

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1-memo	Rostow to President, 9:45 p.m. S — 1 p — <i>open 9-25-92 NLJ 91-285</i> [Duplicate of #36, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (3)."]	<del>4/5/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#1b-memo	Rostow to President, 8:30 a.m. S — 2 p — <i>open 9-25-92 NLJ 91-285</i> [Duplicate of #14] [Duplicate of #36b, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (3)."]	4/5/68	A
<del>#1c-rpt</del>	<del>"Instructions for Governor Harriman"</del> <del>TS — 2 p — <i>open 8-4-93 NLJ 92-436</i></del> [Duplicate of #20a] [Duplicate of #36c, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (3)."]	<del>4/4/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#2-memo	Rostow to President, 9:20 p.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-268 1-15-99</i> S — 1 p —	4/5/68	A
#2a-letter	"Message to Eshkol" " " " S — 3 p —	undated	A
#3-memo	<del>Rostow to President, 9:10 p.m.</del> <del>S — 1 p — <i>open 5-17-95 NLJ 92-497</i></del>	<del>4/5/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#3a-cable	Vientiane 5650 <i>Open NLJ 97-269</i> S — 2 p — <i>exempt 9-3-93 NLJ 92-496</i>	4/5/68	A
#4-memo	<del>Rostow to President, 6:30 p.m.</del> <del>S — 1 p —</del> <i>open 5-17-95 NLJ 92-497</i>	4/5/68	A
#7-memo	<del>Rostow to President, 6:00 p.m.</del> <del>S — 1 p —</del> "	4/5/68	A
#8-memo	<del>Rostow to President, 4:45 p.m.</del> <del>S — 1 p —</del> "	<del>4/5/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#13a cable	New Delhi 12386 C — 2 p — <i>exempt 9-3-93 NLJ 92-496</i> <i>Open NLJ 97-268 1-15-99</i> (Dup. of #60, NSF, spec H of S Comesp, India - 1/11/68-1/20/69, Box 23)	4/5/68	A
#14-memo	Duplicate of #1b <i>open 9-25-92 NLJ 91-285</i>		
#15-memo	Rostow to President, 7:50 a.m. <i>open 10/30/09</i>	4/5/68	A
FILE LOCATION	TS — 1 p — <i>sanitized 8-30-95 NLJ 92-533</i>		

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 70, April 1-5, 1968 Box 32

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#15a rpt	<del>Intelligence Report</del> <i>open 10/30/09</i> <del>TS- 1 p</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#17 memo	<del>Rostow to President, re: Japan</del> <i>open 4-21-93 NLS 96-21</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>4/5/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#17a letter	<del>President to PM Sato</del> <i>open 4-21-93 NLS 96-91</i> <del>PCI 1 p</del>	<del>4/5/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#20 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 5:50 p.m.</del> <del>TS 1 p</del> <i>open 9-25-92 NLS 91-285</i>	<del>4/4/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#20a report	<del>Duplicate of #1c</del> <i>open 8-4-93 NLS 92-436</i>		
#21a cable	<del>Taipei 2668</del> <i>open 4-10-97</i> <del>S 3 p</del>	<del>4/4/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#24 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 2:05 p.m.</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 8-4-93 NLS 92-436</i>	<del>4/4/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#24a memo	<del>Katzenbach to President, re: Yugoslavia</del> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 7-2-93 NLS 92-437</i>	<del>4/4/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#25 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 1:40 p.m.</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>exempt 5/03</i>	<del>4/4/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#25a cable	<del>Intelligence Cable</del> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>4/4/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#27 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 12:35 p.m.</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>sanitized 2-18-93 NLS 91-288</i> <i>same sanitization 4-21-98 NLS 97-270</i>	<del>4/4/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#27a cable	<del>Intelligence Cable</del> <i>sanitized 11-4-99 NLS 97-371</i> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>same NLS 019-032-1 (1/02)</i>	<del>4/4/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#30 memo	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>C 2 p</del> <i>open 5-30-95 NLS 93-368</i>	<del>4/4/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#30a memo	<del>Zwick to President, re: Korea</del> <del>C 2 p</del> <i>Open 5-30-95 NLS 93-368</i> <i>[Dup. # 82g, NSF, CF, Korea, "vol. 6"]</i>	<del>4/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#30b memo	Gaud to President, re: Korea <i>open 10-3-93 NLS 93-370</i> C — 3 p —	3/28/68	A
#30c memo	Gaud and Freeman to President C — 3 p —	3/28/68	A
#31a cable	Blantyre 1214 <i>Open 10-7-98 NLT 97-269</i> PCI — 2 p —	4/3/68	A
#32 memo	Rostow to President S — 1 p — <i>open 5-17-95 NLS 92-492</i>	4/4/68	A
#33a cable	Saigon 23956 <i>Open 10-7-98 NLT 97-269</i> S — 9 p — [Duplicate of #33a, NSF, CF, VN, "8 B (3)b."] [Sanitized 1979]	4/4/68	A
#35 memo	Rostow to President S — 1 p — <i>open 8-4-93 NLS 92-436</i>	4/4/68	A
#37 memo	Rostow to President, 8:10 p.m. S — 1 p — <i>open 5-17-95 NLS 92-492</i>	4/3/68	A
#37a cable	PM Wilson to President <i>open 1-15-99</i> S — 1 p — <i>(Dup of #42, NSF, Special Head of St. Corresp, U.K., Box 56)</i> <i>Open NLT 97-268</i>	4/4/68	A
#38 memo	Rostow to President, 7:30 p.m. S — 1 p — <i>open 9/9/92</i>	4/3/68	A
#38a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S — 3 p — <i>open 4-12-93 NLS 92-394</i>	4/3/68	A
#39 memo	Rostow to President, 7:25 p.m. S — 1 p — <i>open 5-17-95 NLS 92-492</i>	4/3/68	A
#39a cable	Deptel to Vientiane (work copy) S — 1 p — <i>open 9-3-93 NLS 92-496</i>	4/3/68	A
#40a memcon	Dobrynin and Harriman <i>Open NLT 97-269 10-7-98</i> S — 7 p — <i>sanitized 9-3-93 NLS 92-496</i>	4/1/68	A

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#41 memo	Rostow to President, 5:05 p.m. <del>S</del> 1 p open 5-17-95 NLJ 92-492	4/3/68	A
#42 memo	Duplicate of #41 open 4-10-97		
#43a cable	Saigon 23812 <del>S</del> 2 p open 9-3-93 NLJ 92-496	4/3/68	A
#44 memo	Rostow to President, 2:45 p.m. PCI 2 p Open 9/10/92	4/3/68	A
#47a rpt	"Preliminary Views of the DRV Offer..." S 3 p & #44a, NSF, CF, VN, Harray / Cordellie Indian Program... Box 134 (Duplicate of #40b, NSF, CF, VN, "8I- Gen Taylor memos, 11/67-10/68," Box 108)	4/3/68	A
#48 memo	Rostow to President, 10:45 a.m. Open NLJ 97-268 1-15-99 PCI 1 p sanitized 5-17-95 NLJ 92-492 Conf.	4/3/68	A
#48b cable	Prime Minister to Walter Open NLJ 97-268 1-15-99 S 1 p	4/2/68	A
#49 memo	Rostow to President, 9:40 a.m. PCI 1 p sanitized 5-30-95 NLJ 92-533 SANITIZED 8-15-05 NLJ 05-710	4/3/68	A
#50 report	Intelligence Report open 4-9-05 TS 2 p sanitized 4-12-93 NLJ 92-503	4/3/68	A
#51 report	Intelligence Report TS 1 p sanitized 7-4-93 NLJ 92-504 open 4-9-05	4/3/68	A
#53a cable	Vientiane 6972 Open NLJ 97-269 10-7-98 S 2 p [Duplicate of #89a, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (3)"] [Sanitized NLJ 91-287]	4/2/68	A
#55 memo	Rostow to President, 8:45 a.m. <del>S</del> 1 p open 5-17-95 NLJ 92-492	4/3/68	A
#55a cable	Saigon 695 Open NLJ 97-269 10-7-98 S 1 p sanitized 9-3-93 NLJ 92-496	4/3/68	A

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#56 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 8:40 a.m.</del> <del>S 1 p open 5-17-95 NLS 92-492</del>	<del>4/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#56a cable	<del>Saigon 23829</del> <i>Open NLT 97-267 10-7-98</i> <del>S 2 p sanitized 9-3-93 NLS 92-496</del>	<del>4/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#56b cable	<del>Vientiane 7057</del> " " " <del>S 4 p sanitized 9-3-93 NLS 92-496</del>	<del>4/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#57 memo	Rostow to President, 8:00 a.m. S- 1 p	4/3/68	A
#57a cable	Intelligence Cable S- 1 p	4/3/68	A
#57b cable	Intelligence Cable S- 1 p exempt 5/03	4/3/68	A
#58 memo	Rostow to President <del>C 1 p open 7-14-94 NLS 93-291</del> [Duplicate in NSF, CF, UK, Vol. 9]	<del>4/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#58c rpt	Bio Sketch <i>exempt 11-4-99 NLS 97-271</i> C 1 p [Duplicate in NSF, CF, UK, Vol. 9]	undated	A
#60 memo	Rostow to President, re: OAS <del>C 1 p</del> <i>Open NLT 97-268 1-15-99</i>	<del>4/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#60b rpt	"Proposed Scenario..." " " " <del>C 4 p</del>	<del>4/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#61 memo	Rostow to President, re: Japan " " " PCI 1 p	<del>4/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#61a ltr	President to PM Sato " " " PCI 2 p	undated	A
#61b ltr	PM Sato to President " " " PCI 2 p	undated	A

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#64a ltr	<del>President to President Thieu</del> PCI — 1 p — <i>open 5-17-95 NLS 92-499</i>	<del>4/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#68 memo	<del>Rostow to President</del> u C — 2 p —	<del>4/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#69 ltr	<del>President to Prime Minister (CAP-80731)</del> S — 1 p — <i>Open NLT 97-268 1-15-99</i>	<del>4/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#70 memo	Rostow to President, 4:15 p.m. <i>sanitized 2-24-93</i> S 1 p <i>NLS 91-288</i> [Duplicate of #90, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (3)"] <i>more released 4.28.98 NLS 97-270</i>	4/2/68	A
#70a cable	Intelligence Cable <i>sanitized 11-4-99 NLS 97-271</i> S 3 p [Duplicate of #90b, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (3)"]	4/2/68	A
#70b cable	Intelligence Cable <i>except 11-4-99 NLS 97-271</i> S 4 p [Duplicate of #90d, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (3)"]	4/2/68	A
<del>#75a memo</del>	<del>Wheeler to President (CM-3169-68)</del> S — 2 p — <i>open 4-14-93 NLS 92-495</i>	<del>4/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#84a memo	<del>Zwick to President</del> S — 1 p — <i>open 6-27-94 NLS 93-345</i>	<del>3/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#84b memo</del>	<del>Katzenbach to President</del> <i>open 3-14-94 NLS 93-347</i> S — 2 p — <i>sanitized 10-25-93 NLS 92-496</i>	<del>3/23/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#84c rpt	"Background Annex" S — 4 p — <i>open 3-14-94 NLS 93-347</i>	undated	A
#84d rpt	"Burma Map FY 1968..." " S — 1 p —	undated	A
#85 memo	Rostow to President, re: Panama C — 1 p — <i>Open NLT 97-268 1-15-99</i>	4/1/68	A
#87 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 5:20 p.m.</del> S — 2 p — <i>open 2-23-93 NLS 92-22</i>	<del>4/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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#91a ltr	President to PM Wilson S — 2 p — <i>(dup of #42c, NSF, Special Head of State Corresp, UK, Box 56) open 5-17-95</i>	<del>4/1/68</del> <del>NLJ 92-497</del>	<del>A</del>
#91b rpt	"It is here that the real..." TS — 1 p — <i>(dup of #42c, see above) open 4-24-01</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#92a cable	Rawalpindi 4281 TS — 1 p — <i>open 9-3-93 NLJ 92-496</i>	<del>4/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#93a cable	Saigon 23615 TS — 1 p — "	<del>4/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#93b cable	Seoul 5387 TS — 1 p — "	<del>4/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#96 memo	Rostow to President S — 1 p — <i>open 9-25-92 NLJ 91-285</i> [Duplicate of #102, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (3)"]	<del>4/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#96a rpt	"Attack Sorties in NVN and Laos" S — 1 p — <i>open 9-25-92 NLJ 91-285</i> [Duplicate of #102a, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (3)"]	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#97 memo	Rostow to President C — 1 p — <i>open 5-17-95 NLJ 92-492</i>	<del>4/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#99 memo	Rostow for the Record S — 2 p — <i>open 5-17-95 NLJ 92-492</i>	<del>3/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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MEMORANDUM

*Pres. file*  
INFORMATION 1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, April 5, 1968  
9:45 p. m.

SECRET

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached at Tab A are questions Nitze suggests you may wish to raise with General Westmoreland tomorrow.

In line with my memo to you of this morning (Tab B, para 3) I would add this question related to possible negotiations:

-- Can we devise with the Vietnamese a fight-and-talk strategy in which we improve our position on the ground in the weeks ahead, as talks continue?

You may also wish to have General Westmoreland go over the draft instruction for Governor Harriman (Tab C).

Finally, you may wish to ask Westy what steps he and his military colleagues could take to reassure the South Vietnamese that, while they must face the possible reality of negotiations, we don't intend to sell them out.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachments

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-285  
By fw, NARA, Date 9-17-92



1a

SECRET

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
Washington, D. C. 20301

A

April 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Items you may wish to discuss with General Westmoreland.

1. Selection of General Westmoreland's successor as Commander MACV.
2. Selection of the Deputy Commander MACV.
3. Selection of the military advisor to Ambassador Harriman in the meeting with the North Vietnamese representatives. It has been suggested that General Goodpaster and General Seignious be the initial advisors with General Goodpaster returning after the first week or two.
4. A report by General Westmoreland on the military position in South Vietnam including:
  - a. Status of Khe Sanh and plans for the future with respect to the DMZ positions and General Westmoreland's proposal to now go forward with the "trace" from Con Thien toward the sea?
  - b. How does General Westmoreland envisage the campaign in South Vietnam with a continuation of the bombing restriction to the 20th -- or with a cessation of all bombing, etc. against North Vietnam?
  - c. What is General Westmoreland's present evaluation of the ARVN and of the Government of Vietnam?
  - d. What is General Westmoreland's evaluation of the enemy's military strength and posture? How does he evaluate their possible strategy and tactics during talks if they come about?
  - e. How does General Westmoreland view the prospects for a reduction in U.S. deployed forces?
5. General Westmoreland's current evaluation of the pacification program.
6. Differences between the Marines and MACV on control of air support in I Corps North.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority 76 J 91-284  
By ip/ly, NARA, Date 5-8-92



## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ 1b

Friday, April 5, 1968 -- 8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

This, in my judgment, is the message Bunker and Westy should take back to Saigon.

1. U.S. objectives in Vietnam and Southeast Asia remain unchanged: re-install Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and permit self-determination by South Vietnamese.

2. If Hanoi is ready to negotiate, these objectives are achievable if two conditions are satisfied:

- The U.S. and GVN stay closer than ever together;
- The non-Communist South Vietnamese rally and unite.

3. Militarily, we must be prepared to have an effective talk-and-fight strategy. This is more possible than in Korea, because we have the capacity, working together, to improve our position on the ground while negotiations proceed. A campaign plan to this end should be developed. It should include a plan to position U.S. and allied forces at optimum points if a cease-fire should appear likely of negotiation.

4. Politically, the three essentials are these:

-- The government and people of South Vietnam should know the U.S. will negotiate a settlement with the GVN as a partner, -- not over its head. We may not agree on every detail at every point; but we shall consult closely and regularly.

-- If negotiations start, the GVN, with our help, should mount a psywar campaign against the Viet Cong on these themes:

- Hanoi is abandoning the South;
- now is the time to come over to the government side and join in the life of the constitutional government.

-- Above all, it is essential that all non-Communist elements begin to form a working political party to guarantee victory over a Communist-dominated popular front in elections that are bound to come sooner or later.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-285

By fw, NARA, Date 9-17-92~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2-

The U.S. commitment to South Vietnam is one-man, one-vote, not the extermination of all Communists. It is up to the South Vietnamese to convert that commitment into victory.

*W. A. R.* Rostow

~~SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

4/4/68 C  
1c

INSTRUCTIONS FOR GOVERNOR HARRIMAN

Basic Objective

To achieve an understanding with the North Vietnamese representative on a cessation of bombing in the North and arrangements for prompt and serious substantive talks under circumstances which would not be military disadvantageous. Such understanding to be within objectives defined below.

Specific Objectives

1. Cessation of the Bombing

The US is prepared to agree to a cessation of naval, air and artillery bombardment of North Viet-Nam. In keeping with North Vietnamese statements, it is our understanding that such action on our part will lead promptly to talks in which both sides would be free to raise any elements which they believe would lead to a peaceful settlement. We are prepared in these talks to make arrangements to this end, including agreement on announcement of bombing cessation and subsequent talks.

2. Prompt Talks

Substantive talks should be held within 3 to 7 days following the cessation of bombing.

3. Serious Talks

We should seek explicit confirmation by the North Vietnamese that any topic relevant to the substance of peace could be raised in the substantive talks.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 92-436  
By JW, NARA, Date 7-28-93



#### 4. Participants

In any substantive discussions we expect to take account of the interests of the South Vietnamese Government and of our Manila allies. Participation in any such discussions affecting South Viet-Nam must not exclude the Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam.

#### 5. Not Taking Advantage

We should seek to provide an adequate basis for the expectation that North Viet-Nam would not attempt to improve its military position as a result of the US cessation. North Viet-Nam should understand that the US would regard as acts of bad faith inconsistent with its restraints any such attempts. We would consider as examples of bad faith:

- a) Artillery or other fire from or across the DMZ.
- b) Ground attacks across the DMZ or the massing of additional forces or supplies in North Viet-Nam or the DMZ in a manner which poses a direct threat to Allied forces in South Viet-Nam.
- c) An increase in the movement of North Vietnamese troops and supplies into South Viet-Nam.

#### 6. Reconnaissance Flights

The US intends to continue certain reconnaissance flights, and the record should not preclude such flights.

Friday, April 5, 1968  
9:20 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Recognizing that the approach to Eshkol in the letter previously submitted to you was too general, Nick, Gene, and Luke Battle have produced a formulation which comes to bear much more precisely on an urgent operational question. The language which Eban said he could accept when Jarring gave it to him on March 10 if Hussein had accepted, is at Tab A.

The variation desired by Hussein to make it easier for him with Nasser involves the substitution for the bracketed passage (Tab A) of the phrase "their readiness to implement it." The Jordanians indicate they would try to go with the Jarring text even if the Israelis do not accept the phrase. Goldberg suggests it as an additional phrase. Goldberg and State believe in any case that the provision in the next sentence of the phrase "promoting agreement in achieving such a settlement" covers the Israeli position.

In any case, this draft merely urges Eshkol to "consider" this variation of language. The reasons your intervention at this point is regarded as critical are twofold:

-- there is an honest judgment that if we fail on this round -- now that Hussein has indicated that he is prepared to accept the Jarring March 10 formulation -- the Jarring mission will fail and we face a very bleak prospect;

-- the conviction that Eshkol simply will not move unless you personally take a position. He has ignored one intervention after another by Goldberg and the Secretary of State.

I have read the critical passage to Abe Fortas, who now thinks that your intervention might make sense since it is sharply focused on a particular question.

W. W. Rostow

Letter cleared \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-268  
By us, NARA Date 1-15-99



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLI 97-268  
By js, NARA Date 1-15-99

2a

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

MESSAGE TO ESHKOL

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have considered your message to March 22 with two thoughts uppermost in my mind: deep sympathy for the serious problems which continuing terrorist acts pose for your country; and deep anxiety about the prospects for peace in the Middle East.

I appreciate, of course, the dilemma which the recent growth of terrorism presents. I believe, however, that military action across cease-fire lines does not deter the type of terrorism you face, but leads to greater insecurity, above all at this critical moment.

We both recognize, I am sure, that true security for Israel lies only in peace.

I believe we are now at a crossroads in this respect in the Near East: the sole peace-making process now available is the Jarring Mission. I am deeply concerned by the lack of tangible results from this mission and the cumulative deterioration of the situation resulting from a growing incidence of terrorism and counter military actions -- especially at this delicate moment in the internal life of Jordan.

I feel, therefore, that there is an urgent need to reverse the present trend -- a trend which carries the risk not only of greater and greater violence and insecurity, but indeed of another round of general hostilities, as well as irreparable damage to the Jarring Mission. We wish to see every

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

-2-

possible step taken to minimize these risks.

There is very little time. There is still, however, an opportunity for an active strategy of peace. I have just learned of Ambassador Goldberg's discussion with Ambassador Tekeah of April 5. I believe that we must seize the opportunity presented by King Hussein's visit to Nasser, and the King's apparent willingness to urge acceptance of the formulation which Ambassador Jarring gave the Israeli Government on March 10. I understand that Foreign Minister Eban told Ambassador Jarring at that time that your Government could accept this formulation. I urge you most strongly to make your acceptance clear to Ambassador Jarring. The King believes it would greatly enhance the possibility of his success with Nasser if you could also agree to a variation in wording which Ambassador Goldberg set forth to Ambassador Tekeah. I hope you will be able to consider such a variation in language, as necessary.

This may be the last chance for the Jarring Mission, and for peace.

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~



tal-A

~~SECRET~~

-3-

as "implement by withdrawal."

