

45
SENT 2:02 P.M.

EEA366
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1654

1968 APR 19 19 32

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80990

~~SECRET~~

NODIS

for file

~~SECRET~~ NODIS CROCODILE

HEREWITH FIRST EVIDENCE THAT THE GVN IS ORGANIZING ITSELF
RATHER SENSIBLY FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

(QUOTE TEXT OF SAIGON 25167)

1. POLITICAL COUNSELOR HAD FURTHER MEETING WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER DO APRIL 19 TO DISCUSS PROCEDURES FOR SUBSTANTIVE
US/GVN CONSULTATION ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. DO WAS GIVEN
FOLLOWING SUGGESTED OUTLINE OF POINTS TO BE DISCUSSED BY
JOINT US/GVN GROUP, WITH WHICH HE AGREED.

- 1) PARTICIPATION IN PEACE TALKS.
- 2) AGENDA - WHETHER AND AT WHAT STAGE IN THE NEGOTIA-
TIONS THERE SHOULD BE AN AGENDA AND WHAT IT MIGHT CONTAIN.
- 3) ALLIED MILITARY POSTURE IN THE SOUTH DURING TALKS.
- 4) POLITICAL SOLUTION IN SOUTH VIET-NAM IN CONNECTION
WITH A PEACE SETTLEMENT.
- 5) KEY ELEMENTS OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS AND THE MANILA
COMMUNIQUE AS THEY RELATE TO PEACE DISCUSSIONS, INCLUDING
MUTUAL DE-ESCALATORY MEASURES, POW QUESTION, WITHDRAWAL
OF FORCES AND CEASE FIRE, AND NORTH VIETNAMESE COMPLIANCE
WITH THE LAOS ACCORDS.

68 APR 19 PM 2:35

FRIDAY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By us, NARA Date 1-15-99

6) INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF PEACE ARRANGEMENTS.

2. DO SAID THAT HE HAD ESTABLISHED A WORKING GROUP WHICH WAS MEETING SEVERAL TIMES A WEEK WITH HIM TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE POSITIONS FOR GVN TO TAKE IN SUBSTANTIVE TALKS. HE SHOWED POLITICAL COUNSELOR OUTLINE OF ITEMS BEING CONSIDERED BY THIS GROUP WHICH IN GENERAL COVERED THE SAME RANGE OF SUBJECTS WE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERING. DO SAID THAT HIS GROUP CONSISTED NOT ONLY OF PEOPLE WITHIN FOREIGN MINISTRY AND GVN BUT ALSO THE CHAIRMEN OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEES OF THE UPPER AND LOWER HOUSES, AS WELL AS REPRESENTATIVES FROM OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT FOLLOWING THEIR DELIBERATIONS, HE WOULD MEET WITH PRESIDENT THIEU AND THEN HAVE INITIAL JOINT US/GVN MEETING NEXT WEEK. HE AGREED THAT INITIAL MEETING SHOULD BE PRIMARILY FOR PURPOSES OF A PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE MOST URGENT ITEMS.

3. WITH RESPECT TO CONTINUED MANEUVERING ON THE SITE OF US/DRV PRELIMINARY TALKS, DO SAID HE THOUGHT SECRETARY RUSK'S APRIL 18 STATEMENT WAS EXCELLENT AND PUT THE BALL BACK IN HANOI'S COURT. HE THOUGHT THAT IN THE END HANOI MIGHT SUGGEST PARIS AS THE COMPROMISE LOCATION AND EXPRESSED NO PARTICULAR RESERVATION HIMSELF ABOUT THIS SITE.

4. DO HAD NO PARTICULARLY NEW SUBSTANTIVE POINTS ADDITIONAL TO THOSE DESCRIBED IN REFTTEL, AND HE EMPHASIZED THAT THOSE VIEWS HAD OF COURSE BEEN ONLY HIS PERSONAL THOUGHTS RATHER THAN AN OFFICIAL GVN VIEW.

5. DO MENTIONED ONCE AGAIN THE IDEA OF A SEVEN NATIONS SUMMIT MEETING PRIOR TO THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS, OBSERVING THAT HE HAD HAD POSITIVE REPLIES FROM THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES, BUT NO ANSWER AS YET FROM THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS.

BUNKER

DTG 191859Z APR 1968

~~SECRET~~

~~NO DIS~~

46
68 APR 19 PM 12:57

FRIDAY

Pres file

1968 APR 19 17 51

VZCZCZEA363
OO WTE17
DE WTE 1650

FROM: WALT ROSTOV
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP33933

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-82
By sig, NARA, Date 7-28-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APRIL 19, 1968

AS REQUESTED BY LARRY TEMPLE, HERewith A THANK-YOU NOTE
TO AYUB:

"YOU SHOULD KNOW HOW MUCH I APPRECIATE THE PROMPT AND OPEN-
HEARTED WAY YOU RESPONDED TO MY REQUEST OF YESTERDAY. I
REGRET THAT KOSYGIN WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY RESPONSIVE, BUT HOPE
YOUR INTERVENTION WILL WEIGH WITH HIM IN TIME.

"IT IS A COMFORT -- AS ALWAYS -- TO KNOW THAT YOU ARE THERE
AND READY TO HELP."

DTG: 191732Z APRIL 1968

PRESERVATION COPY

47
EE4362
00 WTE12
DE WTE 1649

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82987

~~SECRET~~

1968 APR 19 17 48

68 APR 19 AM 12:54

FRIDAY

Pres file

WE NEED YOUR APPROVAL FOR THE FOLLOWING CABLE TO OUR
EMBASSIES IN ASIA ABOUT SUMMIT MEETING OF FIGHTING ALLIES.

TEXT FOLLOWS:

1. EN ROUTE TEXAS FROM HONOLULU PRESIDENT RESPONDED TO
NEWSMEN'S QUESTIONS REGARDING GVN PROPOSAL FOR A SUMMIT
MEETING. PRESIDENT STATED THAT IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT THAT
WE MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH ALLIES IN THE DAYS AHEAD AND
THAT WE WILL BE MEETING WITH VARIOUS ONES PERIODICALLY.
WHILE NOT RULING OUT POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT AT SOME STAGE,
IMPRESSION WAS CONVEYED THAT SUCH MEETING WAS NOT CONSIDERED
USEFUL AT THIS TIME.

2. LINE WE PROPOSE TAKING WITH ALLIES IS THAT WE DO NOT WISH
TO COMMIT OURSELVES TO FULL DRESS SUMMIT MEETING BETWEEN
THE INITIAL CONTACTS AND FULL-SCALE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
DRV. PRESIDENT WILL BE SEEING (OR HAVE SEEN) EVERYONE OF THE
LEADERS OF THE TCC'S INDIVIDUALLY BEFORE MID-JUNE, WITH THE
EXCEPTION OF PRESIDENT MARCOS. WE WILL ALSO OF COURSE ESTABLISH
REGULAR PROCEDURE FOR CONSULTING WITH TCC'S ONCE TALKS HAVE
BEGUN. IDEA OF SUMMIT SHOULD THEREFORE BE DISCOURAGED
WITHOUT FINALLY CLOSING THE DOOR TO POSSIBILITY AT SOME FUTURE
TIME. WE NOTE THAT AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND NOT IN FAVOR
OF SUMMIT AND THIS CAN BE OF HELP IN ANSWERING URGINGS OF
VIETNAMESE AND THAIS.

APPROVED-----

DISAPPROVED-----

CALL ME-----

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 10095
By us NARA, Date 3-18-98

DTG: 191728Z APR 1968

~~SECRET~~

FROM QUICK COPY

SENT 12:25 P.M.

48

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By ju/mg, NARA, Date 6-2-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 APR 19 17 23

EEA361
CO WTE10
DE WTE 1646

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80934

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APRIL 19, 1968

YOU ASKED US TO PREPARE A DRAFT SPEECH FOR DELIVERY IN THE SENATE, LEANING ON THE RUSSIANS, WITHOUT BEING VIOLENT. THE FOLLOWING DRAFT IS THE RESULT.

MR. PRESIDENT:

IT APPEARS THAT WE ARE ON THE EDGE OF A DIPLOMATIC CONTACT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HANOI GOVERNMENT. IT IS TRUE THAT THIS INITIAL CONTACT IS LIMITED. IT IS LIMITED TO ONLY TWO PARTIES: THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH VIETNAM. IT IS LIMITED IN ITS SUBJECT MATTER: A DISCUSSION OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH BROADER TALKS MIGHT TAKE PLACE.

BUT IT IS NOT LIMITED, MR. PRESIDENT, IN THE HOPES WHICH ARE ATTACHED TO IT. THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, AND I BELIEVE THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD, LOOK TO THIS DEVELOPMENT WITH PROFOUND HOPE AND HIGH EXPECTATION. IT IS, WE ALL KNOW, NOT THE END OF THE CONFLICT. BUT WE ALL HOPE THAT IT PROVES TO BE A BEGINNING OF THE END.

IT IS CLEAR, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT THE PATH TO A SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT IN VIETNAM WILL NOT BE EASY. SUSPICIONS ARE VERY HIGH ON BOTH SIDES. THERE HAS BEEN MUCH TRAGEDY AND LOSS TO EMBITTER BOTH SIDES. BOTH SIDES FEAR THAT THE ENEMY WILL MISINTERPRET A WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE AS AN UNWILLINGNESS TO FIGHT. NEITHER SIDE COMES AS A SUPPLICANT, DEFEATED IN WAR AND FORCED TO SETTLE FOR THE BEST TERMS IT CAN GET.

IT WILL, MR. PRESIDENT, BE A HARD AND TOUGH NEGOTIATION -- AND WE CANNOT BE SURE OF THE RESULT. A REASONABLE AND HONEST SETTLEMENT DOES NOT DEPEND ON US ALONE. IT DEPENDS ALSO ON HANOI.

BUT WE CAN BE SURE OF THIS. IF THESE CONTACTS ARE TO LEAD TO PEACE TALKS -- AND IF THE PEACE TALKS ARE TO LEAD TO PEACE, THEN EVERY COUNTRY WITH A CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE IS GOING TO HAVE TO MAKE IT.

FROM QUICK COPY

Free file
FRIDAY
68 APR 19 PM 12:28

MR. PRESIDENT, THE SOVIET UNION IS IN A POSITION TO AND HAS AN OBLIGATION TO MAKE SUCH A CONTRIBUTION. IT IS A FACT THAT THE COMMUNISTS IN VIETNAM ARE FIGHTING THE WAR WITH SOVIET ARMS AND WITH SOVIET EQUIPMENT. IT IS A FACT THAT WITHOUT THESE SUPPLIES THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD BE TOTALLY UNABLE TO CONTINUE THE WAR AT THE PRESENT SCALE. IT IS A FACT THAT EVERY DAY AMERICAN AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS ARE KILLED WITH SOVIET GUNS AND WITH SOVIET BULLETS. IT IS A FACT THAT THE ROCKETS AND ARTILLERY SHELLS WHICH FELL INTO OUR GARRISON AT KHE SANH EVERY DAY FROM JANUARY 23 TO APRIL 9 WERE SOVIET ROCKETS AND SOVIET SHELLS, FIRED FROM SOVIET WEAPONS.

IT MAY BE TRUE -- INDEED, I AM INCLINED TO BELIEVE IT IS TRUE -- THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DO NOT DEPEND EXCESSIVELY ON SOVIET COUNSEL. IT MAY WELL BE TRUE THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE SOMEWHAT RESISTANT TO SOVIET ADVICE. BUT THE HARD FACT REMAINS THAT THE SOVIET UNION PROVIDES TO NORTH VIETNAM THE ARMS AND THE EQUIPMENT AND THE SUPPLIES WITH WHICH THEY ARE WAGING WAR. THAT FACT NOT ONLY PUTS THE SOVIET UNION IN A POSITION TO EXERCISE INFLUENCE ON HANOI. IT PUTS A HEAVY AND UNAVOIDABLE RESPONSIBILITY UPON THE SOVIET UNION TO DO SO. PERHAPS I SHOULD SAY -- AT LONG LAST, TO DO SO -- FOR THE SOVIET PERFORMANCE IN THE PAST HAS NOT BEEN NOTABLE FOR ITS RESPONSIBILITY.

AS ONE OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE 1954 AND 1962 GENEVA AGREEMENTS, THE SOVIET UNION UNDERTOOK A SPECIAL OBLIGATION TO TRY TO MAKE THOSE AGREEMENTS WORK. IT UNDERTOOK A SPECIAL OBLIGATION TO TRY TO MAKE THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSIONS IN VIETNAM, IN LAOS, AND IN CAMBODIA EFFECTIVE. I REGRET TO SAY THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT FULFILLED ITS OBLIGATIONS. WORSE, IN MANY INSTANCES THE SOVIET UNION HAS ACTED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BLOCK THE EFFORTS MADE BY OTHERS TO BREATHE LIFE INTO THOSE AGREEMENTS AND THOSE COMMISSIONS.

AT THE VIENNA MEETING BETWEEN MR. KHRUSHCHEV AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY, MR. KHRUSHCHEV AGREED THAT LAOS SHOULD BE INSULATED FROM THE STRUGGLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. CERTAINLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT LIVED UP TO THAT UNDERTAKING.

IN 1962 THE GENEVA AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. A CENTRAL ELEMENT TO THAT AGREEMENT WAS THE UNDERTAKING BY ALL THE SIGNATORIES, AND THEY INCLUDED THE SOVIET UNION AND NORTH VIETNAM, THAT ALL FOREIGN TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM LAOS AND THAT NO FOREIGN POWER WOULD USE LAOTIAN TERRITORY FOR THE TRANSPORT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. IT IS A NOTORIOUS FACT THAT THIS AGREEMENT WAS VIOLATED BY NORTH VIETNAM BEFORE THE INK WAS DRY.

MR. PRESIDENT, THE SOVIET ROLE IN THIS FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENT IS A MAJOR ONE, AND ONE WHICH DOES THEM NO CREDIT DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE AGREEMENT, THERE WAS MUCH CONCERN THAT ALTHOUGH THE GREAT POWERS THEMSELVES WOULD LIVE UP TO THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT, THEIR SMALLER ALLIES MIGHT NOT, AND MIGHT BY THEIR TRANSGRESSIONS, PRECIPITATE ANOTHER DANGEROUS CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE MAJOR POWERS. TO MEET THIS CONCERN, OUR REPRESENTATIVE, AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN, AND THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE, AMBASSADOR PUSHKIN, AGREED THAT EACH SIDE WOULD TAKE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENSURING THE COMPLIANCE OF ITS ALLIES WITH THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT. UNDER THE HARRIMAN-PUSHKIN AGREEMENT, THE SOVIET UNION UNDERTOOK TO ENSURE THAT NORTH VIETNAM DID NOT USE LAOTIAN TERRITORY TO INFILTRATE SOUTH VIETNAM. THEIR PERFORMANCE FELL NOTORIOUSLY SHORT OF THEIR UNDERTAKING.

NOT ONLY DID THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CONTINUE TO USE LAO TERRITORY IN VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT. THEY DOUBLED, AND THEN REDOUBLED, AND THEN REDOUBLED AGAIN THEIR MISUSE OF LAO TERRITORY, AND THE SUPPLIES, AND THE GUNS, AND THE AMMUNITION THAT WERE ILLEGALLY TRANSPORTED OVER LAO TERRITORY WERE, AND ARE TODAY, SOVIET SUPPLIES -- AND SOVIET GUNS -- AND SOVIET AMMUNITION.

THE SOVIET UNION NOT ONLY FAILED TO MAKE HANOI BEHAVE. THE SOVIET UNION GAVE TO HANOI WHAT IT NEEDED TO MISBEHAVE WITH. THE SOVIET UNION NOT ONLY FAILED IN ITS ROLE AS GAMEKEEPER -- IT ACTUALLY PROVIDED FREE TRANSPORTATION AND BULLETS TO THE POACHERS.

I BELIEVE THAT THE SITUATION TODAY WOULD BE MUCH LESS DANGEROUS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IF THE SOVIET UNION HAD DISCHARGED ITS OBLIGATIONS IN THE PAST. THE DANGER IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IS THE DIRECT RESULT OF THE ESCALATION OF THE WAR. THE ESCALATION OF THE WAR IS THE DIRECT RESULT OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE VIOLATIONS OF LAOTIAN TERRITORY. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE VIOLATIONS OF LAOTIAN TERRITORY ARE THE DIRECT RESULT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S FAILURE TO MEET ITS OBLIGATIONS.

IN THE PAST, THE SOVIETS HAVE PLAYED A PECULIAR KIND OF HEAD-IN-THE-SAND ROLE CONCERNING VIETNAM. THEY HAVE DECRIED THE CONFLICT AS A THREAT TO WORLD PEACE, BUT HAVE ACTED AS THE PRINCIPAL ARMS MERCHANT TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. THEY HAVE BEEN AMONG THE FIRST TO CALL FOR U.S. RESTRAINT -- BUT HAVE DONE NOTHING TO EFFECT A SIMILAR RESTRAINT UPON NORTH VIETNAM. THEY HAVE TIME AND TIME AGAIN POINTED TO THE VIETNAM CONFLICT AS A MAJOR BARRIER TO FURTHER PROGRESS IN U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS -- BUT THEY HAVE DONE NOTHING TO REMOVE THAT BARRIER. THEY HAVE UNDERTAKEN SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE PEACE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AS CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS AND UNDER THE HARRIMAN-PUSHKIN AGREEMENT -- BUT THEY HAVE FAILED UTTERLY TO ACQUIT THEMSELVES OF THESE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

MR. PRESIDENT, I AM NOT RECITING THIS UNHAPPY TALE IN ORDER TO HEAP SCORN ON THE SOVIET UNION. MY PURPOSE, ON WHAT I HOPE IS THE EVE OF A NEGOTIATION ATTEMPT, IS TO URGE THE SOVIET UNION TO PLAY ITS FULL ROLE IN HELPING TO MAKE THOSE NEGOTIATIONS FRUITFUL.

IT IS CLEAR THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON IS DETERMINED TO GET A PEACE SETTLEMENT IF IT IS POSSIBLE. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT BE THE STUMBLING BLOCK TO A FAIR AND REASONABLE PEACE. WE ARE PREPARED TO GO ALL THE WAY DOWN THE ROAD TO GET A DECENT SETTLEMENT. HOWEVER, IF HANOI'S INTRANSIGENCE CAUSES THESE TALKS TO FAIL -- AND IF THESE TALKS FAIL IT WILL BE BECAUSE OF HANOI'S INTRANSIGENCE -- A SITUATION FAR MORE DANGEROUS THAN THE PRESENT ONE WILL FACE US ALL. IF EVENTS PROVE THAT A GENUINE PEACE IS NOT POSSIBLE THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS, THIS COUNTRY WILL BE FACED WITH QUESTIONS OF THE MOST GRAVE KIND. IF A NEGOTIATED PEACE PROVES IMPOSSIBLE, WHAT, THEN, SHOULD BE THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE VIETNAMESE CONFLICT?

I DO NOT PROPOSE TO ANSWER THAT QUESTION. BUT I POSE IT, SO THAT ALL WILL UNDERSTAND THE VAST IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING THE SUCCESS OF THE UPCOMING TALKS. ALL COUNTRIES -- AND THE GREAT POWERS MORE THAN THE OTHERS -- HAVE A VITAL INTEREST IN A DECENT SETTLEMENT IN VIETNAM. ALL COUNTRIES -- AND THE GREAT POWERS MORE THAN THE OTHERS -- SHOULD EXERT THEMSELVES TO THAT END.

MR. PRESIDENT, I BELIEVE THE TALKS WHICH ARE ABOUT TO BEGIN MUST SUCCEED. I BELIEVE THAT EVERYONE WHO CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THAT SUCCESS MUST CONTRIBUTE. AND I HAVE TRIED IN MY REMARKS TO POINT OUT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS BOTH THE OPPORTUNITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO EXERT INFLUENCE ON HANOI.

MR. PRESIDENT, I HOPE THAT THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE DAYS AHEAD WILL BE BETTER THAN ITS PERFORMANCE IN THE PAST.

DTG: 191432Z APR 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GPS: 1500 IMI 1500

SENT 11:35 A.M.

~~SECRET~~ 49

EYES ONLY

32M
RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 APR 19 16 35

68 APR 19 AM 11:40

FRIDAY

2EA368
OO WTE13
DE WTE1647

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80985

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

APRIL 19, 1968

YOU SHOULD KNOW WESTY'S ATTACK ON A SHAU VALLEY HAS BEGUN.

ONE BATTALION OF THE 3RD BRIGADE, 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION
AGSAULTED INTO A LANDING ZONE IN THE NORTHERN A SHAU VALLEY.
AN ADDITIONAL BATTALION WILL BE AIR LANDED TODAY. THE THIRD
BATTALION IS ON CALL. THESE ATTACKS INITIATED OPERATION
DELAWARE/LAMSON 216. NO CONTACT HAS BEEN REPORTED.

FIRE SUPPORT: SIX ARC LIGHT STRIKES HIT TARGETS IN NORTHERN
A SHAU VALLEY YESTERDAY IN PREPARATION FOR OUR ATTACKS. TWO
ADDITIONAL B-52 STRIKES WERE TARGETED AGAINST ROUTES 547 AND 547A.
EIGHTY-FIVE TACTICAL AIR SORTIES SUPPORTED THE 1ST AIR CAVALRY
DIVISION WITH THE MAJOR PORTION AGAINST A SHAU. GUNSHIPS FROM
THE 9TH CAVALRY HIT NUMEROUS TARGETS IN THE VALLEY. DAMAGE
ASSESSMENT INCLUDED TWO STRUCTURES, 28 BUNKERS, AND ONE
ANTI-AIRCRAFT POSITION DESTROYED. ARTILLERY SUPPORTED WITH 2,046
ROUNDS FIRED.

DTG: 191617Z APR 1968

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988

By 19 NARA Date 5-1-92

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

FROM QUICK COPY

SENT 9:46 A.M.

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~~SECRET~~

SENT
RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 APR 19 14 46

22A359
CD WTE10
DE WTE 1643

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP32982

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-82

By lig, NARA, Date 7-28-94

Pres file

68 APR 19 AM 9:49

~~SECRET~~

APRIL 19, 1968

HEREWITH OUR OUTGOING TO AYUB, THE NEGATIVE RESULT OF HIS TALK WITH KOSYGIN PLUS AYUB'S OWN OBSERVATIONS.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR OEHLERT

PLEASE ARRANGE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DELIVERY OF FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO PRESIDENT AYUB.

"I WOULD BE GREATFUL IF YOU WERE TO TAKE UP WITH PREMIER KOSYGIN THE QUESTION OF A SITE FOR VIETNAM PEACE CONTACTS.

YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT BECAUSE OF OUR CONFIDENCE IN YOU WE WOULD FIND PAKISTAN WHOLLY SATISFACTORY. YOUR TIES WITH BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA SHOULD COMMEND PAKISTAN TO THE OTHER SIDE.

I WOULD WELCOME ANY OBSERVATIONS YOU MAY HAVE ON THIS MATTER AFTER YOU TALK WITH PREMIER KOSYGIN.

WITH OUR PERSONAL REGARDS."

FM AMBASSADOR OEHLERT RAVALPINDI 309
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. UPON RECEIPT YOUR MESSAGE AT 0905 HOURS I PHONED PRESIDENT'S MILITARY SECRETARY MAJOR GENERAL RAFI TO INFORM HIM I WOULD BE BRINGING A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT AYUB FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON WHICH I THOUGHT AYUB WOULD LIKE TO SEE PRIOR KOSYGIN DEPARTURE.

2. WHEN I DELIVERED MESSAGE TO RAFI AT 0945 HOURS HE INFORMED ME THAT:

A. HE HAD INFORMED AYUB, WHO WAS IN A MEETING WITH KOSYGIN, OF MY PHONE CALL;

B. HE WOULD STRAIGHT AWAY TAKE PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MESSAGE IN TO AYUB AT THE CONFERENCE; AND

C. HE WOULD EXPECT THAT AYUB WOULD EITHER SPEAK TO ME ABOUT THE MATTER AT KOSYGIN AIRPORT DEPARTURE AT 1130 HOURS OR CALL ME IN LATER TODAY OR TOMORROW.

FM AMBASSADOR DEHLERT RAYALPINDI 310
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. AFTER KOSYGIN BOARDED HIS PLANE, GENERAL RAFI SOUGHT ME OUT AND SAID THAT PRESIDENT AYUB WISHED TO TALK WITH ME. WHEN I APPROACHED AYUB IN THE MIDST OF A LARGE GROUP OF PEOPLE HE DREW ME ASIDE ONTO THE AIRPORT APRON ABOUT TWENTY FEET AWAY FROM ANYONE ELSE AND TOLD ME THAT:

A. HE HAD TALKED WITH KOSYGIN WHO HAD NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN VERY RESPONSIVE;

B. AYUB SAID THAT KOSYGIN TOOK THE POSITION THAT SINCE PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD STATED THAT HE WAS WILLING TO MEET QUOTE BOTH AT ANY TIME AND ANY PLACE UNQUOTE, HE, KOSYGIN, COULD NOT REPEAT NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE USG WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT ACCEPT EITHER PHNOM PENH OR WARSAW; AND

C. THAT HE DOUBTED THAT HE SHOULD PUT ANY PRESSURE ON HIS HANOI FRIENDS TO TRY TO CAUSE THEM TO CHANGE THEIR POSITION.

2. AYUB THEN SAID THAT LATER, PRESUMABLY TODAY BUT NOT REPEAT NOT NECESSARILY, HE WOULD HAVE DELIVERED TO ME A LETTER FROM HIM TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON COVERING THIS MATTER. I WILL OF COURSE FORWARD THE LETTER BY TELEGRAM AS SOON AS RECEIVED.

3. AYUB THEN SAID THAT IT WAS HIS OPINION, BASED ON THE TOTALITY OF HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH KOSYGIN, THAT KOSYGIN WAS GENUINELY ANXIOUS TO SEE TALKS START AND TO SEE THEM RESULT IN PEACE.

4. AYUB THEN EXPRESSED TO ME HIS SHOCK AND DISAPPOINTMENT AT PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S DECISION NOT REPEAT NOT TO STAND FOR REELECTION. HE SAID THAT HE RECOGNIZED THE PARTIOTIC MOTIVATIONS FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S DECISION, BUT THAT HE PERSONALLY WOULD MISS HIS DEAR FRIEND, AS WOULD THE UNITED STATES AND MUCH OF THE REST OF THE WORLD. HE ADDED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND ALL OF THE WORLD NEEDED A STRONG MAN AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THAT HE HOPED THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD DEVELOP WHICH WOULD PERSUADE PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO CHANGE HIS MIND.

5. THE AIRPORT SCENE PRODUCED AN AMUSING BIT OF SYPLAY. WHEN PRESIDENT AYUB HAD FINISHED HIS FIVE MINUTE CHAT WITH ME AND I TOOK MY DEPARTURE OF HIM, A LARGE NUMBER OF THIRD COUNTRY AMBASSADORS APPROACHED ME INDIVIDUALLY WITH THE GENERAL COMMENT OR OBSERVATION THAT THEY ASSUMED THAT PRESIDENT AYUB WAS GIVING ME AN IMMEDIATE FILL-IN ON THE KOSYGIN CONVERSATIONS. I AM SURE THAT WAS PROBABLY THE CONCLUSION REACHED BY ALL PRESENT INCLUDING THOSE RUSSIANS PRESENT.

