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45

INFORMATION

Monday - May 27, 1966

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Australia as a Potential Contributor to the Inter-American Bank

When Felipe Herrera saw you last Wednesday, you asked him to send you one-page memoranda on non-OAS countries which might contribute more to the resources of the Inter-American Bank.

Attached is the memorandum on Australia. He points out that Latin American countries have placed orders in Australia for pure-bred cattle and sheep and related services. These total some one-half million dollars, but could be expanded.

Under the new Bank policy, Australia is ineligible for new procurement unless it cooperates financially with the Bank. Felipe Herrera suggests a direct government or Bank loan totaling \$1 million as a starter.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

5/27/68

Memorandum from Felipe Herrera on Australia's contribution to the IADB.

RE: Australia - Possible Cooperation with Latin America through the Inter-American Development Bank

- 1.- Commercial and financial relations between Australia and Latin America in the past have not been very close. In essence, Australia and the countries of the Southern part of Latin America produce a range of similar export goods such as wool, meat, ores and wheat. However, Australia has surged ahead and, while still a net importer of capital, has been able to become a significant element among aid donors. This effort is particularly noticeable in relation to underdeveloped countries of South East Asia which so far has been the main direction of Australian aid. For example, Australia has subscribed \$85,000,000 in the capital of the Asian Development Bank.
- 2.- Nevertheless, there are good prospects for Australia becoming active in terms of cooperation to Latin America. Borrowers of the Inter-American Development Bank in Latin America have placed orders in Australia which, although so far amounting to somewhat less than one half million dollars, involve goods important to Latin America, such as purebred livestock to improve the breed of Latin American cattle and sheep, as well as services within the sphere of Australia fields of competence. The possibility of an expansion of such purchases exists.
- 3.- In the framework of the newly adopted procurement policy of the Inter-American Development Bank, by which purchases in developed countries not now members of the Bank are conditioned on financing made available by those countries, Australia has now become ineligible for new procurement, unless a formula can be found whereby the Bank can receive Australia's financial cooperation. Such cooperation could take several forms, among which, given the incipient stage of Australia's capital market, a direct Government or bank loan to the Bank might be the most viable one. The Bank would welcome an offer from the Australian Government which could visualize the implementation of such a loan and has made an appropriate proposal to the Australian Embassy in Washington. Another alternative might be the purchase of participations in the Bank's loans. In such a fashion, Australia would not only become eligible again for new procurement of IDB's borrowers, but would also be provided with a possibility of showing its interest in participating in the development effort of Latin America.
- 4.- It is believed that an appropriate arrangement would be one in which Australia initially provided financing to the Bank in an amount, say of US\$1 million, which would cover procurement to date, and which would be supplemented from time to time by additional finance relative to increased procurement in the future. At the same time, an offer of cooperation from Australia taking the form of providing technical assistance in fields of expertise prevalent in Australia would be most welcome.

May 1968

INFORMATION

Monday, May 27, 1968 -- 6:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

You should know Sec. Rusk went late this afternoon to Chicago to make a speech, with a quite high fever.

He'll be back after midnight.

He'll let us know about his condition -- and availability for breakfast -- about 7:30 a.m. in the morning.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

47

INFORMATION

Pres file

Monday, May 27, 1968 -- 6:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

You should know: Clark and Bus Wheeler have a 10:00 a. m. appointment tomorrow with Mahon's committee.

We should try to do our business with Cy by about 9:45 a. m.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN

Monday, May 27, 1968
6:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Averell underlines with Zorin "no evidence of restraint"; warns him we may go back to the 20th parallel; seeks via Zorin private talks with Hanoi; complains of Hanoi's rigidity.

Pro file

W. W. Rostow

Paris 14827 (DELTO 176)

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ PARIS 14827

Rostow

DELTO 176

N O D I S/HARVAN

FROM HARRIMAN

1. I CALLED ON ZORIN AT SIX O'CLOCK THIS EVENING FOR ABOUT AN HOUR'S TALK. WE STARTED BY DISCUSSING THE WAY THE TALKS WERE GOING. IN ANSWER TO HIS QUESTIONS, I TOLD HIM WE WERE MAKING NO PROGRESS. I EXPLAINED OUR POSITION ON BASIS FOR TALKS, AND READ HIM MY STATEMENT AT THIS MORNING'S MEETING ON THIS SUBJECT. I ALSO POINTED OUT MY REFERENCE TO NO EVIDENCE OF RESTRAINT WHICH I HAD TOLD HIM I WOULD MAKE CLEAR TO NORTH VIET-NAM AGAIN.

2. THIS LED TO A DISCUSSION ON THE PROPRIETY OF OUR ASKING RESTRAINTS FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, AND I INSISTED AGAIN THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE COULD NOT EXPECT FURTHER RESTRAINTS ON OUR PART, WHEN IN FACT THEY WERE INCREASING THEIR ATTACKS ON THE NORTHERN PROVINCES AND POURING MEN AND MATERIAL TO THE SOUTH. LATER I REFERRED ALSO TO ATTACKS ON SAIGON. I EMPHASIZED THAT THE TYPE OF PROPAGANDA SPEECHES BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COULD NOT LAST INDEFINITELY AND AGAIN SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT MAKE PROGRESS IF ONE OR TWO FROM EACH SIDE HAD INFORMAL PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS. I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT HE MIGHT FIND SOME WAY TO PUT THIS THOUGHT INTO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE EAR.

3. HE DEFENDED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION IN THE USUAL MANNER, AND DECLINED TO MAKE ANY SUGGESTION TO THEM. HE DID SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT WE MIGHT PROPOSE PRIVATE TALKS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By rc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

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-2- PARIS 14827, MAY 27

DIRECTLY TO THEM. HE SAID THEY PROBABLY WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL AT FIRST, BUT MIGHT LATER ON, DEPENDING UPON THE PROGRESS OF THE OFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS.

4. I THEN RECALLED TO HIM THAT IN ANSWER TO HIS CHARGE AT OUR LAST MEETING, I HAD DENIED ANY CHANGE IN THE PATTERN OF US BOMBING. I TOLD HIM THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD EXPLAINED TO DOBRYNIN ON MARCH 31ST THAT THE 20TH PARALLEL WOULD BE THE LIMIT OF BOMBING, WHEREAS IN FACT ZORIN MAY HAVE NOTICED THAT DURING THE PAST MONTH OR MORE, THERE HAD BEEN NO ATTACKS ABOVE THE 19TH PARALLEL. TODAY, IN ORDER TO KEEP HIM ACCURATELY INFORMED, I HAD TO TELL HIM THAT THE PATTERN MIGHT CHANGE BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF NORTH VIETNAM. TARGETS NORTH OF THE 19TH PARALLEL MIGHT BE HIT TO CHECK THE LARGE FLOW OF MEN AND MATERIAL TO THE SOUTH. I WAS NOT, HOWEVER, SUGGESTING ANY CHANGE FROM THE POSITION STATED BY THE PRESIDENT TO DOBRYNIN.

5. I TOLD HIM I WAS DISAPPOINTED IN THE EXAGGERATION AND FALSENESS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE STATEMENTS. THIS WAS HAVING A BAD EFFECT IN THE US AND WORLD WIDE BECAUSE OF THEIR OBVIOUS FANTASIES. HE COMMENTED THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DIDN'T THINK MUCH OF OUR POSITION.

6. HE WAS AGAIN CORDIAL BUT DODGED ANY RESPONSIBILITY. AS HE WAS SO INDEFINITE, I CONCLUDED BY ASKING HIM TO INFORM HIS GOVERNMENT THAT I WAS WORRIED BY THE ARROGANCE AND RIGIDITY OF THE NORTH-VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE AND TO EXPLAIN OUR CONCERN.
HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

pro file

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Monday, May 27, 1968 -- 5:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

You may be interested in a conversation today with 34(b)(1)

His theme: military victory for us in Vietnam is by no means ruled out, in the sense that we could emerge in a position virtually to dictate the terms for the political settlement in the South.

His argument:

1. Hanoi must produce a major result in the months ahead.
2. Militarily, they are not likely to produce a decisive result. In fact, we are likely to see a gradual decline in the quality and morale of their forces and of the VC cadre if the Communists do not achieve a major success pretty soon. (By way of example, see two attached reports.)
3. But for this to happen, they must be denied either of their two possible political routes to victory:
 - a U. S. cave-in;
 - a break-up of the Thieu government via political in-fighting.
4. Under the President's leadership, he has little anxiety about the position in the U. S. in the months ahead.
5. His greatest concern is Saigon politics. He fears that Thieu may overplay his hand against Ky, Thang, Vien, and the young Turks. Specifically, he fears Thieu may judge that Bunker could do more to bail him out of political trouble than Bunker could, in fact, deliver.
6. But, if Saigon holds together, he feels prospects are quite bright, looking ahead, despite the heavy fighting which will take place.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

47a

May 27, 1968

SUBJECT: Morale

The executive officer from a company of the 6th VC Battalion, captured on April 30, states that before Tet, morale was very high. Their battalion was up to strength in men and weapons and the political officer had the men very well prepared for the upcoming attack. Now, however, source said that morale was extremely low and the men were not at all anxious for another offensive. They are very afraid to fight in Saigon because of the results of the last encounter. The men who engaged in the Tet Offensive were very tired of fighting and the new recruits were disillusioned and did not think that they could win in Saigon because of past results. The last time they had trained very hard and were prepared for the offensive. Now they have not had the long months to prepare that they had before, they have lost weapons, and if they could not win during Tet when they were strong, they do not really believe that this attack will end any different than the last one. Their PO did not try to make them forget the last attack but tried to make them want to avenge their poor showing. Source stated that this had little effect on the men, however.

The 6th Battalion went into the Tet Offensive with approximately 360 men and returned to their base camp with about 85. Because of the results of the Tet Offensive, recruiting by local infrastructure VC groups had been very poor. Therefore, this unit had been forced to capture replacements for those men lost in the Tet Offensive. Source's company received from 50 to 60 KIAs in the last Tet Offensive and now has received about 40 replacements.

He did not consider his unit to be as effective as it should have been for the Tet Offensive. This unit had been resting in the jungle and training new recruits. However, most of the recruits were impressed into service and did not respond to the training to their utmost.

IR 6-028-1839-68

May 27, 1968

SUBJECT: Infiltration Problems

A personal notebook with entries dated from 10 February to 9 May 1968 by a political cadre of Unit D2 (possibly 2d Bn, 36th Regt, 308th NVA Div) reveals that in moving from MR III, NVN to Thua Thien Province and subsequently to Quang Nam Province, he traveled a total of 1,000 km in one month and six days; ten days by vehicle and 28 days on foot. The document further reveals that during the trip only 15 men were left behind at way stations as compared to other units which left 300 men behind and lost 60 who died.

The subject's notes state that the immediate mission of the Regiment was to construct a road to Hue City in preparation for large scale battles. This road would link with a road recently constructed by the enemy in the vicinity of the Perfume River. On 18 April 1968, the road construction was terminated and the unit prepared for a new mission.

During preparations, the unit encountered a serious desertion problem. The author states: Desertion is alarming. They deserted in masses.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5 ✓ NLJ 01-68
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By JCS/j, NARA, Date 1-5-01
8-2-01

Monday, May 27, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Profile

Attached for your approval is a draft note amending the 1951 U. S. -Danish Defense Agreement. Secretary Rusk has approved the note subject to your concurrence.

Since the B-52 crash in Greenland, the Danes have been pressing us to amend the Agreement. They have sought an absolute prohibition on nuclear overflights or the storage of nuclear weapons in Greenland. The 1951 agreement does not contain such a prohibition.

The Danes have now agreed to an exchange of notes amending the 1951 agreement making nuclear overflights and storage of nuclear weapons in Greenland subject to joint decision by the U. S. and Danish Governments.

Furthermore, John Leddy told the Danes orally that there may be a need for U. S. nuclear overflights under conditions of a grave and sudden threat that did not allow time to obtain the agreement of the Danish Government. The Danish Foreign Office has taken formal note of this statement.

The Danes have the right to request reopening the 1951 agreement at any time. By agreeing to this amendment:

- We will have the right to overfly or store nuclear weapons in Greenland subject to Danish approval (unilaterally in case of emergency); and
- We will avoid a full scale renegotiation of the 1951 agreement which covers our air base and radar installations in Greenland.

Paul Warnke at Defense and the JCS have cleared the amendment.

I concur in Secretary Rusk's recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____
Disapprove _____
Call me _____
[Signature]
MWG: rmm

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PROPOSED U.S. NOTE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5 +NLJ 01-68
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc/sj NARA, Date 8-2-01

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to the recent discussions between our two Governments regarding the request of your Government, made on February 26, 1968, that the U.S. and Denmark agree to supplement the Agreement of April 27, 1951 on the Defense of Greenland with respect to the storage of U.S. nuclear weapons in Greenland and the overflight of Greenland by U.S. aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.

As a result of these discussions, I have the honor to propose the following Agreement:

The United States Government assures the Government of Denmark that in the exercise of its rights and duties in accordance with the provisions of the agreement of April 27, 1951, concerning the defense of Greenland, it will not store nuclear weapons in Greenland or overfly Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons without the consent of the Government of Denmark.

If the foregoing proposal is acceptable to your Government, I have the honor to propose that this note and your reply to that effect shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments,

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

effective on the date of your reply, which shall form an integral part of the Agreement of April 27, 1951.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

L/EUR:ER^WBerlack:EUR/SCAN:EK^{EK}lebenov:mbw

~~SECRET~~

51

INFORMATION

Monday, May 27, 1968 - 4:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

You should know that Sen. Fulbright raised with Bill Macomber and his committee the possibility of having Cy Vance brief them on Wednesday morning.

Bill Macomber says that if we do this, he should also brief the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

If Fulbright is invited to the leadership meeting, that might do; but you may wish to give us your guidance at breakfast tomorrow morning.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 27, 1968
4:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith some thoughts of
Gen. Taylor's which you may wish
to read before breakfast tomorrow
morning.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 29, 1983
By *rg*, NARA, Date 6-4-92

52a

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-383

By , NARA, Date 8-12-93

~~SECRET~~

May 27, 1968

Mr. President:

May I submit a few afterthoughts to your Saturday luncheon meeting?

In the discussion of bringing our bombing back to the 20th parallel, it seemed to me that we became diverted by the argument that, based on reported truck killings, it is militarily preferable to concentrate our bombing on the southern end of the "funnel" rather than disperse it over all of North Viet-Nam. I do not happen to believe that this argument can be sustained but, at best, it is only marginally relevant to the basic issue at stake at this stage of the negotiations.

That issue is how long we should continue to submit to propaganda attacks in Paris while the enemy increases his acts of war in the South and we continue to restrain our acts of war in the North and U.S. casualties mount. I think that we have already demonstrated sufficient forbearance to satisfy those observers and critics who will ever be satisfied and it is time to return to the 20th parallel for two essential purposes: (1) to destroy the illusion of our adversaries that we are shackled by public opinion and internal constraints to the point that we have lost our freedom of action; and (2) to demonstrate to our own people who will otherwise soon become very restive, that we will not tolerate another Panmunjon which would be more humiliating this time than in 1951-53 if conducted to the piping of North Viet-Nam in the public exposure of Paris. Furthermore, the sooner we break the inhibiting chain that seems to be forming about us, the easier and less horrendous it will be to resume the full use of our primary persuader, the bombing of North Viet-Nam.

The lack of preparations of our public for the tough line which we must take is a hard fact with which we should deal at once. I would think that Vance's return should be openly related to our unhappiness over the unproductive nature of the first two weeks of talks and to our unwillingness to continue our unilateral restraints much longer. Abe Fortas made an excellent point about the opportunity which Paris offers as a forum for presenting our position on Viet-Nam to the world. But to exploit this opportunity requires organization and a full-time U.S. spokesman to present repeatedly all aspects of our policy and to correct the misapprehensions about it which are widely held in Europe and elsewhere. It is not just the events in Paris which need comment but the basic elements of our position such as the U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia, the U.S. strategy which we are pursuing to attain them, the meaning and consequences of the TET offensive, the contributions of South Viet-Nam to its own defense, our goals in the negotiations, etc. Harriman might continue to comment on the negotiations themselves and assign to Vance this background spokesman role which no one performs at present.

~~SECRET~~

But Paris is not the only available forum which needs persuasive spokesmen. George Ball in the United Nations should make at least a speech a week in support of our position. Every U.S. ambassador around the world should understand that a primary duty is to be the defender of our policy before the government to which he is accredited and the public of that country. We have never mobilized these overseas resources adequately in support of our case.

At home, you have indicated the actions you wish from your senior officials. But all unofficial help possible would, I am sure, be welcome. I do not know whether your attention has been called to the excellent pamphlet on negotiations (attached) prepared by Senator Douglas' Citizens Committee for Peace with Freedom in Viet-Nam. It should receive the widest possible distribution and use by the defenders of our case. (I like the expression in it that Ho Chi Minh thinks of negotiations as another weapons system.) A little encouragement to the distinguished authors of the pamphlet might get them on public platforms to repeat and emphasize their written views.

In summary, I recommend:

- a. Make warning sounds on Vance's return.
- b. Resume bombing to the 20th parallel shortly thereafter.
- c. Designate and energize qualified spokesmen to defend our case in Paris, United Nations and in every embassy abroad.
- d. Exploit the Douglas Committee and similar unofficial sources of support.
- e. In doing these things, establish beyond any doubt that we will not accept another Paravunjom; that if we are to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam and all other acts of war, the enemy must concurrently stop the terror in the South and all other acts of war; that if the game is fight and talk, we will do both to the fullest of our capabilities.

