

ARCHIVES PROCESSING NOTE

You will find two versions of the document withdrawal sheets in this file. The original document withdrawal sheets were completed in the 1970s and early 1980s. Since that time, many of the documents have been declassified. In an effort to make the withdrawal sheets easier to use, we have updated the withdrawal sheets, listing only the documents that are still closed. Use these updated withdrawal sheets to request Mandatory Declassification Review of closed security classified documents.

The original withdrawal sheets are in a mylar sleeve in the front of the folder. We have retained them in the file so that you can see the status of the documents when the folder was opened and the history of their declassification. Please replace the sheets in the mylar sleeve when you have finished examining them.

November 12, 2003

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

<u>Doc #</u>	<u>DocType</u>	<u>Doc Info</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Pages</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Restriction</u>
008	memo	Rostow to LBJ, 3:45 p.m. [Sanitized 9/10/01 NLJ/RAC 00-329] [Dup. #102, NSF, CF, Korea, Vol. 6]	TS	1	05/04/68	A
016	memo	Rostow to LBJ, 8:45 a.m. [Sanitized 9/10/01 NLJ/RAC 00-329]	S	1	05/04/68	A
016a	report	Intelligence Report [Exempt 9/19/01 NLJ/RAC 00-330 exempt 5/03]	S-	1	undated	A
019	memo	Rostow to LBJ, 8:35 a.m. [Sanitized 9/10/00 NLJ 97-287] [Dup. #63, NSF, Korea, Vol. 6]	S	1	05/04/68	A
019a	cable	Intelligence Information Cable [Sanitized 12/8/03 NLJ 97-285] [Dup. #63a, NSF, CF, Korea, Vol. 6]	S	4	05/02/68	A
019b	cable	Intelligence Information Cable [Sanitized 12/8/03 NLJ 97-285]	S	3	05/03/68	A
020	memo	Rostow to LBJ, 8:00 p.m. [Sanitized 9/10/01 NLJ/RAC 00-329]	S	1	05/03/68	A
020a	memo	Intelligence Memorandum [Sanitized 9/19/01 NLJ/RAC 00-330]	S	3	05/03/68	A

Collection Title National Security File, Memos to the President

Folder Title "Rostow, Vol. 74"

Box Number 33

Restriction Codes

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12/8/2003

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Initials

LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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032a	memo	Wheeler to LBJ (CM-3275-68) [Sanitized 11/25/03 NLJ/RAC 03-75] [Dup. #148, NSF, CF, Israel, Vol. 9]	TS	4	05/03/68	A
			<i>open 3/24/16 (in FBUS)</i>			
047	memo	Rostow to LBJ [Sanitized NLJ 97-287]	S	2	05/02/68	A
063	memo	Rostow to LBJ [Sanitized 3/11/01 NLJ/RAC 00-331]	TS	1	05/01/68	A
063a	cable	Intelligence Cable [Exempt 3/11/03 NLJ/RAC 00-332]	TS	1	05/01/68	A
064d	report	"Enclosure 2" [Sanitized 3/1/00 NLJ 92-281]	S	5	04/05/68	A
067	memo	Rostow to LBJ, 9:10 a.m. [Sanitized 3/11/03 NLJ/RAC 00-331]	TS	1	05/01/68	A
067b	cable	Intelligence Cable [Exempt 3/11/03 NLJ/RAC 00-332]	TS	1	04/30/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a memo	Taylor to President (dup # 400, NSF, CF, Vietnam, Alaman / Cocodike Indian Project) S 3 p Box 134 Open NLT 97-284 (2/98)	5/5/68	A
#1b rpt	"Questions relating to the Coming..." S 1 p "	undated	A
#2 memo	Rostow to President, 4:35 p.m. S 1 p "	5/5/68	A
#2a cable	From Rome S 2 p "	5/4/68	A
#5 memo	Rostow to President, 6:20 p.m. C 1 p Open 6-2-97	5/4/68	A
#5a memo	Macomber to SecState C 3 p Open NLT 97-281 10.5.98	5/3/68	A
#7 memo	Rostow to President, 4:30 p.m. (dup # 31, NSF, CF, VN, "Cocodike Paris To Be Filed") C 1 p Open NLT 97-284 (2/98)	5/4/68	A Box 13
#7a memo	Goodpaster to Harriman and Vance (dup # 32 as above) S 1 p Open NLT 97-278 (4/98)	4/23/68	A
#7b memo	Goodpaster to Harriman and Vance (dup 31 as above) S 4 p "	4/23/68	A
#8 memo	Rostow to President, 3:45 p.m. Sent. 2/9/10/01 NSIRM 00-329 TS- 1 p [Dup. # 102, NSF, CF, KERSA, "VAD. 6"]	5/4/68	A
#10 memo	Rostow to President, 3 p.m. TS 2 p Open 10-7-97 NLT 97-303	5/4/68	A
#12a memo	M. Bundy and Dobrynin S 3 p [Duplicate of #52a, NSF, CF, USSR, Vol. 19] Open NLT 97-284 (2/98)	4/30/68	A
#13 memo	Rostow to President, 1:50 p.m. (dup 3 w Cocodike Paris To Be Filed Box 13) S 1 p NSF, CF, VN	5/4/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 74, May 1-5, 1968 Box 33

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#13a cable	Saigon 26415 (dup 3x NSF, CF, W) Crowdi - Paris to Be Filed "Box 130" S 3 p <i>Open NLJ 97-281 10-5-98</i>	5/4/68	A
#14 memo	Rostow to President, 1:30 p.m. C 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-284 (2/98)</i>	5/4/68	A
#15 memo	Rostow to Read C 1 p <i>open 6-2-97</i>	5/4/68	A
#16 memo	Rostow to President, 8:45 a.m. S- 1 p <i>Sanitized 9/10/01 NS/RAC 00-329</i>	5/4/68	A
#16a rpt	Intelligence Report S- 1 p <i>exempt 9/19/01 NLJ/RAC 00-330</i>	undated	A
#17 memo	Rostow to President, 8:40 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 6-2-97</i>	5/4/68	A
#17a cable	Saigon 26388 S 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-281 10-5-98</i>	5/4/68	A
#19 memo	Rostow to President, 8:35 a.m. Sanitized 11/7/00 NS 67-282 S 1 p <i>more released 12-8-03 NLJ 97-285</i> [Dup. # 63, NSF, CF, Korea, "Vol. 6"]	5/4/68	A
#19a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 4 p <i>more released 12-8-03 NW 97-285</i> [Dup. # 63a, see above]	5/3/68	A
#19b cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 p <i>exempt NLJ 019-023-2</i> <i>Sanitized NW 97-285</i>	5/3/68	A
#20 memo	Rostow to President, 8:00 p.m. S- 1 p <i>Sanitized 9/10/01 NS/RAC 00-329</i>	5/3/68	A
#20a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S- 3 p <i>Sanitized 9/19/01 NLJ/RAC 00-330</i>	5/3/68	A
#22a memo	Rusk to President C 2 p <i>open 6-2-97</i>	5/2/68	A
#23 memo	Rostow to President, 7 p.m. C 1 p <i>open 6-2-97</i>	5/3/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#23a cable	To Paris (work copy) C 1 p <i>Open 6-2-97</i>	undated	A
#27b cable	Vientiane 6273 S 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-281 10-5-99</i>	5/3/68	A
#28a memo	Saunders to Rostow S 2 p <i>Open NL 97-284(2/98)</i> [Duplicate of #151a, NSF, CF, Israel, Vol. 9]	5/2/68	A
#28b rpt	"Nature of the US Commitment..." S 1 p <i>Open NL 97-286(5/26/98)</i> [Duplicate of #151b, NSF, CF, Israel, Vol. 9]	3/25/68	A
#32 memo	Rostow to President, 12:30 p.m. TS 1 p <i>Open 10-7-97 NL 97-303</i> [Duplicate of #148, NSF, CF, Israel, Vol. 9]	5/3/68	A
#32a memo	Wheeler to President (CM-3275-68) TS 4 p <i>sanitized 7-31-98 NL 97-279 these info released 11-25-03 NL/RAC 03-75</i> [Duplicate of #148, NSF, CF, Israel, Vol. 9]	5/3/68	A
#32b rpt	"Selected Armaments and Forces..." TS 1 p <i>sanitized 7-31-98 NL 97-279 Open 11-25-03 NL/RAC 03-75</i>	11/1/69	A
#32c rpt	"Soviet Training..." TS 1 p <i>sanitized 7-31-98 NL 97-279 Open</i>	undated	A
#32d rpt	"Arab and Israeli Air Forces..." TS 1 p <i>sanitized 7-31-98 NL 97-279 Open 11-25-03 NL/RAC 03-75</i>	undated	A
#33a memo	Rostow to President, 12:55 p.m. C 1 p <i>Open NL 97-284(2/98)</i>	5/1/68	A
#38 memo	Rostow to President, 7:30 a.m. S 1 p <i>11</i>	5/3/68	A
#38a cable	Vientiane 6241 S 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-281 10-5-99</i>	5/3/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#38b cable	Vientiane 6243- S 2 p <i>Open NLJ 97-281 10-5-98</i>	5/3/68	A
#39a cable	Saigon 26229- S 8 p <i>Open NLJ 97-281 10-5-98</i> [Duplicate of #3a, NSF, CF, VN, "8 B (3), Bunker's Weekly Reports;" Sanitized NLJ/CBS 10, 1983]	5/2/68	A
#40 memo	Rostow to President, 7:10 p.m. S 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-284 (2/98)</i>	5/2/68	A
#40a cable	New Delhi 13617 <i>Open NLJ 97-281 10-5-98</i> S 2 p	5/2/68	A
#41a memo	Jordan to Rostow S 4 p <i>Open NLJ 97-284 (2/98)</i>	5/2/68	A
#42a ltr	Nasser to President PCI 2 p "	5/1/68	A
#43 memo	Rostow to President, 3:15 p.m. TS 1 p <i>Open 3-11-03 NK/RAC 00-331</i>	5/2/68	A
#43a memo	Intelligence Memorandum TS 2 p <i>Open 3-11-03 NK/RAC 00-331</i>	5/2/68	A
#44 memo	Rostow to President, 1:20 p.m. E 1 p <i>Open 6-2-97</i> [Dup. #16, NSF, CF, Korea, Vol. 6]	5/2/68	A
#44a cable	Seoul 6043. <i>Open NLJ 97-281 10-5-98</i> E 2 p [Dup. #16a, same as above]	5/2/68	A
#45 memo	Rostow to President, 12:35 p.m. C 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-284 (2/98)</i> [Duplicate of #151c, NSF, CF, Israel, Vol. 9]	5/2/68	A
#47 memo	Rostow to President S 2 p <i>Sanitized 9/27/00 NS 97-287</i>	5/2/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#50a ltr	President to President Tubman of Liberia PCI 1 p <i>open NLT 97-284 (2/98)</i>	undated	A
#50c ltr	President to President Tubman of Liberia PCI 1 p <i>1</i>	undated	A
#50e ltr	President Tubman of Liberia to President PCI 1 p <i>1</i>	4/2/68	A
#51 memo	Rostow to President S 3 p <i>Open 9/27/00 NS 97-287</i>	5/2/68	A
#51a rpt	Eshkol to President PCI 5 p <i>open NLT 97-284 (2/98)</i>	4/30/68	A
#54a ltr	President to Kosygin TS 4 p <i>open 6-5-97</i> [Duplicate of #41a, NSF, Files of W. Rostow, "Kosygin"]	5/1/68	A
#57 memo	Rostow to President, 6:10 p.m. C 1 p <i>open 2/98 NLT 97-284</i>	5/1/68	A
#60 memo	Rostow to President, 4:50 p.m. TS 1 p <i>open 6-5-97</i> [Duplicate of #42, NSF, Files of W. Rostow, "Kosygin"]	5/1/68	A
#60a ltr	President to Kosygin TS 4 p <i>open 6-5-97</i> [Duplicate of #42a, NSF, Files of W. Rostow, "Kosygin"]	5/1/68	A
#61a cable	Deptel to New Delhi S 2 p <i>Open NLT 97-281 10-5-98</i>	undated	A
#63 memo	Rostow to President, 2:50 p.m. TS- 1 p <i>sanitized 3-11-03 NW/RAC 00331</i>	5/1/68	A
#63a cable	Intelligence Cable TS- 1 p <i>exempt 3-11-03 NW/RAC 00332</i>	5/1/68	A
#64 memo	Rostow to President, 12:55 p.m. S 1 p <i>open NLT 97-284 (2/98)</i>	5/1/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#64a memo	Rostow to President, 12:55 p.m. <i>pen NLJ 97-284 (2/98)</i> S 2 p	4/29/68	A
#64b memo	Rusk to President S 4 p <i>Open NLJ 97-281 10-5-98</i>	4/19/68	A
#64c rpt	"Enclosure 1" S 1 p " " "	undated	A
#64d rpt	"Enclosure 2" <i>sanitized 3-1-00 NLJ 97-281</i> S 5 p	4/5/68	A
#64e cable	Deptel to Tehran- <i>Open NLJ 97-281 10-5-98</i> S 3 p	4/17/68	A
#64f memo	Zwick to President S 3 p <i>Open NLJ 97-284 (2/98)</i>	4/27/68	A
#64g rpt	"Selected Defense Expenditures..." S 1 p "	undated	A
#65 memo	Rostow to President, 12:55 p.m. <i>(dup #16, NSF, CF, VN, "Crocodile-Pass to Be Filed" Box 130)</i> C 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-284</i>	5/1/68	A
#67 memo	Rostow to President, 9:10 a.m. TS- 1 p <i>sanitized 3-11-03 NW/RAC 00-35</i>	5/1/68	A
#67a cable	Paris 13331 <i>open 5-11-99 RAC</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #25b, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (6)"] [Exempt NLJ 91-86] exempt NLJ 97-281 10-5-98	4/30/68	A
#67b cable	Intelligence Cable TS- 1 p <i>exempt 3-11-03 NW/RAC 00-352</i>	4/30/68	A
#67e cable	Paris 13321 <i>open 5-11-99 RAC</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #25f, NSF, CF, VN, "6 G (6)"] [Exempt NLJ 91-86] exempt NLJ 97-281 10-5-98	4/30/68	A
#68 memo	Rostow to President, 8:45 a.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-284 (2/98)</i> S 1 p	5/1/68	A

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#68a cable	Saigon 26022- S 3 p <i>Open NLJ 97-281 10-5-98</i>	5/1/68	A
#68b cable	Saigon 26094- S 2 p " " "	5/1/68	A
#69 memo	Rostow to President, 8:40 a.m. S 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-284 (2/95)</i>	5/1/68	A
#69a cable	Deptel 155877 to New Delhi S 2 p <i>Open NLJ 97-281 10-5-98</i>	4/30/68	A
#69b cable	New Delhi 13492- S 1 p " " "	5/1/68	A

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INFORMATION

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Sunday, May 5, 1968 -- 5:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Gen. Taylor -- who has given at least as much constructive thought to negotiations as any single American -- has written this thoughtful paper which I commend to you along with my own proposed scenario for the 1:00 p.m. meeting Monday, May 6.

Pres file

W. W. Restow

WWRestow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By BJ, NARA, Date 5-26-92

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 5, 1968

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-284

By isa, NARA Date 2-23-98

~~SECRET~~

Mr. President:

Knowing that you are giving much thought to the problems of the coming negotiations and the positions to be taken by your representatives, I am venturing to summarize some of the points which seem to me most important for discussion with our emissaries before their departure.

a. Our Objective:—"The independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack. . . . The people of South Viet-Nam to be allowed to guide their own country in their own way." It is against this objective that we should measure all our actions at the conference table. We will have succeeded if we attain it--otherwise, we have lost.

b. Cessation of Bombing: It is clear that the first objective of our opponents will be to end the bombing of North Viet-Nam and then settle back to an unhurried talk-fight kind of negotiation during which they will be under little pressure to show progress. They may feel that we are trapped in the San Antonio formula and must negotiate from within its confines but, fortunately, they have given us an "out" if we want to use it and I certainly think we should. The formula was predicated on the assumption that North Viet-Nam would take no advantage of a complete cessation of our bombing, an assumption which is obviously invalid in view of the advantage being taken of even the presently restricted bombing, evidenced by the high level of infiltration in April and the recently renewed attacks on the cities. This is not the restraint we had hoped for--it is taking advantage of our conciliatory gesture and augurs ill for restraint if we took the further step of a complete bombing pause.

Under these new circumstances, I think we should feel completely free to use the bombing issue flexibly as befits our interest in the negotiation. At a minimum, we should not agree to a complete cessation without first verifying that the subsequent talks will be "prompt and productive", to salvage the most useful part of the San Antonio formula. "Prompt" could be left to subjective determination based on the expedition shown in tackling the items on the agenda but "productive" is a term which requires careful attention. A judgment as to whether negotiations will be "productive" can not be made without some understanding of the likely course of subsequent events, to include a knowledge of who will attend the conferences and what will be the content and order of the agenda for the discussions. Since, in our past experience with Communist negotiators, they have usually tried and often succeeded in wrangling interminably over such matters, it appears to me of the utmost importance that we not stop the bombing until these matters are settled. We can not possibly have ground to believe that subsequent negotiations will be "productive" until these points are agreed.

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c. The Preferred Agenda: If we are to press for an agreed agenda before stopping the bombing, we need to have agreement among ourselves as to the desired order of events. At the risk of repeating views previously advanced, I will give my own preferred order of agenda items and some of the reasons for the preference:

Item 1: Understandings with regard to a cessation of the bombing to include the points made in paragraph b above. Efforts to determine the restraints which enemy will observe if we give up bombing. Establishment of the point that we will continue air reconnaissance of North Viet-Nam even if we stop bombing (if we are convinced of the essentiality of the reconnaissance).

Item 2: The conditions for the withdrawal of foreign forces (North Vietnamese, US/FWF) and the disposition of military bases in South Viet-Nam. Methods of verification by both sides.

[Since this matter is a major negotiation objective of the enemy, if we can establish our sincerity on this point early in the game, the rest of the negotiation should be made easier.]

Item 3: The cessation of external reinforcement by NVN and US/FWF. The problem of rotation on our side. Methods of verification by both sides.

[If the conditions for withdrawal of foreign forces have been previously agreed, this point should not be too difficult.]

Item 4: Measures affecting the Viet Cong. Their future political rights and economic privileges. Their freedom of choice of homeland. (North or South Viet-Nam). Any "carrots" which the U.S. might contribute to make the deal more attractive to Hanoi.

[This group of subjects is likely to prove the most formidable stumbling block in the path of our negotiators. In establishing our position, it will require close coordination with the GVN--indeed, a case can be made for making this matter a subject for direct discussion between the GVN and the NLF in a "side" negotiation to which we would be observers. Alternatively, it could be combined with the cease-fire discussion which is the next point on this suggested agenda. In any case, we need in private discussions with our allies to reach agreement on a formula for Viet Cong political participation which is not a sell-out coalition solution. Your formula of "one man, one vote" seems to me to provide the basis for a satisfactory US/GVN position.]

Item 5: A cease-fire in South Viet-Nam.

[I have retained this item for last because it is as complex as all the preceding ones in combination and is likely to consume an inordinate amount of time unless both sides know by this point how they will come out on the preceding topics. With this knowledge, they may be more amenable to reason in working out the details of a cease-fire. Ideally, a cease-fire should be so timed as to set in motion the execution of the foregoing agreements in an atmosphere of cooperation in carrying out a program agreed to by both sides in their respective self-interest.

Since there will be great pressure at the outset of the negotiations to stop the fighting as the first order of business, we might consider initiating immediate cease-fire negotiations by the opposing military commanders on the pattern of the French Army-Viet Minh parleys in 1954. This device would allow them to run concurrently with the Paris discussions and, not being at governmental level, would allow VC/NLF participation without serious objections from the GVN. It might be an advantageous forum for Vietnamese-to-Vietnamese discussions of the future of the Viet Cong mentioned above, even though much of this problem is non-military.]

Item 6: Timing of implementing actions; international supervision of implementations; international guarantees of the settlement.

It seems important that your negotiators receive your guidance before leaving on such matters as have been briefly discussed above. The order of events is important as is the development of the U.S. position or positions on each of the items on the agenda. I am sure that, over the past three years, much work has been done on these points by many officials and many agencies of government but now is the time to sort out the parts of past studies which have value in establishing a coherent position in the actual situation which we are facing.

I am attaching a list of questions suggested by the points raised in this paper which may be worth discussion at your Monday meeting on this subject.

Attachment:

MD2
M. D. T.

~~SECRET~~

Questions Relating to the Coming Negotiations in Paris

- 1. Do we continue to stand on the San Antonio formula or has it been invalidated, wholly or in part, by enemy action?
- 2. If we insist that, before stopping our bombing, we must be assured that the subsequent talks will be "prompt" and "productive", what evidence will we require on these two points?
- 3. What is the value of continued aerial reconnaissance of North Viet-Nam during a bombing pause? Is it negotiable? If so, what would we take for it?
- 4. What is our position on the role of the GVN and the NLF in the coming negotiations?
- 5. In applying the one man-one vote principle, are we willing, if necessary, to sacrifice the present constitutional structure in South Viet-Nam and start again from scratch in forming a popularly elected government?
- 6. What "carrots" are we prepared to contribute to a satisfactory negotiated settlement in terms of guarantees of the settlement, political and economic aid to North Viet-Nam, repair of war damage?

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
 NLJ 97-284
 By is, NARA Date 2-23-98

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Sunday, May 5, 1968 -- ^{4:35} 4:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

I regret to report, despite your instruction to me and my instruction to State, the message to the Vatican has been held up until now. Herewith a proposed draft from you to His Holiness.

I have taken the liberty of adding a phrase in ink on the second page.

W. W. Rostow

Message approved _____

No _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-284
By is, NARA Date 2-23-98

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

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2a~~SECRET-NODES~~

Ambassy ROME

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
 NLJ 97-284
 By us, NARA Date 2-23-98

STATE

NODES

L. Please convey to Vatican following message from President Johnson in response to message from Pope Paul given to USG by Apostolic Delegation April 30:

BEGIN TEXT.

Your Holiness:

I was deeply touched ^{by} ~~for~~ your message offering the Apostolic buildings under your jurisdiction as a location for preliminary meetings on peace in Viet-Nam.

I acknowledge with deepest thanks the desire to contribute to the cause of peace which inspired your offer.

As you know ~~and~~ after considerable difficulty in searching for a mutually acceptable place where these conver-^{have been}sations might occur in a fair and impartial atmosphere, we/were able to reach agreement with North Viet-Nam to have our representatives meet in Paris for discussions beginning May 10.

As we approach these negotiations, I reaffirm to you my dedication to the task of finding at the conference table

EA/VN:Hisham:jm 5-4 4536

EA - Philip C. Habib

White House -

S/S - ~~Director~~

S/AH-Mr. Davidson

~~SECRET-NODES~~

ROME

~~SECRET-NO DIS~~

the means by which the sacrifices of all the peoples involved may be
ended and an early ^(and honorable) peace achieved.

I wish once [^] to
~~again~~ again / express to Your Holiness my deep gratitude
for your impartial actions / ^{over so many years} directed toward promoting peace. May our
labors continue to be guided and supported by your prayers.

Lyndon B. Johnson END TEXT

GP-3

END

3
Ruppel
May 5, 1968

For President's use with Louis Heren and William Rees-Mogg of London Times
Monday, May 6, 1968

With the opening of negotiations in Paris this week, there is little
I ought to say -- or can say.

-- We are still not clear that Hanoi is prepared ^{for} to what we would
regard as an honorable peace settlement.

-- Our ideas remain what they have always been:

- a. re-establish the DMZ at the 17th parallel as a respected
truce line and leave the unification of Vietnam to peaceful
processes in the future;
- b. honor the 1962 Laos Accords: all foreign forces out of Laos
and no infiltration;
- c. a one-man one-vote solution to the politics of South Vietnam.

-- Militarily and politically the men in Hanoi have worked on analogy
with 1954 and the French. But the situation is different:

- a. there is an independent constitutional government in Saigon
and highly nationalistic South Vietnamese armed forces which
survived in good style the Tet attacks which aimed to destroy
them.
- b. there are thoroughly competent U. S. forces which demonstrated
at Khe Sanh and elsewhere they were not subject to North
Vietnamese tactical defeat.
- c. there is an American President who -- unlike Mendes-France
in 1954 -- is not committed to peace at any price.
- d. in my judgment, there is behind this President and his
successor a body of citizens which wants an honorable peace
but will not run out on South Vietnam or Asia.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 20

By ..., NARS, Date 6-25-84

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~~SECRET~~

Sunday, May 5, 1968 -- 4:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Your meeting tomorrow, Monday, May 6, 1968, 1:00 p.m. on negotiations.

Attached memorandum covers the main issues we can expect to encounter in talks with Hanoi.

You may wish to ask Sec. Rusk to make the points in the first paragraph (Negotiations in Context). You may wish me to call him before the meeting and lay the groundwork for this opening approach.

Yes _____ No _____ Call me _____

I believe Sec. Rusk has designated Nick Katzenbach to present Hanoi's position at the meeting. If that is agreeable, you may wish to ask Nick to make the first presentation.

Then you could ask Governor Harriman to make his response.

You might then ask the others present to comment on both presentations, beginning with Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford.

You may wish to confine the discussion to the cessation of bombing, which will be our principal concern in the days and weeks ahead.

But you might ask: What is our position on a ceasefire?

Nick could present Hanoi's position. Harriman could present our stand.

You may then wish to ask: What if they propose a coalition government?

Again, Katzenbach could present Hanoi's stand; Harriman our answer.

The most important aspect of this meeting is for all hands to hear from the President that:

- We are seeking an honest settlement that will hold up in history.
- That you will not be rushed.
- That you will not be diverted by domestic pressures or world opinion.

You want the Negotiating Team to reflect our point of view, and let the enemy do his own negotiating.

W. W. Rostow

4a

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ-CBS 20

By icw, NARS, Date 6-25-84

~~TOP SECRET~~

Sunday, May 5, 1968 -- 4:55 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Negotiations Meeting, Monday, May 6, 1968, 1:00 p.m.

Negotiations in Context

(You may wish to have Sec. Rusk make these points at the beginning.)

Talks in Paris will be only one arena where the outcome of the Vietnam conflict will be determined. Others are:

1. The battleground in Vietnam.
2. The political struggle in South Vietnam, and particularly the stability and strength of the GVN, Hanoi's main target.
3. World public opinion.
4. The political and psychological climate in the U. S.

Every move we make should be geared to these five dimensions. But the assessment of 4 should be left wholly with the President.

Basic Rules for Negotiators.

1. Pursue the goals of the U. S. by every means.
2. Protect the interests of the legitimate, constitutional government of South Vietnam.
3. Don't negotiate for Hanoi; they can argue their own position.

Major Issues Likely to Arise.

First Round

Hanoi's position

Stop unconditionally the bombing and all other acts of war against the North.

U. S. Position

State reasons for bombing.
Demand reciprocity.
-- Reestablish DMZ with strengthened supervision.
~~Enforcement of 1962 Agreement on Laos.~~

If agreement impossible on this basis, then fall back to San Antonio formula: Make clear what we would regard as "taking advantage":

- Shelling or attacks across the DMZ or other border of South Vietnam.
- Unit movements across the DMZ or any border of South Vietnam.
- Infiltration of men and supplies above prevailing at time of San Antonio (i.e., about 6,000 a month).
- Other forms of "taking advantage, including attacks on cities.

Make clear violations will force prompt resumption of bombing.

Will probably try to force end of all reconnaissance as "act of war"

Reject any termination of reconnaissance.

(The Delegation should bear in mind this fact: Our capabilities permit us to knock out about 35% of infiltrating trucks -- in good weather in Laos, 25%; in bad weather, 10% in Panhandle of North Vietnam. The weather is now shifting from bad in Laos to good between 17th and 20th parallels. Military, civilian and scientific officials agree that we ought to be able to achieve as good a level in North Vietnam in good weather as in Laos in recent months; that is, a truck kill of at least 25%. That is the minimum cost of stopping bombing in the North Vietnamese Panhandle. We must get an equivalent for stopping of all bombing in North Vietnam.)

Assuming agreement on an end to bombing in the North -- with Hanoi's full understanding of our position as above -- we enter possible haggling over an agenda -- whether to have one, of so what kind.

Round Two

Hanoi's Position

Hanoi's Four Points provide the only basis for real settlement;
--right of the Vietnamese to peace, independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity; U. S. forces must withdraw; stop acts of war against North Vietnam;

U. S. Position

Each side must be free to raise any matters it chooses. We will discuss Four points; Hanoi must discuss our points.

Priority items:

- Reestablishment of DMZ.
- Enforcement of 1962 Agreement on Laos.

- military provisions of Geneva 1954 must be respected;
- internal affairs must be settled in accordance with the program of the NLF;
- peaceful unification of the country to be settled without foreign interference.

Cease-fire in place (assuming VC/NVN forces are in or around urban centers and their military fortunes look promising).

If U. S. wants to discuss matters concerning the South, it must deal directly with the NLF.

(We may, at this point, get into the whole participation question. We might at this stage raise the "Our Side, Your Side" approach, with NLF taking part of a member of Hanoi's side. We will have heavy bargaining in Saigon to bring the GVN around.)

Round Three: Southern Settlement.

Hanoi's position

Hanoi will try to enhance position of NLF at every turn:

- get us to deal directly with Front;
- insist Front be full member of talks;
- reject participation of GVN.

NLF program is only basis for a reasonable settlement in the South.

- Withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from the South.
- Enforcement machinery (ICC strengthened by Asian neutrals, e. g. Burma, Indonesia, Japan).
- One-man one-vote political solution in South Vietnam.

We are ready to discuss cease-fire, but legal government in the South must be free to run its own country and send its civil administrators and police anywhere, and enforce order with its armed forces.

Any discussion of an internal settlement in the South must involve the GVN.

U. S. Position

We should enhance position of GVN at every turn, denigrate NLF:

- GVN must take part in any talks regarding internal situation in the South;
- NLF has no legitimate standing;
- We support Constitution and legally elected government;
- GVN is prepared to discuss internal problems with members of NLF.

(Close coordination with GVN on this sequence is a must. We may wish to encourage direct GVN talks with "Members of" the Front outside the conference setting in South Vietnam or elsewhere.)

Existing Constitution (or version modified by constitutional legal processes) is only sound basis for settlement.

South Vietnam must have a coalition government based on the NLF, the new Alliance, and other "patriotic elements." Thieu-Ky "cliques" can have no role in political structure.

Political life must be based on "One-man One-vote." GVN and other legitimate political forces in the South must work out their own formula. We will not agree to impose any coalition.

Political normalcy will not be possible while fighting and terror continue. Political settlement must be based on the freely expressed will of the people of South Vietnam. To achieve proper atmosphere for democratic political development, there must be peace and an end to terrorism and harassment. Therefore, we believe final settlement must be based on the essentials of the 1954 Agreement, and enforcement of the 1962 Agreement, on bases. Infiltration must end. We are ready to withdraw our forces in accordance with the pledge of Manila.

Will resist any admission that North Vietnam forces are in the South. May finally admit some "volunteers" are present. Will resist any meaningful enforcement machinery to supervise withdrawals. May agree to encourage "volunteers" to withdraw, but insist U. S. forces pull out -- or at least back to base areas.

We should be ready with convincing evidence that North Vietnamese troops are present in force and in organized units in the South. Demand workable supervisory machinery -- with Asians reinforcing ICC. Refuse to pull back to base areas. Stand on Manila formula -- within six months after North Vietnam pulls out and "violence subsides."

(If NLF and GVN join talks and the subject turns to internal settlement, Hanoi will let NLF take the lead. The GVN should take the lead on our side.)

NLF will push for abolition of present constitution.

GVN should stand fast on present constitution. May wish to point out ways exist for legal changes in same.

NLF may push for new elections in the South.

GVN will resist. We should back their stand publicly, work quietly with them in private to bring them around -- if we are confident they can make a good showing in any such elections and, in particular, will back one non-Communist candidate.

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-4-

GVN and we should push hard for abandonment of force by VC/NLF, urging all South Vietnamese to rejoin the mainstream of political life in the South. GVN should offer pledge of good treatment for all who fore-swear violence, including promise of no retaliation -- which we should back.

May seek international supervision of elections -- with Communists, or course, included.

Election should be run by legal authorities, including Election Commission which proved its integrity in elections last year. Foreign observation -- as opposed to control -- would be welcome.

W. W. Restow

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5

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, May 4, 1968
6:20 p. m.

Profile

Mr. President:

Herewith an account of a conversation between Bill Macomber and Senator Fulbright, which Sec. Rusk believes will interest you.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *ju/rj*, NARA, Date *6-2-97*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED ^{5a}
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-281
By is, NARA Date 10.5.98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM: H - William B. Macomber, Jr. *WBA*

SUBJECT: Conversation with Senator Fulbright

After the Foreign Relations Committee hearings this morning, Senator Fulbright asked me into his office to talk there about the forthcoming US-Hanoi negotiations. The Senator was very pleased about the agreement of Paris as a site and termed it as the first really good news he had in a long time. But his main purpose in talking to me was to urge that the Administration make Senator Mansfield and Senator Cooper a part of the US negotiating team. This, of course, is not a new suggestion on the part of Senator Fulbright, but he was pressing it very hard in his remarks to me this morning. By way of precedent, he referred to the role of Senators Connally and Vandenberg in the 1940's (in 1946 these two Senators were appointed "Special Congressional Advisers" to the U.S. delegation to a series of foreign ministers meetings in Paris where the subject of post-World War II peace treaties was being discussed.)

Senator Fulbright's main point, however, was not one of precedent but rather the following. He asserted that if the North Vietnamese prove to be unyielding and in effect adopt positions which make it impossible to negotiate a satisfactory settlement, the presence of men like Mansfield and Cooper on the delegation would greatly strengthen the Administration's hand at home. He then repeated his assertion that Amb. Harriman is regarded as inflexible by the doves and, therefore, would not be creditable in this regard. He added that Vance was a "military man" and that he also, therefore, did not carry adequate weight with the doves. He said, however, that if what

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-2-

was being reported by Messrs. Harriman and Vance was backed up by Mansfield and Cooper this would assure acceptance among the Administration's critics. When I suggested that it would be difficult to take two Senators and not two Members of the House, he replied that this could be rationalized by saying that the outcome of the negotiations might be a treaty which was a Senate not a House matter. When I noted that Cooper was neither Mansfield's opposite number nor the ranking Republican, he replied that the rationale for taking Mansfield and Cooper could be that Mansfield had long ago established himself as the outstanding Senate expert on Southeast Asia, and that if Mansfield rather than Fulbright was selected, Hickenlooper would not expect to be designated as Fulbright's opposite number. (He did not discuss selecting Dirksen as Mansfield's opposite number.) He then noted that Cooper is the only Republican in the Senate who has served as ambassador and has had extensive diplomatic experience.

When I pointed out that the negotiations could well be protracted, Senator Fulbright replied that the Senatorial members of the delegation need not be on hand full-time, that they could be kept informed by briefings back here and attend the meetings as their Washington duties permit. When I referred to a possible "separation of powers" problem in having the majority leader of the Senate negotiating on a team under the direction of the President, he brushed this aside.

It was understood throughout our conversation that I was in no position to make any commitments regarding his suggestion, but he was obviously talking to me on the assumption that his remarks would be passed along.

The Senator did not specifically discuss the possibility of putting someone on the team who was not a member of Congress but in whom the doves in Congress would have greater confidence than he asserts they do in the case of Messrs. Harriman and Vance. He did, however, comment that such non-Congressional persons as Arthur Goldberg and George Ball, if they could be involved in some way, would carry much greater weight with the doves than the present negotiators.

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CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

In the course of our conversation, Senator Fulbright also referred to his most recent talk with the President. He said he thought the President was misinformed about the reasons why the Polish Government would not allow the New York Times to send Tad Szulc to Warsaw. The Senator indicated that he had discussed this matter with the Polish Ambassador and that the latter had assured him it was not because Szulc was Jewish that he was denied admittance, but rather because Szulc is an ex-Pole and the Polish Government felt that he would be writing as a disaffected former national, rather than as an ordinary American reporter. The ambassador also stated that his Government has no objection to the current New York Times reporter in Warsaw nor would they bar any reporters simply because they were Jewish. In response I said that the anti-semitic policies of the Polish Government were well known. Senator Fulbright said the ambassador had conceded this was a problem, but that it has been exaggerated. As evidence, the ambassador claimed that many Jewish West German businessmen came into Poland regularly.