Subsequently Tekoah (USUN 4389) gave Goldberg (in response to the latter's request), the following text of the Jarring formula as taken down by the Israelis at the time of Jarring's March 10 conversation with Eban:

The Governments of Israel and the UAR (or Jordan) have both indicated to me that they accept SC Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 for achieving a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Mideast question, and [intend to devise arrangements under my auspices for the implementation of the provisions of the resolution.] The two governments have expressed their willingness to cooperate with me in my capacity as a special representative in the discharge of my task of promoting agreement in achieving such a settlement. In view of the urgency of the situation, with a view to expediting efforts to reach a settlement, I have invited the two governments to meet with me for conferences within the framework of the SC resolution in (place). I have the pleasure to inform you that the two governments have responded favorably to this invitation.

March 14: Jarring met in Amman with Talhouni and Rifai.

According to the Jordanians (Amman 3839), Jarring stated that his mission was now stalled over the Israeli insistence upon negotiations and the UAR's insistence upon implementation of the resolution. The Jordanians said they did not see how "acceptance" could be detached from

~~SECRET~~

Formula  
Jarring  
gave  
Israel  
March 10

~~SECRET/CROCODILE~~

Friday, April 5, 1968 -- 9:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the first substantive word from Hanoi via Baggs and Ashmore.

1. It is not clear whether it crossed our message via Vientiane or is meant to by-pass it.

2. It lays down certain conditions but uses the conditional phrase "may be" -- which appears to leave the way for dickering.

3. It proposes Phnom Penh, but leaves the place open for further discussion. (Phnom Penh is bad for a GVN liaison officer.)

4. It sets the subject matter rather rigidly -- but that may be to keep their record clear of never having accepted formally San Antonio.

5. They do not appear to be in a very great hurry.

6. This is what we've done:

- Cabled Sullivan to tell Baggs and Ashmore to come to Washington.
- Asked him to see if he can get some of the "background."
- Scheduled a working level meeting tomorrow to analyze the message and next steps.

WWRostow:rla

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~/NODIS/CROCODILE

April 5, 1968

Copy of Vientiane 5650

1. Baggs and Ashmore have returned to Vientiane via ICC flight with Aide-Memoire from North Vietnamese which purports to represent latter's position with respect to "contacts" and "talks."

Text follows:

"The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has repeatedly protested against the U. S. action in illegally laying hold of civilians and military personnel on board fishing boats and freighters even in the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam demands that the United States stop all its arrogant acts, respect the sovereignty, territory, and security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and release immediately, unconditionally and without any need for an agreement between the two parties, all citizens of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam now being illegally detained.

As for the captured American pilots, they are regarded by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as guilty to the Vietnamese people. Acting upon orders from the U. S. Government, they have bombed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, an independent and sovereign country, killing civilians and destroying property of the Vietnamese people. However, in accordance with the humane and lenient policy of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, they have enjoyed good treatment. On the occasion of the last Tet festival, for the first time, three of the captured U. S. pilots were released in view of their correct attitude during their detention.

With regard to the "limited bombing" of North Vietnam announced by President Johnson, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam made clear its view in its April 3, 1968 statement.

The U. S. Government has not seriously and fully met the legitimate demands of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, of progressive American opinion and of world opinion. However, for its part, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declared its readiness to appoint its representative to contact the U. S. representative with a view to determining with the American side the unconditional cessation of the U. S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, so that the talks may start.

Details about the contact between the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States may be as follows:

The representative with Ambassadorial rank of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is ready to contact the representative of the U. S. Government.

The place of contact may be Phnom Penh or another place to be mutually agreed upon.

In the course of the contact, the U. S. side will specify the date when the unconditional cessation of the U. S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will become effective; then the two parties will reach agreement on the time, place and level of the talks.

Any interpretation of the point of view of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam at variance with the content of this Aide-Memoire is null and void. "

2. The Aide-Memoire was handed to them by Hoang Tung, editor of Nkan Dhan, with whom they had intensive talks for three days. It reflects distillation of "proposals" and "counter-proposals" made in the course of these talks.

3. Further details will follow by separate cables.

4. Baggs and Ashmore undertake to keep this entire matter secret. They are travelling from here to Phnom Penh on ICC plane tomorrow, will make connections there for Tokyo and Honolulu. Expect to arrive Honolulu via Pan Am 846 from Tokyo April 7. They wish to meet with Bundy there to debrief. Please arrange to meet and discreetly transport them to Bundy.

5. After Honolulu meeting, they will travel, if it is so desired, to Washington for meeting with Harriman.

6. It is their impression that Hanoi timetable is not, repeat not, too hurried. Of possible interest is fact that Nguyen Thoung, North Vietnamese Ambassador to Cambodia, travelled to Hanoi on tonight's plane. First possibility for him to return will be Friday, April 12.

7. Baggs wishes Bundy and Harriman to know that they have "large amount of interesting background" which they think will prove of value.

8. Collingwood also has some info which I will debrief tomorrow at breakfast.

Sullivan

###



ACTION

4

~~SECRET~~

Friday, April 5, 1968  
6:30 p. m.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-497  
By cb, NARA, Date 4-27-95

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have gone over carefully with Abe Fortas the situation on the Eshkol letter. We agree that that one can wait.

The letter to Hussein, on the eve of his departure for Cairo, might be a useful gesture. (Tab A).

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (*in response*)

**INFORMATION**

5

**Friday, April 5, 1968 - 6:25 pm**

*Pres file*

**Mr. President:**

**The earliest Sec. Rusk can be  
back is: 12:20 a.m. Monday morning.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**WWRostow:rla**





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520


5a

April 5, 1968

Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

Dear Walt:

The President asked Nick Katzenbach when the Secretary was getting home, and I am attaching a copy of his schedule. You will note he arrives at Andrews at 12:20 a.m. Monday morning. It is not possible to telescope this schedule much because of the twelve hour crew rest requirement in Honolulu.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

FLIGHT SCHEDULE

58

SEATO - Seven Nation - ANZUS Meetings  
March 30 - April 8, 1968

Variation from  
GMT (Hours)

Flying Time:

Saturday, March 30

10:30 a.m.	Depart Andrews	(- 5)	
1:00 p.m.	Arrive Travis Air Force Base		5 hrs., 30 mins
2:30 p.m.	Depart Travis	(- 8)	
6:00 p.m.	Arrive Honolulu	(-10)	5 hrs., 30 mins

Sunday, March 31

6:55 a.m.	Depart Honolulu	(-10)	
11:05 a.m.	Arrive Pago Pago	(-11)	5 hrs., 10 mins
12:35 p.m.	Depart Pago Pago		

(CROSS DATELINE)

Monday, April 1

4:00 p.m.	Arrive RNZAFB, Ohakea	(+12)	4 hrs., 25 mins
4:15 p.m.	Depart Ohakea		
5:00 p.m.	Arrive Wellington	(+12)	45 mins

Friday, April 5

3:00 p.m.	Depart Wellington	(+12)	
3:45 p.m.	Arrive Ohakea	(+12)	45 mins
4:10 p.m.	Depart Ohakea	(+12)	
5:45 p.m.	Arrive Canberra	(+10)	3 hrs., 35 mins

Sunday, April 7

7:00 a.m.	Depart Canberra	(+10)	
1:10 p.m.	Arrive Nandi, Fiji Islands	(+12)	4 hrs., 10 mins
2:40 p.m.	Depart Nandi	(+12)	

Saturday, April 6

10:50 p.m.	Arrive Honolulu	(-10)	6 hrs., 10 mins
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Sunday, April 7

10:50 a.m.	Depart Honolulu	(-10)	
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Monday, April 8

12:20 a.m.	Arrive Andrews	(- 5)	8 hrs., 50 mins
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ACTION

Friday, April 5, 1968  
6:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Ambassador Duke tells us that the Prime Minister of Guyana is coming to Dr. King's funeral on Monday. The Prime Minister of Jamaica may be coming. Many members of the diplomatic corps intend to go to Atlanta. The number we do not know. Duke estimates probably a half-dozen. Duke believes that State Department Protocol office should be represented in Atlanta at the highest level.

W. W. Rostow

Agree \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 92-497  
By cb, NARA, Date 4-27-95

7  
Friday, April 5, 1968  
6:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Nick informs me that he has conferred with Sect. Clifford and Sect. Clifford clears the draft instructions to Ambassador Harriman as presently written.

Bus Wheeler wanted "the examples of bad faith" made into conditions. But the two distinguished lawyers decided that it would be wiser for us to leave them as examples so that if the enemy thought up other actions of "bad faith" we would be free to react against them.

W. W. Rostow



~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 72-497  
By Cb, NARA, Date 4-27-95

Friday, April 5, 1968  
4:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

We are informed by our Ambassador in Jordan that there is a formula which, if accepted by Israel, would lead Hussein to go into negotiations with Israel via Jarring.

Goldberg will be talking with the Israeli Ambassador in New York;  
Barber will be talking to the Israeli Government tomorrow.

I am informed that everyone at State believes it would be enormously helpful if you could clear the letter to Eshkol (as well as the one to Hussein) as soon as possible so that we can fully exploit the chance of putting the Jarring mission on the road.

Everyone at State is conscious of the urgent problems on your mind; but they do not wish to lose the chance to save the Jarring mission.

W. W. Rostow

Friday, April 5, 1968  
12:45 p. m.

9  
✓

Mr. President:

Thru: Marvin Watson

Herewith Nick Katzenbach suggests  
that a special aircraft be made available  
to diplomats who may wish to attend  
Dr. King's funeral in Atlanta.

W. W. R.

Attachment

10  
**INFORMATION**

**Friday, April 5, 1968 -- 12:00 a.**

**Mr. President:**

**At a time when there is little  
amusing around us, I pass along to  
you this rather acute comment.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**WWRostow:rla**

*Pres file*



10a  
↑

003 APR 4 AM 0 32

WA134 PD NL

PORTLAND ORG 3

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

STRONGLY SUGGEST YOU SEND FULBRIGHT AND MORSE TO CONFERENCE  
TABLE WITH VIET CONG HOPEFULLY THEY WILL LEARN SOMETHING  
SCOTT CORBETT JR 6412 SOUTHEAST 29 AVE PORTLAND OREGON.

11  
**INFORMATION**

**Friday, April 5, 1968 -- 10:25 a.m.**

**Mr. President:**

**You may wish to read this suggestion  
on the race crisis from Henry Owen.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**cc: Joe Califano  
Harry McPherson**

**WWRostow:rlm**

*Pres file*

11a  
April 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Present Crisis

1. Proposal: The President (or the Vice President, if it is to be done in the next day or two) should speak to the nation on TV as follows:

-- We are at a turning point: The nation can either move toward increasing bitterness or reconciliation. Our reactions to Dr. King's death will make this choice, and the effects will be felt for a long time.

-- If the move is to be toward reconciliation, it must be made not only in our hearts but in our actions; this means not only restraint by those with grievance, but sacrifice by those who can redress the grievance.

-- Now is the time to make that sacrifice - to move toward economic justice in the wake of this tragedy, as we moved ahead toward political justice in the wake of Selma.

-- This administration intends to lead the way. The President is sending a Special Message to the Congress informing it of the results of the executive branch's review of the report of the President's Commission on Civil Disorders (which the President said, in his March 22 press conference, was underway and would be completed shortly). This review has led not only to acceptance of some of the 47 Commission recommendations which do not require additional appropriations (specify which ones) but also to a decision to ask the Congress for a few "high priority modest budget add-ons" (the language used, as I recall, in the President's March 22 press conference) to finance actions whose effect would be felt quickly, e.g., keeping ghetto schools open this summer. The sums involved are not so large as to break present fiscal ceilings, but they underscore the



need for prompt action on the proposed tax increase.

2. Rationale:

-- The word "crisis", in Chinese, is made up of the symbols which mean danger and opportunity. Dr. King's death poses both. The administration's response will have a lot to do with which prevails.

-- We can't avert the evident danger of growing bitterness and polarization merely by expressions of sorrow, proper these are. Words, alone, are at a high discount in the Negro community. On the TV news this morning, one moderate Negro leader after another said, in effect: "We need some quick action from the white community, if we're to hold our own against the militants."

-- Such action was taken after two other tragedies: The civil rights bill was passed in the wake of President Kennedy's death, and the voting rights bill was passed after Selma. In each case, the administration moved promptly; the President's post-Selma speech to a joint session of the Congress was one of the finest moments in American political history.

-- The present national mood of shock and sorrow provides the opportunity to act again - for the nation to to express that mood in concrete sacrifice. The chances of a favorable reaction may be greater than at any time in the recent past; even people who didn't like Dr. King or sympathize with his grievances (and there are many) will be ashamed to speak their minds for a few days. The mere fact of the administration making this plea to the Congress would be an effective signal to moderates in the black community that help was on the way.

3. Timing: This course only makes sense if it can be followed quickly - before the national mood passes. Two options are open:

(a) The President could give the speech immediately

after his return from Hawaii - in which case it would be well to announce now that this will be done.

(b) The Vice President could give the speech tonight or tomorrow, speaking by direction of the President, and announcing that the President will send or deliver a follow-up Message to the Congress immediately upon his return.

<sup>to</sup>  
Henry Owen

12  
**INFORMATION**

~~SECRET~~

Friday, April 5, 1968 -- 9:30 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Khe Sanh-DMZ-A Shau:

- 18 rounds enemy;
- 2,403 rounds friendly;
- 176 tactical support sorties  
plus 36 B-52's;
- 129.5 tons resupply;
- weather favorable.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRestow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 4-27-92

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 2.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1968  
By rg, NARA, Date 4-27-92



~~SECRET~~

12a

Friday, April 5, 1968, 9:30 a.m.

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number sixty-one on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ/A Shau Valley for the 24-hour period of April 4, 1968.

Khe Sanh weather on April 4 was low overcast with fog until 11:00 a.m. when ceilings improved to 3,000 feet. Conditions remained favorable up to 9:00 p.m., when ceilings and visibility lowered to near 500 feet and 2 miles, respectively. These conditions continued through 9:00 a.m. this morning. A similar pattern with slight improvement is predicted for today.

Resupply for the reporting period amounted to 129.5 short tons. In addition, 44 passenger replacements were landed. Eight C-130 and four C-123 aircraft conducted airdrops. One C-123 aircraft and 17 helicopters landed and delivered cargo and passengers. The stock levels of supplies are considered to be adequate.

The enemy fired a total of 18 rounds at Khe Sanh Combat Base yesterday; 11 artillery and seven mortar. There were no friendly casualties.

Operation Pegasus action included an attack to the southeast out of Khe Sanh Combat Base yesterday by the 1st Battalion 9th Marines. A heavy artillery preparation preceded the attack and 30 North Vietnamese Army bodies were found during the assault. The objective, two kilometers south, was taken without contact. However, heavy enemy shelling during the night killed seven Marines and wounded 34 others (31 evacuated). Friendly casualties in Operation Pegasus for the reporting period were 20 killed and 138 wounded (93 evacuated). Thirty-nine enemy were killed, seven individual and two crew-served weapons captured.

Elsewhere in Quang Tri Province, Task Force Kilo continued to sweep south from the DMZ toward the Song Bo Deiu river. There have been no contacts to date.

Artillery fire support in the Pegasus area during the period of April 3rd and 4th consisted of 197 missions expending 2,403 rounds. Forty missions were observed. Data on total missions fired yesterday is incomplete. However, one mission fired 78 rounds of 105mm COFRAM at troops in the open one kilometer southwest of Khe Sanh. Observer reported rounds on target with unknown results.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/88

By 18 NARA, Date 5-13-92

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988

By 18 NARA, Date 5-13-92

A total of 176 tactical air sorties were flown in support of Operation Pegasus. Of these, sixty-two strikes were in the immediate vicinity of Khe Sanh. One secondary explosion, one secondary fire and seven road cuts were observed.

Six ARC LIGHT strikes (36 sorties) supported Operation Pegasus and Khe Sanh. One secondary explosion was observed. Two secondary explosions were reported for the period of April 2nd and 3rd. Two strikes (12 sorties) are scheduled for today.

Two radar missions in the A Shau Valley reported no significant activity.

~~SECRET~~



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

128  
5 April 1968  
0600 EST

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST  
4 April (9:00 AM 5 April, SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)  
status as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>DAYS SUPPLY ON HAND</u>	<u>PREVIOUS STATUS 8:00 PM 3 Apr EST (9:00 AM 4 Apr SVN)</u>
<u>CLASS I (Rations)</u>		
Meal, Combat, Individual	21	21 days
B Rations	9	7 days
<u>CLASS III (Fuel)</u>		
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	3	3 days
JP-4 Fuel (Jet Fuel)	10.6	10.6 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	9.4	10.2 days
Diesel	24.3	22.4 days
<u>CLASS V (Ammunition)</u>		
A. High Explosive		
60-mm mortar	61	62 days
81-mm mortar	29	30 days
90-mm (tank)	68	68 days
4.2" mortar	28	28 days
105-mm howitzer	31	21 days
155-mm howitzer	30	31 days
B. Antitank		
		<u>ROUNDS ON HAND</u>
90-mm AP-T		254
90-mm HEAT		1,089
66-mm rocket (LAW)		2,197
Antitank mines (M-15)		349
Antitank mines (M-19)		469
Antitank mines (M-21)		32
106-mm HEAT		1,533
106-mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T)		1,455
3.5" rocket		2,323

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1968

By *kg* NARA Date *4-27-92*



~~SECRET~~

C. Antipersonnel

ROUNDS ON HAND


90-mm BEEHIVE	542
105-mm BEEHIVE	1,090
106-mm BEEHIVE	1,456
90-mm CANNISTER	323

CLASS V (COFRAM)

105-mm howitzer	1,684
155-mm howitzer	990
40-mm grenade launcher	6,729
Hand grenades	2,945

2. On 4 April, Khe Sanh was resupplied with 129.5 short tons as follows:

CLASS I	23
CLASS II	7.5
CLASS III	17.5
CLASS IV	32
CLASS V	47
Miscellaneous	2.5

  
S. D. CRAMER, JR.  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:

SECDEF  
DEPSECDEF  
CJCS (3)  
DJS (3)  
J-30  
J-31  
J-32  
J-33  
J-34  
J-4  
AWR  
MCCC  
AFCP  
NFP  
DDO  
ADDO  
CCOC  
PAC DESK

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, April 5, 1968 - 8:35 am

Mr. President:

Herewith a supportive message  
for Mrs. Gandhi.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

New Delhi 12386

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993  
By 126, NARA, Date 4/27/92

L AHCE076 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13a  
EXDIS

PAGE 01 NEW DE 12386 051134Z

RECEIVED  
UNICA

17  
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

1968 APR 5 11 46

O 051037Z APR 68  
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4415

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NEW DELHI 12386

EXDIS

1. TEXT OF MESSAGE SENT BY PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON WHICH WILL PROBABLY BE DELIVERED THROUGH INDIAN EMBASSY.
2. QUOTE DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,
3. QUOTE MAY I EXPRESS OUR WARM APPRECIATION OF THE COURAGEOUS AND IMPORTANT INITIATIVE WHICH YOU HAVE TAKEN IN YOUR ANNOUNCEMENT OF MARCH 31, REGARDING PEACE IN VIETNAM AND SOUTH EAST ASIA? I PARTICULARLY WELCOME YOUR REMARKS THAT THERE IS NO NEED FOR THIS WAR TO CONTINUE, THERE IS NO NEED

~~PAGE 2 RUSSAE 12386 CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO DELAY THE TALKS, THAT YOUR ANNOUNCEMENT INVOLVES ONLY THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE DE-ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT AND EVEN THE LIMITED BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM WOULD COME TO AN EARLY END. I AM ALSO GLAD THAT YOU HAVE NOMINATED AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN ASSISTED BY AMBASSADOR THOMPSON TO TALK WITH HANOI. YOUR STATEMENT THAT PEACE CAN BE BASED ON THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954 CORRESPONDS TO OUR OWN VIEWS.

4. QUOTE 2. WE SHARE YOUR ANXIETY AND CONCERN FOR PEACE. WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE DIFFICULTIES THAT EXIST. THESE CAN BE OVERCOME WITH COURAGE, FAITH AND HUMANITY.
5. QUOTE 3. WE ARE HEARTENED BY THE FACT THAT THE RESPONSE FROM HANOI HAS BEEN POSITIVE. WE SINCERELY HOPE THAT IT WILL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-268

By is, NARA Date 1-15-99





DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-285  
By ju, NARA, Date 9-17-92

INFORMATION <sup>14</sup>

**SECRET**

Friday, April 5, 1968 -- 8:30 a.m. *Pres file*

Mr. President:

This, in my judgment, is the message Bunker and Westy should take back to Saigon.

1. U. S. objectives in Vietnam and Southeast Asia remain unchanged: re-install Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and permit self-determination by South Vietnamese.

2. If Hanoi is ready to negotiate, these objectives are achievable if two conditions are satisfied:

- The U. S. and GVN stay closer than ever together;
- The non-Communist South Vietnamese rally and unite.

3. Militarily, we must be prepared to have an effective talk-and-fight strategy. This is more possible than in Korea, because we have the capacity, working together, to improve our position on the ground while negotiations proceed. A campaign plan to this end should be developed. It should include a plan to position U. S. and allied forces at optimum points if a cease-fire should appear likely of negotiation.

4. Politically, the three essentials are these:

-- The government and people of South Vietnam should know the U. S. will negotiate a settlement with the GVN as a partner -- not over its head. We may not agree on every detail at every point; but we shall consult closely and regularly.

-- If negotiations start, the GVN, with our help, should mount a psywar campaign against the Viet Cong on these themes:

- Hanoi is abandoning the South;
- now is the time to come over to the government side and join in the life of the constitutional government.