M. D. T.

Citizens Committee for
PEACE WITH FREEDOM
in Vietnam

For P.M. RELEASE
MAY 23 1968

NEGOTIATIONS

Hopes vs. Realities

**Statement of the
Special Committee
on
Negotiations
of the
Citizens Committee
for
Peace with Freedom
in Vietnam**

NEGOTIATIONS

Hopes vs. Realities

The United States welcomes negotiations which offer a hope of peace with freedom and honor in Vietnam—a responsible and durable settlement of this long, bloody and costly war. But negotiations are merely a beginning to an end. And the end is not yet in sight.

The road to a negotiated settlement of the war in Vietnam is likely to be long and hard. It is likely to twist and turn and take agonizing detours. And we face the unhappy prospect of continued bloodshed. A cease-fire is more likely to come at the end than at the beginning of a negotiating process.

* * *

We should not be discouraged or deceived by rhetoric. It is not **how** Hanoi says something; it is **what** it says . . . and, more importantly, does.

Negotiations will be desirable if they lead to a mutual de-escalation of the conflict, and if they advance the prospect of achieving our minimum objectives. They will be dangerous and undesirable if they develop into a long drawn-out sequence of meaningless round-table discussions while our fighting men continue to pay, under conditions made more difficult by our restraint, a high daily toll of death and disability.

Negotiations will be insupportable if Hanoi escalates its military effort in the face of the reduction in ours. We must bear in mind that once negotiations begin, the pressure

to continue them will be infinitely more insistent on us than on them. We are highly responsive to domestic and to world opinion; Hanoi is far less responsive to both.

Our objectives

Our minimum objectives in Vietnam must be kept clear and we must state them repeatedly and with precision. **We seek the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack.** Nothing could be simpler or clearer than that.

- The South Vietnamese either freely choose their own government or they do not.
- The aggression from the North either ends or it does not.
- The North either takes over the South or it does not.

With this series of alternatives, it will not be difficult to know whether, and to what extent, we have succeeded or failed.

Negotiations and peace

There is no necessary equation between negotiations and peace. Negotiations are not an end in themselves—they are only a possible means to an end.

Regretfully, our Committee feels obliged to express its fear that many American citizens have been misled both by supporters and opponents of our commitment in Vietnam to place too high a value on negotiations or on "talks" in themselves—and to expect too much, too soon.

Americans think of negotiations as the road to peace but there is unmistakable evidence that Ho Chi Minh thinks of negotiations as another way to fight a war—in effect, as another weapons system. Too many Americans think the question is fight **or** negotiate. The enemy, on the other hand, has developed a consistent policy of fight **and** negotiate.

Hanoi's Deputy Chief of Staff, General Vinh, starkly enunciated this policy in a speech to the Fourth Congress of the Viet Cong: "We will take advantage of the opportunity of-

ferred by the negotiations to stop up further our military attacks . . . the decisive factor lies on the battlefield. In fighting while negotiating, the side which fights more strongly will compel the adversary to accept its conditions."

Panmunjom experience

Our experience at Panmunjom is eloquent testimony to the enemy strategy and a clear warning to us. While Korean negotiations dragged on for two years*—with an enemy record of duplicity, deceit and deliberately abrogated agreements—we suffered 62,000 additional casualties with almost 13,000 dead. And there is yet no true peace in Korea.

We must adopt a realistic attitude toward negotiations, not allowing our hopes and our expectations to outrun harsh realities. Negotiations will be neither valuable nor productive unless both sides feel that it is in their interest to end the conflict and negotiate a settlement of the issues. Even though our military progress has been considerable, we cannot expect to win at the conference table what we have not won on the battlefield. Equally, we must avoid losing at the conference table what we have fought so hard, and given so much, to protect.

American resolution

The pattern of negotiations will reflect the military, economic and political strength of the opposing forces in Vietnam. One of the greatest of these strengths is resolution—the determination to see the struggle through

* The opening session of the truce negotiations was held on July 10, 1951. The Armistice was reached on July 27, 1953. The delegates held 159 plenary sessions, 26 at Kaesong and 133 at Panmunjom. The three subdelegations held 179 additional meetings. The Staff and Liaison officers met 427 times. In all, there were 765 meetings. The various sessions and meetings were recessed 20 times, once for 199 days. 966 hours were spent in face-to-face negotiations with the Communists. The transcript of the Armistice Conference comprises 3 bound volumes, each an inch and one-half thick. The records pertaining to the negotiations occupy 52 library boxes totaling 17 cubic feet.

—and the communication of that determination to the enemy. We would be foolish to expect Hanoi to negotiate a mutually satisfactory settlement of the war if their leaders believe that the resolution of the United States and South Vietnam is failing. Thus, one of the greatest threats to successful negotiations is that Hanoi may underestimate America's resolve.

We must unceasingly make it clear to Hanoi that we do not seek nor will we accept a camouflaged surrender which would inevitably result in the United States "writing off" Southeast Asia for the foreseeable future. We could survive such a catastrophe—but our citizenry should be clear that the whole security system, which has maintained peace and freedom for the past generation, would be eroded—if not destroyed—by an American retreat from our commitments in Southeast Asia. We would become a relatively isolated and less influential nation. Further, our withdrawal would be followed by the massacre of hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese who have stood by our side. On moral grounds alone, this cannot be permitted.

Time and cost

Our opponents view the conflict as being fought in two principal areas—time and cost. They appear convinced that both factors are now working in their favor.

Time: America appears impatient to end the war. We think in terms of weeks and months. Hanoi thinks in terms of years and decades.*

* Mao Tse-tung long ago gave us, in his own words, a capsule definition of our opponents' consistent strategy:

- "Enemies advance, we retreat
- "Enemies halt, we harass
- "Enemies tire, we attack
- "Enemies retreat, we pursue."

The tactics vary; the strategy remains the same.

John K. Fairbank, America's noted Asian scholar, has said: "Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues are committed to permanent revolutionary struggle rather than to an interlude of war terminated by formal peace."

Cost: We appear unwilling to pay the continuing costs of the conflict. They appear resigned to their proportionately far heavier costs, particularly in human casualties. To us an American life is above price; the enemy spends lives as we spend dollars.

In both areas—time and cost—impatience may indeed be our deadliest enemy.

If this is a reasonable analysis, the chances for productive negotiations would not appear to be substantial at this time. Hanoi's willingness to engage in genuine negotiations is, in our judgment, inversely related to their estimate of their military-political progress.

Nevertheless, America and its allies should painstakingly explore, for a reasonable time, every possible avenue of securing an honorable resolution of the conflict.

Peace with freedom

One cannot over-emphasize **what we do not seek** in Vietnam; we do not seek the surrender of North Vietnam or to destroy it or its people. Rather, we seek freedom for South Vietnam and an end of the aggression directed from the North. We fight for peace with freedom and honor.

We hope to see a South Vietnam which is free, united, independent, politically stable and economically expanding. To the degree that these longer range goals are attained, we will have achieved our "victory."

"Instant" victory is, unfortunately, not available to us on the battlefield or at the negotiating table. In both arenas, we must beware of impatience, disillusionment, and extremist and simplistic answers to complex problems. Particularly, if negotiations should break down, we must re-survey our position and weigh carefully the danger of over-reacting and of sharply escalating our military effort in search of a quick "victory." "Winning" in Vietnam at the expense of losing our position in the world would be a Pyrrhic triumph.

America has, by its unilateral de-escala-

tion of the conflict, demonstrated to the world our devotion to peace. It would now seem both prudent and warranted for us not to make further concessions without reciprocal, although not necessarily simultaneous, acts from the other side.

Mutual de-escalation is by definition a two-way street. Hanoi cannot always take and never give; always demand everything and never concede anything. A sequence of unilateral concessions by us, not reciprocated by Hanoi, would be the road to surrender.

Coalition government

We believe there is one thing that the United States should not do. We should not exert pressure on South Vietnam to accept a coalition government.

Any representation of the National Liberation Front in the political structure of South Vietnam should occur as a result of a free political choice expressed by the South Vietnamese themselves. All citizens of South Vietnam can fully participate in the democratic process—on a one man-one vote basis—without the foreign imposition of a coalition government. History is replete with examples of Communist takeovers of governments by obtaining control of key ministries such as defense, justice, police and propaganda. Indeed, Czechoslovakia is only now emerging from twenty years of totalitarianism following a "coalition government."

A world in conflict

Finally, America must not expect too much to flow from a resolution of the conflict in Vietnam. We live in a world of great antipathetic historical forces. There is no early prospect for world peace in the traditional sense. There is conflict in today's world and conflict—political, economic or even military—will unquestionably continue at various levels and in various places for the foreseeable future.

Our basic continuing objective is to hold such conflict within the bounds that permit

the survival of mankind. That is why we adhere to our generous and farsighted policy—the willingness to fight a limited conflict, with limited means, at limited risk for limited objectives.

The success or failure of that policy may well be decisive in shaping not only the destiny of South Vietnam and of Southeast Asia but of the entire world.

Signed:

Omar N. Bradley

Lucius D. Clay

James B. Conant

Paul H. Douglas

Roscoe Drummond

Dwight D. Eisenhower

John W. Hanes, Jr.

Mary P. Lord

Archbishop Lucey

Franz Michael

Ithiel de Sola Pool

Leverett Saltonstall

Henry P. Van Dusen

Eugene P. Wigner

May 1968

THE CITIZENS COMMITTEE

Who we are

Our committee is national and non-partisan—it is composed of Democrats, Republicans and Independents, and of "liberals," "moderates" and "conservatives" drawn from all sections and all sectors of our country.

We are incorporated as a non-profit organization. Membership is limited to those in private life. It is open to any private citizen who shares our views but it is not our purpose to solicit a mass membership or to circulate petitions or to sponsor or participate in rallies or demonstrations.

The Committee has no organizational affiliates. All members serve in their individual capacities.

What we stand for

We are a group of concerned citizens who seek peace *with* freedom in Vietnam.

We are opposed to surrender, however camouflaged. Yet nothing we advocate can be interpreted as unnecessarily risking a general war in Asia or a nuclear war in the world. We favor a sensible road between capitulation and the indiscriminate use of raw power.

We believe that, in this, we speak for the great "silent center" of American life, the understanding, independent and responsible men and women who have consistently opposed rewarding international aggressors from Adolph Hitler to Mao Tse-Tung. And we believe that the "silent center" should now be heard.

Our aim is to be the voice of those who support the bi-partisan fundamentals of American foreign policy—to speak for the "silent center."

How we operate

Our principal activity is educational, to in-

form the American people on the Vietnam situation in its many complex phases.

Finances

The Committee's activities are wholly financed by voluntary contributions from concerned citizens. We hope that you will want to help to make our work effective.

Contributions to the Committee are tax deductible.

Checks should be made out to "Committee For Peace with Freedom" and sent to: 1028 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036.

Publications of the Committee:

1. "Peace With Freedom", policy statement of the Committee.
2. "How The Silent Center Will Seek Peace With Freedom", by Paul H. Douglas.
3. "The Nation's Editors Speak Up on Peace With Freedom and The Silent Center", Editorial reactions to the Committee.
4. "A Balance Sheet on Bombing", Statement of the Special Committee on Bombing Policy.
5. "The Nation's Press Discusses 'A Balance Sheet on Bombing'."
6. "Negotiations—Hopes vs. Realities", Statement of the Special Committee on Negotiations.

Citizens Committee for
PEACE WITH FREEDOM
in Vietnam

1028 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
Telephone: Area Code 202-659-1145

A non-profit, non-partisan
organization founded in October 1967
by private citizens, including:

Harry S. Truman

33rd President of the United States

Dwight D. Eisenhower

34th President of the United States

Organizing Chairman:

Former Senator Paul H. Douglas.

Co-Chairmen:

General of the Army Omar N. Bradley.

Archbishop Robert E. Lucey.

George Meany.

Vice Chairman:

Mrs. Oswald B. Lord.

Director:

Charles Tyroler II

Deputy Director:

Abbott Washburn.

Treasurer:

Huntington Harris

53

ACTION

See file

Monday, May 27, 1968 -- 4:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Gen. Westmoreland plans to arrive at Andrews Air Force Base at noon on Thursday, May 30.

He leaves Vietnam some time on the 29th, goes to Korea and to Yokota, Japan. (This last stop is a very brief one.) He now plans to come directly from Yokota to Andrews.

The estimate here is that it would take about 1 hour longer to get to Texas, depending on where he would fuel. (Some places take up to 2 hours to fuel.)

If he goes to Texas, he might change his route. Would you like Bus Wheeler to talk with Gen Westmoreland tonight about this?

Mrs. Westmoreland does not plan to come with him this time.

W. W. Rostow

Have Bus Wheeler talk with Westy_____

No_____

Call me_____

rln

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 27, 1968, 3:45 P.M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Profile

SUBJECT: Czechoslovakian Influence Seeping into East Germany

1.5(cc)
3.4(b)(1)

Communist officials in East Germany are uneasy about the effect which developments in Czechoslovakia are having in their country. even East German Communist Party members are wondering about what effect the changes in Czechoslovakia will have on their communist state. The following specific instances illustrate the extent of the East German communist leaders' problems:

1. Communists returning to East Germany from weekend trips in Czechoslovakia report that the Czechs are saying their government is now more democratic, more humane, allows greater free speech. One party leader suggested that only true communists be permitted to take vacation and weekend trips to Czechoslovakia so that only a "clear Marxist viewpoint would be taken by East German visitors in discussions with Czechoslovakian citizens."

When the Czechoslovakian tour leader boarded a bus filled with East German tourists at the border, he greeted the occupants by saying, "My dear followers of Ulbricht, you are now entering a free country. Here you can express your opinion freely and no one will lock you up."

2. Persons living on the border are doubtful that the Soviet troops in their area are there to participate in a maneuver, as the press reports, but believe that the Soviet forces have been deployed to the Czech frontier in an effort to control the changes taking place in Czechoslovakia. Some East Germans say they do not understand why their troops should intervene in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia.

3. Many East Germans are listening to radio broadcasts originating in Prague because they doubt that they are getting the facts on the Czechoslovakian situation from East German stations.

4. Students are closely following events in Czechoslovakia, Poland, West Germany and France. One student said there is a critical situation in the socialist camp and that perhaps East Germany is the next country where the youth will rebel.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-57
By cm, NARA, Date 12-4-01

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Rostow

55

ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

Monday, May 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Empress of Iran Can't Come to Dinner

2 Pres file

The Shah's warm answer (attached) to your invitation regrets that the Empress still won't be able to come. She is most grateful.

His response leaves you free to go back to the earlier plan of a small (10-14) working lunch if you believe that would be more productive than another large dinner. We would draft a message highlighting the opportunity for discussion with you and your closest advisers.

If you wish my view, I'd lean toward the smaller affair*. But I believe the Shah will respond well to either, so the choice depends completely on your preference.

W. W. Rostow

Schedule dinner June 11 _____

5/27/68

Prefer small lunch June 12 _____

Call me _____

**That's a stiff view. I have no strong personal feeling. And I see some good in your giving a fine party for an old friend.*
W

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 6-7-92

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/EXDIS
MESSAGE FROM THE SHAH

"Dear Mr. President:

I would like to thank you most cordially for your thoughtful message in which you and Mrs. Johnson have very kindly extended an invitation to the Empress to come to the White House for dinner on June 11. The Empress is most deeply touched by your and Mrs. Johnson's very friendly gesture. However, unfortunately owing to a previous engagement on that day and due to the fact that she had not originally planned to accompany me on my forthcoming visit to the United States of America, the Empress will to her deep regret be unable to partake of your hospitality at this time. She has asked me to convey to you Mr. President and to Mrs. Johnson the expression of her heartfelt gratitude and sincere good wishes. Meanwhile I look forward with pleasure to our meeting next month and send you my warmest regards. Sincerely, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi Dated May 26, 1968."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/EXDIS

ACTION

Monday, May 27, 1968 - 3:10 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Presidential Unit Citation for Australian Company's Performance in Vietnam

In accordance with your instructions here is a Presidential Unit Citation for an Australian unit.

Subject to your approval we have worked out the following scenario with the Australians:

- 1. The citation to be given by you privately to Gorton at your 11:30 a. m. meeting tomorrow. No public remarks required. (Gorton's schedule is very tight tomorrow morning.)
- 2. A simultaneous press release embargoed for use until 7:00 a. m. EST, Wednesday morning, which the Australians think will give the announcement a big play in the Australian morning press.

I recommend that you sign the citation and approve the above scenario.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

MWright:wpt

ACTION

57

Monday, May 27, 1968 -- 1:15 p. m.

Free file

Mr. President:

Herewith, as instructed, a draft speech for Glassboro. I am sending a copy to Sec. Rusk for intensive work in the State Department.

W. W. Rostow

wwrostow:rln

Second Draft - W. W. Rostow (5/27/68)
President's Speech at
Glassboro State College
June 4, 1968
Total words _____

I

I am glad to be back at Glassboro.

A year ago, over a June week end, I came here twice -- on a mission of reconciliation and peace.

For peace -- stable peace -- is the purpose of our foreign policy:

- We honor our commitments in the face of aggression, because there can be no peace if aggression succeeds.
- We join with others in assisting developing nations, because without economic and social progress in the world community, there can be no peace.
- We encourage and assist others to organize the various regions of the world so that their stability and their cooperation can contribute to peace.
- We steadily support the United Nations -- wherever and

whenever it can be effective -- because it is a basic instrument for peace.

But, in the end, peace also requires that we -- we Americans -- play our part in moving towards reconciliation and cooperation with those who have in the past made themselves our adversaries.

II

That is why I came to Glassboro to meet with Chairman Kosygin. Sitting in the living room of President Robinson's house, we talked mainly about four matters:

- The Non-Proliferation Treaty;
- The need for U. S. -Soviet negotiations to damp down the nuclear arms race in strategic weapons;
- The Middle East;
- Vietnam.

