

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a cable	Deptel (draft) to Manila <i>open 1-19-01</i> S 4 p [Duplicate of #61m, Vol. 78]	5/10/68	A
#4 memo	Rostow to President, re: Greece <i>open 1-19-01</i> S 1 p	5/31/68	A
#4a memo	Katzenbach to President, re: Greece <i>open 1-19-01</i> S 3 p	5/21/68	A
#5 ltr	Taylor to Rostow <i>open 8-12-93 ALJ 92-383</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #2p, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "8 I-Taylor Memos"]	5/29/68	A
#6a memo	Katzenbach to President <i>open 1-19-01</i> C 2 p [Duplicate of #18a, NSF, CF, USSR, Vol. 19]	5/29/68	A
#8 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 1-19-01</i> C 2 p	5/28/68	A
#8b memo	Rusk to President <i>open 1-19-01</i> C 3 p	5/20/68	A
#10 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 81201) <i>open 1-19-01</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #105, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 13]	5/31/68	A
#11 memo	Rostow to President (CAP 81198) <i>open 1-19-01</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #107, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 13]	5/31/68	A
#11a memo	Fowler to President <i>open 4/17/02 NLJ 01-65</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #107a, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 13] [Exempt NLJ 85-314]	5/31/68	A
#14 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 81195) <i>open 1-19-01</i> S 2 p [Dup. #61a, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVARD DEL-DELTD III," BX116]	5/31/68	A
#15 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 81193) <i>open 1-19-01</i> C 1 p	5/31/68	A

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 79, May 25-31, 1968 Box 35

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#16 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 81190) <i>Exempt 7/19/01 NS 01-67</i> S 2 p <i>open 1-23-11 NLT 10-4/11 (#109)</i> <i>[dup. #109, NSF, CF, "France, Vol. 13"]</i>	5/31/68	A
#17 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 81192) <i>Exempt 7/19/01 NS 01-64</i> S 2 p	5/31/68	A
#24 memo	<i>Open NLT 17-134 9.21.98</i> Rostow to President, 8:55 a.m. <i>DUPLICATE IN FILES OF NWA, Box 2</i> C 1 p <i>"ATGS MAY-JUNE 68" Doc 19X, 19Y</i> <i>[dup. #167 UN Agency File Vol 10]</i>	5/29/68	A
#24a memo	Katzenbach to President <i>Open in file of NWA, see #24 above</i> C 2 p <i>[dup. #167 UN Agency File, Vol 10]</i> <i>open 7-7-94 NLT 97-131</i>	5/28/68	A
#25 memo	Rostow to President, 8:50 a.m. <i>open 1-19-01</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #168, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 13]	5/29/68	A
#25a cable	Paris 15034 <i>open 1-19-01</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #168a, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 13]	5/29/68	A
#27 memo	Rostow to President, 8:30 a.m. <i>open 1-19-01</i> S 1 p <i>[dup. #13 NSF, CF, VN, "HU Misc. & memos v. 2" Bx 122]</i> <i>[Dup. #78, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVARD TODEL-DELTO III, " Bx 116]</i>	5/29/68	A
#27a cable	Paris 14978 <i>open 2/19/98 RAC</i> S 1 p <i>[dup. #13a, NSF, CF, VN, "HU Misc. & memos v. 2" Bx 122]</i> <i>[Dup. #78a, as above] [dup. #55, NSF, CF, VN, "Harvard Chron II, " Bx 109]</i>	5/28/68	A
#29 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 1-19-01</i> PCI 1 p	5/28/68	A
#29a memo	Shepard for the Record <i>open 1-19-01</i> S 1 p	5/28/68	A
#29b map	Attachment to #29a <i>open 1-19-01</i> PCI 1 p	undated	A
#33 memo	Rostow to President, 1:30 p.m. <i>Open 2/10/98 RAC</i> C 1 p <i>[dup. #52, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVARD Chron II, Bx 122]</i> <i>[dup. #12, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVARD Misc. & memos v. 2, Bx 122]</i>	5/28/67	A
#33a cable	Saigon 28477 C 5 p <i>Open 2/10/98 RAC</i> <i>[dup. #52a, as above] [dup. #12a, as above Bx 122]</i>	5/28/68	A
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#35 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 1-22-93 NLJ 91-467</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #60, NSF, CF, Peru, Vol. 1]	5/28/68	A
#35a cable	Lima 5273 <i>open 1-19-01</i> C 2 p [Duplicate of #60a, NSF, CF, Peru, Vol. 1]	5/27/68	A
#36a cable	Deptel to Saigon (draft) <i>open 1-19-01</i> S 3 p	5/27/68	A
#37 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 1-19-01</i> C 1 p	5/28/68	A
#38 memo	Rostow to President, 10:40 a.m. <i>open 1-19-01</i> TS 1 p [Duplicate of #27, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "5E(2)b--Cambodia"]	5/28/68	A
#38a memo	Intelligence Memorandum TS- 6 p <i>exempt 9/19/01 NLJ/PAC 01-50 exempt</i> [Duplicate of #27b, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "5E(2)b--Cambodia"]	5/28/68 <i>RAC 3/04</i>	A
#38b cable	Saigon 28267 <i>open 1-19-01</i> TS 3 p [Duplicate of #15, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "2C(10)--5/68, General Military Activity" and #27b, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "5E(2)b--Cambodia" and #72 Westmoreland Papers, "#32 History File," Box 17]	5/25/68	A
#38c cable	COMUSMACV 14986 to CINCPAC S 6 p <i>open 7/19/01 NS 01-66</i> [Duplicate of #27c, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "5E(2)b--Cambodia"] <i>is file of WVR, Box 1. MTS/RAC. MAR-June 68, Doc #191</i>	5/25/68	A
#41 memo	Rostow to President, 8:25 a.m. <i>open 1-19-01</i> S 1 p	5/28/68	A
#41a cable	Rawalpindi 5294 <i>open 7/19/01 NS 01-67</i> S 2 p	5/27/68	A
#42 memo	Rostow to President, 8:20 a.m. <i>sanitized 10/10/01 NLJ/PAC 01-59</i> TS 1 p <i>open RAC 11/09</i>	5/28/68	A
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#42a rpt	Intelligence Report <i>Sanitized 9/19/01 NLJ/RAC 01-50</i> TS- 2 p	5/27/68	A
#48 memo	<i>open 1-22-01</i> Rostow to President, 6:20 p.m. <i>dup #97, NSF, CF, VN, HARRIS/Cherokee</i> S- 1 p <i>Indian Ridge Box 134</i>	5/27/68	A
#48a cable	Paris 14827 <i>dup #97a ashore</i> S- 2 p <i>open 1-22-01</i> <i>[dup. #89, NSF, CF, VN, "HARRIS TODEL-DELTO III," Bx 116]</i>	5/27/68	A
#49 memo	Rostow to President, 5:45 p.m. <i>Sanitized 7/19/01 NS 01-69</i> S- 1 p <i>[dup. #17a, NSF, CF, VN, "HV MISC. + MEMOS V.2," Bx 122]</i>	5/27/68	A
#50 memo	Rostow to President <i>dup. #85, NSF, CF, VN, "HV MISC. + MEMOS V.2," Bx 122</i> S- 1 p <i>notes with #85, May 5-6, 1968, doc #194, 198</i>	5/27/68	A
#50a rpt	"Proposed US Note" <i>open 8/11/01 NS 01-68</i> S- 2 p	undated	A
#52a ltr	Taylor to President S- 2 p <i>open 8-12-93 NL 592-383</i>	5/27/68	A
#54 memo	Rostow to President, 3:45 p.m. <i>Sanitized 12/11/01 NS/RAC 01-57</i> S- 1 p	5/27/68	A
#55a ltr	Shah to President <i>open 1-22-01</i> G- 1 p	5/26/68	A
#58a cable	Paris 14774 <i>open 1-22-01</i> S- 3 p <i>[dup. #19a, NSF, CF, VN, "HV MISC. + MEMOS V.2," Bx 122]</i> <i>[dup. #101, NSF, CF, VN, "HARRIS TODEL-DELTO III," Bx 116]</i>	5/27/68	A
#59a cable	Rawalpindi 321 <i>Sanitized 7/19/01 NS 01-67</i> S- 1 p	undated	A
#61 memo	Rostow to President, 11:05 a.m. <i>open 3/13/03 NS/RAC 01-58</i> S- 1 p	5/27/68	A
#61a rpt	Intelligence Report <i>open 5/14/03 NS/RAC 01-59</i> S- 5 p	5/27/68	A

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#62 memo	Rostow to President, 10:50 a.m. <i>open 1-22-01</i> S <u>1 p</u> [Dup. #20, NSF, CF, VN, "HV Misc. & memos v.2" Bx122]	5/27/68	A
#63 memo	Intelligence Memorandum TS- <u>1 p</u>	5/27/68	A
#64 memo	Rostow to President, 5:30 p.m. <i>open 1-22-01</i> C <u>2 p</u> [Duplicate of #16, NSF, CF, Haiti, Vol. 5]	5/26/68	A
#65 memo	Smith to President, 2:20 p.m. <i>open 1-22-01</i> S <u>1 p</u> [Dup. #22, NSF, CF, VN, "HV Misc. & memos v.2" Bx122]	5/26/68	A
#65a cable	Deptel (draft) to Paris S <u>1 p</u> [Dup. #22a, as above]	undated	A
#66 memo	Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m. <i>open 1-22-01</i> S <u>1 p</u> [Duplicate of #177, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 13]	5/26/68	A
#66a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>open 1-22-01</i> S <u>2 p</u> [Duplicate of #177a, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 13]	5/26/68	A
#68 memo	Rostow to President, 10:30 a.m. <i>open 1-22-01</i> S <u>1 p</u> [Dup. #22b, NSF, CF, VN, "HV Misc. & memos v.2" Bx122] * #98, NSF, CF, VN	5/26/68	A
#68a cable	Paris 14709 <i>open 1-22-01</i> S <u>2 p</u> [Dup. #22c, as above] [Dup. #170, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN TODEL-DELTO III," Bx116] * #98a	5/25/68	A
#68b cable	Paris 14710 <i>open 1-22-01</i> S <u>1 p</u> [Dup. #109, as above] [Dup. #22d, VN, Misc. & memos v.2] * #98b	5/25/68	A
#70 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 1-22-01</i> S <u>2 p</u>	5/25/68	A
#71 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 1-22-01</i> S <u>2 p</u>	5/25/68	A
#71a rpt	"Itinerary for Latin American Trip" <i>open 1-22-01</i> S <u>3 p</u>	5/25/68	A
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#72a memo	Katzenbach to President <i>open 1-22-01</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #179a, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 13]	5/25/68	A
#73 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 1-22-01</i> S 3 p [Duplicate of #6b, NSF, CF, Australia, "Visit of PM Gorton"]	5/25/68	A
#74 memo	Rostow to President, 3:15 p.m. <i>open 1-22-01</i> C 1 p	5/25/68	A
#75 memo	"Lunch Mtg with President-Agenda" <i>Duplicate in File of WWR, Box 1, #765 w/1/22/68 & 2/22/68</i> TS 1 p	5/25/68	A open B box
#75a cable	Paris 14694 <i>[dup #77a] open 1-22-01</i> S 2 p <i>[dup. # 112, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN III," Bx 116]</i>	5/25/68	A
#75b cable	Saigon 28267 <i>open 1-22-01</i> TS 3 p	5/25/68	A
#75c cable	Duplicate of #38c <i>op 7/19/01 NS 01-66</i>		
#76a cable	Paris 14698 <i>open 1-22-01</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #49a, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 13]	5/25/68	A
#77 memo	Rostow to President, 12:20 p.m. <i>open 1-22-01</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #49b, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 13] <i>[dup. # 23, NSF, CF, VN, "Hs Misc. & Memos v. 2, Bx 122]</i>	5/25/68	A
#77a cable	Paris 14694 <i>open 1-22-01</i> S 2 p <i>[dup. # 75a] [dup. # 23a, as above]</i>	5/25/68	A
#76b cable	Paris 14699 <i>open 1-22-01</i> C 2 p <i>[dup. of #49b, NSF, CF, France, Vol. 13]</i>	5/25/68	A

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1

ACTION
Saturday, May 18, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reduction of size of Philippine military force in Vietnam (PHILCAG)

President Marcos has been having trouble for several months in getting from his Congress an appropriation to cover PHILCAG. Marcos and other Philippine officials have repeatedly told our Embassy it might be necessary, in view of the Congressional pressure, to reduce the size and change the composition of PHILCAG (for instance medical units instead of engineering battalions).

We have made a vigorous effort, including your letter of April 14, to persuade Marcos to maintain the size and the integrity of PHILCAG. On several occasions he has assured us, and has stated publicly, that he would do so.

Nonetheless, withdrawals have taken place. From an original strength of 2,050, PHILCAG is down to 1,810. The Philippine Secretary of Defense and Armed Forces Chief of Staff have now informed our Embassy that they are planning a weekly reduction of 35 men until PHILCAG is reduced to a strength of 1,400. That would constitute a better than 30% reduction from the original PHILCAG strength.

Attached is an extremely stiff cable to our Embassy in Manila authorizing the Embassy to find out if the reduction has Marcos' approval. If so, the telegram authorizes our Chargé in Manila to speak in very blunt terms to Marcos about the dim view we take of this development. Among other things, the message says that we will suspend further shipments of equipment for Philippine army engineer construction battalions (a matter of great personal interest to Marcos and a program which stems from his visit with you in 1966). We also plan to suspend activity regarding procurement in the Philippines of our needs in Vietnam (another matter stemming from the communique issued at the end of Marcos visit with you). Finally, the cable raises the possibility that at some point the reductions of PHILCAG might render the Philippines ineligible to sit in the councils of troop-contributing countries to Vietnam.

The cable has been personally cleared by Secretary Rusk.

But I have my doubts that this cable will do the job. In the first place our Chargé in Manila is not at all likely to go as far with Marcos as this cable

* not: instructs. see final para.

will permit him to go. The cable should serve, however, to clarify Marcos' intentions and precipitate a dialog with our Mission on the best approach to the problem of keeping PHILCAG intact. Eventually, we may want to resort to another letter from you. That, however, depends on Marcos' reaction, and this cable is a necessary first step.

One good reason for precipitating this issue without delay is to try to get it out of the way before Mennen Williams arrives in Manila, in about a month.

There is one danger in this of which I think you should be aware. Thus far, the reduction of PHILCAG has taken place with virtually no publicity. Manila is a sieve, and a tough approach by us will probably become known and focus publicity on the PHILCAG reduction. However, that is sure to happen anyway, sooner or later. I think it is time to bite the bullet with the Philippines.

I recommend you approve the cable. Whether or not you approve you might want to discuss the problem at the Tuesday luncheon.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Approve _____

Put on Tuesday lunch agenda _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

STATE:MWright:wpt

~~SECRET~~ 1a
AmEmbassy MANILA

INFO: AmEmbassy SAIGON
CINCPAC
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 97-331

By jc/ics, NARA, Date 1-5-01

STATE

EXDIS

Subject: PHILCAG

Ref: Manila 10263

1. We are extremely disturbed with intended action of Philippine Government as reported reftel. Suggest Embassy if it perceives no objection ascertain from Marcos whether the position as reported is indeed his position.
2. If it turns out that Marcos' position is that as reported reftel we find it extremely difficult to reconcile this position with his frequent statement in the past that he would maintain the essential integrity of PHILCAG or his statement (Manila 9252) that during the period of long and protracted negotiations which we are entering is no time to weaken the allied position in South Viet-Nam. We are frankly at a loss what further to say to Marcos. Our position has been made clear on several occasions, including recent personal letter from President Johnson (State 143682). Philippine officials citing out of context Secretary Clifford Statement of our hope eventually to reduce military activity in South Viet-Nam seems to us willful

EA/PHL:CHPrice:jw

5/10

3611

The Secretary

EA/VN - Mr. Burke
EA - Mr. Godley

DOD/ISA - Col. Constant (draft)
DOD/ISA - Adm. Lemos (draft)

WH -

FORM 8-65 DS-322

~~SECRET~~
Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division.

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

misunderstanding at best.

3. At this particular moment, with the Paris talks about to begin, it is extremely important that allies maintain united front. (Thais have reaffirmed their decision send another 10,600 ground combat forces Vietnam where they already have 2,200 with initial additional contingent 5,600 strong arriving by July.) Continuation of strong military presence in South Viet-Nam is important element in our negotiating position, especially in view of communist "talk-fight" tactics which they appear to be implementing to the best of their ability. Any reduction in allied troop commitments at this time would have an unfortunate psychological effect. There would also be adverse reaction from members of U.S. Congress, as Embassy is undoubtedly aware from reports of aid hearings (Passman Subcommittee in particular), public statements several members of Congress, and particular statement of Cromer (State 146179).

4. It is unclear from Philippine position reflected reftel whether reduction to 1400 would be permanent or temporary. In either case, and even if withdrawals were limited to security troops with engineer units remaining intact, we would consider the essential integrity of PHILCAG had not been maintained.

5. U.S. Government has devoted much effort and resources to enable Filipinos to continue their relatively modest contribution in South Viet-Nam. If Filipinos carry out action forecast in reftel, we will consider that much of our effort

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

has come to nought. In such case we cannot predict at this time what our action will be in the future, either immediate or long-run. Until action on PHILCAG shows prospects of more favorable outcome we must maintain suspension on processing of third shipment of equipment for second five ECEs and continue to hold up final preparation and delivery of natural supplier list for Philippine offshore procurement. This means there will be no delivery of the third shipment of equipment before end of this fiscal year at best, especially if action on PHILCAG is postponed until special session mid-June or later. However, in accordance with recommendation para 8 Manila 9829 we will say nothing re these suspensions unless asked.

6. In view of continued Philippine position of not making combat units available in South Viet-Nam, and current and contemplated dilution of present relatively modest commitment, it seems some point may eventually be reached where Philippines could not be considered as troop-contributing country and therefore no longer be eligible to sit in councils of such countries. We cannot visualize US initiating action to exclude them, but if any other nation did so we do not believe we could effectively press for continued Philippine participation. In such case it would be difficult for us to continue any support for PHILCAG units in South Viet-Nam, and maintenance of such units would be matter strictly between Philippine Government and South Vietnamese Government with no

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

assistance or advice from us. It seems to us Filipinos should think long and hard before giving up position in councils of troop contributing countries for what has been and continues to be relatively small membership dues.

7. While we recognize danger of explanation along above lines to Marcos and other Philippine officials, we wanted you to know our general thinking, which you may pass on as you deem appropriate to be effective in continuing to point out gravity with which we view situation.

GP-1

END

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

ACTION

Thursday - May 16, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message on "Border Beauty and Friendship"

Long
2. Pres file

The recent meeting of the US-Mexico Border Development Commission approved Saturday, May 18, as "Border Beauty and Friendship Day".

Ray Telles and some of his Commissioners plan to attend ceremonies at beautification projects. Ray asks whether you would authorize the attached statement to be read in your name.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Proposed Presidential Message on "Border Beauty and Friendship"

Approve ☐

Disapprove ☐

Call me ☐

May 18, 1968

Message on Border Beauty and Friendship Day

I wish I could join you today in celebrating Border Beauty and Friendship Day. It gives me great satisfaction to know that so many are willing to give of their time, money, and effort to make the communities on both sides of the border more beautiful places to live, work and play. In so doing, you establish another bond of friendship between our country and our friends in Mexico.

As I have often told Ambassador Telles and his fellow Commissioners, I want to see our common border a model of beauty, progress and good-will. Participation of the people -- of all the people -- is the only way to make this goal a reality. What you and others in sister cities have started is a happy beginning:

- Trees are being planted in McAllen, Texas, and San Luis and Nogales, Arizona;
- Parks are being built or renovated in Brownsville and El Paso, Texas, and Tecate, California;
- Public buildings are being landscaped in San Ysidro, California;
- A swimming pool is being opened in Columbus, New Mexico, so that children from both countries can enjoy it this summer; and
- Tons of litter are being swept from the streets of border cities.

-2-

I congratulate you on this new beginning. May the fresh look you bring to your communities today encourage you to greater efforts to achieve an environment of beauty for you and your children.

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm
May 16, 1968

~~yellow~~
INFORMATION

3

Monday - May 27, 1968

File

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Australia as a Potential Contributor to the Inter-American Bank

When Felipe Herrera saw you last Wednesday, you asked him to send you one-page memoranda on non-OAS countries which might contribute more to the resources of the Inter-American Bank.

Attached is the memorandum on Australia. He points out that Latin American countries have placed orders in Australia for pure-bred cattle and sheep and related services. These total some one-half million dollars, but could be expanded.

Under the new Bank policy, Australia is ineligible for new procurement unless it cooperates financially with the Bank. Felipe Herrera suggests a direct government or Bank loan totaling \$1 million as a starter.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

on 5/27/68

Memorandum from Felipe Herrera on Australia's contribution to the IADB.

RE: Australia - Possible Cooperation with Latin America through the Inter-American Development Bank

- 1.- Commercial and financial relations between Australia and Latin America in the past have not been very close. In essence, Australia and the countries of the Southern part of Latin America produce a range of similar export goods such as wool, meat, ores and wheat. However, Australia has surged ahead and, while still a net importer of capital, has been able to become a significant element among aid donors. This effort is particularly noticeable in relation to underdeveloped countries of South East Asia which so far has been the main direction of Australian aid. For example, Australia has subscribed \$85,000,000 in the capital of the Asian Development Bank.
- 2.- Nevertheless, there are good prospects for Australia becoming active in terms of cooperation to Latin America. Borrowers of the Inter-American Development Bank in Latin America have placed orders in Australia which, although so far amounting to somewhat less than one half million dollars, involve goods important to Latin America, such as purebred livestock to improve the breed of Latin American cattle and sheep, as well as services within the sphere of Australia fields of competence. The possibility of an expansion of such purchases exists.
- 3.- In the framework of the newly adopted procurement policy of the Inter-American Development Bank, by which purchases in developed countries not now members of the Bank are conditioned on financing made available by those countries, Australia has now become ineligible for new procurement, unless a formula can be found whereby the Bank can receive Australia's financial cooperation. Such cooperation could take several forms, among which, given the incipient stage of Australia's capital market, a direct Government or bank loan to the Bank might be the most viable one. The Bank would welcome an offer from the Australian Government which could visualize the implementation of such a loan and has made an appropriate proposal to the Australian Embassy in Washington. Another alternative might be the purchase of participations in the Bank's loans. In such a fashion, Australia would not only become eligible again for new procurement of IDB's borrowers, but would also be provided with a possibility of showing its interest in participating in the development effort of Latin America.
- 4.- It is believed that an appropriate arrangement would be one in which Australia initially provided financing to the Bank in an amount, say of US\$1 million, which would cover procurement to date, and which would be supplemented from time to time by additional finance relative to increased procurement in the future. At the same time, an offer of cooperation from Australia taking the form of providing technical assistance in fields of expertise prevalent in Australia would be most welcome.

May 1968

~~SECRET~~

Friday, May 31, 1968

*6/3/68 - sent to
MSDR to be held
for Pres' return
now*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Military Aid for Greece

*4-11-68
2. Pres. file*

Attached is a memorandum from Nick Katzenbach explaining our difficulties with the military aid program for Greece and informing you that he has taken administrative action to obligate the balance of FY 68 grant military assistance funds in order to avoid losing them at the end of the fiscal year. He is not, however, recommending we tell the Greeks or resume actual shipment of anything right now because of the damage opponents could do to the whole aid bill.

The dilemma we face in our Greek policy is that a number of our liberals have been convinced by Greeks like Andreas Papandreu that we could bring the military regime down simply by opposing it publicly. Our view of the situation is quite the contrary. We believe that the regime is intent on holding power in the near future and is unlikely to respond to any outside pressure. We will continue prodding them on return to democratic government, but we can't make them go any faster than their interests permit.

Our problem is that we have important facilities in Greece and do not wish to see any further damage to the NATO structure. While we believe the regime considers its relationship with us important enough that it will not tamper with our facilities, there is a risk of this. This government will probably be in power for some time, so we will have to deal with it. That logic would suggest gradually going ahead with the release of some items on the suspended list and separating our military aid from progress toward constitutional government since we're not really affecting the speed of that progress. However, no one feels that we should do this at the risk of the overall aid bill.

Nick says he will be back to you when he has a clearer reading on the impact such a move would have on the aid bill.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

W. W. Rostow

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S/S 7731

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Military Supply Policy Toward Greece

Shortly after the Greek Colonels' coup of April, 1967, we suspended delivery of major assistance under our Greek MAP program. The suspensions--worth some \$34 million--included aircraft, ships, tanks and missiles. We did, however, permit delivery of about \$29 million worth of spare parts and other equipment.

For the last few weeks we have been struggling with the thorny problem of whether we should now lift our prohibition on shipment of some of the suspended items.

The arguments in favor of doing this are:

- The Colonels are firmly in control and may well remain in power for several years.
- We have valuable military facilities in Greece which we should not put in jeopardy.
- Maintenance of these facilities is essential to our position in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly in light of increased Soviet activity there.
- The Greek military must be well enough equipped and trained to carry out its NATO mission--defense of the Alliance's southern flank.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

An additional problem is that if we do not decide soon to obligate the approximately \$20 million of unused FY 68 Greek MAP funds we will either have to transfer the money to some other program, or lose it altogether.

The SIG has taken a hard look at the problem and recommends that we:

- obligate the balance of FY 68 MAP grant funds to the Greek program before July 1 (but not advise the Greek Government as yet).
- release to the Greeks a number of items (valued at about \$5 million) including a minesweeper and a number of used trainers and other non-combatant aircraft.

As you know, Clark Clifford recently made a forceful statement--and one with which I agree--to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the desirability of providing military assistance to Greece. Under normal circumstances I would be prepared to recommend that we proceed with the above steps. But there are some possible domestic political dangers to proceeding right now. A few Members of the Senate and House (Senators Clark and Pell and Congressmen Don Frazer, Don Edwards and Henry Reuss) have long been opposed to any assistance to the Greek Colonels. These people clearly do not have sufficient strength to pass an amendment specifically aimed at denying MAP funds to Greece. But they may decide to take their dissatisfaction out on the Aid Bill. This is particularly crucial in the House, where Henry Reuss and others like him may be able to swing enough key votes to beat the Bill. (This is precisely how Reuss tried to stop our arms sales to Latin America during the hearings on the FY 68 Aid Bill. He almost succeeded.) Important though the Greek MAP program may be, it is not worth paying the price of no Aid Bill.


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-3-

We are now doing a detailed analysis of the effect on the Aid Bill--particularly in the House--of even a partial resumption of shipments of suspended items. After I have a better feel for the situation-I will be back to you with a further report and, perhaps, a recommendation that we proceed with a limited resumption.

