

**ACTION
INFORMATION XXX**

53

Pres file

Monday, June 10, 1968 - 11:30 am

Mr. President:

As requested, herewith a draft memorandum from you to the Secretary of Defense requesting our senior military leaders to speak regularly on the state of the war in South Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rin

53a

June 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

In this critical period I wish our people to have laid before them as clear a picture as possible of the military situation in South Vietnam, including:

- enemy situation;
- enemy capabilities and performance, including infiltration rates, casualties, weapons losses, quality and morale;
- our own military purposes and achievements;
- the progress of the South Vietnamese military.

In particular, I wish our senior military leaders to speak to these matters on a regular basis, including General Westmoreland after his return.

Would you ask General Wheeler to take this matter in hand and keep me informed of the speaking schedule that is worked out, as well as the texts of what is said.

LBJ:WWRestow:rla

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INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, June 10, 1968 -- 9:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

This Prague broadcast makes Burchett's talk with Hedrick Smith worth re-reading.

As you may remember, Burchett even suggested that we might get some reciprocity from a formal cutback to the 19th parallel -- or other action short of a total cessation of bombing in the North.

I do not recommend any action. If the log jam is going to break, it is going to break because of the factors which led them to send Le Duc Tho to Paris. Therefore, we can afford to await what we get from the Russians and what develops in the days ahead in Paris.

My point is, therefore, merely that something seems to be moving on their side which makes the Burchett initiative with Hedrick Smith a piece in a larger mosaic.

W. W. Rostow

FBIS 01
10 June 1968

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WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By J, NARA, Date 3-29-01

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FBIS 01

PRAGUE ON PARIS TALKS

FOR YOUR INFORMATION L

PRAGUE IN ENGLISH TO AFRICA AT 1530 GMT ON 9 JUNE, IN A REVIEW OF THE EVENTS OF THE WEEK, CARRIES THE FOLLOWING BRIEF ALUSION TO THE U.S.-DRV TALKS IN PARIS:

"JOHN AND ROBERT KENNEDY AND MARTIN LUTHER KING ALL HAD TO DIE WHEN THEY TOOK AN UNCOMPROMISING STAND IN FAVOR OF A JUST SETTLEMENT OF WORLD AFFAIRS, ON THE EQUALITY OF ALL NATIONS IN THEIR RIGHT TO FREEDOM, PEACE, AND SELF-DETERMINATION, AND WHEN, REGARDLESS OF THEIR PREVIOUS VIEWS, THEY BEGAN OPPOSING THE AMERICAN WAR IN VIETNAM AND STARTED TO PROMOTE BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THEY WERE MURDERED WHEN THEY STOOD UP AGAINST THE POLICY OF VIOLENCE, THAT POLICY WHICH HAS SO LONG CHARACTERIZED AMERICA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SMALLER COUNTRIES, SUCH AS VIETNAM, WHERE, UNDER THE GUISE OF PROTECTING FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY, THE UNITED STATES IS BRUTALLY SUPPRESSING THIS FREEDOM.

"HOWEVER, THE EFFORTS OF THE WORLD PUBLIC AND OF MANY OUTSTANDING INDIVIDUALS HAVE BROUGHT CERTAIN RESULTS IN THE FORM OF TALKS BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DRV AND THE UNITED STATES. THEY HAVE MET IN PARIS TO BRING ABOUT AN END TO THE WAR AND TO NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM. SO FAR BOTH SIDES HAVE BEEN PERSISTING IN THEIR POSITIONS, AND IT SEEMS THAT THE DEADLOCK IS COMPLETE.

"THEREFORE GREAT HOPE IS PLACED IN THE PERSON OF LE DUC THO, WHO ARRIVED IN PARIS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WEEK. THIS LEADING POLITICIAN OF DEMOCRATIC VIETNAM IS BELIEVED TO HAVE BROUGHT WITH HIM THE DRAFT PROPOSAL OF A COMPROMISE. HE HIMSELF SO FAR HAS NOT TAKEN ANY DIRECT PART IN THE TALKS.

"NEVERTHELESS, THE HEAD OF THE DRV DELEGATION MADE A NOTABLE STATEMENT SHORTLY AFTER LE DUC THO'S ARRIVAL, SAYING THAT THE TALKS ARE BEING TORPEDGED BY THE U.S. DEMAND FOR RECIPROCITY AS A CONDITION FOR HALTING THE BOMBING OF THE DRV. IT IS GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT IF THE UNITED STATES DID NOT ASK FOR RECIPROCITY AS A CONDITION, HANOI WOULD TAKE CERTAIN RECIPROCAL MEASURES ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE, TO SET A GOOD EXAMPLE. THAT WOULD CERTAINLY PUSH THE TALKS AHEAD."

10 JUN 0052Z WCW/HH

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INFORMATION

Pres file

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Monday, June 10, 1968 - 8:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

This is a lucid account of the Thieu-Ky relations: how Thieu has moved against Ky to establish his strength as President; where it now stands; and how it might be remedied at Thieu's initiative.

You should know that we have raised with Bunker the desirability of establishing a small war cabinet at the top, which would help keep Ky from going off the reservation, since he would participate.

W. W. Rostow

[Redacted signature box]

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-18
By rip, NARA, Date 6-19-96

WWRostow:rln

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE *55a*
IN 27429

PAGE 1 OF 7 PAGES

STATE/INR DD/I DIA NMCC/MC EXO (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NEA SDO ONE CRS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

091712Z CITE [REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)

DIST 9 JUNE 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 8 JUNE 1968

SUBJECT [REDACTED] VICE PRESIDENT KY'S 1.3(a)(4)
PRESENT MOOD, EVENTS LEADING THERETO, AND
PROPOSED REMEDIAL ACTION

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (9 JUNE 1968) FIELD NO.

[REDACTED]
SOURCE [REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SUMMARY. [REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN
SOUTH VIETNAM [REDACTED] LED TO CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP,
AN INCREASE IN PRESIDENT

THIEU'S POSITION OF STRENGTH, AND A
DECREASE IN KY'S. [REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] KY'S POSSIBLE RESIGNATION IF THE PRE-

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-31
By *ju*, NARA, Date *8-6-93*

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PAGE 2 OF 7 PAGES

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(classification) (dissem controls)

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SENT TREND CONTINUES. [REDACTED] STEPS THAT
CAN AND SHOULD BE TAKEN TO GET KY ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS AGAIN. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] END SUMMARY.

1. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] POLITICAL EVENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
SINCE THE TET OFFENSIVE (30 JANUARY) HAVE DEALT A SERIOUS
BLOW TO KY'S PRESTIGE AND EGO. AS A RESULT, KY NOW FEELS
HIS OFFICE IS WITHOUT PURPOSE. KY HAD BELIEVED THAT AS
VICE-PRESIDENT HE WOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT POLICY ROLE IN
THE GOVERNMENT (GVN) HOWEVER, THE PERSONALITY CLASH BETWEEN
KY AND PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU HAS PREVENTED THIS, DESPITE
THE EFFORTS OF MANY GVN OFFICIALS TO PERSUADE THE TWO MEN TO
WORK TOGETHER FOR THE GOOD OF THE COUNTRY.

2. [REDACTED] FORMER PRIME MINISTER LOC'S

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IN 27429

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PAGE 3 OF 7 PAGES

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CABINET WAS CREATED WITH THE INTENTION THAT KY WOULD HAVE A POLICY ROLE AND IN THE EARLY POST-ELECTION PERIOD KY DID EXERCISE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE OVER THE GOVERNMENT. THIEU, AWARE OF HIS WEAK POSITION, REFRAINED FROM CHALLENGING KY UNTIL THE POST-TET PERIOD POINTED UP THE WEAKNESSES IN THE LOC CABINET. DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, THIEU PLANNED THE DETAILS OF HIS NEW ADMINISTRATION, MADE A START IN REMOVING A FEW KY SUPPORTERS IN THE MIDDLE ECHELONS OF GOVERNMENT AND REFRAINED FROM COMPROMISING HIS CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION BY WORKING OUT A DEAL WITH KY.

3. AFTER THE TET OFFENSIVE THIEU REALIZED THAT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WOULD PROBABLY SUPPORT CHANGES IN THE CABINET, AND HE WAS CERTAIN THAT THE U.S. WOULD SUPPORT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES OF THE GOVERNMENT. THIEU BEGAN TO MOVE AGAINST KY SLOWLY AND, AT FIRST, WITH SOME FEAR FOR HIS SAFETY. HOWEVER, HE FOUND THE KY ENTOURAGE WEAKER THEN HE EXPECTED, AND DISCOVERED THAT SOME GENERALS, WHO ARE KY'S PERSONAL FRIENDS, WOULD PROBABLY NOT SUPPORT A VIOLENT CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT. [REDACTED] IV CORPS COMMANDER LIEUTENANT GENERAL

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[REDACTED]
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IN 27429

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PAGE 4 OF 7 PAGES

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NGUYEN DUC THANG AS AN EXAMPLE. THIEU ALSO CONCLUDED THAT KY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAD ALIENATED SOME KY SUPPORTERS IN THAT BODY. THIEU REPLACED SOME PROVINCE CHIEFS AND MILITARY COMMANDERS AND CORRECTLY JUDGED THAT HIS USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS WAS NOT LIKELY TO BE INHIBITED SUCCESSFULLY BY KY'S SUPPORTERS. AFTER THIEU DECIDED TO APPOINT TRAN VAN HUONG PRIME MINISTER, THIEU SET ABOUT FORMING A CABINET IN WHICH KY WOULD HAVE LESS INFLUENCE. HE FURTHER STRENGTHENED HIS POSITION BY APPOINTING GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM MINISTER OF INTERIOR. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] A KEY APPOINTMENT AND KHIEM THE MOST POWERFUL MINISTER IN THE CABINET. [REDACTED] KHIEM [REDACTED] INTELLIGENT, CLEVER, RUTHLESS, A STRONG PERSONALITY, AND COMPLETELY LOYAL TO THIEU.

4. [REDACTED] WHEN THIEU ACQUIRED A LOYAL PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET AND WAS SATISFIED THAT THE MINISTERS WOULD HAVE THE COURAGE TO REPLACE KY MEN, HE BEGAN TO FEEL THAT HE COULD RESTORE TO HIMSELF THE FULL POWERS OF THE PRESIDENCY. HE BECAME MORE SURE OF HIMSELF WHEN SEVERAL KY STALWARTS, SUCH AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN

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IN 27429

1.3(a)(4)

PAGE 5 OF 7 PAGES

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NGOC LOAN, WERE PUT OUT OF ACTION DURING THE MAY OFFENSIVE AND WHEN LESS COURAGEOUS MEMBERS OF THE KY ENTOURAGE REALIZED THEIR PERSONAL FUTURES WERE IN JEOPARDY AND BEGAN TO LEAVE THE KY FOLD. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THE UNTIMELY DEATH OF SOME OF KY'S PERSONAL FRIENDS IN SAIGON ON 2 JUNE FURTHER WEAKENED KY'S POSITION. THE TENDERED RESIGNATION OF III CORPS COMMANDER LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE NGUYEN KHANG STRENGTHENED THIEU'S EFFORTS TO REPLACE OR CONTROL MILITARY OFFICERS WHO ARE CLOSE TO KY. THIEU'S SELECTION OF MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN VAN MINH AS CAPITAL DISTRICT COMMANDER WAS NOT AND COULD NOT BE QUESTIONED BY KY BECAUSE MINH IS A PROFICIENT SOLDIER, HAS NO POLITICAL TIES, AND IS RESPECTED BY KY. BY 8 JUNE, KY, WHO [REDACTED] HAS BEEN LIVING IN THE PAST, REALIZED THAT A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF HIS POLITICAL STRENGTH HAD BEEN REMOVED BY THIEU. KY BECAME DEPRESSED AND SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE TO HIS PRIDE.

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5. [REDACTED] THERE IS NO CHANCE THAT

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KY WILL REACT VIOLENTLY TO THESE DEVELOPMENTS, SUCH AS STAGING A COUP. KY LACKS THE STRENGTH, AND THE MILITARY MOST LIKELY WANT NO PART IN ANY SUCH ACTIVITY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IF KY CONTINUES TO BE PUSHED INTO A CORNER THERE IS A CHANCE HE MIGHT CONSIDER RESIGNING THE VICE-

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PRESIDENCY. TO HELP RESTORE KY'S POSITION, [REDACTED] IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO MAKE ANOTHER EFFORT TO GET THIEU AND KY TO WORK TOGETHER. KY'S EGO HAS BEEN DAMAGED SO BADLY THAT THE INITIATIVE FOR A RAPPROACHMENT WILL HAVE TO COME FROM THIEU; IN ASIAN EYES KY CANNOT POSSIBLY MAKE THE FIRST MOVE.

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[REDACTED] KY'S POSTURE WITH THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, PARTICULARLY THE DEMOCRATIC BLOC, MUST BE REPAIRED. ALSO, A COMPLETE HOUSECLEANING OF KY'S ENTOURAGE IS VITAL BECAUSE THOSE FEW WHO REMAIN CONTINUALLY POISON KY'S MIND AGAINST THIEU AND THE AMERICANS.

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6. [REDACTED] THE OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENCY MUST BE REORGANIZED IN ORDER THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THAT OFFICE CAN BE CARRIED OUT. [REDACTED]

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IN 27429

[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

PAGE 7 OF 7 PAGES

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[REDACTED]

DURING THE PAST MONTH KY HAS ALL BUT IGNORED THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEOPLES SELF-DEFENSE PROGRAM AND THE PROGRAM'S ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS IS NOW IN DISARRAY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER , DEPUTY AMBASSADOR BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER, CHIEF OF STAFF J-2) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL MOMYER ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [REDACTED]

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INFORMATION

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 93-18
By CB, NARA, Date 4-20-95

~~SECRET~~

Monday, June 10, 1968 -- 7:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

This interview of Kenneth Young with Thieu is, I suspect, an accurate map of Thieu's mind. And it is quite sensible.

He now perceives clearly that the critical problem for South Vietnam is to build a big, cohesive, non-Communist political party which can defeat the Communists in a one man, one vote election.

He says he will need money for this. In my judgment, he will need the best political advice we can give him, based not so much on U. S. experience as the experience of the Mexicans, South Koreans, Indians, and Tunisians who have pulled it off in under-developed countries.

I shall make sure that we begin work here planning how we can backstop Bunker in this matter.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 29468, 3 sections

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 29468 01 OF 03 081006Z

LARLY IN SAIGON PRIOR TO OR EVEN AFTER A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF MOST OR ALL OF THE COUNTRYSIDE.

5. HANOI HAS DE-ESCALATED ITS STRATEGY POLITICALLY DURING THE LAST THREE YEARS; IN 1965 THE GOAL WAS TOTAL VICTORY TO PUT HO IN INDEPENDENCE PALACE; IN 1966-67 THE OBJECTIVE WAS LOWERED TO QUICK U.S. WITHDRAWAL AND A COALITION TO PUT THE COMMUNISTS IN POWER; IN 1968 HANOI HAS GIVEN UP IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES AND SHIFTED TO A FORM OF DISGUISED COALITION FOR A SOMEWHAT MORE EXTENDED TAKEOVER OF POWER; AND FROM NOW ON HANOI SEEMS TO BE SHIFTING TOWARDS CREATING A THIRD POLITICAL FORCE UNDER ITS CONTROL TO WORK OUT SOMETHING LIKE THE LAOS TROIKA FORMULA AMONG THE NLF, THE NEW ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL, DEMOCRATIC, AND PEACE FORCES (CONTROLLED BY HANOI, OF COURSE), AND ELEMENTS OF THE GVN.

6. THE IMMEDIATE STRATEGY OF HANOI IS UNDOUBTEDLY AIMED AT THE URBAN POPULATION, WITH SAIGON THE PRIMARY TARGET, AND THE IMMOBILIZATION AND COLLAPSE OF THE GVN THE GOAL. SUCCESS IN THIS WOULD STRENGTHEN HANOI'S POSITION IN PARIS AND EXPLOIT THE UNCERTAINTIES IN THE U.S. BEFORE THE POLITICAL CONVENTION. THE COMMUNISTS ARE DOING EVERYTHING THEY CAN, PARTICULARLY IN SAIGON, TO SCORE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SUCCESSES NOW TO BOX AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN INTO HAVING TO ACKNOWLEDGE SUCH A TROIKA AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI UNTIL THE POLITICAL CONVENTIONS DETERMINE WHICH TWO CANDIDATES HANOI WILL BE FACING IN THE NEXT AMERICAN POLITICAL PHASE. ACCORDING TO PRESIDENT THIEU THE COMMUNISTS ARE REALLY WAITING TO SEE WHO WILL BE THE NEXT PRESIDENT, FOR THEY WILL MAKE CONCESSIONS OR NEGOTIATE IN THEIR SENSE ONLY WITH THE NEXT PRESIDENT WHO WILL HAVE AUTHORITY FOR AT LEAST FOUR YEARS.

7. HE THOUGHT THAT HANOI MAY THEN BE ON THE POINT OF RETURNING TO SOME MODIFIED FORM OF THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT. THIS WOULD MEAN ACCEPTING A MILITARY TRUCE WITH A GENERAL CEASE FIRE, THE DMZ, AND THE TEMPORARY ZONES, ETC., IN ORDER THEREAFTER TO WIN SOUTH VIETNAM BY POLITICAL ACTION. PRESIDENT THIEU EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY THAT HANOI WOULD FOLLOW THIS STRATEGY ONLY IF IT MADE SURE THAT U.S. FORCES WOULD NOT BE ABLE LEGALLY OR POLITICALLY TO ENTER VIETNAM AT SOME LATER STAGE IF COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES WERE REQUIRED. HE FELT THAT ONCE AMERICAN TROOPS WERE OUT OF VIETNAM AMERICAN

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 SAIGON 29468 01 OF 03 081006Z

PUBLIC OPINION WOULD OPPOSE THEIR RE-ENTRY. HE FEELS THAT HANOI WILL CAPITALIZE ON THIS FACTOR FOR ITS OWN ADVANTAGE. HANOI WILL ALSO TRY TO GET ALL POWER, HE PREDICTED, BY SPLITTING THE ALREADY DIVIDED NATIONALISTS AND BY CONFUSING THE ELECTORATE IN THE SOUTH BY THE USUAL COMMUNIST TACTICS OF DIVIDE, TERRORIZE AND TAKEOVER. HE SEEMED TO ASSUME THAT IN CARRYING OUT THIS STRATEGY HANOI WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT AND WORK WITHIN THE GVN CONSTITUTION, BECAUSE THIS WOULD BE THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH HANOI COULD GET AND KEEP THE AMERICANS OUT. HE THOUGHT THE COMMUNISTS WOULD HAVE SOME 100,000 POLITICAL CADRES AFTER A CEASE FIRE, ETC., TO GO AROUND THE COUNTRY, INFILTRATE, ORGANIZE AND WIN CONVERTS, SEATS AND EVENTUAL CONTROL IN ANY POLITICAL BODIES AND PARTICULARLY THE LEGISLATIVE ORGANS. THEY REALIZE WHAT THIS WILL TAKE BUT HE FEELS HANOI HAS COMPLETE CONFIDENCE IN ITS ULTIMATE POLITICAL VICTORY UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE EVIDENTLY FEELS THAT THEY WILL TACITLY REMOVE NORTHERN MILITARY FORCES OUT OF THE SOUTH IN CONNECTION WITH THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL AND REMOVAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS. HANOI WILL, HOWEVER, INFILTRATE MANY CIVILIAN POLITICAL CADRES VIA LAOS, CAMBODIA AND THE SEACOAST.

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 SAIGON 29468 02 OF 03 081024Z

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EXDIS:

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION:

8. PRESIDENT THIEU FELT VERY STRONGLY THAT THIS POLITICAL STRATEGY IS A VERY REAL AND DANGEROUS POSSIBILITY BECAUSE HE THINKS HANOI AT SOME POINT IN THE NEXT SIX OR TWELVE MONTHS WILL MAKE A TRUCE OF SOME KIND WHICH WILL INCLUDE SAIGON'S PROPOSALS FOR RECONCILIATION AND AMNESTY PLUS THE AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION HE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THIS STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD NOT ARRIVE UNTIL SOMETIME IN 1969 UNLESS THERE IS A LARGE NATIONALIST UPSET IN THE SOUTH. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE VERY AWARE OF THE WEAKNESS OF THE NATIONALISTS' POLITICAL CAPABILITIES.

9. ON THE GVN SIDE, PRESIDENT THIEU SAID THAT MILITARY STRENGTH AND MILITARY SUCCESSES ARE GROWING ALL THE TIME. HE BELIEVES HIS GOVERNMENT HAS MILITARY PREDOMINANCE NOW IN THE SOUTH WITH THE HELP OF ITS ALLIES AND CAN BEAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY AND VC ANYWHERE AT ANY TIME IN MILITARY ENCOUNTERS. HE REPEATED TO ME WHEN I QUESTIONED HIM ON THIS THAT HE IS VERY CONFIDENT OF HIS MILITARY OUTLOOK DESPITE THE COMMANDO ATTACKS ON SAIGON AND THE ROCKET BOMBARDMENT AGAINST CIVILIANS. HE HAS NO DOUBT OF THE EMERGING MILITARY SUPREMACY ON OUR SIDE. HE ALSO IS SURE THAT HANOI REALIZES THAT IT HAS LOST THE CHANCE FOR MILITARY VICTORY OR MILITARY SUPREMACY WHICH IT HAD IN 1965.

10. THE BASIC QUESTION IS, THEREFORE, BASICALLY POLITICAL.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 29468 02 OF 03 081024Z

ACCORDING TO THE PRESIDENT, MATTERS OF MORALE AND ORGANIZATION ARE CRUCIAL. MOST VIETNAMESE NATIONALISTS FEAR A SELL-OUT IN PARIS AND A PULL OUT OF ALLIED FORCES. THIS ANXIETY IS CAUSING SOME LET DOWN AND LOWERING OF DETERMINATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE POINTED OUT, MOST VIETNAMESE NOW KNOW WHAT HANOI AND THE VC REALLY STAND FOR AND WANT NO PART OF A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER. HE SAID THIS WAS NOW SIGNIFICANTLY TRUE OF THE URBAN POPULATION AND THE EDUCATED PEOPLE. IF MORALE CAN BE SUSTAINED BY THE GVN AND USG BY CONSTANT REAFFIRMATION OF DETERMINATION AND BY SUCCESSFUL ACTIONS, THE POLITICAL QUESTION WOULD THEN BOIL DOWN TO NEW ORGANIZATION AND ENOUGH MONEY TO BRING ABOUT THE NEEDED CONSOLIDATION AND COHESION OF THE DIFFERENT GROUPS. WHEN I POINTED OUT THE LONG STANDING FRAGMENTATION AND FACTIONALISM IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THE PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT IT WAS JUST NOW POSSIBLE TO BEGIN TO HEAL THE DIVISIVENESS OF HIS COUNTRYMEN. HE POINTED OUT THAT HISTORICAL FACTORS SUCH AS THE DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY BEFORE THE FRENCH, THE FRENCH POLICY OF FRAGMENTATION, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT UNDER DIEM AND THE CHAOS AFTER THE 1963 COUP, HAD ALL ADDED TO THE DISINTEGRATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S SOCIETY BUT COULD NOW BE OVERCOME.

11. HE RECOGNIZED, NEVERTHELESS, A SERIOUS HANDICAP OF A SHORT TIME AND LITTLE EXPERIENCE WITH WHICH TO OVERCOME NATURAL DIVISIONS AND TO PUT TOGETHER SOME KIND OF NATIONAL POLICY PROVIDING FOR POLITICAL STABILITY AND LEADERSHIP. THE FIRST TASK FOR HIM IS TO FORM A NATIONAL PARTY OR GROUP OF NATIONALIST ORGANIZATIONS TO OUT-MATCH THE NEW PSEUDO ALLIANCES AND THE NLF, BUT HE SAID THIS WOULD TAKE AT LEAST A YEAR OR TWO WHILE THE NEGOTIATION FIGHTING STAGE CONTINUES. THIS NEXT TWELVE MONTHS IS THE TESTING PERIOD. HE SEEMED CONFIDENT THAT THIS NATIONAL COALESCENCE HAD NOW BECOME A REALISTIC EXPECTATION IF THE VIETNAMESE WENT AT IT VIGOROUSLY.

