

Evidence of heavy infiltration activity into South Vietnam continues to mount. Since 22 March, several unidentified units of North Vietnam's Military Region 3 have disappeared from their regular communications network, a development that exactly parallels indications in the past of the movement of regular North Vietnamese forces to South Vietnam.

Whether these unidentified elements are among the battalion-size "groups" detected during recent weeks in probable infiltration is not known. The number of such "groups"--now 36--continues to increase.

There is also evidence that the high rate of infiltration during recent months has been accomplished at least in part with record speed. It appears from captured documents that at least some of the personnel associated with the newly identified North Vietnamese 209th Regiment in the central highlands moved over 500 miles from North to South Vietnam in about a month.

3 Apr 68

2

DECLASSIFIED 36

Authority NS 96-38 (1386)

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ By hda/um NARA, Date 1-9-05

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

beginning in February. Vehicular transport over almost the whole distance would have been necessary to accomplish the move in that time.

If Hanoi were able to carry out such apparently speedy deployments in any considerable magnitude in the near future, it would alter dramatically the balance of forces in some areas of South Vietnam.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

51

North Vietnamese Provincial Units Near DMZ

North Vietnam may be mobilizing provincial forces for deployment to South Vietnam.

Prisoners captured last month in northern South Vietnam say that two battalions of the "27th" NVA Regiment are now operating just south of the DMZ in eastern Quang Tri Province. They also claim that the "27th" was formed in early February in North Vietnam from mobilized provincial units.

An intercept of 31 March suggests that the 21st Battalion, Quang Binh Provincial Unit, is recruiting laborers and training in preparation for infiltration. It may join the elements of the "27th" Regiment reported in South Vietnam.

The indicated mobilization of provincial units for deployment to the South is in keeping with Hanoi's recent calls on its population to "mobilize all soldiers and people" and to focus their efforts "on serving the great front line and defending and reinforcing the great rear." (SECRET SAVIN)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 96-38(13a)

By edg/km NARA. Date 4-9-05

3 Apr 68

DIA Intelligence Summary

Page A-7

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

52
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 3, 1968
9:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Khe Sanh-DMZ-A Shau:

- 152 enemy rounds incoming;
- 1,098 friendly rounds;
- 142 tactical sorties, plus 42 B-52's;
- 147 tons resupply;
- weather operable.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By eg, NARA, Date 4-27-92

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 4-27-92

SECRET

52a

Wednesday, April 3, 1968, 9:00 a. m.

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number fifty-nine on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ/A Shau Valley for the 24-hour period of April 2, 1968.

Weather at Khe Sanh was clear to partly cloudy yesterday with visibility to five miles. Fog and low clouds formed by 9:00 p. m. lowering ceilings and visibility to less than 500 feet and 1/2 miles, respectively. These conditions persisted until 9:00 this morning. Yesterday's pattern is predicted for the next 24 hours.

Operation Pegasus continued with only light contact. All objectives for the day were secured. The air assault of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division to landing zones seven kilometers south southeast of Khe Sanh, which was initially planned for tomorrow, will be initiated today. Cumulative casualties for deception plan and Operation Pegasus since March 30 were: Friendly 41 killed (14 ARVN, 27 US), 271 wounded (80 ARVN, 191 US), nine missing; enemy 402 killed, 29 killed by air, nine detained, 73 infantry weapons and 17 crew-served weapons captured (the bulk of these casualties occurred in the deception operations west of Quang Tri).

The enemy fired 152 mixed artillery and mortar rounds at Khe Sanh Combat Base yesterday. Five Marines received minor wounds.

Artillery fire support for Khe Sanh consisted of 142 missions expending 1,098 rounds, fourteen missions were observed. No COFRAM ammunition was fired.

Resupply for the reporting period amounted to 147 short tons. In addition, 59 passenger replacements were flown to Khe Sanh. Seven C-130 and four C-123 aircraft conducted air drops. Thirty-six helicopters landed and delivered cargo and passengers. Supplies remain at a satisfactory level with 27 days of rations and 22 or more days of large caliber ammunition on hand.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/80

By 18 NARA, Date 5-13-92

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12336, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988

By 18 NARA, Date 5-13-92

A total of 142 tactical air sorties were flown in support of Operation Pegasus. Of these, 68 were in the immediate vicinity of Khe Sanh. There was no bomb damage assessment. Tactical air sorties planned for tomorrow total 140, with an additional 100 on call. There are 600 additional preplanned sorties that can be diverted into the Pegasus area.

Seven ARC LIGHT strikes (42 sorties) supported Khe Sanh and Operation Pegasus. Ten secondary explosions were observed. Four missions are scheduled for today.

The early morning radar mission in A Shau showed no unusual returns; however, the evening mission revealed returns of 17, 19 and 15 moving target indications in an area northeast and east of A Shau Valley in the vicinity of Route 547. These heavy returns were picked up at different times during the mission. An afternoon photo mission revealed ten probable occupied anti-aircraft defensive positions. There have been twenty-nine ARC LIGHT strikes in A Shau Valley since February 24.

~~SECRET~~



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

3 April 1968
5:00 AM EST

528

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST
2 April (9:00 AM 3 April, SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)
status as of the above time is as follows:

DAYS SUPPLY 8:00 PM 2 Apr EST
ON HAND (9:00 AM 3 Apr SVN)

CLASS I (Rations)

Meal, Combat, Individual	21	21 days
B Rations	6	6 days

CLASS III (Fuel)

Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	3	3 days
JP-4 Fuel (Jet Fuel)	10.6	10 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	10.4	11 days
Diesel	21.3	14 days

CLASS V (Ammunition)

A. High Explosive

60-mm mortar	48	48 days
81-mm mortar	31	31 days
90-mm (tank)	68	68 days
4.2" mortar	28	28 days
105-mm howitzer	22	22 days
155-mm howitzer	32	33 days

B. Antitank

ROUNDS ON HAND

90-mm AP-T	254
90-mm HEAT	1,089
66-mm rocket (LAW)	2,212
Antitank mines (M-15)	349
Antitank mines (M-19)	469
Antitank mines (M-21)	32
106-mm HEAT	1,557
106-mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T)	1,713
3.5" rocket	2,114

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988

By rs NARA Date 4-27-92

SECRET

8:00 PM 2 Apr EST
(9:00 AM 3 Apr SVN)

C. Antipersonnel

ROUNDS ON HAND

90-mm BEEHIVE	542
105-mm BEEHIVE	1,090
106-mm BEEHIVE	1,456
90-mm CANNISTER	323

CLASS V (COFRAM)

105-mm howitzer	1,684
155-mm howitzer	990
40-mm grenade launcher	6,729
Hand grenades	2,945

2. On 2 April, Khe Sanh was resupplied with 147 short tons as follows:

CLASS I	46 tons
CLASS II	11.5 tons
CLASS III	14.5 tons
CLASS IV	40 tons
CLASS V	31.5 tons
Miscellaneous	3.5 tons

Marshall B. Garth
MARSHALL B. GARTH
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director for
Operations, NMCC

DISTRIBUTION

SECDEF
DEPSECDEF
CJCS (3)
DJS (3)
J-30
J-31
J-32
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J-34
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AWR
MCCC
AFCP
NFP
DDO
ADDO
CCOC
Pac Desk

SECRET

53

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 3, 1968
9:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

Just so that you are fully
informed, herewith an incoming from
Sullivan and outgoing from Bill Bundy
on Baggs and Ashmore.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Vientiane 6972, April 1, 1968
CAS Channel to Joseph Smith

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 5-8-92

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

53a

DATE: 1 APR 68

REDC: Apr 2 0206Z 68

FROM: VIENTIANE 6972

IN 82598

TO: Director

Ambassador Sullivan wishes following be conveyed to Mr. William Bundy, Department of State. Please furnish by return message date time that message delivered to Mr. Bundy.

1. Indonesian charge has handed me following message from Ambassador ^Nugroho in Hanoi:

"Attention Ambassador Sullivan stop. Please send urgent William Bundy Washington stop. Extended discussion of proposals reviewed with you have produced tentative agreement on procedure for meeting between DRV and USA only stop. Statement by President Johnson may remove last obstacle stop. Expect formal and official response tomorrow stop. We can be reached this channel stop. Baggs and Ashmore send."

2. In view previous emotional experiences with Baggs and Ashmore and despite insecurity Indonesian channel, I assume you will wish reply immediately. Would

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 97-269

By is, NARA Date 10-7-98

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

suggest, as anodyne answer, that you might wish merely advise them my representative will meet ICC plane April 5 when it arrives Vientiane.

3. In meantime, if I am to play cloak and dagger with these two characters, please provide me some instructions re "proposals reviewed with you" so that I can correctly represent your position.

End of message

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

538

IMMEDIATE VIENTIANE

Ref: VIENTIANE 6972

Following for Ambassador Sullivan:

Bundy contacted 0400Z-2 April. He suggests you reply that he awaiting further word from Baggs and Ashmore.

End of message.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71C9 71-287

By ip/ly, NARA, Date 5-8-92

~~SECRET~~

FOR CIA

~~SECRET~~

53c

DELIVER TO JOSEPH SMITH ONLY

Please send following outgoing to Vientiane in further reply to Vientiane's 6972:

Baggs and Ashmore were given only repeat only text of San Antonio formula and various public statements concerning it. They were given no repeat no message on our behalf and were not even given detailed explanation of what we meant by not taking advantage ^{IN} of San Antonio formula. We did mention Clifford ^{public} testimony about normal supply levels, and did refer to obvious problems that would be created by attacks in DMZ area and by any buildup.

We will want to play this one very cool indeed whatever they have or think they have. You should arrange to see them carefully when they come back through Vientiane and should then report in fullest detail. You should also make it clear to them that whatever affirmative statement they ^{HAVE} ~~make~~ will almost certainly require checking through diplomatic channels. Finally, they should be ~~as~~ ^{THOROUGHLY} impressed ~~as to importance~~ with the need to keep their mouth shut. Try to get Baggs separately on this point, as he is much the more responsible and reliable of the two.

WPBundy:era 4/2/68

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 74-991-237
By sp/hg, NARA, Date 5-8-92

ACTION

54

Wednesday, April 3, 1968
9:15 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I understand Sect. Rusk would like to plan a press conference in Wellington on Friday, April 5, their time.

He plans to focus on the events at the Wellington meetings. He wishes to know:

-- Do you wish him to go forward with a Wellington press conference?

Yes _____ No _____ Call me _____

-- If so, are there any particular points you would like him to emphasize?

Yes _____ No _____ Call me _____

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-497

By CG, NARA, Date 4-27-95

55

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 3, 1968
8:45 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker notes that "one immediate result of the speech is evidence of greater determination on the part of Vietnamese to shoulder the burdens of the war effort."

W. W. Rostow

Salgon 695 (CAS)

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

55a

RECEIVED
WHICA

1968 APR 3 12 34

DLA202
PP YEKADS
DE YEKADL 856 0941229
P 031215Z
FM SAIGON
TO WHITE HOUSE
ZEM

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY 031144Z APR 68 VIA CAS CHANNELS

FM AMB. BUNKER SAIGON 695

TO WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY WALT ROSTOW

REGRET AGAIN TO HAVE TO SAY THAT I HAVE NOT YET COMPLETED PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE DUE TO MUCH ACTION IN WAKE OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, BUT WILL GET IT OFF TOMORROW. AS YOU MAY SURMISE, THERE IS INTENSE INTEREST HERE IN ALL ASPECTS OF PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AND MUCH SPECULATION AS TO HANOI'S REACTION. I THINK ONE IMMEDIATE RESULT OF THE SPEECH IS EVIDENCE OF GREATER DETERMINATION ON THE PART OF VIETNAMESE TO SHOULD THE BURDENS OF THE WAR EFFORT. REGARDS.

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA CAS CHANNELS

GP-1

100

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

NNNN

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-269
By iso, NARA Date 10-7-98

56

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-497
By cb, NARA, Date 4-27-95

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 3, 1968 -- 8:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

Herewith two messages on the bombing dust off:

1. In the light of a message from Charles Collingwood who was in Hanoi, Ellsworth Bunker now recommends, page 2, that it would be "productive to keep air strikes confined to the area from Vinh south and as close as possible to the DMZ. Departures from this should be rare, fully justified, and publicly explained as directly related to the need to support our forces along the DMZ."

2. Baggs and Ashmore appear to have been given a list of alleged bombing attacks close to the 20th parallel, some of which they claim are not related to military supply movements. In paragraphs 2 and 3 Sullivan comments on what we can expect when Baggs and Ashmore, Miss McCarthy and Schurmann arrive in Vientiane on the evening of April 5.

We have not yet received Collingwood's message to Saigon; but I presume it reports that Hanoi plans to make a big noise about the bombing raids nearest the 20th parallel.

WWR Comment: Aside from Hanoi's using this, via the peacenik, as an excuse, the diplomatic question: What would they do if we did restrict bombing south of Vinh? -- a question we might put to the Russians. The point of your exercise was to use a very substantial cutback in bombing to create a condition in which we could go to the negotiating table. Whether or not they are in a mood to do that is the question we ought to get the Russians to answer for us in a pretty straightforward way.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

00 RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 23829 0941040
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 030110Z APR 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9988
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 23829

NODIS

REF/ SAIGON 23830

1. THE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING CABLE CONTAINS TEXT OF A TELEGRAM FROM CHARLES COLLINGWOOD OF CBS, WHO IS NOW IN HANOI, TO CBS. IT WAS GIVEN TO US IN UTMOST CONFIDENCE BY CBS SAIGON BUREAU CHIEF DAN BLOOM. HE ASKED THAT IT BE REVEALED TO NO ONE INCLUDING CBS THAT HE HAS PASSED US THIS MESSAGE.

2. FOLLOWING ARE MY COMMENTS ON COLLINGWOOD'S REPORT:

A. COLLINGWOOD INTERPRETATION OF COURSE REPRESENTS ONLY A CROSS SECTION OF OPINION FROM INFORMAL CONTACTS IN HANOI, AND MAY OR MAY NOT BE VALID. I WANT, HOWEVER, TO ADD MY OWN COMMENTS.

~~PAGE 2 RUMJIR 23829 SECRET~~

B. THE BOMBING ON THANH HOA A FEW HOURS AFTER DELIVERY OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AND TUESDAY'S DOD ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE PARAMETER OF OUR REDUCED BOMBING WOULD EXTEND TO THE 20TH PARALLEL HAS GONE A LONG WAY TO DISSIPATE THE POSITIVE INITIAL REACTION OF US AND FOREIGN PRESS CORPS HERE IN SAIGON TO PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. BY THE NATURE OF THEIR QUESTIONS IT IS ALREADY CLEAR THAT MANY CORRESPONDENTS HERE WILL INTERPRET THE 20TH PARALLEL BOUNDARY AS VIOLATION OF THE SPIRIT OF THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT. THE THANH HOA BOMBING IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SPEECH WAS PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW. I EXPECT WE WILL GET CRITICISM AND NEGATIVE STORIES AS A RESULT.

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL : 692Q
RECEIVED :: April 3, 1968
6:07A.M.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-267
By uo, NARA Date 10-1-98

~~SECRET~~

-2-Page, SAIGON 23829, April 3, 1968 NODIS

C. WE HERE OF COURSE CONTINUING TO ADHERE TO OUR NO COMMENT POLICY IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, BUT I WOULD URGE THAT THE APPROPRIATE WASHINGTON AGENCIES MIGHT RE-EXAMINE OUR AIR STRIKE ON TARGETS NORTH OF VINH AND OUR PUBLIC POSTURE TO SUCH STRIKES. IN VIEW OF THE FAVORABLE FIRST REACTIONS TO THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AND THE UNFAVORABLE SECDOND REACTIONS

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 23829 ~~SECRET~~

WHICH I NOW EXPECT FROM HERE AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE, I THINK IT WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE TO KEEP AIR STRIKES CONFINED TO THE AREA FROM VINH SOUTH AND AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE DMZ. DEPARTURES FROM THIS SHOULD BE RARE, FULLY JUSTIFIED, AND PUBLICLY EXPLAINED AS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE NEED TO SUPPORT OUR FORCES ALONG THE DMZ.

