

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Smith to President, 1:15 p.m. <del>TS 1 p</del> open 10-17-97 NLS 96-270	3/31/68	<del>A</del>
#1a cable <i>Open 12-25-09</i>	Prime Minister to President <del>TS 2 p</del> (Dup. of #42k, SHOSC, UK, Bx 56; Ex 1995)	3/31/68	<del>A</del>
#1b cable	Prime Minister to President open 12-23-09 <del>TS 2 p</del> (Dup. of #42k, see above; Ex 1995)	3/31/68	<del>A</del>
#3 memo	Rostow for the Record <del>S 2 p</del> open 5-12-95 NLS 92-497	3/31/68	<del>A</del>
#4 memo	Rostow to President, 6:40 p.m. <del>S 1 p</del> open 5/2/96	3/31/68	<del>A</del>
#8 memo	Rostow to President <del>TS 1 p</del> open 10-17-97 NLS 96-270	3/31/68	<del>A</del>
#10 memo	Rostow to President, 7:40 p.m. <del>C 1 p</del> open 3-7-97 NLS 96-267	3/30/68	<del>A</del>
#10a cable	Saigon 23537 <del>C 2 p</del> Open 11/20/97 NLS 96-267	3/30/68	<del>A</del>
#12 cable	President to Prime Minister open 5/3/96 <del>TS 2 p</del> (Dup. of #420, NSF, SHOSC, UK, Bx 56)	3/30/68	<del>A</del>
#13 cable	Rostow to Prime Minister <del>S 1 p</del> dup. of opens 5/3/96	3/30/68	<del>A</del>
#14 cable	Prime Minister to President open 12-23-09 <del>TS 1 p</del> (Dup. of #42s, SHOSC, UK, Bx 56; <del>Ex 1995</del> )	3/30/68	<del>A</del>
#18 memo	Rostow to President, 11:45 a.m. <del>TS 1 p</del> open 10-17-97 NLS 96-270 [Sanitized 1980]	3/30/68	<del>A</del>
#20 memo	Rostow to President, 7:45 a.m. same sanitization 5/18/03 NLS 02-217 <del>S 1 p</del> Sanitized NLS 96-269 [Duplicate of #103, NSF, CF, Sweden, Vol. 1]	3/30/68	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

~~NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 69, March 25-31, 1968 Box 31~~

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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#20a cable	Stockholm 8892 S 1 p <i>Sanitized NLS 96-269</i> [Duplicate of #103a, NSF, CF, Sweden, Vol. 1]	3/30/68	A
<del>#21 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 9:45 a.m.</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 3-7-97 NLS 96-269</i>	<del>3/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#21a memo</del>	<del>Saunders to Rostow "</del> <del>S 2 p</del>	<del>3/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#22a cable</del>	<del>London 7677</del> <i>open 4/96</i> <del>C 1 p</del> [Duplicate of #56b, NSF, CF, UK, Vol. 13]	<del>3/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#24 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 8:10 a.m.</del> <del>TS 1 p</del> <i>open 5-30-95 NLS 93-368</i>	<del>3/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#24a cable</del>	<del>Seoul 5381</del> <del>TS 2 p</del> <i>open 3-25-94 NLS 92-338</i>	<del>3/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#25a cable	Saigon 23527 TS 1 p <i>OPEN 7/10/96</i> [Duplicate of #79a, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "[3/19/70 Memo to the President, "Decision to Halt the Bombing" with copies of documents, 1967-68, Box 127]	3/30/68	A
<del>#29a memo</del>	<del>"Uses of the Past"</del> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 11/20/97 NLS 96-267</i>	<del>3/27/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#31b cable</del>	<del>Saigon 23308</del> <del>S 11 p</del> <i>open 11/20/97 NLS 96-267</i> [Duplicate of #31b, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "Bunker's Weekly Cables," Box 104; Sanitized 1979]	<del>3/28/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#32a message</del>	<del>President to PM Wilson</del> <del>TS 3 p</del> <i>open 4/96</i>	<del>3/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#32b cable</del>	<del>Deptel to Seoul (work copy)</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 3-25-94 NLS 92-338</i>	<del>3/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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<del>#32c cable</del>	<del>Deptel to Seoul (work copy)</del> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 3-25-94 NLS 92-338</i>	<del>3/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#33 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 10:30 a.m.</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 3-7-97 NLS 96-269</i>	<del>3/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#33a memo</del>	<del>Zwick to President, re: Afghanistan "</del> <del>S 3 p</del>	<del>3/27/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#33b memo</del>	<del>Gaud and Freeman to President</del> <del>C 2 p</del> <i>open 7-9-99 NLS 96-275</i>	<del>3/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#33c memo</del>	<del>Attachment--"Military Expenditure Review"</del> <del>PCI 1 p</del> <i>open 7-9-99 NLS 96-275</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#33d memo</del>	<del>Attachment--"Review of Proposed PL 480..."</del> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 7-9-99 NLS 96-275</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#36a ltr</del>	<del>President to PM Jonathan</del> <del>PCI 1 p</del> <i>open 3-7-97 NLS 96-269</i>	<del>3/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#43a cable</del>	<del>Saigon 23183</del> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 11/20/97 NLS 96-267</i>	<del>3/28/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#44 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>C 1 p</del> <i>open 3-7-97 NLS 96-269</i>	<del>3/28/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#49 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President "</del> <del>C 2 p</del>	<del>3/28/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#50a memo</del>	<del>Lansdale to US Mission Council Members</del> <del>C 4 p</del> <i>open 8-27-90 NLS 96-117</i>	<del>3/21/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#56 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 8:00 a.m.</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>sanitized NLS 96-269 same info NLS 019-031/3 (1/02)</i>	<del>3/27/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#56a cable</del>	<del>Saigon 543</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 11/20/97 NLS 96-267</i>	<del>3/27/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#57 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, re: Panama</del> <i>open 3-7-97</i>	<del>3/27/68</del>	<del>A</del>
FILE LOCATION	<del>C 1 p</del> <i>NLS 96-269</i>		

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#59 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President</del> <i>open 3-7-97 NLS 96-269</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>3/27/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#63 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 8:10 p.m.</del> " <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>3/26/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#65 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 8:00 a.m.</del> " <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>3/26/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#67a ltr</del>	<del>President to PM Pearson</del> <i>open 12-23-09</i> <del>PCI 1 p</del> <i>[dup #2, 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d - NSF, SADS, "Canada-- 3/1/68-5/31/68" Box 31]</i>	<del>3/27/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#67b ltr</del>	<del>PM Pearson to President</del> <i>open 12-23-09</i> <del>C 2 p</del> <i>[dup #2g, 2i, 2j - as above]</i>	<del>3/12/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#69 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 4:45 p.m.</del> <del>C 1 p</del> <i>open 3-3-97 NLS 96-274</i>	<del>3/26/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#70 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, re: Liberia</del> <del>C 2 p</del> <i>(Dupl #89, CF Liberia, Visit of Tubman...)</i> <i>open 3-7-97 NLS 96-269</i>	<del>3/26/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#70a memo</del>	<del>Katzenbach to President, re: Liberia</del> <del>C 3 p</del> <i>(Dupl #91, CF Liberia, Visit of Tubman)</i> <i>open 11/20/07 NLS 96-267</i>	<del>3/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#70b rpt</del>	<del>"Talking Points" re: Liberia</del> <del>C 4 p</del> <i>(Dupl #93, CF Liberia, Visit of Tubman)</i> <i>open 11/20/07 NLS 96-267</i>	<del>3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#70c photo</del>	<del>Bio Sketch</del> <del>C 1 p</del> <i>(Dupl #95, CF Liberia, Visit of Tubman)</i> <i>exempted NLS 96-271 (4/98)</i>	1966	A
<del>#70d photo</del>	<del>Bio Sketch</del> <del>S 4 p</del> <i>(Dupl #96, CF Liberia, Visit of Tubman)</i> <i>exempted NLS 96-271 (4/98)</i>	undated	A
<del>#75 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 3-7-97 NLS 96-269</i>	<del>3/26/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#75a ltr</del>	<del>President to Kiesinger</del> " <del>S 4 p</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#76a memo</del>	<del>Zwick to President, re: Morocco</del> " <del>S 2 p</del>	<del>3/16/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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<del>#76b memo</del>	<del>Gaud and Freeman to President, re: Morocco</del> <del>C</del> 2 p open 7-9-99 NLS 96-275/ A1b Guidelines	<del>2/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#76e memo</del>	<del>Gaud and Schnittker to President, re: Morocco</del> <del>C</del> 3 p open 7-9-99 NLS 96-275	<del>2/2/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#76f rpt</del>	<del>"Review of Military Expenditures for Morocco"</del> <del>S</del> 7 p open 7-9-99 NLS 96-275	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#77a memo</del>	<del>Clifford to President</del> <del>C</del> 4 p open 12-15-95 NLS 94-408	<del>3/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#77b memo</del>	<del>For Secretary of Defense</del> <del>PCI</del> 1 p open 4/96	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#78 memo</del>	<del>Bowdler to President, 6:00 p.m.</del> <del>S</del> 3 p open 3-7-97 NLS 96-269	<del>3/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#85 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 12:35 p.m.</del> <del>S</del> 1 p open 3-3-97 NLS 96-274 <del>[Dup # 126, NSG, Korea, "Vol 1" p. 355]</del>	<del>3/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#88 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 11:20 a.m.</del> <del>PCI</del> 1 p open 3-7-97 NLS 96-269	<del>3/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#91 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President and SecState, 8:20 a.m.</del> " <del>S</del> 3 p	<del>3/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#91a ltr</del>	<del>To Walther Casper</del> " <del>PCI</del> 1 p	<del>3/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#91b cable</del>	<del>Bonn 9894</del> open 11/20/97 NLS 96-267 <del>C</del> 7 p	<del>3/22/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#94 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President</del> open 3-3-97 NLS 96-274 <del>S</del> 1 p	<del>3/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#95 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>PCI</del> 1 p open 7/10/96	<del>3/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>37a report</del>	<del>Intelligence report</del> <del>S</del> 1 p exempt 9/04	<del>3/28/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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~~NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 69, March 25-31, 1968 Box 31~~

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INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Sunday, March 31, 1968  
1:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Here is the Prime Minister's whole-hearted endorsement of the proposals in your speech, plus a list of practical steps which he recommends be taken following your statement.

Copies have been sent to Nick Katzenbach. Recommendations will be forthcoming shortly.

Bremley Smith

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

BKS:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-270  
By ics, NARA Date 10-15-97

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines

By *g/jc*; NARA, Date 1-13-04

~~TOP SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

RECEIVED  
WHCA

18.20 ZULA 31 MAR 1968

1968 MAR 31 17 58

FROM THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

138/68

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT EYES ONLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

BEFORE SENDING YOU, IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MESSAGE, OUR CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT OF WHAT SHOULD NOW BE DONE FOLLOWING YOUR STATEMENT TONIGHT I SHOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU MY PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE VALUE OF YOUR INITIATIVE.

I WHOLE-HEARTEDLY INDORSE YOUR PROPOSALS AND AM CONTENT WITH THE WORDING WHICH YOU SUGGEST FOR THE REFERENCE TO THE GENEVA CO-CHAIRMAN ETC. I BELIEVE THAT WHAT YOU PROPOSE IS A WISE AND GENEROUS MOVE, WHICH OUGHT TO CONVINCED ANY REASONABLE PERSON THAT THE UNITED STATES IS ANXIOUS FOR PEACE ON A JUST BASIS. MOREOVER, I SEE THE IMPORTANCE OF YOUR INITIATIVE AS AFFECTING PUBLIC OPINION IN BOTH OUR COUNTRIES. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING AN HONOURABLE PEACE IN VIETNAM THE POLITICAL REACTION IN THE UNITED STATES IS CLEARLY MORE IMPORTANT AND MORE RELEVANT THAN THE REACTION IN BRITAIN. IT IS NOT FOR ME TO INTERPRET WHAT YOU ARE DOING IN TERMS OF THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN AMERICA, THOUGH I CAN WELL UNDERSTAND IT. WHAT I WANT YOU TO KNOW ALSO IS THAT, WHILE THIS MUST BE YOUR RESPONSIBILITY I BELIEVE THAT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IT IS OF THE FIRST IMPORTANCE THAT THE WHOLE WORLD, BUT PARTICULARLY HANOI, MUST BE CLEAR THAT WE ARE CARRYING PUBLIC OPINION WITH US BOTH IN YOUR COUNTRY AND TO A LESSER EXTENT IN OURS.

WE HAVE, OF COURSE, TO RECOGNISE THAT THERE ARE SOME WHO ARE WILFULLY HOSTILE AND WILL NOT BE CONVINCED THAT YOUR OFFER IS GENUINE. AND I MUST CONFESS THAT I DOUBT WHETHER HANOI WILL IN FACT RESPOND TO IT. THERE ARE TOO MANY SIGNS THAT THEY ARE PLAYING AMERICAN POLITICS. THEY ARE COUNTING ON A GREAT PEACE MOVEMENT DEVELOPING AND A LOSS OF DETERMINATION BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY THINK THIS THEY WILL OF COURSE BE MORE INTRANSIGENT AND LESS LIKELY TO RESPOND TO ANY INITIATIVE HOWEVER REASONABLE, HOWEVER GENEROUS. NEVERTHELESS, EVEN IF THE ONLY RESULT OF YOUR CURRENT INITIATIVE IS TO BRING HOME TO WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION GENERALLY THAT YOU HAVE DONE EVERYTHING

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

IN YOUR POWER TO GET THIS ISSUE TRANSFERRED FROM THE BATTLE FIELD TO THE CONFERENCE CHAMBER, THIS WILL BE IMPORTANT NOT ONLY IN TERMS OF OUR WESTERN POLITICS BUT, MORE IMPORTANT, IN BRINGING HOME TO HANOI THE FIRM RESOLVE OF ALL OF US, A RESOLVE WHICH YOUR INITIATIVE COULD HELP TO CONSOLIDATE IN TERMS OF POPULAR SUPPORT.

I AGREE WITH YOU THAT IT IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO TRY AND GET SOME MOVEMENT OUT OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. THIS IS RELEVANT, AS YOU SAY, BOTH IN THE GENEVA AND IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONTEXT. WE PROPOSE TO MAKE A SPEEDY MOVE TOWARDS THE RUSSIANS. BUT, AS YOU KNOW, THE RUSSIANS ARE CAUTIOUS AND DIFFICULT ABOUT THIS AND, IN THE HANOI CONTEXT, NOT THEIR OWN MASTERS AND WE OUGHT NOT, THEREFORE, TO TRY TO TIE THEM TO AN EXACT FRAMEWORK OF MOVES, PARTICULARLY TO MEETING AT GENEVA WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE 1954 AGREEMENT. NEITHER OF US UNDERESTIMATES THE DIFFICULTIES OF GETTING THE RUSSIANS TO MOVE. BUT WHEN I WAS IN MOSCOW TWO MONTHS AGO I WAS ABLE TO GIVE EFFECT IN THE COMMUNIQUE TO YOUR HOPES THAT WE COULD GET SOME AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS ON OUR JOINT RESPONSIBILITIES AS GENEVA CO-CHAIRMEN. CLEARLY WE MUST NOW EXPLOIT THIS AS FAR AS WE CAN, AND IN MY FOLLOWING MESSAGE I AM SUGGESTING HOW WE MIGHT SET ABOUT IT IN TERMS OF THE SUCCESSIVE MOVES WE SHOULD NOW TAKE OVER THE NEXT 24 HOURS AS REGARDS BOTH OUR PUBLIC RESPONSE AND THE APPROACH TO THE RUSSIANS. AMONG OTHER THINGS IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN MOSCOW'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE JOINT RESPONSIBILITY TO WHICH I THINK WE CAN HOLD THEM AND ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE GENEVA AGREEMENT AS THE CONTEXT FOR A CONFERENCE PROVIDES THE NEXT STEP TOWARDS ANY SETTLEMENT.

NATURALLY, BEFORE TAKING ANY FINAL DECISIONS ABOUT WHAT WE WOULD PROPOSE SUCCESSIVELY TO DO IN THE 24 HOURS FOLLOWING YOUR STATEMENT, WHICH I UNDERSTAND WILL BE AT 3 AM LONDON TIME AND 5 AM MOSCOW TIME, WE SHALL WANT TO HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON WHAT WE SHALL BE PROPOSING, AND I SHALL BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR EARLY REACTIONS.

I REPEAT, WE WELCOME THE INITIATIVE AND WE SHALL MAKE CLEAR BOTH PUBLICLY AND IN OUR CONTACTS WITH THE RUSSIANS, THAT IT HAS OUR FULL SUPPORT. EVEN IF IT LEADS TO NO IMMEDIATE RESPONSE I BELIEVE ITS VALUE WILL BE IN CONVINCING PUBLIC OPINION OF WESTERN SINCERITY IN THESE MATTERS AND THIS OF ITSELF COULD HAVE AN EFFECT OVER THE MONTHS ON RUSSIA, EVEN ON HANOI, AND THEREFORE ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE.

MESSAGE ENDS

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

RECEIVED  
WHCA

18.55 ZULU MARCH 31, 68

1968 MAR 31 18 06

18

FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

TO THE PRESIDENT

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *plj/c* NARA Date 12-18-09

T89/68

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENTS EYES ONLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

THIS IS MY MESSAGE ABOUT THE PRACTICAL STEPS TO BE TAKEN FOLLOWING YOUR STATEMENT TONIGHT.

THE ACTION WHICH WE HAVE IN MIND WOULD FOLLOW A TIME TABLE STARTING AT 7AM B.S.T. ON MONDAY, APRIL 1 WHICH WOULD BE 1 AM WASHINGTON AND 9AM IN MOSCOW. AT THAT POINT I PROPOSE TO ISSUE FROM NO. 10 A SHORT STATEMENT WARMLY WELCOMING AND SUPPORTING WHAT YOU HAVE SAID.

A LITTLE LATER - JUST SUFFICIENTLY LATER TO INDICATE THAT WE HAVE THOUGHT ABOUT YOUR STATEMENT - I SHALL SEND A PRELIMINARY MESSAGE TO KOSYGIN WHICH WILL BE DESIGNED MERELY TO MAKE THE POINT THAT WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO YOUR STATEMENT AND INTEND TO FOLLOW IT UP WITH THEM AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

LATER IN THE DAY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WILL BE ANSWERING QUESTIONS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. HE HAS 12 QUESTIONS ON VIETNAM, AND THIS WILL PROVIDE A CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY TO REAFFIRM IN PARLIAMENT THAT WE WELCOME YOUR STATEMENT AND INTEND TO GIVE IT OUR FULL SUPPORT IN WHATEVER WAY WE CAN. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WILL ALSO SAY THAT WE HAVE ALREADY MADE CONTACT WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND THAT HE INTENDS TO FOLLOW IT UP WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR LATER IN THE AFTERNOON. HE WILL AVOID GOING FURTHER AT THIS STAGE, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS THE MECHANICS AND SUBSTANCE OF SUBSEQUENT MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

THEREAFTER THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WILL SEE THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR PROBABLY ABOUT 5 PM B.S.T. FROM THIS POINT ONWARDS WE SHALL HAVE TO PLAY THE THING BY EAR TO SOME EXTENT. OUR INCLINATION AT PRESENT IS THAT MICHAEL STEWART SHOULD ASK SMIRNOVSKY TO CONVEY TO MOSCOW THE SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD FOLLOW UP THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

AT THE END OF MY VISIT TO MOSCOW IN JANUARY . AS YOU WILL REMEMBER, THIS CONFIRMED OUR INTENTION TO TAKE SINGLY OR JOINTLY ALL ACTIONS WITHIN OUR POWER TO ACHIEVE THE GOAL OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM CONFLICT. THERE IS ALSO THE ORAL MESSAGE ABOUT PERSONAL CONTACTS WHICH SMIRNOVSKY GAVE ME WHEN HANDING ME KOSYGIN'S REPLY TO MY LAST MESSAGE ON VIETNAM. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY WOULD SUGGEST THAT, SINCE HE HIMSELF HAS ONLY RECENTLY RETURNED TO THIS POST, HE WOULD IN ANY EVENT HAVE WISHED TO RENEW PERSONAL CONTACT WITH GROMYKO IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND WHAT MORE SUITABLE OCCASION COULD THERE BE FOR DOING SO THAN YOUR OWN STATEMENT?

