

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 22, 1968 - 10:35 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Several of the attached observations by the South Korean Prime Minister are of interest covering:

- reason for no current North Korean infiltration;
- what should be done if Paris talks fail; maximum military effort including two additional South Korean divisions;
- relations between Paris talks and North Korean policy.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 7355

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By isa, NARA Date 7-8-78

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla



# Department of State

50a  
**TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~ 371

PAGE 01 SEOUL 07355 210943Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 210845Z MAY 68  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 774

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 7355

E X D I S

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH PRIME MINISTER THIS MORNING ON SUBJECT PRESENT LACK OF INDICATIONS OF NORTH KOREAN INFILTRATION EFFORT, CHUNG SAID HE THOUGHT NK MIGHT BE HOLDING OFF PENDING OUTCOME OF PARIS TALKS ON VIETNAM AND BECAUSE OF NEED TO ASSESS NEW ROK INTERNAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

2. IN CONNECTION WITH PARIS DISCUSSIONS, PRIMIN SAID THAT IF THERE IS CONTINUED STALEMATE WITH SAIGON BEING HIT WHILE HANOI REMAINS UNTOUCHED, MORALE PROBLEM WILL DEVELOP AMONG TROOPS AND CIVILIAN POPULATION IN SVN. HE SAID IF TALKS BREAK DOWN, MAXIMUM FORCE SHOULD THEN BE APPLIED TO BRING VIETNAM WAR TO AN END, AND THAT HE HOLDS TO HIS VIEW THAT KOREAN CONTRIBUTION TO END WAR QUICKLY SHOULD BE TWO MORE DIVISIONS OF TROOPS. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS GIVING ME HIS OWN OPINION ABOUT FURTHER TROOP CONTRIBUTION AND NOT THAT OF PRESIDENT PARK.

3. PRIMIN SAID THAT NORTH KOREANS MAY WELL VIEW OUTCOME OF VN TALKS AS CONTROLLING FACTOR IN THEIR EFFORT AGAINST SOUTH KOREA. IF SETTLEMENT IN VN BECOMES POSSIBLE, NK WOULD WORRY ABOUT INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF AMERICAN STRENGTH FOR KOREA IN CASE OF NEED. IF, HOWEVER, NO SETTLEMENT SEEMS LIKELY TO RESULT FROM PARIS TALKS, AND MILITARY ACTIVITY IN SVN CONTINUES AT PRESENT PACE, THEN HE BELIEVES THERE WILL BE NORTH KOREAN ACTIVITY ALONG DMZ HERE ACCOMPANIED BY INFILTRATION EFFORT. MAIN PURPOSE WOULD BE, HE SAID, TO KEEP ROK GOVERNMENT FROM SENDING ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO VIETNAM.

DECLASSIFIED

GP-3. PORTER

~~SECRET~~

Authority NLS/CBS 10  
By ies, NARS, Date 11-16-83

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By iss, NARA Date 7-8-98

INFORMATION

*Profile*

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 22, 1968 - 10:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

You asked for my comments on Clark Clifford's memorandum of May 20 relating to Amb. Bunker's cable on an appropriate response in the North if Saigon is again attacked.

Clark's view is that: under the language of the March 31 speech an attack on Saigon does not fall under the category of matching restraint by Hanoi. He does not see a link between our cessation of bombing in the North and attack in the South on the cities. He believes that the restraint we should seek is a reduction in the flow of men and materiel from the North into the South.

He could have strengthened his formal argument, as others have done, by noting there is a certain danger in raising the question of how Hanoi uses its forces in the South, because on that basis they could try to restrict our military activities in the South.

What Clark does not deal with is the view -- strongly felt in South Vietnam -- that we could have serious morale problems among troops and civilian population in South Vietnam if two circumstances converge:

-- A prolonged stalemate in Paris, with the bulk of North Vietnam a sanctuary;

-- Another major attack on Saigon or Hue, or both.

In short, while Clark can make a perfectly good, logical and quasi-legal case, based on the language of the March 31 speech, he is not wrestling with a problem which could become more real with each passing day and which could become acute if, say, after another month of fruitless talks in Paris and another month of sanctuary in Hanoi-Haiphong, Saigon gets hit hard again with another 100,000 refugees, etc.

We must think about this problem very hard in the light of the two reports in the last day that Hanoi plans to stonewall in Paris until the Democratic nominee is chosen; and then stonewall further if that candidate is Sen. Robert Kennedy. The underlying postulate of Clark's view, as presented at lunch yesterday, is, I believe, this: We can hold a tolerable basis of support for our policy in Vietnam indefinitely if there are some kind of talks in Paris and, I would add, if U.S. casualty figures are not excessive. If Paris breaks up, he fears an erosion of U.S. support for the war.



~~SECRET~~

-2-

It follows logically that he wishes to take absolutely no risk that we trigger an end to the Paris talks -- or even give the other side any kind of credible excuse for breaking them up.

In turn, he is very anxious, therefore, to keep the bombing between the 19th and 20th parallels available as a riposte to another attack on Saigon, or something equivalent. I would guess that he feels they would not walk out if we replied by bombing up to the 20th; they would walk out if we resumed operations against Hanoi-Haiphong.

What Clark's analysis does not say, in my judgment, is what policy we should follow if there is no break in the Paris talks and if they continue to "read the telephone book" to us each time we meet. I doubt that we can sit still indefinitely under those circumstances.

But whatever I may think, the problem which should be systematically addressed is this: What are our alternatives if we face a telephone-book strategy in Paris until the Democratic convention, plus a telephone-book strategy until November if Senator Kennedy is nominated in Chicago, plus a telephone-book strategy until the end of January 1969 if Sen. Kennedy should be elected in November. Our options are roughly these:

- to hold bombing to the 19th parallel;
- to move bombing to the 20th parallel;
- to resume bombing on the old pattern in Hanoi-Haiphong;
- to resume bombing in Hanoi-Haiphong plus other measures which might force Hanoi and its allies to an earlier decision.

I have in mind, for example, mining the North Vietnamese harbors and/or sending some of our forces northward across the DMZ.

All the current indicators are that Hanoi does not now plan to negotiate seriously with us, on the basis of your March 31 speech; but these current indicators may not be correct. They may be putting out the Bobby Kennedy stories because they feel that we are so anxious to get a settlement soon that this might force us to soften our position on a further unilateral de-escalation. We might get something out of Stewart's talks in Moscow.

Nevertheless, I believe it appropriate that, on a contingency basis, we begin to examine the options open to us if they continue simply to stonewall in Paris.

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

W. W. Rostow



Wednesday, May 22, 1968  
9:50 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

At the NSC meeting on Germany this noon, you may wish to ask Katzenbach to begin with a few words on the French situation before we get into the German subject matter.

Nick has been told that you may wish to have a brief review of the French crisis and will be prepared to respond.

W. W. Rostow

*Pres. File*

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Wednesday, May 22, 1968  
9:15 a. m.

**TOP SECRET**

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

This CIA report on the Situation in Vietnam contains the following items (key passages marked):

- Helicopter losses at Camp Evans will restrict U. S. military in I Corps for the short run (p. 2).
- Enemy pressure will continue in I Corps with another attack on Hue still contemplated (p. 2).
- Elements of the North Vietnamese 308th Division (as well as the 2nd Division, traditionally in the area) may be positioned against Danang (pp. 3-4).
- Ky and the generals believe Thieu outmaneuvered them on Huong and the Cabinet shake-up; partly blame the U. S. ; believe Thieu violated his deal (now confirmed to be in writing) to make no major moves without full consultation with the generals. Ky-Thieu problem worse for the short run at least (pp. II-1 - II-2).
- SAM and anti-aircraft somewhat strengthened in North Vietnamese panhandle (pp. III-1 - III-2);
- Zoom MIG-21 practice flights to 82,000 feet suggest an effort may be made to shoot down one of our high level recce flights (III-2).

W. W. Rostow

**TOP SECRET** attachment(cy 1 SC 00992/68 21 May 68)

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *NLS 019-034-3-11*  
By *SP*, NARA, Date *1/18/02*

May 22, 1968

*For file*

Mr. President:

The State Department has now submitted for your signature the proclamation of an amendment to Article 28 of the Convention of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. In January of this year you signed an instrument of ratification and acceptance of this amendment on which the Senate acted favorably on December 11. The amendment will enter into force on November 3, 1968.

I recommend that you sign this proclamation.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_



Wednesday, May 22, 1968

*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Sarge Shriver proposes the following final paragraph for his remarks on presenting his credentials to President de Gaulle:

"In closing, Mr. President, I bring to you the greetings of President Johnson who personally requested me to convey to you his warm regards and the assurances of his high esteem. He has greatly appreciated the hospitality and efficient arrangements provided by the Government of France for the talks on Vietnam now taking place in Paris and your particularly timely support for his efforts toward the restoration of peace.

"In pursuit of such noble objectives, France and the United States should never falter, fail or separate."

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

ERF:mm

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INFORMATION

Wednesday - May 22, 1968

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

The attached clipping from The New York Times is another encouraging development in Latin American movement toward physical integration.

The Times story covers a successful meeting held by the Foreign Ministers of the River Plate countries at which they took concrete decisions on how they will advance in the development of the River Plate basin.

W. W. Rostow

**Attachment**

5/22/68 New York Times article  
out of Santa Cruz, Bolivia

## LATIN STATES JOIN TO DEVELOP AREA

5 Nations Will Cooperate in  
Rio de La Plata Region

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE  
Special to The New York Times

SANTA CRUZ, Bolivia, May 21 — Five South American nations have agreed to work cooperatively in the economic development of a vast area drained by the Rio de la Plata.

The foreign ministers of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay concluded two days of deliberations here yesterday with a document that not only commits them to future cooperation but also includes plans for specific projects.

Among the projects are regulation of the flow of the Pilcomayo and Bermejo Rivers; creation of an Atlantic Ocean outlet for landlocked Bolivia through the Paraguay River; modernization of port facilities at Buenos Aires and Montevideo, in Uruguay; development of the Santa Lucia River basin, and construction of a hydroelectric project at Salto Grande, Uruguay.

One object of the program, which is likely to take three decades or more to complete, is to open up a huge undeveloped area that remains largely isolated.

But in the minds of many participants at the conference, the most important result of development of the Plata basin

Continued on Page 10, Cc, 4, p 1

## 5 NATIONS IN PACT ON LATIN PROJECTS

Continued From Page 1, Col. 3

could be the steady improvement in standards of living there.

The ministers agreed to establish priorities for the projects within a short time, which is understood to mean 90 days.

The Pilcomayo and Bermejo Rivers have caused disastrous floods and are responsible for the silting of the port of Buenos Aires. The Paraguay River project would entail making the river accessible to navigation upriver to Bolivia.

Bolivia's Foreign Minister, Tomas Guillermo Elío, said in



an interview that his nation's best hope for the present was to push toward the Atlantic to find markets for its iron deposits, citrus fruits and other products.

The Salto Grande hydroelectric project had been proposed before by the Inter-American Development Bank as a joint venture between Argentina and Uruguay, but Argentina turned it down, preferring to build a hydroelectric plant at Chocon, in southern Argentina. The Inter-American Bank recently agreed to finance the Argentine dam.

### A Display of Harmony

The over-all agreement was a display of diplomatic harmony that surprised many observers.

Along with the specific projects, priorities were assigned to other aspects of the program. First priority was given to making a thorough hydrographic and meteorological study of the Plata basin. Parallel studies of this kind were started last year by the Organization of American States and by the Inter-American Development Bank, and when completed this year these studies presumably will meet this requirement.

Descending priority was assigned to an analysis of natural resources in the area; improvement of navigation on the main tributary rivers, including dredging and maintenance; the building of interconnecting roads and railroads; the completion of electric power studies and an evaluation of inland fishery resources.

The agreement stipulates that the draft of a formal treaty will be completed in 120 days, at which time the five ministers will meet again in Brazil. Two months later, an international organization is to be formed.

### New Industries

The major thrust of the program will be, first, to open or improve navigation throughout the network of waterways that drain through the Plata basin. Another goal is to develop new industries and to exploit mineral resources.

According to demographic studies, about 200 million people will be living in the area by the end of the century. Many now live in grinding poverty, despite the area's wealth of natural resources, and could become the base for a political volcano if there is no economic improvement.

Less than 100 miles south of here, Ernesto Che Guevara carried out some of his guerrilla raids and met his death earlier this year after he had been captured by Bolivian rangers.

The marginal existence of most Bolivians is belied by Santa Cruz—which has been enriched by oil—with its newly paved streets, clean adobe houses, thriving stores and prosperous-looking people.

The annual per capita income in Bolivia is about \$140, and in Paraguay it is about \$20 more. Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, while better off, still face staggering development problems, and no single nation with territory in the Plata basin has sufficient capital or resources to meet its needs.

But the specter of nationalist rivalry that has plagued Latin America throughout its history has consistently thwarted real cooperation, and even the new agreement in the Plata basin leaves severe problems unresolved.

It was made clear at the conference that no nation in the group has any intention of renouncing any of its sovereignty in favor of a new supranational agency.

A further problem is likely to be the uncertain role of the various international agencies that will have to underwrite the financing of many of the proposed projects.

Present at the conference were observers from several United Nations agencies, the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development Bank, and a private investment consortium known as the Atlantic Community Development Group for Latin America.



Pres.  
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ACTION

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Tuesday - May 21, 1968 - 7:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Haitian Situation

Bill Bowdler met this afternoon with representatives of State, CIA and DOD to review the bidding on the Haitian situation.

The intelligence community has not been able to come up with a clear picture of what is going on at Cap Haitien. A landing of some nature did take place, but we have not been able to determine the size of the invasion force. The figure of 50-75 men is the one most frequently heard, but the reports of the aircraft used could not have lifted this many. Reports on the fighting vary with the source. The invaders claim progress. Duvalier says they have been contained and will shortly be liquidated. The latest report from Ambassador Ross is that everything appears normal and outwardly calm in Port-au-Prince. He has nothing on the situation in the north.

The Duvalier Government has sent notes of protest to the OAS and the UN but it does not call for action by either body.

At this afternoon's meeting at State, the following contingency actions were noted, or agreed upon:

1. State, earlier today, asked FAA to put out an advisory that all non-scheduled private aircraft were to stay away from Haiti except those going to Port-au-Prince. PanAmerican notified State that it had cancelled its regular flight to the Haitian capital today.
2. The Caribbean Ready Force left Vieques, Puerto Rico, this morning on a training cruise to Panama. This will take it to the south of Haiti. At this stage, there is not sufficient justification to divert the Force toward Port-au-Prince. DOD is to furnish us tonight with the plotted position of the Task Force over the next 24 hours so that we will know precisely what its steaming time to the Haitian mainland will be.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-116 Appral (#10)  
By Sj, NARA, Date 7-8-03

3. DOD is stationing a patrol ship in the Windward Passage to act as a deterrent to the Cubans should they try to send forces into Haiti.
4. [ ] determine the whereabouts of responsible civilian and military Haitian exiles in case it becomes necessary on short notice to put together a responsible government and get it into Haiti. 3.3(b)(1)
5. State is going through the [ ] exercise with US officials with experience in Haiti in case we need to beef up our mission on a crash basis. 3.3(b)(1)
6. Our Embassy in Port-au-Prince has recently reviewed its emergency evacuation plans, but State is to ask the Ambassador to make sure that he is ready for fast implementation should the need arise.
7. State is to prepare a policy paper recommending the action we should take in the event the invaders succeed in gaining control over a respectable piece of real estate and ask for the help of the United States and/or the OAS.
8. State has kept OAS Secretary General Plaza fully briefed on developments in Haiti. We are suggesting to him that he use the delivery of a Haitian Note on the situation to call for an informal meeting of the OAS Council. This would serve to give the OAS a basis for pre-empting collective action in the event the Haitians try to involve the UN. Galo Plaza had lunch with U Thant today. We do not know whether they discussed Haiti, and the roles of their respective organizations.
9. State has informed all of our missions in Latin America of the facts as we know them. State has given special briefings to the Venezuelan and Brazilian Embassies here since these are the two countries on which we would most depend for support in the event collective action becomes necessary.

I believe the foregoing actions are commensurate with the nature of the situation as we know it to be. I have your note suggesting a meeting of principals to go over contingency plans. If after reading the foregoing you still wish to have such a meeting, I suggest it be held late tomorrow afternoon. The participants should be Paul Nitze, Dick Helms, Nick Katzenbach, Covey Oliver, Bob Sayre, Bill Bowdler, and myself.

/s/

W. W. Rostow

Set up meeting for  
tomorrow evening      \_\_\_\_\_

Hold up on meeting  
for the time being      \_\_\_\_\_

Call me      \_\_\_\_\_



*Pres file*  
58

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 21, 1968  
6:20 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith four memcons of Sect. Rusk talking  
with Kuznetsov on:

- the non-proliferation treaty;
- the Middle East;
- Vietnam;
- Korea.

They are not required reading since they  
contain nothing essentially new.

The NPT discussion is fascinating, in its way,  
because it shows how intimately the U.S. and  
the USSR can work when they have isolated an  
issue in which both countries feel they have a  
substantial national interest.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachments

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 95-178  
By CB, NARA, Date 10-25-95

Approved in S/S  
EUR: JML:eh  
(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Rostow  
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Approved for Distribution/Memorandum of Conversation  
by: S/S J. P. Walsh - 5/20/68

DATE: May 17, 1968  
1:00 - 3:15 p.m.

PART I of V.

SUBJECT: Nonproliferation Treaty

PLACE: Secretary's dining  
room.

PARTICIPANTS: For the United States:

For the Soviet Union:

The Secretary  
G - Ambassador Bohlen  
EUR - John M. Leddy

Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov  
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin  
Min. Couns. Yuri N. Tcherniakov

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 95-86  
By lip, NARA, Date 9-6-95

About two-thirds of the 2-hour luncheon was devoted to the  
NPT.

#### US-Soviet Cooperation

Both the Secretary and Kuznetsov expressed their appreciation  
for the close cooperation which had taken place at the UN between  
the Soviet and American delegations on the handling of the NPT.  
The Secretary and Kuznetsov agreed that this close collaboration  
should continue; that the two governments should stand firm against  
any changes, certainly for the time being; and that if, at the  
very end, and if both agree, there were minor changes in the  
text of the Treaty which would not affect basic substance, and  
if by these changes it would be possible to get significantly wider  
adherence to the Treaty, the two governments would then consider  
whether these changes could be accepted.

Kuznetsov emphasized that he was under instructions to agree  
to no changes at present and stressed the problem of opening a  
Pandora's box if alterations were to be considered at this stage.

The Secretary and Kuznetsov agreed that the two countries  
could be more flexible in dealing with the proposed GA resolution  
endorsing the NPT than with the text of the NPT itself; but that  
any changes in the text of the GA resolution must also be

acceptable to both the US and the USSR.

Significance of the Latin American and African Vote

Kuznetsov said that before coming to Washington he had had a talk with Robles, the UN Delegate of Mexico, which was the leader of the Latin American group. He stressed the importance of bringing around the Latin American vote and urged that the US do everything it could to bring the Latin Americans into line. The outlook was not discouraging, but US help was needed. The Secretary said that we would do everything that we could on an urgent basis. According to Kuznetsov, Robles had said that the Mexicans would sign the NPT even if there were no changes in the text, but Robles urged changes in order to bring around the rest of the group. The Secretary observed that Robles was probably more Mexican than the Mexicans. He pointed out that Carrillo Flores, the Mexican Foreign Secretary, was personally strongly in favor of the Treaty.

Kuznetsov said that the Mexican proposal to include in the NPT Treaty -- or possibly in the GA resolution -- a reference to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, would cause serious difficulties for the Soviets. Such a reference in Soviet eyes would bind them to the principles of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which they are still considering and about which they have reservations on two main points:

(1) On the principle of permitting peaceful explosion by non-nuclear weapon states -- (Art. 18) and (2) on the huge area covered by the treaty, which embraces half the Atlantic and half the Pacific.

Turning to Brazil, the Secretary told Kuznetsov that the US was not in agreement with the Brazilians on their proposed amendment regarding peaceful nuclear explosive devices (Pineds). He said that the Brazilian Foreign Minister had told him that the Brazilians would not press their amendment on this subject or urge the other Latin Americans to support it. He thought the Brazilians would probably not sign the NPT now but might come along later. He observed that the Brazilians, like a number of other countries, were attempting to use the NPT in order to get bilateral bargaining advantages from the US on such questions as fuel supply, peaceful uses, the S.W. Africa issue, etc. Kuznetsov said he hoped we would make good use of our bargaining power to get adherence to the NPT.



Reference was made to the fact that Mexican Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores was now visiting Moscow. It was suggested that the Soviets could raise the NPT with him during his visit, while the US would approach the Mexicans in Washington or Mexico City.

Kuznetsov said that the Africans were being troublesome. The African opposition bloc was led by Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya. Their tactic is to promote a resolution which would postpone consideration of the NPT until the 23rd GA. Kuznetsov had had a talk with the UN representative of Kenya within the last few days and had ascertained that an important element in the African position was the attitude of South Africa on the NPT. If the South Africans could be brought to support the NPT unequivocally, this could be very important in swinging the entire African vote. At this point the Secretary showed Kuznetsov a telegram which the Department had received this morning from our Mission in South Africa, explaining some of the South African preoccupations and recommending that a US technical expert be sent to Pretoria in order to clarify these problems. The Secretary said that the US would take steps to do this immediately in an effort to help the situation.

The Secretary asked whether the Soviets felt that the negative Tanzanian attitude was influenced by the Chinese. Kuznetsov said that the Soviets were quite certain of it. The Tanzanians had said at the UN that the NPT was nonsense and what really mattered was disarmament. Their whole idea is to postpone the NPT with the hope it will be killed. In response to Kuznetsov's question as to whether the US could do something with Tanzania, the Secretary replied that our relations were only fair, but we would do what we could.

The Secretary asked whether Kuznetsov felt that the Africans were attempting to use the NPT as a means of pressing their views on S.W. Africa. Kuznetsov confirmed that they were and referred to a recent Asian-African meeting at which a decision was reached that there would be no action on NPT until the S.W. African problem was solved. The Secretary said that this created real difficulties.

Ambassador Bohlen asked Kuznetsov what he felt was the attitude of the francophone Africans. Kuznetsov said "not good"; that according to a recent talk he had with Berard (French Ambassador to the UN) the French would be neutral on

NPT although it really favors the Treaty. Mr. Bohlen recalled that de Gaulle had said a few years ago that he did not believe in treaties which have no real powers of enforcement.

Concluding this aspect of the discussion Kuznetsov once again emphasized the importance of the Latin American vote and the importance of US efforts with the Latin American countries to obtain favorable results.

#### FRG Activities at the UN

Kuznetsov said that the FRG observer at the UN (Von Braun) had recently distributed a press release (which he said had been prepared over a year ago, but with new thoughts introduced) designed to bring uncertainty and doubt about the NPT. The Soviets were wondering whether they should not speak out against this action. From the Soviet view, the FRG is trying to sow seeds of doubt. Meanwhile, while the FRG has two people at the UN the GDR can't get visas from the US to be present at the UN, and the Soviets think that they should.

