

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

| FORM OF DOCUMENT | CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|------------------|--|---------|-------------|
| #1a cable | Saigon 26037 S 1 p <i>open 8-16-99 NLJ 97-280</i> [Duplicate of #1, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (5), Talks with Hanoi," Exempt NLJ 91-93] | 4/30/68 | A |
| #2a ltr | President to Pope Paul VI PCI 2 p <i>open 6-5-97</i> [Duplicate of #40b, NSF, Files of W. Rostow, "Kosygin"] | 4/30/68 | A |
| #2b ltr | Duplicate of #2a <i>open 6-5-97</i> [Duplicate of #40a, NSF, Files of W. Rostow, "Kosygin"] | | |
| #2d ltr | Pope Paul VI to President PCI 2 p <i>open 6-5-97</i> [Duplicate of #40c, NSF, Files of W. Rostow, "Kosygin"] | 4/30/68 | A |
| #3 memo | Rostow to President, 6:40 p.m. <i>open 5/27/00 NLJ 97-287</i> S 1 p | 4/30/68 | A |
| #6a memo | Wheeler to SecDef (CM-3265-68) <i>open NLJ 97-287 4/98</i> TS 2 p | 4/29/68 | A |
| #6b map | Vietnam S 1 p // | undated | A |
| #7 memo | Rostow to President, 11:50 a.m. <i>open NLJ 97-283 (5/98)</i> S 1 p (<i>dup of #3, see below</i>) | 4/30/68 | A |
| #7a cable | Saigon 339 <i>DUPE in FILES OF WWR, Box 1, MTGS, APRIL 1968, doc #3a</i> S 2 p <i>sanitized 8-16-99 NLJ 97-280</i> | 4/30/68 | A |
| #8 memo | Rostow to President, 11:35 a.m. <i>open NLJ 97-283 (5/98)</i> C 1 p | 4/30/68 | A |
| #8a cable | Algier 1565 (<i>dup #4a, 6a, NSF, Country file, Algeria, Vol. II, Box 79</i>) C 3 p <i>open 8-16-99 NLJ 97-280</i> | 4/29/68 | A |
| #11 memo | Rostow to President, 10:50 a.m. <i>DUPE in Files of WWR, Box 1, MTGS, APRIL 1968 #4, 4a</i> TS 1 p | 4/30/68 | A |
| #11a memo | Duplicate of #11- | | |

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 73, April 24-30, 1968 Box 33

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| #11b memo | Wheeler to SecDef (CM-3263-68) TS- 6 p | 4/29/68 | S |
| #12 memo | Rostow to President, 10:00 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 5/98 NLJ 97-283</i> | 4/30/68 | A |
| #12a cable | Vientiane 6164 C 2 p <i>open 8-16-99 NLJ 97-280</i> | 4/30/68 | A |
| #12b cable | Bangkok 13923 S 2 p | 4/30/68 | A |
| #12c cable | Manila 9918 S 1 p | 4/30/68 | A |
| #13 memo | Rostow to President, 9:25 a.m. <i>open 12/13/01 NW/PAC 00-325</i> TS- 1 p | 4/30/68 | A |
| #17a rpt | "Talking Paper" S 3 p <i>open 8-16-99 NLJ 97-280</i> [Duplicate of #157a, NSF, CF, Philippines, Vol. 4] [Sanitized NLJ 86-141] | 5/1/68 | A |
| #21 memo | Rostow to President, 7:20 p.m. <i>open 5-26-98 NLJ 97-286</i> TS 1 p [Dup. #79, NSF, CF, Korea, "Yod. 6"] | 4/29/68 | A |
| #21a rpt | "Summary of Points in Discussions..." 11 TS 3 p [Dup. #79a, see above] | 4/17/68 | A |
| #24a mem | Ginsburgh to Rostow TS 2 p <i>open 12-15-97 NLJ 96-140</i> | 4/29/68 | A |
| #27 memo | Rostow to President, 1:15 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 5/98 NLJ 97-283</i> | 4/29/68 | A |
| #27a cable | Warsaw 2959 S 3 p <i>open 8-16-99 NLJ 97-280</i> | 4/29/68 | A |
| #29 memo | Rostow to President, 12:50 p.m. C 1 p <i>OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-344</i> | 4/29/68 | A |

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| #30 memo | Rostow to President, 12:50 p.m. TS- 1 p <i>sanitized 3-11-03 NW/RAC 00326</i> | 4/29/68 | A |
| #30a cable | Intelligence Cable TS- 2 p <i>sanitized 3-11-03 NW/RAC 00327</i> | 4/29/68 | A |
| #33a cable | CAP 8146 <i>open 5/98 NLT 97-253</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #11a, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (5), Talks with Hanoi"] | 4/28/68 | A |
| #33b cable | Saigon 293 <i>more info released 4-5-00 RAC</i> S 1 p <i>sanitized 8-16-99 NLT 97-280 NLT 97-280</i> [Duplicate of #11b, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (5), Talks with Hanoi"] | 4/29/68 | A |
| #34 memo | Rostow to President, 10:30 a.m. <i>open 12/1/01 NLT 001-068-3-26</i> S 1 p <i>sanitized 8-12-98 NLT 97-289</i> <i>Exempt from NLT 97-289 Appeal</i> | 4/29/68 | A |
| #34a memo | Intelligence Memorandum S 1 p <i>open 12-8-03 NW 97-285</i> | 4/26/68 | A |
| #34b memo | Intelligence Memorandum <i>sanitized 12-8-03 NW 97-285</i> S 4 p <i>sanitized 01-9-03</i> | 4/25/68 | A |
| #37 memo | Rostow to President <i>open NLT 97-283 (5/98)</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #97, NSF, CF, Australia, "Visit of PM Gorton"] | 4/29/68 | A |
| #38 memo | Rostow to President S 1 p | 4/29/68 | A |
| #38b memo | Clifford to President <i>open NLT 97-278 (4/98)</i> S 1 p | 4/27/68 | A |
| #38c rpt | "US-Jordan Arms Agreement" <i>11</i> S 1 p | undated | A |
| #38d rpt | "Status of Jordan Arms Package" <i>11</i> S 1 p | undated | A |

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| #39-memo | Rostow to Rusk C 1 p <i>open NLS 97-283 5/98</i> | 4/29/68 | A |
| #40-memo | Rostow to President, 2:45 p.m. C 1 p // | 4/28/68 | A |
| #41a-ltr | To Shah of Iran PCI 3 p // | 4/28/68 | A |
| #42-memo | Rostow to President, 12:15 p.m. S- 1 p <i>open 12/13/01 NLS/RAC 00-325</i> | 4/28/68 | A |
| #42a-memo <i>Sanitized 12-03 NLS/RAC 00-325</i> | Intelligence Memorandum S- 5 p | 4/27/68 | A |
| #43a-memo | Rostow to President, 7:00 p.m. C 1 p <i>open NLS 97-283 (5/98)</i> | 4/27/68 | A |
| #47-memo | Rostow to President, 12:40 p.m. S 1 p // | 4/27/68 | A |
| #47a-memo | Rusk to President S 4 p <i>open 8-16-99 NLS 97-280</i> | undated | A |
| #48-memo | Rostow to President, 12:35 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 9-25-92 NLS 91-195</i> [Duplicate of #13, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (5), Talks with Hanoi"] | 4/27/68 | A |
| #48e-memo | To Vientiane S 2 p <i>open 9-25-92 NLS 91-195</i> [Duplicate of #13e, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (5), Talks with Hanoi"] | 4/27/68 | A |
| #49a cable <i>Sanitized 12-03 NLS 97-285</i> | Intelligence Information Cable S 7 p [Duplicate of #89, NSF, CF, VN, "TDCS and Cables, Vol. 1"] | 4/26/68 | A |

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|------------------|--|---------|-------------|
| #50a memo | Rusk to President TS 4 p [Duplicate of #5a, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Strategic Missile Talks," Sanitized NLJ 89-149] <i>Declar 89-74 open 1/8/96</i> | 4/26/68 | A |
| #50b cable | To Moscow TS 5 p [Duplicate of #5c, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Strategic Missile Talks," Sanitized NLJ 89-149] <i>Declar 89-74 open 1/8/96</i> | 4/3/68 | A |
| #50c cable | To Moscow TS 2 p [Duplicate of #5d, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Strategic Missile Talks," Sanitized NLJ 89-149] <i>Declar 89-70; open 1/8/96</i> | 4/3/68 | A |
| #50d cable | To Moscow TS 4 p [Duplicate of #5f, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Strategic Missile Talks," Sanitized NLJ 89-149] <i>Declar 89-70; open 1/8/96</i> | 4/24/68 | A |
| #51a memo | Vientiane 6114 (dup #3dd, NSF, CF, VN "Crocodile" Paris to be filed "Box 130") S 2 p <i>open 8-16-99 NLJ 97-280</i> | 4/27/68 | A |
| #51b memo | Vientiane 6113 (dup #3 cc on above) S 4 p | 4/27/68 | A |
| #52 memo | Rostow to President C 1 p <i>open NLJ 97-283 (5/98)</i> | 4/27/68 | A |
| #53a memo | Zwick to President C 1 p <i>open NLJ 97-283 (5/98)</i> | 4/24/68 | A |
| #53b memo | Gaud and Schnittker to President (not open) C 2 p <i>open 8-17-98 NLJ 97-283</i> | 4/17/68 | A |
| #53c memo | Gaud and Freeman to President (not open) C 2 p <i>open 8-17-98 NLJ 97-283</i> | 4/10/68 | A |
| #55 memo | Rostow to President, 6:15 p.m. S 1 p <i>open NLJ 97-283 (5/98)</i> [Duplicate of #190, NSF, CF, Israel, Vol. 9] | 4/26/68 | A |

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| #55a memcon | Rostow, Evron, and Saunders S 3 p Sanitized 8/14/03 NSA info. closed NLJ/RAL 01-65 [Duplicate of #190a, NSF, CF, Israel, Vol. 9] | 4/26/68 | A |
| #56a cable | Bonn 11285 C 2 p open 8-16-99 NLJ 97-280 [Duplicate of #22a, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (5), Talks with Hanoi," Exempt NLJ 91-193] | 4/26/68 | A |
| #57 memo | Rostow to President, 5:10 p.m. C 1 p open 1-12-93 NLJ 91-336 | 4/26/68 | A |
| #58 memo | Rostow to President, 5:10 p.m. TS 1 p open 3-11-03 NLJ/RAL 00-326 | 4/26/68 | A |
| #58a memo | Intelligence Memorandum TS 2 p open 3-11-03 NLJ/RAL 00-326 | 4/26/68 | A |
| #58b memo | Intelligence Memorandum PCI- 1 p | undated | A |
| #58c memo | Intelligence Memorandum PCI- 1 p | undated | A |
| #59 memo | Rostow to President, 3:35 p.m. Sanitized 10/15/01 NSA info. closed TS- 1 p [Dup. # 105, NSF, CF, Korea, "Vol. 6"] | 4/26/68 | A |
| #59a memo | Intelligence Memorandum TS- 2 p [Dup. # 105a, as above] | 4/26/68 | A |
| #60a cable | Intelligence Cable Sanitized 11/8/00 NLJ 97-282 TS 2 p [Dup. # 106a, as above] | 4/26/68 | A |
| #61a memo | Rusk to President C 2 p open 8-16-99 NLJ 97-280 | 4/22/68 | A |
| #63 memo | Rostow to President, 1:30 p.m. C 1 p open NLJ 97-283 (5/98) | 4/26/68 | A |
| #63a rpt | "Polish Monitoring of..." C 2 p open 8-16-99 NLJ 97-280 | undated | A |

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| #64 memo | Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m. S 1 p <i>open NJ 97-283 (5/98)</i> | 4/26/68 | A |
| #64a cable | Hague 5041 S 2 p <i>open 8-16-99 NJ 97-280</i> | 4/26/68 | A |
| #65 memo | Rostow to President, 9:30 a.m. S 1 p <i>sanitized 8-13-98 NJ 97-285 also Rami NJ 019-033-1</i> | 4/26/68 | A |
| #65a cable <i>sanitized 12-8-03 NW 97-285</i> | Intelligence Cable S 1 p <i>except NJ 019-033-1</i> | 4/25/68 | A |
| #66 memo | Rostow to President, 9:00 a.m. S 1 p <i>open NJ 97-283 (5/98) (dup #1 NSF, CF, UN "Crowdlike Pains Lake Field")</i> | 4/26/68 | A |
| #67 memo | Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open NJ 97-283 (5/98)</i> | 4/26/68 | A |
| #67a ltr | President to President Sunay of Turkey S 2 p // | undated | A |
| #67b cable | Ankara 4310 S 2 p // | 3/8/68 | A |
| #67c cable | Deptel 144352 to Ankara C 4 p <i>open 8-16-99 NJ 97-280</i> | 4/10/68 | A |
| #71 memo | Rostow to President, 7:05 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 3-11-03 NJ 124-00326</i> | 4/25/68 | A |
| #71a cable | Intelligence Cable S 1 p <i>sanitized 3-11-03 NJ 124-00327</i> | 4/25/68 | A |
| #72b memo | Hamilton to Rostow C 2 p <i>open 8-17-98 NJ 97-283</i> | 4/25/68 | A |
| #72c rpt | "In millions of dollars..." C 1 p <i>open NJ 97-283 (5/98)</i> | undated | A |
| #73 memo | Rostow to President, 6:15 p.m. S 1 p // | 4/25/68 | A |

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| #73a cable | Paris 13115 S 1 p <i>Exempt 8-16-99 NLT 97-280</i> | 4/25/68 | A |
| #74a cable | Saigon 25643 <i>sanitized 4-5-00 NLT 97-280</i> S 7 p [Sanitized NLJ/CBS-10, 1983] | 4/25/68 | A |
| #75a memo | Read to Rostow C 1 p <i>Open 8-16-99 NLT 97-280</i> | 4/25/68 | A |
| #75b memo | "Persons or Groups refused Polish Visas" PCI 1 p <i>Open 8-16-99 NLT 97-280</i> | undated | A |
| #76 memo | Rostow to President, 1:10 p.m. S 1 p <i>open NLT 97-283 (5/98)</i> | 4/25/68 | A |
| #76a memo | Bohlen to SecState S 1 p <i>Open 8-16-99 NLT 97-280</i> | 4/23/68 | A |
| #79 memo | Rostow to President, 9:45 a.m. <i>open 12/13/01 NW/RAC 00-825</i> TS 1 p | 4/25/68 | A |
| #80a memo | Katzenbach to President C 2 p <i>Open 8-16-99 NLT 97-280</i> [Duplicate of #80a, NSF, CF, Costa Rica, "Visit of President Trejos Fernandez, 6/68] | 4/15/68 | A |
| #84 memo | Rostow to President <i>open NLT 97-283 (5/98)</i> S 1 p | 4/25/68 | A |
| #85 memo | Rostow to President, 6:15 p.m. <i>11</i> S 1 p | 4/24/68 | A |
| #85a cable | Paris 13051 S 2 p <i>Open 8-16-99 NLT 97-280</i> | 4/24/68 | A |
| #85c cable | Deptel to Bangkok <i>11</i> S 2 p | 4/24/68 | A |
| #88a memo | Katzenbach to President <i>u</i> C 2 p | 4/19/68 | A |

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| #89a cable | Saigon 25548 S 2 p <i>open 8-16-99 NLJ 97-280</i> | 4/24/68 | A |
| #94 memo | Rostow to President, 10:30 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 5-19-95 NLJ 94-458</i> | 4/24/68 | A |
| #94a cable | Saigon 25561 S 4 p <i>open 8-16-99 NLJ 97-280</i> | 4/24/68 | A |
| #95 memo | Rostow to President, 8:45 a.m. TS 1 p <i>open 5-26-98 NLJ 97-286</i> | 4/24/68 | A |
| #95a cable | Saigon 25512 TS 1 p <i>open NLJ 97-288 8-18-98</i> | 4/23/68 | A |
| #96 memo | Rostow to President, 8:10 a.m. <i>sanitized 12/13/01 NW/RAC 00-325</i> TS 1 p | 4/24/68 | A |
| #96a memo <i>EXEMPT 5-12-03 NW/RAC 00-328</i> | Intelligence Memorandum S 1 p | undated | A |
| #97 memo | Rostow to President, 8:00 a.m. S 1 p <i>sanitized 8-13-98 NLJ 97-289</i> [Duplicate of #13, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (4), Talks with Hanoi] | 4/24/68 | A |
| #97a cable <i>sanitized 12-8-03 NLJ 97-285</i> | Intelligence Information Cable S 4 p [Duplicate of #13a, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (4), Talks with Hanoi] | 4/23/68 | A |
| #98 memo | Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open NLJ 97-283 (5/98)</i> | 4/24/68 | A |
| #104 memo | Rostow to President S 1 p [Duplicate of #1, NSF, CF, Norway, "King Olav V Visit"] | 4/24/68 | A |
| #104a memo | Rusk to President C 1 p <i>open 8-16-99 NLJ 97-280</i> [Duplicate of #1a, NSF, CF, Norway, "King Olav V Visit"] | 4/22/68 | A |

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| #104c rpt | "Background Paper" C 4 p <i>Open 8-16-99 NLT 97-280</i> [Duplicate of #1b, NSF, CF, Norway, "King Olav V Visit"] | 4/68 | A |
| #104d rpt | Bio Sketch <i>exempt 12-8-03 NL 97-285</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #1d, NSF, CF, Norway, "King Olav V Visit"] | undated | A |
| #476 rpt | Principles Concerning Jerusalem S 2p <i>Open 8-16-99 NLT 97-280</i> | undated | A |

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REGINA GREENWELL
Senior Archivist

August 2, 1999

P file

1**SECRET**Tuesday, April 30, 1968
10:30 a. m.**MR. PRESIDENT:**

This British journalist's report of an interview with an NLF-North Vietnamese contact gives, perhaps, some clue as to how the North Vietnamese intend to negotiate; although it simply could be designed to soften up Western opinion in general.

and worry Saigon.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ EX DIS attachment (Saigon 26037)

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By , NARA, Date 5-28-92

301130Z APR 68 ZFF-1
M AMEMBASSY SAIGON
O SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 718

1a

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 26037

XDIS/NOFORN

FOLLOWING IS MESSAGE WHICH BRITISH AMBASSADOR MACLEHOSE HAS SENT
O LONDON REPEATED WASHINGTON. BRITISH GOVERNMENT WILL NO DOUBT
UPPLY US WITH SUBSTANCE, BUT I THOUGHT DEPT MIGHT LIKE TO HAVE
EXT SOONEST.

EGIN TEXT:

. A COMPLETELY RELIABLE BRITISH JOURNALIST HAS GIVEN ME FOLLOWING
CCOUNT OF BRIEFING THIS MORNING BY AN NLF/NV CONTACT ABOUT COMMUNIST
DEAS ON PEACE TALKS:

. THIS IS IT. THIS TIME PEACE TALKS REALLY WILL TAKE PLACE.

1. NO HURRY, BUT US MUST AGREE TO EITHER WARSAW OR PHNOM PENH.

2. TALKS WOULD INITIALLY BE ABOUT THE ENDING OF THE BOMBING
ETC. HANOI WAS PREPARED TO PULL OUT TWO DIVISIONS VERY SOON AMID
CIRCUMSTANCES OF PUBLICITY. US WOULD HAVE TO RECIPROCATE WITH
WITHDRAWAL OF AT LEAST ONE PROBABLY TWO DIVISIONS.

3. A SETTLEMENT AND CEASE-FIRE SHOULD BE ARRANGED BY MEANS
OF MIXED COMMISSIONS IN THE POLITICAL, MILITARY AND MUNICIPAL
FIELDS. (UNDER QUESTIONING IT EMERGED THAT IT WAS MEANT THAT THE
COMMISSIONS WOULD BE ON A TERRITORIAL AS WELL AS A FUNCTIONAL
BASIS).

4. THE US/HANOI TALKS WOULD ARRANGE FOR THE COMMISSIONS TO
BE SET UP, BUT WOULD REMAIN IN BEING AS A SORT OF STEERING COMMITTEE
OR COURT OF APPEAL.

5. THOUGH THE THIEU/KY REGIME AND ITS CONSTITUTION ETC.,
WOULD HAVE TO GO, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE FOR NLF TO
"MERGE" WITH EXISTING GVN MILITARY, POLITICAL AND MUNICIPAL
(I.E. TERRITORIAL) SETUP.

6. NEGOTIATIONS WOULD TAKE A LONG TIME, ONE OR TWO YEARS.

7. CIRCUMSTANCES OF INTERVIEW MADE INTERROGATION OF INFORMANT
DIFFICULT. IN ANSWER TO QUESTION INFORMANT SAID COMMUNISTS WERE
AWARE OF STRENGTH OF SEPARATIST SENTIMENT IN HUE AND SOLUTION
MIGHT BE FOR DRV TO ANNEX TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES, OR FOR THEM
TO HAVE A SPECIAL STATUS. BUT SUCH DETAILS COULD BE SETTLED

~~PAGE 3 - RUMJIR 26037 - SECRET~~
BY THE COMMISSIONS.

8. AMERICAN EMBASSY INFORMED.

9. CORRESPONDENT WILL PUBLISH. GRATEFUL IF CONFIDENCE COULD
BE RESPECTED UNTIL PUBLICATION. END TEXT.

BUNKER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-280
By CG, NARA Date 7-23-99

Tuesday, Apr. 30, 1968
6:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a draft as delivered,
Literally Eyes Only, to Joe Califano.

Although you may well wish to change it,
I shall put a copy on green for your signature.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 95-174
By fw/irp NARA, Date 6-5-97

2u
April 30, 1968

TO HIS HOLINESS POPE PAUL VI FROM THE PRESIDENT

I have considered most carefully your generous offer of April 30 to make available facilities in the Vatican City for contacts between representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and of the United States to begin the movement towards peace.

I am deeply moved by your initiative, sharing as I do with the people of the United States and all the world the desire that peace come to Southeast Asia at the earliest possible moment.

We have concluded that the impartiality which you have offered and which the Vatican City can provide is an essential and precious ingredient for these first contacts. Neither side should enter these negotiations seeking victory or expecting defeat. The common objective should be an honorable peace.

Men and women in every corner of the globe know the depth and constancy of the untiring efforts of Your Holiness to bring peace to the human family.

Therefore, I accept your proposal.

I am prepared to designate our representatives as soon as you have an indication from the other side that they are prepared to meet with them in the Vatican City.

I would only add my hope and prayer that the spirit of brotherhood in which you have reached out at this critical moment to the contending parties will meet a positive response from the others concerned because, in the end,

-2-

only in a spirit of human reconciliation can we make a just peace in Southeast Asia and then work together on behalf of all human beings in that region.

###

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 95-174
By WJ/127 NARA, Date 6-5-97

May 1, 1968

26

Your Holiness:

I have considered most carefully your generous offer of April 30 to make available facilities in the Vatican City for contacts between representatives of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and of the United States to begin the movement towards peace.

I am deeply moved by your initiative, sharing as I do with the people of the United States and all the world the desire that peace come to Southeast Asia at the earliest possible moment.

We have concluded that the impartiality which you have offered and which the Vatican City can provide is an essential and precious ingredient for these first contacts. Neither side should enter these negotiations seeking victory or expecting defeat. The common objective should be an honorable peace.

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in the end, only in a spirit of human reconciliation can we make a just peace in Southeast Asia and then work together on behalf of all human beings in that region.

Sincerely,

His Holiness
Pope Paul VI
Vatican City

LBJ:WWR:mz

Pope ^{2c}
offers
Vatican



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 95-174
By fw/isp NARA, Date 6-5-97

*3339 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20008*

The Apostolic Delegation, acting on instructions received from the Secretariat of State, Vatican City, has the honor to convey to the Government of the United States of America the following message of His Holiness, Pope Paul VI:

"In view of the great anxiety and expectation of the world for a start of sincere and fruitful negotiations, considering the difficulties which have arisen towards finding a mutually satisfying place for the preliminary discussions, and desiring to contribute to overcoming the obstacles and to providing an honorable opportunity for the first encounters, We are pleased to put at the disposal of the two parties who are most interested, as a location for their meetings, the apostolic buildings which are under our direct, immediate and exclusive jurisdiction.

We do not intend to interfere with any other solutions or initiatives that might effectively facilitate the hoped for result.

If Our proposal may be useful, we are only too glad to make it in the spirit of friendship and with the discretion that the parties may desire.

We have reached these decisions moved solely by the desire to offer to the cause of peace the service and the collaboration that the present circumstances allow Us.

We wish, moreover, to state that, while offering to the two delegations Our hospitality, we want to assure them complete freedom to hold their talks, from which We intend to keep aloof, and thus maintain Our position of impartiality which has always inspired our actions directed to promoting peace and the spirit



*3339 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20008*

Page 2

of brotherhood between peoples and nations of the world."

The Apostolic Delegation wishes to present to the Government of the United States the assurance of its highest consideration.



April 30, 1968

Mr. Rostow

3

1. [unclear]
2. Pres. file

SECRET/EXDIS

Tuesday, April 30, 1968 - 6:40pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Inspecting Israel's Nuclear Reactor

Secretary Rusk has approved instructing Ambassador Barbour to ask Prime Minister Eshkol for another visit by US experts to the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona. Our last visit was in April 1967. Eshkol has acquiesced in periodic visits every 12-13 months, although he has never been enthusiastic.

The visit this year is more important than ever. Up through last spring, we were reasonably confident that the Dimona reactor was being used only for research and that the Israelis were making no attempt to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The reactor used fuel elements from France which had to be returned to France when used. Late last year, however, there were indications that Israel was processing ore obtained without safeguards from Argentina. This could be to make their own fuel elements so they wouldn't have to depend either on France or on safeguarded material.

We have no evidence that Israel has facilities for separating significant amounts of plutonium from irradiated fuel--the next step toward weapons production. But our experts say that last winter's activity could portend a decision to build such a plant. They estimate it would be only two years from that decision to Israel's first weapons test. Eshkol's response to our request could be an important clue to his intentions (though his political difficulties with the visit will also play a role).

Secretary Rusk has already sent the message we showed you urging Israel to support the NPT. Eban's staff says Israel won't make up its mind till toward the end of the year. This visit to Dimona will provide another avenue for reminding them that we're serious about opposing their going nuclear. Since Barbour will be making this request without reference to you, I should think this would carry minimum risk for the time being.

Approve ✓ 5/1/68
Call me

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 97-287

SECRET/EXDIS By ct, NARA Date 9-2-00

ACTION

4

Tuesday, April 30, 1968 - 5:45 PM

Profile

Mr. President:

Attached for your approval is a
warm farewell message to King Olav.
It would be delivered to him in New York
on May 10.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me+ _____


MWG:mst

4a

PROPOSED FAREWELL MESSAGE TO KING OLAV OF NORWAY

Your Majesty:

As you leave the United States, I want you to know how very much Mrs. Johnson and I enjoyed having you with us.

Your presence here has honored America and strengthened the many ties that bind our two nations.

I hope you will carry with you to your great and beautiful land the warmest best wishes of all Americans for the peace, happiness, and prosperity of Norway and her people.

With warmest personal regards,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Majesty
King Olav V of Norway
Waldorf Astoria Hotel
New York, New York


MWG:mst

~~SECRET~~

AC ON

Tuesday, April 30, 1968

12:45 P.M.

1. Summary
2. Pres file
5

MR. PRESIDENT:

We need your guidance before proceeding further on the visit of President Thieu:

1. The dates -- Ambassador Bunker reports that President Thieu would much prefer to come after mid-June -- rather than in May -- so that he can present you with a "complete package" on mobilization, reorganization, and reform. Bunker strongly recommends we go along with Thieu. I concur.

Your schedule and that of Mrs. Johnson are clear for your participation on Tuesday and Wednesday, June 18-19. I prefer starting the visit on Tuesday because it allows Thieu to rest after the long journey, perhaps stay overnight at Williamsburg, then participate with you early in the week so that the balance of the week he could meet with others and see some of the country.

Your schedule is clear for the following week beginning Monday, June 24. However, Mrs. Johnson is scheduled to be in Oregon from Sunday, June 23 to Sunday, June 30, or Monday, July 1.

On balance, because we want this visit to be a success, I recommend you accede to Thieu's wishes that he come after mid-June -- as soon as mutually convenient -- which translates to Tuesday and Wednesday, June 18-19.

Approve June 18-19 ✓ 5/1/68

Develop later dates _____

Call me _____

2. The program of the visit -- It is important that this be a State Visit because it is his first visit to this country as Chief of State. However, we have some flexibility in the degree of formality involved in the State Visit.

-- I gather the ladies of the House believe it would be appropriate to have a rather low key dinner for Thieu since his men and ours are engaged in combat.

-- I discussed this with Bill Bundy and we both thought that the format used during the visit of Prime Minister Ne Win of Burma

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1980
By 78, NARA, Date 5-20-92

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

would be sound -- namely, a reception in which he would have a chance to meet a good many people, followed by a small working dinner in the Mansion.

