

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Rostow to President S 2 p <i>open 6-26-95 NLS 94-407</i>	6/11/68	A
#2 memo	Rostow to President, 11:45 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 4/16/01</i>	6/12/68	A
#3a memo	Taylor to President <i>exempt 1/25/02 NLS 01-157</i> S 7 p <i>open 9-13-07 NLS 01-157</i>	6/7/68	A
#4 memo <i>not open yet</i>	Rostow to President, 8:50 p.m. S 1 p [dup. # 10, NSF, CF, VN, "HV Misc. & Memos v. 3," Box 122]	6/12/68	A
#4a cable <i>open 1-28-99 RAC</i>	Paris 16069 S 3 p [dup. #100, NSF, CF, VN, "HV Misc. & Memos v. 3," Box 122] [dup. #117, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN PARIS TO DEL...," Box 116] [dup. #18, NSF, CF, VN, "HV Chron 7," Box 110]	6/11/68	A
#5a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 2 p <i>exempt RAC 8/05</i>	6/12/68	A
#8a cable	Paris 16113 S 6 p <i>open 6-1-93 NLS 93-16</i>	6/12/68	A
#9a rpt	From British Consulate in Hanoi <i>dup #54a, NSF, CF, VN, Hanoi/Crocodile</i> C 1 p <i>exempt NLS 93-16 Indian Proposal... Box 834</i>	5/23/68	A
#9b rpt	From British Consulate in Hanoi <i>dup #54b as above</i> C 4 p <i>exempt NLS 93-16</i>	5/23/68	A
#9c cable	Telegram #05310 (<i>dup #54c as above</i>) C 1 p	6/10/68	A
#11 memo	Rostow to President, 8:45 a.m. <i>open 5/14/03 NLS/RAC 01-135</i> TS 1 p	6/12/68	A
#11a rpt	Intelligence Report TS- 1 p <i>sanitized 8-4-04 NW/RAC 03-206</i>	6/12/68	A
#12 memo <i>open CLOSING REMOVED PER THE 5/15/03</i>	Rostow to President, 8:45 a.m. 1 p [Duplicate of #28, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "[Non-Vietnam: March-June 1968]," Box 16]	6/12/68	C

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 81, June 7-12, 1968 Box 35

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#14 memo	Rostow to President <i>sanitized 12-23-93 NLJ 92-131</i> S 1 p <i>Open 9/14/01 NS 01-45</i> [Duplicate of #214, NSF, CF, Japan, Vol. 7]	6/12/68	A
#14a cable	From Tokyo <i>Open 11/29/00 NS 00-274</i> S 7 p [Duplicate of #214a, NSF, CF, Japan, Vol. 7]	6/5/68	A
#15 memo	Rostow to President TS 1 p <i>Open 4/16/01</i>	6/12/68	A
#17 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>Open 2-5-93 NLJ 91-343</i>	6/12/68	A
#22 memo	Rostow to President, 6:30 p.m. <i>Open 12-3-96 NLJ 96-25</i> C 2 p (Dup of # 27, WWR-Non-VN-3/6/68)	6/11/68	A
#23 memo	Rostow to President, 6:00 p.m. <i>sanitized 11/13/02 per NLJ/ RAL 01-134</i> S 1 p <i>example NLJ 01-035-3</i>	6/11/68	A
#24 memo	Rostow to President, 5:30 p.m. TS 1 p <i>Open 4/16/01</i>	6/11/68	A
#24a rpt	Intelligence Report <i>sanitized 1/23/02 NLJ/RAL 01-136</i> TS- 2 p	6/10/68	A
#25 memo	Rostow to President, 5:25 p.m. <i>Open 12-15-95 NLJ 95-188</i> TS 1 p [Duplicate of #5, NSF, CF, Mexico, Vol. 4]	6/11/68	A
#25a cable	Mexico 5347 <i>Open 4/16/01</i> TS 4 p [Duplicate of #5a, NSF, CF, Mexico, Vol. 4]	6/8/68	A
#26 memo	Rostow to President, 5:10 p.m. S 1 p <i>Open 5-12-95 NLJ 93-18</i>	6/11/68	A
#26a cable	Paris 16053 <i>Open 6-1-93 NLJ 93-16</i> S 2 p	6/11/68	A

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#26b cable	Paris 16067 <i>open 6-1-93 NLS 93-16</i> S 1 p	6/11/68	A
#27 memo	Rostow to President, 5:05 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 5-12-95 NLS 93-18</i>	6/11/68	A
#27a cable	Paris 16058 S 2 p <i>open 6-1-93 NLS 93-16</i>	6/11/68	A
#30 memo	Rostow to President <i>sanitized NLS 102 p. NLS/RAC 01-134</i> TS 1 p	6/11/68	A
#30a memo	Rusk to President TS 2 p <i>Exempt NLS 019-035-3</i>	6/7/68	A
#30b rpt	Intelligence Report <i>Exempt RAC 5103</i> TS- 2 p	6/3/68	A
#32 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>OPEN 8/8/96 NLS 94-194</i>	6/11/68	A
#32a cable	Bonn 13101 C 2 p <i>open 8-15-94 NLS 94-193</i>	6/10/68	A
#35a ltr	President to Chairman (draft) S 2 p <i>open 4/16/01</i> [Duplicate of #21a, Meeting Notes File, "[Briefing Papers for Tuesday Luncheon, 6/11/68]"]	6/10/68	A
#35b ltr	President to Chairman (draft) S 2 p [Duplicate of #21b, Meeting Notes File, "[Briefing Papers for Tuesday Luncheon, 6/11/68]"]	6/10/68	A
#35c cable	Paris 15760 S 4 p <i>open 6-1-93 NLS 93-16</i> [Duplicate of #21c and #21d, Meeting Notes File, "[Briefing Papers for Tuesday Luncheon, 6/11/68]"]	6/7/68	A
#37a memo	Lansdale to Bunker <i>open 6-1-93 NLS 93-16</i> S 6 p	6/7/68	A

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#38 memo	Rostow to President, 11:50 a.m. S 1 p open 5-12-95 NLJ 93-18	6/11/68	A
#38a cable	Saigon 29661 open 6-1-93 NLJ 93-16 S 3 p	6/11/68	A
#39a cable	Paris 16004 " S 8 p	6/11/68	A
#40a cable	Saigon 29565 " S 4 p	6/10/68	A
#40b cable	Deptel 179417 to All European Posts... S 6 p Sanitized 6-1-93 NLJ 93-16 [Dup. #19b, NSF, CF, VN, HARVARD Misc. + memos vol. 3"] [Dup. #35, NSF, CF, VN, HARVARD Chron. vol. 7"]	6/8/68	A
#41 memo	Rostow to President, 10:15 a.m. S 3 p open 4/16/01 [Dup. #20, NSF, CF, VN, HARVARD Misc. + memos vol. 3"]	6/11/68	A
#43 memo	Rostow to President, 9:15 a.m. open RAC 11/09 TS 1 p Sanitized 8-5-98 NLJ 94-76	6/11/68	A
#43a memo	McCafferty to Rostow open RAC 11/09 TS 1 p Sanitized 8-5-98 NLJ 94-76	6/10/68	A
#43b rpt	Intelligence Report PCI 1 p open 8-5-98 NLJ 94-76	undated	A
#44a cable	Seoul 7773 S 2 p open 3-30-94 NLJ 93-367	6/11/68	A
#47 memo	Rostow to President, 7:25 p.m. S 1 p Sanitized per RAC 4/16/01 [Dup. #28, NSF, CF, VN, HARVARD Misc. + memos vol. 3"]	6/10/68	A
#47a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 p Sanitized per RAC 4/16/01 [Dup. #28, as above.]	6/7/68	A
#48 memo	Rostow to President, 7:20 p.m. Open NLJ 96-141 4/13/98 S 1 p (Dup. of #20, NSF, CF, VN, 2H(4), Box 76)	6/10/68	A
#49a memo	Taylor to President S 2 p open 5-12-95 NLJ 93-18	6/10/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#50a ltr	President to Chairman (draft) S 2 p open 5-12-95 NLJ 93-18	undated	A
#51a cable	Saigon 29571 S 3 p open 6-1-93 NLJ 93-16	6/10/68	A
#54 memo	Rostow to President, 9:00 a.m. <i>Open 4/16/01</i> C 1 p (dup # 23, NSFCF Vietnam "HARVAN" Mem + memo Vol 3, Box 122)	6/10/68	A
#55 memo	Rostow to President, 8:15 a.m. S 1 p Sanitized 7/17/96 NY 93-18 <i>Same sanitized per RAC 9/11/00</i>	6/10/68	A
#55a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 7 p Sanitized 8-9-93 NLJ 93-31 <i>Same sanitized per RAC 9/11/00</i>	6/9/68	A
#56 memo	Rostow to President, 7:45 a.m. S 1 p open 5-12-95 NLJ 93-18	6/10/68	A
#56a cable	Saigon 29468 S 8 p open 6-1-93 NLJ 93-16	6/8/68	A
#57 memo	Rostow to President, 2 p.m. S 2 p <i>open 5-12-95 NLJ 93-18</i>	6/9/67	A
#58 memo	Rostow to President, 1:25 p.m. S 1 p "	6/9/67	A
#58a cable	Paris 15874 <i>open 6-1-93 NLJ 93-16</i> S 5 p	6/9/68	A
#59 memo	Rostow to President, 9:40 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 5-12-95 NLJ 93-18</i>	6/9/68	A
#59a ltr	President to Chairman (draft) S 5 p "	undated	A
#60 memo	Rostow to President, 9:25 a.m. S 1 p OPEN 6/21/95 NLJ 94-344	6/9/68	A
#60a cable	Deptel 179496 to USUN <i>open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342</i> S 1 p	6/9/68	A

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#60b cable	Deptel 179495 to USUN S 1 p open 12-12-94 NLS 94-342	6/9/68	A
#61 memo	Rostow to President, 9:20 a.m. S 1 p open 5-12-95 NLS 93-18	6/9/68	A
#61a cable	Saigon 29481 open 6-1-93 NLS 93-16 S 2 p	6/9/68	A
#61b cable	Saigon 29481 (Section 292) 5 p. secret open 6-1-93 NLS 93-16	6-9-68	A
#64 memo	Rostow to President, 2:50 p.m. TS- 3 p Sanitized 3/13/03 NLS 01-58	6/8/68	A
#64a memo	To AEC Chairman TS- 2 p	6/6/68	A
#64b memo	To Secretary of Defense TS- 2 p	6/6/68	A
#65a cable	Saigon 29472 S 13 p open 6-1-93 NLS 93-16	6/8/68	A
#68 memo	Rostow to President, 6:05 p.m. C 2 p open 6-27-94 NLS 93-345	6/7/68	A
#68a memo	Zwick to President C 1 p	6/6/68	A
#68c memo	Katzenbach to President C 3 p open 3-14-94 NLS 93-347	5/25/68	A
#68c rpt	"Equipment" C 2 p open 12-23-09	undated	A
#70 memo	Rostow to President, 4:15 p.m. S 1 p (dup. #11, NSF files of Walt Rostow, "Dup to Soviet Union" Box 11 open 7/16/96 NLS 95-304)	6/7/68	A
#71 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p (dup of #189, NSF, CFVN, 2H(4), Box 76) open 7/17/96 NLS 95-304 93-18	6/7/68	A
#71a cable	From Saigon open 3-30-94 NLS 93-16	undated	A
FILE LOCATION	C 2 p		

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#74 memo	Rostow to President, 4:20 p.m. TS- 1 p <i>sanitized 3/14/03 NLJ/RAC 01-135</i>	6/7/68	A
#74a rpt	Intelligence Report TS- 5 p <i>sanitized 5-24-04 NW/PAC 01-137</i>	6/7/68	A
#75 memo	Rostow to President, 3:15 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 5-12-95 NLJ 93-18</i>	6/7/68	A
#75a cable	Paris 15760 <i>open 6-1-93 NLJ 93-16</i> S 4 p	6/7/68	A
#77 memo	Rostow to President, 11 a.m. S 1 p <i>Sanitized per RAC 4/16/01</i>	6/7/68	A
#77a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 12 p <i>Sanitized per RAC 4/16/01</i>	6/5/68	A
#79 memo	Rostow to President, 10:40 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 4/16/01</i> [Dup. #97a, NSF, CF, Korea, "Vol. 6"]	6/7/68	A
#79a memo	Cramer for the Record <i>open 12-23-09</i> S 1 p <i>[Dup. #97b, as above]</i>	6/6/68	A
#79b map	Intelligence Map <i>open 12-23-09</i> S 1 p [Dup. #97c, as above]	undated	A
#80a cable	Deptel 29385 to Saigon C 1 p <i>open 6-1-93 NLJ 93-16</i>	6/7/68	A
#83 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 4/16/01</i> S 2 p	6/7/68	A
#83a memo	Fowler to President S 5 p	6/6/68	A
#84 memo	Rostow to President TS- 3 p <i>sanitized 3/13/03 NLJ 01-158</i>	6/7/68	A
#84a rpt	Intelligence Report <i>sanitized 3-15-05 NW 03-212</i> TS- 1 p	undated	A

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#84b memo	NSAM draft TS- 3 p	undated	A
#84c rpt	Appendix A TS- 1 p	undated	A
#84d rpt	Appendix B TS- 1 p	undated	A
#84e rpt	Appendix C TS- 1 p	undated	A
#84f rpt	Appendix D TS- 2 p	undated	A
#85 memo	Rostow to President, 6 p.m. open 11/13/02, per NLT/ARC 01-134 S- 3 p	6/7/68	A
#85a cable	San Salvador 2043 S 2 p	6/6/68	A
#85b cable	Mexico 5271 S 1 p	6/5/68	A
#85c memo	Boonstra to Sayre S 1 p	6/7/68	A
#85d memo	Jova to Oliver S 1 p	6/6/68	A
#85e cable	Guatemala 4917 S 2 p	6/6/68	A
#85f cable	Managua 1820 S 1 p	6/5/68	A
#85g cable	Bogota 4191 <i>sanitized NLT 09-035-3-16 (1/02)</i> S 5 p	6/5/68	A
#85h cable	Rio de Janeiro 8600	6/5/68	A
FILE LOCATION	S 3 p		

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#85i cable	Georgetown 1319 S 2 p	6/6/68	A
#85j report	Intelligence Summary <i>open 12-2309</i> S 1 p	6/3/68	A
#85k report	Intelligence Summary " S 1 p	undated	A
#85l report	Intelligence Summary " S 1 p	undated	A
#85m report	Intelligence Summary " S 2 p	undated	A
#85n report	Intelligence Summary " S 5 p	undated	A
#85o report	Intelligence Summary " S 2 p	undated	A

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June 11, 1968

WWTZ
1
Pres file

Mr. President:

In the attached memorandum, Sec. Rusk recommends we announce our willingness to negotiate an international agreement not to emplace or fix nuclear weapons on the seabed, at the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabed which opens on June 17. The specific language of the statement would be:

"The United States is prepared to enter into serious discussions at an international forum such as the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in order to achieve an appropriate international agreement pursuant to which each party would agree not to emplace or fix nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on, within, beneath or to the seabed beyond a narrow band along its coast and up to the coast of any other State. The width of this narrow band would be determined by negotiation. The prohibition on emplacement or fixing should be aimed not only at the weapons themselves but also at launching platforms or delivery systems for such weapons."

This recommendation has been developed by the Committee of Principals. The JCS, however, do not concur. Sec. Clifford is still considering his position.

The issue as to whether this proposal is in the over-all interests of the United States can be broken down into the following questions:

1. What is the net military significance of the proposal? It would prohibit the introduction of nuclear weapons in a new environment. It is agreed that the statement would not affect any current or planned US military systems. The JCS, however, do not want to give up the option for possible use of the seabed in the future for nuclear weapons systems.

2. How important is the statement politically? This proposal strongly complements our current policies involving international cooperation involving the oceans and seabed. It would also fend off less acceptable seabed arms control proposals. However, the JCS and OSD have questioned how serious the political consequences of not advancing a concrete proposal would really be.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-407

~~SECRET-NOFORN~~ By ig, NARA, Date 6-23-95

3. Could the proposal be adequately verified? The intelligence community agrees that, while we would have little assurance of detecting clandestine emplacement of small numbers of weapons on the seabed, we would probably detect larger deployments that could endanger our security. On balance, Sec. Rusk believes US security interests would be adequately protected. The Chiefs do not agree that our unilateral intelligence capability can adequately monitor the agreement. The JCS and OSD have also raised the question as to whether we could convince the Senate of the adequacy of our unilateral verification capabilities.

4. How does the statement affect our legal position on territorial limits? In order to avoid internal debate as to whether the proposal should be in terms of a 12-mile limit and how it would be defined, the statement now refers to a "narrow band" which would be negotiated. Nevertheless, we will presumably have to surface our position on this early in any negotiations.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

SMKeeny:jb:6-11-68/11:55a

bcc: SMK file and chron

→ WWR (2)

CEJ

SMK comeback copy

Wednesday, June 12, 1968
11:45 a. m.

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MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a summary of telephone report from Paris on the meeting this morning.

1. Meeting went 3 hours 45 minutes.
2. After Harriman's statement, there was a half-hour tea break, during which Harriman pressed for private talks. The answer was "perhaps after progress had been made in other matters."
3. The North Vietnamese statement was, in Habib's judgment, the toughest and most unyielding of all, attacking our position as "absurd" and rejecting reciprocity absolutely.
4. The next meeting is scheduled for next Wednesday. They refused an earlier date.
5. Le Duc Tho was present for the first time.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-29-01

INFORMATION

3

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, June 11, 1968 - 3:45 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Taylor's appraisal of our intelligence performance with respect to the Tet offensive.

Conclusions and recommendation are tersely stated on pp. 4-5.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1963
By *rlg*, NARA, DATE *6-8-92*

~~SECRET~~

3a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

June 7, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the Quality of U.S. Intelligence
Bearing on the TET Offensive, January 1968

Background

1. In my memorandum dated February 23, 1968 you were informed that your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was looking into the "intelligence failure" which allegedly occurred at the time of the attacks on South Vietnamese cities during the TET holiday last January. It was our purpose to determine insofar as possible (a) whether adequate intelligence indicators had been available to serve as warnings prior to the attacks; (b) whether these warnings reached the proper officials in time; and (c) what lessons bearing on intelligence might be learned from the experience. We did not undertake to pass judgment on the adequacy or appropriateness of the subsequent actions taken by commanders and key officials who received the intelligence.

2. The Board consulted with and received briefings from representatives of the principal United States departments and agencies having responsibilities for intelligence relating to the Vietnam theater. Also, the Board made requests for additional information concerning specific aspects of the subject. These requests led to a post-mortem study by the United States intelligence community, in collaboration with appropriate military authorities, which concentrated on the intelligence bearing on the enemy build-up during the 15 days preceding the TET offensive. This study was conducted by a working group composed of representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (acting as Chairman), the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The working group visited South Vietnam in March where it was joined by observers from CINCPAC and MAVC and, with the latter, received briefings and reviewed numerous relevant documents. The group's inquiries also included interviews with Ambassador Bunker, General Westmoreland, United States military commanders and intelligence officers. On the South Vietnamese side, there were interviews with the commanding generals of I and II Corps, the J-2 of the Joint General Staff and his deputy, and the deputy director of the National Police.

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 01-157

By isl, NARA, Date 12-20-06

~~SECRET~~

3. Basing its assessment on the findings of these representatives of the intelligence community and on a sampling of the vast quantity of information received concerning the enemy during the pre-TET period, the Board submits the following views regarding the intelligence aspects of the TET offensive.

Findings

4. Throughout January, 1968 the intelligence apparatus was filled with indications that the enemy was preparing for a series of coordinated attacks on a larger scale than ever before attempted. Considering each Corps area separately, the clearest advance warnings directed attention to the likelihood of enemy attacks in I Corps, the Kontum-Pleiku areas of II Corps, and the vicinity of Saigon in III Corps. In IV Corps, the U.S. intelligence apparatus received virtually no advance indications of the nature and extent of the attacks which occurred. With regard to the timing of the enemy's offensive, most of the intelligence evaluators concluded that the offensive most likely would occur just prior to or immediately following the TET holiday period which extended from January 27 to February 3, 1968. A few of the evaluators in the field, including General Westmoreland, included in their estimates the specific possibility that the offensive might take place during the TET holidays. While some reports suggested the possibility of simultaneous attacks in certain areas the Board found none predicting the extent of the attacks which actually occurred or the degree of simultaneity achieved in their execution.

5. In the intelligence available in the pre-TET period, many of the cities, towns and installations actually attacked were mentioned as possible targets. The Board finds little in the pre-TET intelligence suggesting that the country-wide attacks might concentrate on the cities and towns to the virtual exclusion of frontier targets or that the enemy might seek to establish lodgments in these urban areas and foment uprisings. The expectation seems to have been that the harassment of the cities and towns would be confined largely to mortar and rocket attacks, rather than the ground attacks which actually took place.

6. In the Vietnam theater the evaluation of the pre-TET intelligence indicators prompted cancellation of the TET truce in I Corps on January 25 and contributed to General Westmoreland's actions on January 30 in putting U.S. commanders on full alert throughout all of South Vietnam just prior to the main attacks. Although the pre-TET intelligence did not include precise warning as to the time and place of each major attack which was mounted it did serve as a general alert to field commanders without indicating the exact what, where, when, and how of the impending attacks. Significantly, however, the Board found no case in

which United States forces appeared to have suffered defeat in this period because of a lack of timely intelligence. The Board does not have sufficient information to formulate a similar judgment with regard to the forces of our allies.

7. The Board notes the views expressed in the post-mortem study by the U.S. intelligence community (referred to in paragraph 2 above) that:

"The urgency felt in Saigon was not fully felt in Washington in the immediate pre-attack period. As a result, finished intelligence disseminated in Washington did not contain the atmosphere of crisis present in Saigon. We do not believe that this represents a failure on anyone's part. The information available was transmitted and duly analyzed, but atmosphere is not readily passed over a teletype circuit. Although senior officials in Washington received warnings in the period 25-30 January, they did not receive the full sense of immediacy and intensity which was present in Saigon. On the other hand, with Saigon alerted, virtually nothing further could be done in Washington that late in the game which could affect the outcome."

The Board agrees with much of this frank and revealing statement, particularly the view that many Washington intelligence reports failed to convey the same sense of urgency as existed in Vietnam. To cite two examples, the daily CIA document "The Situation in Vietnam" throughout January was filled with reports of possible enemy offensive actions but it was not until January 28 that the warning became loud and clear that a wide-spread coordinated series of attacks might be expected in the near future. In the period January 15-30, "The President's Daily Brief", which presumably represents the most important intelligence of the day warranting the attention of the President, contains on January 20 the first mention of a possible offensive. Thereafter it is silent on the subject until January 29 when a low-key item appeared noting that enemy forces in the Western Highlands were completing battle preparations.

8. The Board does not agree that this difference of tone in intelligence reporting in Washington is beyond criticism. Several factors probably contributed to this difference: (a) the appearance of intelligence indicators against a background clutter of conflicting or confusing reports which dulled to some extent the sharpness of the warnings conveyed; (b) the difficulty of framing synthesized reports accurately portraying a distant situation; (c) the effect

of the reworking of reports in intermediate intelligence agencies between the field and the senior Washington officials; and (d) the difficulty at the Washington level of sorting out and properly emphasizing the important in the mass of intelligence flowing to Washington from the field.

9. The processing of intelligence reports may not only bleach their color but may also delay the arrival of the product at destination to the extent that decision-makers will not wait for it. The Board is under the impression that senior officials, faced with urgent requirements to make prompt decisions, are often unable to wait for processed intelligence and not infrequently fall back on raw intelligence reports brought to their attention through the initiative of personal staff assistants not a part of the official intelligence organization. While resort to this kind of improvised intelligence support is understandable, the extent of its use by senior officials raises serious questions as to the timeliness as well as to the value of the intelligence contained in the routine publications of the intelligence community.

10. The intelligence assessments of this episode made by the majority of officials concerned provide an example of the difficulty of anticipating the unusual, even when intelligence indicators point in unusual directions. In spite of some intelligence indicators that a wide-spread offensive might be launched against key centers during the TET holidays, past experience led most United States and Government of Vietnam officials to expect the attacks before or after (not during) the holidays. Because the enemy had never in the past launched large-scale simultaneous attacks, most officials were surprised by the large number of attacks which were mounted, by their timing, by their simultaneity, and by their generally good coordination.

Conclusions

11. Based on its review, the Board concludes:

a. that the intelligence at hand contributed to the decision on January 25 to cancel the TET truce in I Corps and to General Westmoreland's action on January 30 putting U.S. commanders on full alert throughout all of South Vietnam just prior to the main attacks;

b. that intelligence contributed substantially to the result that the attacks on the cities were beaten off and that no permanent lodgements were achieved;

c. that the intelligence bearing on the TET offensive proved adequate in that it alerted U.S. commanders in time to permit

them to carry out their missions successfully and, therefore, there are no grounds to support the charge of a major intelligence failure;

d. that the finished intelligence assessments and reporting at the Washington level did not convey the same sense of urgency of the developing military situation as those reaching decision-makers in Saigon and often arrived too late to satisfy the demands of senior officials for prompt information.

Recommendation

Your Board is increasingly concerned that the normal intelligence process in critical circumstances is neither timely nor adequate. Further, there is a concern that the reliance upon sources other than that process will continuously weaken its effectiveness. Therefore your Board recommends a careful study by the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the several intelligence agencies, to determine whether the normal process can be improved to remedy the defects noted in this report. If not, alternate means should be sought and made a part of the institutional process.



Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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DELTO 265

N O D I S

REF: PARIS 16067

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 32760
By us NARA, Date 9-27-99

FOLLOWING ARE NOTES PREPARED BY COLLINGWOOD ON HIS
CONVERSATION WITH LE DUC THO BEFORE AND AFTER RECORDED
INTERVIEW MENTIONED REFTEL:

"LE DUC THO TURNED UP FOR OUR INTERVIEW IN THE COURTYARD
OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE VILLA IN CHOISY-LE-ROI AN HOUR LATE
(ALTHOUGH TO DO HIM JUSTICE, AN AIDE HAD TRIED TO REACH ME
TO PUT ME OFF). HE LOOKED RESTED AND VIGOROUS IN HIS BLACK,
HO CHI MINH STYLE TUNIC. HE IS TALLER THAN THE AVERAGE VIET-
NAMESE, CONDUCTS HIMSELF WITH A GOOD DEAL OF ASSURANCE,
COMMANDS DEFERENCE FROM HIS ASSOCIATES, BUT WAS EXTREMELY CORDIAL
AND SMILING WITH ME. SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND A LITTLE ENGLISH
AND HAS FAIR FRENCH BUT PREFERS TO MAKE USE OF AN INTERPRETER
IN BOTH LANGUAGES. FOR THE FORMAL INTERVIEW HE USED THE
NICE LITTLE INTERPRETER WHO IS WITH THE DELEGATION AND WHOM
I KNEW IN HANOI WHEN HE DID THE OFFICES WITH PHAM VAN DONG AND
TRINK, BUT IN OUR LENGTHY CONVERSATION AFTERWARD HE USED ONE
HE BROUGHT WITH HIM FROM HANOI WHO HAS BETTER ENGLISH.

"THE INTERVIEW ITSELF WAS QUITE UNINTERESTING (COPY ATTACHED)
AND BROKE NO NEW GROUND. (HE HAD COMMITTED HIS STATEMENT TO
MEMORY.) HOWEVER, OUR CHAT BOTH BEFORE AND AFTERWARD WAS
VERY RELAXED AND HE SPOKE WITH THE SAME FREEDOM THAT I HAD NOTICED
AMONG THE HIGHER LEVELS IN HANOI BUT DID NOT ENCOUNTER WITH
XUAN THUY OR ANYONE ELSE IN THE DELEGATION HERE EXCEPT HA

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-2- PARIS 16069, JUNE 11

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PAGE 02 PARIS 16069 111926Z

VAN LAU, WHOM I HAD KNOWN IN HANOI.

"BEFORE THE FILMING WE BEGAN OUR TALK WITH THE USUAL PLEASANTRIES. I SAID IT WAS A NICE DAY AND WHEN HE AGREED, REMINDED HIM THAT HE HAD SAID UPON ARRIVAL THAT THE SUNSHINE WAS A GOOD AUGURY AND TRUSTED HE STILL FELT SO. HE SAID THAT THE TALKS WEREN'T GOING VERY QUICKLY. I OBSERVED THAT THIS WAS A DIFFICULT MOMENT AND IT WAS PROVING HARD TO MOVE FROM ONE PHASE TO THE NEXT. HE GRINNED AND, MAKING A KEY-TURNING GESTURE, SAID IT WAS LIKE A LOCK AND ONE HAD TO FIND THE RIGHT KEY. I STARTED TO SPEAK, BUT WHEN THIS WAS TRANSLATED, HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD THE KEY. I REPLIED THAT, BEFORE HE HAD SAID THAT, I WAS ABOUT TO SAY THAT I HOPED HE HAD BROUGHT A KEY WITH HIM. HE LAUGHED AGAIN AND SAID 'THERE ARE TWO KEYS. WE BOTH HAVE KEYS.'

"WE THEN PERPETRATED THE INCONSEQUENTIAL INTERVIEW AND I THOUGHT HE WOULD GO OFF TO HIS QUARTERS. INSTEAD, WHILE THE DELEGATION INTERPRETERS WAS RENDERING HIS VIETNAMESE INTO ENGLISH, HE TOOK ME, BURCHETT AND HIS OWN INTERPRETER INTO A NEARBY RECEPTION ROOM FOR A SCOTH AND SODA (WHICH HE BARELY TOUCHED; DOESN'T SMOKE, EITHER).

"WE CHATED ABOUT MY VISIT TO HANOI AND I ASKED HIM ABOUT HIS ROLE IN THE VIET MINH. HE SAID HE HAD WALKED 3000 KILOMETRES IN A FEW MONTHS, GOING FROM NORTH TO SOUTH AND BACK. I ASKED WHETHER HE HAD COMMANDED TROOPS OR WAS MAINLY POLITICAL IN THOSE DAYS. HE SAID 'BOTH. IN OUR KIND OF WAR YOU CANNOT SEPARATE THEM.' THEN HE ADDED, 'BUT I WAS MAINLY POLITICAL.'

"THIS LED TO A DISCUSSION OF VIETNAMESE HISTORY--HE WAS EVIDENTLY AWARE OF MY INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT--AND THE WAY THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WERE WILLING TO GO TO ANY LENGTHS TO DEFEAT INVADERS, NO MATTER HOW POWERFUL. HE DESCRIBED THEIR VICTORIES AGAINST THE 'FEUDAL' CHINESE, THE MONGOLS, THE FRENCH, ETC. I THEN RAISED THE POINT WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED TO ME IN HANOI AND SPOKE OF THE VIETNAMESE TRADITION OF ASSISTING THEIR ENEMIES OUT OF THE COUNTRY BY PROVIDING TRANSPORT, ETC. AND I ASKED HIM WHETHER TODAY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE DISPOSED TO OFFER THE KIND OF GESTURE THAT WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE UNITED STATES TO WITHDRAW WITH HONOR.

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-3- PARIS 16069, JUNE 11

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PAGE 03 PARIS 16069 111926Z

"HE THEN ASKED ME WHAT KIND OF GESTURE I HAD IN MIND. I SAID THAT SPEAKING PERSONALLY, WITH NO MORE THAN A JOURNALIST'S KNOWLEDGE, IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE BASIS OF THE AMERICAN POSITION WAS THAT SOUTH VIETNAM SHOULD HAVE A CHANCE TO DETERMINE ITS OWN DESTINY WITHOUT UNIFICATION IMPOSED ON IT BY FORCE AND THAT THIS OBVIOUSLY IMPLIED A DE-ESCALATION OF THE FIGHTING IN THE SOUTH AND THAT HIS SIDE WOULD HAVE TO SHOW THEY WERE WILLING TO DO THIS.

"HE DID NOT REPLY DIRECTLY. INSTEAD HE SAID THAT THERE COULD BE NO PEACE EXCEPT ON THE BASIS OF VIETNAMESE INDEPENDENCE. I SAID THAT IF HE MEANT THAT HE WAS IN DOUBT ABOUT THE WILLINGNESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO WITHDRAW FROM VIETNAM, IT WAS MY OWN VIEW THAT THAT WAS WHAT WE WANTED TO DO ONCE THE WAR WAS OVER.

"HE ASKED ME WHETHER I MEANT THAT THE UNITED STATES REALLY DID NOT WANT TO STAY IN VIETNAM FOR A LONG TIME. I SAID IT REALLY WAS MY FEELING FROM EVERYONE I HAD TALKED TO IN AUTHORITY THAT WE REALLY DID NOT HAVE ANY INTENTION OF REMAINING IN VIETNAM FOR A LONG TIME IF A SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR COULD BE ACHIEVED.

"LE DUC THO THOUGHT THAT OVER BUT SAID NOTHING. I THEN SAID THAT WHEN HE WENT TO THE NEXT MEETING ON WEDNESDAY AND MET GOVERNOR HARRIMAN AND AMBASSADOR VANCE, I WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED TO KNOW WHETHER HE DID NOT GET THE SAME IMPRESSION I HAD SOUGHT TO CONVEY--THAT THE UNITED STATES IS GENUINELY INTERESTED IN FINDING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND THAT WE DID NOT INTEND ANY LONG TERM OCCUPATION OF VIETNAM IF ONE COULD BE REACHED.

"HE SAID HE WOULD BEAR THAT IN MIND WHEN HE MET THEM. I SAID I HOPED WE WOULD MEET AGAIN AND THAT HE WOULD GIVE ME HIS IMPRESSIONS. HE INDICATED HE THOUGHT WE MIGHT MEET AGAIN AND WE PARTED IN A VERY FRIENDLY FASHION." HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

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INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 12, 1968
8:45 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

I asked Dick Helms to write up this rather fascinating account of some movement in the Cuban situation.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 6892

WWRostow:rln



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

5a

12 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

1. On 7 June 1968, Guantanamo Naval Base reported that [] a group of about thirty officers and men from a nearby Cuban tank unit are planning to seize six or seven tanks, assault the communications facility and armory at the camp, and speed to the Guantanamo Naval Base seeking asylum. Along the way, they will fire against any resistance. The Base sent the informant back to the conspirators with the message that the United States does not endorse the plan, will not support it, and recommends that it not be attempted. Further, that if the operation is undertaken, the United States must have more advance notice than the forty-eight hours cited, and that the group must stop their tanks outside the fence surrounding the Base. The Guantanamo Naval Base considers the exfiltration plan feasible if security is maintained until execution time, but estimates that there is only a fifty-fifty chance of this.

