

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

| FORM OF DOCUMENT                  | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE   | DATE    | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------------------|---|---------|-------------|
| #4 cable                          | Deptel 133723 to Saigon<br><del>TS</del> 8 p <i>open 5-8-98 NLJ 96-268</i>  | 3/21/68 | A           |
| #7 memo                           | Rostow to President, 3:30 p.m.<br><del>C</del> 1 p <i>open 3-7-97 NLJ 96-269</i>  | 3/23/68 | A           |
| #8a memo                          | "A Turning Point"<br><del>S</del> 4 p <i>open 11/20/97 NLJ 96-267</i>   | 3/23/68 | A           |
| #10 memo                          | Rostow to President, 2:40 p.m. <i>open 12-15-95 NLJ 94-460</i><br><del>S</del> 1 p<br>[Duplicate of #126, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "[3/19/70 Memo to the President, "Decision to Halt the Bombing" with copies of documents, 1967-68; Sanitized NLJ 86-144] <i>Dup of #3, files of Rostow, "Raimondi, BRS)</i> | 3/23/68 | A           |
| #10a cable<br><i>Open 2-25-04</i> | Saigon 22867<br><del>S</del> 5 p<br>[Duplicate of #126a, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "[3/19/70 Memo to the President, "Decision to Halt the Bombing" with copies of documents, 1967-68] <i>(Dup of # 3a, Rostow, Raimondi, BRS)</i>   | 3/23/68 | A           |
| #11 memo                          | Rostow to President, 1:30 p.m.<br><del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 3-7-97 NLJ 96-269</i>  | 3/23/68 | A           |
| #14 memo                          | Rostow to President, 10:35 a.m.<br><del>C</del> 1 p <i>[dupl #195, 196 - UN Agency File, vol 9] open 3-7-97 NLJ 96-269</i>  | 3/23/68 | A           |
| #14a memo                         | Duplicate of #14  | "       | "           |
| #14b cable                        | USUN 4261 <i>open 11/20/97 NLJ 96-267</i><br><del>C</del> 4 p <i>[dupl #195a, UN Agency File, vol 9]</i>  | undated | A           |
| #15a memo                         | Davis to Rostow <i>open 3-7-97 NLJ 96-269</i><br><del>C</del> 1 p<br>[Duplicate of #24a, NSF, Name File, Davis Memos]   | 3/22/68 | A           |
| #23 memo                          | Rostow to President, 12:20 p.m.<br><del>S</del> 1 p <i>open NLJ 96-272 2/98</i><br>[Duplicate of #168, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "[3/19/70 Memo to the President, "Decision to Halt the Bombing" with copies of documents, 1967-68; Sanitized NLJ 86-147]   | 3/22/68 | A           |

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 68, March 19-24, 1968 Box 31

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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| #23a cable             | Intelligence Information Cable<br>S 11 p <i>Sanitized NLJ 96-271 (4/98)</i><br>[Duplicate of #168a, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "[3/19/70 Memo to the President, "Decision to Halt the Bombing" with copies of documents, 1967-68; Sanitized NLJ 86-145]   | 3/19/68            | A            |
| <del>#24 memo</del>    | <del>Rostow to President, 12:00 noon<br/>S 1 p <i>Open 10-25-97 NLJ 96-32</i></del><br><i>24, 24a Duplicates in Files of WWR, Box 16, NON-DIV, MARCH-JUNE 1968, Doc 4, 4a</i>  | <del>3/22/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| #24a memo              | Intelligence Memorandum<br>S 2 p <i>Open NLJ 96-31 8.13.98</i>   | 3/22/68            | A            |
| <del>#25 memo</del>    | <del>Rostow to President, 12:00 noon <i>Sanitized 5-10-00 RAL</i><br/>S 1 p <i>Sanitized NLJ 96-272 (2/98) Open 7/27/01 NLJ 96-272 appeal</i></del><br>[Duplicate of #14, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "2C (8) 3/68, General Military Activity]<br>[Dupl #92 NSF CF Vietnam, b666, "2A4 - I Corps + DMZ"] | <del>3/22/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| #25a cable             | Intelligence Cable <i>Sanitized 5-10-00 RAL</i><br>S 1 p <i>Sanitized NLJ 96-271 (2/98)</i><br>[Duplicate of #14a, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "2C (8) 3/68, General Military Activity]<br>[Dupl #92a NSF CF Vietnam, b666 "2A4 - I Corps + DMZ"]  | 3/22/68            | A            |
| <del>#27 memo</del>    | <del>Rostow to President, 11:45 a.m. <i>Open 3-7-97</i><br/>S 1 p [Dupl # 197, JN Agency File, Vol 9] <i>NLJ 96-269</i></del>  | <del>3/22/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#27a memo</del>   | <del>Walsh to Rostow<br/>S 2 p <i>Open 11/20/97 NLJ 96-267</i></del>   | <del>undated</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#27b rpt</del>    | <del>"The Security Council"<br/>S 1 p <i>Open 11/20/97 NLJ 96-267</i></del>  | <del>undated</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#32 memo</del>    | <del>Rostow to President<br/>S 1 p <i>Open 3-7-97 NLJ 96-269</i></del>   | <del>3/22/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#32a letter</del> | <del>PM Eshkol to President " "<br/>PCI 3 p</del>  | <del>3/22/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#33 memo</del>    | <del>Rostow to President " "<br/>S 1 p</del>   | <del>3/22/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#34 memo</del>    | <del>Saunders to President, 7:45 a.m. " "<br/>S 1 p</del>  | <del>3/21/68</del> | <del>A</del> |

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 68, March 19-24, 1968 Box 31

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|-----------------------|---|--------------------|--------------|
| #36a memo             | W. Bundy for the Record<br>S <del>1 p</del> <i>open 4/96</i>  | 3/20/68            | A            |
| <del>#37 memo</del>   | <del>Rostow to President, 7:25 p.m.</del><br><del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 3-7-97 NLJ 96-269</i>   | <del>3/21/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#37a cable</del> | <del>Amman 3928</del><br><del>S 2 p</del><br>[Sanitized NLJ 81-93] <i>open 11/20/97 NLJ 96-267</i>  | <del>3/21/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#37b cable</del> | <del>Deptel 133887 to Amman</del><br><del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 3-7-97 NLJ 96-269</i>   | <del>3/21/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#38 memo</del>   | <del>Rostow to President, 7:20 p.m.</del><br><del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 3-7-97 NLJ 96-269</i>   | <del>3/21/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#38a memo</del>  | <del>Rusk to President</del><br><del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 11/20/97 NLJ 96-267</i>  | <del>3/21/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#40 memo</del>   | <del>Rostow to President, 3:45 p.m.</del><br><del>S 1 p</del> <i>open NLJ 96-272 2/98</i>   | <del>3/21/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#40a memo</del>  | <del>DePuy to Wheeler</del> <i>open NLJ 96-273 5/98</i><br><del>S 2 p</del>   | <del>3/21/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#42 memo</del>   | <del>Rostow to President, 12:35 p.m.</del><br><del>S 1 p</del> <i>open NLJ 96-272 2/98</i><br>[Duplicate of #186, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 13] | <del>3/21/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| #42a memo             | Intelligence Memorandum<br>S 10 p<br>[Duplicate of #186b, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 13]<br>[Sanitized NLJ 89-175] <i>sent NLJ 96-271 (4/98)</i> | 3/20/68            | A            |
| <del>#46 memo</del>   | <del>Rostow to President, 9:55 a.m.</del><br><del>C 1 p</del> <i>open 3-7-97 NLJ 96-269</i>   | <del>3/21/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#52 memo</del>   | <del>Rostow to President</del> "<br><del>C 2 p</del><br>[Duplicate in Diary Backup, "3/21/68," -Sanitized 1979]                             | <del>3/21/68</del> | <del>A</del> |

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| <del>#53 memo</del>    | <del>Rostow to President, 8:05 p.m.<br/>C 1 p open 6-8-95 NLJ 93-248<br/>[Duplicate of #18, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "7E (4)A Public Relations Activity"]</del>               | <del>3/20/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#53a memo</del>   | <del>Habib to Rostow<br/>C 2 p open 12-17-93 NLJ 93-249<br/>[Duplicate of #18a, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "7E (4)A Public Relations Activity"]</del>                           | <del>3/19/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| #54 memo               | Rostow to President, 8:00 p.m. (dup of #2, Files of Rostow, S 1 p (Janet 1995) Rainaldi, Box 5)  | 3/20/68            | A            |
| <del>#54a memcon</del> | <del>"Vietnam Peace Proposal" (dup of #2a, see above)<br/>S 2 p (Exempted 1986) open 12-15-95 NLJ 94-460</del>   | <del>3/18/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#54b memo</del>   | <del>"A Procedural Proposal regarding VN"<br/>PCI 4 p open 4/96</del>  | <del>2/9/68</del>  | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#54c memo</del>   | <del>"Draft"<br/>PCI 2 p open 4/96</del>   | <del>2/6/68</del>  | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#56 memo</del>    | <del>Rostow to President, 7:25 p.m.<br/>S 1 p open 3-7-97 NLJ 96-269</del>   | <del>3/20/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#56a letter</del> | <del>President to PM Eshkol "<br/>S 1 p</del>  | <del>undated</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#59 memo</del>    | <del>Rostow to President, 3:45 p.m.<br/>C 1 p open 8-8-94 NLJ 94-19<br/>[Duplicate of #61, NSF, CF, Chile, Vol. 5]<br/>[and #101, NSF, CF, Chile, Vol 4, Box 13]</del> | <del>3/20/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#63a cable</del>  | <del>From Westmoreland, 8:50 a.m.<br/>S 2 p open 12-23-09</del>  | <del>3/20/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#68a memo</del>   | <del>Zwick to President open 5-16-95 NLJ 94-251<br/>C 1 p (dup. #64, NSF, Comin, File Ryuky u Islands) #60</del>   | <del>3/16/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#68b memo</del>   | <del>Gaud and Freeman to President<br/>C 2 p open 4/96</del>   | <del>3/8/68</del>  | <del>A</del> |

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| <del>#70 memo</del>  | <del>Rostow to President, 4:45 p.m. open 7/27/01 NSJ 96-272000</del><br><del>S 1 p sanitized NSJ 96-272 (2/98)</del>  | <del>3/19/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| #70a cable           | Intelligence Information Cable<br>S 11 p <i>sanitized 4/98 NSJ 96-271</i>   | 3/18/68            | A            |
| <del>#71 memo</del>  | <del>Rostow to President, re: Paraguay open 3-7-97</del><br><del>C 2 p</del> <i>NSJ 96-269</i><br>[Duplicate of #4, NSF, CF, Paraguay, "Visit of President Stroessner"]       | <del>3/19/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#71a memo</del> | <del>Katzenbach to President, re: Paraguay</del><br><del>C 3 p</del> <i>open 11/20/97 NSJ 96-267</i><br>[Duplicate of #6, NSF, CF, Paraguay, "Visit of President Stroessner"] | <del>3/18/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#71b memo</del> | <del>Talking Points, re: Paraguay</del><br><del>C 3 p</del> <i>open 11/20/97 NSJ 96-267</i><br>[Duplicate of #6b, NSF, CF, Paraguay, "Visit of President Stroessner"]         | <del>3/20/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| <del>#72 memo</del>  | <del>Jorden for the Record</del><br><del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 3-7-97 NSJ 96-269</i>  | <del>3/19/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| #73a cable           | <del>Saigon 22495</del> <i>more info released 3-17-00 NSJ 96-268</i><br><del>TS 6 p</del> <i>(Dup in Daily Backup, 3/19/68) open 8-11-00</i><br>[Sanitized NLJ 85-47, 85-238] | <del>3/19/68</del> | <del>A</del> |
| #76a cable           | From Westmoreland<br>S 2 p <i>open 12-23-09</i>   | 3/19/68            | A            |

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## PROCESSING NOTE

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In all cases where two different sanitized copies are found in the file, the RAC project reviewers released additional information from the earlier review but closed some information which had previously been declassified and opened. Both copies have therefore been placed in the file so that researchers have access to as much information as possible. The sanitization authority stamped on documents reviewed under the RAC Project will always be "RAC" followed by a number; the sanitization authority stamped on documents reviewed under Mandatory Review will be an "NLJ" case number or the date of a U.S. government agency letter authorizing release of the document.

When ordering photocopies of these documents, please indicate which version you would like photocopied by listing the document number along with the notation "RAC," "non-RAC," or "both."

REGINA GREENWELL  
Senior Archivist

August 2, 1999

1

ACTION

Saturday, March 23, 1968 -- 6:00 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Sec. Clifford makes herewith a strong security case for re-installing \$5.5 million in aid to the Ryukyus (Okinawa) in the Defense budget.

W. W. Rostow

Agreed \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

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1a

Authority DDO Rev 5200, 10  
By reg, NARA, Date 3/31/92

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

23 MAR 1968

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I urge reconsideration of your decision to defer our seeking a \$5.5 million supplemental appropriation for aid to the Ryukyu Islands for FY 1968.

Free and efficient use of our bases in the Ryukyus demands a political stability there. The issue as regards the supplemental is not nearly so much one of providing funds for needed projects as one of shoring up the government party in this critical election year -- thereby ensuring, in our self interest, the continued use of those bases which are critical to our effort in Southeast Asia.

The budget submitted in January indicated an intention to seek this supplemental and this is known to the Ryukyuans. The High Commissioner states they will regard our failure to go forward as a breach of promise. This will

- exacerbate tensions caused by recent events such as our stationing B-52s on Okinawa and our use of those planes in support of Vietnam.
- tend to discredit the government party, with whom we can best cooperate, and enhance the chances of success of the opposition in this fall's elections for the Chief Executive and the Legislature of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands.

Additionally, the measure of our aid to the Ryukyus is a political issue in Japan. Our not seeking the supplemental will add to the problems of Prime Minister Sato, who is having a difficult time persuading the Japanese of the need for the free use of our bases in Okinawa and the need for Japan to accept a greater role in Asian security.

The State Department concurs in this request. House hearings on appropriations for the Ryukyus are set for March 25 at 1:00 p. m.

*W. H. Clegg*

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DOD DIR 5200.10

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X-

1888

2

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*

Wednesday, March 20, 1968 - 2:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

With respect to Thieu's speech -- now scheduled for tomorrow, Thursday, -- I have:

1. Alerted Russ Wiggins and told him to publish text if possible; if not, to give it a fair play.
2. Talked to Scotty Reston in same vein. He sent Max Frankel around. I briefed him on probable main themes.
3. Asked Sec. Rusk to arrange high level State backgrounder when text comes in.
4. Despatched attached back-channel to Westmoreland.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rlh

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12358,  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 18, 1983.

BY *df* ON *3/31/92*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY

2a

VZCZCDSI488 ..... 1968 MAR 20 16 23  
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DE YEKADS 1109 0801615  
O 201559Z ZYH  
FM, WHITE HOUSE  
TO ANEMB SAIGON  
ZEM

68 MAR 20 AM 11:26

WEDNESDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY VIA CAS CHANNELS  
CITE: CAP80707  
FROM WALT ROSTOW EYES ONLY FOR AMB BUNKER AND  
GENERAL WESTMORELAND.

I HAVE CALLED THE PRESIDENT'S ATTENTION TO THE ADVANCE  
TEXT OF THIEU'S SPEECH OF TODAY,

THE PRESIDENT REGARDS IT OF THE HIGHEST, REPEAT HIGHEST,  
IMPORTANCE THAT YOU MAKE A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO GET FULL AND  
FAIR REPORTING FROM SAIGON IN U.S. MEDIA OF WHAT THAT  
SPEECH CONTAINS.

A SPECIAL BACKGROUNDER ON IT APPEARS CALLED FOR,  
EMPHASIZING NOT MERELY WHAT HE PROMISES TO DO BUT  
WHAT HE HAS IN FACT ALREADY DONE. PLEASE GIVE THIS  
YOUR PERSONAL, URGENT ATTENTION  
105

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.3. AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 16, 1983.

