

~~SECRET~~

Monday, June 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Free file

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Bowles
(11:30 a.m. Tuesday, June 18)

5:30 p.m.

Chet will want to fill you in on recent developments in India.
Specifically:

-- Bright economic prospects and the need for more aid. He will describe the economic recovery now underway, led by this year's record grain harvest. He understands the aid problem on the Hill, but he will want to reinforce the case for the need.

-- The importance of getting India to look eastward toward China -- and away from Pakistan. Chet is (rightly) concerned about the Chinese-supported tribal insurgency on the Burmese border. He also believes that redirection of Indian attention to the East and Pakistan to the West is the best long-run hope for Indo-Pak reconciliation.

-- The need for another look at our military supply policy in South Asia. Chet thinks we should extend to spare parts and third country items our current ban on direct sales of finished weapons, and at the same time encourage India and Pakistan to develop their own weapons-making facilities. He will also argue that we should pull out all the stops on the Hill to get India excepted from the Conte Amendment (which requires us to cut economic aid to whatever extent the Indians buy sophisticated weapons).

After hearing Bowles out, you may wish to make some of the following points:

1. The economic story is very heartening, but as realists we must prepare to live with a 1969 aid appropriation no larger than this year's.
2. We certainly want the Indians to look eastward. It is encouraging to see that the Paris talks have made some of them stop and think about their interests in East Asia (and who is protecting them).
3. But is it realistic to hang our hopes for Indo-Pak reconciliation on a tactic designed to get them to forget about each other? Are there any

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *J*, NARA, Date 4-24-01

faster and more likely ways to get them to begin cooperation in such areas as trade and water resource development?

4. The military supply problem is a tough one. There aren't any tidy answers. India could easily survive a cut-off of U.S. equipment and she is well on the way to self-sufficiency in arms production. But Pakistan would be unable to get spare parts for its current equipment and would have to get the bulk of its new stuff from the Chicom. For the moment there don't seem to be any better alternatives to our present line.

5. The Conte Amendment is giving us real trouble all over the world. We believe it should be repealed and the Congress knows it. We will do what we can in this forbidding atmosphere to get it modified. (Specifically, we will follow up on a conversation Bowles had with Conte several days ago in which Conte said -- perhaps just to butter up Bowles -- that he never meant the amendment to apply to such countries as India.)

W. W. Rostow

WWR:EKH:lw

EEA670
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2311

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING CANCELLED PER E.O. 12350,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY 19 ON 8-19-92

42

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81346

1968 JUN 17 17 10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

68 JUN 17 PM 1:22

MONDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUNE 17, 1968

NICK KATZENBACH'S OFFICE JUST CALLED. NIXON CALLED
KATZENBACH AND ASKED FOR A FOREIGN POLICY BRIEFING AT
NIXON'S HEADQUARTERS IN NEW YORK ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE
19, OR FRIDAY, JUNE 21.

IN NICK'S JUDGMENT, THERE ARE TWO ALTERNATIVES:

--NICK IS GIVING A TALK IN NEW YORK ON WEDNESDAY
EVENING. HE COULD GO UP THERE AND TAKE WITH HIM A
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE
CIA. THEY COULD BRIEF NIXON IN NEW YORK LATE ON
WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON.

Pres file

--NICK COULD CALL NIXON AND TELL HIM THAT THE OTHER
BRIEFINGS HAD BEEN DONE IN WASHINGTON BY THE SENIOR
OFFICIALS CONCERNED. WE JUDGE IT BETTER IF THE BRIEFING
WERE DONE BY SECRETARY RUSK AND RICHARD HELMS DIRECTLY.
COULD WE NOT WORK OUT A TIME FOR A WASHINGTON TOP-LEVEL
BRIEFING WITH NIXON?

WE REQUEST YOUR GUIDANCE ON:

KATZENBACH BRIEFING OF NIXON ON WEDNESDAY IN NEW YORK -----

REQUEST NIXON TO COME TO WASHINGTON FOR RUSK BRIEFING -----

CALL ME -----

DTG 171647Z JUN 68

*6/17/68
Jeff Jones telephone to W. Rostow
Prefer be in Wash by senior
officials*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WICZCEEA567
OO WTE13
DE WTE 2307

FROM WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81342

~~SECRET~~

1968 JUN 17 14 37
JUNE 17, 1968

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 4-24-01

43

JUN 17 AM 10:53

MONDAY

SUBJECT: YOUR TRIP TO LATIN AMERICA

COVEY OLIVER AND TOM MANN'S VIEWS ON YOUR TRIP ARE AS FOLLOWS:

COVEY OLIVER

HE FAVORS YOUR MAKING THE TRIP IN INSTALLMENTS, BEGINNING WITH THE VISIT TO SAN SALVADOR. HE HELPED PLAN THE LONGER ITINERARY BECAUSE HE WANTED TO BE RESPONSIVE TO YOUR WISHES. HE THINKS YOUR VISIT WILL HAVE GREATER IMPACT IF YOU TARGET ONE TO CENTRAL AMERICA AND A SECOND TO SOUTH AMERICA.

Profile

HE BELIEVES THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION HAS NOT AFFECTED THE CLIMATE IN CENTRAL AMERICA TO THE POINT WHERE IT BECOMES A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR. MORE IMPORTANT IS THE GENERAL POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE COUNTRY YOU WILL VISIT AND THE CAPABILITIES OF THE SECURITY FORCES. SAN SALVADOR IS OK ON BOTH COUNTS.

IF YOU DECIDE TO MAKE THE SAN SALVADOR TRIP IN JULY, HE WOULD LIKE TO ACCOMPANY YOU WITH ED CLARK AND BOTH OF THEM GO FROM THERE ON A TOUR OF THE EAST COAST COUNTRIES OF SOUTH AMERICA. BY SENDING YOUR TWO TOP ADVISERS ON LATIN AMERICA TO THE SOUTHERN CONTINENT YOU WILL SHOW YOUR INTEREST IN THAT PART OF THE HEMISPHERE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO YOUR GOING TO COLOMBIA AND BRAZIL LATER ON IN THE YEAR.

AS PART OF YOUR PROGRAM IN ELSALVADOR, COVEY SUGGESTS YOU VISIT THE LYNDON B. JOHNSON PUBLIC SCHOOL BUILT WITH ALLIANCE MONEY. HE WILL ALSO TRY TO HAVE THE ETV PROJECT NEGOTIATIONS COMPLETED SO YOU CAN SIGN THE AGREEMENT.

TOM MANN

HE IS ALWAYS CONCERNED WITH YOUR SECURITY AND MUCH PREFERS A SERIES OF SHORT TRIPS TO A LONGER ONE WHICH WOULD GIVE OUR ADVERSARIES MORE TIME IN WHICH TO DO THEIR NEFARIOUS BUSINESS. HE LIKES THE IDEA OF A QUICK TRIP TO SAN SALVADOR AS A STARTER. HE IS OUT OF TOUCH WITH PUBLIC REACTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA TO RECENT EVENTS, BUT THINKS THE IMPORTANT FACTOR IN JUDGING WHERE YOU GO IS HOW STABLE IS THE LOCAL SITUATION. HE POINTS OUT THAT CENTRAL AMERICA IS TRADITIONALLY THE AREA MOST SYMPATHETIC TO US. YOU WILL GET A GOOD WELCOME THERE. SAN SALVADOR HAS ADEQUATE FACILITIES WITH A NEW EMBASSY RESIDENCE AND A NEW HOTEL, BOTH ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF TOWN AND AWAY FROM CONGESTED AREAS.

Oliver, Tom Mann & Bill Bowdler to consider whether trip. Pres. to be done

DTG 171352Z JUNE 1968

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

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1968 JUN 17 12 39

EEA665
00 WTE10
DE WTE 2305

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81341

Pres file
JUN 17 AM 8:45
MONDAY

~~SECRET~~

JUNE 17, 1968

HEREWITH, ACCORDING TO KY:

- RUMORS OF A VC ATTACK ON SAIGON JUNE 19 OR 20;
- HE WILL TRY TO QUIET RUMORS OF A SPLIT WITH THIEU.

SAIGON 30188

1. VICE PRESIDENT KY ASKED BERGER TO CALL THIS MORNING. HE SAID GVN HAD INTELLIGENCE THAT VC PLAN TO STAGE COMMANDO RAIDS IN ARVN UNIFORM ON PALACE AND TAN SON NHUT AIR BASE ON OR ABOUT JUNE 19 OR 20, AND PROCLAIM THIS AS A KY COUP AGAINST THIEU, AMIDST OTHER RELATED ACTIONS.

HE SAID THERE IS POSSIBILITY THAT VC MAY USE HELICOPTERS IN CONJUNCTION WITH ATTACKS.

2. KY SAID MANY RUMORS ARE CIRCULATING HERE AND ABROAD -- HE SINGLED OUT BBC -- THAT HE IS PLANNING COUP, THAT THIEU IS ALREADY IN HIS CUSTODY, THAT HE, KY, WAS WOUNDED IN COUP ATTEMPT OVER WEEKEND, ETC. ETC. RUMORS SO PERSISTENT THAT SOME OF HIS FRIENDS HAVE CALLED TO ASK IF IT IS TRUE HE IS PLANNING A COUP.

3. HE SAID HE HAD JUST COME FROM MEETING WITH THIEU, AND IT WAS AGREED BETWEEN THEM THAT KY WOULD GO ON TELEVISION TUESDAY EVENING TO REASSURE COUNTRY THAT THERE IS NO COUP PLOTTING, AND CALLING FOR NATIONAL UNITY BEHIND GOVERNMENT. HE WILL ALSO EXPLAIN THAT HIS RESIGNATION AS ORGANIZER OF PEOPLE'S SELF DEFENSE CORPS WAS DUE TO FACT THAT PLANS HE HAD MADE WERE COMPLETED AND JOB NOW WAS FOR APPROPRIATE MINISTRIES TO GET ON WITH IT.

4. BERGER CONGRATULATED KY, SAYING IT WAS TIMELY AND IMPERATIVE THAT ACTION BE TAKEN QUICKLY. BERGER SUGGESTED KY CONSIDER BROADCAST EARLIER THAN TOMORROW NIGHT IF POSSIBLE, AND KY SAID HE WOULD TRY.

5. BERGER SAID WE HAD MANY REPORTS HANOI WAS SPREADING RUMORS HERE AND IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES ABROAD THAT THE THIEU-KY GOVERNMENT WAS ABOUT TO COME APART, A NEW GOVT CRISIS WAS IN THE OFFING, AND THAT COMMUNIST AGENTS STRATEGICALLY PLACED IN GVN AND MILITARY WERE WORKING TO PRODUCE THIS CRISIS. A MAIN OBJECTIVE WAS TO EMBARRASS THE US IN PARIS AND IN WASHINGTON BY HAVING ANOTHER GOVT CRISIS HERE. KY SAID HE WAS AWARE OF ALL THIS AND THERE WOULD BE NO CRISIS.

6. BERGER ASKED WHERE ENEMY HELICOPTERS FOR COMMANDO RAIDS WOULD COME FROM. KY SAID FROM CAMBODIA, ACROSS THE TAY NINH BORDER.

7. COMMENT: KY WAS COOL, CALM AND SERIOUS. THE CONVERSATION WAS SHORT AND LIMITED TO THE ABOVE, WITH NO SIDE REMARKS IN ANY WAY CRITICAL OF THIEU OR HUONG. WE HAVE NO RPT NO INFORMATION TO CONFIRM PARA 1, AND CAS IS ATTEMPTING TO ASCERTAIN SOURCE OF KY'S INFO.

BUNKER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NJL 01-177
By us, NARA, Date 1-17-03

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DTG 171158Z JUN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1968 JUN 16 23 03

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 11875
By isa NARA, Date 11-21-97

free file

60 JUN 16 PM 7:13

SUNDAY

EEA658
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2294

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81333

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENEMY AIRCRAFT HAVE CONTINUED TO ATTACK US SHIPS OPERATING NEAR THE DMZ TODAY.

THE USS BOSTON, LOCATED ABOUT 5 MILES OFFSHORE, WAS ATTACKED BY AN ENEMY AIRCRAFT AT ABOUT NOON EDT. DURING THE ATTACK THE AIRCRAFT FIRED FOUR ROCKETS, TWO OF WHICH FIZZLED OUT SOME DISTANCE FROM THE SHIP. THE THIRD ROCKET IMPACTED ABOUT 100 YARDS FROM THE SHIP AND THE FOURTH ROCKET IMPACTED VERY CLOSE SPRAYING A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF SHRAPNEL ABOUT THE DECKS, HOWEVER, THERE WERE NO PERSONNEL CASUALTIES. THE SHIP RECEIVED SOME SHRAPNEL DAMAGE. ADDITIONALLY WE ARE PUZZLED BY THE FOLLOWING REPORTED FACT, THAT INVESTIGATION OF THE SHRAPNEL INDICATES POSITIVELY THAT IT WAS A US WEAPON DUE TO DISCOVERY OF US MARKINGS AND MANUFACTURER ON THE SHRAPNEL FRAGMENTS.

AT 4:00 PM EDT THIS EVENING THE USS EDSON, OPERATING 13 MILES OFF THE COAST, REPORTED THAT IT HAD BEEN ATTACKED BY AN ENEMY AIRCRAFT. DURING THIS ATTACK THE AIRCRAFT FIRED ONE ROCKET WHICH IMPACTED IN THE WATER NEAR THE EDSON'S STARBOARD SIDE. THUS FAR THE EXTENT OF DAMAGE TO THE SHIP, APPEARS TO BE MINOR. THERE WERE NO PERSONNEL CASUALTIES.

THIS IS A CURIOUS PAIR OF INCIDENTS AND I SHALL PURSUE THEM WITH GEN. WHEELER AND ADM SHARP IF NECESSARY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 162231Z JUNE 1968

46

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

sent per Jim Jones

EEA657
OO WTE10 WTE15
DE WTE 2295

1968 JUN 16 23 03

88 JUN 16 PM 7:11

SUNDAY

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TO JIM JONES
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP81334

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BONN 13355

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE ON DAY OF GERMAN UNITY.

REF: STATE 184251 AND 184252

1. THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WAS DELIVERED THIS EVENING. THE FRG IS AGREEABLE TO ITS RELEASE AT 12:00 NOON WASHINGTON TIME JUNE 17. WE CAUTIONED THEM THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO PRIOR PUBLICITY.

2. THE BRITISH AND THE FRENCH WERE INFORMED AND EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE NOTIFICATION. NEITHER KNEW OF ANY PLANS TO SEND SIMILAR MESSAGES. THE FRENCH SAID ONLY THAT THEY WOULD NOTIFY PARIS. THE BRITISH SAID THAT THEY THOUGHT IT WAS AN EXCELLENT MOVE ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE THERE WERE SO MANY REPORTS THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS ENTIRELY CONCENTRATING ON VIETNAM. THEY THOUGHT FOR THIS REASON IT WOULD BE BEST TO LEAVE THIS AS A U.S. GESTURE.

LODGE

DTG: 162244Z JUN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

free file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By pc, NARA, Date 4-24-01

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

1968 JUN 16 20 54

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81332

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12358,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1983.

by ng on 8-19-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

68 JUN 16 PM 5:24

SUNDAY

Pres file

ABOUT 2:30 THIS AFTERNOON I RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM DAVID LAWRENCE. HE IS IN THE DOCTORS' HOSPITAL, ROOM 1029, WITH A PRIVATE PHONE NUMBER 541-5131. HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD BEEN IN THE HOSPITAL WITH HEART TROUBLE FOR ABOUT 10 DAYS, HIS VOICE WAS QUITE WEAK.

HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE WAS QUITE ILL AND DID NOT KNOW WHETHER HE WOULD RECOVER HIS MIND WAS THOROUGHLY CLEAR. HE HAD AN IDEA HE WISHED TO PASS ALONG TO ME, IT IS THE FOLLOWING:

1. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD ASSEMBLE IN PARIS AND GO HIMSELF TO TALK WITH THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS HE COULD GATHER THERE REPRESENTING THE RELIGIONS OF VIETNAM: CATHOLIC, BUDDIST, AND CONFUCIANISM.
2. ACTING ON THE WELL DOCUMENTED PRINCIPAL THAT ALL RELIGIONS PREACH THAT HUMAN LIFE SHOULD BE RESPECTED OR WAS SHOULD BE AVOIDED, PEACE SHOULD BE SOUGHT. THE PRESIDENT SHOULD ASK THESE RELIGIOUS LEADERS TO WORK FOR, SAY, 30 DAYS TO COME UP WITH A SOLUTION IN VIETNAM WHICH WOULD BE HUMANE, RESPECTFUL OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND PROVIDE FOR VIETNAM AND THE WORLD AN EXAMPLE HOW WAR CAN BE CONVERTED INTO PEACE AND MEN CAN FIND THE WAY TO LIVE WITH ONE ANOTHER DESPITE DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL OUTLOOK OR PHILOSOPHY.
3. HE REFERRED SEVERAL TIMES TO HINDU NAMED DAS WHO WROTE A BOOK IN THE 1890'S CALLED "THE ESSENTIAL UNITY OF RELIGIONS."
4. HE UNDERLINED AGAIN AND AGAIN THAT HE FELT THAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD SEEK A BREAKTHROUGH TO THE IMPASSE IN PARIS; HE DOUBTED THAT THE BREAKTHROUGH COULD BE VIA CONVENTIONAL DIPLOMATIC MEANS; AND HE WISHED TO LAY BEFORE US THIS APPROACH TO A BREAKTHROUGH VIA RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS.
5. HE PROPOSED THAT WHILE THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS WERE CONTEMPLATING THE SHAPE OF THE SOLUTION IN VIETNAM THERE SHOULD BE A CEASEFIRE. HE SAID AS HE LAY IN BED AND THOUGHT OF THE FIGHTING IN VIETNAM HE COULD SEE THAT EACH SIDE WENT ON WITH THE WAR OUT OF PRIDE; BUT PRIDE HAD NO PLACE IN RELIGION NOR DID KILLING. WHAT DID HAVE A PLACE IN RELIGIONS WAS THE PRINCIPAL REQUIRED FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM AND ELSEWHERE; NAMELY, THE RIGHT OF ALL PEOPLE TO LIVE.
6. I TOLD MR. LAWRENCE THAT I WOULD REPORT TO YOU EXACTLY WHAT HE HAD TOLD ME. I WAS SURE HE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR OUR SIDE RATHER THAN HANOI'S TO RESPOND TO THE VOICE OF THE CLASSIC RELIGIONS. NEVERTHELESS, AT THIS TIME, ALL AVENUES TO PEACE DESERVED EXAMINATION; AND I ASSURED HIM THAT HIS SUGGESTIONS WOULD GET A FULL EXAMINATION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

48

EEA654
OO WTE13
DE WTE 2291

1968 JUN 16 16 24

1968 JUN 16 PM 12:31

SUNDAY

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81330

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc NARA, Date 4-24-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEREWITH A STATE DEPT REPORT ON EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE WORLD REACTION
TO THE PARIS TALKS PLUS AN ANALYSIS OF THAT REACTION TO DATE.

IN RESPONSE TO A MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY, WE HAVE RECEIVED
FROM EACH OF OUR CHIEFS OF MISSION A PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF WHERE
WE STAND WITH REGARD TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OPINION ON THE POSITIONS
WE AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE TAKEN IN PARIS. OUR MISSIONS
TOLD US ALSO WHAT THEY WERE DOING IN SUPPORT OF THE TALKS AND
WHAT MORE THEY THOUGHT WE COULD DO. WE HAVE EXAMINED THESE
REPORTS AND TAKEN STOCK OF OUR OWN ACTIVITIES AS WELL.

Free file

IN GENERAL, THE CONSENSUS IS THAT WE ARE RUNNING WELL
AHEAD OF THE OTHER SIDE AND THAT WE SHOULD HOLD ESSENTIALLY
TO THE PRESENT COURSE AS FAR AS HANDLING IS CONCERNED. WE
RECEIVED, HOWEVER, SOME SUGGESTIONS AND ARE DEVELOPING CERTAIN
IDEAS AS TO HOW WE MIGHT MARGINALLY IMPROVE OUR EFFECTIVENESS
IN REACHING CERTAIN TARGET GROUPS.

IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH
OF MARCH 31, THE ACTUAL STARTING OF TALKS, AND THE OBVIOUS
SINCERITY OF OUR EFFORT TO SEEK AN HONORABLE SETTLEMENT TOOK
THE WIND OUT OF THE SAILS OF OUR CRITICS AND EVOKED FAVORABLE
REACTIONS ON VIRTUALLY ALL SIDES. LACK OF DEMONSTRABLE PROGRESS
SINCE THEN, HOWEVER, COMBINED WITH THE DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS
IN FRANCE, THE SHOCKING ASSASSINATION OF ROBERT KENNEDY, AND
PREOCCUPATION WITH LOCAL ISSUES, HAVE CAUSED THE PARIS TALKS
TO RECEDE FROM THE POSITION THEY FIRST HELD IN WORLD ATTENTION.

AT THIS POINT IN TIME, WE APPEAR TO HAVE GENERAL SUPPORT
THROUGHOUT THE FREE AREAS OF EAST ASIA EXCEPT, PERHAPS, FOR
JAPAN WHERE THE DESIRE FOR AN IRREVERSIBLE TREND TOWARD A PEACEFUL
RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT OVERWHELMS THE MERITS OF THE ARGUMENTS
IN PARIS. THROUGHOUT THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS WE CONTINUE TO HAVE
FUNDAMENTAL SUPPORT ALTHOUGH SIGNS OF BOREDOM ARE ON THE INCREASE.
IN AFRICA WE ENCOUNTER THE USUAL COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEM, ESPECIALLY
WITH THOSE WHOSE PRINCIPAL RELIANCE IS ON FRENCH MEDIA. IN THE
MID-EAST, THE ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS PRE-EMPTS ATTENTION AND
CONCERN. WE HAVE SCORED SOME CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS IN WESTERN EUROPE
AND IN INDIA THERE HAS BEEN MARKED PROGRESS. ALTHOUGH THERE
IS LITTLE OR NO PUBLIC REFLECTION OF IT, WE ARE AWARE THAT
OUR POSITIONS ARE KEENLY NOTED BY THE EAST EUROPEANS.

AS THE TALKS DRAW OUT, THE LINGERING THOUGHT REMAINS THAT
THE AMERICANS HAVE MOVED FOR AN HONORABLE PEACE, BUT IN THE ABSENCE
OF PROGRESS AT PARIS AND IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING REPORTS OF
DEATH AND DESTRUCTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THIS FAVORABLE
IMPRESSION STANDS IN DANGER OF EVAPORATING. THE WIDELY HELD
DAVID-GOLIATH VIEW IS LIKELY TO REASSERT ITSELF, AND PRESSURE
IS LIKELY TO BEGIN TO MOUNT ON US TO STOP THE REST OF THE BOMBING
"TO SEE WHAT HAPPENS." WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO FORESTALL THIS
BY EMPHASIZING IN OUR OUTPUT THE INTRANSIGENCE OF THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATORS AND THE CYNICISM OF THEIR TERROR ATTACKS
ON CIVILIANS IN SAIGON AND OTHER CITIES.

IT IS GENERALLY AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PROBLEM OF BOREDOM AND FRUSTRATION WITH THE TALKS IS NOT TO BE SOLVED BY CHANGES IN THE INFORMATION HANDLING OF THE TALKS THEMSELVES. BY AVOIDING HIGH-PRESSURE, HIGH-DECIBEL PRESENTATIONS ON THE TALKS -- EITHER TO THE PUBLIC OR TO OFFICIALS -- WE SUSTAIN THE IMAGE OF OUR SINCERITY. TO ALTER THIS WOULD HARMFULLY CONTRADICT THE GOOD EFFECT OF AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN'S OFT-REPEATED INVITATION TO THE OTHER SIDE TO DROP THE POLEMICS AND GET DOWN TO SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE DO NOT CONTINUE TO SEE TO IT THAT WHAT DOES TRANSPIRE AT THE TALKS, ESPECIALLY THE RATIONALITY OF THE US APPROACH, IS KNOWN IN ALL CORNERS OF THE WORLD. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE EXCHANGES THIS LAST WEDNESDAY WERE GIVEN THIS NOW STANDARD TREATMENT:

A) A WORLD-WIDE CIRCULAR TELEGRAM, CIRCULAR 5, WENT TO MISSION CHIEFS GIVING THEM TALKING POINTS TO USE, TOGETHER WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THEIR STAFFS, IN CONVERSATIONS WITH TOP OFFICIALS, CIVIC LEADERS, EDITORS, AND OTHER OPINION MAKERS.

B) USIA SUPPORTED THIS WITH WIRELESS FILE AND POUCHED MATERIAL AS WELL AS WITH VOA COVERAGE.

C) BOB MCCLOSKEY AT HIS BRIEFINGS REINFORCED POINTS MADE BY BILL JORDEN IN PARIS. THE TEXT OF AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN'S "NOTES" WAS RELEASED HERE AS WELL AS IN PARIS. COPIES WERE SENT TO A SPECIAL LIST OF INFLUENTIAL PRIVATE CITIZENS. ALL ELEMENTS OF OUR BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS WHO DEAL WITH THE MEDIA AND PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS WERE INSTRUCTED AS TO HOW TO BACKGROUND THOSE WITH WHOM THEY DEAL.

THE POINTS MADE BY AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED IN THE BRIEFING KITS OF DEPARTMENTAL SPEAKERS. THEY HAVE BEEN PASSED TO AND DISCUSSED WITH INFLUENTIAL PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE DOUGLAS COMMITTEE AND THE AMERICAN FRIENDS OF VIET-NAM. THEY HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE WITH FURTHER BACKGROUNDING TO THE PERIODICAL WRITERS AND EDITORS WHO COME TO US FOR HELP. IN ADDITION, THEY WILL BE PICKED UP ON DEPARTMENTAL PUBLICATIONS SUCH AS THE BULLETIN AND FOREIGN POLICY BRIEFS.

CONVERSELY, WE ATTEMPT THROUGH MANY CHANNELS TO KEEP JORDEN AND THE GROUP IN PARIS INFORMED UP TO THE MINUTE AS TO THE REACTION THE TALKS ARE PRODUCING HERE IN THE UNITED STATES AND ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD. EACH DAY WE ASK JORDEN'S PEOPLE IF THEY ARE GETTING ALL THEY NEED IN THE WAY OF BACKSTOPPING. THE ANSWER HAS BEEN UNIFORMLY AFFIRMATIVE.