-- Above all, it is essential that all non-Communist elements begin to form a working political party to guarantee victory over a Communist-dominated popular front in elections that are bound to come sooner or later.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

The U. S. commitment to South Vietnam is one-man, one-vote, not the extermination of all Communists. It is up to the South Vietnamese to convert that commitment into victory.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

*Per file 15*

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Friday, April 5, 1968 -- 7:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

This intercepted instruction to cease firing artillery at the DMZ may (or may not) be the first response to San Antonio.

We shall follow it closely.

It is coupled, in today's intelligence, with indications of possible imminent attack at Quang Tri, Hue, and Danang, plus continued intensive efforts elsewhere. It would make sense for them to hurry up attacks in the coastal cities while major U.S. forces are relieving Khe Sanh.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLS-141.021.033/1  
By je, NARA, Date 10-30-09

WWRostow:vin

15a

In the eastern DMZ area, an unidentified PAVN artillery-associated element received a message from another unidentified PAVN artillery-associated element on 3 April which stated, "According to H1," a designator associated with the DMZ Front, "we are not to fire anymore." Additionally, an unidentified element of the possible 164th Artillery Regiment was directed on 4 April to inform a personality identified as "the commander" to be present at the Front on that date.

-5-

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority 11LJ.141.521.033/2  
By je, NARA, Date 10-30-09



ACTION

Friday - April 5, 1968

16  
*Leung*  
*2. Pres file*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Annual Report of the Inter-American Development Bank**

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has sent you a copy of their 1967 report on economic and social progress made in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress.

I recommend you send Dr. Herrera the attached letter of acknowledgement.

W. W. Rostow

**Attachment**

**Suggested Presidential letter to Dr. Herrera.**

16a

APR 5 1968

Dear Dr. Herrera:

I appreciate your sending me the Inter-American Development Bank's Report for 1967 on Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America. Knowing the tremendous needs of our hemisphere, we can not be satisfied with the progress made. But the gains give us confidence in the ultimate success of our common efforts under the Alliance for Progress.

I was especially pleased to note the advances in improving living conditions of the people of Latin America through more food, potable water and sewerage, housing and education. I commend you particularly for the analysis made in the Report on higher education in Latin America.

The Bank continues to provide leadership to the physical integration movement in the Hemisphere. Latin American integration will be the principal theme of the forthcoming meeting of the Board of Governors in Bogota, Colombia. The discussions will certainly strengthen the Bank's role in this important area. In view of the increasing attention to integration, you may wish to consider including the status of integration efforts in the Bank's annual report.

Experience continues to show the validity of relating external assistance to each country's efforts to mobilize effectively its domestic financial and human resources. I know of the Bank's interest in stimulating self-help efforts. I am sure it will increasingly emphasize overall country performance in its lending and relate assistance to self-help considerations, as well as the economic and technical soundness of each project.

During the past year we have made a good beginning in carrying out the action program approved by the Presidents at Punta

-2-

del Este. But the bulk of the task remains ahead of us. Your record of lending during 1967 gives me confidence that the Bank will continue to play an increasingly important role in the advance of the Alliance for Progress.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

The Honorable  
Felipe Herrera  
President  
Inter-American Development Bank  
Washington, D. C.

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm  
April 5, 1968



EXECUTIVE  
VICE PRESIDENT

INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20577

168

CABLE ADDRESS  
INTAMBANC

February 28, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to transmit to you, herewith, the Seventh Annual Report of the Social Progress Trust Fund, which has been prepared pursuant to Section 5.04 of the Trust Agreement entered into by the Government of the United States and the Inter-American Development Bank on June 19, 1961, as amended by exchange of letters in October 1966.

This report, which has been approved by the Board of Executive Directors of the Bank contains a factual presentation of the measures taken in each of the Bank's Latin American member countries to implement the goals of the Act of Bogota and the Charter of Punta del Este. This presentation is made within the broad framework of the economic development of the region as a whole, and is complemented with a special study on "Higher Education in Latin America, present situation and outlook".

Respectfully yours,

T. Graydon Upton

C. 1

His Excellency  
Lyndon B. Johnson  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

17

April 5, 1968

*1. [signature]  
2. Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Message to Sato

In the attached memorandum, State (Under Secretary Katzenbach) urgently recommends that you send a letter to Sato. A suggested text is attached at Tab A.

The Japanese Prime Minister is under great heat at the present moment. He is being charged with too close attachment to U. S. policies and actions. He may be in danger of losing leadership of his party.

He wishes to send a personal representative to Washington to meet with you and other officials. In part, he would come to discuss the import surcharge problem. But he would also need to receive an authoritative description of our policies in Viet-Nam and Asia and reassurance regarding their continuity.

I strongly recommend that you approve this approach and inform Sato of your willingness to receive his representative.

W. W. Rostow

WJJ:mlc

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-91  
By sig, NARA Date 12-12-96

17a  
APR 5 1968

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your moving message of April 5, which I have just received.

Ambassador Johnson has also reported to me your suggestion that you send a trusted Minister to Washington in the immediate future for broad discussions of our common economic problems and also of the situation in Vietnam and Asia.

I welcome this suggestion and would be delighted to meet with such a representative. He should, of course, also see Secretary Rusk and others in authority.

Let me take the occasion to assure you that our purpose in Vietnam remains an honorable and lasting peace. You need have no doubt that we shall continue the policies that I and my predecessors have followed in supporting peace, security, and economic development in Asia. I am convinced that these policies have the deep backing of the American people and will continue with whomever my successor will be.

I need hardly add that I deeply appreciate the spirit in which you and I have always been able to work together, and look forward to our continuing a relationship fruitful for both our countries and for the wider cause of peace in Asia. Our commitments to Japan and other nations remain steadfast.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency  
Eisaku Sato  
Prime Minister of Japan  
Tokyo

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-91  
By sig NARA Date 12-12-96

**April 4, 1968**

**Mr. President:**

**Subject: Birthday Greetings to President  
Thieu**

**April 5 is President Thieu's birthday. It  
is particularly appropriate that he receive  
a personal greeting at this time.**

**A suggested message is attached.**

**W. W. Rostow**

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DRAFTED BY:TEXT REC'D FROM WHITE HOUSE  
APPROVED BY:S/S-O:H.L.HEYMANN  
WHITE HOUSE:MR.ROSTOW  
EA/VN:MR.BURKE

*Pres file*

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 9358

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PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT THIEU:

QUOTE: I SEND MY WARMEST REGARDS AND BEST PERSONAL WISHES  
ON THE OCCASION OF YOUR BIRTHDAY. YOUR DETERMINATION TO  
KEEP YOUR PEOPLE FREE AND TO MAKE YOUR COUNTRY STRONG IS  
AN INSPIRATION TO ALL FREE MEN. I LOOK FORWARD TO WELCOMING  
YOU HERE WHEN THE DEMANDS OF YOUR HEAVY RESPONSIBILITIES  
PERMIT. LYNDON B. JOHNSON. UNQUOTE

THE WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT INTEND TO RELEASE THIS MESSAGE,  
BUT HAS NO OBJECTION SHOULD GVN WISH TO DO SO. KATZENBACH

PAGE 2 RUENC 142428 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

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19

INFORMATION

SECRET

Thursday, April 4, 1968 -- 6:30 pm

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

I have talked with Clark Clifford.

He tells me that Bus Wheeler has some minor suggestions on the Harriman draft instructions. He recommends that you hear Wheeler's views before finally clearing.

W. W. Rostow  
(dictated over phone)

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 6/2/92

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 91-285  
By ju, NARA, Date 9-17-92

20  
INFORMATION  
*Pres file*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, April 4, 1968 -- 5:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

I am making these draft instructions to Gov. Harriman available to you before your meeting scheduled at 6:00 p.m.

It is possible you will wish to discuss them with Gov. Harriman; but I do not recommend final clearance of them at the present time.

Clearance in the next day or so may be necessary, however, since it is conceivable that Harriman will be on his way before you return from Honolulu.

You should be aware of the following:

-- As a possible maximum position, Sec. Rusk has recommended that we ask for withdrawal from the northern provinces of South Vietnam of the North Vietnamese divisions presently there;

-- The three "examples of bad faith" in paragraph 5 were cleared by a staff member of the Joint Staff. I am checking with Clark Clifford to make sure that he and Bus Wheeler personally have cleared them.

I recommend that you discuss this on the way out: There may even be wisdom in discussing them with Ellsworth and Westy before we give a final go ahead.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

4/4/68  
20a

INSTRUCTIONS FOR GOVERNOR HARRIMAN

Basic Objective

To achieve an understanding with the North Vietnamese representative on a cessation of bombing in the North and arrangements for prompt and serious substantive talks under circumstances which would not be military disadvantageous. Such understanding to be within objectives defined below.

Specific Objectives

1. Cessation of the Bombing

The US is prepared to agree to a cessation of naval, air and artillery bombardment of North Viet-Nam. In keeping with North Vietnamese statements, it is our understanding that such action on our part will lead promptly to talks in which both sides would be free to raise any elements which they believe would lead to a peaceful settlement. We are prepared in these talks to make arrangements to this end, including agreement on announcement of bombing cessation and subsequent talks.

2. Prompt Talks

Substantive talks should be held within 3 to 7 days following the cessation of bombing.

3. Serious Talks

We should seek explicit confirmation by the North Vietnamese that any topic relevant to the substance of peace could be raised in the substantive talks.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-436  
By fw, NARA, Date 7-28-93

#### 4. Participants

In any substantive discussions we expect to take account of the interests of the South Vietnamese Government and of our Manila allies. Participation in any such discussions affecting South Viet-Nam must not exclude the Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam.

#### 5. Not Taking Advantage

We should seek to provide an adequate basis for the expectation that North Viet-Nam would not attempt to improve its military position as a result of the US cessation. North Viet-Nam should understand that the US would regard as acts of bad faith inconsistent with its restraints any such attempts. We would consider as examples of bad faith:

- a) Artillery or other fire from or across the DMZ.
- b) Ground attacks across the DMZ or the massing of additional forces or supplies in North Viet-Nam or the DMZ in a manner which poses a direct threat to Allied forces in South Viet-Nam.
- c) An increase in the movement of North Vietnamese troops and supplies into South Viet-Nam.

#### 6. Reconnaissance Flights

The US intends to continue certain reconnaissance flights, and the record should not preclude such flights.



21  
*Pres file*

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 4, 1968  
3:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

You might be interested in  
Chiang Kai-shek's anxious reaction  
to your Sunday speech.

W. W. Rostow

Taipei 2668

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 4-27-92

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 92-189

By ju/ju NARA, Date 4-10-97

21a

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 4, 1968

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR MCCONAUGHY (Taipei 2668)

Here follows a memcon of the most significant portions of my conversation with President Chiang on April 3 at the Gimo's residence. The meeting was called at the Gimo's request, and the Gimo had indicated he wished to talk about President Johnson's speech of March 31. Foreign Minister Wei Tao-Ming, Deputy Chief of Mission Hummel, and an interpreter were also present.

I began by saying I would, if the Gimo wished, outline several points concerning the background of President Johnson's decision to institute a de-escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam. Most but not all had been conveyed to the Foreign Minister earlier. The Gimo indicated he would like to hear these points, and I gave a detailed exposition of about a dozen basic points on this subject, drawn from the department's guidance telegrams.

The Gimo said he appreciated my exposition. He said he had listened carefully, and had just that day read the full text of President Johnson's speech. He felt that President Johnson's announcement on the Vietnam war constituted a historic declaration of the greatest significance. He believed that for President Johnson and for the United States this time is the best time to make such a pronouncement on Vietnam. He said he really had nothing to add, except to say that under the conditions surrounding President Johnson, his decision to reduce the level of hostilities seemed to be reasonable and good.

The Gimo then said that what concerned him more was President Johnson's statement that he would not seek and would not accept nomination for another term as President. He said he considered this to be of the highest importance, and he had strong misgivings about it. He said his reason was that in the world today there are many difficulties, not only in Vietnam but in many areas throughout the whole world. If President Johnson is not re-elected, who will clean up the mess? The world is likely to become even more troubled and disturbed. In his personal view, and thinking of all the personalities in the US political arena, he could not think of anyone who could handle matters in a time of national and international emergency as well as President Johnson. It was

SECRET

difficult to imagine anyone being able to do the job President Johnson is doing. This is a time of extremely critical and intractable problems around the world and the United States also has internal difficulties. If President Johnson does not run for another term, those people around the world who are trying to deal with the critical problems will find themselves bewildered, confused, and uncertain of their leadership.

The Gimo emphasized that many things could be said of the declaration not to run again, but a major point is that the people and the government of South Vietnam and especially the Vietnamese troops will have their confidence shattered. On the other hand, Communists the world over will have their morale lifted, and will make bold to try what they wish all around the world. The Gimo said he had fully understood what I had said earlier about the United States taking precautions, and not letting down its guard, but he felt that both South Vietnamese and US troops will find it hard to maintain their confidence if President Johnson is not going to run for another term. They will not know what to think, and the situation in South Vietnam is likely to deteriorate. This is a very important psychological factor, since although President Johnson will continue as President for another ten months, now that he has announced he will not run again, many people will lose hope. He said that in his view the Vietnam war would become progressively more difficult, and the United States should be prepared for an expansion of Communist aggression. He realized that President Johnson had thought long and hard before making his decision not to run, but the Gimo believed that the world situation would become more difficult. He said he had no comment to add on President Johnson's first declaration, on Vietnam, but he wished the second declaration, about not running again, had not been made. Many people had hoped that even if the Vietnam war does not end this year, President Johnson could find a way to end it next year. They now will feel that an honorable peace is not possible, and this sort of thinking will spread in many areas, including Korea, South Vietnam and Thailand, where people will become increasingly worried. The first declaration is a very important historic move, but "as a friend and ally" the Gimo urged that the United States strengthen its preparedness in Vietnam and elsewhere.

The Gimo closed his presentation with a request that his views be conveyed to President Johnson, along with his best regards, and his admiration. He also referred to Secretary Rusk with sentiments of warmth and esteem. I said I would certainly convey the Gimo's views in full to the President and the Secretary. I said I knew that President Johnson would be greatly touched and moved by the evidence of the Gimo's great confidence and high regard. I was sure that President Johnson would want me to say that the President cannot share the Gimo's view of the dire consequences of his decision not to run again. The President would surely feel that the next President would certainly follow in the best traditions of United States history, and would pursue wise policies. No man

can be considered absolutely indispensable, and in times of crisis our people and their leaders have always risen to the occasion. If President Johnson had not felt that the great cause would continue to be upheld at home and abroad, he would not have made his declaration.

The Gimo said that of course President Johnson must have felt that way. However, speaking perhaps not as a representative of world opinion, but certainly as a representative of most of the people of Asia, he said he believed the future course of the world would be decided in the next few years, and if President Johnson could have continued for nearly five more years, many achievements would have been possible. During these five decisive years if the President does not have the same courage, spirit, wisdom, resolution and ways of thinking as President Johnson has had, it will be very bad for the whole world. The Gimo said (characteristically) that he might be wrong in his assessment, but he felt that his record of prognostication had been a good one.

I said I could not but share the Gimo's sense of shock and regret at the President's decision. When I promised to convey his message, I did not try to conceal that I was affected by his earnestness and depth of conviction.



22  
INFORMATION

**SECRET**

Thursday, April 4, 1968  
2:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Porter suggests golf  
on Sunday with Park.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

Secul 5481

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guid. # 1, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 4/27/92



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

W /d

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N O D I S

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR ACTING SECRETARY

THOSE ARRANGING PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE WITH  
PRESIDENT PARK ON SUNDAY MIGHT WISH TO HAVE IN MIND  
FACT THAT PARK HAS TAKEN UP GOLF AND IS MODERATE  
DUFFER. CERTAINLY, NINE HOLES OF GOLF WITH PRESIDENT  
JOHNSON WOULD BE VERY PLEASANT EXPERIENCE FOR HIM.

GP-4. PORTER  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By ing, NARS, Date 6-13-80

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

23

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 4, 1968  
2:15 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith, as usual, Gen. Taylor produces a lucid and cogent memo on the first phase of the negotiations with Hanoi.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993  
By rg, NARA, Date 4/27/92

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

23a

~~SECRET~~

April 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Coming Meeting with the Hanoi Representatives

At your luncheon yesterday, I was impressed by the need to reach a prompt decision among ourselves as to the purpose and scope of the coming meeting with the Hanoi representatives. They are likely to arrive determined to limit the discussion narrowly to agreement as to "the unconditional cessation of bombing and all other war acts by the U.S. against the DRV." In my opinion, it should be our primary objective to verify the likelihood of "prompt" and "productive" negotiations in any second round of substantive negotiations during which the enemy would not take advantage of the suspension of bombing--i.e., check the likelihood of compliance with the San Antonio formula. Not only is it important that we explore these points before we become trapped in a cessation of bombing, but it is to our interest to accomplish as much preliminary work as possible in this first meeting when our opponents are still under the pressure of the present level of bombing. We can afford more foot-dragging here than would be tolerable in a follow-on negotiation with bombing suspended. In the light of these considerations, the agenda of the meeting should include the following:

a. An understanding as to what actions would cease if the U.S. accedes to the Hanoi demands. Our side should make clear that in agreeing to stop "other acts of war" we will not include unarmed reconnaissance of North Viet-Nam or attacks against targets at sea or on land outside of the limits of North Viet-Nam which are related to infiltration or other aspects of the war in South Viet-Nam.

b. A verification of the promptness and likely productiveness of follow-on negotiations. To make such a verification, our negotiators should obtain agreement as to the date, place and attendance of the next meeting. Furthermore, they should seek agreement as to the agenda because we know from past experience that debate over this subject as well as that of the attendance could be dragged out interminably if not agreed to in advance. Furthermore, it is impossible to form a judgment of probable productiveness of talks unless we know in advance the subjects which will be addressed.

c. A unilateral statement of what we mean by our assumption that during these talks "Hanoi will not take advantage of our restraint." In the course of this unilateral declaration, we should also make clear that we are not going to tolerate foot-dragging in the follow-on negotiations and that we are resolved in such a case to break off discussions and to resume full scale bombing.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 89-70

By delly, NARA, Date 5-15-92



If you accept the foregoing outline as the desired agenda for the first meeting, then it seems to me very important to reach an agreement within our own family on the following points which are presently unresolved:

a. Where and when do we wish the follow-on negotiations to take place?

b. What is our preferred agenda for the follow-on negotiations?

With regard to the latter point, it is my view that the agenda of the follow-on negotiations should include the following topics:

a. Mutual agreement to cease reinforcements from outside South Viet-Nam.

b. The conditions governing the eventual withdrawal of foreign forces.

c. Disposition of the Viet Cong. This is likely to be the hardest point to negotiate since it includes such matters as the amnesty arrangements permitting their return to South Vietnamese society and political life, the subsequent participation of the Viet Cong in the political life of South Viet-Nam, provision for the economic resettlement of the Viet Cong and the removal of those so desiring to North Viet-Nam.

d. The conditions for a cease-fire. It is important, I think, to hold this item to last since it, in itself, is as difficult to negotiate as all the foregoing items. However, the cease-fire arrangements should be made easier if both parties know how they have come out in the agreements on the preceding points which constitute the political settlement.

Since the coming meeting with Hanoi representatives is likely to be the prelude to the follow-on substantive negotiations and since the ground work for the latter must be laid in the former, it seems to me very important that a single negotiating team with the same leader represent our side at both meetings. As this will be the most important diplomatic encounter since Panmunjom where the war may be won or lost, we need the best talent in the country on the negotiating team and a very able, tough chief negotiator thoroughly conversant with the ramifications of the Viet-Nam situation to head it. Clark Clifford, Cy Vance or possibly Alex Johnson would seem to me to meet these requirements.

*M.D.2.*  
M. D. T.

24

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

*from file*

Thursday, April 4, 1968 -- 2:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick's briefing note on Ales Bebler, who comes in to see you today at 5:30 p.m.

If Bebler stays with his proposal in the second paragraph, you might explain firmly to him why you cannot accept a total bombing pause without reciprocal military action from the other side.

You will note that Nick recommends you see Averell after the Bebler appointment, since Harriman may be leaving to meet the North Vietnamese before you return from Honolulu, if they accept our proposed date of April 8.

Harriman would like your personal guidance. I believe it important that you tell him that you agree that the South Vietnamese cannot have a veto over our positions; but the possibility of our getting an outcome consistent with U. S. interests hinges in part on the most intense military and political cooperation with the South Vietnamese in a fight-and-talk situation; that Hanoi is undoubtedly counting on divisions between the U. S. and Saigon; and that you want the fullest consultation with the GVN -- and respect for their views -- even if we should adopt, on occasions, different positions, or have to press them hard.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-436  
By *ju*, NARA, Date 7-28-93

WWRostow:rlm

~~SECRET~~

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24a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Ales Bebler

Ales Bebler, Yugoslav President of the International Federation of United Nations Associations, whom Tito reportedly has named his personal assistant for the problem of Viet-Nam, has completed talks in New Delhi and Moscow on his five nation proposal for starting Viet-Nam negotiations. You have agreed to see him, and Bebler was authorized to inform the Soviets of this.

Bebler's plan calls for the UK and USSR, as the two Geneva Co-chairmen, acting together with the three ICC states -- Canada, Poland, and India -- to convene a Geneva Conference to discuss a Viet-Nam peace settlement if (a) the US will stop the bombing, and (b) the five nations are able to secure prior agreement that North Viet-Nam will start negotiations within a brief stated time span. Bebler claims that the UK and Canada are favorable to his proposal and believes after his talks with the Indians that he has their general support also.