*WJG* ON 3/31/92

INFORMATION

Saturday, March 23, 1968 -- 12:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

I asked Mac Bundy about John McCloy's views:

-- With respect to the President, he believes that McCloy would be completely discreet but, unlike, say, Mac or Cy Vance, he would not necessarily go out and publicly advocate a position taken by the President, with which he might disagree;

-- With respect to Vietnam, Mac was not sure but he thought his views were all right.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

133723  
4

Origin ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY

Info: STATE 133723

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED 21 Nov 88 00 18z  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-268  
By is, NARA Date 4-29-98

NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPARTMENT

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. We have received on most confidential basis through the Apostolic Delegate a proposal by the Pope. Following paragraphs of this cable summarizes the papal proposal and our preliminary reaction. May we have, at your earliest convenience, your judgment on the acceptability of this proposal to the GVN together with any evaluation as to the general desirability of such a proposal at this time. Unless you believe that U.S. acceptance of the proposal is desirable and that GVN acceptance can readily be obtained you should not repeat not discuss this proposal with Thieu at the present time.
2. Essence of the papal proposal is that the Pope would publicly invite certain parties to the conflict to a meeting in Sweden. The invitation would read as follows: BEGIN TEXT

|   |                   |  |
|---|-------------------|--|
| Drafted by:<br>S/AH: DIDavidson: eg 3/20/68 | Tel. Ext.<br>7541 | Telegraphic transmission and<br>classification approved by:<br>The Secretary |
|---|-------------------|--|

Clearances: EA - Mr. Bundy U - Mr. Katzenbach S/S - Mr. Walsh

S/AH - W. Averell Harriman

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page @2 of telegram to ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON

~~TOP SECRET~~

1. Although all parties to the Vietnam conflict no doubt believe that they are pursuing laudable objectives by justifiable means, the increasing slaughter should not be allowed to continue if it is at all possible that it can be brought to a halt. Statements from both sides suggest a possible willingness to accept peace and to concern themselves with the practical tasks of moving from where they are now to a point where troops have been withdrawn and there is a viable political life in which all can participate, With the hope that it may move the world one step closer to peace, it has been decided to call a meeting.

2. The following parties are hereby invited to send representatives at the ambassadorial or lower level to attend a meeting to be held at the offices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for three weeks beginning at 10:00 a.m. local time on Monday the \_\_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_\_ 1968.

The Government of the Republic of Vietnam, Saigon

The National Liberation Front of Vietnam

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Hanoi

The Government of the United States of America

The Government of Canada

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The Government of India

The Government of Poland

Any party not wishing to send a formal representative to the meeting may send an unofficial observer or may ask any person, including the representative of some other party, to convey their views officially or unofficially. Representatives not present on the opening day of the meeting may join the meeting later.

3. The meeting is called for the purpose of discussing, formally and informally, measures which ought to be undertaken

- (1) to establish and maintain a cease-fire throughout Vietnam and
- (2) to achieve a settlement based upon an implementation of the Geneva Accords of 1954.

4. Attendance at the meeting is without prejudice to the legal or other position of any party. It is requested that no party make any public statement as to conditions or positions which might prejudice or affect the work of the meeting, and that any questions or comments which a party might have be raised with the chairman at the first day of the meeting.

5. So that there may be some hope that the meeting will produce constructive results and bring Vietnam closer to peace, all parties

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are hereby requested to implement, effective at 2:00 a.m. local time the Sunday before the meeting begins, and to respect at least so long as the meeting continues, a general Reduce-Fire throughout all of Vietnam, such reduce fire to include a cessation of all major offensive military action including a cessation of the bombing and other armed attacks against North Vietnam, it being understood that no party should take military advantage of the reduced military activities on the part of an adversary.

6. There is no need for a reply to this invitation. The meeting will take place as scheduled whether or not all invited parties decide to attend the opening sessions, unless the Chairman finds that the general Reduce-Fire is not ineffect, in which event the meeting shall not be held.

7. Unless and until the meeting should decide otherwise, our representative will serve as Chairman. He will be unavailable for discussion or comment prior to the day scheduled for the opening of the meeting. END TEXT.

3. Our preliminary analysis is that the proposal offers the following advantages:

(a) A third party proposal of this sort, particularly coming

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from the Pope, avoids the appearance of any US initiative at this time and thus reduces adverse impact in Saigon.

(b) From a military standpoint, the proposal -- if accepted by Hanoi -- would create a situation verbally consistent with the San Antonio formula and -- under present circumstances -- perhaps more advantageous to us even than that formula. The NVA/VC would have to lay off "major" offensives as well as refrain from taking "military advantage" of the bombing stoppage. While we and the South Vietnamese would also have to refrain from "major" offensives, this could hardly mean that we could not carry on less-than-major actions in the countryside. There is a hooker in whether maintenance of recent supply levels by the other side would constitute "military advantage" -- but on balance the military trade, if it ever came off, might be favorable to us under present circumstances -- and could be so depicted in Saigon.

(c) The wording of the invitation is generally in our favor in terms of a possible settlement. The invitation speaks of "the practical tasks of moving from where they [the parties] are now to a point where troops have been withdrawn and there is a viable political life in which all can participate." This can certainly be construed to refer to

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to North Vietnamese as well as American "troops", and the reference to a political structure falls well short of anything that would be construed as a coalition. Moreover, the invitation refers specifically to a settlement based on implementation of the Geneva Accords of 1954, as the objective of discussions.

4. We see the following disadvantages and problem areas:

(a) Under the terms of the proposal Hanoi could keep quiet, not appear at the meeting, refrain from any major offensive and thus put us in the position where we have to maintain the bombing stoppage and avoid major offensives. As a practical matter, we believe it likely that Hanoi would either accept the invitation or denounce it publicly shortly after it was issued. If they did the latter, our forthcoming attitude would put us in a very strong position world-wide, and the price of continuing stopping the bombing -- at least until there was a Hanoi major offensive or a taking advantage -- might be well worth the gains we would get.

(b) A more serious problem is that the invitation includes the NLF so that for the first time we would be accepting participation in a forum that included them. However, despite the injunction against statements of conditions or positions, we could still point out that

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out position was not inconsistent with our traditional position on being willing to hear the views of the NLF. On the other hand, the NLF inclusion might make it very difficult for Saigon to accept -- and if we accepted without Saigon it might have a serious splitting effect there. While if we accepted the proposal it would be best if Saigon also accepted, a possible fallback position would be for the U.S. to accept but for Saigon at least to wait and see whether Hanoi denounces this proposal. (On a similar Ceylonese proposal last year Hanoi took them off the hook.)

(c) The proposed line-up of parties leaves out our Manila allies. We would have to explain this to them, and give undertakings that we would consult them closely if talks began, and would work toward an expansion of the group. In other respects, the initial line-up of parties appears satisfactory. The Soviets and the British are left out, which may reflect the Soviet response to earlier versions of the proposal; more fundamentally, any invitation to the Soviets raises the question of the Communist Chinese, and we therefore believe it is wise to leave them out at least at the outset.

5. It is our overall judgment that providing if Hanoi denounced the proposal, did not attend, and/or ~~started~~ <sup>started</sup> or kept up a major offensive

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or took advantages militarily, we would gain credit by our acceptance. This could be the best way to achieve a peace posture at this difficult time without any initiative on our part. Even in the event Hanoi accepted the proposal, we would have militarily a somewhat better deal than under San Antonio. The proposal would particularly give a respite to GVN efforts to build a stronger political base, and it would not appear to preclude some effective action in the pacification area.

6. Therefore unless you have serious doubts we would inform the Apostolic Delegate:

(a) That the U.S. would be prepared to accept the papal proposal.

(b) We are prepared to lay ourselves open to misinterpretation on the NLF role for the sake of moving towards peace.

(c) We wish <sup>to have</sup> the Swiss government substitute for the Swedish government as hosts.

(d) That our position should not be quoted to any third party including particularly the South Vietnamese.

END

RUSK

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

Saturday, March 23, 1968 -- 5:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Re the Muller:

*Pres file*

- It is 12 miles off Cuba, headed for Key West;
- the tug has showed up;
- a second destroyer has showed up;
- its engine has begun to work a little;
- it is going about 5 knots in the right direction.

And Sec. Clifford just reported to me; it may just be that the Navy can make it to Key West now."

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

**INFORMATION**

**Saturday, March 23, 1968  
4:40 p. m.**

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith Gen. Taylor  
supplies an answer to the question:  
Is our Vietnam policy immoral?**

*Pres. file*

**W. W. Rostow**

**cc: Mr. Harry McPherson**

**WWRostow:rin**

62

March 23, 1968

Mr. President:

In recent weeks the most frequent charge against our Viet-Nam policy which I encounter is that it is "immoral," and I have not heard any effective reply to it. I suggest the need for speakers and writers who defend our policy to strike repeated blows at this criticism which otherwise is likely to become an unchallenged cliché.

I attach a line of argument which appeals to me, some part of which might be useful to your speech-writers.

M. D. T.

Attachments:

Is the Viet-Nam War Immoral?

We often hear the criticism that this war is immoral and I often wonder just what is meant by this. It may mean that since all war is cruel, wasteful and destructive, all war is immoral and worthy of condemnation. If that is the thought, one must demur before the evidence of history that there have been both just and unjust wars. But the critics would probably reply in that case that Viet-Nam falls in the class of unjust wars and hence is immoral.

But let us take a moment and give serious thought to what this charge means and see what truth it contains. It must mean that either the purpose, the means or the consequences of our actions in Viet-Nam are in some sense evil, unjust and hence immoral. But would this be the conclusion of honest men whose judgments of right and wrong we are willing to trust?

Before answering this question, we should first examine the American purpose in Viet-Nam. As President Johnson stated in his Johns Hopkins speech in 1965, "Our objective is the independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. We want nothing for ourselves, only that the people in South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way." That has been our objective throughout our Viet-Nam involvement and remains the objective today. It is but the most recent demonstration of our historical dedication to the right of self-determination and can hardly be deemed <sup>m</sup>immoral while we continue to pride ourselves on its successful defense in World War I, World War II, Korea and elsewhere.

If our purpose in Viet-Nam is not immoral, perhaps our means deserve the term. These means assume many forms--some political, some social-economic and some military. The political means we use are generally limited to the

giving of encouragement, advice, and instruction by example by our American officials who try to guide the political leaders of this immature people in their struggle for nationhood and for independence. In this field, our efforts have been rewarded by impressive progress since the turbulent period of 1964-65 when Saigon governments were overturned every three months by irresponsible minority groups, and coups were the order of the day. Surely these American efforts to help the Vietnamese to learn and practice self-government do not merit moral condemnation but rather unalloyed praise.

In the social-economic field, our American representatives in Viet-Nam, supported by their departments and agencies in Washington, have given their guidance and help to Vietnamese officials not only in Saigon but throughout the provinces, often at great personal risk. They have assisted the rebuilding of the war-torn countryside and the improvement of the administrative practices of the central and local governments in solving the enormously complex social-economic problems of the country. Our government has provided funds for these purposes totalling more than \$2 billion in the past three years, funds which have been used to limit inflation, to bring relief to the thousands of war refugees, to assure an adequate national food supply and to permit some growth of the economy in spite of the circumstances of war. These activities and means employed in the social-political field can hardly be called immoral.

There remains to be considered the military means by which we defend the civilian population from the enemy military and guerrilla forces in order to provide security for the acts of nation-building in which we are engaged. Necessarily, many of the military operations take place in populated areas because the enemy seeks to mingle with the people in order to impress

recruits, levy taxes, confiscate food and medical supplies, and obtain the protection from our forces which their presence among civilians affords them. They know that our commanders are operating under the strictest orders ever imposed upon military forces in time of war to use every means to minimize civilian casualties and they take full advantage of this fact. It is they who must bear the responsibility for the civilian losses when, like criminals brought to bay, they shoot it out with the forces of law and order which seek to rescue the civilian hostages. But when we Americans at home see the resulting scenes of civilian suffering on our television screens, we somehow acquire the feeling that we are responsible for these unhappy events and, hence, that the consequences of our actions, regardless of our intentions, are somehow immoral.

This thought raises the general question of the good or evil of the consequences of our Viet-Nam involvement. One can best answer the question by raising another--what would have been the consequences if we had never brought our military aid to South Viet-Nam? There is little doubt that, by now, Ho Chi Minh would have achieved his life-long objective of imposing a Communist regime on South Viet-Nam in spite of the resistance of the large majority of its inhabitants. In so doing, it may be expected that he would have used the same kind of harsh, repressive measures as he did in North Viet-Nam during 1954-55. In that period, it is conservatively estimated that over 50,000 North Vietnamese were executed by Ho's firing squads and many more were put in concentration camps--and these cruelties were carried out in a stronghold of Communist sympathizers. If Ho ever got his hands on the South Vietnamese after their years of resistance to his aggression, we could expect to witness

a blood bath which would cause those grim events of 1954-55 in the North to pale to insignificance. Such, one is led to believe, would have been a consequence of our failure to bring our military forces to South Viet-Nam and the consequence would be far more disastrous if, having come, we withdrew and yielded our friends to the Communist firing squads.

In the light of these conclusions as to our purpose, our means, and the consequences of our actions in South Viet-Nam, it seems likely that most fair-minded men would be inclined to reject without qualification the charge that our course has been or is immoral. Rather, they could turn that charge against those who would surrender our purpose of bringing freedom to South Viet-Nam, renounce the pledges of help given by three Presidents and supported repeatedly by Congress, abandon on the battlefield the 60,000 Free World allies who are fighting beside us and give over our Vietnamese friends to Ho and his henchmen. This is a kind of immorality that all of us can understand, condemn, and reject.

7

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, March 23, 1968 -- 3:30 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a situation report from New York:

-- Arthur is still trying to negotiate the phrase "violent incidents" into the text of the resolution. He feels he has a 50-50 chance.

-- If he fails, he will recommend abstention by the U. S.

-- If we abstain, we may be alone, but it is possible that Brazil, Denmark, and -- maybe -- the U. K. would abstain with us.

Nick reports that Luke Battle believes that abstention would do "irreparable damage" to our position with the Arabs.

The Security Council meeting resumes at 4:30 this afternoon.

I shall let you know how Arthur makes out with "violent incidents."

Present draft resolution attached.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-269  
By Wip, NARA Date 2-19-97

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7a

Draft Resolution

The Security Council,

Having heard the statements of the Representatives of Jordan and Israel,

Having noted the contents of the letters of the Permanent Representatives of Jordan and Israel,

Having noted further the supplementary information provided by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and contained in Documents S/7930/Add.64 and Add.65,

Recalling Resolution 236 (1967) by which the Security Council condemned any and all violations of the cease-fire,

Observing that the military action by the armed forces of Israel on the territory of Jordan was of a large-scale and carefully planned nature,

Considering that all violent incidents and other violations of the cease-fire should be prevented, and not overlooking past incidents of this nature,

Recalling further Resolution 237 (1967) which called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants ~~of the inhabitants~~ of the areas where military operations have taken place,

1. Deplores the loss of life and heavy damage to property,

2. Condemns the military action launched by Israel in flagrant violation of the UN Charter and the cease-fire resolutions,

3. Deplores all violent incidents and other violations of the cease-fire, and declares that actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts.

4. Calls upon Israel to desist from acts or activities in contravention of Resolution 237 (1967),

5. Requests the Security General to keep the situation under review and to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

Note: Point of issue has now boiled down to the words in brackets.

8

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Saturday, March 23, 1968 -- 3:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Henry Owen suggests that your next speech should include the cities as well as monetary problems and Vietnam.

Quite independently, I tossed the same suggestion at Harry McPherson this morning.

On the monetary side, we could include not merely taxes and expenditure cuts but also the kind of international monetary system we are trying to create.

The idea is worth your attention.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ng, NARA, Date 3/31/92

WWRostow:rlh

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-267

By CB, NARA Date 11-3-97

MEMORANDUM

March 23, 1968

SUBJECT: A Turning Point

1. A commentator said something like this on TV last week: "Only the very foolish would count him (the President) out... He can, if he chooses, consider actions on the scale of magnitude comparable to Roosevelt and Churchill...and thus reassert his moral leadership of the nation. But it is not possible to believe any longer that lesser measures can do it."

2. Proposal: The President should speak to the nation (or to a joint session of the Congress) about the results of three reviews which have been underway in the executive branch:

-- of what to do in Vietnam, after the Tet offensive;

-- of what to do about proposals of the President's Commission on Civil Disorders, (in accordance with the President's press conference statement yesterday that these proposals are under intensive study);

-- of what lies ahead in the monetary field.

3. The President should explain that he has chosen to treat all these issues in one speech because of their importance and their inter-relation: We are waging three simultaneous wars - against aggression in Vietnam, against crime and injustice in the cities, and in defense of the world monetary system. We need to prevail on all three fronts, to preserve a peaceful and prosperous future for America.

4. This approach will help to ward off criticism that the administration is preoccupied with the war in Vietnam, to the detriment of other problems.

5. The basic argument for treating these issues together in a moment of high drama, rather than separately and routinely, was well described in a 1948 memorandum from Clark Clifford to President Truman: "There is a clear need for bold and daring steps calculated to reverse the powerful trend now running against us." <sup>1/</sup> Today, that trend is threefold:

<sup>1/</sup>"The Truman Presidency", by Cabell Phillips, page 226

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-- a powerful upsurge of opinion against the war in Vietnam, which could - if not checked - make it difficult for any administration to achieve US objectives in Vietnam;

-- apathy and frustration about the problems of the central cities, which bodes ill for them this summer;

-- continuing concern about the dollar, at home and abroad.

