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INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 6, 1968 -- 7:40pm

Mr. President:

Herewith a CIA memorandum on the significance of Paris as a site for talks.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Intelligence Memorandum

"Significance of Paris as Site for Vietnamese Negotiations"
6 May 1968, No. 0066/68, copy 1

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-289
By ice NARA Date 8-5-98

WWRostow:rla

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
6 May 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Significance of Paris as Site
for Vietnamese Negotiations

Summary

France clearly hopes to profit from the choice of Paris as a site for preliminary US-North Vietnam talks--a choice which French officials earlier had made clear was desired by them but one which they would not take the initiative in proposing. Despite past harsh opposition to the US role in Vietnam, French officials probably will take a relatively neutral posture during the talks, both to encourage the choice of Paris as a site for permanent negotiations and to enhance the possibility that De Gaulle could at some point act as a mediator. De Gaulle's favorable reaction to President Johnson's call for negotiations was in part motivated by the French President's recognition that, if France hoped to play some role in the talks, he must mitigate somewhat his uncompromising stand against US actions in Vietnam. The mediating role is one De Gaulle would very much like to play if he felt the chances for a successful outcome were good, and French officials might make restrained, behind-the-scenes efforts to encourage this possibility. French police are confident they can maintain the necessary security and keep any demonstrations under control. The

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.

1.3(a)(4)

French Communist Party, which in the past has organized numerous demonstrations protesting US involvement in the Vietnamese conflict, probably will mount some form of propaganda campaign in support of Hanoi's position. The Communists probably, however, will in part base their activity on the line which Moscow adopts toward the talks.

1. France is pleased with Hanoi's proposal, and the US acceptance, of Paris as the site for preliminary talks on the Vietnamese conflict. The French Government earlier took the position that, although it would welcome the choice of Paris as a site, it would not take the initiative in proposing it. The choice of Paris without any direct efforts by the government to influence the concerned parties probably will be regarded as a plus factor by De Gaulle. Ever since President Johnson's call for negotiations on Vietnam, numerous French and non-French observers have pointed out these advantages of selecting Paris: that facilities for diplomatic transmissions would be adequate and secure; that Hanoi could avoid taking sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute by choosing a city which would presumably be acceptable to both Communist China and the USSR; that Paris is the nominal ally of Washington but has favored Hanoi's position on the war; and, most important, that all of the concerned parties have some form of representation there.

2. The US, Communist China, the UK and the USSR (the latter two countries the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina) all have embassies in Paris. France and South Vietnam severed diplomatic relations in July 1965 but Saigon continues to occupy its embassy in Paris for consular purposes. The French would probably permit Saigon to supplement its lower-level consular staff with officials who could act in a liaison or observer capacity or who could play a diplomatic role if Saigon at some point is included in the talks.

3. Hanoi is represented in Paris through a seven-man Delegation General headed by Mai Van Bo. Until August 1966 the delegation was only a commercial mission, but North Vietnam persuaded Paris to put the mission on the same footing as the French mission in Hanoi. The change in title merely reflected the fact that, for all practical purposes, the delegation had been acting as a low-level diplomatic mission, handling such functions as the issuing of visas. Mai Van Bo in the past has had ready access to Quai Director of Asian Affairs Etienne Manac'h and other ranking Foreign Ministry officials,

[REDACTED]

with discussions centering primarily on political matters and not trade. The delegation has asked French authorities for permission to establish a short-wave transceiver at Vitry-sur-Seine (south-east of Paris) in order to make direct contact with Hanoi. The Quai d'Orsay has asked that provision of such facilities be expedited, and the necessary installations are expected to be completed shortly. Communication to Hanoi from the Delegation General in Paris has been by TELEX via Moscow.

4. At this point the National Liberation Front has no representation in Paris. The French had responded favorably to the 1966 request of the NLF to open a press office in Paris and two minor NLF officials are expected there soon to make arrangements for opening a bureau. The press bureau probably would function as a political office to some extent.

5. France will seek opportunities, although probably in a restrained, behind-the-scenes fashion, to try to enhance France's role. The primary motivation for De Gaulle's kind words about President Johnson's call for talks--words which were a striking departure from the harsh French stand characteristic of recent years--probably was the realization that, if France was to play the hoped-for mediating role, Paris must take a position more acceptable to the US. At various times in the past several years France has taken a relatively active role regarding Vietnam, sometimes in public and sometimes in private. France sent high-level emissaries to Peking and Hanoi to sound out the leaders; has acted as a channel between Hanoi and the US; has passed a good bit of useful information to the US--sometimes the reporting of the French representative in Hanoi, sometimes the comments of Mai Van Bo, sometimes miscellaneous information. In addition, the French have conferred on numerous occasions with various interested parties such as the Russians, the British and the Cambodians; and De Gaulle in almost every TV address and press conference since mid-1964 has reiterated the French position. In essence, this position calls for the withdrawal of all

foreign forces and the negotiation of an international settlement along the lines of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. The settlement desired by France would not only deal with the problems of Vietnam but also with Cambodia and Laos, as De Gaulle believes the fate of each is linked with that of the others.

6. De Gaulle has long wanted a mediating role in the Vietnamese conflict at such time as it might enhance his prestige and further his goal of playing a significant part in the world arena. He has maintained that France is ideally equipped for such a role because of its past involvement in Indochina, its continuing though limited presence in the area, and its present access to all interested parties. In the past De Gaulle has been careful to eschew the mediating position because he felt the chances for a successful outcome were doubtful. His efforts to put France more squarely into the negotiating picture will thus be in direct relation to his evaluation of the prospects for success.

7. Although the position of the French Government has been one of unalterable opposition to the US involvement in Vietnam, French officials will probably try to maintain a relatively neutral posture during the preliminary talks and the press will probably follow suit. Paris would reason that any injudicious or blatant support for Hanoi's position would lessen the chances that Paris would be a site for further talks or that the French might actually play a direct role in negotiations.

8. The French Communist Party (PCF) in the past has carried on an active propaganda campaign against US involvement in Vietnam. In addition to demonstrations and protest rallies, the PCF encouraged Frenchmen to send signed petitions, postcards, letters and telegrams to the US Embassy and consulates. The response to those appeals for support--despite a March 1967 decision by the party's central committee to step up its activity against the war--has been somewhat apathetic. For this reason, although the Communists probably will attempt to mount some form of anti-US campaign in the course of the

talks, it is doubtful that such an effort would be either very effective or sustained. Moreover, the level of intensity of PCF activity will depend partially on the line which Moscow takes toward the negotiations. To the extent that the USSR exercises restraint, the PCF will be inclined to act with similar caution. In any case, French police are experienced in controlling political agitation in Paris and would certainly be under strict injunction to maintain civic order. A ranking police official indicated security would pose no problem as Paris authorities could muster hundreds of plainclothes officers and at least 50,000 uniformed police if necessary.

9. Prior to the selection of Paris, ranking Belgian officials made clear to the US their displeasure over the possibility of such a choice. They reasoned that this selection would make Paris suddenly the center of world affairs. Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel felt so strongly on the matter that he was campaigning, in effect, for the selection of Warsaw. NATO Secretary General Brosio also favored Warsaw, feeling that Paris would lean over backwards to be unfair to the US.

Monday, May 6, 1968
7:35 p. m.

Pres file
41

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Secretary Rusk's report of his
meeting with Dr. Ralph Abernathy.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: My Meeting with Dr. Ralph Abernathy
and Representatives of the "Poor People",
Wednesday, May 1, 10:45-11:45 A.M.

Dr. Abernathy opened the meeting, introduced a series of speakers who addressed their grievances to me, and stated that he and his followers would return in ten days to see what response was forthcoming. (Speakers listed at Tab A.)

At the close of the meeting, I promised to consider the grievances expressed, to consult with my Cabinet colleagues on points outside my jurisdiction, and to examine and respond to specific grievances that fell within the purview of my Department.

It was apparent at the meeting that the spokesmen for the group were poorly informed and that the first need was to provide them with adequate information on the subjects of their concern. I propose that information relating to legitimate grievances be drawn up to serve as a basis for discussion with Dr. Abernathy and his group when they return. Grievances meriting a response are outlined below.

U.S. Relations with South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal

--Grievance: U.S. relations with these countries support racist societies and thereby serve to undermine national goals and policies of racial equality.

- Response: The Department will prepare a statement and explanation of U.S. policy toward these countries for Dr. Abernathy and his colleague, the Rev. Andrew Young, who raised the issue.

Immigration Policies

- Grievance: Immigration policies which permit entry into the United States of foreign workers (particularly those from Mexico and the Caribbean) should be discontinued until poor Americans are gainfully employed.
- Response: The Department will coordinate with the Departments of Labor and Justice in the preparation of a report on the displacement of lower class American workers by foreign immigrants.
- Grievance: "Green card" holders should be prevented from acting as strike breakers in the Southwest.
- Response: The Department will cooperate with the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the preparation of a statement of facts and of recent regulations designed to prevent strike breaking by green card holders.

AID Policies

- Grievance: Assistance should not be given to the poor in other countries when there is so much poverty at home.
- Response: AID will prepare a statement on global interdependence and the dangers posed to our society of rampant poverty abroad.

- Grievance: AID funds are used to support dictators in Latin America.
- Response: AID will prepare a statement describing its programs in support of social and political development in Latin America and the reform criteria for AID assistance.
- Grievance: AID is developing and dispersing abroad fortified foods which are not available to the poor people at home.
- Response: AID will cooperate with the Department of Agriculture in the preparation of a report on AID programs in this area and their relation to domestic needs and programs.

Spanish Speaking Americans

- Grievance: Cultural and land rights guaranteed to the Spanish speaking people by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo have been denied to them in practice.
- Response: A memorandum prepared for my earlier meeting with Dr. Abernathy on this subject is attached at Tab B together with materials which describe progress made on behalf of Spanish speaking Americans under this Administration. This information will be used as a basis for any further discussions of this subject with Dr. Abernathy. I am also asking Mr. Ximenes to send Dr. Abernathy a supply of the brochure "The Mexican American: A New Focus on Opportunity" which describes your concern and constructive programs for the improvement of the condition of Mexican Americans.

American Indians

- Grievance: American Indians are being denied fishing and other rights guaranteed to them by treaty. Specific references were made to the Treaty of Medicine Creek and the treaty with Russia for the acquisition of Alaska.
- Response: The Department will prepare a summary of U.S. observance of international treaties which affect the status of American Indians.
- Grievance: Out of 6,000 Department of Defense local employees in Alaska only 71 were "Indians" (Eskimos).
- Response: The Department will refer this question to DOD.

Part of the meeting was taken up by angry criticism of the war in Viet-Nam, by intemperate indictments of other U.S. foreign policies, and by allegations that the U.S. was a warfare, not a welfare, state. These accusations were either too general, specious, or propagandistic to be subject to individual response. They can be addressed more suitably in a broad statement of foreign policy principles and goals.



Dean Rusk

Attachments:

- Tab A - List of Speakers
- Tab B - Talking points on Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Presidential speech, memorandum and brochure on Mexican American affairs

Speakers at Secretary Rusk's Meeting May 1
with Poor Peoples' Campaign Leaders

In the order in which they were introduced by
Dr. Abernathy:

Martha Grass, Ponca Indian from Oklahoma

Ella Mae Brooks, Sunflower County, Mississippi

Rafael Duran, New Mexico

Conky Gonzales, Crusade for Justice, Denver, Colorado

Sonia Roberts, Providence, Rhode Island

Albert Foyles, Baltimore, Maryland

Sanford Gottlieb, SANE

Dennis Westbrook, Newark, New Jersey

The Rev. Jesse Jackson, Operation Breadbasket,
Chicago, Illinois

Phyllis Robinson, National Welfare Rights
Organization, Providence, Rhode Island

Hank Adams, Willamette Indian from La Push, Washington

The Rev. Andrew Young, Executive Vice President, SCLC

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Your Meeting with Dr. Ralph Abernathy
Monday, April 29, 1968, 8:00-10:00 a.m.

TALKING POINTS

Claims that the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo granted special political rights or sovereignty have no legal merit.

Claims with respect to individual land holdings may, of course, be taken up in the courts.

We recognize these exaggerated claims are actually symptoms of dissatisfaction of certain Mexican-Americans with their situation.

We fully sympathize with the legitimate aspirations of the Mexican-Americans even though, strictly speaking, these matters fall outside the Department of State's jurisdiction.

We are concerned with their condition because we are Americans, and, also, because our treatment of Mexican-Americans is intimately connected with our relations with Mexico whose goodwill we value highly.

The President has taken unprecedented steps to meet the special problems of these people. He created the Interagency Cabinet Committee on Mexican-American Affairs, chaired by Vicente T. Ximenes. This committee is designed to assure the Mexican-Americans the full benefits of existing Federal programs and to seek new programs to meet needs unique to this community. I have for you copies of the President's statement of accomplishments in these matters.

In addition, the U.S. and Mexico have created the U.S.-Mexico Commission for Border Development and Friendship which has the specific objective of improving the quality of life along the U.S.-Mexican border.

41d
FEBRUARY 23, 1968

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(AUSTIN, TEXAS)

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT

A New Focus on Opportunity for the
Spanish Speaking American

Last October, in El Paso, I attended a conference of high purpose. There, with the Vice President and members of the Cabinet, I met with 1,200 Spanish speaking Americans.

This was the first time that the Mexican American community had an opportunity to discuss matters of direct concern -- ranging from education to economic opportunity, housing to health -- with the highest officials of government.

The aim of the three-day conference was to assure that America's second largest minority was receiving its fair and just share of Federal programs in these areas.

Out of that conference, ideas and suggestions flowed to a Cabinet-level Committee on Mexican American Affairs, which I appointed last June.

Based on the recommendations of the Committee -- many of which stemmed from the El Paso Conference -- I have taken the following actions:

In Education:

- I have signed into law the first Federal bilingual education program. It will help Spanish speaking children overcome the barriers of language which have prevented them from receiving the fullest benefits of education.
- I have asked Congress to provide funds to expand and improve adult and vocational educational programs aimed particularly at those Americans who have no high school diplomas. About 20 percent of these are Spanish speaking.

More

I have instructed the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to:

- accelerate the training of specially-trained teachers to work with Mexican American school children and migrant workers.
- insure compliance with Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. This forbids discrimination in school-district boundaries and in quality of education, wherever the schools receive Federal financial assistance.

In Health and Welfare:

I have requested the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to:

- simplify application and claim procedures in Medicare, Social Security and other programs serving the Mexican American communities.
- gather and analyze data on the health of Spanish speaking Americans.

I have asked the Congress to increase its support of special medical programs for migrant farm workers, most of whom are Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans.

I have appointed a distinguished Mexican American scholar, Dr. Julian Samora, to a Presidential Commission evaluating the Nation's welfare system.

In Housing:

The Department of Housing and Urban Development has selected a number of cities to begin planning under the Model Cities Program. Among them are San Antonio, Eagle Pass, and Waco, Texas; Denver and Trinidad, Colorado; Albuquerque, New Mexico; New York City and San Juan, Puerto Rico -- all with large Spanish speaking populations.

- I have directed the Secretary of HUD to work with Laredo, Texas and its sister city in Mexico, Nuevo Laredo, in an international cooperative effort to help develop a Model Cities Program that will improve the condition of life in this border area.

More

I have recommended expansion of this program in the 1969 budget.

- I have urged Congress again, as I did last year, to give the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission the power to order a halt to employment discrimination.

In Rural Matters:

- I have asked the Congress to authorize a major project to improve Forest Service grazing lands in the Southwest, to serve the small rancher.
- I have instructed the Secretary of Agriculture to expand the activities of the County Extension Service to meet more fully the needs of the small Mexican American farmer.
- I am directing the Secretaries of Agriculture and Labor to hold hearings so that they can set realistic minimum wages for certain farm workers.

Last June, when I established the Cabinet Committee on Mexican American Affairs, I said: "We today reaffirm this truth: That what we do for any minority, we do as well for any majority. After all, we do this for all of America."

These convictions remain firm and resolute. With this report of progress and action, we have begun the journey towards full opportunity for the Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans and other Spanish speaking people of our land.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The Cabinet Committee Hearings on Mexican American Affairs -- held in El Paso, October 26-28, at your direction -- marked an important forward step for the Spanish-surnamed people of our country.

We tried and succeeded in getting solutions, as you suggested, rather than a series of gripes from the Mexican American and Puerto Rican witnesses and, as a result, there was a feeling of accomplishment among participants.

