

SECRET

Wednesday, April 10, 1968
9:30 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I am pleased to forward this historic report to you:
see marked passage.

The base was shelled for 81 consecutive days.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 19, NARA, Date 4-29-92

~~SECRET~~

44a

Wednesday
April 10, 1968, 8:25 a. m.

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number sixty-six on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ/A Shau Valley for the 24-hour period of April 9, 1968.

Weather was clear at Khe Sanh with cloud ceilings above 5,000 feet throughout the reporting period.

Artillery fire support consisted of 182 missions expending 2,708 rounds. Forty missions were observed. No COFRAM ammunition was fired. For the first time since January 20, 1968, Khe Sanh received no incoming enemy fire.

In Operation Pegasus, the 26th Marine Regiment has initiated attacks to the northwest to clear the enemy from that area. In a brief contact to the southwest of Khe Sanh, the 8th ARVN Airborne Battalion killed eight enemy. South and southwest of Khe Sanh Combat Base, 1st Air Cavalry Division units located two weapons/ammunition caches and two mass graves containing a total of 85 enemy bodies. The weapons/ammunition caches contained: 58 individual weapons, 15 crew-served weapons, 1,084 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition, 665 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, 153 B-40 rocket rounds, 2,000 grenades (Chicom), 50,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 500 pounds of TNT, and 25 pounds of medical supplies.

The slide area blocking Route 9 has been bypassed. Twelve bridges and five culverts have been repaired and leading engineer elements are now moving west. It is estimated that Route 9 will be open for logistic traffic on April 12.

Elsewhere in Quang Tri Province, contact was light. Enemy attacks by fire increased during the period, wounding 21 (all evacuated).

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
AF Guido, SEA Records, 4/1/88
By lf NARA, Date 5-18-92

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By kg NARA, Date 5-18-92

A total of 105 tactical air sorties were flown in support of Operation Pegasus. Three secondary fires and damage to one trench was observed. No ARC LIGHT missions were flown in the Khe Sanh area.

The Khe Sanh Combat Base Airfield is open to all aircraft. Supplies remain at a satisfactory level with 29 days of rations on hand. Ammunition is being issued to the 1st Air Cavalry Division to draw stocks down to five days on hand and ten additional days in ammunition supply points.

For the next 24 hours, 74 tactical air sorties are scheduled to support Operation Pegasus with an additional 116 on call. One ARC LIGHT mission is scheduled into the Khe Sanh area today.

Continued partly cloudy skies with good visibility is predicted for the next 24 hours.

Two photo missions and two radar missions were flown over A Shau Valley yesterday. Bomb damage assessment from 18 tactical air sorties in the target area included 17 road cuts and one secondary explosion. Two ground reconnaissance teams inserted into A Shau during 7 to 9 April reported contact with enemy armed with automatic weapons in both missions. A third team remaining on road and river watch reports no contact.

P file
INFORMA .ON

45
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, April 10, 1968

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ 9:00 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Thieu explains why Monday would be extremely difficult for him. He is about to change his government, probably installing the widely respected Huong for Loc as Prime Minister. He is afraid that the timing would bring about the charge that he "made these changes under orders. That is the way our people think, and I cannot afford it, especially at this time. I hope the President will understand." (see marked passage)

He re-expressed his desire to come to Washington in the second half of May and his willingness to consider a meeting earlier if it was essential.

Walt Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By is, NARA Date 1-15-99



Department of State

TELEGRAM

(5)

45a

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

OO RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 24409 1010840
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 100820Z APR 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 483
STATE GRNC
BT

CN: 2579Q
RECD: 5:53A
10 APR 68

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-269
By isa, NARA Date 10-7-98

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 24409

NODIS

REF: STATE 144253

1. PRES. THIEU SAID HE WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO COME TO HONOLULU FOR A MEETING ON MONDAY, WHEN I SAW HIM, ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. WESTMORELAND, IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS ADDRESS TO JOINT SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE (SEE SEPTTEL).

2. I OPENED BY CONGRATULATING HIM ON HIS SPEECH (WHICH WAS GOOD) AND THEN SAID I HAD A SECOND MESSAGE FOR HIM FROM THE PRESIDENT. HE READ IT SLOWLY. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY DISTRESSED AND HIS FIRST WORDS WERE, "I WOULD LIKE TO THINK ABOUT THIS,

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 24409 ~~SECRET~~
AND WILL LET YOU KNOW LATER TODAY." I THEN SAID THAT PRES. PARK WAS ALSO BEING INVITED FOR A MEETING ON TUESDAY. THIEU SAID, "I WOULD LIKE TO MEET THE PRESIDENT'S WISHES, BUT WOULD IT NOT BE BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL WE HAVE THE RESULTS OF THE EXPLORATORY TALKS, THEN WE WOULD BE ABLE TO SEE BETTER WHERE WE STAND? THERE WOULD BE MORE TOPICS TO DISCUSS, AND IT WOULD AVOID THE NECESSITY FOR ANOTHER MEETING."

3. I SAID I THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT WISHES THIS MEETING TO REVIEW THE CURRENT SITUATION IN VIEW OF THE MANY THINGS THAT HAVE HAPPENED IN THESE LAST WEEKS. HE SAID, "YES, I UNDERSTAND AND IT WOULD BE USEFUL. I SAID TODAY IN MY ADDRESS THAT SUCH MEETINGS SHOULD TAKE PLACE FROM TIME TO TIME. BUT THE TIMING OF THIS MEETING IS NOT GOOD FOR ME. I MUST BE FRANK. I AM ABOUT TO REORGANIZE THE GOVERNMENT AND MAKE SOME CHANGES. THIS WILL BE IN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO. IF I GO TO HONOLULU AND THEN ANNOUNCE THESE, I WILL BE CHARGED WITH HAVING MADE THESE CHANGES UNDER ORDERS. THAT IS THE WAY OUR PEOPLE THINK, AND I CANNOT AFFORD IT, ESPECIALLY AT THIS TIME. I HOPE THE PRESIDENT WILL UNDERSTAND."

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

CN: 2579Q
RECD: 5:53A
10 APR 68

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 24409 ~~SECRET~~

4. I SAID I WOULD CONVEY HIS ANSWER TO WASHINGTON, AND WAS SURE THERE WOULD BE FULL UNDERSTANDING OF HIS PROBLEM. HE LOOKED MUCH RELIEVED. HE THEN SAID THAT HIS ORIGINAL DATES OF MAY 15-20 OR LATER FOR THE FORMAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON WERE STILL BEST FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW, BUT, AS HE HAD TOLD AMB. BUNKER, HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO CONSIDER A MEETING EARLIER "SOMEWHERE" IF IT WAS ESSENTIAL.

5. WE WERE SEEING KY IMMEDIATELY AFTER FOR GEN. WESTMORELAND TO REPORT ON HIS TRIP TO WASHINGTON, AND I ASKED THIEU IF HE WISHED ME TO MENTION THIS INVITATION TO KY. HE SAID IT WAS NOT NECESSARY, HE WOULD TAKE IT UP WITH HIM. I CAUTIONED HIM ON THE NEED FOR THE UTMOST SECRECY IN THIS MATTER.

6. COMMENT: THERE WAS NO QUESTION BUT THAT THIEU WAS BEING HONEST. THERE ARE ACTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH TRAN VAN HUONG ABOUT TAKING THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP AND THE RELATED CHANGES IN OTHER CABINET POSITIONS AND POLICIES. THIEU IS IN A HURRY TO MOVE ON THIS FRONT, AND THIS IS ANOTHER REASON WHY HE DOES NOT WANT TO LEAVE AT THIS TIME.

7. OTHER SUBJECTS SEPTTEL.

BERGER

BT

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

46

~~SECRET~~
CROCODILE

Wed., April 10, 1968
8:55 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

If for no other reason, this kind of talk
from Sihanouk should rule out Pnom
Penh (see marked passage).

Walt Rostow

~~SECRET~~ CROCODILE attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By iso, NARA Date 1-15-99



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

46a

R 100748Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6530
STATE GRNC
BT

CN-2551
April 10, 1968
4:25 a.m.

~~SECRET~~ BANGKOK 13005

NODIS/CROCODILE

REFS: (A) STATE 143835 (B) BANGKOK 12945

1. DCM HAD OPPORTUNITY THIS MORNING TO BRIEF FOREIGN MINISTER THANAT ON REF A. REFERRING TO AMBASSADOR'S CONVERSATION YESTERDAY (REF B), DCM NOTED THAT WE HAVE SENT A MESSAGE SETTING FORTH THE DIFFICULTIES PRESENTED BY PHNOM PENH AND SUGGESTING OTHER REGIONAL SITES. DCM ALSO MENTIONED TO THANAT DRV'S PROPOSAL OF INITIAL CONTACTS AT END OF THE WEEK IF PHNOM PENH AGREED UPON.

2. THANAT ACCEPTED THE MESSAGE CALMLY, ASKING HOW WE HAD RESPONDED TO DRV PROPOSAL FOR INITIAL CONTACTS AT THE END OF THIS

PAGE 2 RUMTBK 13005K ~~SECRET~~

WEEK. DCM EXPLAINED THAT SINCE DRV PROPOSAL RE TIMING WAS CONTINGENT ON U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF PHNOM PENH, IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR US TO COMMENT ON DRV TIMING SINCE SUBSTANCE OF OUR MESSAGE CONSISTED OF OUR OBJECTION TO PHNOM PENH.

3. THANAT REITERATED SOME OF THE SAME STRONG AND NEGATIVE VIEWS REGARDING PHNOM PENH WHICH HE HAD EXPRESSED YESTERDAY TO THE AMBASSADOR. HE NOTED THAT PHNOM PENH WOULD NOT PROVIDE A SUITABLE ATMOSPHERE BECAUSE SIHANOUK, IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS, WOULD BE CONSISTENTLY EXPLOITING THE TALKS TO OUR DISADVANTAGE. DCM REITERATED THAT WE ALSO WERE OPPOSED TO PHNOM PENH AND WERE SEEKING ANOTHER SITE.

4. COMMENT: THANAT'S CONCERN REGARDING SIHANOUK'S PROBABLY EXPLOITATION OF THE TALKS TO OUR DISADVANTAGE SEEMS TO BE BORNE OUT BY SIHANOUK'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 8 AS REPORTED BY AFP PHNOM PENH (PARIS 12462), IN WHICH SIHANOUK SAYS QUOTE NATURALLY WE WILL NOT INTERVENE IN THEIR TALKS UNQUOTE, BUT PROCEEDS IN THE NEXT BREATH TO SAY THAT QUOTE HANOI WILL DEMAND A TOTAL HALT TO THESE BONDINGS AND IF WASHINGTON REFUSES TO PLAY STRAIGHT THERE WILL BE NO OTHER CONVERSATION UNQUOTE.

GP-1. UNGER
BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-269

~~SECRET~~

By is, NARA Date 10-7-99

Pres. file

INFORMATIO

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wed., April 10, 1968
8:50 a. m.

47

MR. PRESIDENT:

These two VC IV Corps items are
of interest.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

47a

Extract from [REDACTED]

25X1A

Subject: Situation in the Provinces of IV Corps as of 1300 Hours on 10 Apr. 1968

"2. [REDACTED]

25X1C

members of the VC 306th Regional main force battalion in Vinh Long province, reportedly told the people in Phouc Hau village, Chau Thanh district, that the regional main force battalions received orders not to launch any major operations until they received orders from the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN). This was supposedly done because of the prospects for peace negotiations.

"3. The Viet Cong in Bac Lieu province have been explaining President Johnson's speech halting the bombing in North Vietnam and withdrawing from the Presidential race in the following manner according to information received from the provincial reconnaissance unit. The Viet Cong are saying that the Tet offensive demoralized the American people and lowered their confidence in the President and his government. The President, knowing this situation and realizing that he would be defeated if he sought reelection, therefore withdrew from the race. The bombing halt was announced, according to the Viet Cong, because it has proven a failure and the American people were against its continuation. The Viet Cong also state that the bombing halt will be advantageous to them because North Vietnam will be able to increase its efforts to send arms and ammunition to the South and thus make it easy to win a quick victory over the allied forces."

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-019-032-2-3-4

SANITIZED

Authority NLT 019-032-2-3
By ga, NARA, Date 1/15/02

Pres file

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

Wed. April 10, 1968
8:50 a. m.

48

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-362
By Cb, NARA, Date 5-12-95

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Park accepts Tuesday and under-
stands no-leak requirement.

Walt Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

(6)

48a

OO RUEHC
DE RUALOS 5590E 1010335 2526Q
ZNY SSSSS ZZH 1968 APR 9 PM 10.53
O 100330Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 5590

N O D I S

REF: STATE 144252

1. PRESIDENT PARK WELCOMED MESSAGE CONTAINED REFTTEL. HE WISHES TO REARRANGE HIS OWN SCHEDULE AND WILL INFORM ME TOMORROW MORNING IN CONNECTION WITH PROPOSAL FOR MEETING NEXT TUESDAY.
2. IN DELIVERING MESSAGE I EMPHASIZED ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR COMPLETE SECRECY AND REQUESTED THAT KOREAN ADVANCE PARTY NOW IN HONOLULU RETURN TO KOREA TODAY AS PLANNED. POINTED OUT THEIR CONTINUED STAY THERE WOULD GIVE RISE TO PRESS SPECULATION WHICH MUST BE AVOIDED. KOREANS DID NOT DEMUR.

GP-3. PORTER
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-367
By ing, NARA, Date 2-7-94

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Wed., Apr. 10, 1968
8:45 a.m.

49

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Sullivan delivers the mail to
a somewhat disappointed North Vietnamese.

W. Rostow
W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 4-29-92



Department of State

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM

49a 5

DR RUMJFS 5741 1010513
ZNY. SSSSS ZZH
Z 100443Z APR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7987
STATE GRNC
BT

CN-2530
April 10, 1968
12:25 a.m.

~~SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 5741

NODIS/CROCODILE

REF A. STATE 143725
B. STATE 144250

1. I DELIVERED LETTER CONTAINING ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEXT NOTE CONTAINED REF A TO MY NORTH VIETNAMESE COLLEAGUE AT 1030 LOCAL TIME APRIL 10. IN HANDING HIM THE NOTE, I TRANSLATED ENGLISH PORTION ORALLY INTO FRENCH. HE THANKED ME, BUT ASKED IF I COULD ALSO PROVIDE HIM A WRITTEN "UNOFFICIAL" TRANSLATION. I UNDER TOOK TO DO SO, AND ONE IS CURRENTLY BEING DONE, WHICH WILL REACH HIM BEFORE NOON LOCAL TIME.

PAGE 2 RUMJFS 5741 ~~SECRET~~

2. I ALSO ADDED, SAYING THAT I WAS DOING SO UNDER INSTRUCTIONS, THE INFORMATION AND THE "ASSUMPTION" ABOUT RESIDENT AMBASSADOR CONTAINED REF B. CHAN ACKNOWLEDGED THESE OBSERVATIONS AND HAD NGUYEN CON MAKE NOTES ON IT.

3. CHAN THEN ASSURED ME THAT HE WOULD SEND A MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY TO HANOI. HOWEVER, HE ADDED THAT HIS MEANS OF COMMUNICATION WERE NOT VERY EFFICIENT (PAY TRES EFFICACES). HE WOULD LET ME KNOW WHEN HE RECEIVED AN ANSWER.

4. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH CHAN MUST HAVE ASSUMED THAT WE WOULD PROBABLY REJECT PHNOM PENH, HE SEEMED A LITTLE CRESTFALLEN WHEN HE ACTUALLY GOT THE NEWS. ASIDE FROM THIS NUANCE, HE HAD NO RPT NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT ON THE MESSAGE.

GP-2. SULLIVAN
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-269
By us, NARA Date 10-7-98

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

50

~~SECRET--CODEWORD--SENSITIVE~~

Wednesday, April 10, 1968 -- 8:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

This NSA report on intercepts is interesting.

As you know, the enemy is not in very good position around Saigon although he can harass; nor, in my judgment, is he in very good position around Hue where our fellows have been going out and keeping him off balance.

The one place where Westy thought he might attack soon and where we had indications that he would attack about April 6 was in the Western Highlands: Kontum-Pleiku-Ban Me Thout.

Now we have the following report: "Because it is possible that N-Day (the Vietnamese equivalent of D-Day) will be postponed for a fairly long period of time in order to very definitely guarantee victory, you are to send the weapons and ammunition back one day to the west and select a secure and concealed position to bivouac."

This could relate to negotiations; but, if it does, negotiations, in turn, relate to the fact that their military position is poor and they are pretty sure that if they attacked under present circumstances, they would make a bad job of it. If it does relate to negotiations, the enemy is also keeping that fact from his own troops -- still talking of "victory" to them.

Now we must watch closely what happens around Saigon and Hue where I am sure they will continue to harass the roads and make their presence felt; but whether they do more must have a question mark around it.

You will have noted from today's operational reports that we are keeping on the offensive and capturing caches of weapons in all four Corps areas.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NJL/RAC 00-321
By Sj NARA, Date 2-6-03

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

50a

RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 APR 9 22 13

00 [REDACTED] B755REA536
DE [REDACTED] 1002127
O 092124Z ZYH
FM DIRNSA
TO OSCAR/VICTOR ALFA
USM-604
GCU 1 AUSTF
WHITE HOUSE
ZEM
SECRET SAVIN
2/0/ [REDACTED] R173-68, F.U. NO 1 TO 2/0 [REDACTED] R166-68

3.3(b)(1)

FOLLOW-UP NR 1 TO
VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PLANS FOR COORDINATED ATTACKS
POSSIBLY POSTPONED (052317Z)

FURTHER EVIDENCE OF A POSTPONEMENT IN VIETNAMESE
COMMUNIST GENERAL ATTACK PLANS, AT LEAST IN CERTAIN AREAS OF
THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS MILITARY REGION 5, WAS REVEALED IN MESSAGES
OF 4, 7, AND 8 APRIL PASSED FROM THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
SECTION (MIS) OF THE PAVN 1ST DIVISION TO A SUBORDINATE.
ON 7 AND 8 APRIL THE MIS STATED: " BECAUSE IT IS POSSIBLE
THAT N-DAY ((THE
VIETNAMESE EQUIVALENT OF D-DAY)) WILL BE POSTPONED FOR A
FAIRLY LONG PERIOD OF TIME IN ORDER TO VERY DEFINITELY
GUARANTEE VICTORY, YOU ARE TO SEND THE WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION
BACK ONE DAY TO THE WEST AND SELECT A SECURE AND CONCEALED
POSITION TO BIVOUAC."

EARLIER INDICATIONS OF A POSTPONEMENT WERE NOTED ON
4 APRIL WHEN THE MIS STATED: "IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE FIRST
BATTLE, WHICH PREVIOUSLY WAS SCHEDULED FOR THE AFTERNOON OF
6 APRIL, WILL BE POSTPONED." THE MIS AND THIS SUBORDINATE
REAPPEARED IN COMMUNICATIONS ON 2 APRIL AFTER BEING INACTIVE
SINCE 8 MARCH. THE SUBORDINATE IS CURRENTLY UNLOCATED;
THE MIS IS LOCATED ABOUT 30 KM WEST OF KONTUM CITY.
420

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

NNNN

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 03-199
By us NARA, Date 3-1-24

Wednesday - April 10, 1968

51

Mr. President:

The attached message congratulates the Czechs' new Premier -- sworn in yesterday.

[Handwritten signature]
2. Pres file

Your congratulatory message several days ago to President Svoboda was mentioned publicly in the Czechoslovak press and was helpful, I am sure, as an indication of American responsiveness to the new Czech leadership.

W. W. Rostow

approved 4/10/68

WWR:ND:gg

51a

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE
TO PREMIER CERNIK

Excellency:

I extend to you cordial congratulations on your
appointment as Premier of the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Literally Eyes Only and Amb. Buzar
LDX to State Secretariat/for William Bundy / April 18, 1968
from Walt Rostow

52

The President wishes the reply to Thieu to be as follows:

"We understand President Thieu's reservation about coming at a moment prior to his appointment of a new Prime Minister. We would wish to do nothing to complicate his problems.

"If this decision could be made soon, the President would be glad to see him in Honolulu as late as Wednesday, or even Thursday, April 17 or 18. Could he let us know as soon as possible if those days might be suitable?

"The President thought that an early discussion between the two Presidents might be helpful. President Johnson could give him an authoritative picture of his own intentions over the coming nine months and of the situation in the United States. This is a crucial time for such discussions; but, again, we wish to do nothing to increase President Thieu's problems."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By iso, NARA Date 1-15-99

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ACTION

Limited Official Use

Wednesday - April 10, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Punta del Este Anniversary Messages to Latin American Presidents

On April 3 you agreed to send messages on the OAS Summit anniversary (April 14) to your Latin American colleagues who were at Punta del Este reviewing the progress made on the Summit Action Program and the advances in their respective countries under the Alliance for Progress.

State has prepared almost identical messages to each chief of state (except Ecuador because Arosemena did not sign up, Haiti because Duvalier did not attend, and Panama where we still have two governments) with a tailor-made paragraph on their national accomplishments. I enclose, as a sample, the message to Brazilian President Costa e Silva.

Rather than have you go through all of these basically similar messages, I recommend you approve the sample and authorize me to okay the remainder after careful review of the national accomplishments paragraph.

W. W. Rostow

Approve sample message
and authorize okaying the
others _____

Prefer to see each one _____

Call me _____

Attachment - Sample message (Brazil).

Limited Official Use Proposed Presidential Message
to
Brazilian President Costa e Silva

Dear Mr. President:

One year has passed since we met in Punta del Este to discuss with the other American Presidents and the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago what we could do to intensify our common efforts under the Alliance for Progress and move more quickly toward our goal of bringing a better, more productive life to all peoples of our Hemisphere. Throughout the past year, we have often been reminded that great achievements can only come from great effort, mutual respect and understanding, and the workings of that most valuable dimension -- time. On this first anniversary of our meeting, I believe that we have made an auspicious beginning in carrying out our pledge to accelerate development efforts in the Hemisphere. By moving immediately to turn words into deeds, our peoples have again demonstrated their confidence that we can achieve our goals as long as we continue to work together.

The Inter-American Cultural Council has prepared a regional plan, and pledged financial support, to modernize teaching methods and to harness modern science and technology to our hemispheric

development efforts. We have signed a new and stronger International Coffee Agreement; established a Coffee Diversification Fund; and founded the Inter-American Export Promotion Center to stabilize and increase Latin America's earnings from foreign trade. The six per cent increase in food production during 1967 is an important first step toward making Latin American farms produce the abundance of which they are capable. We have increased the resources of the Inter-American Development Bank by \$400 million and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration by \$35 million to enable those institutions to help finance the construction of vast transportation, power and communications networks, which we agreed were vital to prepare the way for economic integration. In 1967 alone, the Inter-American Development Bank extended almost half a billion dollars in loans, by far the greatest total since its inception. You and your colleagues in the Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Association, among other actions, have established a consultative group as a first step toward the ultimate merger of your trading areas into the Latin American Common Market.

In the amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed at Buenos Aires in February of last year, we have already provided for a strengthening of the structure of our regional Organization so it may more fully serve the great goals of the Alliance for Progress. The United States is now completing its procedures for the ratification of these amendments. Meanwhile, we can note with pleasure the significant strengthening of the Inter-American Cultural Council, in the spirit of the Charter amendments.

I congratulate you and all Brazilians on the further development work you have done in your own country since our meeting at Punta del Este. Your progress in recent months in the continuing battle against inflation is especially encouraging. I am also pleased to see evidence of resumed economic growth in Brazil over the past year. Let me join you in the hope that Brazil will continue to show further progress on both fronts during 1968. Your actions in the field of agriculture to expand the price support program and provide more adequate credit facilities have given a real stimulus to increased Brazilian production of basic foodstuffs, and your courageous program to reduce government operating costs should make further resources available

for agriculture and for other critical sectors such as education. I am also happy to note the measures you have taken to increase exports of Brazilian manufactured products and the rapid growth of your exports this past year.