BUNKER
BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

568

DATE: 3 APR 68
FROM: VIENTIANE 7057
TO: DIRECTOR

RECD: APR 3 1025Z 68
IN 83767

2

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

FOR DELIVERY 0700 LOCAL TIME TO WILLIAM BUNDY FROM AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN:

1. FOLLOWING TWO CABLES RECEIVED TODAY FROM INDONESIAN
CHARGE VIENTIANE:

(1) "PRO AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN STOP. PLEASE TRANSMIT
URGENT WILLIAM BUNDY WASHINGTON STOP. DRV TODAY HANDED US
LIST OF TWELVE BOMB ATTACKS SINCE PRESIDENT JOHNSON SPEECH
STOP. STRIKES AS FAR AS 350 KM NORTH OF DMZ
STOP. DRV STATES TO US AIR RAIDS HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT OVER
A STRIP OF LAND ABOUT 400 KM IN LENGTH AND POPULOUS AREAS WERE
ALSO STRUCK' STOP. YOU MUST UNDERSTAND THIS CANCELS CONCILIATORY
EFFECT OF JOHNSON SPEECH SO FAR AS DRV IS CONCERNED IF CONTINUED
STOP. WE NOW EXPECT COUNTER-PROPOSALS TO PROPOSALS REVIEWED

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-269
By us, NARA Date 10-7-98

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 2

VIENTIANE 7057

IN 83767

WITH YOU ON THURSDAY STOP. SCHEDULED DEPART ICC FLIGHT FRIDAY
STOP. LIST OF BOMB STRIKES AS OF 1900 TUESDAY HANOI TIME FOLLOWS
STOP. BAGGS AND ASHMORE SEND FULL STOP"

(2) " TO AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN FROM AMBASSADOR HUGROHO,
FOLLOWING ASHMORES CABLE PLEASE FOLLOWING LIST OF BOMB ATTACKS TO MR.
WILLIAM DUNDY: APRIL ONE CMA 0910 HH CMA 24 DELAYED ACTION BOMBS
AT HAI BINH VILLAGE CMA THINH GIA DISTRICT THANH HOA PROVINCE
SENICOLON 1310 HH CMA 12 BOMBS AT DONG ANH AND DONG XUAN VILLAGE
CMA DONG SAN DISTRICT CMA THANH HOA PROVINCE CMA 5 TO 7 KMS DISTANCE
FROM THANH HOA PROVINCIAL CAPITAL STOP AT QUANG BINH (17 TO 17, 3
PARALLEL) COLON 1100 HH CMA 6 BOMBS OVER THANH TRACH
CMA QUANG BINH STOP 1200 HH AND 1400 HH WATERMINES LAID AT PHAGIANH
FERRY STOP 1210 HH TO 1215 HH CMA BOMBS AT NGU THUY CMA QUANG
BINH COLON ONE BOMB ON TAY THOI HAMLET CMA TWO BOMBS ON THUONG
NANH AND THUONG DAC HAMLETS SETTING THESE HAMLETS ABLAZE STOP

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3

VIENTIANE 7057

IN 83767

APRIL TWO CMA NORTH AND RIGHT OF 20 PARALLEL COLON 0045 HH THANH HOA RAILWAY STATION BOMBED STOP 1000 HH CMA TU TRU BRIDGE CMA THO TUAN DISTRICT CMA THANH HOA PROVINCE CMA BOMBED STOP 1100 HH CMA HAN BRIDGE NEAR THANH HOA PROVINCIAL TOWN BOMBED STOP 1200 HH UUSS JET PLANES SHELLLED 20 MMNM BUL ON SAN SON ILL STOP FROM 19 TO 20 PARALLEL COMMANDO BOAT ROUNGED AND CAPTURED VIETNAMESE FISHERMAN FROM EAST THANH HOA TO DIEN CHAO DISTRICT CMA NGHE AN PROVINCE STOP FROM 18, 3 TO 19 PARALLEL COLON 0200 HH BOMBS DROPPED AT CUA HOI PORT FULL STOP"

2. ~~IT WOULD SEEM THAT THESE CABLES GIVE PRETTY CLEAR INDICATION OF LINE WHICH HANOI INTENDS TO TAKE WITH RESPECT PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. PRESUMABLY, WE CAN EXPECT THEIR OFFICIAL PRESS AND RADIO ORGANS TO BEGIN TRANSMITTING THIS LINE IN NEAR FUTURE.~~

3. ~~ON OTHER HAND, HANOI, MIGHT, SHREWDLY DECIDE LET AMERICAN PEACENIKS BE THEIR SPOKESMEN, THUS PRESERVING THEIR OWN OPTIONS AND LETTING CASE AGAINST PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS BE BUILT UP BY DISSENTING AMERICANS. IF THEY CHOOSE THIS LATTER TACTIC, WE MAY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 4

VIENTIANE 7057

IN 83767

EXPECT QUITE A CYCLONE TO HIT VIENTIANE THE EVENING OF APRIL 5,
WHEN ICC PLANE RETURNS WITH BASSG, ASHMORE, MCCARTHY AND SCHURHANN.

4. ALTHOUGH I VALUE YOUR COUNSEL TO TRY AND IMPRESS UPON THEM
"NEED TO KEEP THEIR MOUTHS SHUT," I DOUBT THERE WILL BE ANY
POSSIBILITY RESTRAINING SUCH A GROUP WHOSE PRIME INTEREST IS IN
ATTRACTING PUBLICITY AND ATTENTION TO THEMSELVES. THERE IS A
FAIRLY SUBSTANTIAL INTERNATIONAL PRESS CORPS, INCLUDING AT
LEAST THREE TELEVISION TEAMS, WHO ARE LOITERING HERE IN VIENTIANE
FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE GREETING THIS ICC FLIGHT.

5. YOU MAY WISH CONSIDER WHETHER THERE ARE ANY ACTIONS YOU
CAN INITIATE WASHINGTON IN EFFORT STEAL THEIR THUNDER PRIOR
APRIL 5.

~~RECEIVED WASHINGTON APRIL 5 1967~~

~~SECRET~~

BT

END OF MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

58
Wednesday, April 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with British Chancellor of the Exchequer
Roy Jenkins Thursday, April 4, 10:45 a. m.

Jenkins is in the United States for talks with Secretary Fowler, Chairman Martin, and other senior U. S. officials. He also has speaking engagements in Boston and New York.

On March 19 Jenkins presented one of the toughest budgets in British history including tax increases amounting to about \$2.1 billion in a full year. (This is about 2% of Britain's GNP; a comparable increase in the U. S. tax bill would be almost \$16 billion.) He is also asking for legislation to limit increases in prices, wages, and dividends.

The budget will greatly strengthen Britain's balance of payments position. The budget announcement itself has helped rebuild confidence in international financial conditions.

Jenkins will probably give you his views on Britain's economic prospects and on the Stockholm meeting. He may ask for your views on prospects for the tax surcharge.

You may wish to:

- Congratulate him on his budget.
- Express appreciation for Britain's cooperation at Stockholm and at the Washington Gold Pool Meeting.
- Express our determination to strengthen our balance of payments position.

State's talking points paper and biographic memo is at Tab A.

Mr. Jenkins will be accompanied by Sir Patrick Dean. I will be standing by with Ed Fried.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-291

By *ju*, NARA, Date *7-14-94*

W. W. Rostow

ERF:mm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1968


IN REPLY REFER TO:
S/S 5434

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Visit of British Chancellor of the
Exchequer Roy Jenkins

The President is scheduled to meet with the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Roy Jenkins, on
Thursday, April 4, at 11:30 a.m. Enclosed are
talking points for the meeting, and a biographic
sketch of Jenkins.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

Talking Points
Biographic Sketch

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1161
1-Fried
2-Ret
58a

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.1(a)

BY rg ON 5-12-92

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1968 APR 3 PM 4 43

588

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TALKING POINTS

VISIT OF BRITISH CHANCELLOR OF THE
EXCHEQUER ROY JENKINS

April 4, 11:30 a.m.
10:45

You have agreed to receive Mr. Roy Jenkins on April 4 at 11:30 a.m. Thereafter he goes to a lunch in his honor hosted by Secretary Fowler. He will also see Chairman Martin and several other financial officials. From Washington he goes to Boston and New York for speeches and visits with the financial community.

Mr. Jenkins will probably:

1. Outline to you his economic strategy and Britain's economic prospects.

(On March 19 Mr. Jenkins presented one of the toughest budgets in British history. He announced increases in taxation amounting to some £900 million in a full year, an increase of about 8 percent in the Government's total tax revenues. The goal is to cut personal consumption to make room for increases in exports and private investment. The balance of payments should start to move into surplus in the second half of 1968. He also stated the Government's policy to limit increases in prices, incomes, and dividends. Necessary legislation will be introduced shortly.)

2. Comment on last week's Group of Ten Meeting in Stockholm.

You may wish to:

1. Congratulate the Chancellor on his budget.
2. Express appreciation for Britain's cooperative stand in the Group of Ten negotiations.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 -

3. Indicate that we look forward to the British economic program producing the desired improvement in Britain's economic and financial position.

4. Stress that the United States, too, is determined to pursue vigorously its balance of payments program.

5. Express appreciation for British cooperation during the "gold crisis", emphasize our common interests in making a success of the new central bank arrangements relating to gold, and reiterate our determination to maintain the price of monetary gold at \$35 an ounce.

6. Emphasize continued US support for Britain's efforts to get into the Common Market.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 8, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's 5:00 a.m. (his time) reaction to Hanoi's statement.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By arg, NARA, Date 4-27-92



Department of State

^{59a}
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

^{#1}
ACTION COPY

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FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
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1968 APR 3 PM 12 54

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SECTO 25

REF: TOSECS 56 - 68

FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY FROM THE SECRETARY

MY QUICK REACTION TO TOSEC 56 IS AS FOLLOWS:

1. IF THEY SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO GENEVA OR ELSEWHERE, WE SHOULD DO THE SAME.
2. WE SHOULD HAVE A REPRESENTATIVE OF GVN PRESENT AT THE SAME PLACE EVEN THOUGH FIRST CONTACT IS LIMITED TO US AND DRV.
3. IT WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE FOR REPRESENTATIVES OF TWO CO-CHAIRMEN TO BE AVAILABLE AT SAME SITE.
4. IF WE ARE TO STOP ALL BOMBING THERE SHOULD BE COMPARABLE MILITARY ACTION BY DRV. WE SHOULD TRY TO GET WITHDRAWAL OF DRV FORCES IN THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES BACK ACROSS THE DMZ INTO NORTH VIET-NAM. ALTHOUGH DRV MIGHT BEGIN BY SAYING THIS IS CONDITIONAL, THESE PRELIMINARY CONTACTS COULD BEGIN SOME DICKERING ON QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE PRIOR TO FULL BOMBING CESSATION.
5. IT IS FIVE A.M. AS I COMMENT AND I WILL NOT HAVE CHANCE TO SOUND OUT OTHER TROOP CONTRIBUTORS FOR ANOTHER FIVE HOURS.
6. WOULD APPRECIATE FULL TEXT HANOI STATEMENT SOONEST. RUSK

~~SECRET~~

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Authority MLG-91-287

By ispl/y, NARA, Date 5-8-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - April 3, 1968

ACTION

60

Free file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Pan American Day: First Anniversary of the OAS Summit

Sunday, April 14, is Pan American Day and the first anniversary of the Punta del Este meeting. The event warrants special treatment.

Covey Oliver and Bill Bowdler have come up with two ideas which I recommend to you:

1. That you send personal letters to each of your colleagues reviewing the progress made on the Summit Action Program and the advances achieved by them under the Alliance for Progress in their respective countries. (See sample letter at Tab A).

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____.

2. That in a speech at Hemisfair or some other suitable occasion next week (e.g., some 15 Latin American Ministers of Agriculture will be in Washington from Monday to Thursday, April 8-11) you call for a high level multinational Task Force, under the direction of a prominent Latin American, to prepare a master plan for physically integrating Latin America, including identification of projects and setting of priorities. (See scenario at Tab B). Covey's informal soundings with key governments and the heads of CIAP and the Inter-American Bank show that the initiative would be well received. The Bank and AID have the money to cover the cost.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-268

By us, NARA Date 1-15-99

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

- Tab A - Draft of proposed Presidential letter to Presidents.
- Tab B - Scenario on physical integration.

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60a

Draft Letter to Presidents
Marking First Anniversary of Punta del Este Meeting

Dear Mr. President:

One year has passed since we met in Punta del Este to discuss with the other American Presidents and the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago what we could do to intensify our common efforts under the Alliance for Progress and move more quickly toward our goal of bringing a better, more productive life to all peoples of our Hemisphere. Throughout the past year, we have often been reminded that great achievements can only come from great effort, mutual respect and understanding, and the workings of that most valuable dimension -- time. On this first anniversary of our meeting, I believe that we have made an auspicious beginning in carrying out our pledge to accelerate development efforts in the Hemisphere. By moving immediately to turn words into deeds, our peoples have again demonstrated their confidence that we can achieve our goals as long as we continue to work together.

The Inter-American Cultural Council has prepared a regional plan, and pledged financial support, to modernize teaching methods and to harness modern science and technology to our hemispheric

development efforts. We have signed a new and stronger International Coffee Agreement; established a Coffee Diversification Fund; and founded the Inter-American Export Promotion Center to stabilize and increase Latin America's earnings from foreign trade.

The six per cent increase in food production during 1967 is an important first step toward making Latin American farms produce the abundance of which they are capable. We have increased the resources of the Inter-American Development Bank by \$400 million and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration by \$35 million to enable those institutions to help finance the construction of vast transportation, power and communications networks, which we agreed were vital to prepare the way for economic integration.

In 1967 alone, the Inter-American Development Bank extended almost half a billion dollars in loans, by far the greatest total since its inception. You and your colleagues in the Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Association, among other actions, have established a consultative group as a first step toward the ultimate merger of your trading areas into the Latin American Common Market.

I congratulate you and all (nationality) on the further development work you have done in your own country since our meeting at Punta del Este. (Examples)

Through these and other actions, we have begun the great task set for our nations in the Action Program adopted at Punta del Este last year. The advances we have already made have shown the world once again that Americans know how to work together in peace. On behalf of the people of the United States, I reaffirm our unwavering resolve to support your continuing efforts and wish you and your people well during the increasingly active and challenging years ahead.

Sincerely,

Lynddn B. Johnson

His Excellency

President of _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Proposed Scenario

for Promoting Latin American Physical Integration

1. Conduct informal consultations with key Latin American governments, CIAP Chairman Sans and IDB President Herrera to test their reaction to the Task Force proposal.

3. Assuming a favorable response, ask the President to include a statement along the following lines in a speech at Hemisfair, or on Pan American Day:

"Last year at Punta del Este I joined my fellow-Presidents in calling for a bold program to overcome the natural barriers to Latin American physical unity. The Latin American countries have too long been isolated from each other -- divided by high mountain ranges, deep rain forests and forbidding deserts.

Locked behind these barriers are vast resources which can help fulfill the promise of a better life for all their peoples.

The new frontiers of the South American heartland beckon those imaginative enough, daring enough, determined enough to penetrate. A start has already been made by some governments. The Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress and the Inter-American Development Bank have done some initial planning. I ask whether the time has not come to prepare a systematic blueprint for carrying forward this gigantic enterprise -- an enterprise capable of binding a continent with the roads and river systems, power grids and pipelines, transport and telecommunications.

To this end, I suggest to my fellow Presidents and those who direct our Alliance for Progress institutions the establishment of a high level task force, under the

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By iso, NARA Date 1-15-99

leadership of a distinguished Latin American, to prepare a five-year plan for carrying forward the physical integration of our hemisphere. The United States will lend its fullest cooperation."

3. Encourage Sanz and Herrera to take the initiative in drafting terms of reference for, and composition of, the Task Force for presentation by them to the April IDB Board of Governors and CIAP meetings as a basis for discussion.
4. Encourage Colombian President Lleras in his address to the IDB Board of Governors meeting (Bogota - April 22-26) to give strong endorsement to the Task Force idea (as President Johnson did to President Illia's proposal for an OAS Summit.)
5. Herrera at the same meeting would seek approval for IDB participation in the work of the Task Force, including contributing to its expenses (estimated to be about \$500,000). Secretary Fowler would support the Herrera initiative and indicate US willingness to share in the cost, using our Alliance for Progress funds.
6. Sanz would take the same action in CIAP when it convenes on April 29. Ambassador Linowitz would reiterate US support.
7. With IDB and CIAP backing, Sanz and Herrera would prepare a draft resolution -- for their joint presentation to the 6th Annual Meeting of the IA-ECOSOC tentatively scheduled to take place on June 18-29 at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad --
 - (a) establishing the terms of reference of the Task Force and providing the machinery for selection of its members, and
 - (b) instructing the Task Force to make preliminary presentation of its report to the CIAP and IDB prior to presenting it formally to a meeting of IA-ECOSOC in the spring of 1969 for the concurrence of governments. (As appropriate, Ministers of Transport, Communications, Fuels and Energy, and Public Works would be invited to attend this meeting.)

