

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	<i>open 9/12/01 NLJ/RAC 00-413</i> Rostow to President, 8:55 a.m. TS- 1 p	5/20/67	A
#4 memo	Rostow to President, 7:20 p.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #24, NSF, CF, USSR, Vol. 19]	5/24/68	A
#4a note	Intelligence Note 387 <i>Open NLJ 97-331 3-19-99</i> S 7 p [Duplicate of #24a, NSF, CF, USSR, Vol. 19]	5/23/68	A
#5 memo	Rostow to President, 7:15 p.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i> C 1 p	5/24/68	A
#5a memo	Zwick to President C 2 p " " "	5/16/68	A
#5b memo	Gaud to President C 6 p " " "	5/14/68	A
#8 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p " " " [Duplicate of #30a, NSF, CF, Haiti, Vol. 5]	5/24/68	A
#8a memo	Katzenbach to President C 2 p <i>Open NLJ 97-331 3-19-99</i> [Duplicate of #30b, NSF, CF, Haiti, Vol. 5]	undated	A
#10a cable	Paris 14672 S 2 p " " " [Duplicate of #182a, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 13]	5/24/68	A
#12b ltr	President Somoza to President PCI 2 p <i>open 7-24-97</i>	5/10/68	A
#13a ltr	Taylor to President <i>open 8-12-93 NLJ 92-383</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #32b, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "8 I--Taylor Memos"]	5/23/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 78, May 20-24, 1968 Box 34

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#14 memo	Rostow to President, 3:40 p.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9.8.98</i> S 1 p [Dup. #56a, NSF, CF, VN "HARVAN III," Bx 116] [Dup. #24, NSF, CF, VN, "HW misc. & memos v. 2" Bx 122]	5/24/68	A
#14a cable	Deptel to Paris S 4 p <i>Open NLJ 97-331 3-20-99</i> [Dup. #56b, as above]	5/24/68	A
#17 memo	Rostow to President, 2:20 p.m. <i>(Dup. #55, NSF, CF, VN Harvan/Crocodile Indian Proposal Box 134)</i> S 1 p	5/24/68	A
#17a cable	Telegram #157 <i>(Dup. #55a as above)</i> S 2 p	5/23/68	A
#18a memo	Read to Rostow S 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-331 3-20-99</i> [Dup. #99a, NSF, CF, Korea, "var. 6"]	5/23/68	A
#20 memo	Rostow to President, 12:30 p.m. <i>(Dup. #56, NSF, CF, VN Harvan/Crocodile Indian Proposal Box 134)</i> S 1 p	5/24/68	A
#20a cable	Paris 14616 S 6 p <i>Open 3/98 RAC</i> [Dup. #87, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN TODEL-DELTO II," Bx 115]	5/24/68	A
#21 memo	Rostow to President, 9:45 a.m. S 1 p [Dup. #90, as above] [Dup. #25, NSF, CF, VN, "HW misc. & memos v. 2" Bx 122]	5/24/68	A
#21a cable	Paris 14592 S 2 p <i>Open 3/98 RAC</i> [Dup. #90a, as above] [Dup. #25a, as above]	5/24/68	A
#22 memo	Rostow to President, 9:00 a.m. <i>open RAC 4/09</i> TS 1 p [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 20, 1984]	5/24/67	A
#22a rpt	Intelligence Report <i>Sanitized 7/12/01 NSJ/RAC 00-414</i> TS- 3 p [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 2, 1984]	5/23/68	A
#23 memo	Rostow to President, 8:35 a.m. <i>Sani 9/12/01 NLJ/RAC 00-413</i> S- 1 p	5/24/67	A
#24 memo	Rostow to President, 8:30 a.m. S 1 p <i>Sani NLJ 019-034-3-1 (4/02)</i> [Dup. #26, NSF, CF, VN, "HW misc. & memos v. 2, Bx 122"]	5/24/64	A
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#24a cable	Intelligence Information Cable Exempt 3-2-00 NLJ 97-325 S 2 p Edup. #26a, NSF, CF, VN, "Hv misc. r memos V.2, " Box 122 Sani NLJ 019-034-3-2 (1/02)	5/22/68	A
#25 memo	Rostow to President, re: Latin America. C 4 p OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-170	5/24/68	A
#25a rpt	"Itinerary for South American Trip" S 2 p " " "	undated	A
#26a cable	Saigon 28053- S 8 p OPEN NLT 97-331 3-20-99 [Sanitized NLJ 84-57, 1988]	5/23/68	A
#28 memo	Rostow to President, 7:30 p.m. Dupe in Files of WWR, MTGS w/ PRES, may-June '68, Doc 136, Box 2 S 1 p OPEN NLJ 97-333 9.8.98	5/23/68	A
#28a memo dup in conf. file CO 1-6	Rusk to President OPEN 10-14-92 NLJ 91-207 S 3 p	5/23/68	A
#28b memo	Battle to SecState OPEN 10-14-92 NLJ 91.207 S 8 p	5/21/68	A
#29 memo	Rostow to President, 10:30 a.m. Sanitized 5/10/95 NLJ 97-329 S 1 p OPEN 12-23-09	5/23/68	A
#29a memo	Katzenbach to President Exempt 3-9-00 NLJ 97-331 S 2 p Exempt NLJ 019-034-3	5/23/68	A
#30a memo	Morris to Pursley OPEN 8/3/99 NLJ 97-327 S 2 p [Duplicate of #18a, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "2C(10)--5/68, General Military Activity"]	5/22/68	A
#31 memo	Rostow to President, 1:50 p.m. OPEN 3/98 NLJ 97-326 S 1 p	5/23/68	A
#31a memo	Shannon for the Record OPEN 8/3/99 NLJ 97-327 S 1 p	5/23/68	A
#31b map	Attachment to #31a OPEN 8/3/99 NLJ 97-327 S 1 p	undated	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#33a ltr	Duplicate of #13a		
#34 memo	Rostow to President, 2:10 p.m. <i>open 7/13/03 NLS/RAC 00-415</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #16, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "2C(10)--5/68, General Military Activity;" Sanitized NLJ/CBS 23, 1984]	5/23/67	A
#34a cable	MAC 6526 <i>open RAC 11/09</i> S 6 p [Duplicate of #16a, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "2C(10)--5/68, General Military Activity;" Sanitized NLJ/CBS 8, 1983]	5/18/68	A
#41 memo	Rostow to President, 6:20 p.m. S 1 p <i>Sanitized 9/13/00 NLS 97-329</i> <i>same sani NLS 019-034-3-6 (1/02)</i>	5/22/68	A
#41a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 4 p <i>Sanitized 3-2-00 NLS 97-325</i> <i>same sani NLS 019-034-3-7 (1/02)</i>	5/22/68	A
#43 memo	Rostow to President, 6:00 p.m. S 1 p <i>Sanitized 9/13/00 NLS 97-325</i>	5/22/68	A
#43a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 4 p <i>Sanitized 3-2-00 NLS 97-325</i> [Duplicate of #17a, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "2C(10)--5/68, General Military Activity"]	5/21/68	A
#45 memo	Rostow to President C 2 p <i>open 7-22-97</i>	5/22/68	A
#45a ltr	"Suggested Message to the Shah" C 1 p <i>open 7-24-97</i>	undated	A
#49 memo	Rostow to President, 10:45 a.m. S 1 p <i>Sanitized 7/13/00 NLS 97-329</i> <i>same sani NLS 019-034-3-9 (1/02)</i>	5/22/68	A
#49a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 p <i>Sanitized 3-2-00 NLS 97-325</i> <i>same NLS 019-034-3-10 (1/02)</i>	5/21/68	A
#50 memo	Rostow to President, 10:35 a.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-333</i> S 1 p [Dup. #10, NSF, CF, Korea, "Vol. 6"] <i>9.8.98</i> [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 20, 1984]	5/22/68	A
FILE LOCATION			

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 78, May 20 24, 1968 Box 34

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#51 memo	Rostow to President, 10:00 a.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9.8.98</i> S 2 p	5/22/68	A
#53 memo	Rostow to President, 9:15 a.m. <i>Open NLJ 019-034-3-11 (1/02)</i> TS 1 p <i>Sanitized 9/13/00 NLS 97-329</i>	5/22/68	A
#57 memo <i>more info released 7.16.03</i>	Rostow to President, 7:00 p.m. <i>Open NLJ 98-116 5-7-99</i> S 3 p <i>Sanitized 15/8/00 NLS 97-329</i> [Duplicate of #10, NSF, CF, Haiti, Vol. 5]	5/21/68	A
#58 memo	Rostow to President, 6:20 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 10.30.95 NLJ 95-178</i> [Duplicate of #45, NSF, CF, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, Vol. 2, 4/68-9/68]	5/21/68	A
#58a memcon	"Nonproliferation Treaty" <i>open 1-7-95 NLJ 95-86</i> S 7 p [Duplicate of #45a, NSF, CF, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, Vol. 2, 4/68-9/68]	5/17/68	A
#58b memcon	"Middle East" <i>Open NLJ 97-331 3-20-99</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #45b, NSF, CF, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, Vol. 2, 4/68-9/68]	5/17/68	A
#58c memcon	"Korea" " " " " S 2 p [Duplicate of #45d, NSF, CF, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, Vol. 2, 4/68-9/68]	5/17/68	A
#58d memcon	"Vietnam" " " " " S 2 p [Duplicate of #45c, NSF, CF, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, Vol. 2, 4/68-9/68]	5/17/68	A
#60a cable	Paris 14450 S 3 p <i>Open 3/98 RAR</i> [Dup. #113a, NSF, CF, VN, "HARUAN TO DEL-DELTO II, "BOX 115"] <i>616-61m duplicated in File of WWR Box 2</i>	5/21/68	A
#61b memo <i>[duy. #1, MTP, vol. 77]</i>	Rostow to President, 10:50 a.m. <i>616-61m duplicated in File of WWR Box 2</i> S 1 p <i>open NLJ 97-333 Docs 256-25m</i> <i>MTGS w/Pres, MAY-June 68</i>	5/19/68	A
FILE LOCATION	<i>9.21.98 19K-195</i>		

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 78, May 20-24, 1968 Box 34

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	<i>→ Dupes in file of WWR, Box 2 [dup. #1-14, MTP, vol. 78]</i>		
#61e memo	Katzenbach to President <i>open 9-9-99 NLT 97-332</i> S <u>2 p</u>	5/18/68	A
#61d memo	Katzenbach to President <i>open 9-9-99 NLT 97-332</i> S <u>1 p</u>	5/18/68	A
#61e memo	Duplicate of #61c <i>open 9-9-99 NLT 97-332</i>		
#61f memo	To Ambassadors Porter and Johnson <i>sanitized 4/17/03 NLT/RAC 01-171</i> S <u>4 p</u> <i>exempt NLT 019-034-3</i>	5/16/68	A
#61g cable	Tokyo 0074 <i>open 9-9-99 NLT 97-332</i> S <u>1 p</u>	5/17/68	A
#61h cable	Seoul 6549 <i>open 9-9-99 NLT 97-332</i> S <u>1 p</u>	5/17/68	A
#61i cable	To Ambassadors Porter and Johnson <i>sanitized 4/17/02 NLT/RAC 01-171</i> S <u>1 p</u> <i>exempt NLT 019-034-3</i>	5/17/68	A
#61j cable	Deptel (draft) to Seoul <i>open 9-9-99 NLT 97-332</i> S <u>7 p</u>	5/18/68	A
#61m cable	Deptel (draft) to Manila - <i>dupe in files of WWR, Box 2, MTP 54/area MAB-June 68, doc # 25M</i> S <u>4 p</u> <i>Open NLT 97-331 3-20-99</i>	5/10/68	A
#62 memo	Rostow to President, 11:50 a.m. <i>Open NLT 97-333 9-8-98</i> S <u>1 p</u> <i>Edup. # 32, NSP, CF, VN, "HV Misc. r memos v. 2" #K122] & # 99, NSP, CF, VN, "Harvan/Crocodile Indian Program, Box 134"</i>	5/21/68	A
#63 memo	Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m. <i>dup. # 100 as above</i> S <u>1 p</u> " " " <i>Edup. # 33, as above}</i>	5/21/68	A
#63a memo	Rostow to President, 4:45 p.m. " " " S <u>1 p</u> <i>Edup. # 33b, as above} & # 100a as above</i>	5/20/68	A
#63b cable	Paris 14355 <i>[Dup. # 79a] & # 100b as above</i> S <u>3 p</u> <i>Open RAC 3/98</i> <i>[Dup. # 121, NSP, CF, VN, "HARVAN TOPEL-DELTO II," BY H5]</i> <i>Edup. # 33c, NSP, CF, VN "HV Misc. r memos v. 2]</i>	5/20/68	A
#64 memo	Rostow to President, 11:10 a.m. PCI <u>2 p</u> <i>Open NLT 97-335 9.8.98</i>	5/21/68	A

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#65a cable	COMUSMACV 13635 to CJCS <i>sanitized 10-3-97 NLJ 97-330</i> TS 11 p <i>same Sani NLJ 019-034-3-14 (1/02)</i>	5/13/68	A
#67 memo	Rostow to President, 9:50 a.m. <i>Sani 9/12/01 NLJ/RAC 00-413</i> TS- 1 p	5/21/67	A
#67a memo	Taylor to President <i>Sani 9/12/01 NLJ/RAC 00-413</i> TS- 1 p	5/20/67	A
#69 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 5-25-95 NLJ 94-357</i>	5/21/68	A
#70 memo	Rostow to President <i>Open 5/8/00 NLJ 97-324</i> S 2 p	5/21/68	A
#71 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 10-29-92</i> C 2 p <i>NLJ 92-56</i>	5/21/68	A
#72 memo	Rostow to President C 2 p <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i>	5/21/68	A
#73 memo	Rostow to President, 8:15 p.m. <i>Open RAC 3/98</i> S 1 p <i>[Dup. # 46a, NSF, CF, UN, "HARVIAN TODEL-DELTO II," BX 115]</i>	5/20/68	A
#73a cable	Deptel (draft) to Paris S 2 p <i>Open RAC 3/98</i> <i>[Dup. # 46b, as above]</i>	5/20/68	A
#74 memo	Rostow to President, 7:00 p.m. <i>Open in Files of WWR, Box 2, MTOS</i> S 1 p <i>Open 5/8/00 NLJ 98-324</i>	5/20/68	A
#75a memo	Clifford to President <i>Comp #3a, NSF, CF, UN HARVIAN Musc</i> S 2 p <i>open 8/3/99 NLJ 97-327</i>	5/20/68	A
#76 memo	Rostow to President, 6:15 p.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9-8-98</i> S 1 p <i>[Dup. # 118, NSF, CF, UN, "HARVIAN TODEL-DELTO II," BX 115]</i>	5/20/68	A
#76a cable	Paris 14365 <i>Open RAC 3/98</i> S 3 p <i>[Dup. # 118a, as above] & # 101a as above</i>	5/20/68	A
#79a cable	Paris 14355 <i>Open RAC 3/98</i> S 3 p <i>[Dup. # 63b]</i> <i>[Dup. # 1a1, NSF, CF, UN, "HARVIAN TODEL-DELTO II," BX 115]</i>	5/20/68	A

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#81 memo	Rostow to President, 12:15 p.m. <i>open 11/14/03 NLS/RAC 00-416</i> S- 1 p [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 26; 1984]	5/20/67	A
#81a rpt	Intelligence Report <i>open RAC 11/09</i> S- 4 p [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 4; 1983]	5/20/68	A
#82 memo	Rostow to President, 12:05 p.m. <i>open 4-8-94 NLJ 91-457</i> S- 1 p [Duplicate of #101, NSF, CF, Laos, Vol. 18]	5/20/68	A
#83 memo	Rostow to President, 11:15 a.m. S- 1 p <i>open 8-14-97 NLJ 97-107</i>	5/20/68	A
#83a cable	Prague 2140 <i>sup. 4-15, NSF, CF, Czech, Vol. 2, box 173</i> S- 2 p <i>Open NLJ 97-104 9.24.98</i>	5/19/68	A
#85a cable	London 9095 <i>sup. 4-15, NSF, CF, RN Havan/Crocodile Indian Proposal Box 134</i> S- 2 p <i>Open NLJ 97-331 -3-20-99</i>	5/20/68	A
#87 memo	Rostow to President, 9:10 a.m. S- 1 p <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9.8.98</i>	5/20/68	A
#87a cable	Saigon 27759 S- 2 p <i>Open NLJ 97-331 3-20-99</i>	5/20/68	A
#88 memo	Rostow to President, 9:00 a.m. <i>open RAC 11/09</i> TS- 1 p	5/20/67	A
#88b rpt	Intelligence Report TS- 1 p	undated	A
#89 memo	Rostow to President <i>Open NLJ 97-333 9.8.98</i> C- 2 p [Duplicate of #49--NSF, CF, Trinidad/Tobago, Vol. I and in Diary Backup, 5/20/68]	5/20/68	A
#94 memo	Rostow to President <i>exempt RAC 5/03</i> S- 1 p	5/20/67	A
FILE LOCATION	[Duplicate of #9a, NSF, CF, Haiti, Vol. 5]		

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1

~~TOP SECRET -- OXCART --~~

Saturday, May 20, 1967
8:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the answer to your question
about OXCART and post-strike photography.

It would require:

- no cloud cover up to high altitudes;
- 26 hours advance notice.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-413
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-21-01

~~TOP SECRET -- OXCART --~~

ACTIONLIMITED OFFICIAL USEThursday, May 23, 1968 *1. stamp
2. Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Independence Day Message to Hussein

This Saturday, May 25, is the anniversary of Jordan's independence. State recommends that you send Hussein the following message:

"On this anniversary of the independence day of Jordan, I congratulate Your Majesty and send to the people of Jordan good wishes from the people of the United States. We sincerely hope that Jordan, under your courageous leadership, will find peace and justice during the coming year."

We are checking this with you because it is a message to a touchy area. Otherwise, however, it is quite routine and uncontroversial. Any word of encouragement to Hussein is good at this time when we hope he will soon begin talks with Israel under Ambassador Jarring's auspices in New York. The Israelis know full well that we believe Hussein's survival is important to Israel's security and our own interests.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

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INFORMATION

Friday, May 24, 1968 - 7:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

I thought you might like to have
this this evening.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

rln

3a

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

WASHINGTON

May 24, 1968

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Status of the Foreign Aid Bill

The Passman Subcommittee today presumably completed its hearings on the A.I.D. program, although the Latin American Bureau may have to go back for one more session. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have also finished their hearings. This leaves only the Senate Appropriations Committee, which, as usual, will hold its hearings later on.

It is hard to say what will happen next. Doc Morgan's mark-up is pretty well along. However, he has been holding off this past week in order to explore the possibility of getting the leadership of both parties in each House to agree to an arrangement whereby he would bring out an authorization bill at an agreed figure and under a closed rule -- thereby avoiding a floor fight on both money and several awkward amendments. This would be fine if it works and if the figure is right.

Carl Marcy is promoting a nine-month continuing resolution which would not only take the place of an appropriation bill but also obviate the necessity for an authorization bill. He is thinking in terms of 80% of last year's appropriation. In his view the virtue of this scheme is that the Congress could say it was not really adopting a foreign aid bill, but merely making it possible for the new Administration to decide whether or not it wanted to go ahead with foreign aid. He says Senator Fulbright favors this proposal, and that Senator Mansfield seems interested. It does not appeal to me -- at least at this stage of the game.

There are a good many rumors as to what Mr. Passman has in mind, but none of them firm. He and I have agreed to get together soon to talk figures, and I hope to find out then what he is really after.

It is the view of all the members of the Congress I have talked to that there will be no action on the aid bill at least until after the tax bill has been disposed of.

William S. Gaud

William S. Gaud

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4

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 24, 1968 - 7:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

This note collects straws in the wind that we might get talks on strategic weapons with Moscow.

It fits Kissinger's gossip from the meeting in Czechoslovakia, which I sent up the other day.

W. W. Rostow

INR Note 387, May 23, 1968

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 97-333
By us, NARA Date 7-8-98

WWRostow:rln

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

~~SECRET / NO FOREIGN DISSEM / EXD~~

Intelligence
Note - 387

May 23, 1968

7837

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH : S/S
FROM : INR - Thomas L. Hughes
SUBJECT : Signs of Soviet Movement on Strategic Arms Talks

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-331
By *iss*, NARA Date 3-20-99

Rostow

23

Kuznetsov's May 20 speech at the UN was the most recent in a series of hints the Soviets have been dropping in New York of their willingness to talk about limiting the strategic arms race. Thus far Moscow still has not seen its way clear to take up American proposals for bilateral talks on strategic weapons; it is possible that this situation is changing.

Nonproliferation and the UN Audience. At the UN the Soviets feel they must rebut criticisms that the nonproliferation treaty does nothing to disarm the nuclear powers -- a proposition which the Indians and others have advanced to justify their reluctance to sign up. Kuznetsov's April 26 speech to the General Assembly sought to sketch out broad perspectives in the disarmament field which the nonproliferation treaty would open. In listing various possibilities, he mentioned limiting and subsequently reducing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons. The sequence of limitation and then subsequent reduction was as close as the Soviets had come in public statements since Kosygin's at Glassboro to reiterating Soviet acceptance in principle of American proposals for talks on strategic weapons.

1. We discussed Kuznetsov's speech in our Intelligence Note No. 312, "Kuznetsov Drops a Hint About Strategic Delivery Systems as an Arms Control Topic," April 30, 1968 (CONFIDENTIAL).

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

~~SECRET / NO FOREIGN DISSEM / EXDIS~~

GROUP 1
automatic

Madame Myrdal Gets a Fuller Version. Shortly afterward, Madame Myrdal, the Swedish disarmament negotiator, asked her Soviet colleague, Roshchin, at a dinner party about the significance of the order of individual items in Kuznetsov's overall listing. Roshchin replied -- using the sequence Kuznetsov had used -- by starting with non-use of nuclear weapons as the first order of business. When Madame Myrdal observed that Sweden and other countries were getting fed up with "non-armament" measures and wanted to get down to disarmament, Roshchin said that the USSR would be prepared to discuss strategic weapons at the Geneva disarmament conference in the co-chairmen's framework. The Swedish officer who first told ACDA officers of the Roshchin remark to Mrs. Myrdal has since said that Grinevsky of the Soviet delegation had later confirmed it.

Kuznetsov Takes the Podium Again. Speaking to the First Committee on May 20, Kuznetsov returned to the theme that the nonproliferation treaty would increase chances for successful negotiations in the disarmament field (incidentally, he describes such negotiations as a Soviet struggle against those who obstruct disarmament, and argues that the conditions for the struggle would be improved by the treaty). Perhaps in response to sentiments like those expressed by Madame Myrdal, he did not stress or even mention non-use of nuclear weapons (a long-time Soviet staple) in his discussion of measures to limit and stop the nuclear arms race. Rather he opened with extension of the test ban to underground tests. He recalled his previous speech and went on to say:

"We think it necessary to make a special point of the fact that the Soviet Union is prepared to take concrete steps aimed at limiting and, subsequently, reducing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons."

In amplification, he referred to reduction of the arsenal to the absolute minimum while preserving, on a provisional basis, strictly limited numbers of missiles; he thus used terms reminiscent of the Gromyko proposal developed in 1962 and 1963 for retaining some nuclear weapons until the end of the process of general and complete disarmament. The implication was that Moscow would regard its own last proposals in that context as a starting point for discussion of limitation of strategic armaments (it had provisions, incidentally, for retention of small, agreed numbers of ABMs as well as of delivery vehicles)*.

Skittishness About Talks with US. While the Soviets have thus been hinting at a more flexible attitude on strategic weapons as a topic of discussion, they have still avoided tipping their hand on the specific issue on which we have prodded them--direct talks with the US.

*Kuznetsov's display of a forthcoming attitude towards further measures in nuclear disarmament also included a repetition of his April 26 formula of stopping manufacture of nuclear weapons, reducing stockpiles, and "subsequently" the complete banning and scrapping of them. The term "subsequently" could imply the possibility of agreement on a production cut-off as a separate measure.

Roshchin's mention of the ENDC co-chairmen as affording a framework for talks was as close as the Soviets have come to the idea of bilateral talks with the US. In his May 17 conversation with the Secretary, Kuznetsov seemed to appreciate the idea that announcement of US-Soviet talks could give the nonproliferation treaty a fillip at the UN, but he had nothing to say on the subject which was -- as it has so long been -- still under consideration in Moscow.

In his May 20 speech Kuznetsov made a show of flexibility about forums. The USSR, he said of limitation and reduction of delivery vehicles, would be ready to "exchange views with states concerned," but he did not indicate what states or where. Later on, referring more generally to limiting the arms race and disarmament, he said the USSR had no doubt that it would not be difficult to find suitable forms of negotiations if "all interested parties" (not otherwise defined) showed an appropriate desire. He went on to say that the USSR was interested in making the work of the Geneva disarmament conference "more active" and in convening a world disarmament conference, a throwback to Soviet positions of past years.

Doubtless, part of the reason for the Soviet inability to fish or cut bait is the Vietnam situation. The Soviet public posture toward the US in that context obviously creates an impediment to bilateral talks with the US. And it is noteworthy in this connection that Kuznetsov's interesting remarks at the UN have not been played in the Soviet media.

On the other hand, Vietnam probably has also contributed to a Soviet desire to keep open the prospect of such talks for what they may be worth in terms of leverage upon Washington.