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Dir

Richard Helms
Director

[]

4

INFORMATION

Wednesday, June 12, 1968 -- 8:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

You should know:

1. A State Department draft, personally cleared by Sec. Rusk, for the Consular Convention statement, will be here at 8:00 a. m. tomorrow morning for your consideration at that time. I feel it important that the balance you strike in this statement should be one which Sec. Rusk positively approves.

2. I called Amb. Dobrynin tonight, as an old friend, and told him that the Tass International dispatch was a source of real concern. I pointed out to him:

-- The phrase "travesty of the truth" and the personal references to the President. I said that he must understand that in carrying forward our policy we had great difficulties to overcome in our own country as no doubt there were difficulties to overcome in the Soviet Union; but this kind of dispatch was most unhelpful.

-- That it was particularly unhelpful at a time when our two countries faced critical turning points in both Vietnam and the Middle East.

He said that this was simply Tass International reporting "a newspaper correspondent"; he fully understood what I was saying and the legitimacy of our concern; he would get in touch with Moscow tonight.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

ACTION

7

Wednesday, June 12, 1968 - 2:45pm

Mr. President:

Pres file

Attached, for your approval, is a proposed condolence message to President Senghor of Senegal on the death yesterday of Lamine Gueye, President of the Senegalese National Assembly and an African elder statesman. Gueye was well known and highly respected throughout the Continent. State judges -- and I agree -- that a condolence message from you will be appropriate and well received.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

WWR:EKH:RM:lw

ATT: File #1879

7a

Presidential Message to President Senghor of Senegal

Dear Mr. President:

I was most distressed to learn of the death of Lamina Gueye. Free men everywhere mourn the loss of this great statesman. My countrymen join me in expressing deepest sympathy to Mr. Gueye's family, to the people of Senegal, and to the millions of others in all parts of Africa who will cherish his memory.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

INFORMATION

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~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 12, 1968 - 1:30 pm

Mr. President:

Pres file

Herewith Harriman's fuller report. As earlier reported, except that their press man accepted Bill Jordan's invitation to dinner: the first "informal contact" (p. 2). But no date for dinner settled.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 16113 (DELTO 268)

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 6-8-92

WWRostow:rlh



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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N O D I S/HARVAN

DELTO 268

SUBJ: FLASH SUMMARY - EIGHT MEETING

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

1. I PREFACED MY PREPARED REMARKS BY WELCOMING LE DUC THO TO OUR TALKS, SAYING THAT WE WERE WELL AWARE OF HIS POSITION, IN THE COUNCILS OF HIS GOVERNMENT, AND THAT WE HOPED HIS ARRIVAL WAS A GOOD AUGURY. THO, WHO SAT ON THUY'S RIGHT, THANKED ME FOR MY WORDS OF WELCOME. THO IS A MAN WHO IS OBVIOUSLY ACCUSTOMED TO EXERCISING POWER AND HAS THE SELF-ASSURANCE OF SUCH A POSITION.
2. I THEN READ MY PREPARED STATEMENT, STRESSING HEAVILY THE TERROR ATTACKS ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF SAIGON. WHEN I FINISHED AT 11:15, I PROPOSED A TEA BREAK.
3. DURING TEA BREAK THE TWO OF US TALKED WITH XUAN THUY AND LE DUC THO. XUAN THUY SAID HE HOPED THAT THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES WHICH WERE SO FAR APART AT THIS TIME MIGHT BE BROUGHT CLOSER TOGETHER. LE DUC THO ADDED WITH A SMILE, "BY MOVING TOWARD OUR POSITION." XUAN THUY THEN ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT SENATOR KENNEDY'S DEATH, INCLUDING OUR VIEW AS TO THE MOTIVE. HE ASKED SPECIFICALLY WHETHER IN OUR JUDGMENT IT WAS RELATED TO SENATOR KENNEDY'S VIEWS ON THE WAR. WE SAID THAT IT WAS NOT AND WAS DONE BY A PALESTINIAN ARAB WHO WAS APPARENTLY MOTIVATED BY SENATOR KENNEDY'S SUPPORT OF

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PAGE 02 PARIS 16113 121523Z

ISRAEL. WE THEN OPENED THE ISSUE OF PRIVATE, SECRET DISCUSSIONS, SAYING THAT EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT SUCH DISCUSSIONS ARE NECESSARY IN ANY INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS. XUAN THUY REPLIED THAT IT WAS CUSTOMARY TO HAVE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TALKS MOVING IN PARALLEL, BUT THAT HE DOUBTED THAT PRIVATE TALKS WOULD BE HELPFUL AT THIS TIME BECAUSE OUR POSITIONS WERE SO FAR APART. WE RESPONDED BY SAYING IT WAS FOR THAT VERY REASON THAT WE BELIEVED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE SUCH TALKS IN AN ATTEMPT TO MOVE THE POSITIONS CLOSER TOGETHER. WE SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO HAVE THE FOUR OF US PARTICIPATE IN SUCH CONVERSATIONS BUT THAT IF THEY PREFERRED A LOWER LEVEL, THAT WOULD BE FINE, AND IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES MR. HABIB WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE REPRESENTATIVE FOR US. XUAN TYUAND LE DUC THO SAID THEY WOULD TAKE OUR SUGGESTION UNDER CONSIDERATION.

4. BY PRIOR AGREEMENT, HABIB ALSO IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH HA VAN LAU, SUGGESTED A PRIVATE MEETING BETWEEN LAU AND ANYONE ELSE FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION WITH VANCE AND HIMSELF. LAU REACTED WELL AND ASKED IF WE THOUGHT "WE COULD DO SOMETHING GOOD" IN SUCH A MEETING. HE WAS TOLD THAT WE BELIEVED SO AND IT WAS TIME TO GET DOWN TO SERIOUS PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS. HE WAS TOLD THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO MEET PRIVATELY AT ANY TIME AND ANY PLACE THEY MIGHT SUGGEST. HABIB SAID THAT IF IT WERE CONVENIENT WE COULD MEET AT THE HOME OF ONE OF THE US EMBASSY COUNSELORS WHERE PRIVACY COULD BE ASSURED, BUT THAT IF THEY HAD ANOTHER PREFERENCE, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET AT THAT PLACE. LAU SHOWED NO HESITANCY IN DISCUSSING THE SUBJECT AND PROMISED TO LET US KNOW WHAT WAS POSSIBLE. IN ANOTHER CONVERSATION BETWEEN JORDEN AND NGUYEN THANH LE, JORDEN'S PRIOR INVITATION TO DINNER WAS ACCEPTED. LE SAID HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH JORDEN IN A FEW DAYS ABOUT A DATE.

5. AFTER THE BREAK, THUY SAID THAT HE WANTED TO COMMENT ON MY STATEMENT. HE SAID THAT WE WANTED TO TALK ABOUT RELATED MATTERS BEFORE OR AT THE SAME TIME AS THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THUY REPEATED THAT THE NVN POSITION REMAINS: "...THE US SIDE BRINGS AN UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION TO BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

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PAGE 03 PARIS 16113 121523Z

OF VIET-NAM AND THEN THE DISCUSSION WHICH TAKES UP EVERY MATTER OF INTEREST TO BOTH PARTIES."

6. THUY REPEATED HIS EARLIER STATEMENTS THAT AS LONG AS THE US CONTINUED ITS AGGRESSION IN SOUTHVIET-NAM, THE PEOPLE OF SVN WOULD FIGHT UNTIL TOTAL VICTORY. HE BLAMED CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN SAIGON ON US AIR AND ARTILLERY FIRE.

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Department of State

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N O D I S /HARVAN

DELTO 268

7. HE SAID THAT DESPITE US CLAIMS OF RESTRAINT, THE US HAS SHOWN NONE SINCE MARCH 31. THE BOMBING HAS BEEN CONCENTRATED IN A SMALLER AREA BUT HAS INCREASED IN QUANTITY.

8. THUY THEN LAUNCHED INTO A REVIEW OF HISTORY, HANOI-STYLE. HE COVERED EVERYTHING FROM SEATO ("AGGRESSION" TO PRESENT "PUPPET" GVN, MENTIONING THE "FABRICATED EVIDENCE" ON WHICH GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION BASED THE "FACIST" REGIME OF DIEM, THE FAILURE TO HOLD ELECTIONS IN 1956, THE AMERICAN "SABOTAGE" OF THE 17TH PARALLEL AS A "PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE," WITH SOUTH VIET-NAM AS ONLY A "PROVISIONAL ZONE" TO PERMIT FRENCH REPATRIATION. WITHOUT THE AMERICAN SABOTAGE THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO GVN AND VIETNAM WOULD HAVE BEEN REUNIFIED. THE US SET UP DIEM, AND THE PRESENT CLIQUE OF KY AND THIEU, FIGHTING BITTERLY AMONG THEMSELVES, COULD NOT SURVIVE WITHOUT US SUPPORT. THUY STRESSED THE "FRAUDULENCE" OF ALL SVN ELECTIONS.

9. THUY THEN REACHED END OF HIS LENGTHY AND IMMOBILE STATEMENT. HE SAID THAT NOW WAS A GOOD TIME TO STOP THE BOMBING. HE ANSWERED MY PROPOSAL FOR LESS PROPAGANDA IN THESE TALKS, BY CHARGING US WITH LOOKING FOR EVERY MEANS TO DISTORT THE TRUTH AND CONFUSE PUBLIC OPINION, WHILE THE DRV HAS COME HERE FULL OF GOOD WILL. THUY SAID THAT THEREFORE THE DRV MUST KEEP PUBLIC OPINION CORRECTLY INFORMED. HOWEVER, THE DRV WILL TAKE OUR SUGGESTION UNDER CONSIDERATION AND

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PAGE 02 PARIS 16113 02 OF 02 121545Z

ANSWER IT AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME.

10. I BEGAN MY RESPONSE BY SAYING THAT I REJECTED THUYS DISTORTED VERSION OF HISTORY, BUT WOULD NOT ANSWER ALL HIS CHARGES NOW, BECAUSE THE TIME HAD COME TO CONCENTRATE ON MATTERS OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN.

11. I THEN REJECTED EMPHATICALLY THE RECURRING DRV CHARGE THAT WE ARE A NEO-COLONIALIST POWER, DISCUSSING OUR MAGNANIMITY TOWARDS OUR WORLD WAR II ENEMIES, GERMANY AND JAPAN, WHICH HELPED THEM TO TURN FROM PRE-WAR DICTATORSHIPS TO PROSPEROUS POST-WAR DEMOCRACIES. I MENTIONED WORLD WIDE POINT FOUR PROGRAM WITH INDIA AS LARGEST RECIPIENT. I DESCRIBED THE PHILIPPINES CANDIDLY AS A COUNTRY ONCE UNDER OUR CONTROL BUT LONG SINCE INDEPENDENT. I SAID HE WOULD BE LAUGHED OUT OF ANY OF THESE COUNTRIES IF HE SUGGESTED THEY WERE US PUPPETS.

12. I THEN DEALT WITH HIS RECURRENT CHARGE THAT THE GVN WAS A PUPPET. I SAID THAT I COULD NOT ALLOW THE COURAGE OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO BE SO MALIGNED. I REVIEWED THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASE ON WHICH A MAJORITY OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE BUILDING THEIR GOV. I REPEATED THAT OUR OBJECTIVE IN VIETNAM IS FOR THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE FREE FROM TERRORISM AND OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

13. I THEN DEALT WITH THUYS CHARGE THAT WE USE "TOXIC GAS" IN VIETNAM. I SAID THAT IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT WE USE TEAR GAS IN SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. I SAID THAT NORTH VIETNAM HAS DONE THE SAME, AND THE TEAR GAS IS USED IN RIOTS, SUCH AS THOSE HERE IN PARIS. I SUGGESTED THAT IF THUY DOUBTED WHAT I SAID THE ICC OR SOME IMPARTIAL BODY COULD EXAMINE THE GAS WE ARE USING.

14. I POINTED OUT THE CHANGE IN US PUBLIC OPINION AND WORLD OPINION SINCE MARCH 31. THE OVERWHELMING OPINION IS THAT THE DRV SHOULD TAKE SOME STEP TO SHOW ITS GOOD FAITH. INSTEAD, WE GET ESCALATION BY NVA/VC.

15. I SAID THAT WHEN WE GOT DOWN TO DISCUSSING THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND RELATED MATTERS, THE APPROPRIATE TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES FOR THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WOULD BECOME EVIDENT. SO FAR, I SAID, THEY HAD NOT RESPONDED TO MY CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS. I THEN ASKED WHEN THUY WANTED TO MEET NEXT.

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PAGE 03 PARIS 16113 02 OF 02 121545Z

16. AFTER SOME PASSING REMARKS, INCLUDING THE STANDARD LANGUAGE ON CESSATION OF BOMBING, THUY PROPOSED THAT WE MEET NEXT WEDNESDAY. I SAID I WANTED TO REPEAT ONE THING BEFORE WE ENDED THE MEETING, AND I THEN SAID WE WOULD LEAVE SOUTH VIETNAM WHEN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DID AS WE HAD SAID IN THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE. I SUGGESTED MONDAY FOR OUR MEETING. THUY SAID HE WAS BUSY MONDAY AND TUESDAY. I SAID I WOULD RECOGNIZE THE DAY ON WHICH THEY WERE BUSY AND ASKED IF WE COULD NOT MEET BEFORE MONDAY. THUY SAID NO. NEXT-MEETING-IS WEDNESDAY-JUNE-19.
HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

Baskle

9

Wednesday, June 12, 1968
12:00 noon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the U. K. representative in Hanoi presents some off-beat reasons for mild optimism on DRV intentions.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 6-8-92

10

Wednesday, June 12, 1968 - 10:45 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Signing Ceremony for the Special Drawing Rights Legislation

The Special Drawing Rights legislation, which has now been passed by the Congress, represents one of the major achievements of your Administration in the financial field.

I believe a signing ceremony would be highly appropriate. Secretary Fowler, who urges you to have such a ceremony, believes that the members of the three Congressional Committees who had most to do with the development of this proposal should be invited to attend. The three Committees are: the House Banking and Currency Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Joint Economic Committee. In addition, he would invite the members of the Dillon Advisory Committee.

You have until June 19 to sign the legislation. Secretary Fowler would prefer June 18 or June 19.

If you approve a signing ceremony, we will work out for your consideration a statement, a list of invitees, and the date with Joe Califano and Jim Jones.

W. W. Rostow

Approve signing ceremony _____

No _____

Call me _____

cc: Joe Califano

cc: Jim Jones

WR
ERF:mst

11

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET RUFF TRINE~~

Wednesday, June 12, 1968
8:45 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith summary of sensitive
evidence that Brezhnev has been ill.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 2.5
NLJ/RAC 01-135
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-6-03.

~~TOP SECRET RUFF TRINE~~
~~HANDLE VIA TALENT KEYHOLE COMINT CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY~~
~~GAMMA CONTROLLED ITEM~~

11a

USSR: GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV HAS BEEN SUFFERING FROM A PERSISTENT BUT APPARENTLY MILD ILLNESS FOR THE PAST THREE WEEKS.

THERE IS NO SOLID EVIDENCE ON THE NATURE OF THE ILLNESS AND HE DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE BEEN HOSPITALIZED. HE HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN FORCED TO CURTAIL HIS OFFICIAL ACTIVITIES AND HAS MADE ONLY ONE OFFICIALLY REPORTED APPEARANCE SINCE 20 MAY.



NSA25X1
NSA25X3

THE SOVIET PRESS REPORTED THE NEXT DAY THAT BREZHNEV DID TAKE PART IN THE TALKS WITH ULBRICHT. BREZHNEV DID NOT ATTEND A FORMAL DINNER FOR ULBRICHT ON 31 MAY NOR DID HE SEE HIM OFF AT THE AIRPORT LATER IN THE DAY. REPORTS BEGAN CIRCULATING WITHIN THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN MOSCOW THAT BREZHNEV WAS SUFFERING FROM A "MILD" ATTACK OF INFLUENZA. AS IS CUSTOMARY, OFFICIAL SOVIET SOURCES REFUSE COMMENT ON HIS HEALTH. HE CONTINUES TO BE ABSENT FROM PUBLIC GATHERINGS. {TOP SECRET TRINE/ SENSITIVE COMINT SOURCE/GAMMA CONTROLLED ITEM}

12 Jun 68

4

~~GAMMA CONTROLLED ITEM~~
~~TOP SECRET RUFF TRINE~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 03-206
By us, NARA, Date 3-23-04

12

INFORMATION

Free file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ / *Sensitive*

Wednesday, June 12, 1968 -- 8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

You asked me to establish precisely why George McGhee had trouble over at the State Department.

After careful, quiet soundings and recalling my own impressions, my conclusions are these:

- No one dislikes George personally.
- Professionally his performance at State was erratic and impulsive. When a problem was brought to him as Under Secretary for Political Affairs, he would throw off some quick ideas, but he would not follow through.
- The professionals came to believe that he would not do his homework carefully; he would react spontaneously, but often in a way irrelevant to the precise problem before him; no solution would result; and they would go elsewhere: to George Ball or to the Secretary of State directly.
- In Bonn there were similar problems, but they put Martin Hillenbrand there to make sure the essential business was covered.

I am reporting judgments I respect but which are secondary.

As planner at State, I had no business with George. I have known him since 1936 as a friend. I still regard him as a friend. We have never had a cross or contentious word.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12358, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 16, 1983.

BY 19 ON 6-23-92

13

Pres file

VZCZCWE337
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CITE CAP31268

1968 JUN 12 02 17

1968 JUN 11 PM 10:45
TUESDAY

FROM THE PRESIDENT
FOR AMB. ARTHUR GOLDBERG

I WISH YOU TO KNOW HOW GRATEFUL I AM FOR YOUR SUPERB EFFORT -- ALONG WITH THAT OF BILL FOSTER AND YOUR OTHER COLLEAGUES -- IN SEEING THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY THROUGH THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

IF WE CARRY FORWARD WITH THE SPIRIT AND DEDICATION YOU HAVE ALL DEMONSTRATED, WE SHALL EARN THE GRATITUDE NOT ONLY OF OUR OWN PEOPLE BUT OF GENERATIONS UNBORN.
BT

NNNN

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12350, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 18, 1983.

BY rg ON 6-8-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

14

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Call on You by Ambassador Johnson

Pres file

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson is calling on you at 12:30 p. m., June 13. He is in Washington for consultations and the United States-Japan Security Subcommittee meeting held last week.

Ambassador Johnson plans to attend the U. S. -Japan policy planning talks on Friday and Saturday, and to return to Tokyo on Monday morning.

Ambassador Johnson wishes to discuss with you the implications of a series of recent unfavorable developments in our relations with Japan, about which he is seriously concerned.

After the peak established during Prime Minister Sato's November visit to Washington, there have been increasing frictions in U. S. -Japan relations due to a combination of developments both in Japan and the United States. The difficulties between us have been manifest, particularly in economic and trade relations and in a series of incidents relating to U. S. military bases in Japan. The current harmful trends, if sustained over a long period, could moreover have a damaging effect on our fundamental relationship with Japan.

Before departing from Tokyo, Ambassador Johnson and the Embassy staff prepared the attached assessment summarizing the current status and prospects for U. S. -Japan relations. You may wish to review at least the summary of this assessment in paragraphs one and two of the Embassy telegram.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-45
By ebm, NARA, Date 9-7-01

Walt Rostow

Attachment

P. S. You should tell Amb. Johnson that he has a duty to both the U. S. and Japan to make it clear in Tokyo that the onesided view by the Japanese of their security relations with the U. S. will not, in your judgment, prove viable in the years ahead. The Japanese simply cannot go on taking their security as a free gift from the U. S., granted them because of U. S. cold war interests. Even though it is painful to the government and politically difficult, he must make it clear that there must be a fundamental change in Japanese attitudes if our relation is to survive in the longer run. W. W. R.

14a

~~SECRET~~

June 5, 1968

FROM: American Embassy Tokyo

TO: Secretary of State, Washington

SUBJECT: US-Japan Relations, Status and Prospects

SUMMARY:

1. Japan's views of the U.S. and its role in the world, which have in the past provided a base-line around which ups and downs in the state of our relations have occurred, may have been unsettled by recent developments. In the economic field, the Arab-Israeli War, balance of payments difficulties, the "protectionism" scare, etc. are casting doubt on the extent to which Japan can continue to count on us to carry its ball as well as our own in the world economy, let alone expect special favors. In the security field, though opinions have been divided on the need for protection against the threat, and though our military presence in Japan has increasingly become an embarrassment rather than an asset to Japanese politicians, Japan has at least seen our military containment posture as an immutable part of the landscape and have generally assumed it would be successful -- at least over the short run. The Tet offensive and what was interpreted as an abrupt shift into de-escalation and negotiations with Hanoi have thrown doubt on U.S. firmness and invincibility. Racial violence and social unrest in America have roused concern over the basic stability of the American society, and made the American image a rather less positive political symbol. All this has combined with the continuing long-run rise in nationalism and decline in conservative strength to make it possible that the current worsening of the perspective is not just because we are in a political valley, but perhaps something more fundamental. I thus consider it quite possible that Japan is moving toward a serious reappraisal of our relationship, with much potential for harm to our interests as we have thus far defined them.

2. As it looks to me now, damage to our economic interests from any reappraisal would be limited by the realities of Japan's economic position in the world. Efforts to diversify markets and sources of supply, with a lessening of the degree of dependence on the U.S., are certainly in the cards, but not necessarily all to the bad. Despite all Japan might do to increase trade with the Communist Bloc, there are limits to how far Japan could go without sweeping restructuring of her economy or without clear risks to vital interests. A reappraisal might have implications for the future of Japanese economic aid programs, as U.S. leverage for exertion of influence wanes and, perhaps,

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 00-274

By cb, NARA Date 11-27-00

~~SECRET~~

as aid to Southeast Asia comes into competition with China trade for available credit. I believe, however, that there are now authentic Japanese advocates of aid, and a developing consciousness of the basic Japanese interests involved. Japan will probably be cautious about overextension of credit to China, and there will be more nationalistic gratification to be had from aiding Southeast Asia than from trading with a Communist China, which would never be willing to play second fiddle to Japan. Our security interests seem to me more vulnerable, with further retrograde movement possible along the lines of recent difficulties over nuclear powered warships entry, decreasing certainty of smooth sailing in 1970, declining probability of Okinawa reversion with more favorable status for bases than in Japan proper, etc. Politically, while Japan will still be motivated by self-interest to side with us on many issues, it will probably become even harder to get Japan to take our side on any controversial issues. In short, recent developments and trends could do considerable damage to our interests. It is important to note that even with all the above kinds of damage figured in (and not all of it may materialize), we would still be left with much that is positive in our relationship: however, it is also important to note that things conceivably could get even worse, if the world economy turns sour and if the U.S. finds it necessary to administer still more shocks (e. g., Senate deferral of action on special funds for the Asian Development Bank, "Protectionism," withdrawal from EXPO 70). We are going to have to do some serious stock-taking ourselves as we move into the future.

END SUMMARY.

3. Recent developments are affecting Japan's views of and attitudes toward the United States in ways harmful to our interests, as we have defined them. We must, of course, keep in mind the historical fact that the state of U.S. -Japan relations has moved along a rather cyclical course, with peaks and valleys occurring in response rather to the balance of domestic political forces (e. g., the shifts in power position that seem an inexorable part of the life-cycle of Japanese Prime Ministers) than to external events (though these have also had impact). If views from the peaks are misleading, so are those from the valleys, such as that which we at present share with Sato. Nevertheless, with all due allowance made, and subject to later re-examination, we must consider the possibility that current harmful trends may be fundamental.

4. The major factor that has in the past kept the floor under periodic ups and downs in US-Japan relations is a fairly stable conception on the part of the Japanese leadership and most influential Japanese of the U.S. world position and the importance of that position to themselves. The trade relationship, access to U.S. capital markets and technology, and other concrete economic benefits have been and are vital to Japan, and over the years Japan also has become habituated to receiving special favors in the economic field. In efforts

to protect Japan's interests in the world economy and avoid repetition of the nightmare of the Nineteen Thirties, when Japan felt itself being squeezed out of the world economy, Japan has been able to count on a substantial identity of interest with us and on our therefore being willing to carry the ball. Japanese determination at all costs to avoid jeopardizing these interests has imposed limits on fluctuations in the state of US-Japan relations.

5. Attitudes regarding the U.S. regional security position have been mixed. A substantial element of the conservative leadership shares the goals of the containment policy, as it has understood these goals, and regards them as in Japan's own national interest. Others, not really believing there is a security threat to Japan serious enough to worry about, have gone along in the security alliance with us mainly out of a desire to preserve other benefits of the relationship with the U.S., e.g., economic benefits. Regardless of varying attitudes concerning the necessity or desirability of the security relationship, most Japanese have shared the assumption that the military containment policy was firmly fixed and likely to be successful, at least over the short run. However, the security relationship with the U.S. is primarily valued for the "nuclear umbrella" it gives Japan and the role of U.S. forces in the security of South Korea and Taiwan. While the sophisticated recognize that U.S. bases in Japan are important to this system, more generally these bases are regarded as a nuisance which must be tolerated and a price to be paid for other aspects of our relationship. Importantly the bases as such do not constitute any political asset on which the Japanese leadership can capitalize, but the ENTERPRISE and Oji Hospital riots, the Sasebo incident, the F-4 crash in Fukuoka, etc., constitute a situation in which the Government of Japan finds itself constantly on the defensive against opposition attacks, and the political realities push the Government of Japan toward taking a position akin to those of the opposition.

6. In the political field, despite the determined efforts of antique-Marxist opposition to build an image of us as hateful capitalist-imperialist monsters, popular respect for U.S. political institutions, infatuation with many aspects of American mass culture, genuine respect for our intellectual attainments, and the visible attractions of the American way of life, have kept America a strongly positive symbol. Renovationist parties, most intellectuals, and many labor leaders are hostile to the main lines of U.S. foreign policy, but association with the United States and manifestations of U.S. regard for Japan and its leaders have been valued assets usable by Japanese conservative politicians, counter-balanced only in part by the requirement that politicians periodically demonstrate the right degree of "independence," and avoid an image of slavishness or servility.

7. Recent major developments have called into question the basic assumptions about the U.S. The Arab-Israeli war brought home in forceful terms to Government of Japan leaders that the Japanese economy and security

dispositions must be based on an assessment of the international political/strategic situation in which others than the U.S. may play a key role and in which U.S. desires and action may not be decisive. The full context of our balance of payments and dollar defense crisis, and our current and capital account measures, both proposed and instituted, is emerging in a manner to cast doubt on the extent to which Japan can rely on us to carry their ball as well as ours in the world economy, let alone continue to count on the U.S. for special favors in the economic field. The Tet offensive and what was interpreted as an abrupt shift into de-escalation and negotiations with Hanoi, together with the apparent resistance among American people to the continuation of past military containment policies, have thrown doubt on U.S. firmness and invincibility (though negotiations were widely welcomed). Racial violence and other signs of social unrest in America are in some conflict with past conceptions of the American way of life, and to some give rise to concern over the basic stability of American society.

8. There are two other developments which, though not creating the deterioration in Japan-US relations, have measurably strengthened and accelerated it. One is a rising sense of self-confidence, encouraged by twenty years of peace, economic growth, relative political stability, and an improvement in social and cultural life, which makes most Japanese increasingly restless with the realities or implications of reliance on others, particularly the United States. A second development is the continuing erosion of political strength of the Liberal Democratic Party, so that its supporters at the polls now (January 1967) barely exceed the combined totals of the supporters of the Renovationists (counting Komeito as Renovationist, in keeping with its present posture). Opposition parties, moreover, on foreign policy issues that matter, have tended during this past year to find more and more common ground in neutrality, opposition to the security pact, and an opening to China. We have already seen some signs that conservative leadership in order to maintain power will find it increasingly necessary to try to capture this rising nationalist sentiment and pull the teeth of the opposition by pulling back somewhat from close American ties and edging toward more accommodating relationship with Asian Communist powers. Excursions to the left by conservatives are nothing new (witness Hatoyama, Kono, Fujiyama, et al), but they acquire new significance in the present contest.

9. There is thus every reason to expect that Japan will over the next year or so not only be reappraising its policy of the individual issues involved in US-Japan relations, but also taking a fresh critical look at the validity of past practice under which the US-Japan relationship was the cornerstone and major determinant of Japanese positions in every field of international activity. Following is an attempt to explore tentatively the kinds of damage to our interests that might result from such a reappraisal.

10. The relationship in the economic field has been due for reappraisal for a long time past, if only because of the changing ratio of the size of the two economies. Some eminent Japanese have for some time been urging diversification of Japan's trade relationships away from the U.S., and there are increasing numbers of vigorous advocates of expanding trade with mainland China. However, Japan's room for maneuver in rearranging trade and economic relations is limited, and the feasible degree of diversification of markets, e.g., to Europe and Southeast Asia, would not necessarily be harmful to our interests, though we might lose some economic leverage. (Some diversification and less sense of dependence on the U.S. would in fact be psychologically healthy.) Even the most determined effort to reorient trade would still, after a lapse of several years, leave the U.S. as Japan's most important trading partner by far, and would be unlikely to place Japan in a relation of general trade dependence on Communist markets. For Japan to move into a really close alignment with the Communist Bloc, even if it wished, would require sweeping reorganization of Japan's economy, or else an equally sweeping change in the structure and philosophy of the Bloc, which as now constituted is most inhospitable to the kind of economy Japan has developed.

11. How probable it is that Japan's reappraisal of ^{the} U.S. relationship will militate against prospects for a more effective and generous Japanese economic aid program depends on the extent to which Japan's recent progress toward liberalization of aid to Asia is attributable to U.S. pressure and influence. Our influence has certainly been considerable but there are authentic Japanese advocates and basic Japanese interests involved in more liberal aid to Southeast Asia. Efforts to diversify trade could of course lead to the overextension of credit to China at the expense of a capacity to extend aid credits to Southeast Asia: however, the Government of Japan itself will be wary of an overextension of credit. While the emotional complex about China will strengthen pressures for more trade, China trade offers less potential gratification for Japan's nationalistic desire to assert leadership than does economic assistance to Southeast Asia nations. Chances of Communist China's ever acknowledging any degree of Japanese leadership seem nil, and Japan will certainly not play second fiddle to China.

12. Over a shorter run, certain of our economic and financial interests may also suffer. While Japan will still be impelled by a convergence of interests to side with the U.S. in matters relating to international monetary reforms, in opposing "vertical" tariff preferences, etc., and might start basing more of its reserve accumulation on net earnings from Europe rather than the U.S., Japan will probably become still more cautious about the elimination of quota restrictions, freeing foreign exchange for tourist travel, or capital liberalization, at least until it has become clear that America is able to solve its economic problems in a responsible manner with international cooperation.

13. The damage to our security interests vis-a-vis Japan is potentially larger than that to our economic interests. The outlook for free access to Japanese ports for U.S. nuclear vessels is already gloomier, and even popular acceptance by 1970 of the Security Treaty and the extant base structure looks less certain than it was six months or a year ago. The possibility of the Government of Japan accepting reversion of Okinawa with substantially greater freedom of use than enjoyed by bases in Japan proper has receded considerably since last winter. Government of Japan cooperation in applying strategic controls to trade with Asian Communist countries will almost certainly become harder to secure. While the prospect remains that Japan will sign and ratify the non-proliferation treaty if the treaty picks up real momentum within the coming year, Japanese advocates of keeping nuclear options open have doubtless been strengthened. There are only very few counterbalancing advantages that might conceivably emerge from a reappraisal. Japan's willingness to undertake limited ventures in regional collective security, such as selling military equipment to Southeast Asia nations, Taiwan, or Korea, might increase, though domestic political hurdles for the Government of Japan would remain formidable. A Japanese consensus might come to tolerate something more than very gradual acceleration of a buildup in Japan's own defense, which has been the case over the last few years, but any value to the U.S. of such a trend would be offset by the probability that it would be accompanied by assertive nationalist overtones and aggressive demands for a phase-down of U.S. bases. All this worsening of outlook is due in part to the current perspective from a valley. Whatever relaxed attitude the rest of the nation may take about the security threat to Japan, Sato and his likely successors will continue to entertain some genuine concern on this score, and security relations with the U.S. will probably continue to look to them like the most efficient and economical way of coping with the threat: there are accordingly limits beyond which the leadership over the next five years or so will not wish to let the alliance deteriorate. At the same time, a reappraisal such as we are hypothesizing would almost certainly produce some retrograde movement along the lines indicated.

14. The potential for damage to our political interests is also substantial. The Japanese may well become more closely engaged in thinking about post-Vietnam reconstruction and may even move closer to a readiness to participate modestly in an international control set-up, but the Government of Japan is going to be quite leery of associating itself publicly and actively with any controversial U.S. positions re Vietnam. A concern for relations with Republic of China as well as the U.S. and genuine uncertainty at policy levels as to the full import of the cultural revolution will continue to restrict room for maneuver in the area of China policy. Japan's determination to beat us to the punch in any shift of posture is now so much greater, however, that some gesture toward Peking seems certain to materialize. The urge to differentiate their China policy from

ours will make common approach to Chinese Representation in the United Nations more awkward, and increase potential pressures in the United Nations for "compromise" solutions.

15. The damage that would be done to our interests if all or more of the pessimistic possibilities noted above materialized is obviously considerable. Japan's positive contribution to our security interests would have been cut back, and our ability to get Japan's political support for a controversial political position would have been reduced. It is important to note again that this is the perspective from a political valley, and that even with all this damage we would still be left with a US-Japan relationship capable of making a substantial positive contribution to American interests. It is also important to note, however, that things could conceivably turn out worse than now seems probable. For example, if the world economy deteriorated seriously, if the U.S. really pulled back from Asia, and if the U.S. administered a succession of shocks ("protectionism," withholding support from the Asian Development Bank, refusal to participate in EXPO 70, etc.), cumulative effect could conceivably be to set Japan again on the introverted, irrational course it followed in the Nineteen Thirties. Changes in world economic and strategic interrelationships would keep Japan from exhibiting its irrationality in the same forms it took a generation ago, but the results could be very damaging. I trust that we will keep this more remote -- but larger -- danger in mind as we plan how to manage our relations with Japan in the months and years ahead.