IN ADDITION TO THE WEEKLY WHITE HOUSE MEETINGS, WE HAVE SEVERAL OTHER GROUPS WHICH REGULARLY MEET TO CONSIDER AND ACT ON INFORMATION SUPPORT ACTIVITIES. THESE INCLUDE AN INFORMAL INTER-AGENCY WORKING LEVEL GROUP ORGANIZED SOME TIME AGO BY JACK O'BRIEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS (VIET-NAM), AND A MORE NEWLY FORMED GROUP HEADED BY SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY EDWARD THOMPSON. THESE GROUPS ATTEMPT TO FORESEE CONTINGENCIES AND TO PLAN INFORMATION SUPPORT FOR THEM. THE KEY WORD FOR OUR INFORMATION SUPPORT IS "NOT TO GET AHEAD OF PARIS." WE BELIEVE THIS APPROACH HAS GREATLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESS WE HAVE ENJOYED. IT DOES, HOWEVER, LIMIT OUR CAPACITY TO BUILD UP RECEPTIVITY IN ADVANCE FOR A CERTAIN LINE OF ACTION OR FOR A POSITION. BUT THIS IS A SMALL PRICE TO PAY FOR THE CREDIT WE ARE NOW GETTING FOR THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR NEGOTIATORS.

WE WILL SHORTLY SUBMIT A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE CABLES FROM OUR MISSIONS. WE ALSO INTEND TO CONDUCT WITH OTHER AGENCIES IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS A THOROUGH REVIEW OF OUR POSTURE, PROBLEMS, AND PROCEDURES.

DTG 161515Z JUNE 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

49

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAE 11876
By is NARA, Date 11-21-97

RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 JUN 16 15 59

OO WTE10
DE WTE 2290
FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP81329

Profile
'68 JUN 16 PM 12:12
SUNDAY

~~SECRET~~

THE FOLLOWING TWO NMCC REPORTS TELL WHAT WE KNOW OF ENEMY'S BOLD ATTACK WITH HELICOPTERS AND AT LEAST ONE AIRCRAFT ON OUR PATROL BOATS NEAR DMZ.

WE LOST ONE PATROL BOAT; A SECOND, ON RESCUE MISSION ATTACKED.

3 ENEMY HELICOPTERS SHOT DOWN. OTHERS BEING TARGETTED FOR ATTACK.

IN ADDITION, A MIG, PROBABLY FLYING OUT OF VINH, SHOT DOWN ONE OF OUR AIRCRAFT. SEARCH AND RESCUE UNDER WAY, WITH SIGNAL FROM DOWNED PILOT HEARD.

15 JUNE 1968
2355 EDT

FIRST REPORT

SUBJECT: ENEMY HELICOPTER ACTIVITY

1. AT 150955 EDT, THE 3D MARINE REGIMENT REPORTED 13 UNIDENTIFIED HELICOPTERS 11 NAUTICAL MILES NORTH OF GIO LINH. A CHECK REVEALED THAT THERE WERE NO FRIENDLY HELICOPTERS OPERATING IN THAT AREA. TWO USAF AIRCRAFT SCRAMBLED BUT DID NOT GAIN CONTACT. THE USS BOSTON (CAG-1) FIRED ON THE AREA WITH UNKNOWN RESULTS.

PRESERVATION COPY

2. AT 151210 EDT THE USS BOSTON LOCATED 10.5 NAUTICAL MILES EAST-NORTHEAST OF GIO LINH REPORTED 3 ROUNDS OF HOSTILE FIRE WITH ROCKET LIKE CHARACTERISTICS. THE SHIP WAS NOT HIT.

3. AT 151300 EDT A PCF SWIFT BOAT WAS SUNK BY POSSIBLE ENEMY SHORE FIRE 7.5 NAUTICAL MILES NORTHEAST OF DONG HA. TWO PCFS SENT IN TO RESCUE THE SURVIVORS WERE ATTACKED BY A JET AIRCRAFT AND A HELICOPTER BUT THERE WERE NO FRIENDLY CASUALTIES. FRIENDLY LOSSES FROM THE SUNKEN PCF WERE 1 KILLED, 2 WOUNDED, AND 4 MISSING.

4. AT 151710 EDT USAF AIRCRAFT REPORTED 19 ENEMY HELICOPTERS SHUTTLING BETWEEN THE BEN HAI RIVER NORTH OF THE DMZ AND TIGER ISLAND. USAF CLAIM 1 PROBABLE AND 1 POSSIBLE KILL. NAVAL GUNFIRE SHIPS ENGAGED THE HELICOPTERS ON TIGER ISLAND.

16 JUNE 1968

0825 EDT

SECOND REPORT

1. THE LATEST OPERATIONAL INFORMATION CONFIRMS THE LOSS OF A PCF SWIFT BOAT TO ENEMY ACTION. THE LOSS WAS DUE TO ENEMY HELICOPTER ROCKET FIRE RATHER THAN SHORE BATTERIES AS INITIALLY REPORTED. THE SECOND PCF WAS STRAFED BY A SINGLE JET AIRCRAFT AND TWO HELICOPTERS EMPLOYING ROCKETS. HOWEVER, THE PCF WAS UNDAMAGED BY THE COORDINATED ATTACK.

2. US AIRCRAFT HAVE DESTROYED THREE ENEMY HELICOPTERS IN THE AIR AND HAVE DISCOVERED AN ADDITIONAL 19 ENEMY HELICOPTERS ON THE GROUND ALONG THE BEN HAI RIVER IN THE DMZ. PLANS TO ATTACK OR RESULTS OF ATTACKS ON THE 19 HELICOPTERS ARE UNDETERMINED AT THE PRESENT TIME.

3. CURRENT INFORMATION INDICATE THE NORTH VIETNAM HELICOPTER INVENTORY IS COMPOSED OF 17 HARE/HOUND TYPES (3 CREWS, 12-16 TROOP, 1.3 TONS CARGO) AND 4 HOOKS (5 CREW, 65 TROOPS, 6.5 TONS CARGO).

DTG 161459Z JUN 1968

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

69 JUN 16 AM 11:35

SUNDAY

50

1968 JUN 16 15 26

VZCZCEEA652
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2288

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAPS1328

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *je/mg*, NARA, Date 5-1-01

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

HEREWITH FULL TEXT OF BERGUS' RATIONALE FOR U.S. INVITATION
TO RIAD TO COME TO WASHINGTON.

1. PARKER VISIT HAS GIVEN US OPPORTUNITY RE-CANVASS GUAR
VIEWS RE JARRING MISSION, PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, ET AL FROM
PRESIDENCY, FONOFF, HEYKAL AND OTHERS. WHAT WE HEAR FROM
EGYPTIANS, WHAT WE HEAR FROM JARRING, AND WHAT WE HEAR
FROM ISRAELIS ADDS UP TO A PRETTY DEPRESSING PICTURE OF
STALEMATE.
2. EGYPTIANS, FEELING THEY HAVE ONE-UPPED ISRAELIS BY
MAY 9 EXCHANGE WITH JARRING, ARE NOW MAKING FAIRLY ENERGETIC
EFFORTS GAIN INCREASED PUBLIC SUPPORT IN WORLD CAPITALS,
BUT EVEN THEY REALIZE THAT THIS IS A LONG-TERM PROCESS OF
LIMITED VALUE. WHETHER OR NOT THEY BELIEVE THAT TIME IS
ON THEIR SIDE, THEY ARE CERTAINLY ACTING AS IF THEY THOUGHT
SO.
3. ISRAELIS EVIDENTLY REMAIN CONVINCED THAT ARABS WILL IN
TIME BE FORCED BY THEIR OWN INTERESTS MAKE PEACE ON
ISRAEL'S TERMS AND IN MANNER PRESCRIBED BY ISRAEL.
4. RUSSIANS HAVE MORE THAN RECOVERED FROM ILLUSORY
"DEFEAT" INFLICTED UPON THEM BY JUNE WAR. THEIR POLITICO-
MILITARY POSITION IN EGYPT IS EXCELLENT, BETTER THAN ANYTHING
THEY EVER ENJOYED BEFORE, BETTER THAN POLITICO-MILITARY
POSITION OF US VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL OR ANY ARAB STATE. RUSSIANS
CAN CALL THE TUNE AS TO WHAT MILITARY ASSISTANCE WILL BE
FURNISHED AND MANNER IN WHICH IT WILL BE USED. RUSSIANS
PROBABLY HAVE EFFECTIVE VETO OVER ANY POSSIBLE MAJOR UAR
OFFENSIVE ACTION. RUSSIANS NOW HAVE MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE
FACILITIES IN UAR GREATER THAN THEY EVER DREAMED OF TWO
YEARS AGO.
5. WISH RE-EMPHASIZE POINT THAT RUSSIANS ARE NOW OUT OF
THE ARMS RACE SO FAR AS NEED TO COMPETE WITH WESTERN SUPPLIERS
IS CONCERNED. THEIR POSITION HERE SO SOLID THAT THEY WOULD
NO LONGER FEEL CONSTRAINED RESPOND IN KIND TO
INCREASE IN NUMBER OR SOPHISTICATION OF ISRAEL WEAPONS
BY MORE DELIVERIES TO ISRAEL OF AMERICAN HARDWARE. IN SUCH

Free file

EVENTUALITY OUR GUESS IS THAT RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE LITTLE DIFFICULTY PRESUADING UAR THAT EGYPTIAN INTERESTS REQUIRED EVEN MORE SOVIET PRESENCE AND DIRECT SOVIET CAPABILITY ON EGYPTIAN SOIL, IN EGYPTIAN AIRSPACE AND IN EGYPTIAN WATERS, RATHER THAN MORE RUSSIAN WEAPONS.

6. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS TREND OF GROWING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IS NOT IRREVERSIBLE. IF WE BELIEVED TO THE CONTRARY, IT WOULD BE OUR DUTY RECOMMEND DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH SOVIETS IN MIDDLE EAST BEFORE THINGS GET IRREPARABLY WORSE AND CONTAGION SPREADS. BUT WE REMAIN CONVINCED THAT ONCE UAR'S RATIONAL AND IRRATIONAL FEARS OF ISRAEL BEGAN TO BE ALLAYED, EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM WOULD REASSERT ITSELF TO POINT OF LIMITING SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE HERE.

7. IF THIS LINE OF REASONING HAS ANY VALIDITY, IT FOLLOWS THAT AN EARLY AND EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT OF ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM IS A SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES. IT MEANS US MUST PLAY MORE VIGOROUS ROLE IN PROMOTING SUCH A SETTLEMENT FOR TWO REASONS:

A) DESPITE LOGIC OF OUR POSITION THAT PARTIES TO DISPUTE MUST PLAY LEADING ROLE IN SETTLEMENT, FACT IS THAT AFTER ONE YEAR IT HAS BECOME EVIDENT THAT THEY INCAPABLE OF DOING SO. US IS THUS FAR UNABLE TO PROVIDE NECESSARY CATALYST. AS SECRETARY DULLES PUT IT ON AUGUST 26, 1955: "BOTH SIDES SUFFER GREATLY FROM THE PRESENT SITUATION, AND BOTH ARE ANXIOUS FOR WHAT THEY WOULD REGARD AS A JUST AND EQUITABLE SOLUTION. BUT NEITHER HAS BEEN ABLE TO FIND THAT WAY. THIS MAY BE A SITUATION WHERE MUTUAL FRIENDS COULD SERVE THE COMMON GOOD. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE SINCE THE AREA MAY NOT, OF ITSELF, POSSESS ALL OF THE INGREDIENTS NEEDED FOR THE FULL AND EARLY BUILDING OF SECURITY AND WELL-BEING." (UNDERLINING OURS).

B) A SETTLEMENT CLEARLY PROMOTED BY THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE A HISTORIC DIPLOMATIC TRIUMPH WITH LASTING BENEFITS TO US THROUGHOUT THE AREA AND IN MANY OTHER UNDERDEVELOPED REGIONS. WE WOULD HAVE PRODUCED SOMETHING WHICH THE PARTIES THEMSELVES, THE SOVIETS, THE BRITISH, THE WESTERN EUROPEANS, THE NON-ALIGNED STATES, THE UNITED NATIONS WERE INCAPABLE OF PROVIDING.

8. WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE US HAS THE SUBSTANTIVE IDEAS AND THE DIPLOMATIC GIFTS TO PROMOTE SUCH A SETTLEMENT. AS TO SUBSTANTIVE IDEAS, THERE ARE FILE CABINETS OF DOCUMENTS DATING BACK FROM THE "OPERATION ALPHA" DAYS OF 1954-1955 TO THE SUMMER OF 1967 AS TO WHAT COULD BE DONE. WE ARE EITHER UNDULY MODEST OR SELF-DECEPTIVE IF WE SAY USG DOESN'T HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF DEVISING A JUST AND EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT.

9. AS TO TACTICAL CAPABILITIES, WE WILL CONFINE OUR REMARKS TO EGYPT. EGYPTIANS CONTINUE IN TOUCHING, IF EXAGGERATED, BELIEF THAT ONLY US CAN PRODUCE SETTLEMENT REMOTELY ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. OUR DIFFIDENCE TO MAKE THE EFFORT IS READ BY THEM AS SINISTER INTENT. THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD USG ARE NOW COMPRISED OF SUSPICION; DISTRESS AND, PARADOXICALLY, CONSIDERABLE LONELINESS; WE BELIEVE A TACTICAL GESTURE FROM US WOULD GO FAR TOWARD PROMOTING SOME BASIC RETHINKING THROUGHOUT GUAR AND INSTILL NEW READINESS EXAMINE SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN SETTLEMENT (BOUNDARIES, REFUGEES, GAZA, SUEZ, AND AQABA) AS INITIO.

10. WE BELIEVE ONE USEFUL TACTICAL MEASURE WOULD BE TO INVITE UAR FONMIN RIAD TO WASHINGTON FOR TALKS ON NATURE AND SUBSTANCE OF EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT. THIS HAS A GREAT DEAL TO COMMEND IT. FOR ONE THING WE THINK EGYPTIANS WOULD LEAP AT THE OPPORTUNITY. PRIVATELY THEY WOULD BE HIGHLY GRATIFIED. PUBLICLY THEY COULD SELL A RIAD TRIP TO WASHINGTON TO THEIR OWN PUBLIC OPINION AND THAT OF THE OTHER ARAB STATES AS A CONTINUATION OF UAR EFFORTS "EXPLAIN" ARAB POSITION IN FOREIGN CAPITALS.

11. FROM HERE, IT WOULD SEEM THAT U.S. DOMESTIC REACTION WOULD BE POSITIVE TO SUCH A GESTURE. IT COULD BE STATED THAT DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, USG WISHES LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED IN ITS SUPPORT OF UN AND JARRING EFFORTS ACHIEVE PEACEFUL AND EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT. U.S. AS PERMANENT MEMBER OF SECURITY COUNCIL WISHES CONSULT WITH FONMIN OF ONE OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES TO ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE. MOREOVER, IT COULD BE INTIMATED THAT USG INTENDS CONSULT IN DUE COURSE WITH EBAN AND RIFAI AS WELL, ALTHOUGH FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, I WOULD HOPE THAT RIAD VISIT COULD COME FIRST.

12. WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS ON THIS PROPOSAL.

BERGUS

~~SECRET~~

DTG 161421Z JUNE 68

~~SECRET~~

51
Sent 10:48 AM

VZCZCEEA651 H
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 2287

68 JUN 18 14

68 JUN 18 AM 11:01
free file
SUNDAY

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81327

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

HEREWITH LODGE RECOMMENDS KIESINGER NOT COME TO WASHINGTON--
IF THE MATTER ON FACT IS RAISED UNTIL BONN CLEAR ON BERLIN
COUNTERMEASURES.

BONN 13349

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM LODGE

THIS RELATES TO "DIE WELT" STORY ABOUT KIESINGER PLANNING
TO VISIT THE PRESIDENT. THE STORY IS GENERALLY BELIEVED TO
BE QUITE WILD, BUT IF ITS PROBABILITY SHOULD INCREASE, THE
FOLLOWING MAY BE HELPFUL:

1. IT IS INADVISABLE FOR KIESINGER TO SEE THE PRESIDENT
IN CONNECTION WITH THE QUESTION OF COUNTERMEASURES UNTIL
THE FRG HAS MADE ITS POSITION CLEAR ON EXACTLY WHAT COUNTER-
MEASURES IT FAVORS. WHEN I ASKED KIESINGER ABOUT THIS HE
DID NOT GIVE A RESPONSIVE REPLY AND I HAVE BEEN WONDERING
WHETHER HE IS NOT HOPING THAT WE WILL GET NUGGED INTO A
POSITION ON COUNTERMEASURES WHICH IS AHEAD OF HIS. THIS
WOULD BE WRONG. FRG IS BOTH MORE CLOSELY AFFECTED BY AND
BETTER INFORMED ABOUT COUNTERMEASURES THAN WE ARE.
2. I ALSO THINK IT IS INADVISABLE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO BE
INVOLVED BEFORE WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO WORK OUT OUR POSITION
ON COUNTERMEASURES WITH THE BRITISH AND FRENCH.
3. FOR KIESINGER TO SEE THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE
ABOVE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, THEREFORE, BE PREMATURE.
LODGE

~~SECRET~~

DTG 161416Z JUNE 68

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 4-24-01

EEASAS
OO WTE 18
DE WTE 2283

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAPS1324

~~SECRET~~

52

YOU SHOULD KNOW GENERAL WHEELER AND I AM FOLLOWING ^{1968 JUN 16 1968} CLOSELY REPORTED ODD INCIDENTS JUST SOUTH OF THE DMZ AND OFF SHORE. HERewith AN INTERIM EXPLANATION FROM CINCPAC.

Pres file

1968 JUN 15 PM 11:58

SATURDAY

YOUR MORNING REPORT WILL HAVE ANYTHING ELSE THAT DEVELOPS OVERNIGHT.

DURING NIGHT 15-16 JUNE WHILE USS BOSTON ON SCHEDULED NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT OPERATIONS ENEMY HELICOPTERS APPEARED IN DMZ AREA VICINITY SONG BEN HAI, CAP LAY, AND TIGER ISLAND. SHIP TOOK HELOS UNDERFIRE AT 152330H. HELOS MOVED NORTH AND INLAND. AT 160010H BOSTON RECEIVED 3 ROUNDS HOSTILE FIRE WITH ROCKET LIKE CHARACTERISTICS, BELIEVED TO BE FROM SOUTH OF MOUTH OF SONG BEN HAI RIVER. SHIP NOT HIT. AT 160124H SHIP RECEIVED WORD SWIFT BOAT ENFIELD COBRA 'A' WAS HIT AND ITS PERSONNEL WERE IN THE WATER. ENFIELD COBRA 'C' WAS SEARCHING FOR SURVIVORS WHEN HE REPORTED TAKING ROCKET FIRE FROM APPROXIMATELY ONE MILE SOUTH OF SONG BEN HAI. AT 160205H ENFIELD COBRA Z REPORTED ILLUMINATION ROUND IN HIS VICINITY, THEN ENFIELD COBRA 'C' REPORTED 50 CAL FIRE FROM NORTH OF SONG BEN HAI AND HE WAS RETURNING FIRE. AT 16257H ENFIELD COBRA 'C' REPORTED HELO FIRING ON HIM, AND THAT HE WAS HEADING TOWARD BOSTON. BOTH SWIFT BOATS TOOK SHELTER VICINITY. USS BOSTON AND HELOS WITHDREW TOWARD HOSPITAL SHIP REPOSE.

AFTER RECEIPT OF HOSTILE FIRE TWO AIRCRAFT WERE PROVIDED AT 162030H BY ENTERPRISE. AGAIN AFTER HELOS ATTACKING SWIFTBOATS TWO AIRCRAFT PROVIDED BY ENTERPRISE AND TWO AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT BY DANANG ARRIVING AT 160350H.

HELO ACTIVITY CONTINUED BETWEEN CAP LAY AND TIGER ISLAND. AT 162400H NAVY SILVERKITE AIRCRAFT WORKING VICINITY OF CAP LAY REPORTED FIRING ON AND SPLASHING ENEMY HELO. HOWEVER ENEMY HELO ACTIVITY CONTINUES VICINITY CAP LAY AND TIGER ISLAND. AIR FORCE AND NAVY AIRCRAFT CONTINUED SWEEPS OF AREA UNTIL 160620H WHEN APPROACHING DAWN AND DISAPPEARANCE OF HELOS CAUSED CEASING OF THESE OPERATIONS. USS BOSTON HAD ALL BATTERIES MANNED BUT DID NOT FIRE DUE TO RAPIDLY MOVING FRIENDLY LOW FLYERS. UPON DEPARTURE AIRCRAFT USS BOSTON FIRED 13 RDS 5"/38 AT APPARENT HELO ON REVERSE (NORTH) SIDE OF TIGER ISLAND FOLLOWING WHICH THIS CONTACT DISAPPEARED.

DURING MUCH OF THIS ACTION LIGHTED HELOS WERE IN AREA IN GENERAL OVER WATER SOUTH OF DMZ. ALTHOUGH NAVAL GUNFIRE LIASION OFFICER THIRD MAF REPORTED ALL RPT ALL HELOS ALOFT WERE TO BE CONSIDERED TARGETS ORIG ENTERTAINED SUFFICIENT DOUBT THAT LIGHTED HELOS WERE IN FACT HOSTILE THAT USS BOSTON WEAPONS HELD TIGHT. THIS DESPITE ACTION OF SWIFT BOATS OBSERVED FIRING AT THESE LIGHTED HELOS. LIGHTED HELOS LATER EVALUATED FRIENDLY DUE IFF OR THEIR MOVEMENT TO VICINITY USS REPOSE. BEST GUESS HOSTILE HELOS ATTACKED SWIFT BOATS WITH FRIENDLY HELOS SUBSEQUENTLY ARRIVING IN RESPONSE SWIFT CALL FOR MEDEVAC AND SOME CONFUSION OF IDENTITY THEREBY TOOK PLACE.

AMPLIFYING INFO TO FOLLOW.

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 152222Z JUNE 1968

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30
By *jc* NARA, Date 4-24-01

Thursday, June 13, 1968
4:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a letter to His Holiness the Pope,
redrafted according to instructions transmitted
by Jim Jones.

W. W. Rostow

~~2. Profile~~
2. Profile

Attachment

June 15, 1968

Your Holiness:

I was deeply touched by your compassionate message of condolence upon the death of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. We draw strength from your prayers for our fellow citizens and for the Nation at this sad moment.

I am pleased that Archbishop Terrence Cooke has agreed to serve on the Presidential Commission appointed to seek out the causes of violence in our country.

Senator Kennedy believed that Americans could, if they would, end the blight of poverty and bigotry. In this he was at one with the political leadership the United States has enjoyed for the past thirty-five years.

I must report that there has been no substantial progress toward a peaceful and just solution of the war in Vietnam during the Paris talks. Meanwhile, the Communists have mounted a savage, indiscriminate attack on Saigon -- on the government of South Vietnam and on ordinary citizens alike.

There is much speculation that these rocket and mortar attacks are designed not only to shake the government, but to give the impression that the Communists hold the military initiative -- and therefore to secure an advantage in Paris. It is a tragedy -- one of many in this war -- that the people of South Vietnam must suffer as they do because of the aggressive intentions of the Communists.

I cannot predict when the North Vietnamese representatives will be more forthcoming in Paris; nor can I estimate how long the Communists' offensive will continue in South Vietnam. I fear that neither will occur as soon as all mankind desires.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 4-24-01

Nevertheless, the United States and those with whom we are allied will continue to seek an honorable peace at the negotiating table, as we shall remain firm in resisting terror and aggression in South Vietnam. I devoutly hope that my next letter to you will bring more hopeful tidings. Unless it is myself, I know of no one on earth who so longs for news of progress toward peace in Vietnam as Your Holiness.

I should tell you that I have greatly enjoyed my chats with the Apostolic Delegate in Washington.

Sincerely,

LBJ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Holiness
Pope Paul VI
Vatican City

LBJ:HMcPh:WWR:mz
(6/13/68)

54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

68 JUN 15 PM 6:12

SATURDAY

1968 JUN 15 22 02

VZCZCEE646
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2281

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81322

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEC. RUSK HAS PERSONALLY CLEARED THIS DRAFT MESSAGE TO KIESENGER FOR GERMAN UNITY DAY, MONDAY. BECAUSE OF THE RUSSIAN PRESSURE THE MESSAGE HAS MORE THAN ROUTINE IMPORTANCE. IF YOU APPROVE IT IS EVIDENTLY URGENT THAT WE DISPATCH.

Pres file

APPROVED -----

NO -----

CALL ME -----

RECOMMENDATION:

THAT YOU SIGN THE ENCLOSED MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR KIESINGER ON THE OCCASION OF THE DAY OF GERMAN UNITY.

DISCUSSION:

CHANCELLOR KIESINGER INDICATED TO HIS OWN STAFF, AS WELL AS TO OTHERS, THAT HE WOULD APPRECIATE A SPECIAL STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FROM THE UNITED STATES AT THIS TIME WHEN HE FACES PRESSURES ON BERLIN AS WELL AS A DIFFICULT INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEM. (THERE ARE REPORTS, NOT CONFIRMED, THAT HE MAY BE PLANNING A TRIP TO WASHINGTON TO SEE YOU, AS WELL AS TO PARIS AND LONDON, IN THE NEAR FUTURE AS A SIGN OF OUR SOLIDARITY ON BERLIN.)

THERE IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A USEFUL GESTURE OF UNITED STATES SUPPORT ON MONDAY, JUNE 17, THE 15TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UPRISING IN EAST GERMANY WHICH IS CELEBRATED IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AS A "DAY OF GERMAN UNITY". A MESSAGE FROM YOU TO CHANCELLOR KIESINGER ON THIS OCCASION WOULD BE WIDELY AND FAVORABLY NOTED, PARTICULARLY IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND IN BERLIN.

MY DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR:

IT IS A MATTER OF GREAT REGRET TO ME THAT WHILE THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND WE ARE PURSUING OBJECTIVES THAT I BELIEVE ALL MANKIND SHARES, NAMELY TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH OUR NEIGHBORS, BERLIN IS ONCE AGAIN THREATENED.

OUR GOVERNMENT AND YOURS, ALONG WITH THE BRITISH AND FRENCH, ARE CONSULTING ON THIS LATEST TOTALLY UNPROVOKED AND UNJUSTIFIED AGGRAVATION OF THE SITUATION. I WANT TO EXPRESS TO YOU ON THIS DAY OF GERMAN UNITY UNQTE THAT OUR SUPPORT OF FREE BERLIN AND THE GOAL OF A GERMAN PEOPLE UNITED IN PEACE REMAINS AS FIRM AS EVER.

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *4-24-01*

DTG: 152130Z JUN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

55 / SATURDAY

68 JUN 15 PM 4:59

Free file

EEA645
OO WTE18 WTE15
DE WTE 228A

1968 JUN 15 20 51

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAPS1321

~~SECRET~~

JUNE 15, 1968

SUBJECT: WHAT AND HOW WE ARE DOING TO GET ACROSS OUR
SIDE OF THE PARIS TALKS

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

1. HERewith THE KEY ELEMENTS OF REPORTS FROM STATE, ASIA
IN RESPONSE TO YOUR QUESTIONS AT LAST TUESDAY'S
LUNCH.

2. STATE SAMPLED ALL CHIEFS OF MISSION AND HOME BUREAUS,
AND CONCLUDED:

"IN GENERAL, THE CONSENSUS IS THAT WE ARE RUNNING WELL
AHEAD OF THE OTHER SIDE AND THAT WE SHOULD HOLD ESSENTIALLY
TO THE PRESENT COURSE AS FAR AS HANDLING IS CONCERNED.
WE RECEIVED, HOWEVER, SOME SUGGESTIONS AND ARE DEVELOPING
CERTAIN IDEAS AS TO HOW WE MIGHT MARGINALLY IMPROVE OUR
EFFECTIVENESS IN REACHING CERTAIN TARGET GROUPS.

"IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH
OF MARCH 31, THE ACTUAL STARTING OF TALKS, AND THE OBVIOUS
SINCERITY OF OUR EFFORT TO SEEK AN HONORABLE SETTLEMENT
TOOK THE WIND OUT OF THE SAILS OF OUR CRITICS AND EVOKED
FAVORABLE REACTIONS ON VIRTUALLY ALL SIDES. LACK OF
DEMONSTRABLE PROGRESS SINCE THEN, HOWEVER, COMBINED WITH
THE DRAMATIC DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE, THE SHOCKING ASSASSINATION
OF ROBERT KENNEDY, AND PREOCCUPATION WITH LOCAL ISSUES,
HAVE CAUSED THE PARIS TALKS TO RECEDE FROM THE POSITION
THEY FIRST HELD IN WORLD ATTENTION.

"AT THIS POINT IN TIME, WE APPEAR TO HAVE GENERAL
SUPPORT THROUGHOUT THE FREE AREAS OF EAST ASIA EXCEPT,
PERHAPS, FOR JAPAN WHERE THE DESIRE FOR AN IRREVERSIBLE
TREND TOWARD A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT OVER-
WHELMS THE MERITS OF THE ARGUMENTS IN PARIS. THROUGHOUT
THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS WE CONTINUE TO HAVE FUNDAMENTAL SUPPORT
ALTHOUGH SIGNS OF BOREDOM ARE ON THE INCREASE. IN AFRICA
WE ENCOUNTER THE USUAL COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEM, ESPECIALLY
WITH THOSE WHOSE PRINCIPAL RELIANCE IS ON FRENCH MEDIA.
IN THE MID-EAST, THE ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS PRE-EMPTS ATTENTION
AND CONCERN. WE HAVE SCORED SOME CONSIDERABLE SUCCESSES
IN WESTERN EUROPE AND IN INDIA THERE HAS BEEN MARKED
PROGRESS. ALTHOUGH THERE IS LITTLE OR NO PUBLIC REFLECTION
OF IT, WE ARE AWARE THAT OUR POSITIONS ARE KEENLY NOTED BY
THE EAST EUROPEANS. . .

"IT IS GENERALLY AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PROBLEM
OF BOREDOM AND FRUSTRATION WITH THE TALKS IS NOT TO BE
SOLVED BY CHANGES IN THE INFORMATION HANDLING OF THE
TALKS THEMSELVES. BY AVOIDING HIGH-PRESSURE, HIGH-DECIBEL PRE-
SENTATIONS ON THE TALKS -- EITHER TO THE PUBLIC OR TO
OFFICIALS -- WE SUSTAIN THE IMAGE OF OUR SINCERITY. TO
ALTER THIS WOULD HARMFULLY CONTRADICT THE GOOD EFFECT OF
AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN'S OFT-REPEATED INVITATION TO THE OTHER
SIDE TO DROP THE POLEMICS AND GET DOWN TO SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-177
By *WZ*, NARA, Date 1-17-83

"THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE DO NOT CONTINUE TO SEE TO IT THAT WHAT DOES TRANSPIRE AT THE TALKS, ESPECIALLY THE RATIONALITY OF THE US APPROACH, IS KNOWN IN ALL CORNERS OF THE WORLD. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE EXCHANGES THIS LAST WEDNESDAY WERE GIVEN THIS NOW STANDARD TREATMENT:

A) A WORLD-WIDE CIRCULAR TELEGRAM, CIRCULAR 5, WENT TO MISSION CHIEFS GIVING THEM TALKING POINTS TO USE, TOGETHER WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THEIR STAFFS, IN CONVERSATIONS WITH TOP OFFICIALS, CIVIC LEADERS, EDITORS, AND OTHER OPINION MAKERS.

B) USIA SUPPORTED THIS WITH WIRELESS FILE AND POUCHED MATERIAL AS WELL AS WITH VOA COVERAGE.

C) BOB MCCLOSKEY AT HIS BRIEFINGS REINFORCED POINTS MADE BY BILL JORDEN IN PARIS.

"THE KEY WORD FOR OUR INFORMATION SUPPORT IS "NOT TO GET AHEAD OF PARIS." WE BELIEVE THIS APPROACH HAS GREATLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESS WE HAVE ENJOYED. IT DOES, HOWEVER, LIMIT OUR CAPACITY TO BUILD UP RECEPTIVITY IN ADVANCE FOR A CERTAIN LINE OF ACTION OR FOR A POSITION. BUT THIS IS A SMALL PRICE TO PAY FOR THE CREDIT WE ARE NOW GETTING FOR THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR NEGOTIATORS.

3. USIA POLLED ALL ITS FIELD INSTALLATIONS AND FOUND:

"SINCE THE PARIS TALKS BEGAN, NON-COMMUNIST MEDIA AND INFORMED PUBLIC OPINION ABROAD HAVE SHOWN INCREASING UNDERSTANDING AND APPROVAL OF THE SINCERITY OF THE U. S. IN ITS EFFORTS TO END THE VIOLENCE IN VIET-NAM. ON BALANCE, THERE IS INCREASING AWARENESS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE INTRANSIGENCE AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING U. S. READINESS TO MOVE THE TALKS IN A CONSTRUCTIVE DIRECTION, AND OF HEIGHTENED NORTH VIETNAMESE RESORT TO VIOLENCE AND TERROR IN SOUTH VIET-NAM IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING U. S. RESTRAINT THERE."

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

4.

"THE OVERALL TONE OF COVERAGE OF THE VIETNAM ISSUE IN NEWSPAPERS, MAGAZINES AND OTHER MEDIA HAS IMPROVED SUBSTANTIALLY DURING THE PAST FOUR MONTHS, PARTICULARLY IN EUROPE."

5. DEFENSE HAS FOLLOWED A POLICY OF REFRAINING FROM INVOLVEMENT IN THE PARIS TALKS IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY MISHAPS IN TIMING OR EMPHASIS. (I UNDERSTAND THAT PHIL GOULDING HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH GEORGE CHRISTIAN ON THIS.)

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
s
(C)

6. I ELECTED TO SUBMIT THIS BRIEF SUMMARY TO YOU NOW BECAUSE OF YOUR EXPRESSED INTEREST. THE STATE REPORT IS FOUR PAGES [REDACTED] USIA'S REPORT IS QUITE DETAILED BUT WELL ORGANIZED AND CHECK-FULL OF SPECIFICS, AND RUNS TO 75 PAGES (A ONE PAGE SUMMARY WITH 11 PAGES OF AMPLIFICATION, BACKED UP BY 63 PAGES OF DETAILS ON ACTIONS TAKEN, FOREIGN REACTION, AND SPECIFIC FOCUS ON THE JUNE 12 MEETING). IF YOU WISH, I CAN WIRE YOU ADDITIONAL PERTINENT SECTIONS OF ALL THE REPORTS AND HOLD THE BULK FOR YOUR RETURN, OR I CAN SEE ABOUT POUCHING IT ALL TO YOU.

V. V. R.

THIS WILL DO FOR NOW; HOLD REST
UNTIL I RETURN -----

CABLE PERTINENT SECTIONS NOW -----

POUCH IT DOWN -----

DTG 151956Z JUN 68

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

56

EEA641
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2276

1968 JUN 15 16 45

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81317

Free file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUNE 15, 1968

68 JUN 15 PM 12:52

SATURDAY

NICK KATZENBACH WILL LEAD A SMALL U.S. DELEGATION TO DELHI ON JUNE 26 FOR THE FIRST IN WHAT WE HOPE WILL BE A SERIES OF HIGH-LEVEL TALKS WITH THE INDIANS COVERING THE FULL RANGE OF OUR RELATIONS. THE MEETING HAS JUST LEAKED IN NEW DELHI AND STATE WILL CONFIRM TODAY. WE DON'T EXPECT QUICK SETTLEMENT OF THE TOUGH ISSUES, BUT WE HOPE TO SUBSTITUTE FRANK INDO-U.S. CONVERSATION FOR THE SPITTING MATCHES WE HAVE TOO OFTEN SLIPPED INTO OF LATE.

NICK HAS ASKED ED HAMILTON TO JOIN THE DELEGATION, SUBJECT TO YOUR APPROVAL. I HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN YOUR VIEWS ON STAFF TRAVEL; AND I THOUGHT, THEREFORE, I SHOULD GET A SPECIFIC SIGNAL FROM YOU ON THIS PARTICULAR CASE.

THE FACTUAL CASE FOR THE TRIP IS AS FOLLOWS:

1. MOST OF OUR MAJOR PROBLEMS IN INDIA -- MILITARY SUPPLY, CONTE/LONG, FOOD, DEVELOPMENT, ETC. -- ARE COMPLEX POLITICAL ISSUES WITH A STRONG ECONOMIC ELEMENT. HAMILTON WOULD BE THE ONLY MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION WHO COMBINES KNOWLEDGE OF THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE INDIAN ECONOMY AND OUR ECONOMIC AID PROBLEMS IN INDIA.
2. THE INDIANS WOULD WELCOME HIS PARTICIPATION. THE INDIAN AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY SPONTANEOUSLY BUTTON-HOLED HAMILTON AND URGED HIM TO GO, SUGGESTING THAT HE MIGHT RAISE THE MATTER WITH KATZENBACH OR PERHAPS EVEN WITH YOU. (HAMILTON THINKS HE GOT HIM TO CLIMB DOWN AND LEAVE US TO PUT TOGETHER OUR OWN DELEGATION IN AN ORDERLY WAY.)

IF YOU APPROVED, THE TRIP WOULD TAKE HAMILTON OUT OF WASHINGTON FOR ABOUT TEN DAYS. WE COULD COVER FOR HIM HERE; THERE IS NOTHING SPECIAL NOW SCHEDULED IN HIS ACCOUNTS DURING THAT PERIOD. THERE WOULD BE NO ADDITIONAL EXPENSE TO HIS GOING SINCE NICK WILL HAVE HIS OWN AIRPLANE.

ON BALANCE, I WOULD VOTE THAT YOU LET HAMILTON GO, BUT HE AND I WILL, OF COURSE, BE ENTIRELY PEACEFUL IF YOU DECIDE OTHERWISE.

O.K. FOR HAMILTON TO GO-----
LET'S SIT THIS ONE OUT-----
CALL ME-----

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By pc, NARA, Date 4-24-01

DTG 151609Z JUNE 1968

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~~SECRET~~

57

1968 JUN 15 16 40

Pre file

EEA648
OO WTE18
DE WTE 2275

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81316

68 JUN 15 PM 12:47

SATURDAY

~~SECRET~~

JUNE 15, 1968

HEREWITH KEITH WALLER CONVEYS TO ME FOR THE PRESIDENT
PRIME MINISTER GORTON'S REFLECTIONS ON HIS TRIP TO VIETNAM.

QUOTE

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS ASKED THAT THE FOLLOWING VIEWS FORMED
ON HIS CURRENT VISIT TO SOUTH VIETNAM AND OTHER SOUTH EAST
ASIAN COUNTRIES BE CONVEYED TO THE PRESIDENT. THESE VIEWS
ARE ALSO BEING PASSED TO GOVERNOR HARRIMAN WHO HAS EXPRESSED
INTEREST IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S IMPRESSIONS OF HIS VISIT TO
SOUTH VIETNAM.

DURING HIS VISIT TO SOUTH VIETNAM THE PRIME MINISTER VISITED
AUSTRALIAN FORCES AND HAD SEPARATE MEETINGS WITH ABRAMS,
BUNKER, THIEU, HUONG, NATIONAL ASSEMBLY LEADERS, VY AND VIEN.
HARRIMAN WILL BE FAMILIAR WITH U.S. AND ARVN MILITARY REPORTS
AND ASSESSMENTS FROM THE CONTINUING ADVICES OF BUNKER. HOWEVER,
HE MAY BE INTERESTED TO KNOW THE INTENSITY WITH WHICH ALL RVN
LEADERS EXPRESSED TO MR. GORTON THEIR ANXIETY ABOUT THE CONTINUING
STEADFASTNESS AND RESOLVE OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION, PEOPLE
AND NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS. THIS WAS CONVEYED WITH A SINCERITY AND
ABSENCE OF EMOTION WHICH LED THE PRIME MINISTER TO BELIEVE THAT
IT WAS A WORRY TO THEM WHICH WAS MORE DEEP-SEATED THAN BUNKER
MAY HAVE CONVEYED, OR MAY HAVE BEEN INFERRED BY THE ADMINISTRATION
AND HARRIMAN FROM HIS ADVICES. THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THE VERY
GREAT INTEREST WITH WHICH THE RVN LEADERS ENQUIRED ABOUT MR.
GORTON'S DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON AND THE RELIEF WHICH THEY
APPEARED TO DRAW FROM HIS REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
SPEECH IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT REITERATED HIS DETERMINATION
TO HAVE NO "FAKE PEACE". HOWEVER, THEY WERE STILL WORRIED THAT
SOME CONCESSION MIGHT BE MADE AT THE PARIS TALKS WHICH, IN THE
ABSENCE OF A FIRM RECIPROCAL CONCESSION FROM HANOI WOULD, IN
THEIR VIEW, WEAKEN THE WILL OF THEIR PEOPLE, CAUSE DOUBT,
AND UNDERMINE THEIR MILITARY POSITION. THEIR FEARS OF AMERICAN
CONCESSION AT THE PARIS TALKS REMAIN DEEP-SEATED. OTHER ASIAN
LEADERS HAVE MUCH THE SAME POINT OF VIEW AND BELIEVE THAT
ANY COMPROMISE PEACE IN VIETNAM WILL LEAD TO AN EVENTUAL COMMUNIST
SUCCESS AND THEY APPEAR TO HAVE NO ILLUSIONS AS TO WHAT THE OUTCOME
OF SUCH A PEACE WOULD BE.

END QUOTE

/S/ KEITH WALLER

~~SECRET~~

DTG 151609Z JUN 68

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-178

By *SJ*, NARA Date *7-25-01*

~~SECRET~~

1968 JUN 15 16 12

68 JUN 15 PM 12:17

SATURDAY

VZCZCEEA639
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2273

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81314

Profile

~~SECRET~~

JUNE 15, 1968

THIS MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH KIESINGER ON FUTURE U.S. COOPERATION TO PROTECT THE WORLD MONETARY SYSTEM IS INTERESTING.

CHANCELLOR KIESINGER RECEIVED UNDER SECRETARIES ROSTOW AND DEMING ACCOMPANIED BY THE AMBASSADOR ON JUNE 11, 1968.

ROSTOW BEGAN BY EXPRESSING USG GRATIFICATION WITH REGARD TO GERMAN INITIATIVES IN HELPING TO ACHIEVE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS EQUILIBRIUM DURING THE PERIOD SINCE JANUARY 1. THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS IN WHICH FRG HAD PLAYED AN ACTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE PART HAD RESULTED IN A SERIES OF COORDINATED STEPS BY BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS AND BY OTHER GOVERNMENTS. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THESE ACTIONS WOULD BE EFFECTIVE IN FACILITATING EQUILIBRIUM WITHOUT TRADE RESTRICTION, UNLESS THE SITUATION CHANGES.

ROSTOW CONTINUED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED THEM TO CALL TODAY IN THE GREATEST CONFIDENCE, BEHIND THE SCREEN OF THE OFFSET NEGOTIATIONS, TO RAISE WITH THE CHANCELLOR USG CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE RISKS TO THE MONETARY SYSTEM IMPLICIT IN THE WEAKNESS OF STERLING AND THE EVENTS IN FRANCE. WE SAW NO REASON FOR A FRANC DEVALUATION, CONSIDERING THE FRENCH RESERVE POSITION, BUT THERE COULD BE CHANGES IF CAPITAL LEFT FRANCE ON A LARGE SCALE, OR THE ELECTIONS TOOK THE WRONG TURN. IF EITHER CURRENCY FELL, THE OTHER WOULD PROBABLY FOLLOW, AND THE IMPACT OF SUCH EVENTS ON THE MONETARY SYSTEM COULD BE EXTREMELY SERIOUS. WE BELIEVED THAT A GREAT RESPONSIBILITY FELL ON OUR TWO COUNTRIES, BY REASON OF THEIR ECONOMIC STRENGTH, AND THAT WE SHOULD CONSULT TOGETHER URGENTLY TO CONSIDER

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STEPS WE MIGHT TAKE, AND PERSUADE OTHERS TO TAKE, TO ANTICIPATE AND PREVENT EITHER EVENT. WE FELT THAT WE SHOULD TAKE URGENT STEPS TO HEAD OFF SUCH SHOCKS, WHICH COULD WRECK ALL THAT HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN TWENTY YEARS IN BUILDING AN OPEN AND PROGRESSIVE MONETARY SYSTEM.

ROSTOW SAID THAT HE AND DEMING HAD HAD A GOOD VISIT WITH BLESSING AND HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE MORNING. BLESSING AGREED THAT WE SHOULD WORK TOGETHER URGENTLY TO PROTECT THE MONETARY SYSTEM. WE HAD REVIEWED THE PLANS FOR STERLING UNDER DISCUSSION AT BASEL, THE PROSPECTS OF THE FRANC, AND THE POSSIBLE REVALUATION OF THE MARK. BLESSING WAS OPPOSED, AS THE CHANCELLOR KNEW, TO UPWARD REVALUATION OF THE MARK. WE UNDERTOOK TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH ABOUT POSSIBLE PLANS TO SUPPORT STERLING, AND TO WATCH OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICULARLY THOSE AFFECTING THE FRANC.

KIESINGER SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, AND ASKED ROSTOW AND DEMING TO CONVEY TO THE PRESIDENT HIS ASSURANCE THAT HE FULLY AGREED WITH HIS APPRAISAL OF THE RISK; THAT HE WELCOMED THE PROPOSAL OF CONSULTATIONS TO DEVELOP POLICIES TO PROTECT THE MONETARY SYSTEM AGAINST RISKS TO THE FRANC AND THE POUND; AND THAT WHILE THEY KNEW THE VIEWS OF HIS GOVERNMENT ON THE POSSIBLE REVALUATION OF THE DM, ALL ALTERNATIVES SHOULD NOW BE EXAMINED WITH AN OPEN MIND. THE PRESIDENT COULD BE ASSURED THAT THE FRG WOULD DO ITS FULL PART WITH US IN MEETING THE PRESENT DANGER.

HE CLOSED BY ASKING ROSTOW AND DEMING TO CONVEY HIS CORDIAL RESPECTS TO THE PRESIDENT.

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DTG 151509Z JUN 68

SATURDAY
~~TOP SECRET~~

1968 JUN 15 15 46 '68 JUN 15 AM 11

Pres file

EEA638
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2271

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81313

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

HEREWITH SUMMARY OF CIA STUDY ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
MOSCOW ABM SYSTEM

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(T)

WITHIN THE PAST YEAR THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO HAVE MADE FURTHER
REDUCTIONS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES
AT MOSCOW.



PARTIAL SYSTEM OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY IS PROBABLY NEAR.
ALL ELEMENTS OF THE SYSTEM ARE EXPECTED TO BE OPERATIONAL BY
MID-1970.

THE CUTBACKS WILL NOT MATERIALLY CHANGE THE STRATEGIC ROLE
OF THE SYSTEM, SINCE EVEN AT ORIGINALLY INDICATED LEVELS IT COULD
NOT HAVE COPEd WITH A DETERMINED US ATTACK. THE SOVIETS MAY NOW
FEEL A GREATER NEED FOR IMPROVED CAPABILITIES--FOR EXAMPLE,
AGAINST PENETRATION AIDS AND MULTIPLE WARHEADS--BEFORE FILLING
IN THE MOSCOW SYSTEM OR EXTENDING ABM COVERAGE INTO OTHER PARTS
OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE CUTBACKS THUS COULD REPRESENT A PAUSE
WHILE IMPROVEMENTS ARE BEING SOUGHT.

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NL/RAC 01-152
By cm, NARA, Date 12-10-01

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IF SO, THE SOVIETS MAY NOW VIEW ARMS LIMITATIONS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE US AS A WAY OF PROBING--AT NO PENALTY TO THEMSELVES-- THE FIRMNESS OF THE UNITED STATES' INTENT TO CARRY OUT IMPROVEMENTS PRESENTLY PROGRAMED FOR ITS STRATEGIC FORCES. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT FORMALLY RESPONDED TO US INITIATIVES FOR ARMS LIMITING TALKS, THEY HAVE CAREFULLY KEPT ALIVE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY WILL EVENTUALLY DO SO.

MEANWHILE, WORK ON ELEMENTS OF THE MOSCOW ABM SYSTEM IS PROGRESSING:



COMPLETION OF THE LAUNCH SITES STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION WILL PROBABLY MARK THE END OF DEPLOYMENT OF THE SYSTEM IN ITS CURRENT FORM. HOWEVER, ACTIVITY AT THE SARY SHAGAN MISSILE TEST CENTER INDICATES A CONTINUING EFFORT TO IMPROVE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS. A BETTER SYSTEM, BASED ON PRESENT TECHNOLOGY AND WORK CURRENTLY UNDER WAY AT SARY SHAGAN, COULD BE READY FOR DEPLOYMENT WITHIN A YEAR OR TWO BUT PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE WIDELY DEPLOYED AND OPERATIONAL MUCH BEFORE 1973 OR 1974.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
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DTG 151456Z JUN 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

60

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DE WTE 2274

1968 JUN 15 15 33

Pres file
1968 JUN 15 AM 11:57
SATURDAY

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81315

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PARIS 16381

THIS SPECULATION RE DE GAULLE RETIREMENT AFTER THE ELECTIONS MAY INTEREST YOU.

1. AT LUNCHEON YESTERDAY ESTEVA, NEW SENIOR AIDE TO THE MINISTER OF FINANCE, REPORTED CURRENT SPECULATION THAT IF GAULLISTS WIN IMPRESSIVE GAINS IN COMING ELECTIONS DE GUALLE WILL RETIRE FROM SCENE WITHIN SIX WEEKS THEREAFTER.
2. IN LATER CONVERSATION SAME AFTERNOON CLAPPIER, DEPUTY GOVERNOR BANK OF FRANCE, SAID MANY WELL-INFORMED PEOPLE NOW DISCUSSING POSSIBILITIES DE GAULLE RETIREMENT FROM SCENE FOLLOWING ELECTIONS AND SPECULATING RE POSSIBILITY POMPIDOU AS PRESIDENT AND COUVE AS PRIME MINISTER.
3. BOTH MEN, AS WELL AS DROMER OF BNP, REFLECTED GENERAL EXPECTATION OF SIGNIFICANT GAULLIST GAINS IN ELECTIONS BUT ALL THREE WERE BEARISH ON POSSIBILITIES OF GAULLISTS THEREAFTER TAKING REALLY DECISIVE AND SIGNIFICANT STEPS TO MEET UNDERLYING PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE CAUSED CURRENT MALAISE IN MANY SECTORS FRENCH SOCIETY.
WALLNER

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1968 JUN 15 15 18

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RGVZCZCEEA636
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2270

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81312

68 JUN 15 AM 11:26

SATURDAY

~~SECRET~~

BILL JORDEN'S PRIVATE CONTACT DINNER TAKES PLACE MONDAY.

PARIS 16380

1. NGUYEN THANH LE, MEMBER OF DRV DELEGATION AND OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN, HAS ACCEPTED JORDEN'S INVITATION TO PRIVATE DINNER MONDAY NIGHT. THIS WILL BE FIRST INFORMAL CONTACT WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE OUTSIDE MEETING SITE. IT MAY BE OPENING OF PRIVATE TALKS OR MERELY FISHING EXPEDITION.

2. WE PLAN INFORM AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM MONDAY MORNING AND FILL HIM IN ON GENERAL DETAILS AFTERWARD. ASSUME YOU WILL WISH AMBASSADOR BUNKER TO DO SAME WITH THIEU AND POSSIBLY KY AND HUONG. HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

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62

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OO WTE18
DE WTE 2269

1968 JUN 15 15 06

Pres file
89 JUN 19 AM 11:11
SATURDAY

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81311

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUNE 14, 1968

SUBJECT: THE SOVIET MOOD

WE RECEIVED A CABLE TODAY REPORTING THAT GVISHIANI, HEAD OF SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, IS NOW UNWILLING TO MEET WITH MCGEORGE BUNDY AND OTHERS IN ENGLAND ON THE MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE PROJECT. THIS IS INTERESTING BECAUSE - ONLY TWO OR THREE DAYS AGO - THE SOVIETS ACCEPTED (NOTWITHSTANDING THE INVITATION TO THE WEST GERMANS WITHOUT THE EAST GERMANS).

IN THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN MARKEDLY INFLEXIBLE IN THE EXCHANGE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY HAVE ALSO DREDGED UP SOME OLD SPYING ALLEGATIONS AGAINST TWO FORMER AMERICAN DIPLOMATS IN MOSCOW. ONE CAN READ THEIR PROPAGANDA ABOUT THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION AND THE GLASSBORO SPEECH IN SEVERAL WAYS - BUT THEY ARE CERTAINLY NOT GOING OUT OF THEIR WAY TO BE FRIENDLY.

WHY? ONE COULD SPECULATE CZECHOSLOVAKIA STIRRING UP THE EAST GERMANS, CONTRIBUTING TO BERLIN, AND GENERAL UNEASINESS OVER FERMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE AND AT HOME. THE PRESIDENT'S CONCILIATORY TONE MAY MAKE THEM UNCOMFORTABLE VIS A VIS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, RED CHINESE AND ALSO AT HOME (AS AN UNJAMMED VOA BRINGS THE PRESIDENT'S WORDS TO THE LENGTH AND BREADTH OF RUSSIA). THE OPEN COOPERATION BETWEEN US AND THEM IN NEW YORK ON THE NPT HAS NO DOUBT MADE THEM UNCOMFORTABLE. WITH THE TREATY ENDORSED, THEY MAY WANT TO REDRESS THE BALANCE.

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~~SECRET~~

63

68 JUN 14 PM 7:54
FRIDAY

1968 JUN 14 23 55

EEA626
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2257

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81302

~~SECRET~~

JUNE 14, 1968

Pres file

HEREWITH HARRIMAN AND VANCE SEE ZORIN AND GET NOWHERE.