12. HOWEVER, THEY WOULD NEED THE MEANS TO CREATE AND BUILD ORGANIZATIONS, AND HE MEANT MONEY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT POLITICIANS IN VIETNAM ARE NOT RICH AND THERE ARE NO LARGE BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AS IN AMERICA TO MAKE BIG PARTY CONTRIBUTIONS. SO HE HOPED I WOULD UNDERSTAND THE NEED FOR A NEW PARTY OR GROUP TO DEPEND ON THE GOVERNMENT FOR ITS RESOURCES. I REPLIED THAT MANY OF US NOW UNDERSTAND THIS KEY PROBLEM OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN DECOLONIZED, NEWLY-INDEPENDENT AND

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 SAIGON 29468 02 OF 03 081024Z

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. FOR SOME OF US, I ADDED, IT IS A QUESTION ON ONE HAND OF AVOIDING CONSPICUOUS PERSONAL CORRUPTION IN VIETNAM OR ELSEWHERE BY OFFICIALS AND GENERALS WHICH WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR US AMERICANS TO SUPPORT HIM OR THE GOVERNMENT IN VIETNAM -- WHICH HE COMPLETELY AGREED WITH -- AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, OF ACCEPTING THE NEED FOR INTELLIGENT, SUBTLE AND DISCREET MEANS TO SUPPORT POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS.

13. CONCERNING THE NEW NEUTRALIST ALLIANCE OF THE COMMUNISTS, HE AFFIRMED CATEGORICALLY THAT IT IS NO THREAT BECAUSE IT IS ONLY A COLLECTION OF NOBODIES WITH NO ATTRACTION OR PRESTIGE FOR VIETNAMESE. IN FACT, HE THOUGHT THAT IT HAS EVEN LESS THAN THE NLF. (ALTHOUGH THE PRIME MINISTER, THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE EXA-FOREIGN MINISTER HAD EXPRESSED TO ME THE SAME VIEW, I REMAINED A BIT SKEPTICAL BUT DID NOT PRESS THE POINT WITH THE PRESIDENT.)

BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

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TELEGRAM

26

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PAGE 01 SAIGON 29468 03 OF 03 081138Z

12
ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

R 080910Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4281
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

2

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 3 SAIGON 29468

EXDIS

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

14. RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATING A SETTLEMENT I ASKED THE PRESIDENT'S OPINION ABOUT THE FORMULA OF LOCAL "ARRANGEMENTS" OR LOCAL "ACCOMMODATIONS" WITH THE VC BEFORE A GENERAL CEASE-FIRE IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN POLITICAL AND MILITARY PREDOMINANCE OVER THE NLF AND HANOI AS A WHOLE, WHICH I SAID I WAS VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN. HE REJECTED OUT OF HAND WHAT HE CALLED THE "LEOPARD SPOT SCHEME". IT SEEMS TOO IMPRACTICAL BECAUSE THE COMMUNISTS WOULD USE EACH OF THEIR SPOTS TO SPREAD OUT WITH THEIR SUPERIOR SKILL OF INFILTRATION, PROPAGANDA AND ORGANIZATION VIS-A-VIS THE NATIONALISTS OR NON-COMMUNISTS. NATIONALISTS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD BE UNABLE NOR NOT AS CAPABLE OF WIDENING THEIR SPOTS. EVEN THEIR BLUE HELMETS (SECURITY POLICE) WOULD BE UNABLE TO STOP THE 100,000 "BACTERIA" FROM INFESTING ALL OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

15. CONSEQUENTLY, PRESIDENT THIEU BELIEVES THAT SOUTH VIETNAM MUST TAKE ITS CHANCES WITH THOSE 100,000 AFTER A CEASE FIRE ON A VOTING PHASE, APPARENTLY ONE MAN ONE VOTE. THEY WOULD BE ALLOWED TO OPERATE POLITICALLY ONLY AS INDIVIDUALS AND NOT AS A POLITICAL PARTY. THEY WOULD, OF COURSE, MASQUERADE AS NEUTRALISTS OR DEMOCRATS TO CONCEAL THEIR "COMMUNIST MENTALITY" IN ORDER TO CREATE A NEW MOVEMENT THAT WOULD DECEIVE THE PEOPLE AND GRADUALLY TAKE OVER THE COUNTRY, AS HE HAD ALREADY INDICATED. IT WAS APPARENT TO ME THAT HE WAS VERY CONFIDENT OF THE COMMUNIST POLITICAL CAPABILITY AND VERY UNCERTAIN OF THE NATIONALISTS.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

26

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 SAIGON 29468 03 OF 03 081138Z

16. HE SAID HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS VISIT WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND TO VISITING THE U.S. I SAID I HOPED TO SEE HIM AND WISHED HIS VISIT EVERY SUCCESS.

BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

57

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 93-18
By CB, NARA, Date 4-20-95

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, June 9, 1968 -- 2:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Herewith some notes for the 2:30 p. m. meeting on the response to the Kosygin letter.

Sec. Rusk tells me he will bring over several alternative draft replies. Before submitting them to you, he believes you should hear extended discussion of the various points of view.

You may wish to leave the shape of that discussion to Sec. Rusk. My own suggestion as to a possible order for the meeting is indicated by the following questions, which you may wish to have answered before you make a decision.

1. Why did Kosygin write the letter?
 - Because of Harriman's warning to Zorin and fear of a Paris breakdown and escalation?
 - Merely to carry forward the old campaign for a total cessation of bombing in return for merely talk?
2. Why did Le Duc Tho, the Hanoi Politburo member, go to Paris?
 - Because they are hurting on the ground?
 - Because they feel that the political situation in Saigon is moving away from them?
 - Because the Russians have told them they will not finance another year of the war and would have to negotiate seriously?
3. To what precisely did Kosygin commit himself in his letter?
 - Merely that substantive talks would follow a total cessation of bombing?
 - That reciprocal acts of de-escalation would follow a total cessation of bombing?
 - Or did he commit himself to nothing?

~~SECRET~~

-2-

4. What are the advantages of our acting as if Kosygin had made a commitment to Hanoi's deescalation if we totally stopped bombing?

(Sec. Clifford and Amb. Thompson believe this is the right course.)

What are the disadvantages?

- 20% more supplies come through?
- If we told our people we were doing this because of a Soviet commitment and they denied it, U.S. -Soviet relations could be badly damaged?
- If no escalation took place, the President and the Government could be accused of inexcusable naivete after more than 20 years of dealing with Soviet duplicity?
- Danger to the government in Saigon, and morale of our troops in the field if de-escalation did not promptly and effectively take place?

5. If we decide to explore this matter further with the Soviet Union before making a decision, should we do it:

- By a letter to Kosygin?
- By the Secretary of State and Dobrynin?
- By Amb. Goldberg and Kuznetsov?
- By the Secretary of State and Kuznetsov?

6. What should be our stance in Paris on Wednesday?

- Should we proceed with the Russians further before showing any flexibility in Paris?
- Should we have Harriman and Vance see if they can open up a private dialogue on these matters in Paris, in addition to what we decide with respect to the Russians?

7. Should our next communication to the Russians back Harriman's initiative with Zorin and indicate that we regard the present state of the talks as unsatisfactory and likely to require an increased bombing effort by the U. S. ?

W. W. Rostow:rln

58

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 93-18
By cb, NARA, Date 4-20-95

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, June 9, 1968 -- 1:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Paris reports the background of the Hedrick Smith story. It turns out to be Burchett, the Australian Communist journalist, who has been operating in this capacity all the way back to Korean war days.

By coincidence, Bill Jordan just called me. His evaluation is they are simply creating a hopeful atmosphere and that if they want to convey a serious message to us, they have ample opportunities to do so. Jordan also reported that an old South Vietnamese friend just arrived in Paris and underlined the increasing tension in Saigon due to the repeated attacks on the city -- 20 attacks in 35 days, of varying weight.

This converges with Bunker's warning that we should not take this harassment of Saigon casually.

The Burchett comment meshes closely with the Kosygin note in that it suggests great things could happen if only we stopped the rest of the bombing.

It also convinces me that we should not take such a step until we have probed much more deeply with the Russians and, if possible, the North Vietnamese.

If it is the case that they want to get on with serious negotiations but they are merely trying to save face on the total cessation of bombing, a formula can be found. If they force us to step off into the dark without any explicit assurances, I would conclude that they are merely trying to get additional military advantage and complicate still further our relations with Saigon.

You will be interested to note in paragraphs 10 and 11 Burchett's two basic points.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

59

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-18
By Cb, NARA, Dste 4-20-95

INFORMATION

Profile

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

Sunday, June 9, 1968 -- 9:40 a. m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to read some time this morning the draft on which we will be working at 10:00 o'clock this morning, which Sec. Rusk has formulated. There will be changes.

You may wish to note in this draft the following key points:

On page 3, para (c) refers to "an increase in the movement of North Vietnamese troops and supplies into the Republic of Vietnam" as an example of acts which would endanger our security. The problem, is, of course, does this imply that the present level of movement is acceptable.

Page 4, marked passage, states that if the Soviets inform us that, after talking with the DRV, a total cessation of bombing "would not endanger our security interests," we would be prepared to proceed.

Page 5, we ask, as part of this package, for a Soviet commitment "to bring about strict compliance with the Accords of 1962 on the part of the DRV." The problem here is when would such compliance be insisted upon. We have one experience of Soviet failure to honor its word that it would insist on DRV compliance with the 1962 Accords.

At the 10:00 o'clock meeting I shall raise with my colleagues the possible wisdom of putting into this letter a reference to the position which we took at Paris before the formal exchanges began, when Cy Vance was talking to their No. 2, that we would insist on GVN participation when interests of the GVN were involved. My feeling is that it is important that we record this position with Moscow, so that there can be no ambiguity. We might even go further and suggest to the DRV, via Moscow, that it might be wise for them to undertake "informal contacts" with the GVN at a relatively early stage, as well as informal contacts with us.

W. W. Rostow

State Dept Revision #3 (to Kosygin)
WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

State Dept draft
Revision #3 59a

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I welcome your letter of June 5 and your initiative in offering suggestions on how to make progress towards a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. I appreciate also the action of your Government in discussing with representatives of the DRV the initiation of US/DRV unofficial contacts in Paris.

The candor of your views requires me to reply with equal candor and with the greatest possible clarity.

You have informed me that you have reason to think that a complete cessation of bombing and other acts of war against the DRV could contribute to a breakthrough in the 'situation' without any kind of negative consequences for the US, particularly those damaging to our security interests.

As you know, on March 31, I ordered the cessation of bombing of 78 percent of the territory of the DRV. As I have tried to make clear then and subsequently in public statements and through the statements of my representatives in Paris and elsewhere, I stand prepared to stop all bombardment of the DRV when it is possible to assume that the security interests of this country and its allies would not be endangered thereby.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 93-18
By cb, NARA, Date 4-20-85

From March 31 to date, it has not been possible to make such an assumption. This has been due directly to the threat posed by the heavy increase in men and supplies sent by the DRV against the allied forces in the south, repeated attacks from the north across the DMZ, and the unwillingness of Mr. Thuy and his colleagues in Paris to discuss the real issues involved in official conversations.

Since the DRV has clung to the fiction that it has no troops in the south despite universally recognized evidence to the contrary, its unwillingness to agree publicly to match our bombing restraint has not been surprising. But regardless of its fiction Hanoi must realize that with my direct and personal responsibility for the safety of our men, I am unwilling to order a further and total restraint in bombing of the DRV unless I have reason to assume that the DRV would not attempt to improve its military position as a result of the bombing cessation. Misunderstanding on either side on this point could readily lead away from, rather than toward, peace.

It is to clarify these issues that we have requested unofficial contacts in Paris between our representatives and the representatives of the DRV. We thought that private,

informal talks would be the best environment in which to give the other side a precise understanding of the state of mind and expectation in which we would be willing to proceed with substantive talks on matters of concern to our two governments under circumstances of complete cessation of bombing. We would wish to make it entirely clear to them in such contacts that we would not consider it consistent with such total restraint against the DRV, if as a consequence we encountered certain acts endangering US and allied security, such as (a) ground attacks or artillery or other fire across the DMZ; (b) the massing of additional forces or supplies in North Viet-Nam and the DMZ in a manner which poses a direct threat to allied forces in South Viet-Nam; or (c) an increase in the movement of North Vietnamese troops and supplies into the Republic of Vietnam.

On the other hand, we would consider evidence of willingness by the other side to bring about a restoration of the DMZ on the basis envisaged in the 1954 accords as a highly positive indication of progress. It is for this reason that Mr. Harriman has pressed this matter in Paris. We do not emphasize this point in order to achieve

a permanent division of the country--on the contrary, we have consistently asserted the principle that reunification should be decided by peaceful means and choice at the appropriate time by the Vietnamese peoples.

Mr. Chairman, if I order a full halt in the bombing I want you personally to know that we would rely on our means of verification to determine if as a consequence acts detrimental to our security interests had occurred. If we so determined, it would not be possible for me to maintain a position of unilateral restraint in the face of such threats.

Impressed as I am with your assurance that a total cessation would not endanger our security interests, however, I am willing to have my representatives discuss privately with representatives of the DRV the circumstances which would permit an immediate cessation of all bombing.

Furthermore, if you are able to inform me that you have made our views set forth above entirely clear to your friends in Hanoi and that your assurance stands, I would be willing to rely on that and issue the necessary orders.

If we exercised the further restraint you have suggested, I would not want it to be at the expense of

the people of Laos, much of whose territory remains overrun or menaced by troops of the DRV. In the event posited, could I count upon your Government as one of the Co-Chairmen of the 1962 Accords on Laos to take the necessary steps to bring about strict compliance with the Accords on the part of the DRV? Your principal representative in this country has indicated recently that progress towards this end should be possible, and I would welcome your views on this key related issue.

It should not be necessary for me to add that it would be a grave mistake for any one to think that the US is looking for a face-saving out in Viet-Nam or prepared to take a further move toward peace because of the military situation in SVN today. To the contrary, we have had much evidence of the increasingly serious difficulties the DRV has encountered in attempting to continue and escalate its aggression against the Republic of Vietnam. We will not abandon our commitments, but neither will we forego any opportunity to seek a peace under which all of the peoples of that unhappy area can determine their own future free of violence and the threat of force.

Sincerely,

60

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Sunday, June 9, 1968 -- 9:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

Arthur Goldberg tells me his impression of the attached conversation with Kuznetsov was that he was probing for a summit meeting in Geneva as a by-product of an NPT signing there.

He did not pursue; and he does not like Geneva for the NPT, for the same reasons as Sec. Rusk.

But worth considering if further exchanges indicate any progress in engaging Moscow on Vietnam.

Arthur also has the idea you might address the UN Assembly next Thursday, probable final day for NPT. (See cable B, attached.)

W. W. Rostow

State 179496 to USUN NY
State 179495 to USUN NY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-344
By cb, NARA, Date 6-7-95

WWRostow:rln

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R 082341Z JUN 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4484
STATE GRNC
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-342
By lig, NARA, Date 12-8-54

~~SECRET~~ STATE 172496

NODIS

FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG WHILE
IN WASHINGTON.

YESTERDAY I TENDERED A WORKING LUNCHEON IN HONOR
OF THE FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KUZNETSOV
AND HIS SOVIET COLLEAGUES WHO HAVE BEEN WORKING JOINTLY WITH
US AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO OBTAIN ENDORSEMENT OF THE
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

AS INSTRUCTED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE
COURSE OF THE LUNCHEON I TOLD KUZNETSOV THAT OUR DECIDED
PREFERENCE WAS THAT THE TREATY BE SIGNED IN THE THREE
DEPOSITARY CAPITALS -- WASHINGTON, ~~Moscow~~ AND LONDON IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRECEDENT OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
RATHER THAN IN GENEVA AS PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED BY THE SOVIETS.
KUZNETSOV REPLIED THAT WHILE THE SOVIETS PREFERRED GENEVA
THEY WOULD ACQUIESCE IN OUR PREFERENCE FOR SIGNATURE
IN THE THREE DEPOSITARY CAPITALS IF WE INSISTED UPON THIS
PROCEDURE. IN THE COURSE OF HIS STATEMENT KUZNETSOV MENTIONED
THAT ONE OF THE ADVANTAGES OF THE GENEVA SITE WOULD BE THAT
IT WOULD PERMIT THE SIGNING TO TAKE PLACE AT A COMMON SITE
WHERE OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS COULD BE REPRESENTED AT A
HIGH-REPEAT HIGH-LEVEL. IN LIGHT OF THE INSTRUCTION
TO ME TO STATE OUR DECIDED PREFERENCE FOR SIGNING
OF THE THREE DEPOSITARY CAPITALS I DID NOT PROBE WHAT
KUZNETSOV PRECISELY MEANT WHEN HE SAID THAT SIGNING IN GENEVA
WOULD PERMIT HIGH LEVEL SIGNATURES AND INFERENTIALLY A HIGH
LEVEL MEETING BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.
HIS REMARK, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF A PREVIOUS
STATEMENT BY HIM TO BE ON AN EARLIER OCCASION THAT
FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO WAS CONSIDERING SIGNING FOR THE
SOVIET GOVERNMENT IF THE SIGNATURES WERE AFFIXED IN
GENEVA. IF DESIRED I CAN READILY ASCERTAIN FROM HIM PRECISELY
WHAT HE HAD IN MIND SINCE THE MATTER HAS BEEN LEFT THAT THE
SIGNING WILL TAKE PLACE IN THE THREE DEPOSITARY CAPITALS UNLESS
I ADVISE KUZNETSOV DURING THE COURSE OF THE NEXT WEEK THAT
OUR GOVERNMENT HAS RECONSIDERED ITS DECISION IN THE
MATTER.

I SHALL DO NOTHING FURTHER WITH RESPECT TO THE SIGNING
UNLESS I RECEIVE OTHER INSTRUCTIONS. RUSK
BT

~~SECRET~~

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1968 JUN 9 20 55

RR RUEHEX
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO WHITE HOUSE
R 082340Z JUN 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4485
STATE GRUC
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 179495

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ NLS 94-382
By ---, NARA, Date 12-8-94

NODIS

FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS DRAFTED BY AMB. GOLDBERG WHILE IN WASHINGTON. IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WILL ENDORSE A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY ON MONDAY BY AT LEAST 100 AFFIRMATIVE VOTES. SINCE THE FIRST COMMITTEE IS COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL MEMBER STATES THIS MEANS THAT THE TREATY, ABSENT UNFORSEEN CIRCUMSTANCES, WILL BE ENDORSED BY THE SAME OVERWHELMING VOTE IN THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY PROBABLY ON THURSDAY, JUNE 13. THIS PLENARY SESSION ENDORSING THE TREATY WILL WIND UP THE SESSION WHICH FOLLOWING THE VOTE AND STATEMENTS EXPLAINING THE VOTE WILL THEN CONCLUDE ALSO PROBABLY ON THE SAME DAY.

I SHOULD LIKE TO PUT FORWARD A SUGGESTION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S CONSIDERATION THAT THE PRESIDENT CONSIDER ADDRESSING THE ASSEMBLY FOLLOWING THE FAVORABLE VOTE ON THE TREATY. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT AN ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT ON THIS OCCASION WILL BE WELL RECEIVED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

IT IS UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS FROM THE OUTSET STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE CONCLUSION OF THIS TREATY AND THAT THE TREATY IS IN LARGE MEASURE A PRODUCT OF HIS STRONG ENDORSEMENT.

IF THE PRESIDENT IS FAVORABLY DISPOSED I SHOULD BE ADVISED AS EARLY AS MAY BE SO THAT I CAN MAKE APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. I CANNOT AT THIS MOMENT INSURE THE EXACT SCHEDULE AND PARTICULARLY THAT THE WIND UP WILL BE ON THURSDAY. IT MAY BE ON FRIDAY BUT I AM VIRQUALLY CERTAIN THAT IT WILL BE ON EITHER ONE OF THESE TWO DAYS AND I WILL BE ABLE TO ADVISE DEFINITELY AS TO THE DATE BY NOT LATER THAN TUESDAY OF NEXT WEEK.
BT

NODIS

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

61

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-18
By cb, NARA, Date 4-20-95

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, June 9, 1968 -- 9:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

The attached two cables report important political developments in Saigon -- notably if they succeed:

-- Thieu and Huong move with some care to cut down Ky's political base while avoiding a direct confrontation;

-- Thieu puts Tran Van Don to work on a new umbrella political organization which could -- at long last -- be the coalition to run against an NLF coalition, with a chance to win.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 29481
Saigon 29475, 3 sections

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

Wright

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~~SECRET~~ HCE794

PAGE 01 SAIGON 29481 090649Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 W

P R 090600Z JU 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4302
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 29481

EXDIS

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

REF : STATE 179128 (NOTAL)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-16
By *ijp*, NARA, Date *5-24-93*

1. I HAVE OF COURSE BEEN FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE DEVELOPMENTS DISCUSSED IN REFTEL. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN IN MEANTIME REPORT OF MY MEETING WITH THIEU (SAIGON 29396).

2. I HAD BEEN PLANNING TO SEE KY FOLLOWING MY TALK WITH THIEU BUT HE DEPARTED LOSE AGAIN FOR A LONG WEEKEND AT NHA TRANG, SO I S ALL NOT BE ABLE TO SEE HIM UNTIL EARLY NEXT WEEK. HIS DEPARTURE FOR NHA TRANG MEANT THAT HE WAS NOT PRESENT FOR ANY OF THE EVENTS CONNECTED WITH PRIME MINISTER GORTON'S VISIT NOR THE A'ARDS CEREMONY FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND JUNE 8.

3. I CAN APPRECIATE BUI DIEM'S CONCERNS, PARTICULARLY AS SEEN FROM A DISTANCE. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THESE DEVELOPMENTS AFFECT BUI DIEM'S OWN POSITION AND FUTURE VERY DIRECTLY AND I THINK THIS IS ONE FACTOR IN HIS "INTUITION". I DO NOT WANT TO MINIMIZE THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THESE VARIOUS MOVES, INCLUDING THE FAIRLY SUDDEN REPLACEMENT OF GENERAL LOAN AND MAYOR CHA BY INDIVIDUALS CLEARLY MORE IDENTIFIED WITH THIEU AND HUONG. DEPARTMENT WILL HAVE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THESE CHANGES WERE CAREFULLY PRECEDED BY PROMOTIONS FOR GENERALS

LOAN AND THANG AND I PRESUME THAT WHEN LOAN S PHYSICALLY RECOVERED HE WILL BE GIVEN AN APPROPRIATE COMMAND OR OTHER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 SAIGON 29481-090649Z

POSITION, AS THIEU ASSURED ME WOULD BE THE CASE WHEN I SPOKE TO HIM YESTERDAY AT THE CEREMONY FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT GENERAL VLANG IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE SITUATION AND, AS REPORTED IN SAIGON 29396, HE WAS VERY MUCH IN DISAGREEMENT WITH SOME OF KY'S AND LOAN'S EMOTIONAL ALLEGATIONS

4. THE NET EFFECT OF THESE MOVES IS A VERY CONSIDERABLE STRENGTHENING OF THIEU'S POSITION AND A WEAKENING OF KY'S COMBINED APPARENTLY WITH SOME LESSENING OF COHESION IN THE KY CAMP. THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT KY IS SULKING AND IS NO DOUBT MOST UNHAPPY WITH JUST ABOUT EVERYBODY, INCLUDING HIMSELF. HIS SEVERAL INTEMPERATE AND ILL-CONSIDERED STATEMENTS OF LATE AND HIS FAILURE TO FOLLOW UP EFFECTIVELY WITH THE ORGANIZATION OF CIVIL DEFENSE HAVE NOT IMPROVED HIS POSITION. THE UNFORTUNATE EVENTS OF LAST SUNDAY HAVE OF COURSE ACCENTUATED HIS ALREADY FRUSTRATED AND UNHAPPY FEELINGS BUT I DO NOT THINK IT IS LIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE ANY SERIOUSLY DISRUPTIVE ACTIONS WHICH WOULD THREATEN THE STABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT. MY EXPERIENCE WITH THIEU LEADS ME TO BELIEVE THAT HE IS SUFFICIENTLY CAUTIOUS AND CALCULATING THAT HE WOULD NOT MAKE THESE MOVES WITHOUT BEING CONFIDENT THAT THE SITUATION IS UNDER CONTROL.

5. THIS LEAVES THE QUESTION OF HOW TO TRY AND BRING THE TOP LEADERSHIP TOGETHER IN MORE MEANINGFUL COOPERATION IN THE FUTURE. I HOPE THAT THIEU'S PLAN TO USE A SMALL WAR CABINET, AS HE DESCRIBED IT TO ME (SAIGON 29396) WILL BE HELPFUL. I WILL ALSO BE TALKING TO HIM AND TO KY AND HUONG IN THE COURSE OF THE NEXT FEW DAYS WITH THIS GENERAL OBJECTIVE IN MIND.