6. Speeches about the need to stay the course are useful, but will not arrest these trends. There is a widespread public feeling that the Tet offensive, the report of the President's Commission on Civil Disorders, and the gold crisis have posed new issues. People want to be convinced that the administration is facing these issues in a way which takes account of new circumstances and new ideas: That what the country is asked to do responds to changing realities.

7. This is the case. But it could be underlined by a speech which:

-- announced that we have taken some new steps (besides US troop reinforcements) as a result of our review of Vietnam strategy;

-- spelled out specific new actions being taken as a result of the report of the President's Commission on Civil Disorders, thus reinforcing the President's indication at yesterday's press conference that we take these outside ideas seriously;

-- discussed the gold crisis and looks beyond that crisis to long-term remedies.

8. A discerning bureaucrat once remarked of a proposed new initiative that it was like proposing to call a horse "Man o' War": It was a wonderful name, but what was the horse? What would be the substantive content of such a Presidential speech?

9. Vietnam: The main new thing, besides the troop decision, would be a forceful statement that the US intends henceforth

to place increased emphasis on helping the GVN to improve, and to enhance the size and role of, South Vietnamese forces.

This would be welcomed by the American public. It is what the intelligence community believes would do most to affect Hanoi's judgment of long-term military prospects.

The President could point out that pre-Tet improvement in South Vietnamese forces had been one of the main reasons Hanoi feared a long war; that these forces were a main Tet target and performed well; but that Tet revealed deficiencies in their equipment relative to the enemy. He should announce that he has decided that top priority in the US war effort should now go to helping the GVN remedy these deficiencies and expand these forces. He should elaborate on what is being done to these ends.

This frank admission that there is room for improvement in US Vietnam policy and that we intend to exploit it would sit well with the public.

10. Cities: The President should announce that he had approved a number of the Commission's specific recommendations, and specify what they are. (I counted 47 Commission recommendations for national action which went beyond existing programs and would not involve additional appropriations: 28 in employment, 13 in education, 6 in welfare, and 3 in housing. In discussing these intended new actions, the President could also tick off the Commission recommendations which are covered by existing Federal programs; I counted 45 of these).

The President might report that he is appointing a Special White House Coordinator (perhaps someone who had served on the Commission) to ensure that these and such other Commission recommendations as he approves are followed up quickly.

The President should go on to say that he has examined those other Commission recommendations (25, by my count) which would cost additional money: He has approved a few very high priority modest budget add-ons (as mentioned in yesterday's press conference) to cover some of these recommendations - particularly in cases where new action would help to make this a safer summer, e.g., year-round programs in ghetto schools. Most of the more costly Commission recommendations, however, will have to wait till next year, if only because of further staff work needed to estimate their costs in more detail and

to translate them into specific programs and legislative proposals.

The President might conclude by stressing that, in implementing the report, he will be guided by its underlying philosophy: that residents of central cities are entitled not only to human dignity but to an effective role in helping themselves and shaping their own affairs. To this end, the President should announce that he and the Vice President intend to meet increasingly with community leaders of these cities - to learn their views at first hand, so that these people can be participants in, rather than merely objects of, the Federal decision-making process. (The President could invite them to the White House; the Vice President might go to the cities.)

11. Monetary: The President should report and explain:

-- the decisions reached recently in Washington to meet the gold crisis, and their effects to date;

-- progress being made by the US Government in implementing his January 1 balance of payments program;

-- why a tax increase is needed to reinforce these measures.

He should stress that we are now looking beyond these immediate decisions, however, to a basic improvement in the world monetary system. To this end, we will soon take the first step toward activating the agreed additional IMF monetary reserves (March 21 Stockholm Conference). He should make clear that the administration is not merely responding to crisis in the monetary field; it has a long-term strategy for shaping the future.

12. The President should wind up by emphasizing that success in the three wars we are waging will hinge on:

(a) new ideas and actions - he has announced some today, and there will be more;

(b) sacrifice - of substance, of prejudice, and even of lives;

(c) patience - there are no quick fixes.

The American people have always responded before to plain talk and hard courses of action; that is why the President is confident in putting both to them now.

**ACTION**

**Saturday, March 23, 1968 - 2:45 p.m.**

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith a draft for Westy, as requested.**

**You may wish to add, in your own hand, at the bottom of the letter, something like: "I shall be following closely the offensive operations you have planned in the month ahead. Good luck."**

**W. W. Rostow**

**WWRostow:rlh**

*Pres sent to  
Charles Maguire  
for revision*

9  
March 23, 1968

Dear Westy:

I wish to give you directly the background to your appointment as Chief of Staff of the Army.

On January 19 this year Bob McNamara recommended to me that you be elevated to this post. He felt, quite simply, that you were the best man to lead the Army and that, after your protracted period in field command, you deserved a tour in Washington where you were at least equally needed.

I did not wish to make the decision until Clark Clifford was in his post and had a chance to make an independent assessment. Clark came to me with an equally firm recommendation that you take command of the Army.

I cannot find language strong enough to express the confidence we feel in you; our gratitude for the unique service you have rendered your nation and the cause of freedom in Vietnam; and our satisfaction that you will be joining the team in Washington.

Sincerely,

General William C. Westmoreland  
Commander  
U. S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam  
APO San Francisco 96222

LBJ:WWRostow:rln

INFORMATION

10

**SECRET--SENSITIVE**

*Pres file*

Saturday, March 23, 1968  
2:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Ellsworth argues, with respect to the Vatican (or any other peace proposal) for:

- delay, for GVN and public morale to pick up farther;
- prior consultation with Thieu and Ky.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-456  
By g/b, NARA, Date 4/17/96

WWRostow:rla

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Jennifer Cuddeback  
Archivist

January 14, 2004



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~TOP SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 22867

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-460

NODIS

By 149, NARA, Date 5-19-95

NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPT.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BUNKER

REF : STATE 133723

1. I HAVE READ WITH VERY GREAT INTEREST THE VATICAN PROPOSAL OUTLINED REFTEL AND DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS ON IT. FOLLOWING ARE SOME PRELIMINARY VIEWS ON IT AS SEEN FROM HERE.

2. ONE OF MY PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS OF COURSE

~~PAGE 2 RUNJIR 22867/1 TOP SECRET~~

RELATES TO THE TIMING OF THE PROPOSAL AND TO THE TIMING OF CONSULTATION WITH GVN LEADERS, SINCE THESE FACTORS WILL HAVE A VERY GREAT BEARING ON VIETNAMESE REACTIONS TO IT. YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED IN THE MEANTIME MY TELEGRAM 22548 WHICH DISCUSSES IN GENERAL TERMS THE CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING OUR HANDLING HERE OF ANY NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS WHICH MIGHT BE SUGGESTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. ALTHOUGH THE VATICAN PROPOSAL DIFFERS SUBSTANTIALLY FROM THE TWO ALTERNATIVES DISCUSSED IN STATE 131732, ESPECIALLY IN THE FACT IT IS NOT A U.S. INITIATIVE, MY COMMENTS ON TIMING AND THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE HERE ARE PERTINENT IN EVALUATING THE VATICAN PROPOSAL.

3. TO RECAP THE SITUATION, THE GVN IS STILL IN THE PROCESS OF RECOVERING FROM THE TET OFFENSIVE AND THE MORALE OF BOTH THE GVN ITSELF AND THE POPULATION GENERALLY IS ONLY JUST BEGINNING TO REVIVE. SOME TIME WILL BE REQUIRED YET TO INSTILL RENEWED CONFIDENCE, AND IT IS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF RECOVERY AND THE IMPULSE TOWARDS NATIONAL UNITY IN THE INTERIM. ~~OUR~~ ANALYSIS OF THE PROGRESS TOWARDS RECOVERY MADE SO FAR AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THIS EFFORT AND FOR

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-2-, SAIGON 22867, MARCH 23 (SECTION 1 OF 2)

CONTINUING THE OFFENSIVE ON WHICH WE ARE NOW ENGAGED SUGGESTS THAT IN TWO OR PERHAPS THREE MONTHS WE AND THE GVN SHOULD BE ABLE TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS FROM A POSITION OF GREATER STRENGTH.

4. IN ANALYZING THE SPECIFICS OF THE VATICAN PROPOSAL I FIND IT IS TOO VAGUE IN ITS MILITARY PROVISIONS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE MUST BE AN ADEQUATE DEFINITION OF THE "NO ADVANTAGE" FORMULA -- PERHAPS ALONG THE LINES OF THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA -- AND IT MUST LEND ITSELF TO SATISFACTORY DETERMINATION AND DEMONSTRATION OF ENEMY VIOLATIONS OF IT. A PRECISE DEFINITION OF "A GENERAL REDUCE-FIRE" WOULD ALSO BE ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO AVOID MISINTERPRETATIONS WHICH WOULD BIND OUR HANDS UNDULY IN THE CRITICAL PERIOD AHEAD. THIS PERIOD IS ONE IN WHICH OFFENSIVE MILITARY ACTION BY RVNAF AND FREE WORLD FORCES TO REESTABLISH THE PRE-TET SECURITY SITUATION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. IF, AS REFTEL SUGGESTS, THE KIND OF "RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE" ACTIONS NOW BEING INITIATED TO CLEAR OUT POCKETS OF VC/NVA RESISTANCE WOULD NOT VIOLATE THIS PROHIBITION, IT SHOULD NOT RAISE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR US. BUT WE NEED TO KNOW THIS, AND WE ALSO NEED TO KNOW WHAT THE ENEMY WILL BE EXPECTED TO DO

~~PAGE 4 RUMJIR 22867/1 TOP SECRET~~

AND NOT DO TO MEET THIS REQUIREMENT. A REASONABLY CLEAR UNDERSTANDING ON THESE POINTS WOULD BE IMPORTANT SINCE WE AND THE GVN WOULD NOT WANT TO BE FACED WITH A SITUATION IN WHICH WE WOULD BE FORCED BY PUBLIC OPINION TO DESIST FROM SUCH LIMITED BUT ESSENTIAL OPERATIONS IN THE IMPORTANT MONTHS AHEAD.

5. THERE ARE OTHER REASONS WHY A DELAY WOULD BE DESIRABLE, SOME OF WHICH WERE SUGGESTED IN PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE. ADDITIONALLY, THE GVN IS JUST INITIATING A MAJOR MOBILIZATION OF MANPOWER UNDER THE STIMULUS OF THE PUBLIC REACTION TO THE TET ATTACKS AND OF OUR URGING. REALIZATION OF THESE MOBILIZATION GOALS DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS IS IMPORTANT TO STRENGTHENING THE GVN FOR ITS OWN DEFENSIVE PURPOSES IN THE LONGER RUN. TOO EARLY A CONVENING OF TALKS ON THE BASIS SUGGESTED IN REFTEL COULD UNDERMINE MUCH OF THIS PRESENT VIETNAMESE INITIATIVE AS WELL AS THE WILL TO WORK TOGETHER IN THE COMMON CAUSE WHICH HAS EMERGED IN RECENT WEEKS. FOR ALL OF THESE REASONS I URGE THAT WE GO BACK TO THE VATICAN FOR CLARIFICATION OF THESE VITAL POINTS. IF FEASIBLE, I WOULD ALSO EXPLAIN FRANKLY TO THEM SOME OF THE TIMING CONSIDERATIONS DISCUSSED ABOVE AND

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-3-, SAIGON 22867, MARCH 23 (SECTION 1 OF 2)

URGE THEM TO DEFER THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A WHILE. THE POINT COULD BE MADE THAT THE PRESENT DIFFICULTY IN WHICH THE GVN FINDS ITSELF IS THE RESULT OF A BALD ATTEMPT BY HANOI TO TAKE OVER THE GVN BY FORCE AND SURPRISE DURING A TRUCE AND ON A SACRED HOLIDAY. WHILE THE VATICAN PROPOSAL SHOULD BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED ON ITS MERITS BY ALL PARTIES, IT WOULD ONLY BE FAIR TO THE GVN AND ITS LEADERSHIP TO GIVE THEM THE TIME TO RECOVER FROM THIS BLOW BEFORE HAVING TO FACE THE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS WHICH THE PROPOSAL OBVIOUSLY POSES FOR THEM.

6. IN TERMS OF THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE VATICAN PROPOSAL, IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE MAIN DIFFICULTY FOR THE GVN WILL BE THE PRESENCE AT THE TABLE IN THEIR OWN RIGHT OF NLF REPRESENTATIVES. THE GVN HAS ALWAYS SAID THAT SUCH REPRESENTATIVES COULD BE PRESENT AS MEMBERS OF AN NVN DELEGATION. THIS POSITION MIGHT CONCEIVABLY BE STRAINED TO THE POINT OF ACCEPTING SUCH REPRESENTATIVES AT THE TABLE PROVIDED DRV REPRESENTATIVES ARE ALSO THERE, BUT NOT IF THE NLF SHOULD TURN UP ALONE. IN OTHER WORDS, IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL FOR HANOI TO BE PRESENT IF SAIGON IS TO BE PRESENT,

~~PAGE 3 NUMBER 22867/1 TOP SECRET~~

AND I AM SURE THAT THE GVN WILL INSIST ON THIS. A FURTHER ESSENTIAL WOULD BE PRIVATE CONSULTATION BY US WITH THIEU, KY AND DO BEFORE THE VATICAN PROPOSAL IS ACCEPTED BY US AND ANNOUNCED, IN ORDER TO ASSURE THEIR UNDERSTANDING AND TO AVOID PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE IRRETRIEVABLE. ASSUMING THIS CONSULTATION PROCEEDS SATISFACTORILY, SAIGON MIGHT CHOOSE TO AWAIT AN INDICATION OF HANOI'S INTENTIONS BEFORE MAKING ITS OWN INTENTIONS PUBLIC.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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DE RUMJIR 22867/2 0831220  
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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9254  
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6132Q  
1968 MAR 23 AM 8 49

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 22867

NODIS

NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPT.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BUNKER

7. SUBJECT TO THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO TIMING,  
I WOULD RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE:

1) PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS WITH THIEU, KY AND DO TO  
EXPLAIN THIS PROPOSAL IN DETAIL AND SEEK THEIR COOPERATION.

2) USG INFORMS VATICAN PRIVATELY OF U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF

~~PAGE 2 RUMJIR 22867/2 TOP SECRET~~  
ITS PROPOSAL.

3) VATICAN ANNOUNCEMENT OF PROPOSAL.

4) USG PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE.

5) GVN WOULD MAKE NO ANNOUNCEMENT BEYOND INDICATING  
THE MATTER IS UNDER STUDY BUT WOULD HAVE AGREED WITH US THAT  
IT WOULD ATTEND THE MEETING IF THE DRV DOES. SINCE THE  
INTERVENING PERIOD COULD BE A DIFFICULT ONE, WITH THE GVN  
UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE FROM MANY SIDES, INCLUDING THE MILITARY,  
THE ASSEMBLY AND THE PRESS, IT MIGHT BE PREFERABLE FOR THE  
GVN TO ANNOUNCE AT AN APPROPRIATE MOMENT THAT IT WAS  
PREPARED TO ATTEND PROVIDED THE DRV DOES ALSO.

8. YOU HAVE NOTED IN PARA 4B OF REFTTEL THAT A SPLIT MIGHT  
DEVELOP WITH SAIGON. I BELIEVE THAT IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL  
IN THE PRESENT DIFFICULT SITUATION HERE THAT WE HANDLE THIS  
QUESTION IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVOID ANY SUCH SPLIT. IF,  
THEREFORE, WE FIND THAT THE GVN LEADERS ARE UNABLE TO

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

~~-2-, SAIGON 22867, MARCH 23 (SECTION 2 OF 2)~~

~~PAGE 3 RUMJIR 22867/2 T O P S E C R E T~~

SUPPORT OR ACCEPT THE PROPOSED COURSE, I URGE THAT WE GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO OUR POSITION BEFORE MAKING A FINAL DECISION ON ACCEPTANCE. I RECOGNIZE THE VERY IMPORTANT DOMESTIC AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING OUR POSITION ON THIS PROPOSAL, BUT I BELIEVE THAT WE MUST DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO AVOID UNDERMINING THE ELECTED GVN LEADERSHIP AT A TIME WHEN IT STILL FEELS FAIRLY VULNERABLE BUT WHEN THE PROSPECTS FOR STRENGTHENING ITS POSITION IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS ARE QUITE PROMISING. I THEREFORE REITERATE MY RECOMMENDATION THAT BEFORE GOING FURTHER IN EXPLORING THIS PROPOSAL WITH THE GVN, WE SEEK TO HAVE THE VATICAN DEFER IT FOR A PERIOD OF TWO OR THREE MONTHS. IF THIS IS NOT FEASIBLE, THEN WE SHOULD CONSULT THE GVN LEADERS BEFORE ANY FURTHER ACTION IS TAKEN.

BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

Saturday - March 23, 1968 - 1:30 PM

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Panama Situation**

*Pres file*

The impeachment trial of President Robles in the National Assembly starts at 10:00 a. m. tomorrow morning. All indications are that the Arias forces have the votes to convict him. Their intention is then to install 1st Vice President Max Del Valle as the new President. He is reported to have already picked his Cabinet. Assuming Robles does not step down, Panama will have two Presidents and two governments by tomorrow or Monday.

This does not necessarily mean automatic conflict. The best predictions are that both sides will continue to glower at each other -- while the National Guard keeps them apart -- until the Supreme Court reconvenes (April 1) and rules on the impeachment.

So far, the two camps have exercised good control over their followers. Neither one wants to put itself in the position of starting violence. Fortunately the general public has been apathetic. The Robles-Samudio forces held a public rally last night without incidents. The Arias group will hold theirs tomorrow, but away from the National Assembly building.

The National Guard continues its strict neutrality. It is mobilized to deal with any disturbances. Our Country Team assures us the Guard has an adequate supply of tear gas. There is plenty more in the Zone, if needed.

Ambassador Adair's latest report describes a compromise plan being discussed by the two sides for implementation following completion of the Robles trial. It involves both Presidents Del Valle and Robles stepping down. The 2nd Vice President would also resign. Then the Cabinet would elect elder statesman Ernesto de la Guardia, who would take the country to elections. All of this would be within Constitutional norms. Influential elements in both Arias and Samudio camps are said to be in favor of this plan. The trick is to get Robles to agree to it since he is the primary loser in the deal.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

Saturday, March 23, 1968  
12:35 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick forwards an un-  
solicited refusal by the Foreign Service  
Journal to accept and publish a paid  
advertisement by "Federal Employees  
Against the War in Vietnam."

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

1062  
12a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON


March 22, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Comments of the American Foreign Service Association on the Petition by a Group Called "Federal Employees Against the War in Viet-Nam"

I think you will be interested in the attached press release explaining why the American Foreign Service Association has refused to accept a paid advertisement and is otherwise opposing the efforts of a group called "Federal Employees Against the War in Viet-Nam". The latter group is circulating throughout the Federal Government a petition opposing our policy in Viet-Nam.

I should emphasize that not only was this press release spontaneous and unsolicited, but it also comes from an organization of employees of State, AID, and USIA which is fiercely independent and completely outspoken. It is run by relatively young officers (in their 30's) who regard themselves as "young Turks" challenging the older establishment in the Foreign Service. It has by now enlisted the active support of many of our best older officers.

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Attachment.

AMERICAN



126

# FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION

## FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

The Foreign Service Journal, the professional journal of the American Foreign Service Association, has declined to accept for publication a paid advertisement by a group called "Federal Employees Against the War in Vietnam".

While the Foreign Service Journal and the American Foreign Service Association welcome and indeed encourage controversial debate on matters relating to career principles and the Foreign Service as an instrumentality of foreign policy, we are unwilling -- even through the medium of a paid advertisement -- to give scope to any possible misunderstanding of the professional role of members of the Foreign Service.

The Foreign Service in the past fifty years has given our country a diplomatic and consular corps dedicated to the professional representation of our interests abroad. We are expected -- indeed required -- to contribute actively to the formulation of foreign policy and to be principal executors of our policies abroad. For most of us this has been the greatest attraction which the Foreign Service holds.

As a professional service we insist that intelligence, honesty, candor and integrity be our hallmark. We have the obligation to present honestly and forcefully differing views on foreign policy matters within our competence. We do this on a confidential basis, and we have full freedom to voice dissent or to propose alternative policies as part of the policy-making process. This carries with it an equal responsibility to carry out the decisions and policies of those constitutionally and legally charged with responsibility for foreign affairs -- the President and his statutory advisors.

There is at issue not only a legal precept for the Foreign Service. Like other civil servants we accept the limitations regarding partisan political activities placed on us by law. We also recognize that as we undertake a role in the formulation of policy, we are equally required to execute faithfully the policies determined by our executives. An officer of the Foreign Service of the United States cannot represent U. S. policies and at the same time be a public critic of those policies. As a disciplined service we accept this circumstance as essential to the effective conduct of foreign affairs.

ACTION

13

Saturday, March 23, 1968 -- 11:05 a.m.

*Free file*

Mr. President:

Because of Nick Katzenbach's involvement in the staff work preparations for the Advisory Group meeting on Monday, Sec. Rusk recommends that we invite Katzenbach and Nitze to the Monday evening session; but only the Sec. of State and the Sec. of Defense would come over to the session at the White House on Tuesday.

W. W. Rostow

Arrangements above okay \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rla

ACTION

14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, March 23, 1968 -- 10:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

Arthur Goldberg has made some progress with the Security Council draft, softening it somewhat from its earlier form so far as Israel is concerned. We would like to change it further along the lines of paras 5 c and d.

All of those friendly to us would vote for the resolution if the changes in c and d are agreed; although it is uncertain how hard the others will fight with us for those changes.

Nick suggests that we give Arthur:

-- the authority to vote for the resolution if he can bring about the changes in paras c and d;

-- but also give him contingent authority to vote for the resolution as is if he cannot bring about those changes, in order to avoid our being isolated in this matter.

Arthur's own request for authority along these lines is in para. 9.

USUN 04261

W. W. Rostow

Let Amb. Goldberg proceed as he requests in para 9 \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-269  
By wjg, NARA Date 2-19-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

14a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, March 23, 1968 -- 10:35 a.m.

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W. A. Rostow

Let Amb. Goldberg proceed as he requests in para 9 \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-269  
By WJ, NARA Date 2-19-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

146

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 32 USUN N 24261 238950Z

ME IN SC.

1. SC MET THREE TIMES MAR 22-23 WHILE CONSULTATIONS (WHICH STRETCHED WITHOUT PAUSE FROM 10 AM MAR 22 TO 2 AM MAR 23) CONTINUED ON DRAFT RESES. CONSULTATIONS TO CONTINUE 10 AM MAR 23 WITH SC RECONVENING AT NOON.

2. 5-POWER DRAFT (USUN 4251) MODIFIED DURING DAY AS PER SEPTEL (USUN 4260).

3. GOLDBERG MET REPEATEDLY WITH EL-FARRA (JORDAN), WITH FRIENDLY GROUP (UK, CAN, DENMARK, CHINA, PARAGUAY, BRAZIL) AND WITH AFRO-ASIAN NON-PERMS (ALGERIA, INDIA, PAKISTAN, ETHIOPIA, SENEGAL) AS PROPOSALS AND COUNTER-PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER MODIFICATIONS IN DRAFT TEXT (USUN 4260) EXCHANGED.

PAGE 3 RUEHDT 4261 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. AFTER LENGTHY EVENING CONSULTATIONS, AND AFTER IT APPARENT TO JORDAN, ALGERIA AND OTHER AFRO-ASIANS THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE 9 VOTES FOR DRAFT TEXT (USUN 4260), ALGERIA PUT TO GOLDBERG REVISED TEXT AS FOLS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENTS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF JORDAN AND ISRAEL CONCERNING THE GRAVE ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIONS ACROSS THE EAST BANK OF JORDAN ON 21 MARCH 1968,

HAVING NOTED THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTERS OF THE PERMENENT REPRESENTATIVES OF JORDAN AND ISRAEL IN DOCUMENTS S/8473, S/8443, S/8484, AND S/8486,

HAVING NOTED FURTHER THE SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF UNTSO AS CONTAINED IN DOCUMENTS S/7938/ADD.64 AND ADD.65,

CONSIDERING THAT ALL VIOLENT INCIDENTS AND OTHER VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE SHOULD BE PREVENTED,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-267  
By cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 USUN N. 04261 230950Z

RECALLING RESOLUTION 236 (1967) BY WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNED ANY AND ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE,

OBSERVING THAT THIS MILITARY ACTION BY THE ARMED FORCES OF ISRAEL ON THE TERRITORY OF JORDAN WAS OF A LARGE-SCALE AND CAREFULLY PLANNED NATURE,

RECALLING FURTHER RESOLUTION 237 (1967) WHICH CALLED UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO ENSURE THE SAFETY, WELFARE AND SECURITY OF THE INHABITANTS OF THE AREAS WHERE MILITARY OPERATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE,

PAGE 4 RUEHDT 4261 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. DEPLORES THE LOSS OF LIFE AND HEAVY DAMAGE TO PROPERTY;
2. CONDEMNS THIS MILITARY ACTION LAUNCHED BY ISRAEL IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND OF THE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTIONS;
3. DECLARES THAT ACTIONS OF MILITARY REPRISALS AND OTHER GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF CEASEFIRE CANNOT BE TOLERATED AND THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER SUCH EFFECTIVE STEPS OR MEASURES AS ENVISAGED IN THE CHARTER TO ENSURE AGAINST REPETITION OF SUCH ACTS;
4. CALLS UPON ISRAEL TO DESIST FROM ACTS OR ACTIVITIES IN CONTRAVENTION OF RESOLUTION 237 (1967);
5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO KEEP THE SITUATION UNDER REVIEW AND TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS APPROPRIATE.
5. AFTER THIS REVISED TEXT MADE AVAILABLE TO ALL, SC MEMBERS AGREED TO ADJOURN UNTIL NOON MAR 23 TO ALLOW GOVTS TO GET INSTRUCTIONS. WE THEN HELD FINAL MEETING WITH FRIENDLY MEMBERS OF SC (CAN, DENMARK, CHINA, UK, AND TWO LAs) TO ADVISE THEM OF RESULTS OF MEETING JUST CONCLUDED WITH AFRO-ASIANS. WE STATED THAT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 34 USUN N 34261 230953Z

A) AFRO-ASIANS INDICATED THERE WOULD BE "NO PROBLEM" IN REVISING PREAMBULAR PARAS 2 AND 3 OF TEXT IN PARA 4 ABOVE, TO ACCOMMODATE OUR DESIRE FOR GREATER BALANCE;

PAGE 5 RUEMDT 4261 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B) WE FELT CONFIDENT AFRO-ASIANS WOULD AGREE (EL-FARRA TOLD GOLDBERG THIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO JORDAN), IN FINAL ANALYSIS, TO REVISE FIRST PREAMBULAR PARA TO READ:

~~"HAVING HEARD THE STATEMENTS OF THE REPS OF JORDAN AND ISRAEL,~~

(PRESENT LANGUAGE IN AFRO-ASIAN DRAFT IS UNBALANCED SINCE IT MAKES NO MENTION OF ISRAELI COMPLAINT OR STATEMENTS RE TERRORISM);

C) WE BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE ADDED ANOTHER PREAMBULAR PARA, DRAWN FROM ES-SAMU-RES, ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: ~~"CONSIDERING THAT ALL VIOLENT INCIDENTS AND OTHER VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE SHOULD BE PREVENTED, AND NOT OVERLOOKING PAST INCIDENTS OF THIS NATURE"~~

D) WE ALSO BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE ADDITIONAL OP PARA (NEW PARA 4) READING: ~~"DEPLORES ALL VIOLENT INCIDENTS AND OTHER VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE WHICH MUST BE SCRUPULOUSLY OBSERVED BY ALL CONCERNED"~~. MOST OF FRIENDLIES AGREED SUCH CHANGES DESIRABLE, THOUGH IT NOT CERTAIN THEY WILL PROVE WILLING TO PRESS FOR CHANGED, PARTICULARLY (C) AND (D), AS VIGOROUSLY AS WE.

5. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MOVE ALGERIANS AND OTHER AFRO-ASIANS AWAY FROM THEIR EARLY AND EXTREME DRAFT RESES (MAR 21 DRAFT CONTAINED USUN 4251) AND MAR 22 MODIFICATION ENT USUN TO TEXT CONTAINED IN PARA 4 ABOVE. THIS HAS BEEN POSSIBLE BECAUSE WE HAVE HAD BACKIN OF ENOUGH FRIENDLY MEMBERS OF SC (2 LAS, UY, CANADA, DENMARK, CHINA), AS WELL AS CERTAIN DEGREE OF SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING FROM ETHIOPIA, SO THAT THERE HAS NOT BEEN MAJORITY FOR EXTREME RES.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 05 USUN N 04251 233950Z

PAGE 6 RUEHDT 4261 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7. WHILE WE WILL MAKE FURTHER EFFORTS TOMORROW TO ACHIEVE FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN DRAFT RES CONTAINED PARA 4 ABOVE, WE ARE NOT AT ALL HOPEFUL WE WILL BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE ANY MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS. FOR, ON BASIS ATTITUDES EXPRESSED IN CONSULTATIONS LATE IN PM, WE ANTICIPATE SITUATION WHEREIN SOME FRIENDLY MEMBERS (E.G., UK, CHINA, AND PERHAPS DENMARK AND CANADA) WILL PROBABLY BE WILLING ACCEPT DRAFT RES IN PARA 4 WITH ONLY MINIMAL CHANGES; IF THIS IS CASE, THEY UNLIKELY TO STAND WITH US IF WE INSIST ON MAJOR CHANGES.

8. ISRAELIS HAVE TOLD US THEY ARE NOT AT ALL SATISFIED WITH DRAFT IN PARA 4, TAKING PARTICULAR EXCEPTION TO LACK OF ANY EXPLICIT MENTION IN OPERATIVE SECTION OF TERRORISM, SABOTAGE OR INFILTRATION.

9. DESPITE THEIR DISSATISFACTION, WE RECOMMEND THAT, GIVEN SITUATION WE ANTICIPATE, ~~WE BE GIVEN AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT DRAFT RES CONTAINED IN PARA 4 WITH AS MANY IMPROVEMENTS AS WE ARE ABLE TO ACHIEVE. THIS WILL DEPEND ON HOW ATTITUDES OF FRIENDLY MEMBERS ON SC SHAPE UP AFTER THEY RECEIVE COMMENTS AND INSTRUCTIONS RE TODAY'S DEVELOPMENTS FROM THEIR CAPITALS.~~

GP-3.

GOLDBERG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, March 23, 1968  
10:10 a. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This report to me on Soviet  
handling of Robert Kennedy's candidacy  
is mildly interesting.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By AG, NARA, Date 3/31/92

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

15a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 22, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Robert Kennedy's Candidacy

You might be interested in the reaction of the Soviet press and radio to Robert Kennedy's candidacy.

Moscow Radio reported the announcement on March 16 without comment except to say that Kennedy had been critical of U. S. policy in Southeast Asia and had promised a "new policy" to "end the bloodshed in Vietnam." American observers were quoted as saying that Kennedy's chances of gaining the Presidency were fairly good.

On March 19, Izvestia presented the "opportunist" view of the timing of Kennedy's entrance into the race. Nevertheless, the article paraphrased his remarks at his March 16 press conference and March 17 Meet-the-Press appearance to give the impression that the fundamental issue was a difference in principle between Kennedy and the President on Vietnam.

Back in January an Izvestia article called McCarthy a stalking horse for Kennedy, who would himself take the reins for the Democrats challenging the President and his foreign policy if McCarthy attracted sizable voter interest in the primaries. The article also speculated that Kennedy might run for Vice President on President Johnson's ticket for the sake of the Democratic victory and Kennedy's own later ambitions.

In early March, the Soviet Press Attache said in conversation that Soviet media have orders not to make direct personal attacks on the President or potential Presidential candidates.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-269  
By lip, NARA Date 2-19-97

ND  
Nathaniel Davis~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, March 23, 1968  
9:15 a. m.

*Pres. file*

Mr. President:

At Khe Sanh:

- 642 enemy rounds;
- 1443 outgoing;
- 299 sorties plus 54 B-52's;
- 227 tons delivered;
- weather holds good.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988  
By rg, NARA, Date 4-17-92

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988  
By rg, NARA, Date 4-17-92

~~SECRET~~

17a

Saturday, March 23, 1968, 8:40 a. m.

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number forty-eight on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ/A Shau Valley area for the 24-hour period of March 22, 1968.

There was an enemy surge in indirect fire at Khe Sanh. During the reporting period, 642 incoming rounds were recorded as compared to the previous four day average of 135 rounds. Approximately half were artillery (300); the other incoming were mortar (250) and rockets (92). Six Marines were killed, twenty-four wounded with nine requiring evacuation. Incoming enemy fire destroyed an ammunition supply point containing an undetermined amount of mixed caliber white phosphorous and illumination ammunition, 155mm high explosives ammunition, and demolition kits. Although B and C batteries, 13th Marines, temporarily ceased fire, due to close proximity of supply point explosions, none of their gun position ammunition was hit. One hundred and one artillery missions were fired in support of the base, expending 1443 rounds, none of which were COFRAM. Thirty-nine fire missions were observer directed.

Visibility remained good during the period allowing 44 resupply sorties to be flown. Eighteen Air Force aircraft and 26 Marine helicopters delivered 227.5 short tons of supply and 91 replacements. Twelve tons of air delivery equipment was back loaded from Khe Sanh for reuse.