The Soviet reaction to the proposal has until recently been entirely negative. Two months ago the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade expressed to Bebler outright hostility to the plan, asserting that it was up to the Vietnamese to solve their problems. This Soviet position, however, sharply changed in early March when the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade inquired about the progress Bebler was making with his plan and said there would be no difficulty in his seeing Kosygin in Moscow.

~~SECRET-NO DIS~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4


NEJ 92-437

By lip, NARA, Date 5-24-93



Bebler's initial reception in Moscow, where he arrived March 21, was cool, and the first interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin proved to be totally sterile. However, in a second conversation with Firyubin on April 1, Bebler was given certain "observations" on the proposal and, moreover, was told that in the Soviet view Bebler's trip to Washington could serve a useful purpose. Shortly before departure from Moscow, Bebler had a meeting with Gromyko of greater length than he had anticipated and that meeting reconfirmed him in his intention to proceed at once to Washington. Bebler did not disclose the substance of his conversations with either Firyubin or Gromyko and is clearly saving this for Washington.

Hanoi's response of today has obviously overtaken Bebler's proposal, although the Soviet observations to him may well be relevant.

  
Acting Secretary

NOTE: Averell-Harriman will see Bebler at 3:00 p.m. and we will send a supplementary briefing paper with the essence of that conversation.

Averell will plan to accompany Bebler to your 5:30 meeting and will try to condense the time you need to spend with Bebler.

It will be highly desirable if you could see Averell after the Bebler appointment for a few minutes, since the date we have proposed to the DRV might mean that this would be Averell's last opportunity to receive guidance from you on the initial contacts.



INFORMATION

26

SECRET

Thursday, April 4, 1968  
12:40 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This is an important message  
from Bunker.

I commend, in particular, the  
marked passages on Thieu-Ky and the  
need for U.S.-GVN cooperation.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon Z912

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 16, NARA, Date 4-27-92



# Department of State

W 10 5  
TELEGRAM

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APRIL 4, 1968  
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~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 23912

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 76291-287

*Retour*

By sp/ry, NARA, Date 9-8-12

NODIS

DEPT PASS INFO PRIORITY BANGKOK CANBERRA MANILA SEOUL VIENTIANE  
WELLINGTON

REF : SAIGON 23900

1. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION WITH THIEU ACCOMPANIED BY  
BERGER, I GAVE HIM COPY OF WHITE HOUSE RESPONSE TO HANOI'S  
BROADCAST. HE ASKED WHAT SIGNIFICANCE WE ATTACH TO HANOI'S  
STATEMENT, TO WHICH I REPLIED:

A. CLEAR THERE HAS BEEN A CHANGE IN HANOI'S POSITION ON  
TALKS. UP TO NOW, THEY ABSOLUTELY OPPOSED UNTIL ALL BOMBING  
STOPPED, DEFINITELY AND FINALLY. NOW THEY ARE READY TO TALK  
EVEN IN ADVANCE OF CESSATION.

B. OUR NEXT STEP IS TO PROBE AND EXPLORE THESE INTEN-  
TIONS. I HAVE NO INFO AS WHERE AND WHEN.

C. THERE WILL BE NO RPT NO STOP IN BOMBING OR IN  
MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.

D. WE WILL KEEP HIM AND OUR OTHER ALLIES INFORMED ON  
RESULTS OF OUR TALKS.

2. THIEU SAID HIS "FIRST IMPRESSION" WAS THAT THIS WAS  
PROPAGANDA MOVE DESIGNED TO PUT US ON SPOT IN EYES OF U.S.  
AND WORLD OPINION AND THAT HANOI'S INTENTIONS IN THESE TALKS  
WOULD BE CONFINED TO NEGOTIATING FOR COMPLETE CESSATION OF  
BOMBING IN NORTH, WHILE THEY CONTINUE POLICY OF FIGHTING IN  
SOUTH AND INFILTRATING AND SUPPORTING SOUTH. THIS WOULD NOT  
RPT NOT BE ACCEPTABLE HERE.

3. I ASSURED HIM WE FULLY CONSCIOUS OF THIS, AND IF THAT IS  
ALL HANOI IS PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT OUR POSITION WAS VERY  
CLEAR. CESSATION OF ALL BOMBING IN NORTH WITHOUT OTHER STEPS  
BY HANOI TOWARD PEACE WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO US EITHER.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 23912, APRIL 4. NODIS

4. HE SAID HE WOULD BE MAKING STATEMENT, AND WAS THINKING ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:

A. IT SHOULD BE BRIEF--"THE SHORTER THE BETTER".

B. IT SHOULD NOT CONTAIN CONDITIONS.

C. IT SHOULD SAY SAIGON HAS ALWAYS BEEN READY TO HEAR WHAT OTHER SIDE HAS TO SAY.

D. IT WOULD REFER TO CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN US AND VN AS TALKS PROGRESSED.

5. THIEU SAID HE HAD TO BE VERY CAREFUL, AND SO DID WE IN OUR STATEMENTS. IF HIS PEOPLE GOT THE IDEA THAT WE WERE MOVING AHEAD WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THEM, THERE WOULD BE MOST SERIOUS TROUBLE IN COUNTRY AND FOR HIM. I ASSURED HIM WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT DO THAT AND WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT MADE THIS CLEAR.

6. BERGER SAID HANOI WOULD NOW TRY TO DIVIDE VN AND US, AND BOTH SIDES HAD TO BE VERY CAREFUL AND WORK IN CLOSEST COOPERATION. HE AGREED.

7. I SAID I WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO SAY SOMETHING TO PRESS HERE, AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF I COULD SEE WHAT HE INTENDED TO SAY BEFORE HE ISSUED HIS STATEMENT SO THAT WE WOULD BE IN HARMONY. HE AGREED.

8. I SAW KY SUBSEQUENTLY, AND WENT OVER SAME GROUND, AND HE WAS COOPERATIVE AS WELL. ONLY ADDITIONAL ITEMS IN THIS TALK WERE:

A. HANOI WOULD NOT RPT NOT TALK SERIOUSLY UNTIL LATER THIS YEAR, PROBABLY NOT UNTIL AFTER US ELECTIONS. MEANTIME THEY WOULD PRESS OFFENSIVE AND REENFORCE AND SUPPORT NLF IN ORDER TO BE IN STRONGEST POSSIBLE POSITION WHEN REAL NEGOTIATIONS START.

B. ESSENTIAL THAT SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND ALLIES FIGHT WITH UTMOST STRENGTH DURING TALKS SO THEY WILL BE IN STRONGEST POSITION WHEN REAL NEGOTIATIONS START.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 23912, APRIL 4. NODIS

C. ESSENTIAL SOUTH VIET-NAM SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE AND THAT MUST BE THIEU'S. WE WILL TALK TO MILITARY COMMANDERS.

D. THIEU MUST NOW SHOW HIS LEADERSHIP IN COUNTRY AND PULL ALL PEOPLE TOGETHER IN A SINGLE FRONT.

9. COMMENT: THIS COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE BY THIEU AND KY IS ONE OF OUR MOST PRECIOUS ASSETS AND MUST BE PRESERVED. THEY COULD HAVE REAL PROBLEMS, AND SO COULD WE, IF IDEA GOT AROUND THAT THEY WERE JUST A TAIL TO OUR DOG. I WANT TO IMPRESS ON EVERYONE IN WASHINGTON THAT IT IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT WE NOT ONLY KEEP THEM INFORMED BUT THAT WE CONSULT, SO THAT THEY HAVE SENSE OF PARTICIPATION. WE NEED NOT RPT NOT TELL THEM EVERYTHING, BUT AS MUCH AS WE CAN, AND FORM IS ALSO VERY IMPORTANT. THERE MUST NOT RPT NOT BE APPEARANCE OF UNILATERAL ACTION OR UNILATERAL STATEMENTS. WE ARE ENTERING PERIOD WHEN FEW EXTRA HOURS DELAY BEFORE MAKING STATEMENTS WILL PAY HANDSOME DIVIDENDS. I AM CONFIDENT WE CAN TAKE THEM ALONG WITH US AND MINIMIZE THEIR PROBLEMS IF WE ARE SENSITIVE TO THE REQUIREMENTS HERE.

BUNKER  
BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED BANGKOK CANBERRA MANILA SEOUL VIENTIANE  
WELLINGTON BY OC/T 4/4/68.

~~SECRET~~



INFORMATION

27

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 4, 1968 -- 12:35 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

You should read this CIA report on how Thieu really feels about Hanoi's response, including paragraph D -- his view of our negotiators. Thieu is clearly more anxious than he has revealed to Bunker. On the other hand (paragraph C), he seems determined to stand for his country.

In paragraph B he indicates a suspicion that we had a prior deal with Hanoi.

W. W. Rostow

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLI 97-270  
By is, NARA Date 4-28-98

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WWRostow:rlm

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INCA

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1968 APR 4 15 31

*Rostow*

*Mr Rostow - this  
is the report  
Mr Heins  
mentioned to you  
LN*

DLA229

\*\*\*\*\*

OO YEKADS

DE YEKADL 1361R 0951516

O 041515Z ZYK

FM CIA

TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM (FOR MR. ROSTOW)

ZEM

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BACKGROUND USE ONLY CITE

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 1 APRIL 1968

SUBJECT PRESIDENT THIEU'S COMMENTS ON PRESIDENT  
JOHNSON'S VIETNAM SPEECH

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (4 APRIL 1968) FIELD NO.

SOURCE



1. PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU CONVENED A MEETING OF ADVISERS AND STAFF MEMBERS ON THE MORNING OF 1 APRIL TO DISCUSS PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECH AND HIS ANNOUNCEMENT OF A PARTIAL SUSPENSION OF BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM. HE HAD BEFORE HIM A COPY OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH. AFTER ASKING FOR AND RECEIVING THE COMMENTS OF HIS AIDES ON THE SPEECH AND WHAT IT MEANT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN), THIEU VOICED HIS OWN REACTION:

A. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT HANOI WILL RESPOND FAVORABLY TO THE JOHNSON PEACE OFFER BECAUSE OF THE PRESSURE ON THE HANOI LEADERS FROM PEKING.

B. IF HANOI DOES RESPOND FAVORABLY AND COMES TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, IT WILL MEAN THAT ~~THE~~ RE WAS A PRIOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN NORTH VIETNAM (DRV) AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (USG). THE RECENT VISIT OF MAI VAN BO TO GENEVA WITH A MESSAGE FROM THE DRV TO THE SWISS GOVERNMENT REQUESTING DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION WAS AN EXAMPLE OF HANOI'S DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING IN CONNECTION WITH PEACE TALKS. ALSO, EVERYONE KNOWS THAT THE USG HAS A PERMANENT CONTACT WITH THE DRV IN ALGIERS.

C. THE GVN MUST ADOPT A WAIT-AND-SEE POSTURE. HE HIMSELF WILL PURSUE HIS PLAN FOR THE DRAFTING OF MORE KEN. THE GVN WILL SHOW THE WORLD THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARE DETERMINED TO FIGHT ALONE, IF NECESSARY.

~~D. HE IS UNHAPPY ABOUT BOTH OF THE NEGOTIATORS  
NAMED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON. AMBASSADOR AT~~

SANITIZED  
Authority NLS 97-271 & NLS 019-038  
By [signature], NARA, Date 11/17/02

PERKINS.

B. IF HANOI DOES RESPOND FAVORABLY AND COMES TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, IT WILL MEAN THAT THERE WAS A PRIOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN NORTH VIETNAM (DRV) AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (USG). THE RECENT VISIT OF MAI VAN BO TO GENEVA WITH A MESSAGE FROM THE DRV TO THE SWISS GOVERNMENT REQUESTING DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION WAS AN EXAMPLE OF HANOI'S DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING IN CONNECTION WITH PEACE TALKS. ALSO, EVERYONE KNOWS THAT THE USG HAS A PERMANENT CONTACT WITH THE DRV IN ALGIERS.

C. THE GVN MUST ADOPT A WAIT-AND-SEE POSTURE. HE HIMSELF WILL PURSUE HIS PLAN FOR THE DRAFTING OF MORE MEN. THE GVN WILL SHOW THE WORLD THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARE DETERMINED TO FIGHT ALONE, IF NECESSARY.

D. HE IS UNHAPPY ABOUT BOTH OF THE NEGOTIATORS NAMED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON. AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE HARRIMAN IS A GOOD NEGOTIATOR, BUT HE HAS SHOWN BY HIS PAST WORK AS A NEGOTIATOR WITH THE RUSSIANS DURING WORLD WAR II AND IN SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS THAT HE COMPROMISES TOO EASILY WITH THE RUSSIANS. THIEU IS ALSO CONCERNED FOR THE GVN'S FATE BECAUSE BOTH HARRIMAN AND AMBASSADOR THOMPSON WILL TAKE THE VIEW THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE GVN ARE UNCONSEQUENTIAL COMPARED WITH THEIR GOAL OF ATTAINING THE CONFIDENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USSR AND ASSURING COOPERATION BETWEEN IT AND THE USG, AS THEY DO ON ALL MAJOR INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS.

2. THIEU'S BROTHER, NGUYEN VAN KIEU, COMMENTED AFTER THE MEETING THAT THIEU IS GRAVELY CONCERNED OVER WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR THE GVN.

3. ☐ DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER) CINCPAC PACFLT A RPAC PACAF.

REP OR T CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/ NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GP-1

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INFORMATION

Thursday, April 4, 1968 -- 12:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

What about George Woods for Ambassador to the Philippines?

I have a vague impression that he would be willing to accept an Embassy.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla



INFORMATION

29

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 4, 1968  
9:50 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Khe Sanh-DMZ-A Shau:

- 132 enemy rounds;
- 136 tactical support sorties,  
plus 24 B-52's;
- 97 tons resupply;
- weather favorable.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

HW

rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
By rg NARA, Date 4-27-92

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By lg NARA, Date 4-27-92

SECRET

29a

Thursday, April 4, 1968, 9:23 a.m.

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number sixty on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ/A Shau Valley for the 24-hour period of April 3, 1968.

Yesterday at Khe Sanh, low clouds and fog persisted until early afternoon. Weather conditions remained favorable up to 5:00 p.m., when ceilings and visibility lowered to near 500 feet and one mile, respectively. These conditions continued until 9:00 a.m. this morning. A similar pattern is expected today with only slight improvement in conditions predicted.

Resupply for the reporting period amounted to 97 short tons. In addition 21 replacements were flown to Khe Sanh. Five C-130 and three C-123 aircraft conducted airdrops. Nine helicopters landed and delivered cargo and passengers.

The 1st Air Cavalry Division continued to build up artillery assets in the Operation Pegasus area of operation. Six 155mm and four 8 inch howitzers were displaced to a landing zone near Ca Lu. Currently there are 102 tubes supporting the Ca Lu - Khe Sanh complex with 39 additional 105mm howitzers and sixteen 175mm guns supporting from rock pile and Camp Carroll.

The enemy fired 75 artillery and 57 mortar rounds at Khe Sanh Combat Base yesterday. Ten Marines were wounded (one evacuated).

In Operation Pegasus, the 1st Cavalry Division continues attacks to the west of Ca Lu toward Khe Sanh. The 2nd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division, air assaulted to positions south east of Khe Sanh yesterday afternoon. Four kilometers south east of the base, Troop "A", 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, engaged 200 North Vietnamese Army in a trench complex with gunships. This engagement killed 20 North Vietnamese Army with no friendly losses.

Yesterday afternoon I visited landing zone stud and Khe Sanh. The morale of the troops is very high and they are eagerly assuming the offensive.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/88  
By 128 NARA, Date 5-13-92

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
By 128 NARA, Date 5-13-92

Elsewhere in Quang Tri Province, the 3rd Marine Division initiated Phase II of Task Force Kile (Phase I was the deception offensive northeast of Dong Ha). In Phase II the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, in coordination with the 2nd ARVN Regiment sweeps south from Gio Linh with final objectives along the Song Bo Dein river west of Dong Ha.

A total of 136 tactical air sorties were flown in support of Operation Pegasus. Of these, 46 were in the immediate vicinity of Khe Sanh. Three secondary explosions, damage of one trench, seven road cuts, and destruction of nine bunkers was observed.

Four ARC LIGHT strikes (24 sorties) supported Khe Sanh and Operation Pegasus. No secondary explosions were observed. Six missions are scheduled for today.

Aerial surveillance in A Shau included an early morning radar mission which showed one moving target indicator in the valley. An additional morning photo mission revealed the usual occupied anti-aircraft positions.

~~SECRET~~



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

4 April 1968  
0600 EST

298

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST  
3 April (9:00 AM 4 April, SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)  
status as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>DAYS SUPPLY ON HAND</u>	<u>PREVIOUS STATUS 8:00 PM 2 Apr EST (9:00 AM 3 Apr SVN)</u>
<u>CLASS I (Rations)</u>		
Meal, Combat, Individual	21	21 days
B Rations	7	6 days
<u>CLASS III (Fuel)</u>		
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	3	3 days
JP-4 Fuel (Jet Fuel)	10.6	10 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	10.2	11 days
Diesel	22.4	14 days
<u>CLASS V (Ammunition)</u>		
A. High Explosive		
60-mm mortar	62	48 days
81-mm mortar	30	31 days
90-mm (tank)	68	68 days
4.2" mortar	28	28 days
105-mm howitzer	21	22 days
155-mm howitzer	31	33 days
B. Antitank		
		<u>ROUNDS ON HAND</u>
90-mm AP-T		254
90-mm HEAT		1,089
66-mm rocket (LAW)		2,197
Antitank mines (M-15)		349
Antitank mines (M-19)		469
Antitank mines (M-21)		32
106-mm HEAT		1,543
106-mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T)		1,721
3.5" rocket		2,323

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988

By 28 NARA Date 4-27-92



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C. Antipersonnel

ROUNDS ON HAND


90-mm BEEHIVE	542
105-mm BEEHIVE	1,090
106-mm BEEHIVE	1,456
90-mm CANNISTER	323

CLASS V (COFRAM)

105-mm howitzer	1,684
155-mm howitzer	990
40-mm grenade launcher	6,729
Hand grenades	2,945

2. On 3 April, Khe Sanh was resupplied with 97 short tons as follows:

CLASS I	20
CLASS II	5
CLASS III	24
CLASS IV	13
CLASS V	23.5
Miscellaneous	2.5

  
S. D. CRAMER, JR.  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Deputy Director for  
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:

SECDEF  
DEPSECDEF  
CJCS (3)  
DJS (3)  
J-30  
J-31  
J-32  
J-33  
J-34  
J-4  
AWR  
MCCC  
AFCP  
NFP  
DDO  
ADDO  
CCOC  
PAC DESK

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 93-368

By cb, NARA, Date 5-12-95

30

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, April 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Supporting Assistance and P. L. 480 Programs for Korea

Attached is a Zwick-Gaud-Freeman request for your authority to provide Korea \$30 million of Supporting Assistance AID funds and to negotiate a \$72 million P. L. 480 local currency sales agreement (wheat, cotton and tallow). State and Treasury concur.

Our Supporting Assistance and P. L. 480 provide local currency for the support of Korea's military budget. The package proposed would provide virtually the same level of U.S. assistance as in the last fiscal year:

	Millions of dollars	
	<u>FY-1967</u>	<u>FY-1968</u>
Supporting Assistance	45	30
P. L. 480	54	72
Total	<u>99</u>	<u>102</u>

This reflects our policy of steady reduction in Supporting Assistance. The \$30 million level for FY 1968 is about half that of FY 1966 and \$15 million below that of FY 1967. These reductions are possible because of Korea's dramatic economic growth.

All AID funds would be tied to procurement in the United States and the list of commodities would be selected to ensure additionality. Secretary Fowler agrees that these procedures will assure a minimum adverse effect on the U.S. balance of payments.

Korea is specifically exempted from the provisions of the Conte-Long amendment. State and AID have reviewed Korean actions under the Symington amendment and have concluded that Korea is not diverting U.S. development assistance of P. L. 480 sales to military purposes, nor is Korea diverting its own resources to military expenditures, to a degree which materially interferes with its development. Korean GNP grew by 8.5 % last year and is expected to continue strong this year.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Secretary Freeman is on a trade promotion trip in East Asia and will be in Korea on April 6. He hopes it may be possible for him to sign for the United States while there.

I recommend that you approve the Supporting Assistance and P. L. 480 Programs and that you authorize either Secretary Freeman or Ambassador Porter to sign the Agriculture Commodities Agreement for the United States.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

AJ:mm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-368

By CB, NARA, Date 5-12-95

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

APR 1 1968

30a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Supporting Assistance and P. L. 480 Programs for Korea

Bill Gaud and Secretary Freeman request your authority to provide Korea \$30 million of Supporting Assistance AID funds and to negotiate a \$72 million P. L. 480 local currency sales agreement (wheat, cotton and tallow).

Our Supporting Assistance and P. L. 480 provide local currency for the support of Korea's military budget. A letter of understanding with the Korean Government last September indicated our willingness to provide local currency up to \$66 million (dollar equivalent) for CY 1968, a decline from \$91 million last year. The assistance package proposed will provide virtually the same level of U. S. assistance as last fiscal year.

	Millions of dollars	
	<u>FY 1967</u>	<u>FY 1968</u>
Supporting Assistance	45	30
P. L. 480	<u>54</u>	<u>72</u>
Total	99	102

The amount in excess of this year's military requirements will be used to meet U. S. expenditures in Korea and to finance part of our support for Korea's 1969 military budget.

Balance of Payments

All AID funds would be tied to procurement in the U. S. The list of commodities will be selected to assure additionality. Secretary Fowler agrees that these procedures will assure a minimum adverse effect on the U. S. balance of payments.

