

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, March 11, 1968

4:30 p. m.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

MR. PRESIDENT:

The Apostolic Delegate, the Most Reverend Luigi Raimondi, asked to see me this afternoon. He carried a memorandum which proposed that, without the prior knowledge of Hanoi or Washington, a legitimate neutral source invite the following to appear at a conference at a certain time and place: U. S., GVN, Hanoi, and NLF. The three members of the International Control Commission (India, Canada, and Poland) would also be invited. The inviting neutral country would also ask both sides to de-escalate the violence, including a cessation of bombing of North Vietnam.

The Holy See, after examining the project, said that it was impossible to back it without both sides, at least, being informed. Therefore, Rev. Raimondi was willing to have me read the memo; make any remarks I cared to make; but not keep and circulate the memo.

I read it and told him that he should ask for a session with Secretary Rusk; let him read and return the memo; and get his observations. My own observations were these:

-- The memo is based on the assumption that both sides wish to negotiate, but cannot find a way to do so without believed disadvantage. It was unlikely that this was the case; but no idea or hypothesis that might bring peace should be excluded.

-- The proposal called for a "gradual reduction" in the violence; but called for a flat "cessation of bombing of North Vietnam." Whatever proposals were made should be well balanced and symmetrical, in my judgment.

-- The memo suggested Sweden as an ideal authentic neutral -- I noted that out of its own political life, Sweden had gotten itself into a somewhat awkward relation to Vietnam. He immediately said that Switzerland would certainly be better.

-- I concluded by repeating that he should regard my remarks as personal; and should seek out Secretary Rusk. I told him that anything coming from the Holy See or from himself personally would always be taken most seriously by this government.

I told him that I would, of course, inform the President; but I would not circulate a piece of paper about this project within the government beyond that.

He asked me to convey his respects and best wishes to the President.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ERUS, 64-68, vol. 6, #118By jc NARA, Date 1-13-04*W. Carter* Rostow

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Monday, March 11, 1968 - 4:50 pm

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Birthday Greetings to the Japanese Prime Minister

On March 27 Prime Minister Sato will celebrate his 67th birthday. I believe you will wish to send him greetings.

I recommend that you approve the attached suggested message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

AJ:mmm

cc: Mr. Jordan

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 7, 1968

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IN REPLY REFER TO:


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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proposed Birthday Greetings from
President Johnson to Prime Minister Sato

Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato will celebrate his sixty-seventh birthday on March 27. The President knows the Prime Minister well, because of the two visits the latter has paid to Washington, first in January 1965 and more recently in November 1967. The Prime Minister has reflected the closeness of this tie in numerous personal messages to the President. In view of the special relationship which exists between the President and the Prime Minister, and the importance of US-Japan relations, the Department recommends that the President extend birthday greetings to the Prime Minister.

A proposed message, for transmittal through our Embassy at Tokyo, is enclosed. The Department recommends that the message not be released in Washington, but we would have no objections if the Japanese wished to release the message in Tokyo.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Proposed Message from President Johnson
to Prime Minister Sato

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Suggested Message

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

On the occasion of your birthday, I extend warmest congratulations and best wishes for the continued success of your endeavors. Mrs. Johnson joins me in wishing you health and happiness in the coming years.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Eisaku Sato,
Prime Minister of Japan,
Tokyo.

INFORMATION

40

Monday, March 11, 1968 - 3:05 pm

Mr. President:

**Herewith Dick Helms follows up
on the Collins story about the alleged
conflict between himself and me.**

W. W. Rostow

Pres file

WWRostow:rin



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

10 March 1968

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walt Rostow

1. You will recall that prior to the NSC meeting last Wednesday, you handed me a Xerox of an article which appeared in THE COURIER-JOURNAL & TIMES by Frederic W. Collins of THE LONDON SUNDAY TIMES. On the Xerox was a note asking me to "Check this and stop it."

2. I got in touch with Henry Brandon who is the regular LONDON SUNDAY TIMES correspondent in Washington. He told me that he had been on vacation in Aspen and that Collins stands in for him when he is away from Washington. It also appears that Collins normally works for the Ridder publications. In any event, Henry Brandon obviously spoke to Collins because on Saturday evening Collins came up to me and we had quite a conversation about his piece. In a moment of uncommon candor, he admitted to me that he had simply rewritten the Thomas Ross story of an earlier date with which you are familiar. Put another way, Collins had no new "facts" but had simply rearranged the inaccuracies which Ross had already perpetrated about you and me and our views of the Vietnamese war. Collins and I ended our talk amicably enough with my invitation to him to telephone me whenever he has an item which in some way affects the Agency.

3. I think you will agree that it is a dreary commentary on newspapers that a story based on untruths can go so far and get such wide circulation.

Dirh
Richard Helms
Director

SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

41

~~SECRET~~

Monday, March 11, 1968 -- 11:35 am

Mr. President:

Herewith a report on post-Tet morale.

In general:

- people are shaken;
- they fear further attacks;
- they are not pro-Viet Cong;
- the outcome (see last para., p. 5) depends on the reestablishment of security and allied initiative.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 21585

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-6-78, NSC 8-14-80

By JK/ig, NARA, Date 3-3-92

41a

SECRET

Saturday, March 9, 1968

TEXT OF CABLE FROM SAIGON (21585)

SUBJECT: Provincial Popular Attitudes on Tet Attacks and Aftermath

The Political Section and the Joint U. S. Public Affairs Office have prepared an assessment of provincial popular attitudes, as of early March, based upon all material available to the Mission. Reasonably comprehensive information is available on attitudes in urban areas, but there is only fragmentary data on the situation in rural areas. The next HES study will not be available until some time after March 20. The following is a shorter and updated version of a longer assessment of the same subject, which will be transmitted by pouch.

The Tet offensive was a direct attack on the morale and confidence of the people of South Vietnam. Although far from achieving the success for which the enemy hoped, there is no question that it did have significant impact on the countryside as a whole, producing considerable fear of the power the Communists can bring to bear. This impact is likely to be felt for months. What may have been a minimum enemy objective of achieving and consolidating control in the countryside may have been achieved temporarily in many areas in the wake of the assaults on provincial and district towns. Communist armed and unarmed propaganda and food -- collecting teams are reportedly active in much of the countryside. Viet Cong control and influence in many villages and hamlets appears to be adequate to permit fairly large-scale recruiting and intensive propagandizing.

The psychological impact was not all to the advantage of the enemy, however. The excellent overall military performance of ARVN (unfortunately offset in some localities by extensive looting) has on balance produced a new sense of pride and confidence in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. There is a degree of satisfaction in the population that their armed forces and the civilian administration, through their own efforts and backed by a heavy U. S. commitment, were able to throw back the heavy Communist assaults. The enemy was unable to mobilize the people for a general uprising, as he anticipated, though small groups here and there were mobilized for specific purposes, most notably in Hue.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State let 4/25/79
By sp/12, NARA, Date 3-3-92

How long the impact of these various reactions to the offensive will last depends to a great extent on events in the months ahead. The people in the cities as well as in rural areas are apprehensive about the ability of the Government of Vietnam and its allies to provide security, an apprehension which will be allayed only with re-establishment of security in the countryside and reacquisition of the military initiative by the Government of Vietnam and free world military forces.

A probable and quite natural outgrowth of these apprehensions will be an even greater reluctance on the part of individual Vietnamese to commit themselves explicitly to the Government of Vietnam. This tendency may slow nation-building and pacification programs and require more effort and time to stimulate the average citizen to action or commitment.

There has been surprising credence paid to the rumors of Viet Cong/ U.S. collusion to force a coalition government on the Government of Vietnam. The fact that this rumor has been heard in all parts of the country suggests that this is a psychological vulnerability which Viet Cong propaganda is exploiting with success. Public statements by the Ambassador and repeated efforts by members of the Mission to lay this allegation to rest have had only limited success, although in areas where U.S. forces have been heavily engaged and where U.S. casualties have been seen, the rumor has died away quickly.

Attitudes by Corps area follow:

A. I Corps -- Attitudes in I Corps are dominated by the fact that the five provinces in the area are closest to the 17th parallel and are thus closest to the danger of being overrun by the North Vietnamese Army in the event of a Korean-style assault. Morale in I Corps has been fragile for the best part of a year, as a consequence of heavy Communist attacks on the Con Thien and Gio Linh positions, as well as the heavy buildup around Khe Sanh. Communist attack and occupation of parts of Hue for three weeks contributed to further loss of morale in the area as a whole. Recent events have given new life to the rumor, first heard in the spring of 1967, that the U.S. would pressure the Government of Vietnam to abandon the two northern provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien to the Communists either to obtain peace or simply to improve the military situation. Communist assaults on Quang Tri, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, and Quang Tin province capitals were quickly contained and thrown back, with heavy enemy losses, but fear of renewed Communist assaults is still widespread among the population. Viet Cong/ North Vietnamese Army forces largely control western (mountainous) portions

of Quang Tri and Thua Thien, and Viet Cong propaganda cadre are active in lowland villages and hamlets. There was some response to the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army attacks by oppositionist elements in Hue, who appear to have joined the Communist Emergency Administration of Thua Thien-Hue, but the population as a whole did not respond to the Viet Cong, despite a prolonged enemy presence in the city.

B. II Corps -- Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army attacks on province and district capitals were generally thrown back in a few days, although in a subsequent attack on Phan Thiet (Binh Thuan province) February 18, the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army were able to hold part of the town for two days before being driven out. In the provinces where there was strong military and civilian leadership (e. g. , Khanh Khoa and Kontum), morale has remained generally good, even though Kontum was the site of major fighting and is still menaced by the presence of Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces nearby. Morale elsewhere in II Corps is spotty and has been affected adversely in Phan Thiet and Tuy Hoa by looting by ARVN troops. Fighting lasted two weeks in Dalat largely because of a lack of combat troops and a confused command picture, both of which depressed civilian morale. On the whole, simultaneous Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army attacks on nine of the 12 II Corps province capitals resulted in considerably increased fear of, though not allegiance to, the Viet Cong in the region. Here, as elsewhere, there was little evidence of popular response to the Communist call for a general uprising, though in Ban Me Thout, for example, the Viet Cong were able to mobilize about two hundred Montagnard to march on the city with the invitation to join in looting it after its anticipated capture by the Viet Cong.

Viet Cong propaganda activity in II Corps villages and hamlets appears to be considerable, although effects are not yet noticeable. Government of Vietnam military and civilian presence is slowly making itself felt once again outside the province and district capitals to which it had largely been withdrawn during and immediately after the attacks.

C. III Corps -- Overriding concern in most of III Corps is apprehension concerning security. Tet attacks on province and district capitals were not on as large a scale as elsewhere, presumably because some Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army strength was diverted from III Corps for attacks on Saigon. Some villages and hamlets in the area were largely unaffected and untouched by events of the past month, and morale there is unchanged. Renewed apprehensions have resulted from the fact that seven of 11 province capitals have been hit by mortars and rockets since the main

thrust of the Tet offensive died away. Major Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army units are reportedly operating in the provinces surrounding Saigon, which has had a predictably depressing effect on morale in the areas involved. Such enemy strength also means more Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army presence in populated rural areas of Gia Dinh, Binh Duong, Bien Hoa, Hau Nghia, and Long An provinces than has been the case for well over a year. While information on conditions in rural areas is sparse, indications of heavy propaganda and recruitment activity are widely reported. Impact on the people is hard to document, but in absence of effective Government of Vietnam counteraction, we must assume people will adjust to improved Viet Cong power positions and will see no alternative to providing food and recruits to the Viet Cong when demanded. Overt Viet Cong hamlet administrations reported by the district chief to have been established in five remote areas of Binh Long province, although it does not appear that the Communists have been able to expand their control to this extent in other rural areas of III Corps. No signs of popular enthusiasm for Viet Cong in III Corps, and most members of Viet Cong Hamlet Councils in Binh Long appear to have been appointed to positions by Viet Cong hard core but did not volunteer for these jobs.

In several areas of III Corps the Communist propaganda cadre appear to be spreading the jingle, "Blood will flow in May, there will be peace in June." This may indicate an effort to provide the excuse of one more big effort and then peace will come, when the Viet Cong make heavy demands for food and recruits, as they now are reportedly doing. We have no reports on popular reactions to these heavy demands, but cannot believe this will make the Viet Cong more popular.

In the strongly anti-Communist northern Catholic refugee villages near Vien Hoa city, people have formed self-defense organizations and are strongly committed to the Government of Vietnam. The Catholics here have recognized and accepted the necessity for damaging or destroying their homes in order to route the Viet Cong. There have been some encouraging indications of Cao Dai cooperation with the Government of Vietnam in Tay Ninh in driving Viet Cong out of villages and towns and in connection with recovery operations.

D. IV Corps -- The public attitudes in IV Corps are a special case, for they are conditioned by perhaps the most prolonged exposure to more or less continuous Communist activity for the past 20 years. When the Communist insurgency was reactivated in 1959, it moved out of Communist base areas in the U Minh area of Ca Mau Peninsula and the Plaine Des Joncs, near the

Cambodian border, where the Communists have been in virtually full control since 1945. Government of Vietnam administrations in An Xuyen, Kien Tuong, Kien Phong, and parts of Kien Giang have largely been shells for years, while Viet Cong activity in Dinh Tuong, Go Cong, Kien Hoa, Chuong Thien, and Vinh Binh has been on a formidable scale since 1960.

The Viet Cong assaults and the destruction and looting by ARVN that accompanied and followed them had a negative effect on civilian morale and attitudes. Fear of renewed assaults continues to affect popular attitudes towards the Government of Vietnam. There was and is popular resentment that the Viet Cong violated the Tet holidays, but Communist forces remain poised to strike many province and district capitals from positions located, in many cases, only a few kilometers from the centers of the towns. Our impression is that resentment against the Communists is not nearly as strong as prevailing fear of them and of what they may do in the next round of assaults. Behind the shield of Communist forces around the towns the Communist political cadre are reportedly actively working over the population in the rural areas, with indications of active recruitment of additional Viet Cong replacements and whole new units being formed or upgraded from local to main force level. The people may not like the Communists, but what sparse indications we have suggest they are responding to the reality of Communist power in many areas.

Nevertheless, in IV Corps, as elsewhere in the country, there is no enthusiasm for the Viet Cong and no general belief in Communist victory. The Tet offensive has been a heavy blow to popular morale, but there has been considerable recovery since then, and there is a feeling of achievement in many areas that a major Communist assault has been thrown back.

Res. file

Monday, March 11, 1968
10:30 a. m.

42

MR. PRESIDENT:

Congressman John Murphy tells me Congressman Podell, after conferring with his district leaders, is inclined now to change his position on Vietnam and run in his June primary as a dove.

Murphy says he is going to Vietnam and wonders if it might not be good for Podell also to go to Vietnam, returning via Israel, where he would be confronted by people who support our Vietnam position.

I said I would report his call to you, but pointed out it would be inappropriate for me to offer political advice.

Murphy said he would remain steady and try to lead his people on Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

Pres. file

Monday, March 8, 1968
10:00 a. m.

43

Mr. President:

Having reviewed the monetary and trade situation this morning, my judgment is this: it is as important to try to square Wilbur Mills as Richard Russell before moving on reserve call-up, etc.

If Mills is willing to support a tax increase, we can probably handle the shock of a defense budget increase. The tax increase has a disproportionate psychological meaning abroad and in the capital and money markets.

Otherwise it may be very tough on the dollar.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

44

~~SECRET~~

Monday, March 11, 1968 -- 9:45 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Khe Sanh-DMZ:

- weather less good;
- enemy fired 250 rounds;
- 178 tons delivered;
- 328 sorties plus 36 B-52's;
- our supply base at Cua Viet, at Western end of DMZ but quite badly by lucky enemy round;
- major successful further ARVN fire fight at Dong Ha, 102 enemy killed, 7 captured.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD ltr 10-18-78

By ip/ry, NARA, Date 3-3-92

SECRET

44a

Monday, March 11, 1968, 8:45 AM

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number thirty-six on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area for the 24-hour period of March 10, 1968.

Low ceilings and drizzle prevailed at Khe Sanh through most of the reporting period, with a consequent decline in the number of air strikes flown. Light enemy anti-air incidents were recorded as only two aircraft were fired on with minor damage reported to one. Enemy activity was confined to incoming mortar, artillery and rocket rounds with 250 rounds of mixed ordnance falling during the day. Two Marines were killed and 15 wounded, four of whom required medical evacuation.

No significant ground contacts were reported. Enemy activities at other installations in northern Quang Tri paralleled activity at Khe Sanh. No ground contacts were reported by Marine units. However, enemy shelling was damaging. The day's incoming included 10 rounds of artillery falling at A-3. Camp Carroll received 10 mortar rounds. No casualties or damage was reported in either instance. Several artillery rounds fell at positions occupied by the 4th Marines at C-3, with no damage or casualties reported.

Beginning at 7:30 AM on March 10, the Dong Ha combat base received 70 rounds of rocket and 82 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery resulting in three killed and 14 wounded, with seven evacuees. At 9:00 AM, one incoming round landed at the landing ship tank ramp on the Cua Viet. The round struck a drum of fuel, spread into the fuel farm causing secondary fires. The fires subsequently set off several rounds of ammunition. Eighty-five percent of the ramp was reported destroyed. Damages included destruction of five trucks, several buildings, two fuel tanks, one artillery weapon, three communications vans, one crane, three fork lifts and a guard tower. The bladder farm was reported 33 percent destroyed. Initial casualties were recorded as one killed and 28 wounded.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD ltr 1/3/79
By ip/ry, NARA, Date 3-3-92

ARVN operations in northern Quang Tri Province included a large contact north of Dong Ha. In Operation Lamson 193, elements of the 2nd ARVN Regiment engaged a large size enemy force. Fighting continued throughout the day. Friendly casualty figures were recorded as three killed, 37 wounded. A total of 102 enemy were killed with 20 individual and five crew served weapons captured. Seven North Vietnamese Army prisoners were captured.

Marine aircraft flew 80 tactical air sorties in support of Khe Sanh, the Air Force flew 141, and the Navy 107 for a total of 328 sorties. Bomb damage includes two trucks destroyed, 42 road cuts, 14 secondary explosions. 43 secondary fires, three bunkers and 140 meters of trench destroyed, 13 enemy killed, seven gun positions destroyed, and 14 structures destroyed. There were six ARC LIGHT strikes (36 sorties) scheduled into the Niagara area, however, four aircraft went to secondary targets due to targetting equipment and aircraft malfunctions. Three strikes in the Niagara area were classified as close-in targets, ranging from 1300 - 1800 meters from friendly forces.

During the period, 178.5 short tons of supplies were airlifted into Khe Sanh. In addition, 92 passengers were flown in. In all, a total of 18 sorties were flown. Twelve C-130's conducted eleven air drops. Five C-123's conducted three air drops and two landed at the field. One helicopter landed at the field.

For the next period, 307 tactical sorties are scheduled. Six ARC LIGHT strikes (36 sorties) are scheduled.

The morning of March 10 at Khe Sanh was foggy with visibility as low as 1/8 mile at mid-morning. Low clouds remained through the afternoon. After dark, fog formed again restricting visibilities to 1/16 mile by the morning of March 11. The forecast is for continued cloudy weather, with fog during the morning hours and after 8:00 PM at night, lowering visibilities to 1/2 mile after midnight.



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

11 March 1968
0500 EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST
10 Mar (9:00 AM 11 Mar, SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)
status as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>DAYS SUPPLY ON HAND</u>	<u>PREVIOUS STATUS 8:00 PM 9 Mar EST (9:00 AM 10 Mar SVN)</u>
<u>CLASS I (Rations)</u>		
Meal, Combat, Individual	18	17 days
B Rations	9	8 days
<u>CLASS III (Fuel)</u>		
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	3	3 days
JP-4 Fuel (Jet Fuel)	10.6	10.6 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	6.1	7.1 days
Diesel	3.3	4.3 days
<u>CLASS V (Ammunition)</u>		
a. High explosive		
60-mm mortar	43	42 days
81-mm mortar	20	22 days
90-mm (Tank)	108	108 days
4.2" mortar	40	40 days
105-mm howitzer	25	24 days
155-mm howitzer	14	14 days
b. Antitank		
		<u>ROUNDS ON HAND</u>
90-mm HEAT		1,202
66-mm rocket (LAW)		3,381
Antitank mines (M-15)		198
Antitank mines (M-19)		668
Antitank mines (M-21)		0
106-mm HEAT		872
106-mm recoilless rifle (MOP-T)		2,264
3.5" rocket		2,189
90-mm AP-T		329

SECRET

DAYS SUPPLY
ON HAND

PREVIOUS STATUS
8:00 PM 9 Mar EST
(9:00 AM 10 Mar SVN)

c. Antipersonnel

ROUNDS ON HAND

106-mm BEEHIVE


1,027

CLASS V (COFRAM)

105-mm howitzer	5	5 days
155-mm howitzer	5	5 days
40-mm grenade launcher	5	5 days
Hand grenades	10	10 days

2. On 10 March, Khe Sanh was resupplied with 178.5 tons as follows:

CLASS I	13.0 tons
CLASS II	2.0 tons
CLASS III	30.5 tons
CLASS IV	12.5 tons
CLASS V	118.0 tons
Miscellaneous	2.5 tons


JAMES A. SHANNON
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:

SECDEF
DEPSECDEF
CJCS (3)
DJS (5)
J-30
J-31
J-32
J-33
J-4
AWR
MCCC
AFCP
NPP
DDO
ADDO
CCOC
PAC DIV
PAC DESK

SECRET

INFORMATION

45

**Monday, March 11, 1968
8:20 a.m.**

Profile

Mr. President:

**Herewith political complaint
from Sen. Holland via Gene Rostow.**

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

Senator Holland's Discontented Mood

When Gene Rostow met with Senator Holland Wednesday morning (March 6) to discuss a restrictive long staple cotton bill currently before the Senate Agriculture Committee, it soon became apparent that the Senator's interest in the meeting was in conveying to the President his deep sense of frustration over what he considers to be the complete lack of "mutuality" in his relations with the White House. He finds that several other Members of the Committee share this feeling.

He pointed out that the Budget Bureau people are quick to come to him for support for Administration measures and that he has worked hard to support efforts to hold down the budget, even when it would clearly be detrimental to projects important to Florida, and cited in particular his work on Resolution 888. He mentioned also his support of an income tax surcharge, recalling the strong position he took before a hundred or so of his Congressional colleagues at a White House meeting about a year and a half ago. On the other hand, he finds that he receives no consideration from the Budget people in return (he realizes that the President is not personally involved in all of these decisions). He has been trying hard but in vain for years to replenish the capital of the Commodity Credit Corporation, as the law requires. Similarly, the Administration has refused his requests to utilize the \$300 million buffer fund voted by Congress to cushion adverse developments in agricultural areas. The Cross-State Barge Canal is one of the most important economic projects in Florida. The BOB has cut the State request for \$20 million to \$4.6 million, greatly extending the period before this important economic asset will be completed. He described his treatment as being "kicked in the pants".

In the Civil Rights issues currently before the Senate, he sees no effort to work out a compromise, it is being "jammed down our throats". The White House must, he stated, be aware of the political realities in the State of Florida, but appears to ignore them. He described his personal situation as a loyal Democrat, with the extent of his commitment a private matter. He "could not support a man like Wallace" and he could not work with "the other party" because that is not the party which has done things for Florida. He concluded by observing that he might have inherited his loyalty to the Democratic Party, but it is a position which he holds today because of deep conviction.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~lets~~
46
Pres. file
Sunday, March 10, 1968
8:00 PM

Mr. President

As you were informed this morning Site 85 was under enemy pressure. We have been informed tonight by Ambassador Sullivan that he has ordered the evacuation of the 18 Americans because the operations at the Site is impossible.

The Site is under heavy mortar and small arms fire, and the communication unit is reported as being on fire. Steps are being taken to destroy all the remaining equipment prior to evacuation.

Site 85 has long been a thorn in the side of the Communists because it provides an advanced staging base for friendly guerrilla operations and contains communications and navigation equipment that supports U. S. air operations over North Vietnam.