Through these and other actions, we have begun the great task set for our nations in the Action Program adopted at Punta del Este last year. The advances we have already made have shown the world once again that Americans know how to work together in peace. On behalf of the people of the United States, I reaffirm our unwavering resolve to support your continuing efforts and wish you and your people well during the increasingly active and challenging years ahead.

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency

Arthur da Costa e Silva

President of the Republic of Brazil

Brasilia.

DRAFT
WGB:mm
(4-10-68)

54a

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT
for
LATIN AMERICAN CEREMONY

Secretary General Mora, Dr. Herrera, Dr. Sanz, Distinguished
Ambassadors, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am always pleased to welcome friends and neighbors from our
hemisphere to this house. Whatever may be our preoccupations
elsewhere in the world, I maintain paramount interest in the
well-being of our own neighborhood.

This morning I add two more links to the chain of United States
cooperation with the Governments of Latin America:

- ratification of the protocol of amendments to the Charter
of the Organisation of American States; and
- signature of a bill adding \$411 million to the resources of
the Inter-American Bank.

Both signify the United States commitment to a vigorous inter-
American system and a vital Alliance for Progress.

The advance of our regional organization -- like all human activity -- has run in stages. The cycle of innovation and consolidation repeats itself, in response to changing needs and circumstances.

These cycles have run in 20-year periods. I recall how hard Latin America pressed the principle of non-intervention at the Inter-American Conference in 1928. Acceptance of the principle by President Roosevelt paved the way for spectacular advances in the juridical and security fields, culminating in the Rio Treaty and Bogota Charter in 1948.

During the past two decades the focus has been on the economic and social. Here the gains -- from Operation Pan America to the Alliance for Progress -- have been equally dramatic:

- an Inter-American Development Bank now lending at an annual rate of over one-half billion dollars.
- a Central American Common Market which increased intra-regional trade by over 400%.
- a free trade association among the South American States

and Mexico that has boosted their exports by ____ million dollars.

-- an Alliance for Progress which in seven years has invested ____ billion dollars in domestic and foreign resources in the development of Latin America.

In 1968 we are on the threshold of a dynamic new phase with new leadership, new instruments and new priorities.

Next month Dr. Galo Plaza of Ecuador assumes the Secretary Generalship of the OAS succeeding our trusted and good friend Dr. Mora. In his long tenure, Dr. Mora has overseen the consolidation of the gains of the past and the innovations which will guide the hemisphere's efforts for the next period. Dr. Plaza enters at a time of unequalled challenge -- and opportunity.

The structure of the OAS has been streamlined to make it more responsive to the needs of the Governments.

The Alliance for Progress has been extended beyond its original

time frame, in frank recognition that the task is not for a decade but for a generation.

The Action Program of Punta del Este fixed the priorities for what we must do to create a better life in freedom for the billion human beings who will inhabit our hemisphere by the year 2000.

That program rests on three pillars: higher agricultural production, better education, closer integration. I am encouraged by the beginnings:

- a 6% increase in food production in 1967 was twice the rate of new mouths to be fed;
- the hemisphere's top scientists and educators have agreed on how best to harness science and technology to education and development;
- the integration movement has been spurred by new energies with fresh approaches.

At Punta del Este my fellow Presidents and I called for a bold plan to overcome the natural barriers to Latin American physical unity.

Your countries have too long been isolated from each other -- divided by high mountain ranges, deep rain forests and forbidding deserts. (Review maps showing topography and concentration of people in coastal areas and vast unpopulated areas in the interior.)

Locked behind these barriers are vast resources which can help fulfill the American promise of opportunity and prosperity for all your peoples. (Review map showing concentration of national resources.)

The new frontiers of the South American heartland beckon those imaginative enough, daring enough, determined enough to penetrate. A start has already been made by some governments. The Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress and the Inter-American Development Bank have done initial planning. I ask whether the time has not come to prepare a blueprint for systematically carrying forward this gigantic enterprise -- an enterprise capable of binding a continent with roads and river systems, power grids and pipelines, transport and tele-communications. (Review map showing integration projects now underway against map showing the potential for new projects.)

To this end, I suggest to my fellow Presidents and those who direct our Alliance for Progress institutions the establishment

of a high-level task force, under the leadership of a distinguished Latin American, to prepare a five-year plan for speeding up the physical integration of our hemisphere. The United States will lend its fullest cooperation.

My thirty-seven years in public life have spanned the last two cycles in the evolution of our inter-American system. Throughout these four decades I have labored to strengthen our ties and make the Americas a show-case of what men of goodwill working in freedom can accomplish.

I recall one instance in the fall of 1960, when the alliance for economic and social development was beginning to take shape. President Eisenhower wanted Congressional approval to make the first major contribution to a regional social progress trust fund. He sought my help as Senate Majority Leader. Four days from receipt of that request, Under Secretary of the Treasury Dillon pledged \$500 million to the "Committee of 21" meeting in Bogota.

But the final verdict of what I have tried to do for our hemisphere I leave to the historians. As President, I have carried forward in the tradition of two of my distinguished predecessors: the Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Alliance for Progress of John F. Kennedy.

I am proud of what your countries and mine have accomplished together:

Despite some setbacks, democracy is stronger and political stability more secure. Free democratic elections in many of your countries attest to this fact, as do the gains in civil rights in the United States.

Communist subversion has been checked. You have frustrated the designs of the guerrillas and terrorists. You would have preferred to invest the scarce resources spent on internal security on development, but this is the price of freedom.

Latin American economic growth has accelerated and self-help increased. The annual average per capita growth

in GNP has risen from 1.0% in the years 1960-1963 to 2.4% from 1964-1967. At the start of the Alliance, it was expected that some 80% of the total investment would come from Latin America. You have contributed 87%.

Major gains have been made in institutional development.

Savings and loans institutions have increased 25%, credit unions by 175% and agricultural cooperatives by ____%. A new generation of technicians and managers trained in modern methods are bringing reform and higher efficiency in industry and government.

The mechanism of inter-American cooperation has been

modernized and strengthened. The OAS Charter has been streamlined. The Alliance for Progress has moved from the trial-and-error organizational phase to one of sustained action through established institutions.

The United States commitment to the Alliance for Progress

has been fully met and extended. In 1965 I announced that the United States would support the Alliance beyond 1970. Since July 1964, United States economic assistance to Latin

America has totalled \$3934 million -- an increase of 19% over the previous three years. Assistance from the international lending institutions reached \$2124 -- an increase of 44%.

I said after the Punta del Este Meeting that the Alliance for Progress is "a task not for sprinters but for long-distance runners". To win this relay, we must set the pace and hold to it. The Presidents last year set that pace. I will maintain it as long as it is my turn to carry the baton. I trust that my colleagues will do likewise -- as well as those chosen to carry on the race.

CONFIDENTIAL

Donnell
Pres. file 54
ACTION

Wednesday - April 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ceremony on Latin America

We can build an impressive Latin American ceremony next week around your launching the idea of a blue ribbon Inter-American Task Force on Physical Integration. The Johnsonian dimension to the Alliance for Progress is integration. The Task Force concept reinforces that dimension.

As I explained in the scenario I sent you last week, it is important to have the launching before the Inter-American Bank's Board of Governors meets next on April 22 in Bogota, Colombia. Following your statement, we can get:

- Colombian President Lleras to give the idea a big boost when he addresses the Bank Governors.
- The Governors to put the Bank behind it.
- CIAP to give its blessing when it convenes on April 29.
- The Inter-American Economic and Social Council to set up the Task Force in June.
- Further identification by you with the Task Force between June and January 20.

Furthermore, the ceremony can be dressed up if Mike Manatos can get the Senate to pass the pending bill authorizing \$411 million of callable capital for the Inter-American Bank and approve Ed Clark's nomination to the Bank. Then you could sign the ratification instrument to the OAS Charter amendments and the Bank bill and introduce Ed Clark to the Latin American community.

Your statement could focus on the dramatic possibilities for physical integration and what has been accomplished in the inter-American field

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Authority DLJ 94-171
By gwl/imp NARA, Date 6-5-97

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-2-

during your administration. We can arrange a series of large maps for you to illustrate how Latin America can be unified with roads, power lines, transport and communications. The first draft of a statement is at Tab A.

In your note to Mike Manatos you indicated willingness to proceed with a ceremony. I suggest we plan for next Wednesday (April 17).

Approve ceremony
for April 17 _____

Prefer another time _____

Call me _____.

DeVier Pierson tells me you have asked him to arrange an appointment with IDB President Felipe Herrera. You could combine the visit with the ceremony, taking him and Ed Clark to one side after it is over.

Combine Herrera
visit with ceremony _____

Prefer separate
appointment _____

Call me _____.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Tab A - Draft Statement for Ceremony on April 17.

cc - Mike Manatos
DeVier Pierson
Jim Jones

MR. PRESIDENT:

April 9, 1968

55

Here are the questions I would put to the group at 2:15 p.m. today:

Pres. file

1. Are we all agreed on the draft instructions for Governor Harriman? (attached)
2. Are we all agreed that Phom Penh is not a "suitable" place for contacts; and that we should insist on a mutually suitable spot?
3. Are we agreed that, without permitting a veto on the ultimate U.S. position, we should stretch to the limit to consult as well as to inform our allies, notably the GVN, on the course of contacts and negotiations?
4. Are we agreed that we should not permit the contacts to end and "substantive talks to begin" until we had at least put Hanoi on notice that the San Antonio formula still stands and that we intend to act subsequently in terms of that formula?
5. Are we agreed that it is our interest to press U.S. forces and ARVN forces into as sustained an offensive as they can mount?
6. Are we agreed that we should modernize the ARVN and do all we can to strengthen the political hand of the GVN in South Vietnam.
7. Are we agreed that we should encourage the GVN to begin its own serious staff work addressed to the key issues which might arise in the course of the negotiations and to maintain a dialogue with them on those issues even before they may arise for actual decision in negotiations?
8. What leverage, if any, do we have on Moscow to induce the USSR to play a constructive role in the negotiating process if it should begin?
9. Since the political position in the U.S. with respect to Vietnam appears to be a major factor in Hanoi's calculations, what can we do to make them feel that it would be wiser to achieve what we would regard as an honorable settlement soon rather than late?

I would close by asking Ambassador Bunker to make any comments to the group that he cared to make and ask for comments on Ambassador Bunker's paper on negotiations which your senior advisers will have read.

Walt Rostow

April 9, 1968
2:00p

wwk:mf

Tuesday, April 9, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your approval is a brief joint statement for issuance following your meeting with Chancellor Klaus. It was drafted by State and Austrian Foreign Minister Waldheim and has been approved by Chancellor Klaus.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

MWG:mm

D R A F T

56a

JOINT STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON
AND CHANCELLOR KLAUS FOLLOWING
DISCUSSIONS HELD IN WASHINGTON, D.C.
APRIL 10, 1968

President Johnson and Austrian Chancellor Klaus conferred at the White House on the morning of April 10.

The President and the Chancellor had a broad exchange of views on the international situation. Developments in South-east Asia were reviewed and hope was expressed that an equitable solution to the present conflict would be reached. The Middle East question was also discussed. The Chancellor reviewed the situation in Europe with emphasis on Austria's relationship with her neighbors and with the members of the European Communities. The President and the Chancellor stressed the essential role of the United Nations in the maintenance of peace. They also agreed that the proposed Non-Proliferation Treaty would greatly strengthen the foundations of peace and would be a significant step toward

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D R A F T

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- 2 -

halting the arms race and the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

The President and the Chancellor underlined the common desire of their countries to create an atmosphere of co-operation and to bring about relaxation of tensions all over the world. The importance of strengthening the international monetary system and of promoting international trade was also discussed. To this end it was agreed that international cooperation will continue to be necessary.

The President and the Chancellor expressed great satisfaction over the excellent relations between the United States and Austria. They agreed that high-level consultations greatly contribute to further strengthening the existing friendship between the two countries.

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Tuesday, April 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Sale of Automotive Equipment to the USSR

Commerce, with the concurrence of State and Defense, is preparing to license \$8.9 million of gear cutting, testing and measuring machines for the automotive plant Fiat is building in the USSR. The machinery is made by the Gleason Works of Rochester, New York.

The reasons for licensing this equipment are:

- CIA and Defense say it is not strategic and does not involve problems of new or advanced technology. They are sure it will in fact be used in the manufacture of Fiat cars.
- The sale will not disrupt defense priorities at the Gleason plant.
- Comparable equipment is readily available from Switzerland and West Germany. They will make the sale if we don't.
- Financing is all private. No U. S. Government credit or guaranty facilities are involved.
- We licensed similar machinery made by the same firm in 1966 for use in a Soviet-built automotive plant.

You should know, however, that protests will probably follow approval of the license. We expect adverse reaction from those members of Congress who have consistently opposed this trade. Commerce does not plan to issue a press release but it is preparing a statement of facts to answer inquiries. The Ashley Subcommittee on International Trade of the House Banking and Currency Committee will be informed.

This is a clear case of advantageous peaceful trade with the USSR. The Fiat plant will have a political impact in the USSR that is in our national interest. Furthermore, the sale is a net gain for our balance of payments.

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By SP, NARA, Date 1/15/02

W. W. Rostow

ERF
ERF:mst

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Tuesday, April 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Austrian Chancellor Josef Klaus
Wednesday, April 10, 12:00 p.m.

At Tab A are Nick Katsenbach's briefing memorandum and talking points for your meeting with Austrian Chancellor Klaus.

Our relations with Austria are good. There are no major bilateral problems.

Klaus is in political difficulty at home. His People's Party which took office in 1966 following twenty years of coalition government with the Socialists is under attack because of an economic slump and growing unemployment.

Neutrality, based on the 1955 State Treaty, is the keystone of Austria's foreign policy. Klaus requested this visit to the U.S. to counterbalance his recent trips to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. He hopes to have wide-ranging talks with you on broad international issues.

East-West Relations: We have been encouraging Austria's active bridge building policy. You may wish to:

- Ask Klaus for his assessment of developments in this area;
- Tell him of our continuing interest in improving East-West relations.

Europe and the Atlantic Community: Austria's application for associate membership in the European Community has been blocked by Italy as a result of the South Tirol dispute. It is opposed by the Soviet Union on grounds it would be tantamount to union with Germany. You may wish to:

- Assure Klaus we support a strong unified Western Europe;

- Ask him how Austria views its future role in the Western European unification movement.

Vietnam: The Austrian government's official position is that it neither supports nor opposes U.S. policy in Vietnam. Klaus has privately expressed support for our Vietnam policy. He would greatly appreciate hearing your views on current prospects.

Middle East: Austria participates in the UN observer force in Suez and has contributed military and medical units for the UN operations in Cyprus. Klaus hopes to hear your views on the Middle East.

Balance of Payments: Klaus will probably tell you he is worried our balance of payments will hurt Austria but that Austria wants to be helpful. You may wish to tell him:

- We are determined to keep the dollar strong.
- The impact of our balance of payments measures on Austria is likely to be small.
- We welcome continued Austrian cooperation in our common effort to strengthen the international monetary and trading system.

Non Proliferation Treaty: You may wish to tell Klaus we hope Austria will support the draft NPT at the resumed session of the United Nations General Assembly.

South Tirol: Austria's principal foreign policy problem is her dispute with Italy concerning the South Tirol. Klaus may give you a report. We maintain a policy of strict neutrality.

Klaus will be accompanied by Foreign Minister Waldheim and Austrian Ambassador Lemberger.

Walt Stoessel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Ambassador Douglas MacArthur will be here from State. I will be standing by with Ed Fried.


MWC:mm

W. W. Rostow

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

58a

April 7, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Dr. Josef Klaus,
Federal Chancellor of the Republic
of Austria, April 10, 1968, 12 Noon.

This is Chancellor Klaus' first official visit to the United States, although he has visited unofficially three times (the last time was in 1965 when, as Chancellor, he came to address the General Assembly). He arrived in New York on April 6 and will leave from Los Angeles on April 17 for a visit to Japan. You met and talked briefly with him at Adenauer's funeral.

Klaus admires the United States greatly and is sympathetic and understanding of our Viet-Nam problem.

The visit is at the Chancellor's request. Last year he visited Moscow, Bucharest, Sofia, and Budapest. The purpose of his present trip is to demonstrate that Austria maintains a balanced position between East and West. Although Austria is committed by its own legislation to neutrality, Klaus is pro-Western in outlook and has done a good job for the West on his Eastern European visits. It would be useful to have his view on what is going on in Eastern Europe and to talk with him about your bridge-building policies. Foreign Minister Waldheim, who will be with the Chancellor, had some interesting talks in Moscow and Prague only two weeks ago, so you may want to ask him about his trip.

There are no major bilateral problems, although the Chancellor may mention our present balance of payments proposals, and the Austrian reaction thereto. Klaus will

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Authority State Dept. Austria Guidelines

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By fw/ing NARA. Date 6-2-97

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-2-

be particularly interested in your thinking on U.S-European relations. He will also want to have your estimate of the situation in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

Walt Stoessel (Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs) and Doug MacArthur will be there from State. The Austrian Ambassador, Ernst Lemberger, will accompany Klaus and Waldheim.

Talking points and a biographic sketch are enclosed.


Acting Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Talking points.
2. Biographic sketch.

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

58b

TALKING POINTS

Topics You May Wish to Raise:

Presidential Opener

- I'm sorry I was not able to meet with you when you were here in 1965. I'm glad to have this chance to talk with you now about our common problems and interests.
- It is good that there are no important bilateral issues between us.

U.S.-European Relations

- We remain solidly committed to Europe. Our interests coincide and our basic objectives are the same.
- Our current difficulties in Southeast Asia have not weakened our ties with Europe. Carrying out our commitments in Southeast Asia is important to Europe.
- We want a strong and unified Europe. For this reason, we do not support limited trade arrangements between developed European countries and the EEC which do not lead to full political membership. But I know that Austria is a special case because of its self-imposed neutrality. We are, therefore, willing to give sympathetic consideration to Austria's problem.

East-West Affairs

- History, geography, and acceptance by both blocs as an independent neutral give Austria a unique position for encouraging liberalization in Eastern Europe. Austria's contributions to relaxation of tensions have already been great.

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By Julia NARA, Date 6-2-97

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-2-

East-West Affairs (cont'd)

- I hope you will be able to continue to keep us informed of your contacts and assessments.
- Increased knowledge and understanding between peoples and leaders in East and West will aid in lessening tension and contributing to peace. But bridge-building in itself cannot bring about a lasting peace, although it can help ease tensions and prepare the way for discussion of the basic issues dividing us.
- The United States would, of course, expect to participate fully in any European security conference. We very much appreciate the fact that Austria supports us in this view.
- I would be interested in hearing about your visit to Eastern Europe last year, and about Foreign Minister Waldheim's recent trip to Moscow and Prague.

Viet-Nam

- (Austria has been much more steadfast in its support for U.S. policies in Viet-Nam than many other European countries. Klaus has privately expressed support for us, although publicly he has remained silent. He has steadfastly refused to call for a cessation of the bombing in the North, despite heavy Communist pressure.)

Middle East

- The Chancellor has also said he would like your assessment of the present situation in the Middle East. (Austria has provided military and hospital units for Cyprus, and has a small contingent of observers at Suez.)

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-3-

Topics Chancellor Klaus May Raise:

Balance of Payments

Klaus will probably tell you that he is worried that our balance of payments measures (particularly those aimed at restricting tourism) may hurt Austria. He may also say that Austria wants to be helpful (we have had reports that the Austrian cabinet agreed to advance Kennedy Round tariff cuts).

Proposed Reply:

- Our travel measures are still under Congressional consideration, but the impact on Austria should be small.
- We are aware of European concern and interest in our balance of payments measures, and are glad that most of them see the need for cooperation.

South Tyrol

Klaus may want to report latest developments on efforts to reach an agreement with Italy to settle the problem of South Tyrol, which has been an irritant between the two countries for many years.

Proposed Reply:

- We believe this is a bilateral matter between Italy and Austria, and that the U. S. should not get involved. We hope that both countries will be able to reach an early settlement.

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58c

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH
JOSEF KLAUS - CHANCELLOR OF AUSTRIA

Klaus was born in August 1910 in Austria. He studied law and political science, and received a Doctor of Law degree at Vienna in 1934. Soon after, he became secretary to the President of the Austrian Trade Union Federation. He was reportedly dismissed from this post in 1938 because he did not join the Nazi Party.

Klaus was drafted into the German Army in 1939 and served on both the eastern and western fronts until captured by American forces in 1945.

Klaus worked as an attorney until 1948. He joined the People's Party and became Governor of Salzburg in 1949.

He entered the Federal Cabinet as Finance Minister in 1961 but resigned his portfolio two years later when the Cabinet refused to accept his policies. In 1963 he was elected Chairman of the People's Party and in 1964 became Chancellor of the People's Party-Socialist coalition government. His Party achieved majority control following the 1966 elections.

Klaus plays a key role in foreign affairs and personally endorses all foreign policy initiatives or decisions. He believes Austria is spiritually, culturally, and economically a part of the West, despite its political and military neutrality. He is friendly toward the United States.

Klaus has visited the United States three times. During his 1965 visit he saw the Vice President and Secretary Rusk. He did not see the President, who was unavailable during this brief trip.

Klaus' main strengths lie in his energy and clear understanding of a wide range of political and economic issues. His major weakness lies in the area of public relations.

Klaus has a deep interest in cultural affairs, is a connoisseur of music and art, and an enthusiastic skier and mountain climber.

Klaus is apparently reluctant to remain on as either Party Chairman or Chancellor after the 1970 elections. However, he does have ambitions for the Presidency of the Republic and will probably be a candidate in the 1971 Presidential elections.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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58d

APR 3 1968

TO: The Acting Secretary

THROUGH:

S/S *pub*

FROM:

EUR - John M. Leddy *JML*

SUBJECT: Briefing Memorandum for the President for
His Meeting with Dr. Josef Klaus, Federal
Chancellor of the Republic of Austria,
April 10, 1968, 12 Noon

Discussion

There is attached a briefing memorandum for the President for his meeting with Chancellor Klaus of Austria on April 10.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum.

Attachments:

Memorandum for the President
with enclosures.

W
EUR/AIS:WStabler:emt 4/2/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY *W* ON 4-29-92

VZCZCEAA219
00 WTE3
DE WTE 1237

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH80778

UNCLAS

1968 APR 9⁴² 23 41

Let 6:41 PM

59

Pres file

APRIL 9, 1968

THE FOLLOWING LETTER TO YOU FROM RICK PAYNES, A YOUNG ABLE NEGRO FORMERLY ON MY STAFF, IS WORTH YOUR CONSIDERATION. I AM GIVING COPIES TO HARRY AND JOE.

THE HONORABLE
LYNDON B. JOHNSON
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

WHEN I RESIGNED FROM THE STAFF OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL TWO YEARS AGO, MANY PEOPLE ASKED ME WHY I WISHED TO ABANDON A CAREER IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS FOR ONE IN RACE RELATIONS. MY ANSWER THEN HAD FAR LESS MEANING TO MOST THAN IT DOES NOW: I AM DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DETERIORATING STATE OF RACE RELATIONS IN MY COUNTRY.

IN THIS CONNECTION, MR. PRESIDENT, I AM WRITING TO URGE YOU TO CONSIDER PROPOSING THE ORGANIZATION OF PERMANENT HUMAN RELATION COUNCILS IN EVERY CITY AND TOWN IN THE COUNTRY. AMONG THE AIMS OF SUCH COUNCILS WOULD BE THE (A) RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS, (B) PROVISION OF UNOFFICIAL MEDIATORS IN COMMUNITY DISPUTES HAVING THEIR ORIGINS IN ETHNIC CONFLICT, (C) IMPARTING TO THE DISADVANTAGED A SENSE OF PARTICIPATION AND VESTED INTEREST IN THE LIFE OF THE COMMUNITY.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY.

IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE MILITANT AND SO-CALLED "EXTREMIST" ETHNIC GROUPS BE REPRESENTED ON SUCH HUMAN RELATIONS COUNCILS. WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, PARTICULARLY IN THE NEGRO COMMUNITY, IT IS THE MILITANT LEADERSHIP THAT HAS THE EAR AND SYMPATHIES OF THE OVERWHELMING NUMBER OF BLACK PEOPLE, REGARDLESS OF THEIR SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS. WE MUST FACE UP TO THE FACT THAT TODAY THE ROY WILKINSES, WHITNEY YOUNGS, DOROTHY HEIGHTS, SENATOR BROOKS AND OTHERS OF THE "OLD GUARD" ARE MORE REFLECTIVE OF THE ATTITUDES AND APPROACHES OF WHITES THAN THEY ARE OF THOSE OF BLACKS. THEREFORE, IT IS THE ALLEGIANCE AND COOPERATION OF THE NEW LEADERSHIP THAT MUST BE ENGAGED IN CONSTRUCTIVE, COOPERATIVE EFFORTS.

THE CREATION OF A NATIONWIDE NETWORK OF HUMAN RELATIONS COUNCILS, SPONSORED AND ENCOURAGED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, MIGHT GIVE US ALL THE KIND OF POSITIVE FOCUS THAT COULD LEAD US AWAY FROM THE FRAGMENTATION AND SOCIAL DISINTEGRATION OF OUR COUNTRY. YET, MORE, MUCH MORE, WILL HAVE TO BE DONE TO ROOT OUT THE CAUSES OF OUR CURRENT TROUBLES.

MR. PRESIDENT, THIS LETTER IS WRITTEN AT THE HEIGHT OF THE EMOTIONALISM SURROUNDING DR. KING'S ASSASSINATION. THEREFORE, FORGIVE ME FOR THROWING OUT A SUGGESTION WHICH, ADMITTEDLY, HAS NOT HAD THE BENEFIT OF MUCH THOUGHT AND ANALYSIS. HOWEVER, I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT NOW IS THE TIME FOR ANY CITIZEN WHO HAS EVEN THE FRAGMENT OF AN IDEA THAT MIGHT SAVE THE NATION TO RAISE HIS VOICE.

WITH EVERY GOOD WISH.

SINCERELY,

ULRIC HAYNES, JR.
PRESIDENT
MANAGEMENT RESOURCES CORPORATION
NEW YORK

092251Z APR 1968

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By isa, NARA Date 1-15-99

60

DRAFT LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER GORTON

DEAR PRIME MINISTER:

SECRETARY RUSK HAS GIVEN ME A FULL ACCOUNT OF HIS RECENT TALKS WITH YOU IN CANBERRA. I AM GRATEFUL FOR THE TOTALLY FRANK EXCHANGES YOU HAVE HAD WITH HIM. THIS IS THE SPIRIT IN WHICH WE MUST CONTINUE TO SHARE OUR THOUGHTS ON ALL OUR PROBLEMS.

I DO HOPE THAT YOU CAN SEE YOUR WAY CLEAR TO VISIT WITH ME IN WASHINGTON AT ANY TIME CONVENIENT TO YOU. MY RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF MY OWN PERSONAL PLANS IN NO WAY DIMINISHES MY OWN DESIRE TO BE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH YOU ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE MOMENTOUS MONTHS AHEAD. IF THE THIRD WEEK IN MAY IS INCONVENIENT FOR YOU I WOULD TRY TO ARRANGE MY SCHEDULE FOR ANY OTHER TIME AGREEABLE TO YOU.

MEANWHILE, YOU MAY ALREADY KNOW THAT THE PRIME MINISTER OF THAILAND WILL BE VISITING US IN THE SECOND WEEK OF MAY. IN ADDITION, I WANT YOU TO KNOW VERY PRIVATELY THAT I AM TRYING TO RESCHEDULE MY VISIT WITH PRESIDENT PARK OF KOREA IN HONOLULU EARLY NEXT WEEK.

MOREOVER, I AM ALSO INVITING PRESIDENT THIEU TO HONOLULU FOR A SINGLE DAY AT THE SAME TIME. THIS WOULD BE TO FOLLOW UP ON MY CURRENT TALKS WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND AMBASSADOR BUNKER, IN ORDER TO BE SURE WE ARE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO HELP THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO STEADY AND IMPROVE THEIR POSITION, INCLUDING THE NEED FOR INCREASED FORCES. THE VISIT WOULD ALSO BE DESIGNED TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR A MORE FORMAL VISIT BY PRESIDENT THIEU TO WASHINGTON, PROBABLY IN MAY.

YOU HAVE THE LATEST INFORMATION ON OUR EXCHANGES WITH NORTH VIETNAM ABOUT A PLACE AND DATE FOR CONTACT. WE WILL KEEP YOU CLOSELY POSTED.

I WOULD WELCOME YOUR SUGGESTIONS AT ANY TIME.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

DRAFT LETTER TO PRESIDENT PARK

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR UNDERSTANDING RESPONSE TO MY MESSAGE ABOUT POSTPONING YOUR SCHEDULED VISIT TO HONOLULU LAST WEEKEND.

I REMAIN MOST ANXIOUS TO MEET WITH YOU AT THE EARLIEST CONVENIENT TIME. IF THE SITUATION HERE HAS EASED, IT MAY NOW BE POSSIBLE FOR ME TO COME TO HONOLULU NEXT MONDAY AND TUESDAY. COULD YOU JOIN ME THERE FOR TALKS ON TUESDAY? VERY PRIVATELY, I AM ASKING PRESIDENT THIEU TO COME JOIN ME ON MONDAY TO TALK ABOUT STEADYING AND STRENGTHENING THE WHOLE POSITION IN VIETNAM.

I EMPHASIZE THAT THIS SUGGESTION MUST BE UTTERLY PRIVATE UNTIL MY PLANS CAN BE MADE FIRM.

IF YOU CAN COME, I WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO A FULL DISCUSSION OF MATTERS CONCERNING KOREA, AND ALSO TO A REVIEW OF THE VIETNAMESE SITUATION INCLUDING THE PROSPECT FOR CONTACTS AND TALKS AS IT MAY THEN HAVE DEVELOPED.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By isa, NARA Date 1-15-99

DRAFT LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER HOLYOAKE

DEAR PRIME MINISTER:

SECRETARY RUSK HAS GIVEN ME A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE MEETING IN WELLINGTON, INCLUDING PARTICULARLY HIS TALKS WITH YOU. YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB AS HOST AT THESE MEETINGS, AND I THINK THEY WERE A GREAT HELP AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME.

YOU HAVE THE LAST INFORMATION ON OUR EXCHANGES WITH NORTH VIETNAM ABOUT A TIME AND PLACE FOR CONTACTS. NEEDLESS TO SAY WE HOPE THESE WILL LEAD RAPIDLY ON TO TALKS. I AM TREMENDOUSLY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR OWN STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE ACTIONS I ANNOUNCED IN MY SPEECH LAST WEEK.

WE MUST OF COURSE CONTINUE TO STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS. TO THIS END, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I WILL BE MOST HAPPY TO SEE YOU IN WASHINGTON IF YOU SEE YOUR WAY CLEAR TO VISIT WITH ME AT ANY TIME CONVENIENT TO YOU.

AS YOU PROBABLY KNOW, THE PRIME MINISTER OF THAILAND WILL BE COMING TO US THE SECOND WEEK OF MAY. AND I WANT YOU TO KNOW VERY PRIVATELY THAT I AM TRYING TO RESCHEDULE MY POSTPONED VISIT WITH PRESIDENT PARK IN HONOLULU PERHAPS EARLY NEXT WEEK. I AM ALSO INVITING PRESIDENT THIEU TO COME TO HONOLULU FOR A DAY AT THE SAME TIME, TO TALK ABOUT STEADYING AND STRENGTHENING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE POSITION AND TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR A MORE FORMAL MEETING IN WASHINGTON WITH HIM, ALSO PROBABLY IN MAY.

THUS, I HOPE TO BRING ABOUT A SERIES OF CONSULTATIONS THAT WILL KEEP US ALL THINKING ALONG THE SAME LINES AS WE FACE THE HARD PROBLEMS THAT LIE AHEAD. YOU MAY BE ASSURED THAT OUR RESOLVE FOR AN HONORABLE AND SECURE PEACE IS UNSHAKEABLE. I WOULD WELCOME YOUR SUGGESTIONS AT ANY TIME.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By is, NARA Date 1-15-99

63

DRAFT LETTER TO PRESIDENT THIEU

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

AMBASSADOR BUNKER IS WITH ME NOW, AND HAS CONVEYED TO ME YOUR POSSIBLE WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH ME IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR A FULL REVIEW OF THE CURRENT SITUATION.

VERY CONFIDENTIALLY, IF THE SITUATION HERE HAS EASED, IT MAY NOW BE POSSIBLE FOR ME TO COME TO HONOLULU NEXT MONDAY FOR THIS PURPOSE. COULD YOU LET ME KNOW IF THIS IS AGREEABLE TO YOU? I EMPHASIZE THAT THIS SUGGESTION MUST BE UTTERLY PRIVATE UNTIL MY PLANS CAN BE MADE FIRM.

I WOULD HAVE IN MIND A FRANK DISCUSSION OF ALL OUR COMMON PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS. IN THE LIGHT OF ADVICE I HAVE HAD FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND, I WANT TO BE SURE WE ARE DOING ALL WE CAN TO HELP STRENGTHEN THE SITUATION IN YOUR COUNTRY. WE CAN ALSO TALK ABOUT PROBLEMS THAT WOULD ARISE IN CONTACTS OR TALKS WITH NORTH VIET NAM. AND FINALLY, WE COULD TALK FURTHER ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF YOUR PAYING A FORMAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON, PERHAPS IN MAY.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By is, NARA Date 1-15-99

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

Luncheon with the President
Tuesday, April 9, 1968, 1:00 p. m.

64

Agenda

1. Vietnam Negotiations (Sect. Rusk)

Sitrep.

2. Equipment for ARVN; RF-PF. (Sect. Clifford)

-- M-14's?

-- Distribution of new M-16's (50-50 or 75-25).

-- LAW's (anti-tank weapon).

3. Reserve Call-up? (Sect. Clifford)

24,000 for 13,500 plus replacements for 11,000.

4. Resumption of Recce. (Sect. Clifford)

5. Middle East. (Sect. Rusk)

Sitrep.

6. Cyprus (Sect. Rusk)

Sitrep.

7. Other.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993

By sg, NARA, Date 4-29-92

65

ACTION

Tuesday - April 9, 1968

~~1. Prop~~
2. Prop file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from President Balaguer on Sugar

At Tab B is a letter from President Balaguer asking for a 200,000 ton special allocation of the Puerto Rican sugar shortfall.

For the past two years you have given special allocations to the DR. State and Agriculture will be making a recommendation to you in the next 3-4 weeks on what to do this year.

In the meantime, State suggests you acknowledge President Balaguer's letter along the lines of the draft at Tab A. I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Suggested response to letter from President Balaguer.

Tab B - Letter from President Balaguer of March 17, 1968.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By is, **NARA Date** 1-15-99

65a

April 9, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

Ambassador Garcia-Godoy has delivered your letter of March 17 concerning the need of the Dominican Republic for approximately 200,000 tons of the Puerto Rican sugar deficit.

I appreciate the information you give on the importance of these additional sugar sales to your country's economy and balance of payments. You have used the special allocation in previous years wisely, as reflected in your success in modernizing the sugar industry and cutting production costs. Your letter gives us a better understanding of the Dominican interest in this matter.

I have made no decision yet on distribution of the Puerto Rican shortfall for this year. I assure you that in doing so, I and my advisers will take into account all the factors you mention.

Sincerely,

/S/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Dr. Joaquin Balaguer
President of the Dominican Republic
Santo Domingo.

LBJ/WGBowdler:mmm

65b

Letter of March 17, 1968 to President from President Balaguer
of the Dominican Republic

(official translation)

"THE PRESIDENT OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-268

By is, NARA Date 1-15-99

Santo Domingo, D. N.

March 17, 1968

Mr. President:

I wish at this time to refer to the singular importance to the Dominican Republic's economic and political stability of the sugar quota allocated for this year to the Dominican Republic in the United States market.

As Your Excellency knows, because of the precarious political situation of our country at the time the Sugar Act was being considered in the summer of 1965, the Congress of the United States decided not to set the Dominican quota in the Act at an amount that might duly have been accorded to the Dominican Republic as the nearest and most reliable source of sugar supply for the United States market and as the only important sugar producing country of the Western Hemisphere that has to depend entirely upon the export prices of its sugar in order to maintain a balanced domestic and international economy, 70% of its income in foreign exchange still being dependent on sugar.

In view of this situation, the Congress decided to authorize the President of the United States of America to "assign to the Dominican Republic a substantial part of the shortfall of Puerto Rico, or of any other national area or foreign country, in case the interest of the United States should make this advisable."

Thanks to the wise decisions adopted by Your Excellency, in 1966 and 1967 the Dominican Republic was assigned special quotas from the "deficit" quotas of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, under the authority with which Your Excellency is vested.

I am happy to be able to inform Your Excellency that the special allotment of the deficit quota in 1966 and 1967 helped my Government significantly, not only in its efforts to modernize

the Dominican sugar industry and improve its administrative organization, but also to stabilize the industry's costs of production, and made it possible, furthermore, to inaugurate a program of diversification in our agricultural economy. The cost of sugar production was cut by 34 percent, and a profit of 1.5 million Dominican pesos was obtained from the 1967 crop, in contrast to a deficit of 19 million pesos for the period from October 1965 to August 1966.

Despite the efforts to diversify agriculture in which my Government is actively engaged, I consider it vitally important not only that the levels of our sugar exports to the United States be maintained, but that the amount be increased this year by the allocation to the Dominican Republic of approximately 200,000 tons of the estimated shortfall of 525,000 to 550,000 tons in Puerto Rico's quota, taking into account the probability that the Philippines will be unable to absorb a significant portion of that deficit.

During the year 1967 the Dominican sugar industry, in coordination with the authorities of the United States, sold a substantial amount of its sugar on the world market in order to meet the demands of certain consuming countries (Japan and Morocco) which would otherwise have bought the product from other producing sources. The agreed price for the sale of that sugar was the one prevailing in the world market, which, as is a known fact, is maintained at levels very much below the prevailing prices in the United States market.

In view of the results of that operation, the Dominican sugar industry stands in even more urgent need of recovering through additional sales in the United States market, and I respectfully request Your Excellency to take this circumstance into account when the decision is made on the redistribution of the shortfalls to which I have referred.

Thanking you, Mr. President, for the sympathetic consideration you may give to this request, I express to you the assurances of my highest consideration and esteem.

/s/ J. Balaguer
Joaquin Balaguer."

Tuesday, April 9, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your approval and signature is a brief, warm reply to Prime Minister Pearson's April 1 letter to you.

Pearson is expected to turn over the Prime Ministership to his successor, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, later this month.

W. W. Rostow

If you approve, we will
need your signature on
the attached letter _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

WWR
MWG:mm

66

~~1. [unclear]~~
2. Profile

APR 10 1968

66a

Dear Mike:

I am most grateful for the generous sentiments expressed in your thoughtful letter of April 1.

I have, of course, read your April 1 public statement with great interest and was deeply gratified by your prompt support of our proposals on Vietnam.

I know you plan to turn over the Prime Ministership of Canada to your successor in the near future. I hope we shall nevertheless continue to have the benefit of your wise counsel.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

The Right Honorable
Lester B. Pearson, O.B.E., M.P.
Prime Minister of Canada
Ottawa

LBJ:MWG:mmm
4/9/68



66b

PRIME MINISTER · PREMIER MINISTRE

Personal

Ottawa,
April 1, 1968.

Dear Lyndon

I have issued an official statement expressing appreciation of what you said last night on Vietnam. I would like to supplement this by a personal message which can express with more feeling how deeply grateful I think the whole world should be for the proposals you have made and for the courage and wisdom you have shown in making them. It is now strictly up to the other side to reciprocate and if they don't, there should be no doubt where the obstacle to peace lies.

I have no right to comment on your other and more personal decision not to seek or accept re-nomination but I hope I may convey my respect and admiration for the motives that caused you to come to a decision which must have been a very difficult one and could only be made understandable to your friends by the spirit which inspired it.

I had wanted to telephone you but I know you will be deluged by calls so I hope you will accept this personal message instead, which is sent with my most sincere and warmest good wishes.

Kindest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Mr. Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States
of America,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Theresa Pearson

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION

Tuesday - April 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to President Lleras of Colombia

President Lleras sent you the congratulatory message at Tab B on your March 31 speech.

Since President Lleras celebrates his 60th birthday on Friday, April 12, you may wish to combine acknowledgement of his message with a birthday greeting (Tab A).

W. W. Rostow

Approve reply

☒ 4/10/68

Disapprove

☐

Call me

☐

Attachments

Tab A - Proposed Presidential message to President Lleras.

Tab B - April 1, 1968 telegram to President from President Lleras.

A

67a

Suggested Presidential Acknowledgement
to
April 1, 1968 Telegraphic Message from Colombian President Lleras

I deeply appreciate your thoughtful message on my March 31 speech and value your encouragement and support in our difficult search for peace and freedom.

You will celebrate an important birthday this Friday. Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending best wishes.

Lyndon B. Johnson

B₂
676

Telegram to President
from
Carlos Lleras Restrepo, President of Colombia, dated
April 1, 1968

(Official Translation)

"BOGOTA, COLOMBIA, April 1, 1968

The President

The White House.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my warmest friendship and admiration at this time when you have once again shown your patriotism and your devotion to the cause of freedom and peace.

Carlos Lleras Restrepo
President of Colombia".

Monday, April 8, 1968 -- 6:00 PM

68

Free file

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a proposed message on the installation of Jacobus Fouché as State President (ceremonial Chief of State) of South Africa. The installation is Wednesday.

This is a routine protocol message. I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

RPM/vmr

68a

Proposed Message to State President Fouché of South Africa

Dear Mr. President:

I send you greetings as you assume the responsibilities of your high office. I want to take this occasion also to extend best wishes to all the people of South Africa.

Sincerely,

69
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Monday, April 8, 1968 -- 5:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA examines three hypotheses about Hanoi's motives in moving towards contacts and negotiations:

- a "highly optimistic" Hanoi appraisal of its prospects;
- an "uncertain" appraisal;
- a "pessimistic" appraisal.

CIA leans to an appraisal somewhere between Hanoi being "optimistic" and Hanoi being "uncertain." Only time will tell.

For what it is worth, my own impression is that Hanoi is pessimistic about the strictly military situation on the ground; but uncertain to optimistic about the political prospects for them in the U. S. and South Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-288
By ing, NARA, Date 2-23-93

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

69a

~~SECRET~~

1208

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

This paper ^② is an effort to take a more detailed look at what the North Vietnamese are up to than was possible on such short notice in our brief memorandum of 3 April on this general subject.

Rich
Richard Helms

Attachment - 1

"Speculation on Hanoi's Motives"

② written prior to
receipt of official ~~SECRET~~
DRV response ~~SECRET~~

8 April 1968
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWJ 91-286
By ju/497 NARA, Date 6-5-97

1208
69b

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

8 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Speculation on Hanoi's Motives

1. Consistent with its past reactions, Hanoi might have been expected to reject President Johnson's initiative or any other move short of an "unconditional" cessation of bombing. Or it could have stalled for a time, while testing various international currents, and perhaps sounding out its Allies in Moscow and Peking. Instead, Hanoi moved quickly and invented a new stage called "contacts" with the US.

2. Assuming that such contacts are actually intended, several different interpretations are possible for a move of this significance. These rest on alternative appraisals of the total situation which Hanoi may be making. The basic factors which would enter into such appraisals would be the course and prospects of military

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-271
By CB, NARA Date 10-13-99

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~~SECRET~~

action, the viability of the GVN/ARVN under continued pressure, and the effects of election year political currents on the US will to continue the struggle.

3. In theory, Hanoi's appraisal of the situation could range from high confidence through uncertainty to near desperation. In the following paragraphs we consider each of these cases in turn.

CASE I. Hanoi's Appraisal is Highly Optimistic

4. This hypothesis rests on a judgment by Hanoi that the military-political results obtained since Tet and those in prospect in the near future are turning the balance of the struggle in its favor. Hanoi has always said that at such a stage it would be correct to begin talking while still fighting. The fight-talk tactic has been portrayed as a forward move to exploit major military and political successes and leading to the final resolution of the conflict on Communist terms. What could not be known by Hanoi was when the most propitious moment would arise to employ this tactical line; there is considerable evidence suggesting that it believed 1968 would be the "decisive" year, and that it expected the Tet offensive to contribute greatly to this result.

~~SECRET~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

5. The North Vietnamese could read the President's statement as confirming that a decisive stage had, indeed, arrived. They could interpret his decision not to stand for re-election as an admission of failure for his policy in Vietnam, just as they claimed that General Westmoreland's departure indicated a "comprehensive defeat" for his military strategy. They could believe the failure to send large reinforcements to South Vietnam vindicated their predictions that US international commitments plus domestic pressures would eventually limit the US buildup. And they could view the bombing restriction as a concession forced by increasing domestic pressures for peace in Vietnam.

6. The experience of the North Vietnamese leaders in 1953-54 would strongly incline them to such interpretations of American political developments. Even if the Tet offensive fell well short of its hopes, Hanoi would still regard its position as quite strong and Saigon's position as significantly weakened. They would expect negotiations to accelerate the decline of the GVN and exacerbate US-GVN tensions. And they would believe that continued and perhaps intensified military pressures would strengthen Hanoi's bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States. Thus, the confluence of events in South Vietnam and the United States could be regarded as having created optimum conditions for beginning the

- 3 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~SECRET~~

"fight-talk" phase. Hanoi was able, with little time lost in deliberation, to move in the direction already anticipated by its basic strategy.

CASE II -- Hanoi's Appraisal is Uncertain

7. An alternative explanation would be that Hanoi is not entirely confident of its overall position and foresees a long and increasingly costly struggle. While able to endure this, it would prefer not to do so and the President's initiative offered an opportunity -- though not an ideal one -- to give greater emphasis to the political aspects of the struggle. Even if Hanoi believed the US position was weakened and Saigon shaky, it would also recognize the risk of escalation if the President's move had been totally rejected. Hanoi might calculate that by removing himself as a candidate the President was in a better position to adopt new military measures against North Vietnam if necessary. Added to these risks, Hanoi might have seen a certain loss in failing to respond when international reaction to the US move was generally favorable.

8. Under this hypothesis, Hanoi would still have some expectation of being able to combine the talks with fighting in such a way as to force a favorable settlement. They would recognize that

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both sides would be under certain pressures not to allow a complete breakdown in the discussions. They would also recognize that some further concessions would probably have to be made to gain a complete cessation of the bombing; and though their forces would still be capable of further military successes, these would not likely be decisive in bringing about the collapse of the GVN/ARVN.

9. Nevertheless, Hanoi would still see advantages to opening discussions with the US. The bombing restrictions would be prolonged, at least for a while. Saigon would be more and more apprehensive about a secret deal at its expense. In this atmosphere even local military success might have a strong psychological impact on the Allied side. The pressures for continuing the talks would probably be greater on the US than Hanoi. And if, in the end, the talks failed, Hanoi would at least be no worse off.