1. WE LUNCHEd WITH ZORIN JUNE 13. OBEREMKO PRESENT. BOGOMOLOV INTERPRETED WITH PERRY'S ASSISTANCE.
2. ZORIN FIRST BROUGHT UP SENATOR KENNEDY'S DEATH AND LINKED THIS TO VIOLENCE ENGENDERED BY VIET-NAM WAR. WE EXPLAINED PALESTINIAN/ARAB BACKGROUND OF ASSASSIN WITH NO INDICATIONS SO FAR OF ANY ACCOMPLICES.
3. WE COMMENTED ON OUR RECENT TRIPS TO THE US, POINTING OUT THE WIDESPREAD PUBLIC SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT HAS RECEIVED SINCE MARCH 31 SPEECH, AND EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER RISING DEMANDS FOR RETALIATION ON HANOI FOR INDISCRIMINATE SHELLING OF SAIGON.
4. ZORIN BROUGHT UP HIS RECENT TALK WITH CYRUS EATON, WHO HAD TOLD HIM AMERICAN PUBLIC MOST ANXIOUS FOR EARLY END OF WAR. HARRIMAN THEN ASKED ZORIN WHETHER EATON HAD CORRECTLY REPORTED KOSYGIN'S WILLINGNESS AFTER BOMBING STOPPED TOTALLY TO PITCH IN AND HELP ON QUESTION OF VIET-NAM AND SEA SETTLEMENT. ZORIN REPLIED "IF YOU MAKE THAT ASSUMPTION YOU WILL NOT BE FAR WRONG." WHEN HARRIMAN PRESSED HIM FOR SPECIFIC STATEMENT, ZORIN SAID IT WAS "INCONVENIENT" FOR HIM TO FIND OUT PRECISE DETAILS. HARRIMAN SAID THAT IF KOSYGIN WAS IN FACT INTERESTED IN OUR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES, ZORIN COULD REPORT TO HIM. HARRIMAN EXPLAINED THEM BY DRAWING ON MANILA COMMUNIQUE AND PRESIDENT'S JOHNS HOPKINS SPEECH.
5. WE THEN DISCUSSED NEGOTIATIONS IN SOME DETAIL, STATING WE THOUGHT THE BEST WAY TO END DEADLOCK WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE PRIVATE TALKS. ZORIN TRIED TO ARGUE HANOI'S CONTENTION THAT AIR ATTACKS HAD IN FACT BEEN INCREASED AND TOTAL CESSATION WAS ESSENTIAL. HE STATED THAT HE HAD SEEN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, INCLUDING PRIVATE TALKS WITH THO. HE SUMMARIZED THEIR POSITION IN FOUR POINTS:

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(1) US WAS THE AGGRESSOR IN SENDING TROOPS TO VIETNAM AND BOMBING NORTH AND COULD NOT EXPECT HANOI TO CONCEDE ANYTHING IN RETURN FOR TOTAL CESSATION OF BOMBING.

(2) HANOI COULD GO NO FURTHER IN TALKS UNTIL US HAD STOPPED THE BOMBING "OR REACHED AN UNDERSTANDING ON CESSATION OF BOMBING."

(3) PRIVATE TALKS COULD NOT BEGIN UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

(4) NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD BE PREPARED TO TALK FREELY ABOUT ALL OTHER OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS ONCE BOMBING QUESTION WAS SETTLED.

6. WE BOTH EMPHASIZED PRESENT IMPASSE AS A RESULT OF HANOI'S EXCALATION, MENTIONING ATTACKS ON SAIGON WHICH POSED SERIOUS DANGERS FOR SUCCESS OF TALKS.

7. HARRIMAN THEN BLUNTLY TOLD ZORIN THAT AS WE SAW IT, IT WAS THROUGH MOSCOW'S INFLUENCE THAT THESE TALKS HAVE STARTED IN PARIS AGAINST PEKING'S WISHES. IF THE TALKS BROKE UP, MOSCOW'S PRESTIGE WOULD SUFFER TO THE ADVANTAGE OF PEKING. THEREFORE, MOSCOW CLEARLY HAD A STAKE AND SHOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE NOW TO JAR SITUATION OFF DEAD CENTER. HARRIMAN CONTINUED THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN POINTS OF US, SOVIET AND HANOI COMMON INTEREST. ONE, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS A DESIRE TO HAVE NORTH VIET-NAM REMAIN FREE OF CHINESE DOMINATION. HARRIMAN EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT WE COULD READILY AGREE THAT NORTH VIET-NAM REMAIN A SOCIAL STATE WITH SOUTH VIET-NAM NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED, LEAVING UNIFICATION OF THE TWO FOR THE FUTURE TO BE DETERMINED BY BOTH. HARRIMAN SUGGESTED SOVIET UNION COULD PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN GETTING THE TWO SIDES TOGETHER IN A PRIVATE TALK, AFTER DARK, IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY, OR ELSEWHERE. ZORIN WAS RIGID: NO PRIVATE TALKS UNTIL TOTAL CESSATION OF BOMBING.

8. IN A BRIEF PERSONAL TALK WITH OBEREMKO OVER COFFEE, VANCE ANSWERED HIS QUESTION BY ASSURING HIM THAT THE US WAS SERIOUS IN DESIRING A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. OBEREMKO, HOWEVER, STATED FRANKLY HE COULD NOT SAY WHETHER THERE WOULD BE ANY MILITARY RESTRAINT ON HANOI'S PART IF WE STOPPED THE BOMBING COMPLETELY.

9. THE ENTIRE CONVERSATION, THOUGH FRIENDLY, WAS RIGID. ZORIN IS QUITE OBVIOUSLY SO CAUTIOUS THAT HE IS NOT THE MOST SATISFACTORY MAN TO DEAL THROUGH.

DTG: 142215Z JUN 68

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1968 JUN 14 23 10

68 JUN 14 PM 7:34

64 / FRIDAY

VZCZCEEA625
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2258

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81303

~~SECRET~~

JUNE 14, 1968

SECRETARY RUSK IS ON HIS WAY BACK TO WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK; BUT I HAVE AN INTERIM BRIEFING FROM ARTHUR GOLDBERG ON THE TALKS IN NEW YORK TODAY.

1. THE MYSTERIOUS REFERENCE BY MANESCU, TO THE HIGH-LEVEL VISITOR (WHEN YOU WERE IN NEW YORK) REFERRED TO THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER OF ROUMANIA COMING TO WASHINGTON ON THE SCIENCE MISSION. IT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH VIETNAM, APPARENTLY.
2. ON VIETNAM, KUZNETSOV HAD NO INFORMATION BEYOND THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS ITSELF. HE HAD NO AUTHORITY TO INTERPRET WHAT MOSCOW WAS OR WAS NOT PREPARED TO DO IF WE STOPPED BOMBING, OR HOW MUCH THEY WOULD TELL US ABOUT NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY BEHAVIOR IF WE STOPPED BOMBING.
3. ON GERMANY, HE DEFENDED THE GDR'S RIGHT TO EXERCISE ITS "SOVEREIGN RIGHT." HE STATED THAT MOSCOW HAD "NO INTENTION TO CAUSE STRAIN IN US-USSR RELATIONS."
4. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, HIS POSITION WAS A "DREARY REPETITION" OF WHAT ARTHUR HAS BEEN HEARING FROM THE RUSSIANS ALL ALONG IN NEW YORK.
5. ON THE NPT, KUZNETSOV URGED THAT WE NOT HAVE AN INITIAL SIGNING BY THE MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS, BUT DEVOTE OURSELVES TO GETTING THE NON-NUCLEAR POWERS TO SIGN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THIS IS A VIEW FOR WHICH ARTHUR HAS SYMPATHY. HE THINKS WE SHOULD TRY TO GET AS MANY SIGNATURES AS POSSIBLE BETWEEN NOW AND JULY 1ST, AND THEN SUBMIT THE TREATY TO THE SENATE. THIS IS AN ISSUE WHICH WILL BE COMING TO YOU SHORTLY.
6. ON ABM-ICBM TALKS, KUZNETSOV HAS HEARD NOTHING FROM MOSCOW. HE INDICATED THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO PURSUE GENERAL DISARMAMENT MATTERS AT THE FORTHCOMING ENDC MEETING IN GENEVA.
7. IN SHORT, NOT MUCH.

~~SECRET~~

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By jc, NARA, Date 4-24-01

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1968 JUN 14 22 38

VZCZCEEA624
OO WTE18
DE WTE 2256

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAPS1301

Pres file
JUN 14 PM 7:09
FRIDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUNE 14, 1968

SUBJECT: TRIP TO HEMISFAIR WITH THE LATIN AMERICAN
AMBASSADORS

ON MAY 24 YOU AGREED TO TAKE THE LATIN AMERICAN AMBASSADORS
TO HEMISFAIR OVER THE 4TH OF JULY WEEKEND. YOU ASKED THAT WE
PUT LARRY TEMPLE AND ED CLARK TO WORK ON ARRANGEMENTS. THIS
HAS BEEN DONE.

IT OCCURS TO ME THAT AS PART OF THIS TRIP, YOU MIGHT
TAKE THE AMBASSADORS TO VISIT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS FOR
A TOUR AND BRIEFING ON YOUR LIBRARY, THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS
INSTITUTE, AND HOW THE LATIN AMERICAN COLLECTION OF THE
UNIVERSITY WILL BE MADE PART OF THIS COMPLEX.

I ALSO THINK SUCH A VISIT HAS EXCELLENT PUBLICITY POTENTIAL
FOR YOU IN LATIN AMERICA. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE LEN MARKS
PUT TOGETHER A PACKAGE TELLING THE STORY OF THE LIBRARY-
INSTITUTE AND YOUR PLANS TO TEACH THERE AFTER LEAVING OFFICE.
WIDE DISSEMINATION IN LATIN AMERICA OF THIS PACKAGE COULD BE
TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH THE AMBASSADORS' TRIP TO THE
UNIVERSITY TO GIVE IT MORE IMPACT.

THE IMAGE OF YOU CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH A UNIVERSITY AND
PARTICIPATING IN RESEARCH AND TEACHING WILL BE MOST
HELPFUL. IF YOU GO THROUGH WITH THE LATIN AMERICAN TRIP,
IT WILL HAVE THE ADDED DIVIDEND OF BUILDING A BETTER CLIMATE
FOR THE JOURNEY.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *rg*, NARA, Date 6-30-92

DTG 142214Z JUNE 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-200
By CG, NARA, Date 5-4-95 66

~~SECRET~~

EAA623
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2255

1968 JUN 14 22 23

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81300

Profile
Ch

~~SECRET~~

JUNE 14, 1968

1. HERewith A CIA REPORT WHICH INDICATES CHANCELLOR KURT GEORG KIESINGER IS CONTEMPLATING A TRIP TO WASHINGTON DURING THE WEEK OF 16 JUNE. THE CHANCELLOR BELIEVES THE TRIP WOULD UNDERLINE THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH HE VIEWS THE SITUATION RESULTING FROM THE INTRODUCTION OF VISA REQUIREMENTS BY THE EAST GERMANS AND DEMONSTRATE THE UNABATED CONFIDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN ITS ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES.
2. THE CHANCELLOR FELT COMPELLED TO STRESS THE SECOND POINT ON DISCOVERING, DURING HIS 13 JUNE VISIT TO WEST BERLIN, THE DISILLUSIONMENT OF LEADING CITY OFFICIALS, INCLUDING GOVERNING MAYOR KLAUS SCHUETZ, WITH THE ALLIED POWERS. NONE OF THE OFFICIALS WITH WHOM KIESINGER DISCUSSED THE CURRENT CRISIS BELIEVED THAT THE ALLIES WOULD UNDERTAKE ANYTHING TO COUNTER THE EAST GERMAN MEASURES.

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 142205Z JUN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

68 JUN 14 PM 6:36

FRIDAY

1968 JUN 14 22 20

EEA622
OO WTE10
DE WTE2254

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81299

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUNE 14, 1968

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER REPORTS THAT AT 1:15 P.M. EASTERN STANDARD TIME, SAIGON WAS HIT BY 18 ROUNDS OF 82 MM MORTAR. NATIONAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS HIT; 2 POLICEMEN HURT; 2 CIVILIANS HURT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG 142204Z JUN 68

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *Ng*, NARA, Date *6-30-92*

68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 JUN 14 21 29

EEA620
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2253

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81298

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUNE 14, 1968

Pres file
68 JUN 14 PM 5 43
FRIDAY

YOU SHOULD KNOW:

1. CAROL FORTAS WILL DEBRIEF EATON AT 4:30 P.M. SUNDAY AFTERNOON. HE IS COMING TO WASHINGTON FOR DINNER. SHE SAID SHE "CALMED HIM DOWN."
2. BILL JORDEN IS COMING HOME FOR A FEW DAYS NEXT WEEK TO DEAL WITH SOME URGENT FAMILY BUSINESS. WE WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE STOCK AND REVIEW PRESS HANDLING OF PARIS TALKS.
3. JACOB BLAUSTEIN CALLED ON ME FOR AN HOUR URGING STRONGLY THAT YOU MAKE THE PHANTOM DECISION NOW. HIS GROUNDS: ONLY A U.S. SHOW OF STRONG BACKING FOR THE ISRAELIS WILL CONVINCHE THE RUSSIANS AND NASSER THAT THEY MUST MAKE PEACE WITH ISRAEL. I HELD HIM OFF AS BEST I COULD.

DTG: 142048Z JUN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 16, 1993.

BY sq ON 8-19-92

~~SECRET~~

69

1968 JUN 14 21 05

68 JUN 14 PM 5:25

FRIDAY

VZCZCEEA617
OO WTE18
DE WTE 2249
FROM WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAPS1294

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By pc/rj, NARA, Date 5-1-01

Area file

~~SECRET~~

JUNE 14, 1968

THIS BUNKER CONVERSATION WITH THIEU HAS A NUMBER OF INTERESTING POINTS.

SAIGON 29981

1. I SAW PRESIDENT THIEU FOR ABOUT ONE HOUR TO DISCUSS A NUMBER OF MATTERS OF CURRENT INTEREST.
2. SAIGON DEFENSE AND CORPS COMMANDERS. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION ABOUT PROPECTS FOR FURTHER ATTACKS ON SAIGON, THIEU SAID THAT THEY WERE MAKING PROGRESS IN ORGANIZING THE DEFENSE OF SAIGON. HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE WAY IN WHICH GEN MINH WAS TAKING HOLD AND WAS WORKING WITH GEN HAY IN THE JOINT US/GVN HEADQUARTERS. MINH WOULD COORDINATE ALL VIETNAMESE FORCES IN THE AREA -- ARVN, POPULAR FORCES, REVOLUTIONARY FORCES, POLICE, STUDENTS AND YOUTH. THIEU SAID THE CITY'S DEFENSE MUST BE ORGANIZED ON A COMPREHENSIVE SCALE AND HE THEN OUTLINED HIS THINKING. THERE WOULD BE TWO DEFENSE RINGS -- THE OUTER RING CONSISTING OF A SYSTEM OF FORTIFIED STRATEGIC HAMLETS AND THE INNER RING OF FORTIFIED NEW LIFE HAMLETS.
3. THIEU SAID THE NEW TEAM FOR AREA DEFENSE WAS VERY GOOD: GEN MINH, WHOM HE REGARDED AS ONE OF THE BEST ARVN DIVISION COMMANDERS, NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR HAI, SAIGON POLICE CHIEF SAT, AND THE NEW MAYOR NHIEU. THIEU SAID HE THOUGHT HIGHLY OF NHIEU AND I ASKED ABOUT THE REPORT WE HAD HEARD OF GEN KY'S CLAIM THAT HE HAD BEEN CORRUPT AS A PROVINCE CHIEF. THIEU SAID THE PRIMIN AND INTERIOR MINISTER HAD LOOKED INTO THIS CHARGE CAREFULLY AND BOTH CONCLUDED THERE WAS NO REAL SUBSTANCE TO IT. THERE HAD BEEN ONE SMALL INCIDENT IN THE PAST BUT HUONG HAD SAID THAT IT WAS FAR LESS

IMPORTANT THAN CHARGES AGAINST MANY OTHERS HIGH IN THE GVN TODAY. HUONG ADDED THAT THE CUSTOMS DIRECTION MUST BE CLEANED OUT AS WELL, SINCE SOME 40 OFFICIALS WERE WORKING "FOR MONEY" AND THE ONE HONEST MAN WHO HAD BROKEN UP OPIUM SMUGGLING HAD BEEN FIRED.

4. I ASKED THIEU WHETHER HE HAD REACHED A DECISION ON KHANG'S RESIGNATION. I REFERRED TO THE JUNE 2 CHOLON ACCIDENT AND OUR DESIRE NOT TO CREATE DISSENSION BETWEEN AMERICANS AND VIETNAMESE AS A RESULT OF IT. I SAID THAT I UNDERSTOOD ONE REASON KHANG HAD GIVEN FOR RESIGNING WAS THE FACT THAT HE DISAPPROVED OF COMMENTS WHICH KY AND LOAN HAD CIRCULATED ABOUT AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT AND HAD WANTED TO ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITY HIMSELF. THIEU SAID HE HAD NOT YET MADE A DECISION PARTLY BECAUSE KHANG'S RESIGNATION LETTER WOULD RAISE SOME DIFFICULT PROBLEMS IF IT WERE PUBLISHED IN ITS PRESENT FORM. KHANG STATED THAT HE DID NOT DEMAND SUPPORT OR GIVE THE ORDER TO FIRE AND THIEU FEARED THAT IF THE LETTER WERE PUBLISHED IT WOULD STIMULATE THOSE WHO WANT TO PLACE RESPONSIBILITY ON THE AMERICANS. THIEU COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS A STRANGE LETTER TO WRITE IF KHANG REALLY WANTED TO AVOID FRICTION WITH THE AMERICANS AND HE HAD BEEN SURPRISED THAT A CORPS COMMANDER HAD WRITTEN SUCH A LETTER. THIEU SAID TO HIM IT WAS PERFECTLY CLEAR IT HAD BEEN AN ACCIDENT, AND IN FACT MANY AMERICANS HAVE BEEN KILLED IN OTHER WAR-TIME ACCIDENTS. HE WAS GOING TO GIVE FURTHER THOUGHT TO KHANG'S SITUATION BEFORE DECIDING WHAT TO DO.

5. I THEN ASKED ABOUT REPORTS THAT THANG WISHED TO RESIGN. THIEU SAID THAT THANG HAD IN FACT COME TO HIM AND SAID HE HAD NOW DONE HIS JOB IN IV CORPS IN 90 DAYS AND HE WANTED A MORE IMPORTANT JOB, NAMELY HEAD OF THE POLITICAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT. THIEU AGREED THAT HE WOULD BE WELL QUALIFIED FOR THE POLITICAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT BUT TOLD THANG THAT HIS JOB IN IV CORPS WAS NOT YET DONE AND HE MUST STICK WITH IT. HE TOLD THANG THAT IF THE SITUATION THERE WAS SUFFICIENTLY IMPROVED IN THREE MORE MONTHS AND A GOOD SUCCESSOR COULD BE FOUND, HE WOULD AGREE TO THE CHANGE.

6. SMALL WAR CABINET. I ASKED THIEU IF HIS PLANS FOR INAUGURATING THE WAR CABINET WERE GOING AHEAD. THIEU SAID YES, HE HAD BEEN OVER THE MATTER WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND HE WISHED TO GET IT UNDERWAY NOW. THE FIRST PROBLEM TO BE DISCUSSED BY IT WOULD BE THE ORGANIZATION OF CIVIL DEFENSE. HE SAW TWO MAIN ASPECTS REQUIRING ATTENTION. FIRST, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE, FROM CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO PROVINCE TO DISTRICT TO VILLAGE AND HAMLET. SECOND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL-MORAL SUPPORT FOR THE CONCEPT. THIS REQUIRED THE DEVELOPMENT OF MASS ORGANIZATIONS AT THESE SAME LEVELS TO MOBILIZE THE PEOPLE. I REFERRED TO KY'S LETTER OF RESIGNATION REGARDING HIS CIVIL DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITIES, PARTICULARLY HIS REQUEST THAT THE PROBLEM BE TURNED BACK TO THE GOVERNMENT, AND ASKED WHAT WAS NOW PLANNED. THIEU LAUGHED AND SAID THAT FIRST IT WAS THE CENTRAL RECOVERY COMMITTEE, WHICH KY RAN FOR TWO WEEKS, AND THEN TURNED BACK, AND NOW IT WAS CIVIL DEFENSE WHICH HE HAD ALSO TURNED BACK WITH FEW RESULTS AFTER ABOUT A MONTH. HE SAID THAT WHEN KY "GETS OVER HIS SADNESS" HE WOULD THINK ABOUT SOMETHING ELSE FOR HIM TO DO. I TOLD THIEU THAT I HAD HAD A GOOD TALK WITH KY WHO HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CREATING THE PUBLIC APPEARANCE OF UNITY AT THE TOP. I HOPED THE

SMALL WAR CABINET WOULD BRING HIM BACK INTO THE DECISION-
MAKING PROCESS AND WONDERED IF THIEU PLANNED TO ANNOUNCE
ITS INAUGURATION PUBLICLY. THIEU SAID NO, IT WAS A MATTER
OF INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION.

7. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. I ASKED THIEU ABOUT THE REPORT
THAT HE HAD REQUESTED TRAN VAN DON TO PULL A WIDE GATHERING
OF POLITICAL AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS TOGETHER. THIEU
REPLIED THAT HE HAD TALKED FURTHER WITH HIM. THIEU WAS NOT
SURE HOW THIS MIGHT BEST BE ORGANIZED AND SAID
HE WOULD PERHAPS HAVE TO GET
INTO IT MORE DIRECTLY HIMSELF. HE HAD TALKED WITH KY ABOUT
IT. THEY AGREED THAT THE ENEMY WILL KEEP UP THEIR PRESSURES,
INCLUDING MILITARY EFFORTS IN I CORPS, THE HIGHLANDS, AND
AROUND SAIGON, BUT HE WAS CONFIDENT AS TO THE OUTCOME.
IF WE CAN ORGANIZE AND STRENGTHEN OURSELVES, WE CAN
ABSORB THE VC AND THUS SHORTEN THE WAR. I ASKED WHETHER
THIS MEANT TAKING THE VC IN UNDER "ONE MAN, ONE VOTE" AND
THIEU SAID YES, IF WE ARE STRONG ENOUGH. THE ALTERNATIVE
IS GUERRILLA WARFARE FOR FOUR OR FIVE MORE YEARS. I ASKED
WHETHER HE THOUGH THE ENEMY WOULD JUST FADE AWAY OR COME TO
TERMS IN THE FORMER CIRCUMSTANCES. THIEU THOUGHT THEY WOULD
COME TO TERMS ON THE BASIS OF THE 1954 GENEVA ACCORDS. HE
SAID THAT THE GVN COULD THEN WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT WITH THE
NLF/VC, USING THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROGRAM AS A
BASIS. I ENCOURAGED THIEU TO WORK ALONG THESE LINES.

8. PARIS TALKS. I DESCRIBED BRIEFLY THE JUNE 12 MEETING IN
PARIS AND GAVE HIM A COPY OF BUI DIEM'S STATEMENT FOLLOWING
HIS TALK WITH THE SECRETARY. I ALSO SUMMARIZED THE SECRETARY'S
COMMENTS TO BUI DIEM. I SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT WANT TO HAVE
ANOTHER MEETING SOON OF THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE GROUP. I
SAID WE HAD HEARD THAT RUMORS WERE BEING SPREAD TO THE EFFECT
THAT WE AND THE DRV HAD HAD "SECRET TALKS". I THOUGHT THESE
REPORTS WERE PROBABLY STARTED BY THE ENEMY OR POSSIBLY BY THE
FRENCH INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, AND ASSURED HIM THAT
THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR THEM. THIEU SAID HE PUT NO CREDENCE
IN SUCH REPORTS. THIEU THEN SPOKE ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION
IN SAIGON, NOTING THAT THE PARIS TALKS WERE REALLY MORE
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL THAN MILITARY IN THEIR EFFECT.
IF WE WERE BOMBING THROUGHOUT NORTH VIETNAM AND THEY WERE
ATTACKING AND SHELLING SAIGON, THAT WOULD BE UNDERSTANDABLE,
BUT NOW WE HAVE BEEN SHOWING RESTRAINT AND PATIENCE FOR
2 1/2 MONTHS AND WE SEE NO SIGN OF ANY GIVE ON THE DRV SIDE.
PEOPLE HERE ARE ASKING WHAT WILL BE THE REACTION FROM THE
US. THEY BELIEVE THE DRV CONTINUES TO ATTACK SAIGON AS A TEST
OF US DETERMINATION, AND TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE US DOESN'T
DARE RETALIATE AND THEY CAN THEREFORE CONTINUE WITHOUT CON-
STRAINT. THIEU SAID IMPATIENCE WAS GROWING HERE AS DOUBTS
AND TENSIONS MOUNTED AND THERE WERE INDEED MORE DOUBTS ABOUT
US PERSEVERANCE AND INTENTIONS. THESE DOUBTS ARE BEING FED
BY VC RUMORS AND LEAFLETS, AND THREATS SUCH AS THE ONES NOW
CURRENT THAT THERE WILL BE A "SHOWER OR ROCKETS ON JUNE 15".
HE CONCLUDED THAT THE MAN IN THE STREET IN SAIGON IS ASKING
WHY DOES THE US LET THIS GO ON WITHOUT RETALIATION?

DTG 141934Z JUN 68

~~SECRET~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

1968 JUN 14 17 21

70
FRIDAY
1968 JUN 14 PM 1:46

WZCZCEEA616
OO WTE 13
DE WTE 2243

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT.
CITE CAP81293

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

JUNE 14, 1968

YOU SHOULD KNOW WE ARE WATCHING CLOSELY CERTAIN INDICATORS COVERING THE INTENSITY OF THE ENEMY'S ACTIVITIES. THEY SUGGEST SOME KIND OF DE-ESCALATED ACTIVITY, BUT IT IS TOO SOON, REPEAT TOO SOON, TO DRAW ANY FIRM CONCLUSIONS. HERE ARE THE ITEMS OVER WHICH WE ARE SCRATCHING OUR HEADS:

-- FOR THE THIRD DAY SINCE JUNE 11, THE METROPOLITAN AREA OF SAIGON HAS NOT BEEN ATTACKED BY ROCKET OR MORTAR FIRE;

-- THE TRUCKS SIGHTED IN BOTH THE LAOS PANHANDLE AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PANHANDLE ARE MARKEDLY DOWN IN THE LAST WEEK OF MAY AND THE FIRST FIVE DAYS OF JUNE; ALTHOUGH IN LAOS THIS MAY BE SUBSTANTIALLY DUE TO DETERIORATING WEATHER. THE WEATHER IN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PANHANDLE, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN GOOD.