Before having Ambassador Bunker sound out Thieu on this point, we wish to have your judgment:

Full-scale dinner, entertainment, etc. ✓ 5/1/68

Reception and working dinner _____

Other _____

Call me _____

A working luncheon is also a possibility but, in my judgment, would be inappropriate.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Schwartz 4/30
cc: Jorden

Profile
6
INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, April 30, 1968
11:55 a. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Bus Wheeler's analysis and assessment
of the A Shau Valley operation.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By: sg, NARA, Date 6-2-92



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

IVY TREE
SENSITIVE

6a
CM-3265-68
29 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Operation DELAWARE/LAMSON 216

1. The following information concerning Operation DELAWARE/LAMSON 216 is provided in accordance with your request. A map is attached to depict the operational area in South Vietnam (SVN).
2. The A Shau Valley in SVN is extremely important to the enemy. It serves as a logistic artery to his base areas in the adjacent territory of Laos. The valley lies in the most remote part of SVN, and its relative inaccessibility has provided the enemy a major supply and operating base from which he has launched operations against Hue and into the southern I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). Enemy Base Area 607, which lies principally in Laos adjoining the southern end of the A Shau Valley, has been used extensively by the enemy and has been stockpiled with munitions (for example, the rockets which struck Da Nang Air Force Base recently are believed to have come through that base).
3. General Westmoreland had planned to conduct offensive operations in the A Shau Valley for several months. However, the enemy situation which developed early this year in the Khe Sanh area and along the DMZ caused General Westmoreland to redeploy his forces to meet that more immediate threat. As a result, planned offensive operations in the A Shau Valley were temporarily delayed.
4. Operation DELAWARE/LAMSON 216 commenced 18 April and is being conducted as a reconnaissance in force, with the objective of clearing the valley and denying its use to the enemy. In addition, on 23 April, General Westmoreland was authorized to insert a PRAIRIE FIRE unit up to battalion size into Base Area

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
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-278

By us, NARA Date 3-23-98

cy 5 of copies

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

607 as a part of this operation. Prior to the start of the operation, 13 PRAIRIE FIRE reconnaissance operations were conducted in the A Shau Valley and Base Area 607 to ascertain enemy presence and movement in the area.

5. The major units currently committed to DELAWARE/LAMSON 216 include the following: 1st Cavalry Division (7 battalions), 101st Airborne Division (3 battalions), 196th Light Infantry Brigade (3 battalions), 3d ARVN Regiment (3 battalions), and an ARVN Airborne Task Force (3 battalions). These 19 battalions are supported by organic artillery and also by B-52 strikes and tactical aircraft. Operation CARENTAN II, involving the 101st Airborne Division (6 battalions), is now being conducted west of Hue in an area contiguous to that of DELAWARE/LAMSON 216.

6. DELAWARE/LAMSON 216 is a high-risk operation, possibly more dangerous than any other offensive operation initiated in South Vietnam. This is because of the marginal weather and difficult terrain in the A Shau Valley, and significant enemy reinforcement possibilities from nearby Laos.

7. Prospects for success of the operation are considered good. As of this date, there has been no intelligence which indicates any enemy movement toward the A Shau Valley. The weather, marginal thus far during the operation, is expected to improve with the monsoon transition. A ground control approach (GCA) installation, inserted in the A Luoi airstrip on 28 April, has been successfully tested. With this installation, a capability for all-weather aerial resupply is now present in the valley.




EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment
Map

~~TOP SECRET~~



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-278
By is, NARA Date 3-23-98

03

SECRET

7

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, April 30, 1968 -- 11:50 am

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker's excellent and responsive reply to the questions I put to him on your instruction.

You will wish to read this before today's lunch.

Pres. file

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 339, CAS Channels

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-283
By js, NARA Date 4-30-98

WWRostow:rla

FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 339

SANITIZED

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, LITERALLY EYES ONLY WALT ROSTOW

REF: CAP 8416

THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 OF YOUR REFERENCE MESSAGE SUPPLEMENT THE BRIEF PRELIMINARY ANSWER I SENT YOU YESTERDAY.

A. WITH REGARD TO THE STALEMATE:

1. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE ARE GETTING A PREVIEW OF THE WAY HANOI WILL PROBABLY TRY TO PLAY TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS; THAT HE IS NOW PROLONGING THE STALEMATE IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN HIS MILITARY POSTURE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM, TO CONTINUE INFILTRATION OF MEN AND MATERIEL AT A HIGH RATE, AND TO TRY TO GET THE MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE OUT OF WHAT HE CHOOSES TO PICTURE AS OUR UNREASONABLENESS. THERE MAY ALSO BE INVOLVED A QUESTION OF FACE, NOT WISHING TO RECEDE FROM THE POSITION ALREADY TAKEN REGARDING PHNOM PENH AND WARSAW.

2. IT IS MY VIEW WE HAVE BEEN AND ARE CORRECT IN NOT AGREEING TO ACCEPT EITHER PHNOM PENH OR WARSAW AS A SITE FOR CONTACTS. TO DO SO, I BELIEVE, WOULD GREATLY INCREASE APPREHENSION AMONG THE VIETNAMESE AND OUR OTHER ALLIES AS TO OUR INTENTIONS AND PURPOSES, WOULD GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE ENTERING TALKS FROM A POSITION NOT OF STRENGTH BUT OF WEAKNESS, AND FINALLY DOES NOT GET THE TALKS STARTED IN A PROPER ATMOSPHERE.

3. IT DOES SEEM TO ME, HOWEVER, THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO GET CONTACTS STARTED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT IN ORDER TO PREVENT HANOI TAKING ADVANTAGE OF A LENGTHIER BOMBING PAUSE; AND THAT PERHAPS THE MOST LIKELY WAY TO GET AN AGREEMENT FROM HANOI IS THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF SOME THIRD PARTY. I WONDER, THEREFORE, WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE RUMANIANS, THROUGH THEIR DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, TO SUGGEST TO HANOI THAT IT IN TURN PROPOSE TO US A MEETING IN BUCHAREST. THOUGH THE GVN WILL NOT BE HAPPY ABOUT BUCHAREST, THIEU HAS TOLD ME THAT THEY WOULD GO ALONG FOR THE INITIAL TALKS AND ALTHOUGH HE LATER HAD MISGIVINGS, I THINK WE CAN STILL GET HIS ACQUIESCENCE. (I DO NOT BELIEVE THE GVN WOULD HAVE A PROBLEM WITH PARIS IF THAT SHOULD BE SUGGESTED.) IF THE RUMANIANS WERE NOT AMENABLE TO THIS SUGGESTION, PERHAPS WE COULD GET SOME OTHER THIRD PARTY WITH REPRESENTATION IN HANOI TO MAKE THE SUGGESTION.

B. ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF PRESIDENT'S MARCH 31 STATEMENT:

4. THE INITIAL FEELING OF APPREHENSION REGARDING AMERICAN INTENTIONS, THE FEAR OF AMERICAN ABANDONMENT HAS, I THINK, VERY CONSIDERABLY LESSENED. ALTHOUGH SOME ANXIETY IS STILL EVIDENT, EXEMPLIFIED IN THE KIND OF STATEMENTS KY HAS MADE GOING IT ALONE IF NECESSARY, THERE IS MUCH MORE CONFIDENCE IN OUR INTENTIONS. THIEU HIMSELF IS NOT FLAPPABLE, AND HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE CALMEST AMONG THE GVN FIGURES. ONE EXCELLENT RESULT OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AND CLARK CLIFFORD'S SPEECH HAS BEEN THAT THE VIETNAMESE ARE REALLY BEGINNING TO FACE UP TO THE FACT THAT THE TIME WILL COME WHEN THEY WILL BE ON THEIR OWN. THIS, TOGETHER WITH THE AFTER EFFECTS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE, HAS MEANT THAT THE GVN AND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE BUCKLING DOWN TO THE JOB OF MOBILIZING THEIR RESOURCES WITH MUCH GREATER ENERGY AND DETERMINATION THAN THEY HAVE HERETOFORE EXHIBITED. THIEU ESPECIALLY HAS SET ABOUT THE NUMEROUS TASKS INVOLVED OF GETTING THE MOBILIZATION BILL THROUGH THE ASSEMBLY, OF SETTING UP THE MACHINERY FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, OF RESTRUCTURING THE GOVERNMENT SO THAT IT WILL FUNCTION MORE EFFECTIVELY, AND BROADENING ITS BASE IN ORDER TO WIDEN POPULAR SUPPORT, WITH CHARACTERISTIC THOROUGHNESS, ALBEIT ALSO WITH CHARACTERISTIC CAUTION, IN VIEW OF SOME OF THE SENSITIVE PROBLEMS AND RELATIONSHIPS INVOLVED.

5. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT IN SPITE OF THE MILITARY DEFEAT WHICH

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-280

By CB, NARA Date 7-23-99

... OF THE PROGRESS FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, OF RESTRUCTURING THE GOVERNMENT SO THAT IT WILL FUNCTION MORE EFFECTIVELY, AND BROADENING ITS BASE IN ORDER TO WIDEN POPULAR SUPPORT, WITH CHARACTERISTIC THOROUGHNESS, ALBEIT ALSO WITH CHARACTERISTIC CAUTION, IN VIEW OF SOME OF THE SENSITIVE PROBLEMS AND RELATIONSHIPS INVOLVED.

5. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT IN SPITE OF THE MILITARY DEFEAT WHICH THE ENEMY SUFFERED, HE DID GAIN SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE HERE, THOUGH NOTHING COMPARED TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIS WAS ACHIEVED ABROAD.

6. THE SECURITY SITUATION HAS NOT BEEN RESTORED YET TO ITS PRE-TET LEVEL. MANY HAMLET AND VILLAGE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES HAVE NOT YET RETURNED TO THEIR HAMLETS AND VILLAGES, AND THERE IS APPREHENSION REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW ENEMY OFFENSIVE. I WOULD SAY THAT ON BALANCE PEOPLE'S MORALE IS GOOD. THERE IS MORE DETERMINATION TO GET THEMSELVES READY FOR WHAT MAY BE AHEAD AND MORE PULLING TOGETHER THAN I HAVE WITNESSED BEFORE. CONCURRENTLY THERE IS THE FACT WHICH I MENTIONED IN MY LAST WEEK'S MESSAGE, I.E., SOME HARDENING OF POPULAR AND GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES IN RESPECT TO NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WHOLE RANGE OF QUESTIONS THEY RAISE; OPPOSITION TO ANY FORM OF COALITION WITH THE NLF; INSISTENCE ON THE FREEDOM AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF SOUTH VIETNAM, ON ITS PRIMARY ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS, AND ITS DETERMINATION TO SEE THAT THE FRUITS OF ITS LONG STRUGGLE ARE NOT LOST THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. THESE VIEWS FIND EXPRESSION AMONG MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE ASSEMBLY, THE MILITARY, A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE ARTICULATE MIDDLE CLASS, CITY AND TOWN DWELLERS. THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT THERE IS A SIZEABLE SEGMENT OF THE RURAL POPULATION WHICH IS TIRED OF YEARS OF WARFARE AND OF THE DESTRUCTION OF LIFE AND PROPERTY, WHO WANT TO RETURN TO THEIR PADDY FIELDS AND THE TOMBS OF THEIR ANCESTORS EVEN IF IT MEANS TRYING TO GET ALONG WITH THE VC. THERE IS ANOTHER LARGE SEGMENT, HOWEVER, WHICH, WHILE HAVING NO PARTICULAR AFFINITY FOR THE GVN, HAS BEEN WITNESS TO OR VICTIMS OF VC TERRORISM AND LIKES THE VC EVEN LESS.

7. I THINK THE NET EFFECT THUS FAR SINCE MARCH 31 HAS BEEN ON THE PLUS SIDE. WHILE THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME LETDOWN FROM THE HIGH TEMPO OF THE EARLY POST-TET RECOVERY PERIOD, I BELIEVE THINGS ARE MOVING AHEAD WITH COMMENDABLE RESULTS. THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES HAVE GAINED CONFIDENCE IN THEMSELVES, WITH OUR TROOPS ARE ON THE OFFENSIVE, AND CONTINUE TO IMPROVE. THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASING AWARENESS OF THE NEED TO KEEP UP MILITARY PRESSURE, WHICH HAS BEEN EFFECTIVELY STIMULATED BY GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S CONTINUING MEETINGS WITH TOP RVNAF COMMANDERS AND THIEU'S AND KY'S CONSULTATIONS WITH THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP. WHILE THE GOVERNMENT MACHINERY IS NOT GEARED TO MOVE WITH THE EFFICIENCY OF OURS, IT ALSO IS IMPROVING. THIEU HIMSELF HAS GROWN IN STATURE AND IN CONFIDENCE, AND IS BEGINNING TO EXHIBIT QUALITIES OF REAL LEADERSHIP.

8. IN CONCLUSION, I BELIEVE THAT WHAT IS MOST NEEDED IS A CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT U.S. ATTITUDE OF FIRMNESS AND PATIENCE COMBINED WITH ANNOUNCED WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH THE OTHER SIDE ON REASONABLE TERMS. I SEE NO NEED FOR DRAMATIC OR HASTY ACTIONS TO DEMONSTRATE OUR REASONABLENESS AND THE GENUINENESS OF OUR INTENTIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD MAKE KNOWN IN ACCURATE BUT NON-POLEMICAL TERMS THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE WHICH HANOI IS TAKING OF THIS PROLONGED PERIOD OF HAGGLING IN ORDER TO REINFORCE COMMUNIST ELEMENTS IN THE SOUTH THROUGH THE INFILTRATION OF UNPRECEDENTED QUANTITIES OF MEN AND SUPPLIES. IN ANOTHER WEEK OR SO, WE MAY BE FORCED TO INDICATE TO HANOI THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS ON TALKS, WE SHALL HAVE TO REEXAMINE OUR BOMB RESTRICTIONS POLICY. THIS MAY JAR LOOSE A DECISION ON THEIR SIDE, BUT WE SHOULD BE SERIOUS IN ISSUING THIS WARNING, AND NOT DO IT AS A BLUFF.

~~SECRET~~ LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Pres file

8

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, Apr. 30, 1968
11:35 a.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

You may wish to discuss this Algerian cable
at lunch.

A confidant of Boumediene:

- suggests Algeria as site for talks;
- in any case, wants to reopen U. S. - Algerian
diplomatic relations;
- winces at idea of our allies turning up.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-283
By us, NARA Date 4-30-98



Department of State

8a
TELEGRAM
48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 393

PAGE 01 ALGIER 01565 292027Z

84
ACTION SS 70

INFO /070 W

.....
P 291930Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3211

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ALGIERS 1565

LIMDIS

REF: ALGIERS 1556

1. RACHID ZEGHAR CONFIDENT OF BOUMEDIENE, ASKED ME TO TEA TODAY. INSTEAD OF TEA, WE HAD ONE HOUR DISCUSSION. ZEGHAR MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. BOUMEDIENE, WITH WHOM ZEGHAR SAID HE SPENT WEEKEND, WANTED ME TO KNOW OF HIS DEEP APPRECIATION OF MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY, WHICH BOUMEDIENE PERSONALLY ORDERED GIVEN UNUSUAL PUBLICITY.

B. ~~ZEGHAR WAS CHARGED BY BOUMEDIENE TO CONVEY PROPOSAL THAT US OFFER ALGIERS AS SITE FOR MEETING WITH HANOI REPRESENTATIVES TO END VIETNAM WAR. ALL FACILITIES, INCLUDING CLUB DES PINS, AT DISPOSAL OF US DELEGATION.~~

~~PAGE 2 RUFNRS 1565. CONFIDENTIAL~~

C. ~~SAME DELEGATION COULD REGULARIZE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND ALGERIA.~~

D. ~~IF ALGIERS NOT FEASIBLE AS CONFERENCE SITE, GOA READY TO RECEIVE US EMISSARY QUIETLY. LIKE BEAUMONT IN BRITISH EXERCISE TO ARRANGE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.~~

E. ~~GOA PREPARED TO "LET US OPEN CONSTANTINE" AND TO DISCUSS COMPENSATION FOR AMERICAN CLAIMANTS, PERHAPS BY EARMARKING FUTURE US AID FOR THEM. OUTRIGHT GOA APPROPRIATION FOR US CLAIMS NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF PROBLEM WHICH WOULD BE GENERATED WITH FRENCH, "BUT ALGERIA IS PREPARED TO DO JUSTICE TO THESE INDIVIDUALS" AS IT IS TO AMERICAN OIL COMPANIES NOW IN PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. ALGERIA AT SAME TIME WOULD HOPE FOR RESUMPTION OF US AID, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO SHIPMENTS FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES.~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-280

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By CG, NARA Date 7-23-99



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 ALGIER 01565 292027Z

2. IN REPLY, I SAID I HAD HEARD OF ALGERIAN SUGGESTION OF ALGIERS AS CONFERENCE SITE BUT THIS IS FIRST TIME BOUMEDIENE'S NAME HAD BEEN CONNECTED WITH IDEA. WOULD TRANSMIT PROPOSAL TO WASHINGTON, WHERE IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO BE STUDIED AT HIGHEST LEVEL IN CONTEXT OF GLOBAL CONSIDERATIONS, INCLUDING ~~SUCH FACTORS AS WHETHER ALLIED DELEGATIONS COULD ACCOMPANY US DELEGATION. ZEGHAR WINCED~~ SAID THIS PROCESS UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD TAKE SOME TIME. CLARIFIED HIS THINKING ON CONSTANTINE, WHICH I NOTED HAD NOT BEEN CLOSED. OUR ~~CONSUL WHO IS CURRENTLY RESIDENT IN ALGIERS, MAY RETURN TO~~

PAGE 3 RUFNRS 1565 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONSTANTINE AT SUCH TIME AS WE HAVE CONSULAR ASSISTANT TO REPLACE HIM HERE. ON AID, I REPEATED POSITION AS STATED IN AIDE MEMOIRE, WITH WHICH HE WAS FAMILIAR, AND EMPHASIZED THAT MASSIVE US AID COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO FLOW AUTOMATICALLY WITH RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS. ALSO, VOLAG AID WAS CASUALTY OF DIPLOMATIC BREAK, FUTURE US AID FUNDS CONSIDERABLY MORE LIMITED THAN PRIOR TO JUNE, AND FUTURE EMPHASIS OF US AID IN AFRICA WAS IN CONTEXT OF REGIONAL COOPERATION (ZEGHAR SAID THIS SHOULD POSE NO PROBLEM).~~

3. ZEGHAR IS WELL KNOWN BY EMBASSY AND OTHER AGENCY. HE IS ~~UNDOUBTED FRIEND OF US AND HAS BEEN CLOSE TO BOUMEDIENE FOR MANY YEARS. HE HAS BEEN UNOFFICIAL BUT UNCERTAIN CHANNEL TO PRESIDENCY IN EARLIER SITUATIONS. UNCERTAIN IN SENSE THAT IT IS NOT ALWAYS CERTAIN WHETHER HE IS FULLFLEDGED EMISSARY OR TRYING TO ARRANGE DEAL WHICH COULD BE SOLD TO PRESIDENCY. HE IS CLOSE TO SLIMANE HOFFMAN, WHO ALSO CLOSE TO BOUMEDIENE, AND WAS INVALUABLE SOURCE OF EMBASSY INFORMATION DURING ABORTIVE REVOLT OF DEC. 14-15.~~

4. ZEGHAR IMPLIED THAT BOUTEFLIKA WAS FAMILIAR WITH ZEGHAR'S APPROACH TO US. I DID NOT TRY TO PIN HIM DOWN ON THIS BECAUSE I DID NOT WANT TO EMBARRASS BOUTEFLIKA'S AGENTS WITH WHOM I HAVE BEEN SPEAKING BUT WHO HAVE YET TO TELL ME THEY SPEAKING FOR GOA.

PAGE 4 RUFNRS 1565 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. ~~WHILE ALGERIAN MANNER OF DOING BUSINESS ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE IS CURIOUS AND UNBUSINESSLIKE, I HAVE NO DOUBT RE SINCERITY OF~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 ALGIER 01565 292027Z

APPROACHES OF ZEGHAR AND ROUTEFLIKA'A BOYS. WHEN WASHINGTON INSTRUCTIONS ARE DRAFTED FOR RESPONSE TO GOA, HOPEFULLY THEY WILL CONTAIN SUGGESTION ~~THAT WE TALK OFFICIALLY AND IN ONE CHANNEL.~~ (REFTEL CITES SIMILAR BRITISH EXPERIENCE AND RESOLUTION IN FAVOR OF TALKS WITH HAMDANI.) WOULD NOT WANT TO CUT OFF ZEGHAR TOO ABRUPTLY HOWEVER AND WOULD HAVE TO HANDLE THIS ASPECT WITH SOME CARE.

6. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT WE COULD USE INSTRUCTIONS SOONEST EVEN IF THEY ARE ONLY INTERIM.
HOFFACKER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

**Tuesday, April 30, 1968
11:15 a.m.**

Mr. President:

**Here is a revised, consolidated
agenda for today's lunch meeting.**

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NND, Date 5-20-92

~~SECRET~~

Lunch Meeting With the President
Tuesday, April 30, 1968 -- 1:00 p.m.

9a

Pres file

REVISED AGENDA

1. Site Diplomacy: if any. (Sec. Rusk)

Situation report.

2. Possible initiative by Thieu towards the NLF. (Tab A)

Attached memorandum which I sent to Sec. Rusk. Also attached draft cable which I suggested to Sec. Rusk for transmission to Amb. Bunker, bearing on the proposal.

3. Foreign Affairs Briefings of Major Presidential Candidates. (Sec. Rusk and Mr. Helms) (Tab B)

- Previous experience: State and CIA.
- Ground rules for present campaign.

4. U.S. Policy Towards Greater Proportionate Vietnamese Effort and U.S. Troop Ceiling. The President. (Tab C)

Need to maintain flexibility in terms of unknown Hanoi intentions.

5. Possible Bombing Targets Between 19th and 20th Parallels.

Sec. Clifford and Gen. Wheeler will present a paper.

6. Enlargement of BARREL ROLL area in Laos. (Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford)

Enlargement of area permitted for bombing. Sullivan makes a strong case for some enlargement, beyond the area agreed last week, to assist hard-pressed Laos. Defense and State tend to agree.

7. Censorship in South Vietnam. (Sec. Clifford) (Tab D)

As attached indicated (Tab D), the Pentagon, as I now understand it, regards:

- censorship as costing more than it is worth;
- believes the right path is to refine and improve application of Westy's guidelines.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Ng, NARA, Date 5-28-92

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-2-

8. MACV Briefing on Bombing Pause, etc.

At our instigation, MACV plans to brief on intensive enemy supply movements to the South.

The briefing was also planned to reveal -- from reconnaissance data -- the extent to which bridges are being repaired, supplies piled up, etc., in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

We have held up the briefing for twenty-four hours to get your guidance on three points, on which you may wish to hear discussion at lunch today:

- should MACV proceed to background on intensive enemy movements south of men and supplies?
- should we confirm on background that we are, in fact, running reconnaissance missions?
- should we background on the extent to which the enemy is making the most of the respite in Hanoi-Haiphong?

We want to get the facts out; but we don't wish it to look as if MACV is pressuring you on the bombing pause or undercutting our effort to get negotiations going.

- 9. Ambassador Bunker's present plans: he hopes to spend May 9-14 in Katmandu.
(Sec. Rusk)
- 10. New Military Credit Sale for Iran. (Tab E)
- 11. Other.

Walt Rostow

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

P file

10

~~SECRET~~

Luncheon with the President
Tuesday, April 30, 1968

Agenda

1. Site Diplomacy: if any (Sect. Rusk)

Sitrep.

2. Foreign Affairs Briefings of Major Presidential Candidates (Tab A)
(Sect. Rusk; Mr. Helms)

- previous experience: State and CIA.
- ground rules for present campaign.

3. U. S. Policy towards Greater Proportionate Vietnamese Effort and U. S. Troop Ceiling (Tab B)

(The President)

Need to maintain flexibility in terms of unknown Hanoi intentions.

4. Censorship in South Vietnam (Sect. Clifford)

As attached (Tab C) indicates, Pentagon, as I now understand it, regards:

- censorship as costing more than it is worth;
- believes the right path is to refine and improve application of Westy's guidelines.

5. Other.

Walt. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By lg, NARA, Date 5-20-92

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10a A
INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, April 29, 1968, 5:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Briefing of Major Presidential Candidates
in 1964

During the campaign of 1964, State Department records show that

Governor Rockefeller was briefed May 16, 1964,

Governor Scranton was briefed on May 21, and

Mr. Stassen was briefed on May 26.

Senator Goldwater turned down the offer to provide briefings on the grounds that it was less than wise and less than wholehearted (see Tab 1 for his letter to Secretary Rusk dated April 23, 1964).

The three who accepted the offer did so on the basis of a letter from Secretary Rusk stating that he, Secretary McNamara, and CIA Director McCone joined "in offering you all possible information that may affect you in the responsible discussion of issues affecting the national security to offer a full account of the existing international situation as it is assessed by the U.S. Intelligence Community and to respond to any questions which you may ask about present American national security policy and the reasons for it."

The separate briefings of Governor Rockefeller and Governor Scranton were held in Secretary Rusk's conference room. Director McCone gave a global intelligence briefing, particularly on relative U.S. and Soviet strength and then covered each continent. Secretary Rusk then discussed European policy in considerable detail. Secretary McNamara discussed the situation in Southeast Asia. The sessions were very informal with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara adding to Mr. McCone's presentation. Governor Rockefeller and Governor Scranton both interrupted to ask questions. The three officials remained for each briefing which lasted nearly the full two hours.

An offer was made at the end of each briefing to provide additional information if the person being briefed desired to do so at any subsequent time.

CONFIDENTIAL

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAY 18, 1983.

BY hfg ON 5-28-92

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

All three were invited to the White House after their briefings and each met the President.

Each of the three candidates had spoken extensively on foreign policy matters. Governor Rockefeller was critical of policies on Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia, NATO and troop withdrawal, Soviet wheat sales and the effects of the test ban on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Tab 2 is Governor Rockefeller's list of his foreign policy concerns as well as his understanding that his right to criticize would be unaffected by the briefing.

W. Rostow Rostow

Attachments - Tab 1 and 2

CONFIDENTIAL

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C.

106

April 23, 1964

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

President Johnson's offer to provide special briefings for major Presidential candidates, of which your letter was the first official notification, strikes me as less than wise and less than wholehearted.

The striking time lag between the President's announcement and your official action strongly suggests that the offer began as an off-hand political gesture and now is being followed through in much the same spirit.

At the outset, as has been reported, I said that I did not believe such briefings proper. There are a number of reasons:

1. Members of the Congress and the Senate are not without information. Much of the top secret material that the Pentagon has been releasing for political purposes recently has been known to us--but we have not tried to, or wanted to, violate secrecy by throwing the data around as freely as this administration has been.
2. If there are facts that candidates should know about, there may also be facts that the American people should know about--and a careful review of this administration's secrecy policies would impress me as far more useful than this will-of-the-wisp offer to candidates. The State Department's own role in suppressing information regarding Viet Nam and in censoring testimony before Congress might well be included in such a review.
3. The idea of passing along vital and highly classified information to an open field of candidates is basically unwise. When the two parties have actually selected their candidates, such action has been taken as a matter of course. At the moment, as a matter of fact, there might be considerable argument even as to who is or is not a candidate.

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April 23, 1964

4. There is another consideration that has not escaped those who have dealt with such matters before. An offer to hand over secret data, particularly when political motives may be involved, might be used as energetically to silence debate as to serve debate. Having received information in one of these briefings, a candidate, whether he had the information from another source or not, might then be officially or morally inhibited from using the information.

Thus, although I appreciate your personal role in this and your courtesy, I must respectfully decline the offer for the time being. If the Republican convention nominates me, I will, of course, expect that the regular briefings made available to other candidates in the past will be discussed by us as a separate matter.

Sincerely,


Barry Goldwater



STATE OF NEW YORK
EXECUTIVE CHAMBER
ALBANY

NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER
GOVERNOR

10c
THE WHITE HOUSE

APR 27 9 27 AM '64

RECEIVED

April 24, 1964

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your instruction, Secretary of State Rusk has offered to brief me, as a candidate for the nomination of my party for the presidency, on information respecting the issues that affect the national security. I appreciate this very much.

The past, present and future foreign policy of the United States is of vital concern to the American people and all of the free world. It is not only appropriate but essential that the basic issues be responsibly presented to the American people for their information, discussion and decision, particularly during this presidential year. For the past several months, I have been doing just this.

My concern springs from deep interest in and long years of association with foreign policy and international relations in and out of government, including service as Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs starting in 1940, and thereafter as Assistant Secretary of State, Chairman of the President's Committee on International Economic Development, Chairman of the Defense Department Reorganization Committee, Special Assistant to the President for International Affairs.

I have already made formal statements commenting upon overall foreign policy, NATO, Latin America and the space race, and have discussed the situation in Laos, South Vietnam, Cuba and Panama. I plan a series of additional specific statements on United States foreign policy including, among others:

- United States policy toward Vietnam;
- United States policy toward Laos;
- United States policy on Indonesian aggression against Malaysia;
- The sale of wheat to the Soviet Union in the context of East-West trade policy;
- The effects of the nuclear test ban treaty on the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
- The withdrawal of American troops from Europe, and United States policy toward NATO.


I have serious disagreements with the administration in each of these areas and particularly with the basic assumption upon which these policies have been based.

I should, of course, welcome receiving a briefing by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, setting forth the relevant facts on our actual international position and national security. The nature and scope of these factual briefings are, of course, for the administration to determine.

- 3 -

As a basis for the briefing, I want to make it clear that I reserve the right to continue to comment on or express disagreement with past policy decisions or actions and present or future policies and actions relating to the conduct of foreign affairs and national defense if, in my judgment, it is in the national interest.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Dwight D. Eisenhower". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, sweeping initial 'D'.