Tactical air sorties totaled 299 in the Niagara area. Tactical air bomb damage assessment included seven enemy killed, seven secondary explosions, twelve secondary fires, fourteen weapons positions destroyed, one truck destroyed, six trucks damaged and nine road cuts.

Nine ARC LIGHT strikes, with fifty-four sorties were scheduled in the Niagara area. Three sorties were diverted to a secondary target due to equipment malfunction. Four strikes were 1200 - 1500 meters from friendly forces, one strike was 2800 meters away.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/88  
By rg NARA, Date 4-17-92

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
By rg NARA, Date 4-17-92

DAYS SUPPLY  
ON HAND

PREVIOUS STATUS  
8:00 PM 21 Mar EST  
(9:00 AM 22 Mar SVN)

c. Antipersonnel

ROUNDS ON HAND

106-mm BHEIIVE

1,517

CLASS V (COFRAM)

|                        |    |         |
|------------------------|----|---------|
| 105-mm howitzer        | 5  | 5 days  |
| 155-mm howitzer        | 5  | 5 days  |
| 40-mm grenade launcher | 5  | 5 days  |
| Hand Grenades          | 10 | 10 days |

2. On 22 March, Khe Sanh was resupplied with 227.5 short tons as follows:

|               |           |
|---------------|-----------|
| CLASS I       | 47.5 tons |
| CLASS II      | 31.5 tons |
| CLASS III     | 13.5 tons |
| CLASS IV      | 16 tons   |
| CLASS V       | 119 tons  |
| MISCELLANEOUS | None      |



W. E. SHEDD  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:

SECDEF  
DEP SECDEF  
CJCS (3)  
DJS (3)  
J-30  
J-31  
J-32  
J-33  
J-34  
J-4  
AWR  
MCCC  
AFCP  
NFP  
DDO  
ADDO  
CCOC  
PAC DIV  
PAC DESK

SECRET



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

23 March 1968  
4:30 AM EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Kho Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST  
22 March (9:00 AM 23 March, SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)  
status as of the above time is as follows:

|                                 | <u>DAYS SUPPLY<br/>ON HAND</u> | <u>PREVIOUS STATUS<br/>8:00 PM 21 Mar EST<br/>(9:00 AM 22 Mar SVN)</u> |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|
| <u>CLASS I (Rations)</u>        |                                |  |
| Meal, Combat, Individual        | 22                             | 22 days  |
| B Rations                       | 6                              | 7 days   |
| <u>CLASS II (Fuel)</u>          |                                |  |
| Aviation Gass (AVGAS)           | 3                              | 3 days   |
| JP-4 Fuel (Jet Fuel)            | 10.6                           | 10.6 days  |
| Motor Gasoline (NOGAS)          | 12.2                           | 12.8 days  |
| Diesel                          | 10.6                           | 13.6 days  |
| <u>CLASS V (Ammunition)</u>     |                                |  |
| a. High Explosive               |                                |  |
| 60-mm mortar                    | 53                             | 55 days  |
| 81-mm mortar                    | 29                             | 29 days  |
| 90-mm (Tank)                    | 133                            | 133 days   |
| 4.2" mortar                     | 31                             | 31 days  |
| 105-mm howitzer                 | 22                             | 22 days  |
| 155-mm howitzer                 | 27                             | 26 days  |
| b. Antitank                     |                                |  |
|                                 |                                | <u>ROUNDS ON HAND</u>  |
| 90-mm AP-T                      |                                | 329  |
| 90-mm HEAT                      |                                | 1,202  |
| 66-mm rocket (LAW)              |                                | 2,981  |
| Antitank mines (M-15)           |                                | 291  |
| Antitank mines (M-19)           |                                | 469  |
| Antitank mines (M-21)           |                                | 0  |
| 106-mm HEAT                     |                                | 1,480  |
| 106-mm recoilless rifle (HBP-T) |                                | 2,087  |
| 3.5" rocket                     |                                | 3,305  |

DECLASSIFIED

EO 12356, Sec 3.3

DA Memo, Jan 5, 1988

By: [Signature] NAFV DAB 4-17-92

During the next 24 hours, 295 tactical air sorties and eight ARC LIGHT strikes are planned in support of Khe Sanh. The weather is forecast to remain clear to partly cloudy with good visibility.

Along the DMZ, one ground contact was reported. H Company, 4th Marines was in contact with an unknown number of enemy from mid-morning until 5:00 p. m., southeast of Gio Linh. Six Marines were wounded and evacuated. Enemy losses are unknown. Elsewhere in Quang Tri Province, contacts and casualties were light, with no major ground action. Total casualties in the 3rd Marine Division area for the period were six Marines killed, 33 wounded (18 evacuated) and 12 enemy killed.

Air reconnaissance and photo missions flown in A Shau yesterday detected 13 trucks in turn outs along Route 548. This is the largest concentration of vehicles noted in sometime. No strike results available.

18

INFORMATION

Saturday, March 23, 1968  
9:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Quite objectively, I find this speech of my brother Geney one of the best administration statements made for a long time.

The manner in which he links the challenge of race and the cities to the problem of Vietnam is, ~~what~~ I believe, right and helpful.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Pres file

The Cost of Fealty

by

Eugene V. Rostow  
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Address Before  
Manchester, New Hampshire Chamber of Commerce  
March 22, 1968

An American election is and should be an educational process, a process of sifting and canvassing the great issues of policy which the nation faces. But an election is something more than a seminar. It is also a regenerative process - a communion through which we draw fresh strength from the source of all authority in a democracy, the mandate of the people's will.

The election we face this year is one of the most important in a generation. It will be dominated by two immense issues, each central to our history, and to our fate.

One is the challenge to make good at long last our promise of equality to the Negro. From the beginnings of the nation, more than three hundred years ago, Americans have lived with inner tension about the status of the Negro in American society. Slavery, and after slavery, racial discrimination, were accepted by custom and sanctioned by law. But the conscience of the community and the conscience of the law knew these customs were evil, contrary to the most fundamental ideal of our life as a community, the principle "that all men are created equal."

Through a long and painful series of stages, we have sought from the beginnings of the Republic to remake society in the image of this ideal. Within the last few years, under the powerful leadership of President Johnson, the nation has made giant strides to fulfill in action the pledge

of honor we made so long ago, and have so long neglected.

Our new programs in the field of education, welfare and urban affairs seek to initiate irreversible flows of change. They undertake to create new opportunities for the Negro in education, in the economy, in his freedom to live, to work, and to study where he chooses, and to take advantage of every opportunity his talents may command. And we are seeking also to help the Negro, and others who have been disadvantaged by inheritance, to overcome the handicaps of the past, and step through the door in dignity as full members of American society.

These processes of change have costs. They stir resistance, and revive cruel patterns of inhumanity. The contest between the actual and the ideal is never easy, and is often bitter. Today the challenge and the burden of

our problems of poverty, of crime and of protest have been made clear. President Johnson is asking us to honor our pledges, and to carry this burden. Some people would now retreat, discouraged by the costs our national commitment entails. But most of us know we must not falter. No American can doubt the outcome. The values of our Constitutional tradition are the strongest force in our minds, and in our hearts. They will prevail, because they must.

## II

The second great issue in the election will be our foreign policy. Like every other citizen, I welcome the recent intensification of debate about our foreign policy, and particularly about our course in Viet-Nam. Foreign policy is too serious a matter to be left to the experts, or even to the State Department. It must be understood and

accepted by the people if it is to have the strength of the nation behind it.

The debate over foreign policy has many parallels to the debate over Negro rights. Like that debate, it requires us to determine what kind of people we are, and how we propose to meet the tasks which have come to our hands.

The issue of foreign policy we are facing in the election, make no mistake about it, is not alone our policies in Viet-Nam, but whether we continue on the path we have followed since the war, or seek once more to retreat into the isolationism of the nineteenth century, as we did in 1920.

The issue was clearly and correctly posed by Senator Fulbright in his statement on March 11, opening the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's examination of Secretary Rusk.

The distinguished Senator pointed out that the American people are "aroused and disturbed" about the issues of the day, particularly about Viet-Nam. The present policies of the United States, he said, call into question what he called one of the traditional values of America. "There was a time not long ago when Americans believed that whatever else they might have to do in the world - whatever wars they might have to fight, whatever aid they might have to provide - their principal contribution to the world would be their own example as a decent and democratic society." The fading of this dream, he said, was dimming the light of optimism among the American people. He pointed to fears of another summer of violence, to an unpopular war, and to what he called a "spiritual rebellion" among many of our youth.

I share the Senator's conviction that this is a time of testing in our history. But I do not believe these two great tests, in our cities, and in Viet-Nam, came about as aberrant phenomena, or as acts of human will contrary to the course of our national development.

Senator Fulbright is perfectly right in saying that we once thought our main contribution to the world should be the force of our example as a model society at home. That belief came to have a tenacious hold on the American spirit because of the circumstances of our life before 1914. For more than a century, we lived in a system of international order maintained by the European nations. We were safe in that system, and never had to take responsibility for its functioning.

But the old system of order has gone, and cannot be restored. Our safety as a nation now requires us to take the lead in helping to construct a new system of peace, built around regional coalitions that could deter aggression, and organize the conditions of progress. We have not sought this responsibility. It has come to us because the old condition of peace has vanished, and a new one has not yet been born. We must participate in the effort because our national security depends upon our success.

The ideal of which Senator Fulbright spoke so feelingly has become an illusion. Our security cannot be protected by a quick intervention abroad, followed by a return to the comfortable patterns of the nineteenth century. For the first time in our experience as a nation, we must deal directly and continuously with the problem of power, and the effort to continue it within a system of agreed rules: - the rules of

a new international law.

That fact defines our role in the world, now and for as far ahead as we can foresee. We are now engaged in the painful effort to accept that fact, and to clear our minds of notions about ourselves which are no longer relevant.

It is necessarily a difficult effort, requiring us to confront cherished memories, and hopes, and dreams. But reality is implacable, and cannot be exorcised by prayer. Senator Fulbright says this means the end of optimism. I should rather say it marks the end of innocence.

We are involved today in Viet-Nam, as in our cities, because commitments we made, in quieter times, are being put to the test. We made a commitment to give our Negro citizens true equality - we cannot now give up on that commitment because its fulfillment is difficult, more difficult perhaps than many may have expected. We have made commitments to

our friends in the world, first in Europe, then in Asia, to help them resist aggression. I propose to you that we cannot now give up those commitments - made with open eyes, and with the support of both political parties, representing an overwhelming majority of our people - because they too are more difficult than we may have hoped they would be.

Since the Administration of President Truman, since the days when the voice of Senator Vandenberg was heard in the Senate, most Americans have been convinced that our own freedom at home has depended upon stability in the world. The experience of two wars, and of the tragic, fumbling period between the wars, brought home to us the fact that American freedom cannot exist behind fortress walls, with hostile forces dominating large parts of a contracting world outside.

After the Second World War ended, and the threat of Communist aggression became clear to us, we Americans realized that we could not again retreat to isolation, and leave the rest of the world to its own devices. We had no quarrel with the institution of Communism within the Soviet Union. We have no quarrel today with any state simply because it has adopted a socialist system. But we recognized that Communist aggression, like Nazi aggression, could not be tolerated. When the Communists threatened to use force, we made clear our willingness to reply with force. This is the essence of the Truman Doctrine - called forth by Communist designs in Greece and Turkey.

Following that Doctrine, successive American Presidents have faced down Communist aggression time and time again - in Greece and Turkey, in Iran, in Berlin, in Korea and in Cuba. On each occasion, we have made it perfectly clear that we

were not trying to destroy the Communists in their own countries, but only helping others to resist Communist aggression in the non-Communist world.

In this assumption the basic foreign policy of President Eisenhower was the same as President Truman's and indeed, as that of President Kennedy and now of President Johnson.

All four administrations also recognized that besides the naked use of force, there are other means by which an aggressive power can menace another. While these means include the threat of force, they do not require its use. These means can be described by the term subversion - that is, preying upon economic weakness and political and social discontent to undermine a state which harbors them. We came to see that this form of aggression could not be countered by soldiers and alliances alone - that the causes of the grievances had to be faced. This was the origin of the

Marshall Plan, Point Four, and the programs of economic assistance supported by every administration since then.

The United States supports progress and democracy wherever its influence can reach. We do this because such ideas are deep in our nature, and because we know that only progressive societies can develop the inner strength to resist take-over from within, or from without.

In the 1940's, the major thrust of Communist aggression was Europe - Greece and Turkey, then Berlin. As the nations of Europe achieved military security - through NATO - and economic and political stability, Communist aggression found new outlets in Asia. In Korea, Americans demonstrated that aggression on the shores of the Pacific could no more be tolerated than in the North Atlantic area. We halted aggression in Korea, and we took steps to prevent its spread

elsewhere in Asia. Programs of economic assistance, from South Korea to Indonesia, have helped to build economic and political stability, and helped to reduce the danger of subversion. Defense agreements, with Japan, with South Korea and the Republic of China, with Australia and New Zealand, and with our allies in the SEATO treaty, have reduced the threat of overt aggression.

In many places in Asia, we have had notable successes. Dramatic improvements have been registered in such countries as Pakistan, Thailand, the Republic of China and South Korea. Others, like Indonesia, have recently taken highly encouraging steps to put themselves on the road to steady economic growth and progress.

But there is no point in fooling ourselves by looking only at the bright spots. Both local and international

Communist forces continue in their determination to overwhelm their neighbors, both through outright force and through subversion. At the moment, the Communist offensive is focused on Viet-Nam. But what is being attacked is more than one country, it is our whole position in Asia and, in fact, the worth of America's pledges throughout the world.

As long as these pledges required some substantial, but not overwhelming sums for foreign aid, and a considerable, but not massive concentration of military force in the area, the great majority of Americans, in both parties, in both Houses of Congress, accepted them as a necessary development in our nation's, in the world's, history. Our reason told us they were right. Our hearts, our personal lives were little touched by them.

Today, these pledges are being put to a real test - they cost us something more substantial, in money, and in lives. They affect each of us personally. They can no longer, like the Supreme Court's decision on integration, be neatly hung on the wall, to receive an occasional pious glance. Do we still want to back them up? We must choose. We can say "Well, all this talk, all these pledges about helping nations resist aggression are all fine and good - but this isn't what we thought they meant. Sorry, but you'll have to excuse us now - it costs too much."

Or, we can say, with the late President Kennedy:

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

The choice is ours - but let us know what it means. Three Administrations have given their word not to abandon South Viet-Nam. Fortified by our support, local leaders in Viet-Nam and in neighboring countries have risked their necks, marshalled their own forces, and stood up to the Communists. We should have no illusions about what will happen to these people if we abandon them now, nor of the effect of our withdrawal on free people around the world who have shown their willingness to work and struggle to build their nations, and join with us in creating an open world society based on the idea of freedom and of progress.

The credibility of the US commitment to each of these countries will stand or fall on our willingness to keep our commitments to the Vietnamese. In theory, there may be better places to fight; in fact, we have no real alternative.

### III

What is it that makes Viet-Nam so different, so disturbing? For one thing, as I have said, it is an acid test of our commitments - it demonstrates how serious they are, it demonstrates that being a great power necessarily involves great burdens. For another, it is a war unlike any we have fought before.

It is different in its origins. Here there was no Lusitania, no Pearl Harbor, no massive attack across the 38th parallel. But was it any less of an act of aggression when, as early as 1957, Ho Chi Minh ordered those of his supporters whom he left behind in the South after the Geneva Accords to pick up their hidden arms and begin a campaign of terror that has seen about 14,000 civilians killed, and another 45,000 kidnapped since its inception? Is it any less

of an act of aggression when other Communists trained in the North after the Geneva Accords were sent back South to forcibly change the system in that half of the country? Is it any less of an act of aggression when both sides speak the same language, and consider themselves part of one nation? The Germans too are one nation - involuntarily divided. They were promised their unity through free elections, which the Soviets have refused to consider. Yet no one believes that these facts give them the right to reunify their country by force of arms.

The war in Viet-Nam is also different in the way it is being fought. It is a war in which the election of a village chief, the grant of a title to land, the actions of a youth group in rebuilding a Saigon slum are of crucial importance. These events cannot occur unless there is a military shield.

And the military shield will be of no avail unless they occur. It is a war in which 500,000 Americans are engaged, and yet one which only the Vietnamese can really win.

It is not easy for a great nation to send its troops overseas to a distant and strange continent, not to fight by themselves, or in alliance with peoples of similar background, but to fight in support of a people whose traditions and attitudes are different from its own, a people whose experience in self-government is limited, a people whose capacity to govern itself has never really been tested.

Much has been said about the South Vietnamese, these people we find so difficult to understand. We are told their devotion to self-interest and self-aggrandizement dominates all other sentiments - that it places in question their very will to win in the war we are engaged in together.

How can we hope to succeed with such Allies?

