

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2b memo	"Site of Possible US-NVN Talks" S 2 p (dup #2b, NSF, CF, VN "Crocodile Pains In the Field Box 130)	4/11/68 <i>Open NLJ 97-269 10-7-98</i>	A
#3a cable	From Vientiane (work copy) S 2 p	4/11/68	A
#4a cable	Duplicate of #3a <i>Open NLJ 97-269 10-7-98</i>		
#5 memo	Rostow to President, 11:20 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 6-5-97</i>	4/11/68	A
#5a rpt	"April 18, the date..." S 1 p "	4/11/68	A
#6 memo	Rostow to President, 9:55 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 5-30-95 NLJ 93-368</i>	4/11/68	A
#6a cable	Seoul 5614 S 2 p <i>open 3-30-94 NLJ 93-367</i>	4/10/68	A
#6b cable	Seoul 5625 S 1 p "	4/11/68	A
#6c cable	Seoul 5637 S 3 p "	4/11/68	A
#7a cable	From Canberra S 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-268 1-15-99</i>	4/10/68	A
#11 memo	Rostow to President " " " S 2 p	4/11/68	A
#11a memo	Fowler to President S 7 p <i>open 10-17-97 NLJ 97-274</i>	4/10/68	A
#12 memo	Rostow to President, re: Libya <i>Open NLJ 97-268 1-15-99</i> C 2 p	4/11/68	A
#12a memo	Katzenbach to President C 1 p <i>open 6-5-97</i>	4/3/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 71, April 6-11, 1968 Box 32

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#12b rpt	"Proposed Private Visit..." <i>Open NLJ 97-268 10-7-98</i> C 2 p	undated	A
#14b rpt	Duplicate of #5a		
#15a rpt	Duplicate of #5a <i>> Open NLJ 91-258(1102)</i>		
#16 memo	Rostow to President, 10:00 a.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-268 1-15-99</i> S 1 p	4/11/68	A
#16a cable	Vientiane 5777 <i>Open NLJ 97-269 10-7-98</i> S 1 p	4/11/68	A
#16b cable	Vientiane 5784 " " " S 3 p	4/11/68	A
#17 memo	Rostow to President, 10:15 a.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-268 1-15-99</i> C 1 p	4/11/68	A
#19 memo	Rostow to President, 4:30 p.m. " " " C 1 p [Dup. # 111, NSF, CF, Korea, "Vol. 6"]	4/11/68	A
#20 ltr	President to President Park S 1 p <i>open 5-30-95 NLJ 93-368</i>	4/11/68	A
#21 memo	Rostow to President, 11:35 a.m. <i>(dup. # 3, NSF, SHOS, Korea, 4/1/68 - 4/30/68 Box 33)</i> S 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-268 1-15-99</i>	4/11/68	A
#21a ltr	President to President Park <i>(dup. # 2, NSF, SHOS, Korea)</i> S 1 p " " "	undated	A
#22b memo	Rostow to President, 11:35 a.m. <i>open 12-1-94 NLJ 94-272</i> C 2 p <i>(Dup of # 6a, NSF, CF, Lat Am., Vol 6, Ex 3)</i>	4/10/68	A
#28a memo	Katzenbach to President, re: Norway C 2 p <i>Open NLJ 97-269 10-7-98</i> [Duplicate of #10a, NSF, CF, Norway, "King Olav V Visit"]	4/10/68	A
#30 memo	Rostow to President, 4:35 p.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-268 1-15-99</i> C 1 p	4/10/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#32 memo	Rostow to President, 3:45 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 5-20-95 NLJ 93-368</i>	4/10/68	A
#32b cable	From Seoul (work copy) <i>open 3-30-94 NLJ 93-367</i> S 5 p	4/10/68	A
#36 memo	Rostow to President, 2:30 p.m. S 1 p <i>exempt 3-9-00 NLJ 97-273</i>	4/10/68	A
#36a cable	Amman 4264 <i>Open NLJ 97-269 10-7-98</i> S 2 p	4/8/68	A
#36b cable	Intelligence Cable <i>exempt 11-4-99 NLJ 97-271</i> S 2 p <i>exempt NLJ 019-032-2</i>	4/9/68	A
#37a cable	Saigon 24361 <i>Open NLJ 97-269 10-7-98</i> S 3 p	4/9/68	A
#40 memo	Rostow to President, 12:25 p.m. <i>open 10/13/01 NSJ/RAC 00-319</i> TS 1 p	4/10/68	A
#40a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>Exempt 4/10/01 NSJ/RAC 00-320</i> TS- 3 p	4/8/68	A
#41a cable	Saigon 24425 <i>Open NLJ 97-269 10-7-98</i> S 2 p	4/10/68	A
#42 memo	Rostow to President, 10:30 a.m. S 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-268 1-15-99</i>	4/10/68	A
#42a cable	Canberra 4932 S 1 p " " "	4/10/68	A
#43 memo	Rostow to President, 9:30 a.m. TS- 1 p <i>Sanitized 3-4-03 NSJ/RAC 00-321</i>	4/10/68	A
#45 memo	Rostow to President, 9:00 a.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-268 1-15-99</i> S 1 p	4/10/68	A
#45a cable	Saigon 24409 <i>Open NLJ 97-269 10-7-98</i> S 2 p	4/10/68	A

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#46 memo	Rostow to President, 8:55 a.m. <i>Open NLJ 77-268 1-15-99</i> S 1 p	4/10/68	A
#46a cable	Bangkok 13005- S 1 p	4/10/68	A
#47a cable	Intelligence Cable <i>Sanitized 11-4-99 NLJ 97-271</i> C 1 p <i>Sanitized 019-032-2</i>	4/10/68	A
#48 memo	Rostow to President, 8:50 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 5-30-95 NLJ 93-368</i> [Dup. # 46, NSF, CF, Korea, "var. L"]	4/10/68	A
#48a cable	Seoul 5590 <i>open 3-30-94 NLJ 93-367</i> S 1 p	4/10/68	A
#49a cable	Vientiane 5741 <i>Open NLJ 77-269 10-7-98</i> S 1 p	4/10/68	A
#50 memo	Rostow to President, 8:15 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 3-9-03 NLJ/PAC 00321</i>	4/10/68	A
#50a cable	Intelligence Cable S- 1 p <i>Sanitized 5-10-94 NLJ/PAC 03199</i>	4/9/68	A
#52 cable	Rostow to W. Bundy and Bunker <i>Open NLJ 77-268 1-15-99</i> S 1 p	4/10/68	A
#54 memo	Rostow to President C 2 p <i>open 6-5-97</i>	4/10/68	A
#57 memo	Rostow to President <i>open NLJ 019-032-2 (1/82)</i> C 1 p <i>Sanitized 3-9-00 NLJ 97-273</i>	4/9/68	A
#58a memo	Katzenbach to President C 2 p <i>open 6-2-97</i> [Duplicate of #10a, NSF, CF, Norway, "King Olav V Visit"]	4/7/68	A
#58b rpt	"Talking Points" C 3 p <i>open 6-2-97</i> [Duplicate of #10a, NSF, CF, Norway, "King Olav V Visit"]	undated	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#60 draft	President to PM Gorton PCI 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-268 1-15-11</i>	undated	A
#61 draft	President to President Park PCI 1 p <i>(dup # 26 NSF, SHOS, Korea 1/1/68 - 4/30/68⁺ Box 33</i>	undated	A
#62 draft	President to PM Holyoake PCI 1 p " " "	undated	A
#63 draft	President to President Thieu PCI 1 p " " "	undated	A
#65a draft	President to President Balaguer PCI 1 p " " "	4/9/68	A
#65b letter	Balanguer to President PCI 2 p " " "	3/17/68	A
#69 memo <i>Aug 22 20 NSF, CF vN, 66(3), Box 96</i>	Rostow to President, 5 p.m. S 1 p <i>agen 2-2493 NLJ 91-288</i>	4/8/68	A
#69a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 1 p <i>open 6-5-97</i>	4/8/68	A
#69b memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 8 p <i>open 11-4-99 NLJ 97-271</i>	4/8/68	A
#70a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 5 p <i>Sanitized 11-4-99 NLJ 97-271</i>	4/6/68	A
#70b cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 p <i>Sanitized 11-4-99 NLJ 97-271 San NLJ 019-0322</i>	4/6/68	A
#75 memo	Rostow to President, 11:15 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 3-4-03 NLJ/RAC 00-321</i>	4/8/68	A
#75a map	Intelligence Report S 1 p	undated	A
#75b map	Intelligence Report TS 1 p	undated	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#76 memo	Rostow to President, 11:15 a.m. S 1 p <i>Sanitized 5-9-88 NLJ 97-273</i> <i>Sanitized 019-032-2</i>	4/8/68	A
#76a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 p <i>excerpt 11-4-99 NLJ 97-271</i> <i>excerpt NLJ 019-032-2</i>	4/5/68	A
#78 memo	Rostow to President, 9:00 a.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-268 1-15-99</i> S 1 p	4/8/68	A
#78a cable	Vientiane 5697 <i>Open MJ 97-269 10-7-98</i> S 6 p	4/8/68	A
#79 memo	Rostow to President, 8:25 a.m. TS 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-272 2/2/98</i>	4/8/68	A
#79a rpt	"Instructions for Governor Harriman" TS 2 p <i>open 4-10-97</i> [Duplicate of #95a] [Duplicate of #1c, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Volume 70, Box 32]	4/4/68	A
#81 memo	Rostow to President, 8:00 a.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-268 1-15-99</i> S 1 p	4/8/68	A
#81a cable	Vientiane 5678 <i>Open MJ 97-269 10-7-98</i> S 1 p	4/7/68	A
#83 memo	Rostow to President <i>Open MJ 97-268 4-14-99</i> E 2 p [Duplicate of #165, NSF, CF, Philippines, Vol. 4] [Sanitized NLJ 86-140]	4/8/68	A
#84 memo	Duplicate of #83 " " "		
#87 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>Open 3-3-03 NW/RAC 03-199</i>	4/8/68	A
#87a cable	Intelligence Cable S- 1 p <i>Sanitized 5-4-04 NW/RAC 03-199</i>	4/7/68	A

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#90a ltr	President to President Thieu Open NLJ 97-268 1-15-99 PCI 1 p	4/7/68	A
#91 memo	Duplicate of #90a- " " "		
#93 memo	Rostow to President, 7:00 p.m. (dup. #20, NSF, 5/16/5, Kruu S 1 p " " "	4/6/68	A
#93a cable	Saigon 24137 Open NLJ 97-269 10-7-98 S 2 p	4/6/68	A
#95 memo	Rostow to President, 6:10 p.m. TS 1 p Open 2/5/98 NLJ 97-272	4/6/68	A
#95a memo	Duplicate of #79a "TS" 2 pp open 4-10-97		
#96 memo	Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m. S 1 p open 5-19-95 NLJ 94-458	4/6/68	A
#96a cable	Vientiane 5660- Open NLJ 97-269 10-7-98 S 3 p	4/6/68	A
#98 memo	Rostow to President, 10:00 a.m. S 1 p Denitized 3-9-00 NLJ 97-273 rev NSF 019-032-2	4/6/68	A
#98a cable	Rawalpindi 4396- Open NLJ 97-269 10-7-98 S 6 p	4/6/68	A
#102 memo	Rostow to President, 7:40 a.m. Open NLJ 97-268 1-15-99 C 1 p	4/6/68	A
#102a cable	Vientiane 5663- C 1 p open 6-5-97	4/6/68	A

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INFORMATION

Thursday, April 11, 1968 -- 6:15 pm

Mr. President:

You may wish to have the text of
Sec. Clifford's news conference of
this morning.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Pres file 1

NEWS CONFERENCE
OF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CLARK M. CLIFFORD

1a

at

Pentagon

10:00 A. M. (EST)

Thursday, April 11, 1968

- - - -

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I have a brief statement to read, after which I shall attempt to answer questions that you may have.

The President has signed an Executive Order under which I am proceeding to call to active duty approximately 24,500 men in some 88 units from the Reserve components of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The men are being called for service not to exceed 24 months. Notifications are now being sent to all of the units. Each man will have a minimum notice of 30 days before reporting.

Of the 24,500 men being called, 10,000 are being deployed, or scheduled for deployment to South Vietnam, in consonance with the program announced by the President on March 31st. The balance will be used mainly to strengthen the Strategic Reserve.

Individuals from the Strategic Reserve are available as replacements for South Vietnam. The Army is calling approximately 20,000 out of this call-up. They are in 76 units of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.

The Navy is calling approximately 1,000 men in two units of the Naval Reserve. They will be available for rotation between Southeast Asia and the United States.

The Air Force will call approximately 3,500 men in 10 units of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. About one-third of these will be deployed to Southeast Asia under the present plans.

A list of the units being called will be made available to you at 11 o'clock this morning.

MOE

In accordance with our policy, the units earmarked for deployment in Southeast Asia will not be identified until they arrive there at their location.

No decision has been made at this time as to whether additional reserve forces will be called.

That concludes the statement. I am ready for questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, a little more than a week ago "Defense officials" said that up to 50,000 reservists over and above those who make up combat support troops were needed in Vietnam to replace troops needed--to provide troops needed to replace the Marine Regimental Landing Team being recalled.

Does this mean that at this time it won't go as high as 50,000?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: The question had to do with a statement made some days ago by a Defense official that the limitation of the call-up of reserves would be up to 50,000.

Briefly, let me make this comment: You will recall that we sent over to General Westmoreland an increment of 11,000 troops on an emergency basis. They were sent over on an airlift and arrived there in some 48 hours.

The President stated in his speech of March 31st that we must now send to General Westmoreland the support troops that would sustain that 11,000 increment.

Those support troops consisted of artillery, communication, medical--that type of troop.

This increment being called is to satisfy that arrangement that's been made with General Westmoreland. At this time, the President has not reached the decision as to whether he will call up any more reserves or not.

But, of course, he retains the right to do so if it becomes necessary. But this is the only decision that he has made on calling reserves up to this time.

I might add also in that regard that when these additional forces go, the total in Southeast Asia will be brought up-- or the total in South Vietnam, will be brought up to some 549,500, and it is the President's intention at this time not to increase those forces.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you tell us how the present peace-feelers have affected the reserve situation, the Strategic Reserve, and our own plans for call-up?

MORE

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: They have had no effect at all.

We are proceeding as we proceeded before, to supply to our commander in the field the forces that he has told us that he needs.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, is the calling of additional reserves under active study now?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: It is not at the moment because the President has indicated that this is all of the call he's going to make at the present time.

I believe on a routine basis that there will in this Department be a continuing study so that in the event at some future time he should make a decision to call more, we would be ready for him. But he gave us no indication that he has any such intention in mind.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the units of the Selected Reserve Force are equipped with World War II or older equipment. What is going to be done to supply these men with M-16's, and new personnel carriers, and so on?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: For training purposes, some of the older weapons will be used. At the present time, we are building up the production of the M-16 rifle so that as troops are deployed to South Vietnam, they will be given our most modern arms.

In that regard, I might add, that as part of the plan of the increase of the M-16's, we are turning more and more of them over to the ARVN forces so that they also will be better armed as they take an increasingly important and active part in the combat there in South Vietnam.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what the status of the bombing of North Vietnam is now, and perhaps you could tell us what it might be in its staged de-escalation?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: On the evening of March 31st, the President indicated that he was going to discontinue the bombing in the North, in Vietnam. He stated he would discontinue it in that area that consisted of approximately 90 percent of the population of North Vietnam and some 76 percent of the territory of North Vietnam.

Two or three days later, the Defense Department gave out a statement which said that what the President had in mind was that he would not permit the bombing north of the 20th Parallel. There has been no change in any Presidential statement since that time.

QUESTION: There is no bombing north of the 20th Parallel?

MORE

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: There is no bombing taking place today north of the 20th Parallel.

QUESTION: Has there been since the President's statement?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: There has been no bombing north of the 20th Parallel since the President's statement.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, if my arithmetic is right, you plan to call about 14,500 men to beef up the Strategic Reserve. It doesn't sound like much beefing up. Would it indicate at all that you plan to increase the draft calls for the rest of this year or into next year, beyond your former plan?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: We are not able at this time to predict what the draft calls are going to be. They depend to a great extent upon the rate of enlistment and re-enlistment. The draft calls will be maintained and they will be either increased or reduced, depending upon the rate of enlistment.

Now, the 14,500 that go into the Strategic Reserve have been carefully selected so that not only do they, to some extent, increase the number, but they greatly increase the deployment ability and facility of the Strategic Reserve because they fill out units which up to this time have not been deployable but will become deployable after this increment is called up.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the North Vietnamese perhaps might interpret this call-up as an escalation of the war and perhaps this might have an adverse effect on the peace talks?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I do not, because at the time the President made his offer to Hanoi on the evening of Sunday, March 31st, he announced at the same time, and contemporaneously with his offer, that these men were going to be called up. So they had full knowledge of that at the time he made the offer and at the time they gave their response.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, are you maintaining aerial reconnaissance beyond the 20th Parallel?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: In that regard, the President announced that he was halting all aerial attack and naval bombardment north of the 20th. Those were the restrictions that he stated at the time. He at that time did not add any other restrictions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in view of the riot potential on top of the Vietnamese situation, and the fact that we already had a lessened or smaller Strategic Reserve force at home, don't you think this is a very small force to be calling in for the home front forces?

MORE

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: No, because we have ample forces in our military forces here in the United States to take care of any foreseen civil disturbance, because those forces are not just drawn from the Strategic Reserve. They are also drawn from regular Army units.

So we have a very substantial number of troops in this country. I might say at this point that training in this area referred to is progressing, and more troops are being made available from a training standpoint every week and we shall continue to progress in that manner so that we might be ready for any contingency.

QUESTION: Has the infiltration from the North increased or decreased since the 31st of March, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: So far as we can determine, some period prior to March 31st, the rate of infiltration or the rate of shipments through the panhandle of North Vietnam increased and increased rather substantially. So for a number of weeks now, it has been at a substantially higher rate. I do not know that there was any detectable change in that higher rate after the President's speech on March 31st.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what the status of the Department's request to Congress for supplemental appropriations?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: A message will be going up within the next two or three days with reference to this year's supplemental. It is in the process of being drawn. I would rather have it appear in its finalized form than make a comment on it at this time.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in light of the relief of Khe Sanh in recent weeks, would a stopping of the bombing south of the 20th Parallel have a deteriorating effect on U. S. Forces in the northern part of South Vietnam?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: One cannot answer that question with any real degree of specificity. In the event that the bombing is stopped entirely in North Vietnam, then it would be anticipated, as the President said in his San Antonio address, that we would assume that they would not take advantage of it.

Now, we are proceeding upon that attitude and on that basis now.

I think it likely to be inappropriate for me to go into further details in that regard, because for what you will recognize as the degree of sensitivity that exists now regarding contacts that are taking place between Washington and Hanoi.

MORE

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you're giving more M-16's to the ARVN forces. What else is being done to strengthen their ability to fight the war?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: In addition to M-16's that are being given to them, there are a certain type of mortar, an improved type with which they are being supplied; they are being given a greater assistance in the area of helicopter support; they are being given a type of communication equipment that they have needed very badly.

General Abrams has spent a good part of the last year in working with the ARVN forces. He discussed at some length with the President when he was here a few weeks ago what was needed to bring the ARVN to its highest level of combat efficiency and effectiveness.

We are proceeding in a number of areas to increase their effectiveness.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in the light of all these steps you are taking now, was there any error of any substance in not taking these steps earlier to make the M-16's available in these quantities, to get more helicopters, and also the communications gear?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: No. It seems to me to be part of a program that is unfolding with a certain degree of logic to it. We were giving our forces the preference on the M-16's and our other most modern weapons because we were taking the brunt of the effort and the fighting in South Vietnam.

QUESTION: But, Mr. Secretary --

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: May I finish my answer, please, if I might finish it?

QUESTION: Yes.

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: Now that the policy decision has been made to turn over gradually the major effort to the South Vietnamese, we are now starting to give them a degree of preference in our most modern weapons.

Also keep in mind that Thieu recently is calling up 135,000 additional men. They all have to be armed. This is another reason why we are increasing the weapons that we are delivering to the South Vietnamese.

MORE

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I answered your question.

QUESTION: I have a little follow on that. You have some M-16's that went to Hong Kong, and I wondered if you felt that that was, by hindsight, a mistake, to have let them be sold and that you wanted to distribute them to our troops.

