

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 memo	Rostow to President, 7:30 p.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>5/14/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#2a cable	<del>Paris 14020</del> <i>Open NLJ 97-331 3-19-99</i> <del>S 6 p</del> [Dup. #103, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN TODEL-DELTO I," Box 115]	<del>5/14/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#2b cable	<del>Deptel to Paris</del> " " " " <del>S 4 p</del>	<del>5/14/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#5 memo	Rostow to President, 5:20 p.m. <del>S 1 p</del> <i>Open 9/11/00 NS/ACC 00-407</i>	<del>5/14/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#5a rpt	Intelligence Report <i>exempt RAC 9/100</i> S 1 p	5/13/68	A
#7 memo	Rostow to President, 5:15 p.m. C 1 p <i>Sanitized 9/12/00 NS 97-329</i> <i>same Sani NS DA-034-1-1 (1102)</i>	5/14/68	A
#7a cable <i>marked by mistake</i>	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Sanitized 3-2-00 NLJ 97-325</i> <del>C 5 p</del> [Duplicate of #72, NSF, CF, VN, "TDCS and Cables, Vol. 1"]	<del>5/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#8 memo	Rostow to President, 5:10 p.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i> <del>S 1 p</del> [Duplicate of #140, NSF, CF, Israel, Vol. 9]	<del>5/14/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#8a memo	Rusk to President <i>Open NLJ 97-331 3-19-99</i> <del>S 2 p</del>	<del>5/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#8b rpt	"Caradon's Draft Resolution on Jerusalem" <del>C 1 p</del> " " " "	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#9 memo	Rostow to President, 2:30 p.m. <i>Open 12-15-95 NLJ 95-188</i> <del>C 1 p</del> [Duplicate of #12, NSF, CF, Mexico, Vol. 4]	<del>5/14/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#9a memo	Read to Rostow <del>C 2 p</del> <i>Open 12-6-95 NLJ 95-120</i> [Duplicate of #12b, NSF, CF, Mexico, Vol. 4]	<del>4/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#13 memo	Rostow to President <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i> <del>S 3 p</del>	<del>5/14/68</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

S 3 p

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 76, May 9-14, 1968

Box 34

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#14 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President</del> <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i> <del>1 p</del> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, "5/14/68"]	<del>5/14/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#16 memo	Rostow to President, re: Panama <i>Sanitized 5/14/68 NLJ 97-324</i> S 1 p <i>more info released 11-28-10 NLJ 09-338 (#208)</i> [Duplicate of #208, NSF, CF, Panama, Vol. 10]	5/14/68	A
<del>#20 memo</del>	<del>Duplicate of #14</del> <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i>		
<del>#21a ltr</del>	<del>President to PM Holyoake</del> <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i> <del>PCI 1 p</del>	<del>5/14/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#21b ltr</del>	<del>PM Holyoake to President</del> " " " <del>PCI 2 p</del>	<del>5/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#22 memo</del>	<del>Smith to President, 2:50 p.m.</del> " " " <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>5/11/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#22a rpt</del>	<del>"Procedures for the Conversations..."</del> " " " <del>S 3 p</del>	<del>5/11/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#22b rpt</del>	<del>"From US Delegation to Paris Talks"</del> " " " <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#23a cable</del>	<del>CAP 81071</del> <i>Open NLJ 97-331 3-19-99</i> <del>1 p</del>	<del>5/11/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#26a cable	CAP 81067 <i>open 8/3/99 NLJ 97-327</i> S 1 p [Sanitized NLJ-CBS-24, 1984]	5/11/68	A
<del>#27 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President</del> <i>Sanitized 5/14/68 NLJ 97-324</i> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 11-28-10 NLJ 09-338 (#207)</i> [Duplicate of #207, NSF, CF, Panama, Vol. 10]	<del>5/11/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#28 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 7-24-97</i>	5/11/68	A
#28a memo	Read to Rostow S 2 p "	5/11/68	A

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NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 76, May 9-14, 1968

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<del>#30a ltr</del>	<del>President to PM Eshkol PCI 1 p</del> <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i>	<del>5/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#31 memo	Rostow to President, 8:00 p.m. TS- 1 p <i>sanitized 2/13/03 NLJ/RAC 00-408</i>	5/10/68	A
#31a cable	Intelligence Cable TS- 1 p <i>Exempt 3/13/03 NLJ/RAC 00-409</i>	5/10/68	A
<del>#33 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 7:50 p.m.</del> <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>5/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#34 memo	Rostow to President, 7:15 p.m. <i>Sanitized 2/13/03 NLJ/RAC 00-407</i> TS- 1 p <i>Sanitized 2/13/03 NLJ/RAC 00-106</i> [Duplicate of #4, NSF, CF, Czechoslovakia, "Indications (all sources) of Soviet Military intervention into Czechoslovakia (5/4-10/68)"]	5/10/68	A
#34a memo	Intelligence Memorandum TS- 10 p <i>Sanitized 2/11/03 NLJ/RAC 00-910</i> [Duplicate of #4a, NSF, CF, Czechoslovakia, "Indications (all sources) of Soviet Military intervention into Czechoslovakia (5/4-10/68)"]	5/10/68	A
<del>#35 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 6:30 p.m.</del> <del>TS 1 p</del> <i>Open 3/98 NLJ 97-326</i>	<del>5/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#35a memo</del>	<del>Johnson to President</del> <i>Dupe in UN file 3 R NUN offensive in activities</i> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>Open 8/31/99 NLJ 97-327</i> <i>Box 88, Doc 417a</i>	<del>5/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#35b rpt</del> <i>marked in</i>	<del>Attachment-Fact Sheet</del> <i>Dupe w/for 35a - Doc 417a</i> <del>TS 2 p</del> <i>Sanitized 8/21/99 NLJ 97-327</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#36a cable</del>	<del>Saigon 26928</del> <i>Open NLJ 97-331 5-19-99</i> <del>S 5 p</del>	<del>5/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#36b memo</del>	<del>Ginsburgh to Rostow</del> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>Open 5-4-04 NW/RAC 03203</i>	<del>5/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#36c memo</del>	<del>MAC 5862</del> <del>S 4 p</del> <i>Open RAC 11/2/09</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION [Exempt NLJ/CBS 8]

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 76, May 9-14, 1968

Box 34

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#39 memo	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>5/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#39a rpt	"Argentina" PCI 1 p <i>open 7-24-97</i>	5/9/68	A
#41a cable	Paris 13832 <del>C 2 p</del> <i>Open NLJ 17-331 3-19-99</i>	<del>5/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#42 memo	Rostow to President, 12:50 p.m. <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 5/14/01 NSJ/RAC 00-407</i> <i>sanitized 2-15-01 NLJ/RAC 00-106</i>	<del>5/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#42a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S- 3 p <i>sanitized 3-11-03 NLJ/RAC 00-410</i>	5/10/68	A
#43 memo	Rostow to President, 11:55 a.m. <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 8-30-95 NLJ 91-448</i> [Duplicate of #177, NSF, CF, UAR, Vol. 6]	<del>5/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#43-1 memo	Rostow to President, 12:00 noon <del>TS 1 p</del> <i>open 3/13/03 NSJ/RAC 00-408</i>	5/10/68	A
#43a-1 memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>sanitized RAC 5/03</i> TS- 2 p	undated	A
#44 memo	Rostow to President, 9:10 a.m. <del>TS 1 p</del> <i>sanitized 2-15-01 NLJ/RAC 00-106</i> <i>sanitized 5/14/01 NSJ/RAC 00-407</i> [Duplicate of #6, NSF, CF, Czechoslovakia, "Indications (all sources) of Soviet Military intervention into Czechoslovakia (5/4-10/68)"]	5/10/68	A
#44a memo	Intelligence Memorandum TS- 6 p <i>sanitized 3-11-03 NSJ/RAC 00-410</i> [Duplicate of #6a, NSF, CF, Czechoslovakia, "Indications (all sources) of Soviet Military intervention into Czechoslovakia (5/4-10/68)"]	5/10/68	A
#46 memo	Rostow to President, 6:25 p.m. <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 3/98 NSJ 97-326</i> [Duplicate of #58a, NSF, CF, VN, "2C(10), 5/68, General Military Activity"]	<del>5/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 76, May 9-14, 1968

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#46a memo	<del>Nitze to President</del> <i>open 8/3/99 NLJ 97-327</i> S- 1 p [Duplicate of #58b, NSF, CF, VN, "2C(10), 5/68, General Military Activity"]	<del>5/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#46b map	<del>Attachment to #46a</del> <i>1 p 8/3/99 NLJ 97-327</i> PCI- 1 p	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#47a cable	<del>Telegram #33</del> <i>Open NLJ 97-331 3-19-99</i> C- 2 p	<del>4/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#49 memo	Rostow to President, 6:00 p.m. <i>Sanitized 2-13-01 NLJ/RAC</i> TS- 1 p <i>Open 9/17/01 NSF/BAE 00-407</i> [Duplicate of #1, NSF, CF, Czechoslovakia, "Indications (all sources) of Soviet Military intervention into Czechoslovakia (5/4-10/68)"]	<del>5/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#49a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>Sanitized RAC 3/01</i> TS- 4 p [Duplicate of #1a, NSF, CF, Czechoslovakia, "Indications (all sources) of Soviet Military intervention into Czechoslovakia (5/4-10/68)"]	5/9/68	A
#53 memo <i>Same sanitization 5-17-00 (NLJ)/RAC 00-108</i>	Rostow to President, 3:45 p.m. S- 1 p <del>Sanitized 2-13-01 NLJ/RAC 00-108</del> [Duplicate of #2, NSF, CF, Czechoslovakia, "Indications (all sources) of Soviet Military intervention into Czechoslovakia (5/4-10/68)"]	5/9/68	A
#53a cable	Intelligence Cable <i>exempt RAC 5/03</i> S- 1 p [Duplicate of #2a, NSF, CF, Czechoslovakia, "Indications (all sources) of Soviet Military intervention into Czechoslovakia (5/4-10/68)"]	5/9/68	A
#54 memo	Rostow to President, 2:25 p.m. C 1 p <i>Sanitized 9/13/00 NLJ 97-329</i> [Duplicate of #56a, NSF, CF, VN, "2C(10), 5/68, General Military Activity"]	5/9/68	A

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#54a cable	Intelligence Information Cable Sanitized 3-2-00 NLJ 97-325 C 5 p [Duplicate of #80, NSF, CF, VN, "TCDS and Cables, Vol. 1"]	5/9/68	A
<del>#57 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 11:45 a.m. S 1 p open 1-10-95 NLJ 94-156</del>	<del>5/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#58 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 11:20 a.m. Open NLJ 97-333 7-8-78 S 1 p</del>	<del>5/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#58a cable</del>	<del>Saigon 26832- Open NLJ 77-331 3-19-77 S 1 p</del>	<del>5/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#59 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 10:50 a.m. Open 3/13/03 N451KAC 00-408 S 1 p</del>	<del>5/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#59a cable</del>	<del>CTG 77.5 to NMCC Open 3/98 NLJ 97-322 S 1 p</del>	<del>5/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#59b cable	Intelligence Cable sani RAC 5103 S- 1 p	undated	A
<del>#59c cable</del>	<del>CTG 77.5 to NMCC Open 3/98 NLJ 97-322 S 1 p</del>	<del>5/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#59d cable	Intelligence Cable sani RAC 5103 S- 1 p	5/9/68	A
#59e cable	Intelligence Cable sani RAC 5103 S- 1 p	5/8/68	A
#59f cable	Intelligence Cable sani RAC 5103 S- 1 p	5/8/68	A
<del>#62 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President S 1 p OPEN 7/26/98 NY 94-18 [Duplicate of #10d, NSF, CF, Chile, "Filed by the LBJ Library"]</del>	<del>5/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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#62a rpt	<p>Santiago 3535  <del>C</del> 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-331 5-19-99</i>                      [Duplicate of #10d-1, NSF, CF, Chile, "Filed by the LBJ Library"]</p>	<del>5/6/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#64 memo	<p>Rostow to President                      S- 1 p <i>Sanitized S-4-04 NW/PAC 03-204</i></p>	5/9/68	A
#64a memo	<p>Intelligence Memorandum                      S- 4 p <i>Sanitized S-4-04 NW/PAC 03-205</i></p>	5/9/68	A

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*Pres J. Lee*

Tuesday, May 14, 1968  
7:00 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Westy's assessment of current posture and the shape of things to come.

The lineup of combat effective battalions looks like this:

	<u>Enemy</u>	<u>Friendly</u>
I Corps	47	94
II Corps	25-28	61
III Corps	14-17	90
IV Corps	<u>11-13</u>	<u>43</u>
Total	97-105	293

Our 3 to 1 advantage plus airpower and logistics support will enable Westy:

- to maintain ongoing offensive operations in all four corps
- to launch attacks in the Hue-Quang Tri area next week using troops redeployed from the Ashau operation
- to launch a 2-regimental attack west of Danang on 21 May
- to pursue units withdrawing from Saigon area
- to conduct a series of battalion and multi-battalion sweeps in IV Corps
- to reinforce the Highlands in the event of enemy attack

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachments

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLJ-CBS 23  
By isa, NARS, Date 6-29-84

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
MESSAGE CENTER

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CALL 53337  
FOR NMCC/HC  
SERVICE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4  
By ap/hg, NARA, Date 6-9-92

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TO RUEKDA/CJCS

RUHKA/CINCPAC

INFO RUMJIR/AMEMB SAIGON

RUFNCR/AMEMB PARIS

BT

LIMDIS  
IMMEDIATE

~~TOP SECRET~~ LIMDIS 13635 CAS PARIS FOR

LTG GOODPASTER. SEC 1 OF III

SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY POSITION AND FORECAST OF OPERATIONS (U)

REF: JCS MSG 092254 MAY 68 (TS).

1. (C) THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES THE INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT ALLIED AND ENEMY MILITARY POSTURE WHICH WAS REQUESTED BY THE REFERENCED MESSAGE. IN ADDITION A FORECAST OF FORTHCOMING OPERATIONS IS INCLUDED; A SIMILAR MESSAGE WILL BE SUBMITTED WEEKLY BASED ON A REPORTING PERIOD FROM 0001 SUNDAY TO 2400 HOURS SATURDAY, SAIGON TIME AND WILL BE DISPATCHED TO ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON EACH MONDAY BY 0800 HOURS LOCAL TIME, ADDITIONALLY, A DAILY UPDATE WILL BE SUBMITTED TUESDAY THROUGH SUNDAY. THESE REPORTS WILL CONSIST OF THREE PARTS, PART I WILL BE AN APPRAISAL OF THE RELATIVE ENEMY AND FRIENDLY SITUATION, PART II WILL CONSIST OF AN ESTIMATE OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND PART III WILL BE A FORECAST OF PROJECTED OPERATIONS.

2. (S) PART ONE (APPRAISAL OF ENEMY AND FRIENDLY SITUATION)

A. ENEMY SITUATION,

(1) THE RECENT FLURRY OF ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY REPRESENTS THE THIRD PHASE OF HIS 1967-68 WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN, HIS RECENT EFFORT IS BEST UNDERSTOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CAUSES AND GOALS OF HIS WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN,

(2) WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE ENEMY'S OVERLY AMBITIOUS AND EXTREMELY COSTLY OFFENSIVES SEEN THIS YEAR HAVE THEIR ROOTS IN DESPERATION AND WEAKNESS. SINCE LATE 1966 ENEMY PERSONNEL LOSSES HAVE EXCEEDED HIS INPUT FROM ALL SOURCES. NET LOSSES IN 1967

*Handwritten number 32*

ACT: J3-8(1-8)

INFO: CJCS 1(9) DJS 3(10 12) SJCS 3(13 15) J4 3(16-18) J5 2(19 20)

J6 1(21) DIA 2(22 23) CSA-1(24) CNO-2(25 26) CSAF-1(27)

CMC 3(28 30) FILE 1(31)/HAF/MY

EX COPY: CJCS-1 (32) 13 MAY 68 (WARMOUTH)

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
MESSAGE CENTER

WERE PROBABLY ABOUT 54,000 MEN. DURING THIS PERIOD HIS CONTROL OF POPULATION HAS STEADILY DECLINED, REDUCING HIS IN-COUNTRY SOURCES OF MANPOWER, FOOD, AND TAX REVENUES. HE CONTINUALLY FAILED TO ACHIEVE MAJOR POLITICALLY EXPLOITABLE MILITARY VICTORIES AND HIS ATTEMPTS BECAME INCREASINGLY COSTLY. AS A RESULT, IT APPEARS THAT IN MID-1967 THE ENEMY MADE A MAJOR REVISION OF HIS STRATEGY. HE PLANNED A CAMPAIGN AIMED AT THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FREE WORLD RESISTANCE, ACCEPTING OTHERWISE UNTENABLE MILITARY RISKS TO ACHIEVE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT. HE HOPED THAT THIS IMPACT WOULD GENERATE POPULAR UPRISING AGAINST THE GVN, DISAFFECTION OF GVN ARMED FORCES, AND COLLAPSE OF US DETERMINATION TO PURSUE THE WAR.

THUS THE STAGE WOULD BE SET FOR THE FORMATION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT WITH A STRUCTURE FAVORABLE TO THE COMMUNISTS. IN THE FIRST TWO PHASES OF THIS CAMPAIGN, THE ENEMY SUFFERED SEVERE MILITARY DEFEAT. WE HAVE EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT THE ENEMY BELIEVES WORLD-WIDE OPINION HAS CREDITED HIM WITH A PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY. THIS BELIEF, AND THE IMMINENCE OF DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITH THE US AND POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS, WE BELIEVE HAVE GREATLY INFLUENCED THE FORM AND TIMING OF HIS MOST RECENT ATTACKS.

(3) IN THE THIRD PHASE OF THE ENEMY'S WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN INITIATED ON 5 MAY, HE ATTEMPTED ESSENTIALLY A REPEAT OF THE TET FORMULA. HE STILL FOUGHT TO CAUSE DISINTEGRATION OF RVNAF AND COLLAPSE OF THE GVN, AND TO SPARK SOME SORT OF GENERAL UPRISING, BUT RECENT ATTACKS WERE LESS INTENSE, ESPECIALLY IN II AND IV CTZS, WHERE MOST ATTACKS AMOUNTED TO LITTLE MORE THAN HARASSMENT. HE SUSTAINED HIS OFFENSIVE EFFORT IN TWO AREAS--SAIGON, AND THE COASTAL REGION OF NORTHERN I CTZ, FROM HUE TO DONG HA. THE MAJOR ENEMY THREAT IN SOUTH VIETNAM STILL EXISTS IN THESE TWO AREAS, AND ADDITIONALLY IN KONTUM PROVINCE OF THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS, WHERE THE ENEMY HAS STRONG, BUT YET UNCOMMITTED FORCES.

(4) IN I CTZ THE ENEMY HAS A TOTAL EQUIVALENT OF 47 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALIONS. AT KHE SANH, THE ENEMY HAS THE EQUIVALENT OF FOUR COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALIONS. HERE HE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE HARASSING ATTACKS ON FRIENDLY POSITIONS. IN THE AREA FROM THE EASTERN DMZ SOUTH THROUGH QUANG TRI CITY TO BASE AREA 101, THE ENEMY HAS 14 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS. HERE HIS OFFENSIVE PLANS HAVE BEEN DISRUPTED, AND WE EXPECT HEAVY

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ATTACKS BY FIRE AND AMBUSHES WHILE THE ENEMY REGROUPS. IN THE HU REGION, THE ENEMY IS ESTIMATED TO HAVE THE EQUIVALENT OF 11 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALIONS. IN THIS AREA, FRIENDLY OPERATIONS HAVE INHIBITED THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE EFFORTS BUT HE HAS SHOWN MUCH PERSISTENCE IN SPITE OF OVERWHELMING ODDS AGAINST SUCCESS. WE EXPECT HIM TO CONTINUE HIS ATTEMPTS TO PENETRATE HUE OR POSSIBLY QUANG TRI CITY, AS HE TRIES TO SALVAGE A PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY. IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN I CTZ THE ENEMY CONTROLS THE EQUIVALENT OF 18 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALIONS. HIS FORCES IN THESE AREAS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE IN POSITION TO LAUNCH MAJOR ATTACKS BUT ARE CAPABLE OF ATTACKING OUTLYING POSITIONS.

(5) IN II CTZ THE ENEMY CONTROLS 25-28 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALIONS. HERE THE GREATEST THREAT EXISTS IN WESTERN KONTUM PROVINCE, WHERE HE HAS THE EQUIVALENT OF 14 TO 15 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALIONS. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO STRONG INDICATIONS OF IMMINENT ATTACK, HIS UNITS ARE DEPLOYED AND ARE CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING MAJOR ATTACKS IN THE BEN HET/DAK TO/POLEI KLENG AREA WITH KONTUM CITY THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE. AN ATTACK AT ANY TIME IS POSSIBLE; HOWEVER, THE ENEMY MAY PLAN ACTION IN THIS AREA AS A FOLLOW-ON TO THE PRESENT PHASE, WHEN INCREASINGLY POOR WEATHER MAY HAMPER FRIENDLY AIR OPERATIONS. IN DARLAC PROVINCE, THE ENEMY CONTINUES ATTACK PREPARATIONS AND MAY ATTACK BAN ME THUOT CONCURRENTLY WITH A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN KONTUM PROVINCE. ELSEWHERE IN II CTZ, ENEMY HARRASSMENT ACTIVITY AND ATTACKS BY FIRE ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE.

(6) IN III CTZ THE ENEMY MAINTAINS THE EQUIVALENT OF 14 TO 17 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALIONS. THE ENEMY'S MAJOR EFFORT IN HIS RECENT OFFENSIVE PHASE WAS AGAINST SAIGON WHERE MOST OF HIS MAJOR UNITS IN III CTZ WERE PRESENT, OR IN THE ADJOINING PROVINCES. THE WEAKNESS OF HIS OFFENSIVE EFFORT WAS UNDOUBTEDLY DUE TO HIS MARGINAL ABILITY TO EFFECT COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND TO THE LOSSES INFLICTED BY FRIENDLY FORCES WHILE HIS UNITS WERE MOVING TO AND FROM THEIR STAGING AREAS. IN SPITE OF HIS LACK OF SUCCESS, THE NEED FOR SOME FORM OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY MAY IMPEL HIM TO RENEW HIS EFFORTS AGAINST THE CITY. WE EXPECT ATTACKS BY FIRE AGAINST TAN SON NHUT AND OTHER INSTALLATIONS IN THE SAIGON-BIEN HOA AREA TO CONTINUE.

