

INFORMATION

31

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Friday, May 10, 1968 - 8:00pm

Mr. President:

[REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1),(3)
6.1(c)

Pres file

This game makes it all the more important that our delegation make the oral recommendation tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

WWRostow:rln

SANTITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC CO-408
By cbm, NARA, Date 2-28-03

Friday, May 10, 1968 -- 7:50 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

The answer on population appears to be this:

-- There are no "State Department census figures for each province of North Vietnam";

-- The population living below the 20th parallel is roughly estimated at 17% of the total;

-- Our rules of engagement forbid attacks on the populated urban centers in the area -- the center of Vinh, for example;

-- Therefore, on the basis of rules of engagement, ^{and} an estimate of these in the population centers -- the speech drafters knocked the figure down to 10%.

I have just learned these facts and never knew where the 10% came from. I did check the area figures with CIA, and they come out to 68% outside the bombing region.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Walt
Dove and

Dove Broods on Own Bomb

Hatfield Plans to Blast Johnson

By JOHN P. WALLACH
News American
Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON, May 9 — The leading Republican "dove," Sen. Mark Hatfield (R., Ore.), disenchanted with New York Gov. Nelson Rockefeller's mild Vietnam position, is going to speak out on the war whether or not the Paris peace talks succeed.

Hatfield has prepared a statement, to be made public the moment the talks appear to be faltering, that accuses President Johnson of "again widening the credibility gap."

In Johnson's March 31 speech, when he also announced he would not seek re-election, the President limited the bombing of North Vietnam to targets just above the Demilitarized Zone and said that 10 percent of the population, only those below the 20th parallel, would be subject to continued bombing.

"ACCORDING to the administration's own figures," Hatfield's white paper reads, citing a State Department census for each province of North Vietnam, "the population living below the 20th parallel is at least 15 percent and probably 20 percent" of the total in the north.

"This is a difference between the President's figure and the actual figure of about one-and-a-half million people," the statement alleges.

"Put another way, about twice as many people are being affected by our bombing as the President reported," it concludes.

The Sir Launcelot of the Grand Old Party will be jousting against what most Republicans consider an increasingly invisible enemy. They see the war ending and other members of their party falling into line behind the President in hopes of bringing about a quick settlement.

THE SPECTRUM extends from former Vice President Richard Nixon, calling for a moratorium on Viet debate, to New York's senior senator, Jacob Javits, going out of his way to wish the President well in the negotiations.

It also includes the man that Hatfield expected to support as the candidate of the liberal wing of the Republican party—Gov. Rockefeller.

"I understand that Rocky has told the President in private that he supports him down the line on Vietnam," Hatfield confided.

DOES THIS MEAN that the junior senator from Oregon is recon-

sidering his support for the New York governor's candidacy?

"In the past 30 days I've come to believe that Dick Nixon is electable over anyone the opposition can field," Hatfield said.

He joins the chorus of party faithfuls, already including such previous Rockefeller stalwarts as Maryland Gov. Spiro Agnew, who are beginning to think they would rather be in the winner's circle at the convention than go down the line with Rockefeller.

Or in the cryptic words of Sen. Javits, who is himself up for re-

election, "I'd have given even money on Rocky to win the nod before he announced he would not seek the nomination, but not any more."

Poffa

33

Friday, May 10, 1968
7:50 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Two issues arose for urgent decision out of the formal session with the DRV in Paris today (Tabs B and C), of which one has some substance:

-- First -- non substantive -- we have two Presidential representatives and, therefore, all references to our side must be in the plural.

-- Second, the DRV proposed as a title for the talks: "Formal conversations between the Representatives of the Government of the DRV and Representatives of the Government of the United States." This involved not merely the question of title but the possible implication that the talks would, throughout, be wholly bilateral and that any future role for Saigon could not be formal.

Harriman's proposal for dealing with this (DELTO 14, sidlined in red) is to entitle the talks: "Procedure for the conversations between the DRV and the USA until otherwise agreed upon." (Tab B).

Sec. Rusk's proposed outgoing (Tab A) is attached for your approval. It proposes that we enter an oral reservation for the GVN, in addition.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 77-333
By iso, NARA Date 7-8-98

SECRET attachments

(no copies made of attachments
per BKS)

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE 17

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] 34

Friday, May 10, 1968 - 7:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

Herewith latest on Czechs. It appears at this stage to be an attempt to cool the more advanced Czech liberals -- thus far and no farther. But, I would add, a pretty risky affair played with pretty explosive materials.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 00-407

By cbm, NARA, Date 8-2-01

Walt Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

34a

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) >25Yrs
(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 12958 6.1(c) >25Yrs

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
10 May 1968**

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2002

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

**The Situation in Czechoslovakia
(As of 4:00 P.M. EDT)**

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) >25Yrs
(S)

1. The first inkling as to how Moscow plans to respond to press reports of Soviet troop deployments has come from a Soviet diplomat in Latin America. The Soviet, [redacted] has also provided the first known response of any kind from a Soviet source to these reports. When questioned yesterday, the Soviet officer produced what he claimed was a Moscow press release that said that the troop movements are part of a Warsaw Pact exercise. Soviet troops would not, he said, enter Czechoslovakia. No such press release has yet been reported from Moscow but it is entirely possible that the officer in Montevideo has simply jumped the gun. The release as he described it is pretty much what the official Soviet response can be expected to be.

2. In a somewhat similar vein, the Czechoslovak news service reported today that the government in Prague had been informed beforehand of the Soviet troop movements and described the activity as "regular maneuvers...by the armies

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-410
By iss, NARA, Date 11-27-02

[REDACTED]
of the Warsaw Pact countries." This appears to be another effort by the Czechoslovak regime to keep tensions from rising.

East German Views

3. The number two man in the East German party, Erich Honecker, has confirmed that the Soviet and East European leaders meeting in Moscow on 8 May decided that from their viewpoint the situation in Czechoslovakia had deteriorated to such an extent that something had to be done to restrain the Czechoslovaks. The East Germans at least appear hopeful that the Dubcek regime itself soon will clamp the lid down.

4. Honecker informed a district party first secretary today that the "general evaluation", presumably made at the Moscow conference, was that the "counter-revolutionary development" in Czechoslovakia had continued after the Dresden meeting and that "it is necessary to put an end to it." Honecker added that hopefully "a group" will soon emerge "that will openly oppose the counter-revolutionary development." Honecker added that this must be "encouraged."

5. In a later conversation with another party functionary, Honecker stated that "probably in the next few days, some of the Czech comrades will openly call for a struggle against the counter-revolution." In what may have been another reference to this topic, Honecker also

[redacted]
stated that "we figure that in the next few days Dubcek and others will come out openly against it. If not Dubcek, then others will."

Polish Views

6. A 9 May message from the Polish leaders to their Czechoslovak counterparts seemed designed to influence the Prague leaders to curb the liberals in Czechoslovakia. Although effusive and cordial on the surface, when read against the background of the 7 May Polish protest and of critical Polish press commentaries the message clearly was reminding Prague of its binding ties with the USSR, Poland, and other Communist states. The Warsaw regime remains unmistakably nervous about the potential effects of Czechoslovak events on the internal Polish situation and about the damage which a Czechoslovak-West German rapprochement would do to Polish foreign policy interests.

[redacted]

7. In what was probably an effort to play down the situation, a Polish-Czechoslovak delegation, headed by provincial secretary Giersek and secretariat member Indra respectively, issued a resolution yesterday in Tesin, Czechoslovakia, which sanctioned the Czechoslovak

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

[REDACTED]

"democratization process" while warning that the two parties will not allow "anti-socialist" elements to exploit this process. The resolution is probably designed to reassure Prague's allies that the Czechoslovak regime has not lost and will not lose control of the situation.

8. The resolution could also represent an attempt by the Poles to mitigate their earlier criticisms while at the same time re-affirming that they will oppose any further loosening of control by the Czechoslovaks.

Other Eastern European Views

9. Information media in most East European Communist states have not reflected the critical situation between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union nor have rumors of Soviet troop movements towards Czechoslovakia been made public. Yugoslavia, Rumania and Hungary were effusive in their congratulations to Czechoslovakia in honor of its National Day on 9 May. While Bulgaria's congratulations were a shade cooler than in 1987, Bulgarian attendance at the Czechoslovak National Day reception in Sofia was slightly more prestigious than last year's.

10. Tito has applauded the turn of events in Czechoslovakia from the beginning and neither he nor Ceausescu would collaborate in whatever measures Moscow might take against Czechoslovakia. On the contrary, they are almost certain to exert whatever influence they have to oppose any intervention in Czechoslovak internal affairs. The Yugoslav

[REDACTED]

Foreign Office regards the situation as serious and expects Soviet psychological pressures to continue in various forms.

11. With the possible exception of Ulbricht and Gomulka, other East European party leaders would not favor Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia in spite of any anxieties they may have over the course of Prague's democratization. They undoubtedly recognize that such a course of action on the part of the Soviets would seriously set back their own hard-won independence from Moscow and could unleash irrational nationalist sentiments within their countries against their own regimes.

Western European Reaction

12. Results continue to be received from yesterday's solicitation of European governments for information regarding rumored troop movements around Czechoslovakia. The British, Italian and Austrian governments are inclined to believe that some troop movements are in fact occurring, but are unanimous that no invasion is likely at this point.

13. There is some divergence of opinion over the likely objectives of troop movements. The British suspect that maneuvers are designed to encourage hard-line elements in the Czechoslovak Party's central committee to avert the course toward liberalization, while the Austrians see the maneuvers as one of several elements (others being economic pressure and media attacks) intended to slow the pace in Czechoslovakia. The Italians, too, see the military maneuvers

[REDACTED]
as a form of pressure and warning.

14. The Austrians also believe that Czechoslovak efforts to clarify the deaths of Masaryk and other Czechs executed in the late '40s are what concern the Soviets most at this time. Moscow, they feel, fears that such huck-raking will uncover the complicity of still-active Soviet leaders, including Mikoyan, and will have a certain resonance elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

15. The Italian Ambassador in Budapest has heard rumors of Soviet troops movements in northern Hungary, and has despatched his MA to investigate.

16. [REDACTED]
Italian party secretary general Longo returned from a two day visit to Prague on 7 May with a reassuring impression. Longo views Czechoslovak leader Dubcek as a responsible person who will not give the Soviets cause for provocation.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>2
5Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED]

~~Military Activity~~
17. There is continuing evidence of increased Soviet military activity in southern East Germany.

[REDACTED]

This is not normal
exercise procedure as there is no regular training area south of Dresden.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

[REDACTED]

18. Out-of-garrison activity beginning on 7 May has been noted at the Soviet 57th and 89th Guards Motorized Rifle Division installations in south and southwest East Germany. There have been indications of a pending exercise in the Eisenach training area which may involve elements of one or both of these divisions.

19. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These airfields are used by the tactical air army of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

(Continued)

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

20.

21. The high-ranking Soviet military delegation which yesterday attended "Victory Day" celebrations in

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S) Prague returned to Moscow today.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

22.

a parade (probably on 9 May) had been cancelled because of an alert and the troops departed in such haste that they didn't have time to change their parade uniforms. It is unlikely that a practice alert would be called disrupting a Victory Day parade.

23. The Yugoslav military attache in Budapest told his US counterpart on 9 May that Soviet troops in Hungary have not moved northward and are not on alert.

EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs

~~TOP SECRET~~

24. US and French military liaison personnel noted no major move of GSFG units toward the Czechoslovak border during Auto tours of the border area on 9 May. Further reports from these missions are expected late this evening.

25. Unfavorable conditions led to cancellation of plans for low altitude photography of selected Soviet 20th Guards Army installations in the Berlin area (see paragraph, two of the 0700, 10 May Situation Report in Czechoslovakia). The flight has been rescheduled for 11 May.

LATE ITEM

26. A report [redacted] on 10 May attributed to a [redacted] correspondent there claims that Dubcek told the Soviets during his visit to Moscow on 5 May that he no longer controlled events; that the Czechoslovak army is wholly on the side of President Kovboda; that Czechoslovak troops have been moved to the Polish and East German borders; and that Dubcek favors a

~~TOP SECRET~~

break up of the state into two parts, one composed of Bohemia and Moravia, the other of Slovakia. The source claims his information was acquired at the Polish embassy.

27. As to the specifics of this report, there is no indication that Czechoslovak troops have been alerted or moved since the crisis broke. Dubcek's is known to be against any break up of the country into two parts, and it is doubtful that Moscow would countenance such an outcome. All our evidence points to the Army's loyalty being on the side of Dubcek.

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, May 10, 1968
6:30 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Johnson confirms
that Bai Thuong is operationally used
by MIG's.

W. W. Restow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-326
By is, NARA Date 3-3-98

WWRestow:rla



~~TOP SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301


1575
35a
CM-3294-68
10 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: MIG Operations from Bai Thuong
Airfield (U)

1. I understand from Walt Rostow that you desire a statement from me as to whether or not Bai Thuong Airfield is being used by North Vietnamese MIGs. Information on MIG operations from Bai Thuong Airfield which is presently available in Washington is attached hereto.

2. The evidence indicates North Vietnamese MIGs have been using Bai Thuong Airfield, and in fact launched, shot down our aircraft on 7 May 1968, and recovered at that base.


HAROLD K. JOHNSON
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment
a/s

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-327
By cb, NARA Date 7-27-99

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 3
Declassified at 12 year
interval; not
automatically declassified

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

1575
356

ATTACHMENT

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-327
By cb, NARA Date 7-28-99

FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: MIG Operations from Bai Thuong Airfield (U)

1. Bai Thuong presently has a main runway over 7,000 feet long with supporting taxi-ways and at least 30 aircraft dispersal revetments. The shoulder on the northeast side of the runway forms a sod landing area nearly 6,000 feet long and 125 feet wide which is sufficient for MIG operations.

2. The latest [redacted] of 14 February 1968 showed the airfield to be non-operational and since the time when updated [redacted] was required the weather has prevented successful missions. The North Vietnamese MIGs, however, were noted using Bai Thuong on 28 April during two brief periods of activity involving landing and take-off.

3. On 7 May at 0700Z, two Vietnamese piloted MIG 21s took off from Bai Thuong airfield and were vectored south toward our aircraft. The North Vietnamese aircraft on two separate occasions sighted our aircraft but subsequently lost visual contact. After flying south to 1832N/1051E the interceptors took up a heading of 360° at about 0732Z, and a few minutes later [redacted] subsequently engaging a single aircraft, [redacted]

4. [redacted] tracking indicates the engagement took place at 1842N/10532E at 0736Z, [redacted] one aircraft is burning already shot one aircraft into flames, firing two missiles. □

5. These North Vietnamese aircraft subsequently landed at Bai Thuong at 0750Z.

6. An F-4B was downed in the vicinity 1850N/10600E. The adjacent F-4B pilot reports observing airborne missile fired from aircraft seven to eight miles in front of flight.

Attachment

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The first F-4B was hit and observed in nose-down attitude spiraling with tail on fire. The pilot and radar observer ejected and were subsequently recovered. Time coincides with [REDACTED]

7. Between 0931Z and 0948Z the same North Vietnamese pilots, referred to in the premises, were reflected in an inter-airfield flight from Bai Thuong to Phuc Yen Airfield.

8. The following is extracted from CIA summary: "There was extensive MIG fighter interceptor activity in the Panhandle area south of the 20th Parallel on both 7 and 8 May. [REDACTED]"

North Vietnamese have begun to use Bai Thuong Airfield as a staging base. On the 7th, two of the MIGs that engaged US F-4 aircraft in the Vinh area landed at Bai Thuong following the encounter. As many as eight MIGs, which we believe are normally based near Hanoi, were noted active in the Bai Thuong area some six hours after that engagement. Other MIGs used Bai Thuong Airfield on 8 May in flights to and from Hanoi."

9. On 8 May, at least four MIGs flew from Hanoi-area airfields to Bai Thuong. Three MIGs, including two MIG-17s and a single MIG-26, subsequently left Bai Thuong and flew back to the Hanoi area. A lone MIG-21 apparently remained at Bai Thuong.

10. On 9 May, two MIG-21s were detected attempting to engage US aircraft in the vicinity of Vinh. While it is uncertain where the MIGs took off, two MIG-21s recovered at Bai Thuong.

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

34

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 10, 1968 -- 11:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Attached (Tab A) is an important Bunker cable.

It presents:

- his analysis of the enemy's intentions;
- our own basic strength;
- his strong recommendations for a change in Harriman's instructions on the conditions under which a total bombing cessation should be accepted (para. 11 at paper clip).

At Tab B is a MACV analysis of infiltration covered by an interesting Bob Ginsburgh memo which suggests the possible timing of Hanoi's negotiating strategy in relation to infiltration.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS-CBS 20
By us, NARS, Date 6-25-84

cy to George Christian

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

36a
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

ACTION COPY

00 RUEHC RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 26928/1 1310840
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 100820Z MAY 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2363
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 830
STATE GRNC
BT

2327Q

1968 May 10 AM 6 11

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-331
By isa, NARA Date 3-19-99

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 26928

NODIS/CROCODILE

PARIS FOR TODEL

1. I AM NOT WORRIED ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE FIGHTING WHICH HAS BEEN GOING ON AROUND SAIGON SINCE SATURDAY, BECAUSE THE ARVN, POLICE AND US FORCES ARE VERY SUBSTANTIAL AND WE CAN MANAGE ANYTHING WHICH THEY THROW IN, INCLUDING THEIR RESERVES. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, SOME ASPECTS OF THIS AND RELATED MATTERS ON WHICH I WANT WASHINGTON TO HAVE MY VIEWS.

2. THE VC MAIN STRATEGY MANIFESTS ITSELF IN SEVERAL WAYS, TWO OF WHICH ARE ASSASSINATION AND SABOTAGE. ASSASSINATION IS CONCENTRATED ON POLICE OUTPOSTS, AND SABOTAGE AT PUBLIC UTILITIES. ONE POWER STATION IS ALREADY OUT OF ACTION AS RESULT OF SABOTAGE, AND TWO WERE DAMAGED BY SHELLING. A PRE-OFFENSIVE ATTACK, WAS DIRECTED AGAINST VIETNAMESE TV STATION AND FAILED, BUT COULD BE ATTEMPTED AGAIN. FURTHER SABOTAGE EFFORTS MUST BE EXPECTED ON OTHER POWER STATIONS, THE WATER WORKS, POST OFFICE, GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS, ETC. THIS IS WELL UNDERSTOOD HERE AND I AM ASSURED THAT EVERY EFFORT IS BEING MADE TO GIVE ALL PRACTICAL PROTECTION, ESPECIALLY TO KEY POWER AND WATER INSTALLATIONS, BUT THIS DOES NOT PRECLUDE FURTHER INDIVIDUAL SUCCESSES BY THE VC.

3. A BY PRODUCT OF THE FIGHTING HAS BEEN SOME THOUSANDS OF TEMPORARY EVACUEES, WHO HAVE FLED FROM THE FIGHTING AREAS, SOME OF WHOM WILL HAVE LOST THEIR HOMES AND WILL NEED TO BE PROVIDED FOR. THE HOSPITALS ARE NOW FULL OF WOUNDED. THERE IS A REDUCTION IN VEGETABLE AND MEAT SUPPLIES INTO THE CITY, ALTHOUGH SOME SUPPLIES ARE COMING THROUGH FROM THE NORTHEAST. RICE IS AMPLE.

4. THE AIM--OR AT LEAST ONE AIM--OF ALL THIS IS PRETTY CLEAR: ~~TO~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 26928/1, May 10, 1968

NODIS/CROCODILE

PRODUCE AS MUCH TERROR AND HAVOC IN THE CITY FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, IN ORDER TO CAUSE AS MUCH TROUBLE AS POSSIBLE TO THE AUTHORITIES AND THE PEOPLE, WITH THE HOPE OF OVERWHELMING AND COLLAPSING THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CITY SERVICES, PRODUCING MASS DISCONTENT AND HOPEFULLY THE UPRISING WHICH THEY FAILED TO ACHIEVE IN THE TET OFFENSIVE. THERE IS NO SIGN OF PANIC OR SUCH COLLAPSE, AND OUR MILITARY AND THE VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES ARE VERY CONFIDENT THAT THEY ARE GOING TO BRING THIS UNDER CONTROL BEFORE IT REACHES THAT STAGE.