OSBORN

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Checklist for Your Talk with the Shah--12:30 p.m. Today

We hope the following will have been covered in your talks:

1. We will stretch this year's arms sale to the full \$100 million. (You approved \$75-100 million. Defense has found funding for the full amount, and Secretary Rusk recommends you tell the Shah.)
2. We'll do our best to help with his future arms purchases, though we can't commit ourselves beyond what Congress authorizes. You're confident any US Administration will recognize Iran's importance.
3. You're glad the Shah saw King Faisal. Stability in the Persian Gulf depends on their cooperation. (When they had a tiff earlier this year, you urged cooperation. This will show your approval.)
4. Approve attached joint statement. Yes _____ No _____

Here are answers on subjects the Shah raised last night:

1. If he asks about USAF technicians for Phantoms, you might suggest he hire civilians. Even aside from Vietnam demands, we can't do this under our military assistance program.
2. We're not sure which telecommunications problem he'll raise:
 - If it's financing his new national military communications system, we could consider military credit.
 - If it's aircraft control and warning, he could shave a few months by dealing directly with US suppliers rather than through USAF.
3. He may ask you to lean on American oil companies to lift more Iranian oil. We want Iran's revenues to increase, but we stick to the line that we have to leave this to our private companies. He may also ask help in letting more Iranian oil into the US to barter for US goods. We'd hate to commit ourselves on an oil import quota without knowing what he proposes. You might suggest that the oil expert with him (Mr. Fallah) talk to Tony Solomon.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 22 #294

W. W. Rostow

By jc Date 3-29-01

~~TOP SECRET~~

154

June 12, 1968

Mr. President:

Paragraph 5 of the joint statement refers to an agreement by the Smithsonian to act as a clearing house for US scholars and scientists who develop projects in Iran and for Iranians who come here.

Since AID has phased out, this is just one step in building a broad network of normal contacts between our societies. We highlight it because it's symbolic of our new and more mature post-AID relationship.

W. W. R.

1:06

June 12, 1968

**JOINT STATEMENT
BY HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY THE
SHAHANSHAH OF IRAN AND
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON**

The Shahanshah and the President met on June 12 and discussed topics of mutual interest to their two countries. Their talks were conducted in the spirit of close friendship and cooperation that marks Iranian-US relations and the personal associations of His Majesty and the President. The President congratulated the Shahanshah on the continuing impressive pace of Iran's economic and social development.

The President informed His Majesty of the course of talks now occurring in Paris, and both leaders expressed hope that these discussions would lead to an early and durable peace in Southeast Asia.

They discussed the situation in the Middle East and agreed that the peaceful development of the area could be accomplished only through respect for the sovereignty of Middle Eastern states and cooperation among the states of the region for their security and independence. Both leaders expressed their intention of continuing to support efforts made through the United Nations to reduce tensions in the area, reaffirming their support for a just and lasting peace based on the resolution adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations on November 22, 1967.

The Shahanshah reaffirmed Iran's determination to sustain an adequate modern defense force to ensure Iran's national security, and the President expressed the desire of the United States to continue cooperating with Iran to this end.

Of special interest to the Shahanshah and the President was a recent exchange of letters between the two governments in which it was agreed to initiate a program of scientific cooperation in areas of mutual interest. This program is expected to increase the exchange of personnel between the two countries, facilitate the transfer of scientific and technical information and stimulate collaborative research projects between Iranian and American scientists. It was decided that in Iran the Executive agency for implementation of this agreement will be the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, and for the United States the Smithsonian Institution.

His Majesty expressed to the President his profound sorrow over the death of Senator Robert F. Kennedy.

The Shahanshah in taking leave of the President expressed his appreciation for the warm and friendly reception accorded him. Both the Shahanshah and the President agreed that the considerations which have motivated Iranian and American cooperation are today more pertinent than ever.

16

INFORMATION

Pres file

Wednesday, June 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Members of the delegation to the Corregidor Island Pacific War Memorial dedication, June 22

You asked Mennen Williams to provide you with a list of people he would like to see as members of the American delegation to the ceremony. Mennen has provided the following 19 names:

Williams' personal suggestions:

1. Former Governor Pat Brown of California
2. Representative Lucien N. Nedzi of Michigan
3. Mr. Herschel Newsome, National Master,
National Grange
4. Mr. Joseph Beirne, President, Communications
Workers of America
5. Mrs. Emmet O'Neal (widow of our first Ambassador to
the Philippines and a former Congressman from
Kentucky who initiated the whole memorial
project. The Philippines are very anxious for
her to come.)
2311 Conn. Ave., N. W., Washington, D. C.

Congressional representation:

6. Representative Olin E. Teague of Texas
7. Representative Clement J. Zablocki of Wisconsin
8. Representative L. Mendel Rivers of South Carolina

Congressional members of the Corregidor-Bataan Memorial
Commission:

9. Representative William S. Mailliard of California
10. Representative Armistead I. Selden, Jr., of
Alabama
11. Representative Robert L. F. Sikes of Florida
12. Senator Gale W. McGee of Wyoming
13. Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey
14. Senator Daniel B. Brewster of Maryland

Heads of the Five Veterans Organizations:

15. Mr. John LeClair, National Commander, American Defenders of Bataan and Corregider
16. Mr. William E. Galbraith, National Commander, American Legion
17. Mr. Francis J. Beaton, National Commander, Disabled American Veterans
18. Mr. Anthony J. Caserta, National Commander, American Veterans of World War II
19. Mr. Joseph Scerra, Commander-in-Chief, Veterans of Foreign Wars

The formal invitations to attend the dedication are being issued by the Pacific War Memorial Joint Committee. All the people on the above list and their wives are receiving invitations. You might, however, wish to have a member of your staff call them to add the weight of your own interest to the formal invitations, and to invite them to make use of the Presidential plane which you have agreed to provide for the delegation.

W. W. Rostow

MWright:wpt

Mr. Rostow

17

1. ~~copy~~
2. Pres file

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Wednesday, June 12, 1968

SUBJECT: Arms Agreement with the Shah

After hearing the warmth of your statement to the Shah, I'm sure this is just a formality.

However, we reserved for you the final go-ahead on making this year's military credit sale to Iran the full \$100 million. You earlier approved \$75-100 million assuming available funds.

The Shah's negotiator is here and will sign an agreement Friday if you approve. Secretaries Rusk and Clifford recommend you do so. Funds are available.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-343
By gw, NARA, Date 2-1-93

SECRET

INFORMATION 1-

Wednesday, June 12, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Peregrine Worsthorne, Wednesday, June 12, at 6:30 p. m.

Worsthorne is the Deputy Editor and chief diplomatic correspondent of the London Telegraph, Britain's leading Tory paper. He is one of England's leading intellectuals and most influential journalists. He is, and has always been, outspokenly pro-American. He is also pro-Johnson.

Until the Tet offensive, Worsthorne had been one of Europe's most outspoken and effective defenders of American policy in Vietnam. He not only wrote in favor of it, he was active in organizing the support of intellectual opinion.

Tet broke him, and on February 25 the Sunday Telegraph printed a widely publicized piece by Worsthorne in which he withdrew his support from the continuation of the war in Vietnam. His reasons were those of a close friend. Convinced by the Tet offensive that we could not win in Vietnam he wanted, in our own interest, to see us stop the effort.

It was for him a matter of balance. Previously, he had known and vigorously rejected all the arguments against U. S. - Vietnam policy:

1. The human suffering involved -- true and hateful but justifiable in order to give freedom a chance and to avoid Communist hegemony in Asia.
2. The civil war in Vietnam is none of America's business -- not so. Asia must believe in American protection in order to effectively resist Communist infiltration. Moreover, American success in Vietnam is necessary to her continued willingness to defend other parts of the Free World, including Western Europe.
3. Opposition to the war is tearing American society apart, and earning her the hostility of the world -- partly true but revulsion is not justified in view of the strategic need for the American involvement. Anyway the worst of the war will be over before public opinion in the United States or the world reaches crisis proportions.

The common assumption of Worsthorne's defenses of American policy in Vietnam was that it would succeed. The Tet offensive sapped his confidence in our success and therefore -- in his eyes -- gave a heavier value to the disadvantage of our policy. If in the end our efforts would fail, then there was really no justification for the human suffering, the world tension, the division within our own society, and the loss of the support of world opinion. As Worsthorne put it our Vietnam policy is "a miscalculated although entirely understandable exercise in American power which has almost certainly failed in its purpose. No disgrace, indeed -- much honor -- attaches to the United States for having sacrificed so much for so long The task now for well-wishers is to stop justifying the war and to start calmly and without hysteria to live with the fact that America cannot win it. It means for many -- certainly for me -- eating a large number of words. But at this juncture, this seems on balance the least harmful thing to do."

Jack Valenti says that Worsthorne is very pleased with the way you have been handling Vietnam in recent months. His own newspaper printed an editorial facing the column referred to above, and taking issue with it. It may be possible to bring Worsthorne back into camp. After all, he left it reluctantly. The key to his support, obviously, is belief that we will succeed in preventing a Communist takeover of South Vietnam.

In any event I think you will find Worsthorne an interesting fellow. He is the kind of Englishman who believes that Britain passed to the United States the mantle of world leadership and has an obligation to support us in our burden. He is very much a representative of the British establishment, smooth in speech and dress, personally attractive, and perhaps a bit precious.

It might be useful in your conversation with him to know of and refer to a really excellent piece that he did in November 1966 after covering your Asian tour. It was, I think, the most perceptive thing written on your trip. I am attaching excerpts from that piece as well as the column in which he withdrew his support for our Vietnam policy, his own paper's editorial disagreeing with him and an amusing piece by Bill Buckley taking Worsthorne to task for changing his views on Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

Atts

P. S. Late item from the Sunday Telegraph and Worsthorne's comment on the effect of Senator Kennedy's death are immediately attached.

MWright:wpt

18a

London: "Danger of Neo-Isolationism"

London's conservative Sunday Telegraph declared yesterday that "if the American people now plunge even further into self-doubt, or if they over-compensate by a false and insensitive complacency, the delicate balance of power that holds international society together will be perilously disturbed. In a sense, this balance is still one of nuclear terror.

"No assassination can deprive America of her 1,000 Minutemen--a fact that is perfectly well understood in the Kremlin. But, in terms of political influence, beneath that fearful arch lies a shifting ground where, at this moment, the forces of tyranny appear to have gained an unexpected advantage.

"In China, in North Viet-Nam, and in all the third world, American power can now be presented by skillful propaganda as both vulnerable and self-destructive. When President Kennedy was struck down five years ago the American people rallied swiftly under President Johnson's leadership. To repeat this process will require stronger nerves today...

"We, for our part, whose existence depends on the strength and will of the American people, should not do or say anything that might increase their difficulties. The faith they look for in themselves must be fortified by our own."

Peregrine Worsthorne wrote in the same paper that a "bring the boys home from Viet-Nam" movement is likely to grow as a result of Senator Kennedy's assassination.

EXCERPTS FROM PEREGRINE WORSTHORNE'S COLUMN ON PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S ASIAN TOUR.

**London Sunday Telegraph
November 6, 1966**

EYE-OPENER ON ASIA'S NEW HOPE

From the British point of view President Johnson's tour of Asia was painfully sad, symbolizing and underlining the extent to which the United States has replaced this country as the great White power in the area. And the fact that the Australians, New Zealanders and Malaysians showed no visible sign of regret at the change -- rather the opposite -- scarcely assuaged the pain.

One rather doubts, therefore, whether the British diplomatic missions in the countries Johnson visited will have sent back very illuminating despatches.

This could prove unfortunate, since the tour was immensely revealing -- an eye-opening experience, the significance of which this country can ill afford to ignore. It brought home to all those present an extraordinary truth which had to be seen to be believed: that the Vietnam war, far from making the United States hated throughout Asia, has in fact brought about an astonishing outbreak of pro-American enthusiasm.

The feeling today is that Asia for the Asians means, in practice, Asia for the Chinese, and that the only way for Asia to be genuinely Asian -- truly reflecting the immense variety and diversity of all the countries and races making up the vast area is to bring in the United States as an essential counterweight in the balance of power, not for all time, but at least until the major Asian powers, Japan, India and Indonesia, are able or willing to take up the strain.

What the Vietnam war has done is to demonstrate that America is prepared to help in such resistance and to help effectively. Just as President Truman's determination to risk breaking the Berlin blockade strengthened non-Communist Europe's will to unite against Russia, so President Johnson's

willingness to risk committing a great army in South Vietnam has ignited a new spirit of Asian resistance to what only a few years ago was regarded as the inevitability of Chinese domination.

It is not really very surprising that the British and French should find this difficult to believe. Having only so recently and so painfully accustomed themselves to concluding that Asians (and Africans) wanted us out it is not easy to accept the fact that they are prepared to invite another white country in. It must, we suspect, all be a propaganda trick, or another flight of State Department wishful thinking.

But this is precisely why it was so important to have seen with one's own eyes the effect of President Johnson's tour. The warmth of the receptions had all the marks of being genuine. No one, I believe, who has experienced the impressions of that trip can escape concluding that the spirit of neutralism and the spirit of anti-colonialism are no longer significant factors in Asian affairs. The mood today is unmistakably different.

It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that President Johnson was greeted by the Asian crowds with something of the same kind of expectation and enthusiasm which attended President Wilson's visit to war-torn Europe in 1918 as the messiah from over the ocean with a magic wand at his command that could indeed work miracles.

The problem is no longer that Asian countries themselves are not prepared to recognise a Communist danger and therefore unwilling to allow America to help them meet it.

The problem today, surely, arises from the other end of the scale. Are the American people prepared to launch out on another giant endeavour to succour one more troubled continent and have they the patience and the understanding to avoid being panicked and provoked into an escalation of the war in Vietnam which would manifestly change the whole Asian prospect?

In this respect the Manila conference and the Asian tour were acts of high statesmanship for which President Johnson deserved ungrudging admiration -- comparable in their quality of correct timing and imaginative understanding to the great post-war European initiative of General Marshall. For what the tour and the conference were intended to do and have very largely succeeded in doing -- is to turn the world's attention away from exclusive preoccupation with the dirty war in Vietnam, from the killing and maiming and the misery there, to some of the undoubtedly constructive by-products of American willingness to be involved in all this horror.

Success in doing this showed real qualities of leadership -- all the more so in view of Johnson's ailing health at the time -- since if the United States is to preserve its balance about Vietnam, it is absolutely essential that the evils of war, and the social distress of having American troops fighting and dying abroad, should be put into a framework of idealism and morality, and, most important of all, receive some form of tangible legitimation in Asian eyes. I doubt if any reporter who actually experienced this trip could deny that President Johnson succeeded in those aims to a remarkable and memorable extent.

It is surely time, therefore, that we in this country began to realise that undue absorption with the Vietnam war, and the evils thereof, is preventing us from recognising the significance of other and far more encouraging Asian developments.

The new factor, which President Johnson's tour has done so much to underline -- at any rate for those with eyes to see -- is that for a number of reasons Asian attitudes to the prospect of American involvement, both economic and military, are in the process of rapid and revolutionary change.

Two years ago it was assumed that the hangover of anti-colonialism and continuing suspicions about superior Western strength was so deeply ingrained on Asian hearts that no rational calculations about the practical desirability of cooperating with America and the West could ever outweigh these emotional prejudices. It was further assumed -- and still is in Britain -- that America's involvement in the Vietnam war could only still further fortify these ancient fears. What was so fascinating about the President's tour was the evidence it supplied that these assumptions are proving blessedly false.

In fact, almost the opposite is proving true. The pace of Asian adjustments to the reality of the contemporary world is outpacing American and Western ideas for taking advantage of this dramatic change of heart. Free Asia appears more than ready to respond to Western initiatives; readier, indeed, to respond than the West is to propose.

VIETNAM BALANCE REVISED

LONDON SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
FEB 25, 1968

PEREGRINE WORSTHORNE says America should ask herself whether the Communist successes have not undermined the moral basis for continuing the war. In his personal view they have

American body politic. For a few more months, perhaps. But that time scale no longer makes much sense today. Few can really believe, after recent events, that the Viet Cong are about to give in. It is far more likely that the struggle will go on with mounting bitterness. For my part, I no longer find it possible to be certain that fighting on—at such a terrible cost in degradation—will prove a less debilitating experience for the United States than suffering the humiliation of withdrawal.

It is impossible, of course, to be certain. But when it comes to justifying the war there must be some real confidence that the sacrifice is worth while. Once the element of doubt becomes too large the justification sticks in the throat. During the last weeks, it seems to me, the element of doubt has grown to the point where one can go on supporting the United States only by shutting one's mind and closing one's eyes.

This, of course, is precisely the reaction which Viet Cong tactics are aimed at producing. Unfortunately, this does not invalidate it. They have fought the Americans into an impossible psychological corner, and there is no more point in denying this than in denying the military danger at Khe Sanh. In both cases, one might wish it were otherwise. But wishing will not make it so. The truth today is that the Americans are fighting a war for which no really plausible case can any longer be made.

It could be argued that this has been so since the beginning of the war, and that there is no more reason now to turn away from backing America than there has been all along. Mr. Heath even goes further. He suggests that precisely because the Americans are doing so badly it is all the more necessary to rally round in their support.

I can no longer subscribe to that view, much as I would like to. The basic reason is this: once one concludes—as it is difficult, on the present evidence, not to do—that the Americans just do not have the skills and talents to fight this kind of war effectively, and that the longer and harder they try the more protracted and devastating their humiliation is bound to be, then it becomes the duty of a friend to say "enough is enough."

One journalist's revised assessment is, of course, a matter of the utmost insignificance. But I suspect that many other well-wishers of America, who have previously supported her in Vietnam, are also beginning to have serious doubts. It is tempting to keep silent, out of loyalty and a desire not to add one tiny drop to America's torrent of tribulation. But surely the key consideration now is how best to minimise the damage to America and the free world, if America is forced to withdraw, and to make the process of reaching a decision to withdraw as relatively untraumatic as humanly possible.

This is the task to which friends of America must now set their minds. Vietnam is not a disgrace which America must be made to suffer for, although that is how the Left would like to present it. It is a miscalculated, although entirely understandable, exercise in American power—which has almost certainly failed in its purpose. No disgrace—indeed much honour—attaches to the United States for having sacrificed so much for so long, and there is no need to exaggerate an admission of failure into an orgy of national shame.

This surely is the line which those who wish to help the United States should be beginning to take. Blanket support—America right or wrong—does more harm now than good, since it rings embarrassingly false, and leaves the anti-Americans with all the convincing tunes. The task now for the realist well-wishers is to stop justifying the war and to start calmly and without hysteria living with the fact that America cannot win it. It means for many—certainly for me—cating a large number of words. But at this juncture this seems, on balance, the least harmful thing to do.

people. As awareness of the extent of the human suffering grows, so does belief in its political necessity diminish. Indeed, this process has now gone so far that most thoughtful people in this country take the view that the moral evil and material destruction involved in the war—about which there can be no question—more than outweigh the highly debatable theories that can be propounded in its defence.

In the past I have defended the war most vehemently, both in these columns and on many public platforms. It has been my view that on balance more harm would be done to the prospect of world order and human freedom by the Americans being forced to withdraw than by their fighting on until the Viet Cong lost heart. This view has been based on a number of considerations, foremost among them being the likely effect of an American withdrawal (1) on Asia's continuing belief in the credibility of American protection and on the possibility of

effectively resisting Communist infiltration, and (2) on America's own willingness to carry on defending other parts of the free world, notably Western Europe.

Until very recently it has been possible to hold these views with some confidence, since there was good evidence to back them up. South Vietnam's neighbours were impressed by America's apparent achievements in pacifying and stabilising at least the towns, and in slowly but surely reducing the Viet Cong's willingness to join battle. It looked as if America had successfully demonstrated, or was at least on the way to doing so, the validity of her protection. There was, in short, ground for reasonable optimism, or so it seemed to me.

For this reason, it was possible to overlook the mounting hostility to the war among the Americans themselves, particularly among the vast student population, not to mention the hostility of the world at large. This moral revulsion seemed unjustified in the light of claims of genuine success in holding the line of the free world. In any case, it appeared sensible to hope that the worst of the war would be over before this internal American disaffection—and the revulsion of world opinion—reached crisis proportions.

There was never any certainty about this. The case for and against the war was always highly debatable. But in my judgment, until recently, the balance of the argument just tipped in favour of the hawks. Faced, therefore, with all the evidence of atrocity and horror it was possible to aver, with a clear conscience: "Hateful as this is, it is nevertheless helping to maintain a world order which allows freedom to have a chance, and prevents the balance of power slipping towards Communist hegemony in Asia, with all that this would mean in terms of danger to the West."

It is not easy to go on making that case today. In the light of the Viet Cong's sensational re-emergence, how many of South Vietnam's neighbours are still impressed by the value of American protection? Are they not more likely to be drawing the conclusion, after the events of the last three weeks, that the American giant is tragically unable—however willing—to succeed in guerrilla war, except at a price in destruction which makes no possible sense?

A highly distinguished expert on Asia underlined this point very cogently recently when he argued, with great knowledge and authority, that the only way now for the Americans to win was to turn South Vietnam into a colony. He thought he was being helpful to the

American case. But of course he was destroying it entirely, since nothing would more quickly set South-East Asian countries falling to Communism like a row of dominoes than the assumption by the United States of imperial powers in Saigon. Yet without America's seizing such powers, it is almost impossible to believe that she can successfully continue a war which is justified primarily on the ground that it is preventing South-East Asia falling like a row of dominoes.

Reading the grim reports of how American artillery and aircraft are having to blast South Vietnamese cities—so as to recapture control from the Viet Cong—I cannot help concluding that what is being demonstrated today is not the validity of American protection but its brutal impotence; not the point of resisting Communist subversion but its ghastly futility. My support for the American involvement hitherto has been based on the belief that it was working in the sense intended. In the last few weeks it appears to have been doing the exact opposite. Instead of the Americans impressing the world with their strength and virtue, they are making themselves hated by some for what they are doing, and despised by the remainder for not doing it more efficaciously.

This could all change. There are always ups and downs in war. Perhaps the Viet Cong offensive is "their last gasp." In any case, as I pointed out three weeks ago, the Viet Cong at least were not greeted as liberators. Of course there are still some grounds for hope. But I do not believe any longer that there is enough ground to justify what the Americans are being forced to do.

This brings me to the question of the impact of the war on America itself. There is, of course, no doubt at all that the will to prosecute the war is still there and may well be fortified by the current setbacks. Mass defections by the South Vietnamese would be the only development that might dent that will. But these have not occurred. To withdraw, therefore, would be politically explosive, as well as cutting a deep and terrible wound in America's national pride. This danger has, as I say, been one of the principal arguments for encouraging the Americans to carry on.

But what about the countervailing dangers to America if she does carry on? These are also terribly grave. It is not easy to exaggerate the harm being done to American public values, and even to the quality of American private life, by what she is being forced to do in Vietnam. It looks less and less certain that this intense internal moral strain can be sustained without doing irreparable damage to the

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH

February 25, 1968

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INDEPENDENT OF ALL GROUPS

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AND NOT FAINT

THE Vietnam war is a beastly war. There can be no mistake about that. But all wars are beastly; that is why those who have fought in them rarely talk about their experiences. What is new about Vietnam is the ubiquity of the television cameras and the courage and adventurousness of the photographers. Day after day, night after night, the brutality of mutilated bodies has been brought into millions of homes and has had its predictable effect.

The democracies which for the first time permit such frankness, soon to be in colour, unconsciously present an enormous bonus to the enemy's propaganda in this or in any future war. We do not see what is happening on the other side. Many civilians have been mutilated by mistake by the Allies; very many more have been mutilated on purpose by the Viet Cong.

The effect of this exposure of war's beastliness has been increasingly felt in the recent weeks of the Viet Cong offensive. It has led to a strong, natural and compassionate emotional reaction. It has compelled those who have hitherto justified American involvement in Vietnam to re-examine their position, as Peregrine Worsthorne does his on this page to-day. We print his article as a distinguished contribution to the great public debate on the issue: we do not accept its main thesis.

To attempt to link the horrors of war with the validity of war is to fabricate a false link, unless one holds the extreme pacifist position. That position—and it must be distinguished from the pose of those who say that Communist wars are righteous and all others are evil—has always deserved and earned respect if not agreement. It is not the position taken up by most of those who now urge an American retreat in Vietnam. It is not the position held by this newspaper.

The Americans are facing grim tribulations and setbacks in the field and in morale. But Passchendaele did not destroy the arguments for continuing to resist the Kaiser. Those who endured the Hitler blitz

on this country—and babies were killed in Coventry no less than in Saigon—did not turn on Winston Churchill and tell him that because of heavy civilian casualties it was no longer right to resist Nazi aggression. The price of doing so had greatly increased, but the price was still adjudged worth paying.

Similarly, the validity of the case for the American involvement in Vietnam is as strong as ever. Already there are North Vietnamese cadres in Laos and Thailand. The threat of Communist domination of South-East Asia and thereafter of New Zealand and Australia and beyond, constitutes as great a menace to the West and all its values as did Hitler. North Vietnam has invaded and infiltrated the South, not *vice versa*. Locally recruited Viet Cong make up only a quarter of their fighting strength.

The fact that recent events have made the Americans seem incapable of an outright victory is irrelevant. They have never sought an outright victory. They have always maintained a limited objective, to apply such pressure on Hanoi as to force it to the negotiating table. From U Thant's statement yesterday, that objective might appear to be a little nearer. In any case it is still the only possible strategy, and will remain so whatever disasters are yet to come, unless and until it is seen utterly to have failed.

But now, our American allies have no choice. A complete scuttle at this time, a giant Asiatic Dunkirk involving half a million men, is not a practical possibility. And if it were, would the United States ever send troops overseas anywhere again, including Europe?

No, for good or ill the die is cast, and this time of appalling difficulty, psychological and military, is not the time for faint hearts in the United States itself or among her friends. The one thing which the Americans cannot do at this crisis in their fortunes, and the one thing which Britain cannot urge them to do, is to abandon Vietnam and Asia altogether. That way would lie the ultimate disaster for us all.

**THE SWITCH OF
MR. PEREGRINE
WORSTHORNE**

London, Mar 2
— The pro-American community is rocked by

the decision of Mr. Peregrine Worsthorne rather to switch than fight in Vietnam. Mr. Worsthorne, editor of the *Sunday Telegraph*, has backed the American effort in Vietnam ever since the beginning, and from his crucial position on the *Telegraph* has meticulously and passionately, patiently and impatiently, explained the American position, indeed has insisted that it is, or should be, the English position as well. Now he has succumbed—paradoxically—to precisely those arguments he has most contemptuously dismissed in the past. The result is consternation.

Mr. Worsthorne begins by saying that: "It is really very difficult any longer to believe that these babies are dying for any very plausible purpose." A striking sentence, in that a) Mr. Worsthorne adopts the napalmed-baby mode of argument, which foretells instant vulgarization which sure enough ensues; and b) Mr. Worsthorne refers to the "purpose" of our role in Vietnam as no longer "plausible," and thus invites skepticism concerning not American resources, but American motives. There is nothing in the least implausible about American intentions in Southeast Asia unless one suspects what Mr. Worsthorne heretofore has never suspected, namely that our motives are after all impure. There is nothing "implausible" about desiring to contain the Communists in Southeast Asia, or indeed anywhere else.

And so it goes with Philip-Drunk. He cites the opinion of a "highly distinguished expert on Asia" who has recently argued, out of great sympathy with America, that we may need for the time being to turn South Vietnam into a colony. "He thought," Mr. Worsthorne explains,

"that he was being helpful to the American case, but of course he was destroying it entirely, since nothing would more quickly set Southeast Asian countries falling to Communism like a row of dominoes than the assumption by the United States of imperial powers in Saigon."

If someone had shown me that sentence blind, and asked me to name six people in the world incapable of uttering it, I'd have led off the list with the name of Peregrine Worsthorne. What's wrong with that sentence is that assuming the U.S. found it necessary to turn South Vietnam into a colony, which is the last thing any American in his right mind desires to do, the purpose in doing so would be to prevent its becoming a colony of Red China, or Soviet Russia. The suggestion implicit in Mr. Worsthorne's argument, that South Vietnam would prefer to become a colony of the Communists, rather than a colony of the United States, is as mystifying as to suggest that people were happier to live in East Berlin, a colony of the Communists, than in West Berlin, for a brief and necessary period after the war a colony of the Western Powers. It is in any case unsettling to hear a distinguished Tory speak of "imperial powers" with such a show of revulsion.

Fortunately, Mr. Worsthorne punctuates his call for the liquidation of the anti-Communist enterprise in Asia with hedges. He says "it is not easy to go on making the case" for the Vietnam war, which is different from saying that it is not possible to make the case. He says "I no longer find it possible to be certain of the 'wisdom' of fighting on," which is less than to say that he is certain of the unwisdom of fighting on. He says, speaking of the recent defeats at the hands of the Vietcong: "This could all change." But these presumably are now stop-loss just in case things should suddenly go better for us in Vietnam which, who knows, might just possibly happen.

And, fortunately, the management of the *Sunday Telegraph* sharply disagrees with its editor. In a short statement, it makes all the relevant distinctions: Fire One: "Many civilians have been mutilated by mistake by the allies: very many more have been mutilated on purpose by the Vietcong."

Fire Two: "Those who endured the Hitler blitz on this country—and babies were killed in Coventry no less than in Saigon—did not turn on Winston Churchill and tell him that because of heavy civilian casualties it was no longer right to resist Nazi aggression."

And the coup de grace: "But now our American allies have no choice. A com-

plete scuttle at this time, a giant Asiatic Dunkirk involving half-a-million men, is not a practical possibility. And, if it were, would the United States ever send troops overseas anywhere again, including Europe? No, for good or ill the die is cast, and this time of appalling difficulty, psychological and military, is not the time for faint hearts in the United States itself or among her friends. The one thing which the Americans cannot do at this crisis in their fortunes, and the one thing which Britain cannot urge them to do, is to abandon Vietnam and Asia altogether. That way would lie the ultimate disaster for us all." □

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WM. F. BUCKLEY JR.

362 NATIONAL REVIEW

APRIL 9, 1955 363

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Rec'd
for
Pres
Wed 6-12-68
am*

19
Pres file

(S) Tuesday, June 11, 1968
9:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk does not wish us to rush into the attached statement until he takes stock of:

- what the Cabinet in Bonn decides;
- what our allies are prepared to do.

He will be on to it first thing in the morning. We may require a meeting.

My first reflection -- supported by the Soviet priorities stated to Carillo Flores in Moscow -- that Moscow may be trying to trade recognition of East Germany for something on Vietnam and/or Middle East.

In any case I believe we should take stock across the board early tomorrow.

W. W. R.

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SUBJECT: ALLIED STATEMENT ON GDR PASSPORT AND VISA DECREES

1. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED AT THIS EVENING'S QUADRIpartite MEETING IN BONN TO RECOMMEND TO CAPITALS THAT THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT BE ISSUED BY GOVERNMENTS IN WASHINGTON, PARIS AND LONDON. IT WAS AGREED TO AIM AT A RELEASE TIME OF NOON JUNE 12 IN WASHINGTON, AND 5 PM (LOCAL TIME) IN LONDON AND PARIS). THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WILL ISSUE A SEPARATE STATEMENT TOMORROW IN ADDITION TO THE REMARKS OF FRG PRESS SPOKESMAN DIEHL (BONN'S 13162) ISSUED ON JUNE 11.

2. THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED TRIPARTITE GOVERNMENTAL STATEMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT.

THE AMERICAN, BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS DENOUNCE AS CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND TO THE GOAL OF A RELAXATION OF TENSION IN EUROPE ANY PASSPORT OR VISA REQUIREMENTS WHICH AUTHORITIES IN EAST BERLIN ARE SEEKING TO IMPOSE ON

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GERMAN CITIZENS TRAVELING INTO OR THROUGH EAST GERMANY.

3. THE GROUNDS PUT FORWARD FOR THE EAST GERMAN MEASURES ARE FRADULENT AND IN NO SENSE CAN JUSTIFY ACTION WHICH WOULD VIOLATE FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO BERLIN, AS ESTABLISHED SINCE 1945, AND WHICH WOULD DEEPEN THE UNNATURAL AND DANGEROUS DIVISION OF GERMANY AND OF EUROPE.

4. THE THREE GOVERNMENTS ARE PRESENTLY IN CONSULTATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON MEASURES NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION. THEY WILL COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, WHICH SHARES WITH THEM THE RESPONSIBILITY NOT ONLY FOR UNHINDERED BERLIN ACCESS BUT ALSO FOR AN ULTIMATE SOLUTION OF THE GERMAN PROBLEM. END TEXT.

5. THE DEPARTMENT'S CONCURRENCE TO THE ABOVE STATEMENT IS REQUESTED. WE WILL INFORM WASHINGTON BY IMMEDIATE CABLE IF LONDON AND PARIS HAVE COMMENTS AND SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE ABOVE TEXT. LODGE

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Following received in telephone conversation with Halvor Ekern, AmEmbassy, Bonn, 7:55 p.m. Tuesday, June 11.

The American, British and French governments denounce as contrary to international agreements and to the goal of a relaxation of tension in Europe any passport or visa requirements which ~~such~~ authorities in East/ Berlin are seeking to impose on German citizens traveling into or through East Germany.

The grounds put forward for the East German measures are ~~fraudulent~~ ^{invalid} and in no sense can justify action which would violate freedom of access to Berlin as established since 1945 and which would deepen the unnatural and dangerous division of Germany and of Europe.

The three governments are presently in consultation with the Federal Government on measures necessary to deal with the situation. They will communicate directly with the Soviet Government, which shares with them the responsibility not only for unhindered Berlin access but also for an ultimate solution of the German problem.

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USELMLO BELGIUM

UNCLAS BONN 13162

1. THE FEDERAL PRESS OFFICE TONIGHT ISSUED THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT:

BEGIN TEXT.