(7) IN IV CTZ, THE ENEMY HAS 11 TO 13 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS. SINCE THE MAJORITY OF ENEMY FORCES WERE

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WERE NOT COMMITTED DURING THE RECENT OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY, HE RETAINS THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH MULTI-BATTALION ASSAULTS AGAINST SUCH URBAN TARGETS AS MY THO AND CAN THO. CONSTANT FRIENDLY PRESSURE IS LIMITING HIS ABILITY TO MANEUVER AND MASS FOR LARGE SCALE ATTACKS; NEVERTHELESS, ATTEMPTS TO LAUNCH LARGE SCALE GROUND ATTACKS CANNOT BE RULED OUT. HARASSING ATTACKS BY FIRE AND INTERDICTION OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION PROBABLY WILL CONTINUE.

B. FRIENDLY SITUATION.

(1) I CTZ.

(A) THERE ARE 94 MANEUVER BATTALIONS AVAILABLE WITHIN I CTZ TO COUNTER THE ENEMY'S 47 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS.

(B) IN THE KHE SANH AREA, A MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FORCE IS BEING

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LTG GOODPASTER, SEC II OF III  
THE LAND LOC TO THE BASE REMAINS OPEN,  
(C) OPERATION DELAWARE/LAMSON 216 IN THE A SHAU VALLEY HAS  
ACHIEVED ITS OBJECTIVES WITH THE DESTRUCTION OF SIGNIFICANT ENEMY  
FORCES, SUPPLIES AND VEHICLES AND THE DISRUPTION OF HIS ATTEMPTS TO  
USE THE VALLEY AS A STAGING AREA. THEREFOJE, DURING THE NEXT SE  
DAYS WE WILL BE WITHDRAWING FORCES FROM THE A SHAU VALLEY FOR  
EMPLOYMENT ON THE COASTAL PLAIN.  
(D) IN THE COASTAL AREAS OUR FORCES ARE IN SUFFICIENT STRENGTH  
TO DEFEAT ENEMY FORCES IN THOSE AREAS.  
(E) IN THE SOUTHWESTERN REGION OF THE CTZ WE HAVE WITHDRAWN  
SCREENING AND CONTUNGENCY FORCES FROM THE BASE AT NGOK TAVAK AND  
KHAM DUC WHICH CAME UNDER ENEMY MORTAR/GROUND ATTACK FOR EMPLOYMENT  
ELSEWHERE IN I CTZ.  
(2) II CTZ.  
(A) THERE ARE 61 MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN II CTZ TO COUNTER THE  
ENEMY'S 25-28 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS.  
(B) FORCES ARE PRESENTLY POSITIONED IN AN OPTIMUM POSTURE TO  
MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THE HEAVILY POPULATED COASTAL AREA AND TO  
MEET THE POTENTIAL ENEMY THREAT IN THE HIGHLANDS. WE HAVE  
CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR REINFORCEMENT IN THE HIGHLANDS, IF  
REQUIRED, FROM RESOURCES BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TO II CTZ.

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HOWEVER, IT IS NOT INTENDED TO REDEPLOY SUCH FORCES UNLESS THE THREAT THERE ACTUALLY DEVELOPS.

(3) III CTZ

(A) THERE ARE 90 MANEUVER BATTALIONS AVAILABLE WITHIN III CTZ TO COUNTER THE ENEMY'S 14-17 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS. THIS PROVIDES US WITH THE MOST FAVORABLE FORCE RATIO OF THE FOUR CORPS TACTICAL ZONES.

(B) OUR FORCES ARE CONCENTRATING THEIR EFFORTS AROUND THE CITY OF SAIGON AND OUR LARGE BASE COMPLEX AT BIEN HOA. A MAJORITY OF THESE FORCES ARE ENGAGED IN OFFENSIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS TO BREAK THE ENEMY INITIATIVE, REDUCE HIS FORCES, AND INFLICT MAXIMUM DAMAGE WHEREVER LOCATED.

(4) IV CTZ

(A) THERE ARE 48 MANEUVER BATTALIONS OPERATING IN IV CTZ AGAINST THE ENEMY'S 11-13 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS.

(B) AMERICAN PRESENCE HAS RECENTLY BEEN INCREASED IN THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THIS CTZ WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE OF THE 9TH DIVISION TO THE AREA. THIS IS IN FACT AN EXTENSION OF THE LONG AN BATTLE WHICH IS TAKING PLACE ALONG THE III/IV CORPS BOUNDARY.

(C) RIVERINE OPERATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED AT A HIGH TEMPO UTILIZING BOTH US AND RVN FORCES TO FERRET OUT ENEMY ELEMENTS IN DIFFICULT TO REACH SANCTUARIES IN THE INUNDATED AREAS OF THE DELTA.

(D) PBR BOAT PATROLS HAVE BEEN EXPANDED TO INCLUDE THE UPPER MEKONG AND BASSAC RIVERS NEAR THE CAMBODIAN BORDER.

(5) SUPPORTING AIR OPERATIONS.

(A) TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS ARE ORIENTED TOWARD HEAVY INTERDICTION OF ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATION BOTH DAY AND NIGHT TO EXPLOIT DETERIORATING ROAD CONDITIONS CAUSED BY INCREASING RAINS IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. MUSCLE SHOALS OPERATIONS ARE AUGMENTING THE INTERDICTION EFFORT. IN SOUTH VIETNAM TACTICAL AIR SUPPORTS GROUND OPERATIONS ON A CONTINUING BASIS. RECENT NORMAL LEVELS OF EFFORT IN TERMS OF TACTICAL AIR STRIKE SORTIES DAILY REFLECT A TOTAL OF 641 SORTIES. IN THE EVENT OF A REQUIREMENT TO OPERATE AT MAXIMUM CAPABILITY FOR A SHORT PERIOD, WE COULD MOUNT

APPROXIMATELY 900 SORTIES A DAY, DIRECTED AS THE SITUATION WARRANTS.

(B) B-52 SORTIES SUPPLEMENT THE TAC AIR EFFORT CONCENTRATING ON TRUCK PARKS AND STORAGE AREAS AND TROOP CONCENTRATIONS.

B-52 SORTIES RECENTLY HAVE BEEN AVERAGING 59 SORTIES A DAY.

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3. (S) PART TWO (ENEMY CAPABILITIES)

A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES SHOWS THAT HE CAN CONTINUE HIS PRESENT EFFORT IN NORTHEASTERN I CTZ AND IN CENTRAL III CTZ, AND CAN INITIATE A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WHILE WE BELIEVE HE LACKS THE CAPABILITY FOR SIGNIFICANT MILITARY SUCCESS, HE MAY CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS IN SPITE OF HEAVY LOSSES, TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT. THE ENEMY ALWAYS RETAINS THE CAPABILITY TO ATTACK ISOLATED SPECIAL FORCES OUTPOSTS.

B. THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES FOR MORE WIDESPREAD OR INTENSIVE ATTACKS ARE PROSCRIBED BY SEVERAL NOTABLE WEAKNESSES. A MAJOR ENEMY PROBLEM IS THAT OF PERSONNEL. HIS HEAVY LOSSES AND DEPLETION OF IN-COUNTRY PERSONNEL SOURCES HAVE FORCED INCREASING RELIANCE ON INFILTRATION FROM NORTH VIETNAM. WE SEE EVIDENCE OF EXPANDED INFILTRATION TO COUNTER THIS DEFICIT, AND IT APPEARS THAT THE ENEMY IS CYCLING HIS INFILTRATION IN COORDINATION WITH HIS OFFENSIVE PHASES, TO PROVIDE LARGE NUMBERS OF REPLACEMENTS PRIOR TO EACH MAJOR EFFORT. THUS A SURGE OF REPLACEMENTS ARRIVED PRIOR TO TET, MORE DURING MARCH AND APRIL, AND THERE IS EVIDENCE OF HEAVY INFILTRATION NOW UNDERWAY PERHAPS IN PREPARATION FOR NEW OFFENSIVES IN JULY OR AUGUST. MANY OF HIS RECENT REPLACEMENTS, HOWEVER, ARE YOUTHFUL AND ILL-TRAINED, AND THEY ARE BEING COMMITTED TO COMBAT WITH LITTLE TIME FOR INTEGRATION OR TRAINING WITH THEIR UNITS. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS IN RECENT MONTHS OF MANY EXPERIENCED LEADERS AND CADRE, HAS RESULTED IN A QUALITATIVE DETERIORATION.

C. THERE ARE WEAKNESSES IN THE ENEMY'S LOGISTIC SYSTEM. WHILE HE IS APPARENTLY CAPABLE OF BRINGING ADEQUATE QUANTITIES OF MUNITIONS TO HIS BORDER BASE AREAS, WE ARE AWARE THAT HE HAS DIFFICULTY IN SUPPLYING HIS FORCES. HIS ATTEMPTS TO PRE-POSITION MUNITIONS IN OBJECTIVE AREAS ARE OFTEN THWARTED BY OUR DISCOVERY OF HIS CACHES, AND HE IS OFTEN INCAPABLE OF RESUPPLYING COMMITTED UNITS AS A RESULT OF OUR INTERDICTION OF HIS INTERNAL SUPPLY ROUTES. FOOD SHORTAGES IN SOME AREAS HAVE REDUCED HIS COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, AND HE HAS BEEN FORCED TO DIVERT SOME COMBAT UNITS TO FOOD PRODUCTION. IN MANY AREAS HE SUFFERS SHORTAGES OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

D. MAJOR ENEMY VULNERABILITIES THEREFORE EXIST IN HIS LONG LINES OF COMMUNICATION OVER WHICH HE RECEIVES MEN AND SUPPLIES. THESE ROUTES ARE VULNERABLE TO FRIENDLY AIR OPERATIONS, AND GROUND

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INTERDICTION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM, HE IS ALSO VULNERABLE TO ACTION WHICH DENIES HIM ACCESS TO THE POPULATION AS A SOURCE OF IN-COUNTRY SUPPORT. AS A RESULT OF RECENT HEAVY LOSSES AND FAILURE TO ACHIEVE HIS OBJECTIVES, HE IS VULNERABLE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AIMED AT INDUCING DESERTION AND DEFECTION. FINALLY, HE IS VULNERABLE TO ALLIED MILITARY OPERATIONS, ESPECIALLY WHEN HE LEAVES HIS BASE AREAS AND SANCTUARIES AND ATTEMPTS TO MASS FOR ATTACK, AS IS NOW THE CASE IN SEVERAL AREAS.

E. THE MAJOR DETERMINANTS OF FUTURE ENEMY CAPABILITIES ARE THE NUMBER AND QUALITY OF HIS TROOPS AND HIS ABILITY TO SUPPORT THEM LOGISTICALLY. THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY TO CHANGE THE PRESENT SITUATION TO HIS ADVANTAGE THUS RESTS ON SEVERAL FACTORS, INCLUDING HIS ABILITY TO INFILTRATE MEN AND MATERIEL, THE FUTURE LEVEL OF COMBAT.

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AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH HE GAINS IN-COUNTRY SUPPORT FROM THE POPULACE?

F. THE MAJOR INFILTRATION SURGE NOW UNDERWAY, ESTIMATED AT ABOUT 12,000 MEN PER MONTH, COULD BE REFLECTED IN PEAK ENEMY UNIT STRENGTHS IN JULY. IF HIS LOSSES CONTINUE AT ABOUT THE APRIL RATE, THE EXPECTED INFLUX COULD RESULT IN THE MAINTENANCE OF HIS UNIT STRENGTH THROUGH THE SUMMER MONTHS, DESPITE HIS HEAVY INFILTRATION. HE IS LOSING MEN AT ABOUT AN EQUAL RATE. SHOULD HE BE ABLE TO OBTAIN RESPIRE FROM THE MILITARY OPERATIONS NOW DEPLETING HIS STRENGTH, HIS RANKS WOULD RAPIDLY SWELL AS A RESULT OF THE INFILTRATION. THE ENEMY'S COMBINED INFILTRATION AND RECRUITMENT MAY CURRENTLY BE APPROACHING 20,000 MEN PER MONTH.

G. AS THE APPROACHING MONSOON SEASON CAUSES DETERIORATION OF DRY WEATHER ROADS IN LAOS, THE ENEMY WILL ENCOUNTER INCREASING DIFFICULTY IN MOVING SUPPLIES TO HIS BORDER BASE AREAS; AND HIS ABILITY TO MOVE TOWED AND TRACKED WEAPONS INTO SOUTH VIETNAM WILL BE REDUCED. WE BELIEVE ENEMY ABILITY TO OBTAIN IN-COUNTRY SUPPORT WILL CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE IN SPITE OF HIS EFFORTS TO REVERSE THE TREND.

4. (TS) PART THREE (FORECAST OF OPERATIONS)

A. IN I CTZ, IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF THE DMZ, A U.S. MARINE DIVISION AND AN ARVN DIVISION ARE CONDUCTING ON-GOING OPERATIONS TO PREVENT ENEMY INFILTRATION FROM NORTH VIETNAM; TO FIND, FIX, AND DESTROY THE ENEMY, HIS FACILITIES AND LOGISTICS INSTALLATIONS; AND TO KEEP OPEN THE VITAL LAND LOGS. ~~ALONG THE COAST, U.S. ARMY.~~

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MARINE AND ARVN ELEMENTS CONTINUE PREEMPT DENIAL OPERATIONS AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE MAJOR PORTS, LOGISTICS INSTALLATIONS AND HIGHWAYS IN ZONE. BY 20 MAY, THE CAID INTO THE A SHAU VALLEY IN WESTERN I CTZ WILL BE TERMINATED WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE LAST OF U.S. AND ARVN BATTALIONS. THESE UNITS WILL BE DEPLOYED IN THE VICINITY OF HUE-QUANG TRI TO SEEK OUT THE ENEMY BASE AREAS AND TO DISRUPT HIS COMBAT POTENTIAL. IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF I CTZ, A U.S. ARMY DIVISION, A U.S. MARINE DIVISION, AND ARVN DIVISION AND AN ROK MARINE BRIGADE HAVE THE CONTINUING MISSION OF SEARCHING AND CLEARING AND PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE PRIMARY LOC AND LOGISTICS AREAS. ON 21-31 MAY, TWO U.S. MARINE REGIMENTS WILL ATTACK WEST OF DANANG TO ELIMINATE THE ENEMY MAIN FORCE THREAT IN THE AREA.

B. IN THE COASTAL LOWLANDS OF II CTZ, ELEMENTS OF TWO ARVN AND TWO ROK DIVISIONS AND A U.S. AIRBORNE BRIGADE WILL CONTINUE TO CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE TO SEEK OUT, ISOLATE AND DESTROY VC/NVA UNITS OPERATING FROM BASE AREAS CONTIGUOUS TO THE DENSELY POPULATED AND ECONOMICALLY IMPORTANT COASTAL PLAIN, CONCURRENTLY, THEY WILL CONDUCT NUMEROUS CORDON AND SEARCH AND SEARCH AND CLEAR OPERATIONS AS PART OF A CONTINUING ATTACK AGAINST THE VC POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN SUPPORT OF THE GVN PACIFICATION EFFORT. IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS OF II CTZ, ONE U.S. DIVISION AND AN ARVN REGIMENT ~~PHC265GIME~~

WILL CONTINUE PRESENT OPERATIONS TO PREEMPT THE ENEMY'S BUILDUP IN THE REMOTE AREAS OF THE WESTERN PROVINCES AND TO SECURE THE PROVINCIAL TOWNS AND LAND LOC.

C. IN III CTZ, OPERATIONS FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE WILL CONTINUE TO BE CONCENTRATED IN THE PROVINCES AROUND SAIGON AND AIMED AT DEFEATING SCATTERED VC/NVA UNITS AS SOON AS THE ENEMY BEGINS WITHDRAWING THE REMNANTS OF HIS MAIN FORCES TO BASE OR BORDER AREAS TO REGROUP AND RESUPPLY. INDIVIDUAL OPERATIONS WILL BE UNDERTAKEN TO INTERCEPT, BLOCK AND DESTROY THESE FORCES ALONG THEIR ROUTES OF WITHDRAWAL. ALL OPERATIONS WILL BE REPORTED UNDER THE GENERAL OPERATIONAL NAME TOAN THANG. SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THIS OPERATION WILL INCLUDE:

(1) ARVN FORCES, COMPRISING THREE DIVISIONS, WILL CONTINUE THEIR PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF SAIGON, PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CITIES, AND OPERATING OFFENSIVELY TO DRIVE THE ENEMY AWAY

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FROM THE ENVIRONS OF THE DENSELY POPULATED AREAS.

(2) ELEMENTS OF THREE U.S. INFANTRY DIVISIONS, AN ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT, AND AN AIRBORNE BRIGADE WILL CONTINUE MULTIBATTALION-SIZE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE ARVN AS THE ENEMY IS DRIVEN AWAY, THESE UNITS WILL ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITIONS ALONG THE ENEMY ROUTES OF WITHDRAWAL TOWARDS THE BORDER AND CAMBODIAN SANCTUARIES.

(3) THE AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE IS DEPLOYING TO BLOCKING POSITIONS 30 MILES EAST OF SAIGON TO ENGAGE THE ENEMY MOVING TO AND FROM HIS BASE AREAS. THE ROYAL THAI ARMY VOLUNTEER REGIMENT, OPERATING IN THE CTZ NORTH AND EAST OF SAIGON, WILL CONDUCT PATROLLING AND LIMITED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

(4) CIDG ELEMENTS ARE NOW DEPLOYED ALONG THE RIVER AND LAND LOC TO INTERCEPT THE VERY HEAVY INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION MOVING TO AND FROM CAMBODIA. U.S. BATTALIONS MAY BE COMMITTED NEAR THE BORDER IF THE ENEMY MAKES A MAJOR EFFORT TO NEUTRALIZE THE CIDG FORCES BLOCKING HIS RETREAT.

(5) SINCE THE ENEMY CAN BE EXPECTED TO ATTACK LOC, PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CAPITALS AS WELL AS MILITARY INSTALLATION, SUDDEN ENGAGEMENTS IN OR AROUND POPULATION CENTERS ANY WHERE IN III CTZ SHOULD BE EXPECTED AS US/FW/ARVN FORCES RESPOND TO VC/NVA ATTACKS AND GAIN CONTACT WITH ENEMY UNITS.

N

D. THROUGHOUT IV CTZ, THREE ARVN DIVISIONS WILL CONDUCT A SERIES OF PROVINCE-LEVEL COMBAT SWEEPS OF BATTALION AND MULTIBATTALION SIZE TO LOCATE AND DESTROY VC PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES IN BASE AND FORWARD OPERATING AREAS. IN NORTHERN IV CTZ, ON 13-20 MAY, A HIGHLY MOBILE U.S. AND ARVN TASK FORCE, OPERATING IN CONJUNCTION WITH INDIGENOUS FORCES, WILL CONDUCT A COMBAT SWEEP ALONG THE CAMBODIAN BORDER EAST OF THE MEKONG RIVER. THE PURPOSE OF THE SWEEP IS TO INTERDICT THE ENEMY'S LOC FROM HIS CAMBODIAN BASE AREAS. ON 17-18 MAY, THE ARVN RIVER ASSAULT GROUP, WILL CONDUCT A COMBAT SWEEP TO CLEAR A MAJOR CANAL IN CENTRAL IV CTZ. FROM 13-31 MAY, THE U.S. MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE OF ONE BRIGADE WILL CONDUCT A SERIES OF RIVERINE ASSAULTS AND COMBAT SWEEPS IN THE EASTERN PORTION OF IV CTZ AND WILL BE TARGETED AGAINST ENEMY UNITS AS DEVELOPED BY CURRENT INTELLIGENCE. CONCURRENTLY, A U.S. BRIGADE WILL CONDUCT INTENSIVE DAY AND NIGHT OPERATIONS TO DESTROY SMALL GUERRILLA BANDS OPERATING ALONG HIGHWAY 4 SOUTHWEST OF SAIGON. GP-4

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*Pres file*  
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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, May 14, 1968  
7:30 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached at Tab A is Harriman's proposed statement for tomorrow.

At Tab B is Sect. Rusk's recommended redrafting of the key passage at the end in which we identify areas of similarity in our respective positions.

I have been working with Sect. Rusk and Bill Bundy on this. I think the re-draft is an improvement.

The only element I would consider adding to the instructions is giving Averell encouragement to show a certain amount of fire when he comes to the Geneva Accords of 1962. Specifically, he might recall for the benefit of Mr. Thuy that he personally negotiated those Accords; they were signed by the DRV; they were not honored for a single day by the DRV; that their violation has been the proximate cause of this bloody stage of the war; and that he does not intend to sell that horse twice.

As you know, we are on a short time fuse with this cable since Averell needs it for tomorrow morning Paris time.

SECRET attachments

*W. A. Rostow*

Sect. Rusk's draft approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

Unleash Averell \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 97-333**  
**By is, NARA Date 9-8-98**

\* *Clare Clifford*  
*agrees with*  
*Sect. Rusk's*  
*text.*  
*He also approves*  
*Harriman*  
*suggestion, if we*  
*give Harriman*  
*freedom to decide*  
*it/*

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-331  
By us, NARA Date 3-14-99

1. FOLLOWING ARE THE DRAFT NOTES FOR MAY 15 MEETING. PARTICULAR EMPHASIS HAS BEEN GIVEN TO QUESTION OF TERRORISM AND COERCION, MOST VIVIDLY IN THE ATTACKS ON SAIGON. WE DELIBERATELY DO NOT ADDRESS THE SUBJECT OF A BOMBING CESSATION, ALTHOUGH, OF COURSE, THE OTHER SIDE WILL PROBABLY DO SO.

2. BEGIN TEXT

NOTES FOR MEETING, MAY 15

IN OUR LAST MEETING WE AGREED TO STUDY EACH OTHER'S OPENING STATEMENTS. I HAVE EXAMINED YOUR REMARKS WITH GREAT CARE.

