

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Rostow to President, 10:50 a.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i> S 1 p <i>Duplicates in Files of WWR, Box 1, MTGS w/ PRES.</i> <i>MAY-June 1968, Doc # 19K-195</i> <i>* DUPE OF 1-1h</i>	5/19/68	A
*#1a memo	Katzenbach to President <i>open 9-9-99 NLJ 97-332</i> S 2 p <i>[Dup. # 610-61, MTP, vol. 78]</i>	5/18/68	A
*#1b memo	Katzenbach to Rostow <i>open 9-9-99 NLJ 97-332</i> S 1 p	5/18/68	A
*#1c memo	Duplicate of #1a <i>open 9-9-99 NLJ 97-332</i>		
*#1d cable	To Ambassadors Porter and Johnson <i>sanitized 9-9-99 NLJ 97-332</i> S 4 p	5/16/68	A
*#1e cable	Tokyo 0074 <i>open 9-9-99 NLJ 97-332</i> S 1 p	5/17/68	A
*#1f cable	Seoul 6549 <i>open 9-9-99 NLJ 97-332</i> S 1 p	5/17/68	A
*#1g cable	To Ambassadors Porter and Johnson S 1 p <i>sanitized 9-9-99 NLJ 97-332</i>	5/17/68	A
*#1h cable	Deptel (draft) to Seoul and Tokyo S 7 p <i>open 9-9-99 NLJ 97-332</i>	5/18/68	A
#2a cable	Paris 14298 <i>open 4-3-98 RAC</i> S 1 p	5/18/68	A
#3a cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>(dup # 111a, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN TO DEL-DELTO II," BX 115)</i> S 6 p <i>exempt 3-2-00 NLJ 97-325</i> <i>exempt NY 019-034-2</i> <i>[Dup. # 131, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN TO DEL-DELTO II," BX 115]</i> <i>idup # 22 "Chiron II," BX 108] & # 58a. Harvan / Crocodile Indem. Proposal Box 134</i>	5/19/68	A
#5 memo	Rostow to President, 3:40 p.m. <i>open NLJ 97-324 398</i> TS 1 p	5/18/68	A
#5a memo	Hornig to President TS 2 p <i>11</i>	5/18/68	A
#6 memo	Rostow to President, 3:15 p.m. <i>NLJ 97-333 908-78</i> S 1 p	5/18/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 77, May 15-19, 1968 Box 34

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#6a cable	Paris 14286 <i>open 9-9-99 NLS 97-332</i> S 3 p	5/18/68	A
#7a ltr	Rusk to President <i>open 9-9-99 NLS 97-332</i> C 2 p	5/18/68	A
#7b cable	Saigon 27539 <i>Open 2/3/98 RAC</i> C 1 p [dup #35, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN Chron II, "BX108"]	5/17/68	A
#8 memo	Rostow to President, 2:20 p.m. S 1 p <i>Sanitized 5/13/00 NS 97-329</i>	5/18/68	A
#8a cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>exempt 3-2-00 NLS 97-325</i> S 5 p	5/17/68	A
#8b cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 4 p <i>Sanitized 3-2-00 NLS 97-325</i>	5/17/68	A
#8c cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 p <i>exempt 3-2-00 NLS 97-325</i>	5/17/68	A
#11 memo	Rostow to President, 1:30 p.m. TS 4 p <i>open 5-9-95 NLS 94-458</i>	5/18/68	A
#11a memo	Rostow to President TS 5 p <i>open 12-15-95 NLS 94-460</i>	3/9/64	A
#12 memo	Rostow to President, 1:45 p.m. C 1 p <i>open NLS 97-326 2/98</i>	5/18/68	A
#12a memo	Shedd for the Record <i>open 8/3/99</i> C 2 p <i>NLS 97-327</i>	5/18/68	A
#12b map	Attachment to #12a <i>open 8/3/99</i> PCI 1 p <i>NLS 97-327</i>	undated	A
#13 memo	Rostow to President, 12:40 p.m. <i>Open NLS 97-333 2-8-78</i> S 1 p [Dup. #135, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN TODEL-DELTO II, "BX 115"]	5/18/68	A
#13a cable	Paris 14293 <i>Open RAC 2/3/98</i> S 2 p <i>[dup #135a, as above]</i>	5/18/68	A
FILE LOCATION	<i>[dup. #31, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN Chron II, "BX108"]</i>		

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 77, May 15-19, 1968 Box 34

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12358 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#15a memo	Ginsburgh to Rostow TS 2 p <i>Open NLJ 97-323 10-5-98</i>	5/18/68	A
#16 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p [Duplicate of #87, NSF, CF, Australia, Visit of PM Gorton]	5/18/68	A
#17 memo	Rostow to President C 2 p <i>open 7-22-97</i>	5/17/68	A
#17a rpt	"Foreign Visitor Schedule" C 1 p <i>open 7-24-97</i>	undated	A
#19 memo	Rostow to President, 7:15 p.m. S 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i>	5/17/68	A
#19a memo <i>not open yet</i>	Bowdler to Rostow S 1 p <i>Sanitized 5/18/00 NLS 97-324 Admin NLJ 019-034-25(102) same sanitization 11-28-10 NLS 09-338 (# 203a)</i>	5/17/68	A
#19b cable	Panama 4056 S 2 p [Duplicate of #204b, NSF, CF, Panama, Vol. 10] <i>Sanitized 9-9-99 NLS 97-332 same same 4-16-10 NLS 09-336</i>	5/17/68	A
#19c cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 6 p [Duplicate of #125, NSF, CF, Panama, Vol. 10] <i>Sanitized 3-2-00 NLS 97-325 same same 1-15-03 NLS/RAC 99-188</i>	5/17/68	A
#20a cable <i>Open 2/3/98 RAC</i>	Deptel (draft) to London S 9 p [Dup. #68b, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN TODEL-DELTO II," Bx115]	5/17/68	A
#21 memo	Rostow to President, 6:35 p.m. S 1 p [poss. dup. #68a, as above] <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i>	5/17/68	A
#21a cable	Paris 14240 S 3 p [Dup. #60, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN TODEL-DELTO I," Bx115] [dup. #64, " " " " "HARVAN Chron II," Bx108] <i>open 2/3/98 RAC</i>	5/17/68	A
#22a memo	Rusk to President C 2 p <i>open 7-24-97</i>	5/13/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 77, May 15-19, 1968 Box 34

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#22b rpt	Bio Sketch C 2 p <i>open 7-24-97</i>	5/9/68	A
#23 memo	Rostow to President, 4:20 p.m. C 1 p <i>Open 7/13/00</i>	5/17/68	A
#23a memo	[Duplicate of #25, NSF, CF Canada, Vol 5, Bx 166] Intelligence Memorandum C 4 p <i>Exempt 3-2-00 NLJ 97-325</i> <i>Exempt 6/21/95 NLJ 93-410</i>	5/16/68	A
#24a memo	[Duplicate of #28b, NSF, CF Canada, Vol 5, Bx 166] Bowdler to Rostow <i>Sanitized NLJ 97-324 5/10/00</i> S 1 p <i>same Sani NLJ 019-034-2-7(1/02) open 11-28-10 NLJ 09-338 (#203a)</i>	5/17/68	A
#27 memo	Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-333</i> C 1 p <i>9-8-98</i>	5/17/68	A
#27a cable	Saigon 27539 C 1 p <i>Open 2/3/98 RAC</i> <i>[dup. #76]</i> <i>[dup. #35, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN Chron II," Bx 108]</i>	5/17/68	A
#30 memo	Rostow to President, 8:50 a.m. <i>open 9-18-01 NLJ/RAC 00-411</i> TS 1 p	5/17/68	A
#31 memo	Rostow to President, 8:30 a.m. <i>open 3/18/03 per NSF/RAC 00-412</i> TS 1 p	5/17/68	A
#31a rpt	Intelligence Report <i>Sani RAC 5103</i> TS 1 p	undated	A
#32 memo	Rostow to President, 8:10 a.m. <i>Sani RAC 3104</i> S 1 p <i>SANITIZED NLJ-CBS 24</i>	5/17/68	A
#33 memo	Rostow to President, 8:05 a.m. S 1 p <i>Sanitized 5/12/00 NLJ 97-329</i> <i>same Sani NLJ 019-034-2-8(2/02)</i>	5/17/68	A
#33a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 9 p <i>Sanitized NLJ 97-325</i> <i>Sani NLJ 019-034-2-9 (1/02)</i>	5/16/68	A
#34 memo	Rostow to President, 7:45 a.m. S 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i> [Duplicate of #205, NSF, CF, Panama, Vol. 10]	5/17/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 77, May 15-19, 1968 Box 34

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#34a cable	Panama 4044 <i>sanitized 9-9-99 NLJ 97-333</i> S 3 p <i>more info rel. 4-16-10 NLJ 09-336 (H2052)</i> [Duplicate of #205a, NSF, CF, Panama, Vol. 10]	5/16/68	A
#36 memo	Rostow to President <i>Open MJ 97-333 9-8-98</i> S 2 p	5/17/68	A
#36a memo	Katzenbach to President <i>open 9-9-99 NLJ 97-332</i> S 4 p	5/15/68	A
#37 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 5/8/00 NLJ 97-321</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #18, NSF, CF, Brazil, Vol. VIIa]	5/17/68	A
#40 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>open 7-24-97</i>	5/17/68	A
#42 memo	Rostow to President, 7:40 p.m. C 1 p <i>Sanitized 9/13/00 NS 97-329 Ami MJ 09-034-2-10(1/02)</i>	5/16/68	A
#42a cable	Intelligence Information Cable C 10 p <i>Sanitized 3-2-00 NLJ 97-325</i> [Duplicate of #66, NSF, CF, VN, "TDSC and Cables, Vol. 1"]	5/16/68	A
#45a ltr	Taylor to President <i>(dup # 39, NSF, CF, VN Starvan/Corzullo)</i> S 2 p <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i>	5/13/68	A
#46 memo	Rostow to President, 1:00 p.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-323</i> TS 1 p <i>10-5-98</i>	5/16/68	A
#46a cable	Intelligence Cable <i>Open MJ 97-328 10-9-98</i> TS 1 p	5/16/68	A
#47 memo	Rostow to President, 12:15 p.m. S 1 p <i>Sanitized 9/13/00 NS 97-329</i>	5/16/68	A
#47a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 5 p <i>Sanitized 3-2-00 NLJ 97-325</i> [Duplicate of #67, NSF, CF, VN, "TDSC and Cables, Vol. 1"]	5/15/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 77, May 15-19, 1968 Box 34

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#48 memo	Rostow to President, 12:10 p.m. S 1 p <i>Sanitized 9/13/00 NSF 97-329</i> [Duplicate of #42, NSF, CF, VN, "2C(10), 5/68, General Military Activity"]	5/16/68	A
#48a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 16 p <i>Sanitized 3-2-00 NLJ 97-325</i> [Duplicate of #42a, NSF, CF, VN, "2C(10), 5/68, General Military Activity"]	5/15/68	A
#50 memo	Rostow to President <i>Open NLJ 97-333 1-8-98</i> C 1 p	5/16/68	A
#50a memo	Katzenbach to President <i>open NLJ 97-332 9-9-99</i> C 2 p	5/15/68	A
#50b ltr	President to Pastore <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i> C 2 p	5/17/68	A
#50c rpt	"The Supply of Enriched Uranium..." <i>open NLJ 97-332 9-9-99</i> C 4 p	undated	A
#50d memo	Rostow to President <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i> C 1 p	4/22/68	A
#50e memo	Katzenbach to President <i>open NLJ 97-332 9-9-99</i> C 4 p	4/15/68	A
#50h memo	Rusk to President <i>open NLJ 97-332 9-9-99</i> C 3 p	4/22/68	A
#51a cable	Deptel to Paris <i>open NLJ 97-332 9-9-99</i> S 3 p	undated	A
#52a ltr	President to President Gomez <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i> PCI 1 p	5/16/68	A
#53 memo	Rostow to President " " " S 1 p	5/16/68	A
#53a cable	Paris 1419 <i>open NLJ 97-332 9-9-99</i> S 1 p	undated	A

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 77, May 15-19, 1968 Box 34

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#53b rpt	"The aide memoire handed to the President..." PCI 1 p <i>open 9-9-99 NLS 97-332</i>	undated	A
#54 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>Open NLS 97-333 9-8-98</i>	5/16/68	A
#55 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 5/17/68]	5/16/68	A
#55a memo	Rusk to President C 1 p <i>open 8-15-94 NLS 94-193</i>	5/15/68	A
#55b rpt	"Issues and Talking Points Paper" C 2 p [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 5/17/68]	undated	A
#56a cable	Saigon 27497 <i>open 9-9-99 NLS 97-332</i> S 6 p [Sanitized NLS/CBS 10, 1983]	5/16/68	A
#58 memo	Rostow to President, 4:45 a.m. C 1 p <i>Sanitized 9/13/00 NLS 97-325 Semi Sani NLS 019034-2-11 (1/02)</i>	5/15/68	A
#58a cable	Intelligence Information Cable C 4 p <i>Sanitized 3-2-00 NLS 97-325</i> [Duplicate of #70, NSF, CF, VN, "TCDS and Cables, Vol. 1"]	5/13/68	A
#59 memo	Rostow to President, 4:40 p.m. S 1 p <i>Sanitized 9/13/00 NLS 97-325</i>	5/15/68	A
#59a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 4 p <i>Sanitized 3-2-00 NLS 97-325 semi NLS 019-034-2-13 (1/02)</i>	5/13/68	A
#60 memo	Rostow to President, 3:15 p.m. TS 1 p <i>open 3/98 NLS 97-326</i>	5/15/68	A
#60a rpt	"North Vietnam" S 1 p <i>open 8/3/99 NLS 97-327</i>	5/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 77, May 15-19, 1968 Box 34

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#62 memo	Rostow to President, 2:10 p.m. (dup # 22, NSF, CF, Vietnam, S 1 p Sanitized 5/8/00 NLS 97-324)	5/15/68	A
#62a cable	Intelligence Information Cable (dup # 22a as above) S 5 p Sanitized 3-2-00 NLS 97-325	5/13/68	A
#63a cable	(14035) Paris 1500 (dup # 23a as above open 9-9-99 NLS 97-332) C 1 p	5/15/68	A
#64 memo	Rostow to President, 11:35 a.m. S 1 p Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98	5/15/68	A
#64a cable	Saigon 27360 S 1 p Open 2/3/98 RAK [dup # 4, NSF, CF, UN, "HARUAN CHRON I," BX 108]	5/15/68	A
#65 memo	Rostow to President, 11:25 a.m. S 1 p Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98	5/15/68	A
#65a cable	Paris 14057 S 2 p Open 2/3/98 RAK [Dup # 97, NSF, CF, UN, "HARUAN TODEL-DELTO I," BX 115]	5/15/68	A
#67 memo	Rostow to President, 10:35 a.m. S 1 p Sanitized 5/8/00 NLS 97-324	5/15/68	A
#67a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 p Sanitized 3-2-00 NLS 97-325	5/14/68	A
#68 memo	Rostow to President, 10:05 a.m. G 1 p Open NLS 97-326 (2/98)	5/15/68	A
#73 memo	Rostow to President. (dup # 1a, NSF, SMOs, Korea, 1/1/68-4/30/68, Box 33) C 1 p Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98	5/15/68	A
#73a cable	President to President Park C 1 p (dup # 1c as above) " " "	undated	A
#73b cable	Seoul 7177 (dup # 1d as above) open NLJ 97-332 9-9-99 C 1 p	5/14/68	A
#74 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98	5/15/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 77, May 15-19, 1968 Box 34

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#75 memo	Rostow to President, 7:15 p.m. open 3/13/03 per NIS IRAC 00-412 TS 1 p	5/16/68	A
#75a memo	McCafferty to Rostow <i>open RAC # 11/09</i> TS 1 p	5/16/68	A
#75b rpt	Intelligence Report <i>open RAC 11/09</i> S- 1 p	4/9/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 77, May 15-19, 1968 Box 34

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

1

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Sunday, May 19, 1968 -- 10:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a proposal suggested by Nick Katzenbach, concurred in by Sec. Rusk, for retrieving the crew of the PUEBLO.

It involves our signing a receipt for the return of our men in a way which would permit us to disavow accepting a North Korean version of an apology but would permit them to argue that we had.

An Australian in Tokyo with good North Korean contacts, would explore, before the event, whether this procedure would be acceptable to the North Koreans; and that they would deliver the men at the time the receipt was signed by our new representative Gen. Woodward.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-333
By is, NARA Date 9-8-98

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

1a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Next Steps on PUEBLO

In February you approved an instruction to our representative in Panmunjom authorizing him to accept an unsatisfactory North Korean receipt for the PUEBLO crew by overwriting in his own handwriting a simple statement that he had received 82 men and the body of the 83rd crew member.

We have not as yet had a chance to use this procedure, since the North Koreans have never proffered a receipt.

We now would like to revive this proposal through a back channel procedure, i.e., an Australian in Tokyo with good North Korean contacts.

He would be fully briefed on our plan and would tell the North Koreans that we would accept their draft receipt with an overwrite, emphasizing that it must be simultaneous with release of the entire crew.

If the North Koreans were to accept this procedure they would, of course, claim that we had signed their receipt; we would claim that we had signed only what General Woodward had written. Both sides would understand this ambiguity.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-332
By CG, NARA Date 7-28-99

~~SECRET~~

-2-

We would also publish--immediately after release of the crew--the whole story of the seizure and the negotiations, including the transcripts of the meetings at Panmunjom. This record fully supports our refusal to sign their form of receipt as they presented it.

Dean Rusk concurs in this approach. I recommend that you authorize us to go ahead with it.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____


The Under Secretary

~~SECRET~~

1651
1b

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE


Walt:

Assuming that the President approves the memorandum on Next Steps on the PUEBLO (a copy is at TAB A) we will need to have White House clearance of two implementing instructions. (TABs D and E).

At TAB B is a copy of a back channel message we have already sent to Ambassadors Porter and Johnson asking for their comments on our proposed back channel approach.

At TAB C are their replies, and at TAB D is a draft back channel message telling Tokyo to go ahead with the approach through the Australian. Of the preceding, only the draft message at TAB D needs White House clearance.

At TAB E is a copy of our instructions for the 17th closed meeting. It also needs White House clearance.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Attachments:
Stated.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-332
By cb, NARA Date 7-28-99

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1c
May 18, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Next Steps on PUEBLO

In February you approved an instruction to our representative in Panmunjom authorizing him to accept an unsatisfactory North Korean receipt for the PUEBLO crew by overwriting in his own handwriting a simple statement that he had received 82 men and the body of the 83rd crew member.

We have not as yet had a chance to use this procedure, since the North Koreans have never proffered a receipt.

We now would like to revive this proposal through a back channel procedure, i.e., an Australian in Tokyo with good North Korean contacts.

He would be fully briefed on our plan and would tell the North Koreans that we would accept their draft receipt with an overwrite, emphasizing that it must be simultaneous with release of the entire crew.

If the North Koreans were to accept this procedure they would, of course, claim that we had signed their receipt; we would claim that we had signed only what General Woodward had written. Both sides would understand this ambiguity.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-332
By Cb, NARA Date 7-28-99

Tab A

~~SECRET~~

-2-

We would also publish--immediately after release of the crew--the whole story of the seizure and the negotiations, including the transcripts of the meetings at Panmunjom. This record fully supports our refusal to sign their form of receipt as they presented it.

Dean Rusk concurs in this approach. I recommend that you authorize us to go ahead with it.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

The Under Secretary

~~SECRET~~

KTF-AmbBrown:bjk 5/18/68

EXT 6145
WASH 0028

SANITIZED

OK
with
Tab B
1d

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

May 16, 1968

PRIORITY

MESSAGE TO AMBASSADORS PORTER (SEOUL) AND JOHNSON (TOKYO) [REDACTED]

3.4(6)
(1)(6)

SUBJECT: Seventeenth Closed Meeting at Panmunjom

1. Negotiations for release of Pueblo's crew appear to be approaching impasse. North Korean side insists on admission of wrongdoing and unconditional apology. We are unwilling to go beyond expression of regret for any violation of orders which may have caused Pueblo to approach closer than 12 nautical miles to coast of North Korea.

2. State 110781 (not sent Tokyo) authorized US representative to sign unacceptable North Korean document at time of release of Pueblo's crew after first writing in, above signature, any one of several specified inscriptions. Variant of such an inscription applicable to possible course of action discussed in para. 4 below might read: QUOTE There have been turned over to me today at _____ the 82 surviving members of the U.S.S. Pueblo's crew and the body of Seaman Wayne D. Hodges. END QUOTE.

3. If above procedure were followed, we would argue that language inscribed by General Woodward was all that he had signed. This procedure could therefore provide means of obtaining release of crew without making

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-332
By ck, NARA Date 7-28-99

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Tab B

false and humiliating admissions. Problem is to get North Koreans to present document for signature concurrently with release of crew.

4. Your comments are requested soonest on following possible course of action:

A. At seventeenth closed meeting, General Woodward would be instructed to criticize in detail language of U.S. apology proposed by General Pak at sixteenth meeting. Woodward's criticism would, however, include following statement:

QUOTE You cannot expect me to consider your draft as a proper basis for settling the issue before us in the absence of your clear assurance that, simultaneously with my acceptance of an appropriately amended version of such a document, you would release all of the members of the Pueblo's crew. UNQUOTE

B. Australian official in Tokyo, who is in contact with well-connected North Koreans there, would be briefed fully on status of closed talks, including General Woodward's instructions for seventeenth meeting, and would be requested to take following line with his North Korean contacts:

(1) General Woodward will make statement at next closed

SECRET
meeting which contains very significant sentence (quoted in para 4.A. above).

(2) This sentence is designed to open way to rapid settlement of Pueblo case.

(3) If General Pak would prepare document along lines suggested by him at sixteenth meeting, amended to avoid excessive humiliation of United States Government, General Woodward could be expected to accept it concurrently with release of 82 surviving members of Pueblo's crew and body of Seaman Wayne D. Hodges. General Woodward would sign document after first writing in in his own handwriting the language quoted in para. 2 above.

(4) This channel is available for relaying the North Korean response to appropriate U.S. authorities.

5. If, at initial or subsequent Tokyo meeting, North Koreans balked at proposed inscription above General Woodward's signature, Australian would respond that handwritten inscription is essential part of proposal. Australian would be made privy to our purpose in insisting on such an inscription, but would not enlighten North Koreans on this point. Latter might figure out what we were up to, but go along anyway on the ground that a document which each side could interpret in its own way was the best they could get.

6. Use of separate, secret channel would make possible off-the-record discussions. Also, use of such channel might intrigue North Koreans and make them psychologically readier to make deal. Positions taken by our side in Tokyo and Panmunjom would of course have to be closely coordinated.

[Handwritten mark]
KTF: *[Handwritten initials]* Yager:lm 5/15/68

Clearances: KTF - Winthrop G. Brown: *[Handwritten mark]*
U - The Under Secretary: *NK pulse*

cc. Wil - *[Handwritten signature]*

~~SECRET~~

Tatc
1e

DATE: 17 MAY 68

RECD: MAY 17 0725Z 68

FROM: TOKYO 0074

TO: ~~SECRET~~ WASHINGTON

REFERENCE: WASHINGTON 0028

FOR AMBASSADOR BROWN FROM AMBASSADOR JOHNSON:

"I CONCUR IN DESIRABILITY OF TRYING PROPOSED STRATEGY. HOWEVER, BEFORE MAKING ATTEMPT, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD ASK AUSTRALIAN OFFICIAL WHETHER HE CONSIDERS THIS CHANNEL IS STILL VALID AND ADEQUATE FOR PURPOSE.

IF YOU AGREE, WE WILL EXPLORE WITH AUSTRALIAN."

~~SECRET~~

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

—DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-332
By CB, NARA Date 7-28-99

Tatc

IF

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 17 MAY 1968

RECD: 0415Z 17 MAY 68

FROM: SEOUL 6549

~~SECRET~~

TO: ~~SECRET~~ WASHINGTON

PRIORITY

REFERENCE: WASHINGTON 00288

QTE FOR AMBASSADOR BROWN FROM AMBASSADOR PORTER:

MY COMMENT IS LET'S TRY IT. EVEN IF NK'S DON'T ACCEPT
IDEA OF WRITE-IN BY WOODWARD IMMEDIATELY, THEY MIGHT FIND
PROPOSED PROCEDURE INTERESTING. YOU WILL HAVE IN MIND, I AM SURE,
THAT IF WOODWARD WRITES SENTENCE IN WATER-BASED INK NK'S COULD
ERADICATE IT QUITE EASILY SHOULD THEY FEEL IT DESIRABLE
TO DO SO. I ASSUME YOU WILL ALLOW US ADEQUATE TIME TO PREPARE
ROKS FOR THIS PLOY IF U DECIDE TO GO AHEAD. UNQTE

~~SECRET~~

BT

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-332
By Cb, NARA Date 7-28-99

~~SECRET~~

Tab C

Jan D

19

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

May 17, 1968

3.4(b)
(1)(b) MESSAGE TO AMBASSADORS PORTER (SEOUL) AND JOHNSON (TOKYO)
[REDACTED]

REFERENCE: WASH 00288

SUBJECT: Pueblo

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-332
By cb, NARA Date 7-28-99

1. For Tokyo. Go ahead and explore plan with Australian. If results of exploration are favorable, ask Australian to schedule meeting with North Korean contacts and carry out course of action set forth in para four of reference telegram. Meeting should be held as soon as possible and in any event before next Panmunjom meeting which we hope to call May 23 or 24. Please advise both Seoul and Department of results your exploration and of time set for any meeting.

2. For Seoul. Instructions for 17th proposed meeting will suggest that Gen. Woodward call next meeting on May 23 or 24. He should, however, not schedule meeting before meeting of Australian and North Koreans in Tokyo. You are correct in assuming you will be given time to prepare RCKG for kind of settlement contemplated in ref telegram.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Jan D

1h

~~SECRET~~

Embassy SEUL

INFO: Embassy TOKYO

STATE _____

RDDLS/CACTUS

SUBJECT: Instructions for Seventeenth Closed Meeting

REF: A. Seoul 7078
B. State 110781

1. We believe that for the present the best tactic is to adopt a fairly relaxed posture. Therefore, we suggest that you wait a little longer than Pak did in calling the last meeting, perhaps until May 23 or 24, and then call for a meeting on fairly short notice. If you think there is any merit in waking the other side up at one o'clock in the morning for a meeting at eleven, by all means do so.

2. At the meeting General Woodward should make a statement along the following lines:

A. My predecessor and I have met with you here sixteen times in an effort to obtain the release of the U.S.S. Pueblo and its crew. The two sides in these meetings fairly quickly achieved a substantial area of agreement. Thus, there is no dispute concerning the fact that the Pueblo was on an intelligence-gathering mission. There is also no disagreement

REF: SAC/Secy/C. Woodward
5/18/68
5/15/68 3263

Defense -
White H. use -

U. Mr. Katzenbach
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-332
By cb, NARA Date 7-28-99

~~SECRET~~

Int E.

~~SECRET~~

over the policy of my government which has ordered, and will continue to order, ships of the United States Navy to approach no closer than twelve nautical miles to land controlled by your side. We have even reached a measure of agreement concerning the circumstances in which it would be appropriate for the United States to express regret.

D. Despite this substantial area of agreement, we continue to differ on two fundamental points. You have persisted, contrary to established international law, in characterizing the Pueblo's entirely legal and proper activities as espionage. You have also continued to press us to accept evidence unilaterally submitted by your side as proof of intrusions by the Pueblo contrary to orders. My predecessor and I have explained to you on several occasions why we are unable to accept this evidence and why we are unwilling to apologize unqualifiedly for actions which we regard as unproven.

C. We continue to believe that the three-point proposal which is incorporated in the draft receipt which Admiral Smith gave you at the fifteenth meeting represents a fair and reasonable basis for settling the problem created by your side's illegal seizure of the Pueblo. Our proposal fully reflects the area of agreement reached in these talks and strikes a fair compromise on the points still in dispute. I urge you to reconsider your opposition to our proposal and, by accepting it, to bring these talks to a successful conclusion.

D. Even if you cannot now accept our proposal, I urge you to act at once to release the 82 surviving members of the Pueblo's crew and the body of the crew member who died while in your custody. Holding the crew as hostages

~~SECRET~~

will not, I can assure you, cause the United States to change its position in these talks. Your continued illegal detention of these men serves no rational purpose and only places your side in an unfavorable light before world opinion.

E. We have ^{studied} ~~studied~~ very carefully the statements which you have made and the document which you presented at the sixteenth meeting. In this document you asked our side to agree: (i) that the confessions and other evidence which you have produced from the Pueblo crew are valid and conclusive of your claim; (2) that the Pueblo intruded closer than 12 nautical miles to the coast of North Korea; (3) that the crew were engaged in espionage and hostile acts; (4) that we would apologize for these alleged acts; (5) that we should assure they will not be repeated; and (6) that we should request that you deal leniently with the crew.

D. I would like to comment on each of these points in turn:

(i) As I have told you before, we have taken careful note of the alleged confessions and other documents which you have presented to us.

(a) It is an obvious fact that men in captivity under total physical control of your side cannot be expected to speak freely. Moreover these alleged confessions contain statements that the Pueblo was 7.6 miles from the coast when she was captured. We know, as a matter of fact, both

~~SECRET~~

AmEmbassy Secul

~~SECRET~~

from messages received from the Pueblo and messages from your own patrol boats at the time that the Pueblo was more than 15 miles from shore at the time she was captured. Therefore, you cannot reasonably expect us to accept the alleged confessions and other evidence which you have produced at face value and without confirmation.

(b) We are, as I have told you before, prepared to submit the facts of the case to an impartial inquiry by some independent outside group and to have whatever facts this group finds to be true to be made public. This would, of course, involve release of the crew so that they could speak freely and without pressure and we are prepared to have them released to the custody of a third party so that no atmosphere of pressure of either side could be established. We would in fact accept their release to the custody of any government with which we have diplomatic relations, including any of your allies with which we have such relations. If you really believe in the alleged evidence which you have produced you should have no fear of an impartial outside inquiry.

(2) We do not believe that the Pueblo ever ventured closer to the coast than 12 nautical miles. Her orders specified clearly that she should remain outside that distance, and there is no reason to believe that she disobeyed her orders. I have already commented on the alleged evidence to

~~SECRET~~

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

5

AmEmbassy Seoul

~~SECRET~~

the contrary which you have presented. However, as stated, we are prepared to have this matter investigated by an independent outsider and to have whatever facts are determined to be accurate made public.

(3) The Pueblo was on an intelligence-gathering mission on the high seas. She was legally marked US navy vessel. Her crew were in uniform and acting under naval orders. By no stretch of the imagination or any interpretation of international law can she or her crew be charged with espionage, the definition of which is as follows: QUOTE: A person can only be considered a spy when, acting clandestinely or on false pretenses, he obtains or endeavors to obtain information in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party.... Thus, soldiers not wearing a disguise who have penetrated into the zone of operations of the hostile army, for the purpose of obtaining information, are not considered spies. UNQUOTE.

(4) You request us to apologize for espionage and hostile acts and intrusion into claimed territorial waters. For the reasons given above we do not believe we have anything to apologize for, but in the event we are found wrong by impartial inquiry after the crew is released, we are prepared to express regrets for any violation of the ship's orders which may have resulted in her approaching closer than 12 nautical miles from the coast.

AmEmbassy Seoul

~~SECRET~~

(5) You suggest that we ask you to deal leniently with the crew. In fact, we insist as a matter of international law and of human decency that you release these men whom you have illegally seized. You cannot expect me to consider your draft as a proper basis for settling the issue before us in the absence of your clear assurance that, simultaneously with my acceptance of an appropriately amended version of such a document, you would release all of the members of the Pueblo's crew.

G. As I said at the last meeting, the position which Admiral Smith presented at the fifteenth and previous meetings is the considered position of my government. We believe it is obvious that it provides you with everything to which you are entitled, namely, an expression of regret if the facts warrant it.

H. I again urge you to consider our proposals seriously. We could continue indefinitely here repeating our respective positions which would be a rather futile performance, since there is an easy way to solve the matter, namely, impartial public inquiry. If the facts turn out to be as you allege, you will have our expression of regret. You will in any case have our formal assurance that intrusions to which you object will not be made by any of our vessels.

AmEmbassy Seoul

~~SECRET~~

3. FYI Authority still stands to accept unsatisfactory North Korean document, simultaneously with release of entire Pueblo's crew, after writing in and signing one of three inscriptions specified in para. 5 of State 110781. Simplified variant of first of these inscriptions would under most conceivable circumstances appear most likely to produce desired results. Such inscription would read: QUOTE There have been turned over to me today at _____ the 82 surviving members of the U. S. S. Pueblo's crew and the body of Seaman Wayne D. Hedges. END QUOTE. Listing of individual names and serial numbers would not be necessary. END FYI.

END

~~SECRET~~

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

2
19 MAY 68

85
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. President;

I gather Secretary Rusk has reservations about our getting involved directly with the Soviets at this point, with Stewart about to go to Moscow.

He will be in touch with you tomorrow about our response to this cable.

You should know that I have arranged via Vance that Sullivan and Davidson stay exactly with the instruction you cleared to avoid the trouble we had with Wilson over Chet Cooper's "interpretations" of our position.

WWS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

2a

~~SECRET~~

REA537

04592 P

PAGE 01 PARIS 04682 181905Z

1968 MAY 18 PM 3 15

49
ACTION SSO 00

INFO /000 W

Z 181848Z MAY 68
FM ANEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1682

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 14298

N O D I S / HARVAN

DELTO 86

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 25467

By is, NARA, Date 4-2-98

1. WE ACCEPT YOUR VIEW THAT SULLIVAN SHOULD GO TO LONDON ON MONDAY TO BRIEF STEWART. HE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY DAVIDSON WHO HAS BEEN SITTING IN ON ALL MEETINGS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE.
2. YOUR SUGGESTION THAT WE APPROACH SOVIETS DIRECTLY AND FRONTALLY IS EXCELLENT. WE FEEL THE TIME HAS COME TO TAKE UP THE MATTER WITH THEM. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THE SOVIETS ARE TAKING A SPECIAL INTEREST IN OUR CONVERSATIONS, I.E., THEY HAVE PROVIDED A PLANE TO BRING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION HERE AND ARE ASSISTING THEM WITH THEIR COMMUNICATIONS.
3. WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO GET THE SOVIETS INVOLVED, IF POSSIBLE, BEFORE WE FACE A HEAD TO HEAD CONFRONTATION WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHICH COULD COME NEXT WEEK. ACCORDINGLY, WE SUGGEST THAT THOMPSON GETS HIS OAR IN FIRST BEFORE STEWART ARRIVES AND THEN FOLLOW UP AFTER STEWART LEAVES.
4. WOULD APPRECIATE COPY OF INSTRUCTIONS TO THOMPSON FOR OUR GUIDANCE AND COMMENT IF NECESSARY. HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

19 May 68

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

OS

Mr. President;

W

This Indian assessment is over-optimistic by any evidence we now have. The Indians have always been subject to wishful thinking.

Pres file

Nevertheless, worth reading.

W

ACTION

Saturday - May 18, 1968

Mr. President:

Pres file

Dr. Galo Plaza and Dr. Rafael Urquia are taking over the command of the OAS today.

On their election last February you sent congratulatory messages. Covey Oliver urges letters expressing best wishes and continued support as they assume office. We have drafted the attached letters for your consideration.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Suggested letters of congratulations to the OAS Secretary General and Assistant Secretary General

4a

May 18, 1968

Dear Dr. Plaza:

As you begin your term of office as Secretary General of the Organization of American States, I send best wishes and repeat my assurance of continued collaboration.

You know of my special interest in our home hemisphere. During my Presidency I have worked to strengthen the OAS. I know the great potential for peace and progress which lies in close cooperation among the American Republics.

You bring to the Secretary Generalship fresh perspective and new energy tempered by broad experience. You have a unique opportunity to fashion a moment of great challenge into a period of solid accomplishment for the benefit of all the peoples of this hemisphere.

I wish you every success.

Sincerely,

LBJ

His Excellency
Dr. Galo Plaza Lasso
Secretary General
of the Organization of American States
Pan American Union
Washington, D. C.

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm

4b

May 18, 1968

Dear Dr. Urquia:

Today you assume your new responsibilities as Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States. I wish you every success.

You and Dr. Plaza assume the leadership of our regional organization at a time when the needs of the people of our hemisphere call for greater individual and collective effort by the member states. As you give direction to the new effort, you can count on my continued support and that of the people of the United States.

Sincerely,



The Honorable
Dr. M. Rafael Urquia
Assistant Secretary General
of the Organization of American States
Pan American Union
Washington, D. C.

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm

Pres. File
5

Saturday, May 18, 1968
3:40 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

I'm glad to report that while Don Hornig, Gen. Wheeler, and Gen. McConnell don't wholly agree, they now agree on what they disagree about.

My comments are:

1. Truck kills in North Vietnam are running much higher now than the historical figure cited by Don:

	<u>May 1 - 10</u>
Sightings	1,484
Destroyed	151
Damaged	207

This should improve with better weather.

2. I side with Wheeler and McConnell on the first para. top of page 2.

3. Don's figures in the following para. , page 2, are out of date.

4. I disagree with Don's judgment that there would not be significant costs in falling back to Route Package 1.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-326
By is , NARA Date 3-3-98



Department of State

6att#5
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

ZCZCSPR933 FJK559
RR RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 14286 1291203
ZNY SSSSS
R 181155Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1667
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL: 4532Q
RECEIVED: MAY 18, 1968
9:19 A.M.

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 14286

N O D I S MARIA THREE

SUBJECT: PEKING REACTIONS TO PEACE TALKS

SOURCE GAVE ENSOFF FOLLOWING REPORT FROM PEKING MAY 12:
"I REFER TO MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1044-49.

"THE SILENCE OBSERVED BY THE OFFICIAL PRESS ON RECENT DECISIONS OF HANOI AND THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS, THE PERSISTENT REITERATION OF THE MERITS OF ALL-OUT STRUGGLE BY PRESIDENT MAO TSE-TUNG AND MR. CHEN-YI, REPRESENT INDICATIONS OF THE CHINESE DISCONTENT WITH THE EVOLUTION OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM. THE DISCREET RECEPTION OF THE DELEGATION LED BY MR. XUAN THUY, DURING HIS STOPOVER IN PEKING, IS IN CLEAR CONTRAST WITH THE WARM RECEPTION OF MOSCOW.

"PEKING, HOWEVER, UP TO THE PRESENT TIME HAS RESTRAINED ITSELF FROM ANY CRUDE INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF VIETNAM. OF COURSE, CHINA HAS OBVIOUSLY POWERFUL MEANS OF PRESSURE ON THE DRVN; IT COULD NOTABLY SUSPEND ITS ASSISTANCE OR INTERRUPT THE TRANSIT OF AID COMING FROM EASTERN EUROPE. OUR ROMANIAN COLLEAGUES, AMONG OTHERS, DO NOT EXCLUDE THE EVENTUALITY OF MORE SPECTACULAR MEASURES OF COERCION SUCH AS THE DISPATCH OF "VOLUNTEERS" INTO THE DRVN TO "GIVE ASSISTANCE" TO THE REVOLUTIONARY FORCES.

"RECOURSE TO SUCH AN ADVENTURIOUS POLICY WOULD APPEAR, HOWEVER, IMPROBABLE. DEPRIVED OF RUSSIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE, IN FACT SINCE THE OPEN RUPTURE OF 1963, THE LEADERS OF THE PEOPLES CHINESE REPUBLIC HAVE ACCEPTED THE RISK OF ISOLATION. THEY HAVE CONSISTENTLY AVOIDED, ON THE OTHER HAND, ANY ENGAGEMENT NOT CAREFULLY CONSIDERED. THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY MAKES VERY DANGEROUS ANY STRONG THREAT TO WITHDRAW ASSISTANCE, WHICH

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-332
By CG, NARA Date 7-28-99

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 14286, MAY 18

WOULD RISK STRENGTHENING THE INFLUENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN HANOI. TO INTERFERE DIRECTLY IN THE AFFAIRS OF A PEOPLE MOTIVATED BY DEEP NATIONALISM, WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS "ADVENTURESOME" WHICH IS FREQUENTLY DENOUNCED HERE AND WOULD GRAVELY COMPROMISE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD WORLD. THE FORESEEABLE ADVANTAGE OF SUCH AN INITIATIVE WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE PROPORTIONAL TO THE RISKS INCURRED; SOVIET DIPLOMATS THEMSELVES DISREGARD ANY THREAT WITH RESPECT TO SO-CALLED MILITARY ASSISTANCE STRICTLY SPEAKING.

"IT IS DOUBTFUL, THEREFORE, THAT CHINA WOULD HAVE RECOURSE TO DRAMATIC ACTS OF COERCION TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE AUTHORITIES DO NOT RESTRAIN THEMSELVES FROM GIVING HANOI WARNINGS WHICH SOMETIMES HAVE ASSUMED THE CHARACTER OF REAL THREATS. THESE REPEATED PRESSURES HAVE NOT RESULTED UP TO THE PRESENT TIME IN ANYTHING BUT MEDIOCRE RESULTS. PEKING HAS TRIED, IT SEEMS, TO SPEAK DIRECTLY WITH THE FRONT BUT ITS EFFORTS APPEAR UNSUCCESSFUL. IF RECOURSE TO EXTREME MEANS IS EXCLUDED, ECONOMIC PRESSURES ARE POSSIBLE; BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THAT THEY WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO MODIFY THE CURRENT DIRECTION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE POLICY.

"UNABLE TO STOP THE OPENING OF CONVERSATIONS IN PARIS, THE PEKING AUTHORITIES ARE DOUBTLESS DOING THEIR UTMOST TO LIMIT THEIR SIGNIFICANCE AND AVOIDING A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION WHICH WOULD PROGRESSIVELY COVER ALL SOUTHEAST ASIA. ACCORDING TO THE MOST COMMON HYPOTHESIS HELD HERE, CHINA IS AWAITING THE BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATIONS, UNDERSTIMATING PERHAPS THE ACTUAL EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN OPINION; IT REFUSES TO BELIEVE THAT WASHINGTON CAN AGREE TO AN HONORABLE AND PROGRESSIVE RETREAT OF ITS EXPEDITIONARY CORPS. CHINA HOPES, THEREFORE, THAT THE TALKS WILL BREAK DOWN AND THE U.S. WILL HAVE RECOURSE TO NEW MEASURES OF ESCALATION.

"FAILURE OF THE CONVERSATIONS WOULD, THEREFORE, REINFORCE THE ACTION OF THE PARTISANS OF THE PROLONGED WAR WITHIN THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE FRONT. SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WOULD RISK BEING COMPROMISED.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- PARIS. 14286, MAY. 18

"THE CHINESE SET, I ESTS ON THE ASSUMPTION OF THE
 INEVITABLE RIGIDITY AMERICAN POLICY. THIS PREDICTION IS
 NOT ONLY DUE TO AN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF WASHINGTON'S INTENTIONS,
 THE PRESSURES EXERCISED ON THE CADRES AND THE POPULATION OBLIGE
 THE CURRENT LEAD AS A FORTRESS BESEIGED BY
 A POWER NECESSARY WORKING IN CONCERT WITH THE
 MOSCOW REVISIONISTS. IT IS, THEREFORE, DIFFICULT TO
 FORSEE THE REACTIONS OF PEKING UNDER THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THE
 PARIS CONVERSATIONS LEAD TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. ONE
 CAN, HOWEVER, SPECULATE THAT SUCH A REPUDIATION OF THE THESES
 CONSTANTLY DEFENDED BY MAO AND HIS SUCCESSOR DESIGNATE WOULD
 SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE COURSE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION.

GP-1
 SHRIVER
 BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

~~TOP SECRET~~

W. W. ROSTOW

5a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, May 18, 1968

2:00PM-

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-326
By ics, NARA Date 3-3-98

SUBJECT: Vietnam Air Campaign--Meeting with Generals Wheeler
and McConnell

On Friday, May 3, I met with Gen. Wheeler and Gen. McConnell, as you requested. Walt Rostow also sat in on the meeting.

Neither Gen. Wheeler nor Gen. McConnell took exception to the basic numbers derived in the report by the Ad Hoc Vietnam Panel of your Science Advisory Committee. These are:

--Historically, there is about a 10% chance that a ton of military supplies bound for South Vietnam or Laos will be destroyed somewhere in North Vietnam;

--Historically, there is about a 25% chance of its being interdicted in Laos.

--Most of the interdiction occurs in NVN between about May 15 and Oct. 15, and in Laos from about 15 Nov. to 15 April.

Gen. McConnell agreed that interdiction would be more effective in Laos than in North Vietnam, in equivalent weather periods, until the enemy introduces AAA defenses in strength in Laos. The greater effectiveness in Laos derives from the use of night viewing systems, slow aircraft such as Gunship II, and slow FAC's which can spot trucks better. In North Vietnam we must use high performance airplanes which are not as effective against trucks.

On the proposition advanced when I met with you on May 1, which you asked me to discuss with Bus and J.P., there was complete agreement.

It was agreed that nothing in our past experience or in the data for April suggests that the cessation of bombing north of 19° on March 31st significantly contributed to the increased enemy infiltrations or buildup of supply.

Exempted from Automatic Downgrading
or Declassification

No. 2 of 4 Copies
Series A

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

As a corollary, I feel since the cutback did not measurably increase the enemy's ability to move supplies, there is nothing to suggest that a resumption of bombing north of 19° would significantly cut down his ability to continue the buildup; but General Wheeler and General McConnell do not agree.

Although we did not attempt to reach agreement, serious questions were raised to my general proposition that if it were desirable from the standpoint of negotiations, a further stand-down in Route Packages 2 and 3 would not result in an appreciable increase in the movement of supply, at least if the sorties were reallocated into Route Package 1. My perspective derives from the fact that as of May 1 we were killing about 7 trucks a day in RP 2 and 3. In the event of a stand down, 4 or 5 of these 7 would get through to SVN with about 15 tons a day of supplies.


On the other hand, we all agreed that a stand-down in Route Package 1 as well is more serious and ought to be accompanied by reciprocal action on the enemy's part.

This is particularly true in the months from now to October when air action (and also supply movement) in Laos will be largely stopped by the weather, while in North Vietnam the weather will be relatively good.

Incidentally, the supply movement in April seems to have been about 60% greater than in March, not two or three times as suggested in press reports from Saigon.

An updated and slightly revised version of the PSAC report will be available in about a week's time. I would then like an opportunity to discuss it and its implications with you.

The preceding has been reviewed with Bus Wheeler and J. P. McConnell, who agree that it is accurate.


Donald F. Hornig

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, May 18, 1968 - 3:15 pm

Mr. President:

This thoughtful French diplomatic analysis of Peking's attitude towards the Paris talks is worth reading.

Pres file

Key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 14286 MARIA THREE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-333
By iw, NARA Date 9-8-98

WWRostow:rla

Saturday, May 18, 1968
3:10 p. m.

7

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith your redoubtable Secretary of State expresses his view on Bunker's attached cable.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

7a

May 18, 1968

Mr. President:

You asked for my comments on Saigon's 27539 (attached).

My own personal view is that we should not become embroiled in a highly theoretical and "precious" application or interpretation of the San Antonio formula. To me, your speech of March 31 opened a new chapter which brushes aside much of the discussion which preceded it. You paid for that new chapter by a major act of de-escalation. To me, the most important fact about the present situation is that seventy-eight percent of the land area and ninety percent of the population of North Viet-Nam are free from bombing while there is not a single square mile of South Viet-Nam which is immune from Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attacks by rockets, mortars or infantry.

Although you reaffirmed the San Antonio formula in your March 31 speech, I do not believe that we should accept all of the barnacles which accumulated around the San Antonio formula — including the so-called Clifford interpretation.

The simple truth is that no one in the world can tell us what will happen if we stop all of the bombing of North Viet-Nam. Hanoi refuses to tell us and therefore no one else is able to tell us. This is not a problem of diplomatic technique; there are many many ways by which Hanoi could let us know what in fact they would do if we stop all the bombing. This could be done without any loss of face on their part. It boils down to a question of will. Of course they would be glad to exchange some sort of talks, somewhere, for a full cessation of the bombing while they go ahead with their part of the war full scale.

I realize that I am branded as a "hawk" and that this has been an embarrassment to the Administration in some quarters. But looking at all of our experiences in the management of crises in the past three decades, I cannot, for the life of me, see how

we can

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-332
By CG, NARA Date 7-28-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

we can achieve any peace unless some elementary notions of reciprocity, fairness and equity are maintained.

Averell Harriman has already called to the attention of Hanoi the impact of the recent attacks on Saigon on the discussions in Paris and on our attitude toward the good faith of the other side. I don't think that Bunker's cable requires us to do anything different than we have thus far been doing in Paris. But I do believe that our discussions in Paris must be based upon the most simple, honest and fair considerations and that we should not spin spider webs of logic to confuse the requirements of a fair and honorable peace in Southeast Asia. This is why I objected to Averell's use of the so-called "Romanian formula" at the discussions in Paris today.

Hanoi still nurtures the illusion that they can somehow mobilize domestic and world public opinion to force your hand. The beginning of wisdom on their part is a demonstration by us that they cannot succeed in any such nonsense.

Finally, let me say that the present attitude of Hanoi is such that some of the argumentation among our own people is beside the point. Hanoi is not providing any handholds for us to grasp in any direction — therefore we should not come apart among ourselves in the absence of some movement by Hanoi.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

S *AK 7/5/76*
TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4 1 9 9 Q
MAY 17, 1968
7:45 A.M.

CO RUEHC RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 27539 1381105
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 171045Z MAY 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2878
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 898
STATE GRNC
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SAIGON 27539

NODIS/HARVAN

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 21760
By *isa* NARA, Date *2-3-98*

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

REF; A. SAIGON 26928, B. SAIGON 27121

1. LEST THERE BE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING OF INTENT AND PURPOSE OF MY TWO MESSAGES REGARDING CESSATION OF BOMBING (SAIGON 26928 AND 27121) I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT I AM NOT SUGGESTING CESSATION OF ATTACKS AS TRADE OFF FOR STOPPING BOMBING. STILL LESS THAT WE SHOULD CEASE FIGHTING WHILE TALKING. BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT HANOI SHOULD BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND THAT ATTACKS ON SAIGON OR OTHER CENTERS OF POPULATION, WHICH ARE ESSENTIALLY ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS, ARE IN OUR VIEW "TAKING ADVANTAGE" OF SAN ANTONIO FORMULA, AND CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT WITH IMPUNITY AND WITHOUT FEAR OF RETALIATION. I BELIEVE THIS IS JUST AS MUCH "TAKING ADVANTAGE" AS THE MORE THAN DOUBLING OF THE RATE OF INFILTRATION WHICH HAS OCCURRED SINCE AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1967, OR VIOLATION OF THE DMZ.

2. I AGREE WITH GEN WESTMORLAND'S EVALUATION OF THE RECENT ATTACKS. THE BACK HAS BEEN BROKEN OF THE ATTACKS ON SAIGON, BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE ENEMY MAY NOT AGAIN ATTEMPT THE SAME TACTICS A MONTH OR TWO MONTHS FROM NOW. THAT HE WILL BE DECISIVELY DEFEATED AGAIN I HAVE NO DOUBT. BUT MUCH OF HIS MAIN FORCE ELEMENTS IN II, III AND IV CORPS WERE NOT COMMITTED IN THE RECENT OPERATIONS, AND THERE IS CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE THAT HE INTENDS TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE USING SIMILAR TACTICS AIMED AT DESTROYING THE FABRIC OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT.

BUNKER
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Pres. file

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, May 18, 1968 -- 2:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

I have marked key passages in three mildly interesting reports.

Tab A. [redacted] 1.5(c)
[redacted] 3.4(b)(1)

Tab B. [redacted] talking about dumping Thieu-Ky and
setting up a coalition government.

Tab C. [redacted] 1.5(c)
[redacted] 3.4(b)(1)

W. W. Rostow

[redacted] 17 May 1968 1.5(c)
[redacted] 17 May 1968 3.4(b)(1)
[redacted] 17 May 1968

WWRostow:rla

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-329
By is, NARA Date 3-29-00

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

8-2 B
86

ROUTINE
IN 12524

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SOO ONE CRS
OER FBIS DCS IRS AID USIA

DDI (F, X)

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18 U.S. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE [REDACTED]

MAY 17 21 46 Z

SANITIZED DIST 17 MAY 1968 1.5(e)
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 3.4(b)(1)
NLJ 97-325

By [REDACTED], NARA Date 10-22-91

COUNTRY VIETNAM

DOI [REDACTED] MAY 1968

SUBJECT COMMENTS OF [REDACTED] VIETNAM EXPERT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ON NEGOTIATIONS

ACQ [REDACTED]

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] A WELL-KNOWN

[REDACTED] EXPERT ON VIETNAM [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS

ON THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HIS REMARKS WERE IN PART BASED ON CONVERSATIONS HE HAS HAD WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE AND NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OFFICIALS.)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

5
4
3
2
1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

SECRET
(classification) (dissem controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~
[Redacted]

2. [Redacted] THE FINAL SOLUTION TO THE VIETNAM WAR WILL BE A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM MADE UP OF RIGHT, LEFT AND CENTER FACTIONS, SIMILAR TO THE SETTLEMENT IN LAOS IN 1962. THE CENTER FACTION WILL BE THE NEWLY FORMED "ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL, DEMOCRATIC AND PEACEFUL FORCES" WHICH WILL GROW IN STRENGTH BY ATTRACTING SOUTH VIETNAMESE WHO ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE PRESENT SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND WHO HAVE BEEN ANTAGONIZED BY THE TERRORISM OF THE VIET CONG. THE OTHER TWO GROUPS OF THE COALITION GOVERNMENT WILL BE THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF SOUTH VIETNAM (NLFSV) AND A NEW GOVERNMENT TO BE FORMED IN SAIGON AFTER THE OVERTHROW OF THIEU AND KY.

3. [Redacted] THE "ALLIANCE" IS CLEARLY THE CREATION OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT. IT WAS NECESSARY TO FORM THE "ALLIANCE" BECAUSE THE NLF HAD ALIENATED MANY SOUTH VIETNAMESE. DEVILLERS WENT ON TO SUGGEST THAT THE FIGHTING IN AND AROUND SAIGON IS OR SOON WILL BE CONDUCTED IN THE NAME OF THE "ALLIANCE", ALTHOUGH THE TROOPS WILL BE SUPPLIED BY THE VIET CONG. THUS BY MEANS OF A MILITARY THRUST, THE "ALLIANCE" WILL BE ABLE TO CLAIM POLITICAL POWER.

4. [Redacted] HANOI'S INSISTENCE THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST DEAL WITH THE NLFSV ON SOUTH VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS REPRESENTS A MOVE TO FORCE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE THREE

5
4
3
2
1

5
4
3
2
1

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~
[Redacted]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
(d.scm controls)

SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL GROUPS. HANOI FORESEES, HOWEVER, THE
OVERTHROW OF THE THIEU-KY GOVERNMENT BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE ELEMENTS
WHO WILL BE WILLING TO DEAL WITH THE NLF SV AND THE "ALLIANCE".
FURTHERMORE, HANOI EXPECTS THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL SUPPORT A
COUP D'ETAT AGAINST THE PRESENT SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT.

[REDACTED] THE SEQUENCE OF
EVENTS WILL BE: TALKS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH
VIETNAM WHICH WILL SCALE DOWN THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE, DURING WHICH

TIME THIEU AND KY WILL BE REPLACED IN SAIGON, FOLLOWED BY TALKS
BETWEEN THE THREE GROUPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, FOLLOWED BY A GENERAL
CONFERENCE IN WHICH THE MAJOR POWERS, THE BELIGERENTS AND JAPAN
WILL PARTICIPATE.

5. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ELECTIONS
IN SOUTH VIETNAM SHOULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE A COALITION GOVERNMENT
IS FORMED.

6. [REDACTED] A SOUTH VIETNAMESE

OFFICIAL SAID RECENTLY THAT "THE AMERICANS HAVE AMERICANIZED
THE WAR TO THE POINT WHERE THEY DISCUSS OUR FUTURE WITHOUT US,
AND MIGHT EVEN DROP US ALTOGETHER."

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SECRET

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

IN 112524 24

[REDACTED]

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

IF THIS FEELING GROWS WITHIN THE PRESENT SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, A HARD-LINE GROUP MAY SPLINTER OFF FROM THE SOUTH-VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND CONTINUE MILITARY OPERATIONS ON ITS OWN. THIS EVENTUALLY WOULD COMPLICATE AND EVEN ENDANGER THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE, HARRIMAN DELEGATION, CINCPAC, PACAF, ARPAC, PACFLT.

[REDACTED]

BT

~~SECRET~~
[REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

9

ACTION

Pres file

Saturday, May 18, 1968 -- 2:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk suggests you may want George Ball at next Tuesday's lunch when the 19th and 20th parallels problem is discussed.

W. W. Rostow

Yes _____

No _____

Call me _____

WWRostow:rla

!

INFORMATION

Pres file

Saturday, May 18, 1968 -- 2:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

The result of Sec. Rusk's conversation with Amb. Goldberg yesterday was: unless you desired an earlier shift, he would stay with the NPT debate until its conclusion -- now estimated for June 15th.

He would, of course, meet your desire for an earlier change of the guard in New York.

W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow:rla

Pres. file

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-458

Saturday, May 18, 1968
1:30 p. m.

11

MR. PRESIDENT: By UJ, NARA, Date 4-10-95

Herewith, for the record, as requested via Jim Jones, is the story of Plan 6 and WWR's further adventures in Vietnam planning.

1. Having studied guerrilla warfare in the course of my work at the Center for International Studies at MIT in the 1950's, I was put onto the Laos and Vietnam crises by President Kennedy. On his second Thursday in office -- early in February -- President Kennedy told me he assessed Vietnam as the most serious crisis he had inherited. (Mac Bundy took over Congo, Cuba and Berlin, except when Berlin got very hot and we worked together.)

2. Having examined the problem of Vietnam, I early concluded that it was the most dangerous case of guerrilla warfare I had ever seen. The reason was that there was not only a deeply embedded Viet Cong infrastructure in the South, but -- much more serious -- there was a long open frontier across which men and supplies were already moving at a dangerous rate in 1961. It is difficult if not impossible to win a guerrilla war with an open frontier. Looking at that frontier and the problem of monitoring it from inside the borders, I concluded quite early that we might be driven, at some time, to force an end to infiltration by striking at its source.

3. Thus, when President Kennedy encouraged me to address a graduating class at Fort Bragg on guerrilla warfare in June 1961, he personally cleared the following passage:

"The truth is that guerrilla warfare mounted from external bases -- with rights of sanctuary -- is a terrible burden to carry for any government in a society making its way toward modernization. As you know, it takes somewhere between ten and twenty soldiers to control one guerrilla in an organized operation. Moreover, the guerrilla force has this advantage: its task is merely to destroy, while the government must build and protect what it is building. A guerrilla war mounted from outside a transitional nation is a crude act of international vandalism. There will be no peace in the world if the international community accepts the outcome of a guerrilla war, mounted from outside a nation, as tantamount to a free election.

"The sending of men and arms across international boundaries and the direction of guerrilla war from outside a sovereign nation is aggression. This is a fact which the whole international community must confront and whose consequent responsibility it must accept. Without such international action those against whom aggression is mounted will be driven inevitably to seek out and engage the ultimate source of the aggression they confront."

4. When Gen. Taylor and I went out to Vietnam in October 1961 our report to President Kennedy included this further passage, part of which you released sometime ago, in a letter to Senator Jackson:

"While we feel that the program recommended represents those measures which should be taken in our present knowledge of the situation in Southeast Asia, I would not suggest that it is the final word. Future needs beyond this program will depend upon the kind of settlement we obtain in Laos and the manner in which Hanoi decides to adjust its conduct to that settlement. If the Hanoi decision is to continue the irregular war declared on South Vietnam in 1959 with continued infiltration and covert support of guerrilla bands in the territory of our ally, we will then have to decide whether to accept as legitimate the continued guidance, training, and support of a guerrilla war across an international boundary, while the attacked react only inside their borders. Can we admit the establishment of the common law that the party attacked and his friends are denied the right to strike the source of aggression, after the fact of external aggression is clearly established? It is our view that our government should undertake with the Vietnamese the measures outlined herein, but should then consider and face the broader question beyond.

"We cannot refrain from expressing, having seen the situation on the ground, our common sense of outrage at the burden which this kind of aggression imposes on a new country, only seven years old, with a difficult historical heritage to overcome, confronting the inevitable problems of political, social, and economic transition to modernization. It is easy and cheap to destroy such a country whereas it is difficult undisturbed to build a nation coming out of a complex past without carrying the burden of a guerrilla war.

"We were similarly struck in Thailand with the injustice of subjecting this promising nation in transition to the heavy military burdens it faces in fulfilling its role in SEATO security planning along with the guerrilla challenge beginning to form up on its northeast frontier.

"It is my judgment and that of my colleagues that the United States must decide how it will cope with Khrushchev's 'wars of liberation' which are really para-wars of guerrilla aggression. This is a new and dangerous Communist technique which bypasses our traditional political and military responses. While the final answer lies beyond the scope of this report, it is clear to me that the time may come in our relations to Southeast Asia when we must declare our intention to attack the source of guerrilla aggression in North Vietnam and impose on the Hanoi Government a price for participating in the current war which is commensurate with the damage being inflicted on its neighbors to the south."

5. It was against this background that President Kennedy created the concept of Plan No. 6. As you may recall, the reigning military plan for the defense of Southeast Asia at that time was called SEATO Plan 5. It was mainly addressed to the defense of Laos and the Mekong; but it had an annex dealing with Vietnam. As the critical meeting ended, in which President Kennedy indicated which of our recommendations he proposed to accept in a NSAM, he said -- in a mood of wry humor -- with a good many people present around the Cabinet table: "If this doesn't work, perhaps we'll have to try Walt's Plan 6." -- simply the next higher number after 5. There was no plan. It was merely the concept of applying military pressure against North Vietnam as a sanction against infiltration. Subsequently, I gather, the idea of bombing North Vietnam in retaliation for infiltration became known in the Pentagon as "Rostow's Plan 6."

6. Nothing more was heard from Rostow on this subject except for my plea at the time of the Cuba missile crisis that we exploit the Mikoyan visit to focus Moscow's mind on the violation of the Geneva Accords of 1962 which went into effect in October and were already being violated when Mikoyan was in Washington. My Fort Bragg speech was, in effect, a plea that an agreement be reached in Geneva and honored. I knew in my bones that if we let it slide we'd face a serious war.

7. In 1964, as the situation began to deteriorate rapidly in South Vietnam, I talked with Secretary Rusk about the importance of developing contingency plans in case, at some stage, the President should decide that he wished to mount measured military pressures against North Vietnam. After discussion with Secretary McNamara, Secretary Rusk ordered such a contingency study to be mounted, with State, Defense, and CIA participation. I told Secretary Rusk that it would be inappropriate for me to engage personally in this study because my views were already formed; but I assigned to it the two members of the Policy Planning Council, and gave them complete freedom of judgment and action. The study was completed about March 1, 1964, and was entitled, "Alternatives for Imposition of Measured Pressures Against North Vietnam." The study was made available to the Secretaries. To the best of my knowledge it went into staff work, and was never presented to the President. It may have been of some use at a later time.

8. Now, for your telephone call. I took the family off on a skiing vacation in Aspen between February 29 and March 8, 1964. This was just when the study was completed and being circulated in Washington among the agencies. Late on the afternoon of March 4 the telephone rang. It was the White House. I got out of my bath and found that the President had something to say to me. Apparently Elie Abel had put out on a broadcast something about Rostow's Plan No. 6. You told me you had heard of no such plan. If it existed, you had no commitment to it, and you did not wish these matters discussed with the press. I replied that, to the best of my knowledge, I had not talked with

Elie Abel for 18 months. There was no Plan 6. I had not discussed the question of bombing North Vietnam with anyone outside the government. As I recall -- and I happen to recall this telephone conversation well -- you did not in any way suggest that I might be returned to academic life. You asked a straightforward question; I gave a straightforward answer; you gave a straightforward instruction.

9. When I returned my staff told me: "You're in the doghouse." Word had come from the White House staff of the President's displeasure. I told them to go back to work and do their job. But I wrote you the attached memo on March 9 (Tab A). I also probed around to see how the talk could have gotten started, and did a memorandum for Bill Moyers on April 25 (attached Tab B).

10. The next occasion when the matter arose was at Bill Moyers' 30th birthday party -- I believe, Thursday, June 4. I was there informed by Bill and Jack Valenti that you wished me to set down my thoughts on Vietnam. I had to leave that night to give a graduation speech at Haverford before you arrived; but in a long memo to you of June 6, 1964 -- later supplemented with a draft speech -- I explained my views.

11. As you know, I was out of the stream of operations when the decisions were made on the Tonkin Gulf incident. I did happen to be over at the White House that evening. Mac Bundy asked me if I would help Horace Busby on a speech you had to give the next day, August 5, at Syracuse. We pulled out of the files the draft I had done in June and we managed to use some of it in the Syracuse draft.

12. I was not significantly involved again in Vietnam until I came over to work at the White House on April 1, 1966; although I began serious planning of peace negotiations in the last year or so of my work at the Department of State.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

March 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: W. W. Rostow

11a A
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-460
By rip, NARA, Date 6-23-95

Before leaving for a NATO meeting and two speeches in Europe, I should like to add a word to our telephone conversation of last Wednesday evening concerning Viet Nam.

First, I have not seen Elie Abel in many months; and I am quite certain that what I have said in recent background talks to other reporters has not been the reason why my name has come up in public writing about Viet Nam policy. The reason lies in the following passage from a talk I gave in June 1961 at Fort Bragg, which was, of course, appropriately cleared.

"Although as leader of the Free World, the U.S. has special responsibilities which it accepts in this common venture of deterrence, it is important that the whole international community begin to accept its responsibility for dealing with this form of aggression. It is important that the world become clear in mind, for example, that the operation run from Hanoi against Viet-Nam is as clear a form of aggression as the violation of the 38th parallel by the North Korean armies in June 1950. In my conversations with representatives of foreign governments, I am sometimes lectured that this or that government within the Free World is not popular; they tell me that guerrilla warfare cannot be won unless the peoples are dissatisfied. These are, at best, half truths. The truth is that guerrilla warfare, mounted from external bases -- with rights of sanctuary -- is a terrible burden to carry for any government in a society making its way towards

~~TOP SECRET~~

modernization. As you know, it takes somewhere between ten and twenty soldiers to control one guerrilla in an organized operation. Moreover, the guerrilla force has this advantage: its task is merely to destroy; while the government must build and protect what it is building. A guerrilla war mounted from outside a transitional nation, is a crude act of international vandalism. There will be no peace in the world if the international community accepts the outcome of a guerrilla war, mounted from outside a nation, as tantamount to a free election.

"The sending of men and arms across international boundaries and the direction of guerrilla war from outside a sovereign nation is aggression; and this is a fact which the whole international community must confront and whose consequent responsibilities it must accept. Without such international action those against whom aggression is mounted will be driven inevitably to seek out and engage the ultimate source of the aggression they confront.

"I suspect that, in the end, the real meaning of the conference on Laos at Geneva will hinge on this question: it will depend on whether or not the international community is prepared to mount an International Control Commission which has the will and the capacity to control the borders it was designed to control."

Since that time my name has been associated with the proposition that the war in South Viet Nam could not be won unless infiltration from the north was stopped or radically reduced; and this could only be done if Ho Chi Minh were made to pay a price somewhat greater than his venture into Laos and South Viet Nam was worth. This was in fact the conclusion of the Taylor mission of 1961, as you may recall. The most relevant passage from General Taylor's report to President Kennedy, of November 3, 1961, is the following:

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

"While we feel that the program recommended represents those measures which should be taken in our present knowledge of the situation in Southeast Asia, I would not suggest that it is the final word. Future needs beyond this program will depend upon the kind of settlement we obtain in Laos and the manner in which Hanoi decides to adjust its conduct to that settlement. If the Hanoi decision is to continue the irregular war declared on South Vietnam in 1959 with continued infiltration and covert support of guerrilla bands in the territory of our ally, we will then have to decide whether to accept as legitimate the continued guidance, training, and support of a guerrilla war across an international boundary, while the attacked react only inside their borders. Can we admit the establishment of the common law that the party attacked and his friends are denied the right to strike the source of aggression, after the fact of external aggression is clearly established? It is our view that our government should undertake with the Vietnamese the measures outlined herein, but should then consider and face the broader question beyond."

Senator Symington learned of my 1961 view when we talked at Saigon; and, through a TV program of his, Maggie Higgins once wrote a story about it. It was also alluded to when I went before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in secret session in the summer of 1962.

The point here is not whether I have been right or wrong in holding this view. The point is that my connection with this line of thought goes back a long way; and that public references to me arise from that fact, not from any current activity.

Second -- and more important -- I should like to report to you directly what I have done and have not done about this view in recent weeks. This I could not do over the telephone from Colorado.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-4-

When the going got rough in South Viet Nam after the second coun, I launched, after consultation with my colleagues in the Department of State, a preliminary planning exercise in the following terms:

"President Johnson in his State of the Union message said: 'In 1964 we will be better prepared than ever before to defend the cause of freedom whether it is threatened by outright aggression or by the infiltration practiced by those in Hanoi and Havana, who ship arms and men across international borders to foment insurrection.'

"One conceivable way to deal with the Hanoi and Havana problems is by imposing overt, measured sanctions against the source of aggression or convincing the authorities in those capitals that they were likely to suffer such reprisal to the point where they would cease their illegal actions. The purpose of the present exploratory planning exercise is to isolate the critical intelligence, political, psychological, diplomatic and politico-military issues that would have to be faced in executing such a strategy. What is required are the terms of reference for constructing a scenario, not a scenario itself."

When this first cut at the problem was completed, Secretary Rusk directed that we staff the concept out fully for contingency purposes, on an interdepartmental basis. The job was turned over to Bill Sullivan. The Pentagon and other agencies have cooperated wholeheartedly.

I should perhaps underline that, like all planning operations, the objective was not to make policy but to set out the problems and possibilities so that, at a later time, those bearing senior responsibility in the Government, and most notably yourself, would be in a position to make a final judgment.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-5-

In neither of these exercise did I take a personal part, except to insure that all the tough issues would be surfaced. I wished to ensure that the staff work would be done by men not committed to a particular conclusion. I temporarily surrendered to Bill Sullivan for this purpose one of my ablest -- but also one of my most skeptical -- men.

What I wish you to know is that neither with the press nor within your Administration have I been conducting a personal crusade. I have been trying to assure what I presume the taxpayer and you wish me to assure; namely, that contingency plans are prepared in advance of crises so that, in the event, you will have the benefit of the most careful forethought possible.

I do, of course, have convictions about the war in Southeast Asia, which have developed over a decade of experience and thought. I do not believe a guerrilla war can be won with as open a frontier as that which now exists in South Viet Nam. These views I have shared with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and General Taylor. I should be pleased to lay them before you if there were an appropriate occasion.

But I wish you to be confident that I am trying to serve as a planner in your Administration, not as advocate of a policy which is not yours.

In this connection, as I have indicated to both Mac Bundy and Bill Moyers, I hope the time will come soon when you arrange your own connection with the planning process. President Eisenhower used the device of NSC meetings on planning subjects, which were, in my view, excessively costly in time and paper work. President Kennedy read planning papers over weekends and arranged that I saw him every few months to catch up on the planning business. You will undoubtedly wish to make your own arrangements to which, as you know, the whole community of men engaged in planning will eagerly conform.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

April 25, 1964

TO: Mr. Bill Moyers
FROM: W. W. Rostow
SUBJECT: Inquest on an Incident.

This is a note for the record. It should only be referred to the President if, in your judgment, it would interest him or be otherwise helpful.

I've gone into it because I know how painful press distortions of a President's views can be and wished to find out, if I could, what had produced a response in the press beyond the President's words or intent.

* * *

When the President called me at Aspen on March 4, he obviously felt that things I might have said to newspapermen had converted his West Coast statement about a "deeply dangerous game" into a commitment to a policy of pressure on the North -- a commitment he had not made then or now. As the attached memorandum to him indicates, I was confident that nothing I had said, in fact, had contributed to that view in the press. In routine background talks over previous weeks I simply outlined the alternatives, as I had for some time when questioned about Southeast Asia. Since my own convictions were familiar to those with whom I talked -- and were known as maverick views -- there was no question of my imputing a policy to the President.

I have since assembled virtually all the Viet Nam clippings over the relevant period in an effort to establish what it might have been that gave the President's phrase of February 21 a second-stage booster.

TOP SECRET

This memorandum may be declassified when Top Secret memorandum is detached.

116

B

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

A good part of the answer lies, I believe, in probably coincidental leaks in Saigon of plans to carry the war to the North. On February 22 Keyes Beech and Richard Hughes filed the attached despatches, both published in the Washington Post on February 23. On Monday, February 24, Joe Alsop was able to build on these; and a noisy ten days were under way.

Enclosures

Memo to the President
dated March 9, 1964.

Clipping - Washington Post,
Feb. 23, 1964, by Keyes Beech.

Clipping - Washington Post,
Feb. 23, 1964, by Richard Hughes.

Clipping - Washington Post,
Feb. 24, 1964 - Joseph Alsop.

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~

Matter of Fact

By Joseph Alsop

11c

Viet Blockade Possible

REPORTS from Saigon assert that a plan is under consideration to carry the war into North Viet-Nam by guerrilla operations. Here in Washington, however, much graver steps are under review, as possible and perhaps inevitable solutions of "Problem Number One," as President Johnson long ago characterized the Vietnamese war.



Alsop

A sea blockade of the real aggressors, the North Vietnamese Communists, is one of the measures being studied and staffed out, albeit only on a contingency basis. If ever ordered, moreover, the blockade will probably be combined with air interdiction of the main road and rail lines entering North Viet-Nam from China.

Air attacks on North Vietnamese industrial centers by the South Vietnamese air force and many other expedients are also being weighed. In reality, the policy makers here are all unanimous that if anything at all is done to change the rules of the war, a guerrilla effort in North Viet-Nam must at best constitute a subsidiary part of a larger and tougher program.

It can be seen, then, why the present review differs from all its many predecessors. Such expedients as a sea and air blockade of North Viet-Nam were never before considered, even theoretically.

Now, however, only one expedient has been firmly ruled out of consideration by the policy makers. Ruled out is the kind of passive surrender to the Communist aggressors, thinly concealed as "neutralization," which has been proposed by Gen. de Gaulle and by Sen. Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.).

THE STRICTLY contingent character of the cur-

rent staff-work must also be strongly emphasized. There is no immediate likelihood of any dramatic development whatever. All measures are being considered solely on the basis of "if, as and when necessary, and only then."

Yet it is a novel and highly significant development that such a measure as an air and sea blockade is being discussed at all. It reflects a great change in Washington. For this change, there are two highly practical reasons.

The most obvious reason is the intensified concern about the situation on the spot, in the aftermath of the second Vietnamese coup d'etat led by Gen. Nguyen Khanh. To this is linked rising concern about the situation in Laos, where Communist breaches of the 1953 truce agreement are becoming more and more flagrant and threatening.

But there is another reason, as well, why the policy-makers are examining a wider range of alternatives than ever before. It relates rather directly to the increasingly outrageous disregard of the Laotian truce terms, of which, it must be remembered, the Soviet Union is a principal guarantor.

FROM THE DAY the truce agreement was signed, it must be said in fairness to Premier Khrushchev, the Soviets in Laos seem to have done their best to assure observation of the truce terms. Their main reward has been defiance from the North Vietnamese, plus the open transfer of allegiance from the Soviets to the Chinese by the local Communists, the Pathet Lao, who are North Vietnamese stooges.

The recent North Vietnamese mission to Moscow, led by Le Duan and Truong Chinh, was obviously sent not only to obtain Soviet aid because of near-famine conditions at home, but also to secure promises of Soviet

support for a more adventurous policy abroad—the policy revealed by the more and more open breaches of the truce agreement.

In both respects, the mission to Moscow clearly failed. Thus North Viet-Nam is now asking for trouble, so to say, with no assurance of external support except from the Chinese Communists.

The Chinese air, naval and even ground forces are in decay, owing to a total supply cut-off ordered in Moscow in 1959. Hence Chinese help to North Viet-Nam is unlikely to be effective at least against limited measures such as an air and sea blockade.

IN SUM the calculations of risk are changing, at the very moment when the need to adopt bold measures seems to be increasing. To this one must add a further factor with real meaning. In brief, more and more converts are being gained to the view that "we can't play this game with two sets of rules, one for us, and one for them."

Originally, no one took this view but the Director of Plans in the State Department, Walt W. Rostow. Yet it is obviously logical. If the rules permit the North Vietnamese to send large numbers of additional troops across the Laos frontier, and to send more and more supplies through Laos to South Viet-Nam — both in flat violation of the agreement they signed — why should we accept rules forbidding an air and sea blockade of the North Vietnamese frontiers?

This double standard has long been tacitly accepted in Southeast Asia. The simple fact of prolonged acceptance undoubtedly increases the risk and difficulty of any change of rules. Yet a change of rules may be forced upon President Johnson, in ways that will be analyzed in a second report.

12

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, May 18, 1968
1:45 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith an account of the Nimbus satellite, with a small nuclear power unit, that went astray off Vandenberg Air Force Base.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-326
By ics, NARA Date 3-3-98

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Postow

2. Keeney

12a



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

18 May 1968
1155 EDT

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: NASA NIMBUS "B" Weather Satellite
(SNAP-19 Power Source)

1. A NIMBUS "B" weather satellite was launched at 4:23 EDT this morning, aboard a THOR-AGENA rocket by the 6595th Aero Test Wing at Vandenberg Air Force Base. Approximately 135 seconds after launch the missile went beyond safety limits following a hard left yaw of the engine. The THOR-AGENA and satellite package were destroyed by the range safety officer. Specific Presidential approval for this flight had been obtained.

2. The NIMBUS "B" contained two SNAP-19 (Space Nuclear Auxilliary Power) 25 watt radioisotope generators to provide electrical power, to augment the solar power. The fuel is Plutonium 238. The generator capsules were designed, and tested, to withstand ocean impact and sea water corrosion. Corrosive action on the fuel capsule would require many years before the fuel itself would be exposed to sea water. In the event the fuel is exposed to the sea water, the fuel would be slowly dispersed and diluted in extremely small amounts, due to its low solubility. Extensive tests have shown that under these ocean conditions the fuel would present no hazard to people or marine life.

3. The NIMBUS "B" impacted 4 miles north of San Miguel Island in 100-150 feet of water. The island is uninhabited.

4. Public Health Service teams are conducting airborne radiation monitoring in the vicinity of the impact area. There has been no indication of airborne contamination.

5. A Navy salvage vessel left Port Hueneme at 0830 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-327
By cb, NARA Date 7-27-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

this morning and will arrive at impact area at 1430 this afternoon and commence search and recovery operations.



W. E. SHEDD
Brigadier General, USA
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

1 Atch
Map


Distribution:

WHSR
SECDEF
DEP SECDEF
CJCS (3)
DJS (3)
ASD/AE
ASD/PA
AEC
DASA
J-30
J-31
J-32
J-33
J-34
WEST HEMISPHERE DIV (J-3)
J-5 (2)
DDO
ADDO
CCOC
SEA AIR OPS
NWS
AOC
AFCP
NFP
MCCC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-327

By CG NARA Date 7-27-99



NIMBUS B IMPACT

PACIFIC

NEELOWE

*Pres file**13*~~SECRET~~ HARVANSaturday, May 18, 1968
12:40 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Harriman's brief account of today's slugfest.

We're clearly deadlocked on reciprocity; and we shall see whether:

-- they stick and test us by seeing how long we can take it, while they try to mount political pressure on us;

-- or, let some third party suggest a face-saving form of reciprocity.

Their choice will be significant. If they hold -- and are in no hurry -- it suggests they are content to enjoy peace and quiet down to the 19th parallel and await political events in Saigon and the U. S.

If something turns up on the side in coming days, it suggests they may be in Paris for serious business.

W W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

(Delto 26)x 82)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-333
By ics, NARA Date 9-8-98



Department of State.

#4
cy Gully Fisher
TELEGRAM
134

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

REB371

PAGE 01 PARIS 14293 181506Z

045470

1968 MAY 13 AM 11:19

51
ACTION SSO 00

INFO /000 W

Z 181450Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1673

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 14293

N O D I S/HARVAN

DELTO 82

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE.

REF PARIS 14240 (DELTO 76)
STATE 165857 (TODEL 108)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 21757
By ics NARA, Date 2-3-98

1. MAY 18 MEETING OPENED 10:30 AM AND ENDED 2:40 PM. THUY ASKED TO SPEAK FIRST AND THEN LAUNCHED INTO A DIATRIBE CONCERNING US OFFENSES AND CRIMES AGAINST NORTH VIET-NAM, SOUTH VIET-NAM, LAOS, CAMBODIA, AND HUMANITY. HE TOOK TWO HOURS FIFTEEN MINUTES TO PRESENT ALL THIS, BEGINNING AND ENDING WITH RIGID STATEMENT THAT PURPOSE OF OUR MEETING WAS TO "DETERMINE" CESSATION OF BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR, AND THEN TO TAKE UP OTHER MATTERS OF INTEREST TO BOTH SIDES.

2. I OPENED WITH NOTES (PARIS 14240), SUPPLEMENTED BY A FEW COMMENTS ON THE INACCURACIES OF THUY'S STATEMENT. I THEN MOVED TO THE DETAILS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY PRESENCE IN-SOUTH VIET-NAM, UTILIZING LARGE PART OF INFO CONTAINED IN STATE 165857, PLUS OTHER INFO CONCERNING THE SPECIFIC NVN REGULAR ARMY UNITS FIGHTING AROUND SAIGON. DRV DEL SQUIRMED VISIBLY DURING THESE REMARKS.

3. I CONTINUED BY ASKING FOR THEIR RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS ON DMZ, LAOS AND CAMBODIA, AND CALLED UPON THEM TO END POLEMICS. I THEN LAID EMPHASIS ON THE PERTINENT SENTENCES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 31 SPEECH, WHICH I STATED WAS THE BASIS FOR OUR MEETING. I CLOSED BY ASKING AGAIN, "WHAT RESTRAINTS WILL YOU

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 14293 181506Z

TAKE TO CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE?"

4. THUY SAID HE WOULD REPLY TO THE QUESTIONS WHICH I HAD PUT TO HIM. HE THEN RESPONDED IN BRIEF FASHIN, NOT REALLY ANSWERING ANY OF MY QUESTIONS. HE STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT THE FIRST THING WHICH HAD TO BE DETERMINED WAS WHEN WE WERE GOING TO STOP THE BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR. HE SAID ONLY AFTER FULFILLING THE REQUIREMENT OF CESSATION OF BOMBING CAN OTHER QUESTIONS BE TAKEN UP. I ASKED HIM TO READ CAREFULLY THE SENTENCES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 31-SPEECH TO WHICH I HAD REFERRED, REITERATING THE DANGER TO US AND ALLIED FORCES. HE SAID IT IS THE US WHICH HAS LAUNCHED ATTACKS ON THE DRV, AND IT IS UP TO THE US TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT. HE AGREED, "THE US CANNOT ASK FOR EVIDENCE OF RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF THE DRV." SINCE WE HAD HIT A HEAD-ON DISAGREEMENT THERE WERE A FEW MOMENTS OF SILENCE. THUY THEN SAID HE HAD NOTHING FURTHER TO SAY TODAY AND SUGGESTED WE ADJOURN. HE ASKED WHEN WE WOULD LIKE TO MEET AGAIN, AND I SUGGESTED WEDNESDAY MAY 22, TO WHICH HE AGREED.
HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

Pres file

Saturday, May 18, 1968 -- 11:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

My brother Gene has a son named Charles Nicholas Restow. He has just been accepted at Yale.

In a younger generation filled with skeptics and critics, he has been a redoubtable supporter of President Johnson on Vietnam and everything else.

Gene wonders if, at some moment convenient to you, he might bring in Nick to shake your hand?

W. W. Restow

Yes _____

No _____

Call me _____

WWRostow:rln

Pres file
15

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, May 18, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bob Ginsburgh's reflections on Bunker
and Taylor's propositions are worth reading.

I agree with them -- notably marked passages.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb, 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 6-2-92

INFORMATION

15a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thurs., May 16, 1968
1:00 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

*David
10/16*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Harriman and Vance counsel delay on bombing between the 19th and 20th parallels to see if they can smoke out a DMZ proposition over the weekend.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-323
By us, NARA Date 10-5-98

INFORMATION

Saturday, May 18, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Possibility of Science Agreement with Australia during Prime Minister Gorton visit

The Australians have had an interdepartment meeting on this subject. They felt that in view of the short time before Gorton's arrival here, it was best to content ourselves with a paragraph in the communique about science co-operation and our intent to seek ways to increase it.

We have worked out informally with the Australian Embassy here language for the communique, if the Australian cabinet accepts the Departmental recommendation. On the other hand, if Gorton decides he wants to sign an agreement while in Washington, we have a working draft which we think can be quickly negotiated with the Australians.

Whether we go the agreement or the communique route, Dr. Hornig expects to go out to Australia this fall with a team of American scientists to follow up on the Gorton visit.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-333
By WS, NARA Date 9-8-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MWright:wpt

Friday, May 17, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Participation with Foreign Visitors

We are following up on your preference to make upcoming visits by Chiefs of State and Heads of Government as businesslike and non-ceremonial as possible -- especially in terms of the scheduling of your own time through eliminating second office meetings and return receptions hosted by the visitor.

The second office meetings and return receptions are the distinguishing element of State Visits -- as contrasted with Official Visits which generally do not include such participation by you.

You had previously approved four State Visits (President Thieu, the Ruler of Kuwait, President Frei of Chile, and President Leoni of Venezuela) for the balance of the year. Of these visits, the chances of scheduling either President Frei or President Leoni, are slim indeed. You would, therefore, only participate in two State Visits.

1. President Thieu -- June 18-19 -- In view of the special relationship between our two governments, this is the only visit that I suggest you go through with both the second office meeting and the return reception. Thieu will be the first Chief of State visitor since your decision. Everyone will be very alert to any indications of disagreement between you. His is not the right visit on which to inaugurate a new policy of not attending return receptions.*

Approve second office meeting _____

Disapprove _____

Return reception:

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

2. Ruler of Kuwait -- August 7-8 -- We had already told our Ambassador to avoid mention of a second office meeting. There should be no problem, therefore, about that. What is at stake in this case is the return reception. I do not believe we have mentioned this to the Kuwaitis yet (State is checking). But the main problem, as with most of the smaller countries, is their sincere feeling that it just isn't friendly of them not to return your hospitality. In these visits where the atmosphere

* We have indications he will compare his reception with Diem's.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *W. P. ...* NARA, Date 7-22-97

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

of friendship is more important than substance, it's easy to eliminate an office meeting, but it creates irritation when we start cutting back on the display of warm feelings. This has often been a cause of unpleasantness in the planning of visits where you do not attend a return function. But, of course, all of this is manageable.

Leave the return reception on the schedule _____

Eliminate it _____

While the visit of Prime Minister Gorton does not come under the category of State Visits (it is an Official Visit to the US), you previously approved a second office meeting. That has already been discussed with the Australians. Dropping it now would certainly be misinterpreted by the Australians. Also it runs counter to your assurance to them that you would find some way to give the visit a tone of special cordiality. No return reception is involved.

Second office meeting okay _____

Drop it _____

All the other visits you have approved (comprehensive list is found at Tab A) are Official Visits -- either to Washington or to the US -- and consequently do not involve your participation either in a second office meeting or a return reception. Probably other visits will be recommended to you as time goes on. We will, however, make every effort to present these recommendations as Official Visits, rather than State Visits -- thus concentrating your participation into one day.

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN VISITOR SCHEDULE

		<u>Type</u>	<u>Announced</u>
Prime Minister Gorton, Australia	May 27-28	Official to US	4/17
President Trejos, Costa Rica	June 4	Official to Wash.	5/11
President Thieu Vietnam	June 18-19	State	
Shah of Iran	June 12	Private 12:30 PM Office meeting 1 PM Lunch	
President Frei, Chile	(July 24+25)	State	
Ruler of Kuwait	(Aug 7-8)	State	
President Tombalbaye, Chad	(Aug 21)	Official to Wash.	
Prime Minister Barrow Barbados	(Sept. 11)	Official to Wash.	
Prime Minister Bakkush, Libya	(Sept. 25)	Official to Wash.	
President Diaz Ordaz Mexico	(Oct.)	Amistad Dam	
President Pacheco, Uruguay	(Oct. 23)	Official to Wash.	
Prime Minister Hoveyda, Iran	(Dec. 4)	Official to US	
President Leoni, Venezuela	(Dec. 11-12)	State	

Note: Parenthesis -- visitor has not yet accepted these dates

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Authority State letter 9-11-95

By JW, NARA. Date 7-24-97

Pres file

ACTION

Saturday, May 18, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to New Zealand on Coral Sea Celebration

A couple of weeks ago you signed a message for use in connection with the Australian celebration of the Coral Sea victory. This' celebration is also lavishly observed in New Zealand as the symbol of friendship with the United States. The New Zealand celebration is about to take place and State recommends you approve the attached message.

I recommend you approve.

V. W. Rostow

Att

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

STATE:MWright:wpt

SUGGESTED MESSAGE

To the New Zealand-American Association and the English-Speaking Union:

More than a quarter century has passed since the Battle of the Coral Sea. With the passage of time the partnership which joined us together in those dark days has broadened and deepened. Today, our soldiers are once again fighting shoulder to shoulder in the cause of freedom. And today we share a common vision of a new Asia, an Asia which consists of progressive, prosperous, independent states, working together to provide and protect a better life for their people. In the effort to make this great vision come true the old friendships grow firmer, and the old enmities are submerged.

In our growing partnership, organizations such as the New Zealand-American Association and the English-Speaking Union continue to play an important role, through many activities promoting ever closer relations between our two countries on opposite sides of the Pacific. I salute you for your fine contribution. I would like to extend my personal greetings and warm good wishes to you and all the people of New Zealand on the occasion of this year's Coral Sea celebration.

Lyndon B. Johnson

19

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 17, 1968
7:15 p.m.

Pres. file

Mr. President:

Via a Vallarino-Arias deal the voice
of the people may yet be heard in Panama!

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-333
By isa, NARA Date 9-8-98

WWRostow:rln

19a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ Friday - May 17, 1968
6:00 pm

NOTE FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Panama Situation

The attached report from Chuck Adair, plus the CIA Report, strongly suggest that Vallarino is shifting toward Arias, and a political deal may be in the works under which Arias would be permitted to take the Presidency subject to certain guarantees for the Guard and the Eleta interests.

WGB
WGBowdler

Attachments

Panama's 3395, 5/17.



SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-338 (#204a)
By isl, NARA, Date 7-9-10

Rec'd Ltr 4/7
198

RECEIVED
WHCA

UNCLASSIFIED 1968 MAY 17 19 30

~~SECRET~~ HC2597

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-336 (# 2046)
By isl, NARA, Date 4-8-10

PAGE 01 P-,-.- 33395 171921Z

45
ACTION SS 72

INFO SSO 32, NSCE 30, USIE 23, CCO 23, CIAE 33, /J72 W

0 171333Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4056

~~SECRET~~ PANAMA 3395

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: ARIAS/VALLARINO MEETING

1. CHIVCHORRO CARLES CAME IN TO SEE ME THIS MORNING TO REPORT FOLLOWING IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE. HE CONFIRMED REPORT WE HAD RECEIVED EARLIER THAT ARNULFO ARIAS AND GENERAL VALLARINO MET LAST NIGHT. MEETING TOOK PLACE IN PRESENCE SEVERAL OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS OF HU, INCLUDING CARLES, BUT ARIAS AND VALLARINO ALSO YET ALONE FOR ABOUT 45 MINUTES.
2. ACCORDING TO CARLES, ARIAS AGREED: 1) TO MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND APPOINT A COMMANDER FROM WITHIN THE RANKS. (NO DISCUSSION DURING THE TIME OTHERS PRESENT CONCERNING POSITION OF VALLARINO HIMSELF.) 2) THERE WOULD BE NO POLITICAL REPRISALS.
3. VALLARINO AGREED: 1) TO ENSURE NEUTRALITY OF THE GUARD.
2) THE GUARD WOULD UNDERTAKE TO SEE THAT NO RIGGING OF OFFICIAL "ACTAS" WOULD BE PERMITTED (ACCORDING TO CARLES, THOSE "ACTAS" IN GUARD'S HANDS WILL THUS PRESUMABLY BE TURNED OVER TO THE NATIONAL ELECTION BOARD.) 3) TO ACCEPT AS FINAL THE FINDINGS AS ANNOUNCED BY THE NATIONAL ELECTION BOARD. (A COMMUNIQUE TO THIS EFFECT IS TO BE MADE PUBLIC BY VALLARINO THE EVENING OF MAY 17 OR THE MORNING OF MAY 18.) 4) TO TRANSFER FROM THEIR PRESENT DUTY STATIONS THOSE MEMBERS OF THE GUARD WHO ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN UNLAWFUL ELECTORAL ACTIVITY IN A MOVE TO REDUCE PUBLIC TENSION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.
4. UPON MEETING ARIAS, VALLARINO ALLEGEDLY SAID, "DOCTOR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 32 PANAMA 05395 171921Z

ARIAS, THIS IS OUR FIRST MEETING IN SIXTEEN YEARS." MEETING WAS CORDIAL THROUGHOUT AND, ACCORDING TO CARLES, AT ONE POINT VALLARINO ACKNOWLEDGED TO ARIAS THAT HE HAD WON THE ELECTION.

5. WHEN ASKED WHAT GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO FOREGOING MIGHT BE, CARLES SAID ROZLES WOULD PROBABLY ATTEMPT TO REPLACE VALLARINO AS COMMANDANT. HE SAID MOST PROBABLE VALLARINO REACTION WOULD BE TO REFUSE TO ACCEPT DISMISSAL AND THEN TO RECOGNIZE DELVALLE AS PRESIDENT.

6. WE HAVE INDICATION [REDACTED] THAT GOVERNMENT MOVE TO REPLACE VALLARINO MAY BE ATTEMPTED TODAY.

3.3
(b)(1)

GP-1. ADAIR

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY
IN 13409 19c

PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

STATE/INR CE NMCC/MC (CECOEF) JCS ARMY NAVY AIR 25/11/AF/11 NIC NSA SDO ONE CRE
EXO CE FBI OEN FDIS DC9 IRS AID USIA

May 17 4 25/11/AF/11

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SECRET

171918Z

CITE

3.4(b)(1)

DIST 17 MAY 1968

COUNTRY: PANAMA

DOI: 17 MAY 1968

SUBJECT: SITREP AS OF 130 HOURS LOCAL TIME

ACQ:

SOURCE:

[Redacted]

3.4(b)(1)

1. AS OF 0930 HOURS ON 17 MAY THE NATIONAL GUARD (GN) STILL HAD NO CLUES AS TO THE KILLER OF A GN CORPORAL THE PREVIOUS NIGHT IN DOWNTOWN PANAMA CITY. [Redacted]

[Redacted] STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE IDENTITY OF THE KILLER APPEARING IN NEWS MEDIA CONTROLLED BY THE OPPOSING POLITICAL FACTIONS ARE FALSE. [Redacted] COMMENT: BOTH THE PRO-ARIAS AND THE PRO-SANUDIO MEDIA ARE CLAIMING THAT THE ASSASSILANT IS KNOWN AND BELONGED TO A GCON SQUAD OF THE OTHER SIDE.) SOME SHOTS WERE ALSO FIRED IN THE VICINITY OF THE HOTEL PANAMA IN THE EARLY MORNING OF 17 MAY, BUT NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED TO THE GN. [Redacted]

3.4(b)(1)

3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-188
By SJ, NARA, Date 12-02

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

(dissem controls)

3.4(b)(1)

2. GENERAL VALLARINO CALLED A MEETING OF HIS OFFICERS ON 16 MAY AT THE COMMANDANCIA. ATTENDING WERE ALL THE OFFICERS STATIONED IN PANAMA CITY AND ENVIRONS. AT THE MEETING VALLARINO SAID THAT HE WANTED ALL OF HIS OFFICERS TO UNDERSTAND THAT HE WAS IN COMMAND OF THE GN AND THAT HIS COMMANDS WOULD BE OBEYED. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HENCEFORTH NO GN OFFICER WOULD MIX IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION. ANY OFFICER FOUND DOING SO WOULD BE DEALT WITH IMMEDIATELY AND HARSHLY. THE GN WOULD MAINTAIN ITS POSITION OF NEUTRALITY AND NO OFFICER WOULD ATTEMPT TO DEVIATE FROM THAT POSITION. VALLARINO ENDED THE MEETING BY SAYING THAT IF THERE WERE ANY OFFICERS IN DISAGREEMENT, THEY COULD LEAVE THE GN. NONE OF THE OFFICERS INDICATED ANY DISAGREEMENT WITH VALLARINO'S STATEMENTS.

3.4(b)(1)

3. ON THE NIGHT OF 16 MAY VALLARINO REITERATED THE ABOVE INFORMATION AND EXPRESSED HIS INTENTION TO NOTIFY ON 17 MAY ALL OF HIS ZONE COMMANDERS THAT THEY WERE TO BE COMPLETELY IMPARTIAL. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT PERMIT THE GN TO BE USED FOR POLITICAL GAIN BY EITHER THE NU OR THE AP. HE SAID IF HE HAD TO DO IT OVER AGAIN, HE WOULD RAID THE AP HEADQUARTERS AS WELL AS THE NU. HE SAID HE DID NOT LIKE TO SEE THE SPLIT IN PANAMA POLITICS (MEANING THE

3.4(b)(1)

②

~~SECRET~~

3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~
(classification)[REDACTED]
(dissem controls)

BREAKING AWAY OF THE DISSIDENT PARTIES IN THE FORMER GOVERNMENT COALITION) AND THAT, IN FACT, HE HAD MORE TRUE FRIENDS ON THE NU SIDE THAN ON THE AP SIDE. COMMENTING ON THE MURDER OF THE GN CORPORAL, HE SAID IT WOULD NOT SURPRISE HIM IF IT HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY PRO-GOVERNMENT PERSONS TRYING TO PUT THE BLAME ON THE NU AND THUS PROVOKING THE GN TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE NU. [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

4. ON THE MORNING OF 16 MAY THE ELETAS AND GENERAL VALLARINO MET WITH SOME REPUBLICAN PARTY LEADERS TO TRY TO WORK OUT A DEAL. THE ELETAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ARNULFO ARIAS HAD WON THE ELECTION BY A FAIRLY BIG MARGIN AND SAID THEY WERE WILLING TO ACKNOWLEDGE SAMUDIO'S DEFEAT OVER RADIO AND TV IF THEY WERE GUARANTEED IMMUNITY FOR THEMSELVES AND THEIR COMMERCIAL INTERESTS. THE GN WOULD GUARANTEE THE AGREEMENT. IT WOULD ALSO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT VALLARINO WOULD STEP DOWN WITH HIS SUCCESSOR BEING APPOINTED FROM WITHIN THE GUARD AND THAT THE RANK STRUCTURE WOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. THE MAIN ONES WHO WOULD LOSE OUT UNDER SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE SAMUDIO, JOAQUIN FRANCO, AND THEIR COLLABORATORS, SO QUITE NATURALLY THEY

[REDACTED] 3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

③

3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~
(Classification)[REDACTED]
(Dissem controls)

WOULD PREFER A COUP D'ETAT IF NECESSARY. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER ARNULFO ARIAS WILL ACCEPT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT AND IT WILL BE UP TO THE REPUBLICANS AND OTHER DISSIDENT PARTY LEADERS TO TRY TO CONVINCHE HIM. [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

5. AT ABOUT 1800 HOURS ON 16 MAY MRS VALLARINO, ACTING WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE GENERAL, DISCUSSED WITH INOCENCIO GALINDO, ANIBAL GALINDO, HARRY STRUNZ, AND PABLO THAYER (ALL RELATIVES OF THE VALLARINOS AND NU SUPPORTERS) THE GENERAL'S CONVICTION THAT ARNULFO ARIAS HAS WON THE ELECTION AND THE GENERAL'S FEARS REGARDING PROBABLE PERSECUTION OF THE GN AND FRIENDS SUCH AS THE ELETA BROTHERS BY ARIAS. SHE AGREED TO A PROPOSAL THAT JUAN DE ARCO GALINDO, NU LEADER WHO WAS NOT AT THE MEETING, APPROACH ARIAS ON 17 MAY TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION AND SECURE THE REQUIRED ASSURANCES. [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

6. REPORTEDLY, EARLY ON THE MORNING OF 17 MAY VALLARINO AND HIS TWO DEPUTY COMMANDERS MET WITH ARNULFO ARIAS, AUGUSTO "SAMY" BOYD, JUAN DE ARCO GALINDO, AND RUBEN CARLES AT THE HOME OF STRUNZ. THE MEETING WAS CORDIAL, AND VALLARINO REPORTEDLY SAID HE WOULD RECOGNIZE ARIAS AS PRESIDENT-ELECT. IF THE RESULTS SHOWED ARIAS HAD WON THE GN WOULD ACCEPT THIS AS THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE. ARIAS SAID HE WOULD TAKE NO RETALIATORY ACTION AGAINST THE GN, SAID HE WANTED THE GN TO REMAIN NEUTRAL, AND THAT THE GN SHOULD ARREST ALL THOSE WHO COMMIT [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~④
3.4(b)(1)




3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

[Redacted]
(dissem controls)

CRIMES, WHETHER THEY BE AP OR NI SUPPORTERS.

3.4(b)(1)



7. [Redacted] GENERAL VALLARINO IS

SLOWLY ISOLATING THE RAPIDLY PRO-SAMUDIO GROUP WITHIN THE

GN. (FIELD COMMENT: THIS OBSERVATION [Redacted] MAY NOT BE

ENTIRELY OBJECTIVE [Redacted]

3.4(b)(1)


[Redacted] IT IS GENERALLY

CONSISTENT, HOWEVER, WITH OTHER REPORTING TO THE EFFECT

THAT VALLARINO IS TRYING TO MOVE INTO A NEUTRAL POSITION WHILE

THE TORRIJOS CLIQUE IS TRYING TO FORCE THE GN TO STAND FIRM

BEHIND SAMUDIO.)



3.4(b)(1)

THE PRINCIPAL MEMBERS

OF THE PRO-SAMUDIO GROUP NOW ARE TORRIJOS, PUBLIC RELATIONS

OFFICER "BOBBY" HERNANDEZ, MAJOR FRED BOYD, AND MAJOR JUAN

BERNAL. MAJOR RAMIRO SILVERA, WHO HAS ACTED AS A GO-BETWEEN,

HAS SLIPPED TO THE EDGE OF THE GROUP.



3.4(b)(1)

5

[REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

[REDACTED]
(dissem controls)

[REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

3. ARNULFO ARIAS IS VERY CONFIDENT AND STATES THAT A SOLUTION TO THE PRESENT DIFFICULT POLITICAL SITUATION HAS BEEN FOUND. HE PREDICTED THAT THE GN WOULD ISSUE A COMMUNIQUE WITHIN 24 HOURS EXPRESSING ITS WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE DECISION OF THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS BOARD AS TO THE FUTURE PRESIDENT OF PANAMA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE CONSIDERS VALLARINO TO BE IN CONTROL OF THE NATIONAL GUARD CIIING AS AN EXAMPLE A REPORT THAT LT. COL. OMAR TORRIJOS HAD BEEN OFFERED THE POSITION OF COMMANDANT BUT HAD IMMEDIATELY REPORTED THE OFFER TO VALLARINO. [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

9. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, PANCANAL, CINCSO, CINCLANT.

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

ACTION

SECRET

Pres file

Friday, May 17, 1968 - 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's message to Amb. Bruce for presentation to UK Foreign Minister Stewart in preparation for his Moscow discussions.

It is a solid piece of work and reflects Sec. Rusk's thoughts on how we should proceed over a wide range of issues.

W. W. Rostow

Approved ✓ *5/18/68*

Amended _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 6-2-92

~~**SECRET**~~

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Amembassy LONDON IMMEDIATE

INFO: Amembassy PARIS " "
MOSCOW " "

STATE TODEL

NODIS/HARVAN

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 21743
By jis NARA, Date 2-3-98

1. You should convey following points to Stewart as our suggestions for his Moscow discussions and as a personal message from me. Please report reaction.

2. Role of Co-Chairmen. I assume one of the matters Stewart will necessarily explore will be how the Soviets (as well as the British) expect to play a role as the Paris talks unfold. In this sense, the mere fact that Soviets have invited Stewart -- ^{rejecting} after long period of ~~delaying anything~~ even in the appearance of serious action by the Co-Chairmen -- must suggest that they have this very much on their own minds. Moreover, Stewart should know that Soviet representatives in Paris have indicated a desire to stay very closely posted on the talks from the US side -- as we assume they are already doing on the Hanoi side. (Dobrynin

EA: WJGuncy; bma 5/17/68

4235b

The Secretary

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

G • Mr. Bohlen

S/S- Mr. Read
White House - Mr. Rostow~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

implied fairly close Soviet contact with Hanoi in a conversation with us this week.) In other words, Soviets clearly contemplate a close watching brief and remaining in a position ^{to} offer advice to Hanoi as their own, though -- so far as we can detect -- no desire whatever to act as a channel, which is in accordance with their past position.

3. Question beyond this is whether Soviets are now giving any thought to action by Co-Chairmen to convene any form of conference. We have steadily assumed that Hanoi does not wish a "Geneva Conference" (even with some ~~in~~ changes in membership) on Vietnam; GVN would certainly be very skeptical of this, and so would we, because of both Chinese and French roles that would be implied. (We suspect Stewart could be ^{with} sympathetic/in our desire to minimize French role at least for the present.) Hence, while Stewart might quietly be trying to find out whether there is any change in Soviet view, we hope he will not encourage any thought of such action at the present time. It seems to us clearly wiser that talks proceed on private bilateral basis, expanding at the appropriate time to include GVN. (For Stewart's private information, we have in mind a "your side/our side" format that would handle the NLF problem without recognition of any claims for ~~an~~ status on their part, and we have basic GVN concurrence in this plan.) Such talks would come to grips with ~~our~~ all major issues, possibly with internal political

~~SECRET~~

structure in SVN handled in some fashion by South Vietnamese away from the table. Point is that we could visualize some wider conference as being useful only at a much later stage, when it is necessary to firm up supervision, posture of countries outside the area, and similar matters. This seems to fit with Hanoi's own view distinguishing between "talks" or "conversations" (their present term) and "negotiations".

4. While discouraging any possibility of this sort, we clearly believe that Co-Chairmen can and should have continuing quiet role, and it is in line with ~~this~~ ^{this} belief that we are keeping British closely informed and also staying in touch with Soviets.

5. DMZ and Laos. However, we do feel most strongly that key to ~~stopping~~ stopping the bombing may well lie in restoration of the DMZ and in compliance by both sides with the Laos Accords. We hope Stewart can strongly urge Soviets that these would be sound actions that could produce real confidence in an atmosphere of good faith through the talks -- as well as having the major advantage that they would operate on a self-explanatory basis and without necessary admission on Hanoi's part that it is breaching the DMZ or violating the Laos Accords. Thus, we strongly hope Stewart can urge these steps on the Soviets, on their merits alone.

~~SECRET~~

6. Moreover, Co-Chairmen as such could have major role in making ^{or} explicit/~~xxx~~ tacit agreement on these points practically effective. In case of DMZ, restoration of ICC presence in DMZ would be significant step forward, and Co-Chairmen could play major role in initiating this -- ~~xxx~~ perhaps quietly. We should note, however, that studies both by us and by the Canadians (who of course proposed this last April) make it clear that even a broadly effective ICC presence in DMZ requires both additional forces and additional equipment (helicopters) if it is to provide a real confidence level that DMZ is being respected.

7. In the case of Laos, Co-Chairmen again could initiate far more effective ICC action than has ever existed, to provide confidence that 1962 Agreements were being respected. In this connection, we have of course repeatedly supported the idea of the Co-Chairmen reconvening the Geneva Conference on Laos. We would remain favorable to this possibility, but it may ~~xxxxx~~ be more effective in the present scene not to have a separate diplomatic envelope -- which could confuse the picture -- but rather to have the Co-Chairmen prepared to act within their precat ~~xxxxx~~ ~~xxxxx~~ ~~xxxxx~~.

8. The DMZ and Laos issues of course relate directly to the ~~xxxxxx~~ business in Paris of seeing whether we can ~~xxx~~ get a satisfactory picture of future ~~xxxxxx~~ restraint on the other side, to permit

5

London, Paris, Moscow

~~SECRET~~

us to stop the bombing totally. We remain prepared to take this action, but Stewart should understand clearly that the extraordinarily high level of infiltration in recent months -- apparently continuing and possibly increasing since March 31 -- plus the significant and predominantly North Vietnamese military actions in the South (including the attack on Saigon) have created a very different picture than might have been thought to exist at the time the President spoke in San Antonio -- or even when Secretary Clifford mentioned a "normal" rate of infiltration in January. He should know that we have already made these points forcefully to the Soviets, together with our clear conclusion that we need as a minimum a "strong impression" that Hanoi really will exercise restraints that would permit the talks to continue in an atmosphere of good faith and without Hanoi trying to shoot its way to mid victory. Whatever the semantics of the San Antonio formula, its basic objective was to produce a situation in which we could be confident that Hanoi use a bombing cessation to was not seeking to change the military balance in its favor. The events circumstances of recent months have necessarily made us more insistent on both a high level of confidence and on fairly specific elements of at least tacit understanding. Hence, our urging that restoration of the HZ and compliance with the Laos Accords be clear examples of the kinds of restraint we would need.

~~SECRET~~

9. Soviet Action in the event we stopped the bombing. In addition to the question of what Hanoi would do if we stopped the bombing totally, we remain also deeply concerned about what the Soviets will do. ~~Stax~~ Stewart should know that in various conversations, we have had suggestions that our stopping the bombing would at least change in degree the Soviet commitment to support North Vietnam fully with military equipment. We have never been able to pin this down, or in particular to determine whether the Soviets would alter not only their supply of military equipment relevant to the defense of the North (which would tend to ~~drop~~ drop automatically) or would actually cut back on the major quantities of sophisticated equipment (as well as trucks and POL) that they have been sending in the past year for use in the South and in moving men and equipment to the South at the levels we have seen in the past 5 - 6 months. We urge that Stewart strongly take the line that, if we are to stop the bombing totally, the Soviets should play their part in moving toward de-escalation by cutting back not only their military supplies to the North but their supplies and related equipment that go to the South and are related to movement toward the South.

10. Nature of an ultimate settlement. The above points of course relate to the question of stopping the bombing. On the wider

3

London, Paris, Moscow

~~SECRET~~

question of a political settlement, we have already tried in Paris to identify apparent areas of at least verbal agreement concerning the status of South Vietnam and the Geneva Accords -- and we assume Stewart is familiar with Harriman's statement of May 15 on these subjects. In addition, Harriman is hitting hard in the Paris talks on the presence of NVA forces in the South, and the absurdity of Hanoi's persistent denial of this fact. It seems obvious that we will not be able to come to grips with such an issue as troop withdrawal unless Hanoi in some fashion concedes the fact of its military (and subversive) forces being in the South. All these are points on which we urge Stewart to support the reasonableness of our position, and to urge the Soviets to exert what influence they can on Hanoi to make progress possible.

11. On the question of the future internal structure of the South, Stewart should be familiar with our position, as outlined by Harriman in Paris and in my statement of this week, referring in turn to the communication between the President and Thieu in Canberra. For his information, while the Soviets have paid lip-service to Hanoi's coalition position -- based on the NLF program -- they have also evinced interest at some levels in procedures such as supervised elections that go beyond any position we are yet prepared to take but that could eventually be consistent with our basic principle of free political

~~SECRET~~

choice. We do not repeat not urge that Stewart try to get deeply into this subject. However, if it is raised on the Soviet side, we hope that he can support our basic position of free political choice by all South Vietnamese (the President's March 31 speech), and perhaps go on to ask whether the Soviets have any ideas that would be consistent with this principle.

As
 12. Cambodia. RE Stewart will have noted, Harriman included respect for the territorial integrity and neutrality ^{of} Cambodia in his May 15 proposals. We hope that Stewart can at least mention this point in two senses: first, that such a respect by both sides would be a major step forward, with an appropriate role for the Co-Chairman and the ICC in watching over it. Secondly, that even if this cannot be achieved at an early point, the proposals for strengthening the ICC that we have consistently backed (and on which Wilson was briefed in January before going to Moscow) remain valid and could be rapidly implemented if the Soviets backed them and exerted the influence they obviously possess with the Poles and to a lesser degree the Indians. In other words, we hope Stewart will not repeat not overlook the Cambodian issue, even though it is of lesser major significance than the others described above.

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

9

UK LONDON, PARIS, MOSCOW

~~SECRET~~

13. UK representatives have inquired whether member of Paris delegation can go to London on Monday or Tuesday to brief British delegation before its departure. Please advise Stewart that we have raised this question with the delegation and we/have word from Paris shortly about whether this is feasible in light of schedule of talks early next week.

GP-3 END

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-333
By is, NARA Date 9-8-98

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 17, 1968 -- 6:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Harriman's redraft of his approach to the third meeting. As you see, he stays with the DMZ and simply puts again the question marked on page 3.

Sec. Rusk is quite content with this stonewalling formulation at this stage.

it would be
[If I were to make a suggestion that he repeat once again for the record the positive propositions made in the first meeting and the areas of potential agreement isolated in the second meeting. Although Hanoi was stung by the latter and called them "areas of disagreement," I believe for the record we should hold up before Hanoi and the world these two considerable constructive elements in our approach.]

[we suggest that you

I regret that your urgent clearance is again required this evening so that Harriman can proceed in the morning, which is not very far away in Paris.

W. W. Rostow

Cable cleared _____
Cable cleared as amended _____
Suggest that Harriman repeat positive elements
No _____
Call me _____

~~SECRET~~

Paris 14240



Department of State

#1 214

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

REA341

PAGE 01 PARIS 14240 171713Z

45
ACTION SSO 00

INFO /000 W

Z 171618Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1643

04288
1968 MAY 17 PM 1 28

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 21780
By us NARA, Date 2-3-98

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 14240

N O D I S/HARVAN

DELTO 76

REF: STATE 165860 (TODEL 109)

SUBJECT: REDRAFT OF APPROACH TO THIRD MEETING

ACTION COPY

FOLLOWING IS OUR REDRAFT OF THE OUTLINE OF AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN'S OPENING REMARKS FOR MAY 18 MEETING.

1. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT THESE MEETINGS CAN PROVE TO BE A FORUM FOR A MEANINGFUL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS OVER THE ISSUES WHICH WE MUST SOLVE HERE IF PEACE IS TO COME TO VIET-NAM. IN THIS SPIRIT, I WILL TRY TO KEEP MY OPENING REMARKS SHORT AND AVOID A POINT-BY-POINT DENIAL OF YOUR POLEMICAL ALLEGATIONS WHICH I HAVE REJECTED ALREADY AND WHICH I NOW REJECT AGAIN.
2. YOU HAVE CHARGED US WITH DELIBERATE DESTRUCTION OF NON-MILITARY TARGETS IN NORTH VIET-NAM. WE DENY THESE CHARGES, AND BELIEVE THAT THEY SHOULD RECEIVE AN IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION. SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT SUCH AN INVESTIGATION BE MADE BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS. ON AUGUST 19, 1965, SEPTEMBER 24, 1965, AND SEPTEMBER 30, 1966, WE SUGGESTED IN WRITING TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS THAT THEY CONDUCT A "THOROUGH AND IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION." EACH TIME THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIET-NAM REJECTED THE PROPOSAL. NOW THAT YOU HAVE AGAIN MADE THESE SAME

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 14240 171713Z

CHARGES, WE SUGGEST ONCE AGAIN THAT SUCH AN INVESTIGATION BE MADE BY THE ICRC OR ANOTHER IMPARTIAL INTERNATIONAL AGENCY.

3. YOU HAVE ALSO CHARGED US WITH THE USE OF "TOXIC GAS." THIS IS NOT TRUE. WE HAVE NOT USED TOXIC GAS IN VIET-NAM.

4. YOUR EXCELLENCY, I SHOULD ALSO LIKE TO ANSWER THE CHARGE YOU HAVE MADE THAT IT WAS THE UNITED STATES WHICH HAD VIOLATED THE STATUS OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE. IT WAS NORTH VIET-NAM WHICH FIRST VIOLATED THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, USING IT AS A ROUTE OF INFILTRATION FOR ITS TROOPS, AS A BASE FOR STORAGE OF SUPPLIES AND THE STATIONING OF ARTILLERY, INCLUDING ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS, AND AS A SANCTUARY FROM WHICH NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY UNITS CARRY OUT ATTACKS AGAINST SOUTH VIET-NAM. ARTILLERY IN NORTH VIET-NAM ALSO FIRES ACROSS THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AGAINST ALLIED POSITIONS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.

5. SINCE THE LATE 1950'S NORTH VIET-NAM HAS VIOLATED THE GENEVA ACCORDS BY SENDING ARMED MEN DIRECTLY ACROSS THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, AND IN MAY-JUNE 1966 MASSIVE NUMBERS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS--THE ENTIRE 324B DIVISION CONSISTING OF THE 812TH, 90TH AND 803RD REGIMENTS-- BEGAN CROSSING THE 17TH PARALLEL INTO QUANY TRI PROVINCE. THE INTRODUCTION OF THESE UNITS WAS CONFIRMED BY THE TESTIMONY OF PRISONERS FROM THESE REGIMENTS. IN SEPTEMBER 1966, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIET-NAM COMPLAINED TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION ON THE INTRODUCTION OF THE 324 B DIVISION, PROVIDING THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION WITH PERTINENT TESTIMONY FROM 12 CAPTURED PERSONNEL FROM THE THREE REGIMENTS OF THIS DIVISION. IT IS CLEAR FROM THIS EVIDENCE THAT PLANNING FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE 324 B DIVISION BEGAN CONSIDERABLY BEFORE JUNE 1966 AND, INDEED, THAT THE DIVISION WAS INSIDE THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE FOR SOME TIME BEFORE ITS IDENTIFICATION INSIDE SOUTH VIET-NAM.

6. ONLY AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY 324B DIVISION WERE ALLIED FORCES COMPELLED TO INITIATE DEFENSIVE GROUND OPERATIONS FROM QUANY TRI PROVINCE, WHICH AT TIMES HAVE INCLUDED DEFENSIVE ACTIONS IN SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 PARIS 14240 171713Z

7. THE EVIDENCE IS THUS INDISPUTABLY CLEAR THAT NORTH VIET-NAM WAS FIRST TO VIOLATE THE STATUS OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE. IT WAS NOT UNTIL LONG AFTER THESE VIOLATIONS THAT ALLIED GROUND FORCES WERE COMPELLED TO ENTER THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ IN DEFENSE OF THEIR POSITIONS IN QUANG TRI.

8. YOU WILL ALSO RECALL THAT IN BOTH OF OUR PREVIOUS MEETINGS I HAVE SAID THAT THE CONTINUATION OF CRUEL ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS IN SAIGON AND ELSEWHERE DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE ATMOSPHERE FOR SUCCESSFUL TALKS.

9. AND SO WE COME BACK TO THE TASK WHICH CONCERNS US HERE: HOW TO MOVE TOWARD PEACE. YOU HAVE SAID A GREAT DEAL ABOUT A BOMBING CESSATION. THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS SAID THAT THE PRESENT LIMITED BOMBING COULD COME TO AN EARLY END-- IF OUR RESTRAINT IS MATCHED BY RESTRAINT ON THE OTHER SIDE. AND SO, I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU AGAIN A QUESTION WHICH YOU HAVE NOT YET ANSWERED--WHAT RESTRAINTS WILL YOU TAKE TO CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE IN VIET-NAM? .

SHRIVER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WWR 12

Friday, May 17, 1968 -- 5:30 PM

Free file

Mr. President:

In the attached, Secretary Rusk recommends you have a short meeting with Crown Prince Birendra of Nepal. (You may recall meeting this young man during the visit of the King of Nepal last November.)

Rusk's memo gives particulars on the Prince. He is 22, has been studying for a year at Harvard, and is about to go on a tour of North and South America before returning to Nepal. He'll be in Washington June 2-3.

The Crown Prince may not be far away from the throne. King Mahendra has apparently recovered from his recent heart attack. But Dr. Mattingly, whom we sent out to treat him, doesn't think the long-term prognosis is good.

W. W. Rostow

O. K. , set up a short meeting June 2 or 3 _____

I can't see him; ask Secretary Rusk to give him my regards _____

Call me _____

RPM/EKH/vmr

S/S-7236

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

22

May 13, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Call on you by Crown Prince Birendra
of Nepal

Recommendation:

That you receive Crown Prince Birendra of Nepal.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

His Royal Highness, Crown Prince Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva of Nepal, will be in Washington June 2 and 3 preparatory to setting out on a two-month tour of the United States, Latin America, and Canada. He will have just completed a year of undergraduate study in government at Harvard.

I believe that it would serve our interests in Nepal for the Crown Prince to have an opportunity for a brief meeting with you on his own (he was a member of King Mahendra's official party during the 1967 State Visit). At 22, Crown Prince Birendra is the proclaimed heir to an absolute monarchy and serves as Regent whenever his father is absent from the Kingdom. A young leader, destined for the position of highest responsibility in his country, the Crown Prince would, I am sure, value the opportunity for a personal meeting with you.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not
automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 95-248

By jjl/ep NARA. Date 7-24-97

You may recall that his father, King Mahendra, suffered a heart attack on March 15. While the King is recovering nicely, the long-range prognosis given us by Dr. Thomas W. Mattingly is definitely not good. There is, therefore, the prospect that the Crown Prince may ascend the throne in a very few years.

Crown Prince Birendra is a serious-minded young man who appears quite dedicated to the development of his country. Sent abroad in 1967 for a two-year study-tour in Japan, the United States, and Israel, he is spending nearly a year of this time here in the United States. He has relaxed and become quite at home in the undergraduate college life at Harvard where he has been treated as an ordinary individual and has lived in Quincy House, one of the dormitories. His studies have been in the field of government with a smattering of economics. We have looked upon his year in the United States as an excellent occasion to explain to the Crown Prince the basic tenets of the American way of life as well as to cultivate in him an understanding of American foreign policy.

A biographic sketch is enclosed of the Crown Prince. Should it be possible for you to receive him, we will provide some suggested talking points.



Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Biographic sketch.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

22.6

BIRENDRA Bir Bikram Shah Deva

Crown Prince of Nepal

The next ruler of Nepal, Crown Prince Birendra, is at present studying government under some of America's leading political scientists at Harvard University. The 22-year old Crown Prince is heir to an absolute monarchy, and he normally serves as Regent when his father is absent from the Kingdom.

A serious-minded young man who appears dedicated to the development of his country, Birendra is intelligent and alert, and since his arrival at Harvard in 1967 has taken a newly-found interest in studies. Pleasant and polite, gifted with a sense of humor, he has an outgoing personality, especially in informal situations, and is an easy and comfortable person with whom to be.

The Crown Prince is single, wears glasses, and is about five feet nine inches tall. He smokes and takes an occasional drink of Scotch or of gin and tonic. While in the United States he has displayed an informality of manner which he drops only in the presence of high officials of his own country. For example, Birendra likes to stop in lunch counters and strike up conversations with strangers on almost any subject, will carry his own suitcase (except in Washington where he lets Ambassador Khatri tote it), and enjoys a good nightclub show.

During his year at Harvard the Crown Prince has had an opportunity to visit Forts Bragg and Benning, visit Miami and the Florida Keys (he went fishing with some success), attend a World Series' game in Boston as guest of the Commissioner of Baseball, participate in the King's State Visit in November, visit West Virginia and Appalachia with the help of Jay Rockefeller, and make brief visits around New England.

Born in the Royal Palace in Kathmandu in 1945, Birendra was educated privately by tutors and then sent off to India to study at St. Joseph College, Darjeeling, before spending five years in England where he graduated from Eton in 1964. He is now on a two-year study tour in Japan, the United States, and Israel. From April to August 1967 he studied education, social welfare, and industry at Tokyo University. He arrived here in August 1967 and has spent the 1967-1968 academic year as a special undergraduate student at Harvard where he has studied government and had a smattering of pre-college level economics. (While at Harvard he has lived the normal American under-graduate college life in Quincy House, one of the dormitories, where he is known as "Shah" to the House Master and his fellow students.) After his tour of the United States, Latin America, and Canada during June and July 1968 he expects to study agriculture, administration, and internal defense at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Authority NLT 95-248

By gulfisp, NARA. Date 7-24-97

Despite his comparative youth, the Crown Prince has traveled widely. In 1961 he accompanied the King to Belgrade to the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations; in 1965 he represented Nepal at the Tenth Anniversary celebrations of the Bandung Conference in Indonesia and also visited Burma. While at Eton or returning he visited West Germany, Portugal, Switzerland, the Soviet Union, and India, and made a formal visit to Iran. He made an official visit to Communist China for several weeks in the summer of 1966 and had an interview with Mao Tse-tung.

The Crown Prince's favorite hobby is art, and he has done some works in water color and oils. He is interested in the preservation of the traditional Nepalese craftsmanship, and at one time he experimented with the adaptation of traditional wooden art forms to concrete. Having bagged his first tiger at 14, Birendra has kept up an interest in hunting, likes swimming, hiking, and riding, but has done little, if any, of these pursuits while in the United States. He is especially fond of sports cars and presently drives a Jaguar 2/2.

Conversational subjects with him might include his government studies at Harvard under such mentors as Henry Kissinger, Merle Fainsod, S. Hoffmann, and K. W. Deutsch, his plans for touring the United States this summer (itinerary attached), his visits to Job Corps and VISTA centers in West Virginia, art and artists (his knowledge is not too deep), and impressions of America generally. His views on foreign policy might also be explored as well as his impressions of students and student revolts in the United States as seen from the Harvard "Yard".

NEA/INC:HGwing:maj 5/9/68

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, May 17, 1968 - 4:20 pm

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA notes on Canadian politics, including the name of the Conservative candidate, Robert Stanfield, that none of us could remember.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ds/DCH, NARA, Date 9-13-00

WWRostow:rlh

24

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 17, 1968 -- 3:10 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You should read Bill Bowdler's account of what the State Department has in mind about Panama.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By 19, NARA, Date 6-2-92

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Friday - May 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Panama Situation

In my meeting with Covey Oliver and Bill Broe (CIA) we came out as follows on the Adair cable:

1. Adair would let it be known to the Robles-Eleta-Samudio group that we are fully aware of what is taking place and are concerned. (He would not go any further.)
2. State would ask Gerry O'Leary -- who has the reputation of a Panama expert -- to write an article describing what is taking place (i. e., Arias' 50, 000 margin and the tampering with ballot boxes -- all of which is in the public domain) and referring to the preoccupation expressed by "Latin American diplomatic sources". (Several Latin Ambassadors with whom we have talked in the past few days have privately expressed their disgust over the clumsy election rigging.) O'Leary would also say State Department is sticking to its no comment line but is known to be concerned over the implications.
3. A private person well known to Vallarino (not Smathers, but someone like former Governor Fleming, retired General O'Meara, or Jim Minotto) would go to Panama under suitable cover to express the hope that he (Vallarino) would not put the National Guard in the position of enforcing a verdict which runs contrary to the will of the majority.

These three mutually reinforcing steps would be designed to give the Robles-Samudio-Eleta group cause for second thought, but more importantly, to persuade Vallarino to remain neutral. Without the support of the National Guard, the Samudio ticket cannot be imposed. Robles would then have to reach some understanding with Arias.

Bob Sayre tells me Covey Oliver has decided to assume responsibility for following the three-step course. I have counselled that he touch base with the Secretary to get his OK and determine whether the Secretary wants to check it out with the President.

WGB
WGBowler

- 25

Profile

Friday, May 17, 1968 -- 12:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Subject: Ball Take Over at the UN

1. Sec. Rusk recommends strongly that Ball be sworn in at the White House.

2. The thought about Goldberg's retirement had been focused around June 1. But it had also been suggested that he might stay with the NPT in the General Assembly until it was finished. It now looks as though the NPT might drag on beyond June 1. Goldberg has made it absolutely clear that he is prepared to leave when the President finds it convenient to make the change, NPT or not. Goldberg will be discussing this matter with Sec. Rusk and Joe Sisco late this afternoon. I will report to you on that session.

If you have any guidance for Sec. Rusk at his session with Goldberg, I shall be glad to pass it on.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Friday, May 17, 1968 -- 11:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

From file

Herewith a summary of where we stand in Paris:

1. As everyone knows, the first two rounds of formal statements have not yet answered the question: Is Hanoi in Paris to do serious business?

2. They have been exceedingly rigid, focusing on an insistence that we stop all bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV, with no reciprocity whatsoever. They say that "world opinion and progressive forces in the U. S." have forced us to stop part of the bombing and that we ought to accede to such pressure and stop the rest.

3. In the propaganda war they are waging, it is our impression that they are not doing particularly well. Their propaganda is rigid and strident. World opinion is, in fact, looking for serious negotiations and flexibility.

4. On our side, we have replied to various inaccurate charges but concentrated on positive proposals. (See Tab A) On the first day we laid out some 7 substantive propositions which constituted an outline of the settlement. On the second day, Harriman suggested the areas where there might be enough agreement to proceed to detailed negotiations. Thus far he has met no positive response.

5. We do not know how long they intend to stay in this propaganda phase. Various third parties have suggested that they might be interested in a DMZ or in some other form of mutual de-escalation. But we have heard not one word from them.

6. This morning a representative of the North Vietnamese said to the press that if we stopped bombing unconditionally, they would be prepared to discuss a political settlement in South Vietnam. The fact that they raised this critical and sensitive issue in public does not give us much hope; but we shall see.

7. In general, we expected a phase of propaganda like the present phase. There is no basis yet for optimism; but -- equally -- there is no reason to draw the conclusion that the negotiations will have no substance. We need a bit more time.

WWRostow:rln

W. W. Rostow

SUMMARY OF HARRIMAN PROPOSALS

First Session:

Let me sum up what we see as serious and productive actions for us to consider. They are serious in that they go to the heart of the problem. They are productive because taken separately or together they can help resolve our differences.

11 At the core lies the necessity for South Vietnam to be free of outside interference. We repeat again that we are prepared to withdraw our forces as your side withdraws its forces to the North, stops infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides.

2 For our part we desire no bases in South Vietnam, and we are prepared to leave the facilities we have built there to the people to use as they wish.

3 We should undertake the early restoration of the Demilitarized Zone to its proper and original status.

4 The 1962 Agreements on Laos should be honored and its people should be left to the peaceful life they desire.

5 We should agree on the fundamental principle that the South Vietnamese people must be allowed to determine their own future without interference. National reconciliation should flourish. All persons should participate peacefully in their country's political life according to the "one-man, one-vote" principle. This means every citizen should be assured that he can exercise his individual political rights as he see fit within democratic procedures.

6 Finally, we would much prefer to use our resources to support efforts by the nations of Southeast Asia to cooperate in the achievement of their economic and social goals. We are prepared to join with all the nations of Southeast Asia -- and with others -- in building a future with great promise for the peoples of the area. Our faith in Asia is great and we are prepared to back that faith with substantial assistance.

On March 31, we took an important step toward peace. We hope that you will take a similar step.

Second Session:

First -- we both speak of an independent, democratic, peaceful and prosperous South Vietnam. You also speak of a neutral South Vietnam. We have no problem with this if that is South Vietnam's wish.

Second -- we both speak of peace on the basis of respect of the Geneva Accords of 1954 -- to which we add the 1962 Agreements on Laos.

Third -- we both speak of letting the internal affairs of South Vietnam be settled by the South Vietnamese themselves -- which we would clarify by adding, "without outside interference or coercion."

Fourth -- we both speak of the reunification of Vietnam by peaceful means. In our view this must not only be peaceful but also through the free choice of the people of South Vietnam and of North Vietnam.

Fifth -- we both speak of the need for strict respect of the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords.

Now I would like to elaborate further on some specific and urgent steps which are vital to peace, and on which it should be possible to agree.

Certainly one of the prime steps toward the strict observance of the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords should be to restore to the Demilitarized Zone its original and proper status. We agree on the legal existence of that Zone and its prescribed boundaries. We propose that we agree now on making it function the way it should. Are you prepared to join in achieving this; the prompt restoration of the Demilitarized Zone as a buffer is an essential step.

In your statement on Monday, you referred to the 1962 Agreements on Laos. We propose that we agree now that all parties should comply meticulously with the 1962 Agreements on Laos. Let us call upon the two co-chairmen and the three countries which are members of the International Control Commission to make prompt arrangements to assure that those accords are respected. We will be glad to have your prompt answer to this proposal.

On Monday, you also referred to Cambodia. We propose that all armed elements from outside Cambodia should fully respect the territorial neutrality and integrity of Cambodia, and that both our countries give support publicly to the independence and neutrality of Cambodia. Let us join in requesting the International Control Commission to strengthen its functions in this regard. We will be glad to have your prompt answer to this proposal.

Finally, let me emphasize that the people of South Vietnam must be free from coercion. Nowhere is this more important than in Saigon where vicious attacks are being directed against a civilian population. The continuation of such attacks on civilians in Saigon and elsewhere does not contribute to the atmosphere for successful talks.

In closing, I want to repeat the thoughts I expressed in my statement of May 13. I ask that you give careful attention to the affirmative proposals in these two statements.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday
May 17, 1968 - 11:30 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker underlines and clarifies his strong case that further attacks on cities be regarded as "taking advantage" and that Hanoi be so informed.

W. W. Rostow

Salgon 27539

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-333
By is, NARA Date 9-8-98

WWRostow:rlh



Department of State

TELEGRAM

#1
29a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Restow

4 1 9 9 Q
MAY 17, 1968
7:45 A.M.

OO RUEHC RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 27939 1381109
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 171048Z MAY 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2878
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 898
STATE GRNC
BT

ACTION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SAIGON 27939

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 21760
By is NARA, Date 2-3-98

NDIS/HARVAN

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MIUCION

REF; A. SAIGON 26928, B. SAIGON 27121

1. LEST THERE BE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING OF INTENT AND PURPOSE OF MY TWO MESSAGES REGARDING CESSATION OF BOMBING (SAIGON 26928 AND 27121) I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT I AM NOT SUGGESTING CESSATION OF ATTACKS AS TRADE OFF FOR STOPPING BOMBING, STILL LESS THAT WE SHOULD CEASE FIGHTING WHILE TALKING. BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT HANOI SHOULD BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND THAT ATTACKS ON SAIGON OR OTHER CENTERS OF POPULATION, WHICH ARE ESSENTIALLY ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS, ARE IN OUR VIEW "TAKING ADVANTAGE" FOR SAN ANTONIO FORMULA, AND CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT WITH IMPUNITY AND WITHOUT FEAR OF RETALIATION. I BELIEVE THIS IS JUST AS MUCH "TAKING ADVANTAGE" AS THE MORE THAN DOUBLING OF THE RATE OF INFILTRATION WHICH HAS OCCURRED SINCE AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1967, OR VIOLATION OF THE DMZ.

2. I AGREE WITH GEN WESTMORLAND'S EVALUATION OF THE RECENT ATTACKS. THE BACK HAS BEEN BROKEN OF THE ATTACKS ON SAIGON, BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE ENEMY MAY NOT AGAIN ATTEMPT THE SAME TACTICS A MONTH OR TWO MONTHS FROM NOW. THAT HE WILL BE DECISIVELY DEFEATED AGAIN I HAVE NO DOUBT. BUT MUCH OF HIS MAIN FORCE ELEMENTS IN II, III AND IV CORPS WERE NOT COMMITTED IN THE RECENT OPERATIONS, AND THERE IS CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE THAT HE INTENDS TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE USING SIMILAR TACTICS AIMED AT DESTROYING THE FABRIC OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT.

DUNKER
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, May 17, 1968
9:25 a. m.

2
--

MR. PRESIDENT:

The marked passage in the attached UPI ticker item may be interesting.

By way of background, yesterday at Nick Katzenbach's non-group meeting we discussed what direction the talks would take if they were to become serious. One view was that they would talk about the DMZ and perhaps even Laos and Cambodia. The other view was that, if we were tough on our terms for stopping the bombing and if they were truly serious about ending the war in 1968, they would move fairly soon to the ultimate question; namely, a political settlement in the South.

This public statement, as reported, is not a definitive answer. We will be getting from Paris a report on exactly what Sao actually said. And in any case, we have to bear in mind that by raising this question publicly they are also immediately raising the question of GVN participation. Nevertheless, it is interesting that they have thrown into the discussion so early the ultimate question of a political settlement in the South.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

UPI-6

28a

(PEACE)

PARIS--HANOI TODAY OFFERED TO OPEN TALKS ON A VIETNAM POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IF THE U.S. STOPS ALL BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM.

NGUYEN VAN SAO, A SPOKESMAN FOR THE NORTH VIETNAM DELEGATION TO THE PARIS TALKS, MADE THE OFFER IN A STATEMENT TO UPI.

"IF THE UNITED STATES HALTS THE BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE NORTH UNCONDITIONALLY, WE WILL BE READY TO DISCUSS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT FOR VIETNAM," HE SAID.

THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THE COMMUNISTS HAVE COME SO CLOSE TO SAYING THEY ARE READY FOR FULL DRESS VIETNAM PEACE TALKS IN EXCHANGE FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL BOMBING HALT. IN EARLIER STATEMENTS, THEY HAVE SAID MERELY THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS "OTHER MATTERS OF INTEREST TO BOTH SIDES."

BUT SAO AT THE SAME TIME REJECTED A U.S. SUGGESTION IN THE TALKS HERE THAT NORTH VIETNAM CAN GET THE BOMBING HALT IN EXCHANGE FOR RESTORING A DEMILITARIZED ZONE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM.

SAO REJECTED A U.S. HINT THAT A TROOP PULLBACK BY BOTH SIDES FROM THE DMZ WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY WASHINGTON AS A SUFFICIENT GESTURE TO WARRANT AN END TO U.S. BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON MARCH 31 ORDERED A LIMITED HALT TO THE BOMBING IN ORDER TO GET HANOI TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE HERE. THE AIM OF THE CURRENT TALKS IS TO SCALE DOWN THE FIGHTING ENOUGH TO ALLOW A FULL DRESS PEACE CONFERENCE ON THE VIETNAM WAR.

W. AVERELL HARRIMAN, THE U.S. CHIEF NEGOTIATOR HERE, CAME VERY CLOSE IN A TELEVISION REVIEW YESTERDAY TO TELLING THE COMMUNISTS THAT NORTH VIETNAM CAN GET ITS DESIRED HALT IN BOMBING IF IT AGREES TO RESTORING THE DMZ.

HARRIMAN SAID, "I WOULD NOT RULE OUT THE DMZ" AS A POSSIBLE TURNING POINT IN MOVING THE CURRENT TALKS FROM A PROPAGANDA FORUM TOWARD REAL NEGOTIATION. HARRIMAN WENT ON TO LINK THE DMZ PROPOSAL TO JOHNSON'S DEMAND THAT HANOI SHOW SOME EXAMPLE OF "RESTRAINT" IN RETURN FOR ANY TOTAL HALT IN U.S. BOMBING AND SHELLING OF NORTH VIETNAM.

BUT SAO SAID THE U.S. MUST ITSELF PULL OUT OF THE DMZ WITHOUT ANY SIMILAR ACTION BY NORTH VIETNAM. HANOI HAS NEVER ADMITTED IT HAS TROOPS INSIDE THE SIX-MILE-WIDE DMZ OR IN SOUTH VIETNAM DESPITE YEARS OF BATTLING.

SAO SAID THE U.S. HAS "SABOTAGED," "UNDERMINED" AND "DESTROYED" PEACE FACTORS IN THE DMZ AREA.

"THEREFORE A PROPOSAL BY THE UNITED STATES FOR A MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL IS ONLY AN ATTEMPT TO COVER UP THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES," SAO SAID.

BOTH HARRIMAN AND HANOI'S CHIEF DELEGATE, XUAN THUY, TODAY PREPARED FOR THEIR SCHEDULED MEETING TOMORROW.

5/17--GE858A

INFORMATION

Friday, May 17, 1968 -- 9:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

This USIA summary of foreign media reactions to the Paris talks gives a good feel for attitudes, hopes, and anxieties around the world.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

**USIA IOP/GM
May 16, 1968 6 PM**

WWRostow:rla

27a

USIA IOP/GM
May 16, 1968 6 P.M.

FOREIGN MEDIA REACTION TO PARIS TALKS

LONDON: Today's liberal Manchester Guardian declared that "as part of the American effort to convince Hanoi, hints are emerging that the U.S. may slowly be bracing itself for Communist participation in a reconstituted Saigon government.

"Although Mr. Harriman said that the U.S. did not want to impose a coalition on the south, it was learned that South Viet-Nam's Ambassador to the U.S. was seeking indirect contacts with the North Vietnamese delegation. ... It is believed that Mr. Harriman is encouraging him to seek these contacts.

"The U.S. would probably like nothing better than voluntary national reconciliation, and although Hanoi has made it clear that it will have nothing to do with the generals now in power in Saigon, there is no systematic refusal to deal with non-Communist elements in South Viet-Nam."

"Harriman Conciliatory But Firm"

London's conservative Daily Telegraph, a strong supporter of U.S. policy in Viet-Nam, commented that "by Saturday Mr. Thuy should be able to give some more constructive reply to America's generous implied offer to stop all bombing of the north and withdraw from the neutral zone along the boundary between the two Viet-Nams if the north will only reciprocate in the latter operation."

The paper observed that "this offer confirms President Johnson's desire for a fair peace," adding that "Mr. Harriman, while showing an eminently conciliatory spirit, has given every indication of standing firm on essentials, to the relief of America's more discerning friends and allies, especially in Asia."

The independent Times of London said that though yesterday's meeting in Paris "made no progress -- so far, at least, as has been allowed to appear -- the fact remains that the North Vietnamese are not in practice refusing to discuss matters other than an end to the bombing."

Rusk Denial of Roberts' Story

PARIS: The Washington correspondent of moderately conservative Figaro contended that it was "easy to explain... the harshness of the terms" used by Secretary Rusk in denying a Washington Post story that the Administration was ready to give Communists a political role in South Viet-Nam:

"It is only too obvious that such a report is 'unfortunate' on the very day following a press conference held in Paris by Ambassador Bui Diem..."

"It nevertheless remains that if the U.S. is determined to accept a settlement of the Viet-Nam affair based upon the fundamental principle of American democracy -- 'one man, one vote' -- the envisaged solution logically can only result in the creation of a new government in Saigon in which the various elements of South Vietnamese public opinion, including of course the one represented by the NLF, would be called to play a role."

The correspondent argued that therefore Mr. Rusk's "clarification only concerns, in reality and despite appearances, the means of creating a fully representative government in South Viet-Nam."

He wrote that the U.S. "understandably" denies that it is ready to impose a coalition formula on Saigon, but it is "self evident" that if the Paris talks "are to lead one day to real negotiations on the heart of the matter, the principle itself will have to be progressively transformed into a negotiable matter."

"Harriman Denies Report"

Yesterday afternoon's early edition of independent Le Monde gave front-page play to the Washington Post report that the U.S. was ready to accept Communist participation in a Saigon government.

In late editions, however, the headline became: "MR. HARRIMAN DENIES THAT WASHINGTON ENVISAGES A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIET-NAM."

A passage in the initial article, which was deleted from late editions, said:

"The information published by our American counterpart, of which the North Vietnamese side took cognizance with

much interest, seems derived from a very good source.

"If genuine, it shows that President Johnson has become committed to an irreversible process which ought to facilitate the unfolding of the Paris conversations."

BONN: West German media gave prominence to Mr. Harriman's call on the North Vietnamese to agree on four "specific and urgent steps which are vital to peace." U.S. denials of a Washington Post report on alleged U.S. political concessions also drew wide news play.

Right-center Frankfurter Allgemeine carried a front-page article which said that in the long run the U.S. would be ready for "far-reaching concessions," including the acceptance of "a 'non-bourgeois' regime in Saigon if the South Vietnamese people, in free elections, expressed desire for a change of the present regime."

It added, however, that "this does not signify early readiness by Harriman or Vance to abandon present positions."

Munich's left-center Sueddeutsche Zeitung saw two "positive" points emerging from the talks:

1. Mr. Harriman's indication "more clearly than has ever been done in Washington," that the Viet Cong could play a role in South Vietnamese political life commensurate with their effective political strength.
2. Thuy's refraining, for the first time, from "strictly denying the presence of regular North Vietnamese troops in South Viet-Nam."

In West Berlin, independent Tagesspiegel strongly condemned the Communist "terror offensive" against Saigon, which it said was "obviously designed to persuade the world that the U.S. is negotiating about a war which in the Communist view it has lost." However, the paper declared, the offensive "does not stand a chance of success" because the Viet Cong "are now much weaker than during the Tet offensive."

ROME: Several papers contrasted Ambassador Harriman's "realistic and concrete" proposals with Hanoi's "intransigence." Editorial comment was sparse.

Bologna's conservative Resto del Carlino headed its story: "HARRIMAN OUTLINES POSSIBLE PEACE PLAN BUT HARSH POLEMICS CONTINUE. HANOI CONTINUES FRONTAL ASSAULT ON AMERICANS."

COPENHAGEN: Conservative Berlingske Tidende judged that Mr. Harriman's proposals were "neither surprising nor epoch-making," and probably represented "primarily a tactical move... to bring forth the question of Laos and Cambodia."

Radical Liberal Politiken, noted that the U.S. had "officially rejected" the Washington Post story on political concessions, and said:

"Reports about a radical change of U.S. Viet-Nam policy, which opens a possibility of Communist participation in a future South Vietnamese government, today overshadowed interest in the actual peace negotiations, which continued with an exchange of charges and contradictory interpretations of history."

SAIGON: Most Saigon newspapers continued to headline the Paris talks in eight-column banners, as war news was given secondary attention.

Editorials focussed on the talks, with several expressing uneasiness over representation of South Vietnamese interests. Song, in a censored editorial, said:

"What would happen if the U.S. delegation... deems it necessary to accept a solution disadvantageous to the Republic of Viet-Nam?...The South Vietnamese people, before the Paris talks began, were convinced their government would insist on having its own representatives or, at least, a joint U.S.-SVN delegation instead of a single American one...."

"To ward off any plot of partitioning the country or promoting a coalition government, President Thieu can turn to the masses... people will rally behind him and provide him with the strongest support ever seen."

The Saigon military daily Tien Tuyen said:

"Could preliminary talks turn into formal conversations? Could those formal conversations on Viet-Nam problems interest only the U.S. and North Viet-Nam? Americans could not be so foolish as to betray their allies to such an extent. South Viet-Nam will never accept a conference like that."

BANGKOK: Influential Siam Rath wondered whether the U.S. would allow its allies to participate in the "second phase" of peace negotiations, and concluded that "of course the U.S. could not agree" to their exclusion. The paper noted that the U.S. had been criticized in New Zealand for limiting air strikes without consulting its allies, and declared:

"From now on, the U.S. will not be allowed to do things on its own without consulting its allies and receiving their approval.

"The U.S. must let the allies participate in all talks, especially South Viet-Nam... and Thailand, which is close to the scene and has long been the direct target of North Viet-Nam and Communist infiltration."

The paper, in another editorial, sharply criticized U Thant who "sounds as if he has become a mouthpiece for North Viet-Nam."

SYDNEY: The possibility of going from the Paris talks to a Geneva Conference drew support from the Sydney Morning Herald.

"A peace settlement obviously involves a political settlement and it is very difficult to see how this can be achieved given the Saigon government's obdurate refusal to have anything to do with a coalition involving the National Liberation Front. But agreement might be reached within the context of a broader regional settlement safeguarded by the revival of the Geneva accords."

KUALA LUMPUR: Utusan Malaysia said today that Washington should advise its allies in Viet-Nam against making statements that can harm the proceedings at the Paris talks.

The paper said it is appropriate to leave the preliminary talks to Washington and Hanoi, for participation by Saigon can be discussed when major issues have been resolved by Washington and Hanoi.

Hanoi has proved, the paper said, that it can act independently regardless of what Peking says.

"We hope Washington too is prepared to act independently, regardless of what her allies say, for it is the only way the promising atmosphere of the Paris talks can be maintained."

TOKYO: The Japanese press, giving heavy coverage to the Paris talks, maintained a mildly optimistic tone, emphasizing that, despite difficulties, the "outlook is not without hope."

Independent Yomiuri's Paris correspondent stressed U.S.-NVN concern "to free themselves of influence from the nations behind them such as Communist China and the U.S. allies, and to have direct talks for mutual understanding." He concluded:

"One important measure of the prospects in Paris is how independent the U.S. and North Viet-Nam can be in repulsing these outside pressures."

HANOI: North Vietnamese media gave primary attention to Xuan Thuy's statements in Paris, claims of military victories in South Viet-Nam, and charges of "barbarous" U.S. bombing. Hanoi radio said today:

"Although official talks have begun in Paris, U.S. aircraft continue to savagely bomb many populated areas ... including the town, dam, and fallen heroes' cemetery in Nam Dan district...."

Considerable space was devoted to the "barbarous U.S. aggressors" who will be "forced to pay their debt in blood."

NEW DELHI: Indian editors today headlined Ambassador Harriman's list of five areas of possible agreement. However, the Paris talks received second-place on most front pages, and editorial reaction was negligible.

The Paris correspondent of the influential, usually pro-West Hindustan Times of New Delhi emphasized North Viet-Nam's negative response to Harriman's suggestion of quitting the DMZ. He saw "hopeful signs" that the Soviet Union would take a more direct interest in the talks.

Many Indian papers published Paris reports that U.S. officials were angry over U Thant's Alberta University remarks and had accused him of siding with Hanoi.

RAWALPINDI: Pakistan papers played Ambassador Harriman's five-point proposal on their front pages along with the North Vietnamese reaction. Headlines said positions were hardening.

The Pakistan Times of Rawalpindi and Lahore carried on an inside page Secretary Rusk's denial of a reported U.S. willingness to accept the coalition idea. The Morning News of Karachi and Dacca placed the denial on the front page.

The Urdu-language Nawa-i-Waqt of Lahore, frequently critical of the U.S., termed U.S. willingness to talk as "proof of wisdom" and hoped "U.S. leaders would demonstrate the same wisdom and statesmanship during the talks."

The Urdu-language Mashriq of Lahore endorsed Harriman's peace proposal and said it hoped "Rusk and Rostow would not torpedo it by issuing belligerent statements."

TEL AVIV: Ambassador Harriman's list was headlined in the Israeli press. Hatzofeh, national religious party paper, said:

"The tone of the North Vietnamese demands gives the impression that they are seeking propaganda gains in the free world.... Until there is an actual closing of the gap, ... there is no room for optimism."

Two Tel Aviv dailies, Maariv and Yediot Aharonot, today carried reports from their Paris correspondents who quote "observers" as calling the talks "a dialogue of deaf men."

BUENOS AIRES: Nationalist Clarín contended that "Viet-Nam is one nation and was recognized as such in Geneva...."

"The Paris conference must accept the transitory nature of two Viet-Nams and also their ultimate reunification.

"A government must be formed in Saigon which will negotiate with Hanoi and attain fusion within several years. It should be formed of all sectors in the south identified with the cause of national reunification."

MEXICO CITY: Moderate Novedades carried its Paris correspondent's view that the U.S. must eventually accept "the theory that there is only one Viet-Nam, and recognize Hanoi as capital of all Viet-Nam." He added that the only concession that Hanoi is likely to make is the formation of "a coalition government in Saigon pending elections," and predicted that the "socialists" would win the elections.

Moderate-progressive Excelsior ran a piece from its man in Paris supporting North Vietnamese views on coalition government. However, this paper's editor advocated caution. He suggested "Communist participation," but with safeguards "to avoid their taking over."

SANTIAGO: Conservative El Mercurio warned:

"Including the National Liberation Front in a South Viet-Nam coalition government will lead to NLF domination."

The paper's Paris correspondent stressed Ambassador Harriman's prediction that the conference would be protracted, and expressed his own hope that the negotiating parties would maintain their patience to insure the success of the conference.

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET COMINT~~

Pres file

Friday, May 17, 1968 - 8:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

The Chicom economy declined in the past year, despite a bumper harvest due to good weather.

The 1968 harvest is likely to be less good; industry and foreign trade should continue to stagnate or sag.

More than three quarters of Chicom trade is now with the non-Communist world (p. 6): a good technical basis for a transition to normal political relations if and when they come to that point.

W. W. Rostow

CIA Special Report
Weekly Review
"Communist China's Economy Continues to Deteriorate"
Cy 1, 17 May 1968
SC No. 00770/68A

~~TOP SECRET COMINT~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-411
By cbm, NARA, Date 9-17-01

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Friday, May 17, 1968 - 8:30 am

Mr. President:

We have a number of indications that the enemy plans to celebrate Ho Chi Minh's birthday, May 19, with some kind of offensive operations. The attached piece of communications intelligence may indicate that they plan to use some of their aircraft that day near the DMZ.

We will be following the matter closely.

W. W. Rostow

TOP SECRET TRINE

WWRostow:rla

Pres file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-412
By cbm, NARA, Date 2-13-03

2. Possible Impending DRV Offensive

References to possible impending offensive operations by the North Vietnamese, possibly including use of the North Vietnamese Air Force, were reflected in SIGINT. An unidentified AAA Regiment in the vicinity of the DMZ, in communication with another unidentified AAA element on 9 May, stated "It is possible to strike the enemy with artillery on the morning of 16 May....On 19 May [you] must find a method for attaining a target....The principal mission is to regulate and assure the safety of our planes." Collateral indicates that 19 May is the 27th Anniversary of the founding of the Viet Minh front and HO CHI MINH's 78th birthday.

SECRET

(2/ [] T4019, 090422Z) ~~(SECRET. OAVN)~~

SANITIZED
 Authority NLJ 141.022.002/3
 By jc, NARA, Date 11/2/09

-8-

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

32

INFORMATION

25X1

~~SECRET~~




Friday, May 17, 1968 -- 8:10 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

The following paragraph from this morning's CIA military report indicates that there is, in fact, no firm evidence that Hanoi's 330th and 350th divisions are on their way South.

25X1D

 the report regarding the 330th and 350th divisions in paragraph 8 of the 13 May Indications report is incorrect. There is no firm evidence available which suggests an impending southward deployment by these units."

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

Presidential library review for NSC equities required.

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ-141-022-002/14
By jc, NARA, Date 11-2-09

INFORMATION

33

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 17, 1968 -- 8:05 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a probably accurate account of the inner state of GVN politics:

Pres file

- Thieu tightening the reins.
- The generals uneasy about Thieu and the slow-moving Assembly;
- Ky still at arms length from Thieu;
- Some concessions to the generals;
- All hands conscious that all could be lost if they openly fight among themselves.

25X1A

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 019-034-2-8-7
By Q, NARA, Date 1/16/02

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY

IN 12467

PAGE 1 OF 9 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SICDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA 300 ONE CRS
DD/I EXO OER

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SECRET

162045 Z

CITE [REDACTED]

DIST 16 MAY 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 15-16 MAY 1968
SUBJECT PRESIDENT THIEU'S MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT
KY AND THE SENIOR GENERALS TO DISCUSS CABINET
REORGANIZATION AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (16 MAY 1968) FIELD NO.


SOURCE [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: III CORPS COMMANDER GENERAL KHANG CLAIMS THAT VICE PRES-
IDENT KY AND THE SENIOR GENERALS MET AT THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF COMPOUND
ON 15 MAY TO DISCUSS KY'S SELF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION. AT A LATTER MEET-

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD

SANITIZED
Authority N497-325 + N4J0A-034-29
By CD, NARA, Date 1/17/02


IN 12467



PAGE 2 OF 9 PAGES

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD
(classification) (dissem controls)

ING THE SAME DAY WITH PRESIDENT THIEU, THIEU REFUSED TO DISCUSS WITH KY AND THE GENERALS HIS CABINET REORGANIZATION PLANS, BUT SAID HE WOULD REVEAL THEM BY 15 MAY. (KY CLAIMED LATER THAT THIEU HAD ALSO REFUSED TO DISCUSS HIS SPECIFIC PLANS WITH HIM IN PRIVATE.) THIEU ALSO TURNED ASIDE THE GENERALS' PLEAS FOR A MORE-AUTHORITARIAN STYLE OF GOVERNING AND FOR A CANCELLATION OF THIEU'S REFORMS IN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION GENERAL KHANG CLAIMS THAT THE MILITARY WILL RELUCTANTLY ACCEPT THIEU'S DECISIONS AND WILL NOT OPPOSE TRAN VAN HUONG'S APPOINTMENT AS PRIME MINISTER BUT WOULD RESIGN ALONG WITH KY IF KEY MILITARY OR POLICE OFFICIALS WERE REMOVED. END SUMMARY.

1. III CORPS COMMANDER LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE NGUYEN KHANG SAID  THAT VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY AND THE SENIOR GENERALS MET WITH PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU ON 15 MAY TO DISCUSS THEIR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE PERFORMANCE AND POLICIES OF THE THIEU GOVERNMENT. KHANG CHARACTERIZED THE SESSION WITH THIEU AS VERY DISAPPOINTING. EARLIER THAT DAY THE GENERALS HAD MET WITH KY AT THE JOINT GENERAL

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD

IN 12467

PAGE 3 OF 9 PAGES

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD
 (classification) (dissem. controls)


STAFF COMPOUND. IN ADDITION TO KY AND KHANG OTHERS ATTENDING WERE I CORPS COMMANDER LIEUTENANT GENERAL HOANG XUAN LAN, II CORPS COMMANDER MAJOR GENERAL LU MONG LAN, IV CORPS COMMANDER MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG, CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN, MINISTER OF DEFENSE LIEUTENANT GENERAL NGUYEN VAN VY, MINISTER OF INTERIOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL LINH QUANG VIEN, AND MINISTER OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT LIEUTENANT GENERAL NGUYEN BAO TRI.

2. IN THE MAIN THE GENERALS' THESIS AS PRESENTED TO THIEU WAS THAT DURING THESE CRITICAL DAYS, WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH VIETNAM MEETING IN PARIS, AND WITH THE ENEMY APPLYING MAXIMUM PRESSURE IN THE HOPE OF ATTAINING DECISIVE MILITARY AND POLITICAL VICTORIES AND OF INFLUENCING PEACE TALKS, THE GOVERNMENT MUST BE STRONG, DECISIVE AND TIGHTLY ORGANIZED. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE MUST BE GRANTED FULL POWERS

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD

5
4
3
2
1

IN 12467



PAGE 4 OF 9 PAGES

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD
(classification) (dissem control)

BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY UNTIL THE CRISIS SUBSIDES. THE GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY MUST FUNCTION AS ONE. NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO EXPERIMENT WITH CONCEPTS OF CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION WHICH MAY BE SUITABLE IN TIME OF PEACE BUT ARE INADEQUATE IN A WARTIME SITUATION.

3. THE CORPS COMMANDERS SPECIFICALLY ASKED THIEU TO CANCEL HIS PROJECTED OVERHAUL OF THE PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM UNTIL AFTER THE WAR. THEY COMPLAINED THAT THE CHANGES WHICH ALREADY HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED HAVE SO FRAGMENTED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECISION MAKING AND WEAKENED COORDINATION BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES IN THE PROVINCES, THAT IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THE CORPS COMMANDERS TO DO THEIR JOBS.

4. IN RESPONSE THIEU SAID THAT HE TOO WAS DISTURBED BY THE DELIBERATE PACE OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, BUT THAT HE SAW NO ALTERNATIVE TO WORKING WITH IT. SEVERAL OF THE GENERALS SUGGESTED HE SECRETLY THREATENED TO PROLONG THE ASSEMBLY IF IT WAS NOT MORE RESPONSIVE. THIEU

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD

(Classification)

(Dissem controls)

SUGGESTED THIS TACK WAS UNREALISTIC, AT WHICH POINT SEVERAL OF THE GENERALS SAID THAT THIEU COULD GET WHAT HE WANTED FROM THE ASSEMBLY IF THE MILITARY WAS BEHIND HIM AND IF HE USED THE FULL POWER OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY.


5. THIEU THEN EXPOUNDED ON HIS CONCEPT OF HOW THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD FUNCTION. THIS EXPOSITION MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO REVERSE ANY OF HIS ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS OR CHANGE HIS PLANS TO "CIVILIANIZE" THE GOVERNMENT.

6. DURING THE MEETING KY ASKED THIEU IF HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE PLANNED RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, SPECIFICALLY HIS PLANS TO CHANGE THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE CABINET. HOWEVER, THIEU REFUSED TO COMMENT. WHEN PRESSED, THE PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD MAKE HIS INTENTIONS CLEAR ON THIS SUBJECT BY 18 MAY. KHANG SAID HE ASKED KY LATER IF THIEU HAD GIVEN KY THIS INFORMATION IN PRIVATE. KY SAID NO. KY SAID HE HAD HAD

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD

IN 12457



PAGE 6 OF 8 PAGES

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD
(dissem controls)

A PRIVATE MEETING WITH THIEU ON 13 MAY TO DISCUSS CHANGES IN THE GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, DURING THE MEETING THIEU TALKED IN GENERALITIES AND REFUSED TO SAY WHETHER OR NOT HE PLANNED TO REPLACE PRIME MINISTER LOC WITH TRAN VAN HUONG.

7. KHANG SAID THE GENERALS HAD NOT MET WITH THIEU TO DISSUADE HIM FROM REMOVING LOC. ALTHOUGH KY HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT HUONG AS A "THIRD CENTER OF EXECUTIVE POWER" MOST OF THE GENERALS ARE NOT OPPOSED TO HUONG OR ANY STRONGLY ANTI-COMMUNIST PREMIER AS LONG AS HE AGREES NOT TO MIDDLE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE ARMED FORCES. IF THIEU OR A NEW PREMIER ATTEMPTS TO REMOVE BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE, OR GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN, KY AND ALL THE SENIOR GENERALS WILL RESIGN.

8. KHANG SAID KY AND THE GENERALS AGREED THAT THE BEST WAY THE GVN COULD INFLUENCE THE PARIS TALKS WAS TO ACHIEVE SOLED

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD

5
4
3
2
1

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD
(dissem controls)

MILITARY AND POLITICAL PROGRESS IN VIETNAM.

TO DO SO THEY FEEL SOUTH VIETNAM MUST HAVE A STRONG AND UNIFIED GOVERNMENT LED BY THE MILITARY AND THIS WAS THE MESSAGE THEY WERE TRYING TO CONVEY TO THIEU. KHANG SAID A RECENTLY CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT SAID THE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD WIN IN PARIS IF THEY WERE PATIENT BECAUSE OF THE SERIOUS CONTRADICTIONS IN THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT. THERE WERE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THIEU AND KY, BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATURE, BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE CIVILIANS, AND BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE VIETNAMESE. EVENTUALLY THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT WOULD COME APART FROM THE PRESSURE OF THESE CONTRADICTIONS. COMMUNIST STRATEGY WAS TO EXACERBATE THESE CONFLICTS. IF THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT COLLAPSED POLITICALLY, THE DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS WOULD BE ACADEMIC.

9. KHANG SAID THE GENERALS WERE VERY DISCOURAGED OVER THIEU'S UNWILLINGNESS TO MODIFY HIS COURSE. HOW-

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD
(dissem controls)

EVER, KHANG MAINTAINED THAT THE GENERALS DID NOT PLAN TO TAKE ANY PRECIPITATE ACTION AGAINST THIEU OR THE GOVERNMENT, UNLESS THE PRESIDENT OFFERED SOME STRONG PROVOCATION. KHANG SAID HE PERSONALLY WAS CONVINCED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED TO STRENGTHEN HIS PERSONAL POWER POSITION NOW WHILE HE STILL HAS THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND AMERICAN MILITARY POWER BEHIND HIM. MOST OF THIEU'S ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS, KHANG CLAIMED, ARE DESIGNED MORE TO STRENGTHEN THIEU'S PERSONAL POWER POSITION THAN TO STRENGTHEN THE GOVERNMENT. KHANG REASONS THAT THIEU FAVORS "CIVILIANIZING" THE GOVERNMENT SINCE THIS IS THE BEST WAY HE CAN NEUTRALIZE THE POWER OF THE MILITARY. HE ALSO REITERATED A PREVIOUS THESIS THAT THIEU PLANS TO USE THE CHANGES IN THE PROVINCES TO ASSIST HIM IN BUILDING A PERSONAL POLITICAL PARTY IN THE MANNER OF EX-PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM.

10. KHANG SAID THAT KY TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE MEETING AT THE JGS COMPOUND TO EXPLAIN THE NEW SELF DEFENSE FORCE. MOST OF THE GENERALS

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD

IN 12467

PAGE 9 OF 9 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD

(classification)

(dissem controls)

WERE VERY SKEPTICAL OF ITS VALUE AND SAID THE MILITARY WANTED NO PART OF IT. HOWEVER, THE CORPS COMMANDERS AGREED TO PROVIDE ARMS AND TRAINING IF REQUIRED.

11. KHANG SAID HE HAD NO IDEA WHO WOULD BE PRIME MINISTER NEXT WEEK. HE HAD HEARD ONE RUMOR THAT HUONG WAS RELUCTANT TO TAKE THE JOB SINCE HE HAD HEARD OF KY'S OPPOSITION. ALL THREE GENERALS PRESENTLY IN THE CABINET, VY, TRI, AND VIEN, STATED AT THE MEETING AT THE JGS THAT THEY WOULD NOT REMAIN IN A SUBSEQUENT CABINET EVEN IF ASKED. KHANG SAID HE FELT FAIRLY CERTAIN THAT THIEU WOULD ASK GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL DO CAO TRI TO JOIN A NEW CABINET.

12. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF (ALSO SENT)
REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
GROUP 1

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 17, 1968 - 7:45 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith, page 3, Chuck Adair suggests that a non-Executive Branch U. S. figure -- perhaps Sen. Smathers -- go to Panama and talk to the Chief of the National Guard Vallarino and other Panamanian leaders, suggesting that a fraudulent installation of Samudio is not in Panama's interest.

The evidence appears pretty firm that Arias, in fact, got most of the votes.

W. W. Rostow

Panama 3390

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-333
By is, NARA Date 9-8-98

WWRostow:rln



Department of State

34a
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 086

PAGE 01 PANAMA 03390 170057Z

83
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

O 162350Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4044

~~SECRET~~ PANAMA 3390

EXDIS

1. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF DELIBERATE POLICY DECISION, THE EMBASSY AND U.S. GOVT AS A WHOLE HAVE MAINTAINED A POSITION OF STRICT NEUTRALITY THROUGHOUT ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN IN PANAMA. THROUGH THE VOTING LAST SUNDAY, WE FORTUNATELY MANAGED TO REMAIN ALOOF AND TO AVOID BEING DRAWN DIRECTLY INTO WHAT IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED ON OF THE MOST BITTER AND UNBRIDLED POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS IN PANAMA'S HISTORY.

2. NO OFFICIAL REPORT ON THE ELECTION OUTCOME HAS BEEN FORTHCOMING. BOTH SIDES STILL CLAIM VICTORY. THE NU RADIO STATIONS ARE CONSTANTLY URGING THEIR SUPPORTERS TO BE ALERT FOR AN ATTEMPT BY THE GOVT-SAMUDIO FORCES TO DENY ARIAS THE VICTORY.

3. OUR CATALOG OF ABUSES INDICATES THAT LAST SUNDAY'S ELECTION FELL CONSIDERABLY SHORT OF BEING FREE AND HONEST, EVEN UNDER PREVIOUS PANAMANIAN STANDARDS. A WIDE RANGE OF QUESTIONABLE PRACTICES AND ACTIVITIES WERE EVIDENTLY APPLIED IN AN EFFORT TO INCREASE THE VOTE RESULT IN FAVOR OF GOVT CANDIDATE SAMUDIO. THESE INCLUDED ACTS OF COERCION AND INTIMIDATION OF VOTERS, FAILURE TO PROVIDE VOTING TABLES AND BALLOT BOXES IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS, STEALING OF BALLOT BOXES, SOME AT GUNPOINT, TAMPERING WITH INDIVIDUAL TABLE TALLIES AND NOW WHAT APPEARS TO BE RATHER EXTENSIVE EFFORTS TO REVISE THE OFFICIAL ELECTION REPORTS (ACTAS) AND SO RIG THE COUNT AS TO BE ABLE TO DECLARE SAMUDIO THE WINNER WITH THE BACKING OF THE GOVT CONTROLLED ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND THE SUPREME COURT. WHETHER OR NOT AUTHORIZED BY COMMANDANT VALLARINO, IT IS EVIDENT THAT INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN PRO SAMUDIO CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES AND IN SPECIFIC INSTANCES AIDED OR ABETTED THE COMMISSION OF UNLAWFUL AND FRAUDULENT ACTS.

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE

SANTITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 09-356 (#205a)
By: iol, NARA, Date 4-16-10

3

2



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PANAMA 03390 170057Z

4. DESPITE THIS MASSIVE EFFORT IN FAVOR OF SAMUDIO, THE PREPONDERANCE OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE STRONGLY INDICATES THAT ARIAS WAS THE ACTUAL VICTOR IN LAST SUNDAY'S BALLOTING BY A SIGNIFICANT MARGIN.

5. REGARDLESS OF THE DIFFICULTIES THIS MARGIN OF VICTORY POSES FOR SAMUDIO FORCES IN ATTEMPTING TO COVER THE TRANSPARENCY OF THE ALTERATION THEY WILL HAVE TO MAKE, CURRENT INFORMATION ALSO INDICATES THAT GOVT/SAMUDIO FORCES ARE STILL DETERMINED TO PERSIST IN THEIR PLANS TO DECLARE SAMUDIO THE WINNER.

6. AT THIS MOMENT, EVIDENCE POINTS TO THE PROBABILITY THAT NEITHER ARNULFO NOR HIS SUPPORTERS WILL ACCEPT PEACEFULLY A FRAUDULENT SAMUDIO VICTORY.

7. I HAVE DISCUSSED AT LENGTH WITH MEMBERS OF THE COUNTRY TEAM WHAT EFFECTIVE ACTION THE U.S. MIGHT TAKE IN THIS DEVELOPING SITUATION. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT ROBLES, SAMUDIO AND THE LETAS ARE ALL SO DEEPLY COMMITTED TO A SAMUDIO VICTORY (BY ANY MEANS) THAT ANY OFFICIAL EFFORT ON OUR PART TO SWAY THEM FROM THE PRESENT COURSE WOULD BE FRUITLESS AND MIGHT WELL RESULT IN EFFORTS TO DIRECT PUBLIC SENTIMENT AGAINST THE U.S.

3.3(6)(1)

8. I HAVE AGREED THAT [REDACTED] TO ASSIST IN DEVELOPING A WARNING AGAINST A FRAUDULENT DECLARATION OF WINNER IN THIS ELECTION, WHICH COULD BE PLACED IN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, ON THE CONDITION THAT THIS BE FIRST CLEARED WITH STATE DEPT.

9. WE CONSIDER VALLARINO THE KEY TO ANY SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO AVOID A FINAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF A FRAUDULENT ELECTION OUTCOME. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT HE PREFERS TO BE NEUTRAL ALTHOUGH HE HAS EITHER INSTRUCTED OR CONDONED GN PARTISAN INVOLVEMENT BEFORE AND DURING ELECTIONS, BUT HIS FIRST INTEREST IS HIMSELF AND THE GN AND IF HE DECIDES THAT INTEREST IS BEST SERVED BY REJECTING FRAUD HE MAY BREAK WITH THE SAMUDIO FORCES. INDICATIONS ARE THAT HE IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER THE EXTENT AND TRANSPARENCY OF THE FRAUD THAT IS LIKELY TO BE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO MAKE SAMUDIO THE WINNER.

10. WE FEEL THAT AN APPROACH TO VALLARINO AT THIS TIME BY AN

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 PANAMA 03390 170057Z

OFFICIAL OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION IS FRAUGHT WITH DANGEROUS COMPLICATIONS. AN OFFICIAL REMINDER OF LIKELY REACTIONS IN THE U.S. TO FRAUD COULD NOT BE GIVEN TO VALLARINO IF NOT AT THE SAME TIME GIVEN TO ROBLES AND ELETA WHO WOULD SIMPLY DENY EXISTENCE OF FRAUD.

1. IT HAS OCCURRED TO US, HOWEVER, AND WE PROPOSE IT FOR DEPT'S CONSIDERATION, THAT A PERSON OF STANDING AND INFLUENCE, KNOWN TO OFFICIALS IN PANAMA AND HAVING AN INTEREST IN PANAMANIAN AFFAIRS PAST AND FUTURE, MIGHT BE EFFECTIVE IN A CONVERSATION WITH VALLARINO. SENATOR SMATHERS PROBABLY KNOWS VALLARINO PERSONALLY. HE COULD POINT OUT TO VALLARINO THE PROBABLE U.S. PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO A FRAUDULENT ELECTION, BASING HIS CONCERN UPON REPORTS OF THE PRESS. TREATY NEGOTIATIONS, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE MAY ALL BE AFFECTED IF IN FUTURE THE U.S. HAS TO DEAL WITH A GOVT WHICH CAME TO OFFICE BY CONSPICUOUS FRAUD AND IMPOSITION.

12. PERHAPS THERE ARE OTHERS THAN SENATOR SMATHERS. HE CAME TO MIND BECAUSE HE HAS VISITED PANAMA FREQUENTLY, HAS A NUMBER OF WELL PLACED FRIENDS HERE AND HAS AN INTEREST IN PANAMA'S FUTURE. IF SUCH A PERSON SHOULD COME TO PANAMA, HE SHOULD COME ON A PERSONAL BASIS NOT RPT NOT AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF USG. IF DEPT. SHOULD AGREE TO THIS ACTION, IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE.

GP-1. ADAIR



~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Mr. Rostow

ACTION

UNCLASSIFIED

Friday, May 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Farewell Telegram to Bourguiba

[Handwritten signature]
2. Pres file

State asks your approval of the following message to be sent in your name to President Bourguiba when he leaves the United States next Tuesday:

"Best wishes to you and your official party as you conclude this memorable State Visit to the United States.

"From our frank talks and from seeing you amid familiar American scenes, all of us feel we know you and Tunisia a little better and our admiration for the steady progress of your government has deepened. I shall always value your friendship highly and remember your sincerity and your keen perception of the forces at work in our world.

"And now farewell, and may God have you in His keeping. You have added a shining page to the ever-growing record of friendship between our peoples. We wish all happiness to you and your family as you leave us and begin your return to Tunisia."

I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve

Disapprove

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-333
By us, NARA Date 9-8-98

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Jews in Poland

Pres file
sent to Pres
5/18/68 - 11:30 AM

In the memorandum at Tab A, Nick Katzenbach recommends:

1. You authorize Attorney General Clark to be prepared to extend parole to Jewish Poles, and
2. You authorize Katzenbach to tell American-Jewish leaders in confidence that we are prepared to receive Jewish refugees from Poland without regard to quota limitations.

Parole action may not be necessary -- as current refugee provisions will probably enable us to give visas to any Polish Jews who can get out of that country. We have had some Congressional criticism of parole, and would prefer not to use this authority unless necessary. (Parole reduces delay and the need for supporting personal documentation. Technically, it could by-pass legal requirements on health, criminal records, Communist affiliation, etc. -- but the State Department's intention is to require security checks and admit only Polish Jews who would otherwise be eligible as refugees.)

As drafted, Nick Katzenbach's memorandum would have you authorize parole for "refugees from religious persecution in Poland." If there were a renewed attack on the Catholic Church, this could apply to Catholics as well as Jews. There is also a theoretical question whether such a parole should apply to Russian Jews or persecuted religious groups elsewhere. In any event this all represents contingency planning.

If a parole action were taken, it would, of course, be violently denounced by the Polish Government and perhaps also be criticized by some Polish-Americans. Nevertheless, Ambassador Gronouski agrees with the arguments which override these considerations.

Essentially, the argument for action now is:

- to show the Jewish leadership in America that we are prepared to move; and
- to head off a repetition of the Jews' deeply felt conviction that the U. S. Government failed to give visas in time to the desperately persecuted European Jews in the Nazi era.

~~SECRET~~

-2-

I recommend you approve Nick Katzenbach's recommendations on the following understanding:

a. The Attorney General will extend parole only when refugee and other provisions of legislation prove inadequate to the need;

b. Persons coming into the U.S. on parole will have had security checks and would be eligible under normal refugee provisions, and

c. The parole action will technically apply to both Jewish and non-Jewish refugees from racial and religious persecution in Poland.

W. W. Rostow

Katzenbach recommendations approved _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

ND:gg

~~SECRET~~

1630
36

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Jews in Poland

As you know, Poland is in the throes of an anti-Semitic campaign masquerading under the guise of anti-Zionism. The reasons for this campaign are, in large part, related to internal Polish political problems and the struggle for power within the Communist Party. But the fact still remains that many Jews are suffering persecution and that Jewish opinion outside Poland--and particularly in the United States--has been aroused.

We have followed a cautious course thus far. About a week ago, we asked John Gronouski if he thought it would pay for him to make a private approach to the Polish Government, telling them that we would be prepared to accept any Polish Jews who might wish to emigrate to the United States. John replied that he feared any such approach might jeopardize Polish willingness to let some Jews emigrate to Israel. (Many of these people plan to come out through Western Europe, where they will apply for visas to the United States rather than proceeding on to Israel.)

Our only substantive action to date is a mild statement Bob McCloskey issued last month (copy attached at Tab A). We have tried to avoid any strong public position, since this might well lead the Polish Government to take even more repressive measures against the Jews.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-332
By CB, NARA Date 7-28-99

~~SECRET~~

-2-

The Department is coming under ever greater pressure from Jewish organizations here to take stronger action. I have already been called on by several prominent Rabbis; John Gronouski and I are now scheduled (May 23) to see representatives of the Conference of Presidents of Major American-Jewish Organizations. The line I have taken thus far--and the line I will continue to take--is that the U.S. Government wants to do everything possible to protect Polish Jews, but if we get too tough we may do them serious harm.

Frankly, I doubt that we can hold this position much longer. Right though I think our stand is, it simply will not wash with the vast majority of the American Jewish Community. Too many American Jews are extremely sensitive to our Government's failure to lower immigration barriers during the Nazi period. They see our silence now as a repetition of our stand during the 30's and 40's.

I think the time has come to take another step, and to involve the President. I therefore propose that you:

- authorize the Attorney General to be prepared to invoke the parole provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act to admit additional refugees (as we have done in the case of the Cuban refugees) when the visa "numbers" run out;
- authorize me to tell the Jewish leaders who will see me on the 23d that you have decided to set aside all numerical limitations on the immigration of Polish Jews to the U.S.

There are more than enough visa "numbers" available now to accommodate any Polish Jews who may want to come here. But, under the provisions of the new Act, these

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

immigrant visas will no longer be freely available to Poles after June 30, 1968. We may well need this parole authority to handle emigrating refugees after that date. (The total number of Jews in Poland is about 20,000; I doubt that more than 3-5,000 would come here under any circumstances.)

If you authorize these two steps we will be able to:

- be prepared to grant the necessary visas-- subject to the normal security check--to any Jews who may be able to get out of Poland;
- demonstrate Presidential interest in the plight of Poland's Jews.

We are making the necessary fiscal arrangements to have funds available to permit our European posts to handle any increased flow of refugees.

* * *

We may want to take another close look at the situation in a month or so. If things get worse in Poland we might decide to come back to you with some further recommendations. We could consider, for example, a public Presidential statement listing the steps we have already taken, declaring our willingness to admit all refugees from religious persecution in Poland, and restating in the clearest possible terms our national abhorrence of anti-Semitism. Before we think of any public steps, however, I want to be sure that we have exhausted all private channel possibilities; also, we will wish to consider carefully the impact of a public statement on those Jews remaining in Poland.

I have shown a draft of this memorandum to Ramsey Clark, who supports my recommendation.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

Recommendations

That you authorize the Attorney General to be prepared to invoke the parole provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act to admit refugees from religious persecution in Poland.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

That you authorize me to tell the representatives of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations that you have set aside all numerical limitations to immigration of Polish Jews to the United States.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____



Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

~~SECRET~~

On April 1, a press correspondent raised with the Department's spokesman the continuing reports of anti-Semitic occurrences in Poland.

The Department's spokesman replied, "I don't want to get into any assessment of what may be happening in Poland, but I do want to say that the United States condemns anti-Semitism wherever it occurs. History, particularly the events of this century, have clearly shown the tragic consequences which can result whenever anti-Semitism is encouraged in any form. And we would hope the lessons of the past would prevent this from happening again."

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-324
By is, NARA Date 5-3-00

Friday, May 17, 1968

37

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Soviet Space Tracking Ship

The Brazilian Government continues to detain the Soviet space tracking ship *Kegostrov*, found in Brazilian waters -- pending a suitable written apology from the Soviet Government. Our estimate is that the ship is probably a legitimate tracking vessel used in space shots, but she has highly sophisticated gear which would enable her to do electronic intelligence collection if given that mission.

Apparently the *Kegostrov* was first encountered in territorial waters by a Brazilian navy corvette on April 24. The *Kegostrov* claimed it was having fresh water problems and was allowed to depart. It was sighted again in Brazilian waters on May 3, and the Brazilian Navy sent a ship to investigate. The *Kegostrov* was subsequently escorted into the Port of Santos, where it has now been detained for more than a week.

The Brazilian Government has protested and asked for an apology. The Soviets have offered an oral apology, and the Brazilians have now demanded an unequivocal written one.

After getting advice from Len Meeker, Covey Oliver, John Leddy and the Korean Task Force, the Secretary and Under Secretary have concluded that the best course for us to take is not to become involved. There is considerable question how much we could influence the Brazilian Government in any event -- either to effect the ship's immediate release or to use the ship as some sort of counter for the *Pueblo*.

The New York Times reported the detention in a tiny, inside page story several days ago. It is surprising that the incident has so far received practically no press attention -- particularly as it is getting considerable play in Brazil.

W. W. Rostow

ND:gg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BRIEFING/ACTION

Pres file

Friday, May 17, 1968

Mr. President:

I have arranged with Jim Jones for a one-minute photograph with Kei Wakasumi at 12:15 p.m. today.

All that needs to be said is: "I am pleased to have Secretary Rusk express the views of our Administration to the people of Japan."

W. W. Rostow

cc: Jim Jones

WWRostow:rla

Friday, May 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Testimony on the M-16 Rifle Program

Pres file

Secretary Clifford has forwarded to you the testimony given this week by Assistant Secretary of the Army Brooks in response to Congressional questions concerning the procurement of M-16 rifles.

I do not believe it necessary for you to read the testimony because the press fully reported the reasons why the contracts were awarded to General Motors and Harrington & Richardson.

Secretary Clifford says the decision got us badly needed M-16 rifles six months sooner.

W. W. Restow

1617
392

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301


May 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am attaching a copy of the testimony of Assistant Secretary of the Army Brooks, who testified yesterday on the M16 rifle program.

I know you do not have the time to read the entire statement so I call your attention to the underlined portions on pages 4, 8, 9 and 10.

The procedure used was legal and advisable, keeping in mind the need for speed in production of the rifles. By using this procedure, we get the rifles seven months sooner.



Clark M. Clifford

53121 12 07 1 11.

12 OFFICE
RECEIVED

1617
396

STATEMENT
THE HONORABLE ROBERT A. BROOKS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (I&L)
BEFORE THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE
ON THE
M16 RIFLE PROGRAM
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SECOND SESSION, 90th CONGRESS

M16 RIFLE PROCUREMENTS

Information herein is not
for publication until
released by the Special
Subcommittee on the M16
Rifle Program of the
House Armed Services
Committee.

59c

13 May 1968

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE

I welcome the opportunity to appear again before the Committee. As a point of departure, I believe it would be helpful if I reviewed the events of the last few months which led to the decision to expand and accelerate the production of M16 rifles.

As of January of this year, our total planned deliveries for calendar 1968 were about 350,000 M16 rifles, and for calendar 1969 slightly higher. This rate of delivery would have provided by August 1968 the 190,000 additional rifles, earmarked under the then current plans, for U. S., South Vietnamese and other Free World Forces in Southeast Asia.

In February, however, increased combat activity in Vietnam, plans to accelerate the modernization of the South Vietnamese regular forces, and the decision to equip South Vietnamese regional and popular forces with the M16 rifle, increased requirements for Southeast Asia forces, by approximately 640,000 rifles, of which 250,000 were characterized as urgent.

As the President and Secretary of Defense have noted, the South Vietnamese forces are being furnished additional M16 rifles along with many other items of equipment, so that these forces can assume a greater role in the war.

Compared with the new requirements, the previously planned delivery rates for M16s were obviously inadequate. At those rates, the increased requirement would not be satisfied until late 1970 at the earliest. The production base needed to be both expanded and accelerated.

The first step taken to increase production was to request Colt's, the present producer, to expand its monthly capacity from 30,000 to 50,000. The latter rate is expected to be attained in June of 1969 with initial acceleration above 30,000 this month. Expanding production at Colt's to this level was the fastest way to increase deliveries.

Since last October, we had been in the process of selecting a second producer for the M16 rifle. Under competitive procurement procedures, the second source award would have been made in June 1968 to a single producer, with initial production in August 1969. This method, however, would not have provided the rifles needed soon enough to satisfy the increased requirements.

At this point there were several alternative courses of action to further accelerate and expand rifle production. Two received serious consideration. Both had advantages and disadvantages.

The first was to continue competition for a second source, but in addition to select a third producer on a sole source basis from among the four offerors who were in process of qualifying their technical proposals.

The producer would be selected as the one most likely to provide rifles of good quality at the earliest date. The remaining three offerors would be permitted to compete as planned for the June award on a normal production schedule. In developing this alternative, discussions were held with General Motors, Hydra-matic Division, in view of this company's capacity and outstanding past performance against accelerated schedules, particularly in the case of the procurement of M39 automatic 20mm cannon. The discussions helped to establish the maximum accelerated production schedule which we could expect. This alternative would provide us with a substantial number of early rifle deliveries from one additional producer. It would not interrupt the normal competitive procurement process for the other producers. It would obtain fewer rifles from the successful competitor over the period, due to the slower delivery schedule, but most probably at a lower price.

The second alternative was to interrupt the normal competitive process, negotiate with all four competitors against an accelerated schedule, select two of the four and award letter contracts to each in order to permit an immediate production go-ahead with definitization of prices and terms to follow later. This alternative offered the possibility of producing more rifles than the first, since two contractors would be working on accelerated schedules instead of one, but correspondingly increased the risks, both

to the Government and the contractors, and involved a probable increase in prices.

In view of the potential gains from accelerated delivery of the rifles to Southeast Asia I selected the second alternative, and this plan was personally reviewed and approved by the Secretary of the Army, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Accordingly, the decision was made and announced to the competitive contenders and to interested committees of Congress on the 29th of March, and to the press on 30 March 1968, that the Army would select two additional sources to produce M16 rifles to meet accelerated and expanded delivery schedules. Under the new plan, immediate and intense discussions would be held with the four offerors who had submitted acceptable technical proposals in the competitive procurement action. The four offerors and the public were notified that the selection of two contractors would be made primarily on the basis of their production capability and their ability to produce quality rifles to meet the accelerated schedule. The accelerated and increased schedule required each contractor to make initial deliveries in February 1969 and reach a maximum rate of 25,000 per month the following November. Since an expedited selection of the two additional sources was necessary if the required schedules were to be met, initial discussions with the four companies covered production and technical matters only, with price negotiations to follow with the two companies selected.

By December of 1969, our revised procurement program is expected to produce 266,000 more rifles from the two additional sources than the original plan involving a single second source. At that time the total combined production of M16's will have reached 100,000 rifles per month, as compared to 33,500 per month under the original schedule. This expanded rate of production will provide the rifles needed in Southeast Asia one year earlier than our January plans. The issue of M16 rifles and other equipment, along with other steps taken to improve the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, will make it possible in the future to shift an increasingly greater portion of the burden of combat to the South Vietnamese.

I think it would be useful at this point to review what each M16 producer must accomplish. Our original competitive plan developed and announced to the industry last fall required the successful contractor to establish a production line, train personnel, design and acquire tooling, produce a rifle fully interchangeable with those produced by Colt's, and meet exacting quality standards. All this had to be done in 14 months, and culminate in a production rate of 10,000 rifles per month on a one-shift, five-day week basis.

The Army considered it feasible, utilizing the evaluation criteria established last fall, for all four companies involved in the competition to meet these objectives, difficult as they are. As I mentioned earlier, on March the 29th we changed these requirements substantially. We now require a contractor to go through this entire process of engineering, tooling design, training and production in nine and one-half months instead of fourteen, to achieve a rate of 25,000 rifles a month instead of 10,000, and to produce nearly five times as many rifles over the same period as in the previous plan.

There is a risk that any contractor, no matter how expert, and including all of the four with whom discussions were undertaken, may not fully meet this demanding schedule. The Government anticipated and accepted this risk in view of our need to get as many rifles as possible as soon as possible. Even if all contractors meet their schedules, the expanded Southeast Asia requirements I have mentioned will not be fully satisfied until late in 1969.

Since there is some risk with any contractor, those producers with greater engineering and production capability, and better evidence of planning and organization for production of the rifle will offer more assurance of meeting the schedule and will in our judgment produce more rifles than those who rate lower on these counts.

In order to obtain an objective evaluation of the four possible producers, we utilized the source selection procedure originally set up as the first step in the planned selection of a single additional producer. The Commanding General of the Army Materiel Command was designated as the source selection authority. To advise him, he appointed a five-member Source Selection Advisory Council, chaired by the Commanding General of the Army Weapons Command. To provide staff assistance to the Source Selection Advisory Council, a Source Selection Evaluation Board was appointed, with a total staff of approximately 65 people representing skills in the area of weapons engineering, safety, production, tooling and finance. The Source Selection Evaluation Board carefully evaluated and scored each prospective producer. It considered, among other things, general managerial competence, engineering capabilities, financial stability, access to a satisfactory labor force, and existing equipment resources. In the case of each company, the scoring in each area was performed by different individuals acting independently. Composite scores reflecting the individual ratings were then derived. These ratings, along with a narrative explaining the ratings, were made available to the Source Selection Advisory Council. The Council, however, did not rely only upon the Evaluation Board's material, but also used other data sources, and consulted with individuals knowledgeable in specific areas. The Council then ranked the prospective producers based on the degree of confidence

in their ability to meet the schedule, their capability for producing a quality product, and their contributions as a reliable production source for the mobilization base. It was this exhaustive and careful procedure which led to the selection of H&R and General Motors as the two additional producers. I might add that there was no difference of opinion at any level concerning the relative standings of the various producers.

Both of these companies were then asked to submit a ceiling price. This price, later incorporated in a letter contract, represents a maximum beyond which the companies cannot go. It is, however, subject to negotiation downward, and these negotiations will proceed in order to produce a definitive price. Before a price is fixed we will have available a complete audit of the contractor's proposed costs. The contracts involved are subject to Public Law 87-653, which requires that contractors furnish cost and pricing data certified to be current, accurate and complete. The data obtained from the companies and from the audit will assist us in negotiating a fair price.

The ceiling prices in the letter contracts of \$56 million for General Motors and \$42 million for H&R, cover the production of 240,000 rifles by each company, with funding over a two-year period. A great deal of publicity has been given to assumed unit cost figures which are based solely upon the first year ceiling costs and the quantities of 60,000 each produced

during the first year. Using this sort of analysis, the price works out to \$314 per rifle for General Motors and \$250 per rifle for Harrington & Richardson. This approach to producing a unit cost is highly misleading.

During the first year each of the new M16 producers will have to acquire production equipment, inspection equipment and special tooling; they will have to hire and train personnel, complete production engineering, and rearrange plant facilities. We will pay for the reasonable costs of these actions, within the established ceiling price. But at the end of the first year's production, the Army will not only have acquired a quantity of rifles, it will have Government-owned mobilization production lines capable of meeting future requirements, and in addition will have an established and experienced producer with trained personnel and a suitable production plant.

In the case of the M16 production, we are, of course, also paying a premium due to the accelerated delivery schedule, which requires sequential actions to be replaced with concurrent actions, produces overtime requirements, and may require the payment of premium prices for accelerated delivery of components and tooling. All of these actions cost money, and are the price we pay to attain an accelerated schedule.

When we first bought another rifle, the M14, in 1959 through 1961, the first year unit prices based on initial one-time costs ranged as high as \$320. These prices were based on a normal production lead time of 12 months

rather than the accelerated schedule required by the M16 program. Subsequently, unit prices for the M14 rifle dropped as low as \$70. Thus the estimates received reflecting high average costs for the first year's production of the M16 are not out of line with past experience. Even these prices, however, are only estimates. We will aggressively negotiate with each contractor a fair and reasonable firm price, after we have had a full disclosure and audit of the producer's cost data.

It has also been pointed out that we are presently paying about \$104 each to Colt's for the M16 rifle it produces. However, even if we were to purchase the additional quantities from Colt's, prices could not remain at \$104, but would be substantially increased because Colt's also would have to incur costs for additional plant facilities, tooling, and other items.

It is important to emphasize also that on subsequent procurements of the M16, we will be able to have a competitive procurement among the three experienced producers. The resulting competition will put us in a much stronger position to obtain the lowest possible prices for the Government.

By awarding the contracts to General Motors and Harrington and Richardson, we will be able to move the needed rifles to Vietnam seven months sooner than would have been possible under normal price competition and production leadtimes, and sooner than by contracting with either of the competitors

not selected. We have established a basis for future competitive procurement. Finally, we have broadened the mobilization production base to meet future requirements.

Accelerated deliveries to meet increased requirements was our objective. We switched from the price competitive approach to one of selecting two producers judged most capable of manufacturing rifles on an accelerated basis. We announced our intentions and followed the announced plan. Our course of action was the one best calculated to meet our procurement objectives. It was not undertaken lightly, but with full appreciation that it involved a change in the competitive procurement process. I consider the decisions made to be both sound and proper.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Friday - May 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Dominican Municipal Elections

Yesterday the Dominican Republic held mid-term municipal elections. Ambassador Crimmins reports the voting took place without major incidents, despite the threats of the extreme left.

The extreme right PQD Party and Bosch's PRD Party boycotted the elections and campaigned hard to get the voters to abstain. Still some 800,000 voters went to the polls. The Embassy thinks the total could rise to 900,000 when all the votes are in. These figures represent a good turnout for a municipal by-election. The total vote for the hotly contested Presidential race in 1966 amounted to 1.3 million.

There are 78 municipalities in the Dominican Republic. In 1966 Balaguer's PR Party won 64. The Embassy estimates Balaguer's followers will capture 68 to 70. Returns are already in for the Santo Domingo municipality. They show that Balaguer wrested this important power base from the Bosch group. The Social Christians who refused to follow the PRD boycott, doubled their vote over 1966 and won 2 municipalities. Independent parties -- made up largely of PRD dissenters -- are expected to capture 3. The outcome in the remainder is not clear.

PQD-

Our fear was that the/PRD boycott would pick up sufficient steam to render the elections meaningless, thereby weakening Balaguer's political position. The participation of the Social Christians and independent parties blunted this effort. The turnout shows that Balaguer still commands widespread support throughout the country.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 95-340
By [signature], NARA, Date 7-24-97