FM AMBASSADOR OEHLERT RAWALPINDI 311
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR THE PRESIDENT

I AM NOW IN RECEIPT OF A LETTER DATED TODAY FROM S.FIDA
HASSAN, ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT, READING AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR:

WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR LETTER OF TODAY TO THE
PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS, I CONVEY THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PERSONAL MESSAGE TO HIM AS FOLLOWS:

INNERQUOTE AS REQUESTED BY YOU, I IMMEDIATELY TOOK
UP WITH MR. KOSYGIN THE QUESTION OF A VENUE FOR VIETNAM
PEACE CONTACTS. HIS REACTION WAS THAT AFTER YOUR REPEATED
STATEMENTS THAT YOU WOULD BE PREPARED TO HOLD TALKS ANY
WHERE AT ANY TIME, THERE SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM ABOUT THE
SELECTION OF A SUITABLE VENUE. HE CONSIDERS THAT YOU MIGHT
AGREE TO WARSAW WHERE BOTH SIDES HAVE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES.
HE FURTHER CONSIDERS THAT TALKS CAN BEGIN AT ONCE FOLLOWING
A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM YOU. HE SAID THAT THE SELECTION
OF A SITE DOES NOT DEPEND ON USSR BUT IS FOR BOTH NORTH
VIETNAM AND USA TO DECIDE.

IT IS PURELY MY PERSONAL ASSESSMENT THAT WHATEVER
MAY BE THE SOVIET PUBLIC STANCE, INWARDLY THEY TOO ARE
ANXIOUS THAT TALKS SHOULD START AND PEACE SHOULD BE RESTORED
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

IN THE INTEREST OF THE USA AND PEACE IN SOUTH EAST ASIA
I HOPE THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR BOTH THE SIDES TO SHOW
LARGE HEARTEDNESS AND COMMENCE TALKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
AS SO MUCH IS AT STAKE.

HOPE YOU, LADY BIRD AND REST OF YOUR FAMILY ARE IN VERY
GOOD HEALTH.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS,

MOHAMMAD AYUB KHAN END INNERQUOTE

THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE GLAD IF YOU KINDLY TRANSMIT
THIS MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

WITH KIND REGARDS,

YOURS SINCERELY,
S.FIDA HASSAN UNQUOTE

DTG: 191313Z APR 68

51
ZTA358
03 WTE13
DE WTE 1644

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP88933

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ (PARIS 12310) 1968 APR 19 14 00

APRIL 19, 1968

HEREWITH OUR PARIS SOURCE INDICATES THE POLES ARE STILL
PRESSING THE FRENCH AND OTHERS FOR WARSAW.

SOURCE SHOWED EMBOFF APR. 18 TWO TELEGRAMS JUST RECEIVED
FROM WARSAW AND HANOI SIGNED BY WAPLER AND QUIRIELLE RESPECTIVELY:
A. WARSAW TELEGRAM STATED THAT WOLNIAK HAD CALLED IN AMB.
WAPLER THE AFTERNOON OF APR. 17 TO DISCUSS SITE FOR US-NVN
TALKS. HE STATED THAT THE HANOI AMB. IN WARSAW HAD CALLED
ON APR. 12 TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE POLISH AUTHORITIES WOULD
BE AGREEABLE TO WARSAW AS SITE FOR DISCUSSIONS. THE POLISH
GOVT. HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY AND HAD ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE
TO THAT EFFECT IMMEDIATELY. WOLNIAK TOLD WAPLER THAT NO
CONSIDERATIONS OF PRESTIGE HAD BEEN INVOLVED. THE POLISH
RESPONSE WAS TO ENSURE THAT THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE NOT BE
ALLOWED TO ESCAPE AND THEREFORE THEY RESPONDED AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE. POLISH GOVERNMENT WANTED WAPLER TO KNOW THAT
WARSAW SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS GOOD LOCATION FOR BOTH PARTIES
BOTH HAD AMBASSADORS. THE US AMB CARRIED OUT US CONTACTS WITH
THE CHINESE IN WARSAW. AT THE END OF 1966 LEWANDOWSKI HAD
AGREED WITH AMB. LODGE TO CONTINUE CONTACT AT WARSAW. THESE
REASONS MILITATED IN FAVOR OF THE POLISH CAPITAL. ON APR.
15 AMB. GRONOUSKI HAD BEEN URGED BY WOLNIAK TO SO INFORM
WASH. AND TO INSIST ON QUICK RESPONSE.

THE US ARGUMENT THAT THE GOVTS OF SOUTH VIETNAM, SOUTH KOREA
AND THAILAND COULD NOT TAKE PART IN THESE DISCUSSIONS,
WOLNIAK SAID, SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION AT THIS
STAGE. IT WAS A DODGE. THE TALKS WERE PRELIMINARY AND COULD
TAKE PLACE WITHOUT ALLIES.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-273

By 12, NARA Date 5-2-00

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

68 APR 19 AM 9:02

Pres file

AFTER HAVING ENGAGED THE EFFORTS OF FRANCE WITH A VIEW TOWARD HASTENING THE END OF HOSTILITIES, WOLNIAK EXPRESSED THE WISH THAT THE FRENCH GOVT WOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE AMERICANS TO ACCEPT WARSAW. WAPLER SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT THE DEMARCHE TO HIS FOREIGN MINISTER. HE ADDED THAT HE COULD NOT PREJUDGE THE RECEPTION WHICH IT WOULD GET.

LEVANDOWSKI, WHO ASSISTED AT THE CONVERSATION, STATED THAT THE HANOI PLENIPOTENTIARY HA VAN LAU WAS READY TO DEPART HANOI AS SOON AS AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE SITE. HE ALSO STATED THAT INDIVIDUAL DEMARCHES WERE BEING MADE TO THE AMBASSADORS OF OTHER KEY COUNTRIES, E.G., THE SOVIET UNION, UK, INDIA, ITALY AND CANADA. 9. HANOI TELEGRAM 661/662 REPEATED WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, WARSAW, LONDON, RANGOON, STATED THAT QUIRIELLE'S POLISH COLLEAGUE, VASILEWSKY, TOLD HIM THAT IN A CONVERSATION WHICH THE US AMB HAD MENTIONED THAT THE CHOICE OF THE POLISH CAPITAL HAD NOT BEEN FORMALLY RULED OUT BY THE USG. NO INSTRUCTION TO THAT EFFECT HAD BEEN ADDRESSED TO HIM. THE REMARKS OF THE STATE DEPT SPOKESMAN COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS A DEFINITE REPLY.

ACCORDING TO VASILEWSKY, THE POLISH GOVT WAS PREPARED TO PUT THE MAXIMUM FACILITIES AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE TWO PARTIES IN THE EVENT THE AMERICAN SHOULD ACCEPT. THREE BLDGS HAD ALREADY BEEN RESERVED TO RECEIVE THE DELEGATIONS.

MARIA THREE ADDED FOLLOWING PERSONAL COMMENTS: (1) A SITE SHOULD BE CHOSEN WHERE THE CHINESE HAD REPRESENTATION SINCE THEY COULD EITHER BE BROUGHT INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME OR BY THEIR OWN ACTIONS THEY WOULD ELIMINATE THEMSELVES; (2) DESPITE NEUTRAL STATEMENTS BY THE FRENCH GOVT, BOTH THE ELYSEE AND QUAI STRONGLY HOPED PARIS WOULD BE CHOSEN.

WALLNER

DTG: 191313Z APR 1963

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Postaw

52

Friday, April 19, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Free file

SUBJECT: Message Requesting Senate Advice and Consent
to U. S. Accession to the Convention Establishing
a Customs Cooperation Council

At Tab A, for your signature, is a message to the Senate asking for advice and consent to our accession to a 1950 Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council.

The purpose of the Council is to work for uniformity and simplification of the customs systems of the member countries. (It can recommend changes, but the recommendations are not binding.) The Council can play a role in lowering some non-tariff trade barriers, with benefits to U. S. exporters and importers. Fifty-three countries -- including all major industrial nations except the USSR -- now belong to the Council.

This is routine business. Accession to the convention would make it easier for us to influence Council decisions on customs problems that could affect our trade. Treasury (including Lester Johnson, the Commissioner of Customs), the Tariff Commission, Commerce, State and Bill Roth all recommend that we join. The Trade Committee of the White House Conference on International Cooperation made a similar recommendation.

Joining will cost us some money. Our annual contribution to the Council's budget would be about \$187,000 a year. In addition, we would be asked to make a one-time contribution of \$18,000 to the Council's working capital.

The convention includes provisions for privileges and immunities for Council representatives that are broader than we usually grant.

State foresees no serious difficulty in working out an arrangement with the Council that would make it possible for us to accede to the Convention without going beyond our customary practices. They much prefer this approach to entering a reservation on the privileges and

immunities provisions, and will discuss such an arrangement with the relevant committees when they consider the Convention.

Bill Macomber did a very careful check on the Hill shortly before the end of the session with the staffs of the relevant committees. John Martin (House Ways and Means) says there will be no trouble on the House side. Tom Vail of the Senate Finance Committee raised a few questions, but the Bureau of Customs gave him satisfactory answers. He now says we can go ahead.

I recommend you sign the letter at Tab A.

W. W. Rostow

(If you agree, we will need your signature at Tab A.)

Disapprove_____

Call me_____


ERF:rst

Pres file

Friday, April 19, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your approval is
a brief message to President Salazar
of Portugal congratulating him on his
seventy-ninth birthday, April 28.

W. W. Rostow

Approve____
Disapprove____
Call me____

mwg
MWG:mst
4/19/68

53a

DRAFT BIRTHDAY MESSAGE TO
PRIME MINISTER SALAZAR

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am pleased to extend my personal best wishes
to you on the occasion of your seventy-ninth birthday.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, April 19, 1968

W. W. Rostow

*Pres file
54*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Civil Aviation Agreement with South Africa

Attached is a memo from Nick Katzenbach recommending that you approve an amendment to the 1947 U. S. -South African Air Transport Agreement.

The amendment will:

- enable the South African airlines to fly to the U. S. for the first time. They probably would open service to New York near the end of the year -- at the earliest. (South Africa was given rights to serve the U. S. in the original agreement, but the routes were not defined. Up to now, they did not wish to exercise their rights.)
- give U. S. airlines additional routes to South Africa.

The overall agreement and the new route exchange is a very good economic bargain for the U. S. TWA is completely satisfied with the amendment; and Pan American has not objected. The CAB recommends approval.

The only problem is political. The UN General Assembly in 1962 passed a resolution, without U. S. support, requesting member governments to refuse landing and passage facilities to South African aircraft. We may, therefore, receive some criticism in the UN, from African states, and from domestic critics of South Africa.

On the other hand, neither we nor any other industrial country apply commercial sanctions to South Africa. At present the South African airline flies to the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Australia and other industrial countries.

Checks on the Hill did not turn up any opposition to the amendment. In fact, most of the sentiment was favorable.

I concur in State's recommendation that you approve this amendment.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

ERF MWG

ERF:MWG:mst

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 716 88-83
By isp/18, NARA, Date 5-18-92

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

54a

March 4, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: South African Air Route to New York

The Problem

In 1947 we signed an Air Transport Agreement with South Africa which granted:

- The US two air routes to South Africa (one via the North Atlantic and Africa, the other via the Caribbean, South America and Africa);
- rights for South Africa to New York (the actual routes were left for later definition).

At South Africa's request, we have now completed an ad referendum amendment to the 1947 Agreement which defines their rights to New York. The amendment would:

- give South Africa two routes to New York (one via South America, the other via the North Atlantic);
- clarify and expand US routes to South Africa, permitting eventual additional service via five countries in Europe.

The Case for Approving the Amendment

There is a strong case for going ahead with this amendment.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71988-82

By 100/18, NARA, Date 5-18-82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

- In aviation and commercial terms the new route exchange is a very good bargain for us and our airlines. (TWA is completely satisfied with the amendment; PanAm has not objected.)
- We have a legal obligation under the 1947 Agreement to define South African rights to New York (which can only be avoided by denouncing the Agreement, thereby cancelling US rights to South Africa as well).

The Case Against Approval

There are some possible political risks involved in approving the amendment. We will probably get some criticism--although it is hard to tell how much--in the UN and from the Africans. There may be a bit of domestic flak as well. (Independent African countries have prohibited South African aircraft from overflying and landing. Also, the UN General Assembly--without US support--has recommended that member states deny landing and other facilities to South African aircraft.)

Congressional Reaction

Bill Macomber's people have done an informal check on the Hill with the relevant Committee members or their staff. We have talked with seven Senators (or their staff), one Senate Staff Member, seven Congressmen (or their staff), and two House Staff Members. None of these people opposed or disapproved of the agreement. In fact, a strong majority approved going ahead. (A complete report of our Hill consultations is at Tab A.)

* * *

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

On balance, I recommend you approve the amendment. It is a good commercial deal for us, and the costs of denouncing our 1947 Agreement are great. The interested airlines are either in favor of going ahead or have no objection, the CAB recommends approval, and there is no evidence of any strong Congressional opposition. There is some risk of domestic and foreign criticism, but I doubt that it will be great--particularly if we play it very low key.

Recommendation

That you approve an amendment of the 1947 United States-South African Air Transport Agreement defining South Africa's air routes to New York and clarifying and expanding US air routes to Johannesburg.



Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

546

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

February 6, 1968

Subject: Congressional Consultations on US-South Africa
Air Transport Agreement

Mr. Schnee of the Office of Congressional Relations discussed the recently negotiated US-South Africa Air Transport Agreement with 7 Senators (or members of their staff), and 1 Senate staff member, and 7 Congressmen (or members of their staff), and 2 House staff members. In no case was there an expression of opposition to or disapproval of the agreement. A strong majority approved.

Senator Brewster and Rep. Friedel (Md.) expressed their strong concern that future agreements designate Friendship Airport as the terminus for foreign lines rather than the airfields in the New York area. Senator Brewster's staff is of the opinion that the CAB has made a decision not to grant additional rights into New York, but understood that in this particular case the right had been granted to South Africa in 1947.

Senator McCarthy was not available. Emerson Hynes, his I.A., said he would try and get in touch with the Senator but he could not speak for him.

The list of members contacted is attached. Where a name appears in parenthesis it is the name of the staff member with whom Mr. Schnee spoke.

Attached:

List of contacts

54c

Contacts on US-South Africa Air Agreement - January 3 through
February 2, 1968

SENATE

Senator Magnuson	- -	Approved	Commerce Committee
Senator Prouty (Jenkins)	--	No objection	Commerce Committee
Senator Hickenlooper (Pavlick)	--	Approved	Foreign Relations Committee
Senator Brewster (Miller)	--	Approved	Commerce Committee
Senator Hart (Ferris)	--	No objection	Commerce Committee
Senator McCarthy (Hynes)	--	No opinion - would refer	- Foreign Rel. Comm.
Senator Bartlett (Cornman)	--	Approved	Commerce Committee
Don Henderson (SFRCTe Staff)	--	Approval	Foreign Rel. Committee

HOUSE

Rep. O'Hara	--	Approved	Foreign Aff. Comm. Hee
" Bolton	--	Approved	Foreign Aff. Comm. Hee
" Diggs	--	Will consider	Foreign Aff. Comm. Hee
" Friedel	--	Approved	Interstate & For. Commerce
" Devine (Hoyt)		No objection	Interstate & For. Commerce
" Staggers		See Andrew Stevenson , below.	Interstate & For. Commerce
" Springer			
Andrew Stevenson (Staff, Interstate and Foreign Commerce) Approved			
Robert Brandt (Staff, House Foreign Affairs) Approved			

ACTION

Friday
April 19, 1968

55

Free file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to letter from Singapore's
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew

Prime Minister Lee sent to you a very good letter concerning your March 31st speech. Attached is a proposed acknowledgment, which also congratulates him upon his overwhelming election victory of April 13.

I recommend you sign the letter.

W. W. Rostow

Att

55a

April 19, 1968

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I deeply appreciate the thoughts expressed in your letter of April 4 and I am glad to have your understanding of our efforts to reach a peace which will strengthen the security and freedom of Asia.

I note with pleasure that your countrymen have extended your mandate for another five years. Please accept my congratulations and warm good wishes for a fruitful and productive term of office.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Lee Kuan Yew
Prime Minister of Singapore

STATE:LBJ:MWright:wpt



5810

PRIME MINISTER,
SINGAPORE.

556

4th April, 1968.

Dear Mr. President

May I express my admiration for the quiet, almost stoical, patience with which you have borne your difficulties in Vietnam, with all the attendant domestic repercussions.

Your pronouncement to unilaterally suspend bombing for almost the whole of North Vietnam, not to seek re-election and so devote the rest of the nine months of your presidency to seek an honourable and just peace, was a decision of a man of great courage and conviction.

May this momentous act of self-sacrifice eventually lead to a more peaceful and secure future for all of us.

My best wishes,

Yours Sincerely,
Lee Kuan Yew.

President Lyndon B. Johnson,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.,
U.S.A.

SECRET EYES ONLY.

April 19, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

You should know Westy's attack on A Shau Valley has begun.

One battalion of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division assaulted into a landing zone in the northern A Shau Valley. An additional battalion will be air landed today. The third battalion is on call. These attacks initiated operation DELAWARE/LAM SON. 216. No contact has been reported

Fire support: Six Arc Light strikes hit targets in northern A Shau Valley yesterday in preparation for our attacks. Two additional B-52 strikes were targeted against Routes 547 and 547A. Eighty-five tactical air sorties supported the 1st Air Cavalry Division with the major portion against A Shau. Gunships from the 9th Cavalry hit numerous targets in the valley. Damage assessment included two structures, 28 bunkers, and one antiaircraft position destroyed. Artillery supported with 2,046 rounds fired.

(from: MAC 05223 EO para 4. sub A and B)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988

By kg, NARA, Date 5-4-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 19, 1968

57

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

As requested by Larry Temple, herewith a thank-you note to Ayub:

"You should know how much I appreciate the prompt and openhearted way you responded to my request of yesterday. I regret that Kesygin was not immediately responsive, but hope your intervention will weigh with him in time.

"It is a comfort -- as always -- to know that you are there and ready to help. "

000

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By isa, NARA Date 1-15-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - April 18, 1968

TO: The President

FROM: Walt Rostow

Herewith a proposed ^eguest list for the Latin American ceremony
on Tuesday, April 23, on which I would like to have your approval.

Approve ☐

Disapprove ☐

Call me ☐

Attachment

Suggested guest list

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 5-4-92

580

GUEST LIST

for

LATIN AMERICAN CEREMONY

1. All Latin American White House and OAS Ambassadors:

2. Inter-American Organizations

Pan American Union

OAS Secretary General Mora

OAS Assistant Secretary General Sanders

OAS Secretary General-elect Galo Plaza

OAS Assistant Secretary General-elect Rafael Urquía

Legal Director Francisco García Amador

Economic Director Germanico Salgado

Social Director Theo R. Crevenna

Education Director Francisco Céspedes

Cultural Director Rafael Squirru

Science Director Jesse Perkinson

Technical Cooperation Director João Gonçalves de Souza

Information Director Arturo Morales Carrion.

Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress

Chairman Carlos Sans de Santamaria

Executive Secretary Walter Sedwitz

Panel Expert Jorge Marshall

Panel Expert Bernal Jimenez

Inter-American Development Bank

Acting President Robert Menapace

Acting Manager, Technical Department, Pedro Iraneta

Acting General Counsel Jose R. Chiriboga

Acting Manager, Operations Department, James A. Lynn.

Executive-Director-designate Edward A. Clark

3. World Bank and Monetary Fund

President Robert McNamara

Executive Vice President J. Burke Knapp

Bank Director, Western Hemisphere, Gerald Alter

Bank Deputy Director, Western Hemisphere, Roger A. Chaufonier

Bank Director, Development Services Department, Richard H. Demuth

Fund Director, Western Hemisphere Department, Jorge del Canto

Fund Deputy Director, Western Hemisphere Department, E. Walter Roblicheck

4. United Nations Development Program

Director Paul Hoffman

Deputy Director Roberto Huertemate

5. Congressional

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

House Foreign Affairs Committee

House Banking and Currency Committee

Leadership

5. Congressional

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

House Foreign Affairs Committee

House Banking and Currency Committee

Leadership

6. Universities and Foundation Leaders

R. L. Carlson, Ford Foundation

John B. Howard, Ford Foundation

Dr. G. George Harrar, Rockefeller Foundation

Joseph Grunwald, Brookings Institute

Charles N. Myers, Executive Association, Education & World Affairs

Russell Davis, Harvard University

Dr. Albert O. Hirschman, Harvard University

Frederick Harbison, Princeton

President Emeritus Dr. Milton Eisenhower, Johns Hopkins University

President, Dr. Lincoln Gordon, Johns Hopkins University

Charles H. Savage, MIT

Dr. James R. Killian, MIT

Dr. Robert Scott, University of Illinois

Dr. Theodore W. Schultz, University of Chicago

Richard Adams, University of Texas

7. Business and Industry

David Rockefeller, Chairman, CLA

John F. Gallagher, CLA

William F. Barlow, CLA

George S. Moore, First National City Bank

H. W. Balgooyen, American and Foreign Power Co., Inc.

Harold S. Geneen, Chairman and President, International Telephone
and Telegraph

H. L. Romnes, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, American
Telephone and Telegraph

Harold Logan, President, Grace Line

J. Peter Grace, President, W. R. Grace & Co.

W. T. Moore, President, Moore-McCormack Lines

Harding L. Lawrence, President, Braniff Airways, Inc.

Juan T. Trippe, Chairman, Pan American World Airways, Inc.

Captain J. W. Clark, President, Delta Steamship Lines, Inc.

George A. Spater, President and Chief Executive Officer, American
Airlines

Floyd D. Hall, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Eastern Airlines

Terrell C. Drinkwater, President, Western Airlines

8. Executive Branch

State

Secretary Rusk

Assistant Secretary Covey T. Oliver

Assistant Secretary Anthony Solomon

Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz

Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert M. Sayre

Deputy Assistant Secretary Donald K. Palmer

Deputy Alliance Coordinator James R. Fowler

Assistant Deputy Alliance Coordinator Richard W. Richardson

Office Directors:

William L. Krieg

Maxwell Chaplin

Patrick F. Morris

John W. Ford

Jack B. Jubish

Joseph A. Silberstein

Edward T. Long

Phillip Glaessner

Charles R. Burrows

Sidney Schmukler

John C. Hill

Albert L. Brown

John F. Fitzgerald

Hoyt Ware

Richard J. Bloomfield

9. Treasury

Acting Secretary Joseph Barr

Assistant Secretary Joseph Bowman

10. Agency for International Development

Administrator William Gaud

Deputy Administrator Rutherford Poates

11. Commerce

Secretary C. R. Smith

Assistant Secretary for International Business Lawrence McQuade

12. Transportation

Secretary Allen Boyd

Assistant Secretary for International Affairs Donald Agger

13. Civil Aeronautics Board

Chairman John H. Crooker

14. Other

Army Map Service

Robert L. Thomson

Arnold A. Shadrick

Ralph K. Frangioni

Jack Vaughn

Thomas C. Mann

Labor and Religious Leaders

George Meany, President, AFL-CIO

Joseph F. Beirne, President, Communications Workers of America

C. L. Dennis, President Brotherhood of Railways, Airline and
Steamship Clerks

Andrew C. McLellan, Inter-American Representative, AFL-CIO

Msgr. Marvin Borselon, Director, Secretariat for World Justice

Rev. John J. Considine, M.M., U.S. Catholic Conference

Robert S. Bilheimer, National Council of Churches of Christ

Rev. Dana S. Greene, National Council of Churches of Christ

59

April 18, 1968
7:12pm

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk and I agree that something like this draft message should go out tonight from you to President Ayub:

"I would be grateful if you were to take up with Kosygin the question of a site before Vietnam peace contacts.

"You should know that because of our confidence in you, we would find Pakistan wholly satisfactory. Your ties to both the Soviet Union and Communist China should commend Pakistan to the other side.

"I would welcome any observations you may have on this matter after you talk with Kosygin.

"With warm personal regards,"

A letter such as this should be gotten out tonight. It is already tomorrow in Pakistan.

Walt Rostow

WR:mr

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By us, NARA Date 1-15-99

60

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday - April 18, 1968

TO: The President

FROM: W. W. Rostow

*sent Rostow
via pouch*

free file

Herewith a revised text of the proposed statement for the Latin American ceremony. It contains statistics effectively rebutting the unjustified New York Times assessment, without taking the newspaper head-on.

If you think that this provides a satisfactory basis for moving ahead with the ceremony, I will firm up the planning.

Approve ☐

Disapprove ☐

Call me ☐

Attachment

Text of proposed statement

DECLASSIFIED
ON: 10/21/2003, BY: 21, 1003
By: *rg*, NARA, Date: *8-12-92*

for w. a. - 27 -

60a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WGBowdler:mm
(4-19-68)

Secretary ^{*General*} Mora, Dr. Sanz, Dr. Galo Plaza, Distinguished Ambassadors,
Ladies and Gentlemen:

I have asked you to join me for the ratification of the protocol of amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States.

The amendments adjust the functions and structure of our regional organization to changing needs and circumstances since the original Charter was signed in 1948. They place the OAS in a stronger position to carry out increased responsibilities more efficiently.

The act of ratification signifies United States commitment to a vigorous inter-American system and a vital Alliance for Progress.

The Organization of American States is on the threshold of a dynamic new phase, with new leadership, new instruments and new priorities.

Next month Dr. Galo Plaza assumes the Secretary Generalship of the OAS succeeding our trusted and good friend Dr. Mora. During

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *RF*, NARA, Date *5-2-92*

his long tenure, Dr. Mora has overseen the consolidation of the gains of the past and the innovations which will guide the hemisphere's efforts for the next period. Dr. Plaza enters at a time of unequalled challenge and opportunity:

- The OAS has been given a new machinery which must be set in motion.
- The Alliance for Progress has been extended beyond its original time frame, in frank recognition that the task is not for a decade but for a generation.
- The Action Program of Punta del Este fixed the priorities for what we must do to create a better life in freedom for the billion human beings who will inhabit our hemisphere by the year 2000.

These three fundamental events have taken place during the past three years. It has been my privilege as President of the United States to play an active role in each.

The Punta del Este program approved a year ago rests on three main pillars: higher agricultural production, better education, closer integration. I am encouraged by the beginnings:

- Latin American food production in 1967 increased by 6%, or twice the rate of new mouths to feed.

