INITIATIVES IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES, AND THE HIGHLANDS ARE SYNCHRONIZED WITH CONTINUED PRESSURE AT SAIGON AND THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WESTY WILL BE STRETCHED PAPER THIN.

2. I HAVE JUST COMPLETED MY FINAL DISCUSSIONS WITH WESTY ON FORCE REQUIREMENTS. MAJOR ELEMENTS AND APPROXIMATE STRENGTHS ARE LISTED BELOW:

PACKAGE	TIME	UNITS		MANEUVER BATTALION	TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS
		MAJOR UNITS			
A (PRIOR- ITY 1)	NOT LATER THAN 1MAY68	6 ARMD CAV REGT 5 MAR DIV (-) BDE 5TH INF DIV (M)	3 65 3	5 USMCSS 3 USAFSS	
B (PRIOR- ITY 2)	ASAP BUT NOT LATER THAN 1SEP68	5TH INF DIV (M) (-) ROK LIGHT DIV	6 6	4 USAF	
C (PRIOR- ITY 3)	NOT LATER THAN 31DEC68	INF DIV (USA)	9	3 USAF	

\$ INCLUDES 27TH MAR (REINF) NOW ENROUTE SEA.

\$\$ INCLUDES 3 TACTICAL FIGHTER SQUADRONS IN PROGRAM 5 APPROVED BUT NOT DEPLOYED

PACKAGE	STRENGTHS				
	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	TOTAL
A	54,000	8060	37,132	8797	107,983
B	31,600	4446	-----	5750	41,796
C	46,700	138	2,004	6558	55,400
	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
	132,300	12,644	39,136	21,099	205,179

3. THE STRENGTHS SHOWN ABOVE ARE BALL PARK FIGURES, BUT CONSIDERED BY WESTY AND STAFF TO BE FAIRLY VALID.

DTG 15/1646Z FEB 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

70
Sent 17:45
1968 FEB 25 17 45
ZEA224
PP WTE18
DE WTE 853

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80568

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL
FEB 25 PM 12:41
SUNDAY
Pres file
FEBRUARY 25, 1968

HEREWITH WESTY MOVES TO RESTRICT REPORTING OF USE TO THE ENEMY.

1. I AM CONCERNED THAT MUCH SENSITIVE INFORMATION IS BEING RELEASED TO THE PRESS. NEWSMEN HAVE BEEN REPORTING ON ENEMY BOMBARDMENT OF THE KHE SANH AND SAIGON AREA GIVING AN EXACT COUNT OF INCOMING ROUNDS AND RESULTING CASUALTIES.

2. ALL ECHELONS SHOULD NOW BE DIRECTED TO:

A. WITHHOLD RELEASE OF NUMBER OF ENEMY ARTILLERY/MORTAR ROUNDS RECEIVED AND RESULTING FRIENDLY CASUALTIES AT SPECIFIC LOCATIONS.

B. RE-EMPHASIZE TO PRESS THAT THIS INFORMATION IS NOT RELEASABLE AND ENCOURAGE THEIR COOPERATION IN NOT REPORTING BOMBARDMENT/CASUALTY DATA WHICH THEY MAY OBSERVE, POINTING OUT THAT THIS IS VALUABLE INTELLIGENCE FOR THE ENEMY.

3. ADDITIONALLY IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED AT ALL ECHELONS THAT PRECISE LOCATIONS WITH EXACT TROOP STRENGTHS ARE NOT RELEASABLE.

4. WE CANNOT CONTINUE TO SERVE AS SPOTTERS FOR ENEMY ARTILLERY. ON-SCENE REPORTING IS GETTING OUT OF HAND. CARELESS MISUSE OF INFORMATION SERVES ONLY TO BENEFIT THE ENEMY.

5. WARM REGARDS.

DTG 251651Z FEB 68

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By RG, NARA, Date 2-28-92

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988

By RG, NARA, Date 2-28-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

See 12:44

1968 FEB 25 17 44

1968 FEB 25 PM 12:44
SUNDAY

EEA226
PP WTE10
DE WTE 854

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80569

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEBRUARY 25, 1968

HEREWITH FURTHER EVIDENCE OF GRADUAL IMPROVEMENT AROUND QUANG TRI.

THE SITUATION IN QUANG TRI CITY REMAINS RELATIVELY CALM, BUT THE SANH BASE HAS BEEN TAKING A LARGE NUMBER OF ROCKET AND MORTAR ROUNDS. THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION, ESPECIALLY TO THE EAST AND WEST, IN THE LOWLANDS HAVE RECEIVED SPORADIC FIRE. DURING THE NIGHT OF 24/25 FEBRUARY FOR THE FIRST TIME SOME OF THE RD SUPPORT BATTALIONS STAYED IN THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AREA NORTH OF QUANG TRI CITY. U.S. AND VIETNAMESE FORCES IN THE LOWLANDS HAVE BEEN MOVING ABOUT ACTIVELY SEEKING TO CORNER THE ENEMY. NO LARGE ENGAGEMENTS HAVE RESULTED, BUT MANY NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY HAVE BEEN KILLED. THE NVA SEEMED TO HAVE NO FIGHT LEFT AND SOME WERE CAUGHT BREAKING AND RUNNING. THE ENEMY HAS BEEN PROPAGANDIZING OF ANOTHER ATTACK, BUT THIS SEEMS TO BE IN TERMS OF THE FUTURE, TWO OR THREE MONTHS, RATHER THAN VERY SOON.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 251733Z FEB 68

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *hgy*, NARA, Date 2-28-92

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By *hgy*, NARA, Date 2-28-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EEA223
PP WTE10 WTE15
DE WTE 852

RECEIVED
WHCA

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAR30567

1968 FEB 25 17 25

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

Pres file

72
68 FEB 25 PM 12:31
SUNDAY

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A PROPOSED STATEMENT YOU MAY WISH TO MAKE ON THE BATTLE AT HUE, INCLUDING A PLEDGE TO HELP RESTORE THE ANCIENT CAPITAL AND CULTURAL CENTER. STATE APPROVES AND IT INCORPORATES AMBASSADOR BUNKER'S IDEAS.

BUNKER NOTES HOWEVER THAT FIGHTING CONTINUES IN ONE SMALL AREA. HE ALSO REPORTS THAT THIEU AND KY ARE VISITING HUE TODAY. HE URGED THAT THIS STATEMENT NOT REPEAT NOT BE ISSUED HERE UNTIL THIEU AND KY HAVE RETURNED AND UNTIL WE GET WORD FROM THE MISSION THAT HUE HAS BEEN FULLY CLEARED. BUNKER THINKS THIS KIND OF STATEMENT WOULD THEN BE QUOTE PARTICULARLY TIMELY. UNQUOTE.

BEGIN TEXT:

TODAY A GALLANT YET TRAGIC VICTORY WAS WON IN THE CITY OF HUE.

THE BRAVERY OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND UNITED STATES FORCES WHO RE-TOOK THE ANCIENT CITADEL IN BITTER FIGHTING WAS IN THE HIGHEST TRADITION OF MILITARY VALOR.

IT WAS A VICTORY BECAUSE WE KNOW THE GREAT IMPORTANCE THE ENEMY ATTACHED TO HOLDING HUE--AN IMPORTANCE UNDERLINED BY THE INCREDIBLE BRUTALITY AND TERROR AGAINST CIVILIAN OFFICIALS AND AN INNOCENT POPULACE WHICH ACCOMPANIED THEIR ATTACK ON A SACRED CITY AT A SACRED TIME.

IT WAS TRAGIC BECAUSE SO MUCH OF A BEAUTIFUL CITY, RICH IN HISTORY AND HERITAGE, HAS BEEN DESTROYED.

WE AMERICANS ARE NOW ENGAGED WITH THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IN REPAIRING AND RESTORING THE DAMAGE INFLECTED THROUGHOUT VIET-NAM. WE WILL CONTINUE TO HELP IN HEALING THE SCARS OF THE TET ATTACK. TODAY, WE WANT PARTICULARLY TO PLEDGE TO THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM THAT TOGETHER WE WILL REBUILD THE ANCIENT CITY OF HUE, AND THAT THE HISTORY AND TRADITION OF THIS CITY WILL BE THE MORE HONORED AND CHERISHED BY THE FACT THAT BRAVE MEN FOUGHT AND DIED TO MAKE IT A CITADEL OF FREEDOM AND NOT OF TERROR. (END TEXT)

EDTE: 251551Z FEB 68

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *Org*, NARA, Date *6/25/96*

~~TOP SECRET~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

VZCZCEEA222

00 WTE10

DE WTE 848

1968 FEB 25 16 19

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *10-3-78*

By *1/12*, NAKA, Date *8-3-92*

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80565

~~TOP SECRET~~

FEBRUARY 25, 1968

HEREWITH GEN. JOHNSON'S REPORT OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
GENERAL WESTMORELAND

1. GENERAL WESTMORELAND INDICATED THAT HIS DAILY CABLE
AND OPERATIONS REPORTS COVERED THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
COMPREHENSIVELY. HE ADDED THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AS OF THE
TIME OF MY CONVERSATION WITH HIM.

THE RECOVERY OF HUE WAS A SIGNIFICANT MORALE BOOSTER TO
THE VIETNAMESE IN THE AREA. PRESIDENT THIEU VISITED HUE
AND EXTENDED HIS CONGRATULATIONS TO THE FORCES THERE.
THE VIETNAMESE INTEND TO RETAIN THREE VIETNAMESE MARINE
BATTALIONS IN AND AROUND THE CITY. THE 3D ARVN REGIMENT
OF THE FIRST ARVN DIVISION WILL RETURN TO ITS OPERATIONAL
AREA NORTHWEST OF THE CITY WHERE IT WILL RECEIVE
REPLACEMENTS AND HAVE ITS COMBAT CAPABILITY RESTORED.

2. DURING THE DAY SOME ENEMY 130MM ARTILLERY SHELLS
LANDED AT DONG HA. IN THE RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE SOUTHEAST OF
SAIGON ONE TUG AND ONE MERCHANT SHIP WERE TAKEN UNDER FIRE BY
WHAT ARE PRESUMED TO BE RECOILLESS RIFLES AND POSSIBLY RPG-2
AND RPG-7 ROCKETS. ALL DAMAGE WAS ABOVE THE WATER LINE AND
THE TUG AND THE SHIP PROCEEDED TO SAIGON UNDER THEIR OWN POWER.

3. THE PATTERN OF ENEMY ACTIONS INDICATES AN ENEMY EFFORT
TO ISOLATE AND STRANGLE MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS WITH A
SPECIAL EFFORT DIRECTED TOWARD SAIGON.

4. THE GENERAL TEMPO OF ACTIVITY THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM
APPEARS TO BE SLOWING DOWN SOMEWHAT. THE ENEMY IS HARDER TO
FIND AND HE APPEARS TO BE BREAKING DOWN INTO SMALLER UNITS.

5. GENERAL WESTMORELAND CONTINUES TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE
DETAIL CONTAINED IN NEWS STORIES FILED FROM SOUTH VIETNAM. HE
EXPECTS TO HAVE A REVIEW OF HIS PROCEDURES COMPLETED BY THE
EVENING OF 26 FEBRUARY AND IS PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THE CREDENTIALS
OF CERTAIN REPORTERS IF GROUND RULES HAVE, IN FACT, BEEN VIOLATED
BY THEM.

6. THE STAYING POWER OF THE ARVN CONTINUES TO BE UNDER
INTENSIVE STUDY. VIETNAMESE UNITS HAVE NOW BEEN ENGAGED ACTIVELY
FOR ABOUT 26 DAYS. THEY HAVE SUFFERED MORE THAN A NORMAL NUMBER
OF CASUALTIES. SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE TAKEN
THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

A. SEPARATIONS (DISCHARGES) FROM THE MILITARY FORCES
HAVE BEEN DISCONTINUED FOR THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE PERFORMED
LESS THAN 5 YEARS OF ACTIVE SERVICE.

B. INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN SEPARATED IN THE PAST
WITH LESS THAN 5 YEARS OF ACTIVE SERVICE ARE BEING RECALLED TO
ACTIVE SERVICE. GENERAL WESTMORELAND DOES NOT BELIEVE ANY SUB-
STANTIAL NUMBER HAVE YET RETURNED TO DUTY BECAUSE THIS PROGRAM
HAS JUST BEEN STARTED.

C. INDIVIDUALS CHARGED WITH MILITARY OFFENSES AND
SERVING IN LABOR UNITS OR CONFINED IN MILITARY CONFINEMENT FACILI-
TIES HAVE BEEN GRANTED AMNESTY AND ARE BEING RETURNED TO THEIR
MILITARY UNITS.

D. SOME INDIVIDUALS ARE IN TRAINING TO MEET REQUIRE-
MENTS OF THE EXPANDED VIETNAMESE MILITARY STRUCTURE. GENERAL
WESTMORELAND DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THESE INDIVIDUALS WILL BE
DIVERTED TO REPLACE THE HIGHER THAN EXPECTED CASUALTIES IN THE
EXISTING MILITARY STRUCTURE. (MY COMMENT: DIVERSION TO REPLACE
CASUALTIES WILL BE AT THE EXPENSE OF FORMING THE ADDITIONAL ARVN
MILITARY UNITS.)

7. GENERAL WESTMORELAND RECEIVED A LETTER DAY BEFORE
YESTERDAY FROM GENERAL VIEN, CHIEF OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE JOINT
GENERAL STAFF, POINTING OUT THE UNFAVORABLE IMPACT ON VIETNAMESE
MORALE OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF MODERN WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF
ENEMY UNITS, INCLUDING INDIVIDUAL GUERRILLAS. GENERAL WESTMORELAND
INDICATED THE VIETNAMESE HAVE NO CONFIDENCE IN THE CARBINE AND
DESCRIBED IT AS A "POP GUN."

8. GENERAL WHEELER DEPARTED SAIGON AT APPROXIMATELY 4 P.M.,
SUNDAY, SAIGON TIME FOR BANGKOK.

1968 FEB 25 AM 11:26

SUNDAY

~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80565

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *gesta 10-3-78*
By *phg*, NARA, Date *8-3-92*

Pres file

8 25 W 11:26
SUNDAY

~~TOP SECRET~~

FEBRUARY 25, 1968

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SUNDAY, SAIGON TIME FOR BANGKOK.

DTG: 251532Z FEB 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

Feb 9:24 AM

74

1968 FEB 25 14 24

VV EEA221
OO WTE13
DE WTE 847

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80564

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD la 1/3/79

By ip/hg, NARA, Date 3-3-92

68 FEB 25 AM 9:30

SUNDAY

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

MR. ROSTOW WILL BE IN LATER THIS MORNING AND WILL HAVE A COMMENT ON THIS REPORT FOR YOU.

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND.

THIS IS REPORT NUMBER TWENTY-ONE ON THE SITUATION IN THE KHE SANH/DMZ AREA AND COVERS THE 24-HOUR PERIOD FEBRUARY 24, 1968.

ENEMY ACTION SLACKENED CONSIDERABLY IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE YESTERDAY AS COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS DAY'S ACTIVITIES. ENEMY SHELLING DECREASED GREATLY. THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE WAS AGAIN THE PRIMARY TARGET OF THE ENEMY SHELLING AS THE FRIENDLY FORCES RECEIVED OVER HALF OF THE 532 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY, ROCKET, AND MORTAR ROUNDS DIRECTED AGAINST OUR AREAS YESTERDAY. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES AT KHE SANH AS THE RESULT OF THE ENEMY SHELLING AMOUNTED TO SEVEN KILLED AND 20 WOUNDED, WITH 11 WOUNDED EVACUATED.

ENEMY EFFORTS RELAXED IN THE LANCASTER AREA AS ONLY ONE MORTAR ROUND IMPACTED AT CAMP CARROLL. FOUR ROUNDS OF MORTAR FELL AT DONG HA WITH FOUR ADDITIONAL ROUNDS FALLING AT C-2. FIVE MARINES REQUIRED EVACUATION AT C-2. ENEMY SHELLING INTENSIFIED AT CON THIEN, HOWEVER, AS THAT BASE RECEIVED 237 EARLY AFTERNOON ROUNDS OF MORTAR AND ARTILLERY, RESULTING IN TWO MARINES KILLED, AND FIVE WOUNDED AND EVACUATED. AT CUA VIET, THE 1ST AMTRAC BATTALION RECEIVED 18 ROUNDS OF 100MM ARTILLERY IN THE AFTERNOON, WITH THREE MARINES REQUIRING EVACUATION. OTHER THAN SHELLING, ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA CONSISTED OF THREE SPORADIC CONTACTS INVOLVING THE 3D BATTALION.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

30 MARINES AND THE 1ST BATTALION, 4TH MARINES IN OPERATION KENTUCKY. THEY ENGAGED AND KILLED 11 NVA WHILE SUSTAINING NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES. IN AN OBSERVED FIRE MISSION YESTERDAY, FIVE NVA WERE KILLED IN THE OPEN ABOUT SEVEN KILOMETERS SOUTHEAST OF CAMP CARROLL. AT CUA VIET A NAVY CONVOY WITH THREE UTILITY LANDING CRAFTS, ONE MECHANIZED LANDING CRAFT, AND PATROL CRAFT, RECEIVED ANTI-TANK ROCKET, AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE AND MORTAR FIRE, RESULTING IN TWO USN WOUNDED AND EVACUATED.

THERE WERE FIVE ROUNDS OF COFRAN TYPE ORDNANCE FIRED DURING THIS PERIOD, MIXED WITH HIGH EXPLOSIVES, ON TROOPS IN THE OPEN, WITH UNDETERMINED RESULTS DUE TO OBSERVER-TO-TARGET RANGE.

A TOTAL 294 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES WERE FLOWN DURING THE PERIOD IN SUPPORT OF KHE SANH. MARINE AIRCRAFT FLEW 92 SORTIES, WITH BOMB DAMAGE INCLUDING THREE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS, FOUR SECONDARY FIRES, AND TWO BUNKERS DESTROYED. THE AIR FORCE FLEW 162 SORTIES, THE NAVY FLEW 40, WITH 126 SORTIES ON COMBAT SKY-SPOT. VISUAL BOMB DAMAGE INCLUDED TWO SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS, SEVEN SECONDARY FIRES, FIVE MILITARY STRUCTURES DESTROYED, AND 30 MILITARY STRUCTURES DAMAGED. SEVEN B-52 STRIKES (36 SORTIES) WERE FLOWN IN THE NIAGARA AREA.

AERIAL RESUPPLY TO KHE SANH FOR THE PERIOD AMOUNTED TO 152 SHORT TONS. SIXTY-NINE PASSENGERS WERE LANDED AT THE AIRFIELD. RESUPPLY SORTIES TOTALLED 24 ON 24 FEBRUARY. NINE C-130 AIRCRAFT COMPLETED NINE AIR-DROPS. FIVE C-123 AIRCRAFT LANDED AT THE AIRFIELD AS DID TEN MARINE HELICOPTERS.

FOR THE NEXT 24 HOURS 288 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES WILL BE FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF KHE SANH. THERE WILL BE SEVEN ARC LIGHT STRIKES (39 SORTIES) FLOWN IN THE NIAGARA AREA.

WEATHER AT KHE SANH DURING THE PERIOD REMAINED ABOUT THE SAME. CLOUDS REDUCED THE CEILING TO LESS THAN 600 FEET AND DENSE FOG LOWERED THE SURFACE VISIBILITY TO LESS THAN THREE MILES. FROM 11:00AM - 5:00PM THERE WAS SOME IMPROVEMENT AS THE CEILING LIFTED TO 1700 FEET AND THE VISIBILITY TO SEVEN MILES. THE FORECAST FOR 25 - 26 FEBRUARY DOES NOT INDICATE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE.

I AM VERY PLEASED TO REPORT THAT HUE CITADEL WAS CLEARED OF ENEMY AND SECURED AT 7:30AM. I HAVE JUST SENT MY CONGRATULATIONS TO GEN TRUONG.

DTG 25/1335Z FEB 67

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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OO WTE10
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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80560

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

²⁴
FEBRUARY 23, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT

ATTACHED IS A MEMO FROM NICK KATZENBACH ENCLOSING A DRAFT LETTER FROM YOU TO CHANCELLOR KIESINGER ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. SECRETARY FOWLER CLEARED THE LETTER.

THERE IS SOME FEELING YOU SHOULD SEND SUCH A LETTER BY TOMORROW SO AS TO INFLUENCE AN EEC FINANCE MINISTER'S MEETING THAT WILL BE HELD IN ROME ON MONDAY. THE POINT WOULD BE TO KEEP THE HEAT ON KIESINGER TO PUSH HARD FOR THE COMMON MARKET TO MAKE THEIR KENNEDY ROUND CUTS AHEAD OF SCHEDULE - WHICH WOULD GIVE US TRADE BENEFITS FOR OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. IT IS AN ATTRACTIVE PROPOSAL, BUT THE FRENCH ARE OPPOSED AND THEY CAN VETO IT. NEVERTHELESS THE GERMANS ARE STILL PUSHING IT AND SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO DO SO.

NICK'S FINAL JUDGEMENT, HOWEVER, IS THAT WE SHOULD WAIT UNTIL TUESDAY WHEN AMBASSADOR TREZISE GETS HERE AND REPORTS ON HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EUROPEANS ON THE TRADE PROPOSALS. WE WOULD THEN BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO REVIEW THE ALTERNATIVES AND REDRAFT THE LETTER TO KIESINGER IN THOSE TERMS.

I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD SEND A FOLLOWUP LETTER TO KIESINGER BUT PREFERABLY AFTER THE TREZISE REPORT AND THE REVIEW OF OUR POSITIONS. THIS TIME SCHEDULE WOULD ALSO MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO INCLUDE IN THE KIESINGER LETTER REFERENCE TO THE INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MEASURES IN LIGHT OF THE VIETNAM DECISIONS YOU MAY BE MAKING NEXT WEEK.

WVR

SEND LETTER NOW -----

HOLD FOR A FEW DAYS PENDING
REVIEW OF TRADE PROPOSALS -----

SUBJECT: LETTER TO CHANCELLOR KIESINGER ON THE BALANCE OF
PAYMENTS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-249

By cb, NARA Date 4-5-97

ATTACHED FOR YOUR APPROVAL IS A SUGGESTED LETTER TO KIESINGER WHICH FOLLOWS UP ON YOUR EARLIER LETTER TO HIM ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED AN ANSWER TO YOUR PREVIOUS LETTER, THERE ARE SOME REASONS WHY YOU SHOULD HAVE ANOTHER GO AT HIM:

-- GERMAN LEADERSHIP IS ESSENTIAL IF WE ARE TO GET THE EUROPEANS TO MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS;

-- ANOTHER LETTER FROM YOU WILL DEMONSTRATE YOUR PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE ISSUE, AND WILL HELP US BUILD THE RIGHT RECORD. WE MUST BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE--IN THE EVENT WE ARE FORCED TO TAKE RESTRICTIVE MEASURES--THAT WE HAVE FIRST MADE EVERY EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE EUROPE TOWARD EXPANSIONARY POLICIES.

THERE ARE SOME DISADVANTAGES TO A LETTER NOW. IT ENGAGES YOUR PRESTIGE AT A TIME WHEN IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR THE GERMANS WILL BE ABLE TO RESPOND AFFIRMATIVELY. THE DRAFT LETTER, FOR EXAMPLE, SUGGESTS THAT THE EUROPEANS ACCELERATE THEIR KENNEDY-ROUND TARIFF REDUCTIONS. I SEE VERY LITTLE CHANCE--GIVEN THE ATTITUDE OF THE FRENCH--THAT THIS PROPOSAL WILL SUCCEED.

THE LETTER ALSO SUGGESTS THAT THE GERMANS REFLATE. THIS IS AN ISSUE ON WHICH THE GERMAN CABINET IS DIVIDED AND WHERE A PUSH FROM YOU MIGHT HELP TIP THE BALANCE IN OUR FAVOR.

GENE ROSTOW AND JOHN LEDDY FEEL STRONGLY THAT NOW IS THE TIME FOR YOU TO HAVE ANOTHER GO AT KIESINGER. I AM INCLINED TO AGREE--LARGELY BECAUSE WE DO NEED TO BUILD A RECORD--BUT WE SHOULD NOT BE TOO SANGUINE ABOUT THE RESULTS.

THE ADVANTAGE OF SENDING A LETTER TO KIESINGER NOW IS THAT THE GERMANS ARE IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING DECISIONS ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT. THE ADVANTAGE OF WAITING IS THAT PHIL TREZISE--WHO RETURNS ON TUESDAY--MAY COME UP WITH SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON HOW WE SHOULD HANDLE THE GERMANS.

THUS, IF YOU DECIDE TO WRITE KIESINGER THE LETTER WILL HAVE TO GO SOON. HOWEVER, IN MY JUDGEMENT, I DO THINK WE CAN AWAIT TREZISE'S RETURN AND THE THOROUGH REVIEW OF ALL ALTERNATIVES THAT WE WILL GO THROUGH ONCE WE GET THIS REPORT.

/S/ NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH

SEND LETTER NOW-----

HOLD PENDING REVIEW
OF TREZISE REPORT-----

ATTACHMENT:
DRAFT LETTER.

SUGGESTED LETTER

DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR:

I WAS GREATLY ENCOURAGED TO HAVE UNDERSECRETARY ROSTOW'S REPORT OF HIS TALK WITH YOU ON BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POLICY, AND THE REPORT FROM HIM AND AMBASSADOR TREZISE ABOUT THEIR CONVERSATIONS ON THE SAME SUBJECT WITH MEMBERS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION. IF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ACCEPTS YOUR STRONG AND CONSTRUCTIVE LEAD, I BELIEVE YOU WILL HAVE MADE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION NOT ONLY TO OUR COMMON ECONOMIC WELFARE, BUT TO THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE, AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES. THE TEST WILL COME IN THE DAYS AHEAD, AS WE MOVE FROM GENERAL WORDS TO CONCRETE ACTIONS.

I KNOW I DON'T HAVE TO STRESS TO YOU THE RECIPROCAL DANGERS OF ISOLATIONISM ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC IN THIS PERIOD OF STRESS AND TRANSITION. SUCCESS IN THE APPROACH YOU DISCUSSED WITH UNDERSECRETARY ROSTOW, MR. CHANCELLOR, WOULD BE A TONIC FOR THE ALLIANCE, AND A VERY GREAT ACHIEVEMENT ON A MOST CRITICAL AND SENSITIVE FRONT. I HAVE NO DOUBT ITS BENEFICENT EFFECTS WOULD BE FELT IN MANY AREAS, AND FOR A LONG TIME. IT IS A GOAL WORTH A GREAT DEAL OF EFFORT.

I WAS PLEASED TO LEARN THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT AGREES THAT AN EXPANSIONARY SOLUTION IN WESTERN EUROPE TO IMPROVE OUR BALANCE OF TRADE WOULD BE DESIRABLE. MEMBERS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE SUGGESTED AS ONE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SURPLUS COUNTRIES OF EUROPE MIGHT ACCELERATE THEIR KENNEDY ROUND TARIFF REDUCTIONS. THIS IS ONE EXAMPLE OF AN EXPANSIONARY MEASURE WHICH WOULD HELP TO ACHIEVE EQUILIBRIUM IN THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AS A WHOLE. IT COULD FACILITATE THE ADJUSTMENT OF SURPLUSES AND DEFICITS THROUGH ENLARGING TRADE, AND STRENGTHENING THE INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY ON WHICH WE ALL DEPEND. THERE ARE OTHER PROMISING TRADE STEPS WHICH AMBASSADOR TREZISE HAS DISCUSSED. BUT AS AMBASSADOR TREZISE SAID IN THIS MEETING IN BONN, WE SHALL SOON HAVE TO MAKE A DECISION HERE AMONG THE ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF IMPROVING OUR TRADE ACCOUNT.

ACTION TO INFLUENCE THE FLOW OF TRADE SHOULD OF COURSE GO BEYOND TRADE MEASURES AS SUCH. RATES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR INFLUENCING THE LEVEL OF TRADE BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES AND WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD. IF THE SURPLUS COUNTRIES TAKE MEASURES TO ACCELERATE THEIR GROWTH WHILE THE DEFICIT COUNTRIES ACT TO RESTRAIN THEIR ECONOMIES, OUR ACTIONS SHOULD LEAD HARMONIOUSLY AND DIRECTLY TO AN IMPROVED INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS SITUATION. THIS IS WHY BOTH OUR COUNTRIES ACTIVELY SUPPORT THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT MINISTERIAL RESOLUTION OF LAST DECEMBER CALLING FOR INTENSIFIED COOPERATION BETWEEN SURPLUS AND DEFICIT COUNTRIES.

BUT WE MUST NOW MOVE OUT OF THE REALM OF THEORY AND GENERAL RESOLUTIONS AND DOWN TO THE LEVEL OF CONCRETE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO MEMBER COUNTRIES YOUR REFLATIONARY POLICIES INSTITUTED LAST FALL, AND THE RECENT DECISIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ARE STEPS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION BUT WE ARE INCLINED TO THINK THEY WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT IN THEMSELVES TO BRIDGE THE GAP.

WE HAVE BEFORE US AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE THESE QUESTIONS TOGETHER, AND TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION IN CONCERT, AT THE HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS OF THE OECD TO BE HELD IN PARIS DURING THE FIRST WEEK IN MARCH. WE MUST SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY. IT IS A TEST OF THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE TO WORK TOGETHER TO PRESERVE THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND MONETARY SYSTEM WHICH WE SO LABORIOUSLY CREATED FROM THE ASHES OF WAR.

THERE IS A NATURAL TENDENCY IN THE FACE OF A COMPLEX PROBLEM TO ADOPT THE EASIEST SOLUTION. I FEAR THAT IN THE CASE OF TRADE THE SEEMINGLY EASIEST SOLUTION MAY ULTIMATELY CAUSE US THE MOST DIFFICULTY. THE TIME, THEREFORE, HAS COME FOR US TO BREAK NEW GROUND IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WHICH WOULD TURN THE PROBLEM OF RESTORING EQUILIBRIUM INTO A CHALLENGE RATHER THAN A PITFALL. IT WOULD BE ENTIRELY FITTING TO DO THIS IN THE SAME HOUSE IN PARIS SO CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH AN EARLIER BOLD EXPERIMENT IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION--THE EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM. IF WE ACHIEVE SUCH COOPERATION AT THE FORTHCOMING MEETINGS, IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IN OVERCOMING THE DIFFICULT PROBLEM RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE WHICH HAVE PREVIOUSLY OUTLINED AND WHICH UNDER SECRETARIES KATZENBACH AND ROSTOW, AND AMBASSADOR TREZISE HAVE DISCUSSED IN BONN.

IN MY JUDGEMENT, SUCH COOPERATION CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED WITH THE ACTIVE LEADERSHIP OF THE GERMAN REPRESENTATIVES. I SHALL ASK MR. OKUN, THE HEAD OF OUR DELEGATION TO THE ECONOMIC POLICY COMMITTEE, AND UNDER SECRETARY DEMING, THE HEAD OF OUR DELEGATION TO WORKING PARTY 3 ON INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS EQUILIBRIUM, TO WORK ESPECIALLY CLOSELY WITH THE GERMAN REPRESENTATIVES.

WITH CORDIAL GOOD WISHES,

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

HIS EXCELLENCY

DR. KURT GEORG KIESINGER,
CHANCELLOR OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY.

DGR: 250105Z FEB 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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100 FEB 24 20 52

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH80552

UNCLAS

NICK PROPOSED THAT ARTHUR GOLDBERG RESPOND TO U THANT'S
STATEMENT TO DE-ESCALATE THE AFFAIR.

THE SUGGESTED GOLDBERG STATEMENT CLEARED BY NICK FOLLOWS.

WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S
STATEMENT, THE ESSENTIALS OF WHICH WERE REPORTED BY HIM DURING
THE USEFUL TALKS WHICH TOOK PLACE THIS WEEK IN WASHINGTON.
WE ASSURED HIM THEN THAT WE SHARE FULLY HIS DESIRE FOR A
POLITICAL SOLUTION AND AN END TO THE HOSTILITIES IN VIET-NAM.
WE EXPRESSED OUR CONVICTION THAT DISCUSSIONS, TO BE PRODUCTIVE,
SHOULD TAKE PLACE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD NOT DIS-
ADVANTAGE EITHER SIDE.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL BELIEVES THAT DISCUSSIONS WOULD
START "EVEN PERHAPS WITHIN A MATTER OF A FEW DAYS" IF THE
BOMBING OF NORTH VIET-NAM CEASED UNCONDITIONALLY. WE HAVE
BEEN SEEKING PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY AND WOULD WELCOME
CONFIRMATION FROM HANOI THAT TALKS WOULD START PROMPTLY IN
CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE WE COULD REASONABLY ASSUME THAT NORTH
VIET-NAM WOULD NOT TAKE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF THE BOMBING
CESSATION.

FOR REFERENCE: U THANT'S TEXT FOLLOWS:

TEXT OF STATEMENT BY SECRETARY-GENERAL U THANT ON VIET-NAM

VARIOUS QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN RAISED, AND DIFFERENT INTER-
PRETATIONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN, FOLLOWING MY RECENT TALKS IN CERTAIN
CAPITALS. INDEED, IT IS FOR ME A GREAT ADVANTAGE IN THE DISCHARGE
OF MY RESPONSIBILITIES AS SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED
NATIONS TO BE ABLE TO MEET AT INTERVALS WITH LEADERS OF
GOVERNMENTS AND TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH THEM. OBVIOUSLY, IN
THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THE WAR IN VIET-NAM HAS TAKEN
PRECEDENCE OVER ALL OTHER SUBJECTS IN THE DISCUSSIONS, SIMPLY
AS A RESULT OF THE INCREASING CONCERN THAT THIS WAR CAUSES THE
WORLD OVER. ALTHOUGH IT IS FOR THE PARTIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED,
ULTIMATELY, -- AND, I HOPE, SOON -- TO TAKE THE STEPS AND
ESTABLISH THE CONTACTS NECESSARY FOR NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH THEY
KNOW MUST TAKE PLACE IF THIS WAR IS EVER TO BE BROUGHT TO AN END,
THE VIET-NAM CONFLICT HAS REPERCUSSIONS WHICH EXTEND FAR BEYOND
THE PARTIES THEMSELVES. THAT IS WHY I FEEL IT WOULD BE USEFUL
TO PRESENT THIS ACCOUNT OF WHAT HAPPENED DURING THESE RECENT
MEETINGS.

SOME OF THE DETAILS OF MY TRAVEL HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE
PUBLIC ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS BY THE UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS.

60 FEB 24 PM 4:02

SATURDAY

NEVERTHELESS, AS I FEEL IT RELEVANT TO WHAT I WISH TO STATE TODAY, I WILL RECORD THEM AGAIN IN THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY TOOK PLACE. AS IS KNOWN, I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY DURING A BRIEF VISIT TO NEW DELHI IN CONNECTION WITH THE SECOND SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT TO MEET THE CONSUL GENERAL OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM (NORTH VIET-NAM), MR. NGUYEN HOA, ON 8 FEBRUARY, AND TO DISCUSS WITH HIM THE QUESTION OF VIET-NAM. THE CONSUL GENERAL AFFIRMED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT "WOULD HOLD TALKS WITH WASHINGTON ON ALL RELEVANT MATTERS AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME AFTER THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND OF ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM". HE DREW MY ATTENTION TO THE STATEMENT THAT HAD BEEN MADE ON THIS SUBJECT THE DAY BEFORE (7 FEBRUARY) BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM (NORTH VIET-NAM) IN AN INTERVIEW WITH A PRESS AGENCY, WHICH SAID, IN PARTICULAR, THAT TALKS WILL BEGIN AS SOON AS THE UNITED STATES HAS PROVED THAT IT HAS REALLY UNCONDITIONALLY STOPPED THE BOMBING. I THEN PUT TO HIM SOME QUESTIONS WHICH HE PROMISED TO TRANSMIT TO HIS GOVERNMENT, ASSURING ME THAT IT WOULD REPLY TO THESE QUESTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

WHILE IN NEW DELHI, I CALLED ON THE PRESIDENT OF INDIA, DR. ZAKIR HUSAIN, AND HAD SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA, MRS. INDIRA GANDHI. FROM THERE, I FLEW TO MOSCOW WHERE I WAS RECEIVED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, MR. LEONID BREZHNEV, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, PREMIER ALEKSEI KOSYGIN, PRESIDENT NIKOLAI V. PODGORNYY AND FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI A. GROMYKO. IN LONDON, I WAS RECEIVED BY PRIME MINISTER HAROLD WILSON AND HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM, FOREIGN SECRETARY GEORGE BROWN, COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY GEORGE THOMSON, THE MINISTER OF STATE LORD CHALFONT, AND THE LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION, MR. EDWARD HEATH.