2. THE FEDERAL PRESS SPOKESMAN, STATE SECRETARY GUENTHER DIEHL, MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ABOUT THE MEASURES ANNOUNCED IN EAST BERLIN:

3. THE PROPOSED EAST BERLIN MEASURES FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF PASS AND VISA CONTROLS AND OTHER OBSTACLES TO PASSENGER AND FREIGHT TRAFFIC BETWEEN THE TWO PARTS OF GERMANY AND WITH WEST BERLIN REPRESENT ANOTHER VIOLATION OF THE FOUR POWER AGREEMENT CONCERNING GERMANY AND BERLIN AS WELL AS THE PRINCIPLE OF FREE TRAVEL IN ALL OF GERMANY. THE PROPOSED MEASURES ARE ILLEGAL AND HYPOCRITICAL IN REGARD TO THEIR ALLEGED JUSTIFICATION.

4. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT THIS EVENING BEGAN CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES. THE CABINET WILL CONSULT ABOUT THE SITUATION TOMORROW MORNING.

5. THE PROPOSED STEPS PROVIDE ANOTHER PROOF THAT THE AUTHORITIES IN THE OTHER PART OF GERMANY WANT TO DEEPEN AND TO PERPETUATE THE DIVISION OF OUR LAND. THE PROPOSED ACTIONS ARE AIMED AT ALL GERMANS ON THIS SIDE AND ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE DEMARCATION LINE. AT A TIME WHEN GOVERNMENTS IN EAST AND WEST SEEKING UNDERSTANDING ARE TRYING TO ELIMINATE TRAVEL AND TRADE

UNCLASSIFIED

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~~PAGE 32 DOWN 13162 1278387~~

RESTRICTIONS. IN ORDER TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, EVEN NORMAL CONTACT BETWEEN GERMANS IN THEIR OWN LAND IS BEING RENDERED MORE DIFFICULT. THE AUTHORITIES IN EAST BERLIN THROUGH THESE PLANS ARE DRIVING THEIR OWN REGIME FURTHER INTO ISOLATION. 6. THE STEPS ANNOUNCED BY THE VOLKSKAMMER ARE AIMED, THROUGH SERIOUS PROVOCATIONS, TO BLOCK THE POLICY OR RELAXATION AND OF PEACE IN EUROPE. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE ALL STEPS IN ORDER TO AVERT THE ENCROACHMENTS AND CONSEQUENCES INTENDED BY THE REGIME IN EAST BERLIN. END TEXT. LODGE

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~--SENSITIVE

Tuesday, June 11, 1968 -- 7:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

On the Under Secretary of State:

- Nick should stay at least until August.
- David Bruce is the best man to fill in.
- How about David Rockefeller or Henry Ford taking leave of absence for the London post? David would be first rate on financial problems.
- Would Doug Dillon be acceptable at this stage?
- Should George Ball come back to his old post -- while George McGhee goes to New York?
- Incidentally, I don't think George McGhee would be too conservative for London at this time of austere budgets, etc.

W. W. Rostow

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR 16, 1983.

BY rg ON 6-8-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

21
-1

INFORMATION

Tuesday, June 11, 1968
7:15 p. m.

Free file

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Gaud reports on
Doc Morgan's plans for the Foreign
Aid bill.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON

21a


OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

June 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Doc Morgan hopes to complete the mark-up of the foreign aid bill on Wednesday or Thursday.

The budget request for military and economic aid totals \$2.9 billion. He proposes to reduce this by about \$600 million, practically all of which will come from the economic side. This would mean that the \$2.5 billion economic aid request would be reduced to \$1.9 billion - the amount of the appropriation for FY 68 - and that the \$420 million request for military assistance would be reduced by about \$30 million.



William S. Gaud

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-25
By ig, NARA Date 11-6-96

22
INFORMATION

Pres. file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, June 11, 1968 -- 6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

At Mac Bundy's suggestion, I received in my office a most distinguished Greek named Dexiadis. He wished to lay before me his analysis of the Greek situation and his recommendations. Since they contain certain elements which I do not recall having read, they may interest you.

1. There had been a movement of intellectuals and professional people away from the conservatives in Greek politics. This movement was gaining ground. He said its specific gravity lay about the point of the right wing of the Democratic Party in terms of policy. But Andreas Papandreas moved in on it. He in turn was pretty well taken over by Communists or left-wingers. The bulk of the group were too lazy and disorganized to handle the problem. Finally, Andreas' public statement that he would not accept the results of the election gave the young colonels their opportunity to move.

2. There are three key facts which must be understood about the military men who took over:

- they or their families almost all suffered at the hands of the Communists during the civil war;
- they all come from distant mountainous villages and have the basic suspicion of sophisticated city folk that goes with that kind of background;
- in the Greek military hierarchy some of the key leaders were likely to be passed over for promotion, since they were not war college graduates.

3. With this background, their instinct is to cling to power and to do so with a sense of righteousness. He does not believe they can be quickly removed from the scene. He regards the King as a reasonably well-meaning but naive and not very bright young man.

4. Dexiadis explained that, lest there be any misunderstanding, his view of these men was as objective as possible. He had reason for a deep personal antagonism because his daughter was arrested by them and, in the course of imprisonment, had her skull fractured, from which she is just recovering.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-2-

5. His recommendation is that we try to think through a plan by which, over a 3-year period or so, we gradually work with forces in Greece to get these men to understand that they will have to go back to constitutional government.

I explained to him our power in these matters is limited. He said he understood this, but we remained an important element in the equation of Greece, and steady U. S. disapproval and quiet pressure towards a return to constitutional government would be important.

It was quite clear that Doxiadis regarded Andreas as something of a national disaster to his country.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, June 11, 1968
6:00 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

We stimulated CIA to examine student unrest around the world.

This report on [redacted] is forwarded separately by Dick.

34(b)(1)

The summary is marked.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Cy No. 1 - [redacted] 6.1(c)

6 June 1968

"Student Unrest [redacted]" 3.4(b)(1)

WWRostow:rlm

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-134
By *Sj*, NARA, Date 9-12-02

24

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Pres file

Tuesday, June 11, 1968
5:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Dick Helms underlines
ominous Hanoi strategy with respect to
Saigon.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS.141.022.006/3

By jc, NARA, Date 3-29-01

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

24a

Communist Intentions in the Saigon Area

12. The evidence that the Communists are now engaged in an unprecedented effort to mount a sustained offensive against Saigon is continuing to grow.

13. In addition to forces already based in III Corps surrounding Saigon, three enemy battalions from the Mekong Delta region reportedly have been committed to the Saigon fighting. Another two North Vietnamese regiments--the 32nd and 33rd--appear to be en route to the Saigon - III Corps area from the central highlands. Moreover, the heaviest flow of North Vietnamese infiltration groups is destined for III Corps. [REDACTED] captured enemy documents speak of the vital importance of Saigon in the enemy's plans.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

14. The character of the current offensive against the city contrasts sharply with that during the Tet attack when the emphasis was on surprise and shock. The campaign against Saigon since 5 May, on the other hand, is a measured application of force which the enemy apparently hopes to sustain over a period of weeks and months. This concept is perhaps best reflected by the enemy battalions which have thrust into Saigon only to withdraw after several days of fighting and by the continuing mortar and rocket barrages of from three to 20-odd rounds striking the city in a random pattern almost daily over the past month. The Communists apparently concluded after the Tet offensive that they could not seize and hold complete control of any major city in South Vietnam in the present military climate. The Tet experience, however, particularly in Hue, taught them that combat within urban areas could be extremely damaging and effective in serving their objectives.

15. Although the enemy tactics differ from those used in the attacks on Saigon during Tet, the maximum objectives of the current offensive are apparently

10 June 1968

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No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

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SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 01-136

By cbm, NARA, Date 1-11-02

Page 2 sanitized in its entirety

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, June 11, 1968 - 5:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

I have marked key passages in this rather fascinating report of Tony Carrillo Flores talks in Moscow.

Pres file

Evidently, they used the occasion to tell him some fundamentals of their position to communicate to us.

W. W. Rostow

Mexico 5347

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 95-188
By lig, NARA, Date 12-5-95

WWRostow:rln

Saturday, June 8, 1968

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR FREEMAN (Mexico 5347)

SUBJECT: Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores' Visit to USSR

During a nearly two-hour conversation with Carrillo Flores on June 7, he described in considerable detail his impressions of his official visit to the USSR May 21 to 29. He even read me his complete report to President Diaz Ordaz of the trip (4 copies only made), spiced by his own pithy commentary. Following is fairly full summary of the highlights of his report and comments:

The Soviets are principally interested in increasing Soviet-Mexican trade which totalled approximately U. S. \$600,000 in 1967, considerably less than Soviet trade with Brazil, Argentina or Uruguay. The USSR is anxious to expand the sale to the Government of Mexico of heavy machinery and capital goods, i. e., refinery equipment, hydro and thermal power plants, electronic equipment, etc. While unresponsive as to credit arrangements, especially re: local peso costs, Kosygin did assure Carrillo that arrangements could be worked out to produce replacement parts in Mexico under free licenses. Carrillo commented to me that the USSR is starting from the wrong end: that they had no chance of competing in such capital goods, at least in the immediate future, with the U. S., Japan, Germany, etc.; and that they should begin expansion of trade by purchasing more from Mexico (coffee, textiles, cotton, grains) and then expect gradually to increase exports. Carrillo will discuss this with Diaz Ordaz and may perhaps establish a commission within the National Foreign Trade Council to investigate possibilities, but he is far from sanguine.

Regarding foreign policy and national security interests, Carrillo said Gromyko, Kosygin and Podgorny all were amazingly candid and forthcoming in response to his queries. He said the only question specifically left unanswered was when he queried a Soviet astronaut as to when the USSR would put a man on the moon.

The principal, all-persuasive concern of the USSR expressed by Gromyko was the future of Germany. He made clear to Carrillo that the USSR would not hesitate to go as far as a nuclear confrontation with the U. S. in the event of: A. resurgence of Nazi-type state or B. acquisition or control of nuclear weapons by Germany. Gromyko commented that the present West German Government "not only is tolerating a Nazi resurgence but encouraging it". He stated wryly that the U. S. could afford to back German reunification as long as the USSR was unalterably opposed, but he insisted that the U. S. basically is in full agreement that the continued division of Germany is essential for the peace of the world.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-29-01

With respect to basic descending Soviet priorities in the foreign policy field, Gromyko listed them as follows:

- A. Internal security and territorial integrity of the Soviet Union itself;
- B. Security and territorial integrity of geographically close socialist allies (with the notable exception of China);
- C. Security of socialist states in Asia, Middle East and Caribbean (Cuba).

Regarding A. above, Carrillo received the clear impression that any serious threat would trigger an automatic response up to and including, if necessary, a nuclear confrontation with the U. S. Regarding B., the indication was that while a direct frontal threat would receive a similar reaction, certain "economic" changes would be met with a greater degree of Soviet flexibility. (Carrillo assumed inference here was to a Czechoslovakian-type situation. Gromyko specifically voiced the wish that the U. S. and other capitalist countries would "shut up" about Czech developments.) Regarding C. priorities, Gromyko indicated the Soviet intention to strengthen economic and political ties, but he made clear the Soviet unwillingness under any circumstances to risk a nuclear confrontation in their behalf (it was not clear in this connection whether North Korea pertained to B. or C., but Carrillo inferred the latter).

Gromyko characterized China as "totally irresponsible" and "a shame" to the socialist world. While the USSR had not yet even identified thousands of graves resulting from World War II, he said China is already thinking in terms of sacrificing millions to a nuclear holocaust. Gromyko even insisted that China's words do not match her actions; that despite widespread claims of supporting Hanoi, there is nevertheless a large resulting shortfall which the USSR has had to supply. He even went so far as to suggest to Carrillo that, in the remote event of military clash between China and the USSR, the latter might well set aside ideological ties and seek a military alliance with the U. S.

Regarding Vietnam, Gromyko insisted that the USSR hoped for success in the Paris talks. He stated, however, that Hanoi would never accept the "San Antonio Formula" and that the Soviets concurred with Hanoi that all of Vietnam should be considered as a single country. Gromyko insisted that the U. S., as compared to tiny North Vietnam, should be prepared to exhibit more "flexibility" in negotiating posture. (Gromyko apparently failed to elucidate, in light of foregoing conditions, how the Paris talks might prove fruitful.)

Regarding Cuba, Gromyko hinted that a strong effort is being made to assure viability of the regime (as compared to economic catastrophe of the Chinese Communists). Following a year of failure to name an Ambassador (Carrillo drew the implication that this at least partially was a result of Cuban insistence on subversive acts in Latin America), Gromyko said the USSR is naming a high-ranking Soviet official (Aleksandr Alekseyevich Soldatov) as the new Ambassador to Cuba. Carrillo also learned from other (unnamed) Soviet officials that a "deal" was made with Colombia assuring the latter that if they would accept assignment of a Soviet Ambassador, the USSR would neither encourage nor support pro-Communist subversive activities in Colombia. (Carrillo also admitted to me that the recent arrest of a subversive agent trained in Cuba with a large amount of U. S. currency demonstrated that the USSR may have extremely limited influence over the extent of Cuban subversive activities in Latin America.)

Regarding the possibility of a USSR signature to protocol II Tlatelolco Treaty, Gromyko said candidly it is not in the cards for two reasons: (a) the USSR never signs treaties in which it has not participated in negotiations, and (b) area blocked out by the Latin Americans as a nuclear free zone goes far beyond the authority of Latin America and includes too much of the "high seas." The implication was clear to Carrillo that full acceptance of the zone by the USSR would unduly restrict the movement of Soviet nuclear submarines, to the relative advantage of the U. S., and would thus be unacceptable. Gromyko did assure Carrillo, however, that the USSR would be prepared to extend bilateral assurances regarding respect of nuclear free zone to any Latin American country which is prepared to make similar commitments as Mexico and Salvador.

During a Moscow banquet hosted by "Soviet Friends of Mexico," the principal orator (unnamed Soviet athlete who expects to captain Olympic team) followed a eulogy of Mexico and its revolutionary traditions by a bitter attack on the U. S. He referred to the "imperialistic war" of 1847, suppression of the "democratic regime" in Guatemala, Bay of Pigs, Dominican Republic, Vietnam, etc. Carrillo said he rose extemporaneously to a lively defense of U. S. -Mexican relations, categorizing historic by-gones as by-gones, and declaring that never in history had Mexican relations with its northern neighbor been so excellent. Carrillo said his response drew considerable applause. The following day during a meeting with Kosygin, Carrillo said that the sense of his remarks had obviously penetrated, because the former insisted that any improvement in Soviet-Mexican relations need not in any way "prejudice the cordial relations which Mexico currently maintained with any third country."

Miscellaneous Topics

A. Gromyko informally suggested the possibility of a direct Moscow-Mexico air link. Rather than extension of the Moscow-Habana flight, he had in mind extension of the Moscow-Montreal flight. Carrillo commented to me that Mexico already has more than enough foreign flights, for the time being, and that Soviet commercial flights could compete neither in comfort nor in facilities with other foreign carriers, particularly U. S.

B. Carrillo visited Lumumba University, where 120 Mexican students currently are in residence, and talked candidly with the rector. The latter admitted that only a "small minority" are doing outstanding work and that the balance are "hardly getting by." Apparently poor initial selection of candidates, strict discipline, loss of ideological euphoria, and language difficulties are the principal reasons for failure of the program. These poor results despite the fact scholarship students receive room, board, medical care, plus 100 rubles per month (which Carrillo said was in excess of local minimum salary). Gromyko expressed the hope that conclusion of a cultural convention would result in better selectivity, drive and quality of Mexican students in the USSR. (Again Carrillo expressed a pessimistic attitude to me.)

C. Gromyko mentioned the possibility of concluding a consular agreement with Mexico similar to the U. S. agreement. Carrillo agreed to examine the problem.

D. Gromyko, Kosygin and Podgorny all extended a cordial invitation to Diaz Ordaz to visit Moscow at the earliest opportunity. Carrillo made no commitment, except to assure he would pass on the invitation to the President.

E. While most Soviet officials obviously were well briefed on Mexico, Kosygin was least well prepared. He even intimated to Carrillo that the vast majority of Mexico's external debt resulted from Government of Mexico arms purchases from the U. S. Carrillo quickly put him straight, and Gromyko was obviously embarrassed.

Comment.

In response to my inquiry why he felt the Soviets should have been so forthcoming with respect to matters of broad national security and foreign relations in general, Carrillo replied that he was well known as a "pregunton" (needler). I tend to attach somewhat more importance to Soviets' apparently candid replies. It seems highly probable that, while none of the information may be "news" either to Department or to Embassy Moscow, the Soviets may have decided to take advantage of the presence of a "friendly neutral" to expound certain concepts which they could feel fairly sure would reach ears of the United States.

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INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~ - HARVAN

Pres file

Tuesday, June 11, 1968 -- 5:10 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith two junior members of our delegation (Kaplan and Holbrooke) lunch with Karnow and Wilfred Burchett.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-18
By CB, NARA, Date 4-20-95

What they appear to have said is okay. But I must confess to be a little uneasy at getting delegation members mixed up with a professional Communist journalist and a Washington Post reporter.

This could lead to misunderstandings -- notably if Burchett were to misquote them.

I shall have a word with Sec. Rusk to see if he shares my uneasiness.

Also attached is Bollingwood's conversation with Le Duc Tho. The interesting point is marked.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 16053 (DELTO 261)
Paris 16067 (DELTO 263)

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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N O D I S HARVAN

DELTO 261

SUBJ: LUNCH WITH BURCHETT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-16
By W.B., NARA, Date 5-24-93

1. KARNOW OF WASHINGTON POST INVITED KAPLAN AND HOLBROOKE TO LUNCH WITH WILFRED BURCHETT JUNE 11. BURCHETT HAD LITTLE TO ADD TO OUR EXISTING KNOWLEDGE OF HIS VIEWS. HE SHOWED INTEREST IN KY'S APPARENT DECLINE OF POWER, AND THE STATUS OF PRIME MINISTER HUONG.
2. IN ACCORDANCE WITH GOVERNOR HARRIMAN'S INSTRUCTIONS, DELEGATION OFFICERS EMPHASIZED GROWING PRESSURE OF U.S. PUBLIC OPINION TO RESPOND TO ENEMY ATTACKS IN SAIGON AND DMZ. KAPLAN CITED HEARST TELEGRAM, PUBLISHED IN TODAY'S PARIS TRIBUNE, AS EXAMPLE OF PRESSURE NOW GROWING IN U.S. HOLBROOKE SAID PRESIDENT WAS UNDER VIRTUALLY NO PRESSURE FROM AMERICAN PUBLIC TO STOP PRESENT LIMITED BOMBING, BUT THAT IF CURRENT ENEMY OFFENSIVE, PARTICULARLY IN SAIGON, CONTINUED, PRESSURE FOR USG RESPONSE WOULD GROW IN U.S. DELEGATION OFFICERS EMPHASIZED UNLIKELIHOOD OF FURTHER U.S. RESTRAINTS IF HANOI DID NOT GIVE THE PRESIDENT SOME REAL JUSTIFICATION FOR TAKING THE RISKS THAT FURTHER RESTRAINTS WOULD ENTAIL.
3. BURCHETT TOOK ALL THIS IN WITHOUT MUCH COMMENT. HE ARGUED, AS HE HAS IN THE PAST, THAT IN MID-MARCH, NORTH VIET-NAM PULLED BACK FROM KHE SANH AS A STEP OF RESTRAINT. DEL OFFICERS POINTED OUT THAT THE FACTS DID NOT SUPPORT THIS POINT OF VIEW; THAT THE SIGNAL, IF IT WAS INTENDED AT ALL, WAS VITIATED SINCE NORTH VIETNAMESE UNITS ARE NOW ONCE

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PAGE 02 PARIS 16053 111809Z

AGAIN THE KHE SANH AREA. BURCHETT LISTENED WITHOUT DISPUTING THESE FACTS. DEL OFFICERS SAID THAT IF ANY FUTURE MILITARY ACTS BY NORTH VIET NAM WERE INTENDED TO SIGNAL RESTRAINT, THEN SUCH A SIGNAL SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

4. BURCHETT WAS FRANK WHEN DISCUSSING THE FACT THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE TROOPS IN THE SOUTH.

5. GROUND RULES FOR LUNCHEON WERE THAT KARNOW WOULD NOT MENTION FACT OF LUNCHEON IN PRINT OR TO HIS COLLEAGUES. SINCE EVERYTHING BURCHETT SAID TO US HE HAS PREVIOUSLY SAID TO KARNOW AND WAS NOT NEWS TO KARNOW IN THAT RESPECT. KAPLAN EMPHASIZED THAT OUR COMMENTS ON HARRIMAN'S IMPRESSIONS OF U.S. SITUATION WERE OFF-THE RECORD. KARNOW, WHO KNOWS BURCHETT WELL, IS SURE THAT BURCHETT WILL REPORT LUNCHEON IN FULL TO NORTH VIETNAMESE. HARRIMAN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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N O D I S

DELTO 263

FROM HARRIMAN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-16
By LD, NARA, Date 5-24-93

1. CHARLES COLLINGWOOD CAME IN TO SEE ME TO REPORT ON HIS INTERVIEW AND SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH LE DUC THO ON JUNE 10. COLLINGWOOD SAW THO IN THE PRESENCE OF BURCHETT WHO HAD ARRANGED AN ON-THE-RECORD INTERVIEW. COLLINGWOOD HAD SUBMITTED SOME QUESTIONS, AND THO USED THE RECORDED PORTION OF THE CONVERSATION TO ANSWER ONE QUESTION, "HOW DID THE TALKS IN PARIS LOOK FROM THE STANDPOINT OF HANOI?" THO'S RECORDED STATEMENT CONTAINS NOTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY, AND THE TEXT IS BING SUBMITTED SEPTEL.

2. OF GREATER INTEREST WAS THE CONVERSATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE INTERVIEW, COLLINGWOOD GAVE US HIS NOTES OF CONVERSATION, WHICH REPORTED IN SEPTEL, AND ARE WELL WORTH READING IN FULL. PRINCIPAL POINTS WERE: (A) IN REFERRING TO NEGOTIATIONS, THO SAID, "THE UNITED STATES HAD THE KEY." WHEN COLLINGWOOD EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THO HAD BROUGHT A KEY WITH HIM, THO REPLIED, "THERE ARE TWO KEYS--WE BOTH HAVE KEYS." (B) COLLINGWOOD GAINED IMPRESSION THAT THO DOUBTED US WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM VIETNAM. HE TOLD THO THERE WAS NO DOUBT IN HIS MIND THAT WE WANTED TO WITHDRAW AS SOON AS THE WAR WAS OVER.
HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

27
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 93-18
By CL, NARA, Date 4-20-95

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, June 11, 1968 - 5:05 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Eaton continues to spread
Kosygin's message to us -- this time to
Harriman.

The only interesting paragraph is 5,
which Sec. Rusk may wish to bear in mind
when he talks later in the week with
Kuznetsov.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 16058 (DELTO 262)

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

Pres file



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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REAS 11

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 93-16

By *mg*, NARA, Date 5-24-93

N O D I S

DELTO 262

FROM HARRIMAN

1. AT LUNCH TODAY CYRUS EATON TOLD ME OF HIS RECENT TALKS WITH KOSYGIN AND OTHER SOVIET OFFICIALS IN MOSCOW.
2. EATON SAID THAT KOSYGIN HAD ASKED HIM TO DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ME: THAT THE SOVIET UNION VERY MUCH WANTED TO SEE A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN VIET NAM; THAT HE WOULD DO "EVERYTHING IN HIS POWER" TO GET A SETTLEMENT ON THE BROADER ISSUES BUT THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD SHOW FLEXIBILITY ON THE LESSER MATTERS THAT INFLUENCED PUBLIC OPINION BUT WHICH WERE NOT IN THE LONG RUNN SIGNIFICANT. UNDER THIS LATTER HEADING IT WAS CLEAR THAT KOSYGIN INCLUDED STOPPING OF ALL BOMBING OF NORTH VIET NAM.
3. KOSYGIN SAID THAT IF THE WAR CONTINUED HE FELT THE INEVITABLE RESULT WOULD BE ESCALATION. FORCES IN THE US WOULD CAUSE THE USG TO ESCALATE AND THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO INTENSIFY ITS EFFORTS. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, EATON REPORTED THAT THIS WAS NOT STATED AS A THREAT BUT AS A SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WHICH HE FEARED.
4. KOSYGIN POINTED OUT THAT WITH THREE MILLION MEN UNDER ARMS, CHINA HAD THE LARGEST STANDING ARMY IN THE WORLD AND WAS EAGER TO FIGHT IN NORTH VIET NAM. THUS FAR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD RESISTED CHINESE MILITARY INVOLVEMENT.
5. KOSYGIN ASKED EATON WHAT ULTIMATE SOLUTION THE US SOUGHT

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 16058 111830Z

IN VIET NAM, TO WHICH EATON COULD OF COURSE NOT REPLY. KOSYGIN SAID THAT WHEN HE KNEW THIS HE WOULD EXERT HIS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE SUCH A SOLUTION BUT THAT MOSCOW COULD NOT APPEAR TO BE ACTING AS A MEDIATOR. HE IMPLIED THAT IF WE STOPPED OUR ATTACK ON NORTH VIETNAM, A SISTER SOCIALIST STATE, THIS WOULD ALLOW HIM TO PLAY A DIFFERENT AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE.

6. KOSYGIN ASKED EATON WHETHER I COULD GET A MESSAGE TO HIM SETTING FORTH THE ULTIMATE AMERICAN OBJECTIVES.

7. IN REPLY TO EATON'S QUESTION AS TO A GOOD CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION, KOSYGIN SUGGESTED EITHER DOBRYNIN OR KUZNETSOV.

8. EATON SAID THAT HE WAS IMPRESSED WITH POLYANSKY'S POSITION AS KOSYGIN'S PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT, AND MENTIONED THAT DOBRYNIN HAD GOOD CONNECTION WITH POLYANSKY AS WELL AS KOSYGIN.

9. EATON TOLD ME BRIEFLY OF HIS TALK WITH THUY, WITH WHOM HE HAD MET YESTERDAY. THUY WAS COMPLETELY RIGID, ALONG FAMILIAR LINES, AND EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE HE WAS WINNING THE PROPAGANDA BATTLE IN WORLD AND AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. EATON PROPOSED TO THUY THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE MAKE SOME CONCESSIONS TO OBTAIN FULL BOMBING CESSATION. THEN THUY ASKED WHAT KIND, EATON REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO SPECIFY.

10. I OF COURSE EMPHASIZED TO EATON HANOI'S INTOLERABLE ESCALATION, PARTICULARLY IN SAIGON, AND GAVE HIM THE HEARST EDITORIAL TO READ AS INDICATION OF SIGNIFICANT AMERICAN REACTION. I ALSO UNDERLINED THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF FURTHER RESTRAINT IN BOMBING WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL RESTRAINT BY HANOI.

11. ON JUNE 9 EATON HAD DINNER WITH ZORIN WHO SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO HELP EATON IN PARIS AND WHO WOULD KEEP INTEREST IN HIS PLANNED TALKS WITH THUY AND ME.

12. I HAD AN ENGAGEMENT TO LUNCH WITH ZORIN TODAY WHICH WAS CALLED OFF ON ACCOUNT OF ZORIN'S ILLNESS. BOGOMOLOV WAS SO DISTURBED THAT I AM SATISFIED THIS WAS REAL AND NOT DIPLOMATIC. ALTHOUGH ZORIN IS IN BED TODAY, HE ASKED ME TO LUNCH WITH HIM ON THURSDAY.

13. EATON IS LEAVING PARIS TOMORROW FOR NEW YORK EN ROUTE

CLEVELAND. HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

June 11, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Agreement with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy

The Atomic Energy Commission in the attached letter to you recommends that you approve an "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy," determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution. The Department of State concurs in the Commission's recommendation. This proposed agreement would supersede the existing agreement that was signed in July 1955, and subsequently amended several times. The present agreement expires on July 26, 1968.

The proposed agreement is similar to ones recently signed with Japan, Switzerland, Sweden and Norway providing long-term fuel supplies for power reactors.

The principal purposes of the proposed agreement are to extend cooperation with the Government of the Philippines in atomic energy matters and to provide for the supply of enriched uranium to fuel two power reactors planned to be under construction by 1973. In addition the new agreement would incorporate the provisions of the 1964 "Private Ownership" legislation with respect to privately-arranged transfers of special nuclear material.

Safeguards on materials and facilities transferred to the Philippines under the proposed agreement would be administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with an existing trilateral agreement which provides that the United States' safeguards rights are suspended as long as the trilateral agreement remains in effect and would automatically apply if the agreement should be terminated.

I recommend that you approve this proposed agreement. If you agree, there is presented herewith a letter to Dr. Seaberg for your signature. If you sign the letter, the proposed agreement will be formally executed by appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. In compliance with Section 123c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the agreement will then be placed before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____.

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

June 12, 1968

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

In accordance with Section 123a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Atomic Energy Commission has submitted to me by letter dated June 10, 1968, a proposed superseding "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy" and has recommended that I approve the agreement, determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 123b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and upon the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission, I hereby:


- (a) approve the proposed superseding agreement and determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States of America; and
- (b) authorize the execution of the agreement on behalf of the Government of the United States of America by appropriate authorities of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

The Honorable
Glenn T. Seaborg
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:CEJ:mlb (6/11/68)



UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

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JUL 10 1968

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

The Atomic Energy Commission recommends that you approve the enclosed proposed superseding "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy", determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution. The Department of State supports the Commission's recommendation.

The proposed agreement, which has been negotiated by the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, would supersede the current Agreement for Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines. This agreement was signed at Washington on July 27, 1955, was amended by the agreements signed on June 11, 1960, August 7, 1963, and June 27, 1966, and will expire on July 26, 1968.

The proposed superseding agreement with the Philippines is similar to the agreement recently signed with Japan and is also like several other recent long-term power agreements, for example, the Swiss, Swedish, and Norwegian agreements. The primary purposes of the proposed agreement are to extend cooperation with the Government of the Philippines in atomic energy matters and to provide for the supply of enriched uranium to fuel two power reactors planned to be under construction

by 1973. The term of the agreement would therefore be thirty years as in the case of the other agreements cited above.

The quantity of U-235 in enriched uranium needed to fuel these power reactor projects over the term of the agreement is 17,500 kilograms. An additional 100 kilograms would be made available for various research purposes, bringing the overall net ceiling quantity of U-235 which may be transferred under the proposed agreement to 17,600 kilograms.

As is regularly provided when preparing new agreements or amendments, the proposed Philippine agreement incorporates the benefits of the 1964 "Private Ownership" legislation respecting privately-arranged transfers of special nuclear material. In accordance with this legislation, Article VII of the agreement would permit arrangements to be made between either Party or authorized persons under its jurisdiction and authorized persons under the jurisdiction of the other Party for transfers of special nuclear material. Such arrangements would be in addition to the government-to-government transactions currently allowed and would be subject to the ceiling limit of 17,600 kilograms of U-235.

As regularly incorporated in similar Agreements for Cooperation, the basic method for supply of enriched uranium to which there would be a transfer of title would, after December 31, 1968, be through uranium enrichment services for the account of the Philippine transferee requiring such services. This would be accomplished pursuant to proposed Article VIII. Also under this article, sale of enriched uranium would continue to be possible if the Parties so desire.

Also as provided in similar agreements, the proposed Philippine agreement includes language in Article IX which assures the comparability of domestic and foreign prices for enriched uranium and services performed, as well as advance notice required for delivery. Article IX also provides that uranium enriched to more than 20% in the isotope U-235 may be made available to the Philippines

The President

- 3 -

at the discretion of the Commission, when there is an economic or technical justification for such a transfer.

The International Atomic Energy Agency is currently applying safeguards to materials and facilities transferred under the present Agreement for Cooperation in accordance with the trilateral agreement signed in 1964. The proposed new agreement would provide that the Agency be requested to continue its application of safeguards to materials and facilities which would be subject to safeguards under the bilateral agreement. This would be accomplished through a revised safeguards agreement which has been negotiated among the U.S., the Philippines, and the Agency.

Following your approval, determination, and authorization, the proposed agreement will be formally executed by appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. In compliance with Section 123c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the agreement will be submitted to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) Glenn T. Seaborg

Chairman

Enclosure:
Proposed Superseding Agreement
for Cooperation Between the
United States of America and
the Republic of the Philippines

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DRAFT LETTER FOR POSSIBLE USE BY THE
PRESIDENT IN RESPONDING TO
DR. GLENN T. SEABORG

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

In accordance with Section 123a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Atomic Energy Commission has submitted to me by letter dated _____, 1968, a proposed superseding "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy" and has recommended that I approve the agreement, determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, and authorize its execution.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 123b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and upon the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission, I hereby:

- (a) approve the proposed superseding agreement and determine that its performance will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States of America; and

(b) authorize the execution of the agreement on behalf of the Government of the United States of America by appropriate authorities of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg
Chairman
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D.C.

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AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
CONCERNING CIVIL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY

Whereas the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines signed an "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy" on July 27, 1955, which was amended by the Agreements signed on June 11, 1960; August 7, 1963, and June 27, 1966; and

Whereas the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines desire to pursue a research and development program looking toward the realization of peaceful and humanitarian uses of atomic energy, including the design, construction, and operation of power-producing reactors and research reactors, and the exchange of information relating to the development of other peaceful uses of atomic energy; and

Whereas the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines are desirous of entering into this Agreement to cooperate with each other to attain the above objectives; and

Whereas the Parties desire this Agreement to supersede the "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy" signed on July 27, 1955, as amended;

The Parties agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy", signed on July 27, 1955, as amended, is superseded on the date this Agreement enters into force.

ARTICLE II

For the purposes of this Agreement:

(1) "Atomic weapon" means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

(2) "Byproduct material" means any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special nuclear material.

(3) "Commission" means the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

(4) "Equipment and devices" and "equipment or devices" means any instrument, apparatus, or facility, and includes any facility, except an atomic weapon, capable of making use of or producing special nuclear material, and component parts thereof.

(5) "Parties" means the Government of the United States of America, including the Commission on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. "Party" means one of the above "Parties".

(6) "Person" means any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, government agency, or government corporation but does not include the Parties to this Agreement.

(7) "Reactor" means an apparatus, other than an atomic weapon, in which a self-supporting fission chain reaction is maintained by utilizing uranium, plutonium, or thorium, or any combination of uranium, plutonium, or thorium.