-- U.S. KILLED IN ACTION PER DAY, WHICH AVERAGED 64 IN MAY, HAS AVERAGED 29 PER DAY IN THE FIRST FIVE DAYS OF JUNE;

-- THUS FAR IN JUNE, WE HAVE SPOTTED 14 NEW INFILTRATION GROUPS, AS OPPOSED TO HAVING SPOTTED 22 NEW INFILTRATION GROUPS BY THIS TIME IN MAY;

-- AN ABNORMALLY HIGH VOLUME OF HIGH PRIORITY SIGNAL TRAFFIC IS PASSING FROM THE ENEMY HIGH COMMAND TO ITS FORCES; ALTHOUGH WHAT THEY ARE SAYING WE DO NOT KNOW;

-- ON THE KONTUM-PLEIKU FRONT WHERE WE HAVE BEEN EXPECTING A MAJOR ATTACK, THERE ARE APPARENT MOVEMENTS OF THE ENEMY FORCES WHICH MIGHT BE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ONE DIVISION TO CAMBODIA; BUT IT MIGHT EQUALLY BE A REPOSITIONING FOR FURTHER ATTACKS IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS THAN HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY ENVISAGED. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS POSSIBLE BECAUSE THE WEATHER WILL SHORTLY GO BAD ON THAT FRONT;

-- FIRE FROM WITHIN AND ACROSS THE DMZ, WHICH AVERAGED 64 ROUNDS PER DAY IN MAY, HAS BEEN RUNNING 20 PER DAY THROUGH THE FIRST 13 DAYS OF JUNE.

AGAIN, WE ARE DRAWING NO CONCLUSIONS AT THIS TIME; BUT I THOUGHT YOU WOULD BE INTERESTED IN THESE ITEMS WHICH WE SHALL BE FOLLOWING WITH THE GREATEST CARE IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

DTG: 141659Z JUN 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 01-151
By cbm, NARA, Date 7-15-04

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

1968 JUN 14 01 07

68 JUN 13 PM 9:12

THURSDAY
71

VZCZCEEA629
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 2239

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO LARRY TEMPLE
CITE CAP81286

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

THE FOLLOWING IS AN FBI REPORT ON CYRUS EATON ACTIVITIES.

ON JUNE THIRTEEN, NINETEEN SIXTYEIGHT, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT VASILI V. KUZNETSOV, SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, CONTACTED CYRUS S. EATON, CLEVELAND INDUSTRIALIST. EATON STATED THAT HE HAD A SPLENDID TIME IN THE SOVIET UNION AND TOLD MR. KOSYGIN, PROBABLY ALEKSEY N. KOSYGIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, THAT HE WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH WITH KUZNETSOV, ESPECIALLY ON DEVELOPMENTS IN PARIS. EATON INDICATED THAT HE MET WITH HARRIMAN, PROBABLY W. AVERELL HARRIMAN, US AMBASSADOR AT LARGE, ON TUESDAY FOR THREE HOURS. EATON STATED THAT HE THINKS THAT HARRIMAN IS PERSONALLY DISPOSED TO DO WHAT THEY WOULD ALL CONSIDER "THE SOUND THINGS." EATON INDICATED THAT WHAT THEY NEED IS REPORTS FROM PARIS WHICH WOULD REACH THE AMERICAN READER AND INDICATED HE DISCUSSED THIS WITH MR. KOSYGIN AND THEY CAME UP WITH "SOME RATHER BRIGHT IDEAS." EATON INDICATED HE DID NOT THINK THEY SHOULD DISCUSS THEM AT THIS TIME.

Pre. file

EATON INDICATED THAT WHILE HE WAS WITH HARRIMAN, HARRIMAN PHONED WASHINGTON AND MADE SOME IMPORTANT APPOINTMENTS FOR HIM (EATON) IN WASHINGTON, D.C., FOR MONDAY WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT AND WITH MR. CLIFFORD, POSSIBLY CLARK CLIFFORD, U. S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. EATON STATED HE WOULD LIKE TO EXCHANGE IDEAS WITH KUZNETSOV AND PERHAPS WITH MR. DOBRYNIN, SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES. EATON STATED HE WOULD CALL DOBRYNIN IN WASHINGTON TODAY.

EATON AGAIN MENTIONED THAT HE HAS SOME IDEAS AND PLANS THAT HE DISCUSSED WITH MR. KOSYGIN, SOME WERE KOSYGIN'S AND SOME WERE EATON'S, THAT HE THINKS CAN BE VERY USEFUL HERE TO SPEED THINGS UP IN PARIS.

EATON THEN STATED THAT HE TRIED TO SEE KUZNETSOV YESTERDAY AND ASKED IF KUZNETSOV RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM PARIS. KUZNETSOV INDICATED HE WAS VERY BUSY WITH THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY YESTERDAY AND THAT THE SESSION WAS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-180
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-25-02

VERY TENSE. EATON STATED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THEY HAVE A CONFIDENTIAL TALK AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE AND ASKED IF KUZNETSOV IS LIKELY TO BE IN WASHINGTON OVER THE WEEKEND. KUZNETSOV INDICATED HE WOULD NOT BE IN WASHINGTON THIS WEEKEND.

EATON SUGGESTED THAT KUZNETSOV KEEP THE EMBASSY ADVISED OF HIS SCHEDULE. KUZNETSOV INDICATED HE WOULD DO SO.

NORMAN COMISKEY, ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO CYRUS EATON, THEN SPOKE WITH KUZNETSOV AND INDICATED THAT THEY HAD A WONDERFUL TRIP AND ARE WORKING HARD FOR "YOU ALL." KUZNETSOV INDICATED THAT HE THINKS THAT THEIR TRIP WAS VERY USEFUL.

ANOTHER CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT ON JUNE THIRTEEN, NINETEEN SIXTYEIGHT, EATON ADVISED USSR AMBASSADOR ANATOLIY F. DOBRYNIN THAT HE HAD ENJOYED HIS VISIT TO THE USSR AND HE HAD SPOKEN WITH PREMIER KOSYGIN ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. KOSYGIN SUGGESTED THAT EATON GET IN TOUCH WITH DOBRYNIN ON HIS RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES. EATON ADVISED DOBRYNIN THAT HE WOULD BE COMING TO WASHINGTON, D.C., FOR SOME VERY IMPORTANT MEETINGS ON MONDAY (JUNE SEVENTEEN) AND HOPED TO SEE DOBRYNIN ON EITHER SUNDAY OR MONDAY.

EATON, A WEALTHY CLEVELAND, OHIO, INDUSTRIALIST, IS CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, CHESAPEAKE AND OHIO RAILWAY COMPANY. HE IS A NOTORIOUS APOLOGIST FOR THE USSR. HE HAS HAD NUMEROUS CONTACTS WITH USSR OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STATES. HE HAS BEEN CRITICAL OF THE FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

EATON HAS BEEN A PROMINENT SPONSOR OF THE PUGWASH CONFERENCES, WHICH INVOLVE EXCHANGES BETWEEN PROMINENT SCIENTIFIC LEADERS FROM MANY NATIONS. IN AUGUST, NINETEEN SIXTYFOUR, HIS ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT, NORMAN COMISKEY, ADVISED A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C., THAT EATON WOULD SUBMIT A LIST OF INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE TO ATTEND A SEPTEMBER, NINETEEN SIXTYFOUR, PUGWASH CONFERENCE WHO ARE NOT FRIENDLY TO THE SOVIET UNION SO THAT THIS LIST COULD BE FORWARDED TO MOSCOW. ON APRIL ONE, NINETEEN SIXTYEIGHT, EATON CONTACTED USSR AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN AND MENTIONED THAT HE HAD INFORMED PREMIER KOSYGIN LAST SUMMER THAT IF THE WAR CONTINUED, THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE A "DEAD DUCK." EATON STATED THAT PREMIER KOSYGIN SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN A PEACE MOVEMENT IN THE WORLD.

DTG 140010Z JUN 68

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

~~SECRET~~

72

1968 JUN 14 00 24

68 JUN 13 PM 8:29

THURSDAY

EEA607
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2237

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81294

~~SECRET~~

JUNE 13, 1968

Pres file

I HAVE JUST REPORTED TO JIM JONES, AT HIS REQUEST, AND I AM CONFIRMING HERewith A CONVERSATION WITH SEC. RUSK ABOUT THE LATIN AMERICAN TRIP, OF WHICH YOU MAY WISH TO KNOW BEFORE MAKING A FINAL DECISION.

1. SEC. RUSK HAS CERTAIN PERSONAL RESERVATIONS, OF A LIMITED NATURE, ABOUT THE TRIP. HE FEELS UNEASY ABOUT THE PRESIDENT COMMITTING HIMSELF TO BE OUT OF THE COUNTRY FOR SO LONG A PERIOD, NOT SO MUCH IN THE LIGHT OF FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS BUT WITH RESPECT TO THE POSSIBLE SITUATION IN THE CITIES. HE HAD BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT COLOMBIA BUT HE IS NOW ASSURED THAT LLERAS' POLITICAL PROBLEMS ARE CLEAR AND THE PRESIDENT COULD PROCEED THERE. IF HE HAD A PERSONAL RECOMMENDATION TO MAKE, IT WOULD BE THAT THE PRESIDENT MAKE A QUICK TRIP TO CENTRAL AMERICA AND RETURN, WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A SECOND TRIP TO COLOMBIA AND BRAZIL, AGAIN ON A SHORT FUZE.

2. BUT HE ASSESSES THESE RESERVATIONS AS MINOR IF THE PRESIDENT FEELS STRONGLY THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO DO THIS. HE IS SURE THE PRESIDENT'S INSTINCTS ABOUT THIS SHOULD OVERRIDE HIS RESERVATIONS.

3. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, WE NEED YOUR GUIDANCE ON:

PLAN CENTRAL AMERICA ONLY.

PLAN WHOLE TRIP.

CALL ME

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ja, NARA, Date 4-24-01

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 132341Z JUN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

74

1968 JUN 14 00 11

68 JUN 13 PM 8:18

THURSDAY

VZCZCEEA606
OO WTE13
DE WTE 2238

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81285

Free file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUNE 13, 1968

I RECOMMEND YOU APPROVE THE FOLLOWING FAREWELL MESSAGE TO BE SENT TO THE SHAH JUST BEFORE HE LEAVES NEW YORK MONDAY:

"MRS. JOHNSON AND I WERE DELIGHTED TO HAVE YOU WITH US AGAIN. YOUR VISITS ARE ALWAYS A SOURCE OF STRENGTH AND ENCOURAGEMENT TO US.

"I HOPE YOUR OTHER STOPS IN THE UNITED STATES HAVE CONFIRMED THAT WE ARE ONLY TWO OF MANY AMERICANS WHO UNDERSTAND AND APPRECIATE WHAT YOU ARE DOING FOR YOUR PEOPLE. YOUR CONTACTS WITH AN INCREASINGLY BROAD RANGE OF AMERICANS SEEM TO ME A HAPPY PREVIEW OF THE WHOLE NETWORK OF RELATIONSHIPS THAT WILL GROW QUICKLY FROM NOW ON BETWEEN OUR ECONOMIES AND PEOPLES. THESE WILL BE A GREAT SOURCE OF SATISFACTION AND ENRICHMENT FOR US ALL.

"AS YOU RETURN TO IRAN, I HOPE YOU WILL TAKE WITH YOU TO ALL THE TALENTED MEN AND WOMEN WHO WORK WITH YOU FOR IRAN'S GROWTH WORD OF OUR DEEP ADMIRATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT. PERHAPS YOUR GREATEST ACHIEVEMENT HAS BEEN YOUR SUCCESS IN CAPTURING THEIR ABILITIES AND ENTHUSIASM FOR THE GREAT WORK YOU HAVE SET FOR YOURSELF.

"YOU LEAVE WITH US THE WARMTH OF OUR FRIENDSHIP AND TAKE WITH YOU OUR PRAYERS FOR A SAFE JOURNEY AND FOR YOUR CONTINUED SUCCESS."

APPROVE-----

DISAPPROVE-----

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *rg*, NARA, Date *8-19-92*

DTG 132341Z JUN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL - EXDIS~~

ACTION

Friday - June 14, 1968

3
~~Handwritten~~
Pres file 75

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from President Frei

At Tab A is a letter from President Frei, which you have already seen, explaining why he is going to visit Brazil without coming to Washington.

His desire to go to Brazil I can fully understand. It is part of the ABC power syndrome in which Chile, worried over Argentine intentions, looks for moral support in Brazil. His reasons for putting off his trip to Washington are less convincing. He still has problems with his Senate, but behind that I see the fine Italian hand of his Foreign Minister, who is not enthusiastic about his visiting the US.

At Tab B is a suggested reply which leaves the door open for a visit later on if President Frei changes his mind.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Letter from President Frei.

Tab B - Suggested reply.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 95-182
By kg, NARA, Date 1-9-96

~~Dr. J. F. Kennedy~~ 75a

June 15, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of May 28. I appreciate your understanding of my decision not to seek re-election and of the vital question of how to bring peace to Vietnam.

You have also had to make some hard decisions during recent months on the wage readjustment problem. Ambassador Kerry has kept me informed of these developments.

I am disappointed that you have not been able to visit my country as we had planned, but hope that it may still prove possible. I looked forward to your visit as a positive, public expression of our mutual support for basic democratic reforms in our hemisphere consistent with the Alliance for Progress. However, both of us understand the political realities one faces in a democracy.

Your letter is heartening in its optimism on the progress you are making in extending economic and social reform in Chile. I am glad that we have been in a position to help. I need only reflect on my own experience over the years to win equal rights and ease poverty for important sectors of my countrymen to see the similarity with your struggle to bring about basic changes

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 95-182
By 40, NARA, Date 1-9-96

in Chile. I am particularly pleased that you find in Ambassador Kerry a sympathetic friend and helpful counsellor.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Eduardo Frei Montalva
President of the Republic of Chile
Santiago.

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm
June 14, 1968

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

8088

756

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-182

By sig, NARA, Date 1-9-96

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 2308
R-XX/R-XXXIV
Spanish

Office of the President
of the Republic
of Chile

Santiago, May 28, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

For some time I have been wanting to write you to tell you with how much interest--and, if you will forgive me, with affection for you personally--I have followed all the developments of United States politics in recent months. I appreciated to its full worth the step you took, which enhanced your standing as a statesman, because it meant generously facing the internal situation in your country and at the same time decisively facing the problem of peace in Viet-Nam.

After having become acquainted with you at Punta del Este, I have felt closely linked to you personally, and the cordial manner in which you received my sons is something that I shall always remember and that puts me deeply in your debt.

You know that my inability to go to Washington when you invited me was perhaps the worst, or at least the most unpleasant, reverse that I have experienced during my administration. But unfortunately, in a democracy, one must often bow to unjust decisions of the Congress. Following that incident, I told your Ambassador that I would not accept any invitations as long as I could not make the visit to the United States. I did that not only out of courtesy, but because during my administration I have received from you such great understanding and earnest cooperation. Thus, up to the present time I have not accepted any of the numerous invitations I have received from European nations and the Socialist world.

His Excellency

In these circumstances I received an invitation from Brazil, and it seemed to me that I ought to accept it for very special reasons. In the first place, it came from a Latin American country, and I have always thought that visits within Latin America are internal in nature; second, because our country has always maintained very close relations with the Brazilians, and in the face of an invitation from them, the public would not have understood why I refused or postponed it; and third, since certain serious problems exist with various countries concerning integration and other matters, the general public in Chile considers that a visit to Brazil is important for our position in Latin America and for the development of our relations within the Common Market. For these reasons I believed that a visit to Brazil was extremely necessary and desirable for the country and Chilean political circles were of the same opinion. Furthermore, the President of Brazil had visited our country and it was appropriate now to reciprocate.

I want very much and have great interest in making a visit to the United States and I hope to be able to do so toward the end of this year, if the date is possible for you, Mr. President, and if I would not cause any complications in your schedule, which I understand is very intense.

I want also to take this opportunity to tell you that despite many difficulties, the work of my Government is continuing in what I judge to be very good order, and that the program which I set for myself is being carried out to a very high degree, and this, despite any opinions to the contrary, is going to strengthen democracy and social peace on a foundation of deeply rooted transformations in our economic and social development programs. It is especially important for me to tell you that the agrarian reform has led to no decrease in agricultural production. On the contrary, during my administration it has undergone a considerable increase. Your personal understanding, which has been reflected in the attitude of your Ambassador and all of the official United States agencies, has been an essential factor in implementing the agrarian reform. Therefore, despite the difficulties which, I repeat, are not lacking, I am very optimistic.

Finally, Mr. President, I should like to tell you that I have noted with great satisfaction that, thanks to your personal attitude, so I have been informed, there has been progress in respect of some of the important agreements we reached at Punta del Este regarding scientific and technological cooperation and development of the infrastructure for the physical integration of our countries. Unfortunately, at the Latin American level, LAFTA has not advanced in just the way we anticipated and agreed, and this, beyond doubt, is regrettable. On the other hand, we have made progress in Andean integration and in a number of bilateral agreements, especially with Argentina.

I shall close, Mr. President, by telling you that I am following with very great interest your efforts to achieve a just and honorable peace in Viet-Nam. I am confident that those efforts will be understood and appreciated not only by your people but by all mankind.

Accept, Mr. President, my cordial regards.

[s] Eduardo Frei
Eduardo Frei
President of the Republic of Chile

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT,

Attached is CIA's analysis of North Vietnam's ability to withstand the current high rates of attrition. JCS comments are appended.

There is general agreement on the major conclusions:

- Manpower losses are placing a heavy burden on North Vietnam and the strains will be increasingly severe.
- North Vietnam may have to provide as many as 260,000 - 300,000 men a year to replace all losses. Even if this estimate is on the high side it far exceeds the annual draft input of 120,000.
- The arithmetic, however, does not support a hope that a pure attrition battle can be won in 2 years. (because of reserves)
- Present and prospective manpower drains may have influenced Hanoi's shift to the current fight-talk strategy in an effort to achieve a decisive outcome in a relatively short period of time.
- In the final analysis, North Vietnam's willingness to bear this manpower burden will be determined by the extent to which Hanoi feels that its effort is moving the war toward a satisfactory solution.

CIA states that Hanoi's strategy will be dictated more by political judgments than by simple questions of physical capacity. The Chiefs do not take issue with this statement but they appear to place a greater emphasis on the relationship between the enemy's strategy and his losses (a judgment with which I concur).

Thus the JCS state that:

- "From a military standpoint, we do not believe that he can absorb such losses over a protracted period of time and maintain the level of battlefield effectiveness required to pursue this strategy and attain his goals."
- Alternate strategies don't look any more promising in the long run.

~~TOP SECRET~~



(Mr. President)

- His long-term military prospects are not good. His best hope is that through spectacular attacks, even at very high cost in casualties, he can create a short-term image of success on his side and the image of hopelessness on our side.

I would add the following personal observations:

- Neither the CIA nor the JCS have hazarded a guess as to when Hanoi might decide to quit on the basis of their estimate of an adverse balance of prospective gains and losses.

- Hanoi's loss rates between mid-1966 and mid-1967 probably had a significant influence on their decision to shift from a strategy of a prolonged war of attrition to their winter-spring campaign strategy. With current loss rates running twice as high as the last quarter of 1967, there ought to be a high probability that they would change their strategy within the next 6 - 12 months - unless it pays off in the meantime.


W. W. ROSTOW

P. S. I have marked pp. 13-16 for reading, on the qualitative aspects of North Vietnam's manpower problem (at paper clip).

CIA Intelligence Memorandum

W

EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs



June 1968

Copy No. 1

"North Vietnam's ability to withstand manpower attrition"

JCSM-364-68, 11 June 1968 - TS 189080 "North Vietnam's ability to withstand manpower attrition"

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

June 14, 1968 ^{see file} ⁷⁷ _{wire to hush}

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

You should know we are watching closely certain indicators covering the intensity of the enemy's activities. They suggest some kind of de-escalated activity, but it is too soon, repeat too soon, to draw any firm conclusions. Here are the items over which we are scratching our heads:

-- for the third day since June 11, the metropolitan area of Saigon has not been attacked by rocket or mortar fire;

-- the trucks sighted in both the Laos panhandle and the North Vietnamese panhandle are markedly down in the last week of May and the first five days of June; although in Laos this may be substantially due to deteriorating weather. The weather in the North Vietnamese panhandle, however, has been good.

-- U. S. killed in action per day, which averaged 64 in May, has averaged 29 per day in the first five days of June;

-- thus far in June, we have spotted 14 new infiltration groups, as opposed to having spotted 22 new infiltration groups by this time in May;



EO 12958
3.A(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

-- on the Kontum-Pleiku front where we have been expecting a major attack, there are apparent movements of the enemy forces which might be the withdrawal of one division to Cambodia; but it might equally be a re-positioning for further attacks in different directions than have been previously

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-177
By us, NARA, Date 1-17-03

envisaged. Nevertheless, it is possible because the weather will shortly go bad on that front;

-- fire from within and across the DMZ, which averaged 64 rounds per day in May, has been running 20 per day through the first 13 days of June.

Again, we are drawing no conclusions at this time; but I thought you would be interested in these items which we shall be following with the greatest care in the days ahead.

INFORMATION

Friday, June 14, 1968 -- 5:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's response
to your directive.

W. W. Rostow

our
Sec. Rusk memo to the President, 6 14/68, re "getting/story out to the
public more intensively and more effectively" re Vietnam.

78

Pres file

*sent Rusk via
pouch. (6/17/68)*

1914
78a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I have taken up with Presidential appointees and our Public Affairs people the matter of getting our story out to the public more intensively and more effectively. We'll pitch in and do our best.

As a matter of interest, you might wish to glance over the attached notes on appearances made by officers of the Department since January and throughout Fiscal Year 1968.

Faithfully yours,

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:
Notes

The President,
The White House,

Senior Officer Appearances

	<u>Jan. 1 to date</u>	<u>FY 1968</u>	<u>Estimated Audience</u>
Rusk	20	51	51,950
Katzenbach	16	27	na
Rostow	15	18	na
Kohler/Bohlen	13	19	na
Rimestad	4	7	na
Harriman	16	40	na
Assistant Secretaries	<u>113</u>	<u>219</u>	na
	197	381	

Geographic Spread: For the top six officers: 24 states. Including Assistant Secretaries, we have covered every state.

Other Officers' Appearances:

	<u>Jan. 1 to date</u>	<u>FY 1968</u>
Speaking Engagements	779	1,581
Estimated face-to-face audiences	160,000	320,000

Coverage: All 50 states, including Alaska and Hawaii. (East of Miss: 45%; Midwest: 30%; Far West: 25%) 65% students and faculty; 35% others.

Community Meetings:

Principal audiences were students/ faculties of high schools, colleges and universities; world affairs councils; service clubs, religious groups, public in general.

Jan/ June: Covered 10 states
 8 teams of 39 senior/ junior officers (including of AID)
 Total live estimated audience of 68,160
 Total estimated media audience of 8,000,000

FY 1968: Covered 16 states
12 teams of 63 senior/ junior officers (including AID)
Total live estimated audience of 94,183
Total estimated media audience of 13,000,000

Briefings (in Department):

Principal audiences were general public and special interest groups representing schools, colleges, labor, religious women, civic groups

<u>Jan/ June:</u>	Total estimated live audience of semi-weekly briefings:	5,935
	Total estimated live audience of semi-weekly request briefings:	10,122
	Total estimated live audience for special Symposia by invite:	<u>1,140</u>
		17,197

<u>FY 1968:</u>	Total estimated live audience of semi-weekly briefings:	9,190
	Total estimated live audience for special request briefings:	18,899
	Total estimated live audience for special Symposia:	<u>2,255</u>
		30,344

Conferences:

During January 1968, the Department held seven national and regional Foreign Policy Conferences -- three national meetings in the Department and four regional meetings in major cities of the south and southwest. Audiences comprised civic and community leaders, leaders of national organizations, educators and students at the high school and university level, and representatives of the press, radio and TV. Some 40 senior officers of the Department, AID, ACDA and Defense participated. The Secretary took part in all three national conferences and was the leading participant in the Regional Conference in Phoenix. Nick Katzenbach headed the program in Knoxville and spoke at two of the national meetings in Washington.

For the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1968, fourteen conferences were held for audiences totaling approximately 10,000, with some 70 top level officers of the Department and related agencies participating.

Media Appearances:

	<u>Jan. 1-date</u>	<u>FY 1968</u>
Total appearances	261	428
Rusk (Incl. Press Conf.)	12	25
Katzenbach	6	7
Rostow	4	4
Other officers	242	392
Regional Conference Appearances	49	72
"Diplomats Debriefing"	15	15
"Great Decisions"	7	7
Radio-TV Tours	6	16

We also sent 44 radio tapes to 200 stations.

It is particularly noteworthy that, even though requests for speakers leveled off following LBJ's March 31st speech, we continued our efforts to stimulate requests, particularly from colleges and universities. A recent letter from this Bureau produced requests for Department officers to address groups at Summer Sessions during June, July and August.

ACTION

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Friday - June 14, 1968 - 4:55pm

*Pres file
sent to M. S. R. Jr
Ramb.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: \$15 Million Loan for Panama City Water Supply System

Herewith a unanimously-approved request from AID Administrator Gaud (Tab A) that you authorize a \$15 million loan to Panama to build a new water supply system for Panama City.

The City is now dependent on the Canal Zone's water plant. In a couple of years the Zone will not be able to meet the City's growing water needs. To avoid a future water shortage being turned into public anger against the Zone, it is most important that the new water system be started without delay. This is the view of our Ambassador and the Governor of the Zone, shared in by State and DOD.

The loan agreement has been worked out with the Robles government; but President-elect Arias has been consulted and responded favorably.

From a technical standpoint, the loan is well conceived. Secretary Fowler has cleared the balance of payments aspects. There are no Conte-Long or Symington amendment problems. Budget Director Zwick recommends approval (Tab B). I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Attachments

Tab A - Gaud memo of May 27 to President.

Tab B - Zwick recommendation of June 5 to President.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MAY 27 1968

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Loan for a New Water Supply System for Panama City.

On the recommendation of Ambassador Adair, Governor Leber and Deputy U. S. Coordinator Fowler, I am requesting your approval to authorize a \$15 million loan for the construction of an urgently needed new water supply system for Panama City.

Panama City now receives its water supply from the Panama Canal Company under a commitment to provide a maximum of 30 million gallons a day (MGD) from the Company's Miraflores facility in the Canal Zone. Panama City is close to using this maximum allocation at the present time, and the Miraflores facility, which also supplies the needs of the Canal Zone on the Pacific side, cannot guarantee any additional allocation. It is likely that because of very rapid urban growth, Panama City will experience some shortage of water during the next few years, until the proposed new facility becomes operational.

The supply of potable water has been a delicate issue between the United States and Panama since the days of the construction of the Canal. Under the Convention of 1903, the United States was given the right to construct and operate such water and sewerage facilities in Panama City and Colon as were required for the construction and operation of the Panama Canal, with the proviso that after 50 years all such sewerage and water works would revert to Panama. The United States did construct certain sewerage and water systems in Panama City, and since 1915 has been supplying water to Panama City from the Miraflores facility in the Canal Zone. As early as 1942 the Government of Panama expressed the desire for a return of ownership and control of public utilities in Panama City to Panamanian jurisdiction, and by agreements reached in 1942 and 1945 the United States did transfer all its right, title and interest to these utilities. At the same time the United States agreed that "pending the establishment by the Republic of Panama of an independent water supply system, and so long as the Republic of Panama desires to utilize water from the Canal Zone," the United States would continue to provide water to Panama City at the 1945 levels or as otherwise agreed upon. Thus while the United States has no legal obligation to provide the additional quantities of water which Panama City requires, it is clearly in the U. S. interest that the Canal Zone be relieved of its responsibility as the sole supplier of water for Panama City, and that Panama City acquire its own water supply facility, independent of the Canal Zone source and adequate to provide for the city's future needs. Any prolonged water crisis involving Panama City would cause popular resentment which could easily be turned against the Canal

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- 2 -

Zone. In light of these circumstances, the Country Team and the Canal authorities give the proposed loan their strongest endorsement and urge its approval without delay.