The Secretary said that, speaking very frankly, he would like to offer the Soviets some advice. There was an internal problem in the FRG on the NPT. Some were hostile to it, but others, including Kiesinger and Brandt, were prepared to move. Birrenbach was troubled; Strauss was not in favor. The Secretary thought that the FRG would sign the NPT, but he advised the Soviets not to make an issue about the FRG observer's statement; this would only complicate an already serious problem both for the FRG and for the US and would make more difficult FRG support for the Treaty. In any event, he said, the question of a GDR observer at the UN raised a difficult problem in itself.

(Mr. Bohlen briefly mentioned the recent GDR interference with the travel of West German Citizens over the autobahns to Berlin. Kuznetsov quickly said this was an entirely different question and had nothing to do with the NPT. Mr. Bohlen said he had raised the matter only because Kuznetsov had mentioned the question of visas for GDR observers at the UN.)

The Secretary said one of the reasons for the internal opposition in the FRG to the NPT was the thought of making a commitment to the Soviet Union for nothing in return. The US would like to keep the NPT quite separate from all extraneous

matters and he again urged that the Soviets take no action regarding the FRG statement at the UN. He added that the members of NATO were strongly interested in assurances of FRG adherence to the NPT for reasons which would be understood.

#### US-Soviet Talks on Nuclear Weapons

Kuznetsov acknowledged that if the United States and the Soviet Union could agree to start bilateral talks on limiting strategic nuclear weapons this would be helpful at the UN on the NPT. However he could only say that Moscow was still considering the US proposal that talks begin.

#### Security Assurances

Responding to the Secretary, Kuznetsov said that there is considerable dissatisfaction at the UN over security assurances. There was the problem of when to put the draft resolution to the Security Council. The membership problem was not encouraging and it would not be easy to find 9 members in support of it. He had tried to find out what the French attitude would be. The French delegate had told him that he would not be active, but had no answer on the final French position. Probably they would abstain. India would probably also abstain. Ethiopia and Pakistan were doubtful.

The Secretary thought that Japan and India face the most serious problem in connection with security assurances. He said that he personally was 1000% against India becoming a nuclear-weapon state; but that if he were the Foreign Minister of India he would certainly understand the difficulties confronting India in view of the Chinese threat.

Kuznetsov said the Japanese were very active in the GA and have prepared a draft statement. Japanese reservations relate to the questions of security assurances, peaceful uses and disarmament.

The Secretary said his personal view was that Japan would sign; Kuznetsov thought that they and others would nevertheless try to postpone.

Responding to the Secretary, Kuznetsov said that he had no definite answer from the Romanians. The Romanians were not active in the UN. His best guess was that the Romanians would not vote in favor of the GA resolution endorsing the NPT, but would abstain.

The Secretary emphasized two points in connection with security assurances and the position of the US:

1. The US is not prepared to enter into any additional commitments of alliance in order to give security assurances relating to the NPT. We have enough allies as it is and the Senate will not approve any additions.
2. The US is not ready to entertain the prospect of a possible war with the Soviet Union in order to get the NPT.

Therefore, the Security Council approach which we had agreed upon with the USSR is the only approach possible for the US.

The Secretary added that there are few people who truly understand the real meaning of nuclear war -- perhaps not more than 25 or 30 in the US. Kuznetsov said that the Soviet Union understood it very well. The NPT had been under the highest consideration in the USSR which had concluded that the NPT negotiations were of the highest importance and the only way to stop proliferation. He returned to the importance of solidarity between the US and the Soviet Union in not making any material changes in the Treaty except as outlined above.

#### Procedures for Signing NPT

The Secretary said that the US has not made up its mind on the procedure for signing the NPT. This would have to be discussed with the President. The US had no strong objections to signing the Treaty at the ENDC in Geneva. But if this procedure were adopted two problems would arise. If signature of the Treaty were open to all on this occasion, then the question of the non-recognized (implicitly the GDR) would arise. If signing were limited to members of the ENDC, there is the question of how many members we could get to sign. Perhaps it would be less complicated to use the formula followed in connection with the Outer Space Treaty, i.e., to sign in the capitals of the 3 depository powers. Kuznetsov said that the Soviets favored signing in Geneva in order to maximize public attention to the importance of the treaty. This would be analogous to the procedure followed for the Test Ban Treaty (which was signed at one place, in Moscow). He said that if



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- 7 -

problems should arise about non-recognized states (presumably referring to GDR) in a Geneva ceremony, he thought that this could be taken care of.

The Secretary then made a personal suggestion, which he asked the Soviet side not to report, that perhaps there could be an initialing of the text in Geneva with formal signatures taking place in the capitals of the 3 depository powers. He said that he would talk over this whole question with the President.

EO 12812-1 U.S.G.A.

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~~SECRET/EXDTS~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

14 1678  
Raitow  
7608  
9 586

Approved for Distribution by:

S/S - J. P. Walsh - 5/20/68

PART II of V.

DATE: May 17, 1968

1:00 - 3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT: Middle East

PLACE: Secretary's dining  
room.

PARTICIPANTS: For the United States:

For the Soviet Union:

The Secretary  
G - Ambassador Bohlen  
EUR - John M. Leddy

Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov  
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin  
Min. Couns. Yuri N. Tcherniakov

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S USUN  
U AmEmbassy Moscow  
M EUR  
G WH  
IO DOD  
NEA

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 97-331**  
**By us NARA Date 3-20-99**

Kuznetsov, referring to the latest statements by the UAR and Jordan, said that the Arabs had now made forward steps toward a political solution: (1) They had agreed with the essence of the resolution of the United Nations Security Council of November 22. (2) The UAR had indicated its readiness to continue consultations in New York. And, (3) the UAR had agreed to consider the entire scope of the November 22 resolution. Therefore, the other side should not miss this opportunity. But the position of the Israelis is not constructive. And the US has demonstrated no desire to take even a quarter of a step toward resolving the problem. The US should do more to take advantage of this favorable moment. Present tensions could lead to even greater tensions.

The Secretary said that the agreement of the Israelis, the Jordanians and the UAR to have talks with Jarring was at least a step, even though small. President Johnson had reaffirmed American support for the Security Council resolution on the occasion of the recent visit of Tunisian President Bourguiba. The US will support Jarring in New York. We do not insist upon the Israeli position that Israeli-Arab talks at this point must be face-to-face. There was haggling going on between the two sides, each trying to gain. The Secretary said that the US was disappointed with Kosygin's

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reply to President Johnson's letter on the control of arms to the Middle East, which Kosygin had tried to condition upon Israeli withdrawal. The US feels that the Arabs must show restraint. We know that countries other than the Soviet Union are supplying arms to the Middle East, but US/Soviet agreement on this subject is probably necessary to bring this traffic under control. The job now in the Middle East is to get both sides to agree to get down to talks on the substance if progress is to be made.

Kuznetsov said that he had nothing to add to the Kosygin letter on the arms question. Regarding the Jarring Mission, the Soviets wished it success and would do their best to support it. The Secretary observed that we are somewhat disappointed that Jarring had proceeded so cautiously--so far he had not talked substance, only procedure. We hope for a better result from his activities in New York.

Kuznetsov said that the Soviets had given careful thought to the Middle East. They believe that the Israelis must now take a step and that the US must do something to pressure the Israelis.

Kuznetsov then referred to the proposal by the Security Council to establish a time-table for the achievement of a solution to the Middle East problem. The Secretary said that a time-table made sense only in relation to implementing a solution which had already been agreed upon. If a time-table is simply means for establishing pre-conditions, then all the same old difficulties would arise again. Therefore, it is important for Jarring to deal with the real issues.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-331

By is, NARA Date 3-20-99

DATE: May 17, 1968

1:00 - 3:15 p.m.

PLACE: Secretary's dining room.

PART IV of V.

SUBJECT: Korea

PARTICIPANTS: For the United States:

For the Soviet Union:

The Secretary  
G - Ambassador Bohlen  
EUR - John M. Leddy

Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov  
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin  
Min. Couns. Yuri N. Tcherniakov

COPIES TO: S, U, G, WH, SEC DEF, Amembassy MOSCOW

The Secretary said that the United States was very concerned about the Pueblo affair. The United States has gone as far as it is possible for it to go. He said that we could not apologize for something that we do not think that we actually did, i.e., enter North Korean territorial waters. He hoped that we could obtain Soviet assistance in bringing this question to a satisfactory conclusion.

Continuing, the Secretary said we were also concerned about the infiltration of the DMZ by North Korea and statements by North Korea suggesting possible resumption of hostilities toward the South. He asked for Soviet influence with Pyongyang to keep things cool: the situation could become explosive. Mr. Bohlen added that the U.S. was ready to turn over the crew of the Pueblo to any country with which we have relations, including the Soviet Union, pending an objective review of what had happened.

Kuznetsov said that he could not answer at the moment and could only express the hope that the problem would be solved. Dobrynin said that the North Koreans had shown the Soviets a movie of the crew in which they had made statements which left the impression that the crew supported the North Korean view of

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-2-

the Pueblo incident. The Secretary said that if the crew actually said to the U.S. Government what they were alleged to have said to the North Koreans, then the U.S. would be ready to apologize; but we could not place credence in any statements which had been made by the crew under duress.

The Secretary stated in measured terms that if North Korea attacks South Korea, the United States will react with "maximum violence".

Kuznetsov said that the North Koreans had given the Soviets evidence that South Korea had been infiltrating North Korea and that they, the Soviets, were concerned about this. The Secretary replied that he felt it important that the Soviets and the United States ascertain independently and as objectively as they can what the facts really are on both sides and that the two governments should keep in touch on this matter. He thought that both governments should work to cool down the Korean situation on both sides.

Kuznetsov said that the Soviets strongly favor detente in Korea and that we should move against any tension or aggravation of the situation. The Secretary pointed out that a step toward this would be the release of the crew of the Pueblo.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Memorandum of Conversation

Distribution approved by:  
S/S - J. P. Walsh - 5/20/68

Raitow

DATE: May 17, 1968  
1:00 - 3:15 p.m.

PART V of V

SUBJECT: Viet-Nam

PLACE: Secretary's dining  
room.

8

PARTICIPANTS: For the United States:

For the Soviet Union:

The Secretary  
G - Ambassador Bohlen  
EUR - John M. Leddy

Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov  
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin  
Min. Couns. Yuri N. Tcherniakov

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WH  
DOD

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-331  
By us, NARA Date 3-20-97

The Secretary said that at the Paris talks with Hanoi there were two levels of conversation. First was the level of fantasy. Hanoi was saying that there were no NVN forces in the South. Perhaps the U.S. should add to the fantasy by saying that there were no U.S. forces in the South. The Secretary said the U.S. earnestly hopes that we can get past fantasy and down to the substantive problems.

Kuznetsov said that the Soviets wished success for the Paris talks and then repeated the familiar NVN position -- the need for a cessation of the bombing of the North and stoppage of all other acts of war by the U.S. -- before any progress could be made.

The Secretary said that no one, in Hanoi or anywhere else, would tell us what would happen if the U.S. should stop bombing the North. We are not children. The fact of the matter is that 78% of the land and 90% of the people of the North are unaffected by the bombing. Yet not one square kilometer of the South is free from attacks by the Viet Cong and the NVN. These are the facts. The U.S. is not going to stop 1/2 of the war. In the Paris talks Hanoi has made much of U.S. activity in the DMZ. Why don't we have

a real DMZ in which the DMZ is respected on both sides and with outside observation to make the arrangements effective?

Kuznetsov then simply repeated that the Soviets wished success to the Paris talks; that the NLF was fighting for independence; and that if the United States were to stop the bombing this would ease tension and improve world opinion of the U.S. since the bombing of the North was considered a violation of the Geneva Agreements and the United Nations Charter, etc.

Dobrynin briefly raised the Chalmers Roberts story to the effect that the United States had changed its view about the participation of the NLF in a coalition government in the South. The Secretary simply said that this was a false story and could, therefore, mislead Hanoi about our real position.

At the end of the discussion, Kuznetsov said that Hanoi had reaffirmed its view that if the bombing and all other acts of war were to stop this would pave the way for discussions of all other problems. The Secretary said that this was no help so long as the NVN still refused to recognize the interests of the South.

Tuesday, May 21, 1968  
5:45 p. m.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

I am informed -- and delighted -- that Jim Cross has been nominated for the rank of Brigadier General.

You mentioned in passing that you might ask Bob Ginsburgh to undertake his administrative duties, if Jim were shifted to a command.

I believe that would be a net loss for three reasons:

- Bob is a uniquely valuable and tactful link to the JCS;
- He is a well-balanced professional analyst of the course of the war;
- He is our man on the working level team backstopping negotiations in Paris. (He has worked on this problem for a number of years, starting in the Planning Council at State.)

In short, I believe Bob would better serve you at his present chores.

W. W. Rostow

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 18, 1983.

BY kg ON 6-3-92



60

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 21, 1968 - 4:10 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Harriman's account of his talk with de Gaulle. Nothing of great interest.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

Paris 14450 (DELTO 109)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993  
By 25, NARA, Date 6-3-92

WWRostow:rlm



Department of State

Gold/Taylor #7  
TELEGRAM

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N O D I S

DELTO 109

FROM HARRIMAN

1. I MADE MY SCHEDULED COURTESY CALL ON DE GAULLE TODAY AT 11:30, LASTING TWENTY-FIVE MINUTES. WALLNER CAME WITH ME AND THERE WAS AN ELYSEE INTERPRETER PRESENT. THE GENERAL, ALTHOUGH CORDIAL, SEEMED VERY TIRED. HE SHOWED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN THE EARLY PART OF OUR TALK REGARDING HIS VISIT TO ROMANIA, THE SOVIET UNION, ETC., BUT LITTLE INTEREST IN FOCUSING ON VIET-NAM AFFAIRS. OBVIOUSLY, HE HAD OTHER PREOCCUPATIONS. CABINET MEETING WAS SCHEDULED FOR NOON, AND THE MINISTERS WERE ASSEMBLED OUTSIDE HIS OFFICE AS I LEFT.

2. I OPENED BY EXPRESSING THANKS AND GRATIFICATION FOR EXCELLENT ARRANGEMENTS AND FACILITIES OFFERED BY FRENCH. I RECALLED THE PRESIDENT'S APPRECIATION OF HIS APRIL 3 STATEMENT. DE GAULLE SAID HE WAS RECEIVING THUY THIS AFTERNOON: FRANCE WAS OFFERING HOSPITALITY BUT INTENDED TO REMAIN OUTSIDE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. I THEN REFERRED TO THAT PASSAGE OF THE JOINT FRANCO-ROMANIAN COMMUNIQUE CONCERNING VIET-NAM, POINTING TO THE STRESS PLACED ON SELF-DETERMINATION OF VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WHICH, I SAID, WAS ONE OF OUR PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES. WE THEN TALKED ABOUT ROMANIA AND TOUCHED ON DEVELOPMENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AS REPORTED IN FURTHER DETAIL BELOW.

4. DE GAULLE DID NOT SEEM CONVERSANT WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR

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Authority RAC 25451  
By us NARA, Date 3-13-78

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PAGE 02 PARIS 14450 211827Z

TALKS, AND WHEN I ASKED FOR HIS IMPRESSIONS, HE MERELY SAID "I HAVE BELIEVED FROM BEGINNING AND HAVE SAID IT PUBLICLY AND HAVE REPEATED IT TO YOUR COUNTRY'S REPRESENTATIVES THAT YOU MUST CEASE BOMBINGS AND WITHDRAW FROM VIETNAM BY STAGES. IF YOU WANT TO DISENGAGE FROM VIETNAM--AND I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD YOU SHOULD DO THESE THINGS. THEY MAY SEEM UNPLEASANT BUT IN THE LONG RUN THE POWER AND INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES WILL IN NO WAY BE DIMINISHED. ITS PRESTIGE WILL BE ENHANCED, AND YOUR HANDS WILL BE FREE TO DEAL WITH THE GREAT PROBLEMS OF THE WORLD, AND THIS WILL BE A GOOD THING." HE SEVERAL TIMES EXPRESSED HIS HOPES FOR SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS AND AT THE END ASKED THAT I CONVEY HIS BEST WISHES TO THE PRESIDENT, WHOM HE HELD IN HIGH ESTEEM.

5. I MADE CLEAR OUR POSITION ON STOPPING THE BOMBING, DRAWING PARTICULARLY ON THAT PORTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 31 SPEECH CONCERNING HIS RESPONSIBILITIES TO OUR OWN FORCES, AND THE RELATION OF THE BOMBINGS TO THE TACTICAL SITUATION IN THE NORTHERN PART OF SOUTH VIETNAM. I EXPRESSED MY DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE ARROGANT ATTITUDE OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN INCREASING RATHER THAN DECREASING THEIR INFILTRATION WITHOUT ANY SIGN OF RESTRAINT. I EMPHASIZED THAT WE HAD COME WITH POSITIVE OBJECTIVES WHICH WERE TO END THE FIGHTING IN THE NORTH, RE-ESTABLISH THE SOUTH ON THE BASIS OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND ONE-MAN ONE-VOTE AND LEAVE TO THE VIETNAMESE TO DECIDE AT A LATER PERIOD THE QUESTION OF EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION. DE GAULLE LISTENED POLITELY, BUT SHOWED NO INTEREST IN DISCUSSION OF VIETNAM.

5. DE GAULLE WAS MUCH BRIGHTER AND MORE INTERESTED WHEN HE TALKED ABOUT HIS VISIT TO ROMANIA. HE CHARACTERIZED THE ROMANIANS AS "A DOCILE, PEASANT PEOPLE, EASILY LED AND OFFERING LITTLE RESISTANCE TO COMMUNIST RULE WHICH WAS HEAVIER IN ROMANIA THAN IN ANY OTHER SATELLITE EXCEPT EAST GERMANY." HE SAID INCREASING INDEPENDENCE FROM MOSCOW WAS THE CARDINAL OBJECTIVE OF THE PRESENT REGIME, AND IT WAS PLAYING THE CHINESE CARD TO FORWARD THIS OBJECTIVE

BUT FEAR OF THE RUSSIANS WAS GREAT, AND THE FACTORS OF PROXIMITY AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE WERE STRONG. HE THOUGHT THAT THIS OBJECTIVE OF INDEPENDENCE STRENGTHENED AND BROADENED POPULAR SUPPORT OF THE REGIME, AND HE FORESAW A GROWING DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R.

6. ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA HE STRESSED DISENCHANTMENT AND LOOKED FOR

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PAGE 03 PARIS 14450 211827Z

CONTINUED COMMUNIST RULE THERE UNDER THE APPEARANCE OF INCREASING  
LIBERALIZATION. HE TALKED ABOUT THE LACK OF ORGANIZED  
OPPOSITION TO COMMUNISM THERE, BUT DID NOT SEEM IMPRESSED BY THE  
LIBERAL DEVELOPMENTS INSIDE THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT ITSELF.  
HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Pres file*  
61

SECRET

Lunch with the President  
Tuesday, May 21, 1968, 1:00 p. m.

Agenda

1. Paris Talks (Sect. Rusk)

Sitrep; plans for Wednesday meeting; prospects for days ahead.

2. Bombing Between 19th and 20th Parallels (Sects. Rusk and Clifford; Gen. Wheeler)

-- The Military Situation and Enemy Intentions (Gen. Wheeler)

-- Sect. Clifford's View and Recommendation

-- Sect. Rusk's View and Recommendation

3. Proposed New PUEBLO Formula (Sects. Rusk and Clifford)

See Tab A.

4. Draft Cable to Manila on PHILCAG (Filipino engineering unit in Vietnam).  
(Sects. Rusk and Clifford)

See Tab B.

5. Other.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 6-3-92

61a

A

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

Sunday, May 19, 1968 -- 10:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a proposal suggested by Nick Katzenbach, concurred in by Sec. Rusk, for retrieving the crew of the PUEBLO.

It involves our signing a receipt for the return of our men in a way which would permit us to disavow accepting a North Korean version of an apology but would permit them to argue that we had.

An Australian in Tokyo with good North Korean contacts would explore, before the event, whether this procedure would be acceptable to the North Koreans; and that they would deliver the men at the time the receipt was signed by our new representative Gen. Woodward.

*on* *Nick Katzenbach*  
*Agreed* *W. Rostow*

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 77-333  
By is, NARA Date 9-21-98

~~SECRET~~

612

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Next Steps on PUEBLO

In February you approved an instruction to our representative in Panmunjom authorizing him to accept an unsatisfactory North Korean receipt for the PUEBLO crew by overwriting in his own handwriting a simple statement that he had received 82 men and the body of the 83rd crew member.

We have not as yet had a chance to use this procedure, since the North Koreans have never proffered a receipt.

We now would like to revive this proposal through a back channel procedure, i.e., an Australian in Tokyo with good North Korean contacts.

He would be fully briefed on our plan and would tell the North Koreans that we would accept their draft receipt with an overwrite, emphasizing that it must be simultaneous with release of the entire crew.

If the North Koreans were to accept this procedure they would, of course, claim that we had signed their receipt; we would claim that we had signed only what General Woodward had written. Both sides would understand this ambiguity.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-332

By cb, NARA Date 7-28-99



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
-2-

We would also publish--immediately after release of the crew--the whole story of the seizure and the negotiations, including the transcripts of the meetings at Panmunjom. This record fully supports our refusal to sign their form of receipt as they presented it.

Dean Rusk concurs in this approach. I recommend that you authorize us to go ahead with it.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



The Under Secretary

~~SECRET~~

61d

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE


Walt:

Assuming that the President approves the memorandum on Next Steps on the PUEBLO (a copy is at TAB A) we will need to have White House clearance of two implementing instructions. (TABs D and E).

At TAB B is a copy of a back channel message we have already sent to Ambassadors Porter and Johnson asking for their comments on our proposed back channel approach.

At TAB C are their replies, and at TAB D is a draft back channel message telling Tokyo to go ahead with the approach through the Australian. Of the preceding, only the draft message at TAB D needs White House clearance.

At TAB E is a copy of our instructions for the 17th closed meeting. It also needs White House clearance.

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Attachments:  
Stated.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-332  
By cb, NARA Date 7-21-99

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~~SECRET~~

A  
61e

May 18, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Next Steps on PUEBLO

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~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-332  
By cb, NARA Date 7-28-99

~~SECRET~~

-2-

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Dean Rusk concurs in this approach. I recommend that you authorize us to go ahead with it.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

The Under Secretary

SECRET

KTF-AmbBrown:bjk 5/18/68



To: [REDACTED]  
FROM: STUART - INR/DDC

Ext 6145

[WASH 00288]

Old Mark Tab B  
61f

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

May 16, 1968

PRIORITY

MESSAGE TO AMBASSADORS PORTER (SEOUL) AND JOHNSON (TOKYO) VIA [REDACTED] CHANNELS

SUBJECT: Seventeenth Closed Meeting at Panmunjom

1. Negotiations for release of Pueblo's crew appear to be approaching impasse. North Korean side insists on admission of wrongdoing and unconditional apology. We are unwilling to go beyond expression of regret for any violation of orders which may have caused Pueblo to approach closer than 12 nautical miles to coast of North Korea.

2. State 110781 (not sent Tokyo) authorized US representative to sign unacceptable North Korean document at time of release of Pueblo's crew after first writing in, <sup>above signature,</sup> any one of several specified inscriptions.