Let me take a moment to read some slightly edited excerpts from a few diplomatic despatches which illustrate the kind of exasperated feeling many of us seem to have. I quote:

"The majority of.....[them] were chosen for their political views....with no regard to the complex administrative tasks they have to perform... As soon as someone does begin to distinguish himself, personal jealousies and the principle of never allowing another's star to rise soon serve to get him out of the way...

"A businessman....., placed in charge of foreign affairs, resigned under suspicion of using state secrets to his own commercial advantage...

"It pains me to have to report that financial probity and the separation of public good and private gain are not among the

qualities which grace this young Republic... All of its officials are making exorbitant personal profits. Self-interest is dominant everywhere; it is not condemned, but unabashedly practiced... Commercial cupidity is indeed a distinguishing characteristic of the citizens...and will certainly influence the future of the Republic...

"I will not recall here my previous remarks on the questions which divide them... and on the arrangements... which result in uncoordinated efforts, indecision, delay in numerous essential operations, and in the impossibility of taking necessary steps which the resources of the State would otherwise permit...

"This lack of order, in the whole and in its parts, has existed from the beginning..., and has often placed the young Republic in danger... If the enemy... is as aggressive

as we have all too often seen him to be before, as confident and as courageous, he won't find much resistance.

"[Their soldiers] are permitted to hire substitutes...

"[Their officers] are unrestrained in their ambitions to command and in their vanity for rank and titles. This epidemic disease grows faster here than anywhere else in the world..."

It is a wonder that the official who received these reports did not throw up his hands and urge his superiors to give up a bad project. We can all consider ourselves fortunate that the Count de Vergennes, Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of France, had a little more patience with our Continental Congress, and with the American Army, than M. Gerard, the French Minister to Philadelphia, demonstrated in these lines he wrote in 1778. Perhaps we should all emulate Vergennes' patience in reading reports about our Vietnamese allies,

and their will to win.

The reports I cited, like some we receive from Viet-Nam, have good sensational content. Most of the others in the collection from which they were drawn show the firm will of the Americans to succeed, despite their problems. Relative to those I read you, they make dull reading. So too, I suppose, are the daily reports on the number of Vietnamese men and women who give their lives every day - not in dramatic battles - but in the defense of hamlets and villages throughout the country. That these deaths surpassed ours last year, and were double ours during the Tet offensive, likewise seems to attract little attention. Nor do we recall that the 700,000 Vietnamese bearing arms today, relative to population, are the equivalent of about 8,000,000 in the United States. We are all aware that, until recently, 18 and 19-year old Vietnamese were excluded from the draft. Now let us all note

that they will be part of the 135,000 new recruits President Thieu has pledged to add to the Vietnamese Armed Forces this year. We are all aware of negative evaluations of the ability of these men - but we forget the evaluations given by General Westmoreland, or the simple statistics which show that whereas once the Vietnamese armed forces lost twice as many weapons to the Communists as they captured, they have now reversed the ratio to about 1 - 1.5 in their favor.

We are all aware of the corruption of some Vietnamese officials, but the reports on those dismissed for it - on every level - rarely attract attention. Nor, it seems to me, is much attention given to the bold measures now being taken to eliminate the roots and causes of corruption throughout the Vietnamese government.

No one recognizes the need to combat corruption more than President Thieu, who has called it "a shame for the whole nation." In a radio address given just yesterday, President Thieu pledged to his people: "I will not pass up any infraction...I shall not treat with indulgence any clearly established case of corruption..., in the present and in the future."

I am not proposing that we should ignore the Vietnamese' faults. I ask only that we, like the Count de Vergennes in reading of those of our forefathers, weigh them against less dramatic, but concrete, realities. In making our criticisms, let us also recall that we went through exactly the same cycle of complaints about the government and fighting forces of South Korea, eighteen years ago.

Finally, our effort in Viet-Nam is different in what we and our Allies hope to win. We seek no Kaiser going into exile, no Nazi state to be uncompromisingly destroyed, no unconditional surrender aboard the Battleship Missouri. We plan no occupation, no residue of military bases. Of Ho Chi Minh, we ask only that he cease trying to impose his system upon South Viet-Nam by force. We have no quarrel with that system which exists in North Viet-Nam - no reservations as to how the two states, once at peace, should resolve their common interests and problems. For the South Vietnamese, we have no textbooks in Jeffersonian Democracy, no formulas of the "American Way" - we want no more than that they develop, in peace, their own Vietnamese state, in keeping with their own aspirations and traditions. For the Viet-Cong, we foresee no Nuremberg trials, no forced exile similar to that into which Ho Chi Minh sent nearly nine hundred thousand of his

countrymen. The Government of South Viet-Nam has made it quite clear, in word, and in deed, that it is quite willing to open its arms to any Viet-Cong who renounces armed insurrection, and to permit him to aspire to whatever position his talents, or his popular role, can bring him.

President Thieu has said that while he cannot recognize the NLF as a rival government of South Viet-Nam, he is prepared for informal talks with individuals now associated with the NLF, which might bring good results. President Johnson has stressed, most recently in his television interview on December 19, that we should welcome such contacts, and would support arrangements that might be made to build the public life of South Viet-Nam on the principle of one-man, one-vote.

For ourselves, finally, what we want is the same as what we wanted in Korea, to convince the aggressor that he cannot win, to demonstrate that we will not tolerate the success of

of Communist military aggression, direct or indirect, in Asia any more than in Europe.

These are modest objectives. They are, you will note, essentially political objectives. They are objectives that demand that the enemy surrender nothing that is his - neither the freedom of the North Vietnamese State nor that of the Viet-Cong as citizens of the South. They are objectives which the Administration believes could, and should, best be obtained not on the battlefield, but at the negotiating table.

There are many critics and commentators who tell us we must stop seeking a solution in the political and military arenas of South Viet-Nam, and negotiate.

Have these critics really found something new? Is it really an unexplored area the Administration fears to venture into? I believe the facts show the opposite

is true - that there is no one in this country who has given more time, more thought, and more action to the question of negotiations than President Johnson.

We have made and continue to make any number of approaches to negotiations. We have pressed for effective actions by the United Nations Security Council. But Hanoi totally rejects the competence of the UN - and the Soviet Union has uncompromisingly reflected its ally's attitude. So, that channel has been closed to us.

We have turned to North Viet-Nam. Over and over again, directly and through intermediaries, we have offered to discuss any question, any time, without preconditions of any sort by either side. If the larger questions were still too much for Hanoi to consider, we have offered on several occasions to engage the other side in discussions of some form of mutual de-escalation of violence, leading perhaps to a cease-fire,

or at least improving the atmosphere for more substantive discussions. They have refused.

Hanoi has claimed that the bombing raids north of the 17th parallel were the impediment to talks. We heard them. In May of 1965, and again, for 37 days in December that year and January, 1966, we stopped the bombing outright. We now know that Hanoi used this latter pause to undertake a major increase in its infiltration into the South. In respect for Vietnamese tradition, we continued to stop the bombing over the holiday truce periods. This year, as you know, Hanoi honored its promises of a seven-day military standdown during Tet by launching a long-planned major attack on Saigon and urban centers throughout the country.

In the Spring of 1966, when Hanoi began talking of a "permanent" cessation of the bombing, we indicated our

willingness to consider this and asked only for some restraints on their part in turn. Mindful of their sense of face, we made it clear to Hanoi that we required no public announcements, and made no demands for immediate action. No answer. In February, 1967, the President wrote to Ho Chi Minh and offered to stop the bombing and the reinforcement of US troops in Viet-Nam if Ho would stop its infiltration. The offer was brusquely dismissed.

Later in 1967, first privately, then publicly, we offered what is now called the San Antonio formula. We proposed a halt to the bombing, provided only that it led to productive discussions within a reasonable time. We would assume that the Communists not take military advantage of our doing so. From late August to mid-October, while discussions on the

formula were under way through third parties, we restrained our bombing in the Hanoi area, just as we had in the first quarter of the year, when we had hopes of arriving at something through direct contacts in Moscow. Hanoi broke contact.

After North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Trinh's statement of December 29, we again undertook explorations as to the possibilities of working from this statement towards agreement on the San Antonio formula. And again showed restraint in our bombing in the Hanoi area.

To clear up the persistent misunderstanding that we were trying to exact conditions from Hanoi, Secretary of Defense Clifford made clear that we did not interpret the San Antonio formula to mean that it must stop normal levels of assistance to the Viet-Cong - but only that we assumed that Hanoi would not take undue advantage

of our pause to drastically increase these levels.

Nonetheless, the response to our explorations has been and remains negative.

We have sought also to engage the Soviet Union in talks about the problem of Viet-Nam - to enforce the Geneva Accords of 1954 and of 1962, and to consider de-escalation of its aid. Thus far, these approaches have not been productive.

This is the record of some of our efforts. We have left no stones unturned. We have made new approaches, and expressed the continued validity of our older approaches. From all the evidence, we must conclude today that Hanoi still hopes for a military victory, and is therefore unwilling to talk peace except on terms that would violate the legally expressed will of the South Vietnamese people by imposing a foreign dominated minority government upon them.

When this attitude changes, Hanoi will find us ready to talk, as we are now, as we have been. Negotiations are no unexplored alternative to us. Rather, our continued military action is the costly and regretted alternative to a negotiated settlement which we much prefer, but which Hanoi still refuses to explore with us.

There is, of course, the other alternative suggested to us - that of admitting that preventing aggression is only acceptable when it is cheap. This is the alternative of withdrawal. What would it mean for South East Asia? What would it mean, in the end, for America?

The nations of South East Asia today are as diverse as those in any part of the world - and they are developing, and relating to each other, and to the world, in a variety of ways which reflect this diversity. Virtually each of

them has been confronted by a Communist threat at some time in its history - most of them are still confronted by this threat today. They are meeting this threat on their own, without American combat troops, often without any formal ties of alliance to any country at all. In Indonesia, in Malaysia, active communist subversion has been successfully met. In Burma, in Thailand, in Cambodia, local forces continue to hold Communist insurgents in check. Yet, each of these countries is weak compared to the Alliance of China and North Viet-Nam. What has given them, what continues to give them, the confidence to resist?

In the first instance, it is their national and religious traditions - all of them contrary to Marxian Communism. Yet, history has shown them all that proud traditions alone cannot stop armies, cannot stop subversion or the conditions it feeds on.. What tips the balance, then, is their knowledge

that they are not alone. Their conviction that there is a great power, the United States, that is willing to help stop aggression. In Asia as well as in Europe, as long as this conviction is secure, as long as our willingness to assist remains credible, this confidence will remain. South East Asians will deal with their own problems, including insurgency and subversion.

If that confidence is removed, however, these nations would again feel themselves alone. Then, not even the most determined of the free governments of South East Asia could long resist the combination of external pressure and internal subversion the Communists employ. Indeed, most of them recognize there would be no point in resisting such pressure singlehanded. We could expect, then, that most of South East Asia would soon be under the control of one or the other of the Communist allies - which one hardly matters. Hanoi's

would be just as oppressive to the Lao or Cambodian as Peking's to the Burmese or Malaysian.

You need not take my word that our stand in Viet-Nam is the touchstone of that confidence. You need not take my word that our withdrawal from Viet-Nam, and the fall of that country to the Communists, would bring down the rest of South East Asia as well. Last July, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of neutral Singapore, pointed out:

"I feel the fate of Asia - South and South East Asia - will be decided in the next few years by what happens out in Viet-Nam. I mean, that this is the contest. Depending on how that is resolved, the rest of South and South East Asia will fall in place."

Of course, there are those who believe that wouldn't matter either - there are those who are perfectly willing to sacrifice South and South East Asia if that is what we must

do to "get out of Viet-Nam". But what then of India, what, eventually, of the rest of Asia? They would, at the least, be confronted with very grave dangers. And the United States might then be faced by the choice between not one but a number of massive interventions, on the one hand, or the possible collapse of all of Asia on the other.

I am not talking about "monolithic Communism." Even the State Department knows that Hanoi is not a simple satellite of Peking, and that a Communist Indonesia wouldn't be either. But it seems to me that an allinace of such states, and of others transformed into their images, would be no less dangerous to us than any single power dominating the region. We could then be confronted, in a contracting world of jets and missiles, with the threat of a hostile Asia - a threat comparable at least in its potentialities to the threat we recognized thirty years ago as a grave menace to our security.

No one, of course, can give ironclad guarantees about the course of history. But no responsible statesman has the right to close his eyes to its possibilities that lie within it - especially when his nation's security is at stake.

All of our recent Presidents have kept their eyes open. All of them recognized the dangers that could arise if aggression were to go unchecked. Today, however, because the costs are higher, President Johnson is being asked to close his eyes and to ignore the dangers - to us - which a unilateral withdrawal from Viet-Nam would entail. I am pleased to tell you he has no intention of doing that. He has no intention of ignoring the words with which his predecessor began his term of office - or the cautions of the other men who have held the office of the Presidency in the last twenty years. He has no intention of abandoning his quest for a just, negotiated peace in Viet-Nam - or of abandoning that

country before such a peace is attained.

The debate about our course in Viet-Nam has only begun. There is of course an outpouring of feeling and concern about our engagement in Viet-Nam. But protest is not necessarily policy. Thus far the issues have not been sharply defined. But the process of debate, particularly of debate under the fierce lights of an election, will require the contestants to declare themselves. It is natural for politicians to seek vantage points which will seem to offer new hopes for peace in a period of troubled opinion. But the American people will see through verbal formulas, or vague programs which pretend to be alternatives.

The critics of the Administration have not yet succeeded in defining an alternative to our policy in Viet-Nam. Save for the few who frankly advocate surrender, and others who would support a major expansion of our military effort, it is

impossible on analysis to discover in what respects the President's critics would modify his policy of firmness and restraint. They oppose unilateral withdrawal. So does the Administration. They favor negotiation with Hanoi, but so does the Administration which has explored literally hundreds of leads, only to find the other side hanging up the phone. They suggest negotiations with the NLF. But any reputable authority on Viet-Nam, whatever his position, understands that the Liberation Front is not essentially different from Hanoi and that the fundamental conflict in Viet-Nam is squarely between Communists and non-Communists. They favor enlisting the cooperation of the Soviet Union. We have sought to do so many times. They urge larger participation of South Vietnamese forces. That small country has just called another

135,000 men to the colors. True, some would try once again the device of suspending our bombing of North Viet-Nam. But they offer no reason to suggest that such a step would produce better results now than on the previous occasions it was tried.

The plain fact is that Hanoi is not ready to negotiate, save perhaps to preside at our ritual surrender. These are the facts which every American voter should consider very carefully in the months ahead.

INFORMATION

Friday  
March 22, 1968 -- 3:45 a. m.

SITUATION ROOM MEMORANDUM

*susp.*

SUBJECT: Latest Vietnam Situation Report

A check as of 3:15 EST indicates that there have been no ground offensive activities reported from any of the corps areas. The Khe Sanh Combat Base, however, has been receiving heavy mortar and artillery fire since approximately 6 a. m. EST this morning--a total of 465 rounds, two or three times the normal heavy rate.

W. W. Rostow

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W. W. Rostow

ACTION

Pres file

22

Friday, March 22, 1968  
1:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Was it your instruction that Arthur Goldberg take part in Advisory Group deliberations?

Sect. Rusk's notes -- I am told -- had that implication.

Sect. Rusk informs me that Arthur assumes that he has been invited and plans to come to dinner Monday night.

W. W. Rostow

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

INFORMATION

23

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Friday, March 22, 1968 - 12:20 pm

Mr. President:

This report on Tang's performance in the Delta since he assumed responsibility on February 29, is impressive because the CIA officer there is notable for his candid and toughminded reporting. In addition to the summary at the beginning, you may wish to note the marked passages on pages 8-11.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

TDCS db-315/00977-68  
19 March 1968

DECLASSIFIED  
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NLJ 96-272  
By us, NARA Date 2-2-78

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**SANITIZED**

CITE TDCS DB-315/00977-68

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

DIST 19 MARCH 1968

NLJ 96-271

By 110, NARA Date 4-2-98

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**FILE COPY**

- BOWDLE
- BUDGET
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- GUNTER
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- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KERRY
- LEE
- ROUS
- SANDERS
- TERRY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM  
 DOI 17 MARCH 1968  
 SUBJECT SITUATION APPRAISAL: ASSESSMENT OF GENERAL THANG'S PERFORMANCE AS IV CORPS COMMANDER AND OF THE SITUATION IN THE DELTA AS OF 15 MARCH 1968

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (16 MARCH 1968)

FIELD NO. [REDACTED]

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SOURCE [REDACTED] THIS IS A FIELD APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. IT IS NOT AN OFFICIAL JUDGMENT BY THIS AGENCY OR ANY COMPONENT. IT REPRESENTS [REDACTED] INTERPRETATIONS [REDACTED] BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE [REDACTED] AT THE TIME OF ITS PREPARATION.