6. I PLACE NO REAL IMPORTANCE ON THE DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO HA THUC KY AS HE IS NOT AT THIS TIME IN A POSITION TO AFFECT THE SITUATION SERIOUSLY. WE STILL HOPE HE MAY JOIN IN COOPERATION WITH TRAN VAN DON IN THE "SUPER FRONT" THAT THE LATTER IS TRYING TO ORGANIZE WITH THIEU'S BLESSING, BUT EVEN IF HE DOES NOT JOIN, HIS ROLE IS NOT A CRITICAL ONE IN TERMS OF CURRENT POLITICAL STABILITY.

BUNKER

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ HCE759

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-16
By WJ, NARA, Date 5-24-93

PAGE 01 SAIGON 29475 01 OF 02 081435Z

44
ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00, /070 W

P R 081345Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4295
INFO AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
CINCPAC
AMCONSUL DANANG
AMEMBASSY PARIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 29475

PARIS FOR VN MISSION

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

LIMDIS

SUBJ: TRAN VAN DON PLANS FOR NEW UMBRELLA POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

REF: A) SAIGON 25822
B) SAIGON 28361
C) FVS 17252

1. SENATOR TRAN VAN DON TOLD EMBOFF JUNE 8 THAT PRESIDENT THIEU HAS ASKED HIM TO FORM A NEW FRONT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ALL POLITICAL GROUPINGS. THE PURPOSE OF THE NEW FRONT IS BOTH TO SHOW UNITED SUPPORT FOR THIEU WHEN HE GOES TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO STRENGTHEN THE GOVERNMENT GENERALLY VIS-A-VIS THE DRV AND THE NLF.
DON SAYS HE HAS BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE PRESIDENCY, NGUYEN VAN HUONG, IN MAKING PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEW ORGANIZATION. THIEU WILL ALSO BE TALKING BEHIND THE SCENES WITH VARIOUS POLITICAL GROUPS IN ORDER TO ENLIST THEIR SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 SAIGON 29475 01 OF 02 081435Z

2. ACCORDING TO DON, A PRELIMINARY MEETING OF VARIOUS POLITICAL FACTIONS WILL BE HELD JUNE 9. (THIS IS EVIDENTLY THE MEETING REFERRED TO IN FVS 17,246). DON ANTICIPATES THAT THOSE ATTENDING WILL INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FREE DEMOCRATIC FORCE, HIS OWN SALVATION FRONT, THE CVT LABOR UNION, BOTH LEADING FACTIONS OF THE HOA HAO, THE FRONT OF ALL RELIGIONS, TRAN AN AN AND PHAN BA CAM. THE AN GIANG BUDDHIST FACTION WILL BE REPRESENTED, PROBABLY BY THICH PHAP TRI, BUT THE TAM CHAU FACTION MAY STAY AWAY. DON IS TRYING TO PERSUADE HA THUC KY TO TAKE PART, BUT HE SEEMED DUBTFUL THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY DIA VIETS WOULD PARTICIPATE. ASKED ABOUT CATHOLIC REPRESENTATION, DON SAID THAT NGUYEN GIA HIEN AND HIS GREATER SOLIDARITY FORCE WOULD NOT BE PRESENT, BUT OTHER CATHOLIC GROUPS WOULD BE REPRESENTED.

3. DON REITERATED HIS DISLIKE AND DISTRUST OF PRESIDENT THIEU SEVERAL TIMES IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION, BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE IS UNDERTAKING TO HELP THIEU AND BUILD A FRONT IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE THIS IS WHAT VIET NAM NEEDS. HE DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN THIEU AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND THIEU AS PRESIDENT OF VIET NAM.

4. ASKED ABOUT VICE PRESIDENT KY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NEW ORGANIZATION, DON OBSERVED THAT BOTH HE AND KY HAD LONG FAVORED SUCH AN EFFORT AND HAD PROPOSED IT TO THIEU MONTHS AGO. WHEN EMBOFF PRESSED DON ABOUT KY'S PRESENT ATTITUDE, DON WAS EVASIVE. EMBOFF STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY OF GETTING THE SUPPORT OF BOTH THIEU AND KY IN SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING.

5. DON EMPHASIZED HIS HOPE AND INTENTION THAT THE NEW FRONT SHOULD NOT BE CONFINED TO BACKING THIEU ON HIS VISIT TO THE US. HE HOPES THAT IT WILL REMAIN IN EXISTENCE AFTER THE VISIT, UNDERTAKE SUCH THINGS AS CIVIL DEFENSE, AND PROVIDE CONTINUING EVIDENCE OF VIETNAMESE UNITY IN THE FACE OF COMMUNIST AGGRESSION.

6. DON SAID THAT PRESIDENT THIEU INTENDS TO MAKE A RADIO/TV SPEECH EXPLAINING THE PURPOSES OF HIS VISIT TO THE

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PAGE 03 SAIGON 09475 01 OF 02 081435Z

UNITED STATES SHORTLY AFTER THIEU MAKES HIS SPEECH, DON WILL CALL TOGETHER A MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL POLITICAL GROUPS; THEY WILL RESPOND TO THIEU'S SPEECH BY ISSUING A STATEMENT EXPRESSING NATIONAL UNITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES WHICH THIEU WILL OUTLINE IN HIS SPEECH. (COMMENT: THESE REMARKS WERE BASED ON DON'S UNDERSTANDING THAT THE VISIT WOULD TAKE PLACE VERY SOON. ITS DELAY WILL PROBABLY MAKE THIS SCENARIO IMPRACTICAL).

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AMEMBASSY PARIS

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LIMDIS

7. EMBOFF REMINDED DON THAT BEFORE THE FORMATION OF THE HUONG GOVERNMENT, DON HAD SAID HE WOULD THROW HIS SALVATION FRONT BEHIND A HUONG GOVERNMENT (REF A). EMBOFF ASKED IF HE STILL FELT THE SAME WAY. DON LAUGHED AND SAID THAT HE AD BEEN DISTRESSED BECAUSE TRAN VAN HUONG HAD FAILED TO CONSULT WITH HIM, EITHER AS A SENATE BLOC LEADER OR AS HEAD OF THE SALVATIONFRONT, BEFORE FORMING THE CABINET (REF B). NEVERTHELESS, HE HAD TOLD HUONG THAT HE WOULD HELP HIM IF HE COULD. HE ADDED THAT HE THINKS HUONG "TRIED" TO SEE HIM BEFORE FORMING THE CABINET BUT WAS PREVENTED FROM DOING SO BY SOME OF HIS ASSOCIATES. LAER IN THE CONVERSATION, DON NOTED THAT HUONG IS MORE LIKELY TO HAVE TROUBLE WITH THIEU THAN WITH KY.

8. DON ALSO SAID THAT HE IS ONTINUING TO WORK T SETTING UP PROVINCIAL BRANCHES OF HIS SALVATION FRONT. HE WILL GO ON MAKING VISITS TO THE PROVINCES UNTIL HE HAS VISITED EVERY PROVINCE IN THE COUNTRY. DON CLAIMED THAT HIS FRONT IS DOING MUCH BETTER IN TERMS OF WINNING PROVINCIAL SUPPORT THAN IS NGUYEN VAN HUONG'S FREE DEMOCRATIC FORCE.

9. COMMENT: (A) THE ORGANIZATION WHICH DON S TRYING TO PUT TOGETHER COULD BE VERY HELPFUL IN GENERATING AND

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 29475 02 OF 02 -0815-11Z

DEMONSTRATING VIETNAMESE UNITY. A SHOW OF UNIFIED SUPPORT FOR THIEU ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE FOR THE US WOULD NO DOUBT HELP HIM NOT ONLY IN PRESENTING HIS CASE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE WORLD BUT ALSO VI-A-VIS HANOI AND THE NLF. IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT DON AND NGUYEN VAN HUONG ARE NOW APPARENTLY WORKING TOGETHER.

(B) KY'S ATTITUDE IS UNCLEAR. WITHOUT HIS SUPPORT, THE NEW ORGANIZATION WOULD OF COURSE BE LESS THAN FULLY CONVINCING AS A DISPLAY OF NATIONAL UNITY.

(C) HA THUC KY IS VIDENTLY STILL SMARTING BECAUSE OF HIS FAILURE TO GET THE CABINET POST HE WANTED. HOPEFULLY HE CAN BE PERSUADED TO PARTICIPATE IN DON'S NEW ORGANIZATION. HIEN AND THE GSF, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAVE MOST LIKELY BEEN EXCLUDED BECAUSE OF DON'S DISLIKE OF HIEN. WE WILL TRY TO USE OUR INFLUENCE TO PERSUADE ALL CONCERNED TO SINK THEIR DIFFERENCES.

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ACTION

62

Saturday, June 8, 1968 -- 4:40 p. m.

Pres. file

Mr. President:

The Prime Minister of Ireland, John M. Lynch, is now with the Secretary of State. He is the only chief of government to come to the Kennedy funeral.

He would very much like to make a short courtesy call on you. He suggests some time between now and the arrival of the train.

Sec. Rusk thinks it a good idea.

W. W. Rostow

Yes _____

No _____

Call me _____

WWRostow:ria

63

INFORMATION

Saturday, June 8, 1968 - 3:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Clifford herewith recommends you sign a determination which would permit construction of a nuclear-powered guided-missile frigate in a private shipyard.

Area file

The proposed document is attached.

W. W. Rostow

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1845
63a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

JUN 7 1968

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subj: Proposed allocation to a private shipyard of the construction of the approved nuclear-powered guided-missile frigate in the Navy's Fiscal Year 1968 Shipbuilding Program

Encl: (1) Proposed Memorandum from the President to SECDEF

Title I of Public Law 90-22, approved June 5, 1967, required that the contracts for the construction of the two nuclear-powered guided-missile frigates (DLGN) authorized by that law shall be entered into as soon as practicable unless the President fully advises the Congress that their construction is not in the national interest. Pursuant to that requirement, you determined in your memorandum of March 29, 1968, that a program including one DLGN, in lieu of the two authorized by Public Law 90-22, would better serve the needs of national defense.

The "alternate vessel" provision of the Act of March 27, 1934 (48 Stat. 503), as re-enacted by Section 302 of the Act of June 11, 1965 (Public Law 89-37), is applicable to the construction of the approved DLGN in the 1968 Shipbuilding Program. Section 302 requires that the first and each succeeding alternate vessel of each class of warship and escort vessel be constructed in naval shipyards, but it also provides that the President may vary this pattern in any year in the public interest.

Your subsequent memorandum dated April 4, 1968, regarding the variance from the "alternate vessel" requirement of Public Law 89-37 with respect to the Navy's 1968 Shipbuilding Program, did not include the DLGN because the review of the DLGN portion was not completed when that memorandum was submitted for your signature. Accordingly, a separate "Vinson-Trammell" determination is required for that ship.

It is recommended that the construction of the approved DLGN be allocated for award to a private shipyard. This recommendation is based primarily on the heavy workload

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currently assigned and projected for qualified naval shipyards. Further, the DLGN may be acquired as a part of a multi-year procurement which will include the DLGN in the 1967 Program that has been allocated, but not yet awarded, to a private shipyard. This method of procurement should result in the lowest overall cost for the two ships.

For your convenience, I am enclosing a proposed memorandum for your signature, directing that the construction of the DLGN in the 1968 Shipbuilding Program be allocated as indicated herein.

Carl L. Cifford

636

ACTION

June 8, 1968

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Clark M. Clifford
Secretary of Defense**

With respect to the nuclear-powered guided-missile frigate (DLGN) in the Navy's Fiscal Year (FY) 1968 Shipbuilding Program, I find the requirement of the Act of June 11, 1965 (Public Law 89-37) that the first and each succeeding alternate warship and escort vessel shall be constructed in the "Government Navy yards" to be inconsistent with the public interest. Accordingly, I direct that the construction of one DLGN in the FY 1968 Shipbuilding Program be undertaken in a private shipyard.

LBJ:Defense:WWR:rla

ACTION

64

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June 8, 1968 - 2:50 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

file

SUBJECT: FY 1969-1970 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

1. Defense and AEC have submitted for your statutory approval the attached proposed Nuclear Weapons Stockpile for the end of FY 1970 and certain related adjustments to the FY 1969 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile approved by you on June 10, 1967. These stockpile figures are based on the forces detailed in the Five Year Defense Program that is the basis for your military budget request.

3.4(b)
(5), (6)
6.1(a)

[Redacted]

This net reduction results from a reappraisal of requirements in the light of proposed force levels and a review of nuclear weapons requirements.

3.4(b)
(5), (6)
6.1(a)

[Redacted]

4. The FY 1970 weapons production consists of the modernization of certain existing weapons (MINUTEMAN II), and by providing new warheads for new capabilities (POSEIDON, MINUTEMAN III, FB-111). The weapons to be retired are largely obsolete, being replaced during modernization action, or in excess to projected requirements (strategic bombs and surface-to-air missiles).

5. The Joint Chiefs have approved the adjusted FY 1969 and proposed FY 1970 stockpile figures as recommended.

6. In addition to the stockpile numbers, authorization is required for warheads needed for the quality assurance and reliability testing programs.

3.4(b)
(5), (6)
6.1(a)

[Redacted]

In addition the

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ECR 10/10/68 Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-158
By *cbm*, NAC/DA Date 2-28-03

AEC requires an authorization to produce those nuclear warheads parts intended for transfer to the United Kingdom pursuant to the terms of the agreement for cooperation.

7. The proposed FY 1970 stockpile is within the presently projected availability of special nuclear and by-product materials, and the number of weapons requirements to be produced in FY 1970 is within the planned capacity of the Atomic Energy Commission weapons fabrication system.

8. The preliminary AEC estimate of the cost of the weapons to be produced in FY 1970 is approximately \$332,000,000, which does not include the cost of special nuclear materials equipment and plant amortization. Moreover, this figure does not include the costs of Weapon Tests (including development of supplemental test sites) and weapons research and development. These costs are estimated at approximately \$575,000,000 for FY 1970. The above figures are AEC estimates and do not include any additional expenditures to be incurred by the Department of Defense.

9. The Bureau of the Budget has reviewed this proposal. The Bureau believes that the Department of Defense is not retiring enough old strategic bombs in FY 1969 and that the proposed inventory of tactical bombs is not supported by an adequate analysis. However the Bureau recommends that the proposed request be approved and that the issue of the retirement of more obsolete and redundant weapons be readdressed in connection with the FY 1971 review next fall.

10. The approval letters proposed for your signature embody certain new language that the Bureau and my staff have worked out with the Department of Defense and AEC to eliminate certain troublesome obscurities in the language previously used for approvals. The DoD and AEC had found the old language unsatisfactory since they considered their authority was cloudy, and we found it unsatisfactory since it could be subject to interpretation permitting rather large changes in the stockpile without advance Presidential approval.

11. As I reported to you last year, the stockpile request and the request for authorization to disperse nuclear weapons abroad have been tied together procedurally and they are considered by the Secretary of

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-3-

Defense, the Joint Chiefs and the AEC as a joint coordinated action. This year's package is the first result of the new procedure and there seems to be general agreement that the new approach is worthwhile and will produce even better planning and control in years to come.

12. I recommend that you approve the proposed stockpile and sign the attached memoranda to Defense and AEC.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

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Authority 729/CBS/10
By 100/19, NARA, Date 6-5-92

INFORMATION ⁶⁵

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Saturday, June 8, 1968, 12:15 P. M.

Mr. President:

Pres file

Herewith a capsule of Ambassador Bunker's 54th weekly message:

A. General

- PM Huong takes hold with finesse, energy and determination.
- Huong stresses war on corruption, improved Saigon defense; calls on his ministers to study mobilization effects and to set up 3-month work programs.
- Huong adroitly dealing with Ky, press and with Lower House.
- Impression is that GVN is actively confronting its problems.
- Two new councils met for first time: Administrative Reform, and National Planning.
- Thieu is discussing a new "Super Front."
- Reaction to Huong generally favorable, even from Buddhists, but the Dai Viets and Ky are unhappy: Ky may be won over.
- Huong's honeymoon marred by decreasing attacks on Foreign Minister Thanh and heavy criticism of Phan Quang Dan who may have to be dropped.
- Military pressure continues in I and III Corps, especially Saigon.
- Results in increased anti-Viet Cong feeling, desire for arms, and fear and confusion.
- Attacks on Saigon aimed at destruction of morale and support for GVN, and showing world enemy has capital under siege.
- Urban warfare provokes massive firepower response creating more problems--including the tragic rocket-death of six GVN officials.
- General Abrams takes measures to avoid recurrence.

B. Political

- Reaction to Paris still apprehension, mixed with reassurance, skepticism, and now growing impatience.
- Thieu asks how much longer can we afford restraint while the enemy takes advantage.
- On radio/TV Huong calls for "peace with honor, and with guarantees for the future."
- Most Vietnamese view the Alliance as a Hanoi tool.
- Some evidences in provinces of shifts from Ky to Thieu.

C. Military

- As Thieu forecast, enemy is trying to give impression of success, to inflict heavy casualties, and to maintain heavy infiltration despite his own heavy losses (26,000 enemy KIA in May).

-- The purpose is to strengthen his hand in Paris.

D. Pacification

- Thieu and Huong showing greater interest (Huong also RD Minister).
- Huong's principles are protection then involvement in health and education.
- Huong says, as a farmer "coolie," he understands people's wants.
- New Interior Minister eager to press attacks on Viet Cong infrastructure.

E. Urban Recovery

- Last week saw more houses destroyed than rebuilt.
- Evacuees in May up to 168,000 in Saigon while Tet evacuees overall down to 286,000.

F. Economic

- Prices mixed: rice eased but most food items up as fighting slowed deliveries.

W. W. Restow

BKS:amc



Department of State

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FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER
PARIS FOR VIET-NAM MISSION
NODIS

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-16
By , NARA, Date 5-24-93

HEREWITH MY FIFTY-FOURTH WEEKLY MESSAGE.

A. GENERAL

1. IN THE PERIOD SINCE MY LAST MESSAGE, HUONG HAS TAKEN HOLD AS PRIME MINISTER WITH ENCOURAGING ENERGY AND HAS GIVEN EVIDENCE OF DETERMINATION TO MOVE AHEAD ACTIVELY AND ON A BROAD FRONT. THE PERIOD HAS ALSO BEEN MARKED BY CONTINUING MILITARY PRESSURE IN I CORPS AND IN III CORPS WHERE IT HAS PRINCIPALLY BEEN DIRECTED TOWARD HARASSMENT OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF SAIGON. BUT PRESSURE HAS ALSO BEEN EXERTED IN OTHER PARTS OF III CORPS, NOTABLY IN TAY NINH PROVINCE AND CITY. HERE AS IN SAIGON AS WELL, THE VC ATTACKS HAVE INCREASED THE POPULATION'S HATRED FOR THE VC AND THE POPULAR DESIRE FOR ARMS WITH WHICH TO PROTECT THEMSELVES. BUT THEY HAVE ALSO CREATED A FEELING OF CONFUSION AND FEAR. THE CONFUSION ARISES FROM THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE ENEMY HAS SUFFERED A SEVERE DEFEAT IN THE RECENT OFFENSIVE, WHICH IS CERTAINLY CORRECT IN THE MILITARY SENSE, BUT THEY ALSO SEE THAT THE VC HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PENETRATE INTO SAIGON AND TO CONTINUE HARASSING OPERATIONS.
2. HUONG APPEARS TO HAVE TAKEN A FIRM GRIP ON HIS CABINET AND TO HAVE ESTABLISHED HIS OWN AUTHORITY. HE ALSO IS HANDLING HIMSELF WITH CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL SKILL; HE SEEMS TO BE WOOING THE KY CAMP WITH A GOOD DEAL OF FINESSE.
3. IN HIS FIRST TWO CABINET MEETINGS, HE: A) PUT HEAVY STRESS ON THE ATTACK ON CORRUPTION, INSTRUCTED EVERY MINISTER TO REPORT ALL INSTANCES OF CORRUPTION, EVEN IF IT SHOULD INVOLVE A RELATIVE; B) INSTRUCTED GENERALS KHIEM AND VY TO COME UP

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-2- SAIGON 29472, JUNE 8 (SECTION ONE OF FIVE)

WITH PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE THE SAIGON AREA CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM WITH WHICH HE EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION; C) ORDERED ALL MINISTERS TO STUDY THE EFFECTS OF GENERAL MOBILIZATION ON THEIR MINISTRIES AND GIVE HIM THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS; AND D) INSTRUCTED EACH MINISTER TO PREPARE A WORK PROGRAM FOR THE NEXT THREE MONTHS WITH THE PURPOSE OF USING THESE PROGRAMS TO INFORM THE PEOPLE ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ATTRACT ASSEMBLY SUPPORT.

4. HUONG HAS ALSO TAKEN SEVERAL HIGHLY VISIBLE MEASURES WHICH SHOULD HELP IN WINNING SUPPORT FOR HIS GOVERNMENT: A) AN IMPORTANT ONE HAS BEEN THE LIFTING OF CENSORSHIP WHICH HAS RESULTED IN FAVORABLE NEWS STORIES BOTH HERE AND ABROAD; B) HE PAID A WELL PUBLICIZED CALL ON THE SPEAKER OF THE LOWER HOUSE AND INDICATED THAT HE WANTED TO PROMOTE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE LEGISLATURE AND EXECUTIVE; C) ON MAY 31, HE CALLED ON GENERAL LOAN AT THE HOSPITAL, BEARING FLOWERS AND A GIFT, THE PRESS GIVING FULL COVERAGE TO THE VISIT; AND D) ON JUNE 1, HE PAID A SURPRISE VISIT TO THE PETRUS KY REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT CENTER TO CHECK FIRST HAND ON CONDITIONS THERE. LATER HE HELD AN INFORMAL RECEPTION FOR THE PRESS, RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS FREELY IN A LIVELY SESSION.

5. OTHER GOVERNMENT ACTIONS HAVE BEEN FAVORABLY RECEIVED AND HAVE GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS MOVING AHEAD ACTIVELY ON THE PROBLEMS IT FACES. GENERAL NGUYEN VAN MINH (COMMANDER OF THE 21ST ARVN DIVISION) WAS NAMED COMMANDER OF THE CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT, A MOVE WE ALSO HAVE LONG FAVORED. OUR OWN COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN SAIGON WILL BE BROUGHT INTO CLOSE COORDINATION WITH MINH'S NEW COMMAND IN ORDER TO ASSURE MORE EFFECTIVE DEFENSE OF THE CITY.

6. THE NEW COUNCIL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM MET FOR THE FIRST TIME JUNE 4, AND THE NEW NATIONAL PLANNING COUNCIL HELD ITS FIRST SESSION JUNE 5. THIEU WILL CHAIR BOTH COUNCILS WITH DEPUTY CHAIRMEN TO CARRY ON THE DAY TO DAY WORK. THESE BODIES HAVE BEEN SET UP TO IMPROVE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING BY GIVING THESE PROBLEMS HIGH LEVEL AUTHORITY.

7. HUONG'S APPROACH TO KY AND HIS SUPPORTERS WAS REINFORCED BY THIEU'S ANNOUNCEMENT JUNE 3 THAT GENERALS LOAN AND THANG HAVE BOTH ADDED A STAR, LOAN BECOMING MAJOR GENERAL, AND THANG LIEUTENANT GENERAL.

8. THIEU IS ALSO APPARENTLY MOVING TO RALLY WIDER SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT. HE HAS REPORTEDLY DISCUSSED WITH

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-3- SAIGON 29472, JUNE 8 (SECTION ONE OF FIVE)

TRAN VAN DON THE FORMATION OF A NEW SUPER-FRONT, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE THIEU-BACKED FREE DEMOCRATIC FORCE AS WELL AS DON'S NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT, AND A NUMBER OF OTHER POLITICAL GROUPS. DON IS PLANNING A PRELIMINARY MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THESE GROUPS JUNE 9.

9. REACTION TO THE HUONG GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO BE GENERALLY FAVORABLE. PERHAPS THE MOST SURPRISING SOURCE OF SUPPORT IS THE AN QUANG BUDDHIST FACTION. A NUMBER OF THE LEADING BONZES HAVE MADE PUBLIC OR PRIVATE COMMENTS INDICATING THAT THEY ARE PLEASED BY THE FORMATION OF THE HUONG GOVERNMENT. EVEN TRI QUANG, WHO MAY BE RELEASED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, IS REPORTED TO SUPPORT HUONG. GIVEN HUONG'S PREVIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH THE BUDDHIST LEADERSHIP, THIS SUPPORT IS MOST WELCOME.