Variant of such an inscription applicable to possible course of action discussed in para. 4 below might read: QUOTE There have been turned over to me today at \_\_\_\_\_ the 82 surviving members of the U.S.S. Pueblo's crew and the body of Seaman Wayne D. Hodges. END QUOTE.

3. If above procedure were followed, we would argue that language inscribed by General Woodward was all that he had signed. This procedure could therefore provide means of obtaining release of crew without making

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 01-171  
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-25-02

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

false and humiliating admissions. Problem is to get North Koreans to present document for signature concurrently with release of crew.

4. Your comments are requested soonest on following possible course of action:

A. At seventeenth closed meeting, General Woodward would be instructed to criticize in detail language of U.S. apology proposed by General Pak at sixteenth meeting. Woodward's criticism would, however, include following statement:

QUOTE You cannot expect me to consider your draft as a proper basis for settling the issue before us in the absence of your clear assurance that, simultaneously with my acceptance of an appropriately amended version of such a document, you would release all of the members of the Pueblo's crew. UNQUOTE

B. Australian official in Tokyo, who is in contact with well-connected North Koreans there, would be briefed fully on status of closed talks, including General Woodward's instructions for seventeenth meeting, and would be requested to take following line with his North Korean contacts:

(1) General Woodward will make statement at next closed

meeting which contains very significant sentence (quoted in para 4.A. above).


(2) This sentence is designed to open way to rapid settlement of Pueblo case.

(3) If General Pak would prepare document along lines suggested by him at sixteenth meeting, amended to avoid excessive humiliation of United States Government, General Woodward could be expected to accept it concurrently with release of 82 surviving members of Pueblo's crew and body of Seaman Wayne D. Hodges. General Woodward would sign document after first writing in in his own handwriting the language quoted in para. 2 above.

(4) This channel is available for relaying the North Korean response to appropriate U.S. authorities.


5. If, at initial or subsequent Tokyo meeting, North Koreans balked at proposed inscription above General Woodward's signature, Australian would respond that handwritten inscription is essential part of proposal. Australian would be made privy to our purpose in insisting on such an inscription, but would not enlighten North Koreans on this point. Latter might figure out what we were up to, but go along anyway on the ground that a document which each side could interpret in its own way was the best they could get.

6. Use of separate, secret channel would make possible off-the-record discussions. Also, use of such channel might intrigue North Koreans and make them psychologically readier to make deal. Positions taken by our side in Tokyo and Panmunjom would of course have to be closely coordinated.

KTF: ager:lm 5/15/68

Clearances: KTF - Winthrop G. Brown  
U - The Under Secretary

  
NK pul SE

cc. WH - Mr. 



~~SECRET~~

Tatc

619

DATE: 17 MAY 68

RECD: MAY 17 0725Z 68

FROM: TOKYO 0074

TO:  WASHINGTON

REFERENCE: WASHINGTON 00288

FOR AMBASSADOR BROWN FROM AMBASSADOR JOHNSON:

"I CONCUR IN DESIRABILITY OF TRYING PROPOSED  
STRATEGY. HOWEVER, BEFORE MAKING ATTEMPT, I BELIEVE  
WE SHOULD ASK AUSTRALIAN OFFICIAL WHETHER HE CONSIDERS  
THIS CHANNEL IS STILL VALID AND ADEQUATE FOR PURPOSE.

IF YOU AGREE, WE WILL EXPLORE WITH AUSTRALIAN."

~~SECRET~~

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-332

By CL, NARA Date 7-28-99

612

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 17 MAY 1968

RECD: 0415Z 17 MAY 68

FROM: SEOUL 6549

TO: ~~WASHINGTON~~ WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~  
PRIORITY

REFERENCE: WASHINGTON 00288

QTE FOR AMBASSADOR BROWN FROM AMBASSADOR PORTER:

MY COMMENT IS LET'S TRY IT. EVEN IF NK'S DON'T ACCEPT  
IDEA OF WRITE-IN BY WOODWARD IMMEDIATELY, THEY MIGHT FIND  
PROPOSED PROCEDURE INTERESTING. YOU WILL HAVE IN MIND, I AM SURE,  
THAT IF WOODWARD WRITES SENTENCE IN WATER-BASED INK NK'S COULD  
ERADICATE IT QUITE EASILY SHOULD THEY FEEL IT DESIRABLE  
TO DO SO. I ASSUME YOU WILL ALLOW US ADEQUATE TIME TO PREPARE  
ROKS FOR THIS PLOY IF U DECIDE TO GO AHEAD. UNQTE

~~SECRET~~

BT

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-332  
By CB, NARA Date 7-28-97

~~SECRET~~

Tet D

612

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

May 17, 1968

MESSAGE TO AMBASSADORS PORTER (SEOUL) AND JOHNSON (TOKYO)

REFERENCE: WASH 00288

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

SUBJECT: Pueblo

1. For Tokyo. Go ahead and explore plan with Australian. If results of exploration are favorable, ask Australian to schedule meeting with North Korean contacts and carry out course of action set forth in para four of reference telegram. Meeting should be held as soon as possible and in any event before next Panmunjom meeting which we hope to call May 23 or 24. Please advise both Seoul and Department of results your exploration and of time set for any meeting.
2. For Seoul. Instructions for 17th proposed meeting will suggest that Gen. Woodward call next meeting on May 23 or 24. He should, however, not schedule meeting before meeting of Australian and North Koreans in Tokyo. You are correct in assuming you will be given time to prepare ROKG for kind of settlement contemplated in ref telegram.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 01-171  
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-25-02

61 E

~~SECRET~~

Ambassy SEOUL

INFO: Ambassy TOKYO

STATE \_\_\_\_\_

NOBIS/CACTUS

SUBJECT: Instructions for Seventeenth Closed Meeting:

REF: A. Seoul 7078  
B. State 110781

1. We believe that for the present the best tactic is to adopt a fairly relaxed posture. Therefore, we suggest that you wait a little longer than Pok did in calling the last meeting, perhaps until May 23 or 24, and then call for a meeting on fairly short notice. If you think there is any merit in making the other side up at <sup>two</sup> one o'clock in the morning for a meeting at eleven, by all means do so.

2. At the meeting General Woodward should make a statement along the following lines:

A. My predecessor and I have met with you here sixteen times in an effort to obtain the release of the U.S.S. Pueblo and its crew. The two sides in these meetings fairly quickly achieved a substantial area of agreement. Thus, there is no dispute concerning the fact that the Pueblo was on an intelligence-gathering mission. There is also no disagreement

KTF:MCBrow/JAYeger:lm 5/18/68 3263  
5/15/68Defense -  
White House -

U - Mr. Katzenbach

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-332

By cb, NARA Date 7-28-99~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

over the policy of my government which has ordered, and will continue to order, ships of the United States Navy to approach no closer than twelve nautical miles to land controlled by your side. We have even reached a measure of agreement concerning the circumstances in which it would be appropriate for the United States to express regret.

B. Despite this substantial area of agreement, we continue to differ on two fundamental points. You have persisted, contrary to established international law, in characterizing the Pueblo's entirely legal and proper activities as espionage. You have also continued to press us to accept evidence unilaterally submitted by your side as proof of intrusions by the Pueblo contrary to orders. My predecessor and I have explained to you on several occasions why we are unable to accept this evidence and why we are unwilling to apologize unqualifiedly for actions which we regard as unproven.

C. We continue to believe that the three-point proposal which is incorporated in the draft receipt which Admiral Smith gave you at the fifteenth meeting represents a fair and reasonable basis for settling the problem created by your side's illegal seizure of the Pueblo. Our proposal fully reflects the area of agreement reached in these talks and strikes a fair compromise on the points still in dispute. I urge you to reconsider your opposition to our proposal and, by accepting it, to bring these talks to a successful conclusion.

D. Even if you cannot now accept our proposal, I urge you to act at once to release the 82 surviving members of the Pueblo's crew and the body of the crew member who died while in your custody. Holding the crew as hostages

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will not, I can assure you, cause the United States to change its position in these talks. Your continued illegal detention of these men serves no rational purpose and only places your side in an unfavorable light before world opinion.

E. We have <sup>studied</sup> ~~studied~~ very carefully the statements which you have made and the document which you presented at the sixteenth meeting. In this document you asked our side to agree: (1) that the confessions and other evidence which you have produced from the Pueblo crew are valid and conclusive of your claim; (2) that the Pueblo intruded closer than 12 nautical miles to the coast of North Korea; (3) that the crew were engaged in espionage and hostile acts; (4) that we would apologize for these alleged acts; (5) that we should assure they will not be repeated; and (6) that we should request that you deal leniently with the crew.

F. I would like to comment on each of these points in turn:

(1) As I have told you before, we have taken careful note of the alleged confessions and other documents which you have presented to us.

(a) It is an obvious fact that men in captivity under total physical control of your side cannot be expected to speak freely. Moreover these alleged confessions contain statements that the Pueblo was 7.6 miles from the coast when she was captured. We know, as a matter of fact, both

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~~SECRET~~

from messages received from the Pueblo and messages from your own patrol boats at the time that the Pueblo was more than 15 miles from shore at the time she was captured. Therefore, you cannot reasonably expect us to accept the alleged confessions and other evidence which you have produced at face value and without confirmation.

(b) We are, as I have told you before, prepared to submit the facts of the case to an impartial inquiry by some independent outside group and to have whatever facts this group finds to be true to be made public. This would, of course, involve release of the crew so that they could speak freely and without pressure and we are prepared to have them released to the custody of a third party so that no atmosphere of pressure of either side could be established. We would in fact accept their release to the custody of any government with which we have diplomatic relations, including any of your allies with which we have such relations. If you really believe in the alleged evidence which you have produced you should have no fear of an impartial outside inquiry.

(2) We do not believe that the Pueblo ever ventured closer to the coast than 12 nautical miles. Her orders specified clearly that she should remain outside that distance, and there is no reason to believe that she disobeyed her orders. I have already commented on the alleged evidence to

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

the contrary which you have presented. However, as stated, we are prepared to have this matter investigated by an independent outsider and to have whatever facts are determined to be accurate made public.

(3) The Pueblo was on an intelligence-gathering mission on the high seas. She was legally marked US navy vessel. Her crew were in uniform and acting under naval orders. By no stretch of the imagination or any interpretation of international law can she or her crew be charged with espionage, the definition of which is as follows: QUOTE: A person can only be considered a spy when, acting clandestinely or on false pretenses, he obtains or endeavors to obtain information in the zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party.... Thus, soldiers not wearing a disguise who have penetrated into the zone of operations of the hostile army, for the purpose of obtaining information, are not considered spies. UNQUOTE.

(4) You request us to apologize for espionage and hostile acts and intrusion into claimed territorial waters. For the reasons given above we do not believe we have anything to apologize for, but in the event we are found wrong by impartial inquiry after the crew is released, we are prepared to express regrets for any violation of the ship's orders which may have resulted in her approaching closer than 12 nautical miles from the coast.



~~SECRET~~

(5) You suggest that we ask you to deal leniently with the crew.

In fact, we insist as a matter of international law and of human decency that you release these men whom you have illegally seized. You cannot expect me to consider your draft as a proper basis for settling the issue before us in the absence of your clear assurance that, simultaneously with my acceptance of an appropriately amended version of such a document, you would release all of the members of the Pueblo's crew.

G. As I said at the last meeting, the position which Admiral Smith presented at the fifteenth and previous meetings is the considered position of my government. We believe it is obvious that it provides you with everything to which you are entitled, namely, an expression of regret if the facts warrant it.

H. I again urge you to consider our proposals seriously. We could continue indefinitely here repeating our respective positions which would be a rather futile performance, since there is an easy way to solve the matter, namely, impartial public inquiry. If the facts turn out to be as you allege, you will have our expression of regret. You will in any case have our formal assurance that intrusions to which you object will not be made by any of our vessels.

7

AmEmbassy Seoul

~~SECRET~~

3. FYI Authority still stands to accept unsatisfactory North Korean document, simultaneously with release of entire Pueblo's crew, after writing in and signing one of three inscriptions specified in para. 5 of State 110781. Simplified variant of first of these inscriptions would under most conceivable circumstances appear most likely to produce desired results. Such inscription would read: QUOTE There have been turned over to me today at \_\_\_\_\_ the 82 surviving members of the U.S.S. Pueblo's crew and the body of Seaman Wayne D. Hedges. END QUOTE. Listing of individual names and serial numbers would not be necessary. END FYI.

END

~~SECRET~~

61k

B

1:50 p.m.  
5/18/68  
MEMORANDUM

⑦  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

12  
ACTION

612  
Saturday, May 18, 1968  
1:50 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reduction of size of Philippine military force in Vietnam (PHILCAG)

President Marcos has been having trouble for several months in getting from his Congress an appropriation to cover PHILCAG. Marcos and other Philippine officials have repeatedly told our Embassy it might be necessary, in view of the Congressional pressure, to reduce the size and change the composition of PHILCAG (for instance medical units instead of engineering battalions).

We have made a vigorous effort, including your letter of April 14, to persuade Marcos to maintain the size and the integrity of PHILCAG. On several occasions he has assured us, and has stated publicly, that he would do so.

Nonetheless, withdrawals have taken place. From an original strength of 2,050, PHILCAG is down to 1,810. The Philippine Secretary of Defense and Armed Forces Chief of Staff have now informed our Embassy that they are planning a weekly reduction of 35 men until PHILCAG is reduced to a strength of 1,400. That would constitute a better than 30% reduction from the original PHILCAG strength.

Attached is an extremely stiff cable to our Embassy in Manila authorizing the Embassy to find out if the reduction has Marcos' approval. If so, the telegram authorizes our Charge in Manila to speak in very blunt terms to Marcos about the dim view we take of this development. Among other things, the message says that we will suspend further shipments of equipment for Philippine army engineer construction battalions (a matter of great personal interest to Marcos and a program which stems from his visit with you in 1966). We also plan to suspend activity regarding procurement in the Philippines of our needs in Vietnam (another matter stemming from the communique issued at the end of Marcos visit with you). Finally, the cable raises the possibility that at some point the reductions of PHILCAG might render the Philippines ineligible to sit in the councils of troop-contributing countries to Vietnam.

The cable has been personally cleared by Secretary Rusk.

But I have my doubts that this cable will do the job. In the first place our Charge in Manila is not at all likely to go as far with Marcos as this cable

\* not: instructs. see final para.



will permit him to go. The cable should serve, however, to clarify Marcos' intentions and precipitate a dialog with our Mission on the best approach to the problem of keeping PHILCAG intact. Eventually, we may want to resort to another letter from you. That, however, depends on Marcos' reaction, and this cable is a necessary first step.

One good reason for precipitating this issue without delay is to try to get it out of the way before Mennen Williams arrives in Manila, in about a month.

There is one danger in this of which I think you should be aware. Thus far, the reduction of PHILCAG has taken place with virtually no publicity. Manila is a sieve, and a tough approach by us will probably become known and focus publicity on the PHILCAG reduction. However, that is sure to happen anyway, sooner or later. I think it is time to bite the bullet with the Philippines.

I recommend you approve the cable. Whether or not you approve you might want to discuss the problem at the Tuesday luncheon.

*Walt* Rostow

Att.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Put on Tuesday lunch agenda ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

*ask Clifford & desk  
to study & say  
carefully —  
✓*

1588  
61m~~SECRET~~

AmEmbassy MANILA

INFO: AmEmbassy SAIGON  
CINCPAC  
CINCPAC FOR POLADDECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-331By is, NARA Date 3-20-99

STATE

EXDIS

Subject: PHILCAG

Ref: Manila 10263

1. We are extremely disturbed with intended action of Philippine Government as reported reftel. Suggest Embassy if it perceives no objection ascertain from Marcos whether the position as reported is indeed his position.
2. If it turns out that Marcos' position is that as reported reftel we find it extremely difficult to reconcile this position with his frequent statement in the past that he would maintain the essential integrity of PHILCAG or his statement (Manila 9252) that during the period of long and protracted negotiations which we are entering is no time to weaken the allied position in South Vietnam. We are frankly at a loss what further to say to Marcos. Our position has been made clear on several occasions, including recent personal letter from President Johnson (State 143682). Philippine officials citing out of context Secretary Clifford Statement of our hope eventually to reduce military activity in South Viet-Nam seems to us willful

LA/PA:GPrice:jw

5/10

3611

The Secretary

LA/VN - Mr. Burke

DOD/ISA - Col. Constant (draft)

Wii -

EA - Mr. Godley

DOD/ISA - Adm. Lemos (draft)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

misunderstanding at best.

3. At this particular moment, with the Paris talks about to begin, it is extremely important that allies maintain united front. (Thais have reaffirmed their decision send another 10,600 ground combat forces Vietnam where they already have 2,200 with initial additional contingent 5,600 strong arriving by July.) Continuation of strong military presence in South Viet-Nam is important element in our negotiating position, especially in view of communist "talk-fight" tactics which they appear to be implementing to the best of their ability. Any reduction in allied troop commitments at this time would have an unfortunate psychological effect. There would also be adverse reaction from members of U.S. Congress, as Embassy is undoubtedly aware from reports of aid hearings (Passman Subcommittee in particular), public statements several members of Congress, and particular statement of Cromer (State 146179).

4. It is unclear from Philippine position reflected reftel whether reduction to 1400 would be permanent or temporary. In either case, and even if withdrawals were limited to security troops with engineer units remaining intact, we would consider the essential integrity of PHILCAG had not been maintained.

5. U.S. Government has devoted much effort and resources to enable Filipinos to continue their relatively modest contribution in South Viet-Nam. If Filipinos carry out action forecast in reftel, we will consider that much of our effort

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

has come to nought. In such case we cannot predict at this time what our action will be in the future, either immediate or long-run. Until action on PHILCAG shows prospects of more favorable outcome we must maintain suspension on processing of third shipment of equipment for second five ECEs and continue to hold up final preparation and delivery of natural supplier list for Philippine offshore procurement. This means there will be no delivery of the third shipment of equipment before end of this fiscal year at best, especially if action on PHILCAG is postponed until special session mid-June or later. However, in accordance with recommendation para 8 Manila 9829 we will say nothing re these suspensions unless asked.

6. In view of continued Philippine position of not making combat units available in South Viet-Nam, and current and contemplated dilution of present relatively modest commitment, it seems tous point may eventually be reached where Philippines could not be considered as troop-contributing country and therefore no longer be eligible to sit in councils of such countries. We cannot visualize US initiating action to exclude them, but if any other nation did so we do not believe we could effectively press for continued Philippine participation. In such case it would be difficult for us to continue any support for PHILCAG units in South Viet-Nam, and maintenance of such units would be matter strictly between Philippine Government and South Vietnamese Government with no

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

4

MANILA

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

assistance or advice from us. It seems to us Filipinos should think long and hard before giving up position in councils of troop contributing countries for what has been and continues to be relatively small membership dues.

7. While we recognize danger of explanation along above lines to Marcos and other Philippine officials, we wanted you to know our general thinking, which you may pass on as you deem appropriate to be effective in continuing to point out gravity with which we view situation.

GP-1

END



~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 21, 1968  
11:50 a. m.

62

MR. PRESIDENT:

*Free file*

I have just received a call from Bill Jorden. He was speaking on behalf of the delegation. They wish us to reconsider the words "continue to" on grounds different from Sect. Rusk's.

They believe it implies that we cannot continue the present partial cessation of bombing indefinitely. It would be read as an overt threat that, unless they moved along the negotiations, we were going back to total bombing of North Vietnam. It would almost certainly get into the press.

They are conscious that at some stage we may have to do this. They believe that if we make that move:

-- we must prepare the grounds for it very carefully at home and abroad;

-- the warning to Hanoi should not be virtually in public, in the first instance, as it would be, given the character of the present series of meetings.

W. W. Rostow

*I gather Cy Vance called State with the same message*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By us, NARA Date 9-8-98

ACTION

63

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 21, 1968 -- 11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk spoke to me today about your insertion of the words "continue to" take the grave risks...that cessation poses, etc., in Harriman's instruction. This might be read to imply that we can continue to take the costs of a partial bombing cessation indefinitely.

Sec. Rusk is rather pleased that Harriman put Zorin on notice that we might have to go back to full bombing or more if there was not progress in Paris. He is afraid that the inserted phrase might undercut Harriman's warning to Zorin.

Therefore, Sec. Rusk would like to discuss this at lunch today and perhaps get your agreement to drop the inserted words.

For convenience, I attach the relevant message.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 14355

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By is, NARA Date 9-8-98

WWRostow:rlm

~~SECRET~~

63a

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

⑧

Monday, May 20, 1968 - 4:45 pm

Mr. President:

*Rec'd  
5/21*

State will have a recommendation to you tomorrow morning on Harriman's attached draft for Wednesday.

I would avoid the sentence bracketed in red on page 2 until they begin talking seriously with us.

*OK to avoid sentence  
but add "Continue to"  
when indicated*

*WJW* Rostow

Paris 14355

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By is, NARA Date 7-8-78





Department of State

63b  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

REB410

ACTION COPY

PAGE 01 PARIS 14355 201804Z

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ACTION SS0 00

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INFO /000 W

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
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1968 MAY 20 PM 2 24

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 14355

N O D I S / HARVAN

DELTO 97

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 25458  
By is NARA, Date 3-16-98

FOLLOWING IS OUTLINE OF GOVERNOR HARRIMANS REMARKS FOR MAY 22 MEETING:

1. US SIDE WILL SPEAK FIRST.

2. WE WILL LEAD OFF BY SAYING THAT WE HOPE THESE TALKS CAN BE FREE FROM THE EXCHANGE OF POLEMICAL CHARGES AND COUNTERCHARGES. IN THAT SPIRIT, WE WILL KEEP OUR OPENING REMARKS SHORT SO THAT WE CAN HAVE A TRUE DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES WHICH CONCERN US.

3. WE WILL THEN RETURN TO CHALLENGE THROWN US BY THUY MAY 18 WHEN HE ASKED IF WE "DARE GIVE THIS PEOPLE THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION." WE WILL REFER DRV TO REPEATED STATEMENTS BY US THAT WE ARE IN VIETNAM TO PRESERVE FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE ON THE BASIS OF ONE MAN-ONE VOTE, FREE OF COERCION AND OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. THIS, HOWEVER, REQUIRES CERTAIN ACTION, NOT BY THE US, BUT BY THE DRV.

4. WE WOULD POINT OUT THAT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IS A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, CHOSEN BY THE FREE VOTE OF ALMOST FIVE MILLION PEOPLE IN THE SOUTH, AND TRACE BRIEFLY ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY AND CLAIM TO LEGITIMACY. WE WOULD ALSO MAKE BRIEF OBJECTION TO THUY'S CONTINUAL USE OF "PUPPET" DESCRIBE THE GVN.

5. WE WILL MOVE TO BOMBING ISSUE IN SOMEWHAT OBLIQUE FASHION.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 14355 201804Z

WE WILL SAY THAT WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE DRV CONSIDERS THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS TO BE THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND THAT WE REMAIN READY TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE. BUT WE CANNOT TAKE THE GRAVE RISKS, AS POINTED OUT BY MARCH 31ST SPEECH, THAT CESSATION POSES WITHOUT SOME SIGN THAT THE DRV WOULD TAKE MEASURES OF RESTRAINT ON THEIR SIDE. IT IS WITH THIS IN MIND THAT WE PROPOSED THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DMZ AS WELL AS OBSERVANCE OF THE 1962 AGREEMENTS ON LAOS. THE DRV SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT, AS WE HAVE SAID BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY IN THE PAST, WE ARE NOT DEMANDING THE COMPLETE STOPPING OF SUPPORT BY THE NORTH TO ITS FORCES IN THE SOUTH-- "SUPPORT WHICH YOU DENY GIVING TO TROOPS YOU DENY HAVING THERE."