What was the result of our talks? How far have we moved in this year?

In January 1964 -- more than four and a half years ago -- I instructed our negotiators actively to seek a non-proliferation treaty.

The treaty has three major purposes:

- To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons;
- To permit all nations the peaceful uses of the atomic
without fear that atomic materials will be diverted to
the production of nuclear weapons; and
- To give new impetus to negotiations to halt the arms race
in strategic weapons -- and in conventional weapons as well.

The United States and the Soviet Union have worked closely to bring about this treaty; and I believe the talks I had with Mr. Kosygin here contributed to that common effort.

But this is not a matter solely -- or even primarily -- between the United States and the Soviet Union. We are working on a treaty which touches the life of every nation in the world and the life of every human

being. And so we have had to talk with understanding and to negotiate with others, taking their legitimate interests into account.

It is possible that on this very day the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly will vote on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I would not wish to anticipate that vote; but there is reason to hope that the overwhelming majority of the members will commend the Treaty to the General Assembly.

We shall still have some distance to go before we have achieved a world of non-proliferation. But, if we achieve it -- and if we sustain it in the years ahead -- the Treaty will be humanity's most creative step forward since the Atomic Age was born.

III

As I told Mr. Kosygin at Glassboro, in our view the United States and the Soviet Union -- as sponsors of the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- have a special urgent duty to turn down the nuclear arms race. We in

the United States have long been ready to set a time and a place for such discussions. Those nations which are being asked to forego the production of nuclear weapons -- in their own interest and in the common interest -- are urging the United States and the Soviet Union to get on with the job of stabilizing and reducing the level of nuclear arms -- in our interest and in the common interest.

This is a legitimate view. We share it. We are ready to play our part right now.

IV

With respect to the Middle East, this has been a year of frustration for all of us. The peoples of that region and the whole world know that peace is endangered unless we can find a way to move from the cease-fire lines of the present and the truce lines of the past to a stable settlement in the area. Hope is certainly not lost. The Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, was unanimously agreed. Ambassador Jarring

is still in contact with the parties. It is a year almost to the day since war broke out in the Middle East -- a year of danger and anxiety for the nations of the region -- a year in which the peoples were denied the peace and progress they want and deserve.

Now -- right now -- in the days ahead is the time to come to grips with the problems and to solve them. This is the summer -- the summer of 1968 -- in which the government and peoples of the Middle East should firmly decide that their future lies with justice and peace and progress for their peoples, not in a perpetuation of belligerency and fear and hostility.

V

Finally, Vietnam. In this year since the meeting at Glassboro, we have moved -- I hope and pray -- a little closer to peace in Southeast Asia; but there is still a long, hard road ahead. We are talking in Paris, but all the other side has had to say to us, in effect, is this:

Stop the rest of your bombing and let the hundreds of truck-loads of men and supplies you are now destroying, through to South Vietnam so that we may kill more of your men and more of the South Vietnamese and their allies.

This is a position which I rejected on March 31st. We shall continue to reject it. An honorable peace demands reciprocity: and we are only interested in an honorable peace. And so the effort of North Vietnam to take over the political life of South Vietnam by force and coercion continues and expands. The talks have not yet revealed the slightest readiness by the other side to build together with us and with others a solid framework of peace and order in Southeast Asia.

But soon or late -- and all humanity prays it is soon -- the men in Hanoi must give up their fantasies and grapple with the real problems of ending the bloodshed and building peace in Southeast Asia. Until that day, we shall stand fast -- patiently, hopefully -- but strong and steady and unafraid.

VI

Looking back over this year, there are two lessons we can draw.

First, making peace is a long, slow, hard business. As I said a month ago, on another occasion: "We often think about peace as an absence of war. But, in fact, peace is a struggle, an achievement, an endless effort to convert hostility into negotiation, bloody violence into politics, and hate into reconciliation."

The second conclusion is that progress towards peace is possible.

-- We are much further forward on the Non-Proliferation Treaty than we were a year ago.

-- We are, it is to be hoped, considerably further forward in making peace in the Middle East.

-- On Vietnam, we are, at least, talking as well as fighting; and that is better than merely fighting.

-- And I would hope that we are closer to the day -- very close

to the day -- when the United States and the Soviet Union
can sit down and examine together the ways to limit the
costly and dangerous arms race in nuclear weapons.

VII

There is another lesson I would draw from our talks at Glassboro
and from our experiences since. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United
States has the power to make peace in the world by itself -- or even when
we act together on a simple bilateral basis.

This is not a bipolar world, dominated from Washington and Moscow;
and that is good. The nations of the world have been gathering strength --
some of it as the result of the assistance given to them by the American
people. They are increasingly determined to shape their own destiny in
the light of their own history, their own culture and their own ambitions
for the future. A world of diversity is emerging in the last third of the
Twentieth Century. And that is what we wish to see.

But just as democratic freedom within our society carries with it responsibility, so the increasing independence of nations within the world community carries with it increased responsibility. And perhaps the greatest part of that responsibility is to settle their quarrels rather than to perpetuate them.

Peacemaking is a task for all -- on every continent: in Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East, in Africa, in Latin America.

In 1965 a statesman sent me this message:

"I have not been in politics long; but I have learned that it is easier to keep an old quarrel alive than to settle it. Nevertheless, I shall settle it."

I might add that he did. His name was President Park; and the problem was the normalization of South Korea's relations with Japan. Now is the time for many others to follow the creative lead of President Park and his Japanese neighbors.

In the months and years ahead it is the duty of statesmen everywhere to lean away from the easy course of perpetuating old hostility, old fear, old hatred -- and to bring about the reconciliation and peace that all the peoples want and need and deserve.

The United States and the Soviet Union cannot settle all these matters by merely talking together. But we can do a great deal by talking and understanding each other deeply; by moving in parallel where our vital interests permit; and by working in solid collaboration where it is possible -- as it has proved to be on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

We must remember that we are the two greatest industrial powers in the world. We are also the two greatest nuclear powers. The population of the Soviet Union and the United States, taken together, constitutes less than fifteen percent of the three billion human beings who inhabit the earth. But our two nations have great duties to the human family.

A part of that duty is to complete the four great enterprises about which Mr. Kosygin and I spoke a year ago: a Non-Proliferation Treaty; strategic arms talks; peace in the Middle East; peace in Southeast Asia.

VIII

But we should also continue to demonstrate in other fields what we have demonstrated, in fact, in the year that has passed. This has been the year in which we have completed work on an Outer Space Treaty; an agreement on assistance to astronauts; a Consular Convention; and an agreement that will permit Soviet planes to land in New York and our planes to land in Moscow.

The bases for conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States have by no means been wholly removed. We remain at cross-purposes on many matters. Nevertheless, we have demonstrated that we can in part -- on some occasions -- on some issues -- behave like the two most responsible members of the family of nations. We have set an example

by negotiating important bilateral agreements. Together we used the hot line to limit the conflict in the Middle East and to bring about a cease-fire. In outer space and in non-proliferation we worked with others to provide areas of order and rationality in human affairs.

IX

There are other fields in which we ought, working with others, to lead the way.

Scientists from this country and the Soviet Union -- and from some fifty other countries -- have already embarked on the International Biological Program to add to our understanding of how man's actions and nature's reactions impact on each other.

But, because the problems are complex, because some of them are global, I see the need for a continuing international body concerned with these matters.

I, therefore, propose

That the United States, the Soviet Union, and others form
an "International Board on the Human Environment."

Its mission: To assure the survival of the natural environment so
that man himself can survive within that environment.

The Board's ultimate purpose would be to propose standards and
regulations that may be needed to protect the human environment from
man-made dangers.

I have asked my Science Adviser, Dr. Donald Hornig, and Dr. Frederick
Seitz, President of the National Academy of Sciences, to sit down with
their colleagues in the Soviet Union to discuss this proposal at an early time
and to see if we cannot propose it jointly.

There is another common danger and common task: strengthening
the defenses of the human family against nature's anger.

In 1964 I said that "By working together, on a global basis, we can
take new strides towards coping with the historical enemies of storm

and drought and flood. "

The United States and the Soviet Union are, indeed, now working together with other countries in the World Weather Program which looks towards better warning of storms.

But the bitter experiences of many countries around the globe during the first six months of this year make clear what angry nature can do to man.

-- Earthquakes in Sicily and Greece, in Iran, Japan and
New Zealand.

-- Cyclones and tidal waves in Burma.

-- A volcanic eruption in the Philippines.

This list of places where -- in just six months -- nature has brought loss of life, made families homeless, destroyed crops, crushed human hopes, makes clear that we must work harder to meet two needs:

-- Step one. We should pool and share our experience and knowledge about natural disasters -- and how to prepare for them -- and how to relieve their effects. This might be done at an international conference, possibly sponsored by the United Nations. Planning for such a conference should start promptly.

-- Step two. We should support establishment of a new International Natural Disaster Preparedness and Relief Office. This office might be placed in the United Nations. Its mission should be to coordinate the manifold activities which are now carried forward to speed preparedness before disaster and to speed relief in the aftermath.

-- Step three. The United States, the USSR and others should follow the lead of smaller countries in earmarking emergency units of medical experts or other experts or supplies or transports to be moved rapidly to disaster-stricken countries.

So that this humanitarian effort can get under way as soon as possible,

Ball
I am asking Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Ball to initiate now the

necessary political consultations with the Soviet Union and other countries.

X

Behind what we have done in the past five years and what I propose now lies a vision of the future relations between the United States and the Soviet Union -- a vision which looks beyond the famous prediction of Alexis de Tocqueville. More than 130 years ago he wrote:

"The conquests of the American are therefore gained by the plowshare; those of the Russian by the sword. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of the people; the Russian centers all the authority of society in a single arms. The principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting-point is different and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe."

The United States will never cease to be the friend and champion of freedom.

But it is my faith, my hope, and my belief that the underlying antagonism Tocqueville perceived -- and the clash that came about after which we call the Cold War 1945/-- will gradually fade. And that the Soviet Union and the United States will move, step by step, towards their proper role in the human family: to use their resources, their power, their influence on behalf of order

and peace and progress. I believe this will happen because that is the authentic interest of the American and Russian peoples in the world of diversity which is rapidly coming to life -- a world in which men's destinies will be shaped by themselves -- not by others.

One of our own great scientists, the Nobel Prize winner, Dr. Eugene Wigner, was once asked what had moved him to create some of the majestic principles that guide our understanding of physics. Dr. Wigner replied: "I hope that I leave this world a little more orderly than I found it." It was with something like this thought in mind that I announced the decision I had made, on March 31st.

I was determined, in the time that remained for my Administration, to use the office of the Presidency -- at this troubled moment at home and abroad -- on behalf of peace and reconciliation and order among men and nations.

I have no doubt I shall leave an ample agenda for my successor; but I intend to make all the progress I can in the weeks and months ahead. And -- as this year since I met with Mr. Kosygin proves -- progress is possible. It is possible because out among our people and out in the world there are many men of moderation, decency and good sense. They understand that their interests and ambitions, their hopes and fears must be tempered by the knowledge that there are others whose interests and ambitions, hopes and fears must also be respected.

It is your task -- and mine -- and that of peoples and leaders everywhere -- to strive to tip the balance in the right direction: from war to peace; from hostility to reconciliation; from chaos to order; from stagnation to progress.

The town of Glassboro will always be associated with that purpose and effort.

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 27, 1968 -- 1:15 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith text of Harriman's report
of this morning.

Pres file

Nothing new. Key passages marked.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 14774

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rin

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *RG*, NARA, Date 6-23-92



Department of State

TELEGRAM

#10

58a

~~SECRET~~

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ACTION SSO 00

INFO /000 W

1968 MAY 27 AM 11 49

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 0000

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 14774

N O D I S/HARVAN

DELTO 163

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

1. MAY 27 MEETING BEGAN 10:30 AND ENDED AT 2:40. THUY OPENED WITH A LONG STATEMENT STARTING WITH CLAIM THAT IN REPLY TO MARCH 31 SPEECH, DRV ON APRIL 3 DECLARED READINESS TO MAKE CONTACT IN ORDER TO DETERMINE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR, ETC. THUY THEN QUOTED MAY 3 EXCHANGE AGREEING ON PARIS MEETINGS AND SAID THUS USG ACCEPTS CONTACT OF OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS AS DEFINED IN DRV NOTE.

2. THUY THEN LAUNCHED ON LONG HISTORY OF HOW US, BEGINNING WITH PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S STATEMENT OF JULY 21, 1954, ORGANIZATION OF SEATO, ETC., VIOLATED GENEVA ACCORDS, COMMITTS AGGRESSION IN VIET-NAM, AND REPEATED EARLIER THREE-STEP DEMAND THAT US MUST STOP BOMBARDMENT FROM THANH HOA TO VINH LINH; STOP ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR; AND STOP BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS.

3. THUY THEN MOVED TO SUBJECTS OF SELF-DETERMINATION, DMZ, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA. THUY QUOTED LATEST KY STATEMENT AND LEADERS OF SVN ARE A BAND OF SLAVES, LACKEYS FOR A FOREIGN POWER.

4. ON DMZ, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA, THUY REPEATED HIS EARLIER CHARGES AND DEMANDS.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By xc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 14774 271536Z

5. THUY SAID THAT DRV HAS STRICTLY APPLIED GENEVA ACCORDS, REGROUPING ITS PEOPLE WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME LIMITS, SEEKING ELECTIONS, ETC.
6. THUY REPEATED THE GROSSLY EXAGGERATED STATISTICS WHICH HE HAS USED BEFORE (AND WHICH I REBUTTED).
7. THUY THEN MADE CLOSEST THING YET TO AN ADMISSION THAT VNA IS IN SOUTH. HE SAID VIET-NAM IS ONE, THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE ONE PEOPLE, AND NO ONE HAS THE RIGHT TO DIVIDE THEM; WHEN THE US COMES TO VIET-NAM ANY VIETNAMESE HAS THE RIGHT TO FIGHT FOR HIS COUNTRY IN ANY PART OF HIS COUNTRY.
8. THUY THEN REPEATED HIS CHARGES ABOUT US BOMBING AND COMPLAINED ABOUT THE 200 KILOMETERS STILL BEING BOMBED. THUY ENDED BY ASKING WHEN US WILL STOP BOMBING.
9. I BEGAN MY RESPONSE BY REGRETTING THEIR DISTORTIONS OF HISTORY TO CAMOUFLAGE THEIR AGGRESSION. I REJECTED THEIR ALLEGATION OF TERROR ON PART OF US AND TURNED CAMPAIGN OF TERROR BACK ON DRV. I SAID I HAD NOT RELEASED TO THE PRESS MY PREVIOUS STATEMENT CONCERNING THE USE OF TERROR BY DRV IN HUE. I SAID I WOULD HAVE TO RECONSIDER MY DECISION.
10. I THEN READ OPENING STATEMENT. I CLOSED BY ADDING THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS, "PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECH OF MARCH 31ST IS THE BASIS FOR THE MEETINGS WHICH ARE TAKING PLACE HERE IN PARIS. WE REJECT THE SUGGESTION NOW BEING MADE BY YOU THAT THE ONLY REASON FOR OUR MEETINGS IS TO GIVE THE HOUR AND DATE OF THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THIS SUGGESTION FALLS BY ITS OWN WEIGHT BECAUSE IF THAT WERE THE REASON, NO MEETING WOULD HAVE BEEN NECESSARY. INDEED, THE VERY LANGUAGE OF EACH OF YOUR COMMUNICATIONS, STARTING WITH APRIL 3, HAS INDICATED THAT YOU WERE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS WHICH COULD LEAD UP TO A CESSATION OF BOMBING. WE ARE, AND HAVE CONSISTENTLY STATED THAT WE ARE, READY TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF CESSATION OF BOMBING, BUT WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO DISCUSS AT THE SAME TIME RELATED MATTERS"

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 PARIS 14774 271536Z

ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH."

11. THUY'S REBUTTAL WAS PRIMARILY A REPETITION OF PREVIOUS CHARGES. HE ENDED WITH STATEMENT THAT THESE CONVERSATIONS WERE BASED ON DRV STATEMENT OF APRIL 3 AND MAY 3 AND US REPLY OF MAY 3. HE REPEATED DEMAND FOR CESSATION OF BOMBING. I RESPONDED BY READING TO HIM THE LAST SENTENCE OF MY REMARKS ON CESSATION OF BOMBING.

12. SINCE WE HAD MADE NO PROGRESS AND FOUR HOURS HAD ELAPSED, WE ADJOURNED UNTIL FRIDAY AT 10:30 A.M.

HARRIKAN

~~SECRET~~

57

ACTION

Monday, May 27, 1968 - 1:10 pm

Mr. President:

Pres file

Herewith Ben Oehlert asks to see you either:

- Monday, June 17; or
- "prior weekend" (presumably, June 15-16)

W. W. Rostow

Will see June 17 _____

June 15 or 16 _____

Call me _____

WWRostow:rln

59a

~~SECRET~~ 271139Z [redacted] 3.4(b)(1)

FM AMBASSADOR BENJAMIN H. OHLERT, JR. RAWALPINDI 321
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. PLANNING WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS FROM JUNE 17 THROUGH
JUNE 28, LEAVING HERE ON OR SHORTLY AFTER JUNE 5 FOR A
LITTLE FAMILY VISIT EN ROUTE MAINLY TO HAVE FIRST GLIMPSE
OF GRANDDAUGHTER BORN SEPTEMBER 9.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-67
By Sj, NARA Date 7-16-01

2. FEEL GREATER NEED SEE YOU, PRIOR INSTITUTION MY ROUNDS
AT STATE, DEFENSE, ETC., THAN TO SEE GRANDDAUGHTER, BOTH TO:
A. REVIEW DEVELOPMENTS HERE SINCE YOUR DECEMBER 23 VISIT;
B. OBTAIN YOUR PERSONAL INSTRUCTIONS RE IMPORTANT

MATTERS PENDING HERE WITH AYUB. FEEL THESE INSTRUCTIONS VITAL
TO MY SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON.

3. WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE APPOINTMENT IF POSSIBLE EITHER
MONDAY JUNE 17 OR THE PRIOR WEEKEND. COULD OF COURSE MAKE IT
ANYTIME PREVIOUS WEEK IF MORE CONVENIENT TO YOU.

4. A GEORGIA "GOD BLESS."

~~SECRET~~ [redacted] 3.4(b)(1)

BT

NNNN

60

INFORMATION/ACTION

Pres. file

Monday, May 27, 1968 -- 11:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Gorton is ready to have Bill Crook announced at 4:00 p.m. today --
if that is agreeable to you.

W. W. Rostow

Okay _____

Call me _____

cc: George Christian

WWRostow:rlh

61

INFORMATION

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

Monday, May 27, 1968 -- 11:05 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith another interesting paper on infiltration.

Given the rate of enemy casualties in the South, I feel there is a strong possibility that:

- February, March, and April infiltration rates were substantially higher than shown here (see chart, page 3).
- In addition, these calculations do not take into account infiltration launched in October-December, 1967 -- groups now in South Vietnam.
- With the passage of time and improved information, we may have to raise the May-August 1968 figures.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/KAC 01-58
By ctm, NARA, Date 2-13-03

61a

STATUS OF INFILTRATION GROUPS
1 JAN-24 MAY 1968

As of 24 May, 188 North Vietnamese infiltration groups with an estimated strength of 107,000 men had been noted moving south since the first of the year. Although some have recently reached South Vietnam, it will probably be several months before their arrival is reflected in COMUSMACV's monthly infiltration statistics because of acceptance criteria.

Thirty-two of the groups, with a total strength of 14,000 to 19,000, have been noted in South Vietnam or Laos. It is estimated that 56 groups (estimated strength 31,800) detected during January-March have had time to reach their destinations in South Vietnam, and as many as 60 (estimated strength 35,100) are believed to be in Laos. The remaining 71 (estimated strength 40,100) are believed to be in the infiltration pipeline in North Vietnam. (Figures 1 and 2)

Arrival Projections and Attrition

In order to project estimated strengths for the infiltration groups arriving in South Vietnam, an attrition rate of 20 to 30 per cent has been applied. This is based largely on evidence provided by prisoners and captured documents. The attrition rate takes into account NVA losses for sickness, desertions, air and artillery attack, and those forces that will remain in southern North Vietnam and the Lao Panhandle for rear-services and air defense-associated duties.

The number of groups that could arrive in South Vietnam through August of this year and their estimated strengths have been projected on the basis of estimated travel times and rate.

The estimated strength projections for the period January through March reflect COMUSMACV's accepted and possible infiltration strengths including those of the 304th and 320th NVA Divisions (17,000 personnel in January).

Developments This Week

Significant developments during the past week included the re-appearance of two- and three-digit designators for infiltration groups in rear services communications in North Vietnam and a report that two groups, H21A and H21B, were composed wholly of women and had a combined strength of 272. Another two groups, H22A and H22B, with a reported strength of 130 each were detected on 22 May and may also comprise women only. Although this is the first time that communications

27 May 68

DIA Intelligence Supplement

Page 1

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC CI-59

By ebm, NARA, Date 3-10-05

ESTIMATED LOCATION AND POSSIBLE DESTINATION OF INFILTRATION GROUPS

POSS. DESTINATION	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	TOTALS
DMZ - MR TTH	5/3,100	1/600	10/5,200	7/4,500	6-3,400	29-16,800
MR - TTH	1/600	1/600	6/3,300	6/3,900	2-1,200	16-9,600
MR - 5	1/600	4/2,200	10/5,200	13/8,500	7-3,600	35-20,100
B - 3 FRONT	2/1,200	2/1,100	7/3,600	4/2,600	4-2,200	19-10,700
III CORPS	13/8,100	1/600	11/5,700	21/13,700	19-10,600	65-38,700
UNKNOWN		1/500	10/5,200	6/3,900	6-1,500	23-11,000
TOTALS	22/13,600	10/5,600	54/28,200	57/37,100	44-22,500	187-107,000

- GROUPS ESTIMATED TO BE IN SVN
- GROUPS ESTIMATED TO BE IN LAOS
- GROUPS ESTIMATED TO BE IN NVN (IN TRANSIT SOUTH)



have shown female units to be moving south in the infiltration pipeline in North Vietnam, collateral indicates that women have been used in rear-echelon functions for some time. Captured documents have referred to at least one company-size unit composed entirely of female medics at forward station 17 (possibly commo-liaison station 17) in North Vietnam.

Summary

Since 1 January, 187 groups have been detected in SIGINT and one in collateral; their personnel total an estimated 107,000.


The projected infiltration during the period May through August runs at about 14,800-18,800 a month after attrition.

The infiltration is expected to peak in June and July on the basis of possible final destinations of the groups in South Vietnam.

The detection of women moving south in the infiltration pipeline in organized groups is unprecedented, but women have been used in rear-service support elements in the past. (SECRET SAVIN)

PROJECTED MONTHLY INFILTRATION RATES


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1967 ACCEPTED/POSS MACV ESTIMATED ARRIVAL STRENGTH
 ESTIMATED ARRIVAL STRENGTH ESTIMATED ATTRITION
 1968

SECRET SAVIN
27 MAY 68

POSSIBLE GROUP DESTINATIONS



~~SECRET SAVIN~~
27 MAY 68
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
STATUTE MILES
0 25 50 75 100

42

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, May 27, 1968 -- 10:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Habib reports from Paris, by classified phone, as follows:

- Today's meeting went four hours and twenty-five minutes;
- They began with 1-1/2 hour diatribe along familiar lines: wholly repetition, although they are now answering obliquely question of North Vietnamese troops in South by claiming right of Vietnamese soldiers to be anywhere in Vietnam.*
- Ended by citing "world pressure" on U. S. and demanded end of bombing without conditions.
- Harriman answered with his script and stuck with President's March 31st statement on bombing.
- Next meeting on Friday. Laos planned as centerpiece. Souvanna plans a major statement on North Vietnamese presence in Laos before Friday.

W. W. Restow

*Almost an invitation for South Vietnam to invade the North.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

64

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sunday, May 26, 1968 - 5:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with the Haitian Ambassador - 10:00 am Monday, May 27.

Ambassador Bonhomme asked to see you on instructions of President Duvalier to present his government's views on the recent raid by Haitian exiles on Cap Haitien, for which the government insinuates we bear some responsibility.

Despite failure of the raid, Duvalier has taken the incident to the UN Security Council which meets on Monday, May 27 at 4:00 pm. The vague Haitian request asks that "appropriate measures" (unspecified) be taken to reduce international tensions. It sounds like a prepaganda exercise at our expense. Security Council members are generally unenthusiastic about Council consideration.

I suggest you follow these talking points which Nick Katzenbach has already used with him:

1. Since assuming office I have insisted that our relations with Haiti be on the basis of mutual respect. In 1964 we gave Haiti assurances that we would not permit launching of armed activities from the US against Haitian territory.
2. We have no information which would support in any way any allegation that the May 20 raid was launched from any territory under US control. If Haiti has any such information, we would appreciate having it.
3. As Haiti knows, we have enforced our laws against any person trying to launch armed activities against Haitian territory from the US. But we cannot arrest or prosecute anyone on the basis of rumors; we can only do it on the basis of evidence that a court will accept.
4. We are concerned by insinuations of Haitian officials that the US is not complying with these assurances. We have noted the Ambassador's press conference, press stories in Port-au-Prince and Haitian notes to the UN which allege that the raid may have originated in US territory. These allegations are made without presenting a shred of evidence.
5. I regret that Haiti has gone to the UN without first using the normal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

bilateral diplomatic channels with the countries in a position to assist in the investigation. If Haiti wanted to go to a multilateral body, the OAS would have been more appropriate.

6. We are surprised that Haiti has declined to provide the US with any information concerning this incident, despite our repeated requests and despite the fact that this is normal diplomatic practice.

W.W. Reston

45

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, May 26, 1968 -- 2:20 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk wants to send the attached cable instructing Gov. Harriman not to say to the North Vietnamese again that we would not insist on an agreement for restraint but would accept signs of restraint instead of words.

Walt Rostow agrees but asked that this cable be sent to you before it was sent to Paris.

Also attached is a copy of the memo Walt sent to you earlier today, which gives the details of the Harriman proposal.

Unfortunately, we will need your position as soon as possible in order to reach Harriman in time.

Brenley Smith

Rusk cable OK _____

Ask Rostow to call me _____

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

BKS:rla

~~SECRET~~

65a

TO: AmEmbassy PARIS FLASH

NODIS/HARVAN

TODEL _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By , NARA, Date 1-5-01

1. We note paragraph five of your 14709 reporting your conversation with Zerin and including your statement to him that you would make the same point directly on Monday.

2. We have serious concern at your making any move of this sort at the moment, and believe it should at least be postponed until after Vance consultations. Your Monday presentation properly focuses on the DMZ problem, and certainly we wish to continue to press for complete restoration there, which would be a lot more than a "sign" of restraint, although it is a form of agreement that requires no admission of restraint. To indicate at the same session that we were prepared to accept merely a "sign" would undercut the DMZ arguments alone and could even be construed to mean that we do not need a high degree of verbal assurances -- which we most certainly feel that we do.

3. If you have further thoughts on the timing and manner in which a message along these lines might be conveyed we would be delighted to have them either by cable or through Vance. But please hold off on this point for the purposes of the Monday session.

~~SECRET~~

66

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Sunday, May 26, 1968 -- 11:30 am

Mr. President:

Herewith a situation report on France, as of this morning: quieter but unresolved.

If de Gaulle and Pompidou work their way out of this, I do not see how they can avoid wage increases and public expenditures which will:

- weaken the franc;
- induce greater French monetary cooperation;
- perhaps, even, reduce their arrogance about U. K. entry into the Common Market, -- if Germany is prepared to bargain hard for it.
But we'll have to see.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95; State Dept. Guidelines
By AC, NARA, Date 1-5-01

~~SECRET~~
No Foreign Dissem

66a

SC No. 08366/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
26 May 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

France: Situation Report
(As of 0700 EDT)

1. Violence has subsided for the moment. Pompidou will meet for the second time with labor and management this afternoon. The first meeting was reportedly inconclusive.

2. De Gaulle's tactics for dealing with the present situation are now more evident. Pompidou has been assigned the difficult task of handling the immediate situation; De Gaulle will attempt to formulate a broad program to attack the underlying causes of the present discontent. The French President did not touch on the internal situation when Ambassador Shriver presented his credentials yesterday.

3. Negative reaction to De Gaulle's speech continued with even members of his own entourage reportedly feeling that he is no longer capable of coping with the situation. The editor of France's influential Le Monde has now joined the chorus of left-wing and moderate critics who have assailed

~~SECRET~~
No Foreign Dissem

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-64
By Sj, NARA Date 7-20-01

~~SECRET~~
No Foreign Dissem

the general's aloof approach as inappropriate to the grave crisis facing France.

4. The government's announced policy of banning all public assemblies will be tested Monday evening when students have scheduled further demonstrations.

-2-

~~SECRET~~
No Foreign Dissem

ACTION

Sunday, May 26, 1968 -- 11:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

With respect to your meeting with John Hughes on Monday, May 27, at 10:30 a. m., I suggest the following background talking points.

1. Indonesia. We are aware that 1968 may be a critically important year in Suharto's government -- and for Indonesia -- beginning to find its feet economically and consolidating support for the new path of Indonesian policy. Therefore, we have been working very hard with other members of the Indonesian consortium to generate enough aid. We are hopeful that Japan -- like the U. S. -- will ~~provide~~ provide one-third. We are thinking of going beyond that with some aid in wheat, but we must first check out how much could be absorbed in a rice-eating country which is only now beginning to shift towards wheat. In general, the consolidation of the Indonesian position is one of the most important tasks before us in the Far East.

2. Vietnam.

-- On the ground it is clear that Hanoi is pouring an unprecedented number of infiltrators into the South to maintain their strength and units so that they can put pressure on the talks in Paris. We know this not only as a fact which our men confront but also from documents which tell even low-level units that their task is to fight in order to support the negotiations in Paris.

-- In Paris itself they are following a propaganda "telephone-book" strategy. They are not doing very well in world opinion. We have felt no pressure either from abroad or at home to stop bombing without some compensatory action on their part. We are now imposing a quite heavy burden on them -- destroying about 20% of all the trucks coming through to South Vietnam from the North. Given the very high rate of infiltration, we simply cannot accept without some reciprocal action, an increase of 20% in infiltration of men and supplies. It may be that they are going to await the outcome of the elections in the U. S. before they decide to negotiate. We do not know this. We have not decided, but it will be very difficult for us to sit still week after week and month after month with no bombing around Hanoi-Haiphong -- if they simply go on this way in Paris.

3. Communist China. Mao seems incapable of resolving the situation which is now beginning to affect their industrial production and foreign trade. They seem anxious about their food situation, since they cannot count on a second bumper crop like the one they had in 1967. Our best policy is to remain silent and let the Chinese work this out, while letting them know that we look

forward to a time of reconciliation when they are prepared to leave their neighbors alone and join constructively with Asia in the affairs of the world.

4. Long-Range policy in the Far East. If we see it through in Vietnam to an honorable peace, there is a fair hope of our gradually building up the forces in Asia capable of looking after a good deal of their own security and economic development, while we fall back to the role of junior partner in Asia. If we want a non-proliferation treaty -- and a world of non-proliferation -- we cannot pull out of the Far East and go isolationist. It is ironic that some of those who support the non-proliferation treaty most strongly are also for our pulling out of Vietnam. Only a strong and steady U. S. , capable of deterring nuclear blackmail and nuclear war, will keep India and Japan from going nuclear. But we have made much more progress than is generally understood in these years, since we put our forces in Vietnam, in building a New Asia which will permit us two great objectives if we remain steady:

- a stable Asia where two-thirds of humanity lives;
- a less arduous U. S. role in Asia.

But if you look at attitudes in Japan, Korea, Thailand, Australia, and elsewhere, it is perfectly clear that if the U. S. is judged to be unsteady and uncertain, Asia could fragment and fall apart very quickly, undoing all that we have accomplished in that part of the world since 1945.

W. W. Rostow

Xerox copies to: Tom Johnson and Jim Jones

wwrostow:rla

68

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~-- HARVAN

Sunday, May 26, 1968 -- 10:30 a.m.

Pres. file

Mr. President:

Herewith Harriman pushes ahead with Zoria. You may wish to talk with Sec. Rusk about the marked passage on page 2. I myself feel they know very well that we are looking for action by way of restraint and not explicit agreements necessarily; and I doubt that it would be wise in an open session to change the position that we have held on the DMZ and Laos until they are prepared to stop the propaganda and talk quietly.

Also attached is the proposed outline for tomorrow, from Harriman.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 14709 (DELTO 154)

Paris 14710 (DELTO 155)

~~SECRET~~--HARVAN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By J, NARA, Date 1-5-01

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

68-6
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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DELTO 154

NODIS/HARVAN

FROM HARRIMAN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

1. I CALLED ON ZORIN AT HIS EMBASSY THIS MORNING FOR ABOUT AN HOUR'S TALK, ACCOMPANIED BY EMBASSY OFFICER PERRY. YOUNG BOGOMOLOV INTERPRETED.

2. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, ZORING ADMITTED HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO KEEP IN CONTACT WITH ME IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY SUGGESTION TO DOBRYNIN. I SAID I FELT SURE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WISHED TO SEE FIGHTING STOPPED, AND THEREFORE I WOULD TELL HIM FRANKLY OF OUR IMPRESSIONS OF OUR CONVERSATIONS TO DATE, I DESCRIBED THE FUTILITY OF ACROSS-THE ROOM HIGHLY PUBLICIZED SPEECHES, AND HANOI REPRESENTATIVE'S REFUSAL OF MY SUGGESTION TO UNDERTAKE UNPUBLICIZED DISCUSSIONS. I SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO ENCOURAGE THE NVN DELEGATION TO HAVE INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH US THROUGH A MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION OR STAFF. HE SAID THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE UNTIL WE STOPPED BOMBING.

3. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, HE ASKED WHETHER I SUGGESTED CONTACTS BETWEEN ONE MEMBER EACH OF THE DELEGATIONS, OR MORE THAN ONE. I REPLIED EITHER, AND URGED HIM TO THINK OVER MY SUGGESTION.

4. HE GAVE ME THE USUAL LINE, HANDED STEWART BY GROMYKO. I EXPLAINED IN DETAIL THAT WE CONSIDERED THE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 31 SPEECH THE BASIS FOR OUR MEETING, AND REJECTED THE IDEA THAT THE ONLY REASON FOR MEETING WAS TO LEARN THE HOUR AND DATE OF BOMBING CESSATION. I SAID THAT IF THIS WAS ALL, NO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 14709 251833Z

MEETING WOULD HAVE BEEN NECESSARY. I EXPLAINED OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE LANGUAGE OF HANOI'S APRIL 3 STATEMENT, WHICH PROPOSED "CONTACTS WITH THE VIEW OF DETERMINING WITH THE AMERICAN SIDE" ETC. I TOLD HIM WE HAD CONSTANTLY BEEN READY TO TALK ABOUT THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, BUT WOULD INSIST UPON DISCUSSING AT THE SAME TIME RELEVANT MATTERS ON THE BASIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH.