(8) "Restricted Data" means all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons, (2) the production of special nuclear material, or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from the category of Restricted Data by the appropriate authority.

(9) "Safeguards" means a system of controls designed to assure that any materials, equipment and devices committed to the peaceful uses of atomic energy are not used to further any military purpose.

(10) "Source material" means (1) uranium, thorium, or any other material which is determined by the Commission or the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to be source material, or (2) ores containing one or more of the foregoing materials, in such concentration as the Commission or the Government of the Republic of the Philippines may determine from time to time.

(11) "Special nuclear material" means (1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material which the Commission or the Government of the Republic of the Philippines determines to be special nuclear material, or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing.

(12) "Superseded Agreement" means the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines signed by the Parties on July 27, 1955, as amended by the Agreements signed on June 11, 1960, August 7, 1963, and June 27, 1966.

ARTICLE III

A. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the availability of personnel and material, and the applicable laws, regulations, and license requirements in force in their respective

countries, the Parties shall cooperate with each other in the achievement of the uses of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

B. Restricted Data shall not be communicated under this Agreement, and no materials or equipment and devices shall be transferred, and no services shall be furnished, under this Agreement, if the transfer of any such materials or equipment and devices or the furnishing of any such services involves the communication of Restricted Data.

C. This Agreement shall not require the exchange of any information which the Parties are not permitted to communicate.

ARTICLE IV .

Subject to the provisions of Article III, the Parties shall exchange unclassified information with respect to the application of atomic energy to peaceful uses and the problems of health and safety connected therewith. The exchange of information provided for in this Article shall be accomplished through various means, including reports, conferences, and visits to facilities, and shall include information in the following fields:

(1) Development, design, construction, operation, and use of research, materials testing, experimental, demonstration power, and power reactors, and reactor experiments;

(2) The use of radioactive isotopes and source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material in physical and biological research, medicine, agriculture, and industry; and

(3) Health and safety problems related to the foregoing.

ARTICLE V

A. Materials of interest in connection with the subjects of agreed exchange of information as provided in Article IV and subject to the provisions of Article III, including source material, heavy water, byproduct material, other radioisotopes, stable isotopes, and special nuclear material for purposes other than fueling reactors and reactor experiments, may be transferred between the Parties for defined applications in such quantities and under such terms and conditions as may be agreed when such materials are not commercially available.

B. Subject to the provisions of Article III and under such terms and conditions as may be agreed, specialized research facilities and reactor materials testing facilities of the Parties shall be made available for mutual use consistent with the limits of space, facilities, and personnel conveniently available when such facilities are not commercially available.

C. With respect to the subjects of agreed exchange of information as provided in Article IV and subject to the provisions of Article III, equipment and devices may be transferred from one Party to the other under such terms and conditions as may be agreed. It is recognized that such transfers will be subject to limitations which may arise from shortages of supplies or other circumstances existing at the time.

ARTICLE VI

The application or use of any information (including design drawings and specifications), and any material, equipment and devices, exchanged or transferred between the Parties under this or the superseded Agreement shall be the responsibility of the Party receiving it, and the other Party does not warrant the accuracy or completeness of such information and does not warrant the suitability of such information, material, equipment and devices for any particular use or application.

ARTICLE VII

A. With respect to the application of atomic energy to peaceful uses, it is understood that arrangements may be made between either Party or authorized persons under its jurisdiction and authorized persons under the jurisdiction of the other Party for the transfer of equipment and devices and materials other than special nuclear material and for the performance of services with respect thereto.

B. With respect to the application of atomic energy to peaceful uses, it is understood that arrangements may be made between either Party or authorized persons under its jurisdiction and authorized persons under the jurisdiction of the other Party for the transfer of special nuclear material and for the performance of services with respect thereto for the uses specified in Articles V and VIII of this Agreement and subject to the relevant provisions of Article IX and to the provisions of Article X.

C. The Parties agree that the activities referred to in paragraphs A and B of this Article shall be subject to the provisions in Article III and to the policies of the Parties with regard to transactions involving the authorized persons referred to in paragraphs A and B.

ARTICLE VIII

A. During the period of this Agreement, and as hereinafter set forth, the Commission will supply to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or, pursuant to Article VII, to authorized persons under its jurisdiction, under such terms and conditions as may be agreed, all of the requirements of the Republic of the Philippines for uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 for use as fuel in the power reactor program described in the Appendix to this Agreement, which Appendix, subject to the quantity limitation established in Article X, may be amended from time to time by mutual consent of the Parties without modification of this Agreement.

(1) The Commission will supply such uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 by providing after December 31, 1968, to the same extent as for United States licensees, for the production or enrichment, or both, of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 for the account of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or such authorized persons.

(Upon timely advice that any natural uranium required with

respect to any particular delivery of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 under such service arrangement is not reasonably available to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or to such authorized persons, the Commission will be prepared to furnish the required natural uranium on such terms and conditions as may be agreed.)

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph A(1) above, if the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or such authorized persons so request, the Commission, at its election, may sell the uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 under such terms and conditions as may be agreed.

B. As may be agreed, the Commission will transfer to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 for use as fuel in defined research applications, including research, materials testing, and experimental reactors and reactor experiments. The terms and conditions of each transfer shall be agreed upon in advance, it being understood that, in the event of transfer of title of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235, the Commission shall have the option of limiting the arrangements to undertakings such as those described in paragraph A(1) of this Article.

ARTICLE IX

A. With respect to transfers by the Commission of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 provided for in Article VII, paragraph B and Article VIII, it is understood that:

(1) Contracts specifying quantities, enrichments, delivery schedules, and other terms and conditions of supply or service will be executed on a timely basis between the Commission and the transferee, and

(2) Prices for uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 sold or charges for enrichment services performed will be those in effect for users in the United States of America at the time of delivery. The advance notice required for delivery will be that in effect for users in the United States of America at the time of giving such notice. The Commission may agree to supply uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 or perform enrichment services upon shorter notice, subject to assessment of such surcharge to the usual base price or charge as the Commission may consider reasonable to cover abnormal production costs incurred by the Commission by reason of such shorter notice.

B. Should the total quantity of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 which the Commission has agreed to provide pursuant to this Agreement and other Agreements for Cooperation reach the maximum quantity of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 which the Commission has available for such purposes, and should contracts covering the adjusted net quantity specified in Article X not have been executed, the Commission may request, upon appropriate notice, that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or other transferees authorized by it execute contracts for all or any

part of such uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 as is not then under contract. It is understood that, should contracts not be executed in accordance with a request by the Commission hereunder, the Commission shall be relieved of all obligations with respect to the uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 for which contracts have been so requested.

C. The enriched uranium supplied hereunder may contain up to twenty percent (20%) in the isotope U-235. A portion of the uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 supplied hereunder may be made available as material containing more than twenty percent (20%) in the isotope U-235 when the Commission finds there is a technical or economic justification for such a transfer.

D. It is understood, unless otherwise agreed, that, in order to assure the availability of the entire quantity of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 allocated hereunder for a particular reactor project described in the Appendix, it will be necessary for the construction of the project to be initiated in accordance with the schedule set forth in the Appendix and for the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or other transferees authorized by it to execute a contract for that quantity in time to allow for the Commission to provide the material for the first fuel loading. It is also understood that, if the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or other transferees authorized by it desire to contract for less than the entire quantity of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 allocated for a particular project

or terminate the supply contract after execution, the remaining quantity allocated for that project shall cease to be available and the maximum adjusted net quantity of U-235 provided for in Article X shall be reduced accordingly, unless otherwise agreed.

E. Within the limitations contained in Article X, the quantity of uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 transferred under Article VII, paragraph B or Article VIII and under the jurisdiction of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the fueling of reactors or reactor experiments shall not at any time be in excess of the quantity necessary for the loading of such reactors or reactor experiments, plus such additional quantity as, in the opinion of the Parties, is necessary for the efficient and continuous operation of such reactors or reactor experiments.

F. When any source material or special nuclear material received from the United States of America requires reprocessing, such reprocessing shall be performed at the discretion of the Commission in either Commission facilities or facilities acceptable to the Commission, on terms and conditions to be later agreed; and it is understood, except as may be otherwise agreed, that the form and content of any irradiated fuel shall not be altered after removal from the reactor and prior to delivery to the Commission or the facilities acceptable to the Commission for reprocessing.

G. Special nuclear material produced as a result of irradiation processes in any part of the fuel leased under this or the superseded Agreement shall be for the account of the lessee

and, after reprocessing as provided in paragraph F of this Article, shall be returned to the lessee, at which time title to such material shall be transferred to the lessee, unless the Government of the United States of America shall exercise the option, which is hereby granted, to retain, with a credit to the lessee based on the prices in the United States of America referred to in paragraph H of this Article, any such special nuclear material which is in excess of the needs of the Republic of the Philippines for such material in its program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

H. With respect to any special nuclear material not owned by the Government of the United States of America produced in reactors while fueled with materials obtained from the United States of America by means other than lease which is in excess of the needs of the Republic of the Philippines for such material in the Philippine program for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the Government of the United States of America shall have and is hereby granted (a) a first option to purchase such material at prices then prevailing in the United States of America for special nuclear material produced in reactors which are fueled pursuant to the terms of an Agreement for Cooperation with the Government of the United States of America, and (b) the right to approve the transfer of such material to any other nation or a group of nations in the event the option to purchase is not exercised.

I. Some atomic energy materials which the Commission may be requested to provide in accordance with this Agreement, or which have been provided to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines under the superseded Agreement, are harmful to persons and property unless handled and used carefully. After delivery of such materials, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall bear all responsibility, insofar as the Government of the United States of America is concerned, for the safe handling and use of such materials. With respect to any source material or special nuclear material or reactor materials which the Commission may lease pursuant to this Agreement, or may have leased pursuant to the superseded Agreement, to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall indemnify and save harmless the Government of the United States of America against any and all liability (including third party liability) for any cause whatsoever arising out of the production or fabrication, the ownership, the lease, and the possession and use of such source material or special nuclear material or reactor materials after delivery by the Commission to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or to any private individual or private organization under its jurisdiction.

ARTICLE X

The adjusted net quantity of U-235 in enriched uranium transferred from the United States of America to the Republic of the Philippines under Articles V, VII and VIII during the period

of this Agreement for Cooperation or under the superseded Agreement, shall not exceed in the aggregate 17,600 kilograms. The following method of computation shall be used in calculating transfers, within the ceiling quantity of 17,600 kilograms of U-235, made under the said Articles or the superseded Agreement:

From:

- (1) The quantity of U-235 contained in enriched uranium transferred under the said Articles or the superseded Agreement, minus
- (2) The quantity of U-235 contained in an equal quantity of uranium of normal isotopic assay,

Subtract:

- (3) The aggregate of the quantities of U-235 contained in recoverable uranium of United States origin either transferred to the United States of America or to any other nation or group of nations with the approval of the Government of the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement, minus
- (4) The quantity of U-235 contained in a equal quantity of uranium of normal isotopic assay.

ARTICLE XI

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines guarantees that:

- (1) Safeguards provided in Article XII shall be maintained.

(2) No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or authorized persons under its jurisdiction by purchase or otherwise pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, equipment or devices, will be used for atomic weapons, or for research on or development of atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose.

(3) No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement will be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines except as the Commission may agree to such a transfer to another nation or group of nations, and then only if, in the opinion of the Commission, the transfer of the material is within the scope of an Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the other nation or group of nations.

ARTICLE XII

A. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines emphasize their common interest in assuring that any material, equipment or devices made available to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or any person under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement shall be used solely for civil purposes.

B. Except to the extent that the safeguards rights provided for in this Agreement are suspended by virtue of the application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as provided in Article XIII, the Government of the United States of America, notwithstanding any other provisions of this Agreement, shall have the following rights:

(1) With the objective of assuring design and operation for civil purposes and permitting effective application of safeguards, to review the design of any

(a) reactor, and

(b) other equipment and devices the design of which the Commission determines to be relevant to the effective application of safeguards, which are to be made available under this Agreement, or have been made available under the superseded Agreement, to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or to any person under its jurisdiction by the Government of the United States of America or any person under its jurisdiction, or which are to use, fabricate, or process any of the following materials so made available: source material, special nuclear material, moderator material, or other material designated by the Commission;

(2) With respect to any source material or special nuclear material made available to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or to any person under its

jurisdiction under this Agreement or the superseded Agreement by the Government of the United States of America or any person under its jurisdiction and any source material or special nuclear material utilized in, recovered from, or produced as a result of the use of any of the following materials, equipment or devices so made available:

(a) source material, special nuclear material, moderator material, or other material designated by the Commission,

(b) reactors, and

(c) any other equipment or devices designated by the Commission as an item to be made available on the condition that the provisions of this paragraph B(2) will apply,

(i) to require the maintenance and production of operating records and to request and receive reports for the purpose of assisting in ensuring accountability for such materials; and

(ii) to require that any such materials in the custody of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or any person under its jurisdiction be subject to all of the safeguards provided for in this Article and the guarantees set forth in Article XI;

(3) To require the deposit in storage facilities designated by the Commission of any of the special nuclear

material referred to in paragraph B(2) of this Article which is not currently utilized for civil purposes in the Republic of the Philippines and which is not retained or purchased by the Government of the United States of America pursuant to Article IX, transferred pursuant to Article IX, or otherwise disposed of pursuant to an arrangement mutually acceptable to the Parties;

(4) To designate, after consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, personnel who, accompanied, if either Party so requests, by personnel designated by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, shall have access in the Republic of the Philippines to all places and data necessary to account for the source material and special nuclear material which are subject to paragraph B(2) of this Article to determine whether there is compliance with this Agreement and to make such independent measurements as may be deemed necessary;

(5) In the event of non-compliance with the provisions of this Article or the guarantees set forth in Article XI and the failure of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to carry out the provisions of this Article within a reasonable time, to suspend or terminate this Agreement and to require the return of any materials, equipment and devices referred to in paragraph B(2) of this Article;

(6) To consult with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the matter of health and safety.

C. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines undertakes to facilitate the application of safeguards provided for in this Article.

ARTICLE XIII

A. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines note that, by an agreement signed by the Government of the United States of America on June 15, 1964, and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency on September 18, 1964, the Agency has been applying safeguards to materials, equipment and facilities transferred to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines under the superseded Agreement. The Parties agree that Agency safeguards as provided in the trilateral agreement, as it may be amended from time to time or supplanted by a new trilateral agreement, shall continue to apply to such materials, equipment and facilities transferred under the superseded Agreement or to be transferred under this Agreement, recognizing that the safeguards rights accorded to the Government of the United States of America by Article XII of this Agreement are suspended during the time and to the extent that Agency safeguards apply to such materials, equipment and facilities.

B. In the event that the trilateral agreement referred to in paragraph A of this Article should be terminated prior to the expiration of this Agreement and the Parties should fail to agree promptly upon a resumption of Agency safeguards, either Party may,

by notification, terminate this Agreement. In the event of termination by either Party, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall, at the request of the Government of the United States of America, return to the Government of the United States of America all special nuclear material received pursuant to this or the superseded Agreement and still in its possession or in the possession of persons under its jurisdiction. The Government of the United States of America will compensate the Government of the Republic of the Philippines or the persons under its jurisdiction for their interest in such material so returned at the Commission's schedule of prices then in effect in the United States of America.

ARTICLE XIV

The rights and obligations of the Parties provided for under this Agreement shall extend, to the extent applicable, to cooperative activities initiated under the superseded Agreement, including, but not limited to, information, materials, equipment and devices transferred thereunder.

ARTICLE XV

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for the entry into force of such Agreement and shall remain in force for a period of thirty (30) years.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Washington, in duplicate, this _____ day of _____, 1968.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:




John P. Trevithick
Deputy Director
Office of Atomic Energy Affairs
International Scientific and
Technological Affairs
U.S. Department of State



William L. Yeomans
Assistant Director for
Agreements and Liaison
Division of International
Affairs
U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES:



Cristino Lazatin
Science Attache
Embassy of the Philippines

Initialed at Washington, D. C., June 7, 1968.

285

APPENDIX

PHILIPPINE ENRICHED URANIUM POWER REACTOR PROGRAM

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<u>REACTORS</u>	<u>START OF CONSTRUCTION</u>	<u>CRITICALITY DATE</u>	<u>TOTAL KGS. U-235 REQUIRED</u>
A. 500 MWe	1971	1975	9,100
B. 500 MWe	1973	1977	8,400
		TOTAL	<u>17,500</u>

ACTION

29

**Tuesday, June 11, 1968 -
7:55 p. m.**

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith another try.

W. W. Restow

WWRestow:rla

29a

June 11, 1968

**MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense**

In this critical period we are being subjected to serious criticism that we are not communicating adequately with our people concerning the military, political, and diplomatic situation with respect to Vietnam.

There is firm evidence, from representatives of both political parties and all sections of the country, that our people do not feel fully informed.

Therefore, I wish you and those of your colleagues who have been appointed by the President, to undertake a systematic program of presenting the facts about the current situation.

I would be grateful if you would keep me informed on a monthly basis of the speaking and press conference schedules you develop, as well as the texts of what is said.

1/5 Lyndon B. Johnson

LBJ:WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, June 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Shah's Visit

Your office visit with the Shah will be Wednesday at 12:30 p. m., but before the dinner and meeting tonight you will wish to know what is on his mind. As usual, he will wish to hear your views on major world issues, but three specific subjects especially concern him:

1. He hopes for as much assurance as you can give on the continuity of US policy toward Iran. He was badly shaken by your March 31st announcement. Armin Meyer has told him that any American President looking at the Middle East will recognize Iran's importance to us, but it will help for him to hear this from you.

2. Related to this, he will try to find out how much he can count on us for arms supply. You have just agreed to the first \$75-100 million sale in a \$600 million six-year program. We stated our intention to go ahead year by year, but we had to say we can't commit ourselves ahead until Congress gives us new authority. The one thing you can do is to start off the conversation by telling him that we can go all the way to \$100 million this year. (We had told him "\$75-100 million" pending final review of funding possibilities.)

3. Whether or not the Shah talks much about the Persian Gulf, we want to urge him to cooperate with King Faisal. The British pull-out by 1971 leaves Iran, Saudi Arabia and the little Arab principalities face-to-face with a series of conflicting claims over territory and oil rights. We want the leaders on the ground to get together rather than looking to us to arrange a settlement. The Shah understands our position, but knowing you are watching will underline it. He apparently had a good airport talk with Faisal on his way here, and we hope he'll follow up.

The one other matter that may come up-- [redacted] --is the fact that we may wish to move [redacted] intelligence facilities to Iran if Pakistan closes us down at Peshawar. Your best response is to affirm the importance of these activities and let [redacted] carry the ball.

3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-134
By SJ, NARA, Date 4-12-02.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION

Tuesday - June 11, 1968

Pro file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message of Condolence on the Death of Helen Keller

At Tab B is a message which President Balaguer sent you on the death of Helen Keller.

State recommends you authorize an acknowledgement along the lines of Tab A. I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Attachments

Tab A - Acknowledgement to Dominican Republic President Balaguer.

Tab B - President Balaguer's message of condolence of June 4 on the death of Helen Keller.

31a

Presidential Acknowledgement

to

Message of Condolence from President Joaquin Balaguer
of Dominican Republic
On the Death of Helen Keller

Dear Mr. President:

I express my appreciation and that of the American people for your words of sympathy on the death of Miss Helen Keller. She was a courageous woman whose triumph over her handicaps served as an inspiration to people everywhere. We mourn her passing, but are proud of the heritage she left.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Message of Condolence

from

President Joaquin Balaguer of Dominican Republic

(in translation)

"June 4, 1968
Santo Domingo, D. R.

His Excellency

Lyndon B. Johnson

President of the United States of America

Washington, D. C.

Moved by the death of that exemplary woman, Helen Keller, who stirred the admiration of the world by the powerful spiritual forces that made her a heroine, I offer to you and to the people of the United States of America the sincere condolences of the Dominican people and Government and of myself for this very grievous loss.

Dr. Joaquin Balaguer
President of the Dominican Republic"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, June 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres. file

SUBJECT: German Military Offsets

As described in the attached telegram, Gene Rostow and Fred Deming reached agreement with the Germans along the lines outlined to you on Friday. They settled at a figure of \$725 million, consisting of:

- \$100 million of commercial purchases of military equipment;
- \$625 million of German bond purchases.

In addition, the German airline Lufthansa will not use a U.S. credit line of \$60 million to finance its purchase of U.S. commercial aircraft. Instead, it will raise the money in Germany.

We will be meeting with the Germans later in the year to consider long-term solutions for the military offset problem.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NEJ 94-154
 By sig, NARA, Date 7-24-96

ERF
 ERF:m st

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

32a
TELEGRAM

47

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 464

PAGE 01 BONN 13101 102024Z

80
ACTION EUR 20

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, COM 08, E 15, FRB 02, TRSY 08,
XMB 06, RSR 01, /153 W

P 101920Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8607

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-193
By ing, NARA, Date 8-15-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 13101

SUBJECT: MILITARY COST NEUTRALIZATION

DEPARTMENT PASS TREASURY AND DEFENSE

1. AS A RESULT OF DAY'S BARGAINING, GERMANS CAME UP \$125 MILLION, AND ALSO THREW IN LUFTHANSA DEAL. PERSISTENT GERMAN ATTACKS ON THE U.S. ESTIMATE OF \$875 MILLION BALANCE OF PAYMENTS COSTS AND ON THE GROSS NET PROBLEM HIGHLIGHTED IMPORTANCE ON THEIR PART OF STRESSING CONCESSIONS AS ADDRESSED IN PART TO STANDING OF \$875 FIGURE AND TO GROSS-NET CONTROVERSY.
2. PACKAGE WHICH WE FINALLY WORKED OUT INCLUDES \$725 MILLION IN OFFSET AND NEUTRALIZATION DISTRIBUTED AS FOLLOWS: \$500 MILLION MEDIUM-TERM SECURITIES PURCHASES BY THE BUNDESBANK, \$100 MILLION COMMERCIAL PURCHASES BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, \$125 MILLION MEDIUM-TERM SECURITIES TO BE PURCHASED BY A CONSORTIUM OF GERMAN COMMERCIAL BANKS.
3. TO BRIDGE WHAT LAHR CALLED THE RESULTING GAP OF \$150 MILLION, HE PROPOSED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE UNRESOLVED GROSS-NEG CONTROVERSY AND, UNDER THE HEADING OF CONTINUED MONETARY COOPERATION, THE IMMEDIATE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ACCRUAL OF \$60 MILLION RESULTING FROM THE NON-USE BY LUFTHANSA OF THE AMERICAN CREDIT FACILITIES ARRANGED BY EXPORT-IMPORT BANK. WE UNDERTOOK TO USE OUR GOOD OFFICES TO PERSUADE EX-IM TO RENOUNCE ITS COMMITMENT FEE.
4. BY AGREEMENT WITH LAHR WE ARE NOT REPEAT NOT BACKGROUNDING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 BONN 13101 102024Z

THE NUMBERS. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS OUR STRESS IS ON COMMUNIQUE STATEMENT THAT PACKAGE APPROXIMATES SCOPE OF ARRANGEMENTS IN RECENT YEARS. WE ARE ADDING THAT TOTAL, INCLUDING BOTH ITEMS WITH A DIRECT PRICE TAG AND ESSENTIALLY UNQUANTIFIABLE "MONETARY COOPERATION" AMOUNTS TO "VERY SUBSTANTIAL" NEUTRALIZATION OF BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OUTFLOW ON MILITARY ACCOUNT, BECAUSE OF PERSISTENT GERMAN ATTACKS ON U.S. ESTIMATE OF \$875 MILLION AS HIGH (AND ON GROSS/NET PROBLEM AS WAY OF SLURRING ISSUE OF PERCENTAGE OF OFFSET ACHIEVED.
LUDGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

33

Tuesday, June 11, 1968
3:45 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a cool MACV military appraisal for the week.

Here is the line-up by Corps areas:

Relative Strength
(in combat-effective battalion equivalents)

	<u>Enemy</u>	<u>Allied</u>
I Corps	49	93
II Corps	31	66
III Corps	26	91
IV Corps	13	47
	<u>119*</u>	<u>297**</u>

*Average: 4-500 men

**Average: 800 men

Briefly:

- pressure increasing at Khe Sanh;
- increased pressure expected soon at eastern end of DMZ;
- in II Corps Abrams believes he's headed off a big attack with B-52's and other pre-emption;
- Saigon main enemy focus;
- in IV Corps harassment of lines of communication, etc.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET attachment~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 21

By ics, NARS, Date 6-26-84

~~TOP SECRET~~

33a

Monday, June 10, 1968

TEXT OF CABLE FROM COMUSMACV (16652)

SUBJECT: Weekly Assessment of Military Position

This message provides the weekly assessment of the current Allied and enemy military posture for the reporting period ending June 8, 1968.

Part I -- Appraisal of Enemy and Friendly Situation

The enemy's major interest presently appears to be in the central III Corps around Saigon. Another immediate threat exists in the DMZ area where the enemy is building pressure on the Khe Sanh Combat Base. The threat also continues in central I Corps and in the Western Highlands of II Corps. Friendly force operations in Quang Nam and western Kontum provinces appear to have upset the enemy's timetable in these areas, but it is doubtful that he will abandon efforts which have required such extensive preparations.

In I Corps, the enemy has 46 to 49 combat-effective battalion equivalents. At Khe Sanh, where he now has from six to nine combat-effective battalions, recent developments indicate that the enemy intends to increase the scope and intensity of his activities. Ralliers and documents indicate the presence of a newly-infiltrated North Vietnamese regiment there. From the eastern DMZ south through Hue, the enemy has 19 combat-effective battalion equivalents. In the eastern DMZ, the enemy will probably soon try to gain the offensive, and he may need new infiltration of enemy elements to reinforce those depleted by recent large losses. Elsewhere in this area, the enemy will probably continue to resupply and await replacement, attempt to secure the rice harvest, and conduct only small-scale attacks by fire. In the central and southern Corps area, the enemy has 21 combat-effective battalion equivalents, although activity has been at a low level. Attacks by fire against Danang and Chu Lai are likely, and reflect a significant threat to friendly installations there. Activity is expected to remain light in southern I Corps.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NLS/CBS 7

By

ics

, NARS, Date

7-25-83

In II Corps, the enemy controls 31 combat-effective battalion equivalents. The anticipated major ground offensive in Kontum province has still failed to materialize. It apparently has been preempted by B-52 strikes and friendly operations. The enemy retains the capability to launch multi-battalion attacks on fixed installations and to contest friendly initiated actions. However, he has probably lost the capability to coordinate several simultaneous large-scale attacks. In Pleiku and Darlac provinces, the enemy will probably continue the attacks by fire and ambushes which have characterized his actions during the past week. Elsewhere in II Corps, the enemy can be expected to maintain pressure on friendly units with attacks by fire and small probing attacks, and to continue harassment of the Revolutionary Development program in hamlets and villages.

In III Corps, the enemy is credited with 26 combat-effective battalion equivalents. The increase reflects primarily the influx of infiltrators. Throughout the week, the enemy continued to apply pressure on Saigon and its environs with a limited force, while conserving and rebuilding his remaining units in the outlying provinces.

It is apparent that Saigon is now the enemy's major target. His efforts here directly contribute to his major objectives: the creation of conditions which will lead to a popular uprising, and the creation of an impression of strength and momentum in order to erode Allied will to resist, and to enhance his position in negotiations. In his Saigon effort, the enemy is applying lessons learned at Tet: that frontal attacks are costly and generally unsuccessful; that small numbers of troops, once entrenched inside a city, are difficult to dislodge, can raise great havoc and cause widespread destruction of property. Thus his tactics for Saigon are to hold around the periphery of the city with his Main Force units, keep his lines of communication open, and provide a springboard from which to rotate small unit probes into the Capital both to inflict damage and to force heavy destruction by our forces. He also seeks to generate fear, impatience, indignation, and a sense of desperation within the populace. To this end, he augments his ground probes with random shelling of the city and attacks on utility systems. This has been the nature of his effort since May 5.

The enemy is apparently geared for sustained effort. During the last two weeks of May, he has had average losses of 260 killed per day in III Corps. Our estimates indicate that infiltration units in this area have top priority. We estimate that 16 to 18 thousand infiltrators are destined to arrive here over the next three months which represents a significant portion of the total

infiltration effort. We know that one or more battalions have moved up from IV Corps, and believe the enemy may choose to redeploy one or two regiments from II Corps. He thus may be able to absorb present losses. It is apparent that the current attrition of his units and incoming replacements is not sufficient to significantly reduce the threat the enemy can pose to Saigon for the next two or three months. Meanwhile, he can be expected to continue efforts to keep the city in a state of unrest and economic disruption, and provide a source for lurid news headlines.

In IV Corps, the enemy continues to control 11 to 13 combat-effective battalion equivalents. Continued attempts to harass Allied forces and urban areas controlled by the Government of Vietnam, through sporadic attacks by fire and interdiction of lines of communication, remains the most probable enemy course of action.

Part II -- Friendly Situation

A. There are 93 maneuver battalions in I Corps operating against 49 enemy battalion equivalents.

B. In western Quang Tri province, there are 6 combat maneuver battalions conducting offensive operations against the enemy build-up around Khe Sanh. In I Corps north, 7 km northeast of Phu Bai, continued pressure on enemy forces by the 1st ARVN Division Black Panther company, supported by gunships of the 101st Airborne Division and psyops assets resulted in the capture of 23 North Vietnamese Army and 38 Viet Cong prisoners plus the return of 8 Hoi Chanh. Current III Marine deployments in Quang Nam and Quang Tin province appear to be adequate to meet the present central I Corps threat of 21 enemy combat-effective battalion equivalents.

There are 66 maneuver battalions available in II Corps to conduct operations against 31 enemy battalion equivalents. The apparent preemption of the predicted enemy attack in the Kontum area will permit the return of the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to III Corps. Friendly operations were undertaken in Tuyen Duc province on June 8 with the movement of the 3rd Battalion, 506th Airborne to an area southwest of Dalat. Two battalions of the ARVN 44th Regiment will remain in the vicinity of Phan Thiet to maintain security there. The Allied effort in II Corps continues to be supported at a reduced level by B-52 strikes.

There are 91 maneuver battalions in III Corps operating against 26 enemy combat-effective battalion equivalents. The build-up of enemy

of enemy combat-effective battalion equivalents from 16 - 19 to 26 during the past three weeks has influenced the shifting of friendly operations to Gai Dinh province. Currently, there are 29 U.S./South Vietnamese maneuver battalions conducting operations in Gia Dinh province. Inter-Corps moves from I Corps and IV Corps to III Corps have improved the friendly posture in III Corps. During the past week, four maneuver battalions were moved to III Corps (3 ARVN Airborne battalions from I Corps and 1 U.S. battalion from IV Corps); additionally, the ARVN Delta Force (a 600-man reconnaissance unit) was moved from Nha Trang in II Corps to Saigon. The Delta Force will be used to ferret out and eliminate snipers in the greater Saigon area. To further enhance the friendly force posture in III Corps, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division will begin its move from II Corps on June 9 to Phuoc Vinh in Vinh Duong province. By June 11, there will be 93 U.S./Free World/ARVN maneuver battalions in III Corps.

There are 47 maneuver battalions operating against the enemy's 11 to 13 battalion equivalents. Two battalions of the Mobile Riverine Force were moved to Sadec province to continue riverine operations in that area.

Part III -- Enemy Capabilities

With respect to the forecast of enemy infiltration, it is now estimated that an average of 12,500 to 14,600 infiltrators will enter South Vietnam each month through September 1968. This will be insufficient to maintain his strength if recent loss rates continue. However, the enemy retains the capability to reduce his losses by cutting back the tempo of activity and avoiding engagements.

ACTION

34

Tuesday, June 11, 1968 - 3:30pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

Attached for your approval is a warm message to Pope Paul VI replying to his message of condolence on the death of Senator Robert F. Kennedy.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

MWG:mm

SUGGESTED MESSAGE

Your Holiness:

I was deeply touched by your compassionate message of condolence on the death of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. We draw strength from your prayers for our fellow citizens and for the nation at this sad moment.

Senator Kennedy's belief in the equality of all men, his compassion for the poor, his confidence in the essential goodness of men and his unfailing courage serve as an inspiration for all. As we mourn his passing, we dare to hope that what he lived and died for may, with God's help, come to pass.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Holiness

Pope Paul VI,

Vatican City.

~~SECRET~~

35

DECLASSIFIED

Lunch Meeting With the President
Tuesday, June 11, 1968 - 1:00 p.m.

Authority 7198251
By ic/ky, NARA, Date 6-23-92

AGENDA

Pres file

1. Message to Kosygin. (Secretaries Rusk and Clifford)

Tab A. Sec. Rusk's suggested redraft attached as well as Amb. Bunker's proposed revision.

2. Instructions for Wednesday Meeting in Paris. (Sec. Rusk)

Tab B. The key question here is whether they should get into item (c) at the bottom of page 2 and the top of page 3.

It has been agreed there will be no reference to bombing between the 19th and 20th parallels.

3. Defense budget cuts. (Sec. Clifford)

The President asked for a report by Tuesday. Sec. Clifford will be ready.

4. Violations of North Korean air space. (Sec. Clifford)

Sec. Clifford was apprised of the President's interest in this matter. He will report steps that have been taken.

5. Seabeds issue. (Secretaries Rusk and Clifford)

The issue will arise in the UN on Monday, June 23. Sec. Rusk will present a proposed U.S. position.

6. Naval vessels in the Black Sea. (Sec. Clifford)

Sec. Rusk has raised this matter with Sec. Clifford; and it was suggested the issue be aired with the President.

7. Amb. Goldberg's suggestion that the President speak at the close of the Special General Assembly. (The President)

We put this on the agenda because it would be one way to dramatize the President's interest in the NPT as well as an occasion to talk more generally on the search for peace in the world.

8. Other.

~~SECRET~~

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ

~~SECRET~~-NODIS

June 10, 1968

*Draft for
Lynch 6/11/68
35a*

By _____, NARA, Date _____

Dear Mr. Chairman:

See Rusk's draft

I was very glad to receive your letter of June 5 and have given it the most careful study. I think you and I agree as to the great importance of a peaceful resolution of the Vietnamese problem and of a halt to the bloodshed. I think you and I would also agree that the Soviet Union and the United States have a very special responsibility with respect to the reduction of tensions and the stabilization of peace in the world.

