

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 memo	Rostow to President, 8:00 p.m. S 2 p <i>Open 12/2/97 NLJ 96-252</i>	3/13/68	A
#3a cable	Saigon 21981 S 3 p <i>Open NLJ 96-251 8.18.98</i>	3/13/68	A
#4 memo	Rostow to President, 7:50 p.m. TS 1 p <i>open 12-2-96 NLJ 96-260</i>	3/13/68	A
#5 memo	Rostow to President, 6:00 p.m. PCI 3 p <i>Open 5/1/96</i>	3/13/68	A
#5b memo	Katzenbach to President <i>Open NLJ 96-251 8.18.98</i> E 2 p <i>[Attachment vol 2 #737 B-155 Open 6.96]</i>	3/12/68	A
#5d rpt	"Talking Points" E 4 p <i>Open NLJ 96-251 8.18.98</i>	undated	A
#5f rpt	Bio Sketch S 3 p	undated	A
#5g photo	Bio Sketch C 1 p	1964	A
#6a memo	Zwrick to President E 1 p <i>Open 12/2/97 NLJ 96-252</i>	3/13/68	A
#6b memo	Gaud and Freeman to President C 2 p <i>Open 7-28-97 NLJ 96-262</i>	3/8/68	A
#6c rpt	"Review of Proposed PL 480" S 2 p <i>Open 7-28-97 NLJ 96-262</i>	undated	A
#8 memo	Rostow to President, 5:00 p.m. S 1 p <i>Open 12/2/97 NLJ 96-252</i>	3/13/68	A
#8a cable	Deptel 129128 S 2 p <i>Open 4/96</i>	3/13/68	A
#11 memo	Rostow to President, 1:15 p.m. <i>Open 8-8-94 NLJ 94-19</i> E 1 p	3/13/68	A

FILE LOCATION

[dup of #1039, NSF CF Chile, Vol 4]

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 66, March 7-13, 1968 Box 30

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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#12 memo	Rostow to President, 1:10 p.m. <i>open 8-8-94</i> C ^{1 p} <i>(Dup. of #104, NSFIC Chile, Vol 4) NLJ 94-19</i>	3/13/68	A
#12a memo	Rusk to President C ^{1 p} <i>open 4/96</i>	3/12/68	A
#15 memo	Rostow to President, re: Panama C ^{1 p} <i>open 12/2/97 NLJ 96-252</i>	3/13/68	A
#20 memo	Rostow to President, 6:10 p.m. <i>open 4/96</i> TS ^{1 p}	3/12/68	A
#22 memo	Rostow to President, 5:45 p.m. S ^{1 p} <i>open 12/2/97 NLJ 96-252</i>	3/12/68	A
#22a rpt	"Vietnam" <i>Open NLJ 96-251 8.18.98</i> S ^{5 p}	undated	A
#23 memo	Rostow to President, 5:40 p.m. <i>open 12/2/97 NLJ 96-252</i> S ^{1 p}	3/12/68	A
#24 memo	Rostow to President, 5:35 p.m. <i>open 12/2/97 NLJ 96-252</i> C ^{2 p}	3/12/68	A
#26 memo	Rostow to President, 3:05 p.m. S ^{1 p} <i>sanitized 11/17/97 NLJ 96-259</i>	3/12/68	A
#26a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S ^{3 p} <i>example RAC 8/05</i>	3/12/68	A
#31 memo	Rostow to President, 10:00 a.m. C ^{1 p} <i>open 12/2/97 NLJ 96-252</i>	3/12/68	A
#33 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 11/8/99 NLJ 96-182</i> S ^{1 p}	3/12/68	A
#34 memo	Rostow to President S ^{1 p} <i>open 11-21-96 NLJ 95-252</i>	3/11/68	A
#37a memo	Ginsburgh to Rostow TS ^{2 p} <i>open 12-2-96 NLJ 96-252</i>	3/11/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#37b rpt	"Fact Sheet" <i>open 8-14-97 NLJ 96-256</i> TS 1 p	3/5/68	A
#37c rpt	"Rolling Thunder Target..." TS 10 p <i>open 8-14-97 NLJ 96-256</i>	2/29/68	A
#37d rpt	"Targets Uncovered if..." TS 1 p	undated	A
#38 memo	Rostow to President, 4:30 p.m. <i>Acidly of 4/19/95 NLJ 94-456</i> PCI 1 p <i>(Dup of #5, Files of W. Rostow, "Kinnedy," etc.)</i>	3/11/68	A
#46 memo	Rostow to President, 8:00 p.m. PCI 1 p <i>open 4-8-94 NLJ 91-457</i> [Duplicate of NSF, Country File, Laos, Vol. 18]	3/10/68	A
#47 memo	Rostow to President, 11:20 a.m. <i>open 8-21-96</i> C 1 p <i>Country file Vietnam, J D(2) (dup. #7, NSF, memos to President, etc.)</i>	3/10/68	A
#51 memo	Rostow to President, 2:40 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 12/2/97 NLJ 96-252</i>	3/9/68	A
#51a cable	Paris 11280 <i>Open NLJ 96-251 8.11.98</i> S 1 p	3/8/68	A
#59 memo	Rostow to President, 9:40 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 5-30-95 NLJ 93-368</i> [Dup #102, NSF, CF, Korea, "Vol. 2," Bx 255] [Dup #50 same file as above]	3/9/68	A
#59a cable	Seoul 4784 S 2 p <i>open 3-25-94 NLJ 92-338</i>	3/8/68	A
#54 memo	Rostow to President, 1:20 p.m. <i>open NLJ 96-252 12/2/97</i> S 1 p <i>[Dupl. # 129, UN Agency File, 1619]</i>	3/9/68	A
#54a cable	USUN 4081 <i>Open NLJ 96-251 8.11.98</i> S 2 p <i>[Dupl. #129, UN Agency File, 1619]</i>	3/8/68	A
#61 memo	Rostow to President, 8:45 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 12/2/97 NLJ 96-252</i>	3/9/68	A

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#61a cable	Komer to Rostow S 1 p <i>Open NLJ 96-251 8.18.98</i>	3/9/68	A
#62 memo	Rostow to President, re: Mexico C 1 p <i>Open 12-15-95 NLJ 95-188</i>	3/9/68	A
#65 memo	Rostow to President (dup of 7a, NSF, File 7 Harold Saunders "Middle East Summary" E 3 p <i>Open 12/2/97 NLJ 96-252</i>	3/9/68	A <i>Box 26</i>
#69a rpt	"Pacification Assessment" S 4 p <i>Open 8-21-96 (p/mg)</i>	3/8/68	A
#71b memo	Goodpaster for the Record S 4 p <i>Open 5/1/96</i>	3/8/68	A
#73a memo	Nitze to President S 1 p <i>Open 8-14-97 NLJ 96-256</i>	3/5/68	A
#74 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>Open 12/2/97 NLJ 96-252</i>	3/8/68	A
#75 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p	3/8/68	A
#75a letter	Papadopoulos to President PCI 1 p (WWR-Visitors-1968) <i>Open 12/2/97 NLJ 96-252</i>	2/27/68	A <i>Open 12-23-09</i>
#75b letter	President to Papadopoulos PCI 1 p (WWR-Visitors-1968) <i>Open 12/2/97 NLJ 96-252</i>	undated	A
#76 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>Open NLJ 96-252 12/2/97</i> [Duplicate of #45a, NSF, NSCH, Gold Crisis, Book I] [Sanitized NLJ 83-93]	3/8/68	A
#80 memo	Rostow to President, 10:15 a.m. S 1 p <i>Open 5-9-95 NLJ 94-458</i>	3/8/68	A
#83 memo	Rostow to President, 6:15 p.m. S 1 p <i>Exempt 11/7/97 NLJ 96-259</i> <i>Sani NLJ 019-030-3 (1/02)</i>	3/7/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 66, March 7-13, 1968 Box 30

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#83a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 6 p exempt RAC 8/05	3/6/68	A
#87a memo	Cooper to Harriman open 12/2/97 NLS 96-252 S 1 p	3/6/68	A
#88a memo	Katzenbach to President DUPLICATE IN FILES OF WWR, BOX 16, WH-UN Branch June/1968 Doc #1a UR NLS 96-29 S 4 p open 2-19-99 NLS 99-9 [Dup. # 88a, NSF, CF, Korea, "vol. 6"]	3/7/68	A
#89a memo	Rusk to President S 1 p open 8-21-96 8/1/98	3/6/68	A
#93 memo	Rostow to President, 9:55 a.m. C 1 p open 12/2/97 NLS 96-252	3/7/68	A
#95 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p open 12/2/97 NLS 96-252 [Duplicate of #37, NSF, Country File, Romania, Vol. 3]	3/7/68	A
#98 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p open 11/17/97 NLS 96-259	3/7/68	A
7 memo	Rostow to President TS- 1 p. sanitized 10/30/09	3/13/68	A

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INFORMATION

Wednesday, March 13, 1968
8:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

White House telegrams on
Sec. Rusk hold steady at 2 to 1
favorable.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Pres file

1

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 13, 1968

MEMO FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Cumulative Analysis of Telegrams on Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, March 11 and 12

The Vietnam Information Group reports:

-- Yesterday 36 telegrams had been received concerning Secretary Rusk's appearance before the Committee. Public reaction ran favorable to Rusk by a proportion of two-to-one.

-- Since noon, March 11 an additional 62 telegrams have been received at the White House. The proportion favorable to Rusk has held constant at two-to-one.

-- Telegrams praising the Secretary numbered 41. Many said "thank you" to the President and to his Secretary of State and offered "congratulations" for a "wonderful job." The Secretary was praised for a "brilliant presentation," and an "able, stalwart, masterful exposition." He was seen as a man who while under strong attack had shown great "courage," and "self-control" and who "grew in stature" in the face of those who "gave him a rough time." In these telegrams, hostile Senate Committee members were described as "publicity seeking," guilty of "shocking interrogation" techniques, "grandstand play," "crass cheapness" and "heartless persecution."

-- Six of the 41, although praising Rusk, saw the public hearings as endangering national security, encouraging the enemy and demoralizing allied troops. Five of the 41 writers specifically identified themselves as Republicans and several of these noted that they would vote for the President.

-- The 21 critical telegrams tended to focus on war issues rather than on the Secretary. While some labeled Secretary Rusk's testimony as "illogical," "irrelevant," "evasive" and not "amusing," and while several others demanded that the Secretary resign, most asked the President to "admit your errors" and "mistakes," to refuse further "escalation," and to "stop the war." Four of the 19 dissenters specifically identified themselves as disappointed Democrats.

In all, 98 telegrams had been received by early afternoon today with two-to-one still praising the Secretary.


Lou Schwartz

cc: Christian, Jorden, Wright, VIG

Wednesday, March 13, 1968 - 8:00pm

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talk with Vietnamese Ambassador

From file

Ambassador Bui Diem called on me yesterday. He expects to return to Saigon for consultation with government leaders next week.

The Ambassador is deeply concerned about his country and very sensitive to the heavy burdens you bear as a result of our commitment to South Viet-Nam. He believes it is urgent for his government to act decisively and to rally the people behind it. It is of critical importance for the ARVN to fight aggressively and get out into the countryside.

He believes one of the most important problems Viet-Nam now faces is the lack of close cooperation and teamwork between President Thieu and Vice President Ky. He knows Ambassador Bunker has been urging the two to work together. He will press this with all his vigor when he goes home. But he frankly feels that the only real answer is for the United States to weigh in heavily with both men. He did not specify how he thought it should be done, but presumably he is thinking of either a meeting between you and the two Vietnamese leaders or acting through a special envoy from the top level of our government.

I told the Ambassador that:

- our commitment to his country is firm;
- he should by all means urge Thieu and Ky to work together;
- it was urgent for the GVN to act with firmness and that the ARVN must get moving;
- he should convey to the top levels of his government a better understanding of the current state of U. S. public opinion and of the need for Vietnamese to shoulder heavier burdens all across the board.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-252

By Cb, NARA Date 11-1-97~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

You may wish to consider a brief meeting with the Ambassador before his departure. It would provide an opportunity to convey with the highest authority our desire that the Vietnamese leadership stick together and that they get moving. The very fact of such meeting would add weight to the message the Ambassador delivers to his leadership and others in Saigon.

As you know, Ambassador Bunker sees the Vietnamese leaders regularly. This gesture of reciprocity would, I know, be appreciated by our Vietnamese friends and would strengthen the Ambassador's hand in describing the Washington scene and the need for positive action by his countrymen.

You may wish to ask Secretary Rusk for his opinion^{*}, but I think a short talk with the Ambassador would be a definite plus.

W. W. Rostow

Arrange appointment _____

No appointment _____

Call me _____

**I just asked Sec Rusk. He says "It's a very good idea."*

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

3

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 13, 1968
6:30 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith an interesting conversation between Bunker and Ky in which Bunker begins to move in on the Thieu-Ky problem.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 21981

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By lg, NARA, Date 3-2-92

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-251
By is, NARA Date 8-18-98

Wednesday, March 13, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon 21981)

I spent about an hour with Vice President Ky to go over the current situation and to deal with various problems. Ky was generally in a good and positive mood and seemed understanding of the points that I made with him.

I began by telling Ky that I wanted to have his estimate of the situation in the countryside, particularly with respect to the status of pacification, as well as to have his analysis of enemy intentions. Ky said that the situation in the Fourth Corps is not good at all. He had met with General Thang and Revolutionary Development Minister Tri Saturday, March 9, to discuss it. Thang said that there were still some 2000 members of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, Revolutionary Development, Popular Force and Regional Force cadre not accounted for, including their weapons. They did not really know how many were killed, how many missing, or how many might have deserted or defected. Thang is rapidly organizing offensive operations, however, and moving over to the offensive. He urged Ky to wait another week before coming down to evaluate the situation. Thang had commented to Ky that there was Viet Cong recruiting going on there, as well as elsewhere in the country. Commenting generally on pacification, Ky said that Tri had earlier thought that damage to the program was only about 10-15 percent, but he (Ky) thought it would be a good deal higher. He cited as an example Thang's statement that in the Delta some 367 posts had been overrun, or complements had been withdrawn from them.

Ky went on to say that not only must we get back into the countryside, but also have adequate defenses in the cities and towns. In other words, more men were needed. Ky said he had told Thieu some ten days ago when they discussed these matters that 100,000 to 125,000 additional men were needed and could be trained. Training need not all be done in large training centers but could at least partially be done by their own Government units, many of which were below strength and needed to be brought up to strength as soon as possible. He thought that much of the 65,000 already planned increase needed to be used promptly and could be so used provided good equipment was available.

He observed at this point that the enemy outgunning of the Government forces had affected the latter's performance and morale. He concluded by saying that he had told Thieu that the country is psychologically prepared for full mobilization; the people want to be used and want to feel that they are being used for the nation. In discussing the need for adequate equipment for the Vietnamese forces, Ky remarked that this was more important than having more American troops here.

I then told Ky that I wanted to raise one particular matter with him and discuss it fully and frankly. I told Ky that it was vital that his talents be fully used by the Government since the latter needed all the resources available to it. I noted that his decision last year to join Thieu's ticket and to cooperate with Thieu had been a wise and patriotic one which we had also appreciated. I had therefore been very much disturbed by the report of his March 4 talk and his reference to a change in the Government within some 3-4 months if the situation did not improve. I said that nothing had changed our views about the unacceptability of any coup or power-play. If anything, the Tet offensive has made American opinion even more sensitive to such a move, which could undermine our support for Vietnam. In my view, any forceable change in leadership would be disastrous. Ky said he agreed that such action would indeed be disastrous, and reiterated that he was an anti-coup man.

I then went on to say we realized that when he accepted the office of Vice President, it had few specific functions attached to it. As I had indicated, we agreed that his talent and energy should be used fully and effectively. I told Ky that I thought he and the President should get together and work out a personal modus operandi. Together they could decide what functions he should take on. I added that I planned to discuss this also with President Thieu, and I was confident that he would agree that at the present time, national interests must override personal feelings. Ky said that he was ready to do whatever the President orders, and he knew that others in the Government, including the military, felt the same way. All that the President needs to do is to tell us what is required. Ky added that the lack of direction from the President is the fundamental problem.

I told Ky that I thought another important factor of concern is the effort by people in his entourage, as well as the President's, to make difficulties and to undermine the personal relationship of the President and himself . . . In my opinion this problem had reached a point where it could no longer be ignored, and agreement should be reached between the two of them to take action to eliminate it. I thought, for example, that it would be useful to have one administrative officer or secretariat for both of them rather than competing ones, as now existed. I added that if people around either of them continue to make difficulties, they should be removed. Ky said he agreed with this. He added that he had been put in a difficult position at times, since the President might ask him to do something in a private conversation but not announce it publicly. When he then undertook the responsibility, people concluded that he was seeking to grab power. Ky said that he was not seeking power and reiterated that he was ready to do whatever the President ordered. I told Ky that I thought it was vital that Government military leaders also understand this situation and work to avoid division in military ranks. In my opinion, the Government was moving ahead effectively and about as rapidly as feasible in the present difficult circumstances. Ky said there was still a feeling in the Cabinet that they didn't get clear enough directions from the President, observing that a number of the Ministers had talked to him about this. I concluded this part of our conversation by saying that I thought this was a time for everyone to pitch in and work together. I noted that there had been some irresponsible actions, such as the petition for a vote of no confidence in the Lower House, although I understood that this might now be withdrawn. Ky made no response on this point.

I asked Ky finally how he thought civil defense should be organized. He replied that there was clearly a need for effective civil defense measures but that his field was being given no overall direction. He said that he was willing to take it over if the President wanted him to do this, or in fact, anything else. He agreed with my comment that there was a need for the President and him to meet more frequently and to talk things over fully between themselves.

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Pres file

Wednesday, March 13, 1968 - 7:50 pm

Mr. President:

After clearing with you, we proceeded with this CIA estimate. It asserts:

-- that if we increase our forces in South Vietnam and increase our bombing in North Vietnam, we would get from Russia and China no significant reaction;

-- if we mine Haiphong, we will probably get no significant military reaction from the Soviet Union but a general tensing in our relations with the Soviet Union.

I would suggest that you read, especially, pages 11-13. I have circled on page 11 an important observation.

As you know, I believe we should very seriously consider at this time the mining of the North Vietnamese ports.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-260
By ig, NARA Date 11-12-96

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

~~B~~-186060, Cy 1

Communist Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action, 13 March 1968

WWRostow:rlh

Handwritten scribble

WWR

5.