WHILE IN LONDON ON 13 FEBRUARY I WAS INFORMED THAT THE DELEGATE GENERAL OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM (NORTH VIET-NAM) IN FRANCE, MR. MAI VAN HO, HAD JUST RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM HIS GOVERNMENT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO ME. THIS WAS THE REPLY TO THE QUESTIONS I HAD SUBMITTED IN NEW DELHI. I LEFT FOR PARIS ON THE 14TH AND SAW MR. MAI VAN HO, WHO CONVEYED TO ME THE REPLY FROM HIS GOVERNMENT, DATED 13 FEBRUARY, TO MY QUESTIONS. IN THIS MESSAGE, THERE WAS A FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF HANOI'S POSITION CONCERNING DISCUSSIONS WITH WASHINGTON. I WAS TOLD THAT THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM (NORTH VIET-NAM) WOULD HOLD TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME, THAT IS, AS SOON AS THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND OF ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM (NORTH VIET-NAM) BECAME EFFECTIVE. I WAS FURTHER INFORMED THAT, AT THE TALKS, THE UNITED STATES COULD BRING UP ANY MATTER FOR DISCUSSION IN THE SAME WAY AS THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM (NORTH VIET-NAM) COULD BRING UP ANY MATTER. IN REPLY TO MY QUERY, MR. MAI VAN HO STATED THAT THE QUESTION OF THE REDUCTION IN THE FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIET-NAM, THE QUESTION OF THE RECONVENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND ANY OTHER QUESTION COULD BE BROUGHT UP AT THE TALKS.

ON THE SAME DAY, I WAS RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT CHARLES DE GAULLE AND FOREIGN MINISTER MAURICE COUVE DE MURVILLE. UPON MY RETURN TO NEW YORK ON 15 FEBRUARY, I INFORMED AMBASSADOR ARTHUR GOLDBERG OF THE SUBSTANCE OF MY DISCUSSIONS ON VIET-NAM DURING MY VISIT TO VARIOUS COUNTRIES. ON 16 FEBRUARY, I CONFERRED WITH THE PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM (SOUTH VIET-NAM), MR NGUYEN HOA CHI. ON 21 FEBRUARY, I WAS RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON AND SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK IN WASHINGTON. THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED HIS CONTINUED DESIRE TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND THE CONTINUED VALIDITY OF THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA. BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE STRESSED THE NO-MILITARY ADVANTAGE PROVISION OF THAT FORMULA.

MY TALKS IN VARIOUS CAPITALS HAVE REINFORCED MY CONVICTION WHICH I HAVE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED IN MY PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE ISSUE OF VIET-NAM FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS, NAMELY, THAT THE QUESTION IS ESSENTIALLY A POLITICAL PROBLEM WHICH CANNOT BE SOLVED THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY FORCE. IN THE LIGHT OF MY TALKS, I REAFFIRM ALL THAT I HAVE SAID IN THE PAST CONCERNING MY ASSESSMENT OF THE VIET-NAM PROBLEM AND MY APPROACH TO IT. IF THE VIET-NAM QUESTION IS SEEN AS A CONTEST OF UNYIELDING WILL, THERE CAN BE NO SOLUTION. IN THE BROADER CONTEXT IT APPEARS, INDEED, THAT BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE FIRMLY DETERMINED TO PREVENT THE DEFEAT OF THE SIDE WHICH EACH SUPPORTS. IF SUCH A TREND CONTINUES, THE CONCLUSION IS INESCAPABLE THAT THERE WILL BE CONTINUED INTENSIFICATION AND ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT, RESULTING IN UNFORESEEABLE DEVELOPMENTS WITH DIRE CONSEQUENCES.

ON THE OTHER HAND, MY RECENT CONTACTS HAVE CONFIRMED MY VIEW THAT, IF ESSENTIAL STEPS ARE TAKEN, THEY WILL LEAD TO A CHAIN OF EVENTS WHICH, IN THE END, CAN BRING ABOUT A JUST SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM, AND WHICH WILL SAVE BOTH SOUTH VIET-NAM AND NORTH VIET-NAM FROM DEVASTATION AND VIRTUAL DESTRUCTION AND WILL OFFER A CHANCE FOR THE PEOPLE OF VIET-NAM TO REGAIN A SENSE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND TO RECONSTRUCT THEIR WAR-TORN COUNTRY. EVERYWHERE I FOUND A GENUINE DESIRE TO BRING THIS TRAGIC CONFLICT TO AN END. THE INCREASED INTENSITY OF THE HOSTILITIES DURING THE PAST FEW WEEKS SHOULD NOT LEND TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DOOR IS CLOSED FOR NEGOTIATIONS. IN MY VIEW, THE INDISPENSABLE FIRST STEP OF ENDING ALL BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM (NORTH VIET-NAM) SHOULD BE TAKEN AND COULD BE TAKEN WITHOUT TOO GREAT A MILITARY RISK. IF SUCH A STEP WERE TO BE TAKEN, I AM MORE THEN EVER CONVINCED THAT

MEANINGFUL TALKS WILL TAKE PLACE MUCH EARLIER THAN IS GENERALLY SUPPOSED, EVEN PERHAPS WITHIN A MATTER OF A FEW DAYS. AS FOR THE QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE CONDUCT OF THE FIGHTING AFTER THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF THE BOMBING, PARTICULARLY IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND ACROSS THE FRONTIERS, IT CAN REASONABLE BE ASSUMED THAT THESE WILL BE DEALT WITH IN GOOD FAITH. THE PARTIES THEMSELVES SHOULD SOLVE THIS PROBLEM IN ORDER TO ALLOW FOR THE LARGER NEGOTIATIONS TO TAKE PLACE, WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM (SOUTH VIET-NAM) AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF SOUTH VIET-NAM.

THE VIET-NAM WAR HAS ALREADY POISONED THE ATMOSPHERE AND STRAINED INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THIS STRAIN IS KEENLY FELT IN THE UNITED NATIONS WHOSE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING HAS BEEN IMPAIRED AS A RESULT. WE ARE WITNESSING MORE AND MORE THE UNFORTUNATE AND UNDESIRABLE REPERCUSSIONS OF THIS WAR IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD.

INASMUCH AS THE UNITED NATIONS REMAINS HUMANITY'S MAIN HOPE FOR PEACE, IT IS MY DUTY, REGARDLESS OF ALL CRITICISMS, TO TRY TO REFLECT THE CONSENSUS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION AND THE DEEP CONCERN WHICH HAS EXPRESSED ITSELF THROUGH THE FORUM OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

INDEED, THE WORLD IS ANGUISHED AND SICKENED BY THE CONTINUED INTENSITY AND SAVAGERY OF THE WAR. IT IS HEART-RENDING TO WITNESS THE AGONY OF THE INNOCENT CIVILIANS WHO CANNOT POSSIBLE KNOW WHAT IT IS ALL ABOUT. ALSO THE MILITARY CASUALTIES STEADILY MOUNT. THE UGLINESS OF THE WAR IS MATCHED ONLY BY ITS FUTILITY. THERE CAN BE NO VICTORY, NO DEFEAT, ONLY MORE SUFFEREING, MORE DEATH AND MORE DESTRUCTION. THE VERY SURVIVAL OF VIET-NAM IS AT STAKE. IT IS TIME TO CALL A HALT.

DTG: 241850Z FEB 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-249
By CB, NARA Date 11-5-97

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1968 FEB 24 19 35

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80551

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEBRUARY 24, 1965

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

I AM SENDING THIS REPORT BY BUNKER ON HUE AS BACKGROUND TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT WE MAY BE SUGGESTING TO YOU TOMORROW, AFTER CLEARANCE WITH AMBASSADOR BUNKER, A STATEMENT ON THE COMMUNIST ATTACK ON HUE; THE GALLANTRY OF THE VIETNAMESE AND U.S. MARINES' DEFENSE; AND A U.S. COMMITMENT TO HELP IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THIS TERRIBLY TORN UP CITY.

1. FOLLOWING IS AN ACCOUNT OF THE OBSERVATIONS OF AN EMBASSY OFFICIAL WHO WAS IN HUE FEBRUARY 16-17 AND WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED IN AND FREQUENTLY VISITED HUE. THE DESCRIPTION IS CURRENT UP TO THE TIME OF HIS RETURN TO SAIGON FEBRUARY 17.

2. COMMUNICATIONS AMONG THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF THE THREE CITY DISTRICTS WERE STILL VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT. IN THE MIST OF THE WAR, MOST PEOPLE ARE STILL CONCERNED ABOUT QUESTIONS OF LIFE AND DEATH -- THEIR OWN AND THAT OF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY -- AND NOT YET SPECIFICALLY WITH POLITICAL QUESTIONS AS: WHO IS TO BLAME OR WHETHER OR NOT THE AMERICANS CAME TO THE SUPPORT OF THE VIETNAMESE FORCES FAST ENOUGH. ALTHOUGH THERE IS LITTLE REAL INFORMATION, BELIEF IS WIDESPREAD THAT "MANY PEOPLE ARE BEING KILLED" IN THE CITADEL AND LEFT BANK AREAS. INITIALLY, RUMOR HAS IT, THE VC/NVA CAPTURED MANY PEOPLE AND THEN LET THEM GO. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT AS ALLIED RESISTANCE TO THEIR OCCUPATION OF THE CITY GREW, THE ENEMY BEGAN A MORE CONCERTED EFFORT TO ELIMINATE OPPOSITION.

3. ALTHOUGH THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF HUE CLEARLY DID NOT RISE UP EN MASSE AS THE COMMUNISTS EXPECTED, IT APPEARS THERE WAS AN ACTIVE FIFTH COLUMN IN HUE. BOTH OFFICIAL SOURCES AND POPULAR RUMOR INDICATE THAT PARTICULARLY LAY

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

Free file
FEB 24 PM 2:41
SATURDAY

REMNANTS OF THE BUDDHIST POLITICAL STRUGGLE MOVEMENT WERE ACTIVE IN SUPPORT OF THE VC/NVA. PROFESSOR LE VAN HAO, WHO HAD BEEN TEACHING AT HUE UNIVERSITY DURING CURRENT ACADEMIC YEAR, AND OTHER FORMER STRUGGLE PERSONALITIES WERE NAMED TO FRONT ORGANIZATIONAL SET-UP. ALSO THERE ARE REPEATED STORIES OF STRUGGLERS SUCH AS HOANG PHU NGOC TUONG AND HIS BROTHER HOANG PHU NGOC PHAN AND MANY OTHERS "FINGERING" PEOPLE FOR VC/NVA.

4. INTERESTINGLY, REACTIONS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT AMONG BONZES ACTIVE IN THE STRUGGLE MOVEMENT. AFTER ENEMY HAD ENTERED HUE, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT AT LEAST SOME BONZES FORMERLY ASSOCIATED WITH STRUGGLE MOVEMENT HAD STRONG REACTION AGAINST VC. ONE SUCH IS THICH CHON THUC WITH THUONG VAN PAGODA, WHO HAS IN PAST BEEN LABELED A POSSIBLE COMMUNIST BY POLICE AND OTHER VIETNAMESE SECURITY AGENCIES. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS DURING THE VC ATTACK CHON THUC HELPED THE FAMILY OF AN EMPLOYEE OF THE BRANCH CONSULAR OFFICE IN DA NANG, ALTHOUGH HE KNEW SHE WORKED FOR AMERICANS. ON ONE OCCASION HE TRIED TO PASS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ABOUT ENEMY TROOP LOCATIONS TO FRIENDLY FORCES THROUGH HER. IN GENERAL, CHON THIC TYPIFIED VC AS "NATIONAL DESTRUCTION FRONT" (MAT TRAN GIAI PHA), A PUN ON THE NLF (MAT TRAN GIAI PHONG).

5. IN THE CITY ALL PUBLIC SERVICES SUCH AS WATER, ELECTRICITY AND POLICE CEASED TO FUNCTION DURING THE FIGHTING. ELECTRIC POWER IS BEING RESTORED SLOWLY IN PORTIONS OF THE RIGHT BANK DISTRICT. MILITARY AND POLICE HEADQUARTERS, THE HOSPITAL AND OTHER PUBLIC BUILDINGS ALREADY HAVE ELECTRICITY. AS RESULT OF BREAKDOWN OF AUTHORITY, LOOTING HAS APPARENTLY BEEN WIDESPREAD. POLICE PATROLS AND NORMAL SECURITY BEING RESTORED SLOWLY IN WAKE OF ADVANCING FORCES. ALTHOUGH A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF HUE CITIZENS HAD BEGUN TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES ON FEBRUARY 16, MOST OF CITIZENS IN SECURED AREAS OF RIGHT BANK LIVE IN ONE REFUGEE AREA.

6. HIGH ON THE VC LIST FOR LIQUIDATION WERE THOSE VIETNAMESE KNOWN TO WORK FOR AMERICANS. FOLLOWING US EMPLOYEES ON ENEMY PRIORITIES WERE CIVIL SERVANTS, POLICE, AND NATIONALIST POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE STORIES, WHICH PROVINCE CHIEF LT. COL. KHOA REPEATS, THAT 300 CIVIL SERVANTS WERE EXECUTED AND BURIED IN A MASS GRAVE, THIS FACT HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED. THERE ARE REPORTS THAT THE VC CAPTURED A LARGE NUMBER OF YOUTHS AND LED THEM AWAY. MOST REPEATED STORY IS THAT OF SOME 100 TO 150 YOUTHS KIDNAPPED FROM STAUNCHLY CATHOLIC PHU CAM VILLAGE, LOCATED SOUTH OF HUE CITY IN THE AREA JUST ACROSS THE CANAL THAT MARKS THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE CITY.

7. THERE IS SOME COMMENT AMONG REFUGEES THAT AMERICANS WERE LATE IN RESPONDING. NOW, SOME PEOPLE THINK THAT WE ARE OVER-RESPONDING, AS THEY WITNESS U.S. AIRCRAFT BOMB TARGETS IN THE CITADEL, ACROSS THE RIVER FROM THE REFUGEE CAMP.

8. BEYOND SHORT RANGE PROJECTS OF RESTORING HUE TO SOME THING LIKE NORMAL CONDITIONS, PROBABLY MOST IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM WILL BE RECREATION OF THE HUE CITIZENS' FAITH IN GVN AND IN DETERMINATION OF U.S. TO STAND IN NORTHERN I CORPS. ONLY ON FEBRUARY 15 WAS IT POSSIBLE TO SEND IN AN INITIAL U.S. EMERGENCY PROVINCE ADVISORY TEAM TO HUE.

9. RUMORS ARE ALREADY BEGINNING TO EMERGE AGAIN THAT THUA THIEN AND QUANG TRI MIGHT BE ABANDONED. ALSO THERE WILL SURELY BE QUESTIONS OF "WHY THIS DISASTER WAS ALLOWED TO HAPPEN." REGARDLESS OF NECESSITIES OF SITUATION, FEW VIETNAMESE IN HUE WILL UNDERSTAND WHY SUFFICIENT ALLIED FORCES WERE NOT AVAILABLE TO BREAK BACK OF ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN SHORTER TIME. SITUATION IS MADE MORE POIGNANT BY STATEMENT BY PROVINCE CHIEF THAT VC/NVA KILLING OF CIVILIANS APPARENTLY DID NOT REALLY START UNTIL ABOUT TEN DAYS HAD ELAPSED. IN SUMMARY, IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT MANY SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS WILL ARISE AMONG PEOPLE OF CITY FROM ASHES OF HUE.

10. SENATOR TRAN VAN LAM TOLD U.S. FEB 24 THAT AS A RESULT OF VC/NVA KILLINGS IN HUE THE MOOD OF MUCH OF THE REMAINING POPULATION AGAINST ANY CAPTURED MEMBERS OF THE ENEMY FORCES IS ONE OF "VENGEANCE."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 241841Z FEB 68

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

VZCZCEEA208
OO WTE 18
DE WTE 827

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80550

~~SECRET~~

1968 FEB 24 19 25

78
~~SECRET~~
Pres files
FEB 24 PM 2:36
SATURDAY

FEBRUARY 24, 1968

HEREWITH NICK ON TRAVEL PLANS, FOR YOUR APPROVAL.

I UNDERSTAND THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT IS NOW PLANNING A LATIN AMERICAN TRIP FOR SOME TIME IN APRIL (EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER THE EASTER HOLIDAYS). UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, I DOUBT THAT IT WOULD BE WISE FOR ME TO PLAN A LATIN AMERICAN TRIP UNTIL LATE SUMMER OR EARLY FALL. IF YOU APPROVE, I WILL HOLD OFF ANY PLANS UNTIL THE SUMMER AND THEN GET TOGETHER WITH OUR LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLE TO SEE WHETHER A TRIP AT THAT TIME WOULD MAKE SENSE.

IN THE MEANTIME, I DO PLAN TO TRY TO HEAD A DELEGATION OR TWO FOR SHORT TRIPS TO LATIN AMERICA (FOR EXAMPLE, THE DEDICATION OF THE TAVARA DAM IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN MARCH OR APRIL; AND THE JUNE MEETING OF THE INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL IN TRINIDAD.)

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By JP/Ag, NARA, Date 6/25/96

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State memo 9/11/95

By JP/Ag, NARA, Date 6/25/96

OK TO DELAY -----

MAKE PLANS FOR
EARLY TRIP -----

SEE ME -----

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 241841Z FEB 68

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

79

~~TOP SECRET~~

1968 FEB 24 17 24

VZCZCEEA202
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 820

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80543

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS bca 10-4-78 NSC 8-1980
By nap/ky, NARA, Date 3-3-92

Pres file

60 FEB 24 PM 12:30

SENT
SATURDAY

~~TOP SECRET~~

FEBRUARY 24, 1968

HERewith GEN. JOHNSON'S REPORT OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
WITH WESTY AND ABRAMS.

IN THE PAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS A TONE OF SOMEWHAT INCREASED
CONFIDENCE IS EMERGING FROM OUR MILITARY IN SAIGON -- AS IF THE
SCALE AND LIMITS OF THE TASK AHEAD HAD BECOME MORE MEASURABLE
AND MANAGEABLE. BUT MUCH OBSCURITY STILL BECLOUDS THE COUNTRY-
SIDE WHERE MOST OF THE PEOPLE ARE.

1. GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S DAILY CABLE REPORTS ON ACTIVITY AT
KHE SANH AND IN THE DMZ AREA. FOLLOWING HEAVY ARTILLERY, MORTAR
AND ROCKET FIRE AT KHE SANH ON THE AFTERNOON AND EVENING OF 23
FEBRUARY, REPORTS FOR 24 FEBRUARY INDICATE ONLY LIGHT AND
SPORADIC FIRE AT KHE SANH.

2. VIETNAMESE FORCES HAVE CAPTURED THE PALACE INSIDE THE
CITADEL AND THE VC FLAG THAT WAS FLYING OVER THE PALACE IS NOW
IN THE FIRST ARVN DIVISION COMMAND POST. FRIENDLY FORCES HOLD
ALL OF HUE EXCEPT A QUARTER CIRCLE 500 METERS IN RADIUS AT
THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF THE CITADEL WALL. GENERAL WESTMORELAND
COMMENTED THAT IT APPEARED THAT ENEMY RESISTANCE WAS CRUMBLING.
PRESIDENT THIEU PLANS TO VISIT HUE ON 25 FEBRUARY, ALTHOUGH
GENERAL WESTMORELAND INDICATED THAT THE WEATHER FORECAST IS
SUCH THAT PRESIDENT THIEU MAY NOT BE ABLE TO LAND. GENERAL
ABRAMS REPORTS A NUMBER OF GALLANT ACTIONS BY THE FIRST ARVN
DIVISION STARTING WITH ATTACK ON CITADEL WEST WALL AT 0200 HOURS
ON 24 FEBRUARY AND CULMINATING IN SEIZURE OF THE PALACE AFTER
DAYLIGHT. THE RESPONSIBLE COMPANY COMMANDER WAS PROMOTED TO
CAPTAIN ON THE SPOT BY THE VIETNAMESE DIVISION COMMANDER. THE
REMAINING ENEMY-HELD AREA IS TIGHTLY ENCIRCLED. ENEMY WITH-
DRAWAL IS EXPECTED.

3. THERE WAS LITTLE ACTIVITY IN THE II CORPS AREA.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

4. IN III CORPS AREA THE MAJOR ACTIVITY WAS THE ROCKET ATTACK ON TAN SON NHUT AND THE AREA AROUND TAN SON NHUT. ONE ROUND LANDED NOT FAR FROM THE HOUSE WHERE GENERAL WHEELER WAS SPENDING THE NIGHT. GENERAL WHEELER AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND ARE SPENDING THE NIGHT OF 24-25 FEBRUARY IN GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S HEADQUARTERS.

5. IN IV CORPS AREA 19 SEPARATE OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE CORPS AREA RESULTED IN 109 ENEMY KILLED AT A COST OF 30 VIETNAMESE KILLED. TWO BATTALIONS OF THE U.S. RIVERINE FORCE SWEEP AN ISLAND IN THE RIVER IMMEDIATELY NORTH OF CAN THO AND BINH TUY AIRFIELD AND PICKED UP A NUMBER OF VIET CONG SUSPECTS. THIS ISLAND HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF FIRE AGAINST RIVER PATROL CRAFT AND HAS CONSTITUTED A LONG-TIME NUISANCE. HIGHWAY 4 WAS OPEN FROM SAIGON TO BAC LIEU ON 24 FEBRUARY.

6. I QUESTIONED GENERAL WESTMORELAND CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE REPORTS THAT INDICATE AN EARLY ATTACK ON DA NANG. GENERAL WESTMORELAND INDICATED THAT HE AND GENERAL WHEELER VISITED DA NANG ON 24 FEBRUARY AND THAT THE THREAT OF GROUND ATTACK ON DA NANG DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE SIGNIFICANT. I ALSO QUESTIONED HIM ABOUT THE MOVEMENT OF SUBSTANTIAL ENEMY FORCES FROM THE NORTH INTO THE SAIGON AREA. HE BELIEVES THAT THE THREE DIVISIONS REPORTED IN THE AREA HAVE SUFFERED SUBSTANTIAL CASUALTIES IN EARLIER CONTACTS AND THAT THE FORCES GUARDING SAIGON CAN HANDLE THE SITUATION. GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAS THE CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE SAIGON PROMPTLY.

7. FOLLOWING THE VISIT TO DA NANG, GENERAL WHEELER AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND MET WITH PRESIDENT THIEU, VICE PRESIDENT KY AND GENERAL VIEN. TOPICS DISCUSSED WERE NOT REVIEWED BY GENERAL WESTMORELAND, BUT HE INDICATED A WIDE-RANGING, USEFUL AND REALISTIC EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.

8. GENERAL WESTMORELAND IS ENDEAVORING TO DIVERT SOME B-52 STRIKES INTO THE A SHAU VALLEY WHERE HE REPORTS THAT 30 GROUND TARGETS EXIST THAT CONSTITUTE WHAT HE CONSIDERS TO BE AN ALTERNATE LOGISTICS COMPLEX BUILT UP TO SUPPORT THE ATTACK ON HUE. DIVERSIONS OF B-52 STRIKES WILL NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF A CONTINUES POUNDING AROUND KHE SANH. IN ADDITION, INTELLIGENCE TEAMS WILL BE INSERTED IN AND NEAR A SHAU VALLEY AS WEATHER PERMITS; UNFAVORABLE WEATHER HAS PREVENTED ATTEMPS MADE DURING THIS PAST WEEK.

DTG: 241617Z FEB 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

Send 12:20 PM

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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1968 FEB 24 17 20

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-258
By 48 NARA Date 9-23-96

EEA200
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FROM WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80542

60 FEB 24 PM 12:25

SATURDAY

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTON

FEBRUARY 24, 1968

HERewith BUS AND WESTY RESPOND TO OUR QUERY OF YESTERDAY WITH THEIR PICTURE OF THE SITUATION.

FROM HERE THE ENEMY SITUATION LOOKS LIKE THIS:

I CORPS - THE ENEMY ATTACKED KHE SANH YESTERDAY WITH A HEAVY ATTACK BY FIRE AND CONTINUES TO ADJUST HIS FIRE TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HIS ARTILLERY. THE THREAT TO QUANG TRI HAS BEEN REDUCED SOMEWHAT AND NOW CONSISTS OF THE 833RD REGIMENT ATTEMPTING TO INTERDICT THE CUA VIET RIVER, NORTH OF QUANG TRI CITY, AND THE 812TH REGIMENT ATTEMPTING TO CUT ROUTE 1 SOUTH OF QUANG TRI CITY. THERE ARE AT LEAST EIGHT EQUIVALENT COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALIONS THREATENING HOI AN AND DANANG. THE BATTLE AT HUE INVOLVES ABOUT EIGHT COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS AND THE FIGHTING IS HEAVY AS THE ENEMY ATTEMPTS TO HANG ON IN THE CITY. THERE IS EXTENSIVE SUPPLY ACTIVITY IN A-SHAU VALLEY, AND THE ENEMY IS BUILDING A ROAD FROM THE VALLEY TO JOIN HIGHWAY 547 WHICH RUNS TO HUE. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON WHAT TROOP UNITS ARE LOCATED IN A-SHAU.

II CORPS - THE ENEMY IS TACTICALLY DEPLOYED TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE DAK TO AREA. HE IS CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING GROUND ATTACKS WITH SEEN BATTALIONS OF THE 1ST NVA DIVISION SUPPORTED BY ELEMENTS OF THE 40TH ARTILLERY REGIMENT. AVAILABLE EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THESE ATTACKS CAN BE INITIATED AT ANY TIME. IN KONTUM CITY, THE RELOCATION OF MAJOR UNITS COUPLED WITH EVIDENCE OF DETAILED PLANNING INDICATES AN OFFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST THAT CITY WITH AS MUCH AS THREE INFANTRY AND TWO SAPPER BATTALIONS AT ANY TIME. IN PLEIKU CITY, THE ENEMY DOES NOT POSE AN IMMEDIATE MAJOR THREAT AT THIS TIME. HE IS HOWEVER, CAPABLE OF ATTACKS BY FIRE AND HARASSMENT TYPE ACTIVITY.

III CORPS - THE THREE REGIMENTS OF THE 9TH VC DIVISION REMAIN IN NORTHERN AND WESTERN GIA DINH PROVINCE. ELEMENTS OF THE 101ST NVA DIVISION HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED NORTH OF SAIGON, AND A PW FROM THE 141ST NVA REGIMENT, CAPTURED IN SOUTHERN BINH DUONG STATED HIS BATTALION WAS FOLLOWING TWO OTHERS TO GIA DINH. AIRBORNE DIRECTION FINDING LOCATED A TERMINAL SERVING THE 2ND BATTALION, 274TH VC REGIMENT ON 23 FEBRUARY IN EASTERN GIA DINH. THUS, ELEMENTS OF THREE DIVISIONS THREATEN SAIGON, ALTHOUGH SOME OF THEM HAVE BEEN HIT HARD IN THE PAST WEEKS.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

IV CORPS - THE ENEMY IS CURRENTLY ATTEMPTING TO CAPITALIZE ON THE FACT THAT ARVN FORCES IN THE DELTA HAVE BEEN FORCED TO CONCENTRATE UPON THE DEFENSE OF URBAN CENTERS THROUGHOUT THE AREA. WHILE KEEPING HIS MANEUVER UNITS WITHIN STRIKING DISTANCE OF THE MAJOR CITIES AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION, HIS EFFORTS IN THE RURAL AREAS HAVE CENTERED AROUND RECRUITMENT AND ANTI-GVN/US PROPAGANDA. IT IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT HE IS MOVING RAPIDLY TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE THROUGHOUT THE CORPS. DURING RECENT WEEKS THE ENEMY HAS BEEN ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY INTERDICT HIGHWAY 4 THROUGHOUT THE DELTA. ROAD BLOCKS, CRATERING, AND HARASSING ATTACKS HAVE BEEN USED TO BRING TRAFFIC ON THIS MAJOR THOROUGHFARE TO A NEAR STANDSTILL. WE DOUBT THE ENEMY BELIEVES THAT THIS WILL CUT OFF FOOD SUPPLY TO SAIGON.

STRENGTH - ABOUT 65,000 ENEMY COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT TROOPS WERE COMMITTED IN THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE. UP TO 25 PERCENT MORE WERE COMMITTED FROM THE GUERRILLAS, ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AND POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. OF THE TOTAL, ABOUT 30 PERCENT WERE NVA TROOPS. IN THE THREE WEEKS SINCE THAT TIME THE ENEMY HAS COMMITTED ADDITIONAL FORCES (FIVE TO SEVEN BATTALIONS IN I CORPS, FOUR BATTALIONS IN II CORPS, FIVE TO NINE BATTALIONS IN III CORPS, AND NONE IN IV CORPS). MAIN FORCE STRENGTH AT THE BEGINNING OF THE OFFENSIVE WAS ABOUT 133,000 DUE TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE 304TH AND 306TH DIVISIONS. ABOUT HALF OF ENEMY'S MAIN FORCE STRENGTH PROBABLY REMAINS UNCOMMITTED, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT INTACT ELEMENTS BEING THOSE AT KHE SANH, THE DMZ, THE HIGHLANDS, AND FOUR NVA REGIMENTS (2ND DIVISION AND 31ST REGIMENT) IN THE DANANG-HOI AN AREA.

REINFORCEMENT - ALTHOUGH A FEW PW'S HAVE STATED THAT THE 308TH AND 330TH DIVISIONS ARE IN THE DMZ, THERE IS NO CREDIBLE INTELLIGENCE HELD BY MACV INDICATING THAT ADDITIONAL DIVISIONS ARE IN OR NEAR SOUTH VIETNAM OR ENROUTE THERETO. THE NVA DIVISIONS LOCATED IN NVN HAVE NOT EXHIBITED ANY UNUSUAL COMMUNICATIONS PATTERNS WHICH WOULD INDICATE SOUTHWARD DEPLOYMENT, ALTHOUGH THE 308TH DIVISION IS NOT CURRENTLY ISOLATED IN SIGINT.

SUMMARY - WE AGREE WITH YOU THAT THE ENEMY CAN CONDUCT SIMULTANEOUS LARGE SCALE ATTACKS AGAINST KHE SANH, HUE, DANANG, DAK TO, AND SAIGON. HE WILL NO DOUBT ATTACK OTHER TOWNS AND CITIES AT THE SAME TIME. WITH DUE CONSIDERATION FOR THE LOCATION AND STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY THREAT COMUSMACV HAS DEPLOYED HIS FORCES TO BE IN THE BEST POSTURE TO COUNTER THESE SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

WHILE WE ARE PREPARED TO DEFEND AGAINST MULTIPLE ATTACKS, THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE ENEMY MAY DELAY FOR WEEKS, EVEN MONTHS BEFORE INITIATING HIS NEXT OFFENSIVE. IN THE INTERIM HE WILL ATTEMPT TO INVEST THE CITIES AND TOWNS, ATTRITING THE AIR FORCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND WEAKENING THE WILL OF THE CIVILIANS AND THEIR LOYALTY TO THE GVN. TO CAPITALIZE ON ANY SUCH DELAY, TOGETHER WITH RVNAF WE ARE PROCEEDING WITH OPERATIONS DESIGNED TO DESTROY THE ENEMY OR TO PUSH HIM AWAY FROM THE TOWNS, WHILE MOVING TO REOPEN LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND REASSERT FRIENDLY PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DTG: 241546Z FEB 68

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

14:53 AM

81

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OO WTE10
DE WTE 812

1968 FEB 24 15 53

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80537

Pres file

68 FEB 24 AM 11:01

SATURDAY

~~SECRET~~

FEBRUARY 24, 1968

TODAY'S KHE SANH REPORT:

- 1500 ROUNDS OF MORTAR AND ARTILLERY FIRE;
- SMALL PROBING GROUND CONTACTS;
- 155 TONS DELIVERED;
- BAD WEATHER CONTINUES;
- NEVERTHELESS, CONSIDERABLE AIR SUPPORT AND SOME SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD ltr 1/3/79
By iply, NARA, Date 3-3-92

ADDITIONAL LATE ITEM: INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THE ENEMY'S MAJOR ARTILLERY REGIMENT HAS MOVED UP CLOSE TO THE BASE NEAR KHE SANH TOWN.

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

THIS IS REPORT NUMBER TWENTY ON THE SITUATION IN THE KHE SANH/DMZ AREA AND COVERS THE 24-HOUR PERIOD FEBRUARY 23, 1968.

FRIENDLY ELEMENTS BORDERING IN THE DMZ EXPERIENCED AN ACCELERATED ENEMY THRUST YESTERDAY AS ENEMY FIRING WAS IN EXCESS OF 1500 ROUNDS OF MIXED MORTAR AND ARTILLERY, EARMARKED FOR FRIENDLY HELD INSTALLATIONS. KHE SANH COMBAT BASE, THE PREFERRED ENEMY TARGET, BORE OVER 85 PERCENT OF THESE ENEMY EXPLOSIVES AS 1000 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY, AND 300 ROUNDS OF MORTAR IMPACTED IN THE VICINITY. CASUALTIES WERE: 10 KILLED IN ACTION, 51 WOUNDED IN ACTION (21 EVACUATED). INCIDENT TO THE DAMBARDMENT WAS A FIRE IN AN AMMUNITION SUPPLY DUMP, AS 1000 HIGH EXPLOSIVE ROUNDS, 120 CANISTER ROUNDS BOTH 90MM AND 500 BEEHIVE ROUNDS 106MM WERE DESTROYED. RESUPPLY IS SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW. COUNTER BATTERY WAS FIRED ON SUSPECTED ENEMY FIRING POSITIONS RESULTING IN ONE LARGE SECONDARY EXPLOSION.

FEW AREAS WENT UNTOUCHED IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD. CAMP CARROLL RECEIVED 23 ROUNDS OF MORTAR; 26 ARTILLERY ROUNDS IMPACTED AT DONG HA. FOUR MARINES REQUIRED EVACUATION AT CAMP CARROLL; TWO MARINES

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

WERE SLIGHTLY WOUNDED AT DONG HA. AT CON THIEN, FOUR AFTERNOON ENEMY BARRAGES BROUGHT 65 ROUNDS OF HEAVY ARTILLERY ATOP POSITIONS HELD BY THE MARINES. AN ARTILLERY EMBARDMENT FELL IN THE SALINE AREA AS ELEMENTS FROM THE 1ST MARINES COUNTED 61 ROUNDS, WHICH INFLICTED MINOR WOUNDS ON ONE MARINE. FINALLY, ENEMY ATTENTION CONTINUED TO FOCUS AT CUA VIET AS THE 1ST ANTRAC RECEIVED 18 ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY.

IN GROUND ACTION YESTERDAY, AN ARVN RANGER BATTALION MADE CONTACT WITH AN ESTIMATED ENEMY BATTALION AT KHE SANH, 200-400 METERS FROM THE PERIMETER. FRIENDLY ARTILLERY WAS FIRED IN SUPPORT. CASUALTIES ARE UNREPORTED. ALSO, IN A SMALL CONTACT AGAINST A SMALL ENEMY FORCE, A MARINE COMPANY SUCCEEDED IN KILLING 7 NVA, WHILE SUSTAINING ONE FRIENDLY FATALITY.

THIRTY ROUNDS OF 105MM COFRAM ORDNANCE WERE EMPLOYED IN ONE MISSION IN SUPPORT OF THE ARVN RANGER BATTALION IN THE VICINITY OF THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE ON A SUSPECTED NVA BATTALION, WITH UNDETERMINED RESULTS.