We are prepared to end the bombardment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam if it would we know it will lead to a de-escalation of the war. In this connection, I have given special attention to your statement that a cessation of bombing and other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam cannot result in any kind of negative consequences for the United States in the sense of damaging the interests of its security.

Does this statement apply to the security interests of the United States with respect to our own and allied forces in Vietnam? Obviously, the military capability of the DRV would be further enhanced by the total cessation of bombing. A decision must be made by the DRV not to take advantage of this cessation; we and Hanoi must be clear on this point. Such a decision need not be made public. You will understand that I must be concerned about the position of our troops and allied forces in South Vietnam and the safety of its civilian population. Any light which you can throw upon this vital point would be appreciated.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-29-01

Sub A

We shall make every effort to discuss these matters constructively with the representatives of the DRV in Paris. We are prepared to stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a first step. We do need to have assurances, which may be entirely private, as to the next steps for the de-escalation of the violence.

Of course, Mr. Chairman, we would be glad to pursue these matters directly with the government of the Soviet Union. If, for example, you are in position to provide us assurances with respect to the military consequences to our own and allied forces if we stop the bombing, we are prepared to accept your assurances and would issue the necessary orders.

We appreciate the fact that you have informed the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam of our interest in unofficial contacts between our respective delegations in Paris, as well as the fact that you believe that all forms of contact between the parties should be utilized. Our delegation in Paris is ready for such contacts and we would hope very much that the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would be responsive.

I do believe it important that we keep in close touch with each other on this matter.

##



Department of State

TELEGRAM

35c

15

~~SECRET~~

REF 924

PAGE 01 PARIS 15760 071306Z

44
ACTION SSO 00

INFO /ZRB W

O 371212Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2740

017169

1968 JUN 7 AM 9 28

Postwar

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 15760

N O D I S/HARVAN

DELTO 255

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-16
By *id*, NARA, Date 5-24-93

WE ARE SUBMITTING IN THIS MESSAGE A DRAFT OUTLINE FOR THE JUNE 12 MEETING. WE SUGGEST A DISCUSSION OF THE OUTLINE DURING OUR VISIT THIS WEEKEND.

1. WE WILL OPEN. WE PROPOSE MAKING A BRIEF OPENING STATEMENT DEFINING OUR IMMEDIATE PURPOSE IN SPECIFIC TERMS DEALING WITH THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CESSATION OF LIMITED BOMBING OF NORTH VIET-NAM AND WHAT WE HAVE CALLED "RELATED MATTERS."
2. THE STATEMENT WOULD REFER TO THE LACK OF PROGRESS AND THE FACT THAT THE OTHER SIDE HAS BEEN USING THESE MEETINGS AS A PROPAGANDA FORUM RATHER THAN DISCUSSING THE NECESSARY ISSUES. WE WOULD INDICATE NO INTEREST IN PURSUING THE PROPAGANDA LINE AND SUGGEST THAT WE NOW FOCUS ON THE ESSENTIALS AS THEY HAVE EMERGED.
3. WE WOULD DEFINE THE HEART OF THE MATTER AS BEING THEIR DEMAND FOR THE DETERMINATION OF AN UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF ALL BOMBING BEFORE CONSIDERING MATTERS RELATED TO THIS DETERMINATION, AS AGAINST OUR CALL FOR CONSIDERATION OF CESSATION OF BOMBING TOGETHER WITH RELATED MATTERS WHICH INCLUDE RESTRAINT ON THEIR PART AS A SIGN OF GOOD FAITH.

~~SECRET~~

Tab B

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 15760 071306Z

4. WE WOULD INFORM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT, CONTRARY TO THEIR CHARGES THAT WE HAVE INTENSIFIED THE WAR IN THE NORTH SINCE MARCH 31, WE HAVE EXERCISED A DEGREE OF RESTRAINT EVEN BEYOND THAT ANNOUNCED IN THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH OF THAT DATE. AS THEY MUST HAVE NOTED, WE HAVE SHOWN, FOR THE TIME BEING, AN EXTRA MEASURE OF RESTRAINT BY NOT BOMBING IN THE AREA BETWEEN THE 19TH AND 26TH PARALLELS SINCE APRIL 4. MOREOVER, NONE OF OUR TROOPS OR THOSE OF OUR ALLIES HAVE BEEN OPERATING IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ SINCE THEN. THIS EXTRA MEASURE OF RESTRAINT ON OUR PART HAS BEEN APPARENT TO THE AUTHORITIES IN HANOI. UNFORTUNATELY, HANOI HAS RESPONDED WITH THE OPPOSITE OF RESTRAINT AND HAS INTENSIFIED ITS EFFORTS TO TAKE OVER THE SOUTH BY FORCE. SUCH ACTIONS CREATE SERIOUS DOUBTS IN OUR MIND THAT COMPLETELY STOPPING THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH WOULD EVOKE ACTS OF GOOD FAITH ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SIDE.

5. QUOTING FROM THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECHES, WE WOULD EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR TAKING RELATED ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH A TOTAL BOMBING CESSATION. WE WOULD DEFINE RELATED MATTERS AS THOSE ACTIONS WHICH IN THE ABSENCE OF BOMBING COULD ENABLE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, IF THEY WERE TO ACT IN BAD FAITH, TO INCREASE THE INTENSITY OF THE WAR AND THUS ENDANGER THE LIVES OF OUR MEN AND THOSE OF OUR ALLIES.

6. WE WOULD THEN STATE OUR FUNDAMENTAL POSITION THAT NORTH VIET-NAM MUST NOT IMPROVE ITS MILITARY POSITION AS A RESULT OF A US CESSATION OF BOMBING. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE PROPOSED AMONG OTHER THINGS THE EARLY RESTORATION OF THE DMZ TO ITS PROPER AND ORIGINAL STATUS. WE WOULD REGARD AS ACTS OF BAD FAITH INCONSISTENT WITH OUR OWN RESTRAINT ANY ATTEMPTS BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO IMPROVE THEIR MILITARY POSITION AS A RESULT OF A US CESSATION OF BOMBING. SUCH ACTS OF BAD FAITH WOULD INCLUDE: (A) ARTILLERY OR OTHER FIRE FROM AND ACROSS THE DMZ; (P) GROUND ATTACKS ACROSS THE DMZ OR THE MASSING OF ADDITIONAL FORCES OR SUPPLIES IN NORTH VIET-NAM OR THE DMZ IN A MANNER WHICH POSES A DIRECT THREAT TO ALLIED FORCES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM; (C) AN INCREASE IN THE MOVEMENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND SUPPLIES INTO SOUTH VIET-NAM,

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 03 PARIS 15760 071306Z

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE INCREASE IN INFILTRATION RATE OF RECENT MONTHS IS ABNORMAL AND THAT WE ARE THINKING IN TERMS OF THE RATE WHICH PREVAILED IN MID-1967.

7. WE WOULD MENTION AGAIN OUR CONCERN OVER THE LEVEL OF NVA-VC TERROR ATTACKS DIRECTED AGAINST SAIGON AND REMIND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT CONTINUATION OF THESE ATTACKS IS NOT CONDUCTIVE TO PROGRESS AT THE PARIS TALKS.

8. WE WOULD CALL UPON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN THESE TALKS LIE LARGELY IN THEIR HANDS. THEY MUST FACE UP TO THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION AND RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAS CALLED "SOME GESTURES ON THE OTHER SIDE TOWARD PEACE." IF OUR RESTRAINT AND OUR GOODWILL CONTINUE TO MEET ONLY INFLEXIBILITY, BELLICOSE STATEMENTS AND EVASIONS, WE WILL NOT MAKE ANY PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING AN HONORABLE PEACE. WE ARE PATIENT, BUT WE ARE DETERMINED.

9. WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT, IN LINE WITH THE SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE WHICH WE ARE DEMONSTRATING TODAY, THEY ONCE AGAIN CONSIDER OUR EARLIER SUGGESTION TO REDUCE THE PROPAGANDA OUTPUT IN THE WAKE OF EACH MEETING. WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT EACH SIDE AGREE THAT FOLLOWING THIS AND FUTURE MEETINGS NEITHER SIDE WOULD ISSUE FULL TEXTS OF STATEMENTS MADE AND THAT EACH SPOKESMAN WOULD ONLY PRESENT A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF POSITIONS TAKE BY EACH SIDE. WE WOULD HOPE THEREBY NOT ONLY TO DEMONSTRATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR OWN PURPOSE, BUT TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE WORLD THAT WE WERE NOT APPROACHING THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE WITH POLEMICS AND PURE PROPAGANDA.

10. WE WOULD CLOSE BY REPEATING ONCE AGAIN THE STATEMENT USED AT THE JUNE 5 MEETING AS FOLLOWS: "YOU HAVE ASKED THAT WE ACKNOWLEDGE OR DETERMINE OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CESSATION OF ALL BOMBING. AS WE HAVE STATED THIS HAS NEVER PRESENTED AN INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE TO US, AND WE ARE PREPARED, IN FACT, TO CEASE BOMBARDMENT AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCE. ACCORDINGLY, I HOPE THAT WE MAY PROCEED FORTHWITH TO DISCUSS RELATED MATTERS".
HARRIMAN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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REC'D : JUNE 7, 1968
8:33 A.M.

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X O O I S/HARVAN

11. THIS STATEMENT AT THE LAST MEETING RECEIVED NO RESPONSE.
WE BELIEVE THEY NOTED OUR FORMULATION, AND WE WILL BE
WATCHFUL FOR ANY REACTION FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.
MRRYXAN

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

Tuesday, June 11, 1968 -- 12:30 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Abe Fortas called to say that yesterday Cyrus Eaton called from Paris. He first called Carol Fortas and then Abe.

Eaton said he was in Paris at the request of Kosygin and Brezhnev. He told Abe:

- The war will expand if peace does not come quickly.
- China is eager to get into the battle.
- He asked if Harriman has sufficient freedom of action to make decisions quickly.
- The Soviet Union is eager for peace but strongly backs Hanoi.
- He is concerned that U.S. negotiators are not in a position quickly to make concessions.
- He said he would be meeting with the North Vietnamese yesterday.
- He will be meeting with Harriman and Vance today. (Tuesday, June 11)

He told Carol, but did not repeat to Abe, that Kosygin wants to meet the President somewhere in Scandinavia.

Mr. Eaton offered his services to check in advance with Kosygin any proposals we might wish to make.

W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow:rla

Pres file
37

Tuesday, June 11, 1968
12:00 noon

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MR. PRESIDENT:

This is Ed Lansdale's bare-knuckled account of Thieu's political problem and what we face in Vietnamese politics, including how corruption works.

It is worth reading.

W W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 6-8-92

37a

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

TO: Ambassador Bunker DATE: June 7, 1968
FROM: Ed Lansdale *Ed*
SUBJECT: Sensitive Supplement

1. This memorandum contains sensitive material deleted from SLO's study, Nationalist Politics in Viet-Nam. This supplementary material pertains to Parts II through V of the study (The Nationalist Power Structure; Thieu and Ky; The Senior Military Officers; and Loan and the Police).

2. At present, President Thieu does not have the support of the four most powerful leaders after himself -- Ky and Generals Loan, Le nguyen Khang and Cao van Vien -- and to a considerable extent is actively opposed by them. The reasons for this are complex. In the first place, Ky, Khang and Loan see Thieu as the principal threat to their own power and ambitions, and all are ambitious men. Vien is less concerned with power but is a proud, sensitive man who feels Thieu and his entourage have deliberately sought to destroy Vien's image as a highly respected soldier (as a prelude to replacing him with a Thieu supporter) by disseminating malicious rumors concerning corruption on the part of Mrs. Vien. Moreover, Vien is egged on in his dislike of Thieu by Mrs. Vien, who dislikes Mrs. Thieu as well as Thieu himself. Beyond this, however, are two more serious, more dangerous reasons for opposing Thieu which Ky, Loan, Khang and, to a lesser extent, Vien share. These are contempt, bordering on hatred, for Thieu as a weak leader, and a deep-seated distrust that Thieu might "sell out" his country.

3. The reasons for the contempt are as follows: In the eyes of these four Generals, Thieu did nothing in the two worst crises of the last three years, the 1966 Struggle Movement and the 1968 Tet Offensive. Instead, as these Generals see it, even when his country was fighting for its life, Thieu stood back and let them do the work as well as take the risks and blame and then stepped in "over the bodies" to enhance his own position and image.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-16
By *ij*, NARA, Date 5-24-93

4. The reasons for the distrust of Thieu are less easy to pinpoint. They begin with the fact that in the eyes of these four Generals, and of a number of other top leaders and "insiders" in the power structure, no one really knows what Thieu believes in or stands for. Added to this is Northern and Centralist distrust of Thieu as being too closely identified with the interests of the Southern aristocracy (large landowners and wealthy entrepreneurs who made their money under the French) which has separatist and pro-French sympathies. And finally, at least Loan and Khang genuinely distrust Thieu's principal assistant, Nguyen van Huong, as being under the influence, if not the control, of either the Communists, the French, or both.

5. With respect to Thieu's relationship to the other senior officers, Thieu is moving toward bringing most of them under his influence, concentrating particularly on division commanders. This could result in the transformation of the senior officers, from an informal, independent junta which has encouraged the Thieu/Ky rivalry in order to retain its own power, into a pro-Thieu group. Thieu, however, cannot consolidate his influence over the senior officers without replacing Cao van Vien and Le Nguyen Khang. Moreover, Thieu cannot fully consolidate his power until he acquires control of the police/intelligence apparatus, or at the least, control of all security forces, police and military, in the Capital Military District (CMD). This would require either replacing Loan or abrogating his control of police and intelligence units in the CMD. The appointment of General Minh as Governor of Saigon and Gia Dinh appears to represent a compromise between Thieu, and Ky and company. Minh is a wealthy Southerner who is considered a Thieu supporter; however, he also apparently has a good relationship with Cao van Vien and, according to initial reports, will report to the III Corps Commander rather than directly to the Presidency. (Minh is a shrewd politician who, as province chief of An Giang, handled GVN relations with the Hoa Hao for several years during the Diem period. He is considered by well-informed, responsible Vietnamese to be quite corrupt as well as very skillful in "handling" Americans.)

6. At present, the nationalist power structure is not functioning well enough to cope successfully with the magnitude of the present danger. This is essentially because of disunity among the top leaders, which severely weakens the capability of the GVN and

RVNAF to get those things done which are essential to survival. This disunity is likely to increase in the immediate future, as a result of the role of Prime Minister Huong and the new Cabinet, and because of the tragic accident on June 2 in which six officers were killed who were closely associated with Ky, Loan and Khang. (This factor is more an emotional than a rational one, but is very real nevertheless.) The actions of the new Prime Minister and Cabinet are likely to intensify "civil/military" animosity (an oversimplification, but still valid), and more important, to widen the split between Thieu on the one hand and Ky, Loan, Khang and Cao van Vien on the other. Indeed, a number of knowledgeable Vietnamese believe Thieu intends to use Huong and the new Interior Minister, General Tran thien Khiem, as battering rams to wear down the power of Loan, Khang, and Cao van Vien (and thus of Ky) and then, when everyone is groggy, once again to step "over the bodies" and replace Loan, Khang, and Cao van Vien with Thieu supporters. True or not, this is probably the way Ky and company regard the present situation. Moreover, this, combined with the loss of some of the closest friends and associates of Ky, Loan and Khang, could even touch off some irrational, destructive act by them. However, another factor should be noted: It is possible that recent events (the wounding of Loan, the June 2 accident, the continuing battle for Saigon, etc.) might overwhelm one or more of these leaders to the point of withdrawing from the power arena which would of course significantly strengthen Thieu's position.

7. The key to the situation is largely in the hands of Thieu and the U.S. There appear to be only two courses of action sufficient to solve present problems. One is for Thieu to take the lead in creating real teamwork among himself, Ky, Vien, Khang, and Loan; the other is for Thieu to consolidate full power himself by replacing Vien, Khang, and Loan. Both alternatives are difficult and dangerous, but a middle course probably will not suffice. If the first alternative is followed, this would mean restoration of government by de facto military junta (rather than emergence of Thieu as the dominant leader), although this group might be broadened to include Tran van Huong. This would also mean running the GVN and RVNAF through the corps commanders, though it might be possible to eliminate the worst facets of the present corps commander system, i. e., blatant corruption and weak channels of authority. This approach could also touch off

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an open fight between the executive branch on the one hand and the legislature and political elite on the other, although with skill this might be avoided. To carry out this course of action Thieu would have to exert far more personal leadership than heretofore with the other top leaders noted above as well as share power with them, and there would have to be real agreement among them to take those actions which are absolutely essential, including significantly reducing corruption and establishing a much firmer chain of command to run the GVN and RVNAF.

8. The other course of action (i. e., consolidation of Thieu's power) would require, as noted above, replacing Generals Loan, Khang, and Cao van Vien, which would virtually eliminate Ky's power. Thieu would also have to establish an effective management system to control province chiefs, and would have to consolidate influence over the senior officers. Moreover, he would have to strengthen his influence in the National Assembly and among the political elite, taking special care to allay the fears of Northerners, Centralists, and the Buddhists. This is the course of action Thieu is presently pursuing, as evidenced by the appointment of Tran van Huong as Prime Minister, Tran thien Khiem as Interior Minister, General Minh as Saigon/Gia Dinh Governor, (a half-step), Thieu's assumption of authority to appoint and replace province chiefs, and similar executive acts.

9. The U. S. should understand that it cannot have the best of both worlds. Either we support consolidation of Thieu's power or we support a sharing of power among Thieu, Ky, several other top generals, and perhaps Tran van Huong. Given the realities of the situation, to try to support both alternatives simultaneously is unrealistic since they are basically incompatible. Whether we like it or not, and despite the tremendous stakes involved, we have not been able to persuade Ky and company to use, fully, their talents and resources to help Thieu make the Constitutional Government work, which in reality means helping Thieu consolidate full executive power. They will cooperate only if power is to be actually shared among them. The 1967 "agreement" between Thieu and Ky, regardless of what form it actually took, is in de facto effect as far as the thinking of

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Ky and the others are concerned. Thieu's timidity perhaps stems in part from his own de facto acknowledgement of the "agreement" that permitted him to run for President. Any U. S. action that ignores this "agreement" could stir up surprisingly strong reactions.

10. A final supplementary note is worth adding, concerning the corps commander system, which remains largely in effect, and corruption. The corps commander system operates as follows: In the last three to four years, each corps commander has had predominant influence in appointing and replacing all key civil and military officials within his Corps Tactical Zone (division and regimental commanders, and province and district chiefs). During this period, the system developed of corps commanders selling these positions, the arrangements almost always being made through intermediaries (wives, aides, key staff assistants, etc.). The officer being appointed (for example, a province chief), in order to obtain the job and the personal profit through corruption which goes with it, agrees to make regular payoffs to his superiors, the division and corps commanders, and sometimes also pays a lump sum to the corps commander. The key money-collecting official in the system is the province chief, who makes regular payoffs to the division and corps commanders and often to regimental and battalion commanders associated with his province. The province chief's principal sources of money are juggling of official funds and payoffs from businessmen, medium and large, for protection or favors. No businessman can operate without at least the acquiescence of the government, and government favors can help business considerably. Thus, virtually all reasonably substantial businessmen operating in a provincial capital pay a regular sum under the table to the province chief through intermediaries to stay in business, and some pay more to obtain special privileges. The same system (i. e., payoffs by businessmen to government officials) is in effect at the district level in most districts and at the village level in many villages. Village chiefs pay part of the money collected to district chiefs, as do the latter to province chiefs.

11. This system is actually more the control mechanism for most of the RVNAF and for most province and district chiefs, than the institutional channels of authority which appear on

GVN and RVNAF organizational charts. Its damaging effects in terms of weakening discipline, esprit and the overall effectiveness of the GVN and RVNAF are obvious. It has become during the last three years a system with its own momentum, entrapping most senior officers and most middle-level managers (province and district chiefs). Not only are corps and division commanders, and province and district chiefs personally involved but, equally important, a coterie of subordinates around each of these officials since all corrupt activities are carried out through intermediaries. These coterie often become both power centers themselves and self-sustaining entities which continue to operate regardless of changes in top commanders. For example, a group of key subordinates in X province becomes a collection-system for the province chief, with ties to the local business community and also to intermediaries at division and corps headquarters. Once this system is well underway, it is likely to continue even if the province chief is replaced. A new province chief, for example, who wishes to be corrupt finds the system meets his needs. On the other hand, a new province chief who wishes to clean house finds himself trapped. Key subordinates quietly oppose his efforts in every direction and seek to discredit him with his superiors. If the province chief tries to replace these subordinates, the latter are often able to preserve their positions through the support of associates in the corruption system at higher headquarters. Because the system is so pervasive, it is extremely difficult to break.

12. We made an exception of General Nguyen duc Thang, IV Corps Commander, in our study, noting that we did not believe he was part of the system of corruption. We continue to so believe.

cc: Ambassador Berger (personally)
General Westmoreland/General Abrams (personally)
Ambassador Komer (personally)
Mr. Calhoun (personally)
Mr. Lapham (personally)

SLO:EGLansdale:rm

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-18
By CB, NARA, Date 4-20-95

28

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Tuesday, June 11, 1968 -- 11:50 am

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker talks clearly and forcefully with Prime Minister Huong on the issue of unity in the GVN; and Prime Minister Huong replies with equal lucidity and strength on the question of corruption and the danger he personally faces in taking on this critical issue.

Apparently we shall be getting later in the day a report of Bunker's talk with Ky.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 29661

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-16
By 108, NARA, Date 5-24-93

Rostow

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. AFTER A CALL ON PRIMIN HUONG WITH JIM GRANT, I STAYED BEHIND FOR A CONFIDENTIAL TALK WITH HUONG ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF UNITY AT THE TOP OF THE GVN. I TOLD HIM I WISHED TO SPEAK FRANKLY AND CONFIDENTIALLY TO HIM ABOUT THIS VERY IMPORTANT PROBLEM AND SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THE NEED TO BRING VICE PRESKY MORE CLOSELY AND EFFECTIVELY INTO THE MAJOR OPERATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT. I NOTED THAT THE PRIMIN HAD HANDLED THE MATTER OF HIS RELATIONS WITH KY WITH GREAT SKILL AND FINESSE AND SAID I WAS SURE THAT HE COULD BE HELPFUL IN MAINTAINING GOOD RELATIONS AMONG THE THREE TOP LEADERS. IN THE FACE OF ENEMY PRESSURES AND THREATS THIS COOPERATIVE EFFORT WAS VITAL AS VIETNAM NEEDS ALL THE TALENTS IT CAN MUSTER. I ADDED THAT I HAD DISCUSSED THIS PROBLEM WITH PRES HIEU AND HE HAD INFORMED ME OF HIS INTENTION TO CREATE A SMALL WAR CABINET, WHICH SEEMS TO OFFER THE BEST METHOD FOR ASSURING COOPERATION AND CONSULTATION AMONG THE CHIEF GVN LEADERS. I CONCLUDED THAT AS I HAD TOLD PRIMIN LONG AGO IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN MILITARY UNITY, AS WELL AS TO HAVE CIVILIAN UNITY AND MILITARY-CIVILIAN COOPERATION.

2. HUONG SAID THAT HE HAD MENTIONED TO ME AT EARLIER MEETING HIS REALIZATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY UNITY AND THE ABSOLUTE NEED FOR MILITARY SUPPORT OF THE CIVILIAN

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 29661 111400Z

GOVERNMENT. THERE ARE MILITARY AND MILITARY, HOWEVER, HE ADDED, AND SOME OF THOSE AROUND THE VICE PRES ARE THE MOST CORRUPT IN THE NATION. HE CITED THE MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE, CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES, PORT DIRECTOR, CUSTOMS COLLECTOR, AND POLICE AND OTHER AUTHORITIES SHAKING DOWN CHINESE MERCHANTS IN CHOLON AS BEING THE MAIN SOURCES OF INCOME FOR THE HIGH RANKING OFFICERS IN THIS GROUP, ESPECIALLY GEN LOAN. HUONG MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY THAT THE COMMANDER OF THE 5TH PRECINCT POLICE HEADQUARTERS, WHO WAS KILLED ON JUNE 2, WAS ONE OF THE MOST NOTORIOUS OFFICIALS IN CHOLON. HUONG SAID HE HAD RECOMMENDED TO THIEU THAT HE DEAL VIGOROUSLY WITH THE CHANGES NEEDED TO RID THE GOVERNMENT OF THESE CORRUPT INDIVIDUALS, BUT THIEU WAS INCLINED TO TEMPORIZE AND MOVE CAUTIOUSLY. HUONG SAID HE HAD TOLD THIEU THAT HALF MEASURES WOULD NEVER DO IF CORRUPTION IS TO BE ROUTED OUT. HE SAID THAT GEN VY'S RETENTION AS DEFMIN HAD BEEN AGAINST HIS ADVICE AND HE FEARED THAT VY WOULD BE A PROBLEM.

3. HUONG SAID HE KNEW THAT HE WAS IN PERSONAL DANGER, AND HAD IN FACT RECEIVED MANY THREATS, BECAUSE HE HAD MADE CLEAR HIS INTENTION TO ELIMINATE MAJOR CORRUPTION AT ALL LEVELS. HE SAID THAT THIS PROGRAM MUST SUCCEED AND IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO CLEAN OUT THE NEST OF "VESTED INTERESTS" WHICH HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTED BY HIGH RANKING GENERALS IN PARTICULAR. HE THOUGHT THE LOWER RANKING OFFICERS AND THE SOLDIERS WERE NOT SERIOUSLY CORRUPT AND GENERALLY SUPPORTED HIM AS A LEADER. HUONG EMPHASIZED ONCE AGAIN THAT HE WAS NOT AGAINST THE MILITARY AS SUCH BUT WAS DETERMINED TO CUT OUT CORRUPTION. HE SAID THAT THE VC ALSO WERE TARGETED ON HIM BECAUSE THEY KNEW THAT HE WAS A FORMER COOLIE AND A MAN OF THE PEOPLE WHO HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE MASSES. THEY THEREFORE MUST TRY TO ELIMINATE HIM. HE WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THESE RISKS AND PERSONAL SACRIFICES BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE MUST ACCEPT THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP IN THE NATION'S GOOD AND HE SAW NO CHOICE.

4. I RETURNED THE DISCUSSION TO KY AND SOME OF HIS COLLEAGUES, NOTING THAT AN EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO USE THE TALENTS OF THE VICE PRES AND OF HIS BEST ASSOCIATES FOR THE NATIONAL GOOD. I MENTIONED GENERALS THANG AND KHANG IN PARTICULAR. HUONG WAS ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THANG AND AGREED THAT THERE WERE

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PAGE 03 SAIGON 29661 111400Z

SOME GOOD MEN AROUND KY. HE MADE NO SPECIFIC COMMENT ABOUT KHANG BUT SAID HE WAS VERY PLEASED WITH THE NEW APPOINTMENTS OF GEN MINH AS CMD COMMANDER, COL HAI AS DIRGEN OF POLICE, AND COL NHIEU AS MAYOR. HE CONSIDERED THEM ALL GOOD AND CAPABLE MEN, NOTING THAT HE HAD ALREADY WORKED WITH NHIEU IN THE CENTRAL RECOVERY COMMITTEE AND WAS WELL IMPRESSED BY HIS ABILITIES.

5. TOWARDS THE END OF OUR CONVERSATION HUONG EXPRESSED HIS FULL UNDERSTANDING OF OUR DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN AND UNIFY THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND NATION. HE SAID THAT THIS OBVIOUSLY CANNOT BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT CONTINUING US SUPPORT AND THAT HE APPRECIATED MY EXPRESSIONS OF RESPECT AND DESIRE TO WORK WITH HIM FOR THESE PURPOSES. HE ASSURED ME THAT THIS WAS HIS DESIRE AND INTENTION AS WELL.

6. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH HUONG GAVE NO SPECIFIC ASSURANCES OF WORKING MORE CLOSELY WITH KY AND LASHED OUT STRONGLY AT HIS CORRUPT ASSOCIATES, I BELIEVE THAT HE SEES THE NECESSITY FOR A UNIFIED EFFORT AT THE TOP. IT IS APPARENT THAT HE HAS BEEN URGING THIEU TO CLEAN OUT SOME OF THE FORMER CENTERS OF POWER CONNECTED WITH KY, HOWEVER, AND HE MAY WELL BE RIGHT IN WARNING THAT HE IS PLACING HIMSELF IN CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL DANGER BY DOING SO. I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE PRINCIPLES HUONG STANDS FOR COME FIRST WITH HIM AND THAT HE WILL PURSUE THIS COURSE SO LONG AS HE HAS THIEU'S SUPPORT. THIS MAY BRING HIM INTO CONTINUING CONFLICT WITH KY UNLESS THE LATTER ACCEPTS THE NECESSITY FOR SOME OF HIS CORRUPT ASSOCIATES TO BE EASED OUT OF THEIR POSITIONS OF PERSONAL POWER AND INFLUENCE. MY LATER CONVERSATION WITH KY TODAY SUGGESTS THAT HE RECOGNIZES THE NECESSITY FOR A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF READJUSTMENT IN THIS REGARD.
BUNKER

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Pres file

39

Tuesday, June 11, 1968
11:40 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith North Vietnamese chat with Karnow,
Rick Smith, Tony Lewis.

Para 6 (pp. 3-4) is worth reading.

Other key paragraphs marked.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Paris 16004)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rf, NARA, Date 6-8-92



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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NJ 93-16
By 40, NARA, Date 5-24-93

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N O D I S/HARVAN

DELTO 258

FOLLOWING ACCOUNT WAS GIVEN TO HOLBROOKE BY KARNOW AND SMITH:

SUBJECT: JOURNALISTS DINED WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

BACKGROUND:

1. ON MONDAY, JUNE 10, ~~THREE NORTH VIETNAMESE JOURNALISTS~~ INVITED STANLEY KARNOW, OF THE WASHINGTON POST, AND HEDRICK SMITH, OF THE NEW YORK TIMES, TO DINNER. THE DINNER WAS IN RETURN FOR ONE HOSTED BY KARNOW, SMITH, AND ANTHONY LEWIS, OF THE TIMES, ON JUNE 2.

2. THE HOSTS WERE LE CHANH, FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE NEWS AGENCY AND BASED IN HANOI; LE PHU HAO, BASED IN ALGIERS; AND NGO MINH, BASED IN PARIS. LE CHANH WAS CLEARLY THE SENIOR PERSON AND DID MOST OF THE TALKING. WILFRED BURCHETT WAS THERE.

DISCUSSION:

3. AT THE FIRST DINNER THE SUBJECT OF THE GVN HAD NOT COME UP. AT LAST DINNER, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SHOWED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN THE GVN AND IN VARIOUS SOUTH VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES. THEY ASKED KARNOW AND SMITH TO DESCRIBE VARIOUS SOUTH VIETNAMESE-- HUONG, TON THAT THIEN, NGUYEN CHANH THI, BIG MINH, PHAN KHAC SUW, ETC. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE CLEARLY PLEASED AND HEARTENED TO SEE THAT KY'S POWER SEEMED TO BE WANING AND THAT

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PAGE 02 PARIS 16004 111311Z

GENERAL LOAN WAS OUT. THEY ASKED WHETHER KY STILL HAD POWER THROUGH HIS CONTROL OF THE AIR FORCE, AND THEY ASKED IF KY WAS "RESIGNED" TO HIS LOSS OF POWER. SMITH NOTED THAT THEY INQUIRED ABOUT THE POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE SOUTH IN TERMS OF INDIVIDUAL PERSONALITIES. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DID NOT BETRAY, HOWEVER, ANY PERSONAL REACTION TO ANY OF THE INDIVIDUALS DISCUSSED, DESPITE THE AMERICANS' EFFORTS TO DRAW THEM OUT. KARNOW SAID THE NORTH VIETNAMESE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE GVN POSITION ON NEGOTIATIONS. IN REPLY, KARNOW SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE TREND OF THE GVN IN RECENT WEEKS WAS TOWARD SOME SORT OF NEGOTIATIONS. SMITH NOTED THE COMMENTS OF PHAN QUANG DAN ABOUT NEGOTIATING WITH THE FRONT--WITH WHICH THEY WERE FAMILIAR--AND NGO MINH WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER DAN WOULD BE ABLE TO STAY IN THE CABINET. SMITH SAID HE WAS WATCHING, TOO.

4. THIS LED KARNOW AND SMITH INTO A DISCUSSION OF THE ROLE OF THE GVN AND THE NLF IN TALKS. THEY WERE UNABLE TO GET A DIRECT ANSWER FROM LE CHANH WHEN THEY ASKED IF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE READY OR INTERESTED IN FOUR-SIDED TALKS WHICH INCLUDED THE GVN AND NLF. KARNOW AND SMITH FEEL SURE THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELIBERATELY AVOIDED REJECTING THIS IDEA FLATLY THOUGH THEIR ARGUMENTS, DURING A RATHER LENGTHY DISCUSSION, WERE GENERALLY NEGATIVE. KARNOW AND SMITH MADE CLEAR THAT WHEN THEY TALKED OF THE GVN, THEY DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THIEU AND KY. KARNOW ASKED IF THERE WOULD BE OTHER ORGANIZATIONS LIKE THE ALLIANCE. LE CHANH REPLIED THAT THIS DEPENDED ON CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT THERE MIGHT BE SUB-GROUPS OR BRANCHES. BUT HE SAID THE NLF WAS THE MAJOR ORGANIZATION.

5. KARNOW AND SMITH RETURNED TO THE QUESTION OF RESTRAINT AND RECIPROCITY IN RETURN FOR A BOMBING CESSATION. THIS QUESTION HAD BEEN AIRED EXTENSIVELY AT THEIR FIRST DINNER, DURING WHICH THE AMERICANS HAD EXPLAINED AT LENGTH THE NEED FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO HAVE CERTAIN ASSURANCES BEFORE HE TOOK THE RISKS OF A FULL BOMBING CESSATION. THE AMERICANS PRESSED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ON WHAT THE DRV RESPONSE WOULD BE TO A FULL BOMBING HALT. SMITH'S IMPRESSION AFTER THE EARLY PART OF THE DISCUSSION WAS THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE RESPONSE TO A BOMBING HALT MIGHT MERELY BE THE READINESS TO TALK ABOUT ANY SUBJECT THE U. S. WANTED TO RAISE--WHICH, SMITH FELT, WAS NOT REALLY MUCH OF A RESPONSE AT ALL. THIS IMPRESSION CAME PARTICULARLY FROM NGO MINH WHO SAID THAT AFTER THE BOMBING STOPS, THE AMERICANS COULD DRAW

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UP AN AGENDA FOR FURTHER TALKS. SMITH NOTED THAT ONE SUBJECT THE AMERICANS WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS WAS THE PRESENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN THE SOUTH. HE ASKED IF THEIR COMMENTS MEANT THIS COULD BE DISCUSSED. LE CHANH REPEATED THAT THE TWO SIDES COULD DISCUSS QUESTIONS RAISED BY BOTH.