✓ C.K.  
Freeman

Military Expenditures

Our Military Assistance Program to Korea and direct military budget support allow a low level of Korean financed military expenditures. Excluding U. S. budget support, Korea will allocate 17 percent of its total budget and 2.5 percent of GNP to military expenditures in 1968, compared with 13 percent and 1.7 percent in 1967. With respect to the Symington provision, I agree with Bill Gaud that Korea is not diverting our aid or its own resources to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development. Much of our economic aid and P. L. 480

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
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is provided intentionally for military purposes. Korean GNP grew by 8.5 percent last year and is expected to continue strong this year. Korea is specifically exempted from the provisions of the Conte/Long amendment.

Recommendation

Secretary Freeman is on a trade promotion trip in East Asia and will be in Korea on April 6.

I recommend you approve the Supporting Assistance and P. L. 480 programs and that you authorize Secretary Freeman or our Ambassador to sign the Agricultural Commodities Agreement on behalf of the United States.

  
Charles Y. Zwick  
Director

Attachment

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

308

OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MAR 28 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Authorization for FY 1968 Supporting Assistance  
and P.L. 480 Program for Korea

We are prepared to negotiate a P.L. 480 local currency sales agreement with Korea for \$72.1 million and to furnish Korea a total of \$30 million of FY 1968 Supporting Assistance grant funds.

A memorandum from Secretary Freeman and myself on the P.L. 480 program accompanies this memorandum.

The P.L. 480 and Supporting Assistance Programs furnish the following essential commodities required to support Korea's Second Five-Year Plan:

Supporting Assistance Grant

Machinery and industrial raw materials	\$30.0 million
<u>P.L. 480</u>	
500,000 M/T Wheat	\$31.5 million
330,000 bales Cotton	38.0
20,000 M/T Tallow	<u>2.6</u>
	\$72.1 million

We estimate that local currency proceeds from these programs together with proceeds from the FY 1967 pipeline Supporting Assistance and P.L. 480 programs will provide during calendar year 1968: (1) \$65.7 million for military budget support, which is equivalent to 30% of the Korean military budget; (2) \$8.8 million for economic development projects; (3) \$2.6 million for Cooley loans; and (4) \$19 million for U.S. uses.

A.I.D. strategy continues to stress the steady phase-down of supporting assistance and this policy has been incorporated by the Koreans in their Second Five-Year Plan. The \$30.0 million level of Supporting Assistance for FY 1968 is about half the level for FY 1966 and \$15 million below the level for FY 1967. This phase-down is possible because of Korea's dramatic economic growth over recent years.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-370

By fw, NARA, Date 9-21-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

The Supporting Assistance Program has been a key element for several years in negotiating and implementing the annual Korean Stabilization Program, a major self-help effort on the part of the Government of Korea. Releases of Supporting Assistance funds are dependent upon adoption of satisfactory economic policies by the Korean Government. The 1968 Stabilization Agreement, which has been signed recently, is based on an expected 12% real growth and focuses on the following policies aimed at controlling inflation: (1) a balanced budget; (2) restriction of short-term foreign borrowing; and (3) private sector credit expansion limited to the needs of the 12% growth target.

Unlike last year, we plan to release Supporting Assistance funds for FY 1968 immediately, rather than against quarterly performance under the agreement. We feel this is sound because: (1) the adoption of sound policies by the Koreans at the time of the signing of the Stabilization Agreement has become the most crucial aspect of the program; (2) a greater impact can be achieved by releasing the Supporting Assistance funds at one time, now that the amount has been substantially reduced; (3) the Koreans have demonstrated their ability to control inflation through adherence to stabilization measures and they understand that future aid will be dependent upon a good record in 1968; and (4) release of segments of the already authorized \$10 million FY 1968 program loan and negotiation of that planned for FY 1969 in a similar amount will provide checkpoints on Korean performance.

Of the \$30 million total of FY 1968 Supporting Assistance, you already authorized in February, 1967, \$10 million for release during the last quarter of calendar year 1967, dependent on Korean performance under the 1967 Stabilization Agreement. However, these funds have not been released because it became evident that the money supply would exceed the ceiling for December 1967 contained in the Stabilization Agreement. We are now prepared to release these funds because a satisfactory CY 1968 Stabilization Agreement has been negotiated.

We have considered substituting additional P.L. 480 commodities for a portion of the Supporting Assistance program in an effort to save Supporting Assistance funds. However, we strongly recommend against this course because: (1) The \$30 million planning level for FY 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

is consistent with previous plans to decrease steadily Supporting Assistance to Korea, but it represents a somewhat faster decline. (2) The amount is below earlier Korean anticipations. However, to avoid any higher expectations, this amount was tentatively discussed during the now completed negotiations of the 1968 Stabilization Program and became public knowledge in Korea. Our relations with the Koreans have become considerably more complicated and tense because of the North Korean raids into South Korea and the recent Pueblo incident. It is therefore imperative that we avoid the added strains in U.S.-ROK relations that a further reduction in Supporting Assistance would produce. (3) There would be no particular balance of payments benefit to the U.S. from a substitution of P.L. 480 commodities, since procurement of Supporting Assistance will be tied to the United States and items have been selected with a view toward securing maximum additionality. Moreover, increases in the P.L. 480 program would be at the cost of U.S. commercial wheat sales to Korea; the latter will increase by over \$20 million within this year.

Korea is specifically exempted from the provisions of the Conte-Long Amendment (Sec. 119 of the Appropriation Act). State and A.I.D. have reviewed Korean actions under the Symington Amendment (Sec. 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act) and have concluded that Korea is not diverting U.S. development assistance or P.L. 480 sales to military purposes nor is Korea diverting its own resources to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development.

Assistant Secretary of State Bundy concurs herewith.

Recommendation: That you approve \$30 million of Supporting Assistance for Korea as part of the above package.

*William S. Gaud*

William S. Gaud

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAR 28 1968

30c

MEMORANDUM

To: The President

Subject: Title I Public Law 480 Program with Korea

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate with Korea a P.L. 480 local currency sale of \$72.1 million for 500,000 tons of wheat, 330,000 bales of cotton and 20,000 tons of inedible tallow. Proposed currency uses for \$12.65 million worth of the cotton are 50 percent for U. S. uses, 5 percent for private enterprise loans and a 45 percent grant for military budget support; currency uses for the remaining \$59.45 million are 25 percent for U. S. uses, 3 percent for private enterprise loans and 72 percent grant for military budget support. The Department of State concurs in this recommendation as does the Treasury Department.

Need for Program

Korea's cotton production is negligible. The proposed 330,000 bales together with carryover stocks and pipeline will meet Korea's domestic consumption requirements for 1968. Although Korea is making progress in increasing food grain production, bad weather decreased planned availabilities for consumption in 1968. Korea substantially increased commercial purchases of grain from the United States with its own foreign exchange during 1967 and is expected to import about half of its grain purchase requirements for 1968 from the United States with its own foreign exchange. P.L. 480 wheat will ensure adequate supplies to meet the balance of grain requirements for 1968. The tallow will be used for soap making and will help in maintaining U. S. exports of tallow while tallow is in over-abundant supply.

The currency uses proposed are adequate to meet the balance of U. S. commitments for military budget support for Calendar Year 1968 as well as provide a carryover into CY 1969. In addition, the percentage for U. S. use has been increased from the level of previous years and will improve the U. S. balance of payments in CY 1968.

Military Expenditure Review

State/AID concluded that U. S. development assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, P.L. 480 sales proceeds and Korea's resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which would materially interfere with its development.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-370

By ju, NARA, Date 9-21-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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2

Self-Help Measures

In accordance with its Second Five Year Plan, the Government of the Republic of Korea is taking further steps to implement the self-help measures incorporated in the March 25, 1967, sales agreement. In particular, it is working to:

- a) Speed the development and dissemination of high-yielding seed varieties;
- b) Strengthen food marketing through improved grading, storage and transportation facilities, encouraging maximum participation by private commercial enterprise;
- c) Improve the credit system for, and transportation and distribution of, increased supplies of fertilizer, pesticides, and lime in 1968 for use by small farmers.

In addition, the Government of the Republic of Korea is undertaking to:

- 1) Develop a major program of medium and long-term farm credit in addition to expanding short-term agricultural production credit;
- 2) Initiate planning to expand commercial credit available to organizations which supply farm inputs and market farm products;
- 3) Develop a comprehensive land and water use policy, including economic feasibility analyses of alternative land development, irrigation, and conservation projects, with the aim of achieving maximum returns in additional production from investments in these areas.


Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with the P.L. 480 agreement as described above.

March 26 1968

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Administrator

Agency for International Development

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Secretary  
Department of Agriculture

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#### ATTACHMENT

Review of proposed Supporting Assistance grant program and P.L. 480 program per Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended.

State/AID in consultation with the inter-agency advisory committee concerned with the implementation of Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (The Symington Amendment), has determined (a) that Korea's resources are not being diverted to increasing military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development, and (b) that U.S. development assistance is not being diverted by Korea to unnecessary military purposes. (P.L. 480 and Supporting Assistance proceeds are used to support the Korean Defense Budget.) Among the principal factors in the determination are the following:

1. The Country Team has indicated that U.S. development assistance (or sales under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954) are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures;
2. the trend of defense expenditures as a percent of GNP has risen only slightly from 3.6% in 1963 to 4.2% in 1967;
3. the trend of defense expenditures as a percent of central government expenditures has been downward, declining from 31.9% in 1964 to 23.3% in 1967;
4. the defense budget as a percent of GNP for the period 1966-1967 was 3.95%, the median for the region;
5. annual foreign exchange purchases of military items were less than \$1 million over the period 1965 to 1967 and accounted for a negligible portion of the defense budget;
6. the defense budget as a percent of central government expenditures for the period 1966-1967 was 23.55%, only slightly above the regional median of 21.7%.

INFORMATION

Thursday, April 4, 1968  
9:15 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

You should read every word of  
Hasting Banda's reaction to your decision.

W. W. Rostow

Blantyre 1214

WWRestow:rlh





# Department of State

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**TELEGRAM**  
28

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PAGE 01 BLANTY 01214 031113Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 03, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,  
RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, SAL 01, IO 13, EUR 15,  
EA 10, NEA 13, RSR 01, /138 W  
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**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 97-269**

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BLANTYRE 1214

By uo, NARA Date 10-7-98

REF: STATE 139524

1. PRESIDENT BANDA THIS MORNING ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON HIS SHOCK AND SADNESS BOTH ON HIS DECISION TO DEESCALATE THE VIETNAM WAR AND HIS DECISION NOT TO RUN FOR REELECTION.

2. PACING THE FLOOR OF HIS OFFICE WITH BOWED HEAD, BANDA SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE GREAT BURDENS OF THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE AND HAD GREAT SYMPATHY FOR THE CAUSES WHICH LED TO THE DECISION, HE WAS NEVERTHELESS VERY DISTRESSED AND CONCERNED AT THE DIRE CONSEQUENCES WHICH COULD RESULT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S DECISIONS. HE LAID THE BLAME FOR THE DILEMMA ON EUROPEAN AND ASIAN LEADERSHIP PARTICULARLY IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, SWEDEN AND INDIA WHO HAD

~~PAGE 2 RUSSKY 12114 CONFIDENTIAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~  
NOT THE COURAGE, WISDOM OR STATESMANSHIP TO RECOGNIZE THE VIETNAM ISSUE FOR WHAT IT WAS AND GIVE THEIR SUPPORT TO THE AMERICAN EFFORT.

3. "AMERICAN POWER HAS KEPT RUSSIA FROM LIFTING A FINGER, GIVING THE WESTERN WORLD A CHANCE TO CONTAIN AGGRESSIVE COMMUNISM ASIA ONCE AND FOR ALL. BUT ONLY AMERICA AND THE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



# Department of State **TELEGRAM**

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~PAGE 12 DEANTY 01214 021112Z~~

COUNTRIES DIRECTLY THREATENED UNDERSTAND THIS. ONCE AMERICAN POWER IS WITHDRAWN FROM ASIA THE COMMUNISTS WILL SIEZE ALL OF THAT CONTINENT AND THEN BE READY FOR AFRICA," SAID BANDA. "DE GAULLE AND FRANCE OWE THEIR VERY SURVIVAL TO AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN WORLD WAR II AND THE MARSHALL PLAN THEREAFTER. NOW DE GAULLE IS TRYING TO DESTROY THE US IN VIETNAM AND THEIR MONEY, TOO."

4. BANDA CONTINUED HIS PACING, SHAKING HIS HEAD FROM SIDE TO SIDE. "THE PRESIDENT IS OFFERING HIMSELF AS A SACRIFICE IN THE HOPE THAT IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE SELECTION OF NEW LEADERSHIP WHICH CAN COMMAND BROADER SUPPORT FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND ENABLE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE VIETNAM WAR. IT IS AN ACT OF STATESMANSHIP BUT IT IS HEARTBREAKING BECAUSE IT WILL FAIL. THE COMMUNISTS CAN

~~PAGE 3 RUGSEY 12117 6 0 N F I D E N T I A L LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~  
ONLY ANALYZE BOTH DECISIONS -- DESCALATION AND NEW LEADERSHIP - AS GREAT VICTORIES FOR THEMSELVES. THEY WILL NOT NEGOTIATE WHEN THEY ARE WINNING. THEY HAVE DIVIDED AMERICA. THEY HAVE FORCED JOHNSON TO QUIT. THEY THINK HIS SUCCESSOR WILL BE A WEAK DOVE."

5. BANDA CONTINUED, "JOHNSON IS STRONG. HE IS RIGHT. HE IS A GREAT LEADER. THE AMERICAN LIBERALS AND EUROPEAN LIBERALS WHO ARE BETRAYING HIM ARE SOFT AND WEAK LIKE CHILDREN. AMERICA WAS NOT BUILT BY CHILDREN. ITS POWER WAS BUILT ON STRENGTH AND RESOLUTION. WHY CANNOT THE LIBERALS UNDERSTAND? THE COMMUNISTS ARE NOT DOVES; THEY ARE HAWKS. I AM A HAWK. WHY SHOULD AMERICANS BE DOVES? IF THEY ARE DOVES THEY WILL BE EATEN BY THE HAWKS."

6. "YOU TELL PRESIDENT JOHNSON WHAT I HAVE SAID. I WANT HIM TO KNOW HOW I FEEL." JONES

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32

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 72-497  
By cb, NARA, Date 4-27-95

SECRET

April 4, 1968

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Ambassador Thompson (7 p.m. today)

Ambassador Thompson expects to discuss the following:

-- His role in the Vietnamese talks.

(following up your earlier conversation with him)

-- Strategic arms talks.

(Gromyko told Thompson just before he returned that the Soviets are still studying the problem, in no way dismissing it, and attach great importance to it. Gromyko also asked if we had any further views to present. Thompson may suggest that we give the Soviets a more explicit formula. Several such proposals have been under study in the State Department and the Pentagon.)

-- Soviet ratification of the Consular Convention.

(Gromyko told Thompson the Soviets will take up ratification soon. Thompson believes they will follow through, although perhaps not immediately.)

-- Civil air service between Moscow and New York.

(The question of intermediate stops has not been decided. Some months ago, the Soviets felt us out on the possibility of stopping in East Berlin and using our air corridors to Berlin. We were not receptive, and proposed any intermediate stop among Stockholm, Copenhagen, London and Montreal. Yesterday, the Soviet Aerflot agent in New York said he thought the Soviets would soon accept our counterproposal, and that service is probable this summer.)

-- Two personal matters.

(Ambassador Thompson expects to talk over the timing of his return to Moscow, and one other personal matter.)

W. W. Rostow



Thursday, April 4, 1968

33

Mr. President:

Herewith a capsule version of Bunker's 46th weekly report:

*Free file*A. General

- Bunker relates Thieu's views on your March 31 speech.
- Initial reactions to your speech fearful and confused but later generally favorable.
- Your statement on nominations generally brought dismay but many Vietnamese expressed hope Americans would change your mind.
- Bunker points out evidences of determination in excellent Thieu press conference and within Vietnamese society itself.
- Thieu publicly discussed relationship with Ky and gives him mandate to organize civil defense.
- Two new province chiefs appointed in important Bien Hoa and Gia Dinh Provinces.
- Thieu repeats pledge to increase forces by 135,000 in excellent message to April 1 opening of Assembly.

B. Political

- Budget gets through Senate without serious cuts. Final passage expected next week.
- Thieu signs decrees establishing Administrative Reform and National Planning Councils.
- Although national supervision is still inadequate, the civil defense program is expanding -- 83,503 persons in 585 self-defense units.
- Population in the First Corps still fearful of attacks although outrage toward VC has ebbed.
- Terrorist activities and recruiting by VC in the First Corps at high level.
- Attitudes of the First Corps Buddhists unclear as Tri Quang arrest causes little stir.

C. Military

- Activity level is down as the enemy seeks to consolidate his hold on countryside and to choke off lines of communication to the cities.
- The enemy, shifting pressure from Khe Sanh, is building up forces in the highlands and the Danang area.
- III Corps enemy forces continue harrassments and assassinations.
- In IV Corps well armed enemy forces continue to hold initiative.
- Enemy infiltration continues at high level -- 10,000 per month.

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Authority State 75-78, NSC 6-26-79  
By del Hsq., NARA, Date 5-12-92



D. Pacification

- In IV Corps Delta area, where most ground was lost during Tet Offensive, General Thang's efforts are beginning to show results.
- RD teams are gradually returning to villages.
- Sections of Route 4 in northern Delta are open to heavy traffic, but roads and waterways in lower Delta are still insecure.
- Recovery operations are moving ahead.

E. Economic

- Economy continues sluggish in Saigon and in Delta.
- Flow of goods from Delta slowed by enemy interdiction, and propaganda and by GVN regulations.
- We are encouraging GVN to announce appropriate economic policy measures including rice credits.

W. W. R.

Thursday, April 4, 1968

33a

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 23956)

Herewith my forty-sixth weekly message:

**DECLASSIFIED****E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6****NLJ 97-269****By us, NARA Date 10-7-98**A. General

By far the chief event of the week was your speech announcing the bombing pause and your decision not to seek the nomination. Although the effect here of your statements and decisions are not yet entirely clear, we can make some preliminary judgments at this time.

As I have reported, I immediately sought an interview with Thieu. I found that he had already underlined the salient points in the speech. He wanted, of course, my views regarding your announcement with respect to your candidacy and the significance to be attached to it. I replied that I could only give him my personal views: that I felt that by taking this step you had gained a free hand to pursue the new policies which you had announced, but which represented no departure from your stand on Vietnam; that it would cut the ground from under the critics of your Vietnam policy; that it had lifted Vietnam out of the area of domestic politics; and that you are asking the country, including the opposition, to face up squarely to what must be done.

Thieu said that inevitably there would be much speculation and many interpretations among the Vietnamese, questioning as to whether this represented a change in U. S. policy, as well as speculation on the effect on the U. S. domestic political situation. He went on to say that he felt that the speech was unexceptional, flexible, and very carefully constructed, and that it would give him no difficulties. He remarked with a smile that "in this speech President Johnson was more Asian than we Asians."

He thought that Hanoi would deal with the statement on two planes. Officially they would say it was not responsive to their demand for a complete cessation of bombing. Privately, Hanoi would circulate rumors that the speech showed President Johnson recognizes his policy failed and has now abandoned it. When I saw Thieu later, he remarked that he thought the fact that Hanoi had not commented on your statement indicated that they had been taken by surprise.

The general reaction to your speech was at first confused and fearful, but as the text became widely available and was studied carefully, reactions were generally favorable. While there remains some fear, particularly with the man on the street, that the decision to sharply reduce the bombing may be a sign of American wavering in the face of the enemy, most opinion makers here now see it as a necessary gesture toward American and world opinion.

The reaction to your statement about the nomination was also characterized by shock and dismay at the outset. Many feared that this announcement meant that Vietnam had in effect lost its greatest and most powerful ally. I have the impression now, however, that more and more Vietnamese are viewing your decision in the terms which you yourself used to explain it -- a move to unite the American people and to get the Vietnam war out of partisan politics. A number of Vietnamese, including Ky, have expressed the idea that this decision is in Asian eyes an act of "supreme virtue", a selfless (and rather confucian) placing of the needs of the nation and the free world first, and many, probably most, cherish the hope that the American people will somehow compel you to change your mind about seeking another term as President.

Perhaps second in importance to your speech was the very excellent press conference which Thieu held yesterday jointly with Ky. In it, he gave voice to the increased Vietnamese determination to stand against the enemy, regardless of the outcome, and the willingness to shoulder the burdens of the war. This attitude has become increasingly apparent since the Tet offensive. Thieu said, "I have said many times that if the allies cannot continue their assistance, we will fight on alone." He went on to say that South Vietnam will increase its efforts if Hanoi does not respond favorably to our latest effort, and within a "few weeks" will implement general mobilization. He also said that "with the increase in our own troop strength, with the plan for general mobilization, if the U. S. Government deems it necessary, a partial withdrawal of U. S. troops could begin late in 1968".

He spiked reports that we had not consulted with the Government of Vietnam before deciding on the bombing pause, he noted very effectively the fact that in your speech, you gave renewed voice to American determination to accept nothing less than a free and independent South Vietnam, and he demonstrated his own determination to unite with all nationalists (particularly Ky and Ky's followers), and to mobilize the full resources of the nation.

Thieu also spoke out frankly about his relationship with Vice President Ky. While not denying that there have been differences, he made it clear that he and Ky are united on the important issues before the nation, and that they are determined to work together. He specifically gave Ky a public mandate to undertake the organization of civil defense, something which Ky felt he needed and wanted. Thieu also expressed the hope that the draft legislation sent to the National Assembly for the organization of the advisory councils, chaired by the Vice President, would be enacted promptly.