IT IS HERE THAT THE REAL DIFFICULTIES MAY BEGIN. OUR ABILITY TO SUGGEST POSSIBLE TIMES AND PLACES FOR SUCH A MEETING AND STILL MORE TO SUGGEST A POSSIBLE AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION WILL DEPEND ON WHAT YOU AND WE THINK WE CAN DO IN PRACTICAL TERMS IN THE LIGHT OF THE FIRST REACTIONS OF MOSCOW AND HANOI. I DO NOT THINK THAT WE CAN AFFORD TO BE TOO OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE OUTCOME UNLESS THE PROPOSITION PUT TO THEM IS REASONABLY HARD AND DEFINITE AND AMOUNTS TO SOMETHING WHICH BOTH MOSCOW AND HANOI FEEL THAT THEY CANNOT JUSTIFIABLY REFUSE IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS. IT IS HERE THAT I AM A LITTLE UNCLEAR ABOUT THE CRUCIAL PHRASE IN YOUR MESSAGE THAT HANOI'S ACTIONS COULD OFFER A BASIS FOR OUR MAKING THE REASONABLE ASSUMPTION STATED IN THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA - THAT THEY WOULD NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION IF WE STOPPED THE BOMBING ALTOGETHER. EVEN IF GENUINELY INTERESTED IN YOUR OFFER (AND THIS CAN BE NO MORE THAN AN ASSUMPTION), MOSCOW AND HANOI ARE LIKELY TO SAY TO THEMSELVES THAT THEY ARE STILL PREPARED TO TALK IF YOU STOP THE BOMBING UNCONDITIONALLY AND ALTOGETHER; THAT THEY THINK THEY CAN SEE A HINT IN YOUR STATEMENT THAT THIS COULD BE ACHIEVED; BUT THAT THEY CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHAT IT IS THEY HAVE TO DO IN ORDER TO BRING THIS ABOUT. IF WE ARE TO GO INTO ACTION WITH MOSCOW ON YOUR BEHALF WE MUST HAVE SOME ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WHICH WILL BE IN THEIR MINDS. IN OTHER WORDS WHAT IS THE REAL NATURE OF THE PROPOSITION WHICH WE ARE TO TRY TO SELL TO MOSCOW?

IN ADDITION, WE SHALL ALWAYS NEED TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THE WORD GENEVA HAS TWO SPECIAL MEANINGS FOR THE RUSSIANS. THEY HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO ME ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS - AND HAVE IMPLIED IT PUBLICLY - THAT THE GENEVA CO-CHAIRMANSHIP IS FOR THEM A VALID RELATIONSHIP CARRYING RESPONSIBILITY. BUT THEY HAVE MADE IT EQUALLY CLEAR THAT THEY REGARD A CONFERENCE UNDER GENEVA AUSPICES AS ONE OF THE LATER STAGES AFTER THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED ON NEGOTIATIONS, NOT A PRELIMINARY STEP. ONE REASON FOR THEIR RELUCTANCE ABOUT A GENEVA CONFERENCE IS THE WORRY THAT THE CHINESE MIGHT PRESS THEIR CLAIM TO BE THERE. BUT THE MAIN POINT IS THAT THEY ARE NOT GOING TO MOVE, ABOVE ALL IN PUBLIC, BEYOND WHAT HANOI WANTS AT ANY MOMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

*Let President at 8:25*  
*2.*

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, March 31, 1968  
8:15 AM

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S REPORT  
NUMBER FIFTY-SIX ON THE KHE SANH/DMZ/A SHAU VALLEY AREA.

Yesterday at Khe Sanh skies were clear to scattered with good visibility until 9:00 PM. By 2:00 AM this morning, ceilings of less than 600 feet and visibility of less than one mile was recorded. These conditions persisted until 9:00 AM. The same pattern is predicted for tomorrow.

A total of 127 short tons of supplies and 140 passenger replacements were delivered to the Khe Sanh Combat Base during the period. Seven C-130 and four C-123 aircraft conducted airdrops. Twenty Marine helicopters lifted cargo and passengers.

Khe Sanh received 120 artillery, 87 rocket and 140 mortar rounds for a total of 347 incoming rounds. These attacks killed six Marines and wounded 12 (six evacuated). Other activity at Khe Sanh included two combat patrols. In the first a reinforced company from the 1st battalion, 26th Marines engaged an enemy battalion south of the perimeter. Heavy contact continued through the morning. Nine Marines were killed and 71 wounded (42 evacuated). The enemy lost 115. In the second contact, a patrol from company D, 9th Marines contacted an unknown size enemy force west of Khe Sanh perimeter at 1:00 PM yesterday. Three Marines received minor wounds. 15 enemy were killed in the action.

Along the DMZ, the deception attacks which were initiated yesterday continued northwest of Dong Ha. ARVN elements reported killing 132 enemy and US forces killed 18. All objectives for the day were secured by mid-afternoon. A total of 280 enemy were killed (29 killed by air) along the entire DMZ. In addition, three were detained and 25 individual and 12 crew served weapons were captured. Friendly losses stood at 34 killed (14 ARVN, 20 US) and 158 wounded (75 ARVN, 83 US). The 1st Air Cavalry Division continued preparation for future operations.

Artillery fire support for Khe Sanh consisted of 82 missions expending 4,080 rounds. Twenty missions were observed. In one mission supporting operation Lancaster, 14 rounds of COFRAM ammunition was fired. Results are unknown.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1968  
By *ra*, NARA, Date *3-27-92*

SECRET

-2-

A total of 284 tactical air sorties were flown in the Niagara area. Ten secondary explosions, eleven secondary fires, 28 road cuts, damage of six structures, and destruction of four trucks, 105 meters of trenches, 29 bunkers, six structures and one mortar position was observed. Tactical air sorties planned for tomorrow total 192.

There was eight ARC LIGHT strikes (48 sorties) scheduled into the Niagara area. One strike was against a target 1,100 meters from friendly forces. One strike observed three secondary explosions. Eight B-52 missions are scheduled for Niagara on 31 March.

Aerial surveillance in the A Shau Valley included one airborne radar mission which revealed ten targets at two locations. A photo mission detected two vehicles, seen light anti-aircraft positions at three different locations and three anti-aircraft/automatic weapon sites. Three secondary fires were reported from one tactical air mission. Ten tactical air missions were flown against A Shau Targets.

SECRET

2a



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

31 March 1968  
4:30 AM EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST 30  
March (9:00 AM 31 March, SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) status  
as of the above time is as follows:

<u>DAYS SUPPLY</u> <u>ON HAND</u>	<u>8:00 PM 30 Mar EST</u> <u>(9:00 AM 31 Mar SVN)</u>
--------------------------------------	--

CLASS I (Rations)

Meal, Combat, Individual	22	22 days
B Rations	6	6 days

CLASS III (Fuel)

Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	3	3 days
JP-4 Fuel (Jet Fuel)	10.6	10.6 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	9.9	12.6 days
Diesel	20.1	17.9 days

CLASS V (Ammunition)

A. High Explosive

60-mm mortar	45	46 days
81-mm mortar	35	35 days
90-mm (tank)	68	69 days
4.2" mortar	26	28 days
105-mm howitzer	22	23 days
155-mm howitzer	33	32 days

B. Antitank

ROUNDS ON HAND

90-mm AP-T	254
90-mm HEAT	1,089
66-mm rocket (LAW)	2,212
Antitank mines (M-15)	349
Antitank mines (M-19)	469
Antitank mines (M-21)	48
106-mm HEAT	1,538
106-mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T)	1,883
3.5" rocket	2,127

SECRET

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988

By AF NARA, Date 3-27-92

SECRET

8:00 PM 30 Mar EST  
(9:00 AM 31 Mar SVN)

C. Antipersonnel

ROUNDS ON HAND

90-mm BEEHIVE	542
105-mm BEEHIVE	1,090
106-mm BEEHIVE	1,689
90-mm CANNISTER	323

CLASS V (COFRAM)


105-mm howitzer	1,684
155-mm howitzer	990
40-mm grenade launcher	6,729
Hand grenades	2,945

2. On 30 March, Khe Sanh was resupplied with 127 short tons as follows:

CLASS I	2.5 tons
CLASS II	5.5 tons
CLASS III	18 tons
CLASS IV	49 tons
CLASS V	49 tons
MISCELLANEOUS	3 tons

Distribution:

SECDEF  
DEPSECDEF  
CJCS (3)  
DJS (3)  
J-30  
J-31  
J-32  
J-33  
J-34  
J-4  
AWR  
MCCC  
AFCP  
NFP  
DDO  
ADDO  
CCOC  
PAC DIV

  
WILLIAM E. SHEDD, III  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE

3  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-497  
By cb, NARA, Date 5-5-95

Memorandum for the Record, Sunday, March 31, 1968

Meeting of the President with Ambassador Anatoliy T. Dobrynin  
Also present: W. Averell Harriman and W. W. Rostow

*Pres file*

(Note: Gov. Harriman and Mr. Rostow had gone over with Amb. Dobrynin the President's speech for about half an hour before joining the President in the Mansion.)

The partial bombing cessation was explained as well as other statements bearing on our negotiating position.)

The President met Ambassador Dobrynin at about 6:05 p. m.

The President began by stating that he was going as far as he could in all conscience go, given the tactical position in the field. He could not endanger lives of his men on the Vietnamese frontiers by having a total bombing cessation. It was up to the Soviet Union as Geneva co-chairman and as a major arms supplier to Hanoi to bring its influence to bear for a conference and the making of peace.

The President recalled that the Soviet Union had played an important role at Tashkent in settling the India-Pak war. He believed, after his talks with Premier Kosygin at Glassboro, that Kosygin wished to be helpful; although nothing had come of it. But the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. had shown in many matters that we could work together for constructive results; for example, in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This was a time for everyone to bring to bear the greatest forbearance, restraint, and understanding. In South Vietnam itself the contending parties must give up war and seek a one-man, one-vote solution.

The Ambassador should be aware, however, that the U. S. was not going to pull out of Vietnam. The proportion of American voters who actually wanted to pull out was about 5%; another 15% wanted the President to do less militarily; but there were 40% who wanted the U. S. to do more. That was the problem with which he had to deal.

The President had great concern about Southeast Asia as a whole, not only Vietnam. He feared a much wider war that would be contrary to both our interests and the Soviet's interests. He thought perhaps the Chinese were getting "cocky" and "chesty." Their aggressive ambitions should not be encouraged. It was up to the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. to end the war in Vietnam soon and prevent hostilities from spreading.

~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE

The President said he had gone 90% of the way; now it was up to the Co-Chairmen to make it possible to go the last 10% and start negotiations for peace.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked the President to explain precisely why a 100% bombing pause was impossible. The President did so, adding that if Dobrynin thought of what it would be like if there were Russian soldiers in the same position as Americans and German forces were approaching, he would understand. Dobrynin said that the Soviet Union was lucky enough not to be there. The President countered: "But you are helping them."

Ambassador Dobrynin asked about the area in which we would bomb. It was explained: below the 20th parallel.

He asked if there was a time limit on the cessation. The President said no firm limit -- perhaps a few weeks. Dobrynin said that was good. It is better not to have to hurry.

Dobrynin took full notes and a preliminary text of the speech, departing about 6:30 p. m.

W. W. Rostow

4

**SECRET**

Sunday, March 31, 1968 -- 6:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Gov. Harriman and I suggest that you dispatch the following message promptly to Prime Minister Wilson:

"From the President for the Prime Minister.

"I am heartened and grateful that you are prepared to seize with both hands on my initiative <sup>of</sup> ~~last~~tonight.

"Your proposed schedule of action is constructive.

"We shall be getting to you soon a response to the questions you raise in your last two paragraphs.

"You may wish to know that I have just finished briefing Ambassador Debrynia underlining the responsibility Moscow bears both as Co-Chairman and as a major arms supplier to Hanoi."

W. W. Rostow

Message approved for dispatch \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-252  
By plcb, NARA, Date 5/3/96

WWRostow:rla

**SECRET**

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, March 31, 1968 -- 12:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Bus Wheeler called to report as follows: Westy's offensive along Route 9 to Khe Sanh has begun. If it goes well, he would feel quite comfortable going to the meeting. If it should run into difficulties, however, he would not like to be out of his headquarters. He will know by Thursday, his time, where he stands.

The question is: Can we wait as late as, say, Wednesday night here before making a final decision about his going to Honolulu? Bus would like to send a message to him tomorrow morning.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 4-1-92

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
By rg, NARA, Date 4-1-92

WWRostow:rlm

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, March 31, 1968 -- 12:00 noon

*Profile*

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Bundy recommends 5 diplomatic actions this afternoon just before your speech.

In addition, may we dispatch the text to Bunker at about 7:00 p. m. ?

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *kg*, NARA, Date 4-19-82

~~SECRET~~

6a  
March 31, 1968

Proposed Diplomatic Actions

1. Have Goldberg inform U Thant at about 7:00 this evening, on the basis of a summary to be provided by secure means.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. Give text to the Canadian and Indian Ambassadors at about 7:00 this evening, with urgings for affirmative response by their governments. (Although the ICC nations are not mentioned in the speech, one of the major proposals in circulation would call for the co-chairmen and the ICC nations to get together. (We would favor this.)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

3. As a courtesy, call in the South Vietnamese Ambassador and the Manila allies to receive the text at 7:00 this evening, indicating that their governments have already been officially consulted and informed in their home capitals. (Otherwise, word might get around to the effect that we had not consulted these nations, as of course we have.)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

4. Give the British Embassy the full text at 7:00 this evening, likewise noting that Wilson is already fully informed.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC la 3-31-80

By up/ly, NARA, Date 4-2-92

~~SECRET~~

~~-2-~~

5. Have Governor Harriman, following the meeting with Dobrynin, call on the Apostolic Delegate at about 6:30 to give him the text and to ask for affirmative comment from the Pope.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

W. P. Bundy:bmm

**INFORMATION**

**Sunday, March 31, 1968  
10:50 a. m.**

*Pres file*

**Mr. President:**

**The attached message was telephoned  
in to my office and reported by Miss  
Nivens.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**WWRostow:rln**

March 30, 1968

Mr. Rostow,

A Richard Cohen, Assistant Executive Director of American Jewish Congress in New York City, telephoned to say they are going to make a proposal tomorrow to the President, which he wanted you to be aware of and have your comments, if you care to comment.

Their idea is that the President should invite King Hussein of Jordan and Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel to meet with the President aboard a flagship in the Mediterranean to discuss permanent peace in the Middle East. The U.S. is <sup>only</sup> country which has maintained friendly relations with both countries. President is friendly with both.

Two successful precedents for such intervention: in 1966 Premier of Soviet Union called together the leaders of Pakistan and India at Tashkent; and in 1905 President Teddy Roosevelt brought Russia and Japan to the peace table in our own country to end the war. President Roosevelt was awarded the Peace prize.

Mr. Cohen stated their statement will point out that the President is extremely qualified for the role. He has made clear ~~to~~ American people are friends to both countries; has offered aid to both; has friendship and respect of leaders of both countries.

They suggest, therefore, that President should be host at the peace table, and, in the Biblical phrase which he so often quotes, he should say to them: Come, let us reason together.

That is roughly what they plan to say.

Mr. Richard Cohen, Hempsted, New York 223-1653

LN

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

March 31, 1968

Subject: Reaction to Advance Notice on Speech

We have received the following reactions from allies to advance notification regarding contents of your speech:

AUSTRALIA -- Prime Minister Gorton said that "since U. S. is contributing bulk of forces, sustaining greatest losses, and financing most of war costs, it would be inappropriate for small power like Australia to be offering advice." He will be consulting cabinet colleagues regarding content of a supporting statement. Was pleased no reference to need for more Australian troops which, he said "I don't think we could do."

NEW ZEALAND -- Prime Minister Holyoake responded most favorably; he will speak in support of action following your statement.

THAILAND -- Prime Minister Thanom said: "I understand completely what the President wants to do, and I agree with it." Approves idea of increasing ARVN effectiveness. Is convinced Hanoi will denounce your statement. Asked how long we would wait to judge Hanoi's reaction. Indicated he thought we should hit the North hard when bombing is resumed. Also indicated he would take favorable notice of your statement.

PHILIPPINES -- Marcos said: "Tell the President that I agree with his proposed statement." He added: "I hope this will mean we can get to the negotiating table." Asked particularly that his thanks be conveyed to you for advance notice and expressed appreciation for the difficult time faced by you on this issue. He was receptive to idea of making a responsive statement after your announcement.

LAOS -- Souvanna Phouma was: pleased U. S. will continue to demonstrate its determination to persevere; certain Hanoi will denounce partial suspension of bombing as a trick; doubts Hanoi can take any real military advantage; thinks Hanoi will continue harassment, rocket raids, and propaganda; intrigued by indications we anticipate "clear field for whatever actions were then required." Satisfied that sorties available from partial suspension will be used in Laos. Souvanna has long favored more punitive strikes against North Viet-Nam (including hitting the dikes).

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-270  
By ius, NARA Date 10-15-97

W. W. Rostow

9

**SECRET**

Saturday, March 30, 1968 -- 7:45 p.m.

*Pres file*

**Mr. President:**

The obvious points with Dobrynin tomorrow you, of course, know:

- The peace proposal itself;
- His understanding as a mature man that this is as far as you can now go;
- The responsibility that the Soviet Union bears to convert it into something that moves us towards peace.

In addition, you may wish to tell him, quietly and thoughtfully, two things that are true and which may not be getting through to Moscow in their intelligence:

-- The Tet attack was obviously meant to destroy the GVN and the ARVN. It not only failed in both, but it is our honest assessment that the GVN has shown more capacity to move and make decisions than before Tet and ARVN morale is higher than before Tet. (You might even read him some of Ellsworth Bunker's cable.) It is our honest assessment that despite their frantic efforts to mount a second wave of attack, time is not Hanoi's friend.

-- One of the reasons you are not sending more troops to Vietnam is that our military men are quite confident in dealing with the situation.

In short, it would be a mistake on the part of Hanoi -- or anyone else -- to believe that you are making this peace proposal from a sense of weakness in Vietnam.

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority NSG 8-44-80  
OSD 10-6-78; State 12-19-78;

By JK/18, NARA, Date 4-2-92

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, March 30, 1968  
7:40 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This rather hopeful assessment by a wise Korean Ambassador in Saigon of the GVN reaction to Tet will interest you -- including Thieu's need for self-confidence.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 23537

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-269  
By isp, NARA Date 2-19-97

WWRostow:rla

Saturday, March 30, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 23537)

When I took Ambassador Berger today to call on Ambassador Shin Sang Chul of Korea, who is Dean of Diplomatic Corps, he asked us to stay since he wished to discuss the situation here. Shin has been in Vietnam five years, has military background, speaks excellent English. What he had to say in an hour's talk was extremely interesting.

Before Tet, he said, he frankly wondered whether Government of Vietnam forces would not collapse in the event of an enemy attack, which everyone knew was coming. The dimension of that attack was far broader and heavier than anything he had expected, and was a reminder of how widely and deeply established Communists were in the south. Both the government and Vietnam forces had survived this assault. This was most encouraging. It had given Thieu, government and country a measure of self-confidence, which was absent before Tet. He believed that there are likely to be new attacks this year, which he is now confident can and will be beaten back. Since there is now a better distribution of forces, we are not likely to be surprised in the same way, and there is enough military power to handle whatever they may throw at us.

Shin said the main need and problem now is to strengthen further the self-confidence of Vietnamese leaders, especially Thieu, and the people.

He did not share the western view of Thieu as a man of indecision. In Asian terms, there is greater confidence and respect for leaders who are reflective and deliberate than for those who are impulsive and move swiftly. Moreover, Thieu was senior to Ky, he had more support among the armed forces than Ky, he was the elected President, and he had the support of the U. S. and other allies. All this was known to the people, he had pointed all this out to Thieu in an effort to bolster his self-confidence, and he thought Thieu was gradually acquiring confidence, although he had a long way to go.

Greatest immediate need is for Thieu to establish public confidence in his leadership. This can only be done by a serious and prolonged attack on corruption, which was everywhere, but especially in the armed forces. Here Thieu had a problem. Many provincial chiefs and many military leaders were ineffective or incompetent or corrupt. They simply had to be removed, however difficult this was. But ~~this~~ Thieu was the President and he had to move. Any attempt to overthrow Thieu was unthinkable, and Ky knew it, for the allies and the U. S. will not allow it. Ky's chances for office will come four years from now, and this is what he should be told.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-267

By Cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

CONFIDENTIAL

Shin then said the enemy objective at Tet and the new offensives to come are aimed at U. S. opinion. They are designed to depress Americans about the situation in Vietnam, impress on the U. S. the strength of the Communists in South Vietnam, and put the Communists in strongest possible position for negotiations. If the enemy succeeds in their offensives, they will propose a cease-fire and come into the negotiations in a strong position to bargain. If they fail in their offensives and the South Vietnamese hold, as he now thinks they will, the enemy in the course of this year or next will have to modify their strategy in the direction of a protracted war.

That will be the next great test of the effectiveness and competence of this government and of the ability of the South Vietnamese to survive and produce eventually a democratic system. The job of removing Communists from the infrastructure will be very difficult. It will take years and will require strong government and a discipline over a society which is not accustomed to it. The armed forces will have to play a major role in this society for the next few years. They are the only disciplined and controlled force there is and, although they are in need of great improvement and reform in all respects, they are the most hopeful element for laying foundations for the future.

Shin said he was a soldier turned civilian, and could speak to Thieu and Ky more easily perhaps than a civilian, and he was doing so. He said there are some parallels with Korea in respect of the role of the military in building a society, and a democratic one, at that. Although it was vastly more difficult here, he was not without hope that it could be done.