*Costly*  
*75*  
*Agree*

6. WE WILL CLOSE BY REFERRING AGAIN TO OUR OPENING HOPE THAT WE COULD AVOID POLEMICS, AND ADD THAT WE WOULD WELCOME AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE DRV DELEGATION NOT TO RELEASE THE TEXTS OF FORMAL STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS AFTER THIS SESSION. WE COULD AGREE THAT EACH SIDE WOULD GIVE OUT GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE MEETING BUT NOT RELEASE TEXT. THIS WOULD REDUCE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE MEETING IN PARIS TO REPEAT PREVIOUSLY STATED PROPAGANDA POSITION SNA DSPECIFICALLY WOULD BRING US TO A MORE USEFUL AND MEANINGFUL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.

7. WE ASSUME THAT THUY WILL ANSWER BY REPEATING HIS DEMAND THAT WE STOP THE BOMBING, USING PHRASES LIKE THAT CONTAINED IN MAY 18TH STATEMENT--THAT THE US "MUST RAPIDLY GIVE A POSITIVE ANSWER AND IT CANNOT AVOID DOING SO FOR MUCH LONGER". IN RESPONSE WE WILL SAY THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. WE ARE READY TO TRY TO ESTABLISH SOME BASIS FROM WHICH WE COULD PROPERLY CONSIDER YOUR DEMAND FOR CESSATION AND AT THE APPROPRIATE LATER TIME SUCH QUESTIONS AS WITHDRAWAL OR "REGROUPMENT" OF FORCES OTHER THAN THOSE OF SOUTH VIETNAM FROM THE TERRITORY OF SOUTH VIETNAM. THEREFORE, AS WE HAVE SPOKEN OF THE DMZ AND OF THE PROBLEM OF INFILTRATION, WE ARE READY TO DISCUSS WITH YOU IN DETAIL CERTAIN ACTIONS RELATED TO THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM, SUCH AS, FIRING OF ARTILLERY FROM AND ACROSS DMZ AREA; THE MASSIVE INCREASE IN INFILTRATION THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE SINCE MARCH AND APRIL. WE WILL ALSO REFER AGAIN, WHICH STILL SEPARATING THE SUBJECT FROM THE PRECEDING ITEMS, TO THE FACT THAT THE ATTACKS AGAINST SAIGON AND THE OTHER CITIES ARE NOT CONDUCTIVE TO PROGRESS IN PARIS.

8 WE WILL ALSO ASK THE DRV TO PROPOSE THE DATE FOR THE NEXT

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 PARIS 14355 201804Z

MEETING. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE BAD IF THERE WERE ONLY ONE MEETING THIS WEEK, SO, IF DRV DOES NOT PROPOSE FRIDAY OR SATURDAY, WE WILL ASK FOR MEETING THEN.  
HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 21, 1968  
11:10 a. m.

*64*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith notes for your meeting with the Honorable Barry Goldwater at 5:30 p. m. today.

1. The diplomatic situation in Paris. The first phase of the talks in Paris has gone about as we thought it would; that is, they have opened with a rigid statement of Hanoi's position. What we do not know is whether they will proceed beyond that point into serious negotiations either to:

- match adequately a total cessation of the bombing; or
- to get at the critical issues on which a stable peace depends.

In short, it is still not clear whether they came to Paris to make peace sometime during 1968 or merely to try to arrange a situation of military and political improvement for their side while carrying on the war.

2. Outside of Paris their objectives are clear:

-- to present to the world an image of military strength by continued attacks on Saigon and other operations that catch the headlines;

-- to try to undermine the government in Saigon and open the way for a Communist-dominated Popular Front; and, above all, to do what they can to undermine the support of the U. S. for continued conduct of the war in Southeast Asia.

3. The President's instructions to the negotiating team are to:

- proceed slowly and carefully;
- let the enemy do his own negotiating and hold to our basic positions;
- take our positions in terms of the national interest now--and for the long run.

U. S. politics have been wholly ruled out in the negotiating process. The President believes that we have a capable and efficient team in Paris.

4. The military situation in South Vietnam must be understood in terms of the failure of the Tet attacks on the cities to attain their major objective and the heavy losses that were then suffered. In 1967 the average daily rate of enemy killed in action was about 240. Between 30 January and 19 May of this year they have lost at the daily rate of 750. This figure could well be low

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NLJ 97-333  
By is, NARA Date 9-8-98

because it does not include a good many of the casualties inflicted by air power around Khe Sanh. This explains the very high rate of infiltration which is now taking place. The fillers coming down, and now entering the panhandle, have had short periods of training; and there appears to be some shortage of experienced officers. Although the attacks on the cities opened up the countryside to recruitment -- and they are even recruiting women for combat in South Vietnam -- they are having to rely very heavily on an increased proportion of North Vietnamese forces to maintain a capacity to mount offensive operations and to maintain the strength of their units which, as of March, were perhaps 50% under strength.

5. Captured documents indicate that the present military operations in the South are meant to back up the negotiations in Paris with an image of strength.

6. Westmoreland and Abrams (as the attached cable indicates) are confident that they can handle the battle in the months ahead, and they plan some offensive operations of their own.

7. Although one can doubt that they can sustain over a period of a year or more casualty rates running so much higher than those sustained in 1967, we must expect heavy fighting in the months ahead. What they will do if we hold steady in Paris; the GVN holds steady in Saigon; and they make no headway on the ground, we simply do not know. We hope -- but we are by no means sure -- that, having tested us hard in the field, in Saigon, and in the United States, they might move towards a settlement. But it is equally possible that they will wait for the next Administration.

8. So far as the bombing is concerned, in the short run our bombing cutback has not significantly affected the military situation on the ground in South Vietnam. We are bombing intensively the infiltration routes. As the weather gets better in the North Vietnamese panhandle, we shall be able to get about a quarter of the trucks coming through. On the other hand, they are repairing these in Hanoi/Haiphong, and are in a position to bring the trucks down to the panhandle quickly, without harassment. We are watching carefully the possibility of their moving more anti-aircraft and even MIG's into the South.

9. In general, I think we enter this period of contacts -- if not negotiations -- with a strong position if we can keep our people steady at home and the Government of Vietnam steady in Saigon.

W. W. Rostow

~~top secret~~ attachment (WWR memo to P 5/14/68 w/att)



*Pres File*  
*65*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 14, 1968  
7:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Westy's assessment of current posture and the shape of things to come.

The lineup of combat effective battalions looks like this:

	<u>Enemy</u>	<u>Friendly</u>
I Corps	47	94
II Corps	25-23	61
III Corps	14-17	90
IV Corps	<u>11-13</u>	<u>43</u>
Total	97-105	293

Our 3 to 1 advantage plus airpower and logistics support will enable Westy:

- to maintain ongoing offensive operations in all four corps
- to launch attacks in the Hue-Quang Tri area next week using troops redeployed from the Ashau operation
- to launch a 2-regimental attack west of Danang on 21 May
- to pursue units withdrawing from Saigon area
- to conduct a series of battalion and multi-battalion sweeps in IV Corps
- to reinforce the Highlands in the event of enemy attack

W. W. Rostow

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LTG GOODPASTER. SEC I OF III

SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY POSITION AND FORECAST OF OPERATIONS (U)

REF: JCS MSG 092254 MAY 68 (TS).

1. (C) THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES THE INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT ALLIED AND ENEMY MILITARY POSTURE WHICH WAS REQUESTED BY THE REFERENCED MESSAGE. IN ADDITION A FORECAST OF FORTHCOMING OPERATIONS IS INCLUDED; A SIMILAR MESSAGE WILL BE SUBMITTED WEEKLY BASED ON A REPORTING PERIOD FROM 0001 SUNDAY TO 2400 HOURS SATURDAY, SAIGON TIME AND WILL BE DISPATCHED TO ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON EACH MONDAY BY 0800 HOURS LOCAL TIME. ADDITIONALLY, A DAILY UPDATE WILL BE SUBMITTED TUESDAY THROUGH SUNDAY. THESE REPORTS WILL CONSIST OF THREE PARTS. PART I WILL BE AN APPRAISAL OF THE RELATIVE ENEMY AND FRIENDLY SITUATION. PART II WILL CONSIST OF AN ESTIMATE OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND PART III WILL BE A FORECAST OF PROJECTED OPERATIONS.

2. (S) PART ONE (APPRAISAL OF ENEMY AND FRIENDLY SITUATION)

A. ENEMY SITUATION.

(1) THE RECENT FLURRY OF ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY REPRESENTS THE THIRD PHASE OF HIS 1967-68 WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN. HIS RECENT EFFORT IS BEST UNDERSTOOD IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CAUSES AND GOALS OF HIS WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN.

(2) WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE ENEMY'S OVERLY AMBITIOUS AND EXTREMELY COSTLY OFFENSIVES SEEN THIS YEAR HAVE THEIR ROOTS IN DESPERATION AND WEAKNESS. SINCE LATE 1966 ENEMY PERSONNEL LOSSES HAVE EXCEEDED HIS INPUT FROM ALL SOURCES. NET LOSSES IN 1967

ACT: J3-8(1-8)

INFO: CJCS 1(9) DJS 3(10 12) SJCS 3(13 15) J4 3(16-18) J5 2(19 20)

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WERE PROBABLY ABOUT 54,000 MEN. DURING THIS PERIOD HIS CONTROL OF POPULATION HAS STEADILY DECLINED, REDUCING HIS IN-COUNTRY SOURCES OF MANPOWER, FOOD, AND TAX REVENUES. HE CONTINUALLY FAILED TO ACHIEVE MAJOR POLITICALLY EXPLOITABLE MILITARY VICTORIES AND HIS ATTEMPTS BECAME INCREASINGLY COSTLY. AS A RESULT, IT APPEARS THAT IN MID-1967 THE ENEMY MADE A MAJOR REVISION OF HIS STRATEGY. HE PLANNED A CAMPAIGN AIMED AT THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FREE WORLD RESISTANCE, ACCEPTING OTHERWISE UNTENABLE MILITARY RISKS TO ACHIEVE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT. HE HOPED THAT THIS IMPACT WOULD GENERATE POPULAR UPRISING AGAINST THE GVN, DISAFFECTION OF GVN ARMED FORCES, AND COLLAPSE OF US DETERMINATION TO PURSUE THE WAR.

THUS THE STAGE WOULD BE SET FOR THE FORMATION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT WITH A STRUCTURE FAVORABLE TO THE COMMUNISTS. IN THE FIRST TWO PHASES OF THIS CAMPAIGN, THE ENEMY SUFFERED SEVERE MILITARY DEFEAT. WE HAVE EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT THE ENEMY BELIEVES WORLD-WIDE OPINION HAS CREDITED HIM WITH A PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY. THIS BELIEF, AND THE IMMINENCE OF DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITH THE US AND POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS, WE BELIEVE HAVE GREATLY INFLUENCED THE FORM AND TIMING OF HIS MOST RECENT ATTACKS.

(3) IN THE THIRD PHASE OF THE ENEMY'S WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN INITIATED ON 5 MAY, HE ATTEMPTED ESSENTIALLY A REPEAT OF THE TET FORMULA. HE STILL FOUGHT TO CAUSE DISINTEGRATION OF RVNAF AND COLLAPSE OF THE GVN, AND TO SPARK SOME SORT OF GENERAL UPRISING, BUT RECENT ATTACKS WERE LESS INTENSE, ESPECIALLY IN II AND IV CTZS, WHERE MOST ATTACKS AMOUNTED TO LITTLE MORE THAN HARASSMENT. HE SUSTAINED HIS OFFENSIVE EFFORT IN TWO AREAS--SAIGON, AND THE COASTAL REGION OF NORTHERN I CTZ, FROM HUE TO DONG HA. THE MAJOR ENEMY THREAT IN SOUTH VIETNAM STILL EXISTS IN THESE TWO AREAS, AND ADDITIONALLY IN KON Tum PROVINCE OF THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS, WHERE THE ENEMY HAS STRONG, BUT YET UNCOMMITTED FORCES.

(4) IN I CTZ THE ENEMY HAS A TOTAL EQUIVALENT OF 47 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALIONS. AT KHE SANH, THE ENEMY HAS THE EQUIVALENT OF FOUR COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALIONS. HERE HE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE HARASSING ATTACKS ON FRIENDLY POSITIONS. IN THE AREA FROM THE EASTERN DMZ SOUTH THROUGH QUANG TRI CITY TO BASE AREA 101, THE ENEMY HAS 14 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS. HERE HIS OFFENSIVE PLANS HAVE BEEN DISRUPTED, AND WE EXPECT HEAVY

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ATTACKS BY FIRE AND AMBUSHES WHILE THE ENEMY REGROUPS. IN THE HU REGION, THE ENEMY IS ESTIMATED TO HAVE THE EQUIVALENT OF 11 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALIONS. IN THIS AREA, FRIENDLY OPERATIONS HAVE INHIBITED THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE EFFORTS BUT HE HAS SHOWN MUCH PERSISTENCE IN SPITE OF OVERWHELMING ODDS AGAINST SUCCESS. WE EXPECT HIM TO CONTINUE HIS ATTEMPTS TO PENETRATE HUE OR POSSIBLY QUANG TRI CITY, AS HE TRIES TO SALVAGE A PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY. IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN I CTZ THE ENEMY CONTROLS THE EQUIVALENT OF 18 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALIONS. HIS FORCES IN THESE AREAS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE IN POSITION TO LAUNCH MAJOR ATTACKS BUT ARE CAPABLE OF ATTACKING OUTLYING POSITIONS.

(5) IN II CTZ THE ENEMY CONTROLS 25-28 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALIONS. HERE THE GREATEST THREAT EXISTS IN WESTERN KONTUM PROVINCE, WHERE HE HAS THE EQUIVALENT OF 14 TO 15 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALIONS. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO STRONG INDICATIONS OF IMMINENT ATTACK, HIS UNITS ARE DEPLOYED AND ARE CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING MAJOR ATTACKS IN THE BEN HET/DAK TO/POLEI KLENG AREA WITH KONTUM CITY THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE. AN ATTACK AT ANY TIME IS POSSIBLE; HOWEVER, THE ENEMY MAY PLAN ACTION IN THIS AREA AS A FOLLOW-ON TO THE PRESENT PHASE, WHEN INCREASINGLY POOR WEATHER MAY HAMPER FRIENDLY AIR OPERATIONS. IN DARLAC PROVINCE, THE ENEMY CONTINUES ATTACK PREPARATIONS AND MAY ATTACK BAN ME THUOT CONCURRENTLY WITH A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN KONTUM PROVINCE. ELSEWHERE IN II CTZ, ENEMY HARRASSMENT ACTIVITY AND ATTACKS BY FIRE ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE.

(6) IN III CTZ THE ENEMY MAINTAINS THE EQUIVALENT OF 14 TO 17 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALIONS. THE ENEMY'S MAJOR EFFORT IN HIS RECENT OFFENSIVE PHASE WAS AGAINST SAIGON WHERE MOST OF HIS MAJOR UNITS IN III CTZ WERE PRESENT, OR IN THE ADJOINING PROVINCES. THE WEAKNESS OF HIS OFFENSIVE EFFORT WAS UNDOUBTEDLY DUE TO HIS MARGINAL ABILITY TO EFFECT COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND TO THE LOSSES INFLICTED BY FRIENDLY FORCES WHILE HIS UNITS WERE MOVING TO AND FROM THEIR STAGING AREAS. IN SPITE OF HIS LACK OF SUCCESS, THE NEED FOR SOME FORM OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY MAY IMPEL HIM TO RENEW HIS EFFORTS AGAINST THE CITY. WE EXPECT ATTACKS BY FIRE AGAINST TAN SON NHUT AND OTHER INSTALLATIONS IN THE SAIGON-BIEN HOA AREA TO CONTINUE.

(7) IN IV CTZ, THE ENEMY HAS 11 TO 13 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS. SINCE THE MAJORITY OF ENEMY FORCES WERE

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WERE NOT COMMITTED DURING THE RECENT OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY, HE RETAINS THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH MULTI-BATTALION ASSAULTS AGAINST SUCH URBAN TARGETS AS MY THO AND CAN THO, CONSTANT FRIENDLY PRESSURE IS LIMITING HIS ABILITY TO MANEUVER AND MASS FOR LARGE SCALE ATTACKS; NEVERTHELESS, ATTEMPTS TO LAUNCH LARGE SCALE GROUND ATTACKS CANNOT BE RULED OUT. HARASSING ATTACKS BY FIRE AND INTERDICTION OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION PROBABLY WILL CONTINUE.

B. FRIENDLY SITUATION.

(1) I CTZ.

(A) THERE ARE 94 MANEUVER BATTALIONS AVAILABLE WITHIN I CTZ TO COUNTER THE ENEMY'S 47 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS.

(B) IN THE KHE SANH AREA, A MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FORCE IS BEING

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THE LAND LOC TO THE BASE REMAINS OPEN,

(C) OPERATION DELAWARE/LANSON 216 IN THE A SHAU VALLEY HAS  
ACHIEVED ITS OBJECTIVES WITH THE DESTRUCTION OF SIGNIFICANT ENEMY  
FORCES, SUPPLIES AND VEHICLES AND THE DISRUPTION OF HIS ATTEMPTS TO  
USE THE VALLEY AS A STAGING AREA. THEREFORE, DURING THE NEXT SIX  
DAYS WE WILL BE WITHDRAWING FORCES FROM THE A SHAU VALLEY FOR  
EMPLOYMENT ON THE COASTAL PLAIN.

(D) IN THE COASTAL AREAS OUR FORCES ARE INSUFFICIENT STRENGTH  
TO DEFEAT ENEMY FORCES IN THOSE AREAS.

(E) IN THE SOUTHWESTERN REGION OF THE CTZ WE HAVE WITHDRAWN  
SCREENING AND CONTINGENCY FORCES FROM THE BASE AT NGOK TAVAK AND  
KHAM DUC WHICH CAME UNDER ENEMY MORTAR/GROUND ATTACK FOR EMPLOYMENT  
ELSEWHERE IN I CTZ.

(2) II CTZ.

(A) THERE ARE 61 MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN II CTZ TO COUNTER THE  
ENEMY'S 25-28 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS.

(B) FORCES ARE PRESENTLY POSITIONED IN AN OPTIMUM POSTURE TO  
MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THE HEAVILY POPULATED COASTAL AREA AND TO  
MEET THE POTENTIAL ENEMY THREAT IN THE HIGHLANDS. WE HAVE  
CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR REINFORCEMENT IN THE HIGHLANDS, IF  
REQUIRED, FROM RESOURCES BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL TO II CTZ.

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HOWEVER, IT IS NOT INTENDED TO REDEPLOY SUCH FORCES UNLESS THE THREAT THERE ACTUALLY DEVELOPS.

(3) III CTZ

(A) THERE ARE 90 MANEUVER BATTALIONS AVAILABLE WITHIN III CTZ TO COUNTER THE ENEMY'S 14-17 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS. THIS PROVIDES US WITH THE MOST FAVORABLE FORCE RATIO OF THE FOUR CORPS TACTICAL ZONES.

(B) OUR FORCES ARE CONCENTRATING THEIR EFFORTS AROUND THE CITY OF SAIGON AND OUR LARGE BASE COMPLEX AT BIEN HOA. A MAJORITY OF THESE FORCES ARE ENGAGED IN OFFENSIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS TO BREAK THE ENEMY INITIATIVE, REDUCE HIS FORCES, AND INFLECT MAXIMUM DAMAGE WHEREVER LOCATED.

(4) IV CTZ.

(A) THERE ARE 48 MANEUVER BATTALIONS OPERATING IN IV CTZ AGAINST THE ENEMY'S 11-13 COMBAT EFFECTIVE BATTALION EQUIVALENTS.

(B) AMERICAN PRESENCE HAS RECENTLY BEEN INCREASED IN THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THIS CTZ WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN ADDITIONAL BRIGADE OF THE 9TH DIVISION TO THE AREA. THIS IS IN FACT AN EXTENSION OF THE LONG AN BATTLE WHICH IS TAKING PLACE ALONG THE III/IV CORPS BOUNDARY.

(C) RIVERINE OPERATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED AT A HIGH TEMPO UTILIZING BOTH US AND RVN FORCES TO FERRET OUT ENEMY ELEMENTS IN DIFFICULT TO REACH SANCTUARIES IN THE INUNDATED AREAS OF THE DELTA.

(D) PBR BOAT PATROLS HAVE BEEN EXPANDED TO INCLUDE THE UPPER MEKONG AND BASSAC RIVERS NEAR THE CAMBODIAN BORDER.

(5) SUPPORTING AIR OPERATIONS.

(A) TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS ARE ORIENTED TOWARD HEAVY INTERDICTION OF ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATION BOTH DAY AND NIGHT TO EXPLOIT DETERIORATING ROAD CONDITIONS CAUSED BY INCREASING RAINS IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. MUSCLE SHOALS OPERATIONS ARE AUGMENTING THE INTERDICTION EFFORT. IN SOUTH VIETNAM TACTICAL AIR SUPPORTS GROUND OPERATIONS ON A CONTINUING BASIS. RECENT NORMAL LEVELS OF EFFORT IN TERMS OF TACTICAL AIR STRIKE SORTIES DAILY REFLECT A TOTAL OF 641 SORTIES. IN THE EVENT OF A REQUIREMENT TO OPERATE AT MAXIMUM CAPABILITY FOR A SHORT PERIOD, WE COULD MOUNT

APPROXIMATELY 900 SORTIES A DAY, DIRECTED AS THE SITUATION WARRANTS.

(B) B-52 SORTIES SUPPLEMENT THE TAC AIR EFFORT CONCENTRATING ON TRUCK PARKS AND STORAGE AREAS AND TROOP CONCENTRATIONS. B-52 SORTIES RECENTLY HAVE BEEN AVERAGING 59 SORTIES A DAY.

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3. ~~467~~ PART TWO (ENEMY CAPABILITIES)

A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES SHOWS THAT HE CAN CONTINUE HIS PRESENT EFFORT IN NORTHEASTERN I CTZ AND IN CENTRAL III CTZ, AND CAN INITIATE A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. WHILE WE BELIEVE HE LACKS THE CAPABILITY FOR SIGNIFICANT MILITARY SUCCESS, HE MAY CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS IN SPITE OF HEAVY LOSSES, TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT. THE ENEMY ALWAYS RETAINS THE CAPABILITY TO ATTACK ISOLATED SPECIAL FORCES OUT-POSTS.

B. THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES FOR MORE WIDESPREAD OR INTENSIVE ATTACKS ARE PROSCRIBED BY SEVERAL NOTABLE WEAKNESSES. A MAJOR ENEMY PROBLEM IS THAT OF PERSONNEL. HIS HEAVY LOSSES AND DEPLETION OF IN-COUNTRY PERSONNEL SOURCES HAVE FORCED INCREASING RELIANCE ON INFILTRATION FROM NORTH VIETNAM. WE SEE EVIDENCE OF EXPANDED INFILTRATION TO COUNTER THIS DEFICIT, AND IT APPEARS THAT THE ENEMY IS CYCLING HIS INFILTRATION IN COORDINATION WITH HIS OFFENSIVE PHASES, TO PROVIDE LARGE NUMBERS OF REPLACEMENTS PRIOR TO EACH MAJOR EFFORT. THUS A SURGE OF REPLACEMENTS ARRIVED PRIOR TO TET, MORE DURING MARCH AND APRIL, AND THERE IS EVIDENCE OF HEAVY INFILTRATION NOW UNDERWAY PERHAPS IN PREPARATION FOR NEW OFFENSIVES IN JULY OR AUGUST. MANY OF HIS RECENT REPLACEMENTS, HOWEVER, ARE YOUTHFUL AND ILL-TRAINED, AND THEY ARE BEING COMMITTED TO COMBAT WITH LITTLE TIME FOR INTEGRATION OR TRAINING WITH THEIR UNITS. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS IN RECENT MONTHS OF MANY EXPERIENCED LEADERS AND CADRE, HAS RESULTED IN A QUALITATIVE DETERIORATION.

C. THERE ARE WEAKNESSES IN THE ENEMY'S LOGISTIC SYSTEM. WHILE HE IS APPARENTLY CAPABLE OF BRINGING ADEQUATE QUANTITIES OF MUNITIONS TO HIS BORDER BASE AREAS, WE ARE AWARE THAT HE HAS DIFFICULTY IN SUPPLYING HIS FORCES. HIS ATTEMPTS TO PRE-POSITION MUNITIONS IN OBJECTIVE AREAS ARE OFTEN THWARTED BY OUR DISCOVERY OF HIS CACHES, AND HE IS OFTEN INCAPABLE OF RESUPPLYING COMMITTED UNITS AS A RESULT OF OUR INTERDICTION OF HIS INTERNAL SUPPLY ROUTES. FOOD SHORTAGES IN SOME AREAS HAVE REDUCED HIS COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS, AND HE HAS BEEN FORCED TO DIVERT SOME COMBAT UNITS TO FOOD PRODUCTION. IN MANY AREAS HE SUFFERS SHORTAGES OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES.

D. MAJOR ENEMY VULNERABILITIES THEREFORE EXIST IN HIS LONG LINES OF COMMUNICATION OVER WHICH HE RECEIVES MEN AND SUPPLIES. THESE ROUTES ARE VULNERABLE TO FRIENDLY AIR OPERATIONS, AND GROUND

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INTERDICTION WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM. HE IS ALSO VULNERABLE TO ACTION WHICH DENIES HIM ACCESS TO THE POPULATION AS A SOURCE OF IN-COUNTRY SUPPORT. AS A RESULT OF RECENT HEAVY LOSSES AND FAILURE TO ACHIEVE HIS OBJECTIVES, HE IS VULNERABLE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AIMED AT INDUCING DESERTION AND DEFECTION. FINALLY, HE IS VULNERABLE TO ALLIED MILITARY OPERATIONS, ESPECIALLY WHEN HE LEAVES HIS BASE AREAS AND SANCTUARIES AND ATTEMPTS TO MASS FOR ATTACK, AS IS NOW THE CASE IN SEVERAL AREAS.

E. THE MAJOR DETERMINANTS OF FUTURE ENEMY CAPABILITIES ARE THE NUMBER AND QUALITY OF HIS TROOPS AND HIS ABILITY TO SUPPORT THEM LOGISTICALLY. THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY TO CHANGE THE PRESENT SITUATION TO HIS ADVANTAGE THUS RESTS ON SEVERAL FACTORS, INCLUDING HIS ABILITY TO INFILTRATE MEN AND MATERIEL, THE FUTURE LEVEL OF COMBAT,

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AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH HE GAINS IN-COUNTRY SUPPORT FROM THE  
POPULACE?

F. THE MAJOR INFILTRATION SURGE NOW UNDERWAY, ESTIMATED AT  
ABOUT 12,000 MEN PER MONTH, COULD BE REFLECTED IN PEAK ENEMY UNIT  
STRENGTHS IN JULY. IF HIS LOSSES CONTINUE AT ABOUT THE APRIL RATE,  
THE EXPECTED INFUX COULD RESULT IN THE MAINTENANCE OF HIS UNIT  
STRENGTH THROUGH THE SUMMER MONTHS, DESPITE HIS HEAVY INFILTRATION.  
HE IS LOSING MEN AT ABOUT AN EQUAL RATE. SHOULD HE BE ABLE TO OBTAIN  
RESPIRE FROM THE MILITARY OPERATIONS NOW DEPLETING HIS STRENGTH, HIS  
RANKS WOULD RAPIDLY SWELL AS A RESULT OF THE INFILTRATION, THE  
ENEMY'S COMBINED INFILTRATION AND RECRUITMENT MAY CURRENTLY BE  
APPROACHING 20,000 MEN PER MONTH.

G. AS THE APPROACHING MONSOON SEASON CAUSES DETERIORATION OF  
DRY WEATHER ROADS IN LAOS, THE ENEMY WILL ENCOUNTER INCREASING  
DIFFICULTY IN MOVING SUPPLIES TO HIS BORDER BASE AREAS, AND HIS  
ABILITY TO MOVE TOWED AND TRACKED WEAPONS INTO SOUTH VIETNAM WILL BE  
REDUCED. WE BELIEVE ENEMY ABILITY TO OBTAIN IN-COUNTRY SUPPORT WILL  
CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE IN SPITE OF HIS EFFORTS TO REVERSE THE TREND.

4. ~~(TS)~~ PART THREE (FORECAST OF OPERATIONS)

A. IN 1 CTZ, IMMEDIATELY SOUTH OF THE DMZ, A U.S. MARINE  
DIVISION AND AN ARVN DIVISION ARE CONDUCTING ON-GOING OPERATIONS TO  
PREVENT ENEMY INFILTRATION FROM NORTH VIETNAM; TO FIND, FIX, AND  
DESTROY THE ENEMY, HIS FACILITIES AND LOGISTICS INSTALLATIONS; AND  
TO KEEP OPEN THE VITAL LAND LOGS. ~~(ALONG THE COAST, U.S. ARMY,~~

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MARINE AND ARVN ELEMENTS CONTINUE FREE DENIAL OPERATIONS AND PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE MAJOR PORTS, LOGISTICS INSTALLATIONS AND HIGHWAYS IN ZONE. BY 20 MAY, THE CAID INTO THE A SHAU VALLEY IN WESTERN I CTZ WILL BE TERMINATED WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE LAST OF U.S. AND ARVN BATTALIONS. THESE UNITS WILL BE DEPLOYED IN THE VICINITY OF HUE-QUANG TRI TO SEEK OUT THE ENEMY BASE AREAS AND TO DISRUPT HIS COMBAT POTENTIAL. IN THE SOUTHERN PORTION OF I CTZ, A U.S. ARMY DIVISION, A U.S. MARINE DIVISION, AND ARVN DIVISION AND AN ROK MARINE BRIGADE HAVE THE CONTINUING MISSION OF SEARCHING AND CLEARING AND OF PROVIDING SECURITY FOR THE PRIMARY LOC AND LOGISTICS AREAS. ON 21-31 MAY, TWO U.S. MARINE REGIMENTS WILL ATTACK WEST OF DANANG TO ELIMINATE THE ENEMY MAIN FORCE THREAT IN THE AREA.

B. IN THE COASTAL LOWLANDS OF II CTZ, ELEMENTS OF TWO ARVN AND TWO ROK DIVISIONS AND A U.S. AIRBORNE BRIGADE WILL CONTINUE TO CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE TO SEEK OUT, ISOLATE AND DESTROY VC/NVA UNITS OPERATING FROM BASE AREAS CONTIGUOUS TO THE DENSELY POPULATED AND ECONOMICALLY IMPORTANT COASTAL PLAIN. CONCURRENTLY, THEY WILL CONDUCT NUMEROUS CORDON AND SEARCH AND SEARCH AND CLEAR OPERATIONS AS PART OF A CONTINUING ATTACK AGAINST THE VC POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN SUPPORT OF THE GVN PACIFICATION EFFORT. IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS OF II CTZ, ONE U.S. DIVISION AND AN ARVN REGIMENT WILL CONTINUE PRESENT OPERATIONS TO PREEMPT THE ENEMY'S BUILDUP IN THE REMOTE AREAS OF THE WESTERN PROVINCES AND TO SECURE THE PROVINCIAL TOWNS AND LAND LOC.

C. IN III CTZ, OPERATIONS FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE WILL CONTINUE TO BE CONCENTRATED IN THE PROVINCES AROUND SAIGON AND AIMED AT DEFEATING SCATTERED VC/NVA UNITS AS SOON AS THE ENEMY BEGINS WITHDRAWING THE REMNANTS OF HIS MAIN FORCES TO BASE OR BORDER AREAS TO REGROUP AND RESUPPLY. INDIVIDUAL OPERATIONS WILL BE UNDERTAKEN TO INTERCEPT, BLOCK AND DESTROY THESE FORCES ALONG THEIR ROUTES OF WITHDRAWAL. ALL OPERATIONS WILL BE REPORTED UNDER THE GENERAL OPERATIONAL NAME TOAN THANG. SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF THIS OPERATION WILL INCLUDE:

(1) ARVN FORCES, COMPRISING THREE DIVISIONS, WILL CONTINUE THEIR PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF SAIGON, PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CITIES, AND OPERATING OFFENSIVELY TO DRIVE THE ENEMY AWAY

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FROM THE ENVIRONS OF THE DENSELY POPULATED AREAS.

(2) ELEMENTS OF THREE U.S. INFANTRY DIVISIONS, AN ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT, AND AN AIRBORNE BRIGADE WILL CONTINUE MULT-BATTALION-SIZE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE ARVN AS THE ENEMY IS DRIVEN AWAY. THESE UNITS WILL ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITIONS ALONG THE ENEMY ROUTES OF WITHDRAWAL TOWARDS THE BORDER AND CAMBODIAN SANCTUARIES.

(3) THE AUSTRALIAN TASK FORCE IS DEPLOYING TO BLOCKING POSITIONS 30 MILES EAST OF SAIGON TO ENGAGE THE ENEMY MOVING TO AND FROM HIS BASE AREAS. THE ROYAL THAI ARMY VOLUNTEER REGIMENT, OPERATING IN THE CTZ NORTH AND EAST OF SAIGON, WILL CONDUCT PATROLLING AND LIMITED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.

(4) CIDG ELEMENTS ARE NOW DEPLOYED ALONG THE RIVER AND LAND LOC TO INTERCEPT THE VERY HEAVY INFILTRATION AND EXFILTRATION MOVING TO AND FROM CAMBODIA. U.S. BATTALIONS MAY BE COMMITTED NEAR THE BORDER IF THE ENEMY MAKES A MAJOR EFFORT TO NEUTRALIZE THE CIDG FORCES BLOCKING HIS RETREAT.

(5) SINCE THE ENEMY CAN BE EXPECTED TO ATTACK LOC, PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CAPITALS AS WELL AS MILITARY INSTALLATION, SUDDEN ENGAGEMENTS IN OR AROUND POPULATION CENTERS ANY WHERE IN III CTZ SHOULD BE EXPECTED AS US/FW/ARVN FORCES RESPOND TO VC/NVA ATTACKS AND GAIN CONTACT WITH ENEMY UNITS.

N

D. THROUGHOUT IV CTZ, THREE ARVN DIVISIONS WILL CONDUCT A SERIES OF PROVINCE-LEVEL COMBAT SWEEPS OF BATTALION AND MULT-BATTALION SIZE TO LOCATE AND DESTROY VC PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES IN BASE AND FORWARD OPERATING AREAS. IN NORTHERN IV CTZ, ON 13-20 MAY, A HIGHLY MOBILE U.S. AND ARVN TASK FORCE, OPERATING IN CONJUNCTION WITH INDIGENOUS FORCES, WILL CONDUCT A COMBAT SWEEP ALONG THE CAMBODIAN BORDER EAST OF THE MEKONG RIVER. THE PURPOSE OF THE SWEEP IS TO INTERDICT THE ENEMY'S LOC FROM HIS CAMBODIAN BASE AREAS. ON 17-18 MAY, THE ARVN RIVER ASSAULT GROUP, WILL CONDUCT A COMBAT SWEEP TO CLEAR A MAJOR CANAL IN CENTRAL IV CTZ. FROM 13-31 MAY, THE U.S. MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE OF ONE BRIGADE WILL CONDUCT A SERIES OF RIVERINE ASSAULTS AND COMBAT SWEEPS IN THE EASTERN PORTION OF IV CTZ AND WILL BE TARGETED AGAINST ENEMY UNITS AS DEVELOPED BY CURRENT INTELLIGENCE. CON- CURRENTLY, A U.S. BRIGADE WILL CONDUCT INTENSIVE DAY AND NIGHT OPERATIONS TO DESTROY SMALL GUERRILLA BANDS OPERATING ALONG HIGHWAY 4 SOUTHWEST OF SAIGON. GP-4

BT

REF A IS OUT 8667(J3)

~~TOP SECRET~~



66

**Tuesday, May 21, 1968 - 10:15 am**

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith Paul Nitze produces two  
pages of suggestions for the message on  
the tax proposal.**

*Pres file*

**W. W. Rostow**

**wwrostow:rla**

**sent via J. Califano**



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

1665

66a

20 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This morning you asked for suggestions on the message dealing with the tax proposal, and further suggested that an attempt be made to reduce the message to two pages.

Attached is my response.

*Paul H. Nitze*

Attachment

In my address to the nation on March 21st, I stated that: "The passage of a tax bill now together with expenditure control that the Congress may desire and dictate, is absolutely necessary to protect this nation's security and to continue our prosperity, and to meet the needs of our people". I also stated that: "as part of a program of fiscal restraint that includes the tax surcharge, I shall approve appropriate reductions in the January budget when and if Congress so decides that that should be done".

Ten days ago the House and Senate Confereres reached a decision on their final package proposal. I have reviewed that proposal and various alternatives with the Congressional leadership of the majority Party, my Cabinet, my advisors, and representatives of business and labor. I find that no more acceptable combination of tax increase and expenditure reduction can be enacted.

The risk to the nation's security -- its military, its economic, its financial security -- of further delay or failure to restore decisively a responsible fiscal and financial policy for the nation is unacceptable. I am therefore asking the Members/<sup>of Congress</sup>to put aside personal considerations, to forgo for this one essential measure all partisan positions, and join together in seeing that the conference report is adopted.

Failure to act would add another huge deficit to our financial record. It is clearly irresponsible to run "back to back" deficits of \$25 billion and \$23 billion.

Failure to act would continue and intensify the vicious price spiral that robs the weakest in our society.

Failure to act would force the Treasury to borrow huge sums in already crowded credit markets and drive interest rates even higher.

Failure to act would place the entire load for stabilizing the economy on monetary policy, and our experience with that is recession, an unbalanced economy, and near chaos in financial markets.

Failure to act would convince the world that we do not have the will and the courage to manage our financial affairs, and thus would further weaken the world confidence in the dollar -- so vital to our future and that of the Free World.

I therefore repeat my plea to act at once. I will accept my responsibility to make the cuts that the Congress cannot or will not make. But I want to make my priorities absolutely clear. I will do my best to defend the programs for the cities, for the poor and for the defense of our country. Many programs -- needed programs -- programs with great appeal -- will be cut as necessary to meet the targets set. Inflation must and will be prevented.

68

INFORMATION

May 21, 1968

Mr. President:

The attached note on the Dominican Republic municipal elections -- reflecting the vitality of the democratic process -- should -- if you will permit me to say so -- make you feel good.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

*Pres file*



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 21, 1968

68a

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Dominican Municipal Elections

Figures released by the Electoral Board on last Thursday's municipal elections show the turn-out was larger than I had previously reported to you. The Embassy had estimated 800,000, with a possibility of 900,000. The total reached was 1,028,410, or only 316,994 short of the 1966 Presidential election figure.

Of the 77 municipalities:

- Balaguer's PR Party won 66 -- two more than in 1966, including Santo Domingo.
- Social Christians won 2.
- Independents won 9.

The abstention of the far right and left groups had amazingly little impact on the voter turn-out. As a result, Balaguer emerges stronger from the elections.

WGB  
WGBowdler

P. S. While you can't measure the impact of Tavera Dam on the balloting, I am willing to wager that our pushing the loan and Nick Katzenbach's going to Santo Domingo for the signing helped in the foregoing results.

Pres, file  
67

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 21, 1968  
9:50 a. m.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 00-413  
By ebm, NARA, Date 8-21-01

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Max Taylor notes -- and questions --  
the decision to mothball the OXCART and substitute  
for it the SR-71.

The problem is to weigh budgetary savings  
against the OXCART's margin of technical  
superiority.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

 attachment

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

~~SECRET~~  
67a

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

May 20, 1968

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLI/RAC CO-413  
By etm, NARA, Date 8-21-01

Mr. President:

You will recall the issue of the future of the eight OXCART aircraft which you have considered on several occasions in the past. In brief, it is whether to mothball this fleet which represents a capital investment of about \$1 billion in order to make an annual saving in operational costs of between \$4.5 million and \$69 million.

The arguments for the mothballing, apart from the economies, are that the Air Force-operated SR-71 is now capable of taking over the mission for which the OXCART was developed, namely, the penetration of denied airspace for photographic reconnaissance in time of peace.

The main arguments against this action are three:

- a. The SR-71 is inferior to the OXCART in performance as a high altitude reconnaissance aircraft.
- b. The camera of the SR-71 is markedly inferior to that of the OXCART and no improvement is possible for a protracted period.
- c. Since the OXCART is flown by CIA civilians (often "sheep-dipped" military personnel), it can be used in situations where, for political reasons, we might hesitate to use military personnel.

The last recorded decision on this matter of which I am aware was to mothball the OXCART but to delay implementation until the SR-71 had proved itself in flights over North Viet-Nam. Now that ten missions have been flown over North Viet-Nam by the SR-71, I am informed that the decision to mothball the OXCART is about to be implemented, primarily because of budgetary considerations.

Your Intelligence Board has always regarded the OXCART as a most valuable intelligence asset which should be maintained in the active inventory and I am sure that this continues to be the view of the members. While recognizing our inability to appraise budgetary priorities at a time such as this, I feel obliged to call your attention to this concern of the Board over the future of OXCART and to express the hope that all factors have been properly weighed in reaching this latest, and I presume, final decision.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

*Maxwell D. Taylor*  
Maxwell D. Taylor

ACTION

69

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 21, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Navy Exercise in the Sea of Japan

*Pres file*

From June 2 to 10 the U.S. Navy plans an exercise with Japanese units in the Sea of Japan. The exercise has two objectives:

1. To demonstrate, as we have in past years, that our navy units can and will operate in the Sea of Japan. The Navy believes it is particularly important in light of the Pueblo that we not give the Soviets the idea we have stopped operations in the area.

2. To distract Soviet surveillance while a Japanese ship plants a SOSUS-type sensor to the Northeast in the Sea of Japan.

The exercise will come no closer than 140 miles from Soviet territory and 130 miles from North Korean territory. Exercises over the past ten years have gone considerably closer. This year, the U.S. ships have been instructed to avoid any confrontation with Soviet ships and avoid "shouldering." (You may remember that the bumping incident involving the USS WALKER in the Sea of Japan last year involved shouldering.)

On Ambassador Bohlen's recommendation, Secretary Rusk has approved the exercise subject to a White House check. I recommend approval.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-357  
By *ig*, NARA, Date 5-22-95

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

70  
*Pres file*

May 21, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached is a Japanese interview with Hanoi's number two negotiator -- Colonel Lao. It offers a revealing insight into Hanoi's view of U.S. politics on which their negotiating strategy is based:

- Hanoi can't bring itself to believe that you are not a candidate for re-election. Apparently, they view your 31 March speech as a typically Asian ploy.

- Therefore, they believe that the Chicago convention will mark the climax of negotiations. At that time, they think that you will accept their demands in order to secure the Democratic nomination. If you reject their demands, they expect Bobby Kennedy to get the nomination.

- By the end of the Democratic convention, when their demands have still not been accepted, I would guess that:

- if Bobby Kennedy has the nomination, they would be inclined to prolong the war until next year at all costs.

-- If Bobby Kennedy does not get the nomination, they might be inclined to settle the war rather quickly.

In the meantime, therefore, Hanoi intends to stand fast on their 3 April statement of insisting on the unconditional cessation of the bombing before going on to discuss other subjects.

At the same time, it is clear that they do not wish to see the talks break up. I would speculate that they wish to keep the talks going because:

- they want to keep the bombing off their backs north of 20 degrees.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-324

By is, NARA Date 5-2-00

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- they are probably worried about our escalating if the talks break down.

- they want to keep open the option of prompt, serious negotiations after the Democratic convention in case they have miscalculated the outcome.

If this interpretation is correct, I would envision the continuation of this propaganda phase through August, unless

- they receive an extremely serious military setback in the south, or

- we increase the pressure on the north, or

- we cave in.

W. W. Rostow

*FBIS 53, 18 May 1968*

*Ha Van Loai Interview*

~~SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

71

Tuesday, May 21, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on Germany, Wednesday, May 22, Noon

The purpose of the NSC meeting is to discuss major current problems in our relations with West Germany during the months ahead.

Under Secretary Katzenbach will lead off by summarizing the State Department paper which has been circulated to Council members.

(At Tab A is a two-page summary of the paper. The full paper is at Tab B.)

The key problems are:

- a. Berlin -- Maintaining access -- keeping the city free.
- b. The Non-Proliferation Treaty -- the Germans don't like it but we believe they will go along.
- c. Military offset -- present German offer is unacceptable.

CIA Director Helms is prepared to comment on the growth of political extremism in Germany.

Secretary Clifford may have comments on NATO and Germany's security.

Secretary Fowler may have comments on Germany's position on current international monetary problems.

At some point in the discussion you may wish to ask:

- a. What more can we do to convince the Germans to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



- b. How do we come to an acceptable agreement on offset arrangements?
- c. Are we in for any surprises from Germany in connection with its policy of improving its relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe?

You could conclude the meeting by asking for specific recommendations for action on the problems discussed, i. e., the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the military offsets.

W. W. Rostow



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday - May 21, 1968

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Inter-American Bank President  
Felipe Herrera on Wednesday, May 22, 1968, 1:00 p.m.

Dr. Herrera has just returned from an extended trip abroad: to Bogota, Colombia, for the IDB Governors meeting, Santo Domingo for the Tavera Dam signing ceremony, and Europe to raise capital subscriptions for the IDB.

I suggest you raise with him --

1. How he fared in Europe in raising money for Latin American development.

We understand he picked up around \$45 million from the West Germans and some \$10 million from the Swedes and Dutch.

2. How the Bank Governors received your initiative on a Task Force for Latin American Physical Integration, and how he and Dr. Sanz are doing in developing the Task Force.

Both the Bank and CIAP strongly endorsed your proposal. Dr. Herrera and Dr. Sanz are now working on the terms of reference, program and composition of the Task Force. Their recommendations will be submitted to the Governments in time for the Inter-American Economic and Social Council to take action when it meets at the end of June.

I also suggest you make these points:

1. Congratulate him on the performance of the Bank and his re-election as President.

In 1967 the Bank loaned \$597.4 million in 60 loans -- the largest volume in its history. His re-election as Bank

President at Bogota is a measure of the governments' confidence in him and the good job he is doing. In this context, I recommend you mention the importance of the Bank stressing self-help in its lending. The Bank is improving on this score, but still needs to be more hard-headed.

2. Remind him of the major support you have given the Bank during the past twelve months.

This includes:

- (a) the \$900 million three-year authorization and \$300 million appropriation in FY 1968 for the Bank's Fund for Special Operations (FSO) which you recommended and the Congress approved last year; and
- (b) the \$411 million callable capital authorization which you recommended and which has now cleared both the House and the Senate.

At a time of such rough shedding for foreign aid, this is a major achievement which we want him to understand and to make clear to the Latin American Governments.

W. W. Rostow

cc - Mr. DeVier Pierson

WGBowdler:mm

**ACTION**

73

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 20, 1968 - 8:15 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft response to Harriman's proposed scenario Wednesday which:

-- Focuses at this meeting on self-determination in South Vietnam;

-- Removes the sentence which I also found questionable in Harriman's proposal.

In my judgment, this response is good; although one could make Laos the central issue this time rather than the constitutional process in South Vietnam.

If Harriman for any reason prefers to take on the constitutional process on Wednesday, I think we can wait on Laos.

There would be some advantage in getting off this cable tonight rather than tomorrow so that we could have one more turn around with Paris, if necessary, before Wednesday their time.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 25399  
By is NARA, Date 3-13-98

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WWRostow:rla

73c

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ACTION: AmEmbassy PARIS IMMEDIATE

STATE

NODIS/HARVAN

Ref: Paris 14355 (Delto 97)

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 25400  
By is NARA, Date 3-13-98

1. Agree reftel emphasis on constructive tone and short style statement May 22 meeting.
2. Particularly endorse focus on SVN right to self-determination on lines of exposition you have in mind. At end this passage, suggest you consider turning question back on Thuy by challenging him to declare if Hanoi also agrees to give SVN people self-determinative rights. Seems to us we can usefully exploit either way: If Thuy affirmative, you will have opened further area of agreement; if, as is more probable, he evades or denies, we have dramatic and readily understandable confrontation.
3. Your approach to bombing issue skillfully introduces central issue of restraint on their side. We do not repeat not believe we need go at this point as rapidly as last sentence reftel para 5 suggests. Question of degree of NVN support we could accept remains highly sensitive here and in Saigon against backdrop increasing infiltration, expanding enemy logistics, and urban terror attacks.
4. Instead, you might point out that QTE The DRV should understand that it is difficult to discuss questions of restraint in any detail while you deny having major elements of your armed forces in South Viet-Nam. Surely the time has come to begin to discuss the problem on the basis of reality. UNQTE.

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-2-

5. To preserve maximum flexibility on order of consideration and discussion of crucial elements in cessation question, prefer delete QTE later UNQTE in phrase QTE At an appropriate later time UNQTE in reftel para 7, third sentence.

6. Concur your ideas on withholding release formal texts and on desirability second meeting this week. If latter unobtainable, record should clearly show their unwillingness.

GP-

END

EA:W. Leonhart;hjh 5/20/68

~~SECRET~~

Clad: WP Bundy (1)

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 20, 1968 -- 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

In connection with tomorrow's agenda for lunch, the following lesser items might arise, as a result of suggestions by Secretaries Rusk and Clifford:

- The state of the strategic reserve (Sec. Clifford)
- The electronic ship MUELLER off Cuba. (Sec. Clifford)
- Wednesday instructions for Harriman, if not settled earlier on Tuesday morning. (Sec. Rusk)
- Location of NPT signing and solicitation of Papal support for NPT. (Sec. Rusk)
- Policy issues that may arise with Gorton visit. (Sec. Rusk)

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-324  
By is, NARA Date 5-2-00

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

75

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 20, 1968 - 6:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Clark Clifford's response  
to Bunker's cable.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ag, NARA, Date 6-3-92

75a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

May 20, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Walt Rostow has informed me that you wish to have my comments on Ambassador Bunker's cable, Saigon 27539 of May 17th.

The thrust of Bunker's cable is that Hanoi should be made to understand that attacks on Saigon or other centers of population are, in our view, "taking advantage" of the San Antonio Formula and cannot be carried out with impunity and without fear of retaliation. I believe that this is a weak position.

I believe that, at this stage of the negotiations, it is unwise for us to adhere to the San Antonio Formula. I think it is sounder for us to contend that that Formula has been superseded by the President's March 31st speech and events that have occurred since then.

I think the stronger position for us to take is to point to the President's language in the March 31st speech in which he says: "Even this very limited bombing of the North could come to an early end - if our restraint is matched by restraint in Hanoi." The President went on to say he could not stop all bombing, for to do so would immediately endanger the lives of our men and our allies. This is a strong position and one which calls for a quid pro quo from Hanoi.

I have great difficulty, however, in attempting to connect the cessation of bombing in the North with attacks by the enemy on Saigon or other cities. Generally speaking, they are unrelated.

The President, in his March 31st speech, tied the bombing

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-327  
By CB, NARA Date 7-27-99

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of the North to the flow of men and materiel, which he said "would immediately and directly" endanger the lives of our men and our allies.

I believe there is practically no chance of getting Hanoi to agree to a diminution of their efforts in the South in consideration of a bombing halt in the North while we continue full activity in the South without any limitation. I would hope that we could request reciprocal restraint on the part of Hanoi in an area that is tied closely to the bombing and is the type of restraint that there is some possibility they would agree to.

I believe our goal at this stage of the negotiations should be to trade off a cessation of the bombing in the North with the reinstatement of the DMZ and a substantial reduction of infiltration from the North into the South.

*Clark M. Clifford*

Clark M. Clifford

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

76  
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday 20, 1968 - 6:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a meeting between Harriman and Shriver, on the one hand, and Amb. Zorin, the Soviet representative in Paris.

You will note that in the course of this, Zorin said:

-- "that unless bombing was stopped Hanoi would make any moves before US elections."

-- Harriman warned implicitly that "US as a military necessity could not continue bombing restraint indefinitely and might have to resume unlimited bombing again and perhaps other measures."

-- Zorin agreed that they should keep in touch.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 14365

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By isa, NARA Date 7-8-98

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

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N O D I S

HARVAN

DELTO 100

DEPT PASS INFO MOSCOW

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR ZORIN

1. AFTER CONSIDERABLE SQUIRMING IN AN EFFORT TO INDUCE GOVERNOR HARRIMAN OVER TO SOVIET EMBASSY, AMBASSADOR ZORIN (ACCOMPANIED BY FIRST SECRETARY BOGOMOLOV) FINALLY CAME TO LUNCH MAY 19 WITH GOVERNOR HARRIMAN AND AMBASSADOR SHRIVER AT LATTER'S RESIDENCE. ZORIN WAS CORDIAL ENOUGH IN HIS OWN STIFF WAY, BUT AS EXPECTED HE KEPT HIMSELF WITHIN THE STRICT LIMITS OF SOVIET PUBLIC POSITION, AND CONSEQUENTLY NOTHING RESULTED FROM MEETING ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE.

2. GOVERNOR HARRIMAN SET FORTH THE US POSITION, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANT UNILATERAL STEP TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT IN HIS SPEECH OF MARCH 31ST, AND EXPLAINING THAT US COULD GO NO FURTHER WITHOUT SOME INDICATIONS OF RESTRAINT BY HANOI. HE NOTED OUR DISAPPOINTMENT THAT RATHER THAN RESTRAINT, HANOI HAD INCREASED FLOW OF TROOPS AND MATERIAL TO THE SOUTH. HE SAID THAT MEETING IN PARIS RESULTED FROM THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE AND WAS BASED ON HANOI'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT IN MARCH 31 SPEECH. INSTEAD OF DISCUSSING SUBSTANCE OF WHAT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PERMIT THE US TO STOP THE BOMBING COMPLETELY, HANOI'S REPRESENTATIVES WERE SIMPLY USING THE MEETING TO MAKE PROPAGANDA.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 PARIS 14365 201900Z

3. ZORIN'S REPLY, REPEATED THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION WITH LITTLE VARIATION, WAS THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION WAS CLEAR AND WAS SUPPORTED BY USSR; NO FURTHER STEPS COULD BE TAKEN OR EVEN DISCUSSED UNTIL US UNCONDITIONALLY STOPPED BOMBINGS OF DRV. NORTH VIETNAMESE CAME TO PARIS NOT ON BASIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 31ST SPEECH, BUT ON BASIS THEIR OWN DECLARATION OF APRIL 3RD; THEY WERE NOT BOMBING US, US WAS BOMBING THEM, AND NOTHING COULD BE DONE UNTIL THIS STOPPED. HARRIMAN DISPUTED THIS AND POINTED OUT THAT EVEN IN HANOI'S APRIL 3 STATEMENT AND OTHERS SINCE, HANOI HAD INDICATED EACH TIME THAT THEY EXPECTED SOME DISCUSSIONS PRIOR TO A DECISION BY US TO STOP BOMBING COMPLETELY.

4. ZORIN WAS NOT RESPONSIVE TO ANY SUGGESTIONS MADE BY GOVERNOR HARRIMAN AND AMBASSADOR SHRIVER TO GET TALKS OUT OF CURRENT IMPASSE. WHEN GOVERNOR HARRIMAN SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY OF PRIVATE INFORMAL MEETING WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE, PERHAPS WITH SOVIETS PRESENT, ZORIN SAID ANYTHING LIKE THAT WAS "FAR OFF". AMBASSADOR SHRIVER SAID RATHER THAN SOME FORMAL AGREEMENT, PERHAPS ONE COULD ENVISAGE PRIVATE UNDERSTANDINGS, MAYBE EVEN SOME INFORMAL LISTING OF STEPS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN AS FIRST MEASURES; WHAT WAS FUNDAMENTAL WAS THAT IN ORDER TO STOP BOMBING US HAD TO HAVE SOME VIEW OF ROAD AHEAD. ZORIN MERELY REPLIED THAT "US SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS," THAT WHATEVER THE FORUM, HANOI WOULD NOT MOVE AHEAD UNTIL BOMBING STOPPED. IN REPEATING THIS HE ADDED AT ONE POINT THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT UNLESS BOMBING WAS STOPPED HANOI WOULD MAKE ANY MOVES BEFORE US ELECTIONS.

5. IN RESPONSE TO THIS, GOVERNOR HARRIMAN EMPHASIZED THAT IF HANOI DID NOT SHOW SOME RESTRAINT, US AS A MILITARY NECESSITY COULD NOT CONTINUE BOMBING RESTRAINT INDEFINITELY AND MIGHT HAVE TO RESUME UNLIMITED BOMBING AGAIN AND PERHAPS OTHER MEASURES. (THIS WAS STATED NOT AS A THREAT BUT AS A CONSEQUENCE THAT MIGHT FOLLOW FROM HANOI'S CONTINUED DELAYS).

6. RECALLING THAT KOSYGIN HAD ASSURED HIM THE USSR WANTED TO SEE FIGHTING STOPPED IN VIETNAM, GOVERNOR HARRIMAN SPOKE OF USSR'S INFLUENCE IN HANOI AND EMPHASIZED ROLE USSR COULD PLAY IN HELPING TALKS OUT OF CURRENT IMPASSE IN DIRECTION OF SETTLEMENT. TO THIS END GOVERNOR HARRIMAN SAID HE WISHED TO HAVE FRANK DEALINGS WITH ZORIN AND OTHERS IN SOVIET EMBASSY, AND WAS PREPARED TO CALL ON SOVIET AMBASSADOR AT HIS EMBASSY AT A LATER STAGE, PARTICULARLY AS AMERICAN EMBASSY WAS SURROUNDED BY PRESS. WHILE CONCEIVING

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*Department of State*

**TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 PARIS 14365 201900Z

NOTHING ON SUBSTANCE AND REITERATING THAT UNCONDITIONAL US BOMBING CESSATION WAS ESSENTIAL FIRST STEP, ZORIN AGREED EMPHATICALLY THAT CONTACTS SHOULD CONTINUE, BOTH THROUGH HIMSELF AND ALSO THROUGH SOVIET MINISTER OBEREMKO AND BOGOMOLOV WITH OTHERS FROM US SIDE.

SHRIVER

NOTE: NOT PASSED BY OC/T 5/20/68

~~SECRET~~

**PRESERVATION COPY**

Monday, May 20, 1968  
6 p. m.

77

MR. PRESIDENT:

*Pres file*

As instructed, I talked with the Vice President this afternoon about the Vietnam and PUEBLO stories triggered by his statements.

On the your-side-our-side formula, he was briefed by Bill Bundy on the morning of May 13. The Vice President tells me he simply made a mistake: he confused a private understanding with Saigon on this matter with an agreement reached in Paris. He regrets it deeply.

With respect to the PUEBLO, he has the tape of what he said and, I gather, was simply misinterpreted by a very young UPI correspondent.

He was asked if we had given up hope of getting the PUEBLO and its crew back. He said we were trying every opening. There were moves we had not yet made which might be made. He could not say when the crew would be returned. He recalled the length of time it took to get back the fliers in 1960-61. He said that he remained hopeful, although he could not name a date.

The Vice President said that he was tired; he'd had a good day's rest; he would in the future take extreme care with the Vietnam and PUEBLO negotiations.

Earlier I had a talk on this matter with Bill Connell.

W. W. Rostow

78  
INFORMATION

SECRET

Monday, May 20, 1968 - 5:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

As background to Tuesday luncheon, I asked Gen. Wheeler to put on paper a briefing he gave Sec. Clifford this morning, which he summarized for me.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 18, NARA, Date 6-3-92

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78a

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301CM-3333-68  
20 May 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Military Situation in Southeast Asia

1. The report contained herein is a review of the military situation in Southeast Asia and is essentially the same information which I briefed informally to Mr. Clifford this morning.

2. A review of all indicators over the past week reflects continued enemy efforts to maintain and improve his offensive posture in South Vietnam. No indications of enemy attempts to de-escalate the conflict are evident.

3. The apparent massive infiltration effort from the North continues and specific infiltration groups are now being identified in the interrogation of captured PWs. CINCPAC estimates that 75 to 85 thousand enemy troops are now moving southward through the pipeline; about 35 thousand could by now be as far south as the Ashau Valley area. These troops likely constitute fillers and replacements for losses incurred in recent engagements with Free World Forces. Enemy units are receiving replacements in the border areas of I, II and III Corps. PW statements indicate only limited training is being received prior to movement south. The current high rate of infiltration is expected to continue at least through June.

4. The situation in Laos portrays a strong enemy posture throughout the eastern two-thirds of the Panhandle and the northeastern part of the country. Pathet Lao and NVA forces dominate the areas and continue to increase in strength. They have positioned their forces in strategic locations from which attacks against key locations can be launched at the time of their choosing.

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Authority NLS-CBS 6By is, NARS, Date 8-28-84~~SECRET~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
REGRADING: GPO 200 000 000  
DOCS 200 000 000



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5. The high rate of communist logistic activity continues to underscore communist intentions to sustain the fighting. Captured documents suggest the communists intend to increase sharply the shipment of supplies into the northern provinces of South Vietnam, with a peak period slated to occur June through August of this year. Moderate to heavy vehicular traffic was sighted during the past two weeks on all major north-south supply and infiltration routes from North Vietnam into the Demilitarized Zone and Laos. Construction of roads in the Laos Panhandle and South Vietnam continues. Photography during that period suggests the communists continued work on a nearly completed new road which links Dong Hoi with the southwest corner of the DMZ. Aerial photography of 6 and 10 May shows a continued high level of transshipment and other logistic activity in the Thanh Hoa area on the coast near the 20th Parallel. It is estimated that more than 10 thousand tons a month of all classes are now being handled in this area.

6. In the North, enemy exploitation of the bombing pause continues at an accelerating pace. It encompasses primarily those functions directly aiding the prosecution of the war in South Vietnam, namely, transportation, supply and regeneration of power facilities. In the transportation system, photography during April and May showed: The damage to the Paul Doumer Bridge being cleared and reconstruction begun; the bypass for the Doumer Bridge expanded from a three slip ferry to five slip ferry complex with a collocated fixed bridge open on 17 April; the Haiphong Rail Highway Bridge returned to serviceable status; construction on a new fixed bypass for the Haiphong Rail Highway Bridge near completion; construction of a cable suspension bridge at Viet Tri completed. The net result of the improvements in the LOCs is reflected in over 51 newly identified transshipment points, truck parks and POL dumps found between 17 and 19 degrees North during the period 26 April to 11 May 1968. Every major power plant is now being rebuilt; the Hanoi TPP, Haiphong TPP West, Hong Gai TPP and Thai Nguyen TPP are partially operational at this time.

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7. Concurrently with the regeneration of the transportation and power systems, the air defense envelope has been extended southward to Bai Thuong. Photography confirms serviceability of Bai Thuong airfield; radar data, MIG IPF returns, pilot reports and other related intelligence all indicate this airfield is being used regularly as a forward staging base for MIG-17 and MIG-21 operations in the lower route packages. Operating out of Bai Thuong, MIGs now have the capability of ranging down to the 16th Parallel and would have sufficient combat time to engage our strike aircraft or B-52s operating in the area. There are now five to six battalions of SA-2s estimated to be operating south of Thanh Hoa and indications of increased light AAA positions and radar controlled AAA in southern NVN. This expanding air defense envelope also appears to be spreading to the West of Hanoi. Although no MIGs are believed to be using the facility as yet, Yen Bai airfield is now serviceable. It is suspected that another GCI site may soon be installed at or near Xom Lom (2049/10432). These developments, plus recent indications of MIGs operating over the Gulf of Tonkin, all point up the fact that North Vietnam is making every effort to expand and strengthen its air defense posture.

8. In summary, there are no indications of enemy curtailment of military operations. On the contrary, the enemy is increasing his capability to conduct operations in South Vietnam and to defend against our attacks against North Vietnam.



EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Copy furnished:  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Deputy Secretary of Defense

~~SECRET~~

79

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 20, 1968 - 4:45 pm

Mr. President:

State will have a recommendation to you tomorrow morning on Harriman's attached draft for Wednesday.

I would avoid the sentence bracketed in red on page 2 until they begin talking talking seriously with us.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 14355

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356 Sec. 3, 4(h)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988  
By *RG* NARA, DATE 6-22-92



Department of State

79a  
TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 PARIS 14355 201804Z

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1725

1968 MAY 20 PM 2 24

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 14355

DECLASSIFIED

N O D I S / HARVAN

Authority RAC 25458  
By is NARA, Date 3-16-98

DELTO 97

FOLLOWING IS OUTLINE OF GOVERNOR HARRIMANS REMARKS FOR MAY 22 MEETING:

1. US SIDE WILL SPEAK FIRST.

2. WE WILL LEAD OFF BY SAYING THAT WE HOPE THESE TALKS CAN BE FREE FROM THE EXCHANGE OF POLEMICAL CHARGES AND COUNTERCHARGES. IN THAT SPIRIT, WE WILL KEEP OUR OPENING REMARKS SHORT SO THAT WE CAN HAVE A TRUE DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES WHICH CONCERN US.

3. WE WILL THEN RETURN TO CHALLENGE THROWN US BY THUY MAY 18 WHEN HE ASKED IF WE "DARE GIVE THIS PEOPLE THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION." WE WILL REFER DRV TO REPEATED STATEMENTS BY US THAT WE ARE IN VIETNAM TO PRESERVE FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE ON THE BASIS OF ONE MAN-ONE VOTE, FREE OF COERCION AND OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. THIS, HOWEVER, REQUIRES CERTAIN ACTION, NOT BY THE US, BUT BY THE DRV.

4. WE WOULD POINT OUT THAT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM IS A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, CHOSEN BY THE FREE VOTE OF ALMOST FIVE MILLION PEOPLE IN THE SOUTH, AND TRACE BRIEFLY ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY AND CLAIM TO LEGITIMACY. WE WOULD ALSO MAKE BRIEF OBJECTION TO THUY'S CONTINUAL USE OF "PUPPET" DESCRIBE THE GOV.

5. WE WILL MOVE TO BOMBING ISSUE IN SOMEWHAT OBLIQUE FASHION.

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PAGE 02 PARIS 14355 201804Z

WE WILL SAY THAT WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE DRV CONSIDERS THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS TO BE THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND THAT WE REMAIN READY TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE. BUT WE CANNOT TAKE THE GRAVE RISKS, AS POINTED OUT BY MARCH 31ST SPEECH, THAT CESSATION POSES WITHOUT SOME SIGN THAT THE DRV WOULD TAKE MEASURES OF RESTRAINT ON THEIR SIDE. IT IS WITH THIS IN MIND THAT WE PROPOSED THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DMZ AS WELL AS OBSERVANCE OF THE 1962 AGREEMENTS ON LAOS. THE DRV SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT, AS WE HAVE SAID BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY IN THE PAST, WE ARE NOT DEMANDING THE COMPLETE STOPPING OF SUPPORT BY THE NORTH TO ITS FORCES IN THE SOUTH-- "SUPPORT WHICH YOU DENY GIVING TO TROOPS YOU DENY HAVING THERE."

6. WE WILL CLOSE BY REFERRING AGAIN TO OUR OPENING HOPE THAT WE COULD AVOID POLEMICS, AND ADD THAT WE WOULD WELCOME AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE DRV DELEGATION NOT TO RELEASE THE TEXTS OF FORMAL STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS AFTER THIS SESSION. WE COULD AGREE THAT EACH SIDE WOULD GIVE OUT GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE MEETING BUT NOT RELEASE TEXT. THIS WOULD REDUCE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE MEETING IN PARIS TO REPEAT PREVIOUSLY STATED PROPAGANDA POSITION AND SPECIFICALLY WOULD BRING US TO A MORE USEFUL AND MEANINGFUL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.

7. WE ASSUME THAT THUY WILL ANSWER BY REPEATING HIS DEMAND THAT WE STOP THE BOMBING, USING PHRASES LIKE THAT CONTAINED IN MAY 18TH STATEMENT--THAT THE US "MUST RAPIDLY GIVE A POSITIVE ANSWER AND IT CANNOT AVOID DOING SO FOR MUCH LONGER". IN RESPONSE WE WILL SAY THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. WE ARE READY TO TRY TO ESTABLISH SOME BASIS FROM WHICH WE COULD PROPERLY CONSIDER YOUR DEMAND FOR CESSATION AND AT THE APPROPRIATE LATER TIME SUCH QUESTIONS AS WITHDRAWAL OR "REGROUPMENT" OF FORCES OTHER THAN THOSE OF SOUTH VIETNAM FROM THE TERRITORY OF SOUTH VIETNAM. THEREFORE, AS WE HAVE SPOKEN OF THE DMZ AND OF THE PROBLEM OF INFILTRATION, WE ARE READY TO DISCUSS WITH YOU IN DETAIL CERTAIN ACTIONS RELATED TO THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM, SUCH AS, FIRING OF ARTILLERY FROM AND ACROSS DMZ AREA; THE MASSIVE INCREASE IN INFILTRATION THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE SINCE MARCH AND APRIL. WE WILL ALSO REFER AGAIN, WHICH STILL SEPARATING THE SUBJECT FROM THE PRECEDING ITEMS, TO THE FACT THAT THE ATTACKS AGAINST SAIGON AND THE OTHER CITIES ARE NOT CONDUCTIVE TO PROGRESS IN PARIS.

8 WE WILL ALSO ASK THE DRV TO PROPOSE THE DATE FOR THE NEXT

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PAGE 03 PARIS 14355 201304Z

MEETING. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE BAD IF THERE WERE ONLY ONE MEETING THIS WEEK, SO, IF DRV DOES NOT PROPOSE FRIDAY OR SATURDAY. WE WILL ASK FOR MEETING THEN.  
HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

Monday, May 20, 1968 - 4:45 pm

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Jones reports  
Belaunde's positive reaction to your  
task force on physical integration in  
Latin America.

W. W. Rostow

wwrostow:rlh



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
Lima, Peru

80a

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL

May 7, 1968

UNCLASSIFIED

Dear Walt:

I thought you would be interested to see President Belaunde's enthusiastic public praise for President Johnson's proposal to establish a task force on physical integration in Latin America. Belaunde's words, which were spoken for radio transmission as well, were on the occasion of the April 25 signing at the Presidential Palace of the \$7.5 million AID Private Investment Fund loan. Belaunde said:

"... At the same time we sign this fruitful agreement, I am pleased to reaffirm the gratitude of Peru for the words spoken two days ago by President Johnson. In a speech which you, Mr. Ambassador, have been so kind as to give me in unofficial Spanish translation, President Johnson has addressed the nations of the Organization of American States in highly exciting terms and has dealt with the immediate issue of physical integration. ... Furthermore, the Government of the United States has very kindly offered to sustain this executing body (the ad hoc committee), and it has offered to participate in the financing of these works with a special contribution of 300 million dollars to the IDB...

"This effort is one for immediate physical integration, and the President of the United States, who has been brief, for he does not have much time, has honored

UNCLASSIFIED




UNCLASSIFIED

2.

us by dedicating a separate paragraph to an endorsement of the Marginal Jungle Highway. ...Furthermore, the economist Walt Rostow, a good friend of Peru and close adviser of the President of the United States, has been kind enough to explain to a highly distinguished audience in Washington the scope of this project on the map of South America. ..."

Best wishes to you.

Sincerely,

  
J. Wesley Jones

Honorable Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED

INFORMATION

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

Monday, May 20, 1968 - 12:15 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith a useful summary of the status of infiltration groups as of 17 May. DIA now estimates 97,900 as dispatched since January 1, of whom 84,400 are in North Vietnam -- to be arriving at the rate of over 20,000 per month in May, June and July.

This does not include the two divisions brought into the Khe Sanh area in January. The true total, therefore, is nearer 120,000.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

WWRostow:rln

*Free file*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 00-416  
By *SJ* NARA, Date 4-2-03

STATUS OF INFILTRATION GROUPS\*  
1 JAN-17 MAY 1968

Since 1 January, an unusually large number of groups have been noted in SIGINT or other sources, which are believed destined for South Vietnam. The following data, derived from valid but incomplete information, are considered indicative of only a part of the personnel movement taking place:

Over-all Statistics

<u>Place Noted, 1 Jan-17 May</u>	<u>Nr of Groups</u>	<u>Estimated Strength</u>
South Vietnam or Laos	23	13,500
North Vietnam	<u>144</u>	<u>84,400</u>
Total	167	97,900

Estimated Time of Arrival

<u>Date</u>	<u>Nr of Groups</u>	<u>Estimated Strength</u>
Through April	24	14,000
May	38	22,200
June	43	25,200
July	39	22,800
August	<u>23</u>	<u>13,700</u>
Total	167	97,900

\* To date, these groups have not been reflected in COMUSMACV's monthly report of infiltration and troop movement. Whether employed in South Vietnam as replacements or units, it will be a number of months before acceptance criteria can be met and the totals be carried.

20 May 68

DIA Intelligence Supplement

Page 1

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority 1125-141.022-103/10  
By je, NARA, Date 11-2-09

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

# ESTIMATED LOCATION AND POSSIBLE DESTINATION OF INFILTRATION GROUPS

POSS. DESTINATION	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	TOTALS
DMZ — MR TTH	5/3,100	1/600	10/5,200	7/4,500	3/1,700	26/15,100
MR — TTH	1/600	1/600	6/3,300	6/3,900	1/600	15/9,000
MR — 5	1/600	4/2,200	10/5,200	13/8,500	4/2,200	32/18,700
B — 3 FRONT	2/1,200	2/1,100	7/3,600	4/2,600	2/1,100	17/9,600
III CORPS	13/8,100	1/600	11/5,700	21/13,700	14/7,800	60/35,900
UNKNOWN		1/500	10/5,200	6/3,900		17/9,600
TOTALS	22/13,600	10/5,600	54/28,200	57/37,100	24/13,400	167/97,900



GROUPS ESTIMATED TO BE IN SVN



GROUPS ESTIMATED TO BE IN LAOS



GROUPS ESTIMATED TO BE IN NVN (IN TRANSIT SOUTH)

NUMBER  
GROUPS

ESTIMATED  
STRENGTH

13/8,060




Recent Developments

The detection of 24 new infiltration groups in communications since 1 May indicates that the high level of personnel movement noted during March and April is continuing. One of those detected in May -- Group 2009 -- is apparently in Laos.

Infiltration group 275 has reportedly reached South Vietnam. A prisoner taken in Bien Hoa Province of 3d Corps on 16 May claims he was a member of infiltration group 275 which had arrived in South Vietnam on the 4th. This group was originally mentioned in SIGINT on 15 December while at commo-liaison station T-3; it was said to have a strength of 542. The travel time to South Vietnam -- four and a half months -- is slightly more than that estimated as required to reach 3d Corps. (SECRET SAVIN)

# STATUS OF INFILTRATION GROUPS



NOTED IN SVN/LAOS



ESTIMATED TO BE IN SVN/LAOS



ESTIMATED TO BE IN NVN (IN TRANSIT SOUTH)



NUMBER GROUPS	ESTIMATED STRENGTH
---------------	--------------------

13	13,600
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~~SECRET~~ SAVIN  
20 MAY 68

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 20, 1968 - 12:05pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Souvanna's rather  
wise observation on how to negotiate  
with the Communists in Paris.

*Free file*

W. W. Rostow

Vientiane 6642

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12556, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 91-457  
By *ing*, NARA, Date *10-26-93*

WWRostow:rlh



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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RR RUEHC  
DE RUMJFS 6642 1410610  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
R 200550Z MAY 68  
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8563  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 6642

CONTROL: 4722  
Received: May 20, 1968  
7:31 a.m.

*Rostow*

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS PARIS DEL

REF: STATE 166847

AFTER I HAD BRIEFED HIM ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MAY 18 MEETING, SOUVANNA EXPRESSED GREAT SATISFACTION OVER AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN'S HANDLING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO DATE. HE OBSERVED THAT FROM HIS EXPERIENCE THE DRV WOULD REMAIN UNYIELDING UNTIL IT HAD RUN OUT ITS PROPAGANDA STRING AND THEN WOULD BEGIN TO CEDE HERE AND THERE. PATIENCE, HE SAID, WAS A PRIME REQUISITE IN DEALING WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

GP-1 KURWITCH,  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 719 91-427

By up/hg, NARA, Date 6-15-92

NNNN

~~SECRET~~



*Pres Jcl*  
83

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Monday, May 20, 1968  
11:15 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Henry Kissinger, at a Pugwash meeting  
in Czechoslovakia, reports:

-- Czech Foreign Minister optimistic  
on Paris talks;

-- Soviet official says Soviet Defense  
Minister -- as well as Gromyko --  
recommended strategic weapons talks  
with U.S. on April 30, a decision somehow  
linked to Paris talks.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-107  
By iss, NARA Date 6-11-97

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-104

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

19 May 1968

By is, NARA Date 9.24.98

Copy of PRAGUE 2140

Henry Kissinger, who left for New York this morning after "Pugwash" meeting at Marienske Lazne, asked me to pass this message to you.

Kissinger had long talks with Czech Foreign Minister Hajek and with latter's confidential advisor Shejdarek, head of Czech International Institute for Political and Economic Affairs. Corroborating each, they told Kissinger the following.

They thought the North Vietnamese were ready to make a major advance if not a settlement this year in discussions with U. S. As they saw it, progress could be made along these lines:

Hanoi would be satisfied with minimum participation or representation of the Viet Cong in a South Vietnamese government, possibly through a change of name or outward character of the Viet Cong.

Hanoi recognized the result should not, repeat not, humiliate the U. S.

Hanoi might be brought to a cease-fire, either by agreement or of a de facto nature, more likely the latter.

Czech informants thought the situation more susceptible of movement than Korea, because of China's "different role."

Both Hajek and Shejdarek said Czechs would be willing to mediate, especially if U. S. desired to pass special proposals through their channels. Kissinger expressed view this unnecessary and inopportune at this time when both sides had begun direct contact. Czechs reserved further consideration of approach by means of message from Shejdarek asking Kissinger to return to Prague.

Kissinger found his Soviet colleague, Millionshikov, less optimistic about progress this year. Former said Soviets had no advance knowledge of Hanoi's April 3 message accepting direct negotiations with US. Kosygin in the dark and was informed in Teheran by special cable from Moscow.

Kissinger plans to visit Washington this coming Friday.

Copy of PRAGUE 2141

Emphasizing extremely sensitive nature of info, Communist Party representative on Soviet delegation to Marienske Lazne "Pugwash" meeting told Henry Kissinger the following:

On April 30 Soviet Foreign Minister and Soviet Defense Minister submitted a joint memo to Party Central Committee recommending talks with U. S.

SECRET/EXDIS

-2-

on ABM and strategic weapons question. Cleared draft of the communication on same subject to Doty Study Group in the U. S. was cancelled May 8.

Kissinger's informant thought initiation of Vietnam talks in Paris had a bearing on the problem and was unable to predict eventual decision.

BEAM

INFORMATION

SECRET

Monday, May 20, 1968 -- 11:00 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith tables comparing aircraft lost in 1967 versus 1968 over North Vietnam, pre- and post-March 31.

They show the following:

Aircraft lost per 1000 sorties

Pre-March 31, 1967	2.5
Post-March 31, 1967	2.8
Pre-March 31, 1968	2.2
Post-March 31, 1968	1.5

In short:

- loss rates dropped over the last year;
- loss rates dropped sharply this year, with curtailed bombing area.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 6-3-92

WWRostow:rlw

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
Af Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/88  
By rg, NARA, Date 6-3-92



SECRET

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<u>WEEK OF</u>	<u>ATTACK SORTIES</u>	<u>TOTAL SORTIES</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT LOST</u>
2/18/67 - 2/24/67	1,741	3,324	2
2/25/67 - 3/2/67	1,284	2,490	1
3/3/67 -- 3/9/67	1,555	3,021	3
3/10/67 - 3/16/67	2,222	3,887	11
3/17/67 - 3/23/67	1,531	2,941	5
3/24/67 - 3/30/67	2,298	3,903	4
<del>3/31/67 - 4/6/67</del>	<del>2,057</del>	<del>3,614</del>	<del>2</del>
4/7/67 - 4/13/67	2,056	3,631	4
4/14/67 - 4/20/67	1,915	3,567	4
4/21/67 - 4/27/67	2,138	3,946	13
4/28/67 - 5/4/67	2,439	4,477	7
5/5/67 - 5/11/67	<u>2,824</u>	<u>4,020</u>	<u>7</u>
TOTAL	24,060	42,821	63

prior to 31 mar 2.5/1000 attack sorties  
after " " 2.8/1000 " "

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 2.3  
AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/00  
By 128 JARA, Date 6-3-92

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<u>WEEK OF</u>	<u>ATTACK SORTIES</u>	<u>TOTAL SORTIES</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT LOST</u>
2/18/68 - 2/24/68	649	2,216	2
2/25/68 - 3/2/68	876	2,469	3
3/3/68 - 2/9/68	1,037	2,573	1
3/10/68 - 3/16/68	1,053	2,597	1
3/17/68 - 3/23/68	1,277	2,751	4
3/24/68 - 3/30/68	1,292	2,676	3
3/31/68 - 4/6/68	1,418	2,492	1
4/7/68 - 4/13/68	1,626	2,926	1
4/14/68 - 4/20/68	1,724	2,972	4
4/21/68 - 4/27/68	1,923	3,230	3
4/28/68 - 5/4/68	1,865	3,151	4
5/5/68 - 5/11/68	<u>2,322</u>	<u>3,909</u>	<u>3</u>
TOTAL	17,062	33,962	30

prior to 31 mar 2.2/1000 attack sorties

after " " 1.5/1000 " "

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/88  
By            NARA, Date 6-3-92

85

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 20, 1968  
10:50 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Bruce presents  
Secretary's message to Stewart and  
gets a forthcoming response.

W. W. Rostow

London 9095

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 18, NARA, Date 6-3-86





Department of State **TELEGRAM**  
**ACTION COPY**

~~SECRET~~

00 RUEHC  
DE RUHDTGR 9095 1411230  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 201155Z MAY 68  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3684 IMMEDIATE  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 9095

NODIS/HARVAN

FROM AMBASSADOR BRUCE

CONTROL: 4743  
Received: May 20, 1968  
9:05 a.m.

**DECLASSIFIED**

**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLJ 97-331**

**By 140, NARA Date 3-20-99**

1. I MET WITH THE FOREIGN SECRETARY THIS MORNING AND DISCUSSED THE SECRETARY'S TELEGRAM. HE HAD GORE-BOOTH AND MAITLAND PRESENT, AND I EMPHASIZED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE BEING CLOSELY HELD ON OUR SIDE, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH BUNDY SAID I EXPECTED NO DETAILED RESPONSE BEFORE HE HAD FULLER OPPORTUNITY TO REFLECT ON MATTER. FOLLOWING ARE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S PRELIMINARY REACTIONS. HE WILL COMMENT MORE FULLY IN MEETING WITH SULLIVAN AND DAVIDSON SCHEDULED AT 1600 THIS AFTERNOON.

2. NOTING THE SECRETARY'S EMPHASIS ON RECIPROCATATION BY HANOI WITH RESPECT TO THE DMZ, LAOS AND CAMBODIA FOR COMPLETE BOMBING STOP, FOREIGN SECRETARY ASKED WHETHER WE HAVE ANY INFORMATION INDICATING HANOI MIGHT MAKE CONCESSIONS DESPITE THEIR DISCOURAGING PUBLIC STATEMENTS. I SAID I DID NOT KNOW BUT EMPHASIZED POTENTIAL IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET INFLUENCE WITH HANOI. STEWART SAID HE WILL CONCENTRATE ON THIS QUESTION IN MOSCOW AND LOOK FOR ANY CLUE THAT SOVIETS MIGHT REDUCE THEIR SUPPLY ROLE WHEN AN AGREEMENT IS IN PROSPECT. HE THOUGHT QUESTION OF SOVIET ARMS SUPPLY VERY DIFFICULT AND WILL REQUIRE SOME CONSIDERATION OF HOW TO APPROACH IT.

3. FOREIGN SECRETARY REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES HIS AGREEMENT THAT SECRETARY'S MESSAGE SEEMS TO HIM THE RIGHT APPROACH IN PARTICULAR STICKING TO THE CONTRIBUTION THE UK AND SOVIETS CAN MAKE TOGETHER AS CO-CHAIRMAN BUT STOPPING SHORT OF ANY SUGGESTION FOR RE-CONVENING GENEVA CONFERENCE. BOTH HE AND GORE-BOOTH THOUGHT THE SOVIETS COULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL IN WORKING ON THE POLES TOWARD STRENGTHENING THE

**ACTION COPY**  
~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2- LONDON 9095, May:20, 1968 (NODIS/HARVAN)

ICC, AND APPRECIATED LINKAGE OF LAOS AND DM7 FOR POLICING HANOI'S COMMUNICATIONS TO SOUTH. FOREIGN SECRETARY NOTED THAT SOVIETS HAVE BEEN VERY LEGALISTIC, TAKING POSITION POWERS OF ICC CAN BE CHANGED ONLY BY GENEVA CONFERENCE. HOWEVER HE THOUGHT THERE WAS ROOM FOR DISCUSSION WHETHER CO-CHAIRMAN HAVE COMPETENCE ON THEIR OWN TO TAKE STEPS TO MAKE ICC SUPERVISION MORE EFFECTIVE.

4. FOREIGN SECRETARY NOTED THAT WHILE SOVIETS HAVE USUALLY AVOIDED MENTIONING CO-CHAIRMAN ROLE (E.G. LAST WILSON-KOSYGIN COMMUNIQUE SPOKE OF ACTING "JOINTLY" RATHER THAN AS CO-CHAIRMAN), IN NEW YORK CONVERSATION LAST SEPTEMBER SOVIETS HAD SUGGESTED CO-CHAIRMAN MACHINERY USEFUL AND SHOULD BE KEPT IN BEING. ALSO GROMYKO INVITATION OF MAY 10 FOR MOSCOW VISIT CONTAINED PHRASE EXPRESSING HOPE THAT "AS CO-CHAIRMAN" THE UK WOULD SHOW UNDERSTANDING FOR THE POSITION OF HANOI IN THE PARIS TALKS.

5. FOREIGN SECRETARY ARRIVES MOSCOW WEDNESDAY NIGHT, THURSDAY SCHEDULE INCLUDES TWO MEETINGS WITH GROMYKO, ONE WITH KOSYGIN, POSSIBLY WITH BREZHNEV, AND RETURN FRIDAY MORNING. FOREIGN SECRETARY VERY APPRECIATIVE OF SECRETARY'S MESSAGE. SAID IT IS "INCREASINGLY CLEAR" WHAT HE SHOULD SAY TO THE SOVIETS AND THOUGHT UK CAN TURN GROMYKO'S LANGUAGE BACK ON HIM AND URGE SOVIETS "AS CO-CHAIRMAN" SHOW UNDERSTANDING OF US POSITION.

6. DEPT PASS PARIS AS APPROPRIATE.

BRUCE  
BT

NOTE: Not Passed Paris by OC/T.

~~SECRET~~

86

INFORMATION

Monday, May 20, 1968  
10:45 a. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Sen. Fulbright  
expresses his gratitude to you for  
making available the full text of  
Harriman's last statement but one.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

86a

J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARK., CHAIRMAN

JOHN SPARKMAN, ALA.  
MIKE MANSFIELD, MONT.  
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GALE W. MCGEE, WYO.

BOURKE B. HICKL, IOWA  
GEORGE D. Aiken, VT.  
FRANK CARLSON, KANS.  
JOHN J. WILLIAMS, DEL.  
KARL E. MUNDT, S. DAK.  
CLIFFORD P. CASE, N.J.

United States Senate  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

May 18, 1968

CARL MARCY, CHIEF OF STAFF  
ARTHUR M. KUHLE, CHIEF CLERK

Dear Walt:

I have just returned from Arkansas to find your note of the 15th and the full text of Ambassador Harriman's statement. It was very thoughtful of the President to make this available to me, and I hope you will let him know how much I appreciate it.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

  
J. W. Fulbright

The Honorable  
W. W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to  
The President  
The White House

*Pres. file*

87

Monday, May 20, 1968  
9:10 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Thieu raises some questions about Paris and asks (p. 2) a question that will increasingly arise: "What will happen after two or three more weeks of propaganda?"

Thieu concludes: main military and political target of Hanoi is U. S. opinion.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Saigon 27759)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333  
By isa NARA Date 9-8-98





Department of State

87a  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

1968 MAY 20 AM 6 34

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~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 27759

NODIS/HARVAN

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

SUBJECT: THIEU ON NEGOTIATIONS.

1. AT OUR MEETING WITH THIEU ON MAY 19, HE SAID HE WAS NOT RPT NOT CLEAR ON WHAT HARRIMAN HAD ASKED FOR OR PROPOSED IN THE WAY OF NORTH VIETNAM ACTIONS THAT WOULD LEAD TO A CESSATION OF ALL BOMBING. THIEU ASKED THIS QUESTION WITH A WORRIED LOOK.

2. I SAID WE HAVE MADE NO RPT NO SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS OR PROPOSALS. WE ARE STILL IN THE STAGE OF SOUNDING OUT THE NORTH, AND TRYING TO ELICIT FROM THEM WHAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO DO IN EXCHANGE FOR A TOTAL CESSATION. OUR REMARKS HAVE THEREFORE BEEN VERY GENERAL, REFERRING TO THE NEED TO RESTORE THE DMZ TO ITS ORIGINAL PURPOSE AS PROVIDED IN THE GENEVA AGREEMENT, TO THE HEIGHTENED INFILTRATION, TO THE USE OF LAOS IN VIOLATION OF THE 1962 ACCORDS, TO THE ATTACKS ON SAIGON AND OTHER CITIES, ETC.

3. THIEU SEEMED SATISFIED WITH THIS EXPLANATION, BUT I AM SURE HE WILL BE PRESSING US AGAIN TO FIND OUT WHAT OUR MINIMUM CONDITIONS WILL BE. I AM AWARE, OF COURSE, OF THE EXAMPLES OF "TAKING ADVANTAGE" INCLUDED IN HARRIMAN'S INSTRUCTIONS, BUT I WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING OUR VIEWS ON WHAT WE WOULD CONSIDER ACCEPTABLE RECIPROCAL PERFORMANCE BY THE NVN.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-331

By us, NARA Date 3-20-99

~~SECRET~~

PAGE -2- SAIGON 27759, MAY 20, 1968

NODIS/HARVAN

4. HE THEN ASKED ABOUT VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY'S STATEMENT ON AGREEMENT REACHED ON REPRESENTATION. I ANSWERED THIS AND GAVE THIEU COPIES OF STATEMENTS ISSUED BY VP PRESS SECRETARY AND DEPT SPOKESMAN, AND EXCERPT FROM HARRIMAN-VANCE ANSWERS ON CBS AND NBC TV PROGRAMS. I ADDED THAT ISSUE HAD NOT COME UP IN PARIS TALKS, AND THE POSITION WAS AS I GAVE IT TO HIM IN THE MEETING WITH NORTH VIETNAM ON PROCEDURE PRIOR TO OPENING OF THE TALKS. I SAID WE WOULD INFORM HIM OF ANY CHANGE.

5. THIEU THEN ASKED IF WE HAD HAD ANY PRIVATE CONTACTS OUTSIDE THE CONVERSATIONS, AND HAD WE ANY INFO FROM ANY SOURCE ON HANOI'S INTENTIONS OR PLANS AFTER THEY FINISH WITH THE PROPAGANDA STAGE. I SAID NONE IN RESPONSE TO BOTH QUESTIONS.