The proposed project has been developed, after some modifications, on the basis of a feasibility study prepared by a U. S. consulting firm. The new water supply will draw from Madden Lake, about 15 miles north of Panama City, and in its first stage will provide an average daily supply of 56 MGD, sufficient to meet the city's estimated needs through 1980. Combined with those quantities of water which can continue to be provided by the present Canal Zone facility, this project, in its first stage, will meet the expected needs of Panama City through 1988. The anticipated period for design and construction is three-and-a-half years. In the interim, the Panamanian water agency hopes to tap some recently discovered underground water sources near Panama City so as to ease a probable water shortage in the next few years.

The Government of Panama has assigned highest priority to the project. This is indicated among other things by the fact that it will contribute \$8 million (35%) to the cost of the project, amounting during two years of construction to about 20% of the Central Government's capital budget. Panama's contribution will cover more than four-fifths of local costs. Almost 90% of the AID loan will be utilized for the procurement of U.S. goods and services, the remainder going for local procurement in Panama not covered by the Panamanian contribution.

We are taking special care to assure that the Panamanian water agency which is the borrower, will have the managerial, technical and financial capacity to shoulder the increased responsibility arising out of the proposed project. The AID loan includes \$150,000 for the services of a consulting firm, which during the design phase of the project will carry out an operations, methods and rate study for the borrower. In addition \$13,000 will be provided for short-term training courses in the United States in plant operations and maintenance of water supply systems. Prior to the disbursement of loan funds for construction, the borrower will have to give evidence that it is developing a satisfactory operating and maintenance program, and that it is acting on the recommendations of the consultant with respect to water rates, administration, and operations.

In accordance with your instructions in FY 1967 we initiated a special effort to promote economic and social development in Panama's urban areas, with particular emphasis on projects with a more immediate human impact. I am satisfied that the proposed loan will contribute significantly to this effort by providing the essential infrastructure for orderly urban growth in Panama City, and that moreover it will help protect long-range U. S. interests in the Canal Zone.

Symington Amendment: State/A.I.D. in consultation with the Inter-Agency Advisory Committee concerned with the implementation of Section 620(s) the Symington Amendment, of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, has determined

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- 3 -

(a) that Panama's resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree that materially interferes with its development; (b) that neither U. S. development assistance nor P.L. 480 sales are diverted by Panama to military purposes.

Among the principal factors in this determination are the following:

1. Defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP for 1966-1967 were 0.1%, and the trend of this defense share has been steady at 0.1% from 1963 to 1967. The median for the region is 1.65%.
2. Defense expenditures as a percentage of Central Government expenditures for 1966 were 0.5% and 0.7% in 1967. The median for the region is 10.2%.
3. There was no expenditure of foreign exchange for defense articles in 1966 or 1967.
4. The Country Team has reported that there is no evidence of any U. S. development assistance (or P.L. 480 sales) being diverted to military expenditures.

Conte-Long Amendment: Currently available intelligence does not indicate that Panama has purchased sophisticated weapons systems requiring the withholding of assistance under Section 119 (Conte-Long Amendment) of the Foreign Assistance Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1968.

Recommendation: That you approve the authorization of a \$15 million loan for a new water supply system for Panama City.



William S. Gaud

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79b

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JUN 5 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: \$15 million loan for Panama City Water Supply System

Bill Gaud requests your approval to authorize a \$15 million loan to IDAAN, an autonomous water supply agency of the Government of Panama, for a new water supply system for Panama City.

Panama City currently obtains its water from the Panama Canal Company. The city's demand for water will soon exceed the amount of water the Company can provide, 30 million gallons a day (MGD). The proposed new water supply system would provide an average supply of 56 MGD, which combined with the 30 MGD provided by the present Zone system, will meet Panama City's projected needs through 1988.

The project is technically sound. The system to be financed by this loan can be expanded at some future time to meet the city's needs after 1988. A project of this size will undoubtedly strain the managerial and financial capacity of Panama's water agency. However, the loan provides for technical assistance and requires the borrower to establish an adequate rate structure and a satisfactory operating and maintenance program. The Panamanian Government will contribute \$8 million (35%) to the cost of the project.

Ambassador Adair and Canal Zone Governor Leber believe this loan is very important because it will help prevent water shortages which could result in serious urban discontent. This discontent might well be directed against the Canal Zone, as the sole supplier of the city's water. By giving Panama City its own water supply facility, this loan will help to reduce possible pressures on the Zone.

Political Situation - Since Gaud's memorandum was written, Panama's Electoral board has declared Arnulfo Arias the winner of the recent bitterly disputed Presidential election. Arias is scheduled to take office in October. President Robles and the National Guard Commander have indicated they will abide by the Board's decision. The AID Mission has discussed this loan with the President-elect and he reacted favorably. State and AID agree that the political situation should not delay proceeding with this loan now.

ob. HNF.

Balance of Payments - Secretary Fowler does not object to this loan, but believes that further intensified efforts should be made to find ways to improve additionality in the Panama AID program. AID has agreed to work with Treasury to meet this objective.

Military Expenditures - Panama's defense expenditures as a percentage of either GNP or Central Government expenditures are well below the median for Latin America. Gaud reports that State/AID has determined that sanctions under the Symington and Conte/Long amendments do not apply to Panama.

Recommendation - I recommend approval of Gaud's request to authorize this loan.

Charles J. Zwick
Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

80

INFORMATION

Pres file

Friday - June 14, 1968 - 11:35 AM

Mr. President:

Herewith a report from Ray Telles on the results of Border Beauty and Friendship Day -- May 18. He got good press mileage from your statement to the border communities.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT



UNITED STATES-MEXICO COMMISSION FOR BORDER DEVELOPMENT AND FRIENDSHIP

1800 G Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20525

Office of the Chairman
U.S. Section

June 10, 1968

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

It is my pleasure to report that the U.S.-Mexico Border Beauty and Friendship Day which the President's Council on Recreation and Natural Beauty sponsored on May 18 on behalf of the Commission on Border Development and Friendship produced stimulating results.

Representative press clippings and a summary of specific activities which took place in cities all the way from San Diego to Brownsville is attached, but the achievements have implications which transcend a mere recital of the activities.

Specifically, the occasion gave new impetus to efforts to enhance the quality of the lives and of the environment in the border area; these show every promise of continuing.

It spurred citizens and officials alike to look with new eyes at the visual aspects of their lives, and to institute measures to improve those aspects.


It gave birth to working patterns and procedures which promise lasting partnerships of public and private groups, local, State, and Federal.

Border Beauty and Friendship Day brought many other advantages. Not the least of these was to introduce to many for the first time the goals and mission of the Commission on Border Development and Friendship. With the impetus of this occasion, the Commission's overall objectives come closer to fruition. We can and will build on this foundation.

Your Council on Recreation and Natural Beauty is now embarked on another project on behalf of the Commission on Border Development and Friendship. It is seeking to get the four States involved to designate a Brownsville-to-San Diego chain of existing roads as "The Amigo Way." Such a route, properly marked and brought to the attention of the American public, will have extensive economic and social benefits as it attracts tourists and lays open before them the magnificent historic and scenic heritage which the border area offers all who will come... and see.

We look forward to the day when we can report to you that "The Amigo Way" is a designated reality. We also expect to report to you at an early date progress on the many other Border development projects in which the Commission is engaged.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Raymond", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Raymond Telles
Ambassador

Enclosures:

1. Report on Activities.
2. Representative Press Clippings.

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Report on May 18 Border Beauty and Friendship Day Activities
from
Ambassador Telles, Chairman, U.S.-Mexico Commission for
Border Development and Friendship

Brownsville, Texas, broke ground for International Friendship Garden. Mayors of Brownsville and Matamoros, the Chamber of Commerce, Texas Women's Clubs, Boy and Girl Scouts, local garden clubs and Texas Nurserymen were among those participating.

McAllen's Mayor proclaimed Plant-a-Palm Day with palms provided all citizens at cost. Leftovers were to have been donated to the city but there were none. City departments, local banks, Kiwanis and high school Key Clubs helped. Boys' Club members and Boy Scouts have cleared brush and debris from city park lands, rebuilt and marked trails, and been rewarded by hot dog suppers thanks to local merchants.

Laredo ceremonies started Operation Brillante, a citywide clean up campaign. The Chamber of Commerce, city departments (on overtime) and ten civic organizations announced clean up programs to their mayor and the mayor of Nuevo Laredo, which is mounting a parallel effort.

Eagle Pass broke ground for a Lions International Friendship Arch, first on the U.S.-Mexico border, in ceremonies with the counterpart club from Piedras Negras.

Del Rio completed a strip parklet (with two waterfalls) alongside the major highway to the border. Garden clubs, Scouts and other citizen groups donated and installed final plantings on the Day. A month-long city trash disposal campaign was completed.

El Paso and Juarez dignitaries including two mayors, the International Boundary and Water Commissioner and his counterpart, and Lions Club members unveiled plaques in two languages marking the Good Neighbor Bridge; broke ground for a vest pocket park near a pedestrian crossing, and planted trees in Mexico's Chamizal Monument Park.

School children in Columbus, New Mexico, picked up litter and were treated to a hot dog cookout. The opening of the town's swimming pool for children from both Columbus and the sister city of Palomas was announced thanks to funds raised by the International Parents' Club matched by a grant from the Hershey Foundation of Houston, Texas.

Douglas, Arizona, broke ground and planted a tree to mark the beginning of the summer's work on a city park adjacent to the highway and located one block from the border crossing, along the walking path from Agua Prieta to the downtown shopping area.

A caravan of cars proceeded from tree planting at a historic site in Tubac, Arizona, to another tree planting ceremony at the border crossing in Nogales. Mayors of Tucson and of Nogales, Arizona, and Nogales, Sonora, attended as did representatives of State and Federal agencies from both sides, 4-H Clubs, Scouts, and garden clubs.

Calexico's Chamber of Commerce issued free flower seeds, and the citizens' Beautification Committee kicked off a citywide clean up campaign supported by the Mayor, Councilmen, City Manager, and all city agencies as well.

A joint proclamation by the Mayors of San Diego and Tijuana urged citizens to clean up and plant "as a means of accomplishing immediate improvement and as a symbol of continuing friendship." Focus for the Day was at San Ysidro, where some 500 children worked under adult volunteers in a week long anti-litter campaign. A community meeting was held on the Day. The Commission of the Californias presented trees for the State Employment Center, a downtown focal point; kinds of future community beautification were discussed; City Parks' people produced sketches and work schedules for immediate local park development; and plans were outlined for a Teen Post--run by young people, sponsored by the Police Department, supported by OEO and local businessmen.

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Profile

Friday, June 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ratification of the International Grains Arrangement

Attached for your signature is the instrument of the ratification of the International Grains Arrangement 1967.

You sent this international agreement to the Senate for its advice and consent on January 25, 1968. The Senate adopted its resolution of advice and consent to ratification on June 13.

The Arrangement is in two parts:

- The Wheat Trade Convention, which will help to improve and stabilize wheat export prices;
- The Food Aid Convention, under which other countries will share with us in supporting an international food aid effort.

The Arrangement enters into force July 1, 1968, provided that the 18 major countries, including the U. S., who negotiated it under the Kennedy Round deposit their instruments of ratification or declarations of provisional application by June 17, 1968. If the June 17 deadline is not met, a special international meeting would have to be held to set new provisions for when the Arrangement enters into force.

To bring the Arrangement into force on schedule, therefore, it would be necessary for you to sign the instrument of U. S. ratification by June 17. Your signature is equivalent to the U. S. depositing the instrument since the U. S. is the depository power. All the other major countries are expected to ratify on schedule. But a few may have instructions to hold up their action until we ratify.

A purely technical problem exists which I do not believe is of any significance. U. S. authority to carry out its price and food aid obligations under the Arrangement is contained in farm legislation and PL 480 legislation which expires at the end of 1969. The International Arrangement, on the other hand, extends through June 1971. John Schnittker and Bill Roth say this is no problem because no difficulty is anticipated in renewing the relevant domestic legislation. In any event, if we could not meet our

obligations under the Arrangement, we would either have to work out special provisions with other countries or the Arrangement would simply fall apart. No penalties would be involved.

Schnittker, Roth and State recommend you sign the attached instrument. DeVier Pierson and I concur.

If you sign the instrument of ratification, we would want to let other countries know immediately in case they are holding up their action.

W. W. Rostow

(If you approve, we will need your signature on the attached instrument of ratification.)

No _____

Call me _____

ERF
EREmst

June 14, 1968

filed

82

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FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

1. Herewith a CIA report which indicates Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger is contemplating a trip to Washington during the week of 16 June. The Chancellor believes the trip would underline the seriousness with which he views the situation resulting from the introduction of visa requirements by the East Germans and demonstrate the unabated confidence of the Federal Republic in its alliance with the United States.

2. The Chancellor felt compelled to stress the second point on discovering, during his 13 June visit to West Berlin, the disillusionment of leading city officials, including governing Mayor Klaus Schuatz, with the allied powers. None of the officials with whom Kiesinger discussed the current crisis believed that the allies would undertake anything to counter the East German measures.



EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-150
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-25-02

INFORMATION

83

Friday - June 14, 1968

Mr. President:

Pres file

Herewith a warm thank you letter from Felipe Herrera for the IDB signing ceremony.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Letter of June 12 from President of the IADB.



PRESIDENT

INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20577

83a

June 12, 1968

CABLE ADDRESS
INTAMBANC

H
The Honorable
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

I have the honor and personal satisfaction of conveying to you the sincere appreciation of the Board of Executive Directors and staff of the Inter-American Development Bank, as well as my own, for the gracious solemnity of the ceremony in which you signed into law the bill authorizing the United States to approve the increase in the callable capital of the Bank by US\$1,000,000,000. The presence of His Excellency Mr. José Joaquín Trejos, President of the Republic of Costa Rica, added to the brilliance of the event.

I am especially grateful for the generosity of your remarks concerning our Institution. We at the Bank are alive to the crucial importance of the task our member countries have entrusted to us. I can assure you the results you so kindly mentioned, as well as our future efforts, have been and will continue to be motivated by a zealous spirit of public service for the achievement of the social and economic-development goals of Latin America toward which the Alliance for Progress is striving.

Nothing would please me so much as to show you personally the work the Bank has furthered with its financial and technical assistance in Latin America. I hope that your purpose of visiting our countries may soon be realized.

Please accept, my dear Mr. President, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration and esteem.


Felipe Herrera

~~SECRET~~

Friday, June 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Reaffirmation of NATO at Time of
Non-proliferation Treaty Signing

At Tab A is Secretary Rusk's memorandum recommending you approve a scenario for use in reassuring the Germans regarding possible risks to their security from signing the Non-proliferation Treaty.

The Germans see a possible security risk in signing the Treaty which could arise if the NPT outlasts NATO. In this event, they fear they might be deprived of the U. S. nuclear guarantee without having an alternative means of deterring nuclear attack.

To protect themselves they have asked for a U. S. commitment to the defense of Europe -- independent of NATO.

Secretary Rusk proposes an alternative course of action to try out on the Germans. We would tell them:

- That at the time of signing the NPT the U. S. would reaffirm its continuing commitment under existing treaties of mutual security. This could be done by a Presidential statement. (Draft language is shown in Secretary Rusk's memorandum.)
- We would urge the UK to make a similar statement.
- Non-nuclear NATO members could make clear in the NATO Council that the existence of NATO makes possible their adherence to the NPT.
- We (and the UK) would respond by referring to previous assurances of our commitment to NATO and declaring our intention to continue to adhere to NATO as long as this is necessary and desired by our allies.

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-2-

The purpose of all these reassurances is to make it easier for the Germans (and other countries) to sign the NPT.

Secretary Clifford has no problems with this approach.

I concur in Secretary Rusk's recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

No _____

Call me _____

ERF
ERF:mst

SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

84a 1871

June 11, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Reaffirmation of NATO at Time of
Non-proliferation Treaty Signing

Recommendation:

That you approve the enclosed scenario for use in responding to a German request for reaffirmation of United States commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty at the time of signing the Non-proliferation Treaty.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

In their consideration of the Non-proliferation Treaty, the Germans have seen a possible risk to their security from the fact that the Treaty, as drafted, could outlast the North Atlantic Treaty. They fear that this might some day deprive them of the United States nuclear guarantee at a time when they would not be able to develop effective alternate means of deterring a nuclear attack. Some months ago, they suggested that you deal with this problem by making an appropriate statement of United States commitment to the defense of Europe, when the Non-proliferation Treaty is opened for signature.

In a letter of March 30, Under Secretary Rostow proposed in return that the United States reaffirm its commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty at time of signing. He also proposed that those NATO members wishing to do so could make clear that their adherence to the Non-proliferation Treaty under current world conditions was made possible by their confidence in the North Atlantic Treaty. Our thinking was that these

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By pc/b, NARA, Date 4-24-01

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latter statements should be made in the North Atlantic Council forum. The Germans responded in a memorandum (enclosed) which sets forth their views on the way in which this proposal should be implemented.

We have now attempted to prepare a scenario for an oral presentation that would be both responsive to the Germans and compatible with our own interests. If you concur, this scenario would indicate, among other things, your willingness to include in your statement at the time the United States signs the Non-proliferation Treaty a reaffirmation of the continuing commitments of the United States under existing treaties of mutual security. We would envisage language for this purpose along the following lines:

"In welcoming the Non-proliferation Treaty, I wish to reaffirm that the United States remains fully committed to fulfilling its obligations under existing treaties of mutual security. Such arrangements have provided a significant measure of security for the United States and other parties to these treaties. They have created a degree of stability in an often unstable world."

A statement of this kind on your part would be useful in gaining German adherence to the Non-proliferation Treaty. It would also reassure our other allies in Europe and elsewhere that the Treaty in no way affects our existing security arrangements.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Suggested Scenario
2. Rostow Letter
3. German Scenario

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SCENARIO FOR IMPLEMENTING THE
ROSTOW-DUCKWITZ PROPOSALS

The United States is prepared to make a statement at the time of signing the NPT, reaffirming the continuing commitments of the United States under existing treaties of mutual security. The President would be willing to make the statement, if this is desired. We would use the language "under existing treaties of mutual security" as a means of meeting the needs not only of our NATO allies on this score, but of all those countries with which the United States is bound in alliance. We also intend to include a statement of this kind in the testimony to be presented to the United States Senate during advise and consent hearings.

We would urge the United Kingdom to make a statement along similar lines.

It is our thinking that we would also urge other NATO members, at the time they signed the Treaty, to make statements similar to those of the United States and United Kingdom, with perhaps more specific reference to the North Atlantic Treaty than we, with our world-wide system of alliance, can properly make in the context of signing the NPT.

We believe it more effective for the non-nuclear NATO members to make the second point in the Rostow to Duckwitz letter of March 30--that it is the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty and the security it provides to its members that makes possible their adherence to the NPT under current world conditions--in the NAC forum, rather than at the actual signing of the NPT. We and the British would then take note of these statements and recall in this connection our respective reaffirmations of our commitments under existing treaties of mutual security. In doing so, we would refer specifically to our commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty. We would repeat views similar to those

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expressed by the President on February 19 during Secretary General Brosio's visit to Washington, relating to the necessity of maintaining NATO's strength to ensure continuing stability and security in the North Atlantic area. Further, we would declare the intention of the United States Government to continue to adhere to its North Atlantic Treaty commitments as long as this is necessary and desired by our allies. The United States and United Kingdom would make their declarations either in the NAC, the DPC, or, if the timing were convenient, at a NATO Ministerial Conference.

With regard to presenting the above course of action to the members of NATO, we would suggest that the United States approach the United Kingdom bilaterally to seek its support for the proposal. We would also suggest that the FRG do the same with Italy, and that the plan then be presented to the NAC as a joint FRG-Italian proposal, which the United States, and hopefully the United Kingdom, would then promptly endorse.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~SECRET~~

LETTER FROM UNDER SECRETARY EUGENE ROSTOW
TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE STATE SECRETARY
DUCKWITZ, MARCH 30, 1968

Dear Mr. Duckwitz:

It was good seeing you in Washington. I agree with you that continuing contact on matters of mutual concern is indispensable, and I look forward to our close and cordial cooperation on many common problems.

In your letter you raise, in the context of the Non-proliferation Treaty, the question of a possible reaffirmation of the United States nuclear guarantee for Europe. You suggest language the President might include in a declaration on this subject at the time of signing that Treaty.

I note that you recognize that the potential security risk which might arise from the different provisions on duration obtaining in the cases of the Non-proliferation Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty is an unlikely one. We agree. We also have previously drawn attention in our bilateral consultations with the Federal Republic to the Non-proliferation Treaty withdrawal clause. Any fundamental change in the security guarantee provided by the North Atlantic Treaty could be interpreted as an extraordinary event which the Non-proliferation Treaty withdrawal clause is designed to cover.

Nevertheless, we recognize that some German concern remains. However, the specific solution recommended in your letter presents problems. First, we foresee possible harmful effects resulting from issuance of a declaration by the United States that in any way might be construed as having been prompted by concern over the possibility of an early end of NATO. This is an issue of the utmost

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By JCB, NARA, Date 4-24-01

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-2-

sensitivity. Second, and equally important, we believe that security undertakings of the type you suggest would be difficult to achieve outside of a new treaty framework.

In recognition of your concerns, however, I should like to suggest for your consideration an alternate course. This is a strong reaffirmation of North Atlantic Treaty commitments at the time of signing the Non-proliferation Treaty. At the same time, we and other members of NATO could make it clear that adherence to the Non-proliferation Treaty under current world conditions is made possible by the confidence of members in the North Atlantic Treaty.

Such an approach could serve to allay the apprehensions you have cited. I should appreciate knowing whether it would meet your requirements.

Sincerely,

Eugene V. Rostow

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PROPOSED GERMAN SCENARIO

May 2, 1968

We appreciate the understanding the U.S. Government shows for the problems which arise for us from the relation between NPT and NATO.

We consider the declarations valuable and helpful, which in accordance to our proposal Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford has made in the Hague on the question of compatibility of the NPT with the activities of the Nuclear Planning Group. As to a nuclear guarantee we are hopeful that we shall also reach agreement on the means by which this problem can best be met.

We refer in detail to the proposals of Under Secretary Rostow as follows:

- 1) We welcome the proposal that the U.S., we, and other NATO members at the signing of the NPT should make clear that the adherence to the NPT in the present international situation is rendered possible only through the confidence which the members place in the North Atlantic Treaty. Such a declaration would demonstrate that there is an unsoluble link between the existence of the Atlantic Alliance and the obligations of the NPT as undertaken by the non-nuclear members of NATO.

Our concerns, however, would not be dissipated by such a declaration. In view of the long duration of the NPT we are mainly interested in having the protection which the U.S. provide for the non-nuclear partners of the Alliance extended on a long term basis, i.e. as long as the world situation and the security of the allies will require it.

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State Dept. Guidelines
By jc/cb, NARA, Date 4-24-01

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This protection is based on the U.S. membership in NATO, on the specific defense obligations of the U.S. in the framework of NATO, and on her participation in the arrangements for an integrated conventional and nuclear defense as they have been developed until now (see among others Communiqué of the NATO ministerial Conference of December 19, 1967, Athens guide lines, Strategic Concept of NATO MC 1403, NPG). This protection is equally based upon the stationing of U.S. troops in Europe, which - at least from a legal standpoint, does not presuppose the existence of NATO.

We, furthermore, are of the opinion that such a declaration would require the concurrence of possibly all, at least however of the great majority of NATO members. It would be necessary, therefore, to consult this matter as soon as possible with interested NATO members and, depending on the results of these consultations, to raise this question in the Council. U.S. support would be needed in the stage of consultation as well as in the Council.

2) U.S. reaffirmation of NATO commitments:

The problems of a declaration of guarantee independent of NATO, which Mr. Rostow touches upon in his letter, are also realized by us. We had thought that our proposal had taken care of them. This proposal carefully avoids any explicit detachment from the North Atlantic Treaty; it is linked to declarations which the U.S. side has given earlier in a similar form. The counterproposal does not correspond entirely to our aims, since it only comprises NATO commitments which are limited by the right of withdrawal.

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- 3 -

Nevertheless, we believe that such a reaffirmation could meet with our concerns to a satisfactory extent, provided it would have a politically and psychologically stabilizing effect on the alliance. We, therefore, feel that the following points should be taken into account in formulating the declaration:

- a) The declaration should not be limited to a reaffirmation of the U.S. NATO commitments. It should express the conviction of the U.S. Government that the maintaining of the alliance in the future is regarded as necessary (along the lines of the declaration of President Johnson and NATO Secretary General Brosio on February 19, 1968). Furthermore, it should declare the intention of the U.S. Government to adhere for this very reason also in the future to its NATO commitments, as long as this is necessary and desired by the Allies (along the lines of declarations given to us in the cause of the bilateral consultations).
- b) The declaration should be given in the context of the signing of the NPT. It should, however, be repeated during the ratification debate in the Senate, in order to make it a part of the ratification process.
- c) The declaration should be given by the President.

We are looking forward to learning about the U.S. views on the text of such a declaration of the reaffirmation at the earliest convenience.

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Pres file

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~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 13, 1968
4:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I asked Henry Owen to prepare this historical analysis of how the Berlin blockade and the Korean War were brought to an end. I think you will enjoy reading these historical notes.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *kg*, NARA, Date 6-30-92

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

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By jc, NARA, Date 4-24-01

SETTLEMENTS OF EAST-WEST CRISES

Summary Conclusions

This paper considers the diplomatic moves which led to settlement of two previous East-West crises, the Berlin blockade and the Korean war, to see if any pattern emerges which might be relevant to other cases. Three conclusions suggest themselves:

1. In each case the decisive factor was the situation on the ground. The Communists' conclusion that they could not starve out Berlin or conquer South Korea, and that their efforts to this end involved undue costs and risks, was clearly the main reason for their move toward peace negotiations. Until that conclusion had been reached, even the most ingenious, varied, and repeated diplomatic approaches were unavailing.

2. Once the Communists had reached their basic conclusion, they took advantage of the most casual and random opportunities to apprise us of that conclusion: Stalin's published reply to questions submitted by a journalist, Kingsbury Smith, and Malik's talk with Gross at a UN reception.

3. After the ball had thus been opened, rapid and repeated US follow-up queries probably hastened progress toward actual negotiations.

a. In the case of the Berlin blockade, Jessup's repeated probing of Malik, after Stalin's oracular remarks to Kingsbury Smith, probably contributed to Soviet decision-making. The lengthy delays which intervened between Jessup's queries and Malik's replies, plus the lack of any Soviet follow-up after Stalin's statement, are consistent with the theses that the Soviet position had not been fully developed when Stalin's statement was made, and that Jessup's vigorous and aggressive probing contributed to its fuller elaboration.