Shin is leaving for Wellington (SEATO) and then a Chiefs of Mission Conference in Bangkok. He wants to continue the discourse when he returns. He has unusual powers of observation and analysis, and his five years here have apparently not made him cynical, as it has so many others. Berger observed to me after the meeting that he was probably trained at Benning or Leavenworth, which is turning out some of the finest revolutionaries of our time.

*Profile* <sup>11</sup>

Saturday, March 30, 1968, 10:25 a.m.

**SITUATION ROOM INFORMATION REPORT  
SUBJECT: F-111 CRASHES IN THAILAND**

At 8:20 a.m., EST an F-111 crashed approximately 74 miles south of Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. Two chutes were reported seen and search and rescue efforts are now in progress. No other details are known at the present time.

W. W. Rostow

12

SEM  
WHCA

~~TOP SECRET~~ *free file*

PRUS331  
1511 ZULU 30 MAR 68  
FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO THE PRIME MINISTER  
~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

1968 MAR 30 17 11

EYES ONLY

CAP80723

FOR THE PRIME MINISTER EYES ONLY FROM THE PRESIDENT

160 MAR 30 PM 12:18  
SATURDAY

AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE BEEN GIVING THE MOST CAREFUL THOUGHT TO THE VIETNAM SITUATION AND TO OUR NEXT MOVES. I HAVE REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT WE MUST PREPARE TO TAKE CERTAIN VERY LIMITED ADDITIONAL MILITARY ACTIONS INVOLVING THE SENDING OF AN ADDITIONAL 13,500 FORCES TO VIETNAM OVER THE SUMMER. THESE WOULD BE SUPPORT FORCES DESIGNED TO ROUND OUT COMBAT ELEMENTS THAT WE SENT IN FEBRUARY AFTER THE TET OFFENSIVE BEGAN.

AT THE SAME TIME, IN LIGHT OF THE DEPLETED CONDITION OF OUR STRATEGIC RESERVE FOR WORLD-WIDE USE, I HAVE BECOME CONVINCED THAT WE MUST REPLENISH THAT RESERVE -- FOR ALL PURPOSES -- BY CALLING UP ADDITIONAL RESERVES AMOUNTING TO 48,500 MEN.

I EXPECT TO ANNOUNCE THESE MEASURES ON SUNDAY NIGHT, OR MONDAY INCLUDING WITH THEM A LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AS OUR FIRST-PRIORITY, AND MAKING CLEAR ONCE AGAIN THAT OUR MILITARY OBJECTIVE IS SOLELY TO HELP PROVIDE A SHIELD BEHIND WHICH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE CAN DEVELOP.

YET, IN DECIDING ON THESE ACTIONS, IT HAS BECOME TOTALLY CLEAR TO ME THAT I SHOULD NOT TAKE THEM UNLESS AT THE SAME TIME I ANNOUNCE A REALLY CLEAR MOVE TOWARD PEACE. ACCORDINGLY, I EXPECT TO ANNOUNCE AT THE VERY FOREFRONT OF MY SPEECH THAT WE ARE CUTTING BACK THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH TO THE AREA ROUGHLY SOUTH OF THE 20TH PARALLEL. THIS WOULD LEAVE OUT HANOI AND HAIPHONG, AND INDEED ALL THE MAJOR POPULATED AREAS IN NORTH VIETNAM.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-252  
By *picb*, NARA, Date 5/3/94

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

I SHALL ANNOUNCE THIS ACTION WITHOUT SPECIFYING WHAT HANOI SHOULD DO IN RESPONSE, AND WITHOUT TIME LIMIT. AT THE SAME TIME, I SHALL SAY THAT HANOI'S ACTIONS COULD OFFER A BASIS FOR OUR MAKING THE REASONABLE ASSUMPTION STATED IN THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA -- THAT THEY WOULD NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION IF WE STOPPED THE BOMBING ALTOGETHER. I SHALL SAY THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED FOR ANY RESPONSE, AND WOULD SPECIFICALLY HOLD GOVERNOR HARRIMAN AND AMBASSADOR THOMPSON INSTANTLY READY FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH HANOI IN ANY QUARTER.

I WOULD WISH YOU TO KNOW OF THESE ACTIONS IN ANY CASE. BUT I AM PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO HAVE YOUR JUDGMENT ON ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE -- NOW BEFORE ME -- WHICH WOULD CALL UPON THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE SOVIET UNION, "AS CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND AS PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATION'S SECURITY COUNCIL," -- TO EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE SO THAT MOVEMENT TOWARD PEACE MAY RESULT FROM THIS ACT OF DEESCALATION ON OUR PART.

I DO NOT NEED TO SAY THAT WE HAVE NEVER HAD THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT THAT YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD DO ALL IN YOUR POWER IN ANY EVENT. THE PURPOSE OF THE PASSAGE IS TO PUT THE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS -- WHERE IT RIGHTLY BELONGS IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR WHOLE RESPONSIBILITY AND PARTICULARLY THEIR MAJOR SUPPLY CONTRIBUTION TO HANOI'S CURRENT OFFENSIVE. IN THE DESCRIPTION OF THE TWO NATIONS, THE GENEVA ASPECT IS OF COURSE PARAMOUNT; AT THE SAME TIME, REFERENCE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP WOULD HAVE A USEFUL EFFECT HERE, EVEN THOUGH WE FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT HANOI'S TOTAL REJECTION OF UN COMPETENCE -- (PLUS THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL) MAKE IT MOST UNLIKELY THAT THE COUNCIL AS SUCH CAN ACT.

I NOW PLAN TO MAKE THE WHOLE OF THIS ANNOUNCEMENT ON SUNDAY OR MONDAY NIGHT. I HOPE THAT IT WILL MEET WITH YOUR FULL APPROVAL, AND THAT YOU MIGHT BE PREPARED TO MAKE A RESPONSIVE STATEMENT PROMPTLY THEREAFTER. I DO NOT KNOW HOW SOVIETS WILL HANDLE THIS, BUT WE WILL KEEP YOU VERY CLOSELY POSTED AND MAY HAVE FURTHER SUGGESTIONS.

I COUNT ON YOU TO HOLD THIS ABSOLUTELY TIGHT UNTIL ANNOUCEMENT IS MADE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

END

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

March 30, 1968

For the Prime Minister via Michael Palliser

*Pres file*

From Walt Rostow

You should be aware that we shall not repeat not be announcing reserve call-up figures tomorrow. They should be held tight as a drum.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-252  
By plcb, NARA, Date 5/3/96

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

RECEIVED  
WHCA

23.40 ZULU 30 MAR 68  
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

1968 MAR 30 22 45

T86/68

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

MTT

I WAS VERY GLAD AND ENCOURAGED TO GET YOUR MESSAGE.  
OF COURSE WE SHALL DO ALL WE CAN TO HELP WITHOUT DELAY.  
I AGREE AT ONCE TO MAKE A PROMPT RESPONSE IN SUPPORT OF THIS  
INITIATIVE.

WE ARE SCRATCHING OUR HEADS HARD ABOUT HOW WE CAN BUILD  
ON WHAT YOU ARE ANNOUNCING, PARTICULARLY IN THE RUSSIAN  
CONTEXT YOU MENTION. MICHAEL STEWART AND I ARE MEETING  
URGENTLY ON SUNDAY MORNING TO GO INTO THIS MORE FULLY AND I  
SHALL LET YOU KNOW IN GOOD TIME TOMORROW OUR IDEAS ABOUT THIS,  
AND MY CONSIDERED VIEW ON THE WORDING  
ON WHICH YOU HAVE ASKED MY JUDGEMENT.

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

MESSAGE ENDS.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4  
By *pljc*, NARA, Date *12-18-07*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Saturday, March 30, 1968

*Mr. Ponder* 2:45 PM

~~Mr. Rostow:~~

Just received confirmation from NMCC that  
the attached press story is true.

~~Ray~~

*Walt*

*Pres file*

*15*

NNNNMZCZC EPE 232  
SS NOR  
1350: BULLETIN''''':

VIET--BATTLE

SAIGON, MARCH 31 (SUNDAY) (REUTERS)--U.S. MARINES AT  
KHE SANH TRYING TO SMASH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LINES SURROUNDING  
THEM YESTERDAY SURGED OUT OF THE BASE AND ASSAULTED A NORTH  
VIETNAMESE BATTALION, A U.S. MILITARY SPOKESMAN SAID EARLY  
TODAY.

:: (MORE) MB/EB

UU NOR  
1351: URGENT'''''

1ST ADD SAIGON VIET--BATTLE:

X X X TODAY.

THE MARINES SENT OUT A REINFORCED COMPANY--ABOUT 200 MEN,  
WITH ARTILLERY SUPPORT. THEY REPORTED KILLING 115 NORTH  
VIETNAMESE WHILE LOSING NINE MEN KILLED AND 71 WOUNDED.

:: (MORE) MB/EB

NNNNZCZC EPE 234  
YY NOR

1352: 2ND ADD SAIGON VIET--BATTLE:  
X X X WOUNDED.

THE SPOKESMAN SAID THE MARINES LEFT THE PERIMTER OF THE  
REMOTE NORTHWESTERN GARRISON AT 8:30 A.M. LOCAL TIME SATURDAY,  
AND ONE MILE SOUTH OF THE BASE RAN INTO AN ESTIMATED NORTH  
VIETNAMESE BATTALION DUG INTO BUNKERS AND TRENCHES.

THE MARINES HELD THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WITH RIFLE AND MACHINEGUN  
FIRE WHILE THEY DIRECTED A MASSIVE ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT ONTO  
THEM.

THE FIGHTING WAS FIERCE BUT BRIEF--ONE HOUR LATER THE  
MARINES BEGAN TO WITHDRAW AND, CARRYING THEIR DEAD  
AND WOUNDED, HAD ALL MARCHED BACK INSIDE THE BASE BY NOON,  
THE SPOKESMAN SAID.

:: REUTERS MB/EB

Sat., March 3., 1968  
2:25 p. m.

14 Pres  
file

Mr. President:

Herewith Clark Clifford's warm note  
to Westy.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

16a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1968

General William C. Westmoreland  
COMUSMACV  
Saigon, South Vietnam

Dear Westy:


I want to add my personal note of congratulations to the avalanche of best wishes you must be receiving from your friends and your legions of admirers, both American and Allied, over your appointment to the highest position in the United States Army. No man has earned that honor more fully.

You have served with tireless dedication, flawless integrity, and total selflessness in a continuously trying situation. The nation is deeply in your debt. But in a very real sense, your achievements in the complex and thorny tasks which confront us in Southeast Asia are beyond recompense.

It is comforting to know that soon I, and all of those concerned with national security problems will have even closer at hand the benefit of your experience and judgment over the spectrum of military problems that confront us. We are looking forward, too, to the additional bonus that everyone receives who works with you: that happy combination of high morale and driving spirit that has become symbolical of your command.

With high admiration, and warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

  
Clark M. Clifford

P file

17

Saturday, March 30, 1968  
12:00 noon

MR. PRESIDENT:

It looks, from the attached, as if the Five  
held steady and the French are odd man out.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

17a

FBIS 69 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FRENCH ON STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

PARIS AFP IN FRENCH 1520 GMT 30 MAR 68 C

*Restow*  
*Only info we have*  
*BKS*

(TEXT) STOCKHOLM--A SPOKESMAN FOR THE FRENCH DELEGATION DECLARED AT 1610: WE DECLINE TO ASSOCIATE OURSELVES WITH THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE CONFERENCE OF 10.

FRENCH MINISTER OF FINANCE AND ECONOMY MICHEL DEBRE WILL DISTRIBUTE A STATEMENT AND ANSWER CORRESPONDENTS' QUESTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

30 MAR 1547Z GKE/WP

*Pres file*

18

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

Saturday, March 30, 1968

11:45 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have not yet been able to get Sect. Rusk on the phone, but have talked with Bill Bundy. (I have now talked with Sect. Rusk. He believes Bunker should come.)

The situation is that the messages to London, Seoul, Bangkok, Canberra and Wellington are now going out.

Bill Bundy requests permission also to inform Souvanna Pheuma, to whom the bombing of North Vietnam is very important and who has never leaked a personal communication.

He also believes that Marcos personally has proved he can be closemouthed.

Bill Bundy thinks there are two good reasons for getting Bunker to Honolulu:

-- it would make the conference appear less purely military;

-- it gives you a chance personally to tell Bunker to get working with the South Vietnamese after the press conference, preparing the way for a South Vietnamese peace initiative in a month or so.

Finally, Bill believes that it would be good if we could ball in Dobrynin before you speak and tell him what you plan to do, and urge the Soviet Union to seize this opportunity, get to work on peacemaking, and begin to exercise their proper responsibilities as Co-Chairman under the Geneva Accords.

It has just occurred to me that you might want to have Dobrynin in yourself for this purpose.

W. W. Rostow

Souvanna OK \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ Call me \_\_\_\_\_

Marcos OK \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ Call me \_\_\_\_\_

Get Bunker to Honolulu \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ Call me \_\_\_\_\_

Let State talk to Dobrynin \_\_\_\_\_ President will talk to Dobrynin \_\_\_\_\_

No one talk to Dobrynin \_\_\_\_\_ Call me \_\_\_\_\_

**DECLASSIFIED**  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-270  
By is, NARA Date 10-15-97

INFORMATION

19

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, March 30, 1968  
10:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

At Khe Sanh-DMZ-A Shau:

- 56 rounds enemy incoming;
- 1,626 rounds friendly;
- 223 tons resupply; supplies remain satisfactory level;
- 315 tactical sorties, plus 36 B-52's;
- weather generally good.

You should know Bus Wheeler was a bit annoyed with CIA this morning for calling enemy shelling (56 rounds) heavy.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 4-3-92

Saturday, March 30, 1968

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

DECLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: Khe Sanh Report

Authority OSD ltr 1/3/79  
By ip/y, NARA, Date 4-3-92

This is report fifty-five on the Khe Sanh/DMZ/A Shau Valley area, for the 24-hour period 29 March 1968.

Weather at Khe Sanh was generally good yesterday with visibility to seven miles. However, at noon yesterday, fog quickly formed and obscured the sky and reduced visibility to less than one mile. These conditions prevailed during the morning but the fog was expected to lift by 10:00 a. m. Good sky conditions are expected the rest of the day. Heavy fog is again predicted by noon tomorrow to persist until 8:00 p. m.

A total of 223 short tons of supplies and 100 passenger replacements were delivered to the Khe Sanh combat area during the reporting period. Eleven C-130 and three C-123 aircraft conducted airdrops. Forty-five Marine helicopters landed with cargo and passengers. A total of 10.5 tons of air delivery equipment was back-loaded.

Supplies remain at a satisfactory level with 28 days of rations and 23 or more days of large caliber ammunitions on hand.

A total of 56 rounds of enemy indirect fire was received at Khe Sanh; 25 artillery, 25 mortar and six rocket. These attacks wounded five (three evacuated). Ground action occurred when Company D, First Battalion, 9th Marines observed a new enemy trench outside their perimeter. Approximately eight enemy were engaged with small arms and 3.5 inch rockets. The enemy responded with heavy mortar fire. Four enemy were killed and one Marine was wounded.

Along the DMZ, sporadic shelling of friendly bases and installations continued as a total of 63 incoming rounds were received. The only casualties reported were at C3 base north of Cam Lo where five Marines were wounded (two evacuated). Total U. S. casualties were 15 wounded (seven evacuated) and 18 enemy killed (11 by air), one individual and two crew-served weapons captured.

Elsewhere in Quang Tri Province, contact was light with no significant action reported. The First Air Cavalry Division continued reconnaissance near Ca Lu and to the west along Route 9 in preparation for upcoming operations. In a deception maneuver, one Army of the Republic of Vietnam Battalion, one USMC Battalion and one Cav Squadron (reinforced) initiated limited attacks northwest of Dong Ha at 5:00 p. m. last night. Five naval gunfire ships (one cruiser and four destroyers) will support this deception effort.

Artillery fire for Khe Sanh consisted of 82 missions expending 1,626 rounds. Twenty-one missions were observed. No cofram ammunition was fired.

A total of 315 tactical air sorties were flown in the Niagara area. Seven road cuts, 18 secondary fires, damage to two military structures and two trucks and destruction of four military structures and three trucks was observed. Tactical air sorties planned for tomorrow total 255.

There were six arc light strikes (36 sorties) scheduled into the Niagara area. One sortie was diverted to a secondary target. One strike observed five secondary explosions. There were 18 additional secondary explosions reported for the previous period, 8:00 p.m. 27 March to 8:00 p.m. 28 March. Eight missions are scheduled for Niagara for 30 March.

A Shau Valley side-looking air radar and photo missions reported no unusual returns. One reconnaissance team remains in the valley.

~~SECRET~~

196



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

30 March 1968  
4:30 AM EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST  
29 March (9:00 AM 30 March, SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)  
status as of the above time is as follows:

DAYS SUPPLY      8:00 PM 29 Mar EST  
ON HAND        (9:00 AM 30 Mar SVN)

CLASS I (Rations)

Meal, Combat, Individual	22	22 days
B Rations	6	6 days

CLASS III (Fuel)

Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	3	3 days
JP-4 Fuel (Jet Fuel)	10.6	10.6 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	12.6	13.3 days
Diesel	17.9	15.6 days

CLASS V (Ammunition)

a. High Explosive

60-mm mortar	46	46 days
81-mm mortar	35	35 days
90-mm (Tank)	69	69 days
4.2" mortar	28	25 days
105-mm howitzer	23	23 days
155-mm howitzer	32	30 days

b. Antitank

ROUNDS ON HAND

90-mm AP-T	254
90-mm HEAT	1,089
66-mm rocket (LAW)	2,212
Antitank mines (M-15)	349
Antitank mines (M-19)	469
Antitank mines (M-21)	48
106-mm HEAT	1,538
106-mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T)	2,013
3.5" rocket	2,137

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12858, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988  
By    NARA Date 4-3-92

SECRET

8:00 PM 29 Mar EST  
(9:00 AM 30 Mar SVN)

c. Antipersonnel

ROUNDS ON HAND


90-mm BEEHIVE	542
105-mm BEEHIVE	1,090
106-mm BEEHIVE	1,689
90-mm CANNISTER	323

CLASS V (COFRAM)

105-mm howitzer	1,684
155-mm howitzer	990
40-mm grenade launcher	6,729
Hand Grenados	2,945

2. On 29 March, Khe Sanh was resupplied with 223 short tons as follows:

CLASS I	56 tons
CLASS II	4.5 tons
CLASS III	20 tons
CLASS IV	31.5 tons
CLASS V	93 tons
MISCELLANEOUS	18 tons

  
WILLIAM E. SHEDD, III  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Director for  
Operations, NMCC

DISTRIBUTION

SECDEF	CCOC
DEP SECDEF	Pac Div
CJCS (3)	
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J-33	
J-34	
J-4	
AWR	
MCCC	
AFCP	
NFP	
DDO	
ADDO	

SECRET

INFORMATION

20

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, March 30, 1968  
7:45 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Ed Fried reports the unresolved state of the Stockholm conference -- the outcome depending on the willingness of the Five to stand firm in the crunch against the French.

W. W. Rostow

[REDACTED]

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 02-212  
By us, NARA, Date 3-10-03

1968 MAR 30 00 30

20a

DLA096  
OO YEKADS  
DE YEKADL 552 090001B  
O 300002Z ZYH  
FM STOCKHOLM  
TO WHITE HOUSE  
ZEM

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ 292310Z [REDACTED] CITE STOCKHOLM 8892

FROM ED FRIED FOR WALT ROSTOW  
SUBJECT: STOCKHOLM MONETARY CONFERENCE

(1) FIRST DAY SPENT IN STAKING OUT POSITIONS -- WITH NO GREAT SURPRISES. DEBRE MONOPOLIZED DISCUSSION AND WAS ISOLATED ON MOST ISSUES.

(2) GENERAL DISCUSSION

AT DEBRE'S INSISTENCE, CHAIRMAN PROVIDED TIME FOR GENERAL DEBATE. DEBRE MADE OPENING STATEMENT OUTLINING BASIC SICKNESS OF THE SYSTEM, AS HE SEES IT, AND PROPHEYSING DOOM. THE PROBLEM, HE SAID, WAS CAUSED BY THE CONTINUING U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT LONG AFTER THE EXPANSION OF THE DOLLAR AS A RESERVE CURRENCY REACHED ITS NATURAL LIMIT. ONLY SOLUTION WAS AN INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF GOLD -- WHICH HE SAID WAS INEVITABLE. QUESTION WAS NOT WHETHER BUT WHEN IT WOULD TAKE PLACE -- WITHIN ONE YEAR, TWO YEARS, OR TEN YEARS. HE REJECTED INTERNATIONAL RESERVE ASSET AS A WAY OUT AND SAID THAT IF WE ALLOWED CURRENT MONETARY DISORDER TO CONTINUE A COLLAPSE WOULD OCCUR, NOT IN THE SAME WAY AS 1929 BUT BY A CATAclysm NONETHELESS.