CASE III - Hanoi's Appraisal is Pessimistic

10. A third alternative is that the North Vietnamese view the overall balance of forces as distinctly unfavorable and are more or less compelled to settle on whatever terms can be negotiated. The results of the Tet offensive might have forced a reappraisal of their military capabilities, leading to the

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

conclusion that the strains of the war were too great and the prospects of success too doubtful. Though physically capable of further fighting, it is conceivable that they have concluded that another round of attacks would almost surely fail, would be devastating to morale and raw capabilities and might force them to end the war on highly unfavorable terms or fade away, or call on the Chinese to help. On the other hand, a failure to deliver the promised "second wave" would be encouraging to the GVN and the US. The President's statement provided a way out. As long as Communist forces remained intact, negotiations might still hold some prospect of salvaging the Front as a legitimate political instrument and causing an eventual American withdrawal.

CASE IV -- Other Contingencies

11. A final explanation is that there has been some dramatic change in Hanoi. For example, the North Vietnamese populace could be far more restive than we can determine. This of course might prompt concessions to end the bombing, if not the war. Or it could be that there has been a change in the top leadership itself. There has always been the chance of a struggle to succeed Ho Chi Minh. Hanoi's quick move to establish contact with the US could thus be a move in an internal contest or even the first act

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

of a new and more flexible political leadership. While such a change in command would not in itself have to lead to a change in basic policy, it could explain a shift in tactics.

Conclusion

12. Among the alternative explanations suggested above, our current evidence suggests that the truth lies somewhere between Case I and Case II. This would mean that Hanoi considers that it can register further military successes at costs it can afford to bear even if it would prefer not to, that it believes the will to persist is beginning to crumble on the US/GVN side, and that hard bargaining combined with continued military pressure can bring a favorable outcome eventually.


13. If our interpretation is generally correct, then it is probable that Hanoi had for some time been preparing to make a diplomatic initiative -- that the President's statement merely offered an unexpectedly hopeful opportunity to get on with a policy already substantially determined. This is not to say that Hanoi's position in meetings will be conciliatory; on the contrary its representative will probably take a hard line,

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~SECRET~~

demanding an unconditional halt to all bombing and reconnaissance over North Vietnam. We do believe, however, that Hanoi probably wants to talk, and that it will not seek pretexts to back away from establishing contact with the US.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:


ABBOT SMITH
Chairman

~~SECRET~~

Monday, April 8, 1968
4:20 p. m.

Pres file

70

MR. PRESIDENT:

Before talking with Bunker, you may wish to read Thieu's views on the prospects and problems of negotiation as portrayed in the attached two CIA reports.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment TDCS-314/05976-68

" " 77-68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 86498

70a

SANITIZED

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	SOO	ONE	CRS
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This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

061559Z

CITE

~~SECRET~~

DIST 6 APRIL 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI

SUBJECT PRESIDENT THIEU'S VIEWS ON PROBABLE NORTH
VIETNAMESE DEMANDS DURING FORTHCOMING
PEACE TALKS

Roston

3.4(b)(1)
C

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-271

By Cb, NARA Date 10-13 99

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (6 APRIL 1968) FIELD NO.

SOURCE

[REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)
C

SUMMARY: PRESIDENT THIEU [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)
C

[REDACTED]

EXPECTS HANOI TO MAKE TWO DEMANDS DURING THE FORTHCOMING PEACE
TALKS THAT WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE TO HIM: (1) THAT THE GOVERN-
MENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH THE NATIONAL
LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV) AND (2) THAT THE GVN FORM A GENUINE
COALITION WITH THE NFLSV. THIEU CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL THAT

~~SECRET~~

IN 86498

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

THE OPENING OF PEACE TALKS/NOT LEAD TO A DIMINUTION OF U.S. AID AND THAT THE GVN EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO KEEP THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FROM SEPARATING THE QUESTION OF A BOMBING HALT FROM THAT OF A TREATY TO END THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THIEU SAID HE WAS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING DECLARING A GENERAL MOBILIZATION. [REDACTED] BRIEFED THIEU ON A NEW INTERMINISTERIAL COUNCIL CHARGED WITH STUDYING WAYS OF MAINTAINING GVN AUTHORITY IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER EMERGENCY SIMILAR TO THE VIET CONG TET OFFENSIVE. END SUMMARY.

1. [REDACTED] PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU [REDACTED]

3,4(b)(1)
c

[REDACTED] EXPECTS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT (DRV) TO MAKE TWO DEMANDS OF THE AMERICANS DURING FORTHCOMING PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH THIEU WILL BE UNABLE TO ACCEPT. FIRST, THIEU EXPECTS HANOI TO REJECT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT (GVN) AND TO INSIST THAT THE GVN NEGOTIATE WITH THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM (NFLSV). THIEU SAID THAT WHILE THE GVN IS WILLING TO MEET ANYWHERE WITH DRV REPRESENTATIVES, IT WILL NOT NEGOTIATE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

(classification)

(dissem controls)

WITH THE NFLSV. ALSO, THIEU THINKS HANOI WILL INSIST ON A
GENUINE COALITION GOVERNMENT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN), INCLUDING
THE NFLSV. THIEU SAID THAT NO SENIOR MEMBER OF THE PRESENT
MILITARY OR GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHMENT IS WILLING TO ACCEPT A
COALITION GOVERNMENT.

2. THIEU MENTIONED A NUMBER OF OTHER PRIORITIES TO WHICH HE WAS ADDRESSING HIS ATTENTION. HE SAID IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE OPENING OF PEACE TALKS/ ^{SHOULD} NOT LEAD TO ANY DIMINUTION OF AMERICAN MILITARY OR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, SINCE THIS AID WAS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE SURVIVAL OF THE PRESENT VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT THE GVN SHOULD ALSO EXERT EVERY EFFORT TO KEEP THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT (USG) FROM SEPARATING THE
QUESTION OF A BOMBING HALT IN NORTH VIETNAM FROM THAT OF A JUST
PEACE TREATY ENDING THE WAR IN SVN. EVEN WITHOUT A BOMBING
HALT, TALKS COULD LAST A LONG TIME. WITH A BOMBING HALT, THEY
WOULD PROBABLY LAST EVEN LONGER. DURING THIS PERIOD THE
DRV NOT ONLY WILL STRENGTHEN ITS MILITARY FORCES BUT
IT WILL INFILTRATE MANY POLITICAL CADRES INTO THE SOUTH. IF
NEGOTIATIONS ABORT, THE GVN WILL BE FACED WITH A MUCH MORE
DIFFICULT SITUATION SINCE THE COMMUNIST POLITICAL CADRES WILL

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

IN 86498
[REDACTED]

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

~~SECRET~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

BE WORKING HARD TO WEAKEN POPULAR RESISTANCE. THUS, A BOMBING
HALT SHOULD BE CLOSELY RELATED TO A SETTLEMENT IN THE SOUTH.

3. THIEU SAID HE HAS BEEN GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO DECLARING A GENERAL MOBILIZATION AS AN INDICATION OF GVN DETERMINATION. THE PRESIDENT ALSO SAID HE WAS SINCERE WHEN HE DECLARED THAT IT PROBABLY WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE ALLIES TO REMOVE SOME OF THEIR TROOPS BY THE END OF 1968. HE THOUGHT AT LEAST "SEVERAL BATTALIONS" SHOULD BE PHASED OUT BY THAT TIME AS A TOKEN INDICATION OF GVN DETERMINATION TO PLAY A LARGER ROLE IN ITS OWN DEFENSE.

4. [REDACTED] THE NEW INTERMINIS-
TERIAL COUNCIL, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] CONSISTS OF THE MINISTERS OF INTERIOR, CHIEU HOI (OPEN
ARMS) VETERANS, AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENCY, AMONG OTHERS. THE COMMITTEE IS CHARGED WITH STUDY-
ING WAYS OF MAINTAINING GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN THE EVENT OF
ANOTHER EMERGENCY SIMILAR TO THE ENEMY'S TET TRUCE ATTACKS.
IT IS ALSO STUDYING WAYS TO COORDINATE THE GOVERNMENT'S POLITI-
CAL-WARFARE PROGRAM NOW SCATTERED AMONG SEVERAL MINISTRIES
AND THE ARMED FORCES. [REDACTED] THE COMMITTEE HAD ALREADY AGREED

~~SECRET~~
[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ (dissem)
ON THREE POINTS:

A. THE GVN MUST AKE ADVANTAGE OF ITS PRESENT IN-
CREASED MORAL POSITION IN THE FORUM OF WORLD PUBLIC OPINION.
SINCE THE GVN CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM THE USG IN THE BOMBING
HALT AND IN THE INITIATIVES FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, IT BENE-
FITS FROM THE IMPROVED MORAL POSITION OF THE USG RESULTING
FROM THESE MEASURES.

B. THE GVN MUST DEVISE WAYS TO KEEP UP THE "FIGHTING
SPIRIT" OF THE PEOPLE DURING PEACE TALKS. IF THE VIETNAMESE
PEOPLE CONCENTRATE ONLY ON THE HOPE OF PEACE AND FORGET THE
REASONS WHY THE GVN IS FIGHTING THE WAR AND IF NEGOTIATIONS
DO NOT LEAD TO PEACE, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO RECAPTURE THE
SPIRIT OF THE PEOPLE.

C. ALL STEPS POSSIBLE MUST BE TAKEN TO CONVINCE THE
PEOPLE OF THE NORTH THAT THEY MUST COMPEL THEIR GOVERNMENT
TO ARRIVE AT A SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT. THIS WILL INVOLVE
PRIMARILY THE DROPPING OF LEAFLETS OVER NORTH VIETNAM AND
OTHER MEANS TO AFFECT PUBLIC OPINION THERE.

[REDACTED]

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE DIR/JUSPAO
(MR. NICKEL ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

Intelligence Information Cable IN 86484 706

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR CEA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS
DD: EXO OER FBIS DCE IRS AID USIA

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

061558Z

CITE [REDACTED]

25X1

DIST 6 APRIL 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI

Routew

SUBJECT SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800 HOURS

LOCAL TIME, 6 APRIL 1968

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (6 APRIL 1968) FIELD NO.

[REDACTED] 25X1A

SOURCE THIS IS A VIETNAM SITUATION REPORT PREPARED
AT 1800 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 6 APRIL.

1. IN THE LAST 24 HOURS THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN EITHER PUBLIC OPINION OR, OR GOVERNMENT REACTION
TO, THE PROSPECT OF EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH HANOI. [REDACTED]

25X1

[REDACTED] XY HAS MET
SEVERAL TIMES WITH PRESIDENT THIEU TODAY AND THAT THE TWO HAVE

25X1

AGREED THAT THIEU SHOULD GO ON TELEVISION SOON TO EXPLAIN THE
NEW SITUATION AND THE GOVERNMENTS STAND TO THE PEOPLE. A TENTA-

TIVE AGREEMENT TO CALL FOR FULL MOBILIZATION HAS ALSO BEEN REACHED,

THE SAME SOURCE REPORTS, AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE GENERAL NGUYEN VAN VY

25X1A

~~SECRET~~

MORI

Approved For Release 2001/08/24 : NLJ-019-032-2-7-0

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 019-032-2-7-
By [signature], NARA, Date 1/15/02

IN 86484

25X1

25X1A

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

(from controls)

HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH DRAWING UP A DETAILED MOBILIZATION PLAN; PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOBILIZATION IS NOT EXPECTED BEFORE THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK.

25X1A

2. [REDACTED] PRESIDENT THIEU [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1C

[REDACTED] EXPECTS HANOI TO PRESS IN ITS TALKS WITH THE U.S. FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT AND FOR FRONT REPRESENTATION IN A GENUINE COALITION GOVERNMENT; THIEU CALLED BOTH OF THESE DEMANDS UNACCEPTABLE TO HIM AND TO EVERY MEMBER OF HIS GOVERNMENT. THIEU WAS REPORTEDLY ANXIOUS THAT U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID CONTINUE UNABATED DURING ANY TALKS, CALLING AID ESSENTIAL FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S SURVIVAL. [REDACTED]

25X1

3. INSISTENCE ON THE GVN'S CENTRAL ROLE IN ANY REAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH HANOI AND ON THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF A COALITION SOLUTION CONTINUE TO BE THE MAIN THEMES OF PRESS EDITORIALS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF POLITICIANS. THE LOWER HOUSE INDEPENDENCE BLOC MADE THESE POINTS IN A 4 APRIL DECLARATION AND, [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1A

[REDACTED] THE LOWER HOUSE IS EXPECTED TO DRAFT A PRO-GOVERNMENT RESOLUTION TODAY SIMILAR TO THE ONE PASSED

25X1A

EARLIER BY THE SENATE. [REDACTED]

25X1

IN 86434

25X1

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

25X1A ~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

25X1C [REDACTED] TENTATIVE PLANS IN TWO LOWER HOUSE BLOCS TO EXAMINE
POSSIBLE PEACE TERMS THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE WOULD FIND
PALATABLE IF NOT IDEAL.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC
PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

SAIGON SIGCEN NOTE: "DOI" BLANK AS RCVD FROM ORIGINATOR.
WILL CHECK IN A.M. AND ADVISE.

25X1A

S-E-C-R-E-T

71
ACTION

Pres file

Monday, April 8, 1968 -- 3:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

**Admiral Shapp arrived in Washington today at 1:00 p. m. and
will remain until Wednesday night, April 10.**

Admiral Sharp would like to see you while he is here.

General Wheeler recommends that you see Admiral Sharp.

W. W. Rostow

Will see Adm. Sharp_____

No_____

Call me_____

rla

72

from file

INFORMATION

Monday
April 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit by Australia Prime Minister
Gorton

In response to a query from the Australian Embassy you approved May 20-25 for a visit from Prime Minister Gorton.

The Australian Embassy now informs us that a visit during that period seems unlikely. The Australians are thinking in terms of a June visit but do not as yet have firm dates to propose.

In line with your previous instruction we will do our utmost to schedule the Gorton visit, once his wish has become known.

W. W. Rostow

MWright:wpt



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres. file

RR RUEHC
DE RUEHBAC 4844 0971205
ZNY CCCCC
R 061159Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2182
STATE GRNC
BT

*For the President
From Walt Rostow*

CONFIDENTIAL CANBERRA 4844 7 18

01760Q

NODIS

(OC/T PLEASE DELIVER THIS MESSAGE TO THE WHITE HOUSE WITH
NO REPEAT NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL CANBERRA 4844~~

NODIS

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY

JUST A WORD TO LET YOU KNOW THAT MY THOUGHTS ARE
CONSTANTLY WITH YOU AS YOU BEAR THE UNEARNED BURDENS ARISING
FROM THE TERRIBLE TRAGEDY IN MEMPHIS. NO OTHER MAN HAS DONE
SO MUCH AS YOU TO FIND DECENT ANSWERS TO THESE PROBLEMS WHICH
HAVE DEEPLY DIVIDED OUR PEOPLE. YOU HAVE THE DEEPEST SYMPATHY
AND RESPECT FROM EVERYBODY IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD IN THIS
MOMENT OF TRIAL. RUSK
BT

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1983.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY *h2* ON *5-19-92*

SECRET

Meeting with the President
Monday, April 8, 1968, Noon

Agenda

1. Reply to Hanoi

- Place: - Djakarta
- Rangoon
- Kuala Lumpur
- Other.

-- How to deal with para 3.

-- Another date? Monday, April 15?

2. U. S. Delegation.

- How big at beginning?
- Working level composition.

3. Official Languages

- We should propose English and Vietnamese -- keep French out of it.
(We have at least two first-class Vietnamese language officers:
John Negreponte (now at UN) and David Lambertsen (now in Saigon).

4. Consultation with Allies on reply.

5. Basic Instruction.

6. Liaison with South Vietnamese at the site.

- Bui Diem appears to have been designated.

7. Other.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1963
By 18 NARA, Date 5/9/92

75
Free file

INFORMATION

~~SECRET CODEWORD~~

Monday, April 8, 1968 -- 11:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Attached (Tab A) is the pattern of the infiltration way-stations showing how the new groups are being infiltrated into South Vietnam.

As of this morning, NSA has identified 88 groups on the move: average size, 500: total 44,000.

NSA expects the number to ^{rise} ~~be~~ over 100.

Tab B shows the five way-stations identified outside North Vietnam: four on Laos infiltration routes; one inside South Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow


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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-321
By SJ, NARA, Date 2603

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET SAVH~~

75a




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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 03-199
By isa, NARA, Date 3-1-04

~~SECRET SAVH~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

PAVN HIGH COMMAND INFILTRATION
ASSOCIATED ENTITIES



~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

has file

76

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

This March 29 report on comments of
an Australian Communist is interesting.

from a Soviet official

Collingwood was probably correct that
you beat them to the punch on March 31.

W. W. Rostow

25X1A

~~SECRET~~ attachment 

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-019-032-2-8-9

SANITIZED

Authority NLT 019-032-2-8
By JP, NARA, Date 1/15/02

~~SECRET~~

Monday, April 8, 1968 - 9:45 am

Mr. President:

Pres file

Khe Sanh-DMZ-A Shau:

- 3 enemy rounds incoming;
- 1,934 friendly rounds;
- 242 tactical sorties, plus
12 B-52's;
- 142.5 tons resupply;
- weather operable.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988
By rg, NARA, Date 4-29-92

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 4-29-92

SECRET

77a

Monday, April 8, 1968, 9:15 a. m.

TEXT OF CABLE FROM MACV

This is report number sixty-four on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ/A Shau Valley for the 24-hour period of April 7, 1968.

Clear to partly cloudy skies with visibility of 5 miles or more prevailed throughout the reporting period.

Artillery fire support for Khe Sanh consisted of 167 missions expending 1,934 rounds. Fifty-five missions were observed. In one mission using COFRAM ammunition, seven rounds were fired from 155mm howitzers at a large group of North Vietnamese Army in the open five kilometers south of Lang Vei. Good target coverage killed eleven enemy. During the period, Khe Sanh received three incoming artillery rounds. One Marine received minor wounds.

The 1st Air Cavalry Division had numerous small unit contacts in the vicinity of Khe Sanh Combat Base as Operation Pegasus continues. Troops continue to find enemy mass graves. Thirty bodies were found in one site and 24 in another during the period. Artillery air observers were particularly successful in placing fire on hostile elements, killing 46 enemy. Yesterday afternoon, an ARVN Airborne Task Force Air assaulted into landing zone snake, 2 kilometers southeast of Khe Sanh Combat Base. Shortly after arrival, the TF received a heavy rocket and mortar attack from which 18 ARVN soldiers received minor wounds. One enemy was captured. At 3:50 a. m. this morning, the North Vietnamese Army launched ground attacks against the ARVN Task Force. That attack was quickly repelled and the enemy broke contact by 4:10. Seventy enemy were killed and 31 individual weapons captured. Three ARVN were killed and 23 wounded.

By 10:15 this morning, Companies C and D, 2/7th Cavalry and Elements of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division had closed at Khe Sanh Combat Base.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/88
By 18 NARA, Date 5-18-92

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By 18 NARA, Date 5-18-92

A total of 242 tactical air sorties were flown in support of Operation Pegasus. Of these, 151 were in the immediate vicinity of Khe Sanh. Four secondary explosions, destruction on one automatic weapons position, 24 bunkers, and one structure and damage to three bunkers and five trenches were observed. Two ARC LIGHT missions (12 aircraft) were flown in support of Khe Sanh. One strike observed a secondary explosion.

During the period 142.5 short tons of supplies and 36 passenger replacements were delivered to Khe Sanh. Eight C-130 and four C-123 aircraft conducted airdrops. A total of 19 Marine helicopters delivered passengers and cargo. In the past two days, 21 tons of air delivery equipment has been backloaded from Khe Sanh.

For the next 24 hours, 87 tactical air sorties are scheduled to support Operation Pegasus with an additional 116 on call. No ARC LIGHT missions are scheduled.

Continued clear to partly cloudy skies are predicted for the next 24 hours.

There were two radar missions and one photo reconnaissance mission flown in A Shau Valley. Results revealed five moving target indicators, two camouflaged vehicles and occupied anti-aircraft defensive positions. Six tactical air strike sorties and twenty-four ARC LIGHT sorties hit targets in A Shau during the period.

~~SECRET~~



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

772

THE JOINT STAFF

8 April 1968
0700 EST

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status of Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST
7 April (9:00 AM 8 April, SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)
status as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>DAYS SUPPLY</u> <u>ON HAND</u>	<u>PREVIOUS STATUS</u> 8:00 PM 6 Apr EST (9:00 AM 7 Apr SVN)
<u>CLASS I (Rations)</u>		
Meal, Combat, Individual	21	21 days
B Rations	9	9 days
<u>CLASS III (Fuel)</u>		
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	3	3 days
JP-4 Fuel (Jet Fuel)	10.6	10.6 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	9.5	9.9 days
Diesel	23.5	21.5
<u>CLASS V (Ammunition)</u>		
A. High Explosive		
60-mm mortar	69	56 days
81-mm mortar	25	25 days
90-mm (tank)	68	68 days
4.2" mortar	26	26 days
105-mm howitzer	29	29 days
155-mm howitzer	26	27 days
B. Antitank		
		<u>ROUNDS ON HAND</u>
90-mm AP-T		254
90-mm HEAT		1,089
66-mm rocket (LAW)		2,564
Antitank mines (M-15)		349
Antitank mines (M-21)		469
106-mm HEAT		1,533
106-mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T)		1,455
3.5" rocket		2,403

SECRET

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By Ng, NARA, Date 4-29-92

SECRET

ROUNDS ON HAND

C. Antipersonnel


90-mm BEEHIVE	542
105-mm BEEHIVE	1,090
106-mm BEEHIVE	1,515
90-mm CANNISTER	323

CLASS V (COFRAM)

105-mm howitzer	1,637
155-mm howitzer	990
40-mm grenade launcher	6,729
Hand grenades	2,949

2. On 7 April, Khe Sanh was resupplied with 142.5 short tons as follows:

CLASS I	44.0
CLASS II	1.5
CLASS III	7.5
CLASS IV	37.5
CLASS V	45.5
Miscellaneous	6.5


S. D. CRAMER, Jr.
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:

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PAC DESK

SECRET

78

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~--CROCODILE

Pres file

Monday, April 8, 1968 -- 9:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the official reply to our message of April 3-4. It is virtually identical with that given independently to Baggs and Ashmore, on the one hand, and Collingwood, on the other. (Tab A)

As Sullivan notes, the language may have hardened slightly but still leaves wiggle room.

Paragraph 3 attempts to narrow our freedom of action in the discussions; and we will have to make sure that our reply doesn't lock us in.

State is already working on a reply.

Ham Armstrong's discussions with Sihaneuk, referred to here, are attached as Tab B.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By is, NARA Date 1-15-99

Vientiane 5697

Bangkok 12886 (section 1)

P.S. We (Nick + Bill B.) stopped delivery
of our message to Moscow + New Delhi
in time.

~~SECRET~~--CROCODILE

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

~~SECRET~~

6
TELEGRAM

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-269

By us, NARA Date 10-7-98

78a

***** ZZ RUEHC
DE RUMJFS 5697 0991115
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 031033Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7955
STATE GRNC
BT

1967Q
April 8, 1968
6:57 AM

~~SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 5697

NODIS CROCODILE

1. FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF LETTER HANDED TO ME BY NORTH VIETNAMESE CHARGE AT 1605 THIS AFTERNOON. IN EXACT PARALLEL TO LETTER WHICH I SENT HIM APRIL 4, INTRODUCTION AND CLOSING ARE IN FRENCH, WHILE INNER QUOTE IS IN VIETNAMESE. SINCE WE ARE UNABLE TRANSMIT VIETNAMESE DIACRITIC MARKS TELEGRAPHICALLY, WE ARE PROVIDING AN UNOFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION IN THIS CABLE. FOR PURPOSES OF RECORD, WE WILL SEND SUBSEQUENT CABLE TRANSMITTING THE VIETNAMESE TEXT WITHOUT RPT WITHOUT DIACRITIC MARKS. THIS SHOULD ASSIST IN ANY DOUBLE-CHECKING OF OUR TRANSLATION WHICH YOU WISH UNDERTAKE. I SHOULD NOTE THAT CHARGE ORALLY GAVE ME AN "UNOFFICIAL" TRANSLATION OF THE VIETNAMESE TEXT INTO FRENCH.