A TOTAL 351 TACTICAL SORTIES WERE FLOWN DURING THE PERIOD IN SUPPORT OF KHE SANH. MARINE AIRCRAFT FLEW 68 SORTIES. BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT INCLUDED THREE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS, TWO SECONDARY FIRES, AND SIX BUNKERS DESTROYED. THE AIR FORCE FLEW 199 SORTIES AND THE NAVY FLEW 84 SORTIES. WEATHER AGAIN NECESSITATED THE MAJORITY OF MISSIONS BEING COMBAT SKY SPOT. BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT FROM VISUAL STRIKES INCLUDED SIX SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS, SEVEN SECONDARY FIRES, NINE ROAD CUTS, TWO ROCKET POSITIONS DESTROYED, AND FIVE TRUCKS AND FOUR BUNKERS DESTROYED. THERE WERE 14 B-52 STRIKES (45 SORTIES) FLOWN IN THE NIAGARA AREA.

AERIAL RESUPPLY TO KHE SANH FOR THE PERIOD AMOUNTED TO 165 SHORT TONS. MEDICAL SUPPLIES AMOUNTED TO ONE SHORT TON. IN ADDITION 17 REPLACEMENT PASSENGERS WERE LANDED AT THE AIR FIELD. RESUPPLY SORTIES TOTALED 15 ON 23 FEB. TEN C130 AIRCRAFT COMPLETED 10 AIRDROPS. THREE C123 AIRCRAFT LANDED AT THE AIRFIELD AS DID 2 MARINE HELICOPTERS.

FOR THE NEXT PERIOD 238 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES WILL BE FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF KHE SANH. THERE WILL BE SEVEN ARC LIGHT STRIKES (42 SORTIES) FLOWN IN THE NIAGARA AREA.

THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD, THE WEATHER AT KHE SANH WAS POOR, WITH LOW STRATUS CLOUDS REDUCING THE CEILING TO 100 TO 1000 FOOT BROKEN AND DENSE GROUND FOG LOWERING SURFACE VISIBILITY TO 1/16 TO 5 MILES.

THE FORECAST FOR TODAY IS FOR CLOUD CEILINGS AND SURFACE VISIBILITIES NEAR ZERO EXCEPT FROM 1000 AM TO 6:00 PM WHEN THE CEILING WILL RAISE TO 500 FOOT BROKEN AND THE VISIBILITY TO 1 MILE IN GROUND FOG AND DRIZZLE.

DTG 241412Z FEB 68

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Sent 10:16 AM

82

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VZCZCEEA197
OO WTE10
DE WTE 814

1968 FEB 24 15 16

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80533

~~TOP SECRET~~

FEBRUARY 24, 1968

60 FEB 24 AM 20
Pres file
cy sent me club clipping
SATURDAY

HEREWITH A SECOND VIETNAMESE ROUND-UP OF FACTS AND ACTION.

FACTS.

- WE ARE IN ANOTHER PHASE WHEN INTELLIGENCE IS POINTING TO VARIOUS DATES FOR A RESUMED MAJOR OFFENSIVE. A ROUND-UP OF SUCH DATES TENDS TO FOCUS AROUND FEBRUARY 25; BUT THEY RUN ANYWHERE UP TO MARCH 1 -- OR EVEN MARCH 10.
- THE PACIFICATION SITUATION REMAINS OBSCURE. CIA REPORTS SUGGEST MAJOR DISRUPTION OF PACIFICATION IN MOST PROVINCES. ON THE OTHER HAND, WESTY REPORTS THAT ONLY 18 OF THE 54 ARVN BATTALIONS ASSIGNED TO PACIFICATION WERE WITHDRAWN FOR DEFENSE OF THE CITIES AND THAT LOSSES IN THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES SEEMED TO BE MODERATE, ALTHOUGH A NUMBER OF THOSE FORCES AND SOME OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT TEAMS WERE PULLED BACK TO DEFEND PROVINCIAL TOWNS. IN THE DELTA THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT A MAJOR EFFORT IS UNDER WAY TO RECRUIT QUICKLY ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL BY THE VC AND TO EXPAND VC RURAL CONTROL. HOW FAR THEY GET WITH THIS DEPENDS ON HOW QUICKLY OUR OWN AND VIETNAMESE FORCES CAN GET BACK INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE. IT IS SIGNIFICANT, IN MY JUDGMENT, THAT GIAP SPOKE IN HANOI YESTERDAY ABOUT THE "EXPANSION OF LIBERATED AREAS" AS ONE OF THE MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE OFFENSIVE THUS FAR. WE MUST MAKE SURE THEY DO NOT FRIGHTEN US INTO AN "ENCLAVE" POLICY, REMEMBERING ALWAYS THAT WHAT TRIGGERED THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES WAS COMMUNIST AWARENESS THAT THEY WERE GRADUALLY LOSING CONTROL OF THE RURAL POPULATION.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD Ltr 10-11-78; NSC 8-12-80

By cap/rg, NARA, Date 3-4-92

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

- A CIA REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLICE GIVES THEM, ON THE WHOLE, HIGH MARKS EXCEPT IN A FEW PLACES. THE REPORT INDICATES THAT THE CITY ATTACKS PERMITTED THE POLICE TO GET AT THE URBAN VC INFRASTRUCTURE IN A NUMBER OF TOWNS.
- EXCEPT FOR KHE SANH AND THE KONTUM-PLEIKU FRONT, WE STILL ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO ASSESS HOW STRONG AN ATTACK BY MAIN FORCE UNITS CAN BE MOUNTED. WE HAVE TO KEEP OUR MINDS OPEN TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENEMY MAY BE PINNING ARVN AND US FORCES IN THE CITY AS CHEAPLY AS POSSIBLE, AND WITH RUMORS OF MASSIVE ATTACKS, IN ORDER TO EXPLOIT AND CONSOLIDATE THE COUNTRYSIDE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE CERTAINLY IMPORTANT FORCES OUTSIDE OF QUANG TRI, DANANG, AND SAIGON, AS WELL AS ON THE FRONTIERS. (IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO FOLLOW UP ON GENERAL WEYAND'S REPORT OF YESTERDAY THAT THE ENEMY FORCES AROUND SAIGON HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO BREAK UP INTO SMALLER UNITS. THERE WAS ALSO AN INDICATION THAT SOME OF THE UNITS AROUND QUANG TRI WERE FRAGMENTED.)

ACTION.

- I BROUGHT GENERAL TAYLOR AND CLARK CLIFFORD UP TO DATE. GENERAL TAYLOR AGREED WITH MY STATEMENT OF HIS VIEWS TO YOU YESTERDAY.
- I ASKED BUS AND WESTY, VIA THE PENTAGON BACK CHANNEL, FOR THEIR JUDGMENT ON THE ASSESSMENT WHICH I FORWARDED TO YOU YESTERDAY.
- CLARK CLIFFORD AND I ASSURED THAT THE PREPARATORY STEPS YOU INDICATED TO HIM WERE UNDER WAY.
- I BROUGHT HARRY MCPHERSON FULLY UP TO DATE AND PUT HIM IN TOUCH WITH BOB GINSBURGH ON THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF WHAT MIGHT BE REQUIRED.
- I SHALL TRY TO TAKE STOCK AGAIN TODAY WITH CLIFFORD AND TAYLOR.

DTG 241419Z FEB 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 FEB 24 05 25

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80525

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 96-249
By CB, NARA Date 11-5-97

free file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEBRUARY 23, 1968

HEREWITH GEORGE MCGHEE'S ACCOUNT OF HIS TALK WITH KIESINGER ABOUT KIESINGER'S VISIT WITH DE GAULLE.

I HAVE JUST FINISHED AN HOUR AND HALF CONVERSATION WITH BARZEL, ON WHICH I WILL REPORT TOMORROW. HIS CONCERN WAS, BRIEFLY, WITH THE TENSIONS WITHIN THE COALITION AND, ESPECIALLY, CERTAIN UNRESOLVED ANXIETIES ABOUT NPT.

THE NUT OF WHAT I TOLD HIM WAS THAT IF THEY HAD SPECIFIC PROBLEMS, THEY SHOULD FORMULATE THEM PRECISELY AND CONVEY THEM TO US IN THE SPIRIT OF THE PRESIDENT'S PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS WITH CHANCELLOR KIESINGER.

IN HIS REPORT TO ME OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH DE GAULLE, BARZEL SAID THAT DE GAULLE TOLD HIM TWICE, WITH GREAT SOLEMNITY, THAT IF WE USED A TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPON IN VIETNAM, AN AMERICAN CITY WOULD BE HIT WITH A NUCLEAR WEAPON FROM AN UNSTATED DIRECTION (PRESUMABLY NOT FRANCE).

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH KIESINGER: NO. 1

1. I MET WITH CHANCELLOR KIESINGER YESTERDAY AT MY REQUEST. THIS WAS THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY I HAD HAD TO TALK WITH HIM SINCE HIS MEETING WITH GEN DE GAULLE IN PARIS ON FEB 15-16. OUR CONVERSATION LASTED AN HOUR AND A HALF. THE CHANCELLOR WAS IN A GOOD MOOD, VERY FRIENDLY AND EXPANSIVE, AND CARRIED THE DISCUSSION WELL BEYOND THE TIME ALLOTTED.

2. I STARTED BY TELLING THE CHANCELLOR THAT THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER HIGH US OFFICIALS WOULD WELCOME WHATEVER HE COULD TELL US IN CONFIDENCE ABOUT WHAT TRANSPIRED DURING HIS MEETING WITH DE GAULLE, AND HOW HE APPRAISED THE RESULTS. I ASSURED HIM THAT WHATEVER HE SAID WOULD BE HELD IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. THE CHANCELLOR'S COMMENTS ON THE MEETING ARE REPORTED IN THIS TELEGRAM AND IN THE THREE FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS ON EASTERN POLICY (II), THE FUTURE SHAPE OF EUROPE (III) AND FINANCIAL QUESTIONS (IV). THE CHANCELLOR'S REMARKS ON VIETNAM ARE REPORTED IN TELEGRAM V OF THIS SERIES.

3. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT, AS WAS USUAL IN SUCH MEETINGS, THERE HAD BEEN A DISPUTE BETWEEN HIMSELF AND DE GAULLE OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE VIEWS TOWARD THE US. THIS TIME HE BELIEVED HE HAD "WON SOME GROUND". WHEREAS DE GAULLE HAD STRESSED THE GREAT POWER OF THE US -- WHICH HE SAID CONSTITUTED A THREAT TO OTHER COUNTRIES ---THE CHANCELLOR HAD REFERRED TO THE POWER OF THE SOVIET UNION AS BEING A MUCH MORE DANGEROUS THREAT. DE GAULLE HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE GERMAN ATTITUDE TOWARD NATO. HOWEVER, HE ACCEPTED THE FACT THAT GERMANY WISHED TO "PRACTICE" NATO. DE GAULLE HAD ALSO SAID THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE GERMAN DESIRE FOR THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF AMERICAN FORCES IN EUROPE. HE ALSO APPRECIATES THE VALUE OF THE ALLIANCE. NATO CAN ONLY BE ABANDONED IF THE THREAT TO EUROPE IS REMOVED ---WHICH HE DOES NOT NOW CONSIDER TO BE THE CASE. UNLESS SOMETHING ELSE "QUITE UNFORESEEABLE" AROSE, FRANCE WOULD NOT LEAVE IT. THE CHANCELLOR REPEATED TO ME THE WORDS "QUITE UNFORESEEABLE", WHICH HE THOUGHT WAS A STRONGER EXPRESSION THAN DE GAULLE HAS PREVIOUSLY USED. HE CONSIDERED THIS TO BE PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT, SINCE DE GAULLE HAD USED THIS EXPRESSION BOTH IN HIS PRIVATE MEETING WITH HIM AND IN THE LARGE PLENARY SESSION.

4. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE EMPHASIZED TO DE GAULLE, AS HE HAD ALWAYS DONE IN THE PAST, THAT THERE CANNOT BE FULL GERMAN-FRENCH COOPERATION AS LONG AS DE GAULLE CONTINUES TO MAKE PUBLIC ANTI-AMERICAN STATEMENTS. HE TOLD DE GAULLE THAT HE (DE GAULLE) HAD LOST MUCH SUPPORT IN GERMANY AS A RESULT OF THESE STATEMENTS. THE CHANCELLOR ALSO TOLD DE GAULLE THAT, AS FAR AS THE FACTS ARE CONCERNED, HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT DE GAULLE AND THE US WERE SO FAR APART ON THEIR CONCEPTS OF THE FUTURE OF EUROPE. BOTH GERMANY AND FRANCE WANT A STRONG AND UNITED EUROPE, WHICH CAN CONSTITUTE A STABILIZING FACTOR IN THE WORLD. HE ASSURED DE GAULLE THAT THIS IS ALSO WHAT THE US WANTS. IF EUROPE CAN BE UNITED IN AGREEMENT WITH THE US, EUROPE "CAN DO ITS SHARE" IN COPING WITH FREE WORLD PROBLEMS.

5. DE GAULLE HAD, IN A SENSE, APOLOGIZED FOR THE CATEGORICAL LANGUAGE HE CUSTOMARILY USES. HE SAID THAT THIS HAS BEEN NECESSITATED BY THE FRENCH INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION. HE NEEDS THE SUPPORT OF THE COMMUNISTS, AND CAN GET THIS IF HE MAKES STATEMENTS SUCH AS HIS CHARGE THAT THE UK IS "A SATELLITE OF THE US". THE CHANCELLOR BELIEVES THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN DE GAULLE'S THINKING. HE HAD LAST SUMMER GIVEN KIESINGER A SIMILAR EXPLANATION OF HIS POSITION.

6. WITH RESPECT TO UK ENTRY INTO THE COMMON MARKET, KIESINGER ADVISED ME THAT "WE STICK WITH OUR POSITION". THERE SHOULD BE A "BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UK ON ENTRY". OF COURSE, DE GAULLE HAS OPPOSED THIS. HOWEVER, KIESINGER PUSHED HIM IN PARIS TO PERMIT A START TO BE MADE. IN THE END DE GAULLE HAD BEEN WILLING TO STATE, BOTH PRIVATELY TO HIM AND IN THE COMMUNIQUE TEXT, THAT BOTH COUNTRIES WELCOME IN PRINCIPLE THE ENTRY OF OTHER COUNTRIES ---MENTIONING SPECIFICALLY THE UK.

7. THE QUESTION REMAINED, SAID THE CHANCELLOR: "CAN ONE REALLY DO SOMETHING?" THE IDEA OF A "SORT OF FREE TRADE AREA" AS A POSSIBLE SOLUTION HAD, ACCORDING TO THE CHANCELLOR, BEEN A COMMON IDEA. WHEN I QUERIED HIM CLOSELY, HE WOULD NOT ADMIT THAT EITHER FRANCE OR GERMANY HAD PROPOSED THE IDEA FIRST.

ONE MOTIVATION OF DE GAULLE IN AGREEING TO THE IDEA, WHICH HE EXPRESSLY CONFIRMED TO THE CHANCELLOR, WAS TO "HELP THE UK FULFILL THE CONDITIONS FOR ENTRY INTO THE COMMON MARKET MORE QUICKLY".

8. KIESINGER COMMENTED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY BEEN ADVISED BY AN AMBASSADOR OF SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRY (NOT SPECIFIED), THAT THEY WOULD WELCOME THE FREE TRADE AREA APPROACH. THE AMB HAD SAID THAT THIS WAS THE VIEW OF HIS GOVERNMENT, WHICH ALSO THOUGHT THAT THE UK HAD NOT HANDLED WELL ITS EFFORTS TO ATTAIN ENTRY INTO THE COMMON MARKET.

9. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE SIX WILL NOW MEET ON THE 29TH, THE CHANCELLOR CONTINUED, AND WE WILL SEE WHAT COMES OUT". OF THOSE WHO WILL MOST LIKELY OPPOSE THE FRENCH-GERMAN PROPOSALS, HE MENTIONED DUTCH FOMIN LUNS, WHO IS THE "MOST STUBBORN" UK ADVOCATE. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY, THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN FULLY ADVISED AS TO THE RESULTS OF LUNS' TALK WITH BRANDT THE PREVIOUS DAY. HE HIMSELF HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO SEE LUNS.

10. AT THIS POINT I EMPHASIZED TO THE CHANCELLOR HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS TO US THAT ANY PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE UK AND OTHERS BE CLEARLY PREPARATORY TO THEIR EARLY ADMISSION AS FULL MEMBERS OF THE COMMON MARKET. AS HE KNEW, WE AND OTHERS HAD OPPOSED FREE TRADE AREAS, IN THEMSELVES, AS BEING MERELY PREFERENTIAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THIS.

11. IN SUMMARIZING THE RESULTS OF HIS MEETING WITH DE GAULLE INSOFAR AS IT APPLIED TO UK ENTRY, THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT "THIS WAS THE MAXIMUM WE COULD GET. IF WE HAD GOTTEN NOTHING, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN A CRISIS WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET, WHICH GERMANY WISHES TO PREVENT. AS THINGS NOW STAND THE FRENCH HAVE AGREED TO GO AHEAD". HE BELIEVED THAT THE UK SHOULD NOW BE WILLING "TO PUT ITS FOOT IN THE DOOR." IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY, HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT DE GAULLE'S AGREEMENT TO PROCEED CONSTITUTED MERELY A MANEUVER ON HIS PART. CLOSE COOPERATION WITH GERMANY IN EUROPE WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IF DE GAULLE WOULD NOW RENEGE ON THE ASSURANCES HE HAD GIVEN IN THIS RESPECT. THE CHANCELLOR CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS THE GERMAN AND FRENCH INTENTION THAT BOTH INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE BE INCLUDED IN ANY ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE UK. "IN MY VIEW," HE SAID, "WE MUST KEEP MOVING. THE UK MUST NOT BE ISOLATED." ALTHOUGH HE AGREED THAT THE SIX SHOULD CONTINUE TO TALK AMONG THEMSELVES AND HAVE OTHER CONTACTS WITH THE UK, IT WAS NOT HIS IMPRESSION, AS IT HAD BEEN BRANDT'S AS CONVEYED TO ME IN MY MEETING WITH HIM ON FEB 20, THAT DE GAULLE HAS AGREED TO OUTSIDE CONSULTATION WITH THE UK ON EXCHANGE OF TECHNOLOGY. THIS DE GAULLE CONSIDERS TO BE A COMMUNITY MATTER.

12. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY, THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK VERY MUCH OF THE BENELUX PLAN --- SOMEWHAT CONTRARY TO WHAT BRANDT HAD ADVISED ME WAS HIS VIEW. IT WAS LARGELY ON CONSIDERATIONS OF PRESTIGE THAT THE DECISION HAD BEEN MADE TO DISCUSS THIS PLAN IN BRUSSELS ON FEBRUARY 29. THE GERMANS THEMSELVES OPPOSED "ANY FRONT AGAINST THE FRENCH".

McGhee/
Pinninger talk

SUCH ACTION WOULD NOT BE CONSTRUCTIVE. FRENCH RESISTANCE WOULD ONLY BE ACCENTUATED, AND A CRISIS WOULD RESULT IN THE COMMUNITY.

13. THE CHANCELLOR OBSERVED THAT GERMANY HAS, THROUGH THE STAND IT HAS TAKEN, BEEN PUT IN AN UNCOMFORTABLE SITUATION. LUNS, AS WELL AS CERTAIN BRITISH NEWSPAPERS, HAVE SAID THAT THE "GERMANS HAVE BOWED TO FRANCE". THE CHANCELLOR NOTED THAT HE HAD IN HIS SPEECH IN HAMBURG ON FEB 21, SAID THAT IT WAS MUCH BETTER "TO SHOW PATIENCE IN THESE MATTERS", AS THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY HAD ATTEMPTED TO DO, RATHER THAN TO ACT "OUT OF SPITE" AND "AS LITTLE CHILDREN".

14. IN SPEAKING OF HIS PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH DE GAULLE, THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE BELIEVED DE GAULLE HAD CONFIDENCE IN HIM ---BECAUSE THE CHANCELLOR HAD ALWAYS BEEN FRANK WITH DE GAULLE AND BECAUSE DE GAULLE WAS CONVINCED OF THE CHANCELLOR'S COMMITMENT TO GERMAN-FRENCH COOPERATION. IT WAS QUITE POSSIBLE, THE CHANCELLOR SPECULATED, THAT FRANCE COULD TAKE A CONTRARY POSITION, I.E., ONE ANTAGONISTIC TO GERMANY. THE CHANCELLOR COMMENTED THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE MUST BE THE "HARMONIZER". HE WAS READY TO DO THIS, BOTH ON BEHALF OF FRENCH-US RELATIONS AND FRENCH-EUROPEAN RELATIONS --EVEN THOUGH THIS WAS NOT REWARDING.

EASTERN POLICY - II

1. DURING MY ONE AND A HALF HOUR CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR KIESINGER YESTERDAY, THE SUBJECT OF EASTERN POLICY AROSE WHEN THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD DE GAULLE "YOU ASK US TO RECOGNIZE THE ODER-NEISSE LINE AS DO OTHERS." GERMANY CANNOT MAKE SUCH AN "ADVANCE PAYMENT" UNLESS THERE IS A "GRAND DESIGN OF A EUROPEAN PEACE ORDER." THERE WAS NO TIME FOR THE CHANCELLOR TO ELABORATE TO ME WHAT HE MEANT BY THIS.

2. ACCORDING TO THE CHANCELLOR, THE FRENCH DO NOT SEE MUCH POSSIBILITY AT THE MOMENT FOR PROGRESS IN THE EAST. IN THE LONG-RUN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS, HOWEVER, THE CHANCELLOR BELIEVES THAT WESTERN EUROPE CAN EXERT A BENEFICIAL INFLUENCE ON EASTERN EUROPE AND DE GAULLE ADVISED HIM, SAID KIESINGER, TO GO AHEAD IN HIS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. PARTICULARLY, HE HOPED GERMANY WOULD GO FASTER WITH POLAND. AT NO TIME, HOWEVER, DID DE GAULLE PROPOSE AN EASTERN POLICY WHICH COULD BE CONSIDERED CONTRARY TO US INTERESTS. DE GAULLE KNEW, SAID THE CHANCELLOR, THAT GERMANY WOULD OPPOSE SUCH A POLICY. HE HAD MADE IT VERY CLEAR TO DE GAULLE THAT GERMANY AND FRANCE COULD COOPERATE IN A COMMON POLICY ONLY IF FRANCE FIRST AGREED THAT IT MUST BE CARRIED OUT IN FRIENDLY AGREEMENT WITH THE US.

3. I TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY TO ASSURE THE CHANCELLOR THAT OUR GOVERNMENT DID NOT, CONTRARY TO RECENT PRESS SPECULATION, HAVE ANY MISGIVINGS OVER GERMANY'S EASTERN POLICY. THE SECRETARY HAD EMPHASIZED TO BRANDT IN BRUSSELS THE IMPORTANCE OF THREE-POWER RESPONSIBILITY IN WEST BERLIN AND THE POSSIBLE PITFALLS OF A BILATERAL SOV-GERMAN APPROACH TO BERLIN, HOWEVER, WE HAD NO EVIDENCE THAT BRANDT HAD EVER CONSIDERED SUCH ACTION AND WE ACCEPTED HIS ASSURANCES THAT HE HAD NOT. THE CHANCELLOR CONFIRMED

THAT THIS WAS THE CASE. GERMANY RECOGNIZED FULLY THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE THREE ALLIED POWERS IN BERLIN.

4. I ALSO ASSURED THE CHANCELLOR THAT WE RAISED NO QUESTION CONCERNING GERMAN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. WE WELCOME THEIR RECENT ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA. WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTIONS IF THEY WISHED TO GO FURTHER WITH POLAND. WE ALSO HAD NO CONCERNS OVER HIS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH EAST GERMANY, INCLUDING HIS EXCHANGE OF LETTERS WITH GDR PREMIER STOPH. IN THIS CONNECTION I ASSURED THE CHANCELLOR THAT THE ARTICLE BY ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI IN THE JANUARY FOREIGN AFFAIRS DID NOT REFLECT STATE DEPARTMENT POLICY. I NOTED THAT BRZEZINSKI IS NO LONGER ASSOCIATED WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

5. I ALSO SAID THAT WE WISHED TO SET AT REST ANY FEARS ON HIS PART THAT WE HAD CONCERNS OVER GERMAN-SOV DISCUSSIONS, AS REPRESENTED BY THE BRANDT-TSARAPKIN TALKS. THE GERMANS HAD KEPT US ADVISED ON THESE TALKS AND ASSURED US THAT THEY WOULD RESPECT ALLIED INTERESTS. WE HAD EVERY CONFIDENCE THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO IN THE FUTURE. KIESINGER INTERJECTED THAT HE WAS "NOT IMPRESSED WITH THESE TALKS." HE FAVORED A MUTUAL RENUNCIATION OF FORCE WITH THE EASTERN COUNTRIES, HOWEVER, THE SOV TALKS UP TO THIS POINT HAD ONLY BEEN OF A PRELIMINARY NATURE. HE WAS BY NO MEANS WILLING TO PAY THE PRICE WHICH THE SOVS DEMANDED FOR MUTUAL RENUNCIATION OF FORCE. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE GERMANS WAS "TO LOOSED UP THE SITUATION IN THE EAST." THE SOVS, HOWEVER, "DO NOT WANT US" IN BUCHAREST AND PRAGUE AND HAVE OPENED UP A "HEAVY FIRE" (TROMMELFEUER) TO PIN US DOWN. THE GERMANS HAVE IN RESPONSE ATTEMPTED TO TAKE THEIR CASE TO THE WORLD LEVEL, IN AN EFFORT TO EXPLAIN THEIR GOOD INTENTIONS -- NOT ONLY BY WHAT THEY SAY BUT BY WHAT THEY DO.

6. I OBSERVED TO THE CHANCELLOR THAT PRESS ACCOUNTS OF HIS MEETING WITH DE GAULLE HAD BUILT IT UP AS CREATING A BASIS FOR A NEW EUROPEAN APPROACH TO WORLD PROBLEMS. HAD THIS POSSIBILITY BEEN DISCUSSED IN ANY DETAIL? THE CHANCELLOR MINIMIZED SUCH A CONCLUSION SAYING "FOR THE TIME BEING WE CANNOT DO MANY THINGS."

7. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT NEITHER THE AILLERET STRATEGIC CONCEPT NOR THE SEMI-OFFICIAL STUDY MADE BY THE FRENCH ECOLE DES ETUDES POLITIQUES ETRANGERES HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE GERMANS AS A BASIS FOR POLICY DISCUSSION. ANY REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY WERE NOT CORRECT. DE GAULLE HAD AT NO TIME MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF GERMAN NEUTRALITY, WHICH I REMINDED HIM HAD BEEN RAISED IN THE FRENCH PAPER. INDEED, HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT DE GAULLE SEES THIS AS A POSSIBILITY.

8. GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PARIS TALKS FOLLOW BY SEPTIEL. WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE CHANCELLOR'S COMMENT ON THE ECOLE DES ETUDES POLITIQUES ETRANGERES STUDY, BOTH ASSISTANT SECRETARY RIETE AND ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FORSTER HAVE TOLD US THAT BRANDT AGREED THAT THE PAPER SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THE FRANCO/GERMAN STRATEGY STUDY GROUP. WE BELIEVE A MATTER OF SEMANTICS IS INVOLVED HERE.

THE STUDY GROUP IS NOT IN THE GERMAN CONCEPT A POLICY-MAKING BODY. THEREFORE THE PAPER WILL NOT BE A BASIS FOR POLICY DISCUSSIONS.

THE FUTURE SHAPE OF EUROPE. III

1. CHANCELLOR KIESINGER, DURING OUR CONVERSATION YESTERDAY, OUTLINED HIS BROAD VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE WHICH HE HAD DISCUSSED IN A GENERAL WAY WITH DE GAULLE IN THEIR PRIVATE MEETING. HE DID NOT INDICATE WHAT ASPECTS OF HIS CONCEPTS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY DE GAULLE. THE CHANCELLOR STATED THAT IN HIS VIEW THERE ARE TWO ALTERNATIVES:

2. ONE, WHICH HE TERMED AN ATLANTIC IMPERIUM (POLITICAL COMMUNITY), WOULD CONSIST OF WESTERN EUROPE (I ASSUME NATO EUROPE) AND THE US (PLUS I ASSUME CANADA) ON THE ONE HAND, IN CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVS, THE EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES AND POSSIBLY THE CHINESE, ON THE OTHER HAND. THIS IMPERIUM WOULD BE FIRMLY CONSTRUCTED -- WITH NO POLITICAL LEEWAY FOR EUROPE. THE POINT OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO GREAT BLOCS WOULD BE THE EASTERN BORDER OF GERMANY, FRANCE WOULD OPPOSE SUCH A SOLUTION BECAUSE THE IDENTITY OF FRANCE WOULD DISAPPEAR. GERMANY WOULD OPPOSE IT BECAUSE OF THE CONFRONTATION IT WOULD PRODUCE ON ITS EASTERN BORDER -- WHICH WOULD BE A PERMANENT DANGER TO WORLD PEACE. IN THE GERMAN VIEW, IT WOULD BE BETTER IF "SOME DISTANCE WOULD BE PUT" BETWEEN THE SUPER ANTAGONISTS. IN HIS VIEW THE IMPERIUM CONCEPT COULD ONLY BE A POSSIBLE SOLUTION IF CHINA AND THE SOVS GOT TOGETHER AGAIN.

3. A PREFERABLE ALTERNATIVE, EXCEPT IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF RUSSIAN-CHINESE SOLIDARITY, WOULD BE THE CREATION OF A EUROPE WHICH IS A FRIENDLY PARTNER OF THE US. EUROPE WOULD IN SUCH CASE FOLLOW A EUROPEAN POLICY, BUT IN HARMONY WITH THE US. THIS WOULD BE ASSURED BY THE COMMON INTEREST OF BOTH -- WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A DURABLE TIE "FOR A LONG TIME" -- IN ASSURING THAT EUROPE WOULD NOT FALL UNDER SOV DOMINATION. UNDER SUCH A CONCEPT, EUROPE WOULD NOT BE A THIRD FORCE. EUROPE IS TOO SMALL FOR THAT. ITS ROLE WOULD BE AS A BRIDGE -- TO REDUCE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PRINCIPAL ANTAGONISTS.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND OFFSET. IV.

1. IN MY MEETING FEB 22 WITH CHANCELLOR KIESINGER, I FIRST REVIEWED BRIEFLY THE RECENT DISCUSSION BETWEEN UNDER SECRETARIES ROSTOW AND DEMING AND AMB TRIZISE, AND GERMAN OFFICIALS, ON THE US BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND OFFSET ISSUES, ALONG THE LINES REPORTED FROM MY CONVERSATION WITH FONMIN BRANDT ON FEB 20. I THANKED THE CHANCELLOR FOR HAVING PERSONALLY URGED DE GAULLE AS WE HAD BEEN ADVISED, TO AGREE TO AN ACCELERATION TO THE KENNEDY ROUND TARIFF REDUCTIONS, EVEN THOUGH DE GAULLE'S RESPONSE HAD BEEN NEGATIVE. I EMPHASIZED THAT WE WERE COUNTING ON THE HELP OF OUR TRADING PARTNERS WHO WERE IN SURPLUS TO TAKE MEASURES TO FACILITATE IMPORTS -- SO WE COULD AVOID TAKING RESTRICTIVE MEASURES. WE THEN PROCEEDED TO A DISCUSSION OF THE CHANCELLOR'S PARIS VISIT.

2. SUBSEQUENTLY, IN THE COURSE OF THIS DISCUSSION, THE CHANCELLOR SAID WITH RESPECT TO BALANCE OF PAYMENTS THAT

HE HAD TOLD DE GAULLE "WE MUST BE REASONABLE IF THE US IS TO COME INTO BALANCE". THE CHANCELLOR ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT DE GAULLE'S BASIC VIEWS ON ECONOMIC MATTERS REMAINED UNCHANGED AND THAT HE, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE HE SAW THAT IT WOULD BE TO NO AVAIL, DID NOT PRESS DE GAULLE ON THESE MATTERS.

3. THE CHANCELLOR TOLD ME THAT IT WAS HIS OWN VIEW THAT RESTRICTIVE MEASURES ARE NOT EFFECTIVE IN THE LONG RUN. ON THE OTHER HAND HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT, SINCE IMPORTS CONSTITUTE SUCH A SMALL FACTOR IN THE TOTAL AMERICAN ECONOMY, THE US COULD NOT BE ASKED TO UNDERTAKE A DEFLATION IN ORDER TO REDUCE IMPORTS. THE CHANCELLOR ASSURED ME THAT GERMANY WOULD NOT ASK FOR ANY CHANGES IN THE AGREEMENT REACHED IN RIO LAST FALL ON INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS. HE DID NOT INDICATE, HOWEVER, WHAT IF ANY ADDITIONAL MEASURES GERMANY WAS WILLING TO TAKE IN OUR BEHALF.

ATTITUDE IN GERMANY TOWARD THE US AND THE VIETNAMESE WAR. V

1. IN MY MEETING FEBRUARY 22 WITH CHANCELLOR KIESINGER, I EXPRESSED APPRECIATION TO HIM FOR HIS STRONG STATEMENT ON VIETNAM AND THE US BEFORE THE CDU FEDERAL COMMITTEE ON FEB 20. (ON THIS OCCASION KIESINGER WARNED THE CDU AGAINST CRITICISM OF THE US ON VIETNAM AND AGAINST LECTURING OTHER PEOPLE GENERALLY, STATED THAT THE US IS THE COUNTRY MOST STRONGLY ENGAGED FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM ALL OVER THE WORLD AND DECLARED THAT THE FRG SHOULD SUPPORT US. IN THE CASE OF VIETNAM, HUMANITARIAN AID FOR THE SUFFERING POPULATION CONSTITUTED THE BEST GERMAN CONTRIBUTION.) THE CHANCELLOR REPLIED THAT HE HAD REPEATED THIS STATEMENT IN A PUBLIC SPEECH MADE THE PREVIOUS EVENING IN HAMBURG. IN HIS JUDGMENT THERE WAS REALLY NO ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING IN GERMANY. IN A RECENT POLL 69 PERCENT, WITH ONLY 13 PERCENT OPPOSED, ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE TO THE QUESTION WHETHER THE FRG SHOULD ESTABLISH PARTICULARLY GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

2. ACCORDING TO KIESINGER, THE MAJORITY OF GERMANS ARE, MOREOVER, FOR THE US STAYING IN VIETNAM. WHAT FEELING THERE IS IN GERMANY ON THIS QUESTION IS REALLY A GENERAL "ANTI-WAR FEELING," RATHER THAN HOSTILITY TO THE US EFFORT IN VIETNAM. THIS HAS LED TO THE CAPTURE BY EXTREMIST GROUPS OF SOME OF THOSE WHO ARE DISCOURAGED BY THE WAR. HE REFERRED TO THE RECENT STATEMENT MADE BY FEDERAL AID MINISTER WISCHNEWSKI ON FEBRUARY 12, WHICH SOME HAD INTERPRETED TO INDICATE THAT GERMAN AID TO VIETNAM WOULD BE DECREASED. THIS REFLECTED ONLY THE INABILITY TO CARRY OUT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, BECAUSE OF THE CONFUSED SITUATION EXISTING IN VIETNAM. IT DID NOT APPLY TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, WHICH HE HOPED WOULD BE INCREASED.

3. THE CHANCELLOR ALSO SHOWED ME ANOTHER POLL WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN IN A NUMBER OF LEADING WESTERN COUNTRIES ON THE RELATIVE VALUE OF SUCH ITEMS AS PREVENTING CANCER, ELIMINATION OF WAR, REDUCING UNEMPLOYMENT, ACHIEVING LONG LIFE AND REDUCTION OF WORKING HOURS. THIS POLL SHOWED THAT THE GERMAN AND AMERICAN VIEWS ON THESE QUESTIONS WERE ALMOST IDENTICAL -- MUCH MORE SO THAN ANY OTHER TWO NATIONS.