If, as now appears possible, the decision is taken to postpone the 6th IA-ECOSOC conference, Herrera and Sanz would introduce the draft resolution at the Special Meeting of the IA-ECOSOC which will have to convene either late in May or in June to approve certain budgetary and other administrative matters. The resolution could then contemplate submission of the completed report to the rescheduled 6th IA-ECOSOC.

8. In discussing the draft resolution with Sanz and Herrera, suggest:

The plan might cover the following sectors --

a. Telecommunications

Inter-American Telecommunications Network; Central American Telecommunications Network.

b. Highways

Pan-American Highway; Carretera Marginal de la Selva; transverse highways joining groups of countries.

c. Electric Power

Multinational projects; interconnecting grids.

d. Marine Transport

Port operation and development; marine and fluvial shipping services.

e. Air Transport

Expansion of existing air transport system, including navigation facilities and other ground facilities to aid air transport.

f. Pipelines

Petroleum and natural gas.

The composition of the Task Force might be along these lines --

- Chairman - prominent Latin American like Raul Saez.
- Members - Chairman of the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress (CIAP);
- the President of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB);
 - the Secretaries General of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and Central American Common Market (CACM);
 - high officials of the Inter-American Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Agency for International Development (AID);
 - other international development agencies.
- Staff - economists, engineers and development planners.

61

Wednesday, April 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Prime Minister Sato of Japan

Attached for your approval is a draft reply to Prime Minister Sato's letter to you expressing his deep concern over the possibility that we may impose an import surcharge or a border tax for balance of payments reasons. (His letter is at Tab A.)

Your reply notes the importance of an improvement in our trade account to the success of our balance of payments program and our determination to restrain inflation as one means of doing this. It also expresses the hope that Japan and our other major trading partners will take early cooperative action -- such as advance cuts in the Kennedy Round tariff reductions -- to help us achieve this end.

The letter is designed to keep pressure on the Japanese to seek and participate in a satisfactory trade expansion package. It implies this could be a substitute for action on our part but it does not close off your options.

The letter was drafted in State with Gene Rostow and Tony Solomon's approval and cleared by Treasury and Bill Roth. I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By us, NARA Date 1-15-99

ERF
ERF:mmm

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By us, NARA Date 1-15-99

61a

SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER SATO OF JAPAN

I have read your thoughtful letter of March 25, 1968 and wish, first of all, to express my appreciation for the renewed support you have given to the goals of our balance of payments program announced on January 1 of this year. The role that Japan is playing in support of this program is encouraging, particularly in view of the present balance of payments position of Japan. I am certain that I can continue to count on that support in our common interest.

I also recognize the deep concerns you feel over the possibility of the United States Government's taking measures such as border tax adjustments or an import surcharge. As I have frequently stated, the United States Government has every intention of meeting its international responsibilities in the promotion and expansion of world trade as well as in all other areas. We are, however, faced with an extremely serious balance of payments deficit which must be reduced. Improvement in our trade account is critical to the success of our balance of payments program. We would hope the improvement could be effected not only by the internal measures to restrain inflation we are determined to take but also by the early cooperative expansionary action of our major trading partners. In this connection, I particularly welcome the Japanese Government's readiness to accelerate its Kennedy Round cuts and its offer to take other trade-freeing actions. It would be most heartening if a satisfactory solution

could be found through cooperative international action. I hope therefore that the Japanese Government will exert its maximum influence toward finding an expansionary solution.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

618

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By us, NARA Date 1-15-99

Dear Mr. President:

I am deeply appreciative of the fact that you expressed on January 1 of this year your firm determination to maintain the confidence in the U.S. dollar as the key currency of the world by achieving significant improvement in the balance-of-payments position of the United States and of the fact that, since then, your Government has inspite of numerous difficulties continued to make the utmost efforts to this end.

The maintenance of confidence in the U.S. dollar as a foundation of the world monetary system and the improvement of the balance-of-payments position of the United States for that purpose constitute a central factor in the international economic situation, and I believe it imperative that these objectives should be achieved through extensive international cooperation in various fields.

It is for this reason that Japan has been taking the position of rendering as much cooperation as possible to the dollar defense programme of your country inspite of the fact that her foreign exchange holdings amount to only 1.9 billion dollars, including gold reserve of approximately 300 million dollars, and that she is faced with serious difficulties in her balance-of-payments position which it is estimated will show a total deficit of approximately one billion dollars through the calendar years of 1967 and 1968.

I am deeply concerned, however, over the reports that your Government is considering the introduction of such measures as border tax adjustments or import surcharge as a part of the dollar defense programme.

Major countries including Japan have expressed the concern that such measures will not only impair the fruits of the Kennedy Round negotiations attained through mutual cooperation among participating countries, but will also invite counter measures by other countries resulting in the decrease of the volume of world trade.

As you are aware, my country and other trading partners of the United States have made it clear that they stand ready to cooperate by expressing their readiness to accelerate reductions in tariff cuts agreed upon at the Kennedy Round.

negotiations on the condition that no trade restrictive measures such as import surcharge will be adopted, thus cooperating with the United States in solving the question of dollar defence in a manner that would lead to the expansion of world trade.

If, unfortunately, the United States were to decide to go through with these measures in the trade field, it might well impair basically the recent trends toward international cooperation in economic and financial fields. It is on this point, Mr. President, my Government attaches its deep concern.

If the United States were to introduce the system of import surcharge at the reported rate of five percent, Japan's exports to the United States will be considerably affected as a result of which Japan's economy itself will sustain a considerable blow. In particular, the impact on this country will be significantly felt among small enterprises in certain specific industrial fields such as textiles and general merchandise. Moreover, since such small enterprises are often concentrated in particular areas in Japan, industries in those areas will sustain a critical blow as a result of which various social problems may arise which in turn could well affect the friendly sentiments existing between our two peoples.

I earnestly hope that, in the light of the circumstances that I have set forth above, your Government will forego the introduction of the system of import surcharge.

Sincerely,

Eisaku Sato
Prime Minister of Japan

62

April 3, 1968

Mr. President:

The Czechoslovak National Assembly has elected President Svoboda, replacing the Stalinist, Antonin Novotny.

Pres file

It might interest you that this is purported to be the first election by secret ballot (in the National Assembly) in Czechoslovakia in 20 years.

W. W. Rostow
Attachment

Congratulatory message

62a

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SVOBODA OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Excellency:

I extend to you cordial congratulations on your election as
President of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, April 2, 1968, 5:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Visitors for Second Half of 1968

Pres file

You will notice from the attached list that no foreign Heads of State or Heads of Government are scheduled to visit Washington during the second half of 1968.

No recommendations have been made for visits beyond the middle of June on the assumption that your schedule would be so crowded and political activities so intense that you should not be committed beyond these visits already approved.

In view of your decision, should we ask the State Department to recommend for your approval visits of Heads of State and Heads of Government during the second half of this year?

W. W. Rostow

_____ Ask State to make recommendations

_____ Leave the schedule as it stands

_____ Call me

BKS:amc

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White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 46, NARA, Date 4-27-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

April 2, 1968

FOREIGN VISITOR SCHEDULE

63a

<u>Approved & firm:</u>		<u>Type</u>	<u>Announced</u>
Chancellor Klaus, Austria	Apr 10	Official to US	1/12
King Olav, Norway	Apr 25-26	State	12/28
Prime Minister Thanom Thailand	May 8-9	Official to US	3/1
President Bourguiba, Tunisia	May 15-16	State	1/10
<u>Approved, date to be set:</u>			
Prime Minister Gorton, Australia	(May 20-24)	--	
President Suharto, Indonesia	(June 5-6)	State	
<hr/>			
Shah of Iran	June 12	Private Office meeting/lunch	

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 5/3/92

ACTION

64

**Tuesday, April 2, 1968
4:15 p.m.**

Pres file

Mr. President:

**Herewith your letter to Thieu
for signature and formal transmission,
in the wake of cable transmission.**

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 72-497
By CB, NARA, Date 4-27-95

64a

April 2, 1969

Dear Mr. President:

I am most grateful that you have accepted my invitation to visit the United States within the next few weeks. I have been looking forward to receiving you here ever since our first meeting in Honolulu those many months ago. There are many things for us to talk about and I look forward to receiving your views on the matters of mutual interest which concern both of our countries.

In my address last Sunday night I announced the first in what I hope will be a series of mutual moves toward peace. I said we would take further steps if our restraint is matched by restraint in Hanoi. I said at that time that we were prepared to move immediately toward peace through negotiations. In those negotiations, we would seek with you to find a way to bring an end to the suffering of your people.

At the same time I want it clearly understood by you and the South Vietnamese people that my offer Sunday night does not in any way dilute our commitment to our goal of peace and self-determination. We are ready to seek an honorable peace but at the same time a vigilant America stands ready to defend an honored cause whatever the price, whatever the burden, whatever the sacrifice that duty may require. As I have said, the United States will never accept a false solution to this war.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Nguyen Van Thieu
President of the Republic of Viet-Nam
Saigon

LBJ:State:WWR:mz

Mr. Rostow

2. Pers file

65

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, April 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israeli Desalting Coordinator

With Heller unable to do this, I've looked back over our list and developed one new thought.

When Mac Bundy tried Kermit Gordon last August, Kermit felt he had too many other obligations, but it might be worth trying him again to see how he's fixed now.

I also wonder whether Jack Valenti would become a possibility again, now that you are less vulnerable to political pressures. On balance, it might still be better to have someone not so close to you, but I thought him worth mentioning again.

I've thought about David Lilienthal. While he could probably do this without serious detriment to his work on Vietnam, I hesitate to involve him because he is Jewish. I think it's fairer to the individual we pick if we can save him from unnecessary pressures; the pressures built into this project are great enough already. Because I hate to base any recommendation on this sort of criterion, I checked my feeling with Luke Battle, and he reluctantly but completely agreed, especially if we may try to link this plant somehow with something on the Arab side.

We still have the following list:

George Woods
Charles Schultze
Lincoln Gordon

James Riddleberger
Max Millikan
William Webster

I think it might be worth trying Gordon, Woods and Schultze. Mac Bundy endorsed all three, and all of them have the capacity to put this together for you in a statesmanlike way.

W. W. Rostow

Try Gordon, Woods, Schultze
in that order _____
Call me _____

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12812,
SEC. 1.3 AND 1.4. DATE 12/1/81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY *19* ON *4-27-92*

66a

Statement by Prime Minister Tage Erlander, April 1, 1968

President Johnson's statement last night on essential curtailment of the bombing of North Vietnam must be welcomed with relief. We must hope that this first step towards peace shall be the beginning of the end to this cruel war. The seriousness of the American peace initiative is emphasized by the fact that the president has appointed two experienced and much respected men as negotiators and - first and foremost - that he has decided to devote the rest of his term in the White House to achieve peace in Vietnam.

It is the ardent hope of the Swedish government that all parties concerned and all those who have the possibility to affect the development in the direction towards peace shall take president Johnson on his words and contribute to make yesterday's statement from Washington a signal to the end of the war in Vietnam.

66

Tuesday, April 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador William W.
Heath Wednesday, April 3, 1:30 p. m.

You last met with Ambassador Heath on March 13. He is in Washington to discuss the timing of his return to Stockholm, what he should say publicly to the press and privately to the Swedish government when he returns, and what tactics he and his Embassy should follow during the next few months before the September Swedish elections.

The Swedish press has been generally critical of Ambassador Heath's recall. The Swedish government has attempted to turn the recall to its advantage in Parliamentary debate, alleging it represents U.S. pressure for a change in the Swedish position on Vietnam.

Prime Minister Erlander's favorable response to your March 31 speech is attached. The tone suggests that Ambassador Heath could usefully return to Stockholm in the near future.

WWR

W. W. Rostow

MWG:mm

67

Tuesday, April 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Wheat for Sicilian Earthquake Victims

Pres file

As you requested, we looked further into the question of whether we could do something more to help the Sicilian earthquake victims. Specifically, could they use any wheat?

The facts are that Italy is currently an exporter of wheat and its wheat carryover stock grew this year.

We also looked into dried milk and vegetable oils - which are in surplus in the U.S. - as other possibilities. At one time we donated these commodities to Italy through the voluntary agencies.

But here again there are problems. Butter and dried milk are in surplus in the Common Market, of which Italy is a member, and their sale abroad is being heavily subsidized by the Community.

The Italians have not asked us for any further assistance and they seem to have the disaster relief problem in hand. If we wish to offer additional help, a program using dried milk and vegetable oils would be more appropriate than wheat.

Both State and Agriculture recommend against any offer, and I concur. The Italians are in good shape financially; their budget and balance of payments positions are strong. The Italian Government has committed almost \$500 million for the Sicilian earthquake victims. This amounts to almost \$600 per capita, which is a good performance by any standards.

W. W. Rostow

No further offer now _____

Work out a program _____

Call me _____

ERF:rst

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NY 92-497

68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By CB, NARA, Date 4-27-95

INFORMATION

Tuesday, April 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Free file

SUBJECT: Stockholm Monetary Conference

1. Stockholm completed another phase in the IMF Special Drawing Rights plan. It brings us closer to creation of "paper gold".

The central issue was whether France would be able either to stall the proposal or change its basic character. Either outcome would have caused an international monetary crisis and a major drive to raise the official price of gold. Faced with this choice, the other European countries joined with us to settle the remaining questions and put the plan in shape for the ratification process.

2. There were few differences between the U. S. and France's European partners. The main reason for compromises was to help Germany, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands take the political heat at home of dividing with the French on this fundamental issue. They had to be able to show that they were not knuckling under to the U. S. but were acting to protect world prosperity on an issue where France was unreasonable. This required a demonstration that they and the U. S. would go the last mile to meet French demands without prejudicing the plan or the quality of the SDR as a reserve asset.

3. We therefore agreed:

- on changes that amount, in effect, to a strict rather than a loose interpretation of the principles adopted at Rio;
- on making it easier for a country to opt out of the agreement after the decision is made to activate it;
- to give the EEC a veto on decisions for any future increases in IMF quotas and some related questions.

We were prepared beforehand to make most of these concessions in one form or another. In some instances, the compromises were more disturbing to France's Common Market partners than they were to us. Others we regretted making, because they reduced flexibility in the future development of the SDR. The provision giving the EEC a veto on some additional IMF decisions will give us some trouble on the Hill, but it is not a substantive issue.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. The willingness of the Four to stand up against the French is a major political development. It demonstrates again that there are limits on how far deGaulle can push them.
5. The French claimed that the system could not work because our economy had gotten out of hand and we were dumping unwanted dollars on the world. In joining with us, the Four showed they had confidence that we would bring our financial house in order and, specifically, that we would pass the tax bill. The tax bill has now become as much of a world issue as the controversy over the price of gold.
6. We are playing the Stockholm meeting not as a victory of the U. S. over France, but as a victory for the world monetary system and for reason in world financial affairs.

The French did not vote against the agreement, but abstained. They could decide to join when the final document is submitted. But this will be difficult for de Gaulle to do -- particularly after France came out publicly for an increase in the price of gold.

The market reaction to Stockholm has been excellent. The price of gold in London is softening and the volume is small.

7. As a result of Stockholm, it should be possible to put the Special Drawing Rights proposal in final form within two weeks. It will then go to each of the Governors of the IMF for approval by a mail vote. This must be completed within thirty days. On this schedule, we should be able to put the proposal before the Congress for ratification by the end of May.
8. The Stockholm agreement and the Washington Gold Pool decisions are building blocks in the development of a stronger monetary system. They have brought order to the financial markets and give us time to move on our fiscal and balance of payments programs. They also mean we must show results on these programs.

W. W. Rostow

ERF:mst

SENT 4:08 P.M. ~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-268

By js, NARA Date 1-15-99

69

~~EYES ONLY~~

1968 APR 2 21 08

PR03001
201Z 02 APR 68
FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE PRIME MINISTER
~~SECRET~~

CAP84731

EYES ONLY MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER WILSON
AS PROMISED LAST NIGHT, I WOULD LIKE TO SEND OUR FURTHER
THOUGHTS ON THE SPECIFIC QUESTION RAISED IN YOUR DETAILED
MESSAGE OF YESTERDAY ABOUT THE ACTIONS BY HANOI WHICH COULD
LEAD US TO STOP THE BOMBING ENTIRELY.