5. ON POINT OF A LITTLE LESS RIGIDITY ON HIS PART CAME WHEN I SAID WE WOULD NOT INSIST ON AN AGREEMENT FOR RESTRAINT, THAT WE WOULD ACCEPT SIGNS OF RESTRAINT INSTEAD OF WORDS. HE SEEMED INTERESTED IN THIS AND ASKED WHETHER WE HAD MADE THIS CLEAR TO THE OTHER SIDE. I SAID YES, BUT IF HE THOUGHT THERE WAS ANY DOUBT I WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR AGAIN ON MONDAY, BUT SUGGESTED HE MIGHT WISH TO BRING THIS TO THEIR ATTENTION AS WELL. I EXPLAINED THAT UNFORTUNATELY HANOI HAD THUS FAR INCREASED THE MOVEMENT SOUTH AND THE ACTION AROUND THE DMZ, RATHER THAN SHOWN ANY SIGNS OF RESTRAINT. WHEN HE REFUSED TO PASS ANY MESSAGES TO NVN REPRESENTATIVES AS INTERMEDIARY, I SAID THAT I WASN'T ASKING HIM TO TELL ME WHAT HE WAS GOING TO DO, BUT THAT I WOULD ASSUME THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS INSTRUCTIONS HE WOULD BRING THIS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE OTHER SIDE.

6. SEVERAL TIMES, WHEN HE STATED HANOI'S RIGID POSITION, I SAID THAT IF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MAINTAINED THAT ATTITUDE I THOUGHT THE SITUATION WOULD BECOME DANGEROUS. I MADE NO THREATS, BUT EMPHASIZED THE KIND OF PRESSURE THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE UNDER FROM PUBLIC OPINION, WHICH WOULD COMPLAIN THAT HANOI, WHILE ENJOYING A LIMITATION OF BOMBING, WAS NOT TALKING SERIOUSLY OR SHOWING RESTRAINT.

7. THE BEST I CAN SAY IS THAT ZORIN WAS SOMEWHAT LESS ARGUMENTATIVE AND AT LEAST LISTENED COURTEOUSLY. HE WILL CERTAINLY REPORT OUR TALKS TO MOSCOW. END
HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

C. Taylor Dumbauld



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

486

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N O D I S/HARVAN

DELTO 155

1. IN THE COURSE OF PUTTING OUR FINAL DRAFT TOGETHER FOR MAY 27 MEETING, WE HAVE DECIDED TO ORGANIZE PRESENTATION AS FOLLOWS:

A. BEGIN WITH OUR ANSWERS TO EXAGGERATIONS CARRIED IN NLF COMMUNIQUE SIX AS QUOTED BY THUY.

B. HEAD FROM THAT TO OUR PAPER ON NVA PRESENCE IN SOUTH. PRESENT THAT PAPER WITH INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPHS, THEN INSTEAD OF READING ENTIRE PAPER WE WOULD GIVE IT TO THEM AT MEETING. IT WOULD BE IN FORM FOR RELEASE TO PRESS.

C. NEXT MOVE TO DMZ, AND REPEAT OUR PROPOSAL ALONG LINES PREVIOUSLY STATED, AND SUPPLEMENTED WITH LATEST GUIDANCE RECEIVED FROM DEPARTMENT.

D. WOULD THEN RESTATE OUR POSITION ON RESTRAINT AS SET FORTH ANNEX A MAY 22 STATEMENT.

E. WE ALSO PLAN TO USE RECORD OF US PAST RESPONSE TO THIRD CONTRY PEACE PROPOSALS. FOR THIS WE WOULD MAKE CLEAR US CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO VARIOUS PROPOSALS AND THEN RAON THEM THE RECORD. AGAIN THIS WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR RELEASE IF DESIRABLE.

2. YOU WILL NOTE THAT WE HAVE DELIBERATELY SHORTENED VERBAL PRESENTATION BY NOT READING LENGTHY STATEMENTS BUT INSTEAD HANDING THEM TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AT THE MEETING. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR ANNOUNCED DESIRE TO HAVE PRODUCTIVE EXCHANGES AT MEETINGS WITH LESS TIME DEVOTED TO LENGTHY EXPOSITION OF INDIVIDUAL POSITIONS. END

HARRIHAN
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By JC, NARA, Date 1-5-01

Pre file

69

ACTION

Saturday - May 25, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith a proposed guest list for the Inter-American Bank Bill signing ceremony on Tuesday, June 4.

I have asked Vicente Jimenez for some names. I shall send these to you as soon as I get them.

If the list meets with your approval, we will proceed with the invitations.

W. W. Rostow

Approve

Disapprove

Call me

Attachment

(May 25, 1968)

Guest List : IDB Ceremony

June 4, 1968 -- East Room -- The White House

1. Latin American Ambassadors Accredited to White House (22)

- Argentina - H. E. Alvaro C. Alsogaray
- Barbados - H. E. Hilton A. Vaughan
- Bolivia - H. E. Julio Sanjines-Goytia
- Brazil - H. E. Vasco Leitao da Cunha
- Chile - H. E. Jorge Burr, Charge d'Affaires
(Minister-Counselor)
- Colombia - H.E. Dr. Hernan Echavarria
- Costa Rica - H. E. Fernando Ortuno Sobrado
- Dominican Republic - H. E. Hector Garcia-Godoy
- Ecuador - H. E. Carlos Mantilla-Ortega
- El Salvador - H. E. Julio Adalberto Rivera
- Guatemala - ~~Enriquez-Roblox~~ Dr. Francisco Linares Aranda
- Guyana - H. E. Sir John Carter
- Haiti - H. E. Arthur Bonhomme
- Honduras - H. E. Ricardo Midence Soto
- Mexico - H. E. Hugo B. Margain
- Nicaragua - H. E. Dr. Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa

Panama	-	H: E. Jorge T. <u>Velasquez</u>
Paraguay	-	H. E. Dr. Roque J. <u>Avila</u>
Peru	-	H. E. Celso <u>Pastor</u>
Trinidad and Tobago	-	H. E. Sir Ellis E. I. <u>Clarke</u>
Uruguay	-	H. E. Juan Felipe <u>Yriart</u>
Venezuela	-	H. E. Dr. Enrique <u>Tejera-Paris</u>

2. Latin American Ambassadors to the Organization of American States (OAS)

Argentina	-	H. E. Dr. Eduardo Alejandro <u>Roca</u>
Bolivia	-	H. E. Raul <u>Diez de Medina</u>
Brazil	-	H. E. Ilmar <u>Penna Marinho</u>
Chile	-	H. E. Alejandro <u>Magnet</u>
Colombia	-	H. E. Dr. Carlos <u>Holguin</u>
Dominican Republic	-	H. E. Enriquillo A. <u>del Rosario</u>
Ecuador	-	H. E. Dr. Rodrigo <u>Jacome M.</u>
Haiti	-	H. E. Fern D. <u>Baguidy</u>
Mexico	-	H. E. Rafael <u>de la Colina</u>
Panama	-	H. E. Dr. Eduardo <u>Ritter Aislan</u>
Peru	-	H. E. Dr. Luis <u>Alvarado</u>
Uruguay	-	H. E. Dr. Emilio N. <u>Oribe</u>
Venezuela	-	H. E. Dr. Pedro <u>Paris-Montesinos</u>

3. Ambassadors from Non-OAS Countries Contributing to the IADB

Great Britain	-	H. E. Sir Patrick <u>Dean</u>
Canada	-	H. E. A. Edgar <u>Ritchie</u>
Federal Republic of Germany	-	H. E. Heinrich <u>Knappstein</u>
Sweden	-	H. E. Hubert <u>de Besche</u>
Netherlands	-	H. E. Carl W. A. <u>Schurmann</u>
Italy	-	H. E. Egidio <u>Ortona</u>
Spain	-	H. E. The Marquis de <u>Merry del Val</u>
Switzerland	-	H. E. Felix <u>Schnyder</u>
Israel	-	H. E. ^{Yitzhak Rabin} Avraham Harman
Japan	-	H. E. Takeso <u>Shimoda</u>
Belgium	-	H. E. Baron <u>Scheyven</u>

4. Official Party of President Trejos

His Excellency José Joaquín TREJOS Fernández
President of the Republic of Costa Rica

His Excellency Fernando LARA Bustamante

His Excellency Fernando ORTUNO Sobrado

His Excellency Luis D. TINOCO Castro

His Excellency Manuel JIMENEZ DE LA GUARDIA

His Excellency Alberto DIMARE Fuscaldó

Mr. José TREJOS Fonseca

Mr. Carlos VARGAS GENE

Mr. Rodrigo MADRIGAL Nieto

Dr. Carlos Manuel GUTIERREZ Canas

U. S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, Clarence A. Boonstra

5. Pan American Union

OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza

OAS Assistant Secretary General Rafael Urquía

6. Inter-American Development Bank (101)

Felipe Herrera	Orlando Letelier
T. Graydon Upton	James A. Lynn
Carlos S. Brignone	Sixto A. Duran-Ballen
Alfonso Grados	William A. Carter
Diego Calle-Restrepo	Mario Lima
Carlos Perez de la Cova	Jose Irineu Cabral
Edward Clark	Alfredo E. Hernandez
Reuben Sternfeld	Joao de Mesquita Lara
Alberto Ibanez	Luis Buitrago
Carlos Sanguinetti	Freeborn G. Jewett, Jr.
Jose Juan de Olloqui	Robert B. Menapace
Arturo Calventi	Jose Epstein
Carlos E. Peralta-Mendez	Francisco Aquino, h.
Mario Dalponte	Pedro Iraneta
Victor da Silva	Leonel Torres
Federico A. Intriago	Joaquin E. Meyer
Alfred C. Wolf	Mrs. Beatriz R. Harretche
Jose C. Cardenas	Elting Arnold
Joao Oliveira Santos	Jose R. Chiriboga
Guillermo Moore	Arnold H. Weiss
Enrique Perez-Cisneros	Mario O. Mendivil

Inter-American Development Bank (cont'd - 2)

Alexander M. Rosenson	Tyrus Fain
Jorge Hazera	Maxwell Obst
Fausto Ruggiero	Adolfo Linares
Victor Alamo	Jorge Manuel Dengo
Ramon Osuna	Carlos Alurralde
John S. deBeers	Manuel Bendfeldt
Joseph U. Hinshaw	Eduardo Figueroa
Ralph A. Visbal	Cecilio J. Morales
Ralph J. Burton	Felipe Pazos
Mario Solorzano	Gunter Koenig
Rafael Font	Oscar A. Ayala
Laureano Rodrigo	Guy A. Douyon
Alfredo M. Amy	Henri Scioville
Pino-Navarro	Humterto Olivero
Rodrigo Sotela	Ferruccio Accame
Oscar O. Ginebra	Paul Ehrlich
Corrado Baquis	Frank Massana
Lempira E. Bonilla	Robert A. Conrads
Norberto Max Neef	Clarence Pierce
Fernando Caceres	Juan Hughes
Rafael Zuniga	Raul Bajonero-Gil
Paul Jean Colcaire	Miss Adriana Peric

Inter-American Development Bank (cont'd - 3)

Miss Ana I. Conde

Miss Pamela Gibson

Mrs. Mary Virginia Vergara

Miss Sally Strain

Miss Ana Maria Pages

Miss Bertha Cuellar

Miss Maria Isabel Olaso

Miss Myriam Arevalo

Miss Stella Granados

Mrs. Marie H. Theard

Mrs. Yolanda Vigil

Miss Mayra Vargas

Miss Ana Julieta Marin

Miss Amanda C. Tapia

Mrs. Leonor de Aguero

7. Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress

Carlos Sanz de Santamaria	Chairman
Walter J. Sedwitz	Executive Secretary
Jorge Marshall	Member, Panel of Experts
Bernal Jimenez	Member, Panel of Experts

Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (cont'd - 2)

Tulo Montenegro

Neftali Ponce

Gerardo Schamis

Manuel Trucco

8. World Bank

Robert S. McNamara

Jorge Mejia-Palacio

Livingston T. Merchant

Alfredo Valencia

Emmett J. Rice

Jose Camacho

J. Burke Knapp

Gerald Alter

Roger A. Chaufournier

Martin M. Rosen

Neil J. Paterson

Irving S. Friedman

Richard H. Demuth

Bernard R. Bell

Luis Escobar

Daniel Fernandez

Luis Machado

9. International Monetary Fund (9)

Paul Schweitzer

Frank A. Southard, Jr.

William B. Dale

Jorge Gonzalez del Valle

Alexandre Kafka

Jorge Del Canto

E. Walter Robichek

Fernando Vera

Edison Zayas

10. Congressional (83)

(Names to be selected by Mike Manatos and Barefoot Sanders from among following committees which pass on IADB legislation)

Senate Foreign Relations Committee :

J. W. Fulbright

Stuart Symington

John Sparkman #

Thomas J. Dodd

Michael J. Mansfield #

Joseph S. Clark

Wayne Morse #

Claiborne Pell

Albert Gore

Eugene J. McCarthy #

Frank J. Lausche

Bourke B. Hickenlooper #

Frank Church

George D. Aiken #

Congressional (Continued - 2)

Senate Foreign Relations Committee (cont'd)

Frank Carlson #

John J. Williams

Karl E. Mundt

Clifford P. Case

John Sherman Cooper

(# = Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs)

Senate Committee on Appropriations

Richard B. Russell

Allen J. Ellender

Milton R. Young

Margaret Chase Smith

Roman L. Hruska

Gordon Allott

Gale McGee

Ralph W. Yarborough

Spessard L. Holland

Carl Hayden

Congressional (Continued - 3)

House Committee on Banking and Currency

Wright Patman	Paul A. Fino
William A. Barrett	Florence P. Dwyer
Leonor K. Sullivan	Seymour Halpern *
Henry S. Reuss *	William E. Brock
Thomas L. Ashley *	Del Clawson
William S. Moorhead *	Albert W. Johnson *
Robert G. Stephens	J. William Stanton *
Fernand St. Germain	Chester L. Mize *
Joseph G. Minish	Sherman P. Lloyd
Henry B. Gonzalez *	Benjamin Blackburn
Richard T. Hanna *	Garry Brown
Thomas S. Gettys	Chalmers Wylie
Frank Annunzio	Mr. Paul Nelson, Staff Member
Thomas Rees *	Mr. Orman S. Fink, Staff Member
Jonathan Bingham *	
Nick Galifianakis	
Tom Bevill	
Peter N. Kyros	
William B. Widnall *	
Lawrence Williams	

(* = Subcommittee on International Finance)

Congressional (Continued - 4)

House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations

Otto E. Passman

Fred B. Rooney

Julia B. Hansen

Jeffery Cohelan

Clarence D. Long

John J. McFall

House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs

Armistead I. Selden

Barratt O'Hara

Dante B. Fascell

Omar Burleson

John S. Monagan

Edward R. Roybal

Lee H. Hamilton

William S. Mailliard

J. Irving Whalley

H. R. Gross

F. Bradford Morse

James G. Fulton

Congressional (Continued - 5) .

Others

Congressman George H. Mahon

Senator John O. Pastore.

11. Executive Branch (29)

The Vice President

John Rielly - office of Vice President.

Treasury

Secretary Henry H. Fowler

Under Secretary Joseph W. Barr

John R. Petty, Assistant Secretary

Ralph Hirschtritt ,(Deputy Assistant Secretary)

E. J. Finkel, Director, (Office of Latin America)

Joseph M. Bowman, Jr. , (Congressional Relations)

James F. King (Public Affairs)

State Department

Secretary Rusk

Under Secretary Nicholas Katzenbach

Under Secretary Eugene V. Rostow

Executive Branch (Continued - 2)

State Department - cont'd

Ambassador Sol Linowitz

Assistant Secretary Covey T. Oliver

Robert M. Sayre, (Deputy Assistant Secretary)

Donald M. Palmer, (Deputy Assistant Secretary)

James Fowler (Deputy Coordinator-Alliance for Progress)

AID

Administrator William S. Gaud

Deputy Administrator Rutherford M. Poats

Export-Import Bank

President Harold Linder

Executive Vice President Walter Sauer

Executive Branch (Continued - 3)

USIA

Leonard Marks, Director

Robert Akers, Deputy Director

Hewson Ryan, Assistant Director

George Rylance, Assistant Director

Robert Amerson, Deputy Assistant Director

Richard Cushing, Deputy Director of VOA

Lemuel Graves, Chief, Latin American Division, VOA

Lafe Allen, Press Chief, Latin American Division

12. Business and Industry (22)

David Rockefeller, Chairman, Council for Latin America

William E. Barlow, President, Council for Latin America

John F. Gallagher, Senior Vice Chairman, Council for Latin America

Henry R. Geyelin, Executive Vice President, Council for Latin America

William Blackie, Chairman Caterpillar Tractor Co.

Emilio Collado, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey

C. W. Cook, Chairman, General Foods Corporation

Jose de Cubas, President, Westinghouse Electric International

Business and Industry (Continued - 2)

R. Hal Dean, President, Ralston Purina

Harold S. Geneen, Chairman, International Telephone & Telegraph

H. J. Heinz II, Chairman of the Board, H. J. Heinz & Co.

William Hewitt, Chairman, Deere & Co.

Edward B. Hinman, President, International Paper Co.

Lewis Lapham, Vice Chairman, Bankers Trust Co.

Augustine R. Marusi, President, The Borden Co.

George S. Moore, Chairman, First National City Bank, New York

Rudolph A. Peterson, President Bank of America

Thomas Sunderland, Vice Chairman, United Fruit Co.

George C. Wells, Vice President, Union Carbide Corp.

Robert Anderson

C. Douglas Dillon

Thomas C. Mann

13. Labor Leaders (7)

Joseph Bierne, President, Communications Workers of America

Charles Cogen, American Federation of Teachers, Chicago

William C. Doherty, Jr., Executive Director, American
Institute for Free Labor Development, Washington, D. C.