In order to be prepared should we decide to go ahead, I have authorized obligating the balance of the FY 68 grant MAP funds for the Greek program. Since we will not be informing the Greek Government of this decision--and since the items to be supplied are of general utility--we can always reprogram them to another MAP recipient should we decide not to relax our restrictions on Greece.


The Under Secretary

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Walt:

I received a courtesy call today from Dr. Phan Quang Dan, Minister of State for Chieu Hoi and had a very interesting conversation with him. He made two interesting points: first, he is convinced that the GVN should open negotiations with the National Liberation Front leaving to Washington and Hanoi the solving of the foreign intervention problems; second, he feels that in case negotiations in Paris bog down South Vietnam should open a guerrilla front in North Vietnam, sending South Vietnamese guerrillas up the Ho Chi Minh Trail in reverse and taking over North Vietnam supply points as they go.

His general evaluation of the situation in South Vietnam is very reasonable and quite encouraging. He has asked for an appointment through his embassy with the President before he leaves the country at the end of June. I think that the President would enjoy talking to him.

RSM fmg
M. D. T.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-383
By lip, NARA, Date 8-12-93

~~SECRET~~

May 31, 1968

Mr. President:

In the attached Information Memorandum Nick Katzenbach points out that the negotiations with the Russians on a new Exchanges Agreement are likely to be difficult. They start next Monday, *June 3*.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file
4/2/68 sent to NSC to be held for Pres. return

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 29, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Negotiations with the Soviet Union
on Renewal of Exchanges Agreement

The Soviets have now agreed to open negotiations in Moscow on June 3 for the US-USSR Exchanges Agreement for 1968-69.

The negotiations are likely to suffer from the effects of two major Soviet preoccupations. Dissent among their own intellectuals and the recent unsettling developments in Eastern Europe have led to sharpened Soviet efforts to guard against "hostile foreign influences."

The negotiations will also be further complicated because the expected Soviet negotiators are all newcomers to the exchanges program with the United States as a result of reorganization in Moscow.

The Soviet draft of the proposed agreement would reduce some types of exchanges compared to the levels in the last agreement. In two areas of paramount interest to us -- exhibits and performing arts -- the draft avoids specific commitments. (However, contracts for one exchange of performing groups have been signed in anticipation of an agreement, and we have had some indication that the Soviets intend to move forward with exchanges of other groups.)

In the negotiations, our objective will be to preserve the 10-year-old framework for reciprocal exchanges and to ensure continuation of some activity

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

in all previous categories of exchanges, including performing arts attractions and exhibits. We will insist on the principle of a balanced program which reflects the interests of both sides. We will require preservation of protective language which assures us reciprocity in these exchanges. Our ultimate pressure on the Soviets would be to refuse to conclude an agreement which does not meet these requirements.

Although we will seek to maintain the same level of exchanges activities as that envisaged in the previous agreement, we recognize in the present political climate the need to be flexible. Our draft proposes some innovations and expansions, but we expect the Soviets to reject any new activities that might be represented as an advance in exchanges or an improvement in relations with the United States.

I will report to you further before the negotiations are concluded.


Under Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7
Pres. file
6/3/68 - sent to
MOR to be held
for Pres. return

May 31, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agreement with the Government of Ireland Concerning
Civil Uses of Atomic Energy

The Atomic Energy Commission, with the concurrence of the Department of State, recommends that you approve an Amendment to the existing Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ireland Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy. The proposed Amendment would revise and extend the Agreement for Cooperation which was signed March 16, 1956, as amended on February 13, 1961 and August 7, 1963.

The primary purpose of the proposed Amendment is to extend the present Agreement through July 8, 1978. The only special features are: (1) raise the ceiling quantity of U-235 in enriched uranium which may be transferred to Ireland from the current level of six kilograms to twenty-five kilograms in order to provide flexibility in meeting future needs, particularly in programming fuel cycle operations of Irish research reactors; (2) remove the limitation on fuel enrichment to more than 20% in U-235 for use as fuel when the AEC finds there is a technical or economic justification for such a transfer. The proposed Amendment also takes advantage of this opportunity to reflect recent U.S. "Private Ownership legislation" and other provisions to bring the Agreement up-to-date and in conformity with the provisions of similar Agreements that have recently been negotiated with other countries.

Safeguards on materials and facilities transferred to Ireland under the amended Agreement would be administered by the United States. However, the revised Agreement provides that prior to the transfer to Ireland of any highly enriched fuel or any other additional materials or facilities subject to U.S. bilateral safeguards, the International Atomic Energy Agency will be requested to assume safeguards responsibilities respecting such materials and facilities. This formulation rather than the usual requirement of a prompt request to the Agency, has been used because Ireland is not now a member of the Agency.

I recommend that you approve this proposed Amendment at your earliest convenience. The Irish Government unfortunately has been slow in completing its part of the negotiations. Time is running out because the current Agreement expires July 8, and the amended Agreement cannot come into effect until it has been before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for thirty days.

If you agree, there is presented herewith a letter to Dr. Seaborg for your signature. If you sign the letter, the proposed Amendment will be formally executed by appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ireland. In compliance with Section 123c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Amendment will then be placed before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

7c

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

In accordance with Section 123a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Atomic Energy Commission has submitted to me by letter dated May 31, 1968, a proposed amendment to the "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ireland Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy" and has recommended that I approve the proposed amendment, determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 123b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and upon the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission, I hereby:

- (a) approve the proposed amendment and determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States of America;
- (b) authorize the execution of the proposed amendment on behalf of the Government of the United States of America by appropriate authorities of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely,

The Honorable
Glenn T. Seaborg
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:CEJ:mlb (5/31/68)

cc: WWRostow
CEJohnson



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

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MAY 31 1968

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

The Atomic Energy Commission recommends that you approve the proposed amendment to the "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ireland Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy", determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution. The Department of State supports the Commission's recommendation.

The proposed amendment, which has been negotiated by the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, would extend the Agreement for Cooperation between the United States of America and Ireland which was signed in Washington on March 16, 1956, as amended by the agreements signed on February 13, 1961, and on August 7, 1963.

The present agreement is scheduled to expire on July 8, 1968, and the proposed amendment would extend the agreement for ten years. The ceiling quantity of U-235 in enriched uranium which may be transferred to Ireland would be raised from the current level of six kilograms to twenty-five kilograms in order to provide flexibility in meeting future needs over the life of the agreement, particularly in programming fuel cycle operations of research reactors. Such transfers would not be confined to lease arrangements as is now provided. Further, the present agreement limits fuel enrichment to 20% in U-235.

Article IV of the proposed amendment, however, provides for the transfer of uranium enriched to more than 20% in U-235 for use as fuel when the Commission finds there is a technical or economic justification for such a transfer.

As a consequence of the provision for the transfer of highly-enriched fuel, Article VII of the amendment would incorporate in the agreement the standard, comprehensive United States' safeguards rights. Pursuant to Article VIII of the proposed amendment, prior to the transfer to Ireland of materials or facilities subject to bilateral safeguards, the International Atomic Energy Agency will be requested to assume safeguards responsibilities respecting such materials and facilities. This formulation, rather than the usual requirement of a prompt request to the Agency, has been used because Ireland is not now a member of the Agency.

Proposed Article VI would reflect the "Private Ownership" legislation of 1964 permitting arrangements for the transfer of special nuclear material and performance of services with respect thereto to be made between either Party or authorized persons under its jurisdiction and authorized persons under the jurisdiction of the other Party. Such arrangements would be in addition to those between the Governments allowed under the current agreement and would be subject to the policies of Ireland and the United States concerning such transactions, as well as applicable laws, regulations, and license requirements.

As is normally done in extending the Agreements for Cooperation, the opportunity has been utilized to bring other provisions of the current agreement with Ireland into conformity with those of recent agreements and amendments. For example, proposed Article I of the amendment would incorporate definitions for terms which are listed in the same

article of the agreement but are currently defined only by cross-reference to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Proposed Article III would update and expand the formulation of language specifying types of information which may be exchanged; and it would also extend to materials, equipment and devices the disclaimer in Article III of the current agreement concerning accuracy, suitability, and completeness of information transferred. Proposed Article V would consolidate provisions of the agreement respecting transfers of various materials, including special nuclear material other than that used in fueling.

Following your approval, determination, and authorization, the proposed amendment will be formally executed by appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ireland. In compliance with Section 123c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the amendment will then be placed before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) Glenn T. Seaborg
Chairman

Enclosure:
Proposed Amendment to Agreement
for Cooperation Between the
Government of the United States
of America and the Government of
Ireland

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1968 MAY 31 PM 3 48

AMENDMENT TO AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND
CONCERNING CIVIL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY

The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Ireland,

Desiring to amend the Agreement for Cooperation Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Ireland Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, signed at
Washington on March 16, 1956, as amended by the Agreements signed
on February 13, 1961, and on August 7, 1963,

Agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

Article I of the Agreement for Cooperation is amended to read as follows:

"For the purposes of this Agreement:

(a) 'Atomic weapon' means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

(b) 'Byproduct material' means any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special nuclear material.

(c) 'Commission' means the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

(d) 'Equipment and devices' and 'equipment or devices' means any instrument, apparatus, or facility, and includes any facility, except an atomic weapon, capable of making use of or producing special nuclear material, and component parts thereof.

(e) 'Parties' means the Government of the United States of America, including the Commission on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, and the Government of Ireland.

'Party' means one of the above 'Parties'.

(f) 'Person' means any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution,

group, government agency, or government corporation but does not include the Parties to this Agreement.

(g) 'Research reactor' means a reactor which is designed for the production of neutrons and other radiations for general research and development purposes, medical therapy and diagnosis, or training in nuclear science and engineering. The term does not cover power reactors, power demonstration reactors, or reactors designed primarily for the production of special nuclear material.

(h) 'Restricted Data' means all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons, (2) the production of special nuclear material, or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from the category of Restricted Data by the appropriate authority.

(i) 'Safeguards' means a system of controls designed to assure that any material, equipment and devices committed to the peaceful uses of atomic energy are not used to further any military purpose.

(j) 'Source material' means (1) uranium, thorium, or any other material which is determined by the Commission or the Government of Ireland to be source material, or (2) ores containing one or more of the foregoing materials, in such concentration as the Commission or the Government of Ireland may determine from time to time.

(k) 'Special nuclear material' means (1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other

material which the Commission or the Government of Ireland determines to be special nuclear material, or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing."

ARTICLE II

Article II of the Agreement for Cooperation is amended to read as follows:

"1. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the availability of personnel and material, and the applicable laws, regulations, and license requirements in force in their respective countries, the Parties shall cooperate with each other in the achievement of the uses of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

"2. Restricted Data shall not be communicated under this Agreement, and no materials or equipment and devices shall be transferred, and no services shall be furnished, under this Agreement, if the transfer of any such materials or equipment and devices or the furnishing of any such services involves the communication of Restricted Data.

"3. This Agreement shall not require the exchange of any information which the Parties are not permitted to communicate."

ARTICLE III

Article III of the Agreement for Cooperation is amended to read as follows:

"1. Subject to the provisions of Article II, the Parties shall exchange unclassified information with respect to the application of atomic energy to peaceful uses and the problems

of health and safety connected therewith. The exchange of information provided for in this Article shall be accomplished through various means, including reports, conferences, and visits to facilities, and shall include information in the following fields:

(a) Design, construction, operation and use of research reactors, materials testing reactors, and reactor experiments;

(b) The use of radioactive isotopes and source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material in physical and biological research, medicine, agriculture, and industry; and

(c) Health and safety problems related to the foregoing.

"2. The application or use of any information (including design drawings and specifications), and any material, equipment and devices, exchanged or transferred between the Parties under this Agreement shall be the responsibility of the Party receiving it, and the other Party does not warrant the accuracy or completeness of such information and does not warrant the suitability of such information, material, equipment and devices for any particular use or application."

ARTICLE IV

Article IV of the Agreement for Cooperation is amended to read as follows:

"1. As may be agreed, the Commission will transfer to the Government of Ireland or authorized persons under its jurisdiction,

uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 for use as fuel in defined research applications, including research reactors, materials testing reactors, and reactor experiments, which the Government of Ireland decides to construct or operate, or authorizes private persons to construct or operate in Ireland. Contracts setting forth the terms, conditions, and delivery schedule of each transfer shall be agreed upon in advance.

"2. The net amount of U-235 in enriched uranium transferred under this Article during the period of this Agreement shall not at any time exceed twenty-five (25) kilograms. This net amount shall be the gross quantity of such contained U-235 in uranium transferred to the Government of Ireland during the period of this Agreement less the quantity of such contained U-235 in recoverable uranium which has been resold or otherwise returned to the Government of the United States of America during the period of this Agreement or transferred to any other nation or group of nations with the approval of the Government of the United States of America.

"3. Within the limitations contained in paragraph 2 of this Article, the quantity of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 transferred under this Article and under the jurisdiction of the Government of Ireland for the fueling of reactors or reactor experiments shall not at any time be in excess of the quantity thereof necessary for the loading of such reactors or reactor experiments, plus such additional quantity as, in the opinion of the Commission, is necessary to permit the efficient and continuous operation of such reactors or reactor experiments.

"4. The enriched uranium supplied hereunder may contain up to twenty percent (20%) in the isotope U-235. All or a portion of the foregoing special nuclear material may be made available as uranium enriched to more than twenty percent (20%) by weight in the isotope U-235 when the Commission finds there is a technical or economic justification for such a transfer for use in research reactors, materials testing reactors, and reactor experiments, each capable of operating with a fuel load not to exceed eight (8) kilograms of the isotope U-235 contained in such uranium.

"5. When any source or special nuclear material received from the United States of America requires reprocessing, such reprocessing shall be performed at the discretion of the Commission in either Commission facilities or facilities acceptable to the Commission, on terms and conditions to be later agreed; and it is understood, except as may be otherwise agreed, that the form and content of any irradiated fuel elements shall not be altered after removal from a reactor and prior to delivery to the Commission or the facilities acceptable to the Commission for reprocessing.

"6. Special nuclear material produced as a result of irradiation processes in any part of fuel leased hereunder shall be for the account of the lessee and, after reprocessing as provided in paragraph 5 of this Article, shall be returned to the lessee, at which time title to such material shall be transferred to the lessee, unless the Government of the United States of America shall exercise the option, which is hereby granted, to retain, with a

credit to the lessee based on the prices in the United States of America referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article, any such special nuclear material which is in excess of the needs of Ireland for such material in its program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

"7. With respect to any special nuclear material not owned by the Government of the United States of America produced in reactors while fueled with materials obtained from the United States of America by means other than lease which is in excess of the needs of Ireland for such material in Ireland's program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the Government of the United States of America shall have and is hereby granted (a) a first option to purchase such material at prices then prevailing in the United States of America for special nuclear material produced in reactors which are fueled pursuant to the terms of an Agreement for Cooperation with the Government of the United States of America, and (b) the right to approve the transfer of such material to any other nation or group of nations in the event the option to purchase is not exercised.

"8. Some atomic energy materials which the Commission may be requested to provide in accordance with this Agreement are harmful to persons and property unless handled and used carefully. After delivery of such materials, the Government of Ireland shall bear all responsibility, insofar as the Government of the United States of America is concerned, for the safe handling and use of such materials. With respect to any source or special nuclear material or reactor materials which the Commission may, pursuant to this

Agreement, lease to the Government of Ireland or to any private individual or private organization under its jurisdiction, the Government of Ireland shall indemnify and save harmless the Government of the United States of America against any and all liability (including third party liability) for any cause whatsoever arising out of the production or fabrication, the ownership, the lease, and the possession and use of such source or special nuclear material or reactor materials after delivery by the Commission to the Government of Ireland or to any private individual or private organization under its jurisdiction."

ARTICLE V

Article V of the Agreement for Cooperation, as amended, is amended to read as follows:

"1. Materials of interest in connection with the subjects of agreed exchange of information as provided in Article III and subject to the provisions of Article II, including source material, heavy water, byproduct material, other radioisotopes, stable isotopes, and special nuclear material for purposes other than fueling reactors and reactor experiments, may be transferred between the Parties for defined applications in such quantities and under such terms and conditions as may be agreed when such materials are not commercially available.

"2. Subject to the provisions of Article II and under such terms and conditions as may be agreed, specialized research facilities and reactor materials testing facilities of the Parties

shall be made available for mutual use consistent with the limits of space, facilities, and personnel conveniently available when such facilities are not commercially available.

"3. With respect to the subjects of agreed exchange of information as provided in Article III and subject to the provisions of Article II, equipment and devices may be transferred from one Party to the other under such terms and conditions as may be agreed. It is recognized that such transfers will be subject to limitations which may arise from shortages of supplies or other circumstances existing at the time."

ARTICLE VI

Article VII of the Agreement for Cooperation is amended to read as follows:

"1. With respect to the application of atomic energy to peaceful uses, it is understood that arrangements may be made between either Party or authorized persons under its jurisdiction and authorized persons under the jurisdiction of the other Party for the transfer of equipment and devices and materials other than special nuclear material and for the performance of services.

"2. With respect to the application of atomic energy to peaceful uses, it is understood that arrangements may be made between either Party or authorized persons under its jurisdiction and authorized persons under the jurisdiction of the other Party for the transfer of special nuclear material and for the performance of services with respect thereto for the uses specified in

Articles IV and V of this Agreement and subject to the limitations of Article IV, paragraph 2, of this Agreement.

"3. The Parties agree that the activities referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be subject to the limitations in Article II and to the policies of the Parties with regard to transactions involving the authorized persons referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2."

ARTICLE VII

Article VIII of the Agreement for Cooperation is amended to read as follows:

"1. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ireland emphasize their common interest in assuring that any material, equipment or devices made available to the Government of Ireland or any person under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement shall be used solely for civil purposes.

"2. Except to the extent that the safeguards rights provided for in this Agreement are suspended by virtue of the application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as provided in Article VIII bis, the Government of the United States of America, notwithstanding any other provisions of this Agreement, shall have the following rights:

(A) With the objective of assuring design and operation for civil purposes and permitting effective application of safeguards, to review the design of any

(1) reactor and

(2) other equipment and devices the design of which the Commission determines to be relevant to the effective application of safeguards,

which are to be made available under this Agreement to the Government of Ireland or any person under its jurisdiction by the Government of the United States of America or any person under its jurisdiction, or which are to use, fabricate, or process any of the following materials so made available: source material, special nuclear material, moderator material, or other material designated by the Commission;

(B) With respect to any source or special nuclear material made available under this Agreement to the Government of Ireland or any person under its jurisdiction by the Government of the United States of America or any person under its jurisdiction and any source or special nuclear material utilized in, recovered from, or produced as a result of the use of any of the following materials, equipment or devices so made available:

(1) source material, special nuclear material, moderator material, or other material designated by the Commission,

(2) reactors, and

(3) any other equipment or devices designated by the Commission as an item to be made available on the

condition that the provisions of this paragraph 2 (B) will apply,

(i) to require the maintenance and production of operating records and to request and receive reports for the purpose of assisting in ensuring accountability for such materials, and

(ii) to require that any such materials in the custody of the Government of Ireland or any person under its jurisdiction be subject to all of the safeguards provided for in this Article and the guarantees set forth in Article IX;

(C) To require the deposit in storage facilities designated by the Commission of any of the special nuclear material referred to in paragraph 2 (B) of this Article which is not currently utilized for civil purposes in Ireland and which is not retained or purchased by the Government of the United States of America pursuant to Article IV, transferred pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 7 (b), or otherwise disposed of pursuant to an arrangement mutually acceptable to the Parties;

(D) To designate, after consultation with the Government of Ireland, personnel who, accompanied, if either Party so requests, by personnel designated by the Government of Ireland, shall have access in Ireland to all places and data necessary to account for the source and special nuclear materials which are subject to paragraph 2 (B) of this Article, to determine

whether there is compliance with this Agreement and to make such independent measurements as may be deemed necessary;

(E) In the event of non-compliance with the provisions of this Article or the guarantees set forth in Article IX and the failure of the Government of Ireland to carry out the provisions of this Article within a reasonable time, to suspend or terminate this Agreement and to require the return of any materials, equipment and devices referred to in paragraph 2 (B) of this Article;

(F) To consult with the Government of Ireland in the matter of health and safety.

"3. The Government of Ireland undertakes to facilitate the application of the safeguards provided for in this Article."

ARTICLE VIII

The following new article is added directly after Article VIII of the Agreement for Cooperation:

"ARTICLE VIII bis

"1. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ireland, recognizing the desirability of making use of the facilities and services of the International Atomic Energy Agency, agree that prior to the transfer to Ireland of any materials or facilities subject to safeguards under this Agreement the Agency will be requested to assume responsibility for applying safeguards to such materials and facilities. It is contemplated that the

necessary arrangements will be effected without modification of this Agreement through an agreement to be negotiated among the Parties and the Agency which may include provisions for suspension of the safeguards rights accorded to the Government of the United States of America by Article VIII of this Agreement, during the time and to the extent that the Agency's safeguards apply to such materials and facilities.

"2. In the event the Parties do not reach a mutually satisfactory agreement on the terms of the trilateral arrangement envisaged in paragraph 1 of this Article, either Party may, by notification, terminate this Agreement. In the event of termination by either Party, the Government of Ireland shall, at the request of the Government of the United States of America, return to the Government of the United States of America all special nuclear material received pursuant to this Agreement and still in its possession or in the possession of persons under its jurisdiction. The Government of the United States of America will compensate the Government of Ireland or the persons under its jurisdiction for their interest in such material so returned at the Commission's schedule of prices then in effect in the United States of America."

ARTICLE IX

Article IX of the Agreement for Cooperation is amended to read as follows:

"The Government of Ireland guarantees that:

(a) Safeguards provided in Article VIII shall be maintained.

(b) No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to the Government of Ireland or authorized persons under its jurisdiction by purchase or otherwise pursuant to this Agreement and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, equipment or devices, will be used for atomic weapons, or for research on or development of atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose.

(c) No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to the Government of Ireland or authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement will be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of Ireland, except as the Commission may agree to such a transfer to another nation or group of nations, and then only if, in the opinion of the Commission, the transfer of the material is within the scope of an Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the other nation or group of nations."

ARTICLE X

Paragraph 1 of Article XI of the Agreement for Cooperation, as amended, is amended by deleting the word "ten" and substituting in lieu thereof the word "twenty".

ARTICLE XI

This Amendment shall enter into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for the entry into force of such Amendment and shall remain in force for the period of the Agreement for Cooperation, as hereby amended.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized,
have signed this Amendment.

DONE at Washington, in duplicate, this day
of , 1968.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:



Donovan Q. Zook, Director
Office of Atomic Energy Affairs
International Scientific and
Technological Affairs
Department of State



William A. Burke
Chief, European Branch
Division of International Affairs
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND:



Noel Dorr
First Secretary
Embassy of Ireland

Initialed at Washington, D. C., May 31, 1968.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

Tuesday - May 28, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Special Sugar Allocation for the Dominican Republic

Pres file

Secretary Rusk in the memorandum at Tab A recommends that you:

1. make a special allocation to the Dominican Republic of 75,000 short tons of sugar from the Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands deficits, provided Balaguer agrees to set aside at least 1-1/2 cents per pound for mutually agreed programs to improve the efficiency of Dominican agricultural production;
2. sign the directive to Secretary Freeman at Tab B to be implemented when Balaguer accepts the condition.

You authorized special sugar allocations to the DR in 1966 (123,020 tons) and 1967 (105,000 tons). Balaguer still needs additional support and has asked for it again this year. In recommending a special allocation, Secretary Rusk proposes to continue the weening process by cutting the level back 30,000 tons over last year. But this reduction will not materially affect the DR overall quota as compared with what it received in 1967. Higher US consumption and a larger deficit in the Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands quotas will bring increases in the amount received by the DR under the regular pro rata system.

Balaguer continues to make good use of the additional help. Other sugar producers have not complained about the special treatment and are not likely to do so since we are progressively decreasing the special allocation. You have authority in the Sugar Act to make special allocations, and the legislative history singles out the DR as needing help.

Secretary Freeman is in full agreement with the special allocation. BOB has no problem with it.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

I recommend you:

1. Approve Secretary Rusk's recommendation.

Approve

☒

Disapprove

☐

Call me

☐

*rec'd ltr
6/3/68*

2. Sign the directive to Secretary Freeman at Tab B.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Secretary Rusk's recommendation of May 20.

Tab B - Presidential directive to Secretary Freeman.

8a

May 28, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

**SUBJECT: Finding Pursuant to Section 204 (a) of the
Sugar Act of 1948, as Amended by the Sugar
Act Amendments of 1965**

IN VIEW of the restoration of stable political conditions in the Dominican Republic and the establishment of a democratically elected Government,

IN ACCORDANCE with the recommendation of the Conference Report on the Sugar Act Amendments of 1965, that the President use his authority to assign deficits to provide additional quota for the Dominican Republic if the political situation in that Republic warrants such action, and

PURSUANT to Section 204 (a) of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended by the Sugar Act Amendments of 1965,

I HEREBY DETERMINE that in view of the unique and heavy burden of rehabilitation expenditure on the Government of the Dominican Republic in 1968 it would be in the national interest to give the Dominican Republic a special allocation of 75,000 short tons of sugar from the unused Philippine share of the Puerto Rican and Virgin Islands deficits and its pro rata share of the balance of those deficits and of any other deficits that might be declared in 1968.

You are directed to take the necessary steps to allocate deficits in accordance with this finding.

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 20, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Recommendation for a Special
Sugar Quota Allocation to the
Dominican Republic

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize me to instruct our Embassy at Santo Domingo to obtain assurances from the Government of the Dominican Republic that, if the United States makes a special deficit allocation to the Dominican Republic of 75,000 short tons, that Government will set aside a minimum of 1-1/2 cents per pound from the proceeds of the sale of this sugar to be spent on mutually agreed programs to improve the efficiency of the Dominican sugar industry or to assist in diverting excess sugar lands into the production of food or other crops.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That you sign the enclosed directive to Secretary Freeman, to be implemented as soon as our Embassy at Santo Domingo reports Dominican agreement to the conditions we are establishing for assignment of the special allocation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Discussion:

President Balaguer wrote on March 17 asking that you assign the Dominican Republic a special sugar allocation this year in an amount sufficient to bring its share of the Puerto Rican deficit allocation to 200,000 tons. In your reply on April 9 you said a decision on the Puerto Rican deficit had not yet been made and assured President Balaguer that the concerns he expressed would receive our close attention. (In 1967 the Dominican Republic requested that, for the duration of the Sugar Act, it be given an annual quota of 600,000 tons, i.e., including both basic quota and deficit allocation.)

In 1966 you authorized a special sugar allocation for the Dominican Republic of 123,020 tons, bringing its total quota for the year to 603,000 tons. In 1967 you authorized a special allocation of 105,000 tons, but the Dominican Republic's total quota came to 618,000 tons as a result of an increased United States consumption estimate.