MORE

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I am not advised in that regard. I do not know of any M-16's that went to Hong Kong. As long as you have raised the question, I will look into it and I will get the information. Certainly as long as I have been here, and a long time before that, when I had some acquaintanceship with what was going on, I was not conscious of any of the M-16's to Hong Kong. I will look into it and I will find you an answer.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, as I understood it earlier, on the earlier information we had been given, General Westmoreland was to receive 13,000 support troops for the 11,000 he got and then other troops were to be called up to replace the Marine regiment that was now in Vietnam. But it would seem with only 10,000 men going to Vietnam that troops are not being called up to replace the Marine regiment.

Has a decision been made to leave the Marines there?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: No. No, it hasn't.

The 10,000 men being sent now constitute the support troops that General Westmoreland needed. That Marine increment, the 27th Marine RLT, will be coming back sometime this summer and will be replaced by the Army 5th Mechanized, so that there possibly will be units that will come back that will be Marine units and would be replaced by regular Army units, and that would not involve this reserve call-up at all.

QUESTION: Is that the 5th Mechanized?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: Yes.

QUESTION: One brigade or two brigades?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I don't know how much of the 5th Mechanized Division, but a sufficient number to replace the Marines that went over.

QUESTION: Sir, in your opening statement you spoke initially of a call-up of 24,500 men, and then a little farther down you referred to the Army 20,000, Navy 1,000, Air Force 3,500.

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: And those are the figures that constitute the total of 24,500.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, earlier you said in response to a question about the bombing that there is no bombing taking place today north of the 20th Parallel. Has the bomb line been moved down from the 20th Parallel, say, to the 19th or to any place below that?

MORE

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: In that regard, I attempted to answer it before. I said that the President stated -- and then we followed it up with what could be termed a clarification -- that the present statement by him is that there is now a prohibition against the bombing north of the 20th Parallel.

I said at the time, and maybe I didn't make it clear, I do not have anything to add to that previous statement that was given.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you indicated that approximately 3,500 Air Force were being called up, a third of which would be going to Vietnam. Can you tell us how many of that something over 1,000 figure are pilots or rated air crews?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I do not know that. Let me say in that regard that after the press conference, for those of you who have detailed questions about some of the technical phases of the call-up, General Rich, who is the Pentagon expert in that regard, will be available through Phil Goulding's office and the other men, and he can answer any of those detailed questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in the event that we had a complete cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, would the United States be prepared to allow Hanoi to infiltrate certain amounts of men and supplies southward? How would we determine how much they should supply in the South?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: It is a question that obviously is very much on our minds and your minds. My comment will have to be general in nature.

I take you back to the President's San Antonio speech, at which time he said that if the time came for us to order a cessation of the bombing in North Vietnam, we would assume that the North Vietnamese would not take advantage of it.

My answer would be if we did order a cessation of the bombing in North Vietnam and found that they were taking advantage of it, then we would have to make a policy decision then as to what we would do in view of their decision not to comply with the formula that is in our minds.

QUESTION: Sir, you said in response to an earlier question that a policy decision had been made to turn over gradually the major effort to the South Vietnamese. Could you tell us when that decision was made and how it might relate to General Abrams' appointment?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: Well, it has been in the process of being made. I don't know that it occurred on any one date. But for some months that I have been aware of, consultations have been taking place between our military leaders and the South Vietnamese leaders, and plans in this regard have been in the process of formulation.

I noted a comment by President Thieu within the last week in which he stated that his hope was that sometime in the foreseeable future their forces could be developed to the point where they could start in and take over areas that our forces occupied so that our forces could be relieved and be drawn back. That is the program and that is the one we are looking toward.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how do you interpret the situation around Khe Sanh? Do you regard the pullback of the enemy forces there as an effort on their part to demonstrate de-escalation in return for the President's limited halt of the bombing, or do you think that there are other circumstances which led to the lifting of the siege?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I do not interpret it as a de-escalation on their part. The President's speech was the evening of March 31st. The major withdrawal from the Khe Sanh area by the enemy started March 12th. So for a period of over two weeks before he made his speech they were in the process of withdrawing.

I believe we have sufficient information now to indicate to us that the reason they were withdrawing was because they were in the process of being destroyed. One division we know of retired after a while in Laos at only a small percentage of its former strength.

We got a number of prisoner statements that indicate that the area around Khe Sanh from the enemy standpoint was becoming increasingly untenable; that the casualties they were taking were prohibitive and they had no alternative but to withdraw.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, we are dealing with a new policy situation in South Vietnam. As you say, President Thieu says that his forces could take over more of the fighting so that our forces could be drawn back. What role, then, do you see the American forces playing? What does "drawn back" mean?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I think no one can give the details at this time.

MORE

By my answer, I do not mean to suggest that there was any immediate plan for that. It is a long-range plan and I would visualize that when the South Vietnamese troops were ready, that they could be moved into areas where the combat was taking place so that they could supplant some of the American troops.

It might be that the American troops could be used elsewhere. They might be drawn back in reserve. There is going to have to be a period of testing to ascertain whether such a system will work. But it seems to me that it is the ultimate aim that we have for a final determination there; that is, work ourselves into a posture where the South Vietnamese will take over the war.

This is part and parcel, I believe, of the President's decision to place a limitation at this time upon our troop level at a point not exceeding 550,000.

I will take three more questions, because we are already over our time.

MORE

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you characterize the war and this period we are going through now of probing for peace? How do you personally feel about it?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: My remarks, obviously, would have to be exceedingly guarded. We are starting on a new course of action. The President made an offer to Hanoi to start a planned program of de-escalation, the theory being that he would take a step, they might then take a step, he would take another, and over the course of time it could lead to a substantial de-escalation of the fighting.

We are just in the very early stages. After a rather halting beginning in which there was difficulty in getting messages back and forth, that has smoothed out and the messages are going back and forth now effectively.

I might say the tone is quite formal. As of now, the contact is being made with a view to agreeing on the time and the place. I am sure it would be inappropriate, at this sensitive stage, for me to give some private opinion as to what my hopes were that might ultimately result.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, one of the things that is a little confusing in trying to figure this whole business out is the statement that the infiltration has substantially increased over the last months and you have no information whatsoever to say that it has receded at all. But since that time, there have been reports out of Saigon that we have perhaps dropped the level of bombing the range from the 20th to the 19th.

Is it logical to assume that there wouldn't be any decision like that unless there was some positive indication of a step on the other side to de-escalate?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: I think if you permit me to say, I believe it is too hypothetical to answer. The fact is that as you are familiar with the map of North Vietnam, our efforts south of the 20th Parallel encounter the narrowest part of the pan-handle. We also are able, south of the 20th, to direct our attention to the Mu Gia Pass and other areas. So that I believe we can maintain under present circumstances quite an active effort with reference to the flow of men that are coming down south of the 20th Parallel.

If some indication is given by them of an effort to start talks, then I believe that the negotiators, or the conferees, will want to look at what they are doing and what we are doing. I am sure that will be one of the subjects discussed, as to

whether, if we do this, if we make Move A, what will their move be?

I am sure that will be one of the early subjects to be discussed after the time and place are agreed on.

I will have one more question. We are 10 minutes over.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you stated earlier that you are supplying the commander in the field with the forces he has told us he needs. Is that all he told you he needs?

SECRETARY CLIFFORD: Yes.

I might say at this time that at one stage I think there was substantial misunderstanding about what the request was. A very large figure was given at one time with reference to what the field commander needed. That particular memorandum or series of memoranda merely referred to what he anticipated his needs might be over a very substantial period of time, running to a year or a year and a half, under certain conditions. Those would be conditions in which perhaps maximum effort would be made on our part. The present increment that is being sent over has been discussed in detail with Abrams, has been discussed in detail with Westmoreland, and they have both expressed their satisfaction with this increment of troops that are being sent over.

Our time has run out. I thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(10:37 A.M. EST)

INFORMATION

2

SECRET

Thursday, April 11, 1968
3:10 p. m.

Pres. file

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick needles Debrynia
on the Tass leak from Hanoi on Warsaw.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989
By 129, NARA, Date 4-29-92

1258

2a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON


April 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet Press Disclosure of Warsaw as Site
for Talks with North Vietnamese

I thought you would wish to know as quickly as possible the results of my conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin at noon today. I expressed our concern that a TASS dispatch from Hanoi carried the news of the North Vietnamese proposal of Warsaw as a site for talks before Washington had received word through official channels. Ambassador Dobrynin pointed out that a TASS dispatch is not a government statement and he wished to assure me that the TASS report did not involve any connivance by Moscow. He recognized the disadvantage of premature publicity and promised to convey our concern to Moscow.

I enclose the report of our conversation.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Under Secretary

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Conversation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

26

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 11, 1968

SUBJECT: Site of Possible U.S.-North Vietnamese Talks

PARTICIPANTS: Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Under Secretary
W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador-at-Large
Malcolm Toon, Country Director, SOV

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-269
By us, NARA Date 10-7-98

Mr. Katzenbach told Ambassador Dobrynin that he had called him to the Department in order to express his deep concern that the United States Government had learned of the North Vietnamese proposal for Warsaw as a site for talks through a TASS dispatch from Hanoi, rebroadcast by Moscow radio, before the formal proposal from North Vietnam had been received in Washington through official channels. Mr. Katzenbach pointed out that the question of agreeing on a site for talks was a serious matter and it was not helpful to have the question discussed in public channels while negotiations are still going on. In Mr. Katzenbach's view such a development tends to give the impression that what we are engaged in is a propaganda exercise rather than a serious effort to bring about peace in Vietnam. As Ambassador Dobrynin was aware we had some problems with Hanoi in keeping our exchanges private, but Mr. Katzenbach did hope that other countries would not consent to serve as publicity agents in this matter. This could only make agreement more difficult.

Ambassador Dobrynin said he was aware of the Hanoi report through an AP ticker item which he had seen this morning. He hastened to point out, however, that there is a basic difference between a TASS report and a TASS statement, a difference which he had brought to the

EUR:SOV:MIoon:erk 4/11/68
(Drafting Office and Officer)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading
and declassification.

attention of Departmental officials on several occasions in the past. A TASS report, Ambassador Dobrynin pointed out, is precisely the same as any dispatch by an American correspondent; it is not approved or even checked by the Soviet Government and does not in any sense reflect the position of the Soviet Government. A TASS statement, on the other hand, is approved by the Soviet Government and is an accurate reflection of the Soviet Government's position on a particular issue. Ambassador Dobrynin said that he could not understand why there should be concern in the Department about the dispatch from Hanoi which was simply a report based on information the TASS correspondent there had been able to obtain from local sources.

Mr. Katzenbach assured Ambassador Dobrynin that he fully understood the difference between a TASS statement and a TASS report. Both Mr. Katzenbach and Governor Harriman stressed to Ambassador Dobrynin that the important thing was that the Soviet Government should understand that the question of a site for talks should remain out of the public domain and should be discussed quietly in the proper channel. Mr. Katzenbach reiterated that he fully understood Ambassador Dobrynin's point, and he hoped that Ambassador Dobrynin would equally understand and convey to his government our concern that the matter be pursued quietly and without publicity.

Ambassador Dobrynin promised to convey Mr. Katzenbach's expression of concern to Moscow. He then asked if Warsaw would be acceptable to the United States Government. Mr. Katzenbach replied that a decision had not yet been reached but his own personal view was that other places of a more neutral character would be preferable from our point of view.

Ambassador Dobrynin said he wished to reiterate his assurance that the dispatch from Hanoi did not reflect any plot on the part of the Soviet Government to publicize private discussions between Washington and Hanoi.

Pres file

3

**SECRET/
CROCODILE**

**Thursday, April 11, 1968
1:45 p. m.**

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith text as LDX'd to State for transmission.

W. W Rostow

SECRET/CROCODILE attachment

*Cy net + LDX to
Sec Clifford
4/12/68*

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb 22, 1997
By 18, NARA, Date 4-29-92

~~SECRET~~

ACTION: Amembassy VIENTIANE IMMEDIATE

(April 11, 1968)

NODIS/CROCODILE

1. You should immediately arrange delivery to DRV Embassy, with appropriate salutations, of following message:

TEXT

The USG acknowledges the letter delivered by the DRV Embassy in Vientiane to the American Embassy on April 11.

The USG notes that this letter fails to refer to the locations suggested in the USG message of April 10. The USG strongly believes that these contacts, if they are to be used for serious exchanges and not just as an exercise in propaganda, should take place at a location meeting certain minimum standards of fairness and equity. Specifically and by way of example:

a. The contacts should take place in a neutral country, where the atmosphere would reflect impartiality toward the participants and where the host country does not have deep commitments running to either side;

b. Both sides should have representation and adequate communications in order to be in contact with the heads of their governments.

In addition, it has been the understanding of the USG that it was the DRV view, with which we agree, that these initial contacts should take place in an Asian location, which would be more readily accessible to DRV representatives and which is located in the immediate region which has the most direct and vital interest in the achievement of a stable peace.

In the light of these criteria, the USG again calls to the attention of the DRV the four locations suggested in our message of April 10 and requests a response.

~~SECRET~~

-2-

(4/11/68)

The USG would be happy to make further suggestions if thought desirable or to consider any fair and equitable suggestions submitted by the DRV.

The USG remains ready to reach an early agreement on a suitable location and timing. April 15 as we suggested, or April 18 as you suggest, would be satisfactory to the USG, and our representatives are prepared to depart when a location is agreed between the US and the DRV and has been found to be acceptable to the host government.

END

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

ACTION

4

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, April 11, 1968
1:05 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Nick's suggested message to the DRV
via Sullivan.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 4-29-92

4a

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin
Intr

ACTION: Amembassy VIENTIANE IMMEDIATE

[Redacted area]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958; Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-269
By us, NARA Date 10-7-98

STATE

NODIS/CROCODILE

1. You should immediately arrange delivery to DRV Embassy, with appropriate salutations, of following message:

TEXT

The USG acknowledges the letter delivered by the DRV Embassy in Vientiane to the American Embassy on April 11.

The USG notes that this letter fails to refer to the locations suggested in the USG message of April 10. The USG ^{stamps} believes that these contacts, if they are to be used for serious exchanges and not ^{just} as an exercise in propaganda, should take place at a location meeting certain minimum standards of fairness and equity.

Specifically and by way of example:

- a. The contacts should take place in a neutral country,

Dated by: EA:WPBundy:mk 4/11/68 Tel. No. 4235 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Acting Secretary

White House - Mr. Rostow

S/S -

SECRET

Page 2 of telegram to Vientiane

*and adopt a response
replete*

*15-20 to be completed
in April*

where the atmosphere would reflect impartiality toward the participants and where the host country does not have deep commitments running to either side;

b. Both sides should have representation and adequate communications ~~available for contact~~ *in order to be in contact with the leaders of the government*

In addition, it has been the understanding of the USG that it was the DRV view, with which we agree, that these initial contacts should take place in an Asian location, which would be more readily accessible to DRV representatives and which is located in the ^{immediate} region which has the most direct and vital interest in the achievement of a stable peace.

In the light of these criteria, the USG again calls to the attention of the DRV the four locations suggested in our message of April 10. The USG would be happy to make further suggestions or ~~to~~ consider ^{any four and Aquino} suggestions by the DRV.

The USG remains ^{ready} ~~ambitious~~ to reach ^{an} ~~the~~ earliest possible agreement on a suitable location and timing. April 18 ^{as you suggest} would be satisfactory to the USG, and ~~Ambassador Harriman~~ ^{our representative} ~~is~~ prepared ~~for immediate departure~~ when a location is agreed between the US and the DRV and has been found to be acceptable to the host government.

END

if thought desirable

Submitted

ACTION

5

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Thursday 11, 1968 -- 11:20 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the draft reply, as directed by you.

As you are aware, there will be strong opposition to this at State. As you can see from the attached Reuters ticker, ^{someone} ~~they~~ are already leaking that Warsaw is acceptable.

^{State} ~~They~~ believe that we will lose in the propaganda war on the Hill and in world opinion.

W. Rostow

Message approved for dispatch _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 91-258
By *ju/lop* NARA. Date 6-6-97

April 11, 1968

5a

~~SECRET~~

April 18, the date proposed by the DRV for an initial contact at the Ambassadorial level, is acceptable to us.

We believe that if the contact is to be other than an exercise in propaganda, certain standards of fairness must be met:

-- the contacts should take place in a neutral country, where the atmosphere would reflect complete impartiality towards both participants and where the host country does not have deep commitments running to either of the participants;

-- both sides should have representation and adequate communications.

We believe it essential that both participants be accredited to the host country and that the participants have communications adequate to communicate important political and military information and decisions.

-- On reflection, we believe it wise that the contacts should be in Asia, the region which has the most direct and vital interest in the achievement of a stable peace.

In the light of these criteria, we again call to your attention the four locations that we suggested in our message of April 10 : Vientiane, Rangoon, Djakarta, and New Delhi. We commend any one of these to the DRV. If these are unsatisfactory, we should be glad to make other suggestions, or consider your suggestions, which meet the criteria set out above.

DECLASSIFIED

###

Authority NLS 91-258
By fw/sep NARA. Date 6-5-77

58

NNNN
ZCZC EPE 220
UU AHD
1025: URGENT '***VIET--APPROVAL:

Rostow

WASHINGTON, APRIL 11 (REUTERS)-DIPLOMATIC SOURCES SAID
TODAY THE UNITED STATES PROBABLY WOULD GIVE QUICK APPROVAL
TO WARSAW AS THE SITE OF PRELIMINARY CONTACTS WITH HANOI ON
PEACE.

:: (MORE) RH/HV

~~SECRET~~

April 11, 1968
9:55 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

~~1. Park~~
2. Park file

Subject: Visit with President Park

There are three messages in from Seoul regarding the possibility of President Park's coming to Honolulu for a meeting.

First, Presidential Sec. General Yi Hu Rak said President Park would prefer sometime in May. He noted Korean Assembly will convene April 15 and Park thinks it urgent he be there to push key legislation (including development of homeland reserve force). It was clear, too, that Park was not happy about sharing the spotlight with Thieu.

In Second message, Korean Prime Minister is reported to have stressed that "face" was main consideration and that your seeing Thieu first, then Park would make the latter "only a follower."

In third message, DCM met again with Yi Hu Rak. He again stressed importance of Assembly session and said this was primary reason for postponing a meeting in Honolulu. He again suggested May and urged that meeting between you should focus on Korea as well as Viet-Nam. He said it would be best of there were no other meetings with chiefs of state at the same time or place. Yi said he thought Park could be useful in helping ease any problem areas with the Vietnamese. In other words, he suggests a Honolulu meeting with Park in early May and then an invitation to Thieu to come to Washington later in the month. Embassy Seoul thinks Park will come any time in May, but that plans for meeting next Monday or Tuesday be abandoned.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

6a
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

10

OO RUEHC
DE RUALOS 5614E 1020340
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 110317Z APR 68 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 120
STATE RHNC
BT

CONTROL : 2829Q
RECEIVED : April 10, 1968
11:24P.M.

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 5614

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-367
By ig, NARA, Date 2-7-94

REF: A. STATE 144252; B. STATE 144869

1. PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY GENERAL YI HU RAK CALLED ME TO BLUE HOUSE THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS REPLY TO REFTAL A. HE SAID THAT HAVING NOTED PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PLANS FOR VISIT TO HONOLULU NEXT MONDAY NOT YET FIRM, AND HAVING EXAMINED HIS OWN SCHEDULE, PRESIDENT PARK WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST THAT THEY MEET THERE SOMETIME IN MAY. HE SAID ONE OF PRINCIPAL REASONS IS THAT ASSEMBLY IS CONVENING APRIL 15 AND PRESIDENT PARK FEELS HE SHOULD BE HERE ON THAT DATE AND FOR

PAGE 2 RUALOS 5614E ~~SECRET~~
SOME DAYS THEREAFTER IN ORDER TO SUPERVISE HANDLING OF VERY IMPORTANT HOMELAND RESERVE BILL. I SAID I WOULD OF COURSE FORWARD THEIR SUGGESTION BUT I HAD NO INFORMATION CONCERNING POSSIBILITIES FOR MAY MEETING.