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10d

Wednesday, April 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Briefings of Major Presidential Candidates

Foreign affairs briefings of major Presidential candidates in the election of 1964 were handled as follows:

A. On April 20 the President instructed the Departments of State and Defense and CIA to provide all major candidates for the office of President with all possible information helpful to their discussion of American policy". (See Tab A)

B. Secretary Rusk sent appropriate letters to Senator Goldwater, Governor Rockefeller, Senator Smith, Governor Stassen, Mr. Nixon, Governor Scranton, and Governor Wallace of Alabama. In making this announcement, the President said, "We recognize that some of these gentlemen may not consider that they are candidates, but it does not seem appropriate for us to attempt to make that decision for them. Ambassador Lodge is in a somewhat different position. He has access to all information which he needs in discharging his most important assignment, and if at any time this situation should change, we would make whatever new arrangements might become necessary, with pleasure." (See Tab B)

C. Governor Scranton and Governor Stassen accepted the President's offer and were briefed. Ambassador Lodge had information available to him at his Embassy. (See Tab C)

On the basis of recollection of State Department officials, the following practices were used in the elections of 1952, 1956, and 1960:

A. No offers of briefings to Presidential hopefuls in the pre-convention period were made. However, some declared candidates were briefed by the State Department before the conventions, at their request, on both specific subjects and on a global basis.

B. Following the nomination, foreign policy and intelligence briefings were offered by the current Administration to the candidates in 1952, 1956, and 1960.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12358
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 18, 1983.

BY RS ON 5-28-92

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

In 1952, President Truman offered briefings to both candidates. Governor Stevenson came to Washington in August and was briefed at the White House by both State and CIA officials. In addition, a middle-grade CIA officer was assigned to each candidate with the intention of providing weekly briefings on the road during the campaign. The briefings were, in fact, much less frequent, although weekly briefing books were made available to the candidates.

In 1956, Governor Stevenson was telephoned by Secretary Dulles. His only briefing, however, was conducted at CIA and contained only intelligence, as opposed to policy information.

In 1960, Allen Dulles personally briefed Senator Kennedy three times -- twice a general briefing (including a long session at Hyannis in July) and once on a single topic. Senator Kennedy also received a policy briefing by State Department officials prior to his election.

Walt Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

Remarks on Foreign Affairs at the
Associated Press Luncheon in New York City, A
April 20, 1964, 10e

[272] Apr. 20

Public Papers of the Presidents

be my solemn duty as President to submit supplemental requests for additional amounts until the necessary funds of \$3.4 billion are appropriated.

In these areas, and in other areas of concern, we remain faithful to tested principle and deep conviction while shaping our actions to shifting dangers and to fresh opportunity.

This year is an election year in the United States. And in this year let neither friend nor enemy abroad ever mistake growing discussion for growing dissension, or conflict over programs for conflict over principles, or political division for political paralysis. This mistake in judgment has been made twice in our lifetime, to the sorrow of our adversaries.

Now let those at home, who share in the great democratic struggle, remember that the world is their audience and that attack and opposition to old policies must not be just for opposition's sake, that it requires responsible presentation of new choices, that in the protection of our security, the protection of American security, partisan politics must always yield to national need.

I recognize that those who seek to discuss great public issues in this election year must be informed on those issues. Therefore, I have today instructed the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to be prepared and to provide all major candidates for the office of President with all possible information helpful to their discussion of American policy. I hope candidates will accept this offer in the spirit in which it is made—the encouragement of

the responsible discussion which is the touchstone of the democratic process.

In the past 20 years we have gradually become aware that America is forever bound up in the affairs of the whole world. Our own future is linked to the future of all. In great capitals and in tiny villages, in the councils of great powers and in the rooms of unknown planners, events are being set in motion which will continually call upon our attention and make demands on our resources.

Prophecy is always unsure. But if anything is certain, it is that this Nation can never again retreat from world responsibility. You must know, and we must realize, that we will be involved in the world for the rest of our history. We must accustom ourselves to working for liberty in the community of nations as we have pursued it in our community of States.

The struggle is not merely long. The struggle is unending. For it is part of man's ancient effort to master the passions of his mind, the demands of his spirit, the cruelties of nature. Yes, we have entered a new arena. The door has closed behind us. And the old stage has passed into history.

Dangers will replace dangers, challenges will take the place of challenges, new hopes will come as old hopes fade. There is no turning from a course which will require wisdom and much endurance so long as the name of America still sounds in this land and around the world.

NOTE: The President spoke at 1 p.m. at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York City. In his opening words he referred to Paul Miller, president of the Associated Press.

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B

the Assistant Secretary, and the Chairman of the National Mediation Board was invaluable. The groundwork for collective bargaining in the railroad industry has been reestablished. We hope it will promote true cooperation and meaningful communication between labor and management.

Thank you, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT. Thank you, Mr. Davidson.

Now I present Mr. J. E. Wolfe, the Chairman of the National Railway Labor Conference. Mr. Wolfe.

Mr. Wolfe: On behalf of the Nation's railroads, I applaud President Johnson's handling of this dispute. We are deeply grateful for his statesmanship that led to today's settlement which should have a wholesome effect on collective bargaining both in railroading and other industries. The settlement promises to restore the morale of our 700,000 employees to its highest level, and bring a rebirth of the spirit of cooperation between management and union leaders. Thus, the settlement we have made, at President Johnson's request, means a brighter future for America's railroads in an atmosphere of free enterprise.

THE PRESIDENT. Thank you very much, Mr. Wolfe.

The White House and the President receive in the neighborhood of 100,000 letters

per week. The other day I received a letter from a little girl named Cathy May.

Cathy May, tonight I am pleased to tell you that the railroads are going to continue to run without interruption. Cathy May writes me and says:

Dear President Johnson:

I am seven. My grandmother lives in New York. She is coming to see me make my first Holy Communion. Please keep the railroads running so that she can come to see me. Thank you.

CATHY MAY BAKER

36 Hemlock

Park Forest, Illinois

So Cathy's grandmother can now go to see her and all my fellow Americans can be proud that the railroad management and the railroad brotherhoods came, labored, worked, and reasoned together and in the American way found the answer.

I am very indebted to Secretary Wirtz for presiding over these deliberations day and night for many weeks. I am sure that all Americans appreciate the contribution he has made.

NOTE: The President spoke at 6:55 p.m. at Station WTOP's Broadcast House in Washington, D.C. The remarks were broadcast over the Columbia Broadcasting System.

WASH. POST

285 The President's News Conference of April 23, 1964

THE PRESIDENT. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

[1.] Secretary Rusk is sending out letters to all those who may wish to accept my offer to provide all possible information to major candidates this year. Appropriate letters are going to Senator Goldwater, Governor

Rockefeller, Senator Smith, Governor Stassen, Mr. Nixon, Governor Scranton, and Governor Wallace of Alabama.

We recognize that some of these gentlemen may not consider that they are candidates, but it does not seem appropriate for us to attempt to make that decision for

them. Ambassador Lodge is in a somewhat different position. He has access to all the information which he needs in discharging his most important assignment, and if at any time this situation should change, we would make whatever new arrangements might become necessary, with pleasure.

[2.] I do not intend that we should lose sight of those Americans who do not share in the general prosperity of this country, so tomorrow I plan to visit several areas which suffer from heavy unemployment and poverty, or need special attention for the relief of economic distress. I will visit South Bend, Ind.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; Paintsville and Inez, Ky.; Huntington, W. Va.

I am inviting the Governors of the Appalachia States to meet with me in Huntington to discuss problems of that particular area. I will be accompanied by several top officials of this administration who are responsible for leading our attack on the problems of unemployment and poverty. These will include Secretary Wirtz, Secretary Hodges, Under Secretary Roosevelt, and Secretary Celebrezze.

[3.] I am glad to report that our decision to cut back on the production of unneeded nuclear materials, and the parallel announcements of Chairman Khrushchev and Prime Minister Douglas-Home, have been warmly greeted throughout the world, and also by responsible opinion in this country. We have made it very clear that these announcements do not constitute a new international agreement or contract of any sort.

We reached the decision here in the United States on our own initiative as what we, in the United States, ought to do. We did it in a prudent and reasonable concern for our strength and for avoiding excess, and we then explained our intention to the United Kingdom and to the Soviet Govern-

ment. They, in turn, acting on their own responsibility, announced parallel decisions.

This is the policy of restraint by mutual example. I discussed it yesterday in detail with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, at breakfast, and I believe that the discussion resulted in general understanding and agreement among us all.

[4.] We have an encouraging report this morning from Ambassador Unger in Laos. His latest information indicates now that the Government of the National Union under Prime Minister Souvanna is continuing and has the support of all, including the Revolutionary Committee. The important thing now is to concentrate once again on working for the peace and the unity of Laos under the principles established by the Geneva agreements.

[5.] I have had a most cordial telegram from General de Gaulle in response to a message of sympathy which I sent him as soon as I learned of his indisposition last week. We are very much encouraged by the reports from Paris that the General is making a strong and good recovery.

[6.] I am happy to announce that Mr. Robert Anderson, our Ambassador, will be making a brief visit to Panama early next week to meet with Special Ambassador Illueca and other Panamanian officials for the purpose of having a preliminary exchange of views.² At that time, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Illueca will arrange between them how they will conduct their talks on the problems to be worked out between the two countries.

I am also sending to Panama in the near future a team of economic experts for the

² Former Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson was appointed as U.S. representative, with the rank of Special Ambassador, to carry out the objectives of the U.S.-Panama joint declaration of April 3.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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D.C.

The President's News Conference of August 15, 1964

[516] Aug. 15

Public Papers of the Presidents

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Could you help us out on that?

THE PRESIDENT. The administration strongly favors the King-Anderson bill. No one speaking for the administration has ever made any statement at variance with that. I do not want to assume the responsibility for keeping accuracy in reporting, but this is the first question that has been raised since that report about the administration's attitude, and if I had been consulted by the reporter who made the report, I would have answered him as I am answering you.

We favor the King-Anderson bill. The administration has favored it for several years. We will continue to favor it and do everything we can to get it enacted.

[10.] Q. Mr. President, you say you feel Senator Goldwater has performed a disservice to the national security and to world peace. Do you feel he should now publicly recant what he said and join you in setting the record straight?

THE PRESIDENT. That is a matter for the Republican candidate and his own conscience.

[11.] Q. Mr. President, in this same connection, sir, do you plan to renew your offer to make intelligence files available to Senator Goldwater so they can be of use to him in the campaign?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't see any necessity or requirement to renew it or restate it. It still exists. We made the briefings available to all the candidates. Governor Scranton accepted them, Ambassador Lodge had them available to him and utilized them, and even Governor Stassen came here and was thoroughly briefed. We have made that offer to the Republican nominee. If he does not care to have the information or the knowledge that would be contained in those briefings, that is a matter for him. I would say it is a matter entirely for his judgment and for his conscience.

The administration's record is clear that we want every person seeking the office of the Presidency, every responsible candidate, to have responsible and accurate information, and full knowledge, on the position of our Government and conditions in the world. If he does not desire to receive that knowledge, that is entirely a matter for him.

[12.] Q. Mr. President, there have been some public comments that Mr. Yarmolinsky* had been offered as a sort of a sacrifice to the southerners in exchange for support of the poverty program. I wonder if you would care to make any further comment on that?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't want to get into another running discussion here like we are in on nuclear weapons. What public comment? Who said what, so I will know what I am answering and what I am saying.

Q. Sir, I believe there were some published columns from various sources.

THE PRESIDENT. I would think that probably you ought to seek the columnist and see what the source of his information is. Mr. Yarmolinsky is employed by the Defense Department. And the Defense Department, the Labor Department, the Health, Education, and Welfare Department, and the Justice Department are jointly interested in the poverty program, so they all shared a part in preparing it. No one, to repeat, to emphasize, no one, at any time, any place, anywhere, suggested to me anyone for any of these places. The first information that I had that Mr. Yarmolinsky was, in effect, appointed to one of these places that did not exist was the columnist rumor that you talked about.

I was informed by the leader of this task force, Mr. Shriver, that he had made no recommendations to anyone, that he had

* Adam Yarmolinsky, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

Monday, April 29, 1968, 1:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Level of U.S. Military Effort in Vietnam

In your March 31 television address you made two references to the level of U.S. military effort in Vietnam and the indicated references to the South Vietnamese role.

- a. "On many occasions I have told the American people that we would send to Vietnam those forces that are required to accomplish our mission there." (page 622)
- b. "I cannot say and no man could say that no more will be asked of us." (in Vietnam) (page 625)
- c. "Our presence there has always rested on this basic belief: The main burden of preserving their freedom must be carried out by them--by the South Vietnamese themselves.

"We and our allies can only help to provide a shield--behind which the people of South Vietnam can survive and can grow and develop. On their efforts--on their determinations and resourcefulness--the outcome will ultimately depend." (page 621)

- d. "We shall accelerate the reequipping of South Vietnam's armed forces--in order to meet the enemy's increased firepower. This will enable them progressively to undertake a larger share of combat operations against the Communist invaders." (page 622)

Secretary Clifford, in response to press questions at a news conference on April 11 said:

- a. "We are giving our forces the preference on the M-16's and our other most modern weapons because we were taking the brunt of the effort and the fighting in South Vietnam. Now that the policy decision has been made to turn over gradually the major effort to the South Vietnamese, we are now starting to give them a degree of preference in our most modern weapons." (page 6)

- b. Question: "Sir, you said in response to an earlier question that a policy decision had been made to turn over gradually the major effort to the South Vietnamese. Could you tell us when that decision was made and how it might relate to General Abrams' appointment?"

Secy. Clifford: "Well, it has been in the process of being made. I don't know that it occurred on any one date. But for some months that I have been aware of, consultations have taken place between our military leaders and the South Vietnamese leaders, and plans in this regard have been in the process of formulation.

"I noted a comment by President Thieu within the last week in which he stated that his hope was that sometime in the foreseeable future their forces could be developed to the point where they could start in and take over areas that our forces occupied so that our forces could be relieved and be drawn back. That is the program and that is the one we are looking toward." (pages 9 and 10)

- c. Question: "Mr. Secretary, we are dealing with a new policy situation in South Vietnam. As you say, President Thieu says that his forces could take over more of the fighting so that our forces could be drawn back. What role, then, do you see the American forces playing? What does "drawn back" mean?"

Secy. Clifford: "I think no one can give the details at this time.

"By my answer, I do not mean to suggest that there was any immediate plan for that. It is a long-range plan But it seems to me that it is the ultimate aim that we have for a final determination there; that is, work ourselves into a posture where the South Vietnamese will take over the war." (pages 10 and 11)

Secretary Clifford in a speech to the Associated Press in New York on April 22 said:

"We concluded that Americans will not need always to do more and more, but rather that the increased effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Government and its fighting forces will now permit us to level off our effort--and in due time to begin the gradual process of reduction.

"The review established to our satisfaction that Southeast Asia is not for us a 'bottomless pit.'"

"The review confirmed the judgment, already reached by President Thieu, that the South Vietnamese were ready to take on more of the responsibility and to carry more of the military burden.

"As we level off our contribution of men, we are accelerating our delivery to the South Vietnamese armed forces of the most modern weapons and equipment." (pages 6 and 7)

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

P.S. As you can see, Clark has eased over from your concept of a "larger share" for the Vietnamese to the idea that "we level off." Clark's concept will, of course, work if Ho doesn't put into the South such large additional forces that we have to increase total allied strength faster than the South Vietnamese can build up.

W. W. R.



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

102

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

29 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRYKLUND

SUBJECT: Censorship in South Vietnam

Censorship in South Vietnam has been studied several times, including a team of officers who visited SVN in 1966. The team developed a rough plan on how it would be implemented. Other examinations have developed about the same approach. Basically, if censorship is to be imposed, it would require initial implementation by SVN. All communications going out of SVN would be censored, including personal mail. The censorship mechanism probably would involve a combined SVN-U.S. operation, together with other countries which contribute forces to the war.

Mechanics for censorship could be worked out; however, the following are some of the problems involved:

--An elaborate set-up would be required for field press censorship. About 200 trained personnel would be needed for the press alone; we have none today.

--Censorship would have to be accomplished under the authority and consent of the SVN Government. (The SVN Government is now in the midst of passing legislation insuring freedom of the press.)

--Problems of censoring third countries would be immense---politically and mechanically (e.g., among the censors would necessarily be some that speak Japanese, German, French, etc.)

--TV---U.S. and foreign---now ship their unprocessed film out of country. Censorship will require it be processed and edited in country. Great expense to someone will be involved in setting up these facilities in SVN. In addition, the film just will not move as fast as it does now. In general, TV will be late with the news.

--Much of the press corps in SVN is constantly turning over. How is a newsman to be censored after he leaves the country? If he cannot be, larger bureaus can run newsmen in and out of country to effectively negate censorship.

--The thought persists in my mind that censorship with the U. S. press simply will not work unless the U. S. press is convinced it is necessary. Even then, censorship will be looked on as evil and must withstand frequent attacks as to its necessity.

Defense and the Services have up-to-date regulations and field manuals on field press censorship. Some training is planned this summer at the Defense Information School for some USAR detachments. But, as stated above, we have no people trained in field press censorship at the present time.

In the broader context of controlling the release of information, General Sidle indicated on the phone this morning that MACV was considering the idea of lifting the embargo on Operation Delaware in increments. The first increment was released yesterday; it gave the press the go-ahead on stories and film prepared up through 22 April, provided no mention was made of future plans.



L. GORDON HILL, Jr.
Colonel, USA
Special Assistant, SEA

7D
file date: 10 j
23 APR 68

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS

SUBJECT: Interpretation of Ground Rules

1. A MACOI Memorandum to the Press of 29 January 1968, reminded all press members of the ground rules involving ground combat to which they agreed when they were accredited by MACV. A follow-up memorandum of 26 February further explained one of the rules.

2. As the result of these memoranda, members of the press ^{intelligence} have been most cooperative in attempting to stem the flow of important information to the enemy. However, based both on logic and the many queries received from newsmen, it is obvious that no set of ground rules can cover every tactical situation encountered by newsmen in the field. Although relatively few in number, "gray areas" cannot be entirely eliminated.

3. To assist newsmen in correctly interpreting these ground rule gray areas, MACV will provide 24-hour service to anyone who obtains information which he feels is subject to interpretation under the ground rules. Any newsman in the I CTZ who has doubt about the intelligence value of material he wishes to use in a story should contact Colonel Faser at the MACV Press Center, DaNang, Phone: DaNang 6259. Elsewhere in Vietnam, queries should be addressed to MACV extensions 3163 or 3989 where someone able to make a decision will always be on duty.

help insure

4. We hope that this service will provide a maximum flow of information while insuring the necessary protection to our troops.

5. For your information, a copy of the key ground rules is attached.

The following information is not releasable, unless and until released by MACV.

1. Future plans, operations, or strikes.
2. Information on or confirmation of rules of engagement.
3. Amounts of ordnance and fuel moved by support units or on hand in combat units (Ordnance includes weapons or weapons systems.)
4. During an operation, unit designations and troop movements, tactical deployments, name of operations and size of friendly forces involved.
5. Intelligence unit activities, methods of operation, or specific locations.
6. Exact number and type of casualties or damage suffered by friendly units.
7. Number of sorties and the amount of ordnance expended on strikes outside of RVN.
8. Information on aircraft taking off for strikes, enroute to, or returning from target area. Information on strikes while they are in progress.
9. Identity of units and locations of air bases from which aircraft are launched on combat operations.
10. Number of aircraft damaged or any other indication of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of ground antiaircraft defenses.
11. Tactical specifics, such as altitudes, course, speeds, or angle of attack. (General descriptions such as "low and fast" may be used.)
12. Information on or confirmation of planned strikes which do not take place for any reason, including bad weather.
13. Specific identification of enemy weapons systems utilized to down friendly aircraft.
14. Details concerning downed aircraft while SAR operations are in progress.
15. Aerial photos of fixed installations.

1 file

11

Tuesday, April 30, 1968
10:50 a. m.

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CBS Subpoena

Case # NLJ/CBS 20

Document # 50

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
MR. PRESIDENT:

Before lunch you will wish to read this assessment of Admiral Sharp's of enemy dispositions and intentions.

It concludes with Bus Wheeler's recommendation to Sect. Clifford that we should go to work again between the 19th and 20th parallels.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] attachment

(CM-3263-68 29 Apr 68 "Enemy Situation
in Vietnam (U)

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-CBS 20

By is, NARS, Date 9-25-84

WR 73

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

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CM-3263-68

29 April 1968

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CBS Subj: *Subj: na*

Case # NLJ/CBS

16

Document #

16

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Enemy Situation in Vietnam (U)

I have received a report from Admiral Sharp on the enemy situation in Vietnam since our bombing cessation in the North. In light of the current high level of interest in this subject, I am presenting Admiral Sharp's assessment in the succeeding paragraphs.

1. There is a growing body of evidence that belies Hanoi's verbal pronouncements that North Vietnam (NVN) is ready to approach the conference table in an effort to find peace. ~~Wishful thinking has led some observers to interpret hastily certain enemy moves as indicators that the enemy is scaling down the conflict. A close look at these actions indicates otherwise.~~

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Authority NLJ-CBS 16
By is NARS, Date 8-28-84

51-808828/68

WR 73

cy 6 of 7 copies

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([REDACTED])

4. Information from prisoner interrogations and captured documents also does not fit the concept of an enemy moving toward peace. An enemy document captured on 17 April encourages resistance at all costs, stating that conditions for negotiations "will remain unchanged under all circumstances." The document stresses increased vigilance and continued aggressive attack, while discouraging any illusions of peace. This theme was also emphasized in interrogations of Tran Van Dac (alias Tran Van Ha), a ranking communist political officer, who stated that the enemy has planned for nationwide offensive actions to include a major attack on Saigon in the near future.

5. Enemy logistical resupply efforts also expose the lack of any genuine peaceful intent by North Vietnam. Indications of increased use of coastal and inland waterways by water-borne logistics craft (WBLC) are evident. Aerial photography in early April revealed nine motorized coastal

[REDACTED] L

craft and two possible landing craft (LCM) in the Vinh area. Eighty WBLC were sighted on 16 April at the headwaters of the Song Ngan Sau, which feeds into the road system north of Mu Gia. On 18 April three WBLC and 25 trucks were sighted at a newly developed transshipment point just north of Ha Tinh (about 25 miles south of Vinh). Daytime operations of this kind so far south in NVN have been rare. Between 14 and 23 April, US fleet aircraft attacked 433 WBLC, 98 of which were reported as destroyed or damaged.

8. Roadwatch sightings in NVN indicate that the enemy is continuing to move substantial numbers of trucks toward Mu Gia Pass. Reports indicate the use of large convoys, some as large as 200 trucks, and some convoys proceeding with headlights on even under air attack. Air sightings in the Laos Panhandle between 1 and 11 April totaled some 2,400 trucks, an average increase of about 50 trucks per day over the number reported during the last weeks in March. Air sightings from 12 to 18 April were over 2,200 in STEEL TIGER as against the weekly average from 1 January - 31 March of about 1,300. This indicates a determined resupply effort, particularly in view of high truck losses which have numbered 2,002 destroyed/damaged in Laos alone since 1 April.

9. Photographs and visual sightings since the first of the month disclose continued enemy road construction and improvement in SVN in both I and II Corps areas. A new road

[REDACTED]

is being built while an old French road is being improved in the Kontum/Quang Tin border area. Route 548 in the A Shau Valley and the Plei Tran Valley road are both being extended. A report states that a convoy of 120 ten-wheeled trucks left Khe Sanh area on 2 April, drove day and night and arrived in the A Shau Valley on 8 April, with a final destination about 22 miles south of there. The trucks reportedly carried food, ammunition and weapons, including 11 cannons "large enough to fit a small child into the barrel."

10. It is also abundantly clear that the enemy is taking full advantage of the bombing pause to refurbish and repair war supporting industries, lines of communication (LOCs) and airfields in North Vietnam, although the paucity of good photo reconnaissance has prevented a full examination of all target systems. The following examples of changes since 19 April 1968 are believed representative of NVN efforts to recuperate its losses:

A. A combination fixed, pontoon bridge bypass for the Hanoi Railroad/Highway Bridge over the Red River (Target No. JCS 12) was completed and serviceable on 14 April. Rail spurs in the vicinity of the Hanoi Ferry across the Red River (Target No. 616-03719) were filled with assorted rolling stock and supplies. The Haiphong Railroad/Highway Bridge (Target No. 616-00002) was serviceable on 15 April, reflecting repairs made since 16 March. Also on 15 April, repair activity was noted at Haiphong Highway Bridge (Target No. 616-00068) over the Ha Ly Canal. Photography of 18 April revealed 76 barges, one ferry and a newly constructed marine railway at the Hanoi Barge Yard, Thuong (Target No. 616-03372) about 4 NM southeast of Hanoi (near the Hanoi Ferry).

B. All jet capable airfields appear operational with photographic confirmation that the entire airstrip at Phuc Yen was serviceable on 16 April.

C. On 16 April, there were 85 large piles of raw materials at the Phu Ly sugar refinery adjacent to the Phu Ly Thermal Power Plant (Target No. 616-00771).

[REDACTED]

D. Construction and repairs were noted on all major power plants prior to the cessation of bombing. On photography of 16 April, the Thai Nguyen Thermal Power Plant appeared partially operational with further repairs in progress and construction materials noted.

E. Photographs of the Haiphong Port area taken on 18 April show the Soviet-made suction dredge, Zemleses No. 8, has returned. This dredge, which is capable of moving 1,000 cubic yards per hour, had been unlocated since June 1966. This unit is the only NVN-owned dredge that can work in the outer bar area.

11. Worthy-of-note also is the evident change in attitude and outlook by the average NVN citizen. Since the bombing restrictions, a western observer reports there has been a general air of relaxation and confidence in Hanoi, whereas prior to this time, the people were nervous and appeared overworked and fatigued. Members of the diplomatic community in Hanoi reportedly believe North Vietnam will continue and perhaps increase its military effort in South Vietnam prior to and during peace talks in order to have a stronger hand in any negotiations.

12. All of the foregoing point toward a single conclusion: Instead of matching our steps at de-escalating the conflict, the enemy is using the present bombing restriction as an opportunity to recuperate, refurbish his forces, and bring in replacements --- all in preparation for further combat at a time and place of his choosing. He is taking maximum advantage of our bombing pause in the north to repair, rebuild and replenish his forces for increased aggressive activity. Significantly there is a lack of any positive indicators that the enemy is reducing his level of preparations for continued offensive actions in SVN.

Admiral Sharp believes that, in light of the foregoing evidence, our bombing operations should be resumed throughout North-Vietnam in order to apply increased pressure on the enemy with the advent of good weather. While I support Admiral Sharp's view that we should increase pressure on the enemy, I

[REDACTED]

[

recommend that, as a first step, we should immediately resume air strikes and SEA DRAGON naval operations in that area of North Vietnam between 19 and 20 degrees north latitude.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Copies furnished:
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Nitze
Mr. Walt Rostow

INFORMATION

12

~~SECRET~~--CROCODILE

Pres file

Tuesday, April 30, 1968 - 10:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

If you have the time to look at these cables, they indicate:

- The intensity of the Soviet and Eastern European diplomatic campaign on behalf of Warsaw, being conducted in Asia; and
- Marcos indicating the growing anxiety, as reflected by his ambassadors around the world, that we find a way to get the talks started.

W. W. Rostow

Bangkok 13923
Vientiane 6164
Manila 9918

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-283
By iss, NARA Date 4-30-98

~~SECRET~~--CROCODILE

WWRestow:rla



Department of State

#1 12a
TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION COPY

RR RUEHC
DE RUMJFS 6164 1211015
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 300925Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8239
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL: 7 4 3 0
RECEIVED: April 30, 1968
7:20 A.M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIENTIANE 6164

NODIS/CROCODILE

1. SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN REPS CONTINUE ORCHESTRATED CAMPAIGN AMONG LOCAL OFFICIALS, PRESS CORPS, AND DIPLOMATS ESPOUSING WARSAW AS IDEAL SITE FOR U.S.-DRV CONTACTS. FROM REFLECTIONS REACHING US, THEY SEEM TO BE GAINING INCREASINGLY SYMPATHETIC HEARING, ESPECIALLY WHEN THEY COUPLE WARSAW IDEA (AS DID ZORIN TO TANNER) WITH SECOND LOCATION SUCH AS PARIS.

2. PRESUMABLY AS RESULT OF THIS SORT ACTIVITY, SOUVANNA ASKED ME LAST EVENING WHY WE DID NOT PROPOSE A TWO-PHASE APPROACH, COMBINING WARSAW AND PARIS, OR WARSAW AND GENEVA.

PAGE 2 RUMJFS 6164 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
I TOLD HIM WE HAD NEVER OPPOSED TWO PHASE IDEA, SO LONG AS ONE PHASE WAS NOT WARSAW.

3. SIMILARLY, FRENCH AMBASSADOR, WHO ASKED WHETHER THIRD PARTY MIGHT NOT ASSURE FROM POLES THAT LATTER WOULD BE WILLING ADMIT GVN, ROK, ETC. I SAID WE PUBLICLY STATED THAT THIRD PARTIES' ASSISTANCE NOT RULED OUT, PROVIDED IT IS CONSTRUCTIVE, WE DON'T CONSIDER WARSAW CONSTRUCTIVE.

4. SOVIET AMBASSADOR GENTLY TOLD ME LAST EVENING THAT HE THOUGHT WE WERE OVERLOOKING SOME OF THE ADVANTAGES OF WARSAW "ESPECIALLY AS IT WAS SO FAR REMOVED FROM PEKING." HE ALSO GAVE A RARE INTERVIEW TO ASSOCIATED PRESS REP THIS MORNING AND SAID U.S. HAD NEVER QUALIFIED ITS OBJECTIONS TO WARSAW. HE SPECIFICALLY TOLD AP WE HAD NEVER PUBLICLY STATED OUR CONDITION THAT GVN SHOULD BE FREE TO BE PRESENT. I REFERRED AP REP (WHO CAME TO SEE ME AFTER TALK WITH SOVIET) TO BILL BUNDY'S STATEMENT ON AGRONSKY SHOW CONCERNING ACCESS FOR

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-280

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By CB NARA Date 7-23-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- VIENTIANE 6164, APRIL 30

LIAISON REPRESENTATIVES. I ALSO GAVE HIM COPY OF SURPRISINGLY
CONSTRUCTIVE N.Y. TIMES EDITORIAL WHICH LAID OUT REASONS
WHY CHOICE OF SITE WAS IMPORTANT.