THE RELEVANT SENTENCES IN MY SPEECH OF YESTERDAY
WERE: "EVEN THIS LIMITED BOMBING OF THE NORTH COULD COME TO
AN EARLY END--IF OUR RESTRAINT IS MATCHED BY RESTRAINT IN
HANOI. BUT I CANNOT IN CONSCIENCE STOP ALL BOMBING SO LONG
AS TO DO SO WOULD IMMEDIATELY AND DIRECTLY ENDANGER THE LIVES
OF OUR MEN AND OUR ALLIES. WHETHER A COMPLETE HALT BECOMES
POSSIBLE IN THE FUTURE WILL BE DETERMINED BY EVENTS".

WHAT YOU MIGHT TELL MOSCOW IS THAT THE QUESTION OF WHICH
PARTY SHOULD TAKE THE FIRST DEESCALATORY STEP TOWARDS PEACE
HAS NOW BEEN ANSWERED BY THE UNILATERAL AND UNCONDITIONAL
ACTION OF THE US. THE UNITED STATES HAS STOPPED BOMBING
THE AREA WHICH CONTAINS ALMOST 90 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION
OF NORTH VIETNAM, AND IS RESTRICTING ITS BOMBING TO THE MILITARY
TARGETS IN THE LESS POPULATED SOUTHERN PORTION OF NORTH
VIETNAM WHERE SUCH BOMBING IS TACTICALLY NECESSARY TO PROTECT
THE LIVES OF US AND ALLIED TROOPS. THE NEXT MOVE IN TRYING
TO BRING ABOUT PEACE TALKS AND A REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF
VIOLENCE IS NOW CLEARLY UP TO HANOI, AND THE WORLD WILL BE
WATCHING TO SEE HOW HANOI RESPONDS.

YOU MIGHT ADD THAT THE USG WILL BE EXAMINING HANOI'S
MILITARY MOVES WITH GREATEST CARE IN THE PERIOD AHEAD, AND WILL
BE LOOKING FOR ANY INDICATION THAT HANOI TOO IS WILLING TO
TAKE STEPS TO DECREASE THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE. OBVIOUSLY
WE WOULD BE CONCERNED WITH ANY MAJOR NEW ATTACKS OR EFFORTS
TO INCREASE THE ALREADY ABNORMALLY HIGH LEVELS OF INFILTRATION
OF MEN AND SUPPLIES.

OBVIOUSLY WE WILL ALSO BE INTERESTED IN ANY COMMUNICATION
INDICATING HANOI'S THOUGHTS ABOUT HOW TO MOVE TOWARDS PEACE,
AND IN PARTICULAR ANY INDICATION OF WHAT HANOI'S MILITARY
ACTIONS WOULD BE IF THE US STOPPED ALL BOMBARDMENT OF NORTH
VIETNAM.

YOU MIGHT ALSO WISH TO INDICATE TO MOSCOW THAT IT IS YOUR
PERSONAL BELIEF THAT IF HANOI REJECTS THIS LATEST AMERICAN
INITIATIVE, THE US WOULD BE UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE TO TAKE
ADDITIONAL MILITARY ACTIONS.

I WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO RECEIVE YOUR REACTION TO MY
SUGGESTIONS.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

For file

68 APR 2 PM 4:10

TUESDAY

INFORMATION

70

free file

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, April 2, 1968 -- 4:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

I'll believe it when I see it, but the attached
[redacted] (Tab 1) [redacted]
suggests that our two blind hogs (Baggs and
Ashmore) have found an acorn.

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

[redacted] Baggs and Ashmore are
sending a cable stating that Hanoi will meet directly
with the U. S. for talks.

I repeat, I'll believe it when I see it.

The attached CIA report (Tab 2) indicates that
the Indians are being quite vigorous in both Moscow
and Hanoi in response to your speech.

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-270
By ris, NARA Date 4-28-98

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

SANITIZED

DATE 2 APRIL 1968
IN 83226
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

70a

The following intelligence information, transmitted from a CIA Field Station, requires review within the Clandestine Services before being released outside the Agency. Pending results of this review, a copy is being provided for your advance information.

Distribution for BACKGROUND USE ONLY to SDO 24

D/CNE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOY 2 APRIL 1968

SUBJECT: REACTION IN HANOI TO SPEECH BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

ACQ:

SOURCE:

3.4 (b) (1)
c

A1.

3.4 (b) (1)
c

THE STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON THE MORNING OF 1 APRIL 1968 CONCERNING THE SUSPENSION OF BOMBING HAS NOT YET BEEN PUBLISHED IN THE MEDIA OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV) THE PEOPLE HAVE NOT YET BEEN INFORMED WHILE THE TEXT IS BEING STUDIED BY THE DRV GOVERNMENT.

2. THE REACTIONS OF THE DIPLOMATS FROM THE THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IS VERY KEEN AND SOMEWHAT SKEPTICAL BECAUSE BOMBING IS BEING CONTINUED CLOSE THE THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE. THE REACTION OF THE DIPLOMATS FROM NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IS HOPEFUL.

3. IN THE MEANTIME, PERSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES CENTER OF STUDIES OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS HAVE BEEN IN

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-271


By CL, NARA Date 10-13-99



~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

HANOI SINCE 29 MARCH 1968. OE

 3.4.(b)(1)
C
THEY ARE IN HANOI WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE
U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, AND THEIR PURPOSE IS TO MAKE INFORMAL CONTACTS.
THEY WERE REPORTED TO BE SENDING A CABLE TO THE STATE
DEPARTMENT IN WASHINGTON, AND TO THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN VIENTIANE
TO THE FOLLOWING EFFECT: ATTENTION AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN, VIENTIANE.
PLEASE SEND URGENT WILLIAM BUNDY WASHINGTON. EXTENDED DISCUSSIONS OF
PROPOSALS REVIEWED WITH YOU HAVE PRODUCED A TENTATIVE
AGREEMENT FOR A MEETING WITH THE DRV ONLY. THE STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT
JOHNSON MAY REMOVE THE LAST OBSTACLE. EXPECT FORMAL AND
OFFICIAL RESPONSE TOMORROW. WE CAN BE REACHED THROUGH THIS
CHANNEL. BAGGS AND ASHMORE.7

4. THIS MESSAGE, 
PRESUMES A FAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM THE DRV. 

3.4.(b)(1)
C~~SECRET~~

IN 83226

TDCS

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

3.4 (b)(1)
C

[REDACTED] ALTHOUGH THE DRV WANTS A DIRECT MEETING BETWEEN THE DRV AND THE U.S. WITHOUT AN INTERMEDIARY, BAGGS AND ASHMORE HAVE REQUESTED THAT THIS MATTER BE TREATED AS STRICTLY SECRET.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE AMBASSADOR ONLY) CINCPAC AND POLAD (ALSO SENT: SAIGON (AMBASSADOR AND COMMANDING GENERAL ONLY) [REDACTED]

3.4 (b)(1)
C

BT

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, April 2, 1968
3:15 p. m.

71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. President:

Westy says that he regrets that, in good conscience, he cannot make a decision until tomorrow afternoon (Wednesday) our time.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 19, NARA, Date 4-27-82

~~TOP SECRET~~

72

Lunch Meeting With the President
Tuesday, April 2, 1968 -- 1:00 pm

AGENDA

1. Reactions to Bombing Pause. (Acting Sec. Katzenbach)
 - Saigon
 - Wellington meeting
 - Moscow and Eastern Europe
 - North Vietnam
 - Western Europe
2. Middle East: Situation Report. (Acting Sec. Katzenbach)
3. Pueblo: Situation Report. (Acting Sec. Katzenbach)
4. Honolulu: Preparations. (The President)
 - Guidance on preparations
5. Other.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 16, NARA, Date 4-27-92

WWRostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

73
/

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, April 2, 1968 - 12:55pm

Mr. President:

Herewith the bomb and POL costs
of a B-52 mission.

The bombs appear to cost about
\$63,000 per B-52 sortie.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By RG, NARA, Date 4-27-92

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

2 April 1968

73a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: B-52 Bomb and Fuel Costs

1. The cost of typical B-52 conventional bomb loads:
 - a. 108 MK-82 (500 pound) bombs @ \$285: \$30,780
 - b. 84 MK-82 (500 pound) bombs @ \$285: \$23,940
 - 24 MK-117 (750 pound) bombs @ \$340: 8,160 \$32,100
2. The POL cost for typical B-52 Sortie:
 - a. GUAM: B-52 12 hours @ \$342 per hour: \$ 4,104
 - Supporting KC-135 5 hours
 - @ \$235 per hour: 1,175
 - Total \$ 5,279
 - b. THAILAND: B-52 3 hours @ \$342 per hour: \$ 1,026

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Pres file

Tuesday, April 2, 1968
12:45 p. m.

74

MR. PRESIDENT:

I should report that I had an impassioned telephone call from Carl Marcy, who explained that he was reflecting an even more impassioned view of Senator Fulbright and his "dove" colleagues. They regard the 20th parallel as incompatible with your reference to the DMZ. I quoted what you said and then told him to look at a map and observe that the flows of supplies come to the battlefield not only directly down Route 1A to the DMZ, but also via Routes 7, 8, and 18. I told him that we have reports that the enemy is pouring supplies down now, running their trucks with lights on at night, and taking the risks of a crash increase in men and supplies to the South. He said that he understood this, but he wished that the President had explained it. I again pointed out that the President's language was wholly consistent with what we are doing.

He made reference to opinion at the UN and elsewhere. I pointed out that what had concerned UN and other non-Asian opinion had been the attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong. There were no attacks in that area -- in fact, no strategic bombing at all. He said he understood what I was saying, but he wished that the President had explained it in such terms. I said that I had his message.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

75

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, April 2, 1968 - 12:45 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Bus Wheeler reports Westy
on incentives to increase tour extensions
-- and other matters.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:ln

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1968
By RG, NARA, Date 4-27-92

1146

75a



~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3169-68
1 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. During your recent meetings with General Abrams and myself, you requested information on several items: additional incentives for voluntary extensions in Vietnam, casualty reporting and the possibility of putting the AID operation under military control. General Westmoreland's initial thoughts on these matters are outlined below. Additional information will be forwarded as it becomes available.

2. A great deal of consideration has been given to the matter of voluntary tour extensions and recommendations are continuing to be explored. Experience indicates that the majority of people who extend for periods of less than 90 days do so for purely personal reasons and convenience to themselves rather than the Government. For this reason, the 90 to 180 day extension is preferable. Since the incentives of the six month extension are fixed by public law, MACV is restricted to some lesser reward for the shorter extension and must also look to something which can be implemented quickly and without legislation. The provision of an additional R&R for personnel who extend their tours for 90 days or more is a feasible and desirable program. The practice has been in effect on a selective basis for a short time and results indicate that expansion of the program to all Services with appropriate publicity would produce an increase in voluntary extension. The effect would be even greater if extendees are given assurance that the R&R could be taken at the site of their preference. This can be managed locally. MACV will move toward early implementation of this program on a priority basis. Other areas are being explored and will be proposed as developed.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-495
By lip, NARA, Date 4-13-93

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3. With regard to casualty reporting, a more valid comparison between World War II, Korea and Vietnam could be made if similar criteria were used. For example, in World War II and Korea, only those persons wounded seriously enough to require hospitalization were reported. In the Korean conflict in a three year period (June 1950 - July 1953), US forces sustained a total of 103,284 non-fatal wounded who required hospitalization. Over a seven year period in RVN, US forces sustained 56,992 non-fatal wounded where hospitalization was required. 50,254 non-fatal wounded (1 January 1961 - 31 January 1968) did not require hospitalization and, under past reporting procedures, would not have been released to press and public. News media might object to a course of action wherein only hospitalized personnel were reported, however, it is considered that the general public would accept this reporting procedure.

4. While it might be useful to consider military control of AID operations in Vietnam, such a transfer of responsibility appears on the surface to be undesirable. However, General Westmoreland will continue to look into this matter.

5. I concur with the thoughts expressed above, particularly as they pertain to assumption of AID responsibilities by the military.



EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Copies to:

Secretary of Defense
Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Commandant of the Marine Corps

73 JUN 3 11 10 50

2
OFFICE
AID

~~SECRET~~

76

INFORMATION

Tuesday - April 2, 1968 - 12:15 pm

Free file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message from President Lleras of Colombia

President Lleras has sent you the following message on your speech Sunday night:

"The President
The White House.

Permit me, Mr. President, to express in these moments in which you have once more demonstrated your patriotism and devotion to the cause of liberty and peace my deepest understanding and admiration.

Carlos Lleras Restrepo
President of Colombia"

W. W. Rostow

7

Cyrent 5/5 4/2

76a

6

1968 APR 1 PM 9 20

7117 5 VIA RCA

BOGOTACOL 1930 APR 1 1968

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

22543 PERMITAME SENOR PRESIDENTE QUE LE HAGA LLEGAR EN ESTOS
MOMENTOS EN QUE UNA VEZ MAS MUESTRA USTED SU PATRIOTISMO Y SU
DEVOCION A LA CAUSA DE LA LIBERTAD Y DE LA PAZ LOS SENTIMIENTOS
DE MI MAS VIVA SIMPATIA Y ADMIRACION

CARLOS LLERAS RESTREPO

PRESIDENTE DE COLOMBIA

INFORMATION

77

Tuesday, April 2, 1968 - 11:40 a.m

for file

Mr. President:

Hanoi appears to be back at the old stand: bombing must be terminated "definitively and unconditionally"; that is, permanently.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

77a

FBIS 77 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (SUB FOR 73)

PHAM VAN DONG IN SIEMPRE

HANOI CORRESPONDENT'S DISPATCH IN SPANISH TO SIEMPRE MEXICO CITY
1104 GMT 2 APR 68 C

(TEXT) HANOI, 1 APRIL--BY LUIS SUAREZ--SIEMPRE CAN STATE WITH PRIDE THAT IT OBTAINED THE LATEST EXCLUSIVE OFFICIAL INTERVIEW WITH THE DRV GOVERNMENT ONLY ONE AND A HALF DAYS BEFORE JOHNSON ANNOUNCED HIS DECISION TO CEASE THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TERRITORY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE AREA OF THE 17TH PARALLEL.

OUR INTERVIEW WITH PREMIER PHAM VAN DONG ON SATURDAY AFTERNOON 30 MARCH THEREFORE CONSTITUTES A DOCUMENT OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE UNDER THESE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES, AS IT CLEARLY SETS FORTH THE CONDITIONS WHICH HAVE FORCED JOHNSON TO TAKE A FEW STEPS BACK, EVEN THOUGH NOT ALL THE STEPS REQUIRED HERE TO ENTER INTO TALKS.

IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT IN THE INTERVIEW WITH SIEMPRE, PHAM VAN DONG MAKES A CLEAR DISTINCTION. IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF A CESSATION OF BOMBING AS A CONDITION FOR TALKS, BECAUSE CESSATION COULD ALSO BE UNDERSTOOD AS A TEMPORARY HALT, BUT IT IS STATED CLEARLY THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST PUT AN END TO THE BOMBING, THAT IS, THAT IT BE TERMINATED DEFINITELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY AS MUST ALL ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV. IT IS ALSO PROPER TO POINT OUT THAT THE CONTINUATION OF BOMBING OVER THE AREA OF THE 17TH PARALLEL CONTINUES TO BE AN ACT OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV.

THE REPORT REGARDING JOHNSON'S DECISION WAS RECEIVED THIS MORNING BY CIRCLES CONNECTED WITH FOREIGN RADIOS AT THE VERY MOMENT THAT JOHNSON WAS SPEAKING. (NIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES, MORNING IN THE FAR EAST BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENCE IN TIME.) WE HEARD THE LAST AIR RAID ALERT IN HANOI SHORTLY AFTER 2300 SUNDAY. IT WAS THE THIRD AIR RAID ALERT THAT NIGHT. UNTIL NOON MONDAY THERE HAS BEEN NO NEW WARNING OF THE IMPENDING APPROACH OF U.S. PLANES. UP TO 30 MARCH THE UNITED STATES HAD LOST 2,816 PLANES. SOME STATEMENT BY THE DRV GOVERNMENT IS AWAITED WITH INTEREST, BUT NO ONE EXPECTS IT IMMEDIATELY.

2 APR 1336Z BAM/CT

Tuesday, April 2, 1968
11:15 a. m.

78

MR. PRESIDENT:

Walter Hallstein, the former head of the Common Market and leader in the European community, came to see me the other day. He is lecturing at Princeton. Like Monnet, he is a very considerable leader with a deep belief in both a united Europe and a strong Atlantic connection.

I found him full of vigor and confidence in the future.

If you had time, he would very much like to call on you and would come down from Princeton for that purpose before he leaves. Sometime around Easter would be best for him.