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SUMMARY. THE SITUATION IN THE DELTA PROVINCES (IV CORPS TACTICAL ZONE) OF SOUTH VIETNAM IS NOT AS CRITICAL IN MID-MARCH AS IT WAS IN MID-FEBRUARY, BUT IT IS AS CRUCIAL AND WILL CONTINUE SO FOR THE NEXT TWO MONTHS. MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG HAS BEGUN TO REVITALIZE IV CORPS SINCE HIS ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND ON 29 FEBRUARY. GENERAL THANG DESCRIBES HIS PLANS AND PROGRAM WITH THE ONE WORD, "OFFENSIVE," AND FROM THE DAY OF HIS ARRIVAL HAS BEEN ENCOURAGING SUBORDINATE MILITARY LEADERS TO GO ON THE ATTACK. GENERAL THANG'S PROGRAM

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CALLS FOR THE MOBILIZATION OF ALL RESOURCES TO DESTROY VIET CONG (VC) MAIN FORCE UNITS, PROTECT LINES OF COMMUNICATION, RESTORE THE REGIONAL FORCES AND POPULAR FORCES, PRESS FORWARD WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND PUSH THE RECOVERY EFFORT. REGARDING CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION, GENERAL THANG SAYS THAT CIVILIANS MUST UNDERTAKE CIVIL DEFENSE MEASURES INCLUDING THE BUILDING OF SHELTERS AND MUST ORGANIZE TO CARE FOR REFUGEES. DURING FEBRUARY THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM WAS LOSING THE WAR PSYCHOLOGICALLY IN THE DELTA, BUT IT NOW APPEARS THAT GENERAL THANG HAS SUCCEEDED IN REVERSING THE POST-TET TREND OF THE WAR IN THE DELTA. VC MORALE IS CURRENTLY VERY VULNERABLE TO A SUDDEN REVERSAL OF THE WAR AND COULD QUICKLY CRACK IF THE VC COULD BE PERSUADED DURING THE NEXT TWO MONTHS THAT THEY WILL NOT ACHIEVE VICTORY IN EITHER THE SHORT OR LONG RUN. TO INFLICT A PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFEAT ON THE VC THERE MUST BE AGGRESSIVE AND EFFECTIVE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC MAIN FORCE UNITS, ATTACKS AGAINST VC SUPPLY LINES AND PENETRATION OF THEIR BASE AREAS.

END SUMMARY

1. MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG HAS BEGUN TO REVITALIZE IV CORPS SINCE HIS ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND ON 29 FEBRUARY. HIS IMMEDIATE PERSONAL IMPACT AND INITIAL ACTIONS WERE IMPRESSIVE, BUT THERE WAS REASON TO BE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ONE

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INDIVIDUAL, REGARDLESS OF HIS ABILITY AND POSITION, IN REVITA-  
 LIZING THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) ARMED FORCES AND PROVINCE  
 GOVERNMENTS IN THE DELTA THAT HAD FOR SO LONG BEEN USED TO CORRUPT  
 AND INEFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP. BY THE END OF GENERAL THANG'S FIRST  
 WEEK IN COMMAND, HOWEVER, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE SMALL STAFF  
 HE HAD BROUGHT WITH HIM FROM SAIGON IS ALSO EFFECTIVE, AWARE OF  
 THE SITUATION IN THE DELTA, DECISIVE IN REFLECTING HIS VIEWS AS  
 TO WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE, AND DETERMINED TO DO IT. WITH LEADER-  
 SHIP AT THE TOP IN SOME DEPTH, THE ENTIRE IV CORPS STAFF SWUNG  
 INTO LINE AND BEGAN WORKING AS IT NEVER HAD BEFORE.

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2. ON 9 MARCH, GENERAL THANG ASSEMBLED ALL THE PROVINCE  
 CHIEFS AND BRIEFED THEM ON HIS PLANS AND PROGRAM, WHICH HE SAID  
 CAN BE DESCRIBED BY ONE WORD, "OFFENSIVE." FROM THE DAY OF HIS  
 ARRIVAL, GENERAL THANG HAD BEEN URGING SUBORDINATE MILITARY  
 LEADERS TO GO ON THE OFFENSIVE, AND THE NUMBER OF BATTALIONS AND  
 COMPANIES ASSIGNED TO OFFENSIVE ROLES GRADUALLY INCREASED EACH  
 DAY. BY 14 MARCH THE NUMBER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS SCHEDULED FOR  
 THE DAY THROUGHOUT IV CORPS HAD REACHED THE UNPRECEDENTED TOTAL  
 OF 60: 2 DIVISIONAL, 8 REGIMENTAL, 9 SECTOR AND 41 SUBSECTOR  
 OPERATIONS. DURING THE SAME PERIOD THERE WERE ONLY 17 VIET CONG  
 (VC)-INITIATED OPERATIONS AND ALL WERE OF THE ECONOMY-OF-FORCE

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TYPE, THAT IS, 9 MORTAR ATTACKS AND 5 HARASSMENTS. ALSO ON 14 MARCH, 3392 VEHICLES TRAVELLED ON NATIONAL ROADS CONNECTING CITIES IN THE DELTA, AN INCREASE OF ROUGHLY 50 PERCENT WITHIN A FEW DAYS. IT NOW APPEARS THAT GENERAL THANG HAS SUCCEEDED IN REVERSING THE POST-TET TREND OF THE WAR IN THE DELTA WITHIN HIS FIRST TWO WEEKS IN COMMAND.

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3. DURING FEBRUARY THE GVN WAS LOSING THE WAR PSYCHOLOGICALLY IN THE DELTA. THE VC CAMPAIGN OF TERROR AND INTIMIDATION WAS EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE IN UNNERVING GVN LEADERSHIP AT THE CORPS AND PROVINCE LEVELS AND THIS WAS RAPIDLY COMMUNICATED TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND THE LOWER RANKS OF GVN ARMED FORCES WHO WITNESSED THE HASTY AND HEAVY DEFENSES PROVIDED TO HIGHER RANKING OFFICIALS AND GVN AND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) INSTALLATIONS AND THE RELATIVE ABSENCE OF DEFENSES TO PROTECT THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. AT A COST DURING THE LAST FEW WEEKS OF FEBRUARY OF ONLY A FEW THOUSAND MORTAR ROUNDS AND SOME GROUND PROBING ATTACKS AGAINST SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS, PLUS THE GENERATION OF A PROFUSION OF RUMORS OF THREATENED VC MASSIVE ATTACKS AGAINST THE TOWNS AND CITIES, THE VC MANAGED TO GAIN A VIRTUAL STRANGLEHOLD ON THE ECONOMY AND AROUND THE CITIES OF THE DELTA... BY MID-FEBRUARY A PALL OF GLOOM AND FEAR HUNG OVER THE DELTA. THERE WAS MUCH TALK

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AMONG SOUND AND SEASONED OBSERVERS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SIZEABLE DEFECTIONS FROM THE GVN ARMED FORCES IF THE VC SHOULD ATTACK IN STRENGTH. KNOWLEDGEABLE MILITARY OBSERVERS KNEW THAT THE VC COULD TAKE OVER FEW IF ANY OF THE CITIES AND TOWNS OF THE DELTA EVEN WITH A SERIES OF MASSIVE ASSAULTS IF THE GVN HAD THE WILL TO FIGHT, BUT IT WAS OBVIOUS DURING FEBRUARY THAT THE WILL TO FIGHT WAS EBBING. GENERAL MANH PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND EVEN CONTRIBUTED TO THE PESSIMISM BY HIS DEFENSE-ORIENTED ACTIONS. THIS WAS THE SITUATION IN THE DELTA WHEN GENERAL THANG TOOK OVER COMMAND AT 1600 HOURS ON 29 FEBRUARY.

4. THE IMPACT OF GENERAL THANG'S TAKEOVER OF COMMAND WAS FELT ALMOST INSTANTLY IN CAN THO. WITHIN ONE HOUR, BY 1700 HOURS ON 29 FEBRUARY, THE BARBED WIRE AND BUNKER POSITIONS THAT HAD BLOCKED HALF THE MAIN STREET IN FRONT OF GENERAL MANH'S WELL-DEFENDED RESIDENCE HAD BEEN REMOVED AND VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS WERE AGAIN PERMITTED TO USE THE STREET FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE TET. THIS HAD AN IMMEDIATE IMPACT ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. WITHIN TWO HOURS AFTER HE ASSUMED COMMAND, GENERAL THANG HAD ALSO ORDERED TWO RANGER BATTALIONS THAT HAD BEEN DEFENDING THE INNER PERIMETERS OF THE CITY AND

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THE ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS THAT HAD BEEN DEFENDING IV CORPS HEADQUARTERS AND THE CORPS COMMANDERS AND PROVINCE CHIEFS HOUSES TO MOVE IMMEDIATELY TO OFFENSIVE POSITIONS OUTSIDE THE CITY. THIS TOO HAD AN IMPACT ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND PROBABLY EVEN MORE SO ON ARVN.

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5. THE IMPACT OF GENERAL THANG'S LEADERSHIP IS, OF COURSE, BEING FELT MORE SLOWLY IN OTHER PARTS OF THE DELTA

THAN IN CAN THO, BUT HE IS FLYING DAILY TO VARIOUS PROVINCES AND BATTLE ZONES, AS ARE MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF. THE INCREASE IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS TESTIFIES TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE VISITS.

6. GENERAL THANG'S OFFENSIVE PROGRAM CALLS FOR THE MOBILIZATION OF ALL RESOURCES, INCLUDING CIVILIAN, TO FURTHER SIX PRIORITY OBJECTIVES AND TASKS, WHICH ARE AS FOLLOWS: (PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS WILL BE USED TO THE MAXIMUM IN ALL SIX EFFORTS.)

- A. DESTROY VC MAIN FORCE UNITS,
- B. PROTECT LINES OF COMMUNICATION,
- C. RESTORE REGIONAL FORCES AND POPULAR FORCES,
- D. PRESS FORWARD WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM,

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E. PROVIDE SECURITY FOR CITIES AND TOWNS AND

F. PUSH THE RECOVERY EFFORT.

7. REGARDING CIVILIAN MOBILIZATION, GENERAL THANG INFORMED SENIOR AMERICAN ADVISORS THAT THE CIVILIANS MUST BE TOLD THAT IT IS A FACT OF WAR THAT THE VC HAVE LONG-RANGE MORTARS AND ROCKETS, GVN MILITARY FORCES MUST BE DEPLOYED OFFENSIVELY, AND THE GVN CANNOT GUARANTEE THE PROTECTION OF ALL CITIES AND TOWNS AGAINST MORTAR ATTACKS. THE CIVILIANS MUST UNDERTAKE CIVIL DEFENSE MEASURES, INCLUDING THE BUILDING OF SHELTERS AGAINST MORTAR ATTACKS. HE SAID CIVILIANS MUST ALSO ORGANIZE TO CARE FOR REFUGEES AND ABSORB THEM FROM REFUGEE CENTERS INTO THEIR HOMES UNTIL DEVASTATED AREAS CAN BE CLEARED AND RECONSTRUCTION COMPLETED.

B. THE SITUATION IN THE DELTA IS NOT AS CRITICAL IN MID-MARCH AS IT WAS IN MID-FEBRUARY, BUT IT IS AS CRUCIAL AND WILL CONTINUE SO FOR THE NEXT TWO MONTHS. HAD THE SITUATION THAT PREVAILED THROUGHOUT FEBRUARY CONTINUED INTO MAY, THE VC MIGHT NOT HAVE WON ANY HEARTS, BUT THEY COULD WELL HAVE TURNED THE MINDS OF THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE DELTA POPULATION TO FAVOR AN END OF THE WAR AT ANY COST, INCLUDING A CAPITULATION OF THE GVN TO THE VC DEMANDS FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT.

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NEITHER SIDE HAS ANY PROSPECT IN THE SHORT RUN OF WINNING THE HEARTS OF THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE IN THE DELTA BECAUSE THEY ARE SICK AND TIRED OF THIS WAR, BUT OUR SIDE MUST GIVE FULL ATTENTION TO WINNING THE MINDS OF THE PEOPLE BY CONVINCING THEM THAT THE VC CAN NOT POSSIBLY WIN AND THAT THE WAR WILL END MOST QUICKLY IF THE PEOPLE LINE UP ON THE SIDE OF THE GVN.

9. ~~THERE IS A TIME IN EVERY MILITARY ENGAGEMENT WHEN A TURNING POINT IN THE TIDE OF WAR IS REACHED. THE VC UNDOUBTEDLY FELT THAT THIS TURNING POINT HAD BEEN REACHED IN THE DELTA IN FEBRUARY AND IN THEIR FAVOR. THE VC HAVE BEEN KEPT GOING BY A BELIEF IN THE INEVITABILITY OF VICTORY FOR THEIR SIDE. MOST RECENTLY THEY HAVE BEEN LED TO EXPECT VICTORY WITHIN A MATTER OF MONTHS. VC MORALE IS NOW, THEREFORE, VERY VULNERABLE TO A SUDDEN REVERSAL IN THE TIDES OF WAR. VC MORALE COULD QUICKLY CRACK IF THE VC COULD BE PERSUADED DURING THE NEXT TWO MONTHS THAT THEY WILL NOT ACHIEVE VICTORY IN THE SHORT RUN OR THE LONG RUN, AND THAT A VC VICTORY IS NOT ONLY NOT INEVITABLE, BUT IMPOSSIBLE. WORDS AND LEAFLETS WILL NOT CONVINC THE VC OF THIS; ONLY EFFECTIVE OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS WILL DO SO. OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS HAVE~~

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~~BEEN INCREASING IN IV CORPS SINCE GENERAL THANG TOOK OVER,~~  
~~BUT HAVE NOT YET REACHED THE POINT OF BEING VERY EFFECTIVE.~~  
 WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS, ~~THE VC HAVE BEEN AVOIDING CONTACT.~~ NO  
 VC MAIN FORCE UNIT HAS YET BEEN ENGAGED AND DECISIVELY DE-  
 FEATED. ~~THE EXPECTED SECOND CONFRONTATION IN THE CITIES HAS~~  
~~NOT OCCURRED AND BOTH SIDES ARE NOW MANEUVERING IN THE COUNTRY,~~  
 BUT WITH VERY LITTLE ENGAGEMENT. ~~IF THIS SITUATION CONTINUES~~  
~~THROUGH MAY AND INTO THE RAINY SEASON, ANOTHER STALEMATE~~  
~~WILL HAVE BEEN REACHED AND VC MORALE WILL HAVE BEEN IMPAIRED,~~  
 BUT NOT CRACKED.

10. ~~THIS WAR IN THE DELTA THAT COULD HAVE BEEN LOST BY MAY~~  
 COULD ALSO POSSIBLY BE WON BY MAY. IF PSYCHOLOGY IS THE KEY  
 TO THIS WAR, MILITARY POWER IS THE INDISPENSIBLE AND MOST POTENT  
 PSYCHOLOGICAL WEAPON. THE VC PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY ATTAINED IN  
 THE DELTA IN THE POST-TET WEEKS STEMMED IN PART FROM A VC FEEL-  
 ING OF INCREASING POWER RESULTING FROM THE ISSUANCE OF NEW AND  
 EXCELLENT WEAPONS BEGINNING IN OCTOBER 1967. ~~THE VC MUST BE~~  
~~PERSUADED THAT THESE WEAPONS WILL NOT ONLY NOT BE ADEQUATE TO~~  
~~ENABLE THEM TO WIN, BUT THAT OUR SIDE CAN CONTINUALLY UP THE~~  
 ANTE REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY GET MORE NEW WEAPONS OR EVEN NORTH  
 VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) ASSISTANCE IN THE DELTA. A PSYCHOLOGICAL DE-

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(dissem controls)

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FEAT OF THE VC CAN BE ATTAINED ONLY IF WE CAN CREATE IN THE VC CAMP A HEAVY ATMOSPHERE OF DEFEATISM. THIS COULD HAPPEN IF THE VC SHOULD LAUNCH MASSIVE ATTACKS AGAINST THE CITIES AND TOWNS AND THESE ATTACKS SHOULD FAIL WITH HEAVY VC CASUALTIES RUNNING INTO THE TENS OF THOUSANDS. THIS WOULD DEPEND ON VC INITIATIVE TO UNDERTAKE THE ATTACKS AND THE WILL TO WIN OF THE GVN FORCES DEFENDING THE TOWNS, AND WE CANNOT COUNT ON EITHER OF THESE AT THE MOMENT. TO INFLICT A PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFEAT ON THE VC WITHIN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS, WHEN VC MORALE WILL BE MOST VULNERABLE TO CRACKING, OUR SIDE MUST: A. EMBARK ON AGGRESSIVE AND EFFECTIVE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC MAIN FORCE UNITS; B. CUT THEIR SUPPLY LINES AND C. PENETRATE THEIR BASE AREAS TO DESTROY THEIR SUPPLY DUMPS AND CACHES. IF ALL THREE OF THESE STEPS COULD BE TAKEN AT ONCE, THE SUDDEN INSECURITY IT WOULD ENGENDER AMONG THE VC JUST AS THEY THOUGHT THAT VICTORY WAS WITHIN THEIR GRASP COULD CRACK VC MORALE.