85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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OO WTE10
DE WTE 797

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO CAP80522

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 FEB 24 00 23

68 FEB 23 PM 7:31

from file

FRIDAY

FEBRUARY 23, 1968

IN MAC BUNDY'S ABSENCE IN INDIA, I CONTACTED THE FORD FOUNDATION OFFICIAL CONNECTED WITH THE GRANT TO THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP FOUNDATION. HE SAID THE GRANT WAS GIVEN TO TRAIN MINISTERS IN THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF NEGROES IN URBAN AREAS IN SOCIAL PROBLEMS; HOUSING HOW TO FILL OUT WELFARE AND TAX FORMS; POLICE PROBLEMS; ETC. THOSE AT THE CONFERENCE CAME FROM 35 REGIONS. HE SAID HE HAD TALKED WITH THEIR CONSULTANT WHO WAS MONITORING THE GRANT AND WAS INFORMED THE NEWSPAPER REPORT WAS MISLEADING; THAT IS, AT NO TIME WAS THERE LINKAGE OF THE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM AND THE PROPOSED WASHINGTON DEMONSTRATION IN THE SPRING. NEWSPAPERMEN IMPOSED THIS INTERPRETATION, BUT THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR IT IN WHAT WAS SAID AND DONE AT THE CONFERENCE ITSELF.

DTS:242222 FEB 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY *rg* ON *2-28-92*

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-249
By cb, NARA Date 11-5-97

86

February 24, 1968 - 12:00 noon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: 1968 Economic Assistance Program for Colombia

~~1. For file~~
2. For file

Herewith the unanimous recommendation of AID, State, Agriculture and BOB, with Treasury concurrence, of a \$90 million economic assistance package for Colombia for CY 1968. It consists of:

- a \$58 million program loan (\$42 million less than last year);
- a \$15 million agricultural sector loan;
- a \$14.5 million PL 480 sales agreement;
- a \$2-3 million slaughterhouse project loan.

This amount of aid will enable President Lleras to continue his import liberalization, economic stabilization and agricultural development programs. President Lleras's very good performance with our aid last year is one of the brightest spots in our Alliance for Progress efforts. He performed equally well in the political arena by establishing a working majority in the Congress for his reform program and in the security field by clamping down on extremists in the university and aggressively pursuing the guerrillas.

The new aid package, like last year's, is part of a program jointly financed and negotiated by AID with the IMF and the World Bank. The self help requirements are realistically tough.

Colombia has not purchased a lot of new military equipment and we have no indication that it intends to. Hence, the Symington, Conte and Long amendments do not apply. This aspect will be reviewed prior to release of the loans.

I recommend you authorize the negotiating package as recommended.

W. W. Rostow

Approve

☒

Disapprove

☐

Call me ☐.

Attachment

Jim Jones telephoned Mr Rostow 2/26/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

86a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: 1968 Economic Assistance Program for Colombia

Bill Gaud and Covey Oliver request your approval to negotiate and conclude a \$90 million economic assistance package with Colombia for calendar year 1968. The package consists of

- a \$58 million program loan
- a \$15 million agricultural sector loan
- a \$14.5 million P.L. 480 sales agreement for wheat and tobacco
- a \$203 million slaughterhouse project loan.

Like last year, this package is part of a program to be jointly financed and negotiated by AID, the World Bank, and the IDB.

Program Loan. We provided a program loan of \$100 million to Colombia for 1967. Performance under this loan has been very good:

- a flexible exchange rate policy with gradual depreciation of the rate has stimulated exports,
- government investment increased 42 percent, primarily in agriculture and education,
- sound monetary policies held the cost of living increase to 8 percent in 1967 compared to 13 percent in 1966.

In addition to maintaining progress in these areas this year's loan will require further Colombian self-help commitments to

- depreciate the exchange rate by 10 percent more than the increase in domestic price levels,
- significantly liberalize imports,
- assure at least 30 percent growth in minor exports through increased incentives,
- increase national savings by modifying credit and interest rate structure.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-249
By Cb, NARA Date 11-5-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Agricultural Sector Loan and P.L. 480 Agreement. A static agricultural sector has been a major hindrance to economic growth in Colombia. The proposed agriculture sector loan and P.L. 480 agreement are designed to support urgently needed reforms in agriculture. Together they form a mutually reinforcing package which will require the Colombians to

- complete a comprehensive agricultural sector plan,
- draft specific legislation designed to remove disincentives and provide new incentives to private investment,
- increase budget expenditures in agriculture by 20 percent in real terms,
- seek legislation to improve government coordination of agricultural activities.

The proposed \$90 million package provides essential balance of payments support which will allow Colombia to finance a level of imports consistent with a growth rate of 6 percent. The inclusion of the P.L. 480 agreement in this package permits a reduction in the dollar aid that would otherwise be required.

Military Expenditures. Good and Oliver find that Colombian military expenditures do not require the application of the Symington or Cuts amendments at this time. The Colombian Government has been informed of the provisions of these amendments. Their applicability to Colombia will be reviewed prior to subsequent release of these loans.

Balance of Payments. The funds will be used to finance imports from the U. S. Secretary Foster agrees that the tying procedures and related measures proposed by AID will serve to minimize the impact of the proposed loans on the U. S. balance of payments.

Recommendation. I recommend that you authorize AID to negotiate and conclude the \$90 million economic assistance package for Colombia.

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

cc: DO Records
DO Chron.
Director
Deputy Dir.
Ext. 437
Ext. 432 1/2

IPD:BBRAY:ols:2/16/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

86b

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Washington 25, D. C.

FEB 15 1968

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Economic Assistance to Colombia

With the endorsement of Assistant Secretary Oliver and Ambassador Carlson, I am requesting your authorization to begin negotiations with the Government of Colombia in February for the following aid package. It represents our portion of the 1968 assistance program for Colombia concerted by the IBRD, to which we also expect the IMF to contribute substantially.

(a) A Program Loan covering the last three quarters of calendar 1968 of up to \$58 million.

(b) An Agricultural Sector Loan of up to \$15 million.

(c) A PL 480 dollar credit sales program for wheat and the tobacco content of cigarettes up to \$14.5 million for the 18-month period January 1968 through June 1969.

We also expect to negotiate a project loan of \$2-3 million to cover the foreign exchange cost of slaughterhouse construction and improvement.

I also request your authorization to conclude the Program and Agricultural Sector Loans and the PL 480 sales program provided the Government of Colombia, which has made good progress on its current program loan commitments, undertakes satisfactory additional self-help commitments for 1968.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-262
By Cb, NARA Date 3-3-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

The U.S. Interest in Colombia. In its first seventeen months in office, the Government of President Carlos Lleras has made remarkably good progress in economic and political spheres, and its continued success remains Colombia's best hope of achieving a satisfactory rate of economic development and of democratic reforms under the Alliance for Progress.

In the political sphere, President Lleras has reunited his Liberal Party, consolidated his position in Congress, surrounded himself with a dynamic group of executives, and laid the groundwork for further political and economic reforms. He has dealt with the subversive forces domestically with a firm hand, imposing discipline on the university campuses and pursuing the remaining guerrilla-bandit groups in the interior. He has introduced legislation to effect a gradual transition from the National Front, under which Colombia is titularly governed jointly by the Liberal and Conservative parties until 1974, to a more competitive political system. It is important that he succeed in this effort for Colombia, unlike some other Latin American countries, offers no viable alternative political parties or groups, and the danger of political disintegration is considerable if the Lleras Administration founders significantly in its political and economic objectives.

President Lleras has also achieved considerable stature as a leader in the movement towards Latin American economic integration, and especially as a sponsor of the Andean sub-regional group. Colombia's representatives in the United Nations and the OAS have generally been on the same side as the U.S., but President Lleras has simultaneously emphasized his independence by expanding some trade and consular relations with Eastern European countries.

Major Colombian Economic Accomplishments During Current Program Year.

Colombian economic performance during the program has been satisfactory and in some respects, has exceeded our expectations. With respect to the balance of payments, which remains the major constraint on Colombian development, the Colombian Government has, forcefully and successfully implemented constructive policies which have brought about a markedly healthier situation than prevailed a year ago. Sound internal financial and monetary policies have suitably complemented balance of payments management, and the cost of living has risen much more slowly than in recent years. Planning has been greatly improved at the national level, especially in the agricultural and educational sectors. Coffee Federation financing is again sound and internal prices for coffee do not appear to have encouraged increased production, while progress is being made in the detailed studies requisite to a broader diversification program.

Compliance with the main commitments under the FY 1967 program loan has been generally satisfactory to date:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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*100 million
May 1967*

a. Foreign Exchange Policy: A flexible exchange rate policy has been followed in the certificate market, allowing gradual depreciation of the principal rate, which will soon allow its unification with the capital market rate of 16.30 pesos per dollar. A strong incentive to petroleum investment has been provided by the recent change of the petroleum exchange rate from 7.67 to 16.30 pesos per dollar. Although substantial arrears for certain capital market items remain, commercial arrears were eliminated by July. Foreign short-term debt has been markedly reduced and the target for improvement in the reserve position has been substantially exceeded.

b. Export Policy: The Colombian Government through its new Export Promotion Fund and other measures is actively promoting sales of Colombian goods abroad, and 1967 minor exports receipts are expected to exceed 1966 levels by about 20 percent.

c. Fiscal Effort and Monetary Policy: Cumulative current account budget surplus targets are being exceeded, with comfortable margins through careful control of expenditures and improved tax collection, making possible substantial increases in public sector investments for development. For example, as of November 30, 1967, income tax collections were running some 20% ahead of the prior year. Determined efforts are being made to close remaining tax loopholes. The Bank of the Republic's management of monetary policy has been conservative and has strongly supported balance of payments and fiscal action.

d. Agriculture: Allocation of resources to agriculture has been further increased. Planning is developing steadily with several sub-sector plans completed, and the basis for an overall plan has been established. The finances of the Coffee Federation have been strengthened.

e. Education: Reform is being energetically pursued. Use of existing staff and facilities has been improved and the need for new legislation and administrative reforms is being carefully examined by the Colombian Government.

As a result of these measures, as well as a notably firm policy on wages, under the resourceful leadership of President Lleras, the Colombian economy and the Colombian balance of payments in particular are in a distinctly better basic situation than at the beginning of the program period, despite some weakness in coffee prices. Above all, progress toward long overdue institutional reforms is accelerating and the stage is thus being set for a quickened development effort in 1968.

Economic Assistance Strategy for 1968. The strategy for the FY 1967 assistance program was designed to get the Lleras Government off to a strong start in its drive to cope with the country's major problems, including the balance of payments, the need for increased public investment, a more realistic coffee policy, and needed reforms in public administration, taxation, agriculture and education, while assuring continuation of sound fiscal and monetary policies. To this end, extensive self-help commitments were sought over a broad range of issues. For FY 1968, we are changing emphasis within our strategy to give added emphasis to the agriculture sector. The commitments to be sought in the proposed program loan will be reduced to a few essential monetary, fiscal, exchange and development policies, while commitments in agriculture will be negotiated in connection with a separate sectoral loan. (The Mission also expects to be in a position to recommend a sector loan for education for use in calendar 1969.)

In particular, our program loan strategy includes Colombian self-help commitments in the following areas to be sought in conjunction with the IMF and IBRD.

1. Continued rate flexibility and depreciation during 1968 at a rate roughly 10% greater than the increase in domestic price levels.
2. Further progress toward import liberalization, including quarterly reimbursable import registration targets rising during the program period from \$120 to about \$150 million.
3. An increase in incentives to stimulate growth of minor exports tending to assure that the latter will grow by 30% or more in 1968.
4. Elimination of capital market arrears, avoidance of new current account arrears and increased flexibility in acting on foreign investment applications.
5. Policies and measures which will stimulate more active development of mineral resources.
6. Non-inflationary financing of the coffee sector, progress in implementing a coffee diversification program, and, if necessary, a revision of taxation levels in the coffee sector designed to limit incentives to producers and control the profit margins of exporters.
7. Measures to increase national savings, and a start toward basic modification of the country's credit and interest rate structure.
8. Current account surplus targets which will permit a more adequate public sector investment budget financed increasingly with Colombian resources.

The primary objectives of the proposed Agricultural Sector Loan are:

- a. To provide financing for imported agricultural inputs needed to stimulate the commercial sector of agriculture in Colombia.
- b. To generate local currency for investment in agreed projects and programs of highest priority.
- c. To focus leverage on policy and institutional reforms needed to improve the organizational framework and push planning of concrete programs which will attract substantial new investments in commercial agriculture and expand programs to alleviate social and economic problems in the small farm agriculture.

To these ends, in negotiating an agricultural sector loan, we will seek commitments from the following:

1. A firm commitment from the Colombian Government to complete an acceptable comprehensive plan for the agricultural sector to include:
 - a. A complete survey of existing incentives and disincentives to private investment in agriculture.
 - b. Specific recommendations in the form of draft legislation designed to remove such disincentives and/or provide incentives to substantially increase private investment in the agricultural sector in the relatively short run.
2. Additional planning commitments for completion and publication of specific plans for the implementation of expanded public programs in land reform, agricultural extension and identification of blockages in the marketing system for inputs and commodities, with particular attention to export crops.
3. A commitment to increase public expenditures for the agriculture sector in 1968 by 10% over 1967 in real terms (net of all counterpart funds from either the program or sectoral loans).
4. Progressive removal of administrative controls on importations of identifiable agricultural imports.

The proposed PL 480 Agreement will cover purchases over the 18-month period beginning January 1, 1968, of approximately \$9.4 million of wheat and \$3.6 million for the tobacco content of cigarettes. It will include Colombian self-help commitments in agriculture compatible with, and in some respects identical to, those in the agricultural sector loan. In view of the insufficiency of loan funds available, it is important that we conclude a PL 480 Agreement with Colombia.

The proposed assistance levels under the two loans, together with project financing and proposed PL 480 will help Colombia to finance a substantially increased flow of imports that should enable Colombia to approach a growth rate of 6 percent, assuming there is no attrition in coffee prices and that the anticipated level of assistance is provided by other donors.

We would plan to make approximately half of the funds proposed for the program and sector loans available soon after loan agreements are negotiated and signed. The remainder of the funds would be released only after a review of Colombian performance against agreed commitments following five or six months' experience in the program period.

Effect on the U.S. Balance of Payments. U.S. assistance will continue to be used exclusively for the purchase of goods and equipment in the United States. Existing incentives to importers for the utilization of such funds will be continued and if need be additional incentives will be negotiated. The United States' share of import registrations for the Colombian market has held up well, apart from the growing market share of LAFTA countries, and is expected to continue to do so.

Colombian Eligibility Under the Symington and Conte Amendments. Colombia has been notified of the provisions of Section 620 (s) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 known as the Symington Amendment and Section 119 of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act known as the Conte Amendment. These provisions do not apply at this time. Moreover, Colombian military expenditures do not constitute a disproportionate share of total government expenditures and the percentage defense share has been declining, while total capital expenditures and expenditures for agriculture and education have increased. The Colombian military effort concentrates on internal security tasks. The applicability of these provisions will, however, be carefully reviewed prior to release of tranches of the two loans.

Recommendation: In accordance with the framework outlined above, I recommend that you approve the initiation of negotiations with the Government of Colombia in early February for an A.I.D. Program Loan of up to \$58 million, for an Agricultural Sector Loan of up to \$15 million, and for a PL 480 dollar credit sales program of wheat and tobacco of approximately \$14.5 million. The final loan authorizations will be subject to the current inter-agency review and approval process.



William S. Gaud

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

86c

To: The President

FEB 15 1968

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Colombia

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 agreement to provide during FY 1968-69 approximately 150,000 tons of wheat and the tobacco content of about two billion cigarettes, for which the current export market value (including applicable ocean transportation costs) is about \$14.5 million. The proposed terms are payment in dollars of 5 percent on delivery and the balance in approximately equal installments over 19 years; interest will be 2 percent per annum during a 2-year grace period and $2\frac{1}{2}$ percent thereafter. The Departments of State and Treasury concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

The Colombian Government has indicated its intention to give substantially increased support to agricultural development. But, Colombia traditionally has been dependent on imports to meet its domestic wheat consumption needs, and during the eighteen month period of this proposed PL 480 agreement is expected to produce less than half of its needs. Moreover, its total food production, including wheat substitutes, has scarcely kept pace with the population growth of some 3.2 percent per year.

The purchase of 150,000 tons of wheat during FY 1968-69 on PL 480 dollar credit terms would supplement other U.S. assistance in support of Colombia's effort to diversify its agricultural production and to correct its structural balance of payment problem. The development-minded Lleras Government is now giving priority to diversification of its own resources in order to improve food production and exports other than coffee, on which it is over-dependent.

Self-Help Effort

In the negotiations of this agreement, we will seek the following commitments from the Government of Colombia (GOC):

1. All local currencies generated through sale of commodities under this agreement will be allocated to the development of the agricultural sector. Specific uses of the funds will be determined during the negotiations on the total counterpart use for 1968 and 1969, with maximum use of private enterprise in the projects.
2. Agreement of GOC to exercise its best effort to:
 - A. Develop an acceptable comprehensive agricultural sector plan

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-262
By cb, NARA Date 3-3-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

by October 1, 1968, which will include an analysis of existing incentives and disincentives to private investment in agriculture with respect to (1) credit policy, (2) price support policy, (3) tax policy, and (4) tariff policy on agricultural imports, and

- B. Make specific recommendations in the form of draft legislation designed to remove existing disincentives and provide incentives to substantially increase private investment in the agricultural sector.
3. GOC's exercising its best efforts to obtain passage of essential legislation presently before the Colombian Congress necessary to permit improved central Government coordination at the Ministerial level of all activities of public entities operating in the field of agriculture.
 4. Agreement of the GOC to increase the level of public expenditures in real terms in 1968 in support of the agricultural sector by 20 percent over 1967 and by another 20 percent during 1969.
 5. Strengthen systems of collection, computation and analysis of statistics to better measure the availability of agricultural inputs and progress in expanding production of agricultural commodities.

Basis for Usual Marketing Requirement


The usual marketing requirement of 150,000 tons of wheat and \$200,000 worth of cigarettes are based on commercial imports over the past five years. During negotiation of this agreement, we will endeavor to confirm a mutual understanding that Colombia will purchase during FY 1969 at least 100,000 metric tons of wheat on an open competitive bidding basis, without discrimination as to source.

Military Expenditures Review


With respect to Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act, State/AID has concluded that U.S. developmental assistance is not being diverted to military expenditures and that Colombia's resources are not being diverted to military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with Colombia's development.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with this P.L. 480 sales agreement as described above. February 13 1968



Administrator
Agency for International Development



Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

82

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ URGENT

February 24, 1968

*Pres file
CAP 80558*

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Paul Nitze just called. He said that Westy has asked urgent permission that the South Vietnamese who are sharing in the defense of Khe Sanh be permitted to use the COFRAM special ammunition, especially in the form of grenades. They will be bearing some of the shock of ground attack if and when it comes. In fact, the enemy may try to concentrate on them. Westy feels strongly that they should have the best that we have for the defense. The JCS concur. Paul Nitze concurs.

Westy wanted an urgent decision because he thinks the attack may begin at any time and the South Vietnamese must be instructed.

Finding that you were away for an hour, I told Paul that he should give Westy an assent and prepare to begin to instruct the South Vietnamese at Khe Sanh; but that I would lay the matter before you for final decision.

It is my understanding that in Europe and in Korea, where we also have this ammunition stockpiled, we have always envisaged sharing it with our allies at a time of combat.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-258
By sig, NARA Date 9-23-96

~~TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 24, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW AND LEONHART

FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. We learn indirectly that Bunker has told Bob Komer and Don MacDonald to return to States for brief rest -- and short break and that Komer plans to fly back with Wheeler.

2. AID appropriations hearings open February 27 with Vietnam now scheduled last about month later. State, Defense and AID planning testify with home teams and believe field representatives should probably not be involved at this time.

3. They are concerned that Komer's presence in Washington will generate Congressional requests to advance Vietnam appropriations testimony or for some other committee appearance.

4. Wheeler's plane will stop Honolulu on February 27 and Defense is willing fly Komer's wife to meet him there if you think this preferable.

May we have your guidance:

(A) Offload Komer in Hawaii _____

(B) Let him come on _____

89
Pres file
CA P8 0559

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *hg*, NARA, Date *2-28-92*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

90

INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

Friday, February 23, 1968
3:05 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the full report of Cy
Vance's, with attachments, as requested.

re South Korea

W. W. Rostow

TOP SECRET

WWRostow:rla

INFORMATION

91

~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 23, 1968
3:00 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith detailed but somewhat
inconclusive account of the 3 Americans
who approached the Soviet Embassy.

W. W. Rostow

*See follow thru
W*

ASCI-DSCO, 19 Feb 1968

Memo for Mr. W. W. Rostow from Maj Gen Wesley G. Franklin, Actg ACoS for
Intelligence re Wardell; Kisiolek; Mullins

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 3-31-92

92

Feb 23, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

Pres file

Following, for your approval, is proposed wedding
message to ^{Rajiv}~~Ravi~~ Gandhi, elder son of Indian Prime Minister.

(Wedding is February 25 in New Delhi.)

BEGIN MESSAGE:

Mrs. Johnson and I wish you and your bride every
happiness. May your lives together be full of joy and peace.

END MESSAGE

February 23, 1968

93

Presfile

CAP 80520

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

Recent reports from Khe Sanh indicate that 1300 rounds of artillery, mortars and rockets were fired by the enemy during the period 11 o'clock last night to 9:00 a.m. this morning. Eighteen Marines were killed and 38 were wounded as a result of this.

February 23, 1968

94

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

CAP80519

Following, for your approval, is proposed wedding
message to Rajiv Gandhi, elder son of Indian Prime Minister.
(Wedding is February 25 in New Delhi.)

Pres file

BEGIN MESSAGE:

Mrs. Johnson and I wish you and your bride every
happiness. May your lives together be full of joy and peace.

END MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

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1968 FEB 23 15 51

701 WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP 30538

~~SECRET~~

FEBRUARY 23, 1968

HEREWITH AMB. BUNKER BRIEFS THIEU ON THEMES FOR FACE THE NATION AND GETS A FIRM COMMITMENT ON DATES FOR TWO NEW CORPS COMMANDERS (MARCH 1) AND NEW PROVINCE CHIEFS (APRIL 1). ALSO, AN EXPLANATION FOR "PROTECTIVE ARREST" OF CERTAIN POLITICAL FIGURES.

1. I SAW PRESIDENT THIEU EARLY EVENING OF FEBRUARY 22 AND DISCUSSED WITH HIM THE POINTS THAT WE HOPED HE WOULD COVER IN HIS FACE THE NATION APPEARANCE. HE APPRECIATED HAVING THESE SUGGESTIONS AND THE OTHER MATERIAL WE HAD GIVEN HIM TO PREPARE FOR HIS APPEARANCE. IN CONNECTION WITH THE MILITARY FIGURES CONCERNING THE NUMBER OF MEN UNDER ARMS IN VIETNAM AS AGAINST THE U.S., I SAID THAT THE PROPORTION IS REALLY VERY IMPRESSIVE AND MOST PEOPLE DON'T REALIZE HOW LARGE THE ARMED FORCES IN VIETNAM ARE IN RELATION TO THE NATION'S CIVILIAN POPULATION. I ADDED THAT THIS FACT, PLUS THE PROPOSED INCREASE UNDER THE NEW DRAFT PROVISIONS, WILL HAVE A VERY POSITIVE EFFECT. I TOLD THIEU THAT I THOUGHT HE WOULD ALSO BE CLOSELY QUESTIONED ON MATTERS RELATING TO NEGOTIATIONS AND COALITION GOVERNMENT, ESPECIALLY TO SEE IF THERE WERE ANY REAL DIFFERENCES IN VIEWPOINT BETWEEN THE GVN AND THE USG.

2. I THEN RETURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF THE ARRESTS OF CERTAIN POLITICAL FIGURES WHICH I HAD DISCUSSED WITH HIM THE DAY BEFORE. THIEU SAID THAT THIS DECISION HAD BEEN MADE AT A CABINET MEETING ON FEBRUARY 20 AND EMPHASIZED THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS WERE BEING "INVITED" TO THE POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH COMPOUND FOR THEIR OWN PROTECTION AND FOR THE SECURITY OF THE NATION. HE REITERATED THAT THE GVN HAD INTELLIGENCE THAT THE VC WISHED TO EXPLOIT THESE PERSONS TO PROMOTE "PEACE" AND "COALITION GOVERNMENT". HE SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE NEITHER ARRESTED NOR INTERROGATED AND WOULD BE KEPT IN COMFORTABLE QUARTERS. HE ADDED THAT A NUMBER OF OTHERS WHO WERE ON THIS REPORTED VIET CONG LIST WOULD BE INVITED TO COOPERATED UNDER SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 96-249

By CB, NARA Date 11-5-97

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

3. I STRESSED ONCE AGAIN THAT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR AND POLICE AUTHORITIES TO COORDINATE CAREFULLY WITH THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INFORMATION SINCE THIS WHOLE MATTER MADE AN EXTREMELY BAD IMPRESSION ABROAD. I OBSERVED THAT IF THE SECURITY OF THE NATION WAS IN FACT INVOLVED AND THE PEOPLE UNDERSTOOD THIS, THEN THEY WOULD SUPPORT IT. THIEU AGREED AND SAID THAT HE WOULD SEE THAT THIS WAS PROPERLY HANDLED.

4. WE DISCUSSED AGAIN THE SWITCH IN CONTROL OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER, AND THIEU REITERATED THAT THIS HAD BEEN FULLY AGREED AMONG KY, LEO, AND HIMSELF. IN ADDITION TO THE REGULAR MORNING MEETINGS, UNDER THE PRIME MINISTER, THIEU SAID THAT HE PLANNED TO MEET AT LEAST TWICE A WEEK WITH THEM IN HIS OWN SITUATION ROOM IN ORDER TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE PROGRESS BEING MADE. KY ALSO WOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE. HE ADDED THAT WITH RESPECT TO MY EARLIER SUGGESTION THAT THERE BE A BAN PLACED ON PRIVATE LUXURY CONSTRUCTION, HE EXPECTED TO TAKE ACTION SHORTLY TO PLACE SUCH A BAN IN EFFECT FOR A PERIOD OF EIGHT MONTHS TO A YEAR.

5. THIEU THEN DESCRIBED SOME OTHER ACTIONS WHICH HE IS TAKING TO MOVE PRIORITY MATTERS ALONG. HE SAID THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE CHANGE IN CONTROL MACHINERY FOR PROVINCE CHIEFS, WOULD TAKE EFFECT ON MARCH 1. HE ADDED THAT HE WILL SIGN THE REORGANIZATION DECREE, WHICH SETS FORTH THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES, THIS WEEK. THE PRIME MINISTER AND INTERIOR MINISTER WILL SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUE IMPLEMENTING DECREES EXPLAINING IN DETAIL HOW THIS NEW ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENT WILL FUNCTION. AFTER A ONE-MONTH TRIAL PERIOD, A SEMINAR WOULD BE HELD TO REVIEW THE OPERATIONS AND DETERMINE WHETHER THE REORGANIZATION HAD WORKED EFFECTIVELY, AND WHETHER CHANGES WERE NEEDED.

6. THIEU REMARKED THAT THE NEW TRAINING COURSE FOR PROVINCE CHIEFS WOULD BEGIN AT THE SAME TIME, NAMELY MARCH 1. DURING THE PERIOD MARCH 1 TO APRIL 1 THE PRESENT PROVINCE CHIEFS WOULD CONTINUE IN OFFICE ALTHOUGH OPERATING UNDER THE REORGANIZED ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS. CERTAIN PROVINCE CHIEFS WOULD THEN BE CHANGED ON APRIL 1 WHEN THE TRAINING COURSE WAS FINISHED. HE ALSO SAID HE PLANNED TO MAKE THE CHANGE IN II AND IV CORPS COMMANDERS ON MARCH 1. SENDING GENERAL LAN TO II CORPS AND GENERAL THANG TO IV CORPS. WITH RESPECT TO THE DRAFT OF THE YOUNGER AGE CLASSES, THE CALL-UP OF 19-YEAR OLDS WOULD NOW BEGIN MARCH 1 AND CARRY THROUGH APRIL 30; THE 18-YEAR OLDS WOULD BE CALLED UP BETWEEN MAY 1 AND JUNE 30. IN REPLY TO MY QUERY, HE SAID THIS SPEED-UP IN DRAFT WAS PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE.

~~SECRET~~

REF 23/1557Z FEB 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~

For: The President
From: Walt Rostow

92
sent Ranch 2/23/68
CAP 80504

Jim Jones told me last evening you wished a daily Vietnam summary from me. I came in early this morning to summarize yesterday.

I shall do so under three headings: fact, opinion, and action.

Fact:

- The enemy is preparing to strike in the Western Highlands (Pleiku, Kontum, Dak To);
- He is apparently bringing major units in towards Saigon;
- He is, of course, positioned to attack at both Khe Sanh and Quang Tri;
- He has forces around Hue and Danang; degree of readiness less certain, although Westy reported a major contact Northwest of Hue;
- In the Delta especially, but elsewhere as well, he is moving rapidly to exploit the relative vacuum in the countryside to recruit in an effort to make up recent losses, to expand rural control, and exert pressure on towns.
- The effort to close off Route 4 to deny food supplies to Saigon continues, as well as the effort to keep Route 1 closed between Danang and Hue, to limit military supplies to I Corps.
- Diplomatically, the enemy is establishing a whole range of diplomatic ~~contacts~~ ^{contacts} "to explain his victories" and to keep lines open for a later negotiating offensive.
- We now estimate that more than 60,000 were used in the first wave of attack at Tet made up roughly as follows: 37 percent North Vietnamese units; 29 percent VC main forces; 34 percent VC local forces. CIA estimates that main force units (North Vietnamese and VC), estimated by MACV at 115,000 in December were higher than that at Tet. "Over half" of main forces are available for follow-on major attacks.
- There is the suggestion in intelligence that additional North Vietnamese regulars are being brought south -- perhaps two additional divisions.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 20

By isa, NARS, Date 6-25-84

Opinion

General Taylor and I went over all this at length yesterday. He believes ^(they) they will make a total effort, with all their capital soon. They will then try to lock us into a negotiation at their peak position before we can counter-attack. He agrees with Napoleon that ^{providence} ~~precedence~~ is on the side with the last reserves. Therefore, right now we should be moving out to Westy all the ready forces we have and calling up reserves for:

- a Vietnam counter-attack;
- Korea contingency;
- general purposes, for our world posture.

at a number
of places

I agree. I believe we ~~face~~ face the decisive battle of the war. They will try to dissipate Westy's reserves by simultaneous attacks and take Khe Sanh if possible.

I am uncertain about timing; but they are so obsessed with memories of 1954 I suspect they will hit soon, get a maximum position, and then force a negotiation, perhaps via the San Antonio formula before the weather opens up in I Corps and at Hanoi-Haiphong. The Geneva Conference of 1954 opened on April 26. Dienbienphu fell on May 7/8.

for us

I suspect Bus will report considerable anxiety in Saigon.

- Westy reported yesterday that "for the first time General Abrams was permitting himself to be somewhat encouraged."
- Ellsworth's cable contained this key passage after ~~reviewing~~ reviewing Thieu's and Westy's views:

"If these views are correct, and they seem to me quite logical, then it appears they will involve a ~~Ma~~ major effort on the part of the enemy. How long he can sustain such an intensive effort, given the losses which he has already taken and which such an effort will inevitably entail, is problematical, especially if we have the men and material to meet and frustrate him at every turn. I think there is no question about the will."

Action:

1. After going over all this with General Taylor we agreed that on Saturday he would have in the CIA and DIA order of battle experts to determine the enemy forces now ^{available} engaged for the main force battle and, especially, to see whether Hanoi is now bringing in - or has brought in - an extra two divisions. This would be a critical factor in making our case to the Congress, if you so decide.
2. I took the occasion of my 10:30 AM meeting with Secretary Rusk and Clark Clifford to review the picture and underline the diplomatic problem we might face if they tried, having expended their capital, to force us to ~~neg~~ negotiate before our power could be brought to bear. Secretary Rusk observed we might work to modify the San Antonio formula in the light of large North Vietnamese movements and let them know we wouldn't negotiate until North Vietnamese regulars are out of I Corps.
3. I shall bring Harry McPherson up-to-date on the whole picture, at his request, this morning, to prepare him for drafting, if necessary.
4. I saw a number of newspapermen in the past two days: Rowlie Evans, Hugh Sidey, Jack Leacocos, Dick Wilson, and Bob Kleiman. I reviewed the first wave; ^{impressed} updated as we have from the beginning, that we expected I Corps and other main force attacks; used Ellsworth's cable of yesterday for background purposes to suggest the present balance sheet. Evans was in a hand-wringing mood of near despair. He, Sidey, Leacocos, and Wilson all asked about whether we'd send more troops. I flatly said I would make no comment whatsoever. Kleiman wanted to know if we looked on the new National Congress as an instrument for negotiating a settlement with the NLF. I told him that was not why they came together; but if the Communists ever wanted to negotiate a one-man -one-vote settlement, along the lines of your TV statement, just before Canberra, there were many ways. Right now they appeared to be trying to take over South Vietnam lock, stock, and barrel.

~~SECRET~~

98
Feb. 23, 1968
Pres file
CAP80510

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

A distinguished Swiss businessman named Umbricht is operating in Cambodia and Hong Kong as a one-man searcher for peace.

He states he is there with the personal blessing of President Johnson. That, at least, is what is coming into the State Department in the cable traffic.

State has no evidence that you sanctioned his enterprise; although John Hayes has talked to the man. He may have raised the Umbricht matter when he saw you.

Is there anything I should tell State?

###

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-249
By cb, NARA Date 11-5-97

~~TOP SECRET~~

February 23, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

Presfile

Cy Vance has now prepared two reports on his mission to South Korea. The first-person report was submitted to the President. There is no other distribution.

A second report, written in the third person, and including full documentation on the mission, is now in my hands. Copies have been prepared for Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Secretary-Designate Clifford, Under Secretary Katzenbach, Deputy Secretary Nitze, and General Wheeler. It will not be distributed without your assent.

The material is quite sensitive, but necessary if we are to proceed with planning and action for the future.

My recommendation is that it be distributed on a literally eyes only basis and that the designated individuals make available the data and recommendations on a tight, selective "need-to-know" basis to staff working on South Korea.

But you may wish to examine this bulky second report yourself before making a decision.

Send second Vance report by pouch _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-255
By *ics*, NARA Date 9-11-97

Release to designated individuals on "eyes only"
and "need-to-know" basis _____

Call me _____

~~TOP SECRET~~ WWRostow:rlm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 23, 1968

100

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: 1968 Economic Assistance for Brazil

This package contains the unanimous recommendation of AID, State, Agriculture, and BOB, with Treasury concurrence, that you approve an economic assistance program for Brazil for 1968 of \$255 million. Of this amount, \$170 million is FY 1968 money for program, sector and project loans, \$50 million a carryover from the 1967 program loan, and \$35 million of PL - 480.

Brazilian performance last year was not as good as we would have liked. In large part, it was due to President Costa e Silva's new team getting its policies and priorities established. The soft spots were the large budget deficit, too rapid expansion of private credit and a sizeable depletion of foreign reserves. But inflation was reduced from 41% in 1966 to 25% in 1967. The import liberalization program was maintained. And the January exchange rate and credit actions showed a renewed commitment to stabilization.

The negotiating strategy of our assistance package has been carefully coordinated with the IMF and World Bank. The self-help conditions are hard-headed but realistic. Gaud and Oliver find that the application of the Symington Amendment is not required. Applicability of the Conte-Long Amendment will depend on whether President Costa e Silva decides to buy supersonic aircraft or other sophisticated weapon systems. The aid package is structured to permit Conte-Long deductions if this becomes necessary.

I recommend you approve the negotiating package as proposed by Bill Gaud and Covey Oliver.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-249
By CK, NARA Date 11-5-97

Approve ✓

Disapprove —

Call me —

Attachment



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

(2/22/68)

101

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Draft Letter from the President to Mrs. Bucher

The Department and DOD have cleared the draft letter from the President to Mrs. Bucher with the following suggested changes.