Pres file

Wednesday, March 13, 1968 -- 6:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Prime Minister Egal (A-Gal) of Somalia
Thursday, March 14 -- 12 Noon

Schedule:

- 11:30 AM Arrival at diplomatic entrance (arrival statements and full military honors)
- 12:00 Noon Alone 'Egal is fluent in English advisors standing by in Cabinet Room
- 8:00 PM WhiteHouse Dinner

Papers

At Tab A is Katzenbach's briefing memo.

At Tab B are State's Talking Points.

At Tab C is biographic information on Egal.

Setting

Somalia is a poor dry country on the upper east coast of Africa between Kenya and Ethiopia -- the "Horn" that juts out into the Indian Ocean just below the mouth of the Red Sea. It became independent in 1960. It is, despite its economic backwardness, a model democracy by African standards.

The major factor complicating U. S. -Somalia relations is the very serious tension and arms race between Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as a milder form of the same problem with Kenya. We are prime arms suppliers to Ethiopia. The Russians supply Somalia. Until Egal's election last July, both sides rattled sabers with abandon. The basic problem is tribal irredentism: more than one million Somali tribesmen live in Ethiopia and Kenya. Somalia's traditional policy has aimed at annexing all areas populated by ethnic Somalis -- by force if necessary.

How Egal handles the border problem will make or break his political future. He has put his chips on a turnaround from belligerence to detente with Ethiopia and Kenya. Over the past few months, with our quiet applause, Egal has begun peace talks with Haile Selassie and Jomo Kenyatta, pulled back the Somali guerrillas raiding the border areas, and cut his military spending. With each of these steps he is walking on eggs in his Parliament. Everybody in Somalia has some clan relative living on the other side of the border. If the detente doesn't blossom, or if Egal stumbles, the dispute will slip back into the old bitterness -- probably all the worse for the failure of this effort.

Talking Points

1. Border Problem -- You might open by telling Egal how much we admire his courageous efforts to reduce tension with his neighbors, and ask for his views on the prospects for the detente.

He will probably give you a lengthy rundown on what he has done and how hard it has been to carry along his own people. He may ask us to work on the Ethiopians and Kenyans. And there is likely to be a strong hint that we make things tougher for him by continuing to supply arms to the Emperor.

You might reply that:

- We understand his problems. Vice President Humphrey put in a good word for Egal's policy when he saw the Emperor and Kenyatta in January.
 - We will continue to give discreet encouragement to all sides.
 - But only the parties themselves can solve this dispute. Our influence as an outsider is very limited, and a push by us might even be counter-productive.
 - We don't think the Emperor has aggressive designs on anybody. We'd hope that the detente will eventually lead to an agreement to limit arms in the area. In the meantime, we are very pleased with the cuts in military spending that Egal has made.
2. Aid -- Egal is concerned about our aid cut-back in Africa. (Somalia is not one of our concentration countries. Bilateral U. S. aid is scheduled to phase out over the next four years in favor of multilateral and regional projects. This will not affect food or the Peace Corps.)

Egal may make a strong pitch that he needs aid more than ever to hold the line against his hawks by presenting a credible development alternative.

You might say:

- We are not withdrawing from Africa in general or Somalia in particular. Congress willing, we hope to put more -- not less -- aid into Africa in the future than in the past.
- We have put more than \$70 million in Somalia since 1960, almost \$20 million last year alone.
- We hope Somalia will join with her neighbors to put together regional projects which will be eligible under our new policy. We know this is tough. But we think it is terribly important.
- In any event, the new policy will not affect food aid, the Ex-Im Bank, the Peace Corps, or projects done jointly with other donors.
- We are delighted to inform the Prime Minister that we are now ready to sign a \$1.1 million PL 480 agreement. This is evidence of our concern.

3. Vietnam (Egal has been silent.)

W. W. Rostow

5a



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

March 12, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLJ 96-251
By is, NARA Date 8-18-98

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Prime Minister
Mohamed Ibrahim Egal of the
Somali Republic, March 14, 1968;
12:00 noon

Prime Minister Egal

Egal, 39, took office last summer. He speaks English fluently and, though a Muslim, enjoys a drink. He is a pragmatic African moderate and is pro-West. He has few interests outside politics.

Egal has completely reversed Somalia's policies in the last nine months. Somali irredentism dominated past Government policies. Egal seeks peace and cooperation with neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia. He is pushing for greater economic development at the military's expense.

Somali Republic

Somalia is a semi-arid land - much like our South-West. Poor in resources, it has gone in primarily for raising livestock. However, uranium and itrium have just been found near Mogadiscio. If there are large reserves of these metals, as an American company now claims, they could have an enormous effect on the economy.

Somalia is one of the few democracies in Africa. Governments and presidents have changed normally since independence in 1960. The country's tragedy is that European-drawn frontiers have divided the Somali people. Its population is two and a half million; an additional

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

one million live outside the borders, in eastern Ethiopia and northeastern Kenya. Somali irredentism has accordingly plagued the stability of the Horn of Africa.

Somalia has a non-aligned foreign policy. Because of U.S. military aid to Ethiopia, it has leaned in the past somewhat to the USSR, which has supplied large amounts of military and economic assistance.

What Egal Wants

U.S. help with Ethiopia and Kenya in getting them to be more responsive to his efforts to improve relations with them.

More U.S. economic assistance in general and designation of Somalia as an AID emphasis country in particular.

(Both of these he feels are needed in order to prove the soundness of his new policies to the Somali electorate.)

What We Want

To strengthen his position and encourage his policies. (His efforts toward regional peace and economic development, at the expense of the military, exceed our most optimistic expectations, and have won more support within Somalia than appeared possible. We should do all we can to assist this most encouraging development.)

To demonstrate our interest in one of the few African democracies.

Assistant Secretary Palmer will accompany the Prime Minister on his call on you, and Ambassador Thurston will be available at the White House during the meeting.



Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Enclosure:
Talking Points.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5c



5d

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-251
By is, NARA Date 8-18-98

Presidential Opening

- I am happy to welcome you on your first visit to our country.
- I was very pleased at the warm welcome accorded Vice President Humphrey when he visited Somalia in January.
- Please convey my best wishes to President Shermarke (Share-MAAR-kay), whom I met when he visited Washington in 1962.
- Ambassador Thurston has my complete confidence, and I am pleased with the job he has been doing.

Detente in the Horn of Africa

You May Wish to Say

- How is the detente progressing? We admire greatly the courageous steps you have taken to lower tensions with Somalia's neighbors and to work out a series of understandings for improvement of relations.
- We are aware of the many difficulties you still face in this endeavor. We appreciate the need for Ethiopian and Kenyan cooperation, and shall continue to give discreet encouragement to those governments.

Egal May Say

- He may request we use our influence, possibly even our good-offices, at Addis Ababa and Nairobi to induce the Ethiopians and Kenyans to be more cooperative in achieving a detente.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

You May Wish to Respond

- I hope your visit here will indicate to your neighbors our support to you and to the detente. As you know, Vice President Humphrey spoke to Emperor Haile Selassie and President Kenyatta in support of your policies. We are prepared to continue to help, but in the last analysis this problem must be solved among yourselves.
- The influence of any outsider is limited when such basic national interests are involved.

Aid to Somalia

You May Wish to Say

- We appreciate and whole-heartedly endorse your policy of reducing military expenditures in order to devote more resources to self-help and economic development.
- We know of your concern over the eventual ending of our bilateral assistance to Somalia. However, the current programs will continue for several more years until we complete our work. Moreover, with an improved atmosphere in the Horn of Africa, we have great hopes for regional development projects.
- I am particularly pleased that we have been able to work out a PL-480 agreement for over one million dollars.
- We think regional cooperation in Africa is a must. Further, the desire for progress must come from within. As Somalia and its neighbors develop areas for regional development, we will work with them and other donors for the fulfillment of their goals.

Egal May Say

- He has been striving to get his people to forget about irridentist dreams and concentrate on economic development. The average Somali expects to see results soon. Somalia accordingly needs more foreign aid, specifically a U.S. contribution to some pending projects: .

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

- a multi-donor agricultural development along the Juba River;
- a multi-donor construction of a port at Mogadiscio;
- the construction of a link to the Addis Ababa, Ethiopia-Nairobi, Kenya road;
- continuing assistance to Somali education;
- help in establishing a community college in Mogadiscio.

You May Wish to Respond

- We have approved several loans to your Government totaling about \$13 million. This is a vote of confidence in the new Somali thrust for peace in the area and for concentration on development.
- Congress cut the AID budget this year. Our funds for new projects are thus very limited.
- We are interested, however, in regional and multi-donor projects, and depending on funds available, will see what we can do to help.
- Specifically we will review the World Bank sponsored engineering study on the port at Mogadiscio when it is completed later this year to determine whether we can participate in financing the project.
- I suggest that you discuss these matters in more detail with AID Administrator Gaud when you see him tomorrow.
- I fully concur in your effort while here to interest American businessmen in investing in Somalia as another spur to economic development.

Arms to Ethiopia

Egal May Say

- He may express concern at our supplying arms to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

Ethiopia, especially in view of his efforts to reduce tensions and the arms race.

You May Wish To Respond

- We ourselves are opposed to an arms race in the Horn or any increase in forces beyond legitimate defense needs. We are convinced that Ethiopia has no aggressive intentions. Our military assistance to Ethiopia is carefully restricted to what we believe is needed for defense and internal security.
- It is our hope that, in the context of improved Somali-Ethiopian relations, an agreement to limit arms may eventually be possible between the two countries.

Other Topics You May Wish to Raise

- Our views on current developments in Viet-Nam, the Middle East, etc. (The Somali economy has suffered because of the closure of the Suez Canal.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5e



Wednesday, March 13, 1968 -- 6:00 PM

1-1-16
Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: PL 480 for Somalia

In the attached, Messrs. Freeman, Gaud and Zwick recommend a \$1.1 million PL 480 sale (4,000 tons of wheat flour and 2,000 tons of vegetable oil) to Somalia. (State and Treasury concur.)

Charlie Zwick's memo (Tab A) is a good short summary of the proposed program.

At Tab B is the State/AID finding that the Symington Amendment (designed to discourage poor countries from large defense budgets) does not require us to cut this program. Somali Prime Minister Egal has cut military spending as part of his policy of detente in the old border dispute with Kenya and Ethiopia.

I recommend you approve.

It has been suggested that we could get maximum mileage out of the agreement by having the Vice President sign it Thursday or Friday when Egal is in town. We need your guidance on this as well.

W. W. Rostow

Approve O. K. for Vice President to sign _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By sg, NARA, Date 3-2-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

MAR 13 1968

62

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed P. L. 480 Program for Somalia

In the attached memorandum Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your authorization to negotiate a \$1.1 million sales agreement with Somalia for wheat flour and vegetable oil. Repayment will be made in convertible local currency, over forty years with twenty percent down for U. S. use.

Background. Somalia has experienced constant food deficits during the past few years and its agriculture sector has been slow to develop.

- Domestic consumption of vegetable oil has been increasing and oil needs are met primarily from imports; the proposed P. L. 480 sale includes 2,000 tons of oil or roughly 40% of total imports.
- Local grain production has faltered and an import supplement is required. The proposed P. L. 480 sale includes 4,000 tons of wheat flour, about 22% of imports.

Somalia is receiving \$2.5 million in technical assistance for FY 1968.

Self-help. In connection with the proposed agreement, Somalia will undertake a number of specific self-help measures. These include an agricultural bank, grain storage facilities, and a price stabilization scheme.

Military Expenditures. Prime Minister Egal is attempting to improve relations with Kenya and Ethiopia and a detente has been arranged. Egal has reversed previous policy and encouraged a reduction in military expenditures, with a policy of putting the freed money into economic development.

State/AID conclude that Somalia's military costs do not materially interfere with development.

Recommendation. I recommend that you authorize us to begin P. L. 480 negotiations with Somalia. Prime Minister Egal will be in Washington this week.

(signed) Charles J. ...
Director

Attachment _____

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-252
By Cb, NARA Date 11-1-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

66

To: The President

MAR 8 1968

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with the Somali Republic

We recommend you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 agreement with Somalia to provide about 4,000 tons wheat flour and 2,000 tons vegetable oil, with a current export market value, including certain ocean transportation costs, of about \$1.1 million. Payment to be made in convertible local currency over 40 years with 2 percent interest during the 10 year grace period and 2½ percent thereafter. To help defray U.S. Embassy expenditures in Somalia, provision is made for a 20 percent currency use payment in Somali shillings due November 1, 1968. The Departments of State and Treasury concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

Although the general economic performance of Somalia in the past few years has been fairly satisfactory, it has experienced constant food deficits. A nomadic, livestock oriented culture, Somalia's agriculture has been slow in developing. Somalia's traditional agriculture is mainly devoted to food grains and legumes. During three of the last six years, production fell much below the average resulting in shortages of food grain. The estimated average annual production of food grain in Somalia is about 150,000 tons supplemented by imports of about 25,000 tons. Consumption of vegetable oils has grown during the past five years while the production of oil seeds has remained relatively constant. Most of its oil needs are met from imports.

The pro-Western outlook of the present government and its current policies of improving Somalia's previously strained relations with its neighbors, Ethiopia and Kenya, has been our desired aim. Vice President Humphrey received a warm and cordial reception during his recent visit to the country. Prime Minister Egal is scheduled to visit the United States in mid-March and meet with you during his brief stay here.

Basis for Usual Marketing Requirement

Usual marketing requirements have been established based upon the most recent 4-5 year average of commercial edible vegetable oils and wheat flour exports to Somalia from free-world sources.

Self-Help

The Government recognizes that its agricultural production capacity has not shown desired growth and a Livestock Development Agency is

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-262

By Cb, NARA Date 3-3-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

administering development programs in animal health, marketing, and agricultural-industry enterprises. An Agricultural Development Agency (ADA) has been created to assist farmers by extending credits, help them consolidate small holdings, and fostering development of cooperatives. In addition, the ADA with U.N. assistance is undertaking a grain storage, marketing and price stabilization project to help alleviate food grain shortages during poor crop years.

In negotiation of this agreement we will seek commitments that in undertaking to increase agriculture production and improve the storage and distribution of food, the Government of Somali Republic will: (1) Support the Afgoi Agricultural Research and Training Center and other activities to develop new crops and improve crop and livestock production practices, and will coordinate research activities with the regional program of the East African Agricultural and Forestry Research Organization, (2) Increase budgetary support to the Livestock Development Agency and the Agricultural Development Agency, (3) Establish an Agricultural Bank to increase farm credit, (4) Develop grain marketing and storage facilities, and a price-stabilization project designed to offer incentives to increase crop production, (5) Cooperate with the STRC-sponsored regional rinderpest eradication program and increase net supplies and vaccines in some of the remote areas of the country, (6) Support port and road building projects which will increase or facilitate exports of their major agricultural products, bananas and livestock.

Military Expenditure Review

State/AID has concluded that neither U.S. Development Assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, nor PL 480 sales are being diverted to military expenditures and that Somalia's resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which would materially interfere with its development.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with the PL 480 sales agreement.

March 6 1960

William L. Sand
Administrator
Agency For International Development

David H. Johnson
Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT

6c
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-262
By ct, NARA Date 3-3-97

REVIEW OF PROPOSED P.L. 480 AGREEMENT WITH THE SOMALI REPUBLIC PER SECTION 620 (s) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, AS AMENDED.

Somalia spends about \$7 million per year on defense -- the lowest in East Africa. As a per cent of government expenditures, however, Somalia's defense spending is high compared to the sub-sahara median but comparable to that of Ethiopia and nearby Moslem states for recent years. The ratio for Somalia is 19 per cent over the past four years, 21 per cent in the 1968 CY budget. These expenditures support armed forces totalling 12,000 men, with weapons including about 80 tanks and 9 combat aircraft of varying degrees of obsolescence. However, the existing defense establishment was inherited from the previous government by Prime Minister Egal who came into power in August, 1967. Egal's declared policy is to reduce military expenditures and to use these funds for economic development. To that end since coming into power he has:

1. Reduced the Somali armed forces by discharging 3,000 irregular army troops enlisted a year earlier in preparation for possible trouble over the March 1967 referendum in French Somaliland;
2. Called back into Somalia guerillas operating against Kenya and Ethiopia;
3. Initiated a detente with Kenya and Ethiopia;
4. Required the army to undertake a civil action program (construction and maintenance of highways, land clearing and agricultural projects).

For centuries relations between Somalis and Ethiopians have been dominated by religious and cultural enmity. Following Somalia's independence in 1960 tensions in the area increased, with Somali irredentism under the predecessors of the Egal administration a substantial contributing factor. Rightly or wrongly, Somalia believed that it had to build up an army for what it considered legitimate defensive purposes (Ethiopia maintains an army of about 36,000 men with weapons including about 85 tanks and 80 aircraft.) The Soviets roiled these troubled waters by giving the Somalis in 1963 on grant basis, to the best of our knowledge, \$35 million in arms, equipment and training. No Soviet arms have been delivered to the Somalis since early 1967.

The Egal government by completely reversing previous policies and seeking accommodations with Somalia's neighbors is setting a courageous new course in the face of prevalent pan-Somali sentiments. For the present,

~~SECRET~~

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-2-

at least, it appears that the Egal government is doing as much as could reasonably be expected, within current limits of political and economic feasibility, to reduce military expenditures. The continued success of the detente would facilitate and hasten further reduction in military expenditures and permit more closely coordinated regional cooperation.

Foreign exchange spent for military purchases is minimal, limited only to POL products being supplied under long-term credits. Funds for the Somali military are almost wholly domestic expenditures. The Embassy is prepared to certify that no Foreign Assistance Act funds are being diverted to military expenditures.

Taking into account all factors, we conclude that Somalia is not now diverting its resources to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which would materially interfere with its development.

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

7

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

Wednesday, March 13, 1968
5:30 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This CIA appraisal, requested by us, predicts the large North Vietnamese forces in I Corps will seek a clear cut victory against ours in the weeks and months ahead in something like conventional warfare.

This is what Westy has assumed and is tolerably well prepared for.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

Cy 3
13 March 1968

[redacted]
Intelligence Memorandum

"The Continuing Communist Military Threat in Northern South Vietnam."

WWRostow:rla

Presidential library review for NSC equities required.