CONFIDENTIAL

-5-

- Since the start of the Alliance, overall food production has risen over 27%, while population has increased 19%.
- Latin American central government expenditures for education in 1967 amounted to \$2 billion, a 6% increase over last year.
- Since the beginning of the Alliance, central government expenditures for education have risen 62%, or more than 3 times the increase in population.
- The hemisphere's top scientists and educators met following the OAS Summit and agreed on a regional program in science and education to supplement national efforts and pledged \$25 million to launch it.
- The process of economic integration advanced with the organization of the Andean Development Corporation and consultative mechanism to begin combining the Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Association.
- The Inter-American Bank loaned \$81 million for eight new multinational projects in roads, electric power and industries.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

But these are not the only yardsticks of progress. From 1961 to the present:

- manufacturing production increased over 40%, and 6.7% in 1967;
- electric power production rose more than 40 billion kilowatt hours, a 60% increase; for 1967 the increase was 8 billion kilowatt hours;
- an additional 25,000 miles of roads were paved, an increase of 58%; of this amount, 2500 miles were completed in 1967;
- domestic revenues increased by \$3.5 billion, or 33%, of which \$600 million, or 4.5%, occurred during 1967;
- central government investments in public projects like roads, schools, houses, irrigation, increased by one-third;
- the foreign debt service remained at an annual level of between 16.1% of export earnings in 1961 to 17.5% in 1966, and dropped to 17.0% in 1967, reflecting an improved position in the foreign debt structure of most of the countries;

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

- savings and loan institutions grew from 23 in 4 countries in 1961 to 175 associations in 12 countries by 1967, representing an increase in depositors from 50,000 to 750,000. 150,000 of these members were added during 1967;
- agricultural cooperatives rose from 3500 with a membership of 900,000 to 6000 with 1,600,000 members. During 1967 almost 250 new cooperatives were organized.

We are moving forward on a broad front in this hemisphere -- and not backward as some would have us believe. The dimension of poverty, ignorance and disease which must be overcome in our Americas sober us, but does not dismay us. Our confidence in what the Alliance can -- and will -- do springs from what it has done.

While we meet here in Washington, the Governors of the Inter-American Bank are gathering in Bogota, Colombia to set operating guidelines for the next year. Next Monday the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress, under Dr. Sanz' distinguished leadership, convenes in Washington to survey the advance of the Alliance and recommend

new initiatives. Both will focus on their respective roles in the vital process of Latin American integration.

At Punta del Este my fellow Presidents and I called for a bold plan to overcome the natural barriers to Latin American physical unity. The Latin American countries have too long been isolated from each other. With population and industry concentrated along the seacoast (point to map on population density), they have looked across the seas -- to Europe and the United States -- and neglected building the sinews of modern transport and communications which can bind distant parts of a continent as we have done in the United States.

For example:

- To make a satisfactory telephone call between Lima, Peru and Rio de Janeiro it is necessary to go through Miami or New York.
- To travel between Porto Alegre, Brazil and Buenos Aires -- roughly the same distance as from Boston to Washington -- it may take from 2 to 3 days.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-17-

-- Large reserves of gas in Bolivia which could be used in kitchens and factories in neighboring countries remain unused.

Locked behind the high mountain ranges, deep rain forests and forbidding deserts that divide South America are fertile lands and unknown resources (point to map on vegetation to show inner frontier areas awaiting exploitation). Their development can help fulfill the American promise of opportunity and prosperity for this and future generations.

Central America has already demonstrated what can be accomplished by an interlocking system of roads and communications (point to map on Central American roads). Without it the advances made under the Central American Common Market would not have been possible.

The new frontiers of the South American heartland beckon those imaginative enough, daring enough, determined enough to penetrate. A start has already been made by some governments. The Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress and the Inter-American Development Bank have done initial planning. I ask whether the time has not

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 18 -

come to prepare a blue-print for systematically carrying forward this gigantic enterprise -- an enterprise capable of blanketing a continent with roads and river systems, power grids and pipelines, transport and telecommunications (point to map showing existing and potential integration projects).

To this end, I suggest to my fellow Presidents and those who direct our Alliance for Progress institutions the establishment of a high level task force, under the leadership of a distinguished Latin American, to prepare a five-year plan for speeding up the physical integration of our hemisphere. The United States will lend its fullest cooperation.

While Walt Rostow was head of the Policy Planning Council in the Department of State, I had him prepare for me a special study of the integration potential in South America. I have asked him to be here today to describe the results of that study as illustrated by these maps.

I said after the Punta del Este Meeting that the Alliance for Progress is "a task not for sprinters but for long-distance runners". To win this relay, we must set the pace and hold to it. The Presidents last year set that pace in their Action Program. The ~~same~~ document I am about to sign represents my determination to maintain it as long as it is my turn to run.

61

April 15, 1968

FROM BROMLEY SMITH

TO WALT ROSTOW (Air Force I)

INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN

Pres file

Secretary Rusk requests President's approval of following announcement concerning postponement of King of Norway's visit to United States.

QUOTE At the suggestion of His Majesty the King of Norway, it has been agreed to postpone the King's visit to the United States. The King proposed the postponement out of consideration for the President's heavy schedule and the burden of the responsibilities he is presently bearing. END OF QUOTE

As soon as approval is received, State will ask Norwegian agreement. Norwegians are expected to accept this language as long as the verb agreed is used.

State recommends announcement to be made in as low key as possible. Norwegians would release approved text tomorrow morning their time and State would follow with confirmation at noon (EST). Christian could also confirm.

To forestall any leaks here or in Norway, agreement by all is being sought today.

1968 APR 14 16 54

EEA333
CO WTE10
DE WTE 1415

62
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 77-268
By us, NARA Date 1-15-99

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80825

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

APRIL 14, 1968

THIS U THANT CONVERSATION WITH HARMEL REVEALS IDEAS THAT ARE DISTINCTLY UNHELPFUL CONCERNING A VIETNAM SETTLEMENT.

BRUSSELS 5812

1. FONOFF HAS GIVEN US SUBSTANCE OF TELEGRAM WHICH HAS BEEN SENT TO PRINCIPAL BELGIAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS BASED ON CONVERSATION BETWEEN UNSYG AND HARMEL APRIL 10. WHILE THANT AND HARMEL TOUCHED ON MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AND NPT RESUMED GA, BURDEN OF TALK RELATED TO VIET NAM. IN FACT MEMCON ITSELF DOES NOT MENTION EITHER ME OR NPT.
2. FONOFF OFFICIAL SAID CONVERSATION WAS OF ONLY ONE HOUR DURATION AND THANT DID MOST OF THE TALKING. THANT SAID NEGOTIATOR ON NORTH VIET NAM SIDE WOULD BE HANOI'S REPRESENTATIVE IN PHNOM PENH. SYG THOUGHT MEETINGS MIGHT MOVE IN THREE PHASES (1) AMBASSADORIAL TALKS WITH ONLY NVN AND US PARTICIPATING; (2) SECOND PHASE WHICH WOULD BRING IN SVN AND NLF; AND (3) IF SECOND PHASE WERE TO RUN INTO TROUBLE, IT MIGHT THEN BE USEFUL TO TRY TO RECONVENE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. THANT VOLUNTEERED THAT IF NEGOTIATIONS GOT THAT FAR HE DID NOT BELIEVE PEKING WOULD AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN GENEVA CONFERENCE.
3. SYG TOLD HARMEL THAT STOPPING OF THE BOMBING (PRESUMABLY ALTOGETHER) WOULD IN HIS VIEW BRING MILITARY POSITION INTO BALANCE. IN RESPONSE TO OUR REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION OF THIS STATEMENT, FONOFF OFFICIAL SAID HE UNDERSTOOD IT TO MEAN THAT THANT LOOKED UPON BOMBING OF NORTH VIET NAM AS GIVING US AN ADVANTAGE WHICH HANOI COULD NOT MATCH. (COMMENT: FONOFF OFFICIAL ASKED THAT THIS STATEMENT BY SYG BE HELD CLOSELY. HE SEEMED TO FEEL IT REFLECTED A PARTISAN VIEW.)
4. THANT TOLD HARMEL THAT HANOI'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE BID FOR TALKS AGAIN PROVED ITS INDEPENDENCE OF PEKING, THAT HE HIMSELF HAD FOR SOME TIME BELIEVED NORTH VIET NAM WAS RELATIVELY FREE AGENT SO FAR AS CHICOMS WERE CONCERNED.

REPRODUCTION COPY

5. HARMEL ASKED WHAT SYG BELIEVED HANOI'S AIMS WERE. THANT REPLIED THAT HANOI WANTED A UNIFIED COMMUNIST VIETNAM BUT RECOGNIZED THIS WAS NOT FOR THE NEAR FUTURE. AS AN INTERIM OBJECTIVE HANOI WOULD WANT NLF IN THE GOVERNMENT OF SAIGON. (COMMENT: IT WAS NOT CLEAR FROM FONOFF OFFICIAL'S COMMENT WHETHER THIS MEANT GOVERNING ALONE OR IN A COALITION.) THANT SAID HE RECOGNIZED THAT THIS WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO US.

6. HARMEL THEN ASKED HOW U THANT THOUGHT SOUTH VIETNAM SHOULD BE ORGANIZED POLITICALLY. SYG REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE ELECTIONS COULD BE HELD IMMEDIATELY IF A CEASE FIRE OR ARMISTICE WERE TO BE ACHIEVED AND THAT SOME TYPE OF INTERIM GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED WITHOUT ELECTIONS. IN DISCUSSING COMPOSITION OF SUCH INTERIM GOVERNMENT, SYG SAID MEMBERS SHOULD BE "NON-CONTROVERSIAL" AND MENTIONED LEADERS OF EARLIER SAIGON REGIMES INCLUDING A MINISTER "UNNAMED" OF BAO DAI GOVT. NOW RESIDING IN PARIS AND A GENERAL NOW LIVING IN BANGKOK (POSSIBLY BIG MINH). FONOFF OFFICIAL IN READING THIS SECTION SAID IT HAD BEEN APPARENT THAT U THANT HAD LITTLE USE FOR PRESENT SAIGON LEADERS.

7. HARMEL ASKED WHAT INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS COULD DO TO HELP ORGANIZE THE PEACE. THANT RECALLED THAT HANOI HAS CONSISTENTLY REJECTED UN INVOLVEMENT BUT SAID HE PERSONALLY HOPED UN COULD PLAY A ROLE LATER. THANT TOLD HARMEL HE RECOGNIZED THAT BECAUSE OF POLAND ICC'S WERE NOT ALTOGETHER EFFECTIVE.

8. CONCLUDING HARMEL ASKED WHETHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COULD HELP WITH RESTORATION OR REHABILITATION OF VIETNAM WHEN WAR WAS OVER. FONOFF OFFICIAL SAID THANT DID NOT ANSWER DIRECTLY BUT SEEMED TO AGREE THAT THIS WOULD BE USEFUL.

DTG 141639Z APR 1968

~~SECRET~~

GPS 680 IMI 680

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

63

1968 APR 13 22 04

EEA327
OO WTE10 WTE15
DE WTE 1403

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : PRESIDENT
INFO: GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE: CAP80820

CONFIDENTIAL

APRIL 13, 1968

HEREWITH THE USIA REPORT OF NICK'S BACKGROUNDER ON WHY-NOT-PHOM-PENH- OR WARSAW.

WASHINGTON, APRIL 12--A SUITABLE MEETING PLACE FOR CONTACTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH VIETNAM WOULD BE ONE THAT HOLDS NO RPT NO INITIAL ADVANTAGE FOR EITHER SIDE, STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS SAID FRIDAY.

THIS IS WHY WASHINGTON WANTS THE FIRST MEETING TO BE HELD IN A NEUTRAL NATION WHERE THE ATMOSPHERE WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE LIKELY TO PUT THE AMERICANS OR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AT A DISADVANTAGE.

A FAIR SITE, STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS BELIEVE, WOULD CONTAIN AT LEAST THESE INGREDIENTS.

1. A PLACE WHERE THE TWO COUNTRIES NOW HAVE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION.
2. A PLACE WHERE THE HOST GOVERNMENT BACKS NEITHER SIDE IN THE VIETNAM WAR.

IN SUGGESTING PHNOM PENH, CAMBODIA, WHERE THE UNITED STATES LACKS EMBASSY FACILITIES, AND IN PROPOSING WARSAW, POLAND, WHICH SUPPORTS NORTH VIETNAM'S WAR EFFORT, HANOI APPEARS TO BE PUTTING ON PRESSURE FOR A MEETING PLACE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE COMMUNIST SIDE.

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12300,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR 18, 1983.

BY ra ON 5-26-92

68 APR 23 PM 5:48

SATURDAY

Pres file

FROM: COPY

IF HANOI IS SERIOUS, AS IS WASHINGTON, THEN STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS ASSUME THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL AGREE TO A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SITE.

IN THE SEARCH FOR SUCH A SITE, WASHINGTON HAS THOUGHT THAT HANOI WOULD PREFER AN ASIAN SETTING. AFTER ALL, STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS NOTED, PEACE IN VIETNAM IS A MATTER WHICH AFFECTS ASIANS.

RANGOON, NEW DELHI, DJAKARTA, VIENTIANE, OR PERHAPS EVEN SINGAPORE, WOULD BE SUITABLE SITES IN ASIA. GENEVA WAS CONSIDERED A DESIRABLE SITE, OFFICIALS SAID, BECAUSE THERE IS PRECEDENT FOR MEETINGS THERE, IN ADDITION TO AN ATMOSPHERE OF NEUTRALITY.

U.S. SEEKS NEUTRAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY ARE CHARACTERIZED BY THESE OFFICIALS AS AN EXPLORATORY PROCESS, NOT RPT NOT AN EXERCISE IN REJECTING SITES.

HANOI IS ENGAGING IN PROPAGANDA BY CLAIMING THROUGH NEWS MEDIA THAT WASHINGTON IS PROCRASTINATING AND TURNING DOWN PROPOSED MEETING PLACES, STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS COMMENTED.

ANOTHER FACTOR IN THE U.S. EXPLORATION WITH NORTH VIETNAM IS THE BELIEF AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT THAT THE SITE FOR THE FIRST CONTACTS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION, TO BE HEADED BY AMBASSADORS-AT-LARGE AVERELL HARRIMAN, WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TEAM MAY TURN OUT TO BE THE LOCALE FOR ADDITIONAL TALKS.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS SAID THAT ONCE A MEETING PLACE IS ARRANGED THE CONTACTS CAN OCCUR QUICKLY. THEY ENVISAGE A SMALL DELEGATION ACCOMPANYING AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN AND CYRUS VANCE, THE OTHER U.S. REPRESENTATIVE NAMED BY THE WHITE HOUSE.

IT WAS ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WHEN THE UNITED STATES, IN THE PAST, STATED IT WOULD HAVE REPRESENTATIVES AT ANY PLACE AND AT ANY TIME TO TALK PEACE WITH NORTH VIETNAM, WASHINGTON WAS ASSUMING HANOI PREFERRED QUIET, PRIVATE CONTACTS.

BY FOCUSING PUBLIC ATTENTION ON A MEETING PLACE, NORTH VIETNAM HAS ALTERED THE SITUATION. HANOI SEEMS TO BE TRYING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THAT U.S. GESTURE BY PRESSURING WASHINGTON INTO A DISADVANTAGEOUS MEETING PLACE, STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS SAID. END TEXT. UNQUOTE. RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 132110Z APRIL 68

~~SECRET~~

68 APR 23 PM 4:28

SATURDAY

1968 APR 13 21 20

EEA325
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 1400

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80818

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By is, NARA Date 1-15-99

~~SECRET~~

Profile

APRIL 13, 1968

THE FOLLOWING TWO SISCO MEMOS REPORT U THANT'S ACCOUNT OF:

- HANOI'S ANXIETY ABOUT THE CHICOMS, AS IT RELATES ALLEGEDLY TO THE PROBLEM OF SITE;
- GOLDBERG'S PUSHING RANGOON WITH U THANT ON INSTRUCTION. (I DON'T KNOW WHERE HE GOT THE 16TH).

1. ON THE MORNING OF FRIDAY, APRIL 12, IN THE COURSE OF RECEIVING A MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL TRANSMITTED THROUGH BUNCHE, GOLDBERG EXPLAINED TO THE LATTER THE DIFFICULTIES THAT WE FOUND WITH WARSAW AS A SITE FOR THE US-NORTH VIETNAMESE TALKS.

PURSUANT TO WALT ROSTOW'S INSTRUCTIONS, AT THE DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT, GOLDBERG CALLED BUNCHE AND REQUESTED THAT HE INDICATE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OUR BELIEF THAT THE MOST SUITABLE SITE FOR THE INITIAL MEETING IS RANGOON, AND OUR HOPE THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD LEND HIS SUPPORT TO A PROPOSAL FOR AN EARLY MEETING AT THIS LOCATION. IN THE COURSE OF THIS CONVERSATION, GOLDBERG ALSO REITERATED THAT GENEVA CONTINUED TO BE AN ACCEPTABLE SITE.

BUNCHE CALLED GOLDBERG SHORTLY THEREAFTER TO SAY THAT HE HAD COMMUNICATED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL ALONG THE LINES GOLDBERG HAD ASKED. THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN TURN HAD ASKED BUNCHE TO TELL GOLDBERG THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD TRANSMIT THE MESSAGE TO NORTH VIETNAM AS INDICATED ABOVE. BUNCHE INQUIRED WHETHER THE SECRETARY GENERAL COULD COMMUNICATE A SPECIFIC DATE FOR THE MEETING. WITH WALT ROSTOW'S APPROVAL, GOLDBERG INFORMED BUNCHE THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PROPOSING A MEETING IN RANGOON ON THE 16TH. BUNCHE SAID THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS QUITE SYMPATHETIC WITH OUR PROPOSAL.

X FROM QUICK COPY

GOLDBERG DID NOT GET ANY INDICATION AS TO WHETHER THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD LIMIT HIMSELF TO A SIMPLE TRANSMITTAL OR WHETHER HE WOULD ENDORSE OUR PROPOSAL. NEITHER DID BUNCHE KNOW WHAT CHANNEL THE SECRETARY GENERAL INTENDED TO USE. BUNCHE DID CONFIRM THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL DOES NOT INTEND TO SAY ANYTHING TO THE PRESS ON THIS MATTER.

2. IN THE ABSENCE OF AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG, BUNCHE CALLED ME TO RELATE SOME ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL BELIEVES IS RELEVANT WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF A SITE FOR THE US-NORTH VIETNAMESE TALKS.

BUNCHE SAID IT WAS PUZZLING TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, DURING HIS RECENT TALKS WITH MAI VAN BO, AS TO WHY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE RELUCTANT ABOUT GENEVA AS A SITE. THE REASON WHICH BO GAVE, ACCORDING TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, WAS COMMUNICATIONS. NOT ONLY DID BO MAKE THE POINT THAT DELAYS WERE INVOLVED, BUT THAT IF THE TALKS WERE HELD IN GENEVA IT WOULD REQUIRE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION TO COMMUNICATE WITH HANOI THROUGH PARIS, WHICH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DID NOT WANT TO DO.

AS TO OTHER POSSIBLE VENUES, THANT SAYS THAT BO REFLECTED MUCH CONCERN REGARDING PEKING'S NEGATIVE ATTITUDE. THE SUPPLYING OF RICE BY THE CHINESE COMMUNIST TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WAS MENTIONED. ACCORDING TO BO HANOI KNEW THAT PEKING WOULD OBJECT BUT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WISH TO KEEP PEKING'S REACTION AS LITTLE VIOLENT AS POSSIBLE. BO GAVE THE SECRETARY GENERAL THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS CONSIDERATION EFFECTED DELHI AND RANGOON AS POSSIBLE SITES SINCE RELATIONS BETWEEN PEKING AND INDIA AND BURMA RESPECTIVELY ARE NOT GOOD. ACCORDING TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL, AS CONVEYED BY BUNCHE, HANOI FEELS THAT WARSAW WOULD BE A SOFTER BLOW FOR THE CHINESE AND GAVE THEM LESS OF AN OPPORTUNITY FOR VIOLENT REACTION SINCE PEKING'S RELATIONS WITH POLAND ARE BETTER THAN THEY ARE WITH THE OTHER TWO COUNTRIES.

BUNCHE ALSO TELLS ME THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS AT THE MOMENT PUTTING OUT A VERY BRIEF STATEMENT LIMITED TO EXPRESSING HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE EARLY AGREEMENT ON A SITE. HE IS NOT ENDORSING ANY PARTICULAR POSITION IN THIS STATEMENT.

BUNCHE ONCE AGAIN CONFIRMED TO ME, WHAT HE HAD EARLIER CONVEYED TO GOLDBERG, THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAD TRANSMITTED THE MESSAGE TO HANOI INDICATING RANGOON AS OUR PREFERENCE AND PROPOSING A MEETING THERE ON THE 16TH.

I INDICATED TO BUNCHE I WOULD BE AVAILABLE ALL WEEK-END IF THERE WERE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION.

EEA326
CO WTE10
DE WTE 1402

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP88819

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By isa, NARA Date 1-15-99

~~SECRET~~

65

Pres file
68 APR 13 PM 5:01
SATURDAY

1968 APR 13 21 55

~~SECRET~~ CROCODILE

APRIL 13, 1968

HEREWITH THE UK FOREIGN OFFICE SUGGEST UK PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC OPINION MIGHT RUN AGAINST US ON QUESTION OF TURNING DOWN WARSAW BUT GOVERNMENT WILL HOLD STEADY, WHILE NOT GETTING INTO THE MATTER.

1. WE CONTACTED 10 DOWNING STREET AND FONOFF THIS MORNING AND MADE APPROACH AS INSTRUCTED, STRESSING CONSIDERATIONS IN BACKGROUNDER BY UNDER SECRETARY.
2. DOWNING STREET TURNED MATTER OVER TO FONOFF WHICH WAS ABLE CONTACT FONSEC STEWART (HE WAS ON SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT IN COUNTRY) ABOUT 6 PM. FONOFF'S MURRAY HAS JUST GIVEN US STEWART'S REACTION.
3. AFTER CONSIDERING MATTER CAREFULLY, STEWART MAINTAINED POSITION PUT TO DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY BOHLEN YESTERDAY BY BRITISH MINISTER (FONOFF GAVE US SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTIONS SENT BRITISH EMBASSY).
4. ACCORDING MURRAY, STEWART SAID ONLY US COULD MAKE PROPER ESTIMATE ALL FACTORS. HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD OBJECTIONS TO MEETING AT PHNOM PENH WITH COMMUNICATIONS DIFFICULTIES AND EMOTIVE ELEMENTS INVOLVED; HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT THESE FACTORS DID NOT APPLY WITH EQUAL FORCE TO WARSAW, AT LEAST FOR "PRELIMINARY CONTACTS". HE SUGGESTED US MIGHT GAIN MORE ADVANTAGE FROM PUBLIC OPINION STANDPOINT BY CONCEDED WARSAW FOR PRELIMINARY MEETINGS RATHER THAN HOLDING OUT FOR NEUTRAL SITE.
5. STEWART APPREHENSIVE THAT FAVORABLE PUBLIC SENTIMENT CREATED BY PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE MIGHT TURN CRITICAL OVER DELAY IN GETTING TALKS STARTED.
6. STEWART THOUGHT UK SHOULD NOT MAKE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT US POSITION ON VENUE. HE CONSIDERED IT WOULD BE DISADVANTAGEOUS TO POTENTIAL UK INFLUENCE ON ISSUES OF MORE IMPORTANCE AT LATER STAGES IF UK TOOK PUBLIC STAND AT THIS EARLY JUNCTURE ON MATTER OF SITE OF PRELIMINARY CONTACTS. STEWART COMMENTED THAT IF PARLIAMENT WERE NOW IN SESSION HE WOULD BE UNDER PRESSURE TO MAKE STATEMENT IN OPPOSITE VEIN, WHICH, OF COURSE, HE WOULD RESIST.

KAISER

QUICK COPY

DTG 132110Z APR 1968

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SENT
RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 APR 13 20 25

1968 APR 13 PM 3:32
SATURDAY
ProfileEEA323
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1399FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP80817~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HERewith E.V. ROSTOW VOUCHES FOR DEAN PETERSON.

APRIL 13, 1968

JOHN WALSH HAS TRANSMITTED THE PRESIDENT'S ENQUIRY ABOUT DEAN PETERSON. I BELIEVE THAT I AM IN A POSITION TO GIVE HIM FIRM ASSURANCES ABOUT MR. PETERSON'S MATURITY, GOOD SENSE AND LOYALTY. HE IS AN EXPERIENCED MAN OF THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE REPUTATION. HE ADMIRES THE PRESIDENT, AND SEES THIS JOB AS AN EXCITING OPPORTUNITY IN THE FIELD TO WHICH HE HAS DEVOTED HIS PROFESSIONAL LIFE. FROM MY TALKS WITH HIM--AND WITH OTHERS ABOUT HIM--I AM CONVINCED THAT HE UNDERSTANDS AND WILL FULLY RESPECT THE RULES OF DECENCY IN REGARD TO THE PRESIDENT WHO APPOINTS HIM.

DTG: 132004Z APRIL 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MESSAGE
E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.1(a)BY 19 ON 51992

FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EEA328
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1397

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82815

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 APR 13 20 06

APR 13 PM 3:20

SATURDAY

APRIL 13, 1968

DR. MATTINGLY ATTENDED KING MAHENDRA BECAUSE DR. HURST
HAD NUMBER OF ENGAGEMENTS HE COULD NOT EASILY GET OUT OF.
DR. HURST SUGGESTED DR. MATTINGLY BE ASKED TO GO. IF DR.
MATTINGLY OR SOME OTHER QUALIFIED DOCTOR NOT AVAILABLE HE,
DR. HURST, WOULD REARRANGE HIS SCHEDULE AND GO. DR. MATTINGLY
WAS AVAILABLE AND, THEREFORE, WENT TO NEPAL.

DTG: 131947Z APR 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM QUICK COPY

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12304,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR 16, 1983

BY 18 ON 5-19-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 APR 13 20 04

APR 13 PM 3:17

SATURDAY

EEA319
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1394

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80812

For file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APRIL 13, 1968

SUBJECT: QUOTE ANY TIME, ANY PLACE UNQUOTE

I PROMISED A MEMO OUTLINING THE WAY WE ARE HANDLING
THIS PROBLEM.

LINE NICK KATZENBACH TOOK IN SMALL BACKGROUNDER YESTERDAY
WAS:

(1) WHEN WE, IN THE PAST, STATED OUR READINESS TO MEET
AT ANY PLACE, WE ASSUMED HANOI PREFERRED QUIET, PRIVATE CONTACTS.
NOW, HANOI HAS, BY ITS OWN CHOICE, MADE DISCUSSION OF A SITE A
PUBLIC ISSUE. HANOI IS TRYING TO TAKE PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE OF
THE U.S. STATEMENTS BY PRESSURING US INTO A DISADVANTAGEOUS
MEETING PLACE.

IN ADDITION, WE HAVE NOTED:

(2) IT NOW IS CLEAR THAT THE SITE OF FIRST CONTACTS MAY
WELL BECOME THE SETTING FOR MORE FORMAL TALKS. THUS, THE SITE
MUST MEET CERTAIN MINIMAL REQUIREMENTS. THESE ARE:

- PLACE WHERE U.S. AND NVN HAVE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION;
- WHERE GVN AND OTHER ALLIES AND INTERESTED PARTIES WOULD
HAVE READY ACCESS;
- WHERE THE HOST GOVERNMENT IS NOT INVOLVED WITH EITHER
SIDE IN THE VIETNAM WAR;

RECK FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 91-258

By gwh NARA, Date 6-5-97

-- WHERE WE CAN EXPECT EVEN-HANDED TREATMENT FOR THE PRESS OF BOTH SIDES;

-- WHERE OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS ARE ADEQUATE TO THE NEEDS OF BOTH SIDES.