5. THAT THEY HAVE OTHER AIMS IN MIND IS OBVIOUS, SUCH AS INFLUENCING THE PARIS TALKS, IMPRESSING AMERICAN AND WORLD OPINION WITH THEIR CONTINUED ABILITY TO MOUNT SUBSTANTIAL CAMPAIGNS IN ORDER TO CAUSE MORE DESPAIR IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC, ETC. WHAT EMERGES IS THAT THEY ARE MAKING ANOTHER GREAT EFFORT, NOT ON THE SCALE OF TET BUT STILL IMPRESSIVE, AND THEY HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF KEEPING THIS GOING HERE FOR SOME DAYS AND POSSIBLY WEEKS. IF THEY BREAK OFF THIS ATTACK IT WILL BE TO RESUPPLY, THEN START AGAIN SOME WEEKS HENCE, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS ON A REDUCED SCALE IN VIEW OF THEIR INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT RESUPPLY PROBLEMS DURING THE MONSOON SEASON IN LAOS. THEY ARE IN ANY CASE WILLING TO PAY A VERY HEAVY PRICE IN TERMS OF LOSSES.

6. ALONG WITH THIS THERE HAS BEEN AN EXTRAORDINARY MOVEMENT SOUTH, AND INFILTRATION, IN THE LAST FOUR MONTHS, AND THIS CONTINUES. (HOWEVER, OUR SUCCESS AT KHE SANH, THE A SHAU VALLEY CAMPAIGN WITH ITS CAPTURE OF HUGE SUPPLIES, AND OUR SPOILING OPERATIONS IN APRIL, ALSO WITH CAPTURE OF HEAVY SUPPLIES, HAVE INFLICTED GREAT LOSSES ON THE ENEMY'S MANPOWER AND SUPPLIES.) HANOI AND NLF BROADCASTS HAVE CALLED FOR THE BOMBING OF THE PALACE AND AMERICAN EMBASSY BY VNAF DEFECTORS, AND A MASS UPRISING. WE MUST EXPECT THAT ONE OR MORE OF OUR INSTALLATIONS IN AND AROUND SAIGON WILL BE SINGLED OUT AT ANY TIME OVER THE NEXT DAYS OR WEEKS FOR SPECIAL SABOTAGE, WITH A POSSIBILITY OF MORE CASUALTIES TO AMERICANS.

7. THERE IS SOME INTERESTING EVIDENCE OF WHAT IS GOING ON ON THE ENEMY'S SIDE. IN I CORPS JUST NORTH OF HUE ON MAY 1, 102 NVA TROOPS SURRENDERED, THE LARGEST SINGLE BATCH IN THIS WAR, INDUCED BY THE AMPLIFIER BROADCASTS OF A CAPTURED SERGEANT. THE HIGHEST LEVEL DEFECTOR OF THIS WAR, LT. COLONE TRAN VAN DAC WHO JOINED THE VC IN 1945 AND ROSE AS A COMMISSAR AND PROPAGANDIST, DEFECTED ON APRIL 19 AND REVEALED THE PLANS AND TIMING OF THE PRESENT OFFENSIVE. THIS INFORMATION WAS USED IN OUR PREPARATIONS FOR THE ATTACK ON SAIGON, AND HAS PROVEN SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT. ON MAY 8 ANOTHER LT COLONEL DEFECTED NEAR SAIGON ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE POLITICAL COMMISSARS WERE ASKING THE IMPOSSIBLE IN MILITARY TERMS AND HE COULD NOT TAKE IT ANY MORE. HE AND OTHERS, HAVE ADDED THAT MORALE IS NOT AS GOOD AS IT WAS, AND THERE IS WANING

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 26928/1, MAY 10, 1968

NODIS/CROCODILE

CONFIDENCE IN THE RANKS NOW THAT THE VC CAN WIN. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT REPLACEMENTS FROM THE NORTH AND IMPRESSED SOUTHERNERS ARE BEING THROWN INTO BATTLE WITH LITTLE MILITARY TRAINING. THERE IS ALSO SOME EVIDENCE THAT HANOI WAS MOVING TOWARD A BID FOR TALKS EVEN BEFORE THE APRIL 30 SPEECH AND THAT THEY ARE ANXIOUS TO CONTINUE THE TALKS.

8. IT IS MY VIEW THAT HANOI AND THE NLF ARE HURTING, ARE NOW ENGAGED IN A HUGE GAMBLE, AND THIS IS A YEAR OF CLIMAX. THEY, PERHAPS, STILL HOPE FOR A COLLAPSE IN SAIGON. I FEEL CERTAIN THEY WILL FAIL. PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT IN TERMS OF THEIR GAMBLE IS THAT THEY NOW HOPE TO WIN BECAUSE OF WHAT THEY REGARD AS OUR DESPERATE DESIRE FOR PEACE. THE SPEECHES OF MCCARTHY, KENNEDY, GALBRAITH AND OTHERS, ARTICLES IN THE US PRESS AND TV, THE SHIFT IN NEWSWEEK, WALTER CRONKITE AND OTHERS, MAY HAVE CONVINCED THEM THAT IF THEY NEGOTIATE AND FIGHT WE WILL BE READY TO THROW IN THE SPONGE BY FORCING A COALITION ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE.

9. THE ARROGANCE OF THEIR MAY 3 REPLY - TO ARRANGE FOR THE COMPLETE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR - WAS PART PROPAGANDA AND PART BRAVADO. ALL THE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THEY ARE GOING TO BE TOUGH IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND ARE OUT TO OBTAIN THE COLOSSAL CONCESSION OF COALITION GOVERNMENT. THEY, OR AT LEAST SOME IN THE NORTH, MUST BE ARGUING THAT THE UNITED STATES REGARDS ITS BARGAINING POSITION AS WEAK, AND THEREFORE THAT THEY ARE IN A STRONG POSITION. UNLESS WE ACT WITH GENUINE CONFIDENCE IN THE STRENGTH OF OUR BARGAINING POSITION, I AM AFRAID OF THE OUTCOME. BUNKER
BT

PASSED PARIS 10 May 1968

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

ACTION COPY

00 RUEHC RUEHCR
DE RUNJIR 26928/2 1310940
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 100820Z MAY 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2366
INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 831
STATE GRNC
BT

2329Q
1968 MAY 10 AM 6:09

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 26928

NODIS/CROCODILE

PARIS FOR TODEL

10. WASHINGTON KNOWS MY POSITION AS A RESULT OF MY VISIT. I THINK WE ARE IN A VERY STRONG POSITION TO NEGOTIATE, AND THAT IT IS HANOI WHICH IS WORRIED, OR AT LEAST SOME IN HANOI ARE WORRIED, FOR I SUSPECT THEY HAVE THEIR HAWKS AND DOVES JUST AS WE DO.

11. THE CONCLUSIONS I DRAW FROM ALL THE FOREGOING ARE CLEAR:

A. HARRIMAN'S ORDERS TO AGREE TO A FULL CESSATION OF BOMBING IN THE NORTH SHOULD BE AMENDED.

B. WE SHOULD DEMAND AS A CONDITION OF FULL CESSATION A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN THE UNPRECEDENTED NVN MOVEMENT SOUTH, WHICH WE ARE IN A POSITION TO OBSERVE.

C. WE SHOULD DEMAND A REDUCTION NOW IN THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH.

D. MOST IMPORTANT, WE SHOULD UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES AGREE TO A FULL CESSATION OF BOMBING IN THE NORTH, WHILE SAIGON IS UNDER HARASSMENT AND ATTACK. I CAN THINK OF NOTHING MORE CALCULATED TO CAUSE DESPAIR HERE THAN TO AGREE UNDER THESE CONDITIONS. THE SUSPICION IN THE SOUTH AS TO OUR NEGOTIATING INTENTIONS IS THAT WE ARE READY TO GO VERY FAR, EVEN TO COALITION WITH THE NLF OR ITS NEW ALLIANCE, TO STOP THE WAR. IF WE CEASE OUR BOMBING OF THE NORTH WHILE SAIGON IS UNDER ATTACK, THIS SUSPICION WOULD ENORMOUSLY INCREASE AND COULD BECOME UNMANAGEABLE IN TERMS OF MAINTAINING MORALE AND UNITY HERE. THIEU IS EXPECTED TO ESTABLISH A NEW AND BROADER GOVERNMENT SHORTLY AND WE MUST NOT HANDICAP IT AT THE OUTSET. A FULL CESSATION OF BOMBING UNDER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 26928, MAY 10 (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

HARRIMAN'S PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS WOULD ENCOURAGE THE HARD LINERS IN HANOI TO THINK WE ARE READY TO CALL IT QUILTS, AND IN THE DEBATES WHICH MUST BE TAKING PLACE IN THE NORTH THEY WOULD BE JUSTIFIED IN THEIR VIEW THAT THE THING TO DO IS TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON SAIGON.

E. I MYSELF WOULD GO FURTHER, AND EVEN WHILE THE TALKS PROCEED I WOULD BOMB POWER STATIONS, RAILWAY YARDS, AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS NEAR AND IN THE CITIES BELOW THE 20TH PARALLEL, ADDING TO THEIR TROUBLES IN THE NORTH, CREATING MORE REFUGEE PROBLEMS FOR THEM, AND PUTTING NEW STRAINS ON THEIR FACILITIES.

F. IN SHORT, UNTIL THEY REDUCE THE MOVEMENTS SOUTH AND CALL OFF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SAIGON, WE SHOULD NOT AGREE TO A FULL CESSATION, AND AT SOME STAGE WE SHOULD LET HANOI KNOW WHY. AS A FOOTNOTE, WE WOULD LOOK RIDICULOUS IF WE AGREED TO A FULL CESSATION, AND A FEW DAYS LATER HAD ONE OF OUR AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS BLASTED BY SABOTAGE WITH HEAVY AMERICAN CASUALTIES. BUNKER
BT

NOTE: PASSED PARIS 5/10/68.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET -- SAVIN~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

366

9 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Attached is MACV's analysis of infiltration activity as of 4 May. Note that this represents only the first result of a continuing analysis.

Significant conclusions:

- Through March 1968, NVN maintained a normal rate of infiltration of 6,000 - 8,000 a month. (Presumably this does not include the 304th and 320th Divisions.)

- Since 1 March, an additional 55,500 - 65,000 have started south. Estimated destinations:

| | | |
|------------------|-----------------|---|
| MR-5 | 13,500 - 17,000 | { II Corps) (Saigon + Delta) (Western Highlands) (I Corps) |
| COSVN | 18,000 | |
| B-3 Front | 6,500 - 10,000 | |
| DMZ/MR Tri Thien | 17,500 - 20,000 | |
| | 55,500 - 65,000 | |

- Infiltrators move at an average rate of 11 kilometers per day.

- 14,900 are probably now south of the DMZ with 41,800 still in NVN. The last of these could be at the DMZ by about 15 June.

- Estimated dates for closure at destinations:

| | |
|---------------------------|-----------------|
| DMZ/Tri Thien/Hue | -- early June |
| MR-5 | -- late July |
| B-3 | -- late June |
| COSVN - III Corps | -- early August |
| COSVN-Phuoc Long Province | -- late August |

- At the indicated rate of about 13,000 per month, the enemy for the first time in 18 months will be able to sustain a personnel input adequate to cover his losses. *

* Not at present casualty rates - if they are sustained.

~~SECRET -- SAVIN~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 03-203
By ms, NARA, Date 2-27-04

- Country-wide, enemy personnel should peak in July. By the end of June, however, he will have met most of his requirements north of III Corps. Thus, he should have an earlier capability to mount a threat in I Corps and the Highlands.

I would make the observation that if the enemy is interested in serious negotiations, he might have the following fight-talk strategy in mind:

- In return for a cessation of bombing of all NVN, about mid-June he might agree to (a) cease further infiltration and (b) respect the DMZ.

- Sometime in June he might launch a major offensive designed to (a) create as much chaos as possible in the cities and (b) expand to the maximum areas under his control.

- Engage in a concerted diplomatic-propaganda effort to achieve by early August a cease-fire in SVN, which would exploit to the maximum the gains achieved by his military offensive.

We have no convincing evidence that this is, in fact, his strategy. But such moves have sufficient logic for us to recognize that this is one possible strategy.

g

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: MLJ-141.022-001/8
By: PC, NARA, Date: 11-2-09

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~

Copy of MAC 5862

1. Following is a special estimate on personnel infiltration presented to Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, on 4 May 1968.

A. In preface, we should note several recent developments in the communications intelligence field concerning infiltration. In early March, NSA reported that since November 1967 they had noted large groups of personnel at various relay stations in the North Vietnam panhandle. These groups were detected in the rear services communications from Thanh Hoa province in North Vietnam. The groups had 3-digit designator numbers. This was a significant breakthrough, permitting us to project infiltration rates for the first time. We know from prisoners of war and documents that some of the groups identified by NSA began entering South Vietnam in January, and also that some of these 3-digit groups are still in the Laotian panhandle, and some are still entering the II and III Corps areas. We believe that the 3-digit groups were a portion of the normal infiltration flow from the north, and were within our estimate of 6000 to 8000 infiltrators per month -- through March 1968. This estimate concerns the new 4-digit infiltration designators which were introduced in February. The enemy's current infiltration program has all the earmarks of a large-scale reinforcement.

B. During the last two months, we have learned of the temporary locations of 75 of the new 4-digit groups, with respect to the series of commo-liaison (infiltration stations) in the North Vietnam panhandle. 22 additional groups have been referred to in traffic, with no mention of identifiable location. Thus we know of at least 97 4-digit groups in the pipeline; the number is still growing. We know the strength of 57 groups; These total 32,061. The average strength is 562. Applying this to the other identified groups, we estimate total strength of the 97 groups to be 55,700. We also have evidence of an average movement rate of 11 kilometers per day, computed from 34 groups which have been identified at more than one commo-liaison station.

C. We know that a few of these 4-digit groups have arrived in South Vietnam. On 4 and 6 April, intercepts indicated that groups 9028 and 4014 were located immediately to the west of A Shau valley. On 25 April, 4 members of group 4002 rallied west of Quang Tri City, three days after their arrival in base area 101. From 26 to 28 April we noted in communications groups 4011, 4015, 9007, and 9009 in the vicinity of the A Shau valley. These are all the groups for which we now have hard indications of location in or near South Vietnam -- only seven out of the total of 97.

D. The key to the distribution of these personnel perhaps lies in the destinations of the groups, and there may be a clue to destination in the enemy's methodology of group numbering. Although tenuous, we theorize that the first

digit of each group number may indicate the group's destination. In communications intelligence, two groups, 1005 and 1023, have been referenced as going to "Bac An" or "B-47." From collateral intelligence, we accept these to be designations for Military Region-5; thus, that is the possible destination of groups in this series. In the 2000 series, we find reference to groups 2015, 2018, 2019, and 2030 going to "Hai Yen" or "Hai Yen 9." Collateral information equates Hai Yen to a staging area on the border, between Cambodia and Phuoc Long province, in the COSVN (Central Office South Vietnam) area. Thus the groups in this series may be destined for that area. We also have evidence for the 4000 series. Four ralliers from group 4002, captured near Quang Tri City, stated that "Bac Do" was the destination of their group, "Bac Do" being a code for the Quang Tri-Thua Thien area. In communications intelligence, groups 4007, 4005, 4017, and 4019 have been mentioned in connection with "Bac Do." Therefore, Military Region Tri-Thien may be the intended destination of other 4000 series groups. We have similar evidence for the 9000 series. Group 9019 was mentioned in connection with Lam Truong, which in the fall of 1967 was equated with the DMZ front. Groups 9007, 9009 and 9028 were previously noted in communications near the A Shau valley. So, for the 9000 series groups, we postulate destinations of the DMZ area. However, we should note that those in the A Shau may be destined for military region Tri-Thien units formerly in the DMZ area -- such as the 324B North Vietnamese Army division.

E. The enemy identified earlier infiltration packets with a 3-digit number. The first digits of these old designators may correspond to those of the new. Many of the 100 series groups went to Military Region 5, the destination of our 1000 series. A majority of the 200 series went to "Hai Yen" -- in the COSVN area. In the 300 series, 10 of 16 groups which arrived in 1967 went to II Corps. Of these, seven went to B-3 front, three to MR-5. Thus, B-3 front probably received a large share of all 300 series groups. This is a tenuous indication that the 3000 series may be so destined, and it is the only evidence we have of the destination of these groups. In the case of the 700 series, five out of nine located groups went to the COSVN area. The remaining four went to MR-5. Therefore, the weight of evidence suggests COSVN as the destination for the 7000 series groups.

F. If the enemy distributes these troops accordingly, they would be disposed like this:

| Series | Destination | Estimated strength | Requirements |
|--------|---|--------------------|-------------------------|
| | | of series | |
| 1000 | Military Region 5 | 13,500 | 17,000 |
| 2000 | COSVN (Central Office South Vietnam) | 13,500 | 18,000 (total COSVN) |
| 7000 | COSVN | 4,500 | |
| 3000 | B-3 Front | 6,500 | 10,000 |
| 4000 | MR Tri-Thien | 6,500 | 12,000 |
| 9000 | DMZ/MR Tri-Thien | 11,000 | 8,000 |
| Total | | 55,500 | 65,000 |

To assess the reasonableness of this expected distribution in terms of the enemy's replacement requirements, we independently computed his estimated requirements for personnel in each major area which receives replacements from North Vietnam. Results are shown in the requirements column of the preceding table. We used two methods in computing these requirements. In one case, we deducted the estimated strength of each unit from what we consider to be his desired manning level. In the second method, we estimated his personnel losses, less his input, for the first two quarters of the year. Results of the two computations were similar, falling between 60 and 70 thousand. Thus for this comparison, we assumed total requirements of 65,000. We see that enemy requirements are generally comparable to the distribution he would achieve if our first-digit destination theory is valid. When we make this comparison in northern I Corps, we should note that the enemy's planned distribution probably was developed several months ago. Since that time, several major units have been redeployed from the DMZ area -- one division to MR Tri-Thien, and one to B-3 front. The overall comparison, we believe, tends to support our theory.

G. With respect to movement methodology, we have been able to collect data over a 258 kilometer segment of the pipeline in North Vietnam, involving 18 commo/liaison stations for which we know general locations. We have on record 36 separate moves made by 34 different infiltration packets. The longest move was 163 kilometers in 14 days, while the shortest move was only 9 kilometers in one day. The infiltration packets moved at widely varying rates. Three groups moved as fast as 25-26 kilometers per day while two moved less than two kilometers per day. All of this data was computed from intercepts of reports between the commo/liaison stations. We have been able to compute, from this, that the 34 groups moved at an average rate of 11 kilometers per day. We have evidence that there was a partial utilization of vehicles in a shuttle type operation, but no one group moved solely by vehicle. In collateral data, we know from four ralliers taken on 25 April near base area 101, that their group, number 4002, traveled 700 kilometers in 73 days for an average of 9.6 kilometers per day. Furthermore, those 3-digit groups now arriving in II Corps required three months for their travel. They moved approximately 950 kilometers in 90 days, for a rate of 10.5 kilometers per day. 3-digit groups now surfacing in III Corps have been taking up to six months for their trip. All of this experience tends to support our rate of 11 kilometers per day.

H. We have projected the movement of all identified groups, by applying the 11-kilometer daily rate from the last known location of the packets. In this projection, we have assumed a random distribution of the known, but unlocated groups. We estimate that 70 groups with a combined strength of 41,800 are still north of the DMZ at this time. Twenty-seven groups with a total strength of 14,900 probably are distributed between base area 512 at the DMZ and base area 609 in the tri-border area. Furthermore, the last of the now known infiltration packets could be at the DMZ in about six weeks. However, we should not assume that all of the forces north of the DMZ are destined for in-country units.

We know the enemy has stripped his defenses in southern North Vietnam, and he also has a need for construction and road repair labor, both in North Vietnam and in the panhandle of Laos. We have various indications that some of the four-digit serials may be associated with rear service work and can reasonably expect an unknown number of men to be assigned to these tasks.

I. Using the same movement factors, we have estimated the time required for the serials to arrive at their possible destinations. The lead packets of serials 4000 and 9000 could have reached their areas now. We can confirm this by noting in communications the 9000 series groups at A Shau, and ralliers locating the 400 series group at base area 101. The trailing element of the 400 series could close into the Tri-Thien/Hue area in early June, and the same time frame holds true for the 9000 series in the western DMZ. The 1000 series estimated to be destined for MR-5 could have their lead elements already on station, while the trial elements would not close until late July. The B-3 front, estimated to receive the 3000 serials could expect their first replacements in late May, but their last serial of recruits probably would not arrive until late June. In III Corps, the 2000 series could begin arriving in early July while their rearmost elements could close by early August. Finally, the 700 serials should begin arriving in late July and close into Phuoc Long province by late August.

J. In summary, we have determined that the enemy has a large-scale infiltration effort under way. From the size of this effort now moving down the trail at a slow but steady pace, we can expect over the period April through August to see an expanded rate of infiltration into South Vietnam -- a rate we estimate will be about twelve thousand infiltrators per month. At such a rate, the enemy will be able to sustain for the first time in 18 months a personnel input adequate to cover his losses. Enemy killed in action for April was about 12,000. If this is representative of what we will see in the future, his in-country recruiting should be sufficient to accommodate the balance of his casualties. If the total number of infiltrators is considerably higher than our estimate, the enemy's net strength could show an increase. On the basis of all strength and movement factors we have considered, the enemy's personnel situation countrywide will peak in July; however, most of his requirements north of III Corps can be filled by the end of June. Thus, we anticipate an earlier capability for him to mount a threat in I Corps and the western highlands. Even if the enemy launches the offensive in May that he obviously intended for late April, he has sufficient troops en route to rebuild his units for renewed attacks.

2. This represents only the first results of a continuing analysis of infiltration activity. We may revise this estimate as we gain additional data.

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51

ACTION

Friday, May 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Farewell letter to the Prime Minister of Thailand

sup
Pres file

Attached is the suggested text of a farewell letter from you to Prime Minister Thanom and his wife.

The Prime Minister is leaving next Sunday morning, without ceremony. Assistant Secretary Bundy will see him off and will give him your letter just as he steps on the plane.

I recommend you sign the letter.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

MWright:wpt

May 11, 1968

Your Excellency and Thanpuying Chengkol:

As you depart the United States on this memorable tour of the Free World you carry with you the admiration and friendship of myself and Mrs. Johnson, and of the American people. We know the great contribution you and your country are making to the cause of peace with freedom in the world today.

Your visit has given you a chance to measure the strength of our purpose in Asia. As I told you, we will continue to stand beside Thailand in mutual defense against aggression. We will continue our common effort to achieve development and progress.

Thailand is giving the world an outstanding demonstration of what can be done to improve the life of its people while protecting them from violence and intimidation. More than that, Thailand is making a major contribution to similar efforts by its neighbors in Southeast Asia. As increasing progress and prosperity comes to your part of the world, Thailand will deserve great credit.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

**His Excellency
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn
and Thanpuying Chengkol**

STATE:LBJ:MWright:wpt

3.

ACTION

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

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Your visit has given you a chance to measure the strength of our purpose in Asia. As I told you, we will continue to stand beside Thailand in mutual defense against aggression. We will continue our common effort to achieve development and progress.

Thailand is giving the world an outstanding demonstration of what can be done to improve the life of its people while protecting them from violence and intimidation. More than that, Thailand is making a major contribution to similar efforts by its neighbors in Southeast Asia. As increasing progress and prosperity comes to your part of the world, Thailand will deserve great credit.

Sincerely,

**His Excellency
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn
and Thanpuying Chongkol**

STATE:LBJ:MW right:wpt

INFORMATION~~SECRET~~

Friday - May 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Argentine Situation

Pres file

I understand Mr. Kleberg wanted to see you about reports of plotting against President Ongania.

Since he came to power in June 1966, Ongania has performed a delicate balancing act between the "liberal" and "nationalist" factions in the government and military. These labels mask an underlying contest between advocates of free enterprise vs. corporate-statism and continued isolation of the Peronistas vs. their assimilation in the political process. Personal ambitions are also a factor. Sometimes it is hard to tell whether the rumbling is ideological or personal.

The present situation is such a case. The "corporate-state" advocates have been more vocal lately. The leaders of the "liberals" -- Army Commander-in-Chief Julio Alsogaray and his brother Alvaro, Argentine Ambassador here -- have reacted by sounding out would-be plotters. (Ambassador Alsogaray returned to Buenos Aires last week to confer with his brother). But it is also true that the "drift" toward "corporate-statism" is not so pronounced as to justify such drastic action by the "liberals". Furthermore, General Julio Alsogaray reaches retirement age next November and he may well be laying some groundwork to keep his position should Ongania decide to replace him.

If all of this sounds Byzantine, it is the nature of current Argentine politics. Neither CIA nor State consider that we are in a crisis situation. We will follow developments closely and keep you posted.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-333

By isa, NARA Date 9-8-98

W. W. Restow

39a
May 9, 1968

ARGENTINA

(Alsegaray)

Our friends in this country have advised us that the brothers are very serious about doing something in their country before the end of the year. From the viewpoint of backing and support they have

1. Minister of Economy
2. Chief of the Tank Corps
3. General Llanusa in charge of
Second Corps Area

There is no indication as to the possible timing of their move. Evidently the brothers have become disenchanted with Ongania because of some statements that he made recently to the effect that he might want to continue in office for a long time. From the viewpoint of our friends Ongania has been doing a good job and performing very well under difficult circumstances and the country is moving along in satisfactory style. Any upset at this time would not be good for the country even though the brothers are pro-U.S. and are also for private enterprise.

Pres file

0

Friday, May 10, 1968
4:45 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

One reason why I wish to see us bombing between the 19th and 20th parallels soon is the following:

Hanoi knows that we stopped bombing there because of the public uproar at the time. They may sense, also, that we have drawn back the 60 miles to minimize the risk that we hit something beyond the 20th parallel.

This may lead them to overrate the effectiveness of pressure on us on the whole bombing issue. Specifically, it may lead them to feel that the anti-bombing pressure, as reflected in last Sunday's New York Times, is so great that they should press very hard and very long for a total cessation of bombing without any compensating move on their part.

Just as the leaks and the debate in town on Warsaw may have protracted the period before a site was agreed, this view of our attitude towards bombing might protract the phase of negotiating reciprocal action in return for a total bombing cessation. In addition to this reason, of course, I feel that we could get more trucks before they got to South Vietnam if we bombed along the roads between the 19th and 20th parallels and better interfere with their assembly points, airfields, etc., in that area.

In short, I feel there is a political and negotiating reason for bombing the 19th and 20th as well as a straightforward limited military reason.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ML 991731

By isp/ly, NARA, Date 5-19-2

INFORMATION

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

Friday, May 10, 1968 - 2:45 pm

Mr. President:

**Herewith is Gy's account of the
historic first contact with the North
Vietnamese. Key passages are marked.**

free

W. W. Rostow

DELTO 9 (Paris 13832)

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 21, 1983
By lg, NARA, Date 6-1-92



Department of State

TELEGRAM

41a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 969

PAGE 01 PARIS 13832 101718Z

43
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO.00,CCO 00,FILE 02,1032 W

Z 101703Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1347

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 13832

EXDIS

DELTO 9

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-331
By is, NARA Date 3-17-99

1. AMBASSADOR VANCE ACCOMPANIED BY HABIB MET WITH LAU AND VY TO DISCUSS PROCEDURES. AT THE END OF THE MEETING VANCE READ FOLLOWING US STATEMENT TO WAITING PRESS: QUOTE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO PARTIES MET FROM 3:00 TO 4:45 PM TODAY TO DISCUSS PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE TWO DELEGATIONS IN THE FUTURE. WE WILL CONTINUE THESE DISCUSSIONS TOMORROW, BEGINNING AT 10:30 A.M. THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED THAT ON NEXT MONDAY (AT 10:30 A.M.) THE FULL DELEGATIONS REPRESENTING THE TWO PARTIES WILL MEET, END QUOTE.

2. ATMOSPHERE WAS CORDIAL AND BUSINESSLIKE. THEY EVEN WARMED UP A BIT AT END. NORTH VIETNAMESE RAISED A SERIES OF POINTS UPON WHICH WE WILL BE REPORTING IN MORE DETAIL IMMEDIATELY. THEY CONCERNED:

A. THE POINTS THAT SHALL BE APPLIED TO THE SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS WITH THEIR PROPOSING A SENTENCE INVOLVING THE PHRASE "FORMAL CONVERSATIONS". WE DID NOT COMMIT OURSELVES BUT AGREED TO GIVE OUR VIEWS TOMORROW.

B. A SUGGESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO COMPOSITION OF EACH PARTY DESIGNED TO RESTRICT TOTAL NUMBER AND TO ASSURE US PARTY MADE UP ONLY OF AMERICANS WHILE NORTH VIETNAMESE PARTY MADE UP STRICTLY OF CITIZENS OF DRV. WE PROPOSED TO COMMENT TOMORROW.

C. A SERIES OF RELATIVELY NONCONTROVERSIAL POINTS WITH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 13832 101718Z

Time Table

RESPECT TO PRESS, MINUTES, SECURITY AND TIME TABLE FOR MEETINGS.

D. ON LANGUAGES, THEY PROPOSED VIETNAMESE AND ENGLISH AS THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGES. WE AGREED BUT ASKED THAT FRENCH BE A WORKING LANGUAGE. THEY PRACTICALLY AGREED AND WE WILL NAIL DOWN TOMORROW.

E. THEY PROPOSED MAY-13 FOR FIRST FULL SESSION AND PROPOSED, IN PRINCIPLE, ONE SESSION A WEEK EXCEPT ON WEEKENDS AND HOLIDAYS. WE AGREED.

SHRIVER



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

Friday, May 10, 1968 -- 12:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith latest Czech situation
report. *still politics - not
war*

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-407
By cm, NARA, Date 8-21-01

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

42a

5c

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
10 May 1968**

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2002

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

**The Situation in Czechoslovakia
(As of 10:00 A.M. EDT)**

1. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] there have been some troop movements, probably Soviet, in East Germany in the Czechoslovak border area.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

2. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in southern East Germany, Erich Honecker, number two man in the East German party, indicated that troop movements have been taking place in that area.

3. The number of troops involved, however, is possibly small, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the populace has not yet noticed the movements. Moreover, no temporary restricted areas, usually set up to screen large-scale maneuvers or troop movements have been imposed.

4. Honecker ordered several district first secretaries to send people to Czechoslovakia to advise Czechoslovak Communist party members of the East German party's support for them, and to point out the dangers inherent in present

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958; Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RA CDD-410
By iss, NARA, Date 11-27-02

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) >25Yrs
(S)

developments. Honecker reportedly stated that one must want to see when the Czechoslovak Communist Party is going to proclaim a "struggle to put down the counter-revolutionary forces" in the CSSR. Honecker's latter remarks are similar to those expressed in the Polish party's main daily, Trybuna Ludu, on 8 May.

5. In Prague the Czechoslovaks are continuing to enjoy their three day holiday and there were no observable signs of public panic or alarm. No unusual military activity has been detected in Czechoslovakia.

6. Moscow has as yet said not a word about the now widespread reports that some of its forces have been deployed toward Czechoslovakia. It seems clear--no matter how many denials may come later--that the Soviets intend the reports and rumors to have their effect in Prague. In the light of these developments, there seems little doubt that the meeting in Moscow on Wednesday between the Soviet, Polish, East German, Hungarian and Bulgarian leaders was the signal for the launching of this war of nerves against the Czechoslovaks. The propaganda play during the last couple of days suggests, however, that the Hungarians and perhaps the Bulgarians were less willing to lend themselves to such a tactic than the others.

7. Moscow's behavior so far seems more consistent with

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) >25Yrs
(S)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

such a psychological warfare plan than with an intention to move Soviet forces onto Czechoslovakia territory. If this latter were intended, we would have expected Soviet propaganda to have sounded a rising note of alarm or to have begun to prepare a Warsaw Pact cover for intervention.

8.

9. The French government clearly is not treating the situation as critical while Bonn as of late last night was still analyzing the situation.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
(S)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

~~SECRET~~

Pres file
43-1

Friday, May 10, 1968
12:00 noon

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached intelligence item is about as firm as intelligence can be that Hanoi is using the airfields at Bai Thuong and Vinh for MIG's.

General Johnson should be filing his report with you sometime this afternoon.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRIME~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-408
By cbm, NARA, Date 2-28-03

13
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 10, 1968 -- 11:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Conceivably this could be a turning point in the Middle East. The UAR has accepted talks in New York with Jarring.

Beyond that fact, what gives us hope is in para. 5: Cairo now interprets "implementation" as a package deal to be implemented via a time table.

We shall have a draft letter to Nasser up to you during the day.

W. W. Rostow

Cairo 2370

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-448
By CB, NARA, Date 8-21-95

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

12
ACTION SS 73

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00, CCO 00, 1968 MAY 10 14 40
1370

J R. 103735Z MAY. 68
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4712
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY TELAVIV
USMISSION USUN

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 2370

LIMDIS

CORRECTED COPY

SUBJECT: JARRING MISSION

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NLC 91-450

By: [signature], NARA, Date: 6-12-92

Routow

1. MOHAMED RIAD JUST TELEPHONED ^{To} GIVE ME SHORT BRIEFING RE JARRING MAY 9 VISIT. I AM TO SEE MOHAMED AT 10 A.M. LOCAL TOMORROW AT WHICH TIME HE WILL READ MEMCON AND GIVE ME COPIES OF RELEVANT DOCUMENTS.

2. JARRING YESTERDAY OFFICIALLY SUBMITTED ^{To} UAR LETTER WHICH JORDAN HAS ACCEPTED. ISRAEL REPORTEDLY HAS RESERVATIONS RE ONE PARAGRAPH. JARRING REFERS TO IT AS HIS LETTER OF MAY 9, 1968.

3. UAR GAVE HIM REPLY ON SPOT. UAR LETTER SAYS RE DESIRE MEET REPRESENTATIVE IN NEWYORK, UAR PERMREP READY. CONTINUE CONTACTS IN CONFORMITY SC RESOLUTION NOVEMBER 22 FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION.

4. UAR FOMMIN REFERS TO HIS PREVIOUS SUGGESTIONS RE IMPLEMENTATION RESOLUTION AND URGES JARRING CONSIDER DRAWING UP HIS OWN TIME TABLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION. THIS EMANATES FROM FACT UAR ACCEPTS AND READY IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION. UAR ASSURES JARRING ITS WILLINGNESS COOPERATE WITH HIM IN DISCHARGE HIS TALKS.

5. UAR FOMMIN SAID TO JARRING IN ORDER AVOID AMBIGUITY: "UAR ACCEPTS RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE; UAR ACCEPTS RESOLUTION AS A PACKAGE; UAR ACCEPTS RESOLUTION FROM A TO Z; UAR HAS NO PRIOR CONDITIONS."

6. MOHAMED SAYS UAR REQUEST THAT JARRING PREPARE TIME TABLE INDICATES UAR HAS NO PRIORITIES. UAR MAINTAINS ITS POSITION THAT ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW TO JUNE 5 LINE AND UAR WILL NOT SURRENDER ARAB LAND TO ISRAEL.

7. JARRING SAID HE NOT TERMINATING RESIDENCE IN NICOSIA.

8. UAR STRONGLY URGED JARRING CONSIDER PROPOSAL HE PREPARE TIME TABLE AS THIS WAS WAY OUT OF PRESENT DEADLOCK. UAR BELIEVED BRITISH, FRENCH AND RUSSIANS WOULD SUPPORT SUCH A PROPOSAL. JARRING MIGHT WISH DISCUSS WITH PERMANENT MEMBERS SC IN NEW YORK.

BERGUS

~~SECRET~~ 11-11-82

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

3/0/ [] R112-68

serve three battalions of the regiment. According to RLA communications of 28 April, the battalions are located as follows: the 6th Battalion at 19-40N 103-16E (UG 1975), the 7th Battalion at 19-37N 103-25E (UG 3467), and the 8th Battalion at 19-29N 103-14E (UG 1554).

(3/0/ [] R110-68, 2 [] T0797-68, 281303Z)

Two days later SIGINT revealed the location of the Pathet Lao station identified as serving the Xieng Khouang Area Headquarters as being in the same general area. Its location on 9 May was at 19-33N 103-17E (UG 2061), about 4 km northeast of Khang Khay.

(2/G3/ [] R024-68, 091010Z) ~~(SECRET EAVEN)~~

4. Increased DRV Activity Related to U.S. Strikes

Beginning in late April a DRV communications group, previously associated only with tactical operations/ scheduling of flight activity, increased its normal daily volume (12 messages) of traffic approximately six-fold. This higher level of communications has continued to the present and is indicative of a high volume of correspondence concerning tactical operations on the part of the North Vietnamese Air Force.

function. It is apparent, however, that plans involving MIG deployments to the southern DRV area were under discussion as early as mid-April. The first firm SIGINT indication of an imminent MIG deployment was noted on 27 April when a "MIG-17 equipment vehicle" was reported en route to Vinh and another location probably in the southern DRV area. Subsequently, on 28 April at least two DRV MIG-21s and possibly two DRV MIG-17's flew from Phuc Yen and Hanoi respectively, to Vinh Airfield, with en route stopovers

-9-

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-141-022-001/12
By JC, NARA, Date 11-7-09

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~3/0/ ☐ R112-68

at Bai Thuong. Although an interest in Vinh Airfield was reported in SIGINT as early as January of this year, these late April stopovers at Bai Thuong were among the preliminary indicators of possible forthcoming MIG association with this location. The two MIG-21's had apparently returned to Bai Thuong by 3 May, as the Bai Thong controller was noted attempting to establish voice contact with them early in the morning of that day. No further data relating to the actual return trip of the MIG-17's has yet become available; however, the MIG-17 pilots scheduled for the Vinh flight have been noted active since that time at Gia Lam. On 5 and 7 May the tactical-associated DRV communications network informed Bai Thuong, Vinh and an undetermined location (the same mentioned above) of the positions of three U.S. aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Number, types and times of aircraft taking off from the carrier were also noted on both dates. This facility routinely passed B-52 alerts to the same terminals during the period 15 January through 26 March; however, this represents the first identified relay of "ship-spotting" information on this communications group. On 7 May, the two MIG-21 pilots which had flown to Vinh on the 28th, were involved in a reaction, staged from Bai Thuong, to U.S. strike aircraft; one U.S. F4 was downed by the MIGs. On 8 May, DRV MIG-17's and MIG-21's flew from bases in the Hanoi area to Bai Thuong; shortly after landing, these aircraft apparently returned to their respective bases near Hanoi. Finally, on 9 May DRV MIGs again flew southward - as far as 18-10N - and were active south of Vinh during the same time period U.S. strike aircraft were in that area. Although only preliminary data is currently available, it appears that Bai Thuong and Vinh airfields were closely associated with this activity. A review of the aforementioned SIGINT reflections of DRV air activities, when considered with previous levels and types of activities indicates an increased DRV concern for U.S. strike activities against southern North Vietnam, and connotes an effort to dispatch MIG aircraft to areas (Bai Thuong and Vinh) where they can be more readily employed in tactical situations.

-10-

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

No Objection To Declassification 2003/05/22 : NLJ-141-022-1-12-0

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

44

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Friday, May 10, 1968 - 9:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith latest CIA summary on
Czechoslovakia.

It looks like a pretty substantial
show of force with no firm indication
they intend to cross the Czech border.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-407
By com, NARA, Date 8-21-01

~~Walt~~ Rostow

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

44a

Protein

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2002

[redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
10 May 1968

EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Czechoslovakia
(As of 7:00 A.M. EDT)

1. There is still no confirmation of Soviet troop movements on the Czechoslovak borders.

2. Additional Soviet [redacted] activity in Southeastern East Germany probably involving elements of the 20th Guards Army has been reported, but no large troop movement in the area can be confirmed. (USCOB Berlin has been requested [redacted] to arrange collection of low altitude photography of selected 20th Guards Army installations in the Berlin area to ascertain if these Soviet units have departed home stations.)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-410
By no, NARA, Date 11-27-02

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

-2-

[REDACTED]
3. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The French military attache

states that the Soviet armored unit he observed moving south of Krakow on 8 May was "clean," indicating a movement into position rather than a return from maneuvers. During travel on 9 May, the French air attache in Warsaw saw Polish armored carriers and 50 other vehicles moving south on the west side of the Vistula River south of the city.

4. [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S) [REDACTED] Warsaw reports that "NATO attaches" have concluded that Soviet and Polish units have moved into position as a show of force rather than as an ordinary maneuver. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] there are rumors in the city that the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans are holding maneuvers at the Czech border and that some reservists have been notified of an imminent call-up for the

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

-3-

exercises. Western diplomats and military attaches
apparently are still confined to Warsaw.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

5. [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

6. [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

7. There are no [REDACTED]

significant movements within or outside the Carpathian
Military District. [REDACTED]

8. The Soviet press has not reacted as yet to the
reports of troop movements which have appeared in the
Western press, nor has it replayed Polish press attacks
on alleged "anti-socialist" elements in Czechoslovakia.
The Soviet press continues to give extensive coverage,
however, to events in Czechoslovakia, with several

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

-4-

factual reports on the activities of official Soviet delegations which are there for Liberation Day celebrations. These delegations, including a group of high-ranking military figures, are apparently continuing previously scheduled ceremonial activities.

9. In contrast to their recent open answers to reporters' questions, Czechoslovak officials were unavailable for comment yesterday on reports of Soviet troop movements toward their borders. Their evasiveness was aided by the closure of government offices for a three-day holiday on the occasion of the liberation anniversary. Unofficial Czechoslovak newspapers continued to hammer away at the failure of the Soviet Union fully to endorse Prague's "spring revolution," and at inimical Polish attitudes.

10. The closest thing to an official Czechoslovak comment came in a "message to the Soviet people" sent from the celebrations in Prague. In subdued tones, the message reasserted Czechoslovakia's commitment to changes, as outlined previously in the party's action program. Its pledge of cooperation with the socialist countries' fight "against imperialism" was weakly stated and made contingent on "consistent realization of the principle

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

-5-

of non-interference in the internal affairs of individual countries."

11. The Poles have continued their open pressure on the Dubcek regime, repeating again on 9 May that "revisionist and anti-socialist forces supported by imperialist centers of subversion were trying to use changes in Czechoslovakia to unbalance the leading role of the Communist party and weaken ties between Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries." Warsaw newspapers hinted broadly that it was time the new Czechoslovak authorities brought such forces under control. Provincial party boss Gierak, who may someday be Gomulka's successor, gave a harsh speech in the Czechoslovak border town of Tesin, warning that slogans about "democracy, free speech, and culture" were being used by international "imperialist circles" against Communism in Czechoslovakia.

12. East German leaders sent a completely innocuous telegram of congratulations to Prague, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) >25Yrs
(S)

-6-

13. A Hungarian official, in contrast, again voiced the regime's approval of Czechoslovak reforms at a Budapest rally on 9 May, but at the same he included a number of thinly veiled warnings about the necessity for cooperation with the Soviet Union, CEMA and the Warsaw Pact. Despite Soviet apprehensions which were expressed to Marshal Tito last week, the Yugoslav President sent unusually long and effusive messages of congratulations to Czechoslovak leaders.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) >25Yrs
(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, May 8, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your approval and signature is a brief, warm letter to Mayor Hans Hansson of Göteborg, Sweden.

204p
Pres file

The mayor wrote to you on April 19 enclosing and endorsing a pre-American article from one of Sweden's leading newspapers and expressing his best wishes to you and your family.

The mayor occupies an important position in Sweden. Your letter would show our interest in cordial relations with Sweden.

W. W. Rostow

If you approve, we will
need your signature on
the attached letter _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

ERF:mm

May 9, 1968

Dear Mayor Hansson:

Thank you for the kind sentiments expressed in your note of April 19. Mrs. Johnson and I recall with pleasure our visit to your handsome city in 1963 and particularly appreciate your thoughtfulness.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

The Honorable
Hans Hansson
Mayor of Goteborg
Goteborg, Sweden

LBJ:ERF:mm

INFORMATION

46

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, May 9, 1968 - 6:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a Westmoreland request, backed by the JCS and CINCPAC, supported further by Katzenbach and Nitze, that: the use of COFRAM be extended to all sparsely populated areas in South Vietnam.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-326
By is, NARA Date 3-3-98

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

1553
46a

9 MAY 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General Westmoreland now is authorized to employ air-and artillery-delivered COFRAM munitions in South Vietnam in and near the demilitarized zone, the Central Highlands, and in Quang Nam and Thua Thien Provinces; and in North Vietnam and Laos, to include lines of communication in the extended battlefield. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland have recommended that the authority to employ these munitions be extended to all sparsely populated areas in the Republic of Vietnam. The existing safety rules applicable to South Vietnam of strictly controlling all use of COFRAM; limiting artillery impacts to observed fires and to counterfires against mortar, recoilless rifle, and rocket attacks; but in any case only in areas known to be sparsely populated will continue to be observed.

The enemy repeatedly has employed mortars, artillery, and rockets against US and friendly forces and key installations from positions located in sparsely populated areas throughout South Vietnam. Enemy targets suitable for exploitation by COFRAM are known to exist in sparsely populated areas other than those currently authorized. Listed below and on the attached map are several examples:

1. The Do Xa base area within I Corps Tactical Zone.
2. Military Regions 6 and 10 and enemy base areas astride the boundary of II and III Corps.
3. The "Iron Triangle" and war zones C and D in III Corps Tactical Zone.
4. The Plain of Reeds and the Seven Mountains areas in IV Corps Tactical Zone.

Secretary Katzenbach and I recommend your approval.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS: NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR 5200.10

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-327
By CG, NARA Date 7-27-99

Paul H. Nitze


2843

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1968 MAY 9 PM 5 19



AREAS OF
POTENTIALLY
LUCRATIVE
TARGETS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-327
By CG, NARA Date 7-27-99

47
-
INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, May 9, 1968 - 6:20 pm

Pres file

Mr. President:

**This cool British appraisal of
the latest NLF political program.**

It reflects:

- the same objective;
- scaled down in the light of
their setback since Tet.

W. W. Restow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRestow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 21, 1993
By pg, NARA, Date 6-1-92

CYPHER/CAT A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRIORITY HANOI

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 33

30 APRIL 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL PASTILLE.~~

Restow

47a
S
f.v.d.h
V. G
E.H
W4
Seedy

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TEL NO. 33 OF 30 APRIL REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION UNNUMBERED TO WASHINGTON, MOSCOW, PEKING, SAIGON,
POLAD SINGAPORE TOKYO AND KUALA LUMPUR.

MANIFESTO OF THE ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL FORCES OF VIETNAM.

NOW THAT THE MANIFESTO AND THE ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS ON THE
FOUNDING CONFERENCE ON THE ALLIANCE HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED BOTH
IN THE VERNACULAR AND IN FOREIGN LANGUAGES THERE IS NO NEED TO
BURDEN THE ETHER WITH REPETITION OF THE TEXTS MOREOVER THERE
IS STILL NO HARD INFORMATION AVAILABLE HERE ON THE ATTITUDE OF
THE DRV TO THIS NEW MANIFESTATION OF FRONT ACTIVITY.

2. UNTIL APRIL 30TH THE DRV HAD STILL MADE NO PUBLIC COMMENT ON
THE MANIFESTO ALTHOUGH IT WAS ADOPTED ON APRIL 20 AND 21ST, AND
FULL TEXTS WERE PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS. FOR SOME REASON THE
TEXTS WERE GIVEN TO SELECTED FOREIGN MISSIONS ON FRIDAY APRIL 26TH
BUT NOT TO THE FOREIGN PRESS. ALL OF THIS APPEARS TO ADD UP TO
A PICTURE OF THE DRV BEING BEHIND THE GAME IN SOME WAY, OR
EXCESSIVELY ANXIOUS NOT TO SEEM PRIVY TO THE ALLIANCE PLANS.

3. ~~THE NLF HAS BEEN LESS CAUTIOUS.~~ HAVING STUDIED THE DOCUMENT
IN RELATION TO THE 1967 PROGRAMME OF THE NLF, AND DISCUSSED IT
WITH BOTH SOCIALIST AND OTHER DIPLOMATS, I OFFER THE FOLLOWING
IMMEDIATE REACTIONS, CONSCIOUS OF THE SHORTCOMINGS OF MY LOCAL
RESEARCH RESOURCES, AND PARTICULARLY OF A LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE
PERSONALITIES NAMED AS LEADERS.

AS SEEN FROM HERE

A) ~~THE NEW MANIFESTO SEEMS TO BE IN THE MAIN A PRECIS OF THE OLD
PROGRAMME SHORN OF THE ANTI-U.S. VITUPERATION AND REPETITIVE JARGON.
ALL THE WORDS USED IN THE NEW PROGRAMME APPEAR IN THE OLD BUT THERE
IS LESS EMPHASIS ON LAND REFORM AND CLASS WARFARE, AS WELL AS LESS
NAKED HATRED OF THE U.S. AND THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT.~~

CHANCERY GENERAL
Chancery Action
405: CMC: ap

/ B)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-331

By *us*, NARA Date 3-19-99

PRESERVATION COPY

B) THERE SEEMS TO BE GREATER EMPHASIS IN THE NEW DOCUMENT ON THE NEED FOR TIME IN MOVING TOWARD REUNIFICATION. THIS ECHOES A POINT FREQUENTLY MADE BY DRV MINISTERS IN RECENT MONTHS IN PRIVATE. THE MANIFESTO ALSO REFLECTS RECENT DRV MINISTERIAL INTEREST IN FOREIGN RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES IRRESPECTIVE OF POLITICAL SYSTEM.

C) ~~IN GENERAL THIS IS THE MIXTURE AS BEFORE IN REDUCED FORM AND IN Milder COLOURS.~~

D) IT SEEMS THAT THE ALLIANCE, WHICH APPEARS TO BE A LOGICAL EXTENSION OF THE VARIOUS POPULAR ALLIANCES WHICH HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED IN THE SOUTH AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE TET OFFENSIVE, ~~IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE A THINLY DISGUISED FRONT FOR THE NLF, ABLE TO TAKE A NEW INITIATIVE IN FORMING A COALITION.~~

4. OF THE PERSONALITIES NAMED TO LEAD THE ALLIANCE ONLY THE CHAIRMAN TRINH AND ONE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARIES, WRITER THAN NGHI, ARE FAMILIAR TO MY LOCAL VIETNAMESE CONTACTS. I PRESUME THAT THE UNNAMED PERSONS REFERRED TO IN THE COMMUNIQUE ARE NON EXISTENT OR UNDER COVER IN NON LIBERATED TERRITORY, OR MEMBERS OF THE NLF OR OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY. IN HANOI THE FOREIGN OBSERVERS SEE THE PERSONALITIES OF THE ALLIANCE RATHER THAN ITS FAMILIAR AND INNOCUOUS SOUNDING PROGRAMME AS THE CRUCIAL PART OF THE ALLIANCE.

5. ~~PRESUMABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT SO FAR IS THAT THE NLF HAS ACCEPTED THIS DOCUMENT WHICH DOWNGRADES THE NLF FROM ITS PREVIOUSLY CLAIMED POSITION AS THE SOLE VOICE AND REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOUTH TO THAT OF A PARTNER.~~

FO PASS PASTILLE U/N TO WASHINGTON.

SOSFA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUPS 530

SENT AT 06/1831Z BCA

ACTION

48

Thursday, May 9, 1968 -- 6:00 PM

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval,
is a warm birthday message to Presi-
dent Ayub of Pakistan. He will be 61
on May 14.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

EKH:WFM/vmr

182
/

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT AYUB OF PAKISTAN

Dear Mr. President:

Lady Bird and I send warmest personal regards to you on your birthday. Your recovery from your recent illness is ample reason for celebration, not only in Pakistan but wherever men honor courage and statesmanship. We join your millions of friends around the world in wishing you many happy returns.

You will always have a special place in American hearts, Mr. President. May our paths soon cross again.

Sincerely,

State/EKH/vmr

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Thursday, May 9, 1968
6:00 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

CIA's 5:00 p.m. assessment is
relatively reassuring on Czechoslovakia.

They read Soviet moves as pressure
-- not a decision to move.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-407
By cm, NARA, Date 8-21-01

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

WWRostow:rla

49a

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

9 May 1968

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
9 May 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Czechoslovakia
(As of 5:00 P.M. EDT)

1. The movement of Soviet troops toward Czechoslovakia is unconfirmed. Nevertheless, we believe Moscow may make some show of force designed to intimidate anti-Soviet elements in Prague. Rumors and unconfirmed reports of troop movements in Poland continued to be received and some have already become public and presumably have reached Prague. Neither Prague nor Moscow however, has directly commented on the current situation.

25X1D

2. As of 1545 hours, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] no significant deployments of Soviet ground forces in East Europe or within the western USSR. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1D

25X1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We would expect to see all of these things if the Soviets seriously intended to intervene.

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

25X1

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ-141-022-001/16
By JC, NARA, Date 11-2-09

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

25X1

3. Some probably circumstantial information has become available. []

25X1D

25X1D

[]

25X1D

[]

25X1D

[]

25X1D

4. In Czechoslovakia, there is no evidence of any unusual military activity. []

25X1D

[]

K3

[] There is no indication that any Czechoslovak units have been placed on an alert status.

5. Restrictions on the travel of journalists and diplomats in Warsaw have fed rumors that Soviet troops are passing through Poland toward Czechoslovakia.

25X1C

[]

25X1C

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

-2-


25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

25X1

leaving Warsaw during the afternoon of 9 May. At the same time, the Polish press has continued to express its "anxiety and concern" over the work of Czechoslovak "reactionary antisocialist forces supported from the outside," aimed at "dividing Czechoslovakia from the brotherly socialist countries."

25X1D



25X1D



These

are areas where Soviet troops are stationed or where they might pass through Poland if they were heading West.

7. The Soviets probably hope that they can make their point in Prague by the mere show of readiness to intervene. The Soviets are not likely to make more than a display of force without a call for help from some segment of the Czechoslovakian Communist party. Overtly at least, they have done little to set the stage for an actual intervention, such as an announcement of maneuvers under the Warsaw Pact. There has been a loosening up of Soviet press and radio coverage on

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

-3-

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

Czechoslovakia, but so far this gives no good guidance on their intentions. They have today greatly increased their broadcast hours in Czech^{and}~~oslovakia~~, but the content of the broadcasts has not been exceptional thus far.

8. A Czechoslovak broadcast on 9 May indicates that informed circles in Prague are feeling pressure. The commentator ploded with "foreign listeners" to allow Czechoslovakia to build its new society, and added that "the future depends on how freely we make our decisions at home, how tolerant our allies will be.... But for God's sake let us not have even an implication of a repetition of the tragic history of the reckoning of Yugoslavia or perhaps even that of Budapest of 1956.... We would like to commemorate our 50th anniversary (as a republic)...not as a safe pawn or dominated by a foreign secret police....For this reason I want very much my words to travel beyond the frontiers of our country." The tenor of this broadcast, which was beamed about 3:00 P.M. EDT suggests that up to then no Soviet troops had crossed the border.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-4-

25X1

ACTION

Pres file

Thursday, May 9, 1968 - 5:55pm

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a proposed farewell message to Prime Minister Ramgeelam of Mauritius. He leaves tomorrow afternoon from Dulles.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Attached: File 1480

WWR:EKH:RM:lw

572

Proposed Message to Prime Minister
Ramgoolam of Mauritius

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I very much enjoyed our talk yesterday afternoon.
It was good to have your thoughtful views on the challenges
facing your new nation and the world. Mauritius can
depend on America's firm friendship as she strives to
build a prosperous and stable independence.

My best wishes for a safe and pleasant journey home.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

21
INFORMATION

**Thursday, May 9, 1968
4:15 p.m.**

Mr. President:

**Herewith a lucid, manly TV
talk by Thieu.**

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 26853, 2 sections

WWRostow:rlm

Free file

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 6-1-92

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ACTION EA 15

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L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, AID 28, ACDA 16, IO 13,
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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2331
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
CINCPAC
AMCONSUL DANANG
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 26853

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

PARIS FOR VIET-NAM MISSION

SUB: PRESIDENT THIEU SPEECH TO NATION

1. PRESIDENT THIEU DELIVERED 45-MINUTE TELEVISED SPEECH TO THE NATION EVENING MAY 9. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF PRESIDENT'S REMARK (FULL TEXT WILL FOLLOW BY FBIS):

2. THIEU FIRST REVIEWED EVENTS OF PAST WEEK, NOTING THAT ALLIES HAVE INFLICTED HEAVY CASUALTIES ON VC, BUT THAT DAMAGE AND SUFFERING CAUSED BY VC HAS ALSO BEEN CONSIDERABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, 20,000 ADDITIONAL REFUGEES HAVE BEEN GENERATED. AS AT TET, GOVERNMENT HAS DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ASSIST VICTIMS.

3. HOWEVER, CURRENT VC ATTACKS DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THOSE AT TET. VC ARE WEAKEN NOW, AND DID NOT ENJOY ELEMENT OF SURPRISE. VC ARE NONETHELESS ABLE TO CARRY OUT SABOTAGE, AND HAVE RESORTED TO ASSASSINATION AND INDISCRIMINATE SHELLING. IN ADDITION, POLITICAL ACTIVITY HAS BEEN HEAVILY EMPHASIZED. MANY COMMUNIST CADRES HAVE BEEN OPERATING, PRIMARY PURPOSE

Rostow

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BEING TOBOSCT SO-CALLED "ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY."

4. BEFORE TET, COMMUNISTS IMAGINED THAT THEY COULD WIN A MILITARY VICTORY IN PREPARATION FOR NEGOTIATIONS. INSTEAD THEY WERE HEAVILY DEFEATED. THEY NEEDED TIME TO LICK THEIR WOUNDS AND CONSOLIDATE THEIR FORCES. GVN AND ALLIES, DISPLAYING GOOD WILL, INSTITUTED PARTIAL HALT IN BOMBING OF NORTH VIET-NAM. HANOI HAS SUBSEQUENTLY SHOWN THAT IT DOES NOT SINCERELY DESIRE PEACE. HANOI ONLY WANTED TIME, ENOUGH TIME TO STRENGTHEN THEMSELVES AFTER THEIR TET DEFEAT. ONLY AFTER REGAINING THEIR STRENGTH DID THEY AGREE TO TALK. WILLINGNESS TO MEET AT PARIS CAME ABOUT ONLY AFTER LONG DELAY, WHICH THEY USED TO REBUILD THEIR FORCES.

5. HOWEVER, COMPARED TO TET, CURRENT SERIES OF ATTACKS ARE INSIGNIFICANT. MAJOR VC UNITS WERE NOT ABLE TO ENTER CITY. THEY HAVE BEEN SURROUNDED ON OUTSKIRTS AND ARE BEING ANNIHILATED. THEIR LOSSES, AS AT TET, ARE HEAVY.

6. THIEU THEN EXPRESSED HIS SINCERE CONGRATULATION FOR EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE DEMONSTRATED IN PAST DAYS BY ARVN, RF/PF AND POLICE, HE ALSO CONGRATULATED THE PEOPLE, FOR THEIR COURAGE, THEIR CALM, AND THEIR TOTAL UNWILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH VC, JUST AS DURING TET. HE NOTED THAT SINCE TET, PEOPLE HAVE REJECTED NUMEROUS BLANDISHMENTS FROM VC, INCLUDING THAT REPRESENTED BY "ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY."

7. PARIS TALKS ARE ABOUT TO BEGIN, NOTED THIEU. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT DURING THOSE TALKS HANOI WILL FACE THE TRUTH; VC LOSSES HAVE BEEN HEAVY, SOUTH VIETNAMESE STRENGTH- BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY- IS UNDIMINISHED. THE FACT THAT GVN HAS APPROVED OF THE TALKS DOES NOT MEAN THAT IT IS READY TO ACCEPT EVERYTHING DEMANDED BY HANOI, SUCH AS UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING IN NORTH. GVN POSITION (TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS AND PEACE) REMAINS UNCHANGED, AS DOES THAT OF ALLIES. GVN POSITION HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR TO ALLIES AT PARIS, JUST AS IT HAS IN SPEECHES TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

8. HANOI'S DEMAND FOR 100 PERCENT HALT IN BOMBING IS UNACCEPTABLE AS LONG AS THEIR INFILTRATION CONTINUES UNABATED. GVN REMAINS DETERMINED NOT TO NEGOTIATE WITH NLF. THIEU EXPRESSED HOPE THAT ALLIES WILL NOT ACCEPT UNFAVORABLE PROPOSITIONS IN PARIS

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TALKS, SUCH AS STOPPING BOMBING IN NORTH AND ACCEPTING HANOI VIEW OF WAR AS AN INTERNAL MATTER, OR FORMING GVN TO NEGOTIATE WITH NLF. REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM WILL NOT CEDE ONE FOOT OF GROUND TO COMMUNISTS, SAID THIEU. NOR WILL IT ACCEPT COALITION GOVERNMENT. FURTHERMORE, GVN WILL NEVER RECOGNIZE NLF AS A POLITICAL ENTITY ON PAR WITH ITSELF OR NEGOTIATE WITH IT AS AN EQUAL.

9. HANOI SHOULD ADMIT THAT NLF IS ONLY THEIR TOOL. HANOI MUST REALIZE THAT FIRM AND GUARANTEED PEACE FOR BOTH VIET-NAM'S CAN COME ONLY WHEN THEY RECOGNIZE THAT SOLE LEGITIMATE INTERLOCUTOR FOR SOUTH VIETNAM IS LEGAL AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIET-NAM. THIEU HOPED THAT COMMUNISTS WOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE STRENGTH OF SOUTH VIETNAM, NOT MISINTERPRET THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRACY IN UNITED STATES. THEY MUST NOT BELIEVE THAT THEIR ACTS OF SAVAGERY WILL SAP THE STRENGTH OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE OR DETERMINATION OF US AND ALLIES.

10. THIEU SAID THAT HANOI MAY IN FACT RECOGNIZE WEAKNESS OF POSITION. COMMUNISTS KNOW THEY CANNOT OVERTHROW GVN, AND THAT THEY CANNOT WIN A MAJOR VICTORY IN STYLE OF DIEN BIEN PHU. COMMUNISTS MUST KNOW THAT MAY 1968 IS QUITE DIFFERENT THAN MAY 1954. POLITICAL SITUATION, BOTH INTERNALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY IS DIFFERENT THAN IN 1954. STRENGTH AND DETERMINATION OF GVN AND ALLIES IS TOTALLY DIFFERENT THAN IN 1954. HOPEFULLY, SAID THIEU, HANOI WILL RECOGNIZE FALSITY OF REPORTS IT RECEIVES FROM ITS OPERATIVES IN SOUTH. HOWEVER, EVEN THOUGH FORCED TO NEGOTIATE, HANOI WILL CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR OPPORTUNITIES TO ACHIEVE MILITARY VICTORIES AND WILL CONTINUE ITS SABOTAGE AND TERRORISTIC ACTIVITIES. COMMUNIST PLOTS, HOWEVER, WILL NEVER SUCCEED.
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2332
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
CINCPAC
AMCONSUL DANANG
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 26853

11. WE MUST CARRY ON VIGOROUSLY, SAID THIEU. MILITARILY, SINCE TET GVN AND ALLIES HAVE COUNTERATTACKED WITH STRENGTH, AND ARE CONTINUING TO DO SO. GVN HAS REOCCUPIED COUNTRYSIDE, PROTECTED CITIES AND INFLECTED HEAVY LOSSES ON VC. WE ARE DETERMINED TO RETAIN MILITARY INITIATIVE. THIEU NOTED THAT HE PRESENTED PLAN FOR GENERAL MOBILIZATION TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY EXACTLY ONE MONTH AGO. HE APPLAUDED LOWER HOUSE FOR HAVING UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED GENERAL MOBILIZATION IN PRINCIPLE. THIEU SAID THAT ON MAY 8 HE MET WITH CHAIRMAN OF UPPER AND LOWER HOUSES TO DISCUSS URGENT MILITARY REQUIREMENT AND REQUEST SPEEDY ASSEMBLY APPROVED OF MOBILIZATION BILL. HE HOPED THAT IN ADDITION TO FAST ACTION ON BILL, ASSEMBLY WOULD CONSIDER BILL AND COMPLEXITIES INVOLVED IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION "REALISTICALLY." THIEU NOTED THAT RESPONSIBILITY OF GVN IS HEAVY, AND THAT ASSEMBLY AND GVN SHAVE A JOINT RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE THE PEOPLE. HE PLEDGED MAXIMUM EFFORT TO CARRY OUT HIS RESPONSIBILITIES, AND HOPED ASSEMBLY WOULD RESPOND ACCORDINGLY.

12. POLITICALLY, SAID THIEU, VC ARE BEING DEFEATED AS THEY WERE AT TET. PEOPLE HAVE REFUSED TO HELP VC, AS THEY DID AT TET. RECENTLY VC HAVE INITIATED A NEW PLOY IN FORM OF "CELLIARE FOR PEACE AND DEMORARY," AND ARE CONTINUING TO FORMENT

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 26353 02 OF 02 091716Z

POLITICAL PLOTS.

13. IN ORDER TO PRESERVE POLITICAL ORDER AND SECURITY, SAID THIEU, CIVIL AND MILITARY AGENCIES AT ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN INTENDED TO DEAL FORCEFULLY WITH ANY DEMONSTRATIONS ORGANIZED BY THESE "PHONY COALITION GROUPS." PEOPLE MUST NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY SUCH ACTIVITY. POLICE AND MILITARY UNITS WILL USE FORCE IF NECESSARY TO PRESENT ANY DEMONSTRATION FROM GETTING OUT OF BRAND. NLF HAS RECENTLY BEEN DISTRIBUTING PAMPHLETS TOUTING "ALLIANCE", URGING PEOPLE TO BETRAY GOVERNMENT AND PROMISING THEN SHOVE OF SPOILS OF VICTORY. VC WILL NEVER ACHIEVE VICTORY; PEOPLE MUST BE ON GROUND. THIEU CALLED ON MILITARY AND CIVIL SERVANTS TO EXPLAIN TO PEOPLE DANGERS PRESENTED BY VC POLITICAL PROSELYTING. HE ASKED PEOPLE TO MAINTAIN RESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE AND BEWARE OF ADVOCATES OF FALSE PEACE.

14. THIEU ALSO APPEALED TO CIVIL SERVANTS TO MAKE EVEN GREATER SACRIFICES FOR NATIONALIST CAUSE; THEY SHOULD BE PREPARED TO LIVE IN THEIR OFFICES AND WORK AROUND THE CLOCK IF NECESSARY. CIVIL SERVANTS SHOULD ALSO TAKE LEAD IN PARTICIPATION IN PEOPLES SELF-DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS WHEN GENERAL MOBILIZATION IS PROMULGATED. THIEU NOTED AT THIS POINT THAT HE HAS SIGNED DECREE GIVING VICE PRESIDENT KY RESPONSIBILITY FOR PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE ORGANIZATION. HE ADDED THAT VICE PRESIDENT WOULD BE SPEAKING TO PEOPLE ON THIS SUBJECT IN COMING DAYS.

15. THIEU STRESSED THAT REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM MUST STRENGTHEN ITS WAR EFFORT IN ORDER TO PROTECT ITS POSITION IN NEGOTIATIONS. WE MUST AVOID SETTLEMENTS SUCH AS THAT IN LAOS. GVN IS DETERMINED TO CONTINUE MILITARY EFFORT, AND WILL NOT SURRENDER IN NEGOTIATION AS COMMUNISTS HOPE. THIS WILL REQUIRE CONTINUED SACRIFICES BY SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE IN REAR. PEOPLES' SACRIFICES HAVE ALREADY BEEN MANY, SAID THIEU, BUT ONLY BY ADDITIONAL SACRIFICE CAN TRUE PEACE IN FREEDOM BE ACHIEVED.

16. GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZES THESE SACRIFICES AND RECOGNIZES THAT IT BEARS HEAVIEST RESPONSIBILITY. FOR THIS REASON, AS WE APPROACH THIS IMPORTANT POINT IN HISTORY, GOVERNMENT IS DETERMINED TO CARRY FORWARD PROGRAMS PRESENTED TO PEOPLE AND ELECTION TIME. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM, ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN AND CREATION OF A JOINT SOCIETY WILL BE PURSUED REGARDLESS

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OF DIFFICULTIES. ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY, IN BOTH ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL, WILL BE REFORMED TO SERVE PEOPLE BETTER. THIS REORGANIZATION WILL ENCOUNTER MANY OBSTACLES, INCLUDING INTERNAL PROBLEMS CAUSED BY A FEW PEOPLE OF EXCESSIVE AMBITION AND AMOUR PROPRE. HOWEVER, WITH SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE, THESE WILL BE OVERCOME. THIS NOTED THAT HE NEVER EXPECTED PRESIDENCY TO BE EASY. HOWEVER, "I DID NOT WANT THE JOB JUST FOR SAKE OF BEING PRESIDENT," BUT RATHER TO SACRIFICE AND ACCOMPLISH SOMETHING FOR PEOPLE. ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN WILL ALSO INVOLVE MANY DIFFICULTIES, AND IN THIS ALSO SUPPORT OF PEOPLE IS ESSENTIAL.

17. IN CLOSING THIEU EXPRESSED HOPE THAT IN HIS NEXT ADDRESS TO NATION, "PROBABLY NEXT WEEK," HE WOULD BE ABLE TO SPEAK TO PEOPLE ON SUBJECT OF "REORGANIZING" THE GOVERNMENT.
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INFORMATION

Thursday, May 9, 1968 - 4:00 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your 5:00 p.m. meeting with Prime Minister Thanom

Pres. file

By all indications the Thai visit is going extraordinarily well. You covered yesterday all of the ground that we hoped to cover with Thanom. I think the 5:00 p.m. meeting today can be brief. The only item of formal business left is the approval of the joint communique. The final version, approved by both sides, is attached. The only Thai change was to add a final paragraph of appreciation for their warm reception.

In addition to formal approval of the communique, you might do the following three things at the 5:00 p.m. meeting:

1. -- briefly express your pleasure at:
 - the reaffirmation of the Thai intent to send a division to Vietnam.
 - the encouraging Thai response to our Balance of Payments problems.
 - continued Thai leadership in developing effective regional institutions in Thailand.
2. -- say that we are working on the Opening Statement for our delegation in Paris and will provide the Prime Minister with a copy as soon as the drafting processes are completed.
 - you might make special mention that we are taking the position that whatever arrangements are made for peace in Asia should be monitored by Asian states themselves. You could say that this position stems directly from a speech made by Foreign Minister Thanat in which he pointed out the undesirability of leaving the security of Asia to non-Asian powers with only a secondary interest in the matter. We were impressed by that speech. We agree with it. We hope the Thai will take the lead in approaching Indonesia and Japan about the necessity for Asian states playing the role of monitoring in the future. You might ask the Thais which Asian states they think would be best fitted for a monitoring role.

2.

3. -- congratulate Foreign Minister Thanat on receiving from the King yesterday one of the highest awards a Thai can receive. (Today is Thanat's birthday, so you might just refer to the award as a very nice birthday present.)

W. W. Rostow

Atts

MWright:wpt

DRAFT**VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER THANOM KITTIKACHORN OF THAILAND
May 8-9, 1968****JOINT COMMUNIQUE**

At the invitation of President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States, Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn of the Kingdom of Thailand paid an official visit to Washington on May 8 and 9. This visit afforded the President and the Prime Minister and several of his senior Cabinet colleagues an opportunity to exchange views on current developments in Thailand and on the situation in Southeast Asia.

Thailand

The Prime Minister described the dynamic economic expansion currently taking place in Thailand. He mentioned the major role played by private initiative and emphasized Thai interest in promoting foreign investment in his country. He also referred to the forthcoming promulgation of a new Constitution by His Majesty the King.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed the externally-supported, Communist-directed subversion and insurgency in Thailand, especially in the northern and northeastern regions. In this connection, the Prime Minister described his Government's programs for providing security to the rural population and improving their social and economic conditions. He also noted that while welcoming foreign assistance in the form of training, equipment and advice, the Royal Thai Government regarded

--

defeating the insurgency as a Thai responsibility to be carried out by its own forces. The President made clear the intention of the United States to continue its assistance to Thailand to help provide the Royal Thai Government with the means of meeting illegal Communist activities. He stressed American support in the field of accelerated rural development, especially with regard to roads and water resources. The President re-emphasized the determination of the United States to stand by its treaty commitments to Thailand and its other allies in Asia. He recalled with pleasure the three visits he has made to Thailand. He noted the pledge that he had given at the time of his visit to Bangkok in 1966 that the commitment of the United States was not of a particular political party or administration, but of the people of the United States, and that "America keeps its commitments."

Vietnam

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed in detail the situation in South Vietnam. They reaffirmed their determination to assist the Republic of Vietnam in defending itself against aggression in order to assure its people the right to determine their own future free from external interference and terrorism. They also stressed the importance of this defense to the security of other nations in the region.

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the military situation including the recent initiatives of the Government of South Vietnam and actions by the United States and its allies to increase their forces there.

The Prime Minister noted that additional Thai forces, the first increments of a Thai division, will deploy to South Vietnam shortly to join Thai troops already fighting with South Vietnamese, American, and other allied units. The President paid tribute to the contribution Thailand is making to our common defense interests by making base facilities available for use by the United States. He also praised the hospitality extended American servicemen by the Thai people.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the attainment of a just and durable peace required both a strong military posture and the pursuit of a diplomatic solution. They agreed to continue their efforts on both these fronts until such a peace is secured.

The President reviewed in detail the developments that had followed his initiative of March 31 to halt bombing in the major part of North Vietnam and to invite talks. The President and the Prime Minister expressed satisfaction that Paris had now been agreed as the site for talks, and the President reviewed the position that American representatives would take in the opening stages of these talks. The President reaffirmed that at each stage the US Government would continue its full consultations with the Royal Thai Government and its other allies concerning negotiating positions and developments. The President and the Prime Minister also reaffirmed the position stated in the Seven-Nation Foreign Ministers Meeting of April 1967 -- that a settlement in Vietnam, to be enduring, must respect the wishes and aspirations of the Vietnamese people; that the Republic of Vietnam should

be a full participant in any negotiations designed to bring about a settlement of the conflict; and that the allied nations which have helped to defend the Republic of Vietnam should participate in any settlement of the conflict.

Expressing the hope that the Paris conversations would result in serious discussions on the substance of peace in Vietnam, the President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed that the Manila Communiqué of 1966 would form the basis of the allied position. The two leaders emphasized their determination that the South Vietnamese people shall not be conquered by aggression and shall enjoy their inherent right to decide their own way of life and form of government. The President and the Prime Minister also noted the importance of ensuring full compliance with the provisions of the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos.

In discussing the situation which would follow a cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that close and continuous consultation on economic and security questions would be required to assure a smooth transition from war to peace.

Regional Cooperation

The President and the Prime Minister further reviewed the favorable trends in regional cooperation in Southeast Asia and Thailand's leading role in furthering these developments. Particular note was taken of the accomplishments in the United Nations Economic Commission For Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and the Mekong Committee, to whose studies and projects they attach considerable importance, and of the evolution of several new

Southeast Asian organizations which raise hope for a new era of constructive common endeavor for a lasting peace and sustained progress of the area.

Referring to his speech at Johns Hopkins in April 1965, the President cited our support for Southeast Asian regional development as clear evidence of the United States continuing concern for and commitment to the nations of this region.

In particular, the Prime Minister reported to the President discussions held in New York with a US team headed by Mr. Eugene R. Black concerning the favorable outlook for the Pa Mong dam on the mainstream of the Mekong River. The President and the Prime Minister agreed on the importance of this project and the desirability of accelerating present project feasibility studies under the Mekong Committee.

In conclusion, Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn expressed his grateful appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to him and Thanpuying Chongkol as well as the members of their party by the President of the United States and for the warm and friendly welcome accorded them by the Government and the people of the United States.

May 9, 1968


4/10/68

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Thursday, May 9, 1968
3:45 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:



W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~ attachment

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI/RAC 00-408
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INFORMATION

54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, May 9, 1968
2:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

Another high level VC military
defector; his story; his attitude.

W. W. Rostow

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

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SANITIZED
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By is, NARA Date 3-29-80

WWRostow:rlm

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PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

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DIST 9 MAY 1968

$$\begin{array}{r} 1.5(c) \\ 3.4(b)(1) \end{array}$$

SOURCE: CAS DEBRIEFING

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1.5(c).
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(6)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1. THE SOURCE STATED THAT THE SECOND PHASE OF THE OFFENSIVE

WOULD LAST FOR A PERIOD OF SEVEN TO TEN DAYS BEGINNING ON 4
MAY. HE SAID THE VIET CONG (VC) HAD CONSIDERED THE PRESENT
TIME AS THE MOST APPROPRIATE TIME TO LAUNCH THE OFFENSIVE
BECAUSE OF THE INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM
(GVN) AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE GVN'S ALLIES. HE SAID THAT
THE SECOND PHASE OF THE OFFENSIVE WAS ALSO MEANT TO
ENHANCE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION AT THE FORTHCOMING PEACE
TALKS. (FIELD COMMENT: WHILE THE SOURCE DID NOT SAY SO DIRECTLY
HE IMPLIED THAT THE ALLIES PROBLEM WAS THAT THE U.S. PEOPLE
ARE NO LONGER SUPPORTING THE U.S. EFFORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM).

2. THE SOURCE SAID THAT PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN MAKING A
SUCCESS OF THE OFFENSIVE WERE VERY GREAT. AMONG THE DIFFICULTIES
THE SOURCE LISTED:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

A. THE SHEER DIFFICULTY OF ORGANIZING THE TROOPS TO CARRY OUT THE ATTACKS. HE SAID THAT THEY JUST DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH TROOPS TO TAKE AN OBJECTIVE, AND THEN TO EXPLOIT THEIR INITIAL SUCCESS. AND

B. SUPPLYING FOOD AND AMMUNITION WAS THE OTHER SERIOUS PROBLEM; NOT ONLY IN TERMS OF GETTING THE NEEDED SUPPLIES, BUT ALSO IN HAVING ENOUGH PEOPLE TO TRANSPORT THE SUPPLIES TO WHERE THEY ARE NEEDED.

3. THE SOURCE ESTIMATED THE STRENGTH OF HIS REGIMENT, THE [REDACTED] NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) REGIMENT [REDACTED] WAS ABOUT 1500 MEN. (FIELD COMMENT: THE SOURCE FIRST ESTIMATED THAT EACH OF THE REGIMENT'S THREE BATTALIONS HAD A STRENGTH OF 250 TO 300 MEN. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE REST OF THE REGIMENT'S MANPOWER WAS IN SAPPER AND RECONNAISSANCE UNITS).

4. THE SOURCE SAID THAT THE [REDACTED] WAS TO HAVE BEGUN OPERATIONS WHEN THE SECOND PHASE OF THE OFFENSIVE OPENED ON 4 MAY, BUT THAT BECAUSE OF ALLIED OPERATIONS THE [REDACTED] HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO BEGIN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. THE SOURCE STATED THAT THE [REDACTED] BATTALIONS OF THE [REDACTED] WERE TO ATTACK THE REGIONAL FORCES/POPULAR FORCES TRAINING CENTER AT [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

LAI THIEU, VIC XT 866060 AND THE TRAINING CENTER/REAR BASE OF THE 5TH ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) DIVISION'S 7TH, 8TH, AND 9TH REGIMENTS. HE SAID THAT THE [REDACTED] BATTALION WOULD GENERALLY BE IN RESERVE, BUT THAT IT WAS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR OPERATING IN THE AN SON REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AREA. THE SOURCE STATED THAT THE TOWNS OF LAI THIEU AND BUNG VIC XT 852100 COULD ALSO BE TARGETS OF THE [REDACTED] BETWEEN NOW AND THE 15TH OF MAY.

5. [REDACTED]

6. THE SOURCE STATED THAT THE MEN OF HIS REGIMENT

WANTED PEACE, BUT THAT THEY STILL PERFORMED THEIR

ASSIGNED MISSIONS IN A DECISIVE AND ENTHUSIASTIC FASHION.

THE SOURCE SAID THAT GVN PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS EFFECTED HIS

TROOPS VERY LITTLE BECAUSE THEY ARE WELL EDUCATED IDEOLOGICALLY.

HE SAID THAT LEAFLETS WHICH OFFERED A BONUS FOR CERTAIN ACTIONS

OR WHICH APPEALED TO FAMILY ATTACHMENTS HAD VERY LITTLE EFFECT,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

BECAUSE WHEN A MAN HAS AN IDEOLOGY TO FIGHT FOR AND WHEN HE HAS ESCAPED HIS FAMILY TIES HE WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT UNTIL HIS OBJECTIVE IS OBTAINED.

7. IN COMPARING THE GVN AND THE VC FORCES THE SOURCE SAID THAT THE VC FORCES MAKE UP FOR THE GVN'S SUPERIOR FIREPOWER WITH THEIR ENTHUSIASMS. HE SAID THAT WHILE THE GVN MAY CONTROL THE CITIES THE VC CONTROL THE COUNTRYSIDE. HE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS, SAYING THAT MANY PEOPLE HAVE MOVED INTO THE CITIES FROM THE COUNTRY AND THAT MANY PEOPLE NOW IN THE CITIES MAY BE MORE INCLINED TO THE VC THAN THE GVN BECAUSE OF FAMILY TIES. THE SOURCE ALSO OBSERVED THAT PEOPLE ARE SYMPATHETIC TOWARD THE VC BECAUSE THE VC ARE THE FORMER FIGHTERS AGAINST THE FRENCH. THE PRESENT GVN STRUCTURE IS VIEWED AS THE LEFTOVER OFFICIALS WHO FOUGHT FOR THE FRENCH.

8. THE SOURCE SAID THAT HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE ABOUT U.S.

PERSONS

OR WHERE THEY WERE DETAINED. HE STATED THAT

ANY U.S. TROOPS.

THEY HAD NOT CAPTURED

9. FIELD DISSEM; STATE USMACV 7TH AF CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

GROUP 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

51

Thurs., May 9, 1968
1:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I chatted with both Geoffrey Drummmond
(Roscoe was not available) and David Lawrence
on troop movements. They got the point
about Averell and Warsaw.

W. W. Restow

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INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Pres file

Thursday, May 9, 1968 -- 12:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an advance copy of Gen. Johnson's recommendation to the Sec. of Defense.

In this recommendation Gen. Johnson:

-- Supports CINCPAC's judgment that MIG's launched from or staging through Bai Thuong constitute a threat to our fighter bombers, our B-52's; regards as "reasonable" CINCPAC's request "to expend air-to-air ordnance and to conduct immediate armed pursuit of enemy aircraft between 19° and 20° north and to employ surface-to-air missiles against enemy aircraft south of 20° north latitude."

-- Recommends "that immediately following the initial meeting in Paris, CINCPAC be authorized to attack hostile aircraft between 19° and 20° north latitude, to employ surface-to-air missiles up to 20° north latitude and to attack the Bai Thuong Airfield in periods of good weather at such frequency as reconnaissance indicates is necessary to preclude its use by MIGs."

W. W. Restow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRestow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 7C9 91-31
By isp/rg, NARA, Date 6-25-92



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CM-3282-68
8 May 1968

54
56

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Operational Authorities in North Vietnam
Between 19° and 20° North Latitude

CINCPAC has advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the current prohibition against delivery of ordnance in North Vietnam north of 19° provides a sanctuary from which MIGs can launch attacks against US forces. He feels that MIGs launched from or staging through Bai Thuong Airfield can attack our forces and withdraw into the sanctuary north of 19°. Such a tactic possibly resulted in the loss of a US Navy aircraft on 7 May and could be used by the North Vietnamese in MIG strikes against our B-52s.

In view of this threat CINCPAC requests authority be granted to expend air-to-air ordnance and to conduct immediate armed pursuit of enemy aircraft between 19° and 20° north and to employ surface-to-air missiles against enemy aircraft south of 20° north latitude.

CINCPAC's recognition of this threat and the authorities he requests are, in my opinion, reasonable. Expenditure of air-to-air ordnance and immediate armed pursuit can be conducted with the assistance of radar control with little risk of ordnance delivery north of 20°. The reliability and command destruct capability of the surface-to-air missiles are sufficiently high to entail little risk by permitting their use between 19° and 20°. The airfield at Bai Thuong has a minimum operational capability. The runway has a minimum length of usable surface, and the immediate sod area adjacent to the runway has apparently supported jet operations in the past. While CINCPAC has an immediate (about 30 minutes) capability to strike the airfield, it would be accomplished without timely reconnaissance by diversion of aircraft en route to another target area, and that, in my judgment, would entail an undesirable risk of inadvertent violation of the 20° restriction, since the airfield is only 6 miles south of 20°. The airfield can be attacked on a planned basis supported by timely reconnaissance in good weather with little, if any, risk of a violation.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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Authority 719 91-130

By cop/19, NARA, Date 6-25-92

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Page 1 of 2 Pages

~~TOP SECRET~~

Therefore, I recommend that immediately following the initial meeting in Paris, CINCPAC be authorized to attack hostile aircraft between 19° and 20° north latitude, to employ surface-to-air missiles up to 20° north latitude and to attack the Bai Thuong Airfield in periods of good weather at such frequency as reconnaissance indicates is necessary to preclude its use by MIGs.

HAROLD K. JOHNSON
General, U.S.A.
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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Page 2 of 2 Pages

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, May 9, 1968
11:45 a. m.

File
57

MR. PRESIDENT:

You should know the following.

Dick Helms tells me that at noon they will be getting out a CIA paper which indicates that there are movements of Soviet troops in Poland in the direction of the Czech border.

Diplomatic officers in Poland are being kept off the highways.

I shall keep you informed.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-156
By cl, NARA, Date 1-5-95

the file
58

Thursday, May 9, 1968
11:20 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Westmoreland proposes (and Bunker supports) an arrangement whereby Westy would send to Paris every two weeks or so a carefully selected officer who is living with the Vietnam situation. The purpose: to assure that the delegation's view of the situation in Vietnam is not colored by press reports, etc. Westy would rotate these officers every two weeks or so to make sure that the one in Paris was always current.

Secretary Rusk is inclined to think this is a good idea. We are checking with Clifford and Wheeler in Brussels.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-333
By us, NARA Date 9-8-98



Department of State

TELEGRAM

58a

~~SECRET~~

ACTION COPY

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DE RUMJIR 26832 1301205

ZNY: SSSSS ZZH

O 091115Z ZFF-4

FM ANEMBASSY SAIGON.

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2294

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BT

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 26832

1982Q

1968 MAY 9 AM 8:11

Rostow

NODIS

FOR RUSK AND CLIFFORD FROM BUNKER

1. I HAVE JUST HEARD THAT BILL SULLIVAN IS GOING TO PARIS, WHICH I VERY MUCH WELCOME. I AM VERY BOTHERED, HOWEVER, THAT NO HIGH LEVEL MILITARY OFFICER FROM HERE THOROUGHLY CONVERSANT WITH AND UP TO DATE ON THE WHOLE MILITARY SITUATION HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE STAFF TO HELP AVERELL AND CY INTERPRET WHAT IS GOING ON HERE. MILITARY REPORTS FROM HERE TO PARIS AS INTERPRETED BY THOSE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE WHOLE SITUATION, PLUS PRESS ACCOUNTS CAN BE CONFUSING AND MISLEADING, AND LEAD TO UNJUSTIFIED DISCOURAGEMENT. THE PICTURE AS VIEWED FROM HERE IS SOMETIMES DIFFERENT FROM THAT VIEWED IN WASHINGTON AND PARIS, AND ELEMENTS OF STRENGTH IN OUR SITUATION ARE OFTEN OBSCURED BY THE DAILY NEWS.

2. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND WHO PROPOSES THE FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENT. HE WOULD SEND TO PARIS EVERY TWO WEEKS OR SO A CAREFULLY SELECTED OFFICER WHO IS LIVING WITH THE VIET-NAM SITUATION, WHO WOULD HAVE KNOWLEDGE IN DEPTH AND BE FULLY ABREAST OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. OFFICER WOULD BE RELIEVED ON STATION BY THE SUCCEEDING OFFICER. WESTMORELAND WOULD VISUALIZE SOME FOUR TO SIX HIGHLY QUALIFIED OFFICERS FOR THESE ASSIGNMENTS WHO WOULD BE TAKEN FROM THEIR NORMAL DUTIES.

BUNKER

BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-331

By us, NARA Date 3-7-99

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Thursday, May 9, 1968
10:50 a. m.

57

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: North Vietnamese Use of Bai Thuong Airfield

We have gone back over the material received in the Situation Room over the past few days to see if there is any evidence the North Vietnamese are using Bai Thuong Airfield. Using only intercepted North Vietnamese communications, I find strong evidence that they are not only flying into the airfield, but are using it as a staging base to engage U. S. aircraft on their missions over southern North Vietnam.

The Bai Thuong Airfield is located approximately 18 miles northwest of Thanh Hoa about 5 miles south of the 20th parallel.

I have attached the NSA reports which can be summarized as follows:

On May 5 and May 7, Bai Thuong was one of the recipients of reports on U. S. aircraft carrier positions and take-off times of Navy aircraft.

On May 7, two MIG-21's were noted taking off from Bai Thuong in reaction to U. S. aircraft. They remained under control of the airfield and were ordered to attack by the airfield controller. After an engagement in which one U. S. aircraft was shot down, the MIG's returned to Bai Thuong, evidently refueled, and then flew to Phuc Yen.

On May 8, three MIG-21's and two MIG-17's were reflected in round trip flights from the Hanoi area to Bai Thuong.

On May 9, Hanoi informed both Bai Thuong and Vinh of possible U. S. air activity in the Vinh area. At 6:30 a. m. EDT this morning, two U. S. aircraft engaged three MIG's in the Vinh area and reported possibly hitting one.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~ attachments

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-408
By cbm, NARA, Date 2-28-03

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RUMSAL/SEVENTH AIR FORCE
RUHHABA/CINCPACAF
RUMOTLA/COMUSMACTHAI
RUMTBK/AMEMB. BANKOK
RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC
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RUABBS/JOINT SOBE PROCESSING CENTER
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47253*-/AFSCC SAN ANTONIO

1968 MAY 9 13 22

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-322
By us, NARA Date 3-3-98

PAGE 7: 47.17S 129-~~SECRET LIMBS~~ NOFORN EXCEPT AUSTRALIA
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~~SECRET LIMBS~~ JPCCO NOFORN EXCEPT AUSTRALIA
JOPREP JIFFY/CTG 77.5/OPREP-3/PINNACLE/006 (U)

A. REFERENCE

A1. MIG ENGAGEMENT

A2. 09 MAY 68

A.3. SERIAL 005 CH-1

H. PILOT/RIO DEBRIEF OF TWO ENT F4 INVOLVED PROVIDES FOL INFO:

H1. CORRECT MY SERIAL 005 AS FOL: VISUAL IDENT NOT MADE, BUT
POSITIVE HOSTILE CONFIRMED.

H2. SHOWTIME 611 FIRED TWO SPARROWS IN HEAD ON RUN. ONE MISSILE
OBSERVED TO GUIDE WELL. SECOND MISSILE DIVERGED DOWNWARD. IMPACTS
NOT OBSERVED.

H3. APPROX ONE MINUTE LATER SHOWTIME 602 FIRED ONE SPARROW IN HEAD ON
RUN AT SECOND TARGET. MISSILE OBSERVED TO GUIDE WELL. IMPACT
OBSERVED. SMOKE PERSISTED AFTER IMPACT.

H4. HOSTILE ACFT ALT 14 THOUSAND CLOSURE RATE 1100 KTS2 DEEPEST
PENETRATION HOSTILES 18-23N4 FIRING POINT VIC 13-45N8 105-25E3.

H5. ADDITIONAL INFO BY OPREP 4 THIS IS FINAL OPREP 3. GP-3

BT

~~SECRET LIMBS~~

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ZEM

h 090538Z ZYH

F1 [REDACTED]

-25x3

TO OSCAR TWO/NOVEMBER ALFA

ZEM

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

YMMENBQIF 09058

-25x3

21 [REDACTED] R103-68

-25x3

FOIA 3/PL 86-38

(CALL TIMES ZULU)

FOLLOW-UP NUMBER ONE AND FINAL TO USA-32'S SPOT REPORT

-25x3

21 [REDACTED] R103-68, DTG: 080706Z MAY 1.

DRV MIGS IN ROUND TRIP FLIGHTS FROM PHUC YEN AND HANOI
GIA LAM TO BAI THUONG ON 08 MAY.

XXCC

ON 08 MAY, BETWEEN 0610 AND 0954, THREE DRV MIG-21'S
FROM PHUC YEN AND TWO DRV MIG-17'S FROM HANOI GIA LAM
WERE REFLECTED BY DRV TACTICAL AIR AND AIR SURVEILLANCE
FACILITIES IN ROUND TRIP FLIGHTS TO BAI THUONG AIR-
FIELD.

BETWEEN 0610 AND 0626, TWO VIET-PILOTED, GIA LAM-
BASED MIG-17'S PERFORMED AN INTER-AIRFIELD FLIGHT FROM
HANOI GIA LAM TO BAI THUONG. SHORTLY AFTER THE MIG-17'S
HAD ARRIVED AT BAI THUONG, TWO BAI THUONG CONTROLLERS
WERE NOTED MAKING PREPARATIONS FOR THREE MIG-21'S TO
ARRIVE AT THEIR AIRFIELD.

BEGINNING AT 0640, TWO MIG-21'S FROM PROBABLY PHUC
YEN WERE INITIALLY REFLECTED ON A SOUTHERLY
HEADING TOWARD BAI THUONG. THE MIGS CONTINUED ON TO BAI
THUONG, WHERE BOTH AIRCRAFT LANDED BY 0732. SHORTLY
AFTER THE MIGS HAD LANDED, THE BAI THUONG TOWER CON-
TROLLER INSTRUCTED THE WINGMAN "TELL (THE FLIGHT LEADER)
HE CANNOT TAKE OFF UNLESS HE TAXIS TO THE WEST END,"
PROBABLY INDICATING THE AIRCRAFT WERE TO TAKE OFF SHORT-
LY THEREAFTER AND POSSIBLY RETURN TO PHUC YEN.

LATER, BETWEEN 0810 AND 0830, TWO MIG-21'S FROM,
PROBABLY PHUC YEN, ONE FLOWN BY ONE OF THE PILOTS WHO HAD
FLOWN TO BAI THUONG IN THE LATE 0600 HOUR, WERE RELECT-
ED IN A SOUTHERLY FLIGHT TOWARD BAI THUONG AIRFIELD. THE
MIGS CONTINUED TO A SOUTHERNMOST POINT OF 1935N-10523E,
18NM SOUTH-SOUTHWEST OF BAI THUONG, AT 0821 BEFORE RE-
VERSING COURSE AND RETURNING TO PROBABLY PHUC YEN. THE
LAST REFLECTED POSITION OF THESE MIGS WAS APPROXIMATELY
15NM SOUTHEAST OF HANOI AT 0830.

AT 0936, THE SAME TWO MIG-17 PILOTS WHO FLEW TO BAI
THUONG DURING THE 0600 HOUR, WERE REFLECTED DEPARTING
BAI THUONG AND SUBSEQUENTLY RETURNING TO HANOI GIA LAM,
WHERE THE AIRCRAFT LANDED BY 0954. JUST AS THE MIGS
WERE LANDING AT GIA LAM, THE KEP AIRFIELD CONTROLLER
QUERIED THE FLIGHT LEADER, "ARE YOU GOING TO COME TO KEP
AT ALL," TO WHICH THE FLIGHT LEADER REPLIED "I AM NOT
GOING THERE AT ALL."

XXHH

435

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-141-022-001/20

By jc NARA, Date 11-2-09

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

NNNN

No Objection To Declassification 2003/05/22 : NLJ-141-022-1-20-1

NNNNVZCZCCRI683

*****ZZ RUEADWW

DE RUEOJFA A568 130114J

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FM CTG SEVEN SEVEN PT FIVE

TO RUEOJFA/NMCC

RUHKA/CINCPAC

RUHKB/CINCPACFLT

INFO RUHGUL/COMSEVENTHFLT

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ZEN/CTG SEVEN SSVEN PT ZERO

ALL CVA TG CDRS TF SEVEN SEVEN

RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV

RUMSAL/SEVENTH AIR FORCE

NRUHHABA/CINCPACAF

RUMOTLA/COMUSMACTHAI

RUMTBK/AMEMB BANGKOK

RUWJMUA/COMNAVAIRPAC

RUCSAAA/CINCSAC

RUABBS/JOINT SOBE PROCESSING CENTER

RUMUHFA/DOD SPECREP MACV

RUMUHFA/COMUSMACV JRCC

RUWTEJA/AFSCC SAN ANTONIO

Flash

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

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1968 MAY 9 11 49

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-322

By is, NARA Date 3-3-98

PAGE 2 RUMFUD 121 ~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS JPCCO NOFORN EXCEPT AUSTRALIA

RUMFKRE/CTE SEVEN ZERO PT TWO PT ONE PT ONE

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~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS JPCCO NOFORN EXCEPT AUSTRALIA

NUOPREP JIFFY/CHG 77.5/OPREP-3/PINNACLE/005 (U)

A. REFERENCE

A1. MIG ENGAGEMENTIN

A2. 09 MAY 68

H. ESTIMATED THREE HOSTILE ACFT DETECTED PROCEEDING SOUTH BELOW 19N0 WEPE INTERCEPTED VIC VINH BY ENTERPRISE F4 TARCAP AT TIME 091030Z3. POSITIVE VISUAL IDENT AS HOSTILE. THREE MISSILES REPORTED FIRED BY CAP. ONE MISSILE SEEN TO DETONATE. HOSTILES RETURNED NMRTN OF 19N0. RESULTS OF ENGAGEMENT UNDETERMINED AT THIS TIME.

H1. AMPLIFYING INFO TO FOLLOW IN PILOT DEBRIAF

GP-3

BT

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59d

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WHCA

1968 MAY 9 08 32

FOIA-3/PL 86-36

VVZCZCKAA678ZIA063REB322

ZZ [REDACTED]
DE [REDACTED] 656 1300825
Z 090822Z ZYH
FM DIRNSA
TO WHITE HOUSE
INFO STATE/RCI
CIA
DIA/ISIC (PASS TO DDO NMCC)
ZEM
Z 090752Z ZYH
FM [REDACTED]
TO OSCAR TWO/NOVEMBER ALFA
ZEM

NSA-25x3

NSA-25x3

NSA-25x3

~~SECRET SAVIN~~
XXMMENP01F [REDACTED] 09058
2/ [REDACTED] R190-68

SPOT REPORT
(ALL TIMES ZULU)
POSSIBLE IMPENDING HOSTILE ACTIVITY IN VINH AREA
XXCC
DECRYPTIONS OF MESSAGES PASSED OVER THE DRV AIR
OPERATIONS NET BETWEEN CONTROL AT HANOI BAC MAI AND ITS
OUTSTATIONS AT PAI THOUNG AND VINH FROM 0031Z TO 0646Z
ON 9 MAY GIVES EVIDENCE TO POSSIBLE IMPENDING HOSTILE
ACTIVITY IN THE VINH AREA AGAINST ALLIED FORCES DESCRIBED
AS "CHOOSE/SELECT [REDACTED] ENEMY UNEXPECTED." PRESENTLY
IT APPEARS THAT ALTHOUGH PREPARATIONS WERE TO BE
COMPLETED BY 0300Z, THEY WERE NOT IN FACT PREPARED
BY THE TIME OF THE URGENT MESSAGE (0646Z). THE EXACT
NATURE OF THE DIFFICULTY IS NOT KNOWN, ALTHOUGH AT THE
PRESENT TIME IT SEEMS THAT THE MAIN PROBLEM IS
IN THE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, POSSIBLY AT THANOI.
A REFERENCE TO FOUR POSSIBLY NINE MIG-17'S WAS ALSO
NOTED. MESSAGES PASSED FROM VINH TO HANOI INDICATED
THE THE WEATHER WAS FAVORABLE.

NSA-25x3

XXHH
303

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

NNNN

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ 141.022-001/21
By jc NARA, Date 11-2-09

~~SECRET SAVING~~RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 MAY 8 23 05

FOIA-3/PL 86-36

VVZCZCKAA652ZIA019REB280

00 [REDACTED] 770 1292224

O 082220Z ZYH

FM DIRNSA

TO WHITE HOUSE

INFO STATE/RCI

CIA

DIA/ISIC (PASS TO DDO, NMCC)

ZEM

O 081442Z ZYH

FM [REDACTED]

TO OSCAR TWO/NOVEMBER BRAVO

ZEM

~~SECRET SAVING~~

XXMMENP01 [REDACTED] 08058

21 [REDACTED] 0188-68

NSA-25x3

NSA-25x3

NSA-25x3

FOIA-3/PL 86-36

((ALL TIMES ZULU))

DRV AWARENESS OF U.S. CARRIERS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN
XXCC

ON 05 MAY AT 0223 AND AGAIN ON 07 MAY AT 0001N
HANOI BAC MAI, CONTROL OF THE DRV AIR OPERATIONS NET,
WAS NOTED PASSING POSITION REPORTS ON THE THREE U.S.
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN TO ITS OUT-
STATIONS AT BAI THUONG, VINH, AND ANOTHER UNIDENT-
IFIED OUTSTATION. THESE POSITION REPORTS WERE
PASSED IN TERMS OF RANGE AND DIRECTION FROM CITIES
IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE DRV.

A SHORT TIME AFTER THE POSITION MESSAGES WERE
PASSED, CONTROL AGAIN BECAME ACTIVE AND BEGAN PASS-
ING MESSAGES CONTAINING TAKE-OFF TIMES OF U.S.
(PROBABLY NAVY) AIRCRAFT.

COMMENTS: THIS IS THE FIRST KNOWN SIGINT REFLECTIONS
OF AIRCRAFT CARRIER'S POSITIONS BEING PASSED OVER THE
AIR OPERATIONS NET. THIS SAME NET WAS NOTED PASSING
TIMELY INFORMATION TO HANOI CONCERNING THE NVN
AN-2 ATTACK AGAINST PHA THI, LAOS (20-26N 103-43E) ON
12 JANUARY 1968 AND MORE RECENTLY THE FLIGHTS BY DRV
TRANSPORTS INTO THE SOUTHERN DRV AND PROBABLY INTO
SOUTH VIETNAM DURING FEBRUARY 1968. INTERESTINGLY,
DRV MIG AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN NOTED RECENTLY DEPLOYING
TO BOTH VINH AND BAI THUONG. REFERENCE: [REDACTED] SPOT
REPORT 21 [REDACTED] R05-68 DTG 130437 JAN AND FOLLOW-UPS
THERETO; USA-32 SPOT REPORT 21 [REDACTED] R45-68 DTG 271000
FEB AND FOLLOW-UPS THERETO; AND USA-32 SPOT REPORT
21 [REDACTED] R99-68 DTG 291310 APRIL AND FOLLOW-UPS THERETO.

XXHH
320

NSA-25x3

NSA-25x3

NSA-25x3

NSA-25x3

SANITIZED

Authority: NLJ-141-022-061/22
By: JC, NARA; Date: 11-2-09

~~SECRET SAVING~~

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WHCAVVZCZCKA631ZIE86975A172
1968 MAY 8 17 16

FOIA-3/PL 86-36

724 1291606

081604Z ZYH

M DIRNSA

O WHITE HOUSE

INFO STATE/RCI

IA

IA/ISIC (PASS TO DDO NMCC)

FM

003513Z ZYH

M

O OSCAR TWO/NOVEMBER ALFA

FM

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

OYMEMPOIS 0305

0107-69

(ALL TIMES ZUL)

FOLLOW-UP NUMBER TWO AND FINAL SUMMARY TO USA-32'S SPOT

REPORT 2/0110-68, DTG: 07020 MAY 68.

SHOOTDOWN OF U.S. AIRCRAFT BY DRV MIG-21 NEAR VINH ON 07

MAY.

OCCC

BETWEEN 0700 AND 0730 ON 07 MAY, DRV TACTICAL AIR
AND AIR SURVEILLANCE FACILITIES REFLECTED AN ENGAGEMENT
AND SUBSEQUENT SHOOTDOWN OF A U.S. AIRCRAFT NEAR VINH BY
ONE OF TWO DRV MIG-21'S.

AT 0700 TWO VIET-PILOLED MIG-21'S TOOK OFF FROM BAI
THUONG AND WERE VECTORED SOUTH-SOUTHEAST TOWARD HOSTILE
AIRCRAFT. AT 0713, THE MIG PILOTS REVERSED COURSE AND
REPORTED SIGHTING THE HOSTILES. AT THIS TIME, (THE ATTACK
ORDER WAS GIVEN BY THE BAI THUONG AIRFIELD CONTROLLER).
WHILE AN UNIDENTIFIED CONTROLLER ORDERED, "PAY ATTENTION
AND START THE MISSION," HOWEVER, BEFORE THE MIGS COULD
ATTACK, THE PILOTS APPARENTLY LOST SIGHT OF THE HOSTILES.
AFTER ORBITING IN THE AREA, THE FLIGHT LEADER INFORMED
HIS WINGMAN THAT HE HAD NOT FIRED ANY MISSILES. THE IN-
TERCEPTORS THEN COMMENCED A HOLDING PATTERN UNTIL 0728,
WHEN THEY WERE VECTORED TOWARD FOUR HOSTILES, 21.7NM TO
THE FRONT. AT 0731 ONE MIG PILOT REPORTED VISUAL CON-
TACT WITH FOUR F4'S; HOWEVER SHORTLY AFTERWARD, HE RE-
PORTED LOSING SIGHT OF THEM. AIR SURVEILLANCE TRACKING
REVEALS THAT THE MIGS WERE AT THEIR SOUTHERNMOST POINT
(1932N-10511E) AT THIS TIME. THREE MINUTES LATER THE
WINGMAN, WHILE FLYING ON A HEADING OF 360 DEGREES, AGAIN
REPORTS SIGHTING ONE HOSTILE AIRCRAFT AND SUBSEQUENTLY
ENGAGED IT. DRV AIR SURVEILLANCE TRACKING INDICATES THE
ENGAGEMENT OCCURRED AT 0735; AT 1924N-10532E AT 0736, THE
PILOT STATED "ONE AIRCRAFT IS BURNING ALREADY."
THE MIGS THEN ASSUMED A NORTHERLY HEADING, AND THE WINGMAN
REPORTED THAT HE HAD "SHOT ONE AIRCRAFT INTO FLAMES".
FIRING TWO MISSILES.

NSA-25x3

NSA-25x3

NSA-25x3

68 MAY 8 PM 1:26

WEDNESDAY

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 141-022-001/23
By NARA, Date 1-2-09

PRESERVATION COPY

WHILE CONTINUING TOWARD BAI THUONG, THE
IGS WERE INFORMED OF TWO OTHER MIG-21'S FLYING IN THE
BAI THUONG AREA. BOTH MIGS SUBSEQUENTLY LANDED AT BAI
THUONG BY 0750, WITH FUEL REMAINDERS OF 400 AND 300
LITERS.

DURING THIS SAME TIME FRAME TWO VIET-PILOTED PHUC
YEN-BASED MIG-21'S WERE ACTIVE IN DEFENSIVE PATROL SOUTH-
WEST OF PHUC YEN. THE MIGS WERE CONTINUOUSLY ADVISED OF
THE HOSTILES' POSITION, BUT THE INTERCEPTORS EXHIBITED NO
HOSTILE INTENT. THE LAST REFLECTION OF THESE AIRCRAFT
WAS AT 0743, WHEN THEY WERE NOTED LINING UP ON A PHUC YEN
RADIO BEACON.

LATER ON 07 MAY, BETWEEN 0931 AND 0948, THE SAME
PILOTS ACTIVE IN THE 0700 HOUR ENGAGEMENT, WERE REFLECTED
IN AN INTER-AIRFIELD FLIGHT FROM BAI THUONG TO PHUC
YEN. AFTER TAKING OFF FROM BAI THUONG AT 0933, THE MIGS
ASSUMED A NORTHEASTERLY HEADING TOWARD PHUC YEN. AT 0941,
A PHUC YEN CONTROLLER INFORMED THE FLIGHT LEADER THAT HIS
DISTANCE TO PHUC YEN WAS 43NM. THE AIRCRAFT CONTINUED
TOWARD PHUC YEN, WHERE THEY LANDED AFTER 0948.

COMMENTS: THE TWO MIG-21 PILOTS INVOLVED IN THE ENGAGE-
MENT DURING THE 0700 HOUR AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, THE INTER-
AIRFIELD FLIGHT DURING THE 0900 HOUR ARE THE SAME MIG-21
PILOTS WHO DEPLOYED TO VINH CON 23 APRIL AND WHO ARE CON-
SIDERED TO BE TWO OF THE MOST PROFICIENT PILOTS IN THE
DRV AIR FORCE. (SEE [REDACTED] SPOT FOLLOW-UPS TO 24 [REDACTED]
299-68, DTG: 291310 APRIL 68) THE FLIGHT OF THESE
PILOTS FROM VINH TO BAI THUONG WAS NOT REFLECTED IN
SIGINT.

OPERATIONAL DATA CONFIRMS THE LOSS OF AN F4B
(SILVERKILE 210) DURING THIS TIME FRAME.

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652

NSA-25X3

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

PRESERVATION COI

Thursday, May 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Free file

SUBJECT: Loan to the Korean Reconstruction Bank

Attached is a Zwick-Gaud request for your approval to proceed with a \$15 million loan to the Korean Reconstruction Bank, the major source of development finance for Korean industry. The Bank has helped spur the rapid growth of the manufacturing sector, which increased output by 18% in 1966 and 22% in 1967.

The Korean Government will increase its own subscription to the Bank by \$23 million.

The proposed loan would be the last AID loan to Korea in FY 1968 for a total of \$30 million, as against \$61 million last year.

Proceeds from this loan are to be used exclusively to buy machinery, equipment and services in the United States. Treasury agrees that the loan would have a minimum adverse effect on the U.S. balance of payments.

State also concurs in the loan.

I recommend that you approve the proposed loan.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

cc: Mr. Jorden

AJ:mm

1509
602

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

April 22, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: \$15 million loan to the Korean Reconstruction Bank

Bill Gaud requests your approval to proceed with a \$15 million loan to the Korean Reconstruction Bank. The loan will help finance investment by medium size industrial firms.

The Korean Reconstruction Bank is the major source of development finance for Korean industry. It has helped spur the rapid growth of the manufacturing sector which increased output by 18% in 1966 and 22% in 1967.

This is the third U.S. loan to the Reconstruction Bank. Germany, Japan, and the IBRD have also helped finance Korea's development banks. The Korean Government will increase its capital subscription to the Bank by the local currency equivalent of \$23 million. To assure mobilization of private capital, at least 35% of the cost of a project financed by the Bank is furnished by the borrower.

The proposed loan would be the last AID loan to Korea in FY 1968 for a total of \$30 million, a decline from \$61 million last year.

Balance of Payments

Proceeds from this loan will be used exclusively to buy machinery, equipment, and services in the U.S. Commodities and projects will be selected to assure a follow-on potential for commercial exports from the U.S. Secretary Fowler agrees that this loan will have a minimum adverse effect on the U.S. balance of payments.


Military Expenditures

In the recent memorandum on Supporting Assistance and P.L. 480 programs for Korea, I reviewed U.S. assistance

and Korea's military expenditures with respect to the Symington amendment. Korea is not diverting our aid or its own resources to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development. Korea is specifically exempted from the provisions of the Conte-Long amendment.

Recommendation

I recommend that you approve the proposed loan.


Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

1301
e b

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

APR 12 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: New Project Approval: Third Loan to the Korean Reconstruction Bank

I recommend that you authorize me to proceed with a \$15 million loan to Korea for the Korean Reconstruction Bank (KRB). The KRB, a government Bank, is the major source of development loans in Korea. This loan will finance capital input for its private sector customers with its proceeds used exclusively to buy machinery, equipment, and services in the United States. Three million dollars will be earmarked for fishery loans with, however, the explicit understanding that no vessels financed under the loan will operate in the North Pacific.

This is the third A.I.D. loan to the KRB. A \$5 million loan was authorized in 1962 and a \$12 million loan in 1966. The KRB has demonstrated its ability to process subloans satisfactorily; we expect that our earlier loans will be fully committed by the end of this month. KRB has also been the recipient of a DM20 million (\$5 million) German loan which has been fully committed.

The Korean Government's policy is to provide through intermediate lending institutions the funds needed to accelerate the development of private medium and small enterprises, with emphasis on export oriented industries. We endorse this policy.

This loan will be part of a full range of A.I.D. financing for Korea's private industries. We recently authorized in collaboration with the World Bank, and private U.S., Japanese and European banks, a \$5 million loan to the Korean Development Finance Corporation, a newly formed private development banking institution. A.I.D. previously provided assistance to the Medium Industry Bank for subloans to smaller firms. A.I.D. development loans will continue to be available for large projects; at the other end of the spectrum, program loans finance individual equipment items, spare parts and machinery from the U. S.

We estimate that for the next three years Korean small and medium concerns will require \$75 million annually in imported capital goods. A.I.D. funds can only fill a portion of this need, but Japanese and German loans are also helping.

The Korean Government is doing its share by contributing to the capitalization of the development banks. It has agreed to bring its total capital participation in KRB to ₩20 billion (\$74 million) by 1971, and it also lends substantial local funds to the KRB and other development banks on soft terms.


Self-help will be also undertaken by Korean firms in the form of local currency contributions necessary to complete the subloan projects and of financial and managerial improvements necessary to meet subloan criteria. To strengthen its own operations, the KRB is implementing the recommendations of A. T. Kearney and Company, a United States consulting firm, and Arthur Young and Company, a United States certified public accountant firm, which performed a complete financial audit of the bank.

Since September 1966, consultations with the KRB and Medium Industry Bank have shaped the pattern of financing of medium and small industry under A.I.D. loans towards those industries that have a greater follow-on potential for exports from the United States. In 1967, the United States share of Korean commercial imports increased from a previous level of 5% to 6% to approximately 13%. This indicates that A.I.D. loans, such as the proposed loan, do not displace United States commercial exports, but help United States exporters to gain a larger share of an expanding market.

The proposed loan will be the third loan to be authorized for Korea in this fiscal year. It will follow the December 1967 authorization of \$5 million for the Korean Development Finance Corporation and a \$10 million program loan.

Korea is specifically exempted from the provisions of the Conte-Long Amendment (Sec. 119 of the Appropriation Act). State and A.I.D. have reviewed Korean actions under the Symington Amendment (Sec. 620 (s) of the Foreign Assistance Act) and have concluded that Korea is not diverting U.S. development assistance or P.L. 480 sales to military purposes nor is Korea diverting its own resources to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development. The supporting analysis is contained in the attachment.

Recommendation: That you authorize me to proceed with this loan.


William S. Gaud

Attachment:
As Stated

ATTACHMENT

Review of Korean actions under Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended (the Symington Amendment)

State and A.I.D. have reviewed Korean actions under the Symington Amendment and have concluded that Korea is not diverting U.S. development assistance or P.L. 480 sales to military purposes. They also determined that Korea is not diverting its own resources to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development. The Country Team concurs. The following points were among those taken into account in reaching this conclusion:

1. It is United States policy to assist South Korea in developing the capability to defend itself from Communist attack from the north and to counter Communist attempts at internal subversion. We also support South Korean contributions to regional mutual security efforts in Southeast Asia. At present South Korea has 48,000 troops participating in the allied war effort in South Vietnam. Substantial military expenditures are necessary to support these objectives, and we are contributing to the Korean defense budget to help them finance these costs.

2. Korean defense budget expenditures as a percent of GNP have risen only slightly from 3.7% in 1965 to 3.9% in 1967. For the period 1966-1967 these expenditures were 3.95% of GNP, the median for the region.

3. Korean defense budget expenditures as a percent of central government expenditures have declined from 31.9% in 1964 to 23.3% in 1967. These expenditures as a percent of central government expenditures were 23.55% for the period 1966-1967, only slightly above the median for the region of 21.7%.

4. U.S. military budget support derived from P.L. 480 and Supporting Assistance proceeds has been decreasing, and at the same time the Koreans have been increasing their own military expenditures. The self-financed portion of the Korean defense budget has increased from 38.1% in 1965 to 49.4% in 1967. However, these expenditures have remained

relatively stable as a percent of total central government expenditures: 11.7% in 1965 as compared to 11.1% in 1967. Korean self-financed defense expenditures as a percent of GNP have risen only slightly from 1.4% in 1965 to 1.9% in 1967.

5. Over the same period of 1965-1967 Korea has made spectacular economic progress. Annual growth in real GNP has averaged about 10%.

6. Annual foreign exchange purchases of military items were less than \$1 million over the period 1965 to 1967 and accounted for a negligible portion of the defense budget. Korean requirements for imports of military equipment have been provided under the Military Assistance Program.

SECRET/NODIS

Thursday, May 9, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith a capsule of Bunker's 50th weekly report:

Pres. file

A. General

- Agreement on Paris accepted without enthusiasm.
- GVN feels it should be viewed as major participant in talks.
- GVN reconciled to presence of NLF at talks on Hanoi's side.
- With withdrawal of NVN troops and with international guarantees, GVN would accept "one man, one vote."
- We must keep GVN fully and frankly informed.

B. Military

- Widespread attacks aimed at bolstering enemy position in Paris.
- Allies were prepared for attacks, which have been unimpressive.
- We should contrast our peace efforts with VC attacks.

C. Government Actions

- Thieu plans small war cabinet with Huong as Prime Minister.
- Government to be broadened with important political figures.
- Police Commander Loan to be shifted.
- Decree signed setting up Ky's civil defense machinery.

D. Pacification

- Few pacification losses during recent attacks.
- Komer outlines pacification priorities to Thieu.
- More province and district chiefs to be replaced.

E. Mobilization

- Present draft mobilization bill could hurt pacification.
- U. S. urges mobilization cover all paramilitary forces.

F. Urban Recovery

- Thieu's directive spurs better resettlement results.

G. Economic

- Most food supplies still ample in Saigon despite attacks.
- Rice trade remains abnormally low.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18, NARA, Date 6-5-92

W. W. R.

SECRET/NODIS

Thursday, May 9, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 26826)

Herewith my fiftieth weekly message:

A. General

Last week, two events very largely preempted attention here. The first was the announcement on the agreement of Paris as a site for contacts. The second was the widespread attacks which began on the night of May 4-5, only two of which were significant.

The agreement on Paris was accepted by the Government of Vietnam without enthusiasm although considered far preferable to either Phnom Penh or Warsaw. The lack of enthusiasm for Paris is due to the widespread feeling that South Vietnam was abandoned by the French in 1954, that De Gaulle has been highly partisan in his attitude toward the war, and that the French have ambitions to regain influence in Indo-China. Nevertheless, Thieu and South Vietnamese leaders in general are now quite prepared to go along with Paris as the site for preliminary talks, but will be watching to see how the French handle things before having a final view on whether it should be the site for substantive negotiations. I believe your decision to hold out against Warsaw was a wise one because of its effect both here and in Hanoi. Here, it has given the Vietnamese confidence that we are not so eager for a settlement that we will allow ourselves to be pushed around by the Communists. Hanoi knew from the outset that Phnom Penh and Warsaw were unacceptable to us. It is a good beginning to let them know that we do not propose to go to negotiations from a position of weakness and that we can be as determined and patient as Hanoi.

In our discussions with the Government of Vietnam, it is apparent that as we enter preliminary talks, our problems will revolve particularly around the question of the role of the National Liberation Front, both in negotiations and in the eventual political settlement.

Some concern was also expressed on two points regarding the "no advantage" formula:

1. How violations of the formula could be ascertained and established; and
2. Concern that with the current high rate of infiltration, the enemy would derive major military advantages from delay in agreeing on a site and a stringing out of preliminary talks.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7129/ICBS 10
By WJH, NARA, Date 6-5-92

On the first point, I think we were able to convince them that with continuing reconnaissance and our combined intelligence resources, we should be able to ascertain any violations. On the second point, I pointed out that with the DMZ foreclosed as an avenue of infiltration, with the monsoon in Laos now breaking, and with continued interdiction of infiltration routes through Laos, infiltration should be substantially reduced.

On the matter of substantive talks, "participation" is a highly sensitive problem. It is apparent that for domestic political reasons, the question of their own legitimacy, and the impression created abroad, the Government of Vietnam places great importance on being publicly recognized as the major participant on "our side". While I believe that essentially we are both talking about an "our side, your side" formula, which is not too precisely defined, the Government is less concerned about procedures than about their being accepted as a spokesman on "our side" to whom Hanoi must listen and talk. They seem reconciled to the National Liberation Front being present and speaking under a formula in which one side would be Saigon and its friends (which they understand to be the U. S. representing all other allies) and the other side would be Hanoi and whomever it chooses.

While their views on a political settlement are obviously very preliminary, they expressed the view that, assuming there is a verified and enforceable withdraw of North Vietnamese Armed Forces and effective international guarantees against renewed infiltration of military forces, equipment, and supplies, the Government is prepared to accept whatever risk there may be under the concept of "one man, one vote." In their view, this would involve the National Liberation Front accepting constitutional methods and cutting its ties to the north. While they envisage that guerrillas and political cadre will remain to carry out efforts at subversion, they believe they can handle such problems if the conditions of a settlement are satisfactory. It must be said that despite all our assurances, the Vietnamese remain apprehensive about our intentions with regard to the National Liberation Front and any hints of concession to the Front will raise their suspicions.

Thus, I foresee not only long and difficult talks at Paris, and at the subsequent negotiating site, but also difficult discussions here in Saigon between ourselves and the Government of Vietnam. If we keep the Government fully currently informed and deal frankly with Thieu at each step, I believe we can bring them along with us. But we need time to explain what we propose to do and to get their acquiescence; and effort to force rapid decisions or present them with a fait accompli can only serve to arouse their suspicions about our motives.

B. Military Situation

A widespread attack against some 126 cities and towns which began on the night of May 4-5 is clearly an attempt by the enemy to bolster its position at Paris. From a military point of view, most of the attacks are quite unimpressive. Except for Saigon and areas in the First Corps north of Dong Ha and around Hue, the attacks

have been with a few rockets and mortars which did little damage. As you know, we have had good advance intelligence, some of it from a high level defector, which indicated that the attacks would come about this time. Since there was no element of surprise, the people were ready and did not panic. Not long ago, Thieu said to me that the enemy would try to exert pressure about the time talks began, and that in any case, the attacks could not be long delayed. A factor may have been evidence we have had of declining enemy morale among both troops and cadre since Tet. Another may have been the problem of supply, for we have been picking up very large caches of weapons and ammunition in widespread areas as well as capturing large numbers of individual and crew-served weapons. While it is true that a number of the enemy's main force elements have not been committed and that a substantial threat exists in the central highlands, it seems to me several things have been demonstrated by this recent effort. Our troops were alert, at full strength, and poised for any attack that might come. Secondly, was the fact that the enemy's effort was far below the level of Tet, that something went wrong with his coordination, and one may suspect his capability is not what it was. As in the beginning days of Tet, the enemy losses have been extremely heavy. From the beginning of the attack, May 4-5, until midnight May 8-9, he has lost 5,781 killed, compared to friendly losses of 804 (227 U.S., 609 Army of the Republic of Vietnam, 4 Free World).

In Saigon, most of the action has been in Cholon, and in the western and southern outskirts of the city in districts 6, 7, and 8. Here, the enemy is still holding on doggedly, engaging in terror tactics, and directing attacks at power plants. While the damage resulting from the new attacks is not yet fully known, and there will undoubtedly be more before the Viet Cong are fully routed, in comparison with the Tet offensive, it is so far quite light. Up to this morning, it is estimated that there are some 31,000 new evacuees, but a good many of these are reported already returning to their homes. A few hundred more Saigon homes have been destroyed, although there is as yet no accurate count. Elsewhere in the country, reports indicate still lighter damage since few attacks penetrated urban areas.

Saigon is reacting well to the current attacks. Morale is generally good. All major utilities are in operation, the central market is about 75 percent open (although food prices are up sharply), newspapers are appearing as usual (with thorough coverage of the recent attacks), traffic is lighter than usual, but still flowing freely in most parts of the city, government Ministries and the Assembly are working normally, and refugees are so far being cared for adequately.

I think that what was said of the enemy's objectives in the Tet offensive can be said also of these attacks, that his main purpose has been to gain political and psychological advantage in order to strengthen his posture in negotiations. He hoped, I think, on the one hand through assassination and terror tactics and on the other through the effort to gain converts to the new "Alliance", to weaken further the political fabric of the Government of Vietnam, and to make psychological impact on opinion here and abroad. I think we must make a determined effort to see that the world understands the nature of the attacks, including the intention behind them, the terror tactics

employed, and the enemy failure on the ground. We should stress the fact that the enemy is deliberately trying to increase civilian casualties while we are trying to move toward peace; that on the contrary, if they persist in these tactics, they risk military retaliation.

C. Government Actions

On May 7, in the frankest talk I have yet had with Thieu, he opened up on his thinking about restructuring the government. He described his dissatisfaction with the present governmental machinery with Loc's inability to take decisive action, and with the obstacles preventing him from getting vigorously at corruption, and the unwieldiness of the present Cabinet and the incompetence of some of its members. In a long talk which Thieu had on May 4 with Tran Van Huong, they apparently came close together in agreement on what needs to be done. In essence, Thieu plans to reduce the size of the Cabinet, to set up the equivalent of a smaller "war cabinet" though not designated as such, to bring in Tran Van Huong as Prime Minister, and also to include Ha Thuc Ky, Dr. Phan Quang Dan, and others in the government to broaden its base and increase its efficiency. Among other appointments he proposes are those of My Tho Truyen, Huong's Vice Presidential running mate, to the Inspectorate, and a general officer to command the Capital Military District reporting to the Third Corps Commander, General Khang. Contrary to some rumors, he proposes to continue General Cao Van Vien as Chief of the Joint General Staff. Apparently, both Thieu and Tran Van Huong feel that if they are to get at corruption in the police and other branches of the government, General Loan will have to be shifted to another command because of the protection he gives to many individuals engaged in corrupt practices. Loan is in many ways a controversial character. Our people who work closely with him believe he has been an able and effective Director-General of the National Police and he has pushed hard on Operation Phoenix designed to get at the infrastructure. He is a man of undoubted personal courage. He is, however, erratic and frequently through his actions compromises his own and the Government of Vietnam's image. His name has been connected with unsavory rumors and I think there is little doubt that the reputation of the police with the general public is quite low.

Thieu has had a frank exchange with Ky and some of the generals of the deficiencies of the present government, but at the time of my talk with him, he had not yet gotten down to specifics or personal changes with Ky.

The Administrative Reform Council, chaired by Thieu, has been officially announced and will presumably be in action shortly. Thieu has also signed the decree setting up the civil defense machinery under Ky and we understand that Ky's staff is moving rapidly to get a cadre training program underway.

D. Pacification

While field reports necessarily take time to assemble, our preliminary assessment is that no pacification setback comparable to Tet is in the making; in fact, very few losses have been reported to date.

Responding to Thieu's request, Bob Komer had a long talk with him on pacification. Thieu agrees with us in seeing it as a critical factor in the decisive year 1968. As he has frequently said, a Viet Cong main target is to gain control of as much of the rural population as possible in order to put themselves in a strong negotiating position, and to reinforce any demand for a coalition government or partition.

While agreeing that the Government's pacification concepts and policies are sound, Komer pointed out that the program was lagging badly because of inadequate machinery for carrying it out. He proposed that the Central Revolutionary Development Council, which now meets infrequently, be revived to provide top level impetus and follow up. Similar problems exist at corps and province level.

Thieu assured us that he is working on leadership problems; that very soon many more Province and District Chiefs would be replaced.

Komer also stressed two short-term incentives which could help to gain support of the peasant. First is the provision of adequate security, including persistent attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure. The second is in giving the farmer a better price for his crops. The Ministry of Economy has not yet made much of a dent in the problem of removing restrictions and eliminating practices which drain off piasters and thus deny the farmer and the merchant a fair return.

Mobilization. Commendable initiative by the Government of Vietnam to move rapidly ahead with general mobilization is not without serious side effects. The latest Assembly version of the draft mobilization bill could cause serious trouble for the pacification program and impair the effective functioning of the government. Drafting all men under 21 would mean losing 7,100 of the present 39,000 Revolutionary Development cadre, and 7,000 police. Prohibiting recruitment for Revolutionary Development cadre, police, and other paramilitary forces in the 21-34 age bracket would also create serious problems. We have, therefore, suggested to the Government, and I have urged on Thieu, that all military and paramilitary forces be covered in the mobilization, since the police, the Revolutionary Development cadre, the Civilian Irregular Defense Group, and the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit are just as actively engaged in fighting the common enemy and will prevent serious reshuffling and any disruption of the momentum of ongoing programs.

Urban recovery. Last week's exceptionally strong directive from Thieu to Province Chiefs and Mayors to speed up resettlement is beginning to show results. Over 40 percent of recovery requirements have been satisfied. Building allowances paid claims to over 38,000 (vs. 28,000 the week before), and over 43,000 families have received cement and roofing (vs. 32,000 a week ago). In Saigon, apartment construction projects are progressing well, already up to the third floor at two sites.

By last weekend, Tet evacuees had declined 10,000 to 510,000, in contrast to a peak of 821,000. In addition, there are over a million non-Tet refugees, who require continuing care until they can be settled.

E. Economic

The economic picture has once again been dominated by Viet Cong activity. On Monday, May 6, retail prices rose 21 percent above their April 8 level; some tendency to buy and hoard staples such as rice was noted. Another sign of the uneasiness produced by Viet Cong harassment of the city was a jump in the price of gold. Supplies of most foodstuffs continue to be good. However, over the past weekend there was a Viet Cong attack on a Route 4 civilian convoy and also, more unusually, on barges moving through the delta. There is some current intervention of meat and vegetables to Saigon, but rice stocks are ample.

A survey of economic conditions in the delta that commenced last week indicates that, at least prior to the weekend, the delta economy was returning to normal. Shipments of goods in and out were building up, in some cases had reached or surpassed pre-Tet levels. One continuing problem is transportation costs, which continue to be as much as twice pre-Tet levels, despite the return to relative normality. The increased costs are chiefly a risk of premium paid to owners and drivers.

The rice trade has not returned to normal. Paddy prices continue to be low; white paddy is selling for about VN \$11 per kilo -- about 2 piasters less than a year ago at this time. Economic officers and rice merchants agree that the volume of paddy purchases continues low. Flows of rice into Saigon are also subnormal; available data indicate that April rice deliveries were in the 22-25,000 ton range.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Thursday - May 9, 1968

Free file

Mr. President:

In the attached message Ed Korry reports that President Frei will visit Brazil in September but has decided not to come here. Ed does not say whether Frei has the approval of his Senate to leave the country.

Frei seems to have sacrificed good manners for the political advantage of cultivating good relations with the Brazilians as a make-weight against the Argentines. The Chileans have historically had an anxiety complex about Argentine intentions.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Message from Ed Korry
of May 6. (Santiago's 3535)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-18
By lig, NARA, Date 5-22-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Report from Ambassador Ed Korry in Santiago, Chile (#3535)
May 6, 1968

SUBJECT: President Frei To Visit Brazil

1. The Government of Chile and the Brazilian Government announced simultaneously on May 2 that President Frei would visit Brazil in September, accepting President Costa y Silva's long-standing invitation. Foreign Minister Valdes told the press that the two Presidents would probably discuss nuclear policy, expansion of bilateral trade within the framework of Latin American integration, and the results of the New Delhi UNCTAD meeting.
2. The Government's La Nacion hailed the visit as an expression of Chile's policy of seeking the widest Latin American integration without formation of restrictive blocs. Other newspapers reported the announcement without comment, except for communist El Siglo's critical caption that "Frei is going to shake the hand of Brazil's gorilla."
3. Frei has overlooked his statement in February to me that he could not consider visiting any other country while in office without first visiting the United States. Apparently, political expediency has conquered all again. In February, Frei suggested that he would combine a trip to the United States with one to Brazil. However, more recently, in April, following President Johnson's announcement that he would not stand for re-election and racial disturbances after the assassination of Dr. King, Frei told me he could not contemplate a visit to the US. I demurred, but interpreted his remarks to mean that he did not wish to travel to the United States to say farewell to President Johnson, but preferred to wait until after the inauguration of his successor. While nothing more has been said about visiting any other country, it is quite conceivable that under Valdes' massaging, Frei could be prevailed upon to include the USSR and some Eastern European stops as part of any projected travel to the United States in the future.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-331
By is, NARA Date 3-19-79

KORRY.

3

Thursday, May 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested Reply to Letter from President Park

At Tab A is a suggested reply to President Park's letter to you of April 25 (Tab B) which expressed his appreciation for your hospitality in Honolulu and his satisfaction with the meetings there.

The suggested reply expresses your pleasure that he could join you in Honolulu and mentions your own satisfaction with the occasion.

The Department of State does not believe that a reply is required. While I agree that one is not required, I believe that in view of the fact that his meeting with you also involved a journey for him and in view of considerations of troops for Vietnam and our overall relations, a reply might be a courteous and appropriate gesture.

I recommend that you sign the suggested reply.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

cc: Mr. Jorden

AJ:mm

Dear Mr. President:

I was delighted to receive your letter of April 25.

It is always a pleasure to see you and I was gratified that you were able to join me in Honolulu for discussion of some of our common concerns.

I fully share your satisfaction with our meeting. I believe that it demonstrated the continuing strength of the friendship between our two countries and the heightened resolve with which we are mutually confronting the difficult problems which face us.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

**His Excellency
Chung Hee Park
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul**

LBJ:State:AJ:mmm May 9, 1968



*Office of the President
Republic of Korea*

(Translation)

April 25, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to express my sincere and heartfelt appreciation for your warm hospitality extended to me during my recent visit to Honolulu. I am very much grateful to you for your personal welcome at the airport and your thoughtfulness in sending me one of your personal planes to carry myself and my entourage as a gesture of your genuine friendship. Also, I will treasure your wonderful gifts to me, together with the pleasant memory of our meetings at Honolulu.

Above all, your gracious presence at the reception of the Korean Consul-General and your most inspiring speech delivered on that occasion have greatly encouraged not only myself but the entire Korean people. I believe what you spoke there has also resounded through the whole of Asia across the Pacific.

Our meetings have, I am confident, demonstrated anew the strong bonds of solidarity and friendship existing between our two countries. It is my confident hope that our personal contacts and exchange of constructive views conduce greatly to bringing the peoples of our two countries ever closer.

Please accept, your Excellency, my very best wishes for your continued success and personal happiness.

With my kindest regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ Park Chung Hee

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of
the United States of America

~~SECRET~~

Thursday
May 9, 1968

Free file

Mr. President:

Herewith the memorandum on the Czechoslovakian situation which Dick Helms had prepared. (Tab A)

CIA concludes that there are numerous rumors of Soviet troop movements but as yet they have not been able to find firm evidence. They further conclude that if movements are confirmed, it would appear Moscow has decided some saber-rattling in order to influence the Czechoslovaks to put a brake on their democratization.

W. W. Rostow

P. S. At Tab B is a report from Heidelberg, Germany which calls attention to:

A. Reports of the Soviet Twentieth Guards Army being deployed to southern east Germany.

B. [REDACTED]

C. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ / RAC 03-204
By iss, NARA, Date 3-01-04

EO 12958 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

64a

~~SECRET~~
~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

9 May 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Czechoslovak Situation (as of 1200 hours)

1. [redacted] Soviet troops are moving toward or into Czechoslovakia, [redacted]

[redacted]

2. [redacted]

[redacted] claims to have seen Soviet troops moving in the direction of Czechoslovakia in an area south of Krakow on 8 May. [redacted] informed, apparently by the local populace, that the Soviet troop contingents had taken four hours to pass one unspecified location. During the same day, [redacted] while en route to Prague, was stopped 50 kilometers south of Warsaw and forced to return to the Polish capital. On 9 May [redacted] was stopped on the highway 50 km north of Warsaw and told to return. After protests and a two hour wait, he was allowed to proceed.

EO 12958 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs
EO 12958 3.3(b)(6)>25Yrs

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 03-205
By ms, NARA, Date 3-1-04

~~SECRET~~
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3. On 9 May, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] he had heard "last night" a report of troop movements on the Czechoslovak border. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] rumors going around Warsaw that Soviet troops are moving into Czechoslovakia. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Soviet troops were moving in the area and that these movements were connected with developments in Czechoslovakia. [REDACTED]

5. There are a variety of Soviet ground forces that could be called upon if Moscow should come to the point of military intervention in Czechoslovakia. The forces in the Carpathian Military District are generally in a high state of readiness and consist of thirteen divisions. Four of the five tank divisions there are considered combat ready, and two of the eight motorized rifle divisions

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

in the area are considered combat ready. The closest formation to Czechoslovakia is a motorized rifle division at Uzhgorod on the Ukrainian-Czechoslovak border. The Soviets have 10 tank and 10 motorized rifle divisions in East Germany, two tank divisions in Poland, and two tank and two motorized rifle divisions in Hungary. All of these forces are considered to be combat ready.

6. [REDACTED]

7. Czechoslovak party boss Dubcek told interviewers at home on 6 May that he had calmed the "anxieties" of Soviet leaders about the course of events in Czechoslovakia. It seems clear that the Soviets, on the other hand, did

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

not accept Dubcek's assurances that he can control the pace and scope of democratization. On 8 May Pravda quoted Dubcek, thus informing Soviet readers of their leaders' "anxieties."

8. Commentaries on Czechoslovakia from Poland and Hungary []

[] may be of significance. The Poles have continued to attack the "alien, anti-socialist trend in the political life" of Czechoslovakia. The main party daily, Trybuna Ludu, said that this trend is "aimed at undermining the guiding role of the working class (Communist) party, liquidating people's (Communist) power and setting Czechoslovakia at variance with fraternal socialist countries." The Hungarian party-controlled popular front paper, Magyar Nemzet, on the other hand, said on 9 May it could see nothing wrong with Czechoslovakia's new action program or its reforms.

9. [] it would appear that Moscow has decided to do some saberrattling in order to influence the Czechoslovaks to put a brake on their democratization.