"VIENTIANE, LE 8 AVRIL 1968
MONSIEUR WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN
AMBASSADEUR DES ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE
VIENTIANE

"MONSIEUR L'AMBASSADEUR,

"JE SUIS CHARGE PAR MON GOUVERNEMENT DE VOUS PRIER DE TRANSMETTRE A VOS AUTORITES A WASHINGTON LE MESSAGE SUIVANT:

"INNER QTE REGARDING THE SUGGESTION OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT DIPLOMATIC NOTE OF APRIL 4, 1968 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRV HAS THE FOLLOWING VIEWS:

(1) THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRV ACCEPTS THE SUGGESTION OF THE AMERICAN SIDE REGARDING THE TWO SIDES HAVING REPRESENTATION AT RANK OF AMBASSADOR TO CONTACT EACH OTHER.

(2) THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRV ADDS THAT PHNOM, PENH IS AN APPROPRIATE LOCATION.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO VIENTIANE 5697 APARIL 8, 1968, NODIS CROCODILE

(3) DURING THE CONTACT THE AMERICAN SIDE WILL SPECIFY WHEN AMERICA WILL TRULY CEASE WITHOUT CONDITIONS THE BOMBING AND EVERY OTHER ACT OF WAR IN ALL THE NATIONAL TERRITORY OF THE DRV. AFTER THAT THERE WILL BE AGREEMENT REGARDING TIME, PLACE AND LEVEL OF THE OFFICIAL CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE DRV AND AMERICA. END INNER QTE..

"VEUILLEZ AGREEER, MONSIEUR L' AMBASSADEUR, L'ASSURANCE DE MA HAUTE CONSIDERATION.

"NGUYEN-CHRN
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
DE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU VIET-NAM."

2. IN TRANSLATING NUMBERED PARAGRAPH (2) INTO FRENCH, CHAN USED PHRASE "PHNOM PENH SERAIT PREFERABLE." WHEN HE HAD FINISHED HIS TRANSLATION, I ASKED HIM TO GO BACK OVER THAT PARAGRAPH AND TO TELL ME WHETHER, IN HIS VIEW, THE VIETNAMESE TEXT HAD ANY NUANCE WHICH MODIFIED "PREFERABLE." HE STUDIED TEXT BRIEFLY AND SAID THAT HE FELT "PREFERABLE" WAS THE BEST TRANSLATION. HE THEN WENT ON SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVELY TO SAY THAT EVEN PHNOM PENH WASN'T TOO EASY FOR THEM, BECAUSE THE AIRLINE COMMUNICATIONS WERE SO IRREGULAR AND SOMEWHAT UNCERTAIN.

3. I LET IT GO AT THAT AND SAID I WOULD COMMUNICATE THE TEXT FORTHWITH TO MY GOVERNMENT. I EXPECTED TO RECEIVE AN ANSWER SHORTLY AND WOULD SEND SAME TO HIM BY SAFE HAND. HE SAID HE WOULD BE OPEN FOR BUSINESS AS OF 0800 TOMORROW MORNING.

4. BEFORE FINISHING, HE SAID HE HAD AN ORAL MESSAGE ALSO TO CONVEY. HIS GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT OF OUR PROPOSAL TO MEET APRIL 8. FOR ITS PART, HOWEVER, THE DRV IS UNABLE TO MEET SUCH AN EARLY SCHEDULE.

5. COMMENT: IT WILL BE NOTED THAT TEXT PASSED IS PRACTICALLY IDENTICAL WITH TEXTS GIVEN BAGGS-ASHMORE AND COLLINGWOOD; HOWEVER, THE PHRASING RE PHNOM PENH SEEMS, IF ANYTHING, TO HAVE HARDENED SOMEWHAT. IT PROBABLY HAS TO BE READ IN CONNECTION WITH OUR STATEMENT THAT WE "WILL ATTEMPT TO MEET ANY REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS OF THE DRV FOR TIME AND PLACE FOR ESTABLISHING SUCH CONTACTS." ASSUME YOU HAVE SEEN HAM ARMSTRONG'S CABLE FROM BANGKOK REPORTING THAT SIHANOUK SAID HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO HOST MEETING IN PHNOM PENH "IF BOTH SIDES AGREED." AMSTRONG (WHO CURRENTLY HERE) TELLS ME THAT SIHANOUK MADE CLEAR TO HIM DURING HIS TALK THAT HE DID NOT RPT NOT CONSIDER THE GVN ONE OF THE "SIDES" INVOLVED IN ANY OF THESE MATTERS.

6. FOR WHATEVER IT MAY BE WORTH, SOUVANNA HAS TOLD ME (PRIOR TO BEGINNING OF THIS EXCHANGE) THAT HE WOULD BE QUITE CONTENT TO HAVE CONTACTS "OF ALL THE PARTIES" IN VIENTIANE.

GP-2 SULLIVAN

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

24

78b

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 262

02

PAGE 01 BANGKO 12886 061347Z

49
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-269
By us, NARA Date 10-7-98

Rostow

P 061133Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6474

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BANGKOK 12886 SECTION ONE OF TWO

EXDIS:

FOR BUNDY

SUBJECT : ARMSTRONG INTERVIEW WITH SIHANOUK

1. MR. AND MRS. HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG ARRIVED EVENING APR 5 FROM PHNOM PENH. THIS MORNING HE HELPFULLY WROTE OUT FOR YOU AND DISCUSSED WITH US FOLLOWING INITIAL ACCOUNT OF APR 5 INTERVIEW WITH PRINCE SIHANOUK. ASSUME YOU WILL WISH TO DETERMINE APPROPRIATE FURTHER DISTRIBUTION.

2. BEGIN TEXT: BANGKOK, APRIL 6, 1968. I SAW PRINCE SIHANOUK IN PHNOM PENH YESTERDAY. HE SAID HE WAS REALLY DELIGHTED I'D

PAGE 2 RUMTBK 12886K ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
COME BACK AGAIN TO PHNOM PENH AND TALKED VOLUBLY AND IN A VERY RELAXED AND FRIENDLY WAY FOR AN HOUR. HE SPOKE SUBSTANTIALLY AS FOLLOWS:

BEFORE LONG, I RAISED THE QUESTION OF OUR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA. HE SAID, "YES, I WOULD LIKE TO RENEW DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, BUT ONE SMALL PHRASE STANDS IN THE WAY - YOUR RECOGNITION OF CAMBODIA'S PRESENT FRONTIERS. ONE OTHER REQUIREMENT OF OURS - CESSATION OF AGGRESSION - YOU HAVE ALREADY MET IN PRACTICE. BUT THIS ONE YOU DO NOT SEEM ABLE TO BRING YOURSELVES TO MEET. YOU SEEM TO BE AFRAID TO MAKE A STATEMENT ABOUT OUR FRONTIERS BECAUSE YOUR PROTEGES THAILAND AND SOUTH VIETNAM OBJECT. THAILAND OBJECTS BECAUSE SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BANGKO 12886 061347Z

CONCEDE THAT A SMALL TEMPLE PREAS VIHEAR ON THE FRONTIER IS IN CAMBODIA. IT IS IN CAMBODIA BY THE DECISION OF THE WORLD COURT AT THE HAGUE. BUT THAILAND STILL HOPES TO REOPEN THE ISSUE, AND SEEMS TO HAVE YOUR SUPPORT IN THIS STRANGE PROJECT. WHY IS THE UNITED STATES UNWILLING TO ABIDE BY THE VERDICT OF THE WORLD COURT?

PAGE 3 RUMTBK 12886K ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"SOUTH VIETNAM OBJECTS BECAUSE THERE ARE SOME SMALL ROCKY ISLANDS, INHABITED BY A FEW FISHERMEN, WHICH ARE AND ALWAYS HAVE BEEN CAMBODIAN, BUT WHICH IT WOULD LIKE TO ANNEX. THEY ARE PART OF A LARGER GROUP OF ISLANDS WHICH WERE INCLUDED IN COCHIN-CHINA BY THE FRENCH, WHO ALWAYS TRIED TO ENLARGE THEIR TERRITORY AT THE EXPENSE OF CAMBODIA. BUT A GOVERNOR-GENERAL, BREVIE, DREW A LINE LEAVING A FEW WESTERLY SMALL ISLANDS IN CAMBODIAN JURISDICTION; THEY HAVE BEEN ADMINISTERED EVER SINCE (AS INDEED THEY WERE BEFORE) AS PART OF CAMBODIA. THEY ARE OF LITTLE VALUE, BUT SOUTH VIETNAM CLAIMS THEM. WHY? PROBABLY IN ORDER TO HAVE A CLAIM OF SOME SORT - ANY SORT - AGAINST US. IT WOULD SEEM THAT AMERICA, EVEN THOUGH IT HAS MANY COMPLICATED PROBLEMS TO DEAL WITH, MIGHT INVESTIGATE THESE TWO FRONTIER PROBLEMS ON THEIR MERITS AND ACT ACCORDINGLY.

"IT IS NOT AS THOUGH ONLY THE FRENCH HAVE RECOGNIZED CAMBODIAN PRESENT FRONTIERS. MOST OF YOUR EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE DONE SO, INCLUDING ITALY, BELGIUM, HOLLAND AND OTHERS, AS ALSO AUSTRALIA. THE BRITISH FORMULA, RECOGNIZING THE "INVIOABILITY" OF OUR FRONTIERS IS NOT SATISFACTORY, SIMPLY

PAGE 4 RUMTBK 12886C ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BECAUSE IN USING THAT WORDING THEY INDICATE THAT THEY MEAN SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE STRAIGHTFORWARD STATEMENT WE REQUIRE.

"ACTUALLY," HE ADDED WITH A GRIN, "THE PROBLEM IS SETTLED SO FAR AS THE FRONTIER WITH SOUTH VIET NAM IS CONCERNED, FOR THE VIET CONG RECOGNIZE IT. WE RECOGNIZE THEM AS THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIET NAM - AS YOU WILL HAVE TO IN THE END."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 BANGKO 12886 061347Z

I REMINDED HIM THAT A YEAR AGO HE HAD GIVEN ME AS A REASON FOR NOT RESUMING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH US THE FEAR THAT INCIDENTS MIGHT OCCUR THEREAFTER AND MAKE THINGS WORSE THAN IF RELATIONS HAD NOT BEEN RESUMED. FOR INSTANCE, IF AMERICAN OR SOUTH VIET NAM INCURSIONS OCCURED AND CAMBODIANS WERE KILLED THERE MIGHT BE VIOLENT INCIDENTS OUTSIDE THE AMERICAN EMBASSY. HE SAID THAT IT WAS TRUE THAT THIS HAD WORRIED HIM, PARTICULARLY AS HE WOULD NEVER BRING HIMSELF TO FIRE ON CAMBODIAN STUDENTS. BUT THE DANGER OF THIS WAS LESS NOW, SINCE HE HAD DEALT SEVERELY AND EFFECTIVELY WITH LOCAL COMMUNISTS. IF ANY TROUBLE ERUPTED, IT WOULD COME FROM PATROTIC STUDENTS AND NOT FROM COMMUNIST

PAGE 5 RUMTBK 12886K ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STUDENTS EGGED ON FROM ABROAD (MEANING, OBVIOUSLY, PEKING). PRESIDENT SUHARTO ENDED A STATE VISIT TO PHNOM PENH ONLY YESTERDAY. EVERYONE KNOWS HE IS VERY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND HAD KILLED MANY CHINESE AS WELL AS COMMUNISTS, BUT THE PEOPLE GAVE HIM A GREAT WELCOME, STUDENTS INCLUDED.

HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE WERE TWO SORTS OF REBELS, FREE KHMER, ENCOURAGED, FINANCED AND ARMED "BY YOUR PROTEGES" AND KHMER ROUGE, "IN TOUCH WITH PEKING."

IN A DIVERSION, I TRIED, WITH SOME SUCCESS, I THINK, TO CONVINCE HIM THAT EVN IF AT THE BEGINNING OF AMERICAN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN VIET NAM WE HAD ENCOURAGED THE FORMATION BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE OF SPECIAL FORCES AMONG THE KHMER OF SOUTH VIETNAMN WE HAD DONE SO ONLY BRIEFLY AND NOW TRIED OUR BEST TO DISSUADE BOTH SOUTH VIET NAM AND THAILAND FROM ANTI-CAMBODIAN ACTIVITIES. HE ACCEPTED MY ASSURANCE AS TO THE FIRST PART OF THE STATEMENT BUT STILL COULD NOT SEE WHY WE MUST BE SO TIMID AND POWERLESS - AS HE PUT IT - TO INFLUENCE THE ACTIONS OF OUR DEPENDENTS.)

PAGE 6 RUMTBK 12886K ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALTHOUGH HE SAID HE HAD THE REBELS UNDER CONTROL, HE TOOK OUT OF HIS POCKET A SKETCH MAP WHICH HE SAID HAD JUST BEEN GIVEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 04 BANGKO 12886 061347Z

HIM BY HIS CHIEF-OF-STAFF. IT SHOWED THE AREA SOUTH OF THE LAOTIAN TOWN OF ATTOPEU. RED ARROWS POINTED SOUTH-WEST AND SOUTH-EAST, INDICATING INFILTRATION ROUTES OF THE CHINESE AID FOR THE KHMER ROUGE. AN AREA NORTH-EAST OF THE TOWN OF LABANG WAS SHADED RED TO INDICATE THAT IT WAS A REBEL STRONGHOLD. CHINESE ARMS ALSO CAME IN TO THEM BY SEA, HE SAID, CONVERGED BY THE VIET CONG. HE AGREED THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE VIET CONG WERE VERY "COMPLICATED," HELPING THE COMMUNISTS IN ONE WAY, BUT PROTESTING FRIENDSHIP AND RECOGNIZING CAMBODIAN FRONTIERS ON THE OTHER HAND. HE SAID COURIERS HAD BEEN CAPTURED CARRYING MESSAGES BETWEEN THE KHMER ROUGE AND PEKING. PROPAGANDA PRINTED IN CHINA IS ALSO BROUGHT IN, BUT MUST BE TRANSLATED IN CAMBODIA BEFORE DISTRIBUTION.

I WAS MUCH INTERESTED IN HIS OPINION ABOUT THE FUTURE OF SOUTH VIET NAM. HE IS CERTAIN NEITHER THE NORTH NOR THE SOUTH WILL EVER ACCEPT RULE BY CHINA. THE SOUTH WILL PREFER A SEPARATE EXISTENCE FROM THE NORTH FOR SAY 10 OR 15 YEARS, IN ORDER TO

GP-3 HANNAH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~TOP SECRET~~Monday, April 8, 1968 -- 8:25 a.m. *for file*

Mr. President:

I have kept out of the draft instructions for Gov. Harriman. But I have a suggestion about the statement of the basic objective, in the first paragraph, which, in my judgment, would make it a more accurate reflection of the U. S. objective and make it, also, a better document for the historical record.

I would revise the first paragraph as follows:

"Basic Objective. To make arrangements with the North Vietnamese representative for prompt and serious substantive talks looking towards peace in Vietnam, in the course of which an understanding may be negotiated on a cessation of bombing in the North under circumstances which would not be militarily disadvantageous. Such understanding to be within objectives defined below."

The reason is that our objective is not a cessation of bombing; it is prompt and serious substantive talks looking towards peace.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-272
By iso, NARA Date 2-2-98

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

4/1/68

79a

INSTRUCTIONS FOR GOVERNOR HARRISMAN

Basic Objective

To achieve an understanding with the North Vietnamese representative on a cessation of bombing in the North and arrangements for prompt and serious substantive talks under circumstances which would not be military disadvantageous. Such understanding to be within objectives defined below.

Specific Objectives

1. Cessation of the Bombing

The US is prepared to agree to a cessation of naval, air and artillery bombardment of North Viet-Nam. In keeping with North Vietnamese statements, it is our understanding that such action on our part will lead promptly to talks in which both sides would be free to raise any elements which they believe would lead to a peaceful settlement. We are prepared in these talks to make arrangements to this end, including agreement on announcement of bombing cessation and subsequent talks.

2. Prompt Talks

Substantive talks should be held within 3 to 7 days following the cessation of bombing.

3. Various Talks

We should seek explicit confirmation by the North Vietnamese that any topic relevant to the substance of peace could be raised in the substantive talks.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 92-436

By ju/jw, NARA, Date 4-10-97

4. Participation

In any substantive discussions we expect to take account of the interests of the South Vietnamese Government and of our Yankee allies. Participation in any such discussions affecting South Viet-Nam must not exclude the Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam.

5. Not Taking Advantage

We should ~~also~~ provide an adequate basis for the expectation that North Viet-Nam would not attempt to improve its military position as a result of the US cessation. North Viet-Nam should understand that the US would regard as acts of bad faith inconsistent with its restraints any such attempts. We would consider as examples of bad faith:

- a) Artillery or other fire from or across the DMZ.
- b) Ground attacks across the DMZ or the massing of additional forces or supplies in North Viet-Nam or the DMZ in a manner which poses a direct threat to Allied forces in South Viet-Nam.
- c) An increase in the movement of North Vietnamese troops and supplies into South Viet-Nam.

6. Reconnaissance Flights

The US intends to continue certain reconnaissance flights, and the record should not preclude such flights.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

APRIL 8, 1968

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE
TO THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The relief of the forces which have held the base at Khe Sanh is an occasion for me to express the pride and confidence I feel in those who are carrying forward the Nation's struggle against aggression in Southeast Asia.

Side by side with your South Vietnamese comrades -- and our other fighting allies -- you have taken the full initial weight of the enemies winter-spring offensive; and you have now seized the initiative.

The enemy intended to destroy the Constitutional government of South Vietnam and its armed forces. In this he failed.

The enemy intended to over-run the base at Khe Sanh. For this purpose he emplaced around that base at least two divisions of North Vietnamese regulars. Less than 6,000 U. S. Marines and South Vietnamese Rangers -- backed by our tremendous air capacity -- pinned them down, kept them away from the populated areas at the peak of the winter-spring offensive; and imposed heavy casualties.

Now the seige of Khe Sanh is lifted.

But clearly the fighting in South Vietnam is not yet at an end.

The enemy may throw new forces into the battle.

You, I know, intend to continue to move forward.

But by your gallant and skillful support for the brave people and armed forces of South Vietnam, you have brought nearer the time of peace in that suffering land and in all of Southeast Asia.

As we seek now to find through negotiations an honorable peace in Vietnam, I wish you to know that we are grateful for what you have already accomplished and will be counting on you more than ever, until the blessed day when the guns fall silent.

#

#

#

INFORMATION

81

~~SECRET~~-CROCODILE

Monday, April 8, 1968 - 8:00am

Mr. President:

An official Hanoi reply may have been delivered to Sullivan at 4:00 a.m. our time.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Vientiane 5678

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By iso, NARA Date 1-15-99

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

4
TELEGRAM

81a

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 5678

NODIS/CROCODILE

REF : STATE 143098

DEPT PASS FLASH TO MOSCOW, NEW DELHI, SAIGON

1. AT 0900 LOCAL TIME, JUST AS WE WERE PREPARING TO DELIVER TEXT REFTEL TO NORTH VIETNAMESE EMBASSY, NGUYEN TUONG CON CAME TO OUR CHANCERY AND ASKED TO SEE DCM. HE SAID THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE CHARGE WOULD HAVE ANSWER TO OUR LETTER OF APRIL 4 THIS AFTERNOON AND ASKED IF I COULD COME VISIT CHARGE IN ORDER TO RECEIVE SAME. APPOINTMENT HAS BEEN FIXED FOR 1600 LOCAL, WHICH IS 0400 WASHINGTON TIME.

PAGE 2 RUMJFS ~~5678 SECRET~~

2. SINCE BUSINESS DAY HAS NOT RPT NOT YET BEGUN IN NEW DELHI OR MOSCOW, SUGGEST DEPT TAKE ACTION BY FLASH PRECEDENCE TO STOP DELIVERY OF TEXT CONTAINED REFTEL.

3. PLEASE ADVISE BY FLASH OR IMMEDIATE MESSAGE WHETHER THERE ARE ANY PARTICULAR INSTRUCTIONS YOU WISH ME TO FOLLOW IN TALK WITH CHARGE THIS AFTERNOON. FOR EXAMPLE, IF MESSAGE I RECEIVE PROPOSES PHNOM PENH, AS IT PROBABLY WILL, SHOULD I STATE OUR "SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES" WITH THAT PROPOSAL AS OUTLINED PENULTIMATE PARAGRAPH REFTEL.

4. PLEASE ALSO NOTE INEVITABLE ORIENTAL THOCH OF HAVING ME GO TO NORTH VIETNAMESE EMBASSY TO RECEIVE REPLY RATHER THAN HAVING CHAN SET FOOT IN MY BARBARIA.

GP-3. SULLIVAN
BT

NOT PASSED TO MOSCOW, NEW DELHI OR SAIGON BY OC/T

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1968 APR 7 PM 10 16

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-269
By iso, NARA Date 10-7-98

ACTION

Monday - April 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message from President Balaguer on Tavera Dam

President Balaguer has sent you the message at Tab B expressing thanks for arranging the financing of his pet project -- the Tavera Dam. You will recall that he raised the subject at Punta del Este and you asked True Davis to see what could be done.

All the feasibility work on the dam and irrigation system has been completed and the financing worked out as follows:

Inter-American Development Bank	\$22.9 million
AID	\$ 7.0 "
Dominican Government	\$ 4.0 "

The loan signing ceremony is tentatively scheduled for April 29. We are hopeful that Nick Katzenbach and Covey Oliver will attend for us.

I recommend you approve the proposed reply to President Balaguer at Tab A.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒Disapprove ☐Call me ☐

1:25pm 4/9/68 - Marie Fehmer telephoned from Camp David.

Attachments -

- Tab A - Proposed Presidential reply to President Balaguer.
- Tab B - Message from Balaguer of April 2, 1968.

82a

Proposed Presidential Reply

to

Dominican President Balaguer's Message of April 2, 1968

Dear Mr. President

I am most grateful for your thoughtful message of April 2.

I remember well our conversation at Punta del Este on Tavera Dam and the significance you attached to it. The way has now been opened for its construction and the many opportunities for economic development it will bring to your country. You and the Dominican people are to be congratulated for your determination to make this project a reality. I am also reminded of the important contribution made by Dr. Felipe Herrera and members of the staff of the Inter-American Development Bank. For our part we are glad to be able to participate.

Ambassador Crimmins has informed me of your generous remarks of April 1, on signing the PL 480 Agreement and Supporting Assistance loan. I take this occasion to express my appreciation.

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Joaquin Balaguer
President of the Dominican Republic
Santo Domingo.

(Official Translation)
of
Message to the President
from
President Joaquin Balaguer of the Dominican Republic
of April 2, 1968

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
April 2, 1968

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America
Washington, D. C.

I take very great pleasure in expressing to Your Excellency, in my own name and in that of the Dominican people and Government, our most sincere thanks for the valuable aid which Your Excellency has given to the Dominican Republic in obtaining loans, one from the Inter-American Development Bank and the other from the Agency for International Development, for making use of the water resources of the Cibao Valley, an undertaking of the utmost importance in promoting our country's economic development and raising the standard of living of the people living in that potentially very rich area of our national territory. The Dominican Republic is greatly indebted to Your Excellency for that noble contribution to its progress and its social and economic welfare, the indispensable bases for transforming its traditional structures to the benefit principally of its poorest classes.