SANTIZED
Authority NLJ-141-021-030/1
By jc, NARA, Date 10-30-09

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25X1

INFORMATION

8

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 13, 1968
5:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a follow-on of your talk
with the Pope about prisoners.

The only result thus far is a re-
affirmation that our prisoners are
extended "good treatment."

The Holy See will persist in trying
to find ways to be helpful.

Key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

State 139128

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-252
By Cb, NARA Date 11-1-97

Pres file

WWRostow:rlh

8a

SECRET/EXDIS

Wednesday, March 13, 1968

TEXT OF STATE DEPARTMENT CABLE (129128)

SUBJECT: Papal Mission to Saigon and Hanoi

The Apostolic Delegate called on Harriman March 12 to deliver the following confidential memorandum entitled "American Prisoners in North Vietnam."

Begin text:

His Holiness, Pope Paul VI, has always been keenly interested in the Vietnam problem. Accordingly, he has encouraged and followed closely every initiative directed to alleviate the plight of those who suffer the tragic consequences of the war, be they refugees, prisoners, etc.

Humanitarian assistance in South Vietnam has been carried on through "caritas internationalis" for more than five years, and continues to the present time with satisfactory results. Unfortunately, it has not yet been possible to extend these activities to North Vietnam, even though the authorities in Hanoi have been assured on more than one occasion that "caritas" desires only to provide its humanitarian services in cooperation with local organizations.

With regards to the American prisoners of war, one can recall the intercession of His Holiness in their behalf when there was a threat of a public trial, and certainly his appeal for clemency was a contributing factor in inducing the North Vietnamese Government to desist from its intentions and thereby lessened to that extent the danger of the intensification of the conflict.

Subsequent to the meeting of His Holiness with President Johnson and in view of the offered possibility of sending a mission to South Vietnam to visit prisoners of war, the Holy See renewed its efforts and undertook new steps to obtain permission from the Hanoi authorities for a similar mission to North Vietnam. Although from the very outset there was no great hope for positive results, still, as long as the possibility existed, it was felt worth making every possible effort in this direction.

SECRET/EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NY 95-238
By gicb, NARA, Date 7/22/96

Recent contacts with a representative of the North Vietnamese Government have resulted in his repetition of that Government's well-known position regarding the juridical status of the American prisoners. He contended, however, that, despite this, the North Vietnamese Government has in fact extended good treatment to the prisoners, which, he stated, was confirmed by journalists and other persons, both political and religious, who have had the opportunity to see the prisoners in the course of a visit to Hanoi.

Although the response has been disillusioning and negative in tone, the Holy See continues to seek new ways of reaching the intended goal and circumventing the existing difficulty. To that effect, "caritas" of Germany is prepared to send to Hanoi medical supplies which are presently in Hong Kong. The secretary of this organization, Monsignor Huestler, would like to be able to consign these supplies personally to the North Vietnamese Red Cross with whom he has already had contacts. Accordingly, repeated requests have been made through diplomatic channels to make it possible for him to go to Hanoi and eventually visit American prisoners in the name of His Holiness. However, there seems to be little hope that Monsignor Huestler will be allowed to make this trip inasmuch as requests for the needed permissions have been met with evasive replies on the part of the Hanoi Embassy in East Germany.

For purposes of information, it can be mentioned that the Holy See has contacted the President of Tanzania to seek his assistance in this matter since he has relations with North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front. Moreover, an official of the Secretariat of State of His Holiness met with the President in a long and cordial conversation at which time the President underlined the humanitarian aspects of the problem, the urgent need for a solution, and finally, promised to do what he could to facilitate the initiatives of His Holiness. Also, he gave reason to hope that the direct intervention of the Holy See would have some positive result in the near future.

This is a comprehensive statement regarding the present state of the matter. Any further developments will be made known so as to keep the United States Government informed.

9

INFORMATION

Pres file

Wednesday, March 13, 1968 -- 4:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

I owe you and Doug Cater an apology.

Last week he asked me to arrange for Gen. Wheeler to brief the Cabinet on Khe Sanh.

I did so -- but forget.

When he asked me yesterday, I told him I had failed to ask Wheeler.

But Wheeler turned up.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Douglass Cater

WWRostow:rla

INFORMATION

10

Wednesday, March 13, 1968
1:35 p. m.

Mr. President:

Ralph McGill's reaction to the Rusk hearings will interest you. I'm inclined to agree.

Do you wish response drafted?

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

233 APR 12 PM 10 06

10a

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ATLANTA GA 12 508P EST

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

DEAR MR PRESIDENT: I FOUND MYSELF THINKING, AS I WATCHED FULBRIGHT
TODAY, THAT HE WAS, IN A SENSE, A JOE MCCARTHY IN REVERSE
WITH AN OXFORD ACCENT, SOMEWHAT MODIFIED BY EARLY RESIDENCE IN
ARKANSAS. I THOUGHT SECRETARY RUSK MADE HIM LOOK VERY BAD, AND I AM
HOPEFUL THAT THE SENATOR'S PETTINESS AND VINDICTIVE NAGGING WILL
HAVE SOMEWHAT THE SAME EFFECT THAT MCCARTHY'S ARMY HEARINGS HAD.

I THOUGHT THE SECRETARY DID A SPLENDID JOB OF COUNTERING THE
LONG HOURS OF PETTINESS. IN CIVIL RIGHTS FULBRIGHT HAS BEEN
AS BAD AS BILBO OR EASTLAND AND I THINK IT IS HIGH TIME HIS
RECORD AS A FOREIGN RELATIONS EXPERT WAS RE-SEARCHED. WISH I
COULD BE OF SOME HELP TO YOU

RALPH MCGILL.

11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Wednesday - March 13, 1968 - 1:15pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

Pres file

SUBJECT: Appointment for Ambassador Korry

Ed Korry is in town and would like a few minutes with you if your schedule permits.

He has come to report on how he sees the Chilean situation developing over the next two years and what we might do to help President Frei keep the moderate elements of the Christian Democratic Party in the driver's seat. Critical congressional elections will be held in March 1969 and presidential elections in September 1970.

If you have the time to see him, it would be worth your while. Jim Jones tells me your schedule is full for this week, but something might be arranged for the next.

W. W. Rostow

I will see him —

Prefer not —

Call me —

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NEJ 94-19
 By WJ, NARA, Date 7-26-98

cc - Jim Jones

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - March 13, 1968 - 1:10 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

See file

SUBJECT: Appointment for Chilean Ambassador Tomic

Herewith a memorandum from Secretary Rusk recommending that you receive Ambassador Tomic for a farewell call. He returns to Chile on March 23.

I had hoped that Ernie Goldstein's luncheon on March 21 could have served this purpose, but it has been cancelled.

Because Tomic stands a better than even chance to be the next President of Chile, I concur in the Secretary's recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment - Rusk memo.

Approve appointment

Disapprove

Call me

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-19
By ig, NARA, Date 7-15-94

cc - Jim Jones

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

933
120

March 12, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment for
Ambassador of Chile Radomiro Tomic

Recommendation:

That you grant Ambassador Tomic an appointment
before he returns to Chile on March 23, 1968.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Ambassador Tomic is resigning his post to return
to Chile. He plans to leave Washington for New York
on March 23. He leaves New York on March 27. He has
been Ambassador to the US for three years. He is con-
sidered the man most likely to be chosen by the ruling
Christian Democratic Party as nominee to succeed
President Frei. He should return to Chile convinced
that he has friends at the highest level of the US
Government and should carry with him assurances of your
continued friendship and support for President Frei.

If it is convenient to your schedule, I recommend that
you see him before he leaves Washington on March 23.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-15
By *Solap*, NARA, Date 4/22/96

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

13

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 13, 1968 - 8:35 a. m.

Mr. President:

Khe Sanh and DMZ:

- celebration of March 13 (anniversary of opening attack on Dien Bien Phu) exceedingly quiet;
- weather marginal;
- 36 enemy rounds;
- 100 friendly outgoing;
- another excellent ARVN contact near Dong Ha
- 306 sorties plus 43 B-52's;
- 162 tons delivered.

In general, the battle is in a curious phase in Vietnam: no clear enemy attack plan discernable; clock ticking on good supply weather in Laos and poor weather at Khe Sanh; our side moving slowly over to the initiative in I Corps, III Corps, and IV Corps.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By lg, NARA, Date 3-26-92

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By lg, NARA, Date 3-26-92

Pres. file

SECRET

13a

Wednesday, March 13, 1968, 8:20 AM

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number thirty-eight on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area for the 24-hour period of March 12, 1968.

Weather was marginal during most of the day. Early morning fog restricted visibility to one mile with 400 foot overcast ceiling. This improved by mid-day and then began to deteriorate again. Enemy attacks against Khe Sanh continued to be by fire with no ground attacks reported. Khe Sanh received 36 incoming rounds of mixed rocket and mortar, resulting in 11 wounded (two evacuated). Artillery fired 100 missions in support, mostly unobserved. No COFRAM munitions were fired.

Along the remainder of the DMZ, action was characterized by sporadic enemy shelling and two major contacts. Incoming enemy rounds totaled 160 mixed artillery and rocket with seven Marines wounded (evacuated) reported. In a major ground action northeast of Dong Ha, a company of the 4th Marines engaged an estimated enemy battalion losing 10 killed and 23 wounded (evacuated). Six Marines are missing. Enemy losses were 25 killed. In another major ground action, northeast of Dong Ha and approximately three kilometers west of the Marine engagement, the 2nd ARVN Regiment contacted a large enemy force. Four ARVN were killed and 15 wounded while enemy losses were 200 killed, 50 individual weapons and seven crew served weapons captured.

Approximately 800 Breu tribesmen have arrived at Khe Sanh. Arrangements are underway to airlift the refugees from the combat area. There were no changes in the disposition of friendly forces at Khe Sanh during the period.

Marine aircraft flew 86 tactical air sorties in support of Khe Sanh, the Air Force flew 181, the Navy flew 39, for a total of 306 sorties. Bomb damage assessment included 20 road cuts, nine truck destroyed, two trucks damaged, 71 secondary explosions, and 20 secondary fires. There were seven ARC LIGHT strikes (42 sorties) scheduled into the Niagara area, however, one strike (six sorties) was diverted to a secondary target due to friendly civilians near the target area. One strike was within 1200 meters from friendly forces.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/88
By ry NARA, Date 3-26-92

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988
By ry NARA, Date 3-26-92

Resupply for the period amounted to 162 short tons. No passengers were landed at the field. A total of 14 sorties were flown.

Two hundred and eighty-eight sorties are scheduled for the next 24-hour period. The Air Force will have 120 alert sorties on call, the Marines will have 16 aircraft on call. Eight ARC LIGHT strikes (48 sorties) are scheduled.

The weather forecast for March 13 is for continued marginal weather with rain and fog over the mountains. Ceilings and visibility will range from 200 - 500 feet and 1/16 of a mile to three miles respectively.

11
Wednesday - March 13, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Letter to George Moore

I thought you might want to set the record straight concerning your stand on completion of the Pan American Highway by sending the reply at Tab A to George Moore's letter at Tab B.

We are still waiting for the Colombians to decide whether they will agree to using the shorter Caribbean route for the Highway. Agreement on this would be a fine thing to announce when President Lleras makes his official visit here on May 1-2, 1968. Bill Bowdler is taking this up with Covey Oliver to see what might be done.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Suggested reply to letter from George Moore.

Tab B - George Moore's letter of March 7.

17a
March 13, 1968


Dear George:

Thank you for your letter of March 7 concerning completion of the Pan American Highway.

I would like to do precisely what you suggest. That is why in my speech in Mexico City in April 1966 I proposed closing of the Darien Gap. In subsequent discussions with the Colombians, we ran into the question of the route the Highway should follow. There is a longer route down the Pacific coast which would be highly expensive to build and, therefore, questionable from a cost/benefit standpoint. The shorter, Caribbean route in which we are interested would be considerably cheaper. While we are disposed to help in the construction of this route, you will appreciate that the decision as to which route should be followed is a matter for the Colombian Government to decide.

In the meantime, you may be sure that I maintain a lively interest in this project.

Sincerely,



Mr. George S. Moore
Chairman
First National City Bank
399 Park Avenue
New York, N. Y. 10022

PRESERVATION COPY

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm



FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK

146

Original to Pres.

GEORGE S. MOORE
CHAIRMAN

399 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10022

March 7, 1968

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I want to thank you for taking the initiative and time to receive the executive committee of CICYP while they were in Washington. This was clear evidence of the importance you place on Latin America despite the other burdens on your shoulders. It made an enormous impression on our friends from Latin America, which will be reflected in recognition throughout Latin America, as pictures and reports of our meeting with you appear in the press in the area.

I did not want to prolong the meeting to propose a suggestion which I later made to Vice President Humphrey in our meeting with him, and which he has promised to mention to you. This relates to the Pan American Highway. This has been planned since my boyhood. Its conclusion lacks only a few hundred miles of construction which our army engineers could finish in a matter of weeks. Every analysis of Latin American problems points a finger to deficient communications as being among the primary problems. Our communist rivals are usually all too proficient in seizing dramatic, visual achievements to capture the imagination of the masses.

I therefore suggest and urge that you give orders for the completion of the Pan American Highway as soon as possible and use it as a dramatic occasion to cut the ribbon with the Latin American Presidents present at your side. I promise you this will have a dramatic and constructive effect on the U. S. and your personal relations with Latin America that will overshadow many more important and more costly things being done for Latin America. My fellow members of CICYP from Latin America applauded when I mentioned this to Vice President Humphrey.

I again apologize for burdening your desk with secondary matters. I am not expecting a reply to this letter and am merely hoping that you will pass this along to the proper people for consideration if you feel the suggestion has merit.

If I were President of the U. S. A., I would be the President to go down in history as completing the Pan American Highway. They will remember it longer than Balboa or Cortez!

Warmest personal regards.

Yours sincerely,

15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - March 13, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Panama Situation

Pres file

The contest between Arias and Robles-Samudio continues to be a standoff, with the National Guard keeping a wary eye on both camps.

The National Assembly is the arena where impeachment proceedings are slowly unfolding. The Arias forces have marshalled their evidence against Robles and presented it to the Assembly. The Assembly may hand down an indictment by Friday. If they do, another commission must be established to prepare for the trial. Their work will take another 8 - 30 days.

The Robles-Samudio forces know that they lack votes in the Assembly to block impeachment, so they are trying to string the process out in the hope of getting the Supreme Court, when it reconvenes on April 1, to rule that the proceedings are unconstitutional. Meanwhile, they have obtained a Municipal Court order, of questionable legal validity, enjoining the National Guard to disregard what the Assembly may do.

Efforts to work out a compromise have so far produced no positive results. The "third force" civic leaders have had no luck at mediation. The Colombian initiative has not fared well because President Lleras is wrongly suspected by Arias forces of being sympathetic to Samudio. The Costa Ricans have agreed to give it a try, but are not optimistic. We are counselling restraint and trying to get both sides interested in outside electoral observers.

National Guard Commander Vallarino continues his neutral stand. He has made clear to both sides that he will not tolerate strong-arm methods. As the impasse continues and elections draw near, there may be increasing pressure on him to take over the government. Up to now he shows no signs of wanting to use the crisis to further any political ambitions he might have.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-252

By CB, NARA Date 11-1-97

W. W. Rostow

Tuesday, March 12, 1968
7:10 p. m.

16

Mr. President:

Herewith, as requested, a reply
to Governor Guy.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow .

Attachment

March 12, 1968

Simp.

16a

Dear Bill:

It was good of you to write to me about Vietnam in such a full, openhearted way.

I understand the anguish you feel and the anguish of others you faithfully reflect in this thoughtful letter.

Some of the thoughts in your letter were reflected in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sessions on TV with Secretary Rusk. I hope that you had the opportunity to see those exchanges.

You should know that I will consider further what you wrote; but, no matter how hard the choice, the President can only do what, in the end, he concludes is best for the nation.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

Honorable William L. Guy
Governor of North Dakota
Bismarck, North Dakota

LBJ:WWR:mz

16b

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
EXECUTIVE OFFICE
BISMARCK



WILLIAM L. GUY
GOVERNOR

March 7, 1968

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear President Johnson:

Over the past months, I have written letters to you about Vietnam which I did not send. Last week, we governors met with you in Washington. We heard you say that you welcomed observations on United States foreign policy. You stated that all suggestions of possible actions by our government in the pursuit of peace in Vietnam were given thorough consideration by the State Department.

LT

Because of your encouragement to have the governors of our country communicate with you, and because of some subsequent events of a political nature, I now feel that I should write this letter.

Since January 1, I have participated in seven Democratic Party workshops across North Dakota. About 75 precinct committeemen, legislative district chairmen, women club officials and representatives of Young Democrat Clubs were present at each workshop.

Topics on the agenda included organization, finances, publicity and issues. The latter topic was most interesting because views were solicited on what the voters are thinking about such things as inflation, high interest rates, civil disobedience, pollution, crime, civil rights, agriculture and the war in Vietnam. Vietnam discussions occupied a major part of the time.

A definite, profound change has taken place in our people's thoughts about Vietnam in recent months. The war is increasingly unpopular. Without any coaching and without leading questions by our Party leaders, I find a wholesale abandonment of confidence in our mission in Vietnam.

Last Saturday, a group of about 60 very serious demonstrators for peace in Vietnam converged on my office to present a petition signed by 350 supporting their view.

The President
March 7, 1968
Page 2

This group was mainly college and university students from North Dakota. They were orderly, sincere and obviously motivated by deep conviction. Their appeal to me was that I relay their thoughts to you, Mr. President, and those thoughts are among many others which are contained in this letter.

These are prevalent views as gleaned from conversations with North Dakotans and from newspaper editorials which are gradually assuming positions opposed to our present course of action in Southeast Asia:

-- The original government of Diem is now exposed as not having been a very good example of democratic representative government. There is question over our wisdom in originally supporting militarily this Diem type of self-determination.

-- Official corruption has, for many years, been a way of government in South Vietnam and is now even more so. There is a serious concern that even now we are fighting to, in effect, perpetuate a democratic system of government hopelessly enmeshed in corruption.

-- There is no strong sense of nationalism or of allegiance to a central government in South Vietnam. Rather, it is a system of province or village governments. There is a question over South Vietnam's desire or capability to form a national government.

-- The ability of the political system in South Vietnam to mature into a few major political factions in the next few years is lacking. This amateur approach of many political groups does not give enough substance to candidates or programs to provide a workable representative democratic government in the near future.