6. HOWEVER, DURING THE LATER PART OF THE DISCUSSION, LE CHANH AND KARNOW ENGAGED IN WHAT THE AMERICANS REGARDED AS THE MOST INTERESTING EXCHANGE OF THE EVENING. IT CONCERNED THE SAME PROBLEM OF RESTRAINT, BUT SEEMED TO THE AMERICANS TO SUGGEST A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ABOUT PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MOTIVES IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT HE IS NOT RUNNING FOR OFFICE, SMITH EXPLAINED THAT HARRIMAN

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BLUNTLY AND AS A MATTER OF FACT THROUGHOUT THE DINNER. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DID NOT MAKE ANY EFFORT TO CONTRADICT THEM.

8. THE KARNOW'S SURPRISE, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SHOWED NO INTEREST IN THE U.S. DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE. KARNOW HAD ASSUMED THEY WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS U.S. POLITICS, THAT SINCE PART OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE STRATEGY INVOLVED THE U.S. ELECTIONS, THEY WOULD BE INTERESTED IN A POLITICAL DISCUSSION. KARNOW AND SMITH DID SAY THAT THEY ASSUMED THE NOMINEES WOULD BE HUMPHREY AND NIXON. BUT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DID NOT FOLLOW THIS UP.

9. JUST AS IN THE FIRST MEETING, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE RETURNED TO THEIR DOMINANT QUESTION: "DO THE AMERICANS REALLY WANT TO WITHDRAW FROM VIET-NAM?" SMITH AND KARNOW REPEATED THE STATEMENTS THEY HAD MADE JUNE 2, THAT IN THE LONG RUN THE U.S.'S DESIRE WAS TO WITHDRAW FROM VIET-NAM. KARNOW PURSUED THE QUESTION BY ASKING WHETHER THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MEANT AN IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL. IN REPLY, LE CHANH ASKED KANOW HOW LONG THE U.S. WOULD NEED TO WITHDRAW. KARNOW WAS VAGUE, SAYING A LONG TIME---PERHAPS A YEAR OR TWO. LE CHANH'S IMMEDIATE REJOINDER WAS TO CITE ~~THE "SIX MONTHS"~~ PROVISION OF THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE.

10. KARNOW AND SMITH BOTH FELT THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE RECOGNIZED THAT JOURNALISTS DON'T REPRESENT THE US GOVERNMENT. THE AMERICANS ALSO FELT THAT LE CHANH WAS SOMETHING MORE THAN A JOURNALIST, THAT HE WAS A FAIRLY IMPORTANT PERSON. KARNOW SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT BE MORE IMPORTANT THAN GUYEN THANH LE. HE HAD BEEN AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON LAOS.

11. KARNOW AND SMITH WERE UNABLE TO TELL HOW CLOSE BURCHETT IS TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. TWICE DURING THE EVENING THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CORRECTED BURCHETT. (THIS HAD ALSO HAPPENED ONCE AT THE FIRST MEETING.) THE FIRST CORRECTION CAME WHEN BURCHETT SAID THE ALLIANCE WAS LARGER THAN THE NLF. LE CHANH SAID THIS WAS NOT TRUE, THAT HOW COULD A LITTLE BROTHER BE LARGER THAN BIG BROTHER? THE SECOND CORRECTION CAME DURING THE DISCUSSION ON WHAT WOULD FOLLOW A BOMBING CESSATION. BURCHETT, REPEATING THE STANDARD LINE, SAID ANY QUESTION COULD BE "RAISED" (SOULEVER). LE CHANH INTERJECTED, OVERRIDING BURCHETT, TO SAY THAT ANY QUESTION COULD BE "DISCUSSED" (DISCOUTER).

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N O D I S/HARVAN

DELTO 258

FOLLOWING ACCOUNT WAS GIVEN TO HOLBROOKE BY KARNOW AND SMITH:

THE PRESIDENT IS UNDER CERTAIN PRESSURES AND IMPULSES OF HIS OWN, HIS PLACE IN HISTORY, HIS DESIRE TO BE SURE THE U.S. IS NOT SHORT-CHANGED--AND WHATEVER THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THINK OF THESE MOTIVES, THEY ARE REAL AND MUST BE RECKONED WITH. THE PRESIDENT CANNOT "GIVE FIVE IN RETURN FOR THREE ON THE BOMBING," SMITH SAID. AT THIS POINT, KARNOW SAID THAT IF HE WERE PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND WANTED TO STOP THE BOMBING, HE WOULD HAVE TO ASK HIMSELF HOW COULD HE GET "FIVE FOR FIVE"? HE CHANH LEANED ACROSS THE TABLE AND SAID, "WHAT DOES JOHNSON WANT IN RETURN?" KARNOW SAID THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SHOULD STOP THEIR PRESSURE ON DONG HA, KONTUM, SAIGON, AND KHE SANH. AT THIS POINT, TO THE AMERICANS' SURPRISE, LE CHANH SAID, "BUT THAT IS ASKING SEVEN IN RETURN FOR FIVE." ALTHOUGH LE CHANH HAD THUS REJECTED KARNOW'S SPECIFIC EXAMPLE, KARNOW AND SMITH WERE IMPRESSED THAT LE CHANH HAD TREATED THIS QUESTION AS SOMETHING SUBJECT TO BARGAINING. SMITH MADE THE POINT THAT WHILE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DID NOT WANT TO GET INTO POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS WHILE THE BOMBING CONTINUED, BY THE SAME TOKEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON DID NOT WANT TO GET INTO THE SUBSTANTIVE TALKS WITH THE BOMBING HALTED AND WITH THE POSITIONS ALONG THE DMZ UNDER THE THREAT OF MAJOR ATTACK. BURCHETT SAID THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE UNDERSTAND THIS. "THEY GET THIS POINT," BURCHETT SAID. AND THE VIETNAMESE AROUND THE TABLE SEEMED TO GIVE THEIR SILENT ASSENT.

7. THE AMERICANS TALKED ABOUT NVA PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH

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NGO MINH ASSENTED AND EXPLAINED THAT THE TWO SIDES COULD
ARRANGE AN AGENDA. BURCHETT THEN SAID THAT THIS WAS
NEW.

HARRIMAN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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DELTO 258

N O D I S/HARVAN

12. THE AMERICANS RAISED THE QUESTION OF SECRET TALKS. LE CHANH SAID THAT IF THERE WAS GOODWILL ON BOTH SIDES THEN EVERYTHING COULD BE SOLVED THROUGH OPEN TALKS. KARNOW AND SMITH POINTED OUT THE NECESSITY FOR SOME SORT OF SECRET TALKS--"LET'S BE REALISTIC," SAID KARNOW.--LE CHANH JUST LISTENED TO HIS COMMENTS.

12. THE AMERICANS BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE SOUTH. LE CHANH STUCK TO THE STANDARD FORMULA, DESCRIBING THE NLF AS THE "AUTHENTIC" REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE. SMITH AND KARNOW SAID THAT THE AMERICANS FELT THAT THE GVN WAS THE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF AT LEAST A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE SOUTH-VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, AND THAT THEREFORE IT HAD TO BE CONSIDERED AS A FORCE IN ANY FUTURE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. DURING A LONG ARGUMENT, SMITH SUGGESTED THAT HOLDING ELECTIONS WAS PERHAPS THE BEST WAY TO RESOLVE THIS DISPUTE OVER THE PROPER REPRESENTATION OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. BURCHETT SAID THAT THERE COULD BE NO FAIR ELECTIONS WHILE 530,000 AMERICAN TROOPS REMAINED IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SEEMED TO CONCEDE THAT AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE FORMED TO HANDLE THE ELECTIONS. KARNOW SUGGESTED THAT SUCH A GOVERNMENT COULD, IN EFFECT, BE LIKE A "JURY" SELECTED BY "LAWYERS" FROM EACH SIDE, THE LAWYERS HAVING A SORT OF VETO ON MEMBERSHIP IN THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. THIS WAS MORE OR LESS THE EVIAN SOLUTION TO THE ALGERIAN WAR. THE NORTH-VIETNAMESE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT WOULD, IN EFFECT, BE A COALITION.

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14. KARNOW AND SMITH HAVE PASSED THIS INFORMATION ON TO US
IN COMPLETE CONFIDENCE. THEY DO NOT INTEND TO WRITE ARTICLES ABOUT
THE MEETING. THEY HAD ESTABLISHED A CHANNEL WITH THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE JOURNALISTS WHICH THEY HOPE WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION.
HARRIMAN

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INFORMATION
(before lunch)

Pres Del

4/0

Tuesday, June 11, 1968
11:35 a. m.

SECRET-NODIS

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Bunker solemnly analyzes what the Communists are doing to Saigon and its implications as he sees them. I believe you will wish to read this fully before lunch.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET-NODIS attachment (Saigon 29565)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 6-8-92

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-16
By WJ, NARA, Date 5-24-93

Copy of SAIGON 29565 June 10, 1968
Ref: State 179417

Subject: Communist Activities in South Vietnam since the Opening of Paris Talks

1. Saigon-Cholon have been subjected since May 4 to repeated attacks on the fringes, along with continuous forays by smaller enemy units into the city's outskirts, and nightly random firing of an increasing intensity of rockets and mortars, including the heavy and deadly 122mm rocket.
2. Reference telegram provides an excellent description of these most recent Communist attacks, which began just before the Paris talks opened. That telegram should be read as an introduction to this message, which probes somewhat more deeply into the significance of the latest offensive, and assays what impact it has had on the people of this city, and what it portends.
3. POW's and ralliers' interrogations, intelligence reports and captured documents relating to Saigon and Gia Dinh, which I see in detail every day, make clear that the enemy's intention is to keep up the attack for several months, and there are some reports of a major new assault on Saigon contemplated in July or August or later.
4. I start with some generalizations about the three forms of Communist tactics now in use against Saigon:
 - A. The succession of attacks by company and battalion-sized units on the outskirts of the city-- northeast, west, and south -- seem to be directed at blowing out or damaging bridges and key installations such as military and police headquarters and barracks, naval yards, warehouses, naval vessels, prisoner interrogation centers, etc. Apart from the May 4-15 period, these attacks have not done much damage in these lightly populated areas. But there is some damage almost every day, and the total after another three or four months could be substantial. As I see it, the main Communist purposes of these attacks seem to be to show their omnipresence around the capital; to prove to Washington, to Paris and the world that they can strike anywhere and at will; to wear down the population; and to prepare the way for the next general attack. The Communists are paying a fearful price in casualties of those involved, but the stakes are high; but it is a price our intelligence indicates they can continue to pay for several months at least. They hope to finish off the war this year or next.
 - B. Infiltration teams of up to 30 or so are entering Cholon and Saigon, often in civilian clothes or in uniforms of the ARVN, Civilian Defense Corps and student cadres;
 - I. The larger sized teams -- up to 30 or so -- are occupying and holding houses or buildings in densely populated areas, after engaging in

assassination, setting fires, and attacking selected targets such as power facilities, bridges, and police sub-stations. On their list is the U. S. Embassy, the Palace, South Vietnamese and American radio and military installations, etc. The main objectives of these teams seem to be to invite counter-attack in order to achieve the largest amount of destruction: to attack politically and psychologically significant targets that will show how vulnerable Saigon proper is to infiltration; to help unnerve the population; to contribute to the refugee and housing problems; and to soften the city for the grand offensive. These teams are suicide teams, for they are nearly all killed, and only a few are apprehended or defect.

II. Smaller-sized units -- from two to five -- are moving further into the city, engaged in assassination or sabotage, terror or proselyting missions, some of these teams are being instructed to lay low in their safe-houses until ordered into action. They and the long-term "sleepers" in the city, who, we must assume, have penetrated the civil service, police, student and other bodies, will be called into action when the next great offensive and call for uprising are mounted.

III. We have no idea how many small teams have filtered in, or the number of "sleepers." The number of which we have knowledge from POW interrogations and documents is very small. Gen. Abrams has aptly stated that "what we know is probably only the top of the iceberg, we have no idea of how big the iceberg is." I agree, but am inclined to think it is not very large.

C. The third form of tactics is the nightly firing of rockets more or less at random -- clearly a terror weapon. From 10 to 20 rounds of the heaviest caliber are fired almost every night, plus some of low caliber mortars. There is no reason to suppose that these numbers cannot be doubled, tripled, or quadrupled. While the mortality and physical damage so far has not been large, it is constant; not a night passes without some fatalities and some destruction.

D. Clearly the main purpose of the mortar attacks is to contribute to the unnerving of the population, and to impress those abroad that Saigon is under siege. Everyone in the city can hear these large explosions, and as the number of heavy caliber rounds fired rises, we must expect an increase in anxiety and fear. (It may be of interest to know what even the ten rounds of June 7 aimed at the center of town did in our own circle. A Vietnamese hospital, we know well, was hit. The windows of Admiral Veth's house were blown out and an aide slightly injured. Gen. Westmoreland's house and those occupied by Arch Calhoun, Chuck Cooper, and John Robinson and several of our apartment houses narrowly escaped direct hits. The wife of the Vietnamese guard at

Ambassador Berger's house was killed, and the guard severely injured. They live a few blocks away from his residence. One rocket fell in the cemetery across the street from my residence.)

5. Reactions in Saigon. So far, Saigon has taken the recent series of attacks and mortar and rocket raids fairly well, but at the end of the fifth week there are real signs of anxiety and fear, and rumblings of resentment. At the moment the resentment is being directed against the Communists, but it will not be long before it begins to be directed as well against the government and against us.

6. Thieu, anticipating the criticism and the needs of the hour, has moved to strengthen the government by bringing in Huong and a new cabinet. He is now moving swiftly to strengthen the leadership of Saigon-Gia Dinh district: a new governor and commander of the capital military district; a new director of the National Police in place of Loan; a new and, I believe, more effective and honest Mayor of Saigon; a new Port Director in place of the corrupt Chu who was killed. I expect soon to hear of a new Customs Director, another focal point of corruption. His new appointments in Saigon and Gia Dinh are impressive for their records of ability and honesty. These actions will help allay criticism of him and even win popular approval, but only for a time.

7. I turn next to the resentment which will soon be directed against us. There is already a move under way in the legislature calling on the U. S. to resume full bombing of the North. This has been discouraged by the government, and the project has been temporarily shelved. It will only be for a short time. As the crescendo of attacks against Saigon by land and air increases, I venture to say that there will be a mounting demand in the legislature and in the Executive Branch, in the press, and in many organizations calling on us to resume full bombing, this time to include Hanoi as retaliation.

8. Our failure to take retaliatory action as the tide of attack on Saigon swells and culminates in a new general offensive on the city, some weeks or months hence, will not be understood here by the Vietnamese. If in the interim we agree to a total cessation of all bombing of the North without visible and evident reciprocal steps by Hanoi, including a cessation of attacks on Saigon, and the general offensive on Saigon takes place, then we shall be in the most serious trouble here with the Vietnamese, nor do I think that our own fighting forces will understand it. I cannot conceive that we could agree to a total cessation in the North in the face of what is going on here and in I Corps.

9. I do not want to give the impression that the government and the Vietnamese people are not standing up well under these pressures and that they are not determined to resist them. Neither do I want to give the impression that Saigon is under siege, that people are panicky, or that the government is shaky or on the verge of collapse. Knowing the propensity of our press to go

to extremes in their reporting, I fear that they may again be overdrawing the picture here as they did at the time of the Tet offensive. The impact of that offensive was much greater in the U. S. and abroad than it was in Vietnam and I fear that this may be occurring again. But I do want to emphasize as strongly as I can my feeling that if we permit the enemy to keep on taking advantage of our de-escalation, the effects which I have described are bound to occur.

10. I have had no reply to my messages of May 10 and May 13 (Saigon 26928 and 27121) recommending amendment of Harriman's instructions regarding a total cessation of the bombing. I may be wrong, but this is the way it looks from here. It would be helpful to know how it looks from Washington and Paris.

BUNKER

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DRAFTED BY EA/VN CCFLOWERREE
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EA/VN MR BURKE
EA/P MR ARMSTRONG
P/VN MR O'BRIEN
USIA MR SHEPPARD
INR/REA MR SARRIS
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TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
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SUBJECT: COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM SINCE THE
OPENING OF PARIS TALKS

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1. IT HAS BECOME CLEAR THAT SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS IN PARIS THE COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN MAKING AN ACROSS-THE-BOARD EFFORT TO PUT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON SOUTH VIET-NAM. THEIR ACTIVITIES HAVE ENCOMPASSED MILITARY ACTIONS, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL EFFORTS, AND ATTEMPTS TO DISRUPT THE ECONOMY. THE MOST VISIBLE OF THESE, OF COURSE, HAS BEEN THE MILITARY ACTIVITY WHICH KICKED OFF WITH A COUNTRYWIDE SERIES OF ATTACKS ON MAY 5, FIVE DAYS BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF THE PARIS TALKS. HOWEVER, THE ENEMY APPEARS TO HAVE DEVOTED AN EQUAL EFFORT TO THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SPHERE AND THESE EFFORTS ARE CONTINUING.

2. MILITARY FOLLOWING THE TET OFFENSIVE, MANY ENEMY MAIN FORCE UNITS WITHDREW FROM THEIR POSITIONS NEAR URBAN AREAS IN ORDER TO REPLACE THEIR LOSSES IN MEN AND MATERIAL. (INDICATIONS ARE THAT INFILTRATION HAS BEEN CONTINUING AT AN EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH RATE.) THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAD PLANNED A SECOND ROUND OF ATTACKS FOR SOME TIME IN THE SPRING OR EARLY SUMMER, BUT THE INITIATION OF TALKS IN PARIS MAY HAVE RESULTED IN AN ADVANCEMENT OF THEIR SCHEDULE. IN ANY EVENT, A SERIES OF ATTACKS BY FIRE AGAINST CITIES AND TOWNS ERUPTED ON THE NIGHT OF MAY 4-5 BUT ONLY AGAINST SAIGON WAS THERE A DIRECT FOLLOW-UP. ALTHOUGH BY THE MORNING OF MAY 8 SOME 126 LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY HAD BEEN HIT BY ROCKETS OR MORTARS, IT WAS A RELATIVELY TOKEN EFFORT OUTSIDE OF SAIGON CAUSING LITTLE DAMAGE AND FEW FRIENDLY CASUALTIES. THE ENEMY HIMSELF LOST OVER 7000 KILLED IN ACTION IN THE FIRST FIVE DAYS; ALMOST 50 PERCENT OF THOSE WERE IN THE GREATER SAIGON AREA.

3. BUT AS THE MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS SUBSIDED, HEAVY FIGHTING CONTINUED IN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE JUST SOUTH OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND IN THE VICINITY OF HUE WHERE NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES IN REGIMENTAL STRENGTH HAVE BEEN OPERATING. ANOTHER AREA OF HEAVY COMMUNIST PRESSURE HAS BEEN IN THE HIGHLANDS AREA, ESPECIALLY IN THE WESTERN PORTIONS OF KONTUM PROVINCE (NEAR WHERE THE BOUNDARIES OF SOUTH VIET-NAM, CAMBODIA AND LAOS MEET) AND IN THE MOUNTAINOUS REGION SOUTHWEST OF DANANG, WHERE TWO SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS WERE OVERRUN IN MID-MAY. IN THE REMAINDER

S THE COUNTRY ENEMY ACTION HAS BEEN AT A NORMAL LEVEL. IN THE DELTA THE ENEMY HAS BEEN CONCENTRATING ON STAND-OFF ATTACKS BY FIRE AND

ON INTERDICTING LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

4. ENEMY PRESSURE ON SAIGON. THE CURRENT ATTACKS ON SAIGON BY FIRE AND BY SMALL UNIT PROBING APPEAR TO BE PART OF A VIET CONG PLAN TO KEEP PRESSURE ON THE CITY IN ORDER TO DISCREDIT THE GOVERNMENT AT THE SEAT OF ITS POWER AND, BY PRECIPITATING WIDESPREAD DESTRUCTION AND DISLOCATION, TO OVER-BURDEN ITS ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES AND THUS DEMORALIZE THE PUBLIC.

5. SMALL INFILTRATION TEAMS HAVE BEEN BARRICADING THEMSELVES IN BUILDINGS AND ARE DELIBERATELY TRYING TO DRAW FRIENDLY FIRE ON THEMSELVES IN THE EXPECTATION THAT THE RESULTING DESTRUCTION WILL TURN THE POPULATION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT SIDE. INDEED A RECENT VIET CONG DEFECTOR, COL. DUNG, STATED THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAVE A DELIBERATE POLICY OF ATTEMPTING TO DISRUPT NORMAL CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES AND TO DESTROY CIVILIAN PROPERTY. THESE TACTICS ARE SUPPLEMENTED BY CONTINUING MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS. REINFORCEMENTS ARE AVAILABLE FROM ABOUT 3000 MAIN AND LOCAL FORCE TROOPS COMMITTED TO THE CAPITAL AREA PLUS ABOUT 6000 TROOPS (LARGELY THE VC 9TH DIVISION) IN ADJOINING AREAS.

6. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE ENEMY IS CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING THE ATTACKS AT THEIR PRESENT MAGNITUDE AND THAT HE IS ACHIEVING SOME SUCCESS TOWARD HIS LIMITED GOALS. AFTER THE FIRST 26 DAYS OF THESE ATTACKS WHICH BEGAN ON MAY 5, NEW EVACUEES FROM THE SAIGON DISTRICTS MOST AFFECTED REACHED 107,000. AS OF THE END OF MAY APPROXIMATELY 11,000 HOUSES HAD BEEN DESTROYED. TOTAL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES FROM ALL MILITARY ACTION IN SAIGON DURING THE PAST 30 DAYS EXCEEDS 350 KILLED AND 3000 WOUNDED.

7. ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE COMMUNIST ROCKET AND MORTAR FIRE HAS BEEN DIRECTED AT POLICE STATIONS AND POWER PLANTS, MOST OF IT HAS BEEN OF AN INDISCRIMINATE NATURE, APPARENTLY INTENDED PRIMARILY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT. ONE OF THE MOST BLATANT EXAMPLE WAS THE ATTACK OF MAY 19, OSTENSIBLY IN HONOR OF HO CHI MINH'S BIRTHDAY, IN WHICH 22 ROUNDS OF "UNOBSERVED" ROCKET AND MORTAR FIRE LANDED IN A RANDOM PATTERN IN THE CITY. DESTROYING APPROXIMATELY 150 HOMES AND DAMAGING MANY MORE STRUCTURES, INCLUDING THE VIETNAMESE SENATE BUILDING. THREE POLICEMEN AND THREE CIVILIANS WERE KILLED, WHILE 32 CIVILIANS WERE WOUNDED. IN ALL, THE COMMUNISTS FIRED MORTARS AND ROCKETS INTO SAIGON ON

15 DAYS BETWEEN MAY 5 AND MAY 30. A TOTAL OF 52 CIVILIANS WERE KILLED BY THESE ATTACKS DURING THIS PERIOD, INCLUDING 13 CHILDREN. MORE THAN 270 PERSONS WERE INJURED. A LARGE RESIDENTIAL AREA HAS BEEN BURNED AND MANY OTHER HOUSES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED OR DAMAGED AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THIS FIRE. MOST RECENTLY, 16 ROCKETS IMPACTED IN THE CITY IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF JUNE 7 KILLING 25 CIVILIANS AND WOUNDING 46. IT WAS THE FOURTH STRAIGHT NIGHT IN WHICH SUCH ATTACKS HAD OCCURRED.

8. PSYCHOLOGICAL. IN ADDITION TO THE INDISCRIMINATE FIRING INTO HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS, THE VIET CONG CONTINUED THEIR NORMAL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES SUCH AS ASSASSINATIONS, ABDUCTIONS AND GRENADE ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS. THE RATE OF ASSASSINATIONS ROSE DRAMATICALLY IN MAY, ALMOST DOUBLING THE WEEKLY AVERAGE OF APRIL. THE PRELIMINARY TOTALS FOR MAY ARE AS FOLLOWS: ASSASSINATIONS - 623; ABDUCTIONS - 942.

9. COMMUNIST PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORTS HAVE INCLUDED A DRUMFIRE OF PROPAGANDA DESIGNED TO CONVINCE THE POPULATION THAT COMMUNIST MILITARY STRENGTH IS ACHIEVING SIGNIFICANT VICTORIES AND THAT THE ALLIES HAVE LOST THE ABILITY TO DEFEND URBAN "NERVE CENTERS." ANOTHER PROMINENT FEATURE OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA HAS BEEN A CALL FOR MEMBERS OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES TO JOIN THE RANKS OF THE INSURGENTS AND FOR THE POPULATION TO RISE UP AGAINST THE PUPPET REGIME. THESE APPEALS, HOWEVER, APPEAR TO HAVE HAD NO MORE EFFECT THAN SIMILAR CALLS DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE.

10 POLITICAL. ON THE POLITICAL SCENE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY HAS BEEN ATTENTION GIVEN BY COMMUNISTS TO THE "VIET-NAM ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC AND PEACE FORCES," WHOSE EXISTENCE WAS FIRST MADE KNOWN BY THE VIET CONG LIBERATION RAID APRIL 22. THE NEW NATIONAL ALLIANCE WAS TO INCORPORATE LOCAL "ALLIANCE" GROUPS ALLEGEDLY FORMED IN EARLY DAYS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE BUT WHICH HAD BECOME DORMANT THEREAFTER. HOWEVER, WITH THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL ALLIANCE ORGANIZATION (SEE STATE CIRCULAR 162718) COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA BEGAN TO BREATHE NEW LIFE INTO NOTION OF A "THIRD FORCE" ON POLITICAL SCENE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.

11. THUS FAR COMMUNIST STRATEGY WITH RESPECT TO THE ALLIANCE APPEARS TO BE TO (A) ATTEMPT TO ATTRACT RESPECTABLE FIGURES FROM THE PROFESSIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY, (B) TO BUILD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMAGE OF THE ALLIANCE AS A GENUINE NON-COMMUNIST GROUPING ALTHOUGH IN GENERAL SYMPATHY WITH AIMS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT AND (C) TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH THE ALLIANCE MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE AS A PARTICIPANT IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT REPRESENTING THE COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL ELEMENTS. ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNISTS HAVE NOT HAD MUCH SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING ANY OF THESE OBJECTIVES, THEY ARE CONTINUING TO GIVE PROPAGANDA PLAY TO THE ALLIANCE, PERHAPS IN THE HOPE THAT AS THE WAR WEARS ON AND THERE ARE FEW SIGNS OF A SETTLEMENT ON HORIZON, MORE RECRUITS CAN BE GARNERED FROM NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL CIRCLES. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN REPORTS THAT "LIBERATION COMMITTEES," AFFILIATED WITH THE ALLIANCE, ARE BEING ORGANIZED IN THE COUNTRYSIDE IN ORDER TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO CLAIM THAT THE ALLIANCE IS A NATIONAL POLITICAL FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH.

12. COMMUNIST PRESSURE ON THE ECONOMY. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE ATTEMPTED WITH SOME SUCCESS TO PROLONG THE ECONOMIC DISLOCATION WHICH RESULTED FROM THE TET OFFENSIVE. ROADS AND CANALS, ESPECIALLY IN THE DELTA, WERE SYSTEMATICALLY INTERDICTED IN THE POST-TET PERIOD AND IT WAS SOME WEEKS BEFORE TRAFFIC RETURNED TO ANYWHERE NEAR NORMAL LEVELS. THE EFFECT OF THESE ENEMY ACTIONS HAS BEEN A GENERAL STAGNATION OF THE ECONOMY THROUGH-OUT THE COUNTRY. HOWEVER, EXCEPT FOR PERIODS WHEN FIGHTING IN THE OUT-SKIRTS OF SAIGON HAS BEEN INTENSE, MOST VITAL FOODSTUFFS AND OTHER SUPPLIES HAVE MANAGED TO REACH THE CITY. RETAIL PRICES IN SAIGON HAVE RISEN 10 PERCENT ABOVE THE LEVEL OF MAY 1. THE PRICE OF GOLD HAS CONTINUED TO RISE, ALTHOUGH THE VALUE OF THE PIASTER HAS REMAINED RELATIVELY STEADY.

13. THE OUTLOOK. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE HEAVY MILITARY PRESSURE ON SAIGON IS PART OF A COORDINATED CAMPAIGN TO CREATE MAXIMUM STRESS WITHIN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND POPULATION DURING THE PARIS TALKS. THERE ARE NO SIGNS THAT THE COMMUNISTS INTEND TO LET UP THE PRESSURE ON ANY FRONT--MILITARY, POLITICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL OR ECONOMIC. THUS FAR THE GVN AND THE POPULATION HAVE RESPONDED WELL. IN CONTRAST TO THE TET OFFENSIVE, THE PUBLIC HAS BEEN PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE ON THE VIET CONG TO THE GVN POLICE. US OBSERVERS REPORT THAT SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS ARE FIGHTING EVEN BETTER THAN THEY DID AT TET AND THE ENEMY IS TAKING TREMENDOUS PUNISHMENT. (DURING THE PERIOD MAY 5 THROUGH MAY 15 ENEMY CASUALTIES COUNTRYWIDE AMOUNTED TO 11,633, OF WHICH MORE THAN HALF WERE IN SAIGON AND ITS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENVIRONS OR ITS APPROACHES; OVER 100,000 ENEMY HAVE BEEN REPORTED KILLED IN ACTION SINCE JANUARY 1.)

14. ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNISTS HAVE TRIED TO PORTRAY THE RECENT APPOINTMENT OF A NEW CABINET AS A SIGN OF GVN DETERIORATION OR EVEN DESPERATION, JUST THE OPPOSITE SEEMS TO BE THE CASE. ON BALANCE, THE SHIFT SEEMS TO HAVE STRENGTHENED RATHER THAN WEAKENED THE GVN BY BROADENING ITS BASE AND BRINGING MORE RESPECTABLE POLITICAL FIGURES TO IT. FURTHERMORE, THE FACT THAT THE TRANSITION WAS MADE SMOOTHLY--IN CONTRAST TO CRISES SUCH CHANGES HAVE OCCASIONED PREVIOUSLY--IS A HOPEFUL SIGN THAT THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM IS BRINGING A MEASURE OF STABILITY TO VIETNAMESE POLITICS.

15. IN REGARD TO SAIGON, INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND POW INTERROGATIONS, AS WELL AS MOST ANALYSES OF ENEMY INTENTIONS, AGREE THAT THE COMMUNISTS INTEND TO KEEP INTERMITTENT PRESSURE ON THE CITY FOR SOME TIME, PERHAPS FOR AS LONG AS THREE MONTHS.

16. POSTS MAY DRAW ON THE ABOVE AS APPROPRIATE IN DISCUSSING THE CURRENT SITUATION WITH LOCAL CONTACTS. CARE SHOULD OF COURSE BE EXERCISED IN MANNER IN WHICH YOU RELATE ABOVE INFORMATION TO THE PARIS TALKS. AS APPROPRIATE TO THE LOCAL SITUATION, YOU MAY NOTE THAT THESE DEVELOPMENTS GIVE ADDED SIGNIFICANCE TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REFUSAL TO AGREE TO MATCH THE MARCH 31 LIMITATION OF BOMBING WITH SOME RESTRAINT BY THEM. YOU SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THESE DEVELOPMENTS IN SVN WILL LEAD TO EARLY US DECISION TO BREAK OFF TALKS OR RESUME FULL BOMBING. MOREOVER, IT MIGHT NOT BE APPROPRIATE TO HIGHLIGHT COMMUNIST PRESSURE ON SOUTH VIET-NAM IN COUNTRIES (PARTICULARLY SOME TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES) WHERE PRIMARY CONCERN SEEMS TO BE THAT US IS ALREADY ADOPTING TOO SOFT A POLICY. GP-4. RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

21

Tuesday, June 11, 1968
10:15 a. m.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that it is likely that, if we are to preserve the talks in Paris, we shall have to take the risk of breaking them up -- and so demonstrating to Hanoi.

The judgment is premature, since we do not know how the Russians will treat our reply; and that comes first.

But here is my reasoning:

1. Hanoi, on balance, regards our move of March 31st as taken from weakness -- domestic political weakness.

2. They probably calculate that, above all, we don't want to rock the boat in Paris. Our backing down to the 19th parallel has helped convince them.

3. Therefore, they can safely:

-- take the fullest possible advantage of what we regard as an act of de-escalation by increasing rather than reducing their effort and attacking Saigon while Hanoi is a sanctuary;

-- take their own sweet time in the Paris negotiations.

4. In short, I believe they are laughing at us and playing us for suckers on the diplomatic-military front, in the short run.

5. On the other hand, I am pretty sure that they regard their longer run, basic position as weak and requiring a negotiated settlement with, say, the next year:

-- the evidence is now that they were about to take an initiative around March 31;

-- as you know, I do not believe their intense military activity, with abnormally high casualties and North Vietnamese infiltration, is a stable military position;

-- if Thieu-Hueng keep coming forward, they may conclude time is not their friend in South Vietnamese politics;

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-29-01

June 11, 1968

-- the Russians and Eastern Europeans may not be willing to keep them afloat at the cost of a billion dollars a year for long; and the Russians may even have exacted a commitment from them to wind up in 1968 in return for the billion dollar grubstake for the winter-spring offensive.

6. If this is so, Bus Wheeler may be right: we couldn't get them out of Paris with a team of mules.

7. What follows from these tentative judgments:

-- Sect. Rusk should see Kuznetsov in New York, after we despatch the letter to Kossygin, and talk more soberly to him than the tone of your letter to Kossygin. Specifically: we can't live, in any case, with this level of infiltration; we can't live with Saigon a target and Hanoi a sanctuary; we can't live with this pretracted telephone back strategy in Paris;

-- We should have some Senators speak to this theme: McGee, Brooks, Jackson, others;

-- If Kossygin's reply is not satisfactory we should continue the dialogue and then:

-- move back to the 20th parallel;

-- have Averell tell the North Vietnamese that we shall have to match every rocket on Saigon with, at least, a bomb on Hanoi.