First Paragraph

Change "I welcome the opportunity your letter gives me to offer..." to "I welcome this opportunity to offer..."

Fifth Paragraph


Change "You are also disturbed by recent press reports..." to "I understand your concern over recent press reports..."

Sixth Paragraph

Delete first two sentences.

Seventh Paragraph

Change last sentence to "We have every reason to believe that he handled himself to the best of his ability."


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

DEAR MRS. BUCHER:

clear:

DOD/NAVY RA D Adm. O'Brien

I WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY YOUR LETTER GIVES ME TO OFFER
THE ADMIRATION AND REASSURANCE YOU DESERVE.

MY OWN DEEP CONCERN FOR THE MEN OF THE PUEBLO HAS ALWAYS
EMBRACED THEIR TROUBLED FAMILIES. ALL OF THOSE WHO, WITH ME,
DEVOTE LONG DAYS AND NIGHTS TO RESOLVING THIS INCIDENT HAVE
YOUR PERSONAL INTERESTS KEENLY AT HEART. WE WANT MOST URGENTLY
TO RELIEVE YOUR ANXIETY. YOU WILL, I PRAY, FIND COMFORT IN MY
OWN ASSURANCE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S UNFLAGGING EFFORTS AND
DETERMINATION TO SUCCEED.

OUR GOAL IS TO SECURE THE SWIFTEST RETURN OF THE PUEBLO CREW
THAT PEACEFUL MEANS PERMIT. OUR INITIATIVES ARE AS COMPREHENSIVE
AS THEY ARE CONSTANT.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS BEARING DOWN ON EVERY DIPLOMATIC
LEVER AVAILABLE TO US. WE HAVE ACTION UNDER WAY THROUGH OTHER
GOVERNMENTS, THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION AND THE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. OUR NEGOTIATORS FACE A DIFFICULT
AND DELICATE TASK. I AM PROUD AND GRATEFUL FOR YOUR RECOGNITION
THAT THEY MUST BE GUIDED BY THE PARAMOUNT INTEREST -- RELEASE
OF THE CREW UNDER HONORABLE CONDITIONS. I AM MYSELF ENCOURAGED
THAT TALKS PROCEED AT PANMUNJON. YOU AND I HAVE GOOD CAUSE FOR
HOPE IN THIS EVIDENCE OF NORTH KOREA'S WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE
DISCUSSION.

I understand your concern over
YOU ARE ALSO DISTURBED BY RECENT PRESS REPORTS THAT THE
PUEBLO CREW MAY BE TRIED AS CRIMINALS. WE HAVE WARNED NORTH
KOREA, IN THE STERNEST TERMS, THAT ANY SUCH ACTION WOULD
CONSTITUTE A DELIBERATE AGGRAVATION OF AN ALREADY GRAVE SITUATION.

add ~~IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT NORTH KOREA IS MERELY TRYING TO --
ESTABLISH THEIR RIGHT TO TRY THE CREW. THEY COULD THEN PUBLICLY
FORGO THAT RIGHT, AS A POINT-SCORING GESTURE. WE HAVE NO
INDICATIONS THAT THE CREW IS BEING MISTREATED.~~

FRANKLY, PRECISE DETAILS OF THE SEIZURE REMAIN OBSCURED.
IT WILL TAKE TIME TO RECONSTRUCT THE INCIDENT, EVEN AFTER
YOUR HUSBAND AND HIS CREW ARE HOME WITH A FIRST-HAND ACCOUNT.
WE DO KNOW THAT COMMANDER BUCHER FACED A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY.
~~ON PRESENT INFORMATION, WE HAVE NO REASON TO THINK THAT HE
DID NOT HANDLE HIMSELF TO THE BEST OF HIS ABILITY.~~

WHILE MOST UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION ON THE INCIDENT HAS
APPEARED IN THE PRESS, YOU MAY FIND FURTHER REASSURANCE IN
THE ENCLOSURE. THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
PREPARED IT AS AN OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO PUBLIC AND CONGRES-
SIONAL INQUIRIES.

LET ME OFFER ONE FURTHER PERSONAL ASSURANCE. YOUR HUSBAND'S
REPUTATION AMONG THOSE COMRADES WHO KNOW HIM BEST IS HIGH
AND STRONG. KNOWING HIM SO, AND BEING MOVED BY THE PATRIOTISM
AND FORGIVENESS OF YOUR OWN LETTER, I RENEW MY PROMISE OF
PERSEVERANCE AND SUCCESS TO YOU BOTH.

MRS. JOHNSON AND I WILL CONTINUE TO BE WITH YOU IN HEART.
MAY GOD BLESS YOU AND GUIDE YOU THROUGH THIS PASSING TRIAL.

SINCERELY,
LBJ

101a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

101b

RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 FEB 22 04 00

00 WTE
DE WTE 10 52F

FROM MAGUIRE, LBJ RANCH
TO WALT ROSTOW
CITE LBJWH8070

1968 FEB 21 PM 11 09
WEDNESDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOLLOWING IS REVISED TEXT OF REPLY TO MRS. BUCHER. APPROVED BY PRESIDENT. SUBMITTED FOR FINAL CLEARANCE BY YOU AND STATE-DEFENSE AS NECESSARY. PLEASE COMMENT SOONEST TO ME AT RANCH.

DEAR MRS. BUCHER:

I WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY YOUR LETTER GIVES ME TO OFFER THE ADMIRATION AND REASSURANCE YOU DESERVE.

MY OWN DEEP CONCERN FOR THE MEN OF THE PUEBLO HAS ALWAYS EMBRACED THEIR TROUBLED FAMILIES. ALL OF THOSE WHO, WITH ME, DEVOTE LONG DAYS AND NIGHTS TO RESOLVING THIS INCIDENT HAVE YOUR PERSONAL INTERESTS KEENLY AT HEART. WE WANT MOST URGENTLY TO RELIEVE YOUR ANXIETY. YOU WILL, I PRAY, FIND COMFORT IN MY OWN ASSURANCE OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S UNFLAGGING EFFORTS AND DETERMINATION TO SUCCEED.

OUR GOAL IS TO SECURE THE SWIFTEST RETURN OF THE PUEBLO CREW THAT PEACEFUL MEANS PERMIT. OUR INITIATIVES ARE AS COMPREHENSIVE AS THEY ARE CONSTANT.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS BEARING DOWN ON EVERY DIPLOMATIC LEVER AVAILABLE TO US. WE HAVE ACTION UNDER WAY THROUGH OTHER GOVERNMENTS, THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION AND THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. OUR NEGOTIATORS FACE A DIFFICULT AND DELICATE TASK. I AM PROUD AND GRATEFUL FOR YOUR RECOGNITION THAT THEY MUST BE GUIDED BY THE PARAMOUNT INTEREST -- RELEASE OF THE CREW UNDER HONORABLE CONDITIONS. I AM MYSELF ENCOURAGED THAT TALKS PROCEED AT PANMUNJON. YOU AND I HAVE GOOD CAUSE FOR HOPE IN THIS EVIDENCE OF NORTH KOREA'S WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION.

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR 16, 1983.

BY 129 ON 3-26-72

PRESERVATION COPY

YOU ARE ALSO DISTURBED BY RECENT PRESS REPORTS THAT THE PUEBLO CREW MAY BE TRIED AS CRIMINALS. WE HAVE WARNED NORTH KOREA, IN THE STERNEST TERMS, THAT ANY SUCH ACTION WOULD CONSTITUTE A DELIBERATE AGGRAVATION OF AN ALREADY GRAVE SITUATION.

IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT NORTH KOREA IS MERELY TRYING TO ESTABLISH THEIR RIGHT TO TRY THE CREW. THEY COULD THEN PUBLICLY FOREGO THAT RIGHT, AS A POINT-SCORING GESTURE. WE HAVE NO INDICATIONS THAT THE CREW IS BEING MISTREATED.

FRANKLY, PRECISE DETAILS OF THE SEIZURE REMAIN OBSCURED. IT WILL TAKE TIME TO RECONSTRUCT THE INCIDENT, EVEN AFTER YOUR HUSBAND AND HIS CREW ARE HOME WITH A FIRST-HAND ACCOUNT. WE DO KNOW THAT COMMANDER BUCHER FACED A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY. ON PRESENT INFORMATION, WE HAVE NO REASON TO THINK THAT HE DID NOT HANDLE HIMSELF TO THE BEST OF HIS ABILITY.

WHILE MOST UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION ON THE INCIDENT HAS APPEARED IN THE PRESS, YOU MAY FIND FURTHER REASSURANCE IN THE ENCLOSURE. THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS PREPARED IT AS AN OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES.

LET ME OFFER ONE FURTHER PERSONAL ASSURANCE. YOUR HUSBAND'S REPUTATION AMONG THOSE COMRADES WHO KNOW HIM BEST IS HIGH AND STRONG. KNOWING HIM SO, AND BEING MOVED BY THE PATRIOTISM AND FORTITUDE OF YOUR OWN LETTER, I RENEW MY PROMISE OF PERSEVERANCE AND SUCCESS TO YOU BOTH.

MRS. JOHNSON AND I WILL CONTINUE TO BE WITH YOU IN HEART. MAY GOD BLESS YOU AND GUIDE YOU THROUGH THIS PASSING TRIAL.

SINCERELY,
LBJ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 223310Z FEB 68

102

ACTION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Free file

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, February 22, 1968
6:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft cable ^{*} to try out on
Tommy, conforming to your instruction
about arms talks.

The attached chronology of previous
efforts will interest you.

Approved — ; Disapproved —
Call me —

W. Rostow

* Cleared by Nuke K.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 19, NARA, Date 2-28-92

VOAE

EUR/SOV:MToon:11p
2/22/68

DRAFT TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW PRIORITY

STATE

NODIS

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

102a
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-248
By ing, NARA Date 2-25-97

1. The President is deeply concerned at failure of Soviets to act on our proposals for strategic arms talks and for reciprocal restraint on Mid East arms shipments.
2. Aside from their intrinsic urgency and the need to show progress to non-nuclears, we had hoped that arms talks would be under way while Bob McNamara still on job and his enormous talent and expertise remain available and fresh. Time is running out not only in terms of McNamara's availability but also because of increasing pressures on President to move further and faster to offset Soviet activity in both offensive and defensive strategic areas.
3. Re Mid East, our commitment to Eshkol is matter of public record and so long as pace of Soviet arms shipments to radical Arab states and fleet build-up in Mediterranean remains undiminished we will be obliged soon to decide on advanced types of aircraft to Israel.
4. Accordingly, we require urgently positive Soviet response in both areas if we are to avoid taking further steps which may well be irreversible and complicate prospects of cooperation efforts to curb arms race. It is not enough to say proposals are under study, and observations such as Dobrynin has made to you that decision unlikely because of Vietnam and now Korea seem disingenuous and are certainly not helpful.

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

5. We plan instruct you soon deliver following highest-level message, but we have not yet decided whether it should be in form of letter to Kosygin or oral statement as on January 22. Whether written or oral, we must also decide on optimum timing, bearing in mind upcoming Budapest Conference. Activities there may well further inhibit Soviet maneuverability, and before may be better than after. We would appreciate your immediate views on both modality and timing:

BEGIN TEXT. Ambassador Thompson has conveyed to you my sense of urgency about the related issues of moderating the strategic arms race and restraining shipment of conventional arms to the Middle East. I have, of course, read with care the Ambassador's report of your preliminary remarks on both issues, and I am reluctant to approach you again before you have replied in a more formal way. I feel, however, it is important for you to understand that the pressures on me to act in both areas are heavy and time is indeed running out.

In January 1967, I was encouraged to believe that our agreement in principle on the desirability of discussing both the offensive and defensive aspects of the strategic arms problem would soon lead to meetings of our experts and hopefully agreement between them. Over a year has gone by, and talks have not yet begun. Meanwhile, the problem has become more complex, and the need ourselves to agree on restraint while we are urging self-denial on the non-nuclear powers has become more pressing.

I believe we must act soon if we are not to lose forever the opportunity to restrain the competition between us and if we are to avoid a legitimate claim of bad faith on the part of others.

The Middle East arms problem is of equal urgency. You know of my conversations with Prime Minister Eshkol when he was here in December. I cannot long resist legitimate requests by Israel to match arms shipments to other states in the area. This would not only complicate the already difficult mission of Ambassador Jarring in the area, but it would also significantly reduce the chances of peace in that troubled part of the world. Here, too, it is incumbent upon us as the principal sources of arms to the states of the Middle East to move quickly.

As I indicated at Glassboro, these two pressing issues as well as other related aspects of the arms control problem could conveniently be discussed in the same forum. But if you have another view as to the modality of discussions, I shall as always be glad to consider your proposal for I have no fixed view on procedure.

We have now and will continue to have serious differences of view on many problems and in many areas. We must not permit these differences to preclude progress where it is possible. You and I are agreed that we have special responsibilities for the preservation of peace and stability in the world. Let us meet them now. I await your reply. END TEXT

EUR/SOV:MToon

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~STRATEGIC DELIVERY SYSTEM TALKS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-254

By us, NARA Date 4-8-97CHRONOLOGY

- January 21, 1966 William C. Foster asked Dobrynin whether earlier discussions which Foster had had with Ambassador Zorin in 1964 on a freeze proposal to cover strategic offensive and defensive vehicles might have special application to ABMs before such systems were deployed. He expressed a personal interest in any possibility of heading off an accelerated nuclear arms race by curbing ABMs. Dobrynin said that was an interesting but complex problem.
- March 17, 1966 Ambassador Dobrynin suggested to William Foster that some control over the expansion of missiles, both ICBMs and ABMs, was important and should be in our common interest. He said he would be glad to transmit any US suggestions for a balanced consideration of this problem. Mr. Foster expressed interest and said he would discuss with his colleagues what might be done.
- March 18, 1966 Secretary referred to Dobrynin's talk with Mr. Foster, and told the Ambassador that we would be very glad to discuss the matter of limitations on ICBMs and ABMs quietly with the Soviet Union on a bilateral basis. Dobrynin indicated that his Government would be greatly interested in the Secretary's remarks.
- December 6, 1966 Ambassador Thompson raised with Ambassador Dobrynin the idea of an exchange of views on the question of the possibilities of reaching a mutual understanding on limiting anti-missile defense systems.
- January 14, 1967 Kohler asked Dobrynin if he had any response from his Government to Thompson's earlier suggestion for talks on ABMs. He noted we would have to deal with the ABM in the President's budget message, and that we hoped we could have a response from the USSR by January 19 or 20, when we would have to complete the budget message.
- Dobrynin commented he had not understood the urgency of the matter, but would at once inform his Government, which he knew had it actively under consideration.
- January 18, 1967 Dobrynin called on the Secretary and Kohler at 7:00 p.m., and read an oral statement amounting to acceptance in principle of our proposal for talks on ABM on the understanding that offensive systems would also be discussed. He closed by noting that any "reflections" on this subject by the US could be brought to the attention of the Soviet Government.

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

January 27, 1967 Thompson presented to Gromyko the President's message to Kosygin, and in an oral statement indicated our acceptance of the Soviet proposal that discussions should include offensive as well as defensive strategic missile systems.

January 27, 1967 Walt Rostow told Dobrynin in connection with a discussion of ABM deployments that the time had come to try hard to stabilize the strategic nuclear arms race.

February 27, 1967 Gromyko delivered to Thompson Kosygin's reply to the President's letter and oral statement.

February 28, 1967 Kohler told Dobrynin that the first job was to stop the missile race. This could be accomplished satisfactorily by the use of national means of verification.

March 2, 1967 President announced at press conference that Kosygin confirmed the willingness of the Soviet Government to hold talks.

March 23, 1967 Thompson presented an oral statement to Gromyko on the basis of instructions sent March 18. Referring to Soviet representations of February, the US proposed talks to begin April 12, Thompson to be aided by several Washington representatives.

April 11, 1967 Dobrynin had a long discussion with Secretary McNamara, presumably including this subject. No Memcon available in SOV.

April 12, 1967 Dobrynin told Kohler he expected to discuss this subject during his consultations in Moscow.

April 24, 1967 Dobrynin told Thompson in Moscow that the Soviet Government is still considering the question but Vietnam affected the question.

June 1967 The subject of possible strategic missile talks was discussed at some length, at US initiative, during the President's meetings with Kosygin at Glassboro.

June 19, 1967 Thompson told Dobrynin that time was running out and that it would be unwise to delay the talks much longer.

July 8, 1967 Secretary discussed the subject, without concrete results, with Dobrynin.

July 27, 1967 Kohler included this subject in a check list of pending questions which he took up with Dobrynin in the hope that when Dobrynin got back to Moscow he would review the items and induce some movement on the Soviet side.

September 8, 1967 Secretary at press conference emphasized the urgency of holding discussions of offensive and defensive missiles. He hoped the Soviet Union would set a date for such discussions and that both sides would be prepared to put in specific and detailed proposals that would bring this matter under control. The Secretary made it clear that no such date has been established.

September 12, 1967 On the basis of instructions sent September 5, Thompson advised Gromyko of McNamara's speech on ABMs to be delivered September 19. The message re-emphasized our desire to hold early talks on the strategic arms race leading to an agreement first to limit and then to reduce the level of strategic forces of the two sides.

September 19, 1967 McNamara delivered speech on deployment of "thin" ABM system.

September 25,27, 1967 Secretary Rusk discussed this subject with Gromyko in New York on one or both dates.

October 3, 1967 William Foster discussed the subject with L. I. Mendelevich in New York.

October 4, 1967 Dobrynin told ACDA Director Foster that Soviet delay caused by differences within Soviet Government. He also mentioned lack of a ready means of coordination between the political and military.

October 9, 1967 John Leddy asked Deputy Foreign Minister Soldatov if he had any information on Soviet readiness to initiate talks. Soldatov had none.

December 11, 1967 Kohler told Dobrynin the Doty Group's visit to Moscow is no substitute for official talks and should not lead to any delay in Soviet agreement to hold talks.

December 28-30,1967 A group of prominent US scientists led by Dr. Doty held unofficial talks on the urgency of strategic arms control with Soviet scientists and others led by Millionshchikov, Vice President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

January 4,5,9, 1968 Secretary discussed the subject with Dobrynin during one or more of these three meetings.

January 22, 1968 Thompson presented Kosygin with a message from the President.

February 2, 1968

Dobrynin told Thompson in Moscow that the Pueblo incident and Vietnam had set back progress he hoped to make on bilateral questions. He still thought that if the Korean affair were settled the Soviet Government would give a favorable reply on strategic weapons talks.

~~SECRET - NO DIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 102-c
NLJ 96-248
By ig, NARA Date 2-25-97

US SOVIET CONTACTS ON MIDDLE EAST ARMS LIMITATIONS

- June 19, 1967 - President Johnson enunciates "five points" for Middle East settlement
- June 23, 25 - President Johnson - Kosygin; Glassboro, N.J.
Discussed need to reduce arms flow and initiate registration of arms shipments with UN.
- June 27 - Secretary Rusk - Gromyko; New York
Gromyko stated matter of arms deliveries was up to countries concerned to decide at proper time.
- July 8 - Secretary, Kohler, - Dobrynin; Washington
Secretary pointed out we not trying to freeze situation in ME. We believe powers should get together and agree not to contribute to renewed arms race.
- July 27 - Kohler - Dobrynin; Washington
Dobrynin probed for US attitude. Kohler reiterated registration proposal, stating US flexible as to method and tactics, but deliveries should be restricted ~~xx~~ to point of reasonable balance.
- September 25 - Secretary - ~~Dobrynin~~ Gromyko; New York
US desires deal with limitations of arms, not to perpetuate an imbalance, but in interest of preventing arms race betw en countries of area.
Secretary
- October 19 ~~XXXX~~ - Dobrynin; Washington
Dobrynin presented texts of drafts on ME resolution. We do not have memcon.
- November 3 Secretary - Kuznetsov and others; Washington
No Memcons available - discussed ME.
- November 19 Secretary - Dobrynin; Washington
Goldberg - Kuznetsov; New York
Letter from Kosygin to President may have been passed in Washington discussing arms control.
Text of Soviet resolution on ME settlement presented to UNSC included provisions for ME arms control.
- December 4 Kohler - Dobrynin; Washington
(Dobrynin delivered communication dealing with ME - possibly ~~dealing~~ with arms control).
- December 18 E. Rostow - Dobrynin; Washington
US welcomes Kosygin statement of interest in peaceful settlement and arms limitation. Dobrynin said Soviets don't like expenses of arms shipments and are interested in understanding with US.
~~Halt not possible however until a settlement~~

June 19, 1967 - President Johnson enunciates "five points" for Middle East settlement

June 23, 25 - President Johnson - Kosygin; Glassboro, N.J.
Discussed need to reduce arms flow and initiate registration of arms shipments with UN.

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September 25 Secretary - ~~Dobrynin~~ Gromyko; New York
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October 19 Secretary
~~XXXX~~ - Dobrynin; Washington
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(Dobrynin delivered communication dealing with ME - possibly ~~dealing~~ with arms control).

December 18 E. Rostow - Dobrynin; Washington
US welcomes Kosygin statement of interest in peaceful settlement and arms limitation. Dobrynin said Soviets don't like expenses of arms shipments and are interested in understanding with US. Halt not possible however, until a settlement of Arab-Israeli conflict was reached. If not, present course would be pursued.

January 9, 1968 Secretary- Dobrynin; Washington
Secretary told D that decision on further arms to Israel would depend on Soviet willingness to restrict traffic to Arab States. Cited Eshkol communique as proof of US intent.

January 22

Thompson - Kosygin; Moscow
No memocon available. Press sources discussed possible letter from President Johnson to Kosygin. Thompson stated it would be helpful if Soviets would exercise restraint in arms shipments to Arab states as we had done with Israelis.

February 6

Thompson - Kosygin; Moscow
Told Kosygin that as President had said we are trying to restrain the arms race in the ME. Kosygin said arms race would continue as long as the military confrontation continued.

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, February 22, 1968
3:20 p.m.

103
Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a vivid and well-written
China essay by our staff expert -- Al
Jenkins -- with policy observations on
pp. 9-11.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

"Thoughts on China"
February 22, 1968

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *AG*, NARA, Date *2-28-92*

~~SECRET~~

103 a
February 22, 1968

THOUGHTS ON CHINA

Prologue to the Present

The Present Predicament

The Most Probable Future

Relations with Others

The term "madness" has been applied to the present climate in Peking. In some ways it is not inappropriate. But to a Chinese, because of the historical prologue to the present and because of the Chinese way of viewing China and the world, much of the "madness" is explained as inescapable logic and reason.

A Burning in the Belly: The "Hundred Years of Ignominy"

There is something awesome about the world's oldest continuous civilization relentlessly rending itself. Since a quarter of humanity is directly involved, and the rest indirectly, China's current writhings are as important as they are spectacular. The ancient Confucian way of life -- for so long the very cement of the Chinese race -- has cracked and crumbled, and it is not yet clear what will lastingly take its place. The nature of the transformation could fundamentally affect not only the shape of Asia, but in no small measure the character of world civilization itself.

China's self-conscious, embarrassed, but inevitable attack on its own past actually has been going on for a century and a quarter -- ever since the Opium War of 1842 proved that an outrage, and then a long stream of outrages, could be forced upon a great civilization which had neglected to develop the gunboat prerequisite to self-determination.

China's struggle to destroy its persistent Confucian past and to come into the modern world has been waged in varying manner and degree, but -- at least for the first hundred years -- always against humiliating odds imposed by foreigners. "The imperialists" enjoyed extra-territorial rights, owned most of China's large-scale production, regulated much of its trade, and even managed its customs receipts! Through this bitter "hundred years of ignominy" the Chinese developed a veritable burning in

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-190

By fw, NARA, Date 6-21-94

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- 2 -

the belly for renewed national dignity. And fantasies of sheer revenge -- sweet revenge against the white man's exploitation and presumption -- often crowded out even those fantasies of regained grandeur. The wounds of humiliation were all the deeper because for over 3,000 years the Han people had considered that they were the only truly civilized people. Their "Middle Kingdom" was in their eyes the center of the universe -- in all literalness -- and even by religious sanction.

Especially since the turn of the century, China has made increasingly urgent -- almost frenzied -- efforts to modernize into viability as a great power. The republicanism of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek made some progress, and gave promise of more until the Japanese War. That tragedy depleted the nation's energies, furthered the disintegration of traditional ethics and mores, encouraged corruption in officialdom, and led the Kuomintang's ruling circles to commit political suicide by leaning ruinously on the hated foreigner.

During the war, the Chinese Communists won the peasants' loyalty in the large agrarian pockets between the Japanese-held cities and lines of communication. And at Mao's cave headquarters in Yen-an, the degree of self-sacrifice, patriotism, honesty and fraternity evident in that temporary and unreal community won the praises of unbiased observers and the allegiance of increasing numbers of Chinese of a whole spectrum of political and economic persuasions.

The result was that in the Civil War the all-vital intelligence on troop movements in the countryside was given to the Communists and not to the Nationalists. In the cities not only many workers, but many students, professional people and even some government officials worked clandestinely for the Communists in the interest of China's new day.

And so China was "lost." The enormity of that event was apparent, and the United States entered on an orgy of self-flagellation.

For some seven years the Chinese Communists in many ways performed impressively in bringing about a new China. The costs were high (e. g., up to twenty million persons liquidated in the land reform period) but the nation was united, at peace, and expectant. It forged ahead economically so that it was widely spoken of as a model for other developing nations. It had purposeful, cohered leadership which made a fetish of taking no guff from foreigners. And soon, it must be admitted, the masses of Chinese were

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- 3 -

a little better off -- at least materially -- than they had ever been. Mao, success-crowned, began to be deified, and his works canonized.

(If more people, Chinese and others, had read his works earlier, the story might have been different. The Mein Kampf-like candor of his writings would have shown up the war-time "democratic, peace-loving, agrarian reformer" era for what Mao intended it to be: a temporary show-case period to gain support -- a tactical way-station on the road to communism. But not many of his writings at that time were in English. I remember my feeble, worried efforts to spread what I had read in Chinese and heard, but then I was just a Vice Consul from Georgia -- and South Georgia at that. The "agrarian reformer" thesis was widely believed for a long time.)

The regime became overconfident, and Mao (against significant opposition, it now appears) in 1957 launched the so-called Great Leap Forward. This attempt to force production by rapid transition to extreme forms of social and economic organization was a colossal failure. The Russians had strongly advised against the Great Leap. Its economic dislocations disgusted them, its go-it-alone atmosphere affronted them, and its ideological implications alarmed them. Relations festered until in 1960 Russian aid and aiders were withdrawn, and the communist giants split.

The God Who Failed: the Cultural Revolution

The failure of the Great Leap Forward was not only of domestic import; the failure was on the international front, too, and that front was desperately important to the Chinese view of China's place in the sun -- and to Mao's in history. China was no longer the economic model for the Afro-Asian-Latin American world, and this fact began to register itself.

That double failure, domestic and foreign, ironically made inevitable Mao's second supreme effort to enforce his "truth" on China -- a truth which, being demonstrated in practice, was eventually expected to be embraced by the world -- with an assist, of course, from "peoples' wars of liberation."

In order to get back on its feet after the Great Leap, China had to shelve Mao's extreme policies and adopt the road of "revisionism," skirting close to the heresy of private incentive and reward. Not only was Maoism for a time quietly shelved, so was Mao -- at least as much as his associates

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dared and desired. Mao later complained of being treated like a deceased parent. He was trotted out at times, for he had become the symbol of the new China's ancient uniqueness and centrality -- a concept of womb-like balm to the Chinese psyche. After all, he was billed as the greatest living communist theoretician, in the direct Marx-Lenin-Stalin-Mao lineage and the perfecter of "peoples' wars" -- and this, with luck, meant that the Chinese, appropriately, would in time inherit the earth by proxy.

But Mao is not practiced in the art of hiding his light under a bushel. He did not like being semi-shelved, nor did he like what he saw of the bureaucratization of his revolution, the growing apathy of the fattening cadres, and what he considered the recent compromises throughout the nation with "spontaneous capitalistic tendencies." Accordingly he launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, in the attempt to re-solidify his own power, and revive and purify the revolution into something of its pristine vigor, to restore the visionary romance of the Yen-an cave days as a needed propellant to the lagging revolution, and to temper the younger generation (who for the most part had not experienced battle, Yen-an austerity, or even, adequately, class hatred) for its post-Mao revolutionary responsibilities.

Mao had become disillusioned with the Party apparatus. Being charged with implementing policy at the local level, the Party bureaucracy had learned to temper doctrinal purity with practical realities, but to report the results, falsely, as consonant with the expectations of doctrinal purity. It was professionally healthier to do so. This ruse was cumulative in its errors, and the day of reckoning had to come. Mao proceeded to wreck the wayward Party with the Great Cultural Revolution.

Mao's greatest opposition is human nature itself, which he is trying to remake. This is one reason why he has met instinctive opposition as he has successively turned to each major segment of Chinese society for support during the tortuous two years of his Cultural Revolution. (His belief in the right thinking of the masses has been naively total.) Yet his utility as the national father image makes him almost indispensable at this time in Chinese history -- which partly explains why the opposition, so far, has not solidified. The extremes of Maoism are instinctively opposed, while Mao is instinctively clung to.

This genuine and terribly serious dilemma exacerbates already weighty, political, economic and military policy differences in Peking. And a suspicious, perhaps somewhat senile Mao has so reduced his trusted circle of

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cronies during the testiness of the Cultural Revolution that his prestigious minority has barely been able to balance the fighting-for-their-lives bureaucratic majority. This tug-of-war has insured that Peking speaks to the provinces with *vacillation*, indecision and even contradiction. Such confusion has generally resulted in inaction by the local agents of the central government and has given opportunistic groups, from policy opponents to plain hooligans, a breezy field day.

Forces long denied expression by Central Government unanimity and confidence have now been unleashed by Peking's division and indecision, and all sorts of repressed "bourgeois tendencies" are bursting out. These are furthered by the bureaucratic opposition, by patriotic elements which feel they were early deluded into support of a regime the nature of which was misrepresented, by disgruntled youth, by opportunistic workers and peasantry, and by underprivileged elements of society who see advancement only through lawless acts in a time of increasing disrespect for authority.

The Party organization is discredited and its recently respected leadership largely unseated -- throughout the countryside, save for the one important region of Sinkiang (nuclear installations and oil). Lower echelons are uncertain of their mandate, confused by contradictory exhortations from Peking, and affronted (earlier) by the license of the Red Guards and (more lately) by encroachments of the military. Factional fighting (for both ideological and pure power-grab reasons) and lawlessness are rampant. Industrial productivity has been curtailed, agricultural productivity will be seriously hampered for the coming year, and foreign trade jeopardized through economic dislocations and political pig-headedness. The military establishment is assigned jobs for which it is ill fitted: overseeing factories, farms, schools and railroads. But Mao apparently is reluctant to have the military intervene to stop the factional fighting because it is one of his axioms that the people and the army love and support each other, and always act in unison. To admit that the country can only be ruled by the use of military force would be to admit what increasingly seems to be the fact: things have gone too far for Mao to reconsolidate his power. Mao The Symbol may be kept at least as long as he lives, but Maoism as he conceives it in his domestic policies, is not likely to prevail.

The Watershed's Nether Slope: Something of a New Dynasty

While Mao's "mandate of heaven" is clearly slipping, it is too early to tell what will take its place. It may take some time yet in coming, or the military may decide almost any time that they have had enough of their

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country's coming apart, and impose a crisper solution. Regional breakdowns could prevail for a time, but are not likely to be the pattern for long, because of the universal Chinese thirst for reconstituted nationhood, and because China's economy is now sufficiently sophisticated so that it depends upon a network of specialized contributions from all parts of the country.

It is impossible to know the true thinking of the Chinese people, because for 18 years there has not only been lack of freedom of speech, there has not even been freedom to remain silent. All have had to be vocal in support of the regime. It is just possible that the confusion and contradiction in Peking is viewed by a great many Chinese as a welcome sign of collapse, and that they want something quite different to follow. Surely many must be disillusioned with unfulfilled promises of a decade ago; must be bone tired of 18 years of overlapping mass campaigns -- ideological floggings to increase production at little or no personal gain; and must be wearied by receding promises of restored Chinese primacy in the world. Too, the ridiculous lengths to which Mao has been made an infallible god could at some point trigger the most destructive of weapons: ridicule. A non-communist successor regime could thus become conceivable, but it is unlikely. Most Chinese consider capitalism as the only real alternative to communism, and the "capitalism" they knew in China was most unattractive except for the few; it was highly exploitive, with semi-colonial associations. The pragmatic communism of less Maoist periods is probably viewed as not too bad in contrast.

Much more likely, therefore, is a military-bureaucratic collegium of "communist" continuity, but less doctrinaire, increasingly adopting private incentive methods, along with the trend in several other communist countries. Domestically, the likely new management would be termed relatively moderate. In time this may also apply to foreign relations, but at first I should expect disappointingly little change there. Much will depend upon the Chinese assessment of the future utility and promise of the "peoples' war" concept. Much, that is, depends upon the outcome in Vietnam. If later it should appear that the "imperialists" may be on the run through even partial successes of several simultaneous peoples' wars (if they can be ginned up) there may well be a temptation for China in a post-Mao situation to paper over its differences with the Soviet Union and cooperate somewhat more fully against common enemies.

It is inconceivable, however, that the Sino-Soviet relationship will again be anything like as close as in the early 50's. Several of the people purged in the Cultural Revolution are believed to have been ousted because they favored rapprochement with the Soviet Union. If Mao loses out, these

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may return to favor. I am not so sure that a China in league with the Soviet Union would necessarily be mellowed thereby. I think it might be that the Soviet Union instead would be hardened. The Soviet Union seems to harden when it feels strong, and to mellow only as a tactic of prudence when necessary. Formerly, with a fast strengthening China on the loose, the Soviets even came a bit closer to us. It may not be accidental that they have hardened somewhat toward us, now that an estranged China has been weakened by the Cultural Revolution. They might harden the more if China should become again an ally, even a tenuous and uncomfortable one.

China under almost any auspices, if it is united and growing in strength, will continue to present us, and its neighbors, with problems. It will probably not rest until it has carved out in some fashion what it considers to be its legitimate sphere of influence in Asia. Under a successor regime to Mao, and in a situation of something like power balance in Asia, that sphere might well be defined within limits tolerable to us, depending upon how the "influence" were exercised. But not as long as Mao has his way. He is too committed to world revolution as a fundamental article of faith, and too convinced that peoples' wars are the infallible way to reach that objective.

China and the United States: The Mao Dynasty and After

One of Mao's biggest problems has been to activate the traditionally politically lethargic Chinese people. The peasants have long purred: "Heaven is high, and the emperor is far away." Intrusive central government is not the Chinese norm.

Both the communist dialectic and, seemingly, Mao's own psychological make-up dictated that he use the hate-object technique, to ensure political engagement of the populace. He set about, from the very inception of his regime, to make the United States serve the indispensable purpose of the hated devil. He has tried to forge with us, paradoxically, even a sort of "inimical partnership" in the interest of his revolution! This is not just a catch phrase. I believe it accurately describes his conception of our utility to him, for both domestic and foreign policy purposes, and that he and his regime (so long as it is "his") will not respond to any un-devilish overtures on our part. In dealing with the Chinese Communists in Tientsin for nine months after they came to power, in carrying on the negotiations in Geneva before they went to the ambassadorial level, and in four years of advising in the Warsaw talks I have seen scarcely a shred of evidence to the contrary.

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So long as the true Maoists are in control, then, I think we can take it for granted that we will get no response from any bridge-building efforts. Such a response would undermine Mao's basic philosophy. He believes that he can keep his revolution pure, and wound up, only through class hatred at home and devil hatred abroad.

Our occasional statements in the "ultimate reconciliation" vein, as distinguished from tangible bridge-building offers, however, should be continued -- not too frequently, and in very measured tones. These are almost certainly carefully registered in various Peking circles. For just as in many ways China is our biggest headache, so we are certainly China's; it follows that what we do or do not do, and say or do not say, is carefully noted. Primarily our stand in Vietnam, but also our un-devilish statements have surely helped sharpen policy debates in Peking, and it seems certain that potential successor leadership is well aware of its policy options in our regard, if it should wish to test them.