(3) WE NOTE THAT PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 31 (TO WHICH HANOI RESPONDED) SAID WE WERE READY TO MEET QUOTE AT GENEVA OR ANY OTHER SUITABLE PLACE UNQUOTE. IN OUR FORMAL NOTE TO HANOI WE REPEATED THE SUGGESTION OF GENEVA BUT SAID WOULD TRY TO MEET QUOTE ANY REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS UNQUOTE.

(4) A MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM HANOI SAID THE PLACE OF CONTACT WILL BE PHNOM PENH QUOTE OR ANOTHER PLACE TO BE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON UNQUOTE.

(5) WE HAD INDICATIONS HANOI WOULD PREFER A SITE IN ASIA. CAMBODIA IS THE ONLY COUNTRY IN ASIA -- EXCEPT FOR NORTH VIETNAM AND COMMUNIST CHINA -- WITH WHICH WE DO NOT MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. WE SUGGESTED FOUR CAPITALS OF ASIAN NEUTRAL STATES -- ALL OF WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE AND WHERE NVN IS REPRESENTED.

(6) WARSAW IS CAPITAL OF A COMMUNIST COUNTRY -- ONE THAT SIDES OPENLY AND ACTIVELY WITH NORTH VIETNAM. MOST OF OUR ALLIES ARE NOT REPRESENTED THERE AND MIGHT NOT EVEN HAVE ACCESS. TIGHT LOCAL CONTROLS COULD LIMIT ACCESS TO FRIENDLY POWERS AND TO THE NON-COMMUNIST PRESS. HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION OF OUR DELEGATION WOULD NOT BE UNLIKELY.

(7) WE RECALL THE EXPERIENCE IN KOREA AT KAESONG (IN COMMUNIST TERRITORY) WHERE OUR DELEGATION HAD TO TRAVEL TO AND FROM UNDER A WHITE FLAG AND WHERE WE WERE TOTALLY AT THE MERCY OF THE OTHER SIDE IN ARRANGEMENTS AND FACILITIES. WE GOT EVEN-HANDED TREATMENT ONLY WHEN WE MOVED TO PANMUNJON IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 131925Z APR 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SATURDAY

APR 13 PM 2:59

Pres file

1968 APR 13 19 42

EEA318
OO WTE18
DE WTE 1395

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80813

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APRIL 13, 1968

HEREWITH NICK AND BILL BUNDY SUGGEST A SCHEDULE FOR PARK
ON TUESDAY AT HONOLULU.

0900-1200 MEETING OF TWO PRESIDENTS.
(PRESIDENT JOHNSON WILL PROBABLY WISH TO TALK
WITH PRESIDENT PARK ALONE TO BEGIN WITH)

1300- INFORMAL LUNCH GIVEN BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON FOR
PRESIDENT PARK AND HIS PARTY.

1600- MEETING OF PRESIDENTS RESUMED.

1800- ISSUANCE OF COMMUNIQUE.

DTG: 131925 APRIL 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TK FROM QUINCY COPY

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ry, NARA, Date 5-4-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

70

1968 APR 13 19 07

Free file

EEA31S
CO WTE10
DE WTE 1392

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80810

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-207

By up, NARA, Date 11-3-95

60 APR 13 PM 2:13

SATURDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APRIL 13, 1968

NICK KATZENBACH COULD ONLY RAISE BILL FULBRIGHT.
HICKENLOOPER WAS IN TRANSIT SOMEWHERE.

NICK FOUND FULBRIGHT QUITE UNDERSTANDING ABOUT WARSAW. HE SAID THAT WE MIGHT THINK, IF WE HAVE TO, ABOUT MAKING A DEAL: WARSAW FOR THE PRELIMINARY CONTACT; GENEVA FOR THE CONFERENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE TALKS. FULBRIGHT TOOK THE OCCASION, HOWEVER, TO ATTACK HARRIMAN AS A HAWK. SAYING THAT WE COULD NOT BE SERIOUS ABOUT SEEKING PEACE IF HARRIMAN WAS OUR NEGOTIATOR.

CLARK CLIFFORD CONTACTED MARGARET CHASE SMITH, MENDEL RIVERS, WILLIAM BATES, STU SYMINGTON, AND RICHARD RUSSELL. HE FOUND THEM ALL QUITE COMFORTABLE WITH OUR POSITION AND GRATEFUL THAT THEY HAD BEEN INFORMED.

IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION, CLARK UNDERLINED A THOUGHT WHICH HE SUGGESTED I PASS ALONG TO YOU. ONE OF THE PURPOSES OF HIS PRESS CONFERENCE WAS TO BEGIN TO SUGGEST TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT WE HAVE A LONG-RANGE PLAN LEADING TO OUR DISENGAGEMENT AS THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE EXPANDED THEIR ARMED FORCES AND THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR DEALING WITH THE MILITARY PROBLEM. HE FEELS THAT IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT NOW FOR US QUIETLY TO INTRODUCE THIS THEME BECAUSE IT IS NOT CERTAIN THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE PRODUCTIVE. IF THEY ARE, THEY MAY TAKE A LONG TIME. IF THEY BREAK DOWN, WE MUST HAVE A CONCEPT FOR CONTINUING OUR COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM FOR THE LONG PULL BUT ON A BASIS WHICH HAS SOME LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL. THEREFORE, HE IS INCLINED TO BELIEVE WE SHOULD PLAY THE NEGOTIATIONS IN LOW KEY WITHOUT EXCESSIVE OPTIMISM AND KEEP PART OF THE PUBLIC ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE IDEA WE HAVE COME TO A CEILING IN OUR FORCES AND ARE LOOKING TO SLOW BUT ULTIMATE DISENGAGEMENT. HE BELIEVES THE PRESIDENT MIGHT PICK UP THIS THEME FROM TIME TO TIME. I SUGGESTED THIEU ALSO MIGHT OCCASIONALLY SPEAK IN THIS VEIN.

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By Julian NARA, Date 6-5-97

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SATURDAY

APR 13 53

Free file

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80809

~~SECRET~~

APRIL 13, 1968

FOLLOWING IS A CIA ANALYSIS OF SOME FACTORS BEARING ON
US/NORTH VIETNAM TALKS.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. CONCERNING MANY ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM THERE IS LACK OF CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE AND CONSIDERABLE ROOM FOR HONEST DISAGREEMENT. THIS APPLIES, FOR INSTANCE, TO THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF VARIOUS TYPES OF COMMUNIST FORCES, THE EXACT SITUATION IN THE VILLAGES AND HAMLETS OF SOUTH VIETNAM, THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GENERALS THIEU AND KY, THE REAL CONDITION OF THE COMMUNIST FORCES, THE INFLUENCES WHICH MAY BE AT WORK WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM, AND SO ON. YET DESPITE THESE VARIOUS AND IMPORTANT UNCERTAINTIES THE GENERAL OUTLINES OF THE SITUATION MAY BE SKETCHED WITH A FAIR DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE, AND IT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS SHORT PAPER TO DO SO, AVOIDING THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH A DETAILED ANALYSIS PRESENTS.

2. IT HAS LONG BEEN CLEAR, AND IT STILL IS CLEAR, THAT US ARMED FORCES CANNOT BE DEFEATED AND DRIVEN OUT OF VIETNAM BY PURELY MILITARY ACTION. THE OBVIOUS SUPERIORITY OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER RENDERS THIS IMPOSSIBLE. BUT IT HAS LONG BEEN CLEAR ALSO THAT THE COMMUNISTS COULD NOT BE DEFEATED AND DRIVEN OUT OF SOUTH VIETNAM BY PURELY MILITARY MEANS, SAVE IN A LONG-CONTINUED AND COSTLY CONFLICT. THEY CAN MAINTAIN SOME SCALE OF MILITARY ACTION FOR A LONG TIME; THEIR PHYSICAL CAPABILITIES FOR OCCASIONAL MILITARY INITIATIVES ON A MAJOR SCALE REMAIN SUBSTANTIAL. THEY RECEIVE ADEQUATE SUPPLIES FROM FOREIGN SOURCES; THEY HAVE ADEQUATE MANPOWER, NUMERICALLY SPEAKING, TO MEET ALL THEIR FORESEEABLE NEEDS. THUS THE CONTEST, AS HAS LONG BEEN RECOGNIZED, IS ESSENTIALLY ONE OF WILL RATHER THAN OF MILITARY POWER IN THE NARROWEST SENSE.

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3. THE ELEMENT OF WILL IS IMPOSSIBLE TO MEASURE ACCURATELY. IT FLUCTUATES SOMEWHAT FROM TIME TO TIME, ON BOTH SIDES. IT RESTS IMPORTANTLY ON THE PERCEPTIONS EACH SIDE HAS OF VARIOUS FACTORS: THE EBB AND FLOW OF THE MILITARY SITUATION, THE CURRENT AND POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM, PUBLIC OPINION WITHIN THE UNITED STATES AND (TO A MUCH LESS DEGREE) WITHIN NORTH VIETNAM, AND SO ON. IN ADDITION ARE PERIPHERAL CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS WORLD OPINION IN GENERAL, THE ATTITUDES OF THE PRINCIPAL COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS, AND EVEN SUCH THINGS AS THE US BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND THE AMOUNT OF DOMESTIC UNREST WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS WE EXAMINE VERY BRIEFLY THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS WITHIN VIETNAM WHICH BEAR ON THE SITUATION.

THE MILITARY SITUATION

4. DURING THE TET HOLIDAY THE COMMUNISTS STAGED AN OFFENSIVE WHICH HAD GREAT IMPACT AT THE TIME BECAUSE OF ITS WIDESPREAD SCOPE AND VIGOROUS EXECUTION. IN STRICTLY MILITARY TERMS THIS OFFENSIVE WAS CERTAINLY NO COMMUNIST VICTORY; PROBABLY IT SHOULD BE JUDGED ON THE CONTRARY TO HAVE BEEN A COSTLY SETBACK BECAUSE OF THE EXTENSIVE CASUALTIES SUFFERED AND THE FAILURE TO HOLD ANY IMPORTANT CENTER FOR A SIGNIFICANT LENGTH OF TIME. IT WAS FOLLOWED BY A PERIOD OF DIMINISHING COMMUNIST MILITARY INITIATIVE; THE WITHDRAWAL FROM KHE SANH HAS BEEN FOLLOWED IN RECENT DAYS BY DISENGAGEMENT IN OTHER SECTORS AS WELL. THE US AND ITS ALLIES HAVE RESUMED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, GREATLY RELIEVING IN SOME PARTS OF THE COUNTRY THE PRESSURE WHICH EXISTED DURING AND AFTER TET.

5. FOR THE MOMENT AT LEAST, THE MILITARY SITUATION APPEARS SOMEWHAT IMPROVED FOR THE US AND ITS ALLIES. THERE IS EVIDENCE IN THE TESTIMONY OF COMMUNIST PRISONERS AND DEFECTORS OF SAGGING MORALE AND STRAITENED CIRCUMSTANCES, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE FORCES WHICH WERE BESIEGING KHE SANH. BUT THERE IS ALSO EVIDENCE OF SWIFT AND SUBSTANTIAL REINFORCEMENT FROM NORTH VIETNAM, AND OF CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH MAJOR ATTACKS IN SEVERAL AREAS, FOR INSTANCE IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS AND AGAINST COASTAL TOWNS IN I AND II CORPS AREAS. THERE IS NO CONVINCING REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE COMMUNISTS CANNOT CONTINUE FOR A LONG TIME TO CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS ON A HARASSING AND DAMAGING SCALE, AND FROM TIME TO TIME TO MAKE A MAJOR OFFENSIVE EFFORT. IT IS FAIRLY CERTAIN THAT THE PHYSICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE COMMUNISTS WOULD GRADUALLY DIMINISH IF FACED WITH CONTINUING ALLIED MILITARY EFFORT OVER A LONG ENOUGH PERIOD, BUT IT CANNOT BE ARGUED CONVINCINGLY THAT THIS PROCESS WOULD BE SWIFTLY DECISIVE.

6. IN MAKING ITS DECISION TO TAKE UP "CONTACT" WITH THE US, HANOI PROBABLY ACTED IN PART FROM A PREFERENCE TO AVOID LARGE AND LONG-CONTINUING ADDITIONAL MILITARY COSTS IF IT COULD, THOUGH IT WAS PREPARED TO PAY THEM IF IT HAD TO. IT APPARENTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S MOVE OF MARCH 31 OFFERED AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADD AN ELEMENT OF POLITICAL WARFARE TO THE PURELY MILITARY EFFORT, A TACTIC IT HAD ALWAYS INTENDED TO PURSUE TO SOME STAGE. IT FOLLOWS THAT THE CURRENT LET-UP IN MILITARY ACTIVITY IS UNLIKELY TO PERSIST THROUGHOUT VARIOUS PHASES OF "CONTACTS, TALKS, AND NEGOTIATIONS". NEW MILITARY INITIATIVES WILL PROBABLY BE LAUNCHED IN A MANNER AND AT A MOMENT CALCULATED TO GIVE MAXIMUM SUPPORT TO DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. HANOI'S AIM IN THE NEW PHASE WILL BE TO COMBINE POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURES IN ORDER TO BRING A BREAKDOWN OF UNITY AND WILL ON THE ALLIED SIDE.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

7. THE POLITICAL WEAKNESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT REMAIN IMPORTANT FACTORS IN THE NEW PHASE. YET THAT GOVERNMENT IS PROBABLY NO WORSE OFF THAN BEFORE THE TET OFFENSIVE, AND IN SOME RESPECTS MAY BE IN BETTER CONDITION. IT COPEd WITH THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF TET FAIRLY COMPETENTLY, THE ARVN FOUGHT WELL AND IN SOME INSTANCES VERY WELL INDEED, THERE WERE NO MAJOR DEFECTIONS, NO RALLYING OF THE PEOPLE TO THE COMMUNIST CAUSE. NEITHER WAS THERE EVIDENCE OF ENTHUSIASTIC RALLYING TO THE GOVERNMENT SIDE, ON A SIGNIFICANT SCALE. THE GOVERNMENT IS DEDICATED TO CONTINUANCE OF THE STRUGGLE, AND THERE IS LITTLE IMPORTANT OPPOSITION ON THIS SCORE.

8. THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION REMAINS LARGELY APATHETIC. WE CANNOT BE SURE HOW FAR THE COMMUNISTS TOOK EFFECTIVE CONTROL IN THOSE AREAS OF THE COUNTRYSIDE FROM WHICH GOVERNMENT FORCES WERE WITHDRAWN; WE DO KNOW THAT GOVERNMENT CONTROL WAS GREATLY DIMINISHED. THE PROCESS OF PACIFICATION WAS BADLY SET BACK. TO RECOVER THE GROUND LOST, TO GET BACK TO THE PRE-TET SITUATION, AND TO RESUME AN ADVANCE, WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY TAKE A LONG TIME.

9. WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF AND THOSE FACTIONAL GROUPS THAT MATTER, THE MOST IMPORTANT INFLUENCES IN THE NEAR FUTURE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE THE MERE FACT THAT THE US IS MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF NORTH VIETNAM, AND THE COURSE OF ANY TALKS THAT MAY DEVELOP. IT IS EASY TO PREDICT THAT ANY CONSIDERABLE TENDENCY TO COMPROMISE BY THE US WOULD BE DISRUPTIVE OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE. IF, HOWEVER, SAIGON IS KEPT CLOSELY INFORMED AND IS CONVINCED THAT THE US DOES NOT INTEND TO MAKE CONCESSIONS WHICH WOULD GIVE THE NLF AN EFFECTIVE CLAIM TO POWER, IT WILL PROBABLY HOLD STEADY DURING THE EARLY STAGES OF NEGOTIATIONS AT LEAST. ITS CONFIDENCE WOULD BE SEVERELY SHAKEN, HOWEVER, IF IT BELIEVED THE US WAS DISCUSSING THE TERMS OF AN EVENTUAL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITHOUT ITS PARTICIPATION.

HANOI'S APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS

10. THE MOST STRIKING ASPECT OF THE CURRENT POSITION OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IS THEIR EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE US, REVERSING THEIR PREVIOUS REFUSAL TO DO SO BEFORE THE CESSATION OF ALL BOMBING. IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT THE COMMUNISTS MADE THIS MOVE BECAUSE THEY FELT THEIR GENERAL POSITION TO BE DETERIORATING SUFFICIENTLY TO REQUIRE A RETREAT. OR IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT THEY THOUGHT THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES SO WEAKENED -- POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY RATHER THAN MILITARILY -- THAT THE TIME HAD COME TO SHIFT TO A POLITICAL COURSE IN FULL EXPECTATION OF SUBSTANTIAL SUCCESS, PERHAPS IN THE COURSE OF THIS ELECTION YEAR.

11. NEITHER OF THESE CONTENTIONS CAN BE PROVED AT THIS MOMENT, AND IT WOULD BE IMPRUDENT TO ADOPT EITHER WITHOUT STRONG RESERVATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS. ALMOST CERTAINLY THE COMMUNISTS FIND THEIR MILITARY POSITION AND POLITICAL STANDING IN SOUTH VIETNAM LESS IMPROVED BY THE TET OFFENSIVE THAN THEY HAD HOPED; ALMOST CERTAINLY, HOWEVER, THEY HAVE THE CAPABILITY FOR ANOTHER MAJOR MILITARY INITIATIVE DURING THE NEXT WEEKS OR MONTHS. THEY NEVER BELIEVED THAT THEY COULD DEFEAT THE US BY PURELY MILITARY MEANS, BUT THE HABITS OF COMMUNIST THOUGHT, AND THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCE OF FRENCH DOMESTIC POLITICS ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE FRENCH WAR, ARE SUCH THAT THEY PROBABLY TOOK THE RETIREMENT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON AS A SIGNAL OF INTENTION TO BACK DOWN RATHER THAN AS AN INDICATION THAT HE WISHED TO ACHIEVE GREATER FREEDOM IN HANDLING THE WAR.

12. HANOI'S WILLINGNESS FOR A MEETING INAUGURATES A NEW PHASE OF STRUGGLE. DURING THIS PHASE THE COMMUNISTS WILL ENDEAVOR TO COMBINE MILITARY, PROPAGANDA, AND DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS IN THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS WAY FOR THEM. THEY WILL PROBABLY TRY TO ACHIEVE TWO THINGS: TO MAXIMIZE THE HOPES OF THE WORLD FOR PEACE, THEREBY PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE US GOVERNMENT AND CURTAILING ITS ROOM FOR DIPLOMATIC MANEUVER, AND TO MAXIMIZE PRESSURE ON SOUTH VIETNAM BOTH BY MILITARY ACTION AND BY INTENSIFYING SAIGON'S MISTRUST OF US PURPOSES AND METHODS IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE.

13. YET HANOI IS PROBABLY UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN COMING WEEKS, ABOUT THE SUCCESS OF ITS PLANS, AND ABOUT THE TACTICS TO BE FOLLOWED FROM DAY TO DAY. ONLY THE ACTUAL PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS WILL DISCLOSE ITS INTENTIONS MORE FULLY AND AT LEAST BY IMPLICATION REVEAL SOMETHING OF ITS VIEW OF ITS OWN SITUATION.

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FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP80808

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By us, NARA Date 1-15-99

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APRIL 13, 1968

FOLLOWING ARE SUMMARY BRIEFING NOTES FOR HONOLULU MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARK. WE SHALL HAVE A BIG BLACK BOOK WITH US ON MONDAY.

MAJOR TOPICS

PARK HAS THREE THINGS ON HIS MIND:

- A. YOUR PERSONAL DECISION AND ITS EFFECT ON US POLICY IN ASIA.
- B. KOREAN DEFENSE AND OTHER PROBLEMS.
- C. THE VIET-NAM SITUATION AND NEGOTIATIONS.

A. US POLICY IN ASIA

PARK HAS SHOWN GREAT UNHAPPINESS OVER YOUR PERSONAL DECISION AND HAS EVEN EXPRESSED THE FEELING THAT HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSULTED, AS AN OLD AND TRUE FRIEND. ABOVE ALL, HE FEARS THAT WITHOUT YOUR LEADERSHIP THE US MAY ABANDON THE ASIAN POLICIES IT HAS BEEN FOLLOWING.

THUS, HE WOULD DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR FULL COMMENT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION AT HOME AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR OUR POLICY IN ASIA.

B. KOREAN PROBLEMS

1. RETALIATION FOR FURTHER NORTH KOREAN INCIDENTS.
ALTHOUGH THE NORTH KOREANS HAVE NOT ENGAGED IN SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS SINCE MID-FEBRUARY (WHEN AN UPSURGE DID OCCUR LAST YEAR), PARK AND ALL THE KOREANS REMAIN ANXIOUS. YOU WILL RECALL THAT PARK PRESSED VANCE VERY HARD INDEED FOR A GENERAL UNDERTAKING THAT WE WOULD JOIN HIM IN IMMEDIATE RETALIATION IN KIND. HE STRONGLY IMPLIED THE ROK'S WOULD GO IT ALONE IF WE DID NOT JOIN.

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SUGGEST YOU STICK TO VANCE'S POSITION--THAT WE ARE PREPARED FOR JOINT DISCUSSION IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACTS OF EACH CASE. HOWEVER, WE CANNOT GET AWAY FROM THE FACT THAT ANY REPRISALS COULD BUILD UP RAPIDLY AND EVEN THREATEN MAJOR HOSTILITIES. YOU UNDERSTAND HOW THE KOREANS FEEL, BUT THEY MUST RECKON THAT ANY MAJOR HOSTILITIES ARE NOT IN THEIR INTEREST ANY MORE THAN OURS, AND THAT, IN VIEW OF OUR MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY TO HELP IN THEIR DEFENSE, WE MUST BE FULLY CONSULTED.

2. BUILDING UP ROK DEFENSES. PARK WILL PROBABLY DESCRIBE SIGNIFICANT AND RECOGNIZED DEFECTS IN THE EQUIPMENT OF HIS ARMED FORCES AND COUNTER-INFILTRATION AGENCIES. WE ARE IN FACT PROCEEDING RAPIDLY UNDER THE MAP PROGRAM, AND HAVE WORKED OUT AGREEMENT ON THE USES FOR THE \$100 MILLION PENDING SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION. THESE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT HIS EXPRESSED DESIRES. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE NOW MOVED APPROXIMATELY 150 US AIRCRAFT TO KOREA.

SUGGEST YOU BE PREPARED TO GO OVER THESE ACTIONS, ON WHICH WE WILL HAVE DETAILS.

3. MAINTENANCE OF US FORCES IN KOREA. PARK MAY REQUEST ASSURANCE THAT US FORCES, INCLUDING THE ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT, WILL NOT BE WITHDRAWN FROM KOREA WITH OUT HIS CONSENT. WE HAVE TOLD THEM MANY TIMES THAT WE HAVE NO PLAN TO REDUCE THE GENERAL LEVEL OF OUR GROUND FORCES--BY IMPLICATION AS LONG AS THEY HAVE FORCES IN VIET-NAM. WE HAVE GIVEN NO ASSURANCE ON THE ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT.

SUGGEST YOU REPEAT THAT WE HAVE NO PLAN TO REDUCE OUR GROUND FORCES UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT AVOID GOING FURTHER THAN PROMISING FULL CONSULTATION BOTH ON THE AIRCRAFT AND ON ANY LATER PLAN CONCERNING GROUND FORCES.

4. AMENDMENT OF DEFENSE TREATY. PARK AND OTHER KOREANS HAVE PRESSED US FOR AN AMENDMENT OF THE TREATY TO MAKE IT AUTOMATIC IN THE EVENT OF AGGRESSION. THEY HAVE DRAWN A PARALLEL WITH DECLARATIONS WE HAVE MADE IN THE PHILIPPINES--THAT AN ATTACK THERE WOULD NECESSARILY INVOLVE OUR FORCES AT THE OUTSET.

SUGGEST YOU POINT OUT FLATLY THAT ANY AMENDMENT OF THE TREATY IS OUT OF THE QUESTION, AND THAT ANY DECLARATION WOULD HAVE THE SAME SENATE PROBLEMS. AT THE SAME TIME, YOU CAN TELL THEM FLATLY THAT THEY CAN COUNT ON US IF AGGRESSION ACTUALLY TAKES PLACE.

5. 16-NATION DECLARATION. PARK AND OTHER KOREANS HAVE PRESSED US TO JOIN THEM IN GETTING A REAFFIRMATION OF THE DECLARATION MADE IN 1953 BY 16 NATIONS--THAT THEY WOULD ACT IN THE EVENT OF AGGRESSION AND THAT HOSTILITIES WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE CONFINED TO KOREAN TERRITORY. WE HAVE TOLD THEM THAT WE OURSELVES FULLY SUPPORT THAT DECLARATION, BUT THAT OTHERS--SUCH AS THE FRENCH AND EVEN THE BRITISH--WOULD NOT GO ALONG WITH REAFFIRMING IT TODAY. WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF UNANIMITY OR VERY CLOSE TO IT, A STRONG EFFORT TO GET REAFFIRMATION WOULD BE A NET MINUS.

SUGGEST YOU STICK TO THIS POSITION. (OUR SOUNDINGS, EVEN WITH SUCH AS THE THAI, CONFIRM OUR FEARS THAT WE DON'T HAVE THE VOTES).

6. PUEBLO CASE. AS YOU KNOW, PARK IS WORRIED THAT OUR PRIVATE MEETINGS COULD IMPLY RECOGNITION OF THE NORTH KOREAN REGIME. HE IS WORRIED THAT WE MAY GO TOO FAR IN THE DIRECTION OF APOLOGY. AND HE REGRETS THAT WE DID NOT TAKE TOUGHER ACTION AFTER THE SEIZURE.

SUGGEST YOU CALM HIS FEARS ABOUT RECOGNITION--TELL HIM THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP HIM FULLY INFORMED--AND BE PREPARED TO REVIEW WITH HIM OUR PROPOSED CONDITIONAL APOLOGY, TO WHICH HE HAS NOT OBJECTED. REPEAT AT THE SAME TIME THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO APOLOGIZE FOR ANY ALLEGED ACTIONS WHICH WE CANNOT INDEPENDENTLY CONFIRM.

AS TO MORE FORCEFUL ACTION, SUGGEST THAT YOU NOTE THAT WE HAVE EXAMINED MANY ACTIONS, BUT HAVE CONCLUDED THAT LITTLE ONES WOULD BE MERE PINPRICKS, AND THAT ANY MAJOR ACTION (FOR EXAMPLE, AGAINST THE NORTH KOREAN AIR FORCE) WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY MEAN MAJOR HOSTILITIES. HE UNDERSTANDS THIS BIND, EVEN THOUGH HE DOES NOT LIKE IT.

C. VIET-NAM ISSUES

1. ADDITIONAL ROK FORCES. THIEU HAS NOW FORMALLY ASKED THE KOREANS FOR MORE FORCES. WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING A LIGHT DIVISION WITH THEM SINCE LAST FALL, AND ALSO 5,000 ADDITIONAL CIVILIANS.