-- My own observation as a member of your election observers was that the Vietnamese citizens understood democratic process and yearned to exercise it and were willing to exhibit great courage in voting in the face of terrorism. At the same time, I detected bewilderment over South Vietnamese national purpose when I saw and heard major Presidential candidates use their former friendship with Ho Chi Minh as a mark of distinction.

-- The North Vietnamese people do not exhibit the rebelliousness of an oppressed population under Ho Chi Minh. Ironically, they exhibit great tenacity and a high nationalistic fervor when compared to the demoralized and less motivated South Vietnamese.

-- Many people believe that the historic Vietnamese dislike of the Chinese presents a stronger containment of Red China than our own presence in Southeast Asia.

-- One of our original purposes in South Vietnam was to defend the villages and cities against terrorism until that country could build its own defense. Now the killing of civilians in South Vietnam and the destruction of cities, because of our presence, far exceeds the very thing that we thought we were going to prevent.

-- Our expenditures for the military in Vietnam are now said to be in excess of \$2 billion a month. We find our country in the curious position of spending nearly as much for destruction in one month as we spend constructively in foreign aid for the world in one year. What a massive constructive program we could engage in abroad and at home if we were not saddled by the fantastic expenditures for military action in Vietnam.

-- Our military potential is sharply limited by our unwillingness to escalate to atomic bombing or to invade North Vietnam. Both of these escalation alternatives are unthinkable. We are seriously limited by not wanting to provoke the hoards of Red Chinese to spill over into this conflict. We do not want to provoke the Soviet Union by any actions involving their ships in Haiphong Harbor or in the Gulf of Tonkin. If we are willing to admit that these severe limitations of our ability to wage war cannot be changed, then we must realize that the limited war we are following may not be worth the cost in lives, property and dollars.

-- There is a grave feeling of frustration being expressed by North Dakotans. They ask, even if we win, what have we won? And even if we were to withdraw, in the final analysis have we really lost or have we won?

I think, Mr. President, that the above observations and questions are valid and our nation must constantly re-evaluate our course of action.

Though I have privately deplored our being involved in Vietnam, I have always supported you and your Administration as my Commander-in-Chief and as that level of government which has the information to best make judgments in our foreign policy.

It is my belief that conditions are different now than they were four years ago, or two years ago, or two months ago. I believe our country needs to continually reassess its course of action in Southeast Asia.

I think the time is ripe for an exciting and momentous decision that could rank among the great decisions affecting the course of history in this century. I believe the time is here to re-examine the alternatives in foreign policy in Southeast Asia that are available to us.

One alternative deserving our consideration is to announce our disengagement from offensive action in South Vietnam and against North Vietnam. We could begin a calculated withdrawal. We could appeal directly to the United Nations to send troops to stabilize the withdrawal and direct the massive civilian effort to bandage the wounds of war in that war-torn land.

Our reason for disengagement and withdrawal would be simple. It would recognize that our original motive for being in South Vietnam in order to support self-determination has now been changed by the Communist countries into a massive confrontation between themselves and the United States, with the suffering Vietnamese caught in the middle. This massive confrontation is causing a grave situation where nuclear weapons might be the only conclusive step to take. The United States is unwilling to devastate North Vietnam with nuclear weapons, nor are we willing to bring nuclear weapons into use in South Vietnam. We therefore choose to disengage.

We might further state that we are willing to forge our swords into plow shares by assuming all of the expense of a United Nations effort to restore peace and tranquility in war-torn South Vietnam. We could gradually evacuate our troops and equipment to bring about the easing of tensions world-wide. We would, in the eyes of the world, be credited with restraint and flexibility.

To those who might place great importance on the so-called "loss of face" theory, I would allay their fears by saying that this loss would only be present in the minds of some for a single generation. I do not regard it as important.

To those who fear a blood bath if we should withdraw, it can be pointed out that any blood bath would be minor compared to the daily civilian blood bath now taking place.

A decision of this magnitude could excite the world to seek achievement of some of the great goals of freedom for which our nation should take the dominant role of leadership. These goals of freedom could include freedom from poverty, ignorance, disease and suffering, fear, freedom from discrimination, and freedom of self-determination.

A second alternative that might be considered would be an announcement that the United States was halting all offensive action against the Viet Cong and North Vietnam and would maintain only defensive positions within South Vietnam until a definite date, at which time we would withdraw. Our announced defensive positions would be for the purpose of permitting South Vietnam's democratic representative government to mature, and for the purpose of giving time to the South Vietnamese armed forces to grow and train until they could maintain their own security.

This period of time in which we would maintain defensive positions until withdrawal might be announced as two years. This would at least set a positive time during which many things, including negotiations, could take place under less inflammatory conditions.

Our own people would know what our objective was. The South Vietnamese would know what was expected of them and that there was a deadline to accomplish their requirements.

The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong could hardly be justified in increasing the tempo of the war if we stated our purpose as being defensive in favor of buying time for South Vietnam to put its own affairs in order.

The supplying of North Vietnam and Viet Cong troops with Communist Bloc offensive supplies could hardly be justified in the eyes of the world if our professed reason for being present in South Vietnam for a limited period of time was to bring about stability.

We could also announce that, during this two-year period, we would match every de-escalation of our expenditures for offense with a comparative escalation of economic help to rebuild South Vietnam.

We might even ask the United Nations to supervise the two-year cessation of offensive action in order to challenge the world to participate in drawing this conflict to a close.

Mr. President, I know that this conflict has burdened you with both grief and frustration. I know that the changing situation concerning the greater involvement of Communist countries has justifiably forced you into doing things that you did not contemplate. I know that you yearn not only for peace, but for a truly great society at home and abroad that is possible only under peaceful conditions.

The President
March 7, 1968
Page 6

I have never spoken out in opposition to your leadership or your course of action in Southeast Asia, nor do I intend to do so. When I have been called upon to comment on yourself and your national administration, I have consistently supported you and intend to continue to do so.

My letter to you, Mr. President, is simply to add one more voice to others from whom you may hear. I hope that my voice will assure you of my continued confidence in your leadership and a genuine concern that we be flexible in our Southeast Asia policy to the betterment of all mankind.

It may be difficult to make dramatic changes in what has become a definite course of action in Vietnam, but I think the time is here to make some courageous and historic decisions which could be the turning point toward that day when all governmental systems and nations might live together in peaceful coexistence.

On the political side, I have heard Presidential candidate Richard Nixon say that if he were elected President, he would end the war in Vietnam. I noted that he said he would end the war; he did not say he would win the war in Vietnam. He stated that he would keep the military pressure up, but would bring to bear greater forces of economic and political leverage.


Competent observers know what complete demagoguery this is. And yet the American public yearns to have someone say that the war can be ended.

I believe a course of action which sets a timetable of withdrawal and a clear-cut statement of the objectives we seek to achieve up until that withdrawal would be welcomed by the American people. I then think that Americans would pull in behind their government to support such a program.

I believe world opinion also would support a program in which the United States would announce a timetable in which we would extricate ourselves from the sadness in Vietnam and, at the same time, defend only our actions to massively rebuild and revitalize South Vietnam.

With admiration and loyalty, I am

Respectfully yours,


William L. Guy
Governor

Tuesday, March 12, 1968
7:00 p. m.

17

Mr. President:

Herewith my suggested redraft of the letter
to Drew Pearson.

~~1~~
2. Drew file

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

17a

March 12, 1968

Dear Drew:

You know, I am sure, that your disagreement with me on Vietnam policy is a cause of deep regret.

No one can be sure, in a world of human imperfection, that our policy is always absolutely right. But I have examined with a searching, open mind every alternative that has been suggested. There must have been hundreds offered by now. I have judged each to carry far greater risk to our nation's interest than the course we are following. And that is the only criterion a President can bring to bear.

The best men in government will continue to spend their time, their imagination, and their resources to try to develop a program that will bring peace to Southeast Asia and the world. I shall see that your suggestions are always carefully explored and weighed.

It may be that our difference is quite simple. I cannot find it in my heart -- or in our nation's tradition -- to accept the view that our security relations can only run to those nations and ethnic groups which have settled the United States and given us our basic freedoms. The Second World War -- indeed, Pearl Harbor itself -- affirmed an old sense in the nation that our security ran to the Pacific as well as to the Atlantic.

Every religious and human value built into our life requires us not to draw a color line or a cultural line in our dealings with other men and other nations. From all I know, the relations developed by our men fighting side by side with the Vietnamese, or working together in the villages and school houses of Vietnam -- and throughout Asia -- are as deep and fraternal as any could be. You know the kind of ties we have developed since June 1950 with the South Koreans.

Modern weapons, modern communications, and the oldest lesson we know -- that we are all God's children -- move us to the same conclusion. We are inescapably part of a small planet which cannot be split by race or color or culture.

I do not believe it possible, therefore, for the President to interpret treaty relations developed through our constitutional processes any differently in Asia than in Europe.

I am sorry to lose your backing on Southeast Asia, but I take comfort from the knowledge that our shared convictions, I hope, far outweigh our differences.

Sincerely,

Mr. Drew Pearson
2820 Dumbarton Avenue
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWRostow:rla

Dear Drew:

You must realize how deeply distressed I am by your letter.

My difficulty is, that, in all good conscience, I have been unable to evolve a better and more honorable alternative to our present policy. I would never be so positive as to say that our policy is always absolutely right. But I must say that every substitute that I have seen (and as you know I have seen hundreds by now) seems fraught with far greater risk to our national interest than the one we are following. The best men in government will continue to spend their time and their resources trying to develop a program that will bring peace in the world. I shall see that your suggestions are always carefully explored and weighed.

It hurts to lose your backing on Southeast Asia. I take comfort from the knowledge that our shared convictions, I hope, far outweigh our differences.

Sincerely,

LBJ/mf
4:45p
3-12-68

170

DREW PEARSON
2620 DUMGARTON AVENUE
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1968

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have written this letter over half a dozen times, trying to decide whether to send it. I know it will hurt you. But as an old friend, I feel I owe it to you.

Regretfully I have arrived at the conclusion that your policies in the Far East are taking us down a perilous road which can end only in disaster for you personally and for the nation; and that I must leave you.

I know that you did not originate this policy. I know how many overtures for peace you have made, and how you have followed up every possible peace feeler, no matter how remote. I also know how many sleepless nights you have spent trying to find a peace solution.

You have conceived a domestic program more far-sighted, more constructive than any President in history. Your measures for the improvement of the social and economic structure of the nation have put the policies of our friend FDR in the shade. But they are in serious danger of going down the drain if this war continues.

You started on a bold plan for building bridges to eastern Europe and have continued this as far as the war permitted, but resentment to the war is undermining much of what you have done--as it has our relations with such old and new friends as Japan, Sweden and even the British.

March 11, 1968

I cannot go along with you in your reasoning that this war is to stop the march of communism as World War II was to stop the march of Nazism. In Europe we were fighting for the ethnic groups which had settled the United States and given us our basic freedoms. All our cultural and historic ties have been with Europe, not with the Orient. Our immigration laws for nearly two centuries have banned these ties.

Furthermore, the march of communism in Asia is actually a march of nationalism which we inspired originally in the Philippines and which Burma, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, et al have followed. Vietnam, both North and South, want to be independent of China just as much as they do from the French or even from us, and I am convinced our intervention has driven the North partially into the hands of China.

I fear you have been led astray by such short-sighted advisers as Rostow and the military, while some of your other advisers have not spoken up.

In traveling around the country I have found increasing resentment, even bitterness, over the war, with much of it becoming personally directed against you. In my opinion we cannot continue tearing the country asunder over an issue so distant and so unrelated to the mainstream of our lives.

I shall continue to be your enthusiastic supporter in regard to domestic policy and your Latin American and European policy. But I am preparing a series of columns in disagreement with your Far Eastern policy. In order not to be a mere critic, however, I enclose a plan for possible peace in the Near East, which I am not writing about for the time being and which might work.

Respectfully, your friend,



Drew Pearson

DP:kr
Enclosure

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT ON VIETNAM

1. Appoint as a private peace negotiator someone the Russians like and trust, such as Justice William O. Douglas or Senator Bobby Kennedy.

2. Have the American ambassadors in capitals of key neutral and European Communist nations approach Tito of Yugoslavia, Gomulka of Poland, Madam Gandhi of India, and the heads of state of Rumania, Burma and perhaps others advising them confidentially in advance of the peace plan outlined below. The importance of talking to these neutrals and Communist nations is in order to pressure Moscow. There can be no peace in North Vietnam until Moscow is willing to take firm steps to cut off supplies and munitions.

3. Agree to the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam when a U.N. police force would take over to prevent bloodshed and guarantee law and order.

4. A pledge by the United States of approximately \$20 billion over a five-year period with more later if necessary to rebuild the cities of both North and South Vietnam and construct the Mekong Delta development previously outlined by the President. The promise of American funds to rebuild northern cities would give Ho Chi Minh the face-saving he needs for a peace settlement and would put us in the position of being magnanimous.

It may be necessary during the course of these negotiations to stop the bombing. If the above overtures show any sign of making progress, certainly the bombing should be stopped regardless of any military risks.

INFORMATION

**Tuesday, March 12, 1968
7:00 p. m.**

Mr. President:

**Herewith an analysis of the first
36 telegrams we received on Sec. Rusk's
hearing.**

He is doing better than 2 to 1.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

18

Pres file

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 12, 1968

MEMO FOR MR. ROSTOW


SUBJECT: Overall Analysis of Telegrams on Senate Hearings
of March 11

Thirty-six telegrams concerning the first day of Secretary Rusk's appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had been received by mid-day today. A review indicated a public reaction favorable to Secretary Rusk by a proportion of two-to-one and a significant interest in an extension of the hearings beyond March 11.

-- Eleven telegrams praised Secretary Rusk's performance. He was seen as a "courageous," "magnificent" and "most convincing" and "amazing advocate" of US policy and one whose testimony was "conducive to the success" of the United States.

-- Seven telegrams took issue with Senator Fulbright. The Senator was described as a "disgrace" who had shown "obvious bias" and "arrogance," who had "pushed" Secretary Rusk and who had offered "comfort to Ho."

-- Eight telegrams critical of Secretary Rusk and/or favorable to Senatorial critics spoke of "vacillation," "weakness," and a "false," "futile" and "disastrous" policy. Several of these telegrams specifically urged the President to heed Senators Fulbright, Mansfield and Morse.


Lou Schwartz

Pres file
19

MEMORANDUM

7:00 p. m. meeting with
Bill Martin

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, March 12, 1968
6:25 p. m.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State In 8/24/78
By ep/hg, NARA, Date 3/23/92

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here, as we understand it, is what Bill Martin found out and will report to you.

1. With respect to a change in the price of gold, the British and Dutch are inclined to flirt with this option. The Germans are wobbly. The Italians, Belgians and Swiss are strongly against.

2. He achieved agreement on the statement and the willingness to back the gold pool with \$500 million, with another \$500 million contingent. (At the rate the market in London is going, this will only last a matter of days.)

3. The Europeans realize that we all may face soon some quite unpleasant choices; but they are not clear about what these choices are and what will be required of them if we are to hold the system together. They are prepared to close down the London gold market and let the free market price of gold float. What they have not thought through are the terms of the intimate collaboration which will be required to make that kind of system work -- especially how to deal with the consequences of a two-price gold system.

4. In the light of this situation, Treasury, State, Federal Reserve, Council of Economic Advisers, and White House staff people have been driving all day, at Ed Fried's insistence, to get in shape an operational scenario of the kind that is attached. The essential object of the scenario would be to get certain minimum essential commitments from the other members of the gold pool before the closing of the gold pool was announced. On this basis we could proceed in reasonable order to a monetary conference.

5. We do not yet know Joe Fowler's or Bill Martin's personal views of this particular scenario. But we will be presenting it to them either late this evening or tomorrow morning.

6. It emerged from the Basel meeting that the U. S. tax bill and the austerity of the British budget of March 19 are absolutely critical factors. Joe Fowler and Bill Martin have been working Mills over hard on this point. They are also talking to the Republican Policy Committee this afternoon.

My own feeling is that the moment of truth is close upon us; and we shall have to convert some such scenario into action within the next few days.

Attachment

W. A. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~

1. Gold pool announces:

(a) Temporary closing London market

(b) Suspend gold pool operations

(c) Countries pledge:

-- will keep price at \$35;

-- no longer buy or sell gold in free market;

-- existing gold reserves sufficient for monetary purposes;

-- will rely on SDR's for future additions to monetary reserves;

-- will activate SDR's by end of year.

(d) Call on other countries to take pledge.

(e) Agree on standstill re present gold holdings, subject to negotiating new arrangements at a conference they calling in two weeks. under Fund auspices.

(f) Invite all other Fund members to accept standstill and participate in conference.

2. Gold pool countries agree to accept unlimited dollars during interim period under swap arrangements to preserve order in financial markets.

3. Arrange for Japan, Canada, Sweden, Australia (others?) to announce immediately they taking pledge, accept standstill, and prepared participate in conference.

4. Schweitzer says suspension gold sales, pledge, and standstill ^{will} ~~can~~ preserve order in financial markets and lead to ~~and~~ strengthening international monetary system. Supports conference under Fund auspices.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State let 8/24/78
By ip/rg, NARA, Date 3/23/96

Kessler



~~SECRET~~

5. President calls these moves and acts of cooperation a blow to speculators who put system in jeopardy and a means of strengthening system and preserving conditions for expanding world economy.

(Hopefully, he could cite

- removal gold cover as evidence U. S. commitment to preserve ability of dollar to serve as a cornerstone of international monetary system;
- Mills action to ^{more} tax bill as evidence our ability strengthen U. S. balance of payments position.)

6. Call conference to:

- (a) negotiate rules for conversion;
- (b) agree on commitment to convert at least \$2 billion in SDR's a year.

- (c) agree to support special issuance of SDR's equal to gold losses since UK devaluation.
- (d) agree on trade action (advance KR cuts, Japanese quota liberalization, etc.) as substitute for U.S. unilateral measures.
- (e) agree to study and report within _____ recommendations on crawling peg or other means of adding some flexibility to system.
- (f) agree on arrangements to fund sterling (and perhaps dollar overhang).