I think Thieu's press conference was extraordinarily successful. He was confident, sincere, and convincing in his answers to all of the questions. It seemed to me further evidence that Thieu has been growing in stature and that increasingly he has been exhibiting a degree of forcefulness and leadership much to be desired.

As a further commentary on the Thieu/Ky relationship and Thieu's stature in general, the Korean Ambassador made an interesting assessment. Ambassador Shin has been here for five years, and he is an Asian from a country which has



many things in common with Vietnam, including a basic Chinese culture, a corruption problem, new democratic institutions, and a constant Communist threat. Shin told me and Ambassador Berger that he does not share the rather general western view of Thieu as a man of indecision. He feels that in Asian eyes, there is greater confidence and respect for leaders who are reflective and deliberate than for those who are impulsive and move swiftly. Thus, Thieu is really likely to be more effective with the Vietnamese than Ky. Shin also believes that Thieu and the Government of Vietnam generally have been given new confidence by their demonstrated ability to meet and survive such an all-out attack as the Tet offensive. He felt that Thieu still needs increased confidence, but that he is doing better all the time.

The spirit of determination which Thieu exhibited in his press conference, and which has also been apparent in his recent speeches, has also become evident in other aspects of Vietnamese life. I have reported on the general spirit of unity in the face of the enemy that characterized the Vietnamese body politics, perhaps for the first time in this long struggle, after the Tet attacks. As the attacks on our Vietnam policy mounted in the United States following the Tet offensive, we saw here a greatly increased willingness to shoulder the war's burdens. Voluntary enlistments shot up dramatically. There seemed to be a general desire among the population for arms and training so that they could defend themselves in the event of future attacks on the cities. Voluntary contributions to relief and reconstruction efforts were, by Vietnamese standards, very large. In political circles, the response to Tran Van Don's effort to form a single, big anti-Communist front has been surprisingly good. As I reported on Sunday, Thieu got a great ovation from students undergoing military training; students have been almost traditionally against the government, but the reception given Thieu was to my mind symbolic of the changed public atmosphere here. Now we hear Vietnamese saying even if American withdraws, they will fight on to the bitter end. They are talking openly and approvingly of general mobilization.

During the past week, Thieu has made further constructive moves:

1. He has appointed two new province chiefs in the important provinces of Bien Hoa and Gia Dinh surrounding Saigon, bringing the total post-Tet purge so far to 14. Both Lt. Col. Hai in Bien Hoa, a protected favorite of General Cao Van Vien, and Major Cau, General Loan's brother-in-law, were two of the most inept, allegedly corrupt province officials on our list. In the case of Hai, his poor performance in pacification and unwillingness to accept advice had already led Bob Komer to withdraw U. S. commodity support to Bien Hoa's pacification program, and Bien Hoa City had been put off limits to U. S. troops. Both measures were aimed at cutting into Hai's rackets, which were netting him and his cronies considerable money each month. The fourteen newly appointed province chiefs generally appear to be improvements over their predecessors. Apparently, Thieu has picked the men from among officers whom he had personally observed to have turned in superior performances over the past several years. As a result, the new chiefs are less beholden to division and corps commanders, and, from preliminary reports, seem determined to turn in a good performance. We have had reports that General Vien and some of the other Generals are unhappy with their loss of power.



Thieu expects to make further changes at the conclusion of the course for province and district chiefs. There are still some weak province chiefs whom he has indicated that he plans to remove as soon as he has better men available to take their places. He plans to hold a meeting on April 15 of corps commanders and province chiefs at which the new regulations defining relationships between corps commanders, province chiefs, and the new civilian delegates, and their respective duties and responsibilities will be explained.

2. He has forwarded to the Assembly legislation on press regulations and a draft law for a "reconstruction and solidarity" tax, estimated to bring in 3 billion piasters. By decree issued March 30, he also increased the surtax on luxury imports, through which he hopes to bring in revenue of about 4 billion piasters. These bills bring to ten (not including the budget) the number of major bills sent to the Assembly by the government since the Tet attacks. It seems to me this is a commendable record, considering the youth of the government and the difficulties it faces.

3. Thieu also sent a very good message to the opening meeting of the Assembly's regular session April 1. He noted that democracy is working in Vietnam despite the heavy strains and burdens imposed on the government; he repeated his decision to increase the Armed Forces by 135,000 and added that further increases might be necessary; with regard to relief and reconstruction, he reported that the Tet refugees are now down from 700,000 to 380,000; 309 million piasters have been allotted to the provinces for the refugees; and reconstruction is going forward, with new homes underway in Saigon, for example, for 7,000 families. He reported also on the military situation, reiterated the Government of Vietnam's position on peace, noted his recent administrative reforms, and asked the Assembly to move promptly on legislation recently sent to it, particularly the bills on political parties and press regulations.

#### B. Political

Assembly developments. The Senate has completed work on the budget. While making numerous small cuts, it did not seriously amend the administration's draft bill in any important particular. Nor did it change the overall figure voted by the Lower House. The bill now goes back to the Lower House and final passage is expected next week.

I reported last week that the Senate was likely to try to interpellate the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and the Minister of Interior. These Ministers have, in fact, now been "invited" to appear "as soon as possible" to discuss the Government's performance during and since Tet. Until now, the Government has not answered the Assembly request, however, and it is not clear whether the Ministers concerned will or will not appear before the Senate. (The Constitution leaves the question of whether they must appear open, and most Vietnamese seem to think Government Ministers can refuse to be interpellated.)

The administration bill on political parties now before the Assembly provides for legal recognition of parties which establish within one year from date of application ten provincial branches with at least 100 members each. The draft has provisions to encourage the merging of parties, but does not provide for any government assistance to parties which achieve demonstrated minimum levels of public support. Like another draft prepared by Senator Nguyen Van Ngai, the bill also reflects the Vietnamese tendency to think in terms of cadre-based organizations. The criteria of party strength is not votes garnered at the polls, but the number of formally affiliated activists. This approach is in line with Vietnamese experience and political thinking, but we believe it will not help the development of broadly based national parties, at least not as rapidly as we would hope.

Government changes. In line with previous announcements, President Thieu on March 30 signed decrees setting up the administrative reform council and the national planning council, both of which he will chair himself. The Presidential Council of Advisors has not yet been announced, but we understand from various sources that several additional leaders have consented to serve on it. These include Phan Quang Dan, Ha Thuc Ky, Mai Tho Truyen (prominent southern lay Buddhist leader and Tran Van Huong's running mate in the Presidential election), Pham Huu Chuong (civilian member of the "Directorate," Minister of Health under Diem, and a man reportedly close to militant Buddhist leaders), Tran Dinh Nam (elder central Vietnamese Nationalist Party leader), Pham Khoang (Vietnamese Nationalist Party leader who served as a civilian member of the "Directorate"), and Ho Tri Chau (Chairman of the Saigon Bar Association).

Civil Defense. In his report to the Assembly on April 1, Thieu noted that 83,503 civil servants, students, and other civilians have been organized into 585 self-defense units. According to Thieu, the Government has furnished these units with over 9,000 weapons.

We do not have full information on the formation of these groups, and it appears that in some cases local authorities are going ahead with their own plans for civil defense without much reference to central direction. (Vice President Ky will no doubt bring a greater element of organization and central control into these efforts now that he is formally charged with responsibility for this program.) In general, however, the authorities are moving ahead cautiously, arming and training civil servants first, relying heavily on veterans, and emphasizing control and proper organization.

In the Fourth Corps, for example, General Thang reportedly approved proposals to provide 100 weapons per province for self-defense groups and also to arm one in every three government officials. However, he rejected a proposal to arm "religious youth" (the Hoa Hao would probably like very much to again form their private armies under the guise of civil defense). Similarly, in the Third Corps, the authorities have armed mostly civil servants. In the First Corps, our people report considerable enthusiasm for the program. While most of the arms there have gone to civil servants, other groups, including Catholics, have also received

a few weapons. In Quang Tri, most threatened province in many ways, the program reportedly has stimulated cooperation between parties which have in the past been bitter rivals.

In Saigon about 140 civilian defense groups are in some stage of organization or training. About 2,000 weapons have been issued, mostly to civil servants, but also including at least one Catholic group. While the majority of the 140 Saigon groups are said to be concentrated in the central parts of the city, the mayor said that he is also trying to set up a ring of self-defense units along the outer edges of the city.

Political developments in the First Corps. Embassy officers who travel in the First Corps report that the population there is still preoccupied by fear of further enemy attacks, particularly in the northernmost provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien. The feeling of outrage that tended to polarize public opinion against the Viet Cong seems to have ebbed, but uneasiness about the future remains widespread. This ebbing of anti-Communist anger coupled with continued fear of more attacks probably accounts for a decline of enthusiasm among the organizers of the local Danang anti-Communist Front. (The Front remains in business, however, and we are trying to stimulate it and similar groups in the provinces.)

In Hue, relief and reconstruction work is going forward, but morale there also remains low because the population is convinced that they face a new attack in the near future. Helping to overcome these negative attitudes are groups such as the Buddhist Boy Scouts and a large contingent of Saigon students working under the direction of Thieu's personal representative, Father Cao Van Luan. It is becoming clear, however, that it will take time to restore confidence as well as the destroyed homes and temples of Hue. We are considering how we might help in getting Hue University in operation again.

The Viet Cong in the First Corps, meanwhile, have reportedly been very active in the past month in kidnapping and terror activities. Assassination of village and hamlet officials has been significantly increased, and recruiting efforts continue at a high level.

The attitude of the First Corps militant Buddhists and their political future remain unclear. While there are reports of plans to arrest those who have long been regarded as Viet Cong or Viet Cong sympathizers by the authorities, no arrests have taken place. Thich Don Hau, the Monk who was reported by the Viet Cong Radio to have called on the people to support the Communists, is evidently still in Viet Cong hands despite many reports that he was freed. The arrest of Tri Quang and some of his followers in Saigon has caused very little stir among the First Corps Buddhists, possibly because they fear arrest themselves if they try to demonstrate against the Government.

### C. Military

The level of military activity was down this week, with the enemy apparently still engaged mainly in reforming his units, recruiting and infiltrating men to make up the Tet losses, and making strong efforts to consolidate his hold on the countryside. At the same time enemy forces continued their efforts to interdict highways in order to choke off the flow of supplies in and out of the cities. They also continued to remind the population of their presence by mortaring province and district towns.

With good weather for a number of days over Khe Sanh and the reduction of enemy forces in that area, the immediate threat to that particular area ceased. In both One and Two Corps, there were reports that indicated the enemy perhaps intended to launch a general offensive about March 31. However, the offensive did not materialize--probably pre-empted by friendly operations. There are indications that the enemy may now be focusing his offensive intentions on the highlands.

In One Corps, the Hoi An-Danang area appeared to be threatened during this reporting period, with reports of heavy infiltration of enemy personnel and supplies into the surrounding countryside. Enemy efforts to build base areas in the mountainous regions continued and a high level of terror and assassination was maintained. The lengths to which the enemy is going in recruiting were indicated when after one recent One Corps engagement it was estimated that the average age of the seven enemy killed in action was 15 years. (Similarly, in Two Corps the enemy is reported to be employing children for intelligence gathering because government security forces do not prevent them from entering and leaving the cities.)

In Three Corps, mining, interdiction of lines of communication, and attacks on outposts continued. Assassinations of hamlet officials are reported, and numerous low level reports indicate that the Viet Cong in some provinces are still promising new recruits an early victory. Four Corps reports that despite the more vigorous military efforts stimulated by General Thang, the enemy apparently still has the initiative in the countryside and continues to gather his forces for future attacks. One report states that the new automatic weapons issued to guerrilla forces prior to the Tet attacks are being withdrawn from enemy forces in contested areas, perhaps in an effort to hoard the better weapons in anticipation of later massive efforts.

The level of infiltration apparently continues to be high. Since December, it is estimated to be of the magnitude of 10,000 per month.

### D. Pacification

We have been particularly concerned about pacification in the Four Corps Delta area, where we lost the most ground in countryside from the Tet offensive. However, General Thang's efforts to get back on the offensive are beginning to



pay off. Revolutionary Development Cadre teams and supporting security elements have mostly moved back to their assigned areas, though in some cases we are reconsolidating hamlets affected by the Tet offensive rather than moving on to new hamlets. Plans have been amended to place main attention along major roads and waterways for the purpose of enhancing their security.

Better security has brought nearer to normal traffic on the roads in the Northern Delta. An average of 600 vehicles per day traveled the stretch of Route 4 between Saigon and the My Thuan ferry last week. Pre-Tet traffic seldom exceeded 750 vehicles a day. Lower in the Delta and on the waterways traffic is still trickling over routes which, while physically open for traffic, are not yet secure in the judgment of truck owners, rice merchants or the local populace.

Thus change for the better is now appearing in the Delta too. Friendly activity is increasing; enemy activity is decreasing. Recovery operations are moving ahead toward a target of getting the homeless resettled before the rainy season starts 30 days from now.

#### E. Economic

The economy continues to show signs of stagnation, both here in Saigon and in the Delta.

Saigon retail prices fell once again in the week ending April 1. They are now less than five percent above the January 2 level. Rice is at the January 2 level; pork is slightly below or somewhat above that level, depending on the cut. Inflation is not our problem today.

Problems continue to exist with respect to the marketing of agricultural products in Saigon. For security reasons most vegetables now are unloaded from trucks and reloaded onto three-wheeled vehicles at the gates of Saigon, which is costly and inefficient. The conditions of the Saigon market for foodstuffs are such that the increased costs are not being passed on to the consumer, but are being absorbed by the middlemen--and by the peasant producers. Both commercial activity and agricultural production will suffer if this situation continues.

However, the flow of goods into the city has improved. Route 20 from Dalat has generally been open, and vegetable and fruit supplies are ample given the present state of demand. Barge convoys between Saigon and the Delta are moving regularly and are bringing in appreciable supplies of rice (although larger shipments probably await announcement of the Government's new rice program). Finally, despite the fact that truck trips from the more distant parts of the Delta now take two to five days, and the further hazards produced by the somewhat chancey nature of the military road convoys, hog shipments have come back to normal; they averaged 1732 hogs in the period March 20-27 which matches the pre-Tet level.

The relative weight of (1) Viet Cong economic warfare (ranging from psychological campaigns among the peasantry to blowing up Route 4); (2) mercantile uncertainty; and (3) the continuing but intensified frustration of trade by Government of Vietnam checkpoints and regulations, in reducing Delta-Saigon trade overall, is hard to determine. In any event, recent visitors to Delta towns such as Bac Lieu report that commercial activity there is at a very low level. Furthermore, the flow of consumer goods into the area is down, and there is a serious shortage of fuel in some areas.

Continuing insecurity is the major reason for the commercial stagnancy. However, present conditions are not so bad that appropriate economic policy measures can't make a big difference. The Government now seems on the verge of announcing one such measure, whereby it will finance further credit to the rice trade, and also provide a guaranteed price for rice. This would be a big step forward.

We probably have at least another month, and maybe several, before inflation rather than stagnation is the danger. At present, the rapid increase in the money supply, up 17 percent since the end of December, is not being translated into increased prices because of the continuing low level of economic activity. At some point, when the economy picks up, as we hope and expect it to, prices may again start to follow the money supply.

ACTION

Thursday, April 4, 1968

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a proposed farewell message to President Tubman of Liberia.

Tubman sails from New York tomorrow afternoon.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

Proposed Farewell Message to President Tubman

Dear Mr. President:

I hope you have enjoyed your visit to the United States. It was, as always, a great honor to have you with us.

I was especially pleased by our frank discussion of the challenges that concern us both. America is deeply proud of our historic partnership with Liberia. We know that bond will grow and strengthen as we continue to work together for peaceful progress in the new Africa and throughout the world.

Your visit, Mr. President, reminded us again how much we value your wise counsel and faithful friendship.

Mrs. Johnson and I wish you and Mrs. Tubman a fond farewell and a pleasant voyage home.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson



~~SECRET~~

April 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bebler visit

*Pres file*

Governor Harriman has just talked with Bebler and wanted you to have the following additional briefing:

-- Bebler got the impression from Gromyko that the Russians feel there is very little they can do to exert influence on Hanoi - as they are very much concerned about the effect on their influence with Asian Communist parties.

-- At some point the Soviets will want to talk with us without intermediaries

-- Bebler has the strong impression Peking is trying to exert strong pressure on Hanoi to go on fighting. (Bebler did not go to Peking, as Yugoslavs are most unpopular there.)

-- Bebler believes Hanoi will ultimately be willing to postpone unification of North and South Vietnam "indefinitely". Hanoi wants some sort of international guarantees to protect it against Red China. Bebler believes Hanoi will ultimately agree to an independent South Vietnam. He thinks Hanoi is in a mood to negotiate. (It is not altogether clear how much this is Bebler's own thinking, as distinguished from clear indications he may have received from Gromyko and others.)

-- Bebler is seeing Thant tomorrow.

-- Bebler thinks the Czechoslovaks are moving even faster than the Yugoslavs did, but is less hopeful about Poland.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

April 4, 1968

Mr. President:

In connection with the Honolulu trip, you might wish to know that a Soviet oceanographic ship will be in port when you are there.

The ship, the Vityaz, was originally scheduled to call at Honolulu last January - in a visit returning the Oceanographer's call at Odessa in May 1967. The visit was postponed by the Soviets on the grounds of "bad weather conditions" shortly after the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo. The Vityaz last called at Honolulu in 1965.

Its present visit is expected to last from today through Sunday.

*We must be careful about talking on open lines*  
W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~--EYES ONLY

Wednesday, April 3, 1968  
8:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Prime Minister Wilson  
is befuddled, but still anxious to help.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

37  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-497  
By cb, NARA, Date 4-27-95

*Free file*

1968 APR 4 00 55

37a

~~SECRET~~~~EYES ONLY~~

1.50

ZULU APRIL 4, 1968

FROM THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
SECRET EYES ONLY  
T96/68  
SECRET

FOR THE PRESIDENT EYES ONLY FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-268  
By isa, NARA Date 1-15-98

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE AND THE USEFUL GUIDANCE  
IT CONTAINED.

THE STATEMENT ISSUED THIS AFTERNOON BY HANOI CHANGES THE  
SITUATION. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE SHORT STATEMENT WE HAVE  
ISSUED PUBLICLY WELCOMING HANOI'S DECISION TO TALK: AND I HAVE  
BEEN GLAD TO SEE YOUR OWN COMMENTS. THIS IS A RESPONSE  
WHICH I AM SURE YOU ARE RIGHT TO TAKE UP, DESPITE THE OFFENSIVE  
VERBIAGE IN WHICH IT IS WRAPPED. EVEN THOUGH HANOI CONTINUE  
TO INSIST ON THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF THE BOMBING AND  
ALL OTHER WAR-LIKE ACTS AGAINST THE DRV THEY ARE AT LEAST  
NOW WILLING FOR THE FIRST TIME TO MEET AND TALK.

WITH THIS LATEST DEVELOPMENT IT IS NOT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR  
HOW WE AND THE RUSSIANS CAN BEST HELP AT PRESENT. YOUR PEOPLE  
WILL HAVE HAD A FULL REPORT ON MICHAEL STEWART'S TALK WITH  
THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR WHEN HE PASSED A MESSAGE  
TO GROMYKO SUGGESTING AN EARLY MEETING. WE FOR OUR PART  
STAND READY, AS ALWAYS, TO PLAY OUR PART, BOTH AS CO-CHAIRMAN  
AND AS A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AS YOU  
ASKED IN YOUR FIRST MESSAGE, AND, IN SHORT, TO DO ANYTHING WE  
CAN TO BE OF HELP.

I KNOW YOU WILL TELL ME WHEN YOU THINK THE TIME HAS COME  
WHEN WE CAN WEIGH IN AGAIN TO HELP YOU. MEANWHILE YOU HAVE  
OUR HEARTFELT GOOD WISHES IN THE VERY DIFFICULT AND DELICATE  
DISCUSSIONS WHICH CERTAINLY LIE AHEAD.

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~~~EYES ONLY~~



INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 3, 1968  
7:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA discusses -- not  
very conclusively -- Hanoi's motives.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By sp/dch NARA, Date 9/9/92

*Pres file*

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

38a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

3 April 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Hanoi's Motives

NOTE: This memorandum represents the conclusions arrived at after discussion by analysts from CIA, INR, and DIA.

1. Hanoi's move almost certainly does not forecast a change in its war aims, but the statement of 3 April is a significant departure in tactics. The North Vietnamese leaders have abandoned their adamantly-held position that there could be no official contacts at all before the bombing totally ceased.

2. There is one possible motivation which we would virtually rule out: while Hanoi may have been concerned by the mounting costs of an accelerated military effort, it was not constrained by inability to carry on the war. It may -- though we doubt that this was important -- have felt that the President had left himself free to carry out a major escalation of the conflict if the response was negative or long-delayed.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-494

By ijg, NARA, Date 4-1-93

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

~~SECRET~~

3. The quickness of Hanoi's response suggests that it may already have decided, before the President's statement, to go over to "talk-fight" tactics if an opportunity offered itself during the winter-spring offensive. However this may be, we believe that DRV motives were (a) to assure themselves that the respite in bombing which they now have will continue, and hopefully to force the US to a complete cessation of all bombing of the North; (b) to exploit sentiment within the US in favor of ending the war, and if possible to lead the US Government to a point where US public opinion would not tolerate a reversal towards heightened conflict; (c) to intensify divisions between the US and the GVN; and (d) to accelerate disarray in Saigon and undermine the willingness of the South Vietnamese to fight.