I take this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my deepest personal gratitude and my highest consideration.

Joaquin Balaguer
President of the Dominican Republic.

83

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By id, NARA Date 1-15-99

ACTION

Monday
April 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

On April 2 you received the following message from President Marcos in response to your March 31 speech:

"It was with deep pain and fear of the future that I and many other leaders received your decision not to seek or accept the nomination of your party in the next Presidential election. We also note the twin decisions of suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam and the increase in the number of American soldiers committed to South Vietnam. We can only pray for the success of your efforts to bring about peace in that benighted land. Whatever may happen I wish to reiterate my own personal belief that history will uphold the wisdom and validity of your position of the need for the American presence in Asia in these troublous times. It is our prayer and hope that your successor will pursue the same policy. May God be always with you. President Ferdinand Marcos."

To back up the "deep fear of the future" we have very solid indications from Manila that he is about to "compromise" on the PHILCAG detachment in Vietnam. The appropriation for this detachment is now pending before the Philippine Senate and it looks as if Marcos is about to assent to reducing and/or changing the nature of the detachment by replacing military engineering personnel with medical personnel. State urgently suggests you send the following message in the hope that it will stiffen Marcos. Certainly, it would be a bad time for Marcos to start playing with PHILCAG, for that would enhance the South Vietnamese fear that they are being deserted:

"I am deeply grateful for your prayers and good wishes at this time, as I have been grateful for your friendship and support over the past years.

"I have given long and careful consideration to any possible steps we might take to bring us closer to our common goal of peace and self-determination in Vietnam. I hope and pray the steps we are now taking will lead to early and serious talks on a peace settlement. But in such talks, as I have said, the United States will

never accept a fake solution to our arduous struggle and call it peace. Until we achieve an honorable peace, I look to you and to our other allies to join with us in continued efforts in Vietnam.

"It is for this reason that I am extremely disturbed to hear that my statement of March 31 seems to have been misunderstood by some individuals and some members of the press in your country. It has been pointed out to me that there has arisen a mistaken idea that the United States somehow is withdrawing or cutting its commitment to South Vietnam.

"Nothing could be further from the truth. The U.S. Government has publicly announced its intention to call up additional reserves and to send additional units to South Vietnam.

"Concurrent with the reduction in the bombing of North Vietnam, I consider it essential that all troop contributing countries maintain their stance in South Vietnam. Any other course would lead the North Vietnamese to consider we were weakening in our resolve, and would not assist in reaching an honorable peaceful solution. Any other course would lead the people of South Vietnam, in particular, and the people of other nations concerned in general, to consider that we were not living up to our commitments.

"It is to make clear our position that I am addressing this message to you. I have noted with pleasure your stated intention to maintain PHILCAG in South Vietnam with no essential change, and I have welcomed your reassurance on this point. Lyndon B. Johnson."

I recommend that you approve the message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

STATE:MWright:wpt

84

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By is, NARA Date 1-15-99

ACTION

Monday
April 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*1 [initials]
2 Pres file*

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I recommend that you approve the message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

STATE:MWright:wpt

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YOU ARE REQUESTED TO DISSEMINATE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO ALL US FORCES UNDER YOUR COMMAND.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

THE RELIEF OF THE FORCES WHICH HAVE HELD THE BASE AT KHE SANH IS AN OCCASION FOR ME TO EXPRESS THE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE I FEEL IN THOSE WHO ARE CARRYING FORWARD THE NATION'S STRUGGLE AGAINST AGGRESSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

SIDE BY SIDE WITH YOUR SOUTH VIETNAMESE COMRADES -- AND OUR OTHER FIGHTING ALLIES -- YOU HAVE TAKEN THE FULL INITIAL WEIGHT OF THE ENEMY'S WINTER-SPRING OFFENSIVE; AND YOU HAVE NOW SEIZED THE INITIATIVE.

THE ENEMY INTENDED TO DESTROY THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND ITS ARMED FORCES. IN THIS HE FAILED.

THE ENEMY INTENDED TO OVER-RUN THE BASE AT KHE SANH. FOR THIS PURPOSE HE EMPLACED AROUND THAT BASE AT LEAST TWO DIVISIONS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE REGULARS. LESS THAN 6,000 U.S. MARINES AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE RANGERS -- BACKED BY OUR TREMENDOUS AIR CAPACITY -- PINNED THEM DOWN, KEPT THEM AWAY FROM THE POPULATED AREAS AT THE PEAK OF THE WINTER-SPRING OFFENSIVE; AND IMPOSED HEAVY CASUALTIES.

NOW THE SEIGE OF KHE SANH IS LIFTED.

BUT CLEARLY THE FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS NOT YET AT AN END.

THE ENEMY MAY THROW NEW FORCES INTO THE BATTLE.

YOU, I KNOW, INTEND TO CONTINUE TO MOVE FORWARD.

BUT BY YOUR GALLANT AND SKILLFUL SUPPORT FOR THE BRAVE PEOPLE AND ARMED FORCES OF SOUTH VIETNAM, YOU HAVE BROUGHT NEARER THE TIME OF PEACE IN THAT SUFFERING LAND AND IN ALL OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.

AS WE SEEK NOW TO FIND THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS AN HONORABLE PEACE IN VIETNAM, I WISH YOU TO KNOW THAT WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR WHAT YOU HAVE ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED AND WILL BE COUNTING ON YOU MORE THAN EVER, UNTIL THE BLESSED DAY WHEN THE GUNS FALL SILENT.

UNCLAS
BT

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

Monday - April 8, 1968

Pre file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ceremony to mark the first anniversary of the OAS Summit and Pan American Day

You have agreed (paragraph 2 of Tab A) to make a statement marking the first anniversary of the Punta del Este Meeting of Presidents and Pan American Day -- April 14.

For the occasion, I recommend an East Room ceremony on Thursday, April 11 or Tuesday, April 16, to ratify the Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has reported favorably on the Amendments. Mike Manatos tells me he thinks we can get Senate action this week.

You could use your statement at the ceremony to review the progress made on the Summit Action Program and launch the idea of an Inter-American Task Force on Physical Integration. The informal soundings made by State on the Task Force idea has produced an enthusiastic response.

There are some 17 Latin American Ministers of Agriculture in town this week. Were the ceremony to be held this coming Thursday, they would make an excellent addition to the customary audience of Latin American Ambassadors, heads of inter-American organizations, and Congressional leaders.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ceremony for April 11 ☐

Prefer no ceremony ☐

Prefer ceremony after Easter ☐

Call me ☐

Attachment
Tab A.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 4-29-92

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET--CODEWORD~~

April 8, 1968

87

Pro file

Mr. President:

This NSA retrospective analysis suggests that up to 44,000 additional North Vietnamese forces may be moving south.

That would be exactly Westys' 20,000 in the pipeline plus two more divisions.

We do not know yet where they are heading for:

- via Laos into Vietnam;
- straight to the DMZ.

One group, however, indicated it was to go to the 9th Division, operating near Saigon. A second indication came from a way-station, aiding infiltrators, indicating infiltration activity in Laos about opposite Danang.

W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-321
By SJ, NARA, Date 2-6-03

~~SECRET--CODEWORD~~

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SPOT REPORT
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2/0 [REDACTED] R168-68

3.3(6)(1)

PAVN GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF REAR SERVICES COMMUNICATIONS
REVEAL EXTENSIVE MOVEMENT OF MILITARY GROUPS
ADDITIONAL SIGINT DERIVED FROM PAVN REAR SERVICES COMM-
UNICATIONS PROVIDES MORE INFORMATION ON THE GROUPS OF
MILITARY PERSONNEL WHICH ARE MOVING SOUTHWARD THROUGH
NORTH VIETNAM. SINCE APPROXIMATELY 01 FEBRUARY, SOME 82
GROUPS OF PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO IN REAR SERVICE
COMMUNICATIONS. THE FIGURE OF 82 INCLUDES SOME GROUPS WHICH
CANNOT BE CONFIRMED AS VALID I.E., THEIR DESIGNATORS ARE
POSSIBLY INCOMPLETE OR DO NOT FIT THE PATTERN OF GROUP
DESIGNATORS. ACCEPTING THE FIGURE OF 82, THE BREAKDOWN BY
MONTH SINCE APPROXIMATELY 01 FEBRUARY IS AS FOLLOWS:
11 GROUPS IN FEBRUARY, 53 GROUPS IN MARCH AND 18 TO DATE
IN APRIL. ACTUAL STRENGTH FIGURES ARE AVAILABLE FOR
SOME 40 OF THE POSSIBLE 82 GROUPS, PROVIDING A TOTAL OF
21,924 MEN. AVERAGING OUT THIS TOTAL WOULD INDICATE THE
STRENGTH OF EACH GROUP MOVING IS APPROXIMATELY 550 MEN.
AN EXTENSION OF THIS AVERAGE TO ENCOMPASS THE ADDITIONAL
GROUPS FOR WHICH NO ACTUAL STRENGTH FIGURE IS AVAILABLE
MIGHT SUGGEST SOME 44,000 MEN HAVE AT LEAST BEGUN TO MOVE
SOUTHWARD IN THE PAST NINE WEEKS. THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST
OF THE GROUPS OBSERVED. ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON THE GROUPS AND
THEIR MOVEMENT IS CONTAINED IN PREVIOUS REPORTS ((1)).

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC D3-199
By uo, NARA, Date 3-1-04

~~SECRET~~

Meeting With the President
Sunday, April 7, 1968 -- 3:00 p.m.

AGENDA

1. Plans for Future Deployment at the DMZ. (Gen. Westmoreland)
Forces and the future of the trace (barrier).
2. Operational Plans Under Conditions of a Total Bombing Cessation.
(Gen. Westmoreland)
3. Prospective Force Levels and U.S. Reserve Pediton in Vietnam.
(Gen. Westmoreland)
4. A Fight-and-Talk Strategy. (Gen. Westmoreland)
5. Other.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 5-9-92

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

89

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, April 7, 1968 -- 12:00 noon

Mr. President:

Khe Sanh-DMZ-A Shau:

- 24 rounds enemy incoming;
- 2,030 rounds friendly;
- 115 tactical support sorties, plus
9 B-52's in Khe Sanh area;
- 6 B-52's in A Shau;
- 179 tons resupply;
- weather generally good.

for file

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By rf, NARA, Date 4-29-92

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1992
By rf, NARA, Date 4-29-92

Sunday, April 7, 1968
11:00 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

89a

Khe Sanh Report

1. This is report number sixty-three on the Khe Sanh/DMZ/A Shanh Valley area for the period April 6th, 1968.
2. Weather at Khe Sanh was generally good throughout the day yesterday, with occasional broken clouds near 2,000 feet and visibility was reduced to one mile. Conditions improved by 7:00 a.m. this morning, when the fog lifted and good weather returned.
3. Artillery fire support for Khe Sanh consisted of 202 missions expending 2,030 rounds. One hundred sixty-one missions were observed. No COFRAM ammunition was fired. Khe Sanh Combat Base received 24 mortar rounds during the period. The mortar attacks wounded 10 Marines (three evacuated).
4. Yesterday at Khe Sanh, sweeps by the 37th ARVN Rangers outside their perimeter located 70 enemy bodies. Company G, 2d Battalion, 26th Marines engaged an estimated enemy company five kilometers northeast of Khe Sanh at noon yesterday. The contact continued until nightfall and 28 enemy were killed. Four Marines were killed and 36 wounded (35 evacuated).
5. The disposition of Marines in defensive positions at Khe Sanh is adjusting to offensive operations in coordination with operation Pegasus/Lamson 207. An ARVN Airborne Battalion is scheduled to air assault into Khe Sanh Combat Base and thereafter launch attacks to the Southwest. Yesterday, one company of the battalion closed at Khe Sanh. The 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry relieved the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines on Hill 471, two kilometers south of Khe Sanh Combat Base, enabling the Marine battalion to initiate offensive operations to the northeast. Enemy positions to the southeast and northwest in the immediate vicinity of Khe Sanh Combat Base are being cleared by elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. Enemy resistance in these areas is decreasing.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/33
By 18 NARA, Date 5-18-92

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By 18 NARA, Date 5-18-92

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

6. Elsewhere in Quang Tri Province, Company K, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, in night defensive positions nine kilometers southwest of Gio Linh, was attacked by an estimated enemy platoon at midnight last night. A small penetration was made in the Marine perimeter before the attack was repulsed. Sixteen of the enemy were killed and one Marine was wounded. Northeast of Dong Ha, Task Force Kilo continued to sweep southward with only light contact. Yesterday afternoon, northeast of Cam Lo, 1st Battalion, 2nd Infantry (ARVN) engaged an estimated enemy company. Fifty-one of the enemy were killed; one crew-served weapon, 400 rounds 82MM mortar ammo, 200 rounds B-40 ammo, 2,000 kilos of rice and 200 kilos of sugar was captured. Sixteen ARVN were wounded.

7. A total of 115 tactical air sorties were flown in support of Operation Pegasus. Of these, 95 were in the immediate vicinity of Khe Sanh. Initial bomb damage assessment indicated one ammunition dump was destroyed. Two arc light missions (12 aircraft) were scheduled into the Khe Sanh area. Three of the aircraft were diverted to secondary targets. ✓

8. During the period, 479 short tons of supplies and 89 passenger replacements were delivered to Khe Sanh. Nine C-130 aircraft conducted air drops. Two C-130 and 34 Marine helicopters landed and delivered cargo and passengers.

9. For the next 24 hours, 96 tactical air sorties are scheduled to support operation Pegasus with an additional 116 on call. Two arc light missions are scheduled into the Khe Sanh area today.

10. Weather for the next 24 hours is forecast as partly cloudy skies with good visibility.

11. Aerial surveillance in A Shaf included 3 Side Looking Air Radar missions. There were no unusual returns from any of them. One arc light mission (6 sorties) struck inside the valley yesterday.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

898

7 April 1968
0700 EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status of Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST
6 April (9:00 AM 7 April, SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)
status as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>DAYS SUPPLY</u> <u>ON HAND</u>	<u>PREVIOUS STATUS</u> 8:00 PM 5 Apr EST (9:00 AM 6 Apr SVN)
<u>CLASS I (Rations)</u>		
Meal, Combat, Individual	21	21 days
B Rations	9	9 days
<u>CLASS III (Fuel)</u>		
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	3	3 days
JP-4 Fuel (Jet Fuel)	10.6	10.6 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	9.9	11.3 days
Diesel	21.5	23.4
<u>CLASS V (Ammunition)</u>		
A. High Explosive		
60-mm mortar	56	59 days
81-mm mortar	25	26 days
90-mm (tank)	68	68 days
4.2" mortar	26	20 days
105-mm howitzer	29	29 days
155-mm howitzer	27	29 days
B. Antitank		
		<u>ROUNDS ON HAND</u>
90-mm AP-T		254
90-mm HEAT		1,089
66-mm rocket (LAW)		2,194
Antitank mines (M-15)		349
Antitank mines (M-21)		469
106-mm HEAT		1,533
106-mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T)		1,455
3.5" rocket		2,302

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By NARA Date 4-29-92

SECRET

ROUNDS ON HAND

C. Antipersonnel


90-mm BEEHIVE	542
105-mm BEEHIVE	1,090
106-mm BEEHIVE	1,456
90-mm CANNISTER	323

CLASS V (COFRAM)

105-mm howitzer	1,637
155-mm howitzer	990
40-mm grenade launcher	6,729
Hand grenades	2,949

2. On 5 April, Khe Sanh was resupplied with 179 short tons as follows:

CLASS I	52.5
CLASS II	5
CLASS III	17.5
CLASS IV	46.5
CLASS V	53
Miscellaneous	4.5


S. D. CRAMER, Jr.
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:

SECDEF
DEPSECDEF
CJCS (3)
DJS (3)
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AFCP
NFP
DDO
ADDO
CCOC
PAC DESK

SECRET

ACTION

90

**Sunday, April 7, 1968
12:00 noon.**

Pres file

Mr. President:

**You might think of sending back
a letter like this with Gen. Westmoreland.**

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By isa, NARA Date 1-15-99 April 7, 1968

90a

Dear Mr. President:

I am asking General Westmoreland to carry this letter back with him.

We have had good talks in the past two days. I was pleased to hear from him directly, as I had from General Abrams, of the redoubtable performance of the armed forces of Vietnam in the difficult days since Tet, as well as of your plans to expand those forces.

We shall carry forward our efforts to assure that they are well armed.

I was particularly pleased to know that your forces and ours -- and those of your other allies -- are now moving forward on the ground, having seized the initiative.

Should we find a way to enter negotiations on acceptable terms, nothing will be more important for their success than continued aggressive military operations inside South Vietnam and the most rapid possible reestablishment of control by the Government of Vietnam in the countryside.

We must make time our friend.

You should know that this Government -- and the overwhelming majority of the American people -- are looking for an honorable peace, not for an excuse to get out of Southeast Asia at any price. In that effort your Government and ours must and will remain in the closest contact.

I shall be discussing these matters further with Ambassador Bunker during this week.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Nguyen Van Thieu
President of the Republic
of Vietnam
Presidential Palace
Saigon

LBJ:WWRostow:rlh

April 7, 1968

91
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-268

By is, NARA Date 1-15-99

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Sincerely,

His Excellency
Nguyen Van Thieu
President of the Republic
of Vietnam
Presidential Palace
Saigon



LBJ:WWRostow:rlh

INFORMATION

Saturday, April 6, 1968 - 7:05 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith some interesting suggestions
from Henry Owen, if and when you give a
speech.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

92

Pres file

92a

MEMORANDUM

April 6, 1968

SUBJECT: President's Monday Speech

This memorandum makes some substantive suggestions for the President's Monday speech.

1. Down to Earth. The President should announce that he is transferring to proposed urban programs some of \$600 million requested for FY 1969 for "Apollo applications" (post-lunar manned space effort).

This would not postpone our moon landings. But it would be dramatic evidence that the executive branch intends to give the needs of our cities top priority - putting them ahead of everything except defense.

There are other areas of the budget where cuts could be made, but space has this advantage: It is a heavily publicized program, so that cuts in it could be presented with dramatic effect; and there would be widespread public appeal to the notion that we should spend less in the heavens to do more in our cities.

2. Targets. The President should recall the conclusion of Dr. King's speech to the 1963 Civil Rights March, in which he said "I have a dream", and spelled out his vision of eventual Negro equality in one area of national life after another. The President should say that all Americans share that dream and that making it come true is the best memorial we could build to Dr. King. The President should propose that we adopt as a national goal achieving this equality in three specific fields: availability of housing, education, and jobs by our bi-centenary - 1976.

Announcing this goal could have an energizing and dramatic impact, such as President Roosevelt achieved by announcing a "seemingly impossible" goal of 50,000 military aircraft in 1940.)

The President should do more: He should propose that this goal, and actions to attain it, be lifted above the shifting tides of partisan debate and changing administrations, by establishing a standing National Commission - whose members would be chosen (as were those of the Hoover Commission) by the President and by legislative leaders; which would have a staff of its own, as well as direct access to the work of government agencies; and whose task would be to report annually to the American public on progress toward this goal and on the nature and cost of measures still needed to attain it.

The Government would not be bound by the Commission's recommendations (any more than it was by those of the Hoover Commission), but these would provide a "standard to which the wise and honest could repair" - a measuring stick by which government and public, alike, could judge whether what they were doing was adequate.

3. Impact and Co-ordination. The President should announce that he is appointing the Vice President to head a Cabinet level Council which would co-ordinate programs designed to benefit residents of our central cities with a view to maximizing early impact.

This would respond to a widespread feeling, well founded or not, summarized in the report of the President's Commission on Civil Disorders: "There is a clear and compelling requirement for better co-ordination of Federally funded programs, particularly those designed to benefit the residents of the central city".

It would help to dramatize the scope of these programs, whose impact is now diluted by their variety. Bringing these programs together under central direction would help the public to see them in toto, and as facets of a single co-ordinated policy.

4. Self-Help. The President should stress that the grievances which concern us all cannot be redressed by the Government or by white community doing things to

disadvantaged Negroes; they can only be redressed by these people, acting collectively - and with help from others - to improve their lot.

The President should emphasize that this road is already being travelled, and cite some cases. (Thomas Sanders, an ex-basketball player, has just formed a group of Negro businessmen to undertake a Federally-aided \$1 million housing rehabilitation project in Boston; Herman Smith has just started a Negro-owned and operated ghetto food store chain in this area; Herman Miller, a 26 year old, heads an experimental Community Patrol Corps which has just been started in Harlem; Floyd McKissick (CORE) is proposing to Cleveland businessmen a plan for establishing ghetto plants which could eventually be turned over to ghetto ownership and management after the parent company had recovered its costs and a reasonable profit - with the cost of the plant qualifying as an income tax deduction).

The President should say that the task of the Government and others is to help make this collective self-help by central city residents feasible. The Government intends to find out what additional actions it could take to this end by the common sense method of asking the people most concerned. The President and Vice President will be meeting, over the weeks ahead, with community leaders from the major central cities for just this purpose. Two of the ideas which we want to discuss with them are:

-- A Domestic Executive Service Corps whose members - drawn from private business, or Government, or retirement - would be made available without cost to businesses being set up under ghetto ownership and in need of managerial assistance. (I have sent a memo spelling out the idea, which is based on the existence of a comparable Corps for helping businesses in developing areas, in more detail to John Macy.)

-- Increased Federal financing (which would be provided by the Small Business Administration under its existing

authority - Title III - to buy debentures of Small Business Investment Companies) for locally managed public Corporations, which ghetto residents would be encouraged to set up in each major central city, in order to provide technical aid and long term low interest loans to help ghetto residents acquire ownership of absentee-owned small businesses.

Making collective self-help a major feature of the speech would (i) make sense, (ii) be something new, (iii) attract widespread support - both among Negroes searching for self-respect and whites who feel in their bones (as such disparate figures as Eric Hoffer and Eric Sevareid have suggested) that this is the only road to lasting progress:

Henry ^WOwen

*Preside*Saturday, April 6, 1968
7:00 pm93~~SECRET/CROCODILE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

In the light of this cable from Bunker, reporting his conversation with Thieu, I believe you should consider sending back a reassuring message to Thieu with Westy.

It should contain three points:

- our military forces can aid our negotiators -- if they actually go to work -- by going on the offensive and staying on the offensive;
- we regard the Government of South Vietnam as a partner in this negotiation, should it take place;
- the South Vietnamese should design a psychological warfare offensive against the VC as well as a military offensive.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/NO DIS/CROCODILE attachment~~

(Saigon 24137)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By id, NARA Date 1-15-99



Department of State

93a
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

Restow

00 RUEHC
DE RUEJIR 24137 097515
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 060450Z APR 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 251
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL : 1707Q
RECE : 6 APR 68
1:57 AM

6

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 24137

NODIS/CROCODILE

REF: STATE 142079

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-269
By us, NARA Date 10-7-98

1. MY HOUR'S MEETING WITH THIEU THIS MORNING COVERED RANGE OF SUBJECTS, ~~AND WAS UNUSUALLY~~ INTERESTING. THIS TEL DEALS WITH NEGOTIATIONS; SEPTELS ON OTHER SUBJECT.

2. IN RESPONSE HIS QUERY I SAID WE STILL DID NOT KNOW WHERE MEETING WOULD BE HELD. THIEU THEN SAID POLITELY BUT FIRMLY HE WAS CONCERNED WHO WOULD REPRESENT HANOI. IF IT WAS "AN" AUTHENTIC NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT WAS ALRIGHT. IF IT WAS A VC OR A VC WAS ON THE DELEGATION THAT WOULD PRODUCE TROUBLE HERE.

3. HE THEN SAID IT IS IMPORTANT IN OUR STATEMENTS THAT WE STRESS "EXPLORATORY" NATURE OF THESE TALKS, AND KEEP DRIVING HOME THAT WHATEVER WE ARE DOING IS IN FULL CONSULTATION WITH THE ALLIES.