I will report tomorrow the alternative arrangements for filling the functions which were carried out at Site 85.

WWRostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-457
By sig, NARA, Date 10-26-93

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Sunday, March 10, 1968 -- 11:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith my judgment on today's New York Times article on troops.

- 1. The materials were mainly gathered from medium-level officials in both State and Defense, who oppose the sending of more troops to Vietnam.
- 2. These officials either made available, read, or summarized -- probably the latter -- from one of the working papers prepared for the Clifford Committee, which made the argument against more troops.
- 3. I find no evidence that officials who worked directly on the Clifford Committee spoke to the writers of the article; and some indication that they did not. I regard the article as the product of dangerous insubordination which can only be met by an early decision by the President and a full account of where we stand in the winter-spring enemy offensive and what we intend to do.

Incidentally, my impression of the Westmoreland counteroffensive, described in a dispatch, March 3, to General Wheeler, is that it is going quite well in I Corps and around Danang. Thang has taken hold in the Delta. He deserves all the support we can give him. In III Corps we have not yet engaged the divisions near Saigon; but I presume this is imminent.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 6/25/96

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 10/25/96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

FRS 7-14-79

Authority Reading 10-27-78, NSC 2-29-80,

By isply, NARA, Date 3-4-92

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, March 9, 1968 -- 4:45 p. m.

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: The Gold Issue

Walter Heller gave me a rundown on last night's meeting of the Dillon Committee. (Sec. Fowler's Advisory Committee, consisting of: Dillon, Reosa, Heller, Kermit Gordon, David Rockefeller, Edward Bernstein, Frazer Wilde, Andre Mayer, and Bator.) They met informally in New York to go over the options on gold and the balance of payments and will report to Sec. Fowler.

Their conclusions were:

1. The tax bill is a must. They agreed on a strong public statement (attached) which they will release next week after going over it with Fowler.
2. They are unanimously opposed to an increase in the price of gold as a way of dealing with the present crisis.
3. Most would prefer to keep the present gold pool arrangement going but they do not believe it will be possible to negotiate with the Europeans the arrangements necessary (specifically, the gold certificate proposal) to turn the market around and restore calm.
4. They, therefore, believe we will have to close the gold pool operation and let the market price go. They believe it is essential we do this in cooperation with our gold pool partners and preferably at their request.
5. They were somewhat fuzzy on particular plans for getting non-gold pool members to cooperate and suggest we perhaps can use the IMF for this purpose. They believe we will have to act within 30 days and must have a clear idea of where we want to go and how we plan to get there.

Comment: As you can see, these views are not very different from our own. After the meeting of the Central Bankers in Basel this week end, we will have a better idea of what the Europeans are willing to do, what the prospects are of keeping the gold market open and quiet, and what would be the most orderly way of bringing about change. Deming returns tonight, and Bill Martin on Monday.

Fowler is working to get the gold cover bill on the floor of the Senate on Tuesday. Passage of the bill should help quiet things down.

W. W. Rostow

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STATEMENT ON THE SURTAX BY MEMBERS OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE U.S. TREASURY ON INTER-
NATIONAL MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS

The balance of payments position of the United States requires prompt enactment of the temporary ten per cent surcharge on income taxes. As the Treasury's advisers on international monetary problems, we feel impelled to make this public statement of the position we have just reaffirmed to the Secretary of the Treasury.

The tax surcharge has been publicly debated for more than a year. It has been supported by an almost unprecedented consensus of businessmen, bankers and economists. Both at home and abroad, it would provide the necessary signal that the United States is now moving firmly and forcefully to limit the inflationary effects of too much overall demand, and thus to maintain and improve this country's competitive performance in the world economy.

Cuts in Federal expenditures cannot substitute for the enactment of the tax surcharge - this alternative is illusory. The President's

budget has already imposed severe restraint on foreign aid and programs dealing with the critical problems of our cities - education, health, poverty, manpower training, housing, and pollution. We fear that any substantial further reductions in federal spending would come in large part at the expense of these programs of compelling national importance. Some savings can and should be realized by a further stretchout in such programs as space, highways, and public works - but such savings clearly would be insufficient.

There is no need to hold back from tax action in fear of too much restraint. The risks are heavily weighted in the opposite direction. An inflationary spiral, aggravated by an excessive federal deficit, is already underway; left unchecked, the consequences will be damaging to domestic stability as well as to our trade position. Moreover, a surcharge is the most readily reversible tax measure, ideally suited for prompt withdrawal once the danger of overheating has passed.

The President's January 1 balance of payments program does not remove the need for the surcharge; now would further expenditures cuts

within the range of practicability and desirability remove that need.

There is no feasible substitute for tax action to curtail the inflationary excesses in domestic demand that are spilling over into imports — a major factor in the sharp deterioration of the nation's trade position that occurred in the final quarter of 1967. Rising prices and costs are also hurting our exports. This setback in our competitive trade position must be checked before it gets any worse.

Failure to act would endanger worldwide confidence in the dollar and would invite a repetition of flareups in the gold markets. It would risk a serious upheaval in the international monetary system. The Congress should keep in mind the grave consequences of inaction to our international trade and financial position.

We are convinced that, in the interests of our nation's economic strength and stability, enactment of the surcharge must be delayed no longer.

INFORMATION

49

**Saturday, March 9, 1968
4:00 p. m.**

Mr. President:

**Herewith a rather useful
State summary of alternative Vietnam
policies.**

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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Cy 2 Jordan

IN REPLY REFER TO:

4076

March 7, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE



Subject: Alternative Viet-Nam Policies by Key
US Public Figures and Organizations

The attached material was developed as a result of a request by the President to the Secretary at last week's Tuesday lunch. We have added the "GOP Proposal" submitted last July by Congressman Bradford Morse and the Bingham group proposal of March 4. For obvious reasons we dropped Governor Romney from the list.

We have tried to exclude purely critical material and include only affirmative suggestions for changes of existing practice or policy. We have limited the material to the most recent statements available.

BHR

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

As Stated

ALTERNATIVE VN POLICIES BY KEY US PUBLIC FIGURES AND
ORGANIZATIONS

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SENATOR J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT

GVN-NLF Negotiations

"The South Vietnamese government should seek peace negotiations with the National Liberation Front."

Negotiate for a cease-fire

"At the same time as the Saigon government makes direct overtures to the National Liberation Front the United States and South Vietnam together should propose negotiations for a cease-fire among military representatives of four separate negotiating parties: the United States and South Vietnam, North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front."

Stop bombing, reduce scale of military operations

"The United States should terminate its bombing of North Vietnam, add no additional forces in South Vietnam, and reduce the scale of military operations to the maximum extent consistent with the security of American forces while peace initiatives are under way."

Eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces

"The United States should pledge the eventual removal of American military forces from Vietnam."

Negotiate for self-determination in South Viet-Nam

"Negotiations among the four principal belligerents-- the United States and South Vietnam, North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front--should be directed toward a cease-fire and plans for self-determination in South Vietnam."

International conference after cease-fire

"After the principal belligerents have agreed on a cease-fire and plans for self-determination in South Vietnam, an international conference of all interested states should be convened to guarantee the arrangements made by the belligerents and to plan a future referendum on the reunification of North Vietnam and South Vietnam."

Neutralization of area

"In addition to guaranteeing arrangements for self-determination in South Vietnam and planning a referendum on the reunification of North and South Vietnam, the international conference should neutralize South Vietnam and undertake to negotiate a multilateral agreement for the general neutralization of Southeast Asia."

Enclaves as last resort

"If for any reason an agreement ending the Vietnamese war cannot be reached, the United States should consolidate its forces in highly fortified defensible areas in South Vietnam and keep them there indefinitely."

(Eight-point program as outlined
in The Abuse of Power, 1966)

SENATOR MARK O. HATFIELDNegotiate Directly with NLF

On September 22, 1967, Senator Hatfield said the U.S. should negotiate directly with the National Liberation Front in an effort to end the war. He said that the Communist-dominated Front was "from the beginning our chief enemy in Viet-nam...Therefore to negotiate with the representatives of your enemy seems only logical, if you really want peace."

"De-Americanize" the War

While not advocating a U.S. withdrawal from Viet-Nam, Hatfield has urged (April 10, 1967) that the U.S. should tell the South Vietnamese:

"We'll help train, we'll help equip, we'll help supply, but on a careful, scheduled basis you begin to substitute your manpower for our manpower and we'll thereby de-Americanize a military action."

Seek Congressional Participation Prior to Expanding Ground War

On February 28 Senator Hatfield submitted Senate Concurrent Resolution 63 declaring it to be the sense of Congress that the President should seek congressional participation before extending the ground war beyond South Viet-Nam. The resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

SENATOR JAVITS

Defend Enclaves

On Feb 13, 1966, Sen. Javits proposed that the United States adopt a military policy of defending important enclaves "containing 70 to 80% of the population" of South Vietnam (including the Mekong Delta, Saigon, and coastal sections). (NYT, Feb 14, 1966)

Recognize NLF as a Party to Negotiations

On Feb 13, 1966, he called for the US to recognize the NLF as a party to any peace negotiations that might be held. (NYT, Feb 14, 1966)

Submit Issue to UN

On October 26, 1967, while placing into the Congressional Record the Policy Statement and List of Members of the Citizens Committee for Peace with Freedom in Viet-Nam (the Douglas Committee), he said: I hope we will submit this issue to the UN.

Stimulate International Diplomatic Action

In debate on the floor on October 12, 1967, he said: "....the way in which a settlement might be attained is by international diplomatic action. In my judgment, a realistic appraisal of the dynamics required for achieving a settlement by these means gives no cause for optimism at this time.

Despite extensive international concern over the potential dangers to world peace inherent in the Vietnam conflict, diplomacy thus far has not been able to get negotiations started, nor to suggest the outlines of a compromise settlement upon which the two sides might agree. The United States is willing to negotiate. We have even made some adjustments in our position to accommodate international concerns.

But Hanoi remains adamantly opposed to negotiations on any basis other than what would be an implicit prior acceptance of Hanoi's terms for a settlement -- U.S. withdrawal and South Vietnamese capitulation."

Cease Bombing When Appropriate

On October 26, 1967, he said "I hope we will implement an unconditioned cessation of bombing when there is a proper diplomatic framework for it...which will bring about peace negotiations."

Require the Vietnamese to Help Themselves

On October 26, 1967, he said "Beyond everything else, and beyond the fact that we must condition our continuing in Vietnam on what the Vietnamese do for themselves, we must not take over this war and make it our war as if Vietnam were a colony."

Limit Our Commitment

On October 12, 1967, he said: "We have demonstrated our good faith that we would fight for an ally which was remotely willing to fight for itself. Now the question is: Shall the commitment be unlimited?"

Gain Control of Our Policy

On October 12, 1967, he said: "...we need also a fundamental policy which is in our power to shape and which gives us the full range of options to which we, as the major power engaged in the war are entitled."

Avoid a Declaration of War

On October 26, 1967, he said: "I thoroughly disagree with any suggestion of a declaration of war. I hope we do not do it. It would guarantee an escalation of the situation to a realm far beyond where it is -- or is otherwise likely to go."

Renew President's Mandate

On October 12, 1967, he said: "...this policy must, in my judgement, be supported by a new resolution of the Congress to supersede the now obsolete Gulf of Tonkin Resolution...I would renew the President's mandate, so that he would be acting with authority...I assume that the grant of authority would not be quite as broad and unlimited as that which we gave in 1964, but would, nonetheless, be adequate to maintain operations. I think we owe this to the President."

Define Our Objectives

On October 12, 1967, he said: "A definitive resolution of this character, delimiting policy, would be extremely important to the whole world, to define our objective for the world, in answer to the question: Why are we there?"

Do Not Disengage

On October 12, 1967, he said: "...disengagement and withdrawal...we cannot and should not contemplate now."

Continue Useful Bombing

On October 12, 1967, he said: "...in my judgement, we should continue for the present those aspects of the bombing program which are clearly contributory to the safety and success of our combat forces in South Vietnam -- which means the access routes to South Vietnam."

Avoid Excessive Bombing

On October 12, 1967, he said: "...it seems to me that there is a dangerously high element of distorted reasoning in the arguments of the military proponents of an accelerated bombing program...I question whether it is really germane to the guerilla war in the south that our planes be able to roam at will and bomb with impunity over the length and breadth of North Vietnam."

WIN - Demonstrate Political, Economic, and Social as well as Military Progress

On October 12, 1967, he suggested one way to achieve a settlement in Vietnam was "to demonstrate to the Communists on the ground in South Vietnam that the tide of the struggle has shifted decisively against them. This requires demonstrable progress in the political social, as well as in the military field. We have been trying to do this since 1954... By all indications, Hanoi and the Vietcong remain convinced that they will win the struggle in Vietnam -- and win on their own terms. Until the enemy is shaken from this conviction... it is wishful thinking to expect that the Communists will agree to a settlement which meets our minimum objectives."

An Option Out

On October 12, 1967, he said: "...we must find a way to restore to ourselves the option which no general and no country could do without -- a way to get out."

Avoid An Elected Communist Government

Also on October 12, 1967, he said: "Secretary Rusk has repeatedly said that the United States would accept the results if the Communists won control of South Vietnam through free elections... I shall fight with all of the energy I have against any Communist success, including electoral success... Is there any reason to assume that an elected Communist government in South Vietnam would be less of a threat to its neighbors and to our security interests than a Communist government which gained power by other means? I think an elected Communist government would be just as dangerous to our interest and their neighbors..."

SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDYAdopt a more defensive military posture

"We should begin immediately to moderate significantly our military activities in South Vietnam to levels more tolerable to all and more commensurate with our limited aims. Our overriding goal as should be to maximize the safety and security of the Vietnamese people and our own soldiers, rather than to search out the enemy in his territory and on his terms....The adoption of more defensive military posture, one designed to protect and hold areas of heavy population rather than to seek out the enemy, has, I found, some support among our military leaders in Vietnam.

Greater use of influence over GVN

"For too long we have tolerated not only government corruption but government indifference to the people. We have refused to confront Saigon with the same determined fury we have unleashed on Hanoi. But they too must face the hard demands of war -- and those demands should be placed before them by U.S. in clear and concrete terms.

"I would urge a confrontation between our Government and the Government of South Vietnam on the entire question of corruption, inefficiency, waste of American resources, and the future of "The other war." They should be told in terms that will leave no doubt that if they find it impossible to attract the people of Vietnam to their own constitutional government, the American people will rightfully demand serious alterations in the nature of the United States' involvement.

"We can have an enormous influence over the Government of South Vietnam if only we choose to use it. They know that if we were not there they would collapse. We came to their aid because their people were in danger of a Communist takeover. But today many of their officials believe that, because of our fear of China and of our deep concern about Communist advances in Southeast Asia, we are tied to Vietnam irrevocably. As a result, I believe they feel they can act as they wish towards the war and towards their own people, confident we will fill the gaps they will leave.

"They must be disabused of the belief that American men and American money are a fixture in Vietnam." (From address before World Affairs Council, Boston, January 25, 1968)

SENATOR ROBERT F. KENNEDY

Senator Kennedy's affirmative suggestions about the war in Viet-Nam can be abstracted from his article in Look (November 28, 1967).

"There are three possible routes before us: the pursuit of military victory, a negotiated settlement, or withdrawal."

1. "Withdrawal is now impossible. American intervention has created its own reality."
 - a. "If the domino theory is an unsatisfactory metaphor, still it contains a grain of truth. A great power does not cease to be that because it suffers a defeat peripheral to its central interests." With a "defeat or precipitous withdrawal... we would not suddenly collapse; Communist fleets would not appear in the harbor of Honolulu and San Francisco Bay. But there would be serious effects: increased Communist influence--at least--especially in Southeast Asia itself."
 - b. "Beyond Asia, in other nations that have ordered their security in relation to American commitments, a sudden unilateral withdrawal would raise doubts about the reliability of the United States."
2. "We are now steadily widening the war in order, we are told, to increase the costs to Hanoi. Yet let us not omit our own costs from the war's account."
 - a. "The mounting devastation of South Viet-Nam is more and more eroding the fabric of that society, making its ultimate reconstruction more remote and difficult. Yet lasting peace depends upon the strength of the nation we leave behind."
 - b. "The war has also made far more difficult the hopeful pursuit of fresh understanding and diminishing tension between the two great nuclear powers: the United States and the Soviet Union."
 - c. "The war has estranged and alienated us from our closest friends in the Western Alliance."

d. "...the longer the conflict goes on, the more likely we are to 'prove' that we will not oppose Wars of national liberation in the future. Certainly the sight of the world's most powerful nation so frustrated by one of the weakest nations must hearten believers in revolutionary war and the efficacy of Communist tactics."

3. "The third alternative is a negotiated settlement -- as we have known for more than two years, the only satisfactory solution to the war. This course is our stated Government policy. This is the course that I favor. Only negotiations could allow us to end the fighting without precipitate withdrawal, to avoid the progressive destruction and weakening of South Viet-Nam, and end the drain on our own energies and resources, without great damage to our position in Asia and the world.

"The alternatives to negotiation are so unacceptable that I continue to believe the effort should and must be made. Ultimately, no other solution is possible. Despite the killing and the destruction, we are in no better position now than we were a year ago -- and we will not be in any better position a year from now. I continue to believe that we should go to negotiations in an effort to reach a peaceful and honorable settlement. Perhaps we cannot: but we shall never know until we try.

a. "A negotiated settlement must be less than a victory for either side. Both sides must come to any discussion with at least one basic condition, one point they will not yield. For us, it must be that we will not abandon South Vietnam to forcible take-over by a minority. For our adversaries, it must be that they will not accept a settlement that leaves in the South a hostile government, dedicated to the final physical destruction of all Communist elements, refusing any economic cooperation with the North, dependent upon the continued presence of American military power.

"For either side to yield its minimum conditions would be in fact to surrender. If we intend to

deny these conditions to our adversaries, then we must defeat them completely. This we should clearly understand -- and understand as well the full costs of this course, costs out of all proportion to any benefits we might attain. For wise policy is a setting of priorities -- differentiating between that which is merely important and that which is truly essential. And it would be both callous and self-indulgent for those of us who sit comfortably at home to form policy without full, conscious knowledge of the cost to others, young men and women and children, whose lives turn on the abstractions of our discussion."

- b. "One argument has been that the United States could not be absolutely certain that Hanoi and Moscow would negotiate if the bombing were stopped. Hanoi's statements, it has been said, conflict with one another, and some could be read as calling for a guarantee that the bombing would be permanently halted even before negotiations began. Examination of the public statements of Hanoi and Moscow in January and after, however, clearly indicates a major shift away from the North Vietnamese bargaining position since 1966, showing a firm intention to come to the conference table once the bombing of North Vietnam was suspended. In any case, the varying interpretations of the Communist statements need not have been serious obstacles to agreement."
- c. Bombing cessation: further argument "has been that the bombing is necessary to secure our objectives in the South. We began the bombing, as President Johnson told us at Johns Hopkins, for three purposes: 'to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Vietnam...to convince the leaders of North Vietnam...[that] we will not be defeated,' and to reduce the flow of men and supplies from the North. But the first two purposes have already been fulfilled by the huge resources and American lives committed to South Vietnam since the bombing began. As to the third purpose, 'to slow down aggression,' the Secretary of Defense testified in early 1967 that although the bombing of North Vietnam has other values that he supports, 'I don't believe the bombing up to the present has significantly reduced, nor any bombing that I

would contemplate in the future would significantly reduce, the actual flow of men and materials to the South.'

- d. "Stopping the bombing, however, is not peace. Rather, it would be only one part of a coordinated plan for negotiations and settlement. The next step in such a plan would be to ensure that negotiations would not be used as a device for either side to change the military balance.... Immediately after a halt in the bombing, and with or without specific agreement from the North Vietnamese, international teams under the United Nations or a strengthened International Control Commission, or even some other international group established especially for this purpose, should be asked to provide detached and objective information to the world about any large buildup of troops or supplies by either side during the peace talks. Then if the failure of negotiations, coupled with the actions of our adversary, made it necessary for us to re-examine our position, we would act with far clearer international understanding of our motives and necessities."
- e. "...once at the conference table, our problem would in a sense be more difficult. Negotiations are not the end of the road but only a bridge to the future of South Viet-Nam....A military victory is not in sight for anyone. Any settlement must therefore be a compromise that, however imperfect, would protect the self-determination of the Vietnamese people."
- "The first step would be for the South Vietnamese Government, as well as other political elements not represented in it, to begin its own discussions with the NLF. If the people of South Viet-nam are to settle their own future, they must at least begin to talk to each other."
 - "I have always felt that the United States must also be ready to talk directly to all parties -- not only with Hanoi but directly with the NLF in the South."

- "A lasting settlement of the war requires that free elections open to all would ultimately be held and that those who won them would take office. Confidence will depend on the structure of government between the end of hostilities and elections -- perhaps a prolonged period. The Communists would fear a take-over by the military, just as we might fear a Communist coup. Thus, during the interim period between the end of hostilities and elections, it will be necessary to establish a ruling structure in which both sides have confidence."

More recently, the Senator -- in a less thoughtful presentation -- suggested there are many illusions which must be discarded in light of the Tet offensive. Speaking in Chicago on February 8:

"These are some of the illusions which must be discarded if the events of last week are to prove not simply a tragedy, but a lesson: a lesson which carries with it some basic truths.

"First, that a total military victory is not within sight or around the corner; that, in fact, it is probably beyond our grasp; and that the effort to win such a victory will only result in the further slaughter of thousands of innocent and helpless people -- a slaughter which will forever rest on our national conscience.

"Second, that the pursuit of such a victory is not necessary to our national interest and is even damaging that interest.

"Third, that the progress we have claimed toward increasing our control over the country and the security of the population is largely illusory.

"Fourth, that the central battle in this war cannot be measured by body counts or bomb damage, but by the extent to which the people of South Vietnam act on a sense of common purpose and hope with those that govern them.

"Fifth, that the current regime in Saigon is unwilling or incapable of being an effective ally in the war against the Communists.

"Sixth, that a political compromise is not just the best path to peace, but the only path, and we must show as much willingness to risk some of our prestige for peace as to risk the lives of young men in war.

"Seventh that the escalation policy in Viet-Nam, far

from strengthening and consolidating international resistance to aggression, is injuring our country through the world, reducing the faith of other peoples in our wisdom and purpose and weakening the world's resolve to stand together for freedom and peace.

"Eighth, that the best way to save our most precious stake in Vietnam -- the lives of our soldiers -- is to stop the enlargement of the war, and that the best way to end casualties is to end the war.

"Ninth, that our nation must be told the truth about this war, in all its terrible reality, both because it is right -- and because only in this way can any administration rally the public confidence and unity for the shadowed days which lie ahead."

SENATOR MORSERequire the UN To Take Action

In extended discussion on May 15, 1967 following Senator Mansfield's presentation in the Senate, Senator Morse stressed time and again his conviction the United Nations should be made to act on Viet-Nam:

"...my consistent plans for the last 3 or more years that the administration should insist that the United Nations should take jurisdiction over the threat to the peace of the world which has developed in South-east Asia."

* * * * *

"There are some spokesmen for the administration who frequently say, or have said in the past that we have filed a resolution. Filing a resolution does not fulfill our commitment as a signatory to the charter. We filed a resolution but it was not in a form that required Security Council action. It was not in a form that required any action either by way of approval or veto by the Security Council. In effect it was an invitation on the part of the United States to have the Southeast Asian war discussed by the Security Council.

"We should have filed a resolution calling upon the Security Council to take jurisdiction over the war. Then we should have insisted upon our right to have the resolution considered by the Security Council. Please note my use of the word 'right'. We have a right to have the Security Council vote for or veto our request that the United Nations enforce a peace in Vietnam."

Seek International Negotiation

He also supports other international negotiation:

"The only hope for real peace in Vietnam is to have other nations take over the negotiating. The United States would be a party to it, but would not be in control. That is why I believe that if we would try to have the Security Council of the United Nations -- I hope in conjunction with an expanded Geneva Conference -- take over the settlement of the war in Vietnam, a settlement might be reached that both sides in the war could live with.