PARK IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS, BUT DOES NOT WANT THEM IN THE COMMUNIQUE--AND WE HAVE AGREED.

WE ARE UNCERTAIN AT THIS POINT WHAT POSITION TO RECOMMEND. BOTH THE 5,000 CIVILIANS AND THE LIGHT DIVISION MAKE SENSE FROM A MILITARY STANDPOINT, AND WOULD HAVE MAJOR POLITICAL ADVANTAGES FOR US. HOWEVER, THE DOD TENTATIVELY THINKS THAT PROVIDING THE EQUIPMENT FOR THESE FORCES MAY CUT ACROSS OUR TOP PRIORITY FOR ARVN, AT LEAST THIS SUMMER. WE NEED TO HAMMER THIS OUT BEFORE YOU LEAVE.

2. GENERAL SITUATION. PARK HAS JUST HAD AN OPTIMISTIC REPORT ON THE MILITARY SITUATION FROM HIS OWN GENERAL CHAE. HE WILL WANT TO COMPARE NOTES ACROSS THE BOARD.

3. NEGOTIATIONS AND ROK PARTICIPATION. WE HAVE ASSURED THE KOREANS THAT THEY WILL BE FULLY CONSULTED BOTH IN CONTACTS AND TALKS. THEY HAVE NO PLAN TO BE AT THE SITE OF CONTACTS, BUT WILL CERTAINLY SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SITE OF THE TALKS AND WILL BE LOOKING FOR SOME FORM OF PARTICIPATION AT THAT STAGE. WE HAVE NOT YET DISCUSSED WITH THEM OUR POSITION DURING THE CONTACTS, NOR HAVE WE GONE INTO ANY DETAIL ON OUR SUBSTANTIVE POSITION IN THE TALKS.

SUGGEST THAT:

- A. YOU BE PREPARED TO GO OVER THE INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN FULLY, BUT WITHOUT SHOWING HIM THE ACTUAL DOCUMENT (WHICH DOES NOT REFER TO ROK PARTICIPATION BEING NAILED DOWN IN THE CONTACTS).
- B. YOU ASSURE HIM CATEGORICALLY THAT OUR POSITION IN THE TALKS WILL BE BASED ON THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE AND THE 14 POINTS. WE STAND ON THE GENEVA ACCORDS FOR BOTH VIET-NAM AND LAOS, AND ON CONDITIONS FOR FREE CHOICE IN THE SOUTH.

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By isa, NARA Date 10-8-98

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80805

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

Pres file

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APRIL 13, 1968

HEREWITH BUNKER EXPLAINS OUR NEGOTIATIONS STANCE TO THIEU AND KY.

1. I SAW THIEU AND KY SEPARATELY THIS AFTERNOON TO REPORT ON MY TRIP TO GO OVER GROUND OF WHERE WE STAND ON NEGOTIATIONS AND HARRIMAN'S INSTRUCTIONS. THEY CREATED NO DIFFICULTIES.

2. I TOLD THIEU THE PRESIDENT HAD SUGGESTED HONOLULU MEETING IN ORDER TO PERSONALLY ASSURE HIM OF OUR SUPPORT OF HIM AND SOUTH VIET-NAM AS WE MOVE INTO NEW PHASE. I SAID PRESIDENT AND OTHERS IN WASHINGTON WERE ENCOURAGED BY WHAT I HAD TO REPORT ON VN GOVT'S POST-TET EFFORTS, OFFENSIVE SPOILING OPERATIONS, GROWING CONFIDENCE HERE, ETC.

3. TURNING TO OUR ESTIMATE OF HANOI'S NEXT MOVES I SAID THEY CLEARLY WANT TALKS AND ONLY QUESTION NOW IS WHERE AND WHEN. WE EXPECT HANOI WILL CONCENTRATE AT EXPLORATORY TALKS ON GETTING TOTAL CESSATION OF BOMBING. OUR AGREEMENT TO THAT WILL DEPEND ON HANOI'S AGREEMENT TO HOLD SUBSTANTIVE TALKS WITHIN FEW DAYS OF CESSATION, AND TALKS MUST BE SERIOUS AND EMBRACE ALL RELEVANT TOPICS. I OUTLINED OUR POSITION ON "NO MILITARY ADVANTAGE" AND GAVE EXAMPLES OF BAD FAITH. FINALLY I SAID WE INTEND CONTINUE RECONNAISSANCE.

4. I DID NOT RPT NOT MAKE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO GVN PARTICIPATION IN SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH HANOI. INSTEAD SUGGESTED THIEU, KY AND FOREIGN MINISTER CONSTITUTE SMALL GROUP TO MEET AS NECESSARY ON POLICY WITH BERGER, CALHOUN AND ME; THAT CALHOUN AND FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD KEEP IN DAILY TOUCH; THAT VN LIAISON GROUP TO NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE REPORTING, NOT POLICY DECIDING GROUP, AND THAT WE WOULD BE HAPPY SUPPLY THEM WITH SECURE COMMUNICATION CHANNELS.

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5. THIEU AGREED TO ALL THIS AND ASKED A FEW QUESTIONS ON WHAT "NO MILITARY ADVANTAGE" MEANT AND HOW WE COULD ASSURE THIS. GAVE HIM A FEW EXAMPLES, SUCH AS NOTICEABLE INCREASE IN TROOPS MOVING SOUTH OR ACROSS DMZ, AND HE DID NOT PRESS THIS HARD. HE WAS MORE CONCERNED AS TO WHETHER WE WOULD REGARD ESCALATION OF FIGHTING IN SOUTH AS A BREACH OF FAITH AFTER TOTAL CESSATION. I AVOIDED DIRECT ANSWER SAYING WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN OFFENSIVE PRESSURE ON ENEMY IN SOUTH DURING NEGOTIATIONS. HIS SECOND CONCERN WAS WHAT HE CALLED "THE DANGER" THAT HANOI WILL ASK FOR COMPLETE CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH, SOON AFTER THEY GET CESSATION OF BOMBING IN NORTH. I SAID WE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THIS DANGER, AND SO FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED A DE-ESCALATION AND CEASE-FIRE IN SOUTH WOULD BE SUBJECTS FOR LATER NOT EARLY DISCUSSIONS.

6. THIEU SAID IN ADDITION TO BUI DIEM, THEIR LIAISON TEAM WOULD HAVE A MILITARY MAN, POSSIBLY THEIR AMBASSADOR TO CANBERRA OR LONDON, AND PROBABLY THE CHAIRMAN OF SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE TRAN CHANH THANG.

7. THIEU SAID WE HAD HIS AGREEMENT TO GO ALONG ON BASIS I HAD OUTLINED.

8. TALK WITH KY: I WENT OVER ABOVE GROUND WITH KY, WITH MUCH THE SAME POINTS RAISED AND WITH SAME RESULT. HE IS STRONGLY OF VIEW THAT HANOI IS HURTING, WANTS NEGOTIATIONS, AND WILL MOVE SWIFTLY TO GET TOTAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND TOTAL CEASE FIRE. LATTER, HE SAID, WOULD BE "DISASTROUS" NOW. ENEMY HAS TAKEN SEVERE PUNISHMENT DURING AND SINCE TET AND AT KHE SANH, AND WE MUST KEEP HITTING THEM. WE MUST NOT AGREE TO CEASE FIRE. SPIRIT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES IS NOW HIGH, AND THERE IS GROWING CONFIDENCE. HE HAS JUST RETURNED FROM FOURTH CORPS AREA (HE MADE TRIP BY ROAD), REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRES ARE NOW BACK IN MOST PLACES, GEN. THANG IS ENCOURAGED, AND HE CAME AWAY WITH FEELING THINGS ARE MOVING THERE.

9. I TOLD KY OF PROCEDURAL PROPOSALS I HAD DISCUSSED WITH THIEU FOR JOINT CONSULTATION HERE. I SAID SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH THIEU AND KY WERE TIME-CONSUMING. THERE WAS NEED FOR SPEED IN CONSULTATIONS ONCE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED, AND WE SHOULD ALL MEET TOGETHER. HE AGREED.

10. AT END KY SAID HE ALSO APPROVED WAY WE WERE APPROACHING PRELIMINARY TALKS AND INSTRUCTIONS TO HARRIMAN. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID GREAT DANGER WOULD ARISE FROM HANOI'S EFFORTS DIVIDE US AND SOUTH VIET-NAM. WE MUST NOT ALLOW THAT TO TAKE PLACE. BUNKER

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1968 APR 13 01 22

~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80830

Free file

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

APRIL 12, 1968

HERewith THE CIA SUMMARY OF THE FOREIGN IMPACT OF YOUR
31 MARCH ADDRESS.

IT WILL TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME BEFORE MOST FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS CRYSTALLIZE THEIR ASSESSMENTS OF PRESIDENT
JOHNSON'S STATEMENTS ON 31 MARCH, BUT THERE WAS WIDE-
SPREAD RECOGNITION IN THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF THE IMPOR-
TANCE AND FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S
DECISIONS.

INITIAL REACTIONS IN THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD FOLLOWED
PREDICTABLE LINES, RANGING FROM RELIEF AND HOPE THROUGH
INCREDULITY TO APPREHENSIVE UNCERTAINTY. THERE WAS ALMOST
AS BROAD A SPECTRUM OF REACTION IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD.
THIS RANGED FROM NORTH VIETNAM'S PROMPT COUNTERMOVE TO
CAPITALIZE ON WHAT HANOI INTERPRETS AS AN AMERICAN RETREAT
AND READINESS TO SCALE DOWN US OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM,
THROUGH THE GLOATING RHETORIC OF SOVIET PROPAGANDISTS
PROCLAIMING THE "BRANKRUPTCY" OF US POLICIES, TO THE CRAFTY
SILENCE OF THE CHINESE UNTIL TWO DAYS AFTER HANOI MADE
ITS MOVE. HANOI'S COMMUNIST ALLIES APPARENTLY HAD NO
ADVANCE INFORMATION ON THE PROPOSAL FOR "CONTACT" WITH US
REPRESENTATIVES. A POLISH DIPLOMAT IN MOSCOW PRIVATELY
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MOVE CAME AS A
SURPRISE TO EVERYONE, INCLUDING THE SOVIETS.

68 APR 12 PM 8:31

FRIDAY

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED 262
Authority NLS 91-262
By ju/ju NARA. Date 6-5-97

IN ALLIED AND FRIENDLY COUNTRIES, THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WOULD NOT SEEK OR ACCEPT THE NOMINATION FOR ANOTHER TERM DREW ALMOST UNIVERSAL PRAISE AND ADMIRATION IN THE PRESS AND IN PRIVATE REMARKS BY POLITICAL LEADERS. MOST GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD OBSERVED THE CONVENTION OF AVOIDING OFFICIAL COMMENT ON AMERICAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

PREOCCUPATION WITH THE SWIFT PACE OF EVENTS SINCE THE ADDRESS DISCOURAGED SPECULATION ABOUT BROADER AND LONGER TERM EFFECTS ON THE COURSE OF US FOREIGN POLICY. A FEW JOURNALISTIC PUNDITS, HOWEVER, INTERPRETED THE SPEECH AS A RECOGNITION OF THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN POWER FORESHADOWING A RETRENCHMENT IN US COMMITMENTS AROUND THE WORLD. THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NO PUBLIC OR PRIVATE COMMENT IN WESTER EUROPE REGARDING PROSPECTS FOR A CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO NATO AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS GENERALLY. ASIAN OBSERVERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, DISPLAYED GREATER SENSITIVITY TO THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISIONS ON AMERICAN COMMITMENTS AND INTERESTS THROUGHOUT ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. SEVERAL ASIAN OFFICIALS PRIVATELY VENTURED THE OPINION THAT THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN FACTORS UNDERLYING THE ADDRESS MIGHT LEAD TO A TENDENCY TO DISENGAGE FROM ASIAN AFFAIRS. OTHER EXPRESSIONS OF UNCERTAINTY AND CONCERN CENTERED ON THE POLICIES OF THE PRESIDENT'S SUCCESSOR AND THE PROBLEMS OF WORKING OUT THE KIND OF INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP WITH A NEW PRESIDENT WHICH CERTAIN GOVERNMENTS HAVE ENJOYED WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

DTG: 130049Z APR 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~

75

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 APR 13 01 ¹⁴ ~~14~~

VZCZCEEA302
00 WTE 10
DE WTE 1363

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP20798

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APRIL 12, 1968

HEREWITH A MEMORANDUM FROM NICK ABOUT A FORMAL APPOINTMENT
FOR CY VANCE, WITH THE PERSONAL RANK OF AMBASSADOR.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

ENCLOSED FOR YOUR APPROVAL IS A SUGGESTED LETTER ADDRESSED
TO CYRUS ROBERTS VANCE APPOINTING HIM YOUR DEPUTY PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE TO ATTEND THE FORTHCOMING MEETINGS WITH NORTH
VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS, WITH THE PERSONAL RANK OF AMBASSADOR.

SUGGESTED LETTER

DEAR MR. VANCE:

I AM HAPPY TO APPOINT YOU MY DEPUTY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
TO ATTEND THE FORTHCOMING MEETINGS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS,
AND TO ACCORD YOU THE PERSONAL RANK OF AMBASSADOR DURING THE
TERM OF YOUR APPOINTMENT.

SINCERELY,

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY kg ON 5-5-92

FROM QUICK COPY

THE HONORABLE

CYRUS ROBERTS VANCE,

CARE OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

CYRUS ROBERTS VANCE

BORN: CLARKSBURG, WEST VIRGINIA; MARCH 27, 1917

EDUCATION: YALE U., B.A., 1939; YALE LAW SCHOOL, LL.B., 1942; MARSHALL U., HUNTINGTON, W.VA., HONORARY LL.D., 1963; TRINITY COLL., HONORARY LL.D., 1966

MARITAL STATUS: MARRIED

EXPERIENCE:

NON-GOVERNMENT: 1945-47 - ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, THE MEAD CORPORATION, NEW YORK CITY
1947 - ADMITTED TO NEW YORK BAR
1947-56 - WITH SIMPSON, THACHER, & BARTLETT, NEW YORK CITY
1955-61 - PARTNER, SIMPSON, THACHER, & BARTLETT, NEW YORK CITY
1953-51 - CHMN., COMM. ON ADJUDICATION OF CLAIMS ADMINSTRV. CONF. OF U.S. DIR., CHMN. BD. UNION SETTLEMENT ASSN., INC.
1957-63 - SPEC. COUNS., PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
1952 - CONSULTING COUNS., SPEC. SENATE COMM. ON SPACE AND ASTRONAUTICS

GOVERNMENT:

1961-61 - GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1962-64 - SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
1962-64 - A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL ARMED FORCES MUSEUM ADVISORY BOARD OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION
1964-67 - DEP. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1967 - CONSULTANT, DEPT. OF DEFENSE

MILITARY:

1942-46 - SERVED TO LT. (S.G.) IN U.S. NAVY, PRIMARILY IN DESTROYERS IN BOTH THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC

MEMBERSHIPS
AND CLUBS:

FELLOW, AM. COLL. TRIAL LAWYERS.
MEM., AM., N.Y. STATE BAR ASSNS., ASSN. BAR
CITY N.Y. CLUBS: CENTURY ASSN., LINKS
(N.Y.C.), METROPOLITAN (WASH.) TRUSTEE:
KENT SHCOOL, 1956--- AND THE BOYS CLUB OF
NEW YORK, 1959-61

OFFICE:

SIMPSON, THACHER, AND BARTLETT,
120 BROAD STREET, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10005

HOME:

CARE OF SIMPSON, THACHER, AND BARTLETT,
120 BROAD STREET, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10005

LEGAL RESIDENCE: NEW YORK

POLITICAL
AFFILIATION:

PRESENT
POSITION:

PARTNER, SIMPSON, THACHER, AND BARTLETT,
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

DTB: 130004Z APR 57

GPS: 570 INT 570

CONFIDENTIAL

EEA391
CO WTE17
DE WTE 1365

76
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM WALT POSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80799

1968 APR 13 00 48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APRIL 12, 1968

Pres file

SUBJECT: USIA FILM COVERAGE OF HONOLULU MEETING FOR
REPLAY IN SEOUL

THE BLUE HOUSE HAS ASKED KOREAN AMBASSADOR KIM TO REQUEST
USIA TO PROVIDE FILM COVERAGE OF PRESIDENT PARK'S MEETING
WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN HONOLULU. AMBASSADOR KIM, IN TURN,
HAS ASKED USIA TO PROVIDE THE SERVICES OF A KOREAN STAFF
MEMBER OF USIA'S MOTION PICTURE BRANCH TO INTERVIEW
PRESIDENT PARK.

AMBASSADOR KIM HAS INDICATED THAT THE EMBASSY WOULD
PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES TO AND FROM HONOLULU
FOR THE KOREAN STAFF MEMBER. FILM COVERAGE IS TO BE
CONTRACTED FOR LOCALLY IN HAWAII AND THE PROGRAM WILL BE
DIRECTED BY AN AMERICAN USIA STAFF MEMBER COMING FROM SEOUL.

THE SCENARIO WOULD CERTAINLY INCLUDE AN INTERVIEW WITH
PARK AND FILM ON BOTH PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRESIDENT PARK.

IF YOU ARE AGREEABLE, A SHORT INTERVIEW WITH HIM WOULD
MAKE FOR MAXIMUM EFFECT.

APPROVED-----

DISAPPROVED-----

CALL ME

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 130030Z APR 1968

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *fw/rq*, NARA, Date *6-2-97*

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

ACTION

77

Saturday
April 13, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Prime Minister Gorton

Presfile

Here is a suggested message from you to Gorton inviting him to be your guest in Washington on May 27-28:

The Right Honorable
John C. Gorton
Prime Minister of Australia
Canberra

*sent Ranch
via wire
WH 80816*

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I was very glad to have your recent message and to know that you could come here for a visit toward the end of May. We are looking forward to having you as our guest on May 27 and 28. That will give us time for some good personal talks as well as the conversations you may wish to have with my colleagues. Those dates will also permit us to receive you with the ceremony which I think should characterize your first visit here as Prime Minister. We will be in touch with Ambassador Waller on these matters, but I hope you will agree to full military honors upon your arrival and a state dinner on the evening of the 27th.

Lady Bird joins me in the hope that Mrs. Gorton will be able to accompany you. Our warm and personal best wishes to both of you.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

I recommend that you approve the message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *fw/cg*, NARA, Date *6-2-97*

MWright:wpt

78
INFORMATION

Saturday
April 13, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Mike Masaoka talks with Prime Minister Sato

Mike Masaoka, long-time representative of the Japanese-American Citizens League, returned from a trip to Japan. Before departure from Tokyo, he had a talk with Prime Minister Sato. They spoke together just before your recent speech.

*Pres file
sent back
via wire
WH80814*

Mike reported to State that Sato asked the following be passed along:

1. Sato was working hard on the defense problem but found it harder to crack than anticipated;
2. Sato promised not to take any actions that would bother you during the campaign, and hoped we would also take into account his own election problem;
3. He was most concerned about the possible import surcharges and felt they would hurt Japan more than EEC countries despite the fact Japan's balance of payments is in deficit while the EEC has a surplus;
4. Sato promised to continue to help on our balance of payments problem, but hoped we would not take actions that would hurt Japanese trade.

Masaoka also observed:

- Sato's political position is shakier than expected.
- Concern about import surcharges was widespread in top Japanese circles.

W. W. Rostow

STATE: WJJorden:wpt

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By ies, NARA Date 1-15-99

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 91-258

By Julian NARA, Date 6-5-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 13, 1968

79

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Chron

Nick Katzenbach could only raise Bill Fulbright. Hickenlooper was in transit somewhere.

Nick found Fulbright quite understanding about Warsaw. He said that we might think, if we have to, about making a deal: Warsaw for the preliminary contact; Geneva for the conference of substantive talks. Fulbright took the occasion, however, to attack Harriman as a Hawk, saying that we could not be serious about seeking peace if Harriman was our negotiator.

Clark Clifford contacted Margaret Chase Smith, Mendel Rivers, William Bates, Stu Symington, and Richard Russell. He found them all quite comfortable with our position and grateful that they had been informed.

In the course of the conversation, Clark underlined a thought which he suggested I pass along to you. One of the purposes of his press conference was to begin to suggest to the American people that we have a long-range plan leading to our disengagement as the South Vietnamese expanded their armed forces and their capabilities for dealing with the military problem. He feels that it is particularly important now for us quietly to introduce this theme because it is not certain that the negotiations will be productive. If they are, they may take a long time. If they break down, we must have a concept for continuing our commitment in Vietnam for the long pull but on ~~the basis of which~~ a basis which has some light at the end of the tunnel. Therefore, he is inclined to believe we should play the negotiations in low key without excessive optimism and keep part

of the public attention focused on the idea we have come to a ceiling in our forces and are looking to slow but ultimate disengagement. He believes the President might pick up this theme from time to time. I suggested Thieu also might occasionally speak in this vein.

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 APR 12 23 38

EEA299
 OO WTE10
 DE WTE 1360

FROM WALT ROSTOW
 TO THE PRESIDENT
 CITE CAP80796

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APRIL 12, 1968

68 APR 12 PM 6:53

FRIDAY

I GAVE THE PITCH ON WARSAW, ETC., IN DETAIL TO THE FOLLOWING:

J.R. WIGGINS, THE WASHINGTON POST

HENRY HUBBARD, NEWSWEEK

JACK SUTHEPLAND, US NEWS & WORLD REPORT

JOHN STEELE, TIME MAGAZINE

DAVID LAWRENCE

RICHARD WILSON, COWLES PUBLICATIONS

WILLIAM S. WHITE

NEIL SHEEHAN, NEW YORK TIMES

ALL SEEMED SYMPATHETIC.

HUBBARD CALLED ME BACK AND TOLD ME HE THINKS EVEN NEWSWEEK WILL
 USE THE KAESONG ITEM.

DAVID LAWRENCE, RICHARD WILSON, AND BILL WHITE ALL SAID THAT THEY
 WOULD DO COLUMNS.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
 MARKING. CANCELLED FOR E.O. 12958
 SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
 MAR 16, 1983.

BY 13 ON 5-19-92

NEIL SHEEHAN SAID HE WOULD DO HIS VERY BEST BECAUSE HE FELT, AS A CITIZEN, THAT WE WERE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT ABOUT WARSAW.

I GOT BACK TO ARTHUR GOLDBERG, AND HE PROMISED TO GO THE WORK ON THE NEW YORK TIMES IN NEW YORK.

NICK KATZENBACH SAID THAT HE WOULD GET ON THE PHONE WITH FULBRIGHT AND HICKENLOOPER, AT LEAST. CLARK CLIFFORD SAID THAT HE WOULD GET WITH THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE FOLK IN THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE. THEY WILL REPORT THIS EVENING.

IN ADDITION, BILL JORDEN, OPERATING ON THE SAME FREQUENCY, CONTACTED THE FOLLOWING:

US NEWS & WORLD REPORT

AP

UPI

LOS ANGELES TIMES

CHICAGO DAILY NEWS

(HE WAS NOT ABLE TO GET SCOTTY RESTON, WHO WAS OUT OF TOWN)

SECRETARY RUSK CALLED ME FROM THE HOSPITAL. HE SAID ALL WAS WELL, BUT HE HAD ONE MORE TEST FOR TOMORROW. I EXPLAINED TO HIM YOUR POSITION ON WARSAW. HE SAID: "THAT MAKES GREAT GOOD SENSE TO ME."

DTG 122306Z APR 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EEA297
CO WTE10
DE WTE 1358

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAPS0794

1968 APR 12 23 09

Pres file

68 APR 12 PM 6:17

FRIDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APRIL 12, 1968

SHOULD WE OFFER AMBASSADOR KIM OF KOREA A RIDE TO HONOLULU
ON THE BACK UP PLANE?

DIC 122259Z APRIL 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 74, NARA, Date 5-7-92

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

82
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, April 12, 1968 -- 1:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

It is just barely possible that this story of Hanoi being scared off Phnom Penh (and other Asian sites) by Chicom negative reaction has some substance -- except it comes from Manac'h.

Ceylon is about as far away as you could get from Peking and still be in Asia -- if this turns out to be a serious Hanoi consideration.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By isa, NARA Date 1-15-99

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

HCE693

Jordan

~~SECRET~~
~~PLAIN~~

82a

PAGE 01 PARIS12616 121700Z

40
ACTION SS 30

RECEIVED
WHCA

EXDIS

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030103 APR 12 17 46

P 121601Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 731

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 12616

Reuter

EXDIS

SUBJECT: MANAC'H ON SITES FOR US-DRV CONTACT

1. DURING APRIL 12 MEETING. MANAC'H MENTIONED TO EMBOFFS INFO HE HAD RECEIVED FROM PNOM PENH AND HANOI RE SELECTION OF SITES FOR USG-8DRV CONTACT. ACCORDING FRENCH AMBASSADOR PNOM PENH, CHOU-EN-LAI CANCELLED THIS WEEK HIS VISIT TO CAMBODIA WHICH HAD BEEN SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 24. CHOU-EN-LAI DID NOT EXPLAIN IN MESSAGE TO SIHANOUK WHAT "CONDITION FORCED" HIM, AS HE PHRASED IT, TO CANCEL TRIP, BUT FRENCH AMBASSADOR PNOM PENH REPORTS THAT IT REFLECTS CHICOM DISPLEASURE OVER SIHANOUK'S WILLINGNESS TO HAVE US-DRV TALKS HELD IN CAMBODIAN CAPITAL. ACCORDING FRENCH, CHOU-EN-LAI'S ABRUPT CHANGE IN PLANS IS NOT ONLY SIGN OF PEKING'S

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 12616 ~~SECRET~~

OPPOSITION TO HOLDING INITIAL US-DRV CONTACT IN CAMBODIA. FRENCH AMBASSADOR REPORTED EARLIER THIS WEEK THAT CHICOM REP IN PNOM PENH HAD VOICED VIEWS TO THAT EFFECT DIRECTLY TO NORTH VIETNAMESE COLLEAGUE AND DE GUIRIELLE IN HANOI WRITES THAT CHICOM OPPOSITION TO PNOM PENH MIGHT ACCOUNT FOR DIFFERENT VERSIONS NORTH VIETNAMESE GAVE ROGER PIC AND BURCHETTE ON ONE HAND AND COLLINGWOOD ON OTHER RE CHOICE OF PNOM PENH. TO PIC AND BURCHETZ, FOREIGN MINISTER TRINH MENTIONED ONLY PNOM PENH AS VENUE AND THE NEXT DAY, TALKING TO COLLINGWOOD HE INJECTED GREATER FLEXIBILITY BY MENTIONING "PNOM PENH OR ANY OTHER SITE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH PARTIES." WHEN EMBOFFS POINTED OUT THAT CHICOMS OPPOSED TO ANY TALKS -- REGARDLESS WHERE HELD--

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71259

By copy, NARA, Date 5-11-92

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 12616 11700Z

MANAC'H AGREED BUT ADDED THAT WHILE PEKING MAY NOT BE ABLE TO PREVENT HANOI FROM TALKING TO U.S. AT LEAST IT WOULD PREFER CONTACTS NOT BE HELD IN INDOCHINA. PRESENCE OF U.S. NEGOTIATORS SO NEAR TO CONFLICT AND TO CHINA WOULD BE REMINDER OF U.S. PRESENCE AND THEREFORE PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE FOR U.S.

