

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Rostow to President, 12:00 noon <del>C</del> 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-283 (5/98)</i>	5/8/68	<del>A</del>
#1a memo	Smith to Rostow <del>C</del> 1 p "	5/8/68	<del>A</del>
#2b rpt	"Cyprus" <del>C</del> 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-281 10-5-98</i> [Duplicate of #6, Office Files of Ernest Goldstein, "White House Luncheon on 5/8/68"; Sanitized NLJ 90-22]	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#2e rpt	"Paraguay" <del>C</del> 2 p " [Duplicate of #12, Office Files of Ernest Goldstein, "White House Luncheon on 5/8/68"; Sanitized NLJ 90-22]	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#4 memo	Rostow to President, re: Mauritius <del>C</del> 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-283 (5/98)</i> [Duplicate of #6, NSF, CF, Mauritius Islands"]	5/8/68	<del>A</del>
#4a memo	Katzenbach to President, re: Mauritius <del>S</del> 2 p <i>Open NLJ 97-281 10-5-98</i> [Duplicate of #6a, NSF, CF, Mauritius Islands"]	<del>5/8/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#4c rpt	Talking Points <del>S</del> 3 p " [Duplicate of #6c, NSF, CF, Mauritius Islands"]	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#4g rpt	Bio Sketch <i>Open 12-8-03 NW 97-285</i> <del>C</del> 1 p [Duplicate of #6g, NSF, CF, Mauritius Islands"]	undated	A
#4 <sup>h</sup> photo <i>Sanitized 12-8-03 NW 97-285</i>	Bio Sketch <i>Sanitized 10/3/01 - RAC NLJ 001-04651</i> <del>C</del> 1 p [Duplicate of #6h, NSF, CF, Mauritius Islands"]	1966	A
#5a memo	Rostow to President, 4:15 p.m. <i>Open 12-23-09</i> <del>S</del> 4 p <i>same Sanitized 8-17-98 NLJ 97-283</i> [Duplicate of #118a, NSF, CF, India, Vol. 11] [Sanitized NLJ 89-143]	<del>5/8/68</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 75, May 6-8, 1968 Box 33

## RESTRICTION CODES

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#7 memo	Rostow to President, 5:15 p.m. open 5/27/03 NJ/NAC 00-333 TS 1 p	5/8/68	A
#7a rpt	Intelligence Report open 5/27/03 NJ/NAC 00-333 TS 1 p	5/8/68	A
#9a rpt	"Opening Statement" S 9 p	undated	A
#10 memo	Rostow to President, 4:05 p.m. open 5/27/03 NJ/NAC 00-333 S 1 p	5/8/68	A
#10a rpt	Intelligence Report S 1 p open 2-25-04 NJ/NAC 08-200	5/4/68	A
#11 memo	Rostow to President, 4 p.m. C 1 p open NJ 97-283 (5/98)	5/8/68	A
#12a ltr	President to Pope Paul VI PCI 1 p open 6-2-97	5/8/68	A
#14 memo	Rostow to President, 3:100 p.m. S 1 p open 6-5-97	5/8/68	A
#14a rpt	"Statement on US Military Deployments" S 2 p open 6-5-97	undated	A
#19a rpt	"Proposed Schedule of Visitors" C 2 p open 6-2-97	7-12/68	A
#20 memo	Rostow to President, re: Eastern Europe C 1 p open NJ 97-283 (5/98)	5/8/68	A
#20a memo	Rusk to President, re: Eastern Europe C 2 p Open NJ 97-281 10-5-98	5/3/68	A
#22 memo	Rostow to President, 6:30 p.m. C 1 p open 1-12-93 NLS 91-336	5/7/68	A
#24 memo	Rostow to President, 6:10 p.m. TS 1 p open 6-5-97	5/7/68	A

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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#24a memcon	"Delivery of Letter from President" TS 2 p <i>Open NLT 97-288</i>	5/3/68	A
#26 memo	Rostow to President, 6:00 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 10/30/09</i> [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 20; 1984]	5/7/68	A
#26a rpt	Intelligence Report S 1 p <i>OPEN 3-11-03 NW/RAC 00-334</i> [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 8; 1983]	5/6/68	A
#26b rpt	Intelligence Report S 2 p <i>OPEN 3-11-03 NW/RAC 00-334</i>	[5/6/68]	A
#27 memo	Duplicate of #26 <i>open 12-17-96 NLT 96-04 open 10/30/09</i>		
#27a rpt	Duplicate of #26a <i>OPEN 3-11-03 NW/RAC 00-334</i>		
#27b rpt	Duplicate of #26b <i>OPEN 3-11-03 NW/RAC 00-334</i>		
#28 memo	Rostow to President, 5:30 p.m. <i>open 12-17-96 NLT 96-04</i> C 3 p <i>[Duplicate of #4, Files of Walt W. Rostow, "[Briefing material for WWR's Appearance on Issues &amp; Answers, 11/9/68], Box 13]</i>	5/7/68	A
#28a ltr	Johnson to Rostow <i>open NLT 97-283 (5/98)</i> C 2 p <i>[Duplicate of #5, Files of Walt Rostow, "[Briefing material for WWR's Appearance on Issues &amp; Answers, 11/9/68], Box 13]</i>	3/6/68	A
#29 memo	Rostow to President, 5:15 p.m. S 1 p <i>Sanitized 8-13-98 NLT 97-289</i>	5/7/68	A
#29a cable <i>Sanitized 12-8-03 NW 97-285</i>	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 p <i>Sanitized NLT 018-033-3/2/02</i>	3/25/68	A
#30a ltr	President to Clifford <i>open 9-12-97 NLT 97-292</i> S 1 p <i>[Dup. of #21, NSF, CF, VJ, 2H(4), Box 76]</i>	5/7/68	A
#31a memo <i>Sanitized 12-8-03 NW 97-285</i>	Intelligence Memorandum S 1 p [Duplicate of #26c, Tom Johnson Notes of Meetings, "May 7, 1968, 1 p.m."]	5/3/68	A

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#31b memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 6 p <i>Open 12-8-03 NW 97-285</i> [Duplicate of #26d, Tom Johnson Notes of Meetings, "May 7, 1968, 1 p.m."]	<del>5/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#33 memo	Rostow to President, 11:35 a.m. <i>DUPES OF 33, 33a IN FILES OF NWA, Box 2, MTGS MAY-JUNE '68, Doc #37, 37a, 39, 39a, 41</i> S 2 p <i>Open NLT 97-283 (5/98)</i>	5/7/68	A
#33a rpt	"Immediate Issues Requiring Policy..." <i>DUPES OF 33, 33a IN FILES OF NWA, Box 2, MTGS MAY-JUNE '68, Doc #37, 37a, 39, 39a, 41</i> S 8 p <i>Open NLT 97-281 10-5-98</i>	<del>5/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#35 memo	Rostow to President, 9:45 a.m. TS 1 p <i>Open 3-11-03 NW/PAC 00-335</i>	<del>5/7/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#35a memo	Intelligence Memorandum TS 5 p <i>Sanitized 8-9-04 NW/PAC 03-201</i>	5/6/68	A
#37 memo	Rostow to President, re: Thailand S 1 p <i>Open NLT 97-283 (5/98)</i>	5/7/68	<del>A</del>
#37a memo	Rusk to President, re: Thailand <i>Open NLT 97-281 10-5-98</i> S 3 p [Duplicate of #26a, NSF, CF, Thailand, "PM Thanom Kittikachorn Visit"]	<del>5/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#40 memo	Rostow to President, 7:40 p.m. S 1 p <i>Open 8-13-98 NLT 97-289</i>	<del>5/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#40a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 6 p <i>Exempt 12-8-03 NW 97-285</i>	5/6/68	A
#42 memo	Rostow to President, 7:30 p.m. <i>Sanitized 3-24-00 NLT 97-287</i> C 1 p <i>same name NLT 019-0333 (2/02)</i>	5/6/68	A
#42a cable	Intelligence Information Cable C 5 p <i>Sanitized 12-8-03 NW 97-285</i> [Duplicate in NSF, CF, VN, "TDCS and Cables, Vol. 1b"]	5/6/68	A
#43 memo	Rostow to President, 7:15 p.m. <i>Sanitized 3-24-00 NLT 97-287</i> S 1 p	5/6/68	A

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#43a cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Sanitized 12803</i> S 7 p <i>Agm NW 97-283 (5/62) NW 97-285</i>	5/1/68	A
<del>#45 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 6:25 p.m.</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>Open S 20-03</i>	<del>5/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#45a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S- 2 p <i>Sanitized 5404 NW/RACOS-202</i>	5/6/68	A
<del>#47 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 5:00 p.m.</del> <del>TS 1 p</del> <i>Agm 10-7-97 NL 9 97-303</i>	<del>5/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#50a cable	<del>Rawalpindi 4918</del> <i>Open NLT 97-281 10-5-98</i> C 2 p	<del>5/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#51a cable	Circular (SecState to Ambassador) " " " C 2 p <i>(Dup in WHCF, CF, ND 19/CO 312 (1968))</i>	<del>5/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#52a cable	<del>Vientiane 6290</del> " " " S 1 p	<del>5/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#52b cable	<del>Vientiane 6296</del> " " " S 2 p	<del>5/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#55 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>Open NLT 97-283 (5/95)</i>	5/6/68	A
#56 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p [Duplicate of #18, NSF, CF, Latin America, "Filed by the LBJ Library, 1966-69"] /	5/6/68	A
#56d ltr	President Frei to President PCI 3 p	4/18/68	A
#56f ltr	President Balaguer to President PCI 2 p	4/16/68	A

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#56m memo	Katzenbach to President, re: Dominican Republic C — 2 p — <i>Open NLJ 77-281 10-5-91</i> [Duplicate of #18j, NSF, CF, Latin America, "Filed by the LBJ Library, 1966-69"]	5/3/68	<del>A</del>
#61 memo	Rostow to President C — 2 p — <i>OPEN 7/28/95 NLS 94-170</i>	5/6/68	<del>A</del>
#61a memo	Rusk to President <i>open 7-22-94 NLS 94-172</i> C — 3 p	4/26/68	<del>A</del>
#61b rpt	"Proposed Schedule of Visitors" C — 1 p	7-12/68	<del>A</del>
#61c rpt	"Proposed Schedule of Visitors" C — 2 p	1-6/68	<del>A</del>
#61d rpt	"PM Barrow of Barbados" C — 1 p	undated	<del>A</del>
#61e rpt	"President Tombalbaye of Chad" C — 1 p	undated	<del>A</del>
#61f rpt	"PM Hoveyda of Iran" C — 1 p	undated	<del>A</del>
#61g rpt	"President Jorge Pacheco Areco of Uruguay" C — 1 p	undated	<del>A</del>
#61h rpt	"Ruler of Kuwait" C — 1 p	undated	<del>A</del>
#61i rpt	"President Frei of Chile" C — 1 p	undated	<del>A</del>
#61j rpt	"President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico" C — 1 p	undated	<del>A</del>
#62b rpt	"Terms of Reference for US Coordination..." S — 3 p — <i>Open 5/98 NLS 97-283</i>	5/6/68	<del>A</del>

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**NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 75, May 6-8, 1968 Box 33**

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1  
INFORMATION

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*Pres file*

Wednesday, May 8, 1968 -- 12:00 noon

Mr. President:

I asked Brem Smith to make a quite independent security check of the delegation to Paris. Attached is his quite reassuring report.

In my judgment, the problem the delegation is less likely to be that of security but of:

-- Effective unity and organization, in which I would personally hope that Cy Vance would quietly become Chief of Staff in addition to his substantive function; and

-- Leaks.

In the latter respect, I am not thinking so much of carelessness but of the battle of the press that is almost certain to take place since the North Vietnamese are going to play their French friends to a fare-thee-well.

The whole delegation will have to accept the fact that this is going to be fought out in Paris not merely at the negotiating table but in the press and back Bill Jordan in mounting a first-class and unified projection of the U.S. line.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-283  
By is, NARA Date 5-5-98

WWRestow:rlm

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, May 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Security Review of U. S. Delegation to Vietnam Talks

The security files of staff members accompanying the U. S. Delegation to the Vietnam talks have been reviewed.

There is no substantive adverse information of record concerning any of the listed individuals with respect to loyalty or security.

With one exception, individuals on the attached list hold Top Secret security clearances based on background investigations conducted by the Department of State in the case of the eight people from that Department, and by Air Force and Navy in the case of the two Defense Department representatives. The exception is Navy Warrant Officer James C. Jensen whose clearance is for access to classified information only through the Secret category (his assignments in the Navy have not required a higher clearance).

~~There is no substantive adverse information of record concerning any of the listed individuals with respect to loyalty or security.~~

The FBI checked the names of all persons on the list (and in appropriate instances their spouses) with a view to determining whether there is derogatory information of record at FBI with respect to loyalty or security (including a current name check in the criminal record files). No substantive derogatory information was found to be of record at FBI with respect to any of these individuals as a result of the name checks.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-283  
By is, NARA Date 5-5-98

*Bromley Smith*  
Bromley Smith

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Attachment



1. Daniel I. Davidson, Special Assistant to the Ambassador at Large, Secretary to the Delegation
2. Colonel Andrew B. Anderson, Jr., USAF, Executive Assistant to General Goodpaster
3. Miss Nancy Clark, Secretary S/S-S
4. Miss Elizabeth Ghisu, Secretary S/AH
5. Warrant Officer James C. Jensen, USN, Stenographer
6. John D. Negroponte, Interpreter
7. Daniel A. O'Donohue, Secretariat Staff Officer
8. Mrs. Hildegard B. Shishkin, Personal Assistant S/AH
9. Peter B. Swiers, Staff Assistant S/AH
10. Alec. G. Toumayan, Interpreter



INFORMATION

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Wednesday - May 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Six Ambassadors at Ernie Goldstein's Luncheon, Thursday, May 9, 1:00 p.m.

Composition of the Group

It includes four small South American states, plus Israel and Cyprus:

Ambassador Rossides (Row-SEED-eez)	- Cyprus
Ambassador Mantilla (Man-TEE-yah)	- Ecuador
Ambassador Rabin (Rah-BEEN)	- Israel
Ambassador Avila (AH-vee-lah)	- Paraguay
Ambassador Clarke	- Trinidad and Tobago
Ambassador Yriart (ee-ree-ART)	- Uruguay.

Fact sheets on each country, with a biographic sketch of the Ambassador, are in the attached briefing book. Except for Ambassador Avila, they all speak English well.

What You Might Say to the Group

This is a very mixed group. They have little in common. The issues on the minds of the Latinos will have little relevance to the Near Easterners and vice versa.

I suggest you use the occasion to get across one important point to the Israeli and Cypriot Ambassador about the difficulty of making peace.

As you know, prospects for a political settlement in the Israeli-Arab war are no brighter. Unless there is a break soon, the Jarring mission may run out of steam. Israel and the UAR must share blame for lack of progress, and such actions as the Jerusalem parade last week show little sensitivity for Arab concerns.

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Authority 729 90-20  
By isp/ky, NARA, Date 6-1-92



we hope

In Cyprus, talks will soon begin between Greek and Turk communities to arrive at a settlement of their long standing problem. They need to be encouraged to make full use of this opportunity.

You could lead into the topic by discussing recent developments in Vietnam and the Paris talks -- a subject of common interest to all. Then you could philosophize about peace coming to those who work for it rather than those who wait.

With a nod toward Ambassador Rabin, you could discuss how one negotiates from strength and the importance of a proper mix of force and flexibility in achieving a settlement.

You might next allude to the forthcoming discussions between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus and express the hope that it will be possible in the aftermath of agreements reached with Cy Vance's help last fall to move on to a more permanent settlement.

To make the Latinos feel part of the discussion, you could point to the hemisphere's success in resolving its disputes peacefully -- and the fact that there have been no conflicts between members of the Western Hemisphere community for almost 30 years.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Briefing book.

cc - Ernie Goldstein  
Hal Saunders

WGBowdler:mm

2a

Guest List

for

White House Luncheon

Thursday - May 9, 1968 - 1:00 p.m.

1. His Excellency Zenon Rossides, Ambassador of Cyprus
2. His Excellency Carlos Mantilla Ortega, Ambassador of Ecuador
3. His Excellency Yizhak Rabin, Ambassador of Israel
4. His Excellency Dr. Roque Avila, Ambassador of Paraguay
5. His Excellency Sir Ellis Clarke, Ambassador of Trinidad and Tobago
6. His Excellency Juan Felipe Yriart, Ambassador of Uruguay



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CYPRUS

2b

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 97-281**  
**By ice, NARA Date 10-5-98**

1. Ambassador Rossides (Row-SEED-eez)

Ambassador Zenon Rossides, 72, has been accredited since 1960 as both Ambassador to the United States and Permanent Representative to the UN. He spends most of his time in New York and displays a poor grasp of U.S.-Cyprus relations. Recently he visited other countries in this hemisphere where he is accredited. Rossides is agreeable to all but subordinates, fussy about his diet (he probably will only pick at the lunch), and very sensitive about his ambassadorial rank and perquisites. A Greek Cypriot lawyer, Rossides is a zealous and tiresome propagandist for the Greek Cypriot position in the Cyprus dispute.

2. Status of the Cyprus Dispute

Since the Vance Mission ended last November's crisis, the Cyprus dispute has progressed toward a more hopeful stage. Some 7,000 Greek mainland troops illegally stationed in Cyprus have been removed and the UN Force in Cyprus is preparing to verify their removal. Archbishop Makarios, his hand strengthened by winning 95 per cent of the votes in a recent presidential election, has withdrawn all restrictions on Turkish Cypriots' freedom of movement and commercial activities and has drafted proposals for a new constitution. Talks between the two Cypriot communities, probably on the subject of constitutional revision, may soon begin. It is important that these talks succeed in stabilizing the island's situation, so that the recurring threat of a Greek-Turkish war over Cyprus will be extinguished.

3. Cypriot Shipping to North Viet-Nam

Preoccupied with the Cyprus dispute, Makarios has not taken a stand on Viet-Nam. However, a number of merchant ships registered in Cyprus under a "flag of convenience" policy have engaged in trade with both North Viet-Nam and Cuba. Secretary Rusk spoke to Foreign Minister Kyprianou about this problem in September 1967, following which no Cyprus-flag ships visited North Viet-Nam until January. Shipping to Cuba, however, continued, with 43 calls by Cypriot-registered vessels in 1967. Cyprus' lax ship-registry policy constitutes the greatest single obstacle to the development of U.S.-Cyprus relations, because under the Foreign Assistance Act we cannot provide any economic assistance, including investment guarantees, to countries that have vessels trading with North Viet-Nam or Cuba.

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intervals; not  
automatically declassified

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ECUADOR

1. Ambassador Mantilla (Man TEE yah)

Ambassador Carlos MANTILLA Ortega, who is 65 years old, graduated from Georgetown University School of the Foreign Service in 1929. Mantilla is a journalist by profession. His family owns the influential Quito daily "El Comercio," and prior to his appointment as Ambassador in August, 1967 Mantilla served as Executive Director of that newspaper. He has been active in Ecuadorean and inter-American press organizations and was President of the Inter-American Press Association from 1949 to 1950. Mantilla received the Maria Moors Cabot Award for journalism in 1944. Although he has not previously served as Ambassador, he has held other diplomatic posts in Washington and Mexico and at the United Nations and was a member of the Ecuadorean delegation at Punta del Este in 1967. Mantilla was a member of the Constituent Assembly of Ecuador in 1966 and 1967 and served as Chairman of that body's Foreign Affairs Committee. Mrs. Mantilla (Doris) is a native of the United States.

2. Ecuadorean Internal Situation

Ecuador will hold presidential elections on June 2, and the election winner will receive the mantle of office on August 31. The government inaugurated in August will be Ecuador's sixth since Jose Maria de Velasco Ibarra was elected in 1960, and the new President will be the first popularly-elected President since Velasco Ibarra was ousted in 1961. The 75 year old Velasco Ibarra is the favored candidate in this election. His opponents are Camilo Ponce (conservative) and Andrés F. Córdova (Liberal). Whoever wins the election will inherit serious fiscal, economic and

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Authority 7699022

By isp/hg, NARA, Date 6-1-92



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-2-

political problems and likely will have only minority support in the Ecuadorean Congress.

There is no active insurgency problem in Ecuador. All of the conditions for an effective insurgency are present with the exception of leadership, and elements of the extreme left have not been inclined to bury their differences in order to unite for leadership of an insurgency.

### 3. Ecuadorean- United States Relations

Our formal relations with Ecuador have been strained since President Arosemena requested the recall of Ambassador Coerr in October 1967. Coerr had felt that Arosemena's criticisms of the Alliance for Progress would be accepted if not challenged, and after he attempted to set the public record straight Arosemena asked for his recall within forty-eight hours. Arosemena now wants a new U.S. Ambassador, and recently he has made conciliatory gestures to us in the hope that this would lead to appointment of an Ambassador before the June elections.

The most persistent problem in the bilateral relationship stems from Ecuador's claim to a 200 mile territorial sea and her practice of seizing and fining unlicensed U.S. tuna boats caught fishing in that area. We hope to have a formal conference with Ecuador, and Chile and Peru to find a practical solution to this problem while setting aside the juridical dispute. Ecuador has protested formally the Kuchel amendment which would suspend economic assistance to countries that seize and fine U.S. fishing boats until these countries have repaid the fines to the United States.

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ISRAEL

1. Israeli Ambassador Yizhak RABIN

Ambassador Rabin, 46 years old, was born in Jerusalem of parents who had emigrated from the United States to Palestine. During World War II he served with Jewish paramilitary groups. After Israeli independence he participated in armistice talks with the Arabs at Rhodes and began his career with the Israeli Defense Forces. In 1964 Ambassador Rabin was made Chief of the IDF General Staff. Along with General Dayan, he is regarded in Israel as a hero of the June war. On his appointment as Ambassador in February 1968 he held the rank of Major General. He is said to have a close, personal relationship with Prime Minister Eshkol. Ambassador Rabin is married and has a daughter, 18, and a son 13. He is intelligent and has a quiet, friendly personality. Photography is a hobby.

2. Israeli Foreign Policy

Israel welcomed the President's policy statement of June 19, 1967, and has appreciated the support of the US in its search for a peace settlement with the Arabs. Israeli and US views have diverged on matters of tactics for reaching a settlement, on policy in Jerusalem and the occupied territories and on the methods for combating terrorism. Outside of such differences in the Israel-Arab arena, Israeli and US policies are generally in harmony although Israel has not been as forthcoming on Viet-Nam as we would have wished.

Israel is particularly concerned with the role played by the Soviet Union in the Near East, and Ambassador Rabin has said he believes the USSR is determined to maintain tensions in the area. While we generally share this view, we believe the Soviet Union wishes to avoid a renewal of the fighting and would accept a political solution. You might supplement remarks along this line with references to other contacts we have had with the Soviet Union, particularly regarding the NPT and our bilateral relationships.

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- 2 -

Although the countries represented at the luncheon face a variety of problems and have diverse interests, they share a common interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. You might emphasize the importance we attach to positive support for the NPT at the current resumed session of the UNGA.

Israel justifiably prides itself on its record of technical assistance to developing countries. You might encourage Ambassador Rabin to describe the kinds of programs that Israel has undertaken and to describe the degree of success they have obtained.

Israel, like other countries to be represented at the luncheon, has a brain drain problem and you might ask the Ambassador how Israel is dealing with the problem and invite his ideas for ways in which the US might help.

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PARAGUAY

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**DECLASSIFIED**

**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLJ** 97-281

By W, **NARA Date** 10-5-98

1. Ambassador Avila (AM-vee-lah)

Dr. Roque Avila was appointed Paraguayan Ambassador to the United States in January 1968. He has been a leading Colorado Party Congressman and a Director of the Ministry of Public Health. A 53-year old physician, Dr. Avila is considered to be a protege of President Stroessner. Avila is one of a group of younger men working within the Colorado Party for a more open and democratic government.

Dr. Avila was born into a middle-class family in Asuncion in 1914. He fought (as a First Lieutenant) in the bloody Chaco War with Bolivia, and earned a medical degree from the University of Asuncion. In 1942-43 and in 1958-59 Dr. Avila studied medicine in the United States under U. S. Government auspices, and in 1967 he visited the United States under a partial Leader Grant. He regards himself as a great friend of the United States.

Dr. Avila takes himself very seriously and has little sense of humor. He is married and has six children. Dr. Avila speaks some English but resents any implication that he is not fluent in the language.

2. Domestic Political Situation

Paraguay has a turbulent political history with only the most tenuous democratic tradition. Long periods of authoritarian rule have alternated with unstable and short-lived regimes. There has never been a peaceful transfer of power from one political party to another. Twenty-six of the country's fifty presidents have been ousted by coups.

President Alfredo Stroessner assumed power by a coup in May 1954. The first years of his regime were largely concerned with the establishment of internal order, sometimes by repressive means. With the advent of political stability the government gradually implemented a policy of permitting an expanded degree of civil liberty. Three opposition parties have been recognized since 1962 and are permitted a full range of political activity. Major elections were held in 1963, 1965, 1967, and 1968 under progressively improving standards of conduct. (These were the first elections since 1928 in which opposition parties participated.)

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Although progress toward political liberalization continues at a gradual pace, President Stroessner still exercises complete control over his government based on his ability to command the loyalty both of the military and of the popularly based and long established Colorado Party. Stroessner's political adeptness has created an unprecedented atmosphere of domestic tranquility and of relative economic progress. Nevertheless, there remains room for improvement. Contraband and governmental incapacity remain serious problems and it remains doubtful whether the new growth recently permitted the country's weakly-rooted democratic institutions could yet withstand the heavy winds of a political storm.

The newly re-elected Stroessner government, barring Stroessner's unexpected departure from the scene, is likely to be in power in Paraguay for the next ten years. In spite of its many imperfections the trend over the past six years is encouraging, and Stroessner may be expected to continue the current degree of internal peace and stability. Under these conditions Paraguay's political development may continue at a gradual pace, but the country's economic progress is insufficient.

### 3. Paraguayan Development Situation

With Paraguay's low state of economic development the needs for expensive investment in infrastructure are large. Savings generated within the economy fall far short of requirements. Paraguay must call not only upon the resources of the international lending community, but must make a far greater effort to mobilize its own domestic resources. While there has been some improvement in recent years, the central government still only collects between 10 and 11% of GNP in annual revenues. As a consequence, the USG is attempting to gear its economic assistance to improvements in Paraguay's fiscal management, and it is also using its influence with the IDB and IBERD to do the same.

### 4. Paraguay's Foreign Relations

President Stroessner undoubtedly sets the tone for Paraguay's strongly pro-Western and anti-communist foreign policies. His government has consistently supported U. S. policies in the United Nations and in the Organization of American States. He has made clear his firm support for our policies in Viet Nam, our world-wide resistance to communist encroachment, and our economic and military assistance to foreign governments. He supported the U. S.-OAS action at the time of the crisis in the Dominican Republic with a prompt and effective contribution of a troop contingent to the Inter-American Peace Force.

27

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

1. Ambassador Clarke

Ambassador Sir Ellis Clarke has been Ambassador to the United States since Trinidad and Tobago's independence in 1962. He also serves as his country's Ambassador to the OAS and to Mexico. Within recent months he has been named Chairman of the Board of the Trinidad government-owned British West Indian Airways (BWIA), which is being assisted in a reorganization and refinancing by several U.S. firms. Until 1966 Sir Ellis also served as Trinidad and Tobago's Ambassador to the U.N.

Although he has no political party affiliation, Sir Ellis enjoys the confidence of Prime Minister Williams. The Ambassador has always been favorably disposed towards the U.S. His attitude undoubtedly played a major part in influencing Trinidad and Tobago to join the OAS in March 1967.

2. Caribbean Free Trade Area and Caribbean Development Bank

Trinidad and Tobago joined with other English-speaking Caribbean countries and islands on May 1 in the beginnings of a Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA). As the principal manufacturing center in the Eastern Caribbean, the country hopes to benefit substantially as tariffs are lowered within CARIFTA during the next ten years. Trinidad and Tobago also plans to participate in a Caribbean Development Bank being formed by the English speaking territories with U.S., U.K. and Canadian assistance. The Bank presently is in a critical formulative stage as a result of Jamaica's recent decision not to be a member.

3. Restriction on Import of Trinidad Cotton Textiles into the U.S.

The U.S. Government has recently put a ceiling on Trinidad cotton textiles being imported into the U.S. Until now textiles have been one of the better growth industries of the sort needed to cope with Trinidad unemployment situation (15%) which steadily is worsening. The Trinidad government has requested bilateral consultations on the matter, and the request currently is under study within the U.S.G.

4. Limitation on Immigrants to the U.S. from Trinidad and Tobago

On July 1 an immigrant visa quota system will go into effect in the Western Hemisphere. The quota is expected to curtail the

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By 109/4, NARA, Date 6-1-92



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- 2 -

current immigrant flow from Trinidad and Tobago. Traditionally emigration has been the only means of keeping unemployment from increasing beyond the 15% level and of restraining population pressures. In addition to the impending quota action on July 1, it now appears that the flow of domestic workers from Trinidad and Tobago (who constitute most of the emigrants) will be even more seriously affected by an April 23 decision by the U.S. Department of Labor. If this decision goes into effect, it will require all domestics who receive visas to prove that they have been gainfully employed as domestics for a period of one year. Most of the persons who wish to emigrate from Trinidad and Tobago have not had the opportunity to obtain gainful employment there as domestics for more than a year. The new plan, if it eventuates, will seriously reduce the flow of emigrants from Trinidad and will be a source of some distress to the government.

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28

URUGUAY

1. Ambassador Yriart (ee-ree-ART)

Ambassador Juan Felipe YRIART has served in Washington for a total of 15 years and since 1963 as Ambassador. He has also served in the UK and Sweden in addition to the Uruguayan Foreign Ministry since he entered the diplomatic service in 1939. Yriart, who is 49 years old, was educated in Montevideo and Oxford. An active and competent Ambassador, Yriart has served under both Blanco and Colorado party administrations. He is a member of the Colorado Party which presently is in office. Yriart advocates the closest cooperation between Uruguay and the United States, but does not hesitate to voice his own or his country's views when these occasionally diverge from those of the United States Government. He is bilingual.

2. Uruguayan Internal Problems

Interacting economic and political problems, encouraged and aggravated by outmoded institutions, have in recent years become acute in Uruguay. The economy provided a fairly high level of living for the vast majority until the 1950's. A prolonged period of stagnation then set in and deteriorated into a real decline in 1964. Incipient inflation in the 1950's distorted the agricultural base of the economy and made many import substitution industries less economic. Despite halfhearted attempts to stabilize the peso in 1961 and 1963, the inflationary rate in 1967 soared to 135% while GNP declined by an estimated 5%. In late 1967, the GOU embarked on a serious stabilization program and successfully concluded negotiations for a \$25 million IMF standby and \$39 million in U.S. assistance (\$20 million PL-480 sales agreement plus \$19 million in loans for agricultural development and fertilizer).

The council form of government, which effectively frustrated the GOU's coming to grips with key economic issues, was constitutionally replaced in 1967 by a presidential form of government. Although political factionalism is a serious problem for President Pacheco's governing Colorado Party and for the opposition Blanco Party, there is some indication that the problem is being skirted by bringing technically (and less politically) oriented individuals into top government posts. Nevertheless, tough political sledding is to be anticipated for years to come, and will be particularly difficult until the economic stabilization and development program produce the desired results.

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3. Uruguayan Foreign Policy

Our relations with Uruguay are excellent. Uruguay maintains diplomatic relations with all European communist countries, and in the last year has moved toward establishing closer trade relations with them. However, the percentage of Uruguayan trade with those countries is small and the majority of commerce is still with Western Europe and the United States. The Government of Uruguay traditionally has been leary of the intentions of the Argentines and Brazilians, and occasionally becomes paranoid regarding the possibility of intervention by one or both of its large, politically disparate neighbors.

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, May 8, 1968

*Profile*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your approval and signature is a brief, warm letter to Mayor Hans Hansson of Göteborg, Sweden.

The mayor wrote to you on April 19 enclosing and endorsing a pre-American article from one of Sweden's leading newspapers and expressing his best wishes to you and your family.

The mayor occupies an important position in Sweden. Your letter would show our interest in cordial relations with Sweden.

W. W. Rostow

If you approve, we will  
need your signature on  
the attached letter \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

ERF:mm



May 9, 1968

Dear Mayor Hansson:

Thank you for the kind sentiments expressed in your note of April 19. Mrs. Johnson and I recall with pleasure our visit to your handsome city in 1963 and particularly appreciate your thoughtfulness.

Sincerely,

The Honorable  
Hans Hansson  
Mayor of Göteborg  
Göteborg, Sweden

LBJ:ERF:mm

April 19th, 68

Dear Mr. President:

Since you were here it happened two years ago that the Social democrats were defeated in this city and I (a liberal) took over the Mayorship. We all remember with pleasure your visit and I can assure you of the hearty feelings and sincere good wishes from the whole mature part of the Swedish population. As you know, the whole world has a crisis between the generations and in my opinion the post-war generation in the developed world has no longer a steadfast platform but search for new values in life. The earlier Ambassador in Washington, Mr. Boheman, who is a senator in our parliament voted in by Gothenborg, has written a fine article about USA-Swedish relations and I ask Mr. Heath to send it over to you. I can endorse that article with a full heart.

All the best to your country, to you, Mr. President, and to your charming family.

Sincerely yours,

Hans Hansson



STADSFULLMÄKTIGES ORDFÖRANDE I GÖTEBORG  
Sjökaptén HANS HANSSON

April 19<sup>th</sup> 68  
6663

Dear Mr. President.

Since you were here it  
happened two years ago that the  
social democrats were defeated in this  
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Municipality. We all remember with plea-  
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steadfast platform but searches in the haze  
for new values in life. The earlier ambassador  
in Washington Mr. Persson who is a senator in  
our parliament voted in by Falkenberg has  
written a fine article about USA-Sweden relations  
and I ask Mr. Heath to send it over to you. I  
can enclose that article with a full heart.  
All the best to your country, to you  
Mr. President and to your charming family.  
Sincerely Yours *Henrik Persson*



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INFORMAL TRANSLATION  
ARTICLE FROM DAGENS NYHETER,  
APRIL 18, 1968

SWEDEN AND THE USA

(In box by picture.) The aggressiveness of the Swedish Government's policies toward the US is unprecedented for a neutral country. I myself was perhaps now and then critical of certain features of the foreign policy which bore Uden's (former Foreign Minister) seal, which I found at times doctrinaire and inflexible. Now I wish we had it back again, writes Speaker (of the Upper Chamber of Parliament) Erik Boheman, for many years Ambassador in Washington.

(Text) Sweden's relationship with the US has gone through different stages since World War I. During the years just after that war, Sweden was unpopular because it was considered to have been strongly pro-German. But little by little relations improved, and during the period of isolationism which characterized American attitudes, the memories of the war years receded quickly into the background. Then there was a new wave of unpopularity during World War II, particularly after the US entered the war. Swedish neutrality was considered contemptible, and our position found little understanding among those in public, although we were a little better understood in Washington. A certain anti-Swedish propaganda from Norwegian circles contributed somewhat to the public attitude. Swedish-Americans called themselves "of Scandinavian descent". This opinion lasted quite a long time, and got a new lease on life when Sweden, in contrast to Denmark and Norway, did not join NATO.

After a while opinions changed, primarily because Sweden did not become a burden on the American taxpayer, and because Sweden by itself

was able to maintain a defense which was considered stronger than that which could be established with American help in the smaller NATO countries, a defense which was seen as filling a vacuum in Northern Europe and which was judged as contributing to peace and stability in our corner of Europe. Understanding of the importance of Swedish neutrality for Finland's independence grew also. Our progress in the question of labor peace and social legislation drew public attention. The intensive activity undertaken by the Embassy in Washington also helped. I myself traveled all over the country during these years and defended and explained Sweden's position in many speeches and television appearances. A systematic cultivation of cabinet members, Senators and Congressmen as well as the leading press commentators perhaps also contributed. I believe that during my ten years as Chief of Mission in Washington I acquired a certain insight into how both the leaders and the ordinary citizen react and think.

There was also carried out, with strong Government assistance, a nation-wide Swedish information and propaganda activity. Sweden got a reputation as a progressive and somewhat well-balanced society with a careful and neutral foreign policy which enabled Swedes to be used to advantage in international cooperation. Hammarskjold, Per Jacobsson and many others strengthened our position. Americans generally found Sweden to be a sympathetic land with attitudes of good will and friendliness. Large numbers of Swedish-Americans visited the old country. Of course, "sin in Sweden" got quite a bit of publicity and aroused feelings of discomfort in some puritanical circles, but that was by and large a superficial phenomenon.

Much has been spoiled. I have witnessed recent developments which have largely ruined decades of intensive work. In my opinion entirely unnecessarily. The Viet-Nam war, the crisis in the race problem, and balance of payments problems have created in the US problems of moral, psychological, political and economic natures that no one could have foreseen a few years ago. American democracy with its many beauty spots is now in a serious crisis from which it will, in my opinion, emerge victorious as it has so many times in the past. In no country is debate so free and unhampered, criticism of injustices so thorough and sharp, even though prejudices and leftover ideas of an obsolete "American way of life", are hampering factors. America is a big country, a continent, and the difference between the north and the south is in some ways considerable larger than between Sweden and Sicily, even though equalization is under way and is making itself felt. Experience has shown me that in general one can sharply criticize American attitudes without arousing ill will if one's interlocutor has the feeling that the criticism is based on friendship and good will.

The internal American criticism of the Viet-Nam engagement and the way it has been carried out has been sharp and continuous. Foreign criticism has been taken with equanimity as long as it has been within certain bounds. It has been in certain ways a help to the internal opposition. "America is losing its friends." But when no official American representative in a country which is generally considered friendly is even allowed to speak, when representatives of the government directly declare that the FLN is the only representative movement for the South Vietnamese people and this declaration is endorsed by the government's leaders, then the most representative of the oppositions leaders react



negatively. I have many personal evidences of this. "Let us solve our problems ourselves. You're welcome to criticize us, but don't directly take sides with those whose main weapon is terror and who are killing our boys," is a refrain which I have often heard.

Aggressiveness. The asylum which Sweden has given to some dozens of American deserters is not of great significance, but what has been at work is the sympathetic publicity which has been given these youths, not least in state controlled mass media. .

If the Swedish government had been satisfied to support U Thant in his efforts and endorsed his political line, which has been strongly critical of US policy, and if more timely and better-organized demonstrations had been carried out, preferably in part with professional groups, the picture would have been quite different.

One can imagine how we would have reacted if, during a crisis in Sweden, our representatives in the US had been denied the right to a hearing. I myself was during our difficult times exposed to hundreds of questions, which often exposed small knowledge, at times hostility, but my answer was never interrupted. I realize that the comparison is weak, but in any case. . .

One can anyhow hope that if and when peace comes to Viet-Nam, a peace which apparently will not hold an unreserved taking-over of power by the FLN in South Viet-Nam, something which the US according to my understanding could never accept, a good deal of that which is now being destroyed in our relations with the US can be repaired. But that will take years, of that I am quite sure, before Sweden can regain the position in the American consciousness which many years of work had gained.

I am not thinking here so much of trade. The negative aspects here can quite quickly be reversed (although for example the unorganized boycott of French goods appears to have achieved a significant extent), particularly if the Swedish government waters down the aggressiveness in its foreign policy which is unprecedented for a neutral country. I myself was perhaps now and then critical of certain features of Udden's policies which I found at times doctrinaire and inflexible. Now I wish we had them back again. What I'm mainly thinking of is the revival of the friendly atmosphere which in large part characterized relations between the American and the Swedish people.

I will willingly acknowledge that certain Swedish government members have made efforts to cover up and to make progress, and that the US government has likewise, after second thoughts, given up retaliations on the diplomatic level. In public opinion, however, the damage has been done.

Efforts for good relations between the American and the Swedish people are a token of thanks for all the US has done for Europe, perhaps saving the greatest part of Europe from Nazism. These good relations are also of great importance for us because our own political and military security, our economic development and our place in the world, is, when all is said and done, in great measure dependent upon a benevolent US, with which land, in addition, millions of Swedish-Americans tie us.

Erik Boheman

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

4  
*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, May 8, 1968

Mr. President:

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Prime Minister Ramgoolam of Mauritius  
Thursday, May 9, at 12 noon

Attached are Nick Katzenbach's briefing memo and talking points. This is a courtesy call. Mauritius (a small island in the Indian Ocean) just got her independence from Britain in March. (John Mosler and David King were your representatives at the ceremony.) Ramgoolam came here mainly for the formal entry of Mauritius into the UN.

Our only bilateral issue with Mauritius is the sugar quota. (Sugar is their principal export and we're a sizeable market for them.) Ramgoolam might ask for help on the quota. Otherwise, your talk should be confined to pleasantries.

You might tell Ramgoolam:

- We are glad to welcome another young democracy into the family of nations. Mauritius can count on U. S. friendship as she begins the challenging work of nation-building.
- (If asked:) We know sugar exports are vital to the prosperity of Mauritius. We will be as helpful as we can on the quota problem, but Ramgoolam should know this is also a matter involving the Congress. He should make his case as clearly and as strongly as possible in that quarter as well.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-283  
By is, NARA Date 5-5-98

W. W. Rostow

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 97-281**  
**By iso, NARA Date 10-5-98**

May 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Prime Minister Sir  
Seewoosagur Ramgoolam of Mauritius,  
May 9, 1968 at 12:00 Noon

Prime Minister Ramgoolam, who came to the U.S. for the admission of his nation to the UN, is making a private visit to Washington May 8 and 9. He visited Canada privately April 30 - May 8, and will be going to Cape Kennedy from Washington.

Mauritius received its independence from Great Britain last March. The country is faced with serious economic and demographic problems. Its economy is largely dependent on sugar, and its population of 870,000 is split racially.

The Soviets and Chicoms have shown a keen interest in Mauritius. Its important location in the western Indian Ocean would afford them an opportunity to monitor our tracking equipment in Madagascar and could even provide a down-range missile tracking station for Peking. Such inroads would obviously threaten our present use of Mauritius as a landing site for Project Apollo search-and-rescue aircraft.


Prime Minister Ramgoolam is well aware of this situation and has demonstrated that, while outwardly pro-West, he is not above trying to play one side against the other. Ramgoolam's main interest in this visit will be to encourage you to extend aid to Mauritius and to seek a larger sugar quota. We have very little to offer in the way of aid and are in no position to change the sugar quota.

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Talking points are attached. Joe Palmer will accompany the Prime Minister.

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Enclosures:

- TAB A - Talking Points
- TAB B - Schedule
- TAB C - Biographic Information

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SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-281  
By is, NARA Date 10-5-98

Presidential Opening

-- Congratulations to the people of Mauritius upon their entry into the community of independent nations.

-- We are very grateful to Mauritius for participating in our worldwide space efforts by affording NASA and the US Air Force landing rights in connection with our Manned Flight Program.

-- I was pleased to nominate my good friend David S. King as my Ambassador to Mauritius. (Ambassador King, who is also your Ambassador to the Malagasy Republic, is resident in Tananarive.--The Secretary has written you recommending that we accept Guy Balancy as Mauritian Ambassador to the United States.)

Topics Ramgoolam May Raise

Sugar

-- He might ask that we increase Mauritius' sugar quota from 17,229 tons (1968) to approximately 50,000 tons. He may cite his country's heavy dependence on sugar exports and note that Mauritian sugar production was abnormally low during 1963-64, the base years for the determination of foreign quotas under the US Sugar Act.

You May Wish to Respond

-- We are very much aware of the important role sugar exports play in the economic fortunes of Mauritius.

-- Our Sugar Act recognizes this by assigning to friendly foreign producers-- largely less-developed countries-- a generous and expanding share of our

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sugar requirements. We did our best to make certain the quota assignments were equitable, but it was impossible to meet fully the requests of all producers.

- Departures from the statutory quota system may take place only under most exceptional circumstances. This protects Mauritius from quota reductions just as it inhibits changes which would benefit Mauritius at the expense of other countries.
- When changes are contemplated in our sugar quota system, the wishes of Mauritius will certainly be given full consideration.

#### Aid

-- Ramgoolam may ask how and to what extent the United States is prepared to assist in the economic development of Mauritius.

#### You May Wish to Respond

- Mauritius will be eligible to receive PL 480 assistance and Export-Import Bank financing on a bilateral basis.
- We are providing a \$50,000 self-help fund which can be used for small local development activities in Mauritius.
- A Peace Corps program may be an eventual possibility.
- As the Prime Minister knows, however, the emphasis of our aid program in Africa is now on regional and multilateral projects.

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Mauritius may be able to participate in such projects, including university scholarship opportunities.

- We were pleased to be able to provide disaster relief assistance to Mauritius last month to relieve the suffering and devastation resulting from Cyclones Carmen and Monica.

#### Defense

-- He may note the pressures on Mauritius from Communist nations, and ask for American help in defending the western Indian Ocean area through the establishment of an American base on Mauritius.

#### You May Wish to Respond

- We are now looking at the entire area, but we see no present need for an American base on Mauritius.
- We trust the Defense Agreement which Mauritius recently concluded with Great Britain will provide adequately for your security needs.

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NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS

4e  
May 3, 1968

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington, D. C.  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

PROGRAM FOR THE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF HIS EXCELLENCY  
SIR SEEWOOSAGUR RAMGOOLAM, PRIME MINISTER OF MAURITIUS

WEDNESDAY, MAY 8

10:15 a.m. EDT Depart Toronto by United States Air Force Aircraft.

11:15 a.m. Arrive Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. Proceed to Mayflower Hotel.

1:00 p.m. Luncheon hosted by Nicholas deB Katzenbach, Under Secretary of State, at Department of State, 8th Floor.

3:30 p.m. Messrs. Al-Amry, Apcar, and Huang of the World Bank will call on the Prime Minister at the Mayflower Hotel.

5:00 p.m. International Press and Publications Service officials will call on the Prime Minister at the Mayflower Hotel.

Private Evening.

THURSDAY, MAY 9

9:00 a.m. Mr. Jack Vaughn, Director of the Peace Corps and Mr. C. Payne Lucas, Regional Director (Africa), Peace Corps will call on the Prime Minister at the Mayflower Hotel.

10:00 a.m. Mr. R. Peter Straus, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, AID will call on the Prime Minister at the Mayflower Hotel.

11:00 a.m. Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, will call on the Prime Minister at the Mayflower Hotel.

NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS

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THURSDAY, MAY 9 Continued

12 Noon	Prime Minister meets with the President at the White House.
1:30 p.m.	Departure from Andrews Air Force Base via United States Air Force Aircraft. Luncheon in flight.
3:30 p.m.	Arrival at Patrick Air Force Base, Cape Kennedy. Proceed to Sheraton Cape Colony Inn.
7:00 p.m.	Dinner hosted by Deputy Director of Cape Kennedy.

FRIDAY, MAY 10

9:00 a.m.	Prime Minister will tour Cape Kennedy.
1:00 p.m.	Luncheon at Officers Club, Cape Kennedy.
2:15 p.m.	Depart Officer's Club, Cape Kennedy for Sheraton Cape Colony Inn.
2:45 p.m.	Depart Hotel for Patrick Air Force Base.
3:00 p.m.	Departure Patrick Air Force Base via United States Air Force Aircraft.
5:00 p.m.	Arrive Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D. C.
7:00 p.m.	Departure Dulles Airport for London via PAA Number 106.

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C



4-h

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 97-285 and RAC 001-094-5-1  
By HO, NARA, Date 11-20-03



MAURITIUS  
RAMGOOLAM, SEEWOOSAGUR.  
PRIME MINISTER.

1966

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and declassification

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 8, 1968 -- 7:40 p. m.

*for file*

Mr. President:

Knowing how much wiser you have been than most of us on India, I attach a memorandum which I have not signed.

The background is this: When you ordered a hold up on the Indian loan, I instructed our people to examine every form of leverage we might exert on issues of vital interest to the U. S.

I believe the work has been done honestly and in the spirit in which I gave guidance.

If I could think of a way to use our economic leverage over India to advance our broader national interests, I would certainly do so.

Because you may be wiser and more resourceful in this matter than I, I send this memorandum to you to read and consider. I can only commend it to you as an honest effort.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 89-143

By isp/14, NARA, Date 5-28-92



DECLASSIFIED

Authority FR 4364-68, vol. 25 494

# K NARA. Date 12-12-09

WWR

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SECRET

Wednesday, May 8, 1968 -- 4:15 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: AID Loan to India

Two weeks ago you instructed us to hold up on the \$225 million AID program loan proposed for India. This loan would fill out our share of consortium aid for Indian fiscal year 1968, which ended in April.

As you know, India's economic performance and prospects are better now than ever. We have tried to use the delay to find ways to use the loan as political leverage with Mrs. Gandhi and to impress on her how painful it is to get these large sums for a country that isn't always as helpful as we could wish. I am afraid we have come up empty. Bill Gaud and Nick Katsenbach concur in the following analysis and recommendation.

Setting

We must start with two unpleasant but very real facts:

1. From the Indian point of view we would be trying to exert more pressure with substantially less aid. Our total capital aid to India in FY 1968, including this loan, would be about \$200 million, about \$100 million less than last year. Thus, as the Indians see it, we are cutting back by more than 25%. This is particularly painful now because India is in an economic recovery, led by the bumper harvest, which will cause very serious foreign exchange pressure in the Fall. And the Indians have not forgotten that we were among the leaders in the Consortium who assured them in 1966 that they would get \$900 million per year in non-project aid if they agreed to devalue and make other economic reforms. They went through with the reforms. But this year, because of our cut and the delay in IDA replenishment, they will get less than \$600 million in non-project aid. This adds up to a poor base for more arm-twisting.
2. The Government of India is in a particularly weak and delicate political position. Mrs. Gandhi presides over a loose confederation of worried politicians. She is not strong enough to crack the whip over them, and they are not strong enough to withstand heavy nationalist pressures from the Parliament. This problem has been aggravated lately by the lobbying on the Non-Proliferation Treaty in which the Russians (or so the Indians say) have threatened to cut off aid unless India signs. Predictably, Mrs. Gandhi and Morarji Desai have responded with a number of belligerent statements, public and private, to the effect that anybody who tries to blackmail India with aid can take a flying leap. Whether we like it or not, we are clearly in a position where the slightest hint of an attempt to use

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- 2 -

aid as a direct lever outside the economic field will produce an outraged and counterproductive reaction.

#### Possible Quid Pro Quo

There are three major areas in which we might press the Indians to be more helpful:

1. Indian Military Spending: The Indians keep about one million men under arms. They have made several recent deals with the Russians for aircraft, frigates, submarines, and other equipment to modernize their forces. They argue that this is all needed for defense against China, and they are in fact within their 1964 defense plan worked up with our cooperation. We tried to get them to keep their military budget from rising this year, but they announced an increase of slightly less than 5%. In fact, because of price rises, this probably works out to a very small increase in real terms, but it still causes concern in Pakistan and could lead to another round of reciprocal defense increases in both countries.

We have also been having trouble with India with respect to the Conte Amendment which requires us to cut economic aid in the same amount that poor countries spend on sophisticated weapons unless the President finds the arms purchase vital to U. S. security. To be brutal, the Indians have lied to us twice -- once before the Conte Amendment and once after -- about what aircraft they are buying from the Soviet Union. Both cases seem to be products of ignorance rather than intentional deception, and the second case does not now appear to be an actual violation of the Conte provision. But we need much better cooperation in the future.

Our preferred solution to this range of problems has been formal Indo-U. S. defense talks in which we would get the information we need to administer the Conte and Symington Amendments. In theory, we might ask for such talks as a quid pro quo for this loan. But this proposal was explicitly and indignantly rejected in March by Morarji Desai during the last go-around on Conte violations -- though, characteristically, he informally gave us the information we wanted in the same session. It is Chet Bowles' judgment, with which we concur, that any new approach now would not only queer any chance for military conversations, but might also derail current plans for general U. S. -GOI policy talks (proposed by the Indians) in Delhi in July where we hope to make some headway on this subject.

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2. The NPT: Most Indian politicians are frightened of the NPT. They overstate the public sentiment against the Treaty (Morarji likes to say that 99% of Indian public opinion opposes it), but they do know that nobody who counts is really strongly for it and they are afraid that anybody who gets out on a limb will have it chopped off. The Cabinet has taken a formal and public decision against signing the Treaty "in its present form." But the Indian UN Representative is not lobbying with other countries against the Treaty; he is sitting quietly and observing.

It is conceivable that we could try subtly to tie this loan to the Treaty. But again our judgment is that this tactic would hurt us far more than it would help. Mrs. Gandhi and Desai have staked out their position on Russian blackmail; we could expect them to be at least as tough with us. Indeed, a frontal attack from us might well make it so juicy a political plum to oppose the Treaty that it would tip the final balance against it.

3. Economic Reforms: The Indians have done every major thing we have asked them to do in the economic sphere. They made agriculture their top investment priority. They devalued and liberalized imports. They are holding to the import liberalizations in fiscal year 1969 despite the prospect of serious foreign exchange shortage. They are building food buffer stocks and have agreed to make the Food Corporation into the CCC-like entity we advised. They have moved to keep farm prices at incentive levels despite the bumper crop. They have begun to relax the food zones which separated states. In short, we simply don't have any major changes in economic policy to which we could tie this loan even if the loan would provide enough leverage to get them adopted.

On the other hand, if the Indians do not get this loan, economic conditions will force them to turn away from the rapid-growth, free-market track we have urged them to take. Their present balance of payments prospects are very bleak, even assuming this loan is made promptly available. If it is not, they will very soon be forced to put the clamps back on imports and put a damper on what could be the best economic year since Indian independence. We cannot say that this loan will guarantee the economic success we seek. We can say that success is impossible without this loan -- and soon.

#### Conclusions:

We conclude that we can find nothing to be gained from delaying this loan. We have all learned many a lesson from you in years past about dealing with India. But this time there is nothing we want from her which we haven't already received or could possibly receive if we needle her with this loan. (I think this is true with respect to Vietnam negotiations as well.)

SECRET

- 4 -

On the other hand, there are very great costs to delay. The economic recovery led by the bumper grain crop is the most hopeful event in the developing world in at least five years. If the Indians can find the foreign exchange to take advantage of it, we could get sustained growth in the subcontinent on a scale we have only dreamed about in the past. If they cannot find the foreign exchange, we will not only have missed a great economic opportunity, we will have discredited the economic policy line we have worked many years to sell; we will face serious economic stabilization problems in India; and we will have aggravated the current political unrest by adding a host of potent economic issues.

The Aid/India Consortium meets in Washington May 23-24. Only the U.S. has not formally announced an aid pledge for the Indian fiscal year just ended. (This meeting is actually supposed to be about next year's money. It will be very embarrassing for our representative if we have not announced this loan before then. But our problems will far transcend embarrassment. The other Consortium members have maintained their contributions at historical levels despite the fact that it was obvious that the Congressional cut would force us to cut back. If we don't come through now with even our reduced contribution, we will (1) undermine efforts to raise the necessary funds for next year, and (2) make it crystal clear that we are holding out for some quid pro quo which the Indians will assume is political and may hotly denounce -- probably with the support of the other Consortium members.

None of this denies or excuses the fact that the Indians can be irritating and uncooperative. Nor does it excuse the fact that they have often been less than helpful on Vietnam. But I think that this is one of those times when we must swallow our discontent and go ahead with the treatment despite the patient's behavior. I recommend that you approve the loan.

W. W. Rostow

Loan approved \_\_\_\_\_

Let's hold off a while longer \_\_\_\_\_

Loan disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET

EKH/vmr

**ACTION**

**Wednesday, May 8, 1968  
7:15 p.m.**

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith this draft communique  
is agreeable to the Thais.**

**They understand it is not agreed  
by us until you approve. It goes no  
further in commitments in Asia than  
existing language which you have approved.**

**W. W. Restow**

**Approved \_\_\_\_\_**

**No \_\_\_\_\_**

**Call me \_\_\_\_\_**

**WWRestow:rla**

*Pres file*

6a

(CONFIDENTIAL - UNTIL RELEASED)

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER THANOM KITTIKACHORN OF THAILAND  
May 8-9, 1968

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

1. At the invitation of President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States, Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn of the Kingdom of Thailand paid an official visit to Washington on May 8 and 9. This visit afforded the President and the Prime Minister and several of his senior Cabinet colleagues an opportunity to exchange views on current developments in Thailand and on the situation in Southeast Asia.

Thailand.

2. The Prime Minister described the dynamic economic expansion currently taking place in Thailand. He mentioned the major role played by private initiative and emphasized Thai interest in promoting foreign investment in his country. He also referred to the forthcoming promulgation of a new Constitution by His Majesty the King.
3. The President and the Prime Minister discussed the externally-supported, Communist-directed subversion and insurgency in Thailand, especially in the northern and northeastern regions. In this connection, the Prime Minister described his Government's programs for providing security to the rural



- population and improving their social and economic conditions. He also noted that while welcoming foreign assistance in the form of training, equipment and advice, the Royal Thai Government regarded defeating the insurgency as a Thai responsibility to be carried out by its own forces. The President made clear the intention <sup>of the</sup> ~~affairs~~ United States to continue its assistance to Thailand to help provide the Royal Thai Government with the means of meeting illegal Communist activities. He stressed American support in the field of accelerated rural development, especially with regard to roads and water resources.
4. The President re-emphasized the determination of the United States to stand by its treaty commitments to Thailand and its other allies in Asia. He noted the pledge <sup>of his</sup> ~~that~~ he had given at the time ~~of his~~ visit to Bangkok in 1966 that the commitment of the United States was not of a particular political party or administration, but ~~of the~~ people of the United States, and that "America keeps its commitments."

#### Vietnam

5. The President and the Prime Minister reviewed in detail the situation in South Vietnam. They reaffirmed their determination to assist the Republic of Vietnam in defending itself against aggression in order to assure its people the right to determine their own future free from external interference

and terrorism. They also stressed the importance of this defense to the security of other nations in the region.

6. The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the military situation including the recent initiatives of the Government of South Vietnam and actions by the United States and its allies to increase their forces there. The Prime Minister noted that additional Thai forces, the first increments of a Thai division, will deploy to South Vietnam shortly to join Thai troops already fighting with South Vietnamese, American, and other allied units. The President paid tribute to the contribution Thailand is making to our common defense interests by making base facilities available for use by the United States. He also praised the hospitality extended American servicemen by the Thai people.
7. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the attainment of a just and durable peace required both a strong military posture and the pursuit of a diplomatic solution. They agreed to continue their efforts on both these fronts until such a peace is secured.
8. The President reviewed in detail the developments that had followed his initiative of March 31 to halt bombing in the major part of Vietnam and to invite talks. The President and

the Prime Minister expressed satisfaction that Paris had now been agreed as the site for talks, and the President reviewed in detail the position that American representatives would take in the opening stages of these talks. The President reaffirmed that at each stage the US Government would continue its full consultations with the Royal Thai Government and its other allies concerning negotiating positions and developments. The President and the Prime Minister also reaffirmed the position stated in the Seven-Nation Foreign Ministers Meeting of April 1967 -- that a settlement in Vietnam, to be enduring, must respect the wishes and aspirations of the Vietnamese people; that the Republic of Vietnam should be a full participant in any negotiations ~~negotiations~~ designed to bring about a settlement of the conflict; and that the allied nations which have helped to defend the Republic of Vietnam should participate in any settlement of the conflict.

9. Expressing the hope that the Paris conversations would result in serious discussions on the substance of peace in Vietnam, the President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed that the Manila Communique of 1966 would form the basis of the allied position. The two leaders emphasized their determination that the South Vietnamese people shall not be conquered by aggression and shall

enjoy their inherent right to decide their own way of life and form of government. The President and the Prime Minister also noted the importance of ensuring full compliance with the provisions of the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos.

10. In discussing the situation which would follow a cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that close and continuous consultation on economic and security questions would be required to assure a smooth transition from war to peace.

#### Regional Cooperation

11. The President and the Prime Minister further reviewed the favorable trends in regional cooperation in Southeast Asia and Thailand's leading role in furthering these developments. Particular note was taken of the accomplishments in ECAFE and the Mekong Committee, to whose studies and projects they attach considerable importance, and of the evolution of several new Southeast Asian organizations which raise hope for a new era of constructive common endeavor for a lasting peace and sustained progress of the area. Referring to his speech at Johns Hopkins in April 1965, the President cited our support for Southeast Asian regional development as clear evidence of the United States continuing concern for and commitment to the nations of this region.



12. In particular, the Prime Minister reported to the President discussions held in New York with a US team headed by Mr. Eugene R. Black concerning the favorable outlook for the Pa Mong dam on the mainstream of the Mekong River. The President and the Prime Minister agreed on the importance of this project and the desirability of accelerating present project feasibility studies under the Mekong Committee.

7  
*Pres file*

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wed., May 8, 1968  
5:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

There is evidence that the North Vietnamese may have moved MIGs into an airfield six miles south of the 20th parallel giving them a capability to expand their area of operations to the South. Yesterday Communist MIGs engaged a flight of US F-4 aircraft in the Vinh area and shot one down. The North Vietnamese flight staged from Bai Thuong Airfield and apparently retired to the Phuc Yen Airfield in Hanoi.

*Walt* Rostow

Attachments: ~~TOP SECRET~~ CODEWORD

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC DD-333  
By *me*, NARA, Date *5-7-03*

7a

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

#### Thai Force For South Vietnam

An initial contingent of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force -- a newly formed two-brigade division -- will deploy to South Vietnam on or about 15 June, a month ahead of schedule. So far as is known, the second brigade will begin leaving on 27 Jan 69. As the 11,000-man division moves in, elements of the Queen's Cobra Regiment will return; it deployed to South Vietnam in mid-September 1967. (~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~)

#### More on MIG Engagement in Panhandle

Additional COMINT data indicates that three of the MIGs active south of 20 degrees north on 7 May staged from Bai Thuong Airfield and that one of the MIGs apparently did shoot down a USN F-4. Tenuous COMINT data indicates that as many as eight MIGs were again active in the Bai Thuong area some six hours later and that today a MIG-17 may have flown to Bai Thuong from Hanoi.

Operational reports confirm the loss of the F-4 to a probable MIG-17; COMINT, however, indicates that only MIG-21s were involved. US air crews observed an air-to-air missile from a MIG impact on the F-4 causing it to go out of control. Both air crew members were recovered safely. One of the MIG pilots reported shooting an aircraft "into flames," and firing two missiles.

This and other recent activity shows that North Vietnam intends to expand its area of MIG operations to the south, staging from Bai Thuong and possibly other airfields. (~~SECRET SAVIN NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 00-333  
By lis, NARA, Date 5-7-03

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

8

**SECRET**

**Wednesday, May 8, 1968 - 5:30 pm**

**Mr. President:**

With respect to the agenda this afternoon, Sec. Rusk suggests that we reverse the order of the first two items:

-- First, the opening statement which he will introduce and on which you may wish to hear comment;

-- Then, Sec. Rusk to summarize our present tentative position on the key technical negotiating issues (he approves the reasoning behind tentative);

-- Then, finally, the basic guidelines that you wish to lay down for the team, as in my memorandum of earlier this afternoon.

**W. W. Rostow**

WWRostow:rlh

**~~SECRET~~**

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By lg, NARA, Date 5-26-92



~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 8, 1968 - 5:00 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith the proposed Harriman  
opening statement outlining our basic  
position.

*Pres file*

I may have some minor suggestions  
but the essentials seem to be there, if  
our negotiators stick with them.

W. W. Restow

~~SECRET~~

WWRestow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 189, NARA, Date 5-26-92

## Opening Statement

We are meeting here today to begin the work of peace. We have always believed that the conference table -- not the battlefield -- is the place to resolve differences.

Many days of hard discussions lie before us. The passions of war have created suspicion and distrust between us. Let me state today that, for our part, we will make every effort to maintain these conversations on the serious level which they demand. It should be our common task to seek ways to develop a sound basis for mutual understanding.

Our objective in Viet-Nam can be stated succinctly and simply -- to preserve the right of the South Vietnamese people to determine their own future without outside interference.

The process that brings us here today began with President Johnson's speech of March 31. On April 3, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam responded by agreeing to meet with representatives of the United States Government. We understood this to be recognition on your part that the President's initiative had opened the way for

us to meet

**DECLASSIFIED****E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6****NLJ**

97-281

~~SECRET/NODIS~~By us, NARA Date 10-5-98

us to meet and discuss our differences. We are gratified that you agreed that this work should begin promptly -- an attitude which we share.

By his actions on March 31, the President took the first step to de-escalate the conflict. He reduced the level of hostilities by ordering our aircraft and naval vessels to make no attacks on North Viet-Nam, except in the area south of the 20th parallel where the continuing military buildup directly threatens allied positions, and where the movement of troops and supplies are related to that threat. The area in which we have stopped attacks includes almost 90% of North Viet-Nam's population, and most of its territory. The President stopped all bombing in and around the principal populated areas, and in the food-producing areas of the North.

The President went further than that. He said that even this limited bombing could come to an early end -- if our restraint is matched by restraint on the other side. But he added he could not in good conscience stop all bombing so long as such an action would immediately and directly endanger the lives

-3-

endanger the lives of our men and allies. He said that future events would determine whether or not a complete bombing halt could become possible.

Since March 31, we have sought a sign that our restraint has been matched by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. We cannot conceal our disappointment that your Government has chosen to move substantial and increasing numbers of troops and supplies from the North to the South. Moreover, your forces have continued to fire on our forces from and across the De-Militarized Zone.

We ask what restraints you will take for your part to contribute to peace?

We believe the Geneva Accords of 1954, in their essential elements, provide a basis for peace in Viet-Nam.

At Geneva, a de-militarized zone was established under international control arrangements, in order to act as a buffer pending determination of the issue of reunification. We believe that the question of reunification is a matter to be decided freely by peaceful means by the Vietnamese people themselves.

The demilitarized



The demilitarized zone continues to be violated by North Viet-Nam. North Vietnamese troops are crossing the demilitarized zone to attack United States and South Vietnamese forces. Artillery is being fired from across that zone at United States and South Vietnamese forces and defensive positions.

We believe the demilitarized zone should function as a genuine buffer. Let us pull apart the contending forces as a first step toward broader measures of de-escalation. Restoring the demilitarized zone to its proper and original status can be an important test of good faith on each side. We believe it is a reasonable test and we are prepared to carry it out.

There are other provisions of the Geneva Accords which should be considered. The Accords forbid any aggression by any part of Viet-Nam against the other. Starting in the late 1950's the Government of North Vietnam began to infiltrate men that it had trained in techniques of sabotage and subversion to undermine the progress made in the South. By  
the end of

the end of the 1950's the Government of North Vietnam was clearly committing aggression.

In more recent years, this aggression has taken the form of overt invasion with the introduction of regular units of the North Vietnamese Army. A vast amount of tangible evidence establishes this blatant violation of the Geneva Accords.

North Vietnamese military and subversive forces have no business being in South Viet-Nam. As we stated at Manila in October 1966, we are prepared to withdraw our forces from South Viet-Nam as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, stops the infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides.

The Geneva Accords provided for international supervision. We envisage the continuation and strengthening of this function. Experience has demonstrated the shortcomings of existing procedures. We believe that one of our major tasks will be to devise more effective ways of supervising any agreement and ensuring the fair and equitable verification of complaints.

As to the future

As to the future of South Viet-Nam we reiterate the fundamental principle that the South Vietnamese people must be allowed to determine their own future without outside interference. In the last few years, despite continuing conflict, the South Vietnamese people have given practical expression to the right of self determination. The majority of the South Vietnamese people have shown their desire for democratic ways. They are united in their determination to choose their own way of life and their own form of government.

The objective of National Reconciliation has been  
of South Viet-Nam,  
accepted by the Government/ This means that all individuals, regardless of their past actions, may receive the full rights of citizenship.

The United States believes that all of the South Vietnamese people should be allowed to participate peacefully in their country's future, and we reaffirm our belief in the "one-man, one-vote" principle.

In the wider context of peace in Southeast Asia, we believe that the Geneva Agreements of 1962 must be observed.

They provided

They provided for the neutralization of Laos. North Viet-Nam has failed to respect these Agreements. North Vietnamese troops remain in Laos. North Viet-Nam has systematically continued to use the territory of Laos to send men and military equipment South to invade South Viet-Nam in violation of its specific undertakings.

This aggression continues and has been intensified since the early part of this year. We believe it is fundamental to peace in Southeast Asia that these Agreements on Laos be honored.

The future economic development of Southeast Asia concerns its people and their friends. Development is preferable to war. President Johnson, in his speech at Johns Hopkins University in April 1965, pledged substantial support for regional initiatives in this direction. We reaffirm our offer to contribute to the cooperative development of the economic life of the peoples of Southeast Asia -- an effort in which we hope North Viet-Nam would be willing to participate.

The objectives



The objectives of the United States are limited. We do not seek to impose our views on any nation. We believe that the countries of Southeast Asia should be free to determine their own internal affairs and their international position as the peoples of those countries see fit. In Viet-Nam we seek no sphere of influence -- no military presence, no bases, no alliances. We have no desire to threaten or harm the people of North Viet-Nam or to invade your country.

What we seek -- and seek most earnestly -- is South Viet-Nam's freedom from attack and its right to determine its own future. This is the basis of a lasting peace in Southeast Asia.

The President of the United States has often stated the basic desire of our people to live in peace with all nations. We seek no wider war in Southeast Asia. We are prepared to explore all matters relevant to the substance of peace.

As the President said on March 31, the present limited bombing of North Viet-Nam can end. Events will determine whether we can take the risks which such a step can entail to the lives of our men and our allies.

Today a step

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

-9-

Today a step on the road to peace has been taken. It is certain that the road ahead will be uneven and that differences will arise. The eyes of the people of the world are on us and their hope for peace rests on what we do here.

---

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

10  
**INFORMATION**

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

Wednesday, May 8, 1968  
4:05 p.m.

*Pres file*

**Mr. President:**

This fact sheet on bombing in April suggests the quite high price on which we ought to insist for stopping the bombing of the North Vietnamese Panhandle.

The bombing in May and thereafter will become increasingly effective and important because the weather is now clearing in North Vietnam, as the monsoon shifts.

**W. W. Restow**

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

wwrestow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC DD-333  
By uo, NARA, Date 5-7-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10a

FACT SHEET

SI-S-3066/AP-4A

*Col AR*  
*GS*

Effects of the Bombing Since 31 March 1968 (U)

1. (SS) The bombing effort during April 1968 was below the 20<sup>th</sup> parallel and directed almost entirely against the LOCs, transport, and supply facilities. Damage inflicted to highways and highway facilities resulted in the temporary denial of major routes for short periods but generally the LOC networks remained serviceable most of the month. Vehicles damaged and destroyed south of the 20<sup>th</sup> parallel in North Vietnam were higher than any month this year and a three-fold increase over April 1967. In Laos the upward trend was also apparent; vehicles reported damaged and destroyed were the highest on record and a 10-fold increase over April 1967. Damage to waterborne logistics craft and railroad rolling stock decreased from April 1967 levels. A greater number of strikes were made on transshipment points along the LOCs in North Vietnam during April than in the entire first quarter of 1968. The lack of bomb damage assessment reports, however, precludes any quantification of the results.

2. (S) Effects of the bombing:

	<u>April 1967</u>	<u>April 1968</u>
Vehicles destroyed and damaged		
North Vietnam	217	715
Laos	139	1,399
Waterborne Logistics Craft destroyed and damaged	1,124	610
Railroad Rolling Stock destroyed and damaged	71	3
Strikes Against Transshipment Points	33	119

3. (SS) Difficulties were encountered by North Vietnamese infiltration groups due to the bombing. On 24 April, an unidentified rear services element located about 10 miles south of Dong Hoi reported "so many difficulties" caused by air raids that "the groups advancing were forced to turn back." Another group on 20 April reported 12 wounded, one killed, and damage to their supplies from two airstrikes. Other groups have reported that "enemy bombing" had heavily damaged roads forcing repairs before they could proceed.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-200  
By is, NARA, Date 2-12-04

ARTHUR G. GRIFFITH  
LT COL, USA  
DIAAP-4A2/59195  
4 May 1968

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, May 8, 1968, 4:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Security Review of the Staff of the U.S. Delegation *at to*  
Vietnam Talks *Pres file*

In response to your request for further information the security review of the staff members of the U.S. delegation to the Vietnam talks include:

1. A FBI check of the records of the staff members, including the FBI criminal files, which turned up no substantive derogatory information with respect to loyalty or security and no evidence of arrest.
2. Defense and State Department security files on the persons listed contain the results of background investigations which were thoroughly reviewed here. From the standpoint of loyalty and security, no reason was found on which to base a recommendation that the persons listed should not serve on the staff of the U.S. delegation.

Because several of the staff members have served abroad, a full field investigation of each cannot be completed as promptly as desired. If a request for such investigations is made today, the results might not be available to you before several weeks.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-283  
By us, NARA Date 5-5-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

12

Wednesday, May 8, 1968  
3:40 p.m.

*Pres file*  
*Chen*

Mr. President:

Herewith, as requested, a letter  
to His Holiness.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

12a

May 8, 1968

Your Holiness:

I read today of your plan to visit Bogota in August.

I am sure your presence in this Hemisphere will strengthen and inspire all of us to move forward in peace and progress, and in continued loyalty to the humane spiritual heritage we share.

You may wish to consider if a visit to Washington in the course of your journey would be possible and convenient.

It would be a joy for us -- and a source of comfort -- to greet you here and to receive again the benefit of your counsel.

Sincerely,

His Holiness  
Pope Paul VI  
Vatican City

LBJ:WWR:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ju/rq, NARA, Date 6-2-97

13  
ACTION

Wednesday, May 8, 1968

3:15pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to the King of Laos on the Lao National Day

May 11 is Lao National Day. Below is a State Department suggestion for a message from you to the King of Laos:

Your Majesty: ~~It is with a great deal of pleasure~~ that I extend to you and to the People of Laos the sincere good wishes of the people of the United States of America on the National Day of the Kingdom of Laos.

On this occasion we wish to reaffirm our support of the staunch efforts of the Lao people to achieve peace and tranquility. It is our earnest hope that the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos will be respected and honored by all nations.

I assure you that the principles embodied in the 1962 Geneva Agreements guide our relations with your country, and we continue to support full implementation of the provisions of those Agreements as the best means of assuring an enduring peace for your country. With personal regards, Lyndon B. Johnson.

I recommend that you approve the message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

MWright:wpt



DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 94-194

By gwl/np NARA. Date 6-5-97

SECRET

Wednesday, May 8, 1968

3:10pm

*WWR*  
*14*

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: US-German Talks on Military Offsets

At Tab A for your approval is an oral statement on US troop levels in Germany for use if required during the US-German talks on military offsets that begin tomorrow.

In preliminary talks in Bonn in February, we asked the Germans for a two-year arrangement under which they would fully neutralize our estimated foreign exchange costs for 1969 and 1970. This would require them to buy \$750 million a year of medium term US Treasury securities. The Germans will offer less. They probably have in mind settling at last year's level of \$500 million. Our fallback is something in between -- possibly \$675 million, for one year.

We understand the Germans will ask for some assurance on troop levels if we come to an agreed financial settlement. They mentioned a reaffirmation of what we said in a secret minute at the conclusion of the Trilateral Talks last year. In effect, what they want is an informal understanding that US troop levels will stay at currently envisaged levels during the life of the offset agreement. They recently received such an assurance from the British at the conclusion of their offset negotiations with the UK.

In the event the Germans do raise the troop level issue, State and Defense have worked out an agreed oral statement (Tab A).

This statement reaffirms our intention to maintain our NATO force strength through 1968 and links any significant reduction in NATO forces over the future to a balanced move by the East or to a basic change in the security situation. This statement is not as precise a commitment on troop levels as the one we gave them following the Trilaterals but it may be all we need for present purposes. If the Germans insist on a reaffirmation of last year's assurance as a condition for a satisfactory financial outcome, we will check with you again.

Our position on the Talks has been worked out by the Special Steering Group on Military Offsets (Fred Deming, Gene Rostow, Paul Nitze, and Ed Fried). Secretary Rusk has gone over the statement on troop levels. Gene Rostow will head our delegation for the Talks.

I recommend you approve the statement.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Call me \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET

*ERF*  
ERF:41111

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NW 94-194  
By ju/wip NARA, Date 6-5-97

14a

**SECRET**

**STATEMENT ON U. S. MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS**

The U. S. side should not raise this subject. The primary subjects for the May 9 talks are financial. However, if the Germans raise the issue generally, or seek to relate our force levels to the level of neutralization, we should make no commitment but should:

1. Point out that under the Trilateral arrangement, we are now redeploying 34,000 American military personnel and four tactical air squadrons from Germany.
2. Say that the NATO Defense Planning Committee commitment we made (for calendar year 1968) in December 1967 continues in force.
3. Refer to the statement by the President following Brosio's visit of February 19, namely that "they considered that the maintenance of NATO's strength, including the U. S. commitment, are necessary to continuing stability and security in the North Atlantic area. This stability and security provides the basis for exploring with the USSR the possibility of mutual force reductions."
4. Recall the first of the three principles which governed Mr. McCloy's negotiations during the Trilateral Talks which read, "Force levels should be determined

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

through agreement among the Allies on the basis of security considerations, broadly construed." This continues to be the case.

5. Say that the U. S. believes that significant reductions of Allied military strength should only occur as part of a balanced reduction of military strength by both East and West, or as a consequence of other major shifts in the security situation. Allied force levels for 1968 are now based on the NATO Defense Planning Committee action of December 1967. The U. S. is prepared to continue to participate in multilateral determination of what NATO force levels should be.

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

*latest* *P file*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*15*

Wed., May 8, 1968  
2:50 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Revised remarks, with additional  
paragraph as requested.

Attachment

*W. A. Rostow*

OK \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

I would put in a paragraph about my being there  
three times... I think I was there as VP, as  
Pres, and then this last time at the air  
base.

LBJ/mf  
5-8-68  
1:00p



SUGGESTED REMARKS

15a  
(May 8, 1968  
2:35 p. m. )

Prince Wan:

I am very happy to greet you today -- with your Prime Minister at my side.

It is wonderful to be able to pick up a telephone and talk directly from the White House in Washington to Government House in Bangkok. It symbolizes the close friendship between our countries -- a friendship sealed by our common sacrifices for the security and progress of Southeast Asia.

I have visited Thailand on three occasions. I shall always remember the kindness shown to me by its people. And I am also grateful for your friendship and hospitality to the Americans now serving in your country.

I send through you to Their Majesties and the great people of Thailand the warmest regards of the American people, who will continue to stand beside you in the Pacific community.

for file

156

Wednesday, May 8, 1968  
11:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

Is this short version acceptable?

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Yes —

No —

call me —

**SUGGESTED REMARKS**

(May 8, 1968)

15c

**Prince Wan:**

I am very happy to greet you today -- with your Prime Minister at my side.

It is wonderful to be able to pick up a telephone and talk directly from the White House in Washington to Government House in Bangkok. It symbolizes the close friendship between our countries -- a friendship sealed by our common sacrifices for the security and progress of Southeast Asia.

I shall always remember your kindness to Mrs. Johnson and me when we visited Thailand in 1966. I am grateful for the friendship and hospitality you show to the Americans now serving in your country.

I send through you to Their Majesties and the great people of Thailand the warmest regards of the American people, who will continue to stand beside you in the Pacific community.

*file*

16

Wednesday, May 8, 1968  
2:35 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bill Scranton just called. He said that you have several times urged him to leave with you any thoughts he might have about foreign policy. It has occurred to him that it might be wise to put a Republican on the delegation in Paris who was not involved in the campaign but would have a certain credibility with the Republican leadership.

He believes that such a figure might help keep the negotiation out of politics, especially if the negotiation is long, drawn out and contentious. The presence of a Republican who could come back and report might restrain the Republican nominee during the campaign.

He says he has no one in mind.

W. W. Rostow



Wednesday, May 8, 1968  
12:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Deployment of Thai Troops to Vietnam

1. The Thai now have a force of about 2,500 men in Vietnam.
2. They have agreed to increase this force to a light division of 11,200 men. This force will be deployed in two components. The first component, a reinforced brigade of over 6,000 men, is now in training and is scheduled to arrive in Vietnam in July. The second component is scheduled for deployment to Vietnam in January 1969.
3. We are meeting all the extra budgetary expenses of this force, and providing its equipment.
4. Suggested position: Stress the importance we attach to these deployments taking place on schedule, and obtain a reaffirmation from Thanom to that effect.

Marshall Wright

to McGuire

18

DRAFT

(May 8, 1968)

Dear Mike:

I was greatly moved by your statement to the Senate today on The President, Paris and Politics.

You know all too well how closely Hanoi will gear its movement towards peace to its assessment of the debate in the United States and the ultimate fiber of our people.

You have advanced the possibility of our achieving an honorable peace. All Americans are in your debt.

Sincerely,

LBJ

Honorable Mike Mansfield  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

18a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 8, 1968  
2:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
WALT ROSTOW:

Please prepare a letter for the President's signature which he wants to send to Senator Mansfield this afternoon. After you have prepared a draft, send it to Charles Maguire before sending to the President. However, he wants to sign and send it up this afternoon.



James R. Jones

Attachment  
RED TAG

May 8, 1968

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

*war - Vietnam  
and John  
1968*

**COPY**  
THE PRESIDENT, PARIS AND POLITICS

*Rec'd  
for Mike Mansfield  
11:55 a.m.  
186*

Mr. President:

As the Senate knows, I have disagreed on aspects of the conduct of the war in Viet Nam. However, there has been no question in my mind about the desire of the President to end that war. I have expressed on many occasions my full confidence that President Johnson was doing whatever he could to bring about the negotiation of a settlement in Viet Nam. I reiterate that confidence today.

As Majority Leader, I have worked with the President since the day he assumed office and I know something of the burdens which this war has placed on him. The rising casualty figures have hurt him deeply. He has felt for the people of Viet Nam in the terrible ordeal which they are undergoing. He has deplored the financial drain of the war and the constraints which it has placed on dealing with urgent inner problems of the nation.

President Johnson has wanted peace in Viet Nam for all these reasons and simply because he is a man of peace. As a case in point which underscores his willingness to act for peace, I note on the basis of personal knowledge, which predates the selection of Paris as a peace site, that Pope Paul VI made an extraordinary offer to Washington and Hanoi. His Holiness placed at the disposal of the two governments, the apostolic buildings of the Vatican, as a site for peace talks.

The offer was made, properly, in secret, and it remained a secret until several days ago, until Paris was actually chosen as a suitable site for talks. It should not go unnoticed, however, that President Johnson--at a time



# COPY

when he was subjected to severe criticism for failing to act on a meeting place-- guarded his silence even though he had already accepted, without qualification, the Pope's invitation to meet at the Vatican. That the talks were not opened in Rome sometime ago, was not the fault of the President.

Be that as it may, I am delighted that an excellent site for these crucial talks has now been found. It is my deepest hope, a hope which I know is shared by the Senate, that the meetings which are about to begin in Paris will be fruitful.

If I may, I would like to make a plea at this time for patience during the difficult days ahead. The road is extremely precarious; the pitfalls are many. The President needs and warrants every confidence, support and encouragement which can be given to him.

I would urge at this time, therefore, reflection, restraint and reserve in discussion of the issues of Viet Nam. That seems to me to be especially desirable, as the question may arise in the heat of the political campaign during the weeks and months ahead.

The President has gone to great lengths to precipitate the negotiations which will open on May 10 in Paris. His determination to bring about an honorable peace is underscored by a profound act of self-abnegation. In taking himself out of the campaign for the office of President, in my judgment, President Johnson took the political content out of Viet Nam. It would be my hope that the rest of us will now act to keep Viet Nam out of a political context.

Wednesday  
May 8, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*from file*

Mr. President:

Herewith the foreign visitor schedule  
you approved yesterday from July  
through December and your schedule  
from May through June as it stands  
now.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1963

By rg, NARA, Date 5-26-72

19a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Proposed Schedule of Visitors

July - December 1968

<u>Visitor</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Type of Visit</u>	<u>Date</u>
<u>July</u>			
President Frei	Chile	State Visit	24-25
<u>August</u>			
Ruler of Kuwait	Kuwait	State Visit	7-8
President Tombalbaye	Chad	Official Visit to Washington	21-22
<u>September</u>			
Prime Minister Barrow	Barbados	Official Visit to Washington	11-12
Prime Minister Bakkush	Libya	Official Visit to Washington	25-26 (tentative)
<u>October</u>			
President Diaz Ordaz	Mexico	Amistad Dam	
President Pacheco	Uruguay	Official Visit to Washington	23
<u>December</u>			
Prime Minister Hoveyda	Iran	Official Visit to United States	4-5
President Leoni	Venezuela	State Visit	11-12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State letter 9-11-95

By guyng NARA. Date 6-2-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

<u>visitor</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Type of Visit</u>	<u>Dates</u>
	<u>May</u>		
Prime Minister Ramgoolam	Mauritius	Private Visit	9
Prime Minister Thanom	Thailand	Official to United States	8-9
President Bourguiba	Tunisia	State	15-16
Prime Minister Gorton	Australia	Official to Washington	27-28
	<u>June</u>		
Shah of Iran	Iran	Private Visit	12
President Trejos	Costa Rica	Official to Washington	4-5
President Thieu	Vietnam	State	18-19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, May 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
SUBJECT: East European State Visits

*Pres file*

Following your inquiry to Angier Duke, Secretary Rusk recommends that you not invite any Eastern European Chiefs of State at this time (Tab A).

Ceausescu and Tito are the only real possibilities. Ceausescu made himself Chief of State a few months ago in order to operate on the international scene. The chances are about fifty-fifty that he would accept if asked. In light of Secretary Rusk's comments, we might wait three or four months -- see how the Birladeanu visit goes -- and consider an invitation to Ceausescu later this year.

Tito's security problems during his 1963 visit left a bad taste. The emigres can be counted on to stir up an uproar whenever he comes. Nevertheless, a visit would be possible.

As for the USSR, it might be worth considering a second level visitor like Polyansky if our relations continue to improve and the Paris talks achieve progress. Polyansky could then call on you. The most promising occasion for another meeting with Kosygin would be the NPT signing (if the Special General Assembly is successful). The Russians have been talking about Geneva for the ceremony, and sounding as if they are presently thinking of the Foreign Minister level.

Secretary Rusk suggests we await developments. If you want to pursue any of these ideas further you might wish to talk with him.

W. W. Rostow

- Consider Ceausescu idea again  
in several months \_\_\_\_\_
- Await developments \_\_\_\_\_
- Put on Tuesday luncheon agenda \_\_\_\_\_
- Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-283  
By is, NARA Date 5-5-98

WWR:ND:gg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1493  
20a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ** 97-281  
**By** iso, **NARA Date** 10-5-98

May 3, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Invitation to an East European  
Chief of State to Visit the  
United States

Recommendation:

That you not invite an East European Chief of State  
to visit the United States at this time.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

I have heard from Angier Duke that you would like  
our views on the advisability of inviting an East European  
Chief of State to visit the United States. I do not think  
such an invitation advisable now.

President Tito of Yugoslavia, who has traveled widely  
to various nonaligned and Communist countries in recent  
months, has previously visited the United States (October  
1963). I do not believe a further visit by Tito would be  
useful at this time.

Romanian Premier Maurer came to the United States  
last year for the General Assembly meeting on the Near  
East crisis and met with you in June 1967.

Romanian Vice Prime Minister Birladeanu is coming to  
the United States on May 14, in response to an invitation  
from Dr. Hornig, to visit American scientists and scientific  
institutions. This seems to me a sufficient gesture to the  
Romanians for the time being.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

The new leadership in Czechoslovakia is preoccupied with the problems of consolidating its position and internal liberalization. In view of current sensitivities in Soviet-Czech relations, I do not feel that the time is opportune to extend an invitation to Czech President Svoboda.

The present unsettled state of affairs in Poland, particularly the anti-Semitic propaganda campaign, rules out any invitation to Polish Chairman Spychalski.

Our relations with Hungary and Bulgaria, currently limited and inactive, do not offer any sound basis for extending an invitation to Hungarian President Losonczi or Bulgarian Chairman Traykov. Hungary, as you know, has not responded to our appointment of an Ambassador to Budapest by appointing an Ambassador here.

In short, I believe we should rest on our oars for the time being.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 8, 1968  
10:55 a. m.

*File*  
21

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Andy Goodpastor's report of his  
conversation with General Eisenhower.

You will be interested especially in paragraphs  
3 and 4.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 5, 1958

By ag, NARA, Date 5-26-92





8 May 1968

Dear Mr. President,

My visit with Gen Eisenhower yesterday at March AFB is being kept secret by the people out there, since the medical authorities would not want him to have other visitors until after he returns to Walter Reed Hospital, and is settled there.

With great respect,

Andrew Goodpaster



~~SECRET~~  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

216

8 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I saw General Eisenhower for nearly half an hour yesterday at the March AFB hospital. I took the liberty of extending greetings and best wishes from you. He was warmly appreciative, and expressed his support for what you are doing in the matters I discussed with him. Particular comments are indicated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the attached.

His spirits were excellent and he seemed rested, keen and in good strength. He seems to be doing well, though recovery will take some time.

1 Atch  
as

A. J. GOODPASTER  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

~~SECRET~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(h)

BY RG ON 5-28-92



~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

21c

8 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Visit with General Eisenhower, 7 May 1968

1. I visited General Eisenhower, with the permission of his doctors, at March Air Force Base on 7 May. I told him I would be leaving on Thursday, 9 May, for the talks with the North Vietnamese in Paris, but before doing so had wanted to see and talk to him, wish him well and give him a brief report concerning the war in Vietnam and the situation as I see it regarding the negotiations.

2. With respect to the war, I reported that it is going favorably. Despite current efforts of the Communists to attack the cities (which are being dealt with effectively), the initiative is being exercised by our side increasingly. Pacification is regaining a fair measure of momentum. There is a marked rise in confidence, aggressiveness and effectiveness of ARVN forces, especially in I Corps, where they are performing splendidly. There are signs the U.S. is regaining its confidence and steadiness at home. Bunker and Thieu seem to be working well together, and may be able to broaden and strengthen SVN governmental leadership and effectiveness. Recent military operations in SVN have been highly favorable to our side and costly to the enemy, who gives signs of military manpower stringency by the presence of poorly trained soldiers in units in I Corps (men with less than 30 days training, even less than 15 in some cases).

3. I told him preparations for the negotiations are taking shape well, as evidenced in a meeting of principals held yesterday. The tough issues and hard questions have been identified and U.S. views are being developed and formulated. I told him our delegation has firm instructions to be guided by the national interest, and not to be concerned with considerations of political expediency. All in all, my feeling is that we are operating from a firm base, both with respect to the situation and trend in Vietnam and with respect to the approach of our government. No doubt the North

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Authority 710 85-330  
By ip/hg, NARA, Date 5/28/92

~~SECRET~~

Vietnamese will be tough and trying negotiators, and will test the ability of the U.S. to stand up to heat and pressures during negotiations, but we have strength on our side. Of course, no one can be sure when or whether the negotiations will produce any useful results.

4. General Eisenhower was highly gratified over the report of rising ARVN confidence and initiative. He welcomed the approach being taken to the negotiations. He referred to passages from Benet on Lincoln, and to his own instructions to General Bedell Smith not to forget that his side had a bigger stack of chips. He commented that, as General Bedell Smith once stated, we should not expect to attain more at the conference table than we could attain on the battlefield. I told him I agreed, but added my view that we need not accept less.

5. He said that if he has occasion and opportunity he intends to say he considers that we are going into these negotiations from a firm base.

6. General Eisenhower indicated support of the course the President is following with respect to the war in Vietnam and the peace negotiations; he also indicated his support of what I will be doing in Vietnam and in Paris. I expressed appreciation, and added my special thanks for the feeling I have had of his support at the time of my illness and since, together with appreciation for the immense privilege of seeing, over many years, how he has approached and dealt with great problems of the kind now confronting us in Paris and Vietnam.



A. J. GOODPASTER  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army

~~SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Pres. file  
Tuesday, May 7, 1968 -- 6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

I don't wish to perpetuate the myth that I am an uncontrollable optimist, but I did want to call your attention to the fact that on this one day the following fragile, but hopeful, indications came across my desk:

- The possibility of a positive response from Kossygin on strategic weapons talks.
- The possibility that the Jarring mission may take hold.
- The UN man on Cyprus reports that the situation there has "amazingly improved."
- The possibility, at least, of Nigerian peace talks.
- An indication that the Brazilians will not, in fact, obstruct in the end an NPT resolution in the UN General Assembly.
- And we put Averell into orbit on Thursday!

Even this many sparrows don't make a summer, but, if we stay with it and we have some luck, the atmosphere in the world could look a good bit different in some months.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-336  
By WJP, NARA, Date 1-11-93

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



23

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 7, 1968 - 6:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bob Anderson's talk with Nasser. I have marked key passages.

Nasser is at his most conciliatory in this talk. We shall see if he delivers to Jarring on May 10.

W. W. Restow

Cairo 2321

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 49, NARA, Date 5-27-92

WWRestow:rla



# Department of State

23  
**TELEGRAM**  
24

~~SECRET~~ 521

PAGE 01 CAIRO 02321 071011Z

2

11  
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

P 060701Z MAY 68  
FM USINT CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4690

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 2321

EXDIS

FOLLOWING FROM ANDERSON:

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority 729 91-450

By up/12, NARA, Date 5-27-92

1. I MET THIS MORNING (MAY 5) WITH PRESIDENT NASSER FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR AND A HALF. HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

2. WE MUST VERY CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT HE HAS A SEVERE INTERNAL PROBLEM. HE AND HIS CABINET ARE COMPLETELY OPPOSED TO WAR. HE DOES HAVE ELEMENTS IN THE ARMED FORCES WHO WOULD WELCOME A RETURN OF FIGHTING BECAUSE OF THE HUMILIATION OF THE JUNE WAR AND BECAUSE THEY NOW HAVE BETTER TRAINING AND "TECHNICAL HELP". HE DOES NOT AGREE AND HAS TOLD HIS OFFICERS IN A RECENT MEETING THAT HE WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO RISK WAR AGAIN AND FELT THAT WE SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ACHIEVE PEACE. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT HE MUST GIVE SOME LIP SERVICE TO THE ATTITUDE OF HIS SOLDIERS.

PAGE 2 RUEIVCR 2321 ~~SECRET~~

3. HE ALSO SAID THAT THERE WERE "OTHER ELEMENTS" IN THE COUNTRY WHO WOULD WELCOME A RETURN OF HOSTILITIES AND THAT WE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT HE HAD TO DEAL WITH THESE ELEMENTS IN HIS OWN WAY.

4. HE SAID THE RESTORATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. WAS, FROM HIS POINT, DESIRABLE BUT IT RAN CONTRARY AT THIS MOMENT TO PUBLIC OPINION UNTIL THERE WAS AT LEAST SOME SIGNAL FROM OUR SIDE THAT WE WANTED TO IMPLEMENT THE SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 CAIRO 02321 071011Z

RESOLUTION AND WOULD NOT CONTINUE TO TALK IN SUCH TERMS AS "IN THE CONTEXT OF" OR OTHER TERMS WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS VAGUE AND AS SUPPORTING THE ISRAELI VIEW. HE SAID "I AM NOT ASKING ARMS NOR AID. I AM SIMPLY ASKING A CLEAR UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTS THE RESOLUTION AND THE PROPOSITIONS IN PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S STATEMENT."

5. HE DISCUSSED THE JARRING FORMULA BUT WAS UNDOUBTEDLY NOT ENTIRELY FAMILIAR WITH ITS WORDING BECAUSE HE ASKED ME TWICE TO LEND HIM A COPY AND SPENT SEVERAL MINUTES READING IT CAREFULLY AND FINALLY SAID "THERE IS NOTHING IN THIS FORMULA THAT I CAN OBJECT TO." HE ALSO STATED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD NOT WANT TO OPPOSE AMENDMENTS OFFERED BY JORDAN IF THEY WERE INSISTED

PAGE 3 RUEIVCR 2321 ~~SECRET~~

UPON. AGAIN, HE REGARDS STATEMENTS BY THE U.S. AS BEING EQUIVOCAL AND OF TRYING TO UNILATERALLY DEFINE THE MEANING OF THE NOVEMBER RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH ISRAELI AMBITIONS.

6. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD "PLAN TO SEE" JARRING ON HIS RETURN TO CAIRO ON THE 10TH AND THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS TONIGHT WITH HIS CABINET THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE JARRING FORMULA. NASSER SAID "I AM NOT GOING TO QUIBBLE ABOUT WORDS IN THE JARRING FORMULA IF BOTH SIDES WILL APPROACH IT IN GOOD FAITH. HOWEVER, I MUST MAKE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT NEITHER I NOR ANY OTHER ARAB LEADER COULD POSSIBLY HAVE DIRECT TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS IN NEW YORK, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE PERFECTLY WILLING TO WORK THROUGH JARRING."

7. HE ASKED ME IF I THOUGHT MY COUNTRY WAS PREPARED TO HAVE A CONSTANT STATE OF TENSION IN THE NEAR EAST SIMPLY BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS DEMANDED DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS.

8. I REPLIED BY SAYING THAT IT WAS NOT IN MY POWER TO EXPRESS MY COUNTRY'S POLICY AND CERTAINLY NOT TO EXPRESS AN OPINION ABOUT THE POSITION OF THE ISRAELIS.

9. NASSER REITERATED THE SAME POINTS MADE BY RIAD AS TO

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 CAIRO 02321 071011Z

PAGE 4 RUEIVCR 2321 ~~SECRET~~

TERRITORY AND STATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO OPEN THE CANAL TO ISRAELI GOODS AND FINALLY TO ISRAELI SHIPS BUT BY STAGES.

10. HE SPOKE FOR SEVERAL MINUTES ON THE UNREST AND FRUSTRATIONS OF THE YOUTH OF THE COUNTRY, NOT ONLY HERE BUT ELSEWHERE, AND THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HIS ADMINISTRATION INTERNAL PROBLEMS HAD TO DICTATE A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF HIS POLICIES.

11. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE WANTED ME TO MAKE VERY CLEAR THAT HIS COUNTRY "WAS NOT GOING COMMUNIST". HE SAID "IF I AM GONE, THE PROBABLE RESULT WILL BE EITHER A NEW WAR WITH ISRAEL OR A COMPLETE UNWILLINGNESS TO MAKE PEACE ON ANY TERMS. BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND RIAD EMPHASIZED THEIR CONCERN ABOUT THEIR GROWING ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIETS AND RIAD STATED "WE HAVE SOLD OUR COTTON SO FAR IN THE FUTURE THAT I DON'T KNOW HOW WE WILL MEET ALL OUR OBLIGATIONS." THE PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED THAT HE WOULD WELCOME ANY ATTITUDE ON OUR PART THAT WOULD GIVE HIM AN EXCUSE TO TURN AWAY FROM THE SOVIETS, ALTHOUGH HE SAID "I AM NOT ASKING YOU FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT." HE INFORMED ME THAT ALI SABRI HAD LEFT HIS GOVERNMENT AND HE KNEW THAT ALI SABRI HAD BEEN REGARDED AS A COMMUNIST BUT HE SAID "FOR YOUR INFORMATION, EVEN HE DEPLORES THE INVOLVEMENTS WHICH ARE FORCED UPON US BY

PAGE 5 RUEIVCR 2321 ~~SECRET~~

YOUR ATTITUDE WITH THE EASTERN BLOC BECAUSE OUR NATURAL FRIENDS ARE THE WEST."

12. WE TALKED CONSIDERABLY ABOUT COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES AND HE STATED HE HAD TOLD HIS CABINET BEFORE AND WOULD MENTION IT AGAIN THAT THERE MUST BE MUCH GREATER EMPHASIS ON PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN THIS COUNTRY. OUR TALKS WENT TO PETROLEUM, FERTILIZER, LAND RECLAMATION, THE RESUMPTION OF THE TOURIST TRADE AND A HOST OF OTHER SIMILAR SUBJECTS INDICATING HIS GREAT CONCERN WITH EGYPT'S ECONOMIC CONDITION.

13. HE HAS GAINED WEIGHT SINCE I SAW HIM LAST, HAS RESTORED HIS SENSE OF HUMOR AND APPEARS MUCH MORE RELAXED.

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 CAIRO 02321 071011Z

14. HE URGENTLY SAID THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY OTHER MORE FORMAL COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES HE HOPED THAT I WOULD COME FREQUENTLY AND ASKED IF I COULDN'T STAY A FEW DAYS TO CONTINUE OUR TALKS. I TOLD HIM I WAS LEAVING TOMORROW FOR LONDON. BERGUS

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



24  
INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 7, 1968  
6:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

I assume Sec. Rusk called your attention to this hopeful word from Debryala on the possibility of an early positive reply from Moscow on strategic weapons talks.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRestow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 92-436  
By ju/jw, NARA, Date 6-5-97

NODIS

G:CEBohlen:am  
(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Memorandum of Conversation*

DATE: May 3, 1968

SUBJECT: Delivery of Letter from the President

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary  
Ambassador Dobrynin  
Charles E. Bohlen *CB*

COPIES TO:

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-288  
By isa, NARA Date 8-18-98

The Secretary had asked the Ambassador to come in to see him confidentially in order to give him a copy of a letter from the President to Chairman Kosygin. The Secretary gave the Ambassador the letter and after he had read it the Ambassador said that in regard to the second point, namely the discussion of some announcement about talks on offensive and defensive inter-continental missiles, he could tell the Secretary in the strictest of confidence that he thought there might be some forthcoming word on this point from Moscow in the near future. He intimated that he had gathered this from the recommendations made by Kuznetsov from New York.

In regard to the first part of the letter, that dealing with the Middle East, the Ambassador saw very little chance of any favorable reply at this juncture. He said he thought the situation in the Middle East had not improved and there seemed to be very little chance for the Jarring Mission. In this connection, the Ambassador said that according to their reports

~~TOP SECRET~~  
NODIS

NODIS

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

the UAR was quite confused as to what Jarring had received from the Israelis. He said Jarring had read from a three point paper, but had not left a copy with the Egyptians and that it seemed to contain the old formula that "the Israelis recognize but do not accept" the Security Council Resolution. The Secretary said that our information was somewhat different. It appeared that the Israelis had indeed accepted the formula but that there was still some confusion as to some of the details.

G:CEBohlen:am

~~TOP SECRET~~

NODIS

Tuesday, May 7, 1963  
6:05 p. m.

*Profile*  
25

MR. PRESIDENT:

Henry Owen suggests you may get comfort  
from reading this old article by Dean Acheson.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

(Yale Review Vol XLIV Pub in Sept 54 No. 1 "The Responsibility  
for Decision in Foreign Policy by Dean Acheson)

25a

# THE YALE REVIEW

VOL. XLIV • PUBLISHED IN SEPTEMBER 1954 • NO. 1

## THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECISION IN FOREIGN POLICY

BY DEAN ACHESON

IN GIVING one's reflections on "The Responsibility for Decision in Foreign Policy" two lines of thought occur. One concerns the importance of decisiveness in conducting foreign relations, the effect of indecision, or no decision, or contradictory decisions. The other relates to the body or person upon whom rests the final responsibility for making the decisions which determine our course as a nation, and how this task is or should be performed. Both lines start from a common point—where the responsibility and authority lie.

In our American system the President is the person charged with the heavy duty of giving us the line to follow in our dealings with other nations. But, wholly apart from constitutional and legal considerations, his will is not given unlimited scope. In the first place, he is making decisions about our relations with foreign nations—countries, areas, peoples outside of the United States where our laws do not govern and our writ does not run, where the preconceptions of American life are not taken for granted—in short, that vast portion of the earth's surface where Americans are foreigners. The very idea requires the enlightenment which came to the old mountaineer who took his first train ride from his Appalachian crossroads to town, with his face pressed against the window. When the train stopped, he heaved a deep sigh and said to his companion,



"John, there's a heap of folks between here and home, and I guess, by God, we ain't seen half of 'em."

Here is the beginning of understanding of foreign affairs.

It is amid the manifold complexities of the relations between the external world and our own by-no-means-simple country that the President must lay down the line to follow. Whether we, his fellow citizens, follow it or not is another matter. And this suggests the second factor qualifying the freedom of the President's will in reaching his decisions. He is deciding for this particular country at a particular time and under particular circumstances. So there is involved the kind of country and people he leads—the sort of ideas we have inherited and now hold, our traditions and affiliations, our physical resources and the use to which we are putting them and are capable of putting them. All these elements narrow and affect the course of decisions, as currents, winds, shoals, and land affect the decisions of the mariner.

But to return to our point, the final responsibility for decision lies with the President. Sometimes confusion arises about this. We hear it said that the National Security Council is to make, or has made, some important decision. This is an illusion, and a most troublesome one. The NSC decides nothing. It is merely a mechanism for preparing and presenting matters for the President's decision. The power and the responsibility lie with him. He can accept, modify, reject, or do nothing with recommendations from the Council, which is merely a meeting of certain of his advisers. If he does nothing, no decision is made, or a decision to do nothing is made by default. However much the Council's staff is elaborated, it remains a forum—and one which can be very useful—for determining the main problems which require decision and for presenting recommendations to the President.

Again, one reads from time to time that at some meeting with "leaders on the Hill" this or that matter of foreign policy was "decided." This, too, I believe, involves a misconception. These meetings produce not so much a decision of policy as opinions as to whether or how a particular proposal or deci-

sion in which Congressional action will be needed can be carried out. Again the responsibility for deciding whether or how to go ahead rests with the President.

It is placed there by the Constitution and confirmed by a century and three-quarters of experience. The Presidential system supported by the separation of powers is the special American contribution to the science and art of government. It is a contribution which presents its problems, which calls for strong and decisive leadership, but which, given such leadership, has served the country well. Under it the President, the only official in the country elected by all the people, the leader of the dominant political party, the chief magistrate, is the head. His cabinet officers, the chiefs of the departments of government, are selected by him, hold their tenure at his pleasure, and are advisers to him. They can be effective only through him and with his support.

Attempts to graft onto this system institutions and practices drawn from the cabinet of parliamentary systems are usually a mistake and can be mischievous. No good comes from attempts to dilute, share, or usurp the authority and responsibility of the President.

While no good comes from attempts to invade the authority and responsibility of the President, they are continually made and sometimes succeed. This occurs under weak Presidents. The result is Congressional government, which, in turn, results, under twentieth-century conditions, in a negative and vacillating foreign policy, the impairment of our world position, and danger to our national safety. This situation has been described by a former colleague as the "Frenchification" of the Constitution. By this he means government where power is centered in a national assembly as in the four French republican constitutions. Under this system, the Presidency tends to become ceremonial, executive power virtually disappears, and authority is assumed by parliamentarians, undisciplined by any penalty for repudiating the executive, divided into numerous groups no one of which commands decisive power, and unable and unequipped to lead the country in a sustained,

complex, and difficult course of action. The foreign policy emerging from such a situation is formed by slogans and emotion; decisions represent the lowest common denominator of the groups in the legislative assembly. The vital issues, which are always painful, are evaded and decision postponed until events decide them.

We are familiar enough with this course of events as it has appeared and reappeared in French history from the First Republic to the Fourth. But perhaps we do not understand how closely our own situation approximates the French when the Presidential powers fall from hands not strong enough to wield them. For these powers are not self-executing. They cannot be exercised by a committee. They reside in and depend upon the quality of one man. This has been stated by one who held and knew how to use them:

Many diverse elements entered into the creation of the office, springing, as it did, from the parent idea of the separation of powers.

There was the firm conviction of such powerful and shrewd minds as that of John Adams that the greatest protection against unlimited power lay in an executive secured against the encroachments of a national assembly. Then there were the fears of those who suspected a plot to establish a monarchy on these shores. Others believed that the experience under the Confederation showed above all the need of stability through a strong central administration. Finally, there was the need for compromise among these and many other views.

The result was a compromise—a compromise which that shrewd observer, Alexis de Tocqueville, over a hundred and twenty years ago, believed would not work. He thought that the Presidential office was too weak. The President, he thought, was at the mercy of Congress. The President could recommend, to be sure, but he had no power and the Congress had. The Congress could disregard his recommendations, overrule his vetoes, reject his nominations. De Tocqueville thought that no man of parts, worthy of leadership, would accept so feeble a role.

This was not a foolish view and there was much in our early history which tended to bear it out. But there is a power in the course of

## DECISION IN FOREIGN POLICY

5

events which plays its own part. In this case again, Justice Holmes's epigram proved true. He said a page of history is worth a whole volume of logic. And as the pages of history were written they unfolded powers in the Presidency not explicitly found in Article II of the Constitution.

In the first place, the President became the leader of a political party. The party under his leadership had to be dominant enough to put him in office. This political party leadership was the last thing the Constitution contemplated. The President's election was not intended to be mixed up in the hurley-burley of partisan politics. . . . The people were to choose wise and respected men who would meet in calm seclusion and choose a President. The runner-up would be Vice President.

All of this went by the board—though most of the original language remains in the Constitution. Out of the struggle and tumult of the political arena a new and different President emerged—the man who led a political party to victory and retained in his hands the power of party leadership. That is, he retained it, like the sword Excalibur, if he could wrest it from the scabbard and wield it.

Another development was connected with the first. As the President came to be elected by the whole people, he became responsible to the whole people. . . . Our whole people looked to him for leadership, and not confined within the limits of a written document. Every hope and every fear of his fellow citizens, almost every aspect of their welfare and activity, falls within the scope of his concern—indeed, falls within the scope of his duty. Only one who has held that office can really appreciate that. It is the President's responsibility to look at all questions from the point of view of the whole people. His written and spoken word commands national—often international—attention.

These powers which are not explicitly written into the Constitution are powers which no President can pass on to his successor. They go only to him who can take and use them. (Harry S. Truman, New York "Times," May 9, 1954.)

We have had Presidents who have not exercised the Presidential power. It will not exhaust the list to mention Presidents Pierce, Buchanan, Grant, Harding, and Coolidge. When Presi-

dential default occurs it is not correct to say that Congress steps into the vacant place. Attempts are made to do so, but they cannot fully succeed since Congress is not designed, organized, or equipped for executive leadership.

Aside from the obvious reason that so large a body, designed to be a check upon action, cannot be the leader in action, there is another reason highly relevant to our present inquiry. It is that our two-party system cloaks a multiparty reality. There is a saying—not wholly accurate—that strict party votes occur only on the organization of the House and Senate. But it is true that strict party votes are rare enough to cause considerable comment. Every newspaper reader knows that across the traditional party lines run perhaps even deeper alignments—the farm bloc, the protectionist bloc, the isolationist group, the Southern group (on certain questions), the “liberal group” (on certain questions), the mountain states (on minerals and wool), the public power group, the economy group, and so on.

The conclusion relevant here is that a party leader in Congress is not a leader, so far as foreign affairs is concerned, qualified to speak for the party which he nominally leads. His view is not accepted as any more important or controlling than that of any other member. In the absence of Presidential leadership, Congressional policy must be evolved by negotiation among the groups and with a high appreciation of short-term electoral approval. These conditions are not favorable to understanding or dealing with fundamental realities and issues or to producing continuity of policy and the sober facing of difficult problems requiring costly sacrifices. The Nye Committee did not provide the country with an understanding of the problems left by the First World War or with policies consistent with the security of the United States. It resulted in a withdrawal into “Fortress America” which was no fortress at all, because the incidence of power pressures occurred outside it. And it is there—where the pressures focus—that the United States must exercise its capacity to mold and shape the future.

So we return to the President as the pivotal point, the criti-



cal element in reaching decisions on foreign policy. Now the capacity to decide is not a common attribute of mankind. It becomes increasingly rare as the difficulty of the problems increases. The choice becomes one between courses all of which are hard and dangerous. The "right" one, if there is a right one, is quite apt to be the most immediately difficult one. It was certainly so in reaching a decision regarding Korea in June, 1950. In these cases the mind tends to remain suspended between alternatives and to seek escape by postponing the issue. There are always persuasive advocates of opposing courses. "On the one hand" balances "on the other." The problem itself becomes the enemy.

General Marshall understands this very well. Many a time he would burst out in an interminable discussion with, "Gentlemen, don't fight the question. Decide it." And he has often observed that the rarest of all gifts is the capacity for decision.

Many men and some Presidents don't have it. And when this occurs, the consequences are irreparable. It is one of the maladies for which there is no cure, except amputation.

Some years ago a lawyer friend received a call from a man who thanked him for giving him the best advice he had ever received. "You did not take my case," the man explained. "You listened to me, and you said, 'My friend, you are in one hell of a fix.' And," he added, "I was."

So is the country when the function of decision in foreign policy breaks down. For the inescapable result is drift. And it is drift away from the association, the coalition, of free nations which cannot exist without us, and without which we cannot exist as the nation all of us have known. And it is drift in this direction not necessarily from desire—many members of Congress desire quite the opposite—but because policy in association or coalition requires a vast number of coördinated and continuous actions which, for the reasons given, Congress without vigorous executive leadership is not able to provide. This vigorous leadership often involves conflict and competing appeals to the people, the common source of power. This is inherent in the system of the separation of powers, the framers

of which did not rate harmony between the executive and legislative branches as highly as some of their successors.

Different Presidents have gone about reaching conclusions and decisions for the conduct of foreign relations in different ways. Some have relied heavily on solitary reflection and study. One can see instances of this in Presidents Jefferson, Lincoln, and Wilson. Some have relied substantially upon advisers not in the established chart of organization. Here one might cite the two Roosevelts. Others have been meticulous in sticking to "channels," of whom President Truman is outstanding. But, however he works, the President must be free to choose the methods most suited to him. He cannot be confined. Particularly, he must not be confined by law. Legislation that a President must consult this, that, or the other person or body will be futile and harmful. He can be given facilities, but he cannot be compelled to use them.

But it can properly be said that some courses are apt to be more successful than others. Successful organization and method will recognize two fundamental truths—the indivisibility of policy and the speciality of the foreign field.

Governmental policy is an integer—political policy, diplomatic, military, economic, fiscal. It is all one. Each depends upon, is stimulated and limited by the others. The history of our government decisions in the year 1950 is a clinic for any who wish to spell out this thesis. But it will hardly be disputed in theory, while it is very apt to be disregarded in practice. And there will always be argument about the hierarchy of importance. Do we cut the pattern according to the cloth or do we cut the cloth according to the pattern? And where do we find the pattern? But the first requirement is that there must be a pattern.

While this is true, it is also true that, despite popular belief, the field of foreign affairs is a field of special competence. Those who have spent their lives in the study of foreign nations and peoples know more about them than those who have not, just as physicians or physicists know more about their fields of special study. They often make mistakes, and bad ones. We

are under no compulsion to take their advice. But, where our lives are at stake, as between tossing a coin and consulting the specialists, we would be wise to do the latter.

Now it is an interesting fact that the Secretary of State is the senior member of the Cabinet. He is the senior member because this cabinet office was the first to be created upon the formation of our government. And it was the first to be created because then, as now, our relations with foreign nations were the most pressing of all problems with which our government had to deal. This has not always been true in the years which intervened. But it was true then, and it is true now.

Whatever primacy one attaches to our relations with the world beyond our borders, it is plain that a President needs continuous and knowledgeable advice about them. The Department of State exists for this purpose, is highly competent to perform it, and should be the principal, unifying, and final source of advice and recommendation. Unifying and final in this sense, that reports and recommendations from all sources, official and unofficial, come to the President—some of them good, more of them plausible. All of these should be referred to and reported on by the Department of State, which must live with the problem. Its view may be rejected, but it should be heard.

So far we have spoken of a "department" and about "its" view. But a department is made up of thousands of people. It cannot advise the President. And it rarely has a view. Here enters the Secretary of State—an unenviable figure. As Henry Adams pointed out, he is destined to be a pariah with the Congress because he represents problems which the Congress wishes to forget. Votes can be lost but not gained through foreign policy.

Nevertheless he has a place, and an important one, in the making of decisions. It is not the one most photographed and publicized—his exhausting flights to conferences, his greeting of visiting dignitaries, his appearance before committees of Congress and the public as a spokesman for the Administration. His other and essential role concerns both the special



knowledge of the foreign field and the synthesis of foreign policy into a unified governmental policy.

In the first aspect he must draw from the Department of State in usable form its full knowledge and wisdom upon the many matters which press for decision. He should distrust conclusions, his own or others', when they provide answers too facile and pat, but should rather spur and encourage his departmental colleagues to bring together all their varied knowledge and points of view so that all possibilities are tested against the most stringent criticism. He must keep them headed into the problem and present to them the other governmental factors involved which fall outside their field of special competence, but which must weigh heavily with the President.

Out of this method of work will come recommendations from the foreign affairs point of view influenced by, but not wholly coördinated with, the limiting factors of our capabilities in the economic, fiscal, military, and domestic political fields. This final reconciliation must be made by the President. He should be kept fully informed of the progress of the work so that issues are not presented to him suddenly and at a late stage when choices have narrowed, and so that the President's thought may be fully reflected in the work of preparation. But, before the matter comes to the President for action, much can be done to assure that all his advisers have understood and considered one another's points of view and the whole scope of limitations and capabilities applicable to the problem.

Much of this is accomplished by consultation between cabinet colleagues and through such valuable interdepartmental machinery as the National Advisory Council on financial matters and the National Security Council on security matters. It would unduly extend this article to go into these established channels for coördinating policy. But one matter should be mentioned which defies formal organization, but which is absolutely essential. It concerns habits of work and confidence and collaboration between officers of different departments.

One of the curious and toughly resistant characteristics of government departments is the tendency of their people to

isolate themselves from other departments and to regard persons outside their ranks with something amounting, on occasion, to suspicion and hostility. It may seem extraordinary, but it is nevertheless true, that not until General Marshall's tenure as Secretary of Defense had the Secretary of State and his senior officers met with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for continuous discussion and development of policy. And yet foreign policy and military policy divorced from one another are both operating in the field of phantasy.

From September, 1950, until January, 1953—I am not informed thereafter—officers of the two Departments worked in the closest and most loyal coöperation and greatly to the public good. This does not happen automatically; it requires constant attention and effort from all concerned and especially from the top. For both Departments have internal differences springing from perfectly proper differences of emphasis and interests, either from the services, in one case, or the geographical divisions, in the other. Both desire to keep their differences within the family. But it is useful and often most productive to bring them out in discussion, provided those in the discussion preserve confidence. The value of these years of common work in mutual enlightenment, confidence, and advancement of policy and action cannot be overstated.

The same relationship existed with the Economic Coöperation Administration and with its successor, the Mutual Security Agency, and to a lesser, but useful, degree with other Departments having functions in the foreign field—Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and Labor.

The purpose of all this was not necessarily to get agreed recommendations and papers, but to get understanding; and, where there were differences, to have them brought out, not covered up, and to have them intelligent and intelligible differences. One can always get an agreed paper by increasing the vagueness and generality of its statements. The staff of any interdepartmental committee has a fatal weakness for this type of agreement by exhaustion. But such agreements are no



good and of no service to the President, if he has the capacity for decision. What he needs to know are the real issues, honestly presented, with extraneous matter stripped away.

We come back then to where we started—to the President. The decisions are his. Helped by his departmental advisers and their staffs, helped by his own Executive Office—the Bureau of the Budget, the Economic Advisers, and so forth—ultimately he must decide. The volume of work which should be done is appalling. It cannot be got through by listening to oral presentations, or “briefings,” or reading one-page memoranda. It has to be sweated out. The facts have to be mastered, the choices and their consequences understood—so far as consequences can be understood; and then upon “judgments and intuitions more subtle than any articulate major premise” the decision made.

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Document # 56

SANITIZED 26

INFORMATION

*sup*

Tuesday, May 7, 1968 -- 6:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

At Tab A is an interesting MACV assessment of the proportion of North Vietnamese strength in the South: in maneuver and combat support units over 75%.

At Tab B is a rather remarkable table that I had Art McCafferty assemble from documents, diaries, and prisoners of war. It shows the decline in unit strength for a number of enemy formations on which we had firm evidence. To my surprise, it turned out we had evidence on 44% of the North Vietnamese units in South Vietnam.

In March they were 52% under strength. If we project this to all North Vietnamese fighting in the South, it implies that they had lost by March about 44,000 men -- this aside from VC main force losses, guerrillas, etc. Losses of this kind would explain why MACV feels that "the majority of groups are needed and seem to be destined for service as replacements."

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-CBS 20

By ics NARS, Date 6-25-84

WR 75

WWRostow:rla

Duplicate

WR 75-27

~~SECRET~~

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26  
INFORMATION

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

Tuesday, May 7, 1968 -- 6:00 p.m.

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W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: 1125.141.021.038/5  
By: jc, NARA, Date: 10-30-09

WWRostow:rlm

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

26a

May 6, 1968

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM MACV

SUBJECT: MACV J-2 Assessment of Current Infiltration

Current infiltration will accelerate a long term trend in which the balance of enemy forces in South Vietnam are shifting from Viet Cong to North Vietnamese Army. In May of 1965, the North Vietnamese Army contributed 4 percent of enemy in-country strength -- now they are 33 percent; and in maneuver and combat support units alone comprise over 75 percent.

North Vietnamese Army personnel predominate in many units otherwise identified as Viet Cong. For example, Viet Cong rallier Colonel Dan stated the Viet Cong 9th Division was 80 percent North Vietnamese, which closely matches our own estimate of NVA/VC ratio for that unit.

While the expansion of the number of North Vietnamese Army fighting troops in South Vietnam is manifest, it does not seem to represent a major expansion of the force structure. While there are undoubtedly a few units engaged in the current infiltration, the majority of groups are needed and seem to be destined for service as replacements. The only recent North Vietnamese Army elements to appear are the 209th (320th) Regiment in the B-3 Front, the 27th Independent Regiment in I Corps, and a few Battalions.

We believe that what might appear as an expansion of North Vietnamese Army forces in South Vietnam actually reflects the enemy's need to draw more replacements from the north in compensation for decreased ability to recruit in South Vietnam.

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 00-334  
By SJ NARA, Date 2-6-03

<u>Unit</u>	<u>TQ&amp;E</u>	<u>Intelligence Strength</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Examples of Intelligence</u>
320 NVA Div 52 Regt	1,900	1,000 (march)	-48%	Intelligence source reported regiment made up mostly of Nungs; other reports that units of the 320 had lost almost 50% of their men.
304 NVA Div	9,800	4,900 (march)	-50%	Various sources indicate 10,000 lost at Khe Sanh (304 and 325C mainly involved).
9B Regt	2,000	500	-75%	Prisoner states his regiment replaced the 9th, which had lost 75% of its troops to B-52's.
7 Regt	2,000	1,000	-50%	
66 Regt	1,700			
Hq	650			
7th Bn	350			
8th Bn	250	40		Prisoner reports 210 killed
9th Bn	450	81+		Prisoner reported heavy losses and gave current strength.
62B Regt	2,000	1,000	-50%	
325C NVA Div	7,400	3,700? (march)	-50%	Various sources indicate 10,000 lost at Khe Sanh (304 and 325C mainly involved).
2nd NVA Div	5,700	2,850? (march)	-50%	Various sources claim this Division suffered heavy losses and moved to Laos for refitting in March.
6th NVA Regt	1,500	600? (february)	-60%	Losses during Hue battle brought combined strength of 802 and 807 Bns to 300 probably similar for others following.
Hqs	300	150		
800 Bn	300	150		
802 Bn	500	150		
807 Bn	400	150		
1st NVA Div				

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 00-334  
By SJ NARA, Date 2-6-03



<u>Unit</u>	<u>TO&amp;E</u>	<u>Intelligence Strength</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Examples of Intelligence</u>
66 Regt	1,265	635 (february)	-50%	Returnees in March state 1/3 killed or wounded in B-52 strikes; this together with other losses forces unit to go to Cambodia for replacements.
24th NVA Regt (independent)	1,400	900 (february)	-40%	Diary of Medical section shows some 600 casualties in February.
95B NVA Regt (independent)	1,350	675 (march)	-50%	Prisoner stated strength so diminished unit had to leave battle area.
V C E 210 Bn (local)	300	80 (february)	-70%	Returnee stated unit had less than 80 men. after Tet.
7th NVA Div 101st Regt	1,500	(march)	100%	Two prisoners state unit so badly hurt by bombings it was disbanded in March.
5th NVA Div 95th Regt	1,740	930 (april)	50%	Prisoners state 2 bns not combat effective as result of 3-day battle in April.

## INFORMATION

~~SECRET SAVIN~~*Pres file*

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W. W. Rostow

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By jc, NARA, Date 10-30-09

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

27a

~~SECRET SAvIN~~

May 6, 1968

TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM MACV

SUBJECT: MACV J-2 Assessment of Current Infiltration

Current infiltration will accelerate a long term trend in which the balance of enemy forces in South Vietnam are shifting from Viet Cong to North Vietnamese Army. In May of 1965, the North Vietnamese Army contributed 4 percent of enemy in-country strength -- now they are 33 percent; and in maneuver and combat support units alone comprise over 75 percent.

North Vietnamese Army personnel predominate in many units otherwise identified as Viet Cong. For example, Viet Cong rallier Colonel Dan stated the Viet Cong 9th Division was 80 percent North Vietnamese, which closely matches our own estimate of NVA/VC ratio for that unit.

While the expansion of the number of North Vietnamese Army fighting troops in South Vietnam is manifest, it does not seem to represent a major expansion of the force structure. While there are undoubtedly a few units engaged in the current infiltration, the majority of groups are needed and seem to be destined for service as replacements. The only recent North Vietnamese Army elements to appear are the 209th (320th) Regiment in the B-3 Front, the 27th Independent Regiment in I Corps, and a few Battalions.

We believe that what might appear as an expansion of North Vietnamese Army forces in South Vietnam actually reflects the enemy's need to draw more replacements from the north in compensation for decreased ability to recruit in South Vietnam.

~~SECRET SAvIN~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 00-334  
By Sj, NARA, Date 2-6-03

<u>Unit</u>	<u>TO&amp;E</u>	<u>Intelligence Strength</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Examples of Intelligence</u>
320 NVA Div 52 Regt	1,900	1,000 (march)	-48%	Intelligence source reported regiment made up mostly of Nungs; other reports that units of the 320 had lost almost 50% of their men.
304 NVA Div	9,800	4,900 (march)	-50%	Various sources indicate 10,000 lost at Khe Sanh (304 and 325C mainly involved).
9B Regt	2,000	500	-75%	Prisoner states his regiment replaced the 9th, which had lost 75% of its troops to B-52's.
57 Regt	2,000	1,000	-50%	
66 Regt	1,700			
Hq	650			
7th Bn	350			
8th Bn	250	40		Prisoner reports 210 killed
9th Bn	450	81+		Prisoner reported heavy losses and gave current strength.
62B Regt	2,000	1,000	-50%	
325C NVA Div	7,400	3,700? (march)	-50%	Various sources indicate 10,000 lost at Khe Sanh (304 and 325C mainly involved).
2nd NVA Div	5,700	2,850? (march)	-50%	Various sources claim this Division suffered heavy losses and moved to Laos for refitting in March.
6th NVA Regt	1,500	600? (february)	-60%	Losses during Hue battle brought combined strength of 802 and 807 Bns to 300 probably similar for others following.
Hqs	300	150		
800 Bn	300	150		
802 Bn	500	150		
807 Bn	400	150		
1st NVA Div				

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NJL/RAC 00-334  
By SJ, NARA, Date 2-6-03

<u>Unit</u>	<u>TO&amp;E</u>	<u>Intelligence Strength</u>	<u>Change</u>	<u>Examples of Intelligence</u>
66 Regt	1, 265	635 (February)	-50%	Returnees in March state 1/3 killed or wounded in B-52 strikes; this together with other losses forces unit to go to Cambodia for replacements.
24th NVA Regt (independent)	1, 400	900 (February)	-40%	Diary of Medical section shows some 600 casualties in February.
95B NVA Regt (independent)	1, 350	675 (March)	-50%	Prisoner stated strength so diminished unit had to leave battle area.
VC E 210 Bn (local)	300	80 (February)	-70%	Returnee stated unit had less than 80 men. after Tet.
7th NVA Div 101st Regt	1, 500	(March)	100%	Two prisoners state unit so badly hurt by bombings it was disbanded in March.
5th NVA Div 95th Regt	1, 740	930 (April)	50%	Prisoners state 2 bns not combat effective as result of 3-day battle in April.



Her file  
28

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, May 7, 1968 - 5:30 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

My friend Kei Wakaizumi came in today to make a personal and, I must say, eloquent appeal that you grant an interview to him for the Japanese press. The attached letter from Ambassador Johnson makes clear why he believes your voice is needed in Japan at this time. After I explained to Wakaizumi how busy you were and how difficult an interview would be at the present time, he suggested that we would work out the interview on paper beforehand, if you agree; present the questions and answers to you; and then have merely a picture taken with him. Before making a decision, let me summarize his case.

1. The Sato visit with you went well, and many felt that we were launched on a stable period of partnership with Japan.
2. Then came a number of minor incidents that somewhat soured the atmosphere; the visit of the ENTERPRISE; the protests over a U. S. military hospital; the use of B52's from Okinawa against South Vietnam; and the continued agitation about Okinawa itself.
3. These, he said, would have been minor except for the Japanese interpretation of the Tet offensive as a major U. S. defeat, and then the much more serious misinterpretation of your March 31 statement.
4. Sato has been under very severe attack on the grounds that 'your friend President Johnson is going: it is time for you to go.'
5. He said this made no sense unless you understood how the bad reporting in Japan had stirred up the following attitudes:
  - The U. S. was virtually defeated by a small power and has definitely lost the war in Vietnam;
  - Sooner or later the U. S. will have to withdraw from Vietnam and the Communists will take over;
  - The day will come when the United States will turn its back on Asia and, because of its troubles at home, become neo-isolationist;
  - The U. S. is not a trustworthy ally; it suddenly changed its policy on Vietnam and is negotiating with Hanoi over the head of its Vietnamese ally;
  - The next time the U. S. will suddenly change its policy towards Peking and negotiate a deal over the head of Japan;

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-04  
By llj, NARA Date 10-21-96

-- What is the real meaning of U. S. power and what is the use of its protection if it loses the war in Vietnam and the North Koreans can humiliate the U. S. by seizing the PUEBLO;

-- What is the credibility of the U. S. assurance under the military pact with Japan;

-- Therefore, Japan should keep its distance from the U. S. and protect its security by making accommodations with Peking and the Soviet Union.

6. This line of thought from moderate and nationalist Japanese, when combined with the purposeful and permanent left-wing campaign against the U.S. -Japanese relationship could, if left unchecked, have serious consequences when the renewal of the security treaty comes up in 1970.

7. Wakatsuki said it's perfectly clear to him -- and to any thoughtful person -- that the U. S. relationship to Japan is the most important aspect of Japan's future; and Japan is perhaps the most important stake the U. S. has in Asia. What is the meaning of all of the sacrifices the U. S. has made in Korea and Vietnam if Japan should wander off along the path of neutralism and detachment?

8. President Johnson's personal prestige as a statesman is, despite these thoughts, very high. He believes that by speaking directly to the Japanese people in an interview, he could break through the profound Japanese misunderstandings about the position in Vietnam and U. S. policy and reverse the present trend. Ambassador Alexis Johnson strongly supports him in this view.

9. This is what he would like President Johnson to say to the Japanese people:

-- The U. S. is not defeated in Vietnam and will not sell out the independence and right of self-determination of the South Vietnamese people;

-- The U. S. is not going to pull out of South Vietnam except in terms of an honorable peace;

-- The U. S. intends to stay in Asia and honor its commitments; the March 31 speech did not involve any basic change in U. S. policy in Asia;

-- The U. S. is prepared to continue to defend Japan in the future as in the past; it has proved itself a dependable ally in many places;

-- The U. S. welcomes and expects Japan to assume more responsibility and to play a greater role in Asia;

-- The U. S. , while looking forward to reconciliation between Communist China and the rest of the world, does not have in mind any basic change in its China policy;

-- Wakaisumi concluded by saying that he hoped you would reiterate the four basic points you made in your 1966 White Sulphur Springs speech to the Alumni Council on your policy in Asia.

10. I then talked at some length to Wakaisumi about the need for Japan to do more, underlining that Japanese military and aid expenditures in 1966 were only 1.3% of GNP. I pointed, in particular, to the importance of their helping Indonesia soon and substantially. I was sure Prime Minister Sato had political problems; but all statesmen had problems. (Incidentally, Wakaisumi still works quietly for Prime Minister Sato.) I told him that I could make no promises, but I would raise the issue of an interview with you again.

Attachment

W. W. Rostow

No commitment, but let me see a draft of what the questions and answers might look like \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

cc: George Christian



282

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-283  
By is, NARA Date 5-5-98

Tokyo, Japan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 6, 1968

The Honorable.  
Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

Dear Walt:

Our mutual friend Kei Wakaizumi was in to see me this afternoon with a proposition that I find most interesting, for which I would hope I could have your support. Briefly, he wants to do an exclusive interview with the President somewhat in the pattern of that which he did with McNamara in 1966. However, rather than for publication in the "Chuo K Ron", as was the case with the McNamara interview, this would be for publication in the "Bungei Shunju", which has by far the largest circulation (about 700,000) of any serious magazine in Japan. Also, an interview of this kind in this magazine could be expected to receive heavy press play.

Kei's motivation is concern over the beginnings of a trend of adverse opinion here which arise from a complex of factors involving the heavy emphasis the press is giving to the bad side of the news from Vietnam, the Enterprise visit, Okinawa and the B-52's, the Pueblo, the general Korean situation, and, what Kei called, the very "unskillful" handling by the government of the "Defense Debate" in the Diet. He feels that as Japan moves closer to the crucial 1970 period with, he expects, Lower House elections in the fall of 1969, it is important that all those who feel otherwise do all they can to arrest what may be an increased trend towards loosening security ties with the United States and towards neutralism. Without necessarily endorsing all of what Kei says, he clearly has a point and there is no question but that a sympathetic interview with the President, which would receive wide coverage here, could be very helpful. It is, of course, not necessary for the President to say anything particularly new, but rather that what is said is put in a framework as meaningful as possible for a Japanese audience.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2.

I told Kei that I supported the idea and would write you about the possibilities. Although I know that the President has not done this often, I am under the impression that during this past year he gave such an interview to some German correspondents. As far as problems of other press media here, they would be minimal when using a vehicle such as the "Bungei Shunju" and it would not raise the same kind of problems as such an interview with a single one of the heavily competing newspapers or TV chains.

On the mechanics, my thought is that if the President agrees in principle, it could be worked out with a minimum demand on his time by having Kei present all the questions in writing in advance and then you and members of your staff could do up draft answers for the approval of the President. This would require only a few minutes of the President's time with Wakaizumi himself for photos.


From the standpoint here, Wakaizumi would like to do this the first half of April. He is prepared to come to Washington at that time and remain for two weeks or so, if necessary. I told him to do nothing until he heard from me.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Bill Bundy with whom I know you will want to coordinate.

Incidentally, for the first time Wakaizumi directly mentioned to me his mission to Washington last November, and I confirmed his supposition that you had kept me fully informed.

We also had a long chat on why the government here does not do a better job on getting across to the people and why it does not get off the defensive with the opposition. We both agree that it is about time that the Prime Minister and others broke down the long Japanese tradition and began to use TV to get their stories across to the people.

Sincerely,



U. Alexis Johnson

CC: Mr. Bundy



file

29

Tuesday, May 7, 1968  
5:15 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

This [redacted] report suggests how most Eastern Europeans (and, I daresay, Russians) actually feel about the war in Vietnam.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

[redacted] 25 March 68)

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-289  
By ics, NARA Date 8-5-78

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-285  
By ica NARA, Date 10-9-03

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

IN

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS  
EKO DDI OCA XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

CITE

DIST 25 MARCH 1968

COUNTRY BULGARIA/VIETNAM

DOI

SUBJECT BULGARIAN REACTION TO THE WAR IN VIETNAM

EO 12958 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

1. IN BULGARIA TODAY THERE IS MUCH TALK ABOUT THE WAR IN VIETNAM BY THE "MAN ON THE STREET." THE CONFLICT IS ALSO A FREQUENT TOPIC OF CONVERSATION AMONG A LARGE NUMBER OF WRITERS AND INTELLECTUALS SUCH AS PAVEL VEZHNOV AND PETUR NEZNAKOMOV OF STURSHEL, LUDMIL STOYANOV, THE POET LAMAR, EMIL MANOV AND ORLIN VASILEV.
2. THERE IS A STRONG GENERAL FEELING AGAINST THE VIETCONG TET OFFENSIVE AS STUPID BLOOD-LETTING WHICH KILLED MANY PEOPLE AND ACHIEVED NO CONCRETE RESULTS FOR NORTH VIETNAM.

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(classification)

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~  
(dissem controls)

IN

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

(dissem controls)

ALTHOUGH IN FACT THE BULGARIAN MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE NORTH VIETNAM WAR EFFORT IS NOT LARGE, MANY BULGARIANS THINK IT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RECENT SEVERE PRICE INCREASES. THEY BELIEVE THAT BULGARIA HAS NO BUSINESS BEING INVOLVED IN THIS WAR AND THAT THE AMERICANS ARE JUSTIFIED IN DEFENDING SOUTH VIETNAM AGAINST AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH. THEY ACCEPT THE PREMISE THAT SOUTH VIETNAM IS A CLIENT STATE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THEY DO NOT MORALIZE ABOUT IT. BULGARIA IS ESSENTIALLY A LAND OF PEASANTS AND MOST OF THESE PEOPLE TRANSLATE A STRONG SENSE OF VALUE OF LAND INTO SIMPLE TERMS OF "DEFENSE OF THE TERRITORY." THUS, THE AMERICANS HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO FIGHT TO HOLD THE LAND AGAINST INCURSIONS FROM THE NORTH.

3. BULGARIAN WRITERS DO NOT ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF "WAR OF LIBERATION" AND ONLY WISH FOR THE WAR IN VIETNAM TO BE FINISHED. THEY DO NOT THINK NORTH VIETNAM WILL WIN AND THEY SEE A LONG FRUITLESS STRUGGLE AHEAD. ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY CONNECTED WITH THE VIETNAMESE WAR, THE MORALE OF NEW ARMY CONSCRIPTS IS POOR AND IN THE PAST THREE MONTHS NEW HARSH DISCIPLINARY MEASURES HAVE BEEN PUT INTO EFFECT TO QUELL THE RESTLESSNESS AND INCIPIENT HOOLIGANISM IN THE BARRACKS. [REDACTED] HOWEVER, THAT

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(classification)

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(dissem controls)

IN

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

(dissem controls)

THE BULGARIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE THE SITUATION WELL IN HAND AND  
THAT THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF SERIOUS DISTURBANCES.

4.  DISSEM: NONE

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(classification)

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

(dissem controls)

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**ACTION**

~~SECRET~~

**Tuesday, May 7, 1968 - 3:25 p.m.**

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith the letter you asked  
me to draft to Clark Clifford.**

**W. W. Rostow**

~~SECRET~~

**WWRostow:rla**

**DECLASSIFIED**  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 5-26-92

30

1. sup  
2. Pres file

~~SECRET~~

May 7, 1968

30a

Dear Clark:

I would be grateful if you would ask the Joint Chiefs to address themselves to the following five questions which remain much on my mind. I shall, of course, wish to have your observations on the Joint Chiefs' views.

1. What can we do to get additional help to Westmoreland if he becomes involved in another major enemy offensive?
2. What is the status of our plans to strengthen the Strategic Reserve? How can they be further expedited? When do we need to call up additional reserves? Will anything more be required in the way of Congressional action?
3. What is the status of US/GVN plans for expanding the Armed Forces of South Vietnam? What are the target operational dates for the new units? How realistic are the forecasts of operational readiness?
4. What are the critical equipment and personnel shortages which must be overcome if the foregoing plans are to be executed on time?
5. Are the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff satisfied that we are running no unacceptable risks in this period of reduced strategic capabilities? What happens if the enemy increased pressures in Laos, Thailand, Korea, the Middle East, or elsewhere?

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

Honorable Clark Clifford  
Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-292  
By ms, NARA Date 9-11-97

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

*Pres file*

31

~~SECRET~~

Lunch with the President  
Tuesday, May 7, 1968, 1 p. m.

Agenda

1. National Intelligence Estimate on USSR General Purpose Forces  
(Secretaries Rusk and Clifford)

Guidance for USIB meeting next Thursday on estimate which bears on troop requirements in Europe and Mansfield-type withdrawal resolution (see Tab A).

2. Negotiating Issues (Secretaries Rusk and Clifford)

Secretary Rusk should have a paper for the lunch. The requirement is for us to sharpen the issues and prepare for a second meeting with the negotiating group before they depart.

3. Bombing Between the 19th and 20th Parallels (Secretaries Rusk and Clifford)

Should we bomb above the 19th parallel before our men go to Paris in the face of the enemy attack on Saigon?

4. Force Goals at NATO Meeting of Defense Ministers in Brussels (Sect. Clifford)

Should we support an increase in NATO force goals? A decrease?  
Hold at present level?

5. Poor People's March on Washington (Secretary Clifford)

The Defense Department has been asked for equipment (beds, blankets, etc.). Should it be made available?

6. Aid Authorization Bill in Senate (Secretary Rusk)

The issue was: When Sect. Clifford should go up on the Hill on military aid. He settled the date with Senator Fulbright Monday afternoon. The date is May 17 at 10:00 a. m. Sect. Clifford would like to report his conversation with Senator Fulbright.

7. Other.

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White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By lg, NARA, Date 5-28-92

*W. W. Rostow*

~~SECRET~~

16

31a

RECEIVED  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Director of Intelligence and Research

MAY 6 - 1968

DRR/ODK

3 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-14-67: SOVIET  
AND EAST EUROPEAN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

1. The attached draft Memorandum has been approved by the Board of National Estimates after consideration by the USIB representatives.

2. Recipients are reminded that National Intelligence Estimates are releasable to foreign governments only by USIB action. This draft Memorandum to Holders deals with questions which have important implications for current US foreign policy. It is therefore regarded as particularly sensitive, and recipients are cautioned against any unauthorized disclosures.

3. This estimate has been placed on the agenda of the USIB meeting scheduled for 1030, Thursday, 9 May.

JOSEPH SELTZER  
Executive Officer  
National Estimates

6.2(c)

DISTRIBUTION A (MILITARY)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-285  
By us NARA, Date 10-9-03

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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316

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2 May 1968

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF NIE 11-14-67: THE SOVIET AND  
EAST EUROPEAN GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

THE ESTIMATE

Foreword

1. NIE 11-14-67 (16 November 1967) expressed uncertainty regarding the actual equipment holdings of Soviet line divisions, as follows (paragraph 14):

Hitherto we have estimated that all divisions in Categories I and II had a full set of equipment on hand or immediately available. It now appears that this may not be true of many divisions in the USSR, but we are as yet unable to determine with confidence the actual extent of the shortages that may exist.

2. An intensive study has been undertaken to resolve this uncertainty and, eventually, to reassess the combat and reinforcement capabilities of Soviet ground forces. This study is far from complete but our findings to date with regard to the actual

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NIJ 97-285  
By isa, NARA, Date 10-9-03

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holdings of major items of equipment by Soviet line divisions in East Germany and in the Belorussian, Carpathian, and Kiev Military Districts (MDs) in the USSR require the issuance of a Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-14-67.

3. We take occasion to include, in paragraphs 11-12 below, an updating of the discussion of Soviet theater air defense in paragraphs 42-43 of NIE 11-14-67 and of new attack submarines in paragraph 56.

The Equipment of Soviet Line Divisions\*

4. We have very good evidence regarding the major items of equipment held by two divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), one a motorized rifle division, the other a tank

\* Maj. Gen. Wesley C. Franklin, the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes the methodology utilized in the study has provided useful additional data. However, in his opinion, the findings must be regarded only as tentative indications of what major equipments may currently be held by Soviet divisions and may create an erroneous impression that the capabilities of line divisions have been reduced. Since the intelligence community cannot state with certainty the subordination and location of all divisional elements, unit holdings for any given division in the USSR so far considered in this analysis may be somewhat larger than indicated. Gen. Franklin believes the methodology employed in this analysis includes many judgments and assumptions which tend to minimize the estimates of divisional holdings and should not be used as the only basis for judging readiness of any given division. He believes that as more is known about the divisional equipment and the many as yet unsubordinated units located outside known divisional areas, the number of divisions which the Memorandum to Holders has designated as combat ready, will increase. He also anticipates that the total number of Soviet divisions throughout the USSR will rise during the conduct of this analysis.

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division. Our analysis indicates that the motorized rifle division has about 2,300 major items of equipment, the tank division about 2,200. The provision of major items of equipment thus indicated is some 25 percent lower than we previously believed. The number of tanks and artillery pieces, however, remains essentially the same. The difference lies principally in the number of wheeled vehicles and major items of support equipment organic to the division. This difference would not affect either the firepower or the initial mobility of these divisions.

5. We have not examined the other 20 Soviet divisions in Germany and Poland sufficiently to be able to compare them with these two divisions, but we believe this particular motorized rifle division to be typical of the 10 Soviet motorized rifle divisions in Germany, and this particular tank division to be typical of the 12 Soviet tank divisions in Germany and Poland.

6. We have no doubt that the Soviets consider all of their line divisions in Germany and Poland to be "in a full state of readiness for immediate operations." We take the two divisions cited to reflect the Soviet conception of what is required to qualify as "ready for immediate operations" and have used their indicated holdings of major items of equipment as the criterion

~~SECRET~~



by which to judge the readiness of the 34 other Soviet line divisions that we have examined to date.\*

7. On the basis of this criterion and good evidence, we conclude that nine divisions in the Belorussian and Carpathian MDs should be judged to be "in a full state of readiness for immediate operations." Five are motorized rifle divisions, four of them in a cordon close to the western frontier of the USSR. Four are tank divisions belonging to a tank army located not far west of Kiev.

8. We judge that the other 25 divisions in the Belorussian, Carpathian, and Kiev MDs (11 motorized rifle divisions and 14 tank divisions) fall short of the GSFG criterion in their holdings of major items of equipment. In most cases, their equipment amounts to 50-75 percent of that standard.

9. We must stress that our study to date has been directed solely toward determining the quantities of major items of equipment actually held by Soviet line divisions. We find these to be lower than we had previously supposed in the case of "combat ready"

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\* Six of the line divisions in the Baltic MD and the five line divisions in the Moscow MD are also relevant to the reinforcement problem, but we have not yet examined them sufficiently to include them in this analysis.



divisions, and much lower in the case of other line divisions. This reduction in our estimate of the amount of equipment held by these divisions would imply some reduction in our estimate of their manning, but we have not as yet studied the direct evidence regarding manning and are as yet unready to present an estimate on that subject.

10. We must note also that we have not yet studied the army and front level supporting elements in the Soviet ground forces, and consequently are as yet unable to reassess the Soviet organization for combat as a whole. Neither have we studied what would be required to bring a "reduced strength" division up to combat strength, how that could be accomplished, and consequently how quickly such divisions could be made ready "to proceed to areas of concentration." These matters will be addressed in NIE 11-14-68.

#### Theater Air Defense

11. Since the publication of NIE 11-14-67, we have obtained firm evidence of Soviet efforts to strengthen their theater air defense particularly against low-altitude attack. The ground electronic environment has been improved. At most operational airfields aircraft revetments have been constructed, dispersed

~~SECRET~~

aircraft parking patterns employed, and antiaircraft artillery positions occupied. The SA-3 missile system has been deployed to tactical airfields in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. We now have evidence that the Soviets have begun deployment of both the mobile SA-4 missile system and the radar-controlled, quad-mounted 23-mm weapon system, ZSU-23-4, with their field forces.

12. We now have firm evidence of the construction of two new types of torpedo attack submarines in addition to the new class of nuclear-powered attack submarine noted in paragraph 56 of NIE 11-14-67. All three of these new types have streamlined hulls and large rounded bows suggesting high speed, lower noise levels, and improved sonar capability. At least two of the three new types are probably nuclear-powered. These two may be capable of speeds up to 30 knots and operating depths on the order of 1,300 feet. All three types will probably be operational by mid-1968. We continue to believe that some 45 to 60 new attack submarines will be in service by 1977.

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 7, 1968 -- 12:30 pm

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

The attached conversation between Bob Anderson and the UAR Foreign Minister is the first gleam of hope we've seen in the Middle East.

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By sg, NARA, Date 5-27-92

W. W. Rostow

Cairo 2320

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla



# Department of State

32a  
**TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 651

2

PAGE-01- CAIRO 02320 060952Z

12  
ACTION SS 30

INFO 1030 W

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FM USINT CAIRO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4689

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 2320.

EXDIS

FOLLOWING FROM ANDERSON:

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority 714991-450

By wg/18, NARA, Date 5-27-92

1. I MET ON SATURDAY MORNING (MAY 4) FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF WITH MINISTER MAHMOUD RIAD. HE ASKED ME TO COME BACK AT 2:00 IN THE AFTERNOON, AND WE TALKED UNTIL PAST 7:00. STRIPPED OF A LOT OF CONVERSATION, THE MINISTER MAKES THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

2. THE THING MOST FUNDAMENTAL TO THE UAR AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES IS THAT ISRAEL NOT ACQUIRE ANY ADDITIONAL TERRITORY AS A RESULT OF THE WAR AND SECONDLY THAT ANY NEGOTIATION WHICH IS FINALLY MADE MUST GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF THE BOUNDARIES AGAINST EITHER ARAB ATTACK ON ISRAEL OR ISRAELI ATTACK ON ANY ARAB COUNTRY AND THAT WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS ARE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE BELLIGERENT PARTIES SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

3. AS TO SPECIFICS ON THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION, RIAD STATES

~~PAGE 2 RUEIVER 2320 SECRET~~

THAT THE UAR MUST CONCERN ITSELF WITH THE SINAI PENINSULA AND GAZA. JORDAN AND SYRIA WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN TERRITORIAL NEGOTIATIONS.

4. AS REGARDS SINAI AND GAZA, THE UAR WILL REQUIRE A RETURN OF ALL OF THE SINAI PENINSULA AND THAT GAZA DOES NOT BECOME ISRAELI. THEY ARE NOT TOO CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT HAPPENS TO GAZA EXCEPT THAT IT REMAIN ARAB AND, IN FACT, RIAD SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT LIKE TO HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR GAZA.

~~SECRET~~





# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

**SECRET**

PAGE 02 CAIRO 22329 060952Z

4. HE ALSO STATES THAT EACH OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO SIGN INSTRUMENTS OF AGREEMENT ONLY AS THEY RELATE TO THEIR OWN TERRITORY AND NOT A SINGLE DOCUMENT HAVING APPLICATION TO ALL OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES BORDERING ON ISRAEL. THEY WOULD AGREE TO A SIMULTANEOUS EVACUATION OF TERRITORY AND CAREFUL SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD ENSURE THE BOUNDARIES WITHOUT INSISTING ON EVACUATION FIRST.

5. RIAD STATES THAT HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE JARRING FORMULA ALTHOUGH HE SAYS IT HAS NOT YET BEEN FORMALLY PROPOSED BUT WOULD NOT WANT TO OPPOSE THE JORDANIAN AMENDMENTS IF THEY ARE INSISTED UPON BY JORDAN.

7. IT IS FRANK TO SAY THAT HE DOUBTS THAT THE JARRING PROPOSAL

~~RECEIVED 232 060952Z~~

IS BONA FIDE AS FAR AS THE PARTIES ARE CONCERNED BECAUSE OF JARRING'S STATEMENT TO THE JORDANIAN MINISTER THAT HE COULD NOT HONESTLY SAY THAT IN JARRING'S JUDGMENT THE ISRAELIS WERE PREPARED TO IMPLEMENT THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. HE WOULD NOT WANT TO GO TO NEW YORK ON THE BASIS SIMPLY THAT THE JARRING FORMULA CONSTITUTED AN AGENDA, ALTHOUGH HE DOES NOT INSIST UPON THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION BEING REGARDED AS SELF IMPLEMENTING. RIAD ALSO WOULD NOT WANT HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE JARRING INVITATION TO BE INTERPRETED AS ACQUIESCING TO EBAN'S STATEMENT TO JARRING TO THE EFFECT THAT "IT MUST BE MADE CLEAR IN CAIRO THAT IT IS THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE ISRAELIS THAT IF THE JARRING FORMULA IS ACCEPTED IT WOULD LEAD TO JOINT MEETINGS IN NEW YORK".

8. RIAD SAYS "I WILL NOT SAY NO TO JARRING, BUT I HAVE ASKED HIM TO DELAY HIS RETURN TRIP TO CAIRO TO MAY 10 IN ORDER TO KNOW PRECISELY WHAT TO SAY TO HIM".

9. I TAKE THIS TO MEAN THAT ON RIAD'S PART HE HAS NOT YET ACCEPTED THE JARRING INVITATION BUT IS TRYING TO FIND A WAY TO ACCEPT IT WITHOUT ACQUIESCING IN WHAT HE HAS BEEN UNOFFICIALLY TOLD IS THE ISRAELI ATTITUDE.

10. AS TO THE SUEZ, HE STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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REOPENING OF THE SUEZ SHOULD BE BY STAGES. IN THE BEGINNING, ISRAELI GOODS COULD PASS FREELY WITH NO SEARCH AND SEIZURE BUT WITH NO ISRAELI FLAG. THEN, AFTER A PLAN WAS WORKED OUT AND WAS IN OPERATION FOR THE DISPOSITION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM, THEY WOULD MOVE IN STEPS TOWARD ALLOWING THE ISRAELI FLAG TO TRANSIT THE CANAL, BUT ONLY AS THEY FELT THAT THE ARAB (#)

11. THERE ARE OTHER DETAILS WHICH I WILL MENTION TO MR. BERGUS AND MR. BROMELL WHO CAN TRANSMIT THEM AS THEY DESIRE.

BERGUS

NOTE: (#) OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTONINFORMATION  
(for today's lunch)*Pres file**33*~~SECRET~~Tuesday, May 7, 1968  
11:35 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a background paper for today's lunch on immediate negotiating issues requiring policy guidance.

I have marked key passages.

The key issues are these:

-- Reserving the Right to Reconnaissance.

Fully understood as essential.

-- Handling the "No Advantage" Assumption.

Whether to press for an explicit acknowledgement of what they must do to avoid our resumption of bombing or whether to settle for our having put it on the record clearly but unilaterally what we shall expect from them if the bombing halt is to continue.

-- (This paper does not take up Sect. Rusk's important suggestion that at an early stage we start a bilateral with the Soviet Union on the reinstallation of the Laos Accords.)

-- Raising Substantive Issues in the First Phase.

Bill's paper says that they are most unlikely to talk about substance in the first phase. He does not deal, however, with the point made yesterday; namely, that if they start off with a tirade against us for world propaganda purposes our reply should include -- essentially as political warfare -- a statement of our decent and moderate ultimate objectives.

I also would not rule out the possibility that, while the San Antonio formula is being formally debated and negotiated, significant private talks on what may lie down the line might conceivably develop. On this matter our minds should not be closed, at least to possibilities for significant informal chatter.

-- Format and Participation.

This paper presents the "your side/our side" formula. That may be suitable for issues such as a cease-fire, or even, perhaps, the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords. I myself do not believe it appropriate to a discussion of a southern settlement because, as Secretary Rusk clearly points out, Hanoi should not be in a position formally of having anything to do with a southern settlement even though the NLF is Hanoi's agent. I still believe that the proper way to

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-283  
By *is*, NARA Date 5-5-98



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-2-

get a southern settlement is in a private negotiation -- if possible, outside Paris -- between an agent of the Government of Vietnam on the one hand and a "member" of the NLF on the other. On the other hand, General Taylor's point made Monday is sound: the NLF must technically take part in a cease-fire discussion. Therefore, a military cease-fire discussion could be excellent cover for a Saigon-NLF negotiation of a political settlement.

-- Handling of Further Mutual De-escalation.

The suggestions made by Bill Bundy's paper are sensible and, properly implemented, could protect our military position. The passage on pages 7 and 8, however, do not deal with what is perhaps the most important issue: namely, at what stage and in what negotiating forum should the southern political settlement be dealt with? (Incidentally, I think our negotiators should have firmly in mind that when we talk about "self-determination" in South Vietnam, we are talking about a one-man one-vote solution, a phrase not used in this paper.)

-- A point not dealt with in this paper which I regard as important is the effective monitoring of any agreement which may be reached. We simply cannot in good conscience regard the ICC made up of India, Poland and Canada as ~~stable~~. It is broken down with respect to the 1954 agreements; the Laos agreements; and the effective neutrality of Cambodia. Therefore, we should begin to plan now for either a supplement or a substitute for the ICC in the form of a group of Asian states who would have a direct and vital interest in the maintenance of peace in the area and the sanctity of the borders. I am thinking particularly of Japan, Indonesia, Burma, and perhaps Malaysia and Singapore. We should be doing staff work on this now and perhaps even having preliminary talks with certain of these governments, notably Japan and Indonesia.

-- There is another more urgent issue not dealt with in this paper: namely, the participation, in the second phase, of our other fighting allies.

*W. A. Rostow*

~~SECRET/EYES ONLY~~ attachment

Late item: Cy Vance proposes the following issue for discussion:

Another problem on which general guidance would be helpful is whether the negotiators should make a major issue of the agenda and the order in which matters are discussed. Related to this is the question of whether the negotiators should push for agreements on individual issues or should insist on a "package settlement" formula.



~~SECRET~~ / EYES ONLY

DRAFT  
EA:WPBundy:mk  
5/6/68

33a

X copy

Memorandum

Subject: Immediate Issues Requiring Policy Guidance

We expect Hanoi to take the position that the first business in Paris is to arrange for our stopping the bombing, and "later" (in their words) to take up substantive matters. We may thus be faced with a "first phase" and a "later phase."

Issues Clearly Arising in the First Phase

1. Reserving the Right to Reconnaissance. The instructions are clear on this, and there are many tactical possibilities. No further policy guidance appears required.

Handling the "No Advantage" Assumption. The instructions provide that Governor Harriman must make clear to Hanoi that we could not expect the talks to continue in good faith--and by implication would resume bombing--if Hanoi took military advantage of the cessation. The instructions provide that the Governor would give examples of what we mean by "taking advantage." The issue requiring policy guidance is how hard the Governor should press for something more than understanding of our position, i.e.,

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-281

By W, NARA Date 10-5-98

~~SECRET~~ / EYES ONLY

-2-

something in the nature of an undertaking by Hanoi that it will exercise restraint in the areas defined by our examples.

One way of pressing hard would be to use the paragraph in the President's speech in which he said that we could not stop the bombing completely so long as this would endanger the lives of our men, and that whether a complete cessation would become possible "would be determined by events." However, the March 31 speech also contained an explicit renewal of the San Antonio formula in its original form.

If we press hard for some kind of commitment on restraint by Hanoi, at least in the formal sessions, we run the risk that Hanoi would explicitly "reject" any such undertaking, stating that it had always made clear that it rejected the San Antonio formula. (One way to reduce this possibility might be to avoid express reference to the San Antonio formula as such.)

Such a "rejection" by Hanoi would confront us with a difficult problem. If we agreed nonetheless to stop the bombing, it might appear more of a concession. If we do not agree to stop, many circles at home and abroad would accuse us of having hardened our position and made "not taking

advantage" into a prior condition--which we have always denied on the record that it was.

(and repeat several times)

A second course of action would be to present/"not taking advantage" as a firm US position which Hanoi must clearly understand, but not to compel any return comment by Hanoi. This would leave the record clear, and would satisfy the present instructions, but it might arouse criticism by the South Vietnamese and by some elements at home that we had taken a "weak" position.

A third possible course of action would be not to compel Hanoi to comment in the formal sessions but to make our assumption crystal clear--perhaps over and over again--and to seek through informal contacts, or third parties, reactions that would give us some basis for judging Hanoi's intentions.

3. Whether to Raise Substantive Issues in the First Phase. It seems clear to all of us that we could get significant propaganda advantage by spelling out key elements of our substantive position at the outset, probably in our opening statement. These would include the Geneva Accords

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

-4-

of 1954 and 1962, restoration of the DMZ, compliance with the Laos Accords, and the principle of self-determination for South Viet-Nam.

The issue requiring policy guidance is whether to press for serious discussion of these issues before agreement is reached on stopping the bombing. The odds appear overwhelming that Hanoi will not be willing to discuss substantive issues until the bombing stops.

If we were to insist on discussion of substantive issues before we stopped the bombing, we would be in a most difficult position to reconcile this with our past positions. San Antonio says that we would stop the bombing if this would "lead" promptly to productive talks. Therefore, we believe that--while we would do everything possible to tease Hanoi into discussion of substantive issues before we stopped the bombing--we cannot dig in and refuse to agree on stopping the bombing if they do not go along.

Issues that May Arise in the First Phase, or Later

4. Format and Participation. The first phase will clearly be strictly between ourselves and Hanoi. However, once we have agreed to stop the bombing, and perhaps even



~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

-5-

before, the issue of NLF representation may be raised by Hanoi--and in any event we ourselves face the issue of moving at an early point to bring the GVN in.

The issue requiring policy guidance is whether ~~our~~ our representatives should be prepared, at an early stage after the bombing is stopped, to bite the bullet by moving the talks on to a "your side/our side" basis. In essence, the moment we hit a substantive issue involving South Vietnamese interests, we would say that we could not adequately present the viewpoint of "our side" without the participation of the Republic of Viet-Nam, and that we proposed to bring them to the table. Hanoi's counter-move is obvious--to say that the NLF is the proper South Vietnamese party and that they must come. And the only solution we see to the impasse is to have both the GVN and the NLF at the table, with neither Hanoi nor we recognizing the claims that the GVN and NLF make for their status. This is the "your side/our side" formula.

We are already in discussion with the GVN about this formula, and do not yet have their concurrence. But--since the alternative to accepting this formula would be a break-up

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

of the talks on an issue where we are terribly weak both at home and abroad--we strongly recommend policy guidance to: (a) continue to press the GVN to accept the formula; (b) authorize Governor Harriman to be prepared--subject to final authority in light of the tactical situation--to put the formula forward at an early stage in the talks.

5. Handling of Further Mutual De-escalation. We have always said (in the 14 points) that this could be an early topic in talks, including the possibility of a cessation of hostilities or "cease-fire." At the same time, there would be grave military disadvantage in any "cease-fire" that did not permit the GVN to operate freely throughout South Viet-Nam.

As to lesser forms of mutual de-escalation, the restoration of the DMZ falls in this category and would be clearly advantageous to us. Other possible trades exist, <sup>currently</sup> but are judged to be militarily advantageous only if they involve some withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces.

The third element in the picture is that we ourselves wish to keep up the military pressure in the South.

The policy guidance issue is whether and how to raise the question of further mutual de-escalation (after the

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

-7-

bombing has stopped and we have satisfied the "no advantage" assumption). We recommend the following guidance:  
"fight and talk," i.e.

a. We would plan to continue military pressures in the South regardless of what was being discussed in Paris. Such pressures would be modified only in the event that we got a clearly advantageous agreement on mutual de-escalation.

b. At an early stage in the talks, we would raise the issue of mutual de-escalation both in principle and through the specific example of restoring the DMZ. This evidence of our interest in the topic would have a favorable public impact even if Hanoi did not respond, and would accord with our past statements. If Hanoi seriously discussed the topic, we would confront issues requiring further guidance. At the moment, the only clearly advantageous possibility is the restoration of the DMZ, and our representatives would be authorized to reach agreement on this--in the most unlikely event that Hanoi accepted it.

c. We would not ourselves raise a "cease-fire." If Hanoi did so--and this is judged unlikely by most

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

-8-

of our experts---the issue could be handled several ways: (1) by coupling the issue with withdrawal; (2) by insisting that the GVN be able to operate freely throughout the country; (3) by referring the issue to a military subcommittee that might even meet in the DMZ. The last of these may need further thought, since Hanoi might put the NLF on such a subcommittee. However, the main point--for present guidance purposes--is that our representatives would use one or more of these responses to keep the issue alive but to avoid early agreement unless Hanoi accepted our terms.

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY



INFORMATION

Tuesday, May 7, 1968 -- 9:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

As of May 5 the flow of infiltrators continues at a high level:  
13 new infiltration groups since May 1 -- 6630 men.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET TAME~~

Tuesday, May 7, 1968  
9:45 a. m.

*Pres file*  
35

Mr. President:

Herewith an analysis of Peking's attitude toward the negotiation: against it, but not willing or capable of stopping Hanoi from going ahead.

W W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TAME~~ attachment

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 00-335  
By SJ NARA, Date 26-03

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

May 6, 1968

Kostow

35a

MEMORANDUM

To : The Secretary  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes  
Subject: Chinese Reaction to Talks Proposal

The following paper was prepared at Mr. Bundy's request.

The available record of Chinese reactions to the prospect of US-North Vietnamese talks (discussed in detail below) indicates that Peking may have tried hard to deflect Hanoi from this course, but that it will be likely to accept the fact of negotiations while attempting to stiffen Hanoi's position and hoping that the battlefield struggle will persist. Publicly, the Chinese have registered their dissatisfaction with events both by repeating their regular line on the peace talks "hoax" and on "fighting to the end" and by maintaining, since March 31, a noticeable reticence on the war itself and on Vietnamese "victories." At the same time, however, Peking has hinted publicly at North Vietnam's involvement in arrangements for "contacts" with the US without any particular or unusual sign of virulence or condemnation. There has been no mention of Hanoi's decision to open talks in Paris on May 10.

Privately, there evidently has been a flurry of activity, with the North Vietnamese apparently sending a delegation to China, while the Chinese despatched one to Hanoi. Nothing is known about the members of these groups, although both were reported to include high-ranking officials.

3.3  
(b)(1,3,6)

In our view, the fact that the North Vietnamese have gone this far on the path to contacts -- despite Peking's outspoken public opposition to talks of any kind -- suggests that so far the Chinese have been unable or unwilling to put effective pressure on Hanoi. Moreover, the Chinese may believe that the chances that a settlement will emerge from initial US-North Vietnamese contacts are exceedingly slim and that there will probably be a great deal of fighting to come before any cease-fire can be arranged. Peking may also hope that any talks

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NODIS - MARIA

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 03-201

By iss NARA, Date 5-4-04

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NODIS - MARIA

RCI-2404

- 2 -

which open in the near future will break down sooner or later, thus enhancing its argument that it is impossible to deal with the US. Additionally, the Chinese may well feel that pushing the North Vietnamese too hard at this stage could damage their relations with Hanoi and seriously detract from their ability to influence the negotiating process.

Under these circumstances, we would expect no sharp public or private reactions from Peking to the initial stages of US-North Vietnam talks. Behind the scenes Peking will probably continually attempt to stiffen Hanoi's negotiating position, but it will be reluctant to antagonize Hanoi or to undermine seriously North Vietnam's military position while the fighting still goes on.

Following is an account, in chronological order, of Chinese statements and activities.

After  
April 3:

3.3  
(b)(1,3,6)



April 5:

In a broadcast labeled an "NCNA correspondent report" the Chinese made their first comment on President Johnson's speech of March 31, adhering closely to their standard "fight to the end" line. They condemned the partial bombing halt decision as a "new big fraud" resulting from defeats in the war and the American "crisis at home and abroad" and charged that the President "obviously wanted to win a respite on the battlefield...to further expand the war." Peking asserted that "only by thoroughly defeating the US aggressors on the battlefield and forcing them to get out of South Vietnam can the Vietnam question be solved."

~~TOP SECRET/FRINE~~

NODIS - MARIA

~~TOP SECRET/FRINE~~



~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET/TRINE~~

NODIS - MARIA

RCI-2404

- 3 -

April 15:

People's Daily Commentator article blasted the peace talks "hoax" and declared that only by "driving each and every aggressive soldier off Vietnam soil" could the Vietnamese achieve their objectives. At the same time, the article gave the first Chinese inkling that Hanoi, for its part, might be playing some part in arranging contacts with the US, observing that President Johnson had gone back on his word and rejected Phnom Penh as a talks site. It did not accompany this hint of North Vietnamese involvement with anything stronger than usual admonitions against talks put forth in the earlier attacks on the peace talks "hoax."

April 19:

3.3  
(b)(1,3,6)

April 20:

~~TOP SECRET/TRINE~~

NODIS - MARIA

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~  
NODIS - MARIA

RCI-2404

- 4 -

April 21:

3.3  
(b)(1,3,6)



Late  
April:

3.3  
(b)(1,3,6)



Chou's reported remarks seem to indicate that the Chinese would push for extremely hard bargaining at any conference table, but that they can tolerate the idea of negotiations per se. Such an approach is in line with private Chinese comments made before the President's March 31 speech indicating that the Chinese realized that the decision on beginning talks was up to Hanoi.

April 23:

An NCNA broadcast condemned the peace talks "hoax" in usual Chinese terms and declared that the US intended to "push aggression to the end."

April 23:

3.3  
(b)(1,6)



~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~  
NODIS - MARIA

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET/TRINE~~  
NODIS - MARIA

RCI-2404

- 5 -

3.3  
(b)(1,3,6)

April 26:

Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi in a speech at a Tanzanian reception in Peking denounced the "fraudulent peace program" put forth by the US and called it an attempt by the US to get at the peace table what it could not get on the battlefield. Ch'en said that the "Vietnamese people fully understand from experience that without victory on the battlefield it is impossible to solve any question."

April 28:

Peking's NCNA International Service carried a summary of a speech allegedly made by North Vietnamese Politburo member Truong Chinh castigating right deviationists and conservative ideas and urging a continuation of the fight against the US. Significantly, Hanoi did not mention the speech. Although Peking's version of the Chinh speech falls short of its own "fight to the end" position, it nevertheless portrays a tough approach and may reflect not only Peking's approval of this stance but some attempt by the Chinese to give their support to any hard-liners in the North Vietnamese regime.

Clearance: RA/ACA - Mr. Donald

~~TOP SECRET/TRINE~~  
NODIS - MARIA

~~TOP SECRET/TRINE~~  
~~TOP SECRET/TRINE~~

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Tuesday, May 7, 1968

*for file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ratification of the US-USSR Consular Convention

The US-USSR Consular Convention provides for the exchange of ratifications in Washington (it was signed in Moscow).

Are you interested in a White House ceremony? This is the first bilateral treaty ever concluded between the Soviet Union and ourselves. It would also be an occasion to invite a number of Senate leaders. We would expect Dobrynin to represent the Soviets, although First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov is presently in New York and might also attend.

If we exchange ratifications at the White House, you could proclaim the treaty at the same time.

If you do not want a White House ceremony, Secretary Rusk would hold it in the State Department. On foreign policy and protocol grounds it could easily be done either way.

(I just checked with Sec. Rusk personally: He thinks a low-key State Department ceremony would be best, unless you personally felt a White House occasion was appropriate.)

W. W. Rostow

White House ceremony \_\_\_\_\_

State Department ceremony \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

WWR:ND:gg

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39

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 97-283**  
**By iss, NARA Date 5-5-98**

INFORMATION

Tuesday, May 7, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Prime Minister Thanom of Thailand -- May 8-9

*Per file*

Attached is a memorandum from Secretary Rusk on the principal points likely to come up in your conversations with Prime Minister Thanom. Briefly, the Thai are going to want reassurances about the continuity of U.S. policy toward Asia, toward Vietnam, and toward Thailand. In addition to giving them the confidence they need in future U.S. policy, we want to impress upon the Prime Minister the need to get on promptly and harmoniously with the negotiation of a Status of Forces Agreement covering the 47,000 U.S. servicemen in Thailand. We also want to emphasize the importance you attach to the upcoming conversations between our Treasury people and Thai financial authorities about ways of neutralizing the Balance of Payments effects of our security expenditures in Thailand. We very much hope that the Prime Minister will take a personal and sympathetic interest in both these negotiations.

One late point not covered in Secretary Rusk's memorandum: The Thai have asked for a frigate for their Navy under the Military Assistance Program. They have offered to put up about half of the dollar cost if we will put up the remainder. Defense has now approved this funding, but the Thai have not been informed. I suggest you tell the Prime Minister during your meeting with him that we have approved their request for a frigate for the Royal Thai Navy.

A point of personal interest: Thanom's daughter is the wife of the Thai Naval Attache stationed in Washington. The couple has two children, a two-year-old boy and a one-year-old girl. The Thanoms will be seeing these grandchildren for the first time during this visit to Washington. The grandchildren will be at the South Lawn for the welcoming ceremony.

An unusual feature of this visit is the telephone call which you and Thanom will make to Thailand after the state dinner. That call will inaugurate direct telephone service from Thailand to the United States via satellite. We have sent you a separate memorandum on the scenario for the call. Marshall Wright of my staff will be available to escort you and the Prime Minister from the State Dining Room to the Treaty Room where the call will be placed.

W. W. Rostow

Att

MWright:wpt

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

37a

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-281  
By iso, NARA Date 10-5-98

May 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with the Prime Minister of Thailand

Thanom will have three major concerns:

The U. S. commitment to Thailand, particularly after your term of office.

Where we are headed in Viet-Nam.

U. S. support for Thai development and counter-insurgency programs.

A. U. S. Commitment to Thailand

Thanom and his colleagues are deeply concerned about an early, large-scale U. S. withdrawal from SEA under your successor and will be making their own first-hand appraisal of the U. S. political situation as it affects Thailand. Thanom has asked that USAF units remain in Thailand, in reduced numbers, after U. S. withdrawal from Viet-Nam.

Suggest you give Thanom a full, frank explanation of the domestic political scene, particularly as it relates to Southeast Asia. Also agree to consultations on withdrawal of U. S. units in Thailand.

B. Viet-Nam Issues

1. Military Situation. Thanom will want to know how we see the military situation developing. Thai leaders have felt that we have given insufficient priority to making the GVN and ARVN effective and Foreign Minister Thanat has offered to speak to GVN leaders, urging them to work together.

~~SECRET~~

Group 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

Suggest that:

- a) You tell him where we are going in the war;
- b) You express appreciation for Thanat's willingness to talk to the Vietnamese leaders, but explain that others have done so recently and Thanat's approach might be interpreted at this time as "ganging up. "
- c) Stress the need for arrival of the Thai division on schedule in July.

2. Negotiations. The Thai, with unhappy memories of the Geneva negotiations of 1962, are skeptical about negotiations and will press for fullest consultation and eventual participation.

Suggest that:

- a) You stress we are entering negotiations from a position of strength;
- b) Review the course of our efforts to establish contacts with NVN, explaining the reason for our positions;
- c) You go over Ambassador Harriman's instructions in general terms;
- d) You assure Thanom that our position in negotiations will be based on the Manila communique and the 14 points and we stand on effective implementation of the Geneva Accords on Laos and Viet-Nam, and for free choice in South Viet-Nam;
- e) You stress that by removing the war and negotiations from the political campaign, you are freer to do what is necessary to pursue these matters to a successful conclusion.

C. Support for Thai Counter-Insurgency and Development

Concerned over possible U. S. withdrawal, the Thai want to be in a position to defend themselves under any circumstances. Thanom will press for accelerated delivery of MAP and AID equipment for countering Communist insurgency in Thailand. Thanom might also ask U. S. assistance in road-building in Northeast Thailand.

Suggest that:

- a) You express satisfaction at Thai determination to lick insurgency on their own and the progress they are making;
- b) Assure them we are seeking to expedite MAP and AID deliveries and of our continuing support;
- c) Express hope they will continue to allocate even greater Thai resources to rural areas threatened by insurgency;
- d) We are exploring ways of assisting in road-building. Ambassador Unger will follow up on this back in Bangkok.

D. In addition, we wish to make the following points:

1. Status of Forces Agreement. We are pleased that talks are now under way on a SOFA and hope that our two Governments can conclude an agreement promptly. In the interim, we hope the Thai Government will continue its forbearance in matters of jurisdiction over U. S. military personnel in Thailand.

2. Neutralizing U. S. Security Expenditures in Thailand. Thailand's growing economic strength should enable it to assist us further in our balance of payments program. Our State and Treasury officials are looking forward to discussing this matter with Thai financial leaders. We hope the Prime Minister will support these efforts.

E. Foreign Minister Thanat has asked to be present during your discussions with Thanom. This would be desirable to insure effective communication since the Prime Minister's English is not as good as it appears to be.

*Dean Rusk*  
Dean Rusk



38

INFORMATION

Tuesday  
May 7, 1968

*Pres. file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Telephone call to Thailand the night of the state dinner for  
Prime Minister Thanom

As instructed by you, we have worked out arrangements for the inauguration of direct telephone service between Thailand and the United States from the White House the night of your state dinner for Prime Minister Thanom. The call will be received in Bangkok by Acting Prime Minister Prince Wan. Both you and Prime Minister Thanom will speak from here.

The call will be placed immediately after the dinner and before the entertainment (approximately 10:00 p. m.). Two telephones will be set up in the Treaty Room. There will be no media coverage but the White House photographer will record the event. The telephone conversation will be taped and will doubtless receive wide coverage in Thailand. The call will be transmitted to Thailand via Comsat satellite and with the cooperation of RCA and AT&T. The same satellite will have been used earlier that day to telecast the arrival ceremony of Prime Minister Thanom.

Prince Wan's English is excellent and there will be no need for a translator. Prince Wan will be speaking from the Prime Minister's office in Bangkok. Attached are suggested remarks for you to address Prince Wan.

W. W. Rostow

Att

cc: Col. Albright WHCA  
Lou Schwartz (Fleming)  
Bess Abell

MW:wpt  
MWright

## SUGGESTED REMARKS

Prince Wan:

I am very happy to greet you today, by way of one of our communications satellites far out over the Pacific, while we are enjoying the visit of your Prime Minister. As you know, he is sitting here beside me now.

It is wonderful to be able to pick up a telephone and talk direct from the White House in Washington to Government House in Bangkok. It symbolizes the friendship between our countries. And it dramatizes the tremendous technical advances which promise so much for the prosperity of our peoples. In every sense we are growing closer together. I understand there are more than 2,000 Thai students in the United States right now, and of course we have over 50,000 Americans in your country. I want to tell you the American people greatly appreciate the friendship and hospitality your countrymen have shown our sons.

Before saying goodbye, I want to send through you to Their Majesties and the great people of Thailand the warmest regards of the American people. We admire your seven-hundred-year-old tradition of independence. We respect the determination with which you defend that independence today. You may be sure that as the situation develops in Southeast Asia -- hopefully toward the just and lasting peace we have both been working for -- we shall stand by our good friends in Thailand.

39

Tuesday, May 7, 1968

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Congressional Representation at International Conferences**

There is attached a list of major international conferences attended by the United States in the period 1918 to 1966. The list is in two parts -- the first gives U. S. delegations which included Congressional representatives; the second lists the conferences attended by U. S. delegations with no Congressional representation.

No meaningful generalization can be drawn from the list. President Wilson took no Congressional representatives to the Paris Peace Conference in 1920. However, the U. S. delegation to the Washington Naval Conference in 1922 contained Congressional representatives. President Roosevelt took no Congressional representatives to Yalta but most postwar conferences were attended by representatives of Congress.

Discussion of Congressional representatives on U. S. delegations to bilateral conferences has not come up. In the particular case, if the Paris meeting leads to further conferences involving more than two powers, there is adequate precedent to add Congressional representation to the U. S. delegation. In the postwar period, Congressional members were asked to attend the sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Japanese Peace Treaty Conference in 1951 included Congressional delegates, alternates, and observers. The Manila Conference on SEATO in 1954 was attended by Senators Smith and Mansfield who were full representatives.

A recent precedent was the Rio Conference of 1966 which was attended by four Congressional advisers, two from the Senate and two from the House.

W. W. Rostow

MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES  
ATTENDED BY THE UNITED STATES, 1918-1966

- I. With Congressional Representation
- II. Without Congressional Representation

Research Project No. 934  
May 1968

Historical Studies Division  
Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs  
Department of State



With  
Cong.  
Rep.

I. With Congressional Representation

CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT

Washington, D.C.

November 12, 1921-February 6,  
1922

Congressional Delegates:

Henry Cabot Lodge, United States Senate  
Oscar W. Underwood, United States Senate

Congressional Adviser:

Stephen G. Porter, House of Representatives

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE

London

January 21-April 22, 1930

Congressional Delegates:

Joseph T. Robinson, United States Senate  
David A. Reed, United States Senate

GENERAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

Geneva

February 2-July 23, 1932

Congressional Delegate:

Claude A. Swanson, United States Senate

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

London

June 12-July 27, 1933

Congressional Delegates:

Key Pittman, United States Senate  
Samuel D. McReynolds, House of Representatives  
James Couzens, United States Senate

BERMUDA MEETING TO CONSIDER THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

Hamilton, Bermuda

April 19-28, 1943

Congressional Delegates:

Scott W. Lucas, United States Senate  
Sol Bloom, House of Representatives

UNITED NATIONS MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE

Bretton Woods, New Hampshire

July 1-22, 1944

US Delegates:

Brent Spence, House of Representatives  
Charles W. Tobey, Senate  
Robert F. Wagner, Senate  
Jesse P. Wolcott, House of Representatives

Technical Advisers:

Chauncey W. Reed, House of Representatives  
Andrew L. Somers, House of Representatives

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE

Chicago, Illinois

November 1-December 7, 1944

US Delegates:

Alfred L. Bulwinkle, House of Representatives  
Charles A. Wolverton, House of Representatives

INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE

Mexico City

February 21-March 8, 1945

Special Congressional Advisers:

Tom Connally, Senate  
Warren R. Austin, Senate  
Sol Bloom, House of Representatives  
Luther A. Johnson, House of Representatives (Alternate for Sol Bloom)  
Edith Nourse Rogers, House of Representatives

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

San Francisco, California

April 25-June 26, 1945

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (Continued)

US Delegates:

Tom Connally, Senate  
Arthur H. Vandenberg, Senate  
Sol Bloom, House of Representatives  
Charles A. Eaton, House of Representatives

Special assistance given to Delegation by:

Pat McCarran, Senate  
Louis C. Rabaut, House of Representatives  
Karl Stefan, House of Representatives

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EDUCATIONAL,  
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION

London, England

November 1-16, 1945

Delegates:

James E. Murray, Senate  
Chester E. Merrow, House of Representatives

SECOND SESSION  
MEETINGS/OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

Paris, France

April 25-May 15, 1946 and  
July 15-July 22, 1946

Special Congressional Advisers:

Tom Connally, Senate  
Arthur H. Vandenberg, Senate

FIRST PART OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS

London, England

January 10-February 14, 1946



FIRST PART OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS (Continued)

US Delegation:

Representatives:

Tom Connally, Senate  
Arthur H. Vandenberg, Senate

Alternate Representatives:

Sol Bloom, House of Representatives  
Charles A. Eaton, House of Representatives

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Paris, France

July 29-October 15, 1946

Members of the Delegation:

Tom Connally, Senate  
Arthur H. Vandenberg, Senate

SECOND PART OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS

New York

October 23-December 16, 1946

US Delegation:

Representatives:

Tom Connally, Senate  
Arthur H. Vandenberg, Senate  
Sol Bloom, House of Representatives

Alternate Representatives:

Charles A. Eaton, House of Representatives  
Helen Gahagan Douglas, House of Representatives

THIRD SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

New York

November 4-December 11, 1946

Special Congressional Advisers:

Tom Connally, Senate  
Arthur H. Vandenberg, Senate

INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF CONTINENTAL PEACE  
AND SECURITY

Petropolis, Brazil

August 15-September 2, 1947

Delegates:

Arthur H. Vandenberg, Senate  
Tom Connally, Senate  
Sol Bloom, House of Representatives

NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES

Bogotá, Colombia

March 30-May 2, 1948

Special Congressional Advisers:

Donald L. Jackson, House of Representatives  
Michael J. Mansfield, House of Representatives

FOURTH SESSION (REGULAR) OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Lake Success, New York

September 20-December 11, 1949

This delegation included as advisers

Boyd Crawford, Clerk and Administrative Officer, House Committee  
on Foreign Affairs  
Francis C. Wilcox, Chief of Staff, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

(All members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and of  
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs were invited to participate  
as ad hoc advisers to the US Delegation, but they were not named  
as members of the Delegation.)

FIFTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Lake Success, New York

September 19, 1950-  
November 5, 1951

Representatives:

John J. Sparkman, Senate  
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Senate

Advisers (Congressional Committees):

Boyd Crawford, Administrative Officer and Committee Clerk, House  
Committee on Foreign Affairs  
Francis O. Wilcox, Chief of Staff, Senate Committee on Foreign  
Relations

Assistants to Representatives:

John E. Horne, Administrative Assistant to Senator Sparkman  
Cammann Newberry, Administrative Assistant to Senator Lodge

CONFERENCE FOR THE CONCLUSION AND SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY OF  
PEACE WITH JAPAN

San Francisco, California

September 4-8, 1951

Delegates:

\*Tom Connally, United States Senate  
Alexander Wiley, United States Senate

Alternate Delegates:

John J. Sparkman, United States Senate  
H. Alexander Smith, United States Senate  
\*Walter F. George, United States Senate  
Bourke B. Hickenlooper, United States Senate  
James P. Richards, United States House of Representatives  
Robert B. Chiperfield, United States House of Representatives

\*Did not attend

CONFERENCE FOR THE CONCLUSION AND SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY OF  
PEACE WITH JAPAN (Continued)

Congressional Observers:

\*Richard B. Russell, United States Senate  
Pat McCarran, United States Senate  
Styles Bridges, United States Senate  
Dewey Short, United States House of Representatives  
Karl Stefan, United States House of Representatives  
Overton Brooks, United States House of Representatives  
Walter H. Judd, United States House of Representatives  
John J. Rooney, United States House of Representatives  
Abraham A. Ribicoff, United States House of Representatives

SIXTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Paris, France

November 6, 1951-  
February 5, 1952

Representatives:

Michael J. Mansfield, United States House of Representatives  
John M. Vorys, United States House of Representatives

Congressional Staff Advisers:

Boyd Crawford, Staff Administrator and Clerk, Committee  
on Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives

Francis O. Wilcox, Chief of Staff, Committee on Foreign  
Relations, United States Senate

SEVENTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

New York, New York    Part I: October 14-December 23, 1952  
Part II: February 24-April 23, 1953  
(Recessed)

Representatives:

Theodore F. Green, United States Senate  
Alexander Wiley, United States Senate

\*Did not attend

SEVENTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
(Continued)

Advisers:

Boyd Crawford, Staff Administrator, Foreign Affairs Committee,  
United States House of Representatives

Francis O. Wilcox, Chief of Staff, Foreign Relations Committee,  
United States Senate

SEVENTH REGULAR SESSION (PART III) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
OF THE UNITED NATIONS

New York, New York

August 17-28, 1953

Representatives:

Theodore F. Green, United States Senate  
Alexander Wiley, United States Senate

Advisers:

Boyd Crawford, Staff Administrator, Foreign Affairs Committee,  
United States House of Representatives

Francis O. Wilcox, Chief of Staff, Foreign Relations Committee,  
United States Senate

EIGHTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

New York

September 15-December 9,  
1953

Representatives:

Mrs. Frances P. Bolton, United States House of Representatives  
James P. Richards, United States House of Representatives



EIGHTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
(Continued)

Advisers:

Boyd Crawford, Foreign Affairs Committee, United States House  
of Representatives

Francis O. Wilcox, Chief of Staff, Foreign Relations Committee,  
United States Senate

TENTH INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE

Caracas

March 1-28, 1954

Congressional Advisers:

Bourke D. Hickenlooper, United States Senate  
Theodore F. Green, United States Senate

MEETING ON THE SOUTHEAST ASIA PACT

Manila

September 6-8, 1954

U.S. Plenipotentiary Representatives:

The Honorable H. Alexander Smith, United States Senate  
The Honorable Michael J. Mansfield, United States Senate

NINTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York

September 21-December 17,  
1954

Representatives:

The Honorable H. Alexander Smith, United States Senate  
The Honorable James W. Fulbright, United States Senate

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Geneva

August 8-20, 1955

Congressional Advisers:

The Honorable Clinton P. Anderson, United States Senate  
The Honorable John O. Pastore, United States Senate  
The Honorable Bourke B. Hickenlooper, United States Senate  
The Honorable John W. Bricker, United States Senate  
The Honorable Carl T. Durham, United States House of Representatives  
The Honorable Chet Holifield, United States House of Representatives  
The Honorable W. Sterling Cole, United States House of Representatives  
The Honorable Carl Hinshaw, United States House of Representatives

Congressional Observers:

The Honorable John M. Butler, United States Senate  
The Honorable Price Daniel, United States Senate  
The Honorable John M. Dempsey, United States House of Representatives  
The Honorable George W. Malone, United States Senate  
The Honorable Melvin M. Price, United States House of Representatives  
The Honorable William A. Purtell, United States Senate  
The Honorable James E. Van Zandt, United States House of Representatives  
The Honorable Alexander Wiley, United States Senate

TENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

New York

September 20-December 20, 1955

U.S. Representatives:

The Honorable Brooks Hays, United States House of Representatives  
The Honorable Chester E. Mellow, United States House of Representatives  
The Honorable John O. Pastore, United States Senate

CONFERENCE ON THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

New York City

September 20-October 26, 1956

Congressional Advisers:

The Honorable W. Sterling Cole, United States House of Representatives  
The Honorable Paul J. Kilday, United States House of Representatives  
The Honorable John O. Pastore, United States Senate

ELEVENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

New York City

November 12, 1956-March 9,  
1957

United States Representatives:

The Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey, United States Senate  
The Honorable William F. Knowland, United States Senate

ECONOMIC CONFERENCE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

Buenos Aires, Argentina

August 15-September 4, 1957

Congressional Advisers:

The Honorable Homer E. Capehart, United States Senate  
The Honorable Frank F. Church, United States Senate

TWELFTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

New York

September 17-December 14, 1957

United States Representatives:

The Honorable A. S. J. Carnahan, United States House of Representatives  
The Honorable Walter H. Judd, United States House of Representatives

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 13TH SESSION

New York

September 16-December 13, 1958

Congressional Delegates:

The Honorable Bourke B. Hickenlooper, United States Senate  
The Honorable Michael J. Mansfield, United States Senate

FOURTEENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

New York, New York

September 15-December 13, 1959

Representatives:

James G. Fulton, United States House of Representatives

Clement J. Zablocki, United States House of Representatives

CONFERENCE ON ANTARCTICA

Washington, D.C.

October 15-December 1, 1959

Congressional Advisers:

Frank Carlson, United States Senate

Gale W. McGee, United States Senate

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 15TH SESSION

New York

September 20-December 20, 1960

Representatives

George D. Aiken, United States Senate

Wayne L. Morse, United States Senate

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 16TH SESSION

New York

September 19-December 20, 1961

Representatives

Omar Burleson, United States House of Representatives

Marguerite Stitt Church, United States House of Representatives

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 17TH SESSION

New York

September 18-December 21, 1962

United States Representatives:

Gordon Allott, United States Senate

Albert Gore, United States Senate

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 4TH SPECIAL SESSION

New York --

May 14-June 27, 1963

Special Advisers:

Gordon Allott, United States Senate  
Albert Gore, United States Senate

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 18TH SESSION

New York

September 17-December 17, 1963

United States Representatives:

Edna F. Kelly, United States House of Representatives  
William S. Mailliard, United States House of Representatives

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT

Geneva

March 23-June 15, 1964

Congressional Advisers:

James B. Pearson, United States Senate  
George A. Smathers, United States Senate  
Cecil R. King, United States House of Representatives  
Victor A. Knox, United States House of Representatives

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 19TH SESSION

New York

December 1-February 18, 1964

United States Representatives:

Russell B. Long, United States Senate  
Frank Carlson, United States Senate



UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 20TH SESSION

New York

September 21-December 21, 1965

United States Representatives:

Barratt O'Hara, United States House of Representatives

Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen, United States House of Representatives

SECOND SPECIAL INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE

Rio de Janeiro,

November 17-30, 1966

Congressional Advisers:

Frank Church, United States Senate

Hugh Scott, United States Senate

Armistead I. Selden, Jr., United States House of Representatives

William S. Mailliard, United States House of Representatives

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: 21ST SESSION

New York

September 20-December 15, 1966

United States Representatives:

Frank Church, United States Senate

Clifford P. Case, United States Senate

With-  
out  
Cong.  
Rep.

## II. Without Congressional Representation

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE  
Paris

January 18, 1919-January 21, 1920

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CONFERENCE  
Brussels

September 24-October 8, 1920

CONFERENCE ON CENTRAL AMERICAN AFFAIRS  
Washington

December 4, 1922-February 7, 1923

FIFTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES  
Santiago, Chile

March 25-June 1, 1923

THREE-POWER CONFERENCE FOR THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS  
Geneva

June 20-August 4, 1927

WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE  
Geneva

May 4-23, 1927

SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES  
Havana, Cuba

January 16-February 20, 1928

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR THE REVISION OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION  
OF 1906 AND FOR THE PREPARATION OF A CODE FOR THE TREATMENT OF  
PRISONERS OF WAR

Geneva

July 1-27, 1929

GENERAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, SECOND STAGE  
Geneva

February 2-June 29, 1933

GENERAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, THIRD STAGE  
Geneva

October 9, 1933-July 2, 1934

SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES

Montevideo

December 3-26, 1933

GENERAL DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, FOURTH STAGE

Geneva

November 20, 1934-April 13, 1935

CHACO PEACE CONFERENCE

Buenos Aires, Argentina

July 1, 1935-January 23, 1939

LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1935

London, England

December 7, 1935-March 25, 1936

INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

Buenos Aires, Argentina

December 1-23, 1936

CONFERENCE OF BRUSSELS

Brussels, Belgium

November 3-24, 1937

EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES

Lima, Peru

December 9-27, 1938

FIRST MEETING OF THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN  
REPUBLICS FOR CONSULTATION UNDER THE INTER-AMERICAN AGREEMENTS  
OF BUENOS AIRES AND LIMA

Panama, Panama

September 23-October 3, 1939

SECOND MEETING OF THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN  
REPUBLICS FOR CONSULTATION UNDER THE INTER-AMERICAN AGREEMENTS  
OF BUENOS AIRES AND LIMA

Havana, Cuba

July 21-30, 1940

THIRD MEETING OF THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN  
REPUBLICS

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

January 15-28, 1942

CASABLANCA CONFERENCE Casablanca, Morocco	January 14-24, 1943
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE Hot Springs, Virginia	May 18-June 3, 1943
FIRST QUEBEC CONFERENCE Quebec, Canada	August 17-24, 1943
MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS Moscow, USSR	October 19-30, 1943
FIRST CAIRO CONFERENCE (UNITED STATES, CHINA, UNITED KINGDOM) Cairo, Egypt	Nov.22-26, 1943
TEHERAN CONFERENCE (UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, SOVIET UNION) Teheran, Iran	Nov. 28-Dec. 1, 1943
SECOND CAIRO CONFERENCE (UNITED STATES, TURKEY, UNITED KINGDOM) Cairo, Egypt	December 4-6, 1943
INTER-ALLIED SHIPPING CONFERENCE London	July 19-August 5, 1944
WASHINGTON CONVERSATION ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, D.C.	August 21-October 7, 1944
SECOND QUEBEC CONFERENCE Quebec, Canada	September 11-16, 1944
CRIMEA CONFERENCE Yalta	February 3-11, 1945



TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE OF BERLIN (POTSDAM) Potsdam, Germany	July 17-August 2, 1945
FIRST SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS London	Sept. 11-Oct. 2, 1945
MOSCOW MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS Moscow	December 16-26, 1945
FOURTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS Moscow	March 10-April 24, 1947
FIRST SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (PALESTINE) New York	April 28-May 15, 1947
SECOND REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS New York	Sept. 16-Nov. 29, 1947
FIFTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS London	November 25-Dec. 15, 1947
SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (PALESTINE) New York	April 16-May 14, 1948
THIRD REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (FIRST PART) Paris	September 21-December 12, 1948
THIRD REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (SECOND PART) New York	April 5-May 18, 1949

SIXTH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

Paris

May 23-June 20, 1949

FOURTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF AMERICAN STATES

Washington

March 26-April 7, 1951

BERMUDA CONFERENCE

Hamilton, Bermuda

December 4-7, 1953

FOUR POWER CONFERENCE

Berlin

January 25-February 18, 1954

GENEVA CONFERENCE

Geneva

April 26-July 21, 1954

FOUR POWER MEETING; NINE POWER MEETING

Paris

October 20-23, 1954

THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT (SUMMIT MEETING)

Geneva

July 18-23, 1955

MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE  
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, AND THE UNITED STATES

Geneva

Oct. 27-Nov. 16, 1955

MEETING OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Panama

July 21-22, 1956

SUEZ CANAL CONFERENCE

London

July 29-August 2, 1956

August 16-23, 1956

September 19-21, 1956

SUEZ COMMITTEE MEETINGS

London

August 24-September 9, 1956

ECONOMIC CONFERENCE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

Buenos Aires

August 15-September 4, 1957

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

Paris

December 16-19, 1957

FIFTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF AMERICAN STATES

Santiago, Chile

August 12-18, 1959

MEETING OF HEADS OF STATES AND GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE, GERMANY, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES

Paris and Rambouillet

December 19-21, 1959

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

Paris

May 16-17, 1960

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LAOTIAN QUESTION

Geneva

May 16, 1961-July 23, 1962

CONFERENCE OF THE 18-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

Geneva

March 14, 1962

recess August 25, 1966