* * * * *

"It is not too late to try to reestablish the Geneva Conference and expand its membership. To our everlasting credit, although it took us a long time to come to this point, we now support reconvening the Geneva Conference."

SENATOR CHARLES H. PERCYAll-Asian Conference

In an address at the California Institute of Technology on May 2, 1967, Senator Percy said that an All-Asian Peace Conference was "the only hope for a negotiated settlement." But, he added, he could not foresee the North Vietnamese agreeing to negotiate directly with the U.S.

Limit Bombing

On NBC-TV on January 7, 1968, Percy said he did not favor a halt in the bombing, but that it should be limited as a bargaining tool.

"I don't see why we should not bomb and concentrate heavily our bombing on infiltration and supply routes. There is no reason why we should let war materials go through to kill American boys and the Vietnamese. But I do feel that there are certain things we can do. For instance, if the present feelers for negotiations are sincere, we should test them. We could, for instance -- the President could declare that we will not bomb population centers now and then wait to see whether they give any significant response to that. If they do not, then we can take another step of de-escalation, but we have to test their sincerity before we give up very much."

The Senator was asked whether he felt the Administration's reaction to the Trinh statement was "sufficient in the eyes of the world to suggest that we really do want to stop the war and that we are not seeking a total military victory there." The Senator replied: "I think they have to be realistic, but I think we should now offer some symbol and this is why I suggest the President declare as an evidence of our good faith, we will stop bombing population centers."

Participation of Viet Cong in Negotiations

"I have long felt that it has been unrealistic for Saigon -- and therefore ourselves -- to propose negotiations with Hanoi without inviting the Viet Cong to fully participate, if we truly hope to see negotiations come about in the foreseeable future."

GENERAL JAMES M. GAVINEnclave theory

"I believe that the enclave strategy is even more valid today than it was in 1965. Combined with a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam, it would constitute a vital first step in our de-escalation of the war.

"I reasoned that a primary tactical problem, once a war occurs, is to keep it limited. This is particularly true of a war in which we should not have become involved, and in which U.S. interests are, at best, marginal. Therefore I sought a way to halt the buildup, hold what we had, and open negotiations for peace.

"By the fall of 1965 the United States had built up enclaves--vast logistical facilities at Camranh Bay, Danang, Saigon and other places. If we concentrated in these centers, we could immediately stop the ever-increasing inflow of U.S. troops and probably reduce the number of men involved. At the same time, we could encourage the development of democracy in the large areas dominated by these enclaves, and could help the South Vietnamese bring their own troops to a high standard of combat performance.

"While doing this, we could search for a diplomatic solution of the war, using our hold on the big enclaves as a decisive counter in the bargaining."

Neutralization (Tito analogy)

"A Vietnamese solution, based on a "free, neutral and independent" nation--on the pattern of Laos--should be acceptable in Vietnam. Such a government, without ties to China, the Soviet Union or the West, would be in the best interests of Vietnamese and Americans. I do not believe that Ho Chi Minh ever wanted to be a puppet or satellite of China, or Russia. The information we have indicates he is a patriot, an intense nationalist, albeit a Communist--a Tito."

Special Presidential appointee

"The President should appoint, with the advice of the Senate, a special cabinet-level official of great stature to negotiate with the NLF and Hanoi. The sole responsibility of this official should be termination of the war. He should be served by his own staff, free

from bureaucratic interference and the burden of past positions. With a reasoned military strategy and the full energies of our Government devoted to diplomacy, I am convinced that the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese will negotiate."

Bombing cessation

"All bombing of North Vietnam should be stopped, not just because the Communists want it stopped, but because strategic bombing of the North is counter-productive. In a bombing termination, strategy and morality coincide. It should be undertaken immediately."
(From the Saturday Evening Post, February 4, 1968)

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

In a major statement of policy on February 21, 1968, the National Council of Churches set forth several "imperatives", two of which related to Viet-Nam:

- Stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a prelude to seeking a negotiated peace.
- Avoid provocative military actions against mainland China in the knowledge that it has legitimate interest in Asia.

In an earlier Resolution (September 15, 1967), the Council stressed three points:

- GVN should take peace initiatives directly with NLF.
- Stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam.
- Request the U.N. (or other international body) to take up the question of Viet-Nam.

From the Resolution:

"We believe...that the following steps should be taken:

- (a) "We ask that the U.S. make clear to the newly elected government in Saigon the necessity of large-scale, convincing efforts to establish social justice in South Viet-Nam, and the necessity of prompt efforts to secure a just peaceful settlement with the National Liberation Front. It is essential, in our view, that the U.S. declare that the Government of Viet-Nam should take its initiatives and make its own decisions to secure an early, peaceful settlement of the future of Viet-Nam. We urge that the U.S. pledge its support of all such efforts. In the absence of such efforts, we urge the U.S. Government to re-examine its commitments in Viet-Nam.

- (b) "As the General Assembly of the U.N. is about to convene, we ask that there be a shift in U.S. policy at two points. The first is to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam for an unspecified period of time. The second is, simultaneously with the first, to request the U.N. (preferably the General Assembly) or other international agency to take up the question: What steps should be taken and procedures adopted to secure a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam? The newly introduced Senate resolution concerning reference of the Viet-Nam issue to the U.N. deserves popular support."

LUCE PUBLICATIONSTIMERecognize Viet Cong/NLF

Time assumes the war will end through negotiations and compromise give-and-take. To this end the U.S. must be prepared to deal with the Viet-Cong/NLF realistically.

- (a) Time thinks the VC "might be recognized as a political party, and it is not entirely out of the question that they might be permitted to administer the hamlets that they now control, which, by the government's probably optimistic estimate, contain only 17% of the population. In return for this, notes Time, the VC would have to lay down their arms and the North Vietnamese troops would have to leave the country. To guarantee this, U.S. presence would be required "for at least several years."
- (b) Time thinks the U.S. should "encourage appeals to the regional patriotism of the VC" with the aim of getting them "to negotiate a separate peace." It is Time's view that the VC fear being swallowed up by North Viet-Nam and for this reason place less emphasis on reunification than do the North Vietnamese. Thus the issue of reunification is "becoming less emotional and more negotiable than before."

Accept a Compromise

"By keeping up the military pressure during the negotiations, the U.S. could probably help speed them. Together with its allies, the U.S. might reasonably negotiate for a series of compromises: a cease-fire policed by a greatly expanded International Control Commission; a withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops in return for the recognition of the Viet Cong as a political party; the guarantee of South Viet Nam as an independent country for five or more years, during which time the U.S. would be permitted to keep troops in the country -- much fewer than at present, but still a substantial force."

(Abstracted from "What Negotiations in Viet-Nam Might Mean," December 22, 1967)

LIFEBombing Pause or Limitation

Life advocates a limiting of the bombing of North Vietnam to the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos and the southern provinces of North Vietnam with "no publicly announced 'conditions' that carry the whiff of an ultimatum." But this should not be a commitment to stop the bombing indefinitely. In taking this diplomatic and political initiative, the U.S. administration would have clearly in mind the kind of North Vietnamese response we would consider constructive, and how long we were willing to wait for it."

Life advocates this limitation for two reasons:

"There is a remote possibility that a pause now could be the first step toward an acceptable diplomatic settlement of the war.

There is a strong probability that a bombing pause would improve the posture of the U.S. in Vietnam, in the eyes of many other nations and indeed of many Americans, and thus ultimately improve our chances of achieving our purposes in Vietnam." (From "The Case for Bombing Pause Number 7," October 20, 1967)

Life advocates "a change in our bombing pattern, to reduce attacks on North Viet-Nam and to concentrate on targets nearer the fighting front."

Further, "above all, calling off bombing in the northern area would carry an important political message for Hanoi, for the Russians, for the U.N. and other interested critics. We would remind them of what we really object to: not North Vietnam's existence as a country but its aggression against the South." (From "Re-examining the Conduct of the War", January 5, 1968)

Greater Reliance on ARVN

Life urges:

"A greater emphasis than is now evident on the build-up, retraining, and rearming of South Vietnamese forces -- the popular and regional militia as well as the ARVN." (From "Re-examining the Conduct of the War", ibid)

Bring Viet Cong into Political Life of South

Life continues to elaborate on its "southern strategy", involving gradual deescalation of the war in North Vietnam and intensifying "the attack on the VC guerrillas in the South and their 'shadow government'." But "a southern strategy that aims at a decent peace, and a viable South Vietnam, must also find ways to neutralize and absorb the bulk of the VC as individuals and in groups. It must show them some advantage in stacking their arms and taking their chances on a share in the South's political future." As a possible solution Life suggests:

"The wise way to admit the Vietcong into political life is not by coalition from above but from below, hamlet by hamlet. There could well be negotiations for cease-fires at zone or regimental levels between Saigon's representatives and those of the NLF; But the general result should be to give Saigon's police and other representatives access to areas they cannot now enter, and to give the VC activists an honest political future with the right to vote, hold local office and run for parliament." (From "How the Fighting Might End, January 12, 1968)

Greater Emphasis on Non-Military War

Life thinks U.S. strategy has placed too much emphasis on the military to the detriment of the political and social. The U.S. has proved it can beat the enemy's main-force units; it is now time to place greater emphasis on clear-and hold operations with U.S. forces taking "a larger share in the ARVN's assignment to hunt local guerrillas and provide the shield for village security." Search-and-destroy missions should only receive secondary priority.

Life advocates:

"A switch of emphasis from the hunting and grinding down of enemy big-force units to the uprooting of the VC guerrillas and infrastructure inside South Vietnam. (From "Re-examining the Conduct of the War, ibid.)

Newsweek doesn't have an editorial page but until recently it did have a critical Vietnam correspondent in the person of Everett G. Martin, -- Saigon's Bureau Chief. The following is from a Martin article appearing in Newsweek September 25, 1967, called "Vietnam: Last Chance?"

Martin contends the U.S. hasn't made much progress in Vietnam because of Vietnamese obstructionism and advocates along with less emphasis on bombing North Vietnam and stemming infiltration "a radical change in the relationship of the U.S. with the Saigon leadership." The U.S. ought to apply much greater pressure on the GVN and forget about the delicacies of preserving South Vietnamese sovereignty. This pressure ought to result in full mobilization, an integration of ARVN with U.S. forces and creation of a joint command, the diversion of ARVN strength to "rooting out the guerrilla infrastructure, and the U.S. right "to insist on the removal of incompetent or corrupt Vietnamese officials and to review any new appointments."

Vietnam Reassessment

In its most recent editorial on Vietnam, March 4, 1968, the New York Times followed its usual practice and reporting what it believed to be the three alternatives now being considered by the Administration -- "employing 'whatever power resources are necessary to prevail,'" "patching up present strategy," and "a third possible strategy...currently represented by the Pentagon's 'anti-Khe Sanh school'" -- seemed to throw its support to the last of these:

"A pull back from the border: would permit more American military protection of the country's populated areas. There would be less emphasis on search-and-destroy missions and more on clear-and-hold operations designed to speed pacification.

"This strategy, some military planners believe, would cut the recent United States casualty rate in half yet permit more progress in pacification, an objective that has far more to do with success in Vietnam than casualties inflicted on Communist troops.

"One drawback in this strategy, its advocates say, is that it probably would rule out a "clear-cut military victory." But has such a "victory" ever been in the cards? Has not the central confusion in Washington's thinking about Vietnam been precisely the assumption, at every sign of progress, that a military victory could be achieved and might even be in the offing.

"The true allied capability -- one that has existed from the beginning of American intervention -- is that of denying victory to the Communists. Stalemate is the military reality in Vietnam. And stalemate requires ultimate acceptance of political compromise, since there is no other realistic alternative for either side.

"What the Administration needs to do first in its current review is to clarify its own political ends. The question of reinforcements, whether in small or large numbers, will look totally different if their purpose is to help achieve a settlement rather than to pursue the will-o-the-wisp of victory."

Two days earlier, on March 2, in an editorial entitled "New Look at Vietnam Needed," the New York Times similarly avoided substantive suggestions of its own and came up with the following:

With regard to sending more troops: "...at every stage of the Vietnam conflict the enemy's capability has been underestimated...every upward spin on the escalation spiral has simply restored the military stalemate at a higher level of forces, firepower, and casualties. The Communists have covered every American bet. Won't they do so again?"

With regard to a continuance of present approaches: "More of the same" in terms of method is unlikely to bring anything other in results than more of the same. But there can be no change in strategy unless there is a change in the assessment of the problem.

"Secretary Rusk rejects Senator Fulbright's proposal for a full-scale Congressional investigation of Vietnam before further escalation. But the Administration owes it to itself as well as the country to bring fresh minds to bear upon the problem.

"The time clearly has come for the President to appoint a prestigious task force of distinguished citizens, men relatively free from involvement in recent Vietnam debates, to assess the facts and help him redesign the country's answer to its Vietnam dilemma. He need not even reach outside the circle of present and recent public servants to find a man of character to head such a survey. Men like John McCloy, Douglas Dillon, Gen. Lauris Norstad, Averell Harriman or David Bruce come to mind; but there are many others whose tested judgment would both aid the Administration and be accepted by the country as impartial, balanced and wise. The man-made disaster in Vietnam cries out for new and independent evaluation."

REPUBLICAN CONGRESSMEN

(Congressmen F. Bradford Morse, R-Mass; John R. Dellenback, R-Ore; Marvin L. Esch, R-Mich; Frank J. Horton, R-NY; Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., R-Md; Charles A. Mosher, R-Ohio; Richard S. Schweiker, R-Pa; and Robert T. Stafford, R-Vt)

On July 10, 1967, the above group of Republican Congressmen issued a "Proposal for Staged De-Escalation in Vietnam."

The proposal discussed the Nature of Limited War setting forth these "truths":

"First, a limited war with limited objectives cannot be ended and cannot remain limited if one side insists on the unconditional surrender of the other."

"Second, the end of a limited war requires that the combatants that meet at the peace table appear to be equals."

"Third, negotiations to end a limited war are unlikely without an advanced degree of mutual confidence in the word of the combatants."

"Fourth, it is not possible for one side to fight a limited war and the other a total war."

In the context of these "truths", the proposal said:

Communist Options

"Among the options still available for Communist escalation in the Vietnamese conflict are: the use of terrorist bombings against Saigon and the civilian populations of other South Vietnamese cities; the infiltration in massive numbers of the very large North Vietnamese standing Army; the use of Communist volunteers in massive numbers from other Communist countries; the opening of a second diversionary military action in Korea to sap Western strength; etc."

Unlimited Land War in Asia not in US Interest

"...it is not in the United States' interest to become engaged in an unlimited land war on the Asian continent. Escalation which would change the psycholo-

gical atmosphere of the Vietnam war from emphasis on restraint to emphasis on power would be likely to result in such an unlimited land war."

Sudden Bombing Halt Not Useful

"...a sudden and complete halt to the bombing... would also be unlikely to achieve the desired results /bringing the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table/"

What Kind of Policy Qualifies?

"Significant military escalation, sudden and complete cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, and a rigid devotion to the status quo all fail to meet the limited war criteria of a promising policy to bring about honorable negotiations to end the war in Vietnam."

"To qualify such a policy must meet the following criteria:

It must not risk expansion of the limited war to total war.

It must not risk significant erosion of the current military advantage of the United States in Vietnam.

It must induce a growing atmosphere of mutual confidence.

It must permit each side to claim the initiative.

It must not require either side 'to lose face.'

It must be susceptible to presentation, verification, and implementation through the private channels of diplomacy."

Staged De-escalation

"Such a potential policy does exist..."staged de-escalation."

"In five...successive steps the United States would gradually cease bombing of North Vietnam. Each step after the first would be dependent upon a similar de-escalation by Hanoi. If no such step were taken in the first 60 days, the plan would end."

"...will it work? No one can answer that. All that can be said for it is that it seems to offer more promise than the stand-pat policy of the Administration or the alternatives suggested by either set of its major critics."

"...the best chance for peace lies not in giant power or in giant concessions. It lies in small steps, taken quietly - steps that make the position of each side credible to the other. This is now the task of responsible diplomacy in Vietnam."

JOINT STATEMENT
of Eighteen Members of the House of
Representatives

(Congressmen Jonathan B. Bingham, D-NY; John A. Blatnik, D-Minn; Edward P. Boland, D-Mass; Leonard Farbstein, D-NY; Donald M. Fraser, D-Minn; Floyd V. Hicks, D-Wash; Andrew Jacobs, Jr., D-Ind; Joseph E. Karth, D-Minn; Robert W. Kastenmeier, D-Wisc; Robert L. Leggett, D-Cal; John E. Moss, D-Cal; Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., D-Mass; Richard L. Ottinger, D-NY; Thomas M. Rees, D-Cal; Henry S. Reuss, D-Wisc; James H. Scheuer, D-NY; Herbert Tenzer, D-NY; and Sidney R. Yates, D-Ill)

Deeply Disturbed, Convinced Conflict Cannot Be Ended by Military
Means - But Opposed to Unilateral Withdrawal or Any Action
Inconsistent With US National Interests

"The undersigned are deeply disturbed...convinced that the conflict cannot be ended in the near future by military means. At the same time, we oppose unilateral withdrawal or any action inconsistent with U.S. national interests."

Agreed More Imaginative and Intensive Efforts Toward Negotiation
Should be Made Now

"...the passage of time, with steadily mounting casualties on both sides, will only make less likely a solution by negotiated settlement."

Our Objective is Self Determination for the South Vietnamese,
But What Kind of Honorable and Just Settlement Would We Accept?

"We believe a long step forward would be taken if the US were to.../make/ explicit the kind of honorable and just settlement we would accept consistent with our aims."

"In Our View These Basic Principles For a Peaceful Settlement
in Vietnam Would Include the Following:"

- 1) "...free and fair elections in which all parties would be free to participate."
- 2) "For a period preceding...elections, a general cease-fire, supervised by an appropriate international body,

banning military operations and terrorist acts...
mutually acceptable interim governmental arrangements
 (in areas previously controlled by both Saigon and the VC)"

3) "Overall supervision of...elections... by a mutually acceptable body...of an international character..." or "...a Vietnamese Joint Commission or a combination of the two." "...elections...free from any external interference or internal terrorism."

4) "...to comply with the foregoing, the 1967 Constitution would have to be modified, or perhaps replaced, pursuant to agreed procedures."

5) After elections, "all foreign troops would be gradually withdrawn from South Vietnam on a mutually agreed and phased basis which would assure no possible advantage to one side over the other."

6) "International guarantees and arrangements should be provided to assure that the results of the elections not be overturned by renewed outside interference or by a coup of the right or the left."

7) "...future relations between North and South Vietnam, including the possibility of reunification, would be left for future discussion and negotiation, primarily between... North Vietnam and the new government of South Vietnam."

Mutually Acceptable Interim Governmental Arrangements Pose Most Difficult Problem

"One approach to the problem might be through a form of international trusteeship, comparable to the United Nations administration of West New Guinea!..after the Dutch and before the Indonesians.

"Another Exceedingly Difficult Problem would be to Devise the Nature of the International Guarantees to Prevent Frustration of the Will of the Electorate by Violence"

"But these are all matters that could be worked out at the negotiating table, if the parties concerned ... had agreed on the basic principles we have set forth."

INFORMATION

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Saturday, March 9, 1968
2:45 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Taylor's view --
in response to Lodge's paper and
others.

The statement of views A and B
couldn't be better.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rin

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *lg*, NARA, Date 3-2-92

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 9, 1968

SECRET

Mr. President:

I have had the opportunity to read Walt Rostow's memorandum to you of March 6 and Cabot Lodge's of March 5 conveying their thoughts on the war. These papers plus the Post editorial of March 6 and the recurrent Senate debates have stimulated the following discussion of possible changes in the tactics and strategy of the Viet-Nam war.

The attitude which one adopts toward the Vietnamese war results largely from the choice one makes of the facts and purported facts drawn from the vast amount of available information (and misinformation) contained in official and media reports. This exercise of selectivity in choosing what to believe contributes to the wide fluctuation in points of view which we encounter in most discussions of Viet-Nam. However, at the present moment as we try to sort out the facts and consequences of the Tet offensive, there seems to be a polarization of views about two opposing positions; one (View A) that the enemy lost and that we should press forward to exploit that loss, the other (View B) that the enemy won and that we should hedge our losses and seek merely to stalemate the military situation with the resources presently committed.

View A

The Tet offensive was a surprise to us in terms of magnitude, concurrence of attacks and precise timing, and scored important psychological advantages for the enemy. However, it was a risky course of action forced on the enemy by the success of our strategy in 1966 and 1967, which thus far has been a net loss to the enemy. This conclusion arises from a consideration of the heavy losses which the enemy has sustained in the attacks, the present exposed position of many Viet Cong units in areas remote from their relatively secure bases, the alienation of the urban population as a consequence of the damage caused in the cities, and the disillusionment of the enemy troops arising from disappointed hopes of popular uprisings and decisive victories. While the GVN and RVNAF have suffered heavy blows, none has been mortal and, although there are uncertainties as to the exact condition of ARVN, the Regional and Popular Forces and the pacification program, the situation appears to offer great opportunities if it can be exploited promptly.

This spectacular effort on the part of the enemy may be a last climatic attempt to create conditions favorable to negotiations or may be merely a peak in intensity of effort which can be repeated although probably at a lower level and without the benefit of the surprise which the Tet attack enjoyed. In either case, the enemy seems to have abandoned the strategy of a prolonged conflict and to be willing to play for high stakes in a comparatively short period of time.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCSec 10-2-78
By ip/ly, NARA, Date 3-29-2

Thus, we should view the year, 1968, as possibly a year of decision and act in consistence with this assumption. The military crisis may come in the spring or later in the year and we should prepare for either contingency. For the moment, we should rush reinforcements to General Westmoreland as rapidly and in such numbers as our depleted resources will permit and, at the same time, leave no stone unturned in energizing the GVN and ARVN to greater efforts. Concurrently, we need to rebuild our Strategic Reserve at home to be ready for the next phase in Viet-Nam and elsewhere.

With a battle joined which may be decisive, it is no time to consider fundamental alterations of strategy or to be diverted by doubts about the future. General Westmoreland should be encouraged to husband his resources, develop reserves and pass to the offensive as soon as possible. There should be no thought of diminishing the bombing of the North--indeed, now may be the time to decide to mine Haiphong. By the end of year, we should know better the nature of our residual problem in Viet-Nam and can then adjust our conduct accordingly but, for the present, the battle is the thing.

View B

According to View B, the Tet offensive must be rated a net success which demonstrated unsuspected resources and capabilities on the part of the Viet Cong, shattered the illusion of urban security and undermined popular confidence in the GVN.

Although the attacking forces suffered heavy losses (though probably not as many as reported by U.S. officials), the attackers dealt a shattering blow to ARVN, driving most of its units into the towns where they remain, reluctant to return to their posts in the countryside. It will take months to restore the combat effectiveness of ARVN to its pre-Tet condition if, indeed, such restoration is possible. The GVN, while performing reasonably well under fire, is now moving apathetically to repair the damage created by the enemy attacks and it is doubtful whether it could survive another round of heavy attacks. Thieu and Ky are more at odds than ever and there is a real possibility of an anti-Thieu coup or an unconstitutional seizure of emergency powers by the military junta.

With the withdrawal of ARVN to the cities, the countryside has been left exposed to the Viet Cong recruiters and propagandists. Pacification has been set back to a degree as yet unmeasured, but certainly very substantial.

Under the circumstances, it is becoming apparent that even a large reinforcement in U.S. troops can not guarantee a favorable military outcome since any reinforcement by our side can be readily offset by additional enemy infiltration from the north where large resources of military manpower remain untouched. Furthermore, any large U.S. augmentation will result in a further Americanization of the war and will encourage the South Vietnamese to sit back and let the Americans carry even more of the burden.

Under the circumstances, with no prospect of a quick military victory, the commitment of additional forces by the U.S. would be a waste of resources badly needed elsewhere to sustain our world-wide posture. If we keep adding forces, conceivably we could "win" in Viet-Nam and lose the home-front and the rest of the world.