2. MANAC'H SAID NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE ANXIOUS NOT TO OFFEND PEKING UNNECESSARILY AND THEREFORE HANOI, IN SELECTING SITE FOR US-DRV CONTACT, WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT EXPECTED PEKING REACTION.

PAGE 3 RUFNCR 12616 ~~SECRET~~

THIS MIGHT INFLUENCE HANOI'S REACTION TO RANGOON OR NEW DELHI, TWO CAPITALS WHERE CHICONS HAVE RECENTLY EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTIES, MANAC'H SAID.

3. BO FAVORS PARIS AS SITE BECAUSE IT MEETS ALL REQUIREMENTS, MANAC'H SAID, BUT SINCE BO PERSONALLY INVOLVED HE HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO MAKE THIS SUGGESTION. IN THAT CONNECTION MANAC'H NOTED THAT DE QUIRELLE REPORTED STORY SPREAD BY COMMUNIST EMBASSIES IN HANOI THAT HANOI HAD ADVANCE PARIS AS SITE FOR CONTACT BUT U.S. HAD REFUSED. WHILE FRENCH CANNOT EVALUATE ACCURACY OF THIS REPORT, QUAI CONSIDERS QUESTION OF CITIES TO BE EXCLUSIVELY MATTER BETWEEN U.S. AND DRV.

GP-3.WALLNER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THIS
11/10/68

INFORMATION

83

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Pres file

Friday, April 12, 1968 - 1:05 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Hanoi enlists U Thant and
the Polish Vice Minister to press us
on behalf of Warsaw.

W. W. Restow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-268
By vis, NARA Date 1-15-99

WWRestow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-269
By iso, NARA Date 10-8-98

~~SECRET~~ - ~~NODIS~~

4/12/68

83a

At 8:00 a.m. this morning Dr. Bunche telephoned Ambassador Goldberg from New York to his Washington residence to give him a message from Secretary General U Thant from Paris. The Secretary General in the morning, Paris time, had a meeting with Mai Van Bo, the North Vietnamese representative. At this meeting Bo gave the Secretary General a message from Hanoi. The message urged the Secretary General to use his good offices with the U.S. Government to persuade it to agree to Warsaw as the site of the proposed initial talks. In support, the message pointed out to the Secretary General that the President had repeatedly and publicly states his willingness to meet at any place and at any time for peace talks.

The Secretary General instructed Bunche to transmit this message promptly to Ambassador Goldberg for U.S. Government, on the express understanding that the Secretary General was merely forwarding the message and was not making any comment or suggestions with respect to its contents.

SYG now flying back to New York where he is expected to arrive Friday evening.

~~SECRET~~ - ~~NODIS~~

(2)

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

Bunche called Goldberg for a second time this morning and gave him the precise wording of the Secretary General's message to Bunche for transmission to Goldberg. Secretary General's message to Bunche reads as follows:

"In the course of my talk with Delegate General of North Vietnam [Mai Van Bo] he requested me to use my good offices to endorse his government's proposal regarding Warsaw as venue for talks, since in his words 'President Johnson has repeatedly said he would meet with representatives of Hanoi anywhere, any time'.

"Would appreciate your passing this on to Ambassador Goldberg."

IO:JJSisco:jmp
4/12/68

~~SECRET-NODIS~~



Department of State

2
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

83b

***** ZZ RUEHC
DE RUDKRW 2798 1031625
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 121612Z APR 68
FM ANEMBASSY WARSAW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5488
STATE GRNC
BT

3 2 9 6 Q

1968 APR 12 AM 11 37

~~SECRET~~ WARSAW 2798

MODIS/CROCODILE

REF: STATE 145434

1. RECENTLY APPOINTED VICE MIN WOLNIAK CALLED ME IN URGENTLY THIS AFTERNOON TO PRESENT GOP VIEWS RE HANOI APRIL 12 PROPOSAL WARSAW AS SITE FOR USG-NVN TALKS. HE SAID MINISTRY HAD RECEIVED COMMUNICATION FROM HANOI ON THIS SUBJECT, ADDING THAT GOP IS WILLING FACILITATE TALKS AND OFFER FACILITIES AVAILABLE WARSAW IF SUCH ARRANGEMENT ACCEPTABLE BOTH SIDES. WOLNIAK REQUESTED ME CONVEY THIS TO USG AND TO COMMUNICATE ITS REACTION TO POLISH MFA ASAP.

PAGE 2 RUDKRW 2798 ~~SECRET~~

2. I TOLD WOLNIAK THAT THERE HAD BEEN PUBLIC COMMENT ISSUED FROM WHITE HOUSE YESTERDAY THAT, WHILE NOT REJECTING WARSAW, HAD NOTED THAT WE HAD MADE SEVERAL SUGGESTIONS RE POSSIBLE SITES, CONCERNING WHICH WE HAD RECEIVED NO REPLY FROM HANOI. USG HAS SENT MESSAGE TO HANOI ASKING ITS VIEWS OUR SUGGESTIONS. I EXPRESSED BY UNDERSTANDING THAT WE ARE TRYING TO FIND NEUTRAL GROUND FOR HOLDING TALKS.

3. WOLNIAK, NOTING HE HAD BEEN IN NEW JOB ONLY ONE DAY, REPLIED THAT HE HAD READ OF WHITE HOUSE COMMENT IN PRESS BUT PRESENT CONVERSATION WAS FIRST TIME HE HAD HEARD OFFICIAL US GOVT REACTION TO WARSAW SITE. HE OBSERVED, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD SEEN STATEMENTS FREQUENTLY REPEATED OVER PAST TWO YEARS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND SECRETARY RUSK THAT THEY WERE READY FOR TALKS AT ANY TIME AND PLACE. WARSAW SEEMS TO FIT INTO THIS CATEGORY, HE SAID. AS PARTING GESTURE HE EXPRESSED THOUGHT THAT PARTIES WOULD FIND HIS GOVERNMENT GOOD HOST FOR MEETING.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-269

By us, NARA Date 10-8-98

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- WARSAW 2798, APRIL 12, (NODIS/CROCODILE)

PAGE 3 RUDXRW 2798 ~~SECRET~~

4. COMMENT: I UNDERSTAND WHY THERE IS SOME QUESTION ABOUT WARSAW AS SITE FOR INITIAL TALKS, BUT AM MOST CONCERNED THAT REJECTION BY US WOULD GIVE HANOI IDEAL PROPAGANDA INSTRUMENT TO BLAME USG IF EFFORTS TO INITIATE TALKS FAIL. HANOI'S INEVITABLE CHARGE THAT USG WENT BACK ON OFFER TO MEET. "ANY TIME, ANY PLACE", AND THAT WE NEVER HAD SERIOUS INTENTION OF SEEKING NEGOTIATED RATHER THAN MILITARY SOLUTION, WOULD FIND A RECEPTIVE AUDIENCE BOTH IN WESTERN EUROPE AND AMONG SOME ELEMENTS IN U.S.A.

GP-1 GRONOUSKI

BT

1

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

84

Pres file

Friday, April 12, 1968 -- 11:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Bus Wheeler says it is perfectly in order for McCain to join you on the trip to Honolulu.

He will arrange that McCain will be ready to join you -- with the others -- in Austin by Monday.

W. W. Restow

WWRestow:rla

April 12, 1968
Friday, 11:20 A. M.

85

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In the attached memorandum to you, Don Hornig notes that some progress is being made in target acquisition in Vietnam through the use of new scientific means.

W. W. Rostow

Secret attachment

12:50pm
4/11/68
MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

85a

Wednesday
April 10, 1968
3:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Technological Innovation in Viet Nam

The effort to get technological innovation into our Viet Nam operations is continuing. Progress is much too slow, but the attached letter from the Marine Corps notes progress when we try.

The "Snoopy" helicopter is a small, unmanned drone helicopter carrying a TV camera which transmits pictures back to the base. It proved surprisingly invulnerable in tests which the Navy conducted in the coastal areas of the DMZ: it could obviously be enormously effective as an aid to ground operations in the location of personnel and targets. After considerable prodding from the Ground Warfare Panel of your Science Advisory Committee and my staff, the Marines are now moving rapidly and planning to test Snoopy in connection with their operations at Khe Sanh.


Donald F. Hornig

Encl.
S&T No. 529 dtd 4 April 68

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)
By ing, NARS, Date 6-13-80

Unclassified when separated
from enclosures

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

IN REPLY REFER TO

AO3H30-rbf
003H9362

85b

4 APR 1980

~~SECRET~~

Dr. Vincent McRae
Office of Science and Technology
Executive Office of the President
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20500

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(A) and (D)

By inf, NARS, Date 6-13-80

Dear Dr. McRae:

On 29 February, during a meeting of the Ground Warfare Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee, you requested that the Marine Corps and Navy representatives take the necessary action to determine if the Navy's QH-50 drone, in a target acquisition configuration (Snoopy), could be employed to advantage in support of the Marines in the DMZ area of Vietnam in general and at Khe Sanh in particular.

The first meeting between Navy and Marine Corps representatives to follow up on your request was conducted on 1 March. Action was initiated to determine the recommendations and comments of the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, concerning the proposed deployment of Snoopy. Initial action was also taken to arrange for training of required Marine ground control personnel for the program.

On 6 March the Secretary of Defense directed provision of battlefield TV reconnaissance at Khe Sanh within 30 days. Funding responsibility and program management for the test and evaluation phase was assigned to ARPA.

Since that time, the necessary Marine personnel have been trained, three QH-50 drones have been properly configured and two mobile ground control equipments have been prepared. The personnel and equipment are expected to arrive in Vietnam about 16 April.

Present plans are to conduct a two week test and evaluation. Testing will be initiated in the coastal plains area for about two days and then moved to Khe Sanh. If movement to Khe Sanh proves infeasible another location will be selected.

Copy No. 1 of 3 Copies

Sub Cont. No. 529

GROUP 4: Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
declassified after 12 years.

~~SECRET~~


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AO3H30-rbf
003H9368

Planning for continued employment is now in progress in order to ensure continued exploitation of the QH-50 drone capabilities should it demonstrate effectiveness and survivability during the test.

Your interest and assistance in this program is sincerely appreciated. As you know, the Marine Corps and Navy have been exploring this application of "Snoopy" for some time. However, the interest and assistance provided by the Office of Science and Technology has made possible the early test of this program in Vietnam.

Sincerely,



R. G. OWENS, JR.
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-8

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

**Friday, April 12, 1968
10:55 a.m.**

Mr. President:

**Herewith proposed letter to
Sec. Rusk, for your signature,
regarding contacts with private
persons going to Hanoi.**

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

86

Pres file

86a

April 12, 1968

Dear Dean:

I wish to have you lay it down as a flat rule in the Department of State that we shall have no further contacts with private persons going to Hanoi or otherwise engaging in contacts with representatives of the government of North Vietnam or the NLF.

I am convinced that no matter how we restrict those contacts, they result in a posture of quasi-negotiation which misleads Hanoi and undercuts our position at home.

Sincerely,

Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWRostow:rlh

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

87

Friday, April 12, 1968
10:45 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the proposed State-Defense list to accompany you to Honolulu.

DEFENSE

General Wheeler (Clark concludes he is not required in The Hague) Yes ___ No ___
Richard Steadman Yes ___ No ___

STATE

William Bundy Yes ___ No ___
Winthrop Brown (for PUEBLO matter and general excellent background) Yes ___ No ___

WHITE HOUSE

W. W. Rostow Yes ___ No ___
Gen. Ginsburgh Yes ___ No ___
Mildred Zayac (Secretary) Yes ___ No ___

Clark recommends that the group join your aircraft en route for any briefing you may desire.

We are preparing staff papers including a quick summary of key issues which will be ready by the end of the day.

W. W. Rostow

Pres. file

88

Friday, April 12, 1968
10:25 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Marked passages tell the story of Kaesong.

From This Kind of War, by T. R. Fehrenbach,
Macmillan, 1963.

It is subtitled: "A Study in Unpreparedness."

You might note that -- for once -- the U. S. is
trying to learn from history in this matter of
negotiations.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

88a

Truce Talks

honor in the proposed cease-fire, which left its people ravaged and still divided. A settlement along the 38th parallel, for all the American and U.N. protestations of continuance of the goal of uniting Korea by peaceful means, meant the separation of Korea into two blocs for as long as man could count, possibly for centuries.

Syngman Rhee was spurred not only by economic and national reasons to oppose peace now, but also by those same reasons that bound Europe's leaders into an emotional straitjacket in 1916-1917, when the Great War stalemated and it seemed sensible to end it. The Taehan Minkuk had gone into the war with its whole heart; it had been devastated, and one in twenty of its people killed or injured. Millions of orphans and homeless wandered its ruins.

To end the war after such wholesale sacrifice with nothing but the *status quo ante* was more than aging Rhee or the Koreans could bear.

Dr. Rhee issued a statement on 30 June 1951.

The Republic of Korea's conditions for peace were as follows: the CCF must withdraw north of the Yalu; all North Korean Communists must be disarmed; Soviet and Chinese arms assistance to the North must end, under a U.N. guarantee; full ROK participation in any settlement; and no settlement conflicting with the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the Republic of Korea.

From this time on, Syngman Rhee continued to be a patriot or became a major nuisance, depending on the vantage point from which he was viewed. Rhee never materially changed his demands, and he was to experience a continually worsening press in both Europe and America. Rhee, threatening again and again to block an armistice desired by most, became less and less a heroic old resistor of Communism and more and more a stubborn, opinionated old tyrant, determined to keep the West from getting what it wanted.

Actually, both Rhee and Korea were largely helpless. Not a U.N. member but a ward of that body, completely dependent upon American arms, fuel, munitions, and economic aid, the Taehan Minkuk had no chance of materially influencing U.S. policy. Willingly or not, Dr. Rhee had to continue as an American puppet or cease to exist.

But a certain amount of love was lost. With divergent aims, neither Washington nor Seoul now fully trusted the other.

Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Inmun Gun, and Peng Teh-huai, Commander of Chinese Volunteers—whose name until that day was unknown to U.N. intelligence—radioed on 1 July 1951, agreeing to a meeting, not at sea, as Ridgway desired, but at Kaesong.

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Kaesong was three miles below the parallel and a few miles inside Communist lines; north of Seoul, it lay athwart the main north-south corridor through western Korea, along the main invasion route.

The United Nations Command, not caring to be technical, accepted Kaesong. It was to learn that Communists propose nothing, not even truce sites, without an eye to their own advantage.

On 8 July Colonel James C. Murray, USMC; Jack Kinney, an Air Force colonel; and Colonel Lee Soo Young, ROK Army, representing the U.N. command, met with a Colonel Chang of the Communists at a tea-house on the outskirts of rubble-strewn Kaesong. All agreed that the principals to negotiate a possible cease-fire would meet at Kaesong at 1100 on 10 July.

On that date, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy designated by General Ridgway as the Senior UNC Delegate, said to newsmen as he left Munsan-ni:

"We, the delegates from the United Nations Command, are leaving for Kaesong fully conscious of the importance of these meetings to the entire world. We are proceeding in good faith prepared to do our part to bring about an honorable armistice, under terms that are satisfactory to the United Nations Command."

The seventeen nations with fighting forces in Korea had already met, and agreed on terms, which in essence were to freeze the fighting and forces where they stood, form a demilitarized zone in the vicinity of the parallel, exchange of prisoners, and the establishment of an international commission with access to supervise any truce.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, meanwhile, had explicitly instructed Ridgway not to discuss any political or territorial questions with the enemy. Not to be discussed were the seating of Red China in the U.N., Red claims to Taiwan, or any permanent division of Korea, or the 38th parallel as a political boundary.

From the American and U.N. point of view, the sole purpose of the meetings at Kaesong was to end the bloodshed, and to create some sort of machinery to supervise such an armistice. This done, an entirely separate body would sift the political and territorial questions posed by the Korean situation, in an atmosphere of peace.

Americans, even the knowledgeable Dean Acheson, had once again tried to separate peace and war into neat compartments, to their sorrow.

Assembled with Admiral Joy were Major General Laurence C. Craigie, USAF; Major General Henry I. Hodes, USA; Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, USN; and Major General Paik Sun Yup, ROK Army.

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
Truce Talks

Not one of these men was other than a military commander; not one was in any respect a diplomat or politician. They were soldiers, come to forge a military agreement to end the killing.

On the other side of the famous green table at Kaesong was a formidable array of Communist talent: General Nam Il, North Korea Senior Delegate; Major General Chang Pyong San, North Korea; Major General Lee Sang Cho, North Korea; Lieutenant General Tung Hua, Chinese Volunteers; and Major General Hsieh Fang, also Chinese. Several of these men were graduates of Soviet universities, and not one was a fighting man.

"The U.N. took a certain naïveté to the table at Kaesong. . . ." Truce talks, 1951.

USAF



All had held political posts, and with typical Communist deviousness, seemingly the junior man at the table in rank, Hsieh Fang, was the man who actually held the Communist cards.

Immediately, it became apparent that the Communist delegation intended not only to discuss the proposed cease-fire but everything up to and including the kitchen drain. Immediately, they would not agree to an agenda. Immediately, they made sharp protest at Turner Joy's use of the word "Communists"—there were no "Communists" in Kaesong, but only Inmun Gun and Chinese Volunteers; on the other hand, they used such terms as "that murderer Rhee" and "the puppet on Taiwan" quite freely.

They insisted that the 38th parallel must be the new line of demarcation, although the U.N. armies in most places stood well above it—and the parallel, as had been proved, was hardly a defensible line—and that unless the United Nations Command ceased actual hostilities in Korea at once they could not discuss the armistice. They at once refused demands to permit the International Red Cross to inspect North Korean POW camps.

And from the selection of the site at Kaesong—in Communist hands, yet still below the parallel, one of the few spots in Korea where this condition obtained—the forcing of U.N. negotiators to enter Communist territory displaying white flags, as if they were coming to surrender, to the seating of Admiral Joy in a chair substantially lower than Nam Il's, the enemy showed that nothing was too small to be overlooked, if it accrued to his advantage.

As best it could, without sabotaging the truce talks, the U.N. Command began to fight for its own ends. Its delegates had come in good faith, to make an honest end to the killing, with the settlements to come later.

The tragedy of the talks was that the Communists intended merely to transfer the war from the battlefield, where they were losing, to the conference table, where they might yet win something.

The United Nations' desire for peace was genuine—almost frantic. Nothing else could have kept their negotiators, subjected to harassment, stinging insult, and interminable delay, at the green table after the first few sessions.

On 8 July, when Colonels Jack Kinney and Chang Chun San arranged the first Plenary Session, the world had displayed conspicuous joy. Only the United States Government sought to dampen the enthusiasm a bit: the *New York Times* reported on that date that "fighting for several weeks is foreseen by Washington."

Truce Talks

Washington was still not seeing clearly. No one dared guess that it would take 159 plenary sessions and more than two years of haggling to end the killing.

Turner Joy, determined to succeed, said: "Unless you come prepared to spend time you only shortchange yourself and those who depend on you. Time is the price you pay for progress."

But time, above all, was what the Communist world needed in Korea in the summer of 1951.

And time, thirty fatal days, while the U.N. forces paused and marked time in expectation of immediate peace, was what they got.

Sometimes the price of progress comes high.

After the start of talks—first at Kaesong, then transferred to Panmunjom, in a neutral zone ten miles east at U.N. insistence—every action on the checkerboard of the Korean War would be made with one eye on the state of the front and one on the conference table.

Very soon, the U.N. Command was in quandary.

It wanted peace; the governments it represented wanted peace. The Communist world was willing to talk, even though it obstructed day to day, and while the talks went on there was always the hope of peace, eventually.

As Winston Churchill said, "It is better to jaw, jaw, than war, war."

But yet, with both armies in the field, lurking within gunshot of each other, with nothing settled, war could not wholly end.

The U.N. Command no longer looked for victory in the field. It had already been committed to settlement in the vicinity of the 38th parallel, though it insisted upon the present line of contact, not that indefensible, imaginary line of demarcation on the ground. If it flailed ahead now, made great gains, these would have already been compromised and might well be lost at the conference table. Ridgway and Van Fleet and Washington were loath to spend lives for nothing. Yet Ridgway and Van Fleet dared not sit still, letting their forces stagnate, despite Washington.

As summer ripened, there was no progress at the table. The Communist delegations seemed willing, even eager, to delay forever. They had transferred their war largely to the truce table, and now were as happily waging it as before, while they put the time they had bought to good use, if another round at arms should come.

As summer deepened, and the hopes of the world slowly withered, another round at arms was bound to come. In the green and muddy hills of Korea, the war had not ended. It had begun a new and terrible phase.

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Friday, April 12, 1968, 10:20 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Per file

Last month Secretary Rusk asked you to approve his appointment of Dean Peterson as the coordinator of the Water for Peace Program. The papers are attached.

It would be helpful in pushing the program forward if the new coordinator could take over promptly.

(signed) W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

_____ Tell Secretary Rusk to go ahead

_____ Submit new names to me

BKS:amc

90

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, April 12, 1968 -- 9:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

With this 68th daily report on Khe Sanh, the series ends -- with our forces in good order.

You will note that Westy is redispensing some of his forces to help chase the enemy units still hanging about Quang Tri and Danang.

Having studied the North Vietnamese for some 15 years, I am sure that their failure to produce a Dien Bien Phu against the Americans -- and the losses they suffered at Khe Sanh -- is a much deeper and more fundamental blow to their vision of the future than is generally understood.

Although we cannot say it out loud, they learned, finally, at Khe Sanh that Americans of 1968 are not the French of 1954.

W. W. Restow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18, NARA, Date 5-18-82

WWRestow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By 18, NARA, Date 5-18-82

~~SECRET~~

90a

Friday, April 12, 1968, 9:03 a.m.

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is report number sixty-eight on the situation in the Khe Sanh/DMZ/A Shau Valley for the 24-hour period of April 11, 1968.

Khe Sanh experienced a significant increase in low cloudiness as a cold front advanced into the area from the northeast. Ceilings and visibility approached zero conditions during hours of darkness.

During the reporting period Khe Sanh Combat Base received nine rounds of incoming enemy artillery. Between 9:10 - 10:20 a.m. this morning, twelve 122mm rocket rounds were also fired at the base. There were no friendly casualties from these attacks. Friendly artillery fired 160 missions expending 1,726 rounds. Forty-two missions were observed. No COFRAM ammunition was fired.

US units in Operation Pegasus reported that during the period 33 enemy were killed, 16 individual weapons and four crew-served weapons were captured. Our losses were one killed and nine wounded (eight evacuated). In addition at 7:30 p.m. on April 11 six kilometers west-southwest of Khe Sanh near Lang Vei, the 6th ARVN Airborne Battalion contacted an unknown enemy size force. Artillery, mortar and small arms contact continued through the night. As of 6:30 a.m. yesterday ARVN casualties were five killed and 30 wounded. Enemy casualties are unknown.

Friendly force dispositions were changed during the period. The 1st Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division departed Ca Lu and returned to landing zone Sharon, south of Quang Tri City. The 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion departed Khe Sanh and returned to Danang. Enemy force dispositions remain unchanged.

Elsewhere in Quang Tri Province, two kilometers south of the rock pile, the 3rd Battalion 9th Marines and supporting artillery received ten rounds of 130mm artillery. One Marine was wounded and one 175mm gun was damaged. The 3rd Marine Division initiated Operation Charlton at 10:00 a.m. this morning after being temporarily delayed due to weather. This is a combined air assault and armor thrust under control of the 4th Marines. Task organization consists of the 3rd Battalion 5th Regiment and 3rd Battalion 1st Regiment Marines (reinforced). Direction of the attack is from Cam Lo to the south along Route 558.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/88
By ag NARA, Date 5-18-92

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1998
By ag NARA, Date 5-18-92

Fifty-one tactical air sorties and one ARC LIGHT mission (six sorties) were flown in support of the Pegasus area. Bomb damage assessment included four secondary explosions and eight bunkers destroyed.

No aerial resupply was made to Khe Sanh during the period. Supplies remain at a satisfactory level.

A total of 189 tactical air sorties are scheduled for the next period in support of Pegasus with an additional 116 on call. Two ARC LIGHT missions are also planned.

Low clouds and fog are forecast for the next 24-hour period with the poorest conditions expected during nighttime and early morning hours. Conditions are expected to improve slightly during the day.

Aerial surveillance in A Shau included three radar missions which revealed a total of nine moving target indicators.

It would seem that this special daily report has served its purpose and is now unnecessary. I recommend that it be discontinued.

Pres. file

91

~~SECRET~~

Friday, April 12, 1968
9:20 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have marked the mildly interesting passages
in the Baggs-Ashmore full report (see paper clips).

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (log 1257)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ag, NARA, Date 5-7-92

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1-21
Roston- 9/2

MEMORANDUM

April 10, 1968

TO: Ambassador Averell Harriman
Cc: Under Secretary Katzenbach
Assistant Secretary Bundy

FROM: Harry S. Ashmore and William C. Baggs

SUBJECT: Report on Conversations in Hanoi, March 29-April 6, 1968.

Background

The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions has maintained a reliable contact with Hanoi since the original negotiations for the Pacem in Terris II convocation held in Geneva last June. Immediately after the convocation, a message was sent to Hanoi suggesting that discussion of a proposed Southeast Asian economic conference which had taken place there might be of interest. A reply was received indicating that Mai Van Bo, the DRV representative in Paris, would promptly receive Ashmore and Baggs. We reported to Mai Van Bo the details of the Southeast Asian conference proposal. Also developed in this conversation was the idea of whether it would be feasible to set up a private meeting between the DRV and USA only to consider an agenda for a conference which would not take place until after the bombing had halted. The proposal was transmitted by Mai Van Bo to Hanoi.

Ashmore and Baggs reported the conversation fully to Secretary Bundy upon their return to the US.

In late August it was decided that the Center would send Brigadier General Said Uddin Khan, a Pakistani who is a former chief of the peace-keeping mission of the United Nations in Indonesia, to visit the area and check on the possibilities of the proposed economic conference. Again messages were exchanged with Hanoi seeking clearance for General Khan to visit. Responses were immediately received, but in this case they were negative, indicating that the situation there was such that no American and few other foreign visitors were being permitted to enter. This condition continued, with very few exceptions, until after the TET offensive in January and February--with

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 95-253
By ing, NARA, Date 1-9-96

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the CIC flights reduced to a very irregular schedule.

In mid-March developments concerning the possible additional escalation of the war by both sides in Viet-Nam seemed so critical to Ashmore and Baggs that we concluded, on our own motion, that we should suggest our return to Hanoi to reappraise the situation as it related to the Center's continuing interest in Southeast Asia. We dispatched a cable through the DRV Embassy in Phnom Penh to Hoang Tung, who had been our primary contact on our January, 1967, visit to Hanoi, and had been designated in the course of our interview with President Ho Chi Minh as the person we were to deal with.