5. COMMENT: AS ALWAYS HAPPENS IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE
JOURNALISTS ARE IMPATIENT ABOUT FACT THERE IS NO NEWS,
SEVERAL OF THEM ARE ATTEMPTING TO CREATE NEWS. SOVIET CAM-
PAIGN ON WARSAW PLAYS RIGHT INTO THIS PRESS SYNDROME, AND
I BELIEVE YOU MAY EXPECT SEVERAL SPECULATIVE STORIES WITH
VIENTIANE DATELINES,

GP-3 SULLIVAN

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

126

~~SECRET~~

ACTION COPY

RR RUEHC
DE RUMTBK 13923K 121090Q
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 300829Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7055
STATE GRNC
BT

1968 APR 30 AM 6.04 07407Q

~~SECRET~~ BANGKOK 13923

NODIS/CROCODILE

REF: BANGKOK 13382

1. LAST NIGHT AT JAPANESE RECEPTION IN HONOR OF EMPEROR'S BIRTHDAY, SOVIET AMBASSADOR VOLKOV TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO ASK ME WHETHER THERE IS ANYTHING NEW ON THE SELECTION OF A SITE FOR TALKS. I SIMPLY SAID AS FAR AS I KNEW HANOI WAS STILL INSISTING ON WARSAW. VOLKOV ASKED ME SEVERAL TIMES WHAT PROBLEM WE SAW WITH WARSAW, AND I REPEATED THE USUAL POINTS AND COUNTERED BY REMARKING THAT HANOI HAD SO FAR FAILED TO REVEAL THE REASONS FOR ITS REJECTIONS OF ANY OF THE PLACES WE HAVE SUGGESTED. WHEN VOLKOV ARGUED THAT SOME OF THE PLACES WE SUGGESTED WERE NOT NEUTRAL, I SAID THAT THIS IS CERTAINLY NOT TRUE OF VIENTIANE, DJAKARTA, RANGOON OR NEW DELHI. IN APPARENT GREAT SERIOUSNESS SEVERAL TIMES HE IMPORED ME "PLEASE TAKE WARSAW. THERE IS NOT MUCH TIME LEFT". HE WOULD NOT ELABORATE ON THIS POINT BUT INSTEAD WARNED ME THAT THE U.S. CREDIBILITY IS BEING UNDERMINED ALL OVER THE WORLD BY ITS REFUSAL TO ACCEPT WARSAW WHICH MANY "EVEN THAI WHO RELY ON YOU" REGARD AS INDICATING UNWILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE. HE CLAIMS THAT IN RECENT DAYS AT LEAST 25 THAI HAVE EXPRESSED SUCH VIEWS TO HIM. I QUESTIONED THE IDENTITY OF THESE THAI AND WONDERED WHAT THEY WOULD THINK IF WE WERE TO ACCEPT A NON-NEUTRAL SITE SUCH AS WARSAW, WHILE HANOI HAS REJECTED WITHOUT ANY EXPLANATION NUMEROUS NEUTRAL PLACES IN ASIA. NATURALLY, HE DID NOT IDENTIFY HIS THAI CONTACTS, BUT DID EXCLUDE SPECIFICALLY THANAT KHOMAN FROM THE LIST.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-250

By cb NARA Date 7-23-99~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE -2- BANGKOK 13923, APR 30, 1968

NODIS/CROCODILE

2. I SUGGESTED TO VOLKOV THAT ACTUALLY THE DEBATE ABOUT A SITE IS REALLY UNNECESSARY SINCE WE ARE ALREADY CARRYING OUT AN EXCHANGE IN VIENTIANE AND HENCE THE SIMPLEST THING TO DO WOULD BE TO CONTINUE TALKING AT A SITE WHERE WE ARE ALREADY TALKING. IT WOULD BE AN EASY THING TO UPGRADE THE LEVEL OF OUR REPRESENTATION AND I WAS SURE THAT OUR NEGOTIATORS, INCLUDING GOVERNOR HARRIMAN, WOULD BE HAPPY TO COME TO VIENTIANE. VOLKOV SHOOK HIS HEAD AND GRUMBLED QUOTE I DON'T KNOW WHY THEY (HANOI) DON'T LIKE VIENTIANE BUT MAYBE THEY HAVE SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH COMMUNICATIONS UNQUOTE. I NOTED THAT VIENTIANE IS QUITE CONVENIENTLY LOCATED WITH RESPECT TO HANOI.

3. I REPORT ALL THIS FOR THE SAKE OF ENSURING THAT NOTHING SLIPS THROUGH A CRACK, ALTHOUGH I DO NOT SEE ANY SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE. DURING PART OF THIS EXCHANGE THE INDIAN AMB WAS HOVERING BY US, EARS AFLAP. AS IS EVIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR UNGER'S PREVIOUS EXCHANGE WITH VOLKOV, HE SEEMS TO BE INTERESTED IN TALKING BUT HAS NOTHING PARTICULARLY NEW OR IMPORTANT TO SAY. THIS WAS PERHAPS UNDERLINED LAST NIGHT BY THE FACT THAT HE SAID THERE IS VERY LITTLE FOR HIM TO DO IN BANGKOK AND THAT HIS ASSIGNMENT HERE IS QUOTE A SORT OF REST UNQUOTE. HE ARRIVED AT THE RECEPTION AFTER AN HOUR AND A HALF OF VOLLEYBALL AND HIS COMMENTS TO ME WERE FLOATED ON A RATHER GARGANTUAN INTAKE OF SHRIMP TEMPURA AND WHISKEY, WHICH HE SAID HE NEEDED FOLLOWING HIS ATHLETIC EXERTION.

GP-3 HANNAH

BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

12-c

ACTION COPY

1968 APR 30 AM 12 07

073550

00 RUEHC
DE RUMJMA 48T 1210310
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 300255Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY MANILA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1699
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ MANILA 9918

NODIS/CROCODILE

REFS: STATE 150664 STATE 152367 STATE 153842 STATE 154614

1. WITH MARCOS FEELING TEMPORARILY UNWELL ON HIS RETURN TO MANILA, I WAS UNABLE TO SEE HIM UNTIL THIS MORNING. WENT OVER WITH HIM IN DETAIL DEPARTMENT'S THINKING AND POINTS RAISED IN THE REFERENCED TELEGRAMS, EMPHASIZING NEED FOR ABSOLUTE SECRECY IN THE MATTER. NO ONE ELSE WAS PRESENT.

2. MARCOS SAID HE AGREED WITH OUR LINE OF THINKING ON BUCHAREST AND INDICATED IT WOULD NOT PRESENT HIM WITH ANY PROBLEMS. HE DID NOT COMMENT

PAGE 2 RUMJMA 48T ~~SECRET~~
ONE WAY OR THE OTHER ON PROPOSED LIAISON ARRANGEMENTS FOR ICC'S IN THEIR OWN CAPITALS OR IN WASHINGTON.

3. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN RECEIVING REPORTS FROM PHIL EMBASSYS AROUND THE WORLD ALL OF WHOM INDICATED A FELT NEED IN THEIR COUNTRIES TO GET ON WITH THE TALKS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THIS CORRESPONDED WITH HIS OWN THOUGHT ON THE MATTER. HE OBSERVED, POINTING OUT THAT IN HIS VIEW IT WAS BECOMING MORE IMPORTANT EVERY DAY TO START THE TALKS AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. WILSON
BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-280

~~SECRET~~

By C6 NARA Date 7-23-99

13
INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET GOMINT~~

Tuesday, April 30, 1968
9:25 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Here is the report you requested from CIA on the effects of the bombing restriction in North Vietnam and the importance of North Vietnamese facilities between the 19th and 20th parallels. A good summary precedes the paper.

The passage on the facilities between the 19th and 20th parallels is on page 4.

You may wish to have this available at lunch.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

Intelligence Memorandum

"Evaluation of the Rolling Thunder Campaign as Presently Restricted"
29 April 1968, SC 07067/68, copy 1

WWRestow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-325
By cbm, NARA, Date 12-0-01

Mr. Rostow 14

Tuesday, April 30, 1968

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Short Message to the Shah

The Shah sent the following message expressing his sorrow over the devastation caused by our recent tornadoes:

"I have learned with deep regret of the news of the widespread devastation that has been caused by the recent wave of tornadoes in the United States of America and I would like to express to you, Mr. President, my sincere sympathy together with my heartfelt wishes for the welfare and the early rehabilitation of the inhabitants of the stricken areas."

State recommends the following simple response:

"I was touched by your message of sympathy regarding damages caused by tornadoes in the United States, and I am deeply grateful for the interest you have once again shown in the welfare of the American people."

I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓ 5/1/68

Disapprove _____

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15

ACTION

Tuesday, April 30, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

At my request, the State Department prepared the attached notebook containing the messages of condolence you received from world leaders on the occasion of the assassination of The Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.

Because of the recurring theme in the responses to these messages of condolence, I believe it is preferable not to include them in the notebook.

Also attached is a suggested letter to Mrs. King transmitting the notebook.

W. W. Rostow

15a

April 30, 1968

Dear Mrs. King:

Your terrible loss is shared not only by America, but by every country of the world where freedom and human dignity are cherished. In the hours and days after Dr. King's tragic death, world leaders sent many messages of condolence. I thought you and your children might like to have this album containing those expressions of sympathy.

My replies to these leaders reaffirmed America's determination to carry forward the work to which Dr. King gave his great courage and vision.

It is my hope that this token of the world's sorrow will, in some small way, bring you solace and strength in these days of great trial.

Mrs. Johnson and I will continue to keep you in our thoughts and prayers.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.
234 Sunset Avenue, Northwest
Atlanta, Georgia

LBJ:State:LS:cjf

14

For file

INFORMATION

Tuesday -
April 30, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith President Leonl's reaction to your birthday message.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

**Report from Ambassador Bernbaum
in Embassy Caracas of April 29.**

16 a

Ambassador Bernbaum reports from U.S. Embassy Caracas

(telegram no. 4355), April 29, 1968

"I delivered President Johnson's birthday greeting to President Leoni on April 27, during an open house President Leoni held for this occasion. Leoni read the President's message immediately and was obviously very moved by it.

When I left President Leoni's residence, he walked to the door with me and asked me to inform President Johnson of his gratitude for this kind gesture. Leoni expressed too his hope that President Johnson is in excellent health and his profound desire that President Johnson will be successful in his current efforts to win the peace."

17

INFORMATION

Tuesday, April 30, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Governor G. Mennen Williams, May 1 -- 5:30 p. m.

Governor Williams is in town in connection with his appointment as Ambassador to the Philippines. He is appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the morning Friday, May 3.

Attached is a Talking Paper prepared for you by the Department of State for your meeting with Governor Williams. In brief, it suggests that you stress:

1. the necessity for the Philippines maintaining their PHILCAG force in South Vietnam.
2. the importance of the Philippine Government taking a more liberal approach to foreign investment, both in their own interest and as a necessary step to a successful re-negotiation of our current economic relations agreement with them (Laurel-Langley).
3. our intention of keeping our AID programs to the Philippines at a relatively modest level (1968 MAP program is \$21 million and the 1968 AID program is about \$20 million).
4. our concern at the continuing lack of law and order in the Philippines and its inhibiting effect on the confidence of the mass of the people in the ability of the Philippines to meet its problems through existing domestic political structure.

W. W. Rostow

Att

MWright:wpt

Mr. Rostow 18

Pres file

Tuesday, April 30, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. President:

Before you see Roy Wilkins at 11:45 a.m., you should know of the glowing reports we have had of his performance. The attached telegram from Armin Meyer is just one of these.

I heartily endorse Armin's suggestion that you express your appreciation for his outstanding performance as chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Human Rights Conference. He ought to know we're proud of him.

Incidentally, it might not be a bad idea for George Christian to background along this line.

W. W. Rostow

cc: George Christian

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White House Guidelines, Feb. 21, 1953
By 49, NARA, Date 5-29-92

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INFO NEA 13, NSCE 00, SAH 03, L 03, AF 09, ARA 08, EA 10, EUR 15, RSC 01,
SS 20, SP 02, P 04, USIA 12, CIAE 00, INR 07, NSAE 00, RSR 01, NSC 10,
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5571

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PASS TO WHITE HOUSE FOR HAL SAUNDERS

1. IF NOT ALREADY DONE, PRESIDENT MIGHT WISH TO TELEPHONE ROY WILKINS OR SEND HIM MESSAGE OF APPRECIATION FOR SUCCESS HIS MISSION AS CHAIRMAN OF US DELEGATION AT CURRENT UN HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE IN TEHRAN.
2. AS REPORTED IN OTHER TELEGRAMS, E.G. TEHRAN 4344 USG COULD NOT HAVE HAD A MORE IDEAL CHIEF REP. WILKINS TOOK WIND OUT OF SAILS OF DEMAGOGUES WHO WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE HAD FIELD DAY IN HARANGUING OUR COUNTRY RE CIVIL RIGHTS. TO DATE, CRITICISM

~~PAGE 2 RUQTAN 4438 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
OF USG NOT ONLY RE RACIAL PROBLEM BUT ALSO VIET NAM BEEN SURPRIS-
INGLY LITTLE.~~

~~3. PARTICULARLY IMPRESSIVE WAS WILKINS' GENTLE MANNER. PEOPLE
ABROAD TEND TO CONSIDER OUR NEGRO COMPATRIOTS AS ALL STOKELY
CARMICHEL'S OR RAP BROWNS. AS NAACP LEADER, WILKINS DEMONSTRATED
THAT BULK OF COMMUNITY ARE MODERATE AND PATRIOTIC AMERICANS.~~

~~AT SAME TIME, HE EMPHATICALLY VOICED COMMON AMERICAN CONVICTION
OF UNCEASING NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS PROGRESS.~~

2. AS REPORTED IN OTHER TELEGRAMS, E.G. TEHRAN 4344 '86
COULD NOT HAVE HAD A MORE IDEAL CHIEF REP. WILKINS LOOK WIND
OUT OF SAILS OF DEMAGOGUES WHO WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE HAD FIELD
DAY IN HARANGUING OUR COUNTRY RE CIVIL RIGHTS. TO DATE, CRITICISM

PAGE 2 RUQTAN 4438 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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INGLY LITTLE.

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RE UNCEASING NEED FOR CIVIL RIGHTS PROGRESS.

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PAGE 02 TEHRAN 04438 302953Z

4. IRAN'S ENTEZAM, FORMER UNGA PRESIDENT, DESCRIBED WILKINS
AS "SAINT". HE SAID WILKINS PRESENCE ALONE MADE WORTHWHILE PUTTING
UP WITH SORDID POLITICS, PROPAGANDISTIC EXCHANGES AND ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE TRIBULATIONS WHICH ACCOMPANY THIS UN CONFERENCE.
VIRTUALLY ALL DELEGATES VOICED SIMILAR VIEWS.

5. ANOTHER CONFEREES TOLD WILKINS THAT IN MANY YEARS OF ATTEND-
ING INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES NEVER BEFORE HAD TEARS COME TO HER
EYES WHEN HEARING DELEGATE SPEAK.

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6. ADDED DIVIDEND WAS REASSURANCE AND INSPIRATION WHICH ROY
WILKINS PROVIDED OUR SIZEABLE AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN FRANK DIS-
CUSSIONS OF OUR PROBLEMS BACK HOME. HAVING SEEN PICTURES OF
DEVASTATION, E.G. 7TH AND 14TH STREETS IN WASHINGTON, AMERICANS
HERE WERE RELIEVED TO REALIZE THAT FUTURE OF OUR COUNTRY DOES
NOT LIE WITH EXTREMISTS OF EITHER BLACK OR WHITE RACES.

7. ALL IN ALL, WILKINS MADE US PROUD OF OUR COUNTRY. MEYER

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Department of State
H. S. C.

TELEGRAM

APR 25 12 24 PM '68

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INFO AF 09, ARA 08, EA 10, EUR 15, NEA 13, RSC 01, SAH 03, NSCE 00, GPM 04,
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HEW 07, RSR 01, /134 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5514
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AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

UNCLAS TEHRAN 4344

DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR GOLDSTEIN

CANBERRA FOR GOLDSCHMIDT

FROM USDEL, HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE, ATTENTION IO, HARRIMAN

1. ROY WILKINS LEFT TEHRAN APRIL 25 AFTER FOUR VERY FULL DAYS OF ACTIVITY AT HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE CULMINATING IN PRINCIPAL US STATEMENT APRIL 24. STATEMENT RECEIVED EXTRAORDINARY APPLAUSE AND MUCH CONGRATULATORY COMMENT; DEMAND FOR COPIES FAR

LYAGE 2 RUQTAN 4344 UNCLAS
OUTRAN ANTICIPATION. WILKINS HAD ALREADY PROVED AN OUTSTANDING FIGURE AT CONFERENCE. HE HANDLED MAGNIFICENTLY UNEXPECTED REQUEST BY UGANDA DELEGATE FOR MOMENT OF SILENCE IN TRIBUTE TO MARTIN LUTHER KING AND SPOKE BRIEFLY, FIRMLY AND DISPASSIONATELY TO COUNTER SOVIET-INITIATED ATTACKS ON GRC, GOV, FRG AND ROK RIGHT TO BE REPRESENTED AT CONFERENCE.

2. WILKINS MADE A POINT OF TALKING TO AS MANY DELEGATES AS POSSIBLE, OF ALL PERSUASIONS, AND WAS NOTABLY IMPRESSIVE WITH THEM. HE WAS BESIEGED BY MEDIA AND OBLIGINGLY SCHEDULED AS MANY TV AND PRESS INTERVIEWS AS TIME PERMITTED. LOCAL PUBLICITY EX-

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 TEHRAN 04344 250808Z

CELLENT. HE ADDRESSED CAPACITY AUDIENCES AT IRAN-AMERICA SOCIETY AND AT EMBASSY.

3. THROUGH SPLENDID COOPERATION AMB MEYER AND STAFF, WILKINS MET LARGE NUMBER DELEGATES AND LOCAL DIGNITARIES AT RECEPTION AND DINNER.

4. DELEGATION BELIEVES WILKINS VISIT MAJOR SUCCESS FROM US STANDPOINT. IT UNDERCUT ANY TENDENCY HERE TO USE KING ASSASSINATION

PAGE 3 RUQTAN 4344 UNCLAS

AND AFTERMATH AS SPRINGBOARD FOR CRITICISM OF US; HIGHLIGHTED BROAD AMERICAN UNITY IN FACING UP TO ADMITTED US RACE PROBLEMS; AND PROJECTED CALM CONVICTION THAT US WOULD WORK THROUGH ITS PROBLEMS, BY DEMOCRATIC MEANS, TO SUCCESSFUL SOLUTIONS. WE HAVE BEEN IMMENSELY HELPED BY HIS PRESENCE. MEYER

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17a

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TALKING PAPER

Meeting with Governor G. Mennen Williams
May 1, 1968 -- 5:30 PM

Philippine Contribution in South Vietnam

In October 1966 the Philippines sent a 2,050-man unit to South Vietnam, composed of an engineering battalion and its own security support. The Philippine Government is paying the salaries of this unit under an appropriation bill for \$8.5 million passed in June 1966, while the United States is paying overseas allowances and has furnished equipment and other support, to a total cost of slightly more than \$15 million per year. President Johnson in a letter last August raised with President Marcos our hope for increased Philippine assistance, but Marcos replied that because of Congressional and other opposition he could not consider increasing these forces. In fact, he is at present encountering difficulties in securing an appropriation to maintain these forces in South Vietnam. In early April of this year President Johnson received a message from President Marcos concerning President Johnson's speech of March 31 with regard to Vietnam, and in reply President Johnson pointed out that it is essential all troop contributing countries maintain their commitments in Vietnam, lest the North Vietnamese consider that we are weakening in our resolve. In summary the Philippine contribution to South Vietnam is relatively small, and the Philippine Government is encountering difficulties in maintaining the current level.

The President might wish to impress on Governor Williams the necessity of the Philippines maintaining or increasing such contribution in their own interest and in the interest of the free world position in South Vietnam.

Philippine Relations with Other Countries in Southeast Asia

The Filipinos, and President Marcos in particular, seem desirous of increasing their stature and influence among the countries of Southeast Asia. If this could be done, it would contribute to increased strength in the area. However, in March it was publicly disclosed that there was a clandestine training camp in the Philippines, evidently aimed at infiltrating the Malaysian territory of Sabah. This has increased tensions between the Philippines and

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-280
By cb, NARA Date 7-23-99

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2

Malaysia, and damaged the Philippine image in the area as a whole. The two countries have now agreed to hold talks on Sabah in Bangkok in June, but given the adamant position of both sides the prospects for an early amicable settlement are poor.

The President may wish to express to Governor Williams our satisfaction that the two countries have agreed to discuss the issue, since it is primarily a matter between the two countries. We hope that the issue can eventually be settled without damage to friendly relations or regional cooperation.

Philippine Relations with the United States

Our relations with the Philippines at this time are generally good. There are minor irritations in the operation of our bases in that country and minor trade difficulties. We are engaged in negotiations with the Filipinos on issues arising from the operation of the bases, and in accordance with an agreement during the Marcos State Visit in 1966, discussions on future economic relations between the United States and the Philippines began in November 1967. Any agreed arrangement would replace the Laurel-Langley Agreement which is scheduled to expire in 1974, unless replaced earlier. We can expect pressure from the Filipinos for further discussions this year; in fact the Filipinos have asked for a second meeting in May.

The President might point out to Governor Williams that the extremely restrictive policy of the Philippine Government concerning foreign investment makes a meaningful agreement difficult at this time. We would hope the Filipinos will shortly adopt a less restrictive attitude, and the Investment Incentives Law and other laws and policies will be interpreted more favorably toward foreign investment.

United States Aid

The aid programs to the Philippines are relatively modest. The Military Assistance program for 1968 at \$21 million has remained at approximately the same level as previous years, despite heavy cuts in the world-wide program. This level needs continual

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3

review to avoid hazard to long-run retention of our bases in the Philippines and to insure Philippine continual participation in our security objectives in Southeast Asia. The A.I.D. program this year is about \$20 million, mostly in support of agricultural development. We also expect an Ex-Im Bank loan of \$3.1 million for improved airport navigation facilities. 1968 will be an important year for Marcos and for development efforts of his administration. We will be ready within financial limitations to give support if we can, but we do not expect to begin any large new programs this year, since large amounts of external assistance are not the prime requirement for development in the Philippines.

The President might request Ambassador Williams to encourage Marcos to utilize to the maximum Philippine resources as an encouragement to both foreign and domestic private investment and as a means of securing access to additional loans from international lending institutions.

Law and Order

Probably the most disturbing aspect of the situation in the Philippines for 1968 and succeeding years, is the continued low state of respect for law and order. This inhibits investment, both foreign and domestic, contributes to the loss of confidence in the government and increasing disaffection among the mass of the people, and creates the danger that the present political structure will at some point no longer be considered as the most satisfactory means for evolutionary social and economic advance. All our programs in the Philippines and Southeast Asia provide protection for the Filipinos in attempting to work out solutions to this, and other problems. At the same time success or failure of all our programs in the Philippines is dependent on how the Filipinos handle this basic aspect of their own internal situation.

While it would be difficult for Governor Williams to influence the particulars of this situation, President Johnson should point out to him that he must have these basic considerations in his mind in all his dealings with the Filipinos.

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, April 30, 1968

19

MR. PRESIDENT:

Notes for dinner with Joe Alsop

Pres file

1. Solicit his views on:
 - meaning of large scale North Vietnamese infiltration;
 - probable Hanoi tactics in months ahead: military, political, and diplomatic;
 - ask bluntly: if we hold out against Phnom Penh and Warsaw, will they, in the end, pick a third site agreeable to us?
2. Urge him to write about meaning of our Vietnam position for:
 - outcome of struggle in China;
 - whole future of Asia;
 - U. S. position on world scene.
3. Convey your own feeling that it would be a disaster for U. S. and the world if we adopt a racist security policy and let Asia go.

W. W. Rostow

MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION *P. Lee*
20

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Monday, April 29, 1968
7:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Tuesday Lunch, April 30: Supplementary Agenda Items

1. Sect. Clifford and General Wheeler will present a paper on possible bombing targets between the 19th and 20th parallels.
2. MACV Briefing on Bombing Pause, etc.

At our instigation, MACV plans to brief on intensive enemy supply movements to the South.

The briefing was also planned to reveal -- from reconnaissance data -- the extent to which bridges are being repaired, supplies piled up, etc., in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

We have held up the briefing for twenty-four hours to get your guidance on three points, on which you may wish to hear discussion at lunch tomorrow:

-- should MACV proceed to background on intensive enemy movements south of men and supplies?

-- should we confirm on background that we are, in fact, running reconnaissance missions?

-- should we background on the extent to which the enemy is making the most of the respite in Hanoi-Haiphong?

We want to get the facts out; but we don't wish it to look as if MACV is pressuring you on the bombing pause or undercutting our effort to get negotiations going.

W. Rostow Rostow

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White House Guidelines, Feb. 21, 1983
By *kg*, NASA, Date *5-28-92*

~~SECRET~~

Monday, April 29, 1968
7:20 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

There is one operational point arising from your discussions with President Park, as reported by the interpreter. The question is this: Did you tell Park that his troops in South Vietnam could still obtain the equipment now on Okinawa if he extended the ROK tour of duty in South Vietnam?

Yes _____

No _____

Issue still subject to negotiation _____

Call me _____

Incidentally, we are only distributing the operational conclusions from the minutes of your meeting, not the text itself.

You may wish to examine the summary of substantive points attached.

Summary correct —
Correct as modified —
Call me —

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET/NO DIS attachment~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-286
By iso, NARA Date 5-21-98

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Summary of Points in Discussions between President Johnson
and President Park, 1010-1230; 1700-1830 hours, April 17, 1968

1. Open Invitation to Park to Visit US

President Johnson advised President Park that another visit by the latter to the United States would be well received by the US people, and President Johnson would welcome Park and send a plane for him at any time he wished to visit with President Johnson.

2. Additional ROK Military and Civilian Manpower Commitment
to SVN

- (a) US View - At Canberra on December 21, 1967, President Park indicated willingness to send 5,000 civilians and 6,000 additional troops to South Vietnam; the equivalent of a light division. On the basis of the ROK commitment in Canberra, US assistance in equipment amounting to \$88 million and additional military assistance of \$45 million, was earmarked from defense appropriations for the use of the additional ROK troops to be sent to Vietnam. \$32 million of DOD funds for counterinsurgency equipment had been utilized for this purpose, and that counterinsurgency equipment plus \$30 million other equipment is waiting in Okinawa for the use of the new ROK light division. Many of these items of equipment are of highest priority, and if additional ROK troops cannot use them, the USG must ship them to SVN for use by the ARVN.
- (b) ROK View - President Park said it would be "impossible" for him to send more active soldiers to South Vietnam at present because of the situation in South Korea. He said, however, that it would be possible for the Republic of Korea to send one combat group (regimental combat team) numbering 5,000-6,000 men from rear areas in South Vietnam and to have them replaced by civilians. Park said about 1500 ROK soldiers are rotated every month and it would be possible in about three months to send 5,000 civilians to SVN. He agreed to set July 1 as the target date.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-286

By is, NARA Date 5-21-98

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~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

-2-

There is a possibility that the ROK might send more troops in the future but not under the present circumstances. If the military strength of ROK forces in South Korea is strengthened, however, it would be possible to send one or two additional ROK divisions to SVN. At a later point President Park said he would like to send 6,000 additional troops but he had just barely organized the local reserve corps in South Korea whose members must undergo training so he must wait until summer to see how the situation develops. The National Assembly will not (now) approve the troop dispatch proposal. When President Park "feels relieved at a certain stage" he will send the additional troops to Vietnam.

3. Proposal for ROK Extension of SVN Duty Tours

President Johnson suggested that before January 1969 the period of service of ROK troops already in Vietnam be extended and he observed that this action would have the effect of increasing ROK military strength in Vietnam by one division. Park will consider this proposal. The President hoped to have Park's reply by the time Thanom (5/8-9) and Gorton (5/27-28) visit the US in May.

4. Bombing of North Vietnam

President Park spoke in favor of removing all restrictions against enemy targets in North Vietnam.

5. Situation in Korea

- (a) US View - The Administration has sent an Aid to Korea Budget Bill totaling some \$400 million to Congress. Mr. Vance recommended an extra \$100 million for Korea, which Congress has not yet acted on. The Administration is asking that part of the \$100 million go toward activating one air squadron. The President noted that we had sent to Korea some squadrons already and called up reserves because

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of the Korean situation, which should have been destined for Vietnam. With the increased air power in Korea President Johnson thinks that South Korea is superior to North Korea in all the services military capabilities and he does not think that North Korea will stage a large scale attack now.

- (b) ROK View - The ROK is grateful for the added appropriation request but does not "feel at ease with this amount" since North Korea aims at creating a second Vietnam in South Korea. President Park considered ROK air power superior and ROK naval strength about equal to North Korea. He feels that since North Korea has tens of thousands trained guerrillas, the ROK army must strengthen defense in rear areas. He feels that ROK army fire power is "far inferior to North Korea's." He would like to strengthen the ROK air force and he needs US assistance for the strengthening of the local reserve corps.

6. ROK Investment in US Securities

President Johnson asked whether ROK could make short term investment in US bonds and securities in the amount of \$50 to \$100 million and said this purchase would be helpful in having Congress approve a \$230 million military aid bill. President Park did not respond directly but noted that the total ROK national budget is only about \$1 billion.