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b. In the case of the Korean war, a period of nearly three months elapsed between Malik's initial remark to Gross on April 5 and Gromyko's elaboration to Kirk on June 27. Again, the lengthy delays and incomplete Soviet replies which characterized this period suggest that it was one of continuing Soviet decision-making--even though the basic option had been chosen. It is at least possible that the various US moves made during this period (Kennan's talks with Malik and Kirk's approaches to Gromyko) hastened the process.

I. Ending of the Berlin Blockade, 1949

A. The Facts

Following imposition of the blockade, the three Western powers (U.S., U.K., France) negotiated in Moscow during July and August, 1948, to get it lifted. They saw Stalin twice (on August 2 and 23) and reached apparent agreement in principle with him on the lifting of the blockade and on the question of the introduction of the D-Mark in West Berlin, which had been the immediate occasion for its imposition. On August 30 a directive to the four military governors was agreed. It proved impossible, however, to nail down the necessary specific agreements with Molotov in Moscow or among the military governors in Berlin. In addition to holding to a position on the currency which the West could not accept, the Soviets wished to negotiate about the broader question of Germany, where the three Western powers were about to set up a government in their combined zones. The Western powers said that they could not negotiate under duress: the USSR would have to lift the blockade before they would agree to a new meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss Germany and Berlin. The Western powers, meanwhile, had imposed counter-restrictions on trade with East Germany.

Further exchanges could not break the impasse. The Western powers took the question to the U.N. Security Council, where a resolution (Oct. 25) calling for ending the blockade and Western counter-restrictions, for a currency settlement by November 20, and for a CFM meeting ten days after that date, was vetoed by the USSR.

The issue remained deadlocked until January 30, 1949, when Stalin replied in an open letter to some questions put to him by Kingsbury Smith of INS: He said that if the Western governments would postpone establishment of a West German state, the Soviet Union would see no obstacle to raising the blockade, provided the Western powers ended their counter-restrictions. He failed to mention the currency issue, hitherto the main subject of contention.

Philip Jessup then initiated a conversation with Yakov Malik at the UN on February 15, asking if there was any significance in Stalin's non-mention of the currency issue in his statement of the conditions under which the blockade might be lifted.

Malik did not give a direct reply until March 15, when he said (presumably after checking with Moscow) that the omission was "not accidental": The currency question, though important, was one that could be discussed at a CFM meeting, together with other aspects of the German problem.

In further discussion, Jessup noted that there was no need to urge postponement of a West German government since no such government existed. After further inquiries, Malik said on March 21 that a reciprocal lifting of the blockade and counter-restrictions could take place without agreement on postponement of a West German government, provided the date for a CFM meeting on Berlin and Germany was first agreed.

The final agreement was worked out in a series of meetings between Jessup and Malik during April and early May; this agreement covered the date for lifting of restrictions (May 12), the date for the CFM meeting (May 23), and other points. The question of Berlin currency was put on the CFM agenda. Nothing was said about postponing establishment of a West German government.

After a meeting which UK and French representatives also attended, the agreed communique was issued on May 4.

B. Conclusion

Stalin abandoned the blockade and his major conditions for lifting it because it had been broken by the air lift and was not serving its purposes. It had not driven the Western Allies out of Berlin or checked their reorganization of West Germany, and the Western counter-restrictions were hurting East Germany.

But whether Stalin's statement of January 30 was intended as a signal to the West that the Soviet Government had abandoned its previous conditions and accepted the Western terms is not clear. Soviet representatives apparently were not instructed to call Western diplomats' attention to the "non-accidental" omission of the currency question from the January 30 statement. The Soviets took a month to reply to Jessup's query. They decided to abandon insistence on "postponement" of the West German state only in the course of conversations during April.

Thus, it is quite possible that the Soviet position was still not fully developed when Stalin spoke on January 30; that it evolved further in the following months under the pressure of events and of US probing; and that the Soviets' final agreement to raise the blockade might have come later than it did, had not the US engaged in its probing and pushing tactics between January 30 and May 4.

II. The Korean Armistice, 1951

A. The Facts

As Korean fighting continued during the latter half of 1950, there were no serious negotiations on a cease-fire, although the UN Security Council was on record from the very start (June 25) as calling for one, and the General Assembly (Dec. 15) set up a three-man Cease Fire Group to explore with the UN Command and the Communist side the possibilities of arranging a cease-fire. The Communist governments refused to have anything to do with this "illegal committee".

The US, meanwhile, had taken a decision (Dec. 11) that it should support a cease-fire if terms could be negotiated which did not place the UN forces at a military disadvantage or involve political concessions.

The following months saw several moves. The US informed the Chicom government through Sweden (Dec. 22-27) that, once a cease-fire had been effected, there would be no objection to withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea under UN supervision. A UN Good Offices Committee, set up by an Assembly resolution of Feb. 1, 1951, and also using the Swedish government as a channel, tried to find out Communist China's wishes. India made similar approaches. None of these efforts got a favorable answer. Some got no answer at all.

The US, in mid-March, considered a direct appeal to North Korea, but this was abandoned in the face of evidence that the North Korean regime was not acting independently.

North Korea gave the first signal of a willingness on the Communist side to negotiate when, on April 15, 1951, its Foreign Minister wrote to the UN Secretary General drawing attention to a resolution adopted at a session of the Communist-sponsored World Peace Council at its Feb. 21-26 meeting in East Berlin; the resolution had suggested an immediate conference of all the parties concerned with the Korean conflict and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea.

At the UN the Soviets gave some encouragement to the move, but Communist China took no notice of it, and the Good Offices Committee decided against following it up.

Meanwhile the US, at the suggestion of George Kennan, decided to pursue the matter with the Soviet Union. On April 3 the Department instructed Ambassador-at-Large Jessup and Minister Bohlen in Paris to sound out a member of the Soviet delegation then taking part in the Four Power Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting. In talks with Vladimir Semenov (April 5 and 21) Bohlen got no encouragement, but Semenov said the matter should be taken up with Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko. The Department did not authorize talks with Gromyko.

Meanwhile, Malik had indicated--in answer to an informal question by Ernest Gross at a UN reception on April 5--that the USSR was interested in a peaceful solution in Korea.

Later, on May 3, Malik suggested in a conversation with two USUN officers that the US and USSR might reach a settlement through discussion, possibly at the Deputy Foreign Minister level in Paris. The Department then instructed Thomas Cory of USUN to draw Malik out, but

Malik was unavailable. At this point the Department asked George Kennan (then at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton) to try to set up talks with Soviet representatives in New York. He wrote (May 26) to Deputy Representative Tsarapkin whom he knew, and as a result had two long talks with Malik (May 31 and June 5) on Long Island. By the second meeting, Malik obviously had received instructions. The Soviet Union, he said, wanted a peaceful solution at the earliest possible moment. The US should therefore get in touch with the North Koreans and Chicoms.

Malik then put the Soviet position on the public record in a broadcast for a weekly UN radio program on June 23. He said that the Soviet people believed the problem of the war in Korea could be settled and that, as a first step, discussions should be started between the belligerents, looking to a cease-fire and an armistice providing for mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel.

On instructions, Ambassador Kirk asked Gromyko on June 27 for elaboration of Malik's remarks. Gromyko confirmed them, adding that the armistice negotiations should be limited to military matters and conducted by the military representatives of the two sides. Malik later told Gross (June 29) that Gromyko's remarks were all the Soviet government was prepared to say at the time.

The US then authorized General Ridgway to broadcast to the Communist commanders an invitation to talks on a cease-fire. The invitation, issued on June 29, was answered on June 2, and the first meeting was held at Kaesong on July 10.

B. Conclusion

From the record of this entire episode, it appears that the first signal from the Communist side was Malik's oral statement, in answer to Gross' query, on April 6, 1951. It came after a series of earlier US, UN and other attempts to find an opening for negotiation had failed. It came also just as a particularly intensive US effort was getting under way to open a direct channel to the Soviets on the subject.

As in the case of the Berlin blockade, the first Soviet signal was not loud and clear. It did not seem to be a deliberate attempt by the Soviet Government to get negotiations going. One month passed between Malik's first remark and his suggestion for US-Soviet discussions; then another month passed before his more specific statements to Kennan on June 5; and two more weeks elapsed before the US knew that this was the position of the Soviet Government.

During that entire period the US was probing and prodding to get a clear statement of Soviet intentions and terms; it is a matter for conjecture whether this probing and prodding hastened Soviet decisions. The crucial factor was obviously the battlefield situation, but the impact of this situation on developments may have been speeded by US diplomacy.

See file

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Thursday, June 13, 1968
12:00 noon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Mac Bundy just called concerning the East-West Center on the problems of advanced societies which you helped stimulate in your talk with Kosygin at Glassboro and on which he has been working. He said that the British had issued invitations and the Russians had accepted. Gvishiani, Kosygin's son-in-law, will represent the Soviet Union. The meeting will be at Sussex University in England next week. In addition to Mac himself, the U. S. delegation will consist of R. J. Miller of the Ford company, Carl Kayser, and a man named Howard Raiffa of the Harvard Business School. Mac commented that their willingness to attend, after the article reported in today's New York Times, is somewhat hypocritical. But we should live with that hypocrisy and do the business that we can do with them.

They plan to avoid publicity. But if publicity occurs, it will be left in U. K. hands.

He noted that the credit lies with the President; but that fact will have to emerge with the passage of time, since we are playing it low key and via the British at this stage.

He concluded by sending his warm regards; noted that traffic around the Ford Foundation building was clogged up yesterday by our arrival but in a very good cause. He urged that you stop in at the Ford Foundation on one of your helicopter trips to New York.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 4-24-01

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

87

June 13, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith General Taylor acutely identifies certain ambiguities or-~~even~~-possible contradictions in our message to Kosygin.

I shall make it available to Secretary Rusk.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

June 13, 1968

87a
Pres file

Mr. President:

You may be interested in getting the impressions of one who has just seen your letter of June 11 to Kossygin and has not had the advantage of the extended discussions which, I am sure, attended its formulation.

I am struck primarily by two features of the letter. First, there is the clear warning that the continuing attacks on Saigon and its civilian population may become "intolerable" and that we may have to consider a change in our policy of unilateral restraint. It would seem to imply that an end to these attacks would be a condition for further restraints on our bombing but this point is not made clear elsewhere in the text.

The second point about the letter which impresses me is the contradictory language indicating the conditions under which we will completely cease the bombing. It seems to me that we express our conditions in several similar but significantly different ways. We will cease the bombing

- a. "if we know it will lead to the de-escalation of the war."
- b. if there is "a decision by DRV not to take advantage of this cessation."
- c. if we are relieved of concern "about the position of our troops and allied forces in South Viet-Nam and the safety of the civilian population."
- d. if we "know the steps the DRV will take toward further de-escalation of the violence."
- e. if the Soviets give us private precise assurances that there will be "no adverse consequences to our own and allied forces as a result of a bombing cessation."

Although the letter does not undertake to define what degree of escalation we would consider adequate to compensate for a complete cessation, I assume that it implies a level of violence at least below present levels (condition a and d). "Not to take advantage," on the other hand, may be interpreted as meaning no increase of violence or of infiltration above present levels, in which case the status quo would meet our condition b. Condition c would seem to call for a very considerable reduction in the level of violence if

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we are to be freed from concern both for our forces and for the civilian population. However, condition e, which since mentioned last would seem to summarize our position, notably omits reference to the safety of the civilian population and asks only for the status quo of military violence.

As to the action required from the other side prior to our cessation, I understand that we will accept a statement either from the DRV or from the USSR.

I am raising these points without knowing to what extent the vagueness and ambiguity in certain passages have been deliberate. Whatever the advantages (which I do not perceive) of such drafting, it offers the recipient the opportunity to respond favorably to a composite made up of the elements of several passages most favorable to his case.

M. D. T.

88

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Thursday, June 13, 1968
10:25 a. m.

Mr. President:

You should note that no rockets
or mortars fell on Saigon itself in
the past 24 hours.

They attacked military base camps.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 10j, NARA, Date 6-30-92

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~~SECRET NOFORN~~ CITE [REDACTED] (ADVANCE)
REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DI SSEM
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 13 JUNE 1968
SUBJECT SITUATION REPORT AS OF 1800 HOURS
LOCAL TIME.

Ristor

ACQ 25X1A
VIETNAM, SAIGON (13 JUNE 1968) FIELD NO.

SOURCE THIS IS A VIETNAM SITUATION REPORT PREPARED
AT 1800 HOURS LOCAL TIME ON 13 JUNE 1968

1. THE PAST 24 HOURS HAVE BEEN EXCEPTIONALLY QUIET IN
SAIGON. NO MORTARS OR ROCKETS HAVE FALLEN WITHIN THE CONFINES
OF THE CITY AND NO VIET CONG ACTIVITY HAS BEEN REPORTED
FROM ANY OF SAIGON'S NINE PRECINCTS. [REDACTED]

25X1A

2. AT 0350 HOURS 13 JUNE APPROXIMATELY 20 82MM MORTAR
ROUNDS FELL ON THE ARVN AMMO DUMP AT TRAN THANH DU BASE CAMP,
GO VAP DISTRICT, GIA DINH PROVINCE (ABOUT TWO KILOMETERS FROM
TAN SON NHUT AIR BASE). NUMEROUS EXPLOSIONS AND FIRES WERE
TRIGGERED. [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A 3. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CINCPAC
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GP-1 25X1A
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Authority NLJ-019-036-001/6
By JC : NARA, Date 4-24-01

89

ACTION

Thursday, June 13, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter of thanks to the Vietnamese Parliamentary Delegation *free file*

The delegation of Vietnamese parliamentarians who were here in May brought with them as a gift for you an ivory statuette. They had planned to present it to you during their appointment on May 13. In fact, you were out of town and that appointment was cancelled. They left the gift for transmission to you through the Vietnamese Embassy here.

The statuette is about two feet tall and is an elaborately carved depiction of a Vietnamese sage. My office is holding the statuette and we will forward it to the gift section unless you wish to see it.

The delegation has inquired of our Saigon Embassy about your reaction to the gift. For that reason, and particularly to make up for their great disappointment at not meeting you, State suggests that you approve the attached letter of thanks.

The unusual address form is necessary because the Delegation was never able to agree upon a head man -- and, in fact, bickered about it repeatedly. We don't want your thank you note to stir them up again.

I recommend that you sign the letter.

W. W. Rostow

Att

MWright:wpt

89a

June 13, 1968

Dear Friends:

I regret that my absence from the city prevented my meeting with you during your stay in Washington. Vice President Humphrey and Secretary Rusk have informed me in detail of their meetings with you, and I am glad that your visit to the United States went so well.

I am grateful for your handsome gift. The ivory figurine of a classic scholar symbolizes to me the learning for which Vietnamese civilization is renowned. I will prize it not only for its beauty, but as a welcome reminder of your visit to the United States as representatives of the National Assembly of Vietnam.

Sincerely,

The Vietnamese Parliamentary
Delegation
The National Assembly
Saigon, Vietnam

LBJ:MW right:wpt

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 13, 1968

Mr. President:

Pres file

SUBJECT: The Likelihood of More French-Style Eruptions

In the last week of May, Secretary Rusk cabled nearly a score of Ambassadors in key capitals and sought their personal assessment of the likelihood of outbreaks of crisis in those nations.

Herewith a summary of those appraisals together with capsule versions (attached) of the reports from a dozen capitals:

- Ethiopia -- Widening dissatisfaction and increasing violence cause serious concern. Succession problem.
- Germany -- Student violence increases. But students lack worker or farmer support. Population is largely conservative. Any polarization would help the far Right.
- Great Britain -- The Trade Union Congress offers channels for labor grievances. The National Student Congress thus far has acted with moderation. Stability is probable barring an economic crisis.
- Greece -- Despite important undercurrent of dissatisfaction with military regime, worker and student eruptions are unlikely.
- India -- Deep cleavages grow toward possible major upheavals. Expectations are frustrated because of sluggish job opportunities despite educational advances.
- Ivory Coast -- Many fissures in society. Biggest problem is what effect France will have on this dependent state.
- Japan -- Domestic dissatisfactions are being contained. International, especially anti-American, issues will be more difficult to control. Major uprisings are unlikely in the short run.
- Morocco -- Explosions are unlikely. Workers and students are divided and remember the brutal crushing of 1965's riots.
- Pakistan -- In state of arrested turbulence and faced with a succession problem, the outlook is one of growing instability. Our aid identifies us with the Establishment. We may be able to nudge the Government into contact with elements outside. Sporadic mass violence can be expected.

- Peru -- Students are led by Peking-line Communists. No unity exists between students and workers. Concern grows for the masses. No present danger of violent overthrow yet short-run is less hopeful.
- Spain -- Workers and students are split. Succession problem. Franco is not pressing hard. A French repeat is unlikely.
- Tunisia -- Major disturbances are unlikely. The Government is in control.

General Comments:

So far 1968 has witnessed outbreaks of student violence in about 25 nations -- including ours. Many of the world's leading observers are turning their attention to the study of these phenomena.

-- Quantitative data and factual indicators are few in the face of assertions, value judgments and speculations -- and many of the latter support contrary conclusions.

-- Examinations of possible causes are largely tentative but focus on such deeply significant influences on modern living as:

- the impact of technology;
- the potential (or lack of it) for reform of institutions;
- the tensions of changing from oligarchic to more broadly based rule of society;
- the desire -- increasingly militant -- of persons to share or participate in the shaping of their own destiny;
- the stimulus of seeking affluence for those who do not yet have it.

-- For over a decade the nations of the world have undergone a diffusion of power from simple East-West power blocs to a more complex polythetic set of arrangements. In many respects, this diffusion of power phenomenon is now percolating within national societies.

-- Our foreign affairs agencies are paying more attention to observing -- hopefully, anticipating; and ideally, influencing -- these phenomena.

W. W. R.

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ETHIOPIA

- The primary issue is the widened gap between the nation's youth and the Establishment: the Emperor and his close advisors.
 - . Youth criticisms include passivity of the Emperor, heavy security spending aimed at political repression, lack of economic development, failure to give youth its political voice, corruption, and (by leftists) closeness to the "imperial West," particularly the U. S.
- While possibly exaggerated, this critique has a substantial basis and is causing concern at many levels of social and political life.
 - . Some nationalists believe the "security vs. development" issue poses a situation that threatens to get out of hand unless the government dramatically reorients efforts toward development.
 - . The government, while preoccupied with the issue, has so far failed to show it is prepared to take fundamental steps to solve underlying problems promptly.
 - . Student violence has provoked considerable rethinking by individual Ethiopians, with young nationalists realizing that it is no longer sufficient to "wait until the old man goes" before reforming government.
- Added to the socio-economic problem is the realization that Communists have already gained much weight in student circles.
- While it is unlikely that basic reforms can be made until the regime is changed, it is certain that there will be increasing pressures for programs which will go part way to meeting youth demands for economic development, attempts to involve students and youths in national development problems, weaken their emotional attachment to Marxism, and give them an understanding of the Ethiopian situation.
- Part of the student unrest involves academic problems, but recent visitors from American campuses have been able to offer little advice or guidance to alleviate dissatisfactions.
- The U. S. should promptly step up its active concern with the present splits in Ethiopian society in such areas as AID, youth, cultural and information programs.

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GERMANY

- While there has been definitely more instability, the balance is likely to remain on the side of stability.
 - . Student unrest was serious before the French development, and there are many similarities with other western countries.
 - . Unlike France, there have not been significant responses from workers, farmers and other elements of German society.
 - . Even the shooting of student leader Dutschke has not provoked a violent response; rather, the reaction to the students has been strongly negative.
- Behind this reaction are these pertinent characteristics:
 - . Historically, revolutions from below have never succeeded, although this need not remain so.
 - . If polarization of political life between the extreme right and the extreme left were to occur, the extreme right would stand to gain.
 - . Socially, there is less tension than in other western countries, although educational defects are as bad.
 - . Housing, pay and social welfare coverage are adequate to good -- but an economic recession could quickly change this placid atmosphere.
 - . Governmental institutions operate satisfactorily, with the federal system and frequent local elections providing an outlet for popular feelings.
 - . The unified trade union movement lessens competition among competing unions to outbid each other.
- Meanwhile, the cleavage between the leadership of the Social Democratic Party and grass roots members presents a serious crisis.
 - . The lower levels are restive over the leadership's commitment to the continuation of the present coalition with the Christian Democratic Union, and intensification of this crisis could create a vacuum on the left and an opening for radicalism.
- Two other specific attitudes are operating against a repetition of the French example:
 - . Conservatism of the German workers, and widespread hostility toward the students.
 - . The fact that Germany is divided tends to have an inhibitive effect on resort to violence because of a fear that major weakness in the Federal republic could be exploited by the Communists.

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 4-12-00

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90c

- Great Britain has serious problems, but conditions do not now exist for an explosion similar to the events in Paris.
 - . The public is discouraged and disappointed; the Labor Government is in serious difficulty due to the sterling devaluation, the unwillingness to admit failure in maintaining parity, and the struggle with the unions over compulsory income policy.
 - . The Conservatives have failed to capitalize on this, but public criticism is on the rise.
 - . Separatist movements in Scotland and Wales have gained impetus.
- Underlying problems include an unwillingness fully to face up to the fundamental change in Britain's reduced world role, the economic and financial malaise, and the newly surfacing race problem which adds threats of violence to a sense of guilt.
- Despite these problems, there are good reasons for doubting that Great Britain will undergo the Paris experience.
 - . The government is sensitive to public reaction.
 - . The press and TV are honest, competitive and influential.
 - . British youth have generated a pop culture that has swept young Europe and offered opportunities for expression and advancement.
 - . Traditions of stability and civic consciousness are deeper than those of France.
 - . British police are a special positive factor in role, image, effectiveness and attitude.
- The stresses of the economic situation have not yet hit the mass public hard.
 - . Student-worker interaction is very different from that prevailing in France with British emphasis on strictly educational issues.
 - . Astute handling of controversial issues has enabled the national union of students to prevent the leftists and smaller radical student alliances from gaining control of the student government.
 - . And though economic strains are alienating and frustrating sections of the labor movement, the United Trade Unions Congress still offers an effective way to protest.
 - . Traditional labor distrust of "college boys" contrasts with French intellectual-worker agreement on revolutionary myths and Marxists slogans.
- The overall outlook for the next few years in Britain depends upon the achievement of economic growth and the creation of some sense of national purpose and the handling of the race issue.

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GREECE

90d

- Important undercurrents of disaffection continue to exist despite quietude currently imposed by military "establishment".
 - . Student passivity goes beyond subjection of dictatorship, involves family ties, personal career ambitions (as contrasted to wider social conscience) and upper-middle-class status.
- Despite disgruntlements and potential agitation by former establishment--palace, press and politicians--worker and student eruptions are unlikely in near future.
- Long-run question is whether military-based establishment will perceive need to move fast and far enough to keep disaffections below danger levels.

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- Cleavage between the establishment and those on the outside is sharp and apparently growing.
 - . Youth, particularly urban, is in the vanguard of opposition.
- Principal factor seems to be disparity between expectations aroused by advances in education and relatively sluggish economic job opportunities.
 - . Also, there is the factor of pervasive disillusionment as India's freedom struggle fades and present leaders' high-sounding pronouncements are contrasted with blatant maneuvering for political power.
- Present leaders lack the lustre of Gandhi and Nehru, and idealistic youth considers older generation "establishment" to be power-hungry, incompetent and venal.
- With modernizing trends in education, economic development, communications and the agricultural revolution, many backward groups are challenging traditional concepts of class, caste and community.
 - . This challenge is being resisted by those who have benefitted from the status quo.
- In spite of these disaffections, several factors militate against early challenge to the establishment --such as that in France.
 - . Included are traditional respect for elders, inexperience and disorganization of student movements, and lack of cohesion with organized workers and labor unions.
- While traditionalism and static elements of society weigh against sudden upheaval by India's widely dispersed disaffected groups, economic progress will breed discontent among those not benefitting by it.
 - . Student disenchantment is likely to grow in view of changes student power has wrought in other countries.
- Traditionalism may provide India time enough to head off the kinds of troubles being experienced elsewhere and bring forth the required leadership for peaceful transition, but this is not assured.
 - . Unless the government can pace opportunity with the awakening of demands and make a reality of India's constitutional guarantees of equality of opportunity for the masses of Indians, a very severe upheaval someday will come.
 - . How soon is difficult to judge, but it does not now seem in immediate prospect.

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IVORY COAST

- In Black Africa contrasts are so great and modern institutions so fragile that the possibility of serious breakdown has been evident since the beginning of modernization.
- The Ivory Coast has so far been spared the disturbances which have occurred in many other African countries, but it has both internal and external vulnerabilities which could lead to serious trouble.
 - . The major division in society lies in the confrontation of the prehistoric system of village life with the rival establishment of the modernizing elite.
 - . Both the young and the older members of this elite have a common purpose, nourished daily by visible progress, in seeking the complete transformation of the old establishment.
- Serious problems could develop:
 - . If the elite's national purpose were frustrated.
 - . If the political system could not solve the problem of a successor to Houphouet.
 - . If Africanization fails.
 - . If the economy suffers reverses.
 - . Society could split along various fissures including African vs. Europeans, Ivorians vs. foreign African, advanced South vs. backward North and generation vs. generation.
- The Ivory Coast leadership is aware that given their dependence on France, their biggest problem at present is the possible effect of adverse developments there.

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 NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
 By K, NARA, Date 4-24-01

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JAPAN

- There are many surface manifestations of unrest in Japan but there are enough differences from the French situation to warrant a cautious hope that at least in the short run, forces of disaffection will be contained and an explosion avoided.
 - . The Japanese social structure remains tight, disciplined and group-oriented and operates largely by consensus.
 - . Strong national leadership is still an anathema and there is no De Gaulle.
 - . Thus protests do occur and have in fact become almost an accepted and normal channel of pressure upon the government.
 - . The Japanese police forces are experienced and capable and could be reinforced by the Self-Defense Force in the event of major trouble.
 - . These forces support the view that major uprisings are not likely to occur in Japan in the short run.
- It is hard to foresee issues arising in the domestic field which could command unified attention of Japan's diverse competing groups.
- To date, the issues that have most successfully captured widespread and unified attention have been international in character and have linked together the Japanese Government, the U.S. and the possibilities of war involving Japan.
- Various groups might coalesce in their opposition to being dragged into hostilities on the U.S. coattails.
 - . This would deeply affect relations with the U.S. but would avoid a widespread domestic uprising.

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MOROCCO

90h

- Serious outbreak of student unrest is unlikely.
 - . None occurred when French disturbances were at their height.
 - . Current examination schedules also weigh against disturbances.
 - . University students are concentrated away from the economic and political capital of the country.
 - . Workers are concentrated in Casablanca, making coordination between student and worker groups difficult.
- The principal labor union, UMT, has been restless since the arrest of its leader, Mahjoub Ben Seddik, almost a year ago.
 - . Nevertheless, UMT leadership is moderate and cautious and unlikely to take violent initiative, having been quiet during French strike.
 - . If trouble should break out elsewhere, however, UMT could be expected to join in.
- Meanwhile, the majority of Moroccans, the rural population, are engaged in harvesting the best grain crop in their history and have little time for political matters.
- The Government's reaction to any student or labor unrest is certain to be prompt and probably effective.
 - . The Prime Minister has said the Government is fully prepared for any incident that might arise as a result of the Paris turmoil of the June anniversary of the Middle East war.
 - . Students and workers, remembering the brutal crushing of the rioting in Casablanca in March 1965, realize that the Government will not tolerate any serious threat to public order.