Hoang Tung wears several hats. He is the Editor of Nham Dan, the leading Party newspaper. He is also Chairman of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. He is a member of the Party's Central Committee, but holds no official title in the government. He is also the official spokesman for Ho Chi Minh. It should be noted that the committee he heads is entirely separate from the so-called Peace Movement Committee, which normally sponsors American pacifists and "peace activists" who have been admitted to Hanoi. Also it functions separately from the section of the Foreign Ministry which, with the usual active assistance of Wilfred Burchett, handles arrangements for working journalists, such as Charles Collingwood, who was there when we were in Hanoi.

Hoang Tung replied promptly that visas would be awaiting us in Phnom Penh.

We arranged to proceed as rapidly as possible, arriving at Phnom Penh March 27th and departing for Hanoi on the next available flight on March 29. Reservations on the CIC plane had been made by the DRV Embassy in Phnom Penh.

Baggs immediately reported our plans and schedule to Secretary Bundy. Bundy asked that he come to Washington for a briefing before our departure. He came to Washington on Saturday, March 23.

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-3-

State Department Briefing

Baggs met with Bundy, Isham and Sieverts. The following seven points were developed:

1. Sieverts briefed Baggs on the American prisoners now being held in DRV territory. He said our intelligence indicated some of these prisoners were ill. He gave Baggs a 3-page resume of the US views on the question of prisoners, and on the desirability of a Red Cross agency to facilitate mail between the American prisoners and their relatives. Sieverts, with Bundy contributing occasional comments, asked Baggs to make certain inquiries in Hanoi to determine if an enlarged exchange of prisoners might be arranged. Bundy said that our government was willing to exchange DRV prisoners in the South for captured American airmen in the North on any fair basis and suggested we probe to see if we could get a reaction to such an offer from the appropriate parties in the DRV. Bundy said he was persuaded that an exchange of prisoners might lead to cooperation in other regards.

2. On presence of a Red Cross agency in North Viet-Nam, Bundy suggested that we might explore the idea of a Red Cross agency from any Scandinavian country, or Switzerland, or France, and point out that the agency could be established both in the North and in the South, again on an equitable basis, to handle the basic needs of both American and DRV prisoners.

3. Bundy said it would be useful in our discussions in Hanoi if we reminded the North Vietnamese of the statement by Clark Clifford, on January 25, which suggested that "a normal infiltration" of troops and materiel south from the DRV during any talks would not be considered objectionable by the USA, or at least would be anticipated.

4. Bundy also pointed out that the private position of the US on the National Liberation Front was the same as the public position. Our government was prepared at any meeting to hear the views of the NLF or representatives of the NLF.

5. Then discussed was the idea which Ashmore and Baggs

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-4-

brought back after the talk with Mai Van Bo last summer in Paris. The proposal was that the DRV and the USA, only, meet privately and agree informally on an agenda, with the understanding that no official conference would be convened until after the bombing of DRV territory stopped. Bundy said the idea had been discussed around the State Department and suggested that we test the reactions of appropriate parties in the DRV to the idea. He pointed out that the President had indicated, time and again, that the US was willing to talk to the DRV at any place.

6. Bundy said we should also inform the DRV that our government was prepared to deescalate the war in the South if the DRV were prepared to match the deescalation.

7. It was considered inevitable that we had to discuss the possible influence of domestic politics on the question of the Viet-Nam war. Bundy pointed out that not one candidate for the presidency, either a presumed or admitted candidate, had advocated a unilateral withdrawal of US troops from South Viet-Nam, and, indeed, certain of the candidates, if elected to the presidency, might inaugurate a more harsh war policy than the present one of Mr. Johnson. All of this, Mr. Bundy told Baggs, should be made known to the Hanoi leaders.

Bundy said he would alert our Ambassadors in Laos and Thailand to handle any messages we thought necessary to send back.

After the conversation with Bundy, Sieverts called Baggs at his hotel and said Averell Harriman wanted to talk with him. Governor Harriman was in Hobe Sound. Harriman was interested in the matter of the prisoners, and the possibility of exchange, and he reviewed, again, this issue with Baggs.

This then was the substance of the instructions contained in the briefing on March 23 with Baggs. The seven points summarized above were presented to the DRV Government through Hoang Tung in this order and within the indicated limits.

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-5-

The Trip Out

Upon arrival in Phnom Penh March 27th, we found that our visas were in order and that space was available on the CIC plane on Friday. Because of the sensitivity of American-Cambodian relationships, we avoided seeking any local contact during our two days in the capital.

We discovered at the airport that Charles Collingwood, the CBS correspondent, would be on the plane with us to Hanoi. We also learned that Mary McCarthy, the novelist, and Professor Franz Schurmann, of the University of California at Berkeley, both representing American peace action groups, were already in Hanoi. At no time did we have any discussion with these Americans on our contacts with the DRV Government.

We were met on March 29 in Vientiane by Robert Hurwitch, Counselor of the Embassy there, who informed us that three North Viet sailors would be on the plane with us to Hanoi. Hurwitch said these were sailors exchanged for the three Americans released by the DRV earlier. He suggested that the presence of the sailors returning home on the same plane with us might suggest to the DRV our association with and interest in further prisoner exchange.

Initial Contact

We arrived in Hanoi on the evening of March 29 and were met by Hoang Tung. We had dinner privately with him, but only social conversation. It was arranged that we would meet with him at his office at the newspaper at 8 a.m. the following morning and that he would be available all day for conversations. These and all subsequent conversations took place through Hoang Tung's personal interpreter, Nguyen Phuong, who also appeared to be an editorial associate of some standing. Hoang Tung speaks fluent French, but his English is sketchy. All conversations were translated from English into Vietnamese and back.

Hoang Tung emphasized that we should talk plainly and

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-6-

examine all aspects of the hostilities between the US and the DRV--put everything and anything "on the table," in his phrase.

Ashmore and Baggs followed the instructions of Bundy at the beginning of these talks and emphasized that we were not emissaries of the US. We pointed out, again on instructions from Bundy, that we were aware of our government's position on the various issues involved in the war, and that we expected to inform our government fully, by prior agreement, of the pertinent talks we had in Hanoi. We went over in detail the points listed above.

This led off with a discussion of prisoner exchange, Red Cross representation. Neither drew any initial response. The proposal made originally to Mai Van Bo for a secret meeting on an agenda that would not take place until the bombing stops was coolly received and virtually dismissed. The discussion of the possibility of mutual deescalation of the ground war received an even colder reaction, and we concluded that any suggestion for formal reciprocity was likely to be a delicate one.

Hoang Tung brusquely rejected our references to the testimony of Clark Clifford relating to "normal infiltration." He said it was irrelevant. He asserted that the DRV could infiltrate at any rate it chose on its own motion. This is a direct quote from Hoang Tung: "As you can see we can supply the South adequately with the bombing going on. We will continue to do so without the bombing until the shooting stops." He asked if this precluded phased reduction of hostilities. He said it did not--provided we were talking about fighting south of the DMZ.

Hoang Tung said he could appreciate the concern of our government for American prisoners in the North. He said he wished to assure us that the DRV was treating these prisoners as fairly and as comfortably as it could in the circumstances of war. We emphasized that we knew that our government was willing to exchange prisoners immediately, and could begin by exchanging 14 North Viet sailors or fishermen now held in the South for a similar number of Americans now held in the North.

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We emphasized that this would be no innovation but would simply continue the process already begun with the exchange of three captives. We said our government preferred to give priority to exchange of any number desirable to the DRV for the American prisoners who were ill.

Hoang Tung said that this proposal would be taken into consideration, and he asked for us to lay any other ideas we had upon the table before he responded.

After we had finished our presentation, Hoang Tung responded.

He said the prisoner issue was quite separate from any idea of a meeting between the two parties. He said he would give thought to the idea of the prisoner exchange and would report it to his government, but that he regarded it as secondary in importance to the question of meeting so that we may begin to end the war. He said he would examine the idea of an agency of the Red Cross in Hanoi. But this, too, he said, was quite secondary to the idea of talks.

Then he said he would like to give us the position of his government as it related to talks.

First, he said, the US simply must stop the bombing of DRV territory without condition. He said this was the one inflexible position of his government. We asked if this insistence included the territory of South Viet-Nam. No, Hoang Tung responded. His government considered US acts of war against DRV territory unilateral and indefensible. On the contrary, there was fighting between two parties in the South. And, anyway, he emphasized, both sides must realize that the peace could only be made step by step.

He continued by saying that, if the US wished to test the good will of the DRV, then the US should stop the bombing. He added that the DRV was prepared at any time to sit down with the US to find "sensible solutions." At this point, Hoang Tung said he would like to emphasize the procedure for meeting from the DRV view:

1. Halt the bombing without condition. He emphasized

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that the bombing was really the important ingredient; however, he used the phrase, "all acts of war against DRV territory," specifying that this includes the naval bombardment, and the artillery barrage across the DMZ.

2. After the bombing has stopped, Hoang Tung said, the DRV will meet promptly with the US. "It will be a matter of days," he said.

He suggested that his government thought the first meeting should be "a contact" between a representative of any level, high or low, and that this contact should determine three matters:

- a. The timing of a conference between the two countries.
- b. The place of a conference.
- c. The level of representation at the conference.

He said the DRV would meet any place mutually agreeable with the US. At this point, Hoang Tung said the first contact should be procedural. He made it clear under our questioning that he visualized that the first contact would not engage in any substantive discussion, even of agenda. These matters would be postponed until the first meeting that would follow this "first contact." This position was later significantly modified after President Johnson's speech.

He asked us to state our understanding of what he had said and we repeatedly went over point by point our interpretation of what he had said, and he indicated concurrence that it was the correct understanding. At one point we pressed very hard on the question of whether the old issue of "would" and "could" could be raised in connection with what he was now saying. He said emphatically that he was saying that the meeting "will" take place and added that he had so stated previously in a letter to us that was never received.

We said that immediate questions were raised by the DRV's

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position as he stated it. What would be the basis for the talks? Would the DRV insist that the Geneva Accords of 1954, the 4 points of the DRV, and the position statement of the NLF be the basis for talks? No, he said. These adequately set forth the general views of his government, but the actual basis for talks would be determined by the DRV and the US. He added that he understood that the talks could not be limited to points raised by the DRV. In answer to questions, Hoang Tung said the interests of the NLF and the Saigon government ^{would} have to be discussed by the DRV and the US. In sum, he concluded, the agenda would be composed of anything the DRV and the US wished to talk about.

What assurances, we asked, were there that such an open-ended agenda would not lead to the development of the kind of endless marathon the USA had endured at Panmunjom in Korea? Well, there were two eventualities, Hoang Tung replied. The talks could end the war, or the talks could fail and all the fighting would resume. We probed on the previous DRV insistence that the US withdraw its troops. He said this undoubtedly would be discussed at a conference, but he said that he could not imagine an agreement to withdraw that would result in 500,000 Americans pulling out the next day. We interpreted this as acceptance of a phased withdrawal of troops, with some flexibility on timing. We used this phrase, "phased withdrawal", subsequently and it was never objected to.

What of a future government in the South? Hoang Tung said his government believed that a coalition government would evolve in the South, but procedures to establish the government there would have to be discussed in the conference when the DRV and the US get down to how they would bring the NLF and Saigon into the conversations.

We inquired again about a cessation of bombing as the signal for talks to begin. Would some formal statement by the US be necessary? No, he said. His government would accept the simple act of just stopping the bombing.

In this regard, speaking to the point of the initial

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contact, Hoang Tung said the DRV wouldn't care who moved first after the bombing stops. The DRV would make the call to establish the contact, if desired. He said his government would want only to be assured that the bombing had stopped by the time that the contact began.

Second Session

We broke the morning conversation at 11 a.m. and returned at 3 p.m. It was obvious that during the interval Hoang Tung had been reviewing our conversation with official parties. He said as much, and we thought we could see some indication of shifting positions between morning and afternoon. We began by summarizing our understanding of the views he had expressed in the morning.

We emphasized that, while we had no authority to negotiate in any sense on any of these procedural details, we did think that as much specific detail as possible should be included and transmitted by the DRV to our government. We said that we thought that, if his proposals could be refined so as to name places, suggest time, state intervals, this would be evidence of good faith, and should avoid the kind of confusion on which some previous contacts had foundered. He seemed to agree that this was advisable and constantly talked to the point of making definite determination of such matters. However, he always seemed in this and subsequent conversations to want the initial motion for, say designating a place of contact to come from the US.

We concluded our talks late in the afternoon. We agreed to meet again on Monday. Hoang Tung asked if we would summarize in writing our understanding of what he had said. We agreed to give him such a summary of what he had said when we met again on Monday.

He arranged a private dinner that evening with persons we had met on our first meeting at Hanoi in January of 1967. These included Luu Quy Ky, Deputy to Hoang Tung, who, among other things, apparently actually operates the Committee for

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Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; Tran Kong Tuong, identified to us as a lawyer who occupies a position comparable to Minister of Justice, who is a member of the Central Committee, and who told us in the course of conversation that he has been one of the Vietnamese delegation to Geneva; Lee Tang, of the Foreign Ministry; Ngo Dien, described as Information Officer of the Foreign Ministry; and Huy Thong, identified only as a leading intellectual and member of the Committee. All of these were people we had met on the first visit to Hanoi.

Monday, April 1

On Monday morning, April 1, we received the news that President Johnson had announced a decision to halt most of the bombing of DRV territory and also had announced his decision to withdraw from the presidential race. We had telephone contact around noon with Hoang Tung, who was informed of the President's address. We told him we had at his request prepared a written summary of what we understood were the positions he advanced in the Saturday conversation. We suggested that in view of the address by President Johnson these might be somewhat out of date. We told him that we were in no position at that point to make any appraisal of the speech because we had had only sketchy second-hand reports from persons in the hotel who had heard the speech or accounts of it by shortwave radio.

Hoang Tung agreed that the presidential speech did indeed open up new possibilities which would have to be considered. He said that the speech was then being analyzed very carefully by his government, and that this would take some time. We asked if he could obtain for us the text of the speech in English and he said he would try to do so. He said he did not think it would be possible for us to talk again right away because of these new developments but he would get in touch with us.

We decided in view of the proposals in the Johnson speech it might be well for us to attempt to see if we could open a direct communication contact with Ambassador Sullivan in Vientiane. We were scheduled to have lunch at the Indonesian


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Embassy with Ambassador Nugroho, whom we had come to know well at the Geneva Conference. Ambassador Nugroho had heard most of the presidential speech and, although he had no text, he was able to give us a detailed and, we believe, accurate report of the main points made.

We asked Nugroho if it would be possible for him to arrange a radio contact with his diplomatic mission at Vientiane to transmit messages directly to Ambassador Sullivan. He said he would be glad to do this



At 3 p.m. Hoang Tung came to us at the hotel. He said that the presidential statement was still being analyzed and he therefore had no comment to make on the written summary of our Saturday meeting. He said he assumed that it would of necessity have to be amended in some respects after he had had a chance to talk again with his government and he knew what the response to the presidential statement would be.

We asked him if he had any idea at that time how soon the Johnson statement would be released to the people of the DRV by radio and newspaper. He said it certainly would not be released that day, he doubted that it would be released the following day, and he thought Wednesday would be the earliest. This turned out to be the accurate forecast. It is a reasonable assumption that most of the officials of the government during this interval were engaged in a protracted consideration of what modification, if any, in their previous public position they would make.

We talked at some length with Hoang Tung and urged him to use all his influence to obtain a moderate and conciliatory

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statement in response to the President. We assured him that, although we could be identified as critics of US policy, we understood the statement by the President as representing a significant move on the part of the USG, and that we had no reason at all to question the President's sincerity. We said that we felt the fact that he had taken the remarkable step of removing himself from the presidential race, while ordering a significant modification of the bombing policy, had to be accepted as an absolute guarantee of good faith.

At some length we emphasized that the forthright remarks of the President demanded that the DRV respond in kind if indeed the DRV was interested in ending the war.

Hoang Tung agreed. He said that the new bombing policy met, in part, the demand of the DRV, but that it would require further study.

We asked him if he could give us a fairly good indication of when we could expect his government to react to the summary of proposals we were then going to hand him, subject to modification. He said he thought that the earliest he could obtain reaction would be the next day. We then gave him the following summary of our understanding of the proposals he had made in the course of our Saturday conversation:

"April 1, 1968

The following procedure is acceptable to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam:

1. The bombing of the territory of the DRV by the United States of America will halt without condition. Also, naval bombardment, artillery fire across the de-militarized zone, and all other acts of war against the territory of the DRV will cease.
2. The DRV Ambassador in Moscow will make contact with the US Ambassador there within seven (7) days after the cessation of bombing. A message to Hoang Tung from Ashmore and Baggs will confirm Moscow as an acceptable

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point of contact to the US, or propose an alternate site where both countries have diplomatic missions.

3. At initial contact, the DRV Ambassador will be authorized to agree on:
 - a. Time of conference.
 - b. Place of conference.
 - c. Level and composition of representation.

The DRV suggests that the conference should be removed from the combat zone and indicates that Geneva is acceptable. However, the DRV is willing to let the US make the initial determination on the above points. When agreement is reached, the DRV and the US will announce simultaneously that the conference has been scheduled.

4. The conference will convene with only the DRV and the US represented. The DRV agrees that all questions of agenda are then open for discussion. These include:
 - a. Representation of the National Liberation Front and the Republic of Vietnam at this or a subsequent conference.
 - b. A cease-fire or armistice arrangement.
 - c. The exchange of all captured military personnel.
 - d. A phased withdrawal from South Vietnam of all foreign military forces.
 - e. All political questions relating to the future government in South Vietnam."

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We mentioned that in view of the importance of these new developments we proposed to request the Indonesian Ambassador to open up a channel of transmission directly to Ambassador Sullivan in Vientiane. Hoang Tung replied that this was an official matter and he had no authority to discuss it, but the implication was quite clear that he did not believe there would be objection -- and indeed he thought the matter urgent. We walked down to the Indonesian Embassy and filed the following message for urgent transmission to Bundy via Sullivan on the 9 p.m. contact with Vientiane:

"Extended discussion of proposals reviewed with you have produced tentative agreement on procedure for meeting between DRV and USA only STOP Statement by President Johnson may remove last obstacle STOP Anticipate formal and official response tomorrow STOP We can be reached through this channel STOP Baggs and Ashmore"

At the close of our talks with Hoang Tung on Monday, we appreciated the obvious fact that he was not going to be able to hold to the original scheduleⁱⁿ of regular, leisurely talks during the week. If he was notⁱⁿ fact participating in the development of views as they were developing post the Johnson statement, he had to be abreast of them so our talks would have meaning.

Tuesday, April 2

On the following morning, April 2, a messenger from Hoang Tung arrived to tell us that we were being moved from the hotel to a villa maintained by the DRV Government on the west side of town. Hoang Tung indicated that there were too many people around the hotel, and that he wished for our conversations to be most private. He also informed us that he was extremely busy and did not know at what time he would be able to join us, but that he would let us know during the course of the day.

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The villa was a relatively modest but quite comfortable residence fully staffed with servants. It is located on the edge of the row of foreign embassies.

Hoang Tung next contacted us at 7 p.m. when he came to the villa for dinner. He brought with him a list of 12 bombing attacks, identified in considerable detail, saying that these had taken place as far as 350 kilometers north of the DMZ. This list, he said, represented strikes that had been made since the President's speech. This factor, he told us, had kept the top officials of his government in session during the day. It was obvious that he wanted us to transmit this list of bombings to Washington. We told him we would do so. At the end of this dinner, Hoang Tung said that in view of the difficulties of arranging regular, extended talks, it would be useful if we reduced to writing any further comments we had on our original conversation, and the events that had followed. He said he would like to have as detailed a review as we were prepared to set down, and he made clear that these views would be given official scrutiny. He then said, on the basis of our previous summary, the amended version that we handed him at that time, plus this additional information which he would like to have as early as possible the next morning, that he was confident that he would bring back what he called "an official piece of paper" for transmission to our government.

We asked him how soon this could be expected and he said he was not certain but, since we wanted to see something of the country, we might as well make a trip out of town on Wednesday, returning Thursday afternoon. He would make all arrangements for us for the trip and send a special escort with us.

We asked if we could cover the same route we had traveled on our previous visit to Hanoi, heading south on Route 1 and on to Nam Dinh, the third city, which had been very heavily bombed even 14 months before. He agreed and the arrangements were made for us to depart before noon on the following day. It is probably worth noting that the effect of the Presidential bombing pause was accepted as being valid in that area and therefore travel by day was now being permitted when it had been banned 14 months before.

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After dinner at about 9 p.m. we went to the Indonesian Embassy and arranged to transmit the list of bombing raids to Bundy along with our own view that "Washington must recognize that these may cancel conciliatory effect of Johnson speech so far as DRV is concerned if continued." Message awaited us at Embassy from Bundy confirming use of channel through Sullivan and saying Washington awaiting further developments. We indicated in the message that we now hoped to have official statement on the proposals under discussion by Thursday.

Wednesday, April 3

On the morning of April 3, we wrote out the summaries Hoang Tung had requested. This included a statement concerning the details of the proposed Southeast Asian economic/social conference suggested by representatives of Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines to the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. Full information on this proposal is already on file in the Department, and it will not be further discussed here. The response to a request for some indication as to whether the DRV would participate in such a conference was that the matter had little priority in view of the possibility of formal conversations taking place, but that it would be taken under advisement.

We left Hanoi in mid-morning and were driven to Nam Dinh, about 90 kilometers south of Hanoi and were greeted by an air raid siren upon entering the town. Our senior escort, Vu Quoc Thanh, insisted that we leave the city where we had been scheduled to spend the night, and divert to what he described as a safer place, which was a farmhouse near the village of My Trung, about 12 miles from Nam Dinh. There we spent the afternoon and part of the evening. We were awakened at 12:30 a.m. and told that Hoang Tung had been trying to reach us since late that afternoon, and that we were to return to Hanoi immediately. (No attempt is being made in this report to include observations of effect of bombing and traffic movement, morale, etc.) We arrived in Hanoi at 4 a.m. and were handed, as a message from Hoang Tung, the April 3 statement of the DRV in response to President Johnson.

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Thursday, April 4

We joined Hoang Tung at the newspaper office at 7:30 a.m. Before leaving for the appointment we called Nugroho and sent the following message for dispatch to Bundy through Sullivan, transmitted at 7 a.m.:

"Expect in a few hours the details and procedures of DRV counterproposals to meet the USA's STOP Will file promptly STOP"

When he met us Hoang Tung was obviously extremely pleased with the official DRV statement in response to President Johnson. He pointed out the "whereas" paragraph and indicated that this represented a conciliatory gesture of real magnitude. He grinned and said: "They went further than I thought they would." We told him that our reading of the message agreed with that interpretation and that we felt that this might well make way for the beginning of the contact he had discussed earlier.

Then, at his suggestion, we began to go over the papers we had sent him, including our previous summaries, step by step. This was the most detailed discussion yet, devoted almost entirely to attempting to get a precise understanding of what the DRV actually expected to actually happen at the first contact, and so far as possible, what was expected in procedural terms, to follow at the conference proper.

Hoang Tung would illustrate his replies by moving objects around on the table and saying such things as, "The two come together and shake hands," -- "The USA representative announces total cessation of the bombing." -- "DRV representative ^{says} ~~announces~~ he knows this is so because no bombs have fallen," -- "Then they have a talk about the time and place of the conference."

We pursued this in fly-specking detail because, as we told Hoang Tung, we felt that the "whereas paragraph" in its English version might be subject to misinterpretation. It was

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not possible, we suggested, to tell precisely what the DRV expected in regard to a guarantee that the bombing had halted. It was possible, we said, to read the statement to mean the DRV is prepared to meet with the bombing still going on, on the assumption that at that point that this could be a matter settled promptly, but this could mean bombing was still subject to discussion.

Hoang Tung said that the language of the paragraph "with a view to determining with the American side the unconditional cessation of US bombing raids" meant that the bombing raids should be halted by the time the representatives of the US and the DRV met. We pointed out that this was certainly not plain to us and that again, if the DRV really wanted talks to end the war, then it should be more specific on this point and immediately transmit this information to our government. Hoang Tung agreed.

There apparently was some shift in Hoang Tung's previous position, which we had understood made a very clear and sharp distinction between procedural matters to be dealt with at the first contact, and more substantive questions, which were to be delayed until the conference proper. At this stage, in order to try to establish the distinction between contact and conference, he began referring to the "Harriman conference" -- meaning the high-level meeting, and not necessarily the point of first contact. We took this to mean that the procedure was still for a first exchange at the ambassadorial level which would take care of determining the facts of the halting of the bombing, and the details of the following separate meeting. However, Hoang Tung never quite agreed that this was an accurate statement -- always leaving open what appeared to be the possibility of talking of "other things" at the initial contact. He finally asked that we write down, again, the clearest possible interpretation in English, by the numbers, of our understanding of what his position was as based on our discussion of the April 3 DRV statement. He said he would have this approved, amended, or rejected, in whole or in part, as soon as possible by his government -- maybe today, certainly tomorrow. He said again when we pointed out that time was running out that we

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could be assured that he could give us "a piece of paper" before we left Hanoi.

The following six points were drafted in Hoang Tung's office while he and the interpreter stood by, except for one departure for Hoang Tung's private phone booth where presumably he reported he was bringing over another piece of paper.

The six points, as understood by us, from our detailed conversations with Hoang Tung, were thus put down on paper:

"The following is presented as setting forth the official position of the DRV on acceptable procedure for arranging contact with USA.

1. USA representative will be prepared to inform DRV representative that the bombing of all DRV territory has been halted without condition.
2. Total cessation of bombing will have been in effect for at least 24 hours prior to contact between DRV and US representatives.
3. Initial contact will be at ambassadorial level in Moscow, or at any other site where both countries maintain diplomatic missions.
4. The initial contact will deal with questions of procedure to arrange a conference. These questions include:
 - a. Time of conference.
 - b. Place of conference.
 - c. Level of representation at conference.
5. Upon agreement on procedural matters, DRV and USA will announce simultaneously the time and place of the conference.

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6. Representation of conference would consist initially of DRV and US. All substantive questions raised by both countries will be open for discussion."

Hoang Tung took the paper and promised again an official response by his government.

(The inclusion of Moscow as the site for the conference resulted from repeated statements by Hoang Tung that any one of a number of capitals would be suitable. We suggested that he should designate if possible what the DRV first choice would be. In the course of the conversation he seemed at that point to think that Moscow was the most likely capital mentioned. We asked if, writing down the summary, he wanted us to write down Moscow or leave it out. He said go ahead and write it in; it is your summary--but it may be changed. We took this to mean that he did not at that point have final information as to what the selection of the city would be.)

We would like to emphasize again that this sequence of papers written by us and handed to Hoang Tung for consideration by his government were entirely responsive in nature. In each instance we were responding to his request to summarize our understanding of what Hoang Tung had said. Nothing included should be construed as representing a procedural or substantive suggestion from us.

We cabled Bundy for 11 a.m. transmission:

"DRV now considering six points on procedure on contact and subsequent conference STOP Expect decision today STOP Will file promptly STOP"

At 7 p.m., we had a message from Hoang Tung. He suggested only that we have lunch tomorrow. We responded by sending a note saying that we were scheduled to give Washington some indication of when the DRV reply could be expected. At 9 p.m. we received his reply in the form of a brief handwritten note.

