51

INFORMATION

SECRET - Crocodile

Saturday, April 27, 1968 9:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith (A) the full text of the note handed to Sullivan, and (B) Sullivan's discussion of the key paragraph.

W. W. Restow

Vientiane 6113 Vientiane 6114

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Ag, NARA, Date 5 2/92

from fle



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

ZZ RUEHC
DE RUMJFS 6114 1181220
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 271140Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO, SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8206
STATE GRNC
BT
SEORET VIENTIANE 6(14

CONTROL: 6977Q RECVD: April 27, 1968 8:18 a.m.



NODIS/CROCODILE

REF : VIENTIANE 6113

THERE FOLLOWS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION FROM THE UNOFFICIAL FRENCH WHICH ACCOMPANIED THE ORIGINAL TEXT IN VIETNAMESE OF THE NOTE HANDED TO AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN BY NORTH VIETNAMESE CHARGE CHAN ON APRIL 27, 1968.

QUOTE 27 APRIL, 1968

1. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAS SUGGESTED TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES THE CHOICE OF PHNOM PENH OR WARSAW AS A PLACE FOR PRELIMINARY

PAGE 2 RUMJFS 6:14 6 E 6 R E T

CONTACTS BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR,
WITH A VIEW TO PREPARE FOR OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN:
BOTH SIDES. BUT THE AMERICAN SIDE HAS RAISED OBJECTIONS;
IN ADDITION IT HAS ADVANCED UNJUSTIFIED CONDITIONS FOR
THE CHOICE OF A SITE AND HAS PROPOSED FIFTEEN OTHER PLACES.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

HAS DECLARED THAT THE FIFTEEN PLACES PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES ARE INADEQUATE AND THAT THE OBJECTIONS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO THE CHOICE OF PHNOM PENH AND OF WARSAW ARE WITHOUT FOUNDATION. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM REAFFIRMS THAT AT THIS TIME.

IT IS CLEAR THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS DELIBERATELY SEEKING TO DELAY CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN BOTH SIDES. THIS ATTITUDE IS IN COMPLETE CONTRADICTION TO THE DECLARATIONS OF PRESIDENT L.B. JOHNSON AND OF OTHER AMERICAN OFFICIALS SAYING THAT THEY DESIRE PROMPT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC. REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND ARE READY TO GO ANYWHERE.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-280

SECRET

By Cb , NARA Date 7-33-99:

-2- VIENTIANE 6114 Apr 27

PAGE 3 RUMJFS 6114-8 E C R E I

2. IN THE MEANTIME THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONTINUES TO INTENSIFY THE NAVAL AND AIR BOMBING AGAINST
AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE TERRITORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH
PARALLELS; THE NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO
VIOLATE VIETNAMESE TERRITORIAL WATERS AND
AMERICAN AVIATION CONTINUES RECONNAISSANCE OVER NORTH
VIETNAMESE AIR SPACE. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES MUST CEASE UNCONDITIONALLY BOMBING AND ALL OTHER
ACTS OF WAR ON ALL THE TERRITORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC
RUPBULIC OF VIETNAM. SUCH IS THE LEGITIMATE DEMAND OF
ALL THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, OF PEOPLES DESIROUS OF PEACE
IN THE WORLD AND OF THE PROGRESSIVE PEOPLE IN THE UNITED
STATES.

3. IN ANSWER TO THE NOTE OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
DATED APRIL 23, 1968, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM BELIEVES THAT IT IS NECESSARY FOR
HANDI AND WASHINGTON TO ENGAGE IN CONVERSATIONS PROMPTLY
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

PAGE 4 RUMJFS 6114 G E O R E T

HAS GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO MR. DO-PHAT-QUANG, AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM TO THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF POLAND,
TO BE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AMBASSADOR
OF THE UNITED STATES AT WARSAW THE 30TH OF APRIL 1968 OR
SEVERAL DAYS THEREAFTER, REGARDING THE PLACE AND THE DATE
OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES END QUOTE

GP-1 SULLIVAN

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET.

ZZ RUEHC
DE RUMJFS 6113/1 1181215
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 271130Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8204
STATE GRNC
BT

6 9 7 8 Q APRIL: 27, 1968 8:02 A.M.



SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENTIANE 6113

NODIS/CROCODILE

1. SEPTEL TRANSMITS AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF FULL TEXT OF NOTE WHICH I RECEIVED AT 1600 TODAY FROM NORTH VIETNAMESE CHARGE NGUYEN CHAN. OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH IS AS FOLLOWS:

"IN ANSWER TO THE NOTE OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT DATED APRIL 23, 1968, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM BELIEVES THAT IT IS NECESSARY FOR HANOI AND WASHINGTON TO ENGAGE IN CONVERSATIONS PROMPTLY. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAS GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO MR. DO-PHAT-QUANG, AMBASSADOR EXTRA-ORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF

VIETNAM TO THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF POLAND, TO BE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES AT WARSAW THE 30TH OF APRIL 1968 OR SEVERAL DAYS THERE-AFTER, REGARDING THE PLACE AND THE DATE OF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES."

2. AFTER HURWITCH AND I READ THIS TEXT, WE OBSERVED THAT THE SUGGESTION OF WARSAW WAS NOT RPT NOT REALLY RESPONSIVE TO OUR NOTE OF APRIL 23, IN WHICH WE HAD PROPOSED "ADDITIONAL CAPITALS, NOT "PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED BY EITHER SIDE," FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF AGREEING ON A SITE AND TIME FOR THE PROPOSED CONTACTS. CHAN'S REPLY WAS A BLAND BUT STUDIED STATEMENT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE CONTENTS OF OUR NOTE OF APRIL 23.

3. WE THEN WENT ON TO-POINT OUT THAT HIS UNOFFICIAL FRENCH-

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

SECRET

NLJ 97-280 Rv. Ch. NARA Date 2-23-79 SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENTIANE 6113 (NODIS/CROCODILE) APRIL 27

"CONTACTS" IN THIS PARAGRAPH. I ASKED HIM TO CHECK THIS AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE TEXT AND TO SEE IF THIS WAS AN ACCURATE TRANSLATION. CHAN STUDIED THE TEXT AND CONFIRMED THAT IT

PAGE 3 RUMINS STISKI O B C R E T

WAS. (OUR EMBASSY VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE OFFICER CONFIRMS THAT "CONVERSATIONS" IS CORRECT.) I ASKED IF, HE COULD EXPLAIN THE MEANING OF THIS CHANGE IN WORDING FROM "CONTACTS" TO "CONVERSATIONS," HE REFERRED TO AFP STORY FROM HANOI WHICH HAD CHARACTERIZED HIS EMBASSY AS A "LETTER-BOX," AND SAID HE WAS ONLY AUTHORIZED TO DELIVER THESE NOTES. NOT TO EXPLAIN THEM TO US.

- 4. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO WHAT WASHINGTON MIGHT FEEL ABOUT THEIR NOMINATION OF WARSAW AGAIN, THIS CHANGE IN VOCABULARY WAS BOUND TO INTRODUCS "COMPLEXITIES" AND WE WOULD DOUBTLESS NEED SOME EXPLANATION OF WHAT THIS WAS ALL ABOUT. DID IT, FOR EXAMPLE, INVOLVE THE COMPLETE ELISION OF THE "CONTACTS" PHASE OF THE PROCESS, OR WERE THEY MERELY ATTEMPTING TO HOLD "CONTACTS" UNDER ANOTHER GUISE? CHAN SIMPLY REPEATED HIS STATUS AS A POSTMAN. NOT AN INTERPRETER.
- 5. I FINALLY SAID THAT I, TOO, WOULD SPEAK AS A POSTMAN AND WOULD THEREFORE REFRAIN FROM COMMENT ON ALL THE STATE-

PAGE A RUMIES SILVAL SEE ON LET MENTS WHICH WERE MADE IN THE FIRST TWO PARAGRAPHS OF HIS NOTE. INSTEAD, I WOULD ASSURE HIM THAT, DESPITE THE SEVERAL CONFUSING QUESTIONS RAISED BY HIS THIRD PARAGRAPH, WE WOULD SEND THE FULL TEXT TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY.

6. COMMENT: THIS NOTE IS OBVIOUSLY A VERY TRICKY MANEUVER WHICH MERITS CAREFUL STUDY. IT LOOKS TO ME FROM ITS TENOR THAT IT MAY BE INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION. HOWEVER, EVEN IN A PUBLIC FORUM, IT WOULD SEEM TO BEG SOME EXPLANATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, LT MAY BE WORDED WITH DELIBERATE IM-PRECISION IN ORDER TO EVOKE ANOTHER "TROLLOPE PLOY", SINC READ AT ITS MOST LIBERAL VARIANT, IT WOULD SUGGEST THAT "CONVERSATIONS" OF SUBSTANCE COULD START EVEN WHILE THE BOMBING CONTINUED. THE PRICE WE WOULD HAVE TO PAY FOR ACHIEVING THIS MOVEMENT WOULD BE THE AGREEMENT TO MEET FOR A LIMITED PURPOSE AT THE AMBASSADOR-IN-RESIDENCE LEVEL AT WARSAW, THEREBY ENABLING HANOI TO CLAIM ONE BRASS RING-ON-THE-FIRST-SWING-OF-THE-MERRY-GO-ROUND.

-SECRET

SECRET

- -3- SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENTIANE 6113 (NODIS/CROCODILE) APRIL 27
 - 7. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT I WILL GET ANY EXPLANATIONS OF THE

THIRD PARAGRAPH THOUGH CHAN, EVEN THOUGH I ASKED FOR THEM.
IT IS ALSO A MOOT QUESTION WHETHER A NOTE FROM WASHINGTON
ASKING FOR EXPLANATIONS WOULD ADVANCE MATTERS SUBSTANTIALLY,
SINCE THEY PRESUMABLY EXPECT US TO PIECE THE PUZZLE TOGETHER
FROM ITS INTERNAL CONSTRUCTION. GIVEN THE FACT THAT
PARAGRAPH 2 TALKS ABOUT CEASING BOMBING (BUT DOES NOT POSE)
THIS AS A PRIOR CONDITION TO "CONVERSATIONS") AND GIVEN
THE FACT THAT THE BUSINESS IN WARSAW IS CHARACTERIZED AS
"DISCUSSIONS" (WORD TAKEN FROM OUR NOTE OF APRIL 23) IT IN
WOULD SEEM TO ME THAT THERE IS A REASONABLE CASE TO ASSUME
THAT THE "CONTACT" PHASE HAS BEEN DROPPED.

8. A REPLY FROM WASHINGTON, CAREFULLY PHRASED TO ASSURE THAT AMBASSADOR GRONOUSKI WOULD TALK ONLY ABOUT TIME AND PLACE, BUT ALSO ASSURE THAT THE NEXT IMMEDIATE PHASE WOULD BE FULL-FLEDGED SUBSTANTIVE CONVERSATION WHILE BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR CONTINUE, WOULD PUT US IN POSITION TO ASSUME A PURE "FIGHT-TALK, TALK-FIGHT" SITUATION, POSSIBLY WITH LESS STRAIN ON OUR 'ALLIANCES THAN THE THREE-PHASE SCENAIRO PROPOSED IN OUR NOTE OF APRIL 23. ATTWOULD BE

TRADING SOME "FORM" FOR SOME "SUBSTANCE", AND, IN THE LONG?
RUN, POSSIBLY GIVING US THE BETTER OF THE BARGAIN.

9. ON THE OTHER HAND, MERELY ACCEPTING THEIR NOTE AS IT NOW STANDS, WITHOUT STIPULATING OUR OWN PROVISIONS, RUNS THE VERY REAL RISK OF LETTING HANOI TURN THE AMBASSADOR-IN-RESIDENCE "DISCUSSIONS" INTO A "CONTACT" PHASE IN WHICH AMBASSADOR GRONOUSKI WOULD BE EXPECTED, AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO AGREEING UPON A DATE AND PLACE FOR CONVERSATIONS, TO "DETERMINE THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR", AS DRV SPECIFIED IN ITS ORIGINAL NOTE PROPOSING WARSAW.

ID. IT WOULD SEEN TO ME THEREFORE THAT, IF-WE ARE WILLING
TO ACCEPT WARSAW AS A PLACE FOR "DISCUSSIONS", WE SHOULD
STIPULATE THAT THOSE "DISCUSSIONS" ARE EXCLUSIVELY TO FIX
THE DATE AND PLACE FOR "CONVERSATIONS WHICH WOULD ADDRESS
ALL MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES, INCLUDING THOSE MATTERS MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH CHAN'S NOTE."

GP-1 SULLIVAN
BT

SECRET

Department of state

TELEGRAM

SECRET

DE RUMJFS 6113/2 1181215 ZNY SSSSS ZZH Z 271130Z APR 68 FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE TO SECSTATE WASHOC FLASH 8205 STATE GRNC BT 6 9 7 6 Q APRIL 27, 1968 8:01 A.M.

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENTIANE 6113

NOD IS/CROCODILE

THIS WOULD-ASSURE-THAT-SUBJECT-OF-BOMBING-COULD-ONLY COME UP IN THE "CONVERSATIONS" RATHER THAN IN "DISCUSSIONS,"-AND IN SOME PLACE LIKE GENEVA RATHER THAN WARSAW.

11. IF THIS, HOWEVER, IS TO BE DONE, IT SHOULD ALSO BE POINTED OUT THAT THE VERY LAST WORDS IN THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OFFER AN AMBIGUITY. "THE TWO SIDES", AS IT READS IN VIETNAMESE, OR "THE TWO PARTIES", AS IT READS IN FRENCH, IS BROAD ENOUGH SO THAT IT COULD INCLUDE THE U.S. AND ALL ITS ALLIES ON ONE SIDE OF THE TABLE, AND THE DRV AND ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES ON THE OTHER SIDE. WHETHER IT IS PRUDENT AT THIS STAGE TO TRY

TO PIN THIS ONE WITH PRECISION IN A REPLY IS QUESTIONABLE.
IT MIGHT PRESUMABLY, HOWEVER, BE A MAJOR ISSUE IN THE
"DISCUSSIONS" THAT AMBASSADOR GRONOUSKI MAY BE CALLED ON
TO CONDUCT. THE IMPRECISION WITH WHICH IT HAS DELIBERATELY.

BEEN PHRASED IN THIS PARTICULAR NOTE IS POSSIBLE DICTATED BY THE PROBLEMS HANDI WILL HAVE IN HANDLING THE QUESTION OF CHINESE ASSOCIATION WITH THESE "CONVERSATIONS."

GP-1. SULLIVAN

SECRET.

CONFIDENTIAL

INFOR MATION

April 27, 1968 Saturday

Presfile

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Bermuda Riots: Possible Request for U.S. Assistance

Riots which began on Thursday in Bermuda have intensified. There is a racial and political aspect to them. Elections are scheduled for May 23. Parties are split largely along color lines. Most of the rioters are Negro youths.

Leaders of both major political parties have deplored the violence, but the militant fringe of the predominantly Negro party is apparently fanning it.

There has been substantial property damage but no deaths. There is no indication of any anti-Americanism in the riots.

A British frigate is scheduled to arrive in Bermuda at midnight to supplement local police and malitia. The British Governor of Bermuda will reassess the situation tomorrow.merming.

He may ask the U.K. Government to request that the U.S. make available from the U.S. military bases on the Island:

- -- tear gas for use by the Bermuda police; and
- -- military guards to protect the ESSO and Shell refineries.

We are following the problem.

The possible request for assistance is being brought to the attention of Secretaries Rusk and Clifford. They may be in touch with you.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-283 By us, NARA Date 5-5-98

W. W. Rostow

ACTION

Profile

CONFIDENTIAL

April 26, 1968 - 6:30pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: PL-480 for Iceland

In the attached, Messrs. Freeman, Gaud and Zwick recommend a routine \$2.1 million PL-480 package (wheat flour, corn, and tobacco) for Iceland. State and Treasury concur in the recommendation.

Charlie Zwick's short summary memo is at Tab A. Iceland needs this agreement to take up troublesome slack in her economy. This small sale is a reasonable gesture in return for the good relations and NATO base rights we enjoy there. You authorised similar deals in each of the last two years.

I recommend you approve the agreement.

W. W. Rostow

| Approve | - |
|------------|---|
| Disapprove | |
| Call me | _ |

Att: File #1396 WWR:EKH:EM:lw

White House the Literatus, Reb. 24, 1983

By M. P.A., Dave 5-22 93

In Continuence

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

532

APR 2 4 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed P. L. 480 agreement with Iceland

In the attached memorandum Bill Gaud and John Schnittker request your authority to negotiate a \$2.1 million sales agreement with Iceland to provide wheat flour, corn and corn products and tobacco. The proposed terms are fairly hard -- 5-1/2 percent interest, payment to be made in dollars, a 5 percent downpayment, and the balance to be paid over 18 years with the first annual installment of 25 percent of the principal.

P. L. 480 sales to Iceland are in large part a guid pro quo for our military installations in that country. Last year's agreement was for \$1.3 million and was smaller than requested at that time since we deleted corn. We had planned to continue to taper down concessional P. L. 480 sales this year. However, in recognition of Iceland's poor fish crop and consequent economic problems, a slightly larger agreement, plus the inclusion of corn, is now requested.

Since Iceland has no military force of its own, the Symington amendment does not apply.

I recommend that you authorize negotiation of the proposed agreement.

Charles 1 Zaro

Attachments

Approve

Disapprove____

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-283

By ics , NARA Date 4-30.98

-CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

To:

The President

APR 1 7 1958

Subject:

Public Law 480 Sales Program with Iceland

We recommend you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 agreement with Iceland to provide about 5,000 tons wheat flour, 9,945 tons cornmeal, cracked corn and/or corn and 318 tons tobacco and/or the tobacco content of tobacco products, with a current export market value, including certain ocean transportation costs, of about \$2.1 million. Payment to be made in dollars over an 18 year period with interest at 5½ percent per annum. Five percent of the sales value of commodities is to be paid on delivery. The first payment to be 25 percent of the principal due March 31 immediately following the calendar year of delivery and the balance to be paid in 17 approximately equal annual installments. The Departments of State and Treasury concur in this recommendation.

In our previous memorandum, (attached) which was approved by you May 18, 1967 we outlined Iceland's commodity requirements, the U.S. interest in Iceland and self-help efforts to improve that country's agriculture. Since then, due primarily to a bad fish catch and low world prices Iceland's 1967 GMP is down an estimated 6 percent, national income is down an estimated 9 percent, and banking reserves have dropped over 50 percent. We are therefore including corn in this year's program besides wheat flour and tobacco as one means to ameliorate Iceland's current financial difficulties.

The next NATO Ministerial meeting is scheduled to take place in Iceland in June of this year.

Self-Help Efforts

The proposed sales agreement will state the following self-help measures Iceland is undertaking: (1) continue intensive cultivation of available land resources to increase the supply of feed for dairy and sheep farming, and (2) further improve facilities for the storage and distribution of agricultural commodities, particularly for dairy products and meat.

Military Expenditure Review

Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act is not relevant to the case of Iceland because of its lack of a military establishment.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-283 By ūs, NARA Date 8-7-98

- CONFIDENTIAL

Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with this PL 480 sales agreement as described above.

April 10 1969 Agency for International Development Department of Agriculture Approve: Disapprove:

To:

The President

APR 1 0 1957

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Iceland

d NLJ 97-283 By us, NARA Date 8-7-58

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate with Iceland a PL 480 dollar credit sales agreement for approximately 3,700 tons of wheat flour and 338 tons of tobacco and tobacco products of which the total current market value is \$1,263,000 (including certain ocean transportation costs). The proposed terms are payment of 5 percent on delivery and the balance over 19 years at 14 percent interest with a first annual installment of 25 percent of the principal. The Department of State concurs in this recommendation.

Reed for Program

The proposed egreement is based upon Iceland's commodity requirements, and budgetary and political consideration for calendar year 1967. It represents a sizeable decrease from the previous \$2.2 million program.

The original request for PL 480 commodities from the Government of Iceland requested commodities, including corn, valued at \$2.2 million. He have not included corn in this present proposel, both as it is unlikely that an Icelandic market for U.S. corn can be developed (due to transportation costs) and as we believe that concessionary sales to Iceland should continue to be gradually tapered off.

The Icelandic Government will use the proceeds of the sale of these commodities for economic development purposes.

American interests in Iceland are dominated by the strategic military location of the island in the North Atlantic. Iceland is a charter number of NATO, although it has no military forces, and its rent-free contribution of NATO base areas (manned exclusively by U.S. military personnel) is highly important to the U.S. and NATO defense efforts. Our small PL 180 program is one of the few gestures we are able to make in appreciation of the excellent state of base relations.

Self-Help Efforts

In recent years, with Government guidence end essistence, substential agricultural progress has been made in Iceland. In 1966 over 55 percent of the PL 480 generated funds were devoted directly or indirectly (rural electrification) to agricultural development

CONFIDENTIAL

-CONFIDENTIAL

purposes. About 23 percent, or \$20.6 million, of the 1966 Icelandic budgetary resources were directed toward agricultural projects, and the figure for 1957 will be about the same.


The proposed sales agreement will state the following self-help measures which Iceland will undertake:

- (1) Continue its effort to improve the agricultural sector with emphasis on crops suitable to the climate and lend, and
- (2) Continue the improvement in the storage and distribution of agricultural commodities.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with the PL 480 sales agreement as described above.

| Administrator gency for International Development | Becretary Department of Agriculture |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| Approve | : MAY 1 8 1967 |
| Disapprove | |



Mr. Rostow

1. surper 54

CONFIDENTIAL

Friday, April 26, 1968 -6 340m

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israeli Desalting Coordinator

After finding out that Kermit Gordon felt unable to take on this job, I called George Woods--the next candidate on the list you had instructed me to explore.

Hal Saunders briefed George this morning, and he said tentatively that he would be willing to do the job if you wanted him. He did want to look over some papers Hal left with him and promised to call early next week. I think he would be excellent not only for this specific job but also in his ability if needed at an appropriate time to relate this project to the broader Mid-East economic scene.

George says he could devote a good bit of time to the job in May and June. He has plans which he hopes not to change for July and August but could be back at the project after that. If he could give you a firm recommendation by the end of June, I should think that would meet our immediate needs. After you have that, we will need a little time in-house anyway for deliberation and Congressional soundings.

My question now is whether I have your approval to sign him up when he calls back on Monday or Tuesday. If you approve, I will draw up terms of reference and arrange for him to be more fully briefed.

| | 20020 |
|---------|--|
| Approve | |
| Call me | DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12350. SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 16. 1983. |
| | on 5-27-92 |

W W Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

Pres file

SECRET

Friday, April 26, 1968 6:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

In the attached memcon:

- -- I executed your instruction to inform Evron of our follow-up on Eshkol and Phantoms;
- -- Evron made a pitch for earlier delivery of Phantoms, because French have pulled out and to induce Nasser to believe that war in eighteen months would be irrational;
- -- I pressed him on making it possible for Hussein to try for peace.

W. W. Rostow

-SECRET NODES attachment

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-283 By, NARA Date 4-30-98

SECRET-NODIS

April 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

W. W. Rostow Ephraim Evron Harold H. Saunders

Israeli Ambassador Rabin on March 20 had asked Mr. Rostow "at Prime Minister Eshkol's request" about the status of our decision on Phantoms as discussed at the Ranch. Mr. Rostow, on the basis of memos from Secretary McNamara, Mr. Nitze and General Wheeler, and Mr. Helms, reported to the President where staff work stands and asked permission to tell Eyron informally. Not wishing to provoke a strong reaction in Jerusalem, Mr. Rostow with the President's approval passed the information informally in order to give Eyron and Rabin a chance to decide how to handle it with their own Government.

Mr. Evron came in at 5:00 p.m. yesterday to hear this report. Mr. Rostow, speaking very precisely, told him the following:

- 1. Secretary McNamara had determined that the President could decide as late as December 31, 1968, and still begin delivering Phantoms in January 1970 at the production-line rate of about 4 per month.
- 2. General Wheeler, after discussion with General Hod and his team, had determined that US training can be done beginning January 1969 provided the Israelis do preliminary training (English, electronics basics) in Israel.
- 3. Mr. Helms has reviewed the intelligence exchanges with Generals Amit and Yariv. There's no major disagreement on numbers. We interpret these numbers differently with Israel taking the gloomier view. However, Mr. Helms sees no new evidence that would change his estimates.

Mr. Rostow also said that we had carried out our intention, discussed at the Ranch, to approach the Soviets with the following results:

- --We've made two serious approaches.
- -- The Soviets say they're willing to discuss arms limitation after Israeli withdrawal.
- --We have never assumed that a direct Soviet answer was the only possible response. We have always assumed that the only Soviet response might be a <u>de facto</u> slowdown of shipments. We are watching this closely.

E.O. 13236, Sec. 3.5
NIJ 14-266
NIJ 14-366

Mr. Evron in response said he knew his government would be quite concerned. One of the things General Wheeler at the Ranch had said the US would specially watch was France's decision on the Mirages. Not only have the French still not delivered them, but they have signed a contract with Iraq. Iraq, from this deal alone, will end up with more Mirages than Israel now has in its inventory. Evron admitted that Soviet shipments to the Arab countries at the moment seemed to have levelled off and that absorptive capacity is a limiting factor. However, he said, noting that he could not be exact, that Israel has information that the training level of Egyptian pilots had increased to something like 50-100 a year.

In sum, Evron felt there were elements in the situation which called for an earlier decision than waiting until the end of 1968. He conceded that it is technically accurate to say that the President's option will remain open until the end of 1968, but he noted that there are both "psychological and political" elements in the situation which make an earlier decision desirable. In fact, he felt that a public decision was called for, although he did not press that. He then spelled out his notion that the Arabs will only negotiate when they are thoroughly persuaded Israel is so strong that no military solution is possible. In conclusion, he said he could only tell us that the continued uncertainty would worry Jerusalem and urge a prompt decision.

With that subject covered, Mr. Rostow turned to the broader subject of a political settlement, emphasizing that he was speaking entirely personally. He felt a tremendous sense of foreboding and saw the area teetering between the breakup of Jordan and the prospect some day of a bigger war. He felt that "what we and the Israelis owe to our grandchildren transcends hardware." He felt it is absolutely essential that the Israelis give some encouragement to King Hussein to negotiate a settlement. He realized that Nasser seems unwilling at the moment to go that route, but Hussein is grasping for any straw that would permit him to negotiate a bilateral settlement. Mr. Rostow felt that what is necessary is for the Israelis to give Hussein some glimpse of the kind of settlement they might expect on the West Bank, but particularly in Jerusalem.

SDORDT NODIG

Mr. Evron agreed that Hussein is desperately trying to persuade Nasser to give him the blessing for making his own settlement. Hussein--and here Evron cautioned the utmost sensitivity--is using the West Bank notables to try to persuade Nasser to give Hussein a free hand. He did not disagree with Mr. Rostow's line, although he did indicate that there already is communication through the notables with Hussein.

In conclusion, Evron reiterated his argument that a decision on the Phantoms now would both increase Eshkol's maneuverability with his own government and would give Hussein further evidence with which to convince Nasser that the political solution was the only one possible.

Harold H. Saunders

21.71.1.

INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Friday, April 26, 1968 - 5:20 pm

Pres file

Mr. President:

A Seviet diplemat in Boan talks hopefully of sites.

But no word from Hanel.

W. W. Rostow

Bonn 11285

CONFIDENTIAL

WWRostow:rln

White House Guldsines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 1997, NARA, Date 5-28-91



Department of State



-CONFIDENTIAL 989

PAGE 01 BONN 11285 261112Z

ACTION SS 30

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P R 261045Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7988
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MEXICO CITY
AMEMBASSY SAIGON

ONFIDENTIAL BONN 1285

2

Rostow

SUBJ: SOVIET COMMENTS ON VENUE FOR VIET-NAM PEACE TALKS

I. DURING A RECEPTION AT THE SOV EMBASSY LAST EVENING, FIRST SEC BOROVINSKA, IN THE COMPANY OF FIRST SEC NAUMOV AND ANOTHER EMBASSY EMPLOYEE NAMED LOGVINOV PURSUED WITH TWO EMB OFFS THE TOPICTOF VIET-NAM IN SOME DETAIL AND WITH

CONSIDERABLE PERSISTENCE. AFTER RECEIVING THE USEVIEWS ON THE REQUIREMENTS ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACE TALKS. BOROVINSKY SAID "HANOI' IS PREPARED TO MEET IN PARIS, NEW DELHI OR MEXICO CITY." APPARENTLY TO MAKE CERTAIN THE US REPSY HEARD HIM CORRECTLY, HE REPEATED THE STATEMENT ADDING. "I THINK YOU HAVE GOT MY POINT." BOROVINSKY ASSERTED THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE "READY TO NEGOTIATE" AND THAT, AGREEMENT COULD PERHAPS ALSO BE WORKED OUT ON SOME SITES OTHER THAN THE THREE HE HAD MENTIONED PROVIDED IT WAS NOT A CAPITAL IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. (WE DID NOT ASK HOW PARIS FITTED THIS FORMULA.)

2. BOROVINSKY INITIALLY CALLED AT THE US EMBASSY ON APRIL 5 WHERE HE INQUIRED IN SOME DETAIL REGARDING THE US POSITION ON VIET-NAM. SUBSEQUENTLY HE LUNCHED WITH TWO EMB OFFS ON APRIL 15 WHERE HE AGAIN MADE THIS A MAJOR TOPIC OF

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 97-280

-CONFIDENTIAL

By cb , NARA Date 7-43-99

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Department of State

TELEGRAM


CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 11285 2611122

CONVERSATION.
GP-4. MCGHEE

NOTE: HANDLED EXDIS PER S/S-O.





-CONFIGENTAL

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Sus fier

Friday, April 26, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE DECLASSIFIED 5:10 p. m.

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NIJ 9/- 336

MR. PRESIDENT:

By ... NARA, Date 1-11-53

Jim Killian dropped in to see me just before his appointment with you at 5:15. He raised the following possibility for the months ahead: would it not be wise to have a group of experts organized in great security to examine:

- -- trends in weapons technology;
- -- implication of trends for future military tactics and strategy.

In the thoughtful part of the scientific community concerned with these matters, there is a widespread feeling that the nation needs a comprehensive look at this problem. That feeling stems from two circumstances:

- -- an uneasy sense that the Russians may be moving ahead of us in some fields;
- -- a judgment that Pentagen management in recent years may have prevented the full exploration of certain new dimensions in science and technology that bear on military power.

Killian said that in 1954, under the NSC structure, he was able to mount this kind of study for President Eisenhower without any publicity whatsoever. The study proved fruitful. It launched the Polaris, U2, and IRBM programs in the United States.

He underlined the care that is required to achieve this degree of security, noting the less favorable outcome from the President's point of view of the Gaither Committee report.

He asked if I would put this possibility to you as an appropriate enterprise for this phase of your Administration.

He told me that he raised this with Clark Clifford, who said he would think about it. Sometime ago he had referred to the idea casually in talking to Don Hornig.

W. W. Rostow

GONFIGURTLAL/SEMSITIVE

INFORMATION

TOP SECRET TRINE

Friday, April 26, 1968 -- 5:10 p.m. Prus file

Mr. President:

This is a useful and imaginative exercise in intelligence by Art McCafferty of our Situation Room.

He analyses from sensitive sources the known and possible strengths of infiltration from November through April; and then, on a rough basis, estimates their time of arrival in South Vietnam in Chart B, which you will wish to examine.

He concludes that of the possible total, semewhere between 13, 500 and 16, 700 infiltrators have already arrived in South Vietnam. The remaining 33,000 to 55,000 will have arrived in South Vietnam by the beginning of June, with the majority, however, having arrived by mid-May.

The peak rate of arrival in South Vietnam, by this rough calculation, is between 28 April and 11 May.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLI/RAC 00-326



THE WHITE HOUSE

TOP SECRET/TRINE

April 26, 1968


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: North Vietnamese Infiltration

A large number of infiltration groups have been noted in North Vietnamese communications recently. In order to completely understand this, NSA has gone back to November 1 and collated all of its material. In my examination of this information, I have concluded that since November 1, there have been 135 infiltration groups start out from North Vietnam with a strength ranging from approximately 47,000 to 75,000. This is shown in the following table and Chart A attached.

Infiltration Noted in North Vietnamese Communications

| | | Strength | | |
|------------|------------|-----------|------------|--|
| Month | No. Groups | Known | Possible 2 | |
| Nov | 8 | 3,292 | | |
| Dec | 7 | 3,483 - | 4,033 | |
| Jan | 22 | 6,781 - | 12,737 | |
| Subtotal | 37 | 13,556 - | 16,770 | |
| Feb | 9 | 2,794 - | 4,994 | |
| Mar | 54 | 15,328 - | 29,078 | |
| Apr | 35 | 15, 234 | 21,284 | |
| Subtotal | 98 | 33,356 | 55,356 | |
| GRAND TOTA | L 135 | 66,9127 - | 25,418 | |





In order to see just what this might mean in the way of additional personnel arriving in South Vietnam, I have attempted to project the known data into possible times of arrival in South Vietnam, as shown in Chart B.

This, of course, is a very hazardous business, since I had to assume that they were all going to South Vietnam and also determine a time on the trail factor which is only valid if you assume they are all going to the First Corps or the Highlands area. In other words, the data is possibly not valid, but I do think it is illustrative.

In this assumption then, the 13,500 to 16,700 men noted between November and January have already arrived in South-Vietnam. The remaining 33,000 to 55,000 will have arrived in South Vietnam by the beginning of June, with the majority of them, however, having arrived by mid-May.

Art McCafferty





TOP SECRET 3.4(6)(1)

Friday, April 26, 1968 -- 3:35 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA's first reaction on the report of a North Korean attack.

Somewhat reassuring, but not definitive.

More checking will follow.

W. W. Rostow

TOP SECRET

WWRostow:rln

SANITIZED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLI/FAC 00-325 ByCom., NARA, Date 12-10-01 Pour the

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

SC No. 01.267/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 26 April 1968

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT:

Assessment of Report

on North Korean Milltary Attack

Intentions

We have no evidence that suggests that North Korea intends to launch a major attack against the South. However, recent incidents in the area of the DMZ suggest that North Koroa has begun to step up provocations against South Korea and US units along the DMZ.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

The report that there is talk in Pyongyang diplomatic circles to the effect that North Korea is ready to start a wer The general concern of the diplomats as is plausible. the result of the North Korean regime's constant war propaganda was probably further heightened by mecent warnings from the Foreign Ministry to diplomate on the need to construct bomb shelters on embassy grounds.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

It is unlikely, however, that any of the foreign diplomats in Pyongyang, are privy to the intentions of the North Korean government.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

roport that dependents Concerning of "all" the embassies in Pyongyang are being or had been evacuated, the only information we have received Ithat the wife

lambassador ame scheduled and children of the ambassacor are schedul to leave before the and of April. There is no indication of any general exodus or of any instruction from the regime advising this. Moreover, many of the dependents normally leave North Korea in the summer for vacation purposes.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: JAN 2003

> 5. It is true that diplomatic personnel in Pyongyang have no freedom of movement. Although restrictions were tightened following the Pueblo seizure, security measures in North Korea have always been stricter than those of any other Communist nation with the possible exception of Albania.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

SANITIZED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ/BAC 00-328 By Com., NARA, Date 5-3-03

- 6. The May Day celebration normally features a parade of troops and equipment. We have no other indication that there will be a departure from past practices.
- 7. All indications point to a significant rise in North Korean infiltration in the near future; including a substantial increase in terrorism.
 Further and possibly larger incidents along the DMS are also likely.

tensive troop movements in North Korea. North Korea normally deploys most of its forces along the DMZ, and individual deployments in preparation for offensive action against South Korea would be minimal. Other reports from a variety of sources since the Pueblo seizure, in the February-March period, state that there have been troop movements in the Pyongyang area. Sources have stated that these movements are probably for their effect on the North Korean populace itself.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

- 10. On 31 March the North Korean Ministry of National Defense established an alternate radio station in west-central North Korea. This station is probably the control station for an army group exercise. Such exercises normally occur each year. The <u>Pueblo</u> crisis appears to have Galayed this year's activity.
- 11. A final coordinated CIA/DIA assessment will be provided later today.

.EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

-2-

No Poreign Dinner

fres file

INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

Friday, April 26, 1968 - 2:45 pm

Mr. President:

We are, of course, checking this impleasant report from all sources and will report back.

W. W. Rostow

-TOP SECRET

35.7

WWRostow:rln

TOP SECRET NOFORM

0 2639352 1.scd)

RANITIZED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 Rotton NLJ 97-282

NARA Date 10-20-00

TO DIRNSA

INFO HQ NSAPAC

-POP SECRET-NOFORM

F45-1139 F45D-640

INFORMATION REQUEST

COMUSEK REQUESTS URGENT ALL SOURCE CHECK OF FOLLOWING INFORMATION. MSG QUOTED BELOW ALSO BEING SENT VIA SSO CHANNELS TO SSO ARLINGTON HALL, SSO CINCPAC, SSO DIA AND AFSSO 5TH AF/USFJ. PLS ADVISE SOONEST. QUOTE.

INFORMATION PROVIDED FROM A TRAINED OBSERVER FROM

1.56

IS AS FOLLOWS:

BASED ON

THE TALK IN DIFLOMATIC CIRCLES INTEVONGYANG IS THAT NORTH KOREA IS READY TO START A WAR.

- B. DEPENDENTS OF "ALL" OF THE EMBASSIES IN PYCHGYANG WERE BEING OR HAD SEEN EVACUATED.
- C. THE WIFE OF GEN WOLNY, POLISH MEMBER NNSC, WAS BEING TAKEN TO PYCNGYANG ON 27 OR 28 APRIL TO BEGIN HER TRIP HOME TO POLAND. SHE HAD ORIGINALLY EEEN SCHEDULED TO RETURN HOME IN JUNE OF THISYEAR. NO REASON HAS EEEN GIVEN FOR HER EARLY DEPARTURE.
- D. IT IS REPORTED THAT NO MAY DAY CELEBRATIONS ARE PLANNED IN PYONOYANG THIS YEAR SINCE MK TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT NORMALLY SEEN ARE DISPERSED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY AND NOT

THE RECEPT A PERSON

TOP SECRET HOFORN

E. DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL IN PYONGYANG HAVE NO PREE

AVAILABLE FOR A PARADE.

| | MOVEMENT. THEIR MOVEMENT IS NORMALLY BY MOST DIRECT ROUTE |
|-----------|---|
| | FROM EMBASSY TO AIRPORT AND RETURN. |
| 1.5(c) | F. REPORT THAT NIGHT MOVEMENT OF |
| | PERSONNEL FROM NORTH TO DMZ AREA IS CONTINUOUS? IT-CANNOT |
| | BE DETERMINED IF THIS REPRESENTS A BUILD-UP OR IS MERELY |
| | NORMAL ROTATION OF PERSONNEL. |
| | G. USSR MAS ATTEMPTED TO INVLUENCE NORTH KOREA TO EECOME |
| | LESS PELLICOSE BY THREATENING TO WITHHOLD AID. |
| | 2. COMUSEK REQUESTS URGENT ALL SOURCE CHECK, INCLUDING AS |
| | FEASIBLE CHECKS WITH |
| 1.5(c) | TO VERIFY ANY OR ALL OF ABOVE. |
| | FURTHER REQUESTED ARE COMMENTS SOONEST ON POSSIBLE |
| | IMPLICATIONS OF ABOVE. |
| | 3. FOR DIA: |
| 3.4(6)(1) | |
| | UNQUOTE. |

^{*} At the request of DIA, the following note is appended: The above message contains unevaluated information and the details are presently undergoing analysis.

61

Friday - April 26, 1968 - 2: 00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Heavy Water Plant to Romania

2. Pres file

In the memo at Tab A Secretary Rusk recommends you indicate to Senator Pastore that you strongly support the sale of a heavy water plant to Romania. (Secretary Rusk also mentioned this at the NSC meeting on Wednesday.)

Senator Pastore and Congressman Holifield say they will support the sale if you do, and if they can be assured Romania is not sending arms to Vietnam. Senator Hickenlooper and Congressman Hosmer say they regard this as an Executive Branch decision, and say they do not -- and probably will not -- oppose the sale if you support it. Foreign policy advantages include:

- -- extension of IAEA inspection and safeguards to Eastern Europe for the first time -- as Romania is committed to accept them.
- -- encouragement of Romania's independence.

On the question of arms to North Vietnam, Romania has provided trucks, petroleum products (mostly heavy lubricants) and medical supplies, but CIA and others in the Intelligence Community believe they have sent no arms.

The technology for the plant can be found in open scientific literature, although U.S. industrial know-how makes our plant somewhat better than the foreign competitors'. Czechoslovakia is just completing a similar plant with Russian assistance. The French would probably be happy to sell such a plant to the Romanians if we don't. About twenty middle-rank powers have uranium power reactors at the present time.

The Romanians will probably buy the nuclear reactor -- for which they need the heavy water produced by the plant -- from Canada, Britain, Sweden or France. They originally wanted to buy the reactor from us, but we discouraged them.

AEC concurs in Secretary Rusk's recommendation.

| | W. W. Rostow |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Tell Pastore I strongly support sale | • |
| Have State tell him | V 4/20/6 It also relates to |
| No | Roummen for the NPT. |
| Speak to me | white for an |
| | WWR:ND:gg |

THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

610

April 22, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL-

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Sale of Heavy Water Plant to Romania

Recommendation:

That you authorize us or a member of your staff to inform Senator Pastore, as Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, that you consider the sale to Romania of a heavy water plant to be important to US foreign policy objectives.

| Approve | | Approve Disapprove |
|---------|------|-------------------------------------|
| S | tate | Department notify Senator Pastore |
| W | nite | House staff notify Senatore Pastore |

Discussion:

Since mid-1964 we have been considering the possibility of permitting the sale to Romania of nuclear power equipment.

We have a request from Deuterium Corporation of New York to sell Romania a heavy water plant. This would be part of a large nuclear power complex including a nuclear reactor to be purchased from the UK, Sweden, or France. Deuterium wishes to bid on both a large heavy water plant, estimated at \$45 million, and on a smaller alternative plant, estimated at \$15 million.

In either case, the initial charge of heavy water for the reactorperhaps as much as 500 tons, valued at \$25 million—would probably also
be sought from the United States. A favorable decision on the heavy
water plant, therefore, implies willingness to permit the sale of the
necessary heavy water for the initial charge.

The heavy water plant would be sold subject to safeguards admin-

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-280 By C6 , NARA Date 1-23-99 GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified

istered by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The safeguards would include continuing physical inspection and would extend to the nuclear power plant or plants utilizing the heavy water produced.

Authorization of this sale would have the following advantages:

- 1. It would establish IAEA inspection for the first time in a Warsaw Pact country. This would be a significant breakthrough.
- 2. It would be a practical gesture of encouragement to Romanian policies of independence. These policies continue, as most recently illustrated by Romania's stance on the Near East crisis and the Romanian walkout from the Budapest Communist Conference. President Maurer emphasized to you on June 26, 1967 how important a strong and developing economy was to maintaining Romanian independence.
- 3. This sale would thus fill a real gap pending Congressional action on an East-West trade bill. No legislative action with regard to the sale is required nor is formal notification of the JCAE necessary.

The disadvantages lie in the area of public and Congressional reaction. I believe we can deal with the former if we have the latter under control.

With this in mind, our people (Leddy, Stoessel, Pollack, Torbert), together with AEC representatives, talked last summer with Senator Pastore and Congressman Holifield on the Democratic side of the JCAE and Senator Hickenlooper and Congressman Hosmer on the Republican side.

Chairman Pastore said he expects criticism on the Hill but sees the foreign policy advantages. He would be willing to support it publicly provided (a) he hears from you that the sale has your strong support and (b) he can be assured that Romania is not sending arms to Viet-Nam. Congressman Holifield went along with this. We have informed the Joint Committee staff that Romania has shipped transport equipment, petroleum products and medical supplies to North Viet-Nam, but no arms. Although they admitted on August 26, 1967 that their support of North Viet-Nam included "non-repayable economic and military assistance," the Romanians have been relatively restrained in their criticism of US policy in Viet-Nam and have attempted to play a constructive intermediary role in the conflict.

Senator Hickenlooper said he had overall reservations about

-CONFIDENTIAL

"bridge-building" and reserved his right to comment on this or any other aspect of it at any time. He and Mr. Hosmer considered this an Executive Branch decision, however. They said they would not take a position against the sale when our people talked with them and Hickenlooper doubted they would do so in the future.

John Conway, JCAE Chief of Staff, has since told us he thinks the Committee will go along informally with the proposed sale, if an expression of your support can be gotten to the Chairman.

I urge that you authorize this expression of support, following which—and in the absence of a negative reaction from Senator Pastore—we would proceed without delay to authorize the Deuterium Corporation to negotiate the sale.

Dean Rusk

NauRusla

Friday, April 26, 1968 - 1:50 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith U Thant and Ralph Bunche thank you for the pictures.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln



25 April 1968

Dear Mr. Rostow,

Thank you for your kind letter of 17 April with which you sent me a picture taken of President Johnson and myself in the Cabinet Room, and bearing the very kind inscription of President Johnson. I am deeply appreciative of the President's kind thought and particularly of the very warm inscription. I am also grateful to the President for sending me copies of the other photographs enclosed with your letter.

I shall be grateful if you would convey my personal thanks and good wishes to the President.

With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

U Thant

Mr. W.W. Rostow Special Assistant to the President The White House Washington, D.C.

UNITED NATIONS



EASLE ADDRESS . UNATIONS NEWYORK . ADDRESS TELEGRAPHIQUE

NATIONS UNIES

24 April 1968

Dear Walt,

Thank you very much for sending to me at the suggestion of the President the photographs enclosed with your letter of 17 April. I am delighted to have them and I hope you will convey my gratitude to the President. I must confess to the prideful thought that one day my great and great great grandchildren may look at these splendid photos with a little admiration and maybe even a touch of awe at seeing their grandpappy in such exalted company.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours.

The Honorable Walt W. Rostow The White House Washington, D.C.

INFORMATION

-GONFIDENTIAL-

Friday, April 26, 1968 - 1:30 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith, as requested, the Pelish method for menitoring our talks in Warsaw with the Chinese.

W. W. Restow

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-283 By us, NARA Date 4-30-98

WWRostow:rln

Pres file

430

CONFIDENTIAL

POLISH MONITORING OF US-CHINESE COMMUNIST AMBASSADORIAL TALKS

- l. We have always assumed that the Polish authorities electronically monitored the US-Chinese Communist Ambassadorial level meetings at the Myslieiecki Palace in Warsaw. We first obtained specific evidence of this, however, only following the 128th meeting on December 15, 1965, which was monitored by Embassy Warsaw's security officer on one of the radio frequencies (approximately 133 MC) used by the Polish security services (UB). Since that time, each of the meetings has been similarly monitored and recorded with considerable clarity on the same or a nearby frequency by Embassy Warsaw. We do not know whether the radio transmission is in addition to an independent wire tap into the meeting room or is the sole "bug" in the room.
- 2. We have been unable to pinpoint the location of the transmitters. (The December 15, 1965 meeting was broadcast by one transmitter. All subsequent meetings have used two transmitters.) They are obviously placed so as to provide best transmission for the two Ambassadors and the two translators. Transmitters in an overhead chandelier or built into the table are both plausible possibilities. The transmitters are turned on, apparently manually by someone entering the room, approximately 15-20 minutes before the meetings are scheduled to begin and are turned off the same way (footsteps approaching the mike are heard just before cutoff) about 5-10 minutes after the meeting.
- 3. SY constructed a briefcase jammer tuned to the UB frequency range being used. We brought this into the meeting room on two occasions for possible use, and did test it briefly <u>after</u> one meeting had formally concluded. The jammer was <u>not</u> apparently effective at that time. In any event, a small jammer is limited to a narrow frequency range and could easily be circumvented by a shift in monitoring frequencies by the UB from meeting to meeting. Such a jammer is non-functional against a wired monitoring system.
- 4. The frequency used can be picked up on any radio set with the appropriate FM band reception. This is not an ordinary home FM frequency band, however, and radios capable of its reception are probably not generally in the possession of private individuals in Poland although they are available to several other Embassies in Warsaw. We were informed on one occasion by the UPI correspondent in Warsaw that he had heard

-GONPIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-280 By C6 , NARA Date 7-23-99

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

part of the transmission of the December 15, 1965 meeting. We are most doubtful that the story of a German businessman receiving a transmission of a meeting over his hotel radio is true.

5. It may possibly be of interest that when arrangements for the Warsaw meetings were originally being made in 1959 the Chinese suggested that the sessions be held alternately in our respective Embassies. We had originally proposed the Swiss Embassy and rejected the Chinese suggestion. The Polish palace was a compromise solution. We have been considering since last year whether we should recall to the Chinese their original suggestion and try to shift the talks to our Embassies in order to improve the security of the meetings. Our Embassy has a "secure" room. We have no information on the security of the Chinese Embassy, but suspect it is good.

CONPIDENTIAL

INFORMATION

Friday, April 26, 1968 - 11:30 am

Mr. President:

Herewith Thanem says that he would "withheld his objections" to preliminary talks in Bucharest, because of Thieu's acquiencence.

He believes it "almost imperative," however, that a neutral site be selected for substantive talks.

W. W. Rostow

The Hague 5041

_SECRET

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-283 By ico , NARA Date 4. 30-98 Prontile



Department of State

ACTION COPY

-- OECRET

OD RUENC DE RUDKTH 5047 1171300 ZNY SSSSS O R 261200Z APR 68

CONTROL: 6628Q

REC'D : APRIL 26, 1968

7:57AM

FM ANEMBASSY THE HAGUE

TO RUENC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2426 IMMEDIATE INFO RUMIBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 025

STATE GRNC

BT

GEORET THE HAGUE 5841

Rostow

NODIS CROCODILE

REF: A. STATE 153462: B. STATE 153464

1. PURSUANT TO INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL (A) , I CALLED ON PRIMIN THANON THIS MORNING, APRIL 26, AND CONVEYED TO HIM SUBSTANCE PARAS 2 THROUGH 4 REFTEL (B), USING IDENTICAL LANGUAGE FOR KEY POINTS. I INFORMED PRIMIN THAT AMBASSADOR UNGER HAD ALSO MADE CALL ON ACTING PRIMIN PRINCE WAN YESTERDAY.

2. ALSO PRESENT WERE FORMIN, MINISTER FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, AND PERSONAL SECRETARY PRIMIN.

3. FOLLOWING MY PRESENTATION PRIMIN AND FORMIN TALKED TOGETHER FOR ABOUT FIVE MINUTES AFTER WHICH FORMIN SAID TO ME:

PAGE TWO RUDKTH 5041 6 5 0 R E 7

(A) THE PRIMIN FEELS THAT SINCE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRIMIN DOES NOT OBJECT TO BUCHAREST, HE IS PREPARED TO QUOTE WITHOLD HIS OBJECTIONS UNQUOTE.

(B) HOUEVER PRIMIN FEELS THAT FOR ANY SUBSTANTIVE TALKS IT IS QUOTE "IMPORTANT, ALMOST IMPERATIVE" HAQUOTE THAT A NEUTRAL SITE BE SELECTED BECAUSE OF NECESSITY OF ACCESS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES INVOLVED. THE FORMIN ADDED THAT THE PRIMIN REQUESTED ME TO EMPHASIZE SUBSTANCE FOREGOING STRONGLY IN MY REPORT.

(C) PRIMIN HAD TAKEN PARTICULAR NOTE OF MY STATEMENT THAT IF BUCHAREST WERE TO BE SELECTED AS SITE FOR PRELIMINARY CONTACT, THIS WOULD NOT RET NOT PREJUDICE THE LATER SELECTION OF A SITE FOR SUBSTANTIVE TALKS. IN PRIMIN'S VIEW, BUCHAREST, WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR THESE. IF ANY ATTEMPT

-SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3,6

NLJ 97-280

By 66 , NARA Date 7-13-99

-2- THE HAGUE 5041, APRIL 26

VERE TO BE MADE BY A NEUTRAL OR COMMUNIST COUNTRY TO DEDUCE FROM POSSIBLE AGREEMENT ON BUCHAREST FOR PRELIMINARY TALKS THAT IT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE FOR LATER SUBSTANTIVE TALKS, QUOTE THERE WOULD BE OBJECTIONS FROM MANY QUARTERS UNQUOTE.

PAGE THREE RUDKTH 5241-6-6-8-R E-T

(D) THE FORMIN ASKED ME TO REPEAT WHAT I HAD SAID ABOUT THE LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF PRELIMINARY TALKS AND THEN ASKED WHETHER SUCH LIMITATIONS WOULD EXCLUDE ANY DISCUSSION OF AN AGENDA FOR THE SUBSTANTIVE TALKS. I REPLIED THAT I COULD NOT GO BEYOND THE LANGUAGE WHICH I HAD USED, BUT THAT IT SEEMED TO ME CLEAR THAT PRELIMINARY CONTACT WAS TO BE LIMITED TO DISCUSSION OF A SITE SELECTION.

4. THE PRIMIN ASKED ME TO CONVEY TO THE DEPARTMENT HIS ABPRECIATION FOR HAVING BEEN BROUGHT UP-TO-DATE ON THIS MATTER.

TYLER

NOTE: NOT PASSED BANCKOK BY OC/T.

ENGRET

Friday, April 26, 1968 -- 9:30 am

Mr. President:

This report is fairly persuasive on:

- -- the timing of an attack on Salgon;
- -- the methods envisaged.

Pru pieu

W. W. Restow

3.4(b)(1)

WWRostow:rln

Approved For Release 2000/09/4 1-NEJ-019-933-1-6-1-

Authority NLT 019-033-1-6 By D, NARA, Date 1/17/02

EO 12958 3.3(b

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-285.

NARA, Date

5. ALTHOUGH THE POLICEMAN'S VC SUPERIOR HAS MENTIONED NO DATE, HE HAS SAID THAT SAIGON WILL AGAIN BE ATTACKED AND MENTIONED THE CHO QUAN POWER STATION AS ONE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: HE HAS ALSO CLAIMED THAT:

A. EXPLOSIVES WILL BE USED TO START FIRES IN SAIGON AND ARTILLERY AND HEAVY WEAPONS WILL BE USED TO INTERDICT GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO SEND TROOPS TO AREAS OF THE CITY UNDER ATTACK.

B. ASSASINATION TEAMS WILL ATTACK POLICE PERSONNEL SO THAT, UNLIKE TET, THE POPULACE "WILL NOT BE AFRAID TO SUPPORT THE LIBERATION FORCES."

C. VC SYMPATHIZERS AND AGENTS WILL BE ARMED WITH U.S. AND VIETNAMESE WEAPONS PICKED UP ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND FORMED INTO A LE THI RIENG AND A NGUYEN VAN KIEU BATTALION. (FIELD COMMENT: THE VC CLAIM THAT THESE TWO JAILED CADRES WERE KILLED BY THE SAIGON POLICE DURING THE TET ATTACK.)

D. VC FLAGS AND BANNERS AND A DECLARATION OF THE "SAIGON LIBERATION COMMITTEE" WILL BE PASSED OUT AMONG THE PEOPLE WHO WILL BE URGED TO SUPPORT THE VC AND TO SURROUND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE CITY. PEOPLES' COURT WILL BE SET UP TO TRY "TRAITOROUS ELEMENTS."

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY
AMBASSA DOR BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND,
GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL MOMYER ONLY)
CINCPAC PACELT ARPAC PACAF

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-283 By 252, NARA Date 4-30-98

INFORMATION

SECRET

Friday, April 26, 1968 -- 9:00 a.m.

Prestile

Mr. Propident:

Clark Clifford called me last night and again this merning to make the fellowing points, with which I agree.

- 1. The message we sent to them in Vientiane has put them up against a real dilemma. They realise that we will be in an entremely strong propaganda and political position if they refuse to respond to that message. There is some significance in the item on page 3 of today's special daily report on North Vietnam, in which Hanoi radio is reported as merely "marking time" in its propaganda on site selection.
- He does not believe that we should move on Bucharest until we see how they deal with our initiative.
- 3. His own hunch is that we may have to go back to hitting them hard throughout the North and fighting hard in the South and is anxious we have as clean and simple a record to lay before our own people and the world at that time. An initiative on Bucharest which crossed our last initiative, before they had time to reply, might take them off the hook and muddy the record.
- Clifford also noted the usefulness of the small drafting session involving the President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. He hopes that we can proceed on that basis with each step in the negotiation process.

W. W. Rostow

See Ruck eques with this proviso: on a contingency basis we should establish whether for selies could have liaison missions in Bushnest, without committing ourselves in any way to Bushnest

WWRostow:rln

-SECRET

Mr. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-283 By its , NARA Date 4-30-98

ACTION

2 Presfile

SECRET

Friday, April 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to President Sunay on Military Aid

In 1966, John McNaughton went to Turkey (and Greece) to work out a five-year US military aid program. Our purpose was to try to make Turk aspirations more realistic in view of the limited funds Turkey would have to spend. The result was an agreement to engage in continuous joint planning based on the assumption that \$134 million in US aid would be available yearly FY 1967 - FY 1971. Everyone understood that we could not commit ourselves to any specific yearly program until Congress had appropriated each year.

We met our target in FY 1967 with a program of \$136.5 million. However, after the deep Congressional cuts of last fall we have been able to come up with only \$87 million for FY 1968. We have asked Congress for \$110 million in FY 1969, but we doubt we'll get it. Turkey's program is second in size only to Korea's. Since we can't cut Korea much, the burden of cuts falls on Turkey. We have had to cut equally hard on the economic aid side.

President Sunay wrote you a long letter explaining his concern (Tab B). At the same time, he said he wished you to understand that he was not writing complainingly, that he understood your burdens and that he simply wished to ask your help in minimizing the damage of these cuts.

State, AID and Defense propose the attached reply. In connection with it, Ambassador Hart would deliver a more detailed aide memoire (Tab C) and follow up to discuss our position in detail. They have squeezed as much out of the overall appropriation for Turkey as they can and will go on helping the Turks make the most of what they have.

I recommend you approve the attached message (Tab A). It is refreshing to have an ally take its cuts in this spirit. Much of that spirit may be the direct result of the warm personal relationship you established with Sunay last year.

Approve _____ 4/27/68

W. W. Rostow

Disapprove _____
See me _____

SECRET

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SUNAY OF TURKEY

Dear Mr. President:

A

I was touched that, in your letter of March 8, you recalled the talks we had in Washington last year. I said to you then, as I will say now: Turkey has a very special place in my heart. America's responsibilities in our great partnership mean a great deal to me.

I therefore directed that the issues raised in the Turkish Government's memorandum be examined thoroughly and sympathetically at the highest levels of this Government. As you requested, I have personally reviewed the decisions that altered our original plans for the economic and military assistance programs. The detailed answer we have prepared is being delivered to your Government by Ambassador Hart.

I cannot pretend that the austerity which we must practice does not affect Turkey. It does indeed, and I regret it. But I also know, Mr. President, that Turkey is strong and very resourceful. I am confident that as in the past she will overcome any difficulties, and with the help of her friends will meet the ambitious goals you and your countrymen have set.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

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You and I know how hard it is to reach decisions that affect the hopes of so many others. The simple fact is that the realities of today limit our aspirations. Your message revealed rare understanding on that score. Americans will not forget this kind of spirit, so characteristic of our friends in Turkey.

You can be certain that Turkey remains a high-priority country for us. It is one of the first countries to which we would consider devoting additional funds should they become available. In the meantime, let us work together to derive the maximum momentum from the resources at hand or programmed.

In the time that remains before I lay down the responsibilities of my office, I hope that you will continue to communicate to me matters of concern to our two peoples.

For me it is of signal importance that Turkey and the United States work in the closest harmony.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-283 By is, NARA Date 4-30-98

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SECRET ANKARA ASIR

LIMDIS

1. TEXT OF LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM PRESIDENT SUNAY HANDED TO ME BY FONMIN AT 1200 MARCH & FOLLOWS:

QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAS RECENTLY BEEN INFORMED OF THE REDUCTIONS IN THE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID WHICH WILL BE EXTENDED TO TURKEY IN THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR. COMPARED TO LAST YEAR'S FIGURES, THE REDUCTION IN THE ECONOMIC AID IS APPROXIMATELY 59 PERCENT AND THAT IN THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE APPROXIMATELY 36 PERCENT.

I AM FULLY AWARE OF THE SUBSTANTIAL CUTS MADE BY THE CONGRESS IN THE FOREIGN AID APPROPRIATIONS AND OF THE LIMITATIONS

PAGE 2 RUDMGU 4310 C. C. R. T.

IMPOSED UPON THE UNITED STATES BY THE TREMENDOUS BURDEN IT

CARRIES IN VIETNAM. NEVERTHELESS THE EXTENT OF THE DECREASE
IN THE FUNDS ALLOCATED TO TURKEY IS BOUND TO AFFECT SEVERELY
THE DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS OF OUR COUNTRY. IN THE
ECONOMIC FIELD THE REDUCTION IN THE AID WILL CREATE A SERIOUS
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM AND LIMIT DRASTICATELY THE RESOURCES
WHICH ARE NEEDED FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT PLAN.
AND THIS AT A TIME WHEN THE RATE OF GROWTH OF OUR ECONOMY
IN THE RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN VERY PROMISING, AS YOU HAVE YOURSELF
POINTED OUT IN YOUR MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS. IN THE MILITARY
FIELD THE CUTS IN THE AMOUNT OF AID WILL DISRUPT THE IMPLEMENTATION

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Department of State

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OF THE PLAN DRAWN UP IN COOPERATION WITH US AUTHORITIES FOR THE YEARS 1967-1971 AND DECREASE TURKEY'S DEFENSE CAPABILITIES TO A CRITICAL LEVEL, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT TURKEY'S SECURITY PROBLEM HAS BEEN COMPOUNDED BY THE INSTABILITY PREVAILING IN OUR REGION AND THE SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER SOVIET MILLITARY INVOLVEMENT AND PRESENCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAS SUBMITTED TO YOUR EMBASSY IN ANKARA A DETAILED MEMORANDUM EXPLAINING THE IMPACT UPON THE TURKISH ECONOMY AND DEFENCE PROGRAMS OF THE REDUCTIONS HADE IN THE

PAGE 3 RUDMGU 4310 SECRET

AID FUNDS. I AM SURE THAT THIS MEMORANDUM WILL RECEIVE
ATTENTION AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN YOUR GOVERNMENT. DURING
THE TALKS WE HAD IN WASHINGTON IN APRIL LAST YEAR, YOU HAD
VERY KINDLY SUGGESTED THAT I MIGHT COMMUNICATE WITH YOU
DIRECTLY ON QUESTIONS WHICH IN CONSIDERED TO BE OF VITAL
IMPORTANCE. THIS I BELIEVE IS SUCH A QUESTION, AS IT WILL
HAVE FAR REACHING IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROGRESS AND SECURITY
OF TURKEY. I TRUST THAT YOU WILL PERSONALLY TAKE AN INTEREST
IN THE MATTER IN THE SPIRIT WHICH HAVE CHARACTERIZED OUR TALKS
AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE CORDIAL AND EVERLASTING BONDS WHICH
UNITE OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

YOU SINCERELY, CEVDET SUNAY PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

2. CONVERSATION WITH FORMIN AND DETAILED MEMORANDUM REFERRED .

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DRAFTED BY: AEA:TUR - WDHUBBARD
APPROVED BY: NEA - LUCIUS D. BATTLE
DOD/ISA - CAPI. HGLLYFIELD
ISA/NESA - GEN. NEWCOMER
ISA/ILN - DR. MANGLAS
ISA/EUR - COL. CRONIN
JÖINT STAFF/SAMAA - COL. NEALON
JS/J-5 - CAPI. REAVES (INFO)
G/PM - MR. WOLF
AID/NESA - MR. WILLIAMS
NEA:TUR - JMHOWISON

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SUBJECT: REPLY TO TURKISH AIDE MEMBIRE OF MARCH & ON ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

- THERE FOLLOWS TEXT USG REPLY TO THE GOT ALDE MEMOURE IN QUESTION. IT IS CONCURRED IN BY DOD AND ALD. ENBASSY REQUESTED NOT RPT NOT DELIVER USG REPLY UNTIL IT RECEIVES REPLY TO PRESIDENT SUNAY'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON.
- 2. QUOTE: THE USG ACKNOWLEDGES THE RECEIPT OF THE GOT'S ALOE MEMOTRE OF MARCH 8, 1968, WHICH HAS BEEN STUDIED WITH SINCERE INTEREST AND GREAT CARE.
- AND SIZE OF THE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE OFFERED BY THE USG IN FY 1968. IT IS TRUE THAT THE NEW CONTRIBUTIONS

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By Cb , NARA Date 7-23-99

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
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OF THE USS, WHILE SUBSTANTIAL, ARE NOT OF THE MAGNITUDE OF ANNUAL CONHITMENTS IN THE RECENT PAST. THE FISCAL YEAR! 1968 LEVELS OF ASSISTANCE HAVE BEEN MADE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE TOTAL DENANDS UPON THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE USG AND AT A TIME IN WHICH PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS CALLED ON THE AMERICAN PEOPLE "TO JOIN IN A PROGRAM OF MATIONAL AUSTERITY". NEVERTHELESS, THE ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY THE USG, OR TO BE PROVIDED, IS BELIEVED TO BE ADEQUATE TO SUSTAIN TURKEY'S DEVELOPMENT EFFORT, WHEN COMBINED WITH THE ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY OTHER CONSURTIUM MEMBERS.

TAHT TAHT GATON BE NOTED THAT THE USB HAS NEVER MADE DECISIONS ABOUT THE MAGNITUDE OF ASSISTANCE ON THE BASIS OF PREVIOUS LEVELS. THE USS HAS PREFERRED TO CON-CENTRATE ON EXAMINING REQUIREMENTS OF A PARTICULAR YEAR: AND HAS HAD TO WEIGH THESE AGAINST THE ANDUNT OF: RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO IT. IN THE CASE OF PROJECT ASSISTANCE, LEVELS DEPEND TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT ON PROJECT PREPARATIONS, AND THE ESTIMATE FOR FY 1968 AAS BASED IN PART ON THE FACT THAT IN FY 1967 THE USS PROVIDED MORE PROJECT ASSISTANCE THAN ORIGINALLY AMTICIPATED AND A BACKLOS OF STAFFED PROJECT APPLICATIONS DID NOT EXIST FOR FY 1968. HAD THIS NOT BEEN THE CASE, THE PROJECT FIGURES FOR FY 1967 AND FY 1968 WOULD HAVE SEEN APPROXIMATELY \$55 MILLION AND \$30 MILLION, RESPECTIVELY. THESE FIGURES WOULD HAVE REPRESENTED A PICTURE QUITE DIFFERENT FRUM THAT OF \$70 MILLION AND \$15 MILLION IN PROJECT FUNDS; FOR MY 1967 AND MY 1968, NOTED IN THE GOT'S AIDE MEMOIRE, EVEN IHOUGH THE SAME TOTAL AMOUNT OF ASSISTANCE WAS INVOLVED.

THE USG CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THE MORE IMPORTANT MATTER OF CONCERN IS NOT A PARTICULAR MONEY TARGET FOR PROJECTS YEAR BY YEAR BUT THE CHARACTER OF THE PROJECTS THEMSELVES, THAT IS, THE FEASIBILITY OF THEIR EXECUTION AND THEIR IMPORTANCE TO THE TURKISH ECONOMY. IN THE OPINION OF THE USG, THE PRIORITY PROJECTS PREPARED AND SUBMITTED FOR LOAN FINANCING IN FY 1967 AND FY 1968 WERE LARGELY TAKEN CARE OF IN FY 1967. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE USG IS UNPREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY ADDITIONAL PROJECTS THAT MAY APPEAR TO BE ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE AND OF A HIGH PRIORITY. ON THE CONTRARY, THE USG IS READY TO EXAMINE ALL SUCH NEW PROJECT PROPOSALS AND TO CONSIDER THEM SYMPATHETICALLY, IN THE INTEREST OF SUPPORTING THE EFFORTS OF THE GOT TO ATTAIN ITS ECONOMIC GOALS.

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- 6. WITH REGARD TO PROGRAM LOANS, THE USG WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE DECO CONSORTIUM, WHICH EACH YEAR CAREFULLY STUDIES TURKEY'S ECONOMIC EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE NEEDS AND ATTEMPTS TO HEET THE OBJECTIVES: AGREED UPON BY ALL PARTIES CONCERNED. IT IS THE VIEW OF THE USG THAT TURKEY'S NEEDS IN 1968, LEAVING ASIDE QUESTIONS OF. HILITARY ASSISTANCE, ARE BEING LARGELY MET BY THE CONSORTIUM, THE USG HAS INDICATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO JOIN OTHER CONSORTIUM. MEMBERS IN A MODEST DEBT REFINANCING WHICH MOULD HELP CLOSE THE GAP IN ESTIMATES.
- 7. TURKEY'S PRINCIPAL ECONOMIC TIES ARE WITH EUROPE AND THE USG MUULD HOPE THAT A DETERMINED EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO RAISE THE LEVEL OF MET ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY TURKEY'S EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM PARTNERS. NEVERTHELESS, THE USG REMAINS THE LARGEST CONSORTIUM CONTRIBUTOR AND HOPES TO BE AGLE TO MAKE A SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION ASAIN IN 1969. IN ADDITION, THE USG EXPECTS. TO CONTINUE ITS ENCOURAGEMENT OF OTHER CONSORTIUM MEMBERS TO EXPAND THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO TURKISH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.
- B. THE USG IS WELL AMARE OF THE STEPS TAKEN BY THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IN ITS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE ITS ECONOMIC GOALS.

 THESE INCLUDE THE INITIAL STEPS TAKEN TOWARD THE RATIONALIZATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND FOR THE EXPANSION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. LIKEWISE, RECENT STEPS TAKEN TO ENCOURAGE THE CAPTURE OF TOURISM RECEIPTS AND THE REMEMBED ENCOURAGEMENT OF MORKER REMITTANCES HAVE ALSO BEEN NOTED. THESE DEVELOPMENTS SHOULD HELP PAVE THE WAY TOWARD THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY WHICH THE GOT HAS PLANNED, AND THERE IS THE HOPE THEREFORE THAT FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNING ESTIMATES WILL BE HIGHER THAN HAD BEEN ORIGINALLY CALCULATED. THE USG REMAINS OPTIMISTIC THAT, WITH STEADY INTERNAL GROWTH AND INPROVO FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNING FOREIGN EXCHANGE EARNING.
- 9. WITH REGARD TO QUESTIONS RAISED IN THE GOT'S AIDE MEMOIRE ABOUT HILITARY ASSISTANCE, THE USG WILL DO ITS BEST TO ASSIST THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IN HODERNIZING ITS ARMED FORCES. IN THIS CONNECTION, AND GIVEN THE NEEDS OF SOUTHEAST ASEA AND KOREA, THE LEVEL OF \$670 MILLION WITHIN A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD NO LONGER IS ATTAINABLE. NEVERTHELESS, IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT

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-CONTIDENTIAL

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EXCEPT FOR KOREA, TURKEY IS STILL THE LARGEST SINGLE RECIPIENT OF US GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE. SHOULD ADDITIONAL FUNDS BECOME AVAILABLE, THE GOT MAY BE ASSURED THAT VERY CAREFUL CONSTRERATION WILL BE SIVEN TO ITS NEEDS.

THE USG REALIZES THAT PROPER MILITARY PLANNING IS DIFFICULT WHEN FUTURE RESOURCES ARE UNCERTAIN AND DIMINISHING AND FOR THIS REASON IS NOW CLOSELY EXAMINING THE FEASIBILITY OF COVERING SOME OF THE OTHERWISE INEVITABLE SHORTFALLS IN EQUIPMENT BY A MODEST PROGRAM OF CREDIT SALES SUBJECT TO AMNUAL CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS. THERE ARE MANY PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH SUCH A PROGRAM, BUT THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT MAY REST ASSURED THAT THE USG WILL FULLY EXPLORE THIS POSSIBLE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY PLANNING.

11. SHOULD IT BECOME NECESSARY, DESPITE THE BEST EFFORTS
OF THE USB AND ITS FRIENDS, FOR THE US TO MAKE ADJUSTMENTS
IN ITS SUPPORT OF TURKISH FURCE PLANS, THE USB WOULD WISH TO
HAVE THE SEMEFIT OF TURKISH VIEWS, AND TO COOPERATE CLOSELY
IN SEEKING TO MEET THOSE REJUIREMENTS THAT TURKISH AUTHORITIES
CONSIDER MOST ESSENTIAL.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE US FULLY AGREES WITH THE VIEW THAT THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND THE SECURITY OF OUR FREEDOMS HAVE CONSTITUTED A VALUABLE PARTNERSHIP. THE FACT THAT CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE LIMITED THE USG'S POSSIBILITIES IN CERTAIN MAYS DOES NOT DEROGATE FROM THE MUTUAL IMPORTANCE OF THE ASSOCIATION. THE USG IS CONFIDENT THAT CONTINUING JOINT EFFORTS WILL MAKE POSSIBLE THE ATTAINMENT OF ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVES, FOR ITS PART, THE USG REMAINS FIRALY DEDICATED TO THE ALLIANCE, AND WILL BE ALERT FOR NEW OPPORTUNITIES TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS MUTUAL EFFORTS. UNQUOTE.

- GONT TOURTINE

Friday - April 26, 1968

Mr. President:

Pres file

Herewith a letter from President Dian Ordan acknowledging your letter of March 30 and expressing thanks for the Vice President's trip to Mexico and your gift of a Hereford bull.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

April 8, 1968 letter from President Gustave Diaz Ordas.

68a

Informal Translation

of

Letter to the President from Mexican President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz

"PRESIDENT OF MEXICO

National Palace -- April 8, 1968

Dear Mr. President, and Good Friend:

I thank you for your letter of March 30, and I am most grateful for your decision to send Vice President Hubbit H. Humphrey to earry out the highly constructive act of signing Protocol II to the Treaty of Tisteleles in the name of your country.

The task we carry out, trying to achieve peace with all the means at our disposal, is the most noble one that we can undertake as transitory leaders of our countries.

Mrs. Diss Orden and I are highly pleased to know that your daughter Lynda and her husband, Captain Robb, enjoyed Acapulco before he had to leave for his military duties.

Thank you for the gift of the fine Hereford of which you informed me in your letter, and about which I also spoke with the Vice President. I will make sure the Hereford is well taken care of so that it will become a good breeding buil which can improve the strain in some of our herds of this breed.

Please accept, through this letter, the affection of my wife and myself for Lady Bird, your children and yourself, in the expectation that we shall soon be able to express it personally.

Cordially.

a Gustavo Dian Ordas

Gustavo Dias Ordas

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D. C.
U. S. A. "

6

Thursday, April 25, 1968 -- 250 p.m.

Mr. President:

Larry Temple brought me the enclosed unsigned letter from Howard Hughes requesting a 90-day postpenement of the AEC calibration shot scheduled for 6:00 a.m. temperow at the Old Nevada Test site 100 miles from Las Vegas.

I had, of course, followed the preparations for this shot and had been a soured by our experts that it was as safe as any such shot could be calculated in advance.

Nevertheless, in Glenn Scaborg's absence, I had a long conversation with Commissioner Tape to ascertain the facts which appear to be those.

- -- The shot will be at about 1.2 megatens, as opposed to .9 megatens, the next largest previous underground shot at this site.
- -- The purpose is strictly military and related to the development of the ABM.
- -- It will be conducted at 3800 feet depth, 20% deeper than the previous next largest shot.
- -- The AEC has studied the effects and had available an outside panel of experts on its safety.
- -- The Hughes office has been in touch with the AEC; has been effered a full briefing which they did not accept. They argued, instead, as does this letter, for a 90-day postponement. Hughes would like to bring in an independent panel of experts, but Tape is confident that they could not assemble as good a group as the group which menitors AEC operations over the years. Moreover, they could not make the evaluation within the 90 days. The postponement would be expensive and awkward, since, once the holes are dug and instrumentation installed, it is costly to postpone.
- -- Senators Bible and Cannon inite been fully briefed and are strongly in support of the operation, standing up to criticism in Nevada.
- -- AEC expects the same kind of effects from the shot that they have had in the past; namely, no structural damage to buildings in Las Vegas; some slight swaying of high-rise buildings, about which the population has been warned and which it has experienced in the past; possibly some "architectural" damage --

that is, plaster cracks etc. In fact, the complaints of "architectural" damage in the past have never held up on investigation; that is, they turned out to be cracks not due to underground explosions. But Tape does not rule out the possibility of such minor damage.

- -- Hughes' letter -- and others -- implies there is a danger of venting.

 AEC believes that there is no danger of venting in an explosion buried this deep. Venting is liable to arise from shallower explosions.
- -- Hughes raises the example of the Utah sheep. AEC says that if anything happened to the sheep, it arese not from AEC experiments but from experiments from a proving ground for biological weapons in Utah.
- -- AEC has effered also to brief the Hughes organization on a follow-on experiment of about the same magnitude as the present experiment, scheduled to take place in August or September. Again, they have not accepted this.
- -- The AEC plans to move from the Old Nevada site to a Central Nevada site for ABM-related experiments with devices about twice as powerful as that about to be tested, a year or so from now; beyond that they will be developing the site in the Aleutians for further ABM-related experiments of still higher yield in the longer future.

WWR comment: Anything concerned with nuclear devices and scientists has in it, obviously, a margin of risk. I see nothing in Hughes' letter that raises questions which the AEC has not confronted with as much responsibility as could be expected.

W. W. Rostow

April 25, 1968

The Honorable Lyndon Baines Johnson President of the United States The White House Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

You may not remember it, but years ago when you were in the Senate, you and I were acquainted, not intimately, but enough so that you would have recognized my name.

So, when you became President, I was strongly tempted to communicate with you, as one occasion after another developed in which I urgently needed your help.

The last of these was last year when I undertook the manufacture of a small five-place helicopter for use in VietNam. I lost in excess of one-fifth of everything I possessed in the world on this one project, purely because the price was miscalculated.

I was besieged by my people to seek a renegotiation of the contract, and I was sorely influenced to contact you.

However, in this case, as in the past, I decided you were too busy for me to disturb you for anything with a purely selfish purpose.

So, we went ahead, spending more and more for overtime, with only one objective: to build the 700 helicopters in the shortest possible time. The loss was far greater than I have ever suffered in my lifetime. The price we collected for these machines was less than the bill of material alone.

Now, something has occurred that only you can alter from its present course.

Based upon my personal promise that independent scientists and technicians have definite evidence, and can obtain more, demonstrating the risk and uncertainty to the health of the citizens of Southern Nevada, if the megaton plus nuclear explosion is detonated tomorrow morning, will you grant even a brief postponement of this explosion to permit my representatives to come to Washington and lay before whomever you designate the urgent, impelling reasons why we feel a ninety-day postponement is needed?

I have tried every conceivable way to avoid bothering you with this. I appeal to you only as a last resort.

The independent scientists and technicians to whom I refer are not a part of any of the groups who have historically championed the anti-bomb cause.

I am certainly no peacenik. My feelings have been well-known through the years to be far to the right of center.

It is not my purpose to impede the defense program in any way, and I can positively prove that, if my appeal is heeded, the nuclear test program will proceed more rapidly than at present.

It is not my wish to plead the case in this document. But, if you doubt any of my statements, please ask yourself the following questions:

1. If the AEC technicians did not consider the nuclear explosion at the Las Vegas test site to be of marginal safety, then why did they make a firm agreement with me eleven months ago, to move the large explosions to Central Nevada or to some more remote place? And why did they, in fact, move to Central Nevada and build a test site there and detonate one explosion there, and also why did they move to the Aleutian Islands and build a test site and detonate one or more explosions there, which brought objections from Russia?

It just does not seem to me that the citizens of Southern

Nevada should be forced to swallow something that the citizens of

Central Nevada would not tolerate and something that was removed

from the Aleutian Islands because the Russians objected. I think

Nevada has become a fully accredited state now and should no longer

be treated like a barren wasteland that is only useful as a dumping

place for poisonous, contaminated nuclear waste material, such as normally is carefully sealed up and dumped in the deepest part of the ocean.

The AEC technicians assure that there will be no harmful consequences, but I wonder where those technicians will be ten or twenty years from now.

There are some sheep lying dead in nearby Utah.

Surely the technicians in charge of that experiment were equally certain that there would be no harmful consequences. In that instance, it did not take ten or twenty years for the effects to be felt.

My deepest gratitude for your consideration.

Respectfully yours,

Howard Hughes

Dictated by telephone April 25, 1968

ACTION

Thursday, April 25, 1968 -- 7:10 p.m.

Mr. Pråsident:

Joe Alsep was just in on Vietnam, on which he will remain, as always, helpful.

He ended by saying this: "I wender if I could break an eld rule; namely, that I have never asked to see a President. I am deeply moved by the President's decision and his policies. I should be very grateful for a chance to call on him."

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rln

SECRET -- SENSITIVE

Thursday, April 25, 1968 7:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

This intercepted message indicates that some North Vietnamese units are about to jump off on a major offensive operation on April 27 their time.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
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By St., NARA, Date 2-6-03

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| D-DAY POSSIBLY TO OCCURT ON 27 APRIL | |
| ON 25 APRIL, COMMUNICATIONS SERVING THE 812TH | |
| REGIMMENT CONTAINED REFERENCES SUGGESTING THAT N-DAY | |
| WOULD OCCUR ON 27APRIL. A MESSAGE FROM THE 812TH | A. (363) |
| REGIMENT TO A POSSIBLE UNIDENTIFIED SUBORDINATE RE- | |
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| DIRECT REFERENCE TO N-DAY WAS NOTED IN THE MESSAGE, | |

"N-DAY PLUS2."

PAVN COMMUNICATIONS OF 24 AND 25 APRIL, ALONG WITH

THE ABOVE MENTIONED ACTIVITY, NOW INDICATES THAT AT

LEAST ELEMENTS OF THE 90TH REGIMENT, 812TH REGIMENT,

803RD REGIMENT AND 29TH REGIMENT ARE ENGAGED IN PREP
ARATIONS FOR POSSIBLE LARGE SCALE HOSTILITIES TO TAKE

PLACE IN THE NEAR FUTURE, POSSIBLY 27APRIL.

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MENT ON 25 APRIL DID CONTAIN REFERENCES THAT THE 7TH BATTALION WAS CONTINUING TO WORK IN PREPARATION FOR

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ/PAC 00 327 By SL. NARA, Date 2703 HIRS THESE

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INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, April 25, 1968 6:35 p.m.

free file

Mr. President:

Herewith Tem Niblock's memorandum on the subjects Gene Black wishes to raise with you tomorrow, plus Ed Hamilton's comment to me on those issues.

W. W. Rostow

-CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED White House Guldelines, Feb. 24, 1983 By Ag., NARA, Date 5:22 92

WWRostow:rln

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April 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. James R. Jones

Deputy Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT:

Eugene R. Black Visit

Mr. Black plans to raise the following issues in his meeting with the President at Noon, Friday, April 26:

1. Mekong Basin Development - the mainstream Pa Mong Dam

Preliminary analysis indicates very favorable prospects for a huge, mainstream dam on the Mekong River. A 40-man team of U. S. Bureau of Reclamation specialists has been studying the project for 2 1/2 years. By broadening and accelerating present plans, a Stage One project could be ready for a financial decision some time next year. Studies to date have cost about \$10 million of A.I.D. funds.

Walker Cisler (Detroit Edison), Raymond Wheeler (former Chief, U. S. Corps of Engineers), the IBRD staff, and Arthur Goldschmidt at the U N Mission are all anxious to see the project pushed.

The dam would likely produce 20 bil KWH of electricity (2 1/2 times Aswan and 1 1/2 times Grand Coulee); and irrigate between 2 and 5 million acres. Thailand and Laos would be benefitted most. But navigation and flood control benefits in Cambodia and Vietnam would be considerable. Power could be sent economically to North Vietnam.

The first stage would include the full power potential and a start on irrigation and cost an estimated \$800 million. The power portion should be financible on World Bank type terms.

Mr. Black plans to discuss the project with the Prime Minister of Thailand in New York on May 7 and report our favorable technical and economic findings. He wishes the President to be informed on these developments and to endorse his encouragement to A.I.D., Thailand and the Mekong Committee to get this large project ready for consideration as a major post-war activity. There would be relatively small additional costs to A.I.D. for studies and pilot irrigation and other projects. Design work could begin next year. This would reach \$50 million over 2-3 years before construction costs begin.

(It is of related interest that David Lilienthal is keen to identify a second large reservoir, mainstream project in Cambodia to gain full control of Mekong waters in the Delta. Progress on this depends on Sihanouk).

2. Post-War Development Planning for Southeast Asia

Mr. Black plans to suggest the desirability of more substantial planning for post-war economic and social development in Southeast Asia than is now underway. He believes it would be timely, if the President agrees, to give special attention to this and is prepared to consult within the Government and make recommendations to step up our preparations for post-hostilities economic relations with Asia.

He has in mind a combined report on Asian performance on development since the President's Johns Hopkins address, and a set of proposals for post hostilities economic assistance, encouragement of private investment and trade, regionalism, multilateral financing, etc.

Such an effort would require detail of staff for this purpose, and support from State, A.I.D. and other agencies.

3. Special Funds for the Asian Bank, IDA Replenishment and A.I.D.

Mr. Black is worried the Congress will act separately on the several aid proposals with disastrous results for one or more of them. He hopes this can be avoided by persuading the key members (Mahon, Passman, et al) to treat the various items as elements of a package when they apply budget cuts. Since the A.I.D. Bill is in for a big cut in any event, he hopes a way can be found to count the ADB \$50 million and IDA \$160 million as part of the A.I.D. reduction without damaging A.I.D.

He will likely report a most discouraging outlook for the authorization of \$200 million of Special Funds for the Asian Bank. He may urge an early nose-count in the House to see how much support there is for the Asian Bank. And he will likely point out to the President the very real setback it will be to our non-military efforts in Southeast Asia if the Asian Bank Bill doesn't pass this year.

Thomas @ 1

Thomas C. Niblock Special Assistant to Eugene R. Black

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THE WHITE HOUSE

CONFIDENTIAL

April 25, 1968

WWR:

SUBJECT: Eugene Black and the IDA/ADB Money Problem

Black has an appointment with the President at noon tomorrow.

Black wants to do three things at the meeting: (1) brief the President on the \$800 million Pa Mong Dam project on the Mekong between Laos and Thailand; (2) urge the President to order a comprehensive progress report on the Baltimore initiative, perhaps with some proposals for the future; and (3) try out on the President the notion that we propose to key members of Congress a deal in which we would give up bilateral foreign aid money in return for assurances that the IDA and Asian Bank requests will not be cut.

I have no lengthy comments on the first two points. The President should know something about Pa Mong; it is the first of four massive projects which, taken together, can harness the entire Mekong. But financing it will be bloody awful, and the President should understand the scale of the problem sooner rather than later. The only problem raised by the progress report on the Baltimore initiative is the certainty that Black will want to use it as a vehicle for his thoughts on restructuring foreign aid -- at least foreign aid for Southeast Asia. This is not necessarily bad, but the President should understand that it is essentially Black's way of getting the Perkins Committee study proposal approved through the back door.

The last point -- the deal on appropriations -- could be very serious business. Black has talked about it with you, with Joe Barr (who was mildly favorable) and with Bill Gaud. After considerable thought, Gaud has come out against it -- not because he objects on the merits, but because he cannot see with whom such a bargain might be struck.

Gaud's arguments are not trivial. He points out that the only Congressional bargainers who would have a chance of delivering on this kind of arrangement would be Fulbright in the Senate and Mahon or Passman in the House. Fulbright's objections to foreign aid are not fiscal; he could not be persuaded by a fiscal argument or fiscal concessions; he would insist on a bargain revolving around Vietnam; and there is no guarantee he could deliver his committee even if he did make some agreement. Gaud is afraid the net result would be that

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-283 By us , NARA Date 8-7-98

CONFIDENTIAL

foreign aid would be held hostage to Vietnam negotiations, just as the Asian Bank bill is now being held.

On the House side, Gaud observes that Mahon has not taken Passman into his confidence with respect to detailed figures Mahon has been putting together on expenditures and appropriation cuts, and that Passman is noisily upset about it. It is crystal clear to Bill that Passman will never agree to a prior deal, and that any hint that Gaud is dealing with Mahon over Passman's head would insure that Passman would make as much trouble for the bill as possible both in his subcommittee and on the floor.

In sum, Gaud would love to make a deal along Black's lines, but he cannot see how or with whom it could be swung -- and he doubts that, if swung, it could be enforced.

These are powerful arguments, but there is another side to the problem as well. We know that Mahon has put together some figures which involve some appropriations and expenditure reductions for foreign aid. We don't know how much is involved, which of the major foreign aid elements has been cut, or whether Mahon's planning takes into account all of the elements. The scuttlebutt up to yesterday was that Mahon wanted \$1 billion out of "foreign aid", but Charlie Zwick reports that his conversations with the Chairman -- though they involved no exact numbers -- suggest considerably less than that.

It would be very nice to know in more precise terms what Mahon is up to. From my standpoint, the President's optimal response to Black's suggestion would be a call to Mahon and an attempt to get his agreement to let Charlie Zwick in on the Mahon numbers. (In practice, this should get Charlie into position to offer arguments and suggestions on the numbers.) I assume that if the President did this, he would want to do it on a much broader basis than foreign aid. Gaud would buy this in a minute. He trusts Zwick to negotiate his interests and this scheme would avoid the diplomatic problem with Passman which would arise if Gaud seemed to be conspiring directly with Mahon. If a deal along Black's lines is going to be struck, I think it is most likely to be struck between Zwick and Mahon.

You asked for my thoughts on the specifics of a deal. The numbers on the following page assume that Mahon does want about \$1 billion in appropriations (much less in expenditures) from the foreign aid complex. These numbers would be acceptable to AID and the Budget Bureau if the President decided a sacrifice of this scale must be made. I am not sure the MAP numbers would be acceptable to Defense.

Ed Hamilton

(In millions of dollars)

| Element | Request | Cut | Remainder |
|-----------------------------|---------|-------|-----------|
| AID | \$2,500 | \$700 | \$1,800 |
| MAP (grants) | 420 | 20 | 400 |
| MAP (credit sales) | 296 | 96 | 200 |
| IDA | 240 | 80* | 160 |
| PL 480 (Title II donations) | 556 | 106 | 450 |
| Inter-American Bank | 300 | | 300 , |
| Asian Bank | 50 | | 50 |
| | | | |
| TOTAL CUTS | \$1,002 | | |

^{*}This is a paper cut and Mahon will know it. The Budget went to bed with \$240 million on the basis of the large IDA replenishment we proposed to the Europeans. The \$160 million reflects the replenishment we were actually able to negotiate. But nobody really thought even when the budget went up that we would sell the big package. Thus, this "cut" repaired a very low order of sacrifice. If Mahon wouldn't give us full credit for it, my next suggestion would be to put off the Asian Bank appropriation (not the authorization) until next year.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-283 By ica, NARA Date 4-30-98

INFORMATION

SECRET

Thursday, April 25, 1968 6:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

This is the second report that a high-ranking Chinese delegation is in Hanoi or on its way.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 13115

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-28-3 By ica NARA Date 4-30-98

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INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

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Thursday, April 25, 1968 -- 2:10 p.m.

SECRET/NODIS

Mr. President:

Herewith a capsule version of Bunker's 48th weekly report:

· fres file

A. General

- -- Vietnamese still display anxiety but previous fears of possible American abandonment have subsided.
- -- Your statement on agreement on talk site strongly supported and delay in talks has demonstrated U.S. not to be bullied by Hanoi,
- -- Popular and government attitudes on negotiations and questions hardening.
- -- Military activity slackens with significant drop in friendly and enemy losses.
 - -- Enemy losses in first quarter 1968 over 80 percent of all 1967 losses.
- -- Intelligence shows continued enemy buildup for country-wide offensive and heavy southward movement of enemy forces.
- -- Thieu feels enemy offensive will be delayed until negotiations begin or preliminary talks fail.
- -- Assembly committees appear willing to write mobilization bill providing maximum expansion of armed forces while protecting civilian services.
 - -- Bunker recommends formation of war cabinet to Thieu.
- -- Despite continuing pressure for change, formation of Huong government not now imminent.

B. Political

- -- Tran Van Don front slipping; financial difficulties reported. Thieu's performance weakens Vietnamese willingness to support allegedly pro-Ky group.
- -- Free Democratic Force shows modest growth in II and II Corps, some support in Lower House; despite poor leadership could become important with possibility of open Thieu backing.

SECRET/NODIS

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983 By 19, NARA, Date 5-22-92

- -- Thieu luncheons and conferences with Assemblymen continuing, his willingness to try evident, effectiveness growing, but necessary close relationship still hampered by poor staff.
- -- Post-Tet recovery program still moving too slowly; ministries lag despite Thieu's efforts; mission keeping up steady pressure; resettlement priority stressed.
- -- Recount of Tet evacuees brings total down from 821,000 to 542,000; rebuilding assistance increased but still inadequate, only 15 days from onset of rainy season.
- -- Rice moving from Delta to Saigon, transportation almost normal except for portions of Route 4, some key canals and 3 provinces in Delta.

C. Pacification

- -- Lack of GVN top-level pacification organization or leader hampers progress; mission urging Thieu revamp and hold weekly meeting with Central RD Council, priority urged for development efforts follow-up in show-the-flag operational areas.
- -- Ky moving to implement Thieu's directive for self-defense arming of populace. In cities 140,000 trained, 10,000 arms issued; in hamlets 20,000 trained, 3,000 arms issued. Mission aims to triple weapons distribution.

D. Economic

- -- Thieu agrees to joint economic briefing to focus on increasing problems of inflation.
 - -- Continued retail price rise confirms economy becoming more active.
 - -- Commercial import program licensing rises significantly during week.
- -- Mobilization measures have aggravated shortages of various technical skills despite U.S. pressure for reasonable deferment procedures.

W. W. R.

SECRET/NODIS



Thursday, April 25, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 25643)

Herewith my forty-eighth weekly message:

SANITIZED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-280 , NARA Date 2-25-00

A. General

The past week seems to have been, in a sense, one of suspended animation. There has been a feeling of expectancy in the air, people waiting to see whether talks will get underway, and where they will be held. Your statement on the need for agreement on a site to which the interested parties would have adequate access under conditions which would be fair to both sides is considered here to be eminently reasonable and is strongly supported. At the same time, I have the impression that the general feeling of apprehension, the fear of American abandonment, which I reported in last week's message, has subsided somewhat; although some anxiety is still evident there is much more confidence in our intentions. I think it is fair to say that concurrently, there has been some hardening of popular and government attitudes and positions in respect to negotiations and the whole range of questions they raise. In the speech of the Prime Minister on April 17, in the resolutions adopted by the Confederation of Vietnamese Labor Unions, and in the two anti-Communist meetings held in Saigon over the weekend, as well as in statements by members of the government and the Assembly, opposition to any form of coalition with the National Liberation Front; insistence on the freedom and territorial integrity of South Vietnam, on its primary role in negotiations, and its determination to carry on, alone if necessary, to see that the fruits of its long struggle are not lost through negotiations have been emphasized repeatedly.

Your joint communique with President Park has had a good effect here. Virtually all Vietnamese leaders were much reassured by the statement regarding Vietnamese participation in the peace talks. I think this statement alone has taken a good deal of the edge off of their fears. Vietnamese in general also seem to be more encouraged than otherwise by the delay in finding an acceptable site for preliminary contacts. The snag over a site has at least had the merit of demonstrating to them that we are not going to be bullied or cajded into dealing with Hanoi on whatever terms it chooses to demand. The delay has also given many people here time to absorb this turn of events and to evaluate more soberly the meaning of your March 31 speech, various subsequent allied statements, and Hanoi's response.

Leaders such as Tran Van Huong and the head of the Senate's Independence Bloc, Senator Nguyen Van Chuc, this week publicly expressed confidence that the U. S. would not abandon Vietnam. Prime Minister Loc's speech, which I have mentioned, is generally positive in tone. He noted that Thieu is trying to carry out the promises made at Manila, referring to the establishment of constitutional government and the

SECRET/NODIS

attack on corruption as examples. He added that freedom loving peoples everywhere are "looking with confidence at the role and leadership of the United States in the task of stopping the Communists' bold invasion." He then said that in the light of Vietnamese Government performance "Vietnam has the right to expect from her allies that they keep the promises they made in Manila with the view to halting Communist inroads."

Military activity tapered off during the week, both friendly and enemy losses being about 60 percent of the previous week. Enemy losses of 1,899 killed were about half the weekly average for the past six months. In this connection, it is interesting to note that enemy losses during the first quarter of 1968, 73,253 killed, amounted to over 80 percent of the losses for the entire year 1967, and that the ratio of enemy to friendly losses at 7.5:1 is almost double the ratio of 1967.

While military activity declined, intelligence continues to accumulate of enemy buildup for an impending countrywide offensive. There are heavy concentrations of enemy troops in the northern First Corps in the DMZ, Khe Sanh, and Hue areas, and in the A Shau Valley. There are reportedly some 51 enemy maneuver battalions in this region, supported by upwards of 17 artillery and three to four armor battalions. In the Second Corps, it appears the major effort may be made around the Kontum area. In the Third Corps area, the Fifth, Ninth, and Seventh enemy divisions have been regrouped in an arc to the north, northeast, and northwest of Saigon. Intelligence reports from both the First Corps and from a high level defector in the Third Corps forecast heavy attacks for the period beginning April 24 to early May (the dark of the moon). Thieu on April 24, however, expressed doubt that the major offensive would come this soon, feeling the pressure would be stepped up either when negotiations begin or should preliminary talks fail to lead to negotiation. The enemy would then try to exert maximum military pressure. This is in line with a view Thieu has consistently expressed for some time past.

In the meantime, there are indications that the heavy southward movement of enemy forces continues. Heavy truck traffic in Laos and west of the A Shau Valley was observed last week. But while the truck destruction is also very heavy, averaging about 15 percent, it is obvious much of it gets through. A sighting of 230 sampans off the coast of North Vietnam, 100 to 150 miles north of the DMZ, the first of such magnitude, supports other evidences of strenuous efforts by the enemy at reinforcement.

Thieu is pressing the Assembly to enact a mobilization law, holding meetings with members of both the Senate and Lower House in trying to get details of the legislation satisfactorily ironed out. During the past week, the defense committees of the Upper and Lower Houses held joint meetings of general mobilization. The committee members and the Assembly in general seem anxious to write a general mobilization law which will permit the maximum expansion of the armed forces, while at the same time avoiding the disruption of essential civilian services both within the government and in the private sphere. In connection with mobilization, I should also note that the Minister of Defense, in an April 20 news conference, said that general mobilization will allow the allies to begin gradual troop withdrawals at the beginning of 1969.

I think it is interesting to note what the proposed Vietnamese call-up of additional forces and the planned ultimate strength of their military and para-military establishment means in comparative terms. If we take our pre-Tet estimate that 67 percent of the total South Vietnam population of 17 million was under government control, it means that approximately 11, 400,000 were in this category, the pool from which manpower has to be drawn. The U. S. population at 200 million is roughly seventeen and one-half times this figure. Thus, if we take the 178,000 men it is proposed to add to the Vietnamese military and para-military forces, it would be equivalent in the U. S. to a call-up of 2,670,000 men. When this call-up is completed, there will be a total of about 918,000 men under arms, on a comparative basis equivalent to over 16 million for the U. S. For an underdeveloped country, this seems to me a highly creditable performance and should be an answer to uninformed critics who maintain that Vietnam is not carrying a full share of the effort.

Change in government. Thieu said today he is continuing his study of the restructuring of the government and hopes to have this completed soon. He added that one of the problems he was running into was that of finding men of ability and influence to fill the jobs. I again brought up the question of the formation of a war cabinet, which I had suggested to him several times previously, as a means of solving some of his decision-making and administrative problems. I pointed out to him that daily meetings could bring about close consultation between himself, the Vice President, the Prime Minister, the Chief of the Joint General Staff, the individuals charged with economy and finance and mobilization; the decisions could be taken at the meetings and he as President could direct individual responsibility to see that they were carried out. I added that I thought this could result in a much tighter and effective administration of the whole military, pacification, and economic effort. I believe that Thieu is disposed toward the idea and seems inclined to act on t.

Although we had the impression last week that the formation of a Tran Van Huong government was imminent, it does not appear so now. Thieu has apparently encountered some problems. One may be Ky's feeling that Huong is too old, stubborn, and opinionated for the job. Moreover, there is probably some resistance to Huong generally among the military, all of which may have contributed to Thieu's difficulty in moving ahead. Huong himself contributed to this impression in an interview with the Saigon Daily News in which he denied that Thieu had asked him to take on the job of Prime Minister.

The pressure for a change in government has appeared most notably in the Senate in the debate on "war leadership policy." While a number of Senators have urged caution and moderation, several others, notably Dai Viets Nguyen Van Ngai and Pham Nam Sach (both of whom probably hoped to get in the new government themselves), have insisted that the present government is incapable of running the country and must be replaced now if the nation is to deal effectively with the problem of making peace.

The Assembly evidently still intends to interpellate the Prime Minister, though it is not clear how soon this will take place or even if the Prime Minister will agree to appear. In the meantime, various Senate Committees are engaged in examining in detail the shortcomings of the several Government of Vietnam agencies which they monitor; their conclusions will reportedly be embodied in some formal resolution at some point.

There appears to be a fairly widespread and quite genuine conviction that the Loc government is not up to the challenges which face it. I think Thieu himself is not entirely happy with Loc and has a feeling he lacks decisiveness, and I am inclined to believe he will go ahead with changes in the government. But evidently, as is his custom, he is endeavoring to prepare the ground carefully before moving ahead. I think it is still quite possible he may appoint Huong as Prime Minister. I also continue to believe that many of the problems he now encounters in administration would be solved by the formation of a war cabinet.

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B. Political

Party formation. I have the impression that Tran Van Don's Front is losing ground. His visits to the provinces have apprently not resulted in extending the front to the countryside in any meaningful way. Moreover, which suggests that the front is in serious financial straits with the treasury virtually empty. I think it would be fair to say that here in Saigon only Don's considerable personal appeal is keeping it alive. While the front captured the initial feeling of a need to unite in the face of the enemy following the Tet attacks, this feeling has not been enough to sustain it. Failing to find a clearcut function and lacking a grass roots organization, the front is now fading. Another reason for its present weakness is probably the suspicion on the part of many Vietnamese that it was designed to support Vice President Ky. Thieu is beginning to look much stronger as a leader and fewer politicians are now willing to go along with anything that looks like a Ky vehicle.

On the other hand, the free democratic force which appeared in the beginning to have less promise seems now to have some hope of developing. According to our provincial reporters, there appears to be respectable amount of free democratic force organizational activity and support in some provinces, particularly in the Second and Third Corps. One report indicates that provincial leaders of many persuasions -- including Cao Dai, Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang, Dai Viets, and An Quang Buddhists -- are involved in free democratic force organizations in Phu Yen and Khanh Hoa. We have other reports of successful free democratic force appeals to local leaders in Binh Duong and Bien Hoa. While I would not want to overstate this modest progress, if it continues, there may be hope for the free democratic force to develop some genuine grass roots support. It is also evident that the free democratic force has picked up some support in the Lower House of the Assembly where an effort is being made to put together a new bloc that reportedly would be responsive to Thieu and allied with the free democratic force.

The free democratic force does not have impressive leadership at the national level. Its behind-the-scenes organizer, Nguyen Van Huong, appears to us to be a particularly poor leader who suffers from a peculiarly convoluted and paranoid cast of mind. Despite the drawbacks of its national leadership, the free democratic force should not be counted out. One of its chief assets is the general impression that it has government backing and Thieu's support. For those who want to stay on the right side of the authorities, membership in the free democratic force probably has a central negative appeal. As a government party, it would appeal to some ambitious men and women in the provinces who are looking for a way up. Also important is the fact the free democratic force is organized along familiar lines (the lines of the Can Lao and the Lao Dong) and has a clear function; support of the government and backing of government candidates in future elections.


If Thieu were openly to back the free democratic force, its appeal would be much increased. If it continues to grow, he may be willing to take such a step. Certainly he is keenly aware of the need for an effective, nationwide political party to back the government. He has commented to me on the government's lack of popular support in very frank terms. He has also said he is anxious to push party formation; and I think he is still looking for effective ways to do this.

Assembly developments. Thieu has been seeing a good many members of the Assembly of late, holding lunches and small get togethers for members of both Houses. We have reports that he has been effective on these occasions in presenting his ideas, many legislators being impressed by his calm and sincere statements of the problems he faces. However, I think he has not yet created the necessary close relation with the Assembly. He does not have a good staff to help him with this, and he himself is still learning how to cultivate the legislators in an effective way; but he is trying to learn.

Recovery program. Post-Tet recovery in the cities is still moving, but too slowly. Despite President Thieu's continuing interest and weekly chairing of the Central Recovery Committee, his Ministries are not putting full weight behind critical recovery tasks. Hence, we have kept up steady pressure on simplifying procedures, moving commodities, supplying adequate funds, removing economic restrictions, and, above all, resettling Tet evacuees.

A new and better recount of total Tet evacuees shows them down to 542,000 from a peak of 821,000. Quickly resettling them is our top priority recovery task. Assisting them to rebuild 95,000 homes which were 50-100 percent destroyed and another 34,000 homes, under 50 percent destroyed, is the quickest, most direct solution. So far, about 30,000 families have received cement and roofing, all furnished by the U. S. The Government of Vietnam, largely using counterpart funds, has paid rebuilding allowances (either 5,000 or 10,000 piasters, depending on location) to 23,000 families. But with the rainy season due within about 15 days over most of the country except the First Corps, this performance is not good enough.

Transportation, one key to faster recovery, is looking up. The first barge convoy to the Delta under a new plan, whereby U. S. AID contracts with transporters and Vietnamese Government Ministries use the barges, leaves at the end of the week.



Traffic is back practically to normal in the First and Second Corps. It is running 90-100 percent of normal on most Third Corps roads and 50 percent on waterways. In the Fourth Corps, heretofore the biggest problem area, traffic is almost normal except on Route 4 south of Can Tho and the key canals. Three provinces -- Vinh Binh, Chuong Thien, and Kien Tuong -- remain nearly isolated. Traffic is also going up on two critical waterways (especially for movement of Delta rice to Saigon) -- the Mang Thit and Cho Gao canals.

C. Pacification

Though pacification is 99 percent Government of Vietnam business, no top level body or individual guides pacification on the Government of Vietnam side, as is the case on the U. S. side. As a result, Government of Vietnam pacification policy develops slowly and insufficient follow-up takes place. President Thieu heads an inter-Ministerial group called the Central Revolutionary Development Council, but it meets irregularly and has no staff; hence necessary issues are not raised for decision and decisions are not followed up. We have urged Thieu to revivify the Central Revolutionary Development Council by having it meet weekly under the President's personal direction. Thieu probably understands pacification better than any senior Government of Vietnam official (he acted as Secretary-General to a forerunner of the Central Revolutionary Development Council). He has a clear concept of how to achieve territorial security -- the backbone of any effective pacification program. As we do, Thieu sees the Regional and Popular Forces as the key to territorial security though so long as insufficient Regional and Popular Forces are available, regular Army of the Republic of Vietnam battalions have to fill in (as 46 are now doing). Territorial security forces must be adequate to provide the climate in which other aspects of pacification can flourish. Thieu realizes the urgent need to "race the Viet Cong for the countryside," especially before negotiations might fix opposing forces in place.

But the Government of Vietnam does not have adequate machinery to follow through on Thieu's desires. Thus constant pushing from U. S. advisors is required. For example, following up Thieu's suggestion for running show-the-flag operations in all contested or lost hamlets, we are urging the Government of Vietnam to make these the first targets of specific operations to show the people that the Government of Vietnam is still in control and cares about their security.

Vice President Ky, charged by President Thieu with guiding the program for arming the people, is moving to develop an organization to handle this politically sensitive, rather complicated business. So far 820 civil defense groups have been organized in cities, with 140,000 people trained and 10,000 arms issued. In the hamlets more than 20,000 people have been trained and 3,000 arms issued. Our immediate objective is to increase weapons in the hands of self-defense elements threefold.

D. Economic

During my April 24 meeting with Thieu, I pointed out that we seem to face once more the problem of inflation, aggravated now by the destruction of the Tet attacks. I

suggested that we have a joint economic briefing so as to have a common understanding of these problems and what it is we must do in the coming months. Thieu agreed.

Retail prices in Saigon rose for the third straight week seeming to confirm that the economy is turning around and becoming more active after the prolonged post-Tet stagnation. However, the rise of the Index was again only 2 percent, and a handful of individual items accounted for most of the rise: sweetened condensed milk rose sharply because of a temporary stock shortage caused by late arrival of ships. Unloadings during the next few days should relieve this situation. Vegetable prices were down, rice and fish stable, pork up slightly.

Revival of economic activity has stimulated an increase in import licensing. Commercial import program licensing rose in the last reported week (April 8 to 17) to \$5.6 million from \$1.7 million the previous week. Government of Vietnam-financed licensing is also reported up, to \$3.9 million, from \$3.3 million for the same periods. Responsiveness of import licensing to renewed demand is our best insurance against inflation, so this is encouraging.

Manpower continues to be a major concern on the economic side. There is no general manpower shortage, and in fact there are still some pools of unemployment created by the Tet offensive (for instance by destruction of factories) and by the curfew and the closing of bars and night clubs. But this is highly localized and confined to a few types of activity. These people are properly categorized as "frictionally unemployed".

There are on the other hand serious shortages of various technical skills, as always in this economy, and the mobilization measures taken since Tet are aggravating these. Both government Ministries and private industry are affected. We have been pressing the Government of Vietnam through various channels to adopt reasonable deferment procedures in critical cases, but our success in this is still somewhat problematical. Deferment of healthy, young men for any reason whatever now runs cross-current to the strong (and in most respects very desirable) urge on the part of President Thieu and other top officials to make a maximum military effort.

Thurs., April 25, 1968 1:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the list of these known to have been denied Polish visas in the last six months.

The list is incomplete. For example, I am told that a New York Post man named, I believe, Breder, was also denied a Pelish visa.


W W. Rostow

-CONFIDENTIAL attachment



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Weshington, D.C. 20520



CONPIDENTIAL.

April 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Polish Visa Denials to American

Citizens

Attached herewith is a list of those names known to us of American citizens who have been refused visas to visit Poland within the past six months.

There is no regular procedure by which we are informed of such refusals and we are aware of them only when the applicants bring them to our attention.

When we recently asked the Polish Embassy whether there were a policy of large-scale denial of visas to specific categories of individuals, the reply we received was that each case was considered on its merits but that because of "internal developments," the Polish Government was 'exercising restraint" in permitting foreigners to visit Poland.

On the basis of a number of reports we believe there has been a substantial number of visa denials, particularly to American citizens of Jewish origin and to newspaper men.

> Benjamin H. Read Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

List.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-280 By C6 , NARA Date 2-23-99

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONS AND GROUPS REPUSED POLISH VISAS

Newsmen

Tad Szulc New York Times

Dan Morgan Washington Post

Charles Fenyvesi Jerusalem Post and Near East Review

Robert Goralski NBC

US Specialists

Dr. Eli Ginsberg

Dr. Herbert Kufner

Cases Brought to Our Attention by Members of Congress

Mr. and Mrs. Sam Zuckerman

Mr. Moses Levin (Joint Distribution Committee)


Barnice Feedor (Catholic nun) and mother

Mr. Paul Puczek (brother dying in Poland)

Groups Refused

Nikolais Dance Group - refused although Polish Government had asked our Embassy's assistance in obtaining them. Refused on "political grounds."

American Society of Homebuilders - group of 40 people, visas given to all but two. Those two had names which might have indicated Jewish origin.



INFORMATION

-SECRET-

Thursday, April 25, 1968 - 1:10 pm

Mr. President:

You may wish to see Chip Behlen's reaction to Paris as a possible site for the initial "centacts."

It is Sec. Rush's instinct that the initial contacts may in fact stretch into the "substantive" talks.

If that judgment is correct, it bears on Behlen's assessment somewhat.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-283 By ica, NARA Date 4-30-98

WWRostow:rln

Prentile



-SECRET/NODIS

April 23, 1968

MUDUALORANDUM

TO:

The Secretary

THROUGH:

S/S SUR

FROM:

G - Charles E. Boalen Cars.

SUBSECT:

Paris 13000 on Sito for Victor Talks

I have seen Paris telegran in regard to the objections to Paris as a possible site for the mostings. While I understand and sympathics with many of the views empressed by Wallner (I might have been disposed to send the came thing if I had been in Paris), I think two things might porhaps be made apparent to him in any reply which we cond:

- 1. If Paris is proposed we would have no rescurse but to accept because of public opinion both here and cbroad.
- 2.0 It should be made clear that what we have in mind is only the preliminary meeting and not the substantivo diceucciono.

Most of the Paris objections would seen to us to relate much more to the substantive discussion phase and only partially to the initial contact.

Do Gaulle's proceige I don't think would be materially cohenced by having the preliminary meeting in Paris nor would the possibility of French interference be very importent during this phase.

I den't know what the President's views on Paris are, , but I think it might be worthwhile pointing out to him that most of the Paris objections really apply to the suboccartive phase and not to the preliminary contact.

ce: Mr. Horriman

Mr. Dundy

G: CEBohlen: cm

SECRET/HODES

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3,6 NLJ 97-280 By Cb NARA Date 7-23-99 Thursday, Apr. 25, 1968 11:45 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

For the UN: what about

David Bruce?

W. W. Rostow

Thurs., April 25, 1968 11:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, as requested, a letter to Pete Hart.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

28 Partile

Dear Pete:

I appreciated greatly your warm letter of April 12.

The struggle for unity, responsibility, and effective consensus is never-ending in a democracy such as ours. It is the other side of the freedoms we enjoy.

And those of us who have chosen a life of public service must do more in this respect than others.

Your understanding and support will be a source of strength in the months ahead.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

Honorable Parker T. Hart American Ambassador Ankara, Turkey

LBJ:WWR:mz

186

Ankara, Turkey April 12, 1968

The President

The White House

Dear Mr. President:

As one who has been honored by you with appointment to important responsibilities, I wish to express my admiration for your statesmanlike action in sacrificing the opportunity to continue in the world's highest political office. You have done so to help bring an end to the divisiveness which wracks our own society and to enable you to concentrate completely on our perplexing social problems and on bringing the war in Viet Nam to an honorable and successful conclusion. Your example of putting country before self has profoundly touched my colleagues in this Embassy as it has affected my family and me. Among Turks of every level with whom I have talked what you have done has produced a renewed appreciation of the sincerity with which our country under your guidance is endeavoring to resolve difficulties at home and abroad.

We all pray for your continued good health and the success of your leadership.

Faithfully yours.

Parker T. Hart

Ambassador.

ACTION

TOP SECRET CODEWORD

Thursday, April 25, 1968 -- 9:45 a.m.

Preste

Mr. President:

This is a new all-source special daily CIA intelligence bulletin. It has an informative table of contents; and I have marked the key passages so that you may go through it quickly.

Would you like to have it sent to you regularly?

you___ No___

Or, are you sufficiently supplied with intelligence information?

Yes___ No___

W. W. Rootew

-TOP SEGRET-

Cy 2, 25 April 1968 CIB, COMINT

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ/RAC 00-325 By com, NARA, Date 12-10-01

WWRostow:rln

80

2. Preside

-CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday - April 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Invitation to Costa Rican President Trejos

Herewith a memorandum from Under Secretary Katzenbach recommending that you invite President Trejos to make an official visit in June.

This would be a substitute visit, by a Latin American, for that of President Lleras of Colombia who had to postpone his May foreign trips.

President Suharto has cancelled his visit to Washington on Wednesday and Thursday, June 5 and 6. These dates are open on your schedule and Mrs. Johnson's, and could be used for the Trejos visit.

Trejos is a good selection, as the Under Secretary explains. I recommend approval.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment - Katzenbach memo

| Approve Trejos visit for June 5 - 6 | / |
|--|---|
| Disapprove | |
| Call me | |

cc - Jim Jones Lou Schwartz White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By Ag., NARA, Date 5-22-92

DECLASSIFIED



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

80a

April 15, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Invitation to President Trejos of

Costa Rica to Visit Washington in

June

Recommendation:

That you invite President Trejos of Costa Rica to make an Official Visit to Washington, June, 1968.

| Approve | Disapprove |
|---------|------------|
|---------|------------|

Discussion:

President Carlos Lleras Restrepo of Colombia has regretted your invitation to visit Washington May 1-2 in order to remain in Bogota to press for crucial constitutional reform measures currently before the Colombian Congress. He has also publicly announced the cancellation of his proposed trip to Europe.

You recently asked Covey Oliver to recommend to you more leaders of the hemisphere for visits to Washington. In light of restrictions of time and budget, we will be sending, subsequently, additional recommendations for the first half of FY 1969. But I suggest that we now be authorized to invite President Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez of Costa Rica for a mutually convenient date in June.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-280 By Cb , NARA Date 7-33-98 Under the leadership of President Trejos, Costa Rica has taken important steps to promote social and economic development. Costa Rica boasts the region's highest literacy rate and maintains public order without a military establishment. A strong friend of the United States, the Costa Rican Government acted decisively with other Central American governments to break the logjam during the February election of Galo Plaza Lasso as Secretary General of the OAS. Covey was in Costa Rica in January and was impressed by the competence of President Trejos and his team of economic experts.

Malle det ilyl

Under Secretary

Thursday, April 25, 1968 Profit

Mr. President:

I thought you'd want to know that a stormy chapter has quietly closed in the Congo. Yesterday morning, under an OAU deal with the Red Cross, the 120 white mercenaries interned in Rwanda were finally evacuated to Europe. They flew out in two chartered planes -- one to Belgium, the other to Switzerland with a stop in Italy.

We don't know all the details of the evacuation. Our people stayed strictly out of the way while the Africans bargained with the Red Cross. But it's been plain for weeks that everybody concerned, including Mobutu, was tired of haggling and just wanted to be done with it.

You may recall that the sticking point was the Congolese demand for some assurance from the parent countries (mainly Belgium, France, and South Africa) that the mercenaries wouldn't return. Mobutu apparently got some vague promises to this effect and let it go at that.

The job now is to get the Congolese back to serious business in development. No one is betting we've seen the last of these mercenary adventures or that Mobutu will have an easy time holding the country together even without outside interference. But at least we've bought some more time; for the Congo, that's worth celebrating.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

Thursday - April 25, 1968

Mr. President:

Printelle

Sometimes The New York Times gives us a fair shake as in the attached article summing up the Dominican situation on the third analysisary of the 1965 revolt.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

NYTimes article out of Santo Deminge, April 21. (by Henry Giniger -"Economic Gains Are Bolstering Optimism in Dominican Republic")

Ecc omic Gains Are Bolster g Optimism in Dominican Republic

By HENRY GINIGER Special to The New York Times

can Republic, April 21 - The States aid in direct loans and Dominican economy is stronger grants and in food has thought possible in the worst days of disruption and paralysis that followed the revolt of 1965. 1965.

ments, under way or projected, ary support mainly designed to rising agricultural production and exports, improved finances and increased confidence in the country's ability to main-had a double effect of helping tain peace and stability have production and of covering the all contributed to optimism deficits in the country's balhere,

But the optimism is tempered by the fact that the political ence between total income from basis for steady economic progress is still fragile. And no ments abroad. body is sure that there is time for the Government to act effectively.

Joaquin Balaguer.

There are no reliable statisforce has no steady work. The situation is made more urgent by the age distribution of the population. About half of the population. Dominicans are

mouths to feed are serious.

No Miracles Overnight

For an editor, this is pre-cisely the problem. "How pa-tient will all these young people be?" he asks.

an effective appeal to youth. Young people have tended to Young people have tended to more diversified plantings embrace the extremes, except financed in great part by the for those who follow the ban- United States. ner of the Dominican version of the Christian Democratic

what President Balaguer is try-ing to do, with help from the Santiago de los Caballeros, the United States. After the United country's second largest city. States intervened militarily to date in Latin America. From in prospect.

SANTO DOMINGO, Domini-April, 1965, to date United

been the shift of United States New construction and invest- assistance from direct budgetance of payments, the difference between total income from

Export Earnings Rise

or the Government to act ef-ectively.

Steady improvement in sugar production, the Dominican Re-public's main export crop, plus most of the Caribbean coun-ventures into new crops such tries, is afflicted with an acute as fruits and vegetables, have unemployment problem. This is the country's most serious export earnings although not problem, according to President to the point where it can yet pay its way.

President Balaguer said in an tics, but between a quarter and interview that it would be "an a half of the country's labor ideal situation" if the Dominipopulation. About half of the four million Dominicans are under 20.

The population is increasing at the rate 3.6 per cent a year. The implications of this in terms of jobs to provide and te is unable to meet.

The country has had bad luck "Progress is a slow thing," a banker said. "You can't work miracles overnight." with less than normal rainfall over the last three years. Last year the situation reached year the situation reached drought proportions and Santo Domingo has had to ration its e be?" he asks.

There is a strong belief that tion has been maintained and the Government has not made even improved despite this, thanks to better technology and

Project in Final Phase

edge that holding a middle pressed great hope for a major hydroelcetric and irrigation public is extremely difficult Holding a middle ground is northern Cibao area, a densely

The project is designed in its head off what it thought might final phase to supply 80,000 become a Communist takeover, kilowatts of electricity for init introduced major aid pro-grams, hoping these would help bring about a moderate politi-initial loan of \$22.9-million has cal solution. In proportion to been contracted with the Interthe country's size, the pro-grams have been the biggest to and United States help is also



Thursday, April 25, 1968

Prestile

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a routine thank-you to President Kaunda of Zambia. Kaunda sent you a set of new Zambian coins.

W. W. Rostow

| Approve message | |
|-----------------|---|
| Disapprove | _ |
| Call me | |

Proposed Message to President Kaunda of Zambia

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for sending me a set of Zambia's new coins. I shall treasure them as another mark of the progressive nation was you and your people are building With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

WWR:EKH:RM:lw

att: File #888

Mr. Rostow 84
Presfile

SECRET

Thursday, April 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Late Note Before You See John McCloy at 11:45 a.m.

When John McCloy saw King Hussein during his recent trip, Hussein was discouraged about our arms program. At that time, he had asked for certain items to be airlifted, and McCloy may raise this with you.

Paul Nitze has just agreed to a total of 13 flights to Jordan. The first 3 of these will simply be regular US military supply flights into Jordan which, among other material for our people, will also carry some communications and other such logistical equipment included in the Jordanian package. Then there will be 10 special flights, at Jordan's expense, beginning in 2-3 weeks and carrying such things as jeeps and recoilless rifles.

This action partly takes care of Hussein's complaint to McCloy. However, his main concern was discouragement over delays by Israel and Nasser in getting peace talks started. I'm sure he wishes we could lean harder on Israel.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-283 By ics, NARA Date 4-30-98

SECRET

INFORMATION

SEGRET

Wednesday, April 24, 1968 -- 6:15 p.m.

Prentile

Mr. President:

Herewith Wallner in Paris describes working level view at the French Fereign Office; namely. their belief that the U.S. "Is not opposed to Paris." From the context, it appears that they derive this mainly from U Thant's initiative.

Although Goldberg informed U Thant of our view, the attached (Tab A) statement by the Secretary General of today indicates that he is still pushing Paris.

At Tab B is the outgoing cable on Bucharest you wished to see.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-283 By ics , NARA Date 4-30.98

-SECRET-



Department of State

TELLGRAM

(١)

SECRET.

1968 APR 24 PM 3 35

DE RUPNOR 13051 1151935 ZTY SESES R 241707Z APR 68 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO SECSTATE WASHDO STATE GRNC BT SE O R E T PARIS 13051

Rostow

NODIS Crocodile

REF: STATE 149634 AND 149365

SUBJ: POSSIBILITY OF PARIS AS SITE FOR US-DRV CONTACT

1. AT A TINE WHEN FRENCH INFORMATION NEDIA ARE ACTIVELY SPECU-LATING ON PARIS AS LIKELY COMPROMISE SITE FOR INITIAL US-DRV CONTACT, DEPT SHOULD KNOW THAT WORKING LEVEL AT QUAI--AS OF APRIL 23--BELIEVED USG IS NOT OPPOSED TO PARIS AS SITE FOR THESE TALKS. THIS WAS EMBOFF'S DISTINCT IMPRESSION WHEN HE TALKED THAT DAY TO JEAN BRETHES, QUAI'S INDOCHINA CHIEF, SHORTLY BEFORE U THANT TRANSITED PARIS ON HIS WAY BACK FROM TEHERAN, WITHOUT RE-

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 13091 S-E O R E-T

VEALING INFO SET FORTH REFTELS, EMBOFF ASKED BREINES WHAT HE CONSIDERED CHANCES OF PARIS AS SITE FOR INITIAL US-DRV CONTACT, BRETKES:
REPLIED THAT THIS DEPENDS ON HANOI BECAUSE FRENCH UNDERSTAND WASHINGTON WOULD AGREE TO PARIS AS SITE IF PROPOSED BY THIRD PARTY
AND ACCEPTED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE, AS RESULT OF CONVERSATION WITH
BRETHES, ENBOFF PIECED TOGETHER WHAT HE UNDERSTANDS MAY HAVE BEEN
LAST WEEK'S SCENARIO: LAST WEEK U THANT HAD ASKED AMBASSADOR
BERARD TO PROBE POSSIBILITY OF PARIS AS SITE WITH FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND WITH MAI VAN BO. AS A RESULT OF THIS INQUIRY, COUVE DE
MURVILLE MADE STATEMENT BEFORE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE OF
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OFFERING PARIS AS SITE PROVEDED BOTH SIDES
AGREE. IN SAME STATEMENT COUVE STRESSED THAT FRANCE IS NOT TAKING
INITIATIVE IN THIS MATTER (PARIS 12776). APPARENTLY FRENCH ALSO
TRANSMITTED U THANT'S QUERY TO BO WHO IN TURN PASSED ON SOUNDING
TO HANOI. FRENCH IN PARIS OPERATING ON UNDERSTANDING, AS BRETHES
PHRASED IT, THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON WAS CONCERNED OVER DELAYS IN
GETTING TALKS STARTED AND WANTED PROMPT AGREEMENT ON VENUE. FURTHER, WHILE US MAY HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT PARIS IT WOULD AGREE

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3:6 NLJ 97-280 By 66 , NARA Date 7-23-99

-2- PARIS 13051, APRIL 24

TO FRENCH CAPITAL AS SITE FOR INITIAL CONTACT PROVIDED HANDI AUSO AGREES AND SUGGESTION IS MADE BY THIRD PARTY. IN REPLY TO EMBOFF'S

PAGE 3 RUFNER 13051 B-B G-R B-T
QUITTY WHITHER FRENCH HAD RECEIVED ANY SUBSEQUENT MESSAGES FROM
THEIR REPS IN NEW YORK OR WASHINGTON TO EFFECT THAT US CONSIDERED
PARIS UNACCEPTABLE, BRETHES REPLIED NEGATIVELY ADDING THAT FRENCH
IN NEW YORK HAD MERELY BEEN TOLD IN ADVANCE BY U THANT THAT PARIS
WOULD NOT BE ON-LIST OF SITES WHICH WAS ISSUED WASHINGTON APRIL—
18.

2. AS FOR MANOI'S REACTION TO PARIS AS A POSSIBLE SITE, BRETHES SAID THAT AS OF NOON APRIL 23, MAI VAN BO HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS GOVERNMENT. THIS, BRETHES THOUGHT, EXPLAINED WHY BO DID NOT SEE U THANT IN PARIS EITHER ON APRIL 28 OR APRIL 23. BRETHES NOTED THAT DIRING LAST 5 TO 6 DAYS 80 HAD NOT BEEN AT QUAL AS OFTEN AS USUAL AND IN HIS CONTACT WITH QUAL OFFICIALS HAD BEEN MORE RESERVED. THIS, BRETHES OPINED, MAY REFLECT FACT THAT BO HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS FROM HANOI AND SINCE BO HAD PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED PERSONAL PREFERENCE FOR PARIS IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS, BO PREFERRED TO TAKE HIS DISTANCE UNTIL HE RECEIVED WORD FROM HIS GOVERNMENT. BRETHES SAID HE HAD NO INDICATION WHEN THIS MAY BE AND AS FAR AS HE CAN SEE, NORTH VIETNAMESE APPEAR STILL TO PREFER WARSAM OR PHOOM PENH.

PAGE A RUFNCR 13051 S E C R E T

3. FINALLY, BRETHES SAID IT IS HIS IMPRESSION US NOT RPT NOT/
COUNTING MAINLY ON U THANT TO HELP FIND SOLUTION TO SITE PROBLEM
AND WHILE PARIS REMAINS A POSSIBILITY, OTHER CITIES-EVEN SOME FRENCH CAPITAL.

A. COMMENT: TO PROTECT OUR CONTACTS HERE WITH QUAL OFFICIALS IT IS INPORTANT THAT NO RPT NO REFERENCE BE MADE TO BRETHES AS SOURCE THIS INFO.

GP-3. WALLNER

-CECRET

856

UN BRIEFING APRIL 24, 1968 Rostow

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL

Three weeks have elapsed since agreement has been reached between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to hold preliminary talks. Taking into account the considerations publicly advanced by both sides regarding the selection of a venue for such talks, it seems to me that the range of choice has now narrowed down to a few cities. Among these in my views Warsaw and Paris? could be regarded as suitable sites. While I am not aware of any new developments in this regard it is distressingly clear to me that meanwhile the war has been raging unabated. Bombing raids above the 17th Parallel in the past week were reported to be more intensive than ever before although the area of bombing is more limited. There are signs that fighting in the South will increase in intensity. Such a situation is far from propitious for meaningful proliminary talks and I would fervently appeal to all parties directly involved in the war to endeavor to create a more favorable atmosphere. I also appeal to Washington and Hanoi to agree without delay on the venue for the preliminary talks.

CO222 24 15 6 500

THE CHARLE

Tet A

oursons telegram Department of State

INDICATE SECOND Cicaren 10

SHOREY Classification

ACTION:

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

TYAKCEMMI Amembassy CANBERRA

AmEmbassy MANILA

Amembassy SEOUL

Amembassy Wellington

for Clearaine

NFO:

Amembassy SAIGON

NODIS/CROCODILE

. This has to do with our 150004 on the subject of Bucharest as a possible tite for contact with Hanoi. We believe we must prepare ourselves. brough consultations, for contingency that some third party (or even Hanoi) night come up with Bucharest as a possible site. We have taken no nitiative to stimulate this ourselves at this point. Embassy Saigon has discussed the mutter with President Thieu. He said it would be Romania "inconvenient" in that Isomexis was a Communist country, but if no better sate could be agreed upon he was prepared to go along. They also said that if Bucharest was the site he would not attach a liaison team to the US Delegation but would only send one person, without publicity, to maintain liaison. Thieu indicated he did not wish to have GVN appear is a delegation which is not participating in the talks, thus making clear that the first talks were solely between US and Hand.

2. You should now proceed to discuss Bucharest as a possible site at blohest appropriate level your host government, stressing necessity for absolute secreey. For Manila this should be Marcos and for Seoul ou should give our thinking on the subject in accordance with

RA:PCHablb;hih 4/24 x

2030

which spands LY-The Secretary

EA - Wr. Bundy

S/S-

White House - Mr. Rostow S/AH-Gov. Harrimage

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

Classification

NLJ 97-28D

, NARA Date 7-23-99

Jak B

BLFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/TIAL Room 6243

| Page 2 _ of telegram | to |
|----------------------|----------------|
| | -BECKING |
| | Classification |

discussion contained our 150664. You can indicate that the matter has been discussed with Thieu and that he would be willing to see contacts hold in Bucharest in circumstances where no better site is forthcoming.

3. On question of liaison at site we would prefer to limit this as much as possible. Thieu has made clear he does not wish to exaggerate liaison delegation in contact phase and we would hope that this would set example for others, particularly Thais and Koreans. We would intend to maintain major consultative channel through our Embassies in the TCC capitals, with Washington as possible alternative place for detailed discussion. Please inform us of reaction to Bucharest possibility and report any indications of attitude toward question of liaison at contact site.

END

GP-1

ACTION

Mr. Rostow 86

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Wednesday, April 24, 1968

5.15 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Short Message to King Hussein

King Hussein's wife gave birth late yesterday to twin daughters. State recommends the following message:

"Your Majesty: My heartiest congratulations on the birth of your twin daughters. I know they will lighten your days and I send our best wishes to you and your family at this happy time."

W. W. Rostow

| Approve_ | E | _4 | 125 | 68 |
|-----------|---|----|-----|----|
| Disapprov | e | | | |

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SECRET

Wednesday, April 24, 1968 5:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read this truly remarkable letter from Bourguiba to He Chi Minh.

W. W. Rostow

Tunis 4101 (2 sections)

SECRET

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By M., NARA, Date 578 972

WWRostow:rln

Pres file





SECRET 736

PAGE 01 TUNIS 04104 01 OF 02 241751Z

3

ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

Rutar

R 241220Z APR 68 FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5172

SECRET SECTION | OF 2 TUNIS 4104/1

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ncg 91-259

By Golng, NARA, Date 5-26

EXDIS

SUBJECT: BOURGUIBA LETJER TO HO CHI MINH

FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TRANSLATION HANDED TO ME BY FOREIGN MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA'S MESSAGE OF MARCH 20 TO PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH (UNNECESSARY WORDS OMITTED). FULL TEXT OF FRENCH ORIGINAL AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION BEING POUCHED.

"MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

PAGE 2 PUDKKR 4TE4/I SECKET

"YOU AND I ARE ELDERS OF THIS HANDFUL OF MEN WHO HAVE DEVOTED LIVES TO LIBERATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF THEIR COUNTRIES.

OUR STRUGGLE HAS BEEN ALMOST AS LONG AS THIS CENTURY AND HAS NOT YET ENDED BECAUSE OUR IDEAL, REESTABLISHMENT OUR COUNTRIES IN INDEPENDENCE AND DIGNITY AS WELL AS EMANCIPATION OF OTHER PEOPLES OF THIRD WORLD, NOT YET ACHIEVED. YOU AND I, MR. PRESIDENT, HAVE SOUGHT THIS IDEAL TAKING GREATEST ACCOUNT OF REALITIES: GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OUR COUNTRIES, SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC LEVEL OUR PEOPLES AND INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF POWER. THIS, NO DOUBT, IS REASON WHY, HAVING MADE PROGRESS TOWARDS OUR OBJECTIVE THROSH WAYS SO DIVERGENT, WE GIVE IMPRESSION OF BEING IN OPPOSITE CAMPS.

"FALSE IMPRESSION, OF COURSE: FOR EACH OF US HAS"
PRESERVED ESSENTIAL: HIS INDEPENDENCE AND RESPECT HE HAS
FOR OTHER, AND THAT IS WHY I ADDRESS MYSELF TO YOU AGAIN AS



TELEGRAM

SECRET.

PAGE 02 TUNES 84104 01 0F 02 2417512

ONE FIGHTER TO ANOTHER. LAST YEAR, ON OCCASION VIETNAMESE NEW YEAR, I FORMULATED WISH THAT NEW YEAR SEE AT LAST RESTORATION PEACE IN YOUR COUNTRY AND END TO SUFFERINGS OF VN PEOPLE.

PAGE 3 RUDKKR ALGANI G E C R 5 T

"I ADDED: "KNOWING LOFTY PATRIOTIC FEELINGS WHICH HAVE ALWAYS ANIMATED YOU, I TAKE LIBERTY, THIS OCCASION, ADDRESS TO YOU FERVENT APPEAL THAT TET TRUCE BE PRELUDE TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND TO ESTABLISHMENT OF ENDURING PEACE".

"I' AM CONVINCED THAT BEYOND ANY IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATION,
YOU WILL NOT SPARE ANY EFFORT FAVOR AND ENCOURAGE ALL POSSIBILITIES
OF HONORABLE SOLUTION".

"NEGOTIATION CONSTITUES ONLY WAY LIKELY TO PUT END TO SUFFERINGS OF VN PEOPLE, RESTORE PEACE TO VN AND PRESERVE SECURITY SOUTH EAST ASIA AND WORLD".

"I THINK I EIND MEANING OF YOUR STRUGGLE AND FEELINGS WHICH ANIMATE YOU SUMMED UP IN ANSWER YOU WERE KIND ENOUGH TO SEND ME ON TWENTY-THIRD OF FEBRUARY 1967. I HAVE STUDIED HISTORY YOUR PEOPLE AND KNOW THEIR EXCEPTIONAL ENDURANCE AND GREAT LOVE OF LIBERTY. I ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHAT GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION.

PAGE 4 RUDKKR 410471 3 E C R E T

"I ALSO KNOW USA, MEN WHO GOVERN THAT COUNTRY, THEIR
PSYCHOLOGY AND THEIR IMPERATIVES OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
POLICIES. I FORGET NEIGHER AMERICAN REVOLUTION, NOR GENEROUS,
EMANCIPATING AND UNIVERSALIST IDEAS WHICH USA DEFENDED JUST
AFTER FIRST WORLD WAR, NOR EMINENT ROLE WHICH THEY PLAYED IN
LAST GREAT WAR WHEN PRINCIPAL HUMAN VALUES WHICH MAKE UP PRICE
OF LIFE SEEMED ON VERGE BEING SUBMERGED BY MERCILESS BARBARISM
OF NAZIS AND JAPANESE WARLORDS. I CANNOT FORGET EITHER THAT,
EVEN MORE-RECENTLY, USA HAS PLAYED DECISIVE ROLE INTERVENING
WITH OWN ALLIES TO EAVOR DECOLONIZATION OF GREAT NUMBER OF PEOPLES



TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 TUNIS 04104 01 05-02 24:75-Z

OF AFRICA AND ASIA.

"IT SEEMS TO ME ONE CANNOT FORGET THIS FUNDAMENTAL FACT

"TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION ALL THAT AND WHERE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM STANDS, TAKING ALSO INTO ACCOUNT STATE OF WORLD AND AMERICAN OPINION, I DEEM IT MANDATORY, TODAY MORE THAN EVER BEFORE, TO SPARE NO EFFORT TO SEEK HONORABLE POLITICAL WAY OUT OF CONFLICT WHICH IS DEVASTATING

PAGE 5 RUDKKR 4:04/1 C E C R E T

VIETNAM. IN MILITARY FIELD, PARTIAL VICTORIES ARE POSSIBLE: BUT, TOTAL VICTORY IS NOT. /I KNOW, OF COURSE, SOME CONSIDER MILITARY OPERATIONS AS ONE OF ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR WHICH, IF IT LASTS TOO LONG WITHOUT DECISIVE RESULTS, CAN LEAD AVERAGE AMERICAN TO WEARINESS AND HIS GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE TO ABANDON CONTEST.

" ONE SHOULD FEAR - AND A RESPONSIBLE LEADER OUGHT TO ENVISAGE THIS POSSIBILITY - THAT SUCH A CALCULATION MIGHT NOT PROVE RIGHT. REASONING BY ANALOGY IS NOT ALWAYS CORRECT. REACTIONS OF A GREAT PEOPLE ARE NOT EASILY PREDICTIBLE, AND NO MATTER WHAT ONE SAYS, HISTORY DOES NOT REPEAT ITSELF.

"I. FOR ONE, WOULD ADD THAT VICTORY ACHIEVED IN SUCH CONDITIONS, OVER "PAPER TIGER" AMERICA, WILL BE NEITHER IN INTEREST OF WORLD WHOSE BALANCE WOULD BE UPSET NOR IN THAT OF THE VN PEOPLE WHO WOULD HAVE WON VICTORY BUT ACHIEVED NEITHER INDEPENDENCE NOR PEACE.

"FOR, IT IS OBVIOUS, THAT WAR OF VN HAS NOW AS A STAKE SOMETHING WHICH GOES BEYOND VIETNAM ITSELF. YOU ARE, MR.

PAGE 6 RUDKKR 4:04/1-0 E-C-R-E-T

PRESIDENT IN BETTER POSITION THAN ANYBODY ELSE TO FEEL INTER-FERENCES OF THE CLASSICAL COLD WAR BETWEEN USSR AND USA COMPLICATED BY IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL CONFLICT WHICH OPPOSES RED CHINA TO



TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 04 TUNES 04104 01 05 02 24:75:2

USSR .

"UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HIGHER INTEREST OF VN, CONCERN TO PRESERVE ITS INDEPENDENCE FOR TODAY AND TOMORROW, IMPERATIVE TO SPARE ITS YOUTH SO AS TO SET IT TO TASKS OF RECONSTRUCTION, NECESSITY TO KEEP OPEN DOOR OF COOPERATION WITH ALL GREAT POWERS, ALL THESE CONSIDERATIONS S. MILITATE IN FAVOR OF EARLY POLITICAL SOLUTION WHICH CAN ONLY RESULT FROM NEGOTIATION WITHOUT HUMILIATING PRECONDITIONS LIKELY TO BE PRESENTED AS CAPITULATION.

"I FEAR IHAL WITH OTHER STATESMEN, IF PROCESSIOF NEGOTIATION NOT STARTED WITHIN NEXT FEW WEEKS, GREATER MISFORTUNES BEFALL VN AND SEA. I EVEN FEAR PRESENT WORLD EQUILIBRIUM - WHICH I RECOGNIZE IS AT TIMES UNJUST AND RESTRAINING FOR SOME COUNTRIES BUT WHICH HAS MERIT OF EXISTING AND BEING ONE OF BASES ON WHICH WORLD PEACE RESTS - WOULD BE URSET. I REAR WIDER CONFRONTATION WHICH WOULD SOON BECOME RUSSELL



TELEGRAM

SECRET 627

PAGE 01 TUNIS 04104 02 OF 02 241608Z

03

42 ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 241220Z APR 68 FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5173

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 TUNIS 4104/2

EXDIS

SUBJECT: BOURGUIBA LETTER TO HO CHI MINH

UNCONTROLLABLE AND IN-WHICH SMALL COUNTRIES . YOURS AS WELL AS MINE - WOULD LOSE THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND MANKIND MOST OF ITS ACHIEVEMENTS.

"YOU ARE, MR. PRESIDENT, RESPECTED DEAN OF CHIEFS OF STATE OF THIRD WORLD. ALL THROUGH YOUR LONG CAREER YOU HAVE SHOWN, MORE THAN ONCE, YOU KNOW HOW NOT TO GO TOO FAR. TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION PSYCHOLOGY OF ADVERSARY, TO ACCEPT COMPRIMISE EVEN THOUGH ALL OF ONE'S OBJECTIVES NOT YET REACHED, TO AIM BEYOND WAR AT COOPERATION, TO BASE INDEPENDENCE ON

PAGE 2 PUDKKRA4184/2 S E G P E T

STRENGTH OF INTERNAL FRONT BUT ALSO ON BALANCE BETWEEN EXTERNAL GREAT POWERS, THAT IS DIFFICULT COURSE WHICH YOU AND I HAVE TRODEN AND WHICH, IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS, HAS YIELDED CONCLUSIVE RESULTS.

"AIM TODAY SHOULD BE TO INSURE, FOR PREDICTABLE FUTURE, SECURITY OF NYN, INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH AND POSSIBILITY THAT BOTH THESE COUNTRIES MAY ONE DAY REUNITE THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS. ONE SHOULD ALSO, I THINK, SEE TO IT THAT NO GREAT POWER COULD EXTEND HEGEMONY OVER NORTH AND SOUTH AND THUS DISRUFT LOUILIBRIUM OF THE WORLD.

"COUNTRIES NEIGHBORING VIETNAM SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECTED

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 TUNIS 04104 02 OF 02-24:6082

TO-PRESSURES LIKELY TO UPSET SITUATION PREVAILING IN REGION.

"IT APPEARS TO ME THESE OBJECTIVES ARE REASONABLE AND ACCEPTABLE TO YOURSELF, TO ALL VIETNAMESE OF SOUTH AND OF NORTH WHO CARE FIRST ABOUT INDEPENDENCE THEIR COUNTRY, AS WELL AS

TO USA. ALL I KNOW ABOUT YOU, DECLARATIONS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THOSE OF FNL LEADERS, ALL I KNOW ABOUT AMERICAN LEADERS AND THEIR DECLARATIONS AUTHORIZE ME TO THINK THAT CONDITIONS FOR FRUITFUL NEGOTIATIONEXIST TODAY ON THESE BASES.

RAGE S RUDKKR 4184/2 6 E C R E-T

"IT IS OBVIOUS THAT US AND OTHER GREAT POWERS HAVE HOPED TO CONTROL NORTH OR SOUTH OF VIETNAM TO PREVENT IT FROM FALLING UNDER CONTROL OR INFLUENCE OF OTHER GREAT POWERS. TODAY, ONE MAY HOPE THAT AN INDEPENDENT VN, FREE FROM ALL FOREIGN OCCUPATION, WOULD BE FOR THESE POWERS, ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION BECAUSE IT DOES NOT UPSET EQUILIBRIUM TO WHICH THEY ARE ATTACHED.

"I FEEL THAT BY CONTINUING WAR ONE CANNOT ATTAIN ANY
OTHER OBJECTIVE. CONSEQUENTLY, ONE SHOULD, WITHOUT LOSING
ONE MORE DAY, ENTER INTO NEGOTIATION. QUESTIONS OF PROCEDURE
BECOME SECONDARY EVEN IF THEY PRESENT IMPORTANT MORAL ASPECT.

"WAR LIKE ONE WHICH TAKING PLACE IN YOUR COUNTRY CAN ONLY END THROUGH NEGOTIATION, AND NEGOTIATION MEANS RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS AND ACCEPTANCE BY EACH OF PARTIES TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT HONOR, SELF RESPECT AND IMPERATIVES OF OTHER. IF SUCH IS ALSO YOURFEELING AND THAT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT, WOULD IT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO PUT LESS EMPHASIS ON THAT WHICH IS AFTER ALL SECONDARY - THE CONDITIONS OF NEGOTIATIONS - AND MORE ON THAT WHICH IS ESSENTIAL: THEIR CONTENT?

PAGE TRUDKKR TOMAS C E C R E J

SECREI



TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 03 TUNES 04-104 02 OF 02 24:6082

"NOW THAT USA RE-EXAMINING ITS VN POLICY, SUCH ATTITUDE, IF IT APPEARS POSSIBLE TO YOU, COULD PAY OFF. IT COULD NOT ONLY DISPEL IMPRESSION WIDESPREAD IN WORLD - EVEN AMONG YOUR FRIENDS - THAT YOUR WAR OBJECTIVES INCLUDE HUMILIATION OF ADVERSARY, BUT ALSO THAW SITUATION BY MAKING POSSIBLE PRENEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD BRIDGE GAP BETWEEN WAR OBJECTIVES OF PARTIES.

"I CONSIDER MYSELF YOUR EVERLASTING FRIEND AND THAT OF YOUR COUNTRY OF WHICH I APPRECIATE THE TRIALS. I HAVE SOME CREDIT IN US WHERE I INTEND TO GO NEXT MAY. ALL MY LIFE, I HAVE FOUGHT FOR DIGNITY OF MEN AND COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONS.

"WITHOUT SEEKING ANY MEDIATION ROLE OF WHICH I HAVE NO NEED,
I FEEL CONCERNED FOR FATE OF EACH OF PEOPLE OF THIRD WORLD
AND FOR PEACE WHICH, TO MY MIND, IS INSEPARABLE FROM INDEPENDENCE
OF EACH COUNTRY AND AT SAME TIME FROM EQUILIBRIUM OF WORLD.

"I HAVE ALWAYS THOUGHTTHAT INTEREST OF OUR COUNTRIES AND REQUIREMENTS OUR TIMES MAKE IT OBLIGATION FOR US TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT EQUILIBRIUM AND TO PURSUE, IN ORDER TO IMPROVE IT, A POLICY OF DETENTE, ENTENTE AND COOPERATION"

PACE 5 RUDKKA +104/2 S E-C R E-T

PARTICULARLY WITH ALL GREAT POWERS. IF THAT EQUILIBRIUM WERE TO BE UPSET IN FAVOR OF SINGLE POWER AS CONSEQUENCE OF TEST OF STRENGTH WHICH INEVITABLY PUTS AT STAKE SELF-RESPECT OF ONE OF OTHERS, WOULD NOT VN BE ITSELF FIRST VICTIM?

"THAT IS WHAT LEADS ME, AFTER DEEP THOUGHT, TO SEND YOU THIS MESSAGE, MR. PRESIDENT, AND WISH RECEIVE YOUR OWN ANALYSIS. IF YOU WERE TO SHARE MY VIEW, I COULD THEN UNDERTAKE, IN NAME OF TUNISIA OR AT LEVEL OF DAU, ANY ACTION LIKELY CONTRIBUTE TO PREVENTING WAR FROM CONTINUING TO BE ONLY POLICY.

"FOR THAT, BOMBING OF YOUR COUNTRY SHOULD, OF COURSE,
END: BUT IT IS EQUALLY NECESSARY THAT FORMULA FOR SELF-DETERMINATION OF SVN AND FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BE PUT FORWARD
WHICH WOULD SPARE INTERESTS INVOLVED, TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE
COMMITMENTS TAKEN, INSURE INDEPENDENCE OF COUNTRY ITSELE



TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 04 TUNIS 04104 02 0F 02 241-6062

COOPERATION WITH ALL.

PAGE 6 RUDKKE NIGHT SEE GO FEET

"I AM CONVINCED THAT, IF SUCH FORMULA WERE PUT FORWARD, FIGHTING COULD RAPIDLY STOP AND LONG AND HARD STRUGGLE OF VN PEOPLE CLEAR WAY FOR PERIOD OF CONSTRUCTION AND PEACE, FINAL OBJECTIVE OF THIS STRUGGLE TO WHICH YOUR NAME WILL STAY LINKED.

"AND TO CLOSE ALLOW ME, MR. PRESIDENT, EXTEND BEST WISHES AND BROTHERLY GREETINGS TO YOU AND PEOPLE OF VIETNAM."

GP-1. RUSSELL





P fele

Wednesday, April 24, 1968 2:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is Nick Katasabach's memo informing you that unless you object, he plans to recommend to the Atterney General that a waiver of visa ineligibility be granted to Laurent Schwarts. Schwarts is a well-known French mathematician who is ineligible for a visa because of a former membership in the Tretskyite Party in France.

Schwarts was a member of the first Russell "War Crimes Tribunal" and has strongly criticised U. S. action in Vietnam.

He has been invited by the Chancellor of the University of California to speak at the University's Centennial Celebration at Berkeley May 19-25. He has also been invited to speak on Vietnam by the University's "Faculty Peace Committee."

Katsenbach argues that granting the waiver would be in keeping with our liberal waiver and free speech policy and would create little attention. Denial would magnify the issue and arouse press criticism.

W. W. Rostow

| Approve | - |
|------------|---|
| Disapprove | |
| Call me | |

8.8 a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

April 19, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visa Application of Laurent Schwartz

Laurent Schwartz, a French mathematician of world renown who has come to the US in the past on visa waivers, has been invited by the Chancellor to speak at the Centennial Celebration of the University of California at Berkeley, May 19-25. He has also been invited by the Berkeley "Faculty Peace Committee" to speak on Viet-Nam.

Schwartz is ineligible for a visa because of former membership in the Trotskyite Party in France. He was also a member of the first Russell "War Crimes Tribunal" and is a consistent and outspoken critic of US actions in Viet-Nam. He is reported to have endorsed providing financial assistance to US soldiers deserting in France.

Schwartz' case falls into the category of cases in which we routinely seek a waiver of ineligibility except for his participation in the Russell Tribunal and his proposed talk to the "Faculty Peace Committee." I am persuaded that these facts do not warrant refusal of a waiver in his case.

Granting a waiver would be in keeping with our liberal waiver policy to permit visits to US for legitimate purposes by aliens similarly ineligible. Participation in the Berkeley Centennial is clearly legitimate. And we have, in the past,

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-280 By Cb., NARA Date 7-33-99

-GONFIDENTIAL-

- 2 -

given waivers to alien critics of our policies invited here to speak. Granting of a visa in such cases is rarely noticed but denial always engenders criticism in the press.

Unless you object, I plan to recommend to the Attorney General that a waiver be granted, but that we limit the period of time he may remain in the United States (perhaps to two weeks). I am leaving tomorrow for the CENTO meeting and will delay action on this case until my return April 26.

The Under Secretary

Mallin des Kapet

INFORMATION

89

SECRET -- CROCODILE

Wednesday, April 24, 1968 1:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith some further thoughts of Thieu's about Bucharest.

Pres file

W. W. Restow

Salgen 25548

SECRET

WWRostow:rln

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By Ag., NARA, Date 522-92



#/ TELEGRAM

89a

SECRET

5 9 2 0 Q APRIL 24, 1968_ 11:36 A.M.

OF PUMPIR 2554B 1151100
THY SSSS 77H.
O 241355Z APR 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1339
STATE GRNC
BT
SECRET SAIGON 2554B.

Rostow

NODIS/CROCODILE

REF: STATE 151786

THIS MORNING (APRIL 24) TO MAKE POINTS RAISED REFTEL.

DO SAID HE WAS WELL AMARE OF SENSITIVITY ANY SPECULATION AND HAD MADE IT VERY CLEAR TO KIRK DURING INTERVIEW
THAT HE WAS NOT SUGGESTING PARIS NOR SPECULATING PARIS
MIGHT BE THE SITE. KIRK HAD ASKED DO IF RUMOR THAT
GYN WAS SUGGESTING PARIS WAS TRUE. DO SAID IT WAS NOT.
KIRK THEN ASKED IF GVN WOULD OBJECT TO PARIS, TO WHICH
DO REPLIED IT WOULD NOT. IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER QUESTION FROM KIRK
DO HAD SAID THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM OF SVN ACCESS TO PARIS.
EMBOFF EMPHASIZED TO DO THAT NO BECISION MADE IN WASHINGTON
WHETHER ACCEPT PARIS IF PROPOSED AND THAT WE DOUBT WISDOM

PAGE & RUMJIR 20048 3 B 6 R F. T FAVORABLE SPECULATION ON IT. DO ACCEPTED THIS.

CALLED TO THEE SOFFICE SHORTLY AFTER LATTER'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR BUNKER THIS MORNING. THIEU TOLD DO OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR CONCERNING BUCHAREST AND SAID HE WAS BOTHERED ABOUT THIS. THIEU SAID THAT ACCEPTANCE BUCHAREST WOULD BE INTERPRETED HERE AS "NOT FAIR TO OUR SIDE," RUMANIA IS A COMMUNIST COUNTRY AND ACCEPTANCE OF IT AS SITE FOR TALKS WOULD SEEM TO BE ANOTHER CONCESSION JUST AS THE PARTIAL HALT IN BOMBING WAS. THIEU FEARS THAT THE PEOPLE OF SVN HOULD FEEL THAT THIS PATTERN OF CONCESSIONS MIGHT WELL MEAN MORE CONCESSIONS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES. THUS ACCEPTANCE BUCHAREST MIGHT CAUSE HIM SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS ON HOME FRONT.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-280 By C6 , NARA Date 7-23-99

SECRET

- -2- SAIGON 25548, APRIL 68 (NODIS/CROCODILE)
- 3. THIEU THEN SAID TO DO, THAT HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO PARIS, THAT HE WONDERED IF IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO SUGGEST THIS TO THE OTHER SIDE. ALTHOUGH DO DID NOT INDICATE HIS RESPONSE TO THIEU, HE MADE IT CLEAR TO EMBOFF THAT HE, DO, CONSIDERS HANOI WOULD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO REJECT PARIS. DO SAID THAT IT WOULD

RAGE 3 RUMJIR 25548 S E C R ET EVEN BE DIFFICULT FOR HANOI ULTIMATELY TO FAIL TO SUGGEST PARIS IN THE FACE OF PERSISTENT RUMORS THAT PARIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO USG.

- 4. ALTHOUGH DO PROFESSED NO INTENTION TO FLOAT ANY SUGGESTIONS IN HIS INTERVIEW WITH KIRK, AND ALTHOUGH HE WAS AT PAINS AT VIETNAMESE PRESS CONFERENCE AFTERNOON APRIL 23 (SAISON 25453) TO DENY THAT HE HAD MADE ANY SUCH SUGGESTION, EMBOFF HAD DEFINITE FEELING THAT DO PERSONALLY, AND PROBABLY THIEU, LEAN STRONGLY TOWARD PARIS AND THAT DO NOT DISPLEASED THAT RUMOR THAT GVN FAVORS PARIS HAS BECOME CURRENT.
- 5. DO TOLD EMBOFF THAT DISCUSSIONS ARE MOVING AHEAD WITHIN HIS WORKING GROUP AND THAT HE THOUGHT THIEU WOULD BE READY FOR PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIONS WITH US SIDE EARLY NEXT WEEK. EMBOFF STRESSED THAT FIRST CONSULTATIONS WERE INTENDED TO BE ONLY PRELIMINARY AND HOPED THEY WOULD NOT BE TOO LONG DELAYED.

GP-3

BUNKER

go The file

Wednesday, April 24, 1968 -- 12:42 \$.m.

Mr. President:

Some names for the UN post:

Secretary Freeman John Gardner Governor Meyner Governor Terry Sanford Governor Pat Brown Erwin Miller John Rockefeller

W. W. Rostow

WWR/mjdr

SECRET

Mr. President:

Bus Wheeler's attached summary of what the recent high-level defector had to say (pp. 2 - 5) will interest you.

Key passages marked.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET attachment (log 1388)

DECLASSIFIED Authority NLJ-CBS 2/ By ..., NARS, Date 9-25-84



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

912

CM-3228-68 23 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Press Report on High-ranking NVA Rallier (U)

- l. You have probably read recent press accounts of information provided by "the highest-ranking defector yet to fall into allied hands in South Vietnam." This story was filed by George McArthur of the Associated Press and although MACV J-2 indicates that it is inaccurate in some respects, I am very much concerned over the impact which the knowledge of this man's defection by the enemy may have. This is an extremely serious breach of security and MACV is currently investigating the incident with all available resources to try to determine the source of McArthur's information.
 - 2. The gist of McArthur's story is as follows:
- a. The highest-ranking defector yet to fall into allied hands in South Vietnam has surrendered with enemy plans for a "second wave" of attacks on Saigon involving more than 10,000 troops.
- b. The defector was identified as a North Vietnamese colonel and political commissar from the Viet Cong's Ninth Division, posted northwest of Saigon.
- c. The defector turned up in Binh Duong Province, about 50 miles north of Saigon. He is in his early forties and is known in the Communist party as Tam Ha.
- d. The enemy command originally planned the assault on the capital for 22 April as a follow-up to the Lunar New Year offensive, but undetermined problems caused a delay.

Authority NLJ-CBS 6

By NARS, Date 8-28-84

- e. The attacks on Saigon were to follow the same pattern as those that hit the city during the offensive that began January 31. The attacking forces were to include two regiments from the Ninth Division, two regiments from the Fifth Division east of the city and at least two local guerrilla regiments. These forces have since received new weapons and North Vietnamese replacements.
- f. The Ninth Division was to strike from the northwestern edge of the city, hitting the Tan Son Nhut Airbase, while the Fifth Division came in from the east and the south.
- 3. We do not yet possess sufficient information here in Washington on the results of interrogations of this defector to make a detailed analysis of the accuracy of McArthur's article. However, the following excerpts from interrogations of this rallier may be of interest to you:
- a. The third general offensive will start

b. Participating units and targets:

101st Regiment - north of Tan Son Nhut.

88th Regiment - control the rural area in Phu Hoa Dong, Trung An, Highway 8, Tan Thanh Dong area.

208 Rocket Regiment (122 MM) - shell Tan Son Nhut.

D1 - Phu Dong.

D2 - Joint General Staff.

D3 - Bien Hoa and Binh Loi.

Sapper D - coordinate with Dl and D2.
Source estimates 50 percent of above unit strengths are North Vietnamese.



c. The general direction of attack on Saigon will be from southwest Saigon northeast to Tan Son Nhut Airbase. The third offensive will be nationwide. The signal for the start of the attack is unknown, as is the manner of troop commitment (i.e., piece meal or simultaneous). However, source believes that they will be similar to the Tet offensive, namely rocket attack on Tan Son Nhut to signal start of attack and issuance of warning order letter to commanders on the day prior to the attack.

d. Dac gave the following reasons for failure of the Tet offensive:

- (1) Insufficient time to prepare the troops.
- (2) Lack of artillery/infantry coordination.
- (3) Non-availability of DKB rockets.
- (4) Lack of popular support.

To correct these deficiencies COSVN had directed that for the third offensive:

- Artillery would be reinforced.
- (2) Artillery/infantry coordination would be improved.
- (3) Viet Cong would strive to obtain sufficient ammunition and rockets.
- (4) Military and civilian proselyting would be strengthened.
- e. Dac knew of no new weapons to be used in the offensive. Neither was there to be any armor or air support. Source has heard of no heavy engineer equipment in the area. He heard that flame throwers are to be used from company level up, but he has not seen any.

^{*}The name given by the rallier.

Dac stated the 122 MM rocket would be utilized. Other than the 122 MM rockets, he knew of no weapons larger than 82 MM mortars in the area. He did not know of any AAA positions, and added that the 12.7 MM/12.8 HMG units of the 101st Regiment and the regiment's 82 MM mortars were all destroyed in the recent offensive. The only vehicles utilized in resupply are trucks, locally obtained.

- f. Dac knew of no resupply by water to this area; most of the supplies come from Cambodia. In response to questions on Cambodia, Dac could provide only the following information: the Cambodian Army does not resupply the Viet Cong, although NFLSVN had a representative who conducted liaison with the Cambodian corps commander on the border. Dac did not know of any air traffic between Cambodia and North Vietnam.
- g. Since the recent Tet attacks, the following units have sustained losses:
- (1) 101st Regiment 1,850/KIA and WIA, 800 remaining.
- (2) 1st Battalion 22807KIA and WIA, 1201remaining.
- (3) 2nd Battalion 200 KIA and WIA,
- (4) 3rd Battalion 350 KIA and WIA, 180 remaining.
- (5) Sapper Battalion 190 KIA and WIA, 28 remaining.

-SECRET

The majority of casualties were from helicopters and artillery fire. In mid-February 1968, the 208th Rocket Regiment was hit by a B-52 strike at Nhi Binh. Casualties were unknown, but source heard that they were heavy.

h. Replacements are mainly taken from NVA infiltration groups, recovered wounded from the 71st Hospital in Cambodia, and other hospitals. Few youths were locally recruited, as this source of manpower was depleted. Personnel from decimated units were also reassigned. Females were used sparingly.

- i. Dac could provide no details on infiltration, as he had infiltrated in 1962.
- j. Soldiers and lower cadre have low morale because their lives and the situation were worsening and becoming more difficult. Food is lacking. The Chieu Hoi Program is effective and the allied air loudspeaker broadcasts in the area are clear. Southern soldiers and guerrillas are deserting and returning home. NVA deserters hide in the villages and attempt to lead civilian lives.
- k. Source rallied because he foresaw no-victory for the Viet Cong; difficulties could not be solved; he did not accept the division of the nation; and his opinions were not respected by his superiors. He has thought about leaving the Viet Cong ranks for 10 years, but he did not before now, because of the close control of his movements.
- 4. Dac's statements are in general corroborated by other available intelligence. The MACV J-2 believes that the enemy intended to attack Saigon before 1 May, and probably had offensive intentions against a limited number of other cities or places around the country. The enemy's realization of Dac's defection: (with a substantial assist from McArthur) and MACV's preemptive preparations, may very-well have alerted the enemy to the fact that we are aware-of his plans and thus may cause him to change or cancel them.

EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Copy to:

Mr. Walt W. Rostow

Mr. Nitze

Wednesday, April 24, 1968 -- 11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

The attached idea of Pesseny's is not bad: that Westy submit a formal <u>report</u> on the conflict in Vietnam over the period of his responsibility.

It would be a good occasion to document, among other things:

- our increased effort was a respense to their introduction of North Vietnamese regulars into the South in 1964;
- -- the increased North Vietnamese rele in the war down to the present when about 70% of main and local Communist forces are North Vietnamese.

In World War II Marshall reported annually, if I remember correctly.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Pres file

HOOVER INSTITUTION 920

Stonford University, Stanford, Collifornia 94305

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL STUDIES PROGRAM

Hon. Eugene V. Rostow Under-Secretaery of State Department of State Washington, D.C. 20036

April 18, 1968.

Dear Mr. Rostow:

I promised I would write if I had an idea.

Perhaps it would be useful to have General Westmoreland submit a Report on the Vietnam conflict from the beginning to June 1968, with special emphasis on the events since 1965. The Report should include data demonstrating the fact of aggression.

During World War II, the three service commanders produced such reports on a yearly basis. These materials proved highly useful for all our informational efforts.

With best personal regards

Sincerely,

Stefan T. Possony

STP:mvk

Wednesday, April 24, 1968 10:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a good personal note to you from one of your Ambassadors: Pete Hart in Ankara.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Prastile

Ankara, Turkey April 12, 1968

The President

The White House

Dear Mr. President:

As one who has been honored by you with appointment to important responsibilities, I wish to express my admiration for your statesmanlike action in sacrificing the opportunity to continue in the world's highest political office. You have done so to help bring an end to the divisiveness which wracks our own society and to enable you to concentrate completely on our perplexing social problems and on bringing the war in Viet Nam to an honorable and successful conclusion. Your example of putting country before self has profoundly touched my colleagues in this Embassy as it has affected my family and me. Among Turks of every level with whom I have talked what you have done has produced a renewed appreciation of the sincerity with which our country under your guidance is endeavoring to resolve difficulties at home and abroad.

We all pray for your continued good health and the success of your leadership.

Faithfully yours,

Parker T. Har

Ambassador

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NII 94-458

By Cb , NARA, Date 4-10-95

from file

SECRET

Wednesday, April 24, 1968 -- 10:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

You will be interested in this chat between Bunker and Thiou, including especially Thiou's judgment that "major attacks against Saigen and elsewhere will be reserved for a later stage after negetiations start, when Hanoi will want to apply great pressure, to show how strong they are and to influence the negetiations."

Right or wrong, Thieu has had a consistent view for many weeks. Thus far Thieu has not been proved wrong.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-280 By cb , NARA Date 723-99

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH THIEU

- 1. BERGER AND I HAD AN HOUR WITH THIEU THIS MORNING ON A RANGE OF SUBJECTS, SOME OF WHICH WILL BE REPORTED IN SEPARATE MESSAGES. THIS TEL DEALS WITH MILITARY MATTERS.
- 2. RENEWED ATTACKS ON SAIGON: I MENTIONED A RECENT DEFECTOR'S REPORT THAT AN ATTACK WAS BEING PLANNED ON SAIGON DURING THIS WEEK AND ASKED HIS VIEWS.
- 3. THIEU REPLIED WHILE MILITARY AND POLICE ARE ON FULL READINESS, HE THINKS THERE WILL ONLY BE HARASSMENT, MORTAR FIRE, ETC., BUT NO LARGE SCALE OFFENSIVE AT THIS TIME. MAJOR ATTACKS AGAINST SAIGON AND ELSEWHERE WILL BE RESERVED FOR A LATER STAGE AFTER NEGOTIATIONS START, WHEN HANOI WILL WANT TO APPLY GREAT PRESSURE,

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 25561 5 E G R E T TO_SHOW HOW STRONG THEY ARE AND TO INFLUENCE THE NEGOTIATIONS!

4. I SPOKE OF GEN WESTMORELAND'S STRONG DESIRE TO HAVE A GENERAL OFFICER PLACED IN CHARGE OF THE SAIGON MILITARY DISTRICT. (NOTE: DEFENSE OF SAIGON NOW RESTS WITH III CORPS COMMANDER, WHO HAS THE WHOLE REGION TO LOOK AFTER AND CANNOT GIVE SAIGON THE EXCLUSIVE ATTENTION IT NEEDS.) THIEU SAID HE RECOGNIZED THE NEED AND HAS TALKED WITH GENERAL VIEN, CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF, ABOUT CHOOSING SOMEONE. THE POLICE CAN TAKE CARE OF SAIGON-CHOLON, AND A COMMANDING OFFICER IS NEEDED TO

-SEGRET

PAGE 02 SAIGON 25561 241345Z

DIRECT AND COORDINATE THE DEFENSE OF THE CITY AND SUBURBS.

5. I SAID GEN WESTMORELAND HAD SUGGESTED GEN PHAM VAN DONG, NOW RETIRED, OR COLONEL TRAN VAN HAI, CHIEF OF THE ARVN RANGERS, PROVIDING

HE WAS PROMOTED TO BRIGADIER GENERAL. ALTERNATIVELY, MAJOR GENERAL DU QUOC DONG, COMMANDER OF THE AIRBORNE DIVISION, MIGHT BE TEMPORARILY ASSIGNED. THIEU NODDED BUT MADE NO COMMENT.

- 6. I SAID AN ASSOCIATED PROBLEM WAS WHETHER THE SAIGON MILITARY DISTRICT SHOULD BE BROKEN OUT OF III CORPS AND PUT UNDER THE DIRECT AUTHORITY OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF OR REMAIN IN III CORPS, SAYING WESTMORELAND FAVORED THE LATTER. THIEU SAID THAT HE TOO FAVORED KEEPING THE DISTRICT UNDER III CORPS.
- 7. CORPS COMMANDERS' RESPONSIBILITIES IN THEIR AREAS: I SAID WE WERE RECEIVING REPORTS THAT AT LEAST ONE CORPS COMMANDER,

PAGE 3 RUMJIR-25561 S E C R E I
AND POSSIBLY A SECOND, ARE TAKING THE POSITION THAT UNDER THE
RECENTLY REORGANIZED STRUCTURE IN THE CORPS AREAS, THEY WERE
NO LONGER RESPONSIBLE FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT, REFUGEES,
OR OTHER CIVIL MATTERS, AND THEY WERE NOT COOPERATING WITH THE
PROVINCE CHIEFS, WHO HAD THE RESPONSIBILITY, WORKING UPWARDS
THROUGH THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR. I SAID SOME PROVINCE
CHIEFS ALSO SEEM UNCERTAIN ABOUT THEIR AUTHORITY, AND WHERE
THEY STAND, AND I SUGGESTED THIS MIGHT BE CLARIFIED.

- 8. THIEU WAS VISIBLY ANNOYED, BUT NOT WITH ME FOR RAISING THE MATTER.
- "IT IS VERY CLEAR, "HE SAID, "AND I CAN'T UNDERSTAND WHY THERE SHOULD BE THIS TROUBLE IN THE FIELD." HE WANT ON:
- A. THE CORPS COMMANDERS HAVE MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE REGULAR FORCES, AND THEY HAVE TRAINING AND SUPPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES, WHO COME UNDER THE PROVINCE CHIEFS.
- B. THE PROVINCE CHIEFS HAVE MANY JOBS SECURITY, REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT, RECOVERY, REFUGEES, ECONOMICS, TAXES, POLITICAL, ETC.

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PAGE 03 SAIGON 25561 241345Z

THEY HAVE BOTH CIVILIAN MEANS OF ACCOMPLISHING THEIR WORK, CALLING ON THE VARIOUS CIVILIAN MINISTRIES, AND MILITARY MEANS, WHICH INVOLVE CALLS ON THE CORPS COMMANDER AND HIS SUBORDINATE COMMANDS.

C. THE ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTORS TO BE APPOINTED WILL HAVE NO OPERATING RESPONSIBILITIES, BUT WILL BE EXACTLY WHAT THEIR NAME IMPLIES. THEY WILL INSPECT AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

-PAGE 4 RUMJIR 25561-6 E 8 T E T IMPROVEMENTS.

- D. THE PROVINCE CHIEFS MUST DEPEND MORE ON CORDS AND USAID THAN ON CORPS AND SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS TO HELP THEM DO THEIR VARIOUS JOBS, BUT THE MILITARY CLEARLY MUST HELP.
- 9. WHEN HE FINISHED THIS ITEM, HE MADE A NOTE, AND I AM HOPING HE WILL GET THE WORD DOWN AGAIN.
- 10. PACIFICATION BRIEFING FOR THIEU: HE SAID GEN FORSYTHE DEPUTY FOR CORDS HAD BRIEFED HIM YESTERDAY ON PACIFICATION WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE PROBLEM OF IMPROVING THE REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES. I SAID THERE WERE A NUMBER OF OTHER PROBLEMS IN RELATION TO THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, THAT KOMER FELT THAT IT WAS NOT MOVING AS RAPIDLY OR AS WELL AS IT SHOULD AND REMINDED HIM THAT HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT HE, GENERAL TRI, AND OTHERS ON HIS SIDE SHOULD MEET JOINTLY WITH ME, KOMER, AND OTHERS ON OUR SIDE IN ORDER TO REVIEW AND AGREE ON POLICY AND PROCEDURE. HE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD DO THIS.
- 11. WAR CABINET AND CABINET CHANGES: IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY THIEU SAID THIS WAS VERY COMPLICATED AND WAS STILL BEING STAFFED OUT. (COMMENT: HE WAS RATHER LESS FORTHCOMING THAN USUAL ON THIS, AND IT MAY BE THAT HE IS RUNNING INTO TROUBLE WITH KY AND OTHERS ON

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 25561 SECRET

TRAN VAN HUONG. WE HAVE HAD REPORTS THAT KY IS OPPOSED TO BRINGING
IN HUONG, AND CREATING "A THIRD POWER CENTER" AT THE TOP.) I REMARKED
THAT REPORTS CIRCULATING THAT WE FAVORED DZU FOR THE PREMIER'S JOB

-SECRET-

PAGE 04 SAIGON 25561 241345Z

WERE ABSURD. HE LAUGHED SAYING HE KNEW THEY WERE NONSENSE. BUT THE BBC CARRIED THE RUMOR, AND THE VIETNAMESE BELIEVE THE BBC AND THE VOA OVER ANYTHING SAID HERE. AND THESE RUMORS CARRIED THIS WAY GAVE HIM NO END OF TROUBLE. (COMMENT: CAN THE DEPARTMENT HAVE A WORD WITH VOA ON HANDLING THESE MISCHIEVOUS RUMORS?)

- 12. SELF-DEFENSE FORCES: THIEU SAID THERE WOULD BE NO "PEOPLE'S ARMY" (A PHRASE PUT OUT BY VICE PRESIDENT KY A FEW DAYS AGO.)
 THE STRUCTURE FOR SELF-DEFENSE FORCES ALREADY EXISTED IN THE HAMLET AND VILLAGES SO THE NEXT STEP IS TO ORGANIZE THEM IN THE TOWNS AND CITIES, IN THE PROVINCES, AND DISTRICTS. THIS WOULD BE DONE IN THE NINE QUARTIERS OF SAIGON, AND ELSEWHERE, AND WOULD BE TIED IN WITH GENERAL MOBILIZATION.
- 13. THIEU SAID THEY ARE WORKING ON "COMMON NATIONAL CONCEPTS", CRITERIA, PROCEDURES FOR ORGANIZATION, ETC. FOR EXAMPLE CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE WOULD BE DETAILED TO STAY ON THEIR JOBS. SOME WOULD BE ASSIGNED OTHER DUTIES SUCH AS RECOVERY, REFUGEES, YOUTH,

PAGE 6 RUMJIR 25561 S E C-R-E-T
ETC. ONLY THOSE TAGGED FOR DEFENSE WOULD BE ARMED. PROVINCE CHIEFS, DISTRICT CHIEFS AND MAYORS WOULD BE IN CHARGE. THERE WAS STILL A LOT OF WORK TO BE DONE, BUT ALREADY SOME GROUPS HAD BEEN ARMED IN THE CITIES AND HE WAS PRESSING FORWARD ON THIS WHOLE PROGRAM SO THEY WILL BE BETTER PREPARED TO HANDLE THE NEXT GENERAL OFFENSIVES AND THEIR AFTERMATH.

GP-3

BUNKER



INFORMATION

TOP SECRET

Wednesday, April 24, 1968 8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Thieu on Bucharest.

He'll play -- but prefers Paris.

Pres file

W. W. Restow

Saigea 25512 -- CROCODILE

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-286
By is , NARA Date 5-21-98

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Department of State

TOP SECRET

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5828Q April 23, 1968 11:38 P.M.

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-288

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BUNKER By Les , NARA Date 8-18-98

REF A: STATE 151356 B. STATE 15136

- 1. I TOOK UP WITH THIEU TODAY POSSIBILITY OF BUCHAREST AS SITE USING MATERIAL IN REF A. HE SAID IT WOULD BE "INCONVENIENT" IN THAT RUMANIA WAS A COMMUNIST COUNTRY, BUT IF NO BETTER SITE COULD BE AGREED HE WAS PREPARED TO GO ALONG. HE THEN SAID PARIS WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO BUCHAREST, AND WONDERED WHY IT HAD NOT BEEN SUGGESTED BY HANOI.
- 2. I THEN INFORMED HIM OF OUR SUGGESTION TO HANOI THAT SECRET MEETING BE ARRANGED TO DISCUSS SITE (REF B). HE NODDED &PPROV-INGLY. I CAUTIONED HIM ON IMPORTANTOF KEEPING THIS SECRET.
- 3. THIEU THEN SAID IF BUCHAREST WAS SITE, HE WOULD NOT ATTACH LIAISON TEAM TO US DELEGATION, BUT SEND ONE PERSON TO MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH US. HE WOULD NOT ANNOUNCE THIS, BUT IN REPLY TO QUERIES WOULD SAY THAT GVN HAS MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO BE KEPT INFORMED ON RESULTS OF EXPLORATORY TALKS. HE WOULD HOPE THAT IT WOULD NOT COME OUT THAT GVN OFFICER WAS IN BUCKAREST. I SAID I THOUGHT THIS WOULD PROVE DIFFICULT. IN ANY EVENT IF IT WAS BUCHAREST, WE WOULD TAKE A STAND THAT ACCESS HAD TO BE PROVIDED OUR ALLIES AND THEIR PRESS. HE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO HAVE GVN TOO CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH US DELEGATION SINCE THIS WOULD ENEABLE, NLF TO INSIST ON PRESENCE. NOR DID HE WISH TO HAVE GVN LIAISON APPEAR AS DELEGATION WHICH NOT PARTICIPATING IN TALKS AND THUS WOULD APPEAR TO BE OCCUPYING A SUBSIDIARY ROLE: SHOULD BE CLEAR CONTACTS WERE SOLELY BETWEEN US AND HANOI IN FIRST INSTANCE.
- THIS GAVE ME OPENING TO SUGGEST ALTERNATIVE LIAISON ARRANGEMENT IN WASHINGTON (PARA 3 REF B). HE SAID WHILE THIS DESIRIABLE, HE HAD FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL REASONS TO HAVE SOME-ONE ACUTALLY PRESENT AT THE SITE OF THE EXPLORATORY TALKS.
- 5. HE ASKED IF OTHER ALLIES WOULD HAVE LIAISON PRESENCE AT EXPLORATORY TALKS. I SAID I HAD NO INFO ON THIS BUT WOULD INQUIRE. PRESERVATION COPY BUNKER

TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE

Wednesday, April 24, 1968 8:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

3.4(P)(1)

The attached summarises

evidence that the cessation
of bombing north of the 19th parallel has
significantly eased enemy transport and
supply problems to the South.

W. W. Rostow

-TOP SECRET

| extracted from CIA document | 1.5(c) |
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| 23 April 1968 SC No. | 3.4(4)(1) |
| "Indications of Vietnamese Com | munist Military Activity" |

SANITIZED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ/RAC 00-325 Bycbm., NARA, Date 12-10-61 Pres file

SECRET

Wednesday, April 24, 1968 8:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

This report indicates Hanol went to some pain to indicate that it has <u>not</u> ruled out Djakarta.

W. W. Restow

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1)

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SANITIZED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-289 By us , NARA Date 8-5-98

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FONTAINEBLEAU AND GENEVA.

- B. . PRAISED SENATOR FULBRIGHT AND JOHN KENNETH.

 GALBRAITH FOR URGING THAT THE UNITED STATES STICK TO ITS WORD

 AND GET ON WITH NEGOTIATIONS ANYWHERE.
- C. THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT OFFICIALLY REJECTED
 WARSAW AS A SITE. THE DRV STILL DOES NOT UNDERSTAND WHY WARSAW.
 WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE SINCE THE UNITED STATES HAS HELD DISCUSSIONS
 WITH COMMUNIST CHINA THERE FOR SEVERAL YEARS.
- D. THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WANTS A SITE FAVORABLE TO

 ITSELF AND ATMOSPHERE AND WITH CONVENIENT COMMUNICATIONS TO

 WASHINGTON AND ITS ALLIES; YET THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IGNORES

 THE DRY'S SIMILAR WISHES.
- E. IN THE REGARD, DJAKARTA IS NOT UNFAVORABLE FOR
 THE DRV, BUT NEITHER IS IT THE MOST FAVORABLE, AND THE DRV
 WOULD PREFER A SITE MORE ADVANTAGEOUS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE
 DRV GOVERNMENT HAS NOT REJECTED DJAKARTA BUT SIMPLY EXPRESSED
 PREFERENCES FOR A DIFFERENT SITE.

HOWEVER, FOREIGN MINISTER ADAM MALIK ANNOUNCED TO SOME NEWSMEN
THAT THE DRV HAD REJECTED DJAKARTA AS A SITE BECAUSE OF THE

SECRET (classification)

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

HOSTILITY OF THE DJAKARTA PRESS TO THE DRV. THIS WAS NOT TRUE,

- F. APART FROM AMERICAN OBSTRUCTIONISM ON THE QUESTION OF A TALK SITE, ANOTHER INDICATION OF AMERICAN INSINCERITY IS THE DEFINITION OF "LIMITED BOMBING," SINCE THE UNITED STATES HAS NOW BOMBED TARGETS UP TO THE TWENTY-THIRD PARALLEL, WHICH INCLUDES HALF OF NORTH VIETNAM.
- G. THE DRV WILL REACT IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER TO
 THE POSITION TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES. THE DRV CAN WAGE WAR
 SERIOUSLY AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO IF THAT IS WHAT AMERICAN
 ACTIONS INDICATE IS THE REAL AMERICAN DESIRE; IT CAN ALSO TALX
 PEACE SERIOUSLY IF THAT IS WHAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT REALLY
 WANTS.

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Mr. Rostow

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 97-283

By iis, NARA Date 4.30-98

2 Pres pile April 24, 1968

SECRET-NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talk with John McCloy--Noon, Thursday, April 25

John McCloy mainly wants to report on his trip to Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon and the UAR. His visit was private, but most people he saw assumed he would report to you. Our Ambassadors think he did an excellent job explaining US positions and letting the Near Easterners know we are interested in them.

Since you will see the Shah on June 12, you will be especially interested in his mood. The major subject of McCloy's talk was the future of the Persian Gulf. The Shah blamed Iran's problems there on the British withdrawal. McCloy urged statesmanship, but the Shah showed little flexibility in settling these problems with his Arab neighbors.

McCloy had better luck on the Gulf in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Nothing substantial emerged from his talks, but there was agreement that all Gulf powers must work out their differences in a spirit of cooperation.

The Saudis and Kuwaitis gave him the standard Arab line on Israelthe US is pro-Israeli and ought to bring Israel into line. McCloy defended
our position, but probably didn't convince anyone. King Faisal worried
about the Communist threat and urged our support for non-Communist
Arabs, especially Hussein. In Jordan, McCloy heard more of the same.

The most interesting part of the trip was his meeting with Nasser. Nasser suggested that now that you have decided not to run for re-election, the US can show it isn't pro-Israel. He was quite open about his fear of becoming too dependent on the USSR and his hope that we could "do something for the Arabs." McCloy replied that no US administration could compel Israel to withdraw without a convincing simultaneous action from the UAR. Nasser said this was a bitter pill but he understood.

Much of what Nasser said ran along old lines. For example, he is willing to accept a package settlement with Israel which includes withdrawal but which isn't arrived at by direct negotiations. He also admitted that he is the one blocking the resumption of relations with the US. But he said he can't move on this or be more positive about negotiating with Israel because his own internal position is too weak.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET-NODIS

Mr. Rostow 99 2 Pres file 1968

Wednesday, April 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to Patriarch Athenagoras

The Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul sent you the following Easter greetings:

"Happy Easter Your Beloved Excellency White House Nation. My mind and prayers for you all this time."

State recommends the following short response:

"Your All Holiness: It was kind of you to think of me at Easter. I am grateful for your good wishes."

W. W. Rostow

| Approve | / | 4 | 25/68 |
|------------|---|---|-------|
| Disapprove | | | / |

THE WHITE HOUSE

Pres file

Wednesday, April 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Affairs Briefings of Major Presidential Candidates

Foreign affairs briefings of major Presidential candidates in the election of 1964 were handled as follows:

- A. On April 20 the President instructed the Departments of State and Defense and CIA to provide all major candidates for the office of President with all possible information helpful to their discussion of American policy". (See Tab A)
- B. Secretary Rusk sent appropriate letters to Senator Goldwater, Governor Rockefeller, Senator Smith, Governor Stassen, Mr. Nixon, Governor Scranton, and Governor Wallace of Alabama. In making this announcement, the President said, "We recognize that some of these gentlemen may not consider that they are candidates, but it does not seem appropriate for us to attempt to make that decision for them. Ambassador Lodge is in a somewhat different position. He has access to all information which he needs in discharging his most important assignment, and if at any time this situation should change, we would make whatever new arrangements might become necessary, with pleasure." (See Tab B)
- C. Governor Scranton and Governor Stassen accepted the President's offer and were briefed. Ambassador Lodge had information available to him at his Embassy. (See Tab C)

On the basis of recollection of State Department officials, the following practices were used in the elections of 1952, 1956, and 1960:

- A. No offers of briefings to Presidential hopefuls in the preconvention period were made. However, some declared candidates were briefed by the State Department before the conventions, at their request, on both specific subjects and on a global basis.
- B. Following the nomination, foreign policy and intelligence briefings were offered by the current Administration to the candidates in 1952, 1956, and 1960.

CONFIDENTIAL

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING, CANCELLED PER E.O. 12354. SEC. 1.3 AND ASCHONET'S BESSO OF BAR 10 1600.

rg 5-28-92

In 1952, President Truman offered briefings to both candidates. Governor Stevenson came to Washington in August and was briefed at the White House by both State and CIA officials. In addition, a middle-grade CIA officer was assigned to each candidate with the intention of providing weekly briefings on the road during the campaign. The briefings were, in fact, much less frequent, although weekly briefing books were made available to the candidates.

In 1956, Governor Stevenson was telephoned by Secretary Dulles. His only briefing, however, was conducted at CIA and contained only intelligence, as opposed to policy information.

In 1960, Allen Dulles personally briefed Senator Kennedy three times -twice a general briefing (including a long session at Hyannis in July)
and once on a single topic. Senator Kennedy also received a policy
briefing by State Department officials prior to his election.

W. W. Rostow

Rem ks on Foreign Affairs - + the associated 100b Press Luncheon in New York City, april 20, 1964.

[272] Apr. 20

Public Papers of the Presidents

be my solemn duty as President to submit supplemental requests for additional amounts until the necessary funds of \$3.4 billion are appropriated.

In these areas, and in other areas of concern, we remain faithful to tested principle and deep conviction while shaping our actions to shifting dangers and to fresh opportunity.

This year is an election year in the United States. And in this year let neither friend nor enemy abroad ever mistake growing discussion for growing dissension, or conflict over programs for conflict over principles, or political 'division for political paralysis. This mistake in judgment has been made twice in our lifetime, to the sorrow of our adversaries.

Now let those at home, who share in the great democratic struggle, remember that the world is their audience and that attack and opposition to old policies must not be just for opposition's sake, that it requires responsible presentation of new choices, that in the protection of our security, the protection of American security, partisan politics must always yield to national need.

recognize that those who seek to discuss great public issues in this election year must be informed on those issues. Therefore, I have today instructed the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to be prepared and to provide all major candidates for the office of President with all possible information helpful to their discussion of American policy. I hope candidates will accept this offer in the spirit in which it is made—the encouragement of

the responsible discussion which is that stone of the democratic process,

In the past 20 years we have goldbecome aware that America is intever? a
up in the affairs of the whole world to
own future is linked to the future da'
In great capitals and in tiny village, as
councils of great powers and in the more
unknown planners, events are being a
motion which will continually call up a
attention and make demands on our
sources.

Prophecy is always unsure. But it thing is certain, it is that is Notice never again retreat from world in bility. You must know, and we make ize, that we will be involved in the vertor tom ourselves to worker for Electronic community of nations as achieve panels in our community of States.

The struggle is not merely loop or struggle is unending. For his part of a ancient effort to master the passing of mind, the demands of his spirit, the oties of nature. Yes, we have entered to arena. The door has closed believe And the old stage has passed into the

Dangers will replace dangers will take the place of changes will come as old hopes take.

turning from a course which will wisdom and much endurance releases name of America still sound in this wand around the world.

Norm The President spoke at a part of Astoria Hotel in New York Or words he referred to Part To Associated Press.

500 (Vol I, 1963-64)

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ent has ric o Tunction processes r and Mo Labor and National Mediation Board was inmarked. The groundwork for collective actuality in the railroad industry has been retained. We hope it will promote true action and meaningful communication

Tank you, Mr. President.

MA I present Mr. J. E. Wolfe, the Chairba of the National Railway Labor Concrat. Mr. Wolfe.

We Wolfe: On behalf of the Nation's handle I appland President Johnson's handle of this dispute. We are deeply graterist his his statesmanship that led to today's element which should have a wholesome elect on collective bargaining both in rail-sole; and other industries. The settlement promises to restore the morale of our compleyees to its highest level, and was a rebirth of the spirit of cooperation evera management and union leaders. The settlement we have made, at Preside Johnson's request, means a brighter part for America's railroads in an atmosphere of free enterprise.

THE PARSIDENT. Thank you very much,

The White House and the President re-

per week. The other day I received a letter from a little girl named Cathy May.

Cathy May, tonight I am pleased to tell you that the railroads are going to continue to run without interruption. Cathy May writes me and says:

Dear President Johnson:

I am seven. My grandmother lives in New York. She is coming to see me make my first Holy Communion. Please keep the railroads running so that she can come to see me. Thank you.

CATHY MAY BAKER

36 Hemlock

Park Forest, Illinois

So Cathy's grandmother can now go to see her and all my fellow Americans can be proud that the railroad management and the railroad brotherhoods came, labored, worked, and reasoned together and in the American way found the answer.

I am very indebted to Secretary Wirtz for presiding over these deliberations day and night for many weeks. I am sure that all Americans appreciate the contribution he has made.

NOTE: The President spoke at 6:55 p.m. at Station WTOP's Broadcast House in Washington, D.C. The remarks were broadcast over the Columbia Broadcasting System.

: The President's News Conference of April 23, 1964

is PRESENT. Good morning, ladies and

Secretary Rusk is sending out letters
there who may wish to accept my offer
while all possible information to major
distributes this year. Appropriate letters are
to Senator Goldwater, Governor

Rockefeller, Senator Smith, Governor Stassen, Mr. Nixon, Governor Scranton, and Governor Wallace of Alabama.

We recognize that some of these gentlemen may not consider that they are candidates, but it does not seem appropriate for us to attempt to make that decision for them. Ambassador Lodge is in a somewhat different position. He has access to all the information which he needs in discharging his most important assignment, and if at any time this situation should change, we would make whatever new arrangements might become necessary, with pleasure.

[2.] I do not intend that we should lose sight of those Americans who do not share in the general prosperity of this country, so tomorrow I plan to visit several areas which suffer from heavy unemployment and poverty, or need special attention for the relief of economic distress. I will visit South Bend, Ind.; Pittsburgh, Pa.; Paintsville and Inez, Ky.; Huntington, W. Va.

I am inviting the Governors of the Appalachia States to meet with me in Huntington to discuss problems of that particular area. I will be accompanied by several top officials of this administration who are responsible for leading our attack on the problems of unemployment and poverty. These will include Secretary Wirtz, Secretary Hodges, Under Secretary Roosevelt, and Secretary Celebrezze.

[3.] I am glad to report that our decision to cut back on the production of unneeded nuclear materials, and the parallel announcements of Chairman Khrushchev and Prime Minister Douglas-Home, have been warmly greeted throughout the world, and also by responsible opinion in this country. We have made it very clear that these announcements do not constitute a new international agreement or contract of any sort.

We reached the decision here in the United States on our own initiative as what we, in the United States, ought to do. We did it in a prudent and reasonable concern for our strength and for avoiding excess, and we then explained our intention to the United Kingdom and to the Soviet Govern-

ment. They, in turn, acting on their responsibility, announced parallel deciri-

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This is the policy of restraint by many example. I discussed it yesterday in draw with the leaders of both parties in the Cogress, at breakfast, and I believe that the drawsion resulted in general understanding and agreement among us all.

[4-] We have an encouraging reporter morning from Ambassador Unger in La-His latest information indicates now that a Government of the National Union to Prime Minister Souvanna is continuing to has the support of all, including the Restionary Committee. The important is now is to concentrate once again on welfor the peace and the unity of Low exthe principles established by the General agreements.

[5.] I have had a most cordist tele, from General de Gaulle in revere a message of sympathy which I sent him soon as I learned of his indispersion week. We are very much encourage the reports from Paris that the General making a strong and good recovery.

[6.] I am happy to announce that Robert Anderson, our Ambassador, with making a brief visit to Panama early week to meet with Special Ambassador, with lucca and other Panamanian officials for purpose of having a preliminary call of views. At that time, Mr. And and Mr. Illucca will arrange between the problems to be worked out between the recountries.

I am also sending to Panama in the future a team of economic experts in

^{*}Former Secretary of the Treasury Pri-Anderson was appointed as U.S. representations the rank of Special Ambassador, to carry of injectives of the U.S.-Panama joint declarations.

- " Resident's News Co ference of august 15, 1964 -

[516] Aug. 15

Public Papers of the Presidents

Could you help us out on that?

THE PRESIDENT. The administration strongly favors the King-Anderson bill. No one speaking for the administration has ever made any statement at variance with that. I do not want to assume the responsibility for keeping accuracy in reporting, but this is the first question that has been raised since that report about the administration's attitude, and if I had been consulted by the reporter who made the report, I would have answered him as I am answering you.

We favor the King-Anderson bill. The administration has favored it for several years. We will continue to favor it and do everything we can to get it enacted.

[10.] Q. Mr. President, you say you feel Senator Goldwater has performed a disservice to the national security and to world peace. Do you feel he should now publicly recant what he said and join you in setting the record straight?

THE PRESIDENT. That is a matter for the Republican candidate and his own conscience.

[17.] Q. Mr. President, in this same connection, sir, do you plan to renew your. offer to make intelligence files available to Senator Goldwater so they can be of use to him in the campaign?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't see any necessity or requirement to renew it or restate it. It still exists. We made the briefings available to all the candidates. Governor Scranton accepted them, Ambassador Lodge had them available to him and utilized them, and even Governor Stassen came here and was thoroughly briefed. We have made that offer to the Republican nominee. If he does not care to have the information or the knowledge that would be contained in those briefings, that is a matter for him, I would say it is a matter entirely for his judgment and for his conscience.

The administration's record is clear that we want every person seeking the office of the Presidency, every responsible candidate to have responsible and accurate information, and full knowledge, on the position, and full knowledge, on the position of our Government and conditions in the world. If he does not desire to receive that knowledge, that is entirely a matter for him.

[12.] Q. Mr. President, there have been some public comments that Mr. Yarmalinsky had been offered as a sort of a senfice to the southerners in exchange for support of the poverty program. I wonder if you would care to make any further comment on that?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't want to get into another running discussion here like we are in on nuclear weapons. What public comment? Who said what, so I will know what I am answering and what I am saying.

Q. Sir, I believe there were some published columns from various sources.

THE PRESIDENT. I would think that probably you ought to seek the columnist and see what the source of his information is. Mr. Yarmolinsky is employed by the Defeat Department. And the Defense Department, the Labor Department, the Holia Education, and Welfare Department, and the Justice Department are jointly interested in the poverty program, so they all shared a part in preparing it. No one, to repeat to emphasize, no one, at any time, any place. anywhere, suggested to me anyone for any of these places. The first information that I had that Mr. Yarmolinsky was, in clicaappointed to one of these places that did not exist was the columnist rumor that you talked about.

I was informed by the leader of this take force, Mr. Shriver, that he had made to recommendations to anyone, that he had

68 (VOI I 1963-64)

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Adam Yarmolinsky, Assistant to the Secretary of

-CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday - April 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Tavers Dam Signing Coremony in Santo Domingo

Next Tuesday, April 30, President Balaguer is holding a signing ceremony on the IDB and AID loans for the Tavera Dam. You will recall that President Balaguer at Punta del Este asked your help in getting the loans approved.

President Balaguer is staging a big ceremony not only because the loans represent a major achievement in themselves, but also to gain political advantage for the May 16 elections. For the Inter-American Bank Felipe Herrera will attend. Under Secretary Katsenbach is going for us. Covey Oliver has been on the road so much lately that he is reluctant to make this trip, even though be has not been in the Dominican Republic.

When you told the Under Secretary to make some trips to Latin America, you said you would put a plane at his disposal as you have done for Covey Oliver.

I know that Congressman Gallagher's desire to go to the ceremony is a complicating factor. But this could be handled by telling the Congressman that only the Under Secretary will be going for the ceremony and not a delegation, since we do not want to upstage Felipe Herrers, whose Bank is making four-fifths of the loan.

W. W. Rostow

ce - Jim Jones Colonel Cross

ACTION

Wednesday April 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Prime Minister Thanom of Thailand

Pres file

Thailand has just finished constructing a ground station which permits direct telephone communications with the United States via satellite. The Thai are interested in using Prime Minister Thanom's White House visit for an official inauguration of the service.

We are considering a telephone call the night of the state dinner. Following the dinner, and before the entertainment, you and Prime Minister Thanom could go to your office and have a telephone conversation with Acting Prime Minister Prince Wan Waithayakorn. The conversation could be in the nature of a message to the Thai people and we would, of course, provide you with a suitable statement.

This would add an interesting and unusual touch to the state dinner for Thanom, and the whole thing need take very little of your time. I recommend you approve these arrangements.

W W Poston

| | | Kontow |
|------------|------|--------|
| Approve | | |
| Disapprove | | |
| Call me | | |
| | | |

MWright:wpt

103

ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday April 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Possibility of wheat sales to Indonesia

from till

President Suharto and the rest of the Indonesian leadership are now very concerned about their economic problems. Suharto has indicated to our Ambassador his hope for substantial additional assistance from us, specifically including wheat. The proposal is not firm yet, but it does look as if it may be possible to arrange a sizable PL 480 wheat sale to Indonesia.

If the Indonesians are as anxious as they appear to be, we should be in a good position to extract from them some good measures to meet the problem of changing a rice-eating society to a wheat-eating society.

Are you still as anxious as before to move wheat through PL 480 sales?

Yes, follow up with vigor_____

Only if the proposal makes
sense in international terms_____

Call me

White House Guidelines, Fob. 24, 1983

By Ag, NARA, Date 5-29-92

MWright:wpt

CONFIDENTIAL

for file

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 N. 1. 97-283

NLJ 97-283

By ics, NARA Date 4. 30.98 Wednesday, April 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with King Olav of Norway Thursday, April 25, 11:00 a.m.

Attached is Secretary Rusk's briefing memo, talking points, and background paper for your meeting with King Olav V of Norway.

Secretary Rusk notes:

- The King's role is non-political. He will not be able to conduct business. A private, informal meeting would be most appropriate.
- -- The King is interested in the United States and international affairs. He would greatly appreciate hearing your views on the American scene and on international matters, particularly Vietnam.
- Our relations with Norway are excellent. There
 are no significant bilateral problems.

I would only add that the Norwegians have been steadfast supporters of NATO and very helpful to us in the UN and other international organisations. Their shaky performance over the possible postponement of the King's visit was <u>not</u> typical.

A brief biographic sketch is at Tab A.

The King will be accompanied by Minister of Commerce Kaare Willoch and Ambassador Gunneng. Ambassador Tibbetts and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Walt Stoessel will be here from State. I will be standing by with Ed Fried.

W. W. Rostow


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SECRET



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520



April 22, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL -

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with King Olav V of Norway

In view of His Majesty's non-political role, I suggest that the meeting be private, at least initially, and that the atmosphere be informal.

King Olav will not be able to conduct business and therefore will not raise bilateral matters with you, except perhaps to comment on the excellent state of Norwegian-American relations. There are no problems that you need raise with him.

His Majesty is well read and has a keen interest in the United States and in international affairs generally. He is very interested in domestic developments in this country, and would be very flattered if you were to tell him how you personally view the American scene. He will also be very interested in your personal and frank views on international matters, particularly Viet Nam.

I have enclosed a list of talking points for lead-in or conversational topics, and a background paper of brief items for your information.

> DeauRusk Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Talking points

2. Background papers

Group 1

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-280

By C6 , NARA Date 2-23-99

1046

VISIT OF

King Olav of Norway

April 1968

TALKING POINTS

Recall with pleasure your September 1963 visit to Norway and your meeting and lunch with His Majesty.

Express appreciation for Norwegian cooperation in the full range of our relations and note the almost complete absence of bilateral problems.

Express admiration for the active and constructive role that Norway, a small country, plays in international affairs.

Congratulate His Majesty on the recently announced engagement of Crown Prince Harald, whom you last saw in September 1965.

Express admiration for Norway's accomplishments at the Winter Olympic Games at Grenoble, where they won more medals and points than any other country, (six gold, six silver and two bronze medals -- 103 points as opposed to the Soviet Union's 92).

Refer to your common friendship and admiration for President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Tell him of your own personal views of the American domestic scene.

Brief him on your personal estimate on future developments with respect to Viet Nam.

Tell His Majesty that you know he will be most warmly received by the American people throughout his tour of America (Norfolk Naval Base, Cape Kennedy, New Orleans, Hemisfair, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, Minneapolis and the surrounding area, Chicago, and New York).

1040

VISIT OF

King Olav of Norway
April 1968

BACKGROUND PAPER

The President's Meeting with King Olav of Norway

11:00 a.m., Thursday, April 25

The following brief items might be useful as background information for the discussions.

Norwegian-American Relations - Our relations are excellent and we receive good cooperation on matters of mutual interest almost without exception. We have no significant bilateral problems with Norway nor, with the exception of US shipping policies, do they with us.

Viet Nam - United States involvement in Viet Nam has been a major irritant to our relations, but not in any way as serious as it is in Sweden. Officially, Norway has expressed understanding of what we are trying to accomplish, but has urged a halt of the bombing as a first step for negotiations. In this regard, the President's announcement was very favorably received. No Norwegian ships have called at North Vietnamese ports for a number of years (as is also the case with Cuba). Except for Red Cross humanitarian aid designated for both North and South Viet Nam, there has been no Norwegian assistance to the North.

Crown Prince Harald's Engagement - Harald's attachment to a commoner, Miss Sonja Haraldsen, has long been an open secret in Norway. Opposition to a possible

Group 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals, not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 97-280 By c6 , NARA Date 7-23-99 marriage has been serious, and many (probably including King Olav) had hoped that the young Prince would find a mate with at least some trace of royal blood. No such romance has developed, however, and his engagement to Miss Haraldsen in March was announced only after the King had consulted with the Norwegian Cabinet. Significant opposition to the marriage will continue, but pressure for a Republic will probably not be a major factor during the reign of King Olav.

Olympic Games at Grenoble - Norway's performance at Grenoble was astonishing for such a small country, and Norwegians are justly proud. Her athletes won six gold, six silver and two bronze medals and their point total was eleven more than the closest competitor, the Soviet Union, Not many days after, however, an American, John Bowers, won the annual King's Cup combined cross-country and ski jumping race in Norway. The Cup was presented to Bowers by King Olav.

NATO and Defense - Norway has and continues to play a useful and helpful role in NATO. While vocal left-wing elements would like to see Norway leave the Alliance, that is highly unlikely. Norway would like to see a greater NATO role in improving East-West relations as an adjunct to bilateral efforts. Despite angry pressures from the Soviets, multinational military maneuvers take place regularly in Norway, and her forces operate highly classified electronic surveillance facilities, in some instances in direct bilateral cooperation with us. A military sales agreement under which Norway will purchase about \$180 million from the U.S., and we will buy about \$40 million in Norway, has recently been concluded.

East-West Relations - Norway would like to play a "bridge building" role with Eastern Europe and visits are exchanged on a regular basis.

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- 3 -

Nevertheless, nothing concrete or significant has developed as a result of these exchanges. Norway would support a European security conference, but only with careful preparation, a reasonable possibility for beneficial results, and participation of the United States and Canada.

U.S. Balance of Payments - Norway continues to maintain her post war policy of not exchanging her dollar reserves for gold. She is sympathetic toward efforts to improve our balance of payments position, but fears that actual and contemplated restrictive U.S. measures could have an adverse impact on her own economy. As an alternative to unilateral U.S. actions Norway is among those that have proposed acceleration of Kennedy Round tariff cuts to help our balance of payments. We have a favorable trade balance with Norway, and U.S. capital exports to Norway have diminished, largely as a result of the interest equalization tax. Norway is among the countries that are subject to embargo on new direct investment from the U.S. and has expressed concern over the effects of such controls. Norway's own domestic economy and balance of payments position is good.

U.S. Shipping Policies - Our shipping policies have long been a point of issue between the two countries. Close and regular bilateral and multilateral consultations have helped to temper dissatisfaction. Norway has learned to live with U.S. ship construction and operation subsidies, but continues to be unhappy about our 50-50 cargo preference legislation and policy. They are concerned that the U.S. example will be followed by others, particularly the less developed countries, and thus reduce the amount of cargo for which their ships can compete. This is very important to Norway since shipping is a major source of foreign exchange.

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_ 4 -

United Nations - Norway plays an active and helpful role in the United Nations. With the exception of Norway's global approach to Communist Chinese representation, our views on major United Nations matters almost always coincide. Norway recently earmarked troops for United Nations peacekeeping efforts.

Large Aperture Seismic Array - A US/Norway array of underground seismic instruments similar to the Large Aperture Seismic Array (LASA) in Montana is now being built north of Oslo. When completed, the array will increase our capability of detecting and evaluating underground nuclear explosions. The data it will provide, but not our conclusions, will be made freely available to other countries upon request.