He is still active, being the Chairman of the European Committee. He even plans to run for Parliament in Germany and to be a constructive voice in German politics.

W. W. Rostow

Will see Hallstein _____

No _____

Call me _____

79
INFORMATION

**Tuesday, April 2, 1968
10:45 a.m.**

Mr. President:

**A self-explanatory letter from
Bus Wheeler.**

W. W. Rostow

WWRWWRostow:rla



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

1 April 1968

79a

Dear Mr. President:

As you asked me to, I talked to General Westmoreland on the telephone last night. Unfortunately, there was a malfunction on the secure line, and I had to wait until your address to the Nation ended before I talked to him on the open line.

He told me that, despite the fact you had discussed this matter with him in November, your announcement of this decision came as a great shock to him. He asked me to convey to you his belief that your address was a powerful speech, even without the announcement which you made at the conclusion. He ended by asking that I convey to you his respect and good wishes.

May I say that I thought too that your address was the most powerful public utterance which I have ever heard you make. I know that your reasons for announcing that you will not seek nor accept the nomination to be a candidate again for President derives from many complex factors, and I accept that the reasons for your actions override in your evaluation countervailing factors. As you no doubt know, I have no political affiliation; nevertheless, both as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as a citizen I deeply regret that you felt this step necessary.

With best wishes and deep respect,

Sincerely,

EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

INFORMATION

80

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, April 2, 1968 - 9:30 am

Mr. President:

Khe Sanh-DMZ-A Shau:

- 1261 rounds friendly;
- 155 rounds enemy incoming;
- 147 tons resupply;
- 66 tactical sorties, plus
8 B-52's;
- Pegasus continued with light
contact.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988
By rg, NARA, Date 4-27-92

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 4-27-92

~~SECRET~~

80a

Tuesday, April 2, 1968, 8:15 a.m.

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number fifty-eight on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ/A Shau Valley for the 24-hour period of April 1, 1968.

Yesterday at Khe Sanh clouds and fog persisted through late morning. At 11:00 a.m. clouds became scattered and visibility was good until after sunset. Ceilings then formed again reducing visibility to four miles. At 3:00 a.m. today, skies cleared. A similar pattern is expected tomorrow.

Operation Pegasus continued with light contact. The First Marine Regiment seized its objectives west of Ca Lu. The Third Brigade, First Air Cavalry Division assaulted into a fire support base eight kilometers east of Khe Sanh Combat Base at 1:00 p.m. Along the DMZ, deception attacks northeast of Dong Ha continued with light contact. Friendly forces secured objectives south of the DMZ with no casualties reported.

There were 173 friendly artillery fire support missions for Khe Sanh expending 1261 rounds. Eight missions were observed. No COFRAM ammunition was fired.

Eight ARC LIGHT strikes (48 sorties) were scheduled in support of Operation Pegasus. Five aircraft were diverted to secondary targets. Two strikes reported secondary explosions. Seven missions are scheduled for today.

Sixty-six tactical air sorties supported Operation Pegasus. There was no bomb damage assessment. Tactical air sorties planned for tomorrow total 104 with an additional 100 on call. There are 610 additional preplanned sorties that can be diverted into the Pegasus area.

Resupply for the reporting period accounted for 147 short tons. Forty-nine replacements were landed at Khe Sanh. C-130 and C-123 aircraft conducted 12 air drops. One C-123 and 24 helicopters landed and delivered cargo and passengers.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12355, Sec. 3.3
AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/88
By 18 NARA, Date 5-13-92

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By 18 NARA, Date 5-13-92

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

At Khe Sanh, a total of 155 rounds of enemy indirect fire was received; 55 artillery and 100 mortar. These attacks wounded three Marines.

One radar mission in A Shau noted five returns. The morning photo mission revealed no significant activity other than normally occupied anti-aircraft positions along the valley.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

2 April 1968
5:00 AM EST

808

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST
1 April (9:00 AM 2 April, SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)
status as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>DAYS SUPPLY ON HAND</u>	<u>8:00 PM 1 Apr EST (9:00 AM 2 Apr SVN)</u>
<u>CLASS I (Rations)</u>		
Meal, Combat, Individual	21	22 days
B Rations	6	6 days
<u>CLASS III (Fuel)</u>		
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	3	3 days
JP-4 Fuel (Jet Fuel)	10	10.6 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	11	9 days
Diesel	14	21.9 days
<u>CLASS V (Ammunition)</u>		
A. High Explosive		
60-mm mortar	48	46 days
81-mm mortar	31	31 days
90-mm (tank)	68	68 days
4.2" mortar	28	28 days
105-mm howitzer	22	22 days
155-mm howitzer	33	35 days
B. Antitank		
		<u>ROUNDS ON HAND</u>
90-mm AP-T		254
90-mm HEAT		1,089
66-mm rocket (LAW)		2,212
Antitank mines (M-15)		349
Antitank mines (M-19)		469
Antitank mines (M-21)		48
106-mm HEAT		1,538
106-mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T)		1,883
3.5" rocket		2,114

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1989
By 118 NARA. Date 4-27-92

~~SECRET~~

8:00 PM 1 Apr EST
(9:00 AM 2 Apr SVN)

C. Antipersonnel

ROUNDS ON HAND

90-mm BEEHIVE	542
105-mm BEEHIVE	1,090
106-mm BEEHIVE	1,689
90-mm CANNISTER	323

CLASS V (COFRAM)

105-mm howitzer	1,684
155-mm howitzer	990
40-mm grenade launcher	6,729
Hand grenades	2,945

2. On 1 April, Khe Sanh was resupplied with 147 short tons as follows:

CLASS I	37 tons
CLASS II	4 tons
CLASS III	1 ton
CLASS IV	39 tons
CLASS V	66 tons

Marshall B. Garth
MARSHALL B. GARTH
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director for
Operations, NMCC

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~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

81

Tuesday, April 2, 1968
9:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith another good friend
sadly expresses himself to you.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

81a
שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

1 April 1968

Dear Mr. President:


Like many millions of your friends all over the world, I was stunned and saddened beyond words by your announcement last night.

It was an act of Providence that made you President of the United States at this critical juncture in the history of mankind. When the very existence of my country was in jeopardy, it was your genuine sympathy and firm action that played such an important role in seeing us through the crisis which enveloped us.

Personally I still hope that the American people will come to its senses and prevail upon you to carry on.

My thoughts and my heart are with you, Mr. President.

Yours faithfully,


Ephraim Evron
Minister

The Honorable
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States
Washington, D. C.

82

ACTION

Limited Official Use

Tuesday - April 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from President Costa e Silva

Pres file

Herewith President Costa e Silva's reply to your letter of March 8 concerning ratification of the International Coffee Agreement and participation in Hemisfair.

The Brazilian President promises to work for approval of the Coffee Agreement by the Brazilian Congress and give careful consideration to measures for carrying out the understanding on soluble coffee. He regrets that Brazil's austerity program does not permit participation in Hemisfair.

The Brazilian Foreign Office asks permission to release the letter to the press. This is an indirect way of making amends for President Costa e Silva's releasing your March 8 letter without your prior agreement. The Foreign Office was quite chagrined about the failure to consult.

I see no reason to object to release of this letter by the Brazilians in Rio if they want. I would not advise releasing it here, because I am not sure how the coffee trade would interpret the rather non-committal remarks on soluble coffee. The Brazilians are quietly preparing to carry out their understanding on soluble coffee, but do not want to say anything publicly yet.

W. W. Rostow

No objection to
release in Rio _____

Prefer no release _____

Call me _____.

Attachment

Letter to President from Brazilian President Costa e Silva,
3/28/68.

INFORMATION

Tuesday - April 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres. file

SUBJECT: Message from President Balaguer

Yesterday Ambassador Crimmins and President Balaguer initialled a \$30 million PL 480 and Supporting Assistance loan for 1968.

During the ceremony, President Balaguer asked the Ambassador to relay to you his personal thanks for this further indication of United States support for his constitutional government and the Dominican people.

You will recall that at Punta del Este President Balaguer asked your help in arranging the financing for the Taveras Dam project -- the key element of his economic development -- and political -- program. AID and the Inter-American Bank have cleared the way for approval of their respective shares of the loan. Preparations are underway for a special signing ceremony later this month. We expect IDB President Herrera, Nick Katzenbach and Covey Oliver to join President Balaguer in Santo Domingo for the ceremony.

W. W. Rostow

ACTION

84

Tuesday
April 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Presidential determination on military assistance to Burma

In 1961 we began a multiyear program of furnishing \$43 million of assistance to Burma. The \$3.1 million of assistance planned for FY 1968 completes this commitment.

We do not have a military assistance agreement with Burma. Therefore, this program requires each year a Presidential determination and authorization. Six such determinations have been signed previously.

Neither Conte-Long nor Symington amendments apply.

This small program is thoroughly justified on political grounds. It is the principal instrument of our relations with Burma and it is intended to show our support for General Ne Win's policy of maintaining Burma's integrity and independence.

Attached is Under Secretary Katzenbach's recommendation that you authorize this program for FY 1968 and Charles Zwick's concurrence.

I recommend that you sign the determination under Tab A.

W. W. Rostow

Att

STATE:BUDGET:MWright:wpt

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12-YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

1143

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-345

By ju, NARA, Date 6-17-97

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

840

MAR 30 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Presidential Determination and authorization to use
FY 1968 funds to furnish military assistance to Burma

Attached are a memorandum and background annex from Under Secretary of State Katzenbach recommending that you sign a determination to permit the use of FY 1968 funds for military assistance to Burma.

In 1961, President Kennedy made a multiyear commitment to furnish military assistance to Burma. The total program was not to exceed \$43.0 million; \$39.4 million has already been authorized. Both Governments consider that this \$3.1 million FY 1968 program will complete the commitment.

The attached determination authorizes \$2.5 million in defense articles as part of a total FY 1968 program of \$3.1 million. In the absence of a military assistance agreement with Burma (Burma considered such an agreement would be a compromise of her neutrality), the Foreign Assistance Act requires a determination by you that the program is "important to the security of the United States."

The Burma military assistance program is clearly political. It manifests to the Ne Win Government U. S. support for Burma's integrity and independence and it promotes U. S. influence among the Burmese Armed Forces. The military assistance program is our principal program instrument in Burma.

Neither Conte-Long nor Symington amendments apply.

The amount proposed in the determination will be accommodated within the MAP budgetary total for FY 1968.

I recommend you sign the determination.

Charles J. Zwirk
Charles J. Zwirk
Director

Attachments

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 23, 1968

~~SECRET~~

1076
1- Jordan
2- Ret.
84b
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-347

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

By ing, NARA, Date 3-3-94

Subject: Determination and Authorization to Use
FY 1968 Funds to Furnish Military
Assistance to Burma

Recommendation:

I recommend that you make the necessary determination and authorization under the Foreign Assistance Act to furnish Burma \$2.5 million in grant military equipment in FY 1968 as part of a total program of \$3.1 million. The Department of Defense and the Agency for International Development concur in this recommendation. Detailed political and legal justifications are attached at Tab B.

Discussion:

The FY 1968 U.S. military assistance increment of \$3.1 million is considered by the U.S. Government and the Government of Burma to complete the commitment made by President Kennedy in 1961. The multi-year program amounts to a maximum of \$43.0 million of which \$39.4 million has already been authorized.

This program has been and is still a key element in U.S. policy toward Burma. Its objectives are primarily political: to demonstrate to the Ne Win Government support for the independence, unity, and internal security of Burma; to promote U.S. influence in Burma's armed forces; and, to preclude or limit Burma's acceptance of military aid from Communist countries.

~~SECRET~~

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

2

Your determination permitting this assistance to continue is essentially a finding that the authorization is important to the security of the United States. I believe this to be the case and accordingly recommend that you sign the attached memorandum at Tab A.

Richard L. Kitzel
Under Secretary

Enclosures:

Tab A - Memorandum

Tab B - Background Annex to the
Proposed Determination

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TRAINING OFFICE
RECEIVED

~~SECRET~~

84c

BACKGROUND ANNEX

PART I: LEGAL ANALYSIS

The proposed Fiscal Year 1968 program in the amount of \$3.1 million, including up to \$2.5 for defense articles, completes the multi-year military assistance program which was approved by President Kennedy on February 21, 1961, and offered to the Government of Burma in that year subject to the availability of funds. The program was authorized at an amount not to exceed \$43.0 million to be spread over about five fiscal years commencing in Fiscal Year 1962.

Because of the Government of Burma's apprehension that its reputation as a neutral power might be tarnished by receiving U.S. grant military assistance, it has always desired that this military assistance be in the ostensible form of a "sales" program, providing for payment in its own currency at a fraction of actual cost. For the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the "Act"), such an arrangement must be considered to be assistance on a grant basis. Accordingly, the defense articles component of the assistance is subject to the conditions of eligibility set forth in section 505(a) of the Act. Section 505(a) requires that the recipient of grant defense articles shall have agreed to certain conditions therein specified concerning the use and disposition of such defense articles. Section 505(a)(3) of the Act would require Burma to agree that, as may be required by the United States, it will permit continuous observation and review by, and furnish necessary information to, representatives of the United States with regard to use of grant defense articles. Section 505(a)(4) of the Act would require that Burma agree to return to the United States Government such grant defense articles as are no longer required for the purposes for which furnished unless the President consents to other disposition.

The Government of Burma has not agreed to the undertaking required by Section 505(a)(3) of the Act because it has considered that doing so would jeopardize its neutral status. Moreover, the Government of Burma considers that the undertaking required by Section 505(a)(4) of the Act

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-347
By inf, NARA, Date 3-3-94

~~SECRET~~

2

would be inconsistent with the "sale" of the defense articles. There is no indication that Burma would be willing to agree to these two conditions now, and for policy reasons it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to persuade Burma to so agree.

Nevertheless, the contemplated program may be carried out if the President waives for Burma the requirements of Sections 505(a)(3) and 505(a)(4) with respect to the subject defense articles. Under Section 614(a) of the Act, the President may authorize the use of funds without regard to requirements of the Act if he determines that such authorization is important to the security of the United States. The same, or equivalent, determination for Burma, waiving the requirements of paragraphs (3) and (4) of Section 505(a), has been made in previous Presidential Determinations: P.D. 62-14 of April 30, 1962; P.D. 63-8 of May 9, 1963; P.D. 64-11 of May 15, 1964; P.D. 65-9 of March 31, 1965; P.D. 66-5 of November 26, 1965; and P.D. 67-4 of September 23, 1966.

This program has been examined as to possible applicability of the Symington and Conte-Long Amendments. Section 620(s) (The Symington Amendment) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, is, by its terms, inapplicable to military assistance. The "Conte-Long" Amendments of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, FY 1968, which concern the furnishing of "sophisticated weapons systems", are inapplicable because the defense articles under this program are spare parts, not "weapons systems".

PART II: POLITICAL JUSTIFICATION

The purposes of the Burma military assistance program are primarily political: to demonstrate to the Ne Win Government United States support for the independence, stability, and internal security of Burma; to serve as a channel for American influence in the Burmese armed forces; and to preclude, or limit, Burmese acceptance of military aid from Communist countries. Since 1958 the program has been a key element in United States policy toward Burma. The \$3.1 million proposed for FY 1968 funding will complete

~~SECRET~~

the provision of defense articles and services offered by the United States under the 1961 commitment. Failure to continue to carry out this agreement would be interpreted as a breach of commitment and could seriously undermine United States objectives that the MAP in Burma is designed to serve.

The MAP in Burma is one of the few remaining sources of United States influence in that country. The Burmese armed forces which now control the Government like and want the program; and, notwithstanding Burma's policy of strict neutrality, it is the only program of foreign military aid they accept, despite reported offers from Communist China and known offers from the USSR of military aid and advice. This program, therefore, not only serves United States objectives in Burma, but also enables the Burmese Government to meet its security requirements without exposing itself to the influences and pressures that acceptance of military aid from the Communists would entail.

In FY 1965 the United States and the Revolutionary Government of Burma agreed that the United States would provide through 1968 follow-on spares proportioned between the Army, Navy, and Air Force, at an annually-negotiated cost with an annual payment in kyats for equipment included under FY 1965 (known as the Third Increment, Phase II) and previous military sales programs. The United States has received \$7.0 million equivalent in kyats under these programs since FY 1962.

Negotiations with the Burmese Ministry of Defense officials concerning an FY 1968 "sales" program for defense articles and services amounting in value to \$3.1 million (known as the Sixth Increment, Phase II) are expected to begin soon. The proposed FY 1968 program of \$3.1 million is intended primarily to provide follow-on spares for aircraft, ships, weapons, vehicles, and communication equipment previously furnished in order to improve the capability of the Burmese armed forces to accomplish their missions, particularly internal security, and associated defense services. The attached functional summary shows the allocation of funds according to purpose, as presently planned.