4. It is possible that Hanoi read the President's statement as a decisive change in US policy -- an admission of unwillingness to continue the war, and a first step towards accepting the consequences. At least, from Hanoi's point of view, the situation in both the US and South Vietnam since Tet must seem much more vulnerable to talk-fight tactics, and to offer an opportunity for Hanoi to explore the possibilities of a settlement on terms favorable to it. For the North Vietnamese must, after all, be

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

conscious of strains in their society arising from the war, as well as of the opportunities offered by the present situation.

- 3 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~



ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-497

By CB, NARA, Date 4-27-95

39

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 3, 1968  
7:25 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith the proposed message for  
delivery by Sullivan to the highest  
ranking DRV official in Vientiane.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rlh

1164

39a

NO COPY USE ONLY

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-496

By *ju*, NARA, Date 8-13-93

Origin

Index

ACTION: Amembassy NEWARK IMMEDIATE  
 " " VIENTIANE "  
 INFO Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE  
 STATE Amembassy WELLINGTON - TOSEC - IMMEDIATE  
 LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY AND AMBASSADORS  
 NODIS

As quickly as feasible written message

1. Please deliver/following ~~AMEMB WELLINGTON~~ to highest ranking  
 DRV official you can reach.

BEGIN TEXT. The USG has noted the April 3 statement of  
 the DRV indicating "its readiness to send its representatives  
 to make contact with U.S. representatives".

The United States accepts the proposal of the DRV.  
 Ambassador W. Averell Harriman will be available forthwith to  
 establish contacts with the representatives of the DRV. For  
 its part the U.S. would propose that such contacts be established  
 in Geneva on April 8, 1968, but the U.S. will attempt to meet  
 any reasonable alternative suggestions of the DRV for time  
 and place for establishing such contacts. END TEXT.

Please report soonest on action taken to deliver ~~for skg~~  
 2. /~~Please inform DRV representatives of the above information~~  
 foregoing or any problem which arises in connection with delivery.  
 /~~new information being held back from other action addresses~~

~~XX~~

END

Drafted by: S/S - BHRoad 4/3/68  
 S/AH: DIDavidson: eg 4/3/68

Tel. No. 7541

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

U - The Acting Secretary

S/AH - Governor Harriman  
 S/S - Mr. Read

EA - Mr. Bundy

White House -

40  
**INFORMATION**

~~**SECRET**~~

Wednesday, April 3, 1968  
6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

This Harriman-Dobrynin conversation is interesting.

I've marked key passages.

W. W. Rostow

~~**SECRET**~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By sg, NARA, Date 4-27-92

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## Memorandum of Conversation

NODIS w/d

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-269

DATE: April 1, 1968

SUBJECT:

By W, NARA Date 10-7-99

Rostow

PARTICIPANTS:

Ambassador Dobrynin, USSR  
W. Averell Harriman

I asked Dobrynin to lunch today in order to clarify in his mind, as far as possible the President's speech last night. He broke an engagement to do so.

The conversation, which lasted over two hours, was directed largely to clarify as well as I could his own understanding of the American scene today as it relates to the Soviet Union, and particularly Vietnam. (I did not try to pump him on what he might or might not know of Soviet positions.)

I first inquired what he would like to ask me. His first question was, "Is the President's decision final -- will he be drafted?" I explained in some detail, going back to Coolidge's "I don't chose to run," why a statement of this kind from the President was final. It was in no sense comparable to Rockefeller's coyness: "I am not going to run but can be drafted." His second question was why the President chose last night as the time of announcing his Vietnam policy to make this declaration. I replied that I believed he had had this in mind for some time, that some had said as early as last October, if not before. I felt certain that Mrs. Johnson had been urging him to do so from the standpoint

of his

(Dist. Office and Officers)

~~SECRET~~ NODIS



~~SECRET~~

NODIS

- 2 -

health and personal life. No President had ever operated at the speed and intensity as President Johnson, which no constitution can stand forever. I thought he hadn't announced this decision before because he thought it might affect his ability to get through Congress some of his domestic and international programs since it was generally thought that a President's power was lessened if he renounced candidacy, not among the American people, but among the political groups in Congress. I said that I believed he unquestionably felt that, certainly in the U.S., and he hoped, in the world, his earnest appeal for a prompt peaceful solution would carry greater weight if combined with his decision to step out of the American political scene. Certainly that was true in the U.S., and I hoped the Soviet Union would recognize this and if possible persuade Hanoi. No one knew better than I the profound desire of the President for peace. I had been directly involved since the end of December 1965.

He mentioned the lost opportunity of Kosygin's visit in London, February a year ago. I pointed out that this situation had become unmanageable because of the action of NVN in taking advantage of the TET pause. The President's military advisors were gravely concerned by the flow of men and military material to the South. In any event, I could assure him that no man in the U.S. wanted peace more than the President, and he would certainly wish to have negotiations at least underway before he left office, even if a complete agreement had not been reached.

I underlined the desirability of now achieving what I believed was the objective of the Soviet Union as well as the United States -- a peaceful solution of Vietnam. The longer the conflict lasted, the more difficult in many ways the situation would become, particularly if Hanoi insulted the U.S. by throwing away this genuine offer.

~~This led to a considerable discussion about U.S. and Soviet interests in the Far East. Dobrynin indicated~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NODIS

-3-

that from the Soviet standpoint, if we left North Vietnam alone, they were not as concerned about events in South Vietnam!

We discussed at some length the U.S. relationship with Red China. He asked whether there was anything new developing in that line, and I said "None." I said I understood that Kosygin was more relaxed about Peking in his talks with Wilson this year than a year ago in London. Last year he seemed to be very gravely concerned about Red China, whereas now he was not as concerned. Dobrynin replied that border incidents are not as difficult as they had been. He described them in some detail, particularly emphasizing the major problems were in the Amur River area. There were some islands Siberian fishermen had been using, which the Chinese claimed. These people had been interfered with and with perhaps some shooting. The Soviet Union wanted to keep these border incidents to a minimum but they constantly created minor frictions.

He minimized difficulties in Central Asia at the present time. He agreed some thousands had come out from Sinkiang a few years ago when trouble first broke out. He said the Soviet Union was afraid the Government of China was disintegrating. (I assume that to mean the Communist Party). He said they were concerned that the military might be taking over.

He underlined that Ho Chi Minh did not want to be dominated by China. He asked what kind of a settlement we envisaged. I said that could only be determined when the negotiations started. He said, "You mean to say the United States hasn't got a policy?" I said there were some differences of views at present. We were not as disciplined as the Soviet Union. In any event, a great deal depended upon developments in South Vietnam and South Vietnamese attitude. I personally hoped that Saigon and the NLF would be able to work out an acceptable settlement. He underlined the differences between Hanoi and the NLF. He said that

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NODIS

-4-

both had representatives in Moscow. The NLF representative always made it absolutely plain that the North Vietnamese could not talk for the NLF. He said that if we would read the NLF program carefully we would be able to understand the attitude of the Southerners. I told him I had read it carefully, and that if I were to select individual phrases from the program, leaving out the qualifications, the contradictions and the abuse, it could be an American program. The President had said to him yesterday, "One man, one vote." That meant free elections. But the question was how the words would be implemented and how seriously to take the qualifications and contradictions. For example, South Vietnam was to be entirely neutral and non-aligned, and yet to support every liberation movement in Asia, Africa and South America. He asked, "Are you really afraid of their influence?" I said, "No, not at all, but this showed the inconsistency of their statement." "A free and independent, prosperous South Vietnam", to use the language of the NLF, was certainly something that we could support, with unification to be agreed upon with the North at a later time. The right of all to free speech, religion and otherwise, is something that we could support. The right of all groups listed in their statement to play a political role is certainly something we support. How you achieve these objectives was a matter that needed to be thrashed out. The GVN's voice in the negotiations would have to be assured. I assumed the Soviets would want to consider the voice of the NLF. He said, "Will the NLF be allowed to be at a meeting?" Someone had told him the NLF would be only allowed to sit behind the North Vietnamese representative, whisper in their ears, and that the North Vietnamese would speak for them. ~~I said I didn't~~ know who told him that nonsense. The President had clearly stated the NLF could be present and have their views considered. He said, "Does that mean they could sit at the same table?" ~~I said, "Well, if it is a round~~ table with no question of the status of anyone present, yes." We would not recognize them as a government or as ~~representatives of the South Vietnamese people.~~ Of course

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

NOV 15

-5-

the GVN would be present whom we recognized as the government of the South.:

I underlined the importance of Moscow and Hanoi taking the President's proposal most seriously. He said, "Does that mean you are ready to start negotiations?" I said, "Yes. Under the President's orders, I will be any place in the world within 48 hours if the Hanoi Government states they will have a representative there, whether that is Rangoon, Moscow, Geneva or any place else." I said these talks can be public or secret. If they are to be secret, we would have to be more careful in the selection of an individual representing the U.S. less conspicuous than myself. He commented that a place might be selected where the meeting would not be noticed.

He asked what would happen if Hanoi insisted upon 100% stopping of the bombing. I replied that would be a matter for the Soviet Government to consider. I said, "The President made it clear to you yesterday that Hanoi was pouring down men and supplies, attacking our forces in the Northern part of South Vietnam." It was up to the Soviet Union to suggest a proposal that would make it possible for the President to stop this tactical bombing. The President would be willing, as he had indicated, to stop bombing entirely if he could be sure of the security of our forces. I emphasized that we hoped the first subject of discussion would be de-escalation of the fighting. On the other hand, I understood that Hanoi wanted to fight and talk. That might be possible, (but less desirable,) providing there was no advantage gained by Hanoi as a result of the stopping of the bombing.

We talked at some length about the past, about Stalin, Molotov. He questioned me in some detail about Molotov and then finally agreed with my appraisal that he was an extraordinarily rigid individual who was difficult to negotiate

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

NODIC

-6-

with. I told him some of the experiences with Stalin and Molotov, and mentioned that Khrushchev had told me there would have been no agreement over Trieste, stating that Molotov was more of a Yugoslav than Tito. He rejoined, "That is true -- and also the agreement on Austria". I said Khrushchev mentioned that the Austrian Agreement would never have been achieved if he had allowed Molotov to have a free hand. (I don't quite understand why he talked about Molotov -- it may have been purely a curiosity on his part to get my version of Soviet diplomatic history, and does not have significance to the present situation.)

Dobrynin fully agreed that more progress could be made in coming to an understanding in a number of areas if the war in Vietnam could be finished. He agreed that continuation of hostilities with the possibility of escalation might make it more difficult to find a solution in the future. It wasn't quite clear whether his curiosity about our talks with China related to our doing something with them adverse to Soviet interests or whether he could find some way to compose our extreme differences. I didn't pursue it as I had different objectives in this conversation.

We talked about Castro. I said I assumed the Soviet Union was getting somewhat fed up by their relations with him and the expense of maintaining him in all his splendor. He asked what we would do about it. I said, "Well, if you can get Castro to stop his support of the terrorist adventures in Venezuela, etc., the Latin American countries would be more inclined to bring him back into the Latin American community". He said, "How about the U.S.? Won't you demand removal of Russian influence?" I replied, "Certainly we will demand the end of any Russian intentions to make Cuba a base, but I am not sure we would object to your continuing to support him in his economic debacles."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NODIS

-7-

MM I suggested, and he agreed, that if Vietnam could be out of the way there were a number of other areas in the world in which we could come to an understanding, although that was not true of all problems. He was quite frank about the selectivity of the areas in which our interests did not conflict and others in which they did (such as German unification, Middle East, etc.).

We talked at some length about the position of the British. He asked why was it necessary to go through the British -- why couldn't we deal directly? I said that was for them to decide. We had no objection to direct talks. He added that Hanoi didn't trust Wilson. I said we did. His objectives might be his own political interests, but he wished to play a useful role and not against either Soviet or U.S. interests. There might be some messages which were easier for them to convey to us through a third party than direct, such as ways and means of bringing about 100% stoppage of the bombing, or other aspects of an agreement. After all, the Soviet Union and the British were co-Chairmen. I continued that there might be some questions in which Hanoi would prefer to talk to us directly, or others which might be better for the Soviet Union to take up with us. In any event, I said I hoped Moscow would consider soberly and seriously, whatever Wilson suggested.

There were other questions that I wanted to raise, but since the objective of this talk was to try to clarify the American scene in his own mind, I did not bring them up at this session.

- - - - -

ADDITIONAL NOTE: He brought up the question of Laos. I said that the North Vietnamese were not only using Laos as an infiltration route, but were sending in troops to attack the Royal Laotian Army. The position was becoming extremely serious, and I hoped the Soviet Union would take a hand in stopping Hanoi.

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 3, 1968  
5:05 pm

41

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~LITERALLY EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-497

By CL, NARA, Date 4-27-95

MR. PRESIDENT:

General Taylor and I have been talking about the negotiating problem. In one way or another we have followed the staff work on negotiations for a good many years. We have two conclusions.

1. There is much raw material for negotiating positions in Washington, but they are not, repeat not, now in shape for a serious negotiation of about the most complex kind that anyone has ever conceived of. Specifically, we believe a full-time team should be designated to develop positions, including maximum and minimum alternatives.

2. With all due respect to Governor Harriman, we do not believe that he is the man to carry this negotiation -- should it develop -- beyond its first stage. There are two reasons: the effort will be arduous and his health is not all that good; he lacks -- and has always lacked -- an understanding and sympathy for the South Vietnamese. Let me be clear: Averell is 100% correct that we should not let Saigon have a veto over our position in the negotiations. But I doubt that he is in a mood to bring them along and to give them the confidence that will be necessary if a viable solution, in the U.S. interest, is to emerge.

Therefore, we recommend that you consider selecting now the man who will carry this negotiation for the long pull, should it develop, and place him in charge of the full-time task force. Our first choice would be Cy Vance.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/ LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

Wednesday, April 3, 1968  
5:05 pm

42

SECRET/SENSITIVE

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

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W. W. Rostow

SECRET/SENSITIVE/ LITERALLY EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 92-497  
By pw/cb NARA. Date 4-10-97



43  
*Pres file*

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 3, 1968  
5:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker indicates mid-May  
to end of month is likely to be best time  
for a Thieu visit.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 23812

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 4-27-82



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

43a 7

PP RUEHC  
DE RUMJIR 23812 0940640  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
P 030616Z APR 68  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9981  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CONTROL : 660Q  
RECEIVED: April 3, 1968  
4:39A.M.

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 23812

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-496

NODIS

SUBJ: PRESIDENT THIEU'S VISIT

By ju, NARA, Date 8-13-93

Rostow

REFS: A. STATE 140591;

B. STATE 140690

1. ACCOMPANIED BY BERGER, I SAW THIEU TODAY TO DISCUSS VISIT. TEXT OF REF A WAS DELIVERED TO ME DURING MEETING, AND I HANDED HIM THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER. REF B ARRIVED AFTER MY MEETING, BUT I WILL INFORM HIM THIS AFTERNOON RE HONOLULU MEETING POSSIBILITY.

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 23812 ~~SECRET~~

2. TIME OF VISIT: THIEU WANTED SEE MORE CLEARLY HOW SITUATION HERE DEVELOPS IN NEXT FEW WEEKS, AND SAID MID OR END OF MAY LOOKS LIKE EARLIEST POSSIBILITY. (COMMENT: I WOULD SUGGEST WASHINGTON CONSIDER RESERVING TENTATIVE DATE IN THAT PERIOD, AND ANOTHER IN JUNE.)

3. PROGRAMS: HE ASKED WHAT VISITS WERE LIKE AND BERGER AND I GAVE HIM DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF TYPICAL PROGRAM. IF DEPT WISHES START DEVELOPING SHADOW PROGRAM IT CAN BE BUILT AROUND FOL

OWING, ALTHOUGH THIS NOT BE CONSIDERED AS FINAL VIEWS.

A. TWO DAYS IN WASHINGTON, WITH USUAL MEETINGS IN ADDITION TO THOSE OF PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF STATE, DEFENSE, AGRICULTURE, AND AID DIRECTOR. USUAL SOCIAL EVENTS.

B. NATIONAL PRESS CLUB APPEARANCE (IN ENGLISH).

C. MEETINGS WITH SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN, HE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-Page, SAIGON 23812, April 3, 1968, NODIS

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 23812 ~~SECRET~~

WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE AVERSE TO ADDRESSING JOINT SESSION IF YOU FEEL THIS USEFUL OR DESIRABLE. HIS ENGLISH IS GOOD ENOUGH, AND HE CAN BE FAIRLY EFFECTIVE SPEAKER.

D. MEETING WITH VIETNAMESE COMMUNITY IN WASHINGTON DURING TWO DAYS, OR ON FOLLOWING DAY.

E. HE NOT RPT NOT AVERSE TO APPEARANCE ON "MEET THE PRESS" OR SIMILAR, AND PREPARED CONSIDER MEETING SELECTED CORRESPONDENTS, EDITORS, ETC., IN OFF-RECORD TALK.

F. WISHES SEE SOMETHING OF COUNTRY, AND WE TALKED IN TERMS OF BOSTON, NEW YORK, CHICAGO, OR OTHER MID-WEST, AND SAN FRANCISCO. WOULD LIKE MEET INTELLECTUALS, INCLUDING CRITICS OF VIET-NAM. IN THIS CONNECTION, WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK WITH CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE, IF THIS ACCEPTABLE TO US.

G. EXPRESSED SPECIAL DESIRE TO SEE CAPE KENNEDY.

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 23812 ~~SECRET~~

H. HE LIKES FISHING IF THIS COULD BE WORKED IN.

I. STOP AT HONOLULU, WITH MEETING AT CINCPAC, MIGHT BE USEFUL. (THIS NOT MENTIONED TO HIM.)

4. I DID NOT MENTION MRS. THIEU, AND WILL CLEAR THIS UP AT NEXT MEETING.

5. HOPE THIS GIVES YOU ENOUGH TO START DEVELOPING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS.

6. RECKNAGEL WILL BE CONTROL OFFICER.

7. OTHER SUBJECTS DISCUSSED THIS MORNING IN SEPTTEL.

BUNKER  
BT

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 3, 1968  
2:45 p. m.

44

MR. PRESIDENT:

If we get into a talk and fight situation, we should be conscious of our objectives, our strengths, and our weaknesses.

### Objectives

The objective would be to create a political situation at home and in Saigon, plus a military situation on the ground, in which the other side feels that it must hurry to get a definitive peace settlement. Militarily, we should be conscious that we have an opportunity we did not have in Korea. In Korea we were at a fixed line in which the enemy could impose casualties -- and frustration in the U. S. -- without losing anything of his bargaining position. Inside South Vietnam we have the capacity to be steadily improving our position as talks proceed. That should be the object of the exercise.

### Strengths

Our basic strength is the U. S. military potential on the ground and the fact that, if used wisely, it can, along with the ARVN, be steadily cleaning up the North Vietnamese units threatening the cities and pushing the VC units out in the countryside.

In addition, if we can give Thieu's government confidence that we shall not negotiate a southern settlement over his head -- without his participation -- the South Vietnamese could mount an extremely effective psywar campaign against the VC; because once they start talking with us it should not be difficult to convince the VC that they will have to make their terms with Saigon.

Finally, we have the opportunity to ask all political groups in the U. S. to unite behind the President to see if an honorable peace can be drawn from these negotiations -- and to pipe down. I suspect that even Fulbright and The New York Times can be induced to be quiet and wish you well.

### Weaknesses

Our greatest danger lies in the politics and psychology of South Vietnam. While not surrendering our freedom of action wholly or giving Thieu a blank check, we must convince both Thieu's government (and his military) and the South Vietnamese people that we shall be in the closest possible consultation with their government. We shall continue to strengthen their armed forces; and we regard them as central to the negotiation of a southern political settlement along the lines of your December TV interview.



As General Taylor suggests, we and the South Vietnamese must be very alert to the possibility that they will try to use negotiations as a cover for a second wave of attacks, and that, in general, they will also try to fight hard as well as to negotiate. In addition, we must count on their trying to split the non-Communists in South Vietnam with rumors that we are going to sell out over their heads. All of this will require of us the closest possible military and political collaboration with the GVN and with the political leadership outside the GVN, in the Senate, Lower House, and elsewhere.

W. W. Restow

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 3, 1968 -- 2:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a possible agenda for 2:45 p.m. lunch meeting today.

1. Should we accept?  
OR Should we say we react positively and are sounding our allies?
2. Consultation with GVN.  
Is Bundy guidance (his para. 2) acceptable.
3. Consultation with Manila Allies.  
Is Bundy guidance (his para. 3) acceptable.
4. Cables to our men in Seoul, Bangkok, Manila.  
Recommended in second part of Bundy's para. 3.
5. Any change in Present Bombing Ground Rules?  
Bundy's para. 4.
6. How do we phrase affirmative response after consultation?  
(Issues in Bundy's para. 5)
7. Preparation of Instructions for Preliminary Talks.  
(Bundy's para. 6)
8. Presidential statement to the country.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By AS, NARA, Date 5-13-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

45a  
W. P. Bundy:bmm  
April 3 1968

CHECKLIST OF DECISIONS AND PROBLEM AREAS IN  
RESPONDING TO HANOI STATEMENT

1. Public Response Today.

We currently need to indicate an affirmative reaction and an awareness of the importance of the statement. At the same time, we should not accept today until we have really consulted with Saigon and the Manila allies.

In sum, we should hit an affirmative tone and refer to immediate and urgent consultations.