2. IN BELIEF THAT THERE WERE OTHER FACTORS IN THEIR THINKING, I CONTINUED TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH YI HU RAK. IT EMERGED AFTER A TIME THAT WHAT WAS BOTHERING THEM AMONG OTHER THINGS WAS THE SHARING OF LIMELIGHT WITH THIEU. YI HU RAK REMINDED ME THAT THEY HAD INQUIRED BEFORE MAKING DEFINITE DECISION TO GO TO HONOLULU WHETHER MEETING WAS TO BE ONE OF A SERIES AND THAT I HAD REPLIED THAT NO ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE FOR OTHER MEETINGS AT SAME LEVEL. MENTIONING THEN QUESTION OF "FACE" HE SAID THEY FELT IT WOULD DO MUCH MORE FOR PRESIDENT PARK IF IT WAS NOT QUESTION OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON SEEING THIEU ONE DAY AND PARK THE NEXT.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-Page, SEOUL 5614, April 10, 1968 NODIS

3. I SAID THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THEY WERE GIVING THIS FACTOR TOO MUCH WEIGHT, THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S

PAGE 3 RUALOS 5614E ~~SECRET~~

SUGGESTION TO HIS FRIEND WAS THAT THEY MEET FOR INFORMAL AND PRIVATE TALKS AND SINCE THAT TIME THERE HAD BEEN FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO VIETNAM THAT IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL FOR THEM TO DISCUSS IN ADDITION TO FACT THAT KOREA IS IN FOREFRONT OF OUR THINKING IN SUGGESTING THE MEETING. YI HU RAK UNEASILY ADMITTED THAT THESE WERE IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF MATTER BUT HE ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT THEIR SUGGESTION IN ANY CASE.

4. I HAVE NOW RECEIVED REFTEL B, ON BASIS OF WHICH I WILL ASK FOR ANOTHER APPOINTMENT. HOWEVER IT IS NOT CLEAR FROM REF B WHETHER THIEU WILL COME AT ALL TO HONOLULU AND IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT I KNOW ABOUT THIS BEFORE I TALK TO PARK OR YI HU RAK AGAIN.

5. I ALSO NEED YOUR VIEWS AS TO HOW STRONGLY I SHOULD PRESS PARK IN THIS MATTER.

GP-3 PORTER
BT

.NNNN.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

6b
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL : 2847Q
RECD : APRIL 11, 1968
1:26 A.M.

10

***** 22 RUEHC
DE RUALOS 5625E 1020600
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 110652Z APR 68 ZFF1
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 129
STATE GRNC
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-367
By 128, NARA, Date 2-7-94

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 5625

NODIS

REF: SEOUL 5614

1. AT LUNCHEON TODAY PRIME MINISTER BROUGHT UP SUBJECT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S INVITATION TO PRESIDENT PARK. SPEAKING "WITHIN FAMILY" HE SAID THAT PARK'S RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT MEETING AT HONOLULU NEXT TUESDAY WAS BASED PURELY ON CONSIDERATION OF "FACE." HE ILLUSTRATED THIS BY SAYING THAT AT ONE POINT IN MEETING WITH HIS CLOSEST ADVISERS ON THIS SUBJECT YESTERDAY, PRESIDENT PARK HAD REMARKED THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON WOULD SEE PRESIDENT THIEU FIRST AND HAD CONCLUDED WITH STATEMENT "THIS MAKES ME ONLY FOLLOWER."

PAGE 2 RUALOS 5625E ~~SECRET~~

2. PRIMIN THEN VOLUNTEERED FOLLOWING AS HIS OPINION WHICH HE NOT SURE PARK WOULD ACCEPT. PRIMIN FELT THAT IF ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO SEE PRESIDENT PARK FIRST HE WOULD PROBABLY ACCEPT PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S INVITATION. PRIMIN SUGGESTED THAT DCM TRY THIS OUT ON YI HU RAK, OFFERING IT AS DCM'S OWN SUGGESTION AND ON PERSONAL BASIS. DCM WILL DO THIS SOONEST. IN MEANTIME SUGGEST YOU WITHHOLD ALL ACTION WITH RESPECT REFTEL. GP-3 PORTER
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

^{6c}
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

Rostow

02890Q ⁶

OO RUEHC 1968 APR 11 AM 5 51
DE RUALOS 5637E 1020945
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 110925Z APR 68 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 140
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 5637

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 93-367
By lip, NARA, Date 2-7-94

NODIS

REF: A. SEOUL 5625; B. STATE 144869; C. SEOUL 5614

1. DCM MET WITH YI UH RAK TO follow up PRIMIN'S SUGGESTION (REF A). DCM SET STAGE IN TERMS HIS DESIRE TALK YI HU RAK AS OLD FRIEND AND ON PERSONAL BASIS IN LIGHT LATTER'S CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR EARLIER IN DAY. DCM STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRESIDENT PARK IN LIGHT OF SECURITY SITUATION IN KOREA AND RAPID DEVELOPMENTS IN VIETNAM. SAID HE WISHED TO EXPLORE WITH YI HU RAK POSSIBLE WAYS OF KEEPING MOMENTUM FOR MEETING GOING

PAGE 2 RUALOS 5637E ~~SECRET~~
AND IF QUESTION WAS ONE ESSENTIALLY OF "FACE" SO FAR AS PRESIDENT PARK WAS CONCERNED WHAT COULD BE DONE TO MEET THIS CONCERN.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE -2- SEOUL 5637, APR 11, 1968

N O D I S

2. SUBSTANCE OF ENSUING CONVERSATION INDICATED THAT EXPLANATION OF ASSEMBLY SESSION GIVEN TO AMBASSADOR REPORTED REF C IS IN FACT PRIMARY REASON FOR POSTPONING MEETING. PARK, HOWEVER, HAD ALSO BEEN COUNTING ON MEETING IN HONOLULU BEING ONLY ONE BETWEEN JOHNSON AND FRIENDLY CHIEF OF STATE. FELT THAT THIS HAD BEEN MADE AMPLY CLEAR TO US. YI POINTED OUT LATEST INVITATION TO HONOLULU MEETING TO INCLUDE THIEU DILUTES PARK'S POSITION, AND THIS FURTHER AGGRAVATED BY INTENTION PRESIDENT JOHNSON MEET WITH THIEU FIRST. HONOLULU MEETINGS LOSE FURTHER ATTRACTION SINCE PRESENCE OF BOTH THIEU AND PARK WOULD MAKE IT LOOK TO WORLD THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD BROUGHT TO HONOLULU TWO LEADING OBJECTORS TO BOMBING PAUSE POLICY IN ORDER TO FORCE THEM INTO LINE AND ACCEPT BOMBING PAUSE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON MARCH 31. DURING

PAGE 3 RUALOS 5637E ~~SECRET~~

CONVERSATION YI GU RAK MADE IT CLEAR THAT IN VIEW OF INVITATION TO BOTH THIEU AND PARK, IT WOULD BE "MOST EMBARRASSING" FOR PARK TO GO IF THIEU DID NOT ACCEPT INVITATION. (FYI HE DID NOT KNOW THAT THIEU UNABLE PROCEED HONOLULU MONDAY.) FACT BOTH INVITED BOUND TO LEAK AND IT WOULD MAKE PARK APPEAR IN SUBSERVIENT ROLE WITH THIEU ADOPTING MORE INDEPENDENT ATTITUDE.

3. YI HU RAK INDICATED BEST TACTIC WOULD BE TO WAIT AND SEE HOW WASHINGTON REACTS TO PARK'S SUGGESTION OF POSTPONEMENT UNTIL SOMEWHAT IN MAY AS SUBMITTED REF C. IF PRESIDENT JOHNSON ANXIOUS TO MEET WITH PARK, PROSPECTS OF SUITABLE DATE AT EARLIER TIME COULD BE EXPLORED. INVITATION, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE FOR LOCALE WHERE JOHNSON WOULD MEET WITH PARK ALONE AND THERE SHOULD BE NO OTHER MEETINGS WITH CHIEFS OF STATE. FOCUS OF MEETINGS SHOULD BE ON KOREA AS WELL AS VIETNAM, AND VIETNAMESE PROBLEMS SHOULD NOT DOMINATE. INDICATING HE FELT THERE UNSPOKEN DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN VIETNAM AND U.S. GOVERNMENTS, YI HU SUGGESTED PARK

PAGE 4 RUALOS 5637E ~~SECRET~~

COULD PLAY USEFUL ROLE IN EASING ANY PROBLEM AREAS. FELT SUCH PROBLEMS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN PRESIDENTS JOHNSON AND PARK, AND ON BASIS THOSE DISCUSSIONS PARK COULD COMMUNICATE WITH AND INFLUENCE THIEU. THEN THIEU COULD BE INVITED TO WASHINGTON WHERE DIFFERENCES COULD BE READILY RESOLVED SINCE PARK WOULD HAVE PREPARED GROUND BEFOREHAND. YI HU RAK MADE POINT ON ROLE PARK COULD PLAY IN VIETNAM MATTERS SEVERAL TIMES DURING CONVERSATION.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE -3- SEOUL 5637, APR 11, 1968, N O D I S

4. COMMENT: IT CLEAR FROM TALK WITH YI HU RAK THAT PRIME MINISTER'S PROPOSAL IS NON-STARTER. SIMILARLY SUGGESTION REF B THAT PARK COME ON MONDAY OR TUESDAY SINCE THIEU NOT COMING WILL BE REJECTED. CONSEQUENTLY WE HAVE NOT APPROACHED PARK ON THIS POINT. YI REFLECTED SOME RELUCTANCE ON PART OF PARK TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON UNLESS MEETING RESULTS IN SOME ROLE FOR PARK IN VIETNAM AFFAIR THAT WOULD ENHANCE HIS PRESTIGE.

5. ON BASIS PICUTRE WE NOW SEE IT HERE, AND SUBJECT TO

PAGE 5 RUALOS 5637E ~~SECRET~~
COMPELLING REQUIREMENTS YOU MAY HAVE IN MIND, BELIEVE SHOULD ABANDON PLAN FOR HONOLULU MEETING NEXT MONDAY OR TUESDAY AND SUGGEST THAT IT BE RESCHEDULED FOR NEXT MONTH IF PRACTICAL. ALSO SUGGEST NO OTHER MEETINGS WITH CHIEFS OF STATE BE SCHEDULED AT SAME TIME. BELIEVE PARK WILL COME ANYTIME IN MAY UNDER THERSE CONDITIONS IF WE MAINTAIN OUR INTENTION TO DISCUSS KOREAN SECURITY PROBLEMS WITH PARK, AND SEEK LATTER'S FRANK ADVICE ON VIET AMJM

GP-3 PORTER
PT

~~SECRET~~

1

ACTION

Thursday
April 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit by Prime Minister Gorton

Pres file

Gorton replied immediately to your invitation of April 9. He said that he looks forward greatly to visiting you, cannot leave Canberra before May 23, and must be back in Australia by May 30. He is planning on a visit between those dates if the timing is convenient for you. His reply is attached.

Given Gorton's schedule, he could not arrive in Washington before the morning of the 24th, a Friday, and would have to leave on the afternoon of Tuesday the 28th. He could arrive on the morning of the 24th only by flying straight through, and would arrive both tired and out of time-phase. That is an undesirable way to start your first meeting with him since he became Prime Minister, I think, therefore, that we should rule out an arrival on the 24th. I have set out below the options for a visit between the 25th and the 28th of May:

1. A quiet visit with no south lawn ceremonies and no state dinner. There are two ways of doing this:

You could have Gorton meet you at Camp David on Saturday the 25th with a return to Washington on the 27th, thus permitting him to have conversations with Secretaries Rusk, Clifford, and Fowler before his departure on the 28th.

Alternatively, we could fly Gorton from San Francisco to the Ranch on the 25th and do the visit along the "Erhard pattern."

2. You could have Gorton as a weekend guest at Camp David and still have his official arrival with full honors on the south lawn on the morning of Monday, May 27, and a state dinner that evening.
3. If you prefer, we could forgo the private weekend altogether, have Gorton arrive in Washington on the morning of Monday the 27th with full military honors on the south lawn, state dinner in the evening, his calls on other officials in Washington, and a departure on the afternoon of Tuesday the 28th.

In view of the touchiness that Gorton has displayed, it is my instinct to play

it safe and give him the military honors and the state dinner. Therefore, I recommend either of the last two options, depending on whether or not you want to tie yourself down to an informal weekend with him.

I know that you do not like to schedule official visitors for Monday and Tuesday. However, given Gorton's schedule, there is not much choice on this if you wish to render him the usual honors. Once we know your decision on the visit we will come back promptly with an appropriate message of invitation from you to Gorton.

W. W. Rostow

Att

1. invite him to be my weekend guest
at Camp David, May 25-27 _____
2. invite him to be my guest at
the Ranch, May 25-28 _____
3. invite him to be my weekend guest
at Camp David, May 25-26, followed
by an official visit to Washington on May 27-28 _____
4. invite him for an official visit
to Washington on May 27-28 _____
5. call me _____

cc: Lou Schwartz

MWright:wpt

7a

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

From: Amembassy CANBERRA

10 April 1968

My dear President,

Thank you very much for your message which I received this morning.

My colleagues and myself greatly valued Secretary Rusk's visit and were much helped by the talks we had with him.

I look forward greatly to visiting you and thank you again for the suggestion. I am afraid it would be most difficult for me to leave Canberra before 23 May because of the arrangements which have been made for Mrs. Gandhi to visit us and I should need to be back by 30 May. If time within this period would be convenient to you would you please let me know. Meanwhile I shall plan on the basis of a visit between those dates.

I am continuing to receive up to date information about your exchanges with North Vietnam and am grateful to you for arranging to keep me informed so that we may express our views or make suggestions in advance of decisions being taken.

I am particularly grateful to you for taking me into your confidence as to your intentions to see President Thieu and President Park, because it is quite critical for me to have knowledge of this kind in advance of its being generally known.

With kindest regards, Yours Sincerely, John G. Gorton

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By is, NARA Date 1-15-99

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

8

ACTION

Thursday - April 11, 1968

~~1 copy~~
2 Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message from Costa Rican President Trejos

President Trejos has sent you the message at Tab B congratulating you for your March 31 speech.

A recommended reply is at Tab A.

W. W. Rostow

Approve

4/13/68

Disapprove

Call me

Attachments

Tab A - Recommended Presidential response to message from Costa Rican President Trejos

Tab B - Message of April 3, 1968 from President Trejos

Suggested Presidential Message

to

President Trejos of Costa Rica

His Excellency
Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez
President of the Republic of Costa Rica

I appreciate your thoughtful message on our search for peace in Vietnam. It is reassuring to have your understanding and support and that of the Costa Rican people. We remain hopeful that Hanoi will agree to early talks that will lead to an honorable solution.

Lyndon B. Johnson

8b

Official Translation
of
Message to the President from Costa Rican President Trejos
(of April 3, 1968)

"SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, April 3, 1968

The President
The White House.

Yesterday Ambassador Boonstra gave me the text of your address of last Sunday, and I want to send you, in the name of the Government and People of Costa Rica, this message of congratulations on your decision concerning the conflict in Viet-Nam. It bears witness once again to the desire of the United States for peace founded on justice and freedom.

J. J. Trejos Fernandez
President of Costa Rica".

Friday, April 11, 1968

~~copy~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your approval is a brief message to Queen Juliana of the Netherlands replying to her condolence message to you on the death of Dr. King.

Pres file
sent Ranch
via wire

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

ERF:mst

9a

**SUGGESTED REPLY TO QUEEN JULIANA
OF THE NETHERLANDS**

Your touching message of condolence on the death of Dr. King showed us who mourn him here that his life and martyrdom had deep meaning for men everywhere. In this tragic hour we rededicate ourselves to the cause for which he lived and gave his life -- brotherhood, peace and justice.

Lyndon B. Johnson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Proposed Reply

I am grateful for your expression of sympathy on the death of the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King. Even as we mourn his loss, the assurance that our grief is shared by you and your great people renews our faith in the continued strength and progress of the principles for which Dr. King lived.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Her Majesty,
Juliana,
Queen of the Netherlands,
The Hague.

April 5, 1968

The President
The White House

Deeply shocked at the terrible news of the atrocious assault on the life of that great countryman of yours Martin Luther King who gave his life for the cause of justice. We want to express also on behalf of the people of the Netherlands our feelings of heartfelt sympathy.

Juliana R. Bernhard

Profile

Thursday, April 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Submission of the International Coffee Agreement 1968 to the Senate

Nick Katzenbach recommends that we submit the attached International Coffee Agreement, 1968, to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. The Agreement was signed on behalf of the United States on March 21, 1968.

At Tab A is a draft message from the President to the Senate transmitting the Agreement. Tab B contains the Acting Secretary of State's report to you on the Agreement and a copy of the Agreement.

The 1962 Coffee Agreement, which this Agreement will replace, has worked well. It has brought greater stability to coffee prices. Our active participation in the Agreement helped our relations with Latin America and Africa. It was clear at Punta del Este that Latin American chiefs of state view the Coffee Agreement as a major element in hemisphere relations. We agreed at Punta del Este to work with them to improve and strengthen the Agreement.

The new Agreement has improved features -- including teeth in the provisions for reducing surplus coffee production. The existing agreement expires September 30. To maintain continuity and avoid serious disruption in the coffee trade, it is necessary that we obtain ratification of the Coffee Agreement and pass the implementing legislation as soon as possible. State will shortly send draft implementing legislation to the Budget Bureau for submission to both Houses.

We probably will run into opposition in the Congress but less than we did in ratifying the 1962 Agreement and in passing the implementing legislation in 1965. Many of the exaggerated fears that coffee consumers will be gouged by the Agreement were proved baseless. Moreover, the Coffee Agreement has acquired a good press -- as a useful and practical proposition.

The National Coffee Association worked closely with the State Department, and the majority of the industry will probably support the new Agreement as it did the existing one. Katzenbach says that the leadership

of both Houses are informed on the status of the legislation and the timing problem. Fulbright, Mansfield, Long, Proxmire, Morse, Javits, Dirksen, Hickenlooper and Williams have at various times been consulted. Senator Long may actively oppose the Agreement unless a solution is found to the problems faced by a New Orleans shipping line in shipping coffee from Brazil. State is working on it. State found no evidence of concerted opposition to the Agreement -- beyond those who oppose commodity agreements in general.

Bill Macomber has checked with the Foreign Relations Committee and says it may be able to take up the Coffee Agreement in early May.

I concur in State's recommendation that we send the Agreement to the Senate for ratification as soon as possible.

W. W. Rostow

Approve Submission to Senate and Message _____

No _____

Call me _____

ERF:mst

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268

By us, NARA Date 1-15-99

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Status Report on the Balance of Payments

At Tab A is Secretary Fowler's status report on the balance of payments program. It reflects the discussion of the Cabinet Committee and is worth reading in full.

The situation comes down to this:

- The restraints on direct investment and bank lending are having their effect -- less than target but on the whole good.
- Government personnel expenditures abroad are being cut, but the savings are not large. Negotiations to neutralize military expenditures are moving along, but the results are not yet in.
- We will have savings on travel from the voluntary appeal and the customs restrictions, but the \$500 million target is out of sight.
- The trade measure is still up in the air. The Europeans have offered to cut tariffs to us but their offer is hedged with difficult conditions. We are working up our analysis now and will have a separate memo for you on the issues within a week.
- The longer term measures to increase exports and tourism are going well.
- Private foreign purchases of U. S. securities have been a surprisingly big plus factor in the first quarter.

The preliminary figures for the first quarter show an overall liquidity deficit of \$1 billion (\$4 billion annual rate), which is not good. The savings from the program have been offset by a sharp deterioration in our trade account, and by short term capital outflows associated with the March gold crisis. For the first quarter, the trade surplus was down 50% -- a reduction of \$2 billion on an annual basis. Perhaps half of this is explained

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-2-

by higher copper and steel imports associated with strikes. The rest comes from increased imports attracted by our overheated economy.

The first quarter figures will not be published until next month, but they have already gotten around and will come as no surprise. The figures should improve in succeeding quarters but it is clear that the pressure is very much on.

W. W. Rostow

ERF
ERF:mst

~~SECRET~~



APR 10 1968

11a

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The January 1 Balance of Payments Action Program--
Implementation and Progress Report

The need for the January 1 program is as pressing today as it was at the beginning of the year. The Washington Communique on gold and the Stockholm agreement on Special Drawing Rights have calmed but not overcome basic anxieties. The foreign holders of dollars are still suspending judgment on our currency and on the viability of the international monetary system.

Preliminary first quarter balance of payments figures are not a cause of encouragement:

First quarter liquidity deficit (seasonally-adjusted) may be in the \$1 billion area.

-- much more than the \$533 million of the first quarter 1967.

-- much less than the disastrous \$1.8 billion of the fourth quarter 1967.

Official settlements deficit will be less adverse than in either the first or fourth quarters of 1967.

The continued trade account deterioration is the most distressing element and unusual copper and steel imports explain only part of the drop in the trade surplus.

-- Imports continue too high--and they do so on a broad range of products. Imports remain at a swollen 3.4 percent of our GNP--a level they have maintained for almost two years. We lost our "commercial" trade surplus (over-all trade surplus excluding government-financed exports) in the third quarter 1967--the first time since 1959. Exports continue their average growth.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-274

By is, NARA Date 10-3-97

~~SECRET~~

Long-term investments and other special receipts will be only about one-half of the \$675 million received in the first quarter of last year.