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The note follows:

"Dear Messrs. Ashmore and Baggs:

I will answer to all your questions tomorrow.

I have been informed that today the US planes bombed a locality in Lai Chau, one of our provinces on the Viet-Nam/China border.

Sincerely,

Hoang Tung"

We construed this to mean that he wanted this information about the bombing at the Chinese border immediately transmitted to Washington. We sent this to the Indonesian Embassy for 11 p.m. transmission. The message follows:

"Bundy through Sullivan. Reference our last cable, DRV written response at 2100 Thursday Hanoi time follows in entirety:

'Will answer all questions tomorrow STOP We are informed that today US planes have bombed a locality in Lai Chau, one of our provinces on the Viet-Nam/China border.'"

Friday, April 5

Hoang Tung came for lunch the following day, Friday. He opened the luncheon by informing us of the assassination of Martin Luther King and the first reports of rioting in the US. He talked of this in a speculative manner which we felt was quite correct under the circumstances: no gloating, no polemics. It became obvious that he did not have yet the replies to the questions he had promised us and had no particular desire to discuss any of the points we had covered. He assured us that the "piece of paper" he had promised from his government was being prepared and that we could expect to see it in the course of the afternoon -- indicating he thought it would be available at about 3:30 p. m.

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At 3:30, we went to his office and Hoang Tung asked his interpreter to read us the aide memoire, dated Friday, April 5, included as TAB A. He said that this was the official position of his government offered in response to the President's reply to the April 3 statement of the DRV. He said that the aide memoire should be kept secret and transmitted only to our government. He said that it represented the DRV view of the correct procedure to begin talks. This was the document which we handed, in Vietnamese and English translation, to Sullivan in Vientiane, for transmission to Bundy.

Hoang Tung, commenting on the aide memoire, and related matters, said that it would be helpful if word were sent to the DRV that bombing had stopped before the contact began, although this was not cited as a condition. Why had his government offered Phnom Penh as the place of contact? we asked. It was merely a suggestion, Hoang Tung said; the DRV Ambassador there was Nguyen Thuong, and he was a very good man who had the respect of the government and the Central Committee. We raised the point that USA had no diplomatic mission in Phnom Penh. Hoang Tung said that meeting in Phnom Penh was not an inflexible matter. If our government could arrange it in Phnom Penh, then fine. Otherwise, he suggested, our government should make a suggestion to meet elsewhere.

We asked how the signal to arrange the contact should be made. Hoang Tung said this was a matter he would have to take up with his government, but that he would meet us at the airport before our departure and give us the information.

After the meeting ended, we went to Nugroho and sent a cable to Sullivan advising him that we were leaving Hanoi that evening and would bring information to be transmitted to Washington.

The implication of the delay in setting forth the procedure for a reply until he would inform us of the DRV desire at the airport was taken as an indication that he did not expect the aide memoire to be transmitted by radio to Vientiane, but wanted it delivered personally. In raising the question of

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means of contact after our departure, we told him that we were leaving that evening, if the plane flew, and we proposed to hand the aide memoire directly to Ambassador Sullivan upon arrival at Vientiane, where we would be met by Embassy personnel. He then said he had checked, the plane would be flying, and he thought this would put the message into official channels soon enough.

At the airport, as promised, Hoang Tung met us. First he said that Ho Chi Minh was sorry that he could not greet us but that he wished to express his personal hopes that peace would come of these efforts and that we could soon return to Hanoi. Hoang Tung added that we can return at any time we requested.

He then said that a response to the aide memoire could be made to him by open cable through the North Vietnam Embassy in Phnom Penh. He said that this means of transmission had been arranged.

We arrived at Vientiane on Friday night on schedule. We were met by Hurwitch who told us that the Ambassador would like us to come directly to the residence. On the way he inquired as to whether we thought Charles Collingwood, who also expected to see the Ambassador, should be included in our discussion. We told him we did not think so since we had been avoiding any discussion with Collingwood and that would indicate/were in any way involved in transmitting official information, and that we did have an official document to hand to Sullivan. We delivered the report, gave the Ambassador a fairly extensive briefing, and assumed that most of the important information was being transmitted directly to Washington. There was some discussion of the possibility of our stopping off to report to Bundy at Honolulu, where at that point the President's mission was still scheduled. It was arranged that we would check with Ambassador Johnson in Tokyo the following day when we arrived.

At Tokyo a message was waiting from Ambassador Johnson saying that he would like to see us as early as possible the

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next morning, that he had some further information for us. The next morning he called to say that he had had a message from Washington and that some relevant news was coming that he had not yet received, and therefore the meeting was delayed until late morning. At the Embassy he gave us a copy of the White House statement which included the line that there had been no official response to the suggestion that the US would meet, with Geneva proposed as the site. We pointed out that the aide memoire, which we had delivered to Sullivan more than 36 hours before, was certainly construed by the DRV Government as an official statement, and that it made a specific counter-proposal of Phnom Penh as the site. At this point we had not been informed that a proposal had been sent through Sullivan in Vientiane to Hanoi, and we were afraid that the 4th paragraph of the White House statement on Saturday would be misconstrued by the people in Hanoi. We asked Ambassador Johnson for advice on sending an immediate cable to Hoang Tung as a kind of holding action, and he said he had no objection. We sent the message through Phnom Penh informing Hoang Tung that the DRV aide memoire was being transmitted to our government and that we were en route to Washington. We felt this would reduce the possibility of the White House statement being misconstrued as a possible rejection of the Phnom Penh proposal and a breaking off of the contact. Ambassador Harriman is familiar with our subsequent conversation in Washington.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-269

By iso, NARA Date 10-8-98

AIDE MEMOIRE

1. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam has repeatedly protested against the U.S. action in illegally laying hold of civilians and military personnel on board fishing boats and freighters even in the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam demands that the United States stop all its arrogant acts, respect the sovereignty, territory, and security of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, and release immediately, unconditionally and without any need for an agreement between the two parties, all citizens of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam now being illegally detained.

As for the captured American pilots, they are regarded by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam as guilty to the Vietnamese people. Acting upon orders from the U.S. Government, they have bombed the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, an independent and sovereign country, killing civilians and destroying property of the Vietnamese people. However, in accordance with the humane and lenient policy of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, they have enjoyed good treatment. On the occasion of the last Tet festival, for the 1st time, three of the captured U.S. pilots were released in view of their correct attitude during their detention.

2. With regard to the "limited bombing" of North Viet Nam announced by President Johnson, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam made clear its view in its April 3, 1968 statement.

The U.S. Government has not seriously and fully met the legitimate demands of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, of progressive American opinion and of world opinion. However, for its part, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam declared its readiness to appoint its representative to contact the U.S. representative with a view to determining with the American side the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, so that the talks may start.

Details about the contact between the representatives of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and the United States may be as follows :

- The representative with ambassadorial rank of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam is ready to contact the representative of the U.S. Government.

- The place of contact may be Phnom Penh or another place to be mutually agreed upon.

- In the course of the contact, the U.S. side will specify the date when the unconditional cessation of the U.S. bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam will become effective ; then the two parties will reach agreement on the time, place and level of the talks.

3. Any interpretation of the point of view of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam at variance with the content of this side-memoire is null and void.

April 5, 1968.

INFORMATION

92

Pres file

Friday, April 12, 1968 -- 8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

**The marked passages indicate how Hanoi
is trying to nail us on "anytime, anyplace" via:**

- U.S. dove opinion;**
- "world opinion."**

**I could be wrong, but I have the feeling that
they'll come around to something sensible if we
hold steady.**

W. W. Restow

WWRestow:rla

92a

FBIS 21 (SEE 20)

MOSCOW ON SITE FOR PEACE TALKS

MO SCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 0757 GMT 12 APR 68 L

(TEXT) WASHINGTON--THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAS AGAIN TURNED DOWN THE DRV'S PROPOSAL FOR A VENUE FOR PRELIMINARY CONTACTS BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE DRV. AT FIRST THE UNITED STATES TURNED DOWN THE CAMBODIAN CAPITAL PHNOM PENH AS A MEETING PLACE AND THEN WARSAW, WHICH WAS SUGGESTED BY THE DRV GOVERNMENT. U.S. REPRESENTATIVES SAID THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE MEETING ON SOME "NEUTRAL TERRITORY."

ANOTHER WASHINGTON REFUSAL SHOWS THAT THE U.S. SIDE PLANS TO DELAY IN EVERY POSSIBLE WAY THE TALKS ON THE SOLUTION TO THE VIETNAMESE CONFLICT. MANY WHITE HOUSE OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. REFUSALS TO HOLD A MEETING WITH A DRV REPRESENTATIVE, FIRST IN PHNOM PENH AND THEN IN WARSAW, GO AGAINST PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S STATEMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS READY TO SEND ITS REPRESENTATIVE TO ANY POINT OF THE GLOBE TO ESTABLISH CONTACTS WITH A DRV REPRESENTATIVE. A NUMBER OF POLITICAL FIGURES ALSO REGARD THE U.S. POSITION IN THE SAME WAY. POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE (AS RECEIVED) SENATOR EUGENE MCCARTHY, SPEAKING YESTERDAY IN NEBRASKA, EXPRESSED PUZZLEMENT OVER THE POSITION OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AS REGARDS THE CHOICE OF THE PLACE FOR MEETING WITH A DRV REPRESENTATIVE.

12 APR 0942Z WCW/JRB

92b
FB IS 16

B U L L E T I N

NHAN DAN ON U.S.-DRV TALKS

HANOI VNA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 0541 GMT 12 APR 68 B

(TEXT) HANOI--THE HANOI DAILY NHAN DAN IN A COMMENTARY TODAY CRITICIZED THE UNITED STATES FOR FINDING ILLEGITIMATE PRETEXTS FOR REFUSING TO CHOOSE PHNOM PENH AS THE SITE FOR PRELIMINARY CONTACTS BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES.

THE PAPER NOTED THAT THE CORRECT STAND EXPOUNDED IN THE 3 APRIL 1968 STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRV ON THE U.S. LIMITED BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM HAS ENJOYED APPROVAL AND SUPPORT FROM BROAD PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WORLD AND EVEN IN THE UNITED STATES. IT RECALLED THAT IN AN INTERVIEW RECENTLY GRANTED TO CBS, THE DRV FOREIGN MINISTER MADE KNOWN THAT A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DRV GOVERNMENT WITH AMBASSADORIAL RANK IS READY TO MAKE CONTACT WITH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN PHNOM PENH OR IN ANOTHER PLACE TO BE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON, AND THAT IN THE COURSE OF THIS CONTACT, THE AMERICAN SIDE WILL SPECIFY THE DATE WHEN THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF THE U.S. BOMBING RAIDS AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV WILL BECOME EFFECTIVE, THEN THE TWO SIDES WILL REACH AGREEMENT ON THE PROCEDURE OF THE FORMAL TALKS.
(MORE)

12 APR 0620Z WCM/jB

ONLY ADD 16 (NHAN DAN ON U.S.-DRV TALKS)

X X X THE FORMAL TALKS.

920

(TEXT) EARLIER, THE PAPER SAID, HEAD OF STATE NORODOM SIHANOUK HAD DECLARED HIMSELF READY TO LET PHNOM PENH BE USED AS THE SITE FOR CONTACTS BETWEEN THE DRV AND THE UNITED STATES. AFTER BEING INFORMED OF THE DRV GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS, HEAD OF STATE NORODOM SIHANOUK ON 8 APRIL DECLARED THAT FULL FACILITIES WOULD BE GIVEN TO BOTH PARTIES FOR SUCH CONTACT IN PHNOM PENH. HE ALSO DEMANDED THE TOTAL HALT OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM BY THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ACCEPTANCE OF A DIALOGUE WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAM NATIONAL FRONT FOR LIBERATION, WHICH THE AMERICANS SHOULD RECOGNIZE AS THE ONLY AUTHENTIC REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.

UPON LEARNING ABOUT THE DRV GOVERNMENT'S SUGGESTION THAT PHNOM PENH BE USED AS THE VENUE FOR THE CONTACTS, MANY JOURNALISTS QUESTIONED THE U.S. RULING CIRCLES, BUT THE LATTER AVOIDED ANSWERING. REUTERS ON 8 APRIL REPORTED THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON DID NOT WANT TO CHOOSE PHNOM PENH, CLAIMING THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT HAVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA AND THAT PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK DISLIKES AMERICAN NEWSMEN.

SAMDECH NORODOM SIHANOUK ON 10 APRIL 1968 TURNED DOWN SUCH ILLEGITIMATE PRETEXTS, POINTING OUT THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WANT TO CONTACT THE DRV IN PHNOM PENH BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HABITUALLY DESPISES CAMBODIA.

THE PAPER NOTED THAT THE GROUNDELESS U.S. PRETEXTS HAVE PROVOKED REACTION FROM WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT ADDED, PRESIDENT JOHNSON EARLIER HAD MORE THAN ONCE DECLARED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD GO ANYWHERE AND AT ANY TIME TO MEET THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DRV. IN HIS SPEECH ON 31 MARCH HE AGAIN SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES IS READY TO SEND ITS REPRESENTATIVES TO ANY FORUM, AT ANY TIME, TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DRV.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE IN THIS QUESTION SHOWS THAT ITS ACTS DO NOT MATCH ITS WORDS. THE PAPER CONCLUDED.

92d

FB IS 19

MOSCOW ON U.S.-DRV TALKS

MOSCO W IN ENGLISH TO THE UNITED KINGDOM 0700 GMT 12 APR 68 L

(TEXT) NORTH VIETNAM'S PROPOSAL TO MEET AN AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE IN WARSAW HAS MET WITH A NEGATIVE ATTITUDE FROM THE WHITE HOUSE. EARLIER, THE WHITE HOUSE REJECTED PHNOM PENH AS A MEETING PLACE. ITS STAND WAS OUTLINED IN A STATEMENT MADE BY PRESS SECRETARY GEORGE CHRISTIAN AT A NEWS CONFERENCE.

ON THE 3D OF THIS MONTH THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM EXPRESSED READINESS TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE UNITED STATES ON A DEADLINE FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL STOP TO ALL BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE REPUBLIC. THE MEETING SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY DISCUSSIONS OF PROCEDURES CONCERNING OFFICIAL TALKS. THE TACTICS OF DELAYING THE CONTACT ADOPTED BY WASHINGTON, REMARKS OUR OBSERVER, CONFLICT WITH STATEMENTS MADE BY AMERICAN OFFICIALS THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE AT ANY TIME AND ANY PLACE.

12 APR 0920Z WCW/JRB

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Profile

Friday, April 12, 1968 -- 7:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

1.3(a)(5) In connection with the Park meeting, you should be aware [redacted] he felt you should have told him in advance that you are not going to run!

Some time down the road -- when the candidates are sorted out -- it may be important to get them to reaffirm our basic commitments in Asia -- quite aside from Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 5638

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

93a WH
TELEGRAM

5

~~SECRET~~

00 RUEHC
DE RUALOS 5638E 1020940
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 110926Z APR 68 ZFF1
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 141
STATE GRNC
BT

2 8 9 1Q
APRIL 11, 1968
5:32 A.M.

Roctow

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 5638

NODIS

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY

REF: A. SEOUL 5614 B. SEOUL 5625 C. SEOUL 5637

1. YOU SHOULD KNOW WHILE CONSIDERING MY TELEGRAMS CITED ABOVE THAT ADDITIONAL FACTOR MAY BE ONE MENTIONED BY PRIME MINISTER AT LUNCH TODAY. HE SAID PRESIDENT PARK WAS "HURT" WHEN HE LEARNED THROUGH RADIO AND PRESS OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S DECISION NOT TO BE CANDIDATE IN NEXT ELECTION. HE SAID THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON WAS LEADER OF GROUP OF NATIONS IN FREE ASIA AND TO LEARN IN THAT WAY THAT LEADER WOULD NOT RUN FOR US PRESIDENCY AGAIN WAS HARD ON PARK, WHO CONSIDERED THAT HE HAD CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT. I SAID I WAS CONVINCED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO INFORM PRESIDENT PARK OR OTHER CLOSE FRIENDS OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON AS THE DECISION SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE JUST PRIOR TO DELIVERY OF SPEECH ITSELF.

2. MUCH OF THEIR UNEASINESS ARISES FROM THEIR BELIEF THAT IF PRESIDENT JOHNSON LEAVES THE PRESIDENCY THEY WILL LOSE A GOOD FRIEND AND THEY SEE POSSIBILITIES THAT DISTURB THEM. AS YOU KNOW, THEY REMAIN HARSHLY UNCOMPROMISING IN THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD COMMUNISTS AND HAVE INGRAINED OPPOSITION TO OUR DEALING WITH THEM ESPECIALLY ON BILATERAL BASIS, AS WE KNOW FROM PANMUNJOM EXERCISE. IN REACTING TO THEM, I WOULD COUNSEL PATIENCE IF WE CANNOT BRING THEM AROUND TO COMPLETE ACCEPTANCE OF OUR TACTICS IN ALL MATTERS, I AM SURE WE CAN AT LEAST TEMPER THEIR OPPOSITION TO COURSES OF ACTION WE DEEM ADVISABLE IF WE CONTINUE TO TAKE THEM INTO OUR CONFIDENCE SUFFICIENTLY IN ADVANCE TO MAKE THEM FEEL WE REALLY WANT THEIR VIEWS. I AM AWARE OF THE PROBLEMS THIS CREATES FOR US IN MANY MATTERS BUT IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO THEM. GP-3 PORTER

BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLT 93-367
By *ijp*, NARA, Date 2-7-94

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, April 12, 1968
6:30 AM

Mr. President:

I got it done last night but I
thought I earned a Purple Heart be-
fore I was through.

Walt
W. ROSTOW

94

Pres file



Department of State
ACTION COPY

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 648

94a

PAGE 01 SEOUL 05662 120920Z

22
ACTION SS 10

INFO /010 W

Z 120905Z APR 68 ZFFI
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 168

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 5662

EX018

REF: STATE 145761

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-367
By 128, NARA, Date 2-7-94

1. PRESIDENT PARK ACCEPTS WITH PLEASURE PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S INVITATION AND SUGGESTS THEY MEET ON WEDNESDAY, APRIL SEVENTEEN AT HOLOLULU.

2. CAREFUL PRESENTATION OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S DESIRE FOR PERSONAL MEETING, CHOICE OF DAYS CITED REFTTEL AND FACT THAT MEETING TO BE BILATERAL MADE IT UNNECESSARY USE THOUGHTS CONTAINED PARA THREE REFTTEL ATMOSPHERE THEREFORE VERY GOOD.

PAGE 2 RUADIS 5662E ~~SECRET~~

3. WE SUGGEST ARRANGEMENTS SIMILAR TO THOSE ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED, PLUS, PLANE WILL BE PROVIDED FOR PRESIDENT PARK PARTY PLUS THREE OF US (MYSELF, BONESTEEL AND INTERPRETER, DEPARTURE WOULD BE 0730 SEOUL TIME WEDNESDAY SEVENTEENTH WITH ETA HICKAM 2130 LOCAL TUESDAY SIXTEENTH. NO CONTACTS BETWEEN TWO PRESIDENTS UNTIL WEDNESDAY MORNING. PLEASE INFORM WHEN YOU CAN REGARDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR WEDNESDAY, INCLUDING TIME OF END OF CONTACTS. PARK MAY HIGH REMAIN OVERNIGHT. THIS POINT NOT YET SETTLED.

5:30 PM/16 APR

2:30 AM WGA
17 APR

4. ALSO PLEASE REPLY SOONEST IF YOU AGREE TO SIMPLE STATEMENT SAYING THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS INVITED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 SEOUL 05662. 120920Z

PRESIDENT PARK TO MEET HIM IN HONOLULU APRIL SEVENTEEN
FOR DISCUSSION OF MATTERS OF INTEREST TO BOTH COUNTRIES.

GP-3 PORTER

NOTE: HANDLED NODIS PER S/S-O.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

94b

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Origin ACTION: AmEmbassy SEOUL FLASH

Date STATE

EXDIS

per. Seoul 5662.

Reference par. 4 URTEL, while no decision has been made here on time of announcement, please find out if 0900 here today would be satisfactory at your end. Reply soonest.

End

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 93-367

By W-8, NARA, Date 2-7-94

Dictated by: 127 616-
EA/WBundy

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/S-O: CAGendreau

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

Friday
April 12, 1968

95

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Presfile

On April 10 a ferryboat sank in Wellington harbor with the probable death of over 50 people. Secretary Rusk has sent a message of sympathy to Prime Minister Holyoake, but Embassy Wellington strongly recommends a message from you to the Governor General, Sir Arthur Porritt.

A suggested text is:

"Dear Sir Arthur: I have been shocked and saddened to learn of the tragic loss of life in the sinking of the ferryboat Wahine. When I began my Pacific journey eighteen months ago, the people of New Zealand gave me one of the most heart-warming welcomes I have ever received. Ever since that day, I have felt myself one of you. My heart goes out to all who have been bereaved in this disaster. Please convey my sincere condolences to them and to all New Zealanders. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson."

I recommend you approve the message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

W Wright:wpt

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 12, 1968

96

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

I gave the pitch on Warsaw, etc., in detail to the following:

J. R. Wiggins, The Washington Post

Henry Hubbard, NEWSWEEK

Jack Sutherland, US NEWS & WORLD REPORT

John Steele, TIME magazine

David Lawrence

Richard Wilson, Cowles Publications

William S. White

Neil Sheehan, New York Times

All seemed sympathetic.

Hubbard called me back and told me he thinks even NEWSWEEK will use the Kaesong item.

David Lawrence, Richard Wilson, and Bill White all said that they would do columns.

Neil Sheehan said he would do his very best because he felt, as a citizen, that we were absolutely right about Warsaw.

I got back to Arthur Goldberg, and he promised to go to work on the New York Times in New York.

Nick Katzenbach said that he would get on the phone with Fulbright and Hickenlooper, at least. Clark Clifford said that he would get with the Majority and Minority Armed Services Committee folk in the Senate and the

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING CANCELLED PER E.O. 12250,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR 15 1983.

18 5-19-92

House. They will report this evening.

In addition, Bill Jorden, operating on the same frequency, contacted the following:

US NEWS & WORLD REPORT

AP

UPI

Los Angeles Times

Chicago Daily News

(He was not able to get Scotty Reston, who was out of town)

Secretary Rusk called me from the hospital. He said all was well, but he had one more test for tomorrow. I explained to him your position on Warsaw. He said: "That makes great good sense to me."

###

Friday
April 12, 1968

ACTION

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Governor Romney

Attached is a letter from George Romney to you which includes a copy and commends to your attention his Keene, New Hampshire, speech and its "guaranteed neutralization" plan for South Vietnam (Tab A). Also attached is a summary of the points in that speech (Tab B).

Finally, I have attached a suggested reply (Tab C) to the Governor's letter.

W. W. Rostow

Atts

MWright:wpt

97a

SUMMARY OF SPEECH BY GOVERNOR ROMNEY
January 15, 1968

The Governor's speech focuses on two themes: what is wrong with U.S. policy in Vietnam, and his proposed solution which he terms guaranteed neutralization.

What is wrong with our policy

1. too much reliance on conventional military efforts.
2. inadequate attention to the political effort.
3. inadequate or mishandled diplomatic effort to get negotiations.

Guaranteed neutralization plan

1. The goal is to take North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia out of the cold war, to insulate them from Wars of Liberation, and to outlaw the use of force in their territories.
 - a. remove all foreign troops.
 - b. prohibit military alliances with outside powers.
 - c. U.S. must not dictate terms, for the conditions must be worked out by the four countries themselves.
 - d. but United States backing is essential.
2. Three major undertakings necessary to neutralization of the area.
 - a. an internal settlement in South Vietnam worked out between Saigon and the NLF. Settlement would have to include:
 - (1) cease-fire.
 - (2) withdrawal of foreign military.
 - (3) amnesty and full political participation for the Viet Cong.
 - (4) renunciation of terror and force by the Viet Cong.
 - (5) agreement on a process for reunification of North and South Vietnam.
 - b. Great power agreement to: prohibit political and military involvement by outside powers in the neutralized areas.

c. international supervision of the agreements by an effective peace-keeping commission, perhaps under the UN.

The reaction to the Governor's speech was modest, but favorable. The "St. Louis Post-Dispatch" and "The Washington Post" ran favorable editorials and a spokesman for U Thant said that several of Romney's views were similar to those expressed by the Secretary-General.

978

April 12, 1968

Dear Governor Romney:

Thank you for your letter of April 3 and for the copy of your Keene, New Hampshire, speech. I have read both with interest and hope that you will continue to give me the benefit of your counsel on this problem.

I know you share my gratification that Hanoi has agreed to contacts with U.S. Government representatives. It is certainly too early to predict the outcome of these contacts, but we will be pursuing them with vigor and a prayerful hope that we are on the road to peace in Vietnam. I count on your support for our efforts.

Sincerely,

Honorable George Romney
Governor of Michigan
Lansing, Michigan

LBJ:MW:WWR:rlh

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

98

Friday - April 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Latin American Ceremony

Pres file

We can schedule the Latin American ceremony for Friday morning, April 19 or Monday morning, April 22, and still carry through with the scenario for endorsement of the Task Force proposal by the Inter-American Development Bank Board of Governors.

After Monday, April 22, it would be too late and it would be better to have you launch the Task Force idea with a message to the Bank meeting which Secretary Fowler would read.

The ceremony would be held in the East Room where we could have appropriate installation and lighting of the maps to illustrate the physical integration possibilities in Latin America.

We contemplate inviting:

- the Latin American White House and OAS Ambassadors;
- the heads of the inter-American organizations (Mora, Sans, Herrera);
- Senators and Congressmen interested in Latin America;
- Scholars and foundation people working on Latin American economic development;
- representatives of business and industry interested in Latin American development; and
- key officials in State, Treasury, Commerce, and Transportation.

Jim Jones tells me that you may be going to the Ranch after the Honolulu trip and might not be back in time for a Monday morning ceremony.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Your options are:

- (1) to launch the Task Force proposal yourself
at a ceremony on

Friday morning, April 19 _____

or

Monday morning, April 22 _____.

or

- (2) to send a message to the Bank Meeting which
Secretary Fowler could read _____.

If you will indicate your preference for one of the three options, we
will make preparations accordingly.

W. W. Restow

ACTION

Limited Official Use

Friday - April 12, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Birthday Greeting for Venezuelan President Leoni

State recommends you send birthday greetings to President Leoni on April 26. He will be 63. It will be his last birthday as President of Venezuela.

Leoni was unable to accept your invitation to visit Washington because of the electoral campaign and deep divisions in his own party. State believes a birthday message will help smooth over any disappointment Leoni may have felt.

A suggested message is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Approve birthday
message to Leoni _____

Disapprove message _____

Call me _____

Attachment

Suggested message.

99a

Suggested Presidential Birthday Greetings

to

President Leoni of Venezuela
(on his 63rd birthday on April 26, 1968)

Dear Mr. President:

Today is your birthday and I want to share in your celebration by sending warmest congratulations. May the coming year be filled with good fortune for you, your family and your country.

Lyndon B. Johnson