The hearings have already had a very real impact on Federal policies and this surge forward will continue -- if the specific solutions to problems discussed there are acted upon in concert by the Federal establishment, state and local governments, and the private sector.

A summary of the suggested solutions distilled from nearly 2,000 pages of testimony from the El Paso meeting follows:

EDUCATION PROBLEMS

Despite the remarkable increase in Federal grants in aid, most of these programs operate through the often indifferent state educational hierarchies, and hence, fail to meet the special needs of the community. Children with little or no English arrive in the first grade to find a teacher who speaks no Spanish. Witnesses also discussed the problems of adult illiteracy and the need for better vocational and higher education for Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans.

Suggested Solutions

Support, through research, experimentation, demonstration and operating activities, programs in bilingual and bi-cultural education, including curricula, methods, materials, media and administrative procedures;

Provide more funds for adult and vocational education, particularly aimed at the high proportion of school dropouts;

Train teachers and support personnel as well as Federal, state, and local educational administrators in the special needs of the Mexican American community;

Increase support in a massive way to programs for recruitment and retention of Mexican Americans to begin and complete higher education;

Assure greater involvement of community and parents in decision-making on educational policy at the local, state, and Federal levels;

Enlarge the scope and comprehensiveness of Federal funding of education programs so as to effect larger numbers of Mexican Americans served, range of services, accessibility of services and intensity of educational effort;

Move quickly to end de facto school segregation;

Create alternative funding routes for Federal aid where needed for more effective use of funds.

HEALTH AND WELFARE PROBLEMS

Many of the advances in medicine fail to reach the Mexican American community, for several reasons. The witnesses expressed concern about residency requirements, the lack of mobile teams to reach isolated Spanish-speaking communities, and the continuing communications gap between health personnel speaking no Spanish and those who need medical care but cannot speak English. This language difficulty also adds to the bewilderment caused by the complex procedures of welfare offices which are also often inaccessible to the Mexican American community. Finally, the public assistance applicant cannot afford legal advice in welfare litigations.

Suggested Solutions

Drop all residency requirements for Federally-funded programs;

Secure funds for the development of programs to meet the needs and wants of the community;

Secure health data (now generally missing) on Mexican Americans;

Provide better planning of health facilities for easier accessibility by the Mexican American poor and provide the needed bilingual skills in health care personnel;

Appoint Mexican Americans to policy-making positions in the Social and Rehabilitation Services of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and in all state department and social welfare offices in the Southwest;

Establish a commission on public assistance and appoint a Mexican American as chairman;

Hold an interdepartmental hearing on public assistance and the Mexican American community;

Simplify application and claim litigation procedures and make available more legal assistance.

CIVIL SERVICE PROBLEMS

Although the Government has made a commendable series of appointments of Mexican Americans recently, the participants felt that the Government does not make appropriate use of Mexican Americans, particularly in areas in this country, and overseas, where knowledge of Spanish is necessary.

Suggested Solutions

Appoint a Mexican American to the Civil Service Commission;

Require a knowledge of Spanish for certain positions in the Southwest;

Appoint Mexican Americans to policy-making positions in Cabinet Departments and other agencies, in particular to boards which review appeals of employment problems. In addition, expand government recruiting in areas where Mexican Americans predominate with a practical and objective attitude toward qualification standards.

RURAL PROBLEMS

The special needs of the rural Mexican American, be he a farmer or a farm worker, were stressed at the hearings with emphasis on the plight of the migrant and the continuing difficulties with the Forest Service in northern New Mexico.

Suggested Solutions

Require the Department of Agriculture to give increasing attention to the felt needs of the villagers of northern New Mexico;

Have the Secretary of Agriculture set minimum wages for sugar beet workers, as he has done for sugar cane workers;

End the bracero program entirely;

Expand extension and research activities to meet the needs of the small Mexican American farmer;

Establish a mechanism to help adjudicate the claims of Spanish surname residents to the old Spanish land grants;

Require farm employers, receiving government assistance, to pay a living wage.

MANPOWER PROBLEMS

Federal manpower programs, despite some excellent forward moves do not reach the Mexican American who needs help the most: the unskilled worker with minimal education and limited English.

Further, the adverse impact of green card commuters on border-area wage rates was attacked bitterly.

Suggested Solutions

Expand training programs, particularly experimental ones, including those to relocate workers from areas with high rates of unemployment, as well as those to train migrant farm workers whose jobs are being mechanized.

Teach some skills in Spanish;

Encourage employers to use realistic qualification standards;

Require Federal contractors to train and employ unskilled Spanish-speaking workers;

Extend National Labor Relations Act coverage to farm workers.

As for the commuters, the proposals were that the Government either end the commutation completely, or forbid the commuters from working at wages which depress the local economy.

HOUSING PROBLEMS

The witnesses stated that housing programs have been designed for other areas, and other people; they believe that the Department of

Housing and Urban Development should concentrate on the special housing problems of the Spanish surnamed.

Suggested Solutions

Use of the model city program to help Mexican American and Puerto Rican barrios (already partially accomplished);

More flexible programming so that the community's desire for home ownership could be satisfied within housing programs;

Re-evaluation of income requirements for housing assistance programs.

CIVIL RIGHTS AND JUSTICE PROBLEMS

Despite Federal law, violations of voting and jury rights continue; police malpractice cases are rarely investigated and prosecuted; very poor communications persist between police and the Mexican American community; the community is not represented on the U. S. Parole Board nor on many Selective Service Boards.

Suggested Solutions

Include the Attorney General as a member of the Inter-Agency Committee on Mexican American Affairs;

Initiate prompt Federal investigation of voting and jury rights violations;

Activate Federal investigations in police malpractice complaints;

Establish Mexican American law enforcement advisory groups to improve mutual understanding;

Appoint Mexican Americans to the U. S. Parole Board and to Selective Service Boards at national and local levels;

Establish more rehabilitation and follow-up services for addicts.

WAR ON POVERTY PROGRAMS

The participants also urged an expansion of the poverty program, with more emphasis on migrant programs, rural programs, and Head Start.

And although there were some specific complaints, the program is popular with the community.

The above report was prepared with the assistance of the hearing monitors, Mr. Louis Tellez, American GI Forum; Mr. Roberto Ornelas, LULAC; Mr. Roy Elizondo, PASO; Mr. Alberto Pinon, CSO; Mr. Mario Vazquez, Unity Council; Mr. Tom Robles, EEOC Regional Director.

Vicente T. Ximenes

Vicente T. Ximenes
Chairman
Inter-Agency Committee on
Mexican American Affairs

APPROVED:

Honorable Orville L. Freeman
Secretary of Agriculture

Honorable W. Willard Wirtz
Secretary of Labor

Honorable John W. Gardner
Secretary of Health, Education, HEW
and Welfare

Honorable Robert C. Weaver
Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development

Honorable Sargent Shriver
Director of the Office of Economic
Opportunity

P file
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Monday, May 6, 1968
7:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You may wish to note the marked passages in these reflections of Resolution 6 of the Communist Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). They reflect, as the report concludes "that at least as late as mid-April the VC/NVA were still calling for an all-out effort in order to win a decisive victory despite their heavy losses during and since the Tet offensive and Hanoi's 3 April expressed willingness to engage in talks with the United States. "

W. W. Rostow

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Authority NLJ 019-033-3-2
By [signature] NARA, Date 1/17/02

() *ret. Sney B.*

• ROUTINE *42a*

IN 04513

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	SOO	ONE	CRS
DDI		EXO						OER	FBIS	DCS	IRS	AID	USIA

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CITE

DIST 6 MAY 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI APRIL 1968

EO 12958 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SUBJECT THE CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM'S
RESOLUTION 6

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (4 MAY 1968) FIELD NO.

SOURCE THIS IS A COLLATION OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION
ON THE SUBJECT PREPARED IN THE FIELD BY A
RESEARCH UNIT. IT IS NOT FULLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE.

SUMMARY: THREE RECENTLY CAPTURED COMMUNIST DOCUMENTS
AND A REPORT FROM A DISTRICT-LEVEL VIET CONG (VC) CADRE
INDICATE THE EXISTENCE OF A RESOLUTION 6 OF THE CENTRAL
OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM. THE RESOLUTION, APPARENTLY ISSUED
IN LATE FEBRUARY OR MARCH 1968, CALLS FOR CONTINUED LARGE-
SCALE VC AND NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY ACTIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. THREE COMMUNIST DOCUMENTS RECENTLY CAPTURED IN THE

[Redacted]

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-285
By *us* NARA, Date *10-9-03*

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IN 04513

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

SAIGON AREA ALL MAKE REFERENCE TO A RESOLUTION 6 OF THE CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (COSVN) WHICH WAS APPARENTLY ISSUED IN LATE FEBRUARY OR MARCH 1968. THESE DOCUMENTS AND THE INFORMATION THEY CONTAIN ON THE RESOLUTION ARE THE FOLLOWING:

2. THE FIRST DOCUMENT IS A NOTEBOOK

THAT CONTAINS NOTES FROM

THE 6TH RESOLUTION, WHICH THE WRITER STUDIED DURING THE PERIOD 3-12 APRIL 1968. IN DISCUSSING THE TET OFFENSIVE, THE RESOLUTION NOTES THAT DESPITE NUMEROUS VICTORIES, GREATER SUCCESSSES WERE NOT ACHIEVED BECAUSE OF POOR COMBAT SPIRIT, LACK OF COORDINATION AND INADEQUATE PROPAGANDA AND CIVILIAN PROSELYTING PROGRAMS. LOOKING AHEAD, THE RESOLUTION EMPHASIZES THAT IN THE FUTURE THE WAR WOULD BE MORE VIOLENT AND MAY SPREAD TO NORTH VIETNAM AND THE REST OF INDOCHINA. (OTHER RECENT REPORTS ALSO REFER TO THE EXPANSION OF THE WAR TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT MENTION A RESOLUTION 6.) MORE SPECIFICALLY, THE RESOLUTION DIRECTS VC/NVA FORCES TO DO THE FOLLOWING:

A. CONDUCT VIOLENT ATTACKS ON DELTA AND CITY AREAS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN 04513

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

TO WEAR DOWN THE ALLIED/SOUTH VIETNAMESE POTENTIAL.

B. LIBERATE THE RURAL AREAS AND CARRY OUT LAND REFORM.

C. EXPAND GUERRILLA WARFARE AND RAPIDLY DEVELOP ARMED ELEMENTS.

D. MAINTAIN HEAVY PRESSURE ON CITIES AND TOWNS.

E. EXPAND ON THE VICTORIES OF PHASE 1 AND PREPARE FOR THE THIRD STAGE OF THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE.

F. ACHIEVE TOTAL DEFEAT OF THE ALLIED FORCES IN THE SHORTEST PERIOD OF TIME.

3. THE SECOND DOCUMENT IS A NOTEBOOK

WITH ENTRIES DATED 31 JANUARY TO 16 APRIL 1968. AN UNDATED AND BRIEF ENTRY DISCUSSES RESOLUTION 6 AND STATES THAT THE VIETNAM WAR HAS TAKEN A NEW TURN AND THE FUTURE BATTLEFIELDS WILL BE IN THE CITIES. ALTHOUGH THE RESOLUTION STATES THAT THE ALLIED FORCES HAVE LOST MOST OF THEIR FIGHTING STRENGTH, IT ALSO NOTES THAT IN THE FUTURE THE WAR WILL BE MORE VIOLENT.

4. THE THIRD DOCUMENT, ALSO A NOTEBOOK, CONTAINS AN ENTRY DATED 13 APRIL 1968 STATING THAT RESOLUTION 6 CALLS FOR AN ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF VC/NVA PAST VICTORIES AND AN

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IN 04213.

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

AWARENESS OF THE FIERCENESS, HARDSHIPS AND DIFFICULTIES TO BE ENCOUNTERED DURING THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE/UPRISING. THE RESOLUTION FURTHER URGES THE VC/NVA TO BE MORE STEADFAST IN THEIR STRATEGIC DETERMINATION, TO GET RID OF FEAR OF ATROCITIES AND HARDSHIPS, AND NOT TO BE LURED BY THE "PEACE" ILLUSION. (THE DANGERS OF PEACE ILLUSIONS ALSO WERE EMPHASIZED IN A 4 APRIL NVA DIRECTIVE CAPTURED IN BINH DINH PROVINCE.)

5. RESOLUTION 6 WAS ALSO THE SUBJECT OF A TRAINING SESSION HELD BY THE VC TOA THANH DISTRICT COMMITTEE OF TAY NINH PROVINCE ON 15-20 APRIL 1962,

IT WAS DISCLOSED DURING

THE TRAINING SESSION, WHICH WAS CALLED TO STUDY THE RESOLUTION, THAT THERE WOULD BE A NEW PHASE OF MILITARY ATTACKS BETWEEN 4 MAY AND 19 MAY (HO CHI MINH'S BIRTHDAY). THE ATTACKS WOULD BE STRONGER THAN THE TET ATTACKS AND WERE TO BE DIRECTED AGAINST CAPITALS, OTHER TOWNS, AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN 04513

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(classification)

(dissem. controls)

6 RESOLUTIONS ISSUED IN COSVN'S NAME HAVE A DIFFERENT NUMBERING SERIES THAN THOSE EMANATING FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN HANOI, EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY BE THE SAME RESOLUTION. FOR EXAMPLE, THE 12TH RESOLUTION ISSUED BY THE LAO DONG CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN DECEMBER 1965 IN NORTH VIETNAM WAS ISSUED AS COSVN'S 4TH RESOLUTION IN APRIL 1966. IT IS NOT KNOWN IF THE 6TH COSVN RESOLUTION IS ALSO A VERSION OF AN EARLIER HANOI RESOLUTION, ALTHOUGH THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECTS TREATED SUGGESTS THAT THIS IS PROBABLY THE CASE. THE PLANS LAID OUT IN THE RESOLUTION PROVIDE FURTHER INDICATION THAT AT LEAST AS LATE AS MID-APRIL THE VC/NVA WERE STILL CALLING FOR AN ALL-OUT EFFORT IN ORDER TO WIN A DECISIVE VICTORY DESPITE THEIR HEAVY LOSSES DURING AND SINCE THE TET OFFENSIVE AND HANOI'S 3 APRIL EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

7. [] DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE DIR/JUSPAO
(MR. NICKEL ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF
REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ []

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

43

Monday, May 6, 1968
7:15 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

I call your attention to the passage underlined on page 4 of the attached report of [REDACTED] in March 1968. This is the fourth or fifth report in the past year or so which suggests that Hanoi, in fact, does not want us to withdraw totally from South Vietnam. Other such reports have suggested the reason: the Soviet Union does not have enough power in Southeast Asia to serve as a counterweight against the Chinese Communists at a time of peace in Southeast Asia.

It would be odd, indeed, if we discovered that Hanoi did not wish us to exercise fully the Manila formula. I am not sure that they will. But I did wish to call your attention to one more report that they might want us around pretty close after a settlement.

You may wish to read the full text of this report; although it has been summarized in your morning reading.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 57-287
By is, NARA Date 2-28-00

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

43a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN -01095

PAGE 1 OF 7 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	DDP	ONE	CRS
		DDI				EXO		DELT	FDIS	DCS	IN	AID	USIA

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

CITE

DIST 1 MAY 1968

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM/France 1 17 49 Z

DOI:

SUBJECT: THE VIEWS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS ON PEACE

NEGOTIATIONS AS REPORTED BY A FRENCH COMMUNIST
PARTY VISITOR TO NORTH VIETNAM.

ACQ:

SOURCE:

SUMMARY: FOURNIAU CLAIMS THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL
INSIST ON COMPLETE CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENTS BEFORE THEY OPEN
FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES BUT THEY ARE
INTERESTED IN THE EXISTING CONTACT IN VIENTIANE AS A USEFUL

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-285

By NSA, NARA, Date 10-9-03

~~SECRET~~~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

IN

01095

PAGE 2 OF 7 PAGES

25X1A

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification)

(dissem controls)

UNPUBLICIZED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE SHAPE OF EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PLAN TO HAVE A THIRD PARTY REPRESENTED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, A "NATIONAL GOVERNMENT", WHICH WILL INCLUDE THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF) AND CERTAIN NON-NLF SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLITICIANS. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FORESEE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT UNITED STATES BASES WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST IN SOUTH VIETNAM AFTER THE COMPLETION OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CONSIDER THAT CHINA, ALTHOUGH DISAGREEING WITH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, IS POWERLESS TO PREVENT IT. END OF SUMMARY.