It would not seem to be the time quite yet for new bilateral initiatives with China, or even for unilateral gestures toward China of the tangible bridge-building sort. Not only would we be rebuffed, but China would have to go on record to that effect, and a successor regime may well feel sufficient continuity with the present one so as to make renunciation of that record awkward, though it might otherwise be tempted to test us through response.

A better case, at least, could have been made for new initiatives prior to, say, August 1966. Prior to that time Peking's leadership seemed unified and the dislocations of the Cultural Revolution had not threatened the integrity of the nation. Big global issues such as disarmament, non-proliferation and the like seemed to call for efforts before very long to get China better articulated into the world community, for the sake of ultimate world stability. While these considerations as such are still valid, a China weakened through turmoil lends somewhat less urgency, and the prospect of a different China to come, possibly readier to respond, recommends the waiting game. We can sympathize with the Chinese people in their turmoil and strife, but from the standpoint of stark U.S. interests, and so long as China is under present auspices, situations of less advantage to us than the present one easily come to mind.

Our East Asian policies must in general be of a piece. Gestures of magnanimity or friendship toward China in the face of the presently necessary stand in Vietnam and Laos might be applauded in some European capitals and on some American campuses, but not by our friends around the periphery

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of China. Nor does the degree of promise in overtures to Peking at present seem to warrant creating enormous problems for us on Taiwan.

It seems to me, in short, that we have kept our future options open better, rather than otherwise, by keeping relatively quiet while mainland China is trying to sort itself out.

Finally, there is something to be said for keeping our own ideological skirts clean. The evils of the present Peking regime are sufficiently discernible and documentable so that an attempt to cozy up to it -- while possibly serving other honorable purposes if it worked -- would be widely interpreted as a compromise of those things we stand for, as well as the ditching of a rather satisfactory ally on Taiwan. The Great Problem of Taiwan must mature further before it can be solved, and an altered mainland may make it easier.

Meanwhile, we are doing other sorts of things which are very much a part of China policy. We are attempting to thwart Chinese abetted and supported aggression, and we are doing what we can to strengthen non-communist Asia -- very successfully in many instances. And we have made clear that we would not be unresponsive to a China ready to deal on other than paranoically one-sided terms.

Beyond that, it seems to me that the steps we can profitably take are limited, until we can see the color of the China which is to emerge from the present "curious, costly general election" on the mainland. Among those limited steps, we might consider the following:

1. Perhaps we could afford to twist arms in New York with less ferocity and anxiety on the Chinese Representation issue. We spend a lot of blue chips on this issue. This is certainly no time to bring China into the UN, but I think there is no danger of it. On his present tack of all-out peoples' wars, I cannot imagine that Mao would accept the limiting implications of UN membership if it were offered, and it is not likely to be offered to a Peking when everyone knows it is hard to define just what constitutes Peking today -- along with other reasons which have been advanced all along against entry. Peking has said that the UN is controlled by the imperialists, especially the United States, and before it would be interested in membership the organization must be reconstituted, and must withdraw the aggressor label (re Korea) unjustly placed on China and place it where it belongs, on the United States. I think we could put the monkey on Peking's back for its self-imposed isolation, and get a lot of Europeans and Afro-Asians off ours. We could not advocate Peking entry, of course, but we could relax more, in safety.

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2. We might keep adequate China trade controls while removing the opprobrious "trading with the enemy" label, and demonstrate readiness for future flexibility by moving slightly from the total embargo wicket. The "working level" at State is preparing a very modest package which should be scrutinized when it is finished. Even though it is modest, it may go a bit far for now. It seems to me we should quietly move away from the principle of total embargo, both because it is ineffective and because it smacks of former black-and-white days in China policy, but we should not move to a degree which may make any practical difference so long as the Vietnam war goes on.

3. We should use the Warsaw talks more as an educational platform. The record of the talks is read in a Peking leadership circle of some indeterminate size. One of the dangerous things about present Peking leadership is the almost unbelievable degree of its provincialism. We should find excuses to weave into our prepared materials at Warsaw small discourses about the nature of the open world partly already arrived, partly just around the corner: the overlapping, global patterns of social, economic and cultural organization constantly spawned by continuing revolutions in communication, travel and electronic wizardry; the impossibility, today, of curtaining off a society if it expects to keep up with the advanced nations -- reciprocal contributions to knowledge and growth enable advancement in geometrical ratio, while even partially isolated societies will grow in more nearly arithmetic ratio; the total fund of human knowledge is now such that computer centers must specialize more and more, and a country not geared into other centers of learning is at an increasing disadvantage; etc., etc. We cannot negotiate anything meaningful at Warsaw under present conditions, but perhaps we can help worry the semi-mad Maoists into an earlier cracking up, and give the potential successors something to think about.

4. We have done well to refrain from public appraisal of the Cultural Revolution. Its reality is embarrassing enough to the Chinese, without advertisement. At some point when the watershed in China has been passed long enough for the other side to show its character a bit, a Presidential speech on China will probably be advisable. Almost anything we say now will be turned against us by the present regime, and the record of rejection will have grown. We should wait until the present regime may be so discredited that its record in its dying days will not really be pertinent.

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- 11 -

Basically, (and at the risk of speaking in broader terms than my assignment) it seems to me we will help shape the new China as much by what we are as what we do or do not do. Prestige kept carefully intact; quiet, abundant power in the larger sense; credibility and integrity; and fidelity to those fundamentals of the American heritage which made us strong in the first place and in turn have guided, goaded, shamed and inspired people of many other lands to revolutionary progress -- these are the things which will be negotiable assets, when the time comes, with that Chinese quarter of humanity seeking a new national purpose and a new station in the world. It is we who are associated with the real revolution going on in Asia, and that, by and large, is the very best China policy open to us for this transitional period. We need not be lacking in initiatives when the time comes for them to pay off. That could be fairly soon, but no one can yet tell.



Alfred Jenkins

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INFORMATION

104

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, February 22, 1968
3:15 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA's essay on Communist
China's Troubles and Prospects, with a
3-page opening summary.

W. W. Rostow

SC No. 01935/68
22 February 1968
Intelligence Memorandum
"Communist China's Troubles and Prospects"

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-260
By sig, NARA Date 11-12-96

wwrostow:rla

SECRET

on wire to Lender

Feb. 23, 1968

Pres. file

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

105

A distinguished Swiss businessman named Umbricht is operating in Cambodia and Hong Kong as a one-man searcher for peace.

He states he is there with the personal blessing of President Johnson. That, at least, is what is coming into the State Department in the cable traffic.

State has no evidence that you sanctioned his enterprise; although John Hayes has talked to the man. He may have raised the Umbricht matter when he saw you.

Is there anything I should tell State?

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-249
By CB, NARA Date 11-5-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 23, 1968

Profile
CA P 80509

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

Gene Black saw Sen. Fulbright yesterday morning and again prodded him to get moving on the Asian Bank in the Foreign Relations Committee. Fulbright moaned a little about tight schedules, but then agreed to call a special meeting for Black to make his presentation this coming Tuesday at 3 p.m.

Black is anxious to know:

- if the President has had a word with Sen. Hickenlooper, urging support;
- if not, he would be grateful if the President could speak to Hickenlooper before next Tuesday.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 2-28-92

CONFIDENTIAL

107

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FRIDAY
Pres file 55

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80505

~~SECRET~~

FEBRUARY 23, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

HEREWITH A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO YOU FROM AMB. BUNKER.

1. I DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR NOMINATION OF SAM BERGER TO THE POST OF DEPUTY AMBASSADOR HERE. I HAVE THE HIGHEST REGARD FOR HIM PROFESSIONALLY AND AS AN INDIVIDUAL. HIS WIDE EXPERIENCE IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD, AS WELL AS THE FACT THAT HE HAS WORKED WITH OUR MILITARY FORCES, SHOULD BE OF GREAT VALUE TO US HERE. I AM SURE THAT HE WILL ADD STRENGTH TO OUR TEAM DURING THE CRITICAL PERIOD AHEAD WHEN WE MUST PUSH FORWARD WITH ALL ENERGY.

2. I WANT TO SAY ALSO HOW GRATEFUL I AM TO YOU FOR THE WONDERFULLY STEADFAST SUPPORT YOU HAVE GIVEN ME AND THE ENTIRE MISSION, CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, DURING THESE CRITICAL AND DIFFICULT DAYS. WITH GREAT RESPECT AND WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS.

DTG: 231326Z FEB 68

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NW/CBS 10
By ms, NARS, Date 11-28-83

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

February 23, 1968

CAP 80506

Pres file

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Cy Vance has now prepared two reports on his mission to South Korea. The first-person report was submitted to the President. There is no other distribution.

A second report, written in the third person, and including full documentation on the mission, is now in my hands. Copies have been prepared for Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Secretary-Designate Clifford, Under Secretary Katzenbach, Deputy Secretary Nitze, and General Wheeler. It will not be distributed without your assent.

The material is quite sensitive, but necessary if we are to proceed with planning and action for the future.

My recommendation is that it be distributed on a literally eyes only basis and that the designated individuals make available the data and recommendations on a tight, selective "need-to-know" basis to staff working on South Korea.

But you may wish to examine this bulky second report yourself before making a decision.

Send second Vance report by pouch _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-255
By jis, NARA Date 9-11-97

Release to designated individuals on "eyes only"

and "need-to-know" basis _____

Call me _____
Call me _____

ACTION

**Thursday, February 22, 1968
4:20 p.m.**

Mr. President:

At Tab A is a suggested letter to Ed Reischauer thanking him and his colleagues for their memorandum on China, sent in response to your request of February 2. At Tab B is my appraisal of the China specialists' memorandum, a copy of which is at Tab C. This memorandum is a majority report. I understand (Tab D) that George Taylor, of the University of Washington, is writing a dissent.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

109

sent back via pouch

Pres file

109a

February 23, 1968

Dear Ed:

I appreciate the promptness of the response to my request for a memorandum on China and the careful thought which you and your colleagues obviously have put into it. I have read it with interest and will be considering carefully its recommendations in the period ahead.

The evolving nature of China and its relations with its neighbors, with us, and with the world community surely constitute one of the most important questions before mankind today. These matters will continue to be much on my mind in coming months, and I hope we may keep in touch concerning them.

My thanks to you and your associates.

Sincerely,

Honorable Edwin O. Reischauer
Harvard University
1737 Cambridge Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

LBJ:AJ:WWR:rla

February 22, 1968

1096

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appraisal of China Specialists' Memorandum

General Observations

This majority report from the group of China and East Asian specialists who met with you on February 2 is obviously an earnest attempt to be of help in what many consider to be our number one basic problem: China's relations with us and the world. The report is both disarming and accurate when it states, "The specific steps proposed . . . are not new, having been under intensive study at one time or another within the government." I think it fair to say that in general these recommendations are regarded by most of the China specialists within government as having merit, provided appropriate timing in their application is followed. Some of the recommendations have been tried and have failed, through lack of Chinese response. Some are continually being tried. And some, many of us would argue, should not yet be tried.

Analysis

At Tab C I have numbered in red those paragraphs on which comment seemed appropriate. The following paragraph numbers correspond:

1. A reconciliation between the American and Chinese people is not quite the point. No one knows today what the Chinese people think of the American people. U. S. policy is aimed at the emergence of a government on the mainland which will live in peace with its neighbors and will seek for China productive articulation with the modern world.

2. It is true that something of a change of "dynasty" is almost certainly taking place on the mainland, and that the potential new leadership should know of its options in our regard. We have tried through some of your public statements, the Warsaw talks, Voice of America, and third-country diplomacy to make this evident. Whenever we have done so, it has seemingly alarmed the Maoists, who want us in the devil's role. These more angelic aberrations of the "imperialists" are surely a subject of policy debate in Peking -- of concern in some quarters and perhaps hope in others.

3. Demonstration of our flexibility in China policy is a valid concept. Many of us believe that we have done -- in the past three years, particularly -- about all we can or should in this direction, pending somewhat further maturing of the fundamental changes taking place on the mainland. We have done rather well staying out of this Chinese muddle, for the most part.

4. In effect, we have been doing this. We have taken gradual steps, testing along the way. We have been almost invariably rebuffed by the Chinese. The three objectives listed under this paragraph are fine -- they could have been taken out of our policy papers.

5. This "containment" paragraph, brief as it is, is remarkably forthright considering the views of some of the group on Vietnam.

6. Item "1." of the specific steps recommended is, of course, our present policy. Sub-item "a." is also a matter of practical policy. In all instances where there were issues between Peking and us, we have dealt with their constituted officials. Chiang Kai-shek is painfully aware of the reality of sub-item "b."; we do not support Taiwan as a contender for the rule of all China in a continuing civil war. The world knows this, as countless editorials from many countries attest. We do not openly belabor the point out of consideration for a loyal ally's sensitivities. As for sub-item "c.", this is clearly not the time for us to be supporting a seat for Peking in the U. N. We might, however, do well to twist arms on this subject with less vigor in New York.

7. We should watch for opportunities to renew themes of reconciliation which you have already advanced. At this stage in the Cultural Revolution, however, this could very easily be overdone.

8. As for step "2.", "a.", "b.", and "c.", there may be a few minor but politically significant steps which we might soon take in the realm of trade regulations. Here again, the timing is important. We have been working with State on a package which will soon be ready for us to take a good look at. It is well to have it on ice, even if we should decide that this is not the time for implementation. As for sub-item "d.", we have made many attempts to further two-way movement, in each of the fields listed. This seems to annoy, and perhaps frighten, the Chinese. Their response has been almost invariably negative. We have met with much the same results in attempts to exchange information, although much U. S. information in specialized fields does reach the Chinese.

9. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be much we can now do about our "close-in military encirclement of Communist China." It undoubtedly constitutes a severe irritation to a proud people, and may leave fairly lasting resentment. We should take opportunity to show, whenever we can, that we do this with the greatest reluctance, and that we eagerly look forward to the day when it may be unnecessary -- but that we cannot yet see that day emerging. We should be insistent with our own people, however, in keeping territorial encroachments to a minimum consistent with clear intelligence needs. As for inducing the Republic of China to withdraw from the off-shore islands, the day may come when this makes sense, but it is not at hand. These islands are too intimately associated with the national government's very claim to legitimacy.

10. We have made sincere efforts to broaden communications, including the two specific suggestions made. We have made it clear we would talk about any issues in Warsaw of interest to our two governments. The Chinese are only interested in talking about Taiwan, Vietnam and territorial intrusions.

11. You have already observed that you believed you could make good use of a Bohlen counterpart. China specialists of Bohlen's career generation have either been McCarthy casualties or have long since specialized in other areas (e.g., Tony Freeman in Mexico). We should continue to explore possibilities.

Final Comment

If the above analysis appears negative, it is not meant to belittle the value of this contribution from eminent and knowledgeable academic friends. It is just that it takes two to play some games, and Peking does not see it in its interest to play, just now. Things could be very different almost any month now, or it could conceivably take several more years. There are a few things we can do now, but they are very limited -- or rather it seems to me we should for now keep them limited. The brief studies you have asked for in the next few days may afford a good vehicle to examine some of these.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:ksb

ARVARD UNIVERSITY

109c

EDWIN O. REISCHAUER

Room 503
1737 CAMBRIDGE STREET
CAMBRIDGE,
MASSACHUSETTS 02138

February 12, 1968

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

First let me thank you in behalf of the group from the National Committee on United States-China Relations for your great courtesy in giving us so much of your time and attention. We are all deeply appreciative.

I enclose the memorandum you asked us to submit to you. We have written it as individuals, not as members of the Committee, since the Committee itself takes no stand on policy issues, believing that its function is merely to help develop knowledge and understanding about our relations with China. The memorandum has been drafted primarily by Doak Barnett of Columbia, Lucian Pye of M.I.T., and myself but has been coordinated with Alexander Eckstein of the University of Michigan and Robert Scalapino of the University of California. While complete unanimity of opinion cannot be expected within a group of this sort, the points in this memorandum represent a general consensus, and all have at least majority support within the group.

Sincerely yours,



Edwin O. Reischauer

MEMORANDUM ON CHINA POLICY

1) The long-term goal of United States policy toward China is to achieve a reconciliation between the American and Chinese people. Until such a reconciliation is possible, a tolerable modus vivendi is necessary if the whole Asian and Pacific region is to have a chance to achieve stability and orderly growth.

For the following reasons, the next few months are a particularly important time to show initiative in moving toward this goal:

2) 1. Since China is at present in a state of great flux out of which may emerge a leadership more willing to consider new options, it is particularly important for us at this time to exercise imaginative initiatives which will broaden in a desirable way the options open to them.

3) 2. The military actions we have been forced to adopt in Vietnam have created a situation in which it would be particularly useful to demonstrate both to the American public and to our friends abroad our flexibility and forward-looking initiative on the broader problems of our relationship with Asia as a whole, and China in particular.

4) The specific steps proposed in this memorandum are not new, having all been under intensive study at one time or another within the government. Individually or collectively they are not likely to evoke a quick, favorable response from Peking, but they could lay the foundation for progress in the future. It would probably be best not to take the steps proposed all at one time but by progressive increments over a period of several months, in order to avoid giving the impression to the Chinese that the whole effort is merely a propaganda gesture. Taken together, the proposed steps would be designed to make clear to Peking and to the world that the United States is ready:

1) to help bring China fully into the community of nations;

2) to recognize China's legitimate interests as a major power and offer it acceptable alternatives to isolation and belligerency; and

3) to broaden channels of communication, commerce, and personal exchange between the United States and China.

5) We should, at the same time, leave no unclarity about our continued determination to oppose acts of violence and subversion which threaten the legitimate interests of other states.

The specific steps that should be taken in the next several months are the following:

- 6) 1. We should make explicit that we sincerely desire reconciliation with the Chinese people and more specifically that:
 - a) we accept the People's Republic of China as the de facto government of mainland China;
 - b) while supporting fully the right of the people and the Republic of China on Taiwan to determine their own political future and maintain their membership in the United Nations, we do not support Taiwan as a contender for the rule of all China in a continuing civil war; and
 - c) we shall support Peking's seating in the United Nations if it wishes to enter on the same terms as other countries.
- 7) This clarification of our stance toward China would be best accomplished through a series of Presidential speeches and statements which repeat and expand earlier themes, such as reconciliation, "full participation by all nations in an international community under law," free exchange of goods and persons, and the recognition of China's legitimate needs for "security and friendly relations with her neighboring countries," as outlined in the President's speech of July 12, 1966, and the State of the Union Message of January 10, 1967. Other high government leaders should also make statements along similar lines.
- 8) 2. Accompanying this clarification of the American stance, we should repeat and expand specific earlier proposals for the opening of channels of commerce and cultural exchange and should take the following specific steps:
 - a) remove at once the Treasury restrictions which limit American companies abroad from trading with China;
 - b) minimize the China differential in COCOM controls;
 - c) move by quick steps to the removal of all restrictions on American trade with China in non-strategic goods;
 - d) encourage the two-way movement between the United States and China of newsmen, scholars, businessmen, and other citizens; and
 - e) foster the exchange of technological and scientific information and other forms of cooperation in mutually beneficial fields, such as weather prediction and communications by satellites.

9) 3. While not sacrificing our own or our allies' essential security interests, we should seek to diminish the friction and psychological pressures the Chinese feel from what they regard to be our close-in military encirclement. Those military bases and activities that are needed for the containment of potential Chinese aggression should be kept as far as practicable from Chinese territory, and determined efforts should be made to induce the Republic of China to withdraw from the offshore islands (Quemoy and Matsu).

10) 4. We should attempt to broaden communications with Peking through the Warsaw talks or any other available means. While not unduly publicizing the steps proposed under paragraphs 2 and 3 above, we should:

- a) make sure that Peking is fully aware of them and their significance; and
- b) make clear to Peking that we are prepared, on a basis of full equality and recognition of China's legitimate national interests as a great power, to engage in a broad discussion of all the fundamental problems that lie between our two nations, including Asian security problems, a general Asian political settlement, and mutual needs for nuclear security and arms control.

11) 5. As a related point, an office of an Ambassador-at-Large for Asia or some comparable body should be created at the top policy level of the State Department and staffed with persons who, on the one hand, have a special knowledge of and sensitivity to Asian, and particularly Chinese, psychology and attitudes and, on the other, have the full confidence and respect of the President and Secretary of State. This is needed to bring to our handling of Asian problems the same depth of understanding and sure sensitivity that has been provided by several Soviet specialists in our dealings with the Soviet Union.

109e

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98105

Far Eastern and Russian Institute

14 February 1968

Mr. Walter Rostow
The White House
Washington, D.C.


Dear Wult:

I am writing my piece for the President but I thought I should drop you a note for two reasons. One is to say that I could not agree to be associated with the statement drafted by Reischauer, Barnett, and Pye because, as I explained to Ed Reischauer, I see the thing in such a different context that there was no way in which the statement could be modified to take care of my objections. Reconciliation is the wrong word for the ultimate objectives of the United States, and it is bad psychology in any case. I would prefer to proceed from what I think is probably the truth--that we have no quarrel with the Chinese people and they none with us.

The other reason is to say how very much I agreed with you in reaction to what seemed to me to be irresponsible statements by Reischauer in our discussion before the President came along about democracy in South Vietnam. There is nothing quite so funny as a ritualistic liberal trying to appear to be a practical realist.

Kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,



George E. Taylor
Director

GET:fkq

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Thursday, February 22, 1968
3:30 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's three
China policy recommendations,
followed by a State Dept. paper.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 2-28-92

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988

February 22, 1968

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By

, NARA, Date

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-189

By

, NARA, Date

8-19-92

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Policy Toward Communist China

You have asked for our views on the situation in Communist China, Sino-Soviet relations, and Communist Chinese foreign policies--and on the resulting possibilities for change in our own policies. Tab A, attached, is a thoughtful and sound discussion of these matters, looking predominantly to the longer term.

For immediate purposes, I believe we can take only very limited steps, since our firm posture in Asia generally remains crucial and any significant "concessions" to Communist China would be seriously misunderstood in key quarters, not to mention the Congress. Specifically:

1. I do not believe we should change our posture toward the UN. Even the UN's technical organs are, as a practical matter, inseparable for now from the wider question of the General Assembly.
2. On private contacts, we have the option of quiet action to extend our passport policy for travel to Communist China so that we grant passports to anyone who applies. This could be done in the near future, since it has become customary to define our travel policy for publication in the Federal Register on March 15 of each year. A routine announcement at that time should attract no major notice, and would ratify what we have in fact been doing on individual applications for some time. If this commends itself to you, I will put a precise paper before you for decision. The practical effect will almost certainly be nil, since Peking has not admitted any American for some time.
3. On trade, there are certain minimal steps we could

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also take in the near future. These would affect (a) our attempt to apply US trade controls to US subsidiaries abroad (a major source of friction with friendly countries, and one we have frequently waived under pressure); (b) certain outmoded controls on bunkering of ships; and (c) removal of the requirement of Certificates of Origin on Chinese-type goods, for purchases up to \$100 (largely an annoyance, but with some balance-of-payments implications in the current situation). A broader possibility would be (d) a change in export license policy to permit export to Communist China of food-stuffs, fertilizer, insecticides, and farm machinery. All of these relate directly to food only, and the mere act of relaxing would be widely noted and I think more applauded than condemned. Again, if this possibility commends itself to you, I will put a precise paper before you for individual decision in the near future.

I conclude with the basic thought that we must keep Communist China always in mind in our choice of military actions in Viet-Nam and elsewhere. I do not think we are running any significant risks on present lines, but any proposal for new or increased action must take full account of this factor.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Attachment:

Paper on Situation in Communist China
and US Policy Alternatives.

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SITUATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA AND UNITED STATES POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Situation In Communist China

After a year and a half of turmoil, Peking's major emphasis is on channeling the Cultural Revolution into non-disruptive channels, restoring order, and seeking to restore its controls over the country as a whole and to re-establish a system of administration. This emphasis is articulated largely by the military -- which has assumed an increasing role -- and by the remnants of the governmental administrative apparatus.

The Cultural Revolution appears, at the present stage, to have had two major objectives -- to enhance Mao Tse-tung's own power through the removal of his prime political opponents, and to carry through Mao's revolutionary and Utopian ideas of destroying the old society, remolding the individual, and establishing an idealized Communist society.

The results have been the crushing of organized opposition to Mao, but at immense cost: first, to leadership cohesion and Party and government institutions; secondly, a near-total failure of Mao's aims of social and political changes; thirdly, mounting national disillusionment and cynicism, and loss of confidence in Mao and Maoism; and fourthly, incalculable economic and social dislocation.

Today, rather than pressing on with the Cultural Revolution, the leadership is seeking to control the forces they themselves unleashed and to recreate institutional controls and a basic structure of power to replace the one they themselves have weakened.

Outlook

The Peking regime faces staggering problems as it seeks to hold China together and restore order. Mao and his more dedicated followers have not given up their dream of creating a new social order, and will seek opportunities to restore the momentum of the Cultural Revolution. Factionalism at all levels remains high, and steps taken to recreate the administrative structure inevitably feed the factionalism by restoring to power many of those only recently under attack. The People's Liberation Army has been given the task of policing the country in addition to national defense. Yet it is both inhibited by the Maoists from exerting the force necessary to restore order and reluctant to do so for fear of exacerbating the severe tensions the PLA is already under.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-189
By ju, NARA, Date 8-19-92

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Looking somewhat further into the future, whatever success the present uneasy power equilibrium achieves in controlling disorders, re-knitting the social and economic fabric and rebuilding the administrative structure of the country is apt to be set back by the death of Mao. Mao's health is not good, and it is unlikely he will survive for long. His death (or total incapacitation) would remove an important, if now somewhat tarnished, symbol of national unity, and would immediately sharpen the struggle for power.

In summary, China appears to face a period of some years of instability and internal preoccupation. The Cultural Revolution has set loose forces that will make most difficult the task of restoring order and momentum to China's society and economy by any new leadership that may emerge.

Opportunities for U.S. Initiatives

While this situation contains obvious elements of uncertainty and danger for the stability of East Asia, it also contains elements of opportunity for the United States. These elements revolve around the possibility that the disillusionment over Maoism and the increasingly pressing nature of China's internal problems will bring with them, on the part of a new leadership, a re-examination of the premises and priorities of China's foreign policy.

Likely Developments in Peking's Foreign Policies

The close relations existing between Peking and Moscow from 1949-58 represent an exceptional interlude in the much longer historical pattern of mutual suspicion and hostility between China and Russia. This history, the long common border populated by ethnic minorities which have been politically restive under both Chinese and Russian rule, and conflicting ideological and national objectives make it unlikely that a long-term relationship of friendship and cooperation between the two can be re-established.

The death of Mao would remove certain personal obstacles to improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, but unless accompanied by a breakdown of order in China, this would not fundamentally change the strategic relationship between China, the Soviets, and ourselves. Moscow will be

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alert for opportunities to improve its relations with Peking without sacrificing basic Soviet interests, but any such improvement would in all likelihood be based on a relationship of full independence, with each clearly conscious of the dividing line between areas of common and competitive interest.

One evident common interest is their mutual desire to weaken the international position of the U. S. This could provide a basis for tactical collaboration on some specific issues which would be damaging to U. S. interests.

We do not rule out the possibility that either in conjunction with or independent of a lessening of overt Sino-Soviet tensions, the Chinese could move to lessen tensions with the U. S. We should certainly seek, within the context of our other Asian interests, to make this alternative as attractive as possible to Peking.

Peking's policy objectives with respect to its other Asian neighbors, particularly in Southeast Asia, will probably continue to focus on drawing these states into Peking's orbit of political and economic influence and detaching them from close relationships with the U. S. After a very harsh period last spring and summer, in which major threats were laid out against several countries in the area, Peking has now moderated its tactics, although it may be launching a significant subversive effort against Burma. In general, if the situation in Southeast Asia were to soften through adverse developments in Viet-Nam, we might expect to see some increase in pressure and subversion from Peking, notably in Thailand, but the degree to which this was pressed would depend heavily on conditions in the area. Moreover, we can reckon that Peking's internal problems will somewhat reduce the degree of pressure from what would have been foreseen prior to the Cultural Revolution, and specifically in the 1965 period when the U. S. made its major decision on Viet-Nam.

More broadly, and looking into the future, our best forecast would be that the over-all goal of major influence, and when possible control, in key parts of Southeast Asia will probably be shared by Mao's successors whoever they may be. Specific tactical approaches used toward this end will vary, as they have since 1949. Should Mao's successors, however, become less rigidly committed to the concept of a Maoist revolutionary development in the world -- as we strongly suggest they eventually will -- the insurrectionary-subversionary element in Peking's foreign policy may be

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gradually de-emphasized.

In dealing with the rest of the world, Peking will continue to be handicapped by its limited resources and will probably gradually begin to accept the limitations on its abilities to influence or control the actions of other states. The problems of an internal leadership transition will also hamper the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. The general outlines of Peking's policies, however, will probably continue: emphasis on developing relations with the Afro-Asian states, willingness to deal on a practical basis on economic and trade matters with even certain states it does not recognize, and avoidance of war, if at all possible, with major powers.

Peking's Attitude Toward the U.S.

The likelihood of a change in Peking's policies toward the United States is minimal in the next few years, and probably nil while Mao is alive. Nevertheless, Peking has been willing, at some political cost, to keep open the Ambassadorial-level contact in Warsaw and clearly sees an advantage in having a communication point with the United States.

Especially given the current fluid state of Peking's politics, we believe it is in the interest of the U.S. to present to a potential or emerging Chinese leadership a variety of options and alternatives to their present policies.

Alternatives to U.S. Policies

We have, in the past few years, made initial moves in this direction by offering increasing contact through travel and limited types of trade and by attempting to institute a dialogue with Peking on disarmament. Further moves in respect to travel and trade can probably be taken without damage to U.S. security interests. We should also act to minimize potential points of irritation and direct conflict with Peking, and this applies particularly to self-restraint in U.S. military air and naval operations close to Chinese borders.

There is nothing that can presently be done directly to resolve the problem of Taiwan. We are committed to its defense but for all practical

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purposes deal with Peking and Taipei as if they were separate states. This is a direction toward which our policies have been taking us for 15 years and it is probably in our interest to work gradually toward at least a tacit acknowledgement of this reality by both.

So long as Peking's policies remain militant and hostile, there is no net U.S. advantage to be gained from Chinese Communist participation in the UN's political organizations. If Peking were to moderate its policies even to a limited degree, we would almost certainly be confronted by growing pressure from UN members to bring Communist China into the UN, even if this resulted in withdrawal from the UN by the GRC. There are, even at present, significant advantages which might be derived from Peking's membership in a number of the UN's technical organizations (WMO, ITU, WHO, UPU). It is politically difficult to accomplish this, however, without bringing Peking into the General Assembly or the Security Council.

In general, we anticipate in the middle-long run that China's attitude toward the United States will be subject not only to changes in Peking's leadership, which could result in some moderation of Peking's hostility towards us permitting progress towards placing our relations on a more pragmatic basis, but also to the future U.S. posture in East Asia and in particular to the pattern of activities by the United States affecting Chinese security interests. We do find it possible to envisage the gradual development of practical cultural and economic relationships in somewhat the same way as our relations have developed with the USSR, even while our political relationship remains a hostile one.

At some point, it may be desirable to consider the advantage of attempting to draw Peking more into Asian regional ventures such as the Asian Development Bank, ECAFE, or the Mekong Valley Project. We suspect Peking's initial reactions would be negative but the attempt might usefully serve to underline that the U.S. does not oppose Peking's taking part in peaceful economic development programs with its Asian neighbors.

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February 22, 1968

CAP 80494

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT -- LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Pres file

Re Soviet agreement to talk about ABM's and ICBM's.

A message to you of February 27, 1967 from Kosygin said: "We are prepared to continue exchange of views on questions relating to strategic rocket-nuclear weapons. As we understand it, you are in agreement with our view that such questions must be considered as a complex, including both offensive strategic nuclear delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. Certain additional considerations of the Soviet side re approach to solution these questions are being transmitted through Ambassador Thompson. Nor do we exclude possibility of holding in future, as you suggest, special meeting of our appropriate representatives for more detailed discussion this entire problem."

On this basis you said at a press conference on March 2: "I have a brief announcement to make. I have received a reply from Chairman Kosygin to my letter of January 27. This reply confirmed the willingness of the Soviet Government to discuss means of limiting the arms race in offensive and defensive nuclear missiles. This exchange of views is expected to lead to further discussions of this subject in Moscow and with our allies. It is my hope that a means can be found to achieve constructive results."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-249

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By Cb, NARA Date 11-5-97

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- 2 -

At Glassboro you pressed Kosygin hard on three occasions. The nearest to a commitment was on the morning of June 25th when he finally said: If the President is really interested in disarmament I will come to the United States with a technical delegation; but this could only happen if Vietnam and the Middle East crises were settled.

After lunch on the 25th you made another try to nail him down, but he evaded as he had on the 23d.

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80489

1968 FEB 22 23 13

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THU DAY

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~~SECRET~~ CACTUS SENSITIVE

FEBRUARY 22, 1968

Profile

SEC. RUSK, CLARK CLIFFORD AND I PUT ASIDE THE IDEA OF AN APOLOGY BASED ON THE CONFESSIONS, IN OUR MEETING THIS MORNING.

WE DEvised THE FOUR-PRONGED SCENARIO DESCRIBED IN THE ATTACHED CABLE WHICH SEC. RUSK DESPATCHED FOR JUDGMENT AND CRITICISM TO THOMPSON, ALEX JOHNSON, DAVID BRUCE, AND PORTER.

YOU MAY WISH TO INDICATE YOUR REACTION NOW OR AWAIT THE VIEWS OF OUR AMBASSADORS BEFORE GIVING US GUIDANCE.

1. WE ARE UNABLE FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS TO MEET THE NORTH KOREAN REQUEST AT THE EIGHTH MEETING FOR AN APOLOGY BASED ON THE CONFESSIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS AS A CONDITION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE MEN. SINCE NORTH KOREANS HAVE REFUSED TO ACCEPT OUR OFFER TO EXPRESS REGRETS AFTER AN OFFICIAL INQUIRY, IN THE EVENT RESULTS OF INQUIRY JUSTIFY OUR DOING SO, WE MAY BE APPROACHING A DEADLOCK IN THESE PRIVATE MEETINGS OF U.S. AND NORTH KOREAN SENIORS AT PANMUNJOM.

2. WE ARE THEREFORE CONTEMPLATING A FOUR-PRONGED EFFORT TO FIND A SOLUTION.

3. AT THE NEXT MEETING WE PROPOSE TO SAY THAT THE NORTH KOREAN PROPOSAL FOR AN APOLOGY IN ADVANCE OF THE RELEASE ON THE BASIS OF THE CONFESSIONS AND DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO US DOES NOT OFFER ANY POSSIBILITY OF A SOLUTION. WE WILL REPEAT OUR OFFER OF AN INQUIRY AFTER THE MEN AND SHIP HAVE BEEN RELEASED AND SAY WE WILL SUBMIT THE CONFESSIONS AND DOCUMENTS TO THE BOARD OF INQUIRY AS EVIDENCE PERTINENT TO THE INQUIRY.

4. IF THE FOREGOING IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE NORTH KOREANS WE WILL OFFER THEM THE ALTERNATIVE OF AN INVESTIGATING COMMISSION ONCE THE CREW, DOCUMENTS AND VESSEL ARE RELEASED, TO EXAMINE ALL ASPECTS OF THE SEIZURE AND ALL DOCUMENTS AND STATEMENTS, AND MAKE ITS FINDINGS PUBLIC. EACH SIDE WOULD APPOINT A MEMBER AND THE TWO SIDES WOULD AGREE ON A THIRD MEMBER FROM ANOTHER COUNTRY TO SERVE AS CHAIRMAN. IF THE FINDINGS FIND US CULPABLE WE WILL OFFER TO EXPRESS REGRETS.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

5. IT IS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THE NORTH KOREANS WILL REJECT THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSION AND POSSIBLY BOTH PROPOSALS, BUT AT LEAST THEY WILL HAVE SOMETHING TO CHEW ON.