6
ACTION

Saturday, May 4, 1968 -- 6:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

The present tentative thought at State is that the Paris delegation will leave at 7:30 a. m. on Thursday, May 9, arriving 8:00 p. m. -- with the opportunity to get a good night's sleep before the Friday meeting -- if there is one.

Question: Do you wish to see them before they leave, perhaps on the White House lawn?

If so, they could, of course, leave later.

Your guidance requested.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

file
7

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

Saturday, May 4, 1968 - 4:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You should know that Governor Harriman, at a meeting last Thursday of Katzenbach's committee, argued, in effect, that the "domestic political scene" required that we seek a quick settlement, even at some cost to our interests.

Andy Goodpaster today told me that after presenting a paper to Harriman (copy attached) he replied: we can't get all we'd like because of domestic political factors.

Harriman may be reflecting your wishes on this matter.

But -- if not -- I would assume that the President should judge the domestic political factor at each stage of the negotiation, in the context of each negotiating issue.

If that judgment is correct, you may wish to tell our negotiators on Monday that their job is to achieve U. S. objectives in Southeast Asia and leave it to the President to assess at each stage, on each issue, the extent to which domestic politics plays a role -- if, indeed, it has a role.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-284
By ics, NARA Date 2-23-98



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~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

23 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Governor Harriman
Mr. Vance

The attached memorandum proposes that we use, as a central negotiating criterion for the talks with Hanoi, what each side is able (or thinks it will be able) to achieve on the battlefield.

Among the values of having and using such a criterion are the following:

- a. It links military prospects on the ground with posture at the conference table.
- b. It offers a ready response to those who propose making unrealistic demands upon the NVN/VC side, or making unnecessary concessions by the US/SVN side.
- c. It provides a simple basis for understanding and support of the course of negotiations by responsible authority within the United States Government.
- d. It suggests practical working boundaries within which the elements of a realistic yet acceptably safe settlement could conceivably be negotiated.

1 Att
as


A. J. Goodpaster

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-278
By iso, NARA Date 3.23.98

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~



76

~~SECRET -- SENSITIVE~~
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

23 April 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Governor Harriman
Mr. Vance

SUBJECT: Central negotiating criterion for talks with Hanoi

1. In considering possible avenues for negotiation, a criterion of central importance will be what each side is able (or thinks it will be able) to achieve on the battlefield. In schematic, generalized terms:

a. Efforts to get either side to give up through negotiations what it is able to achieve on the battlefield--especially achievements having direct, positive value to the side--will certainly encounter the highest order of resistance.

b. Conceivably, what one side or the other is not able to achieve on the battlefield--together with achievements which are not of themselves of direct, positive value--should be more susceptible to negotiation.

2. Negotiation may not be wholly impossible in the case of 1a above. Some objectives, though possibly attainable, may involve too high a price in lives, resource costs, and political pressures. Moreover, if the objective is one that could be tolerated by the other side if pursued by non-violent means, peaceful arrangements constituting a mutually acceptable alternative to continued combat might conceivably be worked out in negotiations. Within the scope of 1b above, negotiation should be easier. Even in this case, however, one must expect hard and long argument over just what one side or the other can or can not achieve on the battlefield.

3. The following paragraphs present the above concept in more concrete terms.

4. We have now weathered the worst the Communists could throw at us, in the Tet offensive, with full advantage of surprise and concentration. Short of GVN collapse or U.S. cave-in, they cannot achieve on the battlefield a takeover in South Vietnam, (and in fact

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By ia, NARA Date 3-23-98

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their prospect is for a gradual reduction in the area and population under their control, and in their covert strength within the areas that are GVN-controlled or are contested).

5. On the other side, they have weathered our bombardment of the North and our operations in the South with sufficient capability to sustain a continuation of the war on a substantial scale, and preserve a significant structure and apparatus in the South for an extended period. (However, even though they may deny it, the probable prospect is for gradual reduction of their holdings and their infrastructure).

6. If they are prepared to accept that they cannot achieve take-over in the South by force of arms and violence, then the essential purposes served by their effort in SVN are reduced to two:

a. Infliction of destruction, losses and damage upon the GVN-controlled SVN and on US, SVN and Free World armed forces.

b. Protection and preservation of VC structure and membership.

7. They pursue these purposes at heavy costs in loss of lives, in damage to their LOC (south of 19°) and in expenditure of economic effort to the detriment of the well-being of their people.

8. If they are prepared to forego 6a, above (which does not seem to have direct, positive value in itself for them), and if safeguarding arrangements could be found for 6b, they could save themselves through a negotiated solution the costs they are sustaining in losses, damages and resource-expenditures, at no loss to what they can achieve on the battlefield.

9. On our side, the complete extirpation of VC guerrilla, local and mainforce units, plus NVA forces in SVN, appears improbable. Short of VC/NVA termination of violence, some level of terror, insecurity, periodic sabotage and destruction can be expected to continue, together with some residual of Communist infrastructure despite any efforts we and the SVN are likely to make. (However, while VC/NVA capabilities of these kinds will continue, they may be expected to be decreasing, as US/SVN military and pacification operations proceed).

10. If the foregoing is accepted, our purposes also reduce to two, paralleling those of the Communists:

a. Infliction of destruction, losses and damage upon the VC/NVN, particularly their armed forces.

b. Protection and extension of the population and area of SVN under government control.

11. We too are paying in loss of lives as well as heavy economic and political costs for our pursuit of these purposes. We have no major interest in 10a as such. If 10b could be safeguarded and assured by other means, we could save the losses and much of the heavy costs we are now bearing, at no loss to what we can probably expect to achieve on the battlefield.

12. The NVN may not yet be convinced that the GVN can avoid collapse, and that we can avoid cave-in, and we may not yet be convinced that they can sustain the war for an extended period. After they have tested our mettle in a "fight and talk" situation for a period of weeks or months, and after we have seen what they are able to do following the present cycle of apparent re-building from their Tet losses, clearer judgments can be made. If serious progress in negotiations should be delayed for such a period, the time elapsed should permit a judgment as to whether the NVN have used the bombing halt to build up forces and supplies in the South to levels which constitute "taking advantage" of the bombing cessation. Also during this period, and until a settlement based upon non-resort to violence has been developed, it would be important for us to avoid agreements and deescalating actions that would adversely affect our military situation vis-a-vis that of the North Vietnamese, or ease the military pressure on them in SVN.

13. Many questions remain unanswered by this sketchy criterion. Not the least of these is whether the SVN, post-settlement, facing an NLF political drive perhaps supported by a residual level of terror and violence, could sustain itself. Locations for withdrawn forces, cease-fire terms, and verification methods are further concrete questions to be addressed. Moreover, this criterion does not touch the question of which issues should be negotiated by the SVN, and which by the U. S., or by the two in combination.

14. Nevertheless, and in summary, this criterion does appear

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

to provide boundaries within which the elements of a realistic yet acceptably safe settlement could conceivably be developed in a serious yet safeguarded effort to negotiate. A conceivable illustrative pattern of agreement and action might be:

a. The NVN/VC cease the use of force to achieve a take-over of SVN, withdrawing NVN units to the North; cease terrorism, armed attack, sabotage and destruction; and accept assurances against reprisals against VC personnel and peaceful organization in the South.

b. The US/SVN cease the use of force to eliminate the VC totally; cease armed attack on VC and NVA forces; and accept assurances that peaceful administration, extended throughout SVN, will not be interfered with.


A. J. Goodpaster

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

8~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

SANITIZED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
 NLJ/LAC 00-329
 By CBM, NARA, Date 8-21-01

Saturday, May 4, 1968 - 3:45 p. m

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
 (C)

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Special Watch Committee report on North Korea as of 1030 today.

1. In recent months, information from several sources, [REDACTED] has attested to the heightening of the warlike atmosphere in North Korea by the ~~Kim Il-sung~~ regime. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It seems unlikely that the North Koreans would reveal their plans.

2. The current disposition of North Korean armed forces along the DMZ is such that they could initiate a major attack without any prior warning. We have not detected, based on our limited evidence, that they have reinforced or are reinforcing the DMZ area, nor have we noted other significant military indications of a North Korean intention to initiate major hostilities. [REDACTED]

3. The North Koreans are undoubtedly aware that a major attack on the South would involve great risks of escalation. Despite any hope in Pyongyang that the U. S. is overburdened by the Vietnam fighting, the regime should be aware that the U. S. might well mount a quick and destructive response to any major attack from the North. The Pyongyang regime would also have considerable reservations about the degree of Soviet and Chinese aid in the early stages of major hostilities. We do not believe that Pyongyang intends to initiate major hostilities in the near future. We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that North Korea may take some serious military action as a result of a miscalculation of U. S. policy or of ROK attitudes and capabilities.

4. Military actions short of a major attack are likely and would be seen in Pyongyang as promoting its objectives in the area without creating the immediate danger of full-scale retaliation. Such actions could also be taken without prior warning.

W. Rostow
 Rostow

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

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 (C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
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Pres Jea
9

ACTION

Saturday, May 4, 1968

3:20 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Speech by Harriman

Averell will be speaking in New York Monday night when he receives the second annual Roosevelt Memorial Award. Text is attached.

The first part is mainly recollections of Roosevelt and the New Deal. The sensitive portion is the foreign policy segment, especially pp. 9-10.

I question the wisdom, on the eve of talks in the French capital, of sharply criticizing the past French role in Indochina (p. 9). I doubt the utility of suggesting that Ho Chi-minh might have become an "Asian Tito" -- which is an argument our critics often raise to attack our policy.

Finally, I strongly recommend that he not express his hope that "negotiations can be concluded under the direction of President Johnson during the remaining months of his term in office," That sounds far too much like Mendes-France and may mislead Hanoi into thinking we are prepared for major concessions to meet our own time limits.

You may wish to discuss this with Averell. If you prefer me to talk with him, I will need your guidance.

15/

W. W. Rostow

Att

I will discuss with Harriman _____

You talk with Harriman and reflect the thoughts above _____

Speech is all right _____

Call me _____

WJJorden:wpt

9a

EXCERPT OF REMARKS
BY THE HONORABLE W. AVERELL HARRIMAN
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
BEFORE THE SECOND ANNUAL FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT BIRTHDAY
MEMORIAL AWARD DINNER,
NEW YORK HILTON HOTEL, NEW YORK, NEW YORK,
AT 7:00 P.M., E.D.T., MONDAY, MAY 6, 1968.

"Nothing could be more humbling than to have been voted, by a large committee of important Americans, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Birthday Memorial Award, as the man who most 'exemplifies the ideals and aspirations' of President Roosevelt. I have a sneaking suspicion that I was selected because I am the only man now around in public office whom they could remember as having served President Roosevelt.

"Fortunately, too, I find that the older one gets, the more kind people are apt to be, forgetting criticisms, and recalling commendations. I am reminded of a reply a man once made to a questioner:

'What is the secret of your success?'

'My good judgment.'

'And how did you develop good judgment?'

'From experience.'

'How did you acquire experience?'

'Oh, that came from bad judgment.'

Some historians

"Some historians have called the New Deal the Roosevelt Revolution. Roosevelt never did and never thought of it as a revolution. To him it was a constitutional evolution, using the flexible powers which the ~~f~~-founding fathers had given to the President.

"Regardless of what you may wish to call it, to me the New Deal was a major revolutionary departure from the past in two fundamental respects:

"First, Roosevelt moved the control of the financial direction of our country from Wall Street to Washington. The Federal Government undertook full responsibility for the over-all direction of the economy. Wall Streeters complained bitterly, but they could not do anything about it, except let off their emotion in violent resentment of Roosevelt. Roosevelt understood this only too well, and, in fact, he gloried in their enmity. He said in 1936, 'I welcome their hatred,' ^{9/1} yet no matter how much criticism has been levied against the New Deal, no one has been able to repeal any of its legislation.

Roosevelt had the courage

Roosevelt had the courage to experiment and then turn to a new method if the experiment did not succeed.

He was influenced by Keynes' economic theories, and tried, not always successfully, to apply them. It remained for Truman to adopt more consistent economic direction in the transition from war to peacetime production and to adopt ^{extraordinarily successful} ~~specific~~ ^{industrial} programs, such as the Employment Act of 1946.

But it has been Presidents Kennedy and Johnson who fully developed the "new economics" that has led to eight years of continuing rise in economic growth and increased employment. My Republican friends here tonight will, I hope, forgive me for suggesting that the Republicans, when they were in power, were inclined to leave too much to uninhibited economic forces, which led to a succession of ups and downs in economic activity. In justice, perhaps we should say that we learned from ^{that} ~~the~~ experience.

Roosevelt's second revolution concept related to the responsibilities of the Federal Government to the people. He faced an economic crisis more severe than any in our history. Though his first concern was recovery, he saw clearly the need for reform as well.

Roosevelt's [legislative programs and enactments were based on] one fundamental belief and one fundamental ^{principle} ~~idea~~ about the role that Government must play in human affairs. This ~~meant~~ ^{was} a complete break, not only with the past, but with the th

prevailing philosophy.

"The new philosophy of Roosevelt's was that the Federal Government owed a positive duty to come to the help of any citizen or any group of citizens that were suffering want and deprivation through no cause of their own, but because of circumstances which neither he nor any individual State could control. In performing this duty, the Government was committed to pledge all its power and resources.

Today we are apt to forget that
"The prevailing philosophy held that it was the responsibility of each individual to look out for himself as best he could. Private charity or local governments must take care of those who failed. For the Federal Government to step in, was considered at best pure socialism, and at worst, communism.

"In his Second Inaugural Address, speaking of the social reforms of his first Administration, he said:

'But our present gains were won under the pressure of more than ordinary circumstance. Advance became imperative under the goad of fear and suffering. The times were on the side of progress.'

He pointed out:

'To hold to progress today, however, is more difficult...Prosperity always tests the persistence of our progressive purpose.'

These words indicate

"These words indicate the enormous respect President Roosevelt would have had for the succeeding Democratic Presidents who, during periods of prosperity, called for even greater progress in actions toward social justice.

"and yet, in that same Address, he looked to the future:

'For these reasons I am justified in believing that the greatest change we have witnessed has been the change in the moral climate in America -- with this change in our moral climate and our rediscovered ability to improve our economic order, we have set our feet upon a road of enduring progress.'

"And that moral climate has survived_x and still prevails.

"Roosevelt realized that the fight for social justice would never be completely finished, but always expanded. It was going to be a continuing struggle, requiring, as he called it, 'eternal vigilance.' I am sure we all remember his words when he said:

'I see one third of a nation, ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished.'

But his continuing paragraph is often forgotten:

'It is not in despair that I paint you that picture. I paint it for you in hope, because the nation, seeing and understanding the injustice of it, proposes to paint it out... We are determined to make every American citizen the subject of his country's interest and concern...'

[At another time]

"At another time, President Roosevelt recalled the warning of Thomas Jefferson that:

'Widespread poverty and concentrated wealth cannot long endure side by side in a democracy.

Today our problems are of a different order -- enormously difficult but surely more manageable. If I may paraphrase Thomas Jefferson to describe conditions today:

'Concentrated poverty and widespread prosperity cannot long endure side by side in a democracy.'

"When I was Governor of New York, inspired by Roosevelt, I called attention to the fact that in New York State one-seventh of our families had incomes of less than \$2,000, and began a statewide program to deal with this condition. But it was not until President Johnson that our nation has undertaken a direct ~~attack~~ attack on poverty. Our expanding economy has improved conditions for most of our people, and many specific programs have alleviated the distress of others. But President Johnson has called for action to attack poverty at its roots and demanded that it be abolished now.

"In 1944 President Roosevelt foresaw the opportunities that an expanded economy would give in the postwar period and called for an 'economic bill of rights':

'The right of a useful and remunerative job;

'The right of every family to a decent home;

'The right

'The right to adequate medical care;

'The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment;

'The right to a good education.'

"This has been the inspiration of the Democratic Presidents that succeeded President Roosevelt. The Great Society of Lyndon Johnson is the mighty heir of the New Deal, by descent -- or perhaps, ascent -- through the Fair Deal of Harry Truman and the New Frontier of John Kennedy. It in no way belittles their great achievements to say that they are at least in part the unfinished business of the New Deal -- combined with new concepts to deal with the continuing hard struggle towards full social justice for which Roosevelt called. *demanded*

"The world that President Roosevelt foresaw as fulfilling our national requirements and aspirations can perhaps be best described by the Four Freedoms he called for, and their attainment 'everywhere in the world'. To this end the foundations of the United Nations were laid under his direction during the war. He knew from Wilson's bitter experience that it could not be left to the postwar period. *adds Stalin*

"President Truman understood the nature of the world responsibilities that our relatively overwhelming economic *re work* strength placed upon us in the immediate postwar world. The Truman Doctrine, with its aid to Greece and Turkey, was a revolution in our foreign policy. Never before had we undertaken

responsibilities in peacetime

such,
responsibilities in peacetime ~~outside the American Hemisphere,~~

This concept led to the Marshall Plan and NATO, on which the unprecedented prosperity of Europe ~~is now based~~ *was founded,*

Furthermore
"Truman took a major step in fulfilling one of the Four Freedoms when he called for the Point IV Program. Each successive President has supported ^{the} principle that the industrialized nations have an obligation to help the developing nations, a moral obligation, but more than that, a requirement for their ~~survival~~ ^{survival} and prosperity in peace.

"I would particularly like to recall President Kennedy's words in his Inaugural Address when he said:

'To those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves.... If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it can not save the few who are rich.'

"Tonight, as we view the rising expectations here at home, with all the difficulties and turmoil that they are causing, we also see similar [?] pressures in other parts of the world -- including Red China and eastern Europe. Stalin's dream of a monolithic structure of international communism has been shattered. The countries of [?] eastern Europe have been breaking

away from Moscow's

away from Moscow's rigid control. The peoples of each country are striving for greater freedom. The very diversity of the developments in each of the Eastern European countries in itself destroys the rigidity of Marx-Leninist dogma. If the proposals now talked of in Czechoslovakia are achieved, the whole concept of Communist dictatorship with its control of the individual will be undermined. Our policies must be adjusted to the changing world we see around us.

"Our most difficult situation is, of course, Vietnam -- perhaps the most complex we have faced since the War, though not the most dangerous. Historians will no doubt argue and disagree on the wisdom of various actions that have brought us to the present situation. For my part, I recall hearing President Roosevelt on more than one occasion state categorically that he had no intention of permitting the French to return to Indochina. Moreover, the French in 1946 themselves made a deal with Ho Chi Minh to give Vietnam its independence, but the French ^{failed to carry out} reneged on this commitment.

"In either of these cases we might have had a Vietnam under an Asian-type Titoist regime, dependent on support from the West as well as China.

But we cannot

"But we cannot reconstruct history. The United States now has a commitment on which it must make good. In its simplest form, it is to permit the people of South Vietnam to decide their own future without outside interference. At this time we are embarking on the first stage of the beginnings of negotiations for a peaceful settlement. No one can foresee clearly the road ahead. It is quite obvious, however, that patience will be required of the people of the United States as well as the negotiators. This is a difficult posture for Americans at any time, and particularly during an election year. In addition, there must be flexibility in the manner we seek our goals. But, above all, we must have determination and firmness to achieve our fundamental objective -- to permit the South Vietnamese to find their own solutions.

"It is my hope that negotiations can be concluded under the direction of President Johnson during the remaining months of his term of office. There is no man in the country who wants peace through an honorable settlement more than he does. In any event, I hope that favorable progress can be made during this period which will make it easier for the new President to carry on to a successful conclusion.

"More than this I cannot say tonight.

Looking back over

"Looking back over the postwar years, we see the extraordinary progress that has been made and the honorable role that the United States has played in these events. Progress has been gained through United States leadership, and it is unthinkable that we should turn aside now from world responsibilities. Yet today, as our friends become stronger, our role is altering and becoming more and more one of cooperation among equals in status. In brief, our policy should be that which Roosevelt prescribed for the Western Hemisphere -- a good neighbor[^] everywhere in the world."

MEMORANDUM

~~TOP SECRET~~

Bus file

10

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, May 4, 1968
3 pm

Mr. President:

Bus Wheeler, J.P. McConnell and I have met with Don Hornig to discuss the bombing campaign.

Don Hornig advanced the proposition that the enemy's major infiltration and resupply effort was not a result of your 31 March speech. We were all in agreement that the enemy began this effort at least a month earlier -- in order to recoup his heavy losses and to follow-up on his Tet offensive.

Hornig concludes, therefore, that a decision to expand the bombing would have no impact on the enemy. The rest of us conceded that expanding the bombing would probably have no impact on the enemy's intentions, but we felt that it would have a significant military impact on the enemy's costs and patterns of infiltration.

J.P. and Bus, in my view, made a persuasive case for the proposition that you can do a more effective job of interdiction if you have a larger area to work in so that the enemy has to run the guantlet for a longer period of time.

J.P. agreed that Hornig's estimate that the enemy probably loses 35% of his supplies in transit is as good as any. However, he feels that it is not proper to base future decisions on the past estimates that 25% have been destroyed in Laos and only 10% in North Vietnam. He notes that the 25% factor represents a major increase in bombing effectiveness in Laos. He expects that interdiction in North Vietnam in the coming months will improve by a factor of 3. He noted that Harold Brown thinks it could go up by a factor of 5.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-303

By us, NARA Date 10-1-97

~~TOP SECRET~~

We were all agreed that we ought to exact a high price for suspending the bombing in Route Package 1, but Bus, J.P., and I think we should also exact a significant price for Route Packages 2 and 3. J.P. especially emphasized that because of the enemy's logistics network any cutback below 18°45' involved significant military penalties. He and Bus also noted that because of the weather the bombing suspension north of 20° during April had not been excessively costly to us in the short run. Now that the rains have come to Laos, however, with the attendant improvement of weather in NVN, any bombing restrictions in NVN become increasingly significant militarily. Hence we feel that the bombing confers on us significant military advantages which should not be lightly tossed away at the negotiating table.

The underlying issue is our objection to Don Hornig's single factor analysis. The destruction of supplies destined for the South is a relevant and an easily measurable factor. Such an analysis pays lip service to other factors but ignores their importance in evaluating alternative air campaigns. To be valid an analysis must give due weight to these factors which are not so easily measurable: enemy will; economic, manpower, logistics, repair, and air defense costs, and alternative uses of resources.

Finally, Bus and J.P. indicated that they would be very receptive to any ideas that the scientific community might have on technical improvements in weapons and especially on ideas for telescoping the time to transform such ideas into effective operational systems.

W. W. ROSTOW

P file
11
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Saturday, May 4, 1968
3 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You should know that the enemy is
now mortaring Danang, Pleiku, Dalet and
Chu Lai.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Saturday, May 4, 1968 - 2:20pm

Mr. President:

This conversation between
Mac Bundy and Debryna on April 26
will interest you.

I have side-lined key passages.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 5-26-92

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

~~SECRET~~

NLJ 97-284

By is, NARA Date 2-23-98

April 30, 1968

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

I had lunch with Ambassador Dobrynin on Friday, April 26. The meeting was at my initiative but at his Embassy. The vodka and lobster were excellent. This was the most informal and candid of all my talks with Dobrynin.

1. My business in proposing the meeting was to enlist the Ambassador in an effort to get Gvishiani to lead a Soviet delegation to the Sussex meeting on "common problems of advanced societies." I described the situation as it now stands -- the British lead, the widespread response, and the remaining Soviet hesitation over the German problem. I told him that we were still anxious not to press for governmental decision, and he strongly agreed with this approach. Indeed he pressed for evidence that the Sussex meeting was nongovernmental, and I cited the fact that the formal invitation would come from Sussex University. I described Zuckerman's current proposal -- that the Soviets could bring anyone they like as part of their own group (including, by implication, an East German) and I suggested that a non-German Eastern country could probably be included if that would help. I also said that while our first purpose had been and still was to open a new line of serious communication with the Soviet Union, the project was beginning to take on a life of its own because of the intense interest it aroused in many countries, so that I could not tell him that the idea would wait indefinitely for the Russians; the Sussex meeting, for example, was now sure to happen. Dobrynin told me that he remained personally favorable to the project and would raise the matter both with Gvishiani and through official channels.

2. After our discussion on the suggested center for the study of common problems of advanced societies, the Ambassador surprised me by opening the subject of the Middle East with some energy. He said that he thought nothing could be done as long as the U. S. would not use its influence on Israel, and when I asked whether the Soviet Union was prepared to use its influence on the U. A. R., he not only did not say no, but seemed strongly interested in the possibility -- not today, but later, we agreed -- that the U. S. and the Soviet Union might have very private talks to examine the terms that each might be willing to support with its friends in the area. We reviewed some of the familiar pieces of the puzzle and while Dobrynin did not depart from the basic Soviet line, he was less resistant than I expected to my assertion that anyone who wanted the Israelis to withdraw from the Canal would have to say something about Israeli shipping through the Canal. (I do not myself regard the Canal as the central element in the problem, but I made that obvious point in reply to his standard ploy on withdrawal.) The deposit which the exchange left in my mind was that Dobrynin would be personally favorable to a policy of detente by little steps in this area, but that he

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was probably acting as a disavowable skirmisher. He also remarked that his government did not understand why we pressed the question of arms, when in its view the problem of arms was primarily a consequence and not a cause of the troubles there. I explained that the problem mattered greatly to us because it was an area where Soviet action was forcing U. S. action. He said that he himself recognized our problem but that it was hard to explain in Moscow. He also asserted with great firmness that his government had no intention of "fishing in troubled waters" in the Middle East. I expressed some skepticism, and he refined his point; he agreed that his government had interests and purposes of its own in the area, but he said it was not seeking military bases or a military position -- he said that they could easily have much more of that sort of thing if they wanted. I told him I was not a believer in the theory that the Soviet Union was trying to outflank NATO by military means in the Middle East. I thought it had more sense. I said that I thought the real question was whether Nasser could or would accept any constructive moves. On that point Dobrynin mentioned refugees, and then by common consent we turned to another subject. But the exchange suggests to me that there may be more Soviet readiness for serious talk than I have thought.

3. My exchange with Dobrynin on the subject of a site for Vietnam talks was brief. I opened it myself by saying that I was sure he was a man who could understand that Warsaw really was unacceptable from our standpoint. He answered that he did now understand this because he had been given a full explanation by Walt Rostow. He did not contest the matter at all. I found this mildly interesting because in the past Dobrynin has nearly always taken just a few minutes to give me the standard brand of argument when his government was pressing a particular propaganda position with energy. He then went on to say that he thought the people in Hanoi had expected Warsaw to be acceptable to us and that he himself would have shared this judgment before our position became clear. I said that I could understand this error but that I myself believed that the President's position was both persuasive and very firm indeed.

I did try to hint to Dobrynin that the unacceptability of Warsaw did not rule out a Communist capital. I did this by saying that in my own judgment Moscow would be a much better place than Warsaw. Dobrynin, as I expected, said that Moscow would be unacceptable for the Soviet Union because it would put them a shade too close to the action. I said I could understand that.

Dobrynin and I exchanged reminiscences about the selection of Glassboro. I raised the subject in order to demonstrate that agreement can be reached from quite different starting points in these matters. Dobrynin agreed, and told me what a hard time he had had in persuading Kosygin that the Americans were acting in good faith in proposing a military air base at one stage. He said that the Chairman had insisted that no one could be serious in proposing anything so obviously inappropriate. Dobrynin told me that this first reaction was based on the attitude the Soviets take toward their own air

bases, to which no one is invited in any circumstances. Dobrynin said he had explained that the crazy Americans thought their air bases were dandy places for receptions and entertainment of all sorts, and eventually the Chairman calmed down and settled for a polite Soviet explanation to us that an air base would not be understood by third parties.

4. In speaking of Glassboro, Dobrynin made an interesting comment on the exchange between Bob McNamara and Kosygin on the ABM. He said that both he and his Chairman had been gravely disappointed by McNamara's presentation. Given the degree of Dobrynin's candor on other subjects, I was much struck by the energy and firmness with which he associated himself with his principal on this point. He said that in their view McNamara had said nothing more than had already been said publicly by the Americans many times and had given them nothing concrete in terms of facts and figures which would show seriousness. I expressed my surprise, without arguing the point, and said that we on our side had been much disappointed by the Chairman's polemical and even propagandistic response. I asked Dobrynin whether he thought this subject remained one on which there could be really serious private exchanges, and he said that he did indeed think so. He said one of the things which had bothered them about the McNamara demarche at Glassboro was that it had taken place in rather a large group at luncheon. Dobrynin told me that the President had checked with him briefly before giving McNamara the go-ahead signal, and my impression was that he blamed himself for not having tried to steer the President off this tack at the time.

I myself continue to believe that Bob McNamara made a much more serious effort than Kosygin and Dobrynin apparently give him credit for, but from the point of view of the future I think the interesting point is that Dobrynin himself clearly thinks something better can be done on both sides. My own impression is that the best way to explore this subject further would be for the President or the Secretary to designate either McNamara himself or some other trusted and highly knowledgeable individual to explore it directly with Dobrynin. Talks with Dobrynin can be wholly secure, and all the evidence suggests that what is discussed with him gets reported effectively to the highest levels.

5. In informal conversation before lunch, Ambassador Dobrynin displayed a high degree of understanding of election-year politics in the United States. He seemed to have a clear and sympathetic appreciation of the positions of the leading candidates, and as always I think we are fortunate that a man of his caliber is reporting on American affairs to Moscow.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

INFORMATION

13

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, May 4, 1968 - 1:50 pm

Mr. President:

These talks with Thieu and Do reveal Vietnamese anxieties about Paris as the place for anything more than preliminary talks.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 26415

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-284
By jis, NARA Date 2-23-98

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WWRostow:rla



Department of State

John
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~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 26415

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REF : STATE 157537

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-281
By *us*, NARA Date 10.5.98

1. I SAW THIEU THIS MORNING AND GAVE HIM THE FULL ENGLISH TEXT OF DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT AND PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, BOTH OF WHICH HE READ CAREFULLY.

2. THIEU COMMENTED THAT HANOI'S STATEMENT WAS TYPICALLY COMMUNIST. HE THOUGHT THAT PARIS WAS SATISFACTORY FOR THE PRELIMINARY US/DRV TALKS BUT CONSIDERED THAT AS A SITE FOR THE SUBSEQUENT TALKS IT WOULD RAISE SERIOUS PROBLEMS HERE. HE ELABORATED BY SAYING THAT THERE WERE STILL MANY APPREHENSIONS AND MEMORIES OF FRANCE'S ACTIONS IN 1954 "WHEN THEY ABANDONED SOUTH VIET-NAM. HE WONDERED WHETHER THE FRENCH WOULD NOT TRY TO GAIN A MAJOR MEDIATING ROLE IN THE TALKS, ESPECIALLY IN ORDER TO REGAIN INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT FORMER FRENCH INDO-CHINA. HE THOUGHT THIS WAS ONE OF DEGAULLE'S PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES. THIEU WAS EQUALLY CONCERNED AT DEGAULLE'S OBVIOUS PARTISAN ATTITUDE TOWARD NVN AS COMPARED WITH HIS HIGHLY CRITICAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS US AND GVN CONDUCT OF THE WAR. HE CONCLUDED THEREFORE THAT SERIOUS SUSPICIONS WOULD BE AROUSED HERE AS TO WHETHER PARIS WAS AN ADEQUATELY NEUTRAL SITE FOR THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. I POINTED OUT THAT IT SEEMS TO US DEGAULLE AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO LEAN OVER BACKWARDS TO BE SCRUPULOUSLY FAIR AND TO AVOID PROBLEMS ARISING. IF THEY AROSE, WE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO CHANGE THE SITE. I ADDED THAT WE NOW HAD EVIDENCE OF THE DRV GIVING IN TWICE, FIRST, IN NOT AWAITING THE TOTAL CESSATION OF BOMBING FOR TALKS, AND SECOND, IN NOT INSISTING IN THE LAST ANALYSIS ON PHNOM PENH OR WARSAW. WE THEREFORE CONCLUDED THAT THEY WANTED TALKS AND HAD BEEN HURT. THIEU AGREED BUT WAS CONCERNED AT THE ADVANTAGE FOR HANOI FROM THE BOMBING BEING LIMITED TO SOUTH OF 20 DEGREE. HANOI WAS NOW ABLE TO BUILD UP ITS STRENGTH IN THE NORTH AND TO CONTINUE TO INFILTRATE AT A HIGH RATE IN THE SOUTH. I REMARKED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT WE HAD HEARD FROM VIENTIANE THAT THE MONSOON WAS BEGINNING AND COULD AFFECT INFILTRATION, BUT THIEU CLAIMED THAT THEY HAD SUFFICIENT ALL-WEATHER ROAD NOW

~~SECRET~~

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-2- SAIGON 26415, MAY 4. N O D I S

SO THAT THEY WERE IN A BETTER POSITION TO COPE WITH THE MONSOON SEASON AND IT WOULD NOT HAVE AS MUCH EFFECT AS WE HOPED.

4. THIEU ASKED AGAIN ABOUT THE "NO ADVANTAGE" FORMULA. I SAID THAT WE INTENDED TO KEEP UP FULL RECONNAISSANCE AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING DURING THIS PERIOD AND ADDED THAT I HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT WE HAD EXCELLENT JOINT US/GVN MEANS FOR DOING THIS. HE ASKED AGAIN ABOUT THE DMZ AND I REITERATED THAT ATTACKS OR INFILTRATION ACROSS THE DMZ WOULD BE CONSIDERED AS TAKING ADVANTAGE AND NOTED THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THE EXAMPLES WE WOULD GIVE THE DRV.

5. THIEU CONFIRMED THAT BUI DIEM WOULD BE THE PRINCIPAL GVN LIAISON OFFICER AT PARIS, ADDING THAT HE PLANNED TO LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON SUNDAY AND WOULD GO ON FROM THERE TO PARIS.

6. POLITICAL COUNSELOR CALLED ON FOREIGN MINISTER DO SIMULTANEOUSLY. DO ALSO CONSIDERED PARIS ACCEPTABLE AND STRESSED THAT THESE PRELIMINARY TALKS WOULD BE A TEST OF FRENCH BEHAVIOR AND INTENTIONS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED WITH SEVERAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FRENCH PRESS THIS MORNING AND HAD STRESSED THE SAME POINT WITH THEM, POINTING OUT THAT THE FRENCH MUST INDEED PLAY A COMPLETELY IMPARTIAL ROLE IF THEY WANT PARIS TO BE THE SITE FOR THE SUBSTANTIVE TALKS. DO SEEMED LESS CONCERNED THAN THIEU WITH THIS LATTER PROSPECT, AS HE FELT THAT DEGAULLE WAS SO EAGER TO KEEP THE TALKS IN PARIS THAT HE WOULD GO OUT OF HIS WAY TO SEE THAT AN IMPARTIAL ATMOSPHERE WAS MAINTAINED. POLITICAL COUNSELOR SAID WE ALSO EXPECTED THAT FRENCH WOULD BE ON THEIR GOOD BEHAVIOR.

7. DO WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD RECENTLY BEEN QUIETLY IN TOUCH WITH FRENCH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES. HE DID NOT SPECIFY HIS CHANNEL BUT MADE CLEAR THAT IT WAS NOT THE FRENCH CONSUL GENERAL HERE. HE HAD UNDERLINED WITH THEM THE IMPORTANCE OF FRANCE PLAYING A COMPLETELY NEUTRAL ROLE AND NOT SHOWING FAVORITISM TO NVN, POINTING OUT THE CONTINUING BAD FEELING EXISTING IN SVN FROM THE 1954 EXPERIENCE. DO WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE THOUGHT FRANCE WANTED TO PLAY A USEFUL ROLE HERE IN THE FUTURE, PARTICULARLY IN PRESERVING THEIR ECONOMIC INTERESTS, AND ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT THEY COULD PERHAPS BE INVOLVED IN THE ULTIMATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. DO STATED IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT DURING THESE CONTACTS WITH THE FRENCH, THEY HAD INDICATED A DESIRE TO RENEW DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SAIGON. HE TOLD THEM THIS WAS NOT YET THE TIME.

~~SECRET~~

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-3- SAIGON 26415, MAY 4. N O D I S

8. DO SAID THAT THE GVN WOULD BE ISSUING A BRIEF COMMUNIQUE LATER TODAY INDICATING THAT THE ALLIES HAD AGREED ON THE QUALIFICATIONS FOR A SITE AND THAT PARIS SEEMED TO MEET THEM SATISFACTORILY. HE ADDED THAT THE STATEMENT WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE GVN CONSUL GENERAL IN PARIS WOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO BE IN CLOSE LIAISON WITH THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES, BUT NO MENTION WOULD BE MADE AS YET OF THE ADDITIONAL GVN LIAISON GROUP.

9. POLITICAL COUNSELOR SAID THAT THESE DEVELOPMENTS MADE IT URGENT FOR US TO MOVE AHEAD ON OUR CONSULTATIONS REGARDING SOME OF THE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD BE FACING US IN THE FORTHCOMING TALKS. DO AGREED.

BUNKER
BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

14

ACTION

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, May 4, 1968 -- 1:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

The Jarring mission is running out of steam.

We have two choices: (1) We can make a last-minute effort to get negotiations going under Jarring; or (2) we can wait and face the problem of what to do when he resigns after he has submitted his final report. Doing anything significant either now or later will require some sort of heart-to-heart talk with Israel.

I believe that the situation has now reached a stage where no one but you should decide our course. Doing nothing now may well be a decision to let the Jarring mission die.

Unless you are confident that we are on the right course, I recommend a special meeting soon to hear argument on what our course should be.

W. W. Rostow

Set up a meeting _____

No _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-284
By is, NARA Date 2-23-98

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15
May 4, 1968

Send LDX to Ben Read, Department of State, from Walt Rostow

Following is message to General de Gaulle from the President,
to be transmitted through our Embassy Paris.

I am pleased we have found in Paris a place where both
sides can begin the process of making peace in Southeast Asia.
I shall always remember your response to my statement of
March 31 and appreciate the willingness of the Government of
France to make a place available on your soil.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ju/rq, NARA, Date 6-2-97

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

16

~~SECRET~~ [Redacted]

Pres file
EO 12958 3.4(h)(1) > 25Yrs
(C)

Saturday, May 4, 1968 - 8:45 am

Mr. President:

The latest CIA estimate is that more than 80,000 troops have been deployed towards South Vietnam from the North in the first 4 months of 1968.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-329
By Chm, NARA, Date 8-21-01

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

INFORMATION

17

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, May 4, 1968 - 8:40am

Mr. President:

Herewith Thieu agrees to June 18-19 for his visit; although he does not wish to announce until after he makes his cabinet changes in mid-May.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Salgon 26388

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *ju/rq*, NARA, Date 6-2-97

~~SECRET LIMDIS~~

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HCE362

1968 MAY 4 05 29

PAGE 01 SAIGON 26388 040523Z

14
ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00, /070 W

P R 040500Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1973
INFO CINCPAC FOR POLAD

~~SECRET SAIGON 26388~~

LIMDIS

REF : STATE 156719

SUBJ: STATE VISIT BY PRESIDENT THIEU

1. THIEU AGREED YESTERDAY JUNE 18-19 DATE. WE DID NOT RPT NOT DISCUSS TIMING OF ANNOUNCEMENT, SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO THINK ABOUT THIS. MY GUESS IS THAT HE WILL NOT WANT IT ANNOUNCED UNTIL AFTER HE MAKES HIS CABINET CHANGES IN MID-MAY.

2. MRS. THIEU WILL ACCOMPANY.

~~PAGE 2 RUMJIR 26388 SECRET~~

3. WE WILL WORK UP SPECIFIC PROGRAM AND SUBMIT SOONEST. I DISCOURAGED THE IDEA OF HIS ADDRESSING JOINT LEGISLATIVE SESSION ON GROUNDS THIS IS NOT RPT NOT USUAL NOW, WHILE SOME YEARS AGO IT WAS FREQUENT PRACTICE. I SAID THAT I THINK BUI DIEM WILL BE LOOKING INTO THIS ASPECT OF VISIT WHEN HE RETURNS TO WASHINGTON. (I THINK IF THIEU MEETS SOME SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN IT WILL SATISFY HIS REQUIREMENTS.)

BUNKER

~~SECRET LIMDIS~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-281
By WJ, NARA Date 10-5-98

INFORMATION

18

Saturday, May 4, 1968 -- 8:40 am

Mr. President:

Herewith a good statement by
Gorton on the Paris site.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Canberra 5425

wwrostow:rlh

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HCE358

1968 MAY 4 04 27

PAGE 01 CANBER 05425 040418Z

14
ACTION EA 15

INFO SA 01,SSO 00,CCO 00,USIE 00,NSCE 00,CIAE 00,DODE 00,GPM 04,H 02,
INR 07,L 03,NSAE 00,NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02,SS 20,SAH 03,SAL 01,
IO 13,ACDA 16,EUR 15,RSR 01,/118 W

O P 040400Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2346
INFO AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY

UNCLAS CANBERRA 5425

FOLLOWING STATEMENT HAS JUST BEEN RELEASED TO PRESS BY PRIME
MINISTER GORTON:

QUOTE: "AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WELCOMES FACT THAT SITE FOR
TALKS HAS NOW BEEN AGREED BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND HANOI,
AND THAT DATE FOR BEGINNING TALKS HAS BEEN SET.

SELECTION OF SITE ACCORDS WITH VIEWS OF
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS BEEN KEPT CONSTANTLY INFORMED,
OVER PAST FEW WEEKS, BY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AS TO
SUGGESTIONS FOR SITE AND HAS PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY
EXPRESSED VIEW THAT WE THOUGHT IT PREFERABLE FOR SITE

~~PAGE 2 RUEHBAC 5425 UNCLAS~~
TO BE ONE WHICH WAS NEUTRAL.

OUR VIEWS ON THIS MATTER HAVE ALSO BEEN EXCHANGED IN COMMUNICA-
TIONS WITH GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND WITH OTHER
COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTING FORCES TO VIETNAM.

WE BELIEVE THAT WHAT HAS BEEN AGREED IS STEP FORWARD. BUT
IT IS ONLY ONE STEP AND IT IS LIKELY THAT LONG AND HARD
NEGOTIATIONS LIE AHEAD BEFORE WE WILL KNOW WHETHER THOSE
NEGOTIATIONS WILL IN FACT LEAD TO HOPED FOR JUST AND
LASTING PEACE." END QUOTE. CRONK

UNCLASSIFIED

INFORMATION

19

~~SECRET~~
E.O. 13526, sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-287

By cb, NARA Date 9-25-00

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, May 4, 1968
8:35 a. m.

Mr. President:

In the light of this report that the North Koreans might attack South Korea soon -- and other uneasy signals -- the intelligence community is working hard on a fresh assessment of North Korean intentions.

You may be receiving a request to sanction a reconnaissance flight over North Korea.

W. W. Rostow



~~SECRET~~

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

WWRostow:rln

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• PRIORITY

IN-03501

19a

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	DDO	ONE	CRS
	DDI	EXO						OER	FBI	DCS	IRS	AID	USIA

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

032036Z

CITE

DIST 3 MAY 1968

COUNTRY: NORTH KOREA


EO 12958 3.3(b) (1) >25Yrs
(C)

DOI:

SUBJECT: NORTH KOREA'S INTENTION TO ATTACK SOUTH KOREA
AND THUS DIVERT AMERICAN POWER AWAY FROM VIETNAM

ACQ:

SOURCE:



SUMMARY: NORTH KOREA CANNOT TRAIN ZAPU UNCONVENTIONAL
WARFARE CANDIDATES AT THIS TIME BECAUSE IT EXPECTS TO BE
IN A STATE OF WAR SOON. NORTH

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-285 and RAC 001-2564-18
By 112, NARA, Date 10-9-03

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(classification) (dissem controls)

KOREA INTENDS TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK AGAINST SOUTH KOREA SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE OPENING OF "SERIOUS" NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH VIETNAM FOR SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM WAR. THE NORTH KOREANS BELIEVE THE AMERICANS WILL SHIFT A LARGE PORTION OF THEIR MILITARY POWER TO KOREA TO PROTECT SOUTH KOREA AND THUS WEAKEN ITS POSITION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH HANOI. END OF SUMMARY.

1. ETHAN DUBE, TOP ZAPU INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, TRAVELED TO NORTH KOREA IN MID-APRIL ON A NORTH KOREAN TRAVEL GRANT TO DISCUSS NORTH KOREAN TRAINING OF ZAPU UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE CANDIDATES. COMMENT: ZAPU ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL EDWARD NDLOHUVU VISITED NORTH KOREA LAST MAY AND NEGOTIATED AN AGREEMENT FOR NORTH KOREA TO TRAIN 18 ZAPU MEN. ZAPU ACTING PRESIDENT JAMES ROBERT CHIKEREMA HAD ASKED THE NORTH KOREAN EMBASSY IN DAR ES SALAAM TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF TRAINEES TO "40 OR 50").

2. DUBE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM WITH A "HIGH-LEVEL OFFICER" IN THE NORTH KOREAN PREMIER'S OFFICE ON 22 APRIL.

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~~~SECRET~~

IN-03501

[REDACTED]

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(classification) (dissem controls)

(FIELD COMMENT: THE NORTH KOREAN OFFICER WAS NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED.)

3. THE NORTH KOREAN SAID IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO TRAIN THE ZAPU MEN AT THIS TIME BECAUSE THE NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT EXPECTED VERY SOON TO BE IN A "STATE OF WAR". DUBE SAID HE PRESSED THIS POINT BY ASKING IF THE NORTH KOREANS EXPECTED WAR TO RESULT FROM THE PUEBLO AFFAIR. THE KOREAN OFFICER SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT FIGHT OVER THE PUEBLO. HOWEVER, HE SAID IT WAS A CERTAINTY THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD FIGHT TO PROTECT SOUTH KOREA.

4. THE NORTH KOREAN THEN TOLD DUBE THAT NORTH KOREA INTENDED TO ATTACK SOUTH KOREA MILITARILY JUST AS "SERIOUS" NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN NORTH VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES BEGIN. THIS MOVE WILL DIVERT AMERICAN MILITARY POWERE FROM VIETNAM, FRIGHTEN THE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP, AND STRENGTHEN NORTH VIETNAM'S NEGOTIATING POSITION.

THE NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT AGREED TO TRAIN THE

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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IN-03501

[Redacted]

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(classification) (dissem controls)

ZAPU MEN AFTER CURRENT TENSIONS EASED.

6. [Redacted] DISSEM: STATE CINCMEAFSA (ALSO SENT [Redacted],

[Redacted] SAIGON) CINPAC, ARPAC, PACFLT, PACAF.

~~REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

19-6

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SOO ONE CRB
DDI EXO OER FBIS DCS IRS AID USIA

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CITE

DIST 3 MAY 1968

COUNTRY NORTH KOREA

Min 3 19 46 Z

EO 12958 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

DOI

SUBJECT MILITANT MOOD OF STUDENTS IN NORTH KOREA

ACQ

SOURCE

1.

2. P'YONGYANG, 28 FEBRUARY 1968-- "YOU PROBABLY WILL THINK UNIFICATION OF THE FATHERLAND IS SOMETHING TO BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED, AND WHAT I AM TRYING TO TELL YOU IS WHAT UNIFICATION OF THE FATHERLAND IMPLIES. UNIFICATION MEANS WAR, DRIVING OUT THE AMERICANS. I HAVE LEARNED TO SHOOT AT SCHOOL AND WILL PROBABLY JOIN THE ARMY WHEN THE WAR BREAKS OUT. I MAY LIVE OR BE KILLED WHEN THE WAR BREAKS OUT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-285
By *id*, NARA, Date 10-9-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

BUT OUT COUNTRY WILL WIN AND THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT IT. OUR COUNTRY IS READY TO FIGHT AT ANY TIME THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS INVADE. IF THEY DON'T INVADE, THEN WE PROBABLY WILL DO IT. I KNOW THIS WELL BECAUSE I AM HERE. I DON'T CARE ONE WAY OR THE OTHER ABOUT THE WAR. BUT, WHAT I WANT TO SAY IS THAT WHEN THE WAR BREAKS OUT YOU IN JAPAN WILL BE IN THE WORST DANGER. THE AMERICANS WILL NOT BE THE ONLY ONES WHO WILL FIGHT IN THIS WAR. JAPANESE TROOPS ARE NOW STUDYING KOREAN LANGUAGE. THE OUTBREAK OF ARMED UP-RISING IN SOUTH KOREA AND THE SEIZURE OF THE AMERICAN SHIP RECENTLY ARE ALL INTER-RELATED. OUR COUNTRY HAS WAITED FOR THIS CHANCE. WAR IS SURE TO COME. WHEN THE WAR BREAKS OUT, YOU WILL BE SUBJECT TO SEVERE OPPRESSION. KOREANS IN JAPAN MUST UNITE TO STOP OPPRESSION. EVEN IF UNITED, YOU WILL STILL BE OPPRESSED. YOU ARE AMONG THE ENEMY. IF YOU WERE IN JAPAN'S SHOES, WOULD YOU LEAVE THE KOREANS ALONE WHO ARE JAPAN'S ENEMY WHEN THE WAR BREAKS OUT? WHEN I FIRST RETURNED TO KOREA THERE WAS TALK ABOUT THE WAR BREAKING OUT. BUT, EVERYONE IS MORE TENSE THESE DAYS THAN THEN, AND OUTBREAK OF WAR IS AN ACCEPTED FACT. IT WILL GET UNDERWAY BY 1970. YOU KNOW NOW WHY THE SAILING OF THE REPAT SHIP WAS DISCONTINUED."

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3. P'YONGYANG, 20 FEBRUARY 1968-- "WE ARE PREPARED FOR ANY
EVENTUALITY TO FIGHT FACE TO FACE WITH THE ENEMY, AND THE NON-

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(classification)

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

IN

[Redacted]

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

COMBATANTS ARE ORGANIZED FOR A SEMI-WAR STATE."

4. [Redacted] DISSEM: CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC STATE [Redacted]

[Redacted] USFJ NSAPAC/J 5AF COMNAVJ NISOJ USARJ [Redacted]

[Redacted] (ALSO SENT [Redacted]).

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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INFORMATION

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/AC 00-329
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-21-01

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) > 25 Yrs
(C)

Handwritten signature

~~SECRET~~



Friday, May 3, 1968 -- 8:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a CIA warning of attacks in relation to negotiations.

You should know that, on a purely personal basis, I talked to Gen. Wheeler about this problem -- noting among other things that May 8 is the date of both the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the opening of the Geneva Conference of 1954.

He will assure Westy is fully alert.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

20a

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Sc No. 08360/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
3 May 1968

SANTITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/KAC 00-330
By CBM, NARA, Date 9-13-01

MEMORANDUM


SUBJECT: Hanoi's Paris Initiative and the Possibility of a New Communist Military Offensive

1. The timing of Hanoi's move to break the deadlock on selection of a site for talks with the US may well be related to Vietnamese Communist preparations--apparently nearing completion--to launch major offensive military actions. The North Vietnamese may hope to push political developments in the war along to the point where they can be most directly orchestrated with Communist military plans in South Vietnam. There have been numerous indications that the Communists are gearing up for another major offensive, most likely in the months of May or June. Hanoi may have feared that if the deadlock over the site of talks persisted much longer, the political impact of any new military push would have been largely lost. In view of its decision some months ago to move to a "fight-talk" stage of the war, Hanoi would probably wish to prevent such a development if possible.

2. At the time of their 3 April offer of "contacts" with the US, the North Vietnamese may have anticipated fairly rapid progress toward a full bombing halt and the initiation of formal talks on a settlement of the war. Communist military activities in April may have been specifically tailored to the prospective diplomatic dialogue. The drop in major enemy military initiatives in early April may have been intended in part to improve the atmosphere for preliminary contacts with the US designed to obtain a

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.

3.4(b)(1)



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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

full bombing cessation. Meanwhile, the Communists, used the lull to prepare for large-scale offensive operations by early May, when Hanoi may have expected substantive discussions to be under way. Indeed the Communists may have expected the US response to a negotiating offer to be rapid and thus keep their military and diplomatic timetables synchronized. This could account for their quite precipitous addition of Warsaw to Phnom Penh, once the US had rejected the latter.

3. Heavy North Vietnamese infiltration and logistics operations in support of Communist forces in South Vietnam accelerated in April. Major Communist military units in several parts of the south continued the disengagements they had started in late March. Some units withdrew from their usual areas of tactical operations in order to resupply and to be reinforced. The heavy flow of infiltrators from North Vietnam doubtless is being used to beef up existing units and to help form new ones. The entire effort probably was carried on with a view toward applying heavy military pressures during a period of negotiations.

3.4(b)(1) 4. The question of exact timing in kicking off any new offensive is still highly conjectural, even if the Communists are attempting to tie it in with political developments. A number of reports [redacted] [redacted] have said that major attacks would be launched between late April and early May. Other reports, however, have said such attacks would occur between early May and 19 May; still others have mentioned later dates. There are indications in some areas--especially Saigon and I Corps--that attacks may well be imminent, although their timing and scope may be upset by allied operations.

5. In sum, the evidence suggests that attacks could come at any time but we are unable to state with confidence whether they will occur before 10 May. Hanoi could be planning to launch major military actions in South Vietnam just before or shortly after the opening of the Paris talks. We think it equally possible, however, that major Communist military initiatives in the South may be held back for a while in the hope that preliminary contacts will soon

- 2 -

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bring about a full bombing halt. Once this is accomplished, offensive actions could be geared to obtain a maximum impact in ensuing discussions on substantive war issues.

6. The latest report we have of the timing of Communist military operations in the Saigon area indicates that attacks on the city and nearby installations may be launched in the next few days, [redacted]

[redacted]

3.4(b)(1)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
~~SECRET SAVIN~~

INFORMATION

21

Friday, May 3, 1968 -- 7:45 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

The author of this is an old Yugoslav anti-Communist who works somewhere in the Pentagon. There is a great deal of wisdom in it, although one need not agree with every word.

His comment on the characteristics required of the U. S. delegation (pp. 6-9) I would accept.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

S. N. Bjelajac/76497
18 April 1968

THOUGHTS ON PEACE TALKS WITH HANOI AND ON THE
PROBLEM OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT

I. General

1. In view of pending peace talks with Hanoi it is imperative to re-examine the formula of Communist negotiations strategy and to alert the US negotiators relative to the problems they will undoubtedly confront during negotiations with our communist enemies.

2. It is assumed that the US will have a considerable, if not decisive, role in negotiations (particularly in regard to continuation of the war or disengagement from it), although the final acceptance of settlement or resumption of war in Vietnam may entirely depend on the views of the Government of South Vietnam. The Government of South Vietnam may not necessarily follow the US advice; if it believed the peace terms were unacceptable from the point of view of security of South Vietnam. It is assumed that the other allies, with the possible exception of Korea, may support the US position and conform to a US decision. South Vietnam and Korea share at this time almost the same feeling in regard to the security of the area and dangers from communist expansion; their geographic position is in the part of the world which is in grave danger of Chinese Communist inundation.

3. Generally, the US negotiators must expect negotiations to be of long duration; the duration of the talks will depend almost exclusively on the enemy and his willingness to prolong it as long as he sees an advantage of so doing. All indications and Hanoi's behavior in the last two years confirms this belief: it is difficult to see the end of negotiations under the conditions Hanoi is trying to impose upon the US, and under existing unfavorable psychological settings now prevailing both in the US and around the world. Hanoi will not need to hurry since the bombing of North Vietnam, which materially and psychologically hurts the Hanoi war effort the most, is successfully, partially if not entirely, resolved. And as long as the US will keep the bombing pause, each day is a clear gain for Hanoi, politically and militarily. Of course, needless to say, each such day is a clear loss for the United States and her Allies.

4. Some of Hanoi's specific objectives in prolonging peace-talks as long as possible are the following:

a. Recuperation from serious, if not irreparable, setbacks the NLF suffered since the US and Allies undertook the offensive two years ago;

b. Repositioning of political and military forces for new assaults and new threats, and for psychological purposes;

c. ~~For hidden political and subversive purposes (all for bargaining).~~

5. One must expect that Hanoi will seize every opportunity to generate new problems, and to provoke new weaknesses within and among Allies, particularly in regard to public opinion, in hopes to force US and Allies to accept its terms. One must expect that talks may and probably will generate additional dangers and risks which may indeed exceed those connected with the continuation of war itself. The enemy will tend, hopefully without success, to defeat the real reason and purpose for which the United States and Allies have entered the war.

6. Hanoi regards negotiations as not a means of achieving a real settlement or peace, but as a means to gain their own terms. Moscow's seemingly positive attitude towards settlement (by influencing Hanoi to enter talks for peace), may be a well devised Soviet strategy to make US and Allies believe that the Kremlin is really interested in genuine peace, even if on US terms. This attitude is helping Hanoi more than the US and Allies since Hanoi and not the US, is hard pressed for time to recuperate from something which looks like a defeat. Only a few days ago (10 April, 1968), the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party called for a greater offensive against the West and made the statement that there cannot be peaceful settlement of different ideologies and systems of government. The war of ideologies, particularly the communist ideology against those of the West, is once again redeclared. This means that the wars of subversion, the so-called wars of national liberation, will continue even with more intensity. Formal settlement of war in Vietnam, which would not surrender the country to the communists, would surely mean for the communists a need for continuation of the war by subversion.

7. In the words of Hanoi's leadership, ~~the communist strategy is~~ "fighting while negotiating with an aim at opening another front". One of the "another fronts", we may be sure, ~~will be a much more intensified politico-psychological effort through use of which the communists will~~ try to separate Americans from the South-Vietnamese people, and the peoples of both countries from the "ruling cliques" and governments. This already has proved to be successful to a certain degree. But still more time for this is needed. The more time available the better. This strategy may result in greater political problems for the US; even more than if the war were escalated, although ~~an escalation would probably~~ lead to a quick end of it. Neither Chinese nor Soviets would risk a war for it. Further, the Chinese could ~~do little if anything if~~ confronted with a fait accomplis.

8. The term "fighting while negotiating" must not deceive the US negotiators. Even if the Viet Cong stop all combat operations and movement of troops within the combat zone, and movement of supplies and troops

from North to South, that would mean his renunciation of hostilities by about 30 per cent (30%) only, since he has other weapons in his arsenal. His most dangerous and effective weapons are politico-psychological warfare and other subversive and sabotage operations (about 70% of his war effort) which he will continue to use without any restraint and with assured expectations of success. Of course, the principal targets are human beings. Actions by his militant infrastructure will include not only political agitation and propaganda, but direct and indirect pressure against the people and the Government of South Vietnam, and on public opinion abroad. In addition efforts will be made to incite student rioting, labor to slow down production, strikes in transportation and public facilities, and to pitch the political and religious groups into conflict with each other. This may well create chaos in South Vietnam from which only a well-disciplined organization, as the communists are, may profit. They may prove to be the only ones capable to deal with the chaos. The communist parties must be credited with such a capability since in the past they never have refrained from imposition of order by use of bloody suppression and of ruthless extermination of all opposition. The subversive infrastructure in South Vietnam may use for its support the Front Organizations, which although not fully communist oriented, often tend to support the communist cause for a variety of reasons.

9. It must be pointed out that never in the history of communism has a Communist Party offered or accepted negotiations out of strength. The contrary is true. The communists offered and accepted talks only when they were forced to do so because of circumstances; this because of a critical situation and/or weakness. Being masters of deceit and bluff, unparalleled in history, they were able to give the appearance of strength under conditions of real desperation and weakness, and even when they were on the brink of defeat. This was my experience in dealing with the communists in WW II in a situation similar to that in South Vietnam today. All indicates that this is the case now.* Thus the US offer of talks is in itself a great success for Hanoi and NLF. ~~And it is difficult not to agree with those who believe that the enemy is close to collapse.~~ South Korean General Chae Myung Shin recently stated (10 April 1968) "that at this time only a little more push is needed to win the war."

* It is not difficult to bluff in this type of war where a few resolute individuals with rockets in hand can knock down and set fire to hundreds of parked aircraft and vehicles, set a successful ambush, assassinate Marine Guards in front of the US Embassy, or penetrate in civilian-clothes into Saigon, and so on. Psychological effects of such actions are always easier for the communist to achieve when they have as their opposing enemy people who are not psychologically prepared to accept these things and when the press, because of ignorance, contributes more to a negative psychological effect than the enemy actions do.

II. Coalition Government

1. Hanoi and the NLF will seek a "coalition government" as soon as they realize that they cannot get something more, since the mechanism of "coalition governments" proved to be very useful to the communists in the past. They know very well how to utilize it for achievement of their goals. The idea of coalition looks particularly attractive at this time in view of the Presidential election in US since some candidates have already promised Hanoi a coalition government in which the NLF would be represented.

2. Dangers of a coalition government should not be overlooked. One must be especially careful because of the situation in Vietnam which is characterized by weaknesses which lend themselves to exploitation. The weak and immature political institution that exists in South Vietnam has no great chance to survive. More sophisticated nations like Czechoslovakia (to mention one only) could not survive it. The divided political parties and religious groups with opposite beliefs and goals represent a special weakness. Weak and inexperienced, lacking organization, discipline, and well-established goals, these parties and groups cannot begin to compete with the organization, discipline, and strategy of the NLF.

3. There should be an absolute veto of either a Hanoi representation in a coalition government or even a liaison or diplomatic mission, or a cultural or similar group. This could perhaps be allowed later, and only when the situation in South Vietnam improves and stabilizes, and when both the North and South Vietnam Governments agree on establishment of normal diplomatic relations. Such a Hanoi representation on a coalition government would only contribute to subversion in South Vietnam by Hanoi.

4. The crucial point on which the US must insist is that NLF be given representation in a coalition government equivalent to what NLF really represents in terms of people. Control of parts of the territory, particularly if expressed only in terms of percentage, should be of less importance, although the South Vietnam Government assets in that regard are incomparably higher (80%) than those of NLF (20%). And, the NLF controls mostly the jungle and only a small part of the fertile land. Since the amount of representation to be given to the NLF is generally a problem least understood, and represents a real slippery ground, the US delegates must keep in mind the following:

a. Strength of all kinds of Viet Cong troops amounts to a total of about 300,000 or less, which is equal to two per cent (2%) out of total (17.2 million) of South Vietnam population. North Vietnamese regulars cannot be included in the NLF's assets.

b. Number of the NLF supporters (its infrastructure) in the government controlled areas which willingly support VC effort has been rapidly

*I disagree.
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formula*

diminishing, particularly after the TET offensive, and is today not more than 120,000 - 170,000 personnel or 1% of the total South Vietnam population. There may be an additional 1% of passive supporters who were coerced into supporting the VC infrastructure and will abandon it as soon as the fear of coercion ceases to exist. These should not be counted in NLF's assets. Neither should the so-called Front Organizations which are not communist organizations, but from time to time are exploited by the communists.

c. It is estimated that there are about 2.4 million of the population in so-called VC territories. Out of this number, the VC may, at the best, control not more than 240,000 or 10% of that population. This is based on experiences in the past. A very loose, if at all, control of the rest (90%) is a question of the actual situation of movement of the troops of either side closer to that population or of the combat situation. Control of these 90% can be attributed as an asset to either side. These 2.4 million were never given a chance to vote and freely select their sides.

d. In summing up, NLF controls not more than 660,000 - 710,000 individuals all together, or 4% of the total South Vietnamese population (17.2 million).

e. Considering what the enemy really represents in terms of people, the NLF should be given the 4% representation in a coalition government. It is advisable not to give NLF this percentage of representation in each ministry of the government (because of possible subversion and sabotage) but to give it some Ministry (Department of the Government) in which they can hurt the nation least. The Ministries of Police, National Defense, Education, and Transportation should in no case be given to the communists. The Ministry of Labor or Agriculture should be acceptable to them.

III. Few Suggestions in Regard to U.S. Conditions for Peace Talks

If an agreement is reached that both sides should stop fighting during talks, the following should be added to probably existing agenda as the US conditions for continuation of talks:

1. Hanoi and NLF must stop not only combat operations and movement and repositioning of troops within combat zones in South Vietnam, but also all activities of infrastructure and utilization of Front Organizations for political and other covert type activities. The US objective should be to force the enemy infrastructure to register as a NLF agent and make it come into the open; and the Front Organization either to completely stop giving support to their infrastructure and to NLF, or to openly register as a NLF agent. It is of crucial importance that all subversive politico-psychological and other operations and activities among the people by these organizations be completely stopped.

2. Hanoi and NLF must stop their aggression and subversion in Laos, Thailand and Cambodia, to prove their sincere desire for peace in the area. This is an important condition since the enemy may divert his military means for Vietnam in order to increase hostile activities in these countries.

3. The problem of aggression in Vietnam should not be separated from the total problem of subversive war in the whole area. If this is not accomplished the peace talks and agreements reached in regard to South Vietnam would not, generally speaking, improve the US situation in SE Asia. The US would have to regroup her forces into Thailand and probably Laos in order to cope with new problems there. This would be a clear loss for the US since all gains in South Vietnam would be abandoned and left to mercy of an eventual renewed action by the enemy; the psychological effect may be irreparable. There is little doubt that the US would ever be able to rebuild what she had lost in Vietnam and start all over again in order to give another chance for SE Asia to survive continued communist onslaughts.

IV. Points to Keep in Mind at the Bargaining Table

1. US should not permit the Hanoi Government and the NLF to be considered two separate parties at talks since that would give them an unnecessarily better bargaining position, possibly two votes. The whole war in South Vietnam is directed by Hanoi and since the NLF is an instrument of Hanoi, therefore, both should be considered one single bargaining party.

2. US delegation must always keep in mind that the US is talking from the position of strength and the enemy from the position of weakness. Fact is that the US strength and US successes in battlefield in Vietnam are real and the VC is at the brink of defeat. This must be considered a fact no matter what the US and foreign ill-informed and unfriendly newspapers, and leftist-pacifist elements may say and believe.

3. The US delegates must also keep in mind probable repercussion of peace talks not only on the psychological attitude of Southeast Asia, and Korea, but also on the whole world; on the credibility of the US policies and attitudes; and on all long term politico-military and economic consequences of the talks.

4. NLF may change its name to something more attractive for the nationalist elements to join and to bring in a wider membership and obtain better support, but will never give up the party's leadership and control of such a wider group. The name of "National Alliance for Peace" was announced by NLF during and after the TET offensive. One must be prepared to deal with this problem; this trick must not be allowed to go unchallenged.

5. NLF may request as a condition for coalition that no officials of Saigon Government, or otherwise influential patriotic individuals, can be accepted as peace-talks delegates of Saigon Government if they served the French or Diem Regime or were on friendly terms with these. This excludes almost all members of South Vietnam Government, all the important military and civilian personnel of that government and almost all influential citizens. With such a request, to which NLF will give the widest possible publicity, the communists will try to discredit patriotic elements in the eyes of people and to eliminate from talks the first-rate negotiators.

6. Hanoi and NLF may come out with numerous proposals which must be carefully weighed. Here are some possibilities:

a. Proposal to organize "National Union Democratic Government" which would "guarantee basic freedoms to all citizens" (freedom of speech, residence, assembly, press, association, etc). Such a government organized by NLF, or controlled by NLF, would only assure a total communist take-over of South Vietnam.

b. "Montagnard will be given the option of autonomous regions, or their own governments, whatever they may wish," is another probable proposal in order to divide the nation and subjugate its parts separately (divide et impera).

c. "South Vietnam would establish diplomatic relations with East and West and would accept aid from any country that offered it." The slogan is tailored to soften the position of the US negotiators.

d. "Large landowners would not have their properties confiscated."*

e. "Religious orders could continue to belong to their own churches and pagodas."

f. "Chinese would not be forced to adopt Vietnamese citizenship."

g. "Capitalists would be encouraged to expand their operations in industry and trade."

h. If talks develop with no satisfaction for NLF the communists may even go so far to request recognition of their sovereignty over so-called territory under VC control. From that territory as a base the subversion would start as soon as reinforcement and supplies have been brought in from the North. One must be ready for all these and similar slogans to properly react and to inform the public of South Vietnam what to expect if the communist regime is installed in Saigon.

* Number of landowners executed in 1954-1956 by Ho in North Vietnam was about 10,000. People's courts were given a mandatory quota of death sentences for each town and village.

i. Prominent Catholics in South Vietnam have begun talking about migration out of Vietnam to Australia or Canada should the time come that peace talks seem headed toward a coalition government.* This is an additional problem which one must keep in mind and be ready to deal with in case of concessions to the enemy.

j. Hanoi and NLF will play a coordinated game during talks in order to harass the US and Allies, to delay talks, to gain time, to weaken US determination and firmness, to denigrate the principles which US advocates, and to attempt to weaken her determination by eroding her patience. General lack of patience, which is our national weakness, will be tested and the communists know how to exploit it.

V. Suggestions in Regard to the Composition of US Negotiating Team.

There is no doubt the US will select the most capable high level negotiators, therefore, my remarks here are directed to the middle and lower level action officers and diplomatic personnel, who will have to support the effort of their superiors, but also may come into position directly or indirectly to influence the strategy of talks and solutions.

1. In order to understand correct meanings of the communist terms and jargon in general, and to avoid traps, it is indispensable that only US personnel thoroughly knowledgeable of these be considered for selection. These persons must know or be supported by personnel who understand the enemy strategy of conquest and have a solid knowledge of the communist ideological and doctrinal approach to the "problems of negotiating with the capitalist enemy." No panel or working groups should be without such knowledgeable persons. It would be a grave mistake to appoint self-styled experts and otherwise good solid citizens, good patriots, but who are ignorant of the nature of problems and of tricks or finesses involved. Without true knowledge of the enemy strategy of conquest, doctrines and ideologies, and of ways the communists are doing things, even the smartest individual is exposed to the risk of making irreparable mistakes.

2. The members of the US negotiating team must keep in mind that the Asiatic mentality, background, education and philosophy, combined with the communist ideologies and morality, hate for "colonialism," "imperialism," and especially hate for the US "neo-colonialism" and "aggression," will characterize the opposite members at the negotiating table. Such a NLF member would be Nguyen Huu Tho, Chairman of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, a well known French educated anti-American even before the war; he is a communist and well-known poker player with great skill at bluff.

3. Defeatists and pessimists should not be made members of the negotiating team. No individual who cannot rid himself (or herself)

* New York Times, 7 April 1968, article by A. J. Langguth.

from prejudices and wrong conceptions (for example, that the US cannot win in Vietnam or that US and Allies have not already made great accomplishments on the battlefield and in the field of pacification) should be included in the US delegation.

4. ~~Weaklings by nature and people without patience and courage, and without adequate mental and physical endurance, should not be included in the US group.~~

VI. Recommendation

Recommend the contents of this paper, or parts of it, be brought to the attention of Chief of Staff of the Army, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, May 3, 1968 - 7:35pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit with Parliamentary Delegation from Viet-Nam

A delegation from the two houses of the new National Assembly in Viet-Nam will be in Washington May 10-14. They were invited by a group of House members.

In the attached, Secretary Rusk strongly recommends that you agree to receive the delegation during their visit here. They would deeply appreciate the opportunity for a personal meeting. Such a session would underline your support for moves toward representative government in South Viet-Nam.

The delegation is composed of six Senators and six Representatives.

I concur in Secretary Rusk's recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Will see delegation _____

Prefer not to meet _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By AG, NARA, Date 5-29-92

WWR:WJJ:pas:5/4/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON22a

May 2, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for Delegation from
National Assembly of Viet-NamRecommendation:

I suggest that you receive a delegation from the National Assembly of Viet-Nam when they are in Washington during the period May 10-14. The delegation will hold informal discussions with a group of 26 Members of the House of Representatives, who invited them to visit the United States.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Background:

The six Senators and six Lower House Deputies on the delegation were selected by the memberships of their respective chambers. The delegation is a politically prestigious one, especially the Senators. Following their stay in Washington they will divide into two or more groups for field trips to other cities. They hope to acquaint the American public with the facts of South Viet-Nam's case. In their presentations they can be expected to take a strongly nationalistic line on such questions as negotiations.

I believe you would find it useful to meet with this group. It would be particularly valuable for them to have had the experience of a personal meeting with you. Further, it would be an endorsement of the trends

CONFIDENTIALDowngraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority state letter 9-11-95By juw/rjg, NARA, Date 6-2-97

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

toward representative government in Saigon which these legislators represent. If it is convenient to your schedule, I recommend that you see the delegation during its visit here.

A list of the delegation is enclosed.


Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

List of delegation from National Assembly of Viet-Nam.

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF VIET-NAM
Delegation to Visit the United States
May, 1968
(tentative listing)

UPPER HOUSE

- Senator Nguyen Huy CHIEU
- Senator Nguyen Van CHUAN
- Senator Tran Van DON
- or Senator Hong Son DONG
- Senator Nguyen Gia HIEN
- Senator Nguyen Van NGAI
- Senator Pauline THO (Mrs. Nguyen Van THO)

- Chief Administrative Officer --
 Nguyen Thanh LUONG

LOWER HOUSE

- Deputy CHAU SOKAN
- Deputy Duong Vy LONG
- Deputy Do Trong NGUYEN
- Deputy Nguyen Trong NHO
- Deputy Nguyen Khac TAN
- Deputy Tran Duy TU

- Chief Administrative Officer --
 Le Cong THANH

(Attorney Vu Van De, from the Office of the President of the Republic of Viet-Nam, will accompany the Delegation).

MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
SPONSORING THE VISIT OF THE
DELEGATION FROM THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF
VIET-NAM

Rep. Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wis.), Chairman,
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Subcommittee Members:

- Rep. Cornelius E. Gallagher (D-N.J.)
- Rep. William T. Murphy (D-Ill.)
- Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.)
- Rep. Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (D-Mich.)
- Rep. Donald M. Fraser (D-Minn.)
- Rep. John V. Tunney (D-Calif.)
- Rep. William S. Broomfield (R-Mich.)
- Rep. J. Irving Whalley (R-Pa.)
- Rep. William S. Mailliard (R-Calif.)
- Rep. Vernon W. Thomson (R-Wis.)
- Rep. John Buchanan (R-Ala.)

Other Participants:

- Rep. Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D-N.Y.)
- Rep. Charles A. Mosher (R-Ohio)
- Rep. James Harvey (R-Mich.)
- Rep. Robert Taft, Jr. (R-Ohio)
- Rep. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R-Md.)
- Rep. John Brademas (D-Ind.)
- Rep. Jonathan B. Bingham (D-N.Y.)
- Rep. Don Edwards (D-Calif.)
- Rep. F. Bradford Morse (R-Mass.)
- Rep. Sidney R. Yates (D-Ill.)
- Rep. Ogden R. Reid (R-N.Y.)
- Rep. Marvin L. Esch (R-Mich.)
- Rep. John R. Dellenback (R-Ore.)
- Rep. Henry S. Reuss (D-Wis.)

23

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Profile

Friday, May 3, 1968 -- 7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a proposed message from Sec. Rusk to Couve de Murville. Before he sends it, he would like to know if you would like to send such a message to General de Gaulle.

My own recommendation is that a brief, courteous note from you to General de Gaulle is a good idea as a supplement to Sec. Rusk's note to Couve de Murville. It might say:

"I am pleased we have found in Paris a place where it is agreeable for both sides to begin the process of making peace in Southeast Asia. I shall always remember your response to my statement of March 31 and appreciate the offer of the Government of France to make a place available on your soil."

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *juw/mg*, NARA, Date 6-2-97

WWRostow:rlm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Embassy, PARIS

STATE

FOR WALLACE FROM THE SECRETARY

for comments

Please deliver the following personal message from me to Couve de Murville:

Quote. Dear Couve: Now that the decision has been reached to have the preliminary meeting in Paris I just want to tell you how much we appreciate the courtesy and hospitality of the French Government in making this site available to us. I only hope it will not be too much of a bother to you. The Embassy will be in touch with the Quai in regard to certain practical arrangements, and Averell Harriman ^{and Cyrus Vance} would like very much to call on you ^{upon his arrival} ~~in Paris~~.
Best regards. Dean Rusk Unquote.

on the morning of May 10.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State letter 9-11-95By ju/fg NARA. Date 6-2-97

G:CEBohlen:am

The Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other

24

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 3, 1968 -- 5:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

You will be interested in Bill Sullivan's cable on the coming of the monsoon rains in Laos and possible implications for infiltration.

There is a certain correctness in Paris being chosen the same day.

Strictly speaking, the winter-spring offensive is almost over; and the enemy failed.

Of course, that does not mean the fighting is over.

W. W. Rostow

Vientiane 6248

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 20

By js, NARS, Date 6-25-84

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

24a
TELEGRAM
21

~~SECRET~~ 966

PAGE 01 VIENTI 06248 031136Z

44
ACTION EA 15

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAL 01, SAH 03, EUR 15, IO 13, SA 01,
RSR 01, /114 W

R 030602Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8299
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY SAIGON
CINCPAC 2210

Rector

~~SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 6248

- 1. SOUTHWEST MONSOON HAS FINALLY BROKEN HERE IN VIENTIANE AND WE ARE INFORMED THAT RAIN IS ALSO FALLING IN EASTERN REACHES OF THE COUNTRY. WHILE IT WILL BE A FEW WEEKS BEFORE THERE IS STANDING WATER ON THE ROADS AND THE STREAMS RISE PAST FORDING DEPTHS, SURFACE DETERIORATION ON HO CHI MINH TRAIL WILL BEGIN AT THIS TIME. MOREOVER, FOR FOOT TRAVELLERS, SLOPES BECOME SLICK WITH SLIME AND TRAILS BOGGED WITH GUMBO.
- 2. AS YOU WILL READ FROM SEPARATE CABLE, TRUCKS DESTROYED ON HO CHI MINH TRAIL REACHED ALL TIME HIGH DURING MONTH OF

~~PAGE 2 RUMIES 0248 SECRET~~

APRIL AND SEVENTH AF INTERDICTION PROGRAM IS INTENDED CARRY LEVEL OF BOMBING INTO RAINY SEASON THIS MONTH. WE WILL BE CAREFULLY WATCHING ROUTES TO SEE WHETHER ENGINEERING WORK WHICH HAS BEEN DONE DURING DRY SEASON MAKES ANY OF THEM TRAFFICABLE DURING RAINS.

3. ASSUMING MONSOON FOLLOWS ITS TRADITIONAL PATTERN, IT SHOULD EFFECTIVELY AND PROGRESSIVELY THROTTLE DOWN TRAFFIC OF VEHICLES AND EVENTUALLY OF ANIMALS AND PORTERS TO POINT WHERE LOGISTICS SYSTEM THROUGH LAOS BECOMES A VERY UNRELIABLE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS/CBS 10
By ms, NARS, Date 11-16-83

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 02 VIENTI 06248 031196Z~~

SERVICE UNTIL NEXT NOVEMBER.

4. GIVEN THESE CONDITIONS, AND DESPITE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PREDICTIONS THAT MASSIVE REINFORCING INFILTRATION WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE NEAR FUTURE, I WILL CONFESS MYSELF SKEPTICAL THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE CAN CARRY OUT A RESUPPLY AND REPLENISHMENT EFFORT OF THE PROPORTIONS PREDICTED. WHILE I HAVE GREAT RESPECT FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE STAMINA, DISCIPLINE, AND COURAGE, THEY ARE NOT ~~REALLY~~ SUPERMEN. I THINK IT BEHOOVES US TO MAKE MOST CAREFUL CHECK ON ALL ~~RELEVANT~~ INTELLIGENCE DATA CONCERNING

~~PAGE 03 RUMJES 06248 031196Z~~

INFILTRATION, NOT ONLY TO AVOID BEING CAUGHT NAPPING, BUT ALSO TO AVOID BEING OVERSOLD ON ACTUAL ENEMY ACCOMPLISHMENTS.

GP-2 SULLIVAN

~~SECRET~~

Pass file
25

Friday, May 3, 1968
5:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Secretary Clifford wishes me urgently to forward to you his recommendation that we attempt to obtain a 12-month extension of his present authority to call reserve units to active duty. The authority expires on June 30, 1968, unless we act before that time.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


Your present authority to call reserve units to active duty will expire on 30 June 1968. Thereafter if you wish to do so it will be necessary to declare a national emergency.

In our view it would be desirable to obtain a 12-month extension of the expiring authority, but we have not discussed this possibility with Congressional leaders.

Senator Russell, without urging or support from the Administration, instigated adding the now-expiring authority to the 1966 Defense Appropriation Act. If the same procedure were followed in enacting an extension:

- 1) There would undoubtedly be a period of weeks when you would lack the call-up authority - because the 1969 Defense Appropriation Bill will not become law by 30 June, and
- 2) There may be some unhappiness in the House Armed Services Committee - because their legislative jurisdiction would be ignored were the appropriation bill the vehicle for the extension.

I recommend that you discuss the prospects for obtaining a reserve call-up authority extension with the Congressional leadership. If you prefer, we will undertake such discussions - but our ties are mainly with the Armed Services Committees, and it is not there that Congressional objections are likely to be heard.



ACTION 26

Friday, May 3, 1968, 4:40 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Commendation of Foreign Policy Association Effort

For your signature there is a letter to Samuel P. Hayes, President of the Foreign Policy Association, commending the Association for its efforts to improve popular understanding of current foreign policy issues.

The letter is in response to one sent to you with which was enclosed material it is circulating during the campaign period to Senators, Congressmen, and candidates for office.

The material takes no position and presents all sides of each question. The State Department states that the material appears generally accurate and the issues fairly presented.

The draft reply takes no position on the "Foreign Policy Briefs" but merely recognizes the activity as being beneficial.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

26a

May 3, 1968

Dear Mr. Hayes:

Thank you for sending me a copy of "Campaign '68 -- Foreign Policy Briefs." I commend your Association in its efforts to create better understanding of the great and complex foreign policy issues of our day.

Sincerely,

(S) Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Samuel P. Hayes
President, Foreign Policy Association
345 East 46th Street
New York, New York 10017

LBJ:WWR:BKS:amc

27

POSSIBLE ACTION

~~SECRET--CROCODILE~~

Friday, May 3, 1968 -- 4:40 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the delegation list for Paris,
as approved by Sec. Rusk. (Tab A)

You will also be interested in the
attached brief cable from Vientiane
(Tab B) — *a possible hassle on
delegation status*

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/CROCODILE~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 5-26-92

US/DRV Talks

1464
27a

Delegation:

1. Honorable W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large, Personal Representative of the President
2. Honorable Cyrus R. Vance, Personal Representative of the President with personal rank of Ambassador
3. Lieutenant General Andrew J. Goodpaster, U.S.A., Commandant, National War College, Advisor to the Personal Representatives of the President
4. Philip C. Habib, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Advisor to the Personal Representatives of the President and Coordinator of the Delegation
5. William J. Jordan, Member, National Security Council Staff, Advisor to the Personal Representatives of the President
6. Daniel I. Davidson, Special Assistant to the Ambassador at Large, Secretary to the Delegation

Delegation Staff:

1. Colonel Andrew B. Anderson, Jr., USAF, Executive Assistant to General Goodpaster
2. Miss Nancy Clark, secretary S/S-S
3. Miss Elizabeth Ghisu, secretary S/AH
4. Warrant Officer James C. Jensen, USN, stenographer
5. John D. Negrofonte, interpreter
6. Daniel A. O'Donohue, Secretariat Staff Officer
7. Mrs. Hildegard B. Shishkin, Personal Assistant S/AH
8. Peter B. Swiers, Staff Assistant S/AH
9. Alec G. Toumayan, interpreter



Department of State

John Taylor #14
TELEGRAM

27b

~~SECRET~~

6 6 0 Q
May 3, 1968
1:00 P.M.

***** ZZ RUEHC
DE RUMJFS 6273 1241650
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 031640Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8318
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 6273

NODIS/CROCODILE

REF STATE 157542

1. MESSAGE DELIVERED DRV CHARGE CHAN AT 11 P.M.

2. AFTER READING MESSAGE CHAN, WHO SAID HE HAD ALREADY HEARD PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT, NOTED THAT WE HAD NOT YET NAMED NEGOTIATOR OF "MINISTERIAL" RANK. HE MADE THIS POINT ONCE AGAIN DURING BRIEF CONVERSATION. IT MAY BE THAT, WITH TIME AND PLACE AGREED, DRV NOW INTENDS TO HAGGLE ABOUT RANK.

GP-2. SULLIVAN
BT

Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-281
By wo, NARA Date 10-5-98

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 3, 1968
4:20 p. m.

Pres. file
28

Mr. President:

To close out the Drew Pearson
matter, herewith Hal Saunders'
analysis of his files.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-284
By jis, NARA Date 2-23-98

28a

~~SECRET~~

May 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Drew Pearson and Our Commitments to Israel

We've searched our files on this subject. There is nothing of the sort that Pearson mentions. You know the history, but here are the highlights:

1. Last May, we reviewed extensively the nature of US commitments to Israel dating from 1957. I am sure we'll never forget that painful day when the President had to decide what he could tell Eban about the extent and limitation of that commitment. As you told the President on the phone, we haven't written on this subject--even for the Eshkol visit--because we know the President understands our position better than any of us.

2. In August, there was another small flap about commitments when the State Department answered a routine letter from Senator Fulbright listing our treaty commitments, and stating obviously that we did not have such a commitment to Israel. The New York Times unhelpfully headlined this as the State Department saying that we had no commitment.

3. The next public notice of this subject that I recall was the President's TV interview on December 18 which included the following exchange:

"Q-11. MR. SCHERER: Mr. President, that brings us back to Glassboro and your conversations this summer. How much of a factor in the restraint that we and the Russians seem to show in the Middle East crisis was a product of the dialogue that you established with Mr. Kosygin at Glassboro?

"THE PRESIDENT: I think that the Glassboro conference was a very useful conference. I am not sure that it really solved any of the problems of the Middle East. I think the situation in the Middle East is a very dangerous one.

"I think we have made clear our viewpoint in my statements of June 19th, the five conditions that ought to enter into bringing about peace in that area. We stressed those to Mr. Kosygin at Glassboro. He understands them. He did not agree with them. But I think that the Soviet Union understands that we feel very strongly about this matter that we do have definite views.

~~SECRET~~

"I think Ambassador Goldberg, at the United Nations, has made our position very clear. As a result of the action of the United Nations, in sending Ambassador Jarring there as a mediator, we are hopeful that the conditions I outlined on June 19th can be worked out and that a permanent solution can be found to that very difficult problem.

"I would say it is one of our most dangerous situations, and one that is going to require the best tact, judgment, patience and willingness on the part of all to find a solution.


Q-12. MR. RATHER: Mr. President, do you consider that this country has the same kind of unwavering commitment to defend Israel against invasion as we have in South Vietnam?

"THE PRESIDENT: We don't have a SEATO treaty, if that is what you are asking. We have made clear our very definite interest in Israel, and our desire to preserve peace in that area of the world by many means. But we do not have a mutual security treaty with them, as we do in Southeast Asia. "

4. In specific reference to the Pearson column this morning, the only thing from you to the President even remotely related was a memo on April 5 recommending an emissary to Israel and saying the reverse of what Pearson says: "Our main asset in persuading the Israelis to relax is that they believe you will stand behind them. They trust you personally as no one else. My hope is to build on that asset, but it is too soon for you personally to get directly involved. "

5. The only thing done by me on this subject is the attached. You may remember asking me in March, at Marvin Watson's request, to help Peter Rosenblatt on Bill Leonhart's staff to do a paper for use in briefing Jewish leaders with an eye to the election. This project, of course, has been suspended. But my two main points were again the reverse of Pearson's. I said that we are formally committed to Israel's survival and had in 1957 made a specific promise to keep the Straits of Tiran open. I did mention that we have no treaty, but even this was in the context of showing that our commitment is deep.

I might just add that I had a call this morning from Eppie Evron who says he has in the past talked with Pearson and has told Pearson how sympathetic you are. Eppie just called to express his deep dismay and disgust over this article.


Harold H. Saunders

5/3/68 -- W. W. Rostow

Let me add a word.

This is a day we shall remember for another reason. At 1:00 o'clock this morning I was informed that Hanoi was prepared to meet us in Paris to begin to talk about peace.

We often think about peace as an absence of war. But, in fact, peace is a struggle; an achievement; an endless effort to convert hostility into negotiation; bloody violence into politics; hate into reconciliation.

I have sought this moment for more days and nights than you will ever credit -- and in enough places for historians to judge that we were fully credible when we said: "any time, anywhere."

Now we shall begin. The days and weeks and months ahead will be hard and hazardous. But with every fiber in my being, I shall try to move us from fighting to peace; from enmity to brotherhood; from destruction to common efforts on behalf of the men, women, and children of all of Southeast Asia.

In this I ask your prayers.

Thank you and goodnight.

NATURE OF THE US COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL

Definition of the US commitment to Israel falls into two areas:

--First, there is our basic support for Israel's survival. In the formal language of governments, four American Presidents have said, as President Johnson did at the height of crisis on May 23, 1967, that "the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations" of the Near East.

--Second, there is a specific promise related to the Straits of Tiran which grew out of our role in helping to arrange a settlement after the 1956 Arab-Israeli war. In short, the U.S. Government under President Eisenhower in 1957 formally told the Israeli Government that "the United States, on behalf of vessels of United States registry, is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage [with respect to the Gulf of Aqaba] and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right."

The full record of statements in this second category is attached. The one additional point that must be made clear is that, in private 1957 discussions between US and Israeli representatives, it was fully understood on both sides that we were stating a general policy and our intentions but could not provide absolute guarantees without a treaty or something of that sort. These Constitutional limitations were recalled again during Foreign Minister Eban's visit to Washington May 25-26, 1967, but he was told that, working within that Constitutional framework, we planned to pursue vigorously the measures open to maritime nations to assure that the Strait and Gulf remained open to free and innocent passage of the vessels of all nations. This is what we did.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-286
By is, NARA Date 5-21-98

WWR
30
Pres file

Friday, May 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Second Annual Report to The Congress on the Implementation of the "Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965"

At Tab A, for your approval and signature, is a draft letter transmitting the Second Annual Report on the Implementation of the "Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965". This report is required by the Act.

At Tab B is Secretary Smith's explanatory letter to you. State, Treasury, Labor and Bill Roth concur in the report. The report is at Tab C.

Total trade in auto products between the United States and Canada rose from \$790 million in 1964 to \$3.3 billion in 1967. The increase in trade under this agreement helped make the automotive industry in both countries more efficient.

Our trade surplus in auto products with Canada dropped from \$527 million in 1966 to \$439 million in 1967 -- mainly because sales in both countries turned soft in 1967.

Senator Hartke continues to attack the agreement. Publication of the figures showing a decline in the trade surplus probably will give him a peg for further criticism. Few others in the Congress have shown much interest. The industry, the parts manufacturers, and the UAW have been generally satisfied. (Reuther's only worry is renewal of the special adjustment assistance provisions.)

There was a 5.7 percent decline in employment in the U. S. auto industry in 1967, but employment was above the 1964 level.

The automotive agreement is now under review with the Canadians. The Act provides that we must report to Congress on the results of the review by August 31, 1968.

W. W. Rostow

If you approve we will need your signature at Tab A _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Epp
WWR:mst

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress the second annual report on the operation of the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965. By this Act Congress authorized implementation of the United States-Canada Automotive Products Agreement.

The Agreement was designed to create a broader U. S. -Canadian market for automotive products so as to obtain for both countries and both industries the benefits of specialization and large-scale production. We have moved far toward this goal.

Automotive trade between the two countries was \$730 million in 1964, and the year before the Agreement went into force. Trade in 1967 was over \$3.3 billion. The Agreement has also stimulated increased trade in allied products.

Industry, labor and consumers in both countries continue to benefit from the growth in trade and the increased efficiency brought about by the Agreement. It is proof of what can be accomplished when friends and neighbors choose the path of cooperation.

The White House



THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230

APR 30 1968

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to submit for your approval and transmittal to the Congress in accordance with Public Law 89-283, 89th Congress, October 21, 1965, the second Annual Report on the Implementation of the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965.

This Report has been prepared jointly, and is approved by the Departments of State, Treasury, Labor, and the Office of Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. The Report covers the period from January 1, 1967 through December 31, 1967.

The Agreement has been in effect for three years. While it must be recognized that many elements outside the Agreement have influenced the development of our automotive trade with Canada since January of 1965, the overall automotive trade figures for the period covered by this Report indicate that it is serving the national interest well by fulfilling its stated objectives.


Automotive trade between the United States and Canada has increased dramatically since the Agreement was concluded. In 1965, this trade totalled \$1.1 billion, and in 1966 the total was nearly \$2.1 billion. In 1967 it was over \$3.3 billion. Both exports and imports increased substantially, with an estimated net surplus in automotive trade with Canada amounting to \$439 million in 1967.

Although automotive industry employment in the United States declined from the 1966 peak, the November 1967 level remained 51,000 over the corresponding level of 1964. With industry employment ranging from 798,000 in November, 1964 to 894,000 in 1966, 2,064 workers have been found eligible to receive the adjustment assistance made available under the special criteria provided for in the law

since the beginning of the Agreement. Expenditures for plant and equipment by the four major producers in both countries were approximately 32 percent under the average for 1965-66, with approximately 93 percent of their investments being made in the United States.

Price trends indicate that the differential between United States and Canadian automotive prices is narrowing, and finally, the rationalization of production has further enhanced the importance of each country as leading automotive trading partner with the other.

Respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "R. J. ...", is written over the typed name of the Secretary of Commerce.

Secretary of Commerce

Friday, May 3, 1968
12:35 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bill Gaud says Otto Passman is going about saying that the President has stated that no AID appropriations were needed this year -- the developing countries could live off the AID pipeline. Bill says the story could "murder" him.

He wishes to know:

-- Is Passman, in fact, reflecting your views?

Yes _____

No _____

Call me _____

If not, is there any way that this story could be turned off?

W. W. Restow

Pres file

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Friday, May 3, 1968
12:30 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith, as requested, Gen. Wheeler's assessment of the Arab-Israeli arms balance. As you can see, the JCS remains relatively complacent about the balance even after taking into account the French decision on the Mirages for Israel.

You will wish to note particularly his para. 7, page 4, on the timing of high performance aircraft.

W. W. Rostow

TOP SECRET attachment (log 1478 CM-3275-68 3 May 68)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-303
By is, NARA Date 10-1-97



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

1478

32a

CM-3275-68
3 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israeli/Arab Military Balance

1. In response to the query posed by Walt Rostow, I am providing you my assessment of the relative military balance between Israeli and Arab forces now and 12 to 18 months hence.

2. At Enclosure A is a summary of present and projected Israeli and Arab equipment inventories. Except for aircraft, the Israelis probably have as much equipment now as at the beginning of the June war. The Soviets have not delivered fighter aircraft to the UAR since September or October of last year which places Egypt about 65 fighters short of the pre-war level. Deliveries to Syria and Iraq have increased those countries' inventories above the pre-war level. Soviet arms shipments to the area are now continuing at about the pre-war level and no new-type materiel is known to have been delivered. Including total deliveries to date, the Arabs are at about 75% of the pre-war level. Eighteen months from now, Israel will have an aircraft inventory 15% to 20% above pre-war levels while the Arab inventory will remain essentially at its pre-war strength; however, a greater disparity in high performance aircraft numbers to the detriment of Israel will develop. Ground equipment inventories on both sides will remain at approximately pre-war levels. Israel's relative naval capability will have improved due to the addition of guided missile patrol boats.

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Authority FRUS. 64-68, vol. 20, #164

By jc NARA, Date 3-24-16

EXCLUDED BY	DATE
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Page 1 of 4 Pages

~~TOP SECRET~~

3. Our previous estimates on the Arab-Israeli balance have accounted for not only equipment levels, but the qualitative superiority of Israeli forces in such areas as training, intelligence, logistics, motivation and morale, and leadership. In these areas, the Israeli forces are still far superior to the Arabs and will remain so in the months ahead. In addition, the territory the Israelis control places them in better defensive position than they previously occupied, and they now have more combat-seasoned personnel. The Arabs do not currently possess the capability effectively to operate or maintain Soviet equipment. The Soviets, through their training and advisory efforts, (see Enclosure B) are attempting to improve the situation but face many drawbacks such as educational deficiencies and poor morale. The Soviets believe that at the present rate of progress, it will take the UAR at least until the Spring of 1969 to achieve any significant degree of combat readiness. No major qualitative improvements in Syrian capabilities are expected over the next 18 months.

4. While we note increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, it is our conclusion that the Soviets wish to avoid any direct involvement which could lead to a widening of a resumed Arab-Israeli conflict or confrontation with the United States. In this connection, there is still no Soviet air in support of their Mediterranean naval forces. A miscalculation on their part cannot be discounted, but we believe that Soviet efforts would be limited to materiel and advisory assistance such as we have seen in the past. In February we exchanged information on the Middle East situation with the Israeli Director of Intelligence. While there were several differences, we were in general agreement on our assessments of Arab capabilities and Soviet activity in the area. We plan to continue this intelligence interchange and any significant new developments will serve as basis for a joint reassessment of the Israeli position.

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5. A significant factor in Israel's growing imbalance of high performance aircraft, mentioned above, continues to be delivery of 50 French Mirage V's. Although France is continuing in effect an embargo on these aircraft, there are indications that there is a fair chance that Israel will eventually get delivery. The French have now agreed to sell 54 Mirages to Iraq; however, the delivery of these aircraft, not scheduled to begin until late 1969 or early 1970, would not affect the relative balance in the period under discussion. Non-delivery of Mirage aircraft to Israel handicaps Israel's air-to-air capability now and in the future as discussed below.

6. At Enclosure C is a comparison of the current and projected high performance aircraft (MACH 2) capabilities of Israel and those Arab states likely to participate in a resumption of hostilities. This disparity in high performance aircraft inventories is the principal cause of Israel's concern. The comparison shows that the inventory of these aircraft for the contiguous Arab states will increase over the next 18 months by close to 70% (230 to 390) while the Israeli capability of 55 Mirage IIIs remains relatively constant. Thus, Israel would be handicapped in the battle for air superiority unless early bombing attacks on Arab airfields were exceptionally successful. Arab experience last June is not likely to allow the Israelis the degree of success in destroying aircraft on the ground that they enjoyed at that time. If Algeria's capability of 29 aircraft by the end of the estimate period is added to the Arab total, numerically, Israel would face a potentially unfavorable ratio of about 8 to 1. This raw ratio must be adjusted by the aircraft ready status, 50% to 70% for the Arabs versus 80% to 85% for the Israelis, and the qualitative factors such as skill, leadership, and command and control mentioned above. Delivery of the French Mirages to Israel would reduce the unfavorable raw ratio to 4 to 1 with further balance being approached through use of the same adjustment factors.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

7. Considering all these factors, it is my judgment that Israel currently, and probably for the next 18 months, has the capability to defend itself effectively against the Arab forces. This judgment is based on an estimate that the outlook for significant overall improvement in Arab military capabilities, despite Soviet assistance, is only poor to fair. The most imprecise element in this judgment is the relative high performance air strength, hinging in part on actions by the French. Even here, the time at which an imbalance would become critical, in the event of a continued French embargo, allows us to continue to withhold a decision on additional aircraft sales to Israel until late this year. A decision can be made as late as 31 December 1968 and delivery of F-4E aircraft started in January 1970 at the rate of approximately 4 per month from production presently scheduled for the USAF. This would get the F-4E aircraft in the hands of the Israelis at approximately the same time Iraq would receive Mirage aircraft. Necessary training could be commenced as late as 1 January 1969 in order that Israel would have a capability to maintain and operate the aircraft upon delivery.

8. I consider that we should keep the matter of numbers of high performance aircraft in Arab inventories under continuing review. Should the USSR or other sources provide additional high performance combat aircraft to the radical Arab states during the next 6 to 12 months, should deliveries of such aircraft be expedited, or should the French definitely back out of their agreement to provide 50 Mirages to Israel, the relatively favorable forecast set forth above would be invalid.



EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Copy to:
Secretary of Defense

~~TOP SECRET~~

SELECTED ARMAMENTS AND FORCES - ARAB COUNTRIES AND ISRAEL

CURRENT ESTIMATED STATUS/ESTIMATED STATUS 1 NOVEMBER 1969

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 03-75
By isa, NARA, Date 9-4-03

32b

	<u>LEBANON</u>	<u>SAUDI ARABIA</u>	<u>ALGERIA</u>	<u>IRAQ</u>	<u>JORDAN*</u>	<u>SYRIA</u>	<u>EGYPT</u>	<u>ISRAEL</u>
<u>ARMY</u>								
PERSONNEL	13,000/13,000	28,000/30,000	61,000/61,000	80,000/80,000	48,000/48,000	45,000/51,000	150,000/165,000	65,000/65,000
Tanks								
Heavy	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	23/23	0/0
Medium	83/83	18/18	361/361	483/483	176/300	570/570	792/950	1355/1400
Light	40/40	75/75	5/5	37/37	0/0	0/0	56/75	150/150
SP AT and Assault Guns	0/0	8/8	99/110	220/250	14/14	397/450	133/200	246/246
Artillery								
100mm and Over	36/36	100/100	305/305	292/320	22/45	415/430	464/570	182/182
Up to 100mm	30/30	0/0	233/233	415/430	162/162	40/200	975/1100	606/606
AAA								
57mm and Over	12/12	32/32	180/200	97/120	0/0	580/600	303/370	192/192
Up to 57mm	68/68	193/193	299/320	426/450	261/305	946/1000	537/600	342/342
APC	20/20	104/324	496/510	515/515	167/210	0/500	913/1100	1300/1600
<u>AIR FORCE</u>								
PERSONNEL	950/1000	5200/6500	2500/3000	3550/3550	2300/3000	2050/2050	12,000/13,000	11,000/11,000
Aircraft								
Jet Fighters	12/16	22/85	131/135	130/167	12/43	92/120	300/365	244/300
Jet Bombers	0/0	0/0	28/30	21/21	0/0	2/12	53/60	2/2
Transports	1/1	5/9	8/10	15/15	6/6	6/12	65/70	51/55
Helicopters	10/10	10/30	51/51	46/46	4/4	5/16	70/70	70/76
Surface-to-Air								
Missiles	0/0	112/540	32/35	0/0	0/0	0/0	300+/300+	171/280
No. Launchers	0/0	20/68	18/20	0/0	0/0	0/0	39/40	30/48
SSM	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	18/25	0/0
<u>NAVY</u>								
PERSONNEL	300/300	200/300	2000/2500	400/500	150/150	1000/1000	13,000/13,500	3500/3500
Ships								
Destroyers	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	6/6	1/1
Submarines	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	0/0	13/13	4/4
Missile-Patrol	0/0	0/0	9/11	0/8	0/0	4/6	20/20	2/6

* Includes the new arms package for Jordan although the agreement not yet signed.

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32c

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-279
By isa, NARA Date 7-10-98

Soviet Training Assistance to the Arab Bloc

Since the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967, the Soviets have increased their training assistance to the Arab armed forces, principally in the UAR, where about 2,000 Soviet advisers and technicians are active down to brigade level of UAR military units. Soviet training assistance has undoubtedly improved Egyptian military capabilities but the basic UAR problems remain -- poor leadership, impaired by officer purges; Arab resentment of Soviet tutelage; generally low levels of education and technological ability; and, poor morale. The Soviets have instituted a general reorganization of the UAR armed forces and command structure and have emphasized more effective training programs. The Soviets are not believed to be exerting direct command and control although at least temporarily their influence in the armed forces has been greatly increased since June of 1967. The Soviets believe that at the present rate of military reorganization, training and re-equipping, it will take the UAR at least until the spring of 1969 to achieve any significant degree of combat readiness.

Enclosure B

ARAB AND ISRAELI AIR FORCES HIGH PERFORMANCE FIGHTER INVENTORIES
CURRENT AND PROJECTED

	<u>ALGERIA*</u>	<u>UAR</u>	<u>SYRIA</u>	<u>IRAQ</u>	<u>JORDAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>ISRAEL</u>
MIG-21	9/29	84/160	32/48	36/36	---	152/244	52/50 MIRAGE IIIC
SU-7	---	47/80	13/24	18/24	---	78/128	3/3 MIRAGE IIIB
F-104	---	---	---	---	0/18	0/18	
		<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
		131/240	45/72	54/60	0/18	230/390	55/53

* Algeria: Inventory available for resupply of Arab forces, not included in total.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 03.75
By ia, NARA, Date 1-4-03

Enclosure C **PRESERVATION COPY**

ACTION

33

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, May 3, 1968 - 10:45 am

Pres file

Mr. President:

In view of the events of this morning,
I respectfully resubmit this memorandum
for your consideration.

W. W. Rostow

Arrange meeting _____

No _____

Call me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1963
By AG, NARA, Date 5-16-92

THE WHITE HOUSE

INFORMATION

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Wednesday, May 1, 1968

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 12:55 p. m.

NLJ 97-284

MR. PRESIDENT:

By us, NARA Date 2-23-98

Beif

You may wish to consider calling in the members of the Vietnam negotiating team, plus the senior members of the government who will be backstopping the effort -- if it ever begins -- and talking to them along the following lines.

1. All members of the government must understand that in dealing with Hanoi -- and their Communist friends -- we are not dealing with diplomats in the old classical 19th Century tradition. They may well behave in formal diplomacy with correctness, skill, and lucidity. But they view diplomacy as the net outcome of their ability to influence the following factors during the negotiation itself:

- the military situation on the ground;
- the political situation inside South Vietnam;
- U. S. -GVN relations;
- "world opinion" and U. S. political forces that might bear on the Executive Branch.

2. As a government we shall, therefore, have to fight the battle on all these fronts, in addition to diplomacy itself. Our experience with the first month since the President's March 31st statement already demonstrates this fact beyond doubt. Therefore, the President wishes the government to think automatically in terms of all these dimensions of the negotiation in relationship to one another and to working towards a total U. S. policy which advances our interests.

3. Beyond that the President wishes those concerned to know that one major reason that he withdrew from candidacy was to assure that the positions taken in the months ahead on Vietnam would be positions that he judged right in the U. S. interest, freed of any short-run U. S. political pressures. The President wishes peace in Southeast Asia at the earliest possible moment. He wishes all members of the government to apply to this end all the imagination, skill, experience and insight of which they are capable. But this Administration will only settle for an honorable peace as we understand it.

4. Therefore, the President asks all members of the government to operate as a united team. There will, of course, be differences of view among us and debates on this move or that move at one time or another. These debates and discussions must be kept wholly within the family. We are negotiating with Hanoi, not with each other. That negotiation should take place between governments and not between the U. S. government and the press.

Walt Rostow

W.W. Rostow (over phone from Moscow)
May 3, 1968 - 9:15 am

I was informed at 1:00 o'clock this morning that Hanoi was prepared to meet in Paris on May 10. *Le G.*

As you know, we have sought a place for these conversations in which all parties would receive impartial and hospitable treatment. As a result of exchanges with our allies, we agree that France is a country where such treatment could be expected. *loc. 1. No*
✓ 699

I am, therefore, informing Hanoi that the date -- May 10 -- and the site -- Paris -- are acceptable. We will continue in close consultation at all stages with our allies, all of whom, I am glad to report, now have representation in Paris.

We hope that this agreement -- on an initial contact -- will prove a step forward and can represent a mutual and serious movement by all parties towards peace in Southeast Asia.

I have never felt it was useful for public officials to confuse delicate negotiations by detailing personal views or elaborating positions in advance.

I know you will understand, therefore, that I shall not discuss this question further at this conference.

May 1, 1968 -- Sec. Rusk
(about 1:30 AM)

I was informed early this morning that Hanoi was prepared to hold conversations with us beginning on May 10th or several days thereafter, in Paris. We are, therefore, informing Hanoi that our representatives will be prepared to meet with theirs in Paris on May 10 or any time thereafter to be agreed upon. We assume that each side will present its point of view in these first contacts. My own view was stated to the American people on March 31st.

We consider the possibility of such a contact to be a step forward and we hope that it can represent a serious step toward peace in Southeast Asia. We will continue in close consultation with our allies, all of whom have representation in Paris, at all stages.

I know you will understand that it would not be useful for me to elaborate in any way what I have just said. I do not, therefore, expect to take any questions on this particular subject.

#