Nevertheless, atmospherics over Vietnam is equally clearly not preclusive. The Soviets have in the past three years dealt with the US on a variety of bilateral issues (e.g., civil aviation, consular convention, cultural exchanges) and multilateral agreements (space agreements, the nonproliferation treaty) without regard to Vietnam.

Soviet leaders are probably uncertain as to what the objectives in talks with the US on strategic weapons ought to be. The Soviet Union's own strategic deployments have been going on at a rapid pace in recent years, and the Soviets would doubtless be reluctant to be frozen out of anticipated improvements in their position relative to the US. On the other hand, Moscow has seen the US announce its own ABM deployments and begin its MIRV programs, and Soviet officers in Washington have been canvassing opinion in town (apropos of the Stennis subcommittee hearings) on the question of whether the US would use relief from the pressures of Vietnam to build up American strategic forces further. The Soviets are probably also uncertain about the impact of the US election on US military programs. Uncertainties such as these probably go a long way to explaining Soviet failure to respond directly to the US initiative.

- 6 -

Even when and if the Soviets want an agreement, the exact terms, will be very difficult to determine. Visiting Novosti editor Spartak Beglov recently alluded to one new example of the complexity of the problem of determining Soviet goals in talks with the US on strategic weapons. Specifically, he raised the question of American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Over the years Beglov is not to be remembered for originality so much as for sensitivity to current lines on major issues of the day. He may have wind of some discussion in Moscow of defining just where the line about "strategic" is usefully to be drawn.

Certainly, these are the kinds of questions which would be likely to arouse differences among the Soviet leadership and perhaps within the military establishment, too. We have long heard rumors of such differences, but we cannot pin down the exact subjects of disagreements in Moscow or the parties to them. Finally, it should be recalled that last winter a group of US and Soviet academic experts jointly developed a series of questions relating to strategic arms control which they were to discuss at a meeting in the US in June. It was the first time that the Soviet academicians had been prepared to go even as far as posing questions for discussion. The US group is still awaiting word from their Soviet counterparts about their readiness to come to the next meeting. If Kucnetsov's New York remarks foreshadow some Soviet move at the governmental level, the Soviets might prefer not to have the issue pursued at the academic level at this time. On the other hand, given the sort of uncertainties that seem to exist in Soviet minds, the academic talks might be used by the Soviet leaders

- 7 -

as a reconnaissance of US views and intentions. We will have to reserve judgement until we know whether or not the Soviets are prepared to attend the projected June meeting.

ACTION

L. Rostow
2. Pres file~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, May 24, 1968

7:15 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: \$10 Million Tunisian Program Loan

Attached is Bill Gaud's recommendation for this year's program loan (\$10 million) for Tunisia. As you know from your talks with Bourguiba, this is justifiable on economic grounds alone, but it will also be another demonstration to Bourguiba that your expressions of friendship during his visit here are backed by action.

Our past program loans have run about \$15 million a year, but we don't have that much money this year. The Tunisians, as Bourguiba told you, understand our problem so there shouldn't be any serious reaction to the cut. In fact, we told them at one time we might have to cut all the way down to \$5 million.

The loan will be used to finance imports essential to Tunisia's development program. Judging by their past performance and what the Tunisians told us last week, they will use the loan well.

There are no difficulties for this loan with the Conte-Long amendments. Charlie Zwick is aboard, and Secretary Fowler is satisfied that there will be no major adverse effects on our balance of payments.

I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓ *5/25/68*

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 91.333
By ics, NARA Date 7-8-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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5a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

MAY 16 1968

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-333
By iss, NARA Date 9-8-98

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: \$10 Million Program Loan for Tunisia

Bill Gaud requests your approval to negotiate a \$10 million program loan for Tunisia to finance essential imports during FY 1969. This loan will continue our commodity import support but at a level lower than the \$15 million we have provided annually during the past two years.

For eight years Tunisia has been putting substantial amounts in investment - over 20% of Gross Domestic Product a year. This has been generally successful. It helped to produce an annual growth rate over 5% for 1962-1965. However, growth has been negligible during the past two years primarily due to severe droughts which cut agricultural production. Also, in recent years, Tunisia has relied too heavily on costly short-term debt to finance imports. However, the Tunisian Government is now following IMF and AID advice to reduce its short-term debt by restricting investment and short-term borrowing. This action coupled with expected increased agricultural production should revive economic growth.

Self-help. The self-help conditions attached to this loan call for continued stabilization efforts, improvements in the management capabilities of the state enterprises, establishment of priorities for future development projects and increased private sector participation in the economy. The release of the second tranche of this loan, \$5 million, will be conditioned on progress along these lines.

Our assistance commitments to Tunisia in FY 1967 including P. L. 480 assistance was 43% of the \$141 million of assistance from all donors. This year our commitments, including this loan, will be \$47 million or 39% of the \$120 million total anticipated.

Balance of Payments and Additionality. Secretary Fowler has indicated his satisfaction with efforts to assure additionality under this loan. It should not have any major adverse effects on our balance of payments.

1147

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2

Symington and Conte/Long Amendments. Tunisian Government expenditures for defense averaged 5.2% of total government expenditures from 1965 to 1967 and are likely to remain at this level for the foreseeable future. These expenditures constitute less than 2% of Gross Domestic Product. I agree with the State/AID findings that Tunisian resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures and that U. S. economic assistance to Tunisia is not being diverted to military purposes. There is no evidence of Tunisian purchases of sophisticated military equipment.

Recommendation. I recommend that you authorize negotiations for the proposed loan.

Charles J. Zwick

Charles S. Zwick
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

5-8

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-333
By is, NARA Date 9-8-98

MAY 14 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: \$10 Million Program Loan for Tunisia

I request your authorization to conclude with the Government of Tunisia a Program Loan for \$10 million to finance essential imports in Fiscal Year 1969.

U.S. Assistance to Tunisia Effects to Date

U.S. aid to Tunisia is enabling that nation to develop and maintain a viable and progressive society which has produced responsible leadership, friendly to the U.S. and the West, and which has and continues to exert a moderating influence in Arab and African affairs. U.S. assistance to Tunisia has assumed new and pressing significance in light of the events of June 1967 -- events which culminated in an expanded Soviet presence in the Mediterranean.

U.S. relations with Tunisia are among the most cordial that we enjoy throughout Africa and the Middle East; and Tunisia has been consistent in its moderate positions on many issues of direct concern to the U.S. President Bourguiba has (1) publicly supported and expressed understanding of U.S. objectives in Vietnam, (2) repeatedly proposed a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, and (3) since the Arab-Israeli clash of June 1967, has worked steadily for a reasonable solution to that problem.

Economic Justification for the Program Loan

Tunisia's real GDP achieved a steady average growth rate of 5.4 percent annually from 1960 through 1965. This impressive progress was abruptly halted in 1966 and failed to resume during 1967 in the wake of disastrous harvests in both years.

In order to revive the economy's growth in 1968 the Government of Tunisia is launching an investment program of \$241 million (in terms of 1965 prices). These investment needs, compounded by debt and interest payments, bring Tunisian capital requirements to about \$317 million in 1968. Despite determined efforts on the Tunisian side,

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-2-

which will result in national savings of some \$130 million in 1968, that nation's gross requirements for foreign assistance, credits and investments are estimated at a minimum of \$180 million. Gross public aid needs total \$120 million of this sum with minimum necessary program-type aid accounting for \$50 million to \$60 million. Tunisia lacks dependable non-U.S. sources of program-type financing so that this proposed Program Loan of \$10 million will help sustain the input of crucially needed balance of payments support to the economy during 1968 and 1969 at a juncture where such assistance can well determine the resumption of economic growth.

Other Donor Assistance

The U.S. policy of extending assistance to Tunisia includes encouraging other donor countries, the IBRD and the IMF to come forth with aid. In FY 1967 while total U.S. commitments amounted to \$60.5 million, commitments from other donors accounted for another \$80.5 million. In FY 1968 it is estimated that non-U.S. donors will be the source of \$73 million in assistance while the U.S. is contributing \$47 million. The U.S. delegation to the Consultative Group meeting, held May 7 and 8, 1968, emphasized hope and expectation that other donors will give increased aid to Tunisia, thereby making it possible for the U.S. share to decline.

Under the auspices of the IBRD, a Consultative Group consisting of 13 donor nations contributing to Tunisian development has taken a keen interest in reviewing that country's economic performance from year to year and in considering its requirements for future assistance. The U.S., which is a member of the Consultative Group, is working closely with the IBRD, the IMF, and the other donor nations in coordinating assistance to Tunisia; in assessing that country's economic prospects and aid requirements; and in establishing economic performance criteria which the Tunisians are expected to follow in order to utilize effectively the assistance being received.

Effects on U.S. Balance of Payments

A. Export Additionality

The proposed program loan will support the U.S. objective of export additionality from U.S. assistance. The loan is restricted to purchases of commodities and services from the U.S., funds being disbursed through letters of credit established with U.S. banks. U.S. representatives have made perfectly clear to Tunisian authorities the nature of the U.S. balance of payments problems, and the need for

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-3-

Tunisian cooperation in adopting policies and practices which would help the U.S. payments posture. A study by A.I.D. of the export additionality of U.S. assistance has indicated that there is no clear substitution loss through A.I.D.-financed exports to Tunisia. The program loans are being used to test and establish the Tunisian market for a broad range of U.S. products. Kraft paper and cowhides introduced under the FY 1966 program loan, and tinplate being financed under the FY 1967 loan show good promise of proving competitive and should, therefore, establish themselves as permanent U.S. exports to Tunisia. Supplies and equipment needed for Tunisia's rapidly expanding hotel sector, an important exchange earner for that country, are being imported under the FY 1967 loan. It is to be noted also that the 50/50 shipping clause results in Tunisian-owned dollars being spent for transporting the loan-financed commodities in U.S. flag vessels.

B. Tunisia's Debt Repayments and U.S. Aid

Tunisia's considerable debt amortization and interest payment requirements have given rise to concern for the effect on the U.S. balance of payments. An A.I.D. study indicates, however, that the net inflow of non-U.S. assistance and private capital was \$44 million in CY 1966, \$47 million in CY 1967, and \$23 million in CY 1968. At the Consultative Group meeting the U.S. asked that serious consideration be given to ways and means of easing Tunisia's debt burden. This implies the need on the part of non-U.S. donor nations to consider refinancing present loan assistance to Tunisia, increasing future assistance, and extending that assistance on softer terms.

Self-Help

A. Performance

Tunisia's self-help has been comprehensive and successful. Among other measures the GOT achieved a 34 percent rise in domestic revenues between 1964 and 1967 as a result of a 50 percent increase in direct taxes, impositions of new taxes and improved collections. Tunisia is concentrating its resources on agricultural, industrial and social development. Illustratively, the country's 1965-1968 Four-Year Plan calls for total investment of \$1,024,000,000 with about 27 percent of this total earmarked for industrial development, 20 percent for agriculture, and 18 percent for education. To quicken agricultural modernization, diversification methods are being pushed, and the number of Tunisia's cooperatives increased in 1967 by almost 70 percent so that now their combined membership exceeds 250,000. The nationwide Food-for-Work program supported by PL 480 assistance, but largely financed (77 percent) by the GOT employed about 140,000 persons during 1967. In prudently allocating its resources, Tunisia has, until now, restricted outlays on the military establishment to less than 2 percent of GDP.

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-4-

In keeping with economic policy recommendations set forth in the IMF Stand-by Agreement, Tunisia (a) held total investments within the set limit of \$240 million, (b) authorized supplier credits below the amount of repayments by 33 1/3 percent, (c) restricted the disbursement of counterpart and countervalue generations to the level of the corresponding flow of foreign aid resources, (d) continued to assist private enterprises by allocating 70 percent of the imports under the U.S. program loan to the private sector, and (e) established a Bureau of Economic Studies in the Ministry of Agriculture whose first priority area is the optimum development of wheat production.

B. Proposed Self-Help Measures Under the FY 1968 Program Loan

The following measures are proposed:

1. GOT compliance with the economic policy recommendations and ceilings set forth in the IMF Stand-by Agreement of December 1967, as amended.
2. Limitation of the total investment program for 1968 as agreed to with the IMF; and control of current budgetary expenditures as well as expansion of revenue in order to increase governmental surpluses available for financing larger proportions of the investment program.
3. Cooperation with the IMF in assembling and providing data on the lag-time in defraying debts to suppliers for goods and services.
4. Continued reduction of supplier credits utilized to a level below repayments in order to gradually diminish this indebtedness. Beyond this, other short and medium-term credits, private and public, should be gradually reduced with due consideration given to economic requirements.
5. Continued limitation, during 1968, of local currency counter-value and counterpart disbursements to the amounts generated by the flow of assistance.
6. Continued improvement of state enterprise management and operations through such steps as providing business management training to business administrators, and by educating lower level candidates for executive and administrative roles.
7. Improvement of the priority selection of developmental projects through a comprehensive review of the Economic Plan, and earmarking those economic and social undertakings, in the order of their considered importance, which are deemed essential to economic and social growth.

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-5-

8. Increased private sector participation in the economy through:
- a. Continuing to improve the procedure of the licensing system to the private sector by reducing the scope of prohibitions and quantitative restrictions.
 - b. Inventorying and publicizing all advantages available to the private sector such as credit facilities, tax incentives, informational material and administrative support.
 - c. Early publication of the proposed new investment code which will clarify procedures and incentives available to foreign and local investors.
9. Continued improvement of agricultural productivity by:
- a. Placing greater emphasis on agricultural research and economic analysis in formulating policy relative to farm management, pricing and production choices.
 - b. Coordination of all foreign assistance being extended to agricultural development.
 - c. Establishment of priorities for agricultural projects presented for donor financing.
 - d. Provision by the GOT of Tunisian technicians and counterparts for agricultural projects, where agreed upon, in order to assure continuity of those projects

Conditions Precedent

The proposed Program Loan will be provided in two tranches consisting of \$5 million each. The first tranche will be released upon signature of the Program Loan Agreement between the U.S. and the Government of Tunisia; and evidence that it constitutes a valid and legally binding obligation on the Government of Tunisia. In September of 1968 a joint review of the steps taken by the Government of Tunisia to implement the self-help measures set forth above will be taken by A.I.D. and the Government of Tunisia. If A.I.D. finds that appropriate steps are being taken at that time, the second tranche will be made available.

Tunisia's Defense Expenditures

The GOT has minimized its expenditures on military programs for the years 1965 through 1967. These outlays average approximately \$17 million annually, about 5.2 percent of total government expenditures, and less than 2 percent of GDP. In the years 1968 and 1969 the ratios of defense expenditures to total spending will remain at about 5 percent, while the proportion to GDP will remain below 2 percent.

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-6-

Foreign exchange spent for defense as a percent of imports of goods and services for 1966-67 was nil. Moreover, the Country Team has reported that there is no evidence of U.S. development assistance (or PL 480 sales) being diverted to military expenditures.

State/A.I.D. in consultation with the inter-agency advisory committee concerned with the implementation of Section 620(s) (the Symington Amendment), of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, has determined (a) that Tunisia's resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development, and (b) that neither U.S. development assistance nor PL 480 sales are diverted by Tunisia to military purposes.

Currently available intelligence does not indicate that Tunisia has purchased sophisticated weapons systems requiring the withholding of assistance under Section 119 (Conte-Long Amendment) of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1968.

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to approve this loan. The Department of State concurs.


William S. Gaud

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

Friday, May 24, 1968, 6:45 P. M.

Mr. President:

In Walt Rostow's absence, he asked me to forward the attached.

It seems generally consistent with Walt's recent notes to you that earlier estimates may have understated the magnitude of the current infiltration effort.

In our view, the significance is that:

- infiltration is continuing at the same high level of the first four months
- the enemy can probably continue current intense levels of activity-- assuming current rates of attrition
- 2 out of 5 infiltrators are headed for Saigon
- on basis of our in-house calculations, monthly infiltration may be as high as 18,000 instead of General Westmoreland's end-April estimate of 12,000.

Robert N. Glasburgh

Attachment

RNG:amc

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ-CBS 20

By ics, NARS, Date 6-25-84

~~TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

6a



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

24 May 1968

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

1. The study on North Vietnamese manpower which you requested Wednesday is going forward and will be finished within the two weeks you gave us.

2. The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you on the latest findings with respect to deployment from the North since concern is being expressed in several quarters that the Intelligence Community may have under-estimated this rate of deployment. What we find as of now is that men on the move through the pipeline from North to South continues in May at the same high level it has attained during the first four months of this year. We have added 17,000 North Vietnamese between 1 May and 23 May to the 83,000 we observed moving in the period between 1 January and the end of April. Put in other words, the number of individuals en route to South Vietnam from within North Vietnam is at the very least adequate to continue the relatively intense military activity in South Vietnam which we have noted in recent weeks. It is noteworthy that if our analysis is accurate, two out of every five soldiers headed into South Vietnam are being directed to the Saigon area.

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Authority NLS/CBS 1
By ms, NARS, Date 5-7-84

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- 2 -

3. The methodology which we use to calculate this North Vietnamese deployment rate is complex and subject to error. Nevertheless, we owe you our experts' view on what the allied forces and ARVN will be up against in the weeks to come. That brings us to this statement: We can specifically account for the 100,000 troops mentioned in the preceding paragraph. We think this is too small. The experts believe it to be closer to 150,000. We can already establish that 35,000 have arrived in South Vietnam and believe the number may be even higher. In sum, at a minimum this rate of deployment will enable the enemy to replace his losses and maintain the high rate of activity which we have recently witnessed in South Vietnam, particularly in the Saigon area. If General Westmoreland's operations do not succeed in imposing the same level of attrition we also have witnessed in these previous weeks, then this rate of flow will enable the enemy to mount even larger operations, including a major offensive this summer.

(Signed) Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

cc: Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Handwritten signature] 7
ACTION

Friday - May 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza

OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza would like to call on you next week.

At the outset of his term it would be most helpful for him to get directly from you how deeply your interest in Latin America runs. Felipe Herrera commented to Bill Bowdler after your meeting on Wednesday that he had never realized how closely you follow Latin American affairs (lb, your comment on the Tavera loan signing and the Dominican municipal elections) and how personally committed you are to inter-American cooperation. This is the message I would like Galo Plaza to get.

Incidentally, you will find Plaza quite a different fellow from Mora -- refreshingly so.

W. W. Rostow

Approve
appointment

—

Disapprove

—

Call me

—

cc - Jim Jones

8

ACTION

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

Friday - May 24, 1968

Sample

Mr. President:

Herewith a memorandum (Tab A) from Nick Katzenbach recommending you receive the Haitian Ambassador.

His reasons for your doing so are persuasive, and I concur.

Nick's disclaimer that "there is no basis for Haitian allegations against the U.S." may be overstated. The AP despatch at Tab B suggests that the B-25 used in the expedition may well have come from the United States.

W. W. Rostow

**Approve
appointment**

Disapprove

Call me

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-333
By is, NARA Date 9-8-98

Attachments:

Tab A - Nick Katzenbach's memorandum.

Tab B - AP Despatch (53-54) of May 24, from Melbourne, Florida

cc - Jim Jones

8a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-331
By is, NARA Date 3-19-99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: United States-Haitian Relations

Recommendation

* 10 minutes

That you agree to receive the Haitian Ambassador, Arthur Bonhomme, for a very brief visit.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion

The Haitian Ambassador called on me today to press for an appointment with you to discuss current United States-Haitian relations. He obviously feels that he will be dismissed by President Duvalier if he does not obtain the appointment.

I recommend that you concur for two reasons: 1) The Haitian Government has asked for a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the Haitian exile incursion into Haiti. As I have already told you, we had nothing to do with this exile adventure but there are many in the United Nations who will believe that we did. We could avoid difficulties in the U.N. if you would receive the Haitian Ambassador and make clear to him that there is no basis for Haitian allegations against the U.S. and that if Haiti persists it will be damaging

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

to U.S.-Haitian relations. 2) Ambassador Ross has reasonably good access to President Duvalier and other Haitian officials. President Duvalier has made it clear that this access will be cut off unless there is reciprocity.

Richard L. Helms

Under Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1968 MAY 24 PM 1 57

May 24, 1968

86

HAITIAN-BOMBER

(52)

Melbourne, Fla. (AP) -- The owner of a B25 plane which Haitian President Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier says bombed his voodoo island told a news conference today that a mystery man gave him \$1,000 to ferry the bomber from Arizona to Florida.

Jay Humphrey, a former Melbourne Beach resident now living in Freeport, Bahamas, said he knew the man only as "Johnny Knight".

"A thousand dollars is a thousand dollars," Humphrey told newsmen. "I didn't ask too many questions."

Humphrey made the statements in a special telephone hook-up. He refused to appear in person.

Duvalier said he had information which proved one of two B-52s which bombed his island Monday flew out of Melbourne, made an intermediary stop and then dropped explosives on Cap Haitien and set down troops.

"The map found on board a bomber gave very important information, leaving no doubt about its point of departure," he told the Associated Press.

Humphrey said he and Knight flew the plane out of Melbourne last Sunday and took it to a little-used airstrip at Immokalee, in South-Central Florida.

At that point, he told the news conference, a negro joined Knight and he (Humphrey) returned to Melbourne.

"They said they were going to San Antonio," Humphrey said. A check showed the plane never arrived in Texas.

Humphrey said he met Knight about three months ago in Freeport and was offered \$1,000, plus expenses, to purchase the B-25 and ferry it to Melbourne.

(63)

He brought the plane to Melbourne about two months ago and last Sunday was told that he and Knight were taking it to Immokalee.

"He said he wanted to get used to the plane," said Humphrey, who told reporters he was talking from the Melbourne area.

"But I didn't have to do much on the way to Immokalee. He was real sharp with airplanes."

Humphrey said Knight had a Spanish accent and told him he was born in Puerto Rico. "He was about 6-foot-3, 220 pounds, and highly intelligent," Humphrey said.

Humphrey said that after he learned of Duvalier's charge, he tried to reach Knight at an address he had been given, but was told by the person who answered the telephone that he had never heard of Knight.

Humphrey said they stopped at Immokalee only briefly and Knight did not introduce the negro who met them there.

Nobody at the Immokalee Airport could remember Knight or the negro.

May 24, 1968.

9

INFORMATION

Friday, May 24, 1968
5:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Bus Wheeler's comment on a memorandum for the record of Bob Ginsburgh's will interest you.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

See file



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

9a

23 May 1968

Mr

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

On 22 May, Noel Epstein, Wall Street Journal, asked me about the validity of the rumors that the military were pressuring the President to resume the bombing.

I informed Epstein that no responsible military leaders were attempting to pressure the President into resumption of the bombing at this time. I said that I thought the military were satisfied that the President was fully aware of the advantages which the enemy has already received and the additional advantages which could accrue if the bombing restrictions are maintained. Under present circumstances, the military disadvantages have not reached the point where the military are recommending against the continuation of negotiations.

He asked what would happen if such a point were reached. I said that an appropriate recommendation would be made at such a time. I declined to comment on how long it might be before the government might feel it necessary to resume bombing if there were no progress in the peace talks.

9

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

Bob = You are absolutely correct. Stay
with these bastards who seem determined
to prove that the military are
irresponsible, blood thirsty fools, whose
only pastime is war.
W B

10

Pres file

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 24, 1968 - 5:15 pm

Mr. President:

I knew Sarge Shriver was a dynamic fellow but I didn't think all this would come from sending him to Paris.

See attached report on Paris mood as of tonight.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 14672

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 6-22-92

wwrostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 MAY 24 19 48

10a

~~SECRET~~

HCE295

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-331

By us, NARA Date 3-20-99

PAGE 01 PARIS 14672 241933Z

44

ACTION SS 70

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, CIAE 00, /070 W

O 241818Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1963
INFO AMEMBASSY ODNON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO

Rostow

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 14672

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: LAST MINUTE DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO DEGAULLE'S ADDRESS

SO MANY SPECTACULAR EVENTS HAVE OCCURRED THE EMBASSY BELIEVES IT SHOULD WARN THE DEPT THAT DESPITE THE GENERAL EXPECTATION THAT THE COUNTRY, AFTER HEARING GEN DEGAULLE'S SPEECH TONIGHT, WILL PROCEED TO SWIFT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVT, LABOR AND INDUSTRY IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF RECOVERED CALM, THERE EXISTS THE POSSIBILITY THAT WE COULD BE FACED WITH AN INSURRECTIONAL SITUATION FOR ALL THE REASONS SO WELL DESCRIBED BY MENDES-FRANCE (EMBTel 14344). NOT ONLY ARE EXTREMIST ELEMENTS READY TO IGNITE AGAIN THE CHARGED ATMOSPHERE, BUT ALSO THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF SPONTANEOUS COMBUSTION DEVELOPING. FOR EXAMPLE:

A. THE AFTERNOON PRESS, NAMELY FERNIOT IN FRANCE-SOIR AND RELIABLE COLLEAGUES SUCH AS GORDEY AND GOMBAULT, STATE THAT "PARIS IS A POWDERKEG AND THE LEAST SPARK WILL CREATE AN EXPLOSION," PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF GOVT BLUNDERS SUCH AS THE COHN-BENDIT DECISION. MITTERRAND HAS AGAIN CALLED FOR POMPIDOU'S RESIGNATION.
B. GAULLISTS CLOSE TO THE GENERAL SUCH AS FLOHIC, SENIOR AIDE-DE-CAMP, AT LUNCH TODAY MADE NO ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL THEIR ALARM THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION MIGHT GET OUT OF CONTROL. AN INTERIOR MINISTRY OFFICIAL, FRAUDEAU, TOLD EMBOFF THAT THE CRITICAL PERIOD WOULD BEGIN AT 10 PM OR TWO HOURS AFTER DEGAULLE'S ADDRESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, OTHER OFFICIALS ARE CONVINCED THAT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 14672 241933Z

NOTHING CAN HAPPEN "WITH GAULLISTS AND COMMUNISTS WORKING SECRETLY TOGETHER TO QUIET SITUATION."