The conclusion to be drawn from the situation is that we should give serious consideration to a new strategy in South Viet-Nam based upon a leveling off of the U.S. strength and the establishment of a military equilibrium behind a defensive front protecting the largest possible amount of friendly population. This equilibrium (or stalemate) would be maintained, if necessary, for several years, during which time the GVN and ARVN would, we hope, pull themselves together and develop a capability to stand alone. Thus, our decision should be to cease reinforcing and to prepare for a prolonged, low cost, limited war while the Vietnamese develop the necessary strength to end the conflict and to sustain a viable government in the post-war period.

As you might expect, I hold more to View A than to View B but I must admit that the returns are not all in and we can not be entirely sure of the outcome of the Tet offensive. Indeed, that offensive appears far from over and General Westmoreland is likely to have some anxious days before the military situation stabilizes. But, in the short run, even if View B is closer to reality than View A, we still need to reinforce Westy as rapidly as possible with what we presently have available and to create further reserves at home for future contingencies.

Left unanswered is the primary concern of holders of View B that Viet-Nam is a sponge with an inexhaustible capacity for absorbing U.S. resources and, hence, at some point we must call a halt. There is no positive answer to this fear which is a real one, other than to point to a few countervailing considerations.

a. North Viet-Nam has many constraints on increases of its military strength in the south such as finite quantities of trained leadership, difficulties in local recruiting in the south, the manpower requirements in the north resulting from our bombing campaign, and concern over denuding the homeland of combat-ready units.

b. Logistical factors place some limit (though hard to define) on the numbers of troops and/or the tempo of operations which Hanoi can sustain in South Viet-Nam. The current rate of consumption of munitions must put considerable strain on their logistics system as evidenced by the recent effort to run munitions boats by sea through the MARKET TIME barrier.

SECRET

- 4 -

c. This is the fourteenth year of war for North Viet-Nam just as it is for South Viet-Nam and it is hard to believe that Hanoi is enjoying the conflict or can hold out indefinitely as the pessimists believe. You will recall that Giap in a recent interview with a Hungarian visitor allegedly described his forces at Dien Bien Phu as being on the verge of complete exhaustion. They have experienced a lot of fighting since that time and it is now 1968.

These considerations encourage the belief that an end--or at least the start of negotiations--may not be far off and we should place ourselves in the best possible position in anticipation of such a development. It is not a time seriously to consider fundamental changes of strategy although we should always be thinking hard about the alternatives of the future. In this connection, however, I would have real doubt of the feasibility of any strategy which depends for its success upon the willingness of the American people to wage a prolonged, limited war of stalemate. That was a critical weakness of General Gavin's "enclave strategy" and it applies equally to the new strategy of View B.

M.D.T.
M. D. T.

SECRET

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INFORMATION

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Pres file

Saturday, March 9, 1968 -- 2:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

These two sensitive French reports suggest Hanoi may be receding from its Tet offensive objective of a National Liberation Front dominated coalition government to something short of that -- but in the same direction.

Nothing solid -- merely straws in what may or may not be the wind.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-252
By Cb, NARA Date 11-1-97

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WWRostow:rla

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-251
By is, NARA Date 8-18-98

~~SECRET~~/MARIA ONE

Paris 11280, March 8, 1968

1. I was shown briefly telegram dated March 1 from Quirielle in Hanoi reporting that he had received new indications of North Vietnamese intention to support establishment provisional government in South. First indication came from Director of European Affairs in Hanoi and second, through intermediary, from Front representative in Phnom Penh. Latter said that in coalition government formed in South, Front would support but not insist on participating.

2. Quirielle found further confirmation in attacks in North Vietnamese press against Popular Front for National Safety recently formed in Saigon, which Hanoi regards as attempt to forestall formation of provisional government.

3. Comment: I note similarity of what Quirielle reports about National Liberation Front attitude on formation of coalition government in South and what Dr. Roussel, President of Communist-front Franco-Vietnamese Medical Association, told us on same subject. Both claim that National Liberation Front is not insisting on participating in future government in South Vietnam, which appears to be latest line given out by National Liberation Front representation in Phnom Penh.

(signed) Wallner

* * * * *

Extract from Paris 11281, March 8, 1968

Polish Ambassador told Guiringaud (French Ambassador to Japan) that the Polish Government was convinced that in view of mood of North Vietnamese government, there was no place for any intermediary in conflict: certainly no Socialist country, not even USSR, can put pressure on North Vietnam to negotiate without incurring immediate denunciation by Peking. North Vietnam's increasing dependence on 40,000 Chinese technicians and engineering troops and supply situation brings about this state of affairs. (Polish Deputy Chief of Mission, Paris, is peddling same line.) Pole concluded by opining that Hanoi had been disappointed by Tet offensive: their objective had been establishment of provisional government but this clearly no longer possible after recapture of Hue. Pole said his government felt that Americans would re-group and reinforce and that war would drag on until after U. S. November elections.

(signed) Wallner

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, March 9, 1968 - 1:50 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Profile

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk has approved our inviting NATO to hold its Twentieth Anniversary meeting in Washington in April 1969, subject to your approval. It is not our turn to host next year's meeting, but having the Twentieth Anniversary meeting in Washington would demonstrate the continuing commitment of the United States to NATO and the principle of collective security.

The meeting would be attended by the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the fifteen NATO countries.

If you approve holding the meeting in Washington, State will prepare recommendations concerning possible Presidential participation in the public ceremony.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

MWG
MWG:mmm

Saturday, March 9, 1968 - 1:45 pm

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Lord Louis Mountbatten Monday, March 11 at 12:00 p. m.

Lord Mountbatten is traveling in the U. S. under the auspices of Variety Clubs, International, on a special fund raising campaign for children's hospitals. You last met him in May 1965.

Mountbatten retired in 1965 and has not made any recent public statements on current world affairs.

His advice is probably still highly valued by the Wilson Government.

He has had a long association with Southeast Asia and would probably be interested in your views on Vietnam.

You may wish to ask him for his views on Britain's current defense policy.

A biographic sketch is attached.

* * *

Lord Mountbatten will be accompanied by British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean. I will be standing by with Ed Fried.

W. W. Rostow

MWG:mmm

Lord Louis Mountbatten

Earl Mountbatten was born in 1900. He is a grandson of Queen Victoria and uncle of Prince Philip.

He began his Naval career in 1913. In World War II he was appointed Supreme Allied Commander in Southeast Asia. He was made Viceroy of India in 1947 and presided over India's transition from colony to independent state.

In 1948 Mountbatten became Commander in Chief, NATO Forces in the Mediterranean. He was made First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff in 1955 and Chief of the Defense Staff in 1959.

Mountbatten retired in 1965. He retains close connections with the Labor Government. He has traveled widely in recent years including visits to the Far East.

In 1966 he received the William J. Donovan medal in recognition of his services to U. S. intelligence during World War II.

Mountbatten's wife, Countess Mountbatten, died in 1960. He has two daughters and nine grandchildren.

INFORMATION

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Saturday, March 9, 1968 -- 1:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunch reports that
Jarring:

Pres file

- received a strong negative from the UAR;
- UAR may take issue back to Security Council;
- Jarring is very discouraged and tired.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
 NLJ 96-252
 By cb, NARA Date 11-1-97

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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RR RUEHC
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CONTROL : 2337Q
RECEIVED : March 8, 1968
11:08P.M.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-251

By iso, NARA Date 8-18-98

Reston

NODIS

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST

I CALLED ON BUNCHE MAR 8 ACCOMPANIED BY BUFFUM TO COMPARE NOTES ON JARRING'S LATEST TALK IN CAIRO. BUNCHE CONFIRMED ESSENCE OF DISCUSSION WAS AS DESCRIBED BY SPANISH AMB (CAIRO'S 1830) AND PROVIDED ADDITIONAL DETAIL JARRING REPORTED THAT WHILE RIAD WAS FRIENDLY, ATMOSPHERE WAS DISTINCTLY NEGATIVE.

ACCORDING TO JARRING'S REPORT, RIAD OPENED BY RECITING SEVERAL RECENT ISRAELI ACTIONS WHICH HE CONSIDERED JEOPARDIZE FUTURE DISCUSSIONS, I.E., CHANGING STATUS OF "OCCUPIED TERRS", DYNAMITING HOUSES, EXPROPRIATION MEASURES IN JERUSALEM, AND ESKOL INSISTENCE ON PEACE TREATY. RIAD SAID ISRAELI OBJECTIVE IS CLEARLY TO GET PEACE TREATY, WHICH WLD BE TANTAMOUNT TO ARAB SURRENDER, AND THEREFORE IMPOSSIBLE. INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES IN UAR ALSO INVOLVED. (BUNCHE SAID UAR AMB EL-KONY SAID PRIVATELY LAST WEEK HE THOUGHT NASSER WLD PROBABLY SURVIVE CURRENT UNREST BUT WAS NOT CERTAIN. THIS WAS FIRST TIME EL-KONY AND INDICATED ANY DOUBT ABOUT NASSER'S FUTURE.)

RIAD APPEARED PLACE SOME HOPE THAT "GREAT POWERS" WLD PREVAIL ON ISRAEL TO ACCEPT AND IMPLEMENT SC RES. (I READ THIS AS MEANING UAR HOPES RECENT SOV MESSAGE TO US MAY CHANGE DIPLOMATIC SITUATION IN THEIR FAVOR.) RIAD INDICATED THAT IF ISRAEL'S POSITION DID NOT CHANGE, UAR WLD HAVE TO CONSIDER ANNOUNCING IT WAS NO LONGER BOUND BY ITS PREVIOUS ACCEPTANCE OF SC RES.

AT SAME TIME, RIAD APPARENTLY GAVE JARRING NO HINT THAT EVEN IF ISRAEL ACCEPTS RES UAR WLD ENGAGE IN RHODES TYPE DISCUSSIONS AT NICOSIA. HE CLEARLY RULED OUT PEACE TREATY AND REVERTED TO PREVIOUS CONCEPT OF A SOLUTION IMPOSED BY, OR EMERGING FROM, FURTHER SC DEBATE. (JARRING NOTED THIS WAS FIRST TIME RIAD TALKED ABOUT GOING BACK TO SC.) ON SUBSTANCE OF MATTER, RIAD

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-Page, USMISSION USUN 4081, March 8, 1968 NODIS

TOOK EVEN TOUGHER LINE THAN PREVIOUSLY. HE NOW TALKING IN TERMS OF ORIGINAL UAR POSITION THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL MUST BE TO JUNE 4 POSITIONS (ALTHOUGH IN TALKS WITH ME LAST FALL HE ACCEPTED CONCEPT THAT BORDER RECTIFICATION CLD BE INVOLVED). HE AGAIN LINKED OPENING OF CANAL TO SETTLEMENT OF REFUGEE PROBLEM.

I CONSIDER HARD LINE ATTITUDE OF RIAD PARTICULARLY DISAPPOINTING SINCE INVITATION FORMULA SHOWN HIM BY JARRING WLD HAVE REQUIRED ISRAEL'S AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT SC RES FOR IMPLEMENTATION. BUNCHE GAVE US ONLY BRIEF LOOK AT TEXT BUT HASTY READING LEFT IMPRESSION THAT IT MET PREVIOUS UAR REQUIREMENTS FOR MOVING ON TO NEW STAGE IF ISRAELIS WOULD AGREE TO IT. AS BEST WE CAN RECONSTRUCT INVITATION, IT TOOK ROUGHLY FOL FORM: GOVTS OF ISRAEL AND UAR HAVE INFORMED ME THAT THEY ACCEPT SC RES 242 AS BASIS FOR RESOLVING DIFFERENCES AND HAVE AGREED ON NEED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS PROVISIONS. ACCORDINGLY, I INVITE THESE GOVTS TO DESPATCH REPS TO NICOSIA WHO WLD BE AUTHORIZED TO ENGAGE IN NECESSARY DISCUSSIONS UNDER MY AUSPICES TO FACILITATE AGREEMENT.

JARRING HAS GONE ON TO JERUSALEM FOR FURTHER TALKS ALTHOUGH HIS PREVIOUS PESSIMISM ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR SETTLEMENT HAVE OBVIOUSLY BEEN REINFORCED BY LAST ENCOUNTER. (RE LATTER POINT, BUNCE CONFIDED THAT IN TALKING PRIVATELY TO SYG, JARRING WAS MUCH MORE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT FATE OF HIS MISSION THAN WITH BUNCHE AND OTHERS IN SECRETARIAT. HE TOLD SYG HE WAS DISCOURAGED ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT AND PHYSICALLY EXHAUSTED FROM CONSTANT SHUTTLING BETWEEN CAPITALS.)

BUNCHE STRESSED SENSITIVITY OF INFO HE GAVE US AND I TRUST DEPT WILL ASSURE IT IS NOT REVEALED TO ANY OTHER GOVT.

GP-1.

GOLDBERG
BT

~~SECRET~~

55

INFORMATION

Saturday, March 9, 1968 - 1:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

**Herewith a most gracious
communication to you from Lord Avon.**

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:ria



55a

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

9 March, 1968

Dear Mr. President

Thank you so much for your kindness in receiving me yesterday and for giving so much time out of your heavily charged day for our talk. It was of course absorbingly interesting for me with memories of the conflict in Malaya, where our difficulties were less but still formidable enough at the time.

As I told you, I do feel that no statesman of our time has been called upon to face a harsher assignment than yours. Your sternest critic could not deny the courage with which you face the challenging daily decisions.

Each one of us, who are friends of the United States and want to see peace and a free life established on this earth, must pray that you will succeed in reaching that goal of a negotiated settlement based on firm guarantees in which some confidence can be placed and which I know you would like to see prevail in Indo-China.

*With kindest regards and
every good wish,
Yours very sincerely
Avon*

The President

of the United States of America

INFORMATION

Pres file

Saturday, March 9, 1968 -- 1:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

With respect to enemy forces around Khe Sanh, the attached explains:

- Intelligence community is now carrying 14,000 as the enemy threat in the area;
- they agree there have been some recent reductions;
- they will be completing by about Wednesday of next week a study of the whole of I Corps -- the results of which I shall report to you.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

MEMORANDUM

56a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Saturday, March 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Regarding our feeling this morning that the enemy order of battle around Khe Sanh may have fallen to 6-8,000, I have checked with the Intelligence community and find they are carrying about 14,000.

This assessment of the Intelligence people comes about from an upgrading of unit identification from what we were holding and recent OB data from MACV. They are working very hard to check and verify this information and to study the recent movements in the area and will be giving us a current estimate covering the whole of First Corps by Wednesday of next week.

In the meantime, we all agree that the majority of one regiment (1600 men) has moved from Khe Sanh to the Hue area and the added threat from three regiments to the northwest of Khe Sanh has been changed with their movement -- the headquarters of the 320 and two regiments moved to the east, and then, for some unexplained reason, north to the DMZ, and the 90th regiment moved to Hue.


Arthur McCafferty

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 20

By ics, NARS, Date 6-25-84

57

INFORMATION

Saturday, March 9, 1968 - 10:10am

Mr. President:

Herewith a Xerox of the original letter allegedly from the Pueblo crew.

The original is with handwriting experts.

We shall send you an analysis when completed.

Pres. file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

29 Febr ry 1968 572

The President of the United States.
of America
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President,

We, the officers, crew and civilian oceanographers of the USS Pueblo, are writing you jointly to explain the facts and those points we consider pertinent to our capture, and our detention in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to request your assistance in our repatriation. We consider this letter to be vital to our future. We do not mean to imply that your concern for us is or has been negligent; on the

contrary, our earnest desire is that you, our Commander-in-Chief, have the complete facts as we and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea know them.

They are all members of the Armed Forces of the United States or the Department of Defense.

The USS Pueblo was designed and commissioned to conduct electronic espionage and had a detachment of men assigned who are highly trained in this field. A secondary capability was to take oceanographic measurements useful for naval operations for which two civilian oceanographers were assigned.

They were operating under official U.S. Navy orders issued

to us by Commander, Naval Forces Japan, our operational Commander. Our orders were approved and sanctioned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations.

Our ship, in order to obtain electronic and visual intelligence, intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea at the following points:

1. 9.8 miles from Kal San north of Chongjin
2. 11.2 miles from Orang Nan
3. 10.75 miles and 11.3 miles from Nan Do east of Songjin
4. 8.2 miles from Ansong Kap in the Mayang Do area
5. 7.6 miles from Yo Do in the Honasan area.

As we were ordered, we

concentrated our intelligence collection efforts during the 10 days in the coastal waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the vicinity of four ports: Chongjin, Songjin, Mayang Do, and Stonsan. She sampled the electronic environment with emphasis on collecting various information on the naval forces of the Korean Peoples Army and intercepting and locating radars along the coast. She also intercepted communications and detected observation posts and military objects located on the coast. She were captured while committing hostile acts 7.6 miles from Uo Do in the vicinity of Stonsan in the territorial waters of the

Democratic People's Republic of
Korea on 23 January 1968

Immediately following
the capture we attempted
to deny the real purpose of
our operation and our
intrusions into the territorial
waters, hoping to safeguard
national security and our
national honor. However,
we could not long deny
the facts since the Korean
People's Army had in their
possession our documents,
which revealed the real
purpose of our operation
and the ship's position logs
and charts which proved our
intrusions into the territorial
waters of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea.

In light of this damning
evidence and our later honest

conviction that we had gravely wronged the Korean people we sincerely and openly confessed everything.

She then wrote a joint letter of apology to the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and asked for leniency.

Since our detention we have been treated humanely. We are provided with all the necessities for daily living. In fact, the treatment we are receiving is clearly beyond expectation. Our wounded have been treated and are now in the final stages of recovery.

It is legitimate for the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to insist that before our repatriation can be realized, the necessary amenities be made by our Government under whose orders we operated. Specifically, we believe that since the real facts of the Pueblo case have been fully revealed to the world, our

repatriation can be realized only when our Government frankly admits the fact that we intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and committed hostile acts, and sincerely apologizes for these acts and gives assurance that they will not be repeated.

We have had many hours of solitude since our detention to reflect and consider the nature of our offense, and rather than harboring resentment toward the Korean people for our capture, we have a strong feeling of guilt for the act we committed.

We have formed the opinion that espionage such as we conducted is an unjust

infringement upon the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and undermines completely any chance for honesty in international understanding.

This is our belief and does not concern the question of the necessity for vigilance to ensure the security of the United States.

Mr. President, the immense weight of evidence that confirms the Pueblo's intrusions into the territorial waters of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its espionage acts is overwhelming and cannot be refuted.

A vast majority of us are in our twenties and have most of our lives yet to live.

We could discuss at length our hopes for their futures but we think that you understand our desire for prompt repatriation.

We know that you do not consider us as mere pawns but as U.S. naval officers and men who attempted to do only as they were ordered. More importantly, we know that you value us as citizens of our country of which you are President.


We firmly believe now that you have the facts, that you will take all the necessary steps for our expeditious return.

We have had no word of our families and loved ones at home since our capture. We are torn by sorrow, suspense and longing for news of their well-being and are certain that they are even more worried about us. We depend on you to reunite us with them as soon as possible.

We are truly for our country and are torn by grief and longing for our families.

In summation, Mr. President, our future happiness and the well-being of the many hundreds of Americans in our families, is in your hands. We do not doubt that you will see us swiftly returned

Very respectfully,
The Commanding
Officer, Officers,
Civilian Ocean -
ographers and Crew
of the USS Pueblo
(AGER-2)



COMMANDER US Navy
Commanding Officer

Edward Henry Murphy LT, USN
Executive Officer

Stephen R. Harris, LT. USNR
RESEARCH OFFICER
J. Carl A. [Signature], LTJG, USNR
OPERATIONS OFFICER

Gene H. Laey, CWO-3, USN
ENGINEER OFFICER

Timothy Tom Harvill, ENS, USNR
SUPPLY OFFICER

Ralph D. Bouden
RALPH DALTON Bouden

Charles W. Ayling
CHARLES WILLIAM AYLING
~~Angelo Salvatore Strano~~
ANGELO SALVATORE STRANO

James Francis Kell
JAMES FRANCIS KELL
~~Donald Raymond McCarron~~
DONALD RAYMOND MCCARRON

Sidney Jerry Karnes
SIDNEY JERRY KARNES
Earl Murray Fisher
EARL MURRAY FISHER

Don Earl Bailey
DON EARL BAILEY
Donald Richard Peppard
DONALD RICHARD PEPPARD

James Antwynne Shepard
JAMES ANTWYNE SHEPARD
David Lee Kittle
DAVID LEE KITTLE

Rodney Hartman Duke
RODNEY HARTEMAN DUKE

John Allen Shilling
JOHN ALLEN SHILLING
Paul David Brusnahan
PAUL DAVID BRUSNAHAN

Anthony Andrew Lamantia
ANTHONY ANDREW LAMANTIA

Steven Jay Robin
STEVEN JAY ROBIN

James Dewar Layton
JAMES DEWAR LAYTON

Michael William Alexander
MICHAEL WILLIAM ALEXANDER

Bradley Reed Crowe
BRADLEY REED CROWE

Ralph M. McClintock
RALPH MCCLINTOCK

Michael Thomas Barrett
MICHAEL THOMAS BARRETT

John Milton Langenberg
JOHN MILTON LANGENBERG

John White Grant
JOHN WHITE GRANT

Robert Joseph Chicca
ROBERT JOSEPH CHICCA

Robert J. Hammond
ROBERT J. HAMMOND

Francis John Ginther
FRANCIS JOHN GINTHER

Charles Ray Sterling
CHARLES RAY STERLING

Wayne Drexel Anderson
WAYNE DREXEL ANDERSON

Elton Allen Wood
ELTON ALLEN WOOD

Charles Benton Law Jr.
CHARLES BENTON LAW JR.

Alvin Henry Plucker
ALVIN HENRY PLUCKER

Wendell Gene Leach
WENDELL GENE LEACH

Clifford Clair Nolte
CLIFFORD CLAIR NOLTE

Lee Roy Hayes
LEE ROY HAYES

Charles Henry Crandell Jr.
CHARLES HENRY CRANDELL JR.

Herman Paul Baldridge 13-

HERMAN PAUL BALDRIDGE

Armando Moreno Canales

ARMANDO MORENO CANALES

Lawrence William Mack

LAWRENCE WILLIAM MACK

Norbert John Kloppe

NORBERT JOHN KLOPPE

Ronald Leon Berens

RONALD LEON BERENS

Kenneth Roy Wadley

KENNETH ROY WADLEY

Willie Columbus Russell

WILLIE COLUMBUS RUSSELL

Jay Jay Maggard

JAY JAY MAGGARD

Robert Walter Hill

ROBERT WALTER HILL

Earl Raymond Phares

EARL RAYMOND PHARES

Ramon Rosales

RAMON ROSALES

Richard Joseph Regna

RICHARD JOSEPH REGNA

Larry Joe Marshall

LARRY JOE MARSHALL

Monroe Ousl Goldman

MONROE OUSL GOLDMAN

Rushe Junior Blansett

RUSHE JUNIOR BLANSETT

Daniel Dean Wright

DANIEL DEAN WRIGHT

Richard Ivan Bane

RICHARD IVAN BANE

William Thomas Massie

WILLIAM THOMAS MASSIE

John Arthur Mitchell

JOHN ARTHUR MITCHELL

Peter Milton Bandera

PETER MILTON BANDERA

William Douglas Scarborough

WILLIAM DOUGLAS SCARBOROUGH

Gerold William Higerson

GEROLD WILLIAM HIGERSON

Lawrence Edwin Strickland

LAWRENCE EDWIN STRICKLAND

Victor De Leon Escamilla

VICTOR DE LEON ESCAMILLA

Roberto P. Garcia

ROBERTO P. GARCIA

Harry Lewis

HARRY LEWIS

Ralph E Reed

RALPH EDWARD REED

Edward Stuart Russell

EDWARD STUART RUSSELL

Rogelio Parel Abalon

ROGELIO PAREL ABALON

Rizalino L. Hungate

RIZALINO L. HUNGATE

Dale Evans Rigby

DALE EVANS RIGBY

Howard Edward Bland

HOWARD EDWARD BLAND

John Robert Shingleton

JOHN ROBERT SHINGLETON

Norman William Spear

NORMAN WILLIAM SPEAR

Stephen Paul Ellis

STEPHEN PAUL ELLIS

Michael A O'Bannon

MICHAEL ANDREW O'BANNON

Richard Everett Arnold

RICHARD EVERETT ARNOLD

John Charles Higgins, Jr.

JOHN CHARLES HIGGINS, JR.

Steven Eugene Wolf

STEVEN EUGENE WOLF

Dunnie Richard Tuck, Jr.

DUNNIE RICHARD TUCK, JR.

Harry Iredale

HARRY IREDALE, III

INFORMATION

Pres file

Saturday, March 9, 1968 -- 10:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith some possible talking points with Amb. Berger, whom you see at 3:00 p. m. today.

1. His job, of course, is simply to help Amb. Bunker carry out his difficult mission.

2. Having been for some time in Washington, he understands that the political and military performance of the South Vietnamese is as important to U. S. public support to the war effort as the course of battle itself. We know how hard Amb. Bunker is working to make Thieu's constitutional government operate. We hope that Berger's presence in Saigon will strengthen this critical aspect of our Vietnam policy.

3. Although every country is different, we hope that Berger's experience in Korea, at a somewhat similar stage of South Korean political evolution, will be useful to Amb. Bunker and the whole national effort.

If you have time, you might ask him for any reflections he might have, looking back on his experience as Ambassador in Korea; and thank him for undertaking this important mission at a critical time.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

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INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-368
By CG, NARA, Date 5-12-95

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, March 9, 1968
9:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a cable from Seoul
indicating the Korean troop issue is
not dead.

Quite interesting, in fact.

I have called it to Clark's
attention.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 4784

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-367
By ijp, NARA, Date 2-7-94

Seoul 4784, March 8, 1968

SUBJECT: Additional Republic of Korea Troops for Vietnam.

1. For second week in a row, the Prime Minister deliberately raised the subject of additional Korean troops for Vietnam. This time he began by asking whether the U. S. would increase the number of troops being sent to Vietnam. The Ambassador said he believed we would be at level of about 525, 000 men in very near future. Prime Minister said he thought that was good, but didn't the U. S. need more Korean troops. Ambassador replied that we do and that, as he had indicated a week ago, he intended to approach the Government of Korea on this subject again soon. The Ambassador asked if the Prime Minister's thoughts on this had developed since our last mention of it.

2. The Prime Minister then outlined an elaborate scenario, indicating that he had been thinking about this subject since our last meeting, which involved the following: he said that he had excellent information to the effect that within the next year or so Prime Minister Sato of Japan would request the U. S. to return Okinawa to Japan. This would give Sato a political advantage he would need to stay in power and to permit U. S. /Japan Defense Treaty to remain in effect after 1970. Meanwhile, in Vietnam the war would be continuing, and he agreed with the Ambassador that this was a crucial year in Vietnam and there would be a continuing need for more troops to exert maximum pressure on the enemy.

3. After stressing that he was giving only his own ideas and had consulted no one, the Prime Minister said that an American victory in Vietnam is a victory for Korea, and an American defeat in Vietnam is a defeat for the Koreans. Under certain circumstances, the Prime Minister believed, the Government of Korea might be persuaded to send an additional two divisions and perhaps more. However, this could only be managed through a meeting between President Johnson and President Park, perhaps in Hawaii. At that meeting (or perhaps beforehand) the Prime Minister thought the U. S. should state its willingness to:

a. Provide necessary financial assistance to permit the Government of Korea to place its three ready reserve divisions, which are now fully equipped, on active duty;

b. U. S. should then bring the seven Korean rear area security reserve divisions up to the equipment levels of regular ready reserve divisions. This could be done at an equipment cost of about \$9 million for each division.

c. The U. S. , with reversion of Okinawa in mind, should construct a large air base on Cheju-Do for use by such sophisticated aircraft as the F-4.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

4. If this could be done, the Prime Minister continued, President Park would probably be willing to send two regular divisions to Vietnam, perhaps replacing these regular active duty divisions in Korea with the three activated ready reserve divisions. In addition, by following through on previous proposal to employ five thousand civilian reservists in logistical jobs in Vietnam to enable the dispatch of previously discussed light Korean division, it would then be possible to increase number of Korean troops for Vietnam by two divisions and the two-regiment light division. This would make a total of five Korean divisions in Vietnam.

5. Comment. The Prime Minister carefully characterized the foregoing as entirely his own idea, which he has discussed with no one. It seems clear, however, that from refinements contained in this presentation, and from scope of his proposal, that he has been thinking about this subject since our last meeting and that he has quite probably discussed it with others, possibly including the President. I responded to all this by saying that we would think about this and would discuss subject with him again in the near future.

6. I would appreciate your thoughts and suggestions for use in follow-up I should make on this subject. Also, questions which you would wish to have clarified in connection with it.

7. General Bonesteel has seen this message and requests that a copy be routed to CINCPAC.

PORTER

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Saturday, March 9, 1968 -- 9:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

At Khe Sanh:

- third consecutive day of good weather;
- 1813 friendly rounds;
- 370 sorties plus 45 B-52's;
- 201 tons delivered.

Later today I will file with you a report on enemy dispositions at Khe Sanh and the DMZ area indicating the enemy threat at Khe Sanh may consist of 6-8000 men, rather than the 20,000 we have been carrying in our heads.

W. W. Reston

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 3/27/92

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By rg, NARA, Date 3-27-92

60a

SECRET

Saturday, March 9, 1968

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number thirty-four on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area for the 24-hour period of March 8, 1968.

For the third consecutive day, good weather conditions existed at Khe Sanh. Daytime visibility up to seven miles provided excellent flying conditions. Fire support elements expended 1813 rounds in 83 missions, 60 percent of which were observed. Aircraft landed at Khe Sanh, with no unusual interference. A total of 12 enemy anti-air incidents were recorded during the period. Two aircraft were hit with only minor damage. Weather conditions today continue favorable.

Enemy ground activity centered east of the Khe Sanh air strip. At 9:30 a. m. three patrols from the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion engaged an unknown size enemy force at that location and confirmed 27 enemy killed, with no friendly casualties reported. At 7:30 a. m., Marine artillery in the base camp received recoilless rifle fire at their location. They expended 10 rounds of high explosives in direct fire and observed two North Vietnamese Army killed. At 5:30 p. m., four North Vietnamese Army were observed 800 meters east of Khe Sanh. A 60mm mortar mission was fired resulting in one North Vietnamese killed. At 5:35 p. m., an air observed air strike five kilometers northwest of Hill 881 killed two North Vietnamese Army and destroyed a machine gun position. At 7:15 p. m., a wire detail from the 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion was taken under fire while repairing their defensive wire. One ARVN Ranger was killed.

At 6:45 p. m., air strikes were called in 200-600 meters east of Khe Sanh, resulting in the destruction of numerous trench lines and bunkers, and the killing of three enemy. Enemy incoming during the reporting period totalled 297 rounds of mixed mortar, artillery and rockets. As a result of the shelling, 27 Marines were wounded, with 10 evacuated. Other than incoming rounds, there was no enemy activity reported at outlying positions of the Khe Sanh Combat Base.

Elsewhere along the DMZ, major enemy activity was limited to incoming rockets, artillery and mortar rounds. At Camp Carroll and neighboring areas, 11 rounds fell between 4:00 and 5:20 p. m. No damage or casualties were reported.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/88
By RA NARA, Date 3/27/92

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988
By RA NARA, Date 3/27/92

Thirty-four artillery rounds fell at Con Thien, with injuries to one Marine. At 11:30 p. m. , 10 rounds of artillery struck the Dong Ha Combat Base. No casualties or damage was reported.

Enemy ground activity in northern Quang Tri province yesterday was comparatively light, with only small unit contacts reported. At 11:12 a. m. , one Marine was killed and one injured when they detonated an enemy explosive device located 10 kilometers southwest of Camp Carroll. A patrol from the 9th Marines came under small arms fire at 1:30 p. m. , six kilometers northwest of Camp Carroll. Four Marines were wounded. The enemy withdrew. An 81mm mortar mission was fired in support with undetermined results. At 5:55 p. m. , a reconnaissance team made contact with 15 North Vietnamese Army six kilometers south of the rock pile. In an exchange of small arms fire, one Marine was killed. The enemy withdrew leaving five North Vietnamese Army bodies behind.

In Operation NAPOLEON/SALINE, an AMTRAC hit a 150 pound mine totally destroying the vehicle. One Marine was killed and two injured. ARVN elements located 28 140mm rockets four kilometers east of C-1. All were destroyed. At 11:40 a. m. , a forward observer with the 4th Marines spotted 13 North Vietnamese in the open north of Cua Viet River. An artillery mission was fired resulting in four North Vietnamese killed.

There was one COFRAM mission of eight rounds fired, with undetermined results.

Marine aircraft flew 121 sorties in support of Khe Sanh, the Air Force flew 140, the Navy 109, for a total of 370 sorties. Bomb damage included 124 secondary explosions, 81 secondary fires, 28 bunkers destroyed, 100 meters of trench destroyed, 12 road cuts, and 11 enemy killed. Five ARC LIGHT strikes (30 sorties) were scheduled for the Khe Sanh area, but nine aircraft went to secondary targets owing to targeting equipment malfunctions. Two of the strikes were against close-in targets, 1200 meters from friendly forces. One mission reported 14 secondary explosions. For the past week (March 2-8) a total of 45 ARC LIGHT strikes, consisting of 264 sorties, were flown against troop concentrations, artillery positions, and supply/storage areas in the Niagara area. SAC aircrews reported a total of 118 secondary explosions.

Air resupply for the Khe Sanh totalled 201 short tons. Class I amounted to 35.5 short tons, Class II 18 tons, Class III 1.5 short tons, Class IV 3.5 short tons, Class V 142.5 short tons. Forty-six passengers were landed. Resupply sorties totalled 38. Ten C-130's and two C-123's completed air drops. Four CH-53's and 22 CH-46's delivered passengers and cargo.

Three hundred-seven tactical air sorties are planned for the next period in support of Khe Sanh. The Marines schedule 88, the Air Force 119, and the Navy 100. The Air Force will have 120 additional sorties on call, the Marines will have 16 aircraft on call. Five ARC LIGHT strikes (21 sorties) are scheduled for the area.

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ACTION

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, March 9, 1968 -- 8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bob Komer, back channel from Honolulu, suggests:

- 1. We ask him for an eyes only appraisal of the situation upon his return.
- 2. We empower him to tell Thieu and Ky of "top level disappointment" at their failure to rise to the occasion.

Bob properly notes how important it is for him to be a Saigon man -- absolutely loyal to Westy and Bunker.

Therefore, neither of these things should be done without their knowledge and concurrence.

I suggest, therefore, that we:

A. Send a back channel to Bunker, Westy and Komer asking Komer to file with us, as a matter of urgency upon his return, a fresh evaluation of the state of pacification; prospects; and steps that need to be taken to prevent the enemy from consolidating the countryside. (At the moment, damage in the countryside, with enlarged opportunities for Viet Cong recruitment, is clearly the greatest cost we have suffered from the winter-spring offensive.)

B. We should tell Bob to inform Bunker and Westy of our anxiety here about the GVN performance and the Thieu-Ky split; but let Bunker judge whether Bob should speak directly to Thieu and Ky.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-252
By Cb, NARA Date 11-1-97

W. W. Rostow

A approved if Clifford agrees _____

B approved if Rusk agrees _____

No _____

Call me _____

WWRostow:rlw

~~SECRET~~

.....
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 FM AMB KOMER, HONOLULU
 TO WALT ROSTOW, WHITE HOUSE, WASH, D. C.
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100 MAR 9 04 46

~~SECRET~~

61a

~~NODIS~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~ NODIS

1. PRESIDENT WAS CORDIAL AND DETERMINED WHEN I SAW HIM LAST NIGHT, BUT SEEMED IN SOMBER MOOD.
2. HENCE ON REFLECTION I REGRET THAT I DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPRESS MY OWN STRONG VIEW THAT WE ARE ALREADY ON A DISTINCT CURVE OF RECOVERY FROM LOW POINT OF THE INITIAL VC TET OFFENSIVE. IN FACT, HAVING ALREADY ABSORBED THE WORST THE ENEMY CAN PROBABLY OFFER (EXCEPT PERHAPS IN NORTHERN I CORPS), WE ARE ENTERING A PERIOD WHERE OPPORTUNITY OUTWEIGHS RISK IF WE CAN ONLY SEIZE IT.
3. TO RECTIFY MY OVERSIGHT, LET ME SUGGEST THAT YOU OR PRESIDENT HIMSELF REQUEST, AS HE HAS DONE BEFORE, MY OWN EYES ONLY EVALUATION OF EVOLVING SITUATION AS IT LOOKS A WEEK AFTER MY RETURN. AS YOU KNOW, MY LOYALTY TO MY IMMEDIATE BOSSES, SO ESSENTIAL TO THEIR CONFIDENCE IN ME, PRECLUDES MY VOLUNTEERING ANY SUCH APPRAISAL UNLESS SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED.
4. I DID URGE ON PRESIDENT THE CRITICAL NEED FOR GREATER GVN PERFORMANCE AS AN ESSENTIAL COROLLARY TO ANY US ADD-ONS, AND MY CONVICTION THAT ONLY HE COULD COMPEL IT. TO REINFORCE OUR SAIGON EFFORTS CALLS FIRST FOR JUST THE RIGHT SPECIAL EMISSARY AND THEN FOR AN EYEBALL TO EYEBALL BETWEEN THE TWO PRESIDENTS THEMSELVES, IT STRIKES ME THAT MY RETURN COULD BE USED TO HELP ALONG THIS EXERCISE, SINCE THIEU AND KY BOTH REGARD ME AS "THE PRESIDENT'S MAN." THUS IT WOULD HELP SET THE STAGE IF I RETURNED FROM WASHINGTON EXPRESSING ITS KEEN TOP LEVEL DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THEY HAD NOT RISEN ENOUGH TO THE OCCASION YET. I AM SURE THAT BUNKER AND WESTY WOULD HEARTILY CONCUR IF PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THIS.
5. FINALLY, PLEASE REASSURE THE PRESIDENT THAT I SEE A GREATER CHANCE THAN EVER TO OVER AWE HANOI, IF WE CAN ONLY CONVINCE IT THAT ITS ALL-OUT EFFORT HAS FAILED AT GREAT COST. I AM MUCH IMPRESSED BY THAT HUNGARIAN'S REPRISE OF GIAP DESCRIBING DIEN BIEN PHU AS A DESPERATE GAMBLE. WHILE IT TAKES A BOLD MAN OR A FOOL TO BE TOO OPTIMISTIC JUST NOW, I SENSE THAT WE HAVE ALREADY WEATHERED THE WORST OF THE ENEMY'S CONVULSIVE EFFORT. IT WILL BE DIFFICULT AND PAINFUL TO FACE HIM DOWN, BUT WE MAY WELL BE ABLE TO FORCE A MAJOR SHIFT BEFORE NOVEMBER IF WE NOT ONLY INCREASE OUR OWN PRESSURE BUT SEIZE THE PARALLEL OPPORTUNITY TO SHAPE UP A NOW MALLEABLE GVN. WARM REGARDS AND DEPEND ON ME TO STAY IN THERE PUSHING.

GP-1

480

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
 NLJ 96-251
 By is, NARA Date 8-18-98

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-188

By WJG, NARA, Date 11-3-95

62

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, March 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Mexican Border Restrictions

Profile

Prior to Christmas and Washington's birthday the Mexican Government instituted tough customs inspection against returning Mexican nationals resident outside the border zone travelling overland from shopping trips to Texas border cities. US merchants, particularly in Laredo, felt the pinch and made loud complaints at State, here and on the Hill. On both occasions strong representations to the Mexican Ambassador and the Foreign Office brought relaxation of the enforcement.

While we protested the Mexican action, our grounds were not strong because the Mexican Government was simply enforcing customs regulations on the books -- even though not always applied. Mexico has a peculiar customs system under which nationals returning by air can bring back a long list of articles duty free, while overland returnees are restricted to just a few items. We understand the severe enforcement measures at Christmas and Washington's birthday were due to pressure of Monterrey merchants who anticipated heavy purchases in US border cities by Mexicans living in the interior.

The issue of eliminating the discrepancy of exemptions between air travellers and overland travellers was raised in the US-Mexico Trade Committee meeting last December. The Embassy has also taken it up with the Foreign Office. In view of the recent difficulty, State instructed Ambassador Freeman on March 1 to press for a resolution of the problem. He is to point out that purchases along the border by our respective tourists is a two-way street. For years we have waived the Treasury requirement that US tourists must remain at least 48 hours outside the US before taking advantage of the duty-free exemptions for purchases abroad. In the new proposals governing US tourism, Mexico has a privileged position. We expect the Mexicans to reciprocate.

Specifically, Freeman is to seek:

- simplification and clarification of customs regulations.
- elimination of differences between air and overland travellers, hopefully making the overland treatment conform to the more liberal air treatment.
- assurances of consistent enforcement during holiday and non-holiday periods.

I will keep you posted on how these talks progress.

W. W. Rostow

Saturday , March 9, 1968

63

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

**SUBJECT: Full Power for Arthur J. Goldberg or William B. Buffum
to sign the International Coffee Agreement, 1968**

Herewith for your signature is a full power authorizing Ambassadors Goldberg or Buffum to sign the International Coffee Agreement recently negotiated in London.

You indicated at Punta del Este and in letters to Presidents Lleras and Costa e Silva that you backed an improved coffee agreement.

The International Coffee Agreement of 1968 modifies, improves, and extends for five years the mechanisms established under the International Coffee Agreement of 1962.

Tony Solomon is optimistic that the formula for handling the soluble coffee problem in the new agreement, which has been checked out with the industry, will facilitate smooth sailing of the Agreement through the Congress.

I recommend you sign the full power.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

**Full Power for Ambassadors Goldberg or Buffum
for signature.**

64

Saturday, March 9, 1968

Mr. President:

Pres file

The attached reflects a personality clash to which I don't think there is any final solution short of firing one party. However, I think you could probably ride out this storm by:

--call ^Wright Patman to urge favorable treatment of the Asian Bank bill; and

--calling Black (at Hope Sound, Florida) to apply a little butter.

I think the critical thing --if we are to keep Black aboard-- is to call Patman.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-252
By cb, NARA Date 11-1-97

~~Mr. Rostow~~

65

ACTION

Pres. file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday
Friday March 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Response to Congressional Resolutions on Mid-East Desalting

Last December, the Senate passed the Baker Resolution and now the House is considering an identical one. Both state that building large nuclear desalting plants in the Mid-East will hasten peaceful cooperation. Both request you to pursue this.

These, of course, stem from the Eisenhower-Strauss plan of last summer. That, in turn, grew out of a study at Oak Ridge. That study developed a theoretical model showing how one could build up around a big nuclear desalting and electric power plant an industrial and agricultural complex that could absorb the tremendous amounts of electricity that such a plant would have to produce to make its water economical. The men who ran that study made clear that further study would be needed to apply this idea to any specific area.

Therefore, the most direct response to the Baker resolution would be to follow up the Oak Ridge study, applying its theories to the Mid-East.

However, that by itself doesn't make sense, and besides we'd like to go the Baker resolution one better. We don't quarrel with its vision and hope, but it is naive on two serious counts:

-- Fresh water alone won't solve the problems that block peace in the Mid-East. If we could devote the \$1 billion or more Baker's dream would cost to resettling refugees in all kinds of jobs--not just agriculture--we'd take a much bigger step toward settlement. That's not to say that water isn't important; but other issues are more basic.

-- Nuclear desalting is not necessarily the most immediate, practical or economic way to bring more water to the area. It may be the best answer in Israel where most other sources of water are already being efficiently used well. But we still have a long way to go in developing ground water and other sources elsewhere.

The kind of study we would frame would be broader than just applying nuclear desalting to the Mid-East. Oak Ridge could do that study, but we would make that just one piece in a broader study applying other advanced concepts of water management and development. We would

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

bring in some of the pioneers in our own water planning, and we would make our work complement studies being done by Mac Bundy through RAND and by the World Bank.

There are two bureaucratic problems:

1. How to keep these studies in technical perspective. AEC has a way of going wild with its ideas and getting nuclear desalting out of economic perspective. On the other hand, the economists are too skeptical of desalting. In looking around for someone to keep all parts of this effort in tune, we believe we should entrust this to your Water for Peace Office. If we're going to build that office up, now is the time. The alternative is to let Interior or AEC run the show, and we just can't be confident of a balanced result there.

2. How to assure proper program control. The water experts will have to carry the technical ball. But State Department control is necessary to mesh this with other efforts in the region. Baker proposed a Presidential Commission, but we fear that creates expectations beyond what we can deliver. We have concluded that the best bet is to say that the Water for Peace Director, responsible to the Secretary of State, will report in this case to the Secretary through Luke Battle's Interdepartmental Regional Group for this purpose. We are persistently trying to strengthen State's coordination machinery which you established but at the same time we want to build up the Water for Peace Office. Luke has an effective group going, and we think the Water for Peace Director can work through him without unduly restricting the experts' freedom or his own prestige.

Recommendation: Before we go any further down this track, we would like to be sure you approve our general approach. Specifically, State recommends that Secretary Rusk send the attached letter to Senator Fulbright and that a similar letter go to Congressman Morgan. If you approve, we would then work out precise terms of reference for these studies and determine how to finance them. We can do something within the existing Budget, but we might judge that asking for a small budget amendment (less than \$1 million) would be worth considering in order to engage the Congress immediately in responsibility for its recommendations. (We believe Congressman Rooney would be glad to support a small State budget amendment that would contribute to Arab-Israeli progress, but we will be back to you on that.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

I have discussed this with Don Hornig and Charlie Zwick, and they join in the recommendation that you approve the attached letter.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____
Call me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

65a

SUGGESTED LETTER

Honorable J. William Fulbright
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I wish to assure you and the Senators who sponsored Resolution 155, to which the Senate agreed on December 12, 1967, that the Administration will do everything it can to carry out the spirit and purpose of that Resolution. We will also continue to be alert to other methods of achieving its broad objectives.

To begin with, we are planning a series of related studies which will help determine the practicability of designing, constructing and operating one or more nuclear desalting plants to provide fresh water to both Arab and Israeli territories. Since a large nuclear desalting plant must also produce a large amount of electric power, we will also examine the most economic use of such power.

Such studies must, of course, be done within a broad regional and economic framework. We will begin by analyzing the economy of each country in the region to determine what inputs deserve highest priorities for attaining the objectives summarized in Resolution 155. Improved management and use of existing water resources and additional supplies of water and electric power will, of course, have

a high priority. We will also examine the most economic methods of producing and using water and electric power, taking into consideration the advantages to be gained from broad regional cooperation.

Taking into account these over-all considerations, we intend to follow up the study done last summer at Oak Ridge examining the "energy center" concept with a study to determine its applicability in the Middle East. Last summer's study analyzed in theoretical terms the ways in which it may eventually be feasible to use the power from large dual-purpose nuclear power and desalting plants in an integrated food and industrial production complex. Our proposed study would apply the concepts developed to the specific conditions of the Middle East.

As beneficial and economic projects of all varieties are identified, considering the full range of technological opportunities, they can be pursued in whatever ways are consistent with the political situation and with the availability of financial resources at the time. In this framework we can determine the feasibility of financing and installing nuclear desalting plants.

The scope and locality of our studies will naturally be affected by the trend of political attitudes and international relationships. We may have to conduct them primarily within the United States, but one or more of them could include participation by those Middle Eastern

countries and their scientists and technologists whose governments express an active interest.

I am glad to report, in addition, that we already have useful working liaison with 'similarly minded nations,' as suggested in Resolution 155. We are working through United Nations agencies already deeply engaged in studies to assist in the development of the Middle Eastern countries. These agencies, of course, have the advantage of a more cooperative relationship with some countries than the United States has.

A more complete outline of these studies which I have discussed in this letter is being prepared. I believe they will be fully responsive to the request in Resolution 155.