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Department of State

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10. THE APPLAUSE, HOWEVER, IS NOT UNANIMOUS. AS I REPORTED LAST WEEK, THE REVOLUTIONARY DAI VIETS ARE UNHAPPY BECAUSE THEIR LEADER DID NOT GET THE CABINET SPOT HE WANTED. VICE PRES KY AND HIS SUPPORTERS ALSO ARE NOT HAPPY WITH RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. KY HAS STATED BOTH TO ME AND AMBASSADOR BERGER THAT THE SWITCH FROM LOC TO HUONG DOES NOT MEAN STRONGER GOVERNMENT AND GREATER UNITY. I AM HOPEFUL, HOWEVER, THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WAR CABINET, WHICH THIEU TOLD ME JUNE 6 HE PROPOSES TO DO AT THE CABINET MEETING NEXT WEEK, WILL BRING KY INTO ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT DECISIONMAKING PROCESS. IF HUONG FOLLOWS THROUGH ON HIS SKILLFUL EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONS WITH KY, AND IF THIEU WILL MAKE MORE OF AN EFFORT TO TALK THINGS OVER WITH KY, WHICH I AGAIN URGED HIM TO DO YESTERDAY, I THINK THE PROBLEM OF THE THIEU/KY RELATIONSHIP NEED NOT BE TOO TROUBLESOME. I BELIEVE IT IS A FACT THAT KY'S PUBLIC IMAGE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY DIMINISHED BY SOME OF HIS RECENT ACTIONS. HIS INTEMPERATE AND ILL CONSIDERED STATEMENTS, HIS PROPENSITY TO TAKE UP SOMETHING SUCH AS CIVIL DEFENSE ACTIVELY AND ENTHUSIASTICALLY AND THEN LOSE INTEREST AND DROP IT, AND HIS RATHER OBVIOUS SUKING HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME THIEU'S STATURE HAS BEEN RATHER STEADILY ENHANCED NOT ONLY IN SAIGON, BUT IN THE PROVINCES AS WELL.

11. WHILE HUONG STILL SEEMS TO BE ENJOYING SOMETHING OF A HONEYMOON WITH NEARLY ALL POLITICAL FACTIONS, TWO OF HIS MINISTERS HAVE COME UNDER FIRE. SIGNIFICANTLY BOTH ATTACKS CENTER AROUND THE VERY SENSITIVE MATTER OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITH THE COMMUNISTS. ASSEMBLY CRITICISM OF FOREIGN MINISTER THANK, WHICH I REPORTED LAST WEEK, HAS CONTINUED THOUGH IN A SOMEWHAT LOWER KEY. PHAN QUANG DAN'S REMARKS, AS CARRIED IN THE US PRESS, HAVE RESULTED IN HEAVY CRITICISM OF HIM. REPORTS STATING THAT DAN FAVORS IMMEDIATE GVN-MLF TALKS AND AN ULTIMATE COALITION GOVERNMENT HAVE AROUSED

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-2- SAIGON 29472, JUNE 8 (SECTION TWO OF FIVE)

MUCH INDIGNATION HERE. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE SPECIFICALLY REJECTING DAN'S REPORTED VIEWS AND POINTING OUT MINISTERS MUST ACCEPT GOVERNMENT POLICY ON THIS SUBJECT. UNLESS DAN CAN DEFEND HIMSELF VERY SKILLFULLY UPON HIS RETURN, HUONG MAY BE UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE TO DROP HIM FROM THE CABINET.

12. ENEMY PRESSURES ON SAIGON: THE ATTACK ON SAIGON, NOW ENTERING ITS SECOND MONTH, APPEARS TO HAVE TWOFOLD OBJECTIVE: A) TO UNDERMINE AND BREAK DOWN THE MORALE OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, TO WEAKEN THE FABRIC OF GOVERNMENT AND EVENTUALLY TO DESTROY IT; AND B) TO IMPRESS THE US AND WORLD OPINION THAT THE ENEMY IS WINNING THE WAR, THAT SAIGON IS UNDER SIEGE AND ABOUT TO FALL TO COMMUNIST FORCES.

13. ENEMY TACTICS ARE TWOFOLD: A) RANDOM SHELLING OF THE POPULATION WITH ROCKETS AND MORTARS; AND B) GUERRILLA WARFARE ADAPTED TO CITY STREETS. THE ENEMY HAS Poured MORE THAN 250 ROUNDS OF ROCKET AND MORTAR FIRE INTO SAIGON SINCE MAY 5 (THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE GIA DINH AND TAN SON NHUT AIR BASE). ON JUNE 4, A RECORD 40 ROUNDS HIT THE CITY. ON JUNE 6, 16 ROUNDS STRUCK THE CITY KILLING 25 PEOPLE AND DESTROYING 22 HOUSES.

14. THE USE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE IN CITY STREETS BEGAN ABOUT MAY 25. A VC GROUP INFILTRATED INTO GIA DINH CITY AND SPLIT INTO CELL SIZE UNITS WHICH ATTACKED ARVN AND POLICE PERSONNEL ALONG A NUMBER OF STREETS. ON MAY 27, SIMILAR ACTIONS TOOK PLACE IN SAIGON'S FIFTH AND SIXTH PRECINCTS. PRISONER INTERROGATION AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT THE ENEMY AIMS TO PENETRATE SAIGON'S FIRST PRECINCT WHERE, IN A CONCENTRATED AREA, THEY CAN STRIKE AT THE PALACE, THE AMERICAN EMBASSY, GVN MINISTRIES, VITAL GVN PUBLIC COMMUNICATION INSTALLATIONS, AND THE NAVAL BASE. THE ENEMY'S CURRENT TACTIC IS TO ROTATE HIS FORCES, TO ENGAGE IN THE CITY FOR A WEEK AND THEN PULL OUT WHILE ANOTHER GROUP MOVES IN TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE. ANOTHER OBJECTIVE EVIDENTLY HAS BEEN TO PROVOKE ARVN AND US FORCES TO EMPLOY MASSIVE FIRE POWER, THUS DESTROYING MORE OF THE CITY AND CREATING ADDITIONAL POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS FOR THE GOVERNMENT.

15. SINCE MAY 5, THE ENEMY HAS KILLED 189 CIVILIANS AND WOUNDED 614 IN SAIGON AND GIA DINH. IN SAIGON 15,500 HOMES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED AND ABOUT 115,000 NEW EVACUEES CREATED;

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-3- SAIGON 29472, JUNE 8 (SECTION TWO OF FIVE)

IN GIA DINH ANOTHER 30,000 EVACUEES HAVE RESULTED FROM ENEMY ACTION. CONSIDERING THIS TOLL, THE CONTINUED HIGH MORALE OF THE GVN AND ITS PEOPLE IS A TRIBUTE TO THEIR COURAGE AND DETERMINATION. I FEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE SUSTAINED UNCERTAINTY WHICH ENEMY ACTION OF THIS NATURE IS BOUND TO CREATE IS UNLIKELY TO HAVE EVENTUALLY A SERIOUS EFFECT ON MORALE.

16. A TRAGIC ACCIDENT: YOU ARE AWARE, I KNOW, OF THE MALFUNCTIONING OF A US HELICOPTER ROCKET WHICH WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF SIX SENIOR GVN OFFICIALS AND THE WOUNDING OF TWO OTHERS. I HAVE DELIVERED YOUR LETTER OF CONDOLENCE AND REGRET TO PRES THIEU AND VICE PRES KY. THIS MORNING, THIEU EXPRESSED HIS GREAT APPRECIATION FOR THIS GESTURE OF SYMPATHY AND FRIENDSHIP. KY IS IN NHATRANG AND I SHALL BE UNABLE TO SEE HIM UNTIL THE FIRST WEEK OF NEXT WEEK.

BUNKER

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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1968 JUN. 8. AM 9:01

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4288

INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1151

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 5 SAIGON 29472

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17. GENERAL ABRAMS, IN THE MEANTIME, HAS TAKEN THE MOST STRINGENT MEASURES TO AVOID RECURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OF THIS KIND. ACTION BY ARTILLERY, BOMBING, OR GUNSHIP WITHIN CITY AREAS WILL BE TAKEN ONLY ON HIS AUTHORIZATION. HE HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN A STUDY TO DEVISE MEANS FOR BETTER COMBATING THE INFILTRATION AND HARASSMENT WHICH THE ENEMY IS PRESENTLY EMPLOYING. HE HAS ALSO CLOSELY COORDINATED OUR COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS FOR SAIGON UNDER GENERAL WEYAND, II FIELD FORCE COMMANDER, AND GENERAL HAY, DEPUTY TO GENERAL WEYAND; AND AS I HAVE MENTIONED THESE WILL BE BROUGHT INTO CLOSE COORDINATION WITH GENERAL MINH'S NEW COMMAND OF THE CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT.

B. POLITICAL

18. REACTION TO THE PARIS TALKS. MOST VIETNAMESE CONTINUE TO VIEW THE PARIS TALKS WITH CONSIDERABLE APPREHENSION, THOUGH THE CONTINUED FIRMNESS OF THE US POSITION HAS BEEN REASSURING. ALSO, AS I REPORTED PREVIOUSLY, THEY REMAIN EXTREMELY SKEPTICAL THAT ANY ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT CAN COME OUT OF THE PARIS MEETINGS. PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT, MANY ARE NOW GROWING IMPATIENT. ENEMY MILITARY PRESSURE ON SAIGON IS WIDELY SEEN AS AN EFFORT TO FORCE THE US TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN PARIS; AND THIEU SEVERAL TIMES HAS ASKED ME HOW MUCH LONGER WE CAN AFFORD TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT WHILE THE ENEMY CONTINUES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT. SPECIFICALLY, THE NEW INFORMATION MINISTER TON THAT THIEN URGED THAT FOR EVERY MORTAR OR ROCKET DROPPED ON SAIGON, A BOMB SHOULD BE DROPPED ON HANOI.

19. CONG LUAN ON JUNE 2 TYPIFIED THIS ATTITUDE: "SO MANY INNOCENT VIETNAMESE ARE KILLED EVERY DAY. MR. HARRIMAN PROBABLY KNOWS IT, AND AT PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S RANCH, GENERAL WESTMORELAND DID CALL THE ATTENTION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION TO THE EVER-INCREASING INFILTRATION OF COMMUNIST PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT INTO SOUTH VIET-NAM.

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-2- SAIGON 29472, JUNE 8 (SECTION THREE OF FIVE)

IF THE US REALLY WANTS TO ACHIEVE PEACE WITHOUT BEING DECEIVED BY THE COMMUNISTS, SHE SHOULD STOP 'PLAYING THE GAME' AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE GAME IS NO FUN AT ALL, SINCE IT COSTS TOO MUCH BLOOD OF INNOCENT VIETNAMESE, WHO UP TO NOW HAVE SHOWED FRIENDLINESS TOWARD THE AMERICANS WHOM THEY HAVE BELIEVED ABLE TO PROTECT THEM AGAINST COMMUNIST TERRORISM."

20. THE NEW HUONG CABINET -- AND HUONG HIMSELF -- IS BEING ASSESSED IN THE LIGHT OF POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE GVN POSITION TOWARD A PEACE SETTLEMENT. MOST EDITORIAL COMMENT IS FAVORABLE, ASSERTING CONFIDENCE IN THE FIRMNESS OF HUONG'S POSITION.

21. HUONG ADDRESSED HIMSELF TO THE QUESTION OF PEACE IN HIS RADIO/TV ADDRESS MAY 28. HE CALLED FOR A "PEACE WITH HONOR, AND WITH GUARANTEES FOR THE FUTURE." THE GVN WILL TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, HE SAID; THAT INITIATIVE WILL TAKE THE FORM OF A "MAJOR ROLE FOR THE GVN AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE AND IN TALKS REGARDING THE VIET-NAM PROBLEM." IN HIS RECEPTION FOR THE PRESS JUNE 1, HUONG REPORTEDLY SAID THAT HE IS NOT YET ACQUAINTED WITH THE ROLE ENTRUSTED TO BUI DIEM AND THE GVN LIAISON MISSION IN PARIS, BUT THAT HE WILL LOOK INTO IT AND, IF THE PRESENCE OF THE DELEGATION IN PARIS BRINGS NO ADVANTAGE, HE WILL RECALL IT TO VIET-NAM.

22. THE ALLIANCE. ALTHOUGH THE ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL, DEMOCRATIC AND PEACE FORCES HAS CAUSED MUCH COMMENT AMONG LOCAL POLITICIANS AND THE VERNACULAR PRESS SINCE ITS FORMATION IN APRIL, IT IS MY IMPRESSION THAT IT HAS NOT SO FAR HAD ANY SIGNIFICANT APPEAL FOR THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY. SOME STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN, BUT THE GREAT MAJORITY VIEW IT FOR WHAT IT IS, A TOOL OF HANOI. MOST RECENTLY, THE AN QUANG BUDDHIST LEADERS WHO HEAD VAN HANH UNIVERSITY AND THE LARGEST BUDDHIST SECONDARY SCHOOL IN SAIGON HAVE BOTH TOLD US THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS MADE NO INROADS AMONG THEIR STUDENTS AND TEACHERS.

23. THIEU HAS EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS TWO PRIMARY OBJECTIVES: (A) TO GENERATE WORLD WIDE SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT AND OFFER A MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH IT; AND (B) TO PERSUADE LEFTIST VIETNAMESE THAT THERE IS A THIRD ALTERNATIVE TO THE GVN AND THE NLF.

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-3- SAIGON 29472, JUNE 8 (SECTION THREE OF FIVE)

24. SOME REPORTS FROM THE PROVINCES. OUR POLITICAL REPORTERS IN I CORPS NOTE EVIDENCE OF A SHIFT OF POWER FROM VICE PRESIDENT KY TO PRESIDENT THIEU. THEY ARE HEARING CRITICISMS OF KY'S SPEECHES FROM THEIR CONTACTS. MORE IMPORTANT, THE LOCAL CVT LABOR UNION BRANCHES AND THE VNQDD CHAPTERS IN I CORPS APPEAR TO BE LEANING TOWARD THIEU. HERE IN SAIGON I THINK THERE IS A TREND OF INCREASING SUPPORT FOR THIEU AND AWAY FROM KY IN MANY GROUPS, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE FORMATION OF THE HUONG CABINET. EVIDENTLY IT IS BEING REFLECTED IN THE PROVINCES AS WELL.

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Department of State

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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON.

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4289

INFO RUEFNR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1152

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 4 OF 5 SAIGON 29472

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25. IN II CORPS THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IS REPORTEDLY CLOSE TO WHAT IT WAS BEFORE TET. HOWEVER, POLITICAL ATTITUDES REMAIN POLARIZED, WITH THE REACTION AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS GENERATED BY THE TET ATTACKS STILL STRONG. OUR REPORTERS FIND MORE WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE ENEMY AND ALSO A NEW RECEPTIVENESS TO THE IDEA THAT THE VIETNAMESE MUST BEAR THE MAJOR BURDEN IN THIS WAR. ALONG WITH THESE ATTITUDES GOES A STRONG AVERSION TO ACCEPTING AN AMERICAN IMPOSED SOLUTION TO THE STRUGGLE, PARTICULARLY IF IT SHOULD INVOLVE ANY FORM OF COALITION GOVERNMENT.

26. GENERAL MOBILIZATION. PRES THIEU HAS SENT THE GENERAL MOBILIZATION BILL BACK TO THE ASSEMBLY WITH A REQUEST FOR CHANGES. IN PARTICULAR, THIEU WANTS THE BILL TO ALLOW FOR THE DRAFTING OF 17 YEAR OLDS IF NECESSARY (THE DRAFTING OF 18 YEAR OLDS WILL BE COMPLETED THIS MONTH); RAISE THE MAXIMUM DRAFT AGE TO 43; AND ALLOW FOR DEFERMENTS OF NEWLY RECRUITED POLICE AND RD CADRE OVER THE AGE OF 33. THE ASSEMBLY MUST NOW MEET IN JOINT SESSION TO ACCEPT OR REJECT THE PRESIDENT'S AMENDMENTS TO THE BILL.

C. MILITARY

27. /SIDE FROM THE ATTACKS ON SAIGON, TO WHICH I HAVE REFERRED, THE ENEMY INTENTION TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE WHEREVER AND WHENEVER POSSIBLE CONTINUES. AS THIEU HAD FORECAST LONG AGO, HIS STRATEGY IS AIMED AT AFFECTING THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS ATTEMPTING TO GIVE ANY IMPRESSION OF SUCCESS AND OFFENSIVE MOMENTUM. HE IS ALSO ATTEMPTING TO INFLICT THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CASUALTIES ON US FORCES IN THE HOPE OF WEAKENING OUR RESOLVE. WHILE THE NUMBER OF ENEMY ATTACKS ON RVNAF FORCES DURING THE LAST MONTH REMAINED CONSTANT, ATTACKS BY FIRE AND GROUND ATTACKS AGAINST US/FW FORCES HAVE DOUBLED. IN ADDITION, HE IS CONTINUING TO REINFORCE AND BUILD UP HIS UNITS THROUGH THE HEAVIEST INFILTRATION HE HAS YET ATTEMPTED. ALTHOUGH, AS I MENTIONED IN MY LAST WEEK'S MESSAGE, THE ENEMY

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-2- SAIGON 29472, JUNE 8 (SECTION FOUR OF FIVE)

CONTINUES TO TAKE EXTREMELY HEAVY CASUALTIES, IS RECRUITING PROGRESSIVELY YOUNGER AGE GROUPS, AND SENDING MEN INTO COMBAT WITH INADEQUATE TRAINING, HE GIVES EVERY EVIDENCE OF BEING WILLING TO TAKE THESE HEAVY LOSSES IN PURSUIT OF HIS POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. BUT IT IS ALSO EVIDENT THAT HE IS HAVING TO PROVIDE MORE AND MORE COMBAT FORCES IN THE SOUTH AND IT SEEMS TO ME THE QUESTION CAN WELL BE POSED HOW MUCH LONGER HE CAN KEEP UP THESE EXTREMELY HEAVY LOSSES. IN THE MONTH OF MAY ALONE, 26,000 OF THE ENEMY WERE KILLED. NOT ONLY HAVE THE ALLIED FORCES INFLICTED HEAVY LOSSES IN PERSONNEL ON THE ENEMY, THEY HAVE ALSO CAPTURED LARGE NUMBERS OF WEAPONS AND UNCOVERED SIGNIFICANT CACHES OF BOTH WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION.

D. PACIFICATION

28. OUR INITIAL CONTACTS WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGE US TO BELIEVE THAT IT WILL PUSH PACIFICATION HARDER THAN ITS PREDECESSOR. THIEU HIMSELF IS TAKING AN ACTIVE INTEREST IN IT. MOREOVER, KOMER FOUND PRIMIN HUONG MOST INTERESTED, AND CLAIMING THAT HIS APPRECIATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RD MINISTRY WAS EVIDENCED BY HIS RETAINING THE PORTFOLIO HIMSELF.

29. THE PRIMIN STATED THAT HIS TWO GUIDING PRINCIPLES WOULD BE FIRST TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE AND THEREBY GAIN THEIR CONFIDENCE; AND THEN TO INVOLVE THEM IN SUCH PROGRAMS AS HEALTH AND EDUCATION. HONG ALSO AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF INCREASING THE PEASANT'S INCOME--PRIMARILY THROUGH INCREASED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND PRICE POLICIES THAT BENEFIT THE FARMER OVER THE CONSUMER. HE SAID THAT, SINCE HE WAS BORN TO A POOR FAMILY AND HAD WORKED AS A "COOLIE", HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT THE PEOPLE WANTED.

30. KOMER ALSO MET WITH GEN KHIEM, NEW MINISTER OF INTERIOR, TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING AHEAD FASTER THAN HIS PREDECESSOR IN ATTACKING THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE. THIEU HAS ALREADY INDICATED HIS FULL SUPPORT, AND IS AWAITING THE NECESSARY DECREES FROM THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR. KHIEM APPEARS EAGER TO PRESS THIS EFFORT AND REQUESTED CLOSE LIAISON WITH THE US MISSION. AS I MENTIONED IN MY 52 MESSAGE, WE SEE THE ENEMY AS STEPPING UP HIS EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE AND CONTROL THE COUNTRYSIDE AS WELL AS HARASS THE CITIES IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN HIS NEGOTIATING HAND. THUS OUR COUNTER-EFFORT TO DESTROY THE VC POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ACQUIRES EVEN GREATER IMPORTANCE THAN BEFORE. WE WILL KEEP AFTER IT.

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Department of State

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E. URBAN RECOVERY

31. THE CONTINUING ATTACKS ON SAIGON/GIA DINH ARE ADDING TO RECOVERY BURDENS AND SLOWING DOWN RECOVERY OPERATIONS. OUR JOINT ARVN/MACV OPERATION TO CLEAR AND HELP REBUILD DISTRICTS 6 AND 8 IN SAIGON MADE SOME PROGRESS AS RUBBLE CLEARING REACHED 60 PERCENT COMPLETION. THE FIRST PREFAB HOUSES WERE ERECTED IN DISTRICT 8 (NOT BOTHERED SO MUCH BY RECENT FIGHTING), BUT POOR SECURITY GENERALLY INHIBITED WORK IN DISTRICT 6 AND IN GIA DINH AT THE VERY TIME WHEN SOME ADDITIONAL DESTRUCTION WAS TAKING PLACE. OVERALL THERE WAS A NET LOSS DURING THE WEEK AS MORE HOUSES WERE DESTROYED THAN WERE REBUILT.

32. HOWEVER, EVACUEES FROM THE MAY SERIES OF ATTACKS HAS RISEN AGAIN TO ALMOST 160,000 AS FIGHTING CONTINUED IN SAIGON/GIA DINH.

33. MEANWHILE, HOWEVER, WE ARE STILL MOVING AHEAD TO RESETTLE TET EVACUEES. THEIR NUMBER DROPPED ANOTHER 37,000 LAST WEK TO 286,000 -- 31,000 OF WHICH STILL REMAIN IN SAIGON. THROUGHOUT MOST OF SVN, RECOVERY MOVED AHEAD AT GOOD SPEED AS NEARLY 60,000 FAMILY BUILDING ALLOWANCES WERE PAID IN PIASTERS SO FAR. SOME 64,000 FAMILIES HAV NOW RECEIVED CEMENT AND ROOFING ALLOTTED FOR RECONSTRUCTION. SINCE MOST OF THE REMAINING FAMILIES NOT YET HELPED LIVE OUTSIDE THE CITIES AND PROVINCE CAPITALS, THE SHEER LOGISTIC BURDEN OF DELIVERING THOUSANDS OF TONS OF CEMENT IS TAKING TIME TO OVERCOME. WE HAVE GOTTEN THE GVN TO ALLOW PAYMENT OF EXTRA PIASTERS INSTEAD OF CEMENT AND ROOFING IN SUCH REMOTE DISTRICTS, WHICH WILL BE A BIG HELP IN FINISHING OFF TET RECOVERY PROGRAMS: BESIDES RURAL FAMILIES NORMALLY USE WOOD AND THATCH.

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-2- SAIGON 29472, JUNE 8 (SECTION FIVE OF FIVE)

F. ECONOMIC

34. THIS PAST WEEK SAW FEW SIGNIFICANT NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECONOMIC SITUATION. RETAIL PRICES WERE MIXED. RICE PRICES EASED SLIGHTLY, BUT MOST FOOD ITEMS ROSE AS FIGHTING AROUND SAIGON SLOWED DELIVERIES FROM THE DELTA AND THE AREA EAST OF SAIGON.

35. THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE HAS ANNOUNCED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BRUSSELS TARIFF NOMENCLATURE (BTN) FOR TAX CLASSIFICATION PURPOSES, EFFECTIVE JUNE 1. THIS MOVE SHOULD SERVE TO RAISE TAX COLLECTIONS BY SEVERAL BILLIONS OF PIASTERS ANNUALLY AND THEREBY CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC STABILIZATION. MEANWHILE, THE GOVERNMENT'S TAX SURCHARGE ~~BILL~~ BILL, WHICH RAISES MOST DOMESTIC TAX RATES BY 20 PERCENT IS AWAITING UPPER HOUSE ACTION AFTER LOWER HOUSE PASSAGE.

36. MISSION OFFICERS HELD DISCUSSIONS DURING THE WEEK WITH GVN OFFICIALS CONCERNING MEANS OF RETURNING THE GVN FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVE TO THE AGREED \$300 MILLION LEVEL. IT IS CURRENTLY AROUND \$360 MILLION. WE HAVE PROPOSED A SPECIAL RICE PURCHASE FUND OF \$50 MILLION AND PREPAYMENT OF SOME OUTSTANDING DLF LOANS. IF THESE ARE AGREED, WE WILL PASS THE JUNE 30 DATE AT OR VERY CLOSE TO \$300 MILLION.
BUNKER

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66

ACTION

Saturday, June 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Presence of Irish Prime Minister in Washington

Irish Prime Minister John M. Lynch is in Washington to attend Senator Kennedy's funeral. His tentative plans are to leave Washington Monday, June 10, around noon.