4. I THEN REFERRED TO THE EIGHT POINTS WHICH ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER LAM HAD GIVEN US AND ON WHICH CALKOUN HAD GONE BACK YESTERDAY. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN BRIEFED BY LAM. I SAID POINTS B AND C GAVE US SOME DIFFICULTY. OBVIOUSLY AMB. HARRIMAN COULD NOT RPT NOT SIMPLY LISTEN, AND WE COULD NOT RPT NOT CONSULT ON EACH REPLY. WHAT WAS NEEDED WERE GENERAL UNDERSTANDING AMONG US BEFOREHAND, AND HARRIMAN HAD TO BE FREE TO DECIDE THE MOVES. HE DID NOT DISSENT.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE -2- SAIGON 24137, APR 6, 1968

NODIS/CROCODILE

5. HE SAID AFTER THE REAL TALKS START, HE WOULD SEND BUI DIEM AS HIS LIAISON MAN. THIS STARTED HIM ON A DISCOURSE OF SOME OF THE PROBLEMS HE FORESAW WHEN NEGOTIATIONS GET UNDERWAY. HE SAID THERE WAS AN ATMOSPHERE OF APPREHENSION AMONG SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WHICH RESEMBLED THAT BEFORE THE 1954 GENEVA TALKS WHEN IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THE FRENCH WERE ABOUT TO GIVE UP. IT IS BASED ON FEAR AND SUSPICIONS THAT THE U.S. IN ITS ANXIETY FOR PEACE WILL CONCEDE TOO MUCH.

6. SHOULD THE IDEA DEVELOP HERE THAT THE U.S. WAS PREPARED TO MAKE MAJOR CONCESSIONS LEADING TO WITHDRAWAL, THERE WOULD BE "A MORALE COLLAPSE HERE IN TWO OR THREE DAYS". HE COULD PROBABLY HOLD MOST OF THE REGULAR FORCES TOGETHER, BUT NOT THE REGIONAL OR POPULAR FORCES, AND THIS IN TURN WOULD SPREAD TO THE REGULAR FORCES AND THE CITIES. WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DANGER. HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES DO NOT SHARE THE APPREHENSION AND SUSPICIONS IN THE COUNTRY, BUT WE SHOULD KNOW THAT IT EXISTS AND BE VERY CAREFUL IN OUR PUBLIC HANDLING OF STATEMENTS. IF THERE WAS A COLLAPSE HERE, OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION WOULD BE DESTROYED.

7. FORTUNATELY, HE SAID, PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECH CONTAINS MANY POINTS INDICATING THE FIRMNESS OF THE U.S. POSITION, AND HE IS MAKING MAXIMUM USE OF THIS SPEECH TO REASSURE THE LEADERS AND PEOPLE. HE WILL MEET WITH THE CORPS AND DIVISION COMMANDERS ON TUESDAY, APRIL 9, AND ADDRESS A JOINT SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE ON THE 10TH, ON THIS AND TO DISCUSS OTHER MATTERS.

8. COMMENT: REPORTS WE ARE GETTING FROM THE FIELD CONFIRM THIEU'S VIEW THAT THERE IS APPREHENSION IN THE COUNTRY ABOUT OUR NEGOTIATING INTENTIONS. I DO NOT RPT DO NOT KNOW HOW WIDESPREAD THE FEAR MAY BE BUT IT IS THERE. I AM GIVING SOME THOUGHT TO WHETHER I SHOULD SAY SOMETHING TO THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ON MY RETURN FROM WASHINGTON. BUT WE CAN TALK ABOUT THIS NEXT WEEK.

BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~

94

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Saturday, April 6, 1968 - 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Park's reaction to your postponement and, more important, to the situation in Vietnam in which his judgment is much like yours, Westy's, and mine.

Key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

Secul 5513

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 4-29-92



Department of State

94a
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

Restow

6

00 RUEHC
DE RUALOS 5513Z 0906400
ZNY SSSSS ZZK
O 050325Z APR 68 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 54
STATE GRNC
BT

CN 1699Q
April 6, 1968
12:58 a.m.

~~SECRET~~ SEUL 5513

MODIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS/CBS 10
By ics, NARS, Date 11-16-83

REF : STATE 142705

1. I DELIVERED ORAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT PARK ALONG LINES REFTL.
2. PARK SENDS PRESIDENT JOHNSON HIS FULLEST SYMPATHY. IN ADDITION TO OTHER GREAT BURDENS CARRIED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, THERE IS NOW ADDED THAT GENERATED BY ASSASSINATION OF DR. KING. SUGGESTED POSTPONEMENT OF MEETING HAS PRESIDENT PARK'S COMPLETE AGREEMENT AND UNDERSTANDING. HE SENDS HIS WARMEST GOOD WISHES TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

PAGE 2 RUALOS 5513Z ~~SECRET~~

3. PARK APPRECIATED ASSURANCES OF OUR CONCERN FOR ROX INTERESTS AND CONCERN IN PRELIMINARY CONTACTS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE, AS WELL AS OUR INTENTION CONSULT FULLY WITH HIM BEFORE CONTACTS ACTUALLY UNDER WAY. HE DISPLAYED CONSIDERABLE SATISFACTION AT THIS POINT, AND OTHERS MADE IN PARA ONE (C) OF REFTL.

4. PARK WANTED US TO KNOW THAT HIS COMMANDER IN VIET-NAM, GENZZNGFAE, HAD REPORTED THAT EFFECT IN VIETNAM OF OUR CURRENT EFFORTS TO TALK TO NORTH VIETNAMESE WAS "NOT TOO GOOD". VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, SAID PARK, APPARENTLY NOT DOING GREAT DEAL TO CLEAR UP MISAPPREHENSION AND FRUSTRATION AMONG PUBLIC, WHICH UNINFORMED ABOUT US INTENTIONS AND UNCHANGED US POSITION RE HONORABLE PEACE. PARK SAID WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL ABOUT VIETNAMESE OPINION AS THERE COULD OTHERWISE BE DISTURBING POPULAR REACTION IN THAT COUNTRY. ALSO, IF WE GET NOWHERE IN TALKS WITH ENEMY, WE SHOULD BE READY TO RESUME ACTIVITY IN EFFECTIVE MANNER. OTHERWISE, SAID PARK, WE WILL REINFORCE ENEMY PROPAGANDA TO EFFECT THAT WE REALLY SEEKING TO SURRENDER, WITH DEMORALIZING EFFECT ON OUR PEOPLE AND FORCES.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE -2- SEOUL 5513, APR 6, 1968

NODIS

5. PARK SAID HE HAD CALLED GEN. CHAE HONG TO GET FIRST-HAND REPORT ON SITUATION IN LIGHT OF TET OFFENSIVE. CHAE REPORTED THAT ENEMY GAINS AT TET GREATLY OVERESTIMATED, THAT IN FACT ENEMY HAD SUFFERED SEVERE BLOW WHICH HE, PARK, BELIEVES CONDITIONED NORTH VIETNAMESE TO ACCEPT PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PEACE INITIATIVE. CHAE REPORTED TO PARK THAT AT TIME OF TET OFFENSIVE GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAD ESTIMATED ENEMY STRENGTH AT 260,000 AND THAT IS CURRENTLY ESTIMATED AT 200,000. LATTER FIGURE INDICATES EXTENT OF ENEMY LOSSES AT OR SINCE TET, HE SAID. WE SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED BY VIEWS OF "PROFESSORS, STUDENTS AND POLITICIANS WITHOUT EXPERIENCE", PARK CONTINUED. THE SITUATION CHANGES FROM TIME TO TIME IN EVERY WAR. THE ENEMY DID MUCH DAMAGE AND THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM SUFFERED, HE SAID, BUT THEY EXPOSED THEIR UNDERGROUND AND LOST MUCH KEY STAFF AND WEAPONS, PRESIDENT SAID. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE SHOULD CALMLY ASSESS SITUATION AND NOT GET NERVOUS.

6. I MENTIONED AGAIN OUR RESOLVE FOR HONORABLE PEACE IN VIETNAM AS STATED FINAL PARA REFTEL, ADDING THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON WELCOMES AND SEEKS PRESIDENT PARK'S ADVICE AND

PAGE 4 RUALOS 5513E ~~SECRET~~
COMMENT ON THESE SUBJECTS,

7. CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO OTHER SUBJECTS WITH ARRIVAL OF SECRETARY FREEMAN.

8. DEPT PLEASE REPEAT THIS MESSAGE TO SECRETARY OR OTHER ADDRESSEES AS NECESSARY.

GP-3 PORTER
BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED SECRETARY BY OC/T.

~~SECRET~~

95
Pres file

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, April 6, 1968
6:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

All hands agreed to the instruction as written, with the exclusion of the words "seek to" bracketed on page 2. Despite the small change, it was a useful session.

Present were: Sec. Clifford, Under Sec. Katzenbach, Gen. Wheeler, Gen. Westmoreland, Gen. Taylor, Gov. Harriman, and myself.

All together now - in spirit as well as word.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-272
By iss, NARA Date 2-2-98

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 92-436

By ju/jw, NARA, Date 4-10-97

~~TOP SECRET~~

950

INSTRUCTIONS FOR GOVERNOR HARRIMAN

Basic Objective

To achieve an understanding with the North Vietnamese representative on a cessation of bombing in the North and arrangements for prompt and serious substantive talks under circumstances which would not be military disadvantageous. Such understanding to be within objectives defined below.

Specific Objectives

1. Cessation of the Bombing

The US is prepared to agree to a cessation of naval, air and artillery bombardment of North Viet-Nam. In keeping with North Vietnamese statements, it is our understanding that such action on our part will lead promptly to talks in which both sides would be free to raise any elements which they believe would lead to a peaceful settlement. We are prepared in these talks to make arrangements to this end, including agreement on announcement of bombing cessation and subsequent talks.

2. Prompt Talks

Substantive talks should be held within 3 to 7 days following the cessation of bombing.

3. Serious Talks

We should seek explicit confirmation by the North Vietnamese that any topic relevant to the substance of peace could be raised in the substantive talks.

4. Participants

In any substantive discussions we expect to take account of the interests of the South Vietnamese Government and of our Manila allies. Participation in any such discussions affecting South Viet-Nam must not exclude the Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam.

5. Not Taking Advantage

*Minimum
these should
be
preconditions*
We should ~~seek to~~ provide an adequate basis for the expectation that North Viet-Nam would not attempt to improve its military position as a result of the US cessation. North Viet-Nam should understand that the US would regard as acts of bad faith inconsistent with its restraints any such attempts. We would consider as examples of bad faith:

- easy*
- a) Artillery or other fire from or across the DMZ.
 - easy* b) Ground attacks across the DMZ or the massing of additional forces or supplies in North Viet-Nam or the DMZ in a manner which poses a direct threat to Allied forces in South Viet-Nam.
 - difficult to
prove* c) An increase in the movement of North Vietnamese troops and supplies into South Viet-Nam.

6. Reconnaissance Flights

The US intends to continue certain reconnaissance flights, and the record should not preclude such flights.

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/CROCODILE

Saturday, April 6, 1968
11:30 *PM* m.

96
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-458
By CS, NARA, Date 4-10-15

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached indicates that Baggs and Ashmore:

- acted as negotiators;
- took a position that washed out reciprocal action by the DRV if we stopped bombing (see marked passages p. 1 and p. 3).

Hanoi knows they are not negotiators, but this may complicate our lives.

You should know they were given no guidance by Bill Bundy except public statements, including the San Antonio formula.

We shall be considering this and other problems at a meeting today with Clifford, Katzenbach, and myself.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/CROCODILE attachment

(Vientiane 5660)

Pres file



Department of State

~~SECRET~~

96a
TELEGRAM

3

CO RUEHC
DE RUMJFS 5660 0970627 1968 APR 6 AM 2 57
ZNY SSSSS ZZK
O 060530Z APR 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7929
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 5660

NODIS/CROCODILE

DEPT REPEAT IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY,
SAIGON EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR

1. THERE FOLLOW THE TEXTS OF TWO DOCUMENTS DATED APRIL 1
AND APRIL 4 GIVEN US LAST NIGHT BY BAGGS AND ASHMORE. EACH
DOCUMENT CONTAINS A COMMENT AT THE END WHICH EXPLAINS
ITS PURPOSE. IT MAY BE SEEN FROM THESE DOCUMENTS THAT
BAGGS AND ASHMORE MAY HAVE GIVEN THE APPEARANCE OF NEGOTIATING AS
FOR THE USG. ALTHOUGH HOANG TUNG QUITE PROBABLY KNEW THAT THEY WERE
NOT SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF THE USG, THE DRV AT SOME TIME IN
THE FUTURE TO SERVE ITS OWN PURPOSES MAY WISH TO CLAIM THAT

PAGE 2 RUMJFS 5660 ~~SECRET~~
THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT BAGGS AND ASHMORE WERE SPEAKING FOR
THE U.S.

2. BEGIN TEXT APRIL 1 DOCUMENT:

APRIL 1, 1968

THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM:

(1) THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ACCEPTS THE LIMITED
BOMBING OF DRV TERRITORY AS INDICATING THAT THE USA IS PRE-
APRED TO HALT WITHOUT CONDITION ALL ACTS OF WAR AGAINST
THE TERRITORY OF THE DRV, INCLUDING AERIAL, NAVAL, AND
ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT WHEN TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES
BEGIN. (2) IF THE UNDERSTANDING SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH ONE ABOVE
IS CONFIRMED BY A MESSAGE THROUGH ASHMORE AND BAGGS, A
DRV AMBASSADOR IMMEDIATELY WILL MAKE CONTACT WITH A USA
AMBASSADOR AT A SITE DESIGNATED BY THE USA WHERE BOTH

PAGE 3 RUMJFS 5660 ~~SECRET~~
COUNTRIES MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS.
(3) AT INITIAL CONTACT, THE DRV AMBASSADOR WILL BE AUTHORIZED
TO AGREE ON:

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-269

By us, NARA Date 10-7-98

~~SECRET~~

PAGE -2- VIENTIANE 5660, APR 6, 1968 NODIS/CROCODILE

- (A) TIME OF CONFERENCE.
 - (B) PLACE OF CONFERENCE.
 - (C) LEVEL AND COMPOSITION OF REPRESENTATION.
- THE DRV SUGGESTS THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE COMBAT ZONE AND INDICATES THAT GENEVA IS ACCEPTABLE. HOWEVER, THE DRV IS WILLING TO LET THE USA MAKE THE INITIAL DETERMINATION ON THE ABOVE POINTS. WHEN AGREEMENT IS REACHED, THE DRV AND THE USA WILL ANNOUNCE SIMULTANEOUSLY THAT THE CONFERENCE HAS BEEN SCHEDULED.
- (4) THE CONFERENCE WILL CONVEENE WITH ONLY THE DRV AND THE USA REPRESENTED. THE DRV AGREES THAT ALL QUESTIONS OF AGENDA ARE THEN OPEN FOR DISCUSSION. THESE INCLUDE:
 - (A) REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT AND THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AT THIS OR A SUBSEQUENT CONFERENCE.
 - (B) A CEASE FIRE OR ARMISTICE ARRANGEMENT.
 - (C) THE EXCHANGE OF ALL CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL.
 - (D) A PHASED WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH VIETNAM OF ALL

PAGE 4 RUMJFS 5660 ~~SECRET~~
FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES.

(E) ALL POLITICAL QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

COMMENT: THIS PAPER WAS OUR SUMMARY OF CONVERSATIONS WITH HOANG TUNG. HE HAD NO OBJECTION AS TO SUBSTANCE OF OUR SUMMARY AND WE THINK IT PARTICULARLY INTERESTING THAT ALL POINTS DISCUSSED IN NUMBER 4 WERE AGREEABLE TO HOANG TUNG. THE SUMMARY WAS WRILVEN AND DELIVERED TO HOANG TUNG ON APRIL 1 AND MUCH OF THE SENSE OF THE SUMMARY WAS REFLECTED IN THE STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRV ON APRIL 3.

3. BEGIN TEXT APRIL 4 DOCUMENT:

APRIL 4, 1968

ON APRIL 4 WE WERE ASKED BY HOANG TUNG, WHO SAID HE WISHED TO PRESENT THE INFORMATION TO HIS GOVERNMENT, THE POINTS OF PROCEDURE WE THOUGHT AGREEABLE TO OUR COUNTRY AND TO THE DRV FOR ARRANGING CONTACT ON A SUBSEQUENT MEETING. WE SUBMITTED THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE -3- VIENTIANE 5660, APR 6, 1968

NODIS/CROCODILE

(1) THE USA REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE PREPARED TO INFORM THE DRV REPRESENTATIVE THAT THE BOMBING OF ALL DRV TERRITORY HAS BEEN HALTED WITHOUT CONDITION.
(2) THE TOTAL CESSATION OF BOMBING WILL HAVE BEEN IN EFFECT FOR AT LEAST 24 HOURS PRIOR TO CONTACT BETWEEN THE DRV AND THE USA REPRESENTATIVES.
(3) THE INITIAL CONTACT WILL BE AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL IN MOSCOW, OR AT ANY OTHER SITE WHERE BOTH COUNTRIES MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS.
(4) THE INITIAL CONTACT WILL DEAL WITH QUESTIONS OF PROCEDURE TO ARRANGE A CONFERENCE. THESE QUESTIONS INCLUDE:
(A) TIME OF CONFERENCE.
(B) PLACE OF CONFERENCE.
(C) LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION AT CONFERENCE.
(5) UPON AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS, THE DRV AND THE USA WILL ANNOUNCE THE TIME AND PLACE OF THE CONFERENCE.
(6) THE REPRESENTATION AT THE CONFERENCE WILL CONSIST INITIALLY OF THE DRV AND THE USA. ALL SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS RAISED BY BOTH COUNTRIES WILL BE OPEN FOR DISCUSSION.
COMMENT: THESE SIX POINTS, AS INDICATED, WERE PRESENTED AT THE REQUEST OF MR HOANG TUNG FOR HIS GOVERNMENT. HE TOOK THESE POINTS TO HIS GOVERNMENT AND THE RESPONSE OF HIS GOVERNMENT WAS THE AIDE-MEMOIRE DATED APRIL 5.

PAGE 6 RUMJFS 5660 ~~SECRET~~

4. EMBASSY COMMENT: IT WILL BE SEEN FROM THESE DOCUMENTS AND BAGGS-ASHMORE COMMENT THEREON THAT HOANG TUNG USED TECHNIQUE OF REQUIRING BAGGS AND ASHMORE TO DO ALL THE WRITING AND TO PRESENT ALL THE "PROPOSALS." ONLY WRITTEN DOCUMENT WHICH HOANG TUNG PRESENTED THEM WAS AIDE-MEMOIRE OF APRIL 5. BAGGS-ASHMORE DOCUMENTS ALLEGEDLY REPRESENT DISTILLATION OF AGREED POINTS WORKED OUT IN LONG SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS WITH HOANG TUNG. IN THESE DISCUSSIONS, HOANG TUNG ACTED ALONE, ACCOMPANIED ONLY BY INTERPRETER. ALTHOUGH FIRST TWO DAYS WERE AT HOTEL, BAGGS AND ASHMORE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY REMOVED TO A GUEST HOUSE ON "EMBASSY ROW." HOANG TUNG WAS AWARE OF CONTACT WHICH BAGGS AND ASHMORE HAD WITH INDONESIAN AMBASSADOR NUGROHO AND THROUGH NUGROHO TO ME. CONTACT WAS MADE BY TELEPHONE BETWEEN GUEST HOUSE AND INDONESIAN EMBASSY. HOANG TUNG REPORTEDLY TOOK EACH DOCUMENT BACK TO HIS "COLLEAGUES" FOR DISCUSSION BEFORE RESUMING TALKS.

GP-2. SULLIVAN

BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED WELLINGTON AND SAIGON BY OC/T APR 6, 1968.

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

97

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, April 6, 1968
10:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Per file

Khe Sanh-DMZ-A Shau:

- 57 enemy rounds incoming;
- 2,560 friendly rounds;
- 140 tactical support sorties
plus 12 B-52's;
- 184.5 tons resupply;
- weather marginal.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1993
By ig, NARA, Date 4-30-92

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By ig, NARA, Date 4-30-92

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

Apr 16, 1968

TEXT OF CABLE FROM MACV (Saigon 04613)

97a

SUBJECT: Khe Sanh Report

This is report number 62 on the Khe Sanh/DMZ/A Shau Valley area for the 24 hour period, April 6, 1968.

Khe Sanh weather was marginal with fog until 10:00 A. M. yesterday morning. Thereafter, skies became partly cloudy with visibility up to six miles. Marginal conditions returned to 2000 feet and persisted until 10:00 A. M. this morning when conditions again began to improve.

Artillery fire support elements suppressing enemy firing positions and firing on targets of opportunity, expended 2,560 rounds in 170 missions. Forty-four missions were observed. Two missions expended 26 rounds of cofram. Results are unknown. Khe Sanh Combat Base received 41 artillery and 16 mortar rounds for a total of 57 incoming rounds. These attacks wounded 21 marines; all were evacuated.

Attacks against the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines yesterday morning on Hill 471, two kilometers south of Khe Sanh Combat Base were repulsed with 122 enemy killed and 47 individual weapons captured. Two marines were wounded. Also yesterday morning, a 1st Air Cavalry Division helicopter attacked an enemy tank seven kilometers south of Khe Sanh with 2.75 inch rockets. The tank withdrew to the south. During the afternoon, Troop "A", 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, 4 km southwest of the village of Khe Sanh killed 53 enemy by air. In other action yesterday afternoon, Company D, 1st Battalion 8th Cavalry engaged an enemy force in a bunker complex for approximately one hour. The enemy withdrew and broke contact after 11 were killed. One North Vietnamese was detained and two individuals and one crew served weapon were captured. There were no friendly losses.

Elsewhere in Quang Tri Province, Task Force Kilo continued to advance to the northeast of Dong Ha without contact. Seventeen km east of Quang Tri city, eleven enemy dead and three infantry weapons were discovered, believed to be the result of an artillery or tactical air mission.

Marine aircraft flew 72 sorties in support of Operation Pegasus; the Air Force flew 17 and the Navy 51 for a total of 140 sorties. Of these, 89 were in the immediate vicinity of Khe Sanh. Bomb damage assessment included two secondary fires, five road cuts, two bunkers and two automatic weapons positions destroyed, and one artillery position damaged. Two Arc Light Missions (12 aircraft) were flown.

During the period, 184.5 short tons of supplies and 140 passengers were delivered to Khe Sanh. Eight C130 and one C123 aircraft conducted air drops. Two C123 aircraft and 41 Marine helicopters landed and delivered passengers and cargo. Supplies remain at a satisfactory level with 30 days of rations and 20 or more days

SECRET/EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/90

By 14 NARA, Date 5-18-92

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1998

By 14 NARA, Date 5-18-92

of large caliber ammunition on hand. Current plans call for the 1st Air Cavalry Division to draw from Khe Sanh Combat Base stockpiles during coming operations.

For the next 24 hours, 106 tactical air sorties are scheduled to support Operation Pegasus with an additional 188 on call. Two Arc Light Missions are scheduled into the Khe Sanh area today.

Weather is expected to be good throughout the afternoon today until sunrise, when fog conditions are expected to reduce ceilings to 1,000 feet and visibility to two miles.

There were five moving target indicators from an A Shau Valley radar mission. Aerial photographic surveillance revealed four vehicles and nine probably occupied anti-aircraft defense sites in the Valley.