DEBRE HAD NO SUPPORT ON THE GOLD PRICE ISSUE AND THE DISCUSSION WAS PERMITTED TO PETER OUT ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE SDR ISSUE HAD TO BE SETTLED NOW TO EASE CURRENT STRAINS ON THE SYSTEM. *SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS*

(3) (SDR) DISCUSSION

DEBRE SPOKE EXTENSIVELY ON EACH ISSUE, BASING HIS POSITION ON THE NEED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT SDR'S ARE A FORM OF CREDIT AND NOT A RESERVE ASSET. HIS EEC PARTNERS WERE GENERALLY IN OPPOSITION BUT TRIED VARIOUS COMPROMISES TO BRING DEBRE' ALONG.

SCHILLER PLAYED ROLE OF PEACE MAKER -- SOMETIMES AN OVER-EAGER ONE. ITALY (COLOMBO) WAS MORE OUTSPOKEN IN OPPOSITION JOINED BY DUTCH AND ON ONE OCCASION BY BELGIAN.

(4) FUND REFORM ISSUES

FIRST RUN-THROUGH SHOWED LARGELY A DIVISION BETWEEN THE EEC AND NON-EEC COUNTRIES. DEBRE WAS IN MORE COMFORTABLE POSITION THAN IN SDR DISCUSSION.

(5) SECRETARY FOWLER THROUGHOUT INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO BE FLEXIBLE. DISCUSSIONS BROUGHT OUT EXTENT TO WHICH FRENCH WERE STUNG BY WASHINGTON GOLD POOL COMMUNIQUE.

(6) OUTCOME STILL UNCLEAR. STAGE IS SET FOR PACKAGE PROPOSALS WHICH ARE BEING SOUGHT TONIGHT. A COMPROMISE SHOULD BE POSSIBLE BUT THE FRENCH POSITION IS UNPREDICATABLE AND THE WILLINGNESS OF THE FIVE TO GO IT WITHOUT FRANCE IS ALSO UNCERTAIN. A LL AGREED CONFERENCE WILL END TOMORROW.

450

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-269  
By us, NARA Date 1-9-98

~~SECRET~~

21

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, March 30, 1968 -- 9:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to read Hal Saunders' attached reflective memorandum on where we are in the Middle East.

The heart of the problem is this choice:

-- let terrorism versus retaliation play itself out, with all its dangers, until the Israelis soften up enough to come off their rigid position;

-- send someone like Mac Bundy out to tell them they must communicate to Hussein a viable Jerusalem position so that he can take the personal and political risks of going for a settlement.

The Third possibility is a long shot: Nasser may fall; but I don't believe a U. S. policy can be based on that hope.

Hal's memo is worth reading, in my judgment.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-269  
By sig, NARA Date 2-19-97

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

March 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Next Step with Israel-Jordan

The problem in a nutshell is this:

--We agree that terrorism is a threat Israel has to do something about.

--We think Israel's effort to end terrorism by military attacks won't work. If they keep going down this track, we see only a rising spiral of attack and counter-attack ending in all Arabs at the summit rejecting a political solution and committing themselves to a guerrilla war against Israel. There's evidence now that the Israelis are beginning to think this way too, although they feel they must respond to terrorism somehow and don't yet see an alternative.

--The only persons who can stop terrorism from Jordanian territory are the Jordanian government. The problem, therefore, is to convince Hussein to stop it or--if he's already convinced but unable--to create conditions which strengthen his hand enough to crack down. We disagree with the Israelis that their military attacks strengthen his hand.

--The alternative we see is to get Jarring's peace talks on the road. If Hussein can show he's getting somewhere his way, maybe it's not too late for him to call the terrorists off, or stop them by force.

--One of the main obstacles to getting Jarring's negotiations started is Israeli inflexibility. One of the main reasons for Israeli inflexibility is the fact that the Cabinet has not taken a formal position on the terms for a peace settlement; Eshkol fears breaking up his coalition but we have assurance that they'll make up their minds. At the moment there's a glimmer of Arab willingness to talk.

--The difficulty with this is that the Arabs aren't likely to talk until somebody assures them there's a workable deal possible at the end of the track. This is what all the haggling over whether Israel accepts the UN resolution is about.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-269  
By imp, NARA Date 2-19-97

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

What all this adds up to is the conclusion of some of us that we should now urge Eshkol to bite the bullet and make the limited move necessary to give the Arabs the assurance they're looking for. Eshkol would give away nothing of substance; he would risk a Cabinet crisis, possibly for limited gains. But the risk of doing nothing looks a lot worse to us.

The alternative is to let force play itself out. The argument for is that only the Israelis will decide to bite the bullet when the pressure of terrorism builds up. The argument against is that we're in a worse position every time Israel strikes back and there's a real danger of the UN Security Council voting sanctions against Israel--with us having to decide whether to vote for, abstain or veto. More important, Israel is in a worse position if we don't stop the guerrilla spiral before the Arabs commit themselves to it.

The debate was brought to a head today in State when Luke Battle tried to clear a response from the President to Eshkol's last message. Arthur Goldberg felt it was too tough for the President. Luke, while fully understanding the President's concerns, feels that any message we send ought to lay out what we see as the serious consequences of Israel's current course.

My own feeling is that if we decide to do nothing to deter the Israelis from further retaliation it ought to be because we've decided consciously to let force play itself out a while longer. We shouldn't do nothing just because State can't work out line of action it feels the President can approve.

I don't believe there's any point in just sending another Presidential message for Eshkol to disregard. If we approach the Israelis this time, it ought to be with the purpose of working out with them a way to get Jarring on the tracks. I think the only way to do this would be to send someone like Mac Bundy with the most serious words from the President for three or four days of talk in Jerusalem. This need not look like pressure at all. The main focus wouldn't be to restrain them. It's just the only way I can see at this time to decide where we and they are going, and the only place to do that is where Eshkol and his Cabinet are.

State is considering this idea this afternoon.

  
Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

22  
/

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, March 30, 1968  
8:35 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Bruce recommends you  
meet Roy Jenkins.

W. W. Rostow

London 7687

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 4-1-92



Department of State

226  
TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 569

PAGE 01 LONDON 07677 291720Z

02

47  
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P 291658Z MAR 68  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2684

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ LONDON 7677

EXDIS

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

1. ALTHOUGH I UNDERSTAND THERE IS NO PLAN FOR THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, ROY JENKINS, TO MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT WHEN HE IS IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF THE PRESIDENT CAN FIND THE TIME TO SEE HIM. JENKINS WILL SURELY BE A MAJOR FIGURE IN THE LABOR GOVERNMENT IN ITS REMAINING TWO OR THREE YEARS DURING WHICH TIME FISCAL AND ECONOMIC MATTERS ARE LIKELY TO BE THE MOST IMPORTANT SUBJECT IN ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

PAGE 2 /RUDTCR 7677 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

2. JENKINS IS NOW SCHEDULED FOR ONLY ONE DAY IN WASHINGTON, GOING ON FROM THERE TO NEW YORK AND BOSTON. I UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT HE IS THINKING OF SPENDING AN ADDITIONAL DAY IN WASHINGTON AND HE WOULD CERTAINLY DO SO IN ORDER TO SEE THE PRESIDENT. BRUCE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 93-294  
By plp, NARA, Date 4/17/96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

INFORMATION

23  
-

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, March 30, 1968  
8:30 a. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. McConnell acknowledges some "excess support personnel" in the reserve units mobilized at the time of the Pueblo incident and outlines what the Air Force plans to do to keep all hands busy.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By BJ, NARA, Date 4-19-82

**MEMORANDUM**

**OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY**

29 March 1968

Forwarded at the recommendation  
of General Wheeler and with the  
concurrence of Mr. Clifford.

230

~~SECRET~~

236

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON, D.C.



28 MAR 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I share the President's concern as expressed in the Secretary of Defense's memorandum to you, dated 25 March 1968, over the effective utilization of those personnel mobilized at the time of the PUEBLO incident.

We have recently conducted a comprehensive review of units involved and determined that the hardcore personnel have been gainfully employed in increasing the combat readiness of the tactical units. We have found, however, that some units do have support personnel associated with wing/group overhead and housekeeping activities in excess to their needs. This is due primarily to the basic organization of the mobilized units in that they are organized and equipped to deploy, when needed, to a bare base. The majority of the units were mobilized at bases already adequately manned, thus creating an excess in some areas. Each of the commands has, where possible, integrated these personnel into host-base functions, provided TDY augmentation teams to other bases where there are shortages, and established on-the-job training programs.

The actions outlined above are only of interim value. We are in the process of identifying those excess individuals in the six F-100C units tentatively identified for movement overseas. Additionally, action is underway to identify the excesses in the remaining units. These personnel will then be made available for transfer worldwide to meet Air Force requirements. I also plan to move the two remaining F-100C units to Myrtle Beach AFB to develop a training base for the deployed units or for FAC/ALO training.

The matter of preparing personnel for more useful tasks after they leave the service is already under study and

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DDI Bu 5200.10

By rg, NARA, Date 4-1-92

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR. 5200.10

~~SECRET~~

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-1983

~~SECRET~~

review in the Air Force. I find that, for the most part, Air Force personnel in the performance of their normal duties acquire skills for which there is a demand in the civilian job market. For those whose normal duties may not equip them for a post-service occupation, the Air Force has implemented "Project Transition." OSD approved \$4.1 million in FY 69 funds for the Air Force to support the project. Included is an authorization for 719 manpower spaces. This project offers two services: counseling and vocational training conducted during off-duty periods. All personnel are eligible to enter this program. Additionally, all Air Force personnel are encouraged and provided the opportunity to improve their educational background by means of correspondence courses in various programs with civilian educational institutions. Generally, the Air National Guardsmen and Reservists called to active duty left a gainful occupation to which they plan to return. For those who were not so employed or desire to enter a new civilian job area, "Project Transition" is available for assistance.



J. P. McCONNELL, General, USAF  
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 93-368  
By CG, NARA, Date 5-12-95

*Pres file*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, March 30, 1968  
8:10 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Park accepts Honolulu in principle; but makes clear troop issue could not appear in communique, given his current political problems.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 5381

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln



Department of State

240  
TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

00 RUEHC  
DE RUALOS 5381E 0900940  
ZNY TTTT ZZH  
O 300920Z MAR 68  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9941  
STATE GRNC  
BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 93-367  
By ing, NARA, Date 2-7-94

Control: 7903Q  
March 30, 1968  
5:15 a.m.

~~TOP SECRET~~ SEOUL 5381

NODIS

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

REF: STATE 138655

1. AFTER CONSIDERING INVITATION TO HONOLULU MEETING FOR THREE HOURS WITH PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY GENERAL, PRESIDENT PARK ASKED THAT FOLLOWING BE CONVEYED TO YOU:
2. PRESIDENT PARK APPRECIATES INVITATION AND ACCEPTS IN PRINCIPLE. HE WOULD LIKE INFORMATION AS TO WHETHER HIS PRIVATE BILATERAL TALKS WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON WILL BE ONLY SUCH TALKS AT HONOLULU OR PART OF SERIES BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND OTHER CHIEFS OF STATE.

PAGE 2 RUALOS 5381E ~~TOP SECRET~~

3. PRESIDENT PARK IS CONCERNED WHETHER SUBJECT OF ADDITIONAL TROOP DISPATCH TO VIETNAM WILL BE RAISED. IF IT IS, HE WOULD HAVE TO SET FORTH FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON REASONS WHY SUCH DISPATCH (INCLUDING DISPATCH OF LIGHT DIVISION PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED AT CANBERRA) IS VERY DIFFICULT AT THIS TIME. HE FEELS THAT DISCUSSIONS AT HONOLULU SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE AND SUCCESSFUL AND HE WOULD NOT LIKE THIS PARTICULAR SUBJECT OF TROOP DISPATCH TO CREATE PROBLEMS FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN CONNECTION WITH COMMUNIQUE WHICH WOULD BE ISSUED AFTER MEETINGS. HE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENT.
4. IN REPLY TO INQUIRY CONTAINED NUMBERED PARA 2 ABOVE, I SAID I HAD NO INFORMATION EXCEPT THAT PRIVATE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WERE ENVISAGED. I REMARKED HOWEVER THAT EVEN IF BILATERALS WITH OTHER ICC'S ARE ENVISAGED, ROK PRESENCE WOULD APPEAR BE NECESSARY. THEY RECOGNIZED VLAIDITY THIS POINT.
5. ON MATTER OF TROOP DISPATCH, IF YOU INTEND DISCUSS SUBJECT AT HONOLULU, I RECOMMEND THAT YOU REPLY THAT PROBLEMS IN THIS CONNECTION ARE SHARED BY OTHER TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, INCLUDING U.S., AND THAT PROBLEMS IN THEMSELVES SHOULD NOT INHIBIT

~~TOP SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 3 RUALOS 5381E ~~TOP SECRET~~  
FRIENDLY EXCHANGE. TO PREVENT PARK FROM GETTING HIMSELF INTO  
DIFFICULT POSITION THROUGH PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON SUBJECT PRIOR TO  
HONOLULU, I SUGGEST YOU MAKE POINT IN YOUR REPLY THAT PUBLIC  
MENTION OF IT AND OTHER POSSIBLE SUBJECTS OF  
DISCUSSION BE AVOIDED SO AS TO PERMIT USEFUL EXCHANGE ON THIS  
OR ANY OTHER SUBJECT. AS I SEE IT HERE, IF WE ARE TO GET MORE ROK  
TROOPS FOR VIETNAM, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO EMPHASIZE MAJOR  
CONCERN FOR SECURITY PROBLEMS OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA. PORTER  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, March 30, 1968  
8:05 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker reports that both Thieu and Ky are prepared to accept the ideas in the draft speech and then go forward to a joint press conference. The latter could be a true turning point in the political life of Vietnam, if properly done.

With this news in hand, do you now wish to dispatch the message to Wilson?

W. W. Rostow

Dispatch message to Wilson \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7129 86-146

By isp/ug, NARA, Date 4-3-92



Department of State

TELEGRAM

252

TOP SECRET

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OO RUEHC  
DE RUMJIR 23527 0901035  
ZNY TTTT ZZH  
O 301030Z MAR 68 ZFF-1  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9785  
STATE GRNC

CN 7910  
March 30, 1968  
5:59 a.m.

BT  
~~TOP SECRET~~ SAIGON 23527

NODIS - NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE DEPT  
EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY

REFS: A. STATE 138438; B. STATE 138456

1. I GAVE DETAILED EXPOSITION OF REF A SEPARATELY TO THIEU AND KY THIS AFTERNOON, AND BOTH IMMEDIATELY AND WITHOUT HESITATION SAID IT WAS SATISFACTORY.
2. THEY PLAN JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE TO ESTABLISH IN EYES OF COUNTRY THEIR UNITY, AND TO CALL ON COUNTRY TO RISE TO AN ALL OUT EFFORT TO MEET ENEMY THREAT. CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD A DAY OR SO AFTER PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S STATEMENT AND MAKE REFERENCE TO IT. THIEU ASKED FOR TEXT SOONEST, SO HE COULD STUDY AND FIX DATE FOR JOINT CONFERENCE.

BUNKER  
BT

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority State memo 9/11/95  
By plg, NARA, Date 6/25/96

TOP SECRET

Friday, March 29, 1968  
1:10 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bob Bowie tells me that at the Erhard lunch, you suggested he might call on you before he finally leaves. He hesitated to take you up because he felt you were very hard pressed for time.

On second thought, however, he believed it right that he should at least make himself available because he himself would enjoy shaking your hand and having a few words before he left.

He is here today. He will be back next Friday to clean out his office.

He in no way wishes to press you or intrude on your time.

W. W. Rostow

Will see him today \_\_\_\_\_

Next Friday \_\_\_\_\_

On some other occasion \_\_\_\_\_

No time \_\_\_\_\_

Friday, March 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Mike Mansfield's Speech on China

*Pres file*

You asked for a summary of Mansfield's speech. It follows.

Mansfield said nothing new on Viet-Nam but repeated his hope that we will escalate the effort to reach a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

On China, he called for a broad reassessment and a fundamental redirection of our policies. He said there can be no durable peace anywhere in Asia until the problems in Sino-US relations have been resolved.

He decried our limitations on travel to China and on trade with China. He said there was no justification for treating China differently than any other communist country in regard to trade and travel.

He said the two great barriers to a better US-China relationship were Taiwan and the Vietnamese war. He wants the US Government to recognize that the Communist Chinese Government is here to stay and is a major power. Although he recognizes that the chance for progress on the Taiwan issue is bleak, he calls for both sides to recognize that the Mainland and Taiwan are one country, and to take a fresh look at how their division might be ended.

In regard to Viet-Nam his only specific suggestion is for us to make it clear that we are prepared at all times to meet with Chinese representatives to discuss the Viet-Nam problem.

W. W. Rostow

ACTION

Friday - March 29, 1968

*Pres file*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Ratification of Parcel Post Agreement and Regulations for Execution of that Agreement between the United States and Trinidad and Tobago**

Herewith a postal agreement with Trinidad and Tobago which requires your ratification.

The parcel post agreement and regulations for its execution have been approved by the Postmaster General and the State Department.

I recommend that you ratify the agreement.

W. W. Rostow

**Attachment**

**Postal agreement for Presidential ratification.**

INFORMATION

29

~~SECRET~~

Friday, March 29, 1968 - 4:00 pm

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Herewith our company historian  
(Henry Owen) calls -- by implication --  
for an imaginative, bold, military  
thrust.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
B. *rg*, NARA, Date 4-1-92

~~SECRET~~

March 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Uses of the Past

1. You can't win with historical analogies. At first, the press beat the President about the ears for comparing the present situation to 1864. Now they try to turn the comparison against him:

(a) Joseph Alsop and The Evening Star compare (unfavorably) the President's relief of General Westmoreland to Lincoln's support for General Grant, when the latter's bloody 1864 offensives evoked great criticism and despair in the North.

(b) Arthur Schlesinger compares (unfavorably) the President's long prior support for General Westmoreland to Lincoln's relief of incompetent generals before he got a winner with Grant.

2. Both comparisons miss the point:

-- The military victories which turned Northern opinion around in September 1864 and permitted Lincoln to win the election and save the Union (both of which he had expected to lose) were achieved by Sherman before Atlanta - not by Grant before Richmond. While these victories were being achieved, Grant was still in bloody stalemate in Virginia.

-- Sherman had come to his command not by relief of incompetent predecessors but because his superior, General Grant, was promoted to a higher post in Washington. Sherman then took Grant's place in command of the Western armies, in which he had served with growing rank and merit - and with Lincoln's favor - since early in the war.

3. What saved Lincoln, in short, was:

-- not supporting Grant's orthodox military strategy, as Alsop and the Star suggest, but being willing to gamble on Sherman's highly unorthodox foray into the deep South;

**DECLASSIFIED**

**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLJ 96-267**

**By Cb, NARA Date 11-3-97**

~~SECRET~~

-- not relieving incompetent generals, as Arthur Schlesinger suggests, but promoting a good one: Sherman.

If it had not been for this willingness to promote Sherman, and to support his military innovations, both Lincoln and the Union would probably have succumbed to the disastrous impact of Grant's stalemate (which continued past the election) on Northern opinion.

4. What 1864 tells us about Vietnam, in short, is not whether to support or change a given commander or tactic. The lesson is simpler and more limited:

-- That public support for an unpopular and seemingly stalemated war can only be maintained through the tensions generated by a Presidential election if some means can be found of dramatizing to public opinion the prospect of an early end to the war.

-- Whether this involves new or old faces, or new or old tactics, or even military or non-military actions, is immaterial. The important thing is that it should work.

Any analogy which goes beyond this lesson strains the facts.

<sup>HO</sup>  
Henry Owen

29a

~~SECRET~~

March 27, 1968

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-267

By Cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

~~SECRET~~

SERVICE SET

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<sup>HO</sup>  
Henry Owen

INFORMATION

Friday, March 29, 1968 -- 3:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Two unrelated items.

1. John McCloy wants to go to Vietnam and on that basis tell people to calm down and face the job.

Should he be encouraged? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

I found him right steady last night.

2. Charles Bartlett came in today. Except for taking him through the Vietnam situation, he did most of the talking. (As you may know, he has been a friend since the 1950's and has never said anything to me different from what he said to others, so far as I know.) He spoke about Bobby and his great sadness at the ill service he is rendering the memory of John Kennedy. President Kennedy would never have approved what Bobby is doing -- notably exploiting a set-back in the field -- for this kind of political purpose. Bobby, Bartlett said, had many nice qualities; but he had no political wisdom. He wondered how long it would take people to establish firmly that Robert and John Kennedy were quite different. My only observation was to quote Karl Marx's dictum that "history never repeats itself except as farce"; and I suspected this would prove true of both Dienbienphu and Khe Samh; and the Kennedy efforts of 1960 and 1968.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, March 29, 1968 - 1:25 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

I have marked the key passages in Bunker's interesting weekly.

You will be particularly interested in the first post-Tet hamlet evaluation picture, p. 9.