7.
* Questions:

- (a) Do we convert in interim before conference for outsiders who do not accept standstill?
 - (i) What is our maximum liability?
 - (ii) Yes, if gold pool countries agree but only for countries who take pledge.
 - (iii) Alternatively, could take position no conversion before conference -- making standstill compulsory.
- (b) This procedure leaves open for conference whether outcome is pure Green Stripe, Green Stripe Club, or modified Birnbaum. Would depend on firm understandings reached at conference on obligations other countries.
- (c) Is gold value guarantee for dollar overhang necessary part of package at a conference?
- (d) Is appreciation EEC exchange rates essential?

INFORMATION

20

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, March 12, 1968
6:10 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

These Defense Dept. working papers, which were laid on the table as we began work on the Clifford Committee, represents the line of argument against increasing our forces in South Vietnam, which was the basis for some of the newspaper stories.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By gpr/g, NARA, Date 2/17/96

Draft memorandum for the President
Alternative Strategies in Vietnam
1 March 1968

W. W. Rostow:rlm

INFORMATION

21

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, March 12, 1968
6:05 p.m.

Profile

Mr. President:

Herewith Bus Wheeler's
detailed response to the two recent
memoranda of Amb. Lodge:

- on urban police operations;
- on search and destroy
operations and U. S. military
strategy in general.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

Authority CSD 10-6-78, NSC 8-14-80

By JK/19, NARA, Date 3-3-92

938

210



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

~~TOP SECRET~~
NOBIS

11 March 1968
CM-3102-68

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ambassador Lodge's Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 9-21-78
By ip/12, NARA, Date 3-3-92

1. Ambassador Lodge in his memorandum dated 5 March 1968, addresses himself to two major problems and then touches on a number of related matters. The first of these has to do with the level of military forces in Vietnam and their employment. The second has to do with the importance of strengthening the police structure within the cities and towns in order to comb out the Communist organization, so that local political institutions and agencies can operate.

2. Taking this last point first, I am in complete agreement with the Ambassador's very perceptive analysis. In fact, now that the enemy is involved in large-scale infiltration of the cities and towns, the effectiveness of police and security forces has become as important as any other measure. If the towns are lost from within, this would be just as fateful as if they were seized from without. I do have the impression that Ambassador Bunker and the entire mission in Vietnam also agree on the importance of this matter. Current plans to expand the police are consistent with this view and the very elaborate organization under Ambassador Komer, including the special organization for the attack on the infrastructure, are all moving in this direction with all of the imagination and energy at their disposal.

3. With respect to the level of forces and their employment, I believe that there is a widespread misunderstanding about the purpose and the nature of the so-called "search and destroy operations" conducted by U.S. forces in Vietnam. It may be that the term itself is misleading. I define "search and destroy" as offensive operations designed to destroy enemy units, bases and supplies.

4. General Westmoreland has been pursuing three military objectives in South Vietnam, which require that he find and destroy enemy forces:

a. Destroy, neutralize or eject the North Vietnamese Army;

Copy 1 of 7 copies each
of pages series

~~TOP SECRET~~

b. Destroy, neutralize or induce the defection of the Viet Cong military and political apparatus; and

c. Extend the control of the Government over all of the people of South Vietnam and all of its territory.

5. In my view, which is shared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it will be necessary, for a number of reasons, to continue to conduct offensive operations in Vietnam. Among the more prominent reasons are these:

a. Even if the missions assigned to the commander were to be wholly defensive in nature - that is, to defend the government in Saigon, in the provinces and districts and to defend and secure the major population concentrations - it would be necessary to conduct offensive operations against the enemy forces which threaten the government, cities and towns, and the people.

b. The geographic configuration of Vietnam is such that the population frontier is long and indefensible by any system of static defense.

c. If our forces were to fall back along the population frontier, the enemy could mass large forces anywhere in the mountain and jungle hinterland and strike deeply, with force and surprise, into the population areas. Such strong enemy attacks would have excellent prospects for initial success. Then, in order to eject him, it would be necessary to mass large allied forces and subject populated areas to the effects of the heavy firepower which would be required to destroy or eject him. This would lead to the kind of destruction we have seen in Saigon, Hue, and many other cities and towns. Civilian casualties would skyrocket, new refugees would be created, and over a period of time almost total destruction would ensue throughout South Vietnam.

d. Even though it is sometimes more difficult to fight in the deep jungle and mountains, as at Khe Sanh, Dak To and Plei Me, the interests of both the United States and the Vietnamese people are better served by fighting outside the populated areas. Put another way, it is better to have the two divisions which surround Khe Sanh back in the mountains than in

the city of Hue - and it is better to fight the 1st NVA Division at Dak To, for example than in Kontum City or Pleiku.

e. In order to defend the population, it is necessary to patrol in strength in the interior to find large formations and then to strike at them with strength. It is exactly operations of this type which best succeed in keeping the enemy "split up and off balance" so that he can attack less frequently and less effectively against the primary population targets in South Vietnam. These are the operations which now fall into the reporting category of "search and destroy".

Lodge: 6. Concerning two other points made by Ambassador

a. I can find no basis for correlating the length of wars with casualty rates and degree of public support. In this connection, you will find the enclosed statistical comparison (Tab A) of interest.

b. When Ambassador Lodge speaks of censorship, he has put his finger on a problem which has been plaguing General Westmoreland. It seems perfectly clear that we are channeling to the enemy, through the press, information which is extremely helpful to him. This is a real handicap to the Allied forces in Vietnam and certainly one which complicates the successful prosecution of operations.

7. Ambassador Lodge expresses thoughts about the requirement for additional forces beyond those "to enable us to keep faith with the troops in exposed positions". Our forces in Vietnam today, as during the past three years, have been employed primarily to hold off the main forces of the enemy - increasingly North Vietnamese - so that the very process described by the Ambassador could go forward behind their protective screen. By reinforcing from North Vietnam with well over three divisions in two months, General Giap has simply rendered our shield less effective. If I understand General Westmoreland's basic requirement for additional forces, it is simply to prevent the relative balance of force from going badly against him. If the balance of force improves in favor of the enemy, as it has in recent months, the enemy

automatically increases his ability to mount attacks, or to threaten attacks, in an increasing number of places. In his current offensive, he has posed threats in precisely those areas which Ambassador Lodge correctly identifies as being the most critical - the cities, the towns and the concentrations of heavy population.

8. With respect to over-all strategy in Vietnam, I would make this observation. We are now engaged in the most crucial phase of the war. The events of the next three or four months could fundamentally alter the nature of this war. In my view, it is not timely to consider fundamental changes in strategy when we are fully committed in what could be the decisive battles of the war.



EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

War	Period	Length in Months	Battle Deaths	Deaths/Month
I	Apr 1917 - Nov 1918	19	53,000	2,800
II	Dec 1941 - Sep 1945	45	292,000	6,400
Korea	Jun 1950 - Jul 1953	36	34,000	950
Vietnam	Jul 1964 - Mar 1967	32	19,000	600
	(1961 to date)	86	19,200	220)

- World War II was the longest war we have fought in this century and entailed the highest number of battle deaths per month. Yet I believe that it was fully supported by the American public.

- The Korean War never approached the length of World War II. The number of our battle deaths per month in Korea was less than one-sixth of World War II and substantially lower than World War I. But Korea was certainly not a popular war.

- The war in Vietnam (measured from the introduction of U.S. ground combat units) has been shorter than the Korean War and the death rate has been less than two-thirds.

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, March 12, 1968
5:45 p. m.

22

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Prime Minister Wilson reports exchanges with Kosygin on Vietnam.

No movement whatsoever.

Pat Dean was instructed to tell me that the Prime Minister will reflect on this exchange further. But his initial reaction is that Hanoi is in a defiant mood despite the gap between "exhortation and performance" in their Tet offensive. Moscow, apparently, does not believe this is a useful time to use whatever influence it may have to bring about negotiations.

Pat will be pleased to transmit any reactions you may have to this Aide Memoire.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-252
By Cb, NARA Date 11-1-97

AIDE MEMOIRE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-251
By isa, NARA Date 8-18-98

Vietnam

As the Prime Minister indicated at the end of his personal message of 13 February to the President, he sent a message to Mr. Kosygin on 15 February on the lines he had agreed with the President on 9 February. He made it clear that the Soviet Government should be in no doubt that the Americans, from the President downwards, were absolutely determined to see this thing through: by which they meant that no military action by the other side would be allowed by them to reach the stage where an unacceptable military solution was being imposed on South Vietnam. The ferocity of the fighting over the preceding weeks had not in any way weakened this determination, quite the contrary. On the other hand the virulence of the recent fighting has equally not weakened the President's resolve to do everything possible to get the parties round the Conference Table as soon as possible: and that despite considerable public pressure in the United States to concentrate on the purely military aspect, President Johnson remained concerned to see a just, negotiated political solution. The Prime Minister referred to the President's San Antonio speech and the Trinh declaration of 29 December. He pointed out that the President had again re-affirmed on 12 February his resolve to "stick it out" in Vietnam. He had equally renewed his offer to talk peace and his

/willingness

willingness, in his own very graphic expression, to "let Hanoi write the Agenda". In the light of these statements, and his own talks in Washington and of the very clear elucidations and background information that he obtained there, the Prime Minister underlined the responsibility shared by the British and Soviet Governments to do everything possible to help towards a peaceful settlement. He told Mr. Kosygin that, while neither of them was empowered to negotiate on behalf of their friends, and whatever the Russians might feel they had to say publicly for presentational purposes, it was essential that they should both be realistic in private and face up to the need for negotiation.

The Prime Minister then pointed out to Mr. Kosygin that the problem confronting them both was how, without seeking themselves to negotiate, they could help to create a situation in which their friends could meet around the Table as the Prime Minister honestly believed they would both wish to do. He suggested that he and Mr. Kosygin might try to discuss the situation again, or at least to continue a dialogue with a view to helping both sides towards a constructive discussion around the Conference Table.

The Soviet Ambassador delivered Mr. Kosygin's reply on 1 March. This, in the Prime Minister's view, has unfortunately not carried things much forward - and he told the Ambassador so. Mr. Kosygin said that there was no need to repeat the Soviet position, which would be clear to the Prime Minister, and that events subsequent to his visit to Moscow had confirmed that the Soviet Government's evaluation of the situation was correct. Taking up Mr. Wilson's

assurance that President Johnson was desirous of negotiations and a political settlement, Mr. Kosygin asked who was then preventing the United States Government from taking practical steps. The Americans were talking about negotiations but in reality counting on the capitulation of the other side. If certain North Vietnamese points were not clear, Trinh's interview to A.F.P. on 7 February had given specific answers to the questions repeatedly posed by the United States and also raised by the Prime Minister. Why then did the United States go on manoeuvring rather than negotiating? The United States Government had still not realised that there could be no purely military solution and that they could not impose their terms on the other side: hence the American escalation in the area, the intensified bombing of the North and the preparation for extending aggression against Laos and Cambodia. Mr. Kosygin also referred to "reckless talk" about the use of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Kosygin added that President Johnson's motives - whether based on internal political considerations or on a desire to demonstrate strength and firmness in pursuing an inevitably unsuccessful policy - were not important. The result was the same: aggravation of the conflict and a threat to world peace. The San Antonio formulation, which was built on various preconditions, could not serve as a basis for bringing the position of the opposing sides closer together. The best way for the Prime Minister to help his friends "to find as soon as possible the way to constructive negotiations" was to persuade them to stop their aggression in Vietnam and to take a positive attitude towards Hanoi's constructive proposals.

After the Soviet Ambassador had delivered this message he said that he had been asked to convey an additional point. The Soviet Government had noted what the Prime Minister had said about the need for continuing the dialogue between himself and the Soviet leaders. They would keep in mind the possibility of a meeting between the two Prime Ministers at the appropriate time and place.

The Prime Minister told the Ambassador that he would have hoped that the Soviet Government would expound their own interpretation of Trinh. The San Antonio formulation as elucidated amounted in effect to a simple request for a clear sign from Hanoi to establish that productive negotiations could start promptly. Surely the Soviet Government should obtain a formal statement of the position from Hanoi: the dangers and the opportunities were both too great for reliance to be placed on remarks by a Minister to a French journalist. It would be helpful for the Soviet Government to obtain from Hanoi and communicate to him a formal statement of the North Vietnamese position.

The Prime Minister also stressed that the American position that no military advantage should be taken of the cessation of bombing had now been completely clarified, e.g. by the President's open remarks about Hanoi "writing the Agenda" as well as by Clark Clifford. His own understanding of the United States Government's position, in the light of his talks with the President, and on the basis of the American communication last Autumn to Hanoi, was different from what had been the apparent understanding of the

Soviet Government as expressed to him in Moscow.

The Prime Minister took the Ambassador up sharply when he said that he had the impression that British public opinion was unanimous in the belief that the United States were not prepared to stop the war. The Prime Minister said that this was certainly not his view. Indeed, in the light of his direct exchanges with the man who took the decisions, he could say that this was the opposite of the truth. President Johnson showed no sign of giving way to hawk pressures and, even when the fighting had been most intense, he had gone on public record with a further clarification of the steps needed for negotiations to begin. There was no doubt whatever of the President's desire to get to the Conference Table.

Mr. Rostow

23

ACTION

1. ~~_____~~
2. Prov. file

SECRET

Tuesday, March 12, 1968 - 5:40 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Jordan Arms Package

You will recall signing the Conte-Long waiver permitting us to go ahead with our Jordan arms package. The negotiations with King Hussein are just about wrapped up, and we believe we have a deal. State has just sent to Congress the required notice of your waiver with the rationale for it.

One small legal point has cropped up, which the lawyers feel we should clarify for the record.

I believe you were quite aware when you signed the determination that we were urging the Jordanians to buy some equipment--specifically tanks and some 18 Hawker-Hunter aircraft--from the UK. Jordan had in fact already bought 10-12 Hawker-Hunters late last year and is negotiating for 6-8 more.

The documents accompanying the waiver you signed took for granted these purchases in the UK but did not specifically say that your waiver included these purchases as well as the purchases from the US that you were approving. Because the Conte-Long amendment requires us to take into account purchases from all sources, the lawyers believe we should be scrupulous in creating an unmistakably clear record (without prejudging the question of whether these weapons are "sophisticated" or not). I hate to bother you with this detail, but I agree that the record should be complete.

There is no question that Jordan's purchases in the UK are in our interest because they serve the same purpose of blocking Soviet military aid while minimizing the political burden on us.

Therefore, may I clarify the record by stating that your waiver was made taking into account Jordan's purchases in other Western countries?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 96-252
By CB, NARA Date 11-1-97

W. W. Rostow

Yes

3/13/68

No

SECRET

ACTION~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, March 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israeli PL-480 Agreement

We are now down to the final stage in negotiating our PL-480 Agreement with Israel. We have succeeded, I think without causing too much pain, in holding the line on the two basic principles we wished to establish this year--making this a 100% dollar sale and sticking to the 5% downpayment which you approved last week.

There is one final decision needed to wrap up this negotiation. The Israelis have requested that we include an additional 50,000 tons of feedgrain. Going along with them on this would, I feel, conclude the negotiations on a satisfactory note without compromising any of our basic positions.

You may recall that, when we initially presented this program to you, we noted that the Israelis had requested 350,000 tons of feedgrain while Agriculture was proposing only 250,000. Agriculture frankly acknowledged that the difference was entirely the difference between the Israelis' estimates and ours. Agriculture fully admitted it might later revise its estimate, but we suggested starting with our low estimate rather than their high one.

Therefore, we proposed at that time--and you approved--telling the Israelis we would stick to our experts' estimate for the time being, but that we would consider a little additional grain later if the Israelis needed it.

Now, after discussing the situation in further detail with the Israeli procurement officer here, Agriculture's experts are satisfied that the Israelis could use 300,000 tons. Eppie Evron assures us privately he feels this would take care of Israel's needs for this fiscal year and they would not be back to us. Agriculture is happy to move the feedgrain, and at this level the Israelis will also take some oil and tobacco that Agriculture wants to sell.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-252

By CB, NARA Date 11-1-97~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Since we have stuck to our basic principles successfully and since you initially approved the program with the purpose of providing what Israel needs, I recommend we go along with the experts and allow this slight change in the composition of the program. This would raise the dollar value from \$27.1 million to \$30.2 million.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓ 3/13/68
Disapprove _____
Call me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Pres file

Tuesday
March 12, 1968 - 5:30pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: R and R visits to Australia

Several weeks ago you directed that we increase the R and R visits to Australia. Secretary of Defense has now approved a monthly level of 6,800 R and R visits to Sydney, Australia. This makes Australia by far the largest foreign recipient of R and R visits.

The recommended monthly quotas are now as follows:

Hawaii	7300
Australia	6800
Thailand	4000
China	4000
Hong Kong	3500
Japan	2400
Malaysia	1900
Singapore	1800
Philippines	900

W. W. Rostow

MWright:wpt

26

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, March 12, 1968
3:05 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith an interesting note
on Hanoi.

The last paragraph indicates
our radar bombing of Hanoi is quite
effective, psychologically at least.

W. W. Rostow

[Redacted signature block]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-259
By is, NARA Date 10-31-97

W. W. Rostow:rln

Rostow file

Tuesday, March 12, 1968 -- 3:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Via George Christian

Peggy Whedon has asked if I would appear on ISSUES & ANSWERS
on Sunday, March 24, 1968.

W. W. Rostow

Yes _____

No _____

Call me _____

WWRostow:rin

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Pres file
28

~~TOP SECRET~~

Luncheon with the President.
Tuesday, March 12, 1968, 1:00 P. M.

Agenda

1. Vietnam: The Senate and Consultation. (Sect. Rusk)
Reflections on hearings.
2. Korean Troops. (Sects. Clifford and Rusk)
Next moves: light division; costs of "extra two divisions."
3. Vietnamese Troops. (Sects. Clifford and Rusk)
Staff work on support for Thieu's proposition: to provide between 100,000 and 125,000 additional men in six months. How to nail it down? Will there be conflicts between build-up of Vietnamese and U. S. forces?
(See Tab A)
4. Pueblo: Next Steps. (Sect. Rusk)
5. Time Scenario for Troop Decisions. (The President)
Specific matters you wish presented to you for decision and action.
6. Other.