22

Monday,
April 29, 1968 - 6:50pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

For file

Mr. President:

A Buddhist Monk named Khiet has sent a letter to you proposing a ceasefire on Buddha's birthday (May 11). Last year, the same gentleman sent a similar letter to us and to others -- including the Soviets, the Liberation Front, Hanoi and U Thant.

Ambassador Bunker strongly recommends that we ignore Khiet's letter. His view is shared by all concerned at this end.

Thus far, there has been no press interest in the letter. But I thought you should know about it in case a small item appears on the wires.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:WJJorden:pas:4/29/68

INFORMATIONCONFIDENTIAL

Monday, April 29, 1968, 6:30 P. M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

Hanoi propagandists are reaching back into the U. S. press for early quotes on U. S. willingness to meet with Hanoi but are relying primarily on non-Vietnamese criticism of the President to reinforce their case.

a. A commentary on April 15 cited Senator McCarthy and the influential Japanese newspaper Manichi as typical of the widespread criticism of the U. S. refusal to accept Phnom Penh and Warsaw.

b. Senator Fulbright and Senator McCarthy were cited in an April 19 Hanoi broadcast in English which included Nhan Dan article about the U. S. lack of goodwill in arranging a place to talk. Senator Fulbright was quoted as saying "I see nothing at all wrong in going to Phnom Penh." Senator McCarthy was reported as criticizing the President and calling for a new Secretary of State.

c. Last week, Senator McCarthy was quoted by Hanoi three times--all on remarks about where the talks should be held. In one of the broadcasts he was identified as a Presidential hopeful.

d. On April 25, a radio Hanoi transmission in English to Havana relayed some recent statements on the war by Senators Robert Kennedy, Mansfield, and McCarthy. The broadcast noted a Reuters report of a Kennedy statement in Los Angeles in which the Senator allegedly said the U. S. should keep its promise "to go anywhere any time to negotiate peace in Vietnam." Senator Mansfield was quoted as favoring a coalition government in Saigon and a U. S. withdrawal from Vietnam as soon as possible.

A statement by Senator McCarthy charging that Secretary Rusk was 'hamstringing' attempts to start peace talks was also cited. The broadcast did not mention Senator McCarthy's assertion that the Secretary should be replaced.

In keeping with its usual practice, Hanoi made no editorial comment of its own. Nor did it make any particular point of the fact that two of the Senators it quoted were presidential candidates.

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White House Classification, Feb. 24, 1993
By 19, NARA, Date 5-20-92

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- 2 -

e. On April 24 Hanoi reported statements by Congressional leaders critical of the Administration's attitude toward the selection of a site. The radio commentary cited Senator Kennedy's speeches in Los Angeles and Oregon, criticizing the President "for not going anywhere any time"; Senator Mansfield's April 18 statement on U. S. troop withdrawal and Senator McCarthy's criticism of Secretary Rusk on April 21.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

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INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, April 29, 1968 - 6:25 pm

Mr. President:

Bob Ginsburgh's balance sheet of the first month after March 31 is interesting.

I agree that what Hanoi does next -- now that Warsaw is out -- will be quite significant.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRestow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 5-20-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

24a

29 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: A Balance Sheet on Negotiations

At the end of the first month of negotiations, the balance sheet looks about as follows:

Assets

- U.S. initiative to restrict bombing.
- No recent violations.
- Greater bombing concentration in Laos and south of 19°.
- U.S. progressively proposes 15 sites.
- NVN insistence on Warsaw or PhomPenh.
- Allies generally on offensive in SVN.
- U.S. demonstrates we can talk and fight.
- U.S. wants to talk but not overeager.

Liabilities

- Initial confusion over boundary.
- Alleged violations of 20°.
- Enemy gets a free ride north of 19°.
- No reciprocal de-escalation by Hanoi.
- Restrictions on bombing in Laos.
- U.S. signals crossed on acceptability of Warsaw.
- U.S. qualifies "anywhere, any time."
- No progress after 30-day suspension.
- 30 days or more becomes a criterion for "prompt."
- Enemy retains significant military potential.
- Massive infiltration underway.
- Some U.S. allies fear a sell-out.

On balance, I would judge that at the end of the first month of our fight-talk strategy,

- we have improved our military position, but not quite as much as we might have had we continued the bombing north of 19°;
- in our negotiating position, we have done at least as well as the enemy, and, perhaps, just a little bit better.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-140
By Cls, NARA Date 11-10-97

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If Hanoi strikes the balance sheet the same way, it would be reasonable to anticipate a new initiative on their part.

Without predicting what they will do, the most difficult situation which I could envision would be the launching of an attack on Saigon between the time a site had been agreed on and the date for the first meeting.

2

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tues
(part of lunch
agenda 4/30/68)

INFORMATION

25

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, April 29, 1968, 5:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Briefing of Major Presidential Candidates
in 1964

During the campaign of 1964, State Department records show that

Governor Rockefeller was briefed May 16, 1964,

Governor Scranton was briefed on May 21, and

Mr. Stassen was briefed on May 26.

Senator Goldwater turned down the offer to provide briefings on the grounds that it was less than wise and less than wholehearted (see Tab A) for his letter to Secretary Rusk dated April 23, 1964).

The three who accepted the offer did so on the basis of a letter from Secretary Rusk stating that he, Secretary McNamara, and CIA Director McCone joined "in offering you all possible information that may affect you in the responsible discussion of issues affecting the national security to offer a full account of the existing international situation as it is assessed by the U.S. Intelligence Community and to respond to any questions which you may ask about present American national security policy and the reasons for it."

The separate briefings of Governor Rockefeller and Governor Scranton were held in Secretary Rusk's conference room. Director McCone gave a global intelligence briefing, particularly on relative U.S. and Soviet strength and then covered each continent. Secretary Rusk then discussed European policy in considerable detail. Secretary McNamara discussed the situation in Southeast Asia. The sessions were very informal with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara adding to Mr. McCone's presentation. Governor Rockefeller and Governor Scranton both interrupted to ask questions. The three officials remained for each briefing which lasted nearly the full two hours.

An offer was made at the end of each briefing to provide additional information if the person being briefed desired to do so at any subsequent time.

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DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12333,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 18, 1983.

3/18 ON 5-28-82

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

All three were invited to the White House after their briefings and each met the President.

Each of the three candidates had spoken extensively on foreign policy matters. Governor Rockefeller was critical of policies on Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia, NATO and troop withdrawal, Soviet wheat sales and the effects of the test ban on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Tab B is Governor Rockefeller's list of his foreign policy concerns as well as his understanding that his right to criticize would be unaffected by the briefing.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments - Tab A and B

BKS:amc

CONFIDENTIAL

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C.

25a

April 23, 1964

The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

President Johnson's offer to provide special briefings for major Presidential candidates, of which your letter was the first official notification, strikes me as less than wise and less than wholehearted.

The striking time lag between the President's announcement and your official action strongly suggests that the offer began as an off-hand political gesture and now is being followed through in much the same spirit.

At the outset, as has been reported, I said that I did not believe such briefings proper. There are a number of reasons:

1. Members of the Congress and the Senate are not without information. Much of the top secret material that the Pentagon has been releasing for political purposes recently has been known to us--but we have not tried to, or wanted to, violate secrecy by throwing the data around as freely as this administration has been.
2. If there are facts that candidates should know about, there may also be facts that the American people should know about--and a careful review of this administration's secrecy policies would impress me as far more useful than this will-of-the-wisp offer to candidates. The State Department's own role in suppressing information regarding Viet Nam and in censoring testimony before Congress might well be included in such a review.
3. The idea of passing along vital and highly classified information to an open field of candidates is basically unwise. When the two parties have actually selected their candidates, such action has been taken as a matter of course. At the moment, as a matter of fact, there might be considerable argument even as to who is or is not a candidate.

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(2)
4/24/64


Letter and enclosures, if any
Microfilmed by RLM

April 23, 1964

4. There is another consideration that has not escaped those who have dealt with such matters before. An offer to hand over secret data, particularly when political motives may be involved, might be used as energetically to silence debate as to serve debate. Having received information in one of these briefings, a candidate, whether he had the information from another source or not, might then be officially or morally inhibited from using the information.

Thus, although I appreciate your personal role in this and your courtesy, I must respectfully decline the offer for the time being. If the Republican convention nominates me, I will, of course, expect that the regular briefings made available to other candidates in the past will be discussed by us as a separate matter.

Sincerely,


Barry Goldwater



STATE OF NEW YORK
EXECUTIVE CHAMBER
ALBANY

NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER
GOVERNOR

Tat B
THE WHITE HOUSE

APR 27 3 27 AM '64

RECEIVED

256

April 24, 1964

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your instruction, Secretary of State Rusk has offered to brief me, as a candidate for the nomination of my party for the presidency, on information respecting the issues that affect the national security. I appreciate this very much.

The past, present and future foreign policy of the United States is of vital concern to the American people and all of the free world. It is not only appropriate but essential that the basic issues be responsibly presented to the American people for their information, discussion and decision, particularly during this presidential year. For the past several months, I have been doing just this.

My concern springs from deep interest in and long years of association with foreign policy and international relations in and out of government, including service as Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs starting in 1940, and thereafter as Assistant Secretary of State, Chairman of the President's Committee on International Economic Development, Chairman of the Defense Department Reorganization Committee, Special Assistant to the President for International Affairs.

I have already made formal statements commenting upon overall foreign policy, NATO, Latin America and the space race, and have discussed the situation in Laos, South Vietnam, Cuba and Panama. I plan a series of additional specific statements on United States foreign policy including, among others:


- United States policy toward Vietnam;
- United States policy toward Laos;
- United States policy on Indonesian aggression against Malaysia;
- The sale of wheat to the Soviet Union in the context of East-West trade policy;
- The effects of the nuclear test ban treaty on the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
- The withdrawal of American troops from Europe, and United States policy toward NATO.

I have serious disagreements with the administration in each of these areas and particularly with the basic assumption upon which these policies have been based.

I should, of course, welcome receiving a briefing by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, setting forth the relevant facts on our actual international position and national security. The nature and scope of these factual briefings are, of course, for the administration to determine.

As a basis for the briefing, I want to make it clear that I reserve the right to continue to comment on or express disagreement with past policy decisions or actions and present or future policies and actions relating to the conduct of foreign affairs and national defense if, in my judgment, it is in the national interest.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Dwight D. Eisenhower". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large, sweeping initial 'D'.

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Monday, April 29, 1968, 1:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Level of U.S. Military Effort in Vietnam

Pres file

In your March 31 television address you made two references to the level of U.S. military effort in Vietnam and the indicated references to the South Vietnamese role.

- a. "On many occasions I have told the American people that we would send to Vietnam those forces that are required to accomplish our mission there." (page 622)
- b. "I cannot say and no man could say that no more will be asked of us." (in Vietnam) (page 625)
- c. "Our presence there has always rested on this basic belief: The main burden of preserving their freedom must be carried out by them--by the South Vietnamese themselves.

"We and our allies can only help to provide a shield--behind which the people of South Vietnam can survive and can grow and develop. On their efforts--on their determinations and resourcefulness--the outcome will ultimately depend." (page 621)

- d. "We shall accelerate the reequipping of South Vietnam's armed forces--in order to meet the enemy's increased firepower. This will enable them progressively to undertake a larger share of combat operations against the Communist invaders." (page 622)

Secretary Clifford, in response to press questions at a news conference on April 11 said:

- a. "We are giving our forces the preference on the M-16's and our other most modern weapons because we were taking the brunt of the effort and the fighting in South Vietnam. Now that the policy decision has been made to turn over gradually the major effort to the South Vietnamese, we are now starting to give them a degree of preference in our most modern weapons." (page 6)

- b. Question: "Sir, you said in response to an earlier question that a policy decision had been made to turn over gradually the major effort to the South Vietnamese. Could you tell us when that decision was made and how it might relate to General Abrams' appointment?"

Secy. Clifford: "Well, it has been in the process of being made. I don't know that it occurred on any one date. But for some months that I have been aware of, consultations have taken place between our military leaders and the South Vietnamese leaders, and plans in this regard have been in the process of formulation.

"I noted a comment by President Thieu within the last week in which he stated that his hope was that sometime in the foreseeable future their forces could be developed to the point where they could start in and take over areas that our forces occupied so that our forces could be relieved and be drawn back. That is the program and that is the one we are looking toward." (pages 9 and 10)

- c. Question: "Mr. Secretary, we are dealing with a new policy situation in South Vietnam. As you say, President Thieu says that his forces could take over more of the fighting so that our forces could be drawn back. What role, then, do you see the American forces playing? What does "drawn back" mean?"

Secy. Clifford: "I think no one can give the details at this time.

"By my answer, I do not mean to suggest that there was any immediate plan for that. It is a long-range plan But it seems to me that it is the ultimate aim that we have for a final determination there; that is, work ourselves into a posture where the South Vietnamese will take over the war." (pages 10 and 11)

Secretary Clifford in a speech to the Associated Press in New York on April 22 said:

"We concluded that Americans will not need always to do more and more, but rather that the increased effectiveness of the South Vietnamese Government and its fighting forces will now permit us to level off our effort--and in due time to begin the gradual process of reduction.

"The review established to our satisfaction that Southeast Asia is not for us a 'bottomless pit.'"

"The review confirmed the judgment, already reached by President Thieu, that the South Vietnamese were ready to take on more of the responsibility and to carry more of the military burden.

"As we level off our contribution of men, we are accelerating our delivery to the South Vietnamese armed forces of the most modern weapons and equipment." (pages 6 and 7)

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

P. S. As you can see, Clark has eased over from your concept of a "larger share" for the Vietnamese to the idea that "we level off." Clark's concept will, of course, work if Ho doesn't put into the South such large additional forces that we have to increase total allied strength faster than the South Vietnamese can build up.

W. W. R.

27
INFORMATION

~~**SECRET**~~

Monday, April 29, 1968
1:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

**Herewith the Polish Foreign Office
pressures Gromowski on Warsaw for
either:**

- **"initial contacts"; or for**
- **"direct talks held in secrecy"
to resolve the site question.**

W. W. Rostow

Warsaw 2939

~~**SECRET**~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-283
By isa, NARA Date 4-30-98

WWRostow:rla



Department of State
ACTION COPY

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Taylor* 27a
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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***** ZZ RUEHC
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FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5634

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ WARSAW 2959

CONTROL: 7170Q

April 29, 1968

11:56 a.m.

Rostow

NODIS/CROCODILE

1. AT HIS URGENT REQUEST, I CALLED ON VICE MIN FON OFF WOLNIAK AT 1130 THIS MORNING WITH KAISER, CHIEF OF POL SECTION. WOLNIAK WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMB LEWANDOWSKI. IN RESPONSE TO WOLNIAK'S REFERENCE TO OUR LAST MEETING ON FRIDAY, APRIL 12, I CITED BUNDY'S TV STATEMENT REPORTED IN WIRELESS FILE TODAY THAT U.S. CONSIDERS NEITHER PHNOM PENH NOR WARSAW AS IMPARTIAL SITES. I USED BUNDY'S STATEMENT TO CONVEY OUR VIEW ABOUT UNDESIRABILITY OF WARSAW AS SITE FOR TALKS (STATE 150456). I WENT ON AT SOME LENGTH EXPLAINING THAT U.S. IS WILLING TO MEET IN ANY PLACE THAT CAN REASONABLY BE DEFINED AS A NEUTRAL SITE. I STRESSED OUR DESIRE TO AVOID A PROPAGANDA BATTLE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE MORE IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE IN FINDING A SATISFACTORY SITE FOR THE TALKS. I NOTED THAT POLAND HAD EXTENDED MILITARY AID TO NORTH VIETNAMESE, THAT NEITHER GOP NOR POLISH PRESS SHOWS ANY SIGN

PAGE 2 RUDKRW 2959 ~~SECRET~~

OF IMPARTIALITY AND THEREFORE WARSAW COULD HARDLY QUALIFY AS A NEUTRAL SITE. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT POLAND AND ALL OTHER COUNTRIES OUGHT TO BE INTERESTED IN FINDING AN ACCEPTABLE PLACE FOR THE TALKS. I ADDED THAT ONE CAN HARDLY BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND SOME PLACE IN THIS WORLD THAT WOULD BE SATISFACTORY TO BOTH U.S. AND NVN IF NVN IS AS INTERESTED AS WE ARE IN HOLDING TALKS.

2. WOLNIAK ASKED WHETHER THIS WAS OFFICIAL REPLY TO WHAT HE HAD CONVEYED TO ME AT OUR EARLIER MEETING OF APRIL 12. I REPLIED THAT WHAT BUNDY HAD SAID ON TV CONTAINS OFFICIAL U.S. POSITION AS I UNDERSTAND IT.

ACTION COPY

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-280

By CG, NARA Date 7-23-99

~~SECRET~~

~~-2- WARSAW 2959, April 29, 1968 (NODIS/CROCODILE)~~

3. WOLNIAK THEN SAID IN SPITE OF ALL I HAD TOLD HIM HE WANTED TO MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS: (1) IF U.S. SINCERELY WISHES TO START TALKS, ALL OBSTACLES CAN BE OVERCOME, AND (2) POLAND IS NOT INTERESTED IN HAVING WARSAW AS SITE OF TALKS SIMPLY FOR REASONS OF PRIDE AND PRESTIGE. POLAND WANTS TO SEE TALKS STARTED. WITH THIS OBJECTIVE IN MIND, AND WANTING TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARD REACHING PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO VN WAR, POLAND WAS WILLING TO OFFER WARSAW

~~PAGE 3 RUDKRW 2959-0 E O R E T~~

AS A SITE. AS FOR BUNDY'S STATEMENT THAT POLAND IS GIVING MILITARY AID TO DRV, AND THAT POLAND IS NOT A NEUTRAL COUNTRY, WOLNIAK SAID HE DID NOT CONSIDER THIS A VALID OBJECTION. HE SAID POLAND DOES NOT DENY THAT IT SENDS MATERIAL ASSISTANCE INCLUDING MILITARY AID TO DRV. POLAND CONSIDERS IT A DUTY TO SEND SUCH AID TO A COUNTRY UNDER ATTACK. IT IS NOT POLAND'S FAULT THAT DRV IS UNDER ATTACK FROM U.S., CANADA, INDIA AND POLAND, AS MEMBERS OF ICC, HAVE LONG ENOUGH EXPERIENCE TO KNOW HOW DRV CONFLICT DEVELOPED. THERE HAVE BEEN DISCOURAGING EVENTS TO WHICH U.S. CONTRIBUTED MOST. POLAND IS, NEVERTHELESS, OPTIMISTIC, AS FOR ATTITUDE OF POLISH PRESS ON DRV QUESTION, WOLNIAK SAID THAT THIS IS NOT A VALID OBJECTION BECAUSE EVEN IN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES THE PRESS IS CRITICAL OF THE U.S. AS FOR OBJECTION THAT POLAND HAS HEARD, ABOUT ACCESSIBILITY OF WARSAW FOR U.S.G. ALLIES, HE SAID USG HAS NOT RAISED THIS AS A CONDITION FOR ACCEPTABILITY OF WARSAW AS A SITE. HE SAID HE DID NOT THINK THIS LEGITIMATE REASON FOR OBJECTION TO WARSAW FOR INITIAL TALKS AT WHICH ARRANGEMENT FOR SITE OF SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS WOULD BE MADE.

~~PAGE 4 RUDKRW 2959-0 E O R E T~~

4. WOLNIAK ADDED THAT WHEN POLAND SAID IT WAS READY TO FACILITATE INITIAL TALKS, IT MEANT "FACILITATE." HE SAID POLAND WAS READY TO FACILITATE A MEETING AT WHICH ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE ~~MADE~~ FOR THE TIME, LEVEL AND PLACE OF THE BASIC TALKS. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT SUBSEQUENT TALKS HAD TO TAKE PLACE IN WARSAW, THEY COULD BE HELD ELSEWHERE. POLAND WANTS TO FACILITATE THE FIRST GET-TOGETHER BETWEEN DRV AND AMERICANS. TOO MANY DAYS, HE SAID HAVE ALREADY PASSED SINCE OUR LAST MEETING. WOLNIAK RECALLED THAT IN DECEMBER 1966 THE U.S. HAD NO OBJECTION TO WARSAW AS PLACE FOR TALKS WITH DRV EVEN THOUGH POLAND'S VIEWS ABOUT VN WAR WERE WELL KNOWN. HE SAID POLAND HAD NOT SUGGESTED WARSAW IN ORDER TO "GET YOU IN A HOT PLACE;" ON CONTRARY POLAND'S ONLY INTEREST IS IN GETTING TALKS STARTED.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- WARSAW 2959, April 29, 1968 (NODIS/CROCODILE)

5. WOLNIAK MENTIONED THAT IN ABSENCE OF ANY REPLY TO MESSAGE HE HAD CONVEYED TO ME ON APRIL 12, HE HAD GOTTEN TOUCH WITH BRITISH AMB AND OTHERS IN EFFORT TO IMPRESS ON WASHINGTON POLAND'S STRONG VIEWS. HE SAID THAT IF MEETING WERE TO TAKE PLACE IN WARSAW, POLAND WOULD PERMIT PRESS TO COME IN AND IN LARGE NUMBERS. AS FOR POSSIBILITY OF ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS, HE OBSERVED WITH A SMILE THAT WARSAW IS A QUIET PLACE IN CONTRAST TO OTHER NEUTRAL COUNTRIES. AS IN CASE WITH CHINA TALKS, POLAND WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE A SECLUDED PLACE FOR THE CONVERSATIONS.

~~PAGE 5 RUDKAT 2959 SECRET~~

6. THERE MAY BE OTHER REASONS TO EXPLAIN FAILURE TO ARRANGE FOR A MEETING: HANOI, FOR TECHNICAL, POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC REASONS HAS MUCH SMALLER CHOICE THAN U.S. IN WARSAW BOTH HAVE DIPLOMATIC AND NOT JUST EQUIVALENT MISSIONS. BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE TECHNICAL FACILITIES TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS.

7. WOLNIAK THEN SAID THAT HE IS ENCOURAGED BY MY STATEMENT THAT U.S.G. IS GENUINE IN ITS DESIRE FOR A MEETING. HE THEN REFERRED TO A CONTACT LAST SATURDAY BETWEEN AMERICAN AND DRV REPRESENTATIVES IN LAOS. HE SAID POLES HAVE A MESSAGE REPORTING WHAT DRV HAD CONVEYED TO U.S. HE SAID DRV AMB HAD CALLED ON HIM THIS MORNING AND WOLNIAK, READING FROM STATEMENT, SAID "DRV WOULD LIKE TO MEET DIRECTLY WITH AN AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE PURPOSE OF AGREEING ON A PLACE FOR TALKS. THE DRV AMB IN WARSAW HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO EXTEND AN INVITATION TO MEET WITH THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN WARSAW IN PRIVATE. THE MEETING COULD TAKE PLACE IN THE DRV EMBASSY OR ANY OTHER PLACE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE. THE DRV AMB IN WARSAW WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE SUCH A MEETING TOMORROW. THE DRV THINKS THAT IF THE U.S. SINCERELY DESIRES TO GET THE TALKS STARTED, DIRECT TALKS HELD IN SECRECY WOULD ENABLE BOTH PARTIES TO RESOLVE THE SITE QUESTION." WOLNIAK SAID THAT WITH SUCH A SECRET MEETING THE WHOLE QUARREL WOULD LOSE ITS PROPAGANDA NATURE.

8. WOLNIAK SAID HE WAS ASKED BY DRV AMB THIS MORNING TO CONVEY MESSAGE THAT HE WOULD BE DELIGHTED IF HE CAN HAVE A POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM ME EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH POLISH AUTHORITIES. WOLNIAK SAID GOP WOULD BE HAPPY TO DO ALL IT CAN TO FACILITATE PRIVATE SECLUDED TALKS FREE FROM PUBLICITY. HE ADDED THAT HE AND THE MFA WERE AT MY DISPOSAL AT ANY TIME OF DAY OR NIGHT, AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT WE COULD GIVE RESPONSE IN MATTER OF HOURS RATHER THAN DAYS.

9. I EXPRESSED MY APPRECIATION FOR HIS MESSAGE WHICH I SAID I WOULD CONVEY IMMEDIATELY TO MY GOVT.

GP-1 GRONOUSKI

BT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, April 29, 1968
1:10 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

The President of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce in Argentina -- an American businessman of some stature -- called on me today to report the following.

Just before he left for the U. S., the Foreign Minister called him in. He said that the President and the Government were concerned about the long delay in appointing a U. S. Ambassador to Argentina. The Government understood the complexities involved in such an appointment; but there were those Argentine nationalists who were saying that this delay is the result of American indifference or disapproval of the government of Ongania.

He pointed out that the Ongania government had been mature and pro-American. It was cooperating in many ways with the U. S. and wished to continue to do so. (Among other things, it has put a good chunk of its monetary reserves into long-term U. S. bonds.)

The Foreign Minister expressed the hope that we would encourage the present trend of Argentine foreign policy by making an early and good appointment to the post.

My visitor added that he agreed. He had not seen as good a situation in Argentina for 20 years. But he added: "Make sure the President picks a first-class Ambassador."

Walt Rostow

cc: John Macy
Wm. Bowdler

29

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Monday, April 29, 1968 -- 12:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

With respect to the proposed approach to the Soviet Union on strategic weapons, you should know that the State Department memorandum is incorrect in stating that Sec. Clifford is aboard. The situation is that he is still considering the matter.

You may wish to have a meeting later in the week.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-344
By CL, NARA, Date 6-7-95

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


INFORMATION

30

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Monday, April 29, 1968
12:50 p.m.

Mr. President:



Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-326
By *Sj* NARA, Date 2-7-03

RECEIVED

30a

Mr. Rastor
The other parts
were interesting
BKS

3.4(b)(1), (3)
6.1(c)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-327
By Sj, NARA, Date 2703

PAGE 2 IS WITHHELD IN ITS ENTIRETY UNDER
E.O. 12958, SECTIONS 3.4(b)(1),(3) AND 6.1(c).

Monday - April 29, 1968 - 12:45 pm ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Farewell for OAS Secretary General Mora

Pres file

In two weeks Dr. Mora will step down as OAS Secretary General. The American Deputy Secretary General -- Bill Sanders -- will also be leaving.

Given their long tenure and general helpfulness to us -- particularly during the Dominican crisis -- some special recognition by you would be desirable and appropriate. I have in mind a gift and brief presentation remarks at a suitable occasion.

You might consider one of these alternatives:

1. A luncheon to which the Latin American Ambassadors to the OAS and White House would be invited.
2. A mid-morning East Room ceremony, followed by refreshments.
3. An office call, to which Secretary Rusk, Covey Oliver and Sol Linowitz might also be invited.
4. A short visit to Sol Linowitz's farewell party for Mora and Sanders at Blair House on Monday, May 6.

I recommend either the office call, or the Blair House farewell party.

W. W. Rostow

Prefer gift and remarks at --

| | |
|--------------------|-----|
| Luncheon | ___ |
| East Room ceremony | ___ |
| Office call | ___ |
| Blair House Party | ___ |

Prefer no special recognition, ___

Call me ___

cc - Jim Jones

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Per file

32

Mon., Apr. 29, 1968
12:30 p. m.

To: Jim Jones

Jim,

Herewith suggested
talking points, as requested,
for Reuters at 6 p. m.

W. R.
W. W. R.

Attachments

4/29/68

1. U. S. policy towards Europe remains very steady:

-- The security of Western Europe is a matter of primary concern to the U. S., and NATO retains its full importance. Many interesting things are happening in Eastern Europe; but the simple fact is that Warsaw Pact military capabilities are rising. There is no rational basis for our breaking up NATO. We would, of course, be prepared to see mutual troop withdrawals from Central Europe.

-- We still believe that the U. S. -- and the world -- needs a unified Europe to assume its full capacity in dealing with all the world's great problems. The kind of technology that is emerging; the kind of problems we all face in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America; the problems of moving towards a stable peace, all require a strong European voice and presence if we are to be successful. The lesson of recent years is that the individual countries of Europe cannot be fully effective acting alone on the basis of old-fashioned nationalism.

-- So far as Britain is concerned, our ties are deep and abiding. Everyone knows that we hope to see Britain in the Common Market; but that is a matter which can only be settled in Europe by Europeans.

-- Although we can understand the historical reasons that have led to this phase of European isolationism and a focusing on Europe's affairs, there is some danger in Europe's leaving a disproportionate amount of the burden in world affairs to the United States. Old-fashioned isolationism is not strong in the United States. But the feeling that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the world's burdens is strong. Neither Europe nor America should take each other for granted. We must work every day to nurture every strand of partnership, either in monetary affairs, aid to developing countries, trade, security matters, or helping build a stable peace.

2. We simply do not know whether there is a serious possibility of productive talks leading to a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. We can see many objective reasons why the possibility should be real. Hanoi's behavior in the first month after the President's March 31 statement is not particularly encouraging; but we shall persist.

3. U. S. interest in Southeast Asia -- as a major area of strategic interest -- is deeply imbedded in our national life, going back to President Franklin Roosevelt's reaction to Japanese takeover of Indo-China. It is a major region in its own right; the flank of the Indian subcontinent which contains perhaps 20% of the human race; and it is important in terms of transport routes, natural resources, and so on.

-- Specifically, the U. S. has treaty commitments under the Southeast Asia Treaty;

-- The U. S. is greatly encouraged by the economic and social vitality of the area; its determination to maintain its independence; and the beginnings of regional cooperation.

-- Therefore, the President expects that the U. S. would continue to play a role in the region, but hopefully a diminishing role as the countries of the area gather strength, learn to cooperate, and handle an increasing proportion of their problems themselves.