A summary of the text is also attached.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 23308

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rin

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *Ag*, NARA, Date 4-19-82

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, March 29, 1968

~~SECRET/NODIS~~ala

Mr. President:

Herewith a capsule version of Bunker's 45th weekly report:

A. General

- Thieu's March 21 speech was his best and briefest.
- Mobilization proceeding well, but with some adverse effects on civic and pacification activities from critically skilled persons being drafted.
- Civil Defense training progresses, but is not yet well coordinated.
- Proposed new law would increase tax revenue.
- Proposed legislation would give Ky statutory duties.
- Tran Van An and information function elevated to Ministry level.
- Thieu continues establish council personal advisers.

B. Military

- US and GVN forces increase initiatives.
- Enemy harasses Khe Sanh and highland cities and infiltrate at high rate. Enemy may be redeploying to Cambodia and in highlands under pressure from allied bombardments and sweeps.
- RVNAF aggressiveness increases -- evidenced by major actions throughout Vietnam. Operation (Resolve to Win) continues.
- Thang energizes IV Corps with excellent results.

C. Political

- Don Front may be losing some support of National figures.
- The new Huong Force, announced March 27, may have some real rice root support.
- Ky wants Thieu publicly to designate his responsibilities and proposed legislation may help.
- Upper House continues detailed scrutiny of budget.

D. Pacification

- Pacification programs revive slowly, but GVN isn't moving fast enough.
- Key problem is defensive attitude not loss of assets.
- Losses have been considerable, but less than first feared.
- Thieu and Ky show personal interest.

E. Project Recovery

- Brightest news is that Tet refugees have dropped to 392,000 and continue to decline.

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Authority State 7-5781 NSC 6-26-79  
By wj/eg, NARA, Date 4-2-92

-- Roads and waterways are gradually reopening, but Route 4 traffic is 50% of pre-Tet level and rice flows are down. The key, we push in GVN circles, is economic revival.

F. Economic

-- The Retail Price Index is now at pre-Tet level, but this stability results from sluggish business conditions.

-- GVN is considering measures to improve Delta rice situation affected by Tet Offensive.

-- The Saigon Port congestion problem should be resolved by the end of the month.

W. W. R.

Thursday, March 28, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 23308)

Herewith my forty-fifth weekly message:

A. General

On March 21, in a wide ranging speech, the best and briefest he has made since taking office, Thieu outlined what is being done and what his plans are for mobilization, recovery, administrative reform, civil defense, revolutionary development, the attack on corruption, and austerity. He warned that the people would have to face many ordeals in all areas, asked them to accept greater sacrifices, and ended with a plea for greater efforts, for courage, and perseverance.

Mobilization is being pushed. Last Tuesday, Thieu met with Vice President Ky, Minister of Defense General Vy, and Chief of the Joint General Staff, General Cao Van Vien to discuss the rate of call up of draftees, training, and the character and disposition of units. Thirty-eight thousand men in the 19-year age group have received draft cards; 40,000 in the 18-year group will be called up during May and June. Nearly 12,000 reservists have rejoined the armed forces, and 8,000 will be called up in the next phase. In the last two and one-half months, 48,500 men, nearly half of them volunteers, have joined the armed forces, a number greater than in any similar period. The military training of civil servants and students is being accelerated.

Civil defense training is also proceeding and has made substantial progress though it is not yet well enough coordinated. Thieu has asked Vice President Ky to take charge of the program and to come up with a comprehensive plan for the whole country. It is important that this should be carried out carefully and in an orderly and systematic way to avoid the reappearance of any private armies such as existed in prior years. A good beginning is being made in first arming civil servants. Veterans should provide another good civil defense pool.

In its haste to increase the armed forces by at least 135,000, the Government of Vietnam has not given enough attention to protecting important civic and pacification activities. I have raised this problem several times with both Thieu and Prime Minister Loc, furnishing the latter a list of 3,000 essential government jobs whose incumbents should not be drafted unless qualified replacement is available. While the situation relative to the central government in Saigon has been handled fairly well, there is danger that the provincial services and the economy may be seriously affected unless preventive measures are promptly taken. For example, refugee mobile teams are being decimated by the draft just at the time when the refugee load is the greatest; the only anesthesiologist at the Dalat hospital has been drafted,

**DECLASSIFIED**

**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLJ 96-267**

**By Cb, NARA Date 11-3-97**

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

effectively cancelling the hospital's surgical capability. We are, therefore, working on a longer list covering the provincial organizations. The Government of Vietnam has not yet provided clear instructions or adequate machinery to insure that essential civilian government and public services continue to function effectively. Since the contest in Vietnam is not only a contest between military forces, but also between the Government of Vietnam and Viet Cong organizations, it is essential that the Government administrative structure be not weakened. I have suggested to Thieu and Ky that the mobilization directorate be placed either under the Presidency or the Prime Minister's office so that the interests of all the Ministries can be coordinated.

Thieu has also moved on the civilian front:

1. In addition to the eight new province chiefs, whose appointment I mentioned in last week's message, Thieu yesterday appointed four more province chiefs in the provinces of Go Cong, Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh, and Phong Dinh, all in the Fourth Corps area. He has informed me that he expects to replace the province chiefs in Bien Hoa and Gia Dinh in the Third Corps and to make further appointments when the course for province and district chiefs is completed in April.
2. Thieu has also submitted to the Assembly draft laws covering establishment of the Inspectorate, the Supreme Court, the Special Court, the Magistrate Council, and a statute for political parties. Yesterday he submitted draft laws covering the organization and operation of the Economic and Social Welfare Council, the Cultural and Education Council, and the Ethnic Minority Council. The Vice President will preside over these councils. It is anticipated that these draft laws will be debated and put to a vote in the Lower House in early April. This is a welcome development for it will give Ky definite responsibilities which he has hitherto lacked.
3. To provide increased revenue, Thieu told me last Tuesday that he will send a draft law to the Assembly proposing a surtax for "reconstruction and solidarity" which he anticipated would bring in about 3 billion piasters. On March 30, he plans to issue an Executive Order increasing taxes on luxury items and importing goods, expected to bring in about 4 billion piasters in additional revenue. As a first step, he plans to raise the tax on petroleum products from 9 to 13 piasters per liter. He estimates that this will bring in an additional 2 billion piasters. In one or two months, he plans to increase the tax to 17 piasters. Since petroleum products are so widely used in the economy and affect all principal means of transportation, Thieu has decided on a two-step increase in order to avoid too sudden and drastic an impact. In connection with these tax measures, Thieu made a special plea to me to have our authorities work closely with his to prevent supplies from American sources getting into illegal channels of trade. He made the point that obviously non-taxable gasoline and PX supplies would become more attractive.
4. Information was raised to Ministerial level and Tran Van An appointed Minister of Information on March 22. Thieu hopes that An will develop a more effective and imaginative program both at home and abroad. This is badly needed, for information has been one of the weakest elements in the Government of Vietnam structure. An has talked to us about establishing a joint U. S. /Government of Vietnam working

committee and we shall follow up with him on this. He wants to have closer working relationships with all the Ministries and to work out some joint arrangement with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam political warfare section. He also hopes to develop a more realistic "political warfare" campaign against the enemy with more adroit use of TV and radio. We shall lend all the assistance we can for, in my opinion, Government of Vietnam psychological warfare has been a good deal less effective than the enemy's.

5. Thieu has made progress toward the establishment of his council of political and spiritual advisors. He informed me that so far, eighteen individuals had agreed to serve, that he wants to talk to three or four others before making an announcement which he hoped might be this week. Among those who have agreed to serve are Phan Quang Dan and Ha Thuc Ky; he also hopes to have satisfactory Buddhist representation among them. Tran Van Huong has agreed to serve privately as an adviser, but does not wish to be officially listed as such. All had agreed that it would be best not to meet formally in a large group since frank and constructive discussions could better be had in meetings with small selected groups, or individually

6. Announcement has been made that an administrative reform council will be set up in the President's office "under the direct control of the President, and will be responsible for studying and deciding on administrative reforms." It will have a committee on civil service reform which can be used as a vehicle for reviving the proposed civil service general statute which was drafted in October, 1967, by an ad hoc Government of Vietnam committee, and which has never been implemented. A National Planning Council will also be set up "under the direct control of the President, and will be responsible for studying and drawing up all national plans as well as the supervision and execution of these plans."

7. Work is also underway on the establishment of a production rehabilitation fund and a war risk insurance plan, both mentioned by the President in his March 21 speech.

8. On corruption, Thieu said "I have considered it to be a shame for the whole nation" and emphasized his determination to wipe it out. He observed, "I will not pass up any infraction, and in order to start in the right direction, I shall not treat with indulgence any clearly established cases of corruption, especially the abuses committed in the relief program." He promised to strictly carry out punishments handed down by the courts, including the death penalty recently announced in three cases.

According to the President's brother, Nguyen Van Kieu, Tran Van Huong has been persuaded to serve as head of the Inspectorate. Past claims to this effect have not materialized, but if true, this would be a most favorable development, as Huong has a wide reputation for honesty and dedication to clean government. Thus Huong could add some much needed credibility to the government's anti-corruption campaign. His presence should go a long way to instill confidence that this time the government really means business. (Huong recently told an Embassy officer that the only way to handle those who divert relief funds and supplies is to "shoot, shoot, shoot". He seemed to mean it.)

B. Military

U. S. and Government forces increasingly took the initiative last week while the level of enemy activity declined, although there were a number of sizeable actions. During the last two days of last week, Khe Sanh was subjected to very heavy rocketing, but this has since slacked off. It seems probable that our very heavy bombing has inflicted heavy casualties; 1,200 of the enemy are known killed and this may be a relatively small proportion of the total. General Westmoreland believes it is conceivable the enemy may have given up the idea of attacking Khe Sanh and may be withdrawing part of his forces to Cambodia and intending to redeploy in the central highlands. In the southern three provinces of the First Corps, the enemy seems to be disorganized. In the Second Corps, he has maintained a threatening attitude around the cities of Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot but activities have largely been confined to harassment through mortaring and rocketing. In the Third Corps, the Joint U.S. /Army of the Republic of Vietnam operation, Quyet Thang (resolve to win), is progressing well, with sweeps being carried out during the day and ambushes at night. Heavy losses have been inflicted on the enemy. The enemy continues to hang in around Saigon in Gia Dinh, Hau Nghia, and Bien Hoa provinces. In the Fourth Corps, offensive operations have been accelerated, activity last week being the highest on record. The enemy has pulled back from around My Tho and Can Tho and seems to be trying to avoid contact. On the other hand, he has been actively attempting to disrupt traffic. Highway 4 is interdicted almost every night, but is back in operation during the day time.

The enemy apparently is infiltrating from the north at a very high rate. With only four to six weeks of good weather remaining in the Laos panhandle, he is trying feverishly to replenish stocks. He is relying heavily on trucks, building cleverly concealed motorable roads in remote areas from Cambodia into Tay Ninh and Phuoc Long Provinces and from the tri-border area into Kontum Province.

The determination of the Vietnamese Armed Forces to engage the enemy and to expel him from positions from which he can threaten military installations and population centers has become increasingly evident throughout the month of March:

In the First Corps, since the battle of Hue, in which 4,578 enemy were killed (2,623 by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam), there have been three significant Army of the Republic of Vietnam engagements.

1. In Quang Tri Province, the First Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment operation resulted in 208 enemy killed in action, 18 detainees, 49 individual and 16 crew-served weapons captured. Army of the Republic of Vietnam losses were 8 killed in action and 35 wounded in action.

2. In Quang Tri Province, in a Second Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment operation, 155 of the enemy were killed in action, 19 individual and 6 crew-served weapons captured. Army of the Republic of Vietnam were 14 killed in action, 63 wounded in action, and one missing in action.

3. In Quang Tri Province, in another Second Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment operation, the enemy losses were 407 killed in action, 18 detainees, 74

individual and 24 crew-served weapons captured. Army of the Republic of Vietnam losses were 45 killed in action and 185 wounded in action.

In the Second Corps, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam had three significant contacts:

1. In Darlac Province, in an operation by the 45th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment, 160 enemy were killed, 52 individual and one crew-served weapons captured. Army of the Republic of Vietnam sustained 16 killed in action and 16 wounded in action.

2. In Binh Dinh Province, in two engagements in which the Regional and Popular Forces participated, the enemy lost 298 killed in action, 24 individual and 16 crew-served weapons; yet the Regional and Popular Forces losses were one killed in action and 8 wounded in action.

In the Third Corps, the combined campaign, Quyet Thang (resolved to win), began on March 11 with elements of the U. S. First, Ninth, and 25th Infantry Divisions in coordination with the 5th and 25th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Divisions and Vietnamese Airborne, Marines, and Ranger Task Forces. The operation, designed to clear the capital military district and surrounding areas, is progressing with significant results. As examples:

1. In Hau Nghia Province, a combined reconnaissance in force by elements of the 49th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment and 11th U. S. Armored Cavalry, against an estimated enemy battalion, resulted in 142 enemy killed in action, 6 individual and 2 crew-served weapons captured, friendly losses were 8 killed in action (one U. S.) and 21 wounded in action (five U. S.).

2. In Hau Nghia Province, in the early hours of March 25, a combined force of the 34th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Ranger Battalion and elements of the 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry (U. S.) engaged an estimated 300 enemy while reinforcing a popular forces outpost under attack. U. S. tanks, artillery, gunships, and tactical air also participated. Enemy losses now stand at 243 killed in action, 24 individual and 15 crew-served weapons captured. Friendly losses are 32 killed in action (10 U. S.), 103 wounded in action (71 U. S.), two missing in action (Army of the Republic of Vietnam), and three trucks destroyed.

3. Cumulative casualties through midnight March 25 are: enemy (by Army of the Republic of Vietnam) 845 killed in action, 44 detainees, two returnees, 225 individual and 47 crew-served weapons captured; by U. S.: 879 killed in action, 236 detainees, 268 individual and 68 crew-served weapons captured. Friendly (Army of the Republic of Vietnam: 89 killed in action, 231 wounded in action; U. S.: 63 killed in action, 538 wounded in action; 407 evacuated).

In the Fourth Corps:

1. Operation Truong Cong Dinh campaign commenced on March 7 with the First and Second Brigades, 9th U. S. Infantry Division and Army of the Republic of Vietnam 7th, 9th, and 21st Divisions. Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces

energized by the new corps Commander, General Thang, have achieved excellent results. Campaign cumulative casualties through midnight March 25 are: enemy (by Army of the Republic of Vietnam): 502 killed in action, 377 detainees, 157 individual weapons and 16 crew-served weapons captured; by U. S.: 198 killed in action, 141 detainees, 23 individual and five crew-served weapons captured.

2. Another significant engagement occurred in the Fourth Corps in An Kuyen Province at Ca Mau on the morning of March 5 when an estimated reinforced enemy battalion attacked the city and airfield. Popular Forces and 32nd Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment troops attacked with artillery, gunships, and tactical air support. After an eight-hour engagement, the enemy was driven from the battle area leaving 282 dead, 49 individual and 21 crew-served weapons and two radios captured. Friendly losses were 11 killed in action and 47 wounded in action (2 U. S.)

### C. Political

Political organizations. Organizing activity continued this week for two major new political groups, Tran Van Don's Peoples Front for National Salvation and Nguyen Van Huong's Free Democratic Force. Don held a press conference March 22 to announce the composition of the Front's high steering committee and report on his organizing trips to the provinces. Huong's force was publicly launched March 27 with a two-day National Congress for Delegates from all over the country. (It is not clear whether Tran Van An is still going ahead with his plans for another front organization now that he has been named as Minister of Information.)

While Don has suffered no public defections, it is becoming increasingly clear that some of the national political figures who originally took part in his front are now cooling off on it. The question of the continued participation of men such as Tran Van Huong, Phan Khac Suu, and Ha Thuc Ky was avoided at the March 22 press conference by announcing that all members of the Front's temporary advisory board will now be members of the high steering committee. While Huong, for example, has not objected to this continued use of his name, he has appeared only at the first public meeting and he has subsequently let it be known privately that he does not believe the Front is a useful device.

Don, meanwhile, has been making a number of trips to the provinces to set up provincial branches of his organization. It is not yet clear how much success he is having in this effort, though he himself admits that ideally, he should have begun with this activity and then proceeded to the kind of national congress which he held on March 10.

There is a continuing impression that Don's organization is basically pro-Ky and Thieu himself seems still to take a rather dim view of the Don front. He recently told a mission officer that Don's front has no value for use as an instrument to develop and organize public action and Don's concept is not practical for Vietnam

at this time. Thieu said that the Don front will attract no one of substance outside of Don's entourage and his political allies.

Huong's force at its inception appears to be notably lacking in leaders of national stature. His temporary Executive Committee, unveiled at the March 27 meeting, includes several Senators and Deputies, but none of these have been prominent in the Assembly. Huong himself is staying completely in the background, with a relatively unknown southern nationalist, Ngo Ung Tai, serving as the chairman of the force executive committee. The force inaugural was attended by delegations from 36 provinces, however, and Embassy officers observed that these delegations included a sprinkling of provincial councilors and village chiefs. It may be that, despite the lack of national figures among the leaders of the force, Huong has in fact prepared the ground for a national organization with some real support at the rice roots level.

An important difference between the Don front and the Huong force is the fact that the force accepts members only as individuals. Don's front, on the other hand, aims at attracting already organized groups to band together in pursuit of common goals. For the immediate problem of mobilizing the nation against the present Communist threat, Don's approach has clear advantages. However, over the long haul, the Huong method probably offers a better hope of constructing a closely-knit and disciplined political organization.

Huong's concept is a party of cadre, organized in cells, and directed from the top. He has clearly been much influenced by the example of the Lao Dong and Can Lao parties, and the force can be expected to bear a strong resemblance to those organizations if it is successful. Hopefully, there will be one vital difference, however -- the force is being organized with the avowed purpose of seeking power through free elections, and its bylaws pledge adherence to the constitution.

The Don front and the Huong force are not necessarily incompatible, though most Vietnamese politicians persist in seeing them as rivals. Tran Van Don, in fact, attended the public inauguration of the force as a guest. He told an Embassy officer there that he hopes all parties, including the force, can be induced to band together for certain purposes under the banner of his front. This is very close to the idea of Thieu's brother, Nguyen Van Kieu. Kieu told Calhoun on March 27 that he has been consulting with Don, Huong, and Tan Van An about arrangements for linking their organizations together, and he claimed that all had agreed to work out such an understanding. We will be working to influence some such development so as to maximize the unifying influence of these political groups in the face of the enemy.

Thieu-Ky relations. Bui Diem has been talking, by his own account very frankly indeed, with both Thieu and Ky on the absolute necessity for them to close ranks publicly and work together for the good of the nation. I hope that his efforts will reinforce my own frequent attempts to impress this idea on both Thieu and Ky. According to Bui Diem, Ky reiterated his feelings of loyalty and personal obligation to you and his pledge that he will do nothing to upset the present situation. He also

reportedly told Bui Diem that he is willing to get rid of some of the more troublesome members of his staff, including Dang Duc Khoi and Nguyen Thien Nhon if Thieu wishes him to do so.

In recent conversations, Ky has seemed to focus on the need for Thieu to publicly designate some area for him to work on. Thieu has told me and he has told Ky that he wants Ky to manage the Civil Defense Program, and Ky has said he is willing to accept this responsibility. However, he also feels he must have a public mandate from Thieu. I agree that he should and I intend to take this up with Thieu as soon as possible.

Thieu's sending of draft legislation to the Assembly for the establishment of the three advisory councils should also help to alleviate the problem. As Vice President, Ky is supposed to chair these councils, and their establishment should help to occupy him in something besides ill-devised comments to reporters.

Some of the recent friction between Thieu and Ky has no doubt been generated by persistent reports that Ky's supporters were pushing for a constitutional amendment which would allow Ky to become Prime Minister. General Loan seems to have been behind this particular maneuver, and perhaps as a result of some rather frank talks between Komer and Ky about Loan, Loan has been sent to the First Corps to "cool off" for a time. As Loan was also the prime mover behind the effort to have the Assembly declare war on North Vietnam, I hope that his absence will also tend to dampen that particular project.

Assembly developments. The Upper House has been circulating a petition to interpellate the Prime Minister, Defense Minister Vy, and Interior Minister Vien on the government's performance during and since the Tet attacks. The petition already has the required number of signatures, and it is reasonably certain that the ministers will be "invited" to appear following passage of the budget.

According to some of the more moderate Senators, the Ministers can expect some very vigorous questioning. According to Senator Dang Van Sung, the impetus behind the interpellation effort is the "general feeling" that the government must make some fairly extensive changes in the Cabinet to restore public confidence. While some Senators no doubt sincerely believe this, others are probably motivated by more personal considerations. We will do what we can to moderate this development.

The Upper House is now nearing the end of its consideration of the budget. It has taken a much more careful look at the government's plans than did the Lower House, and has made a number of economies. The Senators reportedly have been told by the Minister of Finance that there will be a supplemental budget request from the government within about three months. The Senate, therefore, is taking a very hard look at budget items such as new automobiles or new personnel, while at the same time taking the position that they will approve any funds really needed for essential operations. Thus, they have cut the budgets of the Ministries of Health, Social

Welfare, and Education, but expect to vote more money for all three Ministries when they get the supplemental request to meet the extraordinary demands put on those Ministries by the Tet attacks.