- Notwithstanding these two adverse factors, January and February showed up reasonably well compared with the same two months of 1967.
- March was the costly month--it is too early to be able to analyze the direct and indirect capital flows associated with the gold crisis, but they were probably very adverse.

Prospects for the year

Your January 1 goal of bringing our payments picture "to or close to equilibrium" is vital. The initial psychological impact provided by your announcement served greatly to quiet fears. However, we must have no illusions about getting within point-blank range of equilibrium this year.

Moreover, the targeted savings will not be achieved for this calendar year in several parts of the new program: Some elements have not yet become operative; some will only begin to make their savings in the months ahead; others are on schedule.

An implementation and progress report on the measures in your January 1 Action Program follows:

The First Order of Business

The anti-inflation tax: it is basic to the entire program and more important than ever. Its prospects are also brighter than heretofore.

Wage-price restraint: another basic, long-term measure, closely keyed to the tax. Labor settlements are excessive and as long as the rate of inflation is as high as it is, this is what we must expect. This wage-price restraint effort has seemed mostly to harden management's collective bargaining posture--without moderating labor's demands.

Crippling work stoppages: While the log jam on copper has been broken many crucial contract expirations lie ahead.

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- 3 -

TEMPORARY MEASURES

Direct Investment

While any judgment at this time about the savings of the Commerce Direct Investment Program must be very tentative, Secretary Smith anticipates they may be in the order of \$500 to \$600 million rather than the \$1 billion targeted for 1968. This estimate arises primarily from the unexpectedly large volume of requests for specific authorizations in connection with prior commitments or work in process. Another part of the slippage results from the exemption for Canada-- but this will be more than offset by compensating Canadian actions reflected in other sectors.

Company reporting forms are now coming in and we will be analyzing these figures to see how additional savings may be obtained.

Lending by Financial Institutions

Federal Reserve expects at least a \$400 million reduction in outstanding bank credits to foreigners; the \$100 million savings in credit outflows from nonbank financial institutions to foreign borrowers will not be achieved, because of the Canadian exemption. Over-all, I am expecting the Fed to achieve the \$500 million target.

Travel Abroad

Your appeal to postpone non-essential travel was very helpful and corporations and trade associations in particular seemed to have rescheduled European meetings in the U. S.

The 5 percent ticket tax on air travel and the tightening of Customs restrictions passed the House and will be considered by the Senate after Easter.

Congress has linked the fate of the travel expenditures tax to the type of short term trade measures we come forth with. The ticket tax and customs measures adopted so far in the House of themselves would produce only modest results.

~~SECRET~~

Your January 1 appeal plus uncertainty on the part of the public about what kind of tax will emerge may have some restraining effect on tourism abroad this year, but it is difficult to see how we can approach the targeted savings on travel expenditures without taking some further measures before the tourist season is in full swing.

Government Expenditures Overseas

Minimizing foreign exchange costs of troops

Allied orders placed with the DOD of their defense needs will be down somewhat from the CY 1967 \$1.5 billion level. Payments received are also expected to decline from about \$1.5 billion in CY 1967 to about \$1.0 billion in CY 1968. These declines in orders and payments result primarily from Germany, where the offset agreement obligations ended in CY 1967. Therefore, the payments situation for CY 1968 will require particular emphasis on investments in longer term United States securities and other special transactions, in order to minimize the foreign exchange costs of our troops overseas.

In Europe offset negotiations are underway involving the investment in long-term securities. In Germany, the target is \$750 million in FY 1969. Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Denmark together are targeted for \$185 million.

In Asia, \$350 million of the targeted \$500 million from Japan has been arranged already. Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam have a target of \$350 - \$450 million, and approaches are now underway.

Reduce the number of American civilians working overseas

A first stage cutback of between 12 and 13 percent in Government employees abroad, including contract employees, gets underway mid-year with a saving estimated at \$20 million per year when the full cut is achieved.

Stage two, involving a special review of personnel in 24 major missions abroad, with an ultimate personnel cut of 25 percent as a target, may add another \$10 million of annual savings when complete.

~~SECRET~~

- 5 -

While these savings may be small they have a disproportionately large public relations impact in that we can point to this action as evidence the government is cutting back too.

Reduce impact of personal spending by forces and dependents in Europe

DOD is prepared to recommend measures to reduce by \$100 million (annual basis) the \$600 million a year spent abroad by military personnel and dependents. However, unless similar measures are adopted by other U. S. Government agencies with people abroad and unless a travel tax is approved by the Congress, DOD hesitates to recommend this action.

AID Foreign Exchange Outflow and "Additionality"

Foreign exchange outflow of \$270 million by AID in 1967 will be reduced at your request to \$170 million in this calendar year and this is probably as much as can be done now. Measures to insure increased additionality of U. S. exports financed by AID are being pursued.

LONG-TERM MEASURES

Export Increases

Commerce Department Export Promotion

Supplemental budget requests for FY 1968 and the regular requests for FY 1969 were not warmly received by Congressman Rooney but some, if partial, action is expected.

The Joint Export Association proposal was warmly received by the business community but again Congressman Rooney took a negative attitude when the matter came before his subcommittee. We will be giving special attention to this legislative problem.

\$500 million Export Expansion Facility of EXIMBANK

Committee hearings have begun in the Senate where the reception was very favorable.

~~SECRET~~

Better Export Insurance

In part, this will be accomplished through the facility above, and in part through administrative action by Eximbank, once the above legislation is passed.

More Liberal Rediscount Facility

This was announced last week and it should serve to insulate private bank export financing from changes in the money market and assure an adequate supply of private capital to finance our exports.

Non-Tariff Barriers

Short Term

The extensive consultations begun by Under Secretary Katzenbach, Ambassadors Roth and Trezise have been useful in conveying our message to other countries and at the same time informing us of the alternatives least likely to precipitate retaliation. Acceleration of Kennedy Round tariff cuts is a European counter-proposal and we should have in hand shortly the specific offer.

Chairman Mills is clearly expecting an Administration proposal and I believe we must be prepared with a specific plan by the time Congress reconvenes after the Easter Recess.

Long Term

In March, the GATT Council established a Working Party to convene in April to examine the provisions of GATT with respect to border tax adjustments, the practices with relation to such adjustments and their trade effects. It is our intention to put forth proposals to harmonize the provisions of GATT so that direct tax countries are not disadvantaged in relation to indirect tax countries.

Foreign Investment and Travel in the U. S.

The long-range measures begun in 1963 to encourage foreign portfolio investment in the U. S. culminated in the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966. We have encouraged and cooperated with industry to stimulate more investment.

~~SECRET~~

- 7 -

The private financial community is now carrying the ball as, at this point, it is primarily a private sector activity. The statistical results in the last half of 1967 and early 1968 are very impressive: \$669 million net purchases of U. S. portfolio securities in the last half of 1967 and \$156 million in January 1968 alone.

Attract more foreign visitors to the U. S.

Ambassador Robert McKinney met his shortened deadline and submitted the report of his Industry-Government Special Task Force on Travel on February 15. Stimulated, no doubt, by your January 1 Action Program, industry and foreign airlines responded with unexpected alacrity and contributed to the creation of a significant positive program to facilitate foreign travel here.

A modest supplemental appropriation request is encountering the usual hurdle of Congressman Rooney.

Ambassador McKinney has undertaken further follow-up of these long-term positive measures.

SUMMARY

The Action Program, while off to a fair start, has a number of areas requiring further implementation. The March gold crisis ruined any hopes of having any early benefits reflected in our first quarter figures and the dismal trade surplus greatly handicaps the degree of improvement we can expect this program to achieve.

Henry H. Fowler

Henry H. Fowler

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By is, NARA Date 1-15-99

Mr. Restow

12

2. Pres file ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, April 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit for the Libyan Prime Minister

We have had in mind for several months your inviting the new Libyan Prime Minister. He has indicated his intention to visit the US soon but has not decided between late May or September-October.

Don Hornig, after his return from Libya, strongly recommended that you invite Bakkush, and Nick Katzenbach formally seconds that recommendation. State could work out an impressive program for him with our oil companies working in Libya and universities doing archeological work there. You would need plan only the minimum for him in Washington--a short office chat and a small working lunch for about 10 people. He speaks English well and has an interesting story to tell about Libya's rapid modernization.

Bakkush is important because he is the first Libyan Prime Minister from the younger generation. His appointment could begin to divert into constructive enterprise the growing dissatisfaction of Libya's younger, technically competent men. You'll remember the Shah's story about how the young hotheads of the early 1960's are now in the government working for the Shah's various programs. If the same could happen in Libya, it might be the step that saves Libya from radical takeover when the old king dies.

You will recall also Bakkush's highly constructive statement, which I sent you yesterday, on your address to the nation a week ago Sunday.

Nick Katzenbach suggests (attached) that you invite him for a small working lunch on May 29, but any other date about that time would be equally good. Jim Jones is holding open the entire week May 27-31 for a possible long Memorial Day weekend. Your schedule, however, would permit an office visit and working lunch on Wednesday, May 22.

If you would prefer not to add anything to your spring schedule, we could schedule him in the early fall now that you have given us a go-ahead to develop a fall visit schedule. Even if you approve a spring date, we aren't entirely sure he could come on the exact date proposed, so we would wish to offer a fall date as an alternative anyway.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

*No in May
Yes in Sept or Oct*

May we have your preference among these choices:

4/12/68

1. Invite him to short office talk and small working lunch on May 22. If he can't come then, invite him for September or October, exact date to be set later. _____
2. Disapprove May visit, but invite him for September or October, exact date to be set later _____ ✓
3. Disapprove visit for time being _____

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

12a

April 3, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL-LIMDIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Invitation to Libyan Prime Minister
Bakkush

Recommendation:

That you offer Prime Minister Bakkush of Libya the choice of making a Private Visit to Washington involving on your part a working lunch on Wednesday, May 29, or of paying an Official Visit to Washington in August, 1968.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Richard S. Kohn
Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Explanation Memorandum

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Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By *ijp*, NARS, Date 6-13-80

~~CONFIDENTIAL-LIMDIS~~

Group 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4, State letter 9-11-96

By *ju*, NARA, Date 6-5-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL-LIMDIS~~

Proposed Private Visit of Prime Minister
'abd al Hamid al-Bakkush of Libya

In the coming months Libya's energetic young Prime Minister, 'abd al Hamid al-Bakkush, is planning to travel to a number of friendly countries, including the United States. He has made it clear to our Ambassador that he would welcome an opportunity to meet President Johnson. Dr. Hornig, the President's Science Advisor, has just returned from a visit to Libya and strongly believes a visit of Bakkush to the United States would further United States interests in Libya.

The Ambassador considers it important to extend an invitation to the Prime Minister as soon as possible, as he is obviously holding up further travel arrangements until he knows whether he will be received in Washington. As we don't know exactly when the Prime Minister will be able to travel and as our own calendar for official visits in the first half of 1968 is already full, we are suggesting that the Prime Minister be given a choice of either a Private Visit to Washington in May or an Official Visit in August.

It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of Libya to the United States in the geographic context of Africa and the Middle East. Almost all training of U. S. Air Force units in Europe takes place at Wheelus Air Base, the last United States military base (apart from communications facilities) in the Arab world or Africa. American oil companies have invested over a billion dollars in Libya, and in 1967 the net return from this investment to the United States balance of payments is estimated at between \$150 and \$200 million.

Prime Minister Bakkush would seem to be an ideal Libyan and Arab leader to invite to the United States at this time. Thirty-six years old, he has already had a successful career as a lawyer and cabinet minister. In his dynamic rise he has depended mainly on his personal abilities and energy, as he is without tribal

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-269

~~CONFIDENTIAL-LIMDIS~~

By us, NARA Date 10-7-94

or family ties - customarily the key to success in Libya. In making him Prime Minister the King is obviously trying to bridge the gap with Libya's younger generation and other discontented elements.

At the same time Prime Minister Bakkush has pursued a policy of reaffirming Libya's traditionally moderate and pro-Western orientation. He has publicly tried and jailed about one hundred leftist ringleaders of the disorders that broke out last June as a consequence of the Middle East war. He has said privately and publicly that he wants Wheelus to remain, and he has begun a well-conceived program of reform and development that draws heavily upon American expertise. This is a courageous program for a small (1.7 million), rich nation that lies midway between Algeria and the UAR. King Idris would regard such a private visit as a mark of continued U. S. friendship and support for Libya.

If Bakkush were invited to come as early as the latter part of May, an informal luncheon meeting at the White House would suffice. The rest of the visit could be programmed as essentially private in character. American oil companies and other business groups are eager to show him hospitality. A visit to Washington in the second half of the year, however, should, in our opinion, be programmed as an "Official" one.

Bakkush has already accepted an invitation to visit France in early April. We understand that the French Government is anxious to break into Libya's thriving oil industry, as well as to extend French influence in the Arab world, and is planning to receive Bakkush with considerable fanfare.

~~Stamp~~
2. Pres file

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Thursday, April 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Personal Message from Eshkol

Prime Minister Eshkol sent you the following personal message after hearing your address to the Nation Sunday a week ago:

"I write to express my personal emotion on hearing your speech of March 31. I should like you to know that our people have followed your problems and actions with sympathy and understanding, and there is widespread admiration of your statesmanship and of your unqualified devotion to world peace."

State recommends a brief response, and I suggest the following:

"It was very kind of you to write me concerning my speech of March 31. I very much appreciate your generous thoughts and your expression of comprehension for our efforts. I took this step only after concluding that in this way alone could I devote my full energies to the cause of peace--in Asia, in the Middle East and at home."

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓ 4/12/68

Disapprove

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~SECRET~~

4/11/68

LDX to State Secretariat, for Mr. Katzenbach and William Bundy
from Walt Rostow

The President wishes you to consider promptly, repeat promptly,
a draft message in the vein set out below. He also believes we should
be prepared to make its substance public and explain the reasons for
our position.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By sq NARA, Date 7-29-92

~~SECRET~~

4/1/68

14a

**LIX to State Secretariat, for Mr. Katzenbach and William Bundy
from Walt Rostow**

**The President wishes you to consider promptly, report promptly,
a draft message in the vein set out below. He also believes we should
be prepared to make its substance public and explain the reasons for
our position.**

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 48, NARA, Date 42992

April 11, 1968

~~SECRET~~

148

April 10, the date proposed by the DRV for an initial contact at the Ambassadorial level, is acceptable to us.

We believe that if the contact is to be other than an exercise in propaganda, certain standards of fairness must be met:

-- the contacts should take place in a neutral country, where the atmosphere would reflect complete impartiality towards both participants and where the host country does not have deep commitments running to either of the participants;

-- both sides should have representation and adequate communications.

We believe it essential that both participants be accredited to the host country and that the participants have communications adequate to communicate important political and military information and decisions.

-- On reflection, we believe it wise that the contacts should be in Asia, the region which has the most direct and vital interest in the achievement of a stable peace.

In the light of these criteria, we again call to your attention the four locations that we suggested in our message of April 10: Vientiane, Raangoen, Djakarta, and New Delhi. We commend any one of these to the DRV. If these are unsatisfactory, we should be glad to make other suggestions, or consider your suggestions, which meet the criteria set out above.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 91-258
By Slip, NARA, Date 1/21/02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4/1/68

15

LDM to State Secretariat, for Mr. Katzenbach and William Bundy
from Walt Rostow

The President wishes you to consider promptly, repeat promptly,
a draft message in the vein set out below. He also believes we should
be prepared to make its substance public and explain the reasons for
our position.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 4-19-92

April 11, 1968

~~SECRET~~

15a

April 18, the date proposed by the DRV for an initial contact at the Ambassadorial level, is acceptable to us.

We believe that if the contact is to be other than an exercise in propaganda, certain standards of fairness must be met:

-- the contacts should take place in a neutral country, where the atmosphere would reflect complete impartiality towards both participants and where the host country does not have deep commitments running to either of the participants;

-- both sides should have representation and adequate communications.

We believe it essential that both participants be accredited to the host country and that the participants have communications adequate to communicate important political and military information and decisions.

-- On reflection, we believe it wise that the contacts should be in Asia, the region which has the most direct and vital interest in the achievement of a stable peace.

In the light of these criteria, we again call to your attention the four locations that we suggested in our message of April 10: Vientiane, Rangoon, Djakarta, and New Delhi. We commend any one of these to the DRV. If these are unsatisfactory, we should be glad to make other suggestions, or consider your suggestions, which meet the criteria set out above.

000

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NCT 91-258
By plp, NARA, Date 4/11/02

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

16

Thursday, April 11, 1968
10:00 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the short and the longer cable from Sullivan.

It is clear that Hanoi's objectives are:

- to take our temperature;
- to see if we're capable of being pushed by the U. S. doves into a location we obviously do not want;
- to use the question of place as propaganda around the world, as Sullivan notes in his final paragraph of comment.

I informed Bill Bundy of your view, and he said that he would draft in the sense you directed, but he believes we should walk around the question and look at all its implications before making a final decision. I told him to prepare a draft for submission to you, and that you would decide if you wanted a meeting on this matter.

If we decide to turn down Warsaw, I believe we should enter the propaganda fight openly by explaining precisely why we need a place where the South Vietnamese and our other allies, including their press, can operate comfortably -- which neither Phnom Penh nor Warsaw permit. If we are silent, we shall be pilloried. If we fight for a good neutral place, I think we can carry opinion with us.

~~SECRET~~
Attachments

W. Aver Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By WJ, NARA Date 1-15-99



Department of State

TELEGRAM ^{16a}

~~SECRET~~

15

***** ZZ RUEHC
DE RUNJFS 5777 1021129
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 111109Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8011
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 5777

029080

NODIS/CROCODILE

1968 APR 11 AM 6 43

1. NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE JUST BROUGHT ME A LETTER PROPOSING TALKS TAKE PLACE IN WARSAW, NAMING OUR OLD FRIEND HA VAN LAU AS AMBASSADOR, AND SUGGESTING APRIL 18 RPT 18 AS THE DATE.

2. SINCE THE LETTER CONTAINS A NUMBER OF OTHER COMMENTS OF INTEREST, SUGGEST NO RPT NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT ITS RECEIPT UNTIL YOU RECEIVE THE FULL TEXT WHICH FOLLOWS BY SEPTEL.

GP-2 SULLIVAN
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-269
By us, NARA Date 10-7-99

NNNN

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

162 2
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

*****ZZ RUEHC
DE RUMJFS 5784 1021220
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 111158Z APR 68.
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8015
STATE GRNC
BT

2 9 3 4 Q
1968 APR 11 AM 8 41

~~SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 5784

Crocodile

NODIS/CROCODILE

REF: VIENTIANE 5777

1. HERewith AN INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF LETTER WHICH WAS DELIVERED TO ME AT THIS EMBASSY AT 1300 LOCAL TIME BY NGUYEN CON AND ONE OTHER REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH VIETNAMESE EMBASSY. ORIGINAL IS ENTIRELY IN FRENCH.

QTE VIENTIANE, APRIL 11.

MR. WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN
AMBASSADOR OF THE USA AT VIENTIANE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-269
By us, NARA Date 10-7-98

PAGE 2 RUMJFS 5784 ~~SECRET~~

I HAVE THE HONOR TO REQUEST YOU TO TRANSMIT TO YOUR AUTHORITIES IN WASHINGTON THE FOLLOWING NOTE FROM OUR GOVERNMENT:

INNER QTE WITH RESPECT TO THE NOTE OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT DATED APRIL 10, 1968 THE VIEWS OF THE DRV ARE THE FOLLOWING:

(1) THE DRV REAFFIRMS THAT, ACCORDING TO ITS POINT OF VIEW, A PRELIMINARY CONTACT BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES WITH RANK OF AMBASSADOR OF BOTH PARTIES HAS AS ITS GOAL THAT OF PERMITTING THE AMERICAN SIDE TO DETERMINE THE UN-CONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV AND (OF PERMITTING) THE TWO PARTIES TO AGREE ON THE DATE, THE PLACE, AND THE LEVEL OF OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS. IT IS A PRELIMINARY CONTACT THAT IS NECESSARY TO ENGAGE IN RAPIDLY WITH A VIEW TOWARD BEGINNING THE OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES WITH THE LEAST DELAY;

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- VIENTIANE 5784, APRIL 11. (NODIS/CROCODILE)

PAGE 3 RUMJFS 5784 ~~SECRET~~

(2) THE DRV PROPOSED PHNOM PENH AS THE PLACE FOR THE PRELIMINARY CONTACT BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES WITH RANK OF AMBASSADOR OF BOTH SIDES. SAMDECH NORODOM SIHANOUK, CHIEF OF STATE OF CAMBODIA, HAS AGREED THAT PHNOM PENH MAY BE USED AS THE PLACE OF CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES AND THE CHIEF OF STATE HAS DECLARED THAT ALL FACILITIES WILL BE GIVEN. THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, L.B. JOHNSON, AND OTHER OFFICIAL PERSONALITIES OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAVE REPEATEDLY DECLARED THEMSELVES READY TO GO ANYWHERE TO ENGAGE IN CONVERSATIONS WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DRV.

WE ARE VERY SURPRISED TO SEE THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT NOW REFUSING THE CHOICE OF PHNOM PENH FOR PRELIMINARY CONTACT BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES WITH AMBASSADORIAL RANK OF THE TWO PARTIES. CONTINUING TO STRESS THAT PHNOM PENH IS THE APPROPRIATE PLACE FOR SUCH A CONTACT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRV PROPOSES WARSAW AS AN ALTERNATIVE.

PAGE 4 RUMJFS 5784 ~~SECRET~~

(3) THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRV HAS DESIGNATED NGUYEN-TUONG, DRV AMBASSADOR AT CAMBODIA, AS ITS REPRESENTATIVE IF THE PRELIMINARY CONTACT TAKES PLACE AT PHNOM PENH. IN THE EVENT THIS CONTACT TAKES PLACE AT WARSAW, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRV DESIGNATES MONSIEUR HA-VAN-LAU AS ITS REPRESENTATIVE WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR.

(4) WITH RESPECT TO THE DATE OF THE PRELIMINARY CONTACT BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES WITH RANK OF AMBASSADOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRV AGREES THAT THE CONTACT SHOULD BEGIN APRIL 15, 1963 IF IT TAKES PLACE AT PHNOM PENH. IN CASE IT TAKES PLACE AT WARSAW IT COULD COMMENCE APRIL 18 OR A FEW DAYS AFTER. END INNER QUOTE.

PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. AMBASSADOR, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGH CONSIDERATION.

NGUYEN-CHAN, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I., EMBASSY OF THE DRV. END QTE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- VIENTIANE 5784, APRIL 11. (NODIS/CROCODILE)

PAGE 5 RUMJFS 5784 ~~SECRET~~

2. COMMENT: TENOR OF THIS NOTE AND FACT THAT IT WAS COMPOSED IN FRENCH LEAD ME TO SPECULATE THAT IT WAS WRITTEN WITH AN EYE TO PUBLIC RELEASE AND WHATEVER PROPAGANDA CRUMBS HANOI CAN GLEAN FROM OUR "GO ANYWHERE" STATEMENTS. FACT THAT THEY HAVE ESCHEWED, WITHOUT MENTION, THE FOUR CAPITALS WE PROPOSED IN OUR NOTE LEAVES THEM THE OPTION TO COME BACK TO THEM BY MEETING US MORE THAN HALF WAY IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT WE TURN DOWN WARSAW. FACTY THEY HAVE CHOSEN WARSAW, WHERE THEY ARE ASSURED OF A SYMPATHETIC POLITICAL CLIMATE AND THE ASSISTANCE OF PRESS AND PROPAGANDA CONTROLS FAVORABLE TO THEIR VIEWPOINT, SUGGEST THAT THEY DO NOT RPT NOT WANT A PARTICULARLY QUIET SET OF CONTACTS. ON THE OTHER HAND, CHOICE OF A CAPITAL SO OBVIOUSLY ANATHEMA TO PEKING SHOWS A CERTAIN INSOUCIANCE IN THAT DIRECTION.

3. TEXT IN FRENCH FOLLOWS SEPTTEL.

GP-2 SULLIVAN
BT

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, April 11, 1968
10:15 am

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have received two calls this morning about Baggs and Ashmore.

1. Liz Carpenter said that Ashmore had called her and said:

-- he did not believe the State Department would submit to the White House their "full" report (Bill Bundy is sending it over);

-- they have been up explaining to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff that they thought Harriman and Bundy would negotiate too "tight" and blow up the President's initiative.

2. Abe Fortas called me to say that Scotty Reston called him and said that Baggs and Ashmore want to see the President. If that is impossible, they want to see Abe Fortas. Abe said to Reston that he thought Baggs and Ashmore were irresponsible. Reston agreed. Abe Fortas does not want to see them at all, but would see them if you thought it could serve any useful purpose.

W. W. Rostow

Tell
Should Fortas to see them _____

No _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By id, NARA Date 1-15-99

Thursday, April 11, 1968 -- Noon

W.R.
sup ¹⁸
Pres file

Mr. President:

You'll remember we arranged for Dr. Thomas Mattingly, a heart specialist, to go out to treat King Mahendra of Nepal after the King's recent heart attack. Dr. Mattingly has returned. The King is on the way to recovery and has relayed through Carol Laise his personal appreciation for Dr. Mattingly's visit.

At Tab A, for your approval, is a message replying to the King.

At Tab B, for your signature, is a letter of appreciation to Dr. Mattingly.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

RMorris/vmr

18a

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KING MAHENDRA OF NEPAL

Your Majesty:

Mrs. Johnson and I were very pleased to learn that you are on the road to recovery.

We were glad to be of help in arranging the visit of Dr. Mattingly. If there is anything else we can do, Your Majesty knows Ambassador Laise is standing by.

Our thoughts are with you as you regain the strength to serve your people.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Dear Dr. Mattingly:

I want you to know how much I appreciated your trip to Nepal to care for King Mahendra. You were very generous to take time from your busy schedule for such a long and tiring journey.

Ambassador Laise reports that you performed a great service under difficult conditions. Your very presence did wonders for the morale of King Mahendra and his family and government.

I am deeply proud that America has men of your wisdom and selfless dedication to share with others in need.

With warmest gratitude.

Sincerely,

Dr. Thomas W. Mattingly
2007 I Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

LBJ: WWR:RPM/vmr

ACTION

19

~~confidential~~

Thursday, April 11, 1968 -- 4:30 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Win Brown thinks your message to Seoul will do its work but leave less scars if it is delivered as an oral, rather than written, message.

W. W. Rostow

Go as is _____

To be delivered by Ambassador
as oral message from the President _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By is, NARA Date 1-15-99

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

April 11, 1968

Profile

20

LDX'd to State for dispatch

Dear President Park:

I have been informed by Ambassador Porter that the requested Honolulu meeting will not be convenient for you next week. I regret that the press of domestic business makes our meeting impossible, because I had looked forward to a thorough review with you of urgent problems that concern both of our countries deeply.

I recognize the difficulties which have determined your decision.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NY 93-368
By Cl, NARA, Date 5-12-85

ACTION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

21

Thurs., April 11, 1968
11:35 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a draft message to Park. You should know that State believes that seeing the Korean Ambassador and the Vietnamese Charge here would be awkward for two reasons:

-- their communications are insecure and everything you say would be read internationally;

-- neither has probably been informed of your dealings with Thieu and Park on a meeting.

W. Rostow Rostow

Message approved _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

Will see Korean and South Vietnamese representatives _____

No _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By isa, NARA Date 1-15-99

~~SECRET~~

2/a

Dear President Park:

I have been informed by Ambassador Porter that it will not be convenient for you to meet with me in Honolulu early next week. I understand fully the reasons advanced for your decision. I regret that the press of domestic business makes our meeting impossible, for I had looked forward to a thorough review with you of problems that concern both of our countries deeply.

I hope that a later meeting will be possible at some mutually convenient time.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By us, NARA Date 1-15-99

Pass file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

22

ACTION

Thursday - April 11, 1968 1:45 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Latin American Ceremony

I know you are reluctant to have a Latin American ceremony next week. The launching of the idea of a Task Force on Latin American Physical Integration is a good one and I would not like to see the opportunity lost.

We can still achieve the objective by incorporating the Task Force proposal in a statement from you to the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank which Secretary Fowler could include in his plenary address.

If this meets with your approval, I recommend a statement along the lines of the attached draft.

W. Rostow

*P.S. With Honolulu
WB, you may
wish to take on
the original idea
yourself - Tab A.*

Approve _____
Disapprove _____
Call me _____

W

Attachment

Recommended statement by Secretary Fowler on your behalf to Board of Governors of IADB

Special Message

22a

to

the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank

(to be given by Treasury Secretary Fowler for President)

At Punta del Este my fellow Presidents and I called for a bold plan to overcome the natural barriers to Latin American physical unity. Your countries have too long been isolated from each other -- divided by high mountain ranges, deep rain forests and forbidding deserts.

Locked behind these barriers are vast resources which can help fulfill the American promise of opportunity and prosperity for all your peoples.

The new frontiers of the South American heartland beckon those imaginative enough, daring enough, determined enough to penetrate. A start has already been made by some governments. The Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress and the Inter-American Development Bank have done initial planning. I ask whether the time has not come to prepare a blue-print for systematically carrying forward this gigantic enterprise -- an

enterprise capable of binding a continent with roads and river systems, power grids and pipelines, transport and telecommunications.

To this end, I suggest to my fellow Presidents and those who direct our Alliance for Progress institutions the establishment of a high-level task force, under the leadership of a distinguished Latin American, to prepare a five-year plan for speeding up the physical integration of our hemisphere. The United States will lend its fullest cooperation.

726 A
22 b~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

Wednesday - April 10, 1968 -- 11:35 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ceremony on Latin America

We can build an impressive Latin American ceremony next week around your launching the idea of a blue ribbon Inter-American Task Force on Physical Integration. The Johnsonian dimension to the Alliance for Progress is integration. The Task Force concept reinforces that dimension.

As I explained in the scenario I sent you last week, it is important to have the launching before the Inter-American Bank's Board of Governors meets next on April 22 in Bogota, Colombia. Following your statement, we can get:

- Colombian President Lleras to give the idea a big boost when he addresses the Bank Governors.
- The Governors to put the Bank behind it.
- CIAP to give its blessing when it convenes on April 29.
- The Inter-American Economic and Social Council to set up the Task Force in June.
- Further identification by you with the Task Force between June and January 20.

Furthermore, the ceremony can be dressed up if Mike Manatos can get the Senate to pass the pending bill authorizing \$411 million of callable capital for the Inter-American Bank and approve Ed Clark's nomination to the Bank. Then you could sign the ratification instrument to the OAS Charter amendments and the Bank bill and introduce Ed Clark to the Latin American community.

Your statement could focus on the dramatic possibilities for physical integration and what has been accomplished in the inter-American field

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-272
By WJG, NARA, Date 11-16-94

during your administration. We can arrange a series of large maps for you to illustrate how Latin America can be unified with roads, power lines, transport and communications. The first draft of a statement is at Tab A.

In your note to Mike Manatos you indicated willingness to proceed with a ceremony. I suggest we plan for next Wednesday (April 17).

Approve ceremony
for April 17 _____

Prefer another time _____

Call me _____

DeVier Pierson tells me you have asked him to arrange an appointment with IDB President Felipe Herrera. You could combine the visit with the ceremony, taking him and Ed Clark to one side after it is over.

Combine Herrera
visit with ceremony _____

Prefer separate
appointment _____

Call me _____

 Rostow

Attachment

Tab A - Draft Statement for Ceremony on April 17.

cc - Mike Manatos
DeVier Pierson
Jim Jones

DRAFT
WGB:mm
(4-10-68)

22c

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT
for
LATIN AMERICAN CEREMONY

Secretary General Mora, Dr. Herrera, Dr. Sanz, Distinguished
Ambassadors, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am always pleased to welcome friends and neighbors from our
hemisphere to this house. Whatever may be our preoccupations
elsewhere in the world, I maintain paramount interest in the
well-being of our own neighborhood.

This morning I add two more links to the chain of United States
cooperation with the Governments of Latin America:

- ratification of the protocol of amendments to the Charter
of the Organization of American States; and

- signature of a bill adding \$411 million to the resources of
the Inter-American Bank.

Both signify the United States commitment to a vigorous inter-
American system and a vital Alliance for Progress.

The advance of our regional organization -- like all human activity -- has run in stages. The cycle of innovation and consolidation repeats itself, in response to changing needs and circumstances.

These cycles have run in 20-year periods. I recall how hard Latin America pressed the principle of non-intervention at the Inter-American Conference in 1928. Acceptance of the principle by President Roosevelt paved the way for spectacular advances in the juridical and security fields, culminating in the Rio Treaty and Bogota Charter in 1948.

During the past two decades the focus has been on the economic and social. Here the gains -- from Operation Pan America to the Alliance for Progress -- have been equally dramatic:

- an Inter-American Development Bank now lending at an annual rate of over one-half billion dollars.
- a Central American Common Market which increased intra-regional trade by over 400%.
- a free trade association among the South American States

and Mexico that has boosted their exports by ____ million dollars.

-- an Alliance for Progress which in seven years has invested ____ billion dollars in domestic and foreign resources in the development of Latin America.

In 1968 we are on the threshold of a dynamic new phase with new leadership, new instruments and new priorities.

Next month Dr. Galo Plaza of Ecuador assumes the Secretary Generalship of the OAS succeeding our trusted and good friend Dr. Mora. In his long tenure, Dr. Mora has overseen the consolidation of the gains of the past and the innovations which will guide the hemisphere's efforts for the next period. Dr. Plaza enters at a time of unequalled challenge -- and opportunity.

The structure of the OAS has been streamlined to make it more responsive to the needs of the Governments.

The Alliance for Progress has been extended beyond its original

time frame, in frank recognition that the task is not for a decade but for a generation.

The Action Program of Punta del Este fixed the priorities for what we must do to create a better life in freedom for the billion human beings who will inhabit our hemisphere by the year 2000.

That program rests on three pillars: higher agricultural production, better education, closer integration. I am encouraged by the beginnings:

- a 6% increase in food production in 1967 was twice the rate of new mouths to be fed;
- the hemisphere's top scientists and educators have agreed on how best to harness science and technology to education and development;
- the integration movement has been spurred by new energies with fresh approaches.

At Punta del Este my fellow Presidents and I called for a bold plan to overcome the natural barriers to Latin American physical unity.

Your countries have too long been isolated from each other -- divided by high mountain ranges, deep rain forests and forbidding deserts. (Review maps showing topography and concentration of people in coastal areas and vast unpopulated areas in the interior.)

Locked behind these barriers are vast resources which can help fulfill the American promise of opportunity and prosperity for all your peoples. (Review map showing concentration of national resources.)

The new frontiers of the South American heartland beckon those imaginative enough, daring enough, determined enough to penetrate. A start has already been made by some governments. The Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress and the Inter-American Development Bank have done initial planning. I ask whether the time has not come to prepare a blueprint for systematically carrying forward this gigantic enterprise -- an enterprise capable of binding a continent with roads and river systems, power grids and pipelines, transport and tele-communications. (Review map showing integration projects now underway against map showing the potential for new projects.)

To this end, I suggest to my fellow Presidents and those who direct our Alliance for Progress institutions the establishment

of a high level task force, under the leadership of a distinguished Latin American, to prepare a five-year plan for speeding up the physical integration of our hemisphere. The United States will lend its fullest cooperation.

My thirty-seven years in public life have spanned the last two cycles in the evolution of our inter-American system. Throughout those four decades I have labored to strengthen our ties and make the Americas a show-case of what men of goodwill working in freedom can accomplish.

I recall one instance in the fall of 1960, when the alliance for economic and social development was beginning to take shape. President Eisenhower wanted Congressional approval to make the first major contribution to a regional social progress trust fund. He sought my help as Senate Majority Leader. Four days from receipt of that request, Under Secretary of the Treasury Dillon pledged \$500 million to the "Committee of 21" meeting in Bogota.

But the final verdict of what I have tried to do for our hemisphere I leave to the historians. As President, I have carried forward in the tradition of two of my distinguished predecessors: the Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Alliance for Progress of John F. Kennedy.

I am proud of what your countries and mine have accomplished together:

Despite some setbacks, democracy is stronger and political stability more secure. Free democratic elections in many of your countries attest to this fact, as do the gains in civil rights in the United States.

Communist subversion has been checked. You have frustrated the designs of the guerrillas and terrorists. You would have preferred to invest the scarce resources spent on internal security on development, but this is the price of freedom.

Latin American economic growth has accelerated and self-help increased. The annual average per capita growth

in GNP has risen from 1.0% in the years 1960-1963 to 2.4% from 1964-1967. At the start of the Alliance, it was expected that some 80% of the total investment would come from Latin America. You have contributed 87%.

Major gains have been made in institutional development. Savings and loans institutions have increased 25%, credit unions by 175% and agricultural cooperatives by ___%. A new generation of technicians and managers trained in modern methods are bringing reform and higher efficiency in industry and government.

The mechanism of inter-American cooperation has been modernized and strengthened. The OAS Charter has been streamlined. The Alliance for Progress has moved from the trial-and-error organizational phase to one of sustained action through established institutions.

The United States commitment to the Alliance for Progress has been fully met and extended. In 1965 I announced that the United States would support the Alliance beyond 1970. Since July 1964, United States economic assistance to Latin

America has totalled \$3934 million -- an increase of 19% over the previous three years. Assistance from the international lending institutions reached \$2124 -- an increase of 44%.

I said after the Punta del Este Meeting that the Alliance for Progress is "a task not for sprinters but for long-distance runners". To win this relay, we must set the pace and hold to it. The Presidents last year set that pace. I will maintain it as long as it is my turn to carry the baton. I trust that my colleagues will do likewise -- as well as those chosen to carry on the race.

012/24

LEGATION
- 512-236 (8)
ND19/00312
0037
23

April 11, 1968

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I am glad you were so bold to disregard the principle of non-intervention and write me about my March 31 speech.

Such fine words of comprehension and encouragement from one of this hemisphere's outstanding statesmen mean a great deal to me.

I am most grateful.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Vasco Leitao da Cunha
Ambassador E. and P.
Embassy of Brazil
Washington

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm
2

RECEIVED
APR 16 1968
CENTRAL FILES

INFORMATION

24

Thursday, April 11, 1968 -- 1:25 p.m.

Chron

Mr. President:

Herewith Ellsworth forwards his updated list of GVN accomplishments.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

24a

April 11, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

This is the corrected and updated copy of Accomplishments of the Government of Viet-Nam Since its Inauguration, October 31, 1967, which I mentioned this morning.

Sincerely,

Ellsworth

Ellsworth Bunker

Dear Mr. President

The quotation which Carol mentioned in her letter is from Luke 9:24

Ellsworth



ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF VIET NAM SINCE ITS
INAUGURATION, OCTOBER 31, 1967

1. Formation of Cabinet

a. The cabinet of Prime Minister Nguyen Van Loc was installed in office November 9, 1967, with very little delay following the inauguration of the President and Vice President October 31. The new cabinet represented a fairly major recasting, since only seven persons were holdovers from the previous government. The cabinet members appear to have been chosen primarily on the basis of professional competence, rather than on political grounds, and in general they have functioned well and responded to the guidance of the President and Prime Minister. The only major cabinet change since its formation has been the elevation of the Directorate of Information and Press to the status of a Ministry.

b. Relationships between the cabinet and the National Assembly have developed well, a number of cabinet members having appeared before various committees of the Assembly to explain the operations of their ministries, and in connection with the Assembly's budget debates.

2. Organization of National Assembly

a. The Upper and Lower Houses of the National Assembly were inaugurated October 11 and 31, respectively, and turned with a considerable amount of assurance to the first order of business: the choice of temporary officials, validation of membership, and drafting of rules. The Upper House completed its rules by mid-December, and the Lower House by mid-January, and both Houses turned to the election of permanent officers and distribution of committee memberships. Out of the diversity of political tendencies and affiliations which were represented by the members of the new Assembly, three working blocs have emerged in the Upper House, and four in the Lower House.

3. Assembly Actions

a. Assembly response to the Tet offensive was, by and large, encouraging. Both Houses expressed support for emergency measures instituted by government, condemned VC aggression and appealed for public support of reconstruction effort. Although Assembly rejected President Thieu's request for special economic and finance decree powers, this was done out of constitutional considerations, and did not reflect antipathy toward GVN or indifference toward its efforts.

b. Consideration of the National Budget was the first major item of regular business to come up for Assembly debate (in a special budget session). After considerable debate, both houses approved the budget without major revision. (It must still be returned to Lower House for final action on Senate revisions.)

4. Government-Sponsored Legislation

Since Tet, the government has submitted ten major draft laws to the Assembly, not counting the budget. These include draft laws on the reorganization of the Supreme Court, the Judicial Council, the Inspectorate, the Special Court, the Cultural and Educational Council, the Ethnic Minority Council, the Economic and Social Council, political party formation, press regulations, and a tax increase bill called the "reconstruction and solidarity tax". (In the effort to increase government revenues, the government on March 31 increased the surtax on luxury imports by an average of 10 percent.)

5. President Thieu's Public Image

In a series of appearances before radio and television since Tet, President Thieu has presented his views and shown his personality to the Vietnamese and international public in an increasingly effective way. These addresses have been designed to keep the public informed of government relief and recovery activities, and government actions in more general areas, and to reassure the public of the government's determination to continue the fight against communist aggression.

6. Thieu/Ky Relations

These have measurably improved. The April 2 joint Thieu/Ky press conference and the President's public delegation of special duties to Ky have tended to allay suspicions of disunity between them. They have been conferring together daily and give every evidence of working together more effectively than ever before.

7. Government Response to Tet Attack

a. In general, the GVN civil administration responded well, both during the fighting and in the period of relief and reconstruction after the end of the Tet offensive. While there were certainly flaws in its performance, the conduct of the government stands out in sharp contrast to the anticipation of the enemy that it would collapse under the pressure of their offensive.

b. A joint GVN/US Central Recovery Committee was established in the first few days after the beginning of the Tet offensive, and for the first crucial weeks was chaired by Vice President Ky. An around-the-clock coordinating center was set up in the Palace, to coordinate relief efforts, both civilian and military, GVN and U. S. First priority was given to restoration of Saigon to normal functioning, including military action to clear out the VC, an emergency refugee effort, and a major effort to insure adequate food supplies to the city. These activities were rapidly expanded to include efforts in other fields, such as surface and air transportation, communications, power and water supply and refuse disposal.

c. Results were very good in Saigon, although slower in the provinces. As Hue became secured militarily, attention was turned to that city, where the damage had been extremely high, and the need for emergency assistance was -- and is -- very great.

d. The government continues to do a good job in administering its relief program and in returning to normalcy the cities which were under attack. President Thieu reported the government's progress in this field April 1, stating that the number of refugees nationwide had been reduced to 380,000 from the peak figure of 700,000. Refugees in Saigon now number 78,000 in 54 centers -- down from 160,000 in 78 centers on March 1.

e. The government is responding to the longer-range housing needs in two ways. Some people are being provided with corrugated iron roofing, cement, and a cash payment to enable them to reconstruct their own houses. Others (in Saigon) will be housed in multi-unit dwellings. The government has awarded a contract for the construction of 4,000 units in Saigon, and these are now under construction. Counting both multi-unit and individual self-help dwellings, construction is under way for 7,000 families in Saigon, according to a statement made by President Thieu April 1.

8. Manpower Mobilization

a. Mobilization measures designed to increase RVNAF by 135,000 men in 1968 are well underway. Reserves under 33 years of age with under five years service have been recalled, 19 year olds are being inducted and 18 year olds will be conscripted about May 1. The tour of duty for personnel was extended for an indefinite term, and several less far reaching measures were taken. During February, 7,423 men volunteered, and 5,550 volunteered through March 17, for a five fold increase over the same months in 1967. In addition, 15,754 conscripts reported for induction during the same period, and 11,525 reservists answered the call. On April 1, President Thieu updated these figures, announcing that over 60,000 men had entered RVNAF since January 1.

b. Thieu told General Westmoreland on April 4 that he had decided to add 25,000 Regional and Popular Force soldiers to the force structure in addition to the planned 135,000 man increase.

c. From October 1967 to February 15, 1968, the latest firm figures available, ARVN strength increased by over 38,000 men, in spite of the vicious Tet attacks. Further significant strength increases are expected when the extraordinary mobilization measures listed above achieve their full impact.

d. Measures to assure that essential civilian personnel are not drafted prematurely in such a way as to cripple the GVN are also being taken.

e. On April 10 President Thieu requested the Assembly to authorize general mobilization and submitted a draft law to the Lower House for this purpose.

9. Civilian Self-Defense

a. One of the most widespread popular reactions to the Tet offensive was a request by many civilian groups for arms with which they could protect themselves from VC attacks. President Thieu gave his authorization for local authorities to go ahead with careful arming of selected groups, and in mid-March the Ministry of Interior established criteria for the arming of civilian groups: arms are not to be issued to religious or political groups, and are to be used solely for the defense of the area or office where the group is located, weapons will be issued to groups and not to individuals, and there must be close cooperation with the regular security forces. On April 2, President Thieu gave this program added impetus by announcing publicly that Vice President Ky would undertake the organization of civil defense.

b. President Thieu announced April 1 that 585 units had been established throughout the country, with 83,500 members, and that over 9,000 weapons had been issued. In Saigon alone, approximately 140 civilian groups were in some stage of organization or training for self-defense as of late March, including civil servants who are responsible for the protection of their offices. Approximately 2,000 weapons had been issued, mostly to the civil servant group.

10. Replacement of Corps Commanders

On March 1, the President replaced inefficient commanders of II and IV Corps. The new IV Corps Commander, General Nguyen duc Thang has already increased markedly the offensive posture of ARVN and instilled the population with a higher degree of confidence. General Lu Mong Lan in II Corps has been less active and has yet to prove himself.

11. Administrative Reform

a. On March 1, the GVN redefined relationship between the central government, corps commanders, province chiefs, and government delegates. The net effect of this action is to revive a decree passed in 1956 during the Diem Administration, under which province chiefs reported directly to the central government, and corps commanders were restricted to military responsibilities.

b. An Administrative Reform Council has been established in the Office of the President to add impetus to this program. A National Planning Council to draw up and supervise the execution of national plans has also been created. Both Councils are chaired by the President.

c. In the personnel field, a Directorate General of Civil Service has been established in the office of the Prime Minister, and a Civil Service law drafted.

12. Central Revolutionary Development Council

On November 25 the GVN established a Central Revolutionary Development Council composed of interested Cabinet Ministers and high ranking generals. The Council is to give high level direction and coordination of the Revolutionary Development program. President Thieu has chaired several of its meetings, giving it increased impetus and authority.

13. Combatting Corruption

a. President Thieu has been hammering away at corruption in his public addresses and has been taking active steps against corrupt officials. On March 1 he made an impassioned plea for the eradication of corruption among GVN officials to the provincial officials undergoing training. Again in a March 21 radio/TV address he described corruption as the major obstacle to improvement of society and progress and expressed his determination to push the anti-corruption program vigorously.

b. Suiting the deed to the word, the GVN has replaced or relieved 14 of the 44 Province Chiefs since Tet, 12 of them for "inefficiency," (in most cases a euphemism for corruption). The caliber of replacements indicates a real effort to appoint honest, top-flight personnel. Many lower ranking officials have also been removed.

14. Training for Province Officials

On March 1, the GVN established the first training program for Province and District Chiefs. The program encompasses administrative functions, duties and responsibilities, and is designed to motivate the future leaders with a sense of service to the people. The selection process for these new officials has also been improved

to assure better quality. The first course was completed on April 4 and a seminar will be held on April 15 to review the effectiveness of the program and of the new administrative reform described above.

15. Attack on Infrastructure

a. On December 20, Prime Minister Loc signed a directive creating "PHOENIX," a coordinating system of national scope aimed at identifying and destroying the Viet Cong infrastructure. In February, over 1,700 infrastructure members were eliminated, partly as a result of efforts to counter the Tet offensive, during which many of them had surfaced and exposed themselves to combat.

b. The organization for the attack on the infrastructure is nationwide, with PHOENIX coordinating and giving direction to lower echelons down to the district level. There is a parallel U. S. organization with both advisory and operational functions.

c. Joint US/GVN District Operations and Intelligence Coordinating Centers (DOICC) are the primary action arm at the local level. They have a full-time U. S. officer advisor and representatives from GVN police and intelligence organizations. They perform collection, collation, and operational functions with the VC infrastructure as their primary target. The first DOICC was established in mid-1967 and more than 100 have since been activated. Initial successes have been impressive.

16. ARVN Effectiveness

a. In November 1967, the re-equipped and trained 2nd Regiment, 1st ARVN Division, occupied positions along the DMZ thereby releasing U. S. units for offensive operations. Its performance has been outstanding.

b. A marked increase in the ARVN kill ratio and weapons captured and lost ratio indicate an overall increase in effectiveness in spite of important improvements in enemy firepower. In October and November the enemy to friendly kill ratio held steady at 2.3:1. In December it rose to 3.1:1 and was 6:1 in January and 5.7:1 in February. The weapons captured and lost ratio also improved from a low of 1.4:1 in November to 1.6:1 in December, 2.4:1 in January, and 3.1:1 in February.

c. During the Tet offensive, ARVN units in general defended their positions well, in spite of their being undermanned because of holiday leaves, and effectively counterattacked the VC units. No ARVN units defected, although the VC had fully expected that some would do so.

17. ARVN Morale and Service

Several long-awaited measures to improve morale and the terms of service for ARVN personnel have been taken. On December 20, the GVN authorized a rice allowance of 200 piasters per month to each dependent of Popular Force soldiers, retroactive to June 1, 1967. On January 1, Regular and Regional Force troops received a monthly pay increase ranging from 380 to 494 piasters per man. These measures provided for a significant raise in the standard of living for soldiers and their dependents. Free field rations are also being provided for extended operations.

18. Saigon Port Operations

The Saigon Port Authority and the Ministry of Economy have made significant progress in improving port operations and insuring that importers clear commercial cargo from the port promptly. The measure of their success is that, in spite of the work time lost as a result of the post-Tet curfew, port congestion has been avoided, and warehouses at the commercial port are filled only to about 35 percent capacity.

19. Economic Accomplishments

a. Substantial progress has been made in improving tax and customs administration. On March 31 the surtax on luxury imports was increased by 10 percent.

b. Significant progress has been made by the joint Vietnamese-American development group. Its initial report was presented to the President and Prime Minister on November 16.

c. Substantial progress has also been made in the field of civil aviation. In January, Air Viet-Nam purchased two Boeing 727 aircraft from Pan American. Air Viet-Nam has completed

payment of the full 12.7 million U. S. dollars cost of these planes.

d. The GVN has acted with effect against generalized inflation despite the Assembly's failure to grant Presidential decree powers in the financial and economic field.

20. Austerity Measures

Thieu has issued directives closing bars and nightclubs for the duration and eliminating blackmarket activities.

Ellsworth Bunker

April 10, 1968.

INFORMATION

25

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, April 11, 1968 -- 10:10am

Pres file

Mr. President:

Khe Sanh-DMZ-A Shau:

- for second day, no enemy incoming;
- 2,932 friendly rounds;
- no aerial resupply;
- 89 tactical sorties, plus 6 B-52's in Pegasus area;
- 29 tactical sorties plus 24 B-52's A Shau valley;
- weather good.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 4-29-92

~~SECRET~~

25a

Thursday
April 11, 1968, 10:00 a. m.

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number sixty-seven on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ/A Shau Valley for the 24-hour period of April 10, 1968.

Khe Sanh weather was clear to partly cloudy skies with good ceilings and visibility until 5:00 a. m. this morning. Conditions temporarily deteriorated and by 7:00 a. m. ceilings had lowered to 400 feet and visibility was limited to 1/2 mile in fog. Good conditions returned by 11:00 a. m. this morning.

For the second day, no enemy incoming rounds were received at Khe Sanh. Artillery fire in support of the Khe Sanh Combat Base area consisted of 177 missions expending 2,932 rounds. Thirty-four missions were observed. No COFRAM ammunition was fired.

Supporting fires accounted for the majority of enemy casualties during the period in Operation Pegasus. The A Company, 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment called in three tactical air strikes on a moving tank ten kilometers southwest of Khe Sanh Combat Base. The tank believed to be a Russian type T76 was destroyed and 15 enemy killed. Four kilometers west of Lang Vei, 100 enemy were observed in the open and taken under fire by artillery. Five secondary explosions were observed and 33 enemy bodies were later counted. In Operation Pegasus during the period, 83 enemy were killed, 69 individual weapons and seven crew-served weapons were captured. Friendly losses were one killed and 27 wounded (17 evacuated).

The enemy continues to withdraw from the immediate vicinity of Khe Sanh Combat Base. ARVN, USA, and USMC units are operating in and around Khe Sanh with the immediate security of the base the responsibility of 3rd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division.

Elsewhere in Quang Tri Province, contact was light. In two small unit contacts near Con Thien, Marines killed seven enemy. Two enemy attacks by fire, on C-2 and C-3 bases wounded six Marines. No other friendly losses occurred in the 3rd Marine Division area.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By 19 NARA Date 5-15-92

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/89
By 19 NARA Date 5-15-92

Eighty-nine tactical air sorties and one ARC LIGHT mission (6 sorties) were flown in support of the Pegasus area. Bomb damage included one secondary explosion, 32 road cuts and destruction of one bulldozer.

No aerial resupply was made during the period. Supplies remain at a satisfactory level.

For the next 24 hours, 190 tactical air sorties are scheduled to support Operation Pegasus with an additional 116 on call. One ARC LIGHT mission is also planned.

Continued clear to partly cloudy skies are predicted until sunset. Ceilings will lower to 2,000 feet and visibility to three miles by 9:00 p. m. this evening. Fog is expected to lower visibility to 1/2 mile by 2:00 a. m. tomorrow morning.

Seven moving target indicators were noted on radar missions in A Chau Valley. A photo mission revealed three probable occupied anti-aircraft positions. Tactical air flew 29 strike sorties and B52's flew 24 sorties into the Valley during the period.

26

Thursday, April 11, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your approval is a brief, warm message to Chancellor Kiesinger replying to his condolence message to you on the death of Dr. King.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____


WGW:mm

26a

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Suggested Reply

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

Your touching message of condolence on the death of Dr. King showed us who mourn him here that his life and martyrdom had deep meaning for men everywhere. In this tragic hour we rededicate ourselves to the cause for which he lived and gave his life -- brotherhood, peace and justice.

Lyndon B. Johnson

262

Dear Mr. President:

I am deeply moved by the news that the winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace, the Reverend Martin Luther King, was murdered. I should like to express to you my sincere condolence on the grievous loss which the American nation has suffered.

**Kiesinger, Federal Chancellor
of the Federal Republic of Germany**

Thursday, April 11, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your approval is a warm farewell telegram to Austrian Chancellor Klaus. It would not be sent until after midnight April 15.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

MWG
MWG:mm

27a

VISIT OF
AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR KLAUS
April 1968

SUGGESTED FAREWELL TELEGRAM

TO BE SENT AFTER MIDNIGHT, APRIL 15

His Excellency
Dr. Josef Klaus
Federal Chancellor of the Republic of Austria
St. Francis Hotel
Union Square
San Francisco, California
In Care of Chief of Protocol

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

As you leave our country, I want to tell you again how much Mrs. Johnson and I enjoyed having you and Mrs. Klaus with us in Washington. Our talks together were helpful to me and underscored the close ties of friendship between our two peoples.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending you and the Austrian people our best wishes. We wish you a pleasant onward journey and a safe return home.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Declassified following April 16, 1968

ACTION

28

Thursday, April 11, 1968

Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached is Nick Katzenbach's memo to you reporting a request by the Norwegian Ambassador to postpone the King's visit. The King is scheduled to arrive in Washington April 24. The disturbances here worry the Norwegians.

Nick recommends we do not make it easy for them to cancel. I agree.

W. W. Rostow



ERF:mst

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-269

By is, NARA Date 10-7-98

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

April 10, 1968

28a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Norwegian Desire to Postpone the
Visit of King Olav V

The Norwegian Ambassador came in to see me today to say that King Olav would like to postpone his visit to "some future time." The Ambassador said that recent events in the US (the King assassination and the demonstrations) have "led to some concern that the present atmosphere might not be best for the King's visit." He added that the King, the Norwegian Government, and the Norwegian public had been delighted with your invitation, and that the decision to request a postponement was taken with greatest reluctance and only after careful consideration. He emphasized that this was not a decision that the Norwegian Government would take unilaterally, and that he hoped the postponement could be by mutual consent.

I told the Ambassador that I would pass on his message to you. I said that I personally doubted there was any reason to fear that there would be any unrest during the King's visit, although no one could give a flat assurance. I added that he certainly could not expect us to say that the King should not come; to ask us to do so was in effect asking us to say that the United States was an unsafe place for a foreign visitor. I agreed that any decision to postpone the visit should be made at an early date, rather than to wait until just before the King's arrival on April 24.

I personally think we should go back to the Norwegians and make it clear that this is a decision they will have to make on their own. I don't think we can insist that the King come, but neither do I recommend that we make it easy for him to cancel.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to call in the Ambassador and tell him that while we will understand it if the King should decide to postpone his visit, we believe the decision must be a Norwegian one.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, April 10, 1968
6:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith George Ball inscribes
a copy of his book to you.

W. W. Rostow

THE DISCIPLINE OF POWER
Essentials of a Modern World Structure

Mr. Rostow

Handwritten: 2. Pres file

Handwritten: 30

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, April 10, 1968

Handwritten: 4:35pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Personal Word to Libyan Prime Minister

Libyan Prime Minister Bakkush, commenting on your address to the nation Sunday a week ago, publicly called you a "statesman of the first rank" and said that "if the other side shows good intentions" your Vietnam initiative "should certainly produce a solution" (full text attached).

State would simply like permission to have Ambassador Newsom tell Bakkush that you personally appreciate his statement. Newsom has already given Bakkush his own compliments but a word from you would be a nice gesture.

Bakkush is the bright, young prime minister who impressed Don Hornig so much. He will play an important part in keeping Libya from lining up with Nasser and the Arab radicals and may be the key to a peaceful transition when the old King dies. Any encouragement we give him can only help. I will be sending you separately a recommendation from Nick Katzenbach that you invite Bakkush for a working visit soon (this was in the works before his statement).

W. W. Rostow

Approve telling Bakkush ✓

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By us, NARA Date 1-15-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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PAGE 01 TRIPOL 03257 081235Z

52
ACTION AF 15

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 03, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 104,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, IO 13, SAL 01, EA 10, EUR 15,

AID 28, RSR 01, /150 W

- BOWLER
- BUDGET
- DAVIS
- FRIED
- GARDNER
- HAMILTON
- JOHNSON
- KELLY
- LEE
- RAY
- SCHWARTZ
- TERRY
- WALKER
- WOOD
- YOUNG

Schwartz

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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2530
 INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 220
 AMEMBASSY BAIDA 1208
 AMEMBASSY BENGHAZI 1007
 AMEMBASSY RASAT 290
 AMEMBASSY TUNIS 485

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TRIPOLI 3257

i. TRIPOLI OFFICIAL DAILY AL-ALAM APRIL 7 FRONT PAGED FOLLOWING STATEMENT BY PRIME MINISTER BAKKUUSH APRIL 6 IN REPLY TO QUESTION CONCERNING PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S ANNOUNCEMENT NON-CANDIDACY FOR RE-ELECTION AND PARTIAL SUSPENSION OF AIR RAIDS IN NORTH VIETNAM. BAKKUUSH QUOTED AS SAYING: "IN MAKING THOSE TWO DECISIONS PRESIDENT JOHNSON AT ONE TIME SHOWED EFFECTIVELY THAT HE IS STATESMAN OF THE FIRST RANK AND THAT

PAGE 2 RUQMTI 3257 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
 HIS FIRM BASIC DESIRE IS TO BRING PEACE TO SOUTH EAST ASIA AND, FOLLOWING THAT, TO GIVE THE OPPORUTNITY FOR PEACE IN ALL AREAS OF THE WORLD. I SINCERELY HOPE THAT THE POSITIONS THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON TOOK WILL LEAD TO ATTAINMENT PEACEFUL SOLUTION. IF THE OTHER SIDE SHOWS GOOD INTENTIONS IT SHOULD CERTAINLY PRODUCE A SOLUTION CONCERNING THE VIETNAM QUESTION. THIS WOULD HAVE AN EFFECTON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND WOULD PROVIDE A GREATER OPPROTUNITY FOR COOPERATION BY THE LARGEST COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD TO ARRIVE AT A SOLUTION WHICH WE HOPE WILL PRESERVE THE ARAB RIGHTS IN THE REGION."

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



Department of State

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 TRIPOL 03257 081235Z

2• COMMENT: AMBASSADOR ARRANGING TO CONVEY PERSONALLY APPRECIATION TO PRIME MINISTER BAKKUSH FOR CONSTRUCTIVE AND UNDERSTANDING CHARACTER HIS REMARKS ABOUT PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT.

DECON: APRIL 1969 NEWSOM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Wednesday, April 10, 1968 -- 4:30 PM

WWR
31
Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Aid Loan for Ghana

In the attached, Messrs. Gaud and Zwick recommend a \$15 million aid loan for Ghana. Joe Fowler concurs.

This is a routine package. The loan is part of our joint effort with ten other donors and the IMF to help General Ankrah put Ghana back on its feet after the Nkrumah mess. So far the record is encouraging. Ankrah & Co. have taken some tough and constructive self-help actions -- including devaluation, import reform, and fiscal restraints recommended by the IMF.

Moreover, our own share in the Ghana aid group is declining. Last year we did 60 percent. This \$15 million loan -- plus the \$12 million PL-480 package for Ghana you approved in January -- should be about half of this year's contribution.

We would plan to release this loan in two tranches. Before the second tranche goes, Bill Gaud and Joe Fowler would check to make sure Ghana is following through on self-help measures and other donors are doing their part.

There is no Conte/Long problem with this loan since we have no evidence Ghana is buying sophisticated weapons. And Bill Gaud finds the Symington Amendment doesn't apply because Ghana's military budget is within the bounds necessary for her development effort.

Ankrah is doing a good job of reconstruction, and the other donors will follow our lead. I vote you approve the loan.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

RPM/vmr

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

31a

APR 1 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: \$15 Million Program Loan for Ghana

Bill Gaud requests your approval to negotiate a \$15 million program loan for Ghana for calendar year 1968. This would continue at a lower level than last year, our part of a joint effort with the IMF and other donors to support General Ankrah in his stabilization program.

Last year Ghana took several important self-help actions, the most important being devaluation. This, together with other measures, has improved their balance of payments and introduced price stability.

A recent meeting of aid donors sponsored by the IMF, commended Ghana on its progress and indicated continued support through financial assistance again this year. The U.S. assistance, including \$12.5 million of P. L. 480 commodities approved earlier and the proposed \$15 million AID loan, is estimated to be about half the total long-term nonproject assistance to be provided by donor countries. Last year we provided 60 percent. This year The Netherlands, Italy, Germany, United Kingdom, and Canada are all expected to participate. In addition, Canada and IDA will be providing \$20 million in projects. As a condition for the loan, Ghana will meet the conditions for a renewed standby credit of \$10 million with the IMF.

AID plans to release the commodity loan in two tranches. Before release of the second tranche, AID will review the degree to which Ghana is adhering to the import and financial policies agreed to with the IMF and the amounts of assistance to Ghana actually committed by other donors.

The AID funds will be used to purchase goods in the U.S. Commodities will be selected to avoid substitutions for U.S. commercial exports.

There is no problem on the Conte-Long amendment since there is no evidence of Ghana's purchasing sophisticated military equipment. For purposes of the Symington amendment, Bill Gaud has determined that Ghana's resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures. I agree with this finding since Ghana's military expenditures will have risen from 7.5% of central government expenditures in 1964 to 10.6% in 1968, but still remain about 1.7% of GNP, not unusually high for the region.

I recommend you authorize negotiations to include the proposed loan.

Charles J. Gaud
Charles J. Gaud
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

X "I concur, on the understanding that Treasury will participate in the review for release of the second tranche."

HH7
4-8-68

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

318

MAR 9 1968

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: \$15 Million Program Loan for Ghana

I request your authorization to conclude with the Government of Ghana a Program Loan for \$15 million to finance essential imports in calendar year 1968 and 1969.

Ghana is important to U.S. foreign policy objectives because of its determined efforts since the coup two years ago to establish itself as a responsible and constructive member of the Free World Community. In recognition of Ghana's importance to the United States and its development potential it has been selected as a country of aid concentration in Africa. Our warm ties with Ghana since the coup were further strengthened by General Ankrah's visit to Washington in October 1967, and by the Vice-President's recent visit to Ghana. A \$20 million program loan was made to Ghana in FY 1967. The proposed \$15 million loan, in addition to the \$12 million P.L. 480 program recently authorized, will permit the continuation of the substantial economic progress already made.

Following the overthrow of Nkrumah, the National Liberation Council (NLC) acted promptly and decisively to help Ghana recover from the inherited economic chaos of chronic inflation, exhausted foreign exchange reserves, a huge foreign suppliers credit debt - mostly for unproductive projects, and a stagnant economy. The following self-help measures were adopted in 1966 and 1967:

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. IMF Standby Credits were negotiated and restrictive fiscal-monetary policies recommended by IMF adopted.

. A multilateral debt-rescheduling was arranged in December 1966 under which approximately \$150 million in debt payments falling due in 1966-68 were rescheduled.

. Unproductive state-owned enterprises were retrenched and about 50,000 workers laid off.

. State-owned enterprises were and are being analyzed to decide which to sell to private firms, which to close down and which to continue under state ownership. A number have already been sold to private investors.

. Foreign exchange management was greatly improved by reducing imports in line with foreign exchange availabilities. Repayment of short-term arrearages was initiated. The composition of imports was improved by emphasizing raw materials, industrial spare parts, and agricultural inputs. These measures have resulted in increased production despite substantially reduced import levels.

. In a major step toward balance of payments equilibrium the Ghanaian cedi was devalued by 30 percent in July 1967 to stimulate exports and curb imports. It is worthy of note that the current account deficit was reduced by nearly two-thirds in 1967 over that of 1965 and further gains are anticipated in 1968.

. Sector planning studies and advisory assistance from the Harvard Development Advisory Service were initiated to prepare for a broad development effort to commence in 1969.

These efforts by the Ghanaians were viewed favorably by a group of donor countries (Canada, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, UK, US, plus IBRD, OECD, and UNDP), under the leadership of the IMF, which met in Paris in April 1967, and in Accra in September 1967. Following last year's Ghana Aid Meeting, donor

countries committed or pledged \$77 million in balance of payments support exclusive of \$10 million proposed in September by the Italian Government but not yet firmly committed. The U.S. contribution was \$30 million in a dollar commodity loan and P.L. 480 assistance.

Ghana's self-help efforts, supported by donors, succeeded in stabilizing the economy in 1966. In addition, a gain of some three percent in Gross Domestic Product was achieved in 1967, despite the fact that imports were at the lowest level since independence. This gain in production under strict stabilization policies was, however, at the expense of continuing high unemployment and a reduction in investment, inasmuch as foreign exchange resources had to be diverted from machinery, equipment and construction materials to raw materials and spare parts.

It is U.S. policy to continue support of Ghana within a multilateral context, avoiding the role of predominant donor and encouraging other donors, including international lending agencies, to meet the bulk of Ghana's requirements. The third donor's conference under the aegis of IMF took place on February 20-22, 1968. It provided another opportunity to strengthen the multilateral framework, ascertain Ghana's balance of payments needs, encourage other donor support, and agree upon appropriate self-help measures. The participants, joined this year by the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland, "commended" Ghana for its self-help efforts and undertook to convey to their governments Ghana's need for \$70-80 million of external assistance in 1968. The U.S. Delegation at the Conference urged that in view of the increase in debt servicing charges in 1968 the Western European donors should increase their aid to ensure a net flow of European resources to Ghana.


We seek approval of the present \$15 million loan so that the United States can move promptly to sign the loan agreement. This will strengthen our hand in encouraging other donors to do likewise and permit a more efficient use of these resources in Ghana's stabilization program. It is our intention, in this connection, to release the loan in two tranches, the second tranche will follow a review of Ghana's self-help performance and the performance of other donors.

Commodities financed under this loan will be restricted to U.S. source and origin. Arrangements have been concluded with Ghana, moreover, to ensure that such imports are additive to normal commercial imports. Ocean freight, 50 percent of which must be on U.S. flag carriers, will be financed entirely from Ghana's own resources.

I have concluded from an examination of the evidence that U.S. development assistance is not being diverted to military expenditures and that Ghanaian resources are not being diverted to military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with development. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Ghana is making or intends to make, within the next few months, any purchases which might raise the question of sophistication.

I believe, in conclusion, that given Ghana's importance to the United States, its commendable self-help performance and good development potential, it is very much in the United States' interest to continue our assistance, as part of a multilateral effort, to meet that country's most urgent needs.

Recommendation: That you authorize me to approve this loan. The Department of State concurs.


William S. Gaud

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 93-368

By Cb, NARA, Date 5-12-95

Pres. file

Wed., April 10, 1968
3:45 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith an instruction which has gone out,
but is subject to your revision.

It was delayed because Sect. Rusk and I
disapproved an earlier draft which would have
had Admiral Smith addressing a U. S. officer
under hostile duress, in Pak's presence.

The instruction is designed to cover the con-
tingency noted in red on page 1.

SECRET attachment W. W. Rostow

OK _____

Revise as indicated _____

Call me _____

1243
32a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1968

Walt:

These instructions have been approved
by the Secretary.

In view of the time problem, we are
sending them to Seoul. If you or the
President have any additions or changes
you want made, we will send them as correc-
tions by flash cable.

Sincerely,

NK per hste
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Attachment.

The Honorable
Walt W. Rostow,
Special Assistant to the President.

1243

326

~~SECRET~~Amcabbsey SEOU ~~XXXXXXXX~~ FLASH

STATE _____

NODIS/CACTUS

REFS: A. Seoul 5510
B. Search State 110701DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-367
By ing, NARA, Date 2-7-94

1. If Pak produces Murphy or other crew member at future closed meeting, Admiral Smith should request his immediate release. If Pak refuses, Smith should ask to speak to crew member privately. If Pak consents, Smith should: (a) question crew member on treatment and welfare of crew, (b) ask why crew signed confessions, wrote letters urging apology, etc., (c) offer to pass personal messages to any of crew's families, and (d) read to crew member statement set forth in para. 3. below.

2. If, as appears likely, Pak refuses to permit Smith to speak privately to crew member, Smith should make clear that he has no intention of conversing with crew member in Pak's hearing, since crew member is not a free man. Smith should strongly protest this procedure.

3. Pak's purpose in bringing crew member to closed meeting would presumably be to have crew member make statement along lines of recent letters to officials and families. Unless Smith has been able to speak to crew member privately, Smith should insist that he be permitted to hear following statement, which Smith should if possible deliver before

KTP:JAYager/IGBrown:lm 8/10/68 3263

The Under Secretary

DOD - Mr. Steadman (informed)

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

S/S

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

crew member makes his statement:

A. General Pak, I regard this procedure of producing an American Officer, unfree and still in custody, as offensive and not calculated to resolve our differences or obtain the release of the crew, which is the purpose of these meetings. You and I have met (insert number) times in this building. In these meetings, I have made a number of concrete proposals for settling the problem created by the seizure of the PUEBLO and its crew. At the twelfth of these meetings, I said that at the time of release of the PUEBLO's officers and men, I would:

(1) Acknowledge that the PUEBLO was on an intelligence-gathering mission when the ship was seized by North Korean armed forces.

(2) Provide assurance that ships of the United States Navy will continue to be ordered to remain more than 12 nautical miles from North Korea.

(3) Express regret for any violation of orders by the USS PUEBLO which may have resulted in the ship's approaching closer than 12 nautical miles in North Korea.

This offer still stands, even though your side has thus far refused to accept it.

D. You, General Pak, have made two demands which the United States Government cannot accept:

(1) You demand that the US Government admit that the PUEBLO was engaged in espionage. The Second Hague Convention of 1907 provides:

QUOTE A person can only be considered a spy when, acting clandestinely or on false pretenses, he obtains or endeavors to obtain information in the

Ambassy SEOUL

~~SECRET~~

zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party. . . Thus, soldiers not wearing a disguise who have penetrated into the zone of operations of the hostile army, for the purpose of obtaining information, are not considered spies.

UNQUOTE

The Pueblo is of course a commissioned ship of the United States Navy and its crew were wearing naval uniforms at the time of their capture. The Pueblo's intelligence gathering mission does not constitute espionage, was entirely legal, and is of a type engaged in by several powers, including the Soviet Union.

(2) You also claim that the Pueblo approached closer than 12 nautical miles to North Korea and demand that the U.S. Government apologize for those alleged intrusions into your claimed territorial waters. You must understand that we cannot apologize for acts which we regard as unproven. We can not accept as valid evidence the so-called confessions which members of the Pueblo's crew have made under conditions which are in themselves a form of duress. The alleged admission by crew members that the Pueblo was 7.6 nautical miles from Ye-Do at the time of its seizure is directly contradicted by numerous broadcasts from the Pueblo and from North Korean NA patrol boats which placed the seizure more than 15 nautical miles from the closest territory under North Korean control.

C. Some of the letters from members of the Pueblo's crew have understandably expressed concern over the absence of mail from home. The blame for this must rest squarely on the North Korean authorities who have

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ilmsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

Embassy SEOUL

~~SECRET~~

refused to accept letters for crew members at these meetings and have rebuffed inquiries by the International Committee of the Red Cross concerning the welfare of the crew. The families of crew members have been advised to try to get letters to the crew through the international mails. If such letters do not reach their addressees, one can only conclude that delivery has been blocked by the North Korean authorities.

4. If crew member responds to Smith's statement, or makes statement of his own, Smith should not comment, except to answer personal or humanitarian questions. Replies to such questions should be addressed to Pak. Object is to avoid any exchange which might get crew member into trouble. Smith should decline any offer to question crew member in full meeting on ground crew member not free man.

5. Admiral Smith may use following information as appropriate and at his discretion:

A. The United States Navy is maintaining close contact with all of the families of the crew and is doing all that it can to ensure their welfare.

B. A baby boy was born to the wife of Electrician First Class Hagenson on February 9th. The wife of Lt. Murphy gave birth to a baby girl on March 29. Both mothers and both babies are well.

C. We are sorry to report that Mrs. Katherine W. Murphy, mother of Lt. Murphy, died at McKinley, California, on January 23.

6. Pak may condition release of the crew or part of it on Smith's

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Ambassy SEOUL

~~SECRET~~

signing helicopter type receipt. In this event, Smith should sign after writing in one of inscriptions specified in para. 5. of Ref. B.

7. More difficult problem arises if Pak conditions release of one man on Smith's signing three-point statement (para. 3. A. above) which Smith has offered to provide at time of release of entire crew. We recognize that refusal to do so would be hard to explain to family concerned or to general American public. Giving North Koreans even conditional expression of regret under these circumstances would, however, put us in an impossible position. It is our only real card. North Koreans would be free to proclaim to world that U.S. had abjectly apologized, and we would be restrained from demonstrating fabricated nature of their evidence by concern for welfare of man still in their hands. Disastrous effect of this situation on ROK/US relations could well be imagined. We might be forced to issue White Paper to prevent unacceptable damage to our international position. North Koreans would then be most unlikely to release balance of crew simply in exchange for a conditional apology when White Paper will already have shown that we do not have anything to apologize for.

8. Smith should therefore refuse to sign three-point statement for anything short of a simultaneous release of entire crew. Smith should remind Pak that his own whole presentation has been on the basis that an expression of regret and assurance for the future would provide the basis for release of the entire crew, not one or more individuals. Our offer was made on the same basis. Offering to release one man while keeping the others has no reasonable or acceptable basis.

END

~~SECRET~~
Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

INFORMATION

Wednesday
April 10, 1968 - 3:35 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: PHILCAG -- and your message to Marcos

Pres file

Your message to Marcos urging him to stand fast on PHILCAG appears to have served its purpose. Embassy Manila reports that "the President's letter has served to give Marcos a much needed shot in the arm on PHILCAG, and hopefully he will follow through with a major effort to win the necessary votes" for a bill "which will preserve PHILCAG's essential integrity."

Our Embassy cautions, however, that it will not be easy. Marcos has asked our Embassy to approach three specific senators who have proved unresponsive to Marcos' efforts. Our Embassy will be doing so in the next several days.

We left to Marcos the choice of releasing the text of your message to the public and he wants to assess the tactical situation before deciding to use it publicly to counteract the fairly widespread impression in the Philippines that the United States is backing out of its South Vietnamese commitment. If he does choose to release we have asked for 24 hours notice to permit simultaneous release here, if desired.

In sum, the situation on PHILCAG is looking up -- but we are not out of the woods yet.

W. W. Rostow

MW:wpt

Wednesday, April 10, 1968
3:30 p. m.

Pres. file

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk forwards an
"Eyes only for the President" --
forwarded to you unopened.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

~~Handwritten~~
2. Purple

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday - April 10, 1968 - 3:30pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Human Rights Commission

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12812
SEC 1.6
MAR 17 1992
BY rg ON 4/29/92

Governor Harriman is meeting with the other members of your Human Rights Commission next Tuesday, April 16. Harriman has the idea that the Commission might recommend to you the establishment of a Human Rights Medal. This could be called the Eleanor Roosevelt Medal for Human Rights -- which you might give posthumously this year to Martin Luther King. Alternatively, you might establish a President's Medal for Human Rights and make a double posthumous presentation the first year -- both to Eleanor Rooveselt and Dr. King. Harriman would envisage the medal usually being given to living persons in future years.

Harriman does not want to float this idea to the Human Rights Commission without knowing your attitude and receptiveness to receiving such a recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

- Name medal for Eleanor Roosevelt with posthumously nomination Dr. King _____
- Call it President's Medal for Human Rights with posthumous nomination Eleanor Roosevelt and Dr. King _____
- Confine posthumous recommendations to existing honors, such as Medal of Freedom _____
- Drop idea _____
- Speak to me _____

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

UAR TELEGRAM

36a 47

~~SECRET~~ 668

PAGE 01 AMMAN 04264 082005Z

49
ACTION SS 70

INFO SSO 00, 1070 W

P R 081729Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5190
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1486
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1421
USUN NY 0847

- SOYDNER
- BUDGET
- DAVIS
- FEIN
- GIB
- H
- JET
- JOH
- JOH
- KE
- L
- MCC
- SAUNDERS
- TAYLOR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-269
By us, NARA Date 10-7-98

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4264

LIMIDS NOFORN

DEPT PASS CAIRO

SUBJ: HUSSEIN'S IMPRESSIONS OF CURRENT UAR INTERNAL SITUATION

REF AMMAN 4252 NOTAL

1. IN CONVERSATION REPORTED REFTEL, KING HUSSEIN TOLD ME AND EMBOFF HE WAS STRUCK BY NASSER'S STATEMENTS WITH REGARD TO

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4264A ~~SECRET~~

PROBLEMS HE WAS FACING IN UAR INTERNAL SITUATION. NASSER LAID GREAT STRESS ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMIC SITUATION. HE MADE IT CLEAR HE CANNOT AFFORD TO HAVE TROUBLE WITH SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND LIBYA BECAUSE HE NEEDS THEIR FUNDS SO BADLY. HE TOLD HUSSEIN, IN EFFECT, NOT TO PICK ANY FIGHTS WITH FAISAL BECAUSE IT MIGHT AFFECT FAISAL'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE UAR.

2. HUSSEIN SAID HE HAD BEEN MET AT AIRPLANE STEPS BY NASSER AND ALI SABRI ONLY, WHEREAS PREVIOUSLY THERE HAD BEEN A CROWD OF OTHER " VICE PRESIDENTS" TO GREET HIM. ALI SABRI PARTICIPATED IN ALL MEETINGS, TOGETHER WITH MAHMOUD FAWZI AND MAHMOUD RIAD. FAWZI AND RIAD SHOWED STRONGLY ANTI-AMERICAN ATTITUDES, DIS-

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 AMMAN 04264 082005Z

TRUST FOR JARRING PROPOSAL AS A TRICK, AND NO CONFIDENCE THAT TALKS WITH JARRING COULD BE PRODUCTIVE. ALI SABRI SAID NOTHING IN MEETINGS BUT JORDANIANS, FROM THEIR OTHER CONTACTS AND FROM THINGS NASSER SAID, BECAME CONVINCED THAT THERE HAS BEEN DECIDED LEFTWARD MOVEENT IN UAR GOVT AND THAT ANY CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP WOULD ONLY TAKE UAR FURTHER LEFT.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 4264A ~~SECRET~~

3. HUSSEIN HAD HEARD SEVERAL STORIES ABOUT THE RESIGNATION OF ZAKARIYA MUHIEDDIN. ONE STORY WAS THAT NASSER HAD HAD TO SACK MUHIEDDIN BECAUSE MUHIEDDIN HAD INSISTED ON A GREATER DEGREE OF AUSTERITY, AND NASSER AND OTHER ADVISERS BELIEVED THE PEOPLE WOULD NOT STAND FOR THIS. THERE ARE ALSO OTHER STORIES FLOATING AROUND, SUCH AS MUHIEDDIN'S SPECIFIC DISAPPROVAL OF 12 MILLION EGYPTIAN POUND EXPENDITURE TO RAISE WAGES AND PACIFY LABOR ELEMENTS. THE JORDANIANS JUDGED THAT THERE ARE MANY LEFTISTS IN THE WINGS. NASSER HAD TOLD HUSSEIN THAT HE AS BEEN ROLLING UP A CHINESE COMMUNIST GROUP IN THE UAR. THE JORDANIANS, HOWEVER, FOUND FROM THEIR OWN CONTACTS THAT THERE ARE OTHER TYPES OF EGYPTIAN COMMUNISTS AROUND. PRESUMABLY IDENTIFIED WITH THE SOVIETS.

4. ALTHOUGH THERE IS SOME QUESTION OF WHO NOW CONTROLS THE EGYPTIAN ARMY, HUSSEIN INDICATED HE BELIEVES GENERALI ABDUL MUNIM RIAD IS WELL IN CHARGE.

5. COMMENT: HUSSEIN SEEMS TO HAVE COME AWAY CONVINCED THAT NASSER IS CURRENTLY FACING MORE INTERNAL DISSENSION THAN IS

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4264A ~~SECRET~~

THE JORDANIAN REGIME. FROM SEVERAL OF HIS COMMENTS IT WAS CLEAR HE FELT SHOULD NASSER PERSONALLY BE FORCED FROM OFFICE. HIS SUCCESSOR WOULD BE MORE RADICAL, LESS AMENABLE TO PEACE DISCUSSIONS ANDEVERY BIT AS HARD TO DEAL WITH AS THE SYRIAN LEADERSHIP. SYMMES

GP-3

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

39

SECRET **Wed., April 10, 1968**
 1:20 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

**This Kemer pacification analysis is,
by and large, heartening.**

**The best news is in para. 5: attack on
hard core infrastructure ahead of schedule.**

W. W Restow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 4-29-92

37a

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-269
By UC, NARA Date 10-7-98

Copy of SAIGON 24361, April 9, 1968

(For Ambassador Bunker from Komer)

Herewith latest pacification assessment I promised for use in your talks with President and others. We expedited regular collection of end-March data from all 44 provinces and 242 districts to provide you with most up-to-date assessment yet available to Washington. The situation has now settled down enough that I regard this as first full comprehensive appraisal of post-Tet pacification status. For example, it includes Thua Thien/Hue figures for first time.

(1) While pacification suffered unquestionable setback as by-product of Tet offensive, dimensions this setback now seem even less than previously reported. Moreover, we are now on distinct recovery curve as enemy pulls back in some areas and as we increasingly contest for those hamlets temporarily lost or downgraded.

(2) Perhaps most concrete evidence of this recovery curve is increase in relatively secure population from 59.8% at end of February to 61.0% end-March. (It was 67.2% at end-January). Contested hamlet category, which largely represented uncertainty as to hamlet status during period advisors did not have full access, dropped from 22.0% end-February to 20.7% end-March. VC-controlled population rose only one-tenth percent during March from 18.2% to 18.3%. Since these percentages include urban population, this represents a loss of only some 255 hamlets to Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army control since January, a good indicator of limited dimension of our post-Tet setback in the hamlet war. In other words, out of 9,024 hamlets in the secure through contested categories as of end-January 1968, we lost some three percent to the Viet Cong, while 5% more than before are rated as contested.

(3) The extent to which we have moved back into the countryside offers further evidence that VC/NVA have not just taken over the rural areas. Of 629 Revolutionary Development cadre teams, 545 (87%) are back in hamlets -- 449 (71%) in planned 1968 hamlets. A team-by-team check shows 519 of the 545 teams sleep overnight in their assigned hamlets. Average team strength is 49 out of authorized 59 men; somewhat higher than before Tet. Out of 110 Truong Son (Montagnard) cadre teams, 88 are working in hamlets -- 87 of the 88 sleep in their assigned hamlets.

(4) National police have rounded back into almost pre-Tet shape. Morale is much improved as result of creditable performance during Tet offensive. Moreover, police strength is already back up to pre-Tet level of 73,000. Loan has agreed to replace six incompetent province police chiefs from our blacklist.

(5) Attack against Viet Cong infrastructure is running well ahead of tough, arbitrary goals we established. A record 56 out of 68 police field force companies are being properly employed as exploitation forces in attacking Viet Cong infrastructure. Viet Cong infrastructure eliminations were highest in March of any month on record. Total of 1,323 identifiable quality (important) members wrapped up -- 150 killed, 1,099 captured, and 74 rallied as Chieu Hoi. Comparable January figure was 488; February total was 540. Hence, in last three months eliminations have totaled 2,351 versus goal of 1,800. District intelligence and operations coordinating centers, which are kingpins in stepping up pressure on Viet Cong organization, have already been set up in 107 of South Vietnam's 242 districts. 29 out of 44 provinces now have Phung Hoang committees to tie together all intelligence and exploitation resources at province level.

(6) 46 of the 51 ARVN battalions now assigned to direct support of Revolutionary Development campaign areas where they bolster territorial security and carry out offensive operations against enemy guerrillas and local forces. About 2/3 were withdrawn to defend cities during the Tet offensive. By 29 February 31 were back on direct support job, so gain of 15 during March is substantial.

(7) Increased attention being given to essential Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF) which furnish 24-hour security to people, roads, bridges and critical installations in the countryside. Since local Viet Cong forces which they oppose have improved weaponry, MACV/Joint General Staff working on crash effort to put better weapons in Regional Force/Popular Force hands. M-2 carbines and additional BAR's are already being issued. They will get more M-79 grenade launchers. 25 new US mobile advisory teams designed specifically to upgrade Regional Force / Popular Force took to field on 1 April, bringing total teams to 95. While exact percentages of RF:PF guarding province/district capitals during height of Tet offensive are not known, end-March figures describing present deployment show very satisfactory proportions of RF:PF are securing hamlets or are on other security missions (e. g., patrolling roads, guarding bridges, manning outposts, etc.), in rural areas. Of total RF strength, 73.8% are outside province/district capitals. PF are oriented even more toward the countryside-- 63.7% are securing hamlets and 18.1% are on other rural security missions.

(8) Under Tet offensive stimulus concept of hamlet militia to reinforce RF:PF and give people greater feeling of participation and confidence has taken hold. More than 22,000 people have been trained of which almost 5,000 are armed. Civil defense groups are the city-based analogy of hamlet militia. 441 units with 63,599 members (6,888 armed) have been organized since Tet. None existed before.

(9) Continued low Chieu Hoi rate is one troublesome minus. It indicates that either enemy morale is still good, or strong Viet Cong control measures to prevent defection are working. In two months since Tet, 1,880 returnees came over to GVN side, compared to 8,474 during same period last year. On the plus side, more is being achieved using Chieu Hoi returnees. Armed propaganda team strength grew 12% from 2,615 on 31 January to 2,929 on 1 April. Kit Carson scouts increased from 292 to 332 in same period.

(10) Viet Cong pressure on local GVN administration has seriously reduced its effectiveness. Before Tet we figure that 7,259 hamlets had functioning GVN administrations -- either elected or appointed officials who were carrying out normal governmental duties. Now number is down to 4,471 (62% of pre-Tet level). While RF:PF units or Revolutionary Development cadre teams can be ordered back to the countryside, unarmed elected officials cannot. They will return not with security forces but only after the forces have established a climate of good security. It's this better security climate which is our main pacification objective.

(11) Show-the-flag operations in which government forces visit outlying hamlets are one good way of overcoming psychological effects of the Tet offensive. At our prodding, Joint General Staff (Vietnam) finally issued instructions on 12 March to conduct them throughout the country. By end-March 342 such operations had been mounted, usually in reinforced company strength and lasting one to seven days.

(12) Almost all major roads and waterways are back in operation, and as security improves, traffic on them is rising. March incidents on vital Route 4, for example, are back down to November 1967 level.

Conclusion: Net impression from all these facts and figures is that:

(1) Government of Vietnam lost less of countryside than feared, (2) bulk of pacification forces and assets are intact, and (3) they are being increasingly employed to resecure countryside rather than buttoned up in defense of towns. Moreover, province senior advisors now believe that we can regain pacification momentum in the 9 provinces worst hit within 4 to 8 months, and in 17 less hit provinces within 1 to 2 months. In many of these, and in the remaining 18 provinces we are already going ahead with the original 1968 program. All told, I consider the picture rather more encouraging than even I had hoped as recently as a month ago.

BERGER

###

ACTION

38

Wednesday, April 10, 1968 -- 12:50 pm

Mr. President:

formal
**Herewith recommendations of
the Secretary of Defense and the JCS
for:**

- Abrams**
- Goodpaster**
- McCain**

W. W. Rostow

cc: George Christian

WWRostow:rla

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

38a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Army General Officer Action

I recommend the assignment of General Creighton W. Abrams, now Deputy Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, as Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, an authorized General position. General Abrams, who is 53 years, 6 months of age, will succeed General William C. Westmoreland who is being reassigned.

General Abrams has demonstrated, among other qualities, the capacity for dealing objectively with matters of the broadest significance to our national security.

The above action will not result in the Army exceeding the number of three and four-star positions authorized under law.

The above action is based upon a recommendation of the Secretary of the Army and on the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Earl W. Clegg

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

The President named General Creighton W. Abrams, United States Army, for assignment as Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. He will replace General William C. Westmoreland who is being reassigned. General Abrams is presently serving as Deputy Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

38c

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Army General Officer Nomination

I recommend the assignment of Lieutenant General Andrew J. Goodpaster, now Commandant, The National War College, as the Deputy Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, an authorized General position, and his nomination for appointment to the grade of General. General Goodpaster will succeed General Creighton W. Abrams.

General Goodpaster is 53 years, 2 months of age. He has demonstrated, among other qualities, the capacity for dealing objectively with matters of the broadest significance to our national security.

This action will not result in the Army exceeding the number of three and four-star positions authorized under law.

This action is based upon a recommendation of the Secretary of the Army and on the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.



1 Incl
Nomination

38d

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

The President named Lieutenant General Andrew J. Goodpaster, for assignment as Deputy Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and for appointment to the grade of General. He will replace General Creighton W. Abrams who is being reassigned. General Goodpaster is presently serving as Commandant, The National War College.

38e

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subj: Reassignment, Flag Officer of the Navy

I recommend the reassignment of Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., U. S. Navy to the position of Commander in Chief, Pacific as relief for Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp, Jr., U. S. Navy who will retire in July or August of 1968.

I have advised the Secretary of State that Admiral McCain is being recommended for reassignment as Commander in Chief, Pacific and I have recommended that the Secretary of State take necessary action to accredit Admiral McCain as the Military Advisor and Representative to the various Mutual Defense Alliances in the Pacific. If you approve the assignment of Admiral McCain as Commander in Chief, Pacific I will so inform the Secretary of State.

Admiral McCain, who is 57 years of age, is presently serving as Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe. The authorized grade for his proposed assignment is Admiral.

This action is based on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Navy and on the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Carl H. Sigmond

PROPOSED WHITE HOUSE PRESS RELEASE

The President announced today the assignment of Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., U. S. Navy, as Commander in Chief, Pacific.

Admiral McCain was born in Council Bluffs, Iowa on January 17, 1911, and is presently serving as Commander in Chief, U. S. Naval Forces, Europe. He will succeed Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp, Jr., U. S. Navy, who is retiring.

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, April 10, 1968

1:10 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

~~Handwritten signature~~
2. Pres file

SUBJECT: Israeli Desalting

This is just to give you an interim report on two irons we have in the fire to find a capable person to pick up where Ellsworth Bunker left off on the Israeli desalting project.

First, as you directed in response to my memorandum last week, we have briefed Kermit Gordon in some detail on the dimensions of the job. He is obviously intrigued by it, but he says he needs a few days to figure out whether he can give it the time it requires.

Second, on your instructions via Jim Jones, Hal Saunders talked to Donald Cook yesterday on the phone. He is eager to do anything he can to help, but he would need a more detailed briefing than was possible on the phone before he could tell how much time would be involved. He says he is also completely tied up with matters here and in Europe through April and May and would therefore not be able even to think about serious work until June.

When I hear from Kermit, we will know better how to proceed and I will give you a firmer recommendation then. For the moment, however, I think we should continue to check out Gordon, Woods and Schultze. When we know where they stand, we will be able to put Cook's availability in better perspective.

W. W. Rostow

What about
Arthur Krim -
L

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING, CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.3 (2) ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 1980.

BY rg ON 4-29-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 10, 1968 -- 12:25 p. m.

Free file

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA's assessment of increased North Vietnamese reinforcements on the trails.

It looks like this:

North Vietnamese military detected moving south

November 1967	3,500	
December 1967	4,000	
January 1968	11,000	
February 1968	6,000	
March 1968	29,000	
April 1968 (first week)	<u>10,000</u>	
	54,000	
plus	16,000	arrived in January opposite Khe Sanh -- 894 and 320 North Vietnamese army divisions
	<u>70,000</u>	

As compared with 70,000, MACV estimates that at this time in 1965-66, 44,000 North Vietnamese came south; in 1966-67, about 30,000.

CIA concludes: "We do feel confident in assessing this as the most significant movement of manpower to South Vietnam that Hanoi has ever mounted during a five month period. Our judgment is that it is closely related to the Tet offensive and the apparent North Vietnamese intent to bring the conflict to a 'decisive' conclusion this year. Exactly how the infiltrators will be used, where, and the degree of the threat they will pose to allied forces, however, must await further developments and the accumulation of further evidence."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-319
By cbm, NARA, Date 12-7-01

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

INFORMATION

41

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, April 10, 1968
12:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an account of Westy's
talk with Thieu, upon his return to Saigon.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 24425

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 4-29-92



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PP RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 24425 1011020
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 101010Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
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~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 24425

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-269
By ica, NARA Date 10-7-99

Rastow

NODIS

REF SAIGON 24409

1. IN OUR CALL ON PRES THIEU THIS MORNING, GEN WESTMORELAND REPORTED ON HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON MAKING FOLLOWING POINTS:

- A. THE STRONG DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES;
- B. PROVISION OF M-16'S TO ALL REGULAR FORCES BY JULY, ENABLING AN UPGRADING OF WEAPONS TO THE TERRITORIAL FORCES;
- C. THE THINKING ABOUT ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT: HELICOPTERS, MORTARS, ARTILLERY, ETC., FOR VN FORCES.

2. FOREGOING PROVOKED DISCUSSION WHETHER PRES JOHNSON

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 24425 ~~SECRET~~
CONSIDERING WITHDRAWING SOME UNITS. GEN WESTMORELAND SAID THERE WAS TALK ABOUT THIS IN PRINCIPLE BUT NOTHING DEFINITE. THIEU SAID WHEN ARVN FORCES SHOWED SUFFICIENT IMPROVEMENT, IT SHOULD PERMIT SOME REDUCTION, BUT GEN WESTMORELAND SAID WE HAD "TO WAIT AND SEE". THIEU CLEARLY WAS OF THE MIND THERE SHOULD BE SOME REDUCTION.

3. GEN WESTMORELAND GAVE THIEU NAME OF HIS SUCCESSOR AND HIS PLANS TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON THE END OF MAY, AND ASKED THAT INFO BE TIGHTLY HELD. THIEU EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION AT NEW COMMANDER.

4. GEN WESTMORELAND SPOKE ABOUT LACK OF UNDERSTANDING IN THE US ABOUT MILITARY SITUATION HERE AND THE LIFTING OF THE SIEGE OF KHE SANH, AND SHOWED THIEU A COPY OF HIS PRESS STATEMENT GS* LEAVING U. S. AND HIS COMMENDATION OF THE FORCES AT KHE SANH.

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 24425, APRIL 10, 1968, (NODIS)

5. GEN WESTMORELAND SAID THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER COMMANDERS CONFERENCE ON APRIL 20TH TO GO OVER US AND VN PLANS FOR MAINTAINING THE OFFENSIVE, ADDING THAT PRES JOHNSON WAS KEEN TO KEEP UP THE OFFENSIVE. PRES THUAN SAID HE HAD NOTED

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 24425 ~~SECRET~~

THAT IN THE PRESIDENTS LETTER WHICH GEN WESTMORELAND HAD BROUGHT, AND WAS VERY PLEASED.

6. PRES THIEU THEN SPOKE OF HIS OWN MEETING YESTERDAY WITH HIS COMMANDERS. HE THOUGHT IT WAS A GOOD MEETING. THEY DISCUSSED WHAT TO DO NOW AND IN THE FUTURE IN RELATION TO TACTICS, RECONSTRUCTION, REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC OPINION, PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. "THERE IS TOO MUCH EMOTION ABOUT THESE PEACE TALKS. THEY'RE DEBATING THE ISSUES AND GETTING ALL EXCITED. I KEPT EMPHASIZING THAT WE MUST GET ON WITH OUR JOB IN THE FIELD. THE COMMANDERS ARE ONLY JUST BEGINNING TO REALIZE THAT THE VIETNAMESE FORCES HAVE TO CARRY HEAVIER RESPONSIBILITIES. THERE IS MUCH WORK TO BE DONE, ESPECIALLY IN BUILDING UP THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES. THEY ARE MOST IMPORTANT AND HAVE BEEN TOO LONG NEGLECTED. AND THEIR TACTICS ARE WRONG. THEY THINK THEIR JOB IS TO DEFEND THE OUTPOSTS. WHAT I WANT IS FOR THEM TO SLEEP DAYS, AND GET OUT ON PATROL AT NIGHT. IF THE OUTPOSTS ARE DESTROYED THEY COST NOTHING TO REBUILD. YOU CAN'T GET AT THE ENEMY SITTING IN AN OUTPOST."

7. WE SAW KY AFTER THE ABOVE, BUT THE MEETING WAS BRIEF.

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 24425 ~~SECRET~~

GEN WESTMORELAND INDICATED HIS SUCCESSOR WOULD BE ANNOUNCED IN A FEW DAYS, AND GAVE SOME OF HIS IMPRESSIONS OF WASHINGTON. KY SPOKE ABOUT THE COMMANDERS CONFERENCE WHICH HE THOUGHT USEFUL. NOTHING OF MOMENT. BERGER

BT

(*) AS RECEIVED, CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

42

Wed., April 10, 1968
10:30 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Gorton accepts for a time
between May 23 and May 30 -- if agreeable
to you.

He's pleased about our efforts to keep
him informed and to give him an oppor-
tunity to express his views.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Canberra 4932)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By is, NARA Date 1-15-99



Department of State

42a
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

6

O 100655Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2203
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ CANBERRA 4932

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268

1968 APR 10 02544
AM 255

MODIS

By us, NARA Date 1-15-99

REF: STATE 144251

FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER GORTON HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF APRIL 9 TRANSMITTED REFTEL:

Rostow

BEGIN MESSAGE: 10 APRIL 1968 MY DEAR PRESIDENT, THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR MESSAGE WHICH I RECEIVED THIS MORNING.

MY COLLEAGUES AND MYSELF GREATLY VALUED SECRETARY

PAGE 2 RUEHBAC 4932 ~~SECRET~~
RUSK'S VISIT AND WERE MUCH HELPED BY THE TALKS WE HAD WITH HIM.

I LOOK FORWARD GREATLY TO VISITING YOU AND THANK YOU AGAIN FOR THE SUGGESTION. I AM AFRAID IT WOULD BE MOST DIFFICULT FOR ME TO LEAVE CANBERRA BEFORE 23-MAY BECAUSE OF THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE FOR MRS. GANDHI TO VISIT US AND I SHOULD NEED TO BE BACK BY 30 MAY. IF TIME WITHIN THIS PERIOD WOULD BE CONVENIENT TO YOU WOULD YOU PLEASE LET ME KNOW. MEANWHILE I SHALL PLAN ON THE BASIS OF A VISIT BETWEEN THOSE DATES.

I AM CONTINUING TO RECEIVE UP TO DATE INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR EXCHANGES WITH NORTH VIETNAM AND AM GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR ARRANGING TO KEEP ME INFORMED SO THAT WE MAY EXPRESS OUR VIEWS OR MAKE SUGGESTIONS IN ADVANCE OF DECISIONS BEING TAKEN.

I AM PARTICULARLY GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR TAKING ME INTO

PAGE 3 RUEHBAC 4932 ~~SECRET~~
YOUR CONFIDENCE AS TO YOUR INTENTIONS TO SEE PRESIDENT THIEU AND PRESIDENT PARK, BECAUSE IT IS QUITE CRITICAL FOR ME TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THIS KIND IN ADVANCE OF ITS BEING GENERALLY KNOWN.

WITH KINDEST REGARDS, YOURS SINCERELY, JOHN G. GORTON
END OF MESSAGE. CRONK
BT

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Wednesday, April 10, 1968
9:30 a. m.


43

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Now a third report -- Collingwood and the Russian being the other two --
that Hanoi was about to ask for talks when you let fly on March 31.

3.4(b)(1),(3)



W. W. Rostow

SANTIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NJ/RAC 00-321
By SJ, NARA, Date 2-7-03