Web! Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment (Tab A)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State 3/13/79, NSC 3-27-80
By isp/ry, NARA, Date 3-3-92

28a

TOP SECRET

TAB A

(para. 7 from Ambassador Bunker's cable of March 11, 1968)

Re para 6 - Mobilization - I have already reported on President Thieu's decision to accelerate the mobilization process and his desire to provide between 100,000 and 125,000 additional men for the armed forces during the next six months. In this regard, President Thieu envisages the extensive use of units on Fairfax type operations to protect the cities, their environs, and the lines of communication. We are working with the Government of Vietnam to maintain key civilians in their government functions where they cannot be spared or replaced. General Westmoreland informs me that FY 68 program for the expansion of the Vietnamese armed forces involves an increase of 64,000 men. Only approximately 25,000 of this force increase has been realized. The current approved program is therefore short approximately 40,000 men, for which equipment has been programmed. In accordance with this program, these 40,000 men were to be used to fill existing units and to activate the following major elements: approximately 80 Regional Force companies and 250 Popular Force platoons, 1 Artillery Battalion, 1 Engineer Battalion, 1 Separate Infantry Regiment, and 2 Infantry Battalions to flesh out existing regiments. If additional men are mobilized, RF/PF units could be organized and equipped with World War II-type weapons available by virtue of receipt of more modern weapons by ARVN. General Westmoreland's proposed FY 69 program involves an increase of 93,000. A formal request for approval has been submitted through his channel. Therefore, it is General Westmoreland's opinion that the number of men Thieu plans to mobilize can be conscripted, trained and equipped. Assuming that 125,000 men are mobilized during the next six months, this will result in a net increase of approximately 60,000 men in the South Vietnamese Army over current strength in consideration of estimated losses of approximately 10,000 per month through casualties and desertions. There will be shortages of some equipment until FY 68 programmed quantities are delivered and until FY 69 items are programmed and available from production. Individual weapons will again be of the World War II-type and vehicle shortages will have some effect on mobility. However, these problems are believed to be manageable. The major problem is one of leadership, where it is estimated that officer and NCO requirements may be difficult to fill. We feel that we should encourage Thieu and the Joint General Staff to proceed soonest with their mobilization, not only to form additional units that are sorely needed and to fill up their ranks, but to deny this manpower to the Viet Cong, who are, themselves, in desperate need of manpower.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Stall la 5/7/79

By copy, NARA. Date 3/3/82

INFORMATION

Tuesday, March 12, 1968 -- 12:35 p. m.

Mr. President:

NMCC reports the possible hijacking of National Airlines flight 28 (DC-8) out of Tampa for Miami, with 52 passengers and a crew of 7.

At 11:52 a. m. EST the plane was noted heading for Cuba -- radio contact with the plane cannot be established. Plane is due over north coast of Cuba at 12:25 P. M. EST.

Norad scrambled interceptors which followed aircraft to the 24th parallel where they were forced to orbit.

FAA is arranging clearance with Havana.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

INFORMATION

Pres file

30

Tuesday, March 12, 1968
10:15 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

At Khe Sanh:

- poor weather;
- 150 rounds enemy fire;
- 343 sorties plus 36 B-52's;
- 207 tons delivered.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

SECRET

30a

Tuesday, March 12, 1968, 9:30 AM

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number thirty-seven on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area for the 24-hour period of March 11, 1968.

~~Unfavorable weather conditions~~ continued at Khe Sanh during the reporting period, as fog with intermittent drizzle persisted throughout most of the morning and evening hours. Low ceilings lifted somewhat during the afternoon hours, permitting limited fixed wing support. Enemy anti-air incidents were light as only two aircraft were fired on and one was hit with minor damage.

During the period enemy activity was confined to incoming artillery, rocket and mortar rounds. There were no ground contacts reported. ~~A total of 150 rounds of mixed caliber fell on the Khe Sanh area during the day.~~ Casualties attributed to the shelling were three killed and 23 wounded (eight evacuated).

In the DMZ area, enemy shelling comprised the majority of enemy activity with no significant casualties or damage reported. In the vicinity of the Cua Viet river, elements of the 3rd and 4th Marines received 15 mortar rounds and 12 artillery rounds. One Marine was wounded. In ARVN operations, elements of the 2nd Regiment were in heavy contact throughout most of the day, north of Dong Ha. Initial friendly casualties are recorded as 22 killed and 65 wounded. Enemy casualties are unknown. Sweep operations continue.

There was one COFRAM mission of six rounds fired with undetermined results.

Marine aircraft flew 123 sorties, the Air Force 134, the Navy 86, for a total of ~~343 sorties~~. Bomb damage assessment included 14 road cuts, three automatic weapons positions destroyed, one rocket position destroyed, one bridge destroyed, two bunkers destroyed, eight secondary explosions, 19 secondary fires, and 15 enemy killed by air. There were six ARC LIGHT strikes ~~(36 sorties) scheduled~~, however, three aircraft went to secondary targets due to beacon malfunction. Three strikes were within 1300 - 2800 meters of friendly troops.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSI to 1/3/79
By yp/ly, NARA, Date 3-3-92

A total of ~~207~~ short tons of supplies were airlifted into the Khe Sanh area during the period. In addition, one short ton of mail and 93 passengers were lifted into the base. A total of 28 resupply sorties were flown, eleven air drops by C-130 and two by C-123, and 15 sorties by Marine helicopters.

For the next period, 308 tactical air sorties are scheduled. In addition, the Air Force will have 120 alert sorties, and the Marines will have 16 aircraft on call. Five ARC LIGHT strikes (30 sorties) are scheduled.

The weather forecast for March 12 is for improving conditions to 800 foot ceilings and two mile visibility by mid-morning, and to 2500 to 500 foot ceilings and 7 - 10 miles visibility by early afternoon. Conditions will again deteriorate after sunset, reducing ceilings and visibility to less than 500 feet and one mile by midnight.

File

Tuesday, March 12, 1968
10:00 a. m.

31

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Nick informs me that the French will not act formally on Sarge Shriver's agrément until a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 20 March.

John Leddy has spoken with Ambassador Lucet and with our Embassy in Paris. They both report that the French would not object if an announcement were made that the President intends to appoint Shriver to Paris, and that agrément has been requested.

I have personally confirmed this on the telephone with Lucet.

Given de Gaulle's France, there are certain risks in their double-crossing us; but it's as near O. K. as something like this could be since I don't think the French would risk Lucet's word to the White House.

W. W. Rostow

cc: christina

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-252
By cb, NARA Date 11-1-97

Tuesday, March 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

File

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador William W. Heath
Wednesday, March 13, 1:00 p. m.

Ambassador Heath has been officially recalled by Secretary Rusk to report to you and the Secretary on the full range of U. S. -Swedish relations.

These relations have been marred by a series of violent anti-U. S. demonstrations - including physical attacks on U. S. Embassy personnel - by left wing groups opposed to our Vietnam policy.

The Swedish Government has apologized for the demonstrations but did not effectively prevent their recurrence.

National elections are scheduled for September. The Social Democratic Government needs left wing votes to survive.

On February 21, the Swedish Minister of Education Olaf Palme joined the North Vietnamese Ambassador to Moscow in leading an anti-U. S. demonstration in Stockholm. Palme publicly blamed the U. S. for the Vietnam conflict and accused the U. S. of oppressing the Vietnamese people.

Prime Minister Erlander and Foreign Minister Nilsson publicly endorsed Palme's actions and statements.

Secretary Rusk recalled Ambassador Heath following this episode.

During his farewell meeting with Prime Minister Erlander, Heath indicated the Swedish Government's one-sided treatment of U. S. Vietnam policy was the reason for his recall.

Swedish public reaction to Heath's recall has divided along party lines. Center and right wing parties have attacked the Government for jeopardizing U. S. -Swedish relations because of domestic political motives. The Swedish Government continues to maintain its position regarding our Vietnam policy.

Heath is expected to return to Stockholm in about two months.

MW
MWG:mst

W. W. Rostow

work

33

~~SECRET~~

March 12, 1968

From file

Mr. President:

The nuclear excavation experiment, BUGGY I, involving the simultaneous detonation of five small nuclear devices in a row, was conducted successfully at noon today at the Nevada Test Site

Preliminary observations indicate the dimensions of the resulting crater are about as predicted -- 900 feet long, 300 feet wide, and 80 feet deep. The radioactive venting appears to be somewhat less than predicted. We will not know, however, for 24 to 72 hours whether any of the resulting radioactive cloud will cross the border into Canada.

W. W. Rostow

SMKeeny:jb:3-12-68/4:30p
bcc: SMK file and chron
→ WWR (2)
CEJ
SMK comeback copy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-182
By CB, NARA Date 10-18-99

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Monday, March 11, 1968

34

MR. PRESIDENT:

As instructed, I have spoken with General Wheeler as well as Clark Clifford.

The questions were put to General Westmoreland. There is as yet no reply. The reply may come in today. General Wheeler says that he hopes there will be a little time to "scrub down" Westmoreland's recommendations before they come to you.

Therefore, he is inclined to think that it would be better to make the critical decision tomorrow rather than today; but he and Clifford will be in touch with me later.

As for the other items, we shall have reports:

- Thai equipment, training, and troop dispatch;
- Korean equipment;
- Equipment for 65,000 extra Vietnamese;
- Closing dates of four battalions;
- Additional air squadrons (part of previous package, but no final decision made).

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-257
By cb, NARA Date 9-16-96

Monday, March 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Joe Alsop

You agreed to see Joe tomorrow. He plans to leave for Viet-Nam on March 14.

As you know, he has been staunch in his support of our efforts in Viet-Nam. He is convinced of the need for beefing up our effort and that the present time is crucial.

You may wish to encourage him while he is in Viet-Nam to:

(1) take a harder look than most reporters have at just what the Vietnamese themselves are doing -- both ARVN and the civilian side; are they as bad as the average reporter seems to think?

(2) look in on our allies and make it clear to his readers that we are not alone out there;

(3) dig into the pacification scene -- just how much of a setback has there been? haven't the Viet Cong made pacification a special target because they were worried about the progress that was being made;

(4) and if he can make some kind of dent on his younger colleagues in the press corps, it would be a service to all mankind.

W. W. Rostow

P. S. Joe would like to write an article denouncing the New York Times troop story as based on low-level leakers. He asked for evidence. I didn't give it to him. You may want to tell him the responsible advice given to you was unanimous.

Monday, March 11, 1968
6:05 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You will wish to read this before this evening's session: Bunker's evaluation of troops and other aspects of our suggested program.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment (SAIGON 21733)



Department of State

W 1 d #5
TELEGRAM 36a

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTROL: 2586Q

OO RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 21733/1 071122Z
ZNY TTTT
O 111142Z MAR 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8371
STATE GRNC
BT

RECD: MARCH 11, 1967
10:48 A.M.

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 SAIGON 21733

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS

Authority State Sec [2-77]

REF: STATE 124584

By WJG, NARA, Date 3-3-92

1. I AGREE THAT THE QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL US TROOPS FOR VIETNAM RAISES FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS REGARDING OUR POLICY HERE. AS THE PAPER CONTAINED IN REFTEL INDICATES, THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF AN INCREASE ON THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE INVOLVE DIFFICULT JUDGMENTS AFFECTING BOTH OUR LONG-RANGE AND SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES HERE.

2. ~~A CRITICAL ELEMENT IN JUDGING THE EFFECTS OF AN INCREASE IN US FORCES IS OBVIOUSLY THE SIZE OF THAT INCREASE. GENERAL WESTMORELAND, BASED ON HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE CAPABILITIES OF THE MILITARY SERVICES TO DEPLOY TRAINED UNITS, HAS RECOMMENDED THAT THE FIRST INCREMENT SHOULD AMOUNT TO AN ADDITIONAL~~

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 21733/1 ~~TOP SECRET~~

SEVEN COMBAT MANEUVER BATTALIONS PLUS AN MP BATTALION. THESE FORCES ARE NEEDED TO PARTIALLY OFFSET TROOPS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN DISPATCHED TO NORTHERN I CORPS. ~~IF PRES THIEU'S ANALYSIS OF ENEMY STRATEGY AND CAPABILITY IS CORRECT, NVAFVC FORCES CAN BE EXPECTED TO MOUNT ANOTHER MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN THE LATE SPRING OR SUMMER. THIS OFFENSIVE MUST BE DECISIVELY DEFEATED. EVEN THOUGH VIETNAMESE FORCES WILL BE BUILDING UP DURING THE TIME BETWEEN NOW AND SUMMER, WE CAN NOT EXPECT THEM TO BE FULLY TRAINED, EQUIPPED AND IN PLACE BEFORE THIS PHASE OCCURS. I WOULD THEREFORE FAVOR EARLIEST DEPLOYMENT OF THE FIRST INCREMENT RECOMMENDED BY GENERAL WESTMORELAND. THE QUESTION OF THE DISPATCH OF FORCES BEYOND THIS INCREMENT SHOULD BE REEXAMINED AT A LATER DATE IN THE LIGHT OF THE SITUATION DURING THE SUMMER MONTHS. THE COMMENTS THAT FOLLO~~ RELATE TO THE GENERAL PROBLEMS I FORESEE RESULTING FROM ADDITIONAL US FORCES, ~~ALTHOUGH I BELIEVE THESE PROBLEMS WILL BE MANAGEABLE IF THE INCREASES IS LIMITED TO THE NUMBER PROPOSED UNDER GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S RECOMMENDATION FOR A FIRST INCREMENT. I AM NOT ATTEMPTING TO ADDRESS IN THIS~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- SECTION 1 OF 3 SAIGON 21733, MARCH 11

~~PAGE 3 RUMSIR 21733/1 TOP SECRET~~
~~MESSAGE THE EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL~~
~~US FORCES IN TERMS OF MEASURES REQUIRED IN THE US TO BACK UP~~
~~THIS ACTION AND TO GIVE US THE REQUIRED RESERVE FORCES,~~
~~SINCE THESE ARE MATTERS WHICH HAVE TO BE DETERMINED IN~~
~~WASHINGTON.~~

3. ~~I AGREE THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL US TROOPS WOULD~~
~~PROBABLY STIFFEN THE GVN'S WILL AT A CRITICAL TIME AND WOULD~~
~~BE A FURTHER AFFIRMATION OF OUR COMMITMENT AND OF OUR CAP-~~
~~ABILITY TO MEET IT. THE COUNTERVAILING FACTOR THAT IT COULD~~
~~TEND TO FURTHER AMERICANIZE THE WAR AND TO GIVE THE VIETNESE~~
~~AN ESCAPE ROUTE FROM THEIR RESPONSIBILITY IS AN IMPORTANT~~
~~CONSIDERATION. HOWEVER, THE RECENT ATTACKS HAVE GIVEN THE ALLY-~~
~~COMMUNIST ELEMENTS HERE BOTH A SHOCK AND A SHORT IN THE ARM,~~
~~AS REFTEL INDICATES. THE QUESTION NOW IS HOW TO TAKE ADVANTAGE~~
~~OF THIS WITHOUT IMPOSING IMPOSSIBLE DEMANDS ON THE GOVERNMENT~~
~~WHICH WILL TEND TO MAKE IT THROW UP ITS HANDS AND SLIP~~
~~AWAY FROM ITS RESPONSIBILITY, LEAVING US TO CARRY THE MAIN~~
~~BURDEN. I THINK THE ANSWER TO THIS WILL TURN BOTH ON THE SIZE~~
~~AND DEPLOYMENT OF ADDITIONAL US FORCES AND ON THE AVAILABILITY~~
~~OF EQUIPMENT AND OTHER SUPPORT NEEDED TO ALLOW THE GVN TO~~

~~PAGE 4 RUMSIR 21733/2 TOP SECRET~~
~~INCREASE ITS MILITARY EFFORT PROMPTLY. IN OTHER WORDS, WE NEED~~
~~TO MAINTAIN A CAREFUL BALANCE BETWEEN MODERNIZATION OF RVNAF~~
~~AND THE BUILD-UP OF OUR OWN FORCES. ONE OF THE CLEAR LESSONS~~
~~OF THE PAST FEW WEEKS HAS BEEN THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAVE GIVEN~~
~~ALL OUT SUPPORT IN TERMS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES~~
~~FOR THE NVA/VC AND THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OUTGUN THOSE RVNAF~~
~~FORCES THAT ARE STILL EQUIPPED WITH OUR OLDER WEAPONS. OUR~~
~~MODERNIZATION PROGRAM FOR RVNAF IS JUST BEGINNING TO MAKE~~
~~PROGRESS. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO LET THIS PROGRAM SLIP AND~~
~~MUST EXAMINE EACH MAJOR ITEM CAREFULLY TO INSURE THAT RVNAF~~
~~GETS A FAIR SHARE AND THAT THE MOMENTUM AND CONFIDENCE INSPIRED~~
~~BY ISSUE OF THE NEW ITEMS IS NOT LOST. THE NUMBER OF~~
~~ADDITIONAL US TROOPS CONTEMPLATED FOR DEPLOYMENT SHOULD NOT~~
~~HAVE ANY APPRECIABLE EFFECT UPON THE MODERNIZATION AND~~
~~IMPROVEMENT OF RVNAF. IN FACT, THESE TWO MATTERS SHOULD GO~~
~~HAND IN HAND TO INCREASE THE MOMENTUM OF THE OVERALL BUILD-~~
~~UP OF STRENGTH AND CAPABILITY IN COUNTRY TO PROGRESSIVELY~~
~~DESTROY THE ENEMY. A CONSIDERATION IS MOST URGENT THAT WE GET THE~~
~~WEAPONS RVNAF NEEDS OVER HERE AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE,~~
~~IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF THE GVN'S PRESENT~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- SECTION 1 OF 3 SAIGON 21733, MARCH 11

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 21733/1 ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~MOBILIZATION PLANS.~~ I VIEW THIS MATTER AS BOTH A SHORT AND LONG TERM OBJECTIVE, WHILE IN CONTRAST THE PROVISION OF ADDITIONAL US FORCES IS A NECCARY BUT A SHORT TERM GOAL.