C. RUMORS ARE WILDLY CIRCULATING IN TOWN. ONE THAT PROVED ACCURATE IS THAT THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ORDERED ALL CARS OFF THE STREETS BUT THAT THE ORDER WAS RESCINDED. WORKERS IN INDUSTRIES ARE ALSO REPORTEDLY GOING OUT ON STRIKE AND THIS TOO IS CORRECT IN AT LEAST ONE INSTANCE, I.E., MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT AND LODGING. THE POLICE ARE REPORTEDLY LOOKING FOR A CACHE OF EXPLOSIVES WHICH DISAPPEARED FROM STORAGE IN CORSICA.

D. AT THE SORBONNE THIS AFTERNOON EXTREMISTS LEADERS, JEUNESSE COMMUNISTE REVOLUTIONNAIRE, ARE HARANGUING STUDENTS IN AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE THIS EVENING'S DEMONSTRATION MORE SPECTACULAR THAN BEFORE.

E. EYE-WITNESSES IN THE STUDENT AREA REPORT THAT THERE IS A LOT OF "RABBLE," VARIOUSLY REPORTED AS FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC CHARACTERS OF VARIOUS AGES AND ASSOCIATIONS LIKE THE OAS, "LOOKING FOR ACTION." THERE ARE REPORTS OF CHINESE MONEY AND GUNS COMING IN FROM BERN AND BRUSSELS AND EVEN THE TRADITIONAL RUMORS REGARDING THE CIA AS BEING BEHIND VIOLENCE.

F. ARMY LEAVES HAVE BEEN CANCELLED THROUGHOUT FRANCE AND TROOPS PLACED ON ALERT. FOREIGN LEGION ELEMENTS FROM CORSICA AND FROM AFRICAN INTERVENTION FORCES FROM DAKAR ARE REPORTED TO BE STATIONED NOW OUTSIDE PARIS. MILITARY OBSERVERS REPORT THAT THE ARMY IS, HOWEVER, RELAXED AND CONFIDENT (AS ARE EMBASSY MIL ATTACHES) THAT THEY CAN HANDLE THE SITUATION. SO FAR THE WORKERS' DEMONSTRATION IS PROCEEDING QUIETLY. IN FACT, NEVER SINCE WAR HAS PARIS SEEMED SO QUIET.

GP-1. SHRIVER

~~SECRET LIMDIS~~

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

11

Friday, May 24, 1968 - 5:05pm

For file

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, are replies to condolence messages from President Ayub of Pakistan, and President Ahidjo of the Cameroon, on the recent tornado disaster.

I recommend you approve both messages.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Call me _____

Att: File 1692, 1700

WWR:EKH:RM:lw
5/25/68

Na

Suggested Reply to President Ayub Khan
of Pakistan

Dear Mr. President:

**I am deeply grateful for your message of sympathy
on the recent tornado disaster. Your thoughtfulness,
good friend, is always a special comfort.**

With warmest personal regards.

Lyndon B. Johnson

116

Suggested Reply to President Ahidjo, Republic
of Cameroon

Dear Mr. President:

Your kind message of condolence on the recent
tornado disaster was deeply appreciated. I know that
it is a comfort to the bereaved families to know you
were thinking of us.

With warmest personal regards.

Lyndon B. Johnson

12

INFORMATION

Friday - May 24, 1968

Pres file

Mr. President:

Your good friend, Ambassador Sevilla Sacasa, has just returned from Managua. He brought the attached letter from President Somoza replying to your Summit anniversary message.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

May 10, 1968 letter from Nicaraguan President Somoza.

THE NICARAGUAN AMBASSADOR
WASHINGTON, D. C.

12a

May 20, 1968.

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to send you herewith a letter to you from the President of Nicaragua which he handed to me while I was in Managua recently.

As I had anticipated, you were well remembered when I conversed with my President and our good friend, your Ambassador Kennedy M. Crockett, who is highly esteemed by my Government and my people.

With kindest regards to Mrs. Johnson, and the renewed assurances of my respect and devoted friendship, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa

His Excellency
The President
The White House

Office of the President
of the Republic

Managua, D.N. Nicaragua

May 10, 1968

"The Year of Efficiency in Agriculture"

Dear Mr. President:

I was with particular pleasure that I received Your Excellency's letter sending greetings to the Nicaraguan people and Government, reviewing the great efforts made by the people and Government of the United States to ally themselves more firmly with the countries of Latin America in their march toward development, and reiterating your country's firm resolve to continue along that same line of encouragement of our nations.

Nicaragua, which, as a sincere ally of your country, also holds firmly to its decision to fulfill our hemispheric commitments, has seconded the steps taken by Your Excellency's Government, having adopted various measures designed to give the Nicaraguan people wider possibilities of success in the hemispheric struggle for well-being and freedom.

Among other things, we have set up an economic development program that seeks to maintain the stability of our currency and freedom of exchange. We are endeavoring to implement a policy of austerity in public expenditures. By every possible means we are

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
White House,
Washington, D.C.

working to establish equilibrium in our balance of payments and the rational exploitation of the country's natural resources. We firmly intend to expand primary education throughout the country and provide more flexible and wider opportunities at the other educational levels; and we are seeking to maintain a broad and well-balanced social policy in harmony with our economic and productive potentials. The achievement of all this has been made possible by the efforts of your Government in carrying out its determination to help Latin America, as mentioned by Your Excellency.

Your Excellency's letter was widely publicized in Nicaragua and, echoing the feeling of the Nicaraguan people, I thank you for it most sincerely, because it is an eloquent confirmation of our faith in the fulfillment of commitments assumed by your great nation and of its steadfast cooperation in our struggle to reach higher levels of economic and social progress.

With best wishes for the success and happiness of Your Excellency and the people of the United States of America, I am,

Cordially yours,

[s] A. Somoza

A. Somoza

~~SECRET~~

May 24, 1968

Sent 1716

13

LDX LITERALLY EYES ONLY TO SECRETARY RUSK

Secy Clifford

The President wishes your comments on this memorandum to him from Max Taylor. It is, evidently, relevant to the meeting now planned for tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 6-2-92

132

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Negotiations

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-383
By , NARA, Date 8-12-93

It does not appear to me that we are preparing either Hanoi or our own and the international public for an action which I feel sure we will have to take in Paris in the near future. We are reacting far too little, it seems to me, to actions of Hanoi in raising the level of military action in South Viet-Nam while heckling us to stop the bombing. By our quiescence, we seem to accept as a matter of course the continued high rate of enemy infiltration and repeated acts of accentuated violence--I am thinking particularly of the recent shelling of Saigon for which there has been no reprisal and, indeed, no strong protest to indicate that we take these things seriously. In their fight-talk campaign, the other side is increasing the fighting in the South while trying to talk us out of our freedom to retaliate in the North.

We have three readily available responses to Hanoi's increasing belligerence and to the intransigence of their negotiators at the conference table. The first is to resume bombing back to the 20th parallel. The second is to bomb throughout all North Viet-Nam as we did prior to March 31. The third is to go beyond former bombing levels and include therein the mining of Haiphong harbor.

The timing of these steps is, of course, of great importance as is the preparation of public acceptance for them. I believe that the first step, bombing to the 20th parallel, should be taken now and the fact acknowledged as soon as the press raises the question. Concurrently, we should communicate privately to the Hanoi representatives what we have already said to Zorin with regard to our inability to continue to limit our bombing to the 20th parallel without prompt evidence of restraints on their side. At the same time, we should make clear to the Hanoi representatives in Paris that they are wasting their breath in calling for a total cessation until they match the restraint which we have already shown.

With the warning on the official record, we should then make repeated public statements explaining and justifying what we may have to do. About a week after the warning, in the absence of a conciliatory move from them, we should resume our pre-March 31 pattern of bombing. A further expansion of the bombing would remain for the time being an ace in the hole.

In my judgment, these tough positions are inevitable and the sooner we take them and establish our firmness with the other side, the sooner we can get on to serious business.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

I would not worry too much about a possible walk-out by our adversaries, although we can expect them to threaten it and even go through the motions. In the Panmunjom negotiations, you will recall that there was a prolonged break because of inability to agree on the issue of the involuntary repatriation of prisoners of war, but eventually the other side gave in and came back. In the Paris negotiations, I would anticipate similar gestures but also a similar capitulation if we keep a remorseless military pressure on them throughout.

M.D.T.
M. D. T.

~~SECRET~~

14

ACTION

Profile

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 24, 1968 - 3:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Harriman proposed that we permit inspection in the southern half of the DMZ.

Herewith Sec. Rusk indicates that on Monday he should stick with a more orthodox exposition.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 77-333
By is, NARA Date 9-8-98

Approved _____

DTS
Call me _____

WWRostow:rla

*8:00 pm - John Walsh
called to say Sec Clifford
has cleared. Now has
been cleared by both
Sec Rusk & Sec Clifford*

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS IMMEDIATE

Date

TODEL

NODIS/HARVAN

Ref: Paris 14592

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 97-331
By is, NARA Date 3-20-99

1. We have no problem with your outline contained reftel. We will be standing by to verify your detailed evidence of NVA presence.

2. On the question of machinery to police the DMZ, we sent a cable to Saigon yesterday asking for MACV's current judgment, and this in turn will lead to intensive JCS review of the conclusions reached last July, when we all looked at what would be required for a real policing job as a result of the Canadian proposals. For good measure, we will send you the JCS paper of last July 5, recognizing that it may now require revision. This will come by courier tonight.

3. You will also note that we have already prodded the Canadians as to what their staff thinking would be on an adequate and feasible ICC presence.

Drafted by: WPB

EA: WPBundy:bnm 5/24/68

Tel. No.

4235

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

The Secretary

S/S-

DOD ..

White House -
U - Mr. Katzenbach

Page 2 of telegram to Paris

~~SECRET~~
Classification

4. However, for purposes of your presentation Monday, we believe you should state simply that the currently constituted ICC has the legal authority to supervise a restoration and demilitarization of the DMZ under Article 36b , and that it should assume this function. You might put your proposal in the form of a suggestion that Hanoi join with us in a declaration of respect ~~for~~ in principle for the demilitarized zone, in accordance with Articles/ ^{1, 5-9, and 36} of the Geneva Agreements, and that it join further in a request to the ICC to act at once to provide supervisory machinery that could give the DRV, the US, and the GVN a high level of confidence that the DMZ was in fact being respected.

5. In so doing, we believe your statement should make two points clear:

a. that we envisage a thoroughly effective supervision by the ICC and not simply the token presence that existed prior to 1966.

b. that, in proposing the presently-constituted ICC for this immediate task, we are by no means abandoning ~~our~~ or modifying the suggestion made in your opening statement that a future supervisory mechanism should include Asian nations. (Either on background or in the statement you might wish to make clear the grave practical difficulties and delay that would arise if we

Page 3 of telegram to Paris

~~SECRET~~
Classification

were to seek to form a new commission membership at the present time and for this limited purpose.)

6. Not repeat not for mention in your statement, you should note that this would focus the supervisory job in the ICC and avoid any mention of the Joint Commission originally established in 1954. The Geneva Accords in fact assigned a number ^{of the} ~~of the~~ immediate functions having to do with the DMZ to the Joint Commission, but it has of course long been abandoned and to resurrect it now could obviously run us into major problems whether the GVN (armed forces) should be accepted as the members on our side, and so on. In other words, at present we wish clearly to leave any idea of supervision by a joint commission to one side.

7. Setting these general thoughts against your 14576, you will see that we have not repeat not tried to address the possibility that any inspection system would be confined to the southern half ~~of the~~ ^{as} DMZ, even ~~if~~ a first step. This came up with the Canadian Ambassador here the other day, and we made the point that -- given the equipment and mobility of the proposed force -- one might just as well operate in both halves from a purely practical standpoint. Moreover, as you have noted in your last sentence of 14576, confining the inspection system

U - RF, Katzenbach

Page 4 of telegram to Paris

~~SECRET~~
Classification

to the southern half could be a bad precedent when we come, for example, to the question of future supervision of other points of access and infiltration routes.

8. On the other hand, we can see no problem here with your specific list of the military actions in the DMZ that should be precluded. If you wish to use this, we would see no problem.

9. For your further planning, we are still working urgently on materials concerning NVA presence in Laos. As matters stand, we should have this in shape by late next week. However, we suppose that you may well wish to suggest Thursday for the next meeting, and you should know that we are not repeat not wholly confident we can have a full-scale presentation on Laos by that time. Nonetheless, we would see some merit in hitting the Laos problem at the next meeting, even if we do not have all our evidence marshaled.

10. Apologies for not getting this to you sooner. If you frame a statement on the above lines and can let us see it before Monday delivery, we would be grateful -- but do not believe this is essential if you agree with this ~~guidance~~ guidance.

GP-3

END

ACTION

Friday, May 24, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Communique for the Gorton visit

Attached is our draft for the communique to be issued at the end of the Gorton visit. It does not have Australian approval, which cannot be obtained until Gorton arrives and personally reviews it. However, the Australian Embassy here has gone over it unofficially and they do not anticipate any problems in getting Gorton's approval.

I recommend you approve the draft.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Att

15a

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER JOHN G. GORTON
OF AUSTRALIA
May 27-38, 1968

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

1. At the invitation of President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States, the Rt. Hon. J. G. Gorton, Prime Minister of Australia, paid an official visit to Washington on May 27 and 28. This was Prime Minister Gorton's first visit to the United States since assuming office. It afforded the President and the Prime Minister an opportunity to exchange views on matters of mutual concern, including the situation in Southeast Asia.

Australia-U.S. Relations

2. The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the current state of Australia-U.S. relations. They expressed profound satisfaction that the historic partnership between their two countries was continuing to deepen and grow in significance for the security and progress of the Pacific region. They reaffirmed specifically the importance of the ANZUS Treaty as an expression of the United States continuing strategic interest in the region and the continuing cooperation of the governments in the maintenance of stability and security in Asia and the Pacific.

3. The Prime Minister and the President expressed their gratification with the existing scientific cooperation between the two countries. Such cooperation has advanced the state of science not only to the benefit of both countries but to mankind generally. They agreed that the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and a team of United States scientists would visit Australia and meet with the Australian Minister of Education and Science and his colleagues, to identify additional areas appropriate for cooperative activities and explore ways in which the close cooperation between the American and Australian scientific communities could be broadened and extended.

4. Stressing the importance of the soundness of the dollar to the maintenance of prosperous international economic conditions, the Prime Minister reiterated his full support for the President's program to reduce the United States balance of payments deficit. The President assured the Prime Minister that the United States would strive to avoid undesirable effects on Australia or other nations of measures taken under the program.

Viet-Nam

5. The President and the Prime Minister reviewed in detail the situation in South Viet-Nam, where Australian and American forces are fighting side by side to assure the right of the Vietnamese people to determine their own destiny free of outside interference. They agreed that the establishment of a just and viable peace called both for a strong military posture and for intensive diplomatic efforts.

6. The Prime Minister expressed his gratification that the President's initiative of March 31 had led to conversations with North Vietnamese representatives. The President reviewed in detail the progress of these talks to date. He reaffirmed that the United States Government would continue to consult fully with the Australian Government and other allies as the talks proceed. They agreed that the allied nations which have helped to defend the Republic of Viet-Nam should participate in any settlement of the conflict. The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed that the Manila Communique of 1966 continues to form the basis of the allied position.

7. The President expressed particular appreciation for the warm hospitality which the Australian people have extended to American servicemen on leave from Viet-Nam.

Pacific Regional Cooperation

8. The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the favorable trends in regional cooperation in the Pacific area which had been noted at the ANZUS and SEATO Council meetings in April 1968. They expressed satisfaction that, despite Communist expansionism, many constructive forces are promoting social and economic development in the area. They reaffirmed a hope that the impressive growth of regional groupings in Asia would continue, and expressed willingness to assist in every appropriate and feasible way.

9. The President and Prime Minister recognized that the United Kingdom's decision to accelerate withdrawal of its military forces from Southeast Asia increased the need for regional consultation and cooperation in the security field. The President welcomed Australian continuing involvement in these matters. He assured the Prime Minister of his keen interest in the progress of the consultations and in the outcome of the forthcoming Five-Power Conference in Kuala Lumpur.

ACTION

12

Friday, May 24, 1968

Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached for your approval is a proposed message to King Zahir of Afghanistan on the 50th Anniversary of Afghan independence (May 27).

State judges -- and I agree -- that the occasion justifies a warmer greeting than the routine independence day message.

I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

Att: File #1667

16a

Proposed Message to King Zahir of Afghanistan

Your Majesty:

All Americans join me in sending you and the people of Afghanistan our warm greetings on the 50th Anniversary of your independence.

This is a day for celebration not only in Afghanistan, but everywhere men cherish the spirit of self-determination. Afghanistan has been an inspiring example of the courage of a proud nation to chart its own destiny.

Yet you have understood too that independence is secure only when it brings the blessings of a better life for every citizen. America is glad to have a part in helping you move ahead with the tasks of economic development.

We look forward to our continuing cooperation in the cause of peace and progress. May the next half century see the flowering of the secure and prosperous nation you and your people are striving to build.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 24, 1968 - 2:20 pm

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Stewart's supplementary personal message to Sec. Rusk, on his talks in Moscow.

He correctly judges: "We brought home no bacon today."

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-333
By is, NARA Date 9-8-98

WWRostow:rln

23 MAY

~~SECRET.~~

17a

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELNO 157 OF 23 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
FOREIGN OFFICE AND PRIORITY PARIS.

FOLLOWING FROM SECRETARY OF STATE.

VIETNAM.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-331
By isa, NARA Date 3-20-99

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO MR. RUSK:

I WAS VERY GLAD TO HAVE THE MESSAGE DAVID BRUCE PASSED ME ON MONDAY.
IT WAS ALSO MOST VALUABLE TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF DISCUSSING
THE COURSE THE TALKS HAVE TAKEN IN PARIS WITH SULLIVAN AND
DAVIDSON. BOTH OF THESE QUOTE BRIEFS UNQUOTE WERE HELPFUL WHEN
WE WERE PREPARING FOR MY PRESENT VISIT TO MOSCOW.

2. PAT DEAN WILL BE GIVING YOUR PEOPLE A DETAILED ACCOUNT
OF MY TALKS WITH GROMYKO HERE TODAY. HE WAS PERFECTLY FRIENDLY
AND RELAXED, BUT IT WAS CLEAR TO ME THAT HE HAD NO INSIGHT
INTO HOW THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN PARIS INTEND TO PLAY THEIR
HAND. HIS PRESENTATION TO ME OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION
WAS ENTIRELY ORTHODOX AND UNCOMPROMISING. UNDER PRESSURE HE
FELL BACK ON THE BASIC THESIS THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS THE
AGGRESSOR AND THEREFORE IT FELL TO THE U.S. TO MAKE ALL MOVES
TOWARDS THE NEXT STAGE IN THE TALKS IN PARIS.

3. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT I THOUGHT IT PERFECTLY REASONABLE FOR
THE UNITED STATES TO INSIST ON SOME MEASURE OF RESTRAINT BY THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE BEFORE THE UNITED STATES COULD PROCEED TO AN
UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH. I SAID THAT
I THOUGHT THIS INDICATION COULD BEST COME BY AN ACT OF
DE-ESCALATION IN THE DMZ. THE AMERICANS WERE NOT SEEKING A MORE
FAVOURABLE POSITION BUT THEY COULD NOT ACCEPT A LESS FAVOURABLE

/ONE

~~SECRET~~

-2-

ONE. IF HANOI WOULD ACT IN THIS WAY IT WOULD REMOVE THE FIRST
BLOCK TO PROGRESS IN PARIS AND WE COULD THEN GO FORWARD TO DEAL
WITH THE MANY OTHER DIFFICULT QUESTIONS WHICH REMAINED. AS REGARDS
AN EVENTUAL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT I SAID THAT THE U.S. WANTED
TO ENSURE THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM HAD A FREE CHOICE.
I WARNED GROMYKO THAT HE COULD NOT COUNT ON A STATIC POLITICAL
SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES. IF THERE WERE NO VISIBLE RESPONSE
FROM HANOI TO THE PULL-BACK IN THE BOMBING AND U.S. SOLDIERS

PRESERVATION COPY

WITH THE MANY OTHER DIFFICULT QUESTIONS WHICH REMAINED. AS REGARDS AN EVENTUAL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT I SAID THAT THE U.S. WANTED TO ENSURE THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM HAD A FREE CHOICE. I WARNED GROMYKO THAT HE COULD NOT COUNT ON A STATIC POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE UNITED STATES. IF THERE WERE NO VISIBLE RESPONSE FROM HANOI TO THE PULL-BACK IN THE BOMBING AND U.S. SOLDIERS WERE TO BE IN DANGER, THERE WOULD BE A SERIOUS RISK OF A MOVEMENT OF U.S. OPINION WHICH COULD MAKE THE SITUATION MUCH WORSE. THIS COULD BE A MOST IMPORTANT TURNING POINT FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE. IF HANOI WERE TO IGNORE THIS FACTOR AND LET THIS OPPORTUNITY SLIP THEY WOULD BEAR A VERY HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY.

4. GROMYKO LISTENED VERY CAREFULLY TO ALL THIS. HIS RESPONSE WAS UNSYMPATHETIC AND ROUTINE. HE DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES AND PROFESSED TO DOUBT WHETHER OPINION IN AMERICA WOULD ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT TO TAKE A TOUGH LINE AGAIN.

5. I HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT THAT HE WILL PASS ON A FULL ACCOUNT OF THESE EXCHANGES TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

6. AS A PARTING SHOT GROMYKO MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT THE CONVENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OR ANY OTHER SIMILAR CONFERENCES WAS TOTALLY QUOTE UNREALISTIC IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES UNQUOTE. I DID NOT TAKE HIM TO MEAN HOWEVER THAT HE WAS NOT CONTENT TO KEEP THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP ON ICE AND HE DID NOT DISSENT WHEN I REMINDED HIM OF THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW WHEN WE AGREED TO DO ALL WE COULD QUOTE JOINTLY OR SINGLY UNQUOTE.

7. WE BROUGHT HOME NO BACON TODAY. AT THE SAME TIME I AM SURE IT IS RIGHT TO KEEP PEGGING AWAY AT THE RUSSIANS BOTH IN ORDER TO KEEP THEM, AS THEY WOULD WISH TO BE IN THE PICTURE AND BECAUSE I AM SURE THAT THEY CANNOT AFFORD NOT TO PASS ON ALL THAT I SAID TO HANOI AND XUAN THUY IN PARIS.

PRESERVATION COPY

18

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 24, 1968
2:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith State's analysis of the
Halloran story.

Walsh was with Vance in Korea
and knows the background well.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 6-2-92



7817

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Halloran Article "North Korean Assault
Foreseen" in Washington Post of May 20, 1968

We do not, of course, know precisely the sources from which Halloran received the impression of a possible North Korean attack this year. We surmise, however, that he got it from a variety of sources. In view of the belligerent tone of North Korean propaganda and their steady provocation of incidents along the DMZ, there has undoubtedly been a great deal of speculation in both American and Korean circles as to the real North Korean intention. We know that the ROKs have been much impressed by the character and effectiveness of the Israeli attacks in the Middle East, and so have some of our military. It is almost certain, therefore, that both our military people and the ROKs have been speculating as to the possibility of this type of an attack and what its consequences and effects might be. This would, of course, be an attractive story for a man like Halloran who likes to be as exciting as possible in his articles.

Another, although less likely possibility, is that Korean military officials may have intentionally taken an alarmist line with Halloran to generate a climate of opinion in the U.S. suitable for ROK military assistance requests.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-331

By us, NARA Date 3-20-99

John P. Walsh
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

N. Korea Assault Foreseen

U.S. Military In Seoul Leans Toward View

By Richard Halloran
Washington Post Foreign Service

SEOUL, May 19—An increasing number of American military authorities here believe that North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung will strike South Korea with a large-scale assault this year.

These authorities think the strike may be a punch across the Demilitarized Zone that is followed by a quick withdrawal, or an Israeli-style thrust for Seoul that is followed by a cease-fire with the North Koreans holding their new position, or an all-out North Korean drive for Pusan at the southern end of the peninsula.

Not everyone here holds this view, by any means. Many American observers, including some diplomats, continue to believe the North Koreans intend to undertake a two- or three-year campaign of Vietcong-style subversion, terror, and sabotage to undermine the South Korean government of President Park Chung Hee.

Shift in Estimate

But conversations here during the past two weeks show that there has been a significant shift in the authoritative estimate of the situation. The new analysis holds that Kim Il Sung will try conventional, open attack rather than, or possibly in addition to, guerrilla, commando tactics. It also holds that the North Koreans have shortened their time schedule to make their move this year.

A State Department official who handles Korean affairs said Sunday that if American officials in Seoul have reached such a conclusion "they haven't reported it to us yet."

He said that the United States has been quite concerned about the situation since last summer, but that the State Department has not concluded that the North Koreans "are ready to try another invasion."

Kim Il Sung's avowed target is the reunification of all Korea under his domination "at all costs." The American military authorities looking for an open assault have moved closer to the thinking of many South Korean leaders, who contend that North Korea cannot be successful at guerrilla war and must resort to open war.

Atmosphere of 1950

Some South Korean leaders who lived through the days just before North Korea attacked in June, 1950, to start the Korean War say they are reminded today of the atmosphere and situation of 18 years ago.

These estimates of Kim Il Sung's exact timing, however, are not clear. There have been no reports of significant military movements north of the DMZ so far.

The Americans who think major hostilities may break out this year offer considera-

U.S. Military in Seoul Sees Danger of New Red Assault

KOREA, From A1

ble political and military evidence to support their contention.

They believe that moves toward peace in Vietnam caught Kim Il Sung by surprise. He had been counting on the Vietnam war to keep the Americans preoccupied and American military power tied down. With prospects for peace in the offing, they believe, Kim Il Sung cannot wait.

The new estimate holds that Kim Il Sung is counting on strong anti-war sentiment in the United States to prevent a decisive American response to any attack he might undertake. In Kim's view, this sentiment will grow as peace in Vietnam nears and preclude a military reaction from the United States, especially if the North Korean thrust is limited.

The restrained U.S. response to the Jan. 31 seizure of the intelligence ship Pueblo is concrete proof, in Kim's thinking, that the United States will not react strongly, the new analysis holds.

Many observers here have long believed that the North Koreans intend to use the captive Pueblo crew as bait. The release of the crew, either all at one time or trickling out over a period of time, would be further cause for U.S. restraint, Kim, is believed to think.

Still another element in North Korean thinking, some Americans here estimate, is the U.S. political situation. With President Johnson having announced that he will not run again and the entire presidential picture fuzzy, Kim is counting on hesitancy and uncertainty in American leadership to get away with his plans this year. To wait, the reasoning goes, might mean facing a strong, assured American President.

will lose credibility with its own people.

On the ground, the North Koreans so far have not started sending the flood of seaborne infiltrators into the South Korean interior, as had generally been expected here. Instead, the action this spring has been concentrated along the DMZ, where the level of violence has risen over last year.

Most of the probing has been in the sector guarded by the U.S. 2d Division, which is spread across an 18-mile front astride the invasion corridor to Seoul. It is the most likely sector to be hit by any North Korean thrust.

New Equipment

Military analysts here say that North Korea can marshal its forces to have superiority for a short, concentrated attack. The North Koreans have received recent inputs of military aid from the Soviet Union, including new Mig-21 jet fighters. They are now thought to have about 60 of these high-performance aircraft, double the number they had last January. The North Koreans are also believed to have superiority in artillery and armor, vital for the Israeli-type assault envisioned.

Over the longer run, however, the combined South Korean and American forces have more men, far better logistical support, and the edge in air power from the recent buildup.

In the event that the North Koreans try a sustained offensive that is repelled by the

United States and South Korea, and the U.S./South Korean counterattack goes north of the present DMZ, the North Koreans are believed to be counting on the Communist Chinese to come to their assistance, as in 1950.

Analysts here believe that Peking will not countenance a threat from a hostile army on its Manchurian border along the Yalu River. The North Koreans are thus banking on American fear of a land war with China as another restraint on a major U.S. response.

In addition, analysts here say, Kim is well aware of the growing desire in America to turn away from military involvement in Asia to put attention and resources into stabilizing chaotic racial and urban problems at home.

In Korea itself, some analysts note an increasing personalization of the conflict between Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee. Kim's drive to take over all Korea stems not only from nationalistic and ideological but from personal power compulsions.

War Talk in North

A major factor in the new analysis is the continually rising inflammatory war talk in Pyongyang. It pervades North Korean pronouncements aimed at the North Koreans themselves.

No government brings the people to a war pitch without reason, analysts here say. Nor can it hold the pitch at a high level without moving, or

19

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres. file

Friday, May 24, 1968 -- 12:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Joe Alsop came in this morning. He said he had learned firmly that high-level consideration was being given to going back to bombing between the 19th and 20th parallels. He wanted to discuss timing with me. I said that I would not discuss this subject. It would be a great disservice if he were to write about it.

He said that he had done a column. He did not believe it would do any harm.

The question of timing related to the following proposal: If we were to decide to bomb between the 19th and 20th parallels, we should get Averell Harriman to write a note to Bobby Kennedy making a case for this action in view of Hanoi's action in Paris. He believes Bobby is struggling to get back to the center from the far left; there was a 50-50 chance he would support the action. We would be in a strong position if such a letter were sent.

I thanked him for his suggestion and again expressed my regret that he had gotten into the matter at all.

W. W. Rostow

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12358,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY RA ON 6-2-92

WWRostow:rlm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20
Pres file

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 24, 1968 - 12:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Stewart defends our position redoubtably; but gets absolutely nothing from Gromyko.

Key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 14616, 2 sections

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 97-333
By is, NARA Date 7-8-98

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Department of State

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N O D I S /HARVAN

DELTO 140

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 25430

By is NARA, Date 3-13-98

BRITISH AMBASSADOR, SIR PATRICK REILLY, GAVE HARRIMAN AND VANCE FOLLOWING REPORT ON STEWART VISIT TO MOSCOW. HE ALSO READ FROM A TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY RUSK FROM STEWART. WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING COPY OF SECRETARY BELIEVES IT WOULD BE USEFUL.

BEGIN TEXT: VIETNAM: DISCUSSION WITH MR. GROMYKO ON 23 MAY

1. MR. GROMYKO OPENED WITH A REVIEW OF RECENT EVENTS. THERE HAD BEEN NO REAL PROGRESS IN PARIS SO FAR. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE LEGITIMATELY DEMANDING THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AS AN ESSENTIAL PRIOR STEP: THE UNITED STATES WERE ELABORATING PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SAN ANTONIO POSITION AND DEMANDING RECIPROCAL DE-ESCALATION AND A CESSATION OF INFILTRATION. THUS THE DIALOGUE IN PARIS WAS IN DIFFERENT LANGUAGES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT WOULD DEPEND ON A MORE REALISTIC ATTITUDE BY THE UNITED STATES, THE AGGRESSOR NATION.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REFERRED TO THE POTENTIALITIES OF THE TWO CO-CHAIRMEN WHO WERE NOT CONCERNED MILITARILY, NOR NEGOTIATING ON BEHALF OF EITHER SIDE, BUT WERE MORE IN THE POSITION OF SECONDS IN A DUEL. THE RESULTS OF THEIR PAST DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY WITH THEIR PRINCIPALS SHOULD

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PAGE 02 PARIS 14616 01 OF 02 241439Z

NOT BE UNDER-RATED. THREE MONTHS AGO FEW WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT TALKS WOULD NOW BE TAKING PLACE EVEN THOUGH THERE HAD BEEN NO PROGRESS SO FAR. THE CO-CHAIRMENT HAD A DUTY TO CONSIDER HOW TO HELP OVERCOME THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES. TIME SHOULD NOT BE WASTED IN DISCUSSING THE LEGITIMACY OF EACH SIDE'S DEMANDS. AT PRESENT THERE WAS A WILL ON BOTH SIDES TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO AN END AND MANKIND WANTED TO SEE IT ENDED.

3. THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONTINUED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD ALREADY TAKEN A CONSIDERABLE STEP IN LIMITING THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM. PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S DECISION NOT TO RUN AGAIN SET THE SEAL OF SINCERITY ON HIS WISH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HE HAD SAID THAT HE WAS ALSO PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE COMPLETE STOPPING OF BOMBING. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE OUGHT NOW TO CONSIDER WHAT THEY COULD DO, WITHOUT ENDANGERING THEMSELVES, TO HELP BRING FORWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THEY COULD DO THIS, FOR EXAMPLE, BY GIVING THE UNITED STATES SOUND REASON TO BE SURE THAT THE COMPLETE CESSATION OF BOMBING WOULD NOT EXPOSE UNITED STATES FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM TO GREATER DANGER. THE VITAL POINT WAS NOT WHAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE NEED SAY, BUT WHAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO DO. MR. GROMYKO SHOULD CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE UNITED STATES POSITION IF A CESSATION OF BOMBING EXPOSED UNITED STATES FORCES TO GREATER DANGER THAN BEFORE. PUBLIC OPINION THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT THE CESSATION HAD BEEN MOST UNWISE AND THIS MIGHT RESULT IN A UNITED STATES POLICY CONTAINING GREATER DANGERS THAN AT PRESENT. THE PRESENT SITUATION, ARISING FROM UNITED STATES ACTION, WAS A TURNING POINT: WHAT HAPPENED NEXT WOULD DEPEND ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE COULD REALLY BE RESPECTED AND THE UNITED STATES COULD FEEL THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD GENUINELY OBSERVE IT, THE FIRST OBSTACLE IN THE PARIS TALKS WOULD BE REMOVED AND FURTHER PROGRESS WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

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PAGE 03 PARIS 14616 01 OF 02 241439Z

4. MR. GROMYKO REPLIED THAT BRITISH CONCERN FOR THE POSITION OF UNITED STATES FORCES AFTER A CESSATION OF BOMBING WAS THE WEAKEST POINT IN OUR POLICY. THE AGGRESSOR COULD NOT BE EQUATED WITH THE VICTIM. THE UNITED STATES HAD BROKEN ALL THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND WERE SELECTING ONLY THE DMZ PROVISIONS FOR THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE. THE LEGITIMATE NORTH VIETNAMESE DEMAND FOR A PRIOR CESSATION OF BOMBING SHOULD BE ACCEPTED. HE AND MR. STEWART WERE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE NOT OF THE WAR: THE TWO BELLIGERENTS WERE PLAYING THE DECISIVE ROLE. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEE THAT TRUTH AND THE JUST CAUSE TRIUMPHED.

5. THE SECRETARY OF STATE, CHALLENGING THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSOR AND VICTIM, RECALLED THAT IN 1960 NORTH VIETNAM HAD CALLED FOR AN ALL-OUT STRUGGLE AGAINST THE SOUTH AND HAD THEN SENT NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS INTO THE SOUTH. BUT AGREEMENT WAS UNLIKELY ON WHICH POSITION WAS THE JUST ONE: IT WAS MORE LIKELY ON FINDING SOME

STEPS TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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N O D I S / HARVAN

DELTO 140

IN KOREA THE TWO SIDES HAD TAKEN STEPS, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THEIR OWN VIEWS ON RIGHTS AND WRONGS, TO END THE FIGHTING. OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH VIETNAM HAD CHANGED THEIR OWN POSITIONS RADICALLY. BOTH SIDES HAD THEREBY NARROWED THE GAP. WITH REGARD TO THE DMZ, MR. GROMYKO HAD NOT CORRECTLY APPRAISED THE POSITION OF THE AMERICANS WHO COULD NOT ACCEPT A SITUATION WHEREBY A CESSATION OF BOMBING PUT THEM IN A MORE UNFAVOURABLE SITUATION. ALTHOUGH THE DMZ WAS ONLY ONE PART OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS PROGRESS TOWARDS A FULL RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AGREEMENTS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IF A MEASURE OF DE-ESCALATION COULD BE ACHIEVED THERE. THE UNITED STATES WERE READY TO ACCEPT THE AGREEMENTS AS THE BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT.

6. MR. STEWART CONTINUED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM WOULD BE DETERMINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FREE CHOICE OF ITS PEOPLE. TO EXERCISE THIS CHOICE AND TO EXECUTE THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS THE FIGHTING HAD TO END, AND HE AND MR. GROMYKO SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THIS IN THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMUNIQUE AFTER MR. WILSON'S VISIT. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SHOULD REALIZE THAT THEY COULD DO SOMETHING WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THEIR

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POSITION WHICH WOULD BRING PEACE NEARER. IF NORTH VIETNAME STOOD ON PREVIOUS HISTORICAL POSITIONS THE CHANCE OF PEACE WOULD BE LOST AND NORTH VIETNAM WOULD BEAR A HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY. WITH REGARD TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT MR. STEWART WAS GLAD THAT NORTH VIETNAM BELIEVED THAT SOUTH VIETNAM HAD A RIGHT TO EXIST AND HAVE A GOVERNMENT, BUT FIRST IN THE FIGHTING HAD TO STOP. HOW COULD THE CO-CHAIRMEN HELP? THE EXACT STEPS WERE REALLY FOR THE TWO SIDES IN PARIS. THERE WERE OTHER POSSIBILITIES AS WELL AS THE DMZ. HE HAD OFTEN PROPOSED RECONVENING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. WITH THE PARIS TALKS IN THEIR PRESENT STAGE, THIS WAS PERHAPS PREMATURE, BUT THE CO-CHAIRMEN COULD NOW HELP THE NEGOTIATORS IN PARIS OVERCOME THE FIRST OBSTACLE, PERHAPS ON THE LINES HEHAD SUGGESTED.

7. MR. GROMYKO REPEATED THAT THE QUESTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY AND GUILT COULD NOT BE SEPARATED. THE AMERICANS HAD BROKEN THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND WERE THE AGGRESSORS. FREE ELECTIONS IN THE SOUTH WERE INCONCEIVABLE WHILE HALF A MILLION AMERICAN TROOPS WERE THERE. HE SAW NOTHING NEW IN MR. STEWART'S SUGGESTIONS. FOR THE CO-CAHIRMENT TO BRING INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON THEIR RESPECTIVE SIDES WAS DOUBTFUL: THE POSITIONS OF PRINCIPLE TAKEN BY THE TWO SIDES SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN. CREATING AN ARTIFICIAL SITUATION WOULD NOT SUCCEED. THE AMERICANS DID NOT WISH THE PARIS TALKS TO SUCCEED AND WERE INSISTING ON CONDITIONS AMOUNTING TO AN ULTIMATUM. THE NORTH VIETAMESE PROPOSAL WAS THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM AND ITS JUSTIFICATION COULD NOT BE DENTED. AS FOR AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION, THERE WERE MANY DIFFERENT VIEWS IN THE UNITED STATES APART FROM THOSE OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. THE BRITISH SHOULD EXERT INFLUENCE ON THE LATTER. HOW COULD A GREAT COUNTRY LIKE AMERICA LOSE PRESTIGE BY STOPPING BOMBING LITTLE VIETNAM.

8. THE SECRETARY OF STATE REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT CONSIDERING PRESTIGE BUT THE NEED FOR SOME

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PAGE 03 PARIS 14616 02 OF 02 241449Z

ACTION BY NORTH VIETNAM IN RESPONSE TO THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THIS WAS AN ENTIRELY REASONABLE PROPOSAL FOR ANY COUNTRY WANTING PEACE. AS FOR OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT NATURALLY TOOK THIS INTO ACCOUNT. IF A CESSATION OF BOMBING WERE SEEN IN THE UNITED STATES AS PLACING UNITED STATES TROOPS IN A MORE UNFAVOURABLE POSITION, PUBLIC OPINION MIGHT MOVE TO A POSITION WHERE PEACE WOULD BE MORE DIFFICULT. AS FOR THE PRESENCE OF AMERICAN FORCES, THE UNITED STATES HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THESE WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS PART OF AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT. NORTH VIETNAM WANTED THIS, WHICH UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR SOME ACTION ON THEIR PART, NOT NECESSARILY ANY PUBLIC DECLARATION, TO CLEAR THE ROAD TOWARDS PEACE. HE URGED MR. GROMYKO TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHAT HE HAD SAID.

9. MR. GROMYKO ASKED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO DO LIKEWISE WITH HIS OWN VIEWS. HE ADDED THAT RECONVENING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE WAS UNREALISTIC AT PRESENT. END TEXT.

HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

action

Pres. File

21

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 24, 1968
9:45 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Harriman's proposed scenario for Monday.
You will be getting our recommendations.

No authoritative word yet of Stewart in Moscow.

Town at work, as instructed, on:

- manpower;
- future alternatives for U. S. action.

Do you wish a session today?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-333
By is, NARA Date 9-8-98

~~SECRET~~ attachment

W. W. Rostow

Yes _____

No _____

Call me _____



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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Authority RAC 25432

By is NARA, Date 3-13-98

DELTO 137

N O D I S / HARVAN

FOLLOWING ARE NOTES FOR GOVERNOR HARRIMAN'S REMARKS FOR
MAY 27:

1. THUY WILL BEGIN. WE ASSUME HE WILL CONTINUE LINE DRV HAS
ALREADY TAKEN, EMPHASIZING U. S. OBLIGATION TO STOP THE
BOMBING.

2. WE WILL BEGIN BY SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON THE STATISTICS
USED BY THUY MAY 22 (WHICH HE WILL MAY REPEAT) FROM THE NLF
SIXTH COMMUNIQUE. (THESE BEING CABLED TO WASHINGTON FOR DOUBLE
CHECKING ASAP.) WE WILL ALSO COVER U. S. RESPONSES TO VARIOUS
PEACE PROPOSALS BY GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS. (WE ARE WAITING FOR
DEPARTMENT'S SUMMARY WHICH IS NEEDED URGENTLY.)

3. WE WILL THEN POINT OUT THAT, AS WE SAID MAY 22, WE ARE PREPARED
TO DISCUSS THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, AS DRV HAS REPEATEDLY
REQUESTED.

4. WE WILL LAY STRESS ON THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT. WE WILL POINT
OUT THAT WE HAVE OUTLINED WHAT WE MEAN BY RESTRAINT--AND WE
ARE ALWAYS READY TO DISCUSS WHAT WE MEAN IN GREATER DETAIL.
BUT HOW CAN WE ACTUALLY TALK--AS OPPOSED TO HARANGUE--OVER THE
ISSUE IF THE DRV PERSISTS IN CLAIMING THAT IT HAS NO TROOPS IN THE
SOUTH. IF THAT STATEMENT WERE TRUE, THEN WE WOULD NOT BE BOMBING
THE NORTH, AND WE WOULD NOT BE ASKING FOR ANY RESTRAINT. INDEED,
THE DRV WOULD BE RISKING NOTHING BY AGREEING TO RESTRAINT IF THERE
WERE, IN FACT, NO NVA TROOPS IN THE SOUTH--SINCE THEN THERE

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PAGE 02 PARIS 14592 241159Z

WOULD BE NOTHING TO RESTRAIN. WE MUST THEREFORE RETURN AGAIN TO A QUESTION WHICH IS CENTRAL TO OUR TALKS HERE, AND TO ANY MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE ON THE CESSATION OF BOMBING: THE PRESENCE OF NVA TROOPS IN THE SOUTH IN VIOLATION OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954. AT THIS POINT, WE WILL INTRODUCE THE DETAILED EVIDENCE OF NVA PRESENCE. THIS IS BEING CABLED TO WASHINGTON FOR FINAL VERIFICATION. IT INCLUDES LATEST MATERIAL FROM DIA AND MACV.

5. WE WILL THEN GO ON TO ANOTHER DISCUSSION OF THE DMZ, POINTING OUT IN GREATER DETAIL THAT IT IS DRV THAT VIOLATES DMZ, AND THAT WE ARE READY TO DEMILITARIZE DMZ AT ONCE. WE WOULD HOPE TO FURTHER REFINE OUR PROPOSAL BY USING MATERIAL WHICH WE HAVE REQUESTED FROM WASHINGTON ON THE SORT OF MACHINERY NEEDED TO CARRY OUT THIS PROPOSAL.

6. WE WILL CLOSE BY RETURNING TO BOMBING CESSATION ISSUE, AND REPEATING SECTION CONTAINED AS ANNEX A DELTO 107. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS SHOULD BE REPEATED VERBATIM MAY 27 SO AS TO GIVE U. S. POSITION GREATEST POSSIBLE CONSISTENCY. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO RESPOND IF NORTH VIETNAMESE TRY TO ARGUE THAT WE ARE HERE ONLY TO FIX A DATE FOR CESSATION OF BOMBING. WE WILL MAKE CLEAR AGAIN THAT BOMBING CESSATION IS RELATED TO RESTRAINT, AND THAT OUR DISCUSSION IN THIS REGARD IN NO WAY DENIES POSSIBILITY OF BOMBING CESSATION.

ON THE CONTRARY, IT DEMONSTRATES SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH U. S. APPROACHES THE QUESTION. WHAT WE ASK IS THAT NORTH VIET-NAM RESPOND BY GIVING THE SAME CONSIDERATION TO THE RELEVANT FACTORS.
HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~TOP
SECRET
TRINE~~

Friday, May 24, 1968 - 9:00am

Mr. President:

This is an interesting evaluation of infiltration and the enemy's manpower policy. They are massively pouring in cannon fodder -- rather than first-line troops -- to keep up the pressure.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NIS-141.022-003/2
By je, NARA, Date 11-2-09

III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The average strength of these units, based on the 22 groups for which personnel complements are known, is 496, suggesting that as many as 17,000 troops are involved. This continuing high rate of infiltration from the North is significant because bad weather beginning in May in the Laotian infiltration corridor normally slows troop movements.

2. [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Some of the groups [REDACTED] have had fewer than 200 personnel, lowering the average strength of this month's infiltration groups to well below a norm of 586 since the first of this year. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

4. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

the number of infiltrators [REDACTED] moving south in North Vietnam this year is estimated to be in excess of 100,000. [REDACTED]

the actual number deploying since the first of the year may be substantially higher. How much higher is unknown at present.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAY 2001

23 May 1968

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

III-1

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/pac 00-414
By cbm, NARA Date 7-9-01

~~No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

5. The evidence in support of the theory that more than 100,000 have already deployed from the North in 1968 is to be found in [REDACTED] captured documents, and prisoner interrogations. First is the movement of the 304th and 320th divisions into South Vietnam by January of this year. These units, totaling 16-20,000 troops, were not included in the estimate of 100,000 [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

6. [REDACTED] the 177 infiltration groups [REDACTED] probably do not include all the groups which have moved during the past four and a half months. Although they find it impossible at present to figure out how many are being missed while en route, they acknowledge that total deployments may be well in excess of current estimates.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

7. This impression is supported by the prisoners who have supplied infiltration group numbers [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

8. MACV notes that since 1 February 1968 it has learned of the existence of 218 infiltration groups-- [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

9. There is no solid indication that North Vietnam is depleting its strategic reserve of trained combat personnel in order to keep up the present high level of infiltration. Most of the major North Vietnamese units still assigned to the defense of the homeland show no signs of moving from the North at this time. Rather it appears that the current wave of infiltrating personnel is comprised largely of draftees, reserves, and an unknown number of labor personnel. III-2 23 May 1968

~~No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

10. Evidence is growing that North Vietnam is drawing heavily on "second echelon" manpower in order to carry on infiltration to the south. Captives taken in recent engagements in South Vietnam contain an increasing proportion of young, ill-trained, poorly motivated, and physically unfit troops. It seems likely that persons previously exempt from service for reasons of health now are being taken.

11. It is possible that Hanoi has decided that all such individuals can make a contribution during a year when so much is at stake. Some of them could be used in support of the expanded logistic system required by the deployment of an unprecedented number of troops. Those who are assigned to combat units may be regarded as cannon fodder in keeping up the kind of military pressure the enemy hopes to maintain during the next few months.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

23 May 1968

III-3

~~No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC CO-413
By cbm, NARA, Date 8-21-01

INFORMATION

~~SECRET--SAVIN~~*Pres file*

Friday, May 24, 1968 - 8:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

Following paragraph is an indication that the use of Bai Thuong airfield for MIG's has been resumed:

"The Communists apparently resumed MIG operations south of the 20th parallel on 23 May after a 12-day stand-down. [REDACTED] four MIG fighter-interceptors flew from the Hanoi area to Bai Thuong Airfield and landed. At least two MIG-21s later headed south from Bai Thuong evidently to intercept US aircraft operating south of the 19th parallel. The North Vietnamese aircraft reached a point slightly south of Vinh and apparently returned to Bai Thuong."

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

W. W. Rostow

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

Excerpted from [REDACTED]
"Indications of Vietnamese Communist Military Activity."

24

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 24, 1968 - 8:30 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This is the second intelligence indicator that the chief Hanoi negotiator will go home at the end of May.

W. W. Rostow

25X1A

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-019-034-3-1-3

SANITIZED
Authority NLS 019-034-31
By SP, NARA, Date 7/15/02

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE *24a*

IN

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS *ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SOO ONE CRS
DDI EYO OER FBIS DCS IRS AID USIA

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

CITE

DIST 22 MAY 1968

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI

SUBJECT ADDITIONAL DETAILS CONCERNING THE PLANS OF XUAN THUY
TO RETURN TO HANOI BY THE END OF MAY

ACQ

SOURCE

REF NO.

1.

ON 10 MAY NGUYEN VAN SAO, CHIEF CORRESPONDENT IN LON-
DON OF THE HANOI WEEKLY "CUU QUOC", HAD DESCRIBED THE PRESENT PARIS

5 TALKS TO HIM AS "A PANMUNJOM SITUATION". SAO ADDED THAT WHEN XUAN
4
3 THUY, CHIEF VIETNAMESE DELEGATE, LEFT THE TALKS, HE WOULD LEAVE BEHIND
2
1

5
4
3
2
1

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(dissem controls)

SANITIZED

Authority NLS 019-0343-2

By Q, NARA, Date 11/7/02

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(dissem controls)

A "RUMP GROUP". [REDACTED] COMMENT. SAO ARRIVED IN PARIS ON 11 MAY AND IS ATTACHED TO THE DRV PEACE DELEGATION AS "A SPOKESMAN".

[REDACTED] COMMENT. [REDACTED] IS INTERESTED IN DOING PUBLICITY ON WORLD-WIDE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS.) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] XUAN THUY WAS INTERESTED IN SUCH A PROJECT AND BELIEVED IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL TO EMPHASIZE THE NON-MILITARY ASPECTS OF LIFE IN NORTH VIETNAM. SAO CLAIMED THAT THUY HAD THE AUTHORITY TO GRANT PERMISSION FOR SUCH A PROJECT AND MIGHT LEND HIS SUPPORT TO ITS PREPARATION. [REDACTED] SOMEONE INTERESTED IN DOING THE STORY SHOULD PROBABLY GO TO PARIS TO SEE XUAN THUY, SAO REPLIED THAT THUY WOULD BE IN PARIS ONLY A FORTNIGHT AND WOULD THEN BE RETURNING TO HANOI.

3. [REDACTED] DISSEM: CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [REDACTED]

5
4
3
2
1

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(dissem controls)

5
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2
1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-170

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By ing, NARA, Date 5-9-95

25
ACTION

Friday - May 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Program of Latin American Activities

In your meeting with Felipe Herrera, you told Bill Bowdler of your interest in:

- a signing ceremony on the IDB Bill authorizing \$412 million of callable capital;
- a trip to Hemisfair with all the Latin American Ambassadors and OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza; and
- a trip by you to South America.

I have these recommendations:

IDB Bill Signing

The bill was received from the Hill yesterday morning. You have until June 4 to sign it.

June 4 is the arrival day for President Trejos of Costa Rica. We could have the signing ceremony in the East Room right after the welcoming ceremony and reschedule the customary office call for later in the afternoon.

An East Room bill-signing-ceremony would be a novel item in the program for a state visit; but it ties in nicely with President Trejos' plan to host a luncheon for Felipe Herrera and his Board of Directors at Blair House that same day. Ambassador Duke thinks it a splendid idea.

If you approve this scheduling we shall work out the details.

Approve	_____
Disapprove	_____
Call me	_____.

Trip to Hemisfair

State is in a real bind financially. But after July 1 they should be in a better position to pick up the tab.

President Barrientos wants to come to Hemisfair for the Bolivian National Day at a time when you will be at the Ranch. He is flexible on the date, but asks for sufficient lead time since he wants to combine the visit here with a state visit to Colombia.

We could combine the trip to Hemisfair with the Barrientos visit to San Antonio and make it during the July 4 Recess, thereby helping State on its budget problems.

May we schedule the trip to Hemisfair and the Ranch visit by President Barrientos for Friday, July 5?

Yes	_____
No	_____.

Trip to South America

At Tab A is the itinerary and map for a five-day visit to South America. It is structured to give you a good over-view of Brazil's

achievements and problems. In Brasilia you would do the state honors, plus seeing a new capital on the inner frontiers of South America. In Rio you can get a picture of the contrast between opulence and grinding poverty, so typical of Latin American urban centers. In Sao Paulo you can see the new industrial strength of Latin America and mix with the factory workers. In Recife you can get a feel for the plight and progress of Latin American agriculture. We should be able to get good crowds in all places.

We chose Brazil because it is the largest and the most important, dynamic and interesting country in the area. It is also the place where you are least likely to run into security problems or demonstrations.

A United States President has not been in Brazil since President Eisenhower's visit in early 1960. President Roosevelt went to Natal in 1942 to discuss the war effort with President Vargas. President Truman went to Rio in 1947 to attend the conference that drew up the Rio Pact.

The stops en route in Colombia and Guyana are designed to break up the long trip and blunt the criticism of those who will harp on your going to a country with a military president.

On timing, you might consider mid-July, early August, or November after the elections.

If this kind of trip appeals to you, I will discuss it with Dick Helms and Secretary Rusk. They may still have strong reservations about

~~SECRET~~

-4-

your making any trip to Latin America.

1. I like the itinerary _____

Call me _____.

2. I prefer --

mid-July _____

early August _____

November _____.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Tab A -- Itinerary and map for 5-day visit to South America.

~~SECRET~~

25

Itinerary

for

South American Trip

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-170
By ing, NARA, Date 5-9-95

First Day: Depart Washington for Bogota, Colombia.

- Motorcade from airport to Presidential Palace.
- Dinner with President Lleras.
- Overnight Bogota.

Second Day: Depart Bogota for Brasilia, arriving early afternoon.

- Motorcade from airport to Presidential Palace.
- Visit to President of Supreme Court.
- Address before Joint Session of Brazilian Congress.
- Dinner by President Costa e Silva.
- Overnight Brasilia.

Third Day: Depart Brasilia for Rio, arriving at 11:00 a.m.

- Motorcade from airport to Governor's Palace.
- Luncheon by Guanabara Governor Negrão de Lima.
- Visit to Peace Corps project in a favela (slum) where PCB girls are working.

Third Day: Continued:

- Visit to Villa Alianza low-cost housing project.
- Return dinner by you for President Costa e Silva.
- Rio overnight.

Fourth Day: Depart Rio for Sao Paulo, arriving mid-morning.

- Motorcade from airport to Governor's Palace.
- Helicopter from Sao Paulo to Campinas industrial complex.
- Tour large factory and have lunch with workers.
- Visit coffee fazenda (ranch).
- Overnight at fazenda.

Fifth Day: Depart Sao Paulo for Recife, arriving around noon.

- Motorcade from airport to Governor's Palace.
- Address Council of SUDENE.
- Visit sugar plantation in process of reform and modernization.

" Depart Recife for Georgetown for refueling stop and short visit with Prime Minister Burnham.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NODIS

Authority Dec 84-57
By sp/rg, NARA, Date 6-5-92

Thursday, May 23, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith a capsule of Bunker's 52nd weekly report:

Free file

A. General

- Loc Cabinet resigns and Huong accepts Prime Ministership.
- Thieu stated he would not replace Corps commanders nor tolerate regional discrimination.
- Huong seeks new cabinet representative of various regions and interest groups.
- Reaction to Huong's appointment generally good.
- Ky unhappy but there is no evidence he will try to obstruct the changes.
- Thieu feels VC/NVA are in no hurry for serious talks and the destruction of homes in cities could profoundly sap public morale.
- Thieu feels we should be careful our patience at Paris not considered weakness.
- VC building up own administration in countryside and creating new front groups.
- Morale problems among enemy increasing.

B. Political

- Upper House approves general mobilization bill.
- Lower House debates Paris talks; approves new press law.
- Thieu and Foreign Minister Don to be sole official GVN spokesmen on Paris talks.

C. Military

- General decrease in military activity except in I Corps.
- Enemy building pressure on Khe Sanh, Danang, Hue and Kontum.

D. Pacification

- Slow, steady recovery from serious Tet regression.
- Emphasis on hamlet security and destruction of VC infrastructure.

E. Urban Recovery

- May attacks generated 143,000 new refugees in Saigon/Cholon.
- GVN Central Recovery Committee and joint ARVN-US engineer task force aiding reconstruction efforts.

F. Economic

- Price index dropped 7% during week to level 25% above Tet.
- Semi-annual US-GVN discussions on economic issues.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

W. W. R.

Thursday, May 23, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 28053)

Herewith my fifty-second weekly message:

A. General

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-331
By is, NARA Date 3-20-99

The last week was noteworthy for a number of items:

On May 18, President Thieu announced the resignation of the Loc Cabinet, his decision to reorganize the government, his invitation to Tran Van Huong to serve as Prime Minister, and Huong's acceptance. In an excellent brief speech Thieu paid tribute to the accomplishments of the Loc government, sought to set at rest unfounded rumors which had been circulating about the attitude of the military, the Buddhists, the Southern Separatists, and threatened discriminations against northerners. He made it clear that he had no intentions of replacing the corps commanders, that he would not tolerate discrimination in any form and called attention to the fact that the Congress, representing the whole people, exercised supervision over the activities and effectiveness of the government. He called on people of all persuasions to extend comprehension and assistance to the new government in the common cause.

Tran Van Huong is now engaged in intensive consultations with a broad range of political figures, clearly hoping to establish as wide a base as possible for his new Cabinet. Thieu told me yesterday that he will be meeting again in the afternoon with Huong to go over the Cabinet list, that they have planned to talk with Vice President Ky today, and that he hoped to announce the new government by Friday or Saturday at the latest. It is planned to reduce the Cabinet from the 17 to 13 or 14 and to set up a smaller group, in the nature of a war cabinet, consisting of Thieu, Ky, the Prime Minister, and two or three others who will meet daily to deal with urgent matters and see that decisions are implemented. Thieu indicated that the most effective of the present ministers would be retained, though not necessarily in the same positions: Lu Y (Health), Sieu (Transport), Tri (Revolutionary Development), Vy (Defense), Tinh (Finance), and possibly others. Huong has been at some pains to make clear the fact that he wants to put together a balanced team in terms of regions and other interest groups.

Reaction to the Huong appointment continues to come in and is generally favorable, although there are some who prefer to reserve their views until the composition of the Cabinet is known. Huong has a reputation for personal integrity, honesty, toughness, and a fighter against corruption; he also has a reputation for stubbornness, of which Thieu is aware but which he believes will not prevent their working well together. Thieu told me a week ago that Huong's concern was that he be given enough leeway to work to the end of more effective and honest government. Thieu is prepared to do this and said that he had gone through a long list and "the fact is there is no one to appoint Prime Minister except Huong."

In addition to the generally favorable comment on Huong's appointment, it was encouraging that one of the leading extremist Buddhist figures, Thich Phap Tri, denied publicly that the An Quang group was opposed to Huong, and in fact expressed satisfaction at the appointment.

Unfortunately, as so often in the past, there has been irresponsible reporting on the appointment of the new Cabinet. The reports of a serious crisis or showdown between Thieu and Ky over the Huong appointment appears to be lacking in foundation. While Ky is unhappy over developments, because of Huong's known independence, I know of no evidence that he will attempt to do anything to obstruct it. In fact, it is reported that the conversation Huong had with Ky last Tuesday went very well, and that Huong handled it with tact and skill. The AP story of May 17 which predicted a Thieu-Ky showdown over the appointment of the new Cabinet was written by a new correspondent recently arrived in Vietnam after some years of service in Latin America who accepted at face value one of the countless rumors always circulating in Saigon.

That Hanoi's current strategy is an all-out effort, militarily and psychologically, to strengthen its hand in negotiations continues to be evident. While as I reported in my last message the enemy's major attack on Saigon was broken off, he is covering his withdrawal with a series of rocket and mortar attacks on a variety of targets. This has included indiscriminate firing at Saigon in the early morning hours of May 19 and additional mortar and rocket attacks against the capitals of Ba Xuyen, Dinh Tuong, and Binh Thuan Provinces early on May 21.

The indiscriminate attacks on civilians in Saigon have had an impact in psychological terms as well as added to the list of dead, wounded, and homeless. Three Vietnamese police and three civilians are known dead, 32 civilians and one American soldier are reported wounded, and some 500 people have had their homes destroyed. The home of Nguyen Luu Vien, Deputy Prime Minister in Ky's last Cabinet, was hit by a 122 MM rocket just after he had gotten his family awake and downstairs. He and his family suffered scratches but were otherwise unhurt. He dismissed the attack as blind terror designed to impress world opinion as proving that the Communists are masters in South Vietnam. Nguyen Phu Duc, an advisor to President Thieu, had an experience very similar to Vien's.

In our fifth joint discussion on problems of negotiations yesterday morning, Thieu gave his estimate of Hanoi's objectives and brought up a subject which is obviously of increasing concern to the Government of Vietnam, i. e., how long the present situation of partial bombing halt with no reciprocity can be allowed to go on.

Thieu said that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army is "testing our patience" and are in no hurry to engage in serious talks. They mean to exploit the partial bombing halt for as long as possible in order to increase infiltration and to mount new large-scale attacks. He was concerned that the death and destruction which is daily visible in the cities would have a cumulative psychological impact on the people. Statistics of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army losses (which the enemy can still afford in any case) make little impression on most people, but the

destruction of their homes is evident. Their faith in the government strength and capacity to protect them from these attacks will more and more be sapped. Thieu believed that within another month the enemy would probably launch another major attack, and would continue harassment of the cities in order to discredit the Government of Vietnam and attempt to create an uprising against it.

Thieu felt that the talks so far in Paris have been favorable to our side and that we should use the time to attract international support, but should be careful not to allow our patience to be misread as weakness. He expressed the view that Hanoi would attempt to measure our patience and to exploit the U. S. political situation; that they might attempt to await the development of our political campaign to form a judgment as to the desirability of moving toward a settlement or of awaiting installation of a new administration. He added that though this question was of great concern to him, he thought that we could "wait a while, but not too much longer", before putting a time limit on Hanoi's delaying tactics at Paris. Do observed that the enemy was clearly "taking advantage" already of the partial cessation.

Thieu, Ky and Do have all commented favorably on the performance of our delegation at Paris, and especially on Ambassador Harriman's statements.

It is also increasingly apparent that Hanoi's current strategy of all-out effort to strengthen its hand for a political settlement is directed at the countryside as well as the cities. Documentary evidence shows that the enemy is placing new emphasis on destroying the local Government of Vietnam administrative structure, and on setting up a Viet Cong administration in its place. His effort to strengthen his apparent political base in the cities by organizing front groups is being supplemented by a campaign to organize rural "Liberation Committees" at provincial, district, village, and hamlet levels. This effort, I think, is designed among other things to reinforce the National Liberation Front claim to such wide control over the people in the countryside as to justify a major role for it in a coalition government.

The other side of the coin, however, is the evidence disclosed by recent documents and interrogations of some of the senior Communist officers who have rallied recently. These have brought out a number of signs of growing Communists morale problems in the wake of their heavy losses and defeats during the Tet and May offensives. LtC. Tran Van Dac, a political officer in the area north of Saigon, states that allied air and artillery strikes have caused severe mental tension among Communist troops and cadres. Problems of supply and the evident discrepancy between Viet Cong propaganda and the reality regarding both Army of the Republic of Vietnam and allied fighting spirit and the extent of popular support for the Viet Cong have also had a depressing effect on morale. Another report indicates that most of the people living in Viet Cong controlled areas are war weary and that the Viet Cong promises to bring an end to the war this year will have a disastrous effect on morale if this does not occur. A result of this attitude has been an increase in desertions out of fear of combat losses and an overwhelming desire for survival inspired by the recent peace negotiations. Against this background of declining morale, a document

captured in Binh Duong Province prepared by the chief of the political staff of an element subordinate to the Central Office for South Vietnam emphasizes that the purpose of the peace talks, as the Communists see it, is to confirm the defeat of the allies and a Viet Cong victory. It states that nothing can be expected from diplomatic debates unless a major military victory is achieved. Consequently, Viet Cong personnel must not let themselves be lured by peace illusions, but must support peace negotiations by fighting harder to achieve more decisive victories; a significant contrast between the mood at the top and in the lower ranks which speaks for itself.

B. Political

The National Assembly continues at work. The Upper House approved a general mobilization bill on May 18, although in a shorter version than that approved by the Lower House on May 10. The Upper House leadership is convinced that its version of the bill, leaving considerable discretion to the executive, was necessary if the purposes of general mobilization were to be served, a view shared by a number of Lower House members. This mobilization directorate began drafting 18-year-olds on May 1 with mobilization of the class born in 1950 expected to continue through June. In fact, this will have the effect of drafting a considerable number of 17-year-olds (those who become 18 between June and December this year). This aspect has not received great attention here and perhaps should not be referred to publicly, but it is an indication of the determination that Thieu has managed to infuse into the Government Ministry of Defense.

An inconclusive debate was held in the Lower House on May 14 on a motion submitted by Ho Huu Tuong (a veteran Trotskyite sometimes considered to be a neutralist) for establishment of a special committee on peace talks. The debate finally ended when enough deputies had left so that the chairman halted proceedings for the lack of a quorum. The majority of the speakers objected to the establishment of the committee and while there was some criticism of the U. S. for having "fallen into a Communist trap" by agreeing to go to Paris characterized as a "Communist propaganda center", other deputies have said that the position of the U. S. is not to sell out Vietnam "and called on their colleagues to cease criticizing our friends and allies". The debate is significant as underlining once more that developments in Paris are being closely followed, that there are some reservations about our intentions in the talks but that most of the Assembly is prepared to give us credit for good intentions.

When it became apparent that talks would begin in Paris, I suggested to Thieu that he circumscribe comment within the executive branch of the government. He subsequently issued a directive on May 18, making clear that he, the Prime Minister, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs would be the sole official spokesmen with authority to issue statements or comments expressing the position or attitude of the Government of Vietnam regarding the Paris talks. The circular enjoined all other government officials to avoid comment, conjecture, or arguments in which they express their personal views on the talks.

On May 17 the Lower House voted to approve a press law which, while supporting the principle of freedom of speech, considerably strengthens the penalties for libel, for disseminating material which promotes regional divisiveness, and material which "upholds Communist principles, contentions, or activities, or those of pro-Communist neutralism."

C. Military

There was a decrease in the tempo of the war last week which applied across the board with the exception of the First Corps where the intensity increased. Enemy losses nonetheless continued at a very high rate, at almost a ten to one ratio. The enemy lost 4,765 killed in action compared to 477 friendly losses of which 176 were U.S. and 19 Australians. Enemy weapons lost also continued at a high rate -- 1,097, compared to the loss of 86 friendly weapons.

In the First Corps, activities picked up in the Khe Sanh area, while the 308th North Vietnamese Army Division, which attacked the week before last against the DMZ in strength, suffered such heavy casualties that it was withdrawn into the DMZ area. The pressure around Hue was considerably relieved because of the aggressive actions of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam First Division, together with a Ranger Battalion attached to it and our 101st Airborne Division. In withdrawing from the A Shau Valley, we mined and boobytrapped the areas extensively and established a base for 175 MM guns capable of firing into much of the valley.

Pressures are beginning to build up around Danang and it seems probably that the next wave of the enemy's offensive will be concentrated in Quang Nam Province and in Kontum Province in the central highlands. It also seems quite possible that there will be heavy fighting around Hue in the next several weeks.

Efforts are being made to preempt enemy offensive actions in the Kontum area. There was an interesting action there last week, a good example of cooperation between U.S. and Vietnamese forces. A Regional Force Company was attacked by a North Vietnamese Battalion. Based on prior planning on information received from a prisoner, General Peers' artillery in the vicinity of the camp had been coordinated with the commander of the Regional Force Company. When the attack occurred in the middle of the night, the Regional Force Company held off the attackers long enough to get word to the artillery and because of the pre-planned fire which had been previously developed, enemy attacks were completely stopped. Only 3 Regional Force soldiers were wounded and 147 enemy bodies and many weapons were found outside the post.

In Second Corps the Korean White Horse Division is carrying on a campaign in the hills west of Nha Trang. General Westmoreland reports that the situation in Phan Thiet and Binhthuan Provinces, which had markedly deteriorated, is greatly improved. The Province Chief has become far more aggressive, combined intelligence operations have greatly improved and operations against the infrastructure and in the hills against main force units are being carried on. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam regiments have been extremely aggressive and have achieved excellent results.

In Second Corps the Australians had their heaviest contact of the war. They suffered fairly heavy casualties. In two engagements they killed over 100 of the enemy and believe that they killed still more. The 9th U. S. Division and 5th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division also had successful operations.

In Fourth Corps there were no major engagements but the Vietnamese troops under the leadership of the new Corps Commander, General Thang, kept up their aggressive actions.

D. Pacification

Sometimes we tend to overlook how much control the enemy already has over the countryside, especially since Tet. Regression in the hamlets has been serious. More than 1.1 million people were lost from the relatively secure A, B, C hamlet categories as a result of the Tet offensive. Our hamlet evaluation survey shows slow, steady recovery, but it will take some months at the present rate to restore the pre-Tet level of population control. If we put to one side the cities and large towns (40 percent of the population) the enemy control of strictly rural population rises to 28 percent and total drops to about 45 percent, as contrasted to 62 percent for the population as a whole.

Hence solid gains in the hamlet war are as essential as attrition of the enemy's main forces. This is why we have been seeking to reshape our pacification effort to emphasize short term high impact programs such as: (1) countering regression; (2) improving local security so that the Government of Vietnam officials will move back to villages and hamlets; (3) getting the best leaders into key positions; (4) exerting pressure on the Viet Cong infrastructure; and (5) helping revive the economy on the theory that people who are well off are more likely to support the Government of Vietnam than the Communists. Satisfactory progress is hard to come by, partly because of the inherently slow-moving nature of the pacification process and partly because pacification is a 99.9 percent Vietnamese program which is not yet receiving the dynamic top level Government of Vietnam direction it merits. I can sympathize with Komer's frustrations.

However, the gradual upward trend in these figures, Viet Cong infrastructure eliminations, and economic indicators shows that we are slowly regaining momentum.

End-April hamlet evaluation system reports show further modest gains in recovery of Government of Vietnam control in the countryside. From a post-Tet low and end-February of 59.8 percent of population living in relatively secure areas. End-April data shows an increase to about 62 percent. There was an April gain of 158,000 people in A, B, and C hamlets, while Viet Cong-controlled population declined by about 70,000.

Since we have been giving first emphasis to restoring security so we can later get on with the development aspects of pacification, it is interesting that the April population gain based on the nine Hamlet Evaluation System security factors alone was 368,000 people--more than twice the gain based on all eighteen security and development factors.

Government of Vietnam operations against the Viet Cong infrastructure continued to achieve modest results. Some 1,295 identified enemy organizers and political cadre were eliminated during April, mostly at hamlet and village level. Our advisor reports indicates 183 were killed, 997 captured and 115 rallied as Chieu Hoi returnees. It is significant that 86 percent are alive and giving intelligence that will lead to further eliminations. This multiplication process can, with the improved Phung Hoang organization, seriously cut into the enemy's structure.

E. Urban Recovery

Damage from the early May attack on Saigon/Cholon has turned out to be heavier than first estimated. Refugees rost to about 104,000 in Saigon and 39,000 in Gia Dinh. Houses destroyed total 10-15,000 in Saigon and 5,200 in Gia Dinh. As full magnitude of problems emerged, Thieu accepted our suggestion that Central Recovery Committee take on new Saigon/Gia Dinh task.

Thieu also approved special MACV/Army of the Republic of Vietnam plan, which General Westmoreland developed, for a joint Army of the Republic of Vietnam and U.S. military engineer task force to clear rubble, lay concrete foundations for houses, rebuild some 1,000 destroyed homes, and help people rebuild others in Saigon/Gia Dinh. On Monday, U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam engineers began clearing operations in Saigon districts 6 and 8.

Meanwhile, further progress is being made on resettling Tet evacuees. The number dropped 39,000 to 349,000 as flow of commodities and allowances accelerates. About 47 percent of cement and 41 percent of roofing allowances have been distributed. To help speed up process, Thieu announced at our urging a May 5 deadline for distributing all cash and commodities.

Recovery is proceeding well in Hue. Although there is still much to do, building materials have been distributed to over 5,700 families. Two markets have been re-opened, and a pontoon bridge installed.

F. Economic

The U.S. Aid Mission retail price index fell 7 percent during the week ending May 20, continuing the decline begun the week before. Prices of rice, fresh protein foods, and vegetables declined, with vegetable prices declining substantially. Prices of processed food such as bread, condensed milk, beer, and nuoc mam, (fish sauce) were unchanged or somewhat higher. The index is now 10 percent above the level reached on April 29, the last reading before the May offensive began, and 25 percent above January 2, 1968.

During the week, the joint U.S. -Government of Vietnam economic committee met and discussed a wide range of issues. The U.S. representatives submitted a draft text for an economic policy agreement for 1968, and a letter proposing specific policy agreement for 1968, and a letter proposing specific policy measures to be agreed in June, when a semi-annual review of the situation will be held. The June meeting will probably be the first serious confrontation on economic policy with the Huong cabinet. We will be striving for firm tax revenue targets, measures to hold the foreign exchange level in check, a sound policy on civil service wages, and other measures to keep the economy on the track.

Domestic tax collections in April this year were nearly two billion piasters or 35 percent higher than April last year. While this was in part a catching-up after low collections in February and March, it is nevertheless very encouraging. Total collections in the four months through April 1968 are only one percent lower than the same period last year.

INFORMATION

**Thursday, May 23, 1968
7:35 p. m.**

Mr. President:

Since I gather we are going to meet tomorrow at 6:30 p. m., herewith a draft of my film scenario on foreign policy.

I am sending copies to: Larry Levinson, Larry Temple, Harry McPherson and Jim Jones.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

27

Pres file

May 23, 1968

Film Scenario: Foreign Policy

I. Central Theme: The Great Transition.

On January 10, 1967, President Johnson described in these words the era through which we were passing during his Administration: "We are in the midst of a great transition: from narrow nationalism to international partnership; from the harsh spirit of the Cold War to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a troubled and threatened planet." (Shot: passage from 1967 State of the Union message.)

II. How has he sought to lead our people and the world through this great transition?

Perhaps the simplest and clearest statement of his policy was incorporated in The Goals of Freedom set out by all the participants in the Manila Conference of October 1966. Here is what the leaders of the seven nations said:

"We, the seven nations gathered in Manila, declare our unity, our resolve and our purpose in seeking together the goals of freedom in Vietnam and in the Asian and Pacific areas. They are:

- "1. To be free from aggression.
- "2. To conquer hunger, illiteracy, and disease.
- "3. To build a region of security, order, and progress.
- "4. To seek reconciliation and peace throughout Asia and the Pacific."

(Shot: shots of the President and others at the Manila Conference could serve as background to the narration.)

III. President Johnson applied these four policies not merely in Asia but throughout the whole world.

IV. To be free of aggression.

Although he ached to use all of our resources and talents abroad, as at home, for constructive purposes, the hard fact was this: there were still those in the world who sought to achieve their objectives by aggression across international frontiers where the U. S. had interests and solid commitments. President Johnson knew that the great transition to partnership and progress and peace could not be achieved if aggression was permitted to succeed.

(Shot: assorted but not sharply identified photographs of, say, trucks coming down Ho Chi Minh trail; Che Guevarra; and other indicators of aggressive intent.)

V. Dominican Republic.

In April 1965 it became clear that Communists intended to exploit chaos in the Dominican Republic. The Johnson Administration moved swiftly and decisively to assure the people of the Dominican Republic the right of self-determination without coercion. In this effort, we were joined by allies in the Western Hemisphere. Fourteen months later a peaceful election was held -- scrupulously supervised by the OAS. The citizens of the Dominican Republic began to move forward in dignity, under democracy.

(Shots: Violence in Dominican Republic; landing of U.S. forces; shots of Brazilians and others who joined; Ellsworth Bunker at work in the DR; shots of the election; Balaguer's inauguration; Nick Katzenbach at dam ceremony in 1968.)

VI. Vietnam.

In the aggression against South Vietnam President Johnson faced his most dangerous, difficult challenge. In 1954 the Senate had passed with a vote of 82 to 1 the Southeast Asia Treaty. His two predecessors had committed the nation because they believed that our vital interests were involved in assuring Southeast Asia against aggression. In 1962 the Geneva Accords on Laos appeared to promise that violence could be contained. But the men in Hanoi did not honor their commitment for a single day. In 1964, in the face of political turmoil in Saigon, they expanded their infiltration and brought regular North Vietnamese units into the South. In 1965 the choice facing the nation and its President was: get out of Southeast Asia and turn the area over to the aggressors, or fight to insure that the treaties governing the area were honored and the people of South Vietnam had the right of self-determination.

President Johnson decided that there was only one honorable course for the nation, and only one course which would preserve its vital interests: to keep our word. And so the struggle was fully joined.

Constructive tasks of building a viable independent nation in South Vietnam could not await the end of the war. Working with the South Vietnamese, education was expanded; the sick looked after; agriculture improved; postwar reconstruction planned; and, above all, a constitutional government built by the South Vietnamese in the midst of the war. Behind this shield a new and confident Asia began to emerge and the President held up a vision of what Southeast Asia could become if aggression were abandoned. (Shots: appropriate shots can be identified for each stage of the Vietnam section, including President Kennedy on Vietnam.)

VII. To conquer hunger, illiteracy, and disease.

Despite the burdens of the struggle in Southeast Asia, the President carried forward, abroad as at home, the struggle against the ancient enemies of man: hunger, illiteracy, and disease. In the years of his Presidency, the Alliance for Progress accelerated.

"In these years ... the average per capita growth in Latin America has more than doubled over the first three years of the Alliance, from nine-tenths of one percent in 1961 through 1963, to two and two-tenths percent from 1964 through 1967.

"The United States has put \$7 billion 700 million at the service of the Alliance for Progress. That is 35 percent higher per annum in the last four years than we did in the first three years.

"The enrollment in our primary schools has increased by almost 7 million students, and in secondary schools by close to 2 million students. The number of cooperatives has increased by over 35 percent. A quarter of a million land titles have

already been distributed, and tax collections, which rose \$489 million in the 1961 through 1963 period, increased from \$489 million to nearly \$3 billion during the 1964 to 1967 period."

(Shot: from Mora lunch, if recorded.)

VIII. The Indian droughts.

In 1966 and again in 1967 terrible droughts struck India, where more than half a billion human beings live. Working with the Congress -- and with other nations -- President Johnson assured that there was no starvation. Meanwhile, we worked with the Indians to give food production the priority required. Through these efforts, democracy in India survived; a hopeful agricultural revolution is under way; and the Indians are turning with vigor to family planning. (Shots: drought; food ships; agricultural planning; family planning clinics.)

IX. Progress elsewhere.

President Johnson carried forward our programs of foreign aid in other regions, insisting strongly on self-help as the only practical and effective basis for foreign aid. And during his Administration a number of nations were able to move off the list of foreign aid recipients and go forward on their own: Taiwan, Israel, and Iran. And the end of special assistance was in sight for others as well.

(Shots: economic activity in the three countries.)

X. Regions of security, order, and progress.

In Europe, despite the French attitude towards NATO, our basic partnership was maintained and extended: the new NATO headquarters was opened in Brussels; we achieved important agreements on troop levels and their financing; the Kennedy Round negotiations were successfully completed; and imaginative new measures were worked out with our partners to maintain the international monetary system.

(Shots: new NATO headquarters; McCloy at White House meeting; gay shot at end of Kennedy Round; Rio Monetary meeting. Meetings with Wilson, Kiesinger, Adenauer funeral, Mora, etc.)

XI. Regionalism elsewhere.

President Johnson perceived that it was time to develop regional organizations and partnerships beyond Europe:

-- He threw his full weight behind Latin American integration at the Conference of Punta del Este;

(Shots: President speaking at Punta del Este)

-- He threw his support behind regional developments in Africa in the only speech ever given by an American President wholly devoted to Africa;

(Shot: passage from OAU speech.)

-- Above all, behind the shield in Vietnam, he encouraged the spirit of cooperation in the vital, emerging New Asia;

(Shot: passage from East-West Center speech.)

-- And, as he pointed out at Lancaster, Ohio:

"Our purpose in promoting a world of regional partnerships is not without self-interest. For as they grow in strength inside a strong United Nations, we can look forward to a decline in the burden that America has had to bear this generation. And we can look forward to increased growth and stability in each corner of the world."

(Shot: President speaking this passage, if film available.)

XII. Reconciliation.

President Johnson regarded his efforts to prevent successful aggression; to achieve economic and social progress; to build islands of regional order; as the foundation for the nation's ultimate objective: reconciliation and peace among men.

-- His statesmanship led us from dangerous violence in Panama to friendly negotiations; (Shot: Panama 1965 riots; Anderson negotiations.)

-- Twice his intervention helped prevent war between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus; (Shot: Cy Vance in full cry.)

-- He quietly applied our influence to end the war between India and Pakistan and on terms which permitted us to maintain our good relations with both nations;

(Shot: President with Mrs. Gandhi and with Ayub.)

-- In the Middle East crisis the hot line was used to keep the major powers from confrontation; to achieve a cease-fire; and to leave open the possibility of a peace based on the President's five principles enunciated on June 19, 1967.

(Shot: President in Situation Room on hot line; passage from June 19 speech stating five principles.)

XIII. East-West progress.

Despite all the difficulties, President Johnson also threw his weight into the effort to build bridges to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. (Shot: October 7, 1966 speech.) He knew the task would be long and slow; but it was the right way for mankind. He met with their leaders. (Shots: President with Maurer and then Glassboro with Kosygin.)

Out of such efforts came the Outer Space Treaty, the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union, the Air Agreement, common efforts to bring about a non-proliferation treaty. (Shot: keep camera on Glassboro for the above passage of text.)

And across the chasm of our relations with Communist China he reached out his hand and held up a vision of the reconciliation that must come.

"There is a fourth essential for peace in Asia which may seem the most difficult of all: reconciliation between nations that now call themselves enemies.

"A peaceful mainland China is central to a peaceful Asia.

"A hostile China must be discouraged from aggression.

"A misguided China must be encouraged toward understanding of the outside world and toward policies of peaceful cooperation.

"For lasting peace can never come to Asia as long as the 700 million people of mainland China are isolated by their rulers from the outside world." (Shot: President speaking this passage.)

And then on March

And then on March 31 of this year, when he felt the time was ripe, he reached out for peace in Vietnam -- and met a response.

(Shot: passage from President's speech -- then first Paris meeting.)

He warned that the path to peace in Southeast Asia might be long and hard. But this was the only way.

"We often think about peace as an absence of war. But, in fact, peace is a struggle, an achievement, an endless effort to convert hostility into negotiation, bloody violence into politics, and hate into reconciliation."

* * * * *

"Now we shall begin. The days, the weeks, and the months ahead are going to be very hard and hazardous and trying, and exact the best from all of us. But with every fiber of my being, I shall try to move us from fighting to peace, from enmity to brotherhood, and from destruction to common efforts on behalf of the men and women and children of all of Southeast Asia.

"In all of this, I ask all of you for your prayers."

XIV. 5-minute close. (White House Correspondents theme.) McPherson

ACTION

28

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, May 23, 1968 -- 7:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a proposal by Sec. of State on the Middle East.

It would:

- engage Arthur Goldberg, after he leaves his post, in contact with the Israelis;
- engage, at your choice (and their willingness to serve) David Rockefeller, Eugene Black, John McCloy, or Robert Anderson as our agent with the Arabs.

Sec. Rusk's view is that the national interest now requires us to engage more actively in trying to achieve peace in the Middle East.

I am inclined to agree.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLT 97-333
By is, NARA Date 7-8-98

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WWRostow:rlh

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

28a

~~SECRET~~

May 23, 1968

Mr. President:

I am increasingly concerned, as I know you are, about the continuing delay in moving the Middle Eastern problem toward a more permanent solution. Israel seems to be saying that they will not discuss the substance of outstanding questions with Ambassador Jarring in the absence of face to face discussion with its Arab neighbors. Further, it has refused to act with restraint in Jerusalem and has not even made such a token gesture as withdrawal from the Saudi Arabian islands of Tiran and Senafir.

Israel's Arab neighbors, for their part, seem unwilling to talk seriously about the substance of a permanent settlement and are resting upon periodic propaganda exercises aimed at both Israel and the United States in such forums as the Security Council.

Meanwhile, the influence of the Soviet Union in such key countries as Egypt, Syria and Iraq continues to grow at the expense of our and other Western interests. You are familiar with the arms problem in the area and the refusal of the Soviet Union to discuss the matter seriously with us prior to Israeli withdrawal.

I have been trying to think of some way in which we could get this problem off of dead center — a situation filled with danger.

One possibility would be that we and the Soviet Union discuss this matter secretly and in complete detail — putting together a package which the two of us would then try to impose upon the countries of the area. I do not believe that this would work. I doubt that we and the Soviets could agree simply because their and our interests are in direct conflict. I doubt that the two

of us

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-207
By sp, NARA, Date 10-14-92

~~SECRET~~

-2-

of us could impose a result upon the countries of the area. We failed to restrain Israel last June and there is serious question as to how far the Russians could go with, say, Egypt and Syria.

Another alternative, which appeals to me, is that we ourselves get into a more serious dialogue with both Israel and its Arab neighbors in an effort to find a basis for a settlement with which both sides could live. This would mean asking someone, very privately, to be in touch with both sides on your behalf on a more serious basis than we have yet attempted. There is some difficulty in having the same individual talk both to Israel and to the Arabs because such a person might be looked upon merely as a conduit to the other side and would not be treated with complete frankness. This suggests that we might ask two highly competent Americans to try to see what could be done — one talking with Israel and the other talking with the Arabs.

It seems to me that Arthur Goldberg would be a good person to carry on serious talks with Israel after he leaves his present UN post. I have reason to think that he would be willing to do so. He is a tough-minded man and a superb negotiator and would be trusted by Israel even though points of real disagreement may come up.

As for the Arabs, my mind turns to one of the following (in order of preference): David Rockefeller, Eugene Black, John McCloy and Robert Anderson. I would put Robert Anderson higher on the list except for his private interests in the area.

You might wish to give this idea some thought in order that I may discuss it with you at your convenience.

For your

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-3-

For your information I am attaching a summary which I asked Luke Battle to prepare of all of the suggestions which we have made to both sides in the Middle East. In thumbing through this, you will note that we have been very active in our efforts but that our advice thus far has been largely ignored by both sides. We have had some limited response here and there but the record indicates that both sides have been very stubborn up to this point.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7722 286

~~SECRET~~

MAY 21 1968

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S - *YFW*
FROM: NEA - Lucius D. Battle *LD*
SUBJECT: US Démarches to Israel, the UAR, Jordan and Lebanon
Since May INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

As you requested, the following is a record of our demarches related to an Arab-Israel settlement:

DÉMARCHES TO ISRAEL*(UAR, Jordan, and Lebanon at clips)*June War

- Prior to June 5 we urged Israel not to initiate hostilities with the Arab states.

On June 5, Israel began the war with a pre-emptive attack.

Negotiations and the Jarring Mission

- We have urged the GOI to de-emphasize its insistence on direct negotiations and to enter into talks on the substance of a settlement.

Publicly and privately the GOI maintains the necessity for a direct confrontation with the Arabs. Recently Israel appears willing to forego face-to-face meetings at the outset of negotiations, provided they come at a later stage.

- From the beginning of the Jarring Mission we urged Israel to make a forthright statement of its acceptance of the UNSC Resolution.

Eban sent a message to Jarring on April 6 agreeing to a formula which expressed acceptance of the Resolution. Israel continued to make clear orally, however, that its acceptance involved the expectation that direct talks would develop.

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GROUP-3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals
not automatically declassified

MICROFILMED
BY S/S: CMS

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-207

By *WJG*, NARA, Date *10-14-92*

Jerusalem

- We have asked Israel to suspend and refrain from further unilateral actions (i.e. expropriations, demolition of dwellings) in Jerusalem.

Israel has not replied directly, referring vaguely to the need for urban development. In April the GOI announced new expropriations. On May 2 Israel held its Independence Day military parade in Jerusalem.

- We have called on the GOI to cancel the expropriation of Jerusalem property belonging to an American citizen.

The GOI has not replied.

- Following an announcement that Arab residents of Jerusalem would be granted Israeli citizenship, we registered our concern with the Israeli Embassy.

We have been informally advised that the GOI has no immediate plans to enact the citizenship law.

- We expressed concern at the possibly inflammatory consequences of Jerusalem Reunification Day celebrations set for May 25.

Israel has assured us that the celebrations will be moderate, restrained, and non-military in character, and apparently has prohibited some planned events that could have had repercussions.

Refugees

- We have repeatedly urged Israel to authorize, with adequate security safeguards, the return of post-June war DPs.

Except for very limited return programs, Israel has refused our request, citing the dangers from terrorism and questioning whether the new refugees actually desire to return.

- We have urged Israel not to take measures to deal with the old refugee problem in the occupied territories which would arouse Arab fears.

Israeli leaders have generally been cautious in their statements and actions on the refugee problem, acknowledging our point of view and also apparently inhibited by an unwillingness to commit funds while the future of the occupied territories remains in doubt.

Occupied Territories

- We have indicated publicly and privately our concern at the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.

The GOI has resisted Israeli public demands for a policy of support for civilian settlements but has moved quietly to facilitate the establishment of a few kibbutzim.

- We have publicly called on Israel to adhere to the Geneva Convention in its actions in the occupied territories and have privately expressed disapproval of harsh measures such as the destruction of villages and houses.

The GOI has argued that its security situation requires firm measures and has proceeded to take whatever actions it deemed necessary.

Terrorism/Reprisals

- We have urged the GOI not to respond to terrorist provocations with disproportionate attacks on Jordan.

Israel ignored our requests in mid-March that they not take military reprisal action. Following the March 21 raid, they appear to be trying other means of controlling terrorists, but our expressed views probably play only a minor role in this.

UN Observers

- We have asked Israel to accept UN observers along the Israeli-Jordan ceasefire line.

Israel has refused, saying observers could not control terrorism. The issue has not been pressed in light of Jordan's rejection of observers.

Tiran and Senafir Islands

- We have repeatedly asked Israel to withdraw its forces from Tiran Island occupied during the June war. Recently, the Saudis have told us Israel has occupied Senafir Island, east of Tiran, and we have requested Israel to withdraw if this report is true.

Israel has refused to withdraw from Tiran and has replied to our approach on Senafir with a request for our position on the issue of sovereignty over both islands. In a statement to the press May 20 the Israeli Foreign Ministry referred to discussions with the US of the Tiran occupation and said Israel was not prepared to withdraw except in the context of a peace settlement.

USS LIBERTY Claims

- We have asked Israel to make prompt payment of the \$3.3 million in death claims.

Israel has as yet taken no action but has raised questions as to the basis of the "mental anguish" component of the claim.

DEMARCHES TO THE UAR

Preventions of Hostilities

- In May 1967 we expressed concern at UAR troop movements, urged restraint and hoped the UAR would reconsider its request for withdrawal of UNEF.

The UAR continued troop movements and inflammatory public statements, did not reconsider its decision on UNEF, and rejected the concept that any other state could object to its decision.

- We expressed the hope that the UAR would reverse its decision to close the Straits of Tiran.

The UAR did not reverse the decision.

- We urged the UAR to avoid hostilities and expressed willingness to send Vice President Humphrey to Cairo.

President Nasser responded with an offer to send Vice President Muhieddin to Washington. His offer was accepted but hostilities intervened.

- We informed the UAR that Israel believed a surprise attack was imminent and we assured the UAR that we were continuing to restrain Israel.

The UAR did not attack. (The Egyptians have claimed they took our assurances against an Israeli attack at face value and that these constituted "diplomatic collusion" on Israel's behalf.)

The Big Lie and the Break in Diplomatic Relations

- On June 6 we protested allegations of US involvement in the Israeli attack.

Our protest was noted but rejected. Riad said the UAR had proof of our involvement on behalf of Israel.

- On June 7 we asked for a more conciliatory approach to the US.

The propaganda barrage continued against us without abatement. The severance of relations was deliberately managed with the maximum inconvenience to us.

- On numerous occasions we indicated we expected the UAR to retract the Big Lie.

A half retraction was published in the Look interview of March 5.

- We requested UAR authorization to reopen our Consulate General in Alexandria.

The UAR rejected our request.

Jarring Mission

- We have urged the UAR to make explicit its acceptance of the November 22 UN Security Council Resolution and have emphasized our conviction that negotiations of some sort between the parties were essential for full implementation of the Resolution.

The UAR has explicitly stated it accepts the Resolution, but it has never agreed to negotiations except through Jarring, and it has explicitly stated it will not negotiate directly with Israel.

- We urged the UAR to accept the Jarring formula of March 10.

The formula, as modified by Jordan, was finally accepted by the UAR on May 9.

DEMARCHES TO JORDANJune War

- We called on Jordan to accept the Security Council ceasefire.

Jordan accepted almost immediately on June 6.

The Big Lie and Diplomatic Relations

- We urged Jordan to make a public retraction of the Big Lie.

King Hussein publicly admitted Jordan had made a mistake.

- We privately urged Jordanians not to act precipitously in severing relations with the US and other Western nations.

The GOJ has openly associated itself with us and refused to break relations.

Negotiations and the Jarring Mission

- We asked Jordan to work for Arab restraint at the Khartoum Conference.

The Jordanians led the parade in arguing for a moderate and realistic approach to a settlement.

- We asked Jordan to give their acceptance of the UNSC Resolution, to cooperate with Ambassador Jarring and to urge the UAR to be more forthcoming with Jarring.

The Jordanian position on the Resolution has been the clearest and the most constructive of the three states most directly involved in talks with Jarring. They have shown flexibility toward the Jarring Mission and have urged the UAR to do likewise.

Jerusalem

- From January to April we asked Jordan when it threatened to do so, not to take the Jerusalem question to the Security Council.

While acceding to our earlier requests, when plans for the Israeli Independence Day Parade inflamed Jordanian public opinion the GOJ asked for a Security Council meeting.

- We have asked Jordan to cooperate with us in the wording of Security Council resolutions on Jerusalem. We urged them not to press for a resolution on the general question of Jerusalem following adoption of two resolutions on the parade.

After hard bargaining, Jordan cooperated on the two parade resolutions. It refused our request not to press for a third resolution. After showing some willingness to yield to our arguments on the text of such a resolution, the GOJ decided to go along with the Pakistani-Senegal Resolution which resulted in our abstention in the Security Council vote.

Terrorism/Reprisals

- We have called on Jordan to control terrorist organizations and infiltration across the Jordan River.

Jordan has publicly criticized terrorist activity and taken steps to strengthen its control measures. These measures have been only partially effective.

- We have urged Jordan to accept UN military observers along the ceasefire line.

Jordan has refused, arguing that, in view of the absence of international recognition of its claim to the West Bank, the GOJ could not acquiesce in a form of recognition of the ceasefire line.

Arms

- We have urged Jordan not to accept Soviet arms.

Jordan has not done so.

DEMARCHES TO LEBANON

June War

- We urged Lebanon not to engage in hostilities against Israel.

Lebanon did not do so.

Terrorism

- We have urged Lebanon not to give support to terrorist groups.

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Lebanon has maintained a policy of interdicting the use of Lebanese territory to terrorists even though political leaders have given lip service to support for terrorist organizations.

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

Thursday, May 23, 1968 - 10:30 am

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick Katzenbach's account of our relations with the radio station of the Haitian coalition and our lack of relation to the recent invasion of Haiti.

The financing of the radio station was part of a program of keeping in touch with Haitian exiles who might be helpful to fill the vacuum if Duvalier was overthrown from within.

At yesterday's 303 meeting I questioned the CIA very closely. I am confident that Nick's statement is correct: "CIA did not encourage, help plan, or support the adventure into Haiti in which members of the Coalition were involved."

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rlm

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Authority NWJ.019.034.003/3

By je Date 12-21-09

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~*Pres file*

Thursday, May 23, 1968
9:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a reasonably reassuring
report from the Pentagon on helicopter
losses and their replacement.

W. W. Rostow

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W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

White House 204, 204, 204, 204, 204, 204
By 19, NARA, Date 6-3-92

~~SECRET~~

30a



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

22 May 1968

INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL PURSLEY

You asked for answers to three questions:

- (1) What is the extent of our recent helicopter losses in 1st Corps?
- (2) What is being done to reconstitute these losses?
- (3) Is it true that 1st Corps has "lost mobility"?

Extent of Recent Losses in 1st Corps

Heavy losses to UH-1 helicopters of the 1st Cavalry Division occurred as a result of the attack on Camp Evans on May 19. The latest information received by Army today indicates that:

- 4 were destroyed
- Between 68-93 suffered varying degrees of damage. (We have two reports; the lower figure is probably more accurate.) 41 of these must be returned to the U.S. for repair. The remainder can be repaired on site. Such local repairs generally require from 24 hours to one week, depending on the nature of the damage.

1st Cavalry Division has an authorized force of 300 UH-1s. However, the total population of all aircraft (fixed and rotary wing) in 1st Corps was 1,533 as of May 15.

What is Being Done to Reconstitute these Losses?

The Department of Army was advised today that the 45 UH-1 helicopters (4 lost and 41 to be returned to U.S.) have already been replaced by assignment of assets from the USARV maintenance float, which is a special reserve of aircraft maintained for such purposes.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 97-327

By C6, NARA Date 7-27-99

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The Army is initiating action to airship 45 replacement aircraft from CONUS sources (by drawing as necessary on training base and STRAF units). These shipments will require an estimated 1-2 weeks. The Army will also expedite the return and repair of the damaged aircraft.

Evaluation of the Loss of Mobility in 1st Corps

Admiral Tazewell Shepard of J-3 (Ext. 73229) called Vietnam tonight. He was advised that General Henry Schweitzer, Chief of Staff of the Provisional Corps of Vietnam stated yesterday that while there was some restriction of 1st Cavalry Division mobility, it was not sufficient to restrict operations in the Tactical Area of Operations; and that 50% of the damaged helicopters would be returned to operation within seven days. Admiral Shepard is on duty until midnight.

Tom Morris

THOMAS D. MORRIS

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, May 23, 1968
1:50 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

At last we appear to have gotten a
MIG with a TALOS surface-to-air
missile.

We trust it does not turn out to be
one of our drones.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-326
By jis, NARA Date 3-3-18

WWRostow:rlh

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THE JOINT STAFF

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

23 May 1968
1215 EDT

31-a

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: TALOS - MIG Encounter

1. The USS LONG BEACH fired two TALOS surface to air missiles, in succession, at three MIG aircraft today (230519 EDT), resulting in the apparent destruction of one of the fighter aircraft.
2. The three MIG aircraft were detected at 230518 EDT 50 nautical miles north-northwest of Vinh and believed to have originated from Bai Thuong airfield (see attached map). All friendly aircraft were cleared from the area.
3. The MIG intercept was made at 18°54'N/105°25'E by the first missile 20 nautical miles west-northwest of Vinh. Missile tracking directors verified the aircraft intercept by a large bloom on the radar scope which continued to expand. This is a typical picture of a target breakup and was followed by a complete loss of the electronic target tracking signal.
4. The second missile fired at the same MIG formation apparently detonated on the debris of the first MIG kill and at the same location.
5. This is the first apparent enemy aircraft destruction by a US surface to air missile.
6. CINCPAC has been directed to refrain from releasing the above information to the press since it is possible the enemy does not know what weapon was used.

1 Atch
Map of North Vietnam

James A. Shannon
JAMES A. SHANNON
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

Distribution:

WHSR

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By CG, NARA Date 7-27-99

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By CG, NARA Date 7-27-99

32

ACTION

Pres file

Thursday, May 23, 1968 -- 1:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith State suggests you may wish to help celebrate the Tenth Anniversary of Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy by:

- receiving members and wives in the Rose Garden, as in 1966;**
- appearing briefly at Sec. Rusk's June 13 reception; or**
- issuing a congratulatory statement.**

W. W. Rostow

Arrange Rose Garden affair_____

Will plan to attend reception_____

Will issue statement_____

No_____

Call me_____

WWRostow:rla



7362

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 15, 1968

1620

32a

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for Presidential Recognition
of the Tenth Anniversary of the Senior
Seminar in Foreign Policy

It is requested that the President recognize the
Tenth Anniversary of the Senior Seminar in Foreign
Policy in the period June 1-13, 1968 by:

- a) receiving the 24 Members and their wives
in the Rose Garden, or;
- b) appearing briefly at the Secretary's
reception for the Tenth Seminar at the
Department on June 13, 6:30-8:00 p.m., or;
- c) issuing a congratulatory statement or letter.

Reception in the Rose Garden

The President received the Eighth Seminar in the
Rose Garden on June 9, 1966. TV cameras and the Marine
Band were present. The President spoke informally on
the importance of the career services as a national
resource, and presented diplomas. George Ball, as
Acting Secretary, was present, as well as the Vice
President and heads of the Departments, agencies and
services sending Members to the Seminar. The total time
involved was less than 30 minutes.

The Secretary's Reception

The Secretary will receive the Senior Seminar on
June 13, 6:30-8:00 p.m. About 125 are expected to attend.

The reception is planned as an informal, stand-up occasion, in the course of which the Members will receive their diplomas from a ranking officer of the Department of State. These arrangements could be changed to suit the President's convenience if he found it possible to make a "surprise" appearance. He might merely shake hands with those present or, if he wished, use the occasion as a forum for a statement congratulating the Secretary on the Seminar's tenth anniversary.

Statement Alone

A Presidential letter or statement could be read at the Secretary's reception and later be made available to the press. A proposed draft is enclosed.

The Secretary has approved this memorandum.

SWR

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Background
2. Proposed Letter

BACKGROUND

1. The Seminar is the most advanced interdepartmental program in the field of national and international affairs offered by any agency of the U.S. Government. John Macy, a strong supporter of the Seminar, described it as one of the models upon which the projected Federal Executive Institute will be patterned. It is a small, effective "show piece," limited to 25 senior officers.

2. The President became an Honorary Member of the Senior Seminar on June 9, 1966.

3. President Eisenhower delivered the commencement address to the first Senior Seminar on June 12, 1959. Both President Kennedy and President Johnson have supported it. The Seminar can be cited as evidence of the value which successive Administrations attach to excellence in the career services.

4. Members of Congress from states of the Seminar Members' birth were invited to the Rose Garden in 1966. California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon and Pennsylvania are represented in the Tenth Seminar.

5. Two hundred and thirty-two senior officers have participated in the Seminar program: 137 from the Department of State and the Foreign Service; fourteen each from USIA and AID; ten each from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force; six each from Defense, Agriculture and Commerce; four each from Treasury and CIA; and one from the Bureau of the Budget.

6. Three Members of this year's graduating class will proceed to Viet-Nam. A number of other Members have served or are serving there.

7. The greater part of the Seminar curriculum is devoted to the domestic scene. The Seminar will have traveled 22,500 miles and talked with local officials, businessmen, educators, industrialists, religious and welfare leaders in seventeen states and territories.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Proposed Letter

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Because of the special interest which President Eisenhower, President Kennedy and I have had in the objectives of the Department of State's Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy, and the personal support which we have accorded it, I wish to send you particular congratulations on the occasion of the Seminar's Tenth Anniversary.

We do not need smug and complacent bureaucrats, satisfied with things as they are: we need alert, creative public servants, able to analyze the world scene and to deal understandingly with the world's peoples. This can best be done by men aware of the strengths of our national base and what we are doing to make our national base stronger.

I believe the Senior Seminar, like the National War College and the other senior service colleges, has contributed importantly to enriching the pool of trained senior, career officials upon whom we rely to carry out the nation's business.

Honorable Dean Rusk,

Secretary of State

As a former teacher, who expects to return to teaching, I applaude the Senior Seminar's emphasis upon excellence and its orientation towards free interchanges at its conference table. Military men acquire a deepened knowledge of diplomacy from their Foreign Service colleagues; Foreign Service Officers in turn develop an understanding of the problems of the military. The exchanges of knowledge among students is as important as formal lectures.

Please convey my anniversary congratulations to the Members of your staff concerned with the Seminar such as Ambassador George V. Allen, Director of the Foreign Service Institute, and Ambassador G. Lewis Jones, Coordinator of the Senior Seminar.

I send my congratulations and good wishes to the graduates of the Seminar of 1967-68. I am confident that they will move on to their new tasks strengthened in knowledge, understanding and resolve to serve their country.

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Copy to Members of the Senior Seminar of 1967-68.

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, May 23, 1968
2:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith -- quite independently of
my memorandum of yesterday --
Gen. Taylor raises the question of
where we go from here in the Paris
talks and bombing.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
White House Records Unit, Feb. 24, 1983
By ng, NARA, DATE 6-3-92

~~SECRET~~

May 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Negotiations

It does not appear to me that we are preparing either Hanoi or our own and the international public for an action which I feel sure we will have to take in Paris in the near future. We are reacting far too little, it seems to me, to actions of Hanoi in raising the level of military action in South Viet-Nam while heckling us to stop the bombing. By our quiescence, we seem to accept as a matter of course the continued high rate of enemy infiltration and repeated acts of accentuated violence--I am thinking particularly of the recent shelling of Saigon for which there has been no reprisal and, indeed, no strong protest to indicate that we take these things seriously. In their fight-talk campaign, the other side is increasing the fighting in the South while trying to talk us out of our freedom to retaliate in the North.

We have three readily available responses to Hanoi's increasing belligerence and to the intransigence of their negotiators at the conference table. The first is to resume bombing back to the 20th parallel. The second is to bomb throughout all North Viet-Nam as we did prior to March 31. The third is to go beyond former bombing levels and include therein the mining of Haiphong harbor.

The timing of these steps is, of course, of great importance as is the preparation of public acceptance for them. I believe that the first step, bombing to the 20th parallel, should be taken now and the fact acknowledged as soon as the press raises the question. Concurrently, we should communicate privately to the Hanoi representatives what we have already said to Zorin with regard to our inability to continue to limit our bombing to the 20th parallel without prompt evidence of restraints on their side. At the same time, we should make clear to the Hanoi representatives in Paris that they are wasting their breath in calling for a total cessation until they match the restraint which we have already shown.

With the warning on the official record, we should then make repeated public statements explaining and justifying what we may have to do. About a week after the warning, in the absence of a conciliatory move from them, we should resume our pre-March 31 pattern of bombing. A further expansion of the bombing would remain for the time being an ace in the hole.

In my judgment, these tough positions are inevitable and the sooner we take them and establish our firmness with the other side, the sooner we can get on to serious business.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 92-383
By SP/ig NARA, Date 9/12/08

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

I would not worry too much about a possible walk-out by our adversaries, although we can expect them to threaten it and even go through the motions. In the Panmunjom negotiations, you will recall that there was a prolonged break because of inability to agree on the issue of the involuntary repatriation of prisoners of war, but eventually the other side gave in and came back. In the Paris negotiations, I would anticipate similar gestures but also a similar capitulation if we keep a remorseless military pressure on them throughout.

M. D. T.

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET--SAVIN~~

Pres file

Thursday, May 23, 1968
2:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read Westy's assessment of the enemy's intentions and capabilities. It includes some interesting observations on infiltration and the quality of the enemy's manpower.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET--SAVIN~~

WWRostow:rln

34a

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~

Copy of MAC 6526 18 May 68

1. This is a MACV projection of major actions the enemy will initiate through the remainder of 1968 -- his probable target areas, the magnitude of his activity, their duration, and our estimate of his timing. Supplement to J2 MACV Weekly Intelligence Estimate update (WIEU) No. 20-68.

2. The form enemy action will take is largely rooted in plans he laid early on by the middle of last year -- plans to cope with 1968 -- a year he viewed as crucial. As we all know, he had been losing the war of attrition, and was forced to make a major change -- reverse an unfavorable trend. Growing anti-war sentiment and impatience in the U. S. offered opportunities for him to exploit. He decided on a broad expansion of his force structure and a significant intensification of his military operations in South Vietnam.

3. We have ample evidence of his expansion intentions. First, the broad logistics improvement effort on which he embarked last October -- the construction of new roads -- particularly in-country -- a major effort to enlarge and speed-up the movement of men and supplies and support introduction of more sophisticated weaponry. Second, of special importance, we have seen his growing emphasis to support his new offensive plans with artillery and armor moving along his new in-country road complex which feeds from his trans-border base areas. We have evidence both confirmed and possible -- of tube artillery, tanks, and trucks on or near these highway systems. Obviously he intended to create a modernized, mechanized, highly responsive system over which to move and support vastly increased fire power on key targets deep in South Vietnam.

4. The third indicator of expansion plans was his reinforcement with new units from North Vietnam -- the 304th and 320th divisions in I Corps, two new artillery regiments in II and III Corps respectively, and new infantry regiments and battalions. We have also seen major movements of enemy forces from corps to corps to improve his capabilities in key objective areas -- especially notable is the 325C Division's appearance in the B-3 front. Concurrently, there has been the emergence of many new unit designators in I, III and IV Corps -- these do not represent an increase in strength but rather an expanded command structure within which to absorb recruits, incoming infiltration groups, and upgraded guerrillas, as well as to consolidate existing local units -- these are apparently designed to afford him improved command and control as well as coordination and provide a ready base for build-up.

5. Finally, we are aware of the massive infiltration effort to sustain a hoped-for expanded force structure. Comparing North Vietnamese Army

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By 1C, NARA, Date 11-2-09

infiltration as we know it occurred in 1967 and what we anticipate for 1968, we note the increase in monthly average input from 7000 in 1967 to nearly double that per month this year, and the latter does not include the two divisions that infiltrated I Corps during this past January. When we consider an average travel time between 2 to 4 months depending on destination in-country, it is obvious that the enemy started injecting this huge infusion as early as October -- at least 3 months before Tet -- and he must have formulated his plans many months prior to that.

6. Just listed are the unmistakable signs of his expansion intentions -- but how well has he done? We must credit him with several successes. He has intensified his action -- for example, Khe Sanh, Tet, and the recent attacks on Saigon and the Hue to Dong Ha area. His coordination has improved, expansion of his artillery support started early last year, with an increase in fire support throughout South Vietnam. For example: 122mm rockets were first used last year in the top three corps, and there has been a growth in 122mm rocket battalions to support this weapon. This year we have captured tube artillery in I Corps, indicating 85 and 122mm weapons in South Vietnam. Of special importance is the increase of total artillery battalions countrywide employing large caliber weapons -- from the third quarter of 1967 to the present, the enemy has doubled these units from 13 to 26. He has improved his out-country logistics. Truck sightings in Laos have nearly quadrupled over last year. While this somewhat reflects an increase in our reconnaissance effort and some multiple sightings of the same vehicle, we nevertheless believe it attests to a large increase in the volume of truck movement in Laos.

7. On the other hand, the enemy has had significant failures. First, the pattern of previous years has continued -- he has been defeated in every major engagement. Second, his improved logistics have failed to keep pace with his ambitions; he still cannot sustain combat for long and he has been unable to repeat the intensity of his attacks by fire conducted during Tet. Our operations uncover his caches. He has been unable to employ tube artillery other than across the DMZ and around Khe Sanh, and armor has made but a brief appearance and only in I Corps. Third, his forces have shown a deterioration in fighting quality. We have recent documentation indicating large losses in cadre particularly at the company and platoon level. Prisoners of war tell us more and more of abbreviated training times and we see the very young and the older recruit. Infiltration packets are known to have been committed directly to battle in the Saigon area without integration into established units. Most significant is the degradation of his battlefield discipline -- there are a growing number of incidents of

hurriedly abandoned bodies and material -- far different from his previous practices. Our growing favorable kill rates over a less skilled enemy, and weapons loss rates show a similar trend -- the last quarter nearly doubling over the rate last year. Most important, however, his replacements have been unable to keep pace with his losses. We estimate his monthly replacement input through August of this year will average more than 15,500; however, when we project his losses based on date since initiation of his winter-spring campaign, we find these will be close to 22,000 monthly -- nearly a 7000 man per month loss, despite his surge of infiltration the beginning of this year. The net effect has been that his present in-country strength is even lower today than it was when he set his expansion schemes in motion last year. If it had not been for these failures, the enemy would have realized an expanded force structure -- quantitatively and qualitatively -- he would have reversed 15 months of steady decline and by the end of April his forces could have grown -- additionally, he probably anticipated ARVN defections to add appreciably to this strength -- his revitalized force would have been supported by increased firepower and modernized weapons fed by a mobile supply system all the way from Hanoi -- indeed a formidable enemy for the allies to face. It is quite possible that his Tet attacks were premature vis-a-vis his planned build-up and thus pulled the props from his long range plans -- starting their collapse. His road work was far from complete and his replacements were just arriving. We have evidence that the attack on Hue was scheduled for late March and accelerated at the last moment to match the lunar new year and the factor of surprise they hoped it would afford.

8. Whether or not Tet brought it on, the enemy's hoped-for expansion did collapse; what then of the future? Despite the failure of his plans in the larger sense, their residue still gives him certain capabilities. Expanded infiltration has partially offset his losses and will allow him to carry out intensified operations in short surge bursts in spite of the huge losses they will cost him. He has a more responsive command and control structure substantially easing manipulation from Hanoi. The improved roads will permit increased movement of supplies during the monsoon. Finally, the enemy can add to his infiltration by reinforcement with one or possibly two divisions from the North. While we have no current indications of his intention to do so, it is a possibility we cannot ignore.

9. Within this framework of capabilities, we expect his chief objective through the remainder of 1968 will be to improve his bargaining position at the negotiating table. His strategy to achieve this objective will consist of three, closely linked aspects -- he will fight while talking -- he will continue

his effort to convey an overall impression of strength and flexibility to shake Vietnamese faith in the Government of Vietnam and their future, and to aggravate U. S. impatience and anti-war sentiment. He will seek means to show apparent control over a large area of South Vietnam in order to give him an on-the-soil position for barter and to provide a base for his troops in the event of a cease-fire.

10. Within this context we expect his likely target areas to be these: to engender the image of strength, he will strike those points which will give him maximum psychological gain -- Saigon, and Hue. His emphasis will be on Saigon where, if he could find even a modicum of success, we would expect him to surface his shadow administration and proclaim his government over South Vietnam. To show apparent area control, his objective areas will be more widespread. They will probably be in those regions with relatively sparse population, and close to his border resupply bases and sanctuaries -- most likely the B-3 front where we have seen a recent ominous build-up of his forces, the top two provinces of I Corps which he has long sought to annex, and scattered, isolated Special Forces camps and outposts in the wilderness where he can make maximum gain for minimum effort.

11. Regarding timing, there are a number of factors at play here -- two of which are imponderable. No doubt a major influence will be the political climate, and, of course, the developments of negotiations. There will also be the effect of allied operations in pre-empting him. However, there are three factors which do give us clues as to timing: The effects of the southwest monsoon and his previous patterns of operation during this period, the arrival of infiltration packets in various parts of South Vietnam, and what is beginning to emerge as an enemy effort to stagger his attacks -- an effort to sustain pressure throughout South Vietnam and keep us reacting to his initiative. His 5 May country-wide offensive was notable by its absence of activity in the B-3 front where the posture of his forces is at its strongest -- now the growing threat there seems to promise follow-on to his third phase efforts.

12. Taking a closer look at these factors, we have examined the period of heavy rain associated with the monsoon in the various enemy objective areas -- these are the periods where the rainfall exceeds 8 inches, bringing mud conditions and, in some cases, flooding. We have also examined the history of enemy initiated actions during this period in 1967 to see what effect the monsoon had on his plans. From this, it appears that the monsoon inhibits him the most in the DMZ area with its very heavy rains and in the Delta where severe flooding varies with the accumulated rainfall there as well as the condition of the Mekong in Laos. While last year he avoided large-scale

operations during the worst part of the monsoon in each of the various areas, he did launch several one-day attacks in the B-3 Front and III Corps -- apparently wet conditions in those two regions have somewhat less restrictive effect on his activities there.

13. We have also considered his present infiltration which, according to our estimate, has already peaked in the DMZ, the B-3 Front, and III Corps. It will peak again in the B-3 Front during June, in MR-5 during July, and again in III Corps between July and August. Applying all these timing factors we estimate the following major enemy initiatives are most likely to occur between now and late summer: we expect his third phase which has just tapered off in Saigon and in the Hue to Dong Ha coastal area, to be followed up by a major effort in the B-3 Front which now appears to be getting under way -- this will possibly be of much greater intensity than we have just witnessed, with a real effort on the enemy's part to seize and at least temporarily hold his objectives -- by early or mid-June, we anticipate a renewed effort in northern MR-5 with the Danang area the major target -- somewhat concurrently, we might see a renewed offensive in the eastern DMZ -- possibly a repeat of last year's episode at Con Thien with reconstituted 304th and 320th divisions or reinforcements from the North -- during mid or late July -- infiltration has again peaked in III Corps, we believe another attempt on Saigon is likely -- probably in conjunction with fresh attacks in the Hue area -- the enemy will probably again concentrate his efforts on Saigon where he will plan an even stronger phase than this last one -- however, his need to maintain force integrity by prepositioning supplies and massing and moving his units will expose him to allied operations and spoiling tactics -- possibly forcing him to commit his units piecemeal.

14. At his point the variables exert greater influence on the future. Variables such as the progress of negotiations, his ability to reinforce and our success in pre-empting him. If he continues to pour people down the trail, and we have some doubt about this circumstance, then we may see these as the finish of his summer operations and the start of his next winter-spring campaign. He would follow up the next Saigon attempt with new adventures in the Western highlands, after which there would probably be a lull during the period of greatest monsoon influence throughout the Republic -- after the monsoon, end of October or November, we might see still another strike at Saigon and Hue and by the end of the year a round of attacks in IV Corps and a return to the western DMZ.

15. In summary, we feel we have good intelligence as to the motives now impelling the enemy and the factors that will influence his plans and timing for future initiatives. These lead us to believe that we will see a series of enemy military offensive actions to support his political posture

in the sequence just outlined. We further believe he plans to employ increased fire power, rockets, tube artillery and armor where he can support such an effort, and this year he will try to launch large operations during the monsoon, a venture not characteristic of his previous patterns but pressured by political necessity. While we view these as his intentions, we do not have the same confidence that he will be able to support this effort nor are we sure that his capabilities can match his aspirations.

####

ACTION

Thursday - May 23, 1968

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza's response (Tab A) to your letter of May 18 (Tab B).

You will especially appreciate the second paragraph.

I recommend we seek Galo Plaza's approval to release of the exchange.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☐

Disapprove ☐

Call me ☐

Attachments

Tab A - OAS Secretary General's response of May 22, 1968 to Presidential letter of May 18.

Tab B - Presidential letter of May 18.

PAN AMERICAN UNION
WASHINGTON

May 22, 1968

My dear Mr. President:

I was greatly pleased to receive your letter of May 18, conveying your good wishes and assurances of continued collaboration upon the occasion of my assuming office as Secretary General of the Organization of American States.

The keen personal interest you have taken in your country's neighbors in the Hemisphere and the wholehearted support which you have given to endeavors to promote their progress in all fields have been factors of utmost importance in the advances that our regional community has been able to make in recent years. The knowledge that I can count on such firm and generous backing is a source of great encouragement to me as I enter upon the performance of my duties.

The problems facing the Americas today are indeed a challenge, but one which I take up with enthusiasm at the prospect of service to our member states. I am confident that, with increased public understanding of the purposes and programs of the Organization and determination on the part of government leaders to see that those programs are carried forward, the OAS will be able to make ever-greater strides toward the goal set forth in the Alliance for Progress of bringing a better life to all the peoples of the Hemisphere.

Sincerely yours,

Galo Plaza
Secretary General

The President of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

356

May 18, 1968

Dear Dr. Plaza:

As you begin your term of office as Secretary General of the Organization of American States, I send best wishes and repeat my assurance of continued collaboration.

You know of my special interest in our home hemisphere. During my Presidency I have worked to strengthen the OAS. I know the great potential for peace and progress which lies in close cooperation among the American Republics.

You bring to the Secretary Generalship fresh perspective and new energy tempered by broad experience. You have a unique opportunity to fashion a moment of great challenge into a period of solid accomplishment for the benefit of all the peoples of this hemisphere.

I wish you every success.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Lyndon B. Johnson", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

His Excellency
Dr. Galo Plaza Lasso
Secretary General
of the Organization of American States
Pan American Union
Washington, D. C.

36

ACTION

Thursday - May 23, 1968

For file

Mr. President:

Guyana celebrates its second anniversary of independence on Sunday, May 26.

State is sending the traditional message to the Governor General as Chief of State. I recommend the attached personal message to Prime Minister Burnham.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____.

Attachment

Proposed Presidential message to Prime Minister Burnham on second anniversary of Guyana's independence.

36a
—

Proposed Presidential Message to Prime Minister Burnham of Guyana

On the Second Anniversary of Guyanese Independence Day

on May 26, 1968

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Today Guyana celebrates the second anniversary of its independence.

I congratulate you and the people of Guyana on the achievements made under your leadership. Through self-help efforts at home and cooperation with other Caribbean states on regional projects, you are forging a stronger nation and a more unified hemisphere.

I understand there has been a recent addition to your family. It reminds me of our conversation about children and grandchildren when you were here last January.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending warmest best wishes to you and Mrs. Burnham and the little girl.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency

Forbes Sampson Burnham, O. C.

Prime Minister of Guyana

Georgetown.

Pres file

May 23, 1968

Mr. President:

The State Department has now submitted for your signature an instrument of acceptance, in duplicate, of a series of amendments to the 1960 Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. These are the amendments you submitted to the Senate in February of this year for its advice and consent and on which the Senate acted favorably on May 13, 1968.

I recommend that you sign this instrument.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

ACTION

Thursday, May 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested message to the Indonesia-U.S. Workshop on Food *Profile*

The Workshop is being held in Djakarta May 27 through June 1. It is jointly sponsored by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences and the American National Academy of Sciences. Its purpose is to assist the Indonesian Government in applying science and technology to the problem of increasing Indonesian food production.

Don Hornig's Deputy, Dr. Ivan L. Bennett, Jr., will participate. Bennett was the chairman of the panel of your Science Advisory Committee which prepared the report on the world food problem. It was that report that inspired the Indonesians to have this Workshop focused specifically on Indonesian needs.

Dr. Bennett would like to carry a message from you to the Workshop. State and AID believe such a message would be useful. The suggested text is:

I am greatly heartened by the Assembly of distinguished scientists under the auspices of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences and of the American National Academy of Sciences to participate in a Workshop on Food Production in Indonesia.

As I stated in the preface to the report which is serving as the basis for your discussions, "The World Food Problem is one of the foremost challenges of mankind today."

Experience in our country and that in other countries shows that increased agricultural production is within the capacity of modern science. The problem cannot be solved, however, unless each nation reaches a considered judgment on the course that it is to pursue.

I congratulate and thank all of you for devoting your talents to this vital issue and express my earnest hope for a fruitful outcome of your deliberations.

I recommend you approve the message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

DFMargolles:MWright:wpt

ACTION

31

Pres file

Thursday, May 23, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a proposed message on the 5th Anniversary of the Organization of African Unity (May 25). It is addressed to Congolese President Mobutu in his capacity as President of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State. Copies will be transmitted to every OAU member.

I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

WWR:EKH:RM:lw

Att: Proposed message

Proposed Message to President Mobutu on
the Fifth OAU Anniversary

Dear Mr. President:

As the world celebrates the fifth anniversary of the Organization of African Unity, I want you to know the deep interest with which we in the United States have watched its growth and followed its achievements.

Measured within the span of world history, five years is only a passing moment. But measured against its record, the O.A. U. can take just pride in its major accomplishments:

It has made solid contributions to keeping the peace in Africa and to the settlement of disputes.

It has focused the conscience of the world on the cause of freedom and justice in Southern Africa.

It has enhanced the Continent's economic prospects by encouraging regional organizations.

We share with you the fundamental principles expressed in the Charter of the O.A. U. : "the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny; freedom, equality, justice and dignity ... for African peoples; the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent; and the responsibility to harness the natural and human resources of Africa for the total advancement of its peoples." We are also proud of our special historical relationship to Africa, which has so enriched our own national culture. Most of all, America and Africa share a common vitality and purpose. The world looks to both of us for the answers to age-old problems.

I am certain that time will not diminish the abiding faith of my countrymen in the realization of Africa's aspirations. Nor will it change our determination to help the OAU to reach its goals.

Today all Americans join me in saluting the African statesmen who had the vision to create this organization and the strength and wisdom to carry forward its purpose. We pledge our support in helping you build the Africa you desire.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

INFORMATION

Thursday, May 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: India Debt Relief

You directed us in March to join in negotiation of a debt relief package for India, as recommended by the World Bank. Our two primary goals in the negotiation were: (1) a formula assigning the largest share of relief to countries whose aid has been on hardest terms; and (2) \$100 million in total annual relief for the next 3 years.

We have come out with a good bargain which meets those goals. The package is scheduled to be formally blessed by the other donors at the India Consortium meeting here today. Below is a table showing the agreed annual payments to be postponed. The U.S. share is \$8.7 million per year, less than 9% of the total and less than any other major donor.

Amount of Debt Relief
(\$ millions)

<u>Donor</u>	<u>Annual Share</u>
Germany	\$ 27.5
United Kingdom	18.0
Japan	16.8
World Bank	15.0
United States	8.7
Italy	5.5
France	5.2
Austria	0.9
Belgium	0.9
Canada	0.8
Netherlands	0.8
TOTAL	<u>\$ 100.1</u>

This package will commit the Indians to press the Soviets for comparable relief and to adopt prudent limits in accepting future credits. We're still not satisfied that all the Consortium donors are giving relief on as easy terms as they might. Therefore, though this is nominally a 3-year arrangement, we plan to participate with a firm commitment for only one year to preserve our leverage for the next two.