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PERU

90 i

- Peruvian students have considered themselves at odds with the Establishment since the 1920's.
 - . Most student organizations are controlled by Peking Communists.
- The effectiveness of student dissatisfaction has been diluted by security efforts, student involvement in some genuine reform programs, lack of leadership, and splintering of reform groups.
 - . The crushing of insurgency in Peru as well as neighboring Bolivia has dampened revolutionary ardor.
 - . Moreover, the students still tend to return to conservative patterns in their post-campus years.
- There is no significant unity of action between students and workers.
 - . The Indian masses remain politically inert.
- Although students remain unimpressed and unsatisfied with the government's record on real reforms, there is at present no clear danger of student unrest that would precipitate an overthrow of painfully established democratic institutions.
- The view for the short run is less hopeful.
 - . Educational fund cuts, a rapidly growing number of university students, and diminishing possibilities that the economy can satisfy their aspirations plus the fact that more and more of these students are bred in urban slums add to the mounting of pressure for change.
 - . Repercussions will affect the young intellectual and middle classes who also are becoming activists for change.
 - . In this perspective the curtailment of economic aid to Peru at this time poses new hazards and risks.

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By pc, NARA, Date 4-24-01

90j

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PAKISTAN

- Politically, socially and ideologically Pakistan is in a state of arrested turbulence.
 - . There is prospect of growing political instability centering around Ayub's succession and followed perhaps in the 1970s by increasing unrest and demagoguery.
 - . Dominant groups are united by vested interests and family ties in a relatively small and tightly-knit establishment.
 - . Today, there is increasing awareness among the educated, the youth and even the lower classes of the existing economic inequities, social immobilism and political oppression.
- The establishment seems to feel that for the time being, traditional family discipline and governmental coercion can stem the tide of dissidence until the benefits of modernization are apparent to all.
 - . This may be true for the short run, but the outlook is for a continuation of sporadic outbursts of mass violence over the coming years.
 - . Ayub is firm, pragmatic and aloof, commanding respect but not affection, and, like De Gaulle, may be in danger of being caught between maintaining power and coping with change.
- The nascent "alternative leadership" symbolized by former Foreign Minister Bhutto is stirring discontent and could steer toward increasing confrontations with the establishment.
- Economic development and technological advance are benefitting the industrialists and landowners more rapidly than workers and peasants.
 - . Corruption and awareness of corruption grows, including in the university admission and examination system.
 - . Students and other groups have developed a tradition of demonstrating in numerous confrontations with authority, but important limiting factors are underdeveloped political and trade union opposition.
- The U.S., through its aid, is identified with the establishment -- a dilemma which could exist for a long time.
 - . But, with imagination and firmness we may be better able to nudge the Government into constructive political and social development and reach out to elements outside the establishment.
 - . The U.S. must remain aware of the regime's hypersensitivity and of the difficulties of making contact with the diffuse, non-English-speaking and often radical, emerging leadership.

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 By jc, NARA, Date 4-24-01

90k

- A replay of the Paris experience is considered unlikely in Spain at the present time.
 - . The political groundwork necessary for such a protest has not been established.
 - . It is conceivable that the introduction of new elements such as the death of Franco or his loss of powers could spark an outburst.
- Spanish scrutiny of the events in Paris includes a variety of perspectives:
 - . Proximity, danger of infiltration of men and radical ideas across the frontier, psychological contagion among students and young intellectuals.
 - . The prospect that Spanish workers in France may have to return home thus adding to present unemployment pressures; apprehension concerning the sale of goods to France.
 - . The loss of those tourists who must pass through France to get to Spain.
- De Gaulle's ordeal has brought mixed reactions ranging from feeling of satisfaction about the comeuppance to respect for his ability to turn the tide and regain control.
 - . The incorporation of left-wing elements in De Gaulle's own group has raised fears of the possibility of a communist-controlled nuclear power on Spain's northern frontier.
 - . There is some speculation on French economic ability to afford continuation of her nuclear arms effort.
 - . Discussion of whether De Gaulle had outlived his usefulness and the parallel this might have in Spain has caused the government to suspend one daily newspaper in reprisal.
- Neither arousal nor anger has peaked in Spain's students.
 - . At Madrid University, students now put up banners insulting Franco, but examinations are near and they do not wish to risk losing the credit hours contingent with strike or closure.
- Workers fear loss of jobs as a result of demonstrations.
 - . These fears have been heightened by selective arrests of worker commission leaders.
 - . Workers distrust the students, whom they regard as sons of the rich who play at being radical without taking the risk to livelihood inherent in labor strikes.
- The Spanish authorities feel that the Spanish pot may simmer but will not boil over and that the pressure will be considerably reduced by October.
- Some officials believe that the tactic of a lax response contributed to the Paris explosion and that Franco is incurring risks by tending to let the situation drift in Spain.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jcl/m, NARA, Date 5-1-01

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906
TUNISIA

- Events in France are having minimal effect in Tunisia except for a small, but highly vocal and critical minority of university students.
 - . It is considered unlikely there would be large-scale demonstrations.
 - . Strong measures were taken by the Government of Tunisia against the University of Tunis last March.
 - . The policy of dealing severely with disturbances, coupled with leniency and forgiveness to the less militant offenders, seems to have been effective.
- Security forces in Tunis are believed to be completely loyal to the Government.
- The Trade Union (UGTT) is completely integrated into the party structure and it is unlikely that they would institute strike action.
- The only other group likely to exploit disturbances would be a small Communist group, but they are closely watched by security forces and not considered dangerous.
- There are no French military units stationed in Tunisia.
 - . Two French teachers in Tunis gave up efforts to organize a sympathy strike when threatened with removal from their positions by the Government of Tunisia and the French Embassy.
- The principal effect of strikes has been on Tunisian exports which they have been unable to unload at French ports and consequently have spoiled.
 - . Net loss of exports has been estimated at \$2 million.
 - . The situation could get much worse, however, if the French strikes continue.
 - . Delay in implementation of a recent \$8.4 million French Commodity Loan Agreement will also affect the economy if the strikes continue.
 - . Tourism has not yet been affected.

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By jc, NARA, Date 4-24-01

UNCLASSIFIED

June 13, 1968

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Walt Rostow

L. S. [unclear]
2. Pres file

I recommend you approve the following farewell message to be sent to the Shah just before he leaves New York Monday:

"Mrs. Johnson and I were delighted to have you with us again. Your visits are always a source of strength and encouragement to us.

"I hope your other stops in the United States have confirmed that we are only two of many Americans who understand and appreciate what you are doing for your people. Your contacts with an increasingly broad range of Americans seem to me a happy preview of the whole network of relationships that will grow quickly from now on between our economies and peoples. These will be a great source of satisfaction and enrichment for us all.

"As you return to Iran, I hope you will take with you to all the talented men and women who work with you for Iran's growth word of our deep admiration and encouragement. Perhaps your greatest achievement has been your success in capturing their abilities and enthusiasm for the great work you have set for yourself.

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White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By AG, NARA, Date 8-19-92

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

"You leave with us the warmth of our friendship and
take with you our prayers for a safe journey and for your
continued success."

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

*6/15/68 - Larry Temple telephoned
from Couch*

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RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 JUN 13 23 08

68 JUN 13 PM 7:14

THURSDAY

EEA634
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2231

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81278

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By jc, NARA, Date 4-24-01

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JUNE 13, 1968

YOU WILL WISH, I BELIEVE, TO GET THE FLAVOR OF KIESINGER ON THE MEANING OF THE EAST GERMAN VISA MOVE. COUNTERMEASURES NOT YET DECIDED.

Profile

BONN 13232

SUBJ: MEETING WITH THE CHANCELLOR ON BERLIN ACCESS

1. SUMMARY: DURING A MEETING WITH THE THREE ALLIED AMBASSADORS THIS AFTERNOON, CHANCELLOR KIESINGER TERMED THE EAST GERMAN MEASURES ON PASSPORTS AND VISAS A STEP IN A LONG-PREPARED PLAN AIMED AT A GRADUAL WEAKENING OF THE STATUS OF BERLIN AND AT THE FRG. THE SOVIET UNION CLEARLY STANDS BEHIND THE MEASURES AND IS SEEKING TO ISOLATE THE FRG AND TO DIVIDE IT FROM ITS ALLIES. THE NEW EAST GERMAN MEASURES ARE NOT AIMED ONLY AT BERLIN AND THE FRG HOWEVER BUT ALSO AT THE THREE POWERS. THE CHANCELLOR FELT THAT THE ASSESSMENT OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THIS DEVELOPMENT PROVIDED IN BQD-CC-28 WAS CORRECT. AS SUGGESTED IN THAT DOCUMENT COUNTERMEASURES ARE REQUIRED AND NOT JUST PROTESTS. THE CHANCELLOR URGED AS A FIRST STEP THAT THE TRIPARTITE PUBLIC STATEMENT BE ISSUED BY THE THREE GOVERNMENTS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD NOT REACHED DECISIONS ON SPECIFIC COUNTERMEASURES WHICH THE GERMAN AND ALLIED SIDES SHOULD UNDERTAKE. THIS SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF CLOSE QUADRIPARTITE CONSULTATION. HE WOULD WELCOME DEMARCHES BY THE THREE FOREIGN MINS WITH THE RESPECTIVE SOV AMBASSADORS. THE THREE AMBASSADORS EXPRESSED ON A PERSONAL BASIS GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE CHANCELLOR'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AND SAID THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WOULD WISH TO CONSULT CLOSELY IN ORDER TO FIND THE RIGHT RESPONSE TO THE EAST GERMAN STEPS. END SUMMARY.

1. CHANCELLOR KIESINGER MET WITH THE THREE WESTERN AMBASSADORS FOR AN HOUR THIS AFTERNOON TO DISCUSS THE EAST GERMAN PASSPORT AND VISA REQUIREMENTS. ALSO PRESENT ON THE GERMAN SIDE WERE STATE SECS CARSTENS, GUTENBERG AND DUCKWITZ. THE CHANCELLOR FIRST SAID THAT HE WOULD GO TO BERLIN TOMORROW TO MEET WITH GOVERNING MAYOR SCHUETZ FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION. HE WILL NOT FOLLOW SCHUETZ'S SUGGESTION THAT HE TAKE PART IN A SENATE MEETING SINCE HE DOES NOT WISH TO PROVIDE THE EAST GERMANS WITH ANY PRETEXT FOR CLAIMING THAT THE FRG IS SEEKING TO INTERVENE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF WEST BERLIN. HE THOUGHT THAT UNDER THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THE POPULATION OF WEST GERMANY AND OF BERLIN CONSIDERS HIS VISIT NECESSARY.

2. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT IN HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEW THE EAST GERMAN MOVE IS A STEP IN A LONG-PREPARED PLAN THAT IS AIMED AT A GRADUAL WEAKENING OF THE STATUS OF BERLIN AND AT THE FRG. THE SOVIETS DO NOT WISH A REAL BERLIN CRISIS AND ACTUAL TRAVEL TO BERLIN WILL PROBABLY NOT IMMEDIATELY BE AFFECTED. THE DANGEROUS THING HOWEVER, IS THAT THE EAST GERMANS HAVE CREATED AN INSTRUMENT WHICH CAN BE USED AT ANY TIME IN THE FUTURE TO INTERFERE WITH ACCESS.

3. THE CHANCELLOR REFERRED TO THE QUADRIPARTITE DOCUMENT BQD-CC-28 AND SAID THAT THE ASSESSMENT CONTAINED THEREIN OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE INTRODUCTION OF A VISA REQUIREMENT WAS CORRECT. THE FRG BELIEVES THAT THE EAST GERMAN MEASURES ARE AIMED NOT ONLY AT THE FRG BUT ALSO AT THE THREE POWERS. HE FELT THAT "NOT JUST PROTESTS BUT COUNTERMEASURES ARE NEEDED", IF POSSIBLE AS CONTEMPLATED IN THE BQD.

4. WHAT MAKES THE PRESENT EAST GERMAN MOVE MORE SERIOUS, KIESINGER STATED, IS THAT THEY MARK A CLEAR ESCALATION. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE USSR STANDS BEHIND THE EAST GERMAN REGIME. IT IS TRYING MORE AND MORE TO ISOLATE THE FRG AND DIVIDE IT FROM ITS ALLIES. THE SOVS ARE SEEKING "PERMANENT RIGHT OF INTERVENTION IN THE FRG", THEY WILL NOT ACCEPT THE VERY SINCERE FRG POLICY OF SEEKING A RELAXATION OF TENSION. INSTEAD, THEY INTEND "TO FORCE US TO OUR KNEES" AND THEY NATURALLY SEEK TO USE BERLIN FOR THIS PURPOSE AS THE MOST EXPOSED POINT. THE SOV APPROACH TO THE FRG IS SO BLUNT AS TO BE ACTUALLY DISARMING AS WHEN, FOR EXAMPLE, THEY INSIST PUBLICLY THAT THE FRG MUST SIGN THE NPT AND THAT THE FRG SIGNATURE IS THE ONLY ONE OF INTEREST TO THEM.

5. THE TIME HAS COME TO MAKE THE SOVS REALIZE, KIESINGER SAID, THAT THEY CANNOT THROUGH AN INDEFINITE CONTINUATION OF SALAMI TACTICS FORCE THE FRG TO ACCEPT SOV POSITIONS. "MY REQUEST", THE CHANCELLOR SAID, "IS THAT THE ALLIES, AS FORESEEN IN THE BQD, TAKE A VERY CLEAR POSITION AGAINST THE EAST GERMAN MOVES." THIS IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF THE GERMAN POPULATION IN GERMANY'S ALLIES. THE GERMAN PEOPLE WILL EXPECT A VERY CLEAR POSITION BOTH FROM THE FRG AND THE THREE POWERS "IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE OVERALL POLITICAL SITUATION". THE CHANCELLOR REALIZED HOW DIFFICULT PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH BERLIN WERE AND HOW NECESSARY IT IS TO PROCEED WITH CAUTION AND REALISM. A BALANCE IS REQUIRED IN FINDING THE RIGHT RESPONSE BUT THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF BQD-CC-28 ARE RIGHT.

6. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT THIS WAS A PRELIMINARY PRESENTATION OF THE GERMAN VIEWS WHICH WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY WRITTEN PAPERS SPELLING OUT THE GERMAN POSITION IN GREATER DETAIL. HE URGED THAT IN THE MEANTIME THE THREE GOVERNMENTS ISSUE AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE THE PROPOSED TRIPARTITE STATEMENT. THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET ISSUED A FORMAL STATEMENT AND WOULD DO SO ONLY AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE ALLIES. THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE FRG PRESS SPOKESMAN YESTERDAY AND TODAY WERE "IMPROMPTU".

7. THE THREE AMBASSADORS EXPRESSED, ON A PERSONAL BASIS, GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE CHANCELLOR'S ASSESSMENT AND INDICATED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WOULD WISH TO WORK IN CLOSE CONSULTATION, AS THE CHANCELLOR HAD SUGGESTED, IN FINDING THE RIGHT RESPONSE TO THE EAST GERMAN MOVE. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS OF THE OPINION THAT THE PASSPORT AND VISA REQUIREMENT COULD NOT BE LEFT UNANSWERED. AMBASSADOR LODGE SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED THE EAST GERMAN MOVE A MATTER OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE. HE HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE CHANCELLOR'S MENTION OF COUNTER MEASURES AND ASKED IF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD ANY SPECIFIC IDEAS. THE CHANCELLOR REPLIED THAT THEY HAVE NOT YET CONSIDERED WHAT MEASURES CAN APPROPRIATELY BE TAKEN BY THE FRG AND THE ALLIES.

8. AMBASSADOR LODGE ALSO NOTED THAT BQD-CC-28 FORESEES THE POSSIBILITY OF THE THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS AND THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT MAKING APPROPRIATE DEMARCHES TO SOVIET AMBASSADORS OR IN THE GERMAN CASE TO EAST GERMAN TRADE REPS. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THAT HE WOULD WELCOME AN INITIATIVE BY THE THREE FOMMINS WITH THE RESPECTIVE SOVIET AMBASSADORS IN ORDER TO EXPRESS SERIOUS CONCERN OVER DEVELOPMENTS. THE CHANCELLOR WAS NOT YET SURE THAT HE WOULD CALL IN SOVIET AMBASSADOR ZARAPKIN RIGHT NOW SINCE HE CONSIDERED IT IN THE FIRST INSTANCE BETTER FOR THE THREE ALLIES TO APPROACH THE SOVS GIVEN THE FACT THAT IT WAS A FOUR POWER AGREEMENT WHICH HAS BEEN VIOLATED. AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME HE WOULD, OF COURSE, MAKE THE FRG'S VIEWS KNOWN TO ZARAPKIN.

9. OUR COMMENTS FOLLOW BY SEPTEL. LODGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THURSDAY

pre file

EEA681
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2230

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81277

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUNE 13, 1968

SUBJECT: TEX GOLDSCHMIDT'S REQUEST FOR AN APPOINTMENT

YOU REMEMBER THAT LAST WEEK TEX GOLDSCHMIDT REQUESTED AN APPOINTMENT WITH YOU ON A PERSONAL AND INFORMAL BASIS. TEX FULLY UNDERSTOOD -- PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION -- THAT AN APPOINTMENT COULD NOT BE WORKED OUT BEFORE HIS ALMOST IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE FOR EUROPE.

HE DID ASK THAT THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS BE PRESENTED TO YOU:

-- THERE IS A MULTIPLIER FACTOR IN OUR UNDP CONTRIBUTION WHICH MAKES IT MORE CRUCIAL, IN HIS VIEW, THAN OUR BILATERAL AID. THERE IS NOT ONLY THE 60 PERCENT CONTRIBUTION OF OTHER DONOR COUNTRIES (AS AGAINST OUR 40 PERCENT), BUT ALSO THE MATCHING CONTRIBUTION OF THE HOST COUNTRY.

-- OUR WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT UNDP IS EXTREMELY VISIBLE IN NEW YORK. CUT-BACKS WOULD CAUSE REPERCUSSIONS AROUND THE WORLD.

WHAT TEX HOPES IS THAT YOU MIGHT BE WILLING TO GET SOME WORD TO CHAIRMAN MAHON THAT YOU HAVE A PERSONAL INTEREST IN CHAPTER III (UNDP). AND HAVE BAREFOOT SANDERS EXPRESS SOME INTEREST TO ANDY BIEMILLER, THE AFL-CIO LOBBYIST. TEX BELIEVES BIEMILLER WOULD WORK MUCH HARDER THAN HE IS PRESENTLY DOING FOR UNDP IF HE GOT SOME WORD.

TEX EMPHASIZED THIS IS A STRICTLY PERSONAL, PRIVATE AND UNOFFICIAL APPEAL. HE REALIZES -- WHICH IS TRUE -- THAT BILL GAUD AND OTHERS IN AID AND STATE PLACE A LOWER PRIORITY ON THIS ITEM THAN HE DOES.

DTG 132132Z JUN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 190
By *rg*, NARA, Date 8-19-92

CONFIDENTIAL
THURSDAY
JUN 13 PM 6:54
Profile

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1968 JUN 13 22 42

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81279

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUNE 13, 1968

SUBJECT: SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER GORTON

YOU TOLD GORTON OF OUR CONCERN WITH COMMUNIST USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY FOR PREPARATION OF AN OFFENSIVE IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS OF SOUTH VIETNAM. AS A RESULT, GORTON HAD HIS AMBASSADOR IN PHNOM PENH CONVEY OUR CONCERN TO THE CAMBODIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, STRESSING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF PRIME MINISTER GORTON.

GORTON HAS NOW ASKED "WHETHER THE PRESIDENT IS AWARE OF THIS ACTION." OBVIOUSLY, HE WANTS YOU TO KNOW OF HIS INITIATIVE, AND MAY ALSO BE ENCOURAGING A CONTINUING DIALOGUE BETWEEN YOU.

WE HAVE PREPARED A MESSAGE FROM YOU TO GORTON WHICH THANKS HIM FOR THE INITIATIVE, PROVIDES SOME MORE RECENT INFORMATION ABOUT COMMUNIST USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY, AND EXPRESSES YOUR APPRECIATION FOR THE AUSTRALIAN'S HELP IN CONNECTION WITH TWO AMERICAN PRISONERS RECENTLY RELEASED BY PRINCE SIKANOUK. THE TEXT OF THE SUGGESTED MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: IT WAS VERY GOOD OF YOU TO HAVE AMBASSADOR DESCHAMPS RAISE WITH CAMBODIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PHURISSAPA THE POINTS THAT YOU AND I DISCUSSED WHEN YOU WERE HERE ABOUT OUR CONCERN THAT CAMBODIAN TERRITORY IS AGAIN BEING USED TO STAGE AN OFFENSIVE IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-178
By sj, NARA Date 7-25-01

I NOTE THAT PRINCE PHURISSARA CLAIMED "STRENUOUS EFFORTS ARE NOW BEING MADE TO ELIMINATE ANY FOREIGN PRESENCE" FROM PATANAKIRI PROVINCE. HOWEVER, IT IS OUR DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT SIGNIFICANT PARTS OF THAT PROVINCE ARE NOW EFFECTIVELY REMOVED FROM CAMBODIAN CONTROL AND THAT THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE THE MEANS EVEN TO INFORM ITSELF ON WHAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE DOING THERE. STILL, THE DECLARED INTENTION TO ELIMINATE ANY FOREIGN COMMUNIST PRESENCE IS OF SOME USE, AND I AM GRATIFIED THAT YOUR INITIATIVE MANAGED TO ELICIT IT.

AS AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT IS CURRENTLY HAPPENING IN THE TRI-BORDER AREA, YOU MAY HAVE HEARD FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND THAT ON JUNE 1, ONE OF OUR FIRE BASES CLOSE TO THE CAMBODIAN BORDER IN THAT AREA RECEIVED 33 ROUNDS FROM 100 MM ARTILLERY EMPLACED INSIDE CAMBODIA; A LANDING ZONE NEARBY RECEIVED ADDITIONAL ROUNDS; AND AIRCRAFT FLYING INSIDE SOUTH VIETNAM RECEIVED ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE FROM THE SAME AREA INSIDE CAMBODIA. OUR FORCES REPLIED WITH ARTILLERY FIRE AND AIR STRIKES AND OBSERVED A NUMBER OF SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AND FIRES. WE ARE INFORMING THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT OF THAT INCIDENT.

MAY I TAKE THIS OCCASION, MR. PRIME MINISTER, ALSO TO THANK YOU MOST EARNESTLY FOR THE EFFORTS MADE BY THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY IN PHNOM PENH ON BEHALF OF THE TWO AMERICAN SOLDIERS IMPRISONED THERE UNTIL RECENTLY. YOUR EMBASSY SHOWED AN INITIATIVE AND A COMPASSIONATE INTEREST IN THEIR WELFARE FAR BEYOND THE REQUIREMENTS OF FORMAL REPRESENTATION. I AM DEEPLY GRATEFUL. SINCERELY,
LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

I RECOMMEND YOU APPROVE THE MESSAGE.

AGRO APPROVE -----

DISAPPROVE -----

CALL ME -----

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 132132Z JUN 68

Pres file

June 13, 1968

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk recommends you see King Faisal's brother, the Crown Prince, for half an hour while he is here in late June and early July.

He is not as strong a figure as Faisal, but he's intelligent and fully prepared to talk substance. Given Arab concern over our position on an Arab-Israel settlement, I share Secretary Rusk's view that you could do a great deal in a short talk to help reassure Faisal.

W. W. R.

I'll see him ✓
No _____
Call me _____

6/15/68 - Larry Temple telephoned Mr Rostow (from Rouch)

JS - Jan Jensen notified.

Crown Prince will be here June 26, 1968 and 1-2-3 July 1968.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

95a
June 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Saudi Crown Prince

Recommendation:

I recommend that you receive Saudi Crown Prince Khalid Ibn Abd al-Aziz for a half-hour meeting during his upcoming visit to the United States during the latter part of June.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The Prince is King Faisal's brother and is coming here primarily for a medical checkup which has been arranged for him at the Bethesda Naval Hospital. Khalid is slated to succeed King Faisal, is intimately involved in the Saudi establishment and is privy to the inner councils of Saudi thinking. His views on the state of relations between our two countries and about Arab-U. S. ties generally can be instructive, particularly since they will come from someone who is well disposed toward us but who nevertheless can be expected to convey a valid impression of wider Arab sentiments.

Our stake in Saudi Arabia is high. One of the means left to us to preserve our troubled relationship with the Arab area is through just such opportunities as his visit affords. Your personal attention in receiving him would be most helpful in manifesting our continued desire for cordial relations with the moderate Arab states.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

work

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~~TOP SECRET~~

June 14, 1968

Message
2 Pres file

Mr. President:

In the attached, Secretary Nitze requests your authorization to make appropriate arrangements with the Canadian government for renewal for FY-1969 of the present authorization for SAC overflights of Canada. During periods of increased tension, this would permit, at the direction of the JCS and with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, a maximum of daily overflights of Canada. The airborne routes

3.3(b)(5)

This request has been concurred in by the Department of State which believes that the renewal authorization can probably be negotiated with Canada without difficulty.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment
Nitze memo 6/8

Approve

Disapprove

Call me

SMKeeny:jb:6-14-68/5:15p
bcc: SMK file and chrono ~~TOP SECRET~~
WWR (2)
SMK comeback cy

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 01-181
By cbm, NARA, Date 9-7-04



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

8 JUN 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Strategic Air Command Airborne Alert Program for FY 1969

3.3(b)(5) Although indoctrination training flights [redacted] have been suspended, we believe that the Strategic Air Command should maintain emergency plans and procedures for implementing useful levels of airborne alert [redacted] during periods of increased tension. A modified airborne alert procedure, called the Selective Employment - Air/Ground Alert (SEAGA), has been developed by the Strategic Air Command and will become effective on July 1, 1968. As has always been the case for increased airborne alert in times of tension, the SEAGA airborne flights [redacted] would be implemented only at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with the approval of the Secretary of Defense.

3.3(b)(5) Your authorization to make appropriate arrangements through the Department of State with the Canadian Government for renewal of the SAC overflight authorization for FY 1969 is requested. Arrangements for a maximum of [redacted] overflights daily [redacted] would accommodate the implementation of the SEAGA arrangement.

3.3(b)(5),(6) As indicated by the attachment, the SEAGA airborne routes [redacted]

This memorandum is concurred in by the Department of State.

Paul H. Wiza

Attachment
SEAGA Routes

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOB AND 2200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

APPROVED:
SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 01-182
By ebm, NARA, Date 8-31-04


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~~TOP SECRET~~

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