4. I AM CONCERNED ABOUT ~~SIZABLE ADDITIONAL US FORCES BE CAUSE OF THE EFFECTS OF OUR OVERWHELMING PRESENCE HERE AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE DESTRUCTIVE EFFECT OF OUR TYPE OF WARFARE WILL NULLIFY SOME OF OUR BASIC PURPOSE.~~ ~~BY THIS I MEAN THAT WE WILL INCREASINGLY COME TO PLAY THE ROLE OF A COLONIAL POWER, WHETHER INTENTIONALLY OR NOT. FOR THIS REASON, I THINK WE MUST MAINTAIN A VERY CAREFUL BALANCE BETWEEN WHAT WE UNDERTAKE TO DO OURSELVES AND WHAT WE CAN ACHIEVE THROUGH PRESSURE ON THE GVN, ALWAYS BEARING IN MIND WHAT THE GVN IS CAPABLE OF IN TERMS OF ITS OWN HUMAN RESOURCES.~~ HOWEVER, BRINGING IN THE ADDITIONAL US FORCES PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED SHOULD NOT ADD SERIOUSLY TO THE PROBLEM OF AN OVERWHELMING US PRESENCE. AT THIS TIME, ~~SINCE THESE FORCES WILL BE DEPLOYED IN THE HINTERLANDS FIGHTING VC AND NVA UNITS, WE BE DESTRUCTION AND VISIBILITY SHOULD BE MINIMAL.~~ ADDITIONAL

~~PAGE 6 RUMJIR 21733/1 TOP SECRET~~

FORCES WHEN ADDED TO THE PROPOSED RNVAF BUILD-UP, SHOULD PERMIT US TO REGAIN OUR MOMENTUM AND ACCELERATE IT BEYOND THAT OF 1967. THE FOREGOING GENERAL OBSERVATIONS UNDERLIE SOME OF THE SPECIFIC COMMENTS WHICH FOLLOW IN THE NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS OF THE PAPER QUOTED IN REFTEL.

5. I ~~AGREE WITH PARA 3 THAT THE GVN HAS THE CAPACITY TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY AND POLITICAL CLIMATE, AND THUS ITS IMAGE IN THE US, BUT THE DEFINITION OF THIS CAPACITY MUST BE A REALIZABLE ONE.~~ THEREFORE, THE RANGE OF DECISIONS AND ACTIONS TO BE REQUIRED OF THE GOVERNMENT MUST BE KEYED TO A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF WHAT THEY CAN DO, RATHER THAN AN IDEAL RELATED PRIMARILY TO WHAT WE OR AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD LIKE TO SEE. NO MATTER HOW MUCH WE ACHIEVE HERE, THE AMERICAN PRESS AND PROBABLY CERTIAN OF OUR OWN CONGRESS WILL NEVER REGARD IT AS SUFFICIENT, GIVEN THEIR TENDENCY SOMETIMES TO DEMAND STANDARDS OF PREFECTION WHICH EVEN WE HAVE NOT ATTAINED. ~~I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE AND THE GVN CAN DO WHAT IS NECESSARY, BUT IN DECIDING WHAT THIS IS, WE MUST TAKE SUFFICIENTLY INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT THIS IS AN UNDERDEVELOPED ASIAN NATION TORN BY DECADES OF WAR AND WITH LIMITED HUMAN RESOURCES, ENDEAVORING TO FUNCTION UNDER A NEW AN UNACUSTOMED FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN WHICH IT HAS HAD LITTLE PRACTICE AND LESS TRADITION.~~
BUNKER

~~TOP SECRET~~



Department of State

#5
TELEGRAM

W 1d

~~TOP SECRET~~

OO RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 21733/2 0711310
ZNY TTTT
O 111142Z MAR 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8372
STATE GRNC

CONTROL: 2565Q
RECD: MARCH 11, 1968
8:50 A.M.

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 3 SAIGON 21733

NODIS

6. RE PARA 5 ~~I AGREE THAT A HIGH-LEVEL MISSION TO SAIGON CAN PLAY A HELPFUL PSYCHOLOGICAL ROLE IN THIS SITUATION AND SEC CLIFFORD WOULD BE THE IDEAL PERSON TO HEAD IT. I WOULD BE INCLINED, HOWEVER, TO RECOMMEND THAT THE MISSION COME AT A SOMEWHAT LATER DATE, PERHAPS IN APRIL, TO EVALUATE WHAT IS BEING DONE AND TO GIVE AN ADDED PUSH TO OUR EFFORT. I COULD THEN CONTINUE WITH THE TASK OF LAYING BEFORE THE GOVERNMENT WHAT WE EXPECT OF IT AND OF GETTING THIS EFFORT UNDER WAY.~~ I SHOULD NOTE AT THIS POINT THAT MOST OF THE DECISIONS AND ACTIONS LISTED ARE ONES ON WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY BEEN PUSHING THE GOVERNMENT AND ON WHICH THEY HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO TAKE ENCOURAGING ACTION. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THEY CANNOT DO MORE, BUT MERELY UNDERLINES THE FACT THAT WE IN THE MISSION, AS WELL AS THE GVN, ARE BASICALLY ON THE SAME WAVE-LENGTH WITH WASHINGTON IN TERMS OF OUR OBJECTIVES, AND OF THE TIME-FRAME WITHIN WHICH WE ARE WORKING.

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 21733/2 ~~TOP SECRET~~

7. RE PARA 6 - MOBILIZATION, ~~I HAVE ALREADY REPORTED ON PRES THIEU'S DECISION TO ACCELERATE THE MOBILIZATION PROCESS AND HIS DESIRE TO PROVIDE BETWEEN 100,000 AND 125,000 ADDITIONAL MEN FOR THE ARMED FORCES DURING THE NEXT SIX MONTHS.~~ IN THIS REGARD PRES THIEU ENVISAGES THE EXTENSIVE USE OF UNITS ON FAIRFAX TYPE OPERATIONS TO PROTECT THE CITIES, THEIR ENVIRONS, AND THE LOCS. WE ARE WORKING WITH THE GVN TO MAINTAIN KEY CIVILIANS IN THEIR GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS WHERE THEY CANNOT BE SPARED OR REPLACED. GEN WESTMORELAND INFORMS ME THAT FY 68 PROGRAM FOR THE EXPANSION OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES INVOLVES AN INCREASE OF 64,000 MEN. ONLY APPROXIMATELY 25,000 OF THIS FORCE INCREASE HAS BEEN REALIZED. ~~THE CURRENT APPROVED PROGRAM IS THEREFORE SHORT APPROXIMATELY 40,000 MEN FOR WHICH EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN PROGRAMMED.~~ IN

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- SECTION 2 OF 3 SAIGON 21733, MARCH 11

ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PROGRAM, THESE 40,000 MEN WERE TO BE USED TO FILL EXISTING UNITS AND TO ACTIVATE THE FOLLOWING MAJOR ELEMENTS: APPROXIMATELY 80 RF COMPANIES AND 250 PF PLATOONS, 1 ARTILLERY BATTALION, 1 ENGINEER BATTALION, 1 SEPERATE INFANTRY REGIMENT, AND 2 INFANTRY BATTALIONS TO FLESH

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 21733/2 ~~TOP SECRET~~

OUT EXISTING REGIMENTS. IF ADDITIONAL MEN ARE MOBILIZED, RF/PF UNITS COULD BE ORGANIZED AND EQUIPPED WITH WW II-TYPE WEAPONS AVAILABLE BY VIRTURE OF RECEIPT OF MORE MODERN WEAPONS BY ARVN. GEN WESTMORELAND'S PROPOSED FY 69 PROGRAM INVOLVES AN INCREASE OF 93,000. A FORMAL REQUEST FOR APPROVAL HAS BEEN SUBMITTED THROUGH HIS CHANNEL. ~~THESE FOR~~ ~~IS GEN WESTMORELAND~~ ~~AND~~ ~~OPINION THAT THE NUMBER OF MEN THIEU PLANS TO MOBILIZE~~ ~~CAN BE CONSCRIPTED, TRAINED AND EQUIPPED, ASSUMING THAT 125,000~~ ~~MEN ARE MOBILIZED DURING THE NEXT SIX MONTHS, THIS WILL RESULT~~ ~~IN A NET INCREASE OF APPROXIMATELY 60,000 MEN IN RVNAF OVER~~ ~~CURRENT STRENGTH IN CONSIDERATION OF ESTIMATED LOSSES OF~~ ~~APPROXIMATELY 10,000 PER MONTH THROUGH CASUALTIES AND~~ ~~DESERTIONS.~~ THERE WILL BE SHORTAGES OF SOME EQUIPMENT UNTIL FY 68 PROGRAMMED QUANTITIES ARE DELIVERED AND UNTIL FY 69 ITEMS ARE PROGRAMMED AND AVAILABLE FROM PRODUCTION. INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS WILL AGAIN BE OF THE WW II TYPE AND VEHICLE SHORTAGES WILL HAVE SOME EFFECT ON MOBILITY. HOWEVER, THESE PROBLEMS ARE BELIEVED TO BE MANAGEABLE. THE MAJOR PROBLEM IS ONE OF LEADERSHIP, WHERE IT IS ESTIMATED THAT OFFICER AND NCO

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 21733/2 ~~TOP SECRET~~

REQUIREMENTS MAY BE DIFFICULT TO FILL. WE FEEL THAT WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THIEU AND THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF TO PROCEED SOONEST WITH THEIR MOBILIZATION, NOT ONLY TO FORM ADDITIONAL UNITS THAT ARE SORELY NEEDED AND TO FILL UP THEIR RANKS, BUT TO DENY THIS MANPOWER TO THE VIET CONG, WHO ARE, THEMSELVES, IN DESPERATE NEED OF MANPOWER.

8. RE PARA 7 - ~~THIEU/VY RELATIONSHIP, THIS HAS BEEN ONE OF~~ ~~MY MAIN PREOCCUPATIONS SINCE MY ARRIVAL ALMOST A YEAR AGO.~~ THIS RELATIONSHIP CONTINUES TO HAVE ITS PEAKS AND VALLEYS, AND IT IS NOW IN ONE OF ITS VALLEYS, BUT I SHALL CONTINUE TO DEVOTE MY FULLEST ENERGIES TO MAINTAINING IT AND TO ENCOURAGING A GREATER UNITY OF LEADERSHIP ON ALL SIDES. THE OBJECTIVES OUTLINED IN PARAS 7 AND 8 ARE THOSE WHICH HAVE GUIDED ME IN THE PAST AND I WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE THEM VIGOROUSLY.

9. RE PARA 9 AND 10 - ~~GETTING THE GUN BACK INTO THE~~ ~~COUNTRYSIDE, THIS IS A POINT ON WHICH GEN WESTMORELAND AND I~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- SECTION 2 OF 3 SAIGON 21733, MARCH 11

HAVE BEEN PRESSING THE TOP LEADERSHIP CONTINUOUSLY FOR THE
PAST FEW WEEKS, AND AS I HAVE REPORTED, THIER AND KY ARE
FULLY IN ACCORD WITH IT. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN CIRCLES IN THE
MILITARY LEADERSHIP WHO HAVE BEEN TOO CONSERVATIVE AND

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 21733/2 ~~TOP SECRET~~
RELUCTANT TO MOVE OUT INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE, WE BELIEVE THAT SOME
SUCCESS HAS ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED, AND IN MOST AREAS
THIS EFFORT IS ALREADY WELL UNDERWAY. WE WILL CONTINUE
TO PRESS VIGOROUSLY IN THIS DIRECTION AND TO FURNISH THE
NECESSARY SUPPORT TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO
TAKE THE INITIATIVE WITHOUT FEAR. WESTMORELAND AND I AGREE
REGARDING THE VITAL ROLE OF THE PROVINCE CHIEFS AND THEIR
STAFF AND THE SENSE OF MISSION OF THE ARVN UNITS AND WE
INTEND TO PURSUE THE EVALUATION PROCESS AT ALL LEVELS.
BUNKER
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

#5



Department of State TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTROL: 2630Q
RECD: MARCH 11, 1968
1:56 A.M.

OO RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 21733/3 0711333
ZNY TTTT
O 111140Z MAR 78 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8373
STATE GRNC
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 3 SAIGON 21733

NODIS

10. RE PARA 11 - ~~DRIVE ON THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE. PLEASE~~
THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY WHICH
~~MUST BE TAKEN FULLY AND PROMPTLY. WE ARE ALREADY~~
~~ENGAGED IN THIS COURAGEOUS PROCESS. IT WILL BE PUSHED WITH~~
EVEN GREATER VIGOR.

11 RE PARA 12 - ~~GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN,~~
~~PRES THIEU, AS YOU RECOGNIZE, ALREADY MOVING IN THE~~
~~DESIRABLE DIRECTIONS AND WE WILL KEEP UP THE PRESSURES ON HIM~~
~~TO ACCELERATE THE REFORM AND TO ASSURE THAT IT ACHIEVES THE~~
~~DESIRABLE PURPOSES. I AGREE THAT INCOMPETENT MILITARY COMMANDERS,~~
PROVINCE CHIEFS AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS MUST BE REMOVED AND
THAT WE SHOULD MAKE OUR OWN VIEWS ON SUCH PERSONS KNOWN.
THE WAY IN WHICH THIS IS DONE, HOWEVER, IS SOMETHING ON
WHICH THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE LEFT TO THOSE OF US HERE ON THE
SPOT. WE UNDERSTAND THE OBJECTIVE AND AGREE WITH IT. THE

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 21733/3 ~~TOP SECRET~~

ONLY POINT I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE AT THIS STAGE IS TO EMPHASIZE
THAT THESE CHANGES INVOLVE VERY COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIPS
AMONG THE LEADERS HERE, ESPECIALLY IN THE MILITARY, AND
THAT WE MUST NOT ALLOW OUR EAGERNESS FOR CHANGE TO OUTWEIGH
THE OVERALL OBJECTIVES OF MAINTAINING UNITY OF LEADERSHIP.
I RECOGNIZE THAT THIEU IS OVERLY CAUTIOUS AND RELUCTANT TO
MOVE IN SUCH MATTERS, AND I WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS HIM AS
NEEDED, BUT WE MUST ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THE DEFINITION OF WHAT
IS POSSIBLE MUST BE IN THE LAST ANALYSIS REMAIN HIS, SINCE HE
IS THE PRESIDENT..

12. RE PARA 13 - ~~THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO~~
~~TAKE FULLEST ADVANTAGE OF THE NATIONALIST SPIRIT OF COOPERATION,~~
~~AND WE WILL REVEAL PERSONAL PRIORITIES AND DIFFERENCES FROM~~
~~UNDERLYING THIS FRONT. THE THIEU/KY RELATIONSHIP, THE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- SECTION 3 OF 3 SAIGON 21733, MARCH 11

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES, AND THE INTER-PLAY OF POLITICAL GROUPS AND LEADERS ALL BEAR ON THIS PICTURE. ONE CAUTIONING NOTE WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO SOUND HERE IS THAT WHEN WE CHOOSE TO STIMULATE VIETNAMESE INITIATIVES FOR NATIONAL UNITY, THEY SHOULD BE RELATED TO THE ACTUAL POLITICAL SITUATION HERE AND SHOULD HAVE

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 21733/3 ~~TOP SECRET~~

LASTING MEANING IN ASIAN TERMS, NOT JUST AMERICAN IDEAS OF WHAT WE THINK THEY SHOULD DEVELOP. THE SKEPTICISM WITH WHICH WE THINK THEY SHOULD DEVELOP. THE SKEPTICISM WITH WHICH THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT IS VIEWED BY MANY VIETNAMESE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE INTROSPECTIVE VIETNAMESE OFTEN FINDS A HIDDEN MEANING AND PURPOSE IN WHAT TO US SEEMS LOGICAL AND REASONABLE. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR MEANINGFUL EFFORTS TO UNITY THE NATIONALIST ELEMENTS HERE AND TO CREATE THE BASIS FOR LONGER-TERM POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

13. RE PARA 14 -16, WE WILL BE FORMULATING OUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON ECONOMIC MEASURES ALONG THE LINES SUGGESTED IN THESE PARAGRAPHS.

14. I BELIEVE THAT THE FACTORS DISCUSSED IN PARAS 17 - 19 - US ACTIONS AND LEVERAGE, HAVE ALREADY BEEN ADDRESS AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS MESSAGE. ~~THE GENERAL FEELING THAT THE EMPHASIS SHOULD REMAIN ON OFFENSE AND MODERNIZING RVNAF AND THAT AS FORCE INCREASES SHOULD BE RELATED TO WHAT WE CONSIDER ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN THE OFFENSIVE AND TO OVERCOME CERTAIN GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGES WHICH THE ENEMY HAS, WITHOUT UNDULY WIDENING THE WAR OR OVER-AMERICANIZING IT. I KNOW THAT THIS DEFINITION REQUIRES CAREFUL SPELLING OUT BUT I WOULD HOPE THAT THIS COULD BE OUR BASIC GUIDELINE IN DOING SO.~~

BUNKER

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, March 11, 1968
5:05 p.m.

Pres. file.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bob Ginsburgh maps out the options open to us if we are to bomb more in the Hanoi-Haiphong area -- mining aside.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 79, NARA, Date 3-26-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

37a

11 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Bombing of NVN

1. At present there are eight authorized priority targets which have not been struck or restrike under current authorizations. (Tab A)

2. There are an additional 79 targets not yet authorized which merit consideration. (Tab B) These fall in two categories:

- 27 recommended by the JCS for future programs
- 52 not recommended by the JCS at this time

3. If the circles were reduced (to 3 miles around Hanoi and 1.5 miles around Haiphong), 22 targets would be uncovered. (Tab C)

- 7 in the first category
- 5 in the second category

4. This would leave 20 targets (including three mining approaches) in the first priority within the control circles -- which required specific authorization for strike. There would be an additional 47 targets in the second priority.

5. As far as civilian casualties are concerned, CINCPAC would have greater flexibility if he were instructed to minimize endangering the civilian populace not directly involved in support of military operations.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-258

By sig, NARA Date 9-23-96

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

6. In addition to modifying instructions on civilian casualties there are three broad options available, ~~short of mining the ports:~~

- Option A - ~~Reduce circles~~ - 12 additional targets
- Option B - In addition authorize strikes on all targets in Category 1 except port approaches - 17 additional targets
- Option C - In addition authorize strikes on all targets in Category 2 - 47 additional targets

Encls
a/s

9
ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

5 March 1968

FACT SHEET

UNSTRUCK AUTHORIZED PRIORITY TARGETS (U)

Analysis of the 82 authorized priority targets requiring strike or restrike, reflects the following targets that have not been struck or restruck under current authorizations:

<u>TGT #</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>LOCATION (NM)</u>	<u>DATE AUTH</u>
<u>Within 10 NM Hanoi Prohibited Area</u>			
616-0779	Van Dien Bury Plc	4 S Hanoi	08 Nov 67
616-2830	Duong Xa POL	7 E Hanoi	08 Nov 67
616-3337	Phu Thi POL	6 NE Hanoi	08 Nov 67
*616-3758	Gia Thuong Shpyd	2 NE Hanoi	08 Nov 67
616-4027	Phu Thi RR Spur	6 E Hanoi	16 Jan 68
<u>Within 4 NM Haiphong Prohibited Area</u>			
**616-0671	Haiphong Shpyd #4	In Haiphong	08 Nov 67
<u>Other</u>			
**69	Hon Gai Port	25 E Haiphong	05 Sep 67
616-3518	Tien An POL	15 SW Hanoi	15 Oct 67
*616-3951	Lang Son Stor	7 from China	16 Jan 68

* Scheduled but cancelled due to weather
 ** Scheduled but cancelled due to presence of foreign shipping

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
 NLJ 96-256
 By cb, NARA Date 2-24-97

29 February 1968

37c

ROLLING THUNDER TARGET LIST
 UNAUTHORIZED TARGETS
 RECOMMENDED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS (27)

TGT #	NAME	CIV CAS	LOCATION (NM)	DESCRIPTION
3	Hanoi/Gia Lam AF (ABGLP)	5	2.1 ENE Hanoi	6,550'/5,200' concrete runways. Main structures: 3 POL tanks, 49 acft revetments. Jet light bmr/ftr capability.
11	Hanoi RR Yd/Shops	75	In Hanoi	24% natl mil cargo handling/25% RR rolling stock repair capacity. Main structures: 16 sidings, turntable, 3 locomotive/RR car repair shops, 25 warehouse/support. Major locomotive repair shop.
68.1	Cam Pha Approaches	0	Off Cam Pha	Mineable area 0.7 NM x 3.3 NM, 36' deep. Cam Pha Port with 16% natl maritime cargo handling capacity, handles primarily coal exports.
69.1	Hon Gai Approaches	0	Off Hon Gai	3 mineable areas, varying in width from 0.3 to 0.9 NM, include 6.3 NM of dredged channel 9' - 60' deep. Hon Gai Port with 18% natl maritime cargo handling/17% naval support capacity, handles principally coal exports; closest alternate to Haiphong Port.
70 (0004)	Haiphong Naval Base (D)	30	In Haiphong	60% natl naval support capacity. Main structures: graving dock, 2 piers, 3 marine railways, 40 support. Main naval repair base.
70 (0054)	Haiphong Shipyard 3 (B)	50	In Haiphong	Monthly production: 5-6 barges, 5% natl ship construction/13% ship repair capacity. Main structures: 4 graving docks, 3 buildings ways, 40 support.
70 (0672)	Haiphong Shipyard 1 (F)	15	In Haiphong	6% natl ship construction capacity. Main structures: 2 launchways, marine railway, 34 support.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-256

By cb, NARA Date 2-24-97

1

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROLLING THUNDER TARGET LIST
UNAUTHORIZED TARGETS
RECOMMENDED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS

TGT #	NAME	CIV CAS	LOCATION (NM)	DESCRIPTION
70 (2140)	Haiphong Shipyard N (G)	1	In Haiphong	7% natl ship repair capacity. Main structures: 2 graving docks, 3 support.
70.1	Haiphong Approaches	0	Off Haiphong	3 mineable areas, varying in width from 0.5 to 2.8 NM, include 13.7 NM of channel 19' to 59' deep. Haiphong Port with 46% natl maritime cargo handling capacity, handles 80% NVN ocean shipping and extensive naval, coasting, barge, and small craft traffic.
81	Hanoi TPP	19	In N Hanoi	32,500 kw, 17% natl capacity. Main structures: generator hall, transformer, boilerhouse, 5 support. Largest in NVN; serves natl mil control cntrs/key mil installations in Hanoi area. Over separate 35-kv transmission line, provides alternate power to Haiphong Port, JCS Tgt #70. (Target was struck five times; currently operating at 50% capacity.)
616-0030	Haiphong RR Yd/Shops	25	In Haiphong	3% natl rail mil cargo handling/5% RR rolling stock repair capacity. Main structures: 8 sidings, 4 spurs, turntable, turning wye, locomotive/RR car repair shops, warehouses. Main transshipment point.
<u>616-0038</u>	Hanoi Bks/Stor Dpo	2	3.6 E Hanoi	236,000 sq ft, 2% natl capacity. Main structures: 3 admin, 19 storage, 6 veh repair shops, motor pool, 26 support.
<u>*616-0252</u>	Hanoi Bks W	2	3.8 W Hanoi	6,065 troops, 1% natl capacity. Main structures: admin, 27 support.

ROLLING THUNDER TARGET LIST
UNAUTHORIZED TARGETS
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IGT #	NAME	CIV CAS	LOCATION (NM)	DESCRIPTION
*616-0257	Hanoi Stor Gia NE	10	2.5 NW Hanoi	133,000 sq. ft., 1% natl capacity. Main structures: 67 storage/support, 12 warehouses, 5 admin and 132 SA-2 cannisters/28 AAA guns.
616-0901	Haiphong Warehouse Port	15	In Haiphong	690,000 sq ft, 6% natl capacity. Main structures: 31 warehouses, 93 support.
616-1033	Haiphong Warehouse	31	In Haiphong	209,000 sq ft, 2% natl capacity. Main structures: 22 storage/support.
*616-2353	Hanoi Supply Dpo Xuan	9	4.7 NE Hanoi	124,400 sq ft, 1% natl capacity. Main structures: 5 admin, 7 warehouses, 6 storage, 17 support.
616-2431	Van Dien RR Siding	4	4.8 S Hanoi	3,580' of track. Main structures: spur, 2 sidings. On Hanoi-Vinh rail line.
*616-2704	Hanoi Warehouse	18	2.2 SE Hanoi	93,400 sq ft, 1% natl capacity. Main structures: 2 admin, 4 veh maint, 10 warehouses, 14 support.
616-2706	Hanoi Vehicle Repair SW	44	1.8 SSW Hanoi	76,000 sq ft, 16% natl capacity. Main structures: 4 maint, 27 support. Major veh repair shop.
616-3373	Haiphong Shipyard Vinh	14	In Haiphong	Monthly production: 3-4 barges, 3% natl ship construction capacity. Main structures: 4 building cradles, 6 support.
616-3773	Don Nghia POL Tank Fab	5	In Haiphong	Annual capacity: unknown. Main structures: 2 fabrication/assembly, 5 storage.

ROLLING THUNDER TARGET LIST
UNAUTHORIZED TARGETS
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TGT #	NAME	CIV CAS	LOCATION (NM)	DESCRIPTION
* <u>616-4014</u>	Hanoi Supply Dpo WNW	4	5.5 W Hanoi	136,890 sq ft, 1% natl capacity. Main structures: admin, 2 warehouses, 37 storage, 15 support.
<u>616-4052</u>	Mai Dich Bks 1	1	5.2 WNW Hanoi	800 troops, 0.2% natl capacity. Main structures: 2 admin, 5 storage, 6 support.
* <u>616-4053</u>	Mai Dich Bks 2	5	4.3 WNW Hanoi	4,380 troops, 1% natl capacity. Main structures: 4 admin, maint, 11 storage, laboratory, 5 support.
*616-4122	Haiphong Shipyard Central	15	In Haiphong	Monthly production: 5-7 barges, 5% natl ship construction capacity. Main structures: admin, 5 construction areas.
*616-4245	Haiphong Open Stor	9	In Haiphong	375,000 sq. ft. Rail transshipment point/storage area.

ROLLING THUNDER TARGET LIST
UNAUTHORIZED TARGETS
NOT RECOMMENDED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AT THIS TIME (52)

TGT #	NAME	CIV. CAS	LOCATION (NM)	DESCRIPTION
30	Hanoi NVN ADD Hq	25	In Hanoi	Natl air defense cntr. Main structures: Hq, 6 admin, 6 support. Admin cntr for natl air defense.
57	Hanoi MND/MZ Hq	25	In Hanoi	Natl mil control cntr. Main structures: 50 admin, 3 storage 10 warehouses, 11 veh sheds, 84 support. Prestige tgt; site of MND/major natl commands (Army, Navy, Mil Zone Hq, Gen Staff, Rear Svcs, Political).
*58	Hanoi Supply Dpo S	40	1.7 S Hanoi	Joint Staff assessment pending extensive review of target by DIA
*59	Hanoi Supply Dpo N	30	1.3 NNW Hanoi	Joint Staff assessment pending extensive review of target by DIA
66	Hanoi Intl Radcom Xmtr	2	5.7 SW Hanoi	Radio transmitter. Main structures: transmitter, control bunker, antenna field, 16 support.
67	Hanoi Intl Radcom Rcvr	4	9.2 W Hanoi	Radio receiver. Main structures: opns, transformer, antenna field, 10 support.
70 (0001)	Haiphong Docks (E)	99	In Haiphong	Ocean port, 46% natl maritime cargo handling capacity. Main structures: 2 wharves, 9 warehouses, cold storage. Mil port capacity: 3,800 STPD.
71.09	Phuc Loi Approaches	0	Off Phuc Loi	3 mineable areas, varying in width from 0.2 to 0.75 NM, include 5.8 NM of channel 12' to 33' deep. Phuc Loi Naval Base with 4% natl maritime cargo handling/10% naval support capacity, provides support for patrol boats.
71.11	Thanh Loa Lock	5	2 ENE Thanh Hoa	270' x 60' lock. Accommodates waterway traffic.

* Joint Staff Assessment

ROLLING THUNDER TARGET LIST
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TGT #	NAME	CIV CAS	LOCATION (NM)	DESCRIPTION
71.12	Ben Thuy Lock	21	2 SE Vinh	135' x 26' lock. Accommodates waterway traffic. (Currently inoperable).
71.17	Nguyet Quang Lock	3	8 WNW Thanh Hoa	185' x 70' lock. Accommodates waterway traffic.
71.18	Qua Nhue Ha Lock	1	14 WNW Thanh Hoa	115' x 40' lock. Accommodates waterway traffic.
71.2	Ben Thon Lock	1	26 NNE Hanoi	165' x 50' lock. Accommodates waterway traffic.
71.21	Van Cau Lock	1	25 NNE Hanoi	130' x 40' lock. Accommodates waterway traffic.
71.22	Lu Yen Lock	1	31 N Hanoi	170' x 55' lock. Accommodates waterway traffic.
72.1	Port Wallut Approaches	0	Off Port Wallut	4 mineable areas, varying in width from 0.2 to 1.2 NM, include 7.5 NM of channel 16' to 72' deep. Port Wallut Naval Base with 15% natl naval support/3% maritime cargo handling capacity, provides support for patrol boats.
73 (4108)	Hanoi Docks (B F)	238	In Hanoi	Inland port, 30% NVN inland waterway traffic. Main structures; wharf, 106 warehouses. Important trans-shipment point.
74	Quang Khe Approaches	0	Off Quang Khe	4 mineable areas, varying in width from 0.2 to 1.3 NM, include 4.6 NM of channel. Quang Khe Naval Base with 4% natl maritime cargo handling/15% naval support capacity, provides support for patrol boats.
75	Viet Tri Chemical Plant	67	29 NW Hanoi	Annual capacity: 9,500 MT, 95% natl chemical production. Main structures: polyvinyl processing, mixing, electrolytic cell, 3 warehouses, 12 support. Produces water purifying chemicals/insecticides.

ROLLING THUNDER TARGET LIST
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TGT #	NAME	CIV CAS	LOCATION (NM)	DESCRIPTION
77	Hanoi Machine Tool Plant	21	2.5 SW Hanoi	Annual capacity: 500 units, 90% natl capacity. Main structures: forge/foundry, 4 machine shops, assembly shop, 10 support. Produces lathes, drills, planers, milling machines.
8.1	Phu Tho Fert Plant	24	39 NW Hanoi	Annual capacity: 200,000 MT superphosphate/36,000 MT sulfuric acid, 52% natl fertilizer production. Main structures: 4 admin, phosphate mixing/curing, pyrite crusher, pyrite roaster, dust catcher, 3 sulfuric acid storage tanks, warehouses, packaging/shipping area. Produces chemical fertilizers.
79	Bac Giang Fert Plant	47	26 NE Hanoi	Annual capacity: 100,000 MT, 26% natl fertilizer production. Main structures: ammonia synthesis, nitric acid plant, nitrate processing, coal preparation, support. Produces chemical fertilizers.
82.14	Lao Cai TPP	17	1 from China	8,000 kw, 4% natl capacity. Main structures: generator/boilerhouse, transformer yard, coal processing. Serves industry/apatite mining operations.
616-0034	Lao Cai RR Yd	21	1 from China	11,200' of track. Main structures: 7 sidings, 4 spurs, turntable, passenger/freight station, 30 support. Clf yard. On Hanoi-Lao Cai (NW) rail line.
615-0043	Lang Son RR Siding N	0	8 from China	1,600' of track. Main structures: siding, warehouse, passenger/freight station. On Hanoi-Dong Dang (NE) rail line.
616-0044	Dong Dang RR Yd	0	1 from China	6,550' of track. Main structures: 5 sidings, 4 spurs, 3 storage, passenger/freight station, turning wye. On Hanoi-Dong Dang (NE) rail line.
616-0161	Hanoi Telephone	40	In Hanoi	Central telephone/telegraph cntr. Main structures: 2 buildings.

ROLLING THUNDER TARGET LIST
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TGT #	NAME	CIV CAS	LOCATION (NM)	DESCRIPTION
* <u>616-0258</u>	Hanoi Bks NNW	2	5.1 WNW Hanoi	4,900 troops, 1% natl capacity. Main structures: 11 admin, veh maint, 20 storage, 21 support. Soft Stor Cap.
516-0260	Hanoi Rubber Prod Plant	2	2.9 SW Hanoi	Annual capacity: 10,000 tires, only tire factory in NVN. Main structures: 3 processing, 5 warehouses, admin, 10 support. Produces auto/motorcycle/bicycle tires.
616-0265	Lang Yang RR Br	1	7 from China	672' 5-span steel thru truss with concrete piers/abutments. <u>On spur line off Hanoi-Lao Cai (NW) rail line.</u>
*616-0287	Hanoi Bks W Yen	18	2.6 W Hanoi	11,900 troops, 3% natl capacity. Main structures: 13 admin, 44 storage, 52 support. Soft Stor Cap.
*616-0294	Hanoi Bks W Tay	48	2.3 WNW Hanoi	4,300 troops, 1% natl capacity. Main structures: 17 admin, 7 veh repair, 5 storage, 27 support. Soft Stor Cap.
616-0433	Hanoi Engineering Plant	20	In Hanoi	96,000 sq ft, only construction equipment factory in NVN. Main structures: 7 machine shops, 4 warehouses, 4 support. Produces earthmovers, small diesel engines, spare parts.
* <u>616-0649</u>	Hanoi Fert Plant	4	5.1 S Hanoi	Annual capacity: 20,000 MT superphosphate, 5% natl fertilizer capacity. Main structures: sulfuric acid plant, mixing/crushing, 2 storage.
<u>616-0690</u>	Hanoi Bks WNW Mai Dich	1	5.4 WNW Hanoi	2,700 troops, 0.5% natl capacity. Main structures: 2 motor pools, 3 admin, 14 storage. Soft Stor Cap.

ROLLING THUNDER TARGET LIST
UNAUTHORIZED TARGETS
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TOP #	NAME	CIV CAS	LOCATION (NM)	DESCRIPTION
616-0773	Haiphong Concrete Prod	8	In Haiphong	Annual capacity: 7,500 MT, 30% natl precast concrete capacity. Main structures: casting, crushing/screening, 3 processing, admin, 7 support. Major producer of girders, pylons.
616-0922	Hanoi Machinery Plant Gia	34	In Hanoi	871,000 sq ft, 10% natl capacity. Main structures: 4 admin, 11 machine shops, 29 support. Produces belt conveyors, small machine tools.
616-1827	Lang Yang RR Yd	5	7 from China	3,500' of track. Main structures: spur, 2 sidings. On Hanoi-Lao Cai (NW) rail line.
* <u>616-2111</u>	Mai Dich Trng	15	3.5 NW Hanoi	Communist party training school. Main structures: 18 training.
*616-2359	Hanoi Bks Giang	3	2.0 W Hanoi	900 troops, 0.2% natl capacity. Main structures: admin, 2 veh storage, 2 storage, 21 support. Sq ft Stor. Cap.
616-2656	Hanoi Concrete Prod Plant	9	2.6 NW Hanoi	Annual capacity: 1,500 MT, 6% natl precast concrete capacity. Main structures: 11 production, 7 storage, admin, 11 support. Only asbestos - cement products plant in NVN; produces roofing slabs, building materials.
616-2705	Hanoi Vehicle Repair Bac	1	2.3 SW Hanoi	14,200 sq ft, 1% natl capacity. Main structures: 2 repair shops, 2 maint, 9 support.
616-2869	Haiphong POL Tank Fab	12	In Haiphong	Annual capacity: unknown. Main structures: 2 fabrication, 2 support.

* Joint Staff Assessment

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TGT #	NAME	CIV CAS	LOCATION (NM)	DESCRIPTION
*616-3286	Hanoi Bks 3	47	1.5 W Hanoi	4,170 troops, 1% natl capacity. Main structures: admin, 5 support. <i>Soft Skin Cap.</i>
<u>16-3662</u>	Lang Truoc Radcom Xmtr (ABSORBED BY 4237)	0	14 N Hanoi	Intl radio transmitter. Main structures: transmitter, control generator, pumphouse, antenna field, support.
*616-3728	Haiphong Open Stor 1 (4237)	18	In Haiphong	Open storage for incoming materials, including POL tanks, generators, trucks, tractors.
616-3757	Lang Son RR Yd NE	6	8 from China	4,400' of track. Main structures: 2 sidings, Freight holding yard. On Hanoi-Dong Dang (NE) rail line.
616-3812	Haiphong DPP E	8	In Haiphong	300 kw, 0.2% natl capacity. Main structures: generator hall, 3 POL tanks.
616-3813	Haiphong DPP 3	2	In Haiphong	300 kw, 0.2% natl capacity. Main structures: generator hall, 2 POL tanks.
616-3826	Haiphong DPP W	6	In Haiphong	300 kw, 0.2% natl capacity. Main structures: generator hall, 3 POL tanks.
616-3873	Haiphong Veh Repair	5	In Haiphong	18,000 sq ft, 1% natl capacity. Main structures: maint, 14 support.
*616-4076	Haiphong DPP 4	2	In Haiphong	300 kw, 0.2% natl capacity. Main structures: generator hall, 4 POL tanks, pump house.