He has not asked to call on you and there is no substantive reason that you should see him.

Do you wish to arrange an appointment?

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

Arrange Appointment

No

BKS:amc

ACTION

67

Profile

Friday, June 7, 1968 -- 7:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk recommends that you receive Chat Bowles next week or the week after. He has requested an appointment with you.

As you recall, you have agreed to an appointment with Ben Oehlert on Wednesday, June 19 at 5:30 p.m.

Under the circumstances, it may be best to see both men.

W. W. Rostow

Set up session with Bowles _____

No _____

Call me _____

WWRostow:rin

S/S 8345

1807

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

67a

June 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Call by Ambassador to India
Chester Bowles

RECOMMENDATION:

That you receive Ambassador Chester Bowles, who will be in Washington for consultation.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

DISCUSSION:

Ambassador Bowles will be in Washington on consultation June 11-14 and June 17-20 and has requested an appointment with you. I believe it would be profitable were you to receive him for a discussion of political and economic developments in India and Indo-US relations.

Additionally, you may want to talk to the Ambassador about his January mission to Cambodia and developments in Southeast Asia since then.

I will be meeting with the Ambassador on June 11. He also plans to meet with Secretaries Clifford, Freeman and Smith.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 33-345 ACTION
By W, NARA, Date 6-17-99

W
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Friday, June 7, 1968 -- 6:45 PM

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. President:

One of the results of last year's furor over arms sales to poor countries was the Reuss Amendment to the Ex-Im Bank Act. It stipulates that Ex-Im can finance such sales only when the President has determined that each sale is "in the national interest."

In the attached, Charlie Zwick (Tab A) and Nick Katzenbach (Tab B) recommend that you sign a Determination covering about \$85 million in military sales to 8 countries -- 7 in Latin America, plus Taiwan. Messrs. Clifford, Gaud and Linder concur in this recommendation.

The Reuss Amendment says that your determination must take into account our interests in avoiding (a) arms races among countries not threatened by the communists, (b) the arming of military dictators who are denying social progress to their people, and (c) diversion of resources from economic development. State argues that these sales would not promote arms races because they are largely for replacement of worn-out equipment and they represent a means of restraining the recipients from buying costlier and more sophisticated weapons. The finding with respect to military dictatorships is not open and shut with respect to Argentina and Taiwan, but in both cases there is powerful evidence that the military regimes are not "denying social progress." State further argues that these expenditures would not represent "needless" diversion of resources from development and that in any event our terms (6%, 7 years on the average) are generous enough to soften the foreign exchange impact.

At Tab C is an illustrative list of the type of equipment to be provided. The exact amounts of each item would be subject to negotiation with each country within the ceiling figure established in your Determination.

This Determination does not settle the question of whether and how the Conte/Long Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act may apply to these sales. All these countries except Taiwan are subject to the Conte/Long requirement that we deduct one dollar of economic aid for every dollar a poor country spends on a "sophisticated weapon system." As of now, we don't think that any of the items for Latin America contained herein will be defined as "sophisticated", but that determination is being made through a separate procedure. If we have problems on that front, we will come back to you.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

I join in the recommendation that you approve. But I would not be doing my job if I did not point out that it is a close and subjective judgment whether these sales will involve diversion of funds from development. The Argentine "need" for 15 supersonic jet fighters, for example, is a subject on which reasonable men can and do differ. What we can say, although it will never satisfy Mr. Reuss, is that our only hope of keeping these military "needs" within bounds is to keep our chair in the game by offering a minimal ante. We do much more to accomplish Reuss' ends by making modest sales to these countries than by walking off in a huff and leaving them to the less tender mercies of other suppliers.

If you approve, we need your signature on the Determination at Tab D. The Congress would be notified of your Determination within 30 days, as required by law.

W. W. Rostow

EKH/vmr

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

68a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 93-345

By JW, NARA, Date 6-17-94

JUN 6 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Presidential Determination to Authorize the Use of Export-Import Bank Funds for Foreign Military Credit Sales to Certain Economically Less-Developed Countries

Attached is a memorandum from Under Secretary Katzenbach recommending that you sign a Presidential Determination to authorize the use of Export-Import Bank funds for military credit sales to eight economically less-developed countries. Clark Clifford, Bill Gaud and Harold Linder concur in this recommendation.

The Reuss amendment to the 1968 extension of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 requires that before Export-Import Bank funds can be used for foreign military credit sales to economically less-developed countries you must determine that such sales are in the national interest. The amendment also states that you must take into account the U. S. interests in avoiding 1) arms races among countries not directly menaced by the Soviet Union or Communist China, 2) the arming of military dictators who are denying social progress to their peoples, and 3) expenditures by developing countries on arms of scarce foreign exchange needed for economic development. I believe you will be justified in making this determination on the grounds of the Reuss amendment.

This is a general authorization to use the funds, subject to other legislative provisions affecting credit sales. As the Under Secretary notes, this determination does not authorize the sale of items which would be subject to the Conte-Long amendment.

This credit, to be guaranteed by the Department of Defense, when added to other guaranteed credit not subject to this Presidential Determination, will result in a total program which will not exceed the \$190 million limit on the extension of guaranteed credit imposed for fiscal year 1968 by Section 525(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act.

I recommend that you sign the determination.


Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachments

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-347

By izg, NARA, Date 3-3-94

May 25, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Determination to Authorize Export-Import Bank Participation in FY 1968 Credit Sales of Defense Articles to Certain Economically Less Developed Countries

Recommendation:

I recommend that you make the necessary determination under the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, to authorize the Export-Import Bank to participate in the credit sale of defense articles and services to eight economically less developed countries in FY 1968. The Department of Defense, the Export-Import Bank, and the Agency for International Development concur in this recommendation.

Discussion:

On May 6, 1968, the Export-Import Bank and the Department of Defense reached an agreement whereunder the Bank would participate in the FY 1968 Foreign Military Sales Program subject, inter alia, to obtaining the requisite Presidential determinations as discussed herein.

The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, (the "Act") requires a Presidential Determination that consummation of the transaction proposed is in the national interest before the Bank may participate in the credit sale of defense articles or services to any country designated as economically less developed for the purposes of the Interest Equalization Tax.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This memorandum seeks your favorable determination for the countries listed below (and the estimated total Foreign Military Sales FY 1968 program for each, which may vary approximately 20 percent).

Argentina	\$ 9.5 million
Brazil	20.0 million
Chile	3.0 million
El Salvador	2.2 million
Mexico	4.0 million
Uruguay	0.3 million
Venezuela	4.5 million
Republic of China	40.0 million

The Act, as amended, also stipulates that in making any such determination you take into account, among other considerations, the national interest in avoiding arms races among countries not directly menaced by the Soviet Union or by Communist China; in avoiding arming military dictators who are denying social progress to their own peoples; and in avoiding expenditures by developing countries of scarce foreign exchange needed for peaceful economic progress.

It is our judgment, for reasons detailed in the attachments hereto, that consummation of the proposed credit sales would not precipitate or augment arms races, that in none of the countries concerned would we be arming military dictators denying social progress to their own peoples, and that the extension of the proposed credits would not result in the diversion of foreign exchange needed for peaceful economic progress.

Your determination, as requested herein, will not authorize the furnishing of items which would be subject to the Conte-Long amendments in the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act, and we will ensure that the proposed transactions when consummated will be permissible under all other provisions of law. If your determination is favorable, we will so report to the Congress within thirty days as required by the Act. (The Republic of China is excepted from the provisions of the Conte-Long amendments.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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The proposed determination, which I recommend that you sign, is enclosed. I have also enclosed discussions and further details relevant to the programs proposed for Latin America and the Republic of China.


Under Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Proposed Determination
2. Material on Latin America
3. Material on Republic of China

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EQUIPMENT

ARGENTINA

C-130 Aircraft (1)
Reconditioning of A-4B Aircraft (25) and
Related Support Equipment
EP-2 Aircraft (2)
UH-19 Helicopter (1); UH-13 Helicopter (2)
HU-16 Amphibious Aircraft (1)

BRAZIL

T-37 Trainer Aircraft (25)
Air Traffic Control Equipment
Destroyer Escort (2) In-Country Ship Construction
Patrol Gunboat (3) In-Country Ship Construction

CHILE

M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers (23)
Trucks and Communications Equipment

MEXICO

C-119G Aircraft (6)

EL SALVADOR

Reconditioned F-51 Aircraft (6)
C-54 Aircraft (1)
Unit Equipment for One Infantry Battalion
(e.g., Trucks, Individual Weapons,
Communications Equipment)

URUGUAY

Reconditioned Naval Netlayer (1)

VENEZUELA

OV-10 COIN Aircraft (6)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-019.035.003/10

* J NARA. Date 12-21-09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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F-5A aircraft (8)
Armored personnel carrier M-113A1 (100)
HH1H helicopter (6)
Communications - ASW ship modernization

and other defense articles and services. In addition, credit of \$18 million for Phase II of the Vehicle Modernization Program would be funded in FY 1968 instead of FY 1969 to keep pace with GRC progress on this co-production program.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

68f

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

689

Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Determination under Section 2(b)(4) of the
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended,
(The "Act"), Authorizing Export-Import Bank
Participation in Credit Sales to Certain
Economically Less Developed Countries

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of May 25, 1968, I hereby determine, pursuant to Section 2(b)(4) of the Act, that it is in the national interest to consummate credit sales of defense articles and services with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, and the Republic of China that will include Export-Import Bank participation in the financing.

You are requested on my behalf to report this determination to the Senate and the House of Representatives within thirty days.

69
INFORMATION

Friday, June 7, 1968, 5:45 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Free file

Secretary Rusk does not want to involve the Ambassador of Israel in a appeal for no violence in response to the assassination of Kennedy. However, Luke Battle has been in touch with David Ginsburg with the suggestion that in the event that the situation becomes serious, private Jewish organization leaders would make appeals for non-violence.

For your information, there was a report which turned out to be false that two Arab students were tarred and feathered at Boston University yesterday. There are many Arab students in this country but up to now there have been no instances involving them which have been reported.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

INFORMATION

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Pres file

Friday, June 7, 1968 -- 4:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

I talked privately with Sec. Rusk about a trip to the Soviet Union. His view is as follows:

1. He doubts whether a trip in the present stage of the Vietnam negotiation would be acceptable or fruitful.
2. If we achieve a negotiating breakthrough -- even before Vietnam is wound up -- he thinks a trip might be acceptable to the Soviet Union and quite useful.
3. Therefore, he is inclined to await the outcome of our exchanges with Moscow and events in Paris over the next several weeks before proceeding with exploratory discussions with Dobrynin.

I agree.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NEJ 95-304
 By WJ, NARA, Date 6-20-96

71

INFORMATION

Friday, June 7, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

Subject: Personnel reductions in Vietnam

You asked what Ellsworth Bunker was doing to effect reductions in the number of U.S. Government employees in Vietnam. We queried Bunker, and he replied with the attached letter to you setting forth his plans.

The letter does not deal with military force levels or CIA employment levels, both of which will be the subject of recommendations to the home agency. In regard to AID, USIA, and State, Bunker proposes to reduce personnel requirements by a total of 331 Americans and 885 non-Americans. He adds that he hopes to make recommendations for additional reductions in the future.

It is not clear to me whether his planned reductions represent a decrease in the actual number of people on hand -- or only a cutback on authorized staff levels. I suspect the latter.

W. W. Rostow

Att

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-18
By mf, NARA, Date 6-19-96

MWright:wpt

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

71a

~~EYES ONLY - CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-16
By ing, NARA, Date 3-21-94

FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER - SAIGON

My dear Mr. President:

1. This refers to your letter to me of February 2, 1968, on the program to reduce U.S. personnel overseas, and my reply to you of February 14.
2. I have reviewed with each agency here their requirements in Vietnam and my comments follow.
3. On force levels, suggestions and recommendations are submitted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
4. On CIA, suggestions and recommendations will be sent separately.
5. On the civilian foreign affairs agencies (State, USIA, and AID) and their respective contributions to CORDS (Civilian Operations for Revolutionary Development Support) in Vietnam, and on DOD civilians, I submit the following recommendations:

- A. AID requirements are being reduced by 257 American civilian positions and 761 non-American civilians.
- B. The military assistance Command Vietnam will reduce its requirements by up to 80 American civilians and up to 120 non-American civilians.
- C. USIA finds itself unable to reduce staff at this critical point in public relations and psychological operations, but requests no increase over present ceilings.
- D. Department of State Americans and locals are being re-programmed as operations change, but I find requirement for six more Americans and 26 more non-Americans next fiscal year, all in support of the other agencies' operations.

6. In summary, omitting uniformed forces and CIA, my recommendations are as follows:

	<u>American</u>	<u>Non-American</u>
AID	MINUS 257	MINUS 761
USIA	MINUS 0	MINUS 0
STATE	PLUS 6	PLUS 26
DOD (Civilians)	MINUS 80	MINUS 120
NET REDUCTION	MINUS 331	MINUS 855

~~EYES ONLY - CONFIDENTIAL~~

7. U.S. civilian programs here appear to have leveled off in staffing. We have rigorously examined plans for increases, and with minor adjustments from one program to another, we have eliminated them. I intend to reduce staff positions and staff at every opportunity, and hope to be able to submit further recommendations in the next weeks and months. Sincerely, Ellsworth Bunker.

INFORMATION

Friday, June 7, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Profile

SUBJECT: Condolence Messages from Heads of State

Listed below are Heads of State or heads of government from whom you have received messages of condolence on the death of Senator Kennedy to date. About 25 more are expected. All will be acknowledged.

- President Ongania, Argentina
- Acting Prime Minister McEwen, Australia
- Prime Minister Gorton, Australia
- Gov. Gen. Casey, Australia
- Chancellor Klaus, Austria
- King Baudouin, Belgium
- President Barrientos Ortuno, Bolivia
- President Khama, Botswana
- President Coste e Silva, Brazil
- Gov. Gen. Michener, Canada
- President Tombalbaye, Chad
- President Lleras, Colombia
- Acting President Jorge Vega Rodriguez, Costa Rica
- Lt. Col. Alphonse Alley, Head, Dahomey
- President Balaguer, Dominican Republic
- President Arosemena, Ecuador
- President Sanchez Hernandez, El Salvador
- Emperor Haile Selassie, Ethiopia
- President Kekkonen, Finland
- President Bongo, Gabon
- Chancellor Kiesinger, Fed. Rep. of Germany
- President Luebke, Fed. Rep. of Germany
- Regent Zoltakis, Greece
- President Montenegro, Guatemala
- President Lopez Arellano, Honduras

Prime Minister Benediktsson, Iceland
President Husain, India
The Shah of Iran
President Shazar, Israel
Prime Minister Eshkol, Israel
President Saragat, Italy
King Hussein, Jordan
King Savang Vatthana, Laos
President Helou, Lebanon
President Banda, Malawi
King Hassan, II, Morocco
Prime Minister de Jong, Netherlands
Gov. Gen. Porritt, New Zealand
President Somoza, Nicaragua
President Ayub Khan, Pakistan
President Robles, Panama
President-Elect Armas, Panama
President Marcos, Philippines
President Abdirasid Ali Scermarche, Somali Republic
President Franco, Spain
King Gustaf, VI, Sweden
Prime Minister Erlander, Sweden
President Bourguiba, Tunisia
President Sunay, Turkey
President Areco, Uruguay
Pope Paul VI
Cardinal Cicognani, Vatican Secretary of State

W. W. Rostow

BKS:ksb

ACTION

73

Per file

Friday, June 7, 1968 - 6:00 PM

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a proposed message to President Tsiranana, of the Malagasy Republic. Tsiranana had a close call in a recent helicopter accident but got out with minor injuries.

Our Embassy recommends -- and I agree -- that you join other Heads of State in sending a goodwill message to Tsiranana.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

WWR:EKH:RM:lw

Attached: file #1835

13a

Proposed Message to President Tsiranana of Malagasy Republic

Dear Mr. President:

I was very relieved to learn that you escaped serious injury in your recent air accident. In a moment of our own national sorrow and tragedy, we are thankful for your good fortune.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

INFORMATION

74

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

Friday

June 7, 1968 -- 4:20 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You will be interested in portraits
of:

- Syrian caution when the going gets rough (pp. 4-5);
- French frustration in Iraq (pp. 6-8).

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)


WWRostow:rln

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-135
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-6-03

~~SERVICE SET~~

74a

2.



3.4
(b)(1)

INR Comment: Syria can well be characterized as the Arab world's bravest coward, heroic in words but ultra-cautious in deed. Its actions in the June 1967 war were similar, although the Syrian Army fought well once engaged. Despite the menacing vocality of Syrian leaders in expounding the regime's extremist policies on the Palestine question,

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 01-137
By iw, NARA, Date 3-10-04


TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

including repeated calls for "national liberation war," they have been successful since the war in avoiding any Syrian military involvement that might have invited Israeli reprisal. Meanwhile, Syria's encouragement of fedayeen activity against Israel through Jordan and Lebanon has had serious consequences for the latter countries. This pragmatic approach to regional objectives has protected Syria from attack while putting it in the vanguard of Arab militancy vis-a-vis Israel and placing the moderate governments which it opposes in perilous situations; King Hussein's downfall is one of those objectives.


~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.



3.4(b)(1)

3.4(b)(1)



INR Comment: US intelligence sources have confirmed press reports that a French-Iraqi agreement was concluded in April whereby France agreed to the sale of about 54 Mirage fighter-bombers to Iraq. Although it was to be a straight commercial transaction, French willingness to provide the planes was seen as a play for political influence with the Arabs, as well as an extra inducement for Iraqi acceptance of the bid by the partially state-owned French company, Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP), to develop Iraq's rich, but untapped North Rumailah oil field. However, CFP's hopes were disappointed when the Iraqis declined all foreign offers and announced their intention to develop the North Rumailah oil field on their own. Now the Mirage deal itself, which the French Ambassador notes has cost France something politically elsewhere, is bogging

*This is a contractual arrangement between the wholly state-owned French petroleum company group, Entreprises de Recherches et

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

down over the price already agreed upon in principle with the Iraqis. The Ambassador's conclusion that the USSR may have intervened is probably based on the fact that the Soviets have been supplying Iraq's military aircraft and other arms needs almost exclusively in recent years.

Activites Petrolieres (ERAP), and the Iraq National Oil Company for exploration and development of certain areas of Iraq, not including North Rumailah. From other sources it is known that the deal with ERAP has been criticized both in Iraq and abroad as unduly favorable to the French.

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 93-18
By cb, NARA, Date 4-20-95

ACTION

75

~~SECRET~~

Friday, June 7, 1968 -- 3:15 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Harriman and Vance propose an outline for the June 12 meeting. They wish to discuss it over the weekend before Harriman returns.

In paragraph 4 they refer to the fact we are not bombing between the 19th and 20th parallels. I have a certain reservation about any reference to that fact. It tends to make it official and either to tie our hands in the future or make a return to bombing in that area more dramatic than it need be.

They also propose another try at reciprocity in which they go on from the DMZ proposition in general to the examples of bad faith, which were included in the original Harriman instruction. You will note in (C) they go back to the idea of a permissible (mid-1967) rate of infiltration.

The policy question is: Do we move to a fall-back position before we have serious private talks.

Paragraph 9 gives them a gracious way to shift from propaganda to private talks by seeking an agreement that publicity on the meetings will be cut down.

The whole exercise would be one more test as to whether they are ready to become serious or not.

You may wish to indicate if you have decided whether you want a Monday meeting with Harriman and Vance.

W. W. Rostow

Yes _____

No _____

Call me _____

Paris 15760 (DELTO 255)

WWRostow:rln

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

75a

15

~~SECRET~~

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Rostow

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 15760

N O D I S/HARVAN

DELTO 255

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-16
By 1-8, NARA, Date 5-24-93

WE ARE SUBMITTING IN THIS MESSAGE A DRAFT OUTLINE FOR THE JUNE 12 MEETING. WE SUGGEST A DISCUSSION OF THE OUTLINE DURING OUR VISIT THIS WEEKEND.

1. WE WILL OPEN. WE PROPOSE MAKING A BRIEF OPENING STATEMENT DEFINING OUR IMMEDIATE PURPOSE IN SPECIFIC TERMS DEALING WITH THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CESSATION OF LIMITED BOMBING OF NORTH VIET-NAM AND WHAT WE HAVE CALLED "RELATED MATTERS."
2. THE STATEMENT WOULD REFER TO THE LACK OF PROGRESS AND THE FACT THAT THE OTHER SIDE HAS BEEN USING THESE MEETINGS AS A PROPAGANDA FORUM RATHER THAN DISCUSSING THE NECESSARY ISSUES. WE WOULD INDICATE NO INTEREST IN PURSUING THE PROPAGANDA LINE AND SUGGEST THAT WE NOW FOCUS ON THE ESSENTIALS AS THEY HAVE EMERGED.
3. WE WOULD DEFINE THE HEART OF THE MATTER AS BEING THEIR DEMAND FOR THE DETERMINATION OF AN UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF ALL BOMBING BEFORE CONSIDERING MATTERS RELATED TO THIS DETERMINATION, AS AGAINST OUR CALL FOR CONSIDERATION OF CESSATION OF BOMBING TOGETHER WITH RELATED MATTERS WHICH INCLUDE RESTRAINT ON THEIR PART AS A SIGN OF GOOD FAITH.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 15760 071306Z

4. WE WOULD INFORM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT, CONTRARY TO THEIR CHARGES THAT WE HAVE INTENSIFIED THE WAR IN THE NORTH SINCE MARCH 31, WE HAVE EXERCISED A DEGREE OF RESTRAINT EVEN BEYOND THAT ANNOUNCED IN THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH OF THAT DATE. AS THEY MUST HAVE NOTED, WE HAVE SHOWN, FOR THE TIME BEING, AN EXTRA MEASURE OF RESTRAINT BY NOT BOMBING IN THE AREA BETWEEN THE 19TH AND 20TH PARALLELS SINCE APRIL 4. MOREOVER, NONE OF OUR TROOPS OR THOSE OF OUR ALLIES HAVE BEEN OPERATING IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ SINCE THEN. THIS EXTRA MEASURE OF RESTRAINT ON OUR PART HAS BEEN APPARENT TO THE AUTHORITIES IN HANOI. UNFORTUNATELY, HANOI HAS RESPONDED WITH THE OPPOSITE OF RESTRAINT AND HAS INTENSIFIED ITS EFFORTS TO TAKE OVER THE SOUTH BY FORCE. SUCH ACTIONS CREATE SERIOUS DOUBTS IN OUR MIND THAT COMPLETELY STOPPING THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH WOULD EVOKE ACTS OF GOOD FAITH ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SIDE.

5. QUOTING FROM THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECHES, WE WOULD EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF THEIR TAKING RELATED ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH A TOTAL BOMBING CESSATION. WE WOULD DEFINE RELATED MATTERS AS THOSE ACTIONS WHICH IN THE ABSENCE OF BOMBING COULD ENABLE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, IF THEY WERE TO ACT IN BAD FAITH, TO INCREASE THE INTENSITY OF THE WAR AND THUS ENDANGER THE LIVES OF OUR MEN AND THOSE OF OUR ALLIES.

6. WE WOULD THEN STATE OUR FUNDAMENTAL POSITION THAT NORTH VIET-NAM MUST NOT IMPROVE ITS MILITARY POSITION AS A RESULT OF A US CESSATION OF BOMBING. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE PROPOSED AMONG OTHER THINGS THE EARLY RESTORATION OF THE DMZ TO ITS PROPER AND ORIGINAL STATUS. WE WOULD REGARD AS ACTS OF BAD FAITH INCONSISTENT WITH OUR OWN RESTRAINT ANY ATTEMPTS BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO IMPROVE THEIR MILITARY POSITION AS A RESULT OF A US CESSATION OF BOMBING. SUCH ACTS OF BAD FAITH WOULD INCLUDE: (A) ARTILLERY OR OTHER FIRE FROM AND ACROSS THE DMZ; (B) GROUND ATTACKS ACROSS THE DMZ OR THE MASSING OF ADDITIONAL FORCES OR SUPPLIES IN NORTH VIET-NAM OR THE DMZ IN A MANNER WHICH POSES A DIRECT THREAT TO ALLIED FORCES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM; (C) AN INCREASE IN THE MOVEMENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND SUPPLIES INTO SOUTH VIET-NAM,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 PARIS 15760 071306Z

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE INCREASE IN INFILTRATION RATE OF RECENT MONTHS IS ABNORMAL AND THAT WE ARE THINKING IN TERMS OF THE RATE WHICH PREVAILED IN MID-1967.