Labor Leaders (Continued - 2)

H. E. Gilbert, President, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
and Engineers, Lakewood, Ohio

Jerome Keating, President, National Association of Letter
Carriers of the United States, Washington, D. C.

David Sullivan, President, Building Service Employees'
International, Washington, D. C.

George Meany, President AFL-CIO, Washington, D. C.

14. Religious Leaders (9)

Rev. Louis Colonnese, Director, Latin America Bureau,
U. S. Catholic Conference, Washington, D. C.

Arthur S. Flemming, President, National Council of Churches,
New York, N. Y.

Ernest S. Gross, Chairman, National Council of Churches,
New York, N. Y.

Msgr. Francis T. Hurley, Assistant General Secretary,
U. S. Catholic Conference, Washington, D. C.

Dr. Richard Shaull, Princeton Theological Seminary,
Princeton, N. J.

Dr. John C. Smith, New York, N. Y. (Riverside Drive, N. Y.).

Dr. Eugene Stockwell, Riverside Drive, New York, N. Y.

Dr. Clyde W. Taylor, General Director, National Association
of Evangelicals, Washington, D. C.

Dr. Brady Tyson, Bethesda, Maryland.

15. University and Foundation Leaders 12.

Richard Adams, Acting Director, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas

Russell Davis, Center for Studies in Education and Development, Harvard University

Professor Peter Dorner, Director of the Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin

Dr. Lowell S. Hardin, Ford Foundation, New York

Dr. J. George Harrar, Rockefeller Foundation, New York

Mr. John B. Howard, Director, International Training and Research Program, Ford Foundation, New York

Dr. Brooks James, Dean of College of Agriculture, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, N.C.

Dr. Arthur T. Mosher, Executive Director, Agricultural Development Council, 5th Avenue, N. Y.

Dr. H. F. Robinson, Vice Chancellor, University Systems of Georgia, Atlanta, Georgia

Dr. Theodore W. Schultz, Departments of Economics, University of Chicago

Dr. Milton Eisenhower, President Emeritus, Johns Hopkins Univ.

Dr. Lincoln Gordon, President, Johns Hopkins University.

16. er Reports Covering Latin America (14)

Fernando Galvan - Voice of America

Georgie Ann Geyer - Chicago Daily News

Arthur W. Golden - United Press International

Daniel W. Gottlieb - Reuters

Reporters Covering Latin America (Continued - 2)

Carl D. Howard - U. S. Information Service

Nathan Miller - Baltimore Sun

Ary Moleon - Associated Press

Jeremiah A. O'Leary, Jr. - Washington Evening Star

Virginia Prewitt - Washington Daily News

Warren W. Unna - The Washington Post

Miss Anita von Kahler - Agence France Press

Benjamin Welles - New York Times

James Nelson Goodsell - Christian Science Monitor

Donald Bohning - Miami Herald

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

Saturday, May 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file***SUBJECT: President Thieu's Visit and the Poor People's Demonstration**

President Thieu is scheduled to visit Washington on June 18 and 19. The Poor People's major demonstration in Washington is now planned for June 19. The Justice Department does not know how big the demonstration will be, but is thinking in terms of 100,000 to 500,000 people.

Thus far, the Poor People's movement has concentrated on social issues. There has been very little mention of Vietnam. However, when it becomes known that Thieu will be in Washington on the day of the demonstration it is altogether possible -- I would say likely -- that the demonstration will take on a strong anti-Vietnam tone.

-- A combined Anti-Vietnam/Poor People's demonstration will attract many more participants to Washington than would come for a Poor People's demonstration alone.

-- It would make it much harder for the demonstration's organizers to keep control.

-- If the demonstrators chose to focus their attentions on President Thieu it would be almost impossible to prevent his embarrassment.

-- The press play would concentrate on the demonstrations to the detriment of Thieu's hope for a dignified visit and his attempt to get a useful message across to the U.S. public.

-- The need to ensure Thieu's security would put an additional strain on the resources available to us for handling the demonstration.

It is widely known in Saigon that Thieu is planning a Washington visit in late June. The exact dates are not publicly known, however, Ambassador Bui Diem does not think Thieu would care if his visit were put off for a week or ten days. A longer postponement would make some problems, but might still be the better idea. (We will have to announce the Thieu visit a couple of weeks in advance, and if we only put it off for a week, the demonstrators might just reschedule their demonstration accordingly.)

Thieu's advance team is in town now. We are beginning to make arrangements for Thieu's visit to other cities. Thus, it will very soon become known that we are planning this visit for June 18-19 unless we postpone it now.

~~SECRET~~

I have thought about this problem deeply. I do not like making this recommendation to you. But I see neither wisdom nor prudence in bringing Thieu to Washington on a day in which we may have hundreds of thousands of demonstrators on the streets.

I recommend that you postpone the Thieu visit. We could avoid the problem of the 19th by postponing the visit only a week. We could avoid the whole problem by putting the visit off until July, and not announcing it until the Poor People's demonstration has come and gone. I favor the latter.

If you agree with the recommendation for postponement I suggest you consult immediately with Secretary Rusk as to the best way to obtain President Thieu's assent to the postponement. In the meantime, I recommend that we suspend all activity looking toward a June 18-19 visit, lest the plans for a visit at that time become publicly known.

W. W. Rostow

Postpone until after the demonstration _____

Postpone for one week _____

Go ahead with visit as planned _____

Suspend all out-of-town contacts, but defer postponement for the moment _____

Put on the Tuesday lunch agenda _____

Call me _____

MWright:mm

Pres file
71

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

Saturday - May 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Trip to Latin America

I have your message asking that the itinerary include two days in Central America. A revised itinerary and map are attached.

Yesterday we received a report that the Central American Presidents are planning to meet in the next few months and will ask President Diaz Ordaz to join them. The time and place have not been set.

I think we could make such a meeting jell rather quickly by letting the Presidents know of your interest. A meeting in a Central American capital with the area Presidents and President Diaz Ordaz would get your Latin American visit off to a flying start.

San Salvador has been mentioned as a possible site. This would be a good place. San Jose, Costa Rica, would be the only other politically feasible site, but with President Trejos' visit here next month, it concentrates too much attention on Costa Rica. Furthermore, President Kennedy was there in 1963, and to my knowledge, no other U. S. President has visited any other Central American republic.

We could probably arrange the timing to suit your schedule. The Central Americans should not pose any major problem, although it might be a little more difficult with President Diaz Ordaz.

You might want to use your trip to Hemisfair with the Latin American Ambassadors on Friday, July, 5, as the first leg of your journey. You could leave for San Salvador early on Saturday and spend the balance of the day and overnight there. Sunday you could spend in Nicaragua, and on Monday go to Bogota.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By J, NARA, Date 1-5-01

You could also schedule the trip for mid or late July or early August.

W. W. Rostow

Itinerary satisfactory ____

On timing, prefer:

Call me ____.

leave from Hemisfair July 6 ____

during second two weeks of July ____

during early August ____

Call me ____.

Attachment

Revised itinerary and map.

(5-25-68)

~~SECRET~~

71a

Itinerary
for
Latin American Trip

First Day: Depart Washington (for San Antonio) for San Salvador

- Motorcade from airport to Presidential Palace.
- Meet with Presidents of Central America and Mexico.
- Dinner by President Sanchez for visiting Presidents.
- Overnight San Salvador.

Second Day: Depart San Salvador for Managua

- Reception at the Airport.
- Motorcade with President Somoza to the cathedral for Mass.
- Lunch and rest period at the Embassy.
- Visit to LBJ Electrical Cooperative in the afternoon.
- Dinner by President Somoza.
- Overnight Managua.

Third Day: Depart Managua for Bogota

- Motorcade from airport to Presidential Palace.
- Dinner with President Lleras.
- Overnight Bogota.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 15-01

Fourth Day: Fly Bogota to Cali

- Visit industrial and agricultural projects in Cauca Valley.
- Lunch with Governor.
- Visit Peace Corps and Alliance projects.
- Go to ranch for dinner, local entertainment and overnight.

Fifth Day: Depart Cali for Brasilia, arriving early afternoon.

- Motorcade from airport to Presidential Palace.
- Visit to President of Supreme Court.
- Address before Joint Session of Brazilian Congress.
- Dinner by President Costa e Silva.
- Overnight Brasilia.

Sixth Day: Depart Brasilia for Rio, arriving at 11:00 a. m.

- Motorcade from airport to Governor's Palace.
- Luncheon by Guanabara Governor Negrão de Lima.
- Visit to Peace Corps project in a favela (slum) where PCV girls are working.
- Visit to Villa Alianza low-cost housing project.
- Return dinner by you for President Costa e Silva.
- Overnight Rio.

Seventh Day: Depart Rio for Sao Paulo, arriving mid-morning.

- Motorcade from airport to Governor's Palace.
- Helicopter from Sao Paulo to Campinas industrial complex.
- Tour large factory and have lunch with workers.
- Visit coffee fazenda (ranch).
- Overnight at fazenda.

Eighth Day: Depart Sao Paulo for Recife, arriving around noon.

- Motorcade from airport to Governor's Palace.
- Address Council of SUDENE.
- Visit sugar plantation in process of reform and modernization.

Depart Recife for Georgetown for refueling stop and short visit with Prime Minister Burnham if airport conditions permit.

Otherwise, fly Recife to Andrews via Ramey.

72

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, May 25, 1968 - 4:00 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick Katzenback reports that last night all of Paris looked like Resurrection City.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rln

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *tg* NARA, Date 6-5-92

72a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 25, 1968


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Situation in France as of Noon,
Saturday, May 25, 1968

The most violent demonstrations since the trouble erupted two weeks ago took place last night in Paris and in most major cities in France. Two were killed; 750 injured; fires were set in the Paris stock Exchange and in three police stations. Despite the extent of violence no arms have been used. Calm has returned to Paris, and no Americans are known to have been involved in disorders. Prime Minister Pompidou has issued an order suspending the right of public assembly, and has instructed the security forces to break up immediately any public gatherings in the streets. All eyes are now turned on the Saturday afternoon meeting of labor union and management association leaders with Pompidou. The Prime Minister is expected to meet with student and teacher union leaders in the immediate future. These actions will hopefully defuse the present tense situation.

We will continue to maintain 24-hour coverage of the situation by the France Watch Group in our Operations Center.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

73

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Authority FRUS 64-168, vol. 27, #37

Saturday, May 25, 1968

~~SECRET~~

By jc, NARA. Date 1-5-01

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Visit of Australian Prime Minister Gorton May 27-28

Attached is a memorandum from Secretary Rusk and the briefing book on this visit.

I passed on to Ambassador Waller your hope that Gorton would attend the Rusk luncheon, and your intention to find a way to give the visit a tone of particular cordiality. As the schedule has shaped up, it may be rather difficult to do this. Your second meeting with Gorton is taking place at 11:30 a. m. on Tuesday. It cannot be a long visit because Gorton is due at the National Press Club at 12:15. You may have your own plan for giving the visit a public note of unusual cordiality, but if you want suggestions I have three, in ascending order of effectiveness.

1. You could "spontaneously" accompany Gorton to the luncheon at the State Department following your first meeting with him on Monday. This is not a public luncheon but your departure from the schedule would become known and attract some public comment.

2. You could "spontaneously" accompany Gorton to his speech at the National Press Club on Tuesday, introducing him with some warm words. This would, of course, get heavy press coverage.

3. If you go through with your tentative plans to go to the Ranch on Wednesday, you could have Gorton as a weekend guest. As it now stands, Gorton is due to start back to Australia on Friday afternoon after a heavy schedule in New York. He could instead fly to the Ranch, spend the weekend with you, and catch an Australian airline flight from San Francisco on Sunday, June 2, at 8:00 p. m. This, of course, would be by far the most effective way of dramatizing your special regard for Australia.

Gorton will have three main concerns:

1. Our political situation and its implications for our Asia policy. I suggest you review the situation fully, stressing that the facts do not warrant a conclusion that the U. S. is about to retreat from Asia.

2. The situation in Vietnam and Paris. He will expect a full exchange and has been very sensitive in the past about the need for full and prior

~~SECRET~~

consultation before we take any new departures. He will want to hear your thoughts about what to do if the talks continue to be unproductive, and your plans in regard to the bombing pause under the various contingencies.

Gorton has publicly ruled out any increases in Australian forces in Vietnam, barring some major change in the situation. (The Australians have about 8,000 men -- three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, one bomber squadron, two helicopter squadrons and a tank squadron.)

3. UK withdrawal from Malaysia-Singapore. Gorton seems to be backing away from the earlier Australian plan to maintain a force in Malaysia after the British withdrawal in 1971. He has talked publicly about the possibility of a "Fortress Australia" approach. He may press hard on the idea that Australia cannot undertake commitments in the Malaysia-Singapore area without a firm guarantee of U.S. support and protection under the ANZUS Treaty. I suggest you adhere to our previous line that:

- we think a continued Australian military presence would be a valuable stabilizing factor;
- we realize questions about the application of ANZUS might arise in connection with such deployments;
- we would like to stay in close consultation about the matter;
- but we cannot give a blanket guarantee.

You should be aware that this whole problem may come to a head at the Five-Power Commonwealth meeting (UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore) scheduled for Kuala Lumpur in June.

All of the above points are covered well and in more detail in Secretary Rusk's memo to you.

You might discuss with Gorton your plans for announcing an Ambassador to Australia.

A particular point of interest: Mrs. Gorton was born in Great Barrington, Massachusetts; grew up in Bangor, Maine; and still retains her American citizenship. She is dual national, also having Australian citizenship.

~~SECRET~~

-3-

Gorton is a very different kind of fellow from Harold Holt. Rather than ruling by consensus with his Cabinet, Gorton is attempting to dominate his colleagues. He is also attempting to handle foreign and defense affairs directly from the Prime Minister's office, cutting the External Affairs and Defense Ministers out. Thus it is that he is accompanied only by members of his personal staff.

W. W. Rostow

MWright:mm

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, May 25, 1968, 3:15 P.M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ratification of US-USSR Consular Convention

Pres file

You agreed a few days ago to a White House ceremony for the exchange of instruments of ratification of the US-USSR Consular Convention, and for your proclamation of the treaty.

There is an alternative possibility you might wish to consider ----- a ceremony in Glassboro on June 4. Taking these steps in that setting would certainly be newsworthy--particularly as this is the first bi-lateral treaty ever concluded between the Soviets and ourselves.

The argument against a Glassboro ceremony is the fact that Article 30 of the treaty states that instruments of ratification are to be exchanged in Washington (the signing ceremony having been in Moscow). Len Meeker says that a strict reading of the treaty would have us exchange instruments here--but with Soviet agreement we could move the ceremony without compromising the validity of the document. However, the Soviets could use the technicality as a basis for objection if they didn't want to go to Glassboro for political reasons.

Nick Katzenbach and the people concerned with Soviet matters at State believe the Russians will not be enthusiastic about Glassboro, but also think we can probably persuade them to acquiesce if you want to go ahead.

W. W. Rostow

_____ Suggest Glassboro to the Russians

_____ White House ceremony

_____ Speak to me

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 1-5-01

ND:amc

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

75

Lunch Meeting With the President
Saturday, May 25, 1968 - 1:00 p.m.

1:30

Free file

AGENDA

1. Bombing Between the 19th and 20th Parallels. (Secs. Rusk and Clifford)

At Tab A the Harriman-Vance cable recommending selected attacks beginning not earlier than next Wednesday.

2. Public and Political Preparation, if any, for Attacks Between the 19th and 20th Parallels. (The President)

I have informed Secs. Rusk and Clifford of Joe Alsop's suggestion.

3. Gen. Westmoreland, strongly supported by Adm. Bunker, requests the right to attack with artillery and airpower enemy bases across the border in Cambodia after his attacks in the Kontum-Pleiku area are turned back. The area is uninhabited. Gen. Westmoreland believes that the area meets "the conditions mentioned by Sihanouk to Bowles in January 1968 for areas in which he would close his eyes to such operations." (See Tab B for relevant cables and map.)

4. General Evaluation of Enemy Strategy in Vietnam and Paris. (Secs. Rusk and Clifford, and Gen. Wheeler)

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-68
By sj, NARA Date 7-26-01

~~TOP SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

By Taylor & Dinahugh

75a 5

~~SECRET~~

REA587

PAGE 01 251335Z

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44
ACTION SSO 00

1968 MAY 25 AM 9 38

INFO /000 W

O 251245Z MAY 68
FM ANEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE IMMEDIATE J984

Rostow

~~SECRET~~ 14694

NODIS/HARVAN

DELTO 152

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By PC, NARA, Date 1-5-01

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

1. WE ANTICIPATE THAT DRV WILL HOLD TO THEIR PRESENT POSITION AND WILL MOUNT MAJOR PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN IN AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE IMPRESSION THAT WE HAVE RENEGED ON AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS ONLY THE QUESTION OF FIXING A DATE FOR CESSATION OF BOMBING AND THEN TO DISCUSS OTHER MATTERS. WE ALSO EXPECT THEY WILL ATTEMPT FURTHER MILITARY ATTACKS AGAINST CITIES (AT LEAST BOMBARDMENT) AND ALLIED FORCES DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. WE BELIEVE THAT EVENTS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM WILL AFFECT DRV ATTITUDE HERE. IN THIS REGARD, WE NOTE WITH SATISFACTION RECENT BROADENING OF BASE OF GOVERNMENT.

2. ALTHOUGH ONE CAN NEVER HAVE REQUISITE FORESIGHT, IT WOULD APPEAR TO US THAT DRV PRESENTLY PLANS TO UNDERTAKE NO RESTRAINT ON THEIR PART UNTIL AFTER OUR CONVENTIONS AND PERHAPS LATER. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WILL NOT BREAK OFF DISCUSSIONS. TO DATE WE HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH PRIVATE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE TWO DELEGATIONS. THE RESPONSE HAS BEEN THAT IT IS TOO EARLY.

3. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOW RENEW BOMBING NORTH OF 20 DEGREES BUT SUGGEST FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION DESIRABILITY OF ATTACKING A FEW CAREFULLY SELECTED TARGETS BETWEEN 19 AND 20 DEGREES. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO DRV THROUGH THIRD PARTY HERE THAT THEIR FAILURE TO SHOW RESTRAINT IN RESPONSE TO

Tab A

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OUR LIMITING OF BOMBING CANNOT BE MAINTAINED INDEFINITELY, AND THAT NOT ONLY HAVE THEY SHOWN NO RESTRAINT, BUT IN FACT HAVE BEEN ESCALATING THROUGH INCREASED INFILTRATION AND ATTACKS AGAINST ALLIED MILITARY FORCES AND CITIES.

4. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS COURSE OF ACTION MIGHT MOVE DRV FROM THEIR PRESENT POSITION, ALTHOUGH IT IS UNLIKELY. AS LONG AS WE STAY SOUTH OF 20 DEGREES AND HIT A FEW SELECTED TARGETS, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO HANDLE THE PRESS AND WORLD OPINION.

5. WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD BE PATIENT AND SHOULD NOT BOMB NORTH OF 20 DEGREES AND SHOULD CONTINUE TALKS, SEARCHING FOR PROGRESS.

6. IF THIS SUGGESTION IS ADOPTED, WE BELIEVE SELECTED BOMBING SOUTH OF 20 DEGREES SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE WEDNESDAY TO GIVE US A CHANCE TO CONVEY MESSAGE AS INDICATED ABOVE TO DRV AND HAVE IT SINK IN.

7. WE FEEL IT IS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP OPEN ALL OPTIONS, INCLUDING CLIFFORD EXPLANATION OF SAN ANTONIO AND PACKER'S FORMULAE, AND THEREFORE BELIEVE NO PUBLIC THREAT SHOULD BE MADE. WE SHOULD NOT CLOSE OUT THE OPTION OF MOVING TO A UNILATERAL CESSATION OF ALL BOMBING WHEN WE HAVE ADEQUATELY SATISFIED OURSELVES THAT HANOI UNDERSTANDS THE ASSUMPTIONS ON WHICH WE WOULD BE ACTING. IN ADDITION, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO GET OURSELVES BOXED IN BY WHAT WE MAY DO OR WHAT WE MAY SAY IN THE OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS. HARRIMAN

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Authority RAC 17979

By jk/ics NARA. Date 1-5-01

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I have asked Wheeler office for this

REF: WESTMORELAND'S 250450ZM

FROM BUNKER FOR SECRETARY RUSK AND SECRETARY CLIFFORD

1. THE MILITARY PLAN SUBMITTED BY MACV TO DEAL WITH THE OMINOUS THREATS TO DAK TO AND KONTUM IN THE HIGHLAND AREA IS EMBODIED IN THE REFERENCED MESSAGE FROM GEN WESTMORELAND. YOU WILL NOTE IT HAS MY ENDORSEMENT, INCLUDING THE RECOMMENDATION FOR HEAVY AIR AND ARTILLERY STRIKES INTO THE UNINHABITED "PENINSULA" OF CAMBODIA IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA. (WE ALREADY HAVE AUTHORITY TO STRIKE IN THE LAOS PORTION, IF NECESSARY.)

2. I REALIZE FULLY THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS DEPARTURE FROM PAST POLICY THE POSSIBILITY OF A SHARP OUTCRY BY SIHANOUK DESPITE HIS STATEMENT ABOUT REMOTE AND UNINHABITED AREAS; THE INJECTION OF THE ISSUE INTO THE PARIS TALKS AS A "WIDER ESCALATION" OF THE WAR AT A TIME WHEN WE ARE PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY URGING RECIPROCAL DEESCALATION; AND THE PROBABILITY OF RENEWED CHARGES FROM SOME QUARTERS AT HOME AND ABROAD, CASTIGATING THE SINCERITY OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS AT PARIS TO FIND A WAY TO PEACE.

3. I AM, HOWEVER, CONVINCED THAT THE ESCALATION BY HANOI SINCE JANUARY 30 POSES MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DANGERS TO OUR POSITION HERE AND AT THE BARGAINING TABLE, AND THAT WE MUST INFLICT THE MAXIMUM PUNISHMENT ON THE ENEMY WHEN THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF. WE MAY

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 28267 251156Z

HAVE SUCH AN OPPORTUNITY IN THIS OPERATION. IT MAY NOT BE AS APPARENT IN WASHINGTON AS IT IS HERE THAT HANOI SINCE THE FIRST OF THE YEAR HAS BEEN MAKING A DESPERATE EFFORT IN I CORPS AGAINST QUANG TRI, HUE AND DA NANG. OF THE 5,662 US KILLED BETWEEN JANUARY 1 AND MAY 22, 3,173 WERE KILLED IN I CORPS, AND THE FIGHTING THERE IS CONTINUOUS AND HEAVY, WITH NO SIGN OF ABATING. (THESE FIGURES GIVEN ME YESTERDAY BY MACV COMBAT OPERATIONS ARE A LITTLE LOWER THAN THOSE THAT ARE IN WASHINGTON, BUT THE PERCENTAGES ARE THE SAME.) THE NVA HIGHLAND OPERATION AIMS AT A US DEFEAT IN THIS AREA, AND THE SEIZURE OF SOME PART OF THE HIGHLANDS FOR ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT AND AS A SPRINGBOARD FOR MAKING THE ATTACKS FURTHER SOUTH AND EAST. I AM ASSURED BY MACV THAT THE ATTACK WILL FAIL.

4. BUT IF THE ROUTED VIETNAMESE RETURN ONCE AGAIN TO THEIR BASES IN THE CAMBODIAN SANCTUARY FOR REGROUPING AND REPLACEMENT, AND WE ARE INHIBITED FROM CONVERTING A ROUT INTO A SMASHING VICTORY BY GOING AFTER THEM WITH AIR AND ARTILLERY SIX MILES INTO THIS SANCTUARY, THEN THEY WILL COME OUT AGAIN AND AGAIN. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF WE LET THEM

DO THIS IT ONLY PROLONGS THEIR HOPE OF EVENTUAL SUCCESS, PROLONGS THE WAR AND THE CASUALTIES; AND PROLONGS THE NEGOTIATIONS. AS I HAVE SAID, HANOI THINKS WE ARE TIRING OF THE WAR, THE COST, AND BURDEN AND THE CRITICISM; THAT WE ARE GOING TO BE LESS AND LESS INCLINED TO RETALIATE; AND THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO BE WILLING OR ABLE EVER AGAIN TO ESCALATE.

5. IF WE DEPART FROM OUR PRESENT POLICY IN THIS INSTANCE, AND WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS, IT MIGHT GIVE HANOI PAUSE AS TO WHETHER THEY ARE RIGHT IN THEIR GAMBLE AND ASSUMPTION THAT OUR POLICY CAN GO ONLY ONE WAY, I.E., TOWARD A FURTHER DEESCALATION. THEY MIGHT EVEN CONCLUDE THAT IF WE ARE PREPARED TO ATTACK CAMBODIAN TERRITORY AND FACE THE CRITICISM, THAT WE MIGHT WELL BE PREPARED TO GO BACK TO A FULL BOMBING OF THE NORTH.

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PAGE 03 SAIGON 28267 251156Z

6. I RECOGNIZE THAT HANOI MIGHT THREATEN TO BREAK OFF THE TALKS IF WE HIT INTO CAMBODIA, BUT THEY MIGHT BE CONSTRAINED, FOR IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD BREAK OFF THE TALKS SIMPLY BECAUSE WE HIT CAMBODIA AND SIHANOUK OBJECTED, AND THEY WOULD SCARCELY ADMIT THAT THEIR FORCES ARE IN CAMBODIA. THE MOST HANOI IS THEREFORE LIKELY TO DO IS TO MAKE PROPAGANDA OF OUR ACTION.

7. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE MUST GRASP THIS NETTLE FIRMLY. OUR FORCES HAVE BEEN TAKING HEAVY CASUALTIES, PARTICULARLY IN I CORPS, SINCE JANUARY, AND PART OF THE REASON ARE THE CAMBODIAN AND LAOTIAN SANCTUARIES AND THE STEPPED-UP HANOI MILITARY EFFORT. I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE OF THE WAR AND NEGOTIATIONS LET THEM KNOW THAT WE ARE NO LONGER GOING TO ALLOW THIS UNINHABITED AREA TO BE USED IN THIS FASHION. ONCE HAVING TAKEN THIS STEP HANOI WILL BE CONSCIOUS THAT WE MIGHT RETURN TO ATTACKS IN THIS AREA IF THEY PERSIST IN USING IT AS SANCTUARY. I RECOGNIZE THAT THE WAR WILL HAVE TAKEN ON A NEW DIMENSION EVEN AS WE ARE TALKING PEACE IN PARIS, BUT I AM CONVINCED THAT WE HAVE MORE TO GAIN THAN TO LOSE BY TAKING THIS STEP. IT WILL UNDERSCORE TO HANOI AND TO EVERYONE THAT WE ARE GOING TO SEE THIS THING THROUGH TO THE END AND THAT IF THEY MEAN TO STEP UP THE FIGHTING AND TALK, THAT TWO CAN PLAY AT THIS GAME. AND IF SIHANOUK OBJECTS, WE CAN USE HIS OWN WORDS THAT HE WOULD NOT MIND IF THE US ENGAGED IN HOT PURSUIT IN UNPOPULATED AREAS, AS AUTHORITY FOR OUR ACTION.

8. ACCORDINGLY, I HOPE THAT ALL THOSE IN WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH MAKING THIS DECISION WILL NOT DISMISS IT, BUT GIVE THE MOST SEARCHING AND SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO OUR RECOMMENDATION.

9. I THINK BOTH THESE MESSAGES SHOULD BE REPATED TO PARIS.
BUNKER

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FOR ADM SHARP INFO GEN WHEELER FROM GEN WESTMORELAND SEC 1 OF 14,
SUBJECT: SPECIAL FIRE AUTHORITY (U)

REF: COMUSMACV 40588 DTG 050815Z DEC 67 (TS)

1. (S) THE B-3 FRONT FORCES ARE AGAIN OUT FROM THEIR CAMBODIAN TRI-BORDER SANCTUARY AND INTO KONTUM PROVINCE IN THE II CIZ, A MAJOR BATTLE IS IMMINENT AND, IN FACT, MAY ALREADY HAVE BEGUN, WHEN THE BATTLE IS OVER AND THE ENEMY IS DEFEATED,

HE PROBABLY WILL WITHDRAW INTO CAMBODIA TO REGROUP, REORGANIZE AND GAIN A SANCTUARY IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO HIS WITHDRAWALS ON TWO PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, THE LAST BEING THE BATTLE FOR DAK TO IN OCT/NOV 67.

2. (S) WE HAVE STUDIED THE RECORDS OF THESE WITHDRAWALS AND NOTE THAT THE ENEMY TENDS TO BE A CREATURE OF HABIT, HE GENERALLY USED THE SAME ROUTES TO WITHDRAW AS HE USED TO JOIN THE BATTLE, MANY OF THE UNITS JOINING THE IMPENDING BATTLE TODAY WERE IN THE PREVIOUS

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BATTLES, AND UNDOUBTEDLY, MANY OF THE MEN ON THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY HAVE COME OUT FOR THE THIRD TIME, THIS IS RUGGED, NEARLY UNPOPULATED COUNTRY, HEAVILY FORESTED, INTERSPERSED WITH TRAILS, AND WITH RESTRICT-

ED AVENUES OF MOVEMENT; THEREFORE, WE EXPECT HIM TO AGAIN USE THE ROUTES HE KNOWS.

3. (S) FROM OUR STUDY, AND FROM A DETAILED MAP TERRAIN ANALYSIS, WE FEEL WE CAN PREDICT HIS PROBABLE WITHDRAWAL ROUTES AND CROSSING POINTS INTO CAMBODIA WHEN HE IS DEFEATED IN THIS IMPENDING BATTLE.

4. (S) THE FOLLOWING IS A SCENARIO, BASED ON A PROJECTION OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES, AND FRIENDLY FORCES AVAILABLE TO COUNTER THEM, OF THE PROBABLE COURSE OF ACTION IN KONTUM PROVINCE DURING THE NEXT TWO TO

INFO: CJCS(GEN WHEELER)-5(1-5) DJS(GEN SPIVY)-1(6)
J3(GEN MEYER)-1(7) J5(VADM JOHNSON)-1(8) SACS(A GEN DEPUY)-1(9)
CSA(GEN JOHNSON)-1(10) CNO(ADM MOORER)-1(11) CSAF(GEN MCCONNELL)
-1(12) CMC(GEN CHAPMAN)-1(13) FILE-1(14) HAF/CV

ADV CY NMCC/DDO/CJCS

PAGE 1 OF 6

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NLJ 01-66

By *Sj*, NARA Date 7-16-01

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THREE WEEKS:

A. THE ENEMY OBJECTIVE IS APPARENTLY KONTUM CITY. HOWEVER, POLEI KLEFG SF CAMP WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE OVERRUN BEFORE THE ENEMY CAN ASSURE A PENETRATION TO THE CITY. IT IS LIKELY THAT HE WILL ALSO TRY TO ELIMINATE SOME OR ALL OF THE FIRE SUPPORT BASES.

B. TO THE NORTH, THE ENEMY WILL PROBABLY TRY TO ELIMINATE BEN HET SF CAMP. THE MAJOR EFFORT ON BEN HET, WHICH MAY BEGIN AT ANY TIME, WILL PROBABLY BE ACCOMPANIED BY ATTACKS BY FIRE ON DAK IO. THESE ACTIONS WILL BE CO-

ORDINATED WITH THE DRIVE TOWARD POLEI KLEFG. FORCES PAGES 3 RUMSAW 13890 ~~TOP SECRET~~ NOFORN LINDIS SPECAT AVAILABLE FOR THIS MISSION ARE THE 325C AND 1ST NVA DIVISIONS SUPPORT-

ED BY ELEMENTS OF THE 40TH NVA ARTY REGT, WHEN THE TWO SF CAMPS HAVE BEEN OVERRUN, THE ENEMY FORCES WILL TURN SOUTH AND ATTACK KONTUM CITY FROM THE NORTH. IF THE ENEMY TIME TABLE SHOULD WORK ACCORDING TO PLANS, FORCES APPROACHING KONTUM CITY SHOULD CONVERGE FROM THE NORTH AND WEST FOR A TWO-PRONGED ATTACK. HE PROBABLY ANTICIPATES THAT THE CAMPAIGN WILL LAST AT LEAST A MONTH.

C. WHEN THE ENEMY COMMITS THE BULK OF HIS FORCES, HE WILL FAIL TO ACHIEVE HIS OBJECTIVES AND BE FORCED TO RETREAT TO PREPARED DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.

D. ONCE AGAIN HE PROBABLY WILL CONDUCT A SCREENING ACTION WITH ELEMENTS OF HIS FORCES, WHILE HIS MAJOR COMBAT UNITS DISENGAGE AND WITHDRAW. HEAVY REAR GUARD ACTION WILL BE CONDUCTED TO SLOW DOWN THE ATTACKING FORCES LONG ENOUGH FOR HIS MAJOR UNITS TO ESCAPE. THE 1ST NVA DIVISION CAN BE EXPECTED TO WITHDRAW TO THE SOUTHWEST GENERALLY ALONG THE DAK HODRAI VALLEY, THEN FANNING OUT TO THE WEST ON THE TRAILS LEADING TO THE BORDER. THE DIVISION PROBABLY WILL CROSS THE BORDER AT VARIOUS POINTS BETWEEN YB 7103 AND YB 7215. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION COULD EVEN PROCEED ON DOWN THE DAK HODRAI VALLEY AND ENTER CAMBODIA NEAR BASE AREA 702.

E. THE 325C NVA DIVISION CAN BE EXPECTED TO WITHDRAW WEST-SOUTHWEST GENERALLY PARALLELING THE DAK KAL VALLEY, THEN FANNING OUT ON THE TRAILS LEADING TO THE BORDER. THE DIVISION SHOULD CROSS THE BORDER AT VARIOUS POINTS BETWEEN YB 7310 AND YB 7523.