~~SECRET~~

4

The defense articles would all be procured in the United States and consequently the proposed program would have no significant adverse effect on the balance of payments.

In view of the circumstances related above, it appears appropriate to make the necessary determination and authorization under Section 614(a) of the Act.

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84d

BURMA MAP FY 1968 FUNCTIONAL SUMMARY

(Millions of Dollars)

Category

A. <u>Investment Costs</u> (Force Improvement)		\$0
B. <u>Operating Costs</u> (Force Maintenance)		\$3.1
1. Follow-on Spares	(2.0)	
2. Total Other Maintenance Articles	(.5)	
3. Training	(.2)	
4. Supply Operations	(.4)	
C. <u>Summary Program Totals</u>		
1. Investment Costs	(0)	
2. Operating Costs	(3.1)	
Country Total		\$3.1
D. <u>Classification for Presidential Determination</u>		
1. Defense Articles	(2.5)	
2. Defense Services	(.6)	
Total		\$3.1

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 93-347

By ing, NARA, Date 3-3-94

~~SECRET~~

842

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Presidential Determination
No. 68-

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Determination and Authorization under Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, (the "Act") permitting the use of Funds for Military Assistance to Burma in FY 1968.

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of March 23 , 1968, I hereby:

(1) determine, pursuant to Section 614(a) of the Act, that authorization of the use of up to \$2.5 million of funds made available under the Act for Fiscal Year 1968, to furnish defense articles to Burma on a grant basis without regard to the requirements of paragraphs (3) and (4) of Section 505(a) of the Act is important to the security of the United States; and

(2) authorize, pursuant to Section 614(a) of the Act, the use of such funds for such purpose without regard to the above specified requirements of the Act.

You are requested on my behalf to give prompt notice of these actions, pursuant to Section 634(d) of the Act, to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

X _____

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - April 1, 1968

sent up 4/2/68

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Free file

SUBJECT: Situation in Panama

The Supreme Court reconvened today. We are not aware of any decision on the National Assembly's impeachment of President Robles. The Court may take its time in ruling on the merits of the case. But it is required to approve or rescind a lower court order, handed down while the Supreme Court was in recess, directing the National Guard to ignore the National Assembly's action.

The atmosphere in Panama continues tense, but without serious disturbances. The Arias-Delvalle opposition has called for a demonstration before the Supreme Court this afternoon. It has not been authorized by the Robles Government, so there is a potential for trouble.

The National Guard still has adequate supplies of tear-gas, but stocks are reaching the point where they are looking for replacements. This puts us in a tough spot because the Guard, through last week's actions, has sided with Robles. State has advised Guard Commander Vallarino to try to get supplies from third sources -- without ruling out the possibility of furnishing cannisters from the Canal Zone if the Guard's stock dips that low and public disturbances continue.

Unfortunately, there are no significant efforts to find a compromise. Each side is now waiting for the Supreme Court to rule -- hopefully in its favor.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 77-268
By ics, NARA Date 1-15-99

86

Monday, April 1, 1968 -- 5:10 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Max Taylor has a suggestion looking towards greater political unity on Vietnam.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

86a

April 1, 1968

Mr. President:

Is there any possible way to widen the effect of your act of self-denial in withdrawing from the election race, for the purpose of bringing greater national unity in support of our Vietnam policy?

The avowed Presidential candidates and other prominent politicians are praising your action and saying the right things about the need to eliminate divisions among our people. Might it not be possible to assemble several leading members of both parties at the White House and get them to issue a joint statement indorsing the peace overture contained in your speech last night and offering continued support to our war efforts if Hanoi rejects your proposition? I have in mind such men as Eisenhower, Goldwater and Nixon on the Republican side and Truman, R. Kennedy and McCarthy for the Democrats.

Walt Rostow tells me that he has sent you a similar suggestion but I have not had the opportunity to see it before writing this note.

MDT

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-22
By ju, NARA, Date 2-1-93

87
April 1
~~March 30~~, 1968 - 5:20 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NATO Dialogue on the Future of Southeast Asia
(USNATO 2376)

Profile

Cleveland reports on "the most relevant discussion of Southeast Asia" he's heard in the past two and one-half years. Under instructions, Cleveland laid the groundwork for this talk on March 6. Three things stood out at yesterday's luncheon discussion of NATO Permanent Representatives:

- American efforts in Vietnam have spurred all varieties of Asian nationalism to blossom. This nationalism will prove troublesome to China in the future.
- Europeans today would not fault us if we were to de-escalate the conflict, and if we were to conclude we had carried our commitments to defend Vietnam as far as is reasonable.
- Belgium, Canada, and the UK will help in post-war security arrangements and economic development in Southeast Asia. The others might join in.

Grewe (Germany) thinks our efforts in Vietnam may lead to the "domino theory in reverse", because rising Asian nationalism would impede future Chinese expansionism. Any U. S. de-escalation in Vietnam would be viewed in Europe as a reasonable step. No one in Germany would think our commitments, such as to Berlin, have eroded.

De Ferrariis (Italy) added little; said current Italian interest concentrated on whether our efforts in Vietnam would affect our troop levels in Europe.

Boon (Netherlands) argued that the more relevant question is what do the Southeast Asians want, not what do the Europeans want. Opportunities for Western cooperation with Asia will loom large in the future. The U. S. would suffer if we continue gradual escalation because the VC/NVA can

do the same. He asserted we have fulfilled our commitments but others around the table disagreed, arguing this was for our Asian friends to decide.

Burrows (UK) reiterated the "peace plan" George Brown proposed at the 1966 UNGA and implied clearly the UK would engage in post-war development efforts. Large resources from the U. S., western allies and perhaps the USSR would be required.

DeStaercke (Belgium) stressed no analogy existed between the U. S. involvement in Asia and that previously of the colonial powers -- British, French and Dutch. An American victory has resulted from fostering nationalism as a defense to Chinese objectives. But, the Asian countries are not yet strong enough to afford an American disengagement. Europe's chief concern should not be its relations with Eastern Europe and the USSR but rather with the U. S. Belgium would help in a post-war settlement.

Seydoux (France) stated the U. S. is defending free world interests and not colonial empire as France and others had in Southeast Asia. The goal of the West is a strong GVN but this appears impossible. The future of all Vietnam will probably be Communist but this, in itself, is a service because it places a strong nationalist government at China's southern border.

Campbell (Canada) viewed our commitment under SEATO as "over-fulfilled" and no one could fault us for not doing what could not be done. Our long-run worry should be China and it is a notable fact that the North Vietnamese still show no signs of accepting Chinese assistance. He endorsed participation in post-war security and development.

Cleveland perceives our European friends want a future Southeast Asia in which we will not be too deeply drawn, with consequent ill effects on U. S. /European relations. If we could convert this feeling into actualizing Europe's participation in Asia's future, it would be a plus, he concludes. Cleveland asks for further guidance on the idea of a European consortium offering to help in post-war security and development; whether we are raising similar questions with our Australasian allies.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

88

~~SECRET~~

Monday, April 1, 1968 - 5:15 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith McCloy reports the
Shah's "dismay" at your announcement.

Profile

W. W. Rostow

Tehran 4001

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WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 5-12-92

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~~SECRET~~ TEHRAN 4001

Rostow

DEPT PASS: WHITE HOUSE

MCCLOY AND SHAH

1. WHEN JOHN MCCLOY REACHED CASPIAN NOON APRIL 1, HE FOUND SHAH DISMAYED BY NEWS OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S ANNOUNCEMENT WITHDRAWING FROM PRESIDENTIAL RACE. SHAH ASKED MCCLOY TO TRANSMIT TO PRESIDENT HIS WARMEST REGARDS AND ADMIRATION, DECLARING PRESIDENT IS TRULY GREAT STATESMAN WHO WILLING TO SET CAUSE OF HIS COUNTRY OUTSIDE REALM OF DOMESTIC POLITICS AND HIS OWN PERSONAL POSITION.

2. SHAH WAS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED THAT WITHOUT PREISDENT JOHNSON'S UNDERSTANDING AND WISE LEADERSHIP THERE WILL BE TROUBLE AHEAD

PAGE 2 RIOTAN 4001 ~~SECRET~~
FOR THIS PART OF WORLD IN GENERAL AND FOR IRAN IN PARTICULAR.
MEYER

DECLASSIFIED

Authority neg 91-339

By cap/12, NARA, Date 5-12-92

~~SECRET~~

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Monday, April 1, 1968
5:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Foster invites you to dinner or
cocktails with his ACDA Advisory Committee,
April 8.

A list of those accepting is attached.

Attachment

W. W. Rostow

Accept _____

No _____

Call me _____

89a

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1968

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW
The White House

SUBJECT: General Advisory Committee Dinner--
Blair House--Monday, April 8 at
7:00 p.m.

The General Advisory Committee to ACDA is having its quarterly meeting here Monday and Tuesday, April 8 and 9. Although the Chairman John J. McCloy will be on a trip to the Middle East, you will recall that The Secretary of State and Chairman both thought it would be beneficial for the President to meet with the General Advisory Committee some time this year.

We would all be greatly honored if the President would find it possible to have dinner with the Committee at the Blair House at 7:00 p.m., Monday, April 8, business suit. If the President is not available for dinner, he might however like to talk to the Members of the Committee during the cocktail period, from 7:00 p.m. until 7:45 or 8:00. At this meeting, the Committee will be considering a variety of disarmament matters, particularly the NPT at the forthcoming session of the UNGA later in April and the strategic arms race.

For the President's information, I am enclosing a list of guests invited to the dinner. You will note that although the Chairman will be absent, 12 of the 15 members of the Committee will be present, 8 Senators and 8 Representatives have accepted in addition to The Secretary of State. The Vice President has also been asked. The draft agenda for the meetings is attached.

William C. Foster

William C. Foster

Attachments:

Guest List and
Draft Agenda.

GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE DINNER, APRIL 8, BLAIR HOUSE, 7:00 p.m.

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ACCEPTING

Senators

Sen. Albert Gore
Sen. Henry M. Jackson
Sen. Stuart Symington
Sen. Clifford Case (cocktails)
Sen. John S. Cooper
Sen. Frank Church
Sen. Joseph Clark (cocktails)
Sen. Jack Miller

Congressmen

Rep. Frances P. Bolton
Rep. Melvin Price
Rep. Clement Zablocki
Rep. E. Ross Adair
Rep. Peter Frelinghuysen
Rep. Craig Hosmer
Rep. Cornelius Gallagher
Rep. John B. Anderson

TO HEAR FROM

The Vice President

Sen. Wayne Morse	Sen. Thomas H. Kuchel	Sen. Claiborne Pell
Sen. John Sparkman	Sen. Thomas J. Dodd	
Sen. John O. Pastore	Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy	

TO HEAR FROM

Rep. Chet Holifield
Rep. Thomas E. Morgan

COMMITTEE OF PRINCIPALS ACCEPTING

The Secretary of State
~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~
Mr. Paul Nitze

GAC MEMBERS

Mr. Roger Blough
Gen. Alfred Gruenther
Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky
Mr. Dean McGee
Mr. Ralph McGill
Mr. George Meany
Sen. Maurine Neuberger
Mr. Herman Phleger
Dr. Isidor I. Rabi
Dr. Stephen J. Wright
Dr. Herbert F. York
Mr. John Cowles

GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE DINNER APRIL 8

Regrets

GAC

Mr. John J. McCloy
Dr. James Perkins
Mr. Troy V. Post

Members of Congress

Sen. Mike Mansfield
Sen. Russell B. Long
Sen. Everett Dirksen
Sen. J. W. Fulbright
Sen. Bourke Hickenlooper
Sen. George D. Aiken
Sen. Frank Carlson
Sen. John J. Williams
Sen. Karl E. Mundt
Sen. Frank J. Lausche
Sen. Richard B. Russell
Sen. John Stennis
Sen. Margaret C. Smith
Sen. John G. Tower
Sen. Clinton Anderson
Rep. William H. Bates
Sen. Robert C. Byrd
Sen. Peter H. Dominick
Sen. James B. Pearson
Sen. Howard Cannon

Committee of Principals

The Secretary of Defense
Richard Helms (CIA)
Glenn Seaborg (AEC)
Gen. Wheeler



UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20451

MAR 29 1968

REVISED DRAFT AGENDA FOR THE
TWENTY-THIRD MEETING OF THE GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
April 8 and 9, 1968

ACDA CONFERENCE ROOM
Room 5941, Department of State Building

Monday, April 8

10:00 a.m.	Opening Remarks	The Acting Chairman
10:10 a.m.	<u>NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY NEGOTIATIONS</u>	
	General and ENDC session concluded March 14, 1968	Mr. Foster
10:45 a.m.	<u>Security Assurances</u>	Mr. Foster
11:15 a.m.	NPT scenario at UNGA, and afterwards	Mr. Fisher
11:45 a.m.	Positions of various Governments toward NPT	Mr. Gleysteen
12:15 p.m.	Congressional Appropriations, Authorizations and attitudes	Mr. Bacon Mr. Bunn
12:30 p.m.	Adjourn to Mr. Foster's office, Room 5930	
1:00 p.m.	Luncheon in James Monroe Room, Eighth Floor, State Department	
2:15 p.m.	<u>Nuclear Fuel Supply</u>	Mr. Van Doren

(2)

2:30 p.m. AFTER NPT WHAT?

STRATEGIC ARMS RACE

1. Measures to be considered in next ENDC session Mr. DePalma
2. Recent developments in Soviet strategic offensive and defensive capabilities - CIA - Mr. Duckett,
3. Current thinking on controlling the strategic arms race - ACDA - Mr. Graybeal
4. Discussion

5:30 p.m. Adjourn for the day

7:00 p.m. Mr. William C. Foster, Director, will give a dinner in honor of The Members of The General Advisory Committee at the Blair House, 1651 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Tuesday, April 9

- | | | |
|------------|---|---------------|
| 9:00 a.m. | <u>Recent Developments Affecting Seabed Arms Control Measures</u> | Mr. Poirier |
| 9:45 a.m. | <u>Arms Transfer Activities</u> | Mr. Van Doren |
| 10:15 a.m. | <u>Domestic economic impact:</u>
summary of status to date and description of proposed comprehensive review. | Mr. Alexander |
| 10:30 a.m. | <u>Social Science Advisory Board Activities</u>
<u>Behavioral Science Activities</u> | Mr. Alexander |

(No Public Release Should Be Made)

Tuesday, April 9 Continued

10:45 a.m.	<u>European Security and Troop Reductions</u>	Mr. Kranich
11:15 a.m.	<u>OPERATION "FIRST LOOK" (FT-15)</u>	Gen. Davis
11:30 a.m.	Should the U. S. Ratify the Geneva Protocol on C/BW?	Mr. Bunn
11:45 a.m.	<u>EXECUTIVE SESSION</u> (if desired)	
12:30 p.m.	Adjournment	

90

ACTION

Monday, April 1, 1968 -- 4:35 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

After examining alternative long and short drafts, Sec. Clifford and Gen. Wheeler believe it would be unwise for you to send a message at the present time to the U.S. forces in Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

Drop it _____

Call me _____

WWRostow:rin

ACTION

91

~~SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

Monday, April 1, 1968 - 3:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a message to Prime Minister Wilson, in response to the unanswered question in his cable (Tab A), cleared by Messrs. Clifford, Katzenbach, Harriman, Thompson and Bundy.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By kg, NARA, Date 4-29-92

WWRestow:rlm

4/1/68

DRAFT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 72-497
By CB, NARA, Date 4-27-95

9/a

EYES ONLY MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER WILSON

As promised last night, I would like to send our further thoughts on the specific question raised in your detailed message of yesterday about the actions by Hanoi which could lead us to stop the bombing entirely.

The relevant sentences in my speech of yesterday were: "Even this limited bombing of the North could come to an early end -- if our restraint is matched by restraint in Hanoi. But I cannot in conscience stop all bombing so long as to do so would immediately and directly endanger the lives of our men and our Allies. Whether a complete halt becomes possible in the future will be determined by events".

What you might tell Moscow is that the question of which party should take the first deescalatory step towards peace has now been answered by the unilateral and unconditional action of the US. The United States has stopped bombing the area which contains almost 90 percent of the population of North Vietnam, and is restricting its bombing to ^{the military targets in} the ~~less~~ ^{the less} populated southern portion of North Vietnam where such bombing is tactically necessary to protect the lives of US and allied troops. The next move in trying to bring about peace talks and a reduction in the level of

~~SECRET~~

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violence is now clearly up to Hanoi, and the world will be watching to see how Hanoi responds.