1. CHARLES FOURNIAU, FCP VIETNAM SPECIALIST, STAYED IN HANOI AFTER THE OFFICIAL FCP DELEGATION HAD LEFT AND HAD CONVERSATIONS WITH SENIOR NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS IN EARLY APRIL 1968 ON THE SUBJECT OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION FOLLOWS.

2. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SEE THE CURRENT CONTACTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH VIETNAM IN VIENTIANE AS EXPLORATORY IN NATURE AND DESIGNED TO DETERMINE, IN ADVANCE, WHAT SHAPE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS WILL ASSUME. NO PUBLICITY IS GIVEN TO THESE TALKS BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TO PERMIT THE

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IN 01095

PAGE 3 OF 7 PAGES

25X1A

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

GREATEST LATITUDE IN DISCUSSIONS. "OFFICIAL", I.E. PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDTED NEGOTIATIONS, WILL NOT BEGIN UNTIL THE UNITED STATES STOPS COMPLETELY ITS BOMBARDMENTS OF NORTH VIETNAM AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE THE ASSURANCE THAT THE CESSATION IS PERMANENT. THE UNITED STATES IS CREATING DIFFICULTIES FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BY TRYING TO START NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE COMPLETE CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENTS BUT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL NEVER NEGOTIATE (I.E. "OFFICIALLY") UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS.

3. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES ARE CERTAIN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AMERICANS WILL GET UNDER WAY AND THE ONLY DOUBTS DEAL WITH THE TIMING OF THE TALKS AND WHETHER THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TERMINATED WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON OR WITH SOME OTHER AMERICAN PRESIDENT.

4. THE SCENARIO FOR NEGOTIATIONS AS SEEN BY HANOI IS:

A. THE AMERICAN COMPLETELY STOP THE BOMBARDMENTS.

B. AGREEMENT IS REACHED THAT THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF) COULD PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. (FOURNIAU COMMENTED THAT THIS POINT WAS NOT FIRMLY HELD BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SINCE THE EVENTUAL MERGER OF THE NLF INTO A BROADER BASED "NATIONAL GOVERNMENT" WAS FORESEEN AND THIS

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IN 01095

PAGE 4 OF 7 PAGES

25X1A

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(classification) (dissem controls)

"NATIONAL GOVERNMENT" WOULD BE THE THIRD PARTY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

C. THE DEPARTURE FROM SOUTH VIETNAM OF THE AMERICAN TROOPS.

5. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DO NOT FORESEE ANY PARTICIPATION BY THE PRESENT SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY EXPECT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WILL COLLAPSE COMPLETELY WHEN OFFICIAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN NORTH VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES BEGIN. CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT COULD, HOWEVER, BE INCLUDED IN THE "NATIONAL GOVERNMENT" WHICH IS SEEN AS THE THIRD PARTY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

6. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE PREPARED TO BE VERY SUPPLE WHEN OFFICIAL NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN AND WILL AVOID PUTTING THE AMERICANS IN A POSITION WHERE THEY WILL LOSE FACE. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TO THE UNITED STATES; FOR EXAMPLE, TO PERMIT CERTAIN U.S. BASES TO REMAIN IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CLAIM NOT TO ATTACH MUCH IMPORTANCE TO AMERICAN BASES IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND CITED THE CASE OF THE AMERICAN BASE AT GUANTANAMO BAY IN CUBA AS AN EXAMPLE OF A BASE WITH LITTLE IMPORTANCE.

7. THE END RESULT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, ACCORDING TO THE

IN
[REDACTED]

PAGE 5 OF 7 PAGES 25X1A

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification)

(dissem controls)

NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS, WILL BE A NEW FORM OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS. HOWEVER, THE ACTUAL PRESENCE IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEW GENEVA ACCORDS WILL NOT BE NECESSARY. ACCORDING TO HANOI, ALL OF THE ORIGINAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE GENEVA ACCORDS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CHINA, ARE TACITLY IN FAVOR OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.

8. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP BELIEVES THAT COMMUNIST CHINA IS POWERLESS TO INFLUENCE NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITIONS ON NEGOTIATION. ACCORDING TO THEIR ANALYSIS COMMUNIST CHINA HAS ONLY TWO WAYS OF PRESSURING NORTH VIETNAM:

A. THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS CAN CUT OFF THEIR SUPPLY OF RICE AND WHEAT. HOWEVER, THERE IS A THREE-WEEK RESERVE OF THESE GRAINS AND BEFORE THAT IS EXHAUSTED THE SOVIET UNION COULD SUPPLY THE NEEDED GRAINS BY SEA SHIPMENT.

B. THE CHINESE COULD RECALL THEIR LABOR BATTALIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM. HOWEVER WITH THE COMPLETE CESSATION BY THE AMERICANS OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM, THESE LABOR FORCES WILL NO LONGER BE NEEDED TO REPAIR RAILROADS, BRIDGES, ETC.

ACCORDING TO FOURNIAU, ALL THE NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS AGREE.

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification)

(dissem controls)

IN 01075

PAGE 6 OF 7 PAGES

25X1A

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF CHINA'S INABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY IMPOSE THEIR WILL ON NORTH VIETNAM. CHINA IS REFERRED TO BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AS "LA GRANDE IMPUISSANCE" (I.E. "THE GREAT POWERLESS" AS COMPARED WITH "LES GRANDES PUISSANCES" THE FRENCH TERM FOR THE "GREAT POWERS").

9. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE'S INTEREST IN HAVING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES TAKE PLACE IN PHNOM PENH WAS PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE CLOSENESS OF THIS CAPITOL TO SAIGON. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BELIEVED THAT THIS WOULD HAVE MADE EASIER THE BRINGING INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS OF CERTAIN RESIDENTS OF SAIGON WHO COULD REPRESENT THE NON-NLF EMELENTS OF THE "NATIONAL GOVERNMENT" THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SEE AS AN EVENTUAL SUCCESSOR TO THE NLF.

10. FOURNIAU ADVANCED AS HIS OWN OPINION THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD EVENTUALLY TAKE PLACE IN PARIS. HE THOUGHT THAT THERE WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THE DRV AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO MEET AT WARSAW ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING THE SITE FOR NEGOTIATIONS AT PARIS. FOURNIAU THOUGHT PARIS WAS AN EXCELLENT SITE BECAUSE OF TWO REASONS:

A. DE GAULLE'S WELL KNOWN ANTI-AMERICANISM PROVIDED A CERTAIN GURANTEE THAT ANY TALKS UNDERTAKEN IN FRANCE WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN AN ATMOSPHERE AND

IN 01045

PAGE 7 OF 7 PAGES

25X1A

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(classification) (dissem controls)

UNDER CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO NORTH VIETNAM

B. THERE EXIST CERTAIN EXILED VIETNAMESE IN FRANCE WHO ARE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE "QUAI D'ORSAY" BUT WHO COULD BE USED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AS NON-NLF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE "NATIONAL GOVERNMENT" WHICH WILL BE THE THIRD PARTY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. FOURNIAU GAVE AS EXAMPLES NGUYEN MANH HA, CATHOLIC EX-MINISTER UNDER HO CHI-MINH, AND AN EX-BAO DAI MINISTER WHOSE NAME WAS SIMILAR TO TRAN VAN DO. (SOURCE DID NOT RECOGNIZE THIS NAME).

11. [REDACTED] DISSEM: CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.
25X1A

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Pres file

44

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 6, 1968
6:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith General Taylor expresses
his anxiety about the state of the strategic
reserve.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET attachment~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 20

By ics, NARS, Date 6-25-84

~~SECRET~~

May 6, 1968

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 20

By isa, NARS, Date 6-25-84

Mr. President:

Since the termination last month of the debate over plans to reinforce General Westmoreland and over the reconstitution of the depleted Strategic Reserve, I have developed a growing uneasiness that we are not doing all we should to get ready for the tests of strength which may arise during the coming months. These tests may occur on the battlefield in South Viet-Nam, at the negotiation table in Paris or at any of the soft points in the West which are vulnerable to Communist pressures.

You are well aware of the intense efforts of the leaders of the Hanoi Government to replace their Tet losses and to prepare for the events which they anticipate in this same time frame. One gets the impression that they are leaving no stone unturned to strengthen their military and political position in preparation for negotiations. Whether the thousands of infiltrating soldiers pouring into South Viet-Nam during the past weeks are only to replace past losses or are to raise the net effective strength of enemy forces to a new high is not clear but, in either case, we must assume that they will be used in another "victory drive" to open or to accompany the parleys in Paris--indeed, the drive may already have started. Ho's new proposal to make the Paris meeting a substantive negotiation rather than a preliminary talk may be to avoid wasting the effect of this new offensive on anything less than the main show.

I do not sense a similar feeling of urgency on our side either to prepare to meet a new offensive or to create rapidly additional forces in being to impress our enemies with the fact that we have the reserve strength to meet any new contingency whether in Asia or elsewhere. To carry conviction, deterrent strength needs to be seen--this is one time when the open ways of a democracy might be used to advantage to reveal in unconcealed action our determination to follow through to the finish. Unfortunately, the actions we have taken thus far both to reinforce Westmoreland and to build up the Strategic Reserve have been anything but impressive and contribute little if anything to our deterrent effectiveness. The low key in which these actions are being carried out, although perhaps appropriate to the domestic scene, dampens the effect which we need on the international front.

In my private capacity, I can not know all of the activities going on in government relating to these matters. But, unless you are satisfied that all is going well in preparing for this new phase, I recommend that a progress report be obtained from State/Defense/JCS on the status of the plans to reinforce Westmoreland, to expand the GVN forces and to reconstitute the Strategic Reserve which should provide specific answers to such questions as the following:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

a. What can we do to get additional help to Westmoreland if he becomes involved in another major enemy offensive?

b. What is the status of our plans to strengthen the Strategic Reserve? How can they be further expedited? When do we need to call up additional reserves? Will anything more be required in the way of Congressional action?

c. What is the status of US/GVN plans for expanding the Armed Forces of South Viet-Nam? What are the target operational dates for the new units? How realistic are the forecasts of operational readiness?

d. What are the critical equipment and personnel shortages which must be overcome if the foregoing plans are to be executed on time?

e. Are the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff satisfied that we are running no unacceptable risks in this period of reduced strategic capabilities? What happens if the enemy increased pressures in Laos, Thailand, Korea, the Middle East or elsewhere?

M. D. T.

Take action to get a
report on these matters. _____

No action now. _____

See me. _____

~~SECRET~~

45

INFORMATION

~~SECRET--SAVIN~~

Monday, May 6, 1968 -- 6:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to see these indications that the enemy plans to try to enlarge the scope of his attacks in the time ahead.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

CIA Intelligence Memorandum

6 May 1968

SC No. 09977/68

"The Situation in South Vietnam" (As of 4 p.m. EDT)

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ.141.021038/009
By jc, NARA, Date 5-14-03

~~SECRET~~

45a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
6 May 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in South Vietnam
(As of 4: P.M. EDT)

Indications of Enemy Plans to Continue Attacks

1. Intelligence reports [redacted] suggest that the enemy's current offensive could develop greater scope than was indicated by the first 48 hours of action.
2. Prisoners captured in the sharp fighting in the Phu Tho Race Track area on the western outskirts of Saigon have identified elements of both the 271st and 272nd Regiments of the 9th Viet Cong Division. Late last week a Communist infantryman captured in Hau Nghia Province said that the 9th Division's 273rd Regiment also had orders to attack Saigon.
3. The commitment of the entire 9th Division would enable the enemy to launch a major thrust at the city, possibly to be timed with developing terrorist operations within the city. Allied forces are now reacting to this threat and at last report air and artillery strikes were being directed at enemy forces in the race track area.
4. [redacted] has stated that the Communists intended to launch a new "general attack," presumably countrywide, beginning today at 2300, Saigon time (1100 Washington time). Although late reports indicate that fighting was continuing on the western outskirts of Saigon tonight, Saigon time, no major assault had developed [redacted]

EO 12958 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.3(b)(6)>25Yrs
(S)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 03-202

By us NARA, Date 3-8-04

~~SECRET~~

B.

There has been no recent change in the disposition of the other major unit in III Corps, the 5th Viet Cong Division, the headquarters of which apparently remains in the War Zone D area north of the capital.

6. There are also signs that the enemy's offensive along the coast of northern I Corps has not yet run its course. All three regiments of the 320th Division have been contacted near the Marine base at Dong Ha. [redacted] point to continued Communist attacks in the vicinity of Quang Tri city and Hue. In the central highlands [redacted]

[redacted] strong North Vietnamese forces have moved from the border area, possibly with the intention of launching ground assaults to follow up the recent series of mortar and rocket attacks in this region.

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

46
INFORMATION

Monday, May 6, 1968 - 6:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Amb. Lucet presented to us this afternoon President de Gaulle's response to your message of May 4.

I am glad to note he talks of a "just and honorable peace."

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Pres file

46a

Ambassade de France
aux États-Unis

Washington, le 6 Mai 1968

Je vous remercie de votre message du 4 Mai. Tous, ici, se félicitent du choix qui a été fait de Paris comme lieu des pourparlers, dont tous espèrent qu'il en résultera une paix équitable et honorable. Soyez certain que le Gouvernement français ne négligera rien pour ménager aux négociateurs les meilleures conditions possibles.

Avec ma haute et cordiale considération.

C. de GAULLE

Thank you for your message of May 4. All of us here are pleased that Paris has been chosen as the site of the negotiations, the result of which everyone hopes will be a just and honorable peace. Rest assured that nothing will be overlooked by the French Government to ensure the best possible conditions for the negotiators.

With my highest and most cordial esteem.

C. de GAULLE

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Pres. file

Monday, May 6, 1968 -- 5:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

With respect to Don Hornig's account of the meeting with Generals Wheeler and McConnell, you should know:

-- I told Don that in three important respects I did not believe that it conformed to the views of Generals Wheeler and McConnell;

-- He will be getting in touch with them about their views;

-- In the meanwhile, I doubt the wisdom of launching PSAC further into the bombing business;

-- For what it is worth, my own judgment is that they should be told to help the Department of Defense in rapidly applying science and technology to this field rather than continuing to try to operate as bombing analysts and policy makers.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-303
By irs, NARA Date 10-1-97

WWRostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET~~

P. Lee
48

Monday, May 6, 1968
5:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

I need your guidance on a personnel matter involving Ed Hamilton.

The problem arises because Mac Bundy and Kermit Gordon have decided to sponsor a book of policy papers which would attempt to lay out the major issues and choices facing the new Administration. They plan to line up the best 20-25 academics available and publish their collected wisdom shortly after the election. The book would be financed by Ford and published by Brookings.

The offer to Hamilton is twofold: to write the paper on policy toward peer countries, and to edit the full volume. It would take 5-6 months of hard, full-time effort, starting very soon. I am persuaded that there is no way he could do it on a part-time basis.

Hamilton has made it absolutely clear to me that his first loyalty is to you. If you feel strongly that he should not do this, he will not do it. Indeed, he is not at all anxious to leave his present job; he has been here three years and he is very happy in his work. Nevertheless, he feels that the people involved in this project give it a fair chance of some impact. Therefore, he is now inclined to ask for time off to do it -- again, subject to your approval.

The pros of this proposal are that the exercise is well-sponsored and likely to produce a serious contribution to next year's policy-making. It would also give Hamilton some useful exposure.

The cons are that Hamilton's absence would mean some juggling of staff assignments here and that we would have to get along with one less body in what is likely to be a busy period. There is also the possibility -- though I think it is slight -- that the book may contain some ultra-radical notions and/or some harsh criticism of Johnson Administration policy. (The book will not deal directly with Vietnam.)

On balance, I would recommend that you let Hamilton do this job. I think you can depend on Bundy and Gordon to make sure the book is a serious, constructive enterprise; and I think it would be a useful step in Hamilton's career.

Beyond the simple question of whether you release him, there is the question of whether he should resign or spend 5-6 months on leave without pay. My own view is that we should keep him on the rolls -- because we can use him in December and January and because the new President should have as many options as possible in using or dispoosing of the NSC staff. However, there would be somewhat greater protection for you against the possibility of radical policy recommendations if Hamilton had severed all his connections here before doing the editing job.

In general, you should know I regard Hamilton as one of the ablest men of his generation; and he should be given every chance to grow.

I am confident I can handle the staff business in his absence.

W. W. Rostow

Let Hamilton take leave and accept the offer _____

I will not object, but Hamilton should resign if he wants to accept _____

I would much prefer that Hamilton not do this _____

No _____

Call me _____

49

Monday, May 6, 1968
5:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

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The problem arises because Mac Bundy and Kermit Gordon have decided to sponsor a book of policy papers which would attempt to lay out the major issues and choices facing the new Administration. They plan to line up the best 20-25 academics available and publish their collected wisdom shortly after the election. The book would be financed by Ford and published by Brookings.

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I am confident I can handle the staff business in his absence.

W. W. Rostow

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I will not object, but Hamilton should resign if he wants to accept _____

I would much prefer that Hamilton not do this _____

No _____

Call me _____

Monday, May 6, 1968 -- 3:00 PM

Mr. President:

Attached are Ben Oehlert's outraged reactions to recent gossip on the Hill about a one-year moratorium on foreign aid. He asks that his views be passed to the White House. You may wish to glance over this short cable.

There is a persistent impression on the Hill that the Administration -- and specifically the President -- might be prepared to accept an aid moratorium. Bill Gaud is doing what he can to scotch that one, but he can use any help he can get. Specifically, it would be very useful if you could make the point in one of your conversations with Mahon that such a moratorium would be disastrous to our development policies around the world.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment: Rawalpindi 4918 dtd 5/6/68
EKH/vmr

50

Pres. file



Department of State

6 May 1968

TELEGRAM

PAKISTAN - 50a
AID

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 789

PAGE 01 RAWALP 04918 061225Z

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ACTION SS 72

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, 1070 W

P R 061200Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3559
INFO AMCONSUL LAHORE

BOWLER
BUDGET
DAVIS
FRIED
GINSBURGH
HAMILTON
JENSEN
JOHNSON
JORDON
KERRY
LEONHART
ROCHE
BAUNDERS
TAYLOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RAWALPINDI 4918

LIMDIS

SUBJ: POSSIBLE AID MORATORIUM

REF: STATE 158463

CLASS WHITE HOUSE

FROM AMBASSADOR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-281
By 168, NARA Date 10-5-98

1. I AM APPALLED BY REFTEL INDICATED POSSIBILITY OF YEAR-

PAGE 2 RUQVGM 4918 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LONG NEW OBLIGATION MORATORIUM FOR AID. REGARDLESS OF
DEPTH AND TIMING OF SPECIFIC ECONOMIC EFFECTS (SEPTEL),
THE POLICY EFFECTS, AS WELL AS THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY SERIOUS AND
DIRECTLY DAMAGING. (EVEN KNOWLEDGE USG CURRENTLY CON-
SIDERING SUCH EVENTUALITY WOULD HAVE UNFORTUNATE REPERCUSSIONS;
ESPECIALLY IN VIEW UNSATISFACTORY PROGRESS AND RESULTS FROM
APRIL, 1967 ARMS POLICY.)

2. US ECONOMIC AID TO PAKISTAN IS VITAL ANCHOR TO WINDWARD
SERVING AS MAINSTAY OF RESISTANCE TO PRESSURES FOR FURTHER
POLICY DRIFT TOWARD CHINA AND USSR. FOR US TO SEVER THAT
LIFELINE EVEN FOR ONE YEAR WOULD PROMOTE SEARCHING REVIEW
GOP POLICY UNDER CONDITIONS HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL TO US, AND
FAVORABLE TO CHINESE AND RUSSIAN INTERESTS. I AM PERSUADED THIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 RAWALP 04918 061225Z

WOULD LEAD TO SUBSTANTIAL DETERIORATION IN US INFLUENCE,
TO RENEWED US-PAK TENSIONS, OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC, AND TO
PREJUDICIAL ACTIONS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES OF CURRENT VITAL
INTEREST TO THE US.

PAGE 3 RUOVGM 4918 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. I FRANKLY FEAR, IN EVENT OF SUCH MORATORIUM, FOR THE
VERY BASIS OF US-PAKISTANI RELATIONS AND ENVISAGE A VICIOUS
CYCLE OF ACTIONS AND REACTIONS TO THE COMFORT AND PROFIT OF
OUR ENEMIES AND DISMAY OF OUR FRIENDS. SIGNIFICANTLY,
USSR AT THIS VERY JUNCTURE IS INCREASING ACTIVITY AND PRESENCE
HERE APACE.

4. IT WILL BE A SAD DAY FOR US IMAGE HERE IF IT REVEALED
USG CONSIDERING SUCH MORATORIUM, AND IT WILL BE TRAGIC FOR
OUR INTERESTS IF SUCH MORATORIUM WERE TO BECOME FACT.

GP-4. DEHLERT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

51

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, May 6, 1968 -- 11:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the draft circular cable and
the facts you requested.

For file

W. W. Restow

Send circular cable _____

No _____

Call me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRestow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 5-28-92

51a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-281
By isa, NARA Date 10-5-98

CIRCULAR CABLE

Monday, May 6, 1968

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Set out below are the essential facts concerning the widespread, coordinated, but indiscriminate Communist attacks in South Vietnam over the weekend. You should bring them forcefully to the attention of your diplomatic colleagues and local press.

Highest authorities in Washington regard this performance as ugly and unpromising for negotiations, but will, of course, carry forward in search for honorable peace in Southeast Asia.

In general, it is clear from our experience with month-long negotiation about the site that the struggle for a settlement will have many dimensions outside Paris, including diplomacy and press in every capital.

We are counting on you to play your part vigorously in this critical national effort.

Key facts follow.

Initial totals for the period from noon, Saturday, to 6:00 a.m. this morning, Washington time:

- 120 attacks
- 2,520 enemy killed
- 116 U. S. killed
- 273 ARVN killed
- 385 weapons captured

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Re: the newsmen killed: Four foreign correspondents (one British, three Australian) were killed in the Cholon sector of Saigon when their jeep blundered into a Viet Cong roadblock. The correspondents, who attempted to identify themselves as members of the press, were gunned down by machine gun fire before they could get their vehicle out of the area. A fifth reporter pretended to be dead, then obtained refuge with South Vietnamese civilians.

Baron Hasso Ruedt von Collenberg, first secretary of the West German Embassy, was executed by Viet Cong. The diplomat's body was found in the vicinity of Saigon's Phu Tho race track in the Cholon district. He had been blindfolded and some reports said his hands were tied behind his back. His body was found three blocks from where four news correspondents were slain by the Viet Cong.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres. file

Monday, May 6, 1968
10:15 a. m.

52

MR. PRESIDENT:

In these two cables from Sullivan,
Hanoi squares off for the opening round
in a businesslike way.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachments (Vientiane 6290; 6296)



Department of State

TELEGRAM

52a

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL : 977Q
RECD : MAY 6, 1968
12:37 AM

00 RUEHC
DE RUMJFS 6290 1270430
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 060408Z MAY 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8332
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 6290

NODIS/CROCODILE

THE FOLLOWING IS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION FROM THE UNOFFICIAL FRENCH WHICH ACCOMPANIED A NOTE IN VIETNAMESE HANDED TO THE DCM THIS MORNING BY DRV FIRST SECRETARY TIEN: QUOTE
1) THE DRV TAKES NOTE OF THE USG AGREEMENT TO BEGIN OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS IN PARIS ON MAY 10, 1968 AS WAS STATED IN THE USG NOTE OF MAY 4, 1968. 2) THE DRV RE-AFFIRMS THAT MINISTER XUAN-THUY, ITS REPRESENTATIVE, WILL OPEN THE OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS AT PARIS WITH THE US REPRESENTATIVE ON MAY 10, 1968 OR SEVERAL DAYS THEREAFTER. 3) THE DRV HAS HAD CONTACTS WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WITH A VIEW TOWARD THE NECESSARY MATERIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THESE CONVERSATIONS.

MAY 5, 1968 END QUOTE

GP-1. SULLIVAN
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-281
By 120, NARA Date 10-5-98

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

526

~~SECRET~~

1968 MAY 6 AM 4 01

009900

X
PP RUEHC
DE RUMJFS 6296 1270618
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 060532Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC. PRIORITY 8338
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 6296

NODIS/CROCODILE

REF A. VIENTIANE 6290
B. VIENTIANE 6243

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-281
By jo, NARA Date 10-5-98

1. I AM SURE DEPT WILL HAVE NOTED FACT THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE, IN THEIR LAST TWO NOTES (REFTELS) HAVE CONSISTENTLY EMPLOYED PHRASE "OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS" TO DESCRIBE TALKS OPENING IN PARIS MAY 10.

2. IN VIEW OF METICULOUS CARE WITH WHICH THEY PREVIOUSLY PRESERVED USAGE OF "CONTACTS" AND "CONVERSATIONS", IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT THIS CHANGE HAS SOME SIGNIFICANCE.

PAGE 2 RUMJFS 6296 ~~SECRET~~

3. SIMILARLY, THEIR SHIFT FROM AGREEMENT ON AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL TALKS TO THEIR DECISION TO BE REPRESENTED BY A "MINISTER" IS OF INTEREST. IN THEIR LATEST NOTE, THE FRENCH VERB USED TO DESCRIBE XUAN THUY'S FUNCTION AT PARIS IS "ENTAMER", WHICH LITERALLY MEANS "TO TAKE THE FIRST BITE" OR "TO CUT THE FIRST SLICE." IN OTHER WORDS, TO OPEN, BUT NOT NECESSARILY TO CONTINUE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE -2- VIENTIANE 6296, MAY 6, 1968

NODIS/CROCODILE

4. WE HAVE REFRAINED FROM ASKING OUR LOCAL INTERLOCUTORS FOR EXPLANATIONS OF THESE SEMANTIC AND OTHER CHANGES, SINCE IT IS DOUBTFUL WE WOULD GET ANY ANSWERS. HOWEVER, A COUPLE OF SPECULATIONS SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND.
5. FIRST, BY NAMING A "MINISTER", VIETS HOPE TO EXERCISE PROTOCOLARY PRIVILEGE OF MAKING THE FIRST SPEECH. THIS SPEECH WOULD DOUBTLESS ATTEMPT TO SET AGENDA AND OTHERWISE DICTATE FORMAT FOR TALKS, SECOND, BY CALLING THESE TALKS "OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS", VIETS WOULD NOT ONLY ASSURE THAT FULL SEQUENCE OF TALKS WILL REMAIN IN PARIS (IN LIEU OF SECOND PHASE ELSEWHERE) BUT ALSO THAT RULES ADOPTED AT OUTSET COVER

PAGE 3 RUMJFS 6296 ~~SECRET~~

THE WHOLE SEQUENCE AS THEY ENVISAGE IT. WE COULD EXPECT THEM TO HAVE THEIR "AGENDA" SPEECH MADE PUBLIC IMMEDIATELY, AND HENCE THEIR ESCHEWING ANY USE OF THE PHRASE "PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS" AS WE USED IN OUR NOTES.

6. IN SHORT, THEY ARE PUTTING US ON NOTICE THAT THEY WILL TRY ALL THE TRICKS OF THE TRADE IN THEIR OPENING GAMBITS. I HOPE WE ARE PREPARED TO STRAY A LITTLE FROM THE MARQUIS OF QUEENSBURY PLATFORM OURSELVES.

GP-2. SULLIVAN

BT

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE ~~DECLASSIFIED~~
WASHINGTON E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

53

~~SECRET~~NLJ 91-87
By sig NARA. Date 3-2-92

Monday, May 6, 1968 -- 8:45 a.m.

Free file

Mr. President:

My memorandum to you on negotiating problems is set out in the way most people believe negotiations will run.

This memorandum states what I believe is the optimum way they should run in our interest; and it states the reasons why I do not rule it out as wholly impossible that Hanoi may agree.

1. The southern settlement: the heart of the matter. The war is about the future of power and politics in South Vietnam. The quickest way to end the war is to get an agreement on that subject. Then all the other matters could fall quickly and naturally into place. The reason Hanoi starts with a cessation of bombing -- and then, quite possibly, a cease-fire in place -- is to improve its bargaining position on the question of power and politics in South Vietnam.

From our point of view, therefore, I believe it would be wise for Harriman to seek an early quiet talk with the North Vietnamese negotiator in Paris -- or, perhaps, Cy Vance could have a quiet, informal talk with Mai Van Bo. He should suggest that if we want peace soon, the way to do it is to get the GVN in touch with "a member" of the NLF and let them go to work on the southern settlement. Perhaps they could best do it in South Vietnam while the formal negotiations go forward in Paris. It would be hard in Paris to keep such a conversation from becoming known, given the intensity of scrutiny and gossip that will surround the negotiations.

We could then press Thieu to offer a one-man one-vote solution which would permit the NLF, disguised as a popular front party, to run if -- repeat if -- it accepts the constitution as the basis for political life.

2. Would Hanoi accept such a procedure? The conventional wisdom is that they would refuse. And that may be correct. But it is not certain that they would refuse, for these reasons:

-- Under pressures that we may not wholly understand, they appear to be in something of a hurry.

-- They are now bringing down the probable peak number of infiltrators. It is probably a peak in infiltration because they cannot afford 30,000 per month indefinitely and because they know we cannot stop the bombing if infiltration continues at 30,000 a month. Therefore, they may calculate that in the weeks ahead they may be at maximum strength inside of South Vietnam and with the passage of time we again shall impose heavy attrition on their

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

forces and weaken their bargaining position on the ground. They have reports that in VC villages the children are being taught to chant the following: "Blood will flow in May; there will be peace in June." If they are stirring these kinds of hopes, it must mean, technically, that they are thinking about a quick, rather than a protracted, negotiation.

3. I repeat, all the conventional pre-negotiating indications are that they will go slowly and try via a bombing standdown and perhaps a cease-fire to increase their leverage and diminish ours; but I believe our negotiators should make a serious try to go promptly for the gut issue: a negotiation by South Vietnam for a political settlement, preferably to be conducted in secret in South Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

54

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 20
By ics, NARS, Date 6-25-84

Franklin

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 6, 1968 -- 8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

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~~SECRET~~

-2-

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W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

55

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to Bourguiba

*to keep
2. Pres file*

In preparation for your meeting with President Bourguiba, the attached letter which he wrote to Ho Chi Minh is important reading. > Bourguiba addresses him as one Nationalist Revolutionary speaking to another, and there is real depth in his approach. He urges Ho to enter negotiations with the US for a reasonable Vietnam settlement. He wrote this letter on March 20, and it was apparently a followup on a conversation he had with the Vice President on the Vietnam problem in January.

You will, of course, be discussing Vietnam among other things with Bourguiba. In the meantime, State recommends an interim response which would simply authorize our Charge to tell Bourguiba that:

--you appreciate the constructive spirit in which this letter was written;

--you hope that the letter coming from a statesman of Bourguiba's stature, will have a useful influence in North Vietnam;

--you thought he wisely emphasized the importance of insuring South Vietnam's independence and that countries neighboring South Vietnam should not be subjected to pressures.

In addition to this general comment, our Charge would add the following message directly from you:

"I sincerely hope that by the time we meet in Washington later this month there will be progress which we can review and that I can benefit from your advice on further meaningful steps toward an outcome which the whole Free World awaits."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

W. W. Rostow

NLJ 97-283

Approve _____

By jis, NARA Date 5-5-98

Disapprove _____

* I sent this up to you when
received. W

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

552
TELEGRAM
22

~~SECRET~~ 736

PAGE 01 TUNIS 04104 01 OF 02 241751Z

49
ACTION SS 30

INFO /033 W

R 241220Z APR 58
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5172

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 TUNIS 4104/1

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7LJ 91-259

By WJG, NARA, Date 5-28-92

EXDIS

SUBJECT: BOURGUIBA LETTER TO HO CHI MINH

FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TRANSLATION HANDED TO ME BY FOREIGN MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA'S MESSAGE OF MARCH 20 TO PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH (UNNECESSARY WORDS OMITTED). FULL TEXT OF FRENCH ORIGINAL AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION BEING POUCHED.

"MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

PAGE 2 RUDKKR 4104/1 ~~SECRET~~

"YOU AND I ARE ELDERS OF THIS HANDFUL OF MEN WHO HAVE DEVOTED LIVES TO LIBERATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF THEIR COUNTRIES. OUR STRUGGLE HAS BEEN ALMOST AS LONG AS THIS CENTURY AND HAS NOT YET ENDED BECAUSE OUR IDEAL, REESTABLISHMENT OUR COUNTRIES IN INDEPENDENCE AND DIGNITY AS WELL AS EMANCIPATION OF OTHER PEOPLES OF THIRD WORLD, NOT YET ACHIEVED. YOU AND I, MR. PRESIDENT, HAVE SOUGHT THIS IDEAL TAKING GREATEST ACCOUNT OF REALITIES: GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OUR COUNTRIES, SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC LEVEL OUR PEOPLES AND INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF POWER. THIS, NO DOUBT, IS REASON WHY, HAVING MADE PROGRESS TOWARDS OUR OBJECTIVE THROGH WAYS SO DIVERGENT, WE GIVE IMPRESSION OF BEING IN OPPOSITE CAMPS.

"FALSE IMPRESSION, OF COURSE: FOR EACH OF US HAS PRESERVED ESSENTIAL: HIS INDEPENDENCE AND RESPECT HE HAS FOR OTHER; AND THAT IS WHY I ADDRESS MYSELF TO YOU AGAIN AS

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TUNIS 04104 01 OF 02 241751Z

ONE FIGHTER TO ANOTHER. LAST YEAR, ON OCCASION VIETNAMESE NEW YEAR, I FORMULATED WISH THAT NEW YEAR SEE AT LAST RESTORATION PEACE IN YOUR COUNTRY AND END TO SUFFERINGS OF VN PEOPLE.

PAGE 3 RUDKKR 4104/1 ~~SECRET~~

"I ADDED: "KNOWING LOFTY PATRIOTIC FEELINGS WHICH HAVE ALWAYS ANIMATED YOU, I TAKE LIBERTY, THIS OCCASION, ADDRESS TO YOU FERVENT APPEAL THAT TET TRUCE BE PRELUDE TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND TO ESTABLISHMENT OF ENDURING PEACE".

"I AM CONVINCED THAT BEYOND ANY IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATION, YOU WILL NOT SPARE ANY EFFORT FAVOR AND ENCOURAGE ALL POSSIBILITIES OF HONORABLE SOLUTION".

"NEGOTIATION CONSTITUTES ONLY WAY LIKELY TO PUT END TO SUFFERINGS OF VN PEOPLE, RESTORE PEACE TO VN AND PRESERVE SECURITY SOUTH EAST ASIA AND WORLD".

"I THINK I FIND MEANING OF YOUR STRUGGLE AND FEELINGS WHICH ANIMATE YOU SUMMED UP IN ANSWER YOU WERE KIND ENOUGH TO SEND ME ON TWENTY-THIRD OF FEBRUARY 1967. I HAVE STUDIED HISTORY YOUR PEOPLE AND KNOW THEIR EXCEPTIONAL ENDURANCE AND GREAT LOVE OF LIBERTY. I ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHAT GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF VIETNAM IMPOSES UPON YOU.

PAGE 4 RUDKKR 4104/1 ~~SECRET~~

"I ALSO KNOW USA, MEN WHO GOVERN THAT COUNTRY, THEIR PSYCHOLOGY AND THEIR IMPERATIVES OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICIES. I FORGET NEITHER AMERICAN REVOLUTION, NOR GENEROUS, EMANCIPATING AND UNIVERSALIST IDEAS WHICH USA DEFENDED JUST AFTER FIRST WORLD WAR, NOR EMINENT ROLE WHICH THEY PLAYED IN LAST GREAT WAR WHEN PRINCIPAL HUMAN VALUES WHICH MAKE UP PRICE OF LIFE SEEMED ON VERGE BEING SUBMERGED BY MERCILESS BARBARISM OF NAZIS AND JAPANESE WARLORDS. I CANNOT FORGET EITHER THAT, EVEN MORE RECENTLY, USA HAS PLAYED DECISIVE ROLE INTERVENING WITH OWN ALLIES TO FAVOR DECOLONIZATION OF GREAT NUMBER OF PEOPLES

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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OF AFRICA AND ASIA.

"IT SEEMS TO ME ONE CANNOT FORGET THIS FUNDAMENTAL FACT EVEN WHEN ONE, LIKE YOU, AT WAR WITH USA.

"TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION ALL THAT AND WHERE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM STANDS, TAKING ALSO INTO ACCOUNT STATE OF WORLD AND AMERICAN OPINION, I DEEM IT MANDATORY, TODAY MORE THAN EVER BEFORE, TO SPARE NO EFFORT TO SEEK HONORABLE POLITICAL WAY OUT OF CONFLICT WHICH IS DEVASTATING

PAGE 5 RUDKKR 4104/1 ~~SECRET~~
VIETNAM. IN MILITARY FIELD, PARTIAL VICTORIES ARE POSSIBLE; BUT TOTAL VICTORY IS NOT. I KNOW, OF COURSE, SOME CONSIDER MILITARY OPERATIONS AS ONE OF ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR WHICH, IF IT LASTS TOO LONG WITHOUT DECISIVE RESULTS, CAN LEAD AVERAGE AMERICAN TO WEARINESS AND HIS GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE TO ABANDON CONTEST.

"ONE SHOULD FEAR - AND A RESPONSIBLE LEADER OUGHT TO ENVISAGE THIS POSSIBILITY - THAT SUCH A CALCULATION MIGHT NOT PROVE RIGHT. REASONING BY ANALOGY IS NOT ALWAYS CORRECT; REACTIONS OF A GREAT PEOPLE ARE NOT EASILY PREDICTIBLE, AND NO MATTER WHAT ONE SAYS, HISTORY DOES NOT REPEAT ITSELF.

"I, FOR ONE, WOULD ADD THAT VICTORY ACHIEVED IN SUCH CONDITIONS, OVER "PAPER TIGER" AMERICA, WILL BE NEITHER IN INTEREST OF WORLD WHOSE BALANCE WOULD BE UPSET NOR IN THAT OF THE VN PEOPLE WHO WOULD HAVE WON VICTORY BUT ACHIEVED NEITHER INDEPENDENCE NOR PEACE.

"FOR, IT IS OBVIOUS, THAT WAR OF VN HAS NOW AS A STAKE SOMETHING WHICH GOES BEYOND VIETNAM ITSELF. YOU ARE, MR.

PAGE 6 RUDKKR 4104/1 ~~SECRET~~
PRESIDENT IN BETTER POSITION THAN ANYBODY ELSE TO FEEL INTERFERENCES OF THE CLASSICAL COLD WAR BETWEEN USSR AND USA COMPLICATED BY IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL CONFLICT WHICH OPPOSES RED CHINA TO

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 TUNIS 04104 01 OF 02 241751Z

USSR.

"UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HIGHER INTEREST OF VN, CONCERN TO PRESERVE ITS INDEPENDENCE FOR TODAY AND TOMORROW, IMPERATIVE TO SPARE ITS YOUTH SO AS TO SET IT TO TASKS OF RECONSTRUCTION, NECESSITY TO KEEP OPEN DOOR OF COOPERATION WITH ALL GREAT POWERS, ALL THESE CONSIDERATIONS SEEM MILITATE IN FAVOR OF EARLY POLITICAL SOLUTION WHICH CAN ONLY RESULT FROM NEGOTIATION WITHOUT HUMILIATING PRECONDITIONS LIKELY TO BE PRESENTED AS CAPITULATION.

"I FEAR THAT, WITH OTHER STATESMEN, IF PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION NOT STARTED WITHIN NEXT FEW WEEKS, GREATER MISFORTUNES BEFALL VN AND SEA. I EVEN FEAR PRESENT WORLD EQUILIBRIUM - WHICH I RECOGNIZE IS AT TIMES UNJUST AND RESTRAINING FOR SOME COUNTRIES BUT WHICH HAS MERIT OF EXISTING AND BEING ONE OF BASES ON WHICH WORLD PEACE RESTS - WOULD BE UPSET. I FEAR WIDER CONFRONTATION WHICH WOULD SOON BECOME
RUSSELL

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

21

SECRET 627

25

PAGE 01 TUNIS 04104 02 OF 02 241608Z

42

ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 241220Z APR 68
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5173

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 TUNIS 4104/2

EXDIS

SUBJECT: BOURGUIBA LETTER TO HO CHI MINH

UNCONTROLLABLE AND IN WHICH SMALL COUNTRIES - YOURS AS WELL AS MINE - WOULD LOSE THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND MANKIND MOST OF ITS ACHIEVEMENTS.

"YOU ARE, MR. PRESIDENT, RESPECTED DEAN OF CHIEFS OF STATE OF THIRD WORLD. ALL THROUGH YOUR LONG CAREER YOU HAVE SHOWN, MORE THAN ONCE, YOU KNOW HOW NOT TO GO TOO FAR. TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION PSYCHOLOGY OF ADVERSARY, TO ACCEPT COMPROMISE EVEN THOUGH ALL OF ONE'S OBJECTIVES NOT YET REACHED, TO AIM BEYOND WAR AT COOPERATION, TO BASE INDEPENDENCE ON

PAGE 2 RUDKKR 4104/2 ~~SECRET~~
STRENGTH OF INTERNAL FRONT BUT ALSO ON BALANCE BETWEEN EXTERNAL GREAT POWERS, THAT IS DIFFICULT COURSE WHICH YOU AND I HAVE TRODEN AND WHICH, IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS, HAS YIELDED CONCLUSIVE RESULTS.

"AIM TODAY SHOULD BE TO INSURE, FOR PREDICTABLE FUTURE, SECURITY OF NVN, INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH AND POSSIBILITY THAT BOTH THESE COUNTRIES MAY ONE DAY REUNITE THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS. ONE SHOULD ALSO, I THINK, SEE TO IT THAT NO GREAT POWER COULD EXTEND HEGEMONY OVER NORTH AND SOUTH AND THUS DISRUPT EQUILIBRIUM OF THE WORLD.

"COUNTRIES NEIGHBORING VIETNAM SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECTED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TUNIS 04104 02 OF 02 241608Z

TO PRESSURES LIKELY TO UPSET SITUATION PREVAILING IN REGION.

"IT APPEARS TO ME THESE OBJECTIVES ARE REASONABLE AND ACCEPTABLE TO YOURSELF, TO ALL VIETNAMESE OF SOUTH AND OF NORTH WHO CARE FIRST ABOUT INDEPENDENCE THEIR COUNTRY, AS WELL AS

TO USA. ALL I KNOW ABOUT YOU, DECLARATIONS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THOSE OF FNL LEADERS, ALL I KNOW ABOUT AMERICAN LEADERS AND THEIR DECLARATIONS AUTHORIZE ME TO THINK THAT CONDITIONS FOR FRUITFUL NEGOTIATION EXIST TODAY ON THESE BASES.

PAGE 3 RUDKKR 4104/2 ~~SECRET~~

"IT IS OBVIOUS THAT US AND OTHER GREAT POWERS HAVE HOPED TO CONTROL NORTH OR SOUTH OF VIETNAM TO PREVENT IT FROM FALLING UNDER CONTROL OR INFLUENCE OF OTHER GREAT POWERS. TODAY, ONE MAY HOPE THAT AN INDEPENDENT VN, FREE FROM ALL FOREIGN OCCUPATION, WOULD BE FOR THESE POWERS, ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION BECAUSE IT DOES NOT UPSET EQUILIBRIUM TO WHICH THEY ARE ATTACHED.

"I FEEL THAT BY CONTINUING WAR ONE CANNOT ATTAIN ANY OTHER OBJECTIVE. CONSEQUENTLY, ONE SHOULD, WITHOUT LOSING ONE MORE DAY, ENTER INTO NEGOTIATION. QUESTIONS OF PROCEDURE BECOME SECONDARY EVEN IF THEY PRESENT IMPORTANT MORAL ASPECT.

"WAR LIKE ONE WHICH TAKING PLACE IN YOUR COUNTRY CAN ONLY END THROUGH NEGOTIATION, AND NEGOTIATION MEANS RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS AND ACCEPTANCE BY EACH OF PARTIES TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT HONOR, SELF RESPECT AND IMPERATIVES OF OTHER. IF SUCH IS ALSO YOUR FEELING AND THAT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT, WOULD IT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO PUT LESS EMPHASIS ON THAT WHICH IS AFTER ALL SECONDARY - THE CONDITIONS OF NEGOTIATIONS - AND MORE ON THAT WHICH IS ESSENTIAL: THEIR CONTENT?

PAGE 4 RUDKKR 4104/2 ~~SECRET~~

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 TUNIS 04104 02 OF 02 241608Z

"NOW THAT USA RE-EXAMINING ITS VN POLICY, SUCH ATTITUDE, IF IT APPEARS POSSIBLE TO YOU, COULD PAY OFF. IT COULD NOT ONLY DISPEL IMPRESSION WIDESPREAD IN WORLD - EVEN AMONG YOUR FRIENDS - THAT YOUR WAR OBJECTIVES INCLUDE HUMILIATION OF ADVERSARY, BUT ALSO THAW SITUATION BY MAKING POSSIBLE PRENEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD BRIDGE GAP BETWEEN WAR OBJECTIVES OF PARTIES.

"I CONSIDER MYSELF YOUR EVERLASTING FRIEND AND THAT OF YOUR COUNTRY OF WHICH I APPRECIATE THE TRIALS. I HAVE SOME CREDIT IN US WHERE I INTEND TO GO NEXT MAY. ALL MY LIFE, I HAVE FOUGHT FOR DIGNITY OF MEN AND COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONS.

"WITHOUT SEEKING ANY MEDIATION ROLE OF WHICH I HAVE NO NEED, I FEEL CONCERNED FOR FATE OF EACH OF PEOPLE OF THIRD WORLD AND FOR PEACE WHICH, TO MY MIND, IS INSEPARABLE FROM INDEPENDENCE OF EACH COUNTRY AND AT SAME TIME FROM EQUILIBRIUM OF WORLD.

"I HAVE ALWAYS THOUGHT THAT INTEREST OF OUR COUNTRIES AND REQUIREMENTS OUR TIMES MAKE IT OBLIGATION FOR US TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT EQUILIBRIUM AND TO PURSUE, IN ORDER TO IMPROVE IT, A POLICY OF "DETENTE, ENTENTE AND COOPERATION"

PAGE 5 RUDKKR 4104/2 ~~SECRET~~

PARTICULARLY WITH ALL GREAT POWERS. IF THAT EQUILIBRIUM WERE TO BE UPSET IN FAVOR OF SINGLE POWER AS CONSEQUENCE OF TEST OF STRENGTH WHICH INEVITABLY PUTS AT STAKE SELF-RESPECT OF ONE OF OTHERS, WOULD NOT VN BE ITSELF FIRST VICTIM?

"THAT IS WHAT LEADS ME, AFTER DEEP THOUGHT, TO SEND YOU THIS MESSAGE, MR. PRESIDENT, AND WISH RECEIVE YOUR OWN ANALYSIS. IF YOU WERE TO SHARE MY VIEW, I COULD THEN UNDERTAKE, IN NAME OF TUNISIA OR AT LEVEL OF OAU, ANY ACTION LIKELY CONTRIBUTE TO PREVENTING WAR FROM CONTINUING TO BE ONLY POLICY.

"FOR THAT, BOMBING OF YOUR COUNTRY SHOULD, OF COURSE, END; BUT IT IS EQUALLY NECESSARY THAT FORMULA FOR SELF-DETERMINATION OF SVN AND FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BE PUT FORWARD WHICH WOULD SPARE INTERESTS INVOLVED, TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE COMMITMENTS TAKEN, INSURE INDEPENDENCE OF COUNTRY ITSELF

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 TUNIS 04104 02 OF 02 241608Z

AND ITS NEIGHBORS WHILE AT SAME TIME OPENING POSSIBILITIES OF COOPERATION WITH ALL.

PAGE 6 RUDKKR 4104/2 ~~SECRET~~

"I AM CONVINCED THAT, IF SUCH FORMULA WERE PUT FORWARD, FIGHTING COULD RAPIDLY STOP AND LONG AND HARD STRUGGLE OF VN PEOPLE CLEAR WAY FOR PERIOD OF CONSTRUCTION AND PEACE, FINAL OBJECTIVE OF THIS STRUGGLE TO WHICH YOUR NAME WILL STAY LINKED.

"AND TO CLOSE ALLOW ME, MR. PRESIDENT, EXTEND BEST WISHES AND BROTHERLY GREETINGS TO YOU AND PEOPLE OF VIETNAM."

GP-1. RUSSELL

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Monday - May 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Responses to Your Recent Latin American Initiatives

Your three recent initiatives in Latin America -- messages to your colleagues on the first anniversary of Punta del Este, your proposal for a Task Force on Physical Integration, and Under Secretary Katzenbach's trip to the Dominican Republic for the Tavera Dam loan signing -- have been well received.

Punta del Este Anniversary Messages. Most Presidents released your message to the press and it received prominent coverage. Attached is a resume prepared by State (Tab A).

Three Presidents -- Frei of Chile, Torjes of Costa Rica and Balaguer of the DR -- have written expressing appreciation (Tab B). President Frei's letter reflects some of his discouragement resulting from mounting domestic problems. He laments that the Latin Americans have not made more progress toward integration and expresses the hope that in dealing with our balance of payments problem we will not take measures adversely affecting Latin American products.

Task Force on Physical Integration. The proposal is off to a good start. The Inter-American Bank Governors approved a resolution placing the Bank fully behind it and Felipe Herrera has sent a congratulatory message (Tab C). CIAP has taken similar action.

Your statement received wide press coverage in Latin America. We had consulted key governments in advance and knew of their favorable response. A resume of official and press reaction after you made your proposal is at Tab D.

Tavera Dam Loan Signing. Under Secretary Katzenbach's trip to Santo Domingo was a great success. His personal report to you is at Tab E.

W. W. Reston

Attachments

Tabs A, B, C, D, E.

cy sent George Christian

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-283
By is, NARA Date 5-5-98

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A

May 6, 1968

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Responses to the President's Punta del Este Message

President Johnson's messages to the Presidents of Latin America marking the first anniversary of their meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, were well received. The messages stimulated positive public statements regarding the Alliance for Progress both within the governments and in the information media.

For example, in a message addressed to President Johnson, President Balaguer of the Dominican Republic thanked the President for his "congratulations on the achievements of the Dominican Republic" and stated that Latin America's peoples "are eager to eliminate the conditions of under-development." With this end in mind, the President stated that his Republic "has set out dauntlessly on the road to recovery." The Dominican President expressed his sincere appreciation to President Johnson and to the American people "for the valuable assistance you have given us in this undertaking."

One Santo Domingo broadcast interpreted President Johnson's message to mean he "reaffirmed his determination to continue supporting President Joaquin Balaguer's efforts in behalf of the Dominican Republic" and noted that the message "congratulates Doctor Balaguer for the progress made by the Dominican Republic."

In Chile, the press generally carried the full text. The main theme of the press comments was the President supported President Frei. In this they were encouraged by the Presidential press office. Reaction of most newspapers, with exception of Socialist, Communist, and right-wing organs, was favorable as was comment over the major radio stations.

The Uruguayan reaction was generally appreciative. Seven of the daily newspapers published the full text and one other presented only the paragraph relative to Uruguay. The government party's organs were critical. The Colorado Independent El Dia commented on the Punta del Este anniversary: "We would like to say that we lived in better times, that Latin America progresses, that the Alliance for Progress is a success. But that's not the way it is." The newspaper Hechos, representing the Colorado Party's left-leaning list 99, commented the Presidential message ignored the "harsh realities". The far-right El Debate of the conservative Blanco party claimed the message ignored "Uruguayan realities."

In Bogota, the President's letter was published on the front page of several newspapers. President Lleras, in a press release publicizing the letter, expressed his satisfaction with the accomplishments of the Alliance and said he would soon make a more extensive declaration on the subject.

An editorial in El Tiempo, unofficial spokesman for the Colombian government, stated that "President Johnson's message to President Lleras is truly heartening, not only in support for the ideal of Latin American integration, but also because it offers the certainty that the U. S. maintains its faith in it."

Embassy Rio de Janeiro reported that the full text of the Presidential message was carried prominently on April 18 in the principal papers of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Brasilia. Editorial comment was implicit in the headlines. For example the Jornal do Brasil and the Folha de Sao Paulo headlined "Johnson Praises Costa e Silva." Estado de Sao Paulo led with "Johnson Applauds Brazilian Achievements."

The San Jose, Costa Rica, both morning dailies published accounts prominently on the front page with the complete text of the message.

Embassy Guatemala reports reaction there and that President Mendez Montenegro expressed appreciation for one received by him.

Embassy Caracas reports that President Leoni gave a speech on the anniversary of the Punta del Este meeting that was clearly in line with President Johnson's letter. Leoni took a positive line similar to President Johnson's regarding hemispheric progress and pointed to integration as the "destiny" of Latin America.

The Presidential message was made known to the Peruvian people in a speech April 20 by President Belaunde on occasion of inaugurating another segment of the Carretera Marginal system.

In Paraguay, all five Asuncion newspapers published without comment the text of the Presidential message. Also, all radio stations transmitted the text on at least two newscasts. Excerpts were used on two television outlets.

Summaries of the Presidential message were released to the newspapers in San Salvador. All four dailies published the versions issued by the Presidential press offices. There were no comments.

The message was not released in Panama, Trinidad-Tobago, Argentina, Mexico, or Honduras.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-283

Office of the President
of the Republic of Chile By his, NARA Date 5-5-98

564

Santiago, April 18, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

It was a great pleasure to receive your letter in reference to the results thus far obtained toward reaching the goals that we set a year ago at Punta del Este. This demonstrates anew the interest of the Government of the United States in attending that meeting to cooperate in the economic and social development of Latin America.

I agree with you that progress has been made in the areas that you indicate.

However, I think that on this first anniversary of the Declaration of the Presidents of America, we must lament the lack of results with respect to some of the more important decisions we took at Punta del Este, such as those concerning the process of Latin American integration, which is not advancing at the rate our countries need and, what is even worse, is showing retrogression in certain aspects. This certainly is the responsibility of Latin America. As far as Chile is concerned, we shall continue striving toward the objectives we have drawn up.

We nations of the Andean Group are working in that direction, and you mentioned our first specific result--the signing of the agreement creating the Andean Development Corporation--in your letter. The task of establishing a subregional common market is also a difficult one, and if our efforts are to be fully successful,

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson,

we need the financial and technical cooperation of the more developed countries, and among them the United States in particular. Knowing your Government's interest in the process of Latin American economic integration, I am sure that we can depend on that cooperation.

In the Declaration of Punta del Este we agreed upon a number of measures to improve the condition of Latin America's international trade. However, the results of New Delhi have not been satisfactory, and I believe that only through renewed efforts shall we be able in the future to change the present pattern of world trade. I am confident that the action which your Government will continue to take within the OECD will culminate in the near future in a stable foundation for a system of preferences that will meet our countries' aspirations.

Furthermore, I wish to call your attention again to our opinion, based on the commitments contained in the Declaration of Presidents, with reference to the necessity that Latin American products not be affected adversely by trade measures that may be adopted under the program for bringing the balance of payments of the United States into equilibrium.

On this anniversary I cannot fail to recall our personal meeting and your interest and concern about the problems of our Hemisphere. At Punta del Este our collective will to attain the development of Latin America, with precise procedures, clear goals, and definite time limits, was expressed at the highest political level. Our countries are expecting results.

I know that this undertaking requires time, but time marches on and the basic accomplishments have not been produced, with a serious worsening of the problems that affect all Latin America.

Aware of the importance of solidary hemispheric action to our countries, and confident that we shall find the way to face this common destiny, I send to you, Mr. President, and to the people of the United States, in the name of my Government and the people of Chile, our most cordial greetings.

[s] Eduardo Frei
Eduardo Frei
President of the
Republic of Chile

"Dear Mr. President:

"With great interest and with the greatest pleasure I have received your message, which summarizes with eloquent detail the Inter-American achievements that mark the history of the efforts of our countries in the period of one year from the Punta del Este Meeting. Undoubtedly, the beginning has been auspicious, and the fact that it has been possible to include in that document events of such great importance for the development of the hemisphere, must stamp a seal of optimism even on the spirit of the most skeptical. You have mentioned a series of realities: The Inter-American Cultural Council already has a good regional plan of action; the new International Coffee Agreement offers more solid securities and advantages and now has a fund for the purpose of diversification of crops; the Inter-American Export Promotion Center has been founded. A six percent increase in food production during 1967 is a fact; and the increase in the resources of the Inter-American Development Bank and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration is a fact. The first steps have been taken toward the establishment of the Latin American Common Market. We are on solid ground. However, much remains to be done, and the task should not fall only upon those of us exercising public duties in compliance with the mandates entrusted to us. I believe that it primarily concerns our peoples.

"I am grateful to you, Mr. President, for your kind words of congratulations to all Costa Ricans. Those governing and those being governed as well, have become aware of the need for vigorous and coordinated action and for a joint effort for an increase of our agricultural production, within a rational diversification plan. My government has placed special emphasis on the opening of new zones for agriculture by means of the improvement and construction of new communication (feeder) roads and the development of community action, which requires as a base a physically and mentally sound population in quest of family well-being that provides the foundation for the nation's edifice. These are obligations which we consider fundamental in all governments, and if our effort to fulfill them has won such stimulating congratulations, it supplies us with new impetus to go on indefatigably in our struggle.

"After careful examination of what we have achieved during the year since the Punta del Este Meeting, it is necessary and proper to acknowledge the interest and effort of the United States of America in co-operating in these efforts towards progress. It is indisputable that such cooperation has been decisive in the achievement of this improved position in which America now finds itself.

"I reciprocate your good wishes for Costa Rica, with my most fervent good wishes for the happiness and ever increasing prosperity of the

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noble people of the United States of America and, particularly, for the very prompt resolution of the grave problems which concern your illustrious government. I also wish, Mr. President, your greatest personal happiness.

"José Joaquín Trejos Fernández"

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Embassy Translation of
April 16, 1968 of
Response by Dominican Republic President Joaquin Balaguer
to President Johnson's Message on the First Anniversary
of the Punta del Este Summit Meeting

"His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-283
By is, NARA Date 5-5-98

Excellency:

I take pleasure in acknowledging the receipt of your message on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Meeting of the Presidents of America at Punta del Este.

The fruits of that highly important meeting, enumerated by Your Excellency in your message, are gradually being harvested in a dynamic process designed to promote the development of all our countries. The common effort, resolutely directed toward the establishment of better living conditions in the Americas, has had the initial success that we, the Presidents of America, were confident would be obtained when we met at Punta del Este.

I thank Your Excellency for your congratulations on the achievements of the Dominican Republic, among which you mentioned the joint Dominican-Puerto Rican program; the modernization of the Dominican sugar industry; the launching of an agricultural diversification program; and the successful negotiations for financing the Tavera Dam.

The great task that lies ahead of us is a challenge to the initiative of our peoples, who are eager to eliminate the conditions of underdevelopment which have characterized their life, even though surrounded by the enormous potential wealth with which nature has endowed the Americas. The Dominican Republic has set out dauntlessly on the road to recovery, and I avail myself of this happy occasion to express to Your Excellency, and to the People of the United States, our sincere appreciation for the valuable assistance you have given us in this undertaking of such important implications.

The joint action program adopted at Punta del Este is the Magna Carta of American development. The Dominican Republic is carrying out its task in order to add its effort to the growing common effort of all the countries, convinced that the goals we have set for ourselves will be met.

I express sincere wishes for the well-being of Your Excellency and the People of the United States, as well as for the happiness of all the peoples of our America.

With highest esteem and consideration, I remain, Excellency,

Joaquin Balaguer".

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PRESIDENT LYNDON B JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTONDCUSA

ON CONCLUSION ANNUAL MEETING BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF INTER AMERICAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK IN BOGOTA WISH TO EXPRESS IN BEHALF OF BANK
AND MYSELF PROFOUND APPRECIATION FOR YOUR MESSAGE READ
BY SECRETARY FOWLER AND FOR YOUR SUBSEQUENT SPEECH IN WASHINGTON

WHICH WAS REFLECTED IN PROMPT AND ENTHUSIASTIC ADOPTION OF
RESOLUTION IMPLEMENTING YOUR PROPOSAL FOR IMMEDIATE PREPARATION
OF BLUEPRINT FOR PHYSICAL INTEGRATION OF LATIN AMERICA STOP
UNITED STATES POSITION THIS AND OTHER MATTERS INVOLVED IN
MEETING WAS VERY ABLY PRESENTED BY SECRETARY FOWLER AND
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OLIVER STOP ALSO HIGHLY GRATIFIED TO BE
ABLE TO ADVISE YOU THAT CEREMONY HERE IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
FOR SIGNATURE OF AID AND IDB LOAN AGREEMENTS FOR TAVERA

DAM IN WHICH UNDER SECRETARY KATZENBACK PARTICIPATED WITH
GREAT EFFECTIVENESS AS YOUR
REPRESENTATIVE WAS A NOTABLE SUCCESS IN EVERY WAY STOP
RESPECTFULLY

FELIPE HERRERA

562

May 6, 1968

Resolution

Adopted by the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank
on April 24, 1968

WHEREAS:

The Charter of Punta del Este in establishing the Alliance for Progress emphasized the need for proceeding to economic integration as a condition for the acceleration of economic development of Latin America;

The "Declaration of the Presidents of America", signed on April 14, 1967, calls for positive action in achieving the physical integration of Latin America, particularly in the area of transportation, communications, power, and the joint development of international river basins and frontier regions;

The Bank, pursuant to the decision of the Board of Governors in 1967, will devote increasingly higher amounts of its resources to finance physical integration projects, but there is need for the further planning and formulation of projects in this field;

There has been created within the framework of the Bank's resources the Preinvestment Fund for Latin American integration, through which considerable funds have been channeled to identify and prepare projects furthering the physical integration of Latin America, and the Bank has worked together with the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) in establishing the priorities in the use of the Preinvestment fund for Latin American integration; and

The Bank has been assigned the primary responsibility for implementing, within its sphere of competence, the measures agreed upon by the Presidents of America, including physical integration and the Preinvestment Fund for Latin American integration, the Board of Governors resolves:

That the Bank undertakes promptly, in conjunction with CIAP, to initiate the establishment of a Task Force to develop a five-year plan and action program for physical integration projects in Latin America. The Task Force should be composed of senior officials of organizations concerned with the economic integration and development of Latin America and should be aided by a full-time staff of experts headed by a distinguished citizen of that region.

referred
Bancroft's 6/5/68
4/24/68

That in developing the plan and action program, the Task Force should take into consideration among other factors:

- (1) the urgency of the establishment, interconnection, and expansion of systems of land, sea, river, and air transportation, of telecommunications, of electric power, and of pipelines;
- (2) means of facilitating the participation in the physical integration process of countries at a relatively lower stage of economic development and those not having direct access to the sea;
- (3) the resources estimated to be needed for the preparation of studies for projects which can be initiated within a five-year period and for the execution of such projects.

That the Board of Executive Directors present to the Board of Governors, not later than December 31, 1968, a progress report on the work of the Task Force.

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Reaction to the President's Latin America Physical Integration
Task Force Proposal

Official reaction in Latin American capitals to President Johnson's April 23 announcement of a proposal to establish a high-level task force for the development of physical integration of the Hemisphere has been enthusiastic and positive. High-level officials welcomed the announcement and expressed their willingness to cooperate fully. Concern was evidenced by the Mexicans and Costa Ricans over possible undermining of the position of CIAP, but there were assured by our Embassies that the task force would be a temporary body with its only purpose being the completion of the five-year development plan.

On April 26 the Conference of the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank approved a resolution directing the Bank to "undertake promptly, in conjunction with the CIAP, to initiate the establishment of a task force to develop a five-year plan and action program for physical integration projects in Latin America." Additionally, they resolved to "devote increasingly higher amounts of its resources to finance physical integration projects." The Board of Executive Directors was directed, as well, to present a progress report on the work of the task force no later than December 31, 1968.

Editorial writers and public statements by high-level Hemisphere figures have been consistently favorable.

The Brazilian press commented that this proposal indicates the interest of President Johnson in the development of the Hemisphere and not merely in its subversive potential. At a signing ceremony for a U. S. loan to a Peruvian private investment fund, President Belaunde praised the initiative and referred to the thoughtful sensitivity of the President in his treatment of the matter with other Chiefs of State. The Lima press noted favorably President Johnson's reference to the marginal jungle highway of Peru and the like development goals of the Andean Development Corporation and the United States. The Mexican press cautioned that the Congress must approve of this proposal or it will remain nothing more than an expression of good will, and a Costa Rican newspaper reflected that physical integration will not be the panacea for the Hemisphere's problems and will be difficult to achieve. Other columnists in Latin America described the proposal as "urgent," "indispensable," and "stimulating." In Santiago, Chilean Foreign Minister Valdes stated that "this initiative, together with that already adopted in the educational and technological fields will permit the recovery of optimism in the Alliance for Progress."

(May 6, 1968)

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-281
By us, NARA Date 10-5-98

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

May 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Katzenbach Trip to the Dominican Republic

My trip to Santo Domingo earlier this week was enjoyable and, I think, made a few nickels for our Latin American policy. I got a warm reception throughout the day. I had several chances to talk with President Balaguer. He repeatedly stressed his friendship and regard for you, his appreciation for your personal interest in his country, and his gratitude for United States support of the Tavera Dam Project. Dominicans generally also seemed to appreciate our interest and support; even the opposition press gave favorable treatment to the visit and the signing ceremony.

The ceremony itself was televised on a national hook-up. I read a short statement in somewhat fractured Spanish, emphasizing your personal interest in the project. I also commended the Dominicans for their spirit of cooperation and their dedication to the economic development of their country.

During the day, I visited an AID-financed agricultural research station near the capital, and flew by helicopter to the Tavera site. Press and TV followed us everywhere we went.


I made personal calls on the President and the Foreign Minister. Both were on their best behavior and generally avoided pressing me very hard on outstanding bilateral issues. Balaguer is, however, clearly very much interested in the special sugar quota allocation about which he wrote you last March.

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- 2 -

On the whole I was encouraged by what I saw. Many problems remain: there is extensive poverty and the political structure is still shaky (although much improved when compared with a few years ago). Of immediate concern is a severe drought which will substantially reduce agriculture output next year. But all of these problems are manageable. As things look now, it is probable that the Dominicans will make it through a peaceful transfer of power (elections are set for 1970) for the first time in decades.



Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

CONFIDENTIAL

May 6, 1968

Pres. file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your signature is the instrument of accession to the convention relating to international exhibitions and its two protocols.

This is routine business. The purpose of the convention is to help in the organization of international exhibitions.

You transmitted the convention and protocols to the Senate on November 21, 1967. The Senate gave its advice and consent to accession on April 30, 1968.

W. W. Rostow


WVG:mm



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IN REPLY REFER TO:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 3, 1968

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2-Ret
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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Accession to convention relating
to international exhibitions


I enclose for the President's signature an instrument of accession, in duplicate, to the convention relating to international exhibitions signed at Paris on November 22, 1928, together with two protocols, signed on May 10, 1948 and November 16, 1966, modifying the convention.

The convention and protocols were transmitted by the President to the Senate on November 21, 1967.

On April 30, 1968, the Senate gave its advice and consent to accession to the convention and protocols.

The basic purpose of the convention is to assist in the organization of international exhibitions. That purpose has been accomplished by application of a table of frequency, or time chart, for various types of exhibitions.

One of the duplicates of the enclosed instrument of accession will be deposited with the Government of France, the depositary of the convention and protocols.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Instrument of
accession, in
duplicate.

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Senate of the United States

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION

April 30, 1968

Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to accession by the United States of America to the Convention relating to International Exhibitions signed at Paris on November 22, 1928, together with Two Protocols, signed on May 10, 1948, and November 16, 1966, modifying the Convention (Executive P, Ninetieth Congress, first session).

Attest:



Francis R. Vukobratovic

Secretary



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LYNDON B. JOHNSON

President of the United States of America

TO ALL TO WHOM THESE PRESENTS SHALL COME, GREETING:

KNOW YE That, whereas a convention relating to international exhibitions was signed at Paris on November 22, 1928, and two protocols modifying the convention were signed at Paris on May 10, 1948 and November 16, 1966, all in the French language;

AND WHEREAS the Government of France, as depositary of the convention and protocols, has delivered certified texts of them to the Government of the United States of America;

AND WHEREAS the Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of April 30, 1968, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, did advise and consent to the accession to the aforesaid convention and protocols;

NOW, THEREFORE, be it known that I, Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States of America, having seen and considered the aforesaid convention and protocols, do hereby, in pursuance of the aforesaid advice and consent of the Senate of the United States of America, approve accession of the United States of America thereto.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the city of Washington

our Lord one thousand
nine hundred sixty-eight
and of the Independence
of the United States of
America the one hundred
ninety-second.

By the President:

Secretary of State

ACTION

Monday - May 6, 1968

Prior file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Death of President Robles' Mother

Panamaian President Robles' mother died during the early morning hours of yesterday and was buried less than 12 hours later.

Because of the tense electoral situation I am not recommending a special condolence message. Given the way they play politics in Panama, there is always the possibility that it might be used in the campaign.

Instead I recommend that you authorize Ambassador Adair to express condolences orally on your behalf.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ___
Disapprove ___
Call me ___.

ACTION

Monday - May 6, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Additional Names for Luncheon on Friday for OAS
Secretary General Mora

You asked for additional names of newsmen writing on Latin America and businessmen who operate in the area for the Mora Luncheon. Attached is a supplementary list covering both categories.

I have also included 2 labor leaders and 2 church leaders to give balance to the group.

I have added Senators Fulbright and Mansfield at Mike Manatos' suggestion. You have already approved Morse and Hickenlooper.

Barefoot Sanders suggests adding Chairman Morgan and Mrs. Bolton. He thinks the ranking Democrat and Republican on the Latin American Subcommittee (Selden and Mailliard) have done so poorly by you that he prefers Brad Morse and Dante Fascell instead.

Since the Assistant Secretary General-elect (Rafael Urquia of El Salvador) is in town, I have also put him on the list.

W. W. Rostow

Approve —

Disapprove —

Call me —

Attachment -- supplementary guest list.

cc - Bess Abell
Jim Jones

PRESS

Arthur Golden	-	UPI
Aristedes Moleon	-	AP
Jerry O'Leary	-	Evening Star
Warren Unna	-	Washington Post
Virginia Prewett	-	Washington Daily News
Nathan Miller	-	Baltimore Sun
Ben Welles	-	New York Times
<i>James Nelson</i> ~~Robert~~ Goodsell	-	Christian Science Monitor
Georgie Ann Geyer	-	Chicago Daily News
Donald Bohning	-	Miami-Herald
Dan Gottlieb	-	Reuters
Anita von Kahler	-	Agence France Presse
Carl Howard	-	USIS
Fred Galvan	-	VOA

BUSINESS

Donald Rockefeller	-	Chairman, Council for Latin America
Harding G. Lawrence	-	President, Braniff
John F. Gallagher	-	Vice President, International Operations, Sears Roebuck & Company
William F. Barlow	-	President, Vision, Inc.

BUSINESS -- continued

George S. Moore	-	President, 1st National City Bank
H. W. Balgooyen	-	Ex-Vice President, American and Foreign Power Company
Harold S. Geneen	-	Chairman and President - IT&T
J. Peter Grace	-	President, W. R. Grace & Company
W. T. Moore	-	President, Moore-McCormack Lines
Juan T. Trippe	-	Chairman, Pan American Airlines
Charles M. Brinckerhoff	-	Chairman, Anaconda Copper
Henry Ford, II	-	Chairman, Ford Motor Company
Andrew Heiskell	-	Chairman, Time, Inc.
B. Robert Anderson		President, International Trade & Investment Services
Robert J. Kleberg, Jr.	-	President, King Ranch
C. W. Cook	-	President, General Foods
Rudolph A. Peterson	-	President, Bank of America
Capt. J. W. Clark	-	President, Delta Air Lines
Emilio G. Collado	-	Committee for Economic Development
Jorge de Cubas	-	Westinghouse Corporation
William Hewitt	-	Chairman, Deere and Company
A. Thomas Taylor	-	Chairman and President, International Packers
J. Howard Rambin, Jr.	-	Chairman, Texaco, Inc.

LABOR

George Meany	-	President, AFL-CIO
Joseph F. Beirne	-	President, Communications Workers of America

CHURCH

Msgr. Marvin Bordelon	-	Director, National Conference of Catholic Bishops
Dr. Robert S. Bilheimer	-	Executive Director, Department of International Affairs, National Council of Churches

CONGRESSIONAL

Senator J. W. Fulbright

Senator Mike Mansfield

Congressman Thomas E. Morgan

Congresswoman Frances P. Bolton

Congressman F. Bradford Morse

Congressman Dante B. Fascell

OAS

Rafael Urquia	-	Assistant Secretary General-elect
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Monday, May 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Profile

SUBJECT: National Interest Determination for Export-Import Bank
Financing for Yugoslavia

At Tab A is Nick Katzenbach's memo recommending that you determine it is in the national interest for the Export-Import Bank to extend credits, guarantees, and insurance for U.S. exports to Yugoslavia. If you make this finding, you should also sign the attached draft letters notifying the Congress.

Harold Linder concurs in this recommendation.

You have already made this determination for Yugoslavia for Export-Import Bank guarantees. This determination has been required since 1964 under the Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Act. Since that time, the Export-Import Bank has extended guarantees on \$66 million of U.S. exports to Yugoslavia.

A new determination is now needed because of the Tower-Hickenlooper amendment to the Export-Import Act of 1968. This amendment prohibits Export-Import Bank participation in transactions involving communist countries unless the President determines it is in the national interest.

Under the Tower-Hickenlooper amendment, your finding in favor of Yugoslavia would permit the Export-Import Bank to extend credits as well as guarantees. Under the Appropriations Act only guarantees are permitted. The legal question of which act takes precedence is open. If you make the national determination in favor of Yugoslavia, the Export-Import Bank would consult with the House Appropriations Committee before making a loan (rather than guaranteeing a loan) under the broader provisions of the Tower-Hickenlooper amendment.

Katzenbach has concluded that the Fino amendment -- which prohibits Export-Import Bank financing on transactions with any country whose government supplies goods or services to North Vietnam -- is not applicable to Yugoslavia. This conclusion is supported by the legislative history. Fino said on the House Floor that his amendment would not affect Yugoslavia.

Katsenbach's memo reviews the arguments for continuing Export-Import Bank financing for Yugoslavia. In brief, it is good foreign policy and good business.

Bill Macomber said that he does not expect any significant fuss on the Hill. Neither does Linder.

I concur in this recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

If you approve, you should sign
the attached letter of notification
to the Congress _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____


ERF:mm



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 20, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Export-Import Bank Financing on
Transactions with Yugoslavia

Recommendation:

That you determine that it is in the national interest for the Export-Import Bank to continue to extend guarantees, insurance, and credits in connection with the sale of United States products and services to Yugoslavia and so notify the Congress as required by Section 2(b)(2) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1968. Mr. Linder concurs in this recommendation.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

On February 4, 1964 in accordance with Title III of the Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1964, you determined that it was in the national interest for the Export-Import Bank to issue guarantees in connection with United States exports to Yugoslavia.

A renewed determination in favor of Yugoslavia is needed at this time because of the Tower-Hickenlooper Amendment prohibiting Export-Import Bank participation in transactions involving Communist countries as defined in Section 620(F) of the Foreign Assistance Act, contained in the Export-Import Bank Act of 1968. The Tower-Hickenlooper Amendment is similar to, but not exactly the same as, the prohibition against financing sales to Communist countries which appears in the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Acts of 1964 through 1968. The basic differences between Tower-Hickenlooper and the prohibition in the Appropriation Act are: (1) Tower-Hickenlooper contains a new provision affecting transactions with third countries

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for products that are ultimately destined for use in a Communist country, and (2) Tower-Hickenlooper directly allows for a Presidential Determination regarding the extension of credits (in addition to guarantees).

I believe that it is in the national interest to continue the availability of the Export-Import Bank facilities to Yugoslavia. Experience since 1964 has shown that Export-Import Bank assistance has helped American business maintain a competitive position in this market. To the extent that American firms can continue to sell to Yugoslavia, our balance of payments will benefit directly and our political objectives will be advanced. We have supported Yugoslavia's independence of Soviet control since 1948, and in recent years have depended increasingly on normal business and commercial relationships to draw Yugoslavia more tightly into the free world trading and economic system. We have supported since 1965 an economic reform which is increasing the operation of a market economy in that country and which has permitted Yugoslavia to join the GATT as a full Contracting Party. Yugoslavia no longer needs American aid, but it does need extensive, mutually advantageous economic relations, such as those Export-Import Bank assistance can make possible.

It would not be advantageous at this time to extend the Presidential Determination to other Eastern European countries since they would still be ineligible for Export-Import Bank facilities because of the Fino Amendment to the Export-Import Bank's legislation prohibiting Export-Import Bank participation in transactions with countries whose governments directly furnish goods or services to North Vietnam. We have studied the applicability of the Fino Amendment to Yugoslavia, and I have concluded that the Government of Yugoslavia is not directly furnishing goods, supplies, or military assistance to North Vietnam. On the House Floor Congressman Fino stated that his amendment would not affect Yugoslavia.

A suggested text of the letter of notification to the Congress required by the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, is attached.


Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Suggested letter.

Dear Mr. President:

In compliance with Section 2(b)(2) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, this is to inform you that I have determined that it is in the national interest for the Export-Import Bank to extend guarantees, insurance, credits, and to participate in the extension of credits in connection with any transaction involving the exportation of United States products and services to Yugoslavia. The Bank will report the individual guarantees, insurance, credits, and participations in credits to the Congress as they are extended.

Sincerely,

The Honorable
Hubert H. Humphrey
President of the Senate

 ERF:mm

Dear Mr. Speaker:

In compliance with Section 2(b)(2) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, this is to inform you that I have determined that it is in the national interest for the Export-Import Bank to extend guarantees, insurance, credits, and to participate in the extension of credits in connection with any transaction involving the exportation of United States products and services to Yugoslavia. The Bank will report the individual guarantees, insurance, credits, and participations in credits to the Congress as they are extended.

Sincerely,

The Honorable
John W. McCormack
Speaker of the House
of Representatives

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ERF:mm

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, May 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Visitor Schedule for the Balance of 1968

Herewith Secretary Rusk's recommendations (Tab A) for eight foreign visitors for the balance of the year.

-- Three State Visits -- Chile, Kuwait, Venezuela. This type of visit calls for an arrival ceremony, two office meetings, dinner and your appearance at a reception hosted by the visitor.

-- Three Official Visits to Washington -- Chad, Barbados, Uruguay. This kind of visit calls for an arrival ceremony, one office meeting, luncheon or dinner.

-- One Official Visit to the US -- Iran. The extent of your participation is the same as an Official Visit to Washington.

-- Meeting with Diaz Ordaz at the Amistad Dam dedication.

I recommend that you approve the entire schedule, subject to final negotiation of specific dates with the invitees. We have checked the dates involved here against your schedule, as well as that of Mrs. Johnson.

1. President Frei of Chile -- July 24-25 (Wed-Thurs) -- State Visit

You approved this visit sometime ago, but Frei was unable to get Congressional approval to leave Chile. You recently renewed the invitation through Ambassador Tomic.

Yes _____ No _____

2. Ruler of Kuwait -- August 7-8 (Wed-Thurs) -- State Visit

This will be mainly a ceremonial visit. But in view of the current state of our Arab relations, it is good to have an Arab visit -- and one that is as painless as possible.

Yes _____ No _____

3. President Tombalbaye of Chad -- August 21 (Wed) -- Official to Washington

One of our staunchest supporters in sub-Saharan Africa since 1960.

Yes _____ No _____

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-170

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ By ing, NARA, Date 5-9-95

4. Prime Minister Barrow of Barbados -- September 11 (Wed) -- Official to Washington

Covey Oliver recommends this English-speaking visitor.

Yes _____ No _____

5. You have expressed a desire to dedicate the Amistad Dam with President Diaz Ordaz and stated so in Honolulu. The dedication is tentatively set for early October, and I recommend we proceed with plans.

Yes _____ No _____

6. President Pacheco of Uruguay -- October 23 (Wed) -- Official to Washington

The Secretary recommends October 21-22, but that is a Monday-Tuesday combination and, therefore, I suggest Wednesday, October 23 instead for your participation.

Yes _____ No _____

7. Prime Minister Hoveyda of Iran -- December 4 (Wednesday) -- Official to the US

While you have already agreed to see the Shah on June 12, we believe this visit would be worthwhile.

Yes _____ No _____

8. President Leoni of Venezuela -- December 11 (Wed) -- State Visit

While the Secretary recommends this visit, I believe because of the internal Venezuelan political situation between now and their December elections, it would be better to hold off on extending an invitation.

Hold off on invitation _____ Invite him _____

Don't invite him _____

Additionally, you have already approved visits by President Thieu, President Trejos of Costa Rica and Prime Minister Bakkush of Libya. All have accepted your invitation. I am attaching a copy of your foreign visitor schedule for the first half of the year at Tab B, together with the proposed second half of the year at Tab C.

There will probably be other visits which will come up between now and the end of the year which we would like to recommend, but they will be dealt with separately as the need arises.

W. W. Rostow

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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April 26, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested Schedule of Visits for Chiefs
of State and Heads of Government During
the Second Half of 1968

Recommendation:

That you approve the enclosed schedule of suggested visits for Chiefs of State and Heads of Government during the second half of 1968.

Discussion:

Our recommendations reflect your recent request to Covey Oliver for additional visitors from Latin America during 1968.

Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand has received your invitation to visit this country, extended in lieu of a summit meeting, but has not yet accepted.

I understand, too, that the King and Queen of Thailand may be coming to this country in August to place their daughter in school. If they do, we will recommend a private visit to you.

You have already approved an Official Visit to Washington by Prime Minister Bakkush of Libya for late September.

The points for decision are:

1. President Frei of Chile has let us know that he would welcome an opportunity to visit you in June or July, should that be convenient to you and the Chilean Congress approves his leaving the country. When Ambassador Tomic made his farewell call, you renewed the invitation to President Frei. I suggest the dates of July 24-25 for the Washington portion of a State Visit to the United States.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-172

By fw, NARA, Date 7-7-94

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2. I recommend that you receive the Ruler of Kuwait on a State Visit and suggest the dates of August 7-8 for the Washington portion of the visit. At a time when our relations with the Eastern Arabs are minimal, a gesture to one of the states "neutral" as between the moderate and radical Arabs would be useful for our position in the area.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

3. President Tombalbaye of Chad has been one of our staunchest supporters in sub-Saharan Africa since his country attained independence in 1960. He would welcome an invitation and I suggest the dates of August 21-22 for an Official Visit to Washington.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

4. Covey Oliver recommends a visit by Prime Minister Barrow of Barbados, the newest nation in the hemisphere and the most recent member of the OAS. Covey believes that attention to the English-speaking peoples of the Caribbean would demonstrate our interest in an area of potential instability as the British prepare a gradual withdrawal. I recommend an Official Visit to Washington and suggest the dates of September 11-12.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

5. I understand that you have expressed an interest in meeting with President Diaz Ordaz at the dedication of the Amistad Dam. The dedication is now tentatively scheduled for early October and we hope to arrange a date such that it can be broadcast via Telstar to Latin America. Whether or not this is possible, I recommend that you agree to participate with President Diaz Ordaz at the dedication.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

6. In response to your request, Covey Oliver also recommends that President Pacheco of Uruguay be invited to make an Official Visit to Washington. Uruguay has been a strong supporter of the Alliance for Progress and the United States is committed to assisting President Pacheco's administration. His visit would be welcomed by progressive leaders in this country and Latin America. I recommend an Official Visit to Washington and suggest the dates of October 21-22.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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-3-

7. Close relations with Iran continue to be important to the United States. The Shah's visit of last August was extremely useful and we hope that his Private Visit to the United States in June will be equally so. I believe it would be useful to invite Prime Minister Hoveyda to make an Official Visit to the United States and suggest the dates of December 4-5.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

8. Finally, President Leoni of Venezuela has expressed great interest in the invitation renewed to him. He regrets he cannot come in July and suggests December as an alternative time. I recommend you agree that he pay a State Visit and suggest the dates of December 11-12.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

I am attaching a proposed schedule of visitors, individual justifications and a recapitulation of visits for the first half of 1968.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Proposed Schedule of Visitors
2. Justifications
3. Schedule of Visitors for First Half of 1968

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Proposed Schedule of Visitors

July - December 1968

<u>Visitor</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Type of Visit</u>	<u>Date</u>
<u>July</u>			
President Frei	Chile	State Visit	24-25
<u>August</u>			
Ruler of Kuwait	Kuwait	State Visit	7-8
President Tombalbaye	Chad	Official Visit to Washington	21-22
<u>September</u>			
Prime Minister Barrow	Barbados	Official Visit to Washington	11-12
Prime Minister Bakkush	Libya	Official Visit to Washington	25-26 (tentative)
<u>October</u>			
President Diaz Ordaz	Mexico	Amistad Dam	
President Pacheco	Uruguay	Official Visit to Washington	21-22
<u>December</u>			
Prime Minister Hoveyda	Iran	Official Visit to United States	4-5
President Leoni	Venezuela	State Visit	11-12

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-172
By fw, NARA, Date 7-7-94

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Schedule of Visitors - January-June 1968

<u>Visitor</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Type of Visit</u>	<u>Dates</u>
<u>January</u>			
Prime Minister Eshkol	Israel	Official to Ranch	7-8
Prime Minister Burnham	Guyana	Private Visit	22
<u>February</u>			
Jean Rey	European Communities	Official to Washington	6-8
Prime Minister Wilson	United Kingdom	Official to Washington	6-9
<u>March</u>			
Prime Minister Egal	Somalia	Official to Washington	14-15
President Stroessner	Paraguay	Official to Washington	20-21
President Tubman	Liberia	Official to United States	27-28
<u>April</u>			
Chancellor Klaus	Austria	Official to United States	10-11
President Park	Korea	Honolulu	16-17
King Olav	Norway	State	25-27

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-172

By fw, NARA, Date 7-7-94~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-2-

<u>Visitor</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Type of Visit</u>	<u>Dates</u>
	<u>May</u>		
Prime Minister Ramgoolam	Mauritius	Private Visit	⁹ ~~5-10~~
Prime Minister Thanom	Thailand	Official to United States	8-9
President Bourguiba	Tunisia	State	15-16
~~President Thieu~~	~~Viet Nam~~	~~Date~~	~~15-16~~
Prime Minister Gorton	Australia	Official to Washington	27-28
	<u>June</u>		
Shah of Iran	Iran	Private Visit	12
President Trejos	Costa Rica	Official to Washington	⁴ ~~5-6~~
<i>Pres. Thieu</i>	<i>Vietnam</i>	<i>State</i>	18-19

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Prime Minister Errol W. Barrow of Barbados

The English-speaking states of the Caribbean will have a growing importance in hemispheric relations. Barbados is the newest nation in the hemisphere and most recently-joined member of the OAS. A visit by Prime Minister Barrow could be helpful to us in ensuring Barbadian participation in the newly established Regional Development Agency and the proposed Caribbean Development Bank. More importantly, attention given to English-speaking peoples of the Caribbean at this moment could help to achieve the impression of United States interest in an area of potential instability.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-172
By ju, NARA, Date 7-7-94

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Tombalbaye of Chad

Chad, under the leadership of President Tombalbaye, has been one of the United States' most constant friends in Africa despite the fact that it has not been a major beneficiary of US economic assistance. President Tombalbaye has demonstrated his friendship for the United States in many ways. Chad has hosted a number of United States military and scientific projects. Recently, Tombalbaye agreed to call in the Soviet Ambassador to express his concern over the Pueblo affair. President Tombalbaye has often expressed his understanding for our position in Viet-Nam, and, on September 31, 1967, he sent you a personal letter voicing his prayers that you would be able to find a satisfactory solution to the Viet-Nam situation. President Tombalbaye has repeatedly lauded the American defense of the Free World against the expansion of Communism. We believe that an invitation for an official visit would be fitting recognition for President Tombalbaye's friendship and support.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-172
By pw, NARA, Date 7-7-94

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Prime Minister Hoveyda of Iran

Close and cooperative relations with Iran continue to serve United States interests globally and in the difficult and important Middle East. We are undergoing a period of re-definition of our relations with Iran induced by that country's increasingly independent stance in world affairs and increasing prosperity and national viability.

In his three years as Prime Minister, Mr. Hoveyda has emerged as an effective administrator of the Shah's White Revolution. He is well-regarded by His Majesty and has achieved considerable popularity with the Iranian public. He is likely to be a significant figure on the Iranian political scene for the foreseeable future. He has not made an official visit to the United States as Prime Minister and has in fact not visited the United States for over ten years.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-172
By ju, NARA, Date 7794

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Jorge Pacheco Areco of Uruguay

The United States is committed to assisting President Pacheco's administration in its efforts to arrest inflation, revitalize the economy and achieve rapid and sustained development. Uruguay's democratic tradition has earned this small nation an important place in the forum of the world. Her adherence to the principles of the Alliance for Progress has been exemplary. A visit by President Pacheco would be welcomed both by progressive leaders in the United States and, more importantly, Latin America.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-172

By ju, NARA, Date 7-7-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, Ruler of Kuwait

A State Visit by the Ruler of Kuwait would be important for the following regional reasons.

At a time when our relations with the eastern Arabs are minimal, the gesture of including one such visit would carry favorable overtones for our position in the area generally. Our position would be strengthened by the fact that we would be inviting, not a pro-Western country but a "neutral" Arab state as between the moderate and radical wings. The visit will have important implications for the Persian Gulf, that we intend to take a continuing interest in Gulf affairs. This would have a salutary impact on rulers of the various states concerned, thus contributing to greater area stability.

In addition, Kuwait money will play a key role in any regional development schemes involving the Gulf as a whole. It would be useful to encourage the Kuwaitis to do more in this direction.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-172
By fw, NARA, Date 7-7-94

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Frei of Chile

President Frei accepted an invitation to visit Washington in February, 1967. At the last minute the Chilean Congress denied him constitutional permission to leave Chile. We have subsequently assured President Frei that the invitation remains open if circumstances in Chile permit him to make the visit.

President Frei is a democratic leader firmly committed to the Alliance for Progress. The reform program he has undertaken for Chile is clearly consistent with the Alliance and our support of his efforts has been firm and straightforward. Our original invitation to President Frei was to a large extent based on our desire to hear of his program in Chile, and to dramatize our continued support for the Alliance by receiving a democratic leader firmly committed to its objectives.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 94-172

By ju, NARA, Date 7-7-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico

The International Boundary and Water Commission is understood to be planning a dedication of the Amistad Dam, possibly during September 1968. This ceremony would not constitute a formal visit by a foreign Chief of State, but would probably require about one-half day of your time. We will work out with the Mexicans a mutually agreeable date in the last half of September. The ceremony need not be the occasion for discussions of bilateral problems.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-172
By pw, NARA, Date 7-7-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~2. Pres file~~SECRET

Monday, May 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Signing Up George Woods for Israeli Desalting

George Woods has agreed to do this job and is already briefing himself. To make it formal:

--you might, if you approve, sign the attached note which could serve as his notice of appointment;

--we would, if you approve, give him the attached terms of reference as a general indication of what we'd like him to do. Basically, these ask him to recommend a US position to you.

Approve terms of reference _____ No _____ Call me _____

We also need your guidance on telling the Israelis. Would you prefer to:

- write a note to Eshkol _____
- have me inform Rabin _____
- inform someone here yourself _____
- not tell them yet _____

Finally, we need your guidance on publicity. George would just as soon do his job quietly without fanfare, but he understands your needs and will be content with whatever you wish. On international grounds, State would just as soon avoid another public act which shows us in collaboration with Israel but recognizes it will be hard to keep this quiet for long since George may wish to touch base on the Hill. Here are the possibilities:

- try to keep it quiet _____
- prepare a release for George Christian _____
- prepare contingency press guidance to acknowledge George's role the first time a reporter asks _____

SECRET

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12358,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 18, 1983.

BY RG ON 6-1-92

SECRET

- 2 -

George will be here again tomorrow for further talks. We will pass the attached on to him then if you approve. It would be nice to show our pleasure in his taking the job by putting these in his hands as quickly as we can.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

Mr. ~~Rostow~~

62a

May 6, 1968

Dear George:

Thank you for taking on the job of putting together a recommendation for me on the Israeli desalting project.

I would like to lay as much of the groundwork for progress in desalting as I can while I am President. But I know this is such a complex and costly business that we must apply our best analysis to it. That is why I am grateful that you have agreed to work with me on this.

I have approved the terms of reference which you will be receiving. They will provide a general road map for you, but I want you to feel free to manage this in the way that makes most sense to you.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. George Woods
825 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York

LBJ:HHS:tmt 5/6/68

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-283

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

By jis, NARA Date 5-5-98

626
May 6, 1968

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR
US COORDINATOR ON ISRAELI POWER AND DESALTING
PROJECT

Phase I: Preliminary Review and Recommendation

- I. The coordinator, while carrying out his duties in connection with this project, will act as the representative of the President. The President will determine when the Israelis may be informed of his appointment and when his appointment may be publicly announced.
- II. The coordinator is asked to conduct, by late June if possible, the following preliminary reviews of material in the Israeli power and desalting project:
 - A. Economic. He should review available economic studies to:
 1. Determines the validity of their cost and other assumptions, particularly in view of recent increased costs in the southern California power and desalting project. It would also be worth considering how costs might change during the life of the project.
 2. Ascertain the most likely optimum size (water and electric output) of the plant based on studies made since early 1967, considering that the electrical capacity is limited by the character of the Israeli power market.
 3. Determines whether adequate economic data exist to establish the comparative economics of nuclear and fossil fuels. If possible, show relative costs.
 4. Compare the costs of desalted water with the costs of water from other possible sources, noting to what extent these are practical alternatives in Israel.
 5. Estimate, if this project were undertaken, how much concessional financing and/or continuing subsidy might be required to produce water and power at economic rates in the mid-1970's.
 6. Comment on the tangible or intangible benefits to the US of providing such a subsidy or part of it.

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B. Financial. He should familiarize himself with possible sources of financing to:

- 1/ Determine how much financial assistance might be available from normal U. S. Government programs (AID, Interior, AEC).
2. Estimate the prospects for Congressional approval of a special appropriation for this purpose.
3. Estimate availability of non-USG financing, including resources available to the Government of Israel.

C. Political-economic. He should review the situation in the region at this time to consider what measures might make this project politically more feasible. Specifically, he should:

1. Suggest how, if at all, this project might be related to the broader economic development of the region, including the Arab nations near Israel.
2. Consider whether enlarging the plant to provide water for areas Israel occupied in June 1967 would contribute to peace and especially to refugee resettlement. We cannot assume that the occupied areas will remain under Israeli control, but this dimension of the problem should be explored.
3. Make a personal judgment on the desirability and practicality of exacting Israeli acceptance of the Non-proliferation Treaty or IAEA safeguards on all Israeli nuclear facilities as a condition of any US financial participation.

III. Having completed these preliminary reviews, the coordinator will, by late June if possible, recommend to the President after consulting with the departments and agencies involved:

- A. The organization of any further study, if necessary, and the extent of Israeli participation in any such studies.
- B. If he believes we have as good an analytical basis for decision as we are likely to have under present circumstances, a US Government position on this project, including the desirability of US financial participation and a statement of costs involved.

C. Ways the US Government might participate financially if it decided to do so.

- IV. Staff support. The coordinator, as the representative of the President, will have the full support of Mr. W. W. Rostow, Dr. Hornig and the Bureau of the Budget as needed. The Department of State's Office of Water for Peace will provide day-to-day administrative and technical support and, in close collaboration with the Interdepartmental Group/Near East and South Asia will coordinate the assistance of other departments and agencies. They will provide whatever additional help the coordinator may request.
- V. Relations with Israelis. When the coordinator has determined his plan of work, he may recommend for the President's approval any thoughts he may have on consultations with the Israelis or travel to Israel in connection with this phase of his assignment. If the US Government were to go ahead with this project, the coordinator might then be called upon to negotiate with Israel the terms of US participation. For the moment, however, all his contacts, if any, should be for the sole purpose of informing himself on the project.
- VI. Relations with Arabs. The coordinator should keep in mind the possibility of later putting this project in a broader regional context. For the moment, however, he should confine himself to sources of information not directly connected with the Arab governments.

11:15 Mr. President- Herewith, a proposed statement
for George. May 6, 1968

P. J. L. E.

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Proposed answer to question: Did His Holiness the Pope offer the Vatican as a site for talks?

Answer: Yes, he did. In keeping with Pope Paul's continuing effort to be helpful in the cause of peace, he offered to both sides the facilities of the Vatican, emphasizing the complete neutrality and impartiality of that setting. After study, we considered the proposal to be fair, impartial, and honorable. We accepted the Vatican; but it was apparently turned down by the other side.

Throughout this period when Hanoi was pressing Warsaw by every means -- with some support in the United States -- third countries -- including neutralist countries not aligned with the West -- were suggesting a number of other places which were objectively suitable and fair to both sides. We accepted a number of these places.

In order to maximize the chance that one of them might be found acceptable to both sides, we conducted these negotiations quietly. They were not known to Congress or to the press.

Question: Would you tell us which places you accepted aside from the Vatican?

Answer: No. I don't think that would be particularly helpful at the present time. We shall leave that for diplomatic historians in the future.