Among other cuts were reductions in the funds allotted for the offices of the government delegates, the Senate taking the position that these offices are not provided for in the constitution, and they only add to "administrative frictions." The Senate also took an action which some Senators have interpreted as a slap at Vice President Ky. Noting that the Vice President has no power to sign decrees under the constitution, they questioned his right to establish a separate office by decree. They then voted to put the funds for the Vice Presidency under the same chapter of the budget as the funds for the office of the Presidency.

Because of the numerous Senate changes in the Lower House version of the budget, the bill will have to go back to the Lower House following passage by the Senate. Compromising the House and Senate versions could take some time, but we are told by most sources that final passage will take place during the first week in April.

#### D. Pacification

The pacification program is continuing to revive slowly, although the Government of Vietnam is not yet moving fast enough to win the race for the countryside. As I reported last week, the key problem is less one of loss of assets, the great bulk of them are again in hand, than defensive attitudes which inhibit aggressive movements back into those hamlets now lost or contested.

These losses have been considerable, but less than initially feared. For example, our hamlet evaluation system figures for end-February show a 7 percent decline in relatively secure population (ABC hamlets plus the towns) from the end-January estimate of 67 percent. About 800 hamlets and 1.3 million people dropped from the "secure" category. But it is important to note that most of these dropped into the "contested" category. Only 200 hamlets and 280,000 people are estimated to have reverted to Viet Cong control. Moreover, we believe that these losses as of end-February are being slowly recouped during March.

Meanwhile, President Thieu has been given more guidance to the program. He has moved to reassert Central Government authority over Province Chiefs by cutting Corps Commanders out of all save the military chain of command. His appointment of first eight and now four more Province Chiefs manifests Thieu's desire to have more controlling influence. He also plans to shift the Revolutionary Development Cadre directorate from under the Joint General Staff back to the Revolutionary Development ministry, which may cause disruption and delay just at the time when quick action is essential. Komer has urged Thieu to delay this change until later in the year when pacification is back on the track.

Ky also is active, visiting each Corps to manifest his approval of the modified 1968 Revolutionary Development plans and carry the word that pacification is still a high priority program being given personal attention by top government leaders.

Out of 595 Revolutionary Development teams 464 (77 percent) are now back in the hamlets. Local security forces have had to go with them, which helps achieve Government of Vietnam and U. S. aim of reestablishing a presence.

#### E. Project Recovery

The brightest news on the recovery front is continued drop off in Tet evacuees, indicating that people are gaining confidence in security and that resettlement machinery is beginning to function. Between 13 and 25 March total of Tet refugees declined from 486,000 to 392,000 and are still declining. In Saigon/Gia Dinh, refugees dropped from 122,000 to 99,000 during the same period.

We continue to stress in top Government of Vietnam circles that recovery is much bigger than just repairing damage and helping evacuees. The key is economical revival, which in turn depends critically on restoring roads and waterways to the point where people are confident that they can travel as safely as before Tet. Key roads are reopening, but traffic on them is only slowly reviving because the psychological impact of the Tet offensive hasn't worn off and the Viet Cong are practicing calculated harassment. In Third Corps, even though major highways are open, commercial traffic is below 50 percent of pre-Tet levels. On vital Route 4 in the Delta, traffic flow is now roughly 50 percent of pre-Tet level. On the two most important canals in the Delta, the Mang Thit and the Cho Gao, boat traffic is 20 percent and 30 percent respectively of pre-Tet volume.

As a result, the flow of rice from the Delta to Saigon is way down. Because there isn't enough storage space in the countryside, Delta rice must be moved to covered storage in Saigon before the rains start next month. Traffic out of Saigon is way down too, causing critical shortages of petroleum, oil and lubricants in many Delta provinces, slowing distribution of relief materials, and forcing prices of commodities normally obtained from Saigon to rise to as much as 100 percent above pre-Tet figures. We are doing our best to restore security and confidence.

F. Economic

The money supply declined slightly in the week ended March 9 following two weeks of fairly rapid advance. The public sector deficit continued to rise strongly, but a \$12 million decline in foreign exchange holdings was more than sufficient to offset this factor. Prices fell by about one percent in the week ended March 25 leaving the U. S. Aid retail index only 6 1/2 percent above January 2 and about one percent below January 27, date of the last pre-Tet calculation. As before, the stability in prices can be attributed to the extreme sluggishness in general business conditions.

Rice. While communications between the Delta and Saigon have improved somewhat (one barge convoy has made a round trip), the rice trade remains stagnant, and paddy prices in the countryside continue to soften. The Government does seem to have accepted the idea of providing additional credit, coupled with a commitment to purchase rice at a stated price. Discussions are now going on between the Ministry of Economy and the Trade regarding the amounts available and the price to be set. There is reason to hope that positive Government of Vietnam action along these lines will stimulate commerce in the Delta in general.

The Saigon port congestion problem should be solved by the end of the month. 9,500 tons are now being discharged daily, and the number of contractors clearing the port has increased.

32

**ACTION**

~~TOP SECRET~~

**Friday, March 29, 1968  
11:55 a.m.**

*Free file*

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith two draft cables: one to Wilson; the other to our Ambassador in Seoul for Park. They require your editing and clearance.**

**W. W. Rostow**

~~TOP SECRET~~

**WWRostow:rla**

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By lg, NARA, Date 4-1-92

Back-Channel Message to Wilson

FOR PRIME MINISTER EYES ONLY FROM PRESIDENT

As you know, we have been giving the most careful thought to the Vietnam situation and to our next moves. I have reached the conclusion that we must prepare to take certain very limited additional military actions involving the sending of an additional 13,500 forces to Vietnam over the summer. These would be support forces designed to round out combat elements that we sent in February after the <sup>let</sup> offensive began.

At the same time, in light of the depleted condition of our strategic reserve for world-wide use, I have become convinced that we must replenish that reserve -- for all purposes -- by calling up <sup>additional</sup> ~~additional~~ reserves amounting to 48,500 men.

I expect to announce these measures on Sunday night, including with them a lengthy discussion of the vital importance of increased effectiveness by the South Vietnamese as our first priority, and making clear once again that our military objective is solely to help provide a shield behind which the South Vietnamese can develop.

Yet, in deciding on these actions, it has become totally clear to me that I should not take them [~~nor would the American people support them in the required unity,~~] unless at the same

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-252

By: gpl/b NARA, Date 4/17/96TOP SECRET

time, I announce a really clear move toward peace. Accordingly, I expect to announce at the very forefront of my speech that we are cutting back the bombing of the North to the area roughly south of the 20th parallel. This would leave out Hanoi and Haiphong, and indeed all the major populated areas in North Vietnam.

I shall announce this action without specifying what Hanoi should do in response, and without time limit. At the same time, I shall say that Hanoi's actions could offer a basis for our making the reasonable assumption stated in the San Antonio formula -- that they would not take advantage of the situation if we stopped the bombing altogether. I shall say that we would be prepared for any response, and would specifically hold Governor Harriman and Ambassador Thompson instantly ready for discussions with Hanoi in any quarter.

I would wish you to know of these actions in any case. But I am particularly anxious to have your judgment on additional language -- now before me -- which would call upon the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, "as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference and as permanent members of the United Nation's Security Council," -- to exert their influence so that movement toward peace may result from ~~our action~~. *this act of deescalation on our part.*

I do not need to say that we have never had the slightest doubt that you and your government would do all in your power in any event. The purpose of the passage is to put the pressure on the Soviets -- where it rightly belongs in the light of their whole responsibility and particularly their major supply contribution to Hanoi's current offensive. In the description of the two nations, the Geneva aspect is of course paramount; at the same time, reference to the Security Council membership would have a useful effect here, even though we fully recognize that Hanoi's total rejection of UN competence -- (plus the present composition of the Security Council) make it must unlikely that the Council as such can act.

I now plan to make the whole of this announcement on Sunday night. I hope that it will meet with your full approval, and that you might be prepared to make a responsive statement <sup>not</sup> early Monday. I do/know how the Soviets will handle this, but we will keep ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ you very closely posted and may have further suggestions.           END

W. P. Bundy:bmm March 29

32b

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE  
STATE

For Communicator Only.

The next succeeding message, Top Secret and NODIS, must be handcarried to the Ambassador only. No copies should be made and no other distribution.

GP-4.

End.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 93-367  
By lig, NARA, Date 2-7-94

Drafted by: EA:WPBundy:mk 3/29/68 Clearance	Tel. No. 4235	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA - William P. Bundy
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S/S -

32 c

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE:  COLLECT  
 CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin  
Info

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE

STATE

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 93-367  
By isg, NARA, Date 2-7-94

Literally Eyes Only for Ambassador from Secretary.

1. Highest levels are considering visit to <sup>Honolulu</sup> ~~Guam~~ about next Thursday for consultations, ~~followed by return to Honolulu~~.

You should convey urgently and in utmost privacy to Park

President's invitation to him to come to Honolulu, probably

Friday, for private bilateral discussions. President would be

prepared to consider both Korean problems and current Vietnamese

situation, including courses of action which may be announced in prior to announcement.

the meantime and of which you will be separately advised/

2. You should emphasize to Park that plans for this trip cannot

yet be final because of possibility that enemy offensive in SVN

or other developments will make <sup>visit</sup> ~~Guam aspect~~ inadvisable. In that

event, President might be forced to remain here to deal with

current developments. We would expect to know finally by Tuesday

Drafted by: EA:WPBundy:mk 3/29/68 Clearances	Tel. no. 4235	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary
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White House -

S/S -

Page 2 of telegram to Seoul

~~TOP SECRET~~

*Classification*

or Wednesday, and final arrangements could be completed at that time, including personal plane for Park if desired. We would also need to consider how and when visit would be announced, preferably simultaneously, and how it would be described. You should mention these points to Park to see what his personal thoughts might be, assuming he is affirmative on the basic plan.

GP-3.

End.

~~WWR~~ 33

Friday, March 29, 1968 -- 10:30 AM

*Free file*

~~SECRET~~

Mr. President:

In the attached, Messrs. Freeman, Gaud, and Zwick recommend a \$8.2 million PL 480 agreement with Afghanistan (90,000 tons of wheat; 6,000 tons of vegetable oil.)

This is routine except for the serious problem posed by the Symington amendment and the fact that the Russians have armed the Afghans to the teeth. It is fair to say that if we don't find Afghan arms spending worrisome, we will be open to the charge that we have welched on our assurance that we would take the Symington amendment seriously.

Still, nothing is gained by immediate termination of technical assistance and food aid -- particularly when we want to move wheat. Symington has agreed that enforcement of his amendment should be a process of pressure, not a single rash act.

Our solution -- agreed to by Gaud and Battle -- is to send our Ambassador in with a strong speech on arms at the same time he delivers approval of the wheat deal. This is not a final answer, but it should make the Afghans think and it will give us a defensible line on the Hill.

You will want to read through Zwick's memorandum which is a concise summary of the problem and the proposal.

W. W. Rostow

Approve PL 480 package, with strong instruction to our Ambassador \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

EKH/vmr

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-269  
By 120, NARA Date 2-19-97

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

33a

MAR 27 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed P. L. 480 Agreement with Afghanistan

Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your authority to negotiate an \$8.2 million P. L. 480 agreement with Afghanistan (Tab A). The agreement would provide 90,000 tons of wheat and 6,000 tons of vegetable oil on 40-year dollar credit terms, with a 10-year grace period. To help the U.S. balance of payments, it would require that the first \$750,000 be paid over 10 months beginning on June 30.

The amount of wheat proposed for this agreement is quite generous in view of Afghanistan's recent good crop. However, I feel that it is warranted by our desire to move wheat and by the additional self-help leverage which we can get from a larger P. L. 480 program. This agreement would bring to \$12.5 million the amount of food aid provided in FY 1968. Our dollar aid is limited to technical assistance and is estimated at \$7.5 million this fiscal year.

Self-help. Afghanistan has taken a number of important steps to increase agricultural production, with a view to self-sufficiency in wheat and edible oil by the early 1970's. The last P. L. 480 agreement, signed in July, contained general self-help conditions designed to reinforce the Government's commitment to that goal. This agreement would require additional specific and sound measures, in particular (a) the establishment of a wheat price high enough to provide incentives to farmers, and (b) improvement of fertilizer distribution by turning it over to the private sector.

Military Expenditures. Afghanistan's military supply situation presents a particularly thorny problem. Although about half of its military hardware was provided under contracts concluded prior to 1961, the country's defense establishment is out of all proportion to its economic situation or any realistic appraisal of the current threat. Almost all of Afghanistan's military equipment has been supplied by the Soviets. The current inventory includes an estimated 335 tanks, 55 or more surface-to-air missiles, 250 anti-tank missiles, and 96 MIG fighters. (A background paper on military expenditures is attached at Tab B.)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-269

By sig, NARA Date 2-19-97

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

In spite of this situation Gaud feels, and I agree, that a close reading of the Symington amendment does not require you to make a finding that Afghan resources are being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with economic development. The rationale for this approach is essentially two-fold:

- Since three-fourths of the equipment is provided on a grant basis, actual expenditures amount to only about 20% of the budget and are not out of line with neighboring India and Pakistan.
- These expenditures in themselves probably do not unduly interfere with development. Lack of technical skills and workable institutions constitute a more serious bottleneck to Afghan development.

There are also two strong practical reasons for not invoking the Symington amendment now:

- Our aid program in Afghanistan helps to counterbalance a much larger Soviet presence. In 1963, King Zahir embarked upon an experiment in parliamentary democracy which probably would not have been possible without our influence and support.
- In Afghanistan as elsewhere, the Symington and Conte/Long amendments can be quite useful for purposes of persuasion, but they lose their utility once they are applied. Our relatively small aid program may not enable us to convince the Afghans to reduce their future defense expenditures in any event, but to precipitately cut off all U.S. assistance clearly would not achieve this objective.

On the other hand, I do not think we can simply conduct business as usual in the face of this problem. There is a reasonable chance that the U.S., by building on the dialogue which Ambassador Neumann has begun, can induce some restraint in the Afghan military budget. Moreover, if we ignore the spirit of the Symington amendment in Afghanistan, we lay ourselves open to charges on the Hill that we are not serious about its application and will not put any teeth into our policy anywhere in the world.

On balance, I recommend that we go ahead with this proposed P. L. 480 agreement, but that in negotiating it the State Department be instructed to make a vigorous effort, both here and through Ambassador

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

Neumann in Afghanistan, to get across to the Afghans the following points, agreed to by Bill Gaud and Luke Battle:

- While we recognize that it is difficult for one country to pass judgment on the national security problems and military structure of another, it is our best judgment that Afghanistan's present military structure and expenditures need serious reexamination in the light of the present military threat and what we all know to be the country's economic needs.
- U.S. law now requires that we take future developments on this front fully into account in thinking about any further P. L. 480 assistance or dollar loans or continuation of our technical assistance program.
- We strongly urge Afghanistan to seek ways to reduce the burden of military expenditures upon its economy. The Afghan Government should know that, under present circumstances, increases in the defense budget or new contracts for additional military equipment will make it extremely difficult for us to provide assistance in the future.

(signed) Charles J. Zwick  
Charles J. Zwick  
Director

#### Attachments

Approve P. L. 480 sale \_\_\_\_\_; instruct  
Ambassador and State Department to take  
strong line with RGA \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

336

MAR 6 1968

To: The President

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Afghanistan

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 agreement with Afghanistan to provide approximately 90,000 tons of wheat/wheat flour and 6,000 tons of vegetable oil with a current export market value, including certain ocean transportation costs, of about \$8.2 million. Payment would be made in convertible local currency over 40 years with 2 percent interest during the 10 year grace period and 2½ percent thereafter. However, in order to help defray U. S. Embassy expenditures in Afghanistan, we would provide for a currency use payment of \$750,000 to be converted into local currencies. Payment of the \$750,000 would be in 10 equal monthly installments (\$75,000) beginning June 30, 1968. The Department of State and the Treasury Department concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

The Title I, PL 480 Agreement signed with Afghanistan on July 19, 1967 provided for 40,000 tons of wheat and 4,000 tons of vegetable oils. These quantities were for the purpose of helping to meet Afghanistan's requirements during the first half of FY 1968 following a year of drought. Afghanistan continues to need imports to cover second half FY 1968 and part of FY 1969 requirements. The PL 480 wheat and vegetable oil imports will be used mainly to fill the needs of the urban areas.

Self-help

The Government of Afghanistan is undertaking to improve its production, storage and distribution of agricultural commodities in accordance with the self-help conditions outlined in the July 19, 1967 Agreement. In addition to these, the new agreement we propose would provide for the Royal Government of Afghanistan taking strong steps to:

1. Establish an incentive pricing policy for wheat at levels sufficient to enable farmers to purchase fertilizer, improved seed and other inputs, and adopt improved production practices.
2. Bring fertilizer imports and distribution, now handled by the government, into the private sector.
3. Improve administrative arrangements and personnel management for agricultural development, giving serious consideration to the recommendations made by the United States Agricultural Review Team.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-275

By CG, NARA Date 6-30-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Symington Amendment


Our findings pursuant to the requirements of Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, are included in an attachment to this memorandum.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to negotiate the PL 480 sales agreement as described above.

January 26 1968

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Administrator  
Agency for International Development

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Secretary  
Department of Agriculture

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ATTACHMENT

Military Expenditure Review

State/A.I.D. has concluded that neither U.S. development assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, nor PL 480 sales are being diverted to military expenditures and that Afghanistan resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with Afghan development.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-275  
By 06, NARA Date 6-20-99

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT

REVIEW OF PROPOSED P. L. 480 AGREEMENT WITH AFGHANISTAN PER SECTION 620(a) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, AS AMENDED.

Afghan defense expenditures have remained stable in recent years. According to the best available statistics, which in Afghanistan must be regarded as less than averagely reliable, the percentages of actual expenditures for defense in the Government budget were 19.2 and 20.5 in Afghan fiscal years 1965/66 and 1966/67 respectively. This is a slightly smaller percentage than other countries in the region. Published budget figures for Afghan FY 1967/68 indicate that 19.1 percent has been allocated for military purposes. In constant dollar prices, (base year 1965), expenditures are estimated at \$11.8 million in 1966; \$11.0 million in 1967; and \$10.7 million in 1968. No reliable GNP data is available in Afghanistan; the budget for 1969 should be published within a month but is not yet available.

Afghanistan's military equipment and advisors are almost all supplied by the Soviet Union. The equipment supplied since 1956 by the USSR is estimated to be worth some \$226 million. \$167 million of this has been on a grant basis. Payments for Soviet military assistance (the non-grant part) are financed through barter trade arrangements and not through the use of free foreign exchange. The Afghan Government budgeted roughly \$7.3 million for these barter payments in 1965/66 and again in 1966/67. \$7.3 million is arrived at by using an exchange rate of 55 Afs to the dollar because of arrangements with the USSR (in comparison with 75 Afs in other budget calculations). This reduces the \$7.3 million to roughly \$5.3 million in terms of the budget. Moreover an unknown portion of this amount is being held in reserve and not spent. The amount actually spent is included in the overall defense expenditures described above. The major barter items have been raw cotton, wool, oilseeds and dried fruits and nuts. Many of these goods have little market for convertible foreign exchange either because of low quality or high transportation costs.

Government development investment has declined over the last three years primarily as a result of a decline in foreign economic assistance and restrictive fiscal policies, suggested by the IMF and supported by A.I.D., aimed at reducing deficit financing. Domestic revenue collection during this period has remained relatively stable. The quality of Afghan development efforts has improved and the Government now is devoting resources to activities which have a faster return in contrast to the former practice of emphasizing heavy infrastructure projects. The real deterrents to more rapid economic growth are lack of technical skills and institutional shortcomings. As far as the use of skilled manpower is concerned, the military establishment uses little skilled manpower and this would not be affected in a major way

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-275  
By cb, NARA Date 6-30-99

by reduction of military expenditures.

The U. S. has urged the Afghan Government to make reductions in defense outlays and in a recent conversation on this subject a high official with the foreign office said that the Defense budget for next year would not be increased. On February 13 Ambassador Neumann discussed defense spending with the Prime Minister and reported that the Prime Minister had been fully briefed on our concern in this regard. The Ambassador noted that the top officials of the RGA are now apprised of the legislation and its intent and are aware of the implications of their Government's future military expenditures and arms purchases in the light of concern about defense expenditures.

From the Afghan point of view, military expenditures can be considered to be within reasonable bounds for a society that is at once poor but feels insecure in face of an internal threat, i.e., the divisive tendencies of a largely tribal society and what it considers to be a possible external threat, notably from a stronger Pakistan.

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, March 29, 1968 - 9:35 am

Mr. President:

*Pres fr*

At Khe Sanh-DMZ-A Shau:

- 185 rounds enemy incoming at Khe Sanh;
- 132 rounds enemy incoming at DMZ;
- 2,008 friendly rounds;
- 217 tons resupply;
- 73 replacement personnel;
- 306 tactical sorties, plus 30 B-52's;
- weather good.

W. W. Rostow

rln

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
 White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
 By *ky*, NARA, Date: 4-3-92

34g

~~SECRET~~

Friday, March 29, 1968, 9:00 a. m.

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number fifty-four on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ/A Shau Valley area for the 24-hour period of March 28, 1968.

Weather conditions at Khe Sanh remained good throughout the reporting period. Skies were generally clear with occasional scattered low, middle and high clouds. The forecast for the next 24-hour period is for continued good weather with scattered cloudiness. Isolated thundershowers are predicted in the vicinity of Khe Sanh this afternoon. Visibility is expected to be restricted by haze to seven miles.

Aerial resupply increased over the level of the past few days as a total of 217 short tons were delivered. Fifteen airdrops were conducted. Thirty-seven helicopters delivered passengers and cargo. There were 73 replacement personnel delivered.

Khe Sanh received 100 artillery, 50 rocket, and 35 mortar rounds, a total of 185 rounds incoming. These attacks killed two Marines and wounded 13 (five evacuated). Friendly actions at Khe Sanh killed 16 enemy, thirteen by tactical air strikes.

Along the DMZ, an additional 132 enemy incoming rounds were received. Most fell in the vicinity of C-2 base north of Cam Lo where two Marines were killed and 12 wounded.

The 1st Air Cavalry Division continued to patrol with one troop of 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry in the vicinity of Ca Lu as preparations for forthcoming operations vicinity of Khe Sanh progress on schedule. The 101st Airborne Division carried out deception activities in the vicinity of Dong Ha.

Our artillery fired 99 missions in support of Khe Sanh, expending 2,008 rounds. Twenty-two of the missions were observed. No COFRAM ammunition was fired.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12852 Sec. 5(A)(1)

By isply, NARA, Date 4-3-92

~~SECRET~~

A total of 306 tactical air sorties were flown in the Niagara area. Of these, 198 were flown in the immediate vicinity of Khe Sanh. Damage observed included seven secondary explosions, eight secondary fires and the destruction of 365 meters of trenches, 31 bunkers and one truck. A total of 263 tactical air sorties are planned for the next reporting period.

Five ARC LIGHT strikes, of 30 sorties, were scheduled. Three sorties were diverted to secondary targets. One of the strikes reported observing seven secondary explosions. Six missions are planned for March 29.

One reconnaissance team was inserted into the A Shau Valley early this morning without drawing fire. Damage assessment from tactical air strikes yesterday in A Shau was four machine gun bunkers destroyed, two secondary explosions. There were no unusual returns on radar missions but 12 emissions at 10 locations were detected on a mission flown along Route 547.

~~SECRET~~

346



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

29 March 1968

4:30 AM EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Kho Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST  
28 March (9:00 AM 29 March, SVN time)

1. The Kho Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point(ASP)  
status as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>DAYS SUPPLY ON HAND</u>	<u>8:00 PM 28 Mar EST (9:00 AM 29 Mar SVN)</u>
<u>CLASS I (Rations)</u>		
Meal, Combat, Individual	22	22 days
B Rations	6	6 days
<u>CLASS III (Fuel)</u>		
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	3	3 days
JP-4 Fuel (Jet Fuel)	10.6	10.6 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	13.3	13.3 days
Diesel	15.6	12.2 days
<u>CLASS V (Ammunition)</u>		
a. High Explosive		
60-mm mortar	46	46 days
81-mm mortar	35	37 days
90-mm (Tank)	69	69 days
4.2" mortar	25	28 days
105-mm howitzer	23	21 days
155-mm howitzer	30	30 days
b. Antitank		
		<u>ROUNDS ON HAND</u>
90-mm AP-T		254
90-mm HEAT		1,089
66-mm rocket (LAW)		2,212
Antitank mines (M-15)		349
Antitank mines (M-19)		469
Antitank mines (M-21)		48
106-mm HEAT		1,538
106-mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T)		2,047
3.5" rocket		2,064

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988

By kg NARA, Date 4-3-92

SECRET

8:00 PM 28 Mar EST  
(9:00 AM 29 Mar SVN)

c. Antipersonnel

ROUNDS ON HAND


90-mm BEEHIVE	542
105-mm BEEHIVE	1,090
106-mm BEEHIVE	1,689
90-mm CANNISTER	323

CLASS V (COFRAM)

105-mm howitzer	1,684
155-mm howitzer	990
40-mm grenade launcher	6,729
Hand Grenades	2,945

2. On 28 March, Khe Sanh was resupplies with 217 short tons as follows:

CLASS I	41 tons
CLASS II	5.5 tons
CLASS III	16.5 tons
CLASS IV	51.5 tons
CLASS V	98.5 tons
MISCELLANEOUS	4 tons

  
JAMES A. SHANNON  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

DISTRIBUTION  
SECDEF  
DEP SECDEF  
CJCS (5)  
DJS (3)  
J-30  
J-31  
J-32  
J-33  
J-34  
J-4  
AWR  
MCCC  
AFCP  
NFP  
DDO  
ADDO  
CCOC  
PAC Div

SECRET

ACTION

35,

Friday, March 29, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

*Pres file*

Attached is a memorandum from <sup>*Nick K.*</sup> Secretary ~~Rusk~~ recommending you meet briefly with British Chancellor of the Exchequer Roy Jenkins during his Thursday, April 4, visit to Washington. Ambassador Bruce supports the recommendation.

State does not believe Prime Minister Wilson will be offended by your seeing Jenkins who is a potential rival for the Labor Party leadership.

Jenkins now has meetings scheduled with Secretary Fowler, Chairman Martin, Fred Deming, Art Okun, Bob McNamara, and IMF Managing Director Schweitzer.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

MWG:mm

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

March 29, 1968

7. a  
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for Mr. Roy Jenkins,  
British Chancellor of the Exchequer

Recommendation:

I recommend that you receive the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Roy Jenkins, briefly during his Washington visit on April 4. Ambassador Bruce also believes such a meeting would be of interest to you and helpful to Jenkins.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Background:

Chancellor of the Exchequer, Roy Jenkins, is visiting Washington April 4 for talks with Secretary Fowler, William McChesney Martin, and other financial figures. Jenkins holds a key position in the British Government and is generally regarded as a potential future Prime Minister.

Jenkins has just presented his first budget as Chancellor. It is one of the toughest budgets in British history, wartime not excluded. Expert opinion regards it as a politically courageous effort to deal with the British economic crisis and to give devaluation an opportunity to work. Apart from his primary concern with the British economy, Jenkins will also play an important role in British policies with a substantial financial impact (e.g. defense) and in current efforts to strengthen the international monetary structure.

  
Dean Rusk

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

*WR*

36

*Pres file*

March 29, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a proposed message replying to Prime Minister Jonathan of Lesotho.

Jonathan wrote you recently asking for more food aid to offset this year's crop failure in Lesotho. Our man on the spot has confirmed that the situation warrants emergency help. Lesotho will have a major shortfall and no money to distribute what aid they're getting from the World Food program.

State and AID recommend we move with a routine emergency relief operation. The program would run between \$2 to 3 million for 20,000 tons of corn meal.

I recommend you approve the message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

WWR:EKH:RM:lw

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER JONATHAN  
OF LESOTHO

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I was very sorry to hear that Lesotho is suffering a crop-failure.  
We can certainly appreciate the seriousness of the situation.

I have asked William Gaud and Orville Freeman to put together  
a program to step up our food aid to Lesotho and also to help you in  
its distribution. I have instructed our Charge in Maseru to work  
with your Government to get this program started as soon as possible.

As I told you during our good meeting last September, the United  
States is deeply interested in your development efforts. We admire  
your statesmanship in dealing with the challenges facing your young  
country. We shall continue to look for ways we can be of assistance  
to you.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

WWR:EKH:RM:lw  
3/29/68

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-269  
By sig, NARA Date 2-19-97

Thurs., March 28, 1968  
6:00 p. m.

37

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA warns of a possible  
second round of widespread coordinated  
enemy attacks between 28 March and  
April 2.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED

~~SECRET~~

SC No. 01253/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
28 March 1968

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT : Possible New Offensive in Vietnam

1. Signs are accumulating that a new Communist offensive may be imminent. |

2. | attacks appear most likely to come in the central high-lands, possibly coordinated with other assaults against urban areas and/or allied military installations along the northern coast and in the DMZ area. In the III Corps area the disposition of enemy forces in the provinces surrounding Saigon remains relatively unchanged. |

attacks in Binh Duong, Bien Hoa, and Long Khanh provinces are planned for the very near future. These developments constitute something of a reversal of last week's trends when a number of enemy units were noted moving away from areas of tactical interest. that

3. In general, | mortar, artillery, and rocket attacks would be featured in a new offensive. The Communists have strong forces within striking distance of a number of urban areas, however, and a new thrust into selected towns and cities cannot be ruled out.

SANITIZED

Authority NLS 81-93

By icw, 4-28-83

~~SECRET~~

**ACTION**

**Thursday, March 28, 1968  
3:50 p. m.**

*Pres file*

**Mr. President:**

**Sec. Rusk suggests you see  
Amb. Thompson when he is in town  
early in April.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**Yes \_\_\_\_\_**

**No \_\_\_\_\_**

**Call me \_\_\_\_\_**

**WWRostow:rla**

38a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 28, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment for  
Ambassador Thompson

Recommendation:

That you receive Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson when he is  
in Washington on consultation, April 1 - April 11.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

Ambassador Thompson will arrive in Washington on March 31 and  
plans to be here until April 11, when he will return to Moscow. I  
believe you would find it useful to talk with him soon after his  
arrival in the United States. You saw him last in September, 1967.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

MAR 29 1968 58 611 2 22

BOSTON OFFICE  
RECEIVED

**ACTION**

**Thursday, March 28, 1968  
3:10 p. m.**

**Mr. President:**

**You did not indicate if you wish to see Gen. Memner or not. He will be here Sunday and Monday, March 30-31.**

**He has managed the defense of Khe Sanh by air power. You'd find him interesting.**

*Pres file*

**W. W. Rostow**

**WWRostow:rla**

ACTION

Thursday  
March 28, 1968 - 10:55 AM

~~Key~~  
2. Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Congratulations to Indonesian  
President Suharto

On March 27 the Indonesian Congress unanimously voted to give Suharto a five-year term as President of Indonesia. Prior to this action, Suharto had all the powers of the Presidency but not the formal title.

Attached is a suggested letter of congratulations. I recommend that you sign it.

W. W. Rostow

Att

40a


March 29, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Government and people of the United States of America, I extend to you my sincere congratulations on your appointment as President of the Republic of Indonesia.

Accept also, Mr. President, my warm wishes for your continued success in the great tasks which you have undertaken.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "LBJ Lyndon B. Johnson". The signature is written in a cursive style and is enclosed within a light-colored rectangular border.

His Excellency  
General Soeharto  
President of the  
Republic of Indonesia  
Djakarta

STATE:LBJ:MWright:wpt

41a

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, March 28, 1968, 9: 45 a. m.

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number fifty-three on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ/A Shau Valley area for the 24-hour period of March 27, 1968.

A total of 87 rounds of enemy indirect fire was received at Khe Sanh; 50 artillery, 10 rocket and 27 mortar. These attacks killed one Marine and wounded four (two evacuated). Twelve of the enemy were reported killed as a result of tactical air strikes directed by aerial observers. No ground contact was reported in the vicinity.

U. S. artillery fire support consisted of 79 missions expending 1,375 rounds. Twenty-five missions were observed. No COFRAM ammunition was fired in the vicinity of Khe Sanh. North of Con Thien, five rounds of 105mm COFRAM were fired at North Vietnamese Army in the open with 10 enemy reported hit but not killed. North of Gio Linh, in the DMZ, seven rounds of 155mm COFRAM were fired at North Vietnamese Army in the open with one known enemy killed.

Yesterday at Khe Sanh, ceilings of 800 feet or less and visibility of less than one mile prevailed until late morning. By noon, clouds became scattered and visibility increased up to 10 miles. These conditions continued throughout the remainder of the period. Similar conditions are expected tomorrow except for early morning fog.

A total of 152.5 short tons of supply was delivered to Khe Sanh during the reporting period. Seven C-130 and two C-123 aircraft conducted air drops. One C-123 aircraft and 20 helicopters landed passengers and cargo.

Near Ca Lu, a Platoon from 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines was inserted into a landing zone in preparation for future operations. The friendly force was ambushed by an enemy force using command detonated mines and heavy automatic weapons fire. Seven Marines were killed and 14 wounded. Enemy casualties are unknown.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988  
By kg NARA, Date 4/17/92

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/88  
By kg NARA, Date 4/17/92

A total of 342 tactical air sorties were flown in the Niagara area. Nine secondary explosions, nine road cuts, three secondary fires, and destruction of 37 bunkers, 115 meters of trenches and two weapons positions were observed. Tactical air sorties planned for tomorrow total 203.

There were six ARC LIGHT strikes (36 sorties) scheduled. Four of the targets were close in and nine secondary explosions were observed. Five B-52 missions for March 28 are planned.

Two reconnaissance teams were extracted from A Chau; one under fire from light automatic weapons. Gunships and tactical air called in to support. Weather continues to hinder our ground reconnaissance insertions into the valley. Yesterday, one air radar and two photo missions continued to detect light anti-aircraft weapons positions.



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

416

28 March 1968  
4:30 AM EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST  
27 March (9:00 AM 28 March, SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)  
status as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>DAYS SUPPLY ON HAND</u>	<u>8:00 PM 27 Mar EST (9:00 AM 28 Mar SVN)</u>
<u>CLASS I (Rations)</u>		
Meal, Combat, Individual	22	22 days
B Rations	6	6 days
<u>CLASS III (Fuel)</u>		
Aviation Gass (AVGAS)	3	3 days
JP-4 Fuel (Jet Fuel)	10.6	10.6 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	13.3	14.6 days
Diesel	12.2	12.6 days
<u>CLASS V (Ammunition)</u>		
a. High Explosive		
60-mm mortar	46	55 days
81-mm mortar	37	35 days
90-mm (Tank)	69	133 days
4.2" mortar	28	28 days
105-mm howitzer	21	21 days
155-mm howitzer	30	28 days
b. Antitank		
		<u>ROUNDS ON HAND</u>
90-mm AP-T		254
90-mm HEAT		1,089
66-mm rocket (LAW)		2,212
Antitank mines (M-15)		349
Antitank mines (M-19)		469
Antitank mines (M-21)		48
106-mm HEAT		1,538
106-mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T)		2,055
3.5" rocket		2,170

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988

SECRET

8:00 PM 27 Mar EST  
(9:00 AM 28 Mar SVN)

c. Antipersonnel

ROUNDS ON HAND

90-mm BEEHIVE	542
105-mm BEEHIVE	1,090
106-mm BEEHIVE	1,689
90-mm CANNISTER	323

CLASS V (COFRAM)

105-mm howitzer	1,684
155-mm howitzer	990
40-mm grenade launcher	6,729
Hand Grenades	2,945

2. On 27 March, Khe Sanh was resupplied with 152.5 short tons as follows:

CLASS I	18.5 tons
CLASS II	7.5 tons
CLASS III	31.5 tons
CLASS IV	7.5 tons
CLASS V	85.5 tons
MISCELLANEOUS	2 tons



W. E. SHEDD  
Brigadier General, USA  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:

SECDEF  
DEP SECDEF  
CJCS (3)  
DJS (3)  
J-30  
J-31  
J-32  
J-33  
J-34  
J-4  
AWR  
MCCC  
AFCP  
NPP  
DDO  
ADDO  
CCOC  
PAC DIV  
PAC DESK

SECRET

*42*

Thursday, March 28, 1968  
10:15 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

These comparative figures may interest you.

Input to GVN Forces

	<u>February 1967</u>	<u>February 1968</u>
Draftees	4006	7022
Regular Forces Volunteers	1077	5335
Regional Forces Volunteers	1843	2880
Popular Forces Volunteers	<u>1004</u>	<u>1869</u>
Total	7,930	17,106

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

43

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, March 28, 1968  
10:00 a. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Ky's assessment of the enemy's objectives in the next few months -- and their relation to U. S. political life -- will interest you.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 23183

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By kg, NARA, Date 4-1-92

~~SECRET~~

43a

Thursday, March 28, 1968

TEXT OF CABLE FROM SAIGON (23183)

I took Ambassador Berger to call on Vice President Ky and we had about three-quarters of an hour with him.

I asked Ky how he analyzed enemy intentions for the next few months. Ky replied that it was important not to think only in military terms but rather in relation to their political objectives. He thought that the enemy had taken very heavy punishment during and since the Tet Offensive but they would come back again for further attacks. He said the enemy is now regrouping and resupplying since their units were only 45 to 60 per cent effective as the result of the offensive and the continuing ARVN and U.S. attacks. Ky thought that the main attacks would be on I Corps, especially Hue and Danang, and Saigon. In other areas their activity would be mainly confined to harassment and terrorism as a diversionary effort. He did not expect a major effort at Khe Sanh, which he also regarded as diversionary, but more directly related to the enemy's main thrust.

I asked Ky when he thought this next phase of enemy activity would occur. He said he expected it would start in April, but main effort would probably be around July. He analyzed the enemy's political and psychological aims as being designed to impress the outside world with their military strength and capacity to mount repeated offensives. I asked Ky whether their purpose might be to enter negotiations on the strongest possible basis. Ky nodded agreement saying he thought their principal purpose was to impress American public opinion and show how strong they were, with the hope of achieving a coalition in the negotiations on their terms.

Ky thought the next few months would be decisive. He was convinced the enemy could not achieve military victory. With respect to Saigon, they might get forces into the city again, but he thought this was manageable from the Government of Vietnam viewpoint and he was not particularly worried about Saigon. He was more concerned about I Corps, where they had 200 tanks (our J-2 estimate is 30, but concluded that he did not really think that

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-267

By cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

~~SECRET~~

they could win militarily there, either. He thought Giap was probably prepared to sacrifice another 40 to 50,000 troops, to achieve a political and psychological break-through.

In response to a question Ky reiterated that our main focus of attention and effort must be on the next few months and lesser matters should be put aside for that period. He and the President and Minister Vy and General Vien had met yesterday to discuss what was required during the next few months to meet these main lines of attack. Ky thought that by July or August the Government of Vietnam should have about 65 per cent of the planned 135,000 new men trained. He said the urgent need was to integrate these forces and to remain on the alert.

I asked Ky how he was coming along with planning for the organization of Civil Defense. He said this activity was extremely important and that civil servants, veterans and other groups be armed promptly in order to guard their own home areas, especially in the cities. Some already were being armed and others would be soon. He pointed out that President Thieu had not yet announced that he would have responsibility for this activity. He feared that if this was not done, people would misinterpret his actions as trying to build a new group to support him, and he would again be in a difficult position. I said I was aware of this problem, (Comment: I plan to mention this matter once again to Thieu.)

I remarked to Ky that General Thang seemed to be taking hold in IV Corps and there was sign of a psychological change there. Ky agreed that Thang was taking hold rapidly but emphasized that the basic problem in IV Corps was the continuing interdiction of main roads. He anticipated that this problem would continue to plague them there and elsewhere.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-269  
By inf, NARA Date 2-19-97

*2. Per file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, March 28, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Don Hornig's Report on Libya

Don's three recommendations in the attached warrant serious consideration.

I. The most important and far-reaching is his proposal for tackling the problem of how we operate in countries where AID can't work. Right now this applies to most of the countries of the Middle East--either because they are AID graduates or too oil-rich to qualify for aid. What they need is not capital but American experts. Yet there is now, believe it or not, no systematic way for the USG to get one American consultant to any of these countries. Every time we send one, we have to spend endless hours jerry-building a special program and finding odd little pockets from which to pay for it. Meanwhile, Eastern and Western Europeans are flooding these countries and collaring contracts and political influence for their own capitals. After we've invested millions of dollars in aid, we now bar ourselves from being present at the pay-off.

This has the makings of an important new 1969 program. What this amounts to is developing a way to manage our post-AID relationships. In Iran, for instance, AID has pulled out and it's time to lay the foundation for a mature economic relationship between our two countries. Now that Iran is doing well, we want to cement our relationship in solid ways that can survive political storms.

At this stage, I recommend you just instruct Don and me to give you a more precise recommendation on how to proceed. State endorses the general idea, but we're not ready to be specific yet.

Yes  No  Call me

II. The Libyan Government would like a little boost in developing a small nuclear research program related to petroleum technology. State favors the idea and I see no reason why Don shouldn't go ahead and work this out with Glenn Seaberg. Libya will pay most of the freight.

Yes  No  Call me

III. Don recommends a visit for the young new Libyan Prime Minister. I will have Secretary Rusk's recommendation for you shortly.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

W. W. Rostow

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 26, 1968

Note for Mr. Rostow

WALT:

I have talked about post-AID cooperation with your brother, Gene, and he thinks it urgent that the President take the initiative on this this spring. Attached is my memo to the President on my visit to Libya and the post-AID problem. I would appreciate it if you would forward it on to him.