You might add that the USG will be examining Hanoi's military moves with greatest care in the period ahead, and will be looking for any indication that Hanoi too is willing to take steps to decrease the level of violence. Obviously we would be concerned with any major new attacks or efforts to increase the already abnormally high levels of infiltration of men and supplies.

Obviously we will also be interested in any communication indicating Hanoi's thoughts about how to move towards peace, and in particular any indication of what Hanoi's military actions would be if the US stopped all bombardment of North Vietnam.

You might also wish to indicate to Moscow that it is your personal belief that if Hanoi rejects this latest American initiative, the US would be under heavy pressure to take additional military actions.

I would be grateful to receive your reaction to my suggestions.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

916

It is here that the real difficulties may begin. Our ability to suggest possible times and places for such a meeting and still more to suggest a possible agenda for discussion will depend on what you and we think we can do in practical terms in the light of the first reactions of Moscow and Hanoi. I do not think that we can afford to be too optimistic about the outcome unless the proposition put to them is reasonably hard and definite and amounts to something which both Moscow and Hanoi feel that they cannot justifiably refuse in the light of their public statements. It is here that I am a little unclear about the crucial phrase in your message that Hanoi's actions could offer a basis for our making the reasonable assumption stated in the San Antonio formula -- that they would not take advantage of the situation if we stopped the bombing altogether. Even if genuinely interested in your offer (and this can be no more than an assumption), Moscow and Hanoi are likely to say to themselves that they are still prepared to talk if you stop the bombing unconditionally and altogether: that they think they can see a hint in your statement that this could be achieved: but that they cannot understand what it is they have to do in order to bring this about. If we are to go into action with Moscow and your behalf we must have some answer to this question which will be in their minds. In other words, what is the real nature of the proposition which we are to try to sell to Moscow?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 4-23-01

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

92

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, April 1, 1968 - 3:10 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Ben Oehlert asks you
to reconsider.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Rawalpindi 4281

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By sg, NARA, Date 4-29-92



Department of State

TELETYPE

92a

~~TOP SECRET~~

W D 3

00 RUEHC
DE RUQVGM 4281 0920805
ZNY TTTT ZZH
O 010755Z APR 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3377
STATE GRNC
BT

CN0022
April 1, 1968
4:03 a.m.

~~TOP SECRET~~ RAWALPINDI 4281

MODIS

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM AMBASSADOR

1. WHEN I WROTE YOU ON OCTOBER 23 RECOMMENDING YOUR CONSIDERATION OF ANOTHER BOMBING PAUSE, I DID SO PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF MY FEELING THAT SUCH A DECISION ON YOUR PART AT THE PROPER TIME WOULD ASSURE YOUR REELECTION, WHICH I CONSIDERED THEN AND DO NOW AS VITAL TO OUR COUNTRY.
2. APPRECIATING AS I DO THE PATRIOTIC MOTIVATIONS WHICH HAVE CAUSED YOU TO ANNOUNCE THAT YOU WILL NOT REPEAT NOT SEEK THE NOMINATION OF PARTY FOR ANOTHER TERM SO THAT YOU CAN DEVOTE YOURSELF EXCLUSIVELY TO THE AWESOME DUTIES OF

PAGE 2 RUQVGM 4281 ~~TOP SECRET~~

YOUR OFFICE, I AM DISTRESSED BY YOUR ADDITIONAL STATEMENT THAT YOU WILL NOT REPEAT NOT ACCEPT THE NOMINATION OF YOUR PARTY FOR ANOTHER TERM.

3. ~~AS A FREE MAN, AN AMERICAN, A UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR, AND A REPUBLICAN, IN THE ORDER I URGE YOU MOST RESPECTFULLY TO BE WILLING TO LISTEN TO AND ACCEPT THE MANY DEMANDS YOU WILL BE RECEIVING THAT YOU BE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE NOMINATION OF YOUR PARTY.~~

4. WHATEVER YOUR FINAL DECISION MAY BE, MR. PRESIDENT, I WITH MANY MILLIONS OF OTHER AMERICANS, ~~WILL BE WITH YOU ALL THE WAY.~~

GP-1. DEHLERT
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-496
By ju, NARA, Date 8-13-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

INFORMATION

93

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, April 1, 1968 -- 3:05 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith:

1. Bunker's latest comment on Honolulu, with some caution about political repercussions in Saigon;
2. Park is all packed.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 23615
Seoul 5387

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989
By rg, NARA, Date 4-24-92



Department of State

^{93a}
TELEGRAM

~~ACTION COPY~~

W H 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

FRM/009
PP RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 23615 0921130
ZNY TTTT ZZH
P 011100Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9842
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL: 049Q
Received: April 1, 1968
7:02 a.m.

~~TOP SECRET~~ SAIGON 23615

NODIS

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR ACTING SECRETARY FROM BUNKER

REF: STATE 139446

1. WHEN I RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE YESTERDAY, I FELT THAT SITUATION HERE SUCH THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM ABOUT MY BEING ABSENT FOR SEVERAL DAYS LATE THIS WEEK. AS FAR AS MILITARY SITUATION IS CONCERNED, NVA/VC MOVEMENTS HAVE DECLINED WHILE INITIATIVE IS INCREASINGLY IN OUR HANDS.
2. IT IS TOO EARLY, HOWEVER, TO SAY WHAT POLITICAL EFFECT OF PRESIDENT'S WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE. YOU WILL NOTE FROM MY REPORT ON TALK WITH THIEU THIS AFTERNOON THAT HE APPEARS UNFLAPPABLE, BUT WHAT PUBLIC INTERPRETATION WILL BE AND EFFECT, IF ANY, IS AT THIS MOMENT DIFFICULT TO

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 23615 ~~TOP SECRET~~
FORESEE. I HAVE WONDERED ALSO WHETHER THIS WOULD HAVE ANY EFFECT ON PLANS OF HIGHEST AUTHORITY. COULD YOU LET ME KNOW WHAT THE SITUATION IS? I MAY ADD THAT I THINK IMPROVEMENT HERE HAS BEEN STEADY AND SUBSTANTIAL.

BUNKER
BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-496

By fw, NARA, Date 8-13-93

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~ACTION COPY~~



Department of State

938
TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

(4)

00 RUEHC
DE RUALOS 5387E 0920320
ZNY TTTT ZZH
O 010258Z APR 68 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT

8090Q
1968 MAR 31 PM 10 47 *Roston*

~~TOP SECRET~~ SEOUL 5387

(2)

NODIS

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY

REF : STATE 139445

1. PRESIDENT PARK MOST APPRECIATIVE OF CONTENT REFTEL. HE ACCEPTS WITH PLEASURE INVITATION TO MEETING IN HONOLULU LATE THIS WEEK.
2. HE ALSO VERY PLEASED TO ACCEPT YOUR OFFER OF PERSONAL AIRCRAFT. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR SUGGESTION CONCERNING APPROPRIATE DATE AND TIME OF DEPARTURE

PAGE 2 RUALOS 5387E ~~TOP SECRET~~
FROM SEOUL.

3. HE WILL AWAIT YOUR VIEWS ABOUT CONTENT AND TIMING OF ANNOUNCEMENT.
4. AT PRESENT HE ENVISAGES COMPOSITION OF HIS GROUP AS FOLLOWS: NEW MINISTER OF DEFENSE, CHAIRMAN OF ROK JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, ROK AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON, SECRETARY GENERAL OF PRESIDENCY. YOUR COMMENTS AS TO APPROPRIATENESS OF THIS GROUP WILL BE WELCOME.

PORTER
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-496

By *JW*, NARA, Date *8-13-93*

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

94

Monday, April 1, 1968 -- 3:00 p.m

Mr. President:

Herewith a personal message
and a public statement by Pearson.

for file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By h3, NARA, Date 4-24-82



1746 Massachusetts Ave. N.W.,
Washington, D.C., 20036,
April 1, 1968.

Dear Mr. Katzenbach,

May I ask your office to be good enough to convey to President Johnson the following message from Prime Minister Pearson:

"Dear Mr. President,

I have issued an official statement expressing appreciation of what you said last night on Vietnam. I would like to supplement this by a personal message which can express with more feeling how deeply grateful I think the whole world should be for the proposals you have made and for the courage and wisdom you have shown in making them. It is now strictly up to the other side to reciprocate and if they don't there should be no doubt where the obstacle to peace lies.

I have no right to comment on your other and more personal decision not to seek or accept renomination but I hope I may convey my respect and admiration for the motives that caused you to come to a decision which must have been a very difficult one and could only be made understandable to your friends by the spirit which inspired it. I had wanted to telephone you but I know you will be deluged by calls so I hope you will accept this personal message instead which is sent with my most sincere and warmest good wishes.

Kind personal regards,

L. B. Pearson"

I am also enclosing a copy of the public statement to which the Prime Minister refers in the opening paragraph of the above message.

Yours sincerely,

The Honourable
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach,
Acting Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.


A. E. Ritchie,
Ambassador

cc Mr. Rufus Z. Smith

STATEMENT BEING MADE BY PRIME MINISTER PEARSON OF CANADA
AROUND 12 NOON, APRIL 1, 1968.

948

It would not be fitting for me to comment on President Johnson's announcement that he will not seek nor accept a nomination for another term as President. His decision was made, I am sure, out of regard for the public interest as he saw it, as one would expect from one who has devoted his life to the service of his people; a service which in recent years has been given under a burden of pressures and responsibilities heavier than those borne by any other person in the world.

The President's statement about Vietnam is of major importance for all countries.

Apart from a relatively small area adjacent to the scene of actual fighting, the bombing and shelling of North Vietnam, by air and sea, has now been stopped without time limit or other conditions.

Therefore, it is now strictly up to the Communist side to reciprocate and show their desire to end the war by negotiation rather than force.

It is to be devoutly hoped that they will quickly respond to the United States action.

We must also hope that in this new situation, the friends of Hanoi, and most of all the U.S.S.R., will urge the North Vietnam Government to react to the United States initiative so that the slaughter and destruction of this tragic conflict can be brought to an end.

It is also, I believe, a moment to consider seriously the possibility of U.N. intervention, to assist in the process of peace-making and reconstruction, the beginning of which the President's statement has now made possible.

This is a time for urgent action on every front by all governments who are concerned with ending the war and beginning the negotiation of peace.

The President said last night "There is no need to delay the talks that could bring an end to this long and bloody war."

The world can now say "Amen" to this with a new hope.

It would indeed be tragic if the reaction to this new situation were such as to betray and destroy that hope.

INFORMATION

Limited Official Use Monday - April 1, 1968

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a report from Covey Oliver on his past and future travels in Latin America and his speaking engagements in the United States.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

3/27/68 Oliver memorandum for the President.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Bowdler 95a

March 30, 1968

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Assistant Secretary Oliver's Report
on his Latin American Travels

In response to your recent request to him, I enclose a report from Mr. Oliver on his trips in the Hemisphere thus far and his plans for future visits.

Hubert H. H. H.

Under Secretary

Enclosure:

Assistant Secretary Oliver's Report

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

1142
958
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 27, 1968

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Summary of Latin American Trip

During our conversation on March 22, you asked me to summarize my trips in the Hemisphere since my appointment last year, as well as to indicate what onward visits I am now planning.

Since coming on the job, I have visited every country in Latin America except Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay, Brazil and Guyana. I have not yet visited any of our Caribbean posts. In the past two and a half months, I have traveled to Panama twice, to Mexico and all the Central American countries, including Honduras, and most recently to Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru and Colombia.


As for my onward plans, I shall be accompanying the Vice President on his visit to Mexico City, March 31 - April 1. I expect that domestic speaking engagements and my Congressional schedule will keep me in this country most of April and the early part of May. However, as soon as the Passman hearings are out of the way on May 15, I believe I should undertake a trip to Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile, or to such of them as are suitable for a visit then. Also, I should very much like to make a more extensive trip to Mexico than I have thus far been able to make.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

As to the Caribbean countries, I should like to try your "Thursday to Tuesday" suggestion, using a Jet Star. Or, I could stop off in one or more of these countries during fuel stops on the trip down the East Coast of South America.

In any case, by the end of the summer, I expect to have visited all of our Missions in the Home Hemisphere. After that, I believe I should travel to one or two countries at a time depending on issues arising there to which I could usefully contribute.

On the domestic side, I have tried to keep my promise to you to carry the message of your vital concern for our neighbors and the Alliance throughout the country. In the past several months, I have made good, forward-looking talks in Boston, New York, Philadelphia (twice), Miami, New Orleans, Indianapolis, Chicago, Laredo (three speeches), and San Juan. After HemisFair, I plan a Western speaking swing which will take me to Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland and Minneapolis. In the coming weeks, I shall also be looking for opportunities to speak in the Central and Rocky Mountain areas.


Covey T. Oliver

~~SECRET~~

96

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-285
By ju, NARA, Date 9-17-92

April 1, 1968

Pres file

Mr. President:

In your discussion with General Spike Momyer this afternoon, you may wish to make the following points:

- The bombing cessation was designed to maximize the chance of a negotiated peace and to unify the country, while minimizing military disadvantages and giving our front line troops essential support.

- Military disadvantages are minimized because (1) key infiltration routes into Laos and SVN are still covered, (2) we anticipate only five to eight good bombing days in the northern route packages, and (3) weight of effort in northern route packages has historically been low (6-15%) in April (see Tab).

You may wish to query him on the following:

- How will the air crews in Vietnam react to last night's announcements?

- How has bombing effectiveness over the past few months compared with previous periods? How did it contribute to Khe Sanh defense?

- Is there anything more that could be done within present ground rules to increase the effectiveness of the air campaign?

- What de-escalatory actions by Hanoi would warrant cessation of bombing throughout NVN? In Laos?

- If Hanoi does not respond favorably to our de-escalatory action, what should we do and when?

Finally, you may wish to ask for his thoughts on a message to our men in Vietnam. (A draft will be available by 6:00 p.m.)

P. S. You might ask him what all the fracas is about in control of Marine air in I Corps?

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

96a

~~SECRET~~

Attack Sorties in North Vietnam and Laos

The 20 degree parallel is just to the north of the line between route packages 3 and 4.

The following table shows the distribution of combat sorties (strike, armed reconnaissance, and flak suppression) in North Vietnam and Laos during April 1966 and 1967.

	<u>April 1966</u>	<u>April 1967</u>
Laos	6,318	5,186
Route Packages I, II, III	<u>4,679</u>	<u>6,577</u>
Subtotal	10,997	13,730
 Route Packages IV, V, VI	 672	 2,352
Total	<u>11,669</u>	<u>16,082</u>

Thus, in April 1966 only 6% and in April 67 only 15% of the out-of-country combat sorties were flown in the northern (IV, V, and VI) route packages.

Thus, on the basis of these two years' experience, it could be concluded that restriction of sorties to south of 20 degrees during April would:

- affect only 6 to 15% of the total out-of-country effort; and
- increase the concentration of effort in Laos and south of 20 degrees by 6.5 to 17.6%.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-285
By ju, NARA, Date 9-17-92

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-497
By CB, NARA, Date 4-27-95

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, April 1, 1968

Pres file

Mr. President:

Mac Bundy called. He says Gvishiani, Kosygin's son-in-law, will be in the country for ten days.

Mac will be seeing Gvishiani on his East-West Institute in a few days.

He wondered if it might not be good for the President to see Gvishiani. He said Tommy Thompson would probably take the view that all communications should go through Debryain; but the President might wish, at this critical time, to reinforce his communications with Moscow with a Gvishiani chat.

I said I would pass it along.

He also said he had written to the President. I explained our determination to make these months fruitful. He said he believed the President could and he would be glad to help.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rla

INFORMATION

98

SECRET

Monday, April 1, 1968 -- 11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Henry Owen suggests
cooling off Hanoi by gathering the
candidates and trying to remove
Vietnam policy from contention.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines Feb 24, 1983
BY *mg* NARA Date 4-29-92

~~SECRET~~

98a

April 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Opportunity

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 712 91-287

By isp/12, NARA, Date 5-8-92

1. Proposal: The President should ask the Vice President, Senators Kennedy and McCarthy, and Mr. Nixon to meet with him to discuss the war in Vietnam. The object would be to work out an agreed statement of principles regarding US policy which would take the issue out of campaign politics and confront Hanoi with a unified American position.

2. Rationale:

(a) The danger is that Hanoi will now view this administration as it viewed the Laniel-Bidault cabinet which preceded Mendes France in Paris in 1954: as a lame duck, to be ignored since a better offer is on the horizon.