2. Consultation with the GVN

We should instruct Bunker to act at once with both Thieu and Ky. He should explain that Hanoi's willingness to enter into any kind of talks with us in the ~~lx~~ absence of a complete bombing stoppage is a significant change in their position. He should make it perfectly clear that, in keeping with our past statements that we would talk about the conditions for talks, we have no alternative from every standpoint but to accept. He should get their full concurrences to this.

In the process, Bunker should be armed with as much material as possible to:

- a. Make clear the kind of position we would take on

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 91-287

By uply, NARA, Date 5-13-92

"not taking advantage."

b. Offer the possibility of GVN liaison at the <sup>site</sup> ~~sight~~ of the preliminary talks, but indicate that it might be preferable (bearing in mind communications security) ~~for~~<sup>to</sup> inform them regularly and currently through Bunker.

c. Support the position we will have to take -- that these preliminary talks can only be conducted by us, and that we cannot raise any question of the GVN role in this stage.

d. Explain the problems that will arise when we try to set the format for substantive talks -- assuming that we can work out a satisfactory understanding on "not taking advantage." We should probably give assurance that in any event GVN representatives would be physically present at the ~~sight~~ <sup>site</sup> of the substantive talks. We should further explore the idea of a "our side -- their side" arrangement under which American or GVN negotiators would represent "our side" either on a random basis or in accordance with whatever issue was under discussion in the substantive talks.

e. Give Thieu the basis for a public statement supporting our entry into the preliminary talks, indicating that the GVN has been fully consulted, and indicating that assurances have been given that GVN interests and participation will be fully



taken into account by the US in any substantive talks.

### 3. Consultation with Manila Allies

The Secretary's presence in Wellington means that he must in any event raise the issue and indicate that we see no alternative to our accepting preliminary talks. The Secretary should try to get the Australians and New Zealanders together so that he serves as our action man in obtaining their immediate concurrence. However, he should indicate that we expect to go direct to Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines -- where only the top men can really act and where any attempt to go through the representatives in Wellington would simply cause delay and foul-up.

Without waiting for the GVN concurrences, we should send action cables to our men in Seoul, Bangkok, and Manila -- saying that we believe we must accept and propose to announce this on Thursday. These cables should contain full supporting arguments and a general assurance that the interests and participation of the allies will be kept fully in mind as we see whether substantive talks can be arranged. All three should be told that we are talking to Thieu and Ky, that we believe they will concur at once, and that we need these three concurrences in addition and without waiting for full word on Thieu and Ky.

4. Any Change in Present Bombing Ground Rules?

We should examine the full text of Hanoi's statement to see if this really raises any issue on what we are now doing. Unless it ~~is~~ does, we should not change the ground rules, but should establish a firm position that we adhere to military ground rules during talks of any character. (This position is vital as we look down the line to our necessary freedom of action in the South if there is a complete bombing cessation.)

If Hanoi's statement ~~does emphatically~~ complain vigorously, we should weigh the issue very carefully.

However, even if we do not change the ground rules, it is vital that we should not appear to step up any part of our actions over what we have been doing in the past three days. We should not hit targets near the 20th in any additional force or with any additional frequency whatever -- and it would be useful if we could get clear new ground rules into the orders. Similarly, the total weight of our attacks throughout the <sup>presently</sup> ~~predominantly~~ defined area should not go up. Thirdly, our reconnaissance activity (and leaflets, if any) should not be on <sup>any</sup> greater basis than it has been for the last three days.

### 5. Affirmative Response

The consultations above are of course aimed at being in a position to give an affirmative response, at least in principle, at once. In that response, we would plan to refer to past statements -- notably Secy Rusk on October 22 last -- that we have always said we would be prepared to talk about the "conditions" under which talks could be taken place, including the possibility of a cessation of bombing. We have tricky points, however, on how we refer to "other acts of war", and we may also prefer to use the word "circumstances" rather than "conditions" -- ~~xxxxxxxx~~ ~~xxxxxxxx~~ the word we avoided in the San Antonio formula.

In addition, we face the problem whether our affirmative response should say we ~~and~~ accept in principle and are in touch with Hanoi on place and time -- or should propose a specific place and time, and ~~index~~ identify our negotiator(s).

The former has the difficulty that we have no channel to Hanoi which is both quick and reliable. (The British ~~and~~ have no secure communications there, although we might at once ask them to raise with Hanoi their being given this right -- which was taken from them some months ago.) The French might conceivably be used for this limited mission as an alternative, but this has some psychological disadvantages especially if it leaked to the South Vietnamese.

Direct contact in Hanoi seems to us far preferable to any attempt to deal through North Vietnamese representatives overseas.

In the face of these difficulties -- unless we could get the British into secure operation -- it may be preferable from every standpoint to propose time and place publicly in our response.

In either case, we have to consider what place and timing to propose. Psychologically, Geneva has drawbacks in South Vietnam, and perhaps Bern would be a good choice. On timing, the fact is that our position needs military and other checking requiring at least 2 - 3 days -- if we are to do the job at all properly. On balance, a week would seem about the right balance between the need to show speed and the need to prepare carefully ( and perhaps to check out further elements of our position in Saigon).

6. Preparation of Instructions for Preliminary Talks

This should in any event proceed urgently. The following are the key topics that appear at once:

a. How to explain "not taking advantage." Here we have the problem of defining a "normal" rate of infiltration. We also have the problem of defining the kind of major attacks across or near the DMZ that we would regard as related to the bombing. Thirdly, we must make the point that any major preparatory build-up along the borders of South Vietnam would in our view



be taking advantage. There may be other issues -- and a preliminary paper is being done this afternoon based on staff work started in January.

b. Place, Format, and Timing of Substantive Talks.

All these issues have been examined in the staff work done in January. They need urgent review, particularly on the devices that could be used to bring the GVN in and at the same time minimize our NLF problem. Possible locations were examined in the staff work and this needs review.

INFORMATION

Wednesday - April 3, 1968

Mr. President -

Herewith a personal letter from the Brazilian Ambassador concerning your speech last Sunday night.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

April 2, 1968 letter from Brazilian Ambassador  
Leitao de Cunha.

46a

Washington, D. C.  
April 2, 1968

His Excellency  
Lyndon B. Johnson  
President of the United States of America  
Washington, D. C.

*Dear Mr. President,*

I was deeply struck by Your Excellency's speech on television on Sunday night and feel it my duty as a citizen of this Continent - to the development and welfare of which you are so powerfully contributing - to express my admiration for your great gesture and generous approach towards the re-establishment of peace against aggression and the upholding of unity in your great country.

I trust you will not mind, Sir, if I trespass somewhat on the boundary of your national politics, by addressing you on this subject. However, what happens in, or is done by, the United States of America has such far reaching effects on the lives and welfare of men all over the world, that I feel entitled to send you the expression of my warmest wishes for the success of your disinterested initiative and of my personal admiration for your most high-minded statemanship.

*Respectfully yours  
Vasco Pereira de Almeida*

47  
**INFORMATION**

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 3, 1968  
2:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Taylor offers wise  
advice on the handling of the Hanoi offer.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg NARA Date 4-27-92

WWRostow:rla



Wednesday, April 3, 1968  
10:45 a. m. *48*

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Australians Unhappy About Late Notification

Ambassador Waller came in yesterday to register his Prime Minister's unhappiness with the short notice he received regarding your statement on Viet Nam. He pointed out that consultation with the U. S. plus the appearance of consultation is a major issue in Australia where the opposition portrays the Government as a U. S. satellite. The text of Prime Minister Gorton's message to Waller is attached, plus the text of a sturdy public statement by Gorton.

Gorton's complaints are mainly:

- 1) the lack of full consultation with a staunch ally;
- 2) delay in receiving the full text (the Australian press had it before he did). The latter was particularly difficult for him politically.

Our Embassy in Canberra delivered the principal elements of the bombing hold-down and other aspects of your speech to the Australian Government 24 hours in advance of delivery. They could not catch Gorton before his departure to Wellington Sunday morning, but the message was delivered to Foreign Minister Hasluck. The Prime Minister received the same briefing on his return to Canberra (Sunday evening, Australian time).

There was a delay in delivery of the text here the night of the speech. It was made available to the press at about 7:45 p. m., less than two hours before delivery. Copies went to the State Department and were given to the Australian Minister and others at about 8:45 p. m. The text probably reached Canberra about the same time you were speaking, or a little later.

I explained to Ambassador Waller our problem in getting a final text earlier than 7 p. m. and expressed sympathy with his problem.

State (Bundy) has also discussed this with the Australians.

It is important that Secretary Rusk see Gorton and reassure him en route home -- which he plans to do on Saturday.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-268  
By us, NARA Date 1-15-99

48a

AP 46

CANBERRA

2ND APRIL 68 ( )

2ND APRIL 68 ( )

PRIORITY

UNCLASSIFIED

A.P. 46

VIETNAM.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT MADE IN PARLIAMENT ON 2ND APRIL BY THE PRIME MINISTER, MR JOHN GORTON..

BEGINS.

YESTERDAY AT NOON, AUSTRALIAN EASTERN TIME, THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ANNOUNCED DECISIONS LATELY CONCERNING THE WAR IN VIETNAM.

THESE DECISIONS WERE, FIRSTLY, TO BUILD UP THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES TO A PLANNED TARGET OF 800,000 MEN - AN INCREASE OF 135,000 - AND TO RE-EQUIP THESE AUGMENTED FORCES WITH MORE MODERN EQUIPMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES., SECONDLY, TO MAINTAIN THE U.S. FORCES AT THE LEVEL OF APPROXIMATELY 525,000 MEN, WHICH IS THE LEVEL OF THE UNITED STATES FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM NOW, AND TO DISPATCH SOME ANCILLARY TROOPS TO SERVICE TROOPS WHICH HAD RECENTLY BEEN FLOWN TO SOUTH VIETNAM., THIRDLY, TO RENEW A RESOLVE TO CONTINUE THE MILITARY STRUGGLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM UNTIL SUCH TIME AS A JUST AND LASTING PEACE COULD BE WORKED OUT IN THAT COUNTRY., AND, FOURTHLY, TO CEASE OR HALT AERIAL AND NAVAL BOMBARDMENT OVER A MAJOR PART OF NORTH VIETNAM IN THE HOPE THAT SUCH CESSATION MIGHT LEAD TO THE BEGINNING OF TALKS DESIGNED TO SECURE SUCH A JUST PEACE.

I MADE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THAT MATTER, BUT I FEEL THAT I

HE MIN CW AFD RSL DR/P\*A RS/SH AJSS

I.2843



SHOULD REPEAT IT HERE IN THE HOUSE BEFORE EXPANDING UPON IT.

THE STATEMENT THAT I MADE IS AS FOLLOWS..

(SEE TELEGRAM A.P. 42)

I NOW PROPOSE TO EXPAND SOMEWHAT UPON THAT STATEMENT OF THE GOVT'S ATTITUDE.

THE DECISION BY THE PRESIDENT TO HALT THE BOMBING OF THE LARGER PART OF NORTH VIETNAM - A PART WHERE 90 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION LIVES AND WORKS - NATURALLY HAS ATTRACTED WORLD ATTENTION.

I SAY "NATURALLY" BECAUSE OF THE RECENT SUGGESTIONS MADE IN MANY QUARTERS, AND SUPPORTED, I UNDERSTAND, BY U THANT, THAT IF THE U.S. HALTED ITS BOMBING OF CONTROLLED AND SELECTED TARGETS IN THAT AREA, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS AIMED AT SECURING A JUST, LASTING AND GENUINE PEACE FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE.

I SAY "NATURALLY" ALSO BECAUSE AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND THIS GESTURE BY THE U.S., GIVING UP AS IT DOES A MILITARY ADVANTAGE, IS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT AND GENEROUS GESTURE YET MADE IN THE HOPE OF STARTING SUCH NEGOTIATIONS.

IT IS, MR SPEAKER, AN EXTENSION OF THE OFFER MADE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A. AT SAN ANTONIO LAST SEPTEMBER WHEN HE PUBLICLY OFFERED TO HALT THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM AS SOON AS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD INDICATED THAT SUCH A HALT WOULD LEAD PROMPTLY TO PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION.

THAT OFFER WAS REJECTED BY HANOI.

NOW, THE PRESIDENT HAS GONE THE SECOND MILE.

INSTEAD OF SAYING.. "GIVE US AN INDICATION THAT YOU WILL BEGIN PEACE TALKS AND WE WILL THEN HALT BOMBING, THE PRESIDENT IS SAYING.. "WE WILL NOW HALT THE BOMBING AND ASK YOU IN RETURN TO RESPOND BY BEGINNING NEGOTIATIONS"..

THIS WILL PROVIDE, I THINK, AN ACID TEST OF WHETHER HANOI HAS ANY GENUINE WISH TO ENTER INTO PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS OR NOT.

WE ALL HOPE THEY WILL AND THAT BRITAIN AND THE SOVIET UNION, TO WHOM MY GOVT. HAS SENT MESSAGES SUPPORTING PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S APPEAL, WILL USE THEIR BEST EFFORTS TO SEE THAT THEY DO.

AT THE SAME TIME IT IS IMPORTANT TO REALISE THAT NOT ALL BOMBING HAS BEEN HALTED.

IN THOSE AREAS CONTIGUOUS TO THE BATTLEFIELDS IN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM, THOSE AREAS WHERE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND MUNITIONS OF WAR GATHER AND FLOW TOWARDS THE SOUTH, THE CONTINUATION OF BOMBARDMENT TO HAMPER, HINDER AND REDUCE THIS FLOW WILL CONTINUE.



REINFORCEMENT OF MEN AND SUPPLIES WILL NOT BE STOPPED BY THIS.

BUT IF EVEN A QUARTER OF THE TROOPS DESTINED FOR THE SOUTH ARE DISABLED, IF EVEN A QUARTER OF THE MORTAR BOMBS, MISSILES AND ARTILLARY SHELLS ARE DESTROYED BEFORE THEY CAN WREAK THEIR DESTRUCTION IN THE SOUTH, IF THE TIME TAKEN TO TRANSPORT SUPPLIES IS DOUBLED THEN GREAT ASSISTANCE WILL HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO ALLIED TROOPS IN THE SOUTH AND CASUALTIES AMONG ALLIED TROOPS WHICH OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE BEEN INCURRED WILL NOT BE INCURRED.

THAT IS WHY THE PRESIDENT SAID ..

"I CANNOT IN CONSCIENCE STOP ALL BOMBING SO LONG AS TO DO SO WOULD IMMEDIATELY AND DIRECTLY ENDANGER THE LIVES OF OUR MEN AND OUR ALLIES."

I IMAGINE THERE WOULD BE FEW AUSTRALIANS WHO WOULD NOT AGREE WITH HIM.

WE FOR OUR PART HAVE CONSISTENTLY MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A MILITARY ADVANTAGE IN THE BOMBING OF CONTROLLED AND SELECTED TARGETS OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE IN NORTH VIETNAM.

WE HAVE AS CONSISTENTLY MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE SUPPORTED THE CONCEPT OF HALTING SUCH BOMBING WHEN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO PEACE TALKS, SUBJECT TO THE MILITARY BUILD-UP IN THE SOUTH BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE NOT CONTINUING BECAUSE OF THE BOMBING HALT.

THESE LATEST PROPOSALS WHICH CONTINUE TO OFFER PROTECTION AND SUPPORT TO ALLIED TROOPS IN THE NORTHERN BATTLE FIELD BUT WHICH DELIBERATELY FOREGO THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF MORE WIDESPREAD BOMBING IN THE HOPE OF SECURING THE BEGINNING OF PEACE TALKS, ALSO HAVE OUR SUPPORT AND WE HOPE THEY WILL BE SUCCESSFUL, FOR WE IN AUSTRALIA SEEK, AS WAS STATED IN THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S SPEECH AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS PARLT. ..

".... NEITHER THE DESTRUCTION OF NORTH VIETNAM, NOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE GOVT. OF NORTH VIETNAM BUT MERELY THE CESSATION OF AGRESSION AGAINST THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM SO THAT THOSE PEOPLE MAY, BY THE EXERCISE OF A FRANCHISE THEY THEY HAVE SHOWN THEY KNOW HOW TO EXERCISE EVEN UNDER THE MOST DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS CIRCUMSTANCES, CHOOSE THEIR OWN FORM OF GOVERNMENT.

WE SEEK A JUST AND LASTING PEACE BASED ON THESE OBJECTIVES.

WE HAVE SUPPORTED AND WILL SUPPORT EVERY EFFORT FOR NEGOTIATION OF SUCH A PEACE".

THIS LATEST INITIATIVE IS AN EFFORT TO BEGIN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS FOR SUCH A PEACE.



WE HOPE, AND I THINK ALL AUSTRALIANS HOPE, THAT THIS OBJECTIVE WILL BE ATTAINED.

IT IS NOW FOR HANOI TO RESPOND AND TO SHOW WHETHER THIS PEACE INITIATIVE WILL OR WILL NOT BE REBUFFED, WHETHER THIS SIGNIFICANT CONCESSION WILL OR WILL NOT BE IGNORED, WHETHER THE WAR WILL CONTINUE AT ITS PRESENT TEMPO OR WHETHER, IF PROGRESS IS MADE IN PEACE TALKS IT MAY ABATE.

BUT WE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT, IN DISCUSSING THIS PHASE OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, OF THAT REITERATION IN IT OF A FIRM RESOLVE, SHOULD PEACE INITIATIVES OF THIS KIND BE REBUFFED, TO CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE UNTIL IT IS CLEAR TO THOSE WHO ARE AGGRESSORS THAT THERE WILL HAVE TO BE TALKS WHICH WILL LEAD TO A TRUE PEACE AND NOT TO SOMETHING WHICH THE PRESIDENT DESCRIBED AS A FAKE PEACE.

WE FOR OUR PART ARE READY TO STAND WITH OUR ALLIES, AS WE HAVE IN THE WAR'S PROSECUTION.

WE ARE READY TO SUPPORT OUR ALLIES AS WE HAVE IN ACTIONS DESIGNED TO SEEK TALKS TO SECURE A TRUE PEACE.

IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THIS LATEST INITIATIVE MAY BE ACCEPTED AND THAT THE PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM MAY, THROUGH IT, GAIN THOSE RIGHTS OF SELF DETERMINATION FOR THE PRESERVATION OF WHICH THIS WAR BEGAN AND FOR THE RESTORATION AND PRESERVATION OF WHICH THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT INDICATES THAT THIS WAR WILL, IF NECESSARY, BE CONTINUED, BUT WHICH, AS A RESULT OF THE INITIATIVE HE HAS TAKEN, OFFERS A HOPE OF PEACE TALKS ATTAINING THIS OBJECTIVE WITHOUT FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE."

ENDS

~~SECRET~~

48b

TELEGRAM FROM THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT  
dated 2nd April, 1968

For Waller from Prime Minister.

As I think you know, I and my colleagues were embarrassed by the short notice I received of President Johnson's very important announcement on Vietnam yesterday. Since I received warning of what the President would say, and then only in the broadest terms, only on my return from New Zealand on Sunday evening, it was impossible for me to say in response to press enquiries yesterday that the Australian Government had been fully consulted, and I may have even more difficulty in handling questions in Parliament today.

2. Moreover, I understand that the text of the President's speech was available under embargo to the Washington press at 10.30am Canberra time, which would surely have meant that it could have been made available to us by one means or another before it was delivered. As it was, the Australian press were able to see it before we could.

3. I realise the need for complete secrecy in reaching decisions of this order of magnitude. Nevertheless, I should like you to make sure, by whatever means are open to you, that the President and his senior Aides are made aware of our disappointment and great embarrassment that one of America's closest allies should have been given so little opportunity to address itself properly to the President's proposals and no opportunity to be ready to make informed comments on them immediately on their being made public.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-268  
By isa, NARA Date 1-15-99

~~SECRET~~



for file

49

Wednesday, April 3, 1968  
9:40 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith, as requested, the reasons why we had to continue bombing up to the 20th parallel:

1. At this time of year, the primary supply routes to the frontiers of South Vietnam run through Laos. Specifically, Route 8 running through the Nape Pass; Route 15 running through Mu Gia, are critical for the enemy's supply of the front against Khe Sanh; A Shau valley, which is a supply route for attack against Hue; and the so-called B-3 front including supplies for attack against Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot.

2. In addition, we have to attack Route 7, which runs northwest from Vinh into the Plaine des Jarres in Laos. For Souvanna Phouma, this is critical, notably because an attack is expected in the Plaine des Jarres area at any time by North Vietnamese regulars. It is tactically important to include Thanh Hoa for two reasons:

First, because it is ~~the~~ major concentration and trans-shipment point for both men and supplies going into South Vietnam and Laos;

Second, because it has an airfield which, along with the airfield at Vinh, has recently been active. We have good intelligence that they have been trying to move some MIGs south to attack our B-52's which have done critically important work in breaking up the siege of Khe Sanh and will continue to operate heavily in the northern part of South Vietnam, including the major supply base in A Shau valley.

3. The reason that the President had to take this matter so seriously was because we have the firmest kind of evidence that the enemy is using the supply routes to the South with an intensity we have never seen before, probably in an effort to mobilize forces for a second major wave of attack before the end of the winter-spring offensive. Specifically, Gen. Momyer has told the President that they are for the first time running their trucks at night with their lights on. We have [REDACTED] evidence that they are sending down replacement forces to make up their losses before this second wave of attack, perhaps up to 20,000 men (see Tab A).

4. So urgently do they regard this requirement that they are even uprooting and sending South, North Vietnamese Regional Forces normally engaged in local defense (see Tab B).

5. In making a proposal at this time, therefore, the President had to balance the most forthcoming offer possible with his responsibilities as Commander in Chief.

W. W. R.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 05-76

By isl, NARA, Date 8-15-05