4. Although the U. S. had a bad month with respect to its trade surplus in March, the over-all results of the President's January 1 balance of payments program are reasonably encouraging. The critical requirements now are two:

-- That the U. S. take action via taxes and expenditure reductions to cut its deficit;

-- That the world community move forward rapidly to provide the Special Drawing Rights under the IMF so that we can assure adequate reserves to support the continued expansion of world trade.

326

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW:

The President is seeing representatives
of Reuters today OFF the record at 6:00 p.m.
tonight.

Will you get answers to the first four questions
and return to me this afternoon as soon as
possible?



James R. Jones

Attachment

April 27, 1968

32c

Mr. Tom Johnson,
Assistant Press Secretary to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Reuters Limited 615 National Press Building, Washington, D. C. 20004 Telephone (202) 628-9212

Dear Tom,

I am grateful for the arrangements made for my General Manager, Gerald Long, to call on the President on Monday at 6 p.m.

Here are questions which Mr. Long would like to submit:

1 How does the President view relationships between the United States and Europe developing, and, more particularly, between the United States and Britain? How seriously does this country take the British role?

2 Does the President think there is a serious possibility of productive talks taking place with Ho Chi Minh leading to a peaceful settlement in Vietnam?

3 How does the President see the future of Southeast Asia and will the United States play a continuing role there?

4 Does the President think the steps taken recently to sustain the western world's financial system will be sufficient, or is some further drastic action going to be required? This might have more relevance because of the disappearance in March of the U.S. trading surplus.

What in the President's judgment are the most effective means of dealing with the racial problem and cooling things off in the cities this summer?

Will the nation agree to divert large sums of public money to the fight against poverty and the further improvement of education programmes and job retraining?

Will the President assess the chances at this time for Congress to go along with his tax proposal?

Sincerely,

Pat.
J.W. Heffernan.

33

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, April 29, 1968 -- 10:35am

Mr. President:

Herewith, as instructed, my outgoing yesterday to Bunker (Tab A) and his interim reply (Tab B).

At Tab C are the general sections of the two previous messages to which he refers.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989
By rg, NARA, Date 5-20-92

~~SECRET~~

April 28, 1968

33a

CA P8146

CAS CHANNELS

LITERALLY EYES ONLY TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER FROM WALT ROSTOW

1. You should know that it is possible that the Pope will suggest the Vatican as a site for initial contacts between the two sides. If, in fact, he makes this suggestion, we would be inclined to agree.
2. The President would be particularly interested in any suggestions you might have personally out of your experience on moves that now could be made to break the stalemate and find a site to begin the negotiating process.
3. Finally, the President would be interested in your personal assessment of what the effect has been over the first month since his March 31 statement, on the situation inside South Vietnam and on our world posture towards Vietnam. For example, what is Thieu's frame of mind? Are the South Vietnamese giving more serious thought to the problems of peace and negotiations? Has their morale been damaged? Are they pulling together with greater unity in the face of the possibility which might lie ahead? Has the posture taken on March 31 adversely affected military operations? These are only suggested questions. What the President wants is Ellsworth Bunker's own best personal evaluation of the various effects thus far; the net position; plus any suggestions for action you may feel moved to make directly to him.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-283
By isa, NARA Date 4-3-98

~~SECRET~~

Tab A

33b

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-280
By cb, NARA Date 7-23-99

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 MAY 29 10 26

DLA690
PP YEKADS
DE YEKADL 788 1201018
P 291008Z
FM SAIGON
TO WHITE HOUSE
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY 290940Z APR 68 [REDACTED]

FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 293

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR WALT ROSTOW
REF: CAP8146

1. I APPRECIATE YOUR INFORMATION ABOUT POSSIBILITY THAT VATICAN MAY BE SUGGESTED AS SITE FOR INITIAL CONTACTS. I DO NOT BELIEVE OUR FRIENDS HERE COULD HAVE ANY OBJECTION AND IT WOULD SEEM TO ME WELL TO AGREE AS YOU HAVE SUGGESTED.
2. AS FOR THE BALANCE OF YOUR MESSAGE, I WANT TO GIVE THIS SOME FURTHER THOUGHT AND WILL BE REPLYING TOMORROW. I MIGHT MENTION THAT I HAVE COMMENTED QUITE EXTENSIVELY ON SOME OF THE POINTS MENTIONED IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 3 IN MY LAST TWO MESSAGES TO THE PRESIDENT (SAIGON 25197 AND 25643). THE GENERAL SECTIONS OF THESE TWO MESSAGES COVER IN SOME DETAIL REACTIONS HERE TO THE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 31 STATEMENT AND TO SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS TAKEN BY THIEU AND THE GVN. I SHALL, HOWEVER, REPLY MORE SPECIFICALLY TOMORROW TO THE POINTS YOU MENTION AND TO ANY OTHERS WHICH OCCUR TO ME.

REGARDS.
GP-1
170

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Let B

PROCESSING NOTE

Document #33c consists of extracts from a document (CAP 80991), which is located in another file. The entire document was submitted for mandatory review and portions of it were exempted from declassification. However, none of those exempted portions are among the extracts in document #33c, therefore document #33c has been stamped as "declassified" rather than "sanitized." Please note that CAP 80991 in its entirety is **not** declassified.

~~SECRET~~

Received: Washington CommCen
2:08 PM EST Friday 19 April 1968

Received: LBJ Ranch CommCen
5:40 PM CST Friday 19 April 1968

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EEA368
00 WTE 10
DE WTE 1655

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP80991

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority 210/103510
By wp/hy, NARA, Date 5-29-92

APRIL 19, 1968

HEREWITH BUNKER'S FORTY-SEVENTH WEEKLY REPORT. IT IS
PRECEDED BY A SUMMARY.

A. GENERAL

- ATTITUDES TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS REFLECT ANXIETIES, BUT THERE IS NO PANIC.
- SUBSTANTIAL POSITIVE REACTION INCLUDES: THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE NEED FOR GENERAL MOBILIZATION, GREATER EFFORTS AT ANTI-CORRUPTION, MORE WILLINGNESS OF OPPOSITION FIGURES TO COOPERATE, AN IMPROVED THIEU-KY RELATIONSHIP, AND WIDESPREAD REALIZATION THAT SVN IS AT A DANGEROUS CROSSROADS.
- THOUGHTS ON SETTLEMENT TERMS INCLUDE: A NEUTRAL BUFFER ZONE, PERMITTING THE NLF INTO LEGAL SVN POLITICS; BUT MOST LEADERS FEEL ANY CONCESSION ACCEPTABLE TO HANOI WOULD NOT BE TO SAIGON SO THAT PUBLIC STATEMENTS STICK TO: NO COALITION, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, UNACCEPTABILITY OF THE NLF AS A PEACE TALK EQUAL, AND THE GVN MUST BE THE PRINCIPAL VOICE IN NEGOTIATIONS.
- GVN LEADERS SPEAK OF THE NEED TO FIGHT ALONE; DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BUT HAVE YET TO MATERIALIZE.
- THIEU CONTINUES MOVES TO STRENGTHEN THE GVN AIMED AT BROADENING POPULAR SUPPORT AND SETTING UP A SMALL "WAR CABINET."
- WHEN TRAN VAN HUONG PROBABLY SOON BECOMES PM, HE WILL BRING TO THE GVN SOUTHERN SUPPORT AND AN HONEST IMAGE. WE CAN WORK WITH HIM DESPITE HIS PROBABLE DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN FURTHER THE GVN BEFORE ANY NEGOTIATIONS.
- THE THIEU-KY RELATIONSHIP IS MUCH IMPROVED; THEY CONSULT DAILY.
- THE ASSEMBLY SHOWS INDEPENDENCE AND YET WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH THIEU.
- THIEU SHOWS INCREASING CONFIDENCE AS A RESULT OF: YOUR SUPPORT, THE THREAT NEGOTIATIONS HOLD, HIS PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION, AND INCREASING SUPPORT FROM THE MILITARY.

Int C

PROCESSING NOTE

Document #33d consists of extracts from a document (Saigon 25643), which is located in another file. The entire document was submitted for mandatory review and portions of it were exempted from declassification. However, none of those exempted portions are among the extracts in document #33d, therefore document #33d has been stamped as "declassified" rather than "sanitized." Please note that Saigon 25643 in its entirety is **not** declassified.

Thursday, April 25, 1968

33d

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 25643)

Herewith my forty-eighth weekly message:

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 719/CBS 10By isply, NARA, Date 5-29-92A. General

The past week seems to have been, in a sense, one of suspended animation. There has been a feeling of expectancy in the air, people waiting to see whether talks will get underway, and where they will be held. Your statement on the need for agreement on a site to which the interested parties would have adequate access under conditions which would be fair to both sides is considered here to be eminently reasonable and is strongly supported. At the same time, I have the impression that the general feeling of apprehension, the fear of American abandonment, which I reported in last week's message, has subsided somewhat; although some anxiety is still evident there is much more confidence in our intentions. I think it is fair to say that concurrently, there has been some hardening of popular and government attitudes and positions in respect to negotiations and the whole range of questions they raise. In the speech of the Prime Minister on April 17, in the resolutions adopted by the Confederation of Vietnamese Labor Unions, and in the two anti-Communist meetings held in Saigon over the weekend, as well as in statements by members of the government and the Assembly, opposition to any form of coalition with the National Liberation Front, insistence on the freedom and territorial integrity of South Vietnam, on its primary role in negotiations, and its determination to carry on, alone if necessary, to see that the fruits of its long struggle are not lost through negotiations have been emphasized repeatedly.

Your joint communique with President Park has had a good effect here. Virtually all Vietnamese leaders were much reassured by the statement regarding Vietnamese participation in the peace talks. I think this statement alone has taken a good deal of the edge off of their fears. Vietnamese in general also seem to be more encouraged than otherwise by the delay in finding an acceptable site for preliminary contacts. The snag over a site has at least had the merit of demonstrating to them that we are not going to be bullied or cajoled into dealing with Hanoi on whatever terms it chooses to demand. The delay has also given many people here time to absorb this turn of events and to evaluate more soberly the meaning of your March 31 speech, various subsequent allied statements, and Hanoi's response.

Leaders such as Tran Van Huong and the head of the Senate's Independence Bloc, Senator Nguyen Van Chuc, this week publicly expressed confidence that the U. S. would not abandon Vietnam. Prime Minister Loc's speech, which I have mentioned, is generally positive in tone. He noted that Thieu is trying to carry out the promises made at Manila, referring to the establishment of constitutional government and the

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attack on corruption as examples. He added that freedom loving peoples everywhere are "looking with confidence at the role and leadership of the United States in the task of stopping the Communists' bold invasion." He then said that in the light of Vietnamese Government performance "Vietnam has the right to expect from her allies that they keep the promises they made in Manila with the view to halting Communist inroads."

I think it is interesting to note what the proposed Vietnamese call-up of additional forces and the planned ultimate strength of their military and para-military establishment means in comparative terms. If we take our pre-Tet estimate that 67 percent of the total South Vietnam population of 17 million was under government control, it means that approximately 11,400,000 were in this category, the pool from which manpower has to be drawn. The U. S. population at 200 million is roughly seventeen and one-half times this figure. Thus, if we take the 178,000 men it is proposed to add to the Vietnamese military and para-military forces, it would be equivalent in the U. S. to a call-up of 2,670,000 men. When this call-up is completed, there will be a total of about 918,000 men under arms, on a comparative basis equivalent to over 16 million for the U. S. For an underdeveloped country, this seems to me a highly creditable performance and should be an answer to uninformed critics who maintain that Vietnam is not carrying a full share of the effort.

Change in government. Thieu said today he is continuing his study of the restructuring of the government and hopes to have this completed soon. He added that one of the problems he was running into was that of finding men of ability and influence to fill the jobs. I again brought up the question of the formation of a war cabinet, which I had suggested to him several times previously, as a means of solving some of his decision-making and administrative problems. I pointed out to him that daily meetings could bring about close consultation between himself, the Vice President, the Prime Minister, the Chief of the Joint General Staff, the individuals charged with economy and finance and mobilization; the decisions could be taken at the meetings and he as President could direct individual responsibility to see that they were carried out. I added that I thought this could result in a much tighter and effective administration of the whole military, pacification, and economic effort. I believe that Thieu is disposed toward the idea and seems inclined to act on it.

Thieu is pressing the Assembly to enact a mobilization law, holding meetings with members of both the Senate and Lower House in trying to get details of the legislation satisfactorily ironed out. During the past week, the defense committees of the Upper and Lower Houses held joint meetings of general mobilization. The committee members and the Assembly in general seem anxious to write a general mobilization law which will permit the maximum expansion of the armed forces, while at the same time avoiding the disruption of essential civilian services both within the government and in the private sphere. In connection with mobilization, I should also note that the Minister of Defense, in an April 20 news conference, said that general mobilization will allow the allies to begin gradual troop withdrawals at the beginning of 1969.

There appears to be a fairly widespread and quite genuine conviction that the Loc government is not up to the challenges which face it. I think Thieu himself is not entirely happy with Loc and has a feeling he lacks decisiveness, and I am inclined to believe he will go ahead with changes in the government. But evidently, as is his custom, he is endeavoring to prepare the ground carefully before moving ahead. I think it is still quite possible he may appoint Huong as Prime Minister. I also continue to believe that many of the problems he now encounters in administration would be solved by the formation of a war cabinet.

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INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Monday, April 29, 1968 -- 10:30 am

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA warns the Panama election May 12th may get a bit rough.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

CIA paper, 25 April 1968
"Panama -- In the Eye of the Hurricane?"
log 1410

WWRestow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 005-068-3-24
By Op/is, NARA, Date 12/1/01

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Rostow 1410

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

In view of the Panamanian presidential election two weeks hence, I think you may be interested to note our concern that it may not go off as smoothly as one is inclined now to think.

Rich

Richard Helms

Attachment - 1
Panama -- In the Eye of
the Hurricane?

26 April 1968
(DATE)

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FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-285
By us NARA, Date 10-9-03

1410

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

25 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Panama -- In the Eye of the Hurricane?

1. Over the last two or three weeks the crisis level in Panamanian politics has subsided. Arnulfo Arias and David Samudio, the candidates of the opposing camps, are now concentrating on campaigning for the presidential election of 12 May. The effort to remove President Robles has cooled down since the Supreme Court provided a de jure veto of the action of the National Assembly in approving impeachment charges against him. This legalistic maneuver topped off the de facto veto already applied by the National Guard in its decision to support Robles rather than the legislature.

2. ~~There is a tendency now to accept the inevitability of a victory by Samudio since the Robles administration controls the election machinery and is determined to prevent Arias from~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-285
By isa, NARA, Date 10-9-03

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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coming to power. Robles himself won out over Arias in 1964 with official support in manipulating the election returns. And since the deck is obviously being stacked again, some observers in Panama expect that some of the oligarchs now supporting Arias will cut and run to protect their interests under a Samudio government.

3. The scenario may work out in this manner and the manipulation of the election machinery may be so smoothly handled as to leave scant evidence that the returns were rigged. But we do not think that this is necessarily the case and we suggest that storm warnings be kept hoisted for Panama.

4. In the first place, those oligarchs who turned reluctantly to Arias must have few illusions as to what they can expect from Samudio. He rose to prominence on ability, not on family connections. As Finance Minister under Robles he devised a program of tax reform which was more progressive than either Robles or the National Assembly was willing to adopt. We feel that he is more likely than Arias to try and carry out a real reform program, including taxation of virtually tax-free monopolies held by various oligarchs. Furthermore, this time the number of votes that will have to be juggled is

- 2 -

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likely to be considerably larger than was the case in 1964.
And this time the election will be very carefully scrutinized
by a swarm of US newspapermen and other observers -- even if
President Robles continues to refuse to request the Organization
of American States to send observers. Finally, the perennially
optimistic Robles has been buoyed up by his success in over-
riding impeachment by the National Assembly and may miscalculate
just how much he can get away with on 12 May.

5. There is one very large gap in our information.
For a long time American officials were not in contact with
Arias and recent meetings with him have not provided a clear
reading of how he would react to being defrauded yet another
time. We believe, however, that Arias would not stand still
for it and that Panama is in for stormy political weather
after 12 May.


6. Thus we are not in agreement with the argument that
because Arias has aligned his Panamenistas with a part of the
oligarchy, and could arouse little support for removing Robles,
he can no longer arouse his popular following to challenge a
rigged election. While we would agree that under most circum-
stances the National Guard could control such a reaction, we

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are concerned that its leaders may be tempted to settle some old scores with Arias and overreact to such a challenge, thereby setting off a larger struggle. If this occurs, US interests in Panama are likely to be adversely affected/ regardless of which side wins.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:


ABBOT SMITH
Chairman

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INFORMATION

Pres file

Monday, April 29, 1968 -- 8:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Both Abe Fineberg and Arthur Krim were enthusiastic about George Weeds, if we can get him -- "a ten-strike," as Arthur said.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Harold Saunders

WWRostow:rlh

April 29, 1968

For file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting to brief the Bipartisan Leadership on the Special Drawing Rights Legislation, Monday, April 29, 5:15 p. m.

Invitees

At Tab A is a list of Senators and Congressmen invited to the meeting. They probably will want to leave around 6:00 p. m. to attend State Chambers of Commerce receptions.

At Tab B is a brief note on the status of the proposal and the legislation.

Agenda1. I suggest you open the meeting with a few brief points:

- You are sending the message up tomorrow, April 30.
- The legislation asks the Congress to approve acceptance of an amendment to the International Monetary Fund Agreement.
- The amendment will make it possible for the Fund to assure that enough international reserves are available to meet world needs. It will give protection against an international liquidity shortage and against the unpredictability of new gold supplies.
- International finance seems specialized, technical, and removed from day to day problems. In fact - these Special Drawing Rights will affect production, trade and jobs. They will help make sure the world economy continues to grow.
- We have worked five years on this proposal with bipartisan support and suggestions from the Congress and advice from leading experts in the field.
- This new plan will strengthen the international monetary system but it will not solve the U. S. balance of payments problem -- that is up to us.

2. You could then ask Secretary Fowler and Chairman Martin to comment on the proposal. Fowler will talk for no more than 10 minutes; Martin less than 5 minutes.

3. Next, you could sum up what this all means by noting the following from the message: (Tab C):

- This amendment is a historic undertaking in which we have all played a part and in which we can all take pride.
- The Bretton Woods Machinery -- founded under President Roosevelt almost 25 years ago -- served us well.
- Its success in encouraging the growth of world trade greatly increased world requirements for international reserves.
- The Special Drawing Right amendment to the Fund agreement will meet that requirement. It will help protect us all against an international credit squeeze.
- This is a landmark in international affairs. A new international reserve asset will be created, as needed, by many countries acting together and backing it together.
- As one of the leaders in formulating the plan and as the International Monetary Fund member with the biggest vote, the United States should be among the first to accept the amendment.

4. You could then ask for questions.

(Barefoot is concerned that Ford may try to make a political issue out of this legislation and may try to make trouble at the meeting.)

W. W. Rostow

TAB A

The following Senators and Congressmen were invited to the White House briefing on April 29th for the special drawing rights legislation.

Senators

Mike Mansfield
Russell B. Long
Robert C. Byrd
George A. Smathers
J. W. Fulbright
John Sparkman

Everett McKinley Dirksen
Thomas H. Kuchel
Bourke B. Hickenlooper
Wallace F. Bennett
John J. Williams

Congressmen

John W. McCormack
Carl Albert
Hale Boggs
Wright Patman
Henry S. Reuss
Wilbur D. Mills
Thomas E. Morgan
George Mahon

Gerald R. Ford
Melvin R. Laird
William B. Widnall
John W. Byrnes
Frances P. Bolton
Frank T. Bow
Leslie C. Arends

This gives coverage of the leadership and the Committees that have jurisdiction (House Banking and Senate Foreign Relations). In addition, it covers the Chairman and ranking Republican of the Senate Banking Committee and the Chairman and ranking Republican of the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee.

Status of the Proposal and the Legislation

The legislation authorizes the President to accept a proposed amendment to the International Monetary Fund Agreement.

The Amendment provides for:

- The Special Drawing Rights Facility. This is the machinery to create new international reserves.
- Some largely technical changes in regular Fund operating procedures.

The Amendment must first be approved by a majority of the Governors of the Fund. The vote is in process now. Secretary Fowler, as the United States Governor, has already cast our vote in favor.

The Amendment must then be accepted by 65 member governments with 80% of the voting power.

United States acceptance of an amendment to the Fund requires approval of the Congress. The legislation goes to the House Banking and Senate Foreign Relations Committees.

MASTER

April 27, 1968

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

Twenty-four years ago, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked the 78th Congress to approve a monetary plan which he called the "cornerstone for international economic cooperation."

The Bretton Woods Agreement -- and the International Monetary Fund which it created -- helped map the recovery of a war-ravaged world.

Today I ask the Congress to take another historic step. I seek approval of an amendment to the International Monetary Fund Agreement, to adapt it to changing world conditions. This change -- the first since the Agreement was ratified in 1945 -- is both timely and necessary. It will prepare us for the era of expanding world trade and economic opportunity that unfolds before us.

Recovery and Expansion

The financial statesmen who shaped the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1944 looked beyond the holocaust of war to a time of peace. They remembered the harsh lessons of a depression which had led the world into war.

They knew what had to be avoided -- restrictive monetary policies that strangled progress, competitive depreciation of currencies that led to instability, and the breakdown of international cooperation that impeded trade.

They knew what had to be built -- a cooperative monetary system to foster world economic expansion in a climate of mutual trust and assistance.

The machinery established at Bretton Woods -- through the International Monetary Fund -- brought stability to the exchange rates among the currencies of different nations. It brought order to international financial markets and transactions. It created a carefully designed system of cooperation in dealing with international financial problems.

The machinery as it operated in the quarter-century since World War II produced a record of unparalleled economic progress. The economies of war-ruined nations were rebuilt and have grown on an unprecedented scale. World trade surged from \$40 billion in 1946 to \$200 billion in 1967.

But when Franklin Roosevelt urged approval of the Bretton Woods Agreements, he foresaw that "the experience of future years will show us how they can be improved."

That experience is now part of our history.

The very success of the system in stimulating trade has put new pressures on the Bretton Woods machinery and shows us how that machinery must now be changed.

The rapid growth in world trade and in the flow of capital is outpacing the growth in monetary reserves. The world must take action to provide sufficient reserves for this growth. If it does not, strains and uncertainties in the international monetary system -- and the limitations they create -- could turn the clock backward to the dark days of restrictive economic policies, narrow interests, empty ports and idle men.

Today I propose that the United States lead the way in the action that is needed.

I recommend that the Congress approve changes in the International Monetary Fund Agreement to create a new form of international reserve -- the Special Drawing Right.

Background to Acceptance

The request I make today is not a hasty solution to a newly-discovered problem. It represents the careful work of five years.

The first part of that period was devoted to intensive study by the outstanding economists and financial specialists of many nations.

This laid the base for action. In July 1965 -- with bi-partisan support and suggestions from the Congress -- I directed the Secretary of the Treasury to initiate negotiations. The past three years have been marked by steady progress through patient negotiations -- in The Hague in London, in Rio and in Stockholm.

From the studies and the negotiations has emerged the concept of Special Drawing Rights as a new system for the deliberate and orderly addition to international reserves. They are the refined product of thoughtful and considered agreement among leading experts from the treasuries and central banks of the Free World and the International Monetary Fund.

Throughout the negotiations leading to the development of the Special Drawing Rights plan, the Secretary of the Treasury had the benefit of advice from the Advisory Committee on International Monetary Arrangements. This panel, chaired by former Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, consisted of some of the nation's leading bankers, economists and businessmen with outstanding experience in the field of international finance.

The Need for International Reserves

International reserves are to world trade what working capital is to a growing business. As trade expands -- just as when business grows -- more reserves are needed.

Nations use international reserves to settle their accounts with each other. And these reserves are an important factor in maintaining stable exchange rates between currencies. They are essential to provide time for countries to restore equilibrium in their balance of payments through an orderly process of adjustment.

Reserves must be unimpeachable in quality. They must be acceptable to other nations, as well as to the nation that holds them. Traditionally, international reserves have consisted mainly of gold, dollars and sterling.

But today the world's supply of international reserves cannot meet the requirements posed by growing world trade and capital flows.

In 1948, total world reserves were \$48 billion. Of this, gold accounted for \$33 billion, or almost 70 percent. The remaining 30 percent was divided among dollars -- 6 percent -- and other foreign exchange plus reserve claims on the International Monetary Fund.

Today, reflecting the vast increase in world trade, total reserves have grown to \$73 billion. Of this, gold accounts for \$39 billion, a decrease to 54 percent of the total. Dollars, on the other hand, have risen to 25 percent -- or \$18 billion. The remainder is divided between other foreign exchange and reserve claims on the International Monetary Fund.

Gold became less and less dependable as the source of regular addition to world monetary reserves. Because the U. S. was running a balance of payments deficit, the dollar took up the slack left by gold and provided the largest share of the new reserve growth over the past two decades. Thus, the growth of world reserves has been linked mainly to deficits in America's balance of payments.

With gold unable to meet reserve needs, and with the prospect of reduced dollar supplies for international reserves as the U. S. takes steps to move toward balance of payments equilibrium, one fact clearly emerges: the world needs some new form of acceptable international reserve to supplement existing reserves.

It is the purpose of Special Drawing Rights to fill that need.

The Significance of Special Drawing Rights

International agreement on the Special Drawing Rights proposal comes at a time when the world monetary system has been subjected to uncertainty and speculation following the devaluation of the pound sterling last November.

To all nations of the free world, this agreement will bring new strength.

To the United States, it can provide an opportunity to rebuild gradually the reserves which we have lost over the past years. But in a broader sense, the Special Drawing Rights are of value to the United States because of the strength they will bring to the world monetary system.

As the world's largest trading and investing nation, we prosper when other nations have adequate reserves to assure their expansion of production, employment and trade.

These Rights are a landmark in the long evolution of international monetary affairs. For the first time a reserve asset will be deliberately created by the joint decision of many nations. These nations will back that asset with their full faith and resources -- the strongest support that any asset has ever had. Special Drawing Rights will assure the world economy of an adequate and orderly growth of international reserves, regardless of unpredictable fluctuations in the production of gold or in its private use.

How the SDR's Will Work

Special Drawing Rights -- to be issued only to governments, and exchanged only among governments -- will be a special kind of international legal tender. They will perform the same basic function in the international monetary system as gold, dollars, or other reserve currencies. They will carry a gold value guarantee and will bear a moderate rate of interest.

Special Drawing Rights will be created after careful consultation and broad agreement. Participating countries with 85 percent of the weighted votes must decide that a need for additional reserves exist.

This process will assure wide participation in the use of the new asset and confidence in its acceptability.

These new reserve assets will be distributed in accordance with each member's quota in the International Monetary Fund. Under this arrangement, for example, the United States -- whose quota is about 25 percent of the International Monetary Fund's resources -- would receive \$250 million out of each \$1 billion of Special Drawing Rights issued. The share of the Common Market countries as a group would be about \$180 million; the United Kingdom, \$115 million; Canada and Japan, about \$35 million each; other developed countries, \$105 million; and the developing countries as a group, \$280 million.

A participating country will benefit from the program, but it will have responsibilities as well. It is committed to accept Special Drawing Rights from other countries in exchange for convertible currencies when it is in a strong balance of payments and reserve position. The amount it is required to accept is limited to three times the value of Special Drawing Rights distributed to it by the International Monetary Fund. This limitation is sufficiently broad to assure effective use of the new asset.

The commitment to accept Special Drawing Rights from other countries insures their high quality and liquidity, and gives them the status of a true international reserve asset.

The machinery to create Special Drawing Rights will be put into place when 65 International Monetary Fund member-nations accounting for 80 percent of the weighted votes accept the plan.

As one of the leaders in the formulation of this proposal, and as the member with the greatest percentage of the votes -- about 22% -- it is fitting that the United States be one of the first nations to accept the Special Drawing Rights plan.

Our Hope for Tomorrow

International finance -- the subject of this Message -- is complex and intricate.

But its effects extend far beyond monetary institutions. They reach out to farmland and production line, sales office and show room.

For the heart of this message is a plan to sustain a prosperous and growing world economy through an orderly expansion of trade. As that occurs, we all benefit -- the worker with a better paycheck, the businessman with a new order, the farmer with another market, the family with a wider choice of products.

As the world's economy grows, a promise grows with it. Franklin Roosevelt defined it almost a quarter of a century ago in his first message on the Bretton Woods Agreement, as a hope

"for a secure and fruitful world, a world in which plain people in all countries can work at tasks which they do well, exchange in peace the products of their labor, and work out their several destinies in security and peace; a world in which governments, as their major contribution to the common welfare are highly and effectively resolved to work together in practical affairs...."

That was the hope of America then. It is the hope of America now.

The Congress can move far toward making this hope a reality by its contribution to a sound world monetary system.

I urge the Congress to cast a vote for a stronger world economy by approving the historic Special Drawing Rights legislation I submit today.

The key role of the dollar also gives America another special responsibility. A strong dollar is essential to the stability of the international financial structure. We must fulfill our responsibilities by dealing swiftly with our own budgetary and balance-of-payments deficits. Let me remind the Congress once again of the clear and critical need to pass the tax bill -- the best investment America can make to keep the dollar strong.

37

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday
April 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: The Gorton Visit -- possibility of agreement on scientific cooperation

We have been looking into the possibility of a bilateral agreement with Australia on scientific cooperation. The agreement we are thinking of would not, in the first instance at least, involve any appropriations. It would, rather, serve as a stimulus for exchange of information on projects already being undertaken in the two countries. It would also serve as an administrative umbrella and sanction for new cooperative projects in future years. Finally, it would express formally the desire of both governments for a joint approach to scientific problems of mutual interest.

Such cooperation would by no means be a one-way street. The Australians are doing some absolutely first rate work in a number of fields of great interest to us. The main areas of cooperation identified so far are marine sciences, arid zone research, and weather control.

Prime Minister Gorton was formerly Minister for Science and Technology and would, assumedly, have a personal interest in such an agreement. I think it is very possible that we could have this far enough along to mention in the communique at the end of his visit. It is possible, but not likely, that we could have the agreement signed during his visit.

Before pushing ahead with the Gorton visit in mind we would like to have an indication of your personal interest in the idea of a bilateral agreement on scientific cooperation with Australia.

W. W. Rostow

I like the idea and hope we can
sign agreement during Gorton visit _____

Go ahead with it, but without any
particular focus on the Gorton visit _____

I don't want to clutter up the Gorton
visit with this _____

Call me _____

MWright:wpt

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-283
By ics, NARA Date 4-30-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Rostow

38

2. Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Monday, April 29, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached is Secretary Clifford's summary of where we stand on our Jordan arms program, which you requested.

The one point I might add is that Israel, Jordan and Jarring are all focussing seriously now on the chances for an Israel-Jordan political settlement without the UAR. If Hussein takes that route, he will need our support more than ever. We don't know yet exactly what that might involve, but the arms program must be seen today in that context as well as in the light of our more general support for Jordan.

W. W. R.


DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-283
By ics, NARA Date 4-30-98

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

³⁸⁶
27 April 68

Mr Clifford desires that
this be routed
through Mr Walt
Rostow to the President


Robert G. Gard Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel, USA
Military Assistant to
the Secretary of Defense

14-00

38b

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

27 APR 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: US Arms for Jordan

In response to your inquiry on the subject of arms for Jordan, I attach for your consideration at Tab A, what we agreed to, and the current status of our commitments at Tab B.

To summarize where we are, we have authorized the release of previously financed MAP grant aid in the amount of \$3.8 million and some residual ground force equipment previously sold to Jordan in 1965. In addition, we have agreed to sell F-104 aircraft and ground force equipment (except heavy artillery). Such sales amount to about \$73.3 million and include 18 F-104 aircraft; 100 M48 tanks; 43 Armored Personnel Carriers; 23 artillery pieces; 1,035 miscellaneous vehicles; communications and engineer equipment; ammunition and spare parts.

We have not yet made substantial deliveries of the materiel involved except some MAP grant aid which arrived in Amman this week. We have approved an airlift of some of the ground force equipment that Jordan is buying. This airlift will involve ten C-141 aircraft, cost to be borne by Jordan.

Clark M. Riggard

Attachments - 2

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-278
By is, NARA Date 3-23-98

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-2623

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~~SECRET EXDTS~~

38c

TAB A

US-JORDAN ARMS AGREEMENT

The Memorandum of Understanding and Protocol thereto was the basis of the US-GOJ negotiations consummated on 28 March 1968.

The Jordanian commitments which are in the Protocol relate to

- (1) Jordanian reaffirmation of its policy of procuring all of its defense needs from Western sources;
- (2) An annual review of Jordanian military requirements;
- (3) A financial ceiling on Jordan's indigenously financed budget during CY 1968 at no more than \$56.5 million;
- (4) Full secrecy on all matters concerning the United States offer;
- (5) Jordan's assurance that it will not purchase major items of military equipment from other than United States sources without U.S. approval.

The Memorandum of Understanding commits the United States

- (1) To resume shipment of undelivered FY 1966-67 MAP Grant Aid;
- (2) To resume shipment of suspended ground force equipment sold to Jordan under a 1965 agreement;
- (3) To replace the bulk of ground force equipment lost in the June hostilities by selling specified items on a reimbursable basis;
- (4) To deliver eighteen F-104 aircraft and related equipment at a cost of approximately \$30.5 million;
- (5) To sell ground control radar equipment at a cost of approximately \$2.8 million;
- (6) To consider at some future point up to eighteen additional aircraft of a type to be mutually agreed upon.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-278

By iso, NARA Date 3-23-98

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~~SECRET EMBIS~~

38d

STATUS OF JORDAN ARMS PACKAGEGRANT MAP (\$3.8 million)

First shipment (target drone system; aiming circles; mortar sights, radios and spare parts) arrived in Jordan on 24 April (via weekly Military Airlift Command weekly flight). Ammo (11,300 Rds 105mm; 5250 Rds 106mm; 200 Rds 155mm) scheduled for sealift to arrive in Jordan on 7 June. Other miscellaneous equipment amounting to less than \$1.0 million is scheduled to move to Jordan via sealift over next few months.

SUSPENDED GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT SOLD TO JORDAN IN 1965 (\$7.0 million)

In March 1965 the US agreed to sell to Jordan ground force equipment in the amount of \$44 million of which \$15 million was on credit terms. The bulk of the equipment sold to Jordan was delivered prior to the June Arab-Israeli hostilities. Some 200-300 various radios and miscellaneous spare parts suspended during the June Arab-Israeli hostilities are now scheduled to arrive in Jordan during May-June.

SALE OF GROUND FORCE EQUIPMENT LOST IN THE JUNE HOSTILITIES (\$40 million)

The appropriate sales documents have been transmitted to Amman for signature and deposit of funds by the Jordanians. The US has requested a deposit of \$25 million to cover deliveries of the ground force equipment through CY 1968. The balance will be delivered by the end of 1970. Some of the key items are 100 tanks (M48A1), 43 Armored Personnel Carriers, 23 105mm self-propelled artillery pieces and 24 self-propelled 40mm AA guns. An airlift involving ten C141 aircraft has been agreed to at Jordanian expense.

SALE OF 18 F-104 AIRCRAFT AND RELATED EQUIPMENT (\$30.5 million)

The appropriate sales documents are in Amman for signature and deposit of necessary funds by the Jordanians. Jordan has previously deposited \$10.0 million on this transaction and is being asked to pay \$10 million in 1968 and \$10.5 million in 1969 on this transaction.

GROUND CONTROL RADAR EQUIPMENT (\$2.8 million)

The Jordanians are still studying the specific requirements.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-278

By isa, NARA Date 3-23-98~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET EMBIS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-- LITERALLY EYES ONLY

April 29, 1968

Mr. Secretary:

An off-beat idea.

Why not encourage Thieu to take the initiative and actively seek private negotiations with "a member" of the NLF, using a trusted man.

There are three virtues, if he could see it that way:

- the heart of peace is the southern political settlement anyway;
- the southern political settlement will, in my view, have to be negotiated secretly and, quite probably, separately from any formal conference generated by Washington-Hanoi, if we ever get one;
- it would put Thieu and the GVN in the center of things -- taking the initiative to shape its own destiny -- rather than awaiting anxiously the outcome of U. S. - Hanoi talks, etc.

The odds are, of course, slight that Thieu could generate such quiet talks. But the effort makes sense; and our encouraging him to do so might constitute credible evidence we don't intend to sell him out.

W. W. Rostow

Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-283
By ies, NARA Date 4-30-98

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

40

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sunday, April 28, 1968

2:45 PM

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bermuda Riots

Pres file

Rioting in Bermuda calmed down last night - probably because of a strict curfew and the arrival of a British frigate with a small marine contingent.

The U. K. is flying in a company of troops and tear gas supplies as a precaution against new disorders.

The British Embassy tells us the U. K. no longer anticipates a need for U. S. assistance.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-283
By is, NARA Date 4-30-98

MB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

41

SECRET

Sunday, April 28, 1968
1:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft letter to the
Shah, as requested.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines Feb. 24, 1993
By rg, NARA, Date 5-21-92

WWRostow:rla

41a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-283
By is, NARA Date 4-30-98

DRAFT -- Sunday, April 28, 1968

Your Imperial Majesty:

I write to seek your counsel concerning our efforts to find an honorable and just settlement in Vietnam.

As you know, I ordered, on March 31, the suspension of bombing over most of North Vietnam. I noted that even the very limited bombing that was being continued -- for sound military reasons -- could come to an early end if our restraint was matched by restraint in Hanoi.

At the same time, I proposed to send our representatives to meet with those from Hanoi to discuss means for bringing the war to an end. I suggested they meet in Geneva "or any other suitable place." In its answer Hanoi agreed to meet and suggested Phnom Penh, Cambodia, as an "appropriate place." The North Vietnamese Foreign Minister spoke publicly of Phnom Penh or "another place to be mutually agreed upon."

In addition to Geneva, we have proposed ten sites in Asia and four more in Europe. The only additional proposal from Hanoi has been Warsaw -- capital of a communist country which has openly sided with North Vietnam in the conflict. Moreover, it is a capital where our ~~communist~~ allies would feel less than comfortable and where we could expect restrictive treatment for the press representatives of our side. You should also know that our considerable experience with Warsaw as a secret intermediary was not satisfactory.

As for Phnom Penh, we do not maintain diplomatic relations and have no embassy or official communications facilities.

Quiet and private contacts for an exchange of messages could be arranged in a variety of places. Indeed, there have been such exchanges over the past few years in more places than most people realize. However, the choice of site for serious diplomatic talks and negotiations is quite another thing.

I am sure you will agree that, in a matter so serious as this, the setting for such conversations is of the utmost importance. It must, we believe, be a site in which both sides feel comfortable, in which they can reasonably expect even-handed treatment from the host authorities. It should be a place where both sides have ready access to adequate communications. It should be a place where all the most interested parties either are represented or can have access to the meeting site in a free atmosphere.

For several weeks now, Hanoi has remained in a fixed position, demanding that we accept their proposal for a site for initial contacts. They are using all the outlets of propaganda to enlist as much of world opinion as they can. The basic purpose, I have no doubt, is to see whether this kind of pressure can force us away from our own position.

With your long experience in matters of this sort, I am confident you will recognize the vital importance of diplomatic exchanges occurring in an atmosphere in which the participants feel at ease. There are many such places in the world. There are many countries which have taken no direct part in the Vietnam conflict. There are many in which the governments concerned have not expressed themselves as siding with any of the participants.

In our choice of prospective sites, we have tried conscientiously to advance capitals where we are confident the representatives of Hanoi can be assured fair and equal treatment.

What most of the world wishes to see is for the two sides to move forward toward serious talks. Surely there are a great many places -- some already mentioned by us, some not yet mentioned by either party -- in which an appropriate atmosphere would prevail.

Your magnificent capital is certainly one such setting. You may wish to consider whether it might not be a constructive step to offer Teheran as a site for this most important purpose. I assure you that if you make such a proposal, it will be accepted by us. A private offer to Hanoi through diplomatic channels might help break the impasse in which we now find ourselves.

In any case, I consider it most important that world leaders of the highest standing urge Hanoi to move forward in the choice of an appropriate site. It would be highly important that the leaders in Hanoi understand that their rigid insistence on their own choice be abandoned in favor of a truly neutral site in which both sides and all interested parties could expect even-handed treatment.

A public statement to this effect would have a most useful effect in advancing the cause of finding a peaceful settlement. I would be most grateful if this suggestion meet's with Your Majesty's favorable consideration.

Wm. Jordan? WWRestow:rin

Sincerely,

INFORMATION

42

~~SECRET COMINT~~

Sunday, April 28, 1968
12:15 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This survey of indications of a forthcoming Communist offensive doesn't add much to what you know, although the final two paragraphs (p. 4) are interesting.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Intelligence Memorandum
"Indications of Forthcoming Communist
Offensive Activity in South Vietnam"
Cy # 27 April 1968
SC No. 08359/68

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NL/RAC 00-325
By ebm, NARA, Date 12-10-01

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42a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
27 April 1968

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JAN 2003

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Indications of Forthcoming Communist
Offensive Activity in South Vietnam

1. There are a number of indications that Communist forces in South Vietnam are preparing for major offensive action. If mounted, these actions apparently will be carried out within the context of a renewed "general attack" phase to open the enemy's "summer campaign." Any major new military offensive will certainly be accompanied by intensive political action directed at a "general uprising" and by subversive operations against the ARVN and the GVN. Such attacks would be intended to further the double aim of influencing US and international opinion and; in South Vietnam, of eroding the GVN and contributing to the disintegration of ARVN as an effective force.

2. The evidence on the Communists' timetable is conflicting. Some reports and sources suggest major action in at least some areas (e.g. Saigon and I Corps) within the next few days. Other signs point to mid-May or even later.

3. Preparations for major military action appear complete in some areas, but preparations in others still seem to be incomplete. Moreover, operations by allied forces may pre-empt Communist

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of National Estimates.

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SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 00-328

By cbm, NARA, Date 5-3-05

~~SECRET~~

plans in some areas and disrupt any timetable the Communists now have. The Communists almost certainly would limit the scope of their initial effort to the extent necessary to retain the capability for further major action later in the summer as a means of influencing negotiations. We would thus anticipate that the forthcoming offensive phase would be more analogous to the intensified operations that opened the winter-spring campaign last November than to the all-out "one-shot" thrust of the Tet offensive. The new campaign would thus probably include major assaults on selected cities (e.g. Saigon and probably Hue) accompanied by widespread harassment of allied bases and command and administrative facilities, all designed to regain the initiative temporarily in some areas, cause maximum destruction to allied support facilities, inflict maximum damage to RVNAF units, erode GVN authority in as many areas as possible, produce a further setback to pacification, and generate a political and psychological reaction abroad, particularly in the US, favorable to Communist interests.

Signs of Preparations

4. The indications of impending offensive action can be grouped into three categories: those reflecting movements and improved capabilities; those indicating active planning and battlefield preparations for specific operations; and those suggesting over-all plans for a new phase of activity.

5. There are numerous signs that the recent period of disengagement and regrouping has ended and that Communist units are moving back into a posture of operational readiness. These signs include reports of the arrival of infiltrated replacement groups at Khe Sanh and elsewhere, suggesting that units are being brought back to strength. Recently arrived reinforcement units have been identified near A Shau. Communist command elements displaced from Khe Sanh during recent allied operations have returned to that area. An unusual concentration of units--possibly involving elements of the

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320th Division, which had earlier moved north of the DMZ--has been reported near Dong Ha. Other NVA units are moving in the vicinity of Hue and Phu Bai. The NVA 2nd Division apparently is moving back to normal operational areas near Da Nang after a brief respite in border sanctuaries. The NVA 325th Division has arrived in the Kontum sector, and the 174th and 32d regiments also appear to be moving back into operational areas in the other highlands provinces of Pleiku and Darlac.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

6. In the III Corps area, NVA and VC main force divisions are reflecting preoperational characteristics and at least one regiment--the 274th--is currently involved in a "long march" apparently associated with forthcoming operations. In the delta, the Communists appear to have formed seven new battalions in the past few months, potentially increasing their regular forces there by one third.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

Active planning and battlefield preparations are indicated in reports from a number of areas. [redacted] reflect active preparations for early attacks in northern I Corps, and numerous intelligence reports describe battlefield preparations there and in other sectors of I and II Corps. North Vietnamese ralliers have reported that elements of two NVA regiments are deploying for early attacks on a CIDG camp in western Kontum. Intelligence reports have provided detailed information on enemy plans for early operations in the area south of Da Nang, and less precise information on forthcoming attacks in Phu Yen and other areas of II Corps. A rallier from the NVA 32d Regiment reported his unit was moving supplies into the Ban Me Thuot area. A high-level defector in III Corps reports that an offensive is impending in the Saigon area, and other reports in that region have reflected plans and preparations for an early resumption of offensive action.

Timing

8. Generalized indicators of an impending new phase of offensive action include reports and documents reflecting indoctrination for a "summer campaign," and political and psychological moves by the

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

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Communists that would undergird their military actions. The pattern of enemy activity suggests that the "winter-spring campaign" tapered off after mid-March. This coincides with references in documents and intelligence reports to recent indoctrination sessions on a "summer campaign." The dates for initiating this new campaign have ranged from late April to early May.

Political Aspects

9. On the political front, the renewed propaganda emphasis accorded by the NLF to the new front organizations created during the Tet offensive suggests an anticipatory move to provide a political basis for forthcoming military operations and/or any negotiations with the US. Similarly, recent NLF broadcasts urging "patriotic elements" to prepare to rally to the Viet Cong cause could also be intended, in part, to lay the groundwork for a new phase of intensified political/military activity. These generalized indicators suggest that the "summer campaign" will be carried out within the context of the "general attack - general uprising" objectives of the winter-spring campaign, with emphasis on coordinated military, political, and subversive operations.

10. Hanoi's play of its hand on the negotiations issue will be closely related to Communist actions on the ground in South Vietnam, and these actions' success or lack thereof. The evidence available does not permit confident detailed prediction, but Hanoi would certainly prefer to have any talks with the US commence during a period of Communist success on the ground in South Vietnam rather than at a time when it appeared that allied military and political fortunes were at least temporarily improving.

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Key to Places Mentioned in Text



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

43

4/28/68

Mr. Rostow,

Attached was passed to
the President per Mr. Fried
at 7 pm last night.

Chuck

43a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

April 27, 1968 - 7:00 pm
Saturday

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bermuda Riots: Possible Request for U.S. Assistance

Riots which began on Thursday in Bermuda have intensified. There is a racial and political aspect to them. Elections are scheduled for May 23. Parties are split largely along color lines. Most of the rioters are Negro youths.

Leaders of both major political parties have deplored the violence, but the militant fringe of the predominantly Negro party is apparently fanning it.

There has been substantial property damage but no deaths. There is no indication of any anti-Americanism in the riots.

A British frigate is scheduled to arrive in Bermuda at midnight to supplement local police and militia. The British Governor of Bermuda will reassess the situation tomorrow morning.

He may ask the U. K. Government to request that the U. S. make available from the U. S. military bases on the Island:

- tear gas for use by the Bermuda police; and
- military guards to protect the ESSO and Shell refineries.

We are following the problem.

The possible request for assistance is being brought to the attention of Secretaries Rusk and Clifford. They may be in touch with you.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-283
By vis, NARA Date 4-30-98 W. W. Rostow

EF/mg

ACTION

44

Saturday - April 27, 1968 - 6:35pm

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Washington Meeting of US-Mexican Border Development Commission

The US-Mexico Border Development Commission will meet in Washington next week. It is the second meeting of the full Commission and the first in the United States.

Ray Telles asks if you would be willing to receive them on May 1, 2 or 3 (Wednesday, Thursday, or Friday) at your convenience?

W. W. Rostow

Yes ☐

Prefer not ☐

Call me ☐.

cc - Jim Jones

44a

U.S.-Mexico Commission for Border Development
and Friendship
Room 800, 1800 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20525

April 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM BOWDEER

Subject: Request for President Johnson Meeting with Full Commission

As you know, the full Commission will meet here in Washington May 1, 2, and 3. This is only the second meeting of the full Commission and its first in the United States.

A tremendous lift would be given to the meeting if the President would greet the Mexican and American Commissioners. The meeting could be very brief and he need make only a very few brief remarks, not more than he did to the US/Mexican Interparliamentary Group at Honolulu. (As a matter of fact, the remarks he made there would be very apropos for this gathering.)

We could arrange any time during the meeting to bring the group to the White House. Or, if he preferred, the President could drop in on the meeting at the State Department.

While the group is here, Secretary Rusk will give a reception in their honor and will make some remarks at the closing session when he and Ambassador Margain will sign the disaster planning agreement. We are hoping to get Vice President Humphrey to open the meeting at 10:00 a.m. on May 1.

A meeting with the President would cap the entire proceedings and lift them to the level of concern and action that you and I know he wants.

Raymond Telles
Ambassador

45

her file

INFORMATION

Saturday, April 27, 1968 -- 5:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

At your instruction I put the four weeks-big build up theme to

Joe Alsop
William S. White
John Hightower
Murrey Marder

I could not reach Frankel, Wiggins, or Dick Wilson.

You should know that the UPI story on the front page of this afternoon's Washington Star is good in this respect; and it results from an instruction that we had sent out earlier in the week after our regular Monday session on Vietnam public affairs issues.

Those to whom I did speak responded positively.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

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46

Saturday, April 27, 1968 - 4:20pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Request for Appointment for G. Mennen Williams,
Ambassador Nominee to the Philippines

Profile

Governor Williams will be in Washington next week for the first time since his appointment to Manila was announced. He has asked to see you during his visit, if possible. He is arriving on the afternoon of April 30 and will be here all day May 1st and 2nd.

Governor Williams will be returning to Washington for a longer visit later in May. If an appointment with you is not convenient on May 1 or 2, therefore, we can put it off until later.

I recommend you give him an appointment on May 1 or 2 if it is convenient for your schedule.

W. W. Rostow

Approve May 1st _____
May 2nd _____
Make appointment later _____
Disapprove _____
Call me _____

WWR:WMWright:pas:4/27/68

47

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, April 27, 1968 -- 12:40 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk proposes ~~new~~ tactics for dealing with the Jordanian complaint in the Security Council about the Israeli parade.

Goldberg believes he must be able to tell the Jordanians how we will vote in order to get a resolution we can live with -- in the second approach.

You may wish to discuss this at lunch.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-283
By ics, NARA Date 4-30-98

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WWRostow:rla

47a
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Middle East Situation

We are taking a fresh look at the present situation in the Middle East in light of the continuing differences between the Arabs and Israelis which have made it impossible for Jarring to get talks started and with a view to seeing whether we can recommend to you additional steps to give effect to the policy objectives of your June 19, 1967 speech. However, we have a more immediate short-range problem in the Security Council which begins Saturday to consider the problem of Jerusalem at the request of Jordan. Israel is holding an Independence Day parade which violates provisions of the Armistice Agreement and previous UN resolutions by introducing military forces into Jerusalem beyond those permitted in the Agreement.

The Jordanian objectives are threefold: (a) to get the Security Council to call on Israel to cancel the Independence Day parade of May 2; (b) to reinforce the Armistice Agreement framework, which is an anathema to the Israelis; and (c) to mobilize Security Council opinion against Israeli unilateral measures in Jerusalem which in the Jordanian view amounts to de facto annexation prejudicial to any ultimate settlement. Jordan has requested our support. (We persuaded Eban to say at the United Nations last summer that Israeli administration of Jerusalem is not an annexation, but municipal administration by the occupying power.)

There are basically two approaches we can take in the Security Council.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-280

By C6, NARA Date 7-23-99

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-2-

First, on the assumption we cannot develop sufficient common ground between the United States and Jordanian positions on Jerusalem, we could decide not to try to influence the Jordanians. In these circumstances, they would develop a resolution which would certainly go beyond what the United States could support. We would abstain in the vote, as we have on the two past General Assembly resolutions on Jerusalem, while restating in the Council the basic principles of our policy in essentially the same terms as in the past. Such a result would not disturb Israel too much since it attaches more importance to the United States vote than to the Security Council result. Israel would disregard such a resolution. It would go ahead with the parade and refuse to alter measures already taken in Jerusalem extending its control.

Such a United States abstention would be exploited by the Soviets against our position in the area; it would further disillusion and weaken King Hussein; it would be played by the Arabs and his own people as another example that the King's friendship with the United States is not paying off for him; and it would further aggravate the difficulties which have prevented Jarring from getting a dialogue started.

We believe, and Ambassador Goldberg concurs, there is a second approach which should at least be tried even though its chances of succeeding are slim.

Second, we would have Ambassador Goldberg meet with the Jordanians and probably the Pakistanis to see whether agreement can be achieved on a resolution based on the attached principles which are consistent with our present policy on Jerusalem.

We would have to vote "yes" on the resolution if it stayed within the limits of these principles, and we would have to give the Jordanians this assurance at the outset of the Security Council discussions.

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-3-

Ambassador Goldberg wishes in the first instance to make a major effort to convince the Jordanians to limit the resolution to principle 1: A Call on Israel to cancel the parade because it would aggravate tension and make the Jarring Mission more difficult. This would be consistent with past policy.

Ambassador Goldberg would also be given discretion to support principles 2 through 6 in a Security Council resolution if he thought it would be helpful. The reason we are being so gingerly about principles 2 through 6 is not because they are inconsistent with our policy but because an indication to the Jordanians of a willingness on our part to discuss them could lead to touchy and intricate political and legal issues being raised in the Security Council resolution. Israel is particularly anxious to avoid references to the Armistice Agreement in a resolution since their objective is to replace the unstable Armistice Agreement framework with a durable and stable peace by means of a negotiated settlement. We share this objective. We would leave it to Ambassador Goldberg's judgment as to whether and when to inject principles 2 through 6 in the discussions. We agree with him that we should not support a resolution that has the effect of bulwarking an Armistice Agreement system that has proved unworkable in the past.

If we succeed along these lines we would avoid being isolated, it would be helpful to our position in the area, and it would help maintain an atmosphere in Jordan in which Jarring could continue his efforts. Both Eban and Jarring intend in the next ten days to concentrate in particular on the possibilities of Israeli-Jordan talks, since the recent hardening of the UAR position makes early progress in Cairo unlikely. As you know, Jordan and Israel are close together on Jarring's approach while the UAR has thus far been very negative.

~~SECRET~~

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-4-

You should be aware there will be Israeli grumbling with this second approach. There will also be some domestic reaction in certain quarters, but it should be manageable since the recommended course does not involve any sharp change from past policy. We have long agreed to disagree with the Israelis on Jerusalem. We could balance this somewhat by reaffirming strongly the five principles you stated on June 19, 1967. The fact is that the Israelis have acted very badly on this Jerusalem matter and have put us in a position of near isolation in the United Nations which in turn is having adverse repercussions on our overall position in the area. Those favoring a settlement in Israel would be strengthened by our position.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize Ambassador Goldberg (a) to proceed along the above lines in the knowledge we would vote "yes" if the resolution is consistent with the attached principles; (b) to include a frank discussion with the Israelis, as well as the Jordanians, so that they understand our position clearly.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Principles Concerning Jerusalem

~~SECRET~~

476

~~SECRET~~

PRINCIPLES CONCERNING JERUSALEM

1. A call on Israel to cancel the parade because it would aggravate tension in an already inflamed situation and make the Jarring Mission more difficult.

Other Principles if Desirable

2. Unilateral actions by any of the states in the area cannot be recognized as governing the international status of Jerusalem.

3. Issue of Jerusalem should be considered in the context of a settlement of all the problems arising out of the June conflict.

4. A satisfactory solution for Jerusalem must take into consideration the religious, economic, and political interests at stake, including those of Israel and Jordan. Its future status must be worked out in consultation with all parties having an interest in the special character of the city.

5. Israel is obligated to observe the provisions of international law governing the rights and obligations of an occupying power in the newly-occupied sections of Jerusalem, as it is in the other occupied territories.

6. Pending a settlement, Israel should refrain from actions in the newly-occupied sections of Jerusalem which are prejudicial to the future status of the city or which impede progress toward a settlement.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-280
By CG, NARA Date 7-23-99

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-195
By fw, NARA, Date 9-17-92

48

Pres file

SECRET

Saturday, April 27, 1968 - 12:35pm

Mr. President:

I will bring copies of these along to lunch. They have, Tab A, the locations outside the Communist bloc where the DRV has an Ambassador and we have a representative of some kind; Tab B, a draft note suggesting that we proceed to use our contact in Vientiane to establish the place for date and talks.

W. W. Restow

SECRET

WWRestow:rla

48a
~~SECRET~~

Saturday
April 27, 1968 -- 12:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the draft you outlined.

The following are our representatives and their rank, at the indicated locations:

Algeria -- Lew Hoffacker, DCM

Guinea -- Robinson McIlvaine, Ambassador

Indonesia -- Marshall Green, Ambassador

Laos -- William H. Sullivan, Ambassador

Mali -- C. Robert Moore, Ambassador

Tanzania -- John H. Burns, Ambassador

UAR -- Donald Bergus, Principal Officer

You may wish to drop Indonesia and Laos, in accordance with the principle stated in our note to them of April 23.

W. W. Restow

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WWRestow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 5-28-92

48 2

April 27, 1968

In response to the note of the DRV, dated April 27, 1968, the U. S. Government agrees that it is necessary for Hanoi and Washington to engage in conversations promptly. The U. S. Government agrees also that the first appropriate subject of discussion is the place and date of contact for the purpose of engaging in substantive conversations. The U. S. Government finds Warsaw an unsuitable and inappropriate site for exchanges between the DRV and the USG.

USG is, however, prepared to discuss the place and date of subsequent contacts at any one of the following places where the DRV is represented at the ambassadorial level and the USG has representation adequate for the limited purpose envisaged by both sides: Algeria; Guinea; Indonesia; Laos; Mali, Tanzania; or the United Arab Republic.

WWRostow:rla

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DRAFT

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Wm Jordan draft
4/27/68

For delivery to North Vietnamese Charge in Vientiane:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-195
By gW, NARA, Date 9-17-92

(Appropriate introduction)

The Government of the United States has received the note of the DRV dated April 27, 1968, in which the DRV agrees with the proposal of the United States that our representatives meet at an appropriate location for private discussions to agree on a site and time for proposed contacts.

We stated in our note of April 23 our readiness to consider for this purpose a site not previously considered by either side, and asked the DRV to indicate "appropriate locations suitable for this limited purpose."

Your note of April 27 suggests Warsaw for this purpose. The United States does not consider Warsaw appropriate.

We agree, however, with the statement of the DRV that it is "necessary for Hanoi and Washington to engage in conversations promptly."

In the interest of resolving this matter in a way fair to both parties and of arranging promptly for a time and place for conversations, we propose the following:

that our representatives in Vientiane be empowered by their respective governments to discuss and reach agreement on an appropriate site and an early date for the meeting of ambassadorial representatives for conversations as earlier agreed.


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- 2 -

We note, in this connection, that diplomatic contacts have taken place between us in Vientiane. It is a site convenient to both parties for this limited purpose. The circumstances permit us to use this already established point of contact for confidential exchanges of views regarding a place and date for the talks.

We believe this proposal will permit us to move quickly to agreement on an appropriate place for talks at an early date. It should meet the legitimate demands of all who sincerely desire early moves in the direction of achieving a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Viet-Nam.



INFORMATION

49

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, April 27, 1968
10:35 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This CIA-Saigon summary report
collects evidence on a second wave of
attacks on cities.

It concludes:

- They intend to attack again;
- Timing is not certain;
- In particular, they are sceptical
the enemy is in a position for an
imminent attack on Saigon.

Key passages marked.

W. W. Rostow
TDCS-314/07024-68

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 20

By ics, NARS, Date 6-25-84

WWRostow:rla

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 98815

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| STATE/INR | DIA | NMCC/MC | (SECDEF | JCS | ARMY | NAVY | AIR) | CIA/NMCC | NIC | NSA | SOO | ONE | CRS |
| DD/I | | EXO | | | | | | OER | FBIS | DCS | IRS | AID | USIA |

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.O. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

261554Z

CITE

DIST 26 APRIL 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI MARCH - APRIL 1968
SUBJECT RUMORS AND REPORTS OF POSSIBLE LARGE-SCALE VIET
CONG ATTACKS
ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (26 APRIL 1968) FIELD NO.
[REDACTED]
SOURCE THIS IS A COLLATION AND ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE INFOR-
MATION ON THE SUBJECT PREPARED IN THE FIELD BY A
CAS RESEARCH UNIT. IT IS NOT FULLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE.

1. A NUMBER OF REPORTS FROM SOURCES WITH VARYING ACCESS AND
RELIABILITY INDICATE THAT THE VIET CONG (VC) MAY BE ~~PREPARING FOR~~
~~LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS AGAINST SAIGON AND OTHER SOUTH-VIETNAMESE~~
~~CITIES.~~ ACCORDING TO SOME OF THESE REPORTS, THE ATTACKS MAY TAKE
PLACE AS SOON AS THE ~~END OF APRIL OR BEGINNING OF MAY.~~ HOWEVER,

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SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 97-285 and RAC 11161
By us, NARA, Date 11-20-03

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(classification) (dissem controls)

THE BULK OF THE AVAILABLE INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY THAT CONCERNING COMMUNIST TROOP DISPOSITIONS, ARGUES AGAINST A LARGE-SCALE GROUND ATTACK AGAINST SAIGON IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THIS IS ALSO TRUE FOR MANY OF THE OTHER POPULATION CENTERS OF SOUTH VIETNAM, ALTHOUGH SOME CITIES, E.G., HUE, QUANG TRI CITY, AND DANANG, COULD BE ATTACKED WITHOUT PRIOR WARNING. FURTHER, IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT MOST OF THESE REPORTS ARE OF A LOW-LEVEL, FRAGMENTARY NATURE. SINCE TET, RUMORS AND REPORTS OF IMPENDING ATTACKS HAVE BEEN COMMONPLACE. IN PARTICULAR, MAY DAY (1 MAY) AND HO CHI MINH'S BIRTHDAY (19 MAY) ARE REPORTED AS THE DATES FOR VC ATTACKS. THIS IS TRUE EVERY YEAR.

2. A FAR BETTER SOURCE OF INFORMATION CONCERNING VC INTENTIONS ARE THE HIGH-LEVEL VC DOCUMENTS CAPTURED SINCE TET. THE DOCUMENTS INDICATE THAT THE VC HOPE TO LAUNCH A NEW OFFENSIVE ABOUT THREE OR FOUR MONTHS AFTER TET, OR LATE APRIL TO LATE JUNE. THESE DATES COINCIDE WITH THE FINAL, OR THIRD, PHASE OF THE VC WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN. THE DOCUMENTS DO NOT GIVE FIXED DATES. AS ILLUSTRATED AT TET, IT IS COMMON VC PRACTICE. NOT TO DIVULGE SPECIFIC DATES TO THE TROOPS OR EVEN MOST CADRES UNTIL JUST PRIOR TO THE ATTACKS.

3. ~~IN ANY EVENT, IT APPEARS THAT THE VC STILL HOPE TO LAUNCH~~

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(dissem controls)

A NEW WAVE OF ATTACKS AGAINST THE CITIES, AND THAT SAIGON IS CONSIDERED BY THEM AS THE CRUCIAL AREA. NONETHELESS, THE VC GENERALLY HAVE BEEN PUSHED AWAY FROM SAIGON, AND THEIR ABILITY TO GET INTO POSITION FOR LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS BY THE END OF APRIL OF EARLY MAY APPEARS QUESTIONABLE, ALTHOUGH ATTACKS BY FIRE ARE POSSIBLE AT ANY TIME. IN ADDITION, THE ALLIES ARE ON ALERT IN THE SAIGON AREA BECAUSE OF THE REPORTS OF IMPENDING ATTACKS. THIS ALSO WILL BE THE CASE ON MAY DAY AND ON 19 MAY. ALTHOUGH NOT "DISPROVING" THAT LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS WILL OCCUR, IT DOES RAISE DOUBTS WHETHER THE VC WOULD CHOOSE THESE DATES. IN THIS RESPECT, TET IS NOT A PARALLEL; SECURITY WAS LAX AT TET. FINALLY, THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THE VC PURPOSELY ARE FLOATING RUMORS OF IMPENDING ATTACKS. IT IS PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVE THAT ANY INDIVIDUAL REPORT IS "DISINFORMATION", BUT THE VC ARE KNOWN TO ENGAGE RATHER EXTENSIVELY IN SUCH ACTIVITY.

4. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ARE REPRESENTATIVE REPORTS REFLECTING THE POSSIBILITY OF VC ATTACKS WITHIN THE NEXT MONTH. EMPHASIS IS PLACED ON THE SAIGON AREA.

5. SEVERAL REPORTS RECEIVED DURING THE PAST SIX WEEKS STATE

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

THAT SAIGON WILL BE ATTACKED BY THE END OF APRIL OR DURING THE
FIRST HALF OF MAY. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED]

VC FORCES ARE PREPARING FOR ANOTHER NATION-WIDE OFFENSIVE TO
OCCUR POSSIBLY BETWEEN 22 AND 27 APRIL. [REDACTED] CLAIMED THAT SAIGON
IS TO BE THE MAIN TARGET OF THE OFFENSIVE AND THAT THE ATTACK
WOULD DEFINITELY TAKE PLACE UNLESS NECESSARY SUPPLIES COULD NOT
BE OBTAINED, PROPER PREPARATIONS WERE NOT MADE, OR ALLIED SWEEP
OPERATIONS DISRUPTED VC TROOP MOVEMENTS. SINCE [REDACTED]
STORY HAS SURFACED IN THE PRESS, THIS MIGHT LEAD THE VC TO RE-
CONSIDER THEIR PLANS, ASSUMING THEY ACTUALLY HAD SUCH PLANS OR
HAD NOT ALREADY POSTPONED THEM.

6. A VC/NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) RECONNAISSANCE AGENT
CAPTURED BY ARVN FORCES ON 31 MARCH IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE CLAIMED
TO HAVE RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE VC GO MON DISTRICT COMMITTEE
SOMETIME BETWEEN FEBRUARY AND LATE MARCH WHICH LAID OUT VC PLANS
FOR A SECOND OFFENSIVE AGAINST SAIGON SOMETIME DURING APRIL.
SUPPOSEDLY THE PLAN CALLED FOR THE 9TH VC DIVISION TO ATTACK
ALONG HIGHWAY¹ THROUGH HOC MON AND QUANG TRUNG, WHILE THE 5TH
VC DIVISION WOULD MOVE TOWARD SAIGON THROUGH DI AN, THU DUC, AND

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(classification)

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(dissem controls)

PHU NHUAN, AND THE 7TH NVA DIVISION WOULD ATTACK FROM NHI BINH THROUGH THONG TAY HOI AND AN NHON TO GO VAP. ~~AT PRESENT THE EXACT LOCATION OF THE REGIMENTS OF THE 9TH DIVISION ARE UNKNOWN.~~ IN ADDITION TO THESE DIVISIONS, THE LETTER REPORTEDLY STATED THAT THE "3RD AND 4TH DIVISIONS" WOULD BE HELD IN RESERVE TO ACT AS A BLOCKING FORCE AND TO SHELL TAN SON NHUT AIRBASE AND THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF HEADQUARTERS. THERE IS NO CONFIRMATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF A 3RD AND 4TH DIVISION IN THE SAIGON AREA, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE LOW-LEVEL REPORTS OF THE ELEMENTS OF TWO NEW DIVISIONS BEING IN CAMBODIA.

7. LESS SPECIFIC, BUT MORE CREDIBLE, IS A DOCUMENT DATED ~~5 APRIL~~ FOUND ON A VC COURIER CAPTURED IN SAIGON ON ~~15 APRIL~~ WHICH ALLUDES TO FORTHCOMING ATTACKS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF SAIGON IN THE VC'S PLANS. THE DOCUMENT, IN THE FORM OF A LETTER FROM THE SAIGON GIA DINH ZONE COMMITTEE TO CADRES, PARTY MEMBERS, ~~PRP~~ YOUTH GROUP MEMBERS, AND MEMBERS OF LIBERATION ASSOCIATIONS THROUGHOUT THE ZONE, IS AN EXHORTATION TO LAUNCH HEAVY ATTACKS AGAINST THE GVN IN ORDER TO DESTROY IT TOTALLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POLICY OF THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE AND GENERAL UPRISING. IN ADDITION, AN ARVN PENETRATION AGENT REPORTED THAT ALTHOUGH THE CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (COSVN) HAD SET ASIDE ITS

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(classification) (dissem controls)

ORIGINAL DATE FOR ATTACKING SAIGON, A LATER COSVN DIRECTIVE STATED THAT MILITARY REGIONS WOULD COMMEMORATE 1 AND 19 MAY WITH ATTACKS. THE 1 MAY ATTACK WAS TO BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ARTILLERY UNITS. A REVIEW OF THIS AGENT'S REPORTING OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS, HOWEVER, CASTS DOUBTS ON THE RELIABILITY OF HIS INFORMATION.

8. OTHER VERY RECENT REPORTS ALSO MENTION THE HOLIDAY PERIOD OF 1-19 MAY AS THE TIME FOR A VC OFFENSIVE AGAINST SAIGON. MAY DAY, THE FALL OF DIEN BIEN PHU (7 MAY), BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY (11 MAY), AND HO CHI MINH'S BIRTHDAY OCCUR DURING THIS PERIOD. THE MAJORITY OF THE REPORTS STATE THAT ATTACKS BY FIRE AND ATTACKS ON OUTPOSTS WILL OCCUR UNTIL THE 19TH, WHEN THE MAJOR ASSAULT ON SAIGON WILL TAKE PLACE.

9. LOW-LEVEL REPORTS OF IMPENDING VC ATTACKS IN OTHER PARTS OF SVN INCLUDE A [REDACTED] INFORMANT REPORT, FROM QUANG NGAI PROVINCE IN I CORPS, STATING THAT IN VC MILITARY REGION (MR) 5 PREPARATIONS WERE UNDERWAY FOR ANOTHER GENERAL ATTACK BETWEEN 15 APRIL AND 25 MAY. A SECOND REPORT FROM AN INFORMANT IN QUANG NGAI WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE SPOKEN TO TWO VC CADRES, STATES THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST (LAO DONG) PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE ORDERED

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(classification)~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
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MR 5 TO PREPARE FOR RENEWED ATTACKS. THE ATTACKS WERE TO BE KEYED TO THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND BETWEEN 24 APRIL AND 1 MAY ALL PROVINCES FROM BINH DINH TO QUANG TRI WERE TO BE ATTACKED SIMULTANEOUSLY. NO MENTION IS MADE IN THE REPORT EXPLAINING THE IMPLICIT ASSUMPTION THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN DURING THIS PERIOD, AND IT APPEARS DOUBTFUL THAT SUCH INFORMATION, EVEN IF TRUE, WOULD BE WIDELY KNOWN. IN IV CORPS, THERE ALSO ARE REPORTS WHICH SUGGEST VC ATTACKS AGAINST URBAN AREAS WITHIN THE NEXT MONTH. FOR EXAMPLE, THREE AGENT REPORTS, RATED FAIRLY RELIABLE BY ARVN, STATE THAT THE VC WILL ATTACK AND OCCUPY PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT CAPITALS DURING AND AFTER APRIL. OTHER REPORTS MENTION A NEW PHASE OF VC ATTACKS FROM 20 APRIL TO 28 MAY. FINALLY, IN II CORPS, LOW-LEVEL REPORTS ALSO PREDICT ATTACKS DURING THE NEXT MONTH, THE MOST SPECIFIC BEING A REPORT FROM A SOURCE RATED FAIRLY RELIABLE BY THE GVN [REDACTED] WHICH STATES THAT THE VC ARE PREPARING TO LAUNCH ANOTHER GENERAL OFFENSIVE ON DIEN BIEN PHU DAY.

10. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT
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Saturday, April 27, 1968
10:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

I have marked the key passages in Sec. Rusk's paper on the strategic missile talks, as well as the key passages in the text.

Pres file

This is a major matter and you may wish to have a session with the two Secretaries and Bus Wheeler before making a final decision.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
@ H. House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Ag, NARA, Date 5-28-92

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Strategic Missile Talks

At the Tuesday luncheon meeting on April 23, we held a preliminary discussion of a proposed initiative designed to advance your proposal for bilateral talks with the Soviets on limiting the strategic arms. I would like at this point to review the reasons for taking this step.

This initiative consists of two messages. The first (Tab A) consists of an oral statement to be delivered by Ambassador Thompson to Chairman Kosygin or Foreign Minister Gromyko which would reiterate the U.S. desire to begin talks but which would also contain two innovations: (1) the presentation of the outline of an initial U.S. negotiating proposal; and (2) a discussion of certain principles which would underlie an agreement to limit strategic missiles.

In my view, there are convincing reasons to give the Soviets at this point a somewhat more concrete idea of just what we are prepared to talk about. A number of Soviet contacts have indicated that such a step would help the Soviet Government (i.e., those favoring talks) to reach a positive decision on this matter. It would be taken as an earnest of our intent and help remove doubts that, in proposing talks, we were merely engaged in a propaganda exercise or bent on an intelligence fishing expedition. It would also, not compromise in any way our negotiating position should actual talks begin. Ambassadors Bohlen and Thompson fully share this assessment.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4
NYJ 89-149; 89-74
By JOW, NARA, Date 1/8/96

Mr. Foster also feels that it would be helpful to include in this message a statement of principles so as to make clearer our intentions to the Soviets and to assure that we proceed in the talks on more or less the same set of assumptions. I agree with him.

The second message (Tab B) is a letter from you to Chairman Kosygin, proposing that the U.S. and USSR jointly announce during the current UN General Assembly debate on the NPT their decision to begin strategic missile talks within a specific time period from the date of their announcement. It also calls attention to Ambassador Thompson's oral presentation on the substance of our position on strategic missile talks. You will note that this proposal for a joint announcement represents the substantive advance over the content of your oral message to Chairman Kosygin of January 22. (A slightly expanded, alternate version of this letter is attached as Tab C.) We would gain in two ways if the Soviets were to accept such a proposal. Such an announcement would greatly advance the prospects of the NPT during the General Assembly debate; it would disarm critics who argue that the nuclear powers are doing nothing themselves to limit the arms race. This argument will not be lost on the Soviets, and so the proposal would give them an added inducement to commence strategic arms talks.

I am advised that the JCS, in a memorandum of April 22 to the Secretary of Defense, have opposed presenting to the Soviets the concrete negotiating proposal contained in the oral statement (Tab A). They claim that it would involve "extreme risks." Without attempting a detailed rebuttal of the JCS, I believe that this proposal, if put into effect, would in fact leave the U.S. in a comfortable lead in strategic weapons and, at the same time, put a lid on a new round of the strategic arms race.

The proposal would, in effect, freeze the status quo with respect to ICBMs (including 220 Soviet ICBMs under construction) and would therefore leave the USSR and the United States each with about 1,000 launchers. In the absence of agreement, the Soviets might well increase the size of their force, but we have no plans for an increase. We do plan to substantially improve our capability by putting multiple warheads (MIRVs)

on our Minuteman and Poseidon missiles, and this program will not be affected by proposal. In regard to ABMs, the proposal calls only for an agreement on a fixed number and we plan to propose a number which would permit our Sentinel to go forward. With regard to mobile systems, the proposal simply says that further discussion is needed, and we would be free to make a later specific proposal if we desire to do so, which would maintain our substantial lead in submarine launched ballistic missiles. The proposal would also not affect strategic aircraft, in which we have a decisive advantage.

I recommend that you approve the package proposal presented in Tabs A and B, and that Ambassador Thompson be instructed to deliver these messages without delay. This recommendation has the concurrence of Mr. Foster and Secretary Clifford.

Alternative Courses of Action:

If you rule against sending the package, which is an integral proposal, there are two alternative courses of action set forth below for your consideration.

One alternative would be to send either the letter to Chairman Kosygin given in Tab B (with the last paragraph amended) or the expanded version of this letter given in Tab C. (The latter version differs from the former primarily in that it focuses more on the NPT considerations and includes some fundamental principles.) Mr. Foster strongly believes that a letter to Kosygin should be sent. He feels that the present time gives us a unique opportunity to press the Soviets for public agreement to hold strategic talks, which would, of course, be an important development itself. He believes, moreover, that we should do all we can to ensure favorable action on the NPT in the General Assembly. Soviet agreement to our proposed announcement would be of major importance in this regard. While various Soviet officials have been talked to by U.S. representatives about the relationship between the NPT and an agreement to begin

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strategic talks, Mr. Foster believes that a letter from you to Kosygin bringing to his personal attention your assessment of the importance of this relationship at this critical period in our joint NPT efforts might well tip the scales. /

The other alternative, which is strongly supported by Mr. Bohlen in the event that Tab A were disapproved, is that there should be no message to the Soviets at all at this time. You last sent an oral message on precisely this subject to Chairman Kosygin on January 22 and only received a general oral reply saying that the Soviet Government was studying it. In the circumstances, it seems to Mr. Bohlen that another letter if unaccompanied by a concrete offer would be a waste of the Presidential ability to communicate directly with Chairman Kosygin. Since the Soviets are just as well aware as we are of the importance of this matter to the NPT debate in the General Assembly, it would seem to Mr. Bohlen adequate to have this request submitted by Ambassador Goldberg or Mr. Foster to Kuznetsov.


Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

- Tab A - Proposed oral statement by Ambassador Thompson.
- Tab B - Draft short Presidential letter to Chairman Kosygin.
- Tab C - Draft expanded Presidential letter to Chairman Kosygin.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin
Info

ACTION: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

NODIS

STATE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4

89-149, 89-74

By SPW/jsp, NARA, Date 1-8-96

SUBJECT: Strategic Missile Talks

1. You should seek earliest opportunity to approach Kosygin or highest available responsible Soviet official to request again a favorable response to our proposal for early talks on strategic missile controls. You should outline our views on possible strategic missile controls and on desirability of early talks, as set forth below; text of your oral remarks may at your discretion be left with Soviets.
2. BEGIN TEXT: The United States Government initially proposed discussion on strategic anti-ballistic missile systems because of our belief that deployment of such systems, even if justified in military terms, could not help but spur on a new and costly cycle of the strategic nuclear arms race. We agreed, however, in the very first exchange of views with the Soviet Government's suggestion that such discussions should include offensive strategic nuclear missile delivery systems, as well as anti-missile defensive systems. This has remained throughout, and continues to be, the position of the United States Government.
3. The United States Government has proposed these talks within the framework of the Agreed Principles of September 20, 1961, accepted by our two

Drafted by: G/PM:JPSILAW:DOD/ISA:
MHALPERIN:pep 4-3-68

Tel. Ext.
6066

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by

The Secretary

Clearances:

G - Amb. Bohlen

Amb. Thompson

ACDA - Mr. Foster

WH -

DOD - Secretary Clifford

s/s - Mr. KANX Read

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Governments as a basis for disarmament negotiations and as offering the best means to begin to make progress towards general and complete disarmament. As we have noted earlier, we believe that it should be possible to reach agreement more quickly on important limited measures curbing the strategic arms race, without waiting for agreement on all of the difficult problems inevitably involved in a program for general and complete disarmament. We believe that measures to curb the strategic arms race would help pave the way for substantial reductions, and would have great value in themselves inasmuch as they would avoid a further costly and possibly dangerous spiral of strategic missile deployments. The first step in achieving meaningful strategic arms control should be to restrain the further growth of strategic forces.

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4. It should be possible for our two countries alone to agree on steps to curtail the strategic arms race, and even to make reductions in existing forces, without the necessary participation of others. Moreover, early agreement between our two countries would be of great value in increasing the likelihood that other countries would ~~XXXX~~ ratify and continue to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We ~~will~~ ^{would} be demonstrating that we ~~are~~ ^{were} moving toward disarmament as we are committed by the treaty to try to do.

5. Over a year has passed since we first proposed these discussions. Not only is delay regrettable, but the problem which we are facing can become more difficult with time. However, our task is to take account of the existing situation in devising mutually acceptable measures to curtail the strategic arms race. As each

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armaments increase and grow more complex

[illegible]

on both sides, XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

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An agreement today to curtail future deployments would have the same effect as an agreement a year from now to effect a reduction in deployed weapons; it should also be easier to negotiate, and would result in important savings of resources for us both.

6. We recognize that achieving limitations which meet our separately
perceived requirements and serve

~~XXXX~~ common goals is a complex task, given the nature of contemporary strategic offensive and defensive missile systems and the many factors affecting and determining military capabilities. Our two nations have different levels and kinds of strategic weapons systems and we may not necessarily share identical evaluations ~~positions~~ regarding the utility and roles of these systems. However, we believe that equitable and mutually beneficial strategic arms limitations can be attained provided we start with a common understanding of a problem and are striving for similar goals. In this context, we ~~believe that there are some basic principles underlying the early~~ achievement of any such mutually beneficial restraints on the strategic arms race.

7. Any strategic arms limitation must provide balanced strategic postures acceptable to both sides and should ~~include both offensive and defensive weapons systems.~~ ~~Both~~ sides should be confident of a reasonable second-strike deterrent force. These two related fundamental principles should provide an acceptable strategic relationship on which to base strategic arms control agreements. It would be futile for us to attempt to define such concepts as "superiority" or "parity"; these notions have

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little meaning in a situation, such as the present, in which each of us is certain that the other has the capability under any circumstances to inflict unacceptable damage. We recognize that some adjustments in the deployment of the strategic forces of each side might be appropriate. Such adjustments would be designed to meet our ~~common objective of providing assurance to both sides that their security will be maintained or enhanced, while at the same time avoiding possible disruptive effects and the great cost of a continuation of the strategic arms race.~~

8. ~~Our respective national means of verification should be adequate for achieving meaningful strategic arms control constraints. The United States is prepared to consider the possibilities of placing maximum reliance on such verification of, limitations on deployment of strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems.~~

For other more comprehensive measures, some supplementary inspection arrangements may be required; we would be prepared to include the minimum inspection necessary for effective verification. Our position on this subject is flexible and is governed by the principles that ~~verification of compliance with agreed undertakings is necessary, that maximum reliance should be placed on unilateral ability to verify compliance, and that when additional procedures are required for adequate verification, they must, of course, be provided.~~

9. With all of the above considerations in mind, the United States suggests that ~~consideration be given to cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive missile launchers. This weapon category should include strategic missiles of medium and intermediate range (ranges greater than 1,000 KM), as well as longer-range intercontinental missiles. If the agreement were to be limited to fixed~~

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[land-based missile systems, we would be prepared to rely exclusively on national means of verification. In view of the difficulty of verifying through national means the deployment of sea-based or mobile land-based strategic missile launchers, the possibility of an agreed limitation applying to these weapons could be the subject of discussion.

10. The situation with respect to strategic defensive anti-missile systems is more complex. While some ABM systems may be required in light of the offensive strategic missile systems of other countries, we must recognize that as far as our own two countries are concerned they may also be an important factor in the strategic balance between us. This importance will, of course, be increased if there are agreed limitations on offensive missile systems. In general, it would seem that ~~the most feasible limitation on strategic anti-missile defensive systems would be an agreed number of anti-missile launchers and associated radars which each side could deploy. As in the case of strategic offensive missile systems, we believe that national means of verification would provide assurance with respect to the scale of deployment of fixed land-based defensive anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated radars.~~ Concerning land-mobile or sea-based anti-ballistic missile systems, the same considerations would prevail as are noted above in regard to mobile offensive systems.

11. The United States Government has presented these views in the expectation that representatives of our two Governments will meet shortly to discuss these matters.

END TEXT.

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Origin

ACTION: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

Info

NODIS

STATE

SUBJECT: Strategic Missile Talks

1. At the time of your presentation to Kosygin (or Gromyko if Kosygin is unavailable) of the oral statement on strategic missile talks (septel), you should deliver the following personal message from President Johnson to Kosygin:

BEGIN TEXT:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Ambassador Thompson has informed me of the talk he had with Foreign Minister Gromyko on March 26. Concerning the proposal for our two governments to hold discussions with the aim of controlling the strategic arms race, I understand Foreign Minister Gromyko to say that the Soviet Government is still studying the problem but that it attaches great importance to it.

I am gratified with the latter statement because it corresponds to my deep conviction concerning the need for such negotiations. I am concerned, however, about the urgency for an agreement to begin actual negotiations. As the United States Government has noted in previous communications, each passing month increases the difficulty of reaching agreement on this matter

Dated by: G/PN:JPSC: wipew 4-3-68

Tel. No. 6066

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearance:

G - Amb. Bohlen

Amb. Thompson

ACDA - Mr. Foster

WH -

DOD - Secretary Clifford

S/S -

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

89-70

By: 304/isp, WARA, Date: 1/1/96

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS

Classification

as, from a technical and military point of view, it is becoming more complex. But there is an additional consideration, which leads me to write you this letter, ³ began

As you are aware, the United Nations General Assembly ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ on April 24 its deliberations on the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty. This draft represents the joint product of the efforts of our two governments. I am confident that you share my earnest hope that it will obtain the maximum number of adherents.

To this end, I propose that our two governments announce in the course of the General Assembly debate that they have agreed to commence bilateral negotiations on an agreement to limit strategic offensive and defensive missiles, within ^{a specific} ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ time period ~~XXXXXX~~ from the date of the announcement. I am convinced that such a declaration, of primary importance in itself, would do much to ensure the successful completion of work on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would meet the complaint of many non-nuclear weapons states that, while they undertake significant obligations of self-denial under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union have accepted no compensatory, concrete, obligation to get on with the business of disarmament.

Along with this proposal, I have instructed Ambassador Thompson to present to the Soviet Government an oral statement which further spells out the views of the United States Government on the substance of a possible agreement. I hope and trust that this action will also bring us closer to the commencement of negotiations.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson

END TEXT

GP-1

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS

Classification

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW PRIORITY

Info

NODIS

STATE

SUBJECT: Strategic Missile Talks

1. You should deliver without delay the following personal message from President Johnson to Kosygin:

BEGIN TEXT:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Ambassador Thompson has informed me of the talk he had with Foreign Minister Gromyko on March 26. Concerning the proposal for our two governments to hold discussions with the aim of controlling the strategic arms race, I understand Foreign Minister Gromyko to say that the Soviet Government is still studying the problem and that it attaches great importance to it.

I am gratified with the latter statement because it corresponds to my deep conviction about the need for such

G/PM:JPS:aw:ACDA:SNGraybeal:

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearance: LDWeiler:pl 4/24/68

G - Amb. Bohlen

ACDA - Mr. Foster

WH -

DOD - Secretary Clifford S/S - Mr. Read

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS

Classification

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~
Classification

[negotiations. I am concerned, however, about the necessity to initiate]
meaningful discussion as soon as possible. As the United States Govern-
ment has noted in previous communications, each passing month increases
the difficulty of reaching agreement on this matter as, from a technical
and military point of view, it is becoming more complex. But there is an
additional consideration, which leads me to write you this letter.

As you are aware, the United Nations General Assembly has begun
its deliberations on the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty. This draft
represents the joint product of the efforts of our two governments. I
am confident that you share my earnest hope that it will obtain the
maximum number of adherents. During the resumed GA session our efforts
to achieve a treaty that can be opened for signature in the near future
with the prospect of obtaining a maximum number of adherents will face
a most critical test. Efforts undoubtedly will be made by some states
to postpone the opening of the treaty for signature at least until
after the conference of non-nuclear-weapon states has been held in
the fall of this year. It is important that our two governments do
everything possible to give the greatest impetus to world sentiment
favorable to opening the treaty for signature at an early date.

To this end, I propose that our two governments announce early in
[the course of the General Assembly debate that they have agreed to]

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~
Classification

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Classification

commence bilateral negotiations on an agreement to limit strategic offensive and defensive missiles within a specific time from the date of the announcement. I am convinced that such a declaration, of primary importance in itself, would do much to ensure the successful completion of work on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Through these private bilateral discussions it should be possible for our two countries to reach some agreement on initial steps for curtailng the strategic arms race. We believe that equitable and mutually beneficial strategic arms limitations can be attained provided we can reach a common understanding of the problem and are striving for similar goals. In our view, any strategic arms limitation must provide balanced strategic postures acceptable to both sides and should include both offensive and defensive weapons systems. Both sides should be confident of a reasonable second-strike deterrent force. These two related fundamental principles should provide an acceptable strategic relationship on which to base strategic arms control agreements. We continue to believe that meaningful strategic arms control constraints involving limitations on the deployment of certain strategic offensive and defensive weapons systems can be adequately verified by relying on our respective national capabilities. Progress on controlling the strategic arms race, while important in itself, will also contribute to

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[Our mutual objective of achieving and maintaining the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.]

I hope and trust that these actions will bring our two governments
into closer working relationships.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson

END

GP-1

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS
Classification