6. BEFORE CALLING THE NINTH MEETING WE WOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL MOVES.

7. EMBASSY SEOUL WOULD APPROACH THE SWISS AND SWEDISH MEMBERS OF THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION, AND INFORM THEM THAT THE EIGHT MEETINGS HAVE PRODUCED NO RPT NO RESULT. FOR THEIR PRIVATE INFORMATION, WE HAVE OFFERED TO EXPRESS REGRETS AFTER THE MEN ARE RELEASED AND AN OFFICIAL INQUIRY HELD, SHOULD OUR FINDINGS WARRANT SUCH EXPRESSION, BUT THE NORTH KOREANS ARE DEMANDING AN APOLOGY NOW BASED ON THE CONFESSIONS AND DOCUMENTS AS A CONDITION OF RELEASE. THAT OFFERS NO POSSIBILITY OF A SETTLEMENT AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED. THEY SHOULD ALSO BE TOLD OF THE ALTERNATE OFFERS WE WILL MAKE AT THE NEXT MEETING. ALL THIS FOR THEIR PRIVATE INFORMATION.

8. WHAT WE WOULD LIKE THE SWISS AND SWEDES TO DO, OR EITHER ONE, DEPENDING ON WHAT SEOUL AND THEY DECIDE, IS TO CONVEY TO THE POLES AND CZECHS THEIR ALARM AT THE DELAY IN RELEASING THE VESSEL AND CREW. THEY CAN VENTURE THEIR OPINION THAT THE U.S. MUST HOLD AN INQUIRY AFTER THE RELEASE, AND THAT CLEARLY THE CONFESSIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS WILL BE INTRODUCED INTO THAT INQUIRY. FURTHER THAT THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE TO PUBLISH THE RESULTS, AND IF THERE WAS ANY VIOLATION OR FAULT, THE AMERICANS WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE EXCEPT TO APOLOGIZE. THE NORTH KOREANS HAVE GOT ALL THE PROPAGANDA VALUE THEY CAN OUT OF THE CASE, AND WHAT IS NOW REQUIRED ARE MOVES TO EASE THE TENSIONS ARISING FROM THE SEIZURE OF THE PUEBLO. IF THE NORTH KOREANS TRY TO PRESS THE U.S. TOO FAR AND MAKE IMPOSSIBLE DEMANDS ON THEM, THE ALREADY GRAVE SITUATION CAN BECOME EVEN CRAVER. THEY THEREFORE URGE THE CZECHS AND POLES TO TRY TO IMPRESS ON THE NORTH KOREANS THE NEED FOR AN IMMEDIATE RELEASE.

9. THE THIRD MOVE WILL BE MADE WITH THE RUSSIANS, POSSIBLY THROUGH DOBRYNIN OR THOMPSON OR BOTH. WE WILL SUPPLY THE SOVIETS WITH THE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE EIGHTH CLOSED MEETING, AND INDICATE OUR PLANS FOR THE NINTH MEETING. WE WOULD STRESS THAT AN APOLOGY BEFORE AN INQUIRY AFTER THE MEN ARE RELEASED IS OUT OF THE QUESTION, AND THAT IF THE NORTH KOREANS DO NOT ACCEPT EITHER OF OUR PORPOSALS OR COME UP WITH A REASONABLE SOLUTION, THEN WE HAVE REACHED THE END OF THAT WE CAN SAY TO THE NORTH KOREANS OR OFFER THEM. WE COULD INDICATE OUR CONCERN ABOUT REPORTS THAT CREW WILL BE TRIED. WE WOULD LET THE RUSSIANS DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT WE SHALL SOON HAVE TO TELL OUR PEOPLE AND THE UN THAT THE MEETINGS HAVE PRODUCED NO RESULTS. OUR HOPE IS THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL GET TO THE NORTH KOREANS BEFORE THE NEXT MEETING OR SOON THEREAFTER AND URGE ON THEM THE NEED TO EFFECT AN EARLY TERMINATION OF THIS MATTER BY RELEASE.

10. OUR FOURTH APPROACH WILL BE TO THE JAPANESE AND BRITISH, THE TWO MAIN NON-COMMUNIST TRADING OR SHIPPING NATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA. THEY WILL BE INFORMED OF OUR PLANS FOR THE NEXT MEETING AND OF OUR GENERAL VIEW THAT IT LOOKS AS IF WE ARE REACHING THE END OF THESE TALKS. THEY WILL BE ASKED TO INFORM THE NORTH KOREANS PRIVATELY AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME AFTER THE NINTH MEETING-- IF NO PROGRESS IS INDICATED THERE--THAT THE GRAVITY AND TENSION IN THE AREA ARE SUCH THAT THEY ARE CONSIDERING SUSPENSION OF ALL SHIPPING INTO NORTH KOREAN PORTS. WE SHALL ASK THE JAPANESE AND UK TO AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO SUSPEND SHIPPING IF WE SHOULD ASK THEM TO DO SO SO THAT THIS IS NOT REGARDED BY THEM OR THE NORTH KOREANS AS A BLUFF.

11. THE JAPANESE AND UK WILL BE TOLD THAT WE ARE NOT AT THE MOMENT THINKING OF MORE FORCEFUL MEASURES, AND ARE STILL HOPING TO FIND SOME PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

12. WE WILL ALSO TELL THE JAPANESE AND THE BRITISH AS WELL AS THE SOVIETS THAT THE GRAVITY OF THE PROBLEM SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED BY THEM. WE ANTICIPATE THAT MARCH WILL SEE THE START OF A NEW NORTH KOREAN CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE IN THE DMZ AND THE DESPATCH OF MORE RAIDER TEAMS WHICH, IF THE PUEBLO AND CREW ARE STILL IN NORTH KOREAN HANDS, WILL FURTHER HEIGHTEN THE TENSIONS WHICH ALREADY EXIST. THE RELEASE OF THE CREW COULD DRAW THE FOCAL POINT OF ACUTE TENSION AND MAKE IT EASIER TO DEAL WITH THE SOUTH KOREAN SIDE OF THE PROBLEM.

13. THE FOREGOING IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND COMMENTS WHICH WE WOULD LIKE SOONEST.

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80485

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Authority State Ltr 11-7-78
By sch/y, NARA, Date 3-4-92

SECRET

HERewith BUNKER'S FORTIETH WEEKLY. THE FIRST LONG SECTION IS A SUMMARY.

I. GENERAL

SINCE MY LAST WEEKLY MESSAGE, THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SITUATION, SOME FAVORABLE, OTHERS LESS SO. I SHALL TRY TO SUMMARIZE THESE BRIEFLY AT THE BEGINNING AND WILL ENDEAVOR TO ENLARGE ON THEM LATER IN THE REPORT:

A) THE GVN HAS CONTINUED TO PRESS THE RECOVERY PROGRAM WITH COMMENDABLE ENERGY. DESPITE FRUSTRATIONS, SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. IN THE SAIGON AREA, PUBLIC SERVICES HAVE BEEN MAINTAINED, DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD HAS BEEN EXPANDED, PRICES HAVE COME DOWN (NOW ABOUT 20 PERCENT HIGHER THAN PRE-TET), AND THE PROBLEM OF EVACUEES HAS BEEN HANDLED EFFECTIVELY. THE CURFEW HAS BEEN RELAXED AND PEOPLE ARE GETTING BACK TO THEIR NORMAL OCCUPATIONS. IN THE CITIES AND TOWNS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, RECOVERY WORK IS UNDERWAY, FOOD SUPPLIES ARE ADEQUATE, AND EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO OPEN LINES OF COMMUNICATION AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. THE COUNTERPARTS OF THE CENTRAL RECOVERY COMMITTEE AT CORPS AND PROVINCE LEVEL ARE FOR THE MOST PART WORKING EFFECTIVELY. PERHAPS A MAJOR BY-PRODUCT OF THE EFFORT HAS BEEN THAT OF GETTING MINISTRIES TO WORK TOGETHER, HORIZONTALLY INSTEAD OF VERTICALLY.

B) WE HAVE AS YET NO COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORY OF DESTRUCTION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY BUT THIS IS NOW UNDERWAY. IT IS OBVIOUS FROM PRELIMINARY REPORTS, HOWEVER, THAT DESTRUCTION HAS BEEN HEAVY. EVACUEES WILL PROBABLY NUMBER FROM 400,000 TO 450,000, OF WHICH PERHAPS 30-40 PERCENT HAVING LEFT THEIR HOMES FOR SECURITY REASONS WILL BE RETURNING. MOST OF THE REMAINING WILL BE REFUGEES IN THE TRUE SENSE IN THAT THEIR HOMES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. WE HAVE NO ACCURATE COUNT OF THE NUMBER OF HOUSES DESTROYED NOR AN INVENTORY OF THE DAMAGE TO INDUSTRY. OUR LATEST COUNT SHOWED 61,000 HOUSES DESTROYED, A FIGURE CONSIDERABLY HIGHER THAN THAT OF THE GVN. AS REPORTED IN MY LAST WEEKS MESSAGE, INDUSTRIAL PLANTS HAVE SUFFERED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE. IT IS APPARENT, THEREFORE, THAT THE REPAIR OF PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION CAUSED BY THE TET OFFENSIVE WILL INVOLVE AN EXTENSIVE AND TIME CONSUMING EFFORT, AND A SUBSTANTIAL ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES.

C) FURTHER ELEMENTS IN THE ENEMY'S STRATEGY DEVELOPED WITH RENEWED ATTACKS ON A NUMBER OF CITIES DURING THE NIGHT OF FEBRUARY 18-19 IN WHAT APPEARS TO BE THE SECOND PHASE OF THE TET OFFENSIVE. THESE FOR THE MOST PART WERE ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACKS DIRECTED PRINCIPALLY AT AIRFIELDS AND BASES. EXCEPTIONS WERE THE CITIES OF PHAN THIET AND SONG BE WHICH THE ENEMY ENTERED AND FROM WHICH HE WAS THROWN OUT WITH HEAVY LOSSES. BUT WHAT IS EVIDENT IS THAT THE ENEMY IN EFFECT IS ATTEMPTING AN INVESTMENT OF SOME OF THE MAJOR CITIES. FOR EXAMPLE, TROOPS ARE BEING MOVED CLOSER TO SAIGON AND TO CAN THO IN THE DELTA. HE IS MAKING INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO DISRUPT LINES OF COMMUNICATION, CUTTING HIGHWAY 4 FROM THE DELTA EVERY NIGHT. HIS PRESENT MOVES SEEM TO CONFIRM THIEU'S VIEW THAT HE WILL CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT TO HARASS, ISOLATE, AND CHOK OFF THE CITIES. HE REMARKED TO ME YESTERDAY THAT THE COUNTRYSIDE HAS ALWAYS BEEN OF PRIME IMPORTANCE TO THE VC FOR THIS REASON.

D) THE ENEMY IS BRINGING IN HEAVY REINFORCEMENTS TO THE SAIGON AREA AND SEVERE FIGHTING HAS BEEN TAKING PLACE IN GIA DINH. THESE REINFORCEMENTS EVIDENTLY HAVE BEEN COMING FROM REPLACEMENT CAMPS IN CAMBODIA. HEAVY TRUCK TRAFFIC HAS BEEN NOTED ON THE CAMBODIAN SIDE PROCEEDING UP TO THE BORDER AND HEAVY SAMPAN TRAFFIC OBSERVED FROM THE BORDER INLAND INTO VIET-NAM. THIS RAISES THE QUESTION AS TO HOW LONG WE CAN AFFORD TO PERMIT THE ENEMY TO MAKE USE OF THE LAOS AND CAMBODIAN SANCTUARIES AS FREELY AND EFFECTIVELY AS HE HAS BEEN DOING FOR THE INFILTRATION OF MEN AND MATERIAL. I RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT PROBLEM HAVING MANY COMPLEX AND SENSITIVE POLITICAL ASPECTS, AND WILL THEREFORE WANT TO MAKE IT THE SUBJECT OF ANOTHER MESSAGE.

E) THE ENEMY'S PRESENT MOVES, IT SEEMS TO ME, LEND CREDIBILITY TO GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S VIEWS AND THOSE OF PRESIDENT THIEU ON THE PROBABLE FUTURE COURSE OF HIS STRATEGY. AS I REPORTED LAST WEEK, GENERAL WESTMORELAND BELIEVES THAT THE ENEMY MAY BE PREPARING FOR A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES, PERHAPS SUPPORTED ALSO IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS, AND THAT HE HAS THE CAPABILITY TO MOUNT SUCH AN OFFENSIVE. THIEU'S VIEW, WHICH HE CONFIRMED AGAIN IN MY TALK WITH HIM YESTERDAY, IS THAT THE PRESENT OFFENSIVE WILL BE FOLLOWED BY A SECOND ONE WHICH MAY COME SOME MONTHS FROM NOW, PERHAPS AROUND MAY TO JULY; THAT IN THIS HE WILL TRY TO PIN DOWN OUR TROOPS IN THE NORTH, IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS, AND IN DEFENSE OF THE CITIES; TO CONTINUE MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS ON AIRFIELDS IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE OUR AIR POTENTIAL; TO CONTINUE HARASSMENT AND INFILTRATION OF THE CITIES TO CARRY ON POLITICAL "SPOILING" AND ATTEMPT TO PARALYZE THE GOVERNMENT THROUGH TERROR ATTACKS; AND TO ATTEMPT TO REGAIN AND HOLD AS MUCH OF THE COUNTRYSIDE AS POSSIBLE. THIEU BELIEVES THAT THE MAIN ENEMY OBJECTIVE IS STILL THE COUNTRYSIDE, AND THAT HIS PURPOSE IN ITS CONTROL IS TWO FOLD: TO CHOK OFF THE FLOW OF FOOD AND OTHER SUPPLIES TO THE CITIES, AND TO BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE CONTROLS A LARGE PART OF VIETNAMESE TERRITORY BEFORE GOING TO NEGOTIATIONS. THIEU BELIEVES, THEREFORE, THAT THE ENEMY'S UTMOST OBJECTIVE IS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, AND HIS VIEW OF TIMING LOOKS TOWARD THE END OF 1968 OR EARLY 1969.

F) IF THESE VIEWS ARE CORRECT, AND THEY SEEM TO ME QUITE LOGICAL, THEN IT APPEARS THEY WILL INVOLVE A MAJOR EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE ENEMY. HOW LONG HE CAN SUSTAIN SUCH AN INTENSIVE EFFORT, GIVEN THE LOSSES WHICH HE HAS ALREADY TAKEN AND WHICH SUCH AN EFFORT WILL INEVITABLY ENTAIL, IS PROBLEMATICAL, ESPECIALLY IF WE HAVE THE MEN AND MATERIAL TO MEET AND FRUSTRATE HIM AT EVERY TURN; I THINK THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THE WILL.

G) IT IS APPARENT THAT THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM HAS SUFFERED A SETBACK, THOUGH TO WHAT EXTENT IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE. EIGHTEEN OF THE FIFTY-FOUR ARVN BATTALIONS ASSIGNED TO PACIFICATION WERE WITHDRAWN FOR DEFENSE OF THE CITIES; SO APPARENTLY WERE A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES AND SOME OF THE RD TEAMS, THOUGH THE EXACT NUMBERS ARE NOT KNOWN. THE CONSEQUENT IMPAIRMENT OF SECURITY WHICH HAS RESULTED HAS RAISED DOUBTS IN PEOPLE'S MINDS CONCERNING THE CAPABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SECURITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, HOWEVER, IS THE FACT THAT SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF THE VIET CONG FORCES WERE WITHDRAWN FROM RURAL AREAS FOR THE ATTACKS ON THE CITIES AND THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME A LARGE PART OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE HAS SURFACED AND BEEN IDENTIFIED. THIS SHOULD MAKE POSSIBLE A MORE EFFECTIVE ROOTING OUT PROCESS.

FIRST PRIORITIES, ALREADY UNDERWAY, ARE TO GET SUPPLIES TO THE PROVINCES; TO GET REFUGEES INTO PERMANENT CAMPS; AND TO GET INSPECTION TEAMS OUT. THE NEXT PRIORITIES ARE TO GET THE FORCES BACK INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE; TO RE-ESTABLISH SECURITY; TO REVIVE THE ECONOMY; THROUGH PSYOPS TO CAPITALIZE ON THE TET FAILURE; AND TO ATTACK THE EXPOSED INFRASTRUCTURE.

H) POPULAR REACTIONS HAVE CONTINUED TO SURFACE. CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT WAS AT FIRST BADLY SHAKEN; BUT AT THE SAME TIME POPULAR OPINION HARDENED AGAINST THE VC. WHILE THE ENEMY INSTILLED NEW FEAR IN THE CITY DWELLERS, HE LEARNED THAT THE MASSES WILL NOT VOLUNTARILY SUPPORT HIM. IN THE VIEW OF MANY EXPERIENCED OBSERVERS, THE CRISIS HAS GENERATED A GREATER FEELING OF UNITY AND MORE WILLINGNESS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE COMMON CAUSE THAN HAS EVER BEEN WITNESSED IN THIS COUNTRY. THERE ARE ANXIETIES ABOUT THE "SECOND WAVE" ATTACKS, BUT THERE IS ALSO AMONG MANY VIETNAMESE A NEW SPIRIT; THEY FEEL THEY HAVE MET AND DEFEATED THE BEST THE ENEMY HAD, THEY ARE PROUD OF THEIR ARMY FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY MONTHS, AND AS PHAN QUANG DAN PUTS IT, THEY BELIEVE THAT THEIR GOVERNMENT AND THEIR SYSTEM HAS PROVED IT IS "VIALE" IN THE TOUGHEST KIND OF SITUATION.

2. MILITARY SITUATION. SINCE GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAS REPORTED DAILY, COMPREHENSIVELY AND IN DETAIL, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MILITARY SITUATION, I SHALL ONLY

MAKE A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE PRESENT OUTLOOK. THE "SECOND WAVE" OF THE TET OFFENSIVE IS APPARENTLY UNDERWAY. IT BEGAN WITH A COORDINATED SERIES OF ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACKS THROUGHOUT II, III, AND IV CORPS IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF FEBRUARY 18. SINCE THEN, MANY CITIES AND AIRFIELDS, INCLUDING SAIGON AND TAN SON NHUT, HAVE SUFFERED HARRASSING MORTAR AND ROCKET FIRE. ENEMY FORCES AT CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH ARE CLOSE TO SAIGON WITH THE OBVIOUS PURPOSE OF INVESTING THE CITY. THE APPARENT INTENTION OF THESE ATTACKS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY IS TO TIE DOWN DEFENSE FORCES AND PREVENT THEM FROM MOVING BACK TO THE COUNTRYSIDE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME CONTINUING TO MAINTAIN TENSION AMONG THE URBAN POPULATION AND IMPRESS THEM WITH VC POWER. THE PRIME ENEMY OBJECTIVE, I BELIEVE, IS III CORPS AND SAIGON, ALTHOUGH HE ALSO POSES A THREAT TO CAN THO IN THE DELTA, AND A CONTINUING AND VERY SERIOUS THREAT IN THE NORTHERN PART OF I CORPS WITH FOUR DIVISIONS IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN PROVINCES.

3. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BY NO MEANS NECESSARILY SEEN THE WHOLE OF THE ENEMY INTENTION OR CAPABILITY FOR "SECOND WAVE" ATTACKS, I AM INCLINED TO BE ENCOURAGED BY THE SLOWNESS AND APPARENT RELATIVE WEAKNESS OF HIS FOLLOW-UP ATTACKS. OBVIOUSLY, IT WAS ESSENTIAL FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW TO HIT THE CITIES AND THE GVN AGAIN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. ENEMY RADIO BROADCASTS MADE THE POINT THAT WE MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO GET BACK ON OUR FEET. IN FACT, IT APPEARS TO ME THAT THE GVN, WITH OUR HELP AND PRODDING, HAS REACTED TO THE NEW SITUATION, BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL, FASTER AND BETTER THAN HAS THE ENEMY.

4. ON THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SIDE, WE HAVE REPORTED DAILY THE GOVERNMENT EFFORT OVER THE PAST THREE WEEKS TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATE RELIEF TO THE VICTIMS OF THE FIGHTING, SHOW VIGOROUS LEADERSHIP AND INSPIRE CONFIDENCE BY PUBLIC APPEARANCES AND STATEMENTS, AND RALLY ALL NATIONALIST GROUPS TO THE SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THIS CRISIS.

5. THE RECOVERY PROGRAM. DESPITE MANY FRUSTRATIONS, THE RECOVERY EFFORT IS STILL MOVING FORWARD AT A GOOD PACE. IN FACT, KY BELIEVES THAT THE CENTRAL PEOPLES RECOVERY COMMITTEE HAS LARGELY ACCOMPLISHED THE FIRST PHASE OF ITS MISSION AND THAT ITS DIRECTION SHOULD BE TURNED OVER TO THE PRIME MINISTER. HE HAS BEEN INFLUENCED IN THIS ALSO BY SOME CRITICISM THAT HE HAS BEEN USING THE POSITION OF CHAIRMAN TO GRAB POWER AND THAT IT COULD THEREFORE BECOME A POLITICAL LIABILITY TO HIM. I DO NOT BELIEVE THIS IS SO AND NEITHER DOES THIEU WHO HAS SPOKEN TO ME IN VERY COMPLIMENTARY TERMS OF KY'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS. WHEN I MENTIONED THIS TO THIEU YESTERDAY, HE TOLD ME THAT HE, KY, AND LOC HAD DISCUSSED THE MATTER AND AGREED THAT THE TIME HAD COME WHEN IT SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER, BUT THAT KY WOULD KEEP WATCH OVER THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE AND GIVE SUPERVISION AND DIRECTION

WHEN NECESSARY. THE LOCUS OF THE COMMITTEE WILL BE MOVED TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE. IT WILL CONTINUE IN ITS PRESENT FORM WITH ITS US SUPPORTING AND COMPLEMENTARY STAFF AND WILL HOLD DAILY MEETINGS. THIEU INFORMED ME THAT HE ALSO WILL KEEP CLOSE WATCH OVER THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE AS WELL AS THE CORPS AND PROVINCIAL COMMITTEES.

6. THE BIGGEST PLUSES IN RECOVERY WORK TO DATE HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORY HANDLING OF NEARLY A HALF MILLION EVACUEES (200,000 IN SAIGON/GIA DINH ALONE), FEEDING PEOPLE IN THE CITIES WITHOUT ASTRONOMICAL PRICE INCREASES (SAIGON INDEX IS NOW ONLY ABOUT 20 9/9 HIGHER THAN PRE-TET), AND RESPONSIVE EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE BOTH IN MONEY AND MATERIALS TO HARD-HIT PROVINCES. OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF SOCIAL WELFARE/REFUGEE, HEALTH, AND PUBLIC WORKS MINISTRIES HAS BEEN HEARTENING. THE BIGGEST DIFFICULTY ENCOUNTERED IN BALANCING THE MILITARY NEED FOR TIGHT SECURITY AGAINST AN ESSENTIAL RELAXING OF RESTRICTIONS TO SPEED CIVILIAN RECOVERY.

7. DURING THE WEEK, 269 PRIVATE RICE DEALERS STARTED BUYING FROM GOVERNMENT STOCKS AND DISTRIBUTING THROUGH RETAIL OUTLETS. DISTRIBUTION IS NOW GOING SO WELL THAT GOVERNMENT OPERATED DISTRIBUTION POINTS HAVE ALL BEEN PHASED OUT. THE 2,500 RD CADRE PERFORMED WELL HELPING ORGANIZE AND OPERATE RICE DISTRIBUTION POINTS. NOW, ALL ARE ENGAGED IN SOCIAL WELFARE WORK IN MANY OF 81 REFUGEE CENTERS IN SAIGON AND 44 IN GIA DINH.

8. PLANS ARE UNDERWAY FOR URBAN RENEWAL IN SAIGON/CHOLON DESTROYED AREAS. KY HAS BEEN THE LEADING ORGANIZER OF A PLAN TO BUILD 15,000 MULTI-STORY APARTMENT UNITS TO REPLACE BURNED OUT WARRENS WHERE FIGHTING OCCURRED. INITIAL BIDS FROM PRIVATE CONTRACTORS, LOOKING TO PROFIT FROM INCREASED DEMAND, HAVE BEEN MUCH TOO HIGH. AS I HAVE REPORTED I HAVE SUGGESTED TO THIEU THE FREEZING OF NEW PRIVATE HOUSING STARTS IN SAIGON TO FORCE CONTRACTORS TO BID COMPETITIVELY FOR THESE GOVERNMENT SPONSORED PROJECTS.

9. PACIFICATION. BOB KOMER IS HAVING A DETAILED ASSESSMENT MADE OF THE AFTEREFFECTS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE ON PACIFICATION. OUR INITIAL JUDGMENT THAT VC UNITS IN LARGE MEASURE BYPASSED HAMLETS ON THEIR WAY TO CITIES APPEARS CORRECT. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE SUFFERED A PACIFICATION SETBACK BECAUSE THE GVN PULLED BACK MANY, THOUGH BY NO MEANS ALL, OF ITS LOCAL SECURITY FORCES FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE TO DEFEND THE CITIES. THUS THE VACUUM IN THE COUNTRYSIDE WHICH WE FEARED DOES EXIST; MORE SO IN III AND IV CORPS THAN IN II CORPS (IN I CORPS GOVERNMENT CONTROL HAS NEVER EXTENDED MUCH BEYOND THE NARROW STRIP ALONG ROUTE 1 BECAUSE FEW PEOPLE LIVED ELSEWHERE). PERHAPS TWO-THIRDS OF THE RD TEAMS ARE NOW ASSIGNED DEFENSE AND SOCIAL WELFARE DUTIES IN PROVINCE AND DISTRICT TOWNS. IN MANY PROVINCES, THE TEAMS CAME IN BECAUSE THE LOCAL SECURITY FORCES WERE RECALLED OR DRIFTED BACK TO THE TOWNS. AS I HAVE MENTIONED, OF THE 54 RD SUPPORT BATTALIONS, 18 WERE CALLED IN TO DEFEND PROVINCE CAPITALS AND DISTRICT TOWNS. PERHAPS A THIRD OF RF/PF UNITS IN

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COUNTRYSIDE WERE ALSO USED FOR DEFENSE OF POPULATION CENTERS. HOWEVER, THE PRESS ACCOUNTS HAVE GROSSLY OVERPLAYED THE EXTENT TO WHICH OUR PACIFICATION ASSETS WERE PULLED BACK. IN MANY PROVINCES NOT HARD HIT BY THE ENEMY, THE STATUS QUO ANTE STILL PREVAILS.

10. WE ARE PRESSING CONSTANTLY AND HARD TO GET THE RVNAF FORCES AND RD TEAMS BACK TO THEIR RURAL JOBS. THE GVN, AT OUR URGING, HAS ISSUED THE RIGHT ORDERS, THOUGH THEY ARE STILL TOO GENERAL AND PERMISSIVE. PRESIDENT THIEU IS CONVINCED THAT FILLING THE VACUM BEFORE THE ENEMY RECOVERS AND SHIFTS HIS OPERATIONS TO THE VULNERABLE HAMLETS IS CRUCIAL. THIS WILL TAKE TIME BECAUSE THE ARVN IS TIRED FROM CONTINUOUS FIGHTING, SOME OF THE ARVN LEADERS IN THE FIELD ARE STILL IN A STATE OF SHOCK FROM THE ENEMY'S NEAR SUCCESS, AND SECURITY OF THE CITIES AND TOWNS IS STILL A MAJOR PROBLEM. NONETHELESS WE MAY BE ABLE TO SHORTEN THE TIME FRAME IF THE GVN RESPONDS.

11. AS PLANS TO RECOVER GROUND LOST ARE BEING MADE, KONGER HAS ALSO BEEN ANALYZING 1967 RESULTS IN ORDER TO MAKE IMPROVEMENTS IN 1968. USING THE HES WE HAVE TAKEN A CLOSE LOOK AT THE 1,191 HAMLETS INCLUDED IN THE 1967 RD PROGRAM. DESPITE ANNOUNCED ENEMY INTENTIONS TO SMASH THE RD EFFORT DURING 1967, ONLY 89 OF THESE 1,191 HAMLETS REGRESSED DURING THE YEAR. ALL OTHERS SHOWED IMPROVEMENT OR HELD THEIR OWN. SECURITY FACTORS, USUALLY PRESSURE FROM NEARBY COMPANY-SIZE VC FORCES, ACCOUNTED FOR 80 0/0 OF THE REGRESSION. IN PRIORITY IV CORPS, ONLY FOUR RD HAMLETS WENT BACKWARDS. MOST REGRESSION OCCURRED IN II CORPS (41 HAMLETS) WHERE WE HAD TO THIN OUT OUR FORCES AND LEAVE MORE OF THE JOB OF HANDLING ORGANIZED VC UNITS TO THE VIETNAMESE.

12. INDEED, OUR 1967 SUCCESS IN GETTING PACIFICATION AT LONG LAST OFF THE GROUND MAY HAVE BEEN ONE OF THE FACTORS LEADING THE ENEMY TO SHIFT HIS STRATEGY TO ONE OF ALL OUT EFFORT RATHER THAN PROTRACTED WAR. WHILE OUR SOLID PACIFICATION ACCOMPLISHMENTS WERE MODEST, HANOI DOUBTLESS TOOK FUTURE PROSPECTS INTO ACCOUNT IN REASSESSING ITS STRATEGY.

13. ECONOMIC SITUATION. THE ECONOMIC PICTURE HAS NOT CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY IN THE LAST WEEK. ON THE FAVORABLE SIDE, PRICES IN SAIGON-CHOLON HAVE FALLEN SUBSTANTIALLY. WE NOW ESTIMATE THAT THE COST OF LIVING HERE IS LESS THAN 20 0/0 HIGHER THAN IT WAS IN THE LAST WEEK BEFORE TET, WITH FOOD PRICES ALONE UP ABOUT 25 0/0. DELIVERIES OF FOOD PRODUCTS FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE HAVE BEGUN TO PICK UP AND DISTRIBUTION PROBLEMS IN SAIGON APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN RESOLVED.

14. BUT ON THE UNFAVORABLE SIDE, THE TENDENCY I NOTED LAST WEEK FOR THE COMMERCIAL COMMUNITY TO PULL IN ITS HORNS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED. ALTHOUGH THE GVN IS SERIOUSLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY REVIEWING THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO HELP LOCAL BUSINESS RECOVER FROM THE SEVERE WAR DAMAGE THAT SOME OF THEM SUFFERED, AS YET NO DECISIONS ON RE-CONSTRUCTION LOANS OR COMPENSATION HAVE BEEN MADE.

THERE IS BEGINNING TO BE EVIDENCE THAT THE RICE MERCHANTS ARE DRAGGING THEIR FEET IN PURCHASING THE NEWLY-HARVESTED PADDY SINCE THEY ARE NOT SURE THEY CAN TRANSPORT IT FROM THE DELTA TO SAIGON. BECAUSE OF THE CURFEW, TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS, AND THE GENERAL CONFUSION IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE VC ATTACK MANY BUSINESSES HAVE NOT YET REOPENED AND A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF WORKERS HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO GET BACK TO WORK. SINCE THE TET PERIOD IS A TRADITIONAL TIME FOR TAKING VACATIONS, THIS PROBLEM HAS NOT YET REACHED CRISIS PROPORTIONS.

15. THE GOVERNMENT HAS UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION A NUMBER OF NEW TAX AND STABILIZATION MEASURES. IN GENERAL, THE GVN HAS LABORED EFFECTIVELY AND RESPONSIBLY ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE IN RECENT WEEKS AND SHOWS SIGNS OF BEING WILLING TO FACE UP TO THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OCCASIONED BY THE VC TET OFFENSIVE. NEVERTHELESS, THE PROBLEMS ARE FORMIDABLE AND WE CAN'T YET TELL WHAT THE ENDURING ECONOMIC REPERCUSSIONS WILL BE.

POLITICAL

16. I HAVE MENTIONED THE RALLYING OF MANY NATIONALIST GROUPS IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THIS CRISIS. I HAVE ALSO REPORTED ON THE LARGE NUMBER OF VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE COME FORWARD TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR SUPPORT. ANOTHER OUTSTANDING EXAMPLE WAS THE HOLDING OF THE "PEOPLES CONGRESS TO SAVE THE NATION" ON FEBRUARY 18. ORGANIZED BY TRAN VAN DON, THE CONGRESS WAS ATTENDED BY A WIDE RANGE OF POLITICAL LEADERS. AMONG THE NOTABLES WHO TOOK PART WERE PHAN KHAC SUU, HA THUC KY, TRAN VAN HUONG, TRAN QUOC BUU, TRAN VAN TUYEN, THICH TAM GIAC, AND A NUMBER OF LEADING SENATORS. IN HIS OPENING SPEECH, DON CALLED FOR NATIONAL UNITY AND SAID "NO ONE CAN SAVE US IF WE DO NOT KNOW HOW TO SAVE OURSELVES." THE UNITY IN ADVERSITY THEME PREVAILED IN ALMOST ALL OF THE SPEECHES THAT FOLLOWED, AND THE CONGRESS ENDED BY SETTING UP A STANDING COMMITTEE AND AN ADVISORY BOARD FOR THE FORMATION OF A NATION WIDE FRONT. ACCORDING TO DON, THE FRONT IS NOT TO BE A TOOL OF THE GOVERNMENT, BUT IT WILL COOPERATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND LOOK TO THE GOVERNMENT FOR "A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT." DON INTENDS TO PUSH AHEAD WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FRONT SO AS TO GIVE IT ROOTS IN ALL OF THE PROVINCES AND MAKE IT A REAL POLITICAL FORCE.

17. THIS FRONT INCLUDES MANY ELEMENTS OF THE KIND OF BROAD, ANTI-COMMUNIST POLITICAL GROUPING WHICH WE HOPE THE PRESENT CRISIS WILL GENERATE. AS USUAL THERE ARE SUSPICIONS IN MANY VIETNAMESE MINDS THAT DON'S FRONT IS THE WORK OF VICE PRESIDENT KY AND REFLECTS A CONTINUING EFFORT BY KY TO TAKE OVER POLITICAL POWER. DON HAS TOLD US THAT KY "PUSHED" HIM INTO THE EFFORT, AND HE WORKED WITH A NUMBER OF KY MEN TO ORGANIZE THE CONGRESS. NEVERTHELESS, THE FACT THAT THE CONGRESS INCLUDED A NUMBER OF LEADERS WHO ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO KY, NOTABLY TRAN VAN HUONG AND HA THUC KY, SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT IT IS MUCH MORE THAN A KY VEHICLE AT THIS TIME. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS REPRESENTS AN EFFORT

BY KY TO TAKE OVER POLITICAL POWER OR ANY RIVALRY WITH THIEU, BUT THAT HE HAS WANTED TO GALVANIZE PUBLIC SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT. IN FACT, AS I HAVE REPORTED SEVERAL TIMES RECENTLY, I BELIEVE THIEU AND KY ARE WORKING MORE CLOSELY TOGETHER THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE I HAVE BEEN HERE. THIEU TOLD ME YESTERDAY THAT HE WOULD BE TALKING WITH DON TODAY IN AN EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO GET SOME PRACTICAL RESULTS FROM THE CONGRESS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD WORKED ON BEFORE THE CONGRESS WAS HELD THAT SUCH BROADBRUSH EFFORTS IN THE PAST HAD NEVER BEEN VERY EFFECTIVE. USUALLY WELL MEANING RESOLUTIONS HAD BEEN PASSED AND THAT HAD BEEN THE END OF IT; HE HOPED SOMETHING MORE CONCRETE IN THE WAY OF TANGIBLE RESULTS WOULD COME OUT OF THE PRESENT EFFORT.

18. THIEU, IN THE MEANTIME, IS GOING AHEAD WITH HIS OWN PLAN TO CONSULT WITH SMALL, HOMOGENOUS GROUPS OF RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL LEADERS AT THE PALACE, TO EXPLAIN THE SITUATION FACING THE COUNTRY AND TO ASK FOR THEIR SUGGESTIONS AND SUPPORT. HE HAS BEEN SENDING INDIVIDUAL WRITTEN INVITATIONS TO EACH SUCH LEADER, SPENDING SEVERAL HOURS IN INFORMAL CONVERSATION WITH THEM, AND BELIEVES THAT FOR THE LONG PULL, THIS IS A BETTER WAY OF CREATING A REAL SENSE OF UNITY AND COMMON PURPOSE THAN THE IMMEDIATE CONVENING OF ANY CONGRESS OR COUNCIL OF ADVISORS, ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY THESE HAVE THEIR USES. HE ALSO REMARKED THAT THERE WERE SOME SERIOUS OMISSIONS IN THE LIST DON HAD INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONGRESS, AND HE WILL URGE DON TO INCLUDE THESE IN HIS GROUP. ALL OF THESE EFFORTS ARE USEFUL AND BEAR TESTIMONY TO WIDESPREAD SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT SUCH AS WE HAVE NOT BEFORE WITNESSED.

19. I HAVE ASKED THE MEMBERS OF OUR MISSION COUNCIL TO PROCEED ACTIVELY TO A STOCK-TAKING OF OUR PRESENT POSITION AND AN EVALUATION OF WHAT WE NEED TO DO ABOUT IT: ON THE EXTENT OF THE PHYSICAL DAMAGE; THE EFFECT OF THE ATTACKS ON PACIFICATION; THE EFFECTS ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION, AND LABOR; THE PRESENT SAIGON SITUATION; THE EFFECTS ON INDUSTRY; THE TIME AND RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR RECONSTRUCTION; THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AFTER-EFFECTS OF THE ATTACK; AND THE CURRENT POPULAR RESPONSE TO CALLS FOR UNITY AND MUTUAL COOPERATION. AS NOTED ABOVE, PHYSICAL DAMAGE WAS GREAT. IN ADDITION TO THE DESTRUCTION OF HOUSES, ROADS, BRIDGES, POWER INSTALLATIONS, TELEPHONE NETS, RADIO STATIONS, AND INDUSTRIAL PLANTS HAVE BEEN HARD HIT. AT THE PRESENT TIME, WE DO NOT HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE PICTURE OF THOSE DAMAGES. US AID, IN COOPERATION WITH CORDS, ON FEBRUARY 17 BEGAN A SYSTEMATIC INVENTORY OF THE DAMAGE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WHICH WE EXPECT WILL BE COMPLETED IN ABOUT THREE WEEKS. IT WILL PERMIT AN ORDERLY SERIES OF DECISIONS ON PRIORITIES, CONTRACTS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

20. INFORMATION ON THE ENEMYS COUNTER-PACIFICATION EFFORT IS ALSO INCOMPLETE. AS I HAVE MENTIONED, A SIZEABLE PROPORTION OF GVN SECURITY FORCES WERE PULLED INTO THE URBAN AREAS. WHILE EVIDENTLY FEW RD TEAMS

WERE ATTACKED IN THE INITIAL ASSAULTS, WE CANNOT YET JUDGE TO WHAT DEGREE THE VC HAVE A FREE HAND IN THE COUNTRYSIDE NOW. I DO NOT THINK THEY HAVE BY ANY MEANS ERASED THE PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE IN THE RURAL AREAS IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, BUT WE CAN EXPECT TO FIND THAT THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM HAS BEEN SET BACK. IF PRESIDENT THIEU IS CORRECT IN HIS JUDGMENT THAT THE ENEMY IS NOW CONCENTRATING ON GETTING CONTROL OF THE COUNTRYSIDE, WE MAY FIND THAT THE "SECOND WAVE" IS IN FACT A RACE TO RE-ESTABLISH CONTROL IN THE RURAL AREAS. WITH BOTH ENEMY AND FREE WORLD FORCES HEAVILY DEPLOYED IN THE URBAN AREAS FOR THE PAST FEW WEEKS, SOMETHING OF A VACUUM HAS EXISTED IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. WE MUST DO OUR BEST TO PREVENT THE ENEMY FROM FILLING THAT VACUUM FIRST. THIEU, KY, AND LOC RE ALL WELL AWARE OF THIS REQUIREMENT.

21. IF SECURITY CAN BE RESTORED IN A REASONABLE PERIOD, WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE THAT THE TET ATTACKS WILL CAUSE A GREAT DECLINE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. HIGH PRICES COULD EVEN STIMULATE PRODUCTION. CONVERSELY, CONTINUED DISRUPTION OF ROADS AND CANAL TRANSPORT COULD RESULT IN LESS FUTURE PLANTING AS FARMERS ANTICIPATE A SMALLER POTENTIAL FOR SELLING THEIR CROPS. THE TET OFFENSIVE MAY ALSO SQUEEZE AN ALREADY TIGHT FARM LABOR MARKET. THE GREAT MAJORITY OF ABLE-BODIED YOUNG FARMERS HAVE ALREADY BEEN DRAFTED, EITHER BY THE GOVERNMENT OR THE VIET CONG, LEAVING WOMEN, CHILDREN, AND OLDER MEN TO DO MOST OF THE FARM WORK. THE RECALL OF MEN UNDER 33 WHO HAVE NOT YET COMPLETED FIVE YEARS OF MILITARY SERVICE, AND THE DRAFTING OF 18 AND 19 YEAR OLDS, WILL CUT HEAVILY INTO AGRICULTURAL LABOR, AND MAY RESULT IN A DECLINE IN PRODUCTION.

22. I HAVE NOTED SOME OF THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE SAIGON SITUATION ABOVE. I SHOULD ADD THAT THE PORT OPERATION, WHILE NOT BY ANY MEANS BACK TO NORMAL, IS IMPROVING. ONE DIFFICULTY IS THE CURFEW, WHICH CUTS INTO THE WORKING HOURS OF STEVEDORES AND PORT PERSONNEL. WE ARE TRYING TO GET THIS RELAXED SO THAT DISCHARGE OF VESSELS CAN PROCEED AROUND THE CLOCK. COMMERCIAL IMPORTERS ARE DOING A GOOD JOB IN REMOVING CARGO FROM THE PORT AREA. ON THE LESS ENCOURAGING SIDE IS GENERAL LOAN'S ESTIMATE THAT IT WILL TAKE TWO TO THREE MONTHS TO CLEAR THE VIET CONG OUT OF THE CITY. PRESUMABLY HE IS THINKING OF THE TIME REQUIRED TO PICK UP THE AGENTS SURFACED DURING THE ATTACKS AND USE THEM TO UNCOVER OTHER VC GROUPS.

23. IN REGARD TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION AND POPULAR RESPONSE TODAY, I THINK THESE ARE SUMMARIZED ABOVE AND IN MY PREVIOUS MESSAGE. THE ENEMY WON RESPECT THROUGH FEAR BY HIS ATTACKS, BUT HE DID NOT WIN VOLUNTARY SUPPORT. THE USE OF THE TET HOLIDAY AS A COVER FOR THE ATTACKS WAS MUCH RESENTED. PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, THERE IS A TENDENCY ON THE PART OF VIRTUALLY ALL NATIONALIST VIETNAMESE TO CLOSE RANKS IN THE FACE OF THE COMMON DANGER. WHILE THE FRONT REPRESENTED BY THE "PEOPLES' CONGRESS TO SAVE THE NATION" MAY NOT PROVE VIABLE IN THE LONG RUN, IT DEMONSTRATES THE DEGREE OF UNITY AND WILLINGNESS TO WORK TOGETHER WHICH THE PRESENT CRISIS HAS CREATED.

24. CONVERSELY, I FEAR THAT THE ATTACKS HAVE HAD A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON OPINION ABROAD. THE RECENT ATTACKS SEEM TO BE TAKEN IN MANY QUARTERS AS EVIDENCE THAT THE VIET CONG COMMUNISTS ARE SUPPORTED BY THE PEOPLE--INSTEAD OF THE OPPOSITE, WHICH THE ATTACKS CERTAINLY DID PROVE--AND THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE WELL ON THE WAY TO VICTORY WHEN IN FACT THEY HAVE JUST SUFFERED A MAJOR MILITARY DEFEAT.

25. IN ADDITION TO THE EVIDENCES OF UNITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH I HAVE MENTIONED, I AM ALSO ENCOURAGED BY THE SENATE'S HANDLING OF THE GOVERNMENT'S EMERGENCY MEASURES. WHILE NOTING THAT BOTH THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND PRESS CENSORSHIP SEEM TO CONFLICT WITH THE CONSTITUTION, NO VOICE HAS BEEN RAISED TO CRITICIZE OR OPPOSE THESE ACTIONS. RATHER THE WHOLE THRUST OF THE DISCUSSION HAS BEEN TO FIND PROPER MEANS TO BRING GOVERNMENT MEASURES INTO LINE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS BY PROVIDING FORMAL LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL. IT WOULD BE HARD TO IMAGINE A MORE STRIKING VOTE OF CONFIDENCE AND SHOW OF SOLIDARITY IN ANY COUNTRY. HERE IT IS NOTHING SHORT OF PHENOMENAL.

26. FINALLY, I AM ENCOURAGED BY THE WAY IN WHICH THIEU AND KY ARE WORKING TOGETHER. I HAD A LONG TALK WITH KY ON FEBRUARY 19 IN WHICH WE COVERED THIS FAMILIAR GROUND ONCE MORE. AS I REPORTED THEN, HE REASSURED ME THAT HE UNDERSTOOD HE AND THIEU MUST WORK TOGETHER "NOT AS A TEAM BUT AS A UNIT." YESTERDAY IN TALKING WITH THIEU ABOUT THE CHANGES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE RECOVERY COMMITTEE AND THE RUMORS WHICH HAD ARISEN IN CONNECTION WITH IT, HE SAID THAT THERE WERE NO PROBLEMS BETWEEN HIM AND THE VICE PRESIDENT. HE ADDED, "WE ARE CONFERRING DAILY AND WORKING CLOSELY TOGETHER." THERE ARE, OF COURSE, DIFFERENCES OF TEMPERAMENT BUT THESE CERTAINLY ARE NOT INSURMOUNTABLE. SUCH PROBLEMS AS THERE ARE ARISE CHIEFLY FROM THE AMBITIONS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE ENTOURAGES. I BELIEVE THAT BOTH THIEU AND KY ARE TRYING TO WORK TOGETHER AND TO MAKE AN EFFECTIVE JOINT EFFORT TO CAPITALIZE ON THE PRESENT MOOD OF THE NATION AND I SHALL DO ALL I CAN TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO CONTINUE IN THIS EFFORT.

27. THE PROBLEM NOW IS TO KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM ON ALL FRONTS, AND TO ACCELERATE IT WHERE WE CAN. WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS OF THE HUMAN RESOURCES WITH WHICH WE HAVE TO WORK, I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE SHALL MAKE PROGRESS.

28. IN CONCLUSION, EVEN WITH THE MANY PROBLEMS WE FACE, I BELIEVE THE PRESENT SITUATION GIVES US AN OPPORTUNITY, TOGETHER WITH THE GVN, TO RE-EXAMINE ALL THE THINGS WE CAN DO, IN AND OUT OF COUNTRY, TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR PROGRAMS IN COUNTRY AND TO ADD TO THE PRESSURE ON THE VIET CONG AND HANOI. WE PROPOSE TO GO AHEAD WITH THIS HERE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-260

By uf, NARA Date 11-12-96

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1968 FEB 22 19 54

Pres file

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80484

68 FEB 22 PM 3:11

THURSDAY

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

FEBRUARY 22, 1968

HEREWITH A SUMMARY OF A CIA ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE COMMUNIST MILITARY STRATEGY IN SOUTH VIETNAM. I WILL FORWARD THE FULL TEXT IN THE NEXT POUCH.

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE PAST THREE WEEKS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE COMMUNISTS NOW PLAN TO PUT EXTENSIVE AND SUSTAINED MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE URBAN AREAS OF SOUTH VIETNAM. AT A MAXIMUM, THEY HOPE TO MOVE IN AND CONTROL SOME OF THE MAJOR CITIES; FAILING THIS, THEY HOPE TO BRING ABOUT A DETERIORATION OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY IN URBAN AREAS, AS WELL AS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, THAT EVENTUALLY WOULD BE SEVERE ENOUGH TO FORCE A POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION IN THE WAR ON COMMUNIST TERMS.

DURING THE LAST FEW WEEKS THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN A NUMBER OF INDICATIONS, APART FROM THE ATTACKS ON THE CITIES, THAT ADDITIONAL SHIFTS IN COMMUNIST WAR STRATEGY ARE IN PROCESS. AMONG THESE HAS BEEN EVIDENCE OF PLANS TO USE THE LIMITED NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR ARM IN A LOGISTIC OR ATTACK ROLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. NEW COMMUNIST WEAPONS INCLUDING TANKS AND POSSIBLY BETTER ARTILLERY ROCKETS HAVE APPEARED IN THE DMZ AREA. SIGNS POINTING TO HEAVY NEW TROOP INFILTRATION TO THE SOUTH HAVE BEEN NOTED, WHILE THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES TO THE DMZ AND DOWN THE LAO CORRIDOR HAS CONTINUED AT A STEPPED-UP PACE. ADDITIONAL ENEMY ROAD BUILDING HAS ALSO BEEN UNDER WAY WHICH WILL IMPROVE THE COMMUNISTS' ABILITY TO SUPPORT MILITARY UNITS IN BOTH THE DMZ AND THE COASTAL AREA OF THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

THE DEVELOPMENTS SUGGEST THAT THE ENEMY IS TRYING TO GET IN A POSITION THROUGHOUT THIS AREA WHICH WILL PERMIT HIM TO CONDUCT SUSTAINED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, PROBABLY ALONG MORE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY LINES THAN EVER BEFORE IN THE WAR. RECENTLY THE BULK OF ONE DIVISION OF COMMUNIST TROOPS FROM THE DMZ AREA HAS SLIPPED SOUTH INTO THE COASTAL PLAINS OF QUANG TRI AND, ALONG WITH NVA ELEMENTS ALREADY IN THE SECTOR, WILL PROBABLY ATTEMPT A SUSTAINED CAMPAIGN TO ERODE AND DESTROY FRIENDLY CONTROL OVER THE RURAL POPULATION AND THE CITIES IN THE AREA. IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE GOING TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO HOLD THEIR POSITIONS IN THE CITY OF HUE, INVEST OR CAPTURE QUANG TRI, AND, IF POSSIBLE, GAIN DE FACTO ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER THUA THIEN AND QUANG TRI PROVINCES.

CONTINUED PRESSURE ON THE ALLIED BASTION AT KHE SANH IS LIKELY IN THE COURSE OF THE COMMUNIST EFFORT IN THE NORTH, WITH THE ENEMY SEEKING TO TIE DOWN A SUBSTANTIAL ALLIED REACTION FORCE. WHETHER HANOI WILL MAKE AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO OVERRUN THE BASE REMAINS TO BE SEEN; THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE IN THE SHIFT OF COMMUNIST TROOPS TO THE EASTWARD IN RECENT DAYS THAT THE ENEMY MAY BE REDUCING HIS FORCES IN THE GENERAL VICINITY OF KHE SANH. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE PLANS AT PRESENT ONLY TO MOUNT A LONG-TERM SIEGE OPERATION AGAINST THE BASE.

WE BELIEVE THE MOST LIKELY COURSE OF OVER-ALL ENEMY ACTION IN VIETNAM DURING THE NEAR TERM WILL REVOLVE AROUND A MAJOR EFFORT IN THE NORTH COMBINED WITH SELECTIVE PRESSURE AGAINST THE URBAN AREAS FARTHER SOUTH. THE PRESSURE AGAINST THE CITIES WILL INCLUDE BOTH LIMITED GROUND PROBES AND COORDINATED ATTACKS BY FIRE. WE THINK IT LIKELY THE ENEMY WILL MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT, BOTH FOR POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS, TO HARASS AND DISRUPT THE CITY OF SAIGON.

THE COMMUNISTS WILL ALSO BE HEAVILY ENGAGED IN TRYING TO CONSOLIDATE THE GAINS THEY HAVE MADE THROUGHOUT THE RURAL AREAS OF THE COUNTRY SINCE THE GOVERNMENT'S RETREAT TO DEFEND THE CITIES. IN PARTICULAR, THE COMMUNISTS WILL ATTEMPT TO REVISE MUCH THAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE PACIFICATION/RD PROGRAM, AND WILL UTILIZE RENEWED ACCESS TO THE RURAL POPULATION TO INTENSIFY RECRUITMENT EFFORTS AND THE COLLECTION OF TAXES AND OTHER FORMS OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

DTG: 221850Z FEB 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~

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1968 FEB 22 17 24

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP00479

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THURSDAY
PM 12 22

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FEBRUARY 22, 1968

HEREWITH SEC. RUSK TRANSMITS WIN BROWN'S APPRAISAL OF THE GOVERNORS' ATTITUDES ON VIETNAM AND THEIR CONCERNS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS OVER THE PAST SEVEN MONTHS.

IN VIEW OF THE APPROACHING SEMI-ANNUAL GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE FEBRUARY 29-MARCH 1, AMBASSADOR BROWN PREPARED A REPORT, AT MY REQUEST, COVERING GUBERNATORIAL INTERESTS AND CONCERNS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BASED ON HIS TALKS WITH OVER 30 GOVERNORS SINCE LAST JULY.

I AM TRANSMITTING A SUMMARY OF AMBASSADOR BROWN'S REPORT TO ME.

DEAN RUSK

VIETNAM

WHILE MANY ARE DEEPLY TROUBLED, EVERY GOVERNOR BROADLY SUPPORTED THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY FOR REASONS RANGING FROM CONVICTION AS TO ITS MERITS TO LACK OF A BETTER ALTERNATIVE.

MOST FELT THAT, IN THE NATURE OF THE CASE, AND THE DEMANDS OF THEIR LOCAL RESPONSIBILITIES, THEY COULD NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION ON WHICH TO BASE A REALLY CONSIDERED JUDGMENT. HENCE, LOYALTY TO COUNTRY AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF WAS A MAJOR FACTOR IN THEIR ATTITUDE.

ALL GOVERNORS REPORTED THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE IN THEIR STATE, THOUGH DEEPLY TROUBLED, LIKEWISE SUPPORTED THE PRESIDENT, PRINCIPALLY OUT OF LOYALTY TO COUNTRY AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, RATHER THAN FROM CONVICTION AS TO THE MERITS OF OUR POLICY.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY rg ON 2-29-92

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THE ONE OVER-ALL TREND OF OPINION EMERGING FROM THE SUM TOTAL OF THESE VISITS OVER THE PAST SEVEN MONTHS IS A MOUNTING TENDENCY TO SAY "LET'S GO IN AND WIN OR ELSE GET OUT". AS ONE GOVERNOR RECENTLY PUT IT, "WE CAN'T LET THIS GO ON FOR ANOTHER FOUR OR FIVE YEARS". AN INCREASING HEAD OF STEAM APPEARS TO BE BUILDING UP BEHIND THIS ATTITUDE WHICH IN THE OPINION OF SEVERAL OF THE GOVERNORS MOST RECENTLY VISITED COULD HAVE POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE EFFECTS IF THE WAR CONTINUES FOR A SUBSTANTIALLY LONGER PERIOD ON ITS PRESENT BASIS.

OTHER FOREIGN AFFAIRS INTERESTS

ASIDE FROM VIETNAM AND A SCATTERING OF INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND COMMUNIST CHINA, THE MAIN FOREIGN POLICY INTEREST ENCOUNTERED WAS TRADE.

GOVERNOR CONNALLY WAS INTERESTED IN HAVING AN INTERNATIONAL GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE IN CONNECTION WITH HEMISFAIR IN SAN ANTONIO IN MAY 1968 AND THIS IDEA WAS ENDORSED BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE LAST OCTOBER. WE ARE HELPING ACTIVELY IN THIS.

NEW ENGLAND, KENTUCKY, AND LOUISIANA WERE INTERESTED IN CULTURAL EXCHANGES WITH CANADA AND LATIN AMERICA.

REACTION TO THE LIAISON JOB

ALL GOVERNORS EXPRESSED WHAT WAS CLEARLY SINCERE APPRECIATION FOR THIS NEW FORM OF CLOSER LIAISON WITH THEM. ALL OF THEM FELT THAT THE WHOLE STRUCTURE AND CLIMATE OF FEDERAL/STATE RELATIONSHIPS HAD GREATLY IMPROVED IN THE LAST YEAR.

DTG: 221608Z FEB 1968

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OO WTE 12
DE WTE 748

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80478

~~SECRET~~

HERewith AN INTERESTING DINNER CONVERSATION BETWEEN FREI
AND KORRY.

SANTIAGO 2547

1. IN VERY VALUABLE FOUR-HOUR DINNER ALONE WITH PRESIDENT
FREI AT HIS PRIVATE HOME LAST NIGHT, HE SAID THAT IF IT WERE
WELCOME TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON HE WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH TO
MAKE LONG DELAYED STATE VISIT. HE BELIEVES SENATE WOULD
NOW APPROVE VISIT BECAUSE OF NATIONALISTIC MOTIVES CONNECTED
WITH CHILE'S DISPUTE WITH ARGENTINA AND BECAUSE VISIT TO U.S.
WOULD BE COMBINED WITH ONE TO BRAZIL, TRADITIONAL CHILEAN HOPE
AS COUNTER-WEIGHT AGAINST ARGENTINA. HE SAID IT WOULD BE
INSULTING TO U.S. TO VISIT BRAZIL WITHOUT FIRST GOING TO U.S.
HOWEVER, HE WOULD MAKE NO EFFORT TO REOPEN ISSUE HERE UNLESS
PRESIDENT JOHNSON WISHED IT AND ONLY IF HE WERE CERTAIN OF
EASY APPROVAL BY SENATE. ASSUMING VISIT ACCEPTABLE TO
WHITE HOUSE HE IS KEEN TO KNOW LATEST POSSIBLE DATES FOR
CONVENIENT VISIT DURING ELECTION YEAR. SUBSEQUENTLY IN THIS
MORNING'S PRESS HERE HEADLINE BASED ON WHITE HOUSE PRESS
STATEMENT ON STROESSHER VISIT AND "THREE OR FOUR OTHERS" SAY
FREI VISIT PROBABLE THIS YEAR. (FYI: I WILL NEXT SEE FREI
SUNDAY WHEN I TAKE SENATOR SMATHERS AND PARTY TO PRESIDENTIAL
SUMMER RESIDENCE IN VINA DEL MAR.)

1968 FEB 22 16 40

68 FEB 22 AM 11 55

THURSDAY

Pres file

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-15

By *fw*, NARA, Date *7-20-94*

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2. NEW SUBJECT: FREI ALSO STRESSED VALUE TO HIM IF PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY COULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FAREWELL CALLS BY AMBASSADOR TOMIC TO EMPHASIZE TOTAL U.S. COLDNESS TO ANY POSSIBILITY OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN POPULAR FRONT COMBINATION WITH COMMUNISTS. HE RAISED SUBJECT ALTHOUGH IT WAS A THEME I HAD EMPHASIZED TO HIM IN PREVIOUSLY REPORTED JAN 3 MEETING. HE SAID TOMIC HAD BEE IN BONNET ABOUT BEING GRAND ARCHITECT OF ALLIANCE OF ALL PARTIES EXCEPT RIGHTIST NATIONALS AND HAD CONVINCED HIMSELF THAT U.S. WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE SAME DEGREE OF SUPPORT TO SUCH A GOVERNMENT AS TO PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF CHILE (GOC). TOMIC, FOLLOWING HIS RETURN TO CHILE MARCH 15, COULD POSE "EXTREMELY SERIOUS PROBLEM" TO BOTH PARTY AND COUNTRY IF HE WERE NOT DISABUSED OF IDEA THAT HE COULD WORK OUT DEAL WITH USG, EVENTUALLY ALONG LINES OF U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH TITO. HE DID NOT WANT TO IMPOSE ON PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT BUT HE THOUGHT THAT ABSOLUTE CLARITY ON THIS POINT WAS INDISPENSABLE FOR FUTURE OF CHILE AND ITS RELATIONS WITH U.S. IF TOMIC FELT THAT U.S. AMBASSADOR IN CHILE WAS PUSHING THIS LINE ON HIS OWN WITHOUT FULL SUPPORT OF USG, IT COULD BE FATAL ERROR. FOR THAT REASON HE HOPED THAT IF POINT MADE TO TOMIC, IT WOULD BE DONE IN SUCH A MANNER AS NOT TO INDICATE ANY INITIATIVE FROM MY END NOR OF COURSE FROM HIS. HE SAID TOMIC AS A STRAIGHT DEMO CHRISTIAN PARTY (PDC) CANDIDATE WOULD BE STRONGEST SIMPLE PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRANT IN 1970 AND THAT HIS CHARACTER WAS SUCH THAT IN PURSUIT OF PRESIDENCY HE COULD DECIDE TO MAKE DEAL WITH MODERATE FORCES IN COUNTRY, EASILY SWITCHING STYLE IN CONVINCING MANNER. WHEN I NOTED I MIGHT ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON PRIOR TO TOMIC'S DEPARTURE, HE URGED THAT I NOT APPEAR IN U.S. PRIOR TO ANY FAREWELL CALLS ON PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT. (FYI: MY CURRENT ETA IS EVENING OF SATURDAY MARCH 9.)

3. OTHER SUBJECTS BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY. KORRY

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80482

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1968

AMBASSADOR TUTHILL WILL BE SEEING PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA LATER TODAY. THE SUBJECT OF A REPORTED "INVITATION" FROM YOU TO COSTA MAY COME UP.

AS YOU MAY RECALL FROM AN EARLIER MEMO OF MINE, DEPUTY RAIMUNDO PADILHA, CHAIRMAN OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE BRAZILIAN HOUSE, FOLLOWING A TRIP TO WASHINGTON, TOLD THE BRAZILIAN PRESS THAT THROUGH HIM YOU HAD INVITED COSTA E SILVA TO THE U.S. GEORGE CHRISTIAN'S RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE REMARK ABOUT MORE LATIN AMERICAN VISITORS HAS REVIVED THIS STORY IN THE BRAZILIAN PRESS.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT DOES NOT BELIEVE COSTA E SILVA SHOULD BE INVITED ON AN OFFICIAL VISIT IN THE FACE OF THE GROWING AUTHORITARIAN NATURE OF HIS REGIME. ON THE OTHER HAND SHOULD BRAZIL DECIDE TO PARTICIPATE IN HEMISFAIR, COSTA E SILVA COULD EASILY BE INCLUDED WITH OTHER LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS IN BEING GREETED BY THE PRESIDENT IN TEXAS.

IF COSTA E SILVA RAISES THIS MATTER, I RECOMMEND -- SUBJECT TO WHAT YOU MAY HAVE SAID TO DEPUTY PADILHA -- THAT TUTHILL BE INSTRUCTED TO RESPOND AS FOLLOWS:

-- PRESIDENT JOHNSON WISHES TO MAINTAIN FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE COSTA E SILVA VISIT THE U.S. AT A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT TIME.

-- 1968 VISIT SCHEDULE IS ALREADY SET; PERHAPS A VISIT COULD BE ARRANGED FOR SOMETIME NEXT YEAR.

-- IF COSTA E SILVA COMES FOR HEMISFAIR OPENING, PRESIDENT JOHNSON WOULD BE GLAD TO GREET HIM IN TEXAS WITH OTHER LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTS.

APPROVE. -----

CALL ME -----

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-249
By Cb, NARA Date 11-5-97

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~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80431

Pres file~~TOP SECRET~~

HEREWITH GENERAL JOHNSON'S REPORT ON HIS MORNING CONVERSATION WITH WESTY.

1. GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAD JUST COMPLETED A CALL TO GENERAL ABRAMS AT MACV FORWARD LOCATED AT HUE/PHU BAI. GENERAL ABRAMS STATED TO GENERAL WESTMORELAND THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME HE, GENERAL ABRAMS, WAS PERMITTING HIMSELF TO BE SOMEWHAT ENCOURAGED. HE HAD VISITED THE AMERICAL DIVISION AND THE 2D ARVN DIVISION ON 22 FEBRUARY AS WELL AS THE ELEMENTS OF THE 3D BRIGADE, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION, THAT HAVE ARRIVED AT CHU LAI. THE BRIGADE HAS NOT YET COMPLETED ITS MOVE. BOTH THE AMERICAL AND THE 2D ARVN DIVISION ARE PERFORMING EFFECTIVELY AND ARE STEPPING UP OPERATIONS AWAY FROM THE POPULATED AREAS ONCE AGAIN. GENERAL ABRAMS ALSO REPORTED THAT THE EXPERIENCE LEVEL IN THE 3D BRIGADE, 82D AIRBORNE DIVISION WAS VERY HIGH; THAT THEIR ATTITUDE WAS EXCELLENT; AND THEY WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE RECEPTION GIVEN THEM BY GENERAL KOSTER OF THE AMERICAL DIVISION. IT IS GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S INTENTION TO EASE THE BRIGADE INTO COMBAT OPERATIONS SLOWLY SO THAT TEAMWORK TRAINING WITHIN THE BRIGADE CAN BE REFRESHED FULLY.

2. THE THREE VIETNAMESE MARINE BATTALIONS IN HUE HAVE MADE SLOW PROGRESS BECAUSE OF A LACK OF DIRECT-FIRE HIGH VELOCITY WEAPONS. TEN 106 MM RECOILLESS RIFLES ARRIVED IN HUE/PHU BAI ON 22 FEBRUARY AND WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE VIETNAMESE MARINES ON 23 FEBRUARY TO CORRECT THIS DEFICIENCY. IN ADDITION, BRIGADIER GENERAL OSCAR DAVIS, ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER OF THE FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION, IS LOCATED AT THE FIRST DIVISION COMMAND POST WITH GENERAL TRUONG, THE FIRST ARVN DIVISION COMMANDER. GENERAL DAVIS IS ACTING AS FIRE COORDINATOR FOR GENERAL TRUONG, AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND INDICATED THAT THIS ARRANGEMENT IS WORKING WELL.

FEB 22 PM

THURSDAY

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Authority *GC 10-4-78, 75C 14: 8-19-80*
By *up/ly*, NARA, Date *3-4-92*

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3. THE FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION HAS ENCOUNTERED FOUR ENEMY BATTALIONS NORTH AND EAST OF HUE AND IS IN HEAVY CONTACT WITH THESE UNITS. THE DIVISION COMMANDER REPORTED SOME SUCCESS BUT HAS NOT REPORTED ANY DETAILS. FURTHER, TWO 8 INCH HOWITZERS HAVE ARRIVED NEAR QUANG TRI TO REINFORCE THE FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION AND AN ADDITIONAL TWO ARE EXPECTED TO BE IN POSITION TOMORROW (23 FEBRUARY) AT THE SAME LOCATION. THE FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION CAPTURED 12 PRISONERS. INITIAL REPORTS INDICATE THAT THREE DIFFERENT ENEMY REGIMENTS ARE REPRESENTED BY THE 12 PRISONERS. GENERAL WESTMORELAND DOES NOT KNOW WHAT THIS MEANS, BUT HE EXPECTS TO OBTAIN SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION FROM INTERROGATION THAT WILL BE EXPLOITABLE IN TERMS OF IDENTIFYING SOME INDICATION OF ENEMY INTENTION.

4. GENERAL WESTMORELAND EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT HUE MAY HAVE BEEN THE ENEMY'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE FROM THE OUTSET OF THE TET OFFENSIVE. REPORTS INDICATE AN ENEMY EFFORT TO REINFORCE HUE THROUGH THE A SHAU VALLEY AND HE IS WATCHING THE A SHAU VALLEY VERY CAREFULLY.

5. THERE WAS LITTLE ACTIVITY IN THE II CORPS AREA.

6. THERE WAS CONTACT EARLY 22 FEBRUARY ABOUT 3 KILOMETERS WEST OF SAIGON WITH THE ENEMY REPULSED AND DISPERSED. NORTH OF SAIGON IN SOUTHERN BINH DUONG PROVINCE THE RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY OF THE 5TH ARVN DIVISION ENGAGED AN ENEMY FORCE KILLING 20 ENEMY WHILE LOSING ONLY ONE KILLED. SOUTHEAST OF SAIGON IN THE RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE AN ENEMY FORCE OVERRAN A LOCAL POLICE STATION KILLING 7 AND SEIZING A SMALL NUMBER OF WEAPONS, THE EXACT NUMBER NOT SPECIFIED.

7. ON THE AFTERNOON OF 22 FEBRUARY AT CAT LAI, ANTI-TANK ROCKETS WERE USED BY THE ENEMY TO STRIKE SEVERAL AMMUNITION BARGES. TWO BARGES EXPLODED AND TWO BARGES WERE BEACHED. DEMOLITION EXPERTS ARE IN CONTROL IN THE AREA AND ARE ASSESSING DAMAGE. SMALL ENEMY DETACHMENTS ARE INTERDICTING ROADS AROUND SAIGON USING THE RPG-2 OR B-40 ROCKET AND RPG-7 OR B-41 ROCKET WITH SOME EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST VEHICLES. AS WE WERE TALKING GENERAL WESTMORELAND REPORTED ARVN CONTACT WITH TWO ENEMY BATTALIONS EAST OF TAN SON NHUT WITH THE SPOOKY GUN SHIP WITH MINI-GUNS FIRING ON THIS FORCE. INITIAL REPORTS INDICATE 1 VC MAIN FORCE BATTALION AND 1 VC LOCAL FORCE BATTALION. THE SIZE OF THE ENEMY FORCE IS TENTATIVE AND SPECIFIC UNIT IDENTIFICATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN MADE.

8. GENERAL WESTMORELAND REPORTS THAT SINCE THE TET OFFENSIVE BEGAN ON 29 JANUARY, 39,417 ENEMY HAVE BEEN REPORTED KILLED IN ACTION AND 6,590 INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN DETAINED.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP88477

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FEBRUARY 22, 1968

HEREWITH A RESPONSE FROM DIAZ ORDAZ TO YOUR LETTER ON
THE DEATH OF HIS FATHER.

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT AND TRUE FRIEND:
I AM MOST GRATEFUL THAT, IN THE MIDST OF YOUR MANY PROBLEMS,
YOU SHOULD HAVE WRITTEN SUCH A WARM AND PERSONAL LETTER OF
CONDOLENCE ON THE 5TH OF THIS MONTH.

"AS YOU SAY, MY FATHER REACHED A VERY ADVANCED AGE, WHICH
PERMITTED HIM TO KNOW PRE-REVOLUTIONARY MEXICO, TO WITNESS
THE VIOLENT STRUGGLES WHICH TOOK PLACE IN OUR COUNTRY IN
THE SECOND AND THIRD DECADES OF THIS CENTURY, AND TO APPRECIATE,
IN THE LAST FORTY YEARS OF HIS LIFE, THE STEADY GROWTH OF
OUR COUNTRY IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF PEACE AND PROGRESS, ALTHOUGH
NATURALLY NOT WITHOUT VARIOUS PROBLEMS.

"AT HIS INTERMENT, A GROUP OF FRIENDS SAID THAT HE NEVER HAD
AN ENEMY. THAT IS TRUE.

"UNTIL THE END, HE WORKED UNTIL THE EVE OF HIS
DEATH: IT WAS HIS JOB TO INSPECT THE TREES OF THE FAMOUS
CHAPULTEPEC PARK, PRINCIPALLY AS A SYMBOLIC MEANS OF LINKING
HIMSELF WITH THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH THE PEOPLE HAD CHOSEN
HIS SON TO HEAD, AND BECAUSE OF THE LOVE WHICH HE ALWAYS HAD
FOR NATURE.

"I KNOW THE LOVE WHICH YOU HAD FOR YOUR FATHER - ALTHOUGH
YOU WERE LESS FORTUNATE THAN I, AS YOU LOST HIM WHEN YOU
WERE JUST BEGINNING THE BRILLIANT CAREER WHICH WOULD TAKE
YOU TO THE PRESIDENCY OF THE UNITED STATES. THIS PERMITS
ME TO APPRECIATE THE SINCERITY OF YOUR WORDS. MY MOTHER
HAS ASKED ME TO THANK YOU AND LADY BIRD FOR YOUR KIND
REFERENCE TO HER.

GREETINGS FROM YOUR FRIEND, GUSTAVO DIAZ ORDAZ"

DTG: 221448Z FEB 1968V

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White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DLG, NARA, Date 10/25/96

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