F. ONCE HE HAS CROSSED THE TRI-BORDER AREA, HE WILL HEAD FOR THE BIVOUAC AREAS, BASE CAMPS AND BUNKER COMPLEXES ESTABLISHED CLOSE

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TO THE BORDER ALONG THE ROUTE OF HIS NEW MOTORABLE ROAD COMPLEX, HE WILL STAY IN THIS AREA FOR A MAXIMUM OF A FEW DAYS BEFORE PENETRATING DEEPER INTO CAMBODIA TO THE NORTHERN RATANKIRI PROVINCE, HIS TRADITIONAL DEEP SANCTUARY,

5. (S) CONFRONTED WITH AN AGGRESSIVE ENEMY WITH CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS AS INDICATED IN THE PRECEDING SCENARIO, AND IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT APPROXIMATELY 3 TO 4 WEEKS OF WORKABLE WEATHER CAN BE EXPECTED PRIOR TO THE ONSET OF HEAVY RAINS, THE DETERMINATION HAS BEEN MADE TO PRE-EMPT, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE BY INITIATING FRIENDLY OFFENSIVE ACTIONS IN KONTUM PROVINCE, TO THIS END, WE HAVE LAUNCHED AN INTENSIVE B-52 CAMPAIGN AGAINST ENEMY CONCENTRATIONS, STAGING AREAS, AND SUPPLY BASES IN THE HIGHLANDS. THIS HEAVY BOMBING, (OPN PLATTSBURG) WAS LAUNCHED ON 5 MAY 68, PEAKED ON 23 MAY 68. FROM 23 MAY 68, HARRING UNFORESEEN PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS IN OTHER AREAS, THE WEIGHT OF OUR B-52 EFFORT WILL CONTINUE TO BE ALLOCATED TO THIS OPERATION, BEGINNING 24 MAY 68, THE 3D BDE, 101ST ABN DIV, WILL DEPLOY FROM III CTZ TO THE DAK TO AREA RAISING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF FRIENDLY BATTALIONS IN KONTUM PROVINCE TO 11 US AND 3 RVNAF. UPON CLOSURE OF THESE FORCES ON OR ABOUT 26-27 MAY, A HELIBORNE ASSAULT OF APPROXIMATELY A BRIGADE SIZE WILL BE DIRECTED AGAINST ENEMY POSITIONS IN THE BEN HET AREA, THIS ATTACK SUPPORTED BY MASSIVE B-52 AND TACTICAL AIR STRIKES WILL HAVE THE MISSION OF DESTROYING THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY AND OF FORCING HIM TO WITHDRAW TO HIS CAMBODIAN SANCTUARIES.

6. (S) THROUGHOUT THE ENEMY WITHDRAWAL FROM THE BATTLE AREA WE WILL EXERT EVERY PRESSURE TO KEEP HIM FUNNELED INTO THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS ENUMERATED PREVIOUSLY. IN ADDITION TO MAINTAINING PHYSICAL CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY UNITS AS THEY WITHDRAW, EVERY COLLECTION RESOURCE AT OUR DISPOSAL WILL BE UTILIZED TO THE UTMOST TO INSURE THAT WE KNOW WHERE HE IS AT ALL TIMES. SOME OF THESE ARE AIRBORNE REC

NNAISSANCE, AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY USING BLACK AND WHITE, CAMOUFLAGE DETECTION, AND IR FILM; SLAR/MTI-TO DETECT MOVEMENT; ARUF-TO HELP US TO KNOW WHERE TO START LOOKING; GROUND OBSERVATION; PEOPLE SNIFFERS) AND ALL-SOURCE INTELLIGENCE.

7. (S) WE BELIEVE THAT BY UTILIZING THE ABOVE FACILITIES WE CAN PINPOINT ENEMY LOCATIONS IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA WITH REASONABLE

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PAGE 3 OF 6

35444

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CONFIDENCE. IN FACT, WE BELIEVE THAT ANY TWO OF THE ABOVE RESOURCES, INDICATING ENEMY PRESENCE IN A CERTAIN AREA WOULD PROVIDE AT LEAST A 90PCT ASSURANCE FACTOR THAT THE ENEMY IS WITHIN AT LEAST A ONE OR TWO SQ KM AREA AND COULD BE CONFIDENTLY TARGETED.

8. (S) TARGETS OF REGIMENTAL-SIZE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY APPEAR WITHIN THE AREAS BOUNDED BY THE FOLLOWING COORDINATES:

A. FROM YB 7323 EAST TO YB 7623, SOUTH TO YB 7620 WEST TO YB 7320 AND NORTH TO YB 7323;

B. FROM YB 6920, EAST TO YB 7720, SOUTH TO YB 7717, SOUTHWEST TO YB 7515, WEST TO 7215, NORTH TO YB 7218, WEST TO YB 6918, THEN NORTH TO YB 6920;

C. FROM YB 7215 EAST TO YB 7415, SOUTH TO YB 7409, WEST TO YB 6909, NORTH TO YB 6913, EAST TO YB 7213, AND NORTH TO YB 7215;

D. FROM YB 7109 EAST TO YB 7309, SOUTH TO YB 7305, WEST YB 7205, SOUTH TO YB 7203, WEST TO YB 6803, NORTH TO YB 6806, EAST TO YB 7106, AND NORTH TO YB 7109;

9. (S) USUALLY RELIABLE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS REVEALED FIFTEEN UNITS JUST WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE BOUNDED AREAS ABOVE IN 81

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PAGE 4 OF 6

35444

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TO RUMKA/CINCPAC HAWAII
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~~TOP SECRET~~ NUFURN LINDIS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE 14986
FOR ADM SHARP INFO GEN WHEELER FROM GEN WESTMORELAND FINAL SEC OF II.
NOVEMBER, THE MONTH IN WHICH HE WITHDREW, IN OCTOBER THERE WERE
ONLY FOUR REPORTED SIGHTINGS AND IN DECEMBER, NONE AT ALL, IN
JANUARY AGAIN THE REPORTS INDICATED TWENTY-ONE AND HE ESTABLISHED
TWO BIVOAC AREAS. THIS HEAVY ACTIVITY INDICATED THE STATE OF
PREPAREDNESS FOR THE UPCOMING TET OFFENSIVE,
10. (+S) I AGAIN EMPHASIZE THAT THESE TYPES OF TARGETS TEND TO
BE FLEETING, THE ENEMY TENDS NOT, REPEAT NOT, TO OCCUPY THESE
BIVOAC AREAS AND REGROUPING POINTS FOR MORE THAN A FEW DAYS.
OUR REACTION TIME IS SUFFICIENTLY FAST THAT WE COULD MAKE A B-52
STRIKE AGAINST A CONFIRMED TARGET IN AS LITTLE AS THREE HOURS BY
DIVERTING FROM NEARBY PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED TARGETS, FOR PLANNED
TARGETS THE NORMAL TIME REQUIRED FOR STRIKE IS TWELVE HOURS AFTER
NOMINATION. TAC AIR TARGETS COULD BE HIT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER
NOMINATION.
11. (+S) OUR INTELLIGENCE IS CLOSE ENOUGH TO REAL TIME TO MEET
THE REQUIRED REACTION TIME HERE, BUT IT IS UNLIKELY TO PROVIDE THE
LEAD TIME NECESSARY TO SECURE APPROVAL FROM THE HIGHEST ECHELONS
BEFORE THE TARGET DISSIPATES. IT IS THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT
APPROVAL BE SOUGHT IN ADVANCE TO PURSUE BY FIRE (INCLUDING ARC
LIGHT, TAC AIR, AND ARTILLERY) TARGETS IN THE TRI-BORDER SANCTUARY
AREA OF CAMBODIA. THE SANCTUARY AREA IS MODIFIED SLIGHTLY FROM
THAT IDENTIFIED IN REFERENCE TO INCLUDE ALL THE CAMBODIAN
'PENINSULA' NORTH AND EAST OF YB 6100 (RATHER THAN YB 6200 AS IN-
DICATED IN REFERENCE). THE AUTHORITY WOULD BE USED ONLY IN EVEN'S
UNFOUL GENERALLY AS PRESENTED IN THE ABOVE SCENARIOS, SHOULD THE
REQUESTED AUTHORITY BE GRANTED, TIMELY AND POSITIVE NOTIFICATION
WILL BE MADE PRIOR TO COMMENCING INITIAL CROSS-BORDER ATTACKS.

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PAGES OF 6

35444

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12. ~~(S)~~ I HAVE DISCUSSED THE ABOVE RECOMMENDATIONS WITH
AMBASSADOR BUNKER, WHO WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORTS THE INITIATION OF
THIS ACTION, WHICH APPEARS TO MEET THE CONDITIONS MENTIONED BY
SIHANOUK TO BOHLES IN JANUARY 1968 FOR AREAS IN WHICH HE WOULD CLOSE
HIS EYES TO SUCH OPERATIONS, N

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PAGE 6 OF 6

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INFORMATION

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Saturday, May 25, 1968
1:25 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith de Gaulle receives
Shriver:

- warmly in human terms;
- asusual on Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 14698
Paris 14699

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 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
 White House Guidelines: Feb. 24, 1993
 By rg, NARA, Date 6-5-92

WWRostow:rlh

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L PARIS 14698

1. I PRESENTED MY LETTER OF CREDENCE THIS MORNING AND ALL THE MEMBERS OF MY STAFF WHO ACCOMPANIED ME AGREE THAT GENERAL DE GAULLE WAS EXCEPTIONALLY WARM AND RECEPTIVE FOR SUCH AN OCCASION. THEY ARE ALSO IMPRESSED BY FACT HE SMILED TWICE AND BY THE CORDIALITY OF HIS PREPARED REMARKS, FULL TEXT OF WHICH IS BEING SUBMITTED BY SEPTEL.
2. IN OUR PRIVATE DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE PREPARED EXCHANGE HE WOULD NOT TALK OF THE FRENCH INTERNAL SITUATION BUT SPOKE ONLY ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND PREDOMINANTLY ON VIETNAM. HIS LINE WAS ALMOST STRAIGHT REPETITION OF HIS PHNOMPENH SPEECH. HE STATED US HAD NOTHING TO LOSE BY GETTING OUT OF VIETNAM. IT WOULD NOT HARM OUR DIGNITY, NOR REFLECT BADLY ON THE VALOR OF THE AMERICAN FIGHTING MAN OR THE MILITARY CAPACITY OF THE UNITED STATES. OUR POWER AND INFLUENCE WERE SUCH THAT IT WAS UP TO US TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN SETTLING THE ISSUE.
3. FRANCE HAD NOT SUFFERED IN EYES OF WORLD BY WITHDRAWAL FROM INDO-CHINA OR ALGERIA EVEN THOUGH IT HAD 1,000,000 TROOPS IN THE LATTER.
4. I HAVE REPORTED ABOVE TO HARRIMAN. SHRIVER

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PARIS 14699

SUBJ: TRANSLATION OF PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S REMARKS TO
AMBASSADOR SHRIVER

MISTER AMBASSADOR:

MOST WILLINGLY I HAVE JUST RECEIVED FROM YOUR HANDS THE
LETTERS BY WHICH HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS ACCREDITED
YOU TO ME AND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC AS
AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES. YOU HAVE SPOKEN VERY WELL
AND VERY NOBLY, MISTER AMBASSADOR, AND YOU HAVE EXPRESSED AMERICAN
SENTIMENTS AND I CAN TELL YOU THAT THEY ARE VERY LARGELY SIMILAR
TO FRENCH SENTIMENTS.

AS REGARDS THE PAST, ONE MUST NOT FORGET YOU AND WE HAVE BEEN
BOUND TOGETHER IN ALL THE GREAT TRAGEDIES AND WE MUST REMAIN SO.
WE HAVE BEEN SO BOUND SPONTANEOUSLY AND IT IS IN THIS MANNER THAT
WE MUST BE IF NEW DRAMAS ARISE.

AS FOR THE PRESENT, THERE ARE WITHOUT DOUBT BETWEEN THE AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, GIVEN THE PARTICULAR

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~~PAGE 02 PARIS 14599-251459Z~~

SITUATIONS IN WHICH EACH ONE FINDS ITSELF, CERTAIN DIFFERENCES OF CONCEPTION CONCERNING ONE SUBJECT OR ANOTHER AND IN PARTICULAR CONCERNING THAT OF VIETNAM. BUT THESE ARE, IN A WAY, EVENTS OF THE MOMENT, EPISODIC EVENTS; ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, WE ARE, YOU AND WE, IN THE SAME CAMP OF LIBERTY. WHATEVER HAPPENS, IT IS NECESSARY THAT WE REMAIN SO, YOU AND WE.

AS TO THE FUTURE, MISTER AMBASSADOR, IT DEPENDS NOT ON US, IT DEPENDS ON GOD. EVERYTHING INDICATES IT CAN BE AN AGITATED ONE AND EVEN PERHAPS ONCE AGAIN DRAMATIC. PERHAPS ALSO IT WILL NOT BE. WHATEVER IT MAY BE, MISTER AMBASSADOR, I BELIEVE THAT AMERICAN AND FRANCE WILL BE ONCE AGAIN TOGETHER, I REPEAT IT IF GREAT MISFORTUNES SHOULD BEFALL OUR HUMANITY.

IT IS WITH THIS SENTIMENT THAT I TELL YOU YOU WILL ALWAYS RECEIVE FROM ME AND MY GOVERNMENT ALL THE FACILITIES FOR THE EXECUTION OF YOUR VERY IMPORTANT MISSION. I ASK YOU TO TELL PRESIDENT JOHNSON FOR ME TO WHAT EXTENT MY SENTIMENTS ARE WITH HIM, ESPECIALLY AT THE TIME WHEN HE HAS DIFFICULT QUESTIONS OF AN INTERNATIONAL NATURE TO SETTLE. WE HOPE THAT THINGS TURN OUT WELL, IN PARTICULAR THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW UNDERWAY. THROUGH YOU, MISTER AMBASSADOR, AND IN THE NAME OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE, I SALUTE WITH MUCH AFFECTION, ATTACHMENT AND CONSIDERATION THE GREAT AMERICAN PEOPLE. SHRIVER

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77

INFORMATION

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Saturday, May 25, 1968 - 12:20pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Harriman and Vance
evaluate Hanoi's intentions.

Suggest "few carefully selected
targets between 19th and 20th ... not
before Wednesday."

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

DELTO 152 (Paris 14694)

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jk, NARA, Date 1-5-01



Department of State

TELEGRAM

Q Taylor & Hinchey

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N O D I S/HARVAN

DELTO 152

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 1-5-01

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

1. WE ANTICIPATE THAT DRV WILL HOLD TO THEIR PRESENT POSITION AND WILL MOUNT MAJOR PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN IN AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE IMPRESSION THAT WE HAVE RENEGED ON AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS ONLY THE QUESTION OF FIXING A DATE FOR CESSATION OF BOMBING AND THEN TO DISCUSS OTHER MATTERS. WE ALSO EXPECT THEY WILL ATTEMPT FURTHER MILITARY ATTACKS AGAINST CITIES (AT LEAST BOMBARDMENT) AND ALLIED FORCES DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. WE BELIEVE THAT EVENTS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM WILL AFFECT DRV ATTITUDE HERE. IN THIS REGARD, WE NOTE WITH SATISFACTION RECENT BROADENING OF BASE OF GOVERNMENT.

2. ALTHOUGH ONE CAN NEVER HAVE REQUISITE FORESIGHT, IT WOULD APPEAR TO US THAT DRV PRESENTLY PLANS TO UNDERTAKE NO RESTRAINT ON THEIR PART UNTIL AFTER OUR CONVENTIONS AND PERHAPS LATER. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WILL NOT BREAK OFF DISCUSSIONS. TO DATE WE HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH PRIVATE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE TWO DELEGATIONS. THE RESPONSE HAS BEEN THAT IT IS TOO EARLY.

3. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOW RENEW BOMBING NORTH OF 20 DEGREES BUT SUGGEST FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION DESIRABILITY OF ATTACKING A FEW CAREFULLY SELECTED TARGETS BETWEEN 19 AND 20 DEGREES. WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR TO DRV THROUGH THIRD PARTY HERE THAT THEIR FAILURE TO SHOW RESTRAINT IN RESPONSE TO

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PAGE 02 251335Z

OUR LIMITING OF BOMBING CANNOT BE MAINTAINED INDEFINITELY, AND THAT NOT ONLY HAVE THEY SHOWN NO RESTRAINT, BUT IN FACT HAVE BEEN ESCALATING THROUGH INCREASED INFILTRATION AND ATTACKS AGAINST ALLIED MILITARY FORCES AND CITIES.

4. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS COURSE OF ACTION MIGHT MOVE DRV FROM THEIR PRESENT POSITION, ALTHOUGH IT IS UNLIKELY. AS LONG AS WE STAY SOUTH OF 20 DEGREES AND HIT A FEW SELECTED TARGETS, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO HANDLE THE PRESS AND WORLD OPINION.

5. WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD BE PATIENT AND SHOULD NOT BOMB NORTH OF 20 DEGREES AND SHOULD CONTINUE TALKS, SEARCHING FOR PROGRESS.

6. IF THIS SUGGESTION IS ADOPTED, WE BELIEVE SELECTED BOMBING SOUTH OF 20 DEGREES SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE WEDNESDAY TO GIVE US A CHANCE TO CONVEY MESSAGE AS INDICATED ABOVE TO DRV AND HAVE IT SINK IN.

7. WE FEEL IT IS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP OPEN ALL OPTIONS, INCLUDING CLIFFORD EXPLANATION OF SAN ANTONIO AND PACKER'S FORMULAE, AND THEREFORE BELIEVE NO PUBLIC THREAT SHOULD BE MADE. WE SHOULD NOT CLOSE OUT THE OPTION OF MOVING TO A UNILATERAL CESSATION OF ALL BOMBING WHEN WE HAVE ADEUATELY SATISFIED OURSELVES THAT HANOI UNDERSTANDS THE ADDUMPTIONS ON WHICH WE WOULD BE ACTING. IN ADDITION, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO GET OURSELVES BOXED IN BY WHAT WE MAY DO OR WHAT WE MAY SAY IN THE OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS. HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

72

Pres file

Saturday, May 25, 1968, 9:40 A. M.

Mr. President:

Herewith the hard arithmetic of Vietnam since Tet (January 30-May 18).

	(1)Average 1967	(2)Average since Tet	$\frac{2}{1}$
VC/NVA killed per day	241	821	3.4
Enemy weapons captured per day	85	279	3.3
U. S. killed per day	26	59	2.3
GMN killed per day	30	63	2.1
Enemy/friendly killed ratio	4.1:1	6.7:1	1.6

Enemy losses -- by men and weapons -- are running over three times the 1967 average.

Our losses -- and the GVN's -- are running about twice the 1967 average.

The enemy is now losing about seven men to one of ours -- and our allies.

W. W. Rostow