All in all, other donors have been much more forthcoming than most of us expected. This package does not increase their total aid to India, but it makes what they do provide much more useful in economic terms. More Important, it establishes the principle that those who insist on hard loan terms end up bearing the burden of debt rollover -- a point we have been trying to get across for years.

The U. S. amount is below the cutoff calling for Presidential review, but I thought you would be pleased to know that a fair bargain has been struck.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:EKH:RM:lw

INFORMATION

41

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 22, 1968
6:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

This call of Huong on Ky is a good,
stylish, and encouraging piece of
politics.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

25X1A



~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

SANITIZED
Authority NLT 019-034-3-6
By Q NARA, Date 1/14/02

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 16202

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PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS
DD/I EXO

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

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CITE

DIST 22 MAY 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI

SUBJECT

MEETING OF HUONG AND KY

Review

ACQ

VIETNAM, SAIGON (22 MAY 1968) FIELD NO.

SOURCE

1. PRIME MINISTER DESIGNATE TRAN VAN HUONG CALLED ON VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY FOR WHAT HE SAID WAS NOT A COURTESY CALL BUT RATHER "A SEARCH FOR A CONFIDANT" AFTER MANY LONELY WEEKS OF TRYING TO DECIDE ON HIS POLITICAL ROLE IN THE COUNTRY. HUONG NOTED HE HAD REJECTED MANY REQUESTS FROM PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU TO SERVE AS PRIME MINISTER BUT THAT THIEU HAD FINALLY INSISTED, AT

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

NO DISSEM ABROAD

SANITIZED
Authority NLT 019-034-3-7
By SP, NARA, Date 11/7/02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
(dissem controls)

WHICH POINT HE HAD FELT OBLIGATED TO ACCEPT. HUONG SAID HE WAS ALL TOO CONSCIOUS OF ALLEGATIONS THAT HE IS A SUDISTE, A SEPARATIST AND A POTENTIAL COMPROMISER WITH THE VIET CONG (VC). ALL THESE ACCUSATIONS HE SAID, ARE SIMPLY NOT TRUE. HE SAID HE WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE WIDELY-HELD ASSUMPTION THAT KY IS OPPOSED TO HIM, WHICH HE DOES REALLY BELIEVE IS TRUE.

2. KY RESPONDED BY ASSURING HUONG OF HIS CERTAINTY THAT HUONG IS NOT A SEPARATIST AND WOULD NOT COMPROMISE WITH THE VC. HE SAID HE IS NOT AGAINST HUONG, BUT HE DID EXPRESS SOME CONCERN ABOUT THE YOUNGER, AGGRESSIVE AND SOMETIMES UNSTABLE SET AROUND HUONG WHO COULD "SPOIL IT FOR THE ADULTS." KY MENTIONED VO LUONG TRIEU AND NGUYEN WAN TRUONG BY NAME. HUONG SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE BENT OF SUCH PERSONS AROUND HIM AND DEPRECATED THE AMOUNT OF INFLUENCE THEY WOULD HAVE ON HIS POLICIES AND GOVERNMENT.

3. KY ENCOURAGED HUONG TO GO AHEAD WITH FORMING HIS GOVERNMENT AND NOT BE OVERLY DISTURBED BY RUMORS AND GOSSIP. HE PROMISED THAT AS LONG AS HUONG SERVED THE COUNTRY AND DID NOT COMPROMISE WITH THE VC HE (KY) WOULD BE WITH HUONG. HUONG SAID THAT EVEN THOUGH HE HAD EXPECTED TO BE REASSURED BY KY, HE FOUND KY'S REMARKS VERY SATISFYING. HE THEN TOLD KY THAT IF HE EVER TOOK ANY ACTION THAT KY THOUGHT WAS A

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

(dissem controls)

BETRAYAL OF THE COUNTRY, KY SHOULD TELL HIM AND HUONG WOULD RESIGN AT ONCE.

4. THE REST OF THE CONVERSATION WAS ON AN EVEN MORE PERSONAL BASIS, WITH HUONG REFERRING TO THEIR COMMON PERSONALITY TRAITS AND INTERESTS. HUONG ALSO RECALLED AN INCIDENT AT KY'S WEDDING WHEN HUONG GRASPED KY'S HAND IN THE CARAVELLE HOTEL AND PREDICTED THAT HE WOULD SOMEDAY ACHIEVE GREAT THINGS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. HE MENTIONED THEIR COMMON LIKING FOR DOING "SHOWY" THINGS WHEN OUT AMONG THE PEOPLE AND FOR WRITING POETRY.

COMMENT: IN THE PAST, KY HAS HIMSELF REMARKED ON THE FACT THAT HE AND HUONG ARE ALIKE. KY REACTED POSITIVELY TO WHAT WAS A SOMEWHAT SENTIMENTAL AND OBVIOUS ATTEMPT TO PLAY ON HIS FEELINGS AND FLATTER HIS EGO. KY IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO THIS APPROACH UP TO A POINT. ALTHOUGH HIS REACTION WAS POSITIVE ON A PERSONAL LEVEL, KY REMAINS RESENTFUL OF THIEU'S HANDLING OF THE CHANGE OF CABINET AND SOMEWHAT MISTRUSTFUL OF THE "HUONG SOLUTION". NEVERTHELESS KY APPARENTLY DOES NOT INTEND TO WITHDRAW TO THE SIDELINES AND HAS STATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO BECOME ACTIVE WITH THE ABOUT-TO-BE-CONSTITUTED COUNCILS PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONSTITUTION AND TO CONTINUE HIS DIRECTION OF THE SELF-DEFENSE CORPS.)

5. COMMENT: ACCORDING TO ANOTHER SOURCE, HUONG HAS OFFERED TO NAME LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM VAN MINH, NOW A KY AIDE, AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND TO RETAIN LUU VAN TINH, REPUTEDLY A STRONG KY SUPPORTER, IN HIS PRESENT POST AS MINISTER OF FINANCE.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

NO DISSEM ABROAD

~~SECRET~~
(classification)NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
(dissem controls)

THIS SOURCE ALSO REPORTED THAT KY REMARKED TO A CLOSE ASSOCIATE AFTER THE MEETING THAT HE WAS IMPRESSED BY HUONG'S EVIDENT SINCERITY IN SEEKING HIS COLLABORATION.)

6. ~~SECRET~~ DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE DIR/JUSPAC
(MR. NICKEL ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF ~~SECRET~~
REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/GROUP I

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

42

Wed., May 22, 1968
6:05 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

As the attached table indicates, we are now destroying or damaging 25% of the trucks sighted in the North Vietnamese panhandle -- as the weather improves. That's a serious tax.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

42a

May 22, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Truck Statistics for the Period May 1 - 17

<u>Location</u>	<u>Sighted</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Laos	2,646-2,766	219	58

Of which, in:

Upper Panhandle	1,680-1,700	104	22
Lower Panhandle	966-1,066	115	36

North Vietnam	2,197	242	307
--------------------------	------------------	----------------	----------------

Of which, in:

RP I	1,417	148	205
RP II	780	94	102
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>4,843-4,963</u>	<u>461</u>	<u>365</u>


Art McCafferty

Wed., May 22, 1968
6:00 p. m.

Pres. Jee


43

MR. PRESIDENT:

This report rings true on the timing and part, at least, of the origin of the winter-spring offensive.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

 21 May 68)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-329
By is, NARA Date 3-27-00

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 15445 43a

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	SOO	ONE	CRS
DD/I		EXO						OER	FBIS	DCS	IRS	AID	USIA

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211821Z

CITE

DIST 21 MAY 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM/NORTH VIETNAM/CHINA/USSR

DOI 1967

SUBJECT INFLUENCE OF OPERATION JUNCTION CITY ON
VIET CONG/NORTH VIETNAMESE DECISION TO
ADOPT STRATEGY OF GENERAL OFFENSIVE AND
GENERAL UPRISING

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (18 MAY 1968) FIELD NO. [REDACTED]

SOURCE [REDACTED]

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-325

By is, NARA Date 10-22-99

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)SECRET
(classification)

(dissemination)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1. THE MID-1967 DECISION OF THE VIET CONG (VC)
AND NORTH VIETNAMESE TO SHIFT FROM A STRATEGY OF PRO-
TRACTED WAR TO ONE OF GENERAL OFFENSIVE AND GENERAL UP-
RISEING WAS GEATLY INFLUENCED BY THE AMERICANS' OPERATION
JUNCTION CITY, WHICH WAS CONDUCTED FROM LATE-JANUARY
UNTIL MARCH 1967 IN WAR ZONE C IN NORTHERN TAY NINH
PROVINCE, A MAJOR VC BASE AREA AND THE LOCATION OF CENTRAL
OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM HEADQUARTERS. AT THAT TIME,
THE RUSSIANS SENT A MESSAGE TO HANOI ADVISING THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS SINCE IT WAS DOUBTFUL
THAT THE COMMUNISTS COULD MUCH LONGER WITHSTAND THE EFFECTS
OF SUCH OPERATIONS. THE CHINESE, HOWEVER, URGED THAT

[REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

SECRET

1.5(E)
3.4(b)(1)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

HANOI CONTINUE THE WAR UNTIL THEY HAD SUFFICIENTLY DEVELOPED THEIR NUCLEAR STRENGTH TO HELP HANOI ACHIEVE COMPLETE VICTORY. THE CHINESE ALSO THREATENED TO TERMINATE THEIR ASSISTANCE AND TO WITHDRAW THEIR TECHNICIANS AND OTHER PERSONNEL FROM NORTH VIETNAM SHOULD HANOI ACCEPT THE RUSSIAN ADVICE.

2. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DID NOT LIKE EITHER OF THESE ALTERNATIVES AND WERE DETERMINED TO CONTINUE THE WAR IN THE MANNER THEY THEMSELVES DEEMED BEST. HOWEVER, THEY AGREED THAT A CHANGE IN STRATEGY WAS NEEDED, AND THEY THEREFORE BEGAN THE INITIAL PLANNING AND MOVES WHICH RESULTED IN THE DECISION LATER IN THE YEAR TO ATTEMPT TO EFFECT A GENERAL OFFENSIVE AND GENERAL UPRISING.

3. (FIELD COMMENT: [REDACTED])

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.5(E)
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~

1.5(E)
3.4(b)(1)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

[REDACTED] ALTHOUGH IT IS UNLIKELY OPERATION JUNCTION CITY WAS THE ONLY OR EVEN NECESSARILY THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE VC/NORTH VIETNAMESE DECISION, IT DOES APPEAR THAT THIS OPERATION AND OTHERS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO IT SUCH AS CEDAR FALLS AND ATTELBORO HAD A PROFOUND EFFECT UPON THE CADRES MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED [REDACTED] AND THAT THIS MUST HAVE AFFECTED HANOI'S THINKING, AT LEAST INDIRECTLY.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE DIR/ JUSPAO (MR. NICKEL ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

[REDACTED]

1.5(E)
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~

Pres File
44

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wed., May 22, 1968
5:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

The extent to which Hanoi now gears military actions to Paris talks is suggested by this captured letter linking a very modest artillery mission to Paris.

W. A. R.
W. A. Rostow

Attachment

44a
May 22, 1968

SUBJECT: May Offensive

A letter circulated between two cadre of the 724th Artillery Regiment gives the following instructions for the attack from May 5 to May 15, 1968:

According to directives given by the "E" (Regiment) CO, our current mission is to carry on harrassing fire until N+10 (possibly May 15, 1968). However, our immediate requirement is to carry out a support mission on N+4 (possibly May 9, 1968). We will use 30 rockets for this mission. The purpose is to create pressure over peace talks between our representatives and the American representatives at Paris.

Mr. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By fw/rq, NARA, Date 7-22-97

ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday, May 22, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dinner for the Shah

1. [unclear]
2. Pres file

You asked whether we could have a big dinner for the Shah to which he might bring his wife, instead of the small working luncheon we had planned for him on June 12.

Both your schedule and the Shah's would permit our having a large dinner on June 11. Everyone here and at State feels that, from the foreign policy viewpoint, this would be a good thing to do. The only reason we had not suggested it before was that the Shah had been here on an official visit just last August and, since he is coming this time on a private visit to receive an honorary degree, we did not want to impose on you for another dinner. However, if you would like to have him, we would all be delighted.

We cannot be sure that his wife could come. She has decided not to accompany him on this trip. However, she will just have been to Ethiopia with him, will come as far as Europe with him and then will go on to Morocco with him after his visit here. The Shah has never told us exactly why she did not wish to come here, but we believe that her unpleasant experiences with demonstrating students in Berlin on a previous trip may have made her wary of coming here, where Iranian students usually demonstrate against the Shah when he comes. She might reconsider and come just for the White House part of the trip, but we cannot guarantee this.

If you would like to invite the Shah to dinner on June 11 in hopes that the Empress can come too, we would propose the attached message from you suggesting this change in plans and making a special point of your wish to entertain the Empress before you leave the White House.

If you wish to wrap this all up in one day, we could reschedule the office visit to 5:30 P.M. on June 11. If not, we would leave it scheduled for 12:30 P.M. on June 12.

Once we have your preference and the Shah's acceptance, we will work out the announcement with George Christian.

W. W. Rostow

[Decision blocks on next page.]

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Approve dinner Tuesday, June 11, with
office meeting at 5:30 P.M. same day _____

Approve dinner Tuesday, June 11, with
office meeting at 12:30 P.M. the next day _____ ✓

Leave schedule as is with office meeting
at 12:30 P.M. Wednesday, June 12, followed
by small working lunch _____

CONFIDENTIAL

45a

CONFIDENTIAL

SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO THE SHAH

Your Imperial Majesty: As your forthcoming visit to Washington may well be the last time we will have the honor and pleasure of receiving you personally in the White House, Mrs. Johnson and I wish to extend a heartfelt invitation for you and Her Imperial Majesty to join us for dinner on the evening of June 11. I realize that the Empress had not planned to make this journey with you, but should you be able to reconsider your plans it would give us great joy. With my warm good wishes. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Memo 9-11-95
By jw, NARA, Date 7-24-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Per file
4/6

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday, May 22, 1968 -- 4:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Seven African Ambassadors at Ernie Goldstein's Luncheon -- Thursday, May 23, 1:00 p.m.

The Group:

Ambassador Debrah (DEB-rah) -- Ghana
Ambassador Peel -- Liberia
Ambassador Iyalla (E-YAL-la) -- Nigeria
Ambassador Adoula (Ah-DOO-la) -- Congo(K)
Ambassador Gallin-Douathe (Gal-LAN-doo-WAT) -- Central African Republic
Ambassador Mayaki (My-YAH-kee) -- Niger
Ambassador Ohin (Oh-HEEN) -- Togo

(Attached are State's fact sheets for each country; the first paragraph is a biographic sketch of the Ambassador.)

There's a language problem with this group. Three of them speak little or no English; they'll probably get the gist of your general remarks but would be embarrassed in a two-way conversation.

Background:

This is a relatively like-minded group. These Africans:

- get along with each other. They're all clustered together in West and Central Africa;
- are moderates putting emphasis on development. Five (Ghana, Nigeria, Congo, CAR, and Togo) are ruled by military "caretaker" regimes;
- are pro-Western or "non-aligned." We have given assistance, in some form, to all of them. Each has or soon will have a Peace Corps program. Our relations are good all around the table;
- have been publicly or privately sympathetic to us on Vietnam.

(Ghana, Liberia, and the Congo were included on the Vice President's trip to Africa last January.)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 719 90-22

By isp/rs, NARA, Date 6-15-92

The principal interest in common here is economic development. All are struggling to get their economies off the ground -- some (Ghana and Togo) after waste and mismanagement under past regimes; others (Nigeria and the Congo) in the face of civil war or the threat of internal subversion. Each needs more outside help. Each would like to get more aid from us.

As most Africans, these seven worry that we give the Continent too low priority and are looking for a way to withdraw from Africa altogether. Under the new aid strategy for Africa we are cutting back most bilateral programs in favor of regional projects. But, of this group, the Congo, Ghana and Nigeria (once the civil war is settled) will still be eligible for bilateral help from us.

You may wish to take the same approach with these Ambassadors you've taken with their African colleagues at past lunches. We are still committed to help those who help themselves, and that certainly goes for Africa as well as other developing areas. However, they should appreciate your problems with the Congress. They must know we couldn't and shouldn't do it all; they've got a responsibility to encourage other donors. Most important, the poor countries must show they are serious about attacking their problems with their own measures.

Talking Points:

Along this tack, you might tell the group:

1. Despite Congressional cuts last year and a tough fight on this year's Aid Bill, we're pushing for all we can get. The outlook is not as good as it might be, but we are not about to "withdraw" from our common stake in development.
2. The key is not only what we want, but what others produce on their own. Congress rewards self-help and likes to see other donors carry a fair share. Africans can do a lot to help us on both counts.

W. W. Rostow

42

Wednesday, May 22, 1968, 11:13 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Percentage of Career Ambassadors Appointed by Six Presidents

From 1930 through 1967 the percentage of career and non-career ambassadors appointed by the last six Presidents is:

<u>Administration</u>	<u>Average % Career</u>	<u>Average % non-Career</u>
Hoover	47	53
Roosevelt	46	53
Truman	62	37
Eisenhower	64	35
Kennedy	67	32
Johnson	73	26

These percentages are based on the attached tabulation prepared by the State Department.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

BKS:amc

Nov. 21, '67

47a

CHIEFS OF MISSION

<u>Date</u>	<u>Total No. Positions</u> ^{1/}	<u>Career</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Non-Career</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Vacancies</u>	<u>Total No. Posts</u>
10/1/30	52	24	47%	27	53%	1	55
10/1/35	57	25	45%	31	55%	1	61
10/1/40	53	25	48%	27	52%	1	55
10/1/45	54	31	60%	21	40%	2	56
10/1/50	70 ^{2/}	43	65%	23	35%	4	74
10/1/51	70	41	62%	25	38%	4	74
10/1/52	73	46	64%	26	36%	1	77
10/1/53	73	41	58%	30	42%	2	77
10/1/54	76	45	59%	31	41%	-	78
10/1/55	77	44	59%	31	41%	2	79
10/1/56	80	50	65%	27	35%	3	82
10/1/57	81	52	66%	27	34%	2	83
10/1/58	80	54	69%	24	31%	2	82
10/1/59	81	56	70%	24	30%	1	83
10/1/60	98 ^{3/}	60	71%	25	29%	13	100
10/1/61	97	67	72%	26	28%	4	100
10/1/62	106	63	65%	34	35%	9	109
10/1/63	108	67	66%	35	34%	6	109
10/1/64	112	74	73%	27	27%	11	112
10/1/65	112	82	77%	25	23%	5	113
10/1/66	116	79	75%	27	25%	11	118
10/1/67	110	74	70%	32	30%	4 ^{4/}	112

CHIEFS OF MISSION

- 2 -

- 1/ The number of positions varies from the number of posts due to instances where one Chief of Mission is accredited to two or more posts, e.g., Senegal-The Gambia.
- 2/ The number of positions from October 1, 1950 to October 1, 1959, inclusive, includes overseas Missions to which a Chief of Mission is accredited. This included HICOG from 1949-55; USRO-Paris from 1954-60; Berlin in 1955; and USEC from 1956-60.
- 3/ The number of Chief of Mission positions given since 1963 does not include special Missions such as USRO, OECD, USEC, etc.
- 4/ The vacancies on October 1, 1967 were Botswana, Burundi, Congo (Brazzaville) and Lesotho.

Wed., May 22, 1968
10:45 a. m.

48

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith as requested a letter to
John Gronowski.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file

Attachment

48a

May 22, 1968

Dear John:

I shall never forget your letter of May 20.

Sadness at your departure from public service was tempered by the generosity, wisdom, and steady courage of your appraisal of these years we have shared.

Historians will assess as they will our efforts and achievements, failures and frustrations. But I do know this: no President was ever served by a finer, more dedicated group of men. And none, John, has been finer or more dedicated than yourself.

As you move on to the next phase of your life and work, I wish you to know you carry with you my abiding affection and gratitude.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

Honorable John A. Gronouski
American Ambassador
Warsaw

LBJ:WWR:ms

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

486

May 20, 1968



(25)

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have often heard you say that our success will be measured more by the pride of our children and grandchildren than by the judgement of our contemporaries. I believe that those of us who have served the Johnson Administration will wear a badge of honor for many generations to come.

And so it is with pride - as well as sadness - that I respectfully submit my resignation as Ambassador to Poland.

There is sadness in leaving a generous and thoughtful President.

There is pride in having seen enacted, under your leadership, the basic agenda of legislation that progressives fought for in vain for a quarter of a century.

There is pride, too, in having participated in the development of a foreign policy responsive to the needs and challenges of a changing world.

The bridges that you set out to build to Eastern Europe are not completed. But your policies have laid the foundation for peaceful engagement between East and West.

My deepest satisfaction comes from the role I have played, during the past two and a half years, in your relentless search for peace and stability in Southeast Asia. I believe I know better than most the depth of your commitment to that cause.


Shelley
to be read.

WR
Dropt
The hand
he can't
then let
LBJ/rob

- 2 -

The Johnson Administration will be accorded the mark of greatness by future historians. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to serve in your Cabinet and as your Ambassador.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John A. Gronouski". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long, sweeping underline that extends to the left.

John A. Gronouski
Ambassador to Poland

Approved For Release 2001/08/24 : NLJ-019-034-3-9-5

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 22, 1968 - 10:45 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This CIA report (para. 3) contains the first reasonably firm evidence that Thieu put in writing a deal with the generals guaranteeing that he would "not make any major policy decisions as President without the advice and consent of the Council of Generals."

We are likely to hear more of this before we hear less.

W. W. Rostow

25X1A

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ 019-034-3-9
By g NARA, Date 1/17/02

~~SECRET~~

IN - 15235

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF)	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	SDO	CNE	CRS
DDI	EXC							XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX	XXXXXX

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

211426Z

CITE

DIST 21 MAY 1968

COUNTRY

SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI

SUBJECT

1. SENIOR GENERALS' DECISION NOT TO OPPOSE
TRAN VAN HUONG AS PRIME MINISTER AS LONG AS
HE AVOIDS INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
2. NATURE AND FORM OF AGREEMENT SIGNED BY
GENERALS ON 30 JUNE 1967

ACQ

VIETNAM, SAIGON (21 MAY 1968) FIELD NO.

SOURCE

1. ON 20 MAY 1968, THE SENIOR GENERALS HELD A SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY IN THE LATTER'S OFFICE TO DISCUSS THEIR POSTURE TOWARD PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU

SANTIZED

Authority NET 019-034-3-10

By GD, NARA, Date 1/17/02

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM, NO DISSEM ABROAD

(classification) (dissem controls)

AND PRIME MINISTER DESIGNATE TRAN VAN HUONG. THE GENERALS DECIDED TO TAKE NO ACTION AGAINST THIEU AND TO ASSUME A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE TOWARD HUONG. THE GENERALS WILL GIVE HUONG THEIR TACIT APPROVAL AS LONG AS HE DOES NOT MEDDLE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE ARMED FORCES.

2. THE GENERALS CALLED THE MEETINGS BECAUSE THIEU HAD NOT CONSULTED THEM REGARDING HUONG'S APPOINTMENT AS PRIME MINISTER. KY, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS NOT EVEN OFFICIALLY INFORMED BY THIEU OF HIS PLAN TO APPOINT HUONG UNTIL 1845 HOURS ON 18 MAY; WHEN THE NOTE ARRIVED FROM THIEU'S OFFICE, KY WAS IN NHA TRANG. THE GENERALS VIEW THIEU'S BEHAVIOR IN THE MATTER AS A VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT THAT THE SENIOR GENERALS, INCLUDING THIEU, SIGNED AFTER THE 30 JUNE 1967 MEETING AT WHICH THIEU WAS DESIGNATED THE MILITARY PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE.

3. ON 20 MAY 1968, KY SHOWED AN AIDE THE MUCH-DISCUSSED AND FREQUENTLY DENIED AGREEMENT, WHICH CONSISTS OF TWO TYPEWRITTEN PAGES. THE DOCUMENT STATES THAT WHOEVER AMONG THE SIGNATORIES IS DESIGNATED AS THE GROUP'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AGREES THAT HE WILL NOT MAKE ANY MAJOR POLICY DECISIONS AS PRESIDENT WITHOUT THE ADVISE AND CONSENT OF THE COUNCIL OF GENERALS. THE AGREEMENT

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

~~SECRET~~

IN -15235

[REDACTED]

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

(classification) (dissem controls)

THUS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THE COUNCIL OF GENERALS AS THE BEHIND-THE-SCENES POWER IN THE GOVERNMENT. KY SIGNED AS CHAIRMAN AND MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG AS SECRETARY GENERAL, WHILE TRIEU SIGNED AS A MEMBER, HIS SIGNATURE APPEARING IN FOURTH PLACE ON THE DOCUMENT. KY TOLD HIS AIDE THAT THANG HAD ACTUALLY DRAFTED THE AGREEMENT.

4. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF THIS DOCUMENT WAS THE SUBJECT OF CONSIDERABLE REPORTING DURING THE FIRST PART OF JULY 1967.)

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER, CHIEF OF STAFF, J2) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL MOMYER ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [REDACTED]
REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/ NO DISSEM ABROAD
GROUP 1

~~SECRET~~