(b) The remedy is to develop a consensus among all likely contenders for the Presidency which would make clear that they are united on fundamentals; that they all hope Hanoi will move now; and that it will gain nothing by waiting for political change.

(c) The President's decision provides an opportunity to ask others to rise above politics as usual, in the interests of the country. Furthermore, there is no great advantage for any of the candidates in continuing controversy over Vietnam: The issue is too unpredictable, and their positions are not that all far apart - once the semantics are stripped away. All would benefit from seeing the war ended before the next administration and from being able to concentrate the campaign on domestic issues. So would the country.

3. Note: If this option is to be kept open, it may be important to get to these people quickly - before they come out with comments on the President's initiative which limit their freedom of action.

100
Henry Owen

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Memorandum for the Record, Sunday, March 31, 1968

Meeting of the President with Ambassador Anatoliy T. Dobrynin

Also present: W. Averell Harriman and W. W. Rostow

(Note: Gov. Harriman and Mr. Rostow had gone over with Amb. Dobrynin the President's speech for about half an hour before joining the President in the Mansion.

The partial bombing cessation was explained as well as other statements bearing on our negotiating position.)

The President met Ambassador Dobrynin at about 6:05 p. m.

The President began by stating that he was going as far as he could in all conscience go, given the tactical position in the field. He could not endanger lives of his men on the Vietnamese frontiers by having a total bombing cessation. It was up to the Soviet Union as Geneva co-chairman and as a major arms supplier to Hanoi to bring its influence to bear for a conference and the making of peace.

The President recalled that the Soviet Union had played an important role at Tashkent in settling the India-Pak war. He believed, after his talks with Premier Kosygin at Glassboro, that Kosygin wished to be helpful; although nothing had come of it. But the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. had shown in many matters that we could work together for constructive results; for example, in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This was a time for everyone to bring to bear the greatest forbearance, restraint, and understanding. In South Vietnam itself the contending parties must give up war and seek a one-man, one-vote solution.

The Ambassador should be aware, however, that the U. S. was not going to pull out of Vietnam. The proportion of American voters who actually wanted to pull out was about 5%; another 15% wanted the President to do less militarily; but there were 40% who wanted the U. S. to do more. That was the problem with which he had to deal.

The President had great concern about Southeast Asia as a whole, not only Vietnam. He feared a much wider war that would be contrary to both our interests and the Soviet's interests. He thought perhaps the Chinese were getting "cocky" and "chesty." Their aggressive ambitions should not be encouraged. It was up to the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. to end the war in Vietnam soon and prevent hostilities from spreading.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-497

By cb, NARA, Date 4-27-95

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

File

4/1/68

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~~SECRET~~

-2-

The President said he had gone 90% of the way; now it was up to the Co-Chairmen to make it possible to go the last 10% and start negotiations for peace.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked the President to explain precisely why a 100% bombing pause was impossible. The President did so, adding that if Dobrynin thought of what it would be like if there were Russian soldiers in the same position as Americans and German forces were approaching, he would understand. Dobrynin said that the Soviet Union was lucky enough not to be there. The President countered: "But you are helping them."

Ambassador Dobrynin asked about the area in which we would bomb. It was explained: below the 20th parallel.

He asked if there was a time limit on the cessation. The President said no firm limit -- perhaps a few weeks. Dobrynin said that was good. It is better not to have to hurry.

Dobrynin took full notes and a preliminary text of the speech, departing about 6:30 p. m.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

April 1, 1968

100

LDK to State Secretariat for Ben Read from Walt Rostow

Distribution to be limited to absolute minimum on need-to-know basis.

Check substance of record with Governor Harriman.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By RG, NARA, Date 4-29-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 1, 1968

101

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

Herewith a possible Vietnam passage for today's speech:

Last night I announced that we were taking a new initiative towards peace through reducing our bombing. That initiative is serious, and we must all hope that Hanoi will act on it.

At the same time, let no one doubt that we are determined to go on playing our part in South Vietnam. Others who share our concern with the fate of Southeast Asia must also keep their shoulder to the wheel. Together we can see this conflict through to an honorable peace that gives the South Vietnamese people the right to run their own affairs in freedom.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 4-29-92

Monday, April 1, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached for your approval is the usual routine report on Battle Act determinations. It covers the four quarters from April 1, 1967 through March 31, 1968.

You last approved a similar report in June 1967, covering the period through March 31, 1967.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

MWG:mst

Per file

1139

102a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 30, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Report on Presidential Determinations
Under the Mutual Defense Assistance
Control Act of 1951

Recommendation:

That you approve the enclosed Quarterly Report on
Presidential Determinations Under the Mutual Defense
Assistance Control Act of 1951.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Date:

Discussion:

Section 103(b) of the "Battle Act" requires a
quarterly report concerning determinations that assistance
should be continued to countries which have permitted ship-
ments of strategic items as listed under the Act. A
draft Presidential report incorporating these matters is
enclosed for your consideration. Your approval of this
report would authorize this Department to transmit it to
the chairmen of the six Congressional committees specified
in the Act. The following matters are to be covered:

- a. A list of Determinations made during the
reporting periods.

No Determinations were made in the
quarters ending June 30, September 30, and
December 31, 1967, and March 31, 1968.


- b. Your review of prior Determinations.

I have

I have reviewed all Determinations made previously for shipments of items determined as having strategic significance pursuant to Section 103(b) of the Act by countries receiving United States military, economic, or financial assistance. The only country involved is Japan, which is currently receiving a small amount of previously obligated military assistance. After consideration of all the criteria stated in the "Battle Act", including the contribution of Japan to the mutual security of the free world, the importance to the security of the United States of the assistance going to Japan, and Japanese cooperation in controlling the export to Communist countries of items of strategic importance, I am indicating in the report that you find that no further comments are necessary with respect to prior Determinations.

c. An analysis of trade.

A statement on Japanese trade with Communist areas is provided.


for
Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Draft Report
2. Japan's Trade Analysis

NOV 1 1953

RECEIVED
NOV 1 1953

1028

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON DETERMINATIONS
PURSUANT TO SECTION 103(b) OF THE
MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE CONTROL ACT OF 1951
FOR THE QUARTERS ENDING JUNE 30, SEPTEMBER 30,
AND DECEMBER 31, 1967, AND MARCH 31, 1968

This Report is submitted to the Congress in accordance with Section 103(b) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951.

There were no new Determinations made during the quarters ending June 30, September 30, and December 31, 1967, and March 31, 1968.

The President has reviewed all Determinations made previously and has concluded that no further comments are necessary.

The trade analysis presented herewith as required by the Act brings up to date information contained in previous quarterly reports.

Table 1.--Value and Percentage Share of Japanese Trade with Communist Areas for Calendar Years 1965-66 and January-November 1967

	Value (Millions of dollars)	As percent of total world
Exports to Communist Areas		
1965.....	\$477.7	5.7%
1966.....	599.2	6.1
January-November 1967....	477.1	5.1
Imports from Communist Areas		
1965.....	\$527.1	6.5%
1966.....	688.0	7.2
January-November 1967....	803.0	7.6

Table 2.--Principal Commodities in Japanese Trade With Communist Areas, January-June 1967

EXPORTS	IMPORTS
Manufactured fertilizer; other chemicals; manmade fiber, yarn, thread, and fabrics; iron and steel pipes and fittings; other iron and steel; nonelectric machinery; and ships.	Grains; other foodstuffs; soybeans; wood; cotton; coal; petroleum and products; pig iron; and nonferrous metals and ores.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 1, 1968

103

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have talked with Amb. Bunker. He says that Thieu will be busy in constructive ways in the next several months. But a visit in a few months' time would be good.

Therefore, he thinks it would be helpful if you were to say today something like this:

"President Thieu and his government are now engaged in urgent military, political, and economic tasks which we regard as constructive and hopeful.

"But sometime in the months ahead I hope he will be in a position to accept our invitation to visit the United States."

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 4-29-92

Monday, April 1, 1968
9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

These are the problems I see this morning:

- giving the South Vietnamese enough assurance so that they don't fall apart (Tab A);
- making sure our troop morale is not badly affected by both announcements coming together; perhaps a message from the Commander-in-Chief would be helpful;
- minimizing the joy in Hanoi by seeing if the various U. S. candidates can't move toward a united position -- along the lines of Fulbright's statement that Hanoi would be wise to accept your offer.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

105
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, April 1, 1968 -- 9:00 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Khe Sanh:

- 84 incoming rounds;
- 1,143 outgoing rounds;
- 138 tactical sorties;
- 48 B-52's;
- Operation PEGASUS begins: Marines to open Route 9; brigade of Air Cavalry Division to move to and operate from base 5 miles east of Khe Sanh.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12065, Sec 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1968

By *ry*, NARA, Date 4-29-82

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *ry*, NARA, Date 4-29-82

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

105a

Monday, April 1, 1968, 8:27 a. m.

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number fifty-seven on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ/A Shau Valley area for the 24-hour period of March 31, 1968.

A total of 84 incoming rounds of enemy indirect fire was received at Khe Sanh; 35 artillery, 12 rocket and 37 mortar. These attacks killed three Marines and wounded 15 (seven evacuated). No other significant action took place as Marine elements at Khe Sanh Combat Base continued preparations for forthcoming operations.

The 1st Air Cavalry Division Operation (Operation Pegasus), began today. As part of the Operation, the 1st Marine Regiment (Operational Control of 1st Air Cavalry Division) initiates attacks west from Ca Lu at 6:00 p. m. EST last night to open Route 9. The D Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division is to air assault to a fire support base eight kilometers east of Khe Sanh Combat Base and conduct offensive operations to destroy enemy in area.

Weather at Khe Sanh was generally good yesterday until 7:00 p. m. when visibility was reduced to three miles. Ceilings near 1,000 feet formed by 11:00 p. m. and conditions continued to deteriorate during the early morning hours. At 11:00 a. m. this morning, weather improved to five miles visibility and scattered clouds. A similar weather pattern is expected tomorrow.

Resupply for the reporting period amounted to 202 short tons. In addition 44 passenger replacements were flown to Khe Sanh. Ten C-130 and four C-123 aircraft conducted air drops. One C-123 and 43 helicopters landed and delivered cargo and passengers. Supplies remain at a satisfactory level with 28 days of rations and 22 or more days of large caliber ammunition on hand.

There were eight ARC LIGHT strikes (48 sorties) scheduled into the Khe Sanh area. Three sorties were diverted to a secondary target. One strike observed 10 secondary explosions.

Operation Niagara terminated at 6:00 p. m. yesterday. Future ARC LIGHT strikes in the Khe Sanh area will be reported in support of Operation Pegasus. Eight missions are scheduled for April 1.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/88
by rg NARA, Date 5-12-92

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988
By rg NARA, Date 5-12-92

A total of 138 tactical air sorties were flown in support of Khe Sanh. Five secondary explosions, four secondary fires, and destruction of one truck, two trenches and five bunkers was observed. Tactical air sorties planned for tomorrow total 184.

Artillery fire support for Khe Sanh consisted of 51 missions expending 1,143 rounds. Nineteen missions were observed. No COFRAM ammunition was fired.

Elsewhere in Quang Tri Province, contact was light with no significant action reported.

There were two radar missions and one photo mission flown in A Chau. Returns revealed new trail activity and additional possible light anti-aircraft weapons positions.

SECRET



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

1 April 1968
5:30 AM EST

1058

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST 31
March (9:00 AM 1 April, SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) status
as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>DAYS SUPPLY</u> <u>ON HAND</u>	<u>8:00 PM 31 Mar EST</u> <u>(9:00 AM 1 Apr SVN)</u>
<u>CLASS I (Rations)</u>		
Meal, Combat, Individual	22	22 days
B Rations	6	6 days
<u>CLASS III (Fuel)</u>		
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	3	3 days
JP-4 Fuel (Jet Fuel)	10.6	10.6 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	9	9.9 days
Diesel	21.9	20.1 days
<u>CLASS V (Ammunition)</u>		
A. High Explosive		
60-mm mortar	46	45 days
81-mm mortar	31	35 days
90-mm (tank)	68	68 days
4.2" mortar	28	26 days
105-mm howitzer	22	22 days
155-mm howitzer	35	33 days
B. Antitank		
		<u>ROUNDS ON HAND</u>
90-mm AP-T		254
90-mm HEAT		1,089
66-mm rocket (LAW)		2,212
Antitank mines (M-15)		349
Antitank mines (M-19)		469
Antitank mines (M-21)		48
106-mm HEAT		1,538
106-mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T)		1,883
3.5" rocket		2,095

SECRET

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E.O. 12816, Sec 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By rg NARA, Date 4-29-92

~~SECRET~~

8:00 PM 31 Mar EST
(9:00 AM 1 Apr SVN)

C. Antipersonnel

ROUNDS ON HAND


90-mm BEEHIVE	542
105-mm BEEHIVE	1,090
106-mm BEEHIVE	1,689
90-mm CANNISTER	323

CLASS V (COFRAM)

105-mm howitzer	1,684
155-mm howitzer	990
40-mm grenade launcher	6,729
Hand grenades	2,945

2. On 31 March, Khe Sanh was resupplied with 202 short tons as follows:

CLASS I	39 tons
CLASS II	14.5 tons
Class III	27 tons
CLASS IV	55 tons
CLASS V	42.5 tons
MISCELLANEOUS	24 tons


SHANNON D. CRAMER, JR.
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for
Operations, NMCC

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Monday
April 1, 1968
ACTION

106
sent up 4/2/68
2 Han file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Congressional support for your
Vietnam policy

On March 27, Bryan Dorn (S. C.) made a stem-winding speech of support for your Vietnam policy under a special order which gave him the floor for one hour. During the course of the hour the following Congressmen lauded Dorn's stand and your policy: Speaker McCormack, Congressman Edmondson (Okla), Pucinski (Ill), Joelson (N. J.), Irwin (Conn), Young (Tex), Whitener (N. C.), Thompson (Ga), Kornegay (N. C.), Murphy (N. Y.), Gallagher (N. J.), and Wright (Tex). Congressman Findley (Ill) raised the only sour note.

Incidentally, Dorn, who had earlier decided not to go to Chicago, has now been persuaded to join the South Carolina delegation.

I thought you might want to drop Dorn a note of thanks. A draft is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Att

106a

April 1, 1968

Dear Bryan:

I appreciate your speech to the House on March 27. I'm proud of you and mightily encouraged by your support and understanding.

Sincerely,

[S] Lyndon B. Johnson

**Honorable W. J. B. Dorn
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.**

LBJ:MWright:wpt

Monday, April 1, 1968

Mr. President:

In Joe Califano's absence, I am attaching, for your signature, (both copies) a transmittal letter for the 1967 Food for Freedom Report to the Congress.

Joe's staff have been over the report, as have Charlie Zwick's people. It is routine. It stresses the main lines of your food aid policy -- self-help, encouraging our export markets, moving to sales for dollars, and the new measures to combat infant malnutrition.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:RM:lw

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

108

EFA003
CO WTE 1
DE WTE 1187

1968 APR 1 15 45

Free file

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80729

68 MAR 31 PM 10

MONDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HERewith A POSSIBLE VIET-NAM PASSAGE FOR TODAY'S SPEECH:

LAST NIGHT I ANNOUNCED THAT WE WERE TAKING A NEW INITIATIVE
TOWARDS PEACE THROUGH REDUCING OUR BOMBING. THAT INITIATIVE IS
SERIOUS, AND WE MUST ALL HOPE THAT HANOI WILL ACT ON IT.

AT THE SAME TIME, LET NO ONE DOUBT THAT WE ARE DETERMINED
TO GO ON PLAYING OUR PART IN SOUTH VIETNAM. OTHERS WHO SHARE
OUR CONCERN WITH THE FATE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA MUST ALSO KEEP
THEIR SHOULDER TO THE WHEEL. TOGETHER WE CAN SEE THIS CONFLICT THROUGH
TO AN HONORABLE PEACE THAT GIVES THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE
THE RIGHT TO RUN THEIR OWN AFFAIRS IN FREEDOM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG 011518Z APR 68

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White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993

By 18, NARA, Date 4-29-92

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 1, 1968

109

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

LAP 80728

I have talked with Amb. Bunker. He says that Thieu will be busy in constructive ways in the next several months. But a visit in a few months' time would be good.

Therefore, he thinks it would be helpful if you were to say today something like this:

"President Thieu and his government are now engaged in urgent military, political, and economic tasks which we regard as constructive and hopeful.

"But sometime in the months ahead I hope he will be in a position to accept our invitation to visit the United States."

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By AF, NARA, Date 4-29-92