It would be in the national interest to assign to the Dominican Republic a substantial special allocation again this year as evidence of continued support of the Balaguer Government and of our desire to assist the country in its efforts to reestablish its economy. We recommend, however, continuing the pattern of decreasing the size of the special allocation. It would not be in the national interest of either the United States or the Dominican Republic to perpetuate dependence on this special treatment. The Dominican Republic must be encouraged to diversify away from exaggerated dependence on sugar exports.

We recommend, accordingly, a special allocation to the Dominican Republic for 1968 of 75,000 tons. Since substantially higher deficits are anticipated this year

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands than in the past two years, and on the basis of the projected growth in our consumption, this special allocation plus the Dominican Republic's pro rata share of the remaining deficit should bring its total deficit allocation to 171,000 tons, and its overall quota to about 618,000 tons by the year's end.

A reduced special allocation for the Dominican Republic would be welcomed by other Western Hemisphere suppliers as indicating that we are moving toward the statutory provision for pro rata reallocation of deficits. Some countries have protested the preferential treatment accorded the Dominican Republic. Others have sought special allocations for their own sugar industries. Fourteen such requests were received last year; a smaller number have been made so far this year. All suppliers are aware that special treatment for the Dominican Republic results in reductions in their own deficit allocations; with United States sugar prices netting more than \$90 per ton over returns in the world market, all wish to maximize their United States quotas. Nevertheless, we do not foresee major foreign policy problems if our recommendation is carried out.

We believe that part of the proceeds of the special allocation should be set aside this year, as it was last year, to further developmental activities. We will therefore again require the Dominican Government to agree to levy a special tax of 1.5 cents a pound on the special allocation, to be set aside in a fund to promote the modernization and diversification of the state sugar corporation, in accordance with specific reform targets and measures.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Draft Directive.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 29, 1968 - 7:30pm

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agreement with the Government of Denmark Concerning
Civil Uses of Atomic Energy

The Atomic Energy Commission, with the concurrence of the Department of State, recommends that you approve an Amendment to the existing Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy. The proposed Amendment would revise and extend the Agreement for Cooperation which was signed July 25, 1955, as amended on June 27, 1956 and June 26, 1958.

The primary purpose of the proposed Amendment is to extend the present Agreement through July 4, 1973. At the same time the Agreement is being brought into conformity with the provisions of Agreements that have recently been negotiated with other countries.

The only special feature is a provision to increase the ceiling quantity of enriched U-235 which may be transferred to Denmark from the existing ceiling of fifty kilograms to two hundred kilograms. This will meet the fueling requirements of three Danish research reactors and also be available to accommodate fabrication and conversion services which Denmark may provide to third countries.

Safeguards on materials and facilities transferred to Denmark under the amended agreement would be administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with an existing trilateral agreement which provides that the United States' safeguards rights are suspended as long as the trilateral agreement remains in effect and would automatically apply if the Agreement should be terminated.

I recommend that you approve this proposed Amendment. If you agree, there is presented herewith a letter to Dr. Seaborg for your signature. If you sign the letter, the proposed Amendment will be formally executed

by appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark. In compliance with Section 123c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Amendment will then be placed before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

W. W. Rostow

Approved ☒

Rec'd back 4/3/68

Disapproved ☐

Speak to me ☐

June 1, 1968

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

In accordance with Section 123a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Atomic Energy Commission has submitted to me by letter dated May 21, 1968, a proposed amendment to the "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy" and has recommended that I approve the proposed amendment, determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 123b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and upon the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission, I hereby:

- (a) approve the proposed amendment and determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States of America;
- (b) authorize the execution of the proposed amendment on behalf of the Government of the United States of America by appropriate authorities of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

The Honorable
Glenn T. Seaborg
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington

IBJ:CEJ:mlb (5/27/68)

cc: WWRostow
CEJohnson

DEALNR
DEAD44
OO VTE13
DE VTE 2108

1968 MAY 31 23 4

10

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP81231

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

~~SECRET~~

HERewith NICK KATZENBACH FORWARDS REPORT ON THE FRENCH SITUATION
AS OF NOON TODAY

(5:00 P.M. PARIS TIME)

POLITICAL SITUATION

1. THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT MOVED RAPIDLY IN THE PAST
24 HOURS TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF DE GAULLE'S CALL
FOR A RETURN TO NORMAL BEFORE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS.
IT HAS:

- ISSUED A DECREE RAISING THE MINIMUM WAGE BY 35
PERCENT (TO \$.60 AN HOUR), AFFECTING ABOUT TWO
MILLION WORKERS;
- ANNOUNCED A NEW ALL - GAULLIST GOVERNMENT TODAY.
THE MINISTERS IN CHARGE OF PORTFOLIOS CONNECTED
WITH THE CRISIS HAVE BEEN DROPPED OR SHIFTED.
THREE LEFT-WING GAULLISTS HAVE BEEN APPOINTED TO
BROADEN THE BASE OF GOVERNMENT;
- ANNOUNCED JUNE 23 AND JUNE 30 AS THE DATES FOR
THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS.

2. FRANCE CONTINUES TO REMAIN CALM, WITH NO
DEMONSTRATIONS OR VIOLENCE THUS FAR. THE FRENCH COMMUNIST
PARTY AND THE LEFT FEDERATION HAVE ALREADY STATED
THEY WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTIONS. BOTH PARTIES
WILL BE MEETING TO DISCUSS PLANS FOR ELECTORAL COOPERATION.

3. A SINE QUA NON FOR HOLDING THE ELECTIONS IS THAT
FRANCE MUST RETURN TO WORK. THERE ARE HOPEFUL SIGNS ON THIS
SCORE. THE WORKERS HAVE PROTESTED DE GAULLE'S SPEECH,
BUT THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THEY WILL NOT SUPPORT THE
WILLINGNESS OF THE UNIONS, ANNOUNCED TODAY, TO RENEGOTIATE
A LABOR PACKAGE WITH MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES AND THE
GOVERNMENT. THERE ARE REPORTS THAT THE REFINERY WORKERS ARE
RETURNING TO WORK, AND THAT A FEW SMALL FACTORIES ARE
STARTING UP AGAIN. IN GENERAL, IT IS OUR FEELING THAT
WEARINESS MAY BE SETTING IN ON THE LABOR FRONT AFTER TWO
WEEKS OF NO WAGES, AND THAT WHAT STARTED OUT AS A SPONTANEOUS
ECONOMIC ISSUE AND BECAME A HIGHLY POLITICIZED, MAY
NOW RETURN TO A BREAD-AND-BUTTER PROBLEM.

4. REGARDING THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR
JUNE 23 AND 30, THE FRENCH ELECTION LAW PROVIDES THAT
DEPUTIES TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ARE ELECTED ON A TWO-
BALLOT SYSTEM. A CANDIDATE MUST WIN A MAJORITY OF THE
VOTES CAST TO BE ELECTED ON THE FIRST BALLOT -- A RARE
EVENT BECAUSE OF THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES RUNNING IN MOST
DISTRICTS. IN DISTRICTS WHERE A RUN-OFF IS HELD A WEEK
LATER, A PLURALITY OF VOTES IS SUFFICIENT. IN THE WEEK

FROM: NICK KATZENBACH

BETWEEN THE TWO BALLOTS IT IS CUSTOMARY FOR CANDIDATES WHO HAVE LITTLE CHANCE OF WINNING TO WITHDRAW AND THROW THEIR SUPPORT TO OTHERS.

5. POMPIDOU'S RESHUFFLED MAY 31 CABINET REPRESENTS A MODEST TURN TO THE "LEFT" AS UNDERSTOOD IN THE GAULLIST POLITICAL LEXICON. THE UNPOPULAR MINISTERS OF INTERIOR AND JUSTICE ARE OUT. THE NEW JUSTICE MINISTER HAS TAKEN A PRO-STUDENT POSITION IN RECENT WEEKS. THE NEW MINISTER OF INDUSTRY HAS LONG ADVOCATED MORE PROGRESSIVE ECONOMIC POLICIES. COUVE'S MOVE TO FINANCE MEANS MAINLY THAT HE WAS THE BEST AVAILABLE EXPERT FOR THE JOB DEBRE HAD TO LEAVE BECAUSE OF HIS OBJECTIONS TO AN INFLATIONARY WAGE SETTLEMENT. (AS FINANCE MINISTER COUVE MAY BE EVEN MORE REACTIONARY IN HIS POLICIES THAN DEBRE.) DEBRE GOES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY BECAUSE HE HAD TO HAVE A DIGNIFIED EXIT FROM FINANCE, AS FOREIGN MINISTER HE WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE SUPER-GAULLIST THAT HE WAS IN DEALING WITH WORLD MONETARY PROBLEMS, AND NO MORE PRO-AMERICAN THAN HIS MASTER. THIS RESHUFFLE DOES NOT BROADEN THE GOVERNMENT'S POLITICAL BASE AND WILL NOT MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE TO THE STRIKERS. IT WILL HELP BOOST GAULLIST MORALE FOR THE ELECTIONS.

ECONOMIC SITUATION

DE GAULLE IS MOVING FAST TO SHORE UP THE FRANC, USING RESOURCES OTHER THAN GOLD--PARTICULARLY DOLLARS -- BEFORE REACHING INTO HIS \$5.2 BILLION GOLD HOARD. ACTIONS THUS FAR:

- THE BANK OF FRANCE HAS AUTHORIZED THE NEW YORK FED TO DRAW AS NEEDED ON THE \$700 MILLION IN DEPOSITS IT HOLDS IN NEW YORK TO SUPPORT THE FRANC. (BY MIDDAY THESE DRAWINGS TOTALED \$60 MILLION.) YESTERDAY THE BANK OF FRANCE SUSPENDED SUPPORT FOR THE FRANC EVERYWHERE BUT IN NEW YORK. THE FRENCH HAVE REQUESTED AN IMF DRAWING OF \$746 MILLION (REPRESENTING THE SO-CALLED GOLD AND SUPER-GOLD TRANCHE POSITIONS TO WHICH IT IS MORE OR LESS AUTOMATICALLY ENTITLED). THEY WANT ALL OF THIS MONEY IN DOLLARS -- WHICH WOULD CAUSE US BOTH FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS-- BUT THE FUND STAFF IS WORKING ON A PACKAGE CONTAINING \$146 MILLION IN DOLLARS, \$200 MILLION IN GOLD, \$200 MILLION IN OTHER CURRENCIES AND \$200 MILLION FROM THE GENERAL AGREEMENT TO BORROW (TO WHICH US, FRANCE AND OTHER MAJOR FINANCIAL COUNTRIES BELONG).
- THIS MORNING FRANCE ASKED ACTIVATION OF THE \$100 MILLION SWAP LINE WITH THE FED. ACTIVATION IS AUTOMATIC UNDER THE SWAP AGREEMENT. (THIS MEANS WE WILL LEND UP TO \$100 MILLION IN DOLLARS TO THE FRENCH AGAINST FRANCS TO BE REPAYED IN ABOUT 30 DAYS.)

THESE MOVES DEMONSTRATE A DESIRE TO MAINTAIN THE VALUE OF THE FRANC. A DEVALUATION COULD COUSE US SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES.

DTG: 312149Z MAY 68

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

11
Pres file
May 31, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT

CAP81198

FROM WALT ROSTOW

Following is Secretary Fowler's situation report on the financial aspects of the French crisis. The French at the moment are acting to defend their exchange rate, but we are getting staff work done on what counter actions could be taken if they tried to devalue.

ERF

ERF:mm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *1-5-01*

~~SECRET~~



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

11a

~~SECRET~~

MAY 31 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Financial Aspects of French Crisis

The French unrest

- adds to the uncertainty on foreign currency markets
- raises the specter of a French franc devaluation
- adds to the pressure on sterling
- adds to concern about the international financial system.

French balance of payments prospects were for a slight (\$100 million) deficit in 1968. With the production loss, and the workers' demands, the 1968 deficit will no doubt go considerably higher. Moreover, the competitive position of France could be eroded over the longer term.

The immediate problem, however, is one of confidence. The foreign exchange markets are unsettled; however, the volume of gold transactions is low and the price of gold has not reflected in significantly higher prices the gravity of the French crisis. The Swiss franc and not the German mark seems to be the refuge currency at this stage. The dollar, too, has fared well.

Rumors are rampant that the franc will be devalued. At this time, this makes no economic sense. France has strong reserves to support her currency. The rumors suggest that the franc could be devalued by de Gaulle to pay for the social demands; if the Left comes in, the franc would be devalued to pay for these demands but with the blame cast upon de Gaulle. These are just rumors but with the fast-moving political situation, nothing is certain.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-65
By Sj, NARA, Date 4-8-02

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Uncertainty created by the French situation has added to the pressure on sterling just when we were hoping for a respite for that beleaguered currency. The British are about to draw from the International Monetary Fund to refinance their losses of the last few months.

The international financial system is not being helped by the loss of confidence in the French franc. We have been building a system of increasing inter-relationship among major currencies. Such a structure has permitted greater burden-sharing by these nations--and this French uncertainty detracts from the progress made.

The French have responded to this emergency by cutting off the convertibility of francs owned by Frenchmen. France has had a bank holiday for a week and therefore trading in her currency is difficult--but her losses are already great (over \$300 million). France has drawn today the full \$100 million available to her under her swap line with the Federal Reserve. This is the French portion of the long-established network of short-term credit facilities, mutually available to the Fed and other central banks. We are keeping this transaction very confidential.

France will be asking the IMF for a \$745 million drawing today--the composition of this drawing is now under discussion. It is definitely in our interest to support the French application and indeed if a multilateral lending package were required in the future, I would recommend that it be given serious and sympathetic consideration.

The French and British drawings from the International Monetary Fund will increase the reserves available to us at the Fund, leaving us in a better position to support the dollar. It is too early to judge the longer-term implications on the dollar. This general uncertainty underscores again the urgency of solving our own balance of payments deficit and adds new urgency to the tax surcharge.

Henry H. Fowler
Henry H. Fowler

~~SECRET~~

12

Confidential

May 31, 1968

CAP. 81197
Pres file

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Ratification of US-USSR Consular Convention

Soviet DCM Tcherniakov advised us today that "it is unfortunately impossible" to change courier schedules to bring Soviet instruments for the Consular Convention from Moscow before June 6. He added that Foreign Office lawyers had some "mild reservations" in any case about exchanging instruments outside Washington in light of the treaty text.

Would you like to revert to the earlier plan of a White House ceremony? The State Department is confident we will have no difficulty getting Soviet cooperation. We have checked with Jim Jones who says that Thursday, June 13, would be a good day on your calendar. Secretary Rusk is available all that week.

Thursday, June 13 _____

Check with Jim Jones for another date _____

No White House ceremony _____

Speak to me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA Date 6-4-92

Confidential

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 MAY 31 17 34

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CO WTE10
DE WTE 2101

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81196

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 31, 1968

I'VE JUST TALKED WITH SECRETARY RUSK.

HIS DOCTORS BELIEVE THEY HAVE NOW AT LAST ISOLATED
THE NATURE OF THE BUG AND HAVE PRESCRIBED A SPECIFIC WHICH
SHOULD CLEAR IT UP.

HE HOPES TO BE AT WORK MONDAY MORNING.

HE READ CAREFULLY THE GLASSBORO TEXT, HAS NO PROBLEMS,
AND THINKS IT'S "PRETTY GOOD."

HE HAS SOME SUGGESTIONS ON THE CONCRETE PROPOSALS IN
SECTION IX, WHICH IS NOW BEING REWORKED BY A GROUP AT STATE.
DON HORNIG WILL LOOK AT IT THIS AFTERNOON. BROM SMITH SHOULD
HAVE IT IN SHAPE TO SEND DOWN TOMORROW.

I HOPE TO GET AWAY FROM TONIGHT TO SUNDAY NIGHT, BUT
WILL REMAIN IN TOUCH.

DTG: 311714Z MAY 1968

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Call File, Feb. 21, 1981

By rg NARA, Date 6-4-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

68 MAY 31 PM 1:34

FRIDAY

free file

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1968 MAY 31 17 26

MAY 31 PM 1:35

FRIDAY

14

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81195

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

FRIDAY, MAY 31, 1968

HEREWITH HARRIMAN'S FLASH REPORT.

PARIS 15232

1. WE MET TODAY FOR 3 HOURS 40 MINUTES, WITH ONE VARIATION: I SUGGESTED THAT WE ADJOURN FOR A COFFEE BREAK AND REFRESHMENTS, WHICH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT PROVIDED, TO WHICH THEY AGREED. THUY, HA VAN LAU AND I EACH HAD A CUP OF TEA, AND TALKED ABOUT EVENTS IN FRANCE, WITH NO REFERENCE TO VIET-NAM. HABIB, AT ANOTHER TABLE, HAD A SIMILAR CONVERSATION WITH MAI VAN BO. BO WAS A GOOD DEAL MORE RELAXED THAN THUY.

2. AFTER I HAD MADE MY OPENING STATEMENT, WHICH EMPHASIZED PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S RECENT STATEMENTS TO PRESS, THUY REPEATED HIS CHARGE THAT WE ARE AVOIDING THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THESE TALKS. HE DENOUNCED AGAIN OUR "DEMAND FOR RECIPROCITY." IF U.S. WANTS RECIPROCITY, THUY PROPOSED THAT WE DECIDE TODAY TO ISSUE A JOINT COMMUNIQUE IN WHICH THE U.S. PLEDGED TO CEASE FINALLY BOMBING OF THE DRV, AND THE DRV WOULD PLEDGE TO UNDERTAKE NOT TO BOMB THE UNITED STATES.

3. THUY THEN SAID THAT HE WANTED TO ANALYZE U.S. AIMS IN REGARD TO DMZ, AND WHETHER U.S. WAS REALLY SEEKING PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS. HE ACCUSED U.S. OF TRYING TO TURN 17TH PARALLEL INTO A PERMANENT FRONTIER, AND REPEATED HIS CHARGES AGAINST U.S. IN DMZ IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL, AND THEN SAID HE REJECTED OUR DMZ PROPOSALS. HE DEMANDED THE CESSATION OF BOMBING SO THAT THESE TALKS CAN PROCEED TO OTHER MATTERS OF INTEREST TO BOTH SIDES. HE CHARGED THAT OUR PURPOSE IN BOMBING THE NORTH WAS TO WEAKEN THE LIBERATION FORCES IN THE SOUTH. THUY SAID HE WANTED TO REPEAT HIS MAY 27 STATEMENT THAT THE PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM CAN ATTACK THE AMERICANS ANYWHERE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. HE AVOIDED CLAIM AS STATED AT LAST MEETING OF RIGHT OF ALL VIETNAMESE TO FIGHT ANYWHERE.

4. THUY THEN SOUGHT TO JUSTIFY DRV RIGHT TO EXPRESS VIEWS ON QUESTION OF VIETNAM IN GENERAL BY DISCUSSING HISTORY OF DRV STARTING IN 1945, ALLUDING TO ELECTION OF A GOVERNMENT FOR ALL VIETNAM JANUARY 1946 WITH HO CHI MINH AS PRESIDENT AND CITING DRV SIGNING OF GENEVA ACCORDS. HE REJECTED "ABSURD ALLEGATION" THAT DRV HAS NO RIGHT TO SPEAK FOR VIET-NAM IN GENERAL. HE DISMISSED AS A PUPPET IN FAMILIAR TERMS.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

Free file

5. AFTER A LENGTHY AND HARSH REVIEW OF HIS EARLIER CHARGES, HE CONCLUDED. I THEN SUGGESTED A COFFEE BREAK, AND, AT 1:18 P.M. WE ADJOURNED FOR 15 MINUTES.

6. AFTER THE COFFEE BREAK, I ANSWERED SOME OF THUY'S CHARGES, DRAWING AGAIN ON THE PRESIDENT'S MAY 28 PRESS CONFERENCE. I CHARACTERIZED HIS PROPOSED COMMUNIQUE AS FANTASTIC, AND SUGGESTED THAT HE AGREE TO REPHRASE IT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REAL SITUATION, AS FOLLOWS: "THE US WILL CEASE BOMBING AND ALL ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV, FOR ITS PART, THE DRV WILL ABSTAIN HENCEFORTH FROM ALL BOMBARDMENT, ACTS OF WAR, AND SUBVERSION AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM."

7. THUY REJECTED MY REPHRASING, SAYING THAT IT PLACED ON THE SAME FOOTING THE AGRESSOR AND THE VICTIM OF AGGRESSION. IF THE US ADMITS IT HAS SABOTAGED THE GENEVA ACCORDS, AND COMMITTED AGGRESSION AGAINST THE DRV AND STOPPED BOMBING, ETC., THEN SUCH A COMMUNIQUE WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY.

8. THUY ASKED ME FOR A COPY OF THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT STATEMENT --THE FIRST TIME HE HAS ASKED FOR ANYTHING FROM US. IN TURN I THANKED THUY FOR HIS OFFER TO PROVIDE US WITH COPIES OF THE NLF AND FATHERLAND FRONT PROGRAMS. I SAID I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE NLF PROGRAM AND WOULD WELCOME THE FATHERLAND FRONT PROGRAM, IF IT DIFFERED IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY FROM THAT OF THE NLF.

9. I SUGGESTED THAT ALTHOUGH WE DISAGREED ON WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BREAK OF THE 1954 ACCORDS, WE BOTH AGREED THAT THEY HAD BEEN BROKEN. WE WERE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW OUR TROOPS, AND ASKED WHEN WOULD THEY BE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THEIRS AND LEAVE THE AFFAIRS OF SOUTH VIET NAM TO BE SETTLED BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GENEVA ACCORDS?

10. THUY, AS USUAL, INSISTED ON THE LAST WORD. HE SAID: "AS FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SOUTH VIET NAM AND AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIET NAM, I REJECTED THEM."

11. THE NEXT MEETING, AT THUY'S SUGGESTION, WILL BE ON WEDNESDAY JUNE 5. THERE WAS A BIT MORE GIVE AND TAKE IN THE TALKS TODAY, THOUGH IT MIGHT BETTER BE DEFINED AS SUGGEST AND REJECT.

DTG 311623 MAY 68

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1968 MAY 31 15 39

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 31 AM 11:59

FRIDAY

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81193

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FRIDAY, MAY 31, 1968

MACV REPORTS THAT NUMEROUS CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND PRISONER OF WAR REPORTS CLEARLY INDICATE ENEMY INTENTIONS OF CONTINUING THEIR OFFENSIVE TO PENETRATE SAIGON. FRIENDLY OPERATIONS HAVE THWARTED HIS ATTEMPTS TO MOUNT LARGE COORDINATED ATTACKS ON THE CITY AND HIS LATEST OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN DISJOINTED EFFORTS INDICATIVE OF SERIOUS COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS. NEVERTHELESS, CAPTURED DOCUMENTS REVEAL AMBITIOUS PLANS TO SEIZE OBJECTIVES DEEP IN SAIGON UTILIZING FORCES IN COORDINATED ATTACKS. AT THIS POINT ENEMY INTENTIONS APPARENTLY OUTSTRIP HIS CAPABILITIES.

IN ADDITION, IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT THE SAIGON-GAI DINH VIET CONG REGION PARTY COMMITTEE HELD A MEETING ON MAY 20-21 TO REVIEW THEIR CURRENT SITUATION AND TO FORMULATE A PLAN FOR AN OFFENSIVE TO BE INITIATED IN EARLY JUNE. PRESENT AT THE MEETING WERE THE REGION CHAIRMAN, COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE 165TH REGIMENT, VARIOUS CADRE, AND NGUYEN THI DINH (FEMALE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE LIBERATION ARMY). THE MAIN POINTS OF THE UPCOMING OFFENSIVE ARE:

1. IT IS TO BE MORE VIOLENT THAN THE MAY OFFENSIVE.
2. BATTLES ARE TO BE INITIATED WITHIN THE CAPITAL AS WELL AS IN THE AREAS BORDERING IT TO PUT ALLIED UNITS ON THE DEFENSIVE AND ALLOW VIET CONG UNITS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN OUTLYING AREAS.
3. A NUMBER OF UNDERGROUND UNITS OPERATING INSIDE SAIGON RECEIVED ORDERS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE CITY TO WAR ZONES TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR RANKS AND GET REPLACEMENTS. THEY WERE TO BE BACK IN AREAS BORDERING SAIGON PRIOR TO MAY 26.

DTG: 311419Z MAY 1968

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By xc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

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~~SECRET~~

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1968 MAY 31 14 39

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FROM WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81190

Pres file

1968 MAY 31 AM 10:43

FRIDAY

~~SECRET~~ MARIA THREE

MAY 31, 1968

HEREWITH A FRENCHMAN IN HANOI REPORTS AN OPTIMISTIC TONE
ABOUT PARIS NEGOTIATIONS. (PARIS 15068)

SOURCE GAVE EMBOFF FOLLOWING UNDATED REPORT FROM FRENCH
DELEGATION IN HANOI:

BEGIN TRANSLATION:

DESPITE THE MORE OR LESS HARSH COMMENTS BY THE VIETNAMESE
RADIO AND PRESS ON THE AMERICAN PRESENTATION OF THE FACTS
AND ON THE DECLARATION OF MR. HARRIMAN MADE AT THE MAY 15
SESSION, AT THE VIETNAMESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ONE
WAS OPTIMISTIC AS TO THE FUTURE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE EVE
OF THE THIRD SESSION. THIS IS AT LEAST WHAT THE DIRECTOR FOR
EUROPE TOLD ME.

IT IS TRUE THAT HE HASTENED TO ADD THAT THE OBSTINATE
ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICANS, WHO REFUSE THE UNCONDITIONAL
CESSATION OF BOMBINGS, DELAYED THE PROGRESS OF THE TALKS. BUT
HE DECLARED HIS CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESSURE THAT PUBLIC OPINION
IN THE UNITED STATES, WORLD PUBLIC OPINION, AND OTHER GOVTS
WOULD EXERCISE ON WASHINGTON TO MAKE THE UNITED STATES END ITS
AGRESSION.

THESE DECLARATIONS ARE IN LINE WITH THOSE OBTAINED BY A
SOCIALIST DIPLOMAT FROM ONE OF THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTERS WHO
REPORTEDLY LET IT BE KNOWN THAT VIETNAM WOULD ASK FRIENDLY
COUNTRIES AND ALLIES TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE AMERICAN
GOVT SO THAT THE LATTER--BY COMPLYING WITH THE PRIOR CONDITIONS
DEMANDED BY VIETNAM--CREATES A SITUATION WHICH WILL PERMIT THEM TO
DEAL WITH THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM. ONE CAN THEREFORE EXPECT DURING
THE NEXT DAYS AN INTENSIFICATION OF VIETNAMESE DIPLOMACY AND
A COORDINATION OF ITS PROPAGANDA IN THE PRINCIPAL WESTERN NATIONS.