~~SECRET~~



THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

6 April 1968
0600 EST

978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Supply Status at Khe Sanh as of 8:00 PM EST
5 April (9:00 AM 6 April, SVN time)

1. The Khe Sanh Dump and Ammunition Supply Point (ASP)
status as of the above time is as follows:

	<u>DAYS SUPPLY ON HAND</u>	<u>PREVIOUS STATUS 8:00 PM 4 Apr EST (9:00 AM 5 Apr SVN)</u>
<u>CLASS I (Rations)</u>		
Meal, Combat, Individual	21	21 days
B Rations	9	9 days
<u>CLASS III (Fuel)</u>		
Aviation Gas (AVGAS)	3	3 days
JP-4 Fuel (Jet Fuel)	10.6	10.6 days
Motor Gasoline (MOGAS)	11.3	9.4 days
Diesel	23.4	24.3
<u>CLASS V (Ammunition)</u>		
A. High Explosive		
60-mm mortar	59	61 days
81-mm mortar	26	29 days
90-mm (tank)	68	68 days
4.2" mortar	20	28 days
105-mm howitzer	29	31 days
155-mm howitzer	29	30 days
B. Antitank		
		<u>ROUNDS ON HAND</u>
90-mm AP-T		254
90-mm HEAT		1,089
66-mm rocket (LAW)		2,197
Antitank mines (M-15)		349
Antitank mines (M-19)		469
Antitank mines (M-21)		32
106-mm HEAT		1,533
106-mm recoilless rifle (HEP-T)		1,455
3.5" rocket		2,323

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By ng NARA, Date 4-30-92

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C. Antipersonnel

ROUNDS ON HAND


90-mm BEEHIVE	542
105-mm BEEHIVE	1,090
106-mm BEEHIVE	1,456
90-mm CANNISTER	323

CLASS V (COFRAM)

105-mm howitzer	1,637
155-mm howitzer	990
40-mm grenade launcher	6,729
Hand grenades	2,949

2. On 5 April, Khe Sanh was resupplied with 184.5 short tons as follows:

CLASS I	44.5
CLASS II	17.5
CLASS III	8.5
CLASS IV	58.5
CLASS V	46.5
Miscellaneous	9.0


S. D. CRAMER, JR.
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:

SECDEF
DEPSECDEF
CJCS (3)
DJS (3)
J-30
J-31
J-32
J-33
J-34
J-4
AOC
MCCC
AFCP
NFP
DDO
ADDO
CCOC
PAC DESK

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

98

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, April 6, 1968 -- 10:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

Herewith Oehlert reports a quite firm Pak decision to liquidate our [REDACTED] by 17 July 1969.

25X1A

25X1A

The grounds: it complicates Pak relations with the USSR and Communist China. Other reasons are given (marked passage second page).

Oehlert's comments (marked passage, last page) indicate he believes this may not be the last word.

But we shall start contingency planning on alternative means of intelligence gathering.

W. W. Rostow

Rawalpindi 4396

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-019-032-2-10-6

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 019-032-2-10
By SP, NARA, Date 1/15/02

EXDIS

Handwritten: HANCO 7014

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1968 APR 6 11 10

PAGE 01 RAWALP 04396 061036Z

11
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /;30 W

0 060901Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3515

~~SECRET~~ SECTION I OF II RAWALPINDI 4396

EXDIS

PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE AND CONCERNED AGENCIES
FROM AMBASSADOR

1. PURSUANT TO APPOINTMENT SOUGHT BY MIM I CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER THIS MORNING. YOUSUF AND PIRACHA WERE PRESENT.
2. THE MINISTER HANDED ME A LETTER TERMINATING THE PESHAWAR AGREEMENT. THE TEXT OF THE LETTER FOLLOWS:
"I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REFER TO THE AGREEMENT CONCLUDED ON 18TH JULY, 1959, BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND PAKISTAN

~~FACT - RHQVOM 4396/1 SECRET~~

RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMUNICATION UNIT IN PAKISTAN AND TO STATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN HAVE DECIDED TO TERMINATE THE SAID AGREEMENT (WHEN IT EXPIRES ON 17TH JULY, 1969). THEREFORE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 12 OF THAT AGREEMENT, I HEREBY CONVEY TO YOU NOTICE OF TERMINATION ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN.

" I AVAIL MYSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO YOUR EXCELLENCY THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION." SIGNED SYED SHARIFUDDIN PIRZADA, FOREIGN MINISTER OF PAKISTAN.

3. FOLLOWING DELIVERY OF NOTICE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS WERE MADE, WITH YOUSUF DOING MOST OF THE TALKING:

A. WHEN THE MINISTER AND SECRETARY RUSK MET IN WASHINGTON LAST FALL THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT USG-GOP RELATIONS ARE NOW NORMAL

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-269
By us, NARA Date 10-7-98

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 RAWALP 04396 061036Z

WITH FORMER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES NO REPEAT NO LONGER PRESENT

INCLUDING THE 1965 CESSATION OF ARMS SUPPLY;

B. GOP NOW NORMALIZING FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALL MAJOR POWERS;

C. THIS MEANS THAT THEIR RELATIONS WITH EACH POWER MUST BE BI-LATERAL WITH NOTHING REPEAT NOTHING DIRECTED AGAINST ANY THIRD POWER;

D. PESHAWAR HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE A SERIOUS LIABILITY

~~PAGE 3 RUQVGN 4396/1 SECRET~~

IN GOP RELATIONS WITH BOTH USSR AND CHICOMS;

E. RENEWAL WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE APPRECIATED BY USSR OR BY CHICOMS OR BY QUOTE OUR OWN PEOPLE UNQUOTE;

F. BECAUSE OF RECENT TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT SUCH AS SATELLITES USG REALLY NO REPEAT NO LONGER NEEDS PESHAWAR;

G. USSR AND CHICOMS CAN DO MANY THINGS TO HARM GOP, INCLUDING IN HER RELATIONS WITH GOI;

H. GOP ANXIOUS TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH USG FREE OF STRAIN AND HOPES THAT QUOTE THEY CAN CONTINUE TO GO UP AND UP AS THEY HAVE RECENTLY UNQUOTE;

I. GOP SINCERELY HOPES THAT THIS TERMINATION WILL HAVE NO REPEAT NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON EITHER USG-GOP AID RELATIONS OR ON THE RECENTLY IMPROVED MILITARY SUPPLY SITUATION;

J. THE USG AND USSR HAVE MUTUALLY BEEN SEEKING A DETENTE WITH EACH OTHER AND THE CONTINUANCE OF PESHAWAR WOULD CAST A SHADOW ON THOSE EFFORTS;

K. GOP HOPES, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF RECENT VIET NAM RELATIONSHIP, THAT USG WILL EVOLVE A NEW CHICOM RELATION WHICH WOULD BE MADE MORE DIFFICULT BY PESHAWAR CONTINUANCE.

~~PAGE 4 RUQVGN 4396/1 SECRET~~

4. FOLLOWING THE ABOVE EXPOSITION I EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT THE ABRUPTNESS AND APPARENT FINALITY OF THIS NOTICE AND DISCOURSE TO WHICH YOUSUF RESPONDED THAT THEY WANTED USG TO HAVE AS MUCH NOTICE AS POSSIBLE AND FELT THAT IN 15 MONTHS USG COULD EFFECT ADEQUATE AND SATISFACTORY SUBSTITUTE ARRANGEMENTS.

5. I NOTED THAT USG PROBABLY DID HAVE THE TECHNICAL, GEOGRAPHIC AND FINANCIAL CAPACITIES TO ADJUST TO A NEW SITUATION BUT THE THE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 RAWALP 04396 061036Z

NECESSITY TO MAKE SUCH AN EFFORT WOULD PUT A HEAVY STRAIN ON
USG-GOP RELATIONS NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY COSTLY BUT
ALSO BECAUSE IT WOULD BE INTERPRETED IN MANY USG CIRCLES AS AN
INDICATION THAT GOP PREFERRED COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH USSR AND
CHICOMS MORE THAN WITH USG.

6. I THEN STATED THAT I WOULD OF COURSE REPORT THIS DEVELOPMENT TO
WASHINGTON AND WOULD SEEK INSTRUCTIONS. AT THIS POINT I OBSERVED
THAT I ASSUMED THAT THE SUBJECT WAS STILL OPEN TO DISCUSSION AND
NEGOTIATION. THE RESPONSE WAS AFFIRMATIVE.

7. I THEN REVIEWED BRIEFLY THE SALIENT REASONS WHY IT WOULD NOT
REPEAT NOT BE IN THE INTERESTS OF GOP TO INSIST ON A JULY '69

~~PAGE 5 RETURN 1506/1 SECRET~~

CLOSING OF THIS OPERATION, AS FOLLOWS:

- A. GOP IS ITSELF GETTING A USEFUL TAKE;
- B. GOP HAS THE CONTINUING BENEFIT OF VALUABLE TRAINING;
- C. THE PESHAWAR AREA ENJOYS A VERY VALUABLE ECONOMIC BENEFIT
FROM THE OPERATION;
- D. IF INDEED USG, ALBEIT AT GREAT EXPENSE AND INCONVENIENCE,
SUBSTITUTED OTHER OPERATIONS, THEN THIS MEANS THAT NEITHER REPEAT
NEITHER USSR OR CHICOMS WOULD BENEFIT FROM TERMINATION;
- E. THE KNOWN EXISTENCE OF THE OPERATION HAD NOT REPEAT NOT
PREVENTED CONTINUAL IMPROVEMENT IN GOP RELATIONS WITH USSR OR CHICOMS;
- F. THE EXISTENCE OF PESHAWAR GIVES GOP BARGAINING POWER WITH
USSR AND CHICOMS WHEREAS ITS ELIMINATION WOULD REMOVE THAT LEVERAGE
AND DECREASE COMMUNIST INTEREST IN GOP

8. YOUSUF RESPONDED:

- A. GOP IS NOT REPEAT NOT GETTING ANY WORTHWHILE INFO FROM
OPERATION LARGELY BECAUSE USG DOES NOT REPEAT NOT SHARE ITS TAKE
EXCEPT IN UNIMPORTANT ITEMS AND ALL IMPORTANT AREAS ARE TABOO;
- B. GOP OWN OPERATION IS VERY MARGINAL. GOI IS AWARE OF IT AND HAS
OBJECTED TO IT THUS PUTTING A FURTHER STRAIN ON GOP-GOI RELATIONS;
- C. TRAINING IS VERY LIMITED AND CAN BE HAD UNDER OTHER

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 RAWALP 04396 ,061036Z

~~PAGE 6 RUSVOM 4396/1 SECRET~~

AVAILABLE ARRANGEMENTS;

D. THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS ARE OF NO GREAT ORDER;

E. WHETHER OR NOT REPEAT NOT COMMUNISTS WOULD BE IN IMPROVED SITUATION WITHOUT PESHAWAR THEY PRESS VERY HARD FOR ITS DISCONTINUANCE AND GOP DOES NOT REPEAT NOT CONSIDER IT AS A LEVER BUT RATHER AS A HARDSHIP, NOTING THAT COMMUNISTS CONSTANTLY REFER TO BOTH PESHAWAR AND CENTO AS REPRESENTING SPECIAL TREATMENT OF USG IN VIOLATION OF GOP'S AVOWED POLICY OF BILATERAL EVEN-HANDNESS;

F. GOP RELATIONS WITH COMMUNISTS HAVE CONTINUED TO IMPROVE DESPITE PESHAWAR BECAUSE GOP HAS BEEN BECOMING MORE AND MORE NON-ALIGNED AND USSR AND CHICOMS HAVE GRUDGINGLY ACCEPTED PESHAWAR DURING ITS ORIGINAL TERM BUT WOULD FEEL QUITE DIFFERENTLY ABOUT A RENEWAL;

G. PESHAWAR IS DIRECTED AGAINST USSR AND CHICOMS BUT GOP DOES NOT REPEAT NOT ENGAGE IN ANY OPERATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST USG;

H. GOP IS APPREHENSIVE ABOUT MILITARY BUILD-UP OF GOI AND MUST OBTAIN ASSISTANCE SOMEWHERE BUT COMMUNISTS ALWAYS CITE PESHAWAR AND CENTO AS REASON NOT REPEAT NOT TO AID GOP MILITARILY AND USG HAS CHANGED ITS OWN ARMS POLICY TOWARD GOP EXCEPT FOR RECENT OPENING UP OF SPARE PARTS PROGRAM AND POSSIBLE THIRD COUNTRY TANK ACQUISITION.

~~SECRET~~

~~ACQUISITION~~
OEHLETT

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1968 APR 6 10 56

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PAGE 01 RAWALP 04396 061041Z

17
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

O 060901Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3516

~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF II RAWALPINDI 4396

EXDIS

PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE AND CONCERNED AGENCIES
FROM AMBASSADOR

9. I THEN OBSERVED THAT IN ADDITION TO THE POINTS I HAD PREVIOUSLY MADE GOP SHOULD CONSIDER THAT, HAVING IN MIND FIRST THAT GOP WAS USUALLY ALIGNED AGAINST USG POSITION IN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND SECOND THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE GOP COULD DO FOR USG TO SHOW ITS FRIENDSHIP OTHER THAN TO REFRAIN FROM A PESHAWAR EVICTION, USG WOULD BE ENTITLED TO DRAW ITS OWN CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE GENUINE INTEREST OF GOP IN MAINTAINING, LET ALONE IMPROVING, PRESENT

~~PAGE 2 PUGHON 120610 SECRET~~
RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

10. THE CONVERSATION THEN TURNED TO MATTERS OF THE PRESS, WHICH HAS BEEN PUSHING FOR SOME STATEMENT. IT WAS AGREED THAT IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO MINIMIZE PRESS COVERAGE AND THAT NO REPEAT NO STATEMENT WOULD BE MADE BY GOP OTHER THAN THE OBSERVATION THAT DISCUSSIONS ARE TAKING PLACE.

11. YOUSUF NOTED THAT THE GOP NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MEETS MAY 3 AND THAT QUESTIONS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE PUT TO THE GOVERNMENT FROM THE FLOOR.

12. THE MEETING BROKE UP ON THE NOTE THAT FURTHER CONVERSATIONS WOULD BE HELD, AT MY INITIATIVE, WHEN I HAD RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS.

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 RAWALP PREOY 061041Z

13. COMMENT:

A. IT IS NOT REPEAT NOT SURPRISING THAT FORMAL NOTICE OF TERMINATION WOULD HAVE BEEN DELIVERED. THIS WOULD UNDERSTANDABLY BE LOGICAL WAY FOR GOP TO INITIATE DISCUSSIONS;

B. IT IS NOT REPEAT NOT SURPRISING THAT NOTICE WOULD HAVE BEEN DELIVERED SHORTLY BEFORE THE EXPECTED ARRIVAL OF KOSYGIN;

~~PAGE 3, RUSSOM 4306/2 SECRET~~

C. IT IS WORTHY OF NOTE THAT GOP PLACED SUCH STRESS ON:

(1) EXCLUSION AREAS AND LACK OF GOP TAKE WHICH WE CONSIDER TO BE A RED HERRING; AND

(2) MILITARY SUPPLY.

14. IT IS MY JUDGMENT THAT NO REPEAT NO FURTHER RESPONSE SHOULD BE MADE TO GOP PRIOR TO KOSYGIN ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OTHER THAN FOR ME TO EXPRESS, AND WASHINGTON TO EXPRESS TO HILALY, THE GREAT SURPRISE AND DEEP CONCERN OF WASHINGTON AT THE ABRUPTNESS AND INDICATED INFLEXIBILITY OF THE GOP POSITION COUPLED WITH A STATEMENT THAT WE WILL INITIATE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS FOLLOWING FULL APPRAISAL OF THE EFFECTS OF A CONTINUED GOP INFLEXIBLE POSTURE ON USG-GOP RELATIONS. PLEASE CONFIRM OR COMMENT.

15. WOULD APPRECIATE DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES ON:

A. MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE PERIOD OF CONTINUANCE BEYOND JULY '69;

B. DEGREE TO WHICH EXCLUSION AREAS MAY BE REDUCED OR ELIMINATED;

C. WHAT LINE SHOULD BE TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO:

N (1) MAINTENANCE AND/OR ENLARGEMENT OF SCOPE OF PRESENT MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY NOW LIMITED TO SPARE PARTS AND THIRD COUNTRY

~~PAGE 4, RUSSOM 4306/2 SECRET~~

ACQUISITION OF 200 TANKS;

(2) POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON FUTURE AID POLICY; AND

(3) OTHER POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON GOP-USG RELATIONS.

OEHLERT

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

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99
INFO ACTION

Saturday, April 6, 1968
9:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a suggestion for a critically important passage in your speech to the Congress Monday night.

The central theme is the opposite side of your point about "divisiveness": the power of the great decent majority -- if it acts together in the national interest.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Harry McPherson

Mr. Honore Busby

WWRostow:rla

April 6, 1968

99a

At a time of crisis a great nation must look at itself in the mirror hard; and it must act on what it sees, if it is to remain great.

What do we see now if America looks in the mirror?

-- We see a minority of white Americans who are not willing to grant the Negro full economic, social, and political equality. They hold to attitudes of mind and heart which breed violence against the Negro. One of them struck down Martin Luther King.

-- We see also a minority of Negroes so frustrated by a lack of motivation at home; by a lack of education; by a sense that the great society around them does not want them and cannot use them -- that they take to violence when there is opportunity for violence.

These white and black extremes are the time bombs of our society; and the fuse is very short.

But if we look closely we see something else. There is in our land

a great moderate decent majority. That majority has faith in the values of America's past and the possibilities for our future. It includes the majority of our Negro citizens as well as the majority of our white citizens. They raise their children to take advantage of the opportunities around them. They struggle and sacrifice so that the life of the children can be better than their own.

Why has that majority -- black and white -- not prevented the violence we have seen in these past few days? Why has it been ineffective?

The answer is because the majority has not acted together and responsibly. It has not taken upon itself the three tasks we face:

-- the task of providing to the Negro the fullest possible measure of economic, social, and political opportunity;

-- the task of human reconciliation -- of contact, communication, and fellowship -- at every level of our common life;

-- the task of maintaining the rule of law in the land.

We usually think of democracy first in terms of the freedom it gives us: the freedom of the individual to make his own decisions and to shape his own life; the freedom of groups with common interests to press and pursue those interests.

But a democracy which thinks only of its liberties is in danger of losing them.

Democracy demands that the moderate majority remain united on the great issues which face the nation and act together on these issues.

As President, I must tell you that the majority in our country has not fulfilled its duty. There is ample goodwill among us. But there is also apathy. There is hesitation in taking the steps which must be taken to maintain the unity and fibre of the Republic. There is unnecessary divisiveness.

It was because I felt that my candidacy in 1968 could contribute to that divisiveness that I spoke to the nation on March 31. I now intend to use every fibre of my capacity to mobilize the great moderate majority -- white and black, Republican and Democratic -- to help this nation do what

must be done.

But what I propose cannot be done by the President alone.

It demands that the Congress act and act promptly.

It demands that the Governors and Mayors act and act promptly.

It demands that every citizen who accepts the blessings of a free democracy accept also the responsibility to do what must be done: in his town; in his neighborhood; on his street block/

This is what I propose: *(action program follows)*

As we rally now and grip together the problem before us, we shall also be able to grip and control the great problems which face us in the world.

I cannot guarantee that an honorable peace will soon be possible in Southeast Asia; but there is a decent hope which is worth a maximum effort.

I cannot tell you that we have yet turned the corner in finding a way to peace in the Middle East; but as of tonight the cause is not lost.

I cannot tell you that the trade and monetary system which we have built for 20 years -- and on which our national prosperity is based -- is yet secure in the face of recent challenges; but I can tell you that if this Congress does its duty, that system can be secured.

How we rally now in dealing with our domestic crisis -- whether the moderate majority pulls together in the national interest -- can determine the outcome abroad as well as at home.

For an America torn and divided at home cannot do what it must abroad. At this moment in history we are the necessary balance wheel for peace and progress and order. We cannot do the job alone; but we are not alone. There are many forces ready to work in partnership with us for decent ends. But we are necessary. There is no one to whom we can pass the buck.

It stops right here -- with you and me.

Look around you, my friends, in this chamber. Look around you, my fellow citizens, at those who are your friends and neighbors. Every one of us knows that most of those about him want the same decent things for themselves, their community, and the nation that he does. This is our strength. This is our hope. This is why America has come so far with such grandeur.

I ask all of you here before me -- I ask of all my fellow citizens -- for an act of rededication tonight; for an act of fellowship; for an act of reaffirmation that America will remain great.

Put aside now divisions of race and party. Act as Americans.

On this basis we can go forward together to do what must be done here at home and in the far reaches of the world.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

to P
via Hasty
4/6/68
org

100

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FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2182
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For the President
From Walter Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CANBERRA 4844 7 18

01760Q

NODIS

(OC/T PLEASE DELIVER THIS MESSAGE TO THE WHITE HOUSE WITH
NO REPEAT NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CANBERRA 4844

NODIS

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE SECRETARY

JUST A WORD TO LET YOU KNOW THAT MY THOUGHTS ARE
CONSTANTLY WITH YOU AS YOU BEAR THE UNEARNED BURDENS ARISING
FROM THE TERRIBLE TRAGEDY IN MEMPHIS. NO OTHER MAN HAS DONE
SO MUCH AS YOU TO FIND DECENT ANSWERS TO THESE PROBLEMS WHICH
HAVE DEEPLY DIVIDED OUR PEOPLE. YOU HAVE THE DEEPEST SYMPATHY
AND RESPECT FROM EVERYBODY IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD IN THIS
MOMENT OF TRIAL. RUSK
BT

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12358,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR 16, 1993.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY 129 ON 5-19-92

ACTION

101

**Saturday, April 6, 1968
7:45 a.m.**

Pres file

Mr. President:

**Is this routine message of response
to messages from foreign dignitaries on
the death of Dr. King acceptable to you?**

W. W. Rostow

Yes _____

No _____

Call me _____

WWRestow:rla

10/2

SUGGESTED MESSAGE

I am grateful for your expression of sympathy on the death of the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King. In his quest for freedom and equality for all men, Dr. King spoke not only to the conscience of this nation but to the conscience of the world. Your kind message has given me renewed assurance that there are nations and men ready to shoulder the burden that Dr. King bore with such dignity.

Lyndon B. Johnson

102

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, April 6, 1968 - 7:40 am

Pres file

Mr. President:

Charles Cellingweed reports, in the attached, that Hanoi would not mind recce flights during a bombing standdown. That is a reasonably important indication that they might be serious.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By isa, NARA Date 1-15-99

Vientiane 5663

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ACTION SS 30

1968 APR 6 07 36

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7932
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 2495
AMEMBASSY SAIGON 2102
CINCPAC 2096
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 401

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIENTIANE 5663

1. CHARLES COLLINGWOOD, CBS, RETURNED FROM HANOI LAST NIGHT AND TOLD EMBOFF THAT HE HAD INTERVIEWED PHAN VAN DONG. DURING THE INTERVIEW COLLINGWOOD EXPRESSED HOPE THAT DONG WAS AN OPTIMIST REGARDING THE POSSIBILITIES OF NEGOTIATIONS. DONG REPLIED THAT HE WAS A "MEASURED OPTIMIST." COLLINGWOOD CONTINUED THAT HE HOPED THAT LITTLE INCIDENTS I.E. RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OR THE LIKE, WOULD NOT DISTRACT DONG FROM CONTINUING TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS. DONG REPLIED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE DISTRACTED AS LONG AS THE GENERAL WILLINGNESS TO

PAGE 2 RUMJFS 5663 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TALK WAS MANIFESTED.

COMMENT: INTERVIEW TOOK PLACE AFTER THE REPORTED BOMBING OF LAI CHAU.

GP-3 SULLIVAN

NOTE: HANDLED EXDIS PER S/S-0.

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Authority NLS 91-426
By guf/imp NARA, Date 6-5-97