7. WE WOULD MENTION AGAIN OUR CONCERN OVER THE LEVEL OF NVA-VC TERROR ATTACKS DIRECTED AGAINST SAIGON AND REMIND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT CONTINUATION OF THESE ATTACKS IS NOT CONDUCTIVE TO PROGRESS AT THE PARIS TALKS.

8. WE WOULD CALL UPON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS IN THESE TALKS LIE LARGELY IN THEIR HANDS. THEY MUST FACE UP TO THE REALITIES OF THE SITUATION AND RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAS CALLED "SOME GESTURES ON THE OTHER SIDE TOWARD PEACE." IF OUR RESTRAINT AND OUR GOODWILL CONTINUE TO MEET ONLY INFLEXIBILITY, BELLICOSE STATEMENTS AND EVASIONS, WE WILL NOT MAKE ANY PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING AN HONORABLE PEACE. WE ARE PATIENT, BUT WE ARE DETERMINED.

9. WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT, IN LINE WITH THE SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE WHICH WE ARE DEMONSTRATING TODAY, THEY ONCE AGAIN CONSIDER OUR EARLIER SUGGESTION TO REDUCE THE PROPAGANDA OUTPUT IN THE WAKE OF EACH MEETING. WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT EACH SIDE AGREE THAT FOLLOWING THIS AND FUTURE MEETINGS NEITHER SIDE WOULD ISSUE FULL TEXTS OF STATEMENTS MADE AND THAT EACH SPOKESMAN WOULD ONLY PRESENT A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF POSITIONS TAKE BY EACH SIDE. WE WOULD HOPE THEREBY NOT ONLY TO DEMONSTRATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR OWN PURPOSE, BUT TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE WORLD THAT WE WERE NOT APPROACHING THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE WITH POLEMICS AND PURE PROPAGANDA.

10. WE WOULD CLOSE BY REPEATING ONCE AGAIN THE STATEMENT USED AT THE JUNE 5 MEETING AS FOLLOWS: "YOU HAVE ASKED THAT WE ACKNOWLEDGE OR DETERMINE OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CESSATION OF ALL BOMBING. AS WE HAVE STATED THIS HAS NEVER PRESENTED AN INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE TO US, AND WE ARE PREPARED, IN FACT, TO CEASE BOMBARDMENT AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCE. ACCORDINGLY, I HOPE THAT WE MAY PROCEED FORTHWITH TO DISCUSS RELATED MATTERS"
HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

15

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 1703

REC'D : JUNE 7, 1968
8:33 A.M.

SECRET

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PAGE 1 PARIS 15760 02 OF 02 071225Z

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FM EMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2741

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 PARIS 15760

M D D I S/HARVAN

11. THIS STATEMENT AT THE LAST MEETING RECEIVED NO RESPONSE.
WE BELIEVE THUY NOTED OUR FORMULATION, AND WE WILL BE
WATCHFUL FOR ANY REACTION FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE.
HARRIXAN

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

76

Friday, June 7, 1968 -- 11:05 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This March 20 captured document confirms enemy difficulties, including:

- local manpower shortage, forcing reliance on North Vietnamese infiltrations;
- heavy casualties due to air and artillery attacks;
- lack of confidence after Tet and post-Tet failures.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

76a
June 6, 1968

SUBJECT: January 29 Initiative

A report, dated March 20, 1968, prepared for the signature of San Canh for B4 Current Affairs Committee, pertains to activities accomplished by TXU (possibly VC Binh Duong Province Capital Party Committee), during the X3 Offensive Campaign (probably meaning 3rd Phase of the First General Offensive) from March 5 to March 16, 1968.

Regarding the VC activities, the document reveals that a 3 day meeting was held by 83 men, including eight members of City Party Committee and 35 overt and covert agents. They met to study the orders of E (possibly E5, also known as Sub-Region 5) Party Committee and to prepare a plan of activities for the 3rd VC/NVA offensive phase. Many participants had expressed their doubts as to the success of the 3rd VC/NVA offensive phase. These people argued that with the failures of the two previous phases and the many difficulties caused by FWMAF/RVNAF actions the 3rd offensive Phase cannot be successfully carried out in a matter of a few months. The document discloses that local units and agencies had to completely rely on reinforcements from higher HQ, since they do not have enough personnel to carry out the assigned missions. People also complained about VC/NVA failure to contain or reduce the effectiveness of FWMAF/RVNAF air and artillery capabilities which have caused heavy personnel losses to VC/NVA troops and the population.

77

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, June 7, 1968 -- 11:00 am

Mr. President:

Pres file

25X1A

[Redacted]

From a most dangerous immediate post-Tet position, General Thang has substantially reversed the balance; although the VC have by no means disintegrated.

W. W. Rostow

25X1A

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

SANTIZED

Authority NLS.019.035.003/11

By J, NARA, Date 3-29-01



25X1A

PAGE 2 OF 12 PAGES

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
(dissem controls)

THE VC ARE STRIVING FOR MAXIMUM CONTROL OF THE COUNTRYSIDE AND ARE HARASSING REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) TEAMS AT AN INCREASING RATE BUT ARE NOT KILLING AS MANY RD CADRES AS THEY WERE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN. VC MORALE HAS DETERIORATED. THEY CANNOT CLAIM ANY PROGRESS IN THEIR MILITARY POSITION, WHICH IS SLOWLY DETERIORATING AND ARVN IS NOW STRONGER AND MORE AGGRESSIVE. GENERAL THANG, WHO IS COMPLETING ONE CAMPAIGN AND PLANNING ANOTHER, HAS MADE STEADY PROGRESS THROUGH HIS EMPHASIS ON AN OFFENSIVE POSTURE FOR ARVN. ADDITIONAL TRAINING HOURS WILL BE ADDED TO THE ARVN SCHEDULE TO IMPROVE THEIR FIGHTING ABILITY. AS LONG AS GENERAL THANG IS IN COMMAND, THERE IS LIKELY TO BE SLOW, STEADY DETERIORATION OF THE VC MILITARY POSITION AND A PARALLEL IMPROVEMENT OF THE GVN POSITION. THERE WILL BE NO MASS VC DEFECTIONS, HOWEVER, AND THE VC ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE IS STILL EFFECTIVE AND LARGELY INTACT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRYSIDE OF IV CORPS.

REPORTS OF VC PROBLEMS IN IV CORPS ARE NOT NEW. PRIOR TO TET THE TIDE WAS REPORTEDLY TURNING ON THEM; NEVERTHELESS, THEY WERE ABLE TO STOCKPILE MATERIEL, TO RECRUIT/IMPRESS PERSONNEL INTO SERVICE, AND TO UPGRADE EXISTING MILITARY UNITS PRIOR TO TET, INDICATING THEIR POSITION WAS NOT AS PRECARIOUS AS IT APPEARED. THEIR TRUE STRENGTH WAS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS BECAUSE OF THE TRADITIONAL LACK OF ARVN AGGRESSIVENESS. THE DELTA DIFFERS FROM OTHER CORPS AREAS IN THAT THE TERRAIN IS UNFAVORABLE FOR LARGE-SCALE OPERATIONS AND THUS FAVORS THE VC, AND THE ABSENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) UNITS CONTRIBUTES TO THE PICTURE OF A SOUTHERN REVOLUTION PROJECTED BY COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MEDIA. THERE WAS ALSO IN PRE-TET DAYS A DE FACTO CEASEFIRE IN MUCH OF

5
4
3
2
1

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
(dissem controls)

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(classification)

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(dissem controls)

IV CORPS WHICH GAVE THE VC AN AURA OF STRENGTH IN SPITE OF THEIR PROBLEMS. THE VC INABILITY TO FOLLOW UP THEIR INITIAL TET ATTACKS ON URBAN AREAS IN THE DELTA GAVE STRONG EVIDENCE OF THEIR TRUE CAPABILITIES. GVN FORCES WERE IMMOBILIZED BY THE OPENING ATTACKS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE, BUT EVEN WITH ARVN TIED DOWN BY RUMORS OF MORE ATTACKS AND GVN FORCES WITHDRAWN FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE TO DEFEND THE CITIES, THE VC WERE UNABLE TO CAPITALIZE ON THEIR ADVANTAGES. VC MORALE ROSE AS THEY WERE ABLE TO DISRUPT LIFE IN THE DELTA, THREATEN LARGE AREAS, AND LAUNCH SPORADIC ATTACKS. THE VC OBTAINED MAXIMUM IMPACT WITH A MINIMUM OF FORCES. DURING THIS PERIOD THE VC INCREASED RECRUITMENT, COLLECTED TAXES, ACQUIRED FOOD, MOVED IN SUPPLIES FROM CAMBODIA, AND INCREASED THEIR FIREPOWER WITH NEW WEAPONS.

WHEN THE DYNAMIC GENERAL THANG ARRIVED IN THE DELTA, HE ENCOUNTERED RELUCTANCE AND ANTI-PATHY, BUT HE WAS ABLE TO LAUNCH HIS TRUONG CONG-DINH OFFENSIVE. AS THE GVN BECAME MORE AGGRESSIVE, IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT REPORTED VC PROBLEMS WERE REAL; POPULAR CONFIDENCE IN THE GOOD INTENTIONS OF THE GVN CAME MORE TO THE FORE, BUT THE TRADITIONAL POPULAR APATHY ALLOWED LITTLE MORE THAN TOLERANCE OF THE GVN IF THEY COULD ACHIEVE PEACE. IN A SENSE, THE GVN IMAGE HAS IMPROVED BUT FULL POPULAR SUPPORT IS STILL DEPENDENT ON THE GVN'S ABILITY TO GUARANTEE SECURITY. MEANWHILE, THE VC HAVE A SERIOUS MORALE AND SUPPLY PROBLEM IN THE FACE OF GVN OPERATIONS. THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT THE NEW VC REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES, OR THE NATIONAL ALLIANCE, HAVE TAKEN ROOT. THE VC HAVE LOST MUCH OF THEIR ABILITY TO MASS FORCES. THE SUPPLY OF QUALIFIED PERSONNEL HAS BEEN REDUCED, BUT THERE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE A SERIOUS QUANTITATIVE WEAKENING BECAUSE OF

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
(dissem controls)

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
(dissem controls)

MANPOWER OR SUPPLY PROBLEMS, ALTHOUGH A QUALITATIVE WEAKENING IS EVIDENT.

IN CONCLUSION, WHAT MAY NOW APPEAR TO BE A SUDDEN WEAKENING OF VC FORCES IN THE DELTA MAY BE A MANIFESTATION OF PREVIOUS PROBLEMS BROUGHT TO LIGHT BY GVN OFFENSIVE EFFORTS. WE CAN EXPECT THE ENEMY, IN THE FACE OF GVN-ALLIED ACTIVITY, TO RESTRICT HIS ACTIVITY TO HARASSING ATTACKS AND ECONOMY OF FORCES TACTICS AS HE ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH HIS MOUNTING PROBLEMS. END OF SUMMARY.

1. THE VIET CONG (VC) MILITARY POSITION IN THE DELTA PROVINCES OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S FOURTH TACTICAL ZONE (IV CORPS) IS DETERIORATING. THE ATTRITION RATE OF VC KILLED, CAPTURED, OR SERIOUSLY WOUNDED IN IV CORPS DURING APRIL AND MAY 1968, CONSERVATIVELY ESTIMATED AT ABOUT 12,000, EXCEEDS THE VC CAPABILITY TO RECRUIT AND TRAIN TROOPS AND REPLACE LEADERS. FURTHERMORE, HOI CHANH REPORTS INDICATE THAT DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS THE VC HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY DESERTIONS OF YOUNG SOLDIERS RECRUITED JUST BEFORE AND AFTER TET. THESE VC DESERTERS, MOST OF WHOM WERE PROBABLY RECRUITED UNDER DURESS, DID NOT REPORT TO CHIEU HOI CENTERS, BUT MERELY RETURNED TO THEIR HAMLETS. PERHAPS OF EQUAL SIGNIFICANCE IS THE STEADY IMPROVEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM'S (GVN) MILITARY POSITION IN THE DELTA UNDER GENERAL THANG'S LEADERSHIP. THERE ARE NOW AN AVERAGE OF 70 OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS OF COMPANY SIZE OR LARGER BEING CONDUCTED DAILY THROUGHOUT IV CORPS UNDER GENERAL THANG'S TRUONG CONG-DINH CAMPAIGN. THIS IS MORE THAN DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF MAJOR OPERATIONS THAT WERE CONDUCTED IN IV CORPS PRIOR TO TET. THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THESE OPERATIONS FAIL TO RESULT IN CONTACT WITH THE

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ENEMY, BUT THEY DO "SHOW THE FLAG" IN THE COUNTRYSIDE AND THEY DO TEND TO KEEP THE VC OFF BALANCE. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN FUNDAMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE VIETNAMESE ARMY (ARVN) IN SUCH FIELDS AS PERSONNEL, TRAINING, AND LOGISTICS; FOR EXAMPLE, THERE ARE NOW ABOUT 25 PERCENT MORE MEN PRESENT FOR DUTY EACH DAY IN THE ARVN INFANTRY AND RANGER BATTALIONS IN IV CORPS THAN THERE WERE IN EARLY MARCH. POPULATION CONTROL MEASURES INSTITUTED IN THE CITIES OF THE DELTA DURING THE PAST TWO MONTHS HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY DECREASED THE VC CAPABILITY OF CONDUCTING INTELLIGENCE, PROPAGANDA, AND SAPPER OPERATIONS IN THE CITIES, AND MAY HAVE REDUCED THEIR CAPABILITY TO OBTAIN SUPPLIES FROM THE CITIES. THE CURFEWS RUNNING FROM 2000 TO 0600 HOURS EACH NIGHT PREVENT THE VC FROM PENETRATING THE CITIES IN STRENGTH UNDETECTED AS THEY DID AT TET. CIVIL DEFENSE MEASURES IN THE CITIES ARE ALSO STEADILY IMPROVING, PARTICULARLY IN CAN THO.

2. THE INTENSITY OF THE WAR IN IV CORPS NOW APPEARS TO BE ALMOST DOUBLE THE PRE-TET LEVEL, BUT THE INITIATIVE NOW APPEARS TO BE MORE IN THE HANDS OF THE GVN THAN THE VC. THE VC STILL CAN AND DO INTERDICT LINES OF COMMUNICATION (LOC), HARASS OUTPOSTS AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) TEAMS, AND MORTAR AIRFIELDS AND CITIES. THE VC ARE FOLLOWING ECONOMY OF FORCE TACTICS; NEVERTHELESS, THEY ARE TAKING HEAVIER CASUALTIES THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE TET. THE INCREASED VC ATTRITION RATE IS NOT DUE TO ANY LARGE SPECTACULAR BATTLES IN IV CORPS, IT STEMS FROM FREQUENT AND SCATTERED CONTACTS THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE CORPS AREA -- AND MUCH OF IT IS DUE TO AIR AND ARTILLERY FIRE. FROM THE PATTERN OF THE ATTACKS, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE VC ARE TRYING TO GAIN AND RETAIN CONTROL OF A MAXIMUM PORTION OF THE COUNTRYSIDE. ATTACKS AGAINST RD TEAMS HAVE INCREASED VERY

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SIGNIFICANTLY. THERE WERE 98 ATTACKS ON OR HARASSMENTS OF RD TEAMS IN IV COPRS IN APRIL AND MAY RESULTING IN 39 RD CADRES KILLED IN ACTION AND 91 WOUNDED. THE PREVIOUS HIGHEST NUMBER OF ATTACKS AGAINST RD TEAMS OCCURRED IN NOVEMBER - DECEMBER 1967 WHEN THE TEAMS WERE ATTACKED OR HARASSED 48 TIMES WITH 99 CADRES KILLED AND 107 WOUNDED. THE VC ARE NOW HARASSING THE TEAMS MORE FREQUENTLY, BUT THEY ARE FOLLOWING ECONOMY OF FORCE TACTICS AND ARE NOT OVERRUNNING THE TEAMS AND KILLING AS MANY AS THEY WERE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE VC WINTER - SPRING CAMPAIGN.

3. THE VC IN THE DELTA, WHO FELT THAT VICTORY WAS ALMOST WITHIN THEIR GRASP IN FEBRUARY, HAVE SUFFERED A DETERIORATION OF MORALE DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS. THEY FAILED TO TAKE ANY CITIES AT TET, BUT THEY DID SUCCEED IN PINNING DOWN THE GVN WITHIN THE CITIES DURING FEBRUARY AND THEY DID GAIN ACCESS TO MOST OF THE COUNTRYSIDE IN THE DELTA BY GVN DEFAULT. BUT DURING MARCH, ARVN, REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES, AND RD TEAMS BEGAN MOVING BACK INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE. AFTER SOME INITIAL RESISTANCE, THE VC BEGAN FALLING BACK TO THEIR TRADITIONAL BASE AND OPERATING AREAS. VC LEADERS COULD JUSTIFY THEIR HEAVY TET CASUALTIES DURING FEBRUARY BY POINTING TO THEIR GAINS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE AND THE SUCCESS OF THEIR TERROR AND INTIMIDATION CAMPAIGN WHICH PINNED THE GVN FORCES DOWN IN THE CITIES. BUT SINCE MARCH, THEY CANNOT POINT TO ANY TACTICAL PROGRESS AND THEIR MILITARY POSITION HAS NOW BEEN SLOWLY BUT STEADILY DETERIORATING. FURTHERMORE, ARVN IS NOW STRONGER AND WAGING A MORE VIGOROUS OFFENSIVE THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE PAST.

5 ALL OF THIS IS BOUND TO HAVE A SERIOUS IMPACT ON VC MORALE, AND THIS IS BORNE OUT
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PAGE 7 OF 12 PAGES

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4. GENERAL THANG'S IMPACT ON THE COURSE OF THE WAR IN THE DELTA WAS DRAMATIC DURING HIS FIRST SEVEN WEEKS AS HE SWITCHED IV CORPS FROM A DEFENSIVE TO AN OFFENSIVE POSTURE. BY MID-APRIL THE TRUONG CONG-DINH CAMPAIGN HAD BEEN FULLY LAUNCHED AND WAS PROVING TO BE EFFECTIVE. SINCE MID-APRIL THE RATE OF PROGRESS HAS BEEN MUCH SLOWER, BUT IT HAS BEEN STEADY. THE TRUONG CONG-DINH CAMPAIGN WILL END ON 30 JUNE AND GENERAL THANG IS NOW PLANNING THE NEXT CAMPAIGN. DURING THE NEXT CAMPAIGN THERE IS SUPPOSED TO BE NO LET UP ON OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, BUT THERE WILL BE NEW EMPHASIS ON IMPROVING THE FIGHTING QUALITY OF THE GVN FORCES BY ADDING TWO DAYS OF TRAINING EACH WEEK TO REMEDY MANY WEAKNESSES WHICH GENERAL THANG AND HIS STAFF AND ADVISORS HAVE SPOTTED DURING THE PAST THREE MONTHS. ALL OF THIS INDICATES THAT THERE SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE A STEADY IMPROVEMENT OF THE GVN MILITARY POSITION. SO LONG AS GENERAL THANG REMAINS IN COMMAND OF IV CORPS, THERE WILL PROBABLY BE A SLOW, STEADY DETERIORATION OF THE VC MILITARY POSITION AND AN ACCOMPANYING IMPROVEMENT OF THE GVN POSITION. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT THERE WILL BE ANY SUDDEN CRACKING OF VC MORALE RESULTING IN MASS DEFECTIONS, HOWEVER THE VC STILL CONTROL OR DOMINATE LARGE AREAS OF THE DELTA COUNTRYSIDE AND THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE IS STILL INTACT, EFFECTIVE, AND WIDESPREAD THROUGHOUT THE DELTA.

5. THESE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN IV CORPS SINCE TET NEED HOWEVER TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF PRE-TET EVENTS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT RECENT EVIDENCE OF INCREASED VC DIFFICULTIES IN VIRTUALLY ALL SPHERES OF ACTIVITY IN IV CORPS IS NEITHER A SUDDEN DEVELOPMENT NOR A NEW PHENOMENA IN THE DELTA. NUMEROUS SIMILAR REPORTS WERE RECEIVED FOR AT LEAST SIX MONTHS PRIOR TO TET AS THE TIDE APPEARED TO BE TURNING AGAINST THE

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
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ENEMY COUNTRYWIDE. DISTRIBUTION AND RECRUITING PROBLEMS WERE AMONG THOSE MOST FREQUENTLY CITED AREAS OF WEAKNESS DURING THIS PERIOD, BUT POST-TET DATA MAKES IT CLEAR THAT, IN SPITE OF THESE PROBLEMS, THE VC WERE ABLE TO STOCKPILE LARGE VOLUMES OF MATERIEL AND RECRUIT (OR IMPRESS) LARGE NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL INTO THEIR SERVICE. THE FORMATION OF NEW BATTALIONS AND UPGRADING OF EXISTING UNITS PRIOR TO TET INDICATE THAT THE ENEMY'S SITUATION WAS NOT AS PRECARIOUS AS WE MIGHT HAVE BELIEVED. GIVEN THE GVN'S TRADITIONAL LACK OF AGGRESSIVENESS IN IV CORPS, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS ACCURATELY THE TRUE STRENGTH OR WEAKNESS OF THE VC IN THE CORPS.

6. IN CONTRAST TO THE NORTHERN THREE CORPS WHICH, OVER THE YEAR, HAD CHANGED TO AN NVA-ALLIED WAR ZONE, THE DELTA REMAINED BASICALLY A VC AREA OF OPERATION WHICH THUS GAVE TO SOME THE FACADE OF AN INTERNAL REVOLUTION, AS THE VC PROPAGANDA PROCLAIMED. ADVANTAGES FAVORING THE VC IN THE DELTA WERE TERRAIN, WHICH WAS UNFAVORABLE FOR LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS, AND THE CLOSER COOPERATION OF THE PEOPLE BASED ON THE AFFINITY OF SOUTHERNER FOR SOUTHERNER. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND INTERROGATIONS REVEAL THAT VC COMMANDERS COUNTED ON AND RECEIVED TWO TO FOUR DAYS' NOTICE OF IMPENDING OPERATIONS AGAINST THEM, WHICH MADE IT POSSIBLE TO REDUCE LOSSES BY EVADING ARVN SWEEPS. THESE FACTORS, ALONG WITH A DE FACTO SEMI-CEASEFIRE WHICH EXISTED THROUGHOUT THE CORPS, GAVE THE VC AN AURA OF APPARENT STRENGTH EVEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE MANY REPORTS OF PROBLEMS WHICH PLAGUED THEM. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE VC AT TET, EVEN WITH THEIR GREAT ADVANTAGE OF SURPRISE, PROVED TO BE

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4 THE BEST INDICATOR OF THE VC'S STRENGTH IN IV CORPS. THEIR INABILITY TO FOLLOW UP 4
3 ON THEIR INITIAL ATTACKS PROVIDED STRONG EVIDENCE AS TO THEIR TRUE CAPABILITIES. 3
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7. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE SHOCK, IMPACT, CONFUSION, AND LACK OF CONFIDENCE ENGENDERED BY THE TET ATTACKS, GVN FORCES WENT INTO A STATE OF INACTIVITY AND IMMOBILITY THAT PLAYED INTO THE HANDS OF THE VC, WHO WERE NOT ABLE TO CAPITALIZE ON IT. VC-GENERATED RUMORS OF IMMINENT AND MORE POWERFUL ATTACKS ON THE URBAN AREAS KEPT THE GVN VIRTUALLY PARALYZED AND TIED DOWN IN STATIC DEFENSE AS MOST GVN FORCES WITHDREW TO THE CITIES GIVING THE VC EVEN FREER ACCESS TO THE COUNTRYSIDE. WHILE AT THE TIME IT WAS BELIEVED THAT VERY SERIOUS PERMANENT DAMAGE WAS BEING DONE TO THE VARIOUS GVN PROGRAMS IN THE COUNTRY, IT HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN SHOWN IN THE DELTA, AS ELSEWHERE, THAT THE ENEMY FORCES WERE ALSO TIED DOWN AND NOT IN A POSITION TO EXPLOIT THEIR FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ACCESS TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY HAD BEEN CREDITED. THUS, THE PERMANENT DAMAGE IN THE COUNTRY WAS LESS DURING THE POST-TET PERIOD THAN ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED, BUT CONSIDERABLE DISRUPTION IN ALL PHASES OF LIFE OCCURED THROUGHOUT THE CORPS. FOR A LONG TIME AFTER THE TET ATTACKS THE ENEMY WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN AN ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE URBAN AREAS, NOT BECAUSE OF HIS STRENGTH, BUT BECAUSE OF THE INACTIVITY OF THE GVN FORCES THROUGHOUT THE AREA. HE WAS ABLE TO THREATEN LARGE AREAS OF THE DELTA WITH LITTLE RISK TO HIS FORCES AND TO LAUNCH SPORADIC ATTACKS BY FIRE TO IMPRESS THE POPULACE WITH HIS POWER. HIS ECONOMY OF FORCE TACTICS REDUCED HIS LOSSES TO A MINIMUM WHILE PRODUCING MAXIMUM IMPACT. DURING THIS PERIOD, VC MORALE ROSE AS THEY WERE ABLE TO MOVE AND LAUNCH ATTACKS WITH RELATIVE IMPUNITY. THE PROBLEMS OF THE PREVIOUS SIX MONTHS WERE ALL BUT FORGOTTEN AND RECRUITMENT/IMPRESSMENT IN THE COUNTRY

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4 PROBABLY REACHED A NEW HIGH, AS YOUNG AND OLD WERE SCOOPED UP AND INSTILLED, AT 4
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2 LEAST TEMPORARILY, WITH REVOLUTIONARY ZEAL. TAXES WERE COLLECTED, FOOD ACQUIRED, 2
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SUPPLIES MOVED IN FROM CAMBODIA, AND, AS BEFORE THE TET ATTACKS, NEW-GENERATION WEAPONS, WITH THEIR INCREASED FIREPOWER AND PSYCHOLOGICAL LIFT, WERE PROVIDED TO THE TROOPS.