Don Hornig

Encl.

*EH 44a*  
*for staffing*  
*+ writing*  
*note*  
*WJ*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

44b

Tuesday, March 26, 1968  
2:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit to Libya

On March 8-10 I visited Libya as your representative at the International Trade Fair on the occasion of America Day. I was also able to consult at length with Libyan government officials.

Although my visit coincided with a high religious festival, normally devoted to family celebrations, I met with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Planning, the Minister of Education, the Minister of Industry, and senior faculty members in science, engineering and agriculture.

The government is youthful and energetic. Although staunchly Arab, it clearly looks to the U.S. for guidance and advice--for which it is willing to pay--if we can find ways to provide it. It is strongly in our interest to do so.

Per capita income in Libya was \$30/year in 1960. Now it is \$1000--as a result of oil revenues. But the supply of trained administrators, engineers and teachers has not grown correspondingly. They are but a handful--and need our cooperation and help.

The Problem

They are doing the right things. There were 4,000 students in elementary schools under the Italians--now there are 300,000. They have initiated housing, communications, water development, etc. programs.

But foreign advisers who work in the Libyan ministries are the muscle of development. They now come from the U.K., Italy, France, the UAR and the Soviet Bloc--2250 of them. Almost all Americans left when we withdrew the AID mission and there are now only six working with the Government of Libya.

And with the Americans went much American influence--to the disadvantage of trade and industry--although this Arab country still looks to us and allows us to maintain Wheelus Air Force base.

Post-AID cooperation

Libya looks to the U. S. for help in:

- building an educational system;
- water resource development;
- agricultural development;
- building a medical school and improving public health

The orientation toward the U.S. of the Ministers, most of them U. S. educated, is apparent. In particular the Prime Minister asked for U.S. help in a peaceful uses of atomic energy program--which would excite the imagination of Libyan young people--and around which scientific development might take place.

The problems are twofold:

--After the withdrawal of the AID mission, no U.S. government organization is there to organize U. S. cooperation.

--U.S. technicians require a higher salary than Europeans of apparently equal qualifications. We must find a way around what they consider a generous salary ceiling (\$16,000) which is quite adequate to attract non-U.S. technicians. Ambassador Newsom has recommended a "topping off" program--but this would need Congressional action.

In Libya, as in other countries where aid has been terminated, I believe it is in our interest to safeguard our investment by helping to build a net of commercial and intellectual ties to the U.S.

Visit by Prime Minister Bakkush

The Prime Minister received your letter with pleasure and asked me to convey his thanks and warm regards to you. He mentioned his desire to visit the United States and his hope that he could be received by you. I believe it would be timely if an informal visit could be fitted into your schedule this spring. Walt Rostow has been in contact with Ambassador Newsom in this regard.

This would be an excellent occasion to lay the foundation for a program of expanded technical cooperation between the U.S. and Libya which would involve U.S. technical and intellectual resources and very little money.

Recommendations

I recommend that:

1. As a foremost example of the problem of post AID cooperation (which faces us in Taiwan, Iran and soon in other countries), I work with the concerned agencies to develop a new approach to technical cooperation with Libya and other countries in which assistance has been terminated.


APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ CALL ME \_\_\_\_\_

2. That I work with Glenn Seaborg to develop a program of U.S. - Libyan nuclear research cooperation.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ CALL ME \_\_\_\_\_

3. The Prime Minister be advised that an informal visit can be arranged this spring at a mutually convenient time.

Explore with Rostow: YES \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

  
Donald F. Hornig

Thursday, March 28, 1968

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Attached, as you requested,  
is a simple "thank you" reply to  
Sam Yorty's letter to you.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:EKH:lw

45a

March 28, 1968

**Dear Sam:**

**Many thanks for your note on Nigeria. We keep a close watch on this situation, and you can be sure that I will take your views into account.**

**With warm personal regards.**

**Sincerely,**

*(initialed) LBJ*

**Honorable Sam Yorty  
Mayor of the City of Los Angeles  
Los Angeles, California 90012**

**LBJ:WWR:EKH:lw  
3/28/68**

Dear Sam:

I can well appreciate your concern over the tragic strife in Nigeria. The torment of that young country distresses all of us.

Our position toward the conflict there has been very clear. We want to see an end to the bloodshed and destruction. We want to see the people of all regions and tribes return to the tasks of peaceful development in dignity and cooperation. But the antagonisms that gave rise to the war and the scars left by the fighting run deep. Our best judgment is that any intervention on our part would only complicate and perhaps even set back the chances for a genuine settlement.

We hope that others may be in a better position to help bring about a peaceful end to the Nigerian conflict. We have quietly encouraged efforts of the Organisation of African Unity and the British Commonwealth Secretariat to bring the sides together. And we welcome the individual efforts of men of good will. In the last analysis, however, only the Nigerians themselves can settle their dispute and resolve to live in peace with one another.

The Soviet involvement in the situation is, of course, a matter of concern. At the same time, the position of the United Kingdom and other Western interests remains strong. So far, it appears that the Nigerian Government remains very independent.

We will continue to watch this situation very closely. Nigeria was one of the bright hopes in Africa's march to independence. We will do everything prudence permits to encourage her to get back on the high road.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

LBJ:WWR:EKH:RM:lw  
3/25/68  
Honorable Sam Yorty  
Mayor of the City of Los Angeles  
Los Angeles, California 90012

*too long*

46

~~SECRET~~

March 28, 1968

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

In the attached memorandum, Paul Nitze requests that you approve the SENTINEL program, which covers the deployment of the limited anti-ballistic missile defense system, as a program of highest national priority so that it can be assigned a DX industrial priority rating. Your approval of this action is required by the Defense Production Act of 1950. Nitze also reports that six programs that no longer require DX industrial priorities are being deleted from the highest national priority list. This request has been cleared with the Bureau of the Budget.

If you approve, the agencies that have programs on the highest national priority list or are otherwise concerned will be informed of the action by the attached NSAM.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments:

- 1. Nitze memo 3/14/68
- 2. NSAM

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

SMKeeny:jb:3-28-68/2:45p

bcc: SMK file and chron

>WWR (2)

CEJ

SMK comeback copy

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DECLASSIFIED  
 DOD DIR 5200.10; NLJ 80-98  
 Authority E.O. 11652, Sec 5CA(1)(D)  
 By *dep/rq*, NARA, Date 4-20-92

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

46a

14 MAR 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Changes in the Top National Category of the Department of Defense Master Urgency List for CY 1968

I recommend that you approve the SENTINEL Program as a program of highest national priority which would make it eligible for use of the automatic DX industrial priority rating. The DX dollar limitation for this program will be as follows:

	(Millions of Dollars)	
	<u>FY 1968</u>	<u>FY 1969</u>
R&D	\$ 22.6	\$320.9
Production	\$192.0	\$606.0

The SENTINEL System is a defense system which will use highly advanced radars and interceptor missiles to destroy in flight warheads of attacking ballistic missiles during the period of the 1970's and 1980's. It is being designed to be integrated into the Continental Air Defense Command family of weapons systems and to have growth potential to provide for more protection from sophisticated attacks. The initial operational capability of this system is scheduled for October 1972.

The following six programs are being deleted from the Top National Category of the Department of Defense Master Urgency List for CY 1968 since their objectives have been reached, or they can be maintained on schedule with lower urgency assignments:

- Bomb, Demo, 750 lb., M119, with fuze
- Bomb, 2000 lb., MK 84, Mod 1
- Rocket, 2.75", all types, with fuze
- Cartridge, 60mm, HE
- DEFENDER
- CENTAUR

*Paul H. Nitze*

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Authority E.O. 11652 Sec 5(C)(1)

By wj/y, NARA, Date 4-20-92



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Doc Cont Nr. X-1654

~~SECRET~~

## NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO.

TO:       The Vice President  
           The Secretary of State  
           The Secretary of Defense  
           The Secretary of Commerce  
           Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission  
           Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Agency  
           Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
           Director, Bureau of the Budget  
           Director, Office of Emergency Planning

Subject:   Assignment of Highest National Priority to the  
           SENTINEL Program

In response to the recommendation by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the President, under authority granted by the Defense Production Act of 1950, today established the SENTINEL Program as being in the highest national priority category.

The President also noted removal of the following programs from the top national priority list: Bomb Demo, 750 lb.; Bomb 2000 lb., MK 84 Mod 1; Rocket, 2.75"; Cartridge, 60mm, HE; DEFENDER; and CENTAUR.

W. W. Rostow

SMKeeny:ok 3-27-68

bcc: SMK file and chron

WWR (2)

CEJ

SMK comeback copy

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 75C Dec 5/12/81 (WLS 82-98)

By Shapiro, NARA, Date 4/20/92

47

March 28, 1968

*Pres file*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Draft Exchange Agreement with the USSR**

Yesterday, the Russians told us they would be ready next week to exchange preliminary drafts for a renewed Exchange Agreement. Each side will then study the drafts, and we think the actual negotiations will begin in the latter part of April. The final, agreed text will be resubmitted to you for approval before signature.

The attached text is our initial negotiating position, and will probably be changed considerably. For example, we propose three large exhibits, and the Soviets may propose none. (We had two under the 1966-67 Agreement). We propose television exchanges using communications satellites, but the Soviets may not agree.

We propose the exchange of five major performing arts groups - with the names of the attractions to be decided later through contract negotiations. (This is the same way these groups were handled in the last exchange agreement).

Past agreements have committed us and the Russians to encourage tourism. However, the actual ratio of tourists exchanged has been about 145 Americans for each Russian. In light of this imbalance and the gold problem, we are proposing a tourism section which provides that we jointly study tourist travel arrangements. If the Soviets refuse to buy this change, we may drop the section.

I recommend that you approve the State Department's request for authority to exchange preliminary drafts.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

48

*Pres file*

Thursday, March 28, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Honoring the Memory of Harold E. Holt

Tom Johnson has told me of your desire to prepare a fact sheet on points to be discussed with Mrs. Holt. If you approve, I will brief her along these lines:

-- The President wants to commemorate the bonds that existed between him and the late Prime Minister, as well as the close ties of friendship between our two countries.

-- Two tangible expressions of honoring the late Prime Minister have been discussed with Prime Minister Gorton.

-- Prime Minister Gorton enthusiastically welcomes both suggestions.

-- We wish to name in honor of the late Prime Minister the U. S. Navy Communications Station in the Northwest Cape of Australia. A year ago, the late Prime Minister dedicated this station. This station would bear the late Prime Minister's name.

-- We wish to name one of our Naval vessels in his honor.

-- On May 11, at San Pedro, California, a destroyer-escort's keel will be laid. We intend to name this vessel the USS HAROLD E. HOLT.

-- The ship is scheduled for launching about a year later.

-- The ship will be 438 feet long, about 47 feet wide, and displace about 3,900 tons. Its complement will include 17 officers and 226 enlisted men.

Arrangements should be worked out between our Embassy in Canberra and Mrs. Holt on her return to Australia concerning her participation in the Naval Station ceremony.

You may wish to invite Mrs. Holt back for the keel laying of the vessel, although -- because of her visit here now -- she may not have planned to return to the U. S. in May.

Invite her now \_\_\_\_\_

Hold off \_\_\_\_\_

You may wish to invite Mrs. Holt back for the launching of the vessel in late Spring of 1969. I suggest, however, that no firm invitation be given because of the far off nature of that date.

Invite her now \_\_\_\_\_

Hold off \_\_\_\_\_

I would recommend against a White House announcement of these proposals until we have informed Prime Minister Gorton of our intention. I recommend your approving ~~my~~ informing him of this. If we send him word this afternoon, it would be quite fitting for a White House announcement to be made tomorrow.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is a possible draft press release.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

W. W. Rostow

Schwartz 3/28

48a

**PROPOSED PRESS RELEASE**

The President today announced that the U. S. Navy Communications Station located in the Northwest Cape of Australia and a destroyer escort will be named in honor of Harold E. Holt, the late Prime Minister of Australia.

The U. S. Navy Communications Station in the Northwest Cape of Australia was dedicated by the late Prime Minister a year ago.

The keel of the USS HAROLD E. HOLT is scheduled to be laid May 11, 1968 at San Pedro, California. The vessel will have a complement of 17 officers and 226 enlisted men. It will measure 438 feet long and 46 feet, 9 inches at the beam, and displace 3, 877 tons. The launching of the ship is scheduled for about a year later.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Thursday*  
Wednesday, March 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Stockholm Monetary Conference -- Issues

The IMF's Special Drawing Rights proposal has three phases:

- Agreement in principle on the proposal. This was done last year in the London and Rio meetings.
- Putting the principles in the legal form of an amendment to the IMF Articles. This has been worked on for the past six months. The remaining issues are up for decision and settlement at the meeting in Stockholm. If this is done over the weekend, the proposal will be ready for ratification by governments. We would hope to be able to put it before the Congress in May.
- Activation. The proposal goes into effect when governments with 80% of the voting power ratify it. The Managing Director of the IMF can then propose that a recommended amount of Special Drawing Rights be issued over a five-year period as a needed supplement to existing monetary reserves. The ~~issuance~~ would have to be approved by governments with 85% of the voting power. Activation is at least a year away.

The major issue on the SDR Plan is the question of opting out. The French want the right to participate even if they decide not to accept a financial commitment. They are isolated on this from their Common Market partners. We could manage a concession to avoid a rift.

The French have also raised a large number of technical issues designed to make the SDR's less useful as a monetary reserve. They are alone on most of these issues.

In addition, there are some issues on changes in IMF rules that must be settled in Stockholm. The most troublesome are:

- A change that would give the EEC a veto on any future increases in IMF quotas.

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- 2 -

- A change that would give the EEC a bigger voice in the interpretation of Fund rules.

We believe compromises are possible on these questions.

The main requirement is to have the Stockholm meeting end with a clear understanding that the second stage in the Special Drawing Rights proposal is virtually complete. Failure to do so would have an unsettling effect on the financial markets. The Germans, Italians, Dutch and Belgians realize this.

The key is what the French do.

- They could try for some face saving compromises. This could be feasible.
- They could try to delay a final settlement for another meeting or series of meetings. This would be costly.
- They could in effect walk out and force the Five to choose between keeping the Common Market and financial disorder. This does not seem likely but would be dangerous to us all.

We believe that if the Germans and Italians hold firm, we should be able to work out a successful meeting.

W. W. Rostow

ERF:mst

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

50

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, March 27, 1968  
6:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Amb. Bunker had this memo of  
Ed Lansdale's distributed to the Mission  
Council.

*Pres file*

It is much in the spirit of your  
speech draft.

It is good.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Harry McPherson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rln

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 4-1-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

50a

TO: Members, U. S. Mission Council

FROM: Ed Lansdale *SL*

SUBJECT: Viet-Nam 1968

DATE: March 21, 1968

With the concurrence of Ambassador Bunker, this memorandum is brought to your attention.

1.

We have had evidence in past weeks that this is a year of intensity, of magnified events and of magnified consequences, here, at home in the United States, everywhere that people feel touched by what happens in Viet-Nam. Each of us, also, has our own view of just how critical a year 1968 might prove to be. Thus, with the premonition that we are close to one of those strange "change points" in history, and yearning to have that change favor our cause, I have done some thinking about the struggle ahead. I share the results with you, in what follows.

2.

I believe there is only one acceptable course of action for Americans to follow in Viet-Nam. Stated simply, it is:

Help the Vietnamese get a clear concept of their own national goal which if achieved will gain them a viable nation, and then help them be strong enough to win this goal themselves. (Course A.)

The other principal alternatives, as noted below, I do not believe are acceptable:

B. Take over the management of Vietnamese affairs ourselves and get the war won, with the thought of handing over a going concern to the Vietnamese afterwards.

Or,

C. Find some graceful, rational way of disengaging ourselves from the war in Viet-Nam at the earliest possible moment, without winning.

We are in trouble in Viet-Nam today because we have never fully understood or followed course A and because, therefore, we are attempting

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-117

By ij, NARA Date 8-26-96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

to a considerable degree to follow all of the above courses of action simultaneously. This is an imperfect strategy with which to meet an enemy who is so skillful at waging political-military war against us. The U. S. Mission, for example, currently is performing actions that fall with both courses A and B. Course C, which is disastrously counterproductive to the other courses especially when it is pursued openly at a critical moment in the war, is being publicly advocated in the U. S., including, in Vietnamese eyes, in some official quarters.

I believe we can and should focus our efforts far more sharply on course A and also join together and speak with one voice through a Mission statement to which all can subscribe, to tell official Washington where we stand concerning course C. The statement need not imply criticism of any past U. S. moves or opinions. It can express the views of the Americans directly involved in the conflict on what the truth looks like to us, from up close.

To turn these thoughts into positive actions, the following steps are recommended:

1) The U. S. Mission should define in precise terms the goal in Viet-Nam which if achieved will give the Vietnamese a viable nation, and therefore the goal towards which all elements of the U. S. Mission must strive. A small task force representing each of us, directed by one of us, can draft such a definition for our approval, in one or two weeks. By defining our goal I mean something along the following line:

"We believe the South Vietnamese people have certain inalienable rights including freedom of the individual, justice for all citizens and the right to choose their own form of government without being forced to accept a dictatorial system imposed through terror and invasion. These principles, which we and the Vietnamese share, have achieved concrete, pragmatic expression in the Vietnamese Constitution of 1967. We support the Constitution and the process of Constitutional Government in Viet-Nam. This includes supporting concepts that the duty of each Government official is to serve the legitimate interests of the people; the duty of the Armed Forces is to defend the Constitution, and to protect the people; etc."

2) This statement of our national objective in Viet-Nam could then be used in the following ways:

- a. Sent to Washington where, with the President's approval, it could be disseminated within the executive and legislative branches, and to the American public,

with appropriate wording for each of these audiences.

b. Disseminated to Vietnamese leaders.

c. Disseminated, with appropriate classified guidance, to the U. S. advisory structure in South Viet-Nam.

The above actions would not involve a sudden, mid-stream change in our policies and programs in Viet-Nam but rather would hopefully zero in all of our efforts toward achievement of a clear national objective while making this objective clear to the Vietnamese, the American people, and the world. This would be of great value, regardless of the enemy situation, including the real possibility that the enemy is close to being on the verge of defeat.

3.

If we are to succeed with course A, we must be practical realists and employ our best means to make our Vietnamese allies strong, effective, victorious, and keep sticking to these best means. Our behavior toward the Vietnamese should be that of brothers, even stern older brothers at times, but never that of uninformed and insensitive rich relatives.

In the past, we often have failed to use the best "leverage" of all on our Vietnamese allies -- their need to do things right instead of wrong for their own benefit, to save their own country, to assure their own futures (i. e., national self-interest). This is the same motive which has brought Americans to this land, which has caused us to pay so dearly in lives, goods and money for the effort here. Vietnamese are as human as we are. They will act from the same motive, when it is put to them in believable terms. We must break through such barriers as Vietnamese (and American) colonial tendencies and xenophobia to get the basic truth of what we all hope to achieve in Viet-Nam out into plain view in terms the Vietnamese understand, and then work to get this goal accepted in practice due to the consistency of our behavior at all levels.

The sound start in motivating our Vietnamese allies, then, is to expose them fully to a specific statement of our aims, the definition of just what is desired for a future Viet-Nam, and to cinch this by showing them we believe this, too. Our goal and theirs are practically

identical, only they are not sure of this now and their understanding of actions required to attain this goal is too hazy.

We must convince them of the integrity of our intentions and help them see the path to success more clearly. Then, our guidance, our help, must be given only on the basis of assisting the Vietnamese towards this goal. Remaining true to this rule, we will be believed. Advice to Vietnamese X will not have him wonder if this will cause him trouble with Vietnamese Z and Y, since advice to the latter will follow the same rule as advice to the former. Upon this sound basis, we can then give effective guidance for coping with corrupt practices among Vietnamese officials, ineffective leadership, and other vexing problems. We help those who strive to reach the known and desired goal. We stop helping those who don't strive. Our Vietnamese allies will catch on fast. The deserving will get strong; the undeserving will get eliminated.

Therefore, as noted above, it is recommended that the U. S. Mission, when it defines our specific goal, publish this in a form for use by the entire U. S. advisory effort, and to show to our Vietnamese allies, to provide a constant basic reminder of what every official action should be aimed towards achieving. All Americans in contact with Vietnamese should be instructed to give official advice based upon whether actions are good because they are towards this goal or are bad because they are not. If each American advisor, during the years we have been here, had made his Vietnamese opposite number a better man in serving his country, instead of limiting advice to technical matters, we would have a far mightier force of Vietnamese allies today. Let us concentrate more on this now.

4.

This paper has noted that we are in a most critical period of the war in Viet-Nam and has recommended some fundamental actions at this time within the U. S. Mission. These actions could revitalize the basis upon which U. S. organizations tackle the problems confronting us in Viet-Nam, as well as make our cause in Viet-Nam far more credible to the Vietnamese, the U. S. public and the world. Let us get set to win!