11. GENERAL THANG HAS STAVED OFF DEFEAT BY PROVIDING VERY GOOD LEADERSHIP WHERE VERY BAD LEADERSHIP EXISTED BEFORE, BUT HE CANNOT PERFORM A MIRACLE. HE CANNOT INFLICT MAJOR DEFEATS ON THE VC WITH FORCES CURRENTLY AT HIS DISPOSAL.

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12. NONE OF THE ABOVE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE IV  
CORPS SENIOR ADVISOR OR WITH THE AMBASSADOR.

13. FIELD DISSEM: EXCLUSIVE FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD, EXCLUSIVE  
FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

22 March 1968

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-31  
By isa, NARA Date 8-12-98

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

1. It is my understanding that David Wise will have an article in the SATURDAY EVENING POST early next week reciting his findings as a result of a detailed examination of the Warren Commission files and the listing in Archives of those documents still classified. His article will immediately result in newspaper inquiries as to the whereabouts of a KGB officer named Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, who ostensibly defected in Geneva on 4 February 1964 and requested asylum in the United States.

2. Nosenko is still in the custody of this Agency in the United States. Through the years, we have been working with the FBI in an effort to establish whether he is a KGB agent on assignment in the United States or a bona fide defector. This question is still not resolved. Therefore, newspaper or Congressional access to this individual is not feasible.

3. At the time of the Warren Commission investigation, I had a long personal talk with Chief Justice Warren about Nosenko and our concern that he may be a Soviet agent. It was for this reason that Nosenko's statements concerning the absence of Soviet complicity in the assassination of President Kennedy were not published in the Warren Commission Report.

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4. The foregoing is set down so that interested members of the Executive Branch will be forewarned about the upcoming article and will be in a position to take appropriate action when questions about Nosenko inevitably come forward.

(Signed) Richard Helms

Richard Helms  
Director

- cc: The Secretary of State
- Attorney General
- Under Secretary of State
- The Honorable Walt Rostow ✓
- Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

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INFORMATION

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~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Friday, March 22, 1968 - 12:00 n

Mr. President:

Herewith Dick Helms informs you of a forthcoming Saturday Evening Post article by David Wise, which refers to a failure of the Warren Commission report to reflect a statement made by an ostensible Soviet defector.

*Pres file*

Helms explains the circumstances for your background.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-32  
By ius, NARA Date 10-23-97

WWRostow:rlm

*Pres. file*

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Friday, March 22, 1968  
12:00 noon

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MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached CIA report suggests the possibility of a second attack on Saigon about March 24-25, in the dark of the moon.

Other intelligence indicates offensive operations in I Corps may shortly resume -- after a relatively brief respite.

If they take a second crack, we may wish to think of some quite hard prompt action in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (TDCS-314/04990-68 (advance))

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-272 Appeal  
By cbm, NARA Date 6-4-01

SANITIZED  
Authority                      RAC 11868  
By is ,NARA, Date 7-14-80

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM  
DOI:  
SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1900 HOURS  
LOCAL TIME, 22 MARCH 1968

ACQ: VIETNAM, SAIGON (22 MARCH 1968) 2571A27  
SOURCE: THIS IS A VIETNAM SITUATION REPORT PREPARED  
AT 1900 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 22 MARCH

1. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE VIET CONG (VC) MAY BE PREPARING FOR ACTIVITY IN THE SAIGON AREA IN THE NEAR FUTURE. AGENT AND PRISONER REPORTS, DISCOVERY OF VC ARMS CACHES AND THE ENEMY TROOP DISPOSITION TEND TO INDICATE IMPENDING VC ACTION IN OR NEAR THE CAPITAL.

2. ONE AGENT REPORT STATES THAT THE VC WILL ATTACK SAIGON ON OR ABOUT THE 24TH OR 25TH OF MARCH AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT FAVORABLE MOON PHASE. THE AGENT SAID THIS PREDICTION IS BASED ON ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE GAINED FROM ALLIED CONTACTS WITH ENEMY TROOPS NEAR SAIGON, VC RESUPPLY ACTIVITY AND THE LOSS OF FACE THEY INCURRED IN THE FIRST ATTACK ON SAIGON.

3. ON 19 MARCH A LARGE CACHE OF ENEMY AMMUNITION WAS DISCOVERED IN GIA DINH PROVINCE AND INCLUDED 31 ROUNDS OF 122 MM ROCKET, 1 200 ROUNDS OF MORTAR, 30 ROUNDS OF 75MM RECOILLESS RIFLE AND 138 ROUNDS OF B-40 AMMUNITION. THE DISCOVERY OF THIS CACHE, AND OTHER SMALLER CACHES IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, INDICATES THE ENEMY IS TRYING TO INCREASE HIS STOCKPILE OF MUNITIONS IN THE IMMEDIATE CAPITAL AREA AND THAT HE IS HAVING SOME SUCCESS IN MOVING THE MATERIEL CLOSE TO SAIGON.

4. PRISONER REPORTS ALSO BEAR OUT THE FACT THAT ENEMY FORCES ARE MAKING A GREAT EFFORT TO MOVE SUPPLIES AND MEN INTO POSITION FOR A POSSIBLE SECOND ATTACK ON SAIGON. A PRISONER, STATING THAT HE WAS AN IMPRESSED AMMUNITION BEARER, REPORTED THAT LARGE AMOUNTS OF AMMUNITION WERE BEING MOVED EASTWARD THROUGH HAU NGHIA PROVINCE; A RALLIER FROM THE 506TH LOCAL FORCE BATTALION STATES THAT HIS UNIT WAS INFILTRATING INTO THE CITY IN SMALL GROUPS ON 16 MARCH; AND ANOTHER REPORT MENTIONS THAT PEOPLE IN HOC MON DISTRICT WERE FORCED TO MOVE AMMUNITION INTO GIA DINH PROVINCE TO TWO CACHES.

5. ANOTHER INDICATION IS THAT THE DISPOSITION OF ENEMY TROOPS IS NOW APPROXIMATELY WHAT IT WAS JUST PRIOR TO THE TET OFFENSIVE. MANY OF THE ENEMY UNITS HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM THE CLOSE PROXIMITY OF SAIGON THAT THEY MAINTAINED A WEEK OR TWO AGO. THIS TACTIC IS USED BY THE VC TO DRAW ALLIED FORCES OUT FROM AROUND SAIGON AND SPREAD THEM OUT RELATIVELY THINLY, THUS MAKING IT EASIER TO FILTER SMALL UNITS THROUGH ALLIED LINES AND INTO THE CITY.

6. THE CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT (CMD) PASSED THE COMBINED SECURITY COMMITTEE AT 1740 HOURS ON 22 MARCH A REPORT EVALUATED "B1" BY THE CMD ALLEGING THAT THE VC ARE MOVING LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS TO THE VICINITY OF XT 795050 AND XT 830065, NORTH OF TAN SON NHUT AIR FIELD, AND ARE INFILTRATING TROOPS TO THE SOUTH OF SAIGON IN AN EFFORT TO ATTACK THE SAIGON-GIA DINH AREA BETWEEN 21 AND 23 MARCH.

7. DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR  
FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF  
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REPORT CLASS: ~~SECRET~~  
COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM  
DOI:  
SUBJECT:

SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1900 HOURS  
LOCAL TIME. 22 MARCH 1968

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SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-271  
By iss, NARA Date 4-2-98

ACQ: VIETNAM, SAIGON (22 MARCH 1968) FIELD NO.

SOURCE: THIS IS A VIETNAM SITUATION REPORT PREPARED  
AT 1900 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 22 MARCH

1. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE VIET CONG (VC) MAY BE  
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3.4(b)(1)

2. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] THIS PREDICTION IS  
BASED ON ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE GAINED FROM ALLIED CONTACTS  
WITH ENEMY TROOPS NEAR SAIGON, VC RESUPPLY ACTIVITY AND THE LOSS  
OF FACE THEY INCURRED IN THE FIRST ATTACK ON SAIGON.

3. ON 19 MARCH A LARGE CACHE OF ENEMY AMMUNITION WAS DISCOVERED  
IN GIA DINH PROVINCE AND INCLUDED 31 ROUNDS OF 122 MM ROCKET,  
1 220 ROUNDS OF MORTAR, 30 ROUNDS OF 75MM RECOILESS RIFLE AND 138  
ROUNDS OF B-40 AMMUNITION. THE DISCOVERY OF THIS CACHE, AND  
OTHER SMALLER CACHES IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, INDICATES THE ENEMY IS  
TRYING TO INCREASE HIS STOCKPILE OF MUNITIONS IN THE IMMEDIATE  
CAPITAL AREA AND THAT HE IS HAVING SOME SUCCESS IN MOVING THE  
MATERIEL CLOSE TO SAIGON.

4. PRISONER REPORTS ALSO BEAR OUT THE FACT THAT ENEMY FORCES  
ARE MAKING A GREAT EFFORT TO MOVE SUPPLIES AND MEN INTO POSITION  
FOR A POSSIBLE SECOND ATTACK ON SAIGON. A PRISONER, STATING THAT  
HE WAS AN IMPRESSED AMMUNITION BEARER, REPORTED THAT LARGE AMOUNTS  
OF AMMUNITION WERE BEING MOVED EASTWARD THROUGH HAU NGHIA PROVINCE;  
A RALLIER FROM THE 506TH LOCAL FORCE BATTALION STATES THAT HIS  
UNIT WAS INFILTRATING INTO THE CITY IN SMALL GROUPS ON 16 MARCH;  
AND ANOTHER REPORT MENTIONS THAT PEOPLE IN HOC MON DISTRICT WERE  
FORCED TO MOVE AMMUNITION INTO GIA DINH PROVINCE TO TWO CACHES.

5. ANOTHER INDICATION IS THAT THE DISPOSITION OF ENEMY TROOPS  
IS NOW APPROXIMATELY WHAT IT WAS JUST PRIOR TO THE TET OFFENSIVE.  
MANY OF THE ENEMY UNITS HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM THE CLOSE PROXIMITY  
OF SAIGON THAT THEY MAINTAINED A WEEK OR TWO AGO. THIS TACTIC  
IS USED BY THE VC TO DRAW ALLIED FORCES OUT FROM AROUND SAIGON  
AND SPREAD THEM OUT RELATIVELY THINLY, THUS MAKING IT EASIER TO  
FILTER SMALL UNITS THROUGH ALLIED LINES AND INTO THE CITY.

6. THE CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT (CMD) PASSED THE COMBINED  
SECURITY COMMITTEE AT 1740 HOURS ON 22 MARCH A REPORT EVALUATED  
"B1" BY THE CMD ALLEGING THAT THE VC ARE MOVING LARGE QUANTITIES  
OF ARMS TO THE VICINITY OF XT 795050 AND XT 830065, NORTH  
OF TAN SON NHUT AIR FIELD, AND ARE INFILTRATING TROOPS TO THE  
SOUTH OF SAIGON IN AN EFFORT TO ATTACK THE SAIGON-GIA DINH AREA  
BETWEEN 21 AND 23 MARCH.

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR  
FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

GP-1

550

**ACTION**

*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**Friday, March 22, 1968 -- 12:00 noon**

**Mr. President:**

**Since you are expanding the group somewhat, do you wish to consider John McCloy?**

**W. W. Rostow**

**Invite McCloy** \_\_\_\_\_

**No** \_\_\_\_\_

**Call me** \_\_\_\_\_

**WWRostow:rlh**

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 3/31/92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

27

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Friday, March 22, 1968 -- 11:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read this account of the situation in the UN Security Council on the Middle East.

The question may be:

-- Should we vote with a resolution condemning Israel, with only a minor reference to terrorist attacks and thereby avoid being isolated against the Arabs; or

-- Should we abstain and take those risks?

We know that the Israelis themselves are prepared to be quite calm in face of a "toothless condemnatory resolution" which this will be.

Later recommendations to you will be made by Amb. Goldberg; but we wish you to consider the situation and the alternatives which may soon arise.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-269  
By mg, NARA Date 2-19-97

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

27a

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Security Council Debate on Middle  
East Situation

The Security Council reconvenes at noon today. The likely result will be the adoption in a day or two of a resolution condemning Israel for its countermilitary actions against Jordan. The Israelis expect this result since reports coming out of Israel say that the Security Council is expected "to adopt a toothless condemnatory resolution". Ambassador Goldberg has kept in close touch with the Israelis who know that we are doing our best to try to achieve a reasonably balanced resolution, but that this is not entirely in our control.

The Arabs, with the support of the USSR, India and Pakistan, have developed a resolution which condemns Israel for the large-scale military action. Its principal omission is that there is no explicit reference to the terrorist actions which provoked the Israeli action, though there is a preambular paragraph which makes oblique reference to such acts condemning "any and all violations of the ceasefire". Both Ambassador Goldberg and the Department are agreed that the best strategy is to see whether we can get the Arabs to make minimal changes designed to give the resolution more balance. Our leverage is limited because we estimate this resolution already has the required majority; the Arabs will therefore be most reluctant to make changes.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-267

By CB, NARA Date 11-3-97

~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

The Soviet strategy is to isolate the United States in the Security Council and to exploit this in the Arab world by portraying the United States policy as one of total support for Israel. Both Ambassador Goldberg and the Department believe that from the point of view of our interests in the area the best result would be a resolution which we could support along with the rest of the Security Council. This would have to be weighed against possible adverse domestic reaction if the United States supports a resolution condemning Israel which did not give sufficient prominence to the Arab provocative terrorist raids. Since the Israelis are already discounting in their own public opinion the significance of a condemnatory Security Council resolution, this leads us to believe, for the present at least, that there would be no substantial adverse domestic flak if we were to join the majority.

We will make recommendations to the President on how we should vote when a final text is put before Security Council and we have received Ambassador Goldberg's recommendations.

Attached is a copy of the resolution presently being discussed.

  
John P. Walsh

Acting Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

The Security Council

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Jordan and Israel concerning the grave Israeli military action across the East Bank of Jordan on 21 March 1968,

Having noted the supplementary information provided by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO as contained in Documents S/7930/Add.64 and Add. 65, and also the contents of the letters of the Permanent Representative of Jordan in Documents S/8478 and S/8483,

Observing that this military action by the armed forces of Israel on the territory of Jordan was of a large-scale and carefully planned nature,

Recalling Resolutions 236 (1967) by which the Security Council condemned any and all violations of the ceasefire,

Recalling further Resolution 237 (1967) which called upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place;

1. Condemns Israel for this large-scale military action in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and of the ceasefire (resolutions);
2. Warns Israel that actions of military reprisals cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council will have to consider further and more effective steps and measures as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts;
3. Calls upon Israel to desist from acts or activities in controvention of Resolution 237 (1967);
4. Requests the Secretary General to keep the situation under review and to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-267

~~SECRET~~

By CB, NARA Date 11-3-97

**INFORMATION/ACTION**

28

**Friday, March 22, 1968  
11:00 a. m.**

*Pres file*

**Mr. President:**

**Nick Katzenbach was present:**

- at the dinner and briefings of the Advisory Group on Nov 1, 1967;
- and, according to my notes, at the session with you on Nov. 2.

**W. W. Rostow**

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. C. COLLECTED PER E.O. 12958  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 16. 1983.

BY RA ON 3/31/92

**WWRostow:rla**

28a

②

ACTION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL-  
SENSITIVE

Thurs., March 21, 1968  
7:30 p. m.

*Rec'd  
7:30*

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have received indirect word that Paul Nitze is disturbed because he does not appear to be involved in the Monday-Tuesday briefings, whereas Nick K. is involved, as he was last time.

Should he be invited?

*Walt* Rostow

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me ✓

*I know nothing about  
Katzbach being involved -  
Tell me in  
N*

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12350,  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY *[Signature]* ON 3/31/82

29

**ACTION**

*Pres file*

**Friday, March 22, 1968 -- 10:25 a.m.**

**Mr. President:**

**I received a telephone call from a Mrs. James E. Cross. She apparently has talked to Abe Fortas and others about the problem we face in holding and attracting the youth in the coming election.**

**From her contacts at universities around Washington, she says the youth feel they are being ignored except for being drafted; but many of them are not lost to the cause. This sense of being ignored and not enlisted actively -- as well as listened to -- draws them towards McCarthy and Bobby Kennedy.**

**Mrs. Cross believes that someone -- perhaps a Special Assistant to the President -- should make it his business to get in touch systematically with Democratic -- and even Republican -- youth groups on the campuses.**

**I told her that this was not my business but I would forward the idea to whoever might be concerned with such matters among my colleagues. She volunteered personally to be helpful.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**cc: Mr. Marvin Watson**

**WWRostow:rla**