8. THE ARRIVAL OF GENERAL THANG IN THE DELTA WITH HIS BYWORD "OFFENSIVE" WAS MET BY SOME WITH SCEPTICISM AND BY OTHERS WITH CAUTIOUS HOPE THAT AT LAST THERE WOULD BE UNCORRUPT, DYNAMIC LEADERSHIP, WHICH WOULD MOVE THE UNITS OUT OF THE CITIES AND BRING THE WAR HOME TO THE VC. THANG ENCOUNTERED MUCH RELUCTANCE AND ANTI-PATHY OF SUBORDINATES THAT HIS PREDECESSORS HAD, BUT HE FINALLY WAS ABLE TO LAUNCH HIS TRUONG CONG-DINH OFFENSIVE. THE VC ATTEMPTED TO MAINTAIN THEIR ENCIRCLEMENT OF THE URBAN AREAS, BUT THEY NOW FOUND THEY WERE FORCED TO WITHDRAW BEFORE SUPERIOR FORCES MOVING OUT AGGRESSIVELY AGAINST THEM WITH HEAVY ARTILLERY AND AIR SUPPORT. AS FRIENDLY FORCES BECAME MORE AGGRESSIVE, IT BECAME MORE APPARENT THAN EVER THAT REPORTS OF VC DIFFICULTIES WERE BASED ON FACT AND WERE BEING EXACERBATED BY THANG'S OFFENSIVE. GRADUALLY, A DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE GVN'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE PEOPLE CAME TO THE FORE, CAUTIOUSLY AT FIRST, BUT GROWING IN STRENGTH AS GVN FORCES MOVED OUT AND DEMONSTRATED TO THE PEOPLE THAT EFFORTS WERE BEING MADE IN THEIR BEHALF. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THERE WAS A TURNABOUT IN THE VIEWPOINT OF THE DELTA CITIZENS WHO FOR YEARS HAVE HAD A BASICALLY APATHETIC OUTLOOK TOWARD THE WAR. THEIR GREATEST DESIRE REMAINS TO BE LEFT ALONE AND TO HAVE PEACE. IF THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE GVN, THEN THEY ARE WILLING TO TOLERATE OR ACCEPT IT. THUS, IN A SENSE, THE GVN'S IMAGE HAS IMPROVED AS A RESULT OF THE MORE

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AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS OF THANG, BUT CONSIDERABLE TREPIDATION ON THE PART OF THE PEOPLE WHEN IT COMES TO ALL-OUT SUPPORT OF THE GVN WILL CONTINUE UNTIL SUCH TIME

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AS THE GVN IS ABLE TO PROVE THAT IT CAN FURNISH PROOF POSITIVE OF ITS ABILITY TO GUARANTEE SECURITY.

9. AS TO THE CURRENT VC MORALE AND THEIR CAPABILITIES IN THE DELTA, ALL EVIDENCE POINTS TO THE FACT THAT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE INTERNAL CONFLICT TAKING PLACE IN IV CORPS AMONG THE VIET CONG, AS CADRES STRIVE TO MAINTAIN AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF MORALE AND TO STEM THE TIDE OF THE PRE- AND POST-TET RECRUIT/IMPRESSEE DESERTIONS AS THE TROOPS BECOME DISILLUSIONED, OR HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN HOME. A SERIOUS PROBLEM IS TO PROVIDE THE NECESSITIES OF LIFE TO THOSE WHO REMAIN IN THE FACE OF THE HIGH RATE OF LOSS OF FOOD, MUNITIONS, CACHES, AND RESUPPLY EFFORTS TO ALLIED SWEEPS, "GAME WARDEN", AND "DELTA FALCON" OPERATIONS.

10. REPORTS OF EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH LIBERATION OR REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM IV CORPS BUT WITH LITTLE EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE TAKEN HOLD OR PRESENT A SERIOUS FORCE TO BE RECKONED WITH. IN THE CASE OF THE NEW ALLIANCE, THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW INDICATIONS THAT ANY WIDESPREAD EFFORTS HAVE BEEN PUT FORTH TO INFORM THE PEOPLE OF ITS EXISTENCE, LET ALONE PROPAGANDIZE IT AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE GVN.

11. WHILE THE ATTACK BY MORTAR AND ROCKET FIRE, AMBUSH, TERRORISM, AND INTERDICTION OF LOC HAVE LONG BEEN THE MODUS OPERANDI OF THE VC IN THE DELTA, HE PREVIOUSLY HAD THE CAPABILITY TO MASS FORCES TO PRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL THREAT THROUGHOUT THE CORPS. CURRENTLY HE APPEARS TO HAVE LOST MUCH OF THIS CAPABILITY THROUGH LOSSES THAT HE HAS TAKEN SINCE TET, THROUGH THE REDUCTION IN QUALITY OF PERSONNEL RESULTING FROM RECRUITING/ IMPRESSING FROM HIS REDUCED BASE OF QUALIFIED PERSONNEL, AND FROM THE DRAWING OFF

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OF DELTA UNITS FOR THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT. IN SPITE OF ALL THIS, IT APPEARS THAT THERE HAS NOT BEEN A SERIOUS QUANTITATIVE WEAKENING OF THE ENEMY'S FORCES IN IV CORPS SINCE TET BECAUSE OF MANPOWER OR SUPPLY PROBLEMS. THERE HAS BEEN A DELETERIOUS EFFECT ON HIS FORCES BECAUSE OF INCREASED EFFECTIVE, AGGRESSIVE, FRIENDLY OPERATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THWARTING HIS PLANS.

12. IN SUMMARY, WHAT MAY NOW APPEAR TO BE A SUDDEN WEAKENING OF THE POSITION OF COMMUNIST FORCES IN IV COPRS IS REALLY A MANIFESTATION OF PREVIOUS PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE SURFACED AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE GVN'S RECENT OFFENSIVE EFFORTS. THE ENEMY'S PROSPECTS IN IV CORPS HINGE DIRECTLY ON THE FUTURE ACTIVITIES OF THE GVN AND ITS ALLIES AND ONLY INDIRECTLY ON SUCCESSES AND REVERSALS MET BY HIS FORCES IN THE OTHER CORPS. IN THE NEAR AND MEDIUM TERM FUTURE, WE CAN EXPECT THE ENEMY TO BE FORCED TO RESTRICT HIS ACTIVITIES TO HARASSING ATTACKS OF ALL TYPES AND CONTINUED ECONOMY OF FORCES TACTICS AS HE ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE HIS MOUNTING PROBLEMS.

25X1A 13. [REDACTED] DISSEM. EXCLUSIVE FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD, EXCLUSIVE FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND.

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Friday, June 7, 1968
10:45 a. m.

Pres file

78

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached paper and tables on South Vietnamese desertions show:

- there has been a post-Tet rise in ARVN desertions;
- but it is more than compensated for by increased recruitment.

The armed forces have increased by over 64,000 since Tet.

The net increase for 1968 could be as high as 236,000.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 21, 1992
By kg, NARA, Date 6-23-92

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1998
By kg, NARA, Date 6-23-92

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78a

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

In reference to the VNAF desertion story by Kramer (Washington Post, 5 June, p 14), the following comments are pertinent:

a. Much of the statistical data are correct, or biased somewhat on the favorable side, e. g. :

(1) Feb-Apr 68 desertion rate up 40% over 1967 (actually up 66%).

(2) Desertions in 1967 estimated at 79,000 (actually 81,000).

(3) Desertions in 1967 had dropped 32% below 1966 rate (actually 31%).

(4) Desertions after TET (Feb-Apr 68) averaged 9,000 (actually 11,229).

b. On the other hand, some data err the other way, e. g. :

(1) VC/NVN defections in 1968 are 25% of those in 1967 (actually 30%).

(2) Desertions in Jan 68 dropped to 6,000 (actually 4,867).

c. The most damaging statement is that even though both the volunteer and conscription rates have increased, they are not sufficient to offset the desertion rate and provide the net increase of 135,000 - 268,000 indicated as the GVN goal for this year. The fact is that, since the beginning of Feb 68, VNAF has increased in strength by 64,431. At this rate, which includes some mobilization of reserves, a net increase of 236,000 could be achieved in 1968.

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White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1980
By ag, NARA, Date 6-23-92


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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By ag, NARA, Date 6-23-92

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d. Insofar as quality of VC/NVN defectors is concerned, the reduced 1968 rate more than offsets an apparent higher proportion of military officers and NCOs. In addition, the NVN defection rate appears to have remained constantly low. It should be noted that captured documents and prisoners indicate that, as occurs in VNAF, the deserters do not often defect but rather try to make their way home. These same sources indicate that the VC/NVN units are experiencing increased desertion problems.



Art McCafferty



William L. Lemnitzer

Incls

VNAF Desertion/Accession Data

VC/NVN Defection Data

VNAF Strengths

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VNAF Desertion/Accession Data

	Desertions		Accessions		Difference		RATE PER 1000 OB.	
	1967	1968	1967	1968	1967	1968	1967	1968
Jan	6,912	4,867	8,120	10,890	1,208	6,023	11.3	7.5
Feb	6,973	10,021	7,179	10,936	206	915	11.5	15.5
Mar	8,127	12,715	6,935	34,542	-1,192	21,827	13.4	18.8
Apr	5,987	10,950	8,092	43,178	2,105	32,228	9.9	15.4
TOTAL	27,999	38,553	30,326	99,546	2,327	60,993		

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 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3.
 DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1998
 By AB, NARA. Date 6-23-92

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78b

VC/NVN Defection Data

	VC		NVN	
	1967	1968	1967	1968
Jan	1,475	953	15	12
Feb	2,083	565	21	19
Mar	3,132	417	22	11
Apr	1,869	(596)	2	(29)
TOTAL	8,559	2,531	60	71

DECLASSIFIED
EO 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1998
By hg NARA, Date 6-23-92

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78c

VNAF Strength (in thousands)

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
Jan	613.8	646.9
Feb	608.3	647.2
Mar	605.1	677.6
Apr	606.4	713.3

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1998

By rg NARA Date 6-23-92

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INFORMATION

79

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Friday, June 7, 1968 -- 10:40 a. m.

Mr. President:

You should be aware that there was a slight penetration of the Korean DMZ by an Air Force jet on a recce mission.

Thus far no reaction from North Korea.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-29-01

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79a



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

6 June 1968
0700 EDT

Rostow


THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Penetration of Korean Demilitarized Zone

1. At 042132 EDT June 1968, a US Air Force RF-4C on a photographic reconnaissance mission inadvertently penetrated the Korean DMZ and entered North Korean territory at a point approximately 35 nautical miles north of Seoul (see attached map). The penetration has been confirmed by photographs taken by the aircraft.

2. The 314th Air Division is investigating to determine the cause and extent of the penetration. DMZ warnings were issued on UHF guard frequency by ground control radar starting at 042128 EDT; however, the aircrew states that the warnings were not received. Initial evaluation of radar plots indicates that the aircraft may have penetrated as much as 5 nautical miles into North Korean territory before turning and exiting approximately 4 nautical miles southwest of the point of entry.


S. D. CRAMER, JR.
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for
Operations (NMCC)

I Atch

Map

Distribution:

WHSR

SECDEF

DEPSECDEF

OASD/PA

OASD/ISA

CJCS (3)

DJS (3)

J-30

J-31

J-32

J-34

AFCP

PAC DIVISION

DDO

CCOC

ADDO

PAC DESK


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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-019.035.003/14

By jc NARA, Date 12-21-09

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-019.035.003/14

By jc NARA. Date 12-21-09

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

80

CONFIDENTIAL

Friday, June 7, 1968 - 10:35 am

Pres file

Mr. President:

You should know that Sec. Rusk and Amb. Bunker thought the letters to Thieu and Ky were helpful. They were delivered with certain minor changes, as the attached indicates.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By sig, NARA, Date 6-8-92

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

80a

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WICA

1968 JUN 7 10 29

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HCE636

PAGE 01 SAIGON 29385 070953Z

11
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, /030 W

P 07089Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4192

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SAIGON 29385

EXDIS

REF: STATE 177519

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-16
By ing, NARA, Date 5-24-93

Retlow

1. I BELIEVE THAT THE SUGGESTED CONDOLENCE LETTERS FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THIEU AND KY ARE HELPFUL AND HAVE ACCORDINGLY HAD THEM DELIVERED TODAY, JUNE 7. THIEU TAQT WAS UNCHANGED. KY LETTER WAS REVISED SLIGHTLY AS FOLLOWS: (1) DELETING OF LAST CLAUSE, FIRST PARAGRAPH (OUR CURRENT INFORMATION DOES NOT BEAR OUT THE IMPRESSION THAT COL. CHU WAS RELATED TO EITHER VICE PRESIDENT OR MRS. KY); (2) FIRST SENTENCE OF LAST PARAGRAPH REVISED BY REPLACING "STILL CARRY" WITH "ARE CARRYING".

2. WE PLAN TO LEAVE THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE PUBLICATION OF THE LETTERS TO THE RECIPIENTS BUT WILL INFORM DEPARTMENT PROMPTLY OF ANY PLANS FOR PUBLICATION.

BUNKER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

81

Limited Official Use

INFORMATION

Friday - June 7, 1968 - 10:30 AM

Mr. President:

Pres file

I understand Jamaican Prime Minister Shearer, whom you see at 12:45p.m. today, is quite exercised over the Los Angeles Police Chief's alleged statement shortly after the shooting of Senator Kennedy that the assassin "might have been a Cuban or Jamaican from the way he talked".

The Prime Minister may bring this up. He protested to Ambassador Tobriner, and the Jamaican Charge did the same to State.

W. W. Rostow

ACTION

82

June 7, 1968, Friday, 9:15 A. M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Replies to Messages of Condolence

Pres file

Following is a draft which would be used in replying to messages of condolence received from Heads of State and other foreign dignitaries. Appropriate modification of this draft would be made to fit particular cases.

"The tragic and untimely death of Senator Robert F. Kennedy has come as a great shock to all Americans. On behalf of the people of the United States, I express my deepest appreciation for your words of sympathy.

"The knowledge that your countrymen share our grief is a source of great comfort and consolation. I shall transmit your message to Mrs. Kennedy and members of the Senator's family."

The State Department will prepare a book of messages for the Senator's family if you so desire.

A message from Prime Minister Wilson to you is attached.

W. W. Rostow

_____ Approve

_____ Call Me

BKS:amc

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WHCA

82a

1965 JUN 6 10 48

THURSDAY
6:55

TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

I HAVE HEARD WITH A SENSE OF DEEP SADNESS OF THE DEATH OF SENATOR ROBERT KENNEDY. THIS ACT OF SENSELESS VIOLENCE COMES AS ANOTHER TRAGIC BLOW TO A FAMILY WHICH HAS ALREADY SUFFERED SO MUCH. THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF BRITAIN SHARE WITH THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES THEIR FEELINGS OF HORROR AND SORROW. OUR PEOPLES HEART FELT SYMPATHY WILL GO OUT TO SENATOR KENNEDYS WIDOW AND CHILDREN, AND TO HIS PARENTS, AT THIS SAD TIME.

MESSAGE ENDS

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Friday, June 7, 1968

83

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Plans to Deal with a Possible Franc-Sterling Monetary Crisis

At Tab A is Secretary Fowler's memo on the possible effect of the French internal crisis on the pound and the dollar -- and what we propose to do about it.

Both the French franc and the British pound are in trouble -- for different reasons.

The French face substantial balance of payments deficits over the next year or two -- possibly \$1 billion a year. The high wage settlements they must make will push up prices, increase imports and reduce exports. They have strong reserves to weather the storm and should use them to defend their rate. That is how they are acting now. But they may decide to devalue, possibly after their elections end on June 30, or later in the fall if their situation steadily deteriorates.

The UK is holding down wages and prices and its underlying position should soon improve. But the world is jittery about sterling and British reserves are low and mortgaged.

A French devaluation will probably push the UK to a floating rate. Or a British monetary crisis could cause the French to decide to move. In combination, these events could cause monetary chaos.

The sensible alternative would be an appreciation of the German mark and possibly of the Dutch, Italian, Belgium and Swiss currencies. These countries are in surplus. If they moved their rates upward the whole system would be healthier and stronger. The pound and the dollar would benefit and pressure on the French franc would ease.

The Germans are the key because their trade surplus dominates the system. Their industry would oppose an appreciation of the mark because it would hurt their competitive position. Also a change in parities is a very sensitive operation which could cause unsettling capital movements. So it must be done carefully.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-29-01

Our action program is:

- to get a serious discussion going with the Germans on the possibility of a monetary crisis and what we should be doing about it. Gene Rostow and Deming will be in Bonn on Monday for the offset talks. They could use this opportunity to discuss monetary problems with Chancellor Kiesinger, Economics Minister Schiller and Central Bank Chairman Blessing.
- to push hard for a revaluation of German and other currencies later in the year, depending on how the situation develops.
- work on multilateral measures to support sterling. The central bankers are now considering a proposal to fund part of the outstanding sterling balances. The shakiness of these balances is the most immediate threat to sterling and the system.
- complete our staff work on the quantitative effects of changes in rates and our contingency planning against the possibility of an early French or sterling devaluation.

Secretary Fowler recommends a meeting with you this afternoon on this subject. We could also use it to go over our position on the offset talks with Germany.

If a meeting is feasible, I recommend that Secretary Fowler, Deming, Bill Martin, Gene Rostow, Okun, Fried and myself attend.

W. W. Rostow

Arrange meeting _____

No _____

Call me _____


ERFried:mst

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

June 7, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization for FY 1969

The Department of Defense with the concurrence of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission, has submitted for your approval a proposed deployment plan that will permit the Department of Defense to deploy nuclear weapons in support of operational plans.


3.4(b)
(5)(6)
6.1(a)



There is generally a rather large difference between deployment ceiling and actual deployment in the fleet because weapons are off-loaded when ships are undergoing overhaul or conversion, and in order to provide more weapons aboard ships in the event that the international situation makes this advisable. There is attached a summary table showing the breakdown of the dispersal plan by major geographic region.

The draft NSAM attached recording your approval of the dispersal plan embodies two items which involve actions taken in the Department of Defense since the staff worked on the dispersal plan last fall.

3.4(b)
(5)(6)
6.1(a)



This will add a substantial additional assurance against unauthorized use or loss of control of the weapons. This is an extension of the requirement that all weapons deployed to NATO Europe must have PAL devices which is also noted in this as in previous deployment authorizations. The second item is to retain for Presidential approval the decision on the deployment of 155mm artillery in support

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-158
By Chm, NAL/A, Date 2-29-03

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

of non-U.S. NATO forces. Although you previously gave approval in principle for the dispersal of such artillery, there is still no agreement within the Department of Defense on how many 155 nuclear artillery rounds should be in Europe and how many of these should be in support of our Allies. Studies are now underway both in NATO and in the Department of Defense to answer these questions.

In addition to the two items mentioned above, the draft NSAM also repeats the request made last year for a more intensive reexamination and reevaluation of nuclear weapons requirements in the Pacific area. A beginning was made on this matter during the past year, but considerable work is still to be done to rationalize both the numbers and location of nuclear weapons in this area.

It should be noted that there continues to be a substantial difference worldwide between the ceilings on deployments authorized by you and the actual number of weapons actually deployed worldwide at any given time. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has now assumed personal responsibility for passing on actual deployments and for reporting to you any substantial changes that are grave enough to be brought to your attention. Ultimately it is expected that the spread between deployment ceilings and the actual number of weapons physically deployed will be narrowed by the continuing close personal administration of the Deputy Secretary.

We have had close and continuing cooperation from the staff of the Secretary of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget working with the new procedures put into effect this year for tying the dispersal and stockpile authorizations together and to help the Secretary of Defense do an improved job of forecasting, planning and controlling the deployment of nuclear weapons.

I recommend that you approve the proposed FY 1969 Deployment Ceiling Plan and note the previewed ceilings for FY 1970.


3.4(b)
(5), (6)
6.1(a)

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~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

-3-



3.4(b)
(5), (6)
6.1(a)

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

840

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-212
By is, NARA, Date 8-18-04

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~Handle as Restricted Data in accordance with~~
~~Section 144b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954~~

SUMMARY TABLE
(Region/Country/Command Deployment Totals)

(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	(G)	(H)	(I)	(J)	(K)	(L)	(M)	(N)	(O)
Actual Deployments June 30, 1967			Previously Approved Dispersals, FY 1968			Previously App'd Deprls Less Contingencies End FY 1968			Requested End FY 1969		Deployment Ceilings Projected End FY 1970			

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*See Appendix C for contingency deployments which are not included in totals.

3.3(b)(2,5)

85

ACTION

SECRET - NODIS

Friday - June 7, 1968 - 6:00pm

SA
trip

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Trip to South America

[Handwritten signature]
2. Pres file

All of the Ambassadors have submitted their views on the proposed trip and they raise no insurmountable problems. At Tab A are their cables; here are the highlights:

1. The Central American Presidents would welcome a visit and San Salvador would probably be acceptable. Inviting President Diaz Ordaz would probably be agreeable to all, although Guatemala and Honduras might not be enthusiastic.
2. The security situation in San Salvador is good and the political climate favorable.
3. Ambassador Freeman thinks President Diaz Ordaz would accept a Central American invitation, particularly if he knows his presence would be highly pleasing to you.
4. It would be better to spend one day and one night in Bogota so President Lleras could give you full honors. Colombians would find it hard to understand why you spend less time in the capital than the provinces. (We had thought the altitude in Bogota -- 8600 ft. -- would make it inadvisable to spend the night, but if your doctors have no objection, it would be better to spend more time there.)
5. Ambassador Tuthill thinks you should go to Brasilia, Rio and Pernambuco. He points out the Costa e Silva Government is not popular. Your visit could have a negative effect in Brazil and elsewhere by showing support for Costa e Silva, but it could also help to get him moving on some of Brazil's

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC01-134
By SJ, NARA, Date 9-2-02

pressing social problems. Tuthill thinks the security forces can provide an acceptable security climate.

6. Ambassador Carlson sees no problems in an airport stop in Georgetown, Guyana. Prime Minister Burnham will make an all-out effort to give you a good reception.

The assassination of Senator Kennedy introduces a factor not reflected in cables -- the climate of receptivity for your visit. Covey Oliver is bothered by this. He recognizes it is an imponderable at this stage. The impact in Latin America has been strong, as reflected in the messages of shocked condolence which are pouring in. But in a month's time, this could wear off. Furthermore, the climate could be improved by these actions:

1. Portraying your trip as one of reassurance to Latin America of your continued interest and commitment despite momentary troubles at home and responsibilities elsewhere.
2. Arranging a special mass for the Kennedys at the San Salvador Cathedral, which you and the other Presidents would attend. Doing this at the outset of the trip sets a tone which will help in subsequent steps.

Bill Bowdler asked Secretary Rusk for his views on your making the trip in the light of the responses from the Ambassadors. The Secretary said if you want to make the trip he saw no reason now for not going ahead, with one caveat: if there is serious trouble in the cities, you will not want to be out of the country.