ON THE OTHER POINTS MR. HA WAS NOT VERY PRECISE. WHEN I ASKED HIM IF THE NLF WOULD NOT BE CALLED UPON TO INTERVENE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THE CEASE FIRE IS DISCUSSED, HE CALLED MY ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION HAD SAID THAT IT WAS READY TO DISCUSS ALL QUESTIONS. MOREOVER, HE ADDED WE ARE NOT THERE YET.

ON THE QUESTION OF THE FORMATION OF A COALITION GOVT, WHICH COULD PROBABLY SPEAK IN THE NAME OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE POPULATION AND IN WHICH THE ALLIANCE WOULD PLAY A ROLE, MR. HA WAS VERY EVASIVE. HE HAD RESERVATIONS ON LE DUAN'S STATEMENT TO DUCLOS AS TO THE POSSIBILITY OF INCLUDING PRE-AMERICAN ELEMENTS IN A COALITION GOVT. HE SAID THAT ONE MUST NOT TAKE THIS STATEMENT LITERALLY; IT MERELY MEANS THAT ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT SAIGON ADMINISTRATION COULD HAVE THEIR PLACE IN A GROUPING WHICH MIGHT BE CALLED UPON TO ASSURE PROVISIONALLY THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF GOVT. MOREOVER, THE FRONT HAD ALREADY SAID AS MUCH IN ITS PROGRAM.

FINALLY, I ASKED HIM IF THE PASSIVE DEFENSIVE MEASURES RECENTLY TAKEN IN HANOI EVACUATION OF POPULATION, CONTINUATION OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF SHELTERS, AIR RAID ALERT EXERCISES WERE THE RESULT OF FEAR OF SEEING AMERICAN BOMBERS CROSS THE 20TH PARALLEL AGAIN. HE EVADED ANSWERING MY QUESTION AND MERELY CONFINED HIMSELF TO SMILING. ONE CAN THEREFORE THINK THAT IT IS ABOVE ALL TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER THE POPULATION SO THAT IT DOES NOT BECOME OVERLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THE HANOI AUTHORITIES FIND IT NECESSARY TO REMIND THE POPULATION THAT THE COUNTRY IS STILL AT WAR.

HE ALSO DID NOT APPEAR TO BE PARTICULARLY WELL INFORMED ON THE INTENSIFICATION OF BOMBINGS BETWEEN THE 17TH AND 19TH PARALLELS. HE HAD NO FIGURES ON THIS POINT AND HAD NOT HEARD ABOUT THE SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION OF CEMETARIES WHICH HAD BEEN POINTED OUT TO ME BY SEVERAL SOCIALIST JOURNALISTS WHO RECENTLY HAD TRAVELED IN THE FOURTH ZONE.

I COME AWAY FROM THIS MEETING WITH HA WITH THE CONFIRMATION OF MY PREVIOUS IMPRESSIONS, THAT IS THAT IN HANOI IT IS HOPED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL LEAD TO SOMETHING AND THAT THEY WILL BE CONCLUDED RAPIDLY. END TRANSLATION.

DTG: 311302Z MAY 1968

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, May 29, 1968

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988

Mr. President:

By Ally, NARA, Date 6-5-92

Herewith a capsule of Bunker's 53rd weekly report:

*Pres file*A. General

- Huong Cabinet is broader and stronger than predecessor.
- New government, coupled with Thieu and Ky, represents 56 percent of popular vote at previous elections.
- Bunker reviews qualities of some of the new ministers and outlines Huong's realistic programs presented in TV address.
- Despite some dissatisfaction, military have accepted changes.
- Huong advocates direct negotiations between Hanoi and Saigon but pledges South Vietnam will fight to end.
- Huong counsels discretion in GVN-US relations and feels "national sovereignty" should be maintained publicly.
- Huong projects initial favorable impression.

B. Political

- Majority of Vietnamese still apprehensive about talks but do not oppose continuation.
- Vietnamese leaders feel DRV cannot continue to enjoy permanent limitation of bombing and are still sensitive about SVN representation at proper stage.
- Assembly still grapples with mobilization bill.
- Vietnamese press objects strenuously to press bill in Assembly.

C. Military

- Fighting increased in Quang Tri and around Saigon; casualty ratio remained highly favorable.
- Enemy documents states peace talks merely support military attacks.
- There is need to link cessation of bombing in North with cessation of attacks upon cities in South.

D. Pacification

- Many shortcomings in PF/RF program revealed by computer evaluation.
- GVN hamlet administration making slow comeback following Tet.
- Drive continues to replace ineffective province and district officials.
- Twelve of thirteen new province chiefs working out well.
- Komer has list of 50 poor district chiefs; replacement expected with Huong.

E. Urban Recovery

- New attacks in Saigon increase refugee burdens.
- GVN/US recovery operation underway in Saigon/Gia Dinh area.

F. Economic

- Retail prices unchanged; 10% above pre-second attack level.
- Joint State/Treasury team discussions with VN National Bank.

W. W. R.

Wednesday, May 29, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 28566)

Herewith my fifty-third weekly message:

DECLASSIFIED

Authority mcg/CBS 10
By ics/ly, NARA, Date 6592A. General

The outstanding development of last week was the formation of his government by the new Prime Minister Tran Van Huong, its presentation to President Thieu on May 25, and the formal transfer of office to the new cabinet on May 27.

I think that the new cabinet is both broader and stronger than its predecessor. Huong has admitted that it is not the ideal which he would have wanted and that he had met with difficulties in forming it "which have saddened me and give me concern." For one reason or another, various individuals declined to join the government. Huong's picturesque description of his problems is characteristic of him.

"I decided to go to the market to buy a certain kind of fish or shrimp in order to prepare delicious dishes for my guests. Unfortunately, I could not find this kind of fish or shrimp at the market so I had to improvise to serve them. I cannot vouch that the new dishes are better than the dishes I had intended to serve but I sincerely hope with the new dishes I do not disappoint and have my guests criticize."

The inclusion of Huong as Prime Minister and Dr. Phan Quang Dan as Minister of State materially broadens the base of the government. The Suu-Dan ticket and the Huong-Truyen ticket finished third and fourth respectively in the presidential elections and accounted between them for about 21 percent of the total vote. This, added to the 35 percent for Thieu-Ky ticket received, brings the total representation of the new government to 56 percent of the popular vote. In an effort to further broaden the government base, Huong offered the post of Minister of State to Ha Thuc Ky, whose ticket finished fifth with 7.3 percent of the vote, but Ky declined the offer; it was reported that he had insisted on being appointed Minister of Interior.

Six Ministers from the Loc Cabinet (including five of the best) have been retained by Huong. These are the Ministries of Defense, Finance, Public Works and Communications (which have been combined), Health and Social Welfare (also combined), Agriculture, and Minorities. There have been improvements in a number of other posts:

The appointment of Mai Tho Truyen as Minister of State charged with combatting corruption should serve to strengthen efforts in this direction. He is a highly respected Buddhist layman, was Huong's Vice Presidential running mate in the 1967

election, and will head the present Inspectorate. Thieu told me that when the new Inspectorate is established by the Assembly, he expects to appoint Truyen to it and hopes that he will be elected chairman. Truyen's presence should help to enlist Buddhist support for the Government.

Vu Quoc Thuc, Minister of State charged with economic planning, is a highly respected economist and scholar. He has been working with David Lilienthal's group on post-war economic development and will serve as advisor on economic matters to the Prime Minister.

In the important post of Minister of Economy, Au Ngoc Ho should be a considerable improvement over his predecessor, Truong Thai Ton, who has been shifted to the Ministry of Agriculture. Ho is generally considered by his American counterparts to be abler, more aggressive, and more decisive than his predecessor.

The new Minister of Labor, Dam Sy Hien, has had wide experience in labor matters, has participated in many international labor conferences, and made an extensive study trip to the U. S. in 1966-67. He is a principal leader of the labor union and a good friend of its president, Tran Quoc Buu. He should be able to bring this large labor organization into better and stronger relations with the government.

The new Minister for Information, Ton That Thien, has been described as one of the best trained economists and one of the most articulate and intelligent of all Vietnamese in Saigon. He has also been known as a well informed, articulate critic of both the U. S. and the government of Vietnam; but he is a man of ability, energy, and patriotism, and is certainly not anti-American. He should be a very considerable improvement over his predecessor, Tran Van An, who has been ineffectual in this important post.

Nguyen Van Tho, Minister for Education and Youth (he was Minister for Education in the Ky government), and Le Van Thu, Minister for Justice, should both be considerably stronger than their predecessors in the Loc cabinet.

General Tran Thiem Khiem, Minister for Interior, is a close friend of President Thieu's and is presently Vietnam's Ambassador to Taiwan. Khiem is a career military officer, former Chief of Staff of the Joint General Staff, and former Minister of Defense. He served as ambassador to the United States in 1964-65, and then in Taiwan from October, 1965 to the present. While there are diverse opinions about him, Thieu feels that he will be more effective than his predecessor, General Linh Quang Vien, whom Thieu has described as "lazy."

While the important posts of Defense and Interior are held by military men, the Huong Cabinet represents a considerable move toward civilian government. This is true in the first instance because Huong is a stronger man than Loc and will almost certainly prove less responsive to military advice and pressures. More important, it is also because Thieu himself is inevitably becoming more of a civilian leader. His alliance with Huong is a significant move away from the other generals. We have long anticipated and worked for a true civilian-military partnership here, with the power of the civilian partners increasing slowly but steadily. I believe the Huong Government represents progress toward that goal. Despite the military's dissatisfaction with Thieu's handling of the change in government, they have accepted the situation with remarkably little public fuss.

While it will, of course, take a little time for the new cabinet to settle into its job, I believe it holds promise for performing more effectively than its predecessor, and with a broader base of popular support.

In his first radio-TV address to the nation last night, Huong outlined some of the government's problems and purposes. His approach seemed to be realistic, sober, and sensible and one which should appeal to the people. He called attention to the fact that nationalist ranks are divided, and injustice and corruption are a source of sorrow to patriots. Therefore, many steps must be taken in achievement of common goals. The first such step is the restoration of the authority of the nation and the rebirth of people's confidence in the nation; "only when the nation is strong can we speak of true peace and true independence."

Huong said that during the first period, the government would not propose grandiose programs which have no hope of being carried out; the goals will be limited and realistic, and be part of the national policy already set forth by President Thieu. Emphasis would be placed on the following four goals:

1. Restoration of national authority;
2. Elimination of corruption;
3. Stabilizing the lives of the people;
4. Taking initiatives in the search for peace.

Huong declared that war has bred a situation of social disorder and absence of discipline and he is, therefore, determined to restore the authority of the nation so that the constitution will be universally respected and the law strongly and justly applied.

He described corruption as a major illness. Toward its elimination, the government will follow three basic principles:

1. High ranking members of government must set an example for their subordinates;
2. Responsibility will be clearly defined so that perpetrators of corruption can be identified and removed;
3. Punishment will be applied fairly and without regard to rank.

Stabilization of the lives of the people will involve relief and reconstruction efforts to assist war victims, measures to hold prices down, and to improve distribution of goods and provide livelihood for the poor.

In taking initiatives in the search for peace, the government cannot promise to "solve the war" conclusively since this involves factors beyond the scope of the Government of Vietnam to decide. However, the government is "determined to take initiatives in seeking a peace in accordance with the wishes of the vast majority of the people of South Vietnam, that is to say a peace in honor and with guarantees for the future." Vietnam must have "a major role at the conference table and in talks regarding the

Vietnam problem;" and the Government of Vietnam continues to "advocate direct negotiations between Saigon and Hanoi so that the people of Vietnam can solve their own problems." Huong appealed to Vietnamese of goodwill and responsibility in North Vietnam to cease their war efforts and join the common search for peace. If this tragic war continues in which the civilians are always the victims, the attitude of the Government of Vietnam will become increasingly clear cut; South Vietnamese are determined to fight to the end if the enemy mistakenly believes mortar attacks, destruction of homes, and other such aggressive acts will lead them to victory.

I paid my first call on Huong yesterday and took Ambassador Berger and Calhoun with me. I said that we would work with him and his colleagues in any way he wishes; we had already had experience in working with many of his ministers. Others were new and our senior people would be calling on them promptly. Huong noted that he had a reputation of being a tough nationalist. This he said, with a chuckle, was far from true, but he did not mind people thinking of him in these terms for the Communists were trying to make nationalism their monopoly; their propaganda attacks on the Government of Vietnam as a puppet of the U. S. were designed to destroy the Government of Vietnam in the eyes of the people. He, therefore, had to be careful in his dealings with the U. S. and in what he said; our relations had to be sensitive and discreet. He might say something which disagreed with the U. S. or in a way which we might not quite like, but we should not be concerned, for basically there was trust and he would do everything to develop this bond.

Huong said he was concerned with Communist propaganda that American aid went to few people who were American "favorites," and only a trickle came down to the great mass. He knew it was not true, but he comes from a small town, was poor himself and knows how this kind of propaganda takes effect. The problem was to insure that no aid would be diverted and this meant a much more honest and effective handling of aid by the Vietnamese government agencies; he would do what he could to make improvements.

"The people expect miracles of me", he said, "but I have no magic wand. I can only do my best."

He said his problem now was to make the government work better than it had. This was not going to be easy. The country and the cities were under heavy attack, the economy was partially disrupted, the refugee load was enormous, and there was uncertainty about the future. But the people had made clear at Tet that they did not support the Communists, and this was the base on which he had to build. I said we knew how difficult were the problems and we wanted to get into them as quickly as possible

Huong asked if American aid would be enough to take care of these problems. I said there would be no difficulty about U. S. aid; the problem was to get prompt decisions from the government and then have them carried out. This is where we saw the greatest difficulty.

We did not go very deeply into substance; it was more of a "get acquainted" meeting, but my impressions were favorable. He spoke several times about the poor people and how they looked at things. He is deeply sensitive to Communist propaganda themes and the effect they have. He sees the need to take "nationalist" and "sovereignty" factors into account publicly, but is eager to work out practical and discreet arrangements to use our help and advice. He sees problems and knows that administrative effectiveness is the answer. Whether and what he can do about them remains to be seen. His mind is organized and logical, he is a good listener, he talks clearly and precisely, dotting his conversation with homely comments and his manner is deliberate and unhurried. I was pleased to see that the mountain of files which always covered Prime Minister Loc's desk had disappeared. We shall know better in a few weeks what this all adds up to.

B. Political

Reactions to the Paris talks; the anxiety and the suspicion of U. S. intentions which the Paris talks generated here earlier have declined as Governor Harriman's replies receive publicity here. Nevertheless, I think that the great majority of the Vietnamese still regard the talks with more apprehension than hope. Very few expect that talks are going to produce any results. There remains some resentment of the fact that the North Vietnamese are alone at the conference table with the U. S. representatives. In Vietnamese eyes, the absence of both their own representatives and the representatives of the Soviet Union and Communist China tends to make the Hanoi regime appear fully sovereign while the Government of Vietnam seems to be playing a secondary role.

This does not mean that the Vietnamese are not longing for peace and hoping that an honorable solution can be found. While they are skeptical of the Paris talks resulting in any settlement, or in a settlement which they can accept, they are certainly anxious for genuine peace negotiations. Huong's statement of his government's determination to take the initiative in the search for peace represents well the attitude of most Vietnamese opinion leaders.

Reservations and fears about the Paris talks also do not mean that any significant body of Vietnamese opinion is prepared at this time to oppose the continuation of the Paris effort. The opening of the Paris talks is generally regarded as a fait accompli, and the interest now is on the subjects discussed. The Vietnamese want to be sure that they are represented immediately should the talks get beyond the subject of what North Vietnam will do in return for a cessation of the bombing. There is, moreover, a definite feeling on the part of all Vietnamese leaders -- including President Thieu -- that the partial suspension of the bombing cannot be indefinite. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam cannot be permitted to enjoy a permanent limitation of the bombing and the right to increase its own pressures in South Vietnam simply by making propaganda charges in Paris.

Assembly developments. The Senate version of the general mobilization bill was quite short and gave the executive most of the sweeping powers which President Thieu had requested in the Government draft of the bill. This came as something of a surprise since the Senate and Lower House committees had worked together closely in framing the more restrictive Lower House bill. Some Senators explained that they feel the Assembly must either produce a complete plan on mobilization, spelling out all of the details of the implementation, or give the executive full power to implement general mobilization as it deems best. The Lower House bill fell somewhere between these two poles and was therefore rejected.

The Lower House yesterday reacted to this Senate action by again passing its own version of the mobilization bill by a vote of 109 to 6, thus overriding the Senate version and sending to President Thieu the mobilization measure which I described in a previous message. This bill appears to be an adequate legal base for mobilization, allowing the Executive enough power to take necessary actions. One of the major problems now is to get the Executive to identify and hold in place those individuals whose skills are essential to government operations and the continued functioning of the economy. I made a point of this a number of times in talking with Thieu and also with Huong, yesterday.

The Lower House has also completed work on the press law. The House bill is close to the Executive draft and contains provisions which would allow for continuation of de facto censorship and other forms of government control. The local press has objected strenuously to the bill, threatening to stop reporting sessions of the Lower House, and issuing a press corps resolution denouncing the bill. The Senate has yet to act on the measure. Huong has made public statements favoring full press freedom, and the Senate may act to liberalize the bill. The final version of the press law is likely to provide for some government restraints on the press, however.

The Upper House on May 27 got into the question of whether or not a Senator may, under the constitution, accept appointment to the Cabinet. Several Dai Viet Senators led an attack on the new foreign minister, Senator Tran Chanh Thanh, charging him with various failures as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and claiming that he has in effect resigned from the Senate by accepting appointment as a Minister. The real reason for the attack on Thanh is probably Dai Viet chagrin at not getting the cabinet post which Ha Thuc Ky wanted. However, the constitutional question is important for the future as well as in this instance. The constitution and the Upper House rules appear to be ambiguous, and the not yet formed Supreme Court may have to ultimately pass judgment on the issue.

C. Military

In the week ending May 25, there was an increase in incidents, but a decrease in intensity. As in the previous week, the greatest activity continued in Quang Tri Province and in the Third Corps area in the vicinity of Saigon. In the Second Corps, the major threat to Kontum Province in the western highlands continues with two enemy divisions in the area.

For the week ending May 25, both friendly and enemy casualties were lower than in the preceeding week, but the ratio of losses both in men and weapons remained highly favorable to the allies. The enemy killed in action was 2,550 compared to 367 friendly (of which 153 were U.S.), a ratio of nearly 7 to 1. The allies captured 829 weapons compared to a loss of 46, a ratio of 18 to 1.

The intensity of activity picked up around Saigon at the beginning of this week. On the night of May 26, a battalion of the 25th Infantry Division, U. S., was attacked by an estimated enemy battalion west of the Phu Tho racetrack. Action continued all through

the next day until contact was lost. Two hundred eighteen of the enemy were killed against a loss of six friendly. The pattern of nightly firing by rocket and mortar against Saigon continues. In the early morning hours of May 28, nine 122MM rockets and five rounds of mortar fire fell in the city. As a result of the firing, five Vietnamese children were killed, 38 Vietnamese civilians, and four Army of the Republic of Vietnam wounded. Three houses were destroyed, one building and two generators damaged. It is not so much the amount of damaged inflicted, but the fact that this is a continuing pattern which is important.

The importance which the enemy places on these military activities is pointed out by a captured document, dated April 24, which is a directive for "ideological guidance pertaining to the decision by the U. S. to limit its bombing in North Vietnam and to offer proposals for peace talks." The document was captured by a unit of the U. S. First Infantry Division in Bien Hoa Province east of Saigon on May 5. The directive says in part:

"It is imperative to realize the necessity and objective of our diplomatic struggle, which is intended to bolster the military and political struggles and not to be a substitute for this. Unless a major military victory is achieved, nothing can be expected from diplomatic struggles... diplomatic debate should be regarded as a means to confirm the enemy defeat and our victory. It is not meant to bring us to final victory; consequently, we must never let ourselves be lured by any peace illusions that the diplomatic struggle may create; but instead we must respond to and support our diplomatic struggle by fighting harder in order to achieve more striking and decisive victories."

It seems to me that this document, coupled with the pattern of the enemy military activity and Hanoi's avowed intention to bring about the disintegration of the Saigon Government, poses the question of the nature and extent of the bombing cessation. The terror attacks on the cities in the south, which are essentially attacks against the civilian population, are obviously designed to destroy popular morale, to create loss of confidence in the government, and eventually to bring about its downfall. It seems to me, therefore, that there is a strong argument for linking any cessation of bombing in the north to the cessation of terror attacks on the cities of the south and I believe that a failure to link these two factors could seriously impair our position in the type of negotiations on which we have entered where the enemy is apparently determined to maintain maximum military pressure. This aspect of reciprocal de-escalation might be handled by simply declaring privately to Hanoi (at Paris) that continued attacks would call for appropriate retaliation. We could, if desired, make this specific by saying that rocket and ground attacks on Saigon would automatically entail similar retaliatory responses on other North Vietnamese cities.

Stating our position in this manner would not require a specific reply from Hanoi's negotiators; we would simply state our intention and say that it need not interfere with negotiations as long as such attacks were not resumed.

I realize this raises difficult problems but I have pointed out in several messages the risks I believe we run here if such attacks continue; risks to the morale of the civilian population under a pattern of continual fire attacks and thereby to the fabric of the Government itself. We already have to care for over a million refugees on top of almost one-half million evacuees from terror assaults on urban areas. Even with our help, the GVN's limited capabilities are strained to the utmost in coping with this burden. We are working on better plans for urban defense but at best we can only limit, not wholly prevent, such terror raids or mortar and rocket assaults made for psychological impact. I believe, therefore, that we must also find a way to tie our restraint on bombing of the North to enemy restraint in attacking urban areas in the South.

D. Pacification

As you know, we regard sustained local security as the indispensable first stage of pacification. The Regional and Popular forces are the key to local security. Our newly designed Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) for keeping track of about 1,000 Regional Force companies and 4,300 Popular Force platoons shows great potential as a management tool for carrying out our top priority Regional Force/Popular Force upgrading program. Monthly reports from district advisors cover the status and evaluate the performance of each Regional Force/Popular Force unit. The same computer techniques used with HES are employed and the two systems are tied together through the MACV computer.

For example, by using TFES and HES we have highlighted the fact that two-thirds of some 1800 hamlets which regressed had no assigned Regional Force/Popular Force units. We have now recommended to the GVN that most new Regional Force/Popular Force units being formed should be spread out as Hamlet Security Forces.

TFES reveals many Regional Force/Popular Force shortcomings. Countrywide only 59 percent of authorized Regional Force officers and 69 percent of the Popular Force NCO's (there are no officers) are present for duty. With this shortage of leaders, no wonder Regional Force/Popular Force do not perform better. Each resupply is slow or undependable for 55 percent of Regional Force units and 61 percent of Popular Force units. Sixty-one percent of Popular Force units have no operational radio. Now that we can quantify and keep track of these deficiencies better, we can tackle them better.

In continuing to examine post-Tet regression in the countryside, we are closely monitoring how many GVN hamlet administrations are effectively functioning. Pre-Tet we estimated roughly that GVN hamlet officials were staying day and night and carrying out their duties in some 7,761 hamlets. A rapid post-Tet survey showed that at end-March 4,471 hamlets still had functioning GVN administrations, a decline of 38 percent. Our resurvey at end-April shows that the number has risen to 5,324, well up from post-Tet low but still too low for comfort. We are pushing on this but forecast slow improvement lagging behind restoration of security.

Since the quickest way of getting improvements in pacification or almost any other GVN activity is to replace ineffective and/or corrupt officials, we are continuing to focus on Province and District Chiefs. Replacement for 13 Province Chiefs removed by Thieu at our urging over the past several months are in 12 cases proving to be distinct improvements over former incumbents. Thieu has our list of eight Province Chiefs who still need to be replaced. Bob Komer has also turned over a similar list of 50 poor District Chiefs to the Ministry of Interior. With Tran Van Huong coming in with an anti-corruption platform, we hope to see faster action.

E. Urban Recovery

New evacuees in Saigon peaked at 107,000 as a result of fires following the mortar/rocket attack on the city the night of May 18-19. The number has since dropped to 105,000, but fear of further attacks is keeping many from returning to homes in the outskirts. Added to Saigon evacuee burden are 34,000 in surrounding Gia Dinh. A more accurate count of damaged houses shows 11,800 destroyed in Saigon as a result of the May attacks. In Gia Dinh 6,000 more were destroyed or seriously damaged.

On the plus side, a combined GVN/US operation for assisting Saigon/Gia Dinh recovery is well under way. ARVN and US engineer units moved into Districts 8 and 6 on May 20 and began clearing rubble, restoring utilities, and opening streets. We also plan to erect 340 pre-fab buildings, housing 1,700 families in Districts 6 and 8. This interest shown in the people by the armed forces is having a positive psychological effect. District officials, who are closely tied in with all operations, are highly cooperative and appreciative of our help.

F. Economic

Retail prices were substantially unchanged during the week and remain some 10 percent above their level just before the second round of attacks on Saigon. Some vegetable prices rose because military activity around Saigon slowed shipments from north and east. However, other food prices fell as deliveries from the Delta

of some items increased. Several small and medium size textile mills, along with some yarn and cloth stocks, were reported to have been damaged or destroyed by the recent military activity in and around Saigon and as a result white calico prices rose sharply.

A joint State/Treasury team headed by Deputy Assistant Secretary Barnett met with Governor Hanh of the Vietnamese National Bank on May 21 to discuss ways to neutralizing U.S. security expenditures. Specifically, the team proposed that Vietnam commit itself to maintain present investments in American certificates of deposit and in addition purchase out of its foreign exchange reserves \$50 to \$75 million of a new special 4 1/2 year U.S. Treasury Security. Governor Hanh showed general sympathy and understanding of the U.S. problem, but said that because of its political implications it should also be raised on a political level. I raised this subject with President Thieu on May 25 and will raise it again this week after Thieu has had a chance to brief himself on it.

INFORMATION

Wednesday - May 29, 1968

Mr. President:

The attached New York Times story is further evidence of heightened interest in Latin American physical integration.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

May 29 NY Times article.

Free file

Latin Nations Plan 3-Million Highway

By MALCOLM W. BROWNE
Special to The New York Times

LIMA, Peru, May 26—The Foreign Ministers of four South American nations met here during the weekend to discuss progress on a road some 3,000 miles long that would open the jungle-covered heartlands of South America.

The Foreign Ministers of Peru, Bolivia, Argentina and Paraguay sought to expedite planning and work on the road, known as the Bolivar Highway of the Jungle's Edge.

The meeting of the Foreign Ministers was the second in a week in which they sought a cooperative development of international regions.