I REGRET THAT YOU FELT IT NECESSARY TO BEGIN THESE TALKS WITH A LENGTHY AND DISTORTED RENDITION OF HISTORY. WE ARE HERE TO RESOLVE OUR PRESENT DIFFERENCES, AND TO BUILD A PEACE IN VIETNAM. THEREFORE, TO REHASH OLD ACCUSATIONS, TO REKINDLE OLD CONTROVERSIES -- AND, ABOVE ALL, TO REWRITE HISTORY -- IS AN UNNECESSARY AND UNFORTUNATE WAY TO BEGIN THESE CONVERSATIONS.

NEVERTHELESS, SINCE YOU RAISED THE ISSUE I MUST STATE THAT WE REJECT YOUR INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY.

I INTEND TODAY TO DISCUSS AREAS IN YOUR STATEMENT WITH WHICH WE ARE IN AGREEMENT, AND OUTLINE FURTHER ACTIONS WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE VITAL TO PEACE IN VIETNAM. BUT BEFORE I DO, I AM OBLIGED TO MAKE SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FOURTEEN YEARS AND ON THE LEGALITY OF OUR PRESENCE IN VIETNAM.

II

CONTRARY TO THE FALSE AND GRIM PICTURE YOU PAINTED MONDAY, THE YEARS FROM 1955 TO 1960 WERE A TIME OF GROWTH AND PROGRESS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. PER-CAPITAL FOOD OUTPUT INCREASED MORE THAN 20 PERCENT -- WHILE IT WAS DROPPING 10 PERCENT IN THE NORTH. TEXTILE PRODUCTION INCREASED DRAMATICALLY -- MORE THAN 20 PERCENT IN 1958 ALONE. SUGAR PRODUCTION WENT UP 100 PERCENT.

THE REFUGEES WHO HAD FLED FROM COMMUNIST RULE IN THE NORTH WERE RESETTLED PEACEFULLY IN THE SOUTH, IN ONE OF THE MAJOR REFUGEE MOVEMENTS OF OUR TIME.

THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL POPULATION INCREASED FOUR TIMES DURING THOSE YEARS.

AND IN 1960, PERCAPITA INCOME IN THE SOUTH HAD INCREASED TO ABOUT \$110 A PERSON, MORE THAN 50 PERCENT HIGHER THAN IN THE NORTH.

IN SHORT, THERE WAS A STEADY IMPROVEMENT IN THE LIVES OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM. THEY WERE OUTDOING THE NORTH IN PEACEFUL COMPETITION. RECOGNIZING CLEARLY WHAT WAS HAPPENING, THE LEADERS IN HANOI DECIDED IN THE LATE 1950'S TO TURN TO VIOLENCE AND TERROR TO DESTROY THIS PROGRESS, TO CREATE CHAOS, AND THEREBY TAKE CONTROL.

EVENTS IN THE NORTH IN THESE YEARS WERE IN SHARP CONTRAST TO THE PROGRESS IN THE SOUTH. ABOUT 900,00 PEOPLE FLED TO THE SOUTH DURING THE 300 DAYS ALLOWED BY THE GENEVA ACCORDS. FAR MORE WOULD HAVE GONE IF NORTH VIETNAM, IN VIOLATION OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS, HAD NOT STOPPED THEM.

A BRUTAL FARM PROGRAM RESULTED IN THE EXECUTION OF BETWEEN 50,000 AND 100,00 NORTH VIETNAMESE, INCLUDING MANY WHO HAD SERVED IN THE WAR AGAINST THE FRENCH. SO WIDESPREAD WAS THE TERROR THAT EVEN GENERAL GIAP HAD TO ADMIT IN A SPEECH PUBLISHED IN NHAN DAN ON OCTOBER 31, 1956 THAT:

" WE ... EXECUTED TOO MANY HONEST PEOPLE ... TERROR BECAME FAR TOO WIDESPREAD ... WORSE STILL TORTURE CAME TO BE REGARDED AS A NORMAL PRACTICE DURING PARTY ORGANIZATION."

AS A RESULT OF THIS OPPRESSION, IN NOVEMBER 1956 A SPONTANEOUS PEASANT REBELLION BROKE OUT IN PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH'S HOME PROVINCE AND HAD TO BE PUT DOWN BRUTALLY BY MILITARY FORCE.

FACED WITH THE GROWING PROSPERITY AND PROGRESS IN THE SOUTH, NORTH VIETNAM TURNED INCREASINGLY TO ILLEGAL METHODS TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE SOUTH, VIOLATING SEVERAL KEY PROVISIONS OF THE 1954-ACCORDS. IN VIOLATION OF THE 1954 ACCORDS, SUBVERSIVE CADRES WERE LEFT BEHIND. MANY OF THOSE WHO RE-GROUPED NORTH WERE TRAINED IN GUERRILLA WARFARE AND THEN SENT BACK AS TERROR SQUADS AND POLITICAL AGITATORS.

THESE ACTIONS WERE VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 19 WHICH FORBODE EITHER NORTH OR SOUTH VIETNAM TO RESUME "HOSTILITIES OR TO FURTHER AN AGGRESSIVE POLICY." IN JUNE 1962, IN A SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON INDO CHINA, THE LEGAL COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION CONCLUDED:

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[2]

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~~SECRET~~ PARIS 14020 SECTION 2 OF 2.

NODIS/HARVAN

DELTO 45

"THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT ARMED AND UNARMED PERSONNEL, ARMS, MUNITIONS AND OTHER SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN SENT FROM THE ZONE IN THE NORTH TO THE ZONE IN THE SOUTH WITH THE OBJECT OF SUPPORTING, ORGANIZING, AND CARRYING OUT HOSTILE ACTIVITIES, INCLUDING ARMED ATTACKS DIRECTED AGAINST THE ARMED FORCES AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE ZONE IN THE SOUTH. THESE ACTS ARE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 10, 19, 24 AND 27 OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN VIET-NAM.

"THE COMMITTEE ... HAS COME TO THE FURTHER CONCLUSION THAT THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE PAVN HAS ALLOWED THE ZONE IN THE NORTH TO BE USED FOR INCITING, ENCOURAGING AND SUPPORTING HOSTILE ACTIVITIES OF THE ZONE IN THE SOUTH AIMED AT THE OVERTHROW OF THE ADMINISTRATION IN THE SOUTH. THE USE OF THE ZONE IN THE NORTH FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 19, 24 AND 27 OF THE AGREEMENT OF CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN VIETNAM."

[3]

THE INTRODUCTION OF FORCES AND WEAPONS FROM THE NORTH INTO SOUTH VIETNAM, THE ARMED ATTACKS UPON THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM, THE VIOLATION OF THE TERRITORY OF SOUTH VIETNAM, AND THE COERCION AND INTERFERENCE WITH THE LIVES OF ITS PEOPLE-- ALL THESE CONSTITUTE A CLEAR AND IRREFUTABLE VIOLATION OF THE LETTER AND INTENT OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954. THE FUNDAMENTAL INTENT OF THOSE ACCORDS WAS TO BRING AN END TO THE HOSTILITIES, ESTABLISH A DEMARCATION LINE AND A DEMILITARIZED ZONE, ACCOMPLISH A REGROUPING OF FORCES AND MOVEMENTS OF CIVILIANS INTO THE ZONES TO THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF THAT LINE, AND PROVIDE AGAINST THE USE OF THE TWO-ZONES FOR THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES OR TO FURTHER AN AGGRESSIVE POLICY. REUNIFICATION THROUGH PEACEFUL PROCESSES AND FREE CHOICE WAS ENVISAGED.

THE PATH TOWARD RESTORATION OF THE 1954 ACCORDS IS CLEAR. IT IS TO ABANDON THE RESORT TO FORCE, TO RE-ESTABLISH THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, AND SYSTEMATICALLY TO WITHDRAW ALL FORCES OTHER THAN THOSE OF SOUTH VIETNAM FROM ITS TERRITORY, AND FOR THE ISSUE OF REUNIFICATION TO BE SETTLED PEACEFULLY BY THE PEOPLE IN NORTH VIETNAM AND THE PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

OF THE MANY VIOLATIONS OF THE ACCORDS, ONE STANDS OUT IN ITS CALLOUSNESS AND DISREGARD FOR THE INNOCENT MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN WHO WISH TO LIVE THEIR LIVES IN PEACE IN THE SOUTH-- THAT IS THE RELENTLESS AND RUTHLESS ACTS OF TERROR BY NORTH VIETNAM AND BY ITS AGENTS IN THE SOUTH AGAINST THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. AT THIS VERY MOMENT, TERROR ATTACKS DIRECTED AGAINST THE INNOCENT CIVILIANS OF SAIGON ARE TAKING PLACE.

FROM THE END OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE UNTIL TODAY THREE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS HAVE REPEATEDLY MADE CLEAR THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ACTION IN SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE SOUTH IF NORTH VIETNAM VIOLATED THE ACCORDS. ON THE DAY THAT THE ACCORDS WERE SIGNED,

(MORE TO FOLLOW)

SHRIVER  
BT

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

[43]

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1487  
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~~SECRET~~ PARIS/4020 SECTION 3 OF 3 ~~SECRET~~

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NODIS/HARVAN

DELTO 45

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER SAID THAT, "ANY RENEWAL OF COMMUNIST AGGRESSION WOULD BE VIEWED BY US AS A MATTER OF GRAVE CONCERN." ACCORDINGLY, WE HAVE RESPONDED TO THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHVIETNAM FOR ASSISTANCE AS NORTH VIETNAM INCREASED ITS AGGRESSION.

THE INTRODUCTION OF REGULAR UNITS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY PRECEDED THE INTRODUCTION OF US COMBAT FORCES INTO SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE SUSTAINED BOMBING OF THE NORTH.

AS REGARDS THE SITUATION IN LAOS, THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS DETERIORATION FALLS CLEARLY ON THE SHOULDERS OF HANOI. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DID NOT OBSERVE THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1962 AGREEMENTS AND IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THEY NEVER INTENDED TO. WHILE SOVIET AND AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL PRESENTED THEMSELVES TO THE ICC AND WITHDREW AS REQUIRED, ONLY A HANDFUL OF NORTH VIETNAM'S FORCES DID THE SAME. THE REST CYNICALLY, FLAGRANTLY, AND ILLEGALLY STAYED IN LAOS AND VIOLATED THE PEACE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THAT SMALL, NEUTRAL NEIGHBOR. SINCE 1962, THEIR NUMBERS HAVE BEEN INCREASED AND IN FURTHER VIOLATION OF THE 1962 AGREEMENTS THEY HAVE CONTINUOUSLY USED THE TERRITORY OF LAOSUS A CORRIDOR TO SEND MEN AND MATERIAL INTO SOUTH VIETNAM FOR THE PURPOSE OF THEIR AGGRESSION THERE.

THIS IS WHY WE ARE IN VIETNAM. WE EMPHATICALLY REJECT YOUR ATTEMPTS TO MISUSE HISTORY BY REVERSING THE ROLE OF THE AGGRESSOR AND HIS VICTIM. CLEARLY NORTH VIETNAM IS THE AGGRESSOR AND THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM THE VICTIM. WE REJECT YOUR CHARGES THAT WE HAVE NO LEGAL BASIS FOR OUR PRESENCE IN VIETNAM. THE MORAL ISSUE IS THE DISASTROUS SUFFERING THAT YOUR TERROR AND OTHER ACTS HAVE CAUSED TO THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

LET US NOW LOOK TO THE FUTURE AND SEEK A BASIS FOR PEACE. I AM STRUCK BY SOME SIMILARITIES IN OUR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS. LET ME IDENTIFY FOR YOU SOME OF THE AREAS IN WHICH IT SEEMS REASONABLE TO HOPE TO FIND AGREEMENT. I HOPE THERE MAY BE OTHERS BUT I WISH TO SPEAK OF THESE NOW.

[5]

FIRST- WE BOTH SPEAK OF INDEPENDENT, DEMOCRATIC, PEACEFUL, NEUTRAL AND PROSPEROUS SOUTH VIETNAM. ✓

SECOND-- WE BOTH SPEAK OF PEACE ON THE BASIS OF RESPECT OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954-- TO WHICH WE ADD THE 1962 AGREEMENTS ON LAOS.

THIRD-- WE BOTH SPEAK OF LETTING THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF SOUTH VIETNAM BE SETTLED BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES-- WHICH WE WOULD CLARIFY BY ADDING, "WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE OR COERCION."

FOURTH-- WE BOTH SPEAK OF PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF VIETNAM BY THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTH AND THE PEOPLE OF THE SOUTH. IN OUR VIEW THIS MUST BE NOT ONLY PEACEFUL BUT ALSO THROUGH FREE CHOICE; ~~(BUT THIS IS SOMETHING WHICH WE ARE PREPARED TO LEAVE TO THE VIETNAMESE TO SETTLE FOR THEMSELVES.)~~

FIFTH-- WE BOTH SPEAK OF THE NEED FOR STRICT RESPECT OF THE MILITARY PROVISIONS OF THE 1954 ACCORDS.

NOW I WOULD LIKE TO ELABORATE FURTHER ON SOME SPECIFIC AND URGENT STEPS WHICH ARE VITAL TO PEACE.

CERTAINLY ONE OF THE PRIME STEPS TOWARD THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE MILITARY PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS SHOULD BE TO RESTORE TO THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE ITS ORIGINAL AND PROPER STATUS. WE AGREE ON THE LEGAL EXISTENCE OF THAT ZONE AND ITS PRESCRIBED BOUNDARIES. CAN WE NOT AGREE ON MAKING IT FUNCTION THE WAY IT SHOULD? ARE YOU PREPARED TO JOIN IN ACHIEVING THIS? THIS RESTORATION OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AS A BUFFER IS AN ESSENTIAL STEP.

ANOTHER STEP ON WHICH WE SHOULD AGREE IS STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1962 GENEVA AGREEMENTS IN ORDER TO RESTORE THE SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE, NEUTRALITY, UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE KINGDOM OF LAOS.

FINALLY, LET ME EMPHASIZE THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM MUST BE FREE FROM COERCION. NOWHERE IS THIS MORE IMPORTANT THAN IN SAIGON WHERE VICIOUS ATTACKS ARE BEING DIRECTED AGAINST A CIVILIAN POPULATION. THE CONTINUATION OF SUCH ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS IN SAIGON AND ELSEWHERE DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE ATMOSPHERE NEEDED TO MAKE THESE TALKS SUCCESSFUL.

IN CLOSING, I WANT TO REPEAT THE THOUGHTS I EXPRESSED IN MY STATEMENT ON MAY 13. I REQUEST THAT YOU GIVE CAREFUL ATTENTION TO THE AFFIRMATIVE PROPOSALS IN THESE TWO STATEMENTS.

END OF TEXT.

SHRIVER

BT

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[6]

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE BY CHECKING  
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FOR OC/T USE ONLY

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Classification

Origin ACTION: Amembassy PARIS IMMEDIATE

Info INFO: Amembassy SAIGON "

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NODIS/HARVAN

TODEL

**DECLASSIFIED**  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-331  
By js, NARA Date 3-19-97

Ref: Paris 14020

1. We believe Paris should make following revisions in key final pages of reftel. Revised text would be as follows:

QTE Let us now look to the future and seek a basis for peace. I am struck by some similarities in our respective positions. Let me identify for you some of the areas in which it seems reasonable to hope to find agreement. I hope there may be others but I wish to speak of these now.

First, we both speak of independent, democratic, peaceful, and prosperous South Vietnam.

Second -- ~~xxxx~~ you also speak of a neutral South Vietnam. We have no problem with this if it is South Vietnam's wish and if you respect it.

Drafted by: EA: WPBundy:bmm 5/14/68 Tel. No. 4235 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary

DoD-Secretary Clifford  
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Third -- we both speak of peace on the basis of respect of the Geneva Accords of 1954 -- to which we add the 1962 Agreements on Laos.

Fourth -- we both speak of letting the internal affairs of South Vietnam be settled by the South Vietnamese themselves -- which we would clarify by adding, "without outside interference or coercion."

Fifth -- We both speak of the possible reunification of Vietnam by peaceful means. In our view this must be not only peaceful but also through the free choice of the peoples of South Vietnam and of North Vietnam.

Sixth -- We both speak of the need for strict respect of the military provisions of the 1954 Accords.

Now I would like to elaborate further on some specific and urgent steps which are vital to peace, and on which it should be possible to agree without further delay.

Certainly one of the prime steps toward the strict observance of the military provisions of the Geneva Accords should be to restore to the demilitarized zone its original and proper status. We agree on the legal existence of that zone and its prescribed boundaries. Can we not agree on making it function the way it should? Are you prepared to join in achieving this? This restoration of the

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demilitarized zone as a buffer is an essential step.

In your statement on Monday you referred to the 1962 Agreements on Laos. Let the two Governments represented here at this table announce in the next few days that we agree that all parties should comply meticulously with the 1962 Accords on Laos. Let us call upon the two Co-chairmen and the three Governments which are members of the International Control Commission to make immediate arrangements to ensure that all parties respect those Accords. We will be glad to have your answer to this very specific and important proposal.

On Monday you also referred to Cambodia. Let the two Governments represented here declare within the next few days that we agree that all armed elements from outside Cambodia should fully respect the territorial neutrality and integrity of Cambodia. Let us declare that this should apply to South Vietnamese ~~and~~ Allied forces in South Vietnam and to Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces as well. Let us both give our support publicly to the independence ~~and~~ neutrality of Cambodia. I would be very glad to have a prompt affirmative reply from you on this point:

Finally, let me emphasize that the people of South Vietnam must be free from coercion. Nowhere is this more important than in Saigon

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where vicious attacks are being directed against a civilian population. The continuation of such attacks on civilians in Saigon and elsewhere does not contribute to the atmosphere needed to make these talks successful.

In closing I want to repeat the thoughts I expressed in my statement on May 13. I request that you give careful attention to the affirmative proposals in these two statements. END QTE

2. Saigon should show this formulation verbatim to Thieu and others at your regularly scheduled meeting May 14 15. Please report any reactions urgently to Paris and Department. Balance of statement covered contained in ~~xxxx~~ reftel may be ~~xxxxxx~~ in more general terms.

GP-3

END

INFORMATION

13

*From file*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 14, 1968 - 7:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

I find this memorandum by Bob Ginsburgh an interesting indication of the enemy's military intentions and the pace of military activity in 1968. He is clearly putting on a maximum military effort in pursuit of a political and diplomatic breakthrough.

I am inclined to agree with the last paragraph.

W. W. Rostow

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Authority NLS-CBS 20  
By is, NARS, Date 6-25-84

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

3a

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

14 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: The Pace of the War

The opening of talks in Paris has added a new dimension to the war. But there is not a shred of evidence to show that there has been any change in Hanoi's objectives since the 31st of March. All the evidence points in the opposite direction -- that Hanoi views negotiations as a tactical device for improving its chances of achieving its objectives.

For example, a captured document issued by the political staff of the 3rd NVA Division:

- instructs all units to convince the troops that the restriction of bombing in NVN "derived from the successful all-out attacks carried out by our army and our population" and

- states that "while there will come the time when we have to accept diplomatic meetings with the U.S., this will not change basic policy." Military objectives are to remain unchanged:

- a. To destroy ARVN and overthrow the GVN.
- b. To destroy a significant portion of U.S. troops and war facilities.

What the enemy has actually done since 31 March is consistent with what they say.

The following monthly indicators show that activity in South Vietnam is substantially higher than in 1967. The decline in most indicators since the first quarter, however, is consistent with the recent decline in the enemy's capability as a result of their heavy losses since PET.

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By ics, NARS, Date 6-25-84

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	<u>1967</u>	<u>Jan-Mar 1968</u>	<u>April 1968</u>
Enemy attacks	206	512	391
" sabotage	120	288	212
" harassment	1,603	1,830	1,930
" terrorism	163	113	75
" KIA	7,342	24,152	11,582
U. S. KIA	780	1,616	1,409
GVN KIA	1,060	1,812	1,283

Most recently, the enemy has launched a new wave of attacks on the cities -- especially Saigon. These latest attacks have not equalled the intensity nor have they had the impact of the TET attacks. They have, however, ~~greatly surpassed the second wave of attacks on the cities in mid-February.~~ Captured PWs, ralliers, and documents indicate further attacks will be forthcoming (TABs). In terms of magnitude, the latest attacks:

- have destroyed or damaged ~~20,000~~ houses in Saigon and Gia Dinh compared with 27,000 at TET;
- have produced about 90,000 refugees in Saigon and Gia Dinh as compared with more than 130,000 at TET; and
- have caused an all-time weekly high in U. S. killed in action -- 562 compared with 543 during TET week.

At the same time, North Vietnam is making a major effort to improve their capability for prosecuting the war in SVN, as shown by the following monthly rates:

	<u>1967</u>	<u>Jan-Mar 1968</u>	<u>April 1968</u>
Infiltration	6,700	8,000 - 10,000	12,000 - 30,000
Enemy vehicles observed	3,974	8,265	12,515
" " destroyed	503	1,072	1,713
Waterborne logistics craft sighted (not available)		819	1,549
Tons moving south		2,700 (Nov 67-Mar 68)	6,700

From the positioning of their troops and from PWs and captured documents, we know that they plan to use this capability if they can:

- ~~to continue to harass the major cities and provincial and district capitals;~~
- ~~to try to seize Danang; and~~
- ~~to attack in the Highlands.~~

~~SECRET~~

North Vietnam has also taken full advantage of the current bombing restrictions to restore and expand its economic and military capacity:

- Inoperative factories and power plants have been repaired.
- Dredging the port of Haiphong.
- Repair and new construction of bridges, railroads, and roads.
- POL imports, 47,000 metric tons compared with 33,500 per month for the first quarter.
- MIG training activities increased 50%.
- Air defenses shifted southward.
- All airfields in North Vietnam, except Dien Bien Phu, are serviceable.
- Three airfields south of 20 degrees restored to serviceability since 31 March -- and MIGs have operated from two of them -- Vinh and Bai Thuong (just south of 20 degrees).
- Number of fire control radars increased south of 20 degrees.
- Indications of SAMs moving southward.

These factors clearly show that the new tactic of talking while fighting has not changed the enemy's objective. That objective will not be compromised until the enemy is convinced that:

- we are not prepared to give him a military advantage at the negotiating table; and
- he cannot win at the negotiating table the political objectives which he has failed to achieve by military action.

21  
ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

May 8, 1968

4A 3b  
①

SUBJECT: COSVN Resolution #6

An incomplete notebook, entries dated from October 15, 1967, to April 12, 1968, kept by a member of a Sapper Battalion (possibly 11th Company, 4th NVA Sapper Battalion), contains notes taken from Resolution #6, passed by COSVN, which he had to study during the period April 8 to 12, 1968, when his element was stationed in Bien Hoa Province.

In the first portion, the Resolution recapitulates combat exploits of VC/NVA forces during the first stage of the general offensive (possibly 1968 Tet Offensive). Resounding VC/NVA victories have driven FWMAF/RVNAF into an extremely critical situation and moreover have been fully supported by people of the world including US progressives. However, greater successes were not achieved due to the following deficiencies: Poor combat spirit, lack of coordination, inadequate preparations and faulty operation plans. Many shortcomings also existed in the propaganda and civilian proselyting programs. There were cases where the masses tossed grenades on our troops.

In the second portion, the Resolution asserts that FWMAF/RVNAF with their aggressive nature would intensify their military actions to drive VC/NVA forces out of the areas adjacent to RVN cities and towns and clear main routes of communications to relieve VC/NVA pressure on their rear bases. The Resolution stresses that, despite their desperate efforts, FWMAF/RVNAF would be totally defeated by VC/NVA forces which were strongly backed by the Socialist countries.

In the third portion, the Resolution emphasized that in the future the war would be more violent and may spread to NVN and even Indo-China. It exhorts VC/NVA forces to rush forward and fight until final victory is achieved, no matter how long the war may be.

In the last portion, the Resolution directs VC/NVA forces to:

- Conduct violent attacks in delta and city areas to wear down the FWMAF/RVNAF potential.
- Liberate the rural areas and carry out land reform.
- Expand guerrilla warfare and rapidly develop armed elements.

- Maintain heavy pressure on cities and towns.
- Expand over the victories of Phase 1 and prepare for the third stage of the general offensive.
- Totally defeat FWMAF/RVNAF in the shortest period of time.

A notebook, entries dated January 31, 1968 to April 16, 1968, kept by a surgeon of an unspecified dispensary, contains notes taken from a study of Resolution #6. It states that the Vietnam War has taken a new turn, and the battlefields will be in the cities. The strategy adopted by General Westmoreland for the Vietnam War was upset and President Johnson had to change his policy. FWMAF/RVNAF practically lost their fighting strength and were bogged down in the city areas. However, the Resolution asserts that FWMAF/RVNAF would intensify military action to stabilize the situation until the US presidential elections. In the future the war would be more violent.

3c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ENEMY PLANS

TDCS-314/07712-68

"The source stated that the second phase of the offensive would last for a period of seven to ten days beginning on 4 May. He said the Viet Cong had considered the present time as the most appropriate time to launch the offensive because of the internal problems of the Government of Vietnam and the problems of the GVN's allies. He said that the second phase of the offensive was also meant to enhance the North Vietnamese position at the forthcoming peace talks."

MACV 12726

"Subject also noted that according to the estimate of central (communist, Lao Dong party), the theater of operations in Tri-Thien-Hue MR would be the scene of large-scale operations which would determine the war issue throughout South Vietnam. Captured data: 25 Apr 68."

CDEC 04-3214-68 Notebook, entries dated from 22 Mar to 26 Apr 68.

" Document reveals specific assignments of this cadre as follows:

- "1. Assist local authorities in carrying out directives of COSVN.
- "2. Set up guerrilla units in suburban and city areas newly liberated by VC.
- "3. Keep abreast of the over-all situation of the guerrilla warfare.
- "4. Assist local authorities in expanding their forces."

CDEC 04-3236-68 Notes taken from a political re-orientation session conducted on 6 Apr 68 by U/I Agency of Quang-Nam Prov.

" Coming missions. General Offensive and Uprising is a phase of continuous attacks to be conducted until final victory. It also means the efforts to work against time to gain successes quickly. As the General Offensive and Uprising are the final operations of the Revolution, all the people and soldiers could be mobilized to conduct the three-pronged attacks with continuity to disintegrate the entire puppet Army and Administration, and primarily it war facilities. From now to the completion of

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Authority NLS-CBS 20

By ics, NARS, Date 6-25-84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

missions, 60% of the FWMAF/RVNAF war facilities must be destroyed. Meantime, the RVN machinery of oppression and hostile administrative personnel should be entirely annihilated. During this phase, partial revolts should be conducted in the rural areas, towns, and cities, paving the way for General Offensive and Uprising. Efforts should be made to develop the rural areas in every field, especially the recruitment of Party members and promotion of the people's guerrilla warfare. "

CDEC 04-2602-68

" On an average, from now to the end of the year, each guerrilla participating in combat should kill 6 enemy soldiers, and each guerrilla remaining at the rear should kill 3 enemy soldiers. From now until July 1968, each guerrilla in the front should eliminate 3 enemy soldiers and each at the rear 2 enemy soldiers."

" From now to the end of the year, each village should shoot down 4 aircraft and until July 1968 2 aircraft. "

" Criteria from now until the end of this year: six military vehicles (per village) are to be destroyed. From now until the end of July 1968, 3 vehicles are to be destroyed by each of the following villages: --- "

TDCS-314/07789-68

" The source stated that his unit received seven days of indoctrination prior to the May attacks on Saigon. Their political officers also briefed them on the national and international situation and told them that the front would agree to negotiate with the GVN after all Americans had moved out of South Vietnam. He said they were told that the fighting would continue until this condition was met. "

4

**ACTION**

**Tuesday, May 14, 1968 -- 6:50 p.m.**

*Pres file*

**Mr. President:**

**I noted your comments at Tuesday lunch a week ago on Ed Hamilton; but I have not received a formal indication from you.**

**Should I tell him he should stay with us?**

**W. W. Rostow**

**Yes \_\_\_\_\_**

**No \_\_\_\_\_**

**Call me \_\_\_\_\_**

**WWRostow:rla**

5

INFORMATION

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

Tuesday, May 14, 1968  
5:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the evidence that two additional North Vietnamese divisions may be moving south. You should note that Deng Hol is quite far south -- about 40 miles north of the DMZ.

Thus far the post-Tet infiltrators have looked like fillers rather than new North Vietnamese units. We shall have to watch this closely.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

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Authority NLS/RAC 00-407  
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-21-01

WWRostow:rla

*See file*

**INFORMATION**

**Tuesday, May 14, 1968  
5:20 p. m.**

*Pres. file*

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith a generous note from Lord Avon (Anthony Eden) and an article he wrote for a Japanese newspaper on your decision of March 31.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**wwrestow:rla**

6a

MANOR HOUSE,  
ALVEDISTON,  
SALISBURY.  
BROAD CHALKE 289.

Personal

10th May, 1968

*Dear W. President,*

In the dramatic weeks which have followed, since you were kind enough to receive me in Washington, I have inevitably thought much of the problems which beset the world and of the complexities of your role and your country's in resolving them.

A few days ago I was asked by a leading Japanese newspaper to write an article for them about the Vietnam situation. I am taking the liberty of enclosing a copy of that article, for I thought that you might, after our talk, perhaps be interested in seeing an Englishman's reaction to your own unselfish and courageous decision.

With every good wish to you in the difficult months ahead and always.

*Yours very sincerely  
Anthony Brown*

The President of the United States of America.

6b

HOPES AND FEARS FOR

A VIETNAM PEACE

by

The Earl of Avon K.G., P.C., M.C.

(Lord Avon, then Mr. Anthony Eden, was co-chairman with Mr. Molotov of the 1954 Geneva Conference, which brought an end to the eight year war in Indo-China between France and the Vietminh.)

President Johnson was wise to use cautionary words when he first announced the projected Paris meeting to seek an end to the Vietnamese war. We are only at the beginning of the beginning. How rough the road ahead is likely to be has now been grimly illustrated by the renewed and ruthless Communist assaults upon Saigon. These are intended to improve Hanoi's negotiating position when the talks begin. The vehemence of North Vietnamese broadcasts against the United States and the South Vietnamese Government which accompanied them show this clearly enough. The attacks are not, however, without their wider dangers. President Johnson has limited his air bombardment and he is no doubt as eager as any man to see the talks begin, but they will hardly be fostered if even this concession is used, before the delegates have met, to intensify the brutality of what Pravda has rightly called a "dirty war".

We have to be on our guard not to pre-judge either side as insincere in its search for peace, but each belligerent must also beware of abusing a concession to gain an instant military advantage. In war-time, as I wrote some years ago, diplomacy is strategy's twin, but there must be a limit to the tactical advantage which can be snatched on the battlefield if diplomacy is to have its chance.

Our confidence that negotiations will get under way is therefore still precarious. Even so, if once a serious

beginning could be made, there are elements in the present situation which give sober grounds for hope. It can even be argued that in certain respects the present military situation is more favourable to negotiation than that of 1954. Fourteen years ago, when we met at Geneva to try to end the war between France and Indo-China, the French military position was well nigh desperate. This time, the forces are more nearly in balance, which will still be true whatever the outcome of the immediate fighting in Saigon. The North Vietnamese are probably wise enough not to underestimate the underlying strength of American power, the Russians certainly do not.

Moreover it is of advantage to peace that President Johnson's own courageous initiative has so strengthened his position. They were wrong who thought that he must be a lame duck president from the day of his announcement not to run again. On the contrary, Mr. Johnson was a shrewd enough politician to understand that, as an accompaniment to his unselfish action, he would enjoy a freedom of manoeuvre which he could not have hoped to command in any other way. More than that, he has won a generous scope to negotiate without that bane of any democratic diplomat's life, the voice over the shoulder which resoundingly proclaims: "Why don't you play that trump?"

Nor is President Johnson's authority necessarily a long-term disadvantage for the North Vietnamese. In any negotiation it is important to know that the man with whom one deals can deliver what he sets his name to. From Hanoi's point of view, there is no certainty that another negotiator next year would make matters easier for them. On the contrary, a Republican victory or that of Mr. Humphrey is likely to represent the same line of American thought: a settlement, but not a surrender.

Supposing that this conviction can be established, how should the negotiations be conducted? Should they be direct between the two parties, or around a conference table with the help of intermediaries? In the context of the present world scene there could be advantage in the direct method, if the parties are prepared to make use of it. Here again, there are contrasts with 1954 at Geneva. At that time Mr. Molotov and I were co-chairmen of concurrent conferences, one on Indo-China and the other on Korea. The nature of relations between Russia and China then made it possible for Soviet influence to contribute to the progress of our work on a number of occasions.

Nothing of this kind is possible today. The relations between Peking and Moscow are bitter in their hostility.

Within recent months the People's Daily has been using language of unbridled insult against the Soviet leaders, while the Liberation Army Daily has proclaimed that "it can be safely predicted that a revolutionary storm still more violent than the October Revolution will sweep the Soviet land". This storm, we are told, will clear away "the handful of pests" who are the Soviet leaders today.

Unfortunately there seems little enough chance that the present condition of Russian-Chinese relations will show any early improvement. On the contrary, all the indications are that the hostile alignment is being intensified. From the first rift between these two countries, I have frequently and publicly expressed my concern at this development. I use the word 'concern' advisedly, because I have never believed that it was to any country's advantage that relations between the two greatest Communist powers should deteriorate so sharply. The consequence of this animosity must be to increase the violence of confusion, at a time when anarchy is the most immediate peril to the survival of mankind.

We have to accept that in the present state of relations between Moscow and Peking, the Russians might with some reason be reluctant to sit down at a table with the Chinese.

Even were they so willing, it is evident that they could have no hope of playing a part towards the Chinese in any way comparable to that of 1954. Russia's influence, if it is to be helpful, could probably best be employed privately and at Hanoi. All this throws a more immediate responsibility upon the powers in conflict, which may not be entirely a bad thing. However, if direct negotiations can prove the better way, the long-term neutralisation of the area, which was once Indo-China, should still be the objective.

Laos, Cambodia, North and South Vietnam, all these territories, whether divided or united, have fiercely independent strains in their relationship between themselves and with others. It would be a mistake to attempt to force North and South Vietnam into any cohesive shape at short notice. Time must be allowed to assert its influence and wounds be given a chance to heal. If this is done, economic factors can influence events. Here the opportunities are important for an expansion of trade, not only among the three countries in the war ravaged territories, but throughout South East Asia. The whole area has the scope, the resources and the energy.

The alternatives are stark in this modern world.

Conflict, which in no long time must annihilate the human race, or material progress based on technologies which, through such schemes as the use of the waters of the Mekong River, can bring a new well-being even to the poorest in the least developed lands. It is for the world leaders to determine. These next weeks or months of negotiation about Indo-China's future can point a way.

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, May 14, 1968  
5:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

This VC Colonel's evaluation of  
VC military problems, etc. is worth  
reading.

*see file*

W. W. Restow

25X1A



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRestow:rla

SANITIZED

Authority NLS 019-034-1-1  
By [signature], NARA, Date 1/17/02

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE *7a*  
IN 09668

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS  
DDI EXO OER FBIS DCS IRS AID USIA

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.



THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

131839Z

CITE

DIST 13 MAY 1968

*1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)*

COUNTRY

SOURCE: VIETNAM

DOI

TO 19 APRIL 1968

SUBJECT

RALLIER'S ANALYSIS OF PRINCIPAL VIET CONG,  
MILITARY DEFICIENCIES AND OF REASONS FOR  
DECLINE IN RATE OF RALLIERS

- BOYD
- BUDGET
- DAVID
- FIELD
- GIBSON
- HAMILTON
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- JOHNSON
- JERRY R
- LEONARD
- ROOP
- SANDERS
- TAYLOR

ACQ

VIETNAM, SAIGON (9 MAY 1968) FIELD NO.

SOURCE

[REDACTED]

**SANITIZED**

**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLJ 97-325**

By *is*, NARA Date *10-22-97*

*1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)*

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[REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

(classification) (dissem controls)

[REDACTED]

SUMMARY: ALLIED AIR AND ARTILLERY STRIKES HAVE CAUSED SEVERE MENTAL TENSION AMONG VIET CONG (VC) TROOPS AND CADRES, ACCORDING TO RALLIER LIEUTENANT COLONEL [REDACTED] SIGNIFICANT VC MILITARY DEFICIENCIES ARE THE PROBLEM OF SUPPLYING ARMAMENT TO VC TACTICAL UNITS; DIFFICULTIES OF MEDICAL EVACUATION AND SHORTAGE OF MEDICINES; AND THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN VC INDOCTRINATION AND REALITY REGARDING ARVN/ALLIED FIGHTING SPIRIT AND THE EXTENT OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE VC. [REDACTED] ATTRIBUTES RECENT DECREASED RATES OF RALLIERS TO EFFECTIVE PRE-TET POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE THREE-MAN CELL SYSTEM. END SUMMARY.

1. WHEN ASKED TO COMMENT ON WHAT HE REGARDED AS

[REDACTED]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(classification) (control)

SIGNIFICANT WEAKNESSES OR DEFICIENCIES LIMITING VIET CONG (VC) SUCCESS IN THE MILITARY FIELD, LIEUTENANT COLONEL [REDACTED] [REDACTED] BEGAN BY OBSERVING THAT VC MILITARY CAPABILITIES MUST BE VIEWED IN TERMS OF ALLIED STRENGTHS, PRINCIPALLY AIR POWER AND ARTILLERY. IN HIS OPINION, ALLIED AIR AND ARTILLERY STRIKES HAVE CHANGED THE FACE OF THE COUNTRYSIDE AND HAVE CAUSED SEVERE MENTAL TENSION AMONG VC TROOPS AND CADRES. THE VC, HE SAID, ARE RUNNING OUT OF PLACES TO HIDE AND PROTECT THEMSELVES FROM SUCH STRIKES.

2. [REDACTED] LISTED THE FOLLOWING AS SIGNIFICANT MILITARY DEFICIENCIES:

A. SUPPLY OF ARMAMENT TO TACTICAL UNITS IS A CONTINUING PROBLEM. DELIVERY OF MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM THE NORTH TO VC MAIN STORAGE AREAS IS NOT AN INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEM, ALTHOUGH IT STRAINS THE NORTH'S TRANSPORT CAPABILITIES. ONE PROBLEM IN SUPPLYING TACTICAL UNITS IS THAT IT TAKES THREE MEN TO MOVE ONE 122MM ROCKET PLUS COMPONENTS EVEN OVER SHORT DISTANCES. THEREFORE WHENEVER POSSIBLE THE VC TRANSPORT THIS TYPE OF ROCKET BY SAMPAN. MEDICAL EVACUATION IS A SEVERE PROBLEM FOR VC UNITS AND CAUSES MORALE PROBLEMS. MEDICINES ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY.

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

B. A MAJOR THEME OF VC POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION AND PROSELYTING IS THAT ARVN AND U.S. TROOPS ARE WEAK FIGHTERS WITH NO STOMACH FOR A HARD BATTLE. WHEN VC AND NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) TROOPS ENGAGE ALLIED TROOPS THEY QUICKLY LEARN, WITH DISILLUSIONING EFFECTS, THAT WHAT THEY HAVE BEEN TOLD CONFLICTS WITH REALITY. ALSO, MANY OF THE TROOPS NOW ENGAGED IN THE SOUTH ARE NATIVE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHO HAVE LITTLE AREA AND LOCAL KNOWLEDGE. THIS RESULTS IN UNITS LOSING THEIR WAY DURING TACTICAL SITUATIONS AND IN A GENERAL REDUCTION IN EFFICIENCY.

C. THE POPULATION IN URBAN AREAS IS ESSENTIALLY LOYAL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AND DOES NOT VOLUNTEER TO THE VC ASSISTANCE SUCH AS FOOD, MEDICINES AND MEDICAL CARE. NVA TROOPS ARRIVE IN THE SOUTH AFTER HAVING BEEN TOLD THAT THE VC CONTROL THREE-FOURTHS OF THE COUNTRY AND MOST OF THE POPULATION. THESE TROOPS THEN FIND THEMSELVES IN OUTLYING AREAS WITH NO PEOPLE AROUND AND THEY BEGIN TO WONDER ABOUT THE EXTENT OF ACTUAL VC CONTROL.

3. [REDACTED] THE DECLINE IN THE HOI CHANH (RALLIER) RATE DURING THE LAST MONTHS OF 1967 AND THE FIRST MONTHS OF 1968 RESULTS BASICALLY FROM INCREASED SECURITY MEASURES AND POLITICAL

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(classification) (dissem controls)

INDOCTRINATION AMONG VC TROOP UNITS. THE PURPOSE OF THIS PRE-TET OFFENSIVE INDOCTRINATION WAS TO CONVINCE THE TROOPS THEY WERE ON THE WINNING SIDE AND THAT A DECISIVE PHASE OF THE WAR WAS ABOUT TO BE ENTERED. THE DECREASED RALLIER RATE REFLECTS THE SUCCESS OF THIS INDOCTRINATION. A CONSTANT FACTOR IN KEEPING THE RATE OF DESERTIONS AND RALLYINGS WITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS IS THE NORMAL SYSTEM OF MUTUAL CONTROLS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THREE-MAN CELLS AND THE INCLUSION OF PARTY MEMBERS AMONG THE TROOPS ASSIGNED TO SQUAD-LEVEL UNITS. (FIELD COMMENT: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] MANY VC MILITARY CADRES WERE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] DISILLUSIONED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE, AND [REDACTED] PREDICT [REDACTED] MANY TROOPS WILL RALLY TO THE GOVERNMENT DURING THE MONTHS AHEAD.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE DIR/JUSPAO  
(MR. NICKEL ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [REDACTED]

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3.4(b)(1)

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ACTION

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Tuesday, May 14, 1968 - 5:10pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Jerusalem in the UN Security Council

In the memorandum at Tab A, Secretary Rusk recommends that you authorize Ambassador Goldberg:

- to vote for a resolution along the lines of the Caradon draft at Tab B.
- to vote if necessary for a fall-back which refers to previous General Assembly resolutions and more specific language regarding Israeli actions in the city.

Past GA resolutions called on Israel to rescind its actions to incorporate Jerusalem. (We abstained on the key vote last summer, taking the position that we did not regard Israel's actions as affecting Jerusalem's status.) Our present fall-back would be to vote for a resolution which notes past GA resolutions, but does not explicitly reaffirm them or put the weight of the Security Council behind a call for Israel to undo its past acts.

The situation is fluid in New York, and negotiations may take several turns before Jerusalem comes to a vote. (While the Jordanians would like a vote today, it is not likely until later this week.)

If you wish to give Ambassador Goldberg full discretion, within the guidelines recommended by Secretary Rusk, you could simply approve the Secretary's memorandum. Alternatively, you could authorize Goldberg to pursue his negotiations in New York, but ask him to talk with you again before committing the U.S. to fall-back language.

W. W. Rostow

Recommendation approved \_\_\_\_\_

Strategy generally approved, but have Goldberg check fall-back with me \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By ica, NARA Date 9-8-98

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S/S 7310



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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May 13 1968

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-331

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

By is, NARA Date 3-19-99

Subject: UN Security Council Consideration  
of Jerusalem

The UN Security Council for the past several days has been giving further consideration to the question of Jerusalem; Jordan has been pressing for a Security Council resolution that would call upon Israel to rescind measures which Israel has taken in Jerusalem over the past months which Jordan believes are prejudicial to an ultimate settlement.

Ambassador Goldberg reports that, while he has worked hard in trying to convince Jordan and other Security Council members to avoid further formal action by the Council, it will be necessary for the United States to acquiesce in a resolution if we are not to be almost totally isolated in the Security Council. Both we and Ambassador Goldberg are agreed that a Security Council proposal calling on Israel to rescind past measures would be strongly objected to by Israel and would be totally disregarded. We therefore have taken a strong stand against such a proposition. However, with prospects better that there will be discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices in New York on the question of an over-all settlement, we believe the Council's work should be directed towards a resolution consistent with our policy and past public pronouncements and one which would not prejudice either side's position on Jerusalem. Ambassador Goldberg made a strong statement in the Council to which the Israelis reacted favorably, stressing that the Council should not pronounce itself substantively on the Jerusalem issue in such a way as to prejudice an ultimate settlement or prejudge the final and permanent status of Jerusalem. He also stressed that the

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GROUP 3. Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

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Jerusalem problem, like other aspects, should be part of the over-all agreement between the parties.

The U.K. has drafted a resolution based on the approach taken by Ambassador Goldberg in this statement, which we believe the U.S. should support. Caradon, the U.K. representative, believes it may be necessary to include references to previous General Assembly resolutions and to add some specificity, in particular references to exploitation of land and legislative and administrative actions, in order to achieve agreement in the Council. While we should continue major efforts to avoid such language, we believe we could agree, if necessary, to support an appropriate preambular reference to past General Assembly resolutions as well as more specific language regarding actions in the City. References to past Assembly resolutions would avoid an explicit obligation on the part of Israel to rescind earlier measures as called for in those resolutions. Israel would have preferred no formal Security Council action, and in particular would prefer to avoid reference to the previous Assembly resolutions. While we cannot be categorical, we are inclined to feel the Israelis would not make a major issue of a U.S. vote for such a resolution, however, particularly in light of the fact that we would be totally isolated if we did not do so. We note, for example, that their attitudes regarding the present proceedings in the Security Council have been largely in tactical terms in the context of Goldberg-Tekoah talks. No major demarches have been made here.

Ambassador Goldberg concurs in this memorandum.

Recommendation:

That you authorize giving discretion to Ambassador Goldberg to support a resolution along the lines described above.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

- A - Draft Resolution
- B - Ambassador Goldberg's May 9 speech  
in the Security Council

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CARADON'S DRAFT RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM

The Security Council,

Having heard the statements made before the Security Council,

Declares that pending a final settlement no unilateral act can alter the status of Jerusalem,

Calls for a cessation of all acts that might prejudice endeavors to achieve a just and lasting peace,

Calls accordingly on all concerned to assist, support, and facilitate the efforts now proceeding to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement of all the problems of the Middle East, including the future of Jerusalem, in accordance with the provisions and principles set out in Resolution 242.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-331  
By ica, NARA Date 3-19-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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UNITED STATES MISSION  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Press Release USUN-64(68)  
May 9, 1968

Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, United States  
Representative to the United Nations, in the Security Council,  
on the Middle East Question, May 9, 1968.

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It may be helpful at this point in our debate to recall briefly the road toward peace that we in this Council have traveled together during this past difficult year, and then to look forward to see what the next step ought to be.

We all remember that although a cease-fire was achieved in a matter of days after the outbreak of fighting in June, it required over five months of debate and diplomacy before we were able to launch a positive and united effort for peace. That effort was launched by unanimous action of the Security Council in adopting Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967. The resolution affirmed "that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East." It set forth certain fundamental principles and provisions in that connection; and it asked the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative "to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement" in accordance with those provisions and principles.

Our distinguished Secretary General thereupon designated as Special Representative a very able diplomat, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring. And from that day to this, Ambassador Jarring, with admirable skill and perseverance, has developed and maintained his contacts with the States concerned in pursuance of the mandate given him in Resolution 242.

MORE

The task given to the Special Representative is, of course, inherently very difficult, and it has not been made easier by the further incidents<sup>and actions</sup> of various kinds which have occurred between some of the parties and which have engaged the attention of this Council. As far as my country is concerned, we have sought at every turn to support the peacemaking efforts of Ambassador Jarring and to minimize any damage that these incidents might cause to the hopes for his success. We have done so in the sincere belief that both our duty, as a member of this Council, and our interest in greater stability in the area, require us to promote progress toward a just and equitable peace in the Middle East.

In that spirit we have made clear -- not only in this Council but also directly to the governments concerned -- our strong opposition to all unilateral measures which might prejudice a future settlement and to all acts of renewed violence in the area, whatever form it takes or from whatever quarter it comes. All such measures and actions increase tension in the area.

It is in this context that I should like now to address the particular problem of Jerusalem.

The position of the United States regarding Jerusalem is well known. The United States does not accept or recognize unilateral actions by any of the states in the area as altering the status of Jerusalem. My Government has publicly stated that such unilateral measures, including expropriation of land and legislated administrative action taken by the Government of Israel, cannot be considered other than interim and provisional and cannot affect the present international status, nor prejudice the final and permanent status, of Jerusalem.

As regards the military parade carried out by Israel in Jerusalem on May 2, the attitude of the United States was made clear by our votes in this Council. We shared the concern which the Council expressed in its resolution of April 27, that the parade would "aggravate tensions in the area." We therefore joined in the Council's unanimous adoption of that resolution, calling on Israel to refrain from holding the parade. And we again joined in the unanimous resolution of May 2, deeply deploring what had occurred -- as indeed we deplored any action which tends to aggravate tension in the area.

At this stage of our debate my delegation has given careful thought to the course which the Security Council should follow. It is our considered view that we must not return to the unsuccessful approach of the past -- that of attempting to deal separately with individual aspects of the Middle East problem, however important they may be in themselves. Rather we must continue on the course we embarked on last November -- that of seeking to promote an agreed, peaceful, and accepted settlement embracing all of the aspects of the complex and multi-faceted Middle East problem comprehended in our resolution of November 22.

MORE

Accordingly, the United States, while agreeing that Jerusalem is a most important issue, does not believe that the problem of Jerusalem can realistically be solved apart from other aspects of the situation in the Middle East dealt with in the November 22 resolution. Neither do we believe that Jerusalem can be excluded from the scope of the November 22 resolution. Instead, we consider it basic to a peaceful settlement in conformity with the November 22 resolution that the solution of all aspects of the Middle East problem, including Jerusalem, must be achieved by an agreed and accepted peaceful settlement. In the achievement of such a settlement, the parties themselves must necessarily be engaged. And such a settlement, if it is to achieve our stated goal of "a just and lasting peace," must take into account the legitimate interests of all concerned.

It is above all to the resolution of November 22 that we must return. That resolution is the lodestar that illuminates our journey toward peace.

Mr. President, I now reaffirm once again that the United States continues to support Security Council resolution 242 of November 22 unreservedly, in its entirety, and in all its parts.

Indeed, Mr. President, in the view of the United States the moment has come when the Security Council could make a most constructive contribution to progress toward peace by giving an explicit expression of its support for the Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, in his peacemaking efforts. I strongly believe that such an expression of support from this Council is called for at this time.

On behalf of the United States, therefore, let me offer the suggestion that we promptly find a means to make clear this Council's continued, united will to promote the cause of peace in the Middle East by supporting Ambassador Jarring's efforts in pursuance of his mandate under Resolution 242. Specifically, we profoundly believe that the very best way for the Security Council to support Resolution 242 is to call upon all the parties to refrain from any and all actions that might prejudice Ambassador Jarring's efforts and to extend to the Secretary General's representative full cooperation in carrying out this most difficult mission.

Mr. President, this is a time, as it always is in the Council, for statesmanship by the Council, for not ignoring any of the problems at hand, but for proceeding in the best tradition of the Council to do what this Council can do in the interest of achieving a permanent peace in the area. We were united on November 22 and the unity of 15 members of this Council of varying views, of different ideologies, coming from all parts of the world, is the greatest hope for peace and stability in the Middle East. We must preserve that unity and we must preserve the common desire, that I am sure is shared in this Council, to take constructive action to see to it that the peacemaking process which we initiated on November 22 is carried on in such a manner that the goal that we all fervently hope and pray for shall be achieved.

\* \* \* \* \*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Tuesday - May 14, 1968 - 2:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Mexico and the Bracero Problem

~~Handwritten signature~~  
2. P. via file

Last December you asked Secretary Wirtz and Covey Oliver to go to Mexico to discuss labor matters.

Covey thought is a mistake to make the trip because we cannot satisfy the Mexicans on the bracero question. He advanced four alternatives. You told him to go ahead and keep you posted. At Tab A is his progress report.

Since Covey prepared this report, there has been another favorable development. The head of the Mexican Labor Confederation, Fidel Velasquez, came to Washington for meetings with George Meany on May 6 and 7. Velasquez, an old friend of Ray Telles, told Ray the talks had gone well. Ray's memorandum to you at Tab B gives the details.

A group of US labor leaders is scheduled to go to Mexico City on June 10 to continue the dialogue on border problems.

W. W. Rostow

*in file with Rostow*

Attachments

Tab A - Report by Covey Oliver of April 30.

Tab B - Ray Telles memorandum to the President of May 10.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 95-188  
By lig, NARA, Date 12-5-95



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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1-Bowling  
2-Ret. 9a

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 30, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 95-120

Subject: Status of Program for Mexico

By LEJ, NARA, Date 12-1-95

In December 1967 you asked that Assistant Secretary Oliver work on a program for Mexico to help the Mexicans deal with the adverse effects of the termination of the Bracero Program. The program was to contain four elements:

- A. A substantial A.I.D. loan.
- B. A possible agreement on border trade and development.
- C. Cooperative arrangements on control of illegal immigrants.
- D. A system for adequate advance notice to Mexico if braceros are to be certified for work in the United States during the harvest season.

On April 1 Assistant Secretary Oliver raised the possibility of an A.I.D. loan or U.S. support for additional IDB loans with Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores, who referred the matter to the Finance Ministry. If the Mexicans are interested, we should hear shortly.

An agreement on trade and development for the border area alone is not feasible. The commercial policy problems of confining trade concessions to the border area would be insuperable. Moreover, AFL/CIO's intense opposition to the Mexican Government's Border Industrialization Program and similar attitudes by California and Florida agricultural interests have made border trade an extremely sensitive issue. We have put before the AFL/CIO a program which might lessen their opposition to what is now taking place, but we could not single out the border area for more favorable treatment under present circumstances. We are continuing to look into the possibility of a general trade arrangement with Mexico.

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

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- 2 -

Mexico is our only major trading partner with which we have no trade agreement, either through GATT or bilaterally.) In the short run, since we have no legislation authorizing tariff reductions, we are looking for concessions we might exchange with the Mexicans without legislation. Over the longer run, an agreement with Mexico involving reciprocal concessions on trade barriers is a possibility.

Several of our Immigration and Naturalization officials had a successful meeting with their Mexican counterparts in February and agreed on a number of programs and procedures to restrict illegal entrants. We hope these high-level consultations between immigration authorities will be a continuing process.

The Secretary of Labor is currently considering alternative proposals on how his Department might best provide adequate advance notification to the Mexican Government in the event certification for Mexican Braceros are to be issued during the coming harvest season.

Further reports to you will be made if the Mexicans show interest in loan assistance, or if we are able to devise a realistic package of trade concessions.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



UNITED STATES-MEXICO COMMISSION FOR BORDER DEVELOPMENT AND FRIENDSHIP

1800 G Street N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20525

Office of the Chairman  
U.S. Section

*rec'd May 10, 1962*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: My Meeting with Mexican Labor Leaders

Senor Fidel Velasquez, the head of CTM (Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico) (Mexican Federation of Labor) in Mexico was in Washington on May 6 and 7 for meetings with Mr. George Meany (AFL-CIO). Mr. Velasquez is the equivalent of Mr. Meany in Mexico. He is extremely powerful in Mexican politics and has considerable influence in the election of Mexican presidents. He has been Mexico's top labor leader for approximately 30 years. He is one among the three or four top and influential men in the PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) (Party of Revolutionary Institutions, Mexico's powerful political party.


Mr. Velasquez asked to see me and came to my home with four of his close associates on the evening of May 7. He informed me that he and Mr. Meany had discussed labor problems in general, but in particular the Green Card workers from Mexico and the establishment of U.S. assembly plants on the Mexican side of the border. He states that the Mexican Government has received thirty (30) additional applications from U.S. firms.

He stated that he was satisfied with the results of the meetings with Mr. Meany, whom he found more understanding than anticipated. They ended up sympathizing with each other's problems in connection with the Green Card workers and U.S. assembly plants in Mexico. They further agreed to name a committee at the top level to study and to try to work out these problems.

He asked to see me, first of all because I have known him for several years, and then since he wanted me to inform you of his visit in Washington and his meetings with Mr. Meany. He stated that he would be in touch with me and advise me as to the progress of the joint committee to be named by him and Mr. Meany.

This meeting between Mr. Velasquez and Mr. Meany is significant in that this is the first time that these two top labor leaders have met. Also,

I believe that with the personal interest of these two influential persons in the labor movement the road may be paved for easier solution of labor problems along the border.



Raymond Telles  
Ambassador

**ACTION**

10

**Tuesday, May 14, 1968 - 2:30 p.m.**

**Mr. President:**

**Attached for your approval is a greeting to Tite on his 76th birthday.**

*Per file*

**There has been a Presidential greeting to Tite every year since 1962.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**Approve \_\_\_\_\_**

**Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_**

**Call me \_\_\_\_\_**

**LBJ:ND:gg:rla**

**PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE**

**Excellency:**

**Cordial greetings and warm congratulations  
to you and Madame Bros on your 76th birthday.**

**Sincerely,**

**Lyndon B. Johnson**

**His Excellency  
Marshal Josip Bros Tito  
President of the Socialist  
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  
Belgrade**

~~SECRET~~

11

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989  
By ag, NARA, Date 6-23-92

Lunch Meeting With the President  
Tuesday, May 14, 1968 - 1:00 p.m.

*Pres file*

AGENDA

1. Instructions to Paris Delegation. (Sec. Rusk)

Delegation is expected to recommend that Gov. Harriman be instructed at Wednesday's meeting to:

- Refute major points of North Vietnam statement.
- List areas of agreement found in Monday's statements.
- Propose subjects on which discussion can be concentrated.

Ambassador Bunker strongly recommends a "go very slow" policy on offering total cessation of bombing as long as North Vietnamese attacks go on in Saigon and throughout South Vietnam.

2. Proposal to send U.S. military officer from Saigon to join Paris Delegation. (Sec. Clifford)

Sec. Clifford wishes to discuss. Ambs. Harriman and Vance, Sec. Rusk and Gen. Wheeler support the proposal.

3. Bombing Targets between 19th and 20th parallels. (Sec. Clifford & Gen. Wheeler)

4. Appearance of Sec. Clifford before Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (Sec. Clifford)

First public appearance on Hill since confirmation, scheduled for Friday, May 17. Subject of hearing is military assistance. Formal statement to be released.

5. Czech-Soviet Situation. (Sec. Rusk)

Situation report.

6. Middle East Situation report. (Sec. Rusk)

7. Letter from Kopyga. (Sec. Rusk)

8. Postponement of UN General Assembly Fall Session. (Sec. Rusk)

George Ball and Amb. Goldberg recommend delay of meeting.

9. Other.

~~SECRET~~

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Tuesday - May 14, 1968 -12:55pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Latin American Physical Integration

*Presfile*

Here is another favorable response to your integration initiative.

The Peruvian Government has announced that the Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru will meet in Lima on May 24 - 28 "in order jointly to consider the connection of the Argentine and Paraguayan road systems with those of Bolivia and Peru on the base of the Marginal Jungle Highway and within the common purpose of accelerating South American physical integration".

Ambassador Jones reports that the Peruvian Foreign Office told him that the meeting is in line with renewed efforts toward physical integration stimulated by your recent proposal.

W. W. Reston

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333

INFORMATION 13

~~SECRET~~

By isa, NARA Date 9-8-98

Tuesday, May 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meetings with President Bourguiba

You will recall that you yourself proposed inviting Bourguiba in 1966 at a time when you were particularly impressed by one of his statements supporting our policy in Vietnam. His heart attack and the Arab-Israeli war delayed his visit. However, our purpose is still as it was then--to show our approval of this rational and like-minded statesman.

Although there are some questions about the level of our economic and military assistance, we do not expect Bourguiba to dwell on these bilateral programs. He will probably talk on a high plane about his need to assure Tunisians progress and security and his view of our role in securing world peace. The main points we expect to come up are:

1. Tunisian security. The buildup of Soviet weapons in Algeria on one side and Nasser's power across Libya to the other have made the Tunisians feel highly vulnerable. Bourguiba and his son, now the Foreign Minister, have for several years been talking with us about the possibility of a US security guarantee. We are providing limited military aid. But the plain fact is that, without a military establishment it couldn't possibly afford, Tunisia will have to rely on outside help if it is attacked. To gain some assurance of such help, Bourguiba has gone so far as to offer us secretly the use of his naval base at Bizerte in return for such an assurance.

We believe the Bourguibas are too well informed not to realize that a formal US guarantee is impossible in today's Washington. However, he may discuss with you this problem at some length. Your best response is that we have given Tunisia as much military aid as Congress has made possible. We regret it can't be more, but we just don't have the appropriations. We are doing what we can with advisors to help Tunisia adopt the most modern techniques to get the maximum defensive capability out of its limited expenditures. If he presses hard for a security commitment, you will have to explain honestly the limits imposed by Congress on your ability to make any such commitment.

2. Arab-Israel. Although Bourguiba has always taken a moderate position on Israel's right to exist, he feels very deeply about the injustice the Palestinians have suffered. He has even recently made veiled statements favoring Arab terrorism as the only way to force Israel to withdraw.

~~SECRET~~

Some of this stems from his own revolutionary experience against France. In general, he has no time for radical Arab solutions, and he has said publicly he thought Nasser ought to resign.

Because of his moderation and his antipathy for Nasser, Bourguiba carries little weight with the more powerful Arabs. However, it would be well for you to make unmistakable clear to him that our position has not changed since your speech last June 19. The problem is that we can not make peace for Jordan and the UAR if they--especially Nasser--can't find a way to engage in peace talks of some sort.

3. Economic development. Since Tunisian independence, we have provided over \$500 million in aid. Our three year development aid commitment in the early 1960's gave Tunisia a needed boost at a time when its serious economic planning was just getting under way. Recently, we have provided loans at the level of \$15 million a year along with other economic aid. This year we will have to reduce this to \$10 million (a formal recommendation will be on your desk later this week). We would like to stay at \$15 million, but Congressional cuts make this impossible. Bourguiba doesn't know exactly what the level will be, but he must realize that the cut does not indicate any dissatisfaction with the way Tunisia uses our aid. We only wish more aid recipients would do as well. (Vice President Humphrey was extremely impressed by what he saw in Tunisia.)

You will be interested to know that one of our major aid efforts in Tunisia now is to help adapt the miracle wheat strains to North Africa by developing them in experimental areas in Tunisia. This could become the basis of a sub-regional program involving Morocco and Algeria if it goes well. We have also furnished PL-480 aid. Last September you approved a \$21.7 million program for Tunisia and in March an additional \$1.3 million.

4. Vietnam. If you have time, it would be worthwhile for you to look over again the letter (attached) Bourguiba sent to Ho Chi Minh urging him to negotiate and pointing out the importance of a settlement with the United States. Bourguiba all along has recognized the importance of our commitment to stop Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. You will find him receptive to your point of view, but he will be deeply interested in your reflections on where you hope to go from here.

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

5. Soviet influence. Bourguiba is especially sensitive because his two main threats--Algeria and the UAR--stem partially from the Soviet-backed military in these two countries. He may be particularly interested in the buildup of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean and may gear his pitch to you for possible security guarantees to the Soviet buildup and an offer of the Biserte Naval Base for our use. Our only answer is that we are, as usual, watching the Soviet Fleet carefully.

In sum, Bourguiba will want to discuss his security and development problems with you. He will be equally interested in your view of the world. He will be pleased to share his views of major problems with you.

I will give you a check list of talking points in the morning. I recommend you read Nick Katzenbach's memo and attached talking points in the attached book (red Tab A under "General").

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

13a

~~SECRET~~ 736

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /033 W

R 241220Z APR 68  
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5172



DECLASSIFIED

Authority 76091-259

By sp/ks, NARA, Date 6-7-92


~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 TUNIS 4104/1

EXDIS

SUBJECT: BOURGUIBA, LETTER TO HO CHI MINH

FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TRANSLATION HANDED TO ME BY FOREIGN MINISTER TO PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA'S MESSAGE OF MARCH 20 TO PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH (UNNECESSARY WORDS OMITTED). FULL TEXT OF FRENCH ORIGINAL AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION BEING POUCHED.

"MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:



PAGE 2 RUDKKR 4104/1 ~~SECRET~~

"YOU AND I ARE ELDERS OF THIS HANDFUL OF MEN WHO HAVE DEVOTED LIVES TO LIBERATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF THEIR COUNTRIES. OUR STRUGGLE HAS BEEN ALMOST AS LONG AS THIS CENTURY AND HAS NOT YET ENDED BECAUSE OUR IDEAL, REESTABLISHMENT OUR COUNTRIES IN INDEPENDENCE AND DIGNITY AS WELL AS EMANCIPATION OF OTHER PEOPLES OF THIRD WORLD, NOT YET ACHIEVED. YOU AND I, MR. PRESIDENT, HAVE SOUGHT THIS IDEAL TAKING GREATEST ACCOUNT OF REALITIES: GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OUR COUNTRIES, SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC LEVEL OUR PEOPLES AND INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF POWER. THIS, NO DOUBT, IS REASON WHY, HAVING MADE PROGRESS TOWARDS OUR OBJECTIVE THROUGH WAYS SO DIVERGENT, WE GIVE IMPRESSION OF BEING IN OPPOSITE CAMPS.

"FALSE IMPRESSION, OF COURSE: FOR EACH OF US HAS PRESERVED ESSENTIAL: HIS INDEPENDENCE AND RESPECT HE HAS FOR OTHER: AND THAT IS WHY I ADDRESS MYSELF TO YOU AGAIN AS

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 TUNIS 04104 01 OF 02 241751Z

ONE FIGHTER TO ANOTHER. LAST YEAR, ON OCCASION VIETNAMESE NEW YEAR, I FORMULATED WISH THAT NEW YEAR SEE AT LAST RESTORATION PEACE IN YOUR COUNTRY AND END TO SUFFERINGS OF VN PEOPLE.

PAGE 3 RUDKKR 4104/1 ~~SECRET~~

"I ADDED: "KNOWING LOFTY PATRIOTIC FEELINGS WHICH HAVE ALWAYS ANIMATED YOU, I TAKE LIBERTY, THIS OCCASION, ADDRESS TO YOU FERVENT APPEAL THAT TET TRUCE BE PRELUDE TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND TO ESTABLISHMENT OF ENDURING PEACE".

"I AM CONVINCED THAT BEYOND ANY IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATION, YOU WILL NOT SPARE ANY EFFORT FAVOR AND ENCOURAGE ALL POSSIBILITIES OF HONORABLE SOLUTION".

"NEGOTIATION CONSTITUTES ONLY WAY LIKELY TO PUT END TO SUFFERINGS OF VN PEOPLE, RESTORE PEACE TO VN AND PRESERVE SECURITY SOUTH EAST ASIA AND WORLD".

"I THINK I FIND MEANING OF YOUR STRUGGLE AND FEELINGS WHICH ANIMATE YOU SUMMED UP IN ANSWER YOU WERE KIND ENOUGH TO SEND ME ON TWENTY-THIRD OF FEBRUARY 1967. I HAVE STUDIED HISTORY YOUR PEOPLE AND KNOW THEIR EXCEPTIONAL ENDURANCE AND GREAT LOVE OF LIBERTY. I ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT WHAT GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF VIETNAM IMPOSES UPON YOU.

PAGE 4 RUDKKR 4104/1 ~~SECRET~~

"I ALSO KNOW USA, MEN WHO GOVERN THAT COUNTRY, THEIR PSYCHOLOGY AND THEIR IMPERATIVES OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICIES. I FORGET NEITHER AMERICAN REVOLUTION, NOR GENEROUS, EMANCIPATING AND UNIVERSALIST IDEAS WHICH USA DEFENDED JUST AFTER FIRST WORLD WAR, NOR EMINENT ROLE WHICH THEY PLAYED IN LAST GREAT WAR WHEN PRINCIPAL HUMAN VALUES WHICH MAKE UP PRICE OF LIFE SEEMED ON VERGE BEING SUBMERGED BY MERCILESS BARBARISM OF NAZIS AND JAPANESE WARLORDS. I CANNOT FORGET EITHER THAT, EVEN MORE RECENTLY, USA HAS PLAYED DECISIVE ROLE INTERVENING WITH OWN ALLIES TO FAVOR DECOLONIZATION OF GREAT NUMBER OF PEOPLES

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 TUNIS 04104 01 OF 02 241751Z  
OF AFRICA AND ASIA.



"IT SEEMS TO ME ONE CANNOT FORGET THIS FUNDAMENTAL FACT EVEN WHEN ONE, LIKE YOU, AT WAR WITH USA.

"TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION ALL THAT AND WHERE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM STANDS, TAKING ALSO INTO ACCOUNT STATE OF WORLD AND AMERICAN OPINION, I DEEM IT MANDATORY, TODAY MORE THAN EVER BEFORE, TO SPARE NO EFFORT TO SEEK HONORABLE POLITICAL WAY OUT OF CONFLICT WHICH IS DEVASTATING

PAGE 5 RUDKKR 4104/1 ~~SECRET~~  
VIETNAM. IN MILITARY FIELD, PARTIAL VICTORIES ARE POSSIBLE; BUT TOTAL VICTORY IS NOT. I KNOW, OF COURSE, SOME CONSIDER MILITARY OPERATIONS AS ONE OF ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR WHICH, IF IT LASTS TOO LONG WITHOUT DECISIVE RESULTS, CAN LEAD AVERAGE AMERICAN TO WEARINESS AND HIS GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE TO ABANDON CONTEST.

"ONE SHOULD FEAR - AND A RESPONSIBLE LEADER OUGHT TO ENVISAGE THIS POSSIBILITY - THAT SUCH A CALCULATION MIGHT NOT PROVE RIGHT. REASONING BY ANALOGY IS NOT ALWAYS CORRECT; REACTIONS OF A GREAT PEOPLE ARE NOT EASILY PREDICTIBLE, AND NO MATTER WHAT ONE SAYS, HISTORY DOES NOT REPEAT ITSELF.

"I, FOR ONE, WOULD ADD THAT VICTORY ACHIEVED IN SUCH CONDITIONS, OVER "PAPER TIGER" AMERICA, WILL BE NEITHER IN INTEREST OF WORLD WHOSE BALANCE WOULD BE UPSET NOR IN THAT OF THE VN PEOPLE WHO WOULD HAVE WON VICTORY BUT ACHIEVED NEITHER INDEPENDENCE NOR PEACE.

"FOR, IT IS OBVIOUS, THAT WAR OF VN HAS NOW AS A STAKE SOMETHING WHICH GOES BEYOND VIETNAM ITSELF. YOU ARE, MR.

PAGE 6 RUDKKR 4104/1 ~~SECRET~~  
PRESIDENT IN BETTER POSITION THAN ANYBODY ELSE TO FEEL INTERFERENCES OF THE CLASSICAL COLD WAR BETWEEN USSR AND USA COMPLICATED BY IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL CONFLICT WHICH OPPOSES RED CHINA TO

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 TUNIS 04104 01 OF 02 241751Z

USSR.

"UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HIGHER INTEREST OF VN, CONCERN TO PRESERVE ITS INDEPENDENCE FOR TODAY AND TOMORROW, IMPERATIVE TO SPARE ITS YOUTH SO AS TO SET IT TO TASKS OF RECONSTRUCTION, NECESSITY TO KEEP OPEN DOOR OF COOPERATION WITH ALL GREAT POWERS, ALL THESE CONSIDERATIONS SEEM MILITATE IN FAVOR OF EARLY POLITICAL SOLUTION WHICH CAN ONLY RESULT FROM NEGOTIATION WITHOUT HUMILIATING PRECONDITIONS LIKELY TO BE PRESENTED AS CAPITULATION.

"I FEAR THAT, WITH OTHER STATESMEN, IF PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION NOT STARTED WITHIN NEXT FEW WEEKS, GREATER MISFORTUNES BEFALL VN AND SEA. I EVEN FEAR PRESENT WORLD EQUILIBRIUM - WHICH I RECOGNIZE IS AT TIMES UNJUST AND RESTRAINING FOR SOME COUNTRIES BUT WHICH HAS MERIT OF EXISTING AND BEING ONE OF BASES ON WHICH WORLD PEACE RESTS - WOULD BE UPSET. I FEAR WIDER CONFRONTATION WHICH WOULD SOON BECOME  
RUSSELL



~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ 627

PAGE 01 TUNIS 04104 02 OF 02 241608Z

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42  
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 241220Z APR 68  
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5173

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 TUNIS 4104/2

EXDIS

SUBJECT: BOURGUIBA LETTER TO HO CHI MINH

UNCONTROLLABLE AND IN WHICH SMALL COUNTRIES - YOURS AS WELL AS MINE - WOULD LOSE THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND MANKIND MOST OF ITS ACHIEVEMENTS.

"YOU ARE, MR. PRESIDENT, RESPECTED DEAN OF CHIEFS OF STATE OF THIRD WORLD. ALL THROUGH YOUR LONG CAREER YOU HAVE SHOWN, MORE THAN ONCE, YOU KNOW HOW NOT TO GO TOO FAR. TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION PSYCHOLOGY OF ADVERSARY, TO ACCEPT COMPROMISE EVEN THOUGH ALL OF ONE'S OBJECTIVES NOT YET REACHED, TO AIM BEYOND WAR AT COOPERATION, TO BASE INDEPENDENCE ON

PAGE 2 RUDKKR 4104/2 ~~SECRET~~  
STRENGTH OF INTERNAL FRONT BUT ALSO ON BALANCE BETWEEN EXTERNAL GREAT POWERS, THAT IS DIFFICULT COURSE WHICH YOU AND I HAVE TRODEN AND WHICH, IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS, HAS YIELDED CONCLUSIVE RESULTS.

"AIM TODAY SHOULD BE TO INSURE, FOR PREDICTABLE FUTURE, SECURITY OF NVN, INDEPENDENCE OF SOUTH AND POSSIBILITY THAT BOTH THESE COUNTRIES MAY ONE DAY REUNITE THROUGH PEACEFUL MEANS. ONE SHOULD ALSO, I THINK, SEE TO IT THAT NO GREAT POWER COULD EXTEND HEGEMONY OVER NORTH AND SOUTH AND THUS DISRUPT EQUILIBRIUM OF THE WORLD.

"COUNTRIES NEIGHBORING VIETNAM SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECTED

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 TUNIS 04104 02 OF 02 241608Z

TO PRESSURES LIKELY TO UPSET SITUATION PREVAILING IN REGION.

"IT APPEARS TO ME THESE OBJECTIVES ARE REASONABLE AND ACCEPTABLE TO YOURSELF, TO ALL VIETNAMESE OF SOUTH AND OF NORTH WHO CARE FIRST ABOUT INDEPENDENCE THEIR COUNTRY, AS WELL AS

TO USA. ALL I KNOW ABOUT YOU, DECLARATIONS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THOSE OF FNL LEADERS, ALL I KNOW ABOUT AMERICAN LEADERS AND THEIR DECLARATIONS AUTHORIZE ME TO THINK THAT CONDITIONS FOR FRUITFUL NEGOTIATION EXIST TODAY ON THESE BASES.

PAGE 3 RUDKKR 4104/2 ~~SECRET~~

"IT IS OBVIOUS THAT US AND OTHER GREAT POWERS HAVE HOPED TO CONTROL NORTH OR SOUTH OF VIETNAM TO PREVENT IT FROM FALLING UNDER CONTROL OR INFLUENCE OF OTHER GREAT POWERS. TODAY, ONE MAY HOPE THAT AN INDEPENDENT VN, FREE FROM ALL FOREIGN OCCUPATION, WOULD BE FOR THESE POWERS, ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION BECAUSE IT DOES NOT UPSET EQUILIBRIUM TO WHICH THEY ARE ATTACHED.

"I FEEL THAT BY CONTINUING WAR ONE CANNOT ATTAIN ANY OTHER OBJECTIVE. CONSEQUENTLY, ONE SHOULD, WITHOUT LOSING ONE MORE DAY, ENTER INTO NEGOTIATION. QUESTIONS OF PROCEDURE BECOME SECONDARY EVEN IF THEY PRESENT IMPORTANT MORAL ASPECT.

"WAR LIKE ONE WHICH TAKING PLACE IN YOUR COUNTRY CAN ONLY END THROUGH NEGOTIATION, AND NEGOTIATION MEANS RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS AND ACCEPTANCE BY EACH OF PARTIES TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT HONOR, SELF RESPECT AND IMPERATIVES OF OTHER. IF SUCH IS ALSO YOUR FEELING AND THAT OF YOUR GOVERNMENT, WOULD IT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO PUT LESS EMPHASIS ON THAT WHICH IS AFTER ALL SECONDARY - THE CONDITIONS OF NEGOTIATIONS - AND MORE ON THAT WHICH IS ESSENTIAL: THEIR CONTENT?

PAGE 4 RUDKKR 4104/2 ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 TUNIS 04104 02 OF 02 241608Z

"NOW THAT USA RE-EXAMINING ITS VN POLICY, SUCH ATTITUDE, IF IT APPEARS POSSIBLE TO YOU, COULD PAY OFF. IT COULD NOT ONLY DISPEL IMPRESSION WIDESPREAD IN WORLD - EVEN AMONG YOUR FRIENDS - THAT YOUR WAR OBJECTIVES INCLUDE HUMILIATION OF ADVERSARY, BUT ALSO THAW SITUATION BY MAKING POSSIBLE PRENEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD BRIDGE GAP BETWEEN WAR OBJECTIVES OF PARTIES.

"I CONSIDER MYSELF YOUR EVERLASTING FRIEND AND THAT OF YOUR COUNTRY OF WHICH I APPRECIATE THE TRIALS. I HAVE SOME CREDIT IN US WHERE I INTEND TO GO NEXT MAY. ALL MY LIFE, I HAVE FOUGHT FOR DIGNITY OF MEN AND COOPERATION BETWEEN NATIONS.

"WITHOUT SEEKING ANY MEDIATION ROLE OF WHICH I HAVE NO NEED, I FEEL CONCERNED FOR FATE OF EACH OF PEOPLE OF THIRD WORLD AND FOR PEACE WHICH, TO MY MIND, IS INSEPARABLE FROM INDEPENDENCE OF EACH COUNTRY AND AT SAME TIME FROM EQUILIBRIUM OF WORLD.

"I HAVE ALWAYS THOUGHT THAT INTEREST OF OUR COUNTRIES AND REQUIREMENTS OUR TIMES MAKE IT OBLIGATION FOR US TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT EQUILIBRIUM AND TO PURSUE, IN ORDER TO IMPROVE IT, A POLICY OF "DETENTE, ENTENTE AND COOPERATION"

PAGE 5 RUDKKR 4104/2 ~~SECRET~~

PARTICULARLY WITH ALL GREAT POWERS. IF THAT EQUILIBRIUM WERE TO BE UPSET IN FAVOR OF SINGLE POWER AS CONSEQUENCE OF TEST OF STRENGTH WHICH INEVITABLY PUTS AT STAKE SELF-RESPECT OF ONE OF OTHERS, WOULD NOT VN BE ITSELF FIRST VICTIM?

"THAT IS WHAT LEADS ME, AFTER DEEP THOUGHT, TO SEND YOU THIS MESSAGE, MR. PRESIDENT, AND WISH RECEIVE YOUR OWN ANALYSIS. IF YOU WERE TO SHARE MY VIEW, I COULD THEN UNDERTAKE, IN NAME OF TUNISIA OR AT LEVEL OF OAU, ANY ACTION LIKELY CONTRIBUTE TO PREVENTING WAR FROM CONTINUING TO BE ONLY POLICY.

"FOR THAT, BOMBING OF YOUR COUNTRY SHOULD, OF COURSE, END; BUT IT IS EQUALLY NECESSARY THAT FORMULA FOR SELF-DETERMINATION OF SVN AND FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BE PUT FORWARD WHICH WOULD SPARE INTERESTS INVOLVED, TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE COMMITMENTS TAKEN, INSURE INDEPENDENCE OF COUNTRY ITSELF

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 TUNIS 04104 02 OF 02 241608Z

AND ITS NEIGHBORS WHILE AT SAME TIME OPENING POSSIBILITIES OF COOPERATION WITH ALL.

PAGE 6 RUDKCR 4104/2 ~~SECRET~~

"I AM CONVINCED THAT, IF SUCH FORMULA WERE PUT FORWARD, FIGHTING COULD RAPIDLY STOP AND LONG AND HARD STRUGGLE OF VN PEOPLE CLEAR WAY FOR PERIOD OF CONSTRUCTION AND PEACE, FINAL OBJECTIVE OF THIS STRUGGLE TO WHICH YOUR NAME WILL STAY LINKED.

"AND TO CLOSE ALLOW ME, MR. PRESIDENT, EXTEND BEST WISHES AND BROTHERLY GREETINGS TO YOU AND PEOPLE OF VIETNAM."

GP-1. RUSSELL



~~SECRET~~

14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, May 14, 1968

*sup*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Jacob Beam, U. S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia (Tuesday, May 14 - 12:30 p.m.)

You agreed to receive Ambassador Beam for ten or fifteen minutes prior to his return to Prague.

Ambassador Beam will:

- give you his assessment of the Czechoslovak situation, including Dubcek's probable reaction to Russian troop movements and other pressures.
- present his views on the Czechoslovak gold problem and our claims negotiations. (The State Department is working on a modified and more forthcoming position, which we may want to present to the Czechs.)
- present you with a Life feature book on Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland -- for which Beam wrote the introduction.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
 NLJ 97-333  
 By ica, NARA Date 9-8-98

WWR:ND:gg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14a

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH OF AMBASSADOR

JACOB D. BEAM

Ambassador Jacob D. Beam was born in 1908 and is a native of Princeton, New Jersey. He graduated from Princeton University in 1929 and entered the Foreign Service in 1931. After service at several European posts before World War II, he served on the staff of the Political Adviser SHAEF during and after the war. His other overseas assignments included positions as Counselor of Embassy in Djarkata, Belgrade, and Moscow. In 1957 he was appointed Ambassador to Poland, where he also served three years as the United States representative for the Warsaw ambassadorial talks with Communist China.

He has had such other special assignments as Adviser to the United States Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London in November 1947 and as Acting United States Representative to the United Nations Commission for Indonesia in 1950.

His Washington assignments included the positions of Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Director of the Office of East European Affairs and Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.

From 1962 to 1966 he was Assistant Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

He has been Ambassador to Prague since August 1966.

15

*Pres. file*

INFORMATION

Tuesday - May 14, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith Dr. Mora's eloquent thank you  
for the luncheon last Friday.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

OAS Secretary General Mora's letter,  
May 13.

*Handwritten:*  
to [unclear] 9/4/68  
15a

PAN AMERICAN UNION  
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1968

My dear Mr. President:

Allow me to express once more my deep appreciation of the luncheon with which you honored me and Dr. Sanders last Friday, and of the silver box with which you presented me on that occasion. These marks of your esteem and friendship I shall prize forever.

As I take leave of my office, however, I bear with me further remembrances in your regard---that of the democratic executive, striving to bring a larger measure of social, political, and economic justice to the citizens of his own land; that of the firm friend of his country's neighbors in the Hemisphere, to whose welfare he has likewise dedicated himself; and that of the world leader, seeking for a peace that will permit all peoples to advance in freedom upon the path of progress. I have no more earnest desire than that the efforts you are so selflessly putting forth may achieve the success for which you labor, and that you may find therein the satisfaction which you have so nobly earned.

Please believe me to be, with all good wishes and warm personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

José A. Mora  
Secretary General

The President  
of the United States of America  
Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

Tuesday - May 14, 1968

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Panamanian Elections

Panamanian electoral authorities have still not announced the outcome of Sunday's elections.

Both candidates are claiming victory. The pattern of the likely outcome is beginning to emerge. Official candidate Samudio is claiming a 6-7,000 margin. [redacted] officials in the Electoral Board mention the same figure.

3.3  
(b)(1)

It is quite clear that widespread tampering with ballot boxes took place. The Robles Government has conveniently used two public disturbances yesterday to justify the delay in announcing the tabulation. Ambassador Adair suggests the incidents might have been government-inspired.

3.3  
(b)(1)

[redacted] things are quiet but tense in Panama this morning.

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLI 09-338 (#208)  
By isl NARA, Date 7-9-10

Tuesday - May 14, 1968

*Pien file*

Mr. President:

President Diaz Ordaz wants to erect and dedicate a Benito Juarez statue in Washington before you leave office.

Interior has offered the site at Virginia and New Hampshire Avenues described in the attached memorandum.

Ambassador Freeman has relayed the offer. We are waiting for the Mexican response.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment —

*every thing attached here, but  
copy of the sketch plan  
to the secretaries.  
referred to Pen.*



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR  
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1968

17a  
/

Memorandum

To: William Bowdler, National Security Council

From: Assistant to the Secretary

Subject: Proposed Juarez Memorial

Further to my memorandum of May 9, I am enclosing detailed report from Acting Regional Director, National Capital Region, National Park Service, which is self-explanatory.

On the basis of the report we are recommending the traffic circle at Virginia and New Hampshire Avenues, N. W., as a suitable site for the location of the statue proposed as a memorial to Benito Pablo Juarez. I am also enclosing for your information two marked aerial photographs showing the site and a sketch plan of the geometrics.

You will notice that I have sent a copy of this memorandum to Mr. Max Chaplin, ARA/MEX, Mexican Desk, State Department.

If you think it necessary, a meeting might be arranged between all parties concerned relative to final decision.

After we  
hear from  
the Mex. cons.

Henry L. Kimelman

Enclosures

Copy to: Mr. Max Chaplin



UNITED STATES  
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE  
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION  
1100 OHIO DRIVE, S. W.  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20242

17b

IN REPLY REFER TO:

D66-NCR(RSP)

May 10, 1968

Memorandum

To: Assistant to the Secretary Henry L. Kimelman  
Through: Assistant Secretary for Fish and  
Wildlife and Parks

From: <sup>Acting</sup> Regional Director, National Capital Region

Subject: Proposed Juarez Memorial

A site study for the proposed Juarez Memorial has been prepared as follows and enclosed are two marked aerial photographs showing the site, and a sketch plan of the geometrics for the intersection of Virginia and New Hampshire Avenues.

About the Man

Benito Pablo Juarez is referred to as the "Mexican George Washington." He was born of Indian parents in 1806 in the State of Oaxaca. He was admitted to the bar in 1834 and became a judge in 1842. He became Provisional President in 1857, was elected President in 1861 for a four year term, and re-elected in 1871. He was known for his vigorous liberal policy and it was during his terms of office that the foreign elements were induced to leave Mexico.

Site Qualifications

In selecting the site for the memorial, location, setting, availability, and size are the most important features to be considered in that order. Ideally it would be most appropriate to locate this memorial on a site associated with Mexico. Unfortunately, no area with the above qualifications is available in the vicinity of the Mexican Chancery at 2529 16th Street, N. W.

Available Site

Since no site is available in an area that can be associated with Mexico, the vicinity of the State Department is next chosen for a selection. Sites in this area which comply with all the necessary qualifications are listed as follows:

1. Reservation 31, a Federal triangle located at Pennsylvania Avenue, 19th and H Streets, N. W.

2. A Federal property east of the proposed Federal Reserve Building Addition at Virginia Avenue and 20th Street, N. W.

3. A D. C. Highway Department traffic circle at Virginia and New Hampshire Avenues, N. W.

#### Proposed Site

The traffic circle at Virginia and New Hampshire Avenues would provide a suitable site for this purpose. This oblique circle is divided into two unequal segments by Virginia Avenue and is astride the axis of New Hampshire Avenue. The purpose of the special geometric design for this intersection was to successfully regulate the movement of traffic along New Hampshire Avenue, the major access route to the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts.

The south segment of approximately 13,000 square feet which is the larger of the two areas created by the intersection affords the most suitable location for a statue. A memorial placed in this location would be easily visible for several blocks in all directions. Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway is 1,300 feet west, the Kennedy Center is 800 feet south, the State Department is 2,000 feet east, and Washington Circle is 1,700 feet north.


Because of the special geometric design of the site and the off center axis of New Hampshire Avenue, special care should be exercised in the placing and orientation of a statue. An orientation which would have the statue face Washington Circle on the axis of New Hampshire Avenue would probably be most desirable. This orientation would allow a face or partial face view from three of the four major directions.

An underground sewage pumping station is located on the tract south of the site recommended for the memorial. A short service drive, entrance cover, and ventilating grates make up the visible features of this utility. Proper grading and landscaping would screen this minor intrusion from the scene and no other problems should be caused by this utility occupying a portion of the site.

A recent street widening project for Virginia Avenue occupied certain lands under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service and has made other land available for park purposes. The necessary land transfer to place the total memorial site under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service is presently being expedited.

Russell E. Dickenson

Enclosures




WASHINGTON  
GIRLE MC

JUARez  
MEMORIAL  
SITE

JOHN F. KENNEDY  
CENTER

ROCK CREEK PARKWAY



JUAREZ  
MEMORIAL  
SITE

VIRGINIA

AVENUE

NEW HAMPSHIRE

18

INFORMATION

Tuesday - May 14, 1968

*Pres file*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Second Session of the US-Mexico Border Development Commission**

Herewith Ray Telles' report on the recent session of the Border Commission (Tab A).

Most of the meeting seems to have been devoted to a review of studies and surveys in progress by its working groups on economic development, industrialization, transportation, tourism, education, health, port of entry procedures and sports.

The more tangible accomplishments were:

1. Establishment of a joint emergency planning and disaster relief group.
2. Organization of a pilot binational local planning agency to develop "one community" approaches to redevelopment of border cities. (It is to be located in Nogales.)
3. Establishment of a pilot US-Mexico Manpower Development Center (at Laredo).
4. Establishment of two pilot Cultural Centers, one at Laredo and one at Mexicali.
5. Designation of May 18 as "Border Beauty and Friendship Day" to be marked by special ceremonies at beautification projects along the border. (A list of projects is attached at Tab B).

W. W. Rostow

**Attachments**

Tab A - Report from Ambassador Telles on Second Session of the Border Development Commission.

Tab B - List of beautification projects along the US-Mexican border.

18  
Walt Rostow

May 9, 1968

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Report on Second Session of the Commission,  
May 1-3, 1968

The Second Plenary Session of the Commission was held on May 1, 2 and 3. I believe it was a successful one.

As you remember, the initial, organizing session was held in Mexico City on October 19-20, 1967. In the intervening six months some 16 Working Groups were organized, many projects initiated and a firm, going inter-relationship established with the Mexicans.

Attached for your information is a copy of the Resolutions taken during the Session. These Resolutions have confirmed, on an official basis, many of the projects on which I have reported to you.

The meeting was climaxed on the afternoon of May 3 when Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Margain exchanged notes to establish a formal framework for joint emergency planning and disaster relief. However, the highlight of the Session was your thoughtfulness in inviting the Commission to your historic press conference on May 3. Sr. Vivanco and his people will be reporting personally to President Diaz Ordaz on your wishes for the Commission and your plans to visit Mexico.

I also want to thank you for allowing Walt Rostow to open our meeting and to deliver your greetings. May I say that the work of the Commission would not be as successful as it is without the help of Walt Rostow and Bill Bowdler.

Raymond Telles  
Ambassador

cc: Bill Bowdler, E.O.P.  
Walt Rostow, E.O.P.

MLSpector:mb

May 3, 1968

---

Second Session  
Washington, D. C.

RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMMISSION (2)

During its Second Session the Commission adopted the following resolutions:

1. EMERGENCY PLANNING

The Commission notes with satisfaction that, pursuant to the activities of the Working Group on Emergency Planning, an exchange of notes will take place on May 3, 1968 to establish a formal framework for joint emergency planning and disaster relief.

The Commission is gratified that the Chairmen of the US and Mexican Sections are to be members of the Joint Emergency Planning Committee to be established and pledges its continuing support to that Committee.

2. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The Commission notes with satisfaction the efforts of the Working Group on Economic Development in compiling, collating and analyzing information from many sources relating to the human and material resources of the border area. The Commission agrees that each National Section should accelerate the present efforts designed to explore

the opportunities on both sides of the border to increase the number of new jobs and advance the level of human welfare in the border area. The Working Group will recommend to the Commission for submission to the Governments economic development policies which it considers appropriate to attain these ends. The Working Group will also undertake to identify as soon as possible those development problems whose solution requires the cooperative efforts of both governments, taking into consideration the interaction between the border areas of the two nations.

### 3. INDUSTRIALIZATION

The Commission endorses the continuing efforts of the Working Group on Industrialization to identify the special economic and social characteristics of the border area as they relate to industrialization. The Commission notes with approval the undertaking of a study on possibilities for industrialization of the US side of the border, which is to be done by a private consultant firm for the US Section.

### 4. TRADE

#### A. Cotton Textiles

In view of the importance given by the Government of Mexico to the problem of the inclusion within the US cotton textile import quota of goods assembled

in the Mexican border area from raw materials originating in the US, the Commission agreed that this matter has special relevance to border area development and therefore agreed to transmit the Mexican viewpoints to the competent US authorities, with the recommendation that they study how to solve the problem.

B. In-Bond Stores

The Commission requests the competent US authorities to seek means of implementing, if possible, the following suggestions presented by the Mexican Section:

1) To conclude an agreement between the United States and Mexican Governments which would basically include the following points:

a) A requirement of proof in the form of a valid passport from the customers of "In-Bond" stores that they are passengers (i.e. tourists).

b) Inclusion of basic data from the passport of the tourist-customer on the shipper's Export Permit.

c) Notification to Mexican authorities of the daily volume of such exports.

2) To seek from the Congress of the United States a limitation on licensing of "In-Bond stores on the United States-Mexico border, since they do not

fulfill the objective of increasing international tourism and their presence on the frontier disrupts the normal development of inter-border commerce.

C. Liquor Purchases

The Commission requests that the competent authorities of the two countries seek ways of concluding a reciprocal agreement whereby visitors from one country to the other may import free of customs duties upon their return to their respective country up to one gallon of liquor produced in the country of purchase.

D. Contraband

In view of the serious problems caused by the movement of contraband across the border, the Commission requests the two governments to take further steps toward the closest possible cooperation between their customs services ~~of~~ keeping in mind the excellent example of existing cooperation in the field of narcotics.

5. TRANSPORTATION

A. Transportation Study

The Commission noted with satisfaction the preliminary studies of the Working Group on Transportation and resolved that a survey of present conditions in a specific area be completed, urging the Working Group

to hold in June 1968 the meeting scheduled for Brownsville or Matamoros in order to begin its surveys and to report the results thereof to the Chairmen of the National Sections.

B. Traffic Signs

The Commission recommends that the competent authorities of both countries take the necessary steps as soon as possible to adopt on both sides of the border a uniform system of traffic signs such as the system recommended by the United Nations.

6. TOURISM

The Commission supports the work of the Working Group on Tourism and agrees with the conclusion that a greater development of tourism would have advantageous results for both parties, from the standpoint of the creation of new employment opportunities and increased income for residents of the border area, and it resolves that the Working Group should continue and broaden the scope of its studies on the elimination of the various administrative and procedural obstacles that affect tourism on both sides of the border. The two Sections of the Group should meet for consultation every three months, beginning in June 1968, in order to review the steps taken and to submit recommendations to the Commission. In addition a report on the results of each meeting should be submitted to the Chairmen of the National

Sections. Finally, the Commission recommends to the appropriate Mexican authorities that in so far as possible, they adopt the procedures mentioned in Annex 7 of CODAF/4 in order to facilitate the transit of tourists whose purpose is to engage in hunting.

#### 7. URBAN DEVELOPMENT

The Commission urges the border twin cities of both countries to strive to achieve a "one community" approach to its growth and redevelopment programs by joint planning and cooperative development of its community resources.

The Commission recognizes that this will entail unilateral as well as bilateral approaches but urges constant collaboration and mutual exchanges; and to this end endorses the expansion of the recently initiated urban development workshops; and the establishment by a border community selected by CODAF of a pilot binational local planning agency to explore and develop mutual planning and development approaches.

#### 8. PUBLIC HEALTH

The Commission endorses the efforts of the Working Group on Public Health and resolves that the Group should continue its activities particularly those concerned with the training and development of health manpower, ongoing programs related to environmental health activities, and Mother and Child health.

9. EDUCATION

The Commission endorses the accomplishments of the Working Group on Education and resolves that the Working Group should draft specific proposals for the expansion of teacher and student exchange and promote with the competent authorities of both countries, and assist them in the facilitation of the exchange of Cultural Friendship Kits and the expansion of bilingual language training in the border area. The Commission also recommends that two appropriately trained individuals, one from each country, be commissioned as soon as possible to develop the necessary materials and delineate criteria for a larger scale conference on the recognition<sup>of</sup>/studies made by students transferring from one country to the other and further decides that both National Sections shall appoint resident representatives in the border area who will coordinate plans for educational development.

10. MANPOWER AND LABOR

The Commission endorses the efforts of the Working Group on Manpower and Labor, particularly as regards the compilation and exchange of information concerning employment and labor conditions in the border area. The Commission resolves: That the Working Group should continue to meet periodically and review and assess the information about the extent and causes of unemployment in the border areas in order to provide

technical advice on the manpower and employment ~~implications~~ programs and projects that might be undertaken.

11. TECHNICAL AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING

The Commission endorses the efforts of the Working Groups on Technical and Vocational Training and <sup>on</sup> Manpower and Labor and resolves that CODAF embrace the long-range joint project of establishing a pilot joint US-Mexico Manpower Development Center.

12. CULTURAL ACTIVITIES

The Commission endorses the achievements of the Working Group on Cultural Activities and resolves that two pilot Cultural Centers programmed to meet local needs be established in the border area, one in the United States and one in Mexico, and that the Commission promote conferences, workshops, and competitions in the arts.

13. SPORTS

The Commission endorses the accomplishments and programs of the Working Group on Sports and resolved that its efforts dedicated toward increasing sports activities should be continued and expanded. The Commission further decides that the Working Group shall submit to the Chairmen of both National Sections, not later than June 10, 1968, a complete report on its current and future activities.

14. NATIONAL PARKS

The Commission endorses the achievements and programs

of the Working Group on National Parks and resolves: That both governments should endeavor to bring into full use at the earliest feasible date the routes each is designating as Border Friendship Routes; that the proposals made by both National Sections for unilateral developments on their respective sides of the reservoir created by the Amistad Dam, and at other locations, should be put into final form at the earliest possible time; that both governments should reaffirm the desirability of cultural and recreational developments in the Chamizal; and that both governments should continue and expand the inventories they already have begun of natural and historical features in the border area.

15. BEAUTIFICATION

The Commission endorses the activities of the Working Group on Beautification and resolved<sup>d</sup> that it continue its work on organizing Border Beauty and Friendship Day and in espousing the use of Bilingual Welcoming Signs, both designed to make the border area a more attractive area in which to live and to visit. The Working Group shall keep the chairmen of both National Sections informed of its current as well as future activities.

16. PORTS OF ENTRY

The Commission endorses the efforts and programs of the Working Group on Ports of Entry and resolves that it should

continue its work for improving Port of Entry Inspection procedures and for the exchange of information on the specific requirements <sup>*Border Crossing, such as those for*</sup> ~~such as~~ hunters and private planes.

17. RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER PUBLIC, INTERNATIONAL AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS

The Commission recognizes and endorses the efforts made by the Secretariats of both National Sections to obtain the cooperation or services of institutions such as universities and technical institutes of both countries, as well as of international organizations in the implementation of the projects of the Commission and resolved that their endeavors in this regard should be continued. The Commission also endorses the enlisting of non-governmental organizations which may act as auxiliaries in the development of the programs of the Commission.

18. ORGANIZATIONAL PAMPHLETS

The Commission resolves that the Secretariats of both National Sections should draw up or have drawn up as early as possible a simple pamphlet in Spanish and English, outlining equivalent officials of government bureaus and offices at all levels so that government employees and other persons of both nations will be able quickly to identify counterpart officials when opportunities arise for cooperation between the two countries.

19. THIRD SESSION OF THE COMMISSION

The Commission decided to hold its Third Session in Mexico City on the 4th, 5th and 6th December 1968.

20. MEETINGS OF THE WORKING GROUPS

The Commission agreed that the Chairmen of the two National Sections, in consultation, shall determine the date and place for the meetings of Working Groups in order to review the development of their tasks before the Third Session of the Commission. This decision shall not affect the meetings of Working Groups pointed out in previous resolutions.

Planned Activities  
Border Beauty and Friendship Day  
May 18, 1968

Brownsville, Texas - Ground breaking ceremonies will mark the start of work on an International Friendship Pavilion and Garden which has been a dream of local citizens for years. The Pavilion on several acres along the bank of the Rio Grande within sight of the border itself will house exhibits representing the best of both cultures. The "Day's" ceremonies will be participated in by representatives of both countries.

McAllen, Texas - The city is observing the "Day" in two acts worthy of mention. Mayor Veale has proclaimed Plant-A-Palm Day and two local banks are backing projects organized by the Chamber of Commerce to encourage everyone in town to buy ornamental plants at cost--local nurserymen have pledged as much of their stock as needed and Key Clubs from the local high school will transport the trees. After the "Day" the banks will underwrite the expense of installing any palms left over along streets and in parks throughout the city with special attention to the route leading to the border crossing. In a cooperative effort which could well be copied anywhere--and which was successfully tested a couple of weeks ago to kick off a Boys Club fund raising drive--a major city park area is to be cleared of brush, debris, and litter left not only by normal use but by Hurricane Beulah and the great flood of last fall. Several hundred Boy Scouts from the area will do the work and then be treated to hot dogs donated by local businessmen and barbecued over the brush the boys labored to clean up.

The bridge crews are going to paint the bridge railings and clean up along the bridge and paint the lane markers on May 18.

The citizens of the lower Rio Grande Valley in addition to those ceremonies mentioned are celebrating the wrap-up of a two year Operation Shine--a well organized competitive involvement of organizations, local government, business, and individuals run by the Valley Chamber of Commerce with highly visible results in spite of the devastation of Beulah last fall.

Laredo, Texas - The streets of Laredo are responding to the kick off of an Operation Brillante sponsored by the Chamber of Commerce backed by Mayor Joseph Martin.

Eagle Pass, Texas - The Mayor of Eagle Pass, Texas, will join with his counterpart from Piedras Negras in a ceremony to break ground for an International Friendship Arch sponsored by Lions Clubs from both sides of the border.

Del Rio, Texas - A partnership of city and citizen groups will create a strip park along the major border access highway in the heart of town.

El Paso, Texas - The city's Lions Clubs are the major movers in the construction of a vest pocket park at the entrance to a major pedestrian border crossing. The site is a section of an abandoned irrigation canal filled in by the International Water and Boundary Commission. The plans were guided by the City Planning Department but designed and executed by the Lions. A celebration there will involve the Mayors of both Juarez and El Paso and feature the unveiling of a bilingual plaque on one of the new bridges officially naming it the Good Neighbor Bridge.

Columbus, New Mexico - The children of the tiny community, New Mexico's only border town, will have a litter pick up campaign and a hot dog supper to celebrate their labors as well as opening of the community pool whose pleasures are shared by children from neighboring Palomas, Mexico. The organizers of the "Day" were able to arrange a \$250 matching grant from the Hershey Foundation of Houston, Texas, to facilitate the opening of the pool for the coming summer.

Douglas, Arizona - Tree planting ceremonies will mark the beginning of the development of Speer Park, one block from the border crossing--a park site which will continue to be traversed by the shortest pedestrian route from Agua Prieta to downtown shopping. Eventually city officials hope the park will provide not only a green place to rest for people from both sides of the border but that it will include an information and accommodation center for travelers as well. Such facilities at many border crossings will fill a need that continues to grow as more and more of our population continues to become mobile and seek new horizons for that mobility.

San Luis, Arizona - Merchants plan to line the approach to the border with ornamental palms.

Calexico, California - Plans are underway to use the "Day" as a kick off for a palm planting campaign. Ceremonial plantings are planned with trees being made available at low cost to all homeowners interested in planting them. Low growing plants will be planted along the border fence and planting boxes installed on the fence around the customs inspection area.

San Diego, California - In San Ysidro within the city limits of San Diego, the "Day" has been proclaimed jointly by Mayor Curran and Mayor Gutierrez of Tijuana. Two major kinds of beautification activities are on the agenda for local citizen groups and individuals--a litter pick up campaign by the San Diego War Against Litter Committee in a selected location, and landscape improvement at the State employment center, a focal point in the community for citizens from both sides. Token planting will highlight the celebration to be attended by dignitaries from the local communities from both the United States and Mexico, and from State and Federal agencies and organizations. The city will take the occasion to announce work schedules and show plans for work on the community's park to begin shortly. Plans will be announced for a neighborhood teen center to be the result of the combined efforts of the young people themselves, local businessmen, and the county's OEO programs.

Tecate, California - A program will be initiated to develop a park on Federal lands near the border entry point.

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*Pres file*

INFORMATION

Tuesday, May 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Imelda Marcos visit

According to the Department of Defense, Mrs. Marcos' condition is more serious than had been anticipated. As a result, Walter Reed has now scheduled two additional days of examination and consultation with her.

We arranged for NASA to take the two older Marcos children to Cape Kennedy tomorrow, May 15. Mrs. Marcos will doubtless mention this to you this evening during the dinner.

W. W. Rostow

MWright:wpt

20

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, May 14, 1968

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Jacob Beam, U.S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia (Tuesday, May 14 - 12:30 p.m.)

You agreed to receive Ambassador Beam for ten or fifteen minutes prior to his return to Prague.

Ambassador Beam will:

- give you his assessment of the Czechoslovak situation, including Dubcek's probable reaction to Russian troop movements and other pressures.
- present his views on the Czechoslovak gold problem and our claims negotiations. (The State Department is working on a modified and more forthcoming position, which we may want to present to the Czechs.)
- present you with a Life feature book on Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland -- for which Beam wrote the introduction.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
 NLJ 97-333  
 By ica, NARA Date 9-8-98

WWR:ND:gg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH OF AMBASSADOR

JACOB D. BEAM

Ambassador Jacob D. Beam was born in 1908 and is a native of Princeton, New Jersey. He graduated from Princeton University in 1929 and entered the Foreign Service in 1931. After service at several European posts before World War II, he served on the staff of the Political Adviser SHAEF during and after the war. His other overseas assignments included positions as Counselor of Embassy in Djarkata, Belgrade, and Moscow. In 1957 he was appointed Ambassador to Poland, where he also served three years as the United States representative for the Warsaw ambassadorial talks with Communist China.

He has had such other special assignments as Adviser to the United States Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in London in November 1947 and as Acting United States Representative to the United Nations Commission for Indonesia in 1950.

His Washington assignments included the positions of Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Director of the Office of East European Affairs and Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.

From 1962 to 1966 he was Assistant Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

He has been Ambassador to Prague since August 1966.

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ACTION

Monday, May 13, 1968

*Long*  
*2. Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested reply to the latest letter to you from New Zealand Prime Minister Holyoake

Holyoake has responded to your message of April 11, inviting him to visit Washington to discuss Vietnam. He expressed his appreciation for the invitation, and his assurances that "you have the full support of the New Zealand Government in your endeavours to get serious discussions under way." He adds that, if it is acceptable to you, he would like to defer his visit to Washington until "the situation becomes a little clearer." (Copy of Holyoake's letter is attached.)

State felt no reply was necessary. I do not agree and have attached a brief reply to which State has no objection.

I recommend you sign the reply.

W. W. Rostow

Atts

MWright:wpt

21a

May 14, 1968

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your message of May 1. I am very glad to have the assurances of your full support for our efforts in Paris. I certainly defer to your wish to put off personal discussion between us until the situation has become clearer. I am conscious of and appreciate the confidence implicit in that decision.

In the meantime, we shall consult with your Government fully on developments, and I will look forward to seeing you again whenever you feel a meeting is desirable.

With kind personal regards.

Sincerely,

*LBJ Lyndon B. Johnson*

The Right Honorable  
Keith J. Holyoake  
Prime Minister of New Zealand  
Wellington

LBJ:MWright:wpt

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-553  
By ica, NARA Date 9-8-98



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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By is, NARA Date 9-8-98

MESSAGE DATED 1 MAY 1968 TO PRESIDENT LYNDON B.  
JOHNSON  
FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF NEW ZEALAND,  
RT. HON. KEITH HOLYOAKE

---

Dear Mr President,

Thank you for your message of 11 April in which you invited me to visit you in Washington for discussions on the Vietnam issue.

I am, of course, deeply concerned to maintain the closest contact with you during these difficult times. We were happy to have Secretary Rusk with us in Wellington and to have the benefit of his wisdom and experience. He will have told you that our thinking is developing on close accord with your own.

I should greatly appreciate having a personal discussion with you. It may be, however, that such discussions would be even more worthwhile after your preliminary contacts with the North Vietnamese have shown what possibilities lie open to us.

I would prefer, therefore, if that is acceptable to you, to keep open the possibility of my visiting Washington until the situation becomes a little clearer.

I want you to know, in the meantime, that you have the full support of the New Zealand Government in your endeavours to get serious discussions with the other side under way. I hope that the present difficulties over the site for the

2.

preliminary contacts can be overcome quickly so that the talks can begin.

With kind personal regards.

Yours sincerely,

KEITH HOLYOAKE

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

Saturday, May 11, 1968  
2:50 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Stamp  
& Pres file*

SUBJECT: Procedural Agreement Reached at Paris Talks

Our delegation to the Paris talks reports that at the meeting today the North Vietnamese were businesslike and that the atmosphere was good. (Tab A)

Agreement was reached on the procedures to be followed. (Text is at Tab B.)

Cy Vance made clear to the North Vietnamese that our acceptance of Paragraph 2. (C), which refers to the citizenship of persons participating in the talks, was an entirely reasonable arrangement so long as the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are discussing matters of primary concern to them. However, our acceptance of this provision should not be construed to affect in any way the role which must be played by the legitimate Government of South Vietnam at the appropriate time.

Later in the meeting and in response to this point, the North Vietnamese representative said he took note of our statement and understood it but it was not necessary to discuss it here.

The first substantive meeting is scheduled for 10:30 a. m. Monday, Paris time. North Vietnamese Minister Thuy will speak first. Ambassador Harriman will follow with his opening statement which you have already approved.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By iss, NARA Date 9-8-98

Bromley Smith

~~SECRET~~

222

Saturday, May 11, 1968

**Procedures for the Conversations Between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States of America**

**1. Denomination of the Meeting:**

Official conversations between the representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Government of the United States of America.

**2. Composition of Each Party:**

A. Apart from the representative or representatives appointed by each government, each party can have in the meeting hall a number of advisers (not exceeding 10), experts, interpreters, and secretaries.

B. The total number of persons of each party to attend the formal sessions in the meeting hall will not exceed 20 persons (not counting the members of the Secretariat working outside the meeting hall).

C. To be allowed to attend the sessions between the two parties, as well as to work at the site chosen for the conversations, the components of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam party must be citizens of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and those of the United States party must be citizens of the United States.

D. Each party will communicate to the other the composition of its party to attend the formal sessions as mentioned in Paragraph B above. Modification of the composition of one party, if any, will be communicated to the other party.

**3. Right to Take the Floor:**

At the formal sessions between the two parties, the representative or representatives appointed by the government of each party are the only persons to have the right to take the floor. In case of their absence, another person must be appointed to take the floor in their place.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By isa, NARA Date 9-8-98

~~SECRET~~

*Sub A*

4. Languages, Translation, and Tape-Recording:

A. Vietnamese and English are the two official languages to be used at the sessions of the conversations.

B. French is a working language.

C. Each party may tape-record the statements made by both parties at formal sessions.

5. Minutes:

There will be no joint minutes. Each party appoints a number of secretaries for recording the conversations.

6. Information and Press:

A. Whether joint press-communiques are to be issued or not shall be agreed upon by both parties.

B. Press, movie, and television correspondents will be invited to the opening of the first session of the official conversations between the two parties. They will have ten minutes for their professional activities before the session opens. In view of the accommodating capacity of the meeting hall, both parties will agree with the French Government on the number of the correspondents invited.

C. No pressmen are allowed to attend the sessions of the conversations.

7. Time-Table:

A. The first session of the conversations will be held on May 13, 1968, at 10:30 a. m., at the "Centre des Conferences Internationales" put at the disposal of the two parties.

7. Time-Table (cont'd.)

B. After each session, the time for the next shall be fixed by both parties.

In principle, there will be one session a day, starting from 10:30 a. m., except on Saturdays, Sundays and other holidays agreed upon by both parties.

8. Security and Order:

A. Both parties request the French Government to ensure security and order outside and inside the "Centre des Conferences Internationales" (guarding, and checking permits).

B. If there are persons whose presence at the meeting site is suspicious to either party, this will be brought to the notice of the guards for verification.

C. Each party is allowed to bring with it into the meeting site documents and working facilities (typewriters, tape-recorders, etc.), except movie and photo cameras and weapons.

9. Application:

These procedures are applicable until otherwise agreed upon by both parties.

**From U. S. Delegation to Paris Talks:**

At the meeting this morning, May 11, agreement was reached on procedures to be followed. Same representatives present on both sides as on May 10. Atmosphere was good, businesslike.

Agreed procedures follow in all substantive aspects the U. S. revised text cabled department yesterday. Phrase "until otherwise agreed upon" does not appear in title. Instead, a new item, No. 9, is added and reads "these procedures are applicable until otherwise agreed upon by both parties".

Ambassador Vance read to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam delegation the relevant portion of Paragraph 2, State 162668. They said they understood the elanation but thought it was "not necessary to discuss here".

It was agreed Monday meeting would open publicly to allow press and TV cameras to record the scene. Private session would begin with opening statement by Minister Thuy to be followed by U. S. opening statement by Ambassador Harriman.

Upon departure from meeting site, Ambassador Vance read following statement to the press: "The two parties met this morning for two hours. They have agreed on the procedures for the official conversations between the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Government of the United States of America. The official conversations will begin at 10:30 a. m. on Monday, May 13, 1968."

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam delegation declined to make it a joint statement but said they agreed with it and had no objections to his reading it upon departure from the site.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By is, NARA Date 9-8-98

11 May 1968

THE WHITE HOUS.  
WASHINGTON

Mr. President

*23*  
*Per file*

The British here gave us  
following dispatch from their office  
in Phnom Penh.

WWRostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED  
WHCA

1968 MAY 11 20 10

EEA426  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 1849

FROM: BROMLEY SMITH  
TO : WALT ROSTOW  
CITE: CAP81071

11 MAY 11 PM 4:19

SATURDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BRITISH HERE GAVE US FOLLOWING DISPATCH FROM THEIR OFFICE IN PHNOM PENH.

QUOTE

"BURCHETT ON PEACE TALKS"

IN CONVERSATION WITH A MEMBER OF MY STAFF THIS MORNING (MAY 8) BURCHETT SAID HE SAW A PARALLEL BETWEEN THE LATEST OFFENSIVE ON SAIGON AND THE ATTACK ON DIEN BIEN PHU. HE SAID THE GENEVA TALKS IN 1954 BEGAN ON 7 MAY AND DIEN BIEN PHU FELL ON 8 MAY. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE COMMUNIST NECESSARILY HOPED TO SECURE ANYTHING SO SPECTACULAR AS THE FALL OF CHOLON OR SAIGON BUT HE HAD QUOTE BEEN TOLD UNQUOTE THAT ONE OF THE OBJECTS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE WAS TO IMPLANT CADRES INSIDE SAIGON AND OTHER TOWNS TO CO-ORDINATE ATTACKS AT A GIVEN MOMENT WITH OTHER ATTACKS TO BE MOUNTED FROM THE OUTSIDE. THIS HE SAID WAS WHAT WAS NOW HAPPENING IN ORDER TO INCREASE PRESSURE AT THE TIME OF THE PEACE TALKS. HE THOUGHT THE COMMUNISTS WOULD ENDEAVOUR TO MAINTAIN SUCH PRESSURE DURING THE TALKS.

2. BURCHETT SEEMED GENUINELY SURPRISED TO HEAR OF PRESS REPORTS WHICH SUGGESTED THAT THE COMMUNISTS WERE EXPECTING THE TALKS TO GO ON FOR AS LONG AS A YEAR. THIS WAS CLEARLY NOT HIS IMPRESSION OF NORTH VIETNAM'S INTENTIONS.

END QUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 11/1945Z MAY 68

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-331  
By isa, NARA Date 3-19-99

PRESERVATION COPY

11 Mar 1968

24

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Pres file*

Mr. President

Herewith Bob Ginsburgh's memo  
on enemy attrition.

WWRostow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

24a

08 MAY 11 PM 2:53  
08 MAY 11 PM 2:53

SATURDAY  
SATURDAY

1968 MAY 11 18 43

VZCZCEEA423  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 1845

FROM GEN GINSBURGH  
TO WALT ROSTOW  
CITE CAP81068

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 24

By isa, NARS, Date 7-2-84

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

SATURDAY, MAY 11, 1968

SUBJECT: ENEMY ATTRITION

1. MACV'S PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE ON THE CURRENT ENEMY INFILTRATION CONCLUDES THAT:

- THE ENEMY MAY BE ABLE TO SUSTAIN FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 18 MONTHS A PERSONNEL INPUT ADEQUATE TO COVER HIS LOSSES.
- IF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF INFILTRATORS IS CONSIDERABLY HIGHER THAN OUR ESTIMATE, THE ENEMY'S NET STRENGTH COULD SHOW AN INCREASE.

2. THIS IS NOT AN UNREASONABLE CONCLUSION. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT IT MAY OVERSTATE ENEMY CAPABILITY BY:

- UNDERESTIMATING ENEMY CASUALTIES.
- OVERESTIMATING VC RECRUITMENT.
- UNDERESTIMATING ATTRITION OF INFILTRATORS EN ROUTE.

3. ENEMY LOSSES. SINCE 1 JANUARY, THE ENEMY HAS LOST 97,000 KIA. IF AN ADDITIONAL 33,000 HAVE BEEN DISABLED AS A RESULT OF WOUNDS (.35 TIGER KIA), ENEMY CASUALTIES WOULD NOW AMOUNT TO 130,000. BY 1 JULY, THE ENEMY SHOULD SUFFER AN ADDITIONAL 20,000 TO 50,000 CASUALTIES (BASED ON 1967 OR 1968 RATES). THUS, TOTAL LOSSES FOR THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1968 WOULD AMOUNT TO 130,000 - 180,000.

4. ENEMY INFILTRATION. BY 1 JULY ALL OF THE CURRENT INFILTRATORS COULD BE IN SVN. CURRENT MOVEMENT IS ESTIMATED AT 55,000 TO 65,000. INFILTRATION DURING THE FIRST QUARTER NOT INCLUDED IN THE ABOVE AND NOT COUNTING THE TWO ADDITIONAL DIVISIONS ADDED TO THE ORDER OF BATTLE AMOUNTS TO 30,000. THUS, TOTAL INFILTRATION FOR THE FIRST HALF OF 1968 WOULD AMOUNT TO 85,000 TO 95,000.

5. ENEMY RECRUITMENT. TO MAINTAIN THE ABOVE GAINS AND LOSSES, THE VC WOULD HAVE TO RECRUIT BETWEEN 65,000 AND 95,000 TO SUSTAIN TOTAL ENEMY STRENGTH DURING THIS PERIOD. THIS MEANS A MONTHLY RECRUITMENT RATE OF 10,000 TO 16,000 A MONTH. IN MY VIEW, 16,000 IS INCREDIBLE. 10,000 A MONTH IS CONCEIVABLE. BUT EVEN THIS FIGURE SEEMS HIGH TO ME. IN 1967, OUR BEST ESTIMATE WAS A MONTHLY RECRUITMENT OF 3,500. IN 1966, RECRUITMENT WAS OFFICIALLY ESTIMATED AT 7,000 A MONTH, BUT THIS ESTIMATE WAS ALWAYS VIEWED WITH GREAT SCEPTICISM IN MANY QUARTERS. I WOULD EXPECT THAT THERE HAS BEEN SOME INCREASE IN RECRUITMENT THIS YEAR AS COMPARED TO 1967, BUT I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS INCREASE HAS BEEN AS GREAT AS WE FEARED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE TET ATTACK ON THE CITIES.

6. ATTRITION OF INFILTRATORS. I AM NOT AWARE OF ANY GOOD CURRENT ESTIMATES ON THIS FACTOR. I WOULD SIMPLY NOTE THAT PAST ESTIMATES HAVE INDICATED 10 TO 30 PERCENT ATTRITION AND THAT ONE RECENT POW SAID THAT HALF OF HIS UNIT WAS LOST DURING INFILTRATION. THUS, IT WOULD BE MY HUNCH THAT EN ROUTE, ATTRITION WOULD AT LEAST -- AND PERHAPS MORE THAN -- COMPENSATE FOR ANY UNDERSTATEMENT OF THE INFILTRATORS NOW IN THE PIPELINES.

7. THUS, I WOULD CONCLUDE THAT:

- THE ENEMY MAY BE ABLE TO SUSTAIN HIS STRENGTH, BUT THAT
- MOST PROBABLY HE WILL NOT.

8. THESE FACTORS WOULD LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT:

- AS A MINIMUM, THE ENEMY IS DEPENDENT ON AN EARLY SUCCESS IN NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD HALT OR SLOW DOWN THE CONTINUING EROSION OF HIS STRENGTH.
- HOPEFULLY, HE MAY BE READY TO ARRIVE AT A SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO US WITHIN A MATTER OF MONTHS.

DTG: 111639Z MAY 68

~~SECRET~~ ~~EVER~~ ~~ONLY~~

11 19 72

May 11, 1968

*1 - copy  
of  
Pres file  
a.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Governor Romney's Letter

Herewith a shortened but still responsive reply to George Romney's letter, as per your instructions.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

MWright:mm

Dear Governor Romney:

Thank you for your letter of April 3 and for the copy of your Keene, New Hampshire, speech. I have read both with interest. I hope you will continue to give me the benefit of your counsel on this problem.

I think we agree on many of the points you have presented in your speech. We are not seeking to win a military victory in Vietnam nor are we trying to export our own system there. Rather, we are seeking to assure that the South Vietnamese have the opportunity to create their own system of government and their own society free from terror and coercion. Our military assistance to South Vietnam is shaped to this goal of convincing the aggressor that his efforts to subjugate the South are in vain.

As you so clearly note, the nation-building programs in Vietnam must succeed. In the past two years, I believe the South Vietnamese have made good progress. They have written a constitution and elected a bicameral National Assembly as well as a President and a Vice President. Village and hamlet elections were held, and more than 1,000 villages revitalized their centuries-old system of selecting their own leadership. Revolutionary Development teams of dedicated young Vietnamese have been working in the countryside to help the villages meet the local agricultural, educational and social problems. Good schools, good water, better health and a new prosperity at the market place are indicators of success in these efforts in the many areas of South Vietnam where the government and people have had the opportunity to work together, unmolested by the Communists.

The Communists have attempted to disrupt these efforts to help the villagers and to develop meaningful citizen-government relationships. They have understood that these achievements are a mortal danger to their ambitions. Thus, the heavy use of terror against village leaders, Revolutionary Development teams and participants in village projects. Thus, also, the

Tet assault on the cities and Government of South Vietnam. But the Communists have failed to rally the people to their side, or to destroy the Government.

As you know, the Government of South Vietnam has met the Tet challenge with a priority program of repairing the cities and stepping up the programs in the villages. With the conscription of 18 year-olds and national mobilization, the South Vietnamese are increasing their already great share of the burden of this struggle.

In your speech you outlined a thoughtful plan for a regional settlement. I hope some day soon we can see the kind of cooperation and performance you call for on the part of North Vietnam.

My March 31 initiative succeeded in finally bringing the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table. It is too early to predict the outcome, but I hope and pray that peace can be achieved quickly and honorably. As we strive to that end, there may be difficult days ahead, and we will need the support of such dedicated men as yourself.

Sincerely,

Honorable George Romney  
Governor of Michigan  
Lansing, Michigan

WH/VIG:LBJ:MW:tjs

*not signed*

11 May 1968

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

24

*Pres file*

Mr. President

You may wish to note Bob Ginsburgh's conclusions about infiltration in paragraphs 3 & 4.

WWRostow

26a

~~SECRET~~

088 MAY 11 PM 12:57  
SATURDAY

1968 MAY 11 16 45

EEA422  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 1843

FROM: GEN GINSBURGH  
TO : WALT ROSTON  
CITE: CAP81067

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: INFILTRATION TIMETABLE

1. MACV'S ESTIMATE OF CLOSURE TIMES IN SOUTH VIETNAM WAS BASED ON AN ESTIMATE THAT THE INFILTRATORS MOVE AN AVERAGE OF 11 KILOMETERS A DAY. THIS SEEMS VERY SLOW. NEVERTHELESS, THIS RATE IS SUPPORTED BY ART MCCAFFERTY'S INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS.

2. HOWEVER, THE CESSATION OF BOMBING NORTH OF 19 PARALLEL HAS INTRODUCED A NEW FACTOR -- WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN REFLECTED IN THESE ESTIMATES. INFILTRATORS CAN NOW TRAVEL THE FIRST 75 MILES OR SO OF THE INFILTRATION ROUTE UNHAMPERED BY BOMBING.

3. I WOULD JUDGE, THEREFORE, THAT ALL OF THE CURRENT GROUPS OF INFILTRATORS COULD BE BELOW THE DMZ BY 1 JUNE -- OR PERHAPS AS EARLY AS 21 MAY (AS COMPARED WITH MACV'S PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF 15 JUNE).

4. THUS, ALTHOUGH WE CANNOT EXPECT IT, WE SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF HANOI QUITE PROMPTLY INDICATES THAT THEY WOULD NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF A TOTAL BOMBING CESSATION.

DTG: 111615Z MAY 68

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-327  
By CS, NARA Date 7-27-99

PRESERVATION COPY

27

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, May 11, 1968

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

Subject: Panama Elections: Sunday, May 12, 1968

Tomorrow Panama holds national elections. The outlook is for peaceful balloting. If there is trouble, it is most likely to come after the results are announced.

The assumption is that the official candidate, David Samudio, will win. President Robles controls the electoral machinery. The National Guard is actively backing Samudio. So the stage is set for Samudio to emerge the victor — by foul means if fair ones do not work. The CIA reporting shows that the Robles Government is ready to engage in massive manipulation of the ballot boxes if necessary.

Opposition candidate Arnulfo Arias has campaigned actively despite his loss of face in the unsuccessful impeachment struggle against President Robles last month. Prior to this setback, most observers believed Arias would win a clear majority. How voters will react to Arias' lack of muscle in the impeachment showdown and the government's apparent intention to insure Samudio's victory, we do not know.

The intensity of any public reaction to manipulation of election results will hinge on the degree to which the ballot boxes are stuffed and how blatant Robles and Samudio are about it. The showdown should come on Monday or Tuesday.

W.W.Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 09-338 (#207)  
By *id*, NARA, Date 7-9-10

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

**SECRET**

Saturday, May 11, 1968

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

**SUBJECT: US-German Talks on  
Military Offsets**

We did not reach a financial settlement with the Germans on military offsets. They were unable to go higher than \$500 million -- even after overnight consultations with Bonn. We did not, therefore, get into the question of troop levels. Attached is a brief summary of what happened.

We probably will be getting together with them again in a few weeks. They understand the importance of this issue.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

ERF:mst

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority N65 94-194  
By [signature] NARA. Date 7-24-97



7230

SECRET

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Cost Neutralization Talks

Discussions were held as scheduled on May 9 and 10 between the U.S. (represented by Under Secretary Rostow and Treasury Under Secretary Deming) and the FRG (represented by Foreign Office State Secretary Lahr) on the neutralization of the foreign costs of maintaining our forces in Germany. At the opening meeting, in response to our earlier proposal that the FRG invest \$750 million in medium-term U.S. securities during each of FY 1969 and FY 1970, Lahr offered \$500 million in bonds for FY 1969 only. In addition, he estimated, conservatively he thought, German commercial military purchases in the U.S. at \$100 million during FY 1969 which would represent neutralization of \$600 million of the estimated \$873 million in U.S. foreign exchange costs.

Dr. Lahr said that the U.S. should take into consideration German cooperation in other areas involving international trade and monetary policy during the last year. He said it was a question of priority as between such overall cooperation and cost neutralization. He also emphasized that the Bundesbank considered the purchase of these securities as "abnormal" and Bundesbank agreement to \$500 million in bonds had only been obtained on the basis of Government assurances that political considerations were overriding.

Under Secretary Rostow told Lahr that if this were the maximum the FRG could offer, we were faced with a very serious situation. He recognized the contribution which the FRG and other countries had made in the international monetary and trade field, but emphasized that we had to recognize the very important political issues at stake. We were under heavy political pressure to remove troops from Europe and failure to obtain a satisfactory cost neutralization would be a serious matter.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 94-193By Julian NARA. Date 7-24-97


~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

In between the meetings on May 9 and resumption of the talks on the morning of May 10, Dr. Lahr was in touch with Bonn. He reported on May 10, however, that he had not been given authority to go beyond his first offer. He suggested that the talks be adjourned until a later date to permit talks with high levels in the Bundesbank and Cabinet consideration by the FRG. While Under Secretary Rostow suggested that the talks be resumed as soon as possible, the State Secretary said he had no authority to agree to a new date. However, it was agreed that the scheduled talks between Bundesbank officials and the U.S. Treasury on technical details of the securities would take place on May 15 as planned.

Agreement was also reached on a public posture. Both sides believed it would be unfortunate if the results of the talks were presented to the public in a bad light. It was agreed that the press would be told that we had held another session of talks on the cost neutralization question and would be discussing it again at a later date. We would also confirm the forthcoming Bundesbank/Treasury talks.

Mr. Rostow told Lahr that we had been prepared, as desired by the FRG, to make a statement on troop levels, but we could not do so on the basis of the present offer.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, May 9, 1968

*Pres file*  
*[Signature]*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Suggested Reply to Letter from President Park**

At Tab A is a suggested reply to President Park's letter to you of April 25 (Tab B) which expressed his appreciation for your hospitality in Honolulu and his satisfaction with the meetings there.

The suggested reply expresses your pleasure that he could join you in Honolulu and mentions your own satisfaction with the occasion.

The Department of State does not believe that a reply is required. While I agree that one is not required, I believe that in view of the fact that his meeting with you also involved a journey for him and in view of considerations of troops for Vietnam and our overall relations, a reply might be a courteous and appropriate gesture.

I recommend that you sign the suggested reply.

W. W. Rostow

**Attachments**

cc: Mr. Jordan

AJ:mm

29a

May 11, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I was delighted to receive your letter of April 25.

It is always a pleasure to see you and I was gratified that you were able to join me in Honolulu for discussion of some of our common concerns.

I fully share your satisfaction with our meeting. I believe that it demonstrated the continuing strength of the friendship between our two countries and the heightened resolve with which we are mutually confronting the difficult problems which face us.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

*Lyndon B. Johnson*

His Excellency  
Chung Hee Park  
President of the Republic of Korea  
Seoul

LBJ:State:AJmm May 9, 1968



*Office of the President  
Republic of Korea*

(Translation)

April 25, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to express my sincere and heartfelt appreciation for your warm hospitality extended to me during my recent visit to Honolulu. I am very much grateful to you for your personal welcome at the airport and your thoughtfulness in sending me one of your personal planes to carry myself and my entourage as a gesture of your genuine friendship. Also, I will treasure your wonderful gifts to me, together with the pleasant memory of our meetings at Honolulu.

Above all, your gracious presence at the reception of the Korean Consul-General and your most inspiring speech delivered on that occasion have greatly encouraged not only myself but the entire Korean people. I believe what you spoke there has also resounded through the whole of Asia across the Pacific.

Our meetings have, I am confident, demonstrated anew the strong bonds of solidarity and friendship existing between our two countries. It is my confident hope that our personal contacts and exchange of constructive views conduce greatly to bringing the peoples of our two countries ever closer.

Please accept, your Excellency, my very best wishes for your continued success and personal happiness.

With my kindest regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ Park Chung Hee

His Excellency  
Lyndon B. Johnson  
President of  
the United States of America

~~Mr. Rostow~~ 30

ACTION

*Handwritten:*  
2. P. v. file

SECRET/EXDIS

Friday, May 10, 1968 - 5:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to Eshkol on George Woods

George received your letter and his Terms of Reference on Tuesday, and State has arranged to meet his staffing requirements. He is now at work.

As you requested, we have drafted the attached letter for you to send Prime Minister Eshkol informing him of George's appointment.

When you have signed this letter, I will inform Ambassador Rabin as you requested, and we will telegraph a copy to Ambassador Barbour for quick delivery.

For your signature, if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993  
By           , ICAPP, Date 6/92

SECRET/EXDIS

Mr. Rostow

30a

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 97-333**  
**By ics, NARA Date 9-8-98**

May 10, 1968

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

You will recall that during our meeting in January I said I would soon appoint a successor to Ambassador Bunker to review for me our joint studies of a large desalting and power plant.

I am pleased to tell you that I have chosen a distinguished American, Mr. George D. Woods, retiring president of the World Bank. I believe you will agree that we are fortunate that he is able to work with us on this task.

Mr. Woods has already begun work and is now familiarizing himself with the studies to date. After he has prepared himself, we will of course wish to be in touch with your representatives.

I look forward to our continued cooperation as our two Governments continue to examine together the possibilities of further progress in this important endeavor.

Sincerely,

*115/ Lyndon B. Johnson*

His Excellency  
Levi Eshkol  
Prime Minister of Israel  
Jerusalem, Israel

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 5/10/68