At Tab B is a working level CIA estimate of the security picture in the countries on the itinerary. It is generally in line with the estimates of the Ambassadors. Bill Bowdler has also spoken with Dick Helms who considers the risks to be within acceptable limits.

At Tab C is a new map giving the stops as recommended by the Ambassadors.

If you decide to go ahead with the trip on the July 6-14 schedule, I recommend:

1. an advance party leave as soon as possible to check out the itinerary and get a better feel for the climate of receptivity in the light of the Kennedy assassination.
2. ask Dick Helms for a Board of Estimates assessment based on the more refined itinerary.

W. W. Rostow

Approve sending
advance party _____

Approve Board of
Estimates assessment _____.

Attachments

- Tab A - Cables from Ambassadors.
- Tab B - CIA working level estimate.
- Tab C - New map of itinerary.

Cc - Jim Jones

WGB:mmm



Department of State

Wit (5) 852
Bo TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

RR KUEHC
DE RUES3G 4191/1 1580015
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 252325Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6497
STATE GRNC
BT

1195Q
1968 JUN 5 PM 8 49

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BOGOTA 4191

NODIS/OLEANDER

REF: STATE 176182

1. AGREE CALI AND CAUCA VALLEY BEST PLACE SPEND SINGLE DAY WITH SIZEABLE NUMBER AMERICAN FIRMS, LARGE PEACE CORPS CONCENTRATION, INCOGA (AND REFORM AND RECLAMATION PROJECT), CATTLE RANCHES, VALEY DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, AND GENERALLY RICH AGRICULTURAL ZONE. LARGE WELL APPOINTED COUNTRY CLUB OUTSKIRTS CITY OFFERS BETTER SECURITY POSSIBILITIES THAN LODGING IN TOWN. ALSO ENABLES HELICOPTER SHUTTLE FROM CALI AIRPORT AVOIDING SLOW TRAVEL THROUGH CONGESTED AREAS.

2. SHORT STOPOVER SUGGESTED BOGOTA COULD PRESENT DIFFICULTIES. CALI IS PROVINCIAL CITY, THIRD AFTER TOEDELIN IN SIZE AND IMPORTANCE WHILE BOGOTA TWO MILLION POPULATION CLEARLY CENTER OF NATIONAL LIFE. COLOMBIANS NOT APT TO UNDERSTAND PREFERENCE GIVEN TO PROVINCES BUT PUBLICIZING ALTITUDE PROBLEM SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT EXPLANATION.

3. THINK PRESIDENT LLERAS PROBABLY NOT SATISFIED ONLY ONE MEAL (LUNCH) TO OFFER HOSPITALITY BUT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE AMENABLE ESPECIALLY IF THIS NOT CONSIDERED AS OFFICIAL VISIT BY CHIEF OF STATE.

4. SUGGESTED PROGRAM SET FORTH DEPART:

SUNDAY, JULY 7
ARRIVE BOGOTA 10:30A.M.
VISIT CIUBAB KENNEDY ARRIVING 11:15 A.M. LEAVING 11:45A.M.

WREATH AT BOLIVAR STATUE AT 12 NOON
PRIVATE VISIT WITH PRES. LLERAS 12:30P.M.

PRESIDENTIAL LUNCH AT PALACE 1:20 P.M.
ENDING APPROXIMATELY 3:30 P.M.

SANITIZED

Authority NET 019-035-3-16
NARA Date 4/17/02

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-2- BOGOTA 4191, SECTION 1 OF 2, JUNE 5

VISIT CONGRESS 3:45 P.M.

LEAVE BOGOTA (WHEELS UP) 5:00 P.M.

ARRIVE CALI 5:30 P.M.

HELICOPTER TO COUNTRY CLUB ARRIVING 6:00 P.M.

DINNER OPEN

MONDAY, JULY 8

BREAKFAST AT COUNTRY CLUB

LEAVE CLUB 9:30 A.M. BY HELICOPTER 30 TO 40 MINUTES TO INCORA PROJECT AT RODANILLO TO OBSERVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAND RECLAMATION, ETC.

LEAVE INCORA 11:00 A.M. BY HELICOPTER TO CATTLE RANCH

BARBEQUE LUNCH AT CATTLE RANCH 1:30 P.M.

RETURN TO CALI 3:30 P.M.

VISIT CAUCA VALLEY DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY 4:00 P.M.

VISIT PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS (APPROXIMATELY 50) 5:00 P.M.

DINNER COLOMBIAN-AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 8:30 P.M.
(INFORMAL DRESS)

TUESDAY, JULY 9 - DEPART FOR BRAZIL

5. OUR ASSESSMENT SECURITY ASPECTS OF VISIT AS FOLLOWS:

25XIX
25XIA

GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY SITUATION IS THAT REPORTED WORKING PAPER [REDACTED] HOWEVER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE GUERRILLA PROBLEM QUITE AS SERIOUS AS BEFORE. AN AGGRESSIVE ARMY COMMANDER IN SANTANDER PLUS SOME GOOD INTELLIGENCE BREAKS WHICH HAVE BEEN PURSUED HAVE CONSIDERABLY LESSENED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ARMY OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (ELN). THE RAINY SEASON PLUS THE INCREASED ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE ARMY HAVE ALSO SEEMED TO PUT THE CHINA-LINE POPULAR ARMY OF LIBERATION (ELP) IN A DEFENSIVE POSITION. THE CONFISCATION OF US \$102,000 FOR THE MOSCOW-LINE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC) AND THE ROUNDUP OF THE CLANDESTINE (GUERRILLA SUPPORT) APPARATUS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF COLOMBIA (PCC) HAVE BEEN A SETBACK FOR FARC GUERRILLAS. INFORMATION THAT ONE FARC FRONT NOW IN PROCESS OF MOVING AREA OF OPERATIONS MAY ALSO LESSEN GUERRILLA ACTS FOR THE TIME BEING.

BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

RR RUEHC
DE RUESBG 4191/2 1580030
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 052345Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6498
STATE GRNC
BT

1196Q
1968 JUN 5 PM 9 26

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BOGOTA 4191

NODIS/OLEANDER

6. URBAN TERRORIST BOMBINGS THAT TOOK PLACE BEFORE THE MARCH CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS HAVE SINCE TAPERED OFF. HOWEVER, IT HAS BEEN LEARNED THAT THE BASICALLY UNORGANIZED UNITED FRONT (FU) EXTREMIST GROUP PLANS TO TRAIN SEVERAL OF ITS MEMBERS IN URBAN TERRORIST METHODS AND GET THIS TYPE OPERATION UNDERWAY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE WORKER-STUDENT-PEASANT MOVEMENT (MOEC) AND THE CITY-BASED MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF COLOMBIA--MARXIST/LENIST (PCC-ML), WHILE IN DIS-ORGANIZED CONDITIONS, CAN ALWAYS BE COUNTED ON FOR SOME TERRORIST ATTEMPTS IF THE OCCASION ARISES. THE CURRENT REPRESSION OF THE PCC CLANDESTINE APPARATUS SHOULD DETER PARTY ACTS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT, ALTHOUGH THE PCC MIGHT STILL BE ABLE TO ORGANIZE PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS. THERE IS ALWAYS THE LUNATIC FRINGE TO CONTEND WITH, ESPECIALLY WITH A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT, AND SUCH MEN AS JOSE MELO SOACHA, ALBERTO CENDALES CAMPUZANO, AND OSCAR GIL GALLEGOS, TO NAME A FEW, MIGHT EASILY ATTEMPT TERRORIST ACTS ON THEIR OWN OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH ONE OF THE ABOVE GROUPS. LESS RESPONSIBLE ELEMENTS IN THE NATIONAL POPULAR ALLIANCE (ANP) WOULD DO ALMOST ANYTHING TO EMBARRASS THE GOVERNMENT.

7. STUDENT UNREST HAS NEVER REALLY SETTLED DOWN ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT BECOME VIOLENT LATELY. HOWEVER, WITH THE SUCCESS OF STUDENT MOVEMENTS AROUND THE WORLD (SUCH AS IN FRANCE AND GERMANY), COLOMBIAN STUDENTS, WHO WILL COPY ALMOST ANYTHING, WOULD BE LIKELY TO TRY THEIR OWN HAND AT A SIMILAR EFFORT, ESPECIALLY IF A GOOD EXCISE SUCH AS A PRESIDENTIAL VISIT WERE OFFERED. ON THE OTHER HAND, PRESIDENT LLERAS REMAINS DETERMINED TO KEEP STUDENT PROBLEMS UNDER CONTROL. LEFTISTS AND OTHER EXTREMIST ELEMENTS MAY ATTEMPT USE VISIT AS OCCASION FOR PROTEST AGAINST US INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM.

8. ALL SECURITY SERVICES CAN BE EXPECTED TO TRY TO DO THEIR UTMOST NOT TO ALLOW ANY INCIDENT THAT MIGHT MAR THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT OR EMBARRASS COLOMBIA. THE ARMY WILL PROBABLY CO-ORDINATE AND DOMINATE THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

~~SECRET~~

-2- BOGATA 4191, SECTION 2 OF 2, JUNE 5

25xix

9. ASSESSMENT IS THAT SECURITY FORCES (DAS, ARMY AND POLICE) CAN CONTROL ALMOST ALL ORGANIZED DISTURBANCES; CAN DETECT ABOUT 70 PER CENT OF THE PLANS OF ORGANIZED GROUPS OF A DISRUPTIVE OR TERRORIST ACTIONS; BUT THEY CANNOT GUARANTEE ABSOLUTE DETECTION OR PROTECTION AGAINST ISOLATED ACTS OF TERRORISM. LLERAS' GOVERNMENT IS NOT ADVERSE TO DEALING HARSHLY WITH EXTREMISTS IF NECESSARY, AND THE DAS MORALE AND INITIATIVE, NOW HIGH WITH ITS RECENT SUCCESSES AGAINST THE PCC, THE ARMY, IS ALWAYS CAPABLE AND WILLING. SECURITY FORCES HAVE THE FOLLOWING NUMBERS AVAILABLE IN BOGOTA AND CALI:

A. POLICE IN BOGOTA: 5,000 MEN, 900 OF WHICH ARE TRAINED IN RIOT CONTROL.

POLICE IN CALI: 1,250 MEN, OF WHICH 90 ARE TRAINED IN RIOT CONTROL.

B. ARMY IN BOGOTA: 2,500 TROOPS WITH COMBAT CAPABILITY IN BOGOTA (MORE TROOPS AVAILABLE FROM SERVICE SCHOOLS, HQS UNITS AND OUTLYING AREAS).

ARMY IN CALI: 1,185 MEN IN CALI PROPER.

C. DAS IN BOGOTA: 100 MEN
DAS IN CALI: 25 MEN

10. WHILE THE PRESIDENTIAL BODYGUARD UNIT OF 54 AGENTS HAS TRAINING IN CLOSE-IN PROTECTION AND CALI REGIONAL DAS OFFICE HAS SOME MEN TRAINED IN THIS, WE DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN COUNT ON THEM FOR CLOSE-IN SECURITY OF THE PRESIDENT.

11. THE DAS CHIEF HAS SELECTED A 20-MAN SPECIAL FORCE, NOW IN TRAINING, TO SERVE AS SPECIAL BODYGUARDS FOR POPE PAUL IN AUGUST AND THEY CAN BE USED FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT.

12. DAS' LIST OF DANGEROUS SUBVERSIVES INCLUDING THEIR ADDRESSES IS NOW MORE COMPLETE FOLLOWING THE RECENT PICKUPS OF MEMBERS OF THE PCC CLANDESTINE APPARATUS.

13. THE DAS CHIEF IN CALI IS PRO-AMERICAN AND WORKS WELL WITH HIS POLICE AND ARMY COUNTERPARTS. HOWEVER, HE IS NOT OVERLY INTELLIGENT. TROOPS AND POLICE IN CALI ARE RATED FAIRLY GOOD. SINCE THEY HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE WITH FREQUENT VISITS OF LLERAS TO CALI.

14. THE BOGOTA AIRPORT ROAD, WHICH WAS LONG UNDER CONSTRUCTION, IS NOW NEARING COMPLETION AND IS IN EXCELLENT CONDITION. IT STILL PASSES THE SIDE GATE OF THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY BUT IT

~~SECRET~~

-3- BOGOTA, SECTION 2 OF 2, JUNE 5

IS NOW A HIGH-SPEED DIVIDED HIGHWAY AND THE FORMER BOTTLE-NECK AT THE UNIVERSITY HAS BEEN ELIMINATED. THE CALI AIRPORT ROAD IS ALMOST IMPASSABLE, DUE TO CONSTRUCTION. CALI HAS BEEN A PROBLEM AREA SINCE THE DAYS OF "LA VIOLENCIA" AND HAS A HIGH RATIO OF NUTTY EXTREMISTS THAT DEFY LABELS. SLUM AREAS IN THAT CITY SHOULD BE AVOIDED. THE SAME IS APPLICABLE TO BOGOTA WITH SPECIAL MENTION THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD NOT PASS THROUGH BARRIO POLICARPA, WHICH THE SECURITY SERVICES HAVE DIFFICULTY CONTROLLING UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD DEFINITELY NOT LEAVE TOWN ON THE ROAD TO THE SOUTH, CARLSON
BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

fact

85j

3 June 1968

SUMMARY

The governments of El Salvador, Nicaragua, Colombia, Brazil and Guyana would welcome a visit by President Johnson and would do their best to afford his party every protection. Security services would cooperate with American officials. These services are not well trained and equipped by American standards, but they could produce ample manpower.

In most countries the visit would prompt actual or attempted hostile demonstrations, principally by students and leftists. Most common theme would be opposition to U.S. policies in Vietnam. Publicity would be generally favorable, except in media already opposed to U.S. policies. Violence against the Presidential party can neither be predicted nor completely ruled out; terrorism, if any, would come from individual crackpots or small groups of fanatics.

A refueling stop at Atkinson Field, Guyana, would be innocuous. A visit to the city of Georgetown might give Cheddi Jagan and his PPP an excuse to charge political interference and to raise racial issues.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWJ-079-035 003/17
je NARA Date 12-21-09

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

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EL SALVADOR

The population is basically pro-U.S.; we believe that the possibility of hostile acts against the President would be minimal and that demonstrations, if any, would be feeble. Potential demonstrators would be students, Communist-controlled labor organizations and teachers. Government security forces are believed capable of controlling the situation.

Salvadorean security forces and their strengths are the Army, 3800; the National Guard, 1900; and the National Police, 1900. There is a specially trained 43-man presidential guard, and the National Police has a 50-man riot platoon supplemented by 150 reserves. The National Guard and police have a total of 69 inspectors, most of whom would work on special intelligence investigations. The police have an adequate number of patrol cars and communications equipment.

There is only one good highway from the airport to downtown San Salvador with major congestion only in the city. This road could be covered adequately by Salvadorean forces.

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By jc NARA. Date 12-21-09

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NICARAGUA

The general assessment of security during a presidential visit to Managua would be favorable; the greatest potential danger would come as a by-product of action aimed at President Somoza. Nicaraguan security forces are effective and would probably assign 1000 armed men as a security detail during the visit. These might include 300 infantrymen, 200 Managua police, 150 national guardsmen, 150 armored troops, 100 agents of the Office of National Security, including the presidential bodyguard, and 50 airport police.

The 11th of November Group, a revolutionary movement which is not anti-U.S., was reported in May 1968 to be holding sniper training with 30-30 rifles. Its targets are presumed to be President Somoza and the national guard, and it is questionable whether it would make any attempt on a distinguished visitor. Opposition groups -- the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional, the Partido Socialista Nicaraguense, and the Frente de Estudiantes Revolucionarios -- probably would attempt to paint slogans on walls, wave banners, and pass out leaflets with anti-Vietnam and anti-dictator themes, but such demonstrations would be adequately and strictly controlled.

President Somoza probably would ask President Johnson to ride with him in his armored Cadillac limousine which is about eight years old. Las Mercedes airport is about six and one-half miles northeast of Managua on a good road. Within the city some travel on narrow and congested streets is inevitable.

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COLOMBIA

Bogota

All security services could be expected to do their utmost to prevent any incident which might mar a presidential visit or embarrass Colombia. We believe that the army, police and the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS) could control almost all organized disturbances and detect in advance most (but not all) plans for disruptive or terrorist actions. The city has 2500 troops with more available from outlying areas; 5000 police, 900 of them trained in riot control; 100 DAS agents; and a 54-man presidential bodyguard. The DAS has a list of dangerous subversives, many of whom presumably would be picked up before a visit.

The Bogota airport road, long under construction, is now nearing completion and in excellent condition. It still passes the side gate of the National University, but high-speed travel is possible at this point. Though there has been no recent violence, student unrest persists. Colombian students have been impressed by disturbances in Paris, and might regard President Johnson's visit as an excuse for staging their own demonstrations. On the other hand, Colombian authorities would do their utmost to suppress any such attempts.

Local holidays fall on 13 June (Corpus Christi), 21 June (Sacred Heart), and 29 June (Saint Peter and Saint Paul). On each of these holidays businesses close and many people leave town for a long week-end.

The altitude at Bogota is 9000 feet.

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Authority NLS-019-035-003/20
By jc NARA Date 12-21-09

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Cali

Troops and police in Cali are fairly effective, since they have had experience with frequent visits by President Lleras. The DAS chief in Cali is pro-American and cooperative, though not overly intelligent. Security forces include 1250 policemen, of whom 90 are trained in riot control, 1185 army troops, and 25 DAS agents.

Cali has been a problem area for years and has a high ratio of extremists who defy labels. Slum areas in Cali should be avoided.

Some rural areas of Colombia still have a guerrilla problem though it is not as serious as before. We assume guerrilla areas would be avoided in planning any visits to the countryside.

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BRAZIL

Rio de Janeiro

We expect that the general mood of the Brazilian population, except for student and leftist groups, would be one of reserved friendliness in urban areas with a warmer reception in rural sections. We do not think mass support could be rallied for major anti-Vietnam demonstrations although banners, wall paintings and attempts at minor demonstrations would be almost certain. The Government of Brazil would be anxious to stage a major display of goodwill. Though President Costa e Silva's leadership is not of the type to command emotional displays, the government would be delighted with the visit as a sign of support and the opposition would be equally disappointed. Major media outlets would provide extensive publicity but would not be totally friendly.

The Government of Brazil would provide every military protection, possibly to the extent of giving the impression that the nation is controlled by an oppressive military. Major sources of difficulty would be either student demonstrations or terrorist acts by small extremist groups or independent fanatics. Since the police killing of a student during a demonstration in late March, the student situation in Rio de Janeiro and other key cities has not returned to normal. June, the month just before mid-year vacations, is the traditional month for students to vent their frustrations against authorities. A general strike at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro is scheduled to begin 4 June. Should President Johnson visit Brazil during a period of student unrest, we would expect demonstrations aimed primarily at embarrassing the Brazilian Government. The likelihood of violence against

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Authority NWJ.019.035.003/21
By JC NARA Date 12-21-09

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President Johnson's party is remote but cannot be discounted entirely. Some labor elements might make common cause with the students, as they have done twice already this year.

We are more concerned with the possibility that extremist elements in the Acao Popular, the Marxist Politica Operaria, or dissident Communist Party members might attempt terrorism against the motorcade or against bystanders at airports and along motorcade routes. We have little confidence in the ability of local security services to detect and suppress in advance any planned violence by determined groups.

The Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro) security forces include 13,000 military police and 11,000 civil police who are experienced in protecting distinguished visitors. If necessary, these could be augmented by other military units. The highway between Galeao Airport and the city is under repair. It takes 30 minutes of fast driving under the best conditions to reach the city, and the route is through low-income neighborhoods and industrial or waterfront areas. From a security standpoint it might be preferable to land at Santos Dumont airport; if Air Force One cannot land at this smaller field, we would suggest using a helicopter from Galeao.

We evaluate the friendliness of the general population in Rio de Janeiro as a bit higher than in other Brazilian cities. President Johnson would be treated with respect as the leader of a country with which Brazil has enjoyed traditional ties of friendship. The danger of serious embarrassment would come chiefly from students, small extremist groups or fanatics.

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Brasilia

Given Brazilian popular distaste for U.S. involvement in Vietnam, President Johnson's visit would probably spark some hostile demonstrations. Despite attempts at control by local security services there would probably be offensive slogans or posters and some demonstrations and banner-waving at the airport, along motorcade routes and at other places where students could seek press coverage.

Hostile acts against the presidential party are distinctly possible. Groups such as the Acao Popular, Politica Operaria, and the Communist Party of Brasil are violence-oriented. The Acao Popular is active at Brasilia University, which was torn by riots in March and April 1968.

Brazilian authorities would be anxious to provide maximum protection. The Federal Police has 790 men in the Federal District, many of them trained in the protection of foreign dignitaries. The municipal police have about 2500 men and could be supplemented by army troops and presidential guards. A motorcade could move at 60 miles per hour or better along the well controlled highway from the airport, but this route exposes the motorcade to a three mile stretch flanked by apartments.

The Brazilian Congress is scheduled to go into recess from 28 June until 1 August. Congressmen normally begin leaving Brasilia in mid-June.

Recife

The Recife area is currently quiet but a presidential visit might stir up student agitators and result in anti-American demonstrations. Terrorist attempts by fanatics cannot be excluded;

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there have been isolated bomb attempts and a Molotov cocktail was thrown at the U. S. Consulate General on 29 April 1968.

The state security services are not particularly effective but can be counted on to support the visit as best they know how. The police would use about 2000 men during a visit and could be reinforced by Fourth Army units if necessary. Airport demonstrations could be kept to a minimum. Two roads lead from the airport to the city and either one could be controlled.

June is the rainy season in northeast Brazil, and any plans for visits to outlying points of interest should assume that roads become almost impassable in bad weather.

Sao Paulo

Despite general admiration of things American, U. S. foreign policy is not popular in Sao Paulo. A visit by the President would probably provoke expressions of disapproval of the U. S. role in Vietnam.

In Sao Paulo city, student and dissident Communist groups might create significant security problems. Acao Popular probably represents the greatest threat. The revolutionary student movement has declined in number over the last year but has greatly increased in militancy, and some of the more hot-headed groups could well seize upon a presidential visit to incite trouble. Organized student groups might produce up to 2000 demonstrators; still more students, though not participating in violence, might produce anti-American posters and wall paintings. While we doubt that the orthodox Communist Party would try to create trouble, dissident Communist groups might try to dramatize their opposition.

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Sao Paulo has several semi-independent security services which in the past have generally failed to work well together. While no doubt these services would respond in good faith to a requirement for protection, we question their ability to operate effectively together or to identify and apprehend most potential agitators. Traffic and street conditions in downtown Sao Paulo are generally chaotic; presumably the streets could be cleared for a motorcade.

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GUYANA

The airstrip at Atkinson Field, 30 miles from Georgetown, has been resurfaced and is in good condition. The airport road is under repair and a visit to the city would require 50 minutes' driving each way. For 10 miles entering Georgetown the road is lined with two-story shanty houses and there is normally heavy pedestrian, animal, and bicycle traffic. The police force has 1890 men including a 130-man riot squad. The Special Branch numbers 137. The police are reasonably efficient, though torn by leadership divisions at the top level. We believe police performance would be satisfactory. Additionally, the Guyanese Defense Force could provide 1000 men who, however, are not well trained and have no experience in civil strife. Police could detect and frustrate some, but not all, plans for demonstrations.

Guyana is preparing for an election and Cheddi Jagan's opposition PPP might interpret and propagandize a visit by President Johnson as interference in local political affairs. While the police could control any announced demonstrations, they might permit such PPP activities as small groups of pickets or a vigil in front of the American Embassy. PPP slogans might deal with U. S. Negro rights (Martin Luther King's assassination and H. Rap Brown's imprisonment) as a device to incite the African element in Guyana. There might also be attempts to protest U. S. policy in Vietnam or to portray Prime Minister L. S. F. Burnham as a U. S. stooge. Demonstrations, if permitted, would be unlikely to lead to violence.

Guyanese officials have already made plans which might conflict with a presidential visit. Prime Minister Burnham plans a trip to the United Kingdom 11-22 June. Preparations for this trip, including red-carpet treatment by Her Majesty's Government,

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by jc NARA Date: 12-21-09

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are far advanced. Should President Johnson's visit come during this period, Burnham would be torn between his desire to welcome the President and his need to visit the United Kingdom to promote Guyanese registration and voting. Governor General Rose will be in Grenada for a few days in mid-June.

The possibility of demonstrations and local political complications would be greatly lessened if the presidential visit were limited to a refueling stop at Atkinson Field.

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