8. This may move the negotiations off dead center. It will, if para. 5 above is correct. If para 5. is wrong, they will withdraw from Paris.

9. That would be anmost serious situation; but what would it mean? It would mean they are not prepared for an honorable negotiation nor for an honorable settlement. If so, we'd better face it.

10. I understand -- and with sympathy -- Clark Clifford's view that this could be a mortal blow to the Vice President's political position. But where Clark is wrong is in believing that we -- or the Vice President -- can continue to live with the undignified and humiliating situation where:

June 11, 1968

- they respond to March 31 with escalation, not de-escalation;
- they refuse to negotiate seriously in Paris;
- they shell Saigon and weaken the GVN, while Hanoi goes scot-free.

It is a long time from June to August and August to November.

11. If they do not respond to our communications and actions, and if they walk out of Paris because we exact reprisals on Hanoi for the shelling of Saigon, I do not believe we can or should return to a simple status quo ante. We should do more against both Hanoi and Haiphong.

12. I set these thoughts down reluctantly. I hope that Keesygin's reply will make them irrelevant. But, for what they may be worth, I thought you should have them.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

42

Tuesday, June 11, 1968 -- 10:05 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Le Duc Tho rejects
flatly reciprocity.

As rigid a statement as one
could produce.

Profile

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

42a
Routon

LE DUC THO INTERVIEW.

PARIS VNA IN VIETNAMESE AND ENGLISH TO VNA HANOI 0518 GMT 11 JUN 68 B

(TEXT) PARIS--ON 10 JUNE COMRADE LE DUC THO, SPECIAL ADVISER TO MINISTER XUAN THUY AT THE OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS, ANSWERED A QUESTION BY U.S. CBS TV CORRESPONDENT COLLINGWOOD. THE FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE QUESTION AND ANSWER:

QUESTION: MR SPECIAL ADVISER TO MINISTER XUAN THUY, YOU HAVE JUST COME FROM HANOI. PLEASE LET ME KNOW YOUR OPINION OF DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE PAST MONTH IN THE OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE DRV AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES AND OF PROSPECTS OF THESE CONVERSATIONS

(EDITOR'S NOTE: PRECEDING IN VIETNAMESE ONLY. LE DUC THO'S ANSWER IS IN BOTH VIETNAMESE AND ENGLISH. BOTH VERSIONS ARE IDENTICAL EXCEPT AS NOTED.)

ANSWER: PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD FOLLOW WITH GREAT ATTENTION THE OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DRV GOVERNMENT AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. BUT TO OUR REGRET, NEARLY 1 MONTH HAS ELAPSED AND THE CONVERSATIONS HAVE NOT MADE ANY PROGRESS. THE U.S. SIDE MUST BEAR FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS SITUATION. WE HAVE COME HERE ON THE BASIS OF THE 3 APRIL AND 3 MAY STATEMENTS OF THE DRV GOVERNMENT AND DRV FOREIGN MINISTER RESPECTIVELY TO DETERMINE WITH THE U.S. SIDE THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF ITS BOMBING RAIDS AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF THE DRV, AND THEREAFTER TO DISCUSS ALL OTHER QUESTIONS OF INTEREST TO BOTH PARTIES.

TO DATE THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS PERSISTED IN DEMANDING RECIPROCITY. WE CANNOT ACCEPT THIS ABSURDITY. PEOPLE OF THE WORLD, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE INCLUDED, KNOW THAT OUR COUNTRY IS SOME 10,000 MILES FROM THE UNITED STATES AND THAT WE HAVE CAUSED NO HARM WHATSOEVER TO THE UNITED STATES. YET THE UNITED STATES HAS BROUGHT OVER HALF A MILLION U.S. TROOPS AND MORE THAN 50,000 SATELLITE TROOPS TO CARRY OUT AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SOUTHERN PART OF OUR COUNTRY. IT HAS SENT PLANES AND WARSHIPS TO ATTACK THE NORTHERN PART OF OUR COUNTRY. (PRECEDING SENTENCE IN ENGLISH ONLY--ED) THESE ACTS ARE UNJUST AND IMMORAL. ALL MEN OF CONSCIENCE IN THE WORLD AND LARGE SECTORS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SUPPORT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE AGAINST U.S. AGGRESSION AND FOR NATIONAL SALVATION.

TO PEACEFULLY SETTLE THE VIETNAM PROBLEM, THE UNITED STATES MUST PUT AN END TO ITS WAR OF AGGRESSION AGAINST VIETNAM, UNCONDITIONALLY STOP ITS BOMBING RAIDS AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV, AN INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN COUNTRY (AS PERCEIVED), WITHDRAW U.S. AND SATELLITE TROOPS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM, AND LET THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE THEMSELVES SETTLE THE VIETNAM PROBLEM WITHOUT FOREIGN INTERFERENCE.

THE OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DRV GOVERNMENT AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE TO PROGRESS ONLY WHEN THE U.S. SIDE GIVES UP ITS VIEWPOINT OF RECIPROCITY AND DETERMINES THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF ITS BOMBING RAIDS AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF THE DRV IN ORDER THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO PROCEED AT AN EARLY DATE TO THE DISCUSSION OF OTHER PROBLEMS OF INTEREST TO BOTH PARTIES, THUS CREATING FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR FINDING A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT TO THE VIETNAM PROBLEM.

ON THEIR PART, THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND THE DRV GOVERNMENT REALLY WANT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM BECAUSE IT WILL BE BENEFICIAL TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, TO THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, AND TO WORLD PEACE. HOWEVER, PEACE MUST BE ASSOCIATED WITH GENUINE INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM AND NOT BE A FALSE PEACE. OUR ATTITUDE IS SERIOUS AND CONSISTENT. WHETHER THESE OFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS CAN HENCEFORTH MAKE PROGRESS OR NOT DEPENDS ON THE U.S. SIDE.

43

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET--TRINE~~

Tuesday, June 11, 1968 -- 9:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

Art McCafferty has made some fresh calculations of the infiltration rate into South Vietnam from the North. This table includes arrivals in South Vietnam starting in January with expected rates of arrival from those already in the pipeline down through October. As you can see, his estimate is now 177,000 men, including the two Khe Sanh divisions but not including the 308th division that may now be in the Khe Sanh area.

I am having this in-house estimate checked out by CIA and Defense.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NS-141.022.006/16
By [signature], NARA, Date 11-2-09

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

43a

~~TOP SECRET/TRINE~~

June 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Infiltration

During the period 1-10 May we observed 18 infiltration groups with a possible strength of 10,000 men. During the comparable period of June, we have noted 7 infiltration groups with a possible strength of 3,400 men.

On May 10 we were projecting a possible total of 151,000 men having arrived or on the trail.

Today, we project a possible total of 177,000 men. The attached chart shows the possible arrivals, by month, as we have calculated them. This includes the two divisions (304 and 320) which arrived at Khe Sanh in January, but does not include the 308th Division which may have arrived in May -- adding another 7-9,000 men.

Our calculations are based on information from all sources -- communications intelligence, captured documents and prisoner interrogations, and include infiltrators who began their journey in the last quarter of 1967 but arrived after January 1, 1968.

My personal assessment is that, as we get more information, we will find we are being quite conservative.


Art McCafferty~~TOP SECRET/TRINE~~


DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS-141.022.006/7
By jc, NARA, Date 11-2-01

PROJECTED MONTHLY INFILTRATION RATES

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-76

(By Month of Arrival)

By iss, NARA Date 8-3-98



INFORMATION

44

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, June 11, 1968 - 9:05 am

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Porter's comment.

He thought our draft OK.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 7773

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ry, NARA, Date 6-8-92

WWRostow:rln



~~SECRET~~
Department of State

440
TELEGRAM

10

OO RUEHC
DE RUALOS 7773E 1630200
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 110147Z JUN 68 ZFF1
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1096
STATE GRNC
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~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 2419Q
RECEIVED: JUN 10, 1968
11:32 P.M.

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 7773

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-367
By ing, NARA, Date 2-7-94

NODIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR PORTER

REF: STATE 179514

1. APPRECIATE INVITATION TO COMMENT.
2. FIRST THERE IS FACT OF KSYGIN LETTER ITSELF. "IF MAY NOW BE CLEAR TO SOVIETS THAT DRV POSTURE AND PRONOUNCEMENTS AT PARIS ARE DAMAGING TO DRV AND COMMUNIST CASE GENERALLY. HAVING GONE TO PARIS, AS GENERAL PUBLIC VIEWS IT, AS RESULT OF UNILATERAL AMERICAN CONCESSIONS IN MATTER OF BOMBING, DRV REFUSAL THERE TO CONSIDER RECIPROCAL DE-ESCALATION OR EVEN TO ACKNOWLEDGE ELEMENTARY FACTS OF SITUATION IN SVN HAS BEEN PUT IN SHARP RELIEF BY AMERICAN NEGOTIATORS. SOVIETS PROBABLY NOW TROUBLED ABOUT RECORD THEIR FRIENDS ARE MAKING. FURTHERMORE, REASONABLE US POSTURE AND PROPOSALS ARE EMPHASIZED BY PRESENT PLIGHT OF SAIGON AS COMPARED TO BENEFITS HANOI (CAPITAL AND GOVT) DERIVING FROM OUR PATIENCE AND RESTRAINT. I WOULD SAY THAT SOVIET WORRY ABOUT RELATIVE STANDING OF TWO PARTIES, PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND POLITICALLY SPEAKING, AND FEEL SOMEONE MUST GIVE. THOUGH THEIR LETTER IS COUCHED IN RELATIVELY RESTRAINED TERMS, IT IS OF COURSE DESIGNED TO INDUCE US TO DO THE GIVING ALONG LINES ALREADY STRESSED BY THUY.
3. SOVIET POSITION TOWARD VN NEGOTIATIONS UP TO NOW, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, HAS BEEN TO DO NOTHING IN MATTER WHICH IS CONTRARY TO HANOI'S WSHES. IF THAT STILL THEIR POSITION. KOSYGIN LETTER MAY COMBINE SOV DESIRE TRY SOMETHING ON, PERHAPS FOR REASONS CITED ABOVE, AND DRV WILLINGNESS TO HAVE THEM TRY--FOR PRESENT AT LEAST ALONG LINES ALREADY STATED AT PARIS BY DRV NEGOTIATORS. NO HARM IN TRYING. DRV HAS UNDOUBTEDLY NOTED GROWING BOREDOM WITH THEIR PROPAGANDA LINE, WHICH COULD BE IMPORTANT AMONG FACTORS LEADING TO VARIATION IN ANGLE OF APPROACH IF NOT YET IN THEM.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SEOUL 7773, JUNE 11

4. WHETHER OR NOT SOV LETTER LEADS SOMEWHERE, SOVS ARE CURRENTLY PARTICIPATING IN NEGOTIATIONS. PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO KOSYGIN CORRECTLY AND COMPETENTLY TOOK ADVANTAGE OF OPENING THEY PROVIDED IN OFFERING TO ACCEPT THEIR PRIVATE ASSURANCES THAT DRV WOULD NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CESSATION. THEIR STATEMENT THAT CESSATION WOULD NOT RESULT IN "ANY KIND OF NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES" WAS NOT INADVERTENTLY MADE, AND THEY ARE NOW IN THE INTERESTING POSITION OF HAVING TO DETERMINE FOR THEMSELVES WHETHER DRV WOULD AGREE TO THE PRIVATE PROCESS WE PROPOSE AND WHETHER THEY, THE SOVIETS, SHOULD ENGAGE THEMSELVES WITH US ON THE BASIS OF DRV AGREEMENT. THEY CAN HAVE FEW ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE PERMANENTLY PRIVATE NATURE OF ARRANGEMENTS AS IMPORTANT AS THESE.

5. TEXT OF SOV LETTER STATED CESSATION OF BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR WITH RESPECT TO THE DRV WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A "BREAKTHROUGH," WHILE OUR REPLY COVERING THE SAME PASSAGE SAID AGAINST THE DRV. I SENSE AN IMPLIED DISTINCTION HERE BUT I AM NOT SURE WHAT, UNLESS IT IS SOMETHING IN CONNECTION WITH DRV MAINTENANCE OF THEIR TROOPS CURRENTLY OPERATING IN SVN. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO CLEAR UP THE QUESTION WHETHER DRV TROOPS OPERATING OUTSIDE THE DRV ARE, IN SOVIET VIEW, VALID EXTENSIONS OF IT OR NOT. OTHERWISE, WE WOULD BE UNCERTAIN UNTIL EVENTS CLEAR UP MATTER FOR US WHETHER SOV HAVE IN MIND "BREAKTHROUGH" TOWARD PEACE, OR FOR GREATER NVN PENETRATION OF SOUTH.

6. IN SUM, MY COMMENTS ARE INTENDED TO SUPPORT THE SENSIBLE AND SENSITIVE LINE REFLECTED IN REPLY TO KOSYGIN AS MOST LIKELY TO EXTRACT MAXIMUM RESULT FROM SOV INITIATIVE. IT COULD ACHIEVE A SHIFT IN THE DRV POSITION AS MONOTONED IN PARIS AND IT PUTS SOVIET DESIRE TO HELP (REAL OR APPARENT) IN PRACTICAL CONTEXT.

7. FINALLY, I WAS INTRIGUED BY SOV CONCERN FOR OUR SECURITY AND PRESTIGE. THEY ARE NOT QUITE THE BEST JUDGES OF THE ONE, NOR THE DEVOTED GUARDIANS OF THE OTHER. IN FACT, THAT LITTLE PASSAGE IN THEIR LETTER WOULD PROVIDE GOOD CARTOON MATERIAL FOR "KROKODI)". ONE TEAR COULD BE LABELED "AMERICAN SECURITY," AND THE OTHER "AMERICAN PRESTIGE"--IF THE CROCODILE'S EYE HAS NOT RUN DRY AFTER ALL THESE HARDWORKING YEARS. WHEN I SEE THEM HAND OUT THAT LINE I ALWAYS DRAW COMFORT FROM BY BELIEF THAT WE OWN A CROCODILE OR TWO OURSELVES. GP-1 PORTER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

Monday, June 10, 1968, ^{7:30} 6:00 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Profile

SUBJECT: News of U. S. Soldiers' Release in Cambodia

The news that a U. S. soldier had been released by Cambodia was first received by his mother via a television newscast for the following reasons:

- 1. The United States has no diplomatic or military mission in Phnom Penh.
- 2. The news of release was made public by the Government of Cambodia.
- 3. The Cambodian Government informed the Australian Ambassador in Phnom Penh who notified Canberra and Canberra informed the State Department.

The Army did not notify the mother because they had no knowledge other than what they have been told by the Australians.

Arrangements are being made by the Australians in Phnom Penh to fly Pvt. Tester to a city where he can be received by some U. S. authority. He was supposed to have left Bangkok today but did not.

Knowledge that Prince Sihanouk had decided to release the two U. S. soldiers was included in the State Department's cable summary sent to the President Sunday, A. M. The Reuters report that the two soldiers had been turned over to the Australian Ambassador and were expected to leave for Bangkok today was included in the State Department's Cable Summary sent to the President this morning.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

46

INFORMATION

Monday, June 10, 1968
7:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the Committee I vote
in the UN on the NPT.

There is some hope the vote can
be improved in the General Assembly
later in the week.

Significant abstentions are marked.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file

WWRostow:rln

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 10, 1968

46a

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Walt--

Committee I of the UNGA this afternoon adopted the Resolution commending the Non-Proliferation Treaty to all states and requesting that it be opened for signature at the earliest possible date. The vote for the Resolution was 92 in favor, 4 opposed, 22 abstaining, and 6 not present. Several of the countries, abstaining or not present, will probably vote in favor of the Resolution in the Plenary Session of the UNGA later this week.

The countries opposed were:

Albania	Tanzania
Cuba	Zambia

The countries abstaining were:

Algeria	France	Niger
Argentina	Gabon	Portugal
Brazil	Guinea	Rwanda
Burma	India	Saudi Arabia
Burundi	Malawi	Sierra Leone
Central African Rep.	Mali	Spain
Chad	Mauritania	Uganda
Congo (Brazzaville)		

Countries not present were:

Cambodia	Dominican Rep.
Cameroon	Gambia
Costa Rica	Haiti

Spurgeon
Spurgeon Keeny

INFORMATION

47

~~SECRET~~

Monday, June 10, 1968 - 7:25 pm

free file

Mr. President:

Herewith a French Communist
view of Hanoi strategy.

We are checking for other
intelligence on point D; that is, plans to
assassinate U. S. officials in Saigon.

25X1A

W. W. Rostow

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-019-035-3-6-7

SANITIZED

Authority NLS.019.035.003/6

By J, NARA, Date 3-29-01

470

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY

IN 26820

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	DMC/DC	(SECDEF)	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	CIA/INR	NSA	DDO	ONE	CRS
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~~SECRET~~

071815Z

DIST 7 JUNE 1968 25X1A

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM/FRANCE

DOI: [REDACTED] 25X1A

SUBJECT: NORTH VIETNAMESE PROPAGANDA STRATEGY

ACC: [REDACTED] 25X1A

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

25X1X

1. BASED ON RECENT COMMENTS OF CHARLES FOURNIAU, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE FRANCO-VIETNAMESE FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION (AAFV) AND FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY ADVISOR ON VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY THE AMERICAN BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM IN THAT IT DID HINDER THEIR WAR EFFORTS AND THAT THEY DO NOT WANT TO SEE IT RENEWED.

SANTIZED

Authority NLS 019-035-003/7

By [Signature], NARA, Date 3-29-01

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

IN 26020

25X1A

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

NORTH VIETNAMESE STRATEGY DURING THE NEAR FUTURE APPEARS TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

A. PROPAGANDIZE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD AGAINST THE UNITED STATES BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM TO CREATE POLITICAL PRESSURES ON THE UNITED STATES TO CEASE ALL BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM;

B. PROPAGANDIZE IN THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE AAFV, WHICH IS IN THE PROCESS OF TRANSLATING PROPAGANDA DOCUMENTS INTO ENGLISH FOR DISTRIBUTION TO THE UNITED STATES. THE AAFV HAS LISTS OF LITERALLY THOUSANDS OF NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS PLUS LISTS OF ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES WHICH ARE CONSIDERED TO BE ANTI-WAR AND FAVORABLE TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION. MANY OF THESE WERE GIVEN TO THE AAFV BY A YOUNG AMERICAN WOMAN (UNIDENTIFIED) WHO ATTENDED THE STOCKHOLM PEACE CONFERENCE IN 1967;

C. CREATE AN EXTRAORDINARY SITUATION IN THE SAIGON AREA OF SOUTH VIETNAM BY CONTINUING MILITARY PRESSURE ON SAIGON; AND

D. STRIVE FOR A MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL BLOW BY THE

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

IN 2682C

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES 25X1A

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

ASSASSINATION OF HIGH AMERICAN OFFICIALS IN SAIGON. THE VIET
CONG HAVE NUMEROUS ASSASSINATION TEAMS, REFERRED TO AS TU VE
(SIC), IN THE SAIGON AREA AND THEY INTEND TO USE THESE TEAMS
ON SUICIDE MISSIONS AGAINST SENIOR AMERICANS PRIMARILY FOR THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT THEIR DEATH WOULD HAVE IN THE UNITED STATES
AND EUROPE. 25X1A

2. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE HARRIMAN DELEGATION CINCPAC

ARPAC PACFLT PACAF [REDACTED] 25X1A

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

48

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, June 10, 1968 - 7:20 pm

Pres file

Mr. President:

This is a well-balanced CIA document on the Vietnam situation which you may wish to read.

W. W. Rostow

SNIE 53-68
6 June 1968
Cy No. 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-141
By iso, NARA Date 4-7-98

WWRostow:rlh

Carfeli

49
—

Monday, June 10, 1968
4:45 p. m.

SECRET-NODIS

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith General Taylor expresses his strong reservations on the draft letter to Kocyyia.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-NODIS~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 6-8-92

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~-NODIS

June 10, 1968

49a
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 93-18
By CB, NARA, Date 4-20-95

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Reply to the Kosygin Letter

Because of my absence from Washington yesterday, I have only just seen the Kosygin letter, our draft reply, and Bunker's reaction to that draft. My thoughts on the subject follow:

A close reading of K's letter indicates that it offers nothing new of substance but retains the old ambiguities about the contribution which a total cessation of bombing "could contribute" to the "prospects of a peaceful settlement." As I read it, it is remarkable only by its moderate tone and its timing.

The moderate tone suggests that K would really like a favorable response from us and hopes that we will oblige him. It also indicates that he wants to place the American interest in the foreground of any discussion as the motivating force for any agreement.

As to the reason for the timing of the letter, one can speculate along several lines.

a. The arrival of Tho to head the North Vietnamese negotiating team probably marks the opening of a new phase in the Paris negotiations. K's letter is the opening gun of a new diplomatic offensive to accompany and exploit the military escalation in South Viet-Nam, with its initial target our will to continue the bombing.

b. Hanoi senses that we are probably considering a return to our former bombing pattern in North Viet-Nam and K has sent his letter to make that decision more difficult for us and at least to cause us to delay in taking it.

c. Hanoi is hurting badly even under the restricted bombing and has called for help from the USSR to obtain prompt relief.

Whatever the reason for the letter, it is clearly a bear trap to be approached with caution. Frankly, I do not find that caution in some of the passages of our proposed draft. It seems to limit our concern to the safety of our military forces and to accept the preeminence of the U.S. interest over that of our allies. There is no indignation expressed for the civilian losses in South Viet-Nam and for the continuing attacks on Saigon. There is a dangerous willingness to accept private assurances of unspecified content, either from Hanoi or from the USSR, in exchange for a cessation of our bombing.

~~SECRET~~-NODIS

For a variety of reasons, I advise against the dispatch of the letter as presently written. Generally speaking, I agree with the views of Ambassador Bunker and the changes of text which he recommends--if you decide to stay generally within the framework of the present text. I can think of at least two other approaches to our reply:

a. Confine the answer to amenities and queries about the meaning of the ambiguous language. This kind of exchange can go on for a long time while feeling out the adversary.

b. Stiffen the reply even beyond Bunker's suggestions, making perfectly clear that we are not going to give up our bombing without precise agreements covering reciprocal actions and hinting broadly that we are fed up with the present stalling and expect to relax our self-imposed constraints soon.

My objections to the present text are in general that the course of action implied therein will or may result in the following:

a. It can drive a wedge between us and the GVN and contribute to the collapse of that government--a major enemy objective.

b. It will encourage the Hanoi leaders and convince them that they are right in assuming we are defeated--at least in spirit.

c. Any cessation of bombing will make it almost impossible to resume, thus setting the stage for another Panmunjom.

d. It will further confuse and divide our people who have been assured in the past by their leaders that the bombing restrains infiltration and gives indirect protection to our troops. A cessation now at a time of increased enemy infiltration, of heightened levels of military and terrorist activities and of record-breaking U.S. casualties would defy explanation to any but the extreme left wing of American public opinion.

M.D.2
M. D. T.

INFORMATION

SECRET--SENSITIVE

free file

Monday, June 10, 1968
2:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

This is what the letter to Kosygin would look like, with the deletions and additions suggested by Amb. Bunker.

You should also know that Gen. Taylor, who is now back in town, will have suggestions for you.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989
By rg, NARA, Date 6-8-92

WWRostow:rln

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I was very glad to receive your letter of June 5 and have given it the most careful study. I think you and I agree as to the great importance of a peaceful resolution of the Vietnamese problem and of a halt to the bloodshed. I think you and I would also agree that the Soviet Union and the United States have a very special responsibility with respect to the reduction of tensions and the stabilization of peace in the world.

We are prepared to end the bombardment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam ~~if it would lead to a de-escalation of the war.~~ In this connection when there is agreement on the steps Hanoi will take to de-escalate from its side. I have given special attention to your statement that a cessation of bombing and other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam cannot result in any kind of negative consequences for the United States in the sense of damaging the interests of its security.

~~Does this statement apply to the security interests of the United States with respect to our own and allied forces in Vietnam?~~ Obviously, the military capability of the DRV is already being enhanced by the present restriction of bombing and it would be greatly further enhanced by the total cessation of bombing. We have already made a major move to deescalate whereas Hanoi has countered with increased infiltration and attacks in the Northern Provinces of South Vietnam and by indiscriminate terror attacks on the civilian population of Saigon and other cities. This imbalance cannot be tolerated indefinitely. Moreover, a decision must be made by the DRV not to take advantage of ~~this~~ any total cessation,

and there must be a clear understanding between us and Hanoi on this point.

Such a decision and understanding need not be made public. You will understand that I must be concerned about the position of our troops and Allied forces in South Vietnam and about the welfare of the civilian population of South Vietnam.
~~Any light which you can throw upon this vital point would be appreciated.~~

We ~~shall~~ will make every effort to discuss these matters constructively with the representatives of the DRV in Paris, but we must have a satisfactory understanding, ~~We are prepared to stop the bombing of North Vietnam as a first step.- We do need to have assurances,-~~ which may be entirely private, as to ~~the next~~ specific steps for the de-escalation of to be taken to de-escalate the violence. We are prepared to move step by step in this direction provided there are visible compensating steps taken by the other side.

Of course, Mr. Chairman, we would be glad to pursue these matters directly with the government of the Soviet Union. If, for example, you are in^a position to provide us assurances with respect to the ~~military-consequences-to-our-own-and-allied-forces~~ steps Hanoi will be prepared to take if we stop the bombing, we are prepared to accept your assurances and would issue the necessary orders.

We appreciate the fact that you have informed the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam of our interest in unofficial contacts between our respective delegations in Paris, as well as the fact that you believe that all forms of contact between the parties should be utilized. Our delegation in Paris is ready for such contacts and we would hope very much that the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would be responsive.

I do believe it important that we keep in close touch with each other on this matter.

Pres file

INFORMATION

57

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, June 10, 1968
12:15 p. m.

SECRET

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Bunker blows the whistle on certain key points in our Kosygin message and proposes alternative language.

I will send up shortly a draft of what the message would look like with his revisions.

Walt Rostow

SECRET attachment

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By sg, NARA, Date 6-8-92



Department of State

TELEGRAM

51a

3

~~SECRET~~

Rust...

..... ZZ RUEHC RUEKCR
DE RUMJIR 29571 1621305
ZNY SSSSS ZZK
Z R 101245Z JUN 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4371
INFO RUEKCR/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1160
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL: 2233Q
RECD: JUNE 10, 1968
10:27 A.M.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-16
By , NARA, Date 5-24-93

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 29571

MODIS

NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM
BUNKER

REF: STATE 179514

1. APPRICATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE PRPOSED
REPLY TO KOSYGIN AS I BELIEVE IT WILL VERY DIRECTLY AFFECT THE
SITUATION HERE, INCLUDING THE PERSEVERANCE AND FORTITUDE OF THE
VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND THE STABILITY OF THIEU AND HIS GOVERN-
MENT. A SEPARATE TELEGRAM PREPARED BEFORE REFTEL RECEIVED DESCRIBES
THE CURRENT SITUATION IN SAIGON AND CONTAINES MY VIEWS ABOUT WHAT
SHOULD AND SHOULD NOT BE DONE TO DEAL WITH IT. IT IS A COMPANION-PIECE
TO THIS REPLY.

2. THE VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE AT PRESENT IS BASICALLY SOLID
AND MOR E UNIFIED IN SPIRIT THAN IT HAS BEEN BEFORE, BUT THERE
REMAINS AN UNDERLYING DOUBT ABOUT OUR ULTIMATE WILLINGNESS TO
STAY THE COURSE WITH THEM. THIS FACT CAME OUT IN GORTONS
TALKS HERE WITH THE VIETNAMESE. IF WE SHOULD AGREE TO A
TOTAL CESSATION OF BOMBING WITHOUT A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING
OF WHAT WILL BE DONE ON THE OTHER SIDE TO RECIPROCATE,
IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO BRING NATIONALIST VIETNAMESE
OPINION ALONG WITH US. CERTAINLY THE ATTACKS ON SAIGON
MUST BE SIMULTANEOUSLY STOPPED. OTHERWISE WE RUN THE
DANGER WE COULD UNDERMINE THE GROWING POPULAR SUPPORT
FOR THIEU AND HIS GOVERNMENT AND HIS POLICY OF RESISTANCE
TO THE NORTH AND REFORM AT HOME. IT WOULD BE PARTIJLARLY
DIFFICULT FOR HIM IF THE BOMBING CESSATION WITHOUT COMPENSTATORY
ACTION VIS-A-VIS SAIGON SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PRECEDE HIS
PLANNED VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 29571, JUNE 10

3. I AGREE THAT WE SHOULD SEEK TO STIMULATE A MORE SPECIFIC DISCOURSE WITH BOTH HANOI AND MOSCOW, BUT I BELIEVE THAT IT MUST BE ON TERMS WHICH WILL BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY BOTH OF THEM AND WHICH WILL NOT BE MISUNDERSTOOD BY OUR VIETNAMESE FRIENDS AND OUR ALLIES. MY FEELING, IN BRIEF, IS THAT THE PROPOSED REPLY WHICH SUGGESTS WE ARE PREPARED TO STOP THE BOMBING IN RETURN FOR SOVIET ASSURANCES, IS MUCH IN NEED OF STRENGTHENING IF IT IS TO BE CONVINCING TO HANOI AND MOSCOW, AS WELL AS TO OUR ALLIES. OUR EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH THE COMMUNISTS, WHETHER EUROPEAN OR ASIAN, OVER THE PAST 20 ODD YEARS IS THAT THEY UNDERSTAND FIRMNESS AND CLARITY AND ARE QUICK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF VAGUE WORDS AND UNCERTAIN ACTIONS WHICH SUGGEST TO THEM THAT WE ARE IN A WEAK POSITION. AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE ARE IN A WEAK BARGAINING POSITION AND THIS FACT SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN OUR REPLY, WHILE MAKING QUITE EVIDENT OUR DESIRE TO MOVE TOWARDS MUTUAL DEESCALATION AND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. I THEREFORE URGE MOST STRONGLY THAT WE MAKE THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS IN THE PROPOSED REPLY TO KOSYGIN.

4. REVISION OF SECOND PARAGRAPH: "I HAVE GIVEN SPECIAL ATTENTION TO YOUR STATEMENT THAT A CESSATION OF BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV CANNOT RESULT IN ANY KIND OF NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE SENSE OF DAMAGING THE INTERESTS OF ITS SECURITY. WE ARE PREPARED TO END THE BOMBARDMENT OF THE DRV WHEN THERE IS AGREEMENT ON THE STEPS HANOI WILL TAKE TO DEESCALATE FROM ITS SIDE."

5. REVISION OF THIRD PARAGRAPH: "OBVIOUSLY, THE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE DRV IS ALREADY BEING ENHANCED BY THE PRESENT RESTRICTION OF BOMBING AND IT WOULD BE GREATLY FURTHER ENHANCED BY THE TOTAL CESSATION OF BOMBING. WE HAVE ALREADY MADE A MAJOR MOVE TO DEESCALATE WHEREAS HANOI HAS COUNTERED WITH INCREASED INFILTRATION AND ATTACKS IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES OF SOUTH VIET NAM AND BY INDISCRIMINATE TERROR ATTACKS ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF SAIGON AND OTHER CITIES. THIS IMBALANCE CANNOT BE TOLERATED INDEFINITELY. MOREOVER, A DECISION MUST BE MADE BY THE DRV NOT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY TOTAL CESSATION AND THERE MUST BE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US AND HANOI ON THIS POINT. SUCH A DECISION AND UNDERSTANDING NEED NOT BE MADE PUBLIC. YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSITION OF OUR TROOPS AND ALLIED FORCES, IN SOUTH VIET NAM AND ABOUT THE WELFARE OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF SOUTH VIET NAM."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 29571, JUNE 10

6. REVISION OF FOURTH PARAGRAPH: "WE WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FRV IN PARIS, BUT WE MUST HAVE A SATISFACTORY UNDERSTANDING, WHICH MAY BE ENTIRELY PRIVATE, AS TO SPECIFIC STEPS TO BE TAKEN TO DEESCALATE THE VIOLENCE. WE ARE PREPARED TO MOVE STEP BY STEP IN THIS DIRECTION PROVIDED THERE ARE VISIBLE COMPENSATING STEPS TAKEN BY THE OTHER SIDE.

7. REVISION OF FIFTH PARAGRAPH: "OF COURSE, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE WOULD BE GLAD TO PURSUE THESE MATTERS DIRECTLY WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION, IF, FOR EXAMPLE, YOU ARE IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE US ASSURANCES WITH RESPECT TO THE STEPS HANOI WILL BE PREPARED TO TAKE IF WE STOP THE BOMBING, WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT YOUR ASSURANCE AND WOULD ISSUE THE NECESSARY ORDERS. BUNKER
BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED SEOUL BY OC/T 6/10/68

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

Monday, June 10, 1968 - 11:35 am

Free file

Mr. President:

As a result of discussion of cessation of bombing in the Panhandle, I had drawn up the attached table of our casualties by Corps areas. It shows that U. S. casualties in I Corps have been 50% or more of the total in the past 4 months, rising as high as 84% in May.

Although the flow of North Vietnamese men and supplies affects all the Corps areas, the impact on I Corps is disproportionately great.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

52a

June 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

A comparison of U. S. casualties by Corps area indicates that since the beginning of the year, over half of U. S. deaths have occurred in the First Corps and that the percentage has increased every month.

	Jan		Feb		March		April		May	
	<u>KIA</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>%</u>
I Corps	586	24	1109	53	824	54	824	58	1074	84
II Corps	129	11	168	8	180	12	121	9	171	13
III Corps	379	31	598	28	344	22	310	22	482	38
IV Corps	67	6	158	7	83	5	84	6	53	4
Other*	41	3	91	4	112	7	71	5	389	31
TOTAL	1202		2105		1540		1409		1269	

NOTE: May figures are preliminary and will undoubtedly change as the 389, carried under "other" are redistributed among the Corps areas.

*Other includes hostile fatalities occurring elsewhere in SEA, in the air, or for which Corps is not known.

Art
Art McCafferty