Sincerely yours,

Dean Rusk

1-001, 02
66

Friday, March 8, 1968 -- 6:00 PM

Pre file

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a
congratulatory message on the independence
of Mauritius, March 12.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

RPM/EKH/vmr

66a

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER RAMGOOLAM -- MAURITIUS

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The American people join me in sending heartiest congratulations to you and the people of Mauritius as you celebrate the birth of your nation.

Free men everywhere share your joy and hopes on this historic day. Your commitment to democracy and the rule of law is a firm foundation for progressive nationhood. Mauritius is determined to provide to her people the economic and social advances which alone give meaning to independence, and to assume with pride the place of honor reserved for her in the family of nations.

It is a special pleasure for America to welcome Mauritius as a free and sovereign state. We have enjoyed more than 100 years of peaceful and friendly consular relations with your lovely island. We look forward to a strengthening of these ties as Mauritius charts her own destiny.

My best personal wishes to you, Mr. Prime Minister. I know you will carry out your heavy responsibilities with wisdom and courage.

Sincerely,

ACTION

via Hopkins.

67

Friday, March 8, 1968
5:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith your approval requested
for regulations governing the Pacific
halibut fishery for the U. S. and Canada,
1968.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment (log 907)

ACTION

~~W. W. Rostow~~
2. P. file
Peru (see H. H. H. H.)

Friday, March 8, 1968
5:45 p. m.

68

Mr. President:

Herewith your approval requested
for regulations governing the Pacific
halibut fishery for the U. S. and Canada,
1968.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment (log 907)

S/SP 3926

907

68a



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 7, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Amendment of Pacific Halibut Fishery
Regulations for the 1968 Season

Recommendation:

I recommend that you give routine approval to the enclosed regulations governing the Pacific halibut fishery for the United States and Canada during 1968.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Discussion:

You approved the 1967 halibut fishery regulations. The only major change in the regulations recommended for 1968 is a reduction in the catch limit for regulatory area 3A.

The amendments are within the authority of the Convention of 1953 between Canada and the United States but become effective only after you and the Governor General of Canada approve. Canadian approval is expected momentarily.

There are no public relations problems with these regulations. The Commission proposes them each year in consultation with all branches of the halibut industry.

Handwritten signature of Eugene V. Rostow in cursive.

Eugene V. Rostow
Under Secretary for
Political Affairs

Enclosure:

Proposed Regulations for 1968.

INFORMATION

69

~~SECRET~~

Friday, March 8, 1968
5:40 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith as good an assessment
of the mixed pacification picture as
we can get in Washington.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

sig, NARA, Date 3-2-92

69a

SECRET

March 8, 1968

PACIFICATION ASSESSMENT

1. Overall estimates are still fragmentary. CORDS has ordered a national survey of its program status--expected about April 1. USAID is making a similar assessment--to be completed about the same time.

2. Many critical indicators are lacking. We have not received HES estimates for January or February--and have no hard data on population and hamlet control shifts. Additionally, we have no country-wide reports on damage to Chieu Hoi centers, redefections, destruction of RD projects or village/hamlet defense installations, operations against the VC infrastructure, attacks on prisons or detention centers and numbers of VC prisoners released.

3. Tentative Conclusion. Pacification is still at a standstill in many parts of the country (notably parts of I Corps and most of IV Corps) because of dislocation of pacification resources. But the program is slowly getting underway again where Vietnamese military and paramilitary elements are returning to the pacification areas. A province breakdown follows:

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Region 1</u>	<u>Region 2</u>	<u>Region 3</u>	<u>Region 4</u>
Provinces reporting pacification seriously affected	13	1	4	3	5
Provinces reporting pacification moderately affected	16	3	2	4	7
Provinces reporting pacification slightly affected	15	1	6	4	4
	44	5	12	11	16

4. Pacification Resources: Initial Impact. At the height of the Tet offensive, a number of pacification resources were withdrawn by GVN authorities, primarily to urban areas including province, provincial and district capitals. This included 18 out of 51 ARVN battalions, 109 out of 208 Regional Force companies, 30 out of 568 Popular Force platoons and 277 out of 555 RD cadre teams.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By g/hg, NARA, Date 6/25/96

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By g/hg, NARA, Date 6/25/96

5. Pacification Resources: Status as of March 8 shows a gradual return of assets previously committed to pacification. The RD teams were reported as for the most part intact. 321 of the 555 teams are now back in place with about one-half in planned 1968 locations although many of them are engaged in security duties only. Those not yet returned to hamlets are performing a security mission or on higher priority needs elsewhere such as in the relief effort in Hue. Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU's) are mostly intact, and serving as paramilitary elements in a defense role. No overall information reported on Static Grievance Teams. On the military side, ARVN combat loss sustained during the Tet offensive may have been made up through active recruiting coupled with rounding up Tet absentees, although we do not have information on the strength of units. The Mission has reported RF companies at 80 percent and PF at 85 percent. This is a regional breakout of military assets currently in the countryside:

	<u>Pre-Tet Total</u>	<u>Region I</u>	<u>Region II</u>	<u>Region III</u>	<u>Region IV</u>	<u>Post-Tet Total</u>
ARVN battalions in support of RD	51	3	9	16	8	36

We have no unit location distribution by regions for RF companies or PF platoons. One breakdown comparing present for duty strengths with pre-Tet averages of RF-123 and PF-35 is --

	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>
RF	111	96	91	96
PF	31	25	31	30

6. Police and Police Field Forces are reported functioning normally through most of the country. We lack systematic reporting on current strengths and deployments.

7. Count of refugees created by the Tet offensives increased by more than 120,000 this week as refugee workers conducted more precise surveys. The total now stands at 599,858. Additionally, there have been 68,000 houses destroyed, 4,866 civilians killed and 19,457 civilians wounded.

8. Chieu Hoi total through first week of March is 1,781 -- compared with 4,081 same period last year.

9. Chief economic impact of the Tet offensive on the pacification program has been reduction of commercial community confidence and disruption of the marketing system. Stock situation for imported goods remains satisfactory and prices have been remarkably steady -- increases currently only about 11% above pre-Tet. Most of the major lines of communication are open again, at least part of the time, but incidents occur daily on such vital links as National Route 4, and travel is light. There are indications that the VC/NVA are targeting on secondary roads and bridges to disrupt the countryside and increase urban pressures. Movement of goods along these marketing channels is reportedly increasingly difficult because of physical damage and systematic VC attacks on vehicles.

10. Prognosis: It may take several months to estimate fully the extent of the setback; determine which parts of the program should be re-mounted and where; and get territorial security forces and pacification resources back in place. GVN presence in the countryside has clearly suffered, and much manpower and materiel resources have been diverted to recovery. Both the interest and the confidence of GVN officials who must lead the pacification effort have probably suffered, and the work of regaining popular allegiance at village/hamlet level will be more difficult. Thieu is now chairing the urban recovery effort and Ky is reportedly interested in taking over supervision of pacification. The GVN has, we understand, agreed that reconstruction and pacification are both priority programs and that RD commodities may be used to support construction as long as pacification is not hindered. The tasks may be competitive in terms of men, materials,

~~SECRET~~

and scarce leadership energy; both must be attempted. Many problems -- other than military ones -- are likely to hamper rejuvenation of pacification. But restoration of security in the countryside by offensive action must receive priority.

~~SECRET~~

70

Friday, March 8, 1968
2:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Just to see what it looked like -- in case you might consider this as one option -- I have drafted a Southeast Asia Resolution of 1968. You may wish to discuss it at lunch -- or drop it in the wastebasket.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

(3/8/68)

SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOLUTION OF 1968

Whereas there are now major units of the Army of North Vietnam engaged in aggressive action in South Vietnam contrary to the Geneva Accords of 1954; and

Whereas there are major forces of North Vietnam engaged in aggressive action in Laos and in the transit of Laos with military men and supplies in violation of the Geneva Accords of 1962; and

Whereas the United States has joined with six nations of Asia and the Pacific to frustrate the aggression against South Vietnam and to permit the people of South Vietnam to exercise the rights of self-determination without external coercion: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to defeat the aggression against South Vietnam and to restore peace to Vietnam and Southeast Asia at the earliest possible time, on terms consonant with our national commitments and interests.

INFORMATION

SECRET

**Friday, March 8, 1968
1:35 p. m.**

71
Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Andy Goodpaster reports on his conversation with President Truman and forwards a personal greeting from President and Mrs. Truman.

I have marked the passages where President Truman expresses his view.

W. W. Rostow

~~**SECRET**~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *sq*, NARA, Date *3-2-92*



~~SECRET~~
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

71a

8 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached Memorandum for Record reports my meeting in Independence, Missouri, with President Truman yesterday. (Two tentatively scheduled meetings previously had been cancelled at his request.) President Truman received the briefing with keen interest and close attention. He stressed repeatedly his great appreciation for the briefing, and for your thoughtfulness in arranging it. He sent his warmest regards and best wishes to you.

1 Att
as

A. J. GOODPASTER
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

~~SECRET~~

BY 176 ON 3-29-68



~~SECRET~~
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

716

8 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Truman at Independence,
Missouri, 7 March 1968

I met with President Truman for one hour at his home in Independence, Missouri, on 7 March 1968. (Two meetings tentatively scheduled previously had been cancelled by Mr. Truman's office at his request.) During the meeting, I covered the Pueblo incident, and gave a general review of the war in Vietnam.

With regard to the Pueblo, I told Mr. Truman that the ship was on an intelligence-gathering mission, having left Sasebo, Japan, on 11 January, and that so far as is known nothing out of the ordinary occurred until its seizure on 23 January off Wonsan, North Korea. I told him that the ship was located in international waters when seized, some 15 miles from the nearest land, and that we have no information indicated that the ship violated territorial waters at any time. Its orders specifically required it to stay at least 13 miles offshore. We cannot, of course, be completely certain there was no violation until we have access to the crew and the log. It appears that much, although perhaps not all, of the classified documents and equipment aboard were destroyed. Some of it may have been recovered by the North Koreans. I then summarized what is being done now through diplomatic channels drawing upon information furnished me by Mr. Bromley Smith, including a summary of the positions currently being taken by the North Koreans and by the United States. Mr. Truman had no specific comment on the Pueblo matter.

I next gave him a summary review of the Vietnam war, covering in brief outline the geography of the country, the development of the war in the last few years, the objectives of both sides, the principal forces engaged, the general operational plan and major efforts being exerted by both sides, the overall progress being made up to the Tet attacks, the Tet attacks and their resulting effects to date, the Khe Sanh situation, and the major issues and problem areas that

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-100

By *gip*, NARA, Date 5/1/96

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

now exist. Mr. Truman followed the discussion with keen interest and close attention, with a number of comments and questions.

After my explanation of the situation in early and mid-'65 resulting in the introduction of U. S. forces at a time when the South Vietnamese were close to defeat, Mr. Truman commented that ~~the President did what had to be done, in his opinion.~~ With regard to objectives, I told him that the aim of the North Vietnamese seems clearly to be the take-over of South Vietnam and the imposition of NVN rule throughout North and South Vietnam, and that their determination to pursue this objective is shown in the losses and the destruction they are sustaining. On our side the President has stated our overall objective as seeking an independent, non-Communist South Vietnam, as well as an honorable peace that will leave the people of South Vietnam free to fashion their own institutions without terror or intimidation from the North. Military objectives to this end include imposing costs on North Vietnam to cause them to cease support and direction of the insurgency, defeat of the VC and NVA in South Vietnam, and extension of GVN dominion over South Vietnam, as well as deterring the Chinese Communists from intervention.

I next reviewed the major forces involved on both sides. Mr. Truman was much interested in the fact that the NVA main force units now in South Vietnam are larger than the VC units--thus it is in no sense a civil war.

I reviewed the general progress of the war over the past few years, noting the increase in population under GVN control from one-half in 1965 to two-thirds in 1967, the improvement in the ratio of weapons lost from about 1 to 1 in 1965 to 6 to 1 in 1967. I also commented on the growth of pacification teams and the increase in the number of secure hamlets. Finally I noted the political progress evidenced by the election in which more than 80% (more than four and a half million) of the registered adults voted. This well disproves any charge that the Vietnamese are indifferent about freedom and development.

I reviewed in outline the principal operations now being conducted, including the land campaign in South Vietnam, the B-52 and other air operations, sea surveillance, the anti-infiltration system, the pacification program in South Vietnam, the operations

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

against the lines of communications in Laos, and the air and naval operations against North Vietnam.

I next covered the Tet offensive, bringing out that the attack was launched suddenly during the holiday period; that 5 cities, 35 of 44 province capitals, 36 district towns, many villages and hamlets and some 24 airfields were attacked; that approximately 60,000 enemy troops participated of whom 40,000 were killed in the first three weeks, and over 5,000 captured, as well as 10,000 weapons lost to us, while 3,000 South Vietnamese were killed and 1,000 U.S. The ARVN units were at half strength celebrating Tet, but they responded well and bore the brunt of the attack. U.S. forces supported in 6 cities, but for a limited number of days except at Hue where the battle lasted nearly a month. The losses and other effects on both sides have been heavy and severe. On our side, 60,000 homes were destroyed, many businesses were destroyed or damaged, 4700 civilians were killed and 500,000 refugees resulted. The economy has been set back, and pacification hard hit in at least 13 provinces, where it may take six months to regain pre-attack levels. Local government has been disrupted in many areas and confidence shaken. ARVN units have been drawn into the cities, and the countryside left exposed in many areas. However, on the enemy side losses have been severe; no "uprising" occurred as anticipated; and a hardened attitude now exists toward the NV/VC. The government response has been generally effective, although their success in meeting the heavy additional refugee problem is yet to be demonstrated. ~~President Truman expressed particular appreciation for the report on these attacks; he commented that it had been hard for him to get a full picture.~~

I next reviewed the situation in the Khe Sanh area, bringing out that we have a strong force (4 Marine battalions, heavily reinforced) in the area, with powerful artillery and air support, and with more than 2 divisions available in the northern part of South Vietnam as reinforcements if needed. Heavy B-52 and tactical air support is being provided. Although the weather handicaps logistic support to the Khe Sanh force, our commanders have confidence in their ability to deal with enemy attack. ~~President Truman expressed appreciation for this picture of the situation in light of concern he had felt as a result of press accounts.~~

Finally I gave him a brief survey of some of the major issues and problem areas to which our government has been giving its attention (and to which it will probably continue to do so). The

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first is the pressure to "stop the bombing". Here I referred to the President's San Antonio formula, and to the risks to our troops if the bombing were stopped and the North Vietnamese took advantage of the cessation. ~~Mr. Truman said that he didn't think it was possible to go any further than the President has gone in his offer.~~ I next mentioned the continuing problem of infiltration of men and material through Laos and Cambodia, and the enemy use of those areas as bases. He was gratified to know that we are attacking enemy movements and bases in Laos; I told him that the Cambodia problem is receiving continuing study. I next mentioned the necessity for maintaining the tactical initiative in light of the increased forces the North Vietnamese are sending down from the north and the possibility that more forces will be needed on our side in order to avoid finding ourselves on the defensive. ~~He said it is of great importance to avoid being thrown on the defensive.~~ I next noted the importance of finding ways of protecting cities and the countryside, improving local security and eliminating the structure of Viet Cong cells and sympathizers. This problem, together with restoring the momentum of pacification and development, is receiving urgent attention of our authorities in Vietnam at the present time.

The meeting ended with ~~President Truman's expression of appreciation for the briefing and for the thoughtfulness of the President in making it possible.~~



A. J. GOODPASTER
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

~~SECRET~~

71c

8 March (1968)

Dear Mr. President,

During my meeting, with President Truman yesterday, Mrs. Truman was also present. They both asked after you, with deep feeling, and were gratified at my impression that you are able to bear the burdens and harassments of your post.

Mrs. Truman, with the President joining, asked that I give you their warmest good wishes for both yourself and Mrs. Johnson.

They were most grateful for your thoughtfulness in arranging for the briefing.

Sincerely,

(signed) Andrew G. (Goodpaster)

Friday, March 8, 1968

1:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Russ Wiggins just called. In connection with yesterday's Senate debate on Vietnam, he said:

-- for the Congress to intervene with respect to the number of troops would be unprecedented and most unwise;

-- on the other hand, it may be proper for the Congress to vote on either a new resolution or a repeal of Tonkin Gulf;

-- it would be quite proper to make those who were now "wringing their hands," "shedding crocodile tears," "caterwauling," and expressing their "concern" to be forced to stand up like men and vote one way or the other. He does not believe, that, in the end, there would be more than 12 votes for the repeal of Tonkin Gulf, especially at a time when an important battle was being fought;

-- in addition, he thinks that there are some in the Congress who feel it would be constitutionally proper at this time to have an expression of the will of the Congress.

Russ said he was not absolutely sure in his mind on this matter, but he would think it important -- if possible -- to force the dissenters to vote rather than simply make a lot of noise.

He asked me my view. I told him that I had no firm personal judgment because I did not know enough about the Congress. I did tell him that I would pass his views along to the President.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

73

~~SECRET~~

Friday, March 8, 1968
1:05 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Paul Nitze's response
to your question about helicopter
engine production.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 107, NARA, Date 3-29-82

~~SECRET~~

408
73a



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

5 March 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You asked whether engine production for helicopters was presently scheduled on a six-day-a-week basis. ~~Production of Lycoming T-53 engines is at the maximum rate achievable. The plant is on three shifts, six days a week, with a small force working the seventh day on bottlenecks or limiting items.~~

In order to assure an adequate supply of spare engines, and to avoid limiting augmented production of helicopters in the future, a \$25-million expansion is planned for T-53 production with a new facility to be located at Charleston, South Carolina. The Secretary of Defense on 1 March authorized the initiation of procurement of long lead time items to support expanded production from Charleston, which is expected to increase deliveries from the present level of about 200 a month to 300 a month as soon as possible.

In any event, the increased production of helicopters outlined in my 3 March memorandum to you represents the ~~maximum acceleration which can be achieved due to lead times in obtaining facilities and components other than engines.~~

Paul H. Nitze

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-256
By cb, NARA Date 2-24-97

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1544
Sec Def Cont Nr. I-_____

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INFORMATION

Friday - March 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Panama Situation

Pres file

This is where the Panama situation stands this morning:

1. President Robles yesterday refused to appear before the National Assembly Commission considering impeachment charges against him. Instead he went on television to denounce the proceedings. His action makes any compromise with Opposition Candidate Arias that much harder.
2. Arias is moving ahead on impeachment with great caution. He has not been able to marshal the popular support he anticipated. He has not gained the backing of the National Guard. So he is hesitant to push through on impeachment he cannot enforce.
3. National Guard Commander Vallarino maintains his neutral position and is keeping the two factions apart.
4. Archbishop Clavel is organizing a non-partisan "third force" of business and civic leaders to try to bring the two sides together -- or to take over the government if no compromise is reached and the National Guard decides to dissolve the National Assembly and depose Robles as the only way out of the impasse.
5. Colombia, at our suggestion, has agreed to approach Archbishop Clavel with the idea of getting Robles and Arias to ask for outside electoral observers. If this idea can be combined with mediation by the "third force" group, we may have a formula which will be face-saving for both sides and help in getting reasonably honest elections in May.

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
 NLJ 96-252
 By cb, NARA Date 11-1-97

W. W. Rostow

Mr. Rostow

75

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

ACTION

NLJ 96-252
By cb, NARA Date 11-1-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, March 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Greek Prime Minister

[Handwritten signature]
2. Pres file

A few days ago, the Greek Ambassador delivered the attached message to you from Papadopoulos. It's encouragement on Vietnam; we assume he just wants to keep a line open to you. State recommends the attached reply.

The Ambassador urged us to ease back into a normal relationship and not let the temporary military takeover obscure our basic friendship and anti-Communist alliance. The regime is on the right course and needs our support.

The main issue now is whether we turn on the military aid spigot a little more. Nick Katzenbach has given Luke Battle a go-ahead to begin sounding out the Congress cautiously, but it will be a while before we're ready for decision.

We are expecting a noisy few days on this and other Greek issues because Andreas Papandreu will be here speaking to the ADA dinner tomorrow night, on TV Sunday and with various Congressional and private groups next week. Andreas has organized a "front" of exiles to push out the military government, and he will undoubtedly turn the heat on us for support. Luke Battle will see him Saturday, but we will see how hard he presses before arranging other appointments.

The issue Andreas poses is whether we try to restore Greek constitutional government by backing him or by working to speed the junta in that direction. Andreas and his followers claim they alone can bring liberal government to Greece. The junta claims Andreas is the Communists' frontrunner.

The issue would be serious if Andreas had any prospect of upsetting the regime. But entirely apart from whether we trust him or not, we have no evidence that he can even unite the Greek exiles, let alone oust a firmly entrenched government. We think our only practical choice is to work with the regime as it moves toward a new constitution over the next few months. The attached letter is simply a harmless way of keeping our entree.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓ 3/11/68
Disapprove _____
Call me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ROYAL GREEK EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

95a

February 27, 1968

Mr. President,

The Greek nation breathlessly follows the present dramatic phase in the fierce struggle which American forces, vanguards of freedom, are conducting in Vietnam.

Past experience makes Greeks particularly sensitive in appreciating the meaning of the sacrifice sustained by the noble youth of America in fighting to deter wanton communist aggression as well as its impact to the free world.

Both the people and the Government of Greece, full of admiration for the moral perseverance with which the United States of America fulfill their great mission, wish a speedy and complete victory of American arms, for the sake of liberty and peace throughout the world.

Accept, Mr. President, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

George Papadopoulos
(Prime Minister)

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 95-219 (p. 74)
By jc/wsp NARA. Date 12-18-09

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your kind letter of February 27 concerning the importance of our efforts to support the government and people of South Viet-Nam in their struggle to defend themselves from Communist aggression.

The military efforts by the United States, the South Vietnamese and the Free World allies are designed to achieve a just and durable peace. We also seek to help the South Vietnamese people develop their nation.

It was indeed gratifying to receive your expression of support for our efforts in the cause of freedom.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
George Papadopoulos
Prime Minister of Greece
Athens

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-252
By cb, NARA Date 11-1-97

Friday, March 8, 1968

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Mr. President:

This has been a hard day in the gold and foreign exchange markets.

- The gold pool suffered its third biggest loss, \$179 million.
- The British lost \$172 million supporting sterling.
- The Canadians used \$26 million to bring the Canadian dollar up a few points; they had hoped it would rise without official support, following announcement of Canada's exemption from our balance of payments program.

Speculation is usually at its peak on Fridays, on the belief that action on exchange rates or the price of gold is most likely to occur on a weekend when markets are closed.

Bill Martin is meeting with the central bankers in Geneva over the weekend. Deming is coming back Saturday evening from talks with monetary officials.

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
 NLJ 96-252
 By cb, NARA Date 11-1-97

W. W. Rostow

ERF
 ERF:MWG:mst

~~SECRET~~

Friday, March 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres

SUBJECT: Presidential Determination on Shift of AID Funds

AID does not have enough money in its administrative account to meet additional costs of administering the program in Viet-Nam. The Foreign Assistance Act authorizes transfer of funds up to \$9 million to the Administrative Expenses account from Supporting Assistance funds. Presidential determination is required.

The authority for this has existed since 1966 and has been used each year.

Bill Gaud asks your authorization to transfer \$8 million for this purpose. If further review indicates less is needed, only the lower amount will be transferred.

The Bureau of the Budget (Charles Zwick) concurs.

I recommend you sign the attached determination.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Presidential Determination
No. 68-5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATOR
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: Determination under Section 610 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, (the "Act"), to transfer up to \$8.0 million of Supporting Assistance funds to Administrative Expense funds.

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of February 20 I hereby determine, pursuant to Section 610 of the Act, that it is necessary for purposes of the Act that up to \$8.0 million appropriated under Section 402 of the Act be transferred to, and consolidated with, appropriations made under Section 637(a) of the Act, subject to the limitation that funds so transferred shall be available solely for administrative expenses incurred in connection with programs in Vietnam. I hereby authorize such transfer and consolidation.

You are requested on my behalf to give prompt notice of this determination, pursuant to Section 634(d) of the Act, to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

1 _____

Friday, March 8, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Arguments Used Against Administration in Senate Debate,
Thursday, March 7

Senator Fulbright

(1) Constitutional issue -- Executive has no right to extend the war without debate or consideration by Congress.

(2) Tonkin Gulf Resolution -- Like any contract based on misrepresentation, in my opinion, is null and void.

(a) The Maddox and Turner Joy were engaged in intelligence activities.

(b) Lack of adequate proof that the alleged attack (August 4) in fact took place.

(3) Questions quoted from Washington Post Editorial:

(a) What will we do with the initiative/^{if} we gain it?

(b) What is to stop the enemy from trying to gain it back?

(c) Isn't there a limit to additional forces where the risk of wider war outweighs any conceivable gain in security or stability in South Viet-Nam?

(4) The Senate should insist on being informed about any widening commitment and have a chance to debate any such commitments.

(5) The circumstances of the presentation of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution prevented any meaningful debate.

(6) The Tonkin Gulf Resolution was obtained under "false pretenses on mistaken facts."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 3-31-92

CONFIDENTIAL

Senator Case

(1) Unexplained differences in reports on Viet-Nam by "disinterested observers" and media reporters on the one hand and the "official optimism reports" from the Administration.

(2) Is the war winnable without the destruction of South Viet-Nam and of much of America's might?

(3) The Administration must justify any conclusion that additional commitments will not be self-defeating and cause greater disaster.

Senator Miller

(1) In 1966, "of the thousands of sorties flown over North Viet-Nam, less than 1% were directed at key Chief of Staff targets."

(2) The Administration must tell the Senate and the people why "we must be enduring a prolonged war policy."

Senator Hatfield

(1) Need for clarification of war declaration and war making powers under the Constitution.

(2) Congress must be a partner in war making.

The Senator referred to his resolution (Senate Concurrent Resolution 63) which he introduced several days ago. Text of the resolution is attached.

Senator Church

(1) Asia is "an endless morass" and the day of Western control of Asian affairs has passed.

(2) We stand ready to "plunge still deeper in Asia" where huge populations wait to engulf us, and legions of young Americans are being beckoned to their graves."

(3) We shall soon run out of men and money.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Senator Robert Kennedy

- (1) No light at the end of the tunnel.
- (2) Sending more troops or increasing the bombing is not the answer in Viet-Nam.
- (3) "Are we like the God of the Old Testament, that we can decide in Washington, D. C, what cities, what towns, what hamlets in Viet-Nam are going to be destroyed? "
- (4) Do we have the authority to kill tens and tens of thousands of people because we say we have a commitment to the South Vietnamese people?
- (5) Have the Vietnamese people been consulted on the future?
- (6) Couldn't the Germans or Russians justified their aggression with the same argument -- that they needed territory for their own protection?
- (7) What can more troops accomplish that isn't being accomplished by those that are already there?
- (8) What are the people of Viet-Nam willing to do for themselves?
- (9) Are we going to say -- as we are now saying -- that South Viet-Nam doesn't have to draft its own 18 and 19-year-olds?
- (10) Should we just stand by and watch when the Vietnamese Army loses?
- (11) South Vietnamese youth are buying deferments from draft boards.
- (12) Stealing in Beaumont, Texas, isn't causing the death of American boys.
- (13) Corruption -- do we have to accept it?
- (14) Is our commitment to Thieu or Ky or to whom?
- (15) "What we have been doing is not the answer -- it is immoral and intolerable to continue it. "

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Senator Fulbright

- (1) Viet-Nam doesn't threaten the security of the United States.

Senator Harke

- (1) War is causing stock prices to fall and hurting business.
- (2) The economic system of the United States is in danger of collapsing because of the Viet-Nam war.
- (3) Are we fighting communism in Viet-Nam? If so, why don't we fight it in Cuba? Why not liberate "the people of Communist China?"

Senator Fulbright

- (1) Additional troops will mean supplemental requests of 10-15 billion dollars -- all added upon a deficit.

Senator Mansfield

- (1) We are not in the wrong place, fighting the wrong kind of war.
- (2) The domino theory is a cliché.
- (3) We should try harder for peace on the Diplomatic front.
- (4) The Tet offensive was a confirmation of stalemate.

W. W. Rostow

78a

90TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. CON. RES. 63

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 28, 1968

Mr. HATFIELD submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas extension by the United States of the Vietnam ground war beyond the limits of South Vietnam could constitute a widening of the conflict beyond the intended authorization of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution: Therefore, be it:

- 1 *Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives*
- 2 *concurring)* That it is hereby declared to be the sense of the
- 3 Congress that if the President determines that it is vital to
- 4 the interests of the United States to extend the Vietnam
- 5 ground war beyond the limits of South Vietnam, the Presi-
- 6 dent should first obtain full participation in this decision by
- 7 the United States Senate and House of Representatives.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, March 8, 1968

Pres file

79

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith possible notes for your talk with student editors at 1:30 p. m.

1. Vietnam

Begin by making case against our Vietnam policy:

- We have been fighting on large scale since mid-1965 -- 2-1/2 years: a half-million Americans are engaged: the end is not in sight.
- There is great civilian suffering in Vietnam.
- The war is expensive in resources and divisive at home.
- Many citizens of countries traditionally friendly to us disagree with our policy.
- We have great domestic problems that need more resources and more attention.

What is the answer to these searching arguments?

1. This nation decided that the freedom and independence of Southeast Asia was a national interest of the United States. Every bit of current evidence indicates that the Asian Communists seek control of the whole area right now: not only Vietnam, but Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Burma. In all these countries there are substantial Communist military operations going forward designed to overthrow the governments. There is no one in Asia who does not understand that what is at stake in Vietnam is the future freedom and independence of the Asian countries.

2. On the basis of our commitment and that of the other allies, this Free Asia is going forward with great vitality and beginning for the first time in history to cooperate. In short, we must keep clearly in mind that the outcome of the struggle in Vietnam will determine substantially the future of the part of the world where two-thirds of humanity lives.

3. If the United States were to fail or pull out of Vietnam, where could our word be trusted? Here is what Edward Heath, leader of the opposition party in the House of Commons, said the other day, and we know this is also the basis for the policy of the British Government:

"If the South Vietnam administration were to collapse entirely and the United States were unable to form an administration there, if the United States will were to break, the impact on South Vietnam or even further slaughter would be obvious," he declared. "But the impact on Southeast Asia would be just as wide as anybody in this House has ever described. . . ."

"The impact inside the United States would, of course, be a period of bitter recrimination, with savage presidential elections added to racial problems, alas, which would undermine morale and would then affect the United States in Europe. This is where the question comes back to our doorstep in this country. . . .

"The Soviet Union would once again exert pressure on the pressure points. Those two main points would be the Middle East and Berlin. "

4. Staring at this difficult problem -- with every desire and interest in keeping American forces at home and our resources channeled to domestic purposes -- President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and I all decided that it is a major national interest of this country that this area remain free.

5. Most of you were born about 20 years ago, just about the time when President Truman made the decision -- backed by the Congress -- that we would have to help nations keep their independence against the thrusts and pressures being mounted against them by Communism. Those days of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan must seem a very long time ago. I am sure it is right that you should question the policies developed by the older generation, that you should make a fresh assessment in your time. In making that assessment, however, you must look back to our whole experience in this century:

-- How we tried for three years in the First World War to believe that it was not our affair; but then understood that our nation would be endangered if the Kaiser won and the Atlantic were in his hands, so we fought in a great war;

-- How we tried isolationism again all the way down to the fall of France and the Battle of Britain; then there was Lend Lease; but it was only Pearl Harbor that made it clear to us that we could not separate our security -- our fate -- from that of the peoples of Europe and Asia;

-- Just before most of you were born, we had an election in November 1946 in which the central themes were: bring the boys home, and get rid of meat rationing. Again, there was an isolationist fever; but before Europe and Asia collapsed, President Truman -- with full Congressional support -- set about stopping aggression before it had gone so far that there would be a Third World War.

6. This is the point I want most to make to you: We are not engaged in Vietnam, or elsewhere in the world, to build an empire or to throw our weight around. We are there because we have learned in this whole century that if aggression succeeds, it leads to a bigger war.

7. I do not believe that if the things Mr. Heath predicted began to happen, after we had pulled out of Vietnam, that this country would sit idly by. We would come plunging back as we saw the consequences for Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. But in a world of nuclear weapons, we cannot afford to come in late when aggressors are fully committed.

Now a final word before your questions.

8. The burden of frustrating aggression in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere has been heavy. But we have not carried it alone. We helped the Greeks at the end of the 1940's; but they carried the main burden of struggling for their independence. We took many casualties in Korea; but it was the South Koreans who took the heaviest burden. In Vietnam they have 700,000 men under arms, which would be the equivalent in the U. S. of about 9 million. It is they primarily who are struggling for their independence.

In NATO there are 14 of us. In Vietnam there are 7 of us. Similarly, when there has been trouble in this hemisphere, we have operated either bilaterally with countries who have defended themselves against Communist intrusion, or collectively through the OAS.

And so it is in the constructive works of these years: in trade, in monetary affairs; in assistance to developing nations.

When there is a Berlin crisis, it is true Asians may not be terribly concerned; when there is an Asian crisis, Europeans may not be terribly concerned. When there is a crisis in the Caribbean or guerrillas in the Andes to be dealt with, Europeans and Asians may not be greatly concerned.

But my main point is simply this: We have been building a world of partnerships in both defense and the works of peace and progress. Despite all the dangers and turbulence of this nuclear and post-colonial period, we have avoided a major war thus far and helped build many islands of stability and progress: in Western Europe; in Latin America; in Asia; and some even in young, turbulent Africa.

At this time of history we certainly cannot do the job alone -- and we should not try to do the job alone. But never forget that at this time in history our country is a critical part of the equation. If we falter or waver or withdraw, the constructive enterprises we have built for 20 years could come down around us and this nation could be in mortal peril.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET/SENSITIVE/LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Friday, March 8, 1968

10:15 a. m. 80

MR. PRESIDENT:

With respect to your telephoned instructions:

1. Bill Jordan is summarizing the Vietnam arguments in the Congressional Record.

2. I recommend that you meet with Secretaries Rusk and Clifford on the issues you raised, with this agenda:

A. Additional troops: the 20,000, and can they be kept within 525,000 ceiling?

B. Reserve call-up.

C. Mission to Saigon:

-- Clifford?

-- Vance?

-- Clifford, Vance, Taylor?

D. Terms of reference of mission to Saigon:

-- What can the South Vietnamese be induced to do?

-- What are the prospects in the battle for the next two months?

-- What about troops beyond the 20,000?

E. A Congressional Resolution: Repeal Tonkin Gulf?

3. For what it is worth, here are my thoughts:

-- The critical decision cannot await a second trip to Saigon; that is, the 20,000 plus the reserve call-up. I am not sure it has to be the full 400,000 plus build-up; although that is what the country needs. A second trip to Saigon, before a decision is made on the Wheeler trip, would be taken as a sign of great weakness in the midst of a critical battle.

-- The best man to make the trip would be Clark, because it's his job. And confidence that he understands the situation on the spot is important for him to do his job. Otherwise, Cy Vance -- or, perhaps, both.

-- The country badly needs a Presidential decision -- even if only an interim decision -- and a Presidential speech.

-- Discussion of -- or at least decision on -- new strategies

should await the outcome of the next two months of critical battle.

Set up meeting _____ No _____ Call me _____

WWR:mz

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-458
By Cr, NARA, Date 4-10-95

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INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Friday, March 8, 1968 -- 9:05 a. m.

Mr. President:

At Khe Sanh:

- a second consecutive good weather day;
- 3204 rounds friendly artillery; 95 enemy;
- 321 sorties; 42 B-52's;
- 221 tons delivered;
- 5 U. S. wounded.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
Authority OSI ltr 10-18-78
By ep/ry, NARA, Date 3-3-92

~~SECRET~~

81a

Friday, March 8, 1968, 8:45 AM

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number thirty-three on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area for the 24-hour period of March 7, 1968.

Excellent flying conditions continued at Khe Sanh for the second consecutive day, with seven mile visibility. High ceilings and broken clouds favored fixed and rotary wing aircraft support. Fire support elements, suppressing enemy firing positions and firing on targets of opportunity, expended a total of 3204 rounds of mixed artillery and mortar with excellent target coverage reported. Enemy anti-air incidents continued yesterday with eight aircraft fired on and two receiving hits.

Enemy activity was comparatively light at Khe Sanh. Enemy incoming artillery, rocket and mortar rounds comprised most of the enemy activity. A total of 95 rounds of mixed incoming fell during the 24-hour period, causing injuries to five Marines, four of whom required evacuation. As a result of a rocket round impacting on the airstrip, the runway was temporarily closed to fixed wing aircraft. Repairs were completed by 9:00 AM. At 1:45 PM, an air observer spotted several North Vietnamese Army in bunkers and trenches 17 kilometers north of Khe Sanh. A controlled air strike succeeded in killing five North Vietnamese Army.

Elsewhere within northern Quang Tri Province enemy incoming slackened somewhat, but ground activity increased. A total of 10 rounds of mortar fell near Camp Carroll during the period, causing injuries to five. At 11:00 AM yesterday, the Marines in Napoleon/Saline received 12 rounds of artillery, resulting in two killed and six wounded and evacuated. At 8:30 AM this morning, the Dong Ha combat base received 80 rounds of mixed rocket and artillery resulting in 13 killed and 26 wounded.

Significant ground contacts were recorded yesterday in northern I Corps as the Marines, working in conjunction with ARVN elements, made

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD Sec 1/3/79

By ep/12, NARA, Date 3-3-92

contact with an estimated three company size enemy force, 4 1/2 kilometers north of Dong Ha. Contact continued until 7:00 PM with artillery and air strikes being employed. Initial casualty amounted to 115 killed. Initial casualty figures are two killed and 76 wounded.

In a similar all day contact, the Marines engaged an unknown size enemy force on the south bank of the Cua Viet river. Preliminary friendly casualties are 13 killed and 48 wounded. Enemy casualties are unknown. Fifteen North Vietnamese Army bodies were discovered in what appears to have been an enemy first aid shelter just north of the Cua Viet river.

At 10:10 AM yesterday, the Marines fired 23 rounds of mortar on a known enemy firing position 1500 meters north of Con Thien, and observed three secondary explosions. An air observer spotted an enemy active mortar position with North Vietnamese Army occupying trenches and bunkers, 1 1/2 kilometers northeast of Con Thien. A controlled air strike on the position resulted in 13 North Vietnamese Army killed. The mortar position was destroyed along with 200 meters of trench line. Another air observer controlled air strike four kilometers north of Camp Carroll destroyed two mortars and killed three North Vietnamese Army. At 3:10 PM, an air observer adjusted a fire mission on enemy mortar positions, at approximately the same location, resulting in the complete destruction of the mortar positions and the killing of four North Vietnamese Army.

One COFRAM mission was fired expending ten rounds with undetermined results.

Marine aircraft flew 134 sorties in support of Khe Sanh, the Air Force flew 117, and the Navy 70 for a total of 321 sorties. Bomb damage included four gun positions destroyed, 13 secondary explosions, 28 secondary fires, 35 bunkers destroyed, 21 structures destroyed, one mortar position destroyed, six road cuts, and one armored vehicle damaged. Seven ARC LIGHT strikes comprising 42 sorties were flown. Two of the strikes were against close-in targets. From the previous period additional bomb damage includes 14 secondary explosions, 100 foxholes destroyed, and several trench lines destroyed.

During the period 221.5 short tons of supplies and 21 passengers were flown into Khe Sanh. Fifty-three resupply sorties were flown on March 7. C-130's flew 11 air drops, 42 helicopters air-landed.

For the next 24 hours 268 tactical air sorties are scheduled to support Khe Sanh. Three ARC LIGHT strikes, 18 sorties, are scheduled. The remainder of the force will hit targets in Thua Thien against suspected enemy concentrations. However, the scheduled Thua Thien strikes can be diverted to the Khe Sanh area on two hours notice.

The weather forecast for Khe Sanh is for continued good visibility from late morning on March 8 with skies clear to scattered.

~~SECRET~~



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

816

8 March 1968
0700 EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST
7 Mar (9:00 AM 8 Mar, SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)
status as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>DAYS SUPPLY ON HAND</u>	<u>PREVIOUS STATUS 8:00 PM 6 Mar EST (9:00 AM 7 Mar SVN)</u>
<u>CLASS I (Rations)</u>		
Meal, Combat, Individual	18	19 days
B Rations	8	9 days
<u>CLASS III (Fuel)</u>		
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	3	3 days
JP-4 Fuel (Jet Fuel)	8	8 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	9.3	9.9 days
Diesel	7	8 days
<u>CLASS V (Ammunition)</u>		
a. High explosive		
60-mm mortar	43	43 days
81-mm mortar	22	22 days
90-mm (Tank)	108	102 days
4.2" mortar	43	45 days
105-mm howitzer	22	22 days
155-mm howitzer	16	16 days
b. Anti-Tank		
		<u>ROUNDS ON HAND</u>
90-mm HEAT		1,202
66-mm Rocket (LAW)		3,400
Anti-tank mines (M-15)		168
Anti-tank mines (M-19)		668
Anti-tank mines (M-21)		0
106-mm HEAT		154
106-mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T)		1,724
3.5" rocket		1,682
90-mm AP-T		329

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By ry, NARA, Date 3-3-92

SECRET

DAYS SUPPLY PREVIOUS STATUS
ON HAND 8:00 PM 6 Mar EST
 (9:00 AM 7 Mar SVN)

c. Anti-Personnel

ROUNDS ON HAND

106-mm BEEHIVE


1,027

CLASS V (COFRAM)

105-mm howitzer	5	5 days
155-mm howitzer	5	5 days
40-mm grenade launcher	5	5 days
Hand grenades	10	10 days

2. On 7 March, Kho Sanh was resupplied with 221.5 tons as follows:

CLASS I	48 tons
CLASS II	6.5 tons
CLASS III	0 tons
CLASS IV	5.5 tons
CLASS V	159.5 tons
Miscellaneous	2 tons


S. D. CRAMER, JR.
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:

SECDEF
DEPSECDEF
CJCS (3)
DJS (3)
J-30
J-31
J-32
J-33
J-4
AWR
MCCC
AFCP
NFP
DDO
ADDO
CCOC
PAC DIV
PAC DESK

SECRET

Thursday, March 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Lord Avon (Anthony Eden) noon
Friday, March 8

Avon will be in Washington only for the day, arriving from his winter home in Barbados. He will be Secretary Rusk's guest for lunch. He is scheduled to speak at Cornell University next week.

Avon made the following points in an article published in the January 6 New York Times entitled "Diplomatic Way Out of Vietnam":

- Today's goal should be the reconvening of the Geneva Conference and a negotiated settlement;
- The Russians could play a key role but are not showing interest in doing so;
- Southeast Asians, broadly speaking, welcome U. S. support and are suspicious of China;
- Those who state the fighting will end without a negotiated settlement are only prolonging the war;
- There is no prospect for complete victory for either side.

Avon would be particularly interested in your views on Vietnam.

You may wish to ask him about:

- Britain's future world role in light of the recent defense cutbacks;
- The UK and the EEC;
- The capacity of the Wilson Government to defend sterling.

A brief biographic sketch is attached.

W. W. Rostow

82a

**The Earl of Avon
(Sir Anthony Eden)**

Lord Avon was born in June 1897 and educated at Eton and Oxford. He served in the British Army during World War I and was decorated with the Military Cross. He entered Parliament at the age of twenty-six.

Avon rose rapidly through the Parliamentary ranks and in 1931 was appointed Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He became Foreign Secretary in December 1935.

Avon was instrumental in having the League of Nations undertake limited sanctions against Italy during the Ethiopian War. He resigned from office in February 1938 because he disagreed with Prime Minister Chamberlain's appeasement policies.

Avon rejoined his World War I regiment six months before the outbreak of World War II. In September 1939 he accepted Chamberlain's request to rejoin the Government as Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

He was appointed Secretary of State for War by Churchill in May 1940 and Foreign Secretary in December. He remained Foreign Secretary until July 1945 when the Churchill Government was defeated.

He was reappointed to the post of Foreign Secretary with Churchill's return to power in 1951 and became Prime Minister in April 1955 after Churchill's resignation.

In the summer of 1954 Avon acted as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference on Indochina.

He resigned as Prime Minister in January 1957 because of a recurrence of illness caused in part by the strain of the 1956 Suez crisis. Shortly afterwards he retired from the House of Commons. He was made an Earl in 1961.

Lord Avon is an Honorary Doctor of a number of universities and President of the Royal Shakespeare Theatre. In 1954 he received the Carnegie Foundation's Peace Prize.

Lord Avon has been married twice. He has two sons, one of whom was killed in Burma in 1945. His present wife, Miss Clarissa Spencer Churchill, is a niece of Sir Winston Churchill. He has written several books including a three-volume set of memoirs.

Approved For Release 2001/08/24 : NLJ-019-030-3-4-4

INFORMATION

83

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, March 7, 1968
6:15 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

25X6

Herewith Dick Helms files with
you the [REDACTED] assessment of
dangers in the Middle East.

It has not yet been evaluated by
our people.

Key passages marked.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ 019-030-3-4
By [Signature], NARA, Date 1/15/02

84

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL--SENSITIVE~~

Pres file

Thursday, March 7, 1968 -- 6:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk is extremely anxious to get a feel for last evening's leadership meeting with you, before he faces Fulbright and the others on Monday.

His concern is heightened by Fulbright's performance of today.

In particular, he wishes to make sure that what he says and what you said match and no wedges are driven between you.

You may wish to chat privately with Sec. Rusk about his Monday hearing.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Gold Files, Feb. 24, 1983
By *Ng*, NARA, Date 3-31-92

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL--SENSITIVE~~

Pres file
85

Thursday, March 7, 1968
6:10 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. PRESIDENT:

Clark Clifford called to report the following: Senator Fulbright, through the Clerk of the Foreign Relations Committee, has invited the Secretary of Defense to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Monday, March 18.

Subject: the Military Assistance Program.

Clark sees two options:

-- Go up himself, taking Paul Warnke and Gen. Wheeler with him. He would make a general statement. Warnke and Wheeler would be available to respond to detailed questions.

-- Ask Paul Nitze to do it. That would probably be acceptable to the Committee.

It is Clark's strong recommendation that he not duck the matter but take on the assignment.

However, he requests your decision.

W. W. Rostow

Clifford should accept _____

Nitze should do it _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House, Guidelines, E.O. 24, 1983
By Ag, NARA, Date 3/27/92

DECLASSIFIED

ACTION

86

Authority OSD 10-6-78; NSC 8-14-80

By JK/ly, NARA, Date 3-3-92

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Thursday, March 7, 1968
3:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Clark Clifford and Bus Wheeler are against your sending a message to Gen. Westmoreland at this time along the lines of the draft which I forwarded to them.

There are two major reasons:

-- Clark believes very strongly that we should not now take an optimistic view of the war, but let the facts speak for themselves and hope that in 4 or 5 months things will obviously be better.

-- He also believes we should not influence Westy in what tactical course of action he should pursue: perhaps pushing the enemy all out is right; perhaps not. He does not believe the President should get into this.

Quite aside from the message -- and addressed more specifically to the report of the backgrounder in Vietnam yesterday -- Clark would like to speak with you about our general public stance towards the war, in Presidential and other public statements. He would like to urge great caution about optimism.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Hold message _____
Arrange appointment for Clifford _____

INFORMATION

87

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Thursday, March 7, 1968
3:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk wishes you to read this account
of a conversation between Debrynin and Pat Dean.

What is unclear is what the Russians would
do if we stopped bombing around Hanoi-Haiphong.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority TLC 86-144
By rg/lsp, NARA, Date 3-4-92

WWRostow:rla

87a

~~SECRET~~

March 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR HARRIMAN

FROM: Chester L. Cooper *CLC*

SUBJECT: Conversation with Pat Dean

I stopped at the British Embassy for a drink with Ambassador Dean on Tuesday evening, March 5. We discussed, in general terms, the Soviet position with respect to the war, and Dean told me of an interesting remark that Dobrynin made a few days ago when he and Dean had lunch. In discussing Vietnam, Dobrynin said that he could understand why the Americans were concerned about the security of their troops in the South and mentioned Khe Sahn and, I believe, the DMZ area in general. Dobrynin said that our concentration on bombing the North and, in particular, the area around Hanoi, seemed to him to be counterproductive. Pat got the impression that Dobrynin was hinting that the Soviets could take a fair amount of bombing in the area of the DMZ, and even a step-up of our activities in the South, if this could be accompanied by a stand-down in the bombing of the northern part of Vietnam.

I send this to you for whatever it may be worth. You will recall that the Russians have hinted at this occasionally in the past. In any case, it may be worthwhile for you to see Dobrynin some time soon.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 96-252
By CB, NARA Date 11-1-97

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

88

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Thursday, March 7, 1968
3:40 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Paul Nitze and Nick Katzenbach come up with a series of specific recommendations, in the wake of Cy Vance's report.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *sg*, NARA, Date 3-2-92

88a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 7, 1968

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Paul Nitze and I are impressed with the continuing dangers of the Korean situation. With the improvement of weather at the onset of spring, the North Koreans may well launch further infiltration forays with serious material and psychological consequences. Furthermore, any likely settlement formula at Panmunjom would probably be resented by the sensitive ROKs. We therefore believe that we should push ahead with the implementation of the Vance Recommendations, improving our own posture in respect to Korea and endeavoring to build upon the degree of trust and confidence re-established by his Mission. His recommendations fall into four broad categories which I believe can be approached as follows:

1. U.S. Posture

A. Reassessment of our policies and goals toward Korea -

With the assistance of a small inter-agency group I am taking a very close look at where we are and where we should go in respect to both Koreas. I intend to submit a report on this matter by 1 May.

B. Protecting our nuclear weapon sites -

Recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning personnel requirements for improving the security of our nuclear weapons sites are currently under review in the DOD. Study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is continuing to determine whether additional physical security measures should be taken. This study will be completed by 1 April 1968.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 79-9
By is, NARA Date 1-10-00

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

C. Improving the Korean DMZ Barrier -

Additional counterinfiltration items are being delivered to Korea with airlift of most critical items authorized. Many critical items are already in Korea. An operations analysis study in support of DMZ security and counterinfiltration efforts is in progress. Included in the FY 1968 supplement of \$100 million is an additional sum, yet unspecified, for counterinfiltration items.

D. Reconnaissance Activities in Korea -

General Bonesteel has been authorized to keep Ambassador Porter fully informed of all reconnaissance activities scheduled for the vicinity of Korea.

E. Communications -

To improve our secure communications between Washington and Seoul, on Saturday, 20 February, a secure teleconferencing system was established connecting the Departments of State and Defense with the American Embassy and General Bonesteel's headquarters. Also, on 20 February, the Department of Defense dispatched by air the necessary equipments and technical engineering personnel to establish a secure voice system to connect several key State and Defense facilities in Seoul, and these, in turn, with Washington.

2. Influencing South Korea

A. Defense Ministerial Meetings -

We wish to arrange promptly a meeting between the ROK Ministry of National Defense and our Department of Defense, preferably in April in Hawaii. Paul Nitze plans to head our delegation and CINCPAC would be directly involved. This would be portrayed as a direct follow-up on the Vance Mission and would be designed to pull the ROKs closer to us and to keep the ROKG calmed down. Their desire to retaliate will inevitably increase if the North Koreans step up their raids as the weather improves.

B. Visit of Korean Prime Minister -

In accordance with Vance's recommendations, and if you approve, I wish to authorize Ambassador Porter to invite Prime Minister Chung to visit the United States this spring. Approve _____ Disapprove _____

C. Under Secretary Baird's Visit -

Under Secretary of the Navy Baird plans to visit a number of East Asian countries in April. We will include Seoul on his schedule as an additional political input.

D. American Investment -

The North Korean's have already accomplished part of their objective of diverting the ROKs from their economic effort and frightening-off foreign investment. In continuation of Vance's efforts, we are attempting to keep the ROKs focussed on economic development and endeavoring to buttress up American investment intentions. I will be in touch with George Ball on this subject.

E. Protection for President Park -

The Air Force's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) has trained and equipped the personal Presidential guards of the Heads of State of the Philippines, Bolivia, Thailand, and the Republic of Vietnam. In view of President Park's intense fear over his own safety, and that of his family, we asked Ambassador Porter to offer OSI training to President Park's personal protective force. President Park was highly appreciative of the offer and arrangements are now being made to initiate the OSI training and equippage program within the next three weeks.

3. Influencing North Korea

The Pyongyang Government is difficult to influence under any circumstances but the problem is compounded while they hold the Pueblo crew as hostages. Yet, as Vance recommended, we must endeavor to bring political pressure to bear on them. We have already approached the Russians about the dangers of the current Pyongyang course

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

-4-

and our difficulties in restraining the South Koreans in face of continuing provocation. We have urged them to use what influence they have to persuade the North Koreans to agree to a reasonable settlement of the Pueblo issue and to ease tensions in the area. We have made somewhat similar approaches to the Japanese and British and will endeavor to expand our bilateral approaches to other countries. If we can obtain the release of the crew, we would be in a better position to peel off our political gloves in an effort to indict Pyongyang as a threat to peace. This might include calling a Security Council Meeting on the subject.

4. Military Assistance

Vance has made a number of military assistance recommendations including increased MAP levels in the next few years. These are under study and we will report in a separate memorandum our recommendations regarding future military assistance programs for Korea.



Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

NOV 23 1 51 PM '67

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

ACTION

Pres file

89

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, March 7, 1968
3:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk recommends you see Sam Berger before he leaves for Saigon next Sunday; and he presents specific reasons for this recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

APPROVED _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

~~SECRET~~

W. W. Rostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rla, NARA, Date 3-2-92

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

886

89a

SECRET

March 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment with Deputy Ambassador
Samuel D. Berger

Recommendation:

That you schedule an appointment with Deputy Ambassador Samuel D. Berger before the latter's departure for Saigon early next Sunday, March 10, 1968.

Discussion:

It would be most helpful if you could schedule an on-the-record appointment with Ambassador Berger before his departure for Saigon next Sunday. Your close personal relationship with Ambassador Locke was one of the strengths he enjoyed during his tenure as Deputy Ambassador and it gave him an important added stature with the Vietnamese, who are quite aware of these things.

In addition, it would, of course, be invaluable to Ambassador Berger to get your own personal views on the situation. He has sat in on virtually all of the discussions both here and at Defense on the manpower questions which have confronted us during the last week so he has acquired a full early exposure to the problems ahead. For obvious reasons it would be helpful if there could be pictures taken during the appointment.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State memo 9/11/95
By g/ly, NARA, Date 6/25/96

90

~~1. [unclear]~~
2. [unclear]

Limited Official Use

Thursday - March 7, 1968 - 12:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Birthday Message to President Diaz Ordaz

President Diaz Ordaz celebrates his 57th birthday next Tuesday, March 12.

You may wish to send him a message along the lines of the attached draft.

W. W. Rostow

Approve 3/8/68

Disapprove

Call me

Attachment

Suggested Presidential birthday greeting to President Diaz Ordaz.

90a

**Suggested Presidential Birthday Greetings to
Mexican President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz**
(on March 12, 1968)

Dear Mr. President:

Lady Bird joins me in wishing you a happy birthday. Our thoughts will be with you and Dona Guadalupe as you celebrate. This greeting also carries our best wishes for continued good health and happiness as you provide wise leadership to the Mexican people.

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency

Gustavo Diaz Ordaz

President of the United Mexican States.

91

Pres file

Thursday - March 7, 1968 - 12:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Letter from Prime Minister Burnham

Attached is the advanced text of a letter from Prime Minister Burnham thanking you for the birthday message you sent him recently.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

91a

**Advanced Text of Letter
to President from Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana
dated February 29, 1968**

"Dear Mr. President:

I wish to thank you most sincerely for the warm greetings you extended to me on the occasion of my 45th birthday and for your congratulations on Guyana's achievements since its independence.

We shall strive to continue on our path of peaceful progress and to keep alive the spirit of freedom and self-help to which you have so generously referred.

With every good wish.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ L. F. S. Burnham"

92

INFORMATION

Thursday, March 7, 1968 -- 11:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

Herewith the updated charts showing the intensity of the battle since Tet.


As you can see, both enemy casualties and weapons losses have remained in a range 3 or 4 times the 1967 average; and the ratio of casualties has been about twice as unfavorable to the enemy as during 1967.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln


South Vietnam: Daily Casualties

US
GVN
Enemy




South Vietnam : Index of Enemy Weapons Losses Since Tet

(Daily Average for 1967 Equals 100)



South Vietnam : Enemy Weapons Losses



NOTE: INDIVIDUAL DAILY TOTALS ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR THE FOUR DAY PERIOD OF JANUARY 29 THROUGH FEBRUARY 2, 1967. A. J. R. L. C. B. D. S. L. A. S. V. A. L. P. I. R. P. A. L.




Daily Average for 1967 was 85

South Vietnam : Index of Casualties since Tet

(Daily Average for 1967 Equals 100)



South Vietnam: Ratio of Enemy Killed to Friendly Killed



Ratio in 1967 was 4.1:1

93

ACTION

Prop file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, March 7, 1968 -- 9:55 a. m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk just called with the following. There will be next week a debate on Vietnam in the Bundestag in Bonn.

Sec. Rusk suggests that we send Cabot Lodge to London, Bonn, and Rome. The purpose would be to brief our friends there on Vietnam, and, especially, to stiffen the backs of our German friends for this debate. In Rome he could talk with D'Orlandi who has been talking, as you know, with the North Vietnamese in Prague and squeeze every drop of what little substance there may be out of the D'Orlandi-North Vietnamese conversations.

W. W. Rostow

Lodge trip approved ✓

Disapproved

Call me

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-252
By cb, NARA Date 11-1-97

WWRostow:rlz

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

94

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, March 7, 1968 -- 9:30 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

At Khe Sanh yesterday:

- good weather;
- 217 tons delivered;
- 2367 rounds fired;
- antiaircraft fire heavier, bringing down the C-123;
- 343 tactical air sorties to good effect;
- 42 B-52 sorties.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
Authority OSD ltr 10-18-78
By ip/ky, NARA, Date 3-3-92

SECRET

94a

Thursday, March 7, 1968, 9:50 AM

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number thirty-two on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area for the 24-hour period of March 6, 1968.

Clear skies at Khe Sanh throughout most of the period provided optimum flying conditions for fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Logistical and supporting arms efforts were improved throughout the area of operation. A total of 217 short tons of supplies and equipment were offloaded during the period. Fire support elements expended a total of 2367 rounds of mixed mortar and artillery.

Enemy anti-air resistance was heavy yesterday as 13 Marine aircraft were fired on with three receiving hits. At 2:00 PM, a C-123 with 47 passengers and crew members aboard, received fire on let-down for Khe Sanh, attempted to leave the area, and crashed eight miles east of Khe Sanh. Search parties report no signs of life at the scene.

Enemy artillery, rocket and mortar rounds totaled 115 throughout the period. Eighteen Marines were wounded. An incoming rocket struck a parked C-123 aircraft. No injuries were caused, the plane sustained limited damage. Two other aircraft were reported down yesterday. A helicopter was downed by hostile fire while hovering over a position in Ashau Valley. Five of the 11 people aboard have been rescued so far. An Air Force F-105 crashed in Laos yesterday. The pilot ejected safely, and was recovered.

Along the demilitarized zone, enemy activity centered on Operation Kentucky. Elements positioned at C-2 and C-3 received five and 39 rounds of artillery respectively. Five Marines were injured at C-2, no materiel damage was reported. Con Thien received 15 artillery rounds and eight rounds of mortar, with no casualties or damage reported. At A-3, elements of the 3rd Marines received nine artillery rounds. Other 3rd Marine elements northwest of Dong Ha received 30 rounds of rocket and 15 mortar rounds with no casualties or damage reported. Dong Ha combat base in late afternoon received 10 rounds of artillery resulting in two wounded.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD ltr 10-18-78
By ip/lrg, NARA, Date 3-3-92

Near Camp Carroll, elements of the 9th Marines received 12 mortar rounds, injuring five Marines.

Ground activity in northern Quang Tri Province was significant. In a sharp contact five kilometers northeast of Con Thien, two companies of the 3rd Marines engaged an unknown size enemy force. Eighty-one North Vietnamese Army were killed. Friendly casualties were 14 killed, 29 wounded. South of the Cua Viet river, a battalion of the 4th Marines in night defensive positions fired on 15 North Vietnamese Army in the open. A search at first light revealed 11 enemy bodies and seven individual weapons. South of the Cua Viet, an artillery mission fired on troops in the open killed four enemy.

Marine aircraft flew 142 tactical air sorties in support of Khe Sanh, the Air Force flew 122, and the Navy 79, for a total of 343 sorties. Bomb damage included 87 secondary explosions, 27 secondary fires, 30 bunkers destroyed, 17 enemy killed, one rocket position damaged, 29 road cuts, three trucks destroyed, and 100 meters of trench destroyed. Seven ARC LIGHT strikes (42 sorties) were flown. Twenty secondary explosions were reported from three of the seven strikes. The B-52 effort was concentrated on targets beyond three kilometers from the Khe Sanh perimeter. Only one strike was flown on a close-in target.

During the period 217 short tons of supplies and 85 passengers were flown into Khe Sanh. Thirty-nine resupply sorties were flown on March 6. Nine C-130's and three C-123's completed air drops, three C-123's landed, and 24 helicopters delivered passengers and cargo.

For the next period, 270 sorties are scheduled to support Khe Sanh. Seven ARC LIGHT strikes (42 sorties) are scheduled.

~~SECRET~~

94b



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

7 March 1968
0700 EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST
6 Mar (9:00 AM 7 Mar, SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)
status as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>DAYS SUPPLY ON HAND</u>	<u>PREVIOUS STATUS 8:00 PM 5 Mar EST (9:00 AM 6 Mar SVN)</u>
<u>CLASS I (Rations)</u>		
Meal, Combat, Individual	19	19 days
B Rations	9	9 days
<u>CLASS III (Fuel)</u>		
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	3	3 days
JP-4 Fuel (Jet Fuel)	8	8 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	9.9	11 days
Diesel	8	8 days
<u>CLASS V (Ammunition)</u>		
a. High explosive		
60-mm mortar	43	42 days
81-mm mortar	22	22 days
90-mm (Tank)	102	93 days
4.2" mortar	45	45 days
105-mm howitzer	22	20 days
155-mm howitzer	16	17 days
b. Anti-Tank		
		<u>ROUNDS ON HAND</u>
90-mm HEAT		1,202
66-mm Rocket (LAW)		3,420
Anti-tank mines (M-15)		168
Anti-tank mines (M-19)		668
Anti-tank mines (M-21)		0
106-mm HEAT		154
106-mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T)		1,466
3.5" rocket		1,607
90-mm AP-T		329

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By 19 NARA, Date 3-3-92

SECRET

DAYS SUPPLY PREVIOUS STATUS
ON HAND 8:00 PM 5 Mar EST
 (9:00 AM 6 Mar SYN)

c. Anti-Personnel

ROUNDS ON HAND

106-mm BEEHIVE


1,031

CLASS V (COFRAM)

105-mm howitzer	5	5 days
155-mm howitzer	5	5 days
40-mm grenade launcher	5	5 days
Hand grenades	10	10 days

2 On 6 March, Khe Sanh was resupplied with 217 tons as follows:

CLASS I	31 tons
CLASS II	5 tons
CLASS III	18 tons
CLASS IV	23.5 tons
CLASS V	138.5 tons
Miscellaneous	1 ton


S. D. CRAMER, JR.
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:

SECDEF
DEPSECDEF
CJCS (3)
DJS (3)
J-30
J-31
J-32
J-33
J-4
AWR
MCCC
AFCP
NFP
DDO
ADDO
CCOC
PAC DIV
PAC DESK

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 7, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Invitation to Romanian Scientific Research Chief

When Don Hornig was in Bucharest in 1966, he informally invited the head of the Romanian Council for Scientific Research to visit this country. Since then a new man has been appointed, and the State Department recommends that Don Hornig renew the invitation.

The new man, Alexander Birladeanu, is a member of the Politburo -- one of the top ten in Romania. He would talk with our people about scientific research policy and ways to stretch limited Romanian scientific research funds. He would also travel around the country.

The only political risk we see is the possibility that Romania's economic and military assistance to North Vietnam would give some newsman or Congressman a handle to attack the visit. Romania does provide petroleum and other products to North Vietnam, and a Romanian-Chartered, Greek/Belgian/Panamanian ship is presently enroute to China, we believe, with oil for North Vietnam. The Warsaw Pact Conference now meeting in Sofia will no doubt issue some statement in support of North Vietnam, and subsequent statements cannot be ruled out. (Birladeanu's visit might be a month or two from now.)

Nevertheless, Romania is taking an increasingly independent line -- as most recently demonstrated by her walkout from Budapest -- and is increasingly friendly to us.

Our Ambassador and the State Department recommend that the invitation be extended. Dr. Hornig thinks it is a good idea, and would be happy to host the visit.

Extend invitation _____

W. W. Rostow

No _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-252
By Cb, NARA Date 11-1-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NDavis:feg

96

Pres file

Thursday - March 7, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

Subject to your approval Covey Oliver proposes to send the attached message to the Alliance of Pan American Round Tables which meets in Managua, Nicaragua next week.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Attachment

96a

**Proposed Message of Good Wishes
to the Alliance of Pan-American Round Tables at Managua, Nicaragua**

**(to be issued by Assistant Secretary of State Oliver
on behalf of the President before March 10, 1968)**

**LA ALIANZA de MESAS REDONDAS
PANAMERICANAS
El Salon de Actos del Instituto
Pedagogico de Managua
Managua, Nicaragua**

President Johnson has asked that I convey to the members of the Alliance of Pan American Round Tables his good wishes on the occasion of its eleventh biennial Convention at Managua, Nicaragua, and his special greetings to the representatives of Nicaragua and to the ambassadors of the other countries of the Americas attending the celebration.

The President is particularly happy to extend his greetings to the delegates of the other countries and to our own delegates from California, New Mexico and Texas.

As we approach the historical date on which we celebrate Pan American Day, April 14, it is indeed appropriate to recall that all the peoples of this hemisphere are bound together not only by geography but by common ideals of political, economic and social justice -- and a common belief in brotherhood. I know that this is the spirit that moves your organization.

**Covey T. Oliver
Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs.**

Pres file

Wednesday, March 6, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached, for your signature, is a proposed letter to the Society for International Development during its 10th anniversary world conference. (They are meeting here today through Saturday.)

The Society is a solid professional group of economists, engineers, educators, and public servants. It takes no position on Vietnam or other contentious issues outside the development field. This meeting will draw about 1,000 participants from 35 countries for general discussion of development problems. President Saragat sent them a message when last year's conference was held in Italy.

I recommend you sign.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:EKH:RM:lw

97a

March 7, 1968

Dear Chief Adebisi:

I am most pleased to send warm greetings to you and your colleagues of the Society for International Development as you gather for your Tenth Anniversary Conference.


Over the past decade the Society has performed a vital role in the worldwide attack on poverty and despair. Development is urgent business for all mankind. It demands of every nation, rich and poor, a generous commitment of wealth and skills. But your Society has helped teach us the precious truth that development is first and foremost a human problem. You have recognized that money and technology alone will accomplish little without the energy, the talent, and the dedication of men and women around the world.

The Society brings these men and women together to share their valuable knowledge and experience. It has proven that the challenge of development knows neither national boundaries nor professional jurisdictions. It has provided a bond of fellowship to enlarge the capacities and refresh the determination of those who lead the world in this great adventure of the Twentieth Century.

The last ten years have shown heartening progress in the struggle for a better life. Yet we all know the path ahead is hard and long. The world will need your leadership even more in the future than it has in the past. You have our admiration and support.

My best wishes for a successful conference.

Sincerely,



LBJ:WWR:EKH:RM:llw

3/6/68

Chief S. O. Adebisi

President,

The Society for International Development

Shorham Hotel

Washington, D. C.

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, March 7, 1968

98

MR. PRESIDENT:

One gap in our staff work with respect to the Wheeler recommendations is an estimate of Soviet, CHICOM, and other Communist reactions.

Bill Bundy, having talked to Sec. Rusk, suggests we let the Office of National Estimates, CIA, make an appraisal of probable Communist reactions.

I suggest we give them a wide range of alternatives to analyze so that the Wheeler proposals would not be pinpointed.

W. W. Rostow

Let Office of National Estimates make the analysis _____

No _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-259
By jis, NARA Date 10-21-97

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 7, 1968

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

As instructed I talked with Mr. Andre Mayer at ^{*New York*} ~~Sun Lake~~ tonight on the two questions that concern you.

1. The Choice with Respect to Canada. As between the Canadian devaluation and making an exemption for Canada with respect to U. S. capital exports, Mayer concludes that an exemption is preferable. But he adds an important proviso; namely, that we provide with the Canadians for tight and efficient regulations against outflows from Canada stemming from U. S. capital exports to Canada. In short, Mayer agrees with Joe Fowler that a Canadian devaluation at this time would be very dangerous to the whole international monetary system; that he wishes to make sure that if we make an exception for Canada, Canada does not become a channel for a general leakage of U. S. capital exports.

I believe that Joe is negotiating with the Canadians the terms of a tight control system which has a fair chance of preventing such leakages out of Canada.

2. I then asked Mr. Mayer to present to me the view that he had presented to the President. He said that we need to regain our freedom of action by applying two principles:

- making it absolutely clear that we will not deviate from a \$35.00 per ounce price for gold;
- frustrating those who would play the gold market in order to damage the dollar and the U. S. position on the world scene.

Specifically, he said that working with the group of Ten, we should shift to ^{*a position*} ~~assist them~~, in which we sold gold only to central banks. We would, in short, cease to supply the London gold market.

The price on the London gold market might rise for the time being; but he believes that this would probably only be temporary.

I then raised with him the critical issue of how we would deal with central banks which had large dollar or sterling reserves and which were not within the group of Ten. In particular Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Thailand are involved here; although the Chinese Communist have also been playing the gold market they could exert a certain pressure.

He said that he agreed this was a critical issue. We should make it clear to them, however, as well as to the central banks among the Ten, that if they wanted to convert their currencies into U. S. gold they would have to enter into agreements which would bind them not to release gold to speculators.

Mayer recognizes -- as do all the government experts -- the critical problem is to keep central banks from being tempted by the existence of a temporarily high price for gold in the private markets.

Mayer concludes that this is a more manageable problem than the problem of letting U. S. gold reserves leak away through endless support of the London gold market at a time when the gold shortage and other conditions in the world make the gold market extremely sensitive to rumor and fear.

I believe that Mayer is right and that we may have to move in this direction in the next few days.

3. I concluded by asking Mayer if he agreed with the following two basic principles which underlay what he had said that I wished to be clear that he, in fact, believed they were correct:

- The first rule for the United States at the moment is to operate on a system that will be agreed on among the Ten so that the President will be operating multilaterally. Mayer said, I fully agree.

-- The second point is that if we are to go the route that he suggests with respect to the London gold market, we must rapidly accelerate the creation of alternative reserves, notably the special drawing rights of the IMF. Mayer said, Yes, of course: that is what I assumed.

4. In the light of this discussion -- I have my own feeling -- I recommend that you discuss with Secretary Fowler, Bill ^{Martin}~~Barton~~, etc., tomorrow, not ^{merely}~~only~~ the Canadian problem, but the problem of how we move on an agreed multilateral basis to prevent our gold supply from leaking away any further and accelerating the creation of a rational international monetary system.

I believe the basic deal we must make with Europe now is a trade-money deal: we hold off on any extra restrictions measures in trade and tourists while they accelerate the Kennedy Round and cooperate in an expansion of tourism to the United States; that they cooperate equally with us in a tight common method for dealing with the gold problem.

W. W. Rostow