Agreed on Tentative Plans

Earlier, the Ministers of Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay met in Bolivia to draw up an agreement and some tentative plans for the economic development of the Rio de la Plata basin.

Meanwhile, representatives of the so-called "andino group"—Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Chile and Bolivia—settled enough of their economic and political differences in Quito last week to talk about developing a new petrochemical industry.

The group planned to ask support from the Latin American Free Trade Association, which began new technical meetings in Montevideo last week.

In all of these meetings, progress toward integration and international cooperation has been slowed by the intense nationalism of the member nations, grinding economic competition, and an over-all lack of capital for big projects.

The highway meeting was no exception, and no startling developments in the project were expected.

However, the mere presence of Argentina's Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Méndez, was regarded as an important step.

Surface Communication

Mr. Costa Méndez said when he arrived that he regarded the projected highway as "the vertebral column of economic and social development and of surface communication of our peoples."

In its most ambitious form, the road would stretch all the



The New York Times May 29, 1968
Projected road is shown by broken line, Pan American Highway by the solid line.

way from Caracas, on the north coast of South America down through Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay and Argentina to Buenos Aires.

While the existing Pan-American Highway runs along the west coast of South America most of the way down, the new highway would lie for the most part east of the Andean Mountain range, the traditional barrier between the great cities of the west coast and the interior.

Main Impetus for Road

The main impetus for the road has come from President Fernando Belaúnde Terry of Peru. President Belaúnde, an architect, has made the road

one of his main ambitions since he was elected in 1963.

Only by giving the Indians east of the Andes a road with which to communicate and send goods to the outer world can any real development of the interior be achieved, he believes.

Despite Peru's economic problems, it has been pushing the road along for the past four years, both with studies and actual construction.

In Peru, construction crews aided by two battalions of Peruvian troops are hacking a road out of the jungle at nine different sites. For the most part, the road is primitive and there is no paving. It has some of the appearance of the old Burma Road built during World War II to connect India with China.

Work is desperately slow despite loans of more than \$5-million extended by the United States Agency for International Development and other loans and grants.

It was anticipated in 1965 that the 2,400 miles of road in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia alone would cost about \$35-million and could not be completed until 1985.

Since then, costs have been increasing at about 15 per cent a year and political and economic problems have hampered planning.

For one thing, most small South American nations fear their powerful neighbors, and a road can be used to move tanks and artillery as well as produce.

Despite that, there are hopes that slow progress will eventually make the highway a base from which vast economic and social development can begin.

ACTION

20

Wednesday, May 29, 1968

3:10 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

Attached for your approval is a warm message to Princess Margarethe, Successor to the Throne of Denmark, and Prince Henrik, congratulating them on the birth of a son.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

WWR
mm
MWG:mm

206
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Suggested Message

Mrs. Johnson and I were delighted to hear of the birth of your son and send you both our very best wishes. May your new Prince have a long and happy life.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States

Their Royal Highnesses
Princess Margarethe, Successor to the
Throne, and Prince Henrik,
Copenhagen, Denmark.

May 29, 1968 -- W. W. Rostow

It gives me a special pride and pleasure to make this citation.

I have long had reason to know personally what we have learned as a nation, over the past half century since the First World War: in a fight there is no better man to have at your side than an Australian.

Only yesterday morning I received a typical report of Australians in combat. A small unit of the Third Royal Australian Regiment was blocking an infiltration route towards Saigon, 26 miles northeast of the capital. About a thousand of the enemy, some fresh from North Vietnam, threw themselves against the Australian base. Heavy fighting took place over two hours. The enemy withdrew leaving 44 dead and 32 weapons on the battlefield. Seven prisoners were captured.

General Westmoreland sent a message of congratulations to Major General MacDonald who commands the Australian forces in Vietnam.

This is the kind of steady courage we have come to expect of Australians.

It is a good moment to remind the American people of a fact our news media tend to underplay. This war is not being fought simply by Americans. It is first being fought by the South Vietnamese -- but also by Australians and New Zealanders, Koreans and Thais, and Filipinos.

And together we shall bring a just and honorable peace to Southeast Asia -- for that is our objective -- our only objective.

From last summer to the end of March of this year we had made a special effort to move this war to the conference table and to peace. There was no result.

I then decided to act:

- First, to undertake a major unilateral act of de-escalation. We lifted the bombing from most of the territory and population of North Vietnam, including Hanoi and Haiphong.
- Second, to free our hands so that we could concentrate every moment -- every resource -- in the search for peace, I withdrew from the presidential race.

I felt that these two steps might -- just might -- bring Hanoi to talk.

That has now happened. But I cannot yet report substantive progress.

Nor can I tell you that Hanoi has matched our restraint with theirs.

It is clearly their move. If they move, we are ready to go fast and far with them -- and with others -- to reduce the violence and build a stable peace in Southeast Asia.

I have done everything I know how to do to bring us to this point.

I shall do everything I know how to do to take us all the way of peace.

22
✓

~~SECRET~~

Lunch Meeting With the President
Wednesday, May 29, 1968 - - 1:30 pm

AGENDA

1. De Gaulle: Implications of Possible Retirement. (Under Sec. Katzenbach)
 - Constitutional procedures.
 - Broader implications.
2. Harriman Proposals for 6th Meeting (Friday). (Under Sec. Katzenbach and Sec. Clifford)
 - Outline in general (Tab A)
 - Monitoring lower half of DMZ by ICC. (Tab B)
3. Cambodia: Gen. Westmoreland's Request. (Under Sec. Katzenbach, Sec. Clifford, and Gen. Wheeler)

Tab C.
4. Pueblo: Back Channel Approach via Australians. (Under Sec. Katzenbach)

Last session failed. Nick Katzenbach wishes to raise again. (Tab D)
5. Danish Nuclear Agreement. (Under Sec. Katzenbach and Sec. Clifford)

Tab E.
6. Rhodesia at the United Nations. (Under Sec. Katzenbach)

If any discussion or action required. (Tab F)
7. Other.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 16, NARA, Date 6-23-92

22

Pres file

Wednesday, May 29, 1968 -- 11:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, as requested, a comment on the March 31st speech. The critical passage is attached.

I would interpret it as follows.

1. The offer of San Antonio was renewed with "serious talks on the substance of peace" and "Hanoi will not take advantage of our restraint."
2. But you made a second offer to move by stages to peace talks, restraint, and a bombing cessation. That offer involved a partial bombing cessation and a complete bombing cessation "if our restraint is matched by restraint in Hanoi."
3. It was this second offer which was accepted in the sense that contracts were undertaken in Paris.
4. Therefore, the situation is this: We are committed to a total bombing cessation if they are committed to: matching restraint; and serious talks on the substance of peace. (Incidentally, it will be extremely important that we not stop the bombing totally until we have settled the format of the "serious talks" including a satisfactory role for the GVN.)
5. Looking at the matter in terms of the whole attached passage, I see no reason for us to depart at any time from the phrase "If our restraint is matched by restraint in Hanoi." That textual judgment is, of course, reinforced by the extraordinarily high rate of infiltration as compared to last year; by their explicit effort to mount a maximum offensive to support the Paris talks; by attacks on Saigon; etc.
6. The only part of San Antonio "assumption" that I think we can still keep is that we do not force them to acknowledge publicly what their matching restraint is. We, of course, will have to point to it and verify it if our total cessation is to be acceptable to our own people and the Congress -- as well as to our troops in the field.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

23

Tonight, I renew the offer I made last August—to stop the bombardment of North Vietnam. We ask that talks begin promptly, that they be serious talks on the substance of peace. We assume that during those talks Hanoi will not take advantage of our restraint.

We are prepared to move immediately toward peace through negotiations.

So, tonight, in the hope that this action will lead to early talks, I am taking the first step to deescalate the conflict. We are reducing—substantially reducing—the present level of hostilities.

And we are doing so unilaterally, and at once.

Tonight, I have ordered our aircraft and our naval vessels to make no attacks on North Vietnam, except in the area north of the Demilitarized Zone where the continuing enemy buildup directly threatens allied forward positions and where the movements of their troops and supplies are clearly related to that threat.

The area in which we are stopping our attacks includes almost 90 percent of North Vietnam's population, and most of its territory. Thus there will be no attacks around the principal populated areas, or in the food-producing areas of North Vietnam.

Even this very limited bombing of the North could come to an early end—if our restraint is matched by restraint in Hanoi. But I cannot in good conscience stop all bombing so long as to do so would immediately and directly endanger the lives of our men and our allies. Whether a complete bombing halt becomes possible in the future will be determined by events.

Our purpose in this action is to bring about a reduction in the level of violence that now exists.

It is to save the lives of brave men—and to save the lives of innocent women and children. It is to permit the contending forces to move closer to a political settlement.

And tonight, I call upon the United Kingdom and I call upon the Soviet Union—as cochairmen of the Geneva Conferences, and as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—to do all they can to move from the unilateral act of deescalation that I have just announced toward genuine peace in Southeast Asia.

Now, as in the past, the United States is ready to send its representatives to any forum, at any time, to discuss the means of bringing this ugly war to an end.

I am designating one of our most distinguished Americans, Ambassador Averell Harriman, as my personal representative for such talks. In addition, I have asked Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, who returned from Moscow for consultation, to be available to join Ambassador Harriman at Geneva or any other suitable place—just as soon as Hanoi agrees to a conference.

I call upon President Ho Chi Minh to respond positively, and favorably, to this new step toward peace.

But if peace does not come now through negotiations, it will come when Hanoi understands that our common resolve is unshakable, and our common strength is invincible.

Tonight, we and the other allied nations are contributing 600,000 fighting men to assist 700,000 South Vietnamese troops in defending their little country.

24

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, May 29, 1968 -- 8:55 am

Mr. President:

The UK and the Africans have agreed on a new Security Council resolution on Rhodesia which somewhat tightens existing sanctions, although it does not go as far as the Africans wish.

It puts up to us a choice of going down a road we don't much like or breaking away from the UN consensus.

Nick tells me we have made clear that we would not apply the two non-monetary provisions with respect to telecommunications and consular and trade representation.

Since the vote could come as early as this afternoon, you should be aware that we are now positioned to join in what will probably be a unanimous resolution.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-134
By ia, NARA Date 9-21-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rln

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 28, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Security Council Resolution
on Southern Rhodesia

After lengthy negotiations between the British and the Africans in New York, they have agreed on a new Security Council resolution on Rhodesia which we believe is livable from our point of view and which avoids more drastic action previously demanded by the Africans. The UK has taken the lead throughout and, as a result of a decision in London, will vote affirmatively for the resolution. This would also be our intention. The resolution is likely to be adopted unanimously.

Specifically, the resolution:

(a) Extends the existing sanctions on exports to and imports from Southern Rhodesia to cover all commodities except medical, educational and humanitarian supplies. Since the bulk of our trade with Rhodesia is already embargoed as a result of UN action, the practical effect on US trade is very marginal (only a total of about \$5 million in imports and exports is involved.)

(b) Prohibits investments or transfer of funds to Southern Rhodesia except for humanitarian purposes. Again this feature is marginal, since it does not touch past investments and no new American investments are expected in any case.

(c) Tightens transportation and air travel restrictions with regard to Southern Rhodesia in ways which do not directly affect the U.S.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ

97-131

By MS, NARA Date 10-30-98~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- 2 -


(d) Bars entry into the U.S., except on humanitarian grounds, of persons travelling on Rhodesian passports and persons likely to work against the sanctions program or further the interests of the Rhodesian regime.

The resolution also establishes a Security Council Committee which would supervise the sanctions program and seek to ensure better compliance than in the past. We pressed for this provision in response to the desire of our own commercial interests who feel they are being asked to adhere to the sanctions program more strictly than commercial interests in certain other countries.

Finally, the resolution has two non-mandatory provisions: a request that member states take action which would have the practical effect of cutting off communications with Rhodesia; and a recommendation that consular and trade representation be withdrawn from Rhodesia.

Ambassador Goldberg would make clear in his explanation of vote that we consider these two paragraphs to be non-mandatory. At the same time he would indicate we believe the flow of information and communication with Rhodesia should continue. He would not make any specific statement with respect to the closing of our Consulate General in Salisbury leaving the option open as to what we might do in the future.

The vote is expected on either Wednesday afternoon or Friday morning. Ambassador Goldberg agrees with this course.


Under Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

25

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, May 29, 1968
8:50 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a cable from Paris
tending to confirm the ticker speculation
that de Gaulle will announce his retire-
ment tomorrow.

We shall have a paper up before
lunch on what the constitutional steps
are in case the President of France
retires.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 15534

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

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INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, SAH 03, SA 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00,
GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, HSAE 00, HSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20,
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Z 291214Z MAY 63
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2212

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 15034

ACCORDING ANDRE FONTAINE, FOREIGN EDITOR LE MONDE,
DE GAULLE'S SECRET AND SUDDEN DEPARTURE FOR COLOMBEY
THIS MORNING WILL BE FOLLOWED BY HIS ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS
RETIREMENT. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WILL ALLEGEDLY MEET TOMORROW
UNDER PRIME MINISTER POMPIDOU.

A HIGH FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL HAS JUST REPEATED THE
MANY RUMORS THAT THE REFERENDUM WOULD NOT BE HELD AS
SCHEDULED. FURTHER DETAILS WILL FOLLOW AS AVAILABLE.
SHRIVER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

INFORMATION

Wednesday, May 29, 1968
8:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

In case Leonard Marks did not
send this to you directly, you will wish
to have this summary of world opinion
on the Paris peace talks, etc.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

WIDER APPROVAL OF U.S. PEACE SEEKING
SINCE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 31 ADDRESS

Since March 31 when President Johnson opened a new peace initiative on Viet-Nam while removing himself from the 1968 Presidential race, the attitude of West European media toward the U.S. has lost much of its previous hostility. Increasing sympathy and approval of U.S. efforts to end the war have been expressed by newspapers in pointing out:

1. The President's sacrifice of his political future in his over-riding desire to achieve peace in Viet-Nam.
2. U.S. military restraint in curtailing the bombing.
3. Sincere U.S. efforts to open peace talks with North Viet-Nam.
4. Assignment of "skilled" Averell Harriman to head a high-grade U.S. delegation to the peace talks.
5. Reasonable, constructive U.S. negotiating terms, expressed in part by Harriman's five points.
6. Hanoi's intransigence in Paris, accompanied by new offensives and the murder of civilians in South Viet-Nam.

West European press emphasis of these points since March 31 is in clear contrast to previous charges that the U.S. had been talking about peace while actually ignoring or belittling Hanoi peace feelers in seeking a military decision and a victor's place at the peace table.

Meanwhile, in other areas of the world, the press has made some of the same points, emphasizing the President's efforts to achieve an honorable peace despite Hanoi's intransigence. However, media in Saigon, Seoul, and Bangkok have reflected deep concern that in pursuing peace, the U.S. might be led to remove its protective shield from its Asian allies.

No change is evident in the basic views of newspapers in supporting or objecting to U.S. involvement in Viet-Nam and the bombing of the north.

Attached are editorial excerpts which make the above points in West Europe, East Asia, the Middle East and South Asia, and Latin America.

WEST EUROPE

1. The President's sacrifice of his political future in his overriding desire to achieve peace in Viet-Nam.

ZURICH, influential Neue Zuercher Zeitung, April 3:

"His decision is impressive and does him honor.... He recognized how much he personally had become the center of conflict.... His renunciation is a sacrifice to 'bipartisan foreign policy' such as has never been seen."

ROME, rightist Tempo, April 2:

"Those who know Lyndon Johnson well realize that his great and painful gesture was made in the hope that America and the free world would understand at last that the bloody Viet-Nam conflict was not the result of a mistaken policy... but rather the consequence of Johnson's and America's dedication to the idea of peace with honor."

TURIN, liberal Stampa, April 2:

Mr. Johnson's decision "was a sorrowful one for him to make, but wisdom and the true interests of America and of the world situation called for it. It is obvious that the first and main concern is peace in Viet-Nam."

2. U.S. military restraint in curtailing the bombing.

PARIS, rightist Aurore, April 2 and 3:

"Now it is up to the North Vietnamese to speak.... If the Communists harden their position and claim to be winning the war in the field, their responsibility will be obvious in the eyes of the world."

"The political courage of President Johnson, to which the French Government rightly rendered homage yesterday, started de-escalation. Now the world breathes more easily...."

MANCHESTER, liberal Guardian, April 2:

"In the face of Hanoi's prevarication, President Johnson has now done all that can reasonably be expected.... The burden is now clearly on Hanoi to show that all its talk of peace is not just cynical propaganda."

3. Sincere U.S. efforts to open peace talks with North Viet-Nam,

PARIS, independent Le Monde, April 5:

"Proof has been given that the bitter-enders are not the majority in Washington or Hanoi. This is the first time that so comforting a disclosure has been made since the war began."

LONDON, conservative Daily Telegraph, April 4:

Mr. Johnson has responded to Hanoi's statement "with a swift gesture which should dispel any lingering Vietnamese doubts about the sincerity of his intentions."

EDINBURGH, independent-conservative Scotsman, April 4:

Ho Chi Minh "may realize that President Johnson has gone as far in the direction of conciliation as any head of the American Government could do."

4. Assignment of "skilled" Averell Harriman to head a high-grade U.S. delegation to the peace talks.

AMSTERDAM, Catholic De Tijd, May 17:

"The North Vietnamese press spokesman showed pictures of maimed victims of U.S. air raids (of course, there was not a word about the victims of Viet Cong terrorism in Viet-Nam)!"

The press conferences by the North Vietnamese are "tedious. ... If this continues, the competing press conferences held

by the U.S. will attract more listeners, if for no other reason than that the procedure is much smoother. Bill Jorden, the spokesman of the U.S. delegation, has been a Moscow correspondent for the New York Times. He knows how to brief journalists."

LONDON, conservative Daily Telegraph, May 16:

Mr. Xuan Thuy, although reiterating the demand that the first step must be the unconditional ending of all attacks on the North, has allowed himself to be led by the skilful Mr. Harriman into exchanges over the whole field of differences...."

MUNICH, left-center Sueddeutsche Zeitung, May 10:

The appointment of Mr. Harriman as chief negotiator "increases U.S. credibility in the eyes of the opponent, because he has for some time supported a negotiated solution.... His prestige with the Russians may prove helpful if ever Soviet mediation becomes necessary."

5. Reasonable, constructive U.S. negotiating terms, expressed in part by Harriman's five points.

ROME, independent-center Messaggero, May 20:

"The Americans seem determined not to lose their heads, to meet patience with patience, even if patience is a special and ancient Oriental gift. The Americans also seem determined not to give the impression that they are answering invective with invective."

MUNICH, pro-Christian Democratic Muenchner Merkur, May 17:

"The first propaganda round has ended favorably for the U.S., which has not had such an opportunity to present its stand for a long time...."

"Mr. Harriman's four points on which Hanoi and Washington take similar positions reflect U.S. efforts to bring rapprochement in spite of tough talk."

LONDON, conservative Daily Telegraph, May 16:

"This offer confirms President Johnson's desire for a fair peace, which only his inveterate enemies now question. Beyond that Mr. Harriman, while showing an eminently conciliatory spirit, has given every indication of standing firm on essentials."

HAMBURG, independent Die Welt, May 14:

"While the North Vietnamese chief delegate made heavy attacks on the U.S., Ambassador Harriman delivered a well balanced statement culminating in the proposal to make a first step toward de-escalation."

6. Hanoi's intransigence in Paris, accompanied by new offensives and the murder of civilians in South Viet-Nam.

WEST BERLIN, independent Tagesspiegel, May 16:

The paper strongly condemned the Communist "terror offensive" against Saigon, which it said was "obviously designed to persuade the world that the U.S. is negotiating about a war which in the Communist view it has lost. However, the offensive does not stand a chance of success" because the Viet Cong "are now much weaker than during the Tet offensive."

MILAN, independent-conservative Corriere della Sera, May 15:

"Hanoi's statement was sheer granite, no ray of light, nothing. However, the Americans showed clearly a spirit of reconciliation."

OSLO, commercial Journal Norges Handels og Sjøfartstidende, May 15:

"Hanoi is still imposing absolute terms... that every bombing attack from the American side must stop. Not a shot must be fired against the aggressors from North Viet-Nam by the Americans. If bombs happen to drop on a Communist base which is preparing an attack across the border or a march -- should we say a tourist trip? -- through Laos, then it becomes impossible for peace negotiations to take place."

BONN, center-oriented General-Anzeiger, May 14:

"Yesterday's first round ended with a better score for the Americans. Harriman submitted a fair and reasonable program for de-escalation, while Thuy restricted himself to a drumfire of tough reproaches."

PARIS, rightist Aurore, May 6:

"President Johnson clearly intimated that the behavior of the North Vietnamese in the field actually reflects determination to be able soon to impose their terms on Washington's negotiators.... One can understand the lack of enthusiasm shown by President Johnson, who faces an absolutely intransigent opponent."

EAST ASIA

1. The President's sacrifice of his political future in his overriding desire to achieve peace in Viet-Nam.

KUALA LUMPUR, conservative Sunday Times, April 7:

"President Johnson has ... initiated measures which ... seem to have placed peace in Viet-Nam within human grasp. It was an act that seems to have cost President Johnson his career, but he will have the satisfaction of knowing that by his sacrifice he put an end to the deadly gavotte the world was dancing along on an extremely perilous precipice in Viet-Nam."

SEOUL, Hankuk Ilbo, April 3:

".... A courageous and honest action."

SEOUL, Joongang Ilbo, April 2:

"Mr. Johnson's decision not to run is a last-ditch effort to achieve a negotiated peace."

2. U.S. military restraint in curtailing the bombing.

MANILA, conservative Philippines Herald, April 2:

"The decision to halt the bombing of North Viet-Nam is in the nature of a final test to determine Ho's sincerity and willingness to bring the war to a peaceful end."

SEOUL, Daehan Ilbo, April 2:

"The President's decision to halt the bombing puts real pressure on Hanoi to negotiate, since the action proves U.S. sincerity and desire for peace to the entire world."

3. Sincere U.S. efforts to open peace talks with North Viet-Nam.

BANGKOK, Thai Rath, May 12:

"The talks are the result of a four-year effort by President Johnson, who has displayed unlimited patience and endurance, varying his tactics from warning to persuasion."

SEOUL, Hankuk Ilbo, May 10:

"We fully share the earnest desire of the U.S. for Viet-Nam peace..."

HONG KONG, pro-Western South China Morning Post, April 26:

"It would be wrong... to condemn the Americans for dragging their feet. The blame clearly lies with Hanoi."

KUALA LUMPUR, conservative Straits Times, April 12:

"Preliminary exchanges suggest that the North Vietnamese do not share America's anxiety to get to the negotiating table as quickly as possible."

TOKYO, independent-moderate Yomiuri, April 4:

"The new U.S. peace proposal is basically different from past ones -- LBJ is really serious, and America is in the position of having to get out of the war."

4. Assignment of "skilled" Averell Harriman to head a high-grade U.S. delegation to the peace talks.

BANGKOK, Phim Thai, May 19:

".... Mr. Harriman's psychological approach to the meetings, taking initiatives which boost the prestige of the North Vietnamese delegation and enable them to avoid losing face, is to be praised."

AUSTRALIAN papers ran extensive complimentary backgrounders on Ambassador Harriman.

6. Hanoi's intransigence in Paris, accompanied by new offensives and the murder of civilians in South Viet-Nam,

SYDNEY, conservative Daily Telegraph, May 14:

"It is monstrous that North Viet-Nam's power at the peace table should be purchased at the price of 4,000 killed in the new offensive around Saigon."

AUCKLAND, New Zealand Herald:

"Hanoi is out to try and break the Saigon regime so as to pressure the U.S. into sweeping concessions."

SAIGON, moderately progressive Chinh Luan, May 13:

"In this struggle, it is pure suicide to nurture illusions while Communist efforts unswervingly pursue a single purpose -- to set up the most inhumane dictatorship ever recorded in history."

KUALA LUMPUR, conservative Straits Times, May 10:

"The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong... may believe that by fighting on they can cause war-weariness in America so to intensify that withdrawal will be forced on Washington. The strategy... is one of offering spurious concessions which will have their attractions for an uninformed and tired public opinion, but which will conceal loaded arrangements which official America will be unable to accept.

"In a word the aim will be to cause the talks to collapse in circumstances which will lead American and world opinion to put most of the blame on the U.S. government."

MELBOURNE, tabloid Sun News-Pictorial, May 10:

"The North Vietnamese know that their initial demands will be a much stiffer price than the Americans will pay. But by professing confidence that the talks will succeed, they aim to plant the idea that a U.S. rejection of their terms will be shockingly unreasonable."

MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA

1. The President's sacrifice of his political future in his overriding desire to achieve peace in Viet-Nam.

NEW DELHI, independent, Hindi-language, Nav Bharat Times, April 4:

"President Johnson sincerely wants peace If Hanoi makes any delay in negotiating, the opinion of the entire world will turn against it..."

BOMBAY, independent, Times of India, April 3:

"India welcomes President Johnson's dramatic decision to de-escalate the war..."

CALCUTTA, independent, usually critical of U.S. policy, Amrita Bazar Patrika, April 2:

"It is a great decision which will make a profound impression on even the critics of President Johnson and his conduct of the Viet-Nam war. He deserves all praise for it.... The world is pulled back from the brink of great disaster."

JERUSALEM, independent Jerusalem Post, April 2:

"The President's extraordinary act has preserved and furthered the immense prestige of the Presidency. At the same time, the President has freed himself for what he clearly conceives as an ultimate effort to secure peace..."

3. Sincere U.S. efforts to open peace talks with North Viet-Nam,

ISTANBUL, conservative Tercumen, May 3:

"A strange situation -- everybody shouts at America to go home, and when it actually attempts to do so, everybody begins to worry about it."

NEW DELHI, independent, Hindi-language Nav Bharat Times, April 17:

"The President's advisers are telling everybody to desist from making any comment that might hinder the possibility of peace talks."

BOMBAY, independent, usually critical of the U.S., Free Press Journal, April 17:

"Washington's objection to Phnom Penh are valid and its insistence that the place selected must be neutral territory and that both Hanoi and Washington have diplomatic facilities there also was reasonable..."

TEL AVIV, Orthodox religious paper, She 'Arim, April 4:

"President Johnson is not thinking of a hurried retreat and of leaving Southeast Asia prey to Communism without making a supreme effort to reach an honorable settlement."

4. Assignment of "skilled" Averell Harriman to head a high-grade U.S. delegation to the peace talks.

BOMBAY, independent, usually critical of the U.S., Free Press Journal, April 2:

"While his opting out of the election race is sensational, his move for peace in Viet-Nam carried the first touch of greatness in the Johnson years. Bombing has stopped practically everywhere, and a high-powered U.S. delegation has been named for any negotiations."

6. Hanoi's intransigence in Paris, accompanied by new offensives and the murder of civilians in South Viet-Nam.

NEW DELHI, influential, pro-West Hindustan Times, May 10:

"It is heartening that the U.S. has not let the latest Viet Cong offensive stall the talks.... President Johnson set the frame of reference for substantive talks by reaffirming America's readiness to withdraw from Viet-Nam once an honorable peace is secured."

LATIN AMERICA

1. The President's sacrifice of his political future in his overriding desire to achieve peace in Viet-Nam.

MEXICO CITY, conservative El Sol, April 3:

"In one gesture Johnson has shown more greatness of soul, more patriotism, and more political prudence than his ferocious and garrulous enemies."

SANTIAGO, conservative El Mercurio, April 3:

"In the course of one brief televised speech, President Johnson has laid the foundations for a negotiated solution to the Viet-Nam war"

RIO DE JANEIRO, moderate Jornal do Brasil, April 2:

"Through the decision not to seek reelection and suspend the bombing of North Viet-Nam Johnson took on the new and great personality of a statesman and made clear the American desire for peace with Hanoi...."

3. Sincere U.S. efforts to open peace talks with North Viet-Nam.

MEXICO CITY, semi-official El Nacional, May 7:

"At last there is hope. Both Hanoi and Washington are finally convinced they 'must reason together.' This pleases Mexico, which has repeatedly advocated mediation of international disputes."

BUENOS AIRES, nationalist Clarín, May 6:

"President Johnson has given an irrefutable demonstration that his government sincerely wants peace."

5. Reasonable, constructive U.S. negotiating terms, expressed in part by Harriman's five points.

RIO DE JANEIRO, moderate Diario de Noticias, May 20:

"Johnson has shifted his almost inflexible San Antonio speech to concessions such as the partial bombing suspension."

SANTIAGO, conservative El Mercurio, May 10:

"To date all the concessions have been North American and all the advantages have been for the Communist side. The current position of the North Vietnamese negotiators tends to prolong their advantage. A true peace conference demands transigence from both sides"

6. Hanoi's intransigence in Paris, accompanied by new offensives and the murder of civilians in South Viet-Nam,

BUENOS AIRES, headline, May 16, read:

"HANOI'S NEGOTIATOR INTRANSIGENT" -- Conservative La Prensa

RIO DE JANEIRO, moderate Jornal do Commercio, May 15:

"Xuan Thuy's demand for unconditional suspension of hostilities as a pre-condition for negotiations makes agreement difficult."

RIO DE JANEIRO, moderate O Jornal, May 14:

"Communists adore delaying matters with endless procedural discussions."

MEXICO CITY, moderate Excelsior, May 7:

"Unfortunately, Paris efforts to achieve peace and understanding have coincided with a North Vietnamese effort to revive the offensive against the South."

ADVERSE COMMENT

U.S. allies on the mainland of Asia -- South Viet-Nam, South Korea, and Thailand -- have shown some shock and apprehension in their media reaction to the U.S. peace initiative and the Paris talks.

SAIGON, Song, May 13:

"We must accept the facts no matter how much they hurt in order to seek ways to cope clear-sightedly with all contingencies."

"Speaking frankly, what shall we do -- what can we do -- if our friends and foes come to terms to our detriment?"

SAIGON, Trang Den, May 10:

"De-escalation of the war is not a matter concerning only one party, nor is it the private business of the U.S. and North Viet-Nam."

SEOUL, Chosen Ilbo, April 12:

"Hanoi might take advantage of lengthy talks to rebuild its military power, intensify its military effort, and possibly demand a coalition government as part of a peace pact."

Donga Ilbo, April 2:

The paper carried a statement of the ruling Democratic-Republican Party: "We hope that President Johnson's decision does not mean U.S. policy has shifted to appeasement of the Communists."

BANGKOK, Bangkok World, April 3:

"It is feared here that if Hanoi feels it has succeeded in getting the U.S. to stop bombing the north, it could... demand that the U.S. next stop resisting Communist aggression, then withdraw from South Viet-Nam, then totally quit Southeast Asia."

Moscow, Hanoi, Peking Positions

Soviet media have emphasized that the success of the Paris talks depends entirely on the U.S. and maintained that the Soviet people "wholeheartedly want peace restored.... However, there is the need for the Americans to set aside all thought of dictation, threat, and coercion, and to give up their plans to continue and expand the aggression against South Viet-Nam. This is the main prerequisite for the success of the Paris talks."

Hanoi media have continuously stressed that the first requisite is total, unconditional cessation of U.S. bombing and other attacks on North Viet-Nam. Hanoi's wire service and radio have scoffed at Mr. Harriman's statements in Paris as expressing views "which have been condemned and refuted by the world's people -- views such as reciprocity, mutual de-escalation, aggression against South Viet-Nam by the north, increase in international control, etc."

Peking media have made no direct mention of the Paris talks. They did not even report Xuan Thuy's stop in Peking on his way to Paris. Meanwhile, Chinese Communist media in Peking and elsewhere have continuously denounced U.S. peace initiatives expressed by President Johnson and others as a "fraud" and a "hoax" to conceal the real intention of "expanding U.S. aggression." Also in routine fashion, Peking has accused the Soviet leaders of collusion with the U.S. in plotting to defeat the revolutionary movement of the Vietnamese people.

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, May 2⁹, 1968 - 8:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

Harriman herewith proposes that on Friday he be permitted to urge ICC inspection limited, in the first instance, to the southern portion of the DMZ. You may wish to discuss this at lunch today.

It may be useful propaganda with "world opinion"; but:

-- We should be cautious with proposals that are not fully symmetrical;

-- I do not believe we can propose it until we have cleared with the GVN: it is their real estate, after all.

W. W. Rostow

DELTO 189 (Paris 14978)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 1-5-01

WWRostow:rlh



Department of State

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TELEGRAM
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DELTO 139

N O D I S/HARVAN

REF: A PARIS 14576 DELTO 133
B STATE 171221 TODEL 236

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 18344
By his NARA, Date 2-7-98

1. IN OUR FRIDAY PRESENTATION WE INTEND TO URGE THAT SINCE DRV HAS ALLEGED US VIOLATIONS OF STATUS OF DMZ, HAS DENIED ITS VIOLATIONS OF DMZ AND HAS AGREED THAT PROPER STATUS OF DMZ IS THAT OF BUFFER ZONE, THERE IS NO REASON WHY DRV SHOULD NOT JOINT WITH US IN ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE ICC SUPERVISION OF DMZ.

2. OUR ARGUMENT COULD BECOME MUCH STRONGER IF WE ARE ABLE TO PROPOSE ICC INSPECTION LIMITED IN FIRST INSTANCE, REPEAT IN FIRST INSTANCE NOT OF COURSE AS PERMANENT ARRANGEMENT TO SOUTHERN PORTION OF DMZ.

3. WE REQUEST YOU AGREE THAT WE PROPOSE INSPECTION SYSTEM TO BE CONFINED TO SOUTHERN HALF OF DMZ AS FIRST STEP. CONSIDERATIONS FAVORING THIS PROPOSAL ARE OUTLINED IN PARA 2 (B) OF REFERENCE A. PARTICULARLY IF WE MAKE PROPOSAL THAT, AS FIRST STEP, INSPECTION TAKES PLACE IN SOUTHERN HALF OF DMZ WE DO NOT SEE CREATION OF UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENT. FROM PURELY PRACTICAL STANDPOINT FULL SUPERVISION IN SOUTHERN HALF SHOULD BE ALMOST AS EFFECTIVE AS SUPERVISION THROUGHOUT ENTIRE ZONE. OF COURSE WE DOUBT THAT HANOI WILL ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL BUT REFUSAL WOULD PUT THEM IN BAD PUBLIC POSITION. END
HARRIMAN

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DEPAR.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

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Pres file

Tuesday, May 28, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft TCU speech.

I have checked it with Nick who was too busy filling in for Sec. Rusk to do his own draft. He likes the idea of such a speech and I have absorbed his substantive suggestions.

Although tempted to introduce Vietnam and Paris, I thought it would be good to have a speech which deals with the rest.

I am sending a copy to Charles Maguire.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Building the Peace

I wish to talk about foreign policy tonight -- but in a special way.

Usually the President must address himself to specific circumstances; and, more often than not, he must speak at a moment of crisis and action.

Tonight -- here at a distinguished university -- I want to pause and reflect with you a little on the broad purposes of our foreign policy. I should like us to look back together and look forward.

I

Some of the young regard men of my generation as the prisoners of memories of times before they were born. There is an element of truth in this:

- Because we did live through the severe depression of the 1930's;
- We did see a great President struggle but fail to break the grip of isolationism upon the country;
- We did see a terrible world war result from our failure and the failure of others to stop aggression before it was too late.

-- We do live with the certain knowledge that a third world war would be a nuclear war.

~~And~~ We know that since 1914 the world has been living in the midst of war and the threat of war -- and for twenty three of those years, with the shadow of nuclear weapons.

The peaceful world of 1914 was basically Atlantic and European; now every corner of the globe is part of the world political system.

The world of 1914 was a world of railroads and steamships -- the automobile and the airplane had hardly been born. This is a world of intercontinental ballistic missiles, satellite communications, the jet aircraft.

The world of 1914 -- so far as effective power and politics were concerned -- was primarily a world of white men. This is a world of many races and colors and cultures.

Our task in the years since 1945 and your task in the next generation is the same: it is to master the forces of violence and conflict and to build stable peace -- for the first time since 1914.

There is no other purpose in your nation's foreign policy. In the four and one-half years that I have been your President, this has been my sole preoccupation in foreign affairs.

II

The question for the President -- the question for all of us -- is this: How do you go about, step-by-step, building a stable peace? How do you move a world torn by ideological conflict, by old quarrels, by the frustrations of poverty and stagnation -- how do you move such a world from where it is to where it should be? How do you get from here to there?

In our time we have moved forward by setting four goals and acting on them day by day.

When I went out to Manila in October 1966, and met with our allies, I found that they shared our vision. And we agreed to state our objectives in

this simple form:

- Aggression must not succeed.
- We must break the bonds of poverty, illiteracy and disease.
- We must strengthen economic, social and cultural cooperation
in the region.
- We must seek reconciliation and peace.

Although these four objectives were applied in Manila to Asia and the Pacific, they are as clear a statement of your nation's foreign policy in the past four years as could be found.

III. Aggression must not succeed.

The first rule for a stable peace is that all nations learn that they cannot achieve their ambitions by applying force across international frontiers. This is certainly not a world in which the status quo can be maintained. It is changing rapidly every day within almost every country. The relations among the nations of the world are also changing. The issue which we have faced at many times and places since 1945 is whether we

should permit change to come about through international violence or the threat of violence. America had to stand up with others in the protection of Iran and Greece and Turkey; twice to protect Berlin; to defend South Korea; to prevent the installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba; and now to prevent the taking over of South Vietnam by external force. In each of these crises, we did not stand alone. Those closest to the danger understood it best in each case; but, as the strongest nation standing with the forces of freedom and order, we were there.

But the frustration of aggression is not a foreign policy. It does not, in itself, produce a stable peace. But it is the necessary condition for building a stable peace.

I can tell you that there is no harder decision that a President can face than the commitment of our military forces to action, or even to the risk of action. But without the will to make that decision, there would not

now be freedom in Western Europe, in many parts of Latin America, in South Korea, ^{in the Middle East,} and in Southeast Asia.

IV. We must break the bonds of poverty, illiteracy and disease.

But we helped save the independence of Western Europe, South Korea, the Dominican Republic, and other nations for a larger purpose: to give their peoples a chance to choose their own destiny and to permit them to break the bonds of stagnation, poverty, illiteracy and disease. There is no more fundamental truth in the modern world than this: peace can only be stable in an environment of human progress.

When I became President, I turned -- almost as a first task -- to make sure the Alliance for Progress moved forward and accelerated. When I leave the office of the Presidency, a major source of satisfaction will be the fact that the average per capita growth in Latin America has more than doubled as compared with the first three years of the Alliance for Progress: from nine-tenths of one percent in 1961 through 1963, to two

and two-tenths percent from 1964 through 1967. We have put 35% more resources per annum into the Alliance for Progress in the last 4 years than we did in the first 3 years; and in these years Latin America moved forward in self-help -- with tax collections, for example, rising in Latin America from less than half a billion dollars a year in 1961 through 1963 to nearly \$3 billion in the period 1964 through 1967.

It was in these years also that three fundamental principles were built into our programs of assistance and accepted throughout the world.

First, self-help is the first rule of development. No nation can build another from outside. But some have proved that they can move forward to the point where foreign aid is no longer necessary; for example, Taiwan, Iran, and Israel. Others are moving towards that day in promising style.

Second, agricultural production is fundamental not merely to feed the people but also as the only sure foundation for industrial development. It is pretty hard, as you know, to get good news into the press. But true miracles have been brought about in the last few years with the new rice and

wheat strains; the rapid acceptance of chemical fertilizers and pesticides; and the movement of agriculture to top priority in many developing nations.

I believe it is within our grasp now to buy the time necessary for family planning policies to take hold, so that the human race can be spared a terrible Malthusian crisis.

Third, we cannot and we should not, bear the burden of assistance alone; and we are not bearing the burden alone. We have moved quietly but rapidly to multilateral methods for giving aid: in the Alliance for Progress we have the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress. The resources of the World Bank, the Inter-American Bank and the International Monetary Fund are now brought together in an orderly way around the development programs of each Latin American nation. And so it is with assistance to Korea and Indonesia, India and Pakistan, Turkey and many other nations which require and deserve assistance.

The United States is not acting alone. It is taking its fair share of the aid burden.

It is because there is such promise in these multilateral arrangements that I expressed yesterday my regret that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did not move forward to authorize our share in the Special Fund of the Asian Development Bank.

In this same spirit of cooperation and sharing, we have moved forward in trade and monetary affairs. Most of you listening to me tonight cannot remember the monetary crisis of the 1930's which brought on beggar-thy-neighbor policies of protection, leading to the deep depression which was the setting for the Second World War. I can tell you that the forces of monetary instability and protectionism that could again tear apart the world community are not far from the surface. In these four years we have struggled, and we have thus far succeeded in enlarging international trade and monetary cooperation:

-- The Kennedy Round was completed;

-- We are moving with imagination and wisdom to provide, through cooperation, an alternative to gold at a time when gold production simply will not permit it to play its historic role as the key monetary reserve.

V. We must strengthen economic,
social and cultural cooperation
in the regions.

While public attention has been focused on Vietnam, there has been a quiet revolution in the world and in the way men regard it.

A few years ago we would have talked about the underdeveloped areas -- tending to lump together Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. But a new spirit began to develop in three of these regions, and we have thrown our weight fully behind it.

The governments and peoples of Latin America, Africa, and Asia felt a strong desire to take a larger part of their own destiny into their hands; but they realized that as individual nation-states they could not do the job;

they could not achieve the strength and dignity in dealing with the larger nations of the world which they sought. They set about building or improving regional organizations which would permit them to play the strong, proud, independent role they wished to play in the last third of this century.

That is why I strongly supported the Latin American movement towards integration at the Conference of Punta del Este.

That is why, in the first speech given by an American President wholly devoted to Africa, I threw our support behind the regional and sub-regional institutions of Africa.

That is why, as Asia gathered confidence behind the allied shield in Vietnam, I did what I could to encourage the spirit of cooperation in the vital emerging New Asia.

As we look ahead, it is clear that the United States cannot -- in its own interest or in the cause of peace -- withdraw into isolation. But as others

gain strength and organize themselves in the regions, we can look forward to a decline in the burden that America has had to bear in this first postwar generation. I look forward to the day when the United States can be the friend and partner -- but the junior partner -- in all the regions of the world where we have interests and they have interests in our presence and participation.

And I would add, that when peace comes to the Middle East, as it must, the nations of that region, too, will, I believe, learn to work together on a regional basis on behalf of their peoples. That is the true road to dignity and effectiveness on the world scene.

VI. Reconciliation.

To prevent aggression from succeeding; to achieve economic and social progress; to help build islands of regional order -- all of this is the foundation for the nation's ultimate objective: reconciliation and peace among nations and men.

-- In these years we have had to transform confrontation and violence in Panama into friendly negotiations.

-- We have twice had to play our part in preventing our good friends Turkey and Greece from going to war over Cyprus.

-- We have had to use our influence to bring a quick end to war between our good friends India and Pakistan and to do what we could to encourage both nations in the direction of peace and progress.

-- In the Middle East crisis the hot line was used to keep the major powers from confrontation, to achieve a cease-fire and to leave open the possibility of a stable peace based on the five principles which I enunciated on June 19 last year.

With respect to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, we have been patiently seeking to build bridges -- some of them small, some of them frail -- but some of them important -- bridges to decent, normal relations and peace.

We have worked with the Soviet Union and achieved an Outer Space Treaty, a Consular Convention, and an Air Agreement. We have worked

shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Union and others to bring about a non-proliferation treaty. There are still important areas of difference and conflict between our views and those of Moscow; but there is, in the end, only one way to go in a world where both the Soviet Union and the United States have the capacity to destroy each other and the future of humanity -- toward understanding, accommodation, and to co-operation.

In the same spirit, we have held out our hand and will continue to hold out our hand to mainland China. That great nation is going through an historic inner conflict and debate. On the outcome will depend its future domestic and foreign policy. It is our hope that the talented and intelligent people of China will choose the path of creative modernization at home and peaceful fellowship with their neighbors abroad. There is so much that the Chinese people could do for themselves, for their region, and for the world. They should know that this nation -- and the world community -- look forward with hope to the end of a long self-imposed isolation. Thus far our efforts

have been rebuffed. We shall no doubt be rebuffed again. But we shall continue on the path of patience and hope.

VII

As I observe the unrest of the youth of many countries and study with sympathy its causes, I sometimes feel that one cause is a feeling that times are changing, great transitions are taking place, and their leaders do not seem to understand that fact. On another occasion, I said, "We are in the midst of a great transition: from narrow nationalism to international partnership; from the harsh spirit of the Cold War to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a troubled and threatened planet." I believe that judgment is right. Despite the struggle in Southeast Asia and crises in many parts of the world, I believe that we are moving in these good directions. But, as I said before, the task -- your task and mine -- and my successor's -- is to get from here to there. To build this structure of a stable peace is a slow, painstaking job. It cannot be built

with slogans or rhetoric; it must be built brick-by-brick. It takes patience.

It takes hard work. It takes the ability to live with frustration and still

remain loyal to great goals. It also takes all the idealism, all the

outrage at injustice that youth can bring to public affairs.

These goals are not going to be finally achieved in a day -- or a year --
in the life of this Administration -- or the next. But I deeply believe they
can -- they must be achieved. America cannot do the job alone; but the
job cannot be done without a strong and purposeful America which remains
true to the best that is in us ^{and that} ~~means~~ ^{means} the best that is ~~the best~~ in you.

#

Lois

29

Pres file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday,
May 28, 1968

Mr. President;

Herewith the latest information on the
Scorpion.

-- There has still been no communication
from the submarine.

-- Weather conditions are improving in
the search area.

Contrary to what we understood last night,
the submarine did have two nuclear torpedoes
on board.

W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By xc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

~~SECRET~~

292



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

28 May 1968
0545 EDT

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: USS SCORPION Overdue

1. Atlantic fleet air, surface and submarine units are continuing search operations for the nuclear attack submarine SCORPION (SSN-589) off the Virginia Capes and eastward along the submarine's intended track.

2. SCORPION was due off Norfolk Naval Base, Virginia at 1300 EDT, 27 May from an extended Mediterranean deployment with the SIXTH Fleet. The submarine, with a complement of 99 officers and men, failed to arrive as scheduled. SCORPION was last heard from at 212001 EDT at a position 400 nautical miles south of the Azores. The submarine carried two MK-45 nuclear torpedoes.

3. At the time of SCORPION's scheduled arrival, wind and sea conditions off Norfolk were severe with seas of from 15 to 22 feet. Weather conditions are presently abating with seas reported at 6 feet in the area which will not hamper search operations this morning.

4. Satisfactory communications are presently being maintained with all search units.

TAMMELL SHEPARD, JR.
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

Atch
Map

Distribution:


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NAVY FLAG PLOT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30

By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

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Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30

By 8 NARA, Date 1-5-01

INFORMATION

Tuesday, May 28, 1968, 6:00 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Unsubstantiated Report of Sighting of the Scorpion

The National Military Command Center says it has no word to support a broadcast by radio station WMAL to the effect that the Scorpion has been sighted in the Mediterranean on the surface. The broadcast alleges that Soviet destroyer was alongside the Scorpion. U.S. aircraft were reportedly seeking to drive off the Soviet ship.

W. W. Rostow

BKQamc

ACTION

Tuesday, May 28, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Gorton Visit to the Ranch

Pres file

Just to make certain that our arrangements are in accord with your wishes, we would like your approval for:

1. A big plane.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. Choppers from Bergstrom to the Ranch for the Prime Minister.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

3. Accompanying Australian press to come out in the afternoon with the American press.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

W. W. Rostow

MWright:wpt

May 28, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a routine message of thanks to U Thant for his telegram of sympathy after the recent tornado. Thant's telegram is at Tab A.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

32a

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

Thank you for your kind message of sympathy following tornadoes in eleven American States. I deeply appreciate your concern.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

7641 526 ↑

U.S. Dept. of State
Washington

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WUX CD NEW YORK NY MAY 18 NPT

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

DEEPLY DISTRESSED TO READ OF TORNADO HAVOC IN ELEVEN STATES,
INVOLVING CONSIDERABLE LOSS OF LIFE AND DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY
PLEASE ACCEPT MY MOST PROFOUND SYMPATHY

U THANT SECRETARY-GENERAL UNITED NATIONS.

2

INFORMATION

33

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Free file

Tuesday, May 28, 1968 -- 1:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

This wrap-up of Vietnamese attitudes towards the Paris talks is worth reading.

In short:

- content with U. S. positions thus far;
- great underlying uneasiness about U. S. talking with Hanoi and GVN appearing as U. S. puppet;
- fear that we will talk about their future without their central participation;
- but apprehension is not yet at a crisis point.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 18390
By is NARA, Date 2-9-98

Saigon 28477, 2 sections

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WWRostow:rlh

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1968 MAY 28 12 50

PAGE 01 SAIGON 28477 01 OF 02 281153Z

42
ACTION EA 15

INFO CIAE 00,DODE 03,NSAE 00,NSCE 00,SSQ 03,USIE 00,SAH 03,EUR 15,
GPM 04,NSC 10,SP 02,SS 20,RSC 01,L 03,H 02,P 04,IO 13,INR 07,
AID 28,NIC 01,ACDA 16,RSR 01,/145 W

O P 281115Z MAY 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3546
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
CINCPAC
AMCONSUL DANANG
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
AMEMBASSY PARIS

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Authority RAC 18391
By is NARA, Date 2-9-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 28477

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

PARIS FOR VN MISSION

SUBJ: VIETNAMESE REACTION TO PARIS TALKS

Reston

REF: A) STATE 167526 B) SAIGON 28360

1. REF. A REQUESTED A WEEKLY EVALUATION OF VIETNAMESE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE INITIAL CONTACTS NOW TAKING PLACE BETWEEN THE US AND NORTH VIETNAM IN PARIS. THIS IS THE FIRST SUCH REPORT. WE HAVE DRAWN ON EDITORIALS IN THE VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE PRESS (A SUMMARY OF VIETNAMESE PRESS TREATMENT OF THE PARIS TALKS IS FILED DAILY THROUGH USIS CHANNELS) AS WELL AS REACTIONS NOTED IN NORMAL CONTACTS WITH OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL VIETNAMESE. SUBSEQUENT REPORTS WILL UPDATE THIS GENERAL EVALUATION.

2. THERE IS ACROSS A VERY BROAD SPECTRUM OF VIETNAMESE POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND UNUSUAL CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ABOUT THE PARIS TALKS. AN QUANG BUDDHISTS, NORTHERN CATHOLICS, YOUTH LEADERS, ELDER STATESMEN, "OPPOSITIONISTS" AND

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 28477 01 OF 02 281153Z

SUPPORTERS OF THE GVN IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, ALL VIEW THE PARIS TALKS WITH AS MUCH APPREHENSION AS HOPE. ALTHOUGH SUSPICIONS OF US INTENTIONS HAVE TENDED TO ABATE RECENTLY, VIETNAMESE OPINION LEADERS CONTINUE TO SCRUTINIZE US STATEMENTS MINUTELY FOR ANY SIGNS OF A WEAKENING OF OUR POSITION. THE FACT THAT DURING THE FIRST FIVE MEETINGS IN PARIS THE US HAS TAKEN A REASSURINGLY FIRM POSITION HAS SERVED TO ALLAY SOME OF THE MORE EXTREME ANXIETY WHICH WAS INITIALLY EVIDENT, BUT EVEN WHEN THE VIETNAMESE MAY BE REASSURED FROM DAY TO DAY, THE FEAR OF WHAT TOMORROW MAY BRING REMAINS. VIETNAMESE ARE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TO THE SUBJECT OF THE PRELIMINARY TALKS: ANY INDICATION THAT THE US-DRV DISCUSSIONS WERE ABOUT TO MOVE ON TO BROADER QUESTIONS INVOLVING THE NATURE OF THE ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT WOULD AT ONCE REVIVE THE MOST LIVELY APPREHENSIONS AND SUSPICIONS.

3. THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS FOR CONTINUING VIETNAMESE ANXIETY ABOUT THE PRESENT TALKS:

(A) THE VIETNAMESE ARE WARY OF ANY CONTACTS WHICH TAKE PLACE DURING A US PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEAR. THEY ARE KEENLY AWARE THAT THE COMMUNIST TET OFFENSIVE PRODUCED A PROFOUND AND NEGATIVE REACTION TO THE VIETNAMESE WAR IN THE UNITED STATES. THERE IS THUS CONSIDERABLE FEAR THAT THE US POSITION WILL BE WEAKENED BY PRESSURES GENERATED BY DOMESTIC US DEVELOPMENTS.

(B) THERE IS CONSIDERABLE RESENTMENT OVER THE PRESENCE OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ALONE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH THE US. MANY VIETNAMESE TAKE THE POSITION THAT THE HANOI GOVERNMENT, THE AGGRESSORS IN THE WAR, ARE THUS PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS WHILE THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET NAM, THE VICTIMS, ARE EXCLUDED. VIETNAMESE ALSO POINT OUT THAT NEITHER THE SOVIET UNION NOR CHINA, WITHOUT WHOSE AID HANOI COULD NOT PURSUE THE WAR, IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DRVN IN THE TALKS WHILE THE US SPEAKS FOR THE GVN. THUS THE HANOI REGIME APPEARS BEFORE THE WORLD AS FULLY SOVEREIGN WHILE THE GVN SEEMS TO BE AN AMERICAN PUPPET.

(C) THERE IS ALSO UNHAPPINESS WITH THE CHOICE OF PARIS AS THE VENUE FOR THE TALKS (ALTHOUGH PREFERRED TO PHNOM

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PAGE 03 SAIGON 28477 01 OF 02 281153Z

PENK OR WARSAW ~~CONFERENCE~~ ~~IS~~
VIEWED BY MOST VIETNAMESE
AS NEUTRAL IN THIS WAR.

(D) FINALLY, THERE IS SOME DISATISFACTION WITH THE GVN REPRESENTATION IN PARIS. MANY VIETNAMESE BELIEVE THAT THE GVN FOREIGN MINISTRY AND ITS REPRESENTATIVES IN PARIS ARE NOT COMPETENT TO REPRESENT VIETNAMESE INTERESTS EFFECTIVELY VIS-A-VIS EITHER THE DRV OR THE US. THE SELECTION OF BUI DIEM AS CHIEF LIAISON OFFICER IS AN ADDITIONAL IRRITANT TO SOME. BUI DIEM IS VIEWED AS TOO CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE AMERICANS TO REPRESENT THE GVN IN WHAT MOST VIETNAMESE CONSIDER MAY DEVELOP INTO A CLASH OF INTERESTS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

4. THE DESIRE FOR PEACE IS ALSO PROFOUND. VIETNAMESE OF MOST POLITICAL PERSUASIONS LONG FOR AN HONORABLE PEACE, AND SOME HOPE THAT THE INITIAL US-DRV CONTACTS WILL LEAD IN THAT DIRECTION, ALTHOUGH MOST REMAIN SKEPTICAL.

5. THERE IS RECOGNITION THAT THE PARIS CONTACTS ARE A FAIT ACCOMPLI, AND THAT IT WOULD BE USELESS AND PROBABLY DESTRUCTIVE TO GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE US TO OPPOSE US OPENLY ON THE ISSUE OF HOLDING THEM. SOME OF THE BETTER INFORMED ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT SAIGON BY ITSELF COULD NOT GET HANOI TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE AT THIS JUNCTURE.

BUNKER
~~BT~~

WVN
NOTE: # AS RECEIVED. ~~WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST~~

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PAGE 01 SAIGON 28477 02 OF 02 281207Z

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GPM 04, NSC 13, SP 02, SS 20, RSC 01, L 03, H 02, P 04, IO 13, INR 07,
AID 28, NIC 01, ACDA 16, RSR 01, 145 W

O P 281115Z MAY 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3547
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY
CINCPAC
AMCONSIL DANANG
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
AMEMBASSY PARIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 28477

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

PARIS FOR VN MISSION

6. TO SUM UP, THERE IS WIDESPREAD AGREEMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM THAT THE GVN SHOULD CONTINUE TO GO ALONG WITH US-DRV CONTACTS ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY ARE ONLY INITIAL AND PRELIMINARY IN NATURE. THE SUBJECT TO BE DEALT WITH IS THE CESSATION OF THE BOMBING IN THE NORTH (WHICH WILL ONLY BE UNDERTAKEN CONCURRENTLY WITH AN APPROPRIATE DEESCALATION BY HANOI). MOREOVER, IN THE VIETNAMESE VIEW, THERE IS A DEFINITE TIME LIMIT (UNSPECIFIED, BUT GROWING NEARER) AFTER WHICH THE PARTIAL LIMITATION ON BOMBING IN THE NORTH MUST, FOR MILITARY AND POLITICAL REASONS, BE LIFTED IF HANOI IS NOT FORTHCOMING WITH SOME APPROPRIATE RESPONSE. SHOULD THE TALKS DEVELOP INTO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH DEAL WITH "THE FATE OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE," VIRTUALLY ALL VIETNAMESE FEEL THAT THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT MUST BE THE MAIN INTERLOCUTOR. WHEN AND IF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE, THE GVN POSITION MUST BE THAT A COALITION GOVERNMENT, AND/OR THE RECOGNITION OF THE NLF AS A POLITICAL ENTITY, IS UNACCEPTABLE, AS IS ANY CESSION OF TERRITORY, EITHER FORMALLY

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 28477 02 OF 02 281207Z

OR IN THE GUISE OF A "BUFFER STATE" IN THE NORTH.

7. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE LEVEL OF ANXIETY AND APPREHENSION IS NEARING THE DANGER POINT, ALTHOUGH THE COMBINATION OF THE TALKS WITH GROWING ENEMY HARASSMENT AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE IS TAKING ITS TOLL. PRESS COMMENTARY CRITICAL OF THE UNITED STATES WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE, AND MAY INCREASE SHOULD TIME WEAR ON AND THE BOMBING RESTRICTIONS PERSIST ALONG WITH INCREASED ENEMY INFILTRATION AND PRESSURE. FROM TIME TO TIME WE CAN EXPECT OUTSPOKEN AND OCCASIONALLY IRRESPONSIBLE REMARKS CRITICAL OF THE US FROM VARIOUS VIETNAMESE PUBLIC FIGURES, SUCH AS THOSE WE HAVE HEARD RECENTLY FROM VIET PRESIDENT KY (ALTHOUGH HIS RECENT FULMINATIONS SEEM TO HAVE AROUSED FAIRLY WIDE RESENTMENT AND CRITICISM). WE CAN EXPECT THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN PARIS TO BE FOLLOWED WITH GREAT INTEREST ON THE FLOOR OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH WILL BE QUICK TO NOTE ANY REAL OR IMAGINED SOFTENING OF EITHER THE US OR THE GVN POSITION ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS THE MOST SENSITIVE MATTER OF A COALITION WITH THE COMMUNISTS. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE STREET DEMONSTRATIONS OR OTHER ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT DISTURB OUR FUNDAMENTALLY GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE GVN AS LONG AS THE PARIS TALKS REMAIN WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE.

BUNKER
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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INFORMATION

Tuesday - May 28, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Development of the River Plate Basin

Pres file

You asked that we get maximum publicity for the recent meeting of the River Plate Foreign Ministers in which they agreed on a multinational economic plan for developing the Plata Basin.

USIA is getting out the story overseas. At home, we got the New York Times on Sunday to publish an editorial and a summary article in the "News of the Week in Review" section (copies attached).

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

342

THE NEW YORK TIMES.
SUNDAY, MAY 26, 1968

Progress on the Plata

The agreement of five South American nations to work cooperatively to develop the vast Plata River basin could put new life in the lagging Alliance for Progress. It marks a major step toward the target of regional economic integration set at Punta del Este last year.

Few would have expected a year ago that the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay could have subdued ancient differences to achieve far-reaching agreements as swiftly and cordially as they did at Santa Cruz, Bolivia, this week. The long-range programs that have been initiated for the joint improvement of navigation, for flood control and for power development should substantially raise standards for the 200 million people expected to be living in the area by the end of the century. This cooperative endeavor will help lower national barriers and will lay substantive foundations for the wider Latin-American Common Market scheduled to be in operation by 1985.

The United States remained discreetly in the background during the Plata discussions, with no American Government officials taking part. But behind the Latin negotiations lay a promise of American assistance for multinational efforts. It is essential that the hopes and activity thus generated not be disappointed; that the promised aid be available when—and if—the five nations follow through with the bold plans they have set in motion. This is the kind of alliance the United States long has been urging and that is the hemisphere's best hope for real progress.

A Vast Development Plan

Stretching deep into the heart of South America, encompassing parts of Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Paraguay and Bolivia, is the potentially rich and fertile basin of the Rio de la Plata. By the end of this century, according to demographic studies, more than 200 million people will live in the area. But unless a great transformation is wrought, they will live in the same grinding poverty as now prevails in the region.

Last week, the foreign ministers of the five Latin American nations through which the Plata and its subsidiary rivers — the Pilcomayo, Bermejo, Santa Lucia, Salta Grande and others—flow, met in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, and drew up a vast cooperative economic plan for the development of the Plata basin. The plan would take more than three decades to complete.

The agreement at Santa Cruz must be formalized in a treaty ready for signing within 120

days, at which time the foreign ministers will meet again in Brazil. Two months later, they intend to set up an international organization to carry out the development program.

The program calls for dams and other flood control and power projects on the Pilcomayo and Bermejo Rivers, which in the past have caused disastrous floods; clearing and dredging of the Paraguay River to give Bolivia an outlet to the sea; a hydroelectric project on the Salta Grande River in Uruguay; the modernization of the port facilities in Buenos Aires and Montevideo; and the exploitation of the Plata basin with all its vast potential of human and of natural resources.

Just how these multi-billion dollar projects will be financed was not made specific at the meeting last week, but there was speculation that there will be heavy reliance on United States aid administered through various international agencies.


—RICHARD HAMMER

from

The New York Times

Sunday edition - May 26, 1968

"The Week in Review" section.



INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday - May 28, 1968

Free file

Mr. President:

This cable from Lima tells of another interesting development in the new push toward physical integration since your April 23 statement: linkage of the road systems of Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay with the Peruvian highway on the eastern slopes of the Andes.

The cable also tells of the suspicion of Brazil and Chile. In the past this type of suspicion has been as much an obstacle to co-operation among the Latinos as the physical barriers.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Lima Embassy's 5273, May 27.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-467
By ing, NARA, Date 11-18-92



Department of State

352
TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 736

PAGE 01 LIMA 05273 280459Z

14
ACTION ARA 16

INFO CIAE 00,DODE 00,GPM 04,H 02,INR 07,L 03,NSAE 00,NSC 10,P 04,
RSC 01,SP 02,SS 20,USIA 12,AID 28,E 15,RSR 01,/125 W

R 272310Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6225
INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
USCINCSO 873
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMCONSUL AREQUIPA

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc/rq, NARA, Date 1-5-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMA 5273

USCINCSO FOR POLAD

REF: LIMA 5151

SUBJ: QUADRIPARTITE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

1. MEETING OF FONMINISTERS ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, PERU AND PARAGUAY GOT UNDERWAY AFTERNOON MAY 26. INAUGURAL SESSION HELD AT PRESIDENTIAL PALACE WITH PRESIDENT BELAUNDE PRESIDING. ALSO IN ATTENDANCE ARE OBSERVERS FROM BRAZIL, CHILE, COLOMBIA ECUADOR AND VENEZUELA. IT IS EXPECTED CONFERENCE WILL END MAY 28.

2. MAIN PURPOSE OF CONFERENCE, ACCORDING PERUVIAN ORGANIZERS, IS TO GIVE FURTHER IMPULSE TO PHYSICAL INTEGRATION OF LATIN AMERICA BY ENCOURAGING COUNTRIES REPRESENTED TO LINK THEIR ROAD SYSTEMS WITH PERUVIAN MARGINAL JUNGLE HIGHWAY. BELAUNDE IN OPENING ADDRESS STRESSED IMPORTANCE HIGHWAY TO DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRESS SOUTH AMERICA AND STATED NEW ADVANCES IN SCIENCE NOW MADE POSSIBLE ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION AS YET

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 LIMA 05273 280459Z

UNKNOWN RICHES OF GREAT TROPICAL AREAS. ARGENTINE FONMIN COSTA MENDEZ SPEAKING ON BEHALF COLLEAGUES LAUDED PERUVIAN EFFORTS IN OPENING UP VAST AREAS FOR COLONIZATION AND STRESSED IMPORTANCE OPENING UP NEW ROAD, RIVER, AIR AND TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS WHICH WOULD CONNECT BASINS PLATA, AMAZON AND ORINOCO. COSTA MENDEZ CONCLUDED BY STATING THESE MUTUAL EFFORTS TO BE UNDERTAKEN "WITHOUT RESORTING TO CREATION NEW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OR AFFECTING SOVEREIGN AUTONOMY OF OUR NATIONS..."

3. INDICATION BRAZILIAN AND CHILEAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS MEETING REVEALED BY COMMENTS CHARGES THESE MISSIONS TO EMBOFF. BRAZILIAN NOTED GOB HAD DECIDED SEND OBSERVER HEAD SOUTH AMERICAN SECTION OF FONOFF INSTEAD OF ROAD EXPERT "OWING TO POLITICAL NATURE OF MEETING". CHILEAN OBSERVER IS DIRECTOR URBAN COMMUNICATIONS AND PLANNING WHO IS ARCHITECT. CHILEAN CHARGE IMPLIED THIS SELECTION INTENDED DEMONSTRATE LOW CHILEAN OPINION OF MEETING.

4. VISITING FONMINS ARE OBJECT OF LAVISH ATTENTIONS BY GOP WHICH IS FLATTERED BY PRAISE CENTERED ON MARGINAL HIGHWAY. HIGH PERUVIAN FONOFF OFFICIAL NOTED MEETING WAS MOST IMPORTANT EVENT TAKING PLACE IN LIMA IN MANY YEARS.

GP-3. SIRACUSA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Tuesday, May 28, 1968 - 11:10 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Thieu Visit

Pres file

Attached is a cable which went to Ambassador Bunker last night. It describes the current status for planning for the Thieu visit. In summary, we are staying completely loose on the dates and uncommitted in regard to an address by Thieu to the Congress.

The cable also instructs Bunker to start a dialogue with Thieu about Thieu's public statements here. We want to reach full agreement now on the public line that he will take on peace and other sensitive areas.

W. W. Rostow

Att

MWright:wpt

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362
May 27, 1968

TO: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

INFO: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 1-9-01

Subject; Thieu Visit

1. Further discussions with Bui Diem Saturday and today have produced the following status, with guidance for your discussions with Thieu on May 28.

2. Dates and Announcement. Bui Diem has reported that Thieu understands completely the problem of possible embarrassment arising from the Poor People's Campaign, and also our difficulty in reaching any firm judgment as to the best dates until it becomes clearer how the Campaign will work out. In view of this, Bui Diem reports Thieu as entirely agreeable to keeping fluid on dates, and avoiding any announcement until we are much clearer on the possible picture and are able to be quite firm on the best dates.

3. We told Bui Diem today that we were prepared to cooperate in setting up plans on the alternative assumptions of June 18-19 or June 25-26 for the Washington portion of the visit, and that we thought Washington portion and key elements in other cities could probably be worked out discreetly on this alternate basis. We emphasized again -- and he accepted -- that we could not reach any clear conclusion at least before the end of the week and probably early next week. We agreed that if the visit were to be set for June 18-19, we might be thinking in terms of an announcement about June 7. If it appeared that June 25-26 was going to be better, we should aim toward an announcement perhaps two weeks in advance. Suggest you simply nail down these points in your discussion with Thieu.

4. Schedule. Bui Diem reported today that Thieu was entirely agreeable to approximately 7 days in the Continental US, but would like to have a day of rest in Honolulu at each end. We said that we thought this made sense in terms of the factors previously discussed. Again, we suggest merely nailing this down.

5. Precise Scheduling Plans. Bui Diem had talked at length to Robert Coate Sunday, and Coate had come up with a plan for visiting both San Francisco and Los Angeles within the 7-day framework. In essence, this would mean 2-1/2 days in Washington, a day in New York, leaving on the afternoon of the 4th day for San Francisco, the 5th day and night in San Francisco with a noon speech, and then going to Los Angeles on the 6th day with a fairly light schedule

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- 2 -

on that day, a final speech in Los Angeles at noon on the 7th day, and then off to Honolulu. We will send details on this by separate telegram, but since they are subject to checking with Coate and a lot of ironing out here, we believe you should confine yourself to saying that we are examining this 7-day schedule and will be back in touch with him. (We will also be discussing with advance party here.)

6. Address to Congress. We again emphasized to Bui Diem today that this was uncertain and required Presidential consideration in any event. He has of course emphasized the importance Thieu attaches to this, but we remain uncertain whether it is in fact acceptable to Congressional leaders and wise on balance, particularly if the Congress should then be focussed heavily on the Poor People's Campaign.

7. Draft Communique. To take advantage of Bui Diem's presence and judgment, we showed him a preliminary draft Saturday, emphasizing that it was highly tentative and merely intended to show scope, organization, and format. He gave us some useful comment today, and we will send both our draft and his comments to you by separate telegram for your own use in preparing a revised draft. For purposes of your discussion on May 28 with Thieu, we suggest you avoid getting into detail on this, indicating that you yourself are working on a revised draft, and say that there should be ample time to work this one out. Apparently, Bui Diem did send our draft to Thieu -- which we had asked him not to do, and we apologise for having got ahead of the game, but believe no significant damage will have been done.

8. Substance of Thieu's Speeches Before and During the Visit. We have outlined to Bui Diem certain basic considerations in this area, and he has apparently reported these comments to Thieu. In addition, he has indicated that Thieu has asked him to prepare drafts of possible speeches here.

9. Points we have made, in essence are:

a. That whatever he says should maintain his own political base at home, strengthen so far as possible our own political base here, and above all avoid giving Hanoi anything from which to claim a difference between our two positions.

b. That we should reach full agreement prior to his departure on the line he will take in sensitive areas, including the build-up of ARVN and the increasing responsibility of the South Vietnamese generally, allegations of a Thieu/Ky rivalry and the general question of unity and breadth of the GVN, and the role of the NLF in a future political structure in the South.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

c. That whatever Thieu may say, particularly on the subject of peace, that breaks any new ground should almost certainly not be said but rather expressed before he leaves. In this connection, we have specifically mentioned to Bui Diem the question of foreshadowing in some fashion the possibility that the members of the NLF might be free to form a political party in a future political struggle. We have not pressed hard on this specific point, but it is at least noteworthy that Bui Diem did not gag at it.

d. That comment concerning the Paris talks would have to be worked out with particular care and in the light of the situation that had developed by then.

10. For your meeting on May 28, we believe the main point is to get a clear understanding that you should have careful substantive discussions with Thieu as planning progresses. You may if you wish draw on any of the above points in your discretion.

11. General. In discussing the visit, you may wish to give Thieu some impression of the public mood regarding Vietnam now prevailing within the United States. Essentially, since the March 31 address by the President and Hanoi's agreement to talk, much of the acrimonious public debate on Vietnam has evaporated. The public seems for the present ready to give the talks a chance and to avoid loud controversy which might undo them. In light of the continued intransigence of the North Vietnamese and continuing military actions, there may by mid-June be significant pressures for increased military action on our part. On the other hand, those critical of our GVN policies seem concerned at the lack of progress in Paris and may be pressing for a total cessation of bombing of North Vietnam without any form of reciprocity. It is difficult to project how strong either of these tendencies will have become by mid-June. It is possible, however, that public debate of our Vietnam policy, which has cooled so sharply since March 31, may become more heated by the time Thieu arrives on the scene.

We understand that the foregoing is sensitive ground for you to go over with Thieu and we leave it to your good judgment how best to handle it.

12. Bui Diem goes back to Paris tonight. We have said we would keep in touch with him through Habib, as necessary.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

37

INFORMATION

May 28, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Glassboro Ratification Ceremony

Yesterday the Director of Soviet Affairs at State called in the Soviet Minister-Counselor and suggested that we exchange ratifications of the Consular Convention at Glassboro on June 4. Almost immediately after returning to the Embassy the Soviet Minister called back, saying that by coincidence they had just received notice from Moscow that the ratification papers were being sent by a courier who would arrive on June 6. Nevertheless, he promised to refer our suggestion to Moscow by immediate cable.

It is unlikely that a Soviet courier takes almost two weeks to travel from Moscow to Washington -- particularly as there are direct, non-stop flights by Aeroflot to Montreal. It is also unlikely that Dobrynin would reject our suggestion without referring the matter to Moscow -- which he clearly had no time to do. What is probable is that the Soviet Embassy had actually received a routine notice that the ratification papers were due to be sent in time to reach here on the June 6 courier. The Soviets may well have obscured the exact time the courier was due to leave Moscow -- thereby keeping the Soviet Government's options open if the leadership should decide it wants an excuse to decline our suggestion.

If the Soviets do not want to go to Glassboro, we should hear pretty quickly. If it is a close decision among the leadership, it may take several days.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

38
Pres file
INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 28, 1968 -- 10:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

George Christian says you wish to have for the 11:30 a.m. meeting with Prime Minister Gorton the situation with respect to North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia and the problem that we face.

(Tab A)

1. As the attached paper/ from the CIA, which Dick Helms distributed this morning, indicates, the North Vietnamese have been using the Cambodian salient in various ways for the past 3 years.

2. At the present time some 12,000 enemy troops are arrayed against allied positions in western Kontum province; we know that an offensive has been planned for some time; it is Westy's intention to pre-empt this offensive, if possible, if not, to defeat them and drive them back.

3. The two maps at the end of the CIA paper, marked with paperclips, show the transport routes, headquarters, bivouac areas, etc. now in the Northeast Cambodian salient.

4. At Tab B are Bunker's and Westy's cables which request your permission to attack this salient if and when the North Vietnamese are driven back from their assault on Kontum. The map attached to those cables shows the squares which Westy wishes to attack in this uninhabited base area.

W. W. Rostow

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Authority NLS.002.092.003/4

By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

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Rostow 386

~~TOP SECRET~~

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PAGE 01 SAIGON 28267 251156Z

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Authority RAC 17979

By glic, NARA, Date 1-5-01

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EXDIS

REF: WESTMORELAND'S 250450ZM

FROM BUNKER FOR SECRETARY RUSK AND SECRETARY CLIFFORD

1. THE MILITARY PLAN SUBMITTED BY MACV TO DEAL WITH THE OMINOUS THREATS TO DAK TO AND KONTUM IN THE HIGHLAND AREA IS EMBODIED IN THE REFERENCED MESSAGE FROM GEN WESTMORELAND. YOU WILL NOTE IT HAS MY ENDORSEMENT, INCLUDING THE RECOMMENDATION FOR HEAVY AIR AND ARTILLERY STRIKES INTO THE UNINHABITED "PENINSULA" OF CAMBODIA IN THE TRI BORDER AREA. (WE ALREADY HAVE AUTHORITY TO STRIKE IN THE LAOS PORTION, IF NECESSARY.)

2. I REALIZE FULLY THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DEPARTURE FROM PAST POLICY THE POSSIBILITY OF A SHARP OUTCRY BY SIHANOUK DESPITE HIS STATEMENT ABOUT REMOTE AND UNINHABITED AREAS; THE INJECTION OF THE ISSUE INTO THE PARIS TALKS AS A "UIDER ESCALATION" OF THE WAR AT A TIME WHEN WE ARE PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY URGING RECIPROCAL DEESCALATION; AND THE PROBABILITY OF RENEWED CHARGES FROM SOME QUARTERS AT HOME AND ABROAD, CASTIGATING THE SINCERITY OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS AT PARIS TO FIND A WAY TO PEACE.

3. I AM, HOWEVER, CONVINCED THAT THE ESCALATION BY HANOI SINCE JANUARY 30 POSES MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DANGERS TO OUR POSITION HERE AND AT THE BARGAINING TABLE, AND THAT WE MUST INFLICT THE MAXIMUM PUNISHMENT ON THE ENEMY WHEN THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF. WE MAY

~~TOP SECRET~~

I have asked Wheeler office for this

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 02 SAIGON 28267 251156Z

HAVE SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY IN THIS OPERATION. IT MAY NOT BE AS APPARENT IN WASHINGTON AS IT IS HERE THAT HANOI SINCE THE FIRST OF THE YEAR HAS BEEN MAKING A DESPERATE EFFORT IN I CORPS AGAINST QUANG TRI, HUE AND DA NANG. OF THE 5,662 US KILLED BETWEEN JANUARY 1 AND MAY 22, 3,173 WERE KILLED IN I CORPS, AND THE FIGHTING THERE IS CONTINUOUS AND HEAVY, WITH NO SIGN OF ABATING. (THESE FIGURES GIVEN ME YESTERDAY BY MACV COMBAT OPERATIONS ARE A LITTLE LOWER THAN THOSE THAT ARE IN WASHINGTON, BUT THE PERCENTAGES ARE THE SAME.) THE NVA HIGHLAND OPERATION AIMS AT A US DEFEAT IN THIS AREA, AND THE SEIZURE OF SOME PART OF THE HIGHLANDS FOR ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT AND AS A SPRINGBOARD FOR MAKING THE ATTACKS FURTHER SOUTH AND EAST. I AM ASSURED BY MACV THAT THE ATTACK WILL FAIL.

4. BUT IF THE ROUTED VIETNAMESE RETURN ONCE AGAIN TO THEIR BASES IN THE CAMBODIAN SANCTUARY FOR REGROUPING AND REPLACEMENT, AND WE ARE INHIBITED FROM CONVERTING A ROUT INTO A SMASHING VICTORY BY GOING AFTER THEM WITH AIR AND ARTILLERY SIX MILES INTO THIS SANCTUARY, THEN THEY WILL COME OUT AGAIN AND AGAIN. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF WE LET THEM

DO THIS IT ONLY PROLONGS THEIR HOPE OF EVENTUAL SUCCESS, PROLONGS THE WAR AND THE CASUALTIES; AND PROLONGS THE NEGOTIATIONS. AS I HAVE SAID, HANOI THINKS WE ARE TIRING OF THE WAR, THE COST, AND BURDEN AND THE CRITICISM; THAT WE ARE GOING TO BE LESS AND LESS INCLINED TO RETALIATE; AND THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO BE WILLING OR ABLE EVER AGAIN TO ESCALATE.

5. IF WE DEPART FROM OUR PRESENT POLICY IN THIS INSTANCE, AND WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS, IT MIGHT GIVE HANOI PAUSE AS TO WHETHER THEY ARE RIGHT IN THEIR GAMBLE AND ASSUMPTION THAT OUR POLICY CAN GO ONLY ONE WAY, I.E., TOWARD A FURTHER DEESCALATION. THEY MIGHT EVEN CONCLUDE THAT IF WE ARE PREPARED TO ATTACK CAMBODIAN TERRITORY AND FACE THE CRITICISM, THAT WE MIGHT WELL BE PREPARED TO GO BACK TO A FULL BOMBING OF THE NORTH.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 03 SAIGON 23267 251155Z

6. I RECOGNIZE THAT HANOI MIGHT THREATEN TO BREAK OFF THE TALKS IF WE HIT INTO CAMBODIA, BUT THEY MIGHT BE CONSTRAINED, FOR IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD BREAK OFF THE TALKS SIMPLY BECAUSE WE HIT CAMBODIA AND SIHANOUK OBJECTED, AND THEY WOULD SCARCELY ADMIT THAT THEIR FORCES ARE IN CAMBODIA. THE MOST HANOI IS THEREFORE LIKELY TO DO IS TO MAKE PROPAGANDA OF OUR ACTION.

7. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE MUST GRASP THIS NETTLE FIRMLY. OUR FORCES HAVE BEEN TAKING HEAVY CASUALTIES, PARTICULARLY IN I CORPS, SINCE JANUARY, AND PART OF THE REASON ARE THE CAMBODIAN AND LAOTIAN SANCTUARIES AND THE STEPPED-UP HANOI MILITARY EFFORT. I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE OF THE WAR AND NEGOTIATIONS LET THEM KNOW THAT WE ARE

NO LONGER GOING TO ALLOW THIS UNINHABITED AREA TO BE USED IN THIS FASHION. ONCE HAVING TAKEN THIS STEP HANOI WILL BE CONSCIOUS THAT WE MIGHT RETURN TO ATTACKS IN THIS AREA IF THEY PERSIST IN USING IT AS SANCTUARY. I RECOGNIZE THAT THE WAR WILL HAVE TAKEN ON A NEW DIMENSION EVEN AS WE ARE TALKING PEACE IN PARIS, BUT I AM CONVINCED THAT WE HAVE MORE TO GAIN THAN TO LOSE BY TAKING THIS STEP. IT WILL UNDERSCORE TO HANOI AND TO EVERYONE THAT WE ARE GOING TO SEE THIS THING THROUGH TO THE END AND THAT IF THEY MEAN TO STEP UP THE FIGHTING AND TALK, THAT TWO CAN PLAY AT THIS GAME. AND IF SIHANOUK OBJECTS, WE CAN USE HIS OWN WORDS THAT HE WOULD NOT MIND IF THE US ENGAGED IN HOT PURSUIT IN UNPOPULATED AREAS, AS AUTHORITY FOR OUR ACTION.

8. ACCORDINGLY, I HOPE THAT ALL THOSE IN WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH MAKING THIS DECISION WILL NOT DISMISS IT, BUT GIVE THE MOST SEARCHING AND SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO OUR RECOMMENDATION.

9. I THINK BOTH THESE MESSAGES SHOULD BE REPATED TO PARIS.
BUNKER

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

SECTION 1 AND 2 OF

35444

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
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Restow 03

~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN ~~EXCLUSIVE~~ SPECAT EXCLUSIVE 14986
FOR ADM SHARP INFO GEN WHEELER FROM GEN WESTMORELAND SEC 1 OF 14.
SUBJECT: SPECIAL FIRE AUTHORITY (U)
REF: COMUSMACV 40588 DTG 050815Z DEC 67 (TS)
1. (S) THE B-3 FRONT FORCES ARE AGAIN OUT FROM THEIR CAMBODIAN
TRI-BORDER SANCTUARY AND INTO KONTUM PROVINCE IN THE II CIZ. A
MAJOR BATTLE IS IMMINENT AND, IN FACT, MAY ALREADY HAVE BEGUN. WHEN
THE BATTLE IS OVER AND THE ENEMY IS DEFEATED,
HE PROBABLY WILL WITHDRAW INTO CAMBODIA TO REGROUP, REORGANIZE AND
GAIN A SANCTUARY IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO HIS WITHDRAWALS ON TWO PRE-
VIOUS OCCASIONS, THE LAST BEING THE BATTLE FOR DAK TO IN OCT/NOV 67.
2. (S) WE HAVE STUDIED THE RECORDS OF THESE WITHDRAWALS AND NOTE
THAT THE ENEMY TENDS TO BE A CREATURE OF HABIT. HE GENERALLY USED
THE SAME ROUTES TO WITHDRAW AS HE USED TO JOIN THE BATTLE, MANY OF
THE UNITS JOINING THE IMPENDING BATTLE TODAY WERE IN THE PREVIOUS
U ~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN LINDIS SPECAT
BATTLES, AND UNDOUBTEDLY, MANY OF THE MEN ON THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY
HAVE COME OUT FOR THE THIRD TIME. THIS IS RUGGED, NEARLY UNPOPULATED
COUNTRY, HEAVILY FORESTED, INTERSPERSED WITH TRAILS, AND WITH
RESTRICTED
ED AVENUES OF MOVEMENT; THEREFORE, WE EXPECT HIM TO AGAIN USE THE
ROUTES HE KNOWS.
3. (S) FROM OUR STUDY, AND FROM A DETAILED MAP TERRAIN ANALYSIS, WE
FEEL WE CAN PREDICT HIS PROBABLE WITHDRAWAL ROUTES AND CROSSING
POINTS INTO CAMBODIA WHEN HE IS DEFEATED IN THIS IMPENDING BATTLE.
4. (S) THE FOLLOWING IS A SCENARIO, BASED ON A PROJECTION OF ENEMY
CAPABILITIES, AND FRIENDLY FORCES AVAILABLE TO COUNTER THEM, OF THE
PROBABLE COURSE OF ACTION IN KONTUM PROVINCE DURING THE NEXT TWO TO

INFO: CJCS(GEN WHEELER)-5(1-5) DJS(GEN SPIVY)-1(6)
J3(GEN MEYER)-1(7) J5(VADM JOHNSON)-1(8) SACS(GEN DEPUY)-1(9)
CSA(GEN JOHNSON)-1(10) CNO(ADM MOORER)-1(11) CSAF(GEN MCCONNELL)-
1(12) CMC(GEN CHAPMAN)-1(13) FILE-1(14) HAF/CV

ADV CY NMCC/DDO/CJCS

PAGE 1 OF 6

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-66

By *Sj* NARA Date *7-16-01*

~~TOP SECRET~~

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
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THREE WEEKS:

A. THE ENEMY OBJECTIVE IS APPARENTLY KONTUM CITY, HOWEVER, POLEI KLEIG SF CAMP WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE OVERRUN BEFORE THE ENEMY CAN ASSURE A PENETRATION TO THE CITY, IT IS LIKELY THAT HE WILL ALSO TRY TO ELIMINATE SOME OR ALL OF THE FIRE SUPPORT BASES,

B. TO THE NORTH, THE ENEMY WILL PROBABLY TRY TO ELIMINATE BEN HET SF CAMP, THE MAJOR EFFORT ON BEN HET, WHICH MAY BEGIN AT ANY TIME, WILL PROBABLY BE ACCOMPANIED BY ATTACKS BY FIRE ON DAK TO, THESE ACTIONS WILL BE C

ORDINATED WITH THE DRIVE TOWARD POLEI KLEIG, FORCES
PAGES3 RUMSAW 1389U ~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN LINDIS SPECAT
AVAILABLE FOR THIS MISSION ARE THE 325C AND 1ST NVA DIVISIONS
SUPPORT--

ED BY ELEMENTS OF THE 40TH NVA ARTY REGT, WHEN THE TWO SF CAMPS HAVE BEEN OVERRUN, THE ENEMY FORCES WILL TURN SOUTH AND ATTACK KONTUM CITY FROM THE NORTH, IF THE ENEMY TIME TABLE SHOULD WORK ACCORDING TO PLANS, FORCES APPROACHING KONTUM CITY SHOULD CONVERGE FROM THE NORTH AND WEST FOR A TWO-PRONGED ATTACK, HE PROBABLY ANTICIPATES THAT THE CAMPAIGN WILL LAST AT LEAST A MONTH,

C. WHEN THE ENEMY COMMITS THE BULK OF HIS FORCES, HE WILL FAIL TO ACHIEVE HIS OBJECTIVES AND BE FORCED TO RETREAT TO PREPARED DEFENSIVE POSITIONS,

D. ONCE AGAIN HE PROBABLY WILL CONDUCT A SCREENING ACTION WITH ELEMENTS OF HIS FORCES, WHILE HIS MAJOR COMBAT UNITS DISENGAGE AND WITHDRAW, HEAVY REAR GUARD ACTION WILL BE CONDUCTED TO SLOW DOWN THE ATTACKING FORCES LONG ENOUGH FOR HIS MAJOR UNITS TO ESCAPE, THE 1ST NVA DIVISION CAN BE EXPECTED TO WITHDRAW TO THE SOUTHWEST GENERALLY ALONG THE DAK HODRAI VALLEY, THEN FANNING OUT TO THE WEST ON THE TRAILS LEADING TO THE BORDER, THE DIVISION PROBABLY WILL CROSS THE BORDER AT VARIOUS POINTS BETWEEN YB 7103 AND YB 7215, IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION COULD EVEN PROCEED ON DOWN THE DAK HODRAI VALLEY AND ENTER CAMBODIA NEAR BASE AREA 702,

E. THE 325C NVA DIVISION CAN BE EXPECTED TO WITHDRAW WEST SOUTHWEST GENERALLY PARALLELING THE DAK KAL VALLEY, THEN FANNING OUT ON THE TRAILS LEADING TO THE BORDER, THE DIVISION SHOULD CROSS THE BORDER AT VARIOUS POINTS BETWEEN YB 7310 AND YB 7523,

F. ONCE HE HAS CROSSED THE TRI-BORDER AREA, HE WILL HEAD FOR THE BIVOUAC AREAS, BASE CAMPS AND BUNKER COMPLEXES ESTABLISHED CLOSE

PAGE2 OF 6

35444

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~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

NODIS

TO THE BORDER ALONG THE ROUTE OF HIS NEW MOTORABLE ROAD COMPLEX, HE WILL STAY IN THIS AREA FOR A MAXIMUM OF A FEW DAYS BEFORE PENETRATING DEEPER INTO CAMBODIA TO THE NORTHERN RATTANKIRI PROVINCE, HIS TRADITIONAL DEEP SANCTUARY.

5. (48) CONFRONTED WITH AN AGGRESSIVE ENEMY WITH CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS AS INDICATED IN THE PRECEDING SCENARIO, AND IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT APPROXIMATELY 3 TO 4 WEEKS OF WORKABLE WEATHER CAN BE EXPECTED PRIOR TO THE ONSET OF HEAVY RAINS, THE DETERMINATION HAS BEEN MADE TO PRE-EMPT, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE BY INITIATING FRIENDLY OFFENSIVE ACTIONS IN KONTUM PROVINCE. TO THIS END, WE HAVE LAUNCHED AN INTENSIVE B-52 CAMPAIGN AGAINST ENEMY CONCENTRATIONS, STAGING AREAS, AND SUPPLY BASES IN THE HIGHLANDS. THIS HEAVY BOMBING, (OPN PLATTSBURG) WAS LAUNCHED ON 5 MAY 68, PEAKED ON 23 MAY 68. FROM 23 MAY 68, HARRING UNFORESEEN PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS IN OTHER AREAS, THE WEIGHT OF OUR B-52 EFFORT WILL CONTINUE TO BE ALLOCATED TO THIS OPERATION, BEGINNING 24 MAY 68, THE 3D BDE, 101ST ABN DIV, WILL DEPLOY FROM III CTZ TO THE DAK TO AREA RAISING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF FRIENDLY BATTALIONS IN KONTUM PROVINCE TO 11 US AND 3 RVNAF. UPON CLOSURE OF THESE FORCES ON OR ABOUT 26-27 MAY, A HELIBORNE ASSAULT OF APPROXIMATELY A BRIGADE SIZE WILL BE DIRECTED AGAINST ENEMY POSITIONS IN THE BEN HET AREA. THIS ATTACK, SUPPORTED BY MASSIVE B-52 AND TACTICAL AIR STRIKES WILL HAVE THE MISSION OF DESTROYING THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY AND OF FORCING HIM TO WITHDRAW TO HIS CAMBODIAN SANCTUARIES.

6. (49) THROUGHOUT THE ENEMY WITHDRAWAL FROM THE BATTLE AREA WE WILL EXERT EVERY PRESSURE TO KEEP HIM FUNNELED INTO THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS ENUMERATED PREVIOUSLY. IN ADDITION TO MAINTAINING PHYSICAL CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY UNITS AS THEY WITHDRAW, EVERY COLLECTION RESOURCE AT OUR DISPOSAL WILL BE UTILIZED TO THE UTMOST TO INSURE THAT WE KNOW WHERE HE IS AT ALL TIMES. SOME OF THESE ARE AIRBORNE REC.

7. (50) WE BELIEVE THAT BY UTILIZING THE ABOVE FACILITIES WE CAN PINPOINT ENEMY LOCATIONS IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA WITH REASONABLE

NODIS

PAGE 3 OF 6

35444

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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CONFIDENCE. IN FACT, WE BELIEVE THAT ANY TWO OF THE ABOVE RESOURCES, INDICATING ENEMY PRESENCE IN A CERTAIN AREA WOULD PROVIDE AT LEAST A 90PCT ASSURANCE FACTOR THAT THE ENEMY IS WITHIN AT LEAST A ONE OR TWO SQ KM AREA AND COULD BE CONFIDENTLY TARGETED.

8. ~~(S)~~ TARGETS OF REGIMENTAL-SIZE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY APPEAR WITHIN THE AREAS BOUNDED BY THE FOLLOWING COORDINATES:

A. FROM YB 7323 EAST TO YB 7623, SOUTH TO YB 7620 WEST TO YB 7320 AND NORTH TO YB 7323;

B. FROM YB 6920, EAST TO YB 7720, SOUTH TO YB 7717, SOUTHWEST TO YB 7515, WEST TO 7215, NORTH TO YB 7218, WEST TO YB 6918, THEN NORTH TO YB 6920;

C. FROM YB 7215 EAST TO YB 7415, SOUTH TO YB 7409, WEST TO YB 6909, NORTH TO YB 6913, EAST TO YB 7213, AND NORTH TO YB 7215;

D. FROM YB 7109 EAST TO YB 7309, SOUTH TO YB 7305, WEST YB 7205, SOUTH TO YB 7203, WEST TO YB 6803, NORTH TO YB 6806, EAST TO YB 7106, AND NORTH TO YB 7109;

9. ~~(S)~~ USUALLY RELIABLE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS REVEALED FIFTEEN UNITS JUST WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE BOUNDED AREAS ABOVE IN

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PAGE 4 OF 6

35444

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
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SECTION 2
3 5 4 4 4

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

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FM COMUSMACV
TO RUHKA/CINCPAC HAWAII
RUEKDA/JCS WASHINGTON
BT

NODIS

1. ~~TOP SECRET~~ NUFURN LINDIS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE 14986
FOR ADM SHARP INFO GEN WHEELER FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FINAL SEC OF II.
NOVEMBER, THE MONTH IN WHICH HE WITHDREW, IN OCTOBER THERE WERE
ONLY FOUR REPORTED SIGHTINGS AND IN DECEMBER, NONE AT ALL, IN
JANUARY AGAIN THE REPORTS INDICATED TWENTY-ONE AND HE ESTABLISHED
TWO BIVOAC AREAS. THIS HEAVY ACTIVITY INDICATED THE STATE OF
PREPAREDNESS FOR THE UPCOMING TET OFFENSIVE.
10. ~~(TS)~~ I AGAIN EMPHASIZE THAT THESE TYPES OF TARGETS TEND TO
BE FLEETING, THE ENEMY TENDS NOT, REPEAT NOT, TO OCCUPY THESE
BIVOAC AREAS AND REGROUPING POINTS FOR MORE THAN A FEW DAYS.
OUR REACTION TIME IS SUFFICIENTLY FAST THAT WE COULD MAKE A B-52
STRIKE AGAINST A CONFIRMED TARGET IN AS LITTLE AS THREE HOURS BY
DIVERTING FROM NEARBY PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED TARGETS, FOR PLANNED
TARGETS THE NORMAL TIME REQUIRED FOR STRIKE IS TWELVE HOURS AFTER
NOMINATION, TAC AIR TARGETS COULD BE HIT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER
NOMINATION.
11. ~~(TS)~~ OUR INTELLIGENCE IS CLOSE ENOUGH TO REAL TIME TO MEET
THE REQUIRED REACTION TIME HERE, BUT IT IS UNLIKELY TO PROVIDE THE
LEAD TIME NECESSARY TO SECURE APPROVAL FROM THE HIGHEST ECHELONS
BEFORE THE TARGET DISSIPATES. IT IS THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT
APPROVAL BE SOUGHT IN ADVANCE TO PURSUE BY FIRE (INCLUDING ARC
LIGHT, TAC AIR, AND ARTILLERY) TARGETS IN THE TRI-BORDER SANCTUARY
AREA OF CAMBODIA. THE SANCTUARY AREA IS MODIFIED SLIGHTLY FROM
THAT IDENTIFIED IN REFERENCE TO INCLUDE ALL THE CAMBODIAN
'PENINSULA' NORTH AND EAST OF YB 6100 (RATHER THAN YB 6200 AS IN-
DICATED IN REFERENCE). THE AUTHORITY WOULD BE USED ONLY IN EVENING.
UNFOLD GENERALLY AS PRESENTED IN THE ABOVE SCENARIOS, SHOULD THE
REQUESTED AUTHORITY BE GRANTED, TIMELY AND POSITIVE NOTIFICATION
WILL BE MADE PRIOR TO COMMENCING INITIAL CROSS-BORDER ATTACKS.

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PAGES OF 6

35444

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
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12. (TS) I HAVE DISCUSSED THE ABOVE RECOMMENDATIONS WITH
AMBASSADOR BUNKER, WHO WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORTS THE INITIATION OF
THIS ACTION, WHICH APPEARS TO MEET THE CONDITIONS MENTIONED BY
SIHANOUK TO BOHLES IN JANUARY 1968 FOR AREAS IN WHICH HE WOULD CLOSE
HIS EYES TO SUCH OPERATIONS, N

GP-3

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PAGE 6 OF 6

35444

~~TOP SECRET~~

5/28/68 - drafted by
Ed Hamilton 39

I know that most Americans share my concern about reports that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has voted to defer action on a bill ~~to join in~~ authorizing Special Loan Funds for the Asian Development Bank.

Pres file

This issue goes far beyond the question of tactics in Vietnam. It goes to the fundamental American commitment to help free Asia help itself to build a community of independent nations with a stake in peace and the strength to defend it. Whatever a man's view on the war, there is no acceptable excuse for deferring an action which

- would encourage the nation-building which is the only long-term basis for peace in Asia.
- must be more than matched by other donors before U. S. money could be used.
- would finance American exports only, with no drain on our balance of payments.

The forces of change at work in Asia will not be put off. If we act now, change can be progress. If we delay, it can be tragedy.

I urge the distinguished chairman and members of the Foreign Relations Committee to reconsider and to report out this vital bill at the earliest opportunity.

W. W. Restow

Draft -- May 28, 1968

Proposed Statement: Vance Talks

I talked with Ambassador Cyrus Vance at great length this morning.

He is home on consultation from Paris.

Profile

He described the exchanges which have taken place in Paris and gave me his evaluation of them.

The other side has sought to use these talks for two purposes.

First, to see if we could be pressured to stop the bombing completely in the southern Panhandle of North Vietnam without any compensatory action on their part. At the present time they are pouring men and supplies through this area at an unprecedented rate. The supplies go directly to the battle in South Vietnam. We are destroying about 20% of what is coming through to the South. Without our attacks, our men -- and our allies -- would be bearing that extra burden. It would be translated into casualties -- American, South Vietnamese, Australian, Korean, Thai and Filipino casualties. Our negotiators in Paris

have made clear that we cannot accept a total cessation of bombing unless it is met by an ~~appropriate~~ appropriate measure of reciprocity. That has been our position. It will remain our position.

Second, the other side has been using the occasion of these talks for wide-ranging propaganda. They have been unwilling to enter into serious, quiet discussions of the conditions for ending the bombing or other matters of substance. On the other hand, Amb. Harriman and Amb. Vance have been putting forward a series of constructive proposals, including the reestablishment of an effective demilitarized zone and the implementation of the Laos Accords of 1962. They have also indicated the principles we believe should govern a total settlement of the problem, including the withdrawal of forces from South Vietnam and a political settlement.

I discussed with Ambassador Vance and my other senior advisors the positions we should take in Paris in the future.

While our men deal with the Communist forces in the field, we shall

~~continue to see whether the North will be able to~~

continue patiently to see whether the Paris talks can yield constructive results. In our judgment, it is time to move from fantasy and propaganda to the realistic and constructive work of bringing peace to Southeast Asia.

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, May 28, 1968 - 8:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

It looks as if we haven't really lost
Peshawar.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Rawalpindi 5294

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01



Department of State

41a
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 112.

2

PAGE 01 RAWALP 05294 271049Z

22

ACTION SS 30

INFO NSCE 00, /030 W

R 270550Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI
TO SECSTATE WASHC 3683

~~SECRET~~ RAWALPINDI 5294

EXDIS

PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE

SUBJ: PESHAWAR

1. AT DINNER PARTY LAST FRIDAY NIGHT, THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR INFORMED ME THAT LATE THAT WEEK, AFTER PARLIAMENTARY STATEMENT, A QUOTE VERY HIGH PAKISTANI OFFICIAL UNQUOTE WHOM HE DID REPEAT NOT NAME AND I DID NOT RPT NOT PRESS HIM, HAD SAID TO HIM THAT THE GOP HAS EVERY INTENTION OF RESPONDING FAVORABLY TO A REASONABLE USG REQUEST FOR LIMITED RENEWAL OF PESHAWAR.

2. HE WENT ON TO OBSERVE THAT THE PAKS OFTEN SPOKE AND ACTED STRANGELY IN WAYS WHICH SEEMED TO HIS COUNTRY AND MINE TO BE CONTRARY TO THEIR OWN INTERESTS AND INTENTIONS, AND URGED THAT USG TRY TO UNDERSTAND THIS, MAKE ALLOWANCES FOR IT, AND FORGIVE THEM.

3. HE THEN EXPOUNDED AT SOME LENGTH ON THE ANTI-COMMUNIST AND PRO-WESTERN FEELING OF THE GOP.

4. I HAD A DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO CONVEY A MESSAGE.

5. I RESPONDED ONLY THAT THE GOP SOMETIMES MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR THEIR BEST FRIENDS TO HELP THEM.

6. LATER THAT EVENING I RECEIVED ALMOST IDENTICAL TREATMENT FROM INFORMATION MINISTER SHAHABUDDIN WITH RESPECT TO HIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-67
By Sj, NARA Date 7-16-01

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 RAWALP 05294 271049Z

GOVERNMENT'S PRO-WESTERN AND ANTI-COMMUNIST CONVICTIONS.
HE DID NOT RPT NOT REFER TO PESHAWAR.

7. MY ONLY RESPONSE TO SHAHABUDDIN WAS TO OBSERVE THAT HIS
GOVERNMENT FREQUENTLY CHOSE STRANGE WAYS TO SHOW ITS PREFERENCES.
OEHLERT

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INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~*Pres file*

Tuesday, May 28, 1968 - 8:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

This is quite a story:

- Post-Tet the Delta was the most upset and worrying region of South Vietnam;
- Thang, the new Corps Commander, went on the offensive and stayed there.
- Large caches of ammunition were captured.
- Despite the opening up of the countryside, the enemy had trouble recruiting.
- The distance is long for bringing in North Vietnamese recruits and ammunition.
- As this report indicates, the VC have little wallop left, as the monsoon rains are about to set in.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NIS-141-022.004/2
By jc, NARA, Date 11-2-09

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

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42a

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-56
By cbm, NARA, Date 9-13-01

The Enemy Situation in IV Corps

9. The current pattern of Viet Cong - initiated military activity in the delta provinces of South Vietnam's IV Corps suggests some degree of weakness in the position there of Communist military forces. Captured documents, prisoner interrogations, and [REDACTED] point to increased enemy difficulties in resupply and recruiting.

10. Since 18 February--with the exception of an early March assault on Ca Mau city--the over-all level of enemy-initiated activity has decreased significantly. The bulk of this activity has been concentrated on interdiction efforts against vital road

27 May 1968

I-2

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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and supply routes in addition to standoff attacks by fire. Even the rate and intensity of these actions, however, has been noted falling off in recent weeks. For example, the number of small unit attacks, including attacks by fire, averaged only about 20 per week for the last six weeks. This rate is less than, but close to, the pre-Tet level of attacks. In contrast, the rate for small scale attacks during March and early April averaged near 60 per week.

11. Several factors are probably involved in the decline in enemy military activity. With increased Communist emphasis on the northern half of the country and the Saigon area, it is possible that the enemy's delta forces have been ordered to fill their needs for supplies and reinforcements from local sources only. Large numbers of enemy arms and supply caches have recently been uncovered by allied sweep operations. Despite reports of new Communist weapons and North Vietnamese infiltrators in the delta, the Viet Cong forces there are undoubtedly experiencing difficulties in maintaining a fully effective combat-readiness posture. Furthermore, increased allied military coordination and aggressiveness under the direction of a new corps commander may have helped take the initiative away from the Communists. The allied operations, which have included new concepts and techniques of locating and destroying enemy concentrations of personnel and supplies, have inflicted continual losses, kept the enemy partly off balance, and denied him the ability to maneuver and mass his forces as easily as in the past.

12. Climate is probably also an important consideration currently for the Communists in the delta. The summer southwest monsoon season is approaching. The heaviest rainfall occurs in the delta between June and October.

13. It is also possible that the Viet Cong in the delta are attempting to conserve their energies and logistics for another round of large scale activity at a time of their choosing, possibly in coordination with other offensives expected in key areas of the country.

27 May 1968

I-3

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Breakfast with the President, Tuesday, May 28, 1968

AGENDA

1. Paris Talks as seen in Paris (Mr. Vance)
2. Bombing between 19th and 20th Parallels (Secys Rusk and Clifford, General Wheeler, Mr. Vance)
 - yes or no;
 - when;
 - where - first targets;
 - diplomatic actions required;
 - press handling.
3. Cambodian Problem (General Wheeler)
 - Report on Westy's request (Gen. Wheeler)
 - Views of Secy. Clifford and Secy. Rusk
 - Mr. Vance's reaction with respect to effect on Paris talks
4. Plans for Paris Friday session, May 31 (Secretary Rusk)
 - Souvanna's speech
 - Laos presentation
 - Other items
5. Paris Strategy in general, in weeks ahead (Secy. Rusk, Mr. Vance)
6. Congressional Leadership Meeting (The President)
 - Guidance.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWR:amc

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By rg, NARA, Date 6-4-92

44
INFORMATION

Monday - May 27, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith a letter of appreciation from Felipe Herrera for taking time to receive him last Wednesday.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Letter from Felipe Herrera, dated May 27, 1968.



INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20577

RESIDENT

May 27, 1968

44a
CABLE ADDRESS
INTAMBANC

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Mr. President:


By means of this letter I should like to reiterate to you my deep appreciation for our conversation of last Wednesday. It was for me personally a most memorable occasion.

I have related to my colleagues both on the Board of Executive Directors and on the senior Staff of the Bank the highlights of our conversation and your deep concern for the development of Latin America. Your complete grasp of the many facets of our operation was truly impressive. All of us here at the Inter-American Development Bank greatly appreciate the personal interest which you have manifested in our institution, especially in the face of the tremendous responsibility for the concerns of the whole world which rest upon you.

In accordance with our conversation I am preparing some material, which I am sending to your assistant, in the hope you may find it helpful in the ceremony for the signing of the bill or such other use you may deem appropriate.

Again my deepest thanks.

Respectfully yours,


Felipe Herrera