6. WHAT WILL HAPPEN, THIEU ASKED, AFTER TWO OR THREE MORE WEEKS OF PROPAGANDA? I SAID WE DIDN'T KNOW. HE THEN SAID HE THOUGHT HANOI WOULD STRING THE TALKS OUT, AND THEIR MAIN EFFORT WOULD BE ON THE MILITARY FRONT, AGAINST SAIGON AGAIN AND ELSEWHERE, IN ORDER TO SHOW THEIR CAPABILITY AND TRY TO WIN ANOTHER PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY IN THE US AS THEY DID DURING TET. THIS IS WHAT THEY HAD DONE IN 1954 WHEN THE TALKS STARTED IN PARIS, AND THEY ARE OUT TO REPEAT IT. THEIR TARGET IS AMERICAN OPINION. I SAID WE WERE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THIS, BUT AMERICAN OPINION WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN BY SUCH MANEUVERS.

7. WE AGREED TO HOLD FIFTH CONSULTATION SESSION MAY 21 AT 1700 SAIGON TIME.

BUNKER

BT

NOTE : PASSED AMEMBASSY PARIS BY OC/T MAY 20, 1968...

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Monday, May 20, 1968 -- 9:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Attached (Tab A) is a summary of a captured Communist directive which suggests Hanoi counts on no serious movement in Paris until military operations in the South disintegrate the government in the South and the ARVN.

In the meanwhile, Paris will be used for propaganda.

This is what one would expect them to say to their military forces in the field at this stage; but there is every reason to believe that heavy fighting will continue and they will test our patience to the limit in Paris.

At Tab B is Bunker's impression from briefing on all-weather road construction in Laos. I believe Wednesday in Paris should be devoted completely to full exposition of Hanoi's violation of the Geneva Accords of 1962 on Laos, including road construction, etc. This would time well with Stewart's presence in Moscow later this week. (I believe he leaves London late Tuesday.)

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLS-141-022003/11  
By jc, NARA, Date 11-2-09

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~



~~SECRET~~

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1968 MAY 20 11 26

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS/CBS 10

By is, NARS, Date 12-14-83

PAGE 01 SAIGON 27761 201115Z

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~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 27761

EXDIS

DEPT ALSO PASS DEFENSE AND JCS

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

1. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED TWO VERY INTERESTING BRIEFINGS BY MACV ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF ENEMY ROAD CONSTRUCTION IN LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM, AND A FORECAST OF ENEMY INITIATIVES FOR 1968.

2. THE FIRST BRIEFING BRINGS OUT CLEARLY AND IN DETAIL THE STEP-BY-STEP PROGRESS MADE BY THE NVA IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EXTENSIVE ROAD NETWORK DESIGNED TO FACILITATE AND SPEED UP THE INCREASING LOGISTICAL FLOW REQUIRED FOR SUPPORT OF THE EXPANDING NORTH VIETNAMESE INFILTRATION. A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF THE ROAD SYSTEM IS BEING GRAVELED, INDICATING THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF AN ALL-WEATHER CAPABILITY FROM NVN TO VARIOUS POINTS WITHIN SVN. I BELIEVE THAT THIS ROAD CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM IS FACTUAL EVIDENCE OF NVA DETERMINATION TO SUPPORT THEIR CONTINUING MILITARY REQUIREMENTS OVER A LONG TERM.

3. THE SECOND BRIEFING GIVES THE BEST ESTIMATE AVAILABLE HERE OF WHERE AND WHEN HANOI WILL STRIKE DURING 1968.

4. AT THE DIRECTION OF GENERAL WESTMORELAND THESE BRIEFINGS ARE BEING TAKEN TO PARIS BY THE MACV LIAISON OFFICER, COLONEL TAYLOR. BOTH BRIEFS ARE SHORT AND I STRONGLY URGE THAT THEY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 SAIGON 27761 201115Z

BE HEARD AND SEEN BY OUR DELEGATION IN PARIS. THEY HAVE A BEARING ON THE NEGOTIATING STANCE OF HANOI.

5. THE EVIDENCE OF EXTENSIVE ROAD CONSTRUCTION RAISES THE QUESTION OF ANY REAL VALUE ACCRUING FROM A RESTORATION OF THE DMZ TO ITS DEMILITARIZED STATUS, IF THE ENEMY CONTINUES TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE ITS ROADNET THROUGH LAOS FOR SUPPORT OF HIS MILITARY OPERATIONS. SINCE THE FIRST OF FEBRUARY ONLY AN ESTIMATED 15 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL PERSONNEL INFILTRATION HAS COME THROUGH THE DMZ, AND INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT THE PERCENTAGE IS DECREASING. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT STEPS BE TAKEN IN THE CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS TO AIR THIS VERY IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT.

6. PUBLIC EXPOSURE AT THIS POINT OF THE EXTENT OF ENEMY ROAD CONSTRUCTION IN LAOS AND INTO SOUTH VIETNAM WITH ALL OF ITS OBVIOUS IMPLICATIONS WOULD BE VERY TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE IN REINFORCING OUR POSITION CONCERNING NORTH VIETNAMESE INVOLVEMENT AND INTENTIONS. AS A STARTER I RECOMMEND THAT THIS BE DONE BY BRIEFING THE PRESS EITHER HERE IN SAIGON OR IN PARIS.  
BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-333

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ By id, NARA Date 7-8-78 INFORMATION

Monday - May 20, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with Ambassador Costello --  
Monday, May 20, 1:00 p.m.

*Pres file*

Ambassador Costello asked for this appointment. He has not told us of any specific issue he wishes to raise with you.

At State, he has been talking about:

1. Implications of the new Western Hemisphere Immigration Quota for Trinidad. Under the new WH quota, 120,000 immigrants will be allowed to enter the US. Deduction of 40,000 Cuban refugees reduced the total to about 80,000. Under this figure, immigration from the Caribbean will be cut by half, and the Caribbean governments are unhappy at having the escape valve for excess population partially turned off. But they will have to live with it.
2. New Textile Restraints on Trinidad. The Inter-Agency Textile Committee has fixed a quota for ladies foundation garments imported from Trinidad for 1968 lower than what the Trinidadians want. They are unhappy with the limitation. Talks between the Trinidadians and the Textile Committee will continue, based on new data to be presented by Trinidad.
3. Possibilities of a US Sugar Quota for Trinidad. The Ambassador would like to see Trinidad given a share of our sugar market. Until the Congress amends the law to permit this, there is no chance of satisfying the Ambassador.
4. Our Attitude Toward the Caribbean Development Bank. The Ambassador wants us to become <sup>a</sup>charter members with equity participation. Because of the Congressional picture, we cannot assume membership in another international bank. But we are



prepared to make an AID loan to the Bank and we are exploring the possibility of letting Puerto Rico become a charter member.

5. More Support for British West Indian Airways as a Regional Carrier. Trinidad wants its airline -- BWIA -- accepted by other Caribbean Governments as a regional airline. It has encountered some resistance, particularly with Barbados. We favor the regionalist approach among the former British colonies. The idea of a regional carrier is the only one which makes sense. But there are limits to what we can do to persuade them to be sensible.

All these issues are small in the context of our overall hemispheric relations. If Ambassador Costello raises them, I see no need for you to get into details. He should work them out with Covey Oliver.

Ambassador Costello has been doing a splendid job in Port of Spain. He is eager, serious, hard-working and imaginative. He says he finds the assignment more demanding than he had expected. You might congratulate him on the good job he is doing.

W. W. Rostow

90  
1  
2. Pres file  
May 20, 1968

Mr. President:

In the attached memorandum, Bill Foster reports Secretary Rusk's suggestion that, in lieu of a ceremony, a Presidential statement be released in connection with the signing of the ACDA authorization bill in order to help win a strong vote for the NPT in the UNGA. The attached draft statement is intended to maintain pressure for prompt UNGA action by reasserting your earlier announcement that you expect to submit the Treaty to the Senate this year. Responding to UNGA criticism that the Treaty is discriminatory, the statement emphasizes that "we take with great seriousness the Treaty's obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith toward halting the nuclear arms race and disarmament."

I understand that you have agreed to receive from "Nuclear Week in New York" the "Swords into Plowshares" Award, honoring your sponsorship of the NPT. If this ceremony takes place this week and you plan to make a statement, you might prefer to use this text at that time.

W. W. Rostow

Att.:

ACDA memo May 17

Release statement with signing of ACDA authorization bill \_\_\_\_\_

Use statement at "Swords into Plowshares" ceremony ✓ 5/21/68

No statement \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

SMKeeny:jb:5-20-68/3:30pm

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

17 MAY 1968

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Statement on  
Signing ACDA Bill

Secretary Rusk suggested, in lieu of a ceremony commemorating the signing of the ACDA authorization bill, that the President make a statement when he signs for the purpose of encouraging a strong vote for the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the UN General Assembly. A draft of such a proposed statement is enclosed herewith.



William C. Foster

Enclosure:

Proposed draft statement.

cc: The Secretary of State



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DRAFT WHITE HOUSE PRESS RELEASE  
ON SIGNING ACDA'S AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION

The President today signed into law a bill (HR 14940) extending the life of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for two years.

The President stated:

"In January of 1964, in my first message to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, I proposed agreement on a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. In March of this year, the Geneva Disarmament Conference submitted such a treaty to the United Nations. It reflected four years of work by the United States, the Soviet Union, and many other countries. It is now being debated in the General Assembly. I have every expectation that it can be submitted to the Senate this year.

"This treaty will serve three main purposes. First it will attempt to assure that nuclear weapons, with their catastrophic power of destruction, will not pass into the hands of any more nations.

"Second, it will open the way for all nations to share in the peaceful uses of the atom without arousing fear lest these uses be diverted to nuclear weapons.

"Third it will give new impetus to negotiations to halt the nuclear arms race and begin the process of disarmament.

"Each of these purposes is important to all mankind. We hope this Treaty will achieve wide acceptance and become an effective barrier to the dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons. We will do our part in carrying out the Treaty's principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology should be available for peaceful purposes to all parties. And we take with great seriousness the Treaty's obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith toward halting the nuclear arms race and disarmament. We are ready to return to Geneva this summer to work toward that goal.

"We and the Soviet Union now face a most urgent question: How to avoid a new escalation

in nuclear arms competition? We have reached a point in the arms race where we must either take quick action toward agreement, or plunge pell-mell into more vigorous, more dangerous and more costly competition.

"It is important, therefore, that we work together with the Soviet Union to carry out the provisions of the non-proliferation treaty calling for negotiations to halt the nuclear arms race at an early date. It is also important that we renew the life of the Arms Control Agency so that America will be properly prepared for these negotiations."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

Monday - May 20, 1968

*Pre file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Brazil Health Sector Loan

Herewith a unanimous recommendation from AID (Gaud), State (Oliver) and BOB (Zwick), concurred in by Treasury (Secretary Fowler), that you approve a \$15.4 million Health Sector Loan for Brazil.

Last February when you authorized negotiation of a \$225 million FY 1968 aid package for Brazil, you asked that the sector loans be referred back to you for approval before signing.

The loan is in line with the Summit program. It will be used to attack one of Brazil's major health problems -- gastro-enteric diseases affecting 85% of the population. The self-help conditions are adequate. It poses no difficulties as far as application of the Conte-Long and Symington amendments are concerned.

I recommend you approve the loan.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☐

Disapprove ☐

Call me ☐

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr 1/5/81

By EW/af, NARA, Date 6-15-92

Attachments

AID-State recommendation, signed by William Gaud, 5/6/68  
BOB recommendation by Charles Zwick, 5/11/68.



71a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
Washington 25, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MAY 8 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Health Sector Loan for Brazil

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AID Ltr 1/15/80 (nk J80-20)

By mic/rg NARA, Date 6-15-92

On the recommendation of Ambassador Tuthill and Deputy U.S. Coordinator Fowler, I am requesting your approval to authorize a \$15.4 million health sector loan to the Government of Brazil.

On February 24, 1968, you authorized us to begin negotiations with the Government of Brazil for an economic assistance package of approximately \$255 million. The package consisted of program loan funds of \$125 million, health and education sector loans totaling \$46 million, project loans amounting to \$49 million, and a PL 480 Title I Sales Agreement for 500,000 tons of wheat valued at approximately \$35 million. Your authorization was given with the understanding that the health and education sector loans would be submitted for your approval when they were ready for authorization.

During the period from March 4-8, 1968, U.S. representatives successfully concluded substantive negotiations with the Brazilian Government on the over-all economic assistance program. The understandings reached in these negotiations were in accord with the criteria outlined in my memorandum to you of February 6, 1968. On the basis of these negotiations, I authorized release of \$50 million in 1967 program loan funds plus the signing of a 1968 program loan of \$75 million to the Government of Brazil, subject to that Government's completing certain procedural measures. These measures include informing the CIAP of the details of the program this assistance will support.

The Health Sector loan is now ready for authorization. The loan will provide the initial capital necessary to launch an effective municipal water supply and sewerage finance system for communities throughout Brazil. Gastro-enteric diseases are among the major communicable diseases affecting Brazil's population, both in terms of the number of deaths and the debilitating effects on those who survive them. Eighty-five percent of the population suffers from attacks of gastro-enteric diseases, and the death rate among children under five years due to these infections is nearly 100 times that in the United States. If Brazil is to improve the health level of its continually growing urban population, a sustained assault on these diseases must be launched. Our analysis indicates that this is the most critical area in the health sector.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

An effective approach in attacking these diseases is the provision of an adequate supply of safe water and the sanitary disposal of wastes; that is, to concentrate on prevention rather than treatment. In the newly created National Water Loan Fund, Brazil has a financial mechanism capable of mobilizing federal, state, and municipal funds for the construction of municipal water and sewerage systems. The Water Loan Fund was established on a pilot basis in 1965 by an agreement between A.I.D. and the National Department of Sanitary Works. Three years of successful operation have demonstrated the suitability of the Loan Fund concept as a means for meeting part of the great demand for municipal water and sewerage financing.

Of the proposed A.I.D. loan, \$15 million will be matched by an equal contribution from the Government of Brazil, thus forming a \$30 million fund for the financing of technically sound municipal water and sewerage systems. An additional \$400,000 of loan funds would be allocated to the provision of technical assistance and training.

At present, municipal water and sewerage programs are handled by means of an inefficient pattern of resource allocation, whereby isolated projects are approved without consideration of their effect on other projects, possible overlap in service, or priority ranking. A fundamental objective of this loan will be the creation of a permanent, self-supporting financing system to consolidate resources into a single loan fund for funding complete sanitation programs. The proposed system will contain three essential elements: a) a National Water and Sewerage Loan Fund at the federal level as a source of financing for state, regional, and municipal loan programs; b) a network of state agencies to lend combined national and state loan funds to municipalities; and c) the borrowing municipalities willing to provide a share of project costs and to repay the loans.

It is estimated that over 3 million people will benefit from the first series of water and sewerage sub-loans. As repayments to the Fund are re-lent to other municipalities throughout the life of the forty-year A.I.D. loan, the number of people benefiting will increase by several times. In addition to its obvious health benefits, the proposed program will contribute to such economic advantages as increased industrial productivity due to improved workers health; reduced medical and hospital costs; the elimination of investments in wells, water pumps, and reservoirs; and improved municipal tax yield due to the positive effect of water and sewerage services in property values.

As was indicated to you in my memorandum of February 6, 1968, Brazil may acquire certain military equipment which would require A.I.D. to decide whether the Conte-Long Amendments of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act would apply. To the extent that such equipment were determined to be




~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

"sophisticated weapons systems," the law would require an equivalent reduction in economic assistance. Our best estimates are that this could not require more than about a \$5 million deduction. There are project loans and an education sector loan, in addition to the loan herein recommended for authorization, of approximately \$5<sup>4</sup> million planned for authorization this fiscal year. These will provide an adequate base from which deductions could be made if necessary. Thus, the possibility of such a deduction need not be a consideration in the authorization of this loan, which in the event of the necessity for a deduction would be given a higher priority for authorization than other loans under consideration.

State/A.I.D., in consultation with the inter-agency advisory committee concerned with the implementation of Section 620(s) (the Symington Amendment) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, has determined: a) that Brazil's resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development, and b) that neither U.S. development assistance nor PL-480 sales are diverted by Brazil to military purposes. The assessment on which this determination was made was submitted to you in connection with the Economic Assistance package for Brazil which you approved on February 24. The facts on which the prior assessment was based have not changed materially during the interim.

Recommendation: That you approve the authorization of a \$15.4 million health sector loan to Brazil.



William S. Gaud

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

^ Advance Copy

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EW 11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Brazil Health Sector Loan

All I want to report your approval to authorize a \$11.4 million Health Sector Loan with Brazil.

You authorized negotiation of this loan as part of a total \$225 million FY 1968 assistance package, with the understanding that it would be submitted to you for final approval before signing. Negotiations on the overall economic assistance package have been completed. The Brazilians have agreed to the fiscal and monetary conditions contained in the negotiating instructions you approved. The program loan and P. L. 400 agreements will be signed as soon as the Brazilians formally inform CIAP of the economic program they plan to undertake.

This is the first health sector loan you have been asked to approve. It will provide capital for a National Water Loan Fund to finance water supply and sewerage systems for small and medium size communities throughout Brazil. The Federal Government of Brazil will match our contribution. State and municipal governments will be required to match a substantial portion of the amounts they borrow from the Fund

Our loan will help the Brazilians to

- attack their most critical health problem, gastro-intestinal diseases which affect 85% of the population and contribute to one of the world's highest infant mortality rates,
- create a permanent, self-sustaining financing mechanism for community water and sewerage programs,
- stimulate better planning, financial management, and institutional development at the local level,
- bring the health and economic benefits of safe water and sanitation to 3 million people initially and many millions more as the funds revolve.

Balance of Payments. Secretary Fowler agrees that the procedures to be used in connection with this loan will minimize the impact on the balance of payments.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OMB Ltr 11/10/80

By Shulky, NARA, Date 6-15-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Military Expenditures. When the total economic assistance package was submitted to you in February, Gaud reported that State/AID had determined that Spending Amendment questions were not applicable to Brazil. Gaud reports that the basis for that assessment has not changed.

Gaud had also reported to you that a \$5 million reduction in economic assistance might be necessary under the Conte/Long amendment if the Brazilians acquire sophisticated military equipment, particularly F-5 jets. If such a determination is made, there are loans totalling \$34 million planned for authorization later this fiscal year from which such a deduction could be made. Gaud therefore recommends authorization of this loan, leaving any possible Conte/Long application to future loans.

Recommendation. I recommend that you approve Gaud's request to authorize the Brazil Health Sector Loan.

Attachment

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

cc: DO Records  
DO Chron.  
Director  
Deputy Dir.  
Ret. 437  
Ret. 432 1/2

IPD:Altschmanoff:ols:5/8/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Profile

Monday, May 20, 1968

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT:     Employment of White House Fellow, Edgar Kaiser, Jr.**

In looking over the new White House Fellows, I am very impressed with one of them, Edgar Kaiser, Jr. I would like to ask young Kaiser to join my staff to work with me on special projects, primarily on intelligence coming from Vietnam.

Normally, the new Fellows enter their assignments in September. Because of my immediate need, I would like to hire him as a member of the NSC Staff as soon as he is available.

Is there any reason why I should not make the offer to him? I do not know whether he will accept but I did not want to move before checking with you.

W. W. Rostow

\_\_\_\_\_ OK to make offer

\_\_\_\_\_ Prefer he not work in White House

\_\_\_\_\_ Call me

Edgar F. Kaiser, Jr.  
Economist  
Age: 25  
3100 Andreasen Drive  
Lafayette, California

Edgar Kaiser, Jr., has been serving under contract as a program economist for the Joint Embassy-USAID Economic Division in Saigon, Viet Nam. His primary responsibility has been to train and direct a group of young Vietnamese economists who, with him, have been reporting on rural economic conditions in South Vietnam.

Born in Portland, Oregon, Mr. Kaiser attended grade school in Michigan and California before entering Governor Dummer Academy in Massachusetts. There he captained the school's New England championship track team and was selected as its most valuable player. He was the leader of the school's singing group, and a member of the varsity football team.

In 1961 Mr. Kaiser entered Stanford University and received his B.A. degree in political science in 1965. While at Stanford he was elected president of the largest student organization on campus, and was a member of the President's Student Advisory Committee, chairman of the Dean of Men's Student Relations Committee, and a member of the Stanford ski team.

Mr. Kaiser then entered the Harvard Business School receiving his MBA in May of 1967. While at Harvard he wrote several case studies which subsequently have been used by the Harvard Business School, and published an article on the role of the government in labor negotiations, one of his special interests.

During his ten years as a student, Mr. Kaiser had a variety of part-time jobs in the United States and overseas, ranging from construction jobs to steel mills and automobile plants. An accomplished snow and water skier, Mr. Kaiser is an accredited instructor of both. He is also a professional singer and song writer, having had a number of records released.

Mr. Kaiser's community activities have included participation in the Bay Area Youth Guidance Program in San Francisco. During his four years at Stanford, he helped organize and performed in charity water ski shows for the Palo Alto Convalescent Home. He has also participated in a Danny Thomas charity concert in the San Francisco Cow Palace. At Harvard, Mr. Kaiser served as an assistant to the manager of the WKBG Inc. television studio where, along with other duties, he was responsible for working with the Massachusetts United Fund Promotional Fund Raising Campaign.

Mr. Kaiser was married to the former Caroline MacTyre Orr of Scotland in November of 1966. They have one daughter, Suzanne, born in Bangkok, Thailand.

# # #

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*Pres file*

Monday - May 20, ACTION  
1968

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Letter from Salvadoran President Sanchez**

Herewith a reply to your summit anniversary message from President Sanchez of El Salvador. It has a good paragraph of support on Vietnam.

If you have no objection, he would like to make the letter public.

No objection                   —

Call me                         —.

W. W. Rostow

**Attachment**

May 13, 1968 letter from President Sanchez



President of the  
Republic of El Salvador

San Salvador, May 13, 1968

Excellency:

The Ambassador of the United States to El Salvador has delivered to me the message which you sent me on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Meeting of the Presidents of America at Punta del Este, Uruguay.

Like you, I am gratified at the accomplishments achieved in the Hemisphere during the past twelve months, among them the preparation by the Inter-American Cultural Council of a regional program to modernize teaching methods and to utilize science and technology; the signing of a stronger International Coffee Agreement and the creation of a Coffee Diversification Fund; the foundation of the Inter-American Development Bank and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration; and the first steps taken toward the establishment of the Latin American Common Market.

I want to take this opportunity to tell you that the Salvadoran people support you and congratulate you for your valiant efforts to achieve peace in Viet-Nam. Your struggle for lasting peace is understood by democratic peoples who yearn to improve their present standards of living, since the battle being waged in Viet-Nam concerns us all: to stop decisively the subversion that seeks to exploit man's primary feelings, not to elevate but rather to destroy man himself and change him into a thing, bereft of the powers of reason. Whatever the results may be, we are sure that your determination will help to strengthen the system of international moral principles, on which alone the true peaceful association of all nations can be based.

I thank you for your congratulations to the people of El Salvador for the progress they have made, and for your words expressing the determination of your government to sponsor aid so that we may continue our efforts to reach the goals we have set for ourselves.

Respectfully,

[s] F. Sánchez H.

Fidel Sánchez Hernández  
President of El Salvador

His Excellency  
Lyndon B. Johnson,  
President of the United States of America,  
Washington, D.C.