

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a memo	President to Westmoreland S 1 p <i>open 1-22-98 NLJ 96-257</i>	3/6/68	A
#2 memo	Rostow to President, 9:00 p.m. TS 1 p <i>open 8-21-96 p/vrj</i>	3/6/68	A
#2a memo	Nitze to President TS 1 p <i>open 8-14-97 NLJ 96-256</i>	3/6/68	A
#2b rpt	"Tentative List of Actions..." TS 1 p <i>open 8-14-97 NLJ 96-256</i>	undated	A
#6a rpt	"Bombing Pauses" S 1 p <i>open 11-7-97 NLJ 96-250</i>	2/7/65	A
#7a rpt	Duplicate of #6a " "		
#10a rpt	<i>marked in error</i> Intelligence Report <i>sanitized</i> S 4 p <i>open 7-16-99 MJ 96-261</i>	3/6/68	A
#10b cable	Saigon 21315 S 3 p <i>sanitized NLJ 96-251 8.22.98</i>	3/6/68	A
#12 memo	Rostow to President, 1:40 p.m. S 1 p <i>sanitized 11/17/97 NLJ 96-259; same sanc per RAC 8/05</i>	3/6/68	A
#12a rpt	Intelligence Report <i>sanitized 7-16-99</i> S 3 p <i>NLJ 96-261</i>	3/5/68	A
#12b cable	<i>marked in error</i> Intelligence Information Cable <i>sanitized 7-16-99</i> S 6 p <i>NLJ 96-261</i>	3/6/68	A
#13 memo	Rostow to President, 1:35 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 11-21-96 NLJ 96-257</i>	3/6/68	A
#13a memo	For Rostow S 2 p <i>open 8-14-97 NLJ 96-256</i>	3/6/68	A
#13c rpt	"Expenditures to Date..." S 1 p <i>open 8-14-97 NLJ 96-256</i>	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 65, March 1-6, 1968 Box 30

RESTRICTION CODES

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#14a memo	Lodge to SecState TS 6 p <i>open 4/96</i>	3/5/68	A
#16 memo	Rostow to President, 10:15 a.m. <i>open 11-7-97 NLJ 96-250</i> S 3 p [Sanitized NLJ CBS 20]	3/6/68	A
#19 memo	Rostow to President " " C 1 p	3/6/68	A
#19a ltr	President to PM Senanayake " " C 2 p	undated	A
#19b ltr	From Embassy of Ceylon PCI 1 p <i>open 8/10/96 JOW</i>	2/19/68	A
#19c ltr	PM Senanayake to President <i>open 11-7-97 NLJ 96-250</i> PCI 2 p	2/11/68	A
#20 memo	Rostow to President, re: Panama <i>open 11-7-97 NLJ 96-250</i> C 1 p	3/6/68	A
#21 memo	Rostow to President, re: Ecuador " " C 1 p	3/6/68	A
#22 memo	Rostow to President, re: Iran C 1 p <i>open 2-5-93 NLJ 91-343</i> [Duplicate of #227, NSF, Country File, Iran, Vol. 2]	3/6/68	A
#22a memo	Rusk to President, re: Iran C 1 p <i>open 5-27-92 NLJ 91-341</i> [Duplicate of #227a, NSF, Country File, Iran, Vol. 2]	3/3/68	A
#23 memo	Rostow to President C 2 p <i>open 11-7-97 NLJ 96-250</i> [Duplicate of #3, NSF, Subject File, "Ambassadorial-Lunchcons (Goldstein);" Sanitized 1981]	3/6/68	A
#25a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 6 p <i>Open 1/22/98 NLJ 96-257</i>	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 65, March 1-6, 1968 Box 30

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#39a rpt	"Informal Embassy Translation" PCI 1 p <i>open 8-21-96 Q/rg</i>	2/22/68	A
#39b ltr	President Ordaz to President <i>open 11-7-97 NLJ 96-250</i> PCI 1 p	2/23/68	A
#43 memo	Rostow to President, 8:10 p.m. " " S 1 p	3/4/68	A
#43a cable	Rome 4590 <i>Open NLJ 96-251 8.18.98</i> S 3 p	3/4/68	A
#44 memo	Rostow to President, 8:05 p.m. <i>open 11-7-97 NLJ 96-250</i> S 1 p	3/4/68	A
#44a memcon	Rusk and Ambassador Ansary <i>Open NLJ 96-251 8.18.98</i> S 1 p	3/4/68	A
#49 memo	Rostow to President, 1:00 p.m. <i>open 11-7-97 NLJ 96-250</i> S 1 p	3/4/68	A
#50 memo	Rostow to President, noon " " S 1 p [Duplicate of #126, NSF, Country File, India, Vol. 11]	3/4/68	A
#50a memo	Zwick to President, re: India " " S 2 p [Duplicate of #126b, NSF, Country File, India, Vol. 11]	2/27/68	A
#52 memo	Rostow to President, 9:40 a.m. C 1 p <i>open 11/17/97 NLJ 96-259</i> [Duplicate of #95, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "[3/19/70 Memo to the President--"Decision to Halt the Bombing" with copies of documents, 1967, 1968]" [Sanitized NLJ 86-147]	3/4/68	A

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#52a rpt	Intelligence Report C 2 p [Duplicate of #95a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "3/19/70 Memo to the President--"Decision to Halt the Bombing" with copies of documents, 1967, 1968]" [Sanitized NLJ 86-145]	3/3/68	A
#53 memo	Rostow to President, re: Israel	3/4/68	A
#53a msg	C 2 p open NLJ 96-251 8.18.98	3/2/68	A
#54 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p	3/4/68	A
#55 memo	Rostow to President TS 1 p	3/4/68	A
#55a memo	Deputy SecDef to President TS 1 p	3/4/68	A
#55b memo	Morris to Nitze TS 3 p	3/3/68	A
#55c rpt	Attachment to #55b PCI 1 p	undated	A
#55e rpt	"Enclosure" S 2 p	undated	A
#55f memo	Nitze to President S 1 p	3/3/68	A
#55g memo	Wheeler to President S 1 p	3/2/68	A
#55h memo	Johnson to Wheeler S 1 p	3/1/68	A
#55j memo	Nitze to President TS 1 p	3/4/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#55k memo	Wheeler to SecDef TS 6 p <i>open 8-14-97 NLJ 96-256</i>	3/3/68	A
#55l memo	Nitze to President S 1 p <i>open 4/96</i>	3/3/68	A
#55n rpt	"This is the work horse for..." S 8 p <i>open 8-14-97 NLJ 96-256</i>	undated	A
#55o rpt	"Summary of Proposed Increase..." S 1 p <i>open 8-14-97 NLJ 96-256</i>	undated	A
#55p memo	Nitze to President TS 1 p <i>open 4/96</i>	3/4/68	A
#56a ltr	"Vietnam"- <i>Open NLJ 96-251 8.18.98</i> PCI 4 p [Duplicate of #114a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "[3/19/70 Memo to the President--"Decision to Halt the Bombing" with copies of documents, 1967, 1968]"	undated	A
#58 memo	Rostow to President PCI 1 p <i>open 11/17/97 RANLJ 96-259</i>	3/4/68	A
#60 memo	Rostow to President, re: Canada <i>open 91-7-13</i> S 2 p <i>sanitized 6-13-95 NLJ 93-409</i>	3/4/68	A
#61 memo	Rostow to President, re: Israel <i>open 11-7-97 NLJ 96-250</i> C 1 p	3/4/68	A
#63 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 7-27-95 NLJ 94-18</i>	3/4/68	A
#64 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80651) <i>open 11-7-97 NLJ 96-250</i> S 2 p	3/4/68	A
#67 memo	Rostow to President (CAP 80653) S 1 p <i>sanitized 11/17/97 NLJ 96-259; same sani per RAC 8/05</i>	3/4/68	A
#70 memo	Rostow to President (CAP 80640) <i>open 11-7-97 NLJ 96-250</i> C 1 p	3/3/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#71 memo	Rostow to President (CAP 80634) S - 1 p (dup of #76) open 11-7-97 NLJ 96-250	3/2/68	A
#72 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80633) exempt 11-7-97 NLJ 96-250 S - 3 p open 12-23-09	3/2/68	A
#76 cable	Duplicate of #71 open 11-7-97 NLJ 96-250		
#78 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80618) C - 2 p [Duplicate of #13a, NSF, Country File, Latin America, Vol. 6] open 12-3-94 NLJ 94-272	3/1/68	A
#79a memo	Duplicate of #78 "		
#82 memo	Rostow to President, 8:00 a.m. S - 1 p open 8-21-96 CP/19	9/1/68	A
#82a cable	Lahore 3807 open NLJ 96-251 8.18.98 S - 1 p	2/29/68	A
15 memo	Rostow to President TS- 1p. exempt 9/04	3/6/68	A
35 memo	Rostow to President TS- 1p. exempt 9/00	3/5/68	A
416b report	Fact sheet open 10/30/09 S - 1 p	3/3/68	A
49a cable	intelligence cable S- 1p. exempt 5/03	3/4/68	A

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ACTION

✓

~~SECRET~~

From file

Wednesday, March 6, 1968
9:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Westy might find this draft
message cheering.

W. W. Rostow

Okay, send _____

No _____

~~SECRET~~

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By AJ, NARA, Date 3-2-92

~~SECRET~~

March 6, 1968

CAS CHANNELS

From the President for General Westmoreland, Literally Eyes Only

As you know, we are considering most seriously the suggestions Gen. Wheeler brought back from his trip to Vietnam.

In the meanwhile, I wish to tell you how much comfort and inspiration your message to General Wheeler of March 4 brought to me.

I was raised by Mr. Rayburn to believe that West Point produced better professional military officers than the halls of the Congress. Nevertheless, my feeling at this distance is that the enemy has been hurt by the first five weeks of his winter-spring offensive more than our side. Like all great battles, this may be close. But my instinct tells me you are right: every South Vietnamese, U. S. and allied unit -- every cock and bottle washer -- ought to be inspired in the days ahead with an offensive spirit. Within the limits of what you regard as prudent, I believe it is now time for our side to go for broke. In any case, as you enter this crucial counteroffensive, you should know you have my confidence and my prayers.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-257
By us, NARA Date 1-20-98

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 6, 1968
9:00 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Paul Nitze requests your permission to discuss defense supplementals, already committed, with the Chairman of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees -- without prejudice to possible further requests.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Plg, NARA, Date 6/25/96

WWRostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET~~

893

2a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED 6 MAR 1968
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-256
By cb, NARA Date 2-24-97

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: FY 1968 Supplemental

Actions we have taken in the last month, or plan to take in the near future, add approximately \$2.5 billion to the New Obligational Authority required for FY 1968, assuming these actions will continue unchanged for the balance of the fiscal year. They include deploying 10,500 additional troops to Vietnam, calling up 14,600 Reserves, equipping Thai and Korean troops, providing additional ammunition and equipment to ARVN troops, building aircraft shelters in Vietnam and Korea, constructing new TNT facilities, increasing production of M-16 rifles, increasing helicopter production, and procuring additional ammunition.

These actions cannot be financed within available FY 1968 funds, and I therefore suggest that we plan on submitting a supplemental budget request.

The size of this request cannot be determined until decisions are made regarding increased deployment and call-up of additional Reserves, which are not included in the \$2.5 billion mentioned above. Nevertheless, I believe we should discuss the general situation immediately with the Chairmen of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees. Our present procedures require that we notify them of all significant planned changes in the program. We need their acquiescence in stopping this regular reprogramming procedure, in which we shift funds from one program to another, and in instituting "programming in anticipation of a supplemental," a technique which authorizes the Services to proceed with approved new programs without shifting funds out of present programs. We used this technique in 1966. The legal authority for this technique already exists. We have no reason to believe that the Committees will not agree with this proposal.

Congressional Committees are now considering the Defense FY 1968 "zero supplemental," which shifts funds from one appropriation to another, but with no net increase. We hope that the leadership will be willing to consider the new supplemental as a separate action so as not to slow down enactment of the bill now before them.

If you approve, we shall initiate these discussions with the Committee Chairmen.

Paul H. Nitze

Approved: _____

Date: _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

Copy 2 of _____ Copies

Sec Def Cont Nr. X- 1517

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tentative List of Actions
Approved or Approved in Principle

	Estimated Additional FY 1968 New Obligational Authority ^{a/} (\$ Million)
<u>Actions beyond Program 5</u>	
82nd Airborne Brigade and 27th RLT deployment	155
Navy Reserve recall	6
Air Force Reserve recall	31
Air Force Korean Deployments	156
Navy Aircraft and Ships	22
<u>Additional Procurement</u>	
Helicopters	705
Electronic Countermeasure Pods	23
B-52 munitions	230
Ground and Ship Gun ammunition	304
TNT Production Facilities	60
Aircraft Shelters SVN	44
Aircraft overhauls	25
M-16 Rifles	52
Replace TET destruction	68
<u>Materiel for Korea^{b/}</u>	
Equipping ROK Light Division	68
Anti infiltration equipment	3
Ammunition and Equipment Reserve ROK	237
Construction	123
Aircraft Shelters	30
<u>Materiel for Other Allies</u>	
Equipping Thai Light Division	31
ARVN Equipment modernization	49
ARVN Additional ammunition	54
Total	2,476

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-256
By Ct, NARA Date 2-24-97

^{a/} In some cases, these amounts have not been thoroughly analyzed by OSD staff.

^{b/} In addition to \$100 million MAP program.

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

3

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 6, 1968
8:05 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker's cable.

Key passages are marked --
interesting and worth reading.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 21321

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By lg, NARA, Date 3-2-12

Wednesday, March 6, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 21321)

Herewith my forty-second weekly message:

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State ltr 11-7-78

By ij/hg, NARA, Date 3-3-92

A. General

In my last week's message, I attempted to give an interim evaluation of the effects of the Tet offensive pending more detailed reporting from the provinces. I think it is important also to try to make some evaluation of what motivated an obvious change of tactics on Hanoi's part and what the implications are of their failure to achieve their immediate objectives in order to plan for the period ahead. I should also like to mention some of the things to which I think we should be giving top priority.

This change of tactics represented a radical departure from the theory of a prolonged war. It may be that the most likely reason for the change, a view shared by Thieu, was a growing awareness on Hanoi's part that the war was not going well; that with the great increase in American power, the progress toward a representative, nationalist government in South Vietnam and the spreading of pacification through the countryside, the gradual approach did not seem capable of coping with it. Hanoi also undoubtedly calculated that it had assets it could use in South Vietnam in the anticipated wide popular support and defections from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Their widespread propaganda to this effect would indicate that this was an essential part of their plan.

The Communists seemed to have hoped that the result of the initial offensive would leave them in control of a number of cities and perhaps portions of others, including Hue and Saigon; that the countryside would have come into their hands automatically through victory in the cities; that there would be enough popular response to enable them to form coalitions between the National Liberation Front, newly formed front groups like the Alliance of Democratic and Peaceful Forces, and independent "progressive" groups to govern on the local and ultimately perhaps on the national level. Not only was the Government of Vietnam not envisioned as part of the coalition, but on the contrary, the Communists expected that it would have been discredited, its army weakened by the defection of large numbers of troops, the U. S. humiliated by the occupation of its Embassy and attacks on other installations, and disillusioned with the showing of its Vietnamese allies against whom the brunt of the attack was directed.

In such a situation, Hanoi would be in the posture of strength from which they would like to negotiate hoping thus to achieve a ceasefire and provisions for eventual American withdrawal; and perhaps under such conditions, quite willing to accept

a coalition between the National Liberation Front, the newly created non-Communist fronts, and independent "progressive" groups.

It is clear that the Communists have not achieved anything like these expectations, but it is undoubtedly true also, as Thieu has said, that they have had a fallback position. It would appear now that while they have kept up some harassment of the cities, they are in the process of making an assessment of the present situation and there have come hints of a new course of action. In recent propaganda, there is renewed emphasis on the countryside, the "destruction" of the pacification campaign as a major achievement of the offensive. The suggestion arises that they may now try to move to exploit their current gains against our rural programs.

Another current theme is the "collapse" of the Government of Vietnam administration. We may expect that the Government at all levels may be a continuing target in the period ahead through what Thieu referred to as "political spoiling tactics", propaganda, assassinations, and terrorism. A third element in the Communist propaganda is the frustration of the U. S. "search and destroy" programs. They claim that they are tying down our troops in a defensive role, and the importance of Saigon and Hue in current Communist propaganda would indicate that these may be, as Thieu has said, two principal targets of future Communist military action.

As I have previously mentioned, there are options open to Hanoi and their choice of options will probably depend on their assessment of the developing situation in the urban and rural areas of Vietnam and the outcome of new military engagements. But it may be significant that Communist propaganda is now speaking of the long war, of the need for each victory to be the basis for another, and of the stubbornness of the Americans. They are not promising easier, quick solutions. This may well indicate that the strategy outlined by Thieu in his recent conversations with me, which I have previously reported, i. e., pressure in the First Corps and the central highlands to tie down our troops, harassment of the cities, and an attempt to take over the rural areas, may well be the course they will follow. This could involve a prolonged effort through the spring and summer (Thieu sees a critical period as probably May-October) in the hope of attaining their political objective of achieving a strong posture for negotiations.

But while, because of the nature of the war, the enemy may have options, we have opportunities which through prompt and decisive action can be turned to our advantage; action as prompt and decisive as lies within Vietnamese capabilities, channeled by our advice and guidance, and stimulated to the maximum extent possible by our persuasion, prodding, urging, and leverage. The following are things to which we are giving top priority: 1. Vigorous prosecution of the recovery program. Priority to adequate care of the refugees, construction of housing, repair and replacement of facilities such as ports and waterways, lines of communication, industrial plants, and utilities, restoration of security in urban and rural areas. The Government of Vietnam has moved with commendable promptness and vigor. Thieu is chairing central committee meetings twice weekly and has made prompt decisions to eliminate delays and bottlenecks, cut red tape, get funds and supplies quickly into the hands of the refugees, placed a ban on luxury

construction, and started the rebuilding of homes.

2. Resumption of aggressive offensive operations. It is essential that this should be undertaken throughout the country in order to preempt the vacuum left by the withdrawal of our forces to defend the cities and towns and by the Viet Cong forces for the attack. In a number of provinces, the Viet Cong have themselves attempted to fill this vacuum, spreading propaganda, increasing recruitment, collecting food and intimidating the population. It has been necessary first to reinforce and bring our forces up to strength, and they are now going over to the offensive. General Westmoreland and General Vien have worked out plans jointly with the Corps commanders and our own forces commanders for sustained offensive operations and these are now being initiated.

3. Mobilization. I have already ^{reported} Thieu's intention to increase the Vietnamese armed forces to the maximum possible within the capabilities for training and equipment. He believes that manpower is available to mobilize an additional 100,000 men and that it might even be possible to stretch this to 125,000. Drafting of 19-year-olds is scheduled to be completed by April 30, and 18-year-olds by June 30. Thieu has said to me if necessary to achieve the required number, the draft age should be reduced further to 17. Thieu wants to achieve this force increase as rapidly as possible, hopefully within the first six months, since he views the period May-October as critical. The provision of necessary equipment will be essential to making effective use of this increase. At the same time, we shall need to make optimum use of available manpower in order not to cripple essential civilian operations while increasing the armed forces.

4. Reorganization of the armed forces. A beginning has been made in the appointment of Generals Lu Lan and Thang to command the Second and Fourth Corps. Evaluations should be made of the performance of all commanders, those who performed well commended and rewarded, those whose performance was unsatisfactory replaced. It is essential to upgrade the leadership of the Vietnamese forces. It is also essential, I believe, to improve the equipment of these forces. It is difficult to expect the maximum in moral or performance of troops who go into combat knowing they are outgunned by the enemy.

5. Attack on the infrastructure. A considerable portion of the infrastructure has surfaced and the opportunity to attack it is now better than at any previous time. Operation Phoenix, which is directed at the infrastructure, must be expanded and strengthened.

6. Reorganization of the Civil Administration. This should also be pressed. Thieu himself proposes to chair the committee on the reform of the civil service. He proposes to streamline the service, weed out incompetents, substantially reduce the number of employees, adequately compensate the remainder, thereby increasing efficiency and reducing the incentive to corruption. A school for the training of province chiefs was inaugurated March 1, with 30 candidates enrolled; training will be completed April 1. Thieu has told me he will go ahead immediately with the replacement of the five or six poorest of the province chiefs and will

replace others on April 1 from the candidates now being trained. He has in his possession a list of province chiefs whose performance we believe has been unsatisfactory.

7. Stabilization and other economic measures. Added inflationary pressures will develop and the budgetary gap increase as a result of expenditures for recovery and increases in the armed forces as well as through a loss of taxes because of the widespread destruction of property by the Tet offensive. Since it is doubtful that Thieu will get the decree powers he has requested from the assembly, he told me yesterday, he plans to request additional taxes when presenting a supplementary budget to the assembly. These would include direct and indirect taxes, customs duties, and petroleum, oil, and lubricants taxes. In addition, he is establishing a national fund for solidarity and reconstruction, through which he hopes to secure very substantial contribution on a country basis.

8. Mobilization of all available resources, material and spiritual. The government must capitalize on all of the resources available to it. These include not only such things as increasing the armed forces, the optimum and most efficient use of manpower, but also all the voluntary offers of aid and assistance which have come to it or which can be organized and used effectively. The spirit of cooperation and unity which developed in the wake of the Tet offensive must be channeled and harnessed to effective purpose. The fronts being formed by Tran Van Don and Tran Van An, a front being formed in Danang, are examples. These should work together cooperatively and if possible to be tied together in a super-front.

Thieu's continuing consultations with group leaders, enlisting their advice and support and those of the groups they represent is another hopeful development. The relief work of the labor unions is still another example of voluntary cooperation. These and similar efforts need to be stimulated and inspired by vigorous leadership. This I have been trying to impress on Thieu in my almost daily encounters with him.

9. Thieu relationship. Given the difference of temperament of the two men, this will always be a difficult matter and one that will need constant nurturing and watching. I felt that it had considerably improved up to the time of the Tet offensive and through the early days of the attacks. Now it has retrograded again, in considerable measure, I fear, through the ambitions and scheming of people around them, and I shall have to take prompt measures to attempt to restore it.

10. Restoration of confidence. Security is the key to this. People want assurance that the Government is able to provide security, that the armed forces can and will protect them; that there is no competition for power within the government; and that the government will no longer be a sanctuary for privilege and corruption, that incompetence will be weeded out. People want information not only about what the government proposes to do, but what it is doing. They want the government to take them into its confidence. Hopefully, this in time will engender trust in the government, eventually overcome the ingrained cynicism and disillusionment toward the government which is characteristic of the Vietnamese people. In a people as highly individualistic, skeptical, and prone to intrigue as the Vietnamese, this is a large order, but I think people everywhere tend to respond to a call to greatness.

B. Additional Government Actions

Thieu told me on March 5 that he has begun to choose the members of his Council of Advisors, a process which he expects to conclude in a few days. While he did not say whom he is considering, we understand that they will be drawn from the men with whom he has been consulting over the past several weeks. If Thieu succeeds in getting a fairly wide range of respected political and religious figures into his Advisory Council, I believe it will be a significant step toward the broadening of support for the government.

In any event, Thieu intends to push for wider support in a variety of ways. He told me March 2 that even after forming the Advisory Council, he means to continue his informal meetings with the leaders of various groups. While this effort is hard to evaluate, we have had some reports from participants which suggest it is at least a useful way of putting across government politics and blunting opposition. The participants are flattered, if nothing else.

I have encouraged Thieu to develop closer relations and have more personal contact with Assembly leaders. (This seems particularly important in light of the Lower House action rejecting his request for emergency economic powers, which I will discuss more fully below.) Thieu had lunch with ten Assembly leaders March 5, and I believe he has become fully aware of the need to continue to cultivate them.

I have been urging Thieu to make frequent and brief radio and television appearances to inform the people of his government's programs and achievements. As I reported last week, he made a very good, if long, speech February 28, and since then has also met several times with foreign correspondents. He thinks informal meetings with the foreign press are useful -- as I certainly also do -- and he told me that he intends to have selected pressmen to the palace for lunch from time to time.

Thieu is making a special effort to help the people of Hue, having named a personal representative, Father Cao Van Luan, to act for him there, and he has in various ways demonstrated both publicly and privately his concern for the victims in the unhappy city.

Thieu/Ky relations. On the negative side, as I noted above, I am now concerned at what appears to be a deterioration of the personal relations between Thieu and Ky. On March 2 Thieu told me that he had that same morning a long talk with Ky about enemy strategy, troop requirements, and the pacification effort. It was apparent from Thieu's discussion that he and Ky were in substantial agreement on these topics. Thieu further said that he had asked Ky to accompany Minister Tri in an effort to evaluate countrywide the state of the pacification effort, and that Ky would be making recommendations to him after the survey was complete. I was encouraged by these and other remarks from both Thieu and Ky to believe that they were continuing to find ways to cooperate in dealing with national problems.

However, on March 5, I found Thieu in a plainly different mood with regard to Ky. Whereas on March 2 he had laughed about the rejection by the Lower House of his request for special economic powers and said he was not disturbed by the Assembly action, on March 5 he told me he thought the adverse vote was the result of threats by General Loan. He noted the connection between Ky and Loan, said that Loan's actions are tending to create two governments, and observed that although he has tried to be kind and friendly with Ky, Loan's actions make it very difficult.

Prime Minister Loc earlier told Calhoun that the Assembly members responsive to Ky and Loan had received no instructions from them with regard to the request for special economic powers and spoke very critically of Loan and his henchman, Mai Den. We are not clear whether Ky simply failed to use his influence, or Loan actively sought to have the measure rejected. In any event, it is clear that Ky did not do all he might have to assist the President in a rather important matter,

and Thieu is understandably disturbed by the fact.

The same day, an Embassy officer found Ky in a critical mood, complaining that Thieu's failure to take decisive actions was causing unrest and dissatisfaction among elements of the armed forces. In all of this I suspect that, as usual, their entourages are much to blame.

I advised Thieu to have another frank talk with Ky about the matter, and I also made a point of assuring him that as President he has our strong backing. But I said that as President, it is he who must take the initiative. As I mentioned previously, I shall be following up actively on this to get them back on a cooperative footing.

The Fronts. Tran Van Don expects to hold his National Convention for the National Salvation Front on March 10 as scheduled, but it is not clear how successful he will be. Many people are suspicious that the front is a Ky vehicle, and such stones are fed by the continued effort of Tran Van An to form his own front. An is seen as Thieu's man, put forward to undermine the Don front which represents Ky. Judging from what Thieu and Ky have told me there may be no real substance to these stories, but their existence is a political fact and they are so widely believed that people like Tran Van Huong are doubtful about continuing their association with the front. The militant Buddhist representative, Thich Thien Minh, has in fact definitely withdrawn, apparently because of the arrest of Thich Tri Quang. (Minh links the front to Ky, and he blames the arrest on Ky's man, Loan. Hence he pulled out of the Don Front as a gesture against Ky.)

Efforts to bring An and Don together went forward last week. And the two groups met again Monday. Don reported to one of our Embassy officers that An "made too many conditions" to permit a merger, and he said that he does not expect An and his group to take part in the March 10 convention. However, Thieu's brother Kieu told Calhoun yesterday that he expects An may attend in his personal capacity and may be elected by the convention to the steering committee of the front. If this should happen, some of the talk about a Thieu/Ky split being mirrored in the fronts would probably subside, and Don's prospects for building a broader anti-communist coalition would be considerably improved.

I think that Don's Front would be most useful as a device for mass information programs and to rally the people in the relief and reconstruction efforts now going forward throughout the nation. Don has these ideas in mind, but he also is thinking in terms of civil defense. We are inclined to be a little doubtful about the front's role in civil defense, as that kind of organization, particularly if it involves setting up local militia, would need to be rather tightly tied to the government security arms.

C. Relief and Recovery Operations

As I noted above, President Thieu has put special emphasis on the relief program in Hue. He cited three reasons for this emphasis: a) Hue suffered extremely heavy damage; b) Hue is the "second capital" of South Vietnam, and so has great psychological importance to all of the people, and c) the government must erase the impression that Saigon neglects the people who live near the demilitarized zone.

Latest information from Hue is that the refugee population there has declined by 22,000 as improved security permitted many people to return to their homes. (The total for Hue refugees now stands at 94,000, but local officials expect this figure to shrink rapidly as more refugees return to their homes.) Neither rice nor funds are a problem in Hue, with 30.6 million piasters allocated and large rice shipments enroute.

In First Corps generally there is now an 1800 to 0800 with the exception of Hue which still has a 1600 to 0800 curfew. General Lam is considering setting the curfew at 1900 to 0700 throughout the Corps area. We also have reports of the organization of self-defense systems in First Corps, with more than 5,000 already involved. (Of these, more than half are civil servants and about 40% have been armed.) Plans are for 2,000 persons to be recruited in each Province, with emphasis on the cities.

The recovery committee now has two teams traveling in the provinces, explaining government policies, carrying back emergency requests, and getting a first-hand view of the situation. The teams bring back mixed reports. Some provinces, with capable, resourceful leaders are able to convert the policies and assistance furnished by Saigon into meaningful progress. Others are still floundering.

Pleiku, for example, has issued reconstruction materials and allowances to half of 1,000 homeless families, schools have been reopened, refugees in temporary camps have been reduced from more than 20,000 to zero, all roads have been restored to pre-Tet security conditions, many members of the Viet Cong infrastructure have been rounded up, and the 1968 pacification plan is being carried out. By contrast, a sorry lot of Kien Hoa Province officials, including the province chief, are holed up in battered Ben Tre, guarding the city with the bulk of the provincial forces against an enemy whose strength and location are virtually unknown. Kien Hoa's 22,000 evacuees still living in squalid camps, rubble has not yet been cleared from the city streets, no reconstruction materials or allowances have been paid to any homeless family, and the police are totally inactive in attacking the Viet Cong infrastructure.

Most provinces fall somewhere between Pleiku and Kien Hoa, with good examples beginning to outnumber the bad.

As noted above, President Thieu has organized a recovery fund drive starting March 10 and lasting one month. Army and civil servants are being asked to contribute one day's pay. The unofficial drive now under way has already netted more than 70 million piasters in Saigon/Gia Dinh. Most provinces are finding that local businessmen and civic organizations are eager to contribute to local campaigns. This spirit of helpfulness and charity in time of emergency is an encouraging sign.

Among this week's accomplishments, the following are noteworthy:

1. Distribution of reconstruction commodities began Monday in Saigon (each homeless family receiving 10,000 piasters, 10 bags of cement, and 10 double sheets of roofing).
2. Curfew was regularized in Saigon from 1900 to 0700, allowing people to put in a full day's work and commercial activity to revive substantially.
3. The schedule for opening schools (March 11 for the university; April 1 for all others) was announced.
4. Funds were allocated to the provinces for recovery and reached VN\$603 million, with more available to support plans when they are submitted and approved.

Some outstanding problems include:

1. 600,000 post-Tet evacuees are still on the government's hands. (I estimate the number had peaked out.) There are indications that a goodly number of these are not bona fide refugees, i. e., they have homes which they can return to, but find the dole attractive.

2. In some cases, cash is not getting to the provinces even though funds have been allocated (we will furnish Air America planes to carry piasters to provinces instead of relying on largely inoperative mail to deliver checks.

3. Gasoline is in short supply in many outlying provinces.

4. Road/waterways are still not back to pre-Tet levels. As a result, commercial traffic is not flowing freely.

5. Rice is stacking up in the Delta and in Saigon. With regard to the pacification program, I reported last week on our preliminary assessment of the status of that effort after the Tet attacks. Our great interest in getting back into the countryside as rapidly as possible is shared fully by President Thieu. He has stressed to me more than once his feeling for the importance of regaining the initiative and moving out from defense of the cities into the rural areas. As I have mentioned, both General Westmoreland and General Vien are visiting field commanders to explain their concept of a stepped-up offensive campaign which has in fact been kicked off in some areas.

No one, not even the enemy, knows precisely the conditions in the countryside. As Bob Komer has explained, it's a matter of aggregating what is happening; in 12,600 hamlets, what 4,000 Popular Force platoons and 900 Regional Force companies are doing, activities of 555 Revolutionary Development cadre teams plus 108 Truong Son Dams, status of police forces in 44 provinces and districts, as well as discovering just what the enemy is up to. A cadre team census shows 321 of 555 Revolutionary Development teams now in their assigned hamlets (though many are engaged wholly in defense as opposed to their normal activities). Part of the offensive campaign will be to reinsert Revolutionary Development teams, restore lost Regional and Popular Force outposts (which now total more than 200), reopen (repair if needed) secondary roads, and re-establish the Government of Vietnam sway over the rural population. Where forces and cadre teams have already returned, they are not finding that the Viet Cong's short duration attempts at their particular brand of pacification have been any more successful on the skeptical peasants than the Government's program would have been over the same time span.

D. Political

The Assembly is still in a generally cooperative mood in spite of the Lower House rejection of the President's request for emergency economic powers. The debate that led to that rejection was restrained and very responsible for the most part, with

emphasis on the constitutional problem. A number of deputies and Senators have made it clear that they intend to act fast on any legislation which the President submits.

The Lower House expects to complete work on the budget in seven or eight days. This will probably result in final approval of the budget being voted by the Senate about the end of the month. We anticipate no significant alterations in the budget by the Assembly, particularly as there is sure to be a supplementary budget request as a result of the Tet attacks.

The Lower House is only now completing its organization into blocs. The democratic bloc, with 42 members, was formed February 27. Generally pro-government, the bloc is in many respects the lineal descendent of the democratic alliance in the constituent Assembly. Some of the membership is the same, and like the alliance, the new bloc includes a majority of the ethnic minority representatives. Also like the democratic alliance, the democratic bloc is understood to be responsive to the direction of Vice President Ky.

A Catholic-revolutionary Daviet alliance took shape in Kein, the independent bloc which was officially formed March 5. It has 21 members. Two other blocs are reportedly in the process of formation, the 20-member new society bloc and the unity bloc, with 19 members; membership of the latter two has not yet been announced.

E. Economic

Monetary data just released by the National Bank, the first available covering the period of the Tet offensive, show a VN \$9.2 million (11 percent) rise in the money supply during the period January 13-February 17. The increase amounted to VN \$6.9 billion during the week of January 13-20, and could be attributed almost entirely to payment of the Tet bonus and prepayment -- one week ahead of normal schedule -- of January salaries. Money supply increase during January 31-February 17, i. e., since the onset of the attacks, was VN \$2.4 billion, or barely more than the normal increase for the period.

Both the overall U. S. AID price index and its food portion rose 1 percent during the week of March 4. Rice prices were lower, most protein food prices unchanged, and vegetable prices were sharply higher. Cause of the latter appears to be the movement last week, for security reasons, of truck distribution points, and hence the effective wholesale market, to points outside of Saigon. The U. S. AID index now stands 11 percent above January 22 (last pre-Tet calculation) with the food portion of the index up 17.5 percent.

It is expected that a new P. L. 480 agreement, for the provision of 100,000 tons of rice to Vietnam, will be signed at the beginning of next week. The Government of Vietnam has agreed to increase the selling price of imported rice, and has also agreed to purchase additional rice from the United States, using its own foreign exchange.

The domestic rice situation is gloomy. The March-April crop in the First Corps will be severely reduced, not simply by military activity; but also because that area has suffered from a drought. While the Fourth Corps crop was relatively good, little rice has been transported to Saigon since mid-January due to Viet Cong interdiction of roads and waterways; these transportation difficulties, plus the reluctance of merchants and bankers to risk further purchases of Delta rice, have led to a sharp decline in paddy prices in the Delta. In this situation, as in so many others, the re-establishment of security and the return of confidence is essential.

We shall be pushing for these and other priorities I have mentioned as hard as we know how in the days ahead.

March 6, 1968

4 Suso
(for 6:30
P's Senatorial
brfg)

The Enemy Offensive

1. We knew from about September 1967 that the enemy planned a massive winter/spring offensive. That is why the President accelerated the delivery to Vietnam of 102 of the 106 Maneuver Battalions promised by Westmoreland by June 68, by Christmas 1967.

That is why I warned the Australian Cabinet and other of our fighting allies at Canberra that we must expect "kamikaze tactics" this winter.

2. We now know from many sources that the enemy judged that he was losing the war as it was being conducted in 1967. For example, here is the summary of an interrogation of a North Vietnamese Captain captured on Feb. 5 in Danang: "The source stated that the strategy of occupying and defending the rural areas of South Vietnam, as proposed by General Thanh, was not successful and was believed by General Giap to be in error. Giap therefore decided that before peace talks could be held it would be necessary to achieve a military advantage over the Allies."

3. As Tet approached, Gen. Westmoreland sensed that a big blow was coming at Tet. He agreed, in the first place, only to a 36-hour Tet, as opposed to the seven days the VC had announced. On Feb. 24, he asked for our permission to cancel Tet completely and to continue bombing in the southern part of North Vietnam during Tet. He also brought his divisions close to Saigon sensing an attack there. The tactical surprise of the enemy in striking the cities was due to two factors: the fact that Tet had never been violated in all the many years of war in Vietnam by either side; he kept secrecy by giving his operational instructions only a few days before the attack -- thereby losing considerable efficiency in the attack itself.

4. It is now estimated that the attack was undertaken by about 65,000 VC and North Vietnamese forces, plus about 17,000 guerrillas, supply troops, etc. Thus, about 84,000 of the enemy's total forces of all kinds -- totaling about 240,000 -- went into the battle. In the period between November and Tet, the enemy brought two additional North Vietnamese divisions into ~~North~~ Vietnam.

South

5. Here is Ellsworth Bunker's summary which came to me on Feb. 29 looking back over the first month:

3/6 Paper for Sen. brfg

(1) It is evident that the enemy made a heavy commitment of his forces to the Tet offensive, some 62,000 plus guerrilla and other elements in supporting roles; that more than half of the forces committed have been destroyed and more than 10,000 weapons captured, a figure which tends to substantiate the reported personnel losses. These heavy losses would appear to have a number of consequences: many enemy units are expected to be ineffective for a considerable period; a heavy replacement flow will be required from North Vietnam which is likely to result in a significant increase in the proportion of North Vietnamese Army troops in South Vietnam; and there is a possibility that he may be forced to reassess his strategy, for example, the all-out offensive versus the "conservation of forces" policy, the attack on urban areas versus his "frontier" strategy, or the desirability of going into a primarily guerrilla war posture.

(2) This reassessment of strategy by the enemy may be influenced by the psychological effect on him of the heavy losses and defeats he has suffered. He mounted an intense propaganda effort prior to the attacks, thoroughly indoctrinated his troops with the idea that the winter-spring campaign would be the decisive and concluding period of the war, that a coalition government would be formed, and their hardships would cease. Now enemy propaganda is talking about a long war, and there are no further references to "victory this spring". It would seem logical that this pre-Tet psychological buildup would be followed by a letdown as the enemy troops come to realize that they have not won the final victory, but on the contrary have taken very heavy losses only to be thrown out of all the cities they attempted to seize. Probably the letdown will be most rapid and severe among Viet Cong provincial and regional forces, guerrillas, and infrastructure. If this should take place, it may well result in an upturn in Chieu Hoi rates.

(3) It is clear also that the enemy made a major miscalculation in believing that the people would rise to support his forces. A recently captured document makes this even clearer than before. A Central Office for South Vietnam order dated February 1, a critique of the first phase of the Tet offensive, points to the lack of popular uprising and Army of the Republic of Vietnam defections as key failures. But, as I have noted before, failure of the masses to actively support the enemy does not necessarily mean there is solid popular support for this government; and among many elements of the population, there is widespread apprehension and fear of further attacks by the enemy. Nevertheless, opinion has hardened against the enemy, and Vietnamese Government efforts to assist the victims of the fighting have probably improved the government's image in certain quarters. In some areas, popular indignation against the enemy is running very high. The post-attack feeling of national unity and willingness to cooperate with the authorities remains strong, granted there is still a considerable distance to go to create a solid, enduring climate of opinion which can be described as strong, positive support for the government as against the present essentially anti-Viet Cong feeling! Nevertheless, these are positive elements in the present military picture.

6. It is also clear the enemy had a fallback plan if the attack on the cities failed, because he was talking not about a Tet offensive, but a winter/spring offensive which will run probably through April.

7. Here is what one captive said:

"If Phase I failed, Viet Cong troops during Phase 2 would besiege the cities and, at the same time, lure U. S. troops into the Khe Sanh area. Phase 3, which was expected to coincide with the establishment of a coalition government, would involve a decisive battle in the Kontum-Pleiku or Saigon area. In support of this new strategy, the North Vietnamese/Viet Cong planned to increase activities in southern Laos to permit the infiltration into South Vietnam of most Regular North Vietnamese Army units. The latter would try to avoid pitched battles with U. S. troops and, instead, to confine them in their bases."

8. The situation has, in fact, evolved much in the way that the prisoner of February 5 stated:

- There has been mortaring but no new major attack on the cities;
- The enemy is picking up recruits in the open parts of the countryside but not using his resources to consolidate the countryside;
- The enemy is trying to pin our forces in the cities of the Delta and Saigon; he poses a threat to Kontum-Pleiku in the Western Highlands; he has 20,000 men under very heavy bombardment outside Khe Sanh; and right now he is assembling major forces for a second attack on Hue. *He is using mainly North Vietnamese forces to do this, not committed to the attack on the cities.*

Meanwhile, the ARVN has been replenishing its troops; the revolutionary development cadres are moving back to the villages; General Westmoreland indicates that he plans to move out on the offensive, in a report I wish to read to you.

WWZ014
OO WTE 16
DE WTE 961

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP30644

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOLLOWING IS GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S REPORT ON OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM:

ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN NO HIGHLY PUBLICIZED MAJOR OPERATIONS LAUNCHED AGAINST THE NVA, THERE HAS BEEN A GENERAL RESUMPTION OF AGGRESSIVE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

YESTERDAY, GEN VIEN AND I VISITED GEN THANG, THE NEW IV CORPS COMMANDER, AT CAN THO. GENS ECKHARDT, WEYAND AND EWELL WERE PRESENT. THIS WAS THE INITIAL MEETING ON OUR FORTH-COMING OFFENSIVE. MY PHILOSOPHY WAS EXPRESSED AS FOLLOWS:

DURING THE PAST THIRTY DAYS THE ENEMY TRIED TO EFFECT A COUP. HIS PLANS WERE BASED ON THE TWIN ASSUMPTIONS THAT THE PEOPLE WOULD RISE UP AND JOIN HIS FORCES AND THAT THE FIGHTING SPIRIT OF THE RVNAF WAS LOW. THE RECORD OF THE PAST THIRTY DAYS HAS PROVED THAT THE PEOPLE ARE SOUND, THEY WILL FIGHT FOR THEIR FREEDOM. THE ARMED FORCES HAVE PROVED THAT THEY DO HAVE FIGHTING SPIRIT. THERE WERE NO TRAITORS; NEARLY ALL UNITS FOUGHT WELL. THE ENEMY WAS MISLED BY HIS OWN PROPAGANDA.

THE QUESTION IS OFTEN HEARD, "WHEN ARE THE VC GOING TO ATTACK AGAIN?" THIS TYPE OF THINKING IS UNACCEPTABLE. THE VC ARE TIRED, THEY HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY CASUALTIES, THEY ARE STAYING IN THEIR POSITIONS ATTEMPTING TO POSE AS A THREAT, BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, HOPING THAT WE WILL REMAIN DEFENSIVELY ORIENTED AROUND THE CITIES AND NOT ATTACK THEM.

WE MUST STOP THINKING ABOUT THE NEXT VC ATTACK AND START THINKING, ALL OF US, OF CONTINUING TO CARRY THE ATTACK TO THE ENEMY. WE ARE FULLY CAPABLE OF DOING IT. IT IS TRUE THAT OUR FORCES HAVE BEEN OPERATING AT A FAST PACE FOR THIRTY DAYS AND WE HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY CASUALTIES. SOME MAY BE TIRED. HOWEVER, THE MAIN THING NOW IS OUR STATE OF MIND. IT WILL BE THE SIDE THAT PERSEVERES AND CARRYS THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY THAT WINS. AND WE ARE GOING TO DO IT.

THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WE ARE MOVING TO A GENERAL OFFENSIVE.

IN IV CORPS GEN THANG HAS JUST TAKEN COMMAND AND HE IS WORKING ON PLANS TO LAUNCH A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE, COMMENCING ON 6 OR 7 MARCH. IT WILL INVOLVE A MAJOR PORTION OF THE 7TH ARVN DIVISION AND ABOUT TWO THIRDS OF THE 9TH U.S. DIVISION UNDER GEN EWELL. GEN WEYAND WILL PROVIDE HELO SUPPORT, AN AIR CAVALRY TROOP AND ADDITIONAL ARTILLERY. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE OPERATION WILL BE TO DEFEAT

112021
0:10 P.M. 4a
SUNDAY
MARCH 3, 1968

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Sec Dec 9-21-78
By sp/ly, NARA, Date 3-3-92

THE FOUR MAIN FORCE BATTALIONS IN DINH TUONG, RESTORE THE SECURITY AROUND MY THO, SECURE AND REPAVE HIGHWAY 4, REESTABLISH - AND RELOCATE AS NECESSARY - THE REGIONAL FORCES/ POPULAR FORCES OUTPOSTS, AND FURTHER THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. THIS OPERATION WILL BE THE FIRST EVENT OF A MAJOR CORPS WIDE OFFENSIVE WHICH GEN THANG WILL INITIATE. IT WILL HAVE ONE NAME (VIETNAMESE) AND WILL BE PROPERLY PUBLICIZED SO AS TO MAKE THE BROADEST POSSIBLE IMPACT.

IN III CORPS, A SIMILAR PLAN IS BEING WORKED OUT BY GENS WEYAND AND KHANG. IT WILL EMBRACE THE FIVE PROVINCES AROUND SAIGON - AND WILL BE A ONE NAMED JOINT U.S./VN OPERATION. IT WILL ALSO BE ONE OF THE LARGEST EVER CONDUCTED IN III CORPS AND WILL CONTINUE UNTIL THE ENEMY IS DEFEATED OR DRIVEN OUT OF THE AREA. IT WILL COMMENCE NEARLY SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE IV CORPS OFFENSIVE AND WILL BE PROPERLY REPORTED SO AS TO HAVE MAXIMUM IMPACT.

AT THE SAME TIME, IN NORTHERN I CORPS, WE WILL MOVE INTO HIGH GEAR IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. WITH OVER 20 PERCENT OF ALL U.S./ ARVN MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN THIS AREA, AND WITH THE LOGISTIC SITUATION IMPROVING DAILY, WE ARE IN AN EXCELLENT POSTURE AS TO COMMENCE A BROAD OFFENSIVE.

THE OPERATIONS IN I & III CORPS WILL BE SUPPORTED BY THE MAXIMUM USE OF TACTICAL AIR AND B-52 STRIKES. FOR THE TIME BEING, I MUST KEEP PRIORITY OF AIR AT KHE SANH BUT I AM PREPARED TO MAKE MASSIVE SHIFTS, PARTICULARLY OF B-52S, TO ASHAU VALLEY OR TO III CORPS, WHEN THE WEATHER PERMITS TACTICAL AIR TO PROVIDE VISUAL ATTACK SUPPORT FOR KHE SANH.

IN II CORPS, WE ARE NOT PLANNING ON ONE MAJOR OFFENSIVE. HOWEVER, THE ROKS ARE ON THE MOVE ALONG THE COAST IN A MULTI-BATTALION OPERATION. GEN PEERS IS PREPARED TO WAGE A MAJOR BATTLE AGAINST THE ENEMY FORCES IN KONTUM OR DARLAC PROVINCES. HIS SPIRIT IS AGGRESSIVE AND HE HAS THE EXACT FRAME OF MIND REQUIRED TO CONDUCT THE ECONOMY OF FORCE OPERATIONS WHICH HIS SITUATION REQUIRES. PEERS HAS A NEW COUNTER PART, MAJ GEN LU LAN, WHO AT THE OUTSET HAS DISPLAYED AN AGGRESSIVE SPIRIT.

ON MONDAY GEN VIEN AND I ARE MEETING WITH GENS WEYAND AND KHANG AND THEIR DIVISION COMMANDERS TO DISCUSS THEIR PLANS FOR THE IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS OFFENSIVE STRATEGY.

TOMORROW AFTERNOON VIEN HAS INVITED AT MY SUGGESTION THE FREE WORLD COMMANDERS TO HIS HEADQUARTERS TO GIVE THEM THE BENEFIT OF HIS OFFENSIVE ATTITUDE. SINCE IT IS NOT WITHIN VIEN'S CHARACTER TO USE FORCEFUL LANGUAGE I WILL PROVIDE THE NECESSARY EMPHASIS IN A FOLLOW-UP.

TODAY I WILL VISIT GENS ABRAMS, CUSHMAN AND ROSSON TO REVIEW THEIR PLANS.

I HOPE THAT THE IMPACT OF THESE SIMULTANEOUS MAJOR OPERATIONS WILL CONVINCe THE PEOPLE IN SVN AND WASHINGTON THAT WE ARE NOT WAITING FOR EITHER THE VC TO RESUME THE INITIATIVE, OR FOR SOMEONE TO HELP US. THE TIME IS RIPE TO MOVE OUT AND WE WILL DO SO.

WE WILL EMPHASIZE THE OFFENSIVE NATURE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS IN FUTURE REPORTS, WITHOUT DISTORTING THE PERSPECTIVE.

900

9. In short, we are in the midst of one of the major battles of modern times. It probably has at least two months to run. After the big wave of attack on the cities had failed, the enemy has continued to lose, as these charts show (attached), 3 to 4 times as many weapons each day and 3 to 4 times the number killed in action as compared with the average level for 1967. Our losses and the Vietnamese have not risen proportionally. As opposed to the average of about 4 to 1 for 1967, enemy losses are running thus far about 10 to 1 throughout the period of the winter-spring offensive.

We have done and shall do all we can to help our men through this critical battle. But, as you can see, they are in good heart.

The enemy has said that he intends to make 1968 the year of decision. We must meet him on those terms.

INFORMATION

6 Pres file

Wednesday, March 6, 1968
5:30 p. m.

(Thru Watson
for mtg w/
Senators)

Mr. President:

I gather you want this list of complete and partial
bombing pauses urgently.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

6c 277

Bombing Pauses: Complete and Limited - Since Feb. 7, 1965

A. Complete Pauses

- (1) May 12-18, 1965 (five days, 20 hours)
- (2) December 24, 1965-January 31, 1966 (36 days, 15 hours)
- (3) December 24-26, 1966 (two days)
- (4) December 31, 1966-January 2, 1967 (two days)
- (5) February 8-12, 1967 (five days, 18 hours)
- (6) May 23-24, 1967 (24 hours)
- (7) December 24-25, 1967 (24 hours)
- (8) December 31, 1967-January 2, 1968 (36 hours)

B. Pauses limited to Hanoi or Hanoi/Haiphong Areas

- (1) December 23, 1966-March 1, 1967 within 10 NM of center of Hanoi (314 sq NM)
- (2) May 22, 1967-June 9, 1967 within 10 NM of center of Hanoi (314 sq NM)
- (3) June 11, 1967-August 9, 1967 within 10 NM of center of Hanoi (314 sq NM)
- (4) August 24, 1967-October 23, 1967 within 10 NM of center of Hanoi (314 sq NM)
- (5) From January 3, 1968 (Hanoi) and from January 16, 1968 (Haiphong) within 5 NM of the center of the cities (156 sq NM)

C. Total Duration of Complete and Limited Pauses

- 1965 - 12 days (complete)
- 1966 - 39 days (34 complete; 5 partial)
- 1967 - 6½ months or 198 days (9 complete; 189 partial)
- 1968 - 35 days (1 complete; 34 partial)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

SECTION A - UNCLASSIFIED
SECTIONS B AND C - ~~SECRET~~

NLJ 96-250
By Cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

7

Wednesday, March 6, 1968
5:30 p. m.

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W. W. Rostow

Attachment

29

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- (2) May 22, 1967-June 9, 1967 within 10 NM of center of Hanoi (314 sq NM)
- (3) June 11, 1967-August 9, 1967 within 10 NM of center of Hanoi (314 sq NM)
- (4) August 24, 1967-October 23, 1967 within 10 NM of center of Hanoi (314 sq NM)
- (5) From January 3, 1968 (Hanoi) and from January 16, 1968 (Haiphong) within 5 NM of the center of the cities (156 sq NM)

C. Total Duration of Complete and Limited Pauses

- 1965 - 12 days (complete)
- 1966 - 39 days (34 complete; 5 partial)
- 1967 - 6½ months or 198 days (9 complete; 189 partial)
- 1968 - 35 days (1 complete; 34 partial)

SECTION A - UNCLASSIFIED
SECTIONS B AND C - ~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-250
By cf, NARA Date 11-3-97

INFORMATION

Wednesday, March 6, 1968 -- 5:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NewsMedia Contacts.

Pres file

Cabot Lodge called me yesterday and Bill Hearst called me today about a proposed editorial Hearst plans to write. He would say what we are doing in Vietnam is for Asia. The South Vietnamese are trying hard to defend their country; but the rest of Asia (excepting Laos and Thailand) are not helping. Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan ought to do more. He says the editorial would be in terms of: "American citizens are saying. . . ." It would have no bug-out implications although it might carry the threat that if they didn't show a willingness to help within two years, we might give up on them. I told him we were interested in getting more help out of Asia; but he would have to decide himself what line to take.

On Tuesday, March 5, I saw John Scall, ABC News, and Boyd France, BUSINESS WEEK; on Wednesday, March 6 I saw Hugh Sidey and Jack Sutherland. With all four I took the following line: under no circumstances would I say ~~no~~ word about troops, etc. They all accepted this without probing too hard. I then explained we were in the middle of the winter-spring offensive. I showed them the statistics on the intensity of the battle which continues to run 3-4 times 1967 in terms of enemy casualties and weapons. The enemy casualty ratio has more than doubled from about 4-1 to 10-1. We could not now predict the outcome of the battle which probably could go on two more months. I then listed the factors on which the outcome would depend:

- vigor of the GVN and ARVN and especially what Tang can accomplish in IV Corps;
- how the battle against the three enemy divisions outside Saigon proceeds;
- how the battle at Hue and Khe Sanh proceeds.

Sidey told me that his editors are planning a big review of U. S. strategy in Vietnam. I said that my advice was this: There is plenty of time to re-assess strategy when we know how the battle comes out. Right now the best thing LIFE magazine could do for the country and for our forces and the Vietnamese was to explain that we are in the middle of a battle and to wish Westmoreland, Bunker and Thieu well.

Russ Wiggins called me today (Wednesday, March 6) to suggest that we offer to make Hanoi, Haiphong, Hue and Saigon open cities. They would not attack or mortar; we would not bomb. I told him we would think about it. I then went on to tell him what I had told the others: that it is wholly proper to think about strategy, as his editorial did, but until we know how the enemy and we made out in their winter-spring offensive, we ought to be cheering our men on. He said he would find an occasion to do this.

Joe Alsop also telephoned today to invite us to dinner. He indicated he would like very much to see you before he goes to Vietnam next week. His substantive inquiry was about the gold situation. I told him that there was an underlying problem of inadequate supplies of gold, but there was no panic or crisis as of today.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Wednesday, March 6, 1968
5:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You see Bob Komer at 7:00 p. m. tomorrow, Thursday.

By way of background, I have found him in good health and spirits, determined to throw himself into the battle to regain the countryside. He recognizes the damage that has been done by the Tet offensive but, without being naive, he is in good heart.

You may wish to:

-- ask him what his present estimate is of the damage to pacification done by the enemy's offensive (the latest figures are a little more cheerful than the initial estimates);

-- ask him what we can reasonably ask the South Vietnamese to do to improve their political and military performance (he gave me a good list privately which, along with other judgments, I used to good effect in the Clifford committee);

-- ask him if Ellsworth Bunker can, as Ambassador, bring the leverage to bear on Thieu and Ky which is needed, or whether Clark Clifford or some other Presidential emissary is needed to shock them into coming together;

-- ask him what he believes the enemy will do if his winter/spring offensive fails to produce any significant favorable result: continue attritional warfare; negotiate; fade away.

You may wish to thank him for being a good soldier -- which he is -- and tell him that you are counting on him to see it through.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

Preske

Wednesday, March 6, 1968
4:40 p. m.

10

SECRET

Mr. President:

I was misinformed.

Here is the report Dick Helms referred to at the NSC meeting -- plus Amb. Bunker's evaluation and the corrective course of action he proposes.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachments

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ng, NARA, Date 2-2-92

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Special Report

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-261

COUNTRY South Vietnam

By Cl, NARA Date 6-30-99

DATE OF INFO.

DATE 6 March 1968

SUBJECT

VICE PRESIDENT KY'S BELIEF THAT MILITARY DISSATISFACTION WITH PRESIDENT THIEU'S INDECISIVENESS MAY LEAD TO THIEU'S OUSTER AND REPLACEMENT BY KY

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

SOURCE

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

Summary

Although he knows of no concrete plans to unseat President Thieu, Vice President Ky believes that the dissatisfaction of Vietnamese military leaders with Thieu's failure to provide decisive leadership in the present emergency may lead to Thieu's ouster. Ky is no longer certain he would oppose such a move, since he believes that the survival of his country may depend on decisions taken in the next few months. He doubts that Thieu can provide the forceful and aggressive leadership and direction the times demand and believes that only he himself is capable of making the government meet the people's needs as President.

End Summary

1. Speaking in a matter-of-fact and almost detached manner, Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky observed that the dissatisfaction of Vietnamese military leaders with President Nguyen Van Thieu's failure to provide decisive leadership in meeting Vietnam's pressing problems may eventually lead to moves to oust Thieu from power. Military discontent has not yet crystalized into concrete planning to unseat Thieu, but Ky is uncertain of his ability

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)



1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)



1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

to dissuade military malcontents from such planning, since many of the military young turks now regard Ky himself as conservative and a member of the establishment. Beyond this, Ky is not certain that he would want to dissuade them from such action, even if he could, since what is involved now is not just his loyalty to President Thieu, but the survival of his country. Ky realizes that American government reaction to any coup d'etat in Vietnam would be "very bad".

2. Ky believes that the government cannot afford the luxuries of debate and research on urgent problems while the Viet Cong are camped on the capital's outskirts. It cannot debate priorities between refugee care in the cities and pacification in the countryside. It simply must undertake both tasks at once if the Viet Cong are not to exploit through renewed attacks weakness in the countryside or the dissatisfactions of refugee masses in the cities. By and large, the Vietnamese government needs little added support from the United States; Vietnam needs American financial help in dealing with the refugee problem and clear and repeated expressions of American determination to see the war through, but its primary need is for bold, imaginative, and aggressive presidential leadership.

3. Although Ky had previously called coups outmoded and obsolete in the post-election context, the Viet Cong Tet offensive and its resulting grave problems have greatly changed the situation and could justify a change in leadership. South Vietnam's present form of government may prove inadequate to deal with the present emergency; for example, despite the lower house's turndown of Thieu's request for special emergency financial and economic powers, the government cannot afford to waste precious time in the present crisis in seeking legislative approval for funds and measures needed to meet the emergency.

4. Ky called the next three or four months critical for Vietnam's future. Actions taken during these months will determine whether the turning point eight or ten months hence will see victory or defeat for South Vietnam. The leadership exerted by the President is vital to the effective prosecution of all civil and military operations. Without forceful direction from the top, lower government echelons will be unable to cope with the Viet Cong threat; similarly, dissatisfaction of senior Vietnamese military officers with the quality of presidential leadership will affect the morale and effectiveness of Vietnamese military forces all down the line.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)



5. Ky said that President Thieu to date has not provided the leadership required by the situation and that there seems very little hope that he will change in the future. Thieu is basically a loner, unable to seek or encourage the help offered by subordinates. Even his brother Nguyen Van Kieu admits that the President is too isolated to have effective working relationships with his ministers. Thieu reacts to pressures of the moment, especially American pressures, but makes no major moves until events absolutely require action.

6. It is wrong to credit Thieu with new-found decisiveness for his recent removal of the II and IV Corps Commanders and for instituting a training course for new province chiefs; these steps should have been taken months ago, Ky said. Although the plan for reorganization of the armed forces was fully staffed out and approved by General Cao Van Vion and was presented to Thieu in December, it still reposes in the President's office. Minister of Interior Linh Quang Vien and Revolutionary Development Minister Nguyen Bao Tri have repeatedly complained to Ky in recent weeks of Thieu's indecisiveness and of the sluggishness of government actions.

7. Ky sought an audience with Thieu on 1 March and in the company of Ministers Vien and Tri voiced his concern over government inactivity on pressing issues. At this meeting Ky urged the immediate mobilization of 120,000 additional men for the armed forces and suggested that he be given the role, which Thieu then assigned him, of supervising the pacification effort. Thieu voiced his concern over the adequacy of training facilities for 120,000 new soldiers and over American willingness to arm and equip them. Ky urged streamlined training of the new conscripts at existing facilities, followed by in-unit and combat training as the men are assigned as fillers in existing units. To settle for the delays of orthodox training and assignment procedures, Ky argued, would be to risk defeat by the Viet Cong with too little and too late. American willingness to arm the new troops could be relied on since the United States would welcome this initiative and use it to answer its domestic critics of the Vietnamese failure to mobilize fully. Typically, Ky said, Thieu finally agreed to the additional mobilization but three days later had failed to act to implement it.

8. Ky remarked that several months ago Thieu had told General Nguyen Duc Thang that there would be no need for any coup to oust him; if the military leadership became dissatisfied with his performance, they had only to inform him and he would bow out and turn over authority to someone else. Ky professed to be puzzled by Thieu's apparent continuing apprehension that Ky is seeking to undermine him; he finds this concern the more baffling after his own actions in abandoning his presidential aspirations and in giving up his recent post of Chairman of the Committee for People's Relief (CPR) to avoid speculation about his ambitions. He noted that he would have been willing to stay on as CPR Chairman had Thieu asked him to, and referred to radio Hanoi's quickness in exploiting this situation as an example of disunity within the government.

9. Ky was asked specifically whether there was any other individual besides himself who could replace President Thieu if Thieu were to be removed from office. After several moments reflection Ky replied with a flat "no". In answer to a second question relating to his previous tenure as Prime Minister and referring to some of the criticisms levied against his performance then, Ky replied that his previous performance in that role should not be used to measure his abilities since it should be remembered that Thieu held the position of Chief of State and could and did occasionally frustrate Ky's proposals by simply failing to sign the decrees Ky submitted to the office of Chief of State. Ky indicated that as President he would not operate under such a handicap. In answer to another question whether he would be able to gain popular support and the trust of the people as President, Ky replied it would not be of much importance whether the people liked or trusted him initially, particularly in this crisis atmosphere, and that he would instead gradually gain popular acceptance by demonstrating his ability to make the government function to meet the needs of the people.

10. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (Ambassador Bunker, Political Counselor) USMACV (General Westmoreland, Ambassador Komer) CINCPAC (Exclusive for CINCPAC and POLAD).

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~~SECRET~~

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-251
By isa, NARA Date 8-22-98

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 21315

EXDIS

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

attached

1. I HAVE READ WITH CARE COVERING VICE PRESIDENT KY'S EXTREMELY FRANK COMMENTS ABOUT HIS OWN FEELINGS AND AMBITIONS, AND POSSIBLE PLANS. I BELIEVE THAT THESE STATEMENTS NEED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. THE FOLLOWING ARE, THEREFORE, ONLY PRELIMINARY COMMENTS.

3.4(b)(1)

2. I JUDGE KY'S COMMENTS TO BE CAREFULLY DESIGNED TO APPEAL TO AN AMERICAN AUDIENCE WHICH HE PROBABLY CORRECTLY JUDGES

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 21315 ~~SECRET~~
TO BE EAGER FOR DYNAMIC AND SPEEDY ACTION BYNT
WPVN TO ERASE

THE EFFECTS OF THE VIET CONG OFFENSIVE SINCE TET. WHAT HE OBVIOUSLY HAS NOT WEIGHED SUFFICIENTLY IS THE UNACCEPTABLE EFFECT, BOTH INTERNALLY IN VIETNAM AND EXTERNALLY, ESPECIALLY IN THE U.S., OF ANY SUCH SEIZURE OF POWER. ACTION OF THE SORT KY IS TALKING ABOUT WOULD MEAN DESTRUCTION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND FLUSHING DOWN THE DRAIN THE VERY CAREFULLY NURTURED EFFORTS AT CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT HERE. IT WOULD MEAN RETURN TO GOVERNMENT BY COUP AND THE RESUMPTION OF MILITARY DICTATORSHIP. ALL OF THIS IS CLEARLY AND TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US AND TO AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. IN FACT, ALTHOUGH A CHANGE TO MORE DYNAMIC LEADERSHIP WOULD APPEAL TO CERTAIN AMERICAN CIRCLES, THE OTHER EFFECTS WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO DESTROY WHAT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 SAIGON 21315 061552Z

AMERICAN POPULAR SUPPORT THERE IS FOR OUR EFFORT HERE. IN THIS SENSE I BELIEVE KY IS COMPLETELY MISREADING AMERICAN OPINION.

3. I BELIEVE HE IS ALSO MISREADING VIETNAMESE OPINION, OTHER THAN THE GROUP OF DISCONTENTED MILITARY CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH HIM, AND ELEMENTS OF THE YOUNG TURKS AND BABY TURKS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SUCH A POWER MOVE WOULD GENERATE SUPPORT IN MILI-

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 21315 ~~SECRET~~

TARY QUARTERS FOR THE REASONS GIVEN BY KY AND FOR OTHER REASONS AS WELL, BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT IN THE SHOWDOWN LAST JUNE KY DID NOT HAVE THE SUPPORT IN THE MILITARY HE THOUGHT HE HAD. HE IS ALSO IGNORING THE FACT THAT HE IS NOT TRUSTED BY MOST CIVILIAN LEADERS, AND CIVILIANS IN GENERAL IN VIETNAM. THE ONLY SURELY PREDICTABLE EFFECT OF SUCH A POWER PLAY WOULD BE TO ERASE WHAT POPULAR CIVILIAN SUPPORT THERE IS FOR THE GVN, AND I BELIEVE THAT THIS REMAINS CONSIDERABLE, DESPITE THE CURRENT DISAPPOINTMENTS AND FRUSTRATIONS.

4. AS I HAVE INDICATED, THESE ARE ONLY PRELIMINARY REACTIONS. I BELIEVE THAT THE FIRST STEP IS FOR ME TO HAVE A HEART-TO-HEART TALK WITH KY WHEN HE RETURNS TO SAIGON LATER THIS WEEK AND TO POINT OUT TO HIM WHY SUCH A COURSE IS COMPLETELY OUT OF THE QUESTION AS FAR AS THE U.S. IS CONCERNED. HE WILL HAVE TO BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE ONLY COURSE OPEN TO HIM AND HIS SUPPORTERS IS FULL AND HONEST COOPERATION WITH THE ELECTED PRESIDENT. I RECOGNIZE THAT THE PROBLEMS IN THE THIEU-KY RELATIONSHIP ARE CREATED ON BOTH SIDES. THOUGH THIEU HAS REASON TO BE SUSPICIOUS OF SOME OF KY'S FOLLOWERS, ESPECIALLY LOAN, HE HAS BEEN LESS THAN ADEPT IN

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 21315 ~~SECRET~~

HIS HANDLING OF KY WHO IS VAIN AND SUSCEPTIBLE TO FLATTERY. HE MUST GIVE KY SOME DEFINITE AND CONTINUING DUTIES TO PERFORM TO EMPLOY THE LATTER'S VERY CONSIDERABLE ENERGY AND INTELLIGENCE. I WOULD PLAN TO URGE BOTH THIEU AND KY TO COME TO A COMPLETE AND FRANK UNDERSTANDING ON WHAT IS NEEDED AND HOW IT SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THIS CRITICAL PERIOD AHEAD. I WOULD ASSURE THEM THAT THEY BOTH HAVE OUR FULL SUPPORT SO LONG AS THEY WORK

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 SAIGON 21315 061552Z

TOGETHER TO UNIFY THE NATIONAL EFFORT. I REMAIN CONVINCED THAT IF THEY WILL WORK TOGETHER IN A SINCERE COLLABORATION AND WITH MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS NEEDED AND HOW TO DO IT, THEY CAN BRING ALONG WITH THEM THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF VIETNAMESE OPINION, BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY. I SEE NO OTHER COURSE IN THE

IMMEDIATE FUTURE AND THEREFORE PLAN TO PURSUE THIS GENERAL LINE OF ACTION VIGOROUSLY WITH BOTH THIEU AND KY.
BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~EXDIS~~

INFORMATION

11

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 6, 1968
1:45 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

At Khe Sanh:

- 184 tons delivered;
- enemy fire relatively light;
- we fired 2146 rounds plus
312 sorties plus 41 B-52
sorties;
- 2 tracked vehicles at DMZ
turn out to be deccys.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12355, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 3/26/92

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1998
By 19, NARA, Date 3/26/92

~~SECRET~~

11a

Wednesday, March 6, 1968, 12:40 PM

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number thirty-one on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area for the 24-hour period of March 5, 1968.

Weather conditions at Khe Sanh eased yesterday as afternoon high ceilings and broken clouds provided good visibility for controlled fixed wing strikes. Fire support elements were also aided by the break in the weather as 2146 rounds of mixed artillery and mortar were fired on known and suspected enemy positions, with excellent target coverage. Enemy anti-aircraft interference was light as resupply aircraft offloaded 184 tons of supplies and equipment.

At 7:20 AM, the Marines had four enemy command detonated devices explode blowing holes in their defensive wire, causing two minor injuries. An air observer controlled air strike on 10 - 15 North Vietnamese Army moving west on a trail 14 kilometers southwest of Khe Sanh confirmed two killed. At 6:25 PM, a controlled air strike on a possible enemy rocket site 6 1/2 kilometers south of Khe Sanh resulted in one North Vietnamese Army killed. Six North Vietnamese Army were observed in the open 200 meters west of Khe Sanh. Scout snipers took them under fire, killing two of them. Enemy incoming during the period amounted to 70 mortar, 20 artillery and 15 rocket rounds. Casualties attributed to the shelling were 12 wounded (eight evacuated).

At positions bordering the DMZ, enemy activity followed a pattern similar to that at Khe Sanh. Seven mortar rounds impacted at Cau Lu with no resulting damage or injuries. Elements from the 9th Marines, near Camp Carroll, received a total of 15 rounds of mortar during the day causing minor injuries to two Marines. A company of the 3rd Marines in Operation Napoleon/Saline received 10 mortar rounds resulting in five Marines wounded and evacuated. Early this morning, 50 artillery rounds impacted at positions occupied by the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines in the vicinity of Mai Xa Thi village. There were no casualties or damage.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/89
By 128 NARA, Date 3-26-92

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By 128 NARA, Date 3-26-92

In ground contact yesterday, another Cua Viet to Dong Ha river convoy was attacked north of Dong Ha. A landing craft received minor damage when hit by a recoilless rifle round and suffered one killed and three wounded. Gunships retaliated quickly, the convoy continued to its destination. A reaction force sent to clear the area received fire from an estimated enemy platoon. Artillery and air strikes provided support. Friendly casualties were five killed and 14 wounded. Nine North Vietnamese Army were killed. An observation post at Con Thien spotted 20 North Vietnamese Army in bunkers. An air observer spotted what appeared to be two tracked vehicles in the DMZ, eight kilometers north of Con Thien. A mission was fired and the two objects were destroyed. Closer inspection determined the objects to be prefabricated decoys.

There was one COFRAM mission fired, expending five rounds and resulting in five enemy killed.

The Marine aircraft wing flew 155 tactical air sorties in support of Khe Sanh, the Air Force flew 112, and the Navy 45, for a total of 312 sorties. Bomb damage included 11 secondary explosions, 13 secondary fires, four trucks destroyed, three mortar positions destroyed, one rocket position destroyed, nine roads cut, and six enemy killed. There were seven ARC LIGHT strikes (41 sorties) flown in the Niagara area. Of the seven sorties flown, four were close-in (within three kilometers) to friendly forces. Secondary explosions were reported from three of the close-in strikes. A total of six secondary explosions and several large fires were reported on all seven strikes.

During the period 184 short tons of supplies and 73 personnel were flown into Khe Sanh. There were a total of 34 resupply sorties. Ten C-130's and two C-123's completed 12 air drops. Three C-123's and 19 helicopters air landed cargo and passengers.

For the next period, 272 tactical air sorties are scheduled to support Khe Sanh. There will be seven ARC LIGHT strikes (42 sorties).

INFORMATION

12

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 6, 1968
1:40 p.m.

Pres. file

Mr. President:

Herewith the report to which Dick Helms referred at the NSC meeting this morning.

Amb. Bui Diem outlines the lecture Bunker (Clifford or Taylor) must read to Thieu -- and Ky.

W. W. Rostow

P.S. Also attached (just arrived) what it looks like from Thieu's point of view.

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

Vietnamese Ambassador's View that the United States must Demand Policies Conducive to Uniting GVN Leadership from President Thieu

[Redacted] 6 March 1968

WWRostow:rln

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-259
By js, NARA Date 10-31-97

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Special Report

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-261

By cb, NARA Date 6-30-99

COUNTRY South Vietnam

DATE OF INFO. [REDACTED]

DATE 5 March 1968

SUBJECT

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR'S VIEW THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST DEMAND POLICIES CONDUCIVE TO UNITING GVN LEADERSHIP FROM PRESIDENT THIEU

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1. [REDACTED] a discussion about the lack of cooperation within and among the newly-organized anti-communist fronts gave rise to the following remarks by the Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States, Bui Diem: Co-operation can never be effective at the lower levels when there is no unity at the top. He said that he was convinced that the fault lies with President Nguyen Van Thieu and that Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky wishes to work with and for President Thieu. Ky has made efforts to see Thieu, but Thieu usually puts Ky off and never expresses appreciation for Ky's efforts. Thieu apparently continues to be suspicious of Ky. Thieu's entourage exacerbates this situation by continually agitating against Ky.

2. According to Bui Diem a number of Ky's supporters, particularly those in the military, have in the past urged Ky to seize initiatives and assert authority, but Ky has always refused to do this. Bui Diem warned that the day might come when these military officers could not be put off by Ky, but would move ahead on their own and "wipe out Thieu." They would not eliminate Ky, Diem remarked, because they understand his position. Diem speculated that some Major might be running things some day. He explained that he has no particular Major in mind but just wanted to make the point that an element



1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

of younger army officers exists which will not be content to see the country slipping down the drain because of inefficiency at the top.

3. ~~Bui Diem said that the United States should tell Thieu directly and "inside of four walls" the following:~~

A. ~~The United States supports Thieu and Ky as President and Vice President; supports them jointly; does not support Ky over Thieu; and will not support any effort by Ky to take over the government from Thieu.~~

B. ~~There are many evidences that Thieu and Ky are not cooperating efficiently and that their staffs are working at cross purposes.~~

C. ~~Thieu must put aside his suspicions of Ky. He must arrange a division of responsibilities with Ky so that both may work harmoniously and effectively towards their mutual goals. As President, Thieu must take the initiative in calling Ky, seeking his active cooperation and giving him responsibilities.~~

D. ~~Thieu must put an end to the divisive attitudes and activities of his staff. If certain officials cannot put aside their petty rivalries and cooperate effectively with other elements of the government, they must be replaced.~~

E. ~~Finally, Thieu should be reminded that history will not judge him by his goodwill but by his accomplishments. The government's successes and failures will be his successes and failures. The government can succeed only if it is united in purpose and aggressive in meeting its challenges.~~

4. ~~Bui Diem said that Thieu would not resent such strong language and would not react negatively. Thieu would not show much reaction at all initially, but would think it over that night in bed. Diem explained that this is the difference between Ky and Thieu. Ky would react emotionally, but Thieu would accept it because he would recognize that he would have to accept it. It is, however, Thieu and not Ky who needs this lecture, Diem said.~~

5. Bui Diem reiterated that the essential first point to be made to Thieu was that the United States supports him and would not support Ky over him. With this reassurance and the knowledge that his success or failure depends entirely on American support, Thieu would accept the admonition.

6. Bui Diem said it was difficult to talk in this manner to an American because he was "100% Vietnamese" and had the pride of the Vietnamese. He had not made this recommendation, he said, to anyone else and under normal conditions would not want any American interference in Vietnamese politics. Conditions were not normal because of the war and because of American presence. If the Americans were not in Vietnam, a situation such as now exists between Thieu and Ky could not exist - at least not for long. He added that if it had been left up to the Vietnamese, there certainly would not have been presidential and parliamentary elections in wartime. "You see," he concluded, "you have power and you have responsibilities." Bui Diem emphasized that he believed that his foregoing views must reach policy levels in the United States Government

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER ONLY).

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

IN 64394

12b

PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS
DDI EXO

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

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CITE

SANITIZED

DIST 6 MARCH 1968

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-261

By cb, NARA Date 6-30-99

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI [REDACTED]

SUBJECT PRESIDENT THIEU'S CONCERN OVER ATTEMPTS TO
UNDERMINE HIS POSITION; ANALYSIS OF THE
VIET CONG TET OFFENSIVE

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON [REDACTED] FIELD NO.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

SOURCE

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

SUMMARY: ~~PRESIDENT THIEU IS TROUBLED OVER WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS ATTEMPTS TO UNDERMINE HIS POSITION AS PRESIDENT. HE NAMED VICE-PRESIDENT KY, NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR LOAN AND OVERSEA'S SECURITY SERVICE CHIEF MAI DEN AS HIS DETRACTORS. THIEU DESCRIBED THE VIET CONG (VC) TET OFFENSIVE AS ORIGINATING FROM WEAKNESS. THE VC LAUNCHED IT TO GAIN A PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY SINCE THEY REALIZE THEY CANNOT WIN A MILITARY WAR. HOWEVER, THE VC WILL BE A SERIOUS THREAT OVER THE NEXT FEW~~

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

(classification) (dissem controls)

MONTHS AND WILL PROBABLY LAUNCH THE NEXT PHASE OF THE OFFENSIVE IN MAY OR JUNE BEFORE THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS. IN THE POLITICAL FIELD, THIEU SAID THAT HE IS NOT OPPOSED TO ANTI-COMMUNIST FRONT GROUPS, BUT HE THINKS IT IS BETTER FOR THE GOVERNMENT NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED IN SUPPORTING THEM. END SUMMARY.

1. [REDACTED] PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU SAID THAT HIS MAJOR PROBLEM AT THE PRESENT TIME IS A PERSONAL ONE WHICH INVOLVES ACTIVITIES DESIGNED TO UNDERMINE HIS POWER AND PRESTIGE AS PRESIDENT. THIEU NAMED VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE NGUYEN NGOC LOAN AND CHIEF OF THE OVERSEAS SECURITY SERVICE MAI DEN AS THE INSTIGATORS OF THIS EFFORT. THIEU FEELS THAT HE HAS BEEN BACKED INTO A CORNER, AND ALTHOUGH HE IS GENERALLY FAIR AND GENTLE TO ALL PEOPLE, HE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE SOME ACTION TO ASSERT HIMSELF AGAINST SUCH DETRACTORS. ALL THIEU WANTS IS TO BE A GOOD PRESIDENT FOR THE FULL FOUR YEARS OR EVEN THESE FIRST FIVE MONTHS, IF HE DOES NOT SURVIVE THE PRESENT FIGHTING, THOUGH HE HAS NO FEARS FOR HIS PERSONAL SAFETY.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

2. THIEU REFERRED TO THE 1 MARCH LOWER HOUSE VOTE AGAINST GRANTING HIM SPECIAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DECREE POWERS WITH THE COMMENT THAT THE OPPOSITION INCLUDED THE KY/LOAN CONTROLLED DEMOCRATIC BLOC. THIEU CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE BLOC VOTED AGAINST HIM UNLESS IT WAS A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO EMBARRASS HIM AS PRESIDENT SINCE KY HAD ASKED TO ORGANIZE THIS BLOC TO OPERATE IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE BLACK PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES RUN BY MAI DEN CONTINUE TO EMBARRASS THIEU AND HIS ADMINISTRATION AND ARE OBVIOUSLY DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS OBJECTIVE. IN ADDITION, LOAN AND HIS GROUP ARE TRYING TO MAKE NGUYEN VAN LOC APPEAR AS AN INEFFECTIVE PRIME MINISTER IN ORDER TO EMBARRASS THIEU. THIEU STATED THAT IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT LOC WAS NOT HIS CHOICE BUT WAS FORCED ON HIM BY THE GENERALS, INCLUDING KY. THERE IS ALSO AN ORGANIZED EFFORT LED BY LOAN AND POSSIBLY SUPPORTED BY KY TO PLACE CORRUPT MEN IN SENIOR GOVERNMENT POSTS, INCLUDING PROVINCE CHIEFS, SO THAT THESE CORRUPT APPOINTEES MAY BE CITED AS AN EXAMPLE OF THIEU'S INEFFECTIVENESS.

3. THIEU BELIEVES THAT THE MOBILIZATION OF 125,000 ADDITIONAL SOLDIERS IS MANDATORY IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUSNESS

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

OF THE VIET CONG (VC) THREAT OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. HOWEVER, HE WOULD LIKE A FORMAL U.S. AGREEMENT TO PROVIDE THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THESE ADDITIONAL TROOPS BEFORE TAKING POSITIVE STEPS TO IMPLEMENT MOBILIZATION.

4. THIEU ASCRIBED THE VC TET OFFENSIVE TO HANOI'S REALIZATION THAT MASSIVE AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM HAS MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE COMMUNISTS TO WIN A MILITARY VICTORY. THUS, THE TET OFFENSIVE IS AN EXPRESSION OF WEAKNESS. IT HAD AS ITS PRINCIPAL PURPOSE PUTTING THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM INTO A STRONG POSITION IN PREPARATION FOR THE INESCAPABLE DAY WHEN NEGOTIATIONS MUST BEGIN. IN FACT, THE VC ARE SO WEAK THEY COULD NOT AFFORD TO WAIT UNTIL THE GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY OF NEXT YEAR'S TET UNTIL THEY ATTACK.

5. THE TET OFFENSIVE REPRESENTS A LAST DITCH MILITARY EFFORT WHICH CAME ABOUT BECAUSE THE VC WERE FAILING ON ALL OTHER FRONTS. THE VC ATTACKED THE CITIES IN ORDER TO CREATE MAXIMUM PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT. A FEW ROCKET OR MORTAR ROUNDS CAUSE MINOR DAMAGE BUT CREATE A GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT WHEREAS 50 HAMLETS TAKEN OVER BY THE VC COULD PASS LARGELY

~~SECRET~~
1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

UNNOTICED BY THE OUTSIDE WORLD. THIEU CITED THE VC ORDER TO TAKE AND HOLD THE CITIES FOR 48 HOURS AS AN INDICATION THAT THE VC REALIZED THEIR WEAKNESS.

6. THIEU BELIEVES THAT THE VC WILL LAUNCH THE NEXT PHASE OF THE OFFENSIVE IN MAY OF JUNE BECAUSE THE VC REALIZE THIS EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE BEFORE THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS FOR THE MAXIMUM PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION.

7. THIEU IS IN FAVOR OF A UNITED ANTI-COMMUNIST FRONT GROUP. HE SAID THAT THERE IS NO REASON WHY HE SHOULD BE OPPOSED TO FRONT GROUPS IN VIEW OF THE FACT THEY ARE ORGANIZED IN SUPPORT OF HIM AND HIS GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, THIEU DOES NOT THINK THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD OFFER ITS SUPPORT TO THESE FRONT GROUPS SINCE THE MEMBERS WOULD ASSUME THE GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO EXPLOIT THEM AND WOULD RESIGN CAUSING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE FRONT. THIEU BELIEVES THAT IT IS BETTER FOR HIM TO CONTINUE SEEING SELECTED POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND TRYING TO PERSUADE THEM TO COOPERATE IN BRINGING THEIR FOLLOWERS INTO A UNITED FRONT GROUP WHICH WILL OPPOSE COMMUNISM AND OFFER ITS SUPPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT. THIEU

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

(classification) (dissem. controls)

SAID THAT EVENTUALLY CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE FRONT GROUPS MAY FORM THE BASIS FOR A POLITICAL PARTY ALTHOUGH THIS SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO DEVELOP WITHIN THE NEAR FUTURE. THIEU ADDED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN LITERALLY HUNDREDS OF FRONT GROUPS AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS IN VIETNAM OVER THE YEARS, AND FEW HAVE HAD ANY REAL COHESION OR BEEN PARTICULARLY EFFECTIVE IN BROADENING THEIR POLITICAL BASE.

8. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR, MR. ZORTHIAN) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER, CHIEF OF STAFF, J-2) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL MOMYER ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

13

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Wednesday, March 6, 1968 -- 1:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Clifford supports a Westmoreland (CINCPAC and JCS) recommendation that we release COFRAM for use in counter-mortar fire in uninhabited areas near Danang, where airfield and base attacks have been heavy.

Sec. Rusk concurs.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-257
By cb, NARA Date 9-16-96

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

13a



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

6 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW

Subject: Use of COFRAM (U)

1. On 3 March 1968, General Westmoreland reported and CINCPAC concurred that additional target areas for the use of COFRAM were now considered essential to combat operations in South Vietnam. The following recap is provided:

a. Many areas within the Danang tactical area of responsibility (Quang Nam Province) meet the present criteria for use of COFRAM in South Vietnam.

b. Numerous sightings in these areas point to the presence of sizeable enemy forces.

c. Intelligence sources indicate a major ground assault against the vital areas of Danang tactical area of responsibility is being prepared.

d. Continued use of mortars and rockets by the enemy indicates urgent need to employ the most effective means to destroy exposed enemy mortar and rocket crews, i.e., with COFRAM.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff established areas in which selected COFRAM could be employed in Southeast Asia under the following criteria:

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-256
By cb, NARA Date 2-24-97

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

a. COFRAM artillery impacts in South Vietnam will be limited to observed fires and to counterfires but only in areas known to be sparsely populated.

b. COFRAM will not be used for harassing and interdiction fires.

c. No geographical restrictions are placed on the use of COFRAM hand grenades and 40mm cartridges.

3. The areas in Quang Nam Province which COMUSMACV has determined to be suitable for use by COFRAM artillery are surveyed and plotted on firing charts and also on large-scale, highly accurate maps. The artillery target-acquisition capability in this area is such that areas inhabited by friendly South Vietnamese are accurately plotted and would be avoided.


4. Recent mortar attacks on US positions in and around Danang have inflicted considerable personnel and materiel losses. In order to improve the tactical defensive situation around Danang and reduce losses such as the helicopters recently lost at Marble Mountain, COMUSMACV recommends that he now be authorized to employ available COFRAM against enemy targets located in the unpopulated areas of Quang Nam Province in accordance with the limiting criteria summarized in paragraph 3, above. CINCPAC has concurred.

5. In view of the above, I feel it prudent to recommend approval of the attached message to CINCPAC which authorizes COMUSMACV to expend COFRAM in unpopulated areas of Quang Nam Province in accordance with current criteria. Your support and approval of this action is recommended on an urgent basis. A map of Quang Nam Province and a summary of COFRAM firings to date are also attached.

Attachments

a/s

~~SECRET~~



07-1-68

07. E 2

SECRET
COFRAM EXPENDITURES TO DATE

(S-NF) COFRAM Expended Operationally - Interim Report. As of 4 March 1968, a total of 130 artillery COFRAM rounds have been expended operationally in RVN. Authority to expend COFRAM was given by COMUSMACV to CG, III MAF and CG, 7th Air Force on 2 February 1968, and to CG, I FFORCE V on 10 February 1968. The 120-day combat evaluation period began on 7 February 1968 and will close before 4 June 1968. CINCPAC has tasked COMUSMACV to make a final evaluation report on the 120-day period by 15 June 1968. A tabulation of the expended COFRAM rounds is as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NR OF ROUNDS</u>	<u>EXPENDING UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION & RESULTS</u>
7 Feb 1968	105mm	28	III MAF	Long Vei Excellent coverage
7 Feb 1968	105mm	36	III MAF	Long Vei Excellent coverage
12 Feb 1968	105mm	4	III MAF	Camp Carroll 14 NVAs killed out of 40 to 50 observed in open and in open foxholes
15 Feb 1968	8"	1	III MAF	Dong Ha Unknown
19 Feb 1968	105mm	6	III MAF	DMZ Killed 13 out of 15 NVAs in open
20 Feb 1968	105mm	30	III MAF	DMZ Unknown
20 Feb 1968	105mm	15	III MAF	Dye Marker Area at sensor acquired target - Unknown
25 Feb 1968	105mm	30	1st Air Cav Div	Quang Tri 200 enemy in open Results unknown
4 Mar 1968	105mm	30	III MAF	Quang Tri Unknown

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-256
By eb, NARA Date 2-24-97

~~SECRET~~

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

CONTROLLED AT 8 YEAR INTERVALS:
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
ATT. #3

INFORMATION

14
Pres file

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

Wednesday, March 6, 1968
1:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Cabot Lodge makes his case for a modification in military policy which would permit us protracted operations in Vietnam at low casualty levels.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 3-3-92



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

14a

March 5, 1968

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

To: The Secretary
From: H. C. Lodge *H.C. Lodge*
Subject: Herewith what I tried to convey to you on Sunday.

American public opinion can stand a long drawn out military campaign with few casualties or a relatively short campaign with high casualties (such as World War II which from the American standpoint began with heavy combat operations in December 1942 and ended in April 1945, i. e., two and one-half years). But American public opinion cannot stand a long drawn out war with high casualties. As far as the overwhelming mass of public opinion is concerned, the big thing is U. S. casualties. If they go down, none of the other things matter very much. And Vietnamese civilian casualties would go down too.

It would be most imprudent to expect quick results in Viet-Nam. The central purpose, after all, is to build a nation and this involves psychological changes which usually come gradually. As realists we should assume a protracted effort -- hopefully with low casualties. If things should go quicker than we expect, so much the better.

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

Authority State ltr 2/79
By Oldch NARA. Date 4/15/96

"Search and Destroy"

The policy of the U. S. military in Viet-Nam has consistently -- and rightly -- been to conduct what is called "offensive operations." But these are defined as "search and destroy" -- and this raises serious questions.

Such a definition clearly implies a belief that an exclusively military victory is conceivable and that if we just get out and destroy enough Viet Cong the war will come to an end. This is the so-called "war of attrition."

Such a war was sound doctrine in World War II, but it is not realistic in the Viet-Nam war. It is not possible to win the war by killing the enemy by military means on the ground in South Viet-Nam. The hard core terrorist guerrilla certainly cannot be reached that way. He will only be reached when the people give enough information about the terrorists so that they can be rooted out by police-type methods. This is what is meant by "pacification" which, in turn, is the first step in "nation-building." And the North Vietnamese soldier can be better reached by bombing North Viet-Nam and by being apprehended when he reaches his so-called "safe haven" in South Viet-Nam.

The following questions, therefore, arise:

a) has there not been unnecessary killing of people on our side because of the policy of "search and destroy," in particular

by the devastating effect of our artillery and airpower on Vietnamese civilians and buildings?

b) has not this tactic failed to do the job?

c) has it not also created an undue number of refugees?

d) has it not made heavy demands on precious intellectual and physical energies which might otherwise have been aimed at nation-building, which is the most promising way to achieve a durable result?

Might we not, therefore, do much better if we defined the phrase "offensive operations" as meaning "split up the enemy and keep him off balance"? In accordance with this definition the U. S. military would be playing its own utterly indispensable part: acting as a shield behind which the Vietnamese nation-building and pacification operations can take place.

Someone who enjoys the President's confidence and has a good grounding in military and political matters, but who is not in the regular military hierarchy, should see whether a policy of "split up and keep off balance" would not result in fewer U. S. casualties, fewer refugees and at the same time actually expedite the pacification program, by releasing energies now inevitably absorbed by the great demands of the present policy of "seek out and destroy."

The question of how we use our armed forces is a matter of the greatest political importance, even though its execution is

military. It should be viewed from the viewpoint of the highest possible overall civilian strategy.

More Troops?

More troops, therefore, should, in accordance with this reasoning, be sent in numbers sufficient only to enable us to keep faith with our troops in exposed positions, as in the northern end of South Viet-Nam -- and not to continue the past emphasis on "search and destroy."

The new emphasis should be on the creation of durable local political institutions under which police-type programs -- for "territorial security" -- can operate. Such an emphasis would be on protection of heavily populated areas, which would, of course, require operations outside of these areas. It would deny safe haven to the infiltrators from the North. It should organize South Vietnamese society as efficiently as North Vietnamese society is organized. There should thus be intensive and repeated scourings -- i. e., "comb-outs" -- precinct by precinct, block by block, house by house, and farm by farm. It should be as hard to move from one precinct to another or from one village to another in South Viet-Nam as it is today in North Viet-Nam. All this should mean fewer U. S. casualties and fewer Vietnamese refugees. And it should hasten the end of the war.

Our present practice of having virtually everything available to the press is also a loser. The enemy would never do such a thing. We should institute censorship just as we did in World War II and on the very simple grounds that we are risking American lives if we don't.

A New Turn

Thus it would be clear that we are not going to abandon Viet-Nam; but that we are going to run the war with a somewhat different emphasis in the light of our experience at the time of the Tet raids, which has created a new situation.

There were those who, in the late forties and early fifties, believed that the so-called "cold war" with the Soviet Union must come to a head. Some were making plans accordingly -- to "end the cold war by winning it." Then General Eisenhower explained to the American people that we must learn to live with the cold war. Everyone now sees that this was good advice.

We can learn to live with this Vietnamese situation and, if we do not watch the clock, we will find that time will be working for us. We have had soldiers in Germany and in Korea since 1945. Similarly, we can have soldiers in Viet-Nam providing protection

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS

- 6 -

for the nation-building program against external aggression. But South Viet-Nam must become competitive with Communism -- not just on the conventional battlefield but in every single aspect of life, notably in the organization of their society. We must build a solid foundation before we start putting on the penthouse.

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

14a

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DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS

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TOP SECRET - NODIS

- 6 -

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Pres file
DECLASSIFIED 16
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-250
By ct, NARA Date 11-3-97

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~ Wednesday, March 6, 1968
10:15 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith some personal thoughts on the war.

Objective: The art of the next two or three months would be to produce a situation in which Hanoi decided to end the war. If that is impossible, the objective is to produce a situation in the second half of the year in which our side is clearly moving forward.

Present Situation: We are clearly in the midst of an unresolved critical battle. The enemy is committed -- having taken stock of his immediate post-Tet situation -- to continue to throw forces into the battle at a rate almost four times his average for 1967: he is losing about 1,000 KIA per day as opposed to 241 per day in 1967. He did increase his order of battle in the days before Tet -- with several additional North Vietnamese divisions, North Vietnamese fillers for VC main force units, plus hasty recruiting for VC units. But there is no evidence he can sustain present rates for more than a matter of a few months.

At the moment the enemy appears to be trying to pin Delta and Saigon allied forces close to the cities; draw Westy's reserves to the Western frontiers (Kontum-Pleiku); and strike a decisive blow in I Corps. The threat forming up around Hue is major (perhaps 5 - 6000 enemy troops). Westy is trying to put his Delta and Saigon forces on to the offensive; deal with the Western highlands economically; fight a decisive battle in I Corps.

To maximize the chance that we achieve our objective, these things should happen:

-- the ARVN and the GVN should put on a performance which convinces Hanoi, the U. S., and Moscow that they are viable and must be considered a major factor in a settlement;

-- above all, Westy must win as decisive a victory at Hue -- and in I Corps -- as he can;

-- the U. S. must behave in the days ahead in a way to make clear we have the will and staying power to carry on;

-- the supply prospects for North Viet Nam over the coming months and year must be worsened;

-- the GVN -- from a position of strength -- must put forward a powerful new appeal and proposal for peace in the South.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

WWR
Pers.
Thoughts
on
WBR

The proper timing of this sequence is critical.

A Proposal for Consideration :

The best trigger point would be:

-- a major battle around Hue, initiated either by the enemy or by Westy going out to get these forces before they are set;

-- plus some success in the battles Westy tells us are about to begin as Thang moves to the offensive in the Delta and our forces move out simultaneously against the enemy's Saigon divisions. This should happen in the next few days.

When the battle is joined we do two things:

-- go for the Clifford package, beginning with a reserve call-up; *

-- mine the North Vietnamese ports with delayed-action mines, telling international shipping to get out of North Vietnamese territorial waters.

At Tab A is a fresh analysis of the mining problem done by Bob Ginsburgh at my request. Mining by itself would not be decisive; but it will be costly to the enemy. The maximum predicted Soviet reaction would be to bring in mine-sweepers and shoot their way through. (This is what the Czech general, recently defected, has said; but since we're not blockading, there is nothing to shoot except mines.)

Against this background -- and assuming some tactical success in the forthcoming battles -- we persuade Thieu to take the offensive for peace:

-- appealing to all Vietnamese to stop the bloodshed;

-- offering to talk to any southerners on the basis of converting the war into politics under a constitutional one-man-one-vote system.

We could accompany the offer with a temporary stoppage of bombing.

The whole sequence hinges, of course, on some tactical success on the ground in coming days and, especially, one clear-cut victory -- hopefully at Hue. Thieu must feel he is operating from some strength.

*The Reserve call-up may not be able to wait until the battle is joined; but the best time to mine the ports -- should you decide to do so -- would be at the height of battle.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/
LITERALLY EYES ONLY

-3-

Not since the Civil War has quite so much hinged for our country on immediate battlefield events.

As for Hanoi and the Russians: I do not believe a Communist takeover of South Viet Nam is regarded as a vital Soviet interest. The Chinese will oppose, but are not likely to occupy North Viet Nam. Hanoi may have entered the winter-spring offensive with the same judgment at high levels that they have conveyed to low levels; namely, 1968 must be the Year of Decision.

What happens if we fail in I Corps? I doubt that the North Vietnamese can drive Westy from I Corps; but a setback would not be a good occasion for a peace initiative. But we should proceed to lay the extra burden on the North Vietnamese supply system via mining.

This is a line of thought -- not a firm recommendation. I believe it deserves some examination.

West Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/LITERALLY EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

169

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Mining North Vietnamese Ports

The issue of mining the 3 major North Vietnamese ports involves a balancing of:

- The immediate military advantages,
- The potential disadvantages of possible Soviet or Chinese Communist countermoves -- military or political, and
- International legal implications.

There is a wide range of opinion on each of these factors.

Military Effectiveness. Opinions on military effectiveness range from the view that mining would be decisive to the view that its effect would be insignificant.

On the one hand, it is argued that (1) the enemy would simply counter the minefields by lightering supplies across the beaches and (2) North Vietnam's small craft inventory is sufficient for that job. On the other hand, it is argued that (1) North Vietnam's dwindling supply of watercraft does not have that much excess capacity (2) such a major lightering effect would require a major increase in watercraft and (3) in the process of lightering supplies, significant numbers of watercraft would be destroyed by our aircraft and SEA DRAGON surface forces.

I know of no way of satisfactorily quantifying the debate any more than we have been able to satisfactorily quantify the impact of our current air campaign.

You might note, however, that CINCPAC's most recent assessment of the impact of mining the ports and interdicting the land lines of communication concluded that North Vietnam's military capabilities would be seriously impaired six months after mining and would be completely degraded in one year. DIA, however, believes that there are too many uncertainties about the operational effectiveness, stockpile levels and consumption rates to

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Authority 749 85-315

By 10p/19, NARA, Date 3-3-92

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estimate the results with such precision. Nevertheless, DIA agrees that even though a lesser impact were obtained, mining the ports would impose the maximum hardship on North Vietnam. You will also recall that the JCS have consistently judged that mining the ports would put the maximum pressure on North Vietnam.

Possible Communist Reaction. From the outset it has been a matter of major concern that -- regardless of the legalities or illegalities -- the Soviets or Chinese Communists might react to mining by widening the war or by taking counter military or political actions in other areas.

Similar concerns caused us to refrain for some time from attacking SAM sites and airfields in order to avoid the possibility of killing Soviet personnel. Such fears have not materialized and there has been no noticeable rise in temperature resulting from our attacks on SAM sites and airfields. On the other hand, bombing or strafing of ships from other communist countries has immediately resulted in stiff protests and loud outcries.

Nevertheless, for the last nine months or so the intelligence community has judged that mining the ports most probably would not cause either the Soviets or Chinese to engage in a major escalation of the war. They have also estimated that a Communist initiative in Berlin would probably be too risky for them. However, they have noted that mining might (but not necessarily) cause the death of a nonproliferation agreement (or at least be the excuse for its death). The Middle East and Korea looked like the most likely spots for a Soviet or ChiCom response to mining. Perhaps they still are. However, by refraining from mining we did not defer the Six Day War, nor the Pueblo incident, nor even communist attacks on South Vietnamese cities (including port cities).

Legal Implications. To some unknown extent, Soviet and ChiCom reactions would be influenced by international legal considerations. If mining were sanctioned by international law, they ought to feel less compelled to react than if they judged it necessary to react as a matter of principle to safeguard their international legal rights.

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a. Hague Convention (Tab A). It can be (in fact has been) argued that the Hague Convention would prohibit the mining of the North Vietnamese ports because it would interfere with commercial navigation and neutral shipping. On the other hand, it can be argued that the Hague Convention is inapplicable because North Vietnam never subscribed to it. More importantly, the Convention did not prevent mining in either World Wars I or II though it probably provided some measure of restraint.

b. Innocent Passage. However, there remains the question of whether the mining of Haiphong would infringe upon the right of innocent passage for neutral merchant ships. (Tab B) The right of innocent passage exists only in the territorial seas -- in the case of North Vietnam that area extending outward 3 miles from its coastline. The present plans for mining the ports, however, restrict themselves to mining of internal waters and hence would not infringe upon the right of innocent passage, which does not exist in internal (as opposed to territorial) waters. (Tab C defines inland and territorial waters.) Thus the US could base its legal case upon the fact that in wartime neutral nations have no more rights of passage in internal waters than they do on highways on a belligerent's territory.

However, we might wish to phrase such a justification so that it does not turn out to be unduly restrictive since we might wish at some point to mine territorial waters as well (for example, a series of mine barriers perpendicular to the coastline). Most probably we would not want to mine the high seas. However, as Tab D indicates there is ample precedent in World Wars I and II for mining both territorial seas and the high seas as well as inland waters.

Regardless, of where mines were laid we would be under an obligation to notify any neutral nations whose shipping might be endangered as a result (Tab E). This requirement would be adequately met if an announcement was made upon completion of the laying of minefields with delayed fuze mines which would give any merchant shipping a reasonable time to clear port safely.

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c. Precedent. We have already established precedents in Vietnam for action against the 3 major ports. Armed reconnaissance and naval surface forces are currently authorized to attack NVN watercraft in territorial waters in the southern part of North Vietnam. There have been no complaints about the legality of this action. Thus there is no precedent for legally complaining about the extension of these operating areas to the northern boundary of North Vietnam. Similarly, there has been no legal objection to the mining of inland waterways and estuaries in the southern part of North Vietnam. Nor have any legal objections been raised over the sowing of Mark 36 destructors throughout the inland waterways of North Vietnam. (Of course, the requirement that foreign shipping not be endangered has precluded their use east of the Haiphong Port.) Thus, as long as we comply with the requirement of notification there is no legal bar to mining the 3 major ports.

Conclusion. Thus it is my personal conclusion that;

- Mining is militarily feasible and desirable.
- Mining would raise the noise level but the risks of Soviet or ChiCom escalation would be small.
- Mining should be justified on the basis that it is within inland waterways -- without precluding the possibility that at a future date we might mine territorial waters.
- Mining with delayed fuze mines should be undertaken without prior notification or consultation.
- Mining would be a useful signal to the North Koreans.
- Mining is the best way of satisfying that part of the US public opposed to sending more of our boys to South Vietnam without increasing pressure on North Vietnam.
- Mining would probably not generate additional opponents of our war policy but the present opponents might become noisier -- if that is possible.

2

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

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166
A

TAB A

PRECEDENT FOR THE USE OF SEA MINES

1. The Hague Convention VIII of 1907 is the only codified international law with respect to mine warfare. It was written with a recognition of the impact that the use of mines in the Russo-Japanese War would have on war at sea and the safety of neutral shipping. The preamble of the Convention stated:

"Seeing that while the existing position of affairs makes it impossible to forbid the employment of automatic submarine contact mines, it is nevertheless expedient to restrict and regulate their employment in order to mitigate the severity of war and to ensure, as far as possible, to peaceful navigation the security to which it is entitled, despite the existence of war. . ."

Thus, the writers of the Hague Convention realized that it would not be possible to prohibit belligerents from employing mine warfare.

2. The only express prohibition to belligerents with respect to location and purpose of mining is in Article 2, which reads:

"It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coasts and ports of the enemy for the sole object of intercepting commercial navigation."

The experience of both World Wars has confirmed that this Article has been useless as a restraint upon the mining of commercial routes. Thus, precedent as established in World Wars I and II may carry more weight on the subject of mining than would the out-of-date and ineffective Hague Convention.

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Tab A

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3. In World War I the German Government announced intentions to close the trade routes to English ports by mining and then proceeded to lay mines indiscriminately on those trade routes, both inside and outside territorial waters. UK initiated mining operations in reprisal for the German policy. Similarly, the UK mine fields were placed both in territorial waters and on the high seas. Late in the war the United States achieved a mining capability where she could and did assist the UK in the laying of a minefield which extended across the North Sea from Scotland to Norway.

4. In World War II Germany adopted her same policy of offensive mine laying on the trade routes. The UK mined extensively, both in territorial waters and high seas, but with considerable effort made to protect neutral shipping. The United States mined extensively in the Pacific, both against enemy warships and merchant shipping and in territorial waters and on the high seas.

5. In summary it can be stated that in World Wars I and II, the Hague Convention did not serve to prevent mining operations. Both sides mined as necessary, both in territorial waters and on the high seas. The Convention probably did provide some measure of restraint, at least to the UK, which made every effort to safeguard neutral shipping.

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16c

TAB B

MINES AND THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE

1. The rules of international law relating to naval war are a compromise between two opposing rights: the right of a belligerent to bring the utmost pressure to bear on his adversary short of violating certain fundamental rules of international law and humanity, and the right of the neutral to continue his commercial and other intercourse with the enemy states with which he is at peace.

2. All statements of international law and precedent deal with these subjects under the supposition that a legal state of war exists. There appear to be no documented opinions regarding these issues under situations such as the present hostilities in Southeast Asia, where no party to the conflict has declared war.

3. The official statements of the United States indicate that we consider this a collective self-defense action. However, in most circumstances we have attempted to restrain and conduct our operations in accordance with the provisions of the rules of International Law dealing with war. It is, therefore, only logical to consider the international law with respect to mining and the rights of neutrals, including the right of innocent passage, as applicable, even though a legal state of war is not considered to exist. Regardless, however, if it is desired to apply principles of international law to the problem of the possible mining of the Port of Haiphong, there is only one set of principles to consider -- those principles being the ones based on the existence of a state of war.

Tab B

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4. With respect to mining the harbor of Haiphong, the question arises as to whether the right of innocent passage for neutral merchant ships would be infringed. The right of innocent passage is defined in and exists only in the territorial seas -- the territorial seas being the maritime zone immediately adjacent to a state's territory commencing at its coastline and extending to seaward for a definite distance. In the territorial sea the littoral state has the right of jurisdiction over foreign ships of war and merchant vessels, police functions, customs and revenue functions, fishery rights, and maritime ceremonial rights, as compared to its internal waters in which it has complete sovereignty. Present plans for mining the Port of Haiphong restrict themselves to the internal waters. Mining in this manner, therefore, would not infringe the right of innocent passage which is not defined in internal waters.

5. The question follows as to the rights and principles applicable to the internal waters, specifically the ports. If principles concerning peacetime situations were consulted, it would be clear that commercial ports must be left open to international traffic. The liberty of access to ports granted to foreign vessels implies their right to load and unload their cargoes, embark and disembark their passengers. If the principles concerning wartime are applied, then naval operations against commerce usually take the form of endeavoring to prevent the enemy from attaining by sea such commodities as are classified under the term "contraband," and which may assist him in his prosecution of the war. The concept of belligerents and neutrals also applies and neutrals are forbidden to supply ammunition or war materials of any kind to the belligerents. Such materials come under the heading of contraband and are extremely difficult to define since there is hardly a commodity which cannot be claimed to be useful in warfare, and hardly any trade which in the modern sense does not influence the carrying on and furtherance of the war and either economically or

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militarily is not conducive to the advantage of one belligerent and the consequent disadvantage of his opponent. In World War II the United States and Great Britain preserved the old distinction between absolute and conditional contraband. Absolute contraband included all kinds of arms, ammunition, and explosives, POL, and transportation equipment, communication equipment, tools and implements, and currency and bullion. The suppression of absolute contraband has always been easier to justify than the suppression of conditional contraband, such as food and clothing, which have required proof of hostile destination.

6. Although the concept of contraband is applicable in particular to measures such as blockade or capture, where there is a means of discriminating between cargoes which will be passed and cargoes which will be stopped, it does serve to show a basis for denying the enemy much of the war materials such as transportation equipment, and POL, which are presently being brought into North Vietnam through the Port of Haiphong.

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TAB C

TERRITORIAL AND INLAND WATERS

The following is taken from C. John Colombos, International Law of the Sea (Sixth Edition), pp 87-88 and 175.

Distinction between Territorial and National Waters.

The waters which are adjacent to a State's territory are of two kinds: (a) territorial: (b) interior or national. Territorial waters are those included within a definite maritime zone or belt adjacent to a State's territory. Within these waters, it is generally recognised that foreign Powers may claim certain rights for their vessels and their subjects, the chief of which is the right of innocent passage. Interior or national waters, on the other hand, consist of a State's harbours, ports and roadsteads and of its internal gulfs and bays, straits, lakes and rivers. In these waters, apart from special conventions, foreign States cannot, as a matter of strict law, demand any rights for their vessels or subjects although for reasons based on the interests of international commerce and navigation, it may be asserted that an international custom has grown in modern times that the access of foreign vessels to these waters should not be refused except on compelling national grounds.

Definition of Territorial Waters.

The term "territorial waters" is used to indicate that part of the sea which extends from a line running parallel to the shore to a specified distance therefrom, commonly fixed by the majority of maritime States at three marine miles measured from low-water mark. All waters outside territorial waters are to be considered as forming part of the high sea. The marine mile referred to is the "Admiralty" or "nautical" mile as adopted by the British Hydrographic Office.

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Tab C

Interior or National Waters.

"Interior," "inland" or "national" waters comprise all those waters which lie within the base-line of the territorial waters, viz., a State's ports and harbours, bays and gulfs, land-locked seas, lakes, straits and rivers. Ports, harbours and roadsteads are, as in Roman Law, dependencies of the maritime territory, and form part of the domain of the State in nearly all modern countries. . . . The base-line from which the territorial waters are measured in front of ports passes across the entrance from the outermost part or harbour work on one side to the outermost part or harbour work on the other side.

The Geneva Sea Convention of 1958 adopted the same principle, viz., that for the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, the outermost permanent harbour works which form an integral part of the harbour system shall be regarded as forming part of the coast.

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TAB D

THE HISTORIC EMPLOYMENT OF MINING

I. World War I

1. From 1914 to 1918 the United Kingdom and United States used offensive mining in the Mediterranean, Aegean and Adriatic Seas, in the English Channel and in the North Sea, including the exit to the Norwegian Sea between the Shetland Islands and the Norwegian Coast. Mining was initiated by the Germans in August 1914 in the North Sea without regard to the safety of merchant shipping or the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1907. During the war mines were laid both on the high seas and in territorial waters.

2. By the end of the war Great Britain had laid over 128,000 mines, of which more than 40 percent were in enemy waters. The United States had laid over 56,000 mines. As a result of these activities approximately 150 enemy war vessels and naval auxiliaries were sunk, including some 35 U-boats.

II. World War II

1. From 1939 to 1945 British mine fields were laid in the Mediterranean, Adriatic, Aegean Seas, Danube River, the North Sea, and Baltic Sea, the English Channel, the Bay of Biscayne and in extensive areas across the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap. In the Far East during the same period the United States and United Kingdom laid mine fields throughout the Southwest Pacific, Indian Ocean, South China Sea, East China Sea, and in areas around the Japanese Islands and the Inland Sea.

2. It is interesting to note that the United Kingdom mined neutral Norwegian territorial waters. This step was taken on 8 April 1940, to force the vital iron ore

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Tab D

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traffic to Germany out into the open sea where it could be attacked. Both Norway and Sweden protested violently; however, by coincidence, the preliminary moves in the German occupation of Norway coincided with the laying of the mines. On the day following the operation Oslo was in German hands and Norwegian waters had ceased to be neutral.

3. The results of British mining in World War II were 1,050 Axis warships and merchant vessels sunk, plus a further 540 damaged. This figure does not include the casualties inflicted on the Japanese who lost 287 ships to mines, plus an additional 34 due to unknown causes. Another source, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey; however, indicates that the mining campaign in the Pacific accounted for well over 1,000 ships sunk or damaged.

4. The following "lessons learned" were derived from the World War II offensive mine laying campaign against Japan and were taken from the published results of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey:

a. In order to provide for the necessary logistics, it is essential that prior to or early in a war a decision be made regarding the desirability of a major mining campaign.

b. In nearly every area, offensive mining would have produced greater results if it had been begun at an earlier date on a larger scale. The nature of mining attack was such that it could have prevented other offensive actions to a greater extent than it did.

c. Aerial mine laying does not require air superiority to the extent of needing complete control of the air. Thus, mine laying is easier than most offensive action.

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d. Much of the value of a new weapon lies in its surprise introduction and large-scale use before the enemy can develop countermeasures.

e. Mining of inland waterways can be extremely effective as proven by the World War II mining of the Yangtze River and the Danube River.

f. Mine laying fills an important gap in a well balanced attack on the waterborne commerce and naval forces of a nation. Offensive mine laying should be considered as a complementary effort rather than a competitor of any other means. However, mine laying is more economical in both equipment and personnel than other means of achieving comparable results.

g. One of the important effects of mine laying is to force the enemy to expend men and material in undertaking countermeasures.

h. The primary purpose of mining is to delay and disrupt shipping. In World War II the delays and disruption of the shipping traffic from the mining campaign were significant and greatly complicated the enemy's logistics problems. Because of the mining blockade of the Shimonoseki Straits and important industrial ports, the shipping in those areas was finally reduced to a trickle. Shipping was diverted to other Honshu ports where cargoes waited to pass an already over-loaded land system in order to reach the industrial and populated sections of Japan.

i. Mining can exert a powerful influence within the country mined. In Japan, in areas that were mined and not subject to bombing attack, populace escaped without physical harm. At the same time the military and civilian population suffered acute shortages of food and essential commodities. There were indications that resentment was awakened against the local Government by such acute shortages. The people, not seeing apparent damage from attacking aircraft, were evidently not aroused against the minelayers.

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16f

TAB E

NOTIFICATION OF OR CONSULTATION WITH OTHER STATES WITH
RESPECT TO THE USE OF MINES IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. The Hague Convention (VIII) of 1907 is the sole international instrument on the subject of mine warfare. The second paragraph of Article 3 is quoted as follows:

"The belligerents undertake to do their utmost to render these mines harmless within a limited time, and, should they cease to be under surveillance, to notify the danger zones as soon as military exigencies permit, by a notice addressed to ship owners, which must also be communicated to the governments through the diplomatic channel."

The general spirit of this provision for the promulgation of warning notices was adhered to in World War I and II by the allies.

2. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter contains the provision for individual or collective self-defense. This article then goes on to provide that any measures of self-defense must be immediately reported to the Council, whose general responsibility and authority for taking action to maintain or restore the peace remains unaffected.

3. If the United States were to mine the deep water harbors of North Vietnam, the intent of the above two provisions for notification would be adequately served if the laying of the mine fields were announced on completion along with the general location of danger zones. It would be appropriate at the time of laying the mines to provide for a short delay in their arming in order to give any merchant shipping that so desired an opportunity to clear the port safely.

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Tab E

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4. Other than the above notification it is not clear that any public announcement or consultation within the UN, NATO, or SEATO framework would be in the best interests of the United States. Any announcement prior to accomplishment of the mining would provide an opportunity for those who so desired to bring pressure against the United States to prevent the mining. Discussion within international organizations would invite debate which could result in delays. It is doubtful that such discussion could generate any degree of support for the measure.

ACTION

17

**Wednesday, March 6, 1968
8:30 a.m.**

Mr. President:

Pres file

**Attached letter to Mr. Hoyt
rewritten, as requested.**

W. W. Rostow

rln

17a

March 6, 1968

Dear Palmer:

Because I know you to be fair and I believe you want your paper always to be reliable, I asked Director Helms to comment on The Denver Post story of February 25 written by Mr. Thomas E. Ross.

These comments are for your personal information only and must be treated in strict confidence.

Sincerely,

LBJ Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. E. Palmer Hoyt
Editor and Publisher
The Denver Post
Denver, Colorado 80202

LBJ:WWRostow:rla

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ACTION

Tuesday, March 5, 1968 - 11:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, as requested, a letter to Palmer Hoyt for your signature.

Dick Helms agreed to removal of the Secret classification.

W. W. Rostow

*3/6/68
returned for re-write.*

rla

17c

March 3, 1968

Dear Palmer:

Because I believe you to be honorable and I believe you want your paper always to be reliable, I asked Director Helms to comment on The Denver Post story of February 25 written by Mr. Thomas E. Ross.

These comments are for your personal information only and must be treated in strict confidence.

Sincerely,

Mr. E. Palmer Hoyt
Editor and Publisher
The Denver Post
Denver, Colorado 80202

LBJ:WWRostow:rin

I deeply regret newspaper stories such as the one you brought to my attention this morning and a television broadcast in the same vein. The motive behind them I understand, where they derive from I do not understand. As you know better than anyone, a factual statement may be regarded as "optimistic" or "pessimistic" depending on the point of view of the listener. Nevertheless, I would like to give you certain personal assurances even though you already know them to be the case:

1) There is no tension between anyone of my acquaintance in the White House and the Central Intelligence Agency.

2) No Central Intelligence Agency official worthy of his salt is concerned about his job.

3) No member of Congress has ever discussed with me any problem about "reduction in the flow of intelligence information from the Agency" to the appropriate departments of Government.

4) When I briefed the Senate Appropriations Committee last week, I talked about the Soviet Union and China -- I did not discuss Vietnam.

5) I never said before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee what I was alleged to have said, i.e. that we had received

a "severe setback" in Vietnam or "this will be a 100 years' war". The Chairman of the Subcommittee, Congressman George Mahon, publicly denied that I had made such statements. I have other witnesses as well in support of my assertion. (It is my understanding that Congressman Melvin Laird is the originator of the phrase "a 100 years' war" and that he has admitted it.)

6) Relations between the White House Staff, particularly Mr. Rostow, and the Agency have never been better. We work together daily in an effort to arrive at the best appraisal we can of what is happening in Vietnam.

7) No one can make the flat statement that every member of his organization is tight-lipped and does not "leak". I can only say that I have been able to find no evidence that we have any "leakers" in the Agency at the present time. I would appreciate receiving any evidence to the contrary.

8) Thomas Ross, of THE CHICAGO SUN TIMES, has not been near me or the Agency since he and David Wise wrote the book several years ago, "The Invisible Government".

Dick

White House, CIA Split on Viet Prospects

By THOMAS B. ROSS

(C) 1966, Denver Post-Chicago Sun-Times
WASHINGTON — A high state of tension has developed between the White House and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) over the CIA's steady pessimistic assessments of the Vietnam war.

Reliable administration and congressional sources report that the friction has reached the point where key CIA officials are worried about their jobs.

Members of the congressional subcommittees charged with overseeing the CIA are understood to be concerned that the conflict may result in a reduction in the flow of intelligence information from the agency.

CIA Director Richard M. Helms, who reportedly gave a frank account of the agency's Vietnam position at a closed-door meeting of the House Appropriations Committee two weeks ago, appeared last week before the Senate Appropriations Committee.

SECRET TESTIMONY

Sen. Carl Hayden, D-Ariz., committee chairman, said Helms' secret testimony "concerned the relationship of the United States in a military way to other nations."

Helms, the first CIA director to come from within the agency's ranks, indicated he talked principally about the Soviet Union. Neither Helms nor Hayden disclosed whether the Vietnam war was discussed.

At the root of the CIA-White House dispute are conflicting interpretations of recent events as well as long-range developments in Vietnam.

White House foreign affairs specialists, notably Walt W. Rostow, President Johnson's adviser on national security affairs, are taking an optimistic view of the Viet Cong attacks on the cities and the siege of the Marine outpost at Khe Sanh, near the North Vietnam border.

On the basis of captured enemy documents, the White House staff has developed the position Johnson has presented to the public — that the Communist offensive was a desperate, mean-



RICHARD M. HELMS
Up from the ranks.

cessful and highly costly effort to seize and hold at least some urban centers.

In other words, the Viet Cong attacks are seen as a sign of weakness foreshadowing a major U.S. military breakthrough.

CIA RAISES DOUBTS

The CIA, on the other hand, reportedly has raised doubts as to whether the captured documents show conclusively that the attacks were designed as a conventional military operation to gain territory, rather than a guerrilla campaign to lay the psychological groundwork for longer range objectives.

The CIA's reports are based on information provided by its agents in Vietnam as well as by the normal channels of military intelligence.

The CIA's pessimism on Vietnam is understood to be based principally on the fact that, as its agent network has grown in size and efficiency, it has detected more and more Viet Cong sympathizers and more Viet Cong influence.

In short, if the CIA's information is valid, the Communists are a much more powerful force in South Vietnam than was believed by the administration when the decision was made to commit large numbers of U.S. troops three years ago.

Handwritten signature
2. Profile
ACTION

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Wednesday, March 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Libyan Prime Minister

Don Hornig is stopping in Libya on his way to his Paris meetings. He will represent us at the Tripoli International Fair. He will meet the new young Libyan Prime Minister and would like to carry with him the attached letter of greetings from you. He leaves tomorrow at 2:00 p. m.

His trip and your letter are good ideas for two reasons:

1. Libya now has enough oil money so that AID can no longer operate there, but Libya desperately needs foreign experts to help it spend its money wisely. We have had a hard time organizing our participation because no part of the USG has a strong mandate to operate in this sort of post-AID situation, even though recipient countries can pay most of the bill. Through sheer resourcefulness, State has persuaded a private team to survey Libya's medical and health needs. Don's trip will emphasize that--although we're having trouble getting started in this field--we do consider Libya important and want to participate in its development.

2. Prime Minister Bakkush is the most promising prime minister Libya has had. He understands development and is bringing young and capable people into his government. If anyone has a chance of capturing the energies of restless young experts, his odds seem much better than even. The main problem in determining Libya's future political leanings is to entrench a moderate government that can produce economic results before stagnation ends in a leftist explosion and takeover. He will be a leading candidate for a visit with you when that can be worked out. A letter for Don to carry with him would be a useful gesture.

Attached for your signature if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

March 6, 1968

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am glad that Dr. Hornig's visit gives me this opportunity to reaffirm the deep interest of the United States in the welfare and progress of the Kingdom of Libya.

I know that Dr. Hornig, one of our most distinguished scientists and my personal advisor on science and technology, is delighted at this chance to satisfy his desire for further knowledge about Libya's extraordinary development. I am looking forward to hearing his firsthand report because I, too, wish to know more of your achievements.

I also wish to stress how greatly I value the friendly ties between our two countries, and I should appreciate your conveying to His Majesty King Idris I my warm personal wishes.

You, Mr. Prime Minister, have undertaken a difficult task at an exciting time in Libya's history. I wish you every success in your work.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
'Abd al-Hamid al-Bakkush
Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Libya
Tripoli

LBJ:HHS:tmt 3/6/68

Pres. file

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday, March 6, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a proposed reply to Prime Minister Senanayake of Ceylon. Senanayake wants us to increase our pledge at this week's meeting of the Ceylon Aid Group in Paris.

Our current aid amounts to about \$15 million a year in food (with another \$2.5 million through CARE). AID/State are studying the possibilities for added help to Ceylon, but everyone agrees for now that we can't do more than maintain our pledge at \$15 million. Development loan money is too slim to encourage the Ceylonese this early in the year. We are looking for ways to get more PL 480 into Ceylon.

I recommend you approve this message. It lets Senanayake down easy and keeps the door open if we find some money later.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

See me _____

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-250
By cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

WWR:EKH:RM:lw
Att: File 850 and 740

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

19a

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO
PRIME MINISTER SENANAYAKE
OF CEYLON

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I appreciated your writing me about the importance you attach to the Aid Group Meeting in Paris this week. Our representative in Paris will be fully prepared to discuss any and all issues connected with Ceylon's economic situation and aid requirements. I want you to know that, despite our serious balance of payments problem, we intend to maintain our support in the Aid Group at no less than the present level. And we shall continue to explore other ways we might be helpful within the limitations of our financial situation and the restraints imposed by our Congress.

You can take much pride in the report of the World Bank that your Government has set in motion a genuine growth effort in Ceylon. Your successful agricultural programs are an example of what hard work and imaginative leadership can accomplish. I recently sent Mr. Eugene Rostow to the UNCTAD meeting in New Delhi to encourage just this kind of creative action.

I know, Mr. Prime Minister, the political problems you face in carrying forward vital but difficult economic measures. You have shown great wisdom and courage. Your statesmanship will make possible a brighter future for all the people of Ceylon. I look forward to hearing

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-250
By Cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

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- 2 -

from you again whenever you wish to share your thoughts on these matters which concern us both so deeply.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency

Dudley Senanayake

Prime Minister of Ceylon

Colombo.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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*Embassy of Ceylon
Washington, D. C.*

The Ambassador of Ceylon presents his compliments to the Honorable The Secretary of State and has the honor to forward a communication addressed to His Excellency Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States of America, by the Honorable Dudley Senanayake, M.P., Prime Minister of Ceylon.

It will be appreciated if the communication is forwarded to The White House.

A copy of the letter is attached for reference.

The Ambassador of Ceylon avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Honorable The Secretary of State the assurances of his highest consideration.

February 19, 1963.

Colombo, 11th February, 1968.

My dear President,

The World Bank has arranged to hold the fourth meeting of countries interested in providing financial assistance to Ceylon in Paris on 7th March, 1968, in order to review recent economic developments and the future foreign assistance needs of Ceylon. I am addressing this letter to you to stress the importance of this meeting and of its outcome as far as my country is concerned.

The World Bank has already circulated a report on our problems and needs as a background to the forthcoming meeting. I am gratified to see the Bank's conclusion that "it is very much to the credit of the Government that since 1965 a holding operation has been transformed into a growth effort." Our efforts have been particularly successful in the field of domestic agriculture where the rather ambitious targets we set for 1967 were surpassed. These results augur well for the future and there is every prospect that the momentum of growth could be sustained.

We have had, however, to implement our plans and programmes in the background of unprecedented difficulties in the external field. Our export earnings in 1966 and 1967 were 13 per cent and 15 per cent below the level of 1965. On the other hand, prices of imports rose steeply reflecting a sharp increase in the price of rice and other food imports, in freight rates and so on. Aid flows themselves were delayed and it was only in 1967 that Aid arrivals reached a sizable magnitude.

We have faced these difficulties as best as we can and we have not hesitated to take protective measures unpopular though these might be. For example we halved the rice ration, devalued the rupee and introduced the strictest economies in imports.

MORZ

I need hardly say that we are determined to adhere to the path we have chosen - the path of growth and development. We do so in the firm expectation that in this we will continue to receive the support of our friends abroad. In this endeavor, the need for additional external resources is critical. The World Bank has urged upon the members of the Aid Group the vital importance of increasing the quantum of external assistance above previous levels. This is necessary not to sustain consumption, but to provide the import requirements for increasing the tempo of growth.

The next Aid Meeting is for us a crucial one. We have now about two years before the life-time of the present Parliament ends and elections are due. Our development effort will have, within this time, to make a meaningful impact and to offset the repercussions of our adverse external fortunes. We must, therefore, accelerate our efforts with the assistance of our friends abroad. I

am acutely aware of the fact that our request for assistance comes at a time of severe economic difficulties for many of the donor countries. But I am hopeful that despite these difficulties your Government together with other donor Governments will find it possible to provide the necessary additional external resources required for our programs of economic recovery and growth.

I would like once more to convey to you the thanks of my Government for the participation of your country in the programmes of assistance to Ceylon.

With warmest personal wishes,

Yours sincerely,

DUDLEY SENANAYAKE.

His Excellency Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.
U.S.A.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - March 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Panama

Pres file

There has been no change during the past 36 hours in the Panama situation.

Following the understanding reached last Monday, each side is waiting for the other to carry out its part of the bargain. Robles is supposed to name a new "apolitical" Cabinet, but says he wants Arias to suspend the impeachment proceedings against him first. Arias, in the absence of Cabinet changes, is proceeding cautiously with impeachment. He wants to keep the pressure on Robles without pressing an impeachment he might not be able to enforce.

Meanwhile, National Guard Commander is remaining strictly neutral and keeping both sides apart.

The crowds brought into Panama City by both sides, and which posed the possibility of a clash, have gone home. The atmosphere in Panama City is more relaxed today.

State has sent messages to our Embassies in Costa Rica, Panama and Colombia asking their views on getting Presidents Lleras and Trejos to suggest OAS electoral observers to Robles to help cool the situation. Based on the reactions, we will decide whether to press this idea. State is keeping Bob Anderson fully informed of developments.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-250
By Cl, NARA Date 11-3-97

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-250
By CB, NARA Date 11-3-97

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Wednesday - March 6, 1968

SUBJECT: Ecuador

Pres file

Last Saturday President Arosemena reshuffled his cabinet. He dropped Foreign Minister Julio Prado, the architect of his Punta del Este posture and the ouster of Ambassador Coerr. In his place he appointed Gustavo Larrea, until recently Ambassador in Washington.

Because Larrea is such a good friend of the United States, this is obviously intended as a conciliatory gesture toward us. In return, Arosemena hopes you will respond by appointing a new Ambassador. This was made clear when Larrea flew to Venezuela two weeks ago to talk to Covey Oliver about the impending cabinet changes.

Other indications of Arosemena's desire to kiss-and-make-up prior to elections (June 2) and transfer of power (September 1) are:

1. his reasonably cooperative and conciliatory attitude on the joint review of their complaints about the AID program;
2. no attacks on the Alliance since September 1967;
3. the prompt release without publicity of a US tuna boat seized by an Ecuadorean frigate last week.

Our Charge in Quito recommends that we respond favorably to these conciliatory actions, short of sending a new Ambassador until after the June elections. Among the things he suggests are:

1. let it be known publicly around April 1 that appointment of a new Ambassador is under active consideration;
2. resume low-level technical talks on pending loan applications (in the understanding that negotiations would not be completed until termination of Arosemena's mandate).

Covey Oliver will be sending you his recommendation on how we might proceed. I will withhold judgment until I see what Covey advises. In any event, we should say nothing about consideration of a new Ambassador to Ecuador until you fill the vacancies at Buenos Aires and Montevideo. There are indications that the Argentines and Uruguayans are a little restive on this score. They would take amiss any indication that Ecuador is receiving prior attention.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-343
By ju, NARA, Date 2-1-93

Mr. Rostow

27

2. P. profile

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, March 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for the Shah of Iran

The Shah is coming to receive an honorary degree at Harvard on June 13. He would naturally like to drop in for a short chat with you. With the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf now a certainty, he will want to stay in close touch with you, and we have an interest in his cooperation with his Arab neighbors to prevent an undue increase in Soviet or Arab radical presence.

Secretary Rusk recommends that you invite the Shah to an office meeting and a small working lunch either June 12 (Wednesday) or 14 (Friday) so he can stop in on his way to or from Cambridge. We realize you just had him for a more formal visit last August and would not have recommended another meeting so soon. But since he's coming on a private invitation for a laudable purpose, it's hard not to pay him some attention.

An additional reason for the meeting is that, as you know, we maintain our relationship with the Shah via periodic contact of this sort--more frequent than is normal in other cases. Right now he is having another periodic case of annoyance and nervousness over some serious problems and decisions he faces.

In short, he's at another point of needing reassurance that he can count on us. He isn't getting what he wants from the oil companies; the British are vacating the Gulf leaving him face to face in a dispute with Saudi Arabia over tremendous oil reserves under the Persian Gulf; his military sales agreement with us is pending; Kosygin is coming in April, and the Communist clandestine radio is raking him over and appealing to his opposition; he's not doing too well with the Arabs, and he may be feeling generally isolated at the moment.

Your schedule would permit an office chat and small lunch on either June 12 or 14.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓
Wednesday, June 12 ✓
Friday, June 14 _____

Disapprove _____

CONFIDENTIAL

22a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-341
By ju, NARA, Date 5-27-92

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Invitation to the Shah of Iran
During Visit to the U.S.

Recommendation:

That you invite the Shah of Iran to pay a private visit to the White House on June 12 or June 14, 1968.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The Shah is coming to this country to receive an honorary degree from Harvard on June 13. He would appreciate an invitation to pay a brief private visit to you either just before or just after he goes to Cambridge. An office meeting and small lunch on either June 12 or June 14, whichever is more convenient for you, would be a useful opportunity to talk with this close and valued friend from the Middle East. With the forthcoming departure of the British from the Persian Gulf, the role of Iran in the area will become increasingly significant.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

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Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, March 6, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

23
Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Six Ambassadors at Ernie Goldstein's Lunch
Thursday, March 7, 1:00 P. M.

The Group

Germany - Ambassador Knappstein (Knap-Shtein)
Portugal - Ambassador Garin (Gar-in)
Denmark - Ambassador Ronne (Ru-nuh)
Romania - Ambassador Bogdan (Bog-dan)
Japan - Ambassador SHimoda (She-mo-da)
Guyana - Ambassador (Sir John) Carter

This is a very mixed group of Ambassadors. West and East European, Caribbean and Japanese. Broad topics are most appropriate.

You may wish to make the following points:

- Despite differences of geography and ideology, we all have an intense desire to build a secure and peaceful world.
- In Europe we are engaged with our allies in an effort to improve East-West relations.
- In Asia we are meeting our commitment to freedom.
- We are devoting resources and energy to help the developing countries.
- Cooperation among developed countries is essential if we are to strengthen and improve the international trade and financial system.
- We place special emphasis on stopping the arms race.
- The General Assembly Session this spring will consider the Non - Proliferation Treaty and we hope that a treaty can be signed as soon as possible. (Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister Macovescu has just completed a secret visit here to discuss the NPT with Secretary Rusk. While the Romanians put forward a number of objections and hope for improvements in the text, they also indicated they expected to sign the treaty in the end.)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-250

By CB, NARA Date 11-3-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- Express pleasure at meeting with the Ambassadors. Express understanding of the importance their reports are given in their own capitals. Express confidence that these reports will interpret our deeds and aspirations accurately, fairly, and wisely.

Attached are fact sheets for each country, giving a biographical sketch of each Ambassador and summarizing bilateral issues.

W. W. Rostow

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23a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GERMANY

Ambassador Karl Heinrich Knapstein

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State let 10/5/78

By ip/ry, NARA, Date 3-23-92

1. Biographic Data

In Washington since September 1962. Born 1906, educated in Germany. Former journalist and radio commentator. Diplomatic service since 1950, serving in Chicago, Madrid, UN Headquarters, and FRG Foreign Office in Bonn. Friendly and helpful. Married, two daughters.

2. US-German Relations

US-German relations are excellent. Specific matters of mutual interest include:

A. Balance-of-Payments. German reaction to the U.S. balance-of-payments program has been generally favorable. There is concern that measures we might take in the trade field would be contrary to our common objective of trade liberalization. Under Secretary Rostow recently discussed the neutralization of U.S. military costs in Bonn.

B. US Troop Levels. The Germans anticipate that there may be reductions in US force levels in Europe (without corresponding Soviet reductions) as a result of the Mansfield Resolution, Viet-Nam and the balance-of-payments problem.

C. FRG Eastern Policy. The FRG is trying to improve relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe, parallel to the policy you announced for the U.S. in October 1966. We have assured them of our support.

D. Viet-Nam. The FRG has continued to express official understanding and sympathy for U.S. policy, and has a small but useful aid program there. Student unrest, some of which is channeled into protests against Viet-Nam, plagues Germany as it does other countries.

3. Suggested Conversational Topics

Tell him that you welcome German cooperation with our balance-of-payments program. Assure him of our continued understanding of the FRG Eastern policy. His Chancellor and Foreign Minister have recently been in Paris. He may have impressions of that visit.

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23b
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PORTUGAL

Authority State br 10/5/78
By ip/rs, NARA, Date 3/23/92

Ambassador (Dr.) Vasco Vieira GARIN

1. Biographic Data

Garin, a career diplomat for 37 years, has been Ambassador to the United States since April 1964. He previously served as Ambassador at the U. N., Minister to Canada, India, Thailand, and Ceylon. He served in Washington from 1940 to 1946.

Garin, 61, is beginning to show the wear and tear of 13 years of difficult diplomatic posts. His attitude toward the U. S. reflects his country's frustration and resentment over U. S. policy of advocating self-determination for Portugal's African territories and U. S. restrictions against the use of U. S. military equipment in the territories.

Mrs. Garin is of British origin. Both speak English fluently. His step-daughter is married to an American; he has two American grandchildren.

2. U. S. -Portuguese Relations

While disagreement on Africa casts a pervasive shadow over our bilateral relations we were able to achieve satisfactory understandings on a number of economic questions in 1967 (cotton, tobacco, Kennedy Round, coffee, international monetary issues). Portugal has neither actively supported nor opposed our position on European and NATO questions.

3. Visitors from Portugal

Foreign Minister FRANCO NOGUEIRA visited the U. S. in November 1967.

4. Suggested Conversational Topics

a. NBC-TV TODAY show recently originated its broadcasts from Portugal, Brought into millions of American homes Portugal's interesting history, beautiful country and friendly people.

b. Despite differences over our respective estimates on situation in Portuguese Africa, U. S. values its cooperative relationship with Portugal in many other areas such as NATO.

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23c

DENMARK

Ambassador Torben Henning RØNNE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ex 10/5/78
By ep/y, NARA, Date 3/23/92

1. Biographic Data

Rønne, a 48 year old career diplomat has been Ambassador to the United States since April 1965. He has served previously in the Foreign Ministry at Copenhagen, in Paris and Rome.

Ambassador Rønne is favorably disposed toward the United States and easy to deal with. He is a relatively young man, by Danish standards, to hold such an important ambassadorial post. He converses easily in English. He is married but the Rønnes have no children. The Ambassador, whose father was a sea captain, is interested in sailing.

2. US-Danish Relations

Relations between the US and Denmark have long been close and cordial. The spirit of cooperation between our two countries has been notably manifest in the handling of the many problems arising from the crash of the B-52 at Thule on January 21. On major international issues, the Danes are almost always in agreement with the United States. There has been considerable Danish apprehension about US policies in Vietnam but official statements on Vietnam have been relatively restrained.

3. Visitors from Denmark

Jens Otto Krag and Hans Tabor, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister respectively in the Danish Government which held power until February 1 of this year, visited Washington last Fall. Mr. Krag dined with President Johnson during his unofficial visit in late October.

4. Suggested Conversational Topics

Refer to the installation of Denmark's new, non-socialist Government on February 2. It would be appropriate to ask how the Baunsgaard government is progressing, now that it has been in office for a month.

March 11 is the birthday of King Frederik. It would be appropriate to offer congratulations and inquire after the King's health.

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ROMANIA

DECLASSIFIED

Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan

Authority State let 10/5/78
By ep/rs, NARA, Date 3/23/92

1. Biographic Data

In Washington since July 1967. Born 1921. Career diplomat. Stationed in Bucharest except for tour as Counselor in Washington, 1951-53. Speaks excellent English and French. Affable, easy to talk to.

2. US-Romanian Relations

Quite cordial despite Vietnam, chiefly because of Romania's outspoken and persistent assertion of independence of USSR in both political and economic fields. Romania refused break relations with Israel last summer. US and Romania actively seeking closer bilateral ties but progress handicapped by Firestone case (1964) when US firm withdrew, under domestic right-wing pressures, from agreement to build synthetic rubber plant; by prohibition on Exim credits; and by lack of MFN treatment. No major issues.

3. Visitor from Romania

Prime Minister Maurer. Visited President last summer, had friendly exchange of views with President on Vietnam, other international issues, and bilateral relations.

4. Suggested Conversational Topics

Express gratification that Ambassador is traveling so extensively in US.

Express hope and confidence in mutually beneficial economic cooperation.

Say we are following with interest Romania's economic development and its determined course of independence based on its national interests and concern for international peace.

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not automatically declassified.

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JAPAN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ltr 10/5/78
By ep/hg, NARA, Date 3/23/92

Ambassador Takeso SHIMODA

1. Biographic Data

Shimoda, a career diplomat, has been Ambassador here since May 1967. Previously he was Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, the top career position in the Foreign Office in Tokyo. Served in Paris, The Hague, Shanghai, Brussels and Moscow, in the latter two as Ambassador.

Shimoda speaks English well. He is strongly pro-Western and has been cooperative and understanding of U. S. views. He advocates Japan assuming a more realistic posture on defense.

2. US-Japan Relations

Relations are close and extensive. U. S. bases in Japan and Okinawa have played a vital role in our efforts in Korea and Vietnam. Japanese Government has supported our Vietnam policy; Prime Minister Sato last year visited Saigon. Japan is providing significant benefits to our balance of payments this year despite its own serious deficit position. Japan has doubled its foreign economic aid since 1964, especially in Southeast Asia. Japan is our second most important trading partner. U. S. has agreed to return Bonin Islands to Japan in near future. Major long-range problem is reversion of Okinawa. Japanese are very concerned about protectionist sentiment in Congress and possible U. S. trade measures such as border tax.

3. Suggested Conversational Topics

Highly successful visit to Washington by Prime Minister Sato in November 1967. Note that Japan will hold first world exposition (EXPO 70 at Osaka) in Asia and will host 1972 Winter Olympics.

Observe an increasing gravitation world interest to Asia and particularly Japan which soon to become third ranking economic power behind U. S. and USSR. Economic impact also great, i. e., mutually profitable two-way trade of almost \$6 billion last year.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

23f

GUYANA

Ambassador (Sir) John Carter

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Sec 10/5/78

By sp/ry, NARA, Date 3/23/92

1. Biographic Data

Guyana's first Ambassador to U.S., recently appointed also Guyana Permanent Representative to UN; here since Guyana Independence in May 1966. Born 1919, in then British Guiana; MA from London University, and LL.B from Middle Temple (London). Prominent attorney and politician in Guyana since WWII and former law partner of Prime Minister Burnham. Knighted on June 1966. Married to former American cover girl and fashion model, the former Sara Lou Harris of North Carolina. Two small boys.

2. US-Guyana Relations

US-Guyana relations have been close since Burnham coalition government defeated communist-oriented Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party in December 1964. US instituted substantial AID program in early 1965.

Guyana Elections are to be held late in 1968. Jagan, supported by East Indians (nearly 1/2 population) is expected to lose, but vote will be close. We favor Burnham and his coalition partner Peter D'Aguiar (head of United Force).

Border Disputes with Venezuela and Surinam plague Burnham who has periodically requested US to urge moderation on his neighbors. We are officially neutral but have given Venezuelans and Dutch our estimate that extreme pressures on Burnham prior to elections could help Jagan.

3. Visitors from Guyana

Burnham came to Washington in January for a checkup at Bethesda Naval Hospital. His health good. He called on President and Secretary.

4. Suggested Conversational Topics

Ambassador's difficult task working at UN and in Washington; outlook for Guyana elections; recent moves toward Caribbean integration -- Caribbean Free Trade Area, Development Bank, and Regional Secretariat.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, March 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Civil Air Agreement with Czechoslovakia

Pres file

The civil air negotiations with Czechoslovakia ended successfully on February 9. State requests approval to sign the ad referendum agreement reached during the negotiations. The Civil Aeronautic Board concurs in recommending that it be signed.

The agreement will regularize a temporary arrangement begun in July 1965 under which the Czechs unilaterally permitted Pan American to service Prague. An earlier formal agreement reached with the Czech Government in 1946 became inoperative two years after the 1948 communist takeover of Czechoslovakia.

The Czechs did not have the right to service the U. S. under the temporary arrangement. Under the new agreement they would have that right, but there are no prospects of their flying here for at least 18 months.

The agreement will provide further indication that progress can be made with the Eastern Europeans despite Vietnam. The Czechs accepted our standard form Air Transport Agreement and granted us rights beyond Prague without insisting on onward rights to South America for themselves. If the agreement is confirmed, we would hope to use it as a model in any future negotiations with other Eastern European countries.

Pan American, the only U. S. airline on this route, is pleased with the proposed agreement.

Extensive soundings were taken on the Hill in 1966 to clear the way for beginning negotiations. The staffs of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees were sounded out again last week; they knew of no problems to going ahead.

The State Department plans to issue a press release when the agreement is signed, although we do not expect it will receive much notice. (The State Department issued a brief press release on February 9 announcing the conclusion of the current round of talks. It received routine press treatment.)

I concur in State's recommendation that you approve the agreement.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____ Disapprove _____ Call me _____

MWg
MGW:mm



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

24a
in Fred
2-Rel.
By Davis

IN REPLY REFER TO:
S/S 3195

February 23, 1968

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Air Transport Agreement with Czechoslovakia

The civil air negotiations with Czechoslovakia ended successfully on February 9, 1968. As anticipated in my memorandum of February 2, ad referendum agreement was reached on the text of an air transport agreement, including a route schedule and related exchange of letters containing supplementary understandings on the critical issue of ticket sales/currency conversion. Copies of these documents are attached. With the following exceptions, they remain as described in the background memoranda attached to my memos of February 2 and January 22:

- 1. ARBITRATION. amended to shorten the the third arbitrator could not themselves. Article XII. request of the Czechs, the article was persons who might be chosen to select ent that the two Contracting Parties the selection. See Paragraph 2(b),
- 2. ROUTES. The Schedule to the Agree promise on routes is reflected in the
- Pan American Air only US airline designated for scheduled service to Prague, i with the results from the commercial standpoint, and the C nautics Board is well satisfied. In the Department's view, t eement also is beneficial in the context of overall relations hoslovakia and the President's program for building bridges ntain Europe. On several occasions during the negotiations, Mr. aniel Davis expressed White House interest in the achievement of an agreement in this round.

We are gratified that the Czechs accepted our standard form air transport agreement, especially the capacity and rate provisions, and that we obtained extensive rights beyond Prague without giving Czechoslovakia a route beyond the US to Latin America. If the agreement is confirmed by both Governments, we hope to use it as a model in future negotiations with other Eastern European countries, when and as bilateral air transport agreements with such other countries become desirable.

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White House approval of the ad referendum agreement is recommended.
The Civil Aeronautics Board concurs.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures: Texts of Agreement and
letter exchange

U-Mr Katzenbach ^{HR} LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
E/AN: JJFerretti:mpp 2/15/68


AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

24b

The Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,

Desiring to conclude an agreement for the purpose of
promoting air transport relations between the United States
of America and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each Contracting Party grants to the other Contracting
Party the following rights necessary for the operation of
air services by the designated airlines of the other
Contracting Party: The right of transit; the right to land
for non-traffic purposes; and the right to take on and
discharge international traffic in passengers, cargo, and
mail, separately or in combination, at the points in its
territory named on each of the routes specified in the
appropriate paragraph of the Schedule of this Agreement.

ARTICLE II

Air service on a route specified in the Schedule of
this Agreement may be inaugurated by an airline or airlines
of one Contracting Party at any time after that Contracting
Party has designated such airline or airlines for that
route and the appropriate authorities of the other
Contracting Party have given the necessary permission. Subject
to the provisions of Article III of this Agreement, such
authorities shall give this permission with a minimum of
procedural delay.

ARTICLE III

(1) Each Contracting Party reserves the right to
withhold, revoke or impose conditions on the operating
permission of the airline or airlines designated by the
other Contracting Party in the following circumstances:

(a) In the event of failure by such airline to
qualify before the aeronautical authorities of that
Contracting Party under the laws and regulations normally
applied by these authorities to the operation of international
air services;

(b) in the event of failure by such airline to comply with the laws and regulations referred to in Article IV of this Agreement; or

(c) In any case where the aeronautical authorities of that Contracting Party are not satisfied that substantial ownership and effective control of such airline are vested in the Contracting Party designating the airline or in nationals of that Contracting Party or, in the event of a consortium of airlines, in the Government or nationals of the States whose airlines comprise that consortium; provided that, with respect to a consortium, air transport agreements providing for the air service in question are in force between the Contracting Party from which operating permission is being sought and each of the States whose airlines comprise the consortium.

(2) Unless immediate action to withhold or revoke operating permission is essential to prevent further infringement of the laws and regulations referred to in Article IV of this Agreement, the right to withhold or revoke such permission under the present Article shall be exercised only after consultation with the appropriate authorities of the other Contracting Party.

ARTICLE IV

(1) The laws and regulations of one Contracting Party relating to the admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation, or to the operation and navigation of such aircraft while within its territory, shall be applied to the aircraft of the airline or airlines designated by the other Contracting Party and shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entrance into or departure from and while within the territory of the first Contracting Party.

(2) The laws and regulations of one Contracting Party relating to the admission to or departure from its territory of passengers, crew or cargo of aircraft, including regulations relating to entry, clearance, immigration, passports, customs, and quarantine, shall be complied with by or on behalf of such passengers, crew or cargo of the airline or airlines of the other Contracting Party upon entrance into or departure from and while within the territory of the first Contracting Party.

ARTICLE V

Certificates of airworthiness, certificates of competency, and licenses, issued or rendered valid by one Contracting

Party and still in force, shall be recognized as valid by the other Contracting Party for the purpose of operating the routes and services provided for in this Agreement, provided that the requirements under which such certificates or licenses were issued or rendered valid are equal to or above the minimum standards which may be established pursuant to the Convention. Each Contracting Party reserves the right, however, to refuse to recognize, for the purpose of flight above its own territory, certificates of competency and licenses granted to its own nationals by the other Contracting Party.

ARTICLE VI

Each Contracting Party may impose or permit to be imposed just and reasonable charges for the use of airports and other facilities under its control. Such charges shall not be higher than the charges imposed for use by its national aircraft engaged in similar international services.

ARTICLE VII

(1) Each Contracting Party shall exempt the designated airlines of the other Contracting Party on a basis of reciprocity and to the fullest extent possible under its laws and regulations from import restrictions, customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees, and other national duties and charges on fuel, lubricating oils, consumable technical supplies, spare parts including engines, regular equipment, ground equipment, stores, and other items intended for use solely in connection with the operation or servicing of aircraft of the airlines of such other Contracting Party in international air service.

(2) The exemptions granted by this Article shall apply to items:

(a) Introduced into the territory of one Contracting Party by the designated airlines of the other Contracting Party;

(b) Retained on aircraft of the designated airlines of one Contracting Party upon arriving in or leaving the territory of the other Contracting Party; or

(c) Taken on board aircraft of the designated airlines of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other and intended for use in international air service; whether or not such items are used or consumed wholly within the territory of the Contracting Party granting the exemption.

(3) With the consent of the appropriate customs authorities and upon payment of any customs duty if required, items exempted in accordance with paragraph (2)(a) may be used for purposes other than those specified in paragraph (1).

ARTICLE VIII

(1) There shall be a fair and equal opportunity for the airlines of each Contracting Party to operate on any route covered by this Agreement.

(2) In the operation by the airlines of either Contracting Party of the air services described in this Agreement, the interest of the airlines of the other Contracting Party shall be taken into consideration so as not to affect unduly the services which the latter provide on all or part of the same route.

(3) The air services made available to the public by the airlines operating under this Agreement shall bear a close relationship to the requirements of the public for such services.

(4) Services provided by a designated airline under this Agreement shall retain as their primary objective the provision of capacity adequate to the traffic demands between the country of which such airline is a national and the countries of ultimate destination of the traffic. The right to embark or disembark on such services international traffic destined for and coming from third countries at a point or points on the routes specified in this Agreement shall be exercised in accordance with the general principles of orderly development to which both Contracting Parties subscribe and shall be subject to the general principle that capacity should be related to:

(a) Traffic requirements between the country of origin and the countries of ultimate destination of the traffic;

(b) The requirements of through airline operations; and

(c) The traffic requirements of the area through which the airline passes after taking account of local and regional services.

(5) Neither Contracting Party shall restrict the airline or airlines of the other Contracting Party with respect to capacity, frequency, scheduling or type of aircraft employed in connection with services over any of the routes specified in the Schedule of this Agreement. In the event that one of the Contracting Parties believes that the operations conducted by an airline of the other Contracting Party have been inconsistent with the standards and principles set forth in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) or (4) of this Article,

It may request consultations pursuant to Article 1 of this Agreement for the purpose of review; the operations in question determine whether they are in conformity with said standards and principles.

ARTICLE IX

(1) All rates to be charged by an airline of one Contracting Party to or from points in the territory of the other Contracting Party shall be established at reasonable levels, due regard being paid to all relevant factors, such as costs of operation, reasonable profit, and the rates charged by any other airline, as well as the characteristics of each service. Such rates shall be subject to the approval of the aeronautical authorities of the Contracting Parties, who shall act in accordance with their obligations under this Agreement, within the limits of their legal powers.

(2) Any rate proposed to be charged by an airline of either Contracting Party for carriage to or from the territory of the other Contracting Party, shall, if so required, be filed by such airline with the aeronautical authorities of the other Contracting Party at least thirty (30) days before the proposed date of introduction unless the Contracting Party with whom the filing is to be made permits filing on shorter notice. The aeronautical authorities of each Contracting Party shall use their best efforts to insure that the rates charged and collected conform to the rates filed with either Contracting Party and that no carrier rebates any portion of such rates by any means, directly or indirectly.

(3) It is recognized by both Contracting Parties that during any period for which the aeronautical authorities of either Contracting Party have approved the traffic conference procedures of the International Air Transport Association or other associations of international air carriers, any rate agreements concluded through these procedures and involving airlines of that Contracting Party will be subject to the approval of the aeronautical authorities of that Contracting Party.

(4) If a Contracting Party, on receipt of the notification referred to in paragraph (2) of this Article, is dissatisfied with the rate proposed, it shall so inform the other Contracting Party at least fifteen (15) days prior to the date that such rate would otherwise become effective, and the aeronautical authorities of both Contracting Parties shall endeavor to reach agreement on the appropriate rate.

(5) If a Contracting Party, upon review of an existing rate charged for carriage to or from its territory by an airline of the other Contracting Party is dissatisfied with

that rate, it shall so notify the other Contracting Party and the aeronautical authorities of both Contracting Parties shall endeavor to reach agreement on the appropriate rate.

(6) In the event that an agreement is reached pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (4) or (5) of this Article, each Contracting Party will exercise its best efforts to put such rate into effect.

(7) (a) If under the circumstances set forth in paragraph (4) no agreement can be reached prior to the date that such rate would otherwise become effective, or

(b) If under the circumstances set forth in paragraph (5) no agreement can be reached prior to the expiry of sixty (60) days from the date of notification:

then the Contracting Party raising the objection to the rate may take such steps as it may consider necessary to prevent the inauguration or the continuation of the service in question at the rate complained of, provided, however, that the Contracting Party raising the objection shall not require the charging of a rate higher than the lowest rate charged by its own airline or airlines for comparable service between the same pair of points.

(8) When in any case under paragraphs (4) and (5) of this Article the aeronautical authorities of the two Contracting Parties cannot agree within a reasonable time upon the appropriate rate after consultation initiated by the complaint of one Contracting Party concerning the proposed rate or an existing rate of the airline or airlines of the other Contracting Party, upon the request of either, the appropriate provisions of Article XII of this Agreement shall apply. In rendering its decision or award, the arbitral tribunal shall be guided by the principles laid down in this Article.

ARTICLE X

Subject to the further understandings incorporated in the exchange of letters attached to this Agreement, the following provisions shall govern the commercial operations and opportunities of the designated airlines of each Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party:

(a) Each designated airline has the right to engage in the sale of air transportation in the territory of the other Contracting Party either directly or, in its discretion, through approved agents. Such airline shall have the right to sell such transportation, and any person shall be free to purchase such transportation, in the currency of that territory or in freely convertible currencies of other countries.

(b) Any rate specified in terms of the national currency of one of the Contracting Parties shall be established in an amount which reflects the effective exchange rate (including all exchange fees or other charges) at which the airlines of both Parties can convert and remit the revenues from their transport operations into the national currency of the other Party.

(c) Each designated airline has the right to convert and remit to its country surplus earnings in excess of sums locally disbursed resulting from revenues in the territory of the other Contracting Party. Conversion and remittance of such surplus earnings shall be at the official rate of exchange in effect for the sale of transportation at the time such surplus is presented for conversion and remittance. The transferred earnings shall be exempted from taxation or any other restriction and the conversion and remittances shall be permitted promptly.

Either Contracting Party may at any time request consultations with the appropriate authorities of the other Contracting Party on questions concerning the interpretation, application or amendment of this Agreement. Such consultations shall begin within a period of sixty (60) days from the date the other Contracting Party receives the request, unless otherwise agreed by the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE XII

(1) If any dispute arises between the Contracting Parties with respect to matters covered by this Agreement or any amendment thereto, the Contracting Parties shall use their best efforts to settle such dispute in the first instance through the consultations provided for in Article XI. Any dispute not satisfactorily adjusted through such consultations shall, upon request of either Party, be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the procedure set forth therein.

(2) Arbitration shall be by a tribunal of three arbitrators constituted as follows:

(a) One arbitrator shall be named by each Contracting Party within 60 days of the date of delivery by either Contracting Party to the other of a request for arbitration. Within 30 days after such period of 60 days, the two arbitrators so designated shall by agreement designate a third arbitrator, who shall not be a national of either Contracting Party.

(b) If the third arbitrator cannot be agreed on in accordance with paragraph (a), the Contracting Parties shall, within 30 days following the 30-day period provided for in paragraph (a), agree that either the President of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization or the Director General of the International Air Transport Association shall select the third arbitrator. In no case shall such third arbitrator be a national of either Contracting Party.

(3) Each Contracting Party shall use its best efforts consistent with its national law to put into effect any decision or award of the arbitral tribunal.

(4) The expenses of the arbitral tribunal, including the fees and expenses of the arbitrators, shall be shared equally by the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE XIII

This Agreement and all amendments thereto shall be registered with the International Civil Aviation Organization.

ARTICLE XIV

Either Contracting Party may at any time notify the other Contracting Party of its intention to terminate this Agreement. Such notice shall be sent simultaneously to the International Civil Aviation Organization. The Agreement shall terminate six months after the date of receipt of the notice of intention to terminate, unless by agreement between the Contracting Parties such notice is withdrawn before the expiration of that time.

ARTICLE XV

This Agreement shall supersede the Air Transport Agreement between the United States of America and the Czechoslovak Republic signed at Prague on January 3, 1946.

ARTICLE XVI

(1) "Agreement" shall mean this Agreement and the Schedule attached thereto and any amendments thereof.

(2) "Aeronautical authorities" shall mean, in the case of the United States of America, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and in the case of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Ministry of Transport, Civil Aviation Administration, or, in both cases, any person or agency authorized to perform the functions exercised at the present time by those authorities.

(3) "Designated airline" shall mean an airline that one Contracting Party has notified the other Contracting Party, in writing, to be the airline which will operate a specific route or routes listed in the Schedule of this Agreement.

(4) "Convention" means the Convention on International Civil Aviation opened for signature at Chicago December 7, 1944.

(5) The terms "territory," "air service," "international air service," and "stop for non-traffic purposes" shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in Articles 2 and 96 of the Convention.

ARTICLE XVII

This Agreement shall enter into force on the day it is signed.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE in duplicate, in the English and Czech languages, both texts being equally authentic, at _____ this _____ day of _____, one thousand' nine hundred and sixty-eight.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC:

SCHEDULE

24c

A. An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the United States shall be entitled to operate air services on the route specified, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in Czechoslovakia, at points specified in this paragraph:

From the United States via points in Ireland, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Belgium, and the Federal Republic of Germany to Prague and beyond via intermediate points to India and beyond to the United States in both directions.

With respect to beyond points between Prague and India, the designated U.S. airline(s) may make four (4) traffic stops in the following countries:

Austria
Yugoslavia
Turkey
Lebanon
Iran
Pakistan

With respect to beyond points between India and the United States, the designated U.S. airline(s) may make six (6) traffic stops in the following countries:

Thailand
Viet Nam
Malaysia
Singapore*
Indonesia
The Philippines
Hong Kong
Japan*

* Rights to both these countries will not be utilized at the same time.

The Government of the United States shall have the right to substitute for any country initially selected another of the countries listed in the same group of countries. Such right may be exercised at six (6) month intervals with 30 days' advance notice to the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

B. An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic shall be entitled to operate air services on the route specified, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in the United States of America at the points specified in this paragraph:

From Czechoslovakia via a point in the Federal Republic of Germany, or France, or the United Kingdom, points in Luxembourg, Belgium, The Netherlands and Denmark to Montreal, Canada and New York.

Montreal may be served both as a point intermediate to and beyond New York.

With respect to its selection of a point in the Federal Republic of Germany, or France, or the United Kingdom, the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic shall have the right to substitute for the point initially selected a point in either of the other two countries. Such right may be exercised at six (6) month intervals with 30 days' advance notice to the Government of the United States.

REPLY TO LETTER CONCERNING ARTICLE X

24d

Dear Mr.

I refer to your letter of _____, the text of which, translated into English, reads as follows:

INSERT AGREED TEXT

I confirm the foregoing understandings on behalf of the Government of the United States of America.

Sincerely yours,

24e

3

C. Points on any of the specified routes may, at the option of each designated airline, be omitted on any or all flights.

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conditions have been achieved for the airlines of each Contracting Party to conduct their business activities in the territory of the other Contracting Party on the basis of implementation of Article X to a mutually acceptable extent. If the consultations do not establish to the satisfaction of both Contracting Parties that mutually acceptable conditions have been achieved, and unless a further understanding is concluded, the Air Transport Agreement will expire automatically, without regard to the requirements of Article XIV, twenty-four months after the Czechoslovak designated airline inaugurates scheduled services to the United States.

I am pleased to confirm the foregoing understandings on behalf of my Government and would appreciate receiving your acknowledgment that they likewise are confirmed by the Government of the United States of America.

Sincerely yours,

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, March 5, 1968
6:10 p. m.

Free file

Mr. President:

I commend to you this evenhanded, imaginative, closely-reasoned memorandum by Bob Glasburgh on how the situation looks to the other side.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rla, NARA, Date 3-2-92

~~SECRET~~

254

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
Hanoi

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-257
By isa, NARA Date 1-20-98

TO: General Vo Nguyen Giap

FROM: Director of Intelligence and Evaluation,
Ministry of National Defense

1. This is our just completed summary analysis of operations for the first month of the Lunar Year.

2. Achievements. Based on our review of the objective facts, we conclude that we have achieved major successes against the U. S. imperialists and the puppet government and troops. As planned, during this month, we

- launched simultaneous and timely attacks on almost all towns, cities, district seats, sectors, and enemy military bases;
- achieved almost complete tactical surprise by attacking during TET;
- inflicted serious casualties on U. S. and puppet troops;
- caused the puppet troops to withdraw from the countryside in order to protect the cities, and
- as a result, seriously disrupted the so-called pacification program;
- proved to our brothers in the south that the puppet government cannot protect the cities; and
- increased dissension in the United States and showed that the Westmoreland strategy cannot win. (We have received reports that even now the Americans are re-evaluating their strategy with a view toward adopting an enclave strategy which will give us even greater freedom in the countryside.)

3. Deficiencies. On the other hand, if we are to go on to greater successes, we must admit the following serious deficiencies in the execution of your plans for this phase of the winter-spring campaign:

~~SECRET~~

- As a result of poor security and the compromise of our plans, we failed to achieve strategic surprise.

- Although we inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, our own losses increased in much greater proportion than the enemy's. Thus, our forces are more than 10% below our pre-TET strength while enemy forces have increased slightly.

- As a result of inadequate intelligence and improper execution, we failed to bring about a general uprising in the cities.

- Despite many initial successes, we have failed to hold on to any of the important towns or cities.

- We have not yet inflicted an important defeat on the U.S. forces.

- The second wave on the cities on February 17 and 18 was of insufficient intensity.

- Compromise of our plans has permitted the enemy to launch a series of spoiling attacks which have disrupted many of our planned follow-on attacks.

- As a result of enemy air attacks, we have had to delay the assault on Khe Sanh, while we have been unable to interdict the enemy's aerial resupply effort despite weather favorable to us.

- Failure to resupply our units by sea has caused serious -- though not critical -- supply shortages in the coastal provinces.

- Formation of the National Alliance Front for Democracy and Peace was premature in some areas. Since we had not yet secured certain areas militarily, we simply revealed certain covert assets without achieving favorable results.

- Although many units of the puppet troops were at half strength, we did not annihilate any major units.

- Despite our initial successes, we have failed to follow up sufficiently vigorously; we have allowed the puppet troops to recoup much of their military effectiveness.

- Although we have created a vacuum in the countryside, we have failed to follow up sufficiently vigorously to expand and consolidate our control. Despite heavy losses, we must exert maximum effort to exploit this important opportunity which has

been created. Instead of worrying about how badly we have been hurt, we must remember that the enemy is also disorganized. We must bend every effort to get more complete reports on the status of those units which were heavily engaged. Unfortunately, it may take another month before all our reports are in.

3. Alternative Strategies. Thus, despite our major successes, we must consider the alternative strategies now available to us in light of the deficiencies which have been disclosed. These are discussed below:

a. Negotiations. The Americans are eager to negotiate just for the sake of negotiating. Many Americans are simply looking for a face-saving way out. President Johnson, however, fully understands that any negotiated settlement must reflect the objective situation -- that is the facts on the ground. Thus, he is not yet ready to agree to the kind of coalition government which would enable the NLF to seize control once the American troops left. Nor is he yet willing to negotiate a cease fire which would allow NVA troops to stay in the south. This situation can only be changed by inflicting a major defeat on U.S. troops and/or bringing about a change in U.S. public opinion. Since American public opinion has been badly shaken by our winter-spring offensive, we must continue to fight on even more vigorously in the months ahead in order to negotiate later on from a position of strength. If worst comes to worst -- if for some unknown reason we should fail to improve our position, we always have the option of accepting the San Antonio formula as a basis for transforming the military struggle into a political struggle.

b. De-escalation. We always have the possibility of withdrawing our NVA troops while the Viet Cong revert to stage II insurgency. This, of course, would represent defeat -- even if only temporarily. This would be similar to the American option of an enclave strategy. It is unthinkable so long as we are undefeated on the battlefield. Only if it should become apparent in the months ahead that we cannot win militarily could we consider this possibility. While it has some important advantages over a negotiated settlement, a unilateral de-escalation would not get the American bombing off our backs unless they could be persuaded by public opinion to reciprocally de-escalate. In any event, this is an alternative which we need not consider further at this time.

~~SECRET~~

c. War of Attrition. As you so properly recognized last year after General Thanh's death, we were gradually losing the war of attrition in the south because of superior enemy fire power. As you noted at the time, a protracted war of attrition is still the proper strategy to be followed by inferior forces in most cases, but the existing circumstances prevented this from being a winning strategy. In our view there has been no change in the circumstances which should now cause us to revert to that losing strategy of a war of attrition. (This does not preclude the possibility that we might wish to revert to that strategy for a short period of time in order to prolong the war until political circumstances might be more favorable.)

d. Winter-Spring Offensive. Thus, by a matter of simple elimination we arrive at the continuation of our present strategy. Within the broad lines of this present strategy, however, there are a number of key issues which deserve your urgent consideration.

4. Key Issues.

a. Exploitation in the Countryside. We have created a vacuum in the countryside. Although the countryside is not controlled by the puppet government, we don't control it either. We urgently need to find more effective ways of quickly exploiting this vacuum so that we can establish control and widen the base for our political and military support.

b. Harassment of the Cities. In some cases our harassment campaign is of little more than nuisance value. Although the ARVN is not yet fully exploiting the weaknesses of our units encircling the cities, they will begin to do so in the near future unless we improve both the coordination and effectiveness of our harassment.

c. Attack on Khe Sanh. The enemy is fully prepared for an attack on Khe Sanh. His air campaign has imposed heavy attrition on our forces and supplies. With only 6,000 men in the Khe Sanh base, he is in effect tying down almost 20,000 of our troops which have been preparing for the attack. Thus, we must now carefully weigh the prospects of a successful Dien Bien Phu action against

- the possibility of failure, and
- alternative uses for our forces in other areas where the enemy is not expecting us (perhaps via the A Shau Valley against Hue).

d. Additional Objectives. We have troops in position to attack a number of additional locations, such as: Saigon, Quang Tri City, Hue, DaNang, Pleiku Kontum, Dak To. The questions to be decided are:

- Should we simply harass these locations or should we mount major ground attacks against them?

- Should we concentrate our forces against a few or spread our forces to attack as many as possible?

- Should any such attacks be simultaneous or sequential, and how should they be timed in relation to possible attacks on Khe Sanh?

- What are the objective chances of success of these various possibilities?

e. Timing. How long can we continue to sustain the present rate of casualties which is running more than four times the 1967 casualty rate? How long should we do so without material evidence of success?

f. Reinforcements. Can we and should we send an additional 30,000 troops to the south -- in addition to replacing current casualties -- in an effort to get back to the pre-TET force ratios? What is the minimum reserve we must keep at home to protect against the possibility of U.S. invasion -- two or three divisions or all six of those we have left?

g. Mobilization. Should we call up additional reserves? How many of the theoretical three million reserves are actually available in view of the current severe manpower shortages? How fast can we assemble, train, and equip them? How would a major call-up restrict our immediate ability to deploy troops south? Would we be able to mobilize fast enough to have any significant impact before the end of the year? Will the USSR and our allies be willing to foot the major additional costs of equipping reserves? Can they get us the equipment fast enough -- with or without enemy action to mine the ports?

h. Countering Increased Pressures. What can and should we do to counter the possibility of increased enemy pressures, such as:

- Deployment of additional troops ?
- Invasion ?
- Closing the ports ?
- Bombing the dikes ?

In the event of major increases in pressures, should we negotiate before the full effect is apparent to the enemy or should we first see how effectively we can counter his efforts ? Can our home front withstand the serious deprivations which would result ?

i. Negotiations. Should we proceed with our present time schedule for the negotiating phase ? Should we postpone a decision until we can judge the outcome of the winter-spring offensive ? If we do negotiate in accordance with the San Antonio formula, how can we force the enemy to stop bombing Laos ?

j. Logistics. How long can we logistically support the current intensity of activity in view of

-Greatly increased consumption rates of equipment and supplies ?

- Existing shortages of food supplies ?
- Increased effectiveness of air interdiction in Laos and southern North Vietnam ?
- Effective interdiction of sea resupply ?
- The impact of bad weather on Laotian supply lines beginning in April or May ?
- The improvement of bombing weather in North Vietnam in March or April ?
- Anticipated increased effectiveness of the barrier ?
- The possibility of the enemy's taking action to close down our supply lines through Cambodia ?
- The possibility of enemy actions against the ports ?

In view of the above, how many additional troops could we logistically support in the south ?

5. Detailed studies of each of these issues are now underway. We shall be prepared to discuss them at next week's meeting of the Politbureau.

~~Signature Illegible~~

Information 26

Tuesday, March 5, 1968

3:50pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: U.S. Assistance to Sicilian Earthquake Victims

The Sicilian earthquakes began on January 15. On January 16 you sent a message of sympathy to President Saragat and indicated we were ready to help. Beginning on January 16 in response to the Italian Government's request for assistance, we airlifted in the following:

A medical team, 1,000 cases of "C-rations", 250 tents, field kitchens, communications equipment, 1,300 blankets, and two 3/4 ton army trucks. U.S. aircraft also assisted in airlifting Italian supplies.

AID allocated \$185,000 from its Worldwide Disaster Relief Contingency Fund to meet the costs of United States Government relief assistance.

U.S. Military Forces in Italy donated and airlifted perishable food supplies from Naples to the disaster area, and provided personnel to assist in the erection of tents.

On January 22, the Italian Inter-Ministerial Committee, charged with coordinating Sicilian earthquake relief, informed our Embassy in Rome that it had no further requests to make for emergency assistance from the United States Government and expressed appreciation for U.S. assistance.

New tremors struck the area during the night of January 24-25. On the afternoon of January 25, the Italian Government requested United States Government assistance in supplying emergency rations to feed the new victims.

On the morning of January 26, a U.S. Air Force plane arrived in the area carrying enough rations to provide 33,000 meals. A United States Air Force plane also assisted in airlifting Italian supplies. AID authorized an additional \$25,000 for emergency relief to cover the cost of this assistance.

Last week the DOD leased to the Italian Government 1,557 two-family unit quonset huts valued at approximately \$2,450 each for a period of up to five years without charge. The first shipment is scheduled to leave the United States on March 8.

There are several bills before Congress seeking relief from immigration quota restrictions for the refugees.

Approximately 83,000 people have been displaced as a result of the Sicilian earthquakes:

19,800 are living in public buildings and private homes
37,700 are living in tents and rail cars
21,300 are in mainland Italy
4,400 are in foreign countries

Our Consulate General in Palermo reports that the victims are receiving essential shelter, food, medicine, cash payments, etc. from the Italian Government.

The Italians have not asked us for any further assistance. Our Consulate General in Palermo and our Embassy in Rome remain in close contact with Italian authorities directing assistance operations.

W. W. Rostow

MM
MGlitman:mm

INFORMATION

27

Tuesday, March 5, 1968 - 3:30 pm

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith what we believe is an authentic Hungarian account (the defector, Radvanyi) of Gen. Glap lecturing to a visiting delegation on how he took Dien Bien Phu.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

On the third day of our visit to Vietnam, the delegation visited the Museum of Party History in Hanoi. We had a distinguished tourist guide, General Giap himself. In one of the halls of the modestly furnished museum, in a group picture hanging on the wall, we discovered a youthful photograph of Ho Chi Minh. It had been taken in Paris. Ho was rising to speak in a congress of the French Communist Party. In the background of the picture Maurice Teorez and the other French party leaders were visible. In another group picture Ho Chi Minh and Pham Van Dong were standing next to Stalin on a scaffolding on Moscow's Red Square Mausoleum, on the occasion of a May-first parade. A third photograph had been taken in Peking, as Mao Tse Tung and Ho Chi Minh were shaking hands in a friendly manner after signing a friendship and cooperation agreement (?) concluded between the two countries.

In the central hall of the Museum had been placed a papier-mache model commemorating the battle of Dien Bien Phu. General Giap stepped up into a pulpit placed on one side of the model, from where the Museum's tourist guide usually narrates to groups of visitors the story of the battle. The delegation sat down on wooden benches placed facing him. Like a university professor, Giap picked up a long bamboo stick. With fanatically burning eyes, first in a soft voice, then with increasingly decisive modulation, he began to narrate the battle which sealed the victory over the French. The battle of Dien Bien Phu was essentially the last, desperate exertion of the Viet Minh guerrilla army, said the general. Had we not been victorious there, French colonial power in Vietnam would still be having its seat in Hanoi and Saigon. Our armed forces were on the verge of complete exhaustion. Our supply of rice was running out; lack of ammunition was reaching catastrophic proportions. The population had become apathetic during the long partisan war and it was becoming difficult to draft new fighters for our guerrilla army. Because of years of jungle warfare, morale in the fighting units had reached the low point. We had to put everything on one card. The supreme council of war remained in session for days and finally came to the decision that the impossible had to be attempted, a decisive battle had to be joined. We picked Dien Bien Phu as the scene of the battle. It was our assumption that General Leclerc (?), the commander of the French expeditionary forces, must feel excessively secure in the militarily (extraordinarily) fortified, mountain-girt valley of Dien Bien Phu. We knew the French military school and strategic thinking. We counted on the fact that the postwar French military leadership had not drawn a lesson from its defeat suffered during World War II at the Maginot Line and that, similarly to the Maginot Line, it considered Dien Bien Phu an impregnable fortification. Our calculations this time proved to be correct. The French could not imagine how the Vietminh could be able, through the almost impenetrable forest, to bring onto the scene units in adequate

numbers and strength and also the necessary war materiel. The task was indeed difficult, said the General. First provisions had to be made for a detailed reconnoitering of the terrain, which could be effected in a relatively short time. The second step was to organize the transportation of the forces. The road was covered by some of the fighters on bicycle, by others on foot. They carried no load whatsoever. There was one burden-bearing coolie for each soldier; these /former/ carried the hand-weapons and the ammunition, as well as the rice ration needed by the soldier and the coolie. We solved /the problem/ of transporting the artillery batteries captured from the French and /those/ received from abroad -- mostly from the Soviet Union and China -- with /the aid of/ elephants and buffaloes. To the dephants we gave military grades of rank, as /in the case of/ the soldiers, remarked Giap in a half sentence.

When we reached the area of Dien Bien Phu, continued the general, I ordered a general rest of three days. During this the political officers endeavored to raise the morale of the soldiers. They explained to them that the French could be beaten, the same way the Japanese had been beaten in World War II. If a Frenchman is hit by a bullet, it kills him just as /surely/ as it would a Vietnamese. The French are not gods by any means, repeated the political officers a hundred and a thousand times. There was, indeed, great need for this agitation, because, in all honesty, the soldiers were scared of the French.

After the three-day rest we started the siege. During the first phase of the battle we conducted typical guerrilla warfare. We attacked, only at night and wiped out only one or two French pillboxes. This was done by digging subterranean tunnels to the pillboxes, by rendering harmless the French soldiers outside the pillboxes, and then by blowing up the pillboxes. At first the French command had thought that this was only the usual partisan attack, which was a customary event in that military region. We permitted the undisturbed traffic of their resupply transport aircraft. It was only later that we brought up artillery and began shelling the only runway on the Bien Bien Phu airfield, which then we kept under constant fire, so that the French had to try to assure resupply for their base with the aid of parachutes. These parachuted packages often landed near to our position. We changed the positions of our batteries often, and by the time the French artillery could triangulate (?) us, our mortars and cannon were in other positions.

We increased the pressure systematically and finally we were attacking the base day and night from all sides. Finally the day arrived when the French military command realized the hopeless nature of the battle and surrendered the fortifications of Dien Bien Phu.

Everyone listened very attentively to the general's presentation, and the delegation members asked many questions. Foreign Minister Endre Sik asked him what would have happened, had the Americans granted the military assistance which the French requested, and what would have happened if the Americans had intervened. The reason we went to Geneva in 1954 was because we assessed this possibility as a real danger, replied General Giap.

INFORMATION

28

Tuesday, March 5, 1968 -- 3:30 pm

Mr. President:

If you have time, you might read the marked passages in these prisoner of war interrogations. The information may not be hard but, taken together, they indicate the mood of the Viet Cong after the failure of the first phase of the Tet offensive.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

28a

March 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Continued review of prisoner interrogation and/or captured documents seem to confirm the thought that the VC/NVA had made plans for setting up local government structures after the successful take-over during the Tet offensive.

Initial interrogation of approximately 44 Viet Cong in Quang Ngai City indicate that some of these may be fairly important finance/economy cadres and possibly prospective members of a Viet Cong provisional government. One of those arrested was to become head of the Quang Ngai "National Democratic and Peace Front" in the event of Viet Cong takeover.

A new Viet Cong informant whose reliability has not yet been established reports that the second phase of the offensive had begun by mid-February. The Viet Cong will not attack as many places as before but will concentrate large forces against a few main areas in an attempt to occupy them, kill GVN cadre, and control the people. It had not been determined if the Viet Cong would attack Quang Ngai City, but regardless of the decision, the Viet Cong plan to attack Nghia Hanh, Son Tinh, and Duc Pho District Headquarters, Tra Khuc Bridge, Quang Ngai Airport, and the base in Binh Lien Village, Binh Son District. ~~The informant also said that two communist Chinese divisions, one North Korean Regiment, and one Soviet Air Defense Regiment would be in North Vietnam to allow North Vietnamese Army units to move south and hit hard to force peace talks. It could not be judged if this was propaganda designed to boost morale or presented as fact.~~

Informants of varying reliability in VC-controlled areas of Quang Ngai Province have indicated that as of February 10 the Viet Cong have held many military/political retraining sessions for soldiers since the ~~Tet offensive failed in Quang Ngai. The Viet Cong claimed that their plans failed because urgent orders and preparation from high-level cadres were lacking. The Viet Cong were planning many meetings to assess the strong and weak points of the first phase of the offensive and prepare for the second phase.~~

A Viet Cong informant claims to have obtained the following information from the Long Khanh Provincial Force Political Officer.

A. The Tet offensive was the first wave of the general uprising of the South Vietnamese people. The offensive was conducted throughout South Vietnam to illustrate that the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam's (NFLSV) manpower and weapons can defeat the US and GVN troops in the major cities. He said that by proving that the NFLSV can defeat the forces of the US and GVN the NFLSV would gain more support from the nations of the world.

B. The campaign was also to bring pressure to bear on the US and the GVN so that they will begin to think in terms of accepting a coalition government as suggested by the NFLSV.

C. The campaign was also to gain deeper sympathy from the American people who are protesting the Vietnam war and to show them that patriotic people in Vietnam have the capabilities to defeat thousands of American aggressors in Vietnam. The campaign will also cause President Johnson's prestige to be lowered in the next presidential election.

Informant reports from Quang Tri, Siang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces indicate that the Viet Cong are making preparations for a second attack on the cities of I Corps. The only specific date mentioned is from Quang Tri where February 29 to March 3 were target dates if the Viet Cong encountered no obstacles. If difficulties are met, the plans will be continued and an opportunity sought until March 30. The people of VC-controlled areas were assembled the last three days of February to prepare for demonstrations in Quang Tri City after a military attack.

A prisoner captured on February 5 in Danang City, provides the following information.

The primary factors for the Viet Cong failure to take Danang on January 29, 1968, were faulty intelligence and a mix-up in the schedule for the attack. In order to curry favor with their superiors, Viet Cong cadres in Danang exaggerated their reports, over-estimated the people's pro-VC sentiments, and underestimated the morale of GVN civil servants and

troops. Although the general offensive throughout the country was to begin the night of January 30, 1968, a prior order had scheduled the attack on January 29. Certain Viet Cong units did not receive the second order and attacked on the night of January 29. To compound these errors, the staff of the Quang Da + Danang Special Zone failed to understand the mood of the people of Danang. They had been led to believe that the people of Danang had grown steadily to their understanding (become more anti-American) and were waiting only for an opportunity to seize power. However, they found that the people did not want to demonstrate or to fight.

A local provincial level security unit source in Long An Province, who has provided the unit with reliable information for three months, has reported that the Viet Cong say that they must successfully attack and overrun the province capital, Tan An. According to the report, the Viet Cong are telling the people that if they fail to overrun Tan An, they will turn in their weapons to the GVN and stop fighting. The source also indicates that the local Viet Cong have been promised the support of North Vietnamese Army troops for the next attack on Tan An, and that a total of 6,000 troops will be used in the attack. The Viet Cong are also claiming that small guerrilla actions are finished and that only large scale attacks will take place in the future.



Art Mc Cafferty

Mr. Lee

29

Tuesday, March 5, 1968, 2:00 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Study of National Security Decision-Making

The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), headed by General Taylor, has a grant from the Ford Foundation to study the "planning, decision-making and implementation process in the field of national security."

The study will deal with ^{substantive} as well as procedural and organizational matters. It is to be classified and General Taylor has offered to seek guidance as to its strictly limited distribution. The first part is to be completed by next December. Several of those who will be doing the work are favorably known to me as former Government officials.

General Taylor has asked my cooperation and that of members of the National Security Council staff. He is making similar requests of Secretary Rusk, General Wheeler, Dick Helms and Paul Nitze.

I would like your guidance as to the degree of cooperation which should be extended to those making the IDA study. Other Government officials should also be informed so that the Government as a whole can react uniformly to requests for cooperation.

Although it is a risk facilitating a study of the kind proposed by IDA, I am certain that we can rely on General Taylor to prevent misuse of any parts of the study which may be critical of the way decisions are reached in the national security area. Conversely, careful use of a favorable finding by the IDA group would be a possibility.

I recommend that you authorize me to work out with General Taylor and his staff specific guidelines covering the cooperation of administration officials. Hopefully these guidelines would settle now differences which might arise at a later time as to the study, its content, recommendations and distribution.

Approved _____

No _____ Call me _____

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

1. ~~Substance~~
2. Pres file
30

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No _____
Call me _____
BKS:amc

W. W. Rostow

30a

I N S T I T U T E F O R D E F E N S E A N A L Y S E S

400 Army-Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202, Telephone (703) 558-1000



Maxwell D. Taylor, President

23 February 1968

Dear Walt:

You will recall my mention of the study of the planning, decision-making and implementation process in the field of national security which IDA (the Institute for Defense Analyses) is undertaking with the encouragement and financial support of the Ford Foundation. Within IDA, Chet Cooper's International and Social Studies Division is charged with the study and Larry Legere, whom you will remember from my White House days in the Kennedy administration, will be the project leader. As your informal reaction to my description of the project was favorable, I am now about to call upon you for the support of your office which you very kindly offered to make available.

It goes without saying that no study of the national security process could be of value without contact on the part of our analysts with you and the members of your staff. To facilitate this contact, it would be of great assistance if you would designate someone like Bromley Smith, who knows something of the study and whose unique background brings him immediately to mind, to serve as a point of liaison with Legere and his group. Also, in writing to other officials such as Dean Rusk, Paul Nitze, Bus Wheeler and Dick Helms, I would like to mention that I have discussed this study with you and that you have offered the cooperation of your staff.

I am most hopeful that the product of our work in this field will be of assistance to present and future officials coping with the problems of national security. The study will, of course, be classified and its distribution strictly limited. In this matter of distribution, we shall want your guidance at the appropriate time.

Sincerely,

Maxwell D. Taylor

Mr. Walt W. Rostow
The White House
Washington, D. C.

P.F.

306

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

July 22, 1959

The President has authorized me to make available to you the enclosed copy of his letter to Senator Jackson dated July 10, 1959, and the "Guidelines" respecting the study contemplated by Senate Resolution 115, for information and guidance in connection with the provision by Executive Branch personnel of information for this study to the Government Operations Subcommittee and its staff.

Copies of the President's letter and of the "Guidelines" are being transmitted to the Members and Advisers of the National Security Council and their Planning Board Representatives and to the Members of the Operations Coordinating Board.

GORDON GRAY
Special Assistant
to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 10, 1959

Dear Senator Jackson:

Your July 9th letter and its enclosed "guidelines" respecting the study proposed by S. Res 115 relieve the most serious of the concerns outlined in my June 25th letter to Senator Johnson.

The bounds contemplated by the "guidelines" seem to me to be generally satisfactory, it being my understanding that insofar as the National Security Council is concerned your study is directed to procedures and machinery and not to substance.

Within those bounds my staff, including personnel of the National Security Council organization, will, I assure you, work cooperatively with your Subcommittee in an effort to help make this study of value not only to the Legislative Branch but to the Executive Branch as well.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



The Honorable Henry M. Jackson
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

PROPOSED GUIDELINES

1. The proposed inquiry, insofar as it relates to the National Security Council, will be a study, not an investigation. It will not attempt, by legislation or otherwise, to infringe upon the Constitutional privilege of the President to obtain advice through such organization and procedures as he deems appropriate.

2. Testimony will not be taken from Executive Branch personnel in respect to the substantive consideration of matters by the National Security Council or its subordinate machinery. Personnel of the operating Departments of Government will testify in respect to their own policies or activities but without reference to substantive consideration of such matters by the National Security Council or its subordinate machinery.

3. Study of the National Security Council and its subordinate machinery will be directed to matters involving purposes, composition, organization and procedures. Executive Branch officials will be authorized to make full disclosure as to such matters subject to appropriate security safeguards in case of classified projects.

4. Any testimony by present or former Government officials who have served on the National Security Council or its subordinate bodies regarding the National Security Council and its subordinate machinery will be taken first in Executive session. Decisions as to the taking of subsequent public testimony by such officials with respect to such matters and as to the subsequent publication of their testimony or parts thereof taken in Executive session will be governed by security considerations as agreed in each instance between the Subcommittee and a representative designated by the President; and any references to the National Security Council or its subordinate machinery with respect to any matter not covered in paragraph 3 above will not be publicly released except as agreed in each instance between the Subcommittee and the representative designated by the President. The Presidential representative will be authorized to attend all hearings of the Subcommittee relating to the National Security Council or its subordinate machinery and will be provided a transcript of the testimony taken in Executive session as a basis for reaching the decisions referred to above.

~~SECRET~~

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Lunch Meeting With the President
Tuesday, March 5, 1968, 1:00 pm

Pres file

AGENDA

1. Pueble: Next Moves. (Sec. Rusk)

2. Vietnam. (Sec. Rusk, Sec. Clifford and Gen. Wheeler)

Any follow-on from this afternoon's discussion of Westmoreland's request.

3. Berlin. (Sec. Rusk)

Situation report.

4. NPT. (Sec. Rusk)

Situation report and question of security assurances.

5. Senator Hellings' suggestion on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. (Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford)

The two Secretaries will be prepared with a recommendation.

6. Sec. Rusk's March 11 appearance before the Congress on Foreign Aid.

The President may wish to give guidance on how to handle this particular appearance.

7. Personnel. (Sec. Rusk)

Sec. Rusk will wish to talk with you privately about certain personnel problems.

8. Other.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 119, NARA, Date 2-2-92

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

Tuesday, March 5, 1968
1:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Walter Heller has a dozen reasons for not taking on the Israeli desalting job; a bad back, a tremendous schedule of existing commitments, etc.

But he has agreed, without commitment, to come in on Saturday morning and be briefed on the nature and scope of the task.

W. W. Rostow

work
33

Tuesday, March 5, 1968 -- 12:15

Pres file

Mr. President:

Last week you approved John Mosler as one of your personal representatives at the independence ceremonies for the new Republic of Mauritius. (Mauritius is an island in the Indian Ocean off the coast of Africa.)

However, there were two other matters connected with Mauritius on which we did not receive your guidance:

1. Whether you approve of David King, our Ambassador to the neighboring Malagasy Republic (Madagascar), as your other personal representative at the independence ceremonies. The Mauritians have asked for two.
2. Whether you approved accreditation of King to the new Republic of Mauritius in addition to his present post.

John Macy, who originally put these questions before you, is not certain whether you meant to approve King or whether you wanted other names. The Mauritians are pushing us for an answer.

W. W. Rostow

Approve King as personal representative _____

Approve King's double accreditation _____

Disapprove _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Call me _____

EKH/vmr

INFORMATION

Tuesday, March 5, 1968 -- 10:30 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You should know that Robert Bowie is planning to return to the Harvard Law School April 1, opening up the slot of Counselor to the Department of State.

He tells me that the Law School insists that he return by that time if he is to keep his long-run status there.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm