

41

ACTION

*Pres file*

Thursday, May 16, 1968 -- 7:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

You can't shoot a man for trying -- or maybe you can.

Kei Wakatsumi and his Tokyo editor ask if two things are possible as background to the Rusk interview:

-- a picture with you;

-- a statement from you that you are "pleased to have Sec. Rusk express the view of your Administration to the people of Japan."

Their case: it would make a "big difference" in the impact of the interview.

This would be ridiculous except for one fact: Wakatsumi and his editor are fighting the pro-American battle in Japan -- without question.

W. W. Rostow

Okay\_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rlh  
No\_\_\_\_\_

Call me\_\_\_\_\_

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, May 18, 1968  
7:40 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This is quite a story.

A Buddhist monk in Danang tipped  
off the police about a band of young VC  
sappers -- heading off a rough time.

W. W. Rostow

25X1A

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rla

SANITIZED  
Authority NLJ 019-034-2-10  
By Q, NARA, Date 1/16/02

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IN 11789 42a

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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## SANTIZED

**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

NLJ 97-325

By is, NARA Date 10-22-99

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(classification) (dissem controls)

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WERE TRIGGERED BY A REPORT OF SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY TO POLICE FROM A BUDDHIST MONK WHO NORMALLY IS NOT NOTABLY PRO-GVN. POLICE INFORMANTS HAVE REPORTED THAT THE VC WERE INFILTRATING SAPPERS AND CADRES INTO DANANG TO CONDUCT TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND TO STIR UP DEMONSTRATIONS. NO BUDDHIST CEREMONIES ON BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY TOOK AN ANTI-GVN ATTITUDE. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THE PEOPLE ARE RESPONDING TO VC EFFORTS TO INCITE THEM TO DEMONSTRATIONS AT THIS TIME. END SUMMARY.

1. THE ENEMY HAS CONTINUED TO HARASS QUANG NAM PROVINCE BY MORTAR AND ROCKET FIRE, WITH THE HOURS OF ATTACK GROWING EARLIER AND EARLIER. ROCKET ATTACKS AGAINST POINTS IN THE DANANG AREA, CAUSING LITTLE DAMAGE, OCCURRED ON THE NIGHTS OF 8 AND 11 MAY, FOR EXAMPLE, AT ABOUT 2100 HOURS. ON 12 MAY, HOWEVER, A FEW ROCKETS HIT DANANG AIRBASE AND MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY IN EARLY EVENING BETWEEN ABOUT 1830 AND 1930 HOURS. ON 13 MAY HOI AN, QUANG NAM CAPITAL, TOOK ABOUT EIGHT MORTAR ROUNDS AT 1450. HARASSMENT THE NIGHT OF 13/14 MAY WAS LIMITED TO AREAS OUTSIDE OF HOI AN AND A FEW ROUNDS IN DANANG EAST AND CHINA BEACH ACROSS THE RIVER FROM DANANG. VERY LITTLE, AND NO MAJOR, HARASSMENT OCCURRED THE NIGHT OF 14/15 MAY. AN UNTESTED POLICE INFORMANT

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SAID THAT THE VC HAD SENT CADRES TO DANANG TO CHECK THE ACCURACY OF THEIR MORTAR AND ROCKET FIRE.

2. THE ARREST OF 23 SAPPER CADRES AND FOUR COMMO-LIAISON CADRES IN DANANG BETWEEN 5 AND 10 MAY ATTESTS TO VC INTENTIONS TO CONDUCT TERRORIST ACTIVITY, ASSASSINATIONS AND SABOTAGE TO CREATE CONFUSION PREPARATORY TO LAUNCHING A SECOND OFFENSIVE.

(COMMENT: ACCORDING TO ONE REPORT, THE ATTACK PLAN FOR QUANG NAM AND DANANG IN MAY WOULD BE DIVIDED INTO TWO PHASES, OR SUB-PHASES, THE FIRST FEATUING GUERRILLA AND SAPPER TACTICS AND HARASSMENT, WITH THE SECOND SUBPHASE APPARENTLY TO INVOLVE GROUND ATTACK.) APPREHENSION OF THE SAPPERS FOLLOWED A CALL FROM THICH MINH TUAN, HEAD OF THE BO DE BUDDHIST HIGH SCHOOL, TO POLICE ON 4 MAY. TUAN TOLD POLICE THAT A NUMBER OF YOUNG PEOPLE NOT KNOWN TO HIM WERE GATHERED IN THE SCHOOL COMPOUND AND BEHAVING STRANGELY. POLICE ARRESTED SEVERAL OF THESE YOUNG PEOPLE WHO WERE NOT DANANG RESIDENTS. ONE OF THEM ADMITTED THAT ALL WERE MEMBERS OF SAPPER BATTALION Q/91.

3. BY 14 MAY SOME FIFTEEN OF THE SAPPERS HAD MADE SOME DEGREE OF ADMISSION REGARDING THEIR ACTIVITIES FOR THE VC. INTERROGATIONS REVEALED THEM TO BE MEMBERS OF TERRORIST/SABOTAGE (SAPPER) BAT-

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(dissem controls)

TALION Q/91, WHICH WAS MADE UP OF FIVE COMPANIES, NUMBERING  
300 OR 400 INDIVIDUALS, MALE AND FEMALE. MEMBERS WERE RE-  
CRUITED MAINLY IN DIEN BAN DISTRICT, QUANG NAM; MOSTLY TEENAGERS,  
AT LEAST ONE AS YOUNG AS 14, OF BOTH SEXES AND INCLUDING YOUTHS  
OF ABOUT TWENTY WHO HAVE BEEN TRAINED AS SAPPERS AND TERRORISTS.  
ONE GIRL WAS A SECTION CHIEF WHO WOULD COMMAND 27 OR 30  
MEMBERS. AMONG THE PERSONNEL OF Q/91 ARE CADRES FROM REGULAR  
SAPPER BATTALIONS, WHICH SEEM TO STIFFEN DISCIPLINE OR TO SERVE AS  
SPECIALISTS. ALL WERE HIGHLY MOTIVATED AND GIVEN MORE THAN SUPER-  
FICIAL TRAINING IN THE USE OF WEAPONS. SOME REGARDED THEMSELVES  
AS SUICIDE TROOPS. THEY RESIDED IN RURAL AREAS NOT FAR FROM  
DANANG BUT HAD VISITED DANANG AND SEEMED GENERALLY ABLE TO DRESS  
AND BEHAVE IN A MANNER THAT RENDERED THEM INCONSPICUOUS IN THE  
CITY.

4. INTERROGATIONS OF THE YOUTHS INDICATED THAT THEY WERE  
TO MAKE A SERIOUS ATTEMPT AT TERRORISM AT 0200 HOURS ON 5 MAY.  
AT LEAST FIFTY YOUNG SAPPERS HAD BEEN SENT TO DANANG ONE OR TWO  
DAYS EARLIER FOR THE EFFORT. ONE GROUP WAS TO ATTACK AND ATTEMPT  
TO HOLD DANANG RADIO BROADCASTING STATION. ONE YOUNG GIRL WAS

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(classification controls)

TO OPERATE A 60MM MORTAR IN ATTACKING THE MAYOR'S OFFICE. OTHER OBJECTIVES IN DANANG INCLUDED HEADQUARTERS OF ARVN SPECIAL SECTOR FOR DANANG AND ITS ENVIRONS AND TWO POLICE POSTS. THEY WERE TO LAUNCH THEIR ATTACKS SIMULTANEOUSLY AT 0200 HOURS ON 5 MAY, TAKING THEIR SIGNAL A ROCKET ATTACK AGAINST DANANG AIR BASE AT THAT TIME (WHICH DID OCCUR AT ABOUT THAT TIME). THEIR CACHES OF WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES WERE GENERALLY QUITE NEAR THE TARGET. THE CACHE SITES WERE TO BE USED AS RENDEZVOUS POINTS FOR VARIOUS TEAMS OR ACTION GROUPS. THE ARREST OF SEVERAL OF THE SAPPERS DURING THE PRE-MIDNIGHT HOURS OF 4 MAY EVIDENTLY DISRUPTED THE EFFORT AND PREVENTED ANY OF THE GROUPS FROM LAUNCHING ITS ATTACK. THE VC ACTION MAY HAVE BEEN THWARTED ALSO BY THE CURFEW AND GENERALLY VERY TIGHT SECURITY MAINTAINED IN THE CITY, BUT THE FACT THAT THEIR WEAPONS WERE CACHED WITHIN A FEW BLOCKS OF EACH TARGET SUGGESTS THAT THEY MIGHT NEVERTHELESS HAVE SUCCEEDED HAD THEIR PRESENCE NOT BEEN DISCOVERED WHEN IT WAS.

5. THE DISCOVERY AND CONFISCATION OF CONSIDERABLE WEAPONRY, AMMUNITION, AND EXPLOSIVES IN SEVERAL CACHES IN DANANG ATTESTS TO CAPABILITY OF THE VC TO CARRY OUT THEIR PLANS IF NOT APPREHENDED. BY 14 MAY A TOTAL OF ABOUT 600 KILOS OF EXPLOSIVE HAD

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(dissem controls)

BEEN FOUND IN SIX CACHES DISCOVERED IN DANANG. AT THE HOUSE OF A SUSPECTED VC AGENT, WHO HAD TAKEN FLIGHT, POLICE DISCOVERED THREE B/40 ROCKET LAUNCHERS WITH ELEVEN ROUNDS; FOUR AK/47 RIFLES WITH 2,000 ROUNDS; FOUR K/54 PISTOLS, A NUMBER OF GRENADES, AND SEVERAL TIME FUSES. OTHER CACHES, INCLUDING ONE ON THE BO DE HIGH SCHOOL COMPOUNE, YIELDED ADDITIONAL AK/47'S WITH SOME 5,000 ROUNDS, B/40 ROUNDS, AND TIME FUSES AS WELL AS THE EXPLOSIVES. PHAM DUY DAI, VC COMMISSIONER OF DANANG CITY SECOND DISTRICT COMMITTEE AND FORMER SAPPER BATTALION COMMANDER (CAPTURED DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE) HAS SAID THAT THE VC MAY HAVE CACHED AS MUCH AS 800 KILOS OF EXPLOSIVES IN DANANG BY FEBRUARY.

5. (COMMENT: IT WOULD APPEAR THAT ONLY YOUNG TERRORISTS WERE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS PARTICULAR MISSION AND THAT PROFESSIONAL SAPPERS FROM THE MILITARY UNITS SUBORDINATE TO THE VC QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE (GVN QUANG NAM PROVINCE AND DANANG CITY) WERE NOT INVOLVED. THIS SUGGESTS THAT ACTION OF 5 MAY WAS SUPPOSED TO BE A CURTAIN RAISER FOR LATER MILITARY ACTION THAT HAS NOT YET MATERIALIZED. THE OBJECTIVES CITED IN PARA. 4 ARE ONLY A FEW OF THE VC TARGETS IN DANANG REPORTED BY POLICE IN-

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(classification controls)

FORMANTS AND OTHERS.)

7. THE SAPPERS WERE TO INFILTRATE INTO DANANG WITHOUT WEAPONS. EACH WAS GIVEN VNS2,000, A CERTIFICATE OF RESIDENCE, A BIRTH CERTIFICATE AND A NEW SET OF CLOTHING. THEY LEFT FROM THANH QUI AND DONG HO VILLAGES, DIEN BAN, ON 4 MAY. BILLETS IN DANANG WERE ALREADY ARRANGED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE TEAM THAT WAS TO ATTACK THE RADIO STATION STAYED AT BO DE HIGH SCHOOL (NEXT DOOR TO THE RADIO STATION) AND WERE TO RECEIVE THEIR WEAPONS THERE, AND THE TEAM THAT WAS TO ATTACK THE DANANG HOTEL (U.S. ENLISTED MEN'S BILLET) STAYED AT DANANG STADIUM AND WERE TO RECEIVE THEIR WEAPONS THERE.

8. [REDACTED] A VC SAPPER CELL LEADER WHO WAS CAPTURED ON 4 APRIL, SAID THAT VC LEADERS TOLD HIM DURING TRAINING/REORIENTATION IN THE NUOC MAN (MARBLE MOUNTAIN) ARE AFTER THE TET OFFENSIVE, THAT TO SUCCEED IN THE SECOND UPRISING, THE VC MUST CARRY OUT A PERIOD OF DESTROYING GVN TYRANTS FROM 5 TO 20 APRIL. IF THE VC COULD DESTROY THE TYRANTS THEY COULD MOBILIZE THE POPULATION TO CONDUCT A DEMONSTRATION AND CREATE DISTURBANCES, WHICH WOULD PROVIDE GOOD SUPPORT FOR MILITARY FORCES ATTACKING FROM OUTSIDE. THE VC LEADERS DID NOT SAY WHEN THE SECOND UP-

[REDACTED]

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(dissem controls)

ISING WAS TO OCCUR, BUT INDICATED THAT IT WOULD OCCUR AFTER A PERIOD OF ELIMINATING GVN TYRANTS. THE VC SAID THE MILITARY FORCE IN THE SECOND UPRISING WOULD BE LARGER AND WOULD REQUEST CLOSE SUPPORT OF RAID AND SHELLING BY HEAVY WEAPONS TO ATTACK DANANG AIRBASE, MARBLE MOUNTAIN AIR FACILITY, I CORPS HEADQUARTERS, AND TRINH MINH THE BRIDGE. FOLLOWING THE ATTACK AND AFTER TAKING OVER THESE LOCATIONS, THE VC WOULD ATTACK DANANG CITY WITH INTENT TO OCCUPY. WHEN THE ORDER FOR MILITARY ATTACK IS ISSUED, VC UNDERGROUND POLITICAL CADRES WILL ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE THE POPULATION OF DONG GIANG, THIRD DANANG DISTRICT, TO CROSS THE RIVER BY BOAT TO DEMONSTRATE.

9. (COMMENT: THIS PATTERN OF PLANNED ACTIVITY APPARENTLY HAS NOT CHANGED, ALTHOUGH SEVERAL REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE DATE OF THE SECOND OFFENSIVE WAS DELAYED BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE LACK OF COORDINATION AND NEED FOR TROOP REPLACEMENT AND REORIENTATION. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE HAD NO REPORTS OF MOVEMENT OF THE SECOND NVA DIVISION TOWARD THE DANANG TACTICAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY BY 12 MAY, ALTHOUGH SUCH A MOVE IS EXPECTED. (THE SECOND DIVISION HAS FIGURED IN ALL REPORTS OF PLANNED MAJOR ENEMY ACTION AGAINST DANANG.) POW STATEMENTS INDICATE THAT ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST

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VC REGIMENT, SECOND DIVISION, MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO TIE DOWN  
FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE VICINITY OF ROUTE NO. 14 WHILE THE RE-  
MAINDER OF THE SECOND NVA DIVISION BY-PASSES THE AREA IN A MOVE  
TOWARD THE COASTAL PLAINS .)

10. ACCORDING TO POLICE INFORMANT REPORTS THE VC HAVE INSTRUCTED CADRES TO USE RD CADRE UNIFORMS AND BUDDHIST MONKS ROBES TO INFILTRATE INTO DANANG AND TO CONCEAL WEAPONS INSIDE COFFINS TO CARRY THEM TO DANANG CITY. OTHERS WORE BANDAGES AS WOUNDED CIVILIANS AND WENT TO DANANG BY BUS. THE VC ALSO HAVE BEEN ORGANIZING YOUTH/TEENAGER SUICIDE GROUPS. THEIR MISSIONS INCLUDE TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND ORGANIZATION OF DEMONSTRATIONS IN DANANG. THEIR AIMS INCLUDE CREATION OF CONFUSION AND GETTING THE PEOPLE TO DEMAND A COALITION GOVERNMENT. THE VC WERE PLANNING THE SAME TYPE OF ACTIVITY AGAINST DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS OF THE PROVINCE AS WELL.

11. IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT THE VC CAN SUCCEED IN AROUSING THE POPULACE TO DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE GVN. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WHO IS NOT NOTABLY PRO-GVN, IS ONLY ONE EXAMPLE OF PRIVATE CITIZENS WHO HAVE NOTIFIED THE POLICE OF SUSPICIOUS ACTIONS. IN HOI AN THE HEAD OF THE UNIFIED BUDDHIST ASSOCIATION, WHO PRE-

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(dissem controls)

SIDED AT THE BUDDHA BIRTHDAY CEREMONY ON 11 MAY, WAS EXTREMELY POLITE AND CONCILIATORY TO PROVINCE OFFICIALS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROVINCE SENIOR ADVISOR WHO WERE PRESENT. HE CALLED UPON THE PEOPLE TO BE GOOD VIETNAMESE DURING THE YEAR AND TO WORK FOR AN INDEPENDENT VIETNAM. NO DEMONSTRATION WAS ATTEMPTED ON BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY IN DANANG, ALTHOUGH INFORMANT REPORTS INDICATED THAT THE VC HOPED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ASSEMBLIES ON THAT DAY TO CREATE CONFUSION AND EVEN DEMONSTRATIONS. REGIONAL POLICE HEAD-QUARTERS HAD ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS THROUGHOUT I CROPS TO WATCH FOR ANY VC MANIPULATION OF CROWDS AND TO STOP ANY ATTEMPTED DEMONSTRATION IMMEDIATELY.

12. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC  
PACFLT ARPAC PACAF III MAF CORDS [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

1.5(E)  
3.4(b)(1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Thursday, May 16, 1968 -- 6:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Over the past few days I have briefed the following on Paris:

Tuesday, May 14, 1968

Tom Lambert, Los Angeles Times, on the telephone  
Boyd France, BUSINESS WEEK, in my office

Wednesday, May 15, 1968

Max Frankel, New York Times, in my office  
(Lester Velle, Reader's Digest, in my office) -- Middle East  
Jack Sutherland, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, in my  
office

Russ Wiggins, The Washington Post, on telephone  
Rescoe Drummend, on the telephone

Chalmers Roberts, on the telephone. I hit him hard on the story.

Thursday, May 16, 1968

William S. White, in my office

W. W. Rostow

W W R  
ACTION

44

Thursday, May 16, 1968 -- 4:15 PM

for file

Mr. President:

Joe Palmer leaves soon for a tour of 17 African countries. All but one (the Congo) are countries the Vice President did not visit on his trip in January.

It occurred to Joe that, since you have urged him several times to get out to Africa, you might be persuaded to send along small Presidential mementos for each of the President's he will see (list at Tab A). For example, you might wish to send either a pair of the Presidential-seal cuff links for each President, or an autographed copy of This America, or both.

This is not a must, but it is a nice idea and would be well received in Africa.

W. W. Rostow

Let's send: Cuff links \_\_\_\_\_

Autographed books \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

EKH/vmr



LIST OF COUNTRIES MR. PALMER WILL VISIT

<u>NATION</u>	<u>LEADER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
Cameroon	Ahmadou Ahidjo	President
Central African Republic	Gen. Jean Bedel Bokassa	President
Chad	Francois Tombalbaye	President
The Gambia	Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara	Prime Minister
Congo(K)	Joseph D. Mobutu	President
Gabon	Albert Bongo	President
Guinea	Ahmed Sekou Toure	President
Niger	Hamani Diori	President
Senegal	Leopold Sedar Senghor	President
Sierre Leone	Siaka Stevens	Prime Minister
Upper Volta	Lt. Col. Sangoule Lamizana	President
Uganda	A. Milton Obote	President
Burundi	Michel Micombero	President
Rwanda	Gregoire Kayibanda	President
Nigeria	Maj. Gen. Yakubu Gowon	Head of the Federal Military Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces

45

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, May 16, 1968  
3:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Taylor's thoughts,  
in support of Amb. Bunker, on the need  
to go slow on total bombing cessation.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By hjs, NARA, Date 6-2-92

45a

~~SECRET~~

May 13, 1968

Mr. President:

In his cable of May 10 (Section II, Saigon 26928), Ellsworth Bunker makes a case against a total cessation of bombing of North Viet-Nam for an inadequate return to which I heartily subscribe. To gain the advantages from a total cessation which he seeks and to avoid the adverse consequences he foresees (suspicion and despair in South Viet-Nam; encouragement to increased violence in North Viet-Nam), I would suggest the adoption of the following negotiation position, immediately or progressively as the talks develop:

a. Tacit or overt disavowal of the San Antonio formula.

While insistence on evidence of "productive" discussions as a price for a total cessation of bombing offers possibilities for maneuver under the San Antonio formula, the "no advantage" condition has always been difficult to use to advantage. To equate "no advantage" to the maintenance of normal levels of infiltration poses impossible problems of establishing what is normal and of proving departures from that normal after we have stopped the bombing.

However, we now have the possibility of getting rid of the San Antonio formula on the ground that it has been invalidated by subsequent events which make it impossible for us to assume that no advantage would be taken of a total cessation of bombing. Since March 31, we have instituted a unilateral geographical restraint on our bombing and the enemy response to it has been to take the fullest advantage of it by conducting infiltration at an ever increasing rate and by resuming the attack of South Vietnamese cities after the pattern of the Tet offensive. It is impossible to consider a further reduction of our bombing until these escalatory acts of the enemy cease and we receive some tangible evidence indicating the adoption of appropriate restraints in compensation for the present restrictions on our bombing.

b. Resumption of bombing between 19th and 20th parallel.

We have this action available to us at any time. We would be justified in taking it now but I would prefer holding it for use at some point during negotiations when it will produce maximum effect. If our adversaries reject our demand for the restraints mentioned in the preceding paragraph, that would be an excellent time to renew our bombing up to the 20th parallel.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By 120, NARA Date 9-8-98

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- 2 -

c. Discussions of total cessation of bombing.

The foregoing actions would not preclude a continuing discussion of a total cessation of bombing but we should try to keep it within the confines of the total package of issues to be negotiated. The bombing is our primary "persuader" and should be retained to the last to make a maximum contribution to "prompt and productive" discussions and agreements. We should not be reluctant to resume bombing in the Hanoi-Haiphong area whenever it becomes apparent that the enemy is increasing his activities in the South or deliberately stalling the negotiations.

If you see any merit in the foregoing views, I would suggest that they be passed to our negotiators in Paris.

M. D. T.

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

46

Thurs., May 16, 1968  
1:00 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Harriman and Vance counsel delay  
on bombing between the 19th and 20th parallels  
to see if they can smoke out a DMZ proposition  
over the weekend.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachmentg Paris 805 to Helms from Davis)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-323  
By is, NARA Date 10-5-98



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-328  
By iss, NARA Date 10-6-98

Walt,

46a  
The original of this has  
gone to Dean Rusk.  
No other copies have  
been distributed.

Dick

~~TOP SECRET~~ 161340Z MAY 68 CITE SCPARIS 805

IMMEDIATE SCWASHINGTON

WSBELT

FOR MR HELMS EYES ONLY FROM DAVIS

HARRIMAN AND VANCE HAVE ASKED ME TO SEND FOLLOWING MESSAGE  
THROUGH OUR CHANNEL FOR DELIVERY TO SECSTATE. IT IS  
IN REPLY TO CITE CAP 81131 RECEIVED THIS MORNING.

ACCORDING TO LATER PHONE CALL FROM ROSTOW, THAT MESSAGE--  
ADDRESSED ROSTOW TO HARRIMAN-ACTUALLY WAS FROM SECSTATE AFTER  
TALKING TO HIGHEST AUTHORITY. FOLLOWING SHOULD OF COURSE BE  
TREATED AS PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.

QUOTE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE.

WITH REFERENCE TO YOUR CAP 81131, WE ARE OF COURSE CONCERNED  
WITH THE CONTINUING BUILD-UP AND THE FAILURE TO INDICATE ANY  
RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. WE HAVE  
REPEATEDLY UNDERLINED THIS TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION  
AS WELL AS IN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN NO VISIBLE PROGRESS, THERE ARE  
SOME INDICATIONS THAT IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A DIALOGUE  
ON A VARIATION OF THE OLD PHASE A/PHASE B FORMULA. IN THIS  
CONNECTON, WE RECEIVED TWO REPORTS YESTERDAY. THE FIRST WAS  
FROM AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR ANDERSON, AS A RESULT OF A CONVERSATION  
WITH MANAC'H, IN MANAC'H SAID HE THOUGHT THERE WAS DRV

PRESERVATION COPY

INTEREST IN OUR PROPOSAL CONCERNING THE DMZ. SECONDLY, BUI  
DIEM REPORTED TO US YESTERDAY THAT FRENCH JOURNALISTS HAD TOLD HIM  
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE SAYING THAT IF THE US FIRST STOPPED  
THE BOMBING, NORTH VIETNAM MIGHT BE WILLING TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT  
THE DMZ.

WE OURSELVES HAVE NOTED THAT THUY HAS SPOKEN AT  
CONSIDERABLE LENGTH ABOUT THE DMZ, CRITICIZING IN DETAIL OUR  
"ABUSE" OF THE DMZ, WHICH COULD INDICATE THAT HE WAS BUILDING  
UP A CASE TO SELL THE PUBLIC THAT NORTH VIETNAM WOULD GAIN BY  
THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE DMZ.

ALTHOUGH WE TAKE ALL THIS WITH SUITABLE GRAINS OF SALT,  
WE FEEL THAT THERE MAY BE A CHANCE TO DEVELOP SOME FORWARD  
MOVEMENT. IF THAT IS THE CASE, WE SUGGEST FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION  
THAT REINSTITUTION OF THE BOMBING BETWEEN THE NINETEENTH AND  
TWENTIETH PARALLELS MIGHT RETARD THE EXPLORATION OF SUCH POSSIBILITY.  
WE THEREFORE SUGGEST WAITING UNTIL AT LEAST AFTER WEEKEND  
DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING OUR SATURDAY MEETING, TO SEE WHAT MAY  
DEVELOP ALONG THESE LINES.

UNQUOTE

~~TOP SECRET~~

BT

PRESERVATION COPY

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INFORMATION

47

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Thursday, May 16, 1968  
12:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

This VC Colonel's assessment of the steady nationalist spirit in the ARVN is hopeful -- even if it has an anti-U. S. flavor.

W. W. Rostow



1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLI 97-329**  
**By is, NARA Date 3-29-00**

wwrostow:rla



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 11319

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STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	SDO	ONE	CRS
DD/I		EXO						OER	FBIS	DCS	IRS	AID	USIA

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AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

151712Z

CITE

DIST 15 MAY 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI TO FEBRUARY 1968

SUBJECT CAPTURED VIET CONG COLONEL'S DISAGREEMENT  
WITH CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM'S  
ASSESSMENT OF ARVN'S STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (4 MAY 1968) FIELD NO. [REDACTED]

SOURCE [REDACTED]

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-325

By js, NARA Date 10-22-99

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3.4(b)(1)

(classification)

(dissemination)

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

SUMMARY: THE MILITARY PROSELYTING SECTION OF THE  
CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (COSVN) BELIEVES THAT  
THE ARMY OF VIETNAM (ARVN) IS RENT WITH DISSATISFACTION,  
AVERSE TO COMBAT, AND COMPOSED OF SOLDIERS WHO DO NOT  
REALLY HATE THE VIET CONG (VC) AND DESIRE A PEACE IN WHICH  
NOBODY WILL BE BOTHERED OR HAVE TO ENDURE DIFFICULTIES.  
ALSO, MOST ARVN OFFICERS ARE SUSPICIOUS OF THE U.S. AND  
DO NOT LIKE AMERICAN ATTITUDES. COLONEL [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] DOES NOT SHARE THIS VIEW.

HE REGARDS ARVN AS AN AGGRESSIVE AND EFFECTIVE FORCE.

HE AGREES THAT ARVN PERSONNEL WANT PEACE BUT ONLY ONE  
IN WHICH BOTH THE VC AND AMERICANS GET OUT. END SUMMARY.

1. ACCORDING TO COLONEL [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

1.5(e)  
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~



(action)

(dissem controls)

[REDACTED]

THE MILITARY PROSELYTING SECTION HOLDS THE FOLLOWING VIEW OF THE ARMY OF VIETNAM (ARVN): ARVN PERSONNEL HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT BEING ABLE TO RELY ON CONTINUED U.S. SUPPORT, ALTHOUGH INITIALLY THEY PUT THEIR TRUST IN U.S. MILITARY PROWESS. ARVN IS ALSO RENT WITH DISSATISFACTION CAUSED BY INEQUITIES AND FACTIONALISM. THE TROOPS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE VC IS NOT REALLY ONE OF HATE BUT RATHER MISTRUST OF VC PROPAGANDA AND FEAR OF LOSING FREEDOM SHOULD THE VC WIN. DURING COMBAT, ARVN PERSONNEL FIRE OUT OF SELF-DEFENSE RATHER THAN BECAUSE OF ANY MORE ACTIVE MOTIVE. BECAUSE OF LOW MORALE; RELIANCE IS PLACED ON SUPERIORITY OF NUMBERS AND WEAPONS. ALL THAT ARVN PERSONNEL WANT IS A PEACE IN WHICH NOBODY WILL BE BOTHERED OR HAVE TO ENDURE DIFFICULTIES. ANY REGIME WILL DO. MOST ARVN PERSONNEL LOOK UPON THE U.S. FORCES IN VIETNAM AS A NECESSARY MILITARY ALLY AND THEY ARE VERY WILLING TO COOPERATE IN ORDER TO ASSURE U.S. ASSISTANCE. HOWEVER, MOST OFFICERS BELIEVE THE U.S. IS NOT HELPING THE GVN FOR PURELY ALTRUISTIC

[REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

REASONS, AND THEY DO NOT LIKE AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD  
THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, THE AMERICAN FEELING OF SUPERIORITY,  
AND SO FORTH.

2. COLONEL [REDACTED] STATED THAT WHAT HE HAS LEARNED  
OF ARVN DURING THE PAST YEAR, PLUS NEW INFORMATION RESULTING  
FROM CONTACT WITH ARVN PERSONNEL SINCE HIS CAPTURE, HAS  
LED HIM TO FORM AN OPINION OF ARVN THAT IS FAR DIFFERENT  
THAT THAT HELD BY COSVN. HE DESCRIBED HIS VIEW IN THESE  
WORDS:

"THERE IS QUITE A STRONG CURRENT OF NATIONALISM  
AMONG ARVN PERSONNEL. I KNOW FROM CONVERSATIONS  
THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT GIVEN TO  
U.S./GVN RELATIONS. THERE IS NO OPEN OPPOSITION  
TO THE U.S. BUT THERE IS A DECIDED DIFFERENCE  
IN IDEAS. ARVN CANNOT BE SHRUGGED OFF AS AN  
INDIFFERENT, PUPPET FORCE. ARVN DOES WANT PEACE,  
BUT ONE IN WHICH BOTH THE VC AND AMERICANS GET  
OUT. ARVN IS AGGRESSIVE. ITS PERFORMANCE WHEN  
TAKEN BY SURPRISE DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE WAS A  
GREAT SURPRISE TO ME. IF ARVN IS NOT DEFEATED

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3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~

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1.5(c)  
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(dissem controls)

(dissem controls)

OUTRIGHT BY A DEFINITELY SUPERIOR MILITARY FORCE,  
THERE IS NO POLITICAL FORCE OR STRATEGY WHICH  
COULD DISINTEGRATE A LARGE PART OF IT OR STIR  
UP WITHIN IT A REBELLION WHICH COULD SUCCESSFULLY  
TOPPLE THE GOVERNMENT."

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE

DIR/JUSPAO (MR. NICKEL ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

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~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

48

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, May 16, 1968  
12:10 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

You will be interested in this well-balanced CIA-Saigon appraisal of the May VC offensive.

There is a summary and key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow



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~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-329  
By is, NARA Date 3-29-00

WWRostow:rla

January 26, 2000

PROCESSING NOTE:

Pages 5 and 12 are missing in the original copy of # 48a, and thus they are missing in this sanitized copy of the document.

REGINA GREENWELL  
Senior Archivist

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY;  
Intelligence Information Cable

48a  
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STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SOO ONE CRS  
GCR F215 DCS I2'S AID US7A  
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~~SECRET~~

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DIST 15 MAY 1968

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-325

By is, NARA Date 10-22-99

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI MAY 1968

SUBJECT SITUATION APPRAISAL: THE MAY VIET CONG OFFENSIVE

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (14 MAY 1968)

FIELD NO. [REDACTED]

SOURCE A STAFF OFFICER OF THIS ORGANIZATION. THIS IS A FIELD APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. IT IS NOT AN OFFICIAL JUDGMENT BY THIS AGENCY OR ANY COMPONENT. IT REPRESENTS THE OBSERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF A STAFF OFFICER BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO HIM AT THE TIME OF PREPARATION.

SUMMARY. THOUGH "GENERAL" IN REGARD TO ATTACKS BY FIRE, THE MAY OFFENSIVE THUS FAR HAS BEEN LIMITED ALMOST ENTIRELY TO THE SAIGON AREA, AND HAS ACCELERATED ENEMY ATTRITION DESPITE AN APPARENT HUSBANDING OF FORCES. THOUGH LONG DELAYED, THE OFFENSIVE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN PREMATURE IN TERMS OF ENEMY PREPAREDNESS AND A POLITICAL EXPLANATION OF ITS TIMING MUST BE CONSIDERED. POST-TET VIET CONG DOCUMENTS HAVE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE EARLIER FAILURE WHILE URGING VIET CONG/NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (VC/NV) FORCES TO FORGE AHEAD "ON THE CREST

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(classification)

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OF VICTORY." THE DOCUMENTS ALSO SPEAK OF TIGHTENING THE SIEGE ON THE CITIES TO SPEED DISRUPTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AND TO PERMIT LIBERATION OF THE ENTIRE RURAL AREA. MORE PRIVILEGED INFORMATION, ACCORDING TO AGENT REPORTS, DISCUSSES THIS IN TERMS OF THE PEACE SETTLEMENT AND THE NEED TO REMOVE CERTAIN TOP GVN LEADERS. HIGH LEVEL RALLIERS SUGGEST MILITARY DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THESE POLITICAL GOALS. COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA OUTPUT EQUATES THE PRESENT ATTACKS WITH THE EARLY SPRING OFFENSIVE IN TERMS OF GRANDIOSE GOALS AND IN THE APPEALS FOR UPRISING, WHILE ALSO SPEAKING OF THE ISOLATION OF THE LEADERS. THE GOVERNMENT HAS CONTINUED TO FUNCTION AS USUAL; THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) AND THE POLICE HAVE DONE REASONABLY WELL. THE ATTACKS HAVE NOT DIVERTED ATTENTION FROM OTHER PRIORITY AREAS AND PLANS TO STRENGTHEN THE GOVERNMENT ARE GOING FORWARD. APPEALS FROM THE ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL, DEMOCRATIC AND PEACE FORCES HAVE NOT BEEN ANSWERED. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, HOWEVER, THE GVN APPEARS TO HAVE GENERATED

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(classification)

(transmission controls)

SOME POPULAR RESENTMENT BY ITS OVER-RELIANCE ON AIR AND ARTILLERY POWER IN ROOTING THE VC OUT OF SAIGON. THIS RESULTED IN SUBSTANTIAL DEVASTATION BEING WREAKED ON PARTS OF THE CITY AND HAS LED TO SOME CRITICISM, EVEN BITTERNESS, TOWARD THE GVN AND U.S. ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY HAS TAKEN HEAVY LOSSES IN THE SAIGON AREA, HE RETAINS CONSIDERABLE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES AND MAY LAUNCH MAJOR ACTION IN I CORPS AND THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS, AND POSSIBLY AGAIN IN SAIGON FROM THE WEST. PRESENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT ~~THE COMMUNISTS CONTINUE TO THINK IN TERMS OF A PROTRACTED~~ MILITARY SITUATION. -END SUMMARY.

1. ON THE NIGHT OF 4-5 MAY, THE VIET CONG/NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (VC/NVA) LAUNCHED THEIR LONG HERALDED SECOND "GENERAL OFFENSIVE." ALTHOUGH BY THE MORNING OF 8 MAY SOME 126 LOCATIONS HAD BEEN HIT BY ROCKETS OR MORTARS, IT WAS A RELATIVELY TOKEN EFFORT NATIONWIDE, CAUSING LITTLE DAMAGE AND FEW FRIENDLY CASUALTIES. ~~THE ENEMY HIMSELF LOST OVER 7,000 KILLED IN ACTION NATION-WIDE BY BODY COUNT IN THE FIRST FIVE DAYS, AND LOST ALMOST 50 PERCENT OF THOSE IN THE GREATER SAIGON AREA.~~ ALLIED SPOILING ACTION PRIOR TO 5 MAY TOOK A HEAVY TOLL OF ENEMY MUNITIONS AND MEN. ON ITS WAY INTO SAIGON ON 3 MAY, ELEMENTS OF THE VC 9TH DIVISION LOST ABOUT 350 MEN, THE DONG

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NAI REGIMENT LOST 236 AND OTHER UNITS INVOLVED HAD BEEN UNDER CONSTANT HARASSMENT FROM ALLIED SWEEP OPERATIONS FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. ALTHOUGH ELEMENTS OF SEVERAL BATTALIONS MANAGED TO INFILTRATE SAIGON, THE FOREWARNED AND REINFORCED ALLIED UNITS SUCCESSFULLY REPELLED ENEMY EFFORTS TO PENETRATE THE CITY WITH HIS MAJOR FORCES. ALLIED OFFENSIVE THRUSTS, PARTICULARLY IN AND AROUND HUE, MAY HAVE FRUSTRATED SIMILAR PLANS FOR OTHER CITIES.

2. ~~THE ENEMY INITIALLY COMMITTED ONLY ONE OF HIS THREE REGULAR DIVISIONS IN I CORPS AND DID NOT EMPLOY SIGNIFICANTLY HIS THREE ARTILLERY REGIMENTS AND POSSIBLY THREE SEPARATE ARTILLERY BATTALIONS THERE. DESPITE RELIABLE EVIDENCE OF A SUCCESSFUL BUILDUP IN I CORPS AND THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS, AND THE PRESENCE OF ARMOR AND HEAVY ARTILLERY IN I CORPS, THE ENEMY DID NOT MAKE A MAJOR MOVE IN THESE AREAS IN CONJUNCTION WITH HIS "GENERAL" OFFENSIVE.~~ HIS RELUCTANCE TO REPEAT THE TET STRATEGY OF WIDESPREAD SIMULTANEOUS GROUND ASSAULTS AGAINST THE CITIES ~~MAY REFLECT IN SOME AREAS THE UNREADINESS OF HIS FORCES.~~ RALLIER REPORTS SUPPORT THIS HYPOTHESIS. THE QUESTION IMMEDIATELY ARISES AS TO WHY HE CHOSE TO STRIKE AT

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1.5(c)  
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LISTED THE FOLLOWING AMONG THE VC'S FAILURES:

- THE FAILURE TO AGITATE THE POPULATION TO RISE UP;
- THE FAILURE TO SPARK AN ARMED UPRISING TO TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT;
- THE FAILURE TO REALIZE THAT THE STRUGGLE WOULD BE A LONG ONE;
- THE FAILURE TO ANNIHILATE ALLIED MILITARY STRENGTH;
- AND FAILURES IN PLANNING, LIAISON AND TRANSPORTATION.

THE VC ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THESE FAULTS "GREATLY LIMITED OUR VICTORIES." NEVERTHELESS, THESE DOCUMENTS ALL CALL ON THE VC NVA FORCES TO FORGE AHEAD "ON THE CREST OF VICTORY". SOME OF THEM SPECIFY SAIGON AS THE DECISIVE POINT AND MANY OF THEM RECKON THE SURVIVAL OF THE "PUPPET REGIME" IN TERMS OF "DAYS AND HOURS."

4. ACCORDING TO A REPORT ATTRIBUTED TO A VC INTELLIGENCE CADRE IN I CORPS, PLANS FOR A SECOND WAVE OF ATTACKS WERE TIED TO PEACE TALKS AND, INDEED, ~~THESE ATTACKS ARE CONSIDERED CRUCIAL TO THE SETTLEMENT TO BE EXPECTED.~~ IN ADDITION TO SUCH MILITARY GOALS AS NEUTRALIZING AIRFIELDS, THE STATED POLITICAL GOAL OF THE ATTACKS IS TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH INTERNAL SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL FACTIONS AND U.S. PRESSURE, ~~DUE TO THE INVOLVEMENT IN THE PEACE TALKS,~~ WILL COMBINE TO BRING A CHANGE

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1.5(k)  
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~  
(dissem)

~~IN THE TOP LEADERSHIP OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN).~~

ALTHOUGH SELECTED AREAS WERE TO BE TAKEN AND HELD FOR SEVERAL DAYS, THIS PLAN DID NOT NECESSARILY INVOLVE MILITARY CONQUEST IN THE SOUTHERN CORPS AREAS.

5. THE PLAN FOR I CORPS, HOWEVER, MAY WELL BE DIFFERENT. THE REPORT CITED ABOVE STATES THAT THE CADRES ARE BEING TOLD OF HOPES OF ANNEXING TERRITORY AS FAR SOUTH AS PHAN THIET AND, ALTHOUGH THIS IS CERTAINLY UNREALISTIC, THERE MAY WELL BE A PLAN TO SEIZE AND HOLD TERRITORY AROUND HUE AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE IN NORTHERN I CORPS AND IN THE HIGHLANDS (B-3 FRONT). ANOTHER, PERHAPS MORE REALISTIC, GOAL IS REFLECTED IN A MEMO DATED 10 APRIL, CAPTURED IN THE SAIGON AREA, ~~WHICH DISCUSSES ACTION TO BE TAKEN TO CELEBRATE ANNIVERSARIES COMING UP IN MAY. IT STATES THAT TIGHTENING THE SIEGE ON THE CITIES WILL SPEED DISRUPTION OF GVN ORGANIZATIONS AND PERMIT LIBERATION OF THE ENTIRE RURAL AREA.~~

6. WHATEVER THE RATIONALE FOR THESE PLANS, ~~THE ORDERS TO THE TROOPS ARE FOR CONTINUED OFFENSIVE ACTION AND ULTIMATELY A RENEWAL OF THE ATTACKS ON THE CITIES AND THE DESTRUCTION OF ALLIED/GVN MILITARY FORCES. THE RESPONSE OF THE TROOPS AS~~

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1.5(c)  
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(classification) (dissem)

[REDACTED]

- REVEALED BY RALLIERS, SOME OF THEM VERY HIGH RANKING, MIGHT
- BE SUMMED UP AS BEING VERY SKEPTICAL. COLONEL [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] WHO RALLIED [REDACTED] AFTER RECEIVING ORDERS TO PREPARE
- FOR THE NEW ATTACK, STATED THAT THE VC UNITS HE KNEW ABOUT
- WOULD HAVE THE SAME MISSION AS THEY HAD DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE,
- EVEN THOUGH TROOP REPLACEMENTS HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED. RE-
- SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION WAS POOR, MORALE WAS NOT HIGH, AND THE VC
- KNEW THAT THE ALLIES HAD STRONG DEFENSES AROUND SAIGON. HE
- WAS CONVINCED -) THAT THE WAR WOULD END IN 1968, AND HE WAS
- CONVINCED THAT THE VC COULD NOT WIN. SO HE DEFECTED. NVA LT.
- COLONEL [REDACTED] "RALLIED" [REDACTED] BECAUSE OF HIS
- "DISILLUSIONMENT WITH CURRENT POLICIES AFFECTING THE DEPLOYMENT
- OF UNITS" AND HIS "TOTAL DISAGREEMENT WITH THE ROLE OF POLITICAL
- CADRES WHO MAKE FINAL DECISIONS CONCERNING DEPLOYMENT OF UNITS
- WITHOUT REGARD FOR THE TACTICAL SITUATION." HE ADDED THAT HE
- WAS UNABLE TO RECONCILE THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT
- OFFENSIVE WITH THE MILITARY OBJECTIVES.

7. DESPITE THE ATTACKS THUS FAR IN THE MAY OFFENSIVE NOT HAVING REACHED THE LEVEL OF THE TET OFFENSIVE, THE PROPAGANDA OUTPUT OF HANOI AND LIBERATION RADIO TREAT THEM EQUALLY.

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1.5(c)  
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HANOI CHARGES THAT THE ATTACKS GIVE THE LIE TO U.S. CLAIMS OF HAVING REGAINED THE INITIATIVE SINCE TET. LIBERATION RADIO BROADCASTS TO THE PEOPLE OF SAIGON CALL FOR AN ALL-OUT EFFORT BY THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES TO SEIZE THE CITY AND TOPPLE THE GOVERNMENT. APPEALS TO OFFICERS, MEN AND POLICE SPEAK OF THEIR "LAST CHANCE" TO JOIN THE WINNING SIDE-- THE LIBERATION ARMY. A LIBERATION RADIO BROADCAST OF 6 MAY, COMMEMORATING THE DIEN BIEN PHU VICTORY, CONCLUDES: "ALL WE HAVE TO DO IS TO STAGE REPEATED ATTACKS AND WIDESPREAD UPRISINGS TO WIN COMPLETE VICTORY." THE 8 MAY LETTER FROM HO CHI MINH TO NGUYEN HUU THO, PRAISING THE EXPLOITS OF RECENT DAYS, ~~URGES DETERMINATION TO FIGHT CONTINUALLY AND SPEAKS OF AN CEMENTATION DRIVE FOR EXTERMINATING THE ENEMY.~~ AT THE SAME TIME, PROPAGANDA KEYED TO THE NEW ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL, DEMOCRATIC AND PEACE FORCES STATES THAT ITS EMERGENCE SHOWS THAT ONLY AN ISOLATED HANDFUL OF GVN LEADERS WISH TO CONTINUE THE WAR.

3. UNLIKE THE TET ATTACKS WHEN THE GVN AT FIRST WAS UNABLE TO FUNCTION, AND LATER HAD TO DIRECT ITS EFFORTS ALMOST ENTIRELY TO REFUGEE AND RELIEF PROBLEMS, ~~THE CURRENT ATTACKS HAVE~~

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1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~

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NOT DIVERTED ATTENTION FROM OTHER PRIORITY AREAS. PRESIDENT THIEU HAS KEPT ONE EYE ON THE PARIS PEACE TALKS AND ANOTHER ON WASHINGTON AND HIS FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON. THIEU HAS CONTINUED WITH HIS PLANS TO STRENGTHEN THE GOVERNMENT, AND POSSIBLY HIS PERSONAL POWER POSITION, BEFORE HE MEETS WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON, INCLUDING PLANS TO RESHUFFLE THE CABINET AND PROBABLY TO REPLACE PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN VAN LOC WITH TRAN VAN HUONG. ALTHOUGH LOC'S REPLACEMENT SHOULD CREATE NO MAJOR PROBLEMS, IF THIEU AND HUONG MOVE TO REPLACE KEY MEN FROM VICE-PRESIDENT KY'S CAMP IN THE GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY, WHICH SEEMS LIKELY, IT COULD CREATE SERIOUS TENSIONS INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF HIGH-LEVEL RESIGNATION OR THREATS THEREOF. ONE CHANGE WHICH HUONG WILL PROBABLY INSIST ON WHEN HE BECOMES PRIME MINISTER WILL BE THE REPLACEMENT OF GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN AS NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR. THIS CHANGE, HOWEVER, WOULD PROBABLY BE LESS OF A PROBLEM NOW THAN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A MONTH AGO, AS LOAN MAY NOT BE ABLE TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES AS POLICE DIRECTOR BECAUSE OF THE WOUND HE RECEIVED DURING THE MAY ATTACKS.

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1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~  
(classification) (dissem)

9. A HOPEFUL SIGN HAS BEEN THE FAILURE OF THE ~~NLF~~ SPONSORED ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL, DEMOCRATIC AND PEACE FORCES TO MAKE ANY INROADS INTO THE POPULATION DURING THE ATTACKS. ALTHOUGH THE NEW ALLIANCE HAS ATTRACTED A HANDFUL OF INTELLECTUALS TO ITS BANNER, IT APPEARS TO HAVE LITTLE POPULAR APPEAL. ITS CALL TO THE VIETNAMESE MILITARY TO JOIN FORCES HAS GONE UNNEEDED. IF THE ENEMY EXPECTED THAT THE INITIATION OF THE PARIS TALKS WOULD DEMORALIZE ARVN TROOPS IT MUST BE SORELY DISAPPOINTED SINCE THERE APPEARS TO BE NO SLACKENING IN THE RESOLVE OF THE VIETNAMESE MILITARY TO WIN. IN FACT, AS ONE FIELD GRADE OFFICER PUT IT, THE ARVN IS NOW FIGHTING WITH INCREASED DETERMINATION. ~~NEVERTHELESS, THE APPEAL OF THE ALLIANCE DEPENDS IN LARGE PART ON WHAT TAKES PLACE IN PARIS. IF IT APPEARS THAT A COALITION GOVERNMENT IS IN THE OFFING, OR A SIMILAR SOLUTION IS TO BE EVOLVED, THE ALLIANCE COULD BECOME ATTRACTIVE TO A GOODLY NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE.~~

10. INTERNALLY, ~~THE REACTION OF THE GVN AND OF THE GENERAL POPULACE IN SAIGON APPEARS TO HAVE BOTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS, AND AT THIS TIME IT IS TOO EARLY TO DETERMINE WHICH WILL PREVAIL.~~ MUCH, OF COURSE, WILL DEPEND ON WHAT IS DONE

013

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3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~  
(classification) (dissem. controls)

TO GENERALIZE ABOUT THE REACTION OF THE PEOPLE. MANY OF THOSE WHO CAME FACE TO FACE WITH THE ENEMY AND WITH THE ALLIED RESPONSE SUFFERED HEAVY PERSONAL LOSSES, AND THEY UNDERSTANDABLY FEEL DIFFERENTLY FROM THOSE WHO FELT RELATIVELY LITTLE PRESSURE. MOREOVER, THE VC DID PENETRATE THE CAPITAL AND FIRED ROCKETS AND MORTARS INTO POPULATED AREAS, THUS ONCE AGAIN DEMONSTRATING THEIR ABILITY TO BRING THE WAR INTO THE CITY. THERE HAVE BEEN BOTH EXPRESSIONS OF ANGER AT THE VC FOR THE ATTACKS AND AT THE GVN FOR ITS INABILITY TO PREVENT THEM. MORE DISTURBING, THE GVN APPEARS TO HAVE OVERLY RELIED ON AIR--INCLUDING NAPALM--AND ARTILLERY INSTEAD OF MORE DISCRIMINATE SWEEP ACTIONS TO ROOT OUT THE VC. AS A RESULT THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE WREAKED ON PARTS OF THE CITY, PARTICULARLY IN THE 6TH AND 8TH PRECINCTS. THUS FAR, 105 CIVILIANS ARE REPORTED TO BE DEAD, 2,600 WOUNDED, 9,500 HOMES DESTROYED AND SOME 96,000 EVACUEES. (THERE HAVE BEEN AN ADDITIONAL 9,000 HOMES DESTROYED IN GIA DINH, AND THERE ARE 32,500 EVACUEES IN THE PROVINCE.)

12. IN SUM, THE OVERALL DESTRUCTION AND DISRUPTION IS NOT AS GREAT AS THAT DURING TST, BUT SELECTIVELY IT HAS BEEN GREATER

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1.5(c)  
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(classification) (dissem)

E.G. THE 6TH AND 8TH PRECINCTS. ~~IN ANY EVENT, IF THIS~~  
~~DESTRUCTION IS NOT COMPENSATED FOR QUICKLY IT COULD HAVE~~  
~~SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FUTURE.~~ INDEED, THE OVER-REACTIONS  
 OF THE GVN TO THE PRESENCE OF A FEW VC IN AN AREA MUST HAVE  
 PROVED SOBERING TO MANY VIETNAMESE WHO COULD WATCH THE DAILY  
 DEVASTATION BEING WREAKED BY THE ALLIES ON PARTS OF THEIR CITY.  
 THE THOUGHT THAT IT COULD BE MY AREA AND MY HOME MUST HAVE  
 CROSSED THEIR MINDS AS THEY WATCHED THE JETS SWOOP IN AND  
 UNLOAD THEIR BOMBS ON THE CITY. ~~THUS, THERE IS SOME~~  
~~CRITICISM AND EVEN BITTERNESS TOWARD THE GVN AND TOWARD THE~~  
~~U.S. OVER THE METHODS USED TO RID THE CITY OF THE VC.~~  
 CONCLUSION

13. ~~IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE TOP VIETNAMESE~~  
~~COMMUNIST LEADERS COULD HAVE DECEIVED THEMSELVES AGAIN TO~~  
~~THE EXTENT THAT THEY APPARENTLY HAD PRIOR TO THE TET OFFENSIVE.~~  
~~THE ONLY JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PRESENT OFFENSIVE MUST BE~~  
~~FOUND IN INTERNAL POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC~~  
~~EVENTS.~~ THE SUDDEN EMERGENCE OF THE VIETNAM ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL,  
 DEMOCRATIC AND PEACE FORCES IN THE SAIGON AREA IN LATE APRIL,  
 PRIOR TO SECURING THE CITY BASES PREVIOUSLY TERMED A PREREQUISITE

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(classification) (classification)

AND THE NATIONWIDE ATTENTION TO THE CREATION OF LIBERATION COMMITTEES, A ~~LOCAL-GOVERNMENTAL-TYPE-ADMINISTRATIVE-APPARATUS~~ IN ~~VC-CONTROLLED-AREAS~~, SUGGEST THAT THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS MAY BE ANTICIPATING THE POSSIBILITY OF A ~~POLITICAL-SOLUTION~~ PERHAPS SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. ALTHOUGH CURRENT VC EXHORTATIONS WARN THE TROOPS OF LONG AND BITTER FIGHTING AHEAD, IT WOULD ONLY BE COMMON SENSE TO EXHORT THE TROOPS AGAINST THE "ILLUSIONS OF PEACE," A COMMON THEME IN VC DOCUMENTS. IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT VILLAGERS WERE TOLD IN MARCH THAT "BLOOD WILL FLOW IN MAY" SO THAT THERE WOULD BE "PEACE IN JUNE."

14. IF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HOLD TO THEIR CONCEPT OF CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS IN THREE PHASES--PRELIMINARY CONTACTS TO END THE BOMBING, TALKS ABOUT TALKS, AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES--WE CAN PROBABLY EXPECT THEM TO STICK TO THEIR DOCTRINE OF FIGHTING WHILE NEGOTIATING AND SEEKING TO ENHANCE THEIR DIPLOMATIC POSITION BY MILITARY ACTION. HOWEVER, THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT IF THE ~~PRELIMINARY-CONTACTS~~ IMMEDIATELY TRANSFORM THEMSELVES INTO FORMAL TALKS, AND STATEMENTS BY RADIO HANOI SUGGEST THIS POSSIBILITY, THE PRESENT WAVE OF ATTACKS COULD BE A FINAL MILITARY EFFORT.

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1.5(c)  
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(classification) (dissem)

AIMED AT MAXIMUM EXTENSION OF VC CONTROLLED AREA WHICH WILL  
CULMINATE IN A REQUEST FOR A CEASEFIRE PERMITTING THE VC TO  
UNDER TAKE A POLITICAL CONSOLIDATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF  
THEIR ALLIANCE AND LIBERATION COMMITTEES. THUS, AS WE MOVE  
INTO THE "TALKING" PHASE, THE KEY TO HANOI'S ACTUAL INTENTIONS  
IS AS LIKELY TO COME FROM THE TABLE IN PARIS AS FROM THE  
BATTLEFIELD IN SAIGON.

15. IF AN ESTIMATE IS TO BE MADE HERE AND NOW, HOWEVER, WE  
WOULD OPT FOR THE LONGER TIME FRAME. ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY HAS  
TAKEN HEAVY LOSSES IN THE SAIGON AREA, THE ATTACKS THUS FAR ARE  
CHARACTERIZED GENERALLY BY PROBING ACTIONS WITH ECONOMY OF FORCES  
AND, AGAIN WITH THE EXCEPTION OF I CORPS AND THE B-3 FRONT, THIS  
CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE. HOWEVER, A HEAVY ATTACK ON SAIGON  
FROM THE WEST TO TRY TO PENETRATE AND REMAIN IN CHOCON MIGHT BE  
ATTEMPTED TO ACHIEVE A PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY AT THE OUTSET OF  
THE TALKS.

16. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC PACFLT  
ARPAC PACAF

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3.4(b)(1)

**INFORMATION**

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*Pres file*

**Thursday, May 16, 1968 - 7:55 a.m.**

**Mr. President:**

**The message from Sec. Rusk to Gov. Harriman was, by error, sent last night from me, although clearly marked from the Secretary.**

**I called Amb. Harriman's office and informed him it was from Sec. Rusk and his response should be addressed to the Secretary.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**Ref: CAP 81131 (CAS CHANNELS)**

**wwrostow:rla**

WWR

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 16, 1968

*Per file*

Mr. President:

In the attached memorandum (Tab A), Nick Katzenbach reports on his meeting yesterday, May 15, with Senator Pastore on two proposals which you had asked be discussed with him: (1) sale of U-235 fuel to the UK for its nuclear submarines, and (2) sale of a heavy water plant to Rumania.

Senator Pastore indicated he was persuaded the sale of the heavy water plant to Rumania was in our interests. He asked Katzenbach to discuss the problem further informally with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy which Katzenbach has agreed to do.

Senator Pastore stated that he was willing to receive your letter as drafted on the UK proposal and would support you in this action. Katzenbach recommends, therefore, that you sign the attached letter (Tab B) to Senator Pastore indicating your decision to proceed with the sale of U-235 fuel to the UK for its nuclear submarines.

I have attached for your information the previous submission on the UK sale (Tab C) and the Rumania sale (Tab D).

W. W. Rostow

Attachments:  
Tabs A, B, C, D

SMKeeny:jb:5-16-68/6pm  
bcc: SMK file and chron  
SMK comeback copy  
WWR (2)  
NDavis -w/cy Tab A  
ERFried -w/cy Tab A  
CEJohnson -w/cy Tab A

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By us, NARA Date 9-8-98

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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

50a

May 15, 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Fuel for UK Nuclear Submarines;  
Heavy Water Plant for Rumania

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter to Senator Pastore on nuclear fuel for UK submarines which was transmitted to you on April 15, 1968.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

I met today with Senator John Pastore. I advised him of your strong support of the prospective sale of a US heavy water producing plant to Rumania. I also explained our thinking in response to his questions in his letter of November 20, 1967, regarding the prospective supply of fuel for British nuclear submarines. As you requested, I showed him the reply you are contemplating sending him. AEC Commissioner Gerald Tape accompanied me.

While we discussed a number of considerations pro and con, it was clear that Senator Pastore's main concern is the prospect of a highly political Senate debate in which the opponents of these deals would throw against the Administration and its supporters the argument that we were helping countries who were supplying North Vietnam in a war where American boys are being killed.

Noting your strong support for the sale of a heavy water plant to Rumania, he said that he was personally

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-332

By CL, NARA Date 7-28-99~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Int A

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persuaded this was something it was in the US interest to do. He asked that I come to an informal meeting of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to present the arguments for this action, in the hopes that possible opponents in both parties would be dissuaded from making an issue of this matter. I agreed to do so at an early date.

After reading your proposed reply to his letter on the British submarine fuel question, Senator Pastore said that he would be willing to receive the letter as written and would as always support you and the Administration.

  
Under Secretary

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WORK

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By ica, NARA Date 9-8-98

Dear John:

I am most pleased that you are able to resume your duties in the Senate. We have missed you.

I would like now to respond to your thoughtful letter on the UK fuel request for their nuclear submarine program. I have had my people take a careful look at the issues you raised. Their memorandum on the subject is enclosed.

Their conclusions seem to me to make a lot of sense. The British have been staunch and firm friends through many difficult moments; their support for our Vietnam policies has been a great source of strength to all of us. In light of this steadfast friendship, we should think long and hard before taking steps that could only injure this close relationship.

I have decided, therefore, to inform the British that we are prepared to work out appropriate arrangements for the supply of the requested fuel. Knowing your concerns on this matter, I deeply appreciate your willingness to support me in this decision.

In reaching this decision, I have taken into account the UK's withdrawal from many world-wide defense undertakings. While the UK defense cutback decisions are disappointing to us, I believe we should continue to cooperate with them in defense programs that are in our interests as well as theirs.

As you noted in your letter, we have not cooperated with the Italians or the Dutch in naval nuclear propulsion programs for which they requested our help. I believe, however, that they and our other Allies will understand that our providing fuel for UK submarines is a continuation of existing cooperation with the UK and does not involve new "favoritism." We would, of course, expect to review fully with the Joint Committee any change which we might contemplate in our posture towards cooperative programs in the field of naval nuclear propulsion.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*John B*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

I am aware of the recent British offer to supply -- under EURATOM safeguards -- a relatively small amount of low-enriched uranium to Italy for use in land-based experiments related to a nuclear propelled surface ship project. I understand the Italians will probably not accept this offer because the British informed them that they would not be able to supply fuel for the shipboard reactor as well as the experimental work. I believe that the British offer was not contrary to our interests and should not affect our willingness to provide fuel for the UK submarine fleet.

Perhaps you would like to talk with Dean Rusk or Nick Katzenbach about this further to get a more detailed picture of the considerations that led to my decision. I know that either of them would be happy to do so.

Sincerely,

/s/ LBJ

Enclosure

The Honorable John O. Pastore  
The United States Senate  
Washington, D. C. 20510

LBJ:SMKeeny:jbr 4-20-68

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502

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Supply of Enriched Uranium Fuel  
For the UK Submarine Program

Concern has been expressed about the proposed supply of enriched uranium to the British for their nuclear submarine program in the post-1970 period on the following grounds:

1. Such an arrangement might complicate our relationships with other countries which have requested, but have not received, US assistance for naval nuclear propulsion programs;
2. Purchase of submarine fuel from the US may enable the UK to compete more effectively with the US in the international nuclear power market;
3. Such an arrangement is unwarranted in view of UK trade with Red China, North Vietnam and Cuba.

These considerations are discussed in order.

1. Effect on US Relations with Other Countries

The United States has had a major influence on both the hunter-killer and Polaris submarine programs of the UK. We have provided both a complete reactor for the first UK nuclear hunter-killer submarine and continuing substantial technical assistance under the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement. The 1962 Nassau Agreement resulted in the UK undertaking its Polaris submarine program. Under this Agreement, all of the UK Polaris submarines are to be committed to NATO. The UK is also assigning all of its nuclear hunter-killer submarines to NATO missions.

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By CG, NARA Date 7-28-99

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-2-

Up to now, the UK has provided fuel for all its nuclear submarines except the first one, using material produced at the Capenhurst gaseous diffusion plant. However, the top stages of that plant were shut down in 1964 at the time the US and USSR were also announcing cutbacks in the production of weapons materials. Additional highly enriched uranium suitable for submarine fuel could be produced at Capenhurst only after considerable expenditures by the UK. On the other hand, the US can supply the submarine reactor fuel needed by the UK without difficulty.

In light of this background, an unfavorable response to the UK would have the disadvantage of introducing an unnecessary abrasiveness into US/UK relations. Indeed, forcing the UK to resume production of highly enriched uranium at Capenhurst could be regarded as a distinctly unfriendly act in light of the UK's recent financial difficulties. In addition, renewed production by the UK of highly enriched unsafeguarded weapons-grade material might serve to emphasize the gap between the nuclear "haves" and the "have not" nations at a time when the US and UK are making a serious effort to achieve a Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Agreement by the US to sell nuclear submarine fuel to the UK would be unlikely to cause new feelings of discrimination on the part of other nations to which the US has not provided assistance in the field of naval nuclear propulsion. The long standing cooperation between the US and the UK in the nuclear field is well known to our other allies, and they would probably view the sale to the UK of nuclear submarine fuel as a natural extension of existing arrangements. All requests by other nations for assistance in naval nuclear propulsion would involve the initiation of new programs rather than continuation of an existing program as in the case of the UK.

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## 2. US/UK Competition in Sale of Power Reactors

Provision by the US of the amounts of submarine fuel the British have requested would allow them to release for their nuclear power program only about one-tenth of the amount of low-enriched fuel required for the initial loading of one medium-sized power reactor. This would not be of significance in the international market for nuclear power reactors.

In 1966 the US entered into agreements with the United Kingdom for cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy under which up to 10,000 kilograms of U-235 will be supplied to the UK. Much of this material will be used in the British nuclear power program. These agreements could, of course, have the effect of releasing British enriched uranium for potential competition with the United States. This concern was raised during the hearings on the agreements held by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. However, the conclusion was reached that the sale of uranium to friendly nations at prices which fully cover the cost of production should not be withheld because of their ability to compete with the US in the international reactor field. In view of the US agreement to provide the United Kingdom with nuclear material for civil purposes, it would be difficult to justify, on the basis of possible competitive advantage, withholding material for use in an important UK defense program which contributes materially to the common defense and security.

## 3. UK Trade with Red China, North Vietnam and Cuba

The UK does not permit the export of strategic goods on the COCOM list to North Vietnam, Communist China or Cuba. Its exports to North Vietnam in 1966 amounted to only \$104,000 or less than one percent of the total

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free world exports of \$12.5 million to that country. UK exports to Communist China and Cuba in 1966 were \$93.6 million and \$22.7 million respectively and accounted for 7 and 9 percent of these countries' imports from the free world. UK exports to these three countries during 1967 were: Communist China \$108.1 million; North Vietnam \$185,000; Cuba \$24.1 million. Although the US has discouraged British trade with North Vietnam, Cuba and Communist China, the UK government is not in a position to prevent private companies from engaging in non-strategic trade with these three countries.

A related matter of concern to the US is the use of British-flag cargo ships to carry goods to North Vietnam. During 1967, a total of 78 free world ships entered North Vietnamese ports. Of these, only one was a vessel registered in the United Kingdom itself. However, 66 Hong Kong-registered ships, which fly the British flag, entered North Vietnamese ports during 1967. These ships are engaged primarily in coastal shipments from Communist China to North Vietnam. They are manned almost entirely by Hong Kong Chinese crews, operate under time charters to Communist China or North Vietnam, and are believed to be under control of Communist Chinese interests.

The US has periodically discussed with the UK Government the possibility of dealing with the problem of Hong Kong registered ships trading with North Vietnam. The UK has great difficulty in taking effective action in view of the implications such action might have for Hong Kong.

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333

April 22, 1968

Mr. President: By us, NARA Date 9-8-98

In the attached memo, Nick Katzenbach recommends that you advise Senator Pastore by letter (Tab A) of your decision to sell nuclear fuel to the UK for its nuclear submarines in the period after 1969.

Last summer, you approved the recommendation of State, Defense, and AEC that, subject to consultation with the Joint Committee, we inform the UK of our willingness to begin negotiations on this subject. After these consultations took place, Senator Pastore in a letter to you (Tab B) strongly questioned the desirability of the proposed agreement. He stated, however, that he would support the decision if you still wanted it, despite the misgivings of the Joint Committee.

The issue was then carefully reviewed, and State, Defense, and AEC recommended that you should inform Pastore that you had decided to go ahead on this matter. However, you decided to take no action at that time. After Senator Pastore's heart attack, it was decided to defer further action until his return to work which is now expected after the Easter recess. \*

In making his positive recommendation on this matter, Katzenbach in the attached memo deals with each of the objections raised by Senator Pastore. He also examines the relation to this decision of the UK decisions on defense cutbacks as well as the possible sale of UK nuclear fuel to Italy for Italy's nuclear surface ship program, a subject of long-standing interest to the Joint Committee.

The proposed letter for your signature states only the general considerations leading to your decision to go ahead on this matter. A more detailed response to his specific questions is presented in an unsigned attachment to your letter.

The DOD and the AEC concur in the decision to go ahead on this matter and on the text of the proposed letter to Senator Pastore.

*Will Nick to go me & explain to Pastore*  
☐ Approve attached letter to Pastore  
☐ Disapprove  
☐ Call me

W. A. Rostow

\* Sen. Pastore is now back.

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W

Tab C



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

50c

April 15, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Response to Letter from Senator Pastore  
Concerning the Supplying of Fuel for  
British Nuclear Submarines

Recommendation:

That you forward the letter and accompanying memorandum attached at Tab A to Senator Pastore in response to his letter (Tab B) about providing fuel for British nuclear submarines in the years beyond 1969.

Background:

Senator Pastore has now recovered sufficiently to begin resuming his duties in the Senate. It is therefore appropriate that you now respond to his letter of last November on the question of fuel for UK nuclear submarines.

In his letter, the Senator stated that he believed it would not be in our interest to supply fuel for UK submarines because it would:

-- create difficulties with other countries who also want assistance for naval nuclear propulsion programs;

-- permit the UK to compete more effectively with us in international nuclear power markets; and

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-332

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;  
declassified after 12 years

By CG, NARA Date 7-28-99

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-- be unwarranted in view of the UK's trade with Red China, North Vietnam and Cuba.

Discussion:

The State Department has, for some time, strongly favored supplying to the British enriched uranium fuel for their submarine force, and so informed the AEC last summer. We do not agree with Senator Pastore that provision of fuel to the UK would give us trouble with our other Allies, nor do we agree that it would strengthen the British competitive position in the international power reactor market.

Further, we do not believe that the level of British trade with North Vietnam, Cuba and Communist China justifies a refusal to provide them nuclear fuel. If we were to refuse, the British would look on it as a slap in the face in light of their continued support for our Vietnam policies.

The Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission both agree that we should make a favorable reply to the British.

While the Senator deserves a full answer on the points he raised, I believe it would be unwise for you personally to commit yourself in a detailed reply. I therefore recommend that you send him a brief letter enclosing our unsigned memorandum which contains further details.

We have included in the draft letter a brief mention of the following matters which have arisen since Senator Pastore's letter was received:

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-3-

-- In January, the UK announced substantial cutbacks in its defense programs. These decisions did not change the goals for the UK nuclear submarine force, which takes on even greater relative significance in the UK's defense posture as its other forces are reduced.

-- The UK offered a few weeks ago to provide a relatively small quantity of low-enriched uranium fuel for use in experimental work related to Italy's nuclear surface ship program. The US received a similar request from the Italians some time ago which we have been unable to meet because of objections within both the Executive and Legislative Branches to the involvement of the Italian Navy in the project.

The British informed us in advance of their offer to the Italians and explained their reasons for making it. We did not object to their offering uranium to the Italians. We felt that we should not try to stop the British from dealing with the Italians, nor take retaliatory action (i.e., refusing to provide fuel for British submarines). We did, however, explain to the UK why we were not able to meet the Italian request and we did not endorse or encourage the UK's action.

Very recently we have been informed that Italy will probably not accept the UK offer of fuel for the critical experiment because the UK was not able to commit itself to provide a larger quantity of fuel for the Italian shipboard reactor. It has also been reported that Italy has decided to accept a French offer of fuel for the land-based experimental work, but we have no confirmation of this.

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-4-

We informed the Joint Committee of the British plan to offer fuel to the Italians so I recommend that you mention the matter in your letter to Pastore.

*Richard L. Campbell*  
Under Secretary

Attachments:  
As stated

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOHN D. PASTORE, R.I.  
CHAIRMAN  
RICHARD B. RUSSELL, GA.  
CLINTON P. ANDERSON, N. MEX.  
ALBERT GORE, TENN.  
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.  
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, IOWA  
GEORGE D. AIKEN, VT.  
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WILLIAM H. BATES, MASS.  
JOHN B. ANDERSON, ILL.  
WILLIAM M. MCCULLOCH, OHIO

# Congress of the United States

## JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 20, 1967

504

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

The Atomic Energy Commission presented testimony to the Joint Committee on October 25, 1967, regarding a United Kingdom request that the United States provide fuel for their nuclear submarine program in the post 1970 period. The British request is for approximately 400 kilograms of U-235 enriched to 93% during the period 1971-72 and between 200 to 300 kilograms per year of similar material thereafter.

Commissioner Gerald F. Tape, during his presentation, stated that Presidential approval of the AEC's recommendation to provide the requested fuel had been obtained subject to the following stipulations: the agreement would deal only with the supply of nuclear fuel for submarines and would not involve a continuation of technological assistance in naval nuclear propulsion; the agreement would not be open-ended but for a limited period of time with the possibility of extension.

Also, I understand your approval of the proposed cooperation was subject to consultation with the Joint Committee. Your thoughtful suggestion that the AEC consult with the Joint Committee is very much appreciated and I would like to take this opportunity to give you my views and the views of the Committee on this matter.

The AEC in presenting the arguments for this proposed agreement stated a belief that military as well as "political" benefits will accrue to the United States. The AEC's explanation of what political benefits would accrue to the United States was somewhat less than convincing. I believe that the Joint Committee is not of the mind to approve this request from the United Kingdom without receiving more compelling arguments than have been put forth.

By granting this new arrangement we are going to add to our international difficulties with at least two nations, Italy and The Netherlands. Of course, this may open the door to other countries to request similar assistance.


The Italian Government has been pressing our State Department to intercede with responsible branches of the Executive Department to insure that nuclear fuel to assist them in developing a naval nuclear propulsion capability be made possible. The Dutch have requested nuclear submarine assistance. In both instances we have not complied with their wishes. If we agree to assist the British we can expect these nations will request equal treatment, and we will be faced with the charge, with some validity, that again the British have evoked their claim to a "special relationship" with the United States.

The British have the capabilities of producing the highly enriched uranium requested, however, it is not economical for them to do so. If we enter into this arrangement it will free the British plants to produce uranium for commercial purposes. Thus Great Britain will be able to compete on a more favorable basis with the United States in the emerging international nuclear power market.

On a more sensitive issue closer to our hearts, it is the United States policy to discourage nations from trading with Red China, North Vietnam, and Cuba. I regret to say that I have noticed statistics in the Congressional Record and the press which indicate that Great Britain is in the forefront of Western allies who are trading with these nations. I am concerned that we may be practicing a double standard and making allowances for British trade which in my opinion they are not entitled to.

If in your judgment you believe that despite the misgivings of the Joint Committee, you still want us to enter into this arrangement with the British, I will support you. However, I am concerned that such an arrangement has more deficiencies than assets for the United States.

Sincerely yours,



John O. Pastore  
Chairman

508

Friday - April 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Heavy Water Plant to Romania

In the memo at Tab A Secretary Rusk recommends you indicate to Senator Pastore that you strongly support the sale of a heavy water plant to Romania. (Secretary Rusk also mentioned this at the NSC meeting on Wednesday.)

Senator Pastore and Congressman Holifield say they will support the sale if you do, and if they can be assured Romania is not sending arms to Vietnam. Senator Hickenlooper and Congressman Hosmer say they regard this as an Executive Branch decision, and say they do not -- and probably will not -- oppose the sale if you support it. Foreign policy advantages include:

- extension of IAEA inspection and safeguards to Eastern Europe for the first time -- as Romania is committed to accept them.
- encouragement of Romania's independence.

On the question of arms to North Vietnam, Romania has provided trucks, petroleum products (mostly heavy lubricants) and medical supplies, but CIA and others in the Intelligence Community believe they have sent no arms.

The technology for the plant can be found in open scientific literature, although U. S. industrial know-how makes our plant somewhat better than the foreign competitors'. Czechoslovakia is just completing a similar plant with Russian assistance. The French would probably be happy to sell such a plant to the Romanians if we don't. About twenty middle-rank powers have uranium power reactors at the present time.

The Romanians will probably buy the nuclear reactor -- for which they need the heavy water produced by the plant -- from Canada, Britain, Sweden or France. They originally wanted to buy the reactor from us, but we discouraged them.

AEC concurs in Secretary Rusk's recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Tell Pastore I strongly support sale \_\_\_\_\_

Have State tell him \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

*Int D*



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

10-1

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April 22, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Sale of Heavy Water Plant to Romania

Recommendation:

That you authorize us or a member of your staff to inform Senator Pastore, as Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, that you consider the sale to Romania of a heavy water plant to be important to US foreign policy objectives.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

State Department notify Senator Pastore \_\_\_\_\_

White House staff notify Senator Pastore \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

Since mid-1964, we have been considering the possibility of permitting the sale to Romania of nuclear power equipment.

We have a request from Deuterium Corporation of New York to sell Romania a heavy water plant. This would be part of a large nuclear power complex including a nuclear reactor to be purchased from the UK, Sweden, or France. Deuterium wishes to bid on both a large heavy water plant, estimated at \$45 million, and on a smaller alternative plant, estimated at \$15 million.

In either case, the initial charge of heavy water for the reactor—perhaps as much as 500 tons, valued at \$25 million—would probably also be sought from the United States. A favorable decision on the heavy water plant, therefore, implies willingness to permit the sale of the necessary heavy water for the initial charge.

The heavy water plant would be sold subject to safeguards admin-

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NLJ 97-332  
By CG, NARA Date 7-28-99

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GROUP 3  
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not automatically declassified



istered by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The safeguards would include continuing physical inspection and would extend to the nuclear power plant or plants utilizing the heavy water produced.

Authorization of this sale would have the following advantages:

1. It would establish IAEA inspection for the first time in a Warsaw Pact country. This would be a significant breakthrough.
2. It would be a practical gesture of encouragement to Romanian policies of independence. These policies continue, as most recently illustrated by Romania's stance on the Near East crisis and the Romanian walkout from the Budapest Communist Conference. President Maurer emphasized to you on June 25, 1967 how important a strong and developing economy was to maintaining Romanian independence.
3. This sale would thus fill a real gap pending Congressional action on an East-West trade bill. No legislative action with regard to the sale is required nor is formal notification of the JCAE necessary.

The disadvantages lie in the area of public and Congressional reaction. I believe we can deal with the former if we have the latter under control.

With this in mind, our people (Leddy, Stossel, Pollack, Torbert), together with AEC representatives, talked last summer with Senator Pastore and Congressman Holifield on the Democratic side of the JCAE and Senator Hickenlooper and Congressman Hosmer on the Republican side.

Chairman Pastore said he expects criticism on the Hill but sees the foreign policy advantages. He would be willing to support it publicly provided (a) he hears from you that the sale has your strong support and (b) he can be assured that Romania is not sending arms to Viet-Nam. Congressman Holifield went along with this. We have informed the Joint Committee staff that Romania has shipped transport equipment, petroleum products and medical supplies to North Viet-Nam, but no arms. Although they admitted on August 26, 1967 that their support of North Viet-Nam included "non-repayable economic and military assistance," the Romanians have been relatively restrained in their criticism of US policy in Viet-Nam and have attempted to play a constructive intermediary role in the conflict.

Senator Hickenlooper said he had overall reservations about

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-3-

"bridge-building" and reserved his right to comment on this or any other aspect of it at any time. He and Mr. Hosmer considered this an Executive Branch decision, however. They said they would not take a position against the sale when our people talked with them and Hickenlooper doubted they would do so in the future.

John Conway, JCAE Chief of Staff, has since told us he thinks the Committee will go along informally with the proposed sale, if an expression of your support can be gotten to the Chairman.

I urge that you authorize this expression of support, following which--and in the absence of a negative reaction from Senator Pastore--we would proceed without delay to authorize the Deuterium Corporation to negotiate the sale.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

51

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, May 16, 1968

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith the draft outgoing to  
Harriman for your clearance this evening,  
if possible.

The Situation Room will inform  
State Operations Center if you agree.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1963  
By sg, NARA, Date 6-2-92

WWRostow:rla

# GOING TELEGRAM Department of State

CATE: C/collet  
CAGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

5/1a

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Sign

Date

ACTION: AmEmbassy PARIS IMMEDIATE

INFO: AmEmbassy SAIGON

TODEL

NODIS/HARVAN

Ref. Delto-68

Subject: Outline of approach of third meeting.

1. We feel the constructive tone and restraint of your approach since beginning of conversations has given us effective and well-managed ~~public~~ with press and public. lead/ Strongly concur in your intention to go on in vein you propose. We are not averse to winning few more rounds on your present ~~lines~~ and suspect that DRV side may become more interested in substance as they see diminishing returns from their propaganda exertions. Your plan to go toward shorter more substantive statements works either way: You win if they stick to propaganda; you offer them an opening if they want to talk substance. Believe you should therefore continue offering reasonable proposals, even if you do not yet detect positive response from other side.
2. To maintain your lead with the press, it may be desirable to space your positive proposals, presenting them gradually and developing them on subsequent days, so that something newsworthy keeps coming down the pike. For Saturday, we particularly endorse your idea (para 5 C) of

Drafted by: U:RMOorsteen  
EA-Amb. Leonhart

Tel. Tel.  
2030

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by

EA - W. Leonhart

Classified

W. H. - Mr. Leonhart

DDO-Secretary Clifford

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-332

By CG, NARA Date 7-28-99

FORM 8-65 05-322

Page 2 of telegram to PARIS

~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

focusing on their intentions if the bombing stopped and your emphasis (para 6) on reestablishing the DMZ. Separately we are sending you some ideas on DMZ for your consideration. Additionally, believe you should continue press affirmative action proposals on Laos and Cambodia and highlight NVA military presence in SVN which you so effectively tabled in second meeting.

3. At this stage, DMZ reestablishment seems to us the crucial and pay-off issue. Meaning to be attributed to San Antonio is especially sensitive at this time. Furthermore, we suspect there is considerable advantage in waiting for them to press for a bombing halt on basis of San Antonio rather than urging it on them. For this reason, we <sup>think</sup> ~~may~~ that you <sup>should</sup> defer raising this subject (para 5B) and avoid introducing specific interpretation. If you think they are likely to press on San Antonio, we would appreciate receiving soonest language you would prepare on contingency basis should a reply be essential.

4. FYI If any progress emerges with respect to DMZ, we have in mind follow up by pressing Russians to weigh in on restoring 1962 Laos Accords. END FYI.

5. We like your plan try for private talks with NVN counterparts at coffee break or any other occasion which may crack their propagandistic rigidity. You will know how best to keep Bul Diem's spirits up.

6. Separately sending cables (TODEL 93) as you requested on (a) NVA presence in SVN, (b) NVA role in latest attack on Saigon, (c) DRV violations



Page 3 of telegram to PARIS

~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

of DMZ. Additionally, we may have thoughts for your consideration tomorrow on draft declaration re Cambodia. Let us know what additional materials you need.

GP-3

END

52

ACTION

Thursday - May 16, 1968

1. ~~Pres file~~  
2.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message from Ecuadorean President Arosemena

President Arosemena has sent you the message at Tab A endorsing your initiative on physical integration. He also asks your support for construction of a trans-Amazonian highway linking Ecuador with Brazil.

State recommends the reply at Tab B which expresses appreciation for the message but skirts the request for assistance.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Message from President Arosemena, May 7, 1968

Tab B - Suggested Presidential reply to President Arosemena.

52a

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By is, NARA Date 9-8-98

May 16, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to learn of your support for the creation of a high level task force to prepare a five year plan to hasten physical integration of Latin America. I am gratified that the proposal has been well received throughout the hemisphere.

The Inter-American Development Bank and the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress have authorized President Herrera and Chairman Sanz to work out the terms of reference and financial and procedural details for presentation to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council.

I hope the task force will be constituted promptly so that we will have at an early date expert advice on the priority to be given to integration projects.

Sincerely,



His Excellency  
Dr. Otto Arosemena Gomez  
Constitutional President of the  
Republic of Ecuador  
Quito.

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, May 16, 1968

Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached are Amb. Harriman's general views on how to approach the session on Saturday.

We have just finished a discussion of this cable in Nick Katzenbach's Vietnam Committee, which Sec. Rusk attended.

You will be getting tonight for clearance from the Situation Room, a cable which focusses on para. 5-B, sidelined in red.

Sec. Rusk suggested -- and we all agreed -- that we should not repeat not at our initiative go back at this stage to the San Antonio formula as presented to the Romanians. Instead, we should hold out for a firm cleaning up of the DMZ. If Hanoi should show any interest in the DMZ, we would begin to pick up Dobrynin's comment to Sec. Rusk on Laos; namely, his flat statement that if we stopped bombing North Vietnam, they would use their full influence to bring about total compliance with the Geneva Accords of 1962. This is a good, lucid, tough position. We believe Harriman should stay with it.

If they raise the interpretation of the San Antonio formula we put to the Romanians, we could deal with that; but we would wait until they raised it -- which would be a good sign.

We also agreed that the outgoing cable should stay firmly on the question of North Vietnamese military presence in the South and present evidence, which has moved, I believe, from the Pentagon to Paris this afternoon. Otherwise, we found nothing much to debate in the attached Harriman outline.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-333

By us, NARA Date 9-8-98

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm



MODIS

KARVAN

DELTO 68

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-332  
By CG, NARA Date 7-28-99

53a

SUBJECT: OUTLINE OF APPROACH OF THIRD MEETING

1. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE SETS OUT THE APPROACH WE PLAN TO TAKE IN THE MAY 18 MEETING.

2. SINCE WE BEGAN SECOND MEETING, WE SHALL LET THUY LEAD OFF SATURDAY. THEREFORE, WE WILL STAY FLEXIBLE AS TO HOW WE SHOULD RESPOND, DEPENDING ON WHAT THUY DOES. WE BELIEVE THE TWO MOST LIKELY POSSIBILITIES ARE: (A) ANOTHER DAY OF POLEMICS BY THUY AIMING FOR THE PROPAGANDA EFFECT ON THE BIG PRESS AUDIENCE; OR (B) THUY PRESSING VERY HARD FOR US TO TELL HIM WHEN THE BOMBING WILL STOP, AND CONFINING HIS PRESENTATION TO AN UNCOMPROMISING REFUSAL TO GET INTO OTHER ISSUES.

3. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO REPLY TO WHATEVER LINE HE TAKES. THE EXACT TONE AND NATURE OF OUR RESPONSE WILL BE BASED ON HOW THEY SAY THEIR PIECE.

4. WE HAVE IN MIND A RELATIVELY SHORT RESPONSE. WE WISH TO MOVE AWAY FROM LONG STATEMENTS BACK AND FORTH AND DEVELOP A MORE POINTED DIALOGUE. WE ARE GOING TO SEE IF WE CAN REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF PROPAGANDA TRADING THAT GOES ON (INCIDENTALLY, JORDEN IS BEGINNING TO GET QUESTIONS FROM REPORTERS AS TO WHEN WE ARE GOING TO STOP EXCHANGING PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND GET DOWN TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATION). IT IS OUR STRONG IMPRESSION FROM THE PRESS CORPS HERE THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE OVERPLAYING THEIR PROPAGANDA HAND AND THAT OUR RESTRAINT HAS PROVED A MORE EFFECTIVE METHOD OF HANDLING THE PRESS HERE, WHILE ALSO REASSURING SAIGON, THE TCC'S AND SOUVAN. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR GUIDANCE ON THIS MATTER.

5. IN ADDITION TO WHATEVER RESPONSE IS REQUIRED TO THUY'S OPENING REMARKS, WE INTEND:

A. TO ANSWER BRIEFLY CERTAIN CHARGES MADE ON WEDNESDAY. WE WILL PUT FORWARD THE ICRC SUGGESTION CONTAINED IN STATE 164991 (TODEL 86).

B. TO CORRECT THE MISSTATEMENT (OR DELIBERATE MISINTERPRETATION) OF THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA BY USING LANGUAGE SIMILAR TO THAT CONTAINED IN THE ROMANIAN CONTACT.

C. TO ASK THEM AGAIN WHAT RESTRAINT THEY NOW HAVE IN MIND OR WHAT THEY INTEND TO DO IF WE WERE TO STOP THE BOMBING ENTIRELY.

6. WHETHER THEY RAISE THE BOMBING ISSUE WITH US AT THE OUTSET, OR WHETHER IT COMES UP DURING OUR REMARKS, WE WILL TRY TO LEAD THEM INTO A DISCUSSION OF WHAT MIGHT FOLLOW A BOMBING CESSATION. THIS SHOULD GET US TO THE ISSUE OF THE DMZ AND OTHER ACTIONS OF RESTRAINT OR "GOOD FAITH" ON THEIR PART.

7. WE MAY ONLY RAISE THE DMZ ISSUE IN BROAD TERMS ON SATURDAY IN THE LARGE MEETING HALL, BUT WILL BE PREPARED TO GO FURTHER PRIVATELY IF IT CAN BE ARRANGED. TO BEGIN TO OPEN UP CHANCE OF CONTACT OUTSIDE OF MEETING ROOM, WE INTEND TO SUGGEST THAT WE HAVE A COFFEEBREAK BETWEEN OPENING REMARKS. DURING THIS BREAK WE WILL SEE IF WE ARE IN A POSITION TO TALK PRIVATELY TO EITHER THUY OR LAU. WE ALSO HAVE IN MIND CREATING OTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR MORE PRIVATE AND EXTENDED TALKS AS SOON AS NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE IN A MOOD TO DO SO.



The aide memoire handed to the Romanian Government in November, 1967, which we understand was communicated to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in mid-December, explained this statement in the following language:

"The President, in making his assumption that the North Vietnamese would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation while discussions proceed, was not assuming North Viet-Nam would cut off entirely its support of its forces in the South while the armed struggle was continuing; at the same time the United States Government would feel if North Vietnam sought to take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation to increase its support of its forces in the South, to attack our forces from north of the Demilitarized Zone or to mount large-scale visible resupply efforts, now impossible, it would not be acting in good faith."

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-332

By CG, NARA Date 7-28-99

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By us, NARA Date 9-8-98

Mr. Rostow 54

*Pres. file*  
INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, May 16, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Second Meeting with Bourguiba--5:00 p.m. Today

The purpose of this meeting is to approve the joint statement and give Bourguiba a chance to say anything else on his mind.

Bourguiba handled himself well at the Press Club. On Arab-Israel, he took the same line he did with you yesterday--that the real solution lies between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs, not with Nasser or Hussein. The Israelis shouldn't object.

He and Secretary Rusk had a good talk this morning. The Secretary filled him in on Vietnam, and then they discussed mostly bilateral issues. The Secretary is meeting at 3:00 p.m. with Foreign Minister Bourguiba to discuss the matter of arms from Turkey he raised with you yesterday. I suggest you cover the following:

1. Is the joint communique (attached) OK with him? (He has seen a French translation and Bourguiba, Jr. says it's all right with them. Secretary Rusk has approved.)
2. You understand Secretary Rusk has discussed the question of arms from Turkey with him and the Foreign Minister today. In principle, you have no objection. But there are some legal complications. We will study these actively and do all we can.
3. Is there anything else he'd like to discuss?
4. You want him to know that you have appreciated what he has said publicly and privately. You respect his views. You are glad they are so close to yours.
5. You wish to reassure him of our strong continuing interest in Tunisia.
6. You'll see him at his reception later.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

54a

May 16, 1968

JOINT STATEMENT

On May 15, 1968, President Johnson welcomed President Bourguiba of Tunisia as his guest for a State Visit to the United States. The two Presidents had a mutually valuable exchange of views on Tunisian-United States relations and on African, regional and world developments.

President Bourguiba described the successful efforts Tunisia is making to consolidate its independence, develop its economy and achieve new social goals for all its people, men and women, young and old. He expressed Tunisia's appreciation for American assistance, which has contributed significantly to Tunisian economic development. President Johnson recalled the longstanding interest of the United States in Tunisia's efforts to achieve in peace and security its goals of economic development and social progress.

President Bourguiba expressed his understanding of America's aim in supporting the principle of national independence and self-determination in Southeast Asia and commended President Johnson for seeking talks on the Viet Nam problem. The two Presidents shared the hope that a general easing of world tensions would be brought about by patient and persistent efforts to achieve a just settlement in Viet Nam.

President Bourguiba stressed the urgency of a just settlement of the Middle East problem. President Johnson expressed his agreement, and in that connection reiterated his firm belief that justice for all was to be found in the five principles he had enunciated on June 19, 1967. The two Presidents reaffirmed their strong support for the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, as offering the surest road to peace, and called on all Governments to cooperate fully with the Jarring Mission toward this end.

President Johnson noted with great satisfaction the priority given by Tunisia to building up sound and fruitful relations with its Maghrebian neighbors, as well as with other regions of Africa. He explained the United States Government's belief that regional economic cooperation offered an effective means of hastening the process of development and contributing to the lessening of world tensions.

The two Presidents consider that this State Visit, with the many demonstrations of American friendship for Tunisia which it evokes, is a symbol of the common political philosophy, the belief in freedom, the respect for the dignity of the individual, and the profound disposition toward peace, which are shared by the Tunisian and the American peoples.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, May 16, 1968

*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

At Tab A is Secretary Rusk's <sup>*suggested*</sup> talking points memo for use during your meeting with Ambassador Lodge, scheduled for Friday, May 17, at 11:45 a. m.

Among the topics the Secretary suggests you raise are:

- Berlin - The access issue has calmed down. No West German officials have been turned back since April 26, but new incidents are likely to occur.
- Germany's Eastern Policy - You may wish to ask Lodge to reassure Kiesinger and Brandt that we understand and support Germany's efforts to improve relations with the East and ultimately to achieve reunification. We hope the Germans will keep us informed of these efforts so that NATO moves toward the East can be coordinated.
- Military Offsets - You may wish to ask Lodge to remind Kiesinger and Brandt of the importance we attach to a successful outcome of the current negotiations.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-333

By iss, NARA Date 9-8-98

W. W. Rostow

  
ERF:MWG:mst

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

55a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Ambassador Lodge,  
Friday, May 17 at 1:00 p.m.

You have agreed to receive Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Friday, May 17 at 1:00 p.m. This is his final call on you before his departure for Germany May 20. I enclose a short outline of key issues between us and the Germans and some talking points on each issue, as appropriate.

*Dean Rusk*  
Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Issues and Talking Points Paper.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-193  
By inf, NARA, Date 7-29-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS PAPER

Here is a brief outline of key U.S.-German issues, and related talking points for your use with Ambassador Lodge, Friday, May 17 at 1:00 p.m.

A. Berlin - The East Germans have issued bans on travel to and from Berlin by members of the right-radical NPD Party, and high FRG officials. The regime wants to establish its "sovereignty"; and seeks to inhibit connections between the FRG and Berlin and thereby contribute to the erosion of Berlin confidence and viability. We have protested to the USSR. The East Germans have turned no officials back since April 26. Tension is abating for the moment. The East Germans are likely to try again from time to time.

Ask Lodge to give you his views on Berlin's future, and ideas for more secure access arrangements, including German access, after he has had time to study the problem. Tell him you regard Berlin as an important American tie with the Germans, a significant indicator of Soviet intentions, and an important symbol of American-European mutual security.

B. German Eastern Policy - The Kiesinger government's Eastern policy (better relations with Moscow, relations short of recognition with East Germany, and diplomatic relations with the Eastern European states) is consistent with our own. The FRG occasionally hears reports that we don't approve. This has been an irritant.

Lodge should let the Chancellor, Brandt, and other senior officials know that you understand and sympathize with their policy. Add that you expect the Germans to keep us informed on talks with the East. Tell Lodge of your interest in NATO exploration of balanced mutual troop reduction possibilities. Lodge should keep you informed of German views.

C. Troop Cost Neutralization - U.S./German talks on a new agreement for German purchases of Treasury securities to neutralize our foreign exchange losses began May 9/10 and will resume in a few weeks. The Germans have offered to extend the present rate of bond purchases for another year. We hope they will improve that offer.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-193

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~By       , NARA, Date 7-29-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Lodge should tell the Chancellor soon that your ability to resist Congressional pressure for troop reductions would be greatly strengthened if you could show that the Germans are helping to neutralize our losses.

D. Security and NATO - Increased interest in Eastern Europe and a German feeling of greater independence notwithstanding, the Germans continue to rely on us and on the Alliance for their national security.

Lodge should take frequent occasion to underscore the interdependence of U.S. and German security in NATO, as the basis for U.S./German partnership. The Germans are sensitive to "tutelage" but they still want to be reassured that we are faithful Allies.

E. Reunification - We continue to support German reunification. This is a long-range goal. Reunification could emerge from a long period of reduced East-West tensions. Experience of the last few weeks (Berlin access problems and Czechoslovakia) suggests that pitfalls remain and Western security interests require continued attention.

Lodge should keep you informed of German views about the outlook for reunification, and what they believe we can do to make progress possible.

F. Right-Radicalism - The "Nazis" aren't going to take over. NPD success are related to current economic and social difficulties. Nevertheless, the NPD's performance creates public opinion problems here.

Ask Lodge for continuing assessments of NPD prospects, and effectiveness of FRG efforts to control NPD. Tell him that we want to avoid getting U.S. publicly involved, because the NPD thrives on foreign criticism.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



## THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET/NODIS

WASHINGTON

Thursday, May 16, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith a capsule of Bunker's 51st weekly report:

*Per file*A. General

- The enemy suffered a heavy setback militarily in his attack on Saigon, but he also demonstrated a considerable measure of success toward other objectives - his position at Paris and a show of his attack capability.
- Continuing destructive attacks could threaten all achievements.
- We should indicate attacks on cities - as well as high infiltration - cannot be carried out with impunity.
- Thieu overcame Ky's objections to Huong as Prime Minister.
- Thieu's decision not to change military commands is reassuring.
- People's reactions to negotiations vary.
- Civil defense program progressing: Ky outlines objectives on TV.
- Thieu, Ky and Do sensitive that US may be entering substantive talks without Vietnamese presence.

B. Political

- As yet no protection for civil administration in draft mobilization bill.
- Loc's good Assembly appearance will not alter proposed cabinet changes.
- Communists face difficulties selling their new "Alliance."
- Outside Saigon, public confidence has been improving.

C. Military

- Heaviest fighting in I Corps: partial withdrawal from A Shau under way.
- General Thang expects increased enemy activity in IV Corps.

D. Pacification

- Province programs virtually unscathed by third phase post-Tet attacks.
- Psychological impact of latest attacks weaker; pacification still slow-paced.

E. Urban Recovery

- Saigon damage adds to recovery problems; priority leadership required.
- Tet evacuee resettlement continues; total remaining drops to 388,000.
- Recovery commodities flow to countryside; rains spur participation.

F. Economic

- Little economic panic in Saigon, despite attacks and curtailment of traffic.
- After 25% rise, food prices dropping steadily as attacks diminish.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

W. W. R.

Authority: MLG/KBS/10  
By: icshg, Date: 6-5-92

Thursday, May 16, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 27497)

Herewith my fifty-first weekly message:

A. General

A number of significant events occurred during the past week:

The back of the enemy attack on Saigon has been broken and again he has suffered extremely heavy casualties. From the beginning of the attacks on the night of May 4-5 to midnight May 15, in the country as a whole the enemy lost 11,633 killed (more than half in the Saigon area) and well over 2,000 weapons. Friendly losses for the same period were 907 killed in action, 169 missing, and something over 300 weapons. The enemy clearly suffered a heavy setback militarily. But I think it is also clear that he had objectives other than military. One was an attempt to bolster his position at Paris and to impress American and world opinion with his ability to mount substantial campaigns against the cities and towns of South Vietnam. In shifting their strategy from the countryside to the cities, and especially Saigon, they are hoping by means of repeated attacks, raids, sabotage, shelling, and the destruction of more and more parts of the city to undermine the fabric of government and to produce the uprising that would destroy it. One cannot ignore the fact that in creating another 125,000 refugees or evacuees in Saigon and Gia Dinh and in the severe damage or destruction of another 16,000 houses (probably a conservative estimate), the enemy has had a considerable measure of success. In the recent attacks, except for the First Corps and Saigon, mostly by rocket and mortar fire, much of the enemy's main force has been uncommitted and he is, therefore, in a position to continue his harassing attacks. That he will continue to be defeated and suffer heavy losses, I have no doubt. But if he continues to create refugees, to destroy and damage houses and industrial plants, the question is how long this can be endured without threatening all that has been achieved here.

Hanoi, I think, is taking a calculated gamble, believing that our desire for peace and to deescalate the war is now so great that we cannot reverse this trend, that we will not dare to restore full bombing of the north or retaliate against Hanoi. It is for this reason that in my two messages this past week I urged that we not agree to cease our bombing of the north without specific commitments from Hanoi with respect to activity in the south. It seems to me we should make it clear that the attacks against Saigon and the cities, which are essentially attacks on civilians, are just as much "taking advantage" of the San Antonio Formula as the doubling of the rate of infiltration which has occurred since August-September, 1967, and the attacks on the demilitarized zone; and that these cannot be carried out with impunity and without fear of retribution.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-332

~~SECRET/NODIS~~By CB, NARA Date 7-28-99



Thieu inaugurated a series of weekly radio and television speeches to the nation May 9. It was a good speech reviewing the impact of the recent attacks, noting the heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy, but also the damage and suffering caused by the Communists. He emphasized the fact that the enemy had increasingly resorted to sabotage, assassination, and indiscriminate shelling accompanied by considerable political activity. He congratulated the people and the armed forces for their performance during this new test of their courage and determination. He concluded his speech by expressing the hope that in his next address to the nation, probably this week, he would be able to speak to them on the subject of "reorganizing" the government.

In my talk with him on May 14, Thieu said that he was in the final stages of deciding on the new structure of the Cabinet and was examining with Tran Van Huong names for those to be replaced. He said that he had talked with Ky on the day before and had overcome his objections to Huong as Prime Minister. Thieu himself had canvassed the whole field and remarked that "the fact is there is no one to appoint Prime Minister except Huong". His decision not to make any change in the military commands is also reassuring. This presumably, for the present at least, will apply also to General Loan as Director-General of the National Police. In any case, it appears now doubtful that Loan will be able to resume his duties for some time. His leg wound is apparently serious enough to make it possible that some amputation may be necessary. Even if his leg is saved, he will lose some mobility and it seems unlikely that he can continue actively as police director. The circumstances under which this situation has developed are such as to avoid what might have been a source of friction between Thieu and Ky.

Concern over the subject of negotiations seems to be a countrywide subject in South Vietnam at present, linked, as it is, to the future of every South Vietnamese in the most direct way. Reports from various sources in the Second, Third, and the Fourth Corps, I think, give some general indications of how the average person is thinking. An observer from Gia Dinh Province in the Third Corps feels that the peace initiative has produced three divergent positions: In the first group are government officials, the military, wealthy businessmen, some educators, Catholics and those who came south after 1954. This group strongly opposes peace moves at this time, for it feels that the government is in no position to emerge from talks with results that will be acceptable; that the result of talks would see the formation of a coalition government with eventual takeover by the Communists. In the second group are low to middle income urban workers who were initially pleased with the prospects of peace, but now seem concerned about their economic future in a peacetime situation without the U. S. presence. In the third group are the peasants and farmers in rural areas without any political views or ideological beliefs who would welcome an early end to the fighting on practically any terms.

In the Second and Fourth Corps also, there seems to be evidence that the urban and rural poor want peace more than anything else and are not greatly concerned in the manner in which this might be achieved. There is, on the other hand, a growing body in the cities who have seen death and destruction all around them, who have

been outraged by the terror tactics of the Viet Cong, and who are increasingly apprehensive of any arrangement which would threaten to bring the Communists to power. In the rural areas also, although there is much bending with the wind, there is growing resentment at the enemy tactics of forced heavy taxation, of abduction, and assassination and terror.

A welcome development of this attitude has been the gathering momentum of the self-defense program throughout the country. In a radio and television speech on May 11, Vice President Ky outlined the objectives of the people's self-defense organization:

1. To mobilize the entire population;
2. To create a force in the rear areas to release the army for combat;
3. To strengthen the will of the people for defense of the nation's cause;
4. To create a people's force to strengthen the voice of the Republic of Vietnam at the conference table;
5. To permit the country to maintain a total war of an extended duration; and
6. To distribute the national potential rationally to permit it to fight and produce at the same time.

The students seem to have taken hold with a good deal of enthusiasm and have already been pressed into service in Saigon. Professor Nguyen Van Truong, of the University of Saigon, remarked that he thought the students were enthusiastic in participating in the defense of the capital and that if the Communists attack them or attempt to kidnap them, they will meet with strong opposition.

I have reported quite fully on our discussions with Thieu, Ky, and Dr. Tran Van Do on the subject of peace negotiations. They have been pleased with the two statements made by Ambassador Harriman. But at yesterday's meeting, I sensed some sensitivity on their part that we might be getting into substantive talks without their presence. I note that Ambassador Bui Diem expressed some similar fears in Paris. This continues to be a highly sensitive matter here and could be politically explosive.

#### B. Political

The Lower House completed action on a general mobilization bill on May 10, and the Upper House began discussion of it yesterday. The bill, as drafted, appears to give the government adequate authority to use decree power to issue the necessary implementing regulations, but the test of its effectiveness will come in the implementation of the law. So far, no regulations adequate to the protection of the civil administration and the functioning of the economy have been drafted. We have repeatedly called this to the attention of both Thieu and the Prime Minister, and both have agreed that it is important that this be done, but to date no effective action has been taken. This is in great part due to the fact that with the changes in government reported imminent, Ministers are reluctant to act. For this reason, not only

as it applies to mobilization, but as it affects the functioning of the entire government, I hope that Thieu will be able to make his proposed changes this week. In any case, there is bound to be some drag while the new Ministers are familiarizing themselves with their jobs.

On May 13, Prime Minister Loc appeared before the Upper House in the morning and the Lower House in the afternoon in answer to their request for interpellation and to report on the achievements of his government after six months in office. He commented at length on the government response to the Tet offensive, on the plans for general mobilization, on measures to improve the efficiency and honesty of the government, concluding by asserting the determination of the government to achieve "three national targets: to build democracy, to resolve the war, and to reform society." He took cognizance of the reports about changes in the government by saying that Cabinet changes or changes of personnel are necessary when the situation warrants them and that the Cabinet is ready for changes or for withdrawal when the interests of the nation require it. Loc handled questions well, but I think the performance as a whole is unlikely to change Thieu's view that a Cabinet change is necessary.

The "South Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces" on which I reported two weeks ago has had less of an impact than appeared at first might be possible. I think there is little doubt that the Communists have been looking eagerly for "respectable" personalities to give the "Alliance" an appearance of legitimacy. I have the impression, however, that the Communists will have difficulty in maintaining any significant distinction between the National Liberation Front and the "Alliance" among most of the South Vietnamese public. There is, of course, no distinction and Radio Hanoi's constant attention to the "Alliance" will tend to underline this fact in the public mind.

Outside of Saigon, the mood of public confidence has grown steadily over the past weeks, as the work of recovery proceeds, the economy begins to revive, and the events of the Tet offensive fade from memory. The "second wave" offensive was largely directed at Saigon and most province and district capitals suffered from nothing more than a few mortar and rocket rounds.

### C. Military

As the enemy elements in the Saigon area were being cleared up, the heaviest fighting this past week took place in northern First Corps. There was a major enemy thrust across the DMZ and considerable activity in the Khe Sanh plateau. Enemy activity continued around Hue and there was some shelling of the city. In the A Shau Valley, our forces met little resistance but continued to find caches of weapons and ammunition and also a large underground hospital. We are now withdrawing from the A Shau Valley, but will leave behind a roving guerrilla force and establish a 177MM artillery base within range of the valley. A few rockets were fired at Danang, but the fire was inaccurate and little damage was done. The Special Forces outpost at Kham Duc in Quang Tin Province was attacked and overrun

in the early morning hours of May 10. General Westmoreland had previously decided to withdraw forces before the attack took place. In the process, two C-130's and four helicopters were lost. One-hundred fifty Vietnamese dependents were killed in the loss of one of the C-130's. In Binh Dinh Province in the Second Corps, the 22nd Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division, the Regional and Popular Forces and the 173rd U. S. Airborne Brigade have been doing well. In Tuyen Duc and Lam Dong Provinces, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam suffered three bad ambushes.

I have already reported on the activities around Saigon in the Third Corps. In the Fourth Corps, the Vietnamese forces had two successful operations, one in Vinh Long Province, the other in Chau Duc. Ky told me yesterday that the Fourth Corps Commander, General Thang, reported that contacts with the enemy were getting more frequent and closer to the towns, and that he was looking for some stepped-up activity. He felt that this might come within a few days, perhaps around the 19th.

#### D. Pacification

Field reports from all 44 provinces indicate that pacification programs were hardly touched by the so-called "third phase" Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army attacks. As a result, pacification activity in the countryside is proceeding at about the pre-attack pace -- slow but hopefully sure.

Our assessment shows that, in contrast to Tet offensive, only one battalion and one company were repositioned this time in defense of province and district capitals. Nationwide, the enemy overran only 16 outposts out of more than 4,000; at least 10 have been reoccupied already. Only six out of more than 700 Revolutionary Development or Truong Son teams were withdrawn from hamlets, in contrast to more than 300 teams withdrawn during the Tet offensive.

The psychological impact on the population also seems far less than the Tet offensive. The people were better prepared for the May attacks, the armed forces and police were at strength and on the alert, and the enemy attacks were much weaker. Excessive concern with security is not evident. However, damage in Saigon and Gia Dinh will present additional urban recovery problems.

All told, we are pleasantly surprised with the lack of impact on pacification from recent attacks, though still concerned with the relatively slow pace and lack of strong direction in the government pacification program.

#### E. Urban Recovery

Though the May attack does not present us with any nationwide urban recovery problem comparable to that after Tet, the damage in Saigon and Gia Dinh area was heavy. We estimate 90,000 refugees in Saigon and 35,000 in the area surrounding Saigon. Houses destroyed or severely damaged number about 9,500 in Saigon and



6,000 in suburbs according to first, probably conservative estimates. Economic effects so far are minimal. Already 24-hour curfew imposed in parts of Saigon has been lifted to 1600-0900. Police are escorting commercial trucks into Saigon, rice prices are holding steady, but meat and vegetable prices have almost doubled as a result of scare buying and temporarily decreased supplies. At first, the government was inclined to try to handle this new recovery effort through normal ministerial channels. But we are recommending that the central recovery committee should take charge. Thieu will have to exert personal leadership if quick results are to be expected.

Meanwhile, resettlement of Tet evacuees continues. The number has dropped to 388,000 (versus 510,000 a week ago), as resettlement commodities and allowances are pumped out through provinces and districts that have finally gotten geared up. Rainy skies have given many families in temporary shelter incentive to reconstruct their homes. About 40 percent of the estimated million plus bags of cement and a million sheets of aluminum roofing have been distributed to families whose homes were more than 50 percent destroyed. Better than 90 percent of the total cement and roofing required has been delivered to provinces for local distribution. Nearly 100,000 tons of commodities have been released from Saigon and regional warehouses to assist Tet victims. With supplies on hand or due in South Vietnam ports shortly, we believe new attack victims can be handled in the same way as the 821,000 Tet evacuees.

#### F. Economic

Last week was one of great uneasiness for mission economists. The Viet Cong attacks on Saigon to a great extent fell across the city's main lifelines of food supply and commercial traffic. There was for a day or so active fighting in the Phu Lam area, where the main road from the delta enters Cholon, and along the Bien Hoa Highway, which channels all traffic from the north and east into the city. The 24-hour curfew imposed for several days in Cholon meant a complete stoppage of all commercial activity in that area and of traffic through it. Last but not least, the nearby fighting also put a stop to the operations of the municipal slaughter house nearby.

It is rather remarkable in view of all this that the Saigon population showed few signs of panic in its economic behavior. Households had apparently by and large foreseen emergencies, and in many cases had already laid in all the food they could stock. Therefore, though food prices rose about 25 percent during last week, these increases ceased as soon as the fighting moderated, and prices began to come back down at the beginning of this week.

Traffic from the delta into Cholon via Phu Lam has now been resumed, with convoys escorted into the city. Traffic from the north and east is being re-routed around the damaged Bien Hoa Bridge via old Route 1 without major delays. We expect that the city's commercial life will return to normal by next week, if further Viet Cong attacks do not occur. Economic conditions elsewhere in the country were affected only slightly by the fighting in Saigon.



INFORMATION

57

Wednesday, May 15, 1968 -- 4:50 p.m.

*free file*

Mr. President:

We have the following request from Bill Bundy: "In the President's talks with Mrs. Marcos, was there any commitment on the next stage in the Laurel-Langley conversations?"

W. W. Rostow

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, May 15, 1968 - 4:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

This defector's estimate of VC morale in relation to peace talks is of some interest.

W. W. Rostow

25X1A

[REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rla

SANITIZED  
Authority NLJ 019-034-2-11  
By Q, Personnel, Date 1/16/02

( CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE *58a*

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PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS  
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132117Z

CITE

DIST 13 MAY 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COUNTRY

SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI

TO 19 APRIL 1968

SUBJECT

RALLIER'S ASSESSMENT OF POSSIBLE IMPACT OF  
PARIS TALKS ON VIET CONG MORALE

ACQ

VIETNAM, SAIGON (9 MAY 1968) FIELD NO.

SOURCE

**SANTIZED**

**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLJ 97-325**

By is, NARA Date 10-22-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)*

1,5(c)  
3,4(b)(1)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1. IN THE OPINION OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL [REDACTED] SEVERAL FACTORS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN CONSIDERING THE POSSIBLE IMPACT ON VIET CONG (VC) TROOP AND CADRE MORALE OF THE PENDING PARIS TALKS. HIS OWN EXPERIENCE INDICATES THAT AT COMPANY LEVEL, TROOPS ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY WAR WEARY. THE TALKS COULD HAVE THE INITIAL EFFECT OF INSPIRING THEM BUT THEY WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DISAPPOINTMENT SHOULD THE TALKS DRAG ON OR BE APPARENTLY FRUITLESS. IN SOME WAYS, THE REACTIONS OF THE TROOPS ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO MANIPULATION BY POLITICAL OFFICERS, WHO WOULD BE EXPECTED TO INCREASE THEIR EFFORTS TO URGE THE TROOPS TO FIGHT HARDER IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE MOST FAVORABLE BARGAINING POSITION POSSIBLE. WHILE [REDACTED] STILL AT HIS VC POST, EVEN TALK AMONG THE TROOPS ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS WAS DISCOURAGED AND THE LINE WAS THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO FIGHT HARDER TO ACHIEVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~1,5(c)  
3,4(b)(1)

1,5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(rel. controls)

A FAVORABLE PEACE. HOWEVER, THE RANK AND FILE WANT PEACE AT ANY PRICE. VC CADRES AT [REDACTED] OWN LEVEL ARE ESSENTIALLY LOYAL EVEN THOUGH, IN HIS OPINION, THERE IS SOME UNVOICED DISILLUSIONMENT AMONG THEM.

2. [REDACTED] DISCOUNTED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE PARIS TALKS HAVING ANY EFFECT ON POSSIBLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV) AND THE HANOI GOVERNMENT. HE HIMSELF DOES NOT BELIEVE THERE ARE ANY CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO. THE NFLSV IS THE CREATION OF HANOI AND WILL CONTINUE TO OBEY ORDERS. HE MERELY LAUGHED WHEN ASKED IF THE NFLSV COULD CARRY ON THE WAR BY ITSELF IF HANOI WERE TO CEASE ITS SUPPORT. [REDACTED] SPECULATED THAT A RESUMPTION OF BOMBING IN THE NORTH WOULD CAUSE THE PEOPLE TO BECOME DISCOURAGED AND DISILLUSIONED SINCE THEY ARE ALREADY TIRED PHYSICALLY.

3. (FIELD COMMENT: [REDACTED] COMMENTS ON THE PROBABLY EFFECTS OF THE PARIS TALKS ON MORALE SHOULD BE READ IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS OWN INTENSE PERSONAL DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE COURSE OF THE WAR. HOWEVER, UP TO THE TIME OF THE RALLY ON 19 APRIL HE HAD RECEIVED REPORTS ON TROOP MORALE FROM POLITICAL OFFICERS OF VC SUBREGION 1 AND HAD MADE PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS OF THE

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3.4(b)(1)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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3.4(b)(1)

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SITUATION.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE DIR/JUSPAO  
(MR. NICKEL ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

1.5(c)  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 15, 1968  
4:40 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This is a probably authentic  
report [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

W. W. Restow

1.5(c)  
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[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

WWRestow:rla

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-329  
By is, NARA Date 3-29-00

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

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PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SECRET

CITE

DIST 13 MAY 1968

COUNTRY CHINA/VIETNAM

DOI MAY 1968

MAY 13 23 3 FILE COPY

SUBJECT CHINESE COMMUNIST DIPLOMAT'S REPORT ON  
COMMENTS BY A DRV DIPLOMAT ON THE  
TALKS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND  
VIETNAM IN PARIS

BOWDER  
BUDGET  
DAVIS  
FRIED  
HARRISON  
JESSUP  
JUNIOR  
KERRY  
ROOPE  
SAUNDERS  
TANCO

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

1. ON 10 MAY 1968 A CHINESE COMMUNIST DIPLOMAT ABROAD DESCRIBED TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE STAFF AT HIS EMBASSY A CONVERSATION HE HAD JUST HAD WITH A DRV DIPLOMAT IN THE AREA IN WHICH THE DRV DIPLOMAT HAD EXPLAINED TO HIM ABOUT THE PEACE TALKS WITH THE AMERICANS IN PARIS. THE CHINESE DIPLOMAT TOLD THE GROUP THAT IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE CHINESE ALREADY KNEW A GOOD DEAL ABOUT THE TALKS FROM NEWS MEDIA, HE ASKED THE DRV DIPLOMAT HIS OPINION CONCERNING THE FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS. THE DRV DIPLOMAT SAID HE BELIEVED THE MAIN THEME OF THE PEACE TALKS WAS CEASEFIRE, BUT HE DID NOT EXPRESS HIMSELF VERY CLEARLY ON THAT POINT. THE DRV

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

(classification)

(dissem controls)

SANITIZED

Authority NLT 97-3254 NLS 019-034-2-13

By NARA, Date 1/17/02

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

(classification)

(dissem controls)

DIPLOMAT SAID IT WAS VERY CLEAR THAT THE PROBLEMS OF VIETNAM WERE TO BE SOLVED ONLY ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THE DRV DIPLOMAT SAID: "WE ARE DETERMINED TO LIBERATE SOUTH VIETNAM AND WE HAVE PREPARED OURSELVES ON EVERYTHING FOR A LIBERATED VIETNAM. THERE IS NEVER ANY DOUBT WHATSOEVER IN OUR MINDS ABOUT LIBERATING SOUTH VIETNAM. THE PEACE TALK IS SIMPLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF COORDINATING OUR EFFORT ON THE BATTLEFIELD. BY USING DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES WE HAVE PUT THE AMERICANS IN A DEFENSIVE POSITION MILITARILY; THUS, THEY ARE IN A DEFENSIVE POSITION ON THE BATTLEFIELD AS WELL AS IN DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES."

2. THE CHINESE DIPLOMAT THEN COMMENTED TO HIS COLLEAGUES THAT IT HAD BEEN UNNECESSARY FOR THE DRV DIPLOMAT TO EXPLAIN THESE MATTERS TO THE CHINESE SINCE THEY WERE FULLY AWARE OF THE GENERAL SITUATION IN VIETNAM THROUGH NEWS AND RADIO MEDIA. HE SAID THERE WERE ACTUALLY ONLY TWO CHOICES FOR THE VIETNAMESE AND AMERICANS: WAR OR TALK. THE DRV DIPLOMAT'S STATEMENT THAT THE DRV WAS DETERMINED TO LIBERATE SOUTH VIETNAM WAS A WELL KNOWN FACT AND NEED NOT BE REPEATED. EVERYONE KNEW THAT THE U.S. WAS THE AGGRESSOR IN VIETNAM. RIGHT NOW THE AMERICANS WERE TALKING ABOUT WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH VIETNAM. IF THEY

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

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REALLY HAD GOOD INTENTIONS, THEY COULD GET THEIR HALF MILLION TROOPS OUT OF SOUTH VIETNAM WITHIN TWO MONTHS' TIME. THE U.S. DID NOT HAVE A MILLION TROOPS IN VIETNAM BUT ONLY A HALF A MILLION. THAT BEING THE CASE, WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF TALKING ABOUT PEACE AT THIS TIME. THERE WERE ONLY TWO CHOICES FOR THE AMERICANS: TO GET OUT OF SOUTH VIETNAM OR BE ELIMINATED BY THE VIETNAMESE. THE CHINESE DIPLOMAT SAID THAT APPARENTLY THE U.S. WAS TAKING A POLICY OF "DELAYING THE TIMETABLE." THE DIPLOMAT SAID: "OUR CONCLUSION IS SIMPLE: THE ONLY SOLUTION FOR VIETNAM IS TO CONTINUE THE WAR; WHAT CAN YOU EXPECT OUT OF PEACE TALKS? WE HAVE MADE OURSELVES VERY CLEAR ON THAT POINT; ~~OUR GOVERNMENT CLEARLY STATED THAT WE WILL SUPPORT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IN THEIR LIBERATION WAR, ISN'T THAT CLEAR ENOUGH? BUT THEY (THE VIETNAMESE) WANT TO TALK WITH THE AMERICANS. WHAT CAN WE DO? THEY SHOULD REALIZE, HOWEVER, THAT WHETHER OR NOT THERE ARE PEACE TALKS, THE FINAL PURPOSE IS TO GET THE AMERICANS OUT OF SOUTH VIETNAM.~~ THE AMERICANS PROBABLY ARE THINKING ABOUT THE SAME THING AND THIS IS WHY THEY ARE STILL BOMBING, ATTACKING AND INTENSIFYING THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITIES

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IN THE SOUTH." (THE DIPLOMAT THEN ADDED THAT THE DRY WAS  
NOW LEANING TOWARD THE "REVISIONISTS")

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION *has file*  
(for 5:30 meeting) *60*

Wednesday, May 15, 1968  
3:15 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

You may wish to handle the 5:30 meeting as follows:

1. Report of Paris Session (Sect. Rusk)

Hanoi demanded that we stop bombing for nothing -- flatly --  
no give at all.

2. Infiltration Rates through Panhandle (Sect. Clifford and Gen. Wheeler)

Attached figures show:

- 1295 trucks sighted in Panhandle May 1 - 8.
- about 25% destroyed or damaged.
- both figures rising rapidly as weather clears and rains come to Laos.

3. Should We Resume Between 19th and 20th Parallels? (Sects. Rusk and Clifford)

4. Operational Orders (Gen. Wheeler)

If President so decides, how to draft operational orders to assure that fixed targets will be attacked one-by-one.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-326  
By *iso*, NARA Date *3-3-98*

W W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

60a

North Vietnam

1 Thru 8 May 1968

	<u>RP I</u>	<u>RP II</u>	<u>RP III</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>DAILY AVERAGE</u>
Sighted	878	253	164	1,295	162
Destroyed	87	22	14	123	15
Damaged	145	30	16	191	24

*Weekly Average for April 1968:*

- Sightings, about 760*
- destroyed, about 104*
- damaged, about 87*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-327  
By CG, NARA Date 7-27-99

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

61

ACTION

*Pres file*

Wednesday, May 15, 1968 - 3:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

When I raised the question of a Japanese interview by Wakatsumi, you responded: "Wouldn't Rusk do it up good. I prefer not to do it."

I then took the matter up with Sec. Rusk. He is, I believe, prepared to proceed. It is the unanimous judgment, however, of Embassy Tokyo, our best friends in Tokyo, and the Dept. of State that the interview would have more impact in Japan if it were an interview with the President. Therefore, we had prepared this draft to give you a chance to make a final assessment and decision.

If you approve this text, nothing more would be required than a photograph with Wakatsumi.

*There is no doubt the impact would be vastly greater if you did it.*

W. W. Rostow

Let Rusk do it \_\_\_\_\_

Interview approved \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rla

61a

QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS

FOR PRESIDENTIAL INTERVIEW

WITH MR. WAKAIZUMI



QUESTION NO. 1

Mr. President, the people of Japan -- and, I am sure, the people of many countries of the world -- were greatly impressed by your March 31st speech in which you took a unilateral step toward de-escalating the conflict in Vietnam and, at the same time, announced your decision neither to seek nor to accept the nomination of the Democratic Party for the Presidency. Japanese welcomed your historic statement as well as the positive response of North Vietnam. We sincerely wish an early and honorable peace acceptable to all parties concerned.

Since the delicate negotiations are going on in Paris at this moment, I do not want to ask any questions which might interfere with the progress of those negotiations. I would like to solicit your thoughts on some fundamental matters of U.S. foreign policy in Asia and the Pacific, particularly as it concerns Japan.

Mr. President, some Japanese feel that your speech, in the context of recent developments in Vietnam, signals a basic modification of U.S. policy toward Asia. Is this the case?

QUESTION NO. 1

ANSWER:

Not at all, Mr. Wakaizumi, not at all.

My March 31 speech was another in a long series of efforts to move the conflict in Vietnam to the negotiating table. Peace -- a lasting and honorable peace -- has always been our aim in Asia. Aggression is the enemy of peace. That is why we are fighting in Vietnam, to defeat aggression and to win a peace in which the South Vietnamese people can work out their own future. If armed aggression can succeed in South Vietnam, then the peace will be secure nowhere in Asia. So, we are determined that armed aggression will not succeed in Vietnam. We have been from the beginning. We still are.

There has been no change in our policy. We have never sought more than an honorable settlement of the conflict. But we will never accept anything less.

My March 31 speech made it crystal clear that we will meet our commitments in Asia. We are prepared to negotiate in good faith. But we will never -- never -- abandon our commitments or compromise the bright future of Asia.

You should remember that American policy in Asia and our involvement in Vietnam has been developed under four American Presidents representing both political parties. There is no question in my mind that our policy toward Asia has the broad support of the American people. Our policy is not the work of one man -- or of any one party. It is the

result of the determination of the American people to put our full weight behind the organization of peace in the world.

And once peace is achieved, we stand ready to use our economic and technological resources in a more generous measure than is now possible to continue the work of building a New Asia with a better life for its people.

QUESTION NO. 2

To put it bluntly, it is widely believed in my country that the United States has virtually lost the war in Vietnam and that, sooner or later, regardless of the progress of negotiations, the United States will have to withdraw. According to this point of view, the day will come when the United States will turn its back on Asia and adopt some kind of neo-isolationism. Since we are linked with the United States in an important security pact, we are deeply interested in being able to count on a trustworthy ally. I would be most interested in your reaction to the assessment of the situation which I have just mentioned.

## QUESTION NO. 2

### ANSWER:

I see no basis for the belief that the United States has "virtually lost the war in Vietnam," as you put it. The Lunar New Year offensive, launched by the Communists in the midst of a sacred holiday, got the Communists lots of publicity. It also got them enormous casualties. Despite depleted ranks because of holiday leaves, the South Vietnamese Army fought back hard and effectively. The popular uprising that the enemy called for over and over in their radio broadcasts and that they forecast in the orders to their forces simply never came about.

To the contrary, this cruel attack on the cities served to harden the determination of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves. Voluntary enlistments went way up in February. A new mobilization law has passed the House of Representatives. 18- and 19-year olds are being drafted for the first time. And new moves have been undertaken to improve the weapons and the training of the Vietnamese Army.

The siege of Khe Sanh, which the Communists planned as an American Dien Bien Phu, was broken. The enemy suffered fearsome losses while ours were moderate.

No, I can see no signs that the enemy is doing well at all.

Nor is there any question of a United States withdrawal from Asia. We are a Pacific power as well as an Atlantic power. We believe world peace requires political and economic strength among the nations of Free Asia. We intend to go on contributing to that strength as we have in the



past. When necessary, as in Korea and Vietnam, we are prepared to resist aggression, for unchallenged aggression is a mortal danger to the peace and stability of Asia.

With respect to Japan, I told your Prime Minister last fall, that the United States commitment to your country can be counted upon. I can assure the people of Japan that the United States will never fail to honor that commitment.

QUESTION NO. 3

Your answer (that the United States will not withdraw from Asia, in response to the preceding question in the interview) reminds me of the important speech you made to the American Alumni Council in July 1966. At that time you said that the first essential for peace in Asia was the determination of the United States to meet its obligations in Asia as a Pacific power. In view of your statement, it would appear that that determination has not diminished.

Now certain critics both in the United States and elsewhere feel that U.S. obligations in Europe and elsewhere, in addition to its commitment in the Pacific, leave the United States over-extended. They point to your country's domestic problems, and also to world monetary problems, as reasons for reducing the scope of U.S. interests overseas. Do you feel that the breadth of U.S. commitments hampers its ability to respond flexibly to situations as they arise around the world?

QUESTION NO. 3

ANSWER:

The United States has the resources and the will to meet its commitments both to the American people and to our friends abroad. Look at the record of the last 25 years. Look at Iran, Berlin, Greece, Korea, Lebanon, and now Vietnam. And there have been others. .

We have not reduced our forces in NATO as a result of the Vietnam War. We continue to maintain a strategic reserve in the United States to deal with any sudden crisis that might arise. In fact, we are now strengthening that reserve.

Of course, we expect others to carry their share of the burden. And some are doing so. There are five Asian nations fighting beside U.S. and Vietnamese soldiers against the aggression from the North. Many others, including Japan, are giving non-military assistance to South Vietnam.

In the future we expect to see our allies play an expanding role, not only in protecting the security of the free world, but in providing the economic assistance which will make that world stable and prosperous. It is right that free nations should make whatever contribution they can to the security of their neighbors and the peace of their area. And it is right that prosperous nations should help their poorer neighbors build a better life for their people.

The United States has the resources to meet its commitments. But it is difficult for us to ask our people to sacrifice if others are not doing

their part. In recent years more and more nations have come to realize the need to share their strength with their neighbors. Japan, for instance, has been playing an important role in regional development. You are making a major contribution to the Asian Development Bank. You are playing an equal role with us in helping Indonesia. This is heartening to us, and it makes it easier for us to continue to carry our share of the burden. I have no doubt that the future will bring an ever greater measure of cooperation between nations. I am sure that Japan will play a leading role in that cooperation, particularly in Asia. I am sure that others will follow Japan's lead. And I am sure that my country will play its full role.

#### QUESTION NO. 4

Since we are talking about international commitments to bring about peace and security, I am interested in your thoughts on the role Japan might play. I feel personally that economic development and political stability of Southeast Asia are intimately related to Asian peace, and that Japan is uniquely qualified to assist in achieving these ends. As you mentioned, the Asian Development Bank, in which Japan and the United States are major participants, is a first step in this direction. I would be interested in your ideas concerning some of the next steps in international cooperation for development.



QUESTION NO. 4

ANSWER:

The nations of Asia are now beginning to realize the importance of working together for their common interests. Japan, as the greatest industrial power in Asia, can obviously be of prime importance in that endeavor. There is much to be done in Asia, and Japan can play a very constructive role in helping to achieve the economic progress and the political cooperation which are essential for peace and stability in that area. The burden is a heavy one and cannot be carried by the United States or any other country alone. It is for that reason that we feel that Japan's participation in this task is vital.

No nation stands to benefit more than Japan from a peaceful, prosperous, progressive Asia. No nation is in a better position than Japan to help make that kind of Asia a reality. The exact form of your contribution is something for the Japanese people and government to decide. But we look to Japan for a great contribution.

QUESTION NO. 5

Unfortunately, economic development is not a sufficient condition for bringing about peace. Diplomatic and other means are also essential for reducing tensions. As you said in the speech which I have already mentioned, the "...essential for peace in Asia which may seem the most difficult of all is reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies. A peaceful mainland China is central to a peaceful Asia."

Because of yearning for peace and of our geographical position, we Japanese are particularly interested in the possibility of such a process of accommodation. We ourselves have been trying to keep trade and cultural contact with China. Therefore, we are greatly interested in your views on the future of relations with mainland China and on possible policies which might help to bring about an accommodation.

QUESTION NO. 5

ANSWER:

I recognize and have spoken of the need for working toward a lessening of tensions between <sup>mainland</sup> China and the United States.

I hope that Peking will change its absolute opposition and resistance to efforts we have undertaken in this direction.

For example, there has been a steady relaxation of our restrictions on the travel of Americans to Mainland China and of Mainland Chinese to the United States, although Peking does not see fit to take advantage of this.

In 1961 President Kennedy quietly suggested the United States might be prepared to supply food at a time when the Chinese were importing a good deal of food. That offer was rejected.

Last spring we tried on a small scale to permit the licensing of the sale of certain drugs helpful in fighting diseases which we believed were spreading in parts of the Mainland. Again it was rejected.

We continue to meet with the Mainland Chinese in Warsaw at the ambassadorial level and we have dealt with them in the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina and the 1961-1962 Geneva Conference on Laos.

However, Peking's leaders have continued to hold to their very militant stance in foreign affairs. They go on aiding and encouraging what they call "national wars of liberation." They continue to develop their nuclear arsenal and explode nuclear weapons in the atmosphere.

We hope, nevertheless, that Peking will cease its self-isolation, will change its dedication to the violent revolutionary overthrow of

governments and will decide that it wants to re-enter the family of nations.

I might remind you of what I said in my State of the Union speech on January 10, 1967.

"We shall continue to hope for a reconciliation between the people of Mainland China and the world community -- including working together in all the tasks of arms control, security, and progress on which the fate of the Chinese people, like their fellowmen elsewhere, depends.

"We would be the first to welcome a China which decided to respect her neighbor's rights. We would be the first to applaud her were she to apply her great energies and intelligence to improving the welfare of her people. And we have no intention of trying to deny her legitimate needs for security and friendly relations with her neighboring countries."

QUESTION NO. 6

Mr. President, I have just participated in a conference on the subject of Okinawa at Stanford University. Since it affects the ties of friendship between our two countries, I should like to raise this one urgent problem. As you know, all Japanese, including the people of the Ryukyus, strongly desire the early reversion of the administrative rights to Japan. We realize that this problem too is intimately related to the problem of establishing peace in Asia, but at least we should like to get a clear date for Okinawa's return as soon as possible.



QUESTION NO. 6

ANSWER:

I had very frank and useful talks with Prime Minister Sato here in Washington last November about the Ryuku Islands question. The Prime Minister told me of the desire of the Japanese people for restoration of administrative rights over the Ryukyus. I informed the Prime Minister that I fully understand the desire of the Japanese people for the reversion of these islands. At the same time, we both recognized that the United States military bases on these islands continue to play a vital role in assuring the security not only of Japan but of other free nations in the Far East.

This question is closely linked to future developments in Asia, and therefore I cannot at this time give you a definite timetable for reversion. Nevertheless, I understand the Prime Minister's desire for reaching an agreement within a few years on a satisfactory date for reversion. Therefore, we agreed last year to keep this question under joint and continuing review. In the meantime I am pleased by the agreement we have already reached for the return of the Bonin Islands.

Prime Minister Sato and I also recognized the need to take steps to promote the economic and social welfare of the people of the Ryukyu and to foster greater identification with Japan proper, in order to reduce the stresses which will come at such time as administrative rights are restored to Japan. We therefore agreed to establish an Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands. This Committee is now

operating in Naha, and I understand that in a few short months it has already come up with some very constructive actions.

QUESTION NO. 7

Mr. President, we all know that nothing is more important to the peace of the world than the improvement of relations between the two super-powers -- the United States and the USSR. Japanese relations with the Soviet Union have been improving; we have been encouraged by recent signs of progress in Soviet-US relations, such as the ratification of a consular convention between your two countries. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty also holds out prospects for a more peaceful world. Unfortunately, these prospects are marred by the continued development and testing of nuclear weapons at the very time when non-nuclear powers are being asked to renounce their nuclear option.

Japan is more painfully aware of the horrors of nuclear war than any other nation.. We know that you share that awareness; we remember your remarks on the subject as long ago as 1957 in your "Open Curtain" speech. Although Japan is now the world's third greatest industrial power with the obvious capability of building nuclear weapons, we are most reluctant to do so. Nevertheless, we cannot be at ease, nor can we feel certain that the cause of peace is being advanced, so long as testing of nuclear weapons continues.

Mr. President, we know from your letter of transmittal of the most recent report on the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency that you are completely aware of the considerations mentioned above. However, we feel strongly about the urgency of measures to achieve realistic and

effective arms control and disarmament. We are anxious to have your appraisal of the prospects for progress in the near future.

QUESTION NO. 7

ANSWER:

I have devoted many hours -- many days -- to the task of improving Soviet-American relations.

There has been some progress. We have successfully negotiated the Space Treaty, the air agreement and the agreement on the return of astronauts as well as the Consular Convention which you mentioned. Most important of all is the joint proposal for a Non-Proliferation Treaty. We have managed to do all this at the very time that the Vietnam conflict was complicating our relations with the Soviet Union. So, I think there is solid ground for hope and progress in the future.

In particular, we would like to get talks started between ourselves <sup>on</sup> and the Soviets/limiting strategic offensive and defensive missiles. We are convinced that there is a mutual interest in stopping the accumulation and refinement of these weapons. I stated publicly on February 12 my hope that talks on this subject could start soon.

We also would like to see the Soviets work with us to settle the Middle East crisis. That is a dangerous situation. It is a situation in which we think there is need for U.S. -Soviet cooperation.

We would like to have Japan's support for these efforts. I think Japan can play a very useful role in working for a wide adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As you know, that proposal was worked out very painstakingly at Geneva. It takes into account the views of many nations, including Japan.



QUESTION NO. 8

Mr. President, we have been discussing major questions of world peace and security. You deal with such questions daily. It has been said that the President of the United States is the most powerful yet the loneliest man in the world. Because you have been so close to these major world questions, I would be particularly interested in any thoughts you would like to share on your hopes and fears for the future of mankind in this nuclear age.

QUESTION NO. 8

ANSWER:

As I said in my response to an earlier question, I am certain that the future will see a world in which cooperation between nations is commonplace.

I am not pessimistic about the future. I am not pessimistic at all. The recovery of Japan is an example of what free men can do in conditions of peace and security. All over Asia a new society is coming into being. The progress of Korea, of Thailand, of Malaysia, Singapore, and the Republic of China -- all this is dramatic proof that men can work together to conquer their ancient enemies of poverty and sickness and ignorance. Prosperity, hope, a better life for the people of the world: those are the conditions of peace. That is what we have to work for, to create the conditions of peace. Peace is too important to be left to chance. It is essential that the nations of the world invest their resources and their energies in the task of organizing the peace -- of creating the conditions of peace.

I think we have made great progress. At the very moment that the tragic war of Vietnam has gone on, the building of a new Asia has also gone on. The future does not lie in the fighting and the desolation of Vietnam battlefields. It lies in the schools that have been built in Thailand, the factories that have been built in Japan. It lies in the miracle rice strains developed in the Philippines. It lies in the great work that is going on to develop the Mekong Valley for the benefit of a

hundred million people.

I believe that mankind now has, for the first time in history, the tools and the knowledge to build a peace. I believe science and technology puts within our hands the ability to solve our problems -- to give a better life to all our people. But we will miss this chance if we do not recognize it and work for it. The key is cooperation between nations.

I believe that the nations of the world are coming to see this truth. And I believe that the young people of the world see it more clearly than the rest of us. There is much hard work yet to be done. There will be dangers to meet and sacrifices to bear in the future as in the past. But I believe profoundly, Mr. Wakaizumi, that the people and the nations of the world will meet the challenge. I envy the young people who are just coming into this world. They will know a better world than we have known.

QUESTION NO. 9

In closing, Mr. President, I should imagine that people all over the world are wondering how you feel about your momentous decision to give up your political career to devote more of your time to the quest for peace. Have your days been less hectic, and have you felt more tranquility of mind since then?

62

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 15, 1968 -- 2:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

This report [REDACTED] is worth heading. It may indicate pretty accurately Hanoi's frame of mind.

1.3(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

Even more interesting are paragraphs 4 and 6.

Technically, this [REDACTED] is quite correct in para 4: The right way to negotiate would be first to get at the political future of South Vietnam and then work out the steps of mutual deescalation, withdrawal, etc. In my judgment, the test of their seriousness in Paris will be the moment when they engage -- probably behind the scenes -- in talk about the political settlement in South Vietnam.

1.3(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

Para. 6 is important because, once again, it indicates that their objective will be to pressure us to break up the constitutional government and start manipulating various Vietnamese into a coalition government -- the heart of their operation.

W. W. Rostow

[REDACTED]  
~~SECRET~~

1.3(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-324  
By is, NARA Date 5-3-00

WWRostow:rla



62a.

6-2-2

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE  
IN 09471

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SOO ONE CRS  
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This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

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CITE

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13 MAY 1968

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3.4(b)(1)*

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

MAY 13 23 38 Z

DOI. MAY 1968

SUBJECT NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS TOWARD THE NEGOTIATIONS

AS PRESENTED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR

ACQ MAY 1968

FIELD NO.

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SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-325

By *js*, NARA Date *10-22-99*

*1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)*

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(classification)

1. [REDACTED] MAY 1968 [REDACTED] NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE  
ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECH  
ON 31 MARCH WAS A "DRAMATIC REVERSAL OF TRENDS, A QUALITATIVE LEAP."  
UNTIL MARCH 31ST, HANOI EXPECTED THAT JOHNSON PLANNED TO ESCALATE  
THE WAR, TO APPEAL TO US NATIONALISM AND TO SEEK RE-ELECTION ON A  
WAVE OF PATRIOTIC POPULARITY. SUDDENLY, HE WENT THE OTHER WAY AND  
"DE-ESCALATED". [REDACTED] HANOI UNDERSTOOD WHAT  
CONCRETE EVENTS BROUGHT JOHNSON TO MAKE HIS DECISION: THE TET  
OFFENSIVE, THE DOLLAR PROBLEM, AMERICAN ISOLATION FROM ITS ALLIES  
AND THE PEACE MOVEMENT. EVEN THOUGH THE PARTIAL SUSPENSION OF THE  
BOMBING WAS NOT WHAT HANOI HAD DEMANDED, IT WENT A LONG WAY IN THE  
DIRECTION OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION. "WE KNOW THAT THIS NEW  
AMERICAN TREND TOWARD PEACE MAY BE REVERSED AND THE HAWKS MAY GAIN  
THE UPPER HAND, SO WE ARE PREPARED TO GIVE THIS PEACE TREND A CHANCE  
TO DEVELOP.

5 2. THUS, [REDACTED] AT THE PEACE TALKS, THE VIETNAMESE 5  
4  
3 EXPECT TO BE PATIENT AND TO LET THE AMERICANS MANEUVER AROUND THEIR 3  
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1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~

(classification)

PUBLIC OPINION AT HOME, AND MANEUVER AROUND THEIR CUMBERSOME ALLIES.

"WE ARE NOT AS INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATING AS WE ARE OF GETTING AMERICAN TROOPS OUT OF VIETNAM, SO, IF THE NEED ARISES, IF THE AMERICANS NEED TIME, IF THEY NEED TO MAKE CERTAIN STATEMENTS, IF THEY NEED TO CLAIM THAT THEY HAVE ACHIEVED THEIR GOALS IN VIETNAM, EVEN IF THEY NEED TO CLAIM THAT THEY HAVE WON, WE WILL NOT MIND . . . AS LONG AS THEY PROMISE TO LEAVE VIETNAM."

3. THE VIETNAMESE WILL NOT RELY SOLELY ON NEGOTIATIONS. THEIR POSITION ON THE BATTLEFIELD WILL CONTINUE TO BE REINFORCED. PRESIDENT JOHNSON IS A "VERY SLY FOX" AND HE WILL NOT BE GIVEN THE TEMPTATION TO SUDDENLY CHANGE HIS MIND BY THINKING HE HAS A BETTER MILITARY CHANCE. "AFTER ALL, THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE A KIND OF DIPLOMATIC TRANSLATION OF THE MILITARY SITUATION. WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN AWARE THAT WE CANNOT THROW THE AMERICANS INTO THE SEA. OUR ACTIONS ARE A CAREFULLY PLANNED MIXTURE OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL PRESSURE. IN THAT REGARD WE WILL CONTINUE TO NEED OUR FRIENDS IN THE WORLD TO SPEAK UP AND SUPPORT OUR CAUSE."

4. ~~AT THE PEACE TALKS, THE MAIN ISSUE WILL BE THE FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM. IF AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE ISSUE, THE INTER-~~  
~~MEDIATE STEPS TO BE TAKEN, SUCH AS THE CONTROL OF THE DE-ESCALATION,~~  
~~WILL NOT PRESENT INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEMS. THERE WILL BE NO~~

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~

(classification)

1,5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~  
(classification)

~~RESTRICTIONS ON TOPICS TO BE DISCUSSED DURING THE TALKS. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE PREPARED FOR WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSIONS.~~

5. AMBASSADOR [REDACTED] AGREED THAT "TO A DEGREE" THE GENEVA ACCORDS MAY SERVE AS A FRAMEWORK FOR A SOLUTION TO THE VIETNAM PROBLEM. HE MENTIONED THE STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED: "SELF-DETERMINATION, ELECTIONS, RE-UNIFICATION OF VIETNAM - ONE AFTER THE OTHER, AT DIFFERENT TIMES, HOWEVER, THE SITUATION IS DIFFERENT NOW. THERE IS NOW THE FRONT TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AND OTHER FACTORS."

6. REFERRING TO THE NEWLY ANNOUNCED "ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC AND PEACEFUL FORCES" IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AMBASSADOR [REDACTED] SAID THAT NORTH VIETNAM IS AWARE THAT SOME PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM DO NOT WANT COMMUNISM. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT AN INDEPENDENT NEUTRAL SOUTH VIETNAM. [REDACTED] ~~WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD GET RID OF KY, AND LATER ON THEY WOULD DUMP THIEU. THEN THE AMERICANS COULD FIND SOUTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS WHO ARE ACCEPTABLE TO THE "ALLIANCE" AND WHO ARE WILLING TO FORM A COALITION GOVERNMENT.~~

7. ~~WITH UNSTATED BUT CLEAR REFERENCE TO THE RUSSIANS AND THE CHINESE RESPECTIVELY, [REDACTED] SAID THAT SOME FRIENDS THOUGHT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SHOULD HAVE STOPPED THE FIGHTING AND SETTLED FOR LESS; OTHER FRIENDS WANT THE WAR TO CONTINUE.~~ "WE THOUGHT THAT WE MUST GO ON UNTIL 3

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3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~  
(classification)

THE END OF THE STRUGGLE. WE ALONE WILL DECIDE WHEN TO FIGHT AND WHEN TO STOP AND WHAT TO SETTLE FOR. OUR FRIENDS ALL THINK IN TERMS OF THEIR OWN PROBLEMS AND CONTINGENCIES."

8. AMBASSADOR [REDACTED] SAID THAT WHEN JOHNSON MADE HIS SPEECH ON 31 MARCH, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TOOK HIM BY THE ARM AND SUGGESTED THAT THE AMERICANS MEANT BUSINESS "THE FRENCH PLAYED AN ACTIVE ROLE AS MEDIATOR, AND THE PARIS CONFERENCE WAS A MORAL VICTORY FOR DE GAULLE," HE SAID.

9. FIELD DISSEM: HARRIMAN, DELEGATION, STATE, CINCPAC, PACFLT, ARPAC, PACAF, [REDACTED]

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3.4(b)(1)



63

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, May 15, 1968  
2:10 p.m.

*Free file*

Mr. President:

Being on the diplomatic firing  
line may not be as educational as being  
in a foxhole -- but it helps, as the  
attached cable from Harriman suggests.

W. W. Rostow

DELTO 50 (Paris 14035)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 6-2-92



Department of State

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**TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 754

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 14035

EXDIS:

FROM HARRIMAN

DELTO 50

WE SUGGEST THAT ARTHUR GOLDBERG GO TO U-THANT TODAY AND TELL HIM IN AS STRONG LANGUAGE AS HE FEELS APPROPRIATE THAT HIS ALBERTA SPEECH IS NOT CONDUCIVE TO ACHIEVING PROGRESS IN NEGOTIATIONS HERE. HARRIMAN

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-332

By CB, NARA Date 7-28-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

*Pres file*

64

Wednesday, May 15, 1968  
11:35 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Thieu confirms the story about  
Ky as possible head of GVN negotiating team.

I agree with Bunker's assessment --  
and Thieu's.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
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By ics, NARA Date 7-8-78

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~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 27360

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 21641  
By is NARA, Date 2-3-98

Restow

EXDIS

PARIS FOR HARRIMAN

1. IN MY TALK WITH THIEU ON MAY 14, I ASKED WHETHER TRAN VAN DO WOULD CONTINUE AS FOREIGN MINISTER, AND WHETHER HE HAD GIVEN FURTHER THOUGHT TO THE HEAD OF THE DELEGATION TO THE PARIS TALKS.
2. THIEU SAID THAT HE WAS UNDER SOME PRESSURE TO REMOVE TRAN VAN DO AS FOREIGN MINISTER, BUT WAS DOING HIS BEST TO KEEP HIM. DO WAS KNOWLEDGEABLE AND HAD EXPERIENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND THEY WERE SHORT OF EXPERTS. BUT HE WAS NOT FORCEFUL, HE WAS A WEAK ADMINISTRATOR, AND PEOPLE RECALL HIS ROLE IN THE 1954 NEGOTIATIONS. IN CONNECTION WITH THE PRESENT TALKS IN PARIS DO COULD BE A PROBLEM, FOR HE WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO MAKE CONCESSIONS AND COMPROMISES.
3. THIEU SAID KY HAD VOLUNTEERED TO HEAD THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THERE SOME MERIT IN SENDING HIM. HE WAS KNOWN TO BE TOUGH AND THERE WOULD BE POPULAR CONFIDENCE IN HIS APPOINTMENT, AND IF HE MADE COMPROMISES IT WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE IN THE COUNTRY.
4. COMMENT: I AM BEGINNING TO THINK THAT THERE IS A GOOD DEAL IN THIS, AND WHILE WE WOULD FIND KY DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH AND SUSPICIOUS OF US, I THINK HE CAN BE WORKED ON, AND IF BROUGHT ALONG BY US WOULD BE AN ASSET TO THIEU AND TO US IN ARRIVING AT A SETTLEMENT. MOREOVER, THIEU MAY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 SAIGON 27360 151358Z

HAVE IN MIND TO GET KY OUT OF THE COUNTRY IN ORDER TO GIVE HIM A FREER HAND TO REORGANIZE THINGS HERE. I THINK WE SHOULD LET THIEU MAKE THIS DECISION IF HE WANTS TO AND NOT TRY TO DISCOURAGE IT.

[BUNKER]

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

65  
*Over file*

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 15, 1968  
11:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a short account of the  
hair pulling contest in Paris this  
morning.

W. W. Restow

Paris 14057

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By ics, NARA Date 9-8-98

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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NODIS

HARVAN

DELTO 53

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 2.16.55  
By is NARA, Date 2-3-98

1. TODAY'S MEETING STARTED AT 10:30 AM. I OPENED WITH STATEMENT SENT TO DEPT (PARIS 14037). THUY REPLIED WITH LENGTHY STATEMENT CHARGING ALLEGED ACTS OF AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST THE NORTH. HIS STATEMENT CONTAINED USUAL LIST OF ALLEGATIONS COVERING CITIES, HOSPITALS, SCHOOLS, DIXES, BERTRAND RUSSELL TRIAL, ETC. HE REPEATED HIS PREVIOUS DEMAND FOR CESSATION OF BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR. HE REJECTED US REQUEST FOR RESTRAINT AS "ABSURD" AND SAID US MUST STOP ACTIONS WITHOUT "DEMANDING" ANY CONDITIONS OF DRV.
2. I REPLIED WITH STRONGLY-WORDED CONDEMNATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FALSEHOODS, THEN GAVE EXAMPLES OF ATROCITIES COMMITTED IN COLD BLOOD BY VC AND NVN FORCES, DESCRIBING, AS AN EXAMPLE, DETAILS OF THE BRUTAL MURDER OF ONE THOUSAND CIVILIANS AT HUE. I REPEATED PORTION OF MAY 13 OPENING STATEMENT ON RESTRAINT, AND AGAIN ASKED HIM TO REPLY TO QUESTION OF WHAT THEY WOULD DO TO MATCH OUR RSTRAINT.
3. THUY/REPLIED WITH FURTHER POLEMICS, AGAIN DEMANDING UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING.
4. I ASKED THUY WHETHER HE HAD ASSERTED THERE WERE NO NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. HE REPLIED, HE HAD ALREADY ANSWERED THE QUESTION. WHEN I PRESSED HIM, HE DODGED DIRECT REPLY.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 14057, MAY 15

5. THE MEETING ADJOURNED AT TWO O'CLOCK WITH AGREEMENT TO MEET AGAIN AT HIS SUGGESTION AT 10:30AM ON SATURDAY.

6. I UNDERSTAND NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE PLANNING FULL DISPLAY OF CHARTS AND MAPS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR CHARGES, AT THEIR PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH HAS JUST STARTED. WE ARE RELEASING TEXT MY STATEMENT AND JORDEN WILL GIVE RUN-DOWN OF MEETING, EMPHASIZING OUR CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS. END  
HARRIMAN  
BT

~~SECRET~~

*W. W. R*  
66

Wednesday, May 15, 1968 -- 10:45 AM

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

On March 8 Bill Gaud, Charlie Zwick and I recommended that you make the legal determination necessary to permit AID to transfer \$8 million from their Supporting Assistance appropriation to their Administrative account to pay salaries and expenses in Vietnam. You instructed us to find out whether AID would live without a transfer, and, if not, to sweat the amount down as far as possible.

Attached is the result of Charlie Zwick's investigation. He finds that:

- there is no way that AID can meet these expenses without a transfer. Your budget was constructed on the assumption of a transfer, and the Congress has indicated it prefers we fund these Vietnam expenses through transfer rather than enlarging the general AID Administrative account.
- The amount can be -- and has been -- reduced from \$8 million to \$7.2 million.

Budget reports that the effort to get a precise fix on the minimum amount required has brought us up against a tight timing deadline. Technically, AID is stretching the law by keeping employees on the payroll for the last two days despite the fact that without this transfer the Agency has no way to pay them. If you decide not to approve the transfer, AID will have to begin furloughing employees immediately.

I recommend you sign the Determination at the signature tab.

W. W. Rostow

EKH/vmr



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66a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

MAY 14 1968

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**Subject: Presidential Determination on Transfer of AID Funds**

In March, Walt Rostow and I recommended that you approve a transfer of \$8 million of AID Funds from the Supporting Assistance appropriation to Administrative Expenses. The funds are to cover the administrative costs of the Vietnam program. You asked that we take another look at the amount. I have carefully reviewed the proposal again and have concluded that the minimum amount we should transfer is \$7.2 million. A revised determination for this amount is attached.

The key factors are:

- Congress prefers that we fund the administrative costs of the Vietnam AID program by this transfer method.
- The authority has been used for each of the last two years.
- Your 1968 budget was planned on the basis of such a transfer.
- The current estimate of \$7.2 million is 20% below the amount originally budgeted for this purpose.
- AID will be overobligated if the transfer is not made. Payrolls cannot be met.
- AID's Administrative Expenses account is too small to absorb this large amount. It was cut sharply by Congress and is absorbing part of the 1968 pay raise costs.

- Bill Gaud has embarked on a serious program to further reduce the number of AID employees and administrative costs, but its effect won't come until next year.

In short, I believe the transfer is fully justified and that \$7.2 million is the minimum prudent amount. I recommend that you sign the attached determination.

(signed) Charles J. Zwick  
Charles J. Zwick  
Director

Attachment



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ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1968 MAY 15 AM 11 13

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

66 b

5/16/68

Presidential Determination  
No. 68-5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADMINISTRATOR  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: Determination under Section 610 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, (the "Act"), to transfer up to \$7.2 million of Supporting Assistance funds to Administrative Expense funds

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of February 20 I hereby determine, pursuant to Section 610 of the Act, that it is necessary for purposes of the Act that up to \$7.2 million appropriated under Section 402 of the Act be transferred to, and consolidated with, appropriations made under Section 637(a) of the Act, subject to the limitation that funds so transferred shall be available solely for the administrative expenses incurred in connection with programs in Vietnam. I hereby authorize such transfer and consolidation.

You are requested on my behalf to give prompt notice of this determination, pursuant to Section 634(d) of the Act, to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

67  
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 15, 1968 -- 10:35 am

Mr. President:

You may be interested in this report on French attitudes towards the Paris negotiation. It reflects accurately at least one part of French thinking; namely, that we should push aside the present government in Saigon.

If and when the negotiations get serious, we shall probably see a concerted effort, embracing both the French and the Russians, for us to break up what has been achieved through the constitutional process.

W. W. Rostow

1.3(e)  
3.4(b)(1)

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SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-324  
By id, NARA Date 5-3-00

WWRostow:rlm

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

67a. PRIORITY 67a

IN 10743

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SOO ONE CRS  
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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

142147Z

CITE

DIST 14 MAY 1968

1,5(c)  
3,4(b)(1)

COUNTRY: FRANCE/VIETNAM

DOI: MAY 1968

SUBJECT: FRENCH GOVERNMENT THINKING ON THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS,

ACQ:

SOURCE:

1.

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT

**SANITIZED**

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-325

By is, NARA Date 10.22.99

1,5(c)  
3,4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~  
(location)

(airmail controls)

INTENDS TO TAKE A PARTICULARLY DISCREET ATTITUDE TOWARD THE AMERICAN/  
NORTH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE FIRST PHASE WHICH RELATES TO  
THE CESSATION OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM, TAKING NO PUBLIC  
POSITION WHICH MIGHT CONCEIVABLY EMBARRASS EITHER INTERLOCUTOR. DURING  
THE SECOND PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHEN THE QUESTION <sup>ARISES</sup> /OF FORMULATING  
A STATUTE AND OF PROVIDING GUARANTEES FOR A GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH  
VIETNAM, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN  
THE DELIBERATIONS. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAS NO INTENTION OF RE-  
QUESTING PERMISSION TO PARTICIPATE, BUT EXPECTS THAT WHEN THE  
MOMENT ARRIVES, ONE OR THE OTHER OF THE NEGOTIATING GROUPS WILL  
REQUEST FRENCH PARTICIPATION AND THE FRENCH NOW FEEL THAT THEIR SUPPORT  
WILL BE REQUESTED BY A SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, BUT NOT THE  
GOVERNMENT CURRENTLY IN POWER.

2. THE FRENCH HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT CHANGES MAY TAKE PLACE  
RATHER RAPIDLY IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT  
AND EVEN SPEAK OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT, WHICH WOULD OVER-  
THROW THE THIEU KY GOVERNMENT AND REPLACE THEM BY PERSONALITIES LESS  
"COMPROMISED".

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~



IN 10743

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~  
(classification)

(control controls)

3. WITHOUT DISMISSING THE POSSIBILITY OF A SAIGON GOVERNMENT DOMINATED BY THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OF SOUTH VIETNAM (NLFSV). THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT IS NOT ACTIVELY IN FAVOR OF SUCH A GOVERNMENT, AND, IN FACT, IS NOT OPPOSED TO RENEWING RELATIONS WITH A SAIGON GOVERNMENT IN WHICH THE NLFSV IS NOT A PARTICIPANT.

4. DISSEM: HARRIMAN DELEGATION, STATE, CINCPAC, PACFLT, ARPAC, PACAF

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*  
68

Wednesday, May 15, 1968  
10:05 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

You should know we have received the following flash message from MAC V predicting another attack on Saigon tonight:

"A III Corps source who has reported reliably in the past states that there are now 3 battalions and a forward command post of sub-region 5 located at Binh Phuc. They will attack Saigon tonight. They will also drop Vinh Loi bridge tonight. Source further states two special action groups from sub-region 5 are already in city."

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-326  
By is, NARA Date 5-1-98

*Pres. file*

69

Wednesday, May 15, 1968  
9:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

This is an unsolicited comment  
from John Scali.

W W. Rostow

cc: George Christian

69a ↑

100-100000-100000  
100-100000-100000

1968 MAY 14 PM 4 07

WA078 INTL

PARIS 19 14 1830

WALT ROSTOW

THE WHITE HOUSE

BILL JORDEN IS DOING A SUPERB JOB IN KEEPING PRESS

INFORMED REGARDS

JOHN SCALI.

3

2

ACTION

Wednesday - May 15, 1968

*Handwritten:*  
1. ~~Handwritten~~  
2. *Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a letter (Tab A) from Robert Partridge, General Manager of the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, endorsing your Latin American Physical Integration proposal, and a suggested reply (Tab B).

W. W. Rostow

**Attachments**

Tab A - Letter of April 30 from Robert D. Partridge

Tab B - Suggested Presidential reply.





# NATIONAL RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION

2000 FLORIDA AVE., N.W. • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009 • Area Code 202, 265-7400

April 30, 1968

*original  
to Pres  
5/1/68*

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

We applaud your remarks at the signing of the Organization of American States Treaty Amendment on April 23. We agree with you that much progress has been made in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress, but much more needs to be done. The pace of change is not fast enough.

In our opinion, if the pace of development in Latin America is to accelerate, then more attention must be given to rural areas. Here lies the food producing base and the most undeveloped resource - the rural people. Many of them say they are "the forgotten people".

NRECA specialists have been in all of these countries during the past five years. They have found much potential for development, but the major obstacle is the lack of electric power in rural areas. There is much evidence that rural electrification may be the most important key to unlock the total resources of the community, to motivate rural citizens.

We would urge that when a high-level task force is appointed to prepare a five-year plan to speed up the development in this hemisphere particular attention should be given to the electrification of rural areas.

Very respectfully yours,

  
Robert D. Partridge  
General Manager

RDP:jmr

LOW COST ELECTRIC POWER FOR RURAL AMERICA

May 15, 1968

Dear Mr. Partridge:

Many thanks for your encouraging letter of April 30.

I am happy to report that my suggestion for an Inter-American Task Force on Physical Integration has been well received in Latin America. I am hopeful that by the end of next month it will be established.

You may be sure that hydro-electric projects and electrification of rural areas will be covered in the study. Once the Task Force is operating, it might be useful for its members to speak with your specialists. I will make sure that this possibility is brought to their attention.

Sincerely,

Mr. Robert D. Partridge  
General Manager  
National Rural Electric  
Cooperative Association  
2000 Florida Avenue, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20009

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm

*ACTION 72*  
*Pres file*

Wednesday, May 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Invitation to the Thirtieth Anniversary Ceremony of  
Thousand Islands Bridge

You have been invited by the Thousand Islands Bridge Authority to attend a ceremony on July 11 commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Bridge's dedication by President Roosevelt and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King. (Congressman Celler originally extended this invitation on behalf of the Bridge Authority.)

The setting and the occasion would provide a good first opportunity for you to meet and have a private talk with whoever will be elected Prime Minister of Canada on June 25, and to make a brief address. The visit probably would take a full day.

Former Prime Minister Pearson had agreed to attend the ceremony before stepping down. The Bridge Authority says it is confident the new Canadian Prime Minister -- whether Trudeau or Stanfield -- would attend.

There is one possible complication. If the election is close, it may not be clear by July 11 who will be the new Prime Minister. Should neither party obtain a majority in the election, the decision might be left to the Parliament, which does not reconvene until early August.

If you approve in principle going to the rededication ceremony, we could get around the complication arising out of the Canadian election. We would call the Bridge Authority and tell them:

- you are inclined to accept their invitation to join the Canadian Prime Minister in the rededication ceremony but;
- you will want to await the outcome of the Canadian election and appointment of the Prime Minister before formally accepting an invitation.

State would inform the Canadian Government of our reply to the Bridge Authority.

Secretary Rusk supports this course.

W. W. Rostow

Approve in principle, make  
tentative arrangements \_\_\_\_\_  
Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
Call me \_\_\_\_\_

MWG:FRF:mm

72

*for file*

INFORMATION

Wednesday - May 15, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith William Sanders' thank you for the luncheon and gift you gave him and Dr. Mora last week.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

May 13, 1968 letter to President from William Sanders

72a  
presented to  
the Pres.  
9/12/68  
PAN AMERICAN UNION  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL


May 13, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I deeply appreciate your thoughtfulness in including me in the luncheon and your remarks on the occasion of the fine tribute you paid to Dr. José A. Mora last Friday. Your very welcome gift of the photograph of yourself will occupy a privileged position in my home and will be an ever present reminder of your kindness.

In your letter of September 6 of last year to the American members of the staff of the Pan American Union you said that in our work we are serving the best interests of our land, and thereby advancing the well-being of our neighbors--and the purpose of all mankind. This is an inspiring statement of our role as international public servants. I am particularly grateful to you for expressing the same idea in the words you inscribed on your gift to me.

Sincerely yours,

  
William Sanders

The President of the  
United States of America  
Washington, D.C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, May 15, 1968

*See file*

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Message to President Park

President Park has personally instructed his Minister of Finance to invest \$50 million of Korean reserves in longer term United States Treasury securities (Tab B). Your discussion of the subject in Honolulu was instrumental in eliciting this prompt response from the Republic of Korea.

Ambassador Porter has recommended that an appropriate expression of thanks be conveyed to President Park, and State has suggested a message from you (Tab A).

I recommend that you approve the message.

*(I suggest dropping the last phrase. He shouldn't be thanked too much.)*

W. W. Rostow

## Attachments

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Mr. Jorden

AJenkins:mm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By us, NARA Date 9-8-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: Amembassy SEOUL

Please deliver the following message from the President to  
President Park:

Honorable Chung Hee Park  
President  
Republic of Korea

Dear President Park:

Ambassador Porter has just informed me of your personal  
intervention in the matter of investing Korean reserves in longer  
term United States Treasury securities.

I very much appreciate your prompt response. This is an  
action which serves the interest of both our countries and one  
for which I am very grateful.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97.333  
By us, NARA Date 9-8-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

73b  
**TELEGRAM**

47

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 514

PAGE 01 SEOUL 07177 140227Z

85  
ACTION EA 15

INFO CIAE 00,DODE 00,GPM 04,H 02,INR 07,L 03,NSAE 00,NSC 10,P 04,  
RSC 01,SP 02,SS 20,USIA 12,AID 28,E 15,COM 08,FRB 02,TRSY 08,  
RSR 01,/142 W

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P 140125Z MAY 68  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 634

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SEOUL 7177

SUBJECT: NEUTRALIZING US SECURITY EXPENDITURES

1. MINISTER OF FINANCE (SUH) ASKED ME TO CONVEY FACT THAT PRESIDENT PARK ARRIVED UNEXPECTEDLY AT MINISTRY OF FINANCE TODAY, WHERE NEGOTIATIONS WITH BARNETT/CROSS GROUP HAD BEEN IN PROGRESS, AND INSTRUCTED MINISTER TO MEET US REQUESTS FOR INVESTMENT OF KOREAN FX IN US TREASURY OBLIGATIONS ALONG LINES MENTIONED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AT HONOLULU. IN REPLY TO PRESIDENT PARK'S REQUEST FOR EXPLANATION OF TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THIS MATTER, SUH SAID HE GAVE HIS PRESIDENT SAME CONVINCING PRESENTATION THAT EFFORT HAD PREVIOUSLY GIVEN ROK FINANCIAL TEAM. I INQUIRED MEANING OF THIS IN TERMS OF DOLLAR INVESTMENT, TO WHICH FINANCE MINISTER REPLIED "FIFTY MILLION OVER AND ABOVE PRESENT ROK HOLDINGS, AND ALTHOUGH WE DON'T SEE AN ADDITION OF TWENTY-FIVE RIGHT NOW, WE WILL FIND IT VERY SOON. PRESIDENT PARK WANTS IT."

2. PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S DISCUSSION OF SUBJECT AT HONOLULU THEREFORE REGISTERED WITH THE KOREAN PRESIDENT. THE ROKS WILL COOPERATE, AND I WOULD LIKE TO CONVEY TO PRESIDENT PARK AN APPROPRIATE EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR HIS COOPERATION, BECAUSE ROK ATTITUDE WILL HELP BARNETT/CROSS MISSION IN OTHER EA COUNTRIES. MAY I HAVE THIS ASAP?

GP-3 PORTER  
BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-332

By CB, NARA Date 7-28-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-533  
By us, NARA Date 9-8-98

Mr. Rostow <sup>74</sup>

*Pres file*  
INFORMATION

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Wednesday, May 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Bourguiba--Noon Today

1. You would be interested in his impressions of the new Canadian Government. (He is coming from Ottawa.)
2. You have heard good things from Vice President Humphrey and others about what he is doing for Tunisia. You would be interested in hearing him talk about his plans and problems.
  - If he mentions his security problem, you may have to explain our problems with security assurances. This doesn't mean we'd stay silent if Tunisia were attacked, but there are limits on what we could do.
  - If he mentions aid, you might explain how much Congress cut last year but say we will do the best we can. (We originally feared we would have to cut from \$15 million last year to \$5 million this. But the recommendation now coming to you is for \$10 million.) In any case, our cuts imply no loss of interest in Tunisia.
3. You would welcome his views on the Arab-Israeli situation. You might assure him that you stand by your June 19 speech and the November 22 UN resolution. We will do everything we can to help achieve a political settlement. But we don't feel we should try to impose one. We'd like to see its terms come from the parties themselves.
4. You appreciate his support on Vietnam. You would like to tell him (what you can) about the military situation in South Vietnam and the talks in Paris.
5. Most important, you might reassure him that we're not walking out of the Middle East or North Africa. You know we're being accused of this. But no one should confuse our standing back to let Arabs and Israelis themselves work out the terms of settlement with lack of determination to compete with the USSR to keep a strong position in the area.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Thursday, May 16, 1968 - 7:15 pm

Mr. President:

This McCafferty memorandum -- which I requested -- suggests the time saving of infiltration groups between the 20th and 19th parallels.

An interesting -- but not decisive -- effect of the bombing cessation.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

WWRostow:rla

*Pres file*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 00-412  
By Cbma, NARA, Date 2-15-03



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/TRINE

Thursday, May 16, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW:

In looking at the infiltration data, it occurred to me that in addition to the benefit of new airstrips to operate from, another advantage accrued to the North Vietnamese as a result of the bombing halt north of the 19th parallel is that almost half of the infiltration way stations are located in this area. Thus the infiltration groups get a free ride for almost half of the distance of their trip through North Vietnam. This can be seen from the attached map.

There is not sufficient data in the intercept material as yet to determine the time advantage gained by this. You might be interested to know that in March the time from T4 to T10 for one unit was 10 days. While in April one unit made it in 7 days; another unit in 8 days. In March it took 12 days to go from T10 to T15. While in April it took one unit 2 days to go from T11 to T14 and 3 days to go from T9 to T14. As I said these are inclusive but are suspicious.


  
Art McCafferty

TOP SECRET/TRINE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLS 141.022.002/6  
By je, NARA, Date 11-2-09

75b

# POSSIBLE COMMO-LIAISON STATION NETWORK FOR INFILTRATION GROUPS



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLT 141-022.002/6  
By pc, NARA, Date 11-2-09

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE