

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

189

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Rostow to President, 7 p.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-134 9.21.98</i> S 1 p [Dupl # 154, 155, JN Agency File Vol 10]	6/25/68	A
#1a memo	Goldberg to President and Secretary S 1 p <i>open 6-6-01</i>	6/24/68	A
#1b memo	Goldberg to President and Secretary S 9 p <i>open 10/24/01 NLJ 01-224</i>	6/23/68	A
#3 memo	Rostow to President, 6:45 p.m. <del>S 1 p</del> <i>OPEN 5.25.03 NW/RAC 01-178</i> <del>[Sanitized NLJ/CBS 21]</del>	6/25/68	A
#3a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>open RAC 11/09</i> <del>S 1 p</del> [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 21]	6/25/68	A
#4 memo	Rostow to President, 6:35 p.m. <i>open 10/6/01 NLJ 01-220</i> S 1 p	6/25/68	A
#4a memo	Seaborg to President S- 2 p	5/29/68	A
#7a ltr	President to Pope Paul VI PCI 1 p	6/25/68	A
#8 memo	Rostow to President, 4:15 p.m. <i>Sanitized per RAC 6-6-01</i> TS- 1 p	6/25/68	A
#8a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>sanitized 12/13/01 NLJ/RAC 01-179</i> TS- 1 p	6/25/68	A
#8b memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>sanitized 12/13/01 NLJ/RAC 01-179</i> TS- 3 p	6/25/68	A
#8c memo	Intelligence Memorandum TS- 4 p <i>sanitized 12/14/02 per NLJ/RAC 01-179</i>	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 83, June 20-25, 1968 Box 36

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#8d memo	Intelligence Memorandum TS- 5 p <i>Digitized 12/4/02 per NSAAC 01-179</i>	undated	A
<del>#11a memo</del>	<del>Taylor to President</del> <i>open 8-12-93 NLJ 92-383</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #24a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "8I--Taylor Memos-General"]	<del>6/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#13 memo	Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m. <i>(dup # 91, NSF, CF, VN, Harvard/ Crocodile Indian Program Box 154)</i> S 1 p <i>open 6-6-01</i>	6/25/68	A
#13a memcon	Dobrynin and Harriman <i>dup #4/a as above)</i> S 4 p <i>open 6-6-01</i>	<del>6/22/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#14 memo	Rostow to President, 11:25 a.m. <i>open 10/21/01 NLJ 01-223</i> S 1 p	6/25/68	A
#14a cable	Paris 16906 S 1 p	6/24/68	A
#16 memo	Rostow to President, 10 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 6-6-01</i>	<del>6/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#16a cable	Managua 1932 S 1 p	6/25/68	A
#16b cable	San Jose 3022 S 1 p	6/25/68	A
#16c cable	Guatemala 5230 S 1 p	6/25/68	A
#16d cable	Tegucigalpa 3012 S 1 p	6/26/68	A
#16e cable	San Salvador 2152 S 2 p	6/26/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#16f cable	Deptel Circular S 1 p	undated	A
#17 memo	Rostow to President, 9:30 a.m. (dup # 92, NSF, CF, Vietnam <sup>Harrison/Crosswell</sup> S 1 p <sub>Indian Proposal Box 134</sub> <sup>6/25/68</sup> <sub>open 6-6-01</sub>	6/25/68	A
#17a cable	Paris 16928 <sup>dup # 92 to Wallace</sup> S 2 p	6/24/68	A
#18a cable	Reykjavik 251131Z TS 1 p	6/25/68	A
#18b cable	Reykjavik 250110Z TS 1 p	6/25/68	A
#20 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p [Duplicate of #213, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. X; Exempt NLJ 84-181]	6/25/68	A
#21a cable	Santiago 4187 C 2 p <sup>open 7-28-94 NLJ 94-15</sup> [Duplicate in NSF, Country File, Chile, Vol. 5]	6/24/68	A
#22 memo	Rostow to President, 7 p.m. TS 1 p <sup>open 3-25-03 NW/RAC 01-178</sup>	6/24/68	A
#22a cable	Intelligence Cable <sup>exempt RAC 5/03</sup> S- 1 p	6/24/68	A
#22b cable	Intelligence Cable <sup>semi RAC 7/05</sup> TS- 2 p	undated	A
#22c rpt	Intelligence Report <sup>semi RAC 3/04</sup> S- 1 p	6/27/68	A
#24b ltr	Pope Paul VI to President PCI 2 p <sup>open 6-6-01</sup>	6/5/68	A
#25 memo	Rostow to President (dup # 92, NSF, CF, VN <sup>Harrison/Crosswell</sup> <sub>Box 134</sub> <sup>Indian Proposal</sup> ) PCI 2 p	6/24/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#25a cable	Paris 16929 <i>open 6-16-98 RAC</i> S <del>1 p</del> [Dup. # 93, NSF, CF, VN, "HARWAN, VI." BX117] <i>dup #92d as above</i>	<del>6/24/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#26 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 10/24/01 NLJ 01-223</i> C <del>2 p</del>	6/24/68	A
#29 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 6-6-01</i> S <del>1 p</del>	6/24/68	A
#32a memo	Foster to Rostow. <i>(dup #25a, NSF, Country file, Middle East vol. 2 Box 104)</i> S <del>1 p</del> <i>open 10/24/01 NLJ 01-223</i>	6/24/68	A
#33a memo	Taylor to President <i>open 8-12-93 NLJ 92-383</i> S <del>3 p</del> [Duplicate of #25b, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "8I--Taylor Memos-General"]	<del>6/24/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#36a cable	Saigon 30844 <i>open per RAC 6-6-01</i> S <del>5 p</del>	6/24/68	A
#37 memo	Rostow to President, 8:40 a.m. C <del>2 p</del> <i>open 6-6-01</i>	6/24/68	A
#38 memo	Rostow to President, 8:20 a.m. S <del>1 p</del> <i>OPEN 3-25-03 NW/RAC 01-175</i>	6/24/68	A
#38a rpt <i>EXUMPA 6-6-03 NLJ/RAC 03117</i>	Intelligence Report S- 1 p	6/23/68	A
#39 memo	Rostow to President, 7:45 a.m. <i>sanitized 10/24/01 NLJ 01-223</i> S 1 p	6/24/68	A
#39a cable	Paris 16851 S 1 p	6/22/68	A
#39b cable	Paris 16850 S 1 p	6/22/68	A
#39c cable	Paris 16849 S 1 p	6/22/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#40a ltr	W. Bundy to Rostow C 1 p <i>open 6-6-01</i>	6/23/68	A
#41a cable	Deptel to Paris S 3 p	6/68	A
#41b cable	Deptel to Paris S 7 p	6/22/68	A
#42a cable	Deptel to Paris S 6 p	6/21/68	A
#43 memo	Rostow to President, 3 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 10/24/01 NLS 01-223</i>	6/22/68	A
#43a cable	Deptel 188934 to Paris S 4 p <i>open 6-16-98 RAC</i> [Dup # 59, NSF, CF, VN, "HAKUAN, VI." Bx117]	6/22/68	A
#44 memo	Rostow to President, 12:55 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 6-6-01</i>	6/22/68	A
#44a cable	Intelligence Cable S 5 p <i>open 3-16-05 NW/PAC 01-180</i>	6/22/68	A
#45a cable	USUN 5711 C 2 p <i>open 7-7-99 NLS 97-131</i> [Duplicate of #31a, NSF, Subject File, "Law of the Sea Conference"] [Dupl # 158a UN Agency File #110]	6/21/68	A
#46 memo	Rostow to President, 12:50 p.m. TS 1 p	6/22/68	A
#46a memo	Clifford to President TS 1 p <i>open 12-15-95 NLS 94-408</i> [Dup # 69, Pages of Clifford, Corson. w/Pres. Box 10]	6/21/68	A
#46b memo	Wheeler to President TS 4 p <i>open 7-27-04 NW 01-222</i>	6/17/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#46c rpt	"Enclosure" TS <del>2 p</del> <i>OPEN 7-27-09 NW 01-222</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#46d rpt	"The Views of the Secretary of Defense..." TS <del>2 p</del> <i>OPEN 7-27-09 NW 01-222</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#47c rpt	"Appendix" S 7 p	undated	A
#49 memo	Rostow to President, noon <del>C 1 p</del> <i>open 6-6-01</i>	<del>6/22/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#49a cable	Paris 16745 <i>open 12-14-10 NW/RAC 10-213 (#149a)</i> <del>C 1 p</del> <i>[Camp. # 149a, NSF, CS "France, Vol. 13"]</i>	<del>6/21/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#50 memo	Rostow to President, 11:45 a.m. <i>open 6-6-01</i> S <del>2 p</del> [Duplicate of #10a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C (11) General Military Activity"]	<del>6/22/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#50b cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>sanitized 6/18/02 NSF 01-221</i> S 8 p [Duplicate of #10b, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C (11) General Military Activity"]	6/21/68	A
#51 memo	Rostow to President, 8:30 a.m. TS <del>1 p</del> <i>OPEN 3-25-03 NW/RAC 01-178</i>	<del>6/22/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#52 memo	Rostow to President, 8:25 a.m. TS <del>1 p</del> <i>OPEN 3-25-03 NW/RAC 01-178</i>	<del>6/22/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#52a cable <i>exempt 6-6-03 NW/RAC 03-117</i>	Intelligence Cable TS- 1 p	6/21/68	A
#53 memo	Rostow to President, 7:30 p.m. S <del>2 p</del> <i>open RAC 4/9/98</i>	<del>6/21/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#54 memo	Rostow to President, 7 p.m. S <del>1 p</del> <i>open 6-6-01</i>	<del>6/21/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#56 memo	Rostow to President, 9:15 a.m. <i>open RAC 4/9/98</i> S <del>2 p</del> [Duplicate of #12, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C (11) General Military Activity"]	6/21/68	<del>A</del>
#56a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 2 p [Duplicate of #12a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C (11) General Military Activity"]	6/20/68	A
#56b cable	Intelligence Cable S 2 p [Duplicate of #12c, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C (11) General Military Activity"]	6/20/68	A
#56c memo	Ginsburgh to Rostow <i>open 5/9/02 NLJ 01-223</i> TS <del>3 p</del> [Duplicate of #12e, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C (11) General Military Activity"]	6/20/68	<del>A</del>
#56d rpt	Intelligence Report <i>san: RAC 5/03</i> TS- 1 p	6/20/68	A
<del>#56e rpt</del>	<del>Intelligence Report</del> <i>upon per RAC 12-8-17</i> <del>C 1 p</del> <del>[Duplicate of #12i, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C (11) General Military Activity"]</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#59 memo	Rostow to President, 8:30 a.m. <i>open 6-6-01</i> <del>C 2 p</del>	6/21/68	<del>A</del>
#60 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 6-6-01</i> <del>C 1 p</del> [Duplicate of #33, NSF, Subject File, "Law of the Sea Conference"]	6/21/68	<del>A</del>
#60a memo	Rusk to President C 3 p [Duplicate of #33a, NSF, Subject File, "Law of the Sea Conference"]	undated	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#62 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 3:45 p.m. open 5/28/03 TS 1 p</del>	<del>6/21/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#62a cable</del>	<del>Deptel to Saigon open 3/28/03 RAC 21999 TS 3 p</del>	<del>6/21/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#63 memo	Rostow to President, 3:05 p.m. S 1 p	6/21/68	A
<del>#63a cable</del>	<del>Saigon 30631 open per RAC 6-6-01 S 5 p</del>	<del>6/21/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#64 memo	Rostow to President, 1 p.m. exempt RAC 9/00 TS- 1 p	6/21/68	A
#64a memo	Intelligence Memorandum exempt RAC 9/00 TS- 2 p	6/21/68	A
#64b ltr	Intelligence Memorandum exempt RAC 9/00 TS- 1 p	5/22/68	A
#64c memo	Intelligence Memorandum exempt RAC 9/00 TS- 2 p	6/20/68	A
<del>#66 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m. open 5/28/03 RAC 22006 TS 1 p</del>	<del>6/21/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#67 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 11:20 a.m. open 5/28/03 C 1 p</del>	<del>6/21/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#70 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 6:20 a.m. S 1 p open NY 019-036-2 (1/02)</del>	<del>6/20/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#78 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 11:15 a.m. S 2 p open RAC 4/98</del>	<del>6/20/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#78b memo</del>	<del>Taylor to Rostow open 5-16-95 NLS 94-27 S 1 p [Duplicate of #5a, Memos to the President, Vol. 82]</del>	<del>6/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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1079

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#80 memo	Rostow to President, 10:10 a.m. PCI 1 p [Duplicate of #29, NSF, Subject File, "Law of the Sea Conference"]	6/20/68	A
<del>#80a memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 7:20 p.m.</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>Open 11/05</i> [Duplicate of #2, Memos to the President, Vol. 82] [Duplicate of #29a, NSF, Subject File, "Law of the Sea Conference"]	6/19/68	A
<del>#80c rpt</del>	<del>"Arms Control and Ocean Floor"</del> <i>Open 11/05</i> <del>S 1 p</del> [Duplicate of #2b, Memos to the President, Vol. 82] [Duplicate of #29e, NSF, Subject File, "Law of the Sea Conference"]	undated	A
<del>#80d rpt</del>	<del>"Tab A"</del> <i>Open 11/05</i> <del>C 2 p</del> [Duplicate of #2c, Memos to the President, Vol. 82] [Duplicate of #29g, NSF, Subject File, "Law of the Sea Conference"]	undated	A
#82a memo	Saigon 30500 <i>Open 6-6-01</i> S 8 p [Duplicate of #13a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "8B (3)"; Sanitized-NLJ/CBS-10]	6/20/68	A

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Tuesday, June 25, 1968 -- 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Arthur Goldberg's plan for a U. S. initiative to break the impasse on the Middle East. You will wish to read it and consider it carefully, I am sure.

As you will note, page 9, Goldberg suggests that any such U. S. initiative should await the outcome of Jarring's talks in Europe. The effort Goldberg suggests would come to a head when the Foreign Ministers are in New York during the General Assembly meeting; although preliminary moves, if we go this route, would be required in August by way of preparation.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-134  
By isa, NARA Date 7-21-78

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla



UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA  
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

June 24, 1968

YUkon 6-2424

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY

As I leave my post I am submitting the attached memorandum on the Middle East - which is the principal unfinished business on the agenda of the United Nations. I have previously discussed the substance of the memorandum with Nick Katzenbach, George Ball, Joe Sisco and Luke Battle at a meeting in the Department. However, for security reasons, I am only sending copies of the memorandum to the President and the Secretary.

*Arthur J. Goldberg*  
Arthur J. Goldberg

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 5-29-01

1b

UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

June 23, 1968

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA  
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

YUkon 6-2424

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM TO: The President  
The Secretary of State

FROM: Ambassador Goldberg

SUBJECT: Middle East - Proposal for Breaking Present  
Impasse

Introduction

It has been suggested by the Secretary of State that it would be helpful if I would set forth in some detail my suggestions for breaking the present impasse in the Middle East. With this in mind, I would like to present my personal assessment of the difficulties which lie ahead and the course which we should follow to meet them.

Difficulties

It seems clear to me that the United Arab Republic, supported if not actively prompted by the USSR, is contemplating an early return of the Middle East problem to the Security Council, probably in July. In such a move, they would have the active support of Algeria, Pakistan, and Hungary; India would go along, as would France; and the Latin American members of the Council might well be susceptible to giving their support to such a move. Jordan and other Arab states would have to support the UAR if it initiated such a move.

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-224  
By SJ, NARA, Date 10-18-01

The aim, as I see it, would be to have the Council - either directly or through Jarring - lay down a time-table (or, to put it in other words, formulae or directives) for implementing stage by stage the various matters covered by the Security Council resolution of November 22. Under this scenario, the Security Council (either directly or through Jarring) would propose terms of settlement, and the Council itself would proceed to impose them upon the parties through an implementing resolution which the parties would be called upon to "accept". In this way, the Arabs would claim to be complying with the November 22 resolution call for "an accepted settlement". At the same time, they could claim to be acting in a manner which involves no violation of the Khartoum formula of "no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with it". (In this connection, it should be recalled that various Arab officials have pointed out that the Khartoum formula does not forbid "peace", only "peace treaties".)

As to the contents of a Security Council imposed settlement, it seems clear that the UAR--relying upon the principle in the November 22 resolution that there should be no territorial acquisition as a result of war--would seek first and foremost a directive that Israel withdraw to the pre-June 5 lines, which the Arabs would urge be declared by the Council and "accepted" by the parties as the secure and recognized boundaries envisaged in the November 22 resolution.

In addition, the Arabs would probably be willing to accept as elements of such an imposed settlement: (a) a Security Council call for the establishment of demilitarized zones, taking in territory of both Israel and its Arab neighbors (including Sharm el Sheikh); (b) a Security Council declaration that all states or claims of belligerency between all states in the area cannot be asserted or recognized; (c) a Security Council call upon each state in the area to recognize the sovereignty and right to exist of all other states in the area; (d) a Council call for the opening of the Tiran Straits and the Suez Canal to the shipping of all nations without discrimination; and (e) a Council directive that the refugee problem should be solved along the lines of past General Assembly resolutions.

In my view, this approach to a settlement--a settlement imposed upon the parties by a Council resolution--would have several basic flaws:

First, it would be unacceptable to Israel. As for the proposed substance of the settlement, Israel will not yield Jerusalem or the Gaza Strip; will not agree to the demilitarization of any part of Israel; and will not regard a Security Council resolution--even if "accepted" by the UAR--to be a guarantee of free passage through the Strait of Tiran and the Canal. In addition, Israel will, at the very minimum, insist upon some territorial adjustments for security reasons in its boundaries with Jordan and Syria. As for the proposed form of settlement, it too would be unacceptable, for Israel will insist upon some form of a signed agreement between itself and the Arab states. The Israelis regard this to be the sine qua non of an Arab commitment to a permanent settlement.

Second, past history demonstrates disregard by all parties for resolutions of the Council and the Assembly. For example: UAR disregard of the 1951 Council resolution on Suez and belligerency; Israeli disregard of Assembly resolutions on refugees; Arab disregard of the Assembly partition resolution; recent Israeli disregard of Assembly and Council resolutions on Jerusalem. This history proves that acceptance of a resolution by one party alone is not sufficient. And, as already pointed out, even if the Arabs were to accept a Council resolution imposing the terms of a settlement as outlined above, Israel would not.

Third, in the improbable event that all parties were to accept a Security Council imposed settlement, there would be no guarantee that all elements of the Council's resolution would be fully implemented. One or both sides could fall off; and the changing political composition of the Council gives no confidence that the Council would, in this event, be able even to reaffirm its implementing resolution, let alone do anything about its partial repudiation by one of the parties.

Fourth, an implementing resolution of the Council could be interpreted by the Arabs in such a way that their continued acceptance of some elements (specifically, free passage through the Canal and Tiran) could be linked to a final solution of the refugee problem--and conversely, by Israel, that withdrawal would be contingent upon one or more Arab actions.

My immediate conclusion from the foregoing is that we should try to avoid further Security Council action in the foreseeable future. Yet we will not be able to do this indefinitely, or perhaps even for long, unless progress can be made toward a political settlement. The critical question at this juncture is, therefore, how to proceed now.

#### Jarring Mission

Jarring's Mission, which we have been supporting, is now frustrated by his inability to get the parties into substantive discussions. The ideal step would be to get agreement between the parties on Rhodes-type negotiations under Jarring's auspices dealing with the substantive issues.

The Israelis, while publicly insisting on direct negotiations, have in the past stated to Jarring and to us that they would agree to this procedure. Lately, as a result of internal political pressures, the Israeli position seems to have hardened. Nevertheless, I believe that we could hold Israel to this past agreement. The Jordanians in the past have indicated a willingness to participate in such negotiations, but the UAR has been and remains unwilling; and it is doubtful Jordan will proceed in the face of UAR intransigence on this point. If this stalemate continues, as seems likely, Jarring will at some time later this summer have no alternative but to report the impasse to the Council, and the Council will have no alternative but to convene to consider his report.

U.S. Initiative to Break Impasse

I see no way of breaking this impasse except by a diplomatic initiative on our part in support of Jarring's effort for a substantive settlement.

Substance: We should formulate suggested terms for an overall settlement which would involve concessions on both sides but which would not require re-drawing the map of the Middle East so as to deprive or deny any nation in the area viability or security. First: In the case of the UAR, it would involve the return to the UAR of all UAR territory occupied during the June war. Gaza is not included in this category, since it is not and has never been UAR territory. Second: the Jordanian situation is much more difficult, but in principle it would involve the return of a demilitarized West Bank to Jordan except for boundary adjustments, such as the Latrun salient, which pose real security problems for Israel and which cannot be solved by the creation of demilitarized zones. Adjustments such as this, however, should be compensated for by Israeli agreement to give Jordan access to a port on the Mediterranean. Third: Jerusalem would remain, as it is now, one city under Israeli administration. However, Jordan would be afforded a permanent and guaranteed political and religious role through a Vatican-type arrangement which would embrace the Moslem holy sites and suitable surrounding areas, and a Jordanian corridor connecting the Jordanian enclave to Jordan. The Kalandia airport area would be returned to Jordan. No Jordanian military presence would be permitted in Jerusalem, but Jordan police presence would not be excluded from the Jordanian area. Fourth: The Sinai, including Sharm el Sheikh, and the West Bank would be demilitarized. (No mention is made of Syria because of its unwillingness to enter into any arrangement; this being the case, we must assume Israel will sit where it now is.) The Gaza Strip: this would go to Israel but would be demilitarized. The demilitarization of Gaza, Sinai, including Sharm el Sheikh, and

the West Bank would, ideally, be assured by United Nations supervision under an arrangement which would permit its withdrawal only by mutual agreement of the parties (i.e., including Israel). Realistically, however, it is difficult to conceive that Israel--in the light of its past experience--would agree to this. Perhaps the most realistic solution, if it can be sold as part of a package to the Arab states, would be to have the demilitarization of the West Bank ensured by joint Israeli-Jordan patrols, that of Sinai and Sharm el Sheikh by joint Israeli-UAR patrols, and that of Gaza by an Israeli contractual agreement. Fifth: The Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal will be open for Israeli flag ships, and this will be guaranteed by a contractual commitment by the UAR as hereafter described and by declarations in the Security Council by the permanent members, similar to the declarations made by the US, UK, and USSR with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty security assurances. Sixth: There should be a comprehensive and agreed upon plan for a final solution of the refugee problem, involving appropriate means of repatriation and compensation.

Method of Implementation: If we were successful in getting the agreement of the parties to the terms outlined above (or something similar), the end result would have to be a signed agreement between the parties.

This need not, however, be labeled a peace treaty. It could be similar in form to the 1956 Joint Declaration ending the state of war between the USSR and Japan. And it could be entitled something like "Joint Declaration, Made Pursuant to the Provisions of Resolution 242 of the Security Council, Concerning Withdrawal of Israeli Armed Forces, etc." (listing seriatim all issues covered by paragraphs 1 and 2 of the resolution). Such a Declaration could be recommended by Jarring and confirmed by the Security Council through a resolution calling upon the parties to sign the Declaration.

The end result, therefore, would be a contractual agreement between the parties. This should go far in satisfying Israeli demands for a contractual agreement and also help save Arab Face against a "peace treaty".

Securing Agreement

If we agree upon such an initiative, we should first sound out the Israelis by a high level approach to Eshkol and Eban. This should be a secret approach to them in Jerusalem. Agreement should be sought both as to substance and method. Specifically, the Israelis should be urged to agree to:

(a) flexibility about the means by which a final settlement is reached and the form of a final settlement (i.e., not insisting upon a peace treaty as such);

(b) limitation of their demands for territorial changes from the pre-June 5 lines to those outlined above.

As to the means for arriving at a settlement, we should secure Israeli agreement to engage in the first instance in indirect negotiations or contacts--i.e., an exchange of substantive views between themselves and the Arabs through ourselves and Jarring as intermediaries with a view to reaching agreement between the parties on all of the various issues involved in a settlement: withdrawal, secure and recognized boundaries, renunciation of belligerency, recognition by each state in the area of the sovereignty and right to exist of all other states in the area, guaranteed freedom of passage through Tiran and Suez, and a final settlement of the refugee problem.

While we could agree that Rhodes-type talks offer one possible modality for negotiations, we should remind Israel how very limited were the direct contacts at Rhodes (only two meetings--one at the beginning, the other at the end), and we should secure their agreement not to make this particular modality, or any other, a condition of their exchanging

substantive views. We could assure the Israelis that if substantive terms are agreed upon between Israel and the UAR and Jordan in secret discussions, a direct final meeting would necessarily take place and that other such meetings would not be excluded depending upon the progress of the talks.

I recognize that it will not be easy to get Israeli agreement to flexibility on means and moderation in territorial changes. I am convinced, however, that a carrot and stick approach will not be effective. On the contrary, I believe the approach most likely to be effective with the Israelis will be to go forward promptly with delivery of the Phantoms they are pressing for and the equipment Israel seeks for its proposed anti-infiltration line. I foresee three positive effects from going ahead in this way:

(a) the more reasonable and moderate elements within the Israeli Government will have very persuasive and concrete evidence that they are succeeding in getting actual physical means to protect and enhance Israeli security;

(b) by providing concrete proof of our own genuine concern with Israeli security, our hand will be strengthened in asking for Israeli agreement for flexibility on means toward a settlement and moderation in territorial changes;

(c) finally, this would have a salutary - i.e., inhibiting--effect on unrealistic thinking within Arab governments about another "military round" with Israel.

After Israeli agreement is obtained, we would then establish contact with the UAR and Jordan to seek Arab agreement. At this stage we might well enlist the British and even possibly the Soviets to use their influence to obtain Arab agreement.

Necessity for Complete Secrecy

If this proposal is to have any chance of success, complete secrecy will have to be preserved throughout the delicate and sensitive probings we will be making. Otherwise one or both parties will reject the initiative before it gets off the ground. Thus it is recommended that an emissary be sent first to Jerusalem to probe the Israeli reaction. This emissary should put forth the proposal in highly tentative form, carefully avoiding any aspect of an ultimatum looking toward an imposed settlement. If Israel responds affirmatively, the same or perhaps a different emissary should conduct a similar exploration with the UAR and Jordan. How to handle Jarring will be a matter of particular delicacy. Perhaps the best way would be to advise him that the U.S. will try to facilitate his effort to involve the parties in substantive discussions by conducting diplomatic soundings. He could be assured that our objective would be to have the substantive proposal emerge publicly through him.

Conclusion

We have confirmed intelligence that Jarring is meeting privately with Eban, Riad and Rifai during Jarring's "vacation" in Europe. Any U.S. initiative should await the outcome of these talks since the entire assumption of this proposal is that Jarring will not be able to break the present impasse. If Jarring reports continued lack of success, our initiative could then be put into play. Early success is not to be anticipated but we should point toward active consideration which hopefully might lead to deferment of any Security Council action this summer and enough progress so that after initial discussions in Jerusalem, Amman and Cairo, substantive discussions could be pursued with the Foreign Ministers in New York when the General Assembly convenes in September. (It is interesting that Rifai of Jordan is also thinking in these terms.)

2

**ACTION**

**Tuesday, June 25, 1968 -- 6:45 p.m.**

**Mr. President:**

**If it fits your convenience, I should like to take two weeks of leave early this summer: say, the last two weeks in July.**

**If you find it appropriate, I should like to take the family down to the Virgin Islands and make use of one of the government installations there. Harry McPherson has been good enough to establish that the Governor and his staff would not find that inconvenient at that time.**

**I am wholly conscious that the time may not be convenient to you and you may not judge it appropriate for us to use the Virgin Islands facility.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**Time okay\_\_\_\_\_**

**No\_\_\_\_\_**

**Call me\_\_\_\_\_**

**Virgin Islands okay\_\_\_\_\_**

**No\_\_\_\_\_**

**Call me\_\_\_\_\_**

**WWRostow:rla**

*[Faint handwritten notes and signatures at the bottom of the page]*

*Profile*

3

Tuesday, June 25, 1968  
6:45 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

New June infiltration is still running behind April and May.

We discovered today that 4 of the 23 June groups were going north, not south. Therefore, the figure is nearer 10,000 new infiltrators than 12,000 (about 500 per group).

There could still be a bulge in the intelligence towards the end of the month.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 01-178  
By ctm, NARA, Date 2-28-03

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

3a

SECRET SAVIN

June 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

The following is an extract from NSA's Daily Infiltration Summary.

A possible reduction in North Vietnamese Army personnel infiltration activity is reflected in rear services communications for the period June 1 - 21. A total of 23 new infiltration groups were observed in the pipeline during this time period. A comparison with corresponding periods in April and May is as follows:

April	-	34 new groups
May	-	35 new groups
June	-	23 new groups

  
Art McCafferty

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLS 141.022.008/2  
By jc, NARA, Date 11-2-09

SECRET SAVIN

*Pres file 4*

~~SECRET~~  
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

Tuesday, June 25, 1968 - 6:35 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In the attached letter, Chairman Seaborg, in response to a standing instruction from you, reports certain changes being planned in the National Nuclear Test Program, which is being revamped to give increased emphasis to determining the effects of high altitude, high yield nuclear detonations on strategic missiles and anti-ballistic missile systems. Such experiments cannot be performed satisfactorily underground, and the test program will be kept in a state of readiness to conduct these experiments in the atmosphere if a situation were to come about in which testing in the prohibited environments would be resumed. At the same time, Chairman Seaborg reports that improvements in underground techniques have made it possible to conduct development tests for low-yield nuclear devices and accordingly this portion of the standby atmospheric testing program is being reduced in priority and emphasis.

As a result of these changes being made in the test program, DoD and AEC have concurred in the cancellation of a full deployment overseas exercise scheduled and funded for FY 1969 and in the use of the funds provided for this exercise to further the development of a readiness capability to carry out the revised test program.

Chairman Seaborg reports that the AEC will inform the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the DoD will notify the Senate Committee on Armed Services of this proposed cancellation of the overseas exercise.

W. W. Rostow

Att: ltr to Pres. from Dr. Seaborg dated May 29 '68

WWR: CEJ:lw

Noted \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NJ 01-220  
By cbm, NARA, Date 12-4-01

~~SECRET~~ ~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

cc: Mr. Keeny

*Pres file*  
5

Tuesday, June 25, 1968  
6:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I had two major press contacts today.

1. William Beecher of the New York Times is going out again to Viet Nam. We reviewed mainly the military situation: possible impending attack on Saigon; casualty rates; effectiveness of bombing in the panhandle; etc. In addition, he is going to Korea, so we reviewed the situation there.

2. Joe Kraft came in. He raised what he had heard to be my displeasure at several of his columns. I told him that his information was correct. I did not expect a friendly press; but I said that he should have telephoned me for my view of the facts before he wrote. He accepted this in reasonably good grace.

He is going to Paris and wanted to know our view of the state of the negotiations. I told him that there was no movement of substance, but that it was possible in the weeks ahead that we would know whether we had a negotiation or a dry creek. He asked if the other side had raised the question of representation. I said that they had not and that this would be difficult for them because that would get them into substance before the bombing had stopped. We discussed also whether Hanoi was more likely to negotiate this year rather than in 1969. I said I could make an argument either way and simply did not know.

As he was leaving, Kraft said that he and a number of other serious newspapermen -- his own designation -- were troubled that the designation of so high a public figure as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court had been dealt with on an informal, rather than a formal, basis. I had no comment.

W. W. Reston

cc: George Christian

Tuesday, June 25, 1968 - 5:10pm

Pres file

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Wagner at 11:30 a. m.,  
Wednesday, June 26

Ambassador Wagner has just completed his consultations with Washington agencies and is leaving for Madrid on July 1.

Our relations with Spain have cooled in recent months because of U. S. unwillingness to support Spanish efforts to reclaim Gibraltar and because of the B-52 crash at Palomares.

The key issues in Spanish-American relations are:

- U. S. Bases - The Spanish want to revise the base agreement. They are asking for increased military assistance, a limitation on movement of U. S. forces in Spain to Gibraltar, and a new status of forces agreement. We believe they will also ask for a stronger U. S. security commitment to Spain.

Spanish economic and military teams have already been in Washington for preliminary negotiations. The Spanish Foreign Minister is scheduled to see Secretary Rusk here on July 8. We hope to conclude the negotiations before the present agreement expires on September 26, 1968.

- Gibraltar - We have maintained a position of strict non-involvement in the Spanish-UK dispute over Gibraltar.
- Economic Issues - The Spanish have attempted to link their request for a more favorable treatment under the U. S. balance of payments program to the base negotiations. We have turned them down on this but have agreed to hold regular high level consultations on general economic problems.

W. W. Rostow

  
MWG:mm

**ACTION**

7

**Tuesday, June 25, 1968  
5:05 p.m.**

*Pres file*

**Mr. President:**

**Herewith, as requested, a draft  
letter to His Holiness Pope Paul VI.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**WWRostow:rla**

INFORMATION

8  
Free file

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, June 25, 1968 -- 4:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

I have been fascinated for some time with reports that Hanoi might not be in such a great hurry to get U. S. forces out of Vietnam, when peace is made.

Herewith CIA responds ably to my request to assemble all Hanoi and NLF statements on this subject.

They do seem to indicate Hanoi may not be in a great hurry to have us implement the Manila Declaration:

- perhaps as a hedge against Chicom pressure;
- perhaps to have us there to make sure Communists aren't slaughtered.

I'm not sure; but it's quite interesting.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

SC No. 07260/68, cy No. 1, 25 June 1968 memo to Mr. Rostow from George C. Carver w/attachment: Memo SC No. 07259/68, cy No. 1, TOP SECRET TRINE [REDACTED]

WWRostow:rln

25X1A

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-141-022-8-3-3

SANTIZED

Authority RK-NLJ.141.022008/3

By jc., NARA, Date 5-20-01



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

8a

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: AUG 2001

25 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT : Communist Views on U.S. Presence  
in Vietnam

1. Per your request we have prepared the attached memorandum on Vietnamese Communist attitudes regarding a U.S. presence in Vietnam. The memorandum's two annexes recount actual North Vietnamese and NLF statements on this topic over the past three years.

2. The increased number of Vietnamese Communist comments on this point over the past month is almost certainly related to the fact that talks with the U.S. began in May.

[Redacted]

EO 12958 6.1(c)-25Yrs

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

Attachment: Memo [Redacted]

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(C)

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~~NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

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(C) [Redacted] Cy No. 1

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 01-179  
By obm, NARA, Date 12-4-01

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

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(C)

8b

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE: AUG 2001

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
25 June 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Vietnamese Communist Attitudes on a Phased  
Withdrawal of US Forces from South Vietnam

1. Since the opening of the Paris talks, the North Vietnamese have been holding out the prospect that they would accept a phased withdrawal of US troops from South Vietnam if they had a firm commitment that the US intended ultimately to disengage completely. Such hints have appeared with increasing frequency in private conversations between North Vietnamese and a wide variety of sources over the past two months.

2. This is not the first time that Hanoi has indicated that it is prepared to be flexible on troop withdrawal. The hints are now appearing at a rate, however, which suggests that the Communists wish to emphasize the subject. In contrast to the current initiative shown by the North Vietnamese in raising this issue, Communist leaders in the past offered such hints only on a very selected basis to questions from prominent westerners or to newsmen who were probing Communist demands for a political settlement. In those instances Hanoi spokesmen were making every effort to plead their cause effectively without spelling out North Vietnam's basic bargaining position. They have been, however, fairly consistent in maintaining that they would make the withdrawal process as easy as possible.

3. Since April of this year, Hanoi spokesmen have both taken the initiative and been more specific in hinting to a wide variety of sources that the Communists were prepared to accept a phased withdrawal of American troops which would last as long as several years. The earliest report of this nature came from a French Communist, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] who claims to have

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 01-179

By atm, NARA, Date 12-4-01

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(C)

talked to important but unidentified high-level North Vietnamese leaders. He told [redacted] that Hanoi was prepared to make concessions on the withdrawal issue, such as permitting the US to retain certain military bases in South Vietnam. He did not volunteer any time frame, but used the US base at Guantamamo, Cuba, as an example of the kind of arrangement the Vietnamese could live with.

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4. Another [redacted] reported [redacted] the North Vietnamese consul [redacted] had talked to his staff about Hanoi's position in the upcoming Paris peace talks and told them that the only concession that the North Vietnamese would make would be to allow some time for the withdrawal of the US "as was done in the case of the French." [redacted] a North Vietnamese propaganda official, [redacted] told his hosts privately that Hanoi intended to be flexible in the Paris talks. He gave as an example the fact that his country was prepared to see American withdrawal from South Vietnam accomplished in phases.

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5. Since the opening of the Paris talks, such comments have also come from sources close to the North Vietnamese negotiating team. Their chief western press contact, Wilfred Burchett, is quoted as saying on 26 May that the North Vietnamese would "in the end show themselves surprisingly accommodating." He was specifically talking about American "disengagement" from South Vietnam. Hanoi's diplomatic representative in Paris, Mai Van Bo, told [redacted] that if the US cannot leave Vietnam all at once, it can take a few years to complete the withdrawal. The US can close one base at a time, said Bo, and the timetable for departure and "similar problems" will raise no difficulty.

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6. The statements of Liberation Front officials on US troop withdrawal are generally in line with Hanoi's. Front spokesmen have consistently indicated on a selected basis [redacted] that the modalities of withdrawal were subject to negotiation. In recent months they, too, have

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been more specific and have discussed the issue in terms of phases and enclaves.

7. Annex A contains specific examples of earlier North Vietnamese statements on US troop withdrawals and Annex B cites examples of Liberation Front statements on the subject.

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DATE: OCT 2002

ANNEX A

Representative North Vietnamese Statements on US Troop Withdrawal from South Vietnam

1. [redacted] Aug 67 - [redacted] Conversation between [redacted] Ambassador [redacted] and North Vietnamese Ambassador [redacted] Aug 67.

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[redacted] stated that the time of the withdrawal of the American troops was not a decisive question. In this connection, he pointed to the agreement on the withdrawal of the French troops.

2. [redacted] Aug 67 [redacted]

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A pro-Communist [redacted] who was in Hanoi for three years [redacted] claims that in late April 1967 Nguyen Duy Trinh said peace talks could only be entertained if the US and its allies withdrew from Vietnam or announced a set date before which such a withdrawal would be completed.

3. [redacted] July 67

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A reliable [redacted] reports that DRV press officer in Paris [redacted] said "There are a great many intermediary solutions between the extremes of total US victory and total US withdrawal and anything is negotiable except the bombing of North Vietnam."

4. [redacted]  
[redacted] June 67, Tran Ngoc Kha told [redacted] ambassador [redacted] "What we want is the final unification of the Vietnamese people. We are fully aware of the fact that this will take time. North Vietnam is not demanding the immediate withdrawal of US

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By is, NARA, Date 11-27-02

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~~TOP SECRET~~

forces, but the withdrawal of US forces after the conclusion of peace negotiations and within an "appropriate period of time."

- 5. June 67 Debriefing of [redacted] correspondent in Hanoi.

On the basis of his eight months in Hanoi and conversations with DRV officials [redacted] believes that Hanoi is prepared to make concessions on details (of a settlement)-- such as timing of US troop withdrawal.

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- 6. [redacted] July 67 Pham Van Dong [redacted]

Ending the war for us has two meanings: an end to the bombings and a withdrawal of US forces. We like the formula of President de Gaulle. Some US troops would have to stay until the end of the process of political settlement. We do not want to humiliate the US.

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- 7. [redacted] Aug 66 [redacted] During [redacted] June 66 visit of [redacted] Para 1:

.. "Hanoi officials told [redacted] that in the event of negotiations on the Vietnam crisis NVN would not demand immediate unification, establishment of Socialist system in SVN, immediate withdrawal of US troops from SVN, or SVN severance of relations with third countries."

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- 8. [redacted]

Source is [redacted] Member of a Western Communist party who was in Hanoi in [redacted] 1966 and had meeting with [redacted] public relations officer of Foreign Ministry and head of liaison committee of Lao Dong Party. Dien made fol point:

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A. "The Vietnamese condition that Americans must withdraw would be satisfied if they merely made an overt step towards withdrawal to indicate a genuine intention to withdraw in due course."

9. [redacted] May 65. Mai Van Bo [redacted]  
[redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
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"..When asked if Hanoi recognized that realization of its proposed Principle of Withdrawal of American forces would depend upon the conclusions of a negotiation, Bo responded exactly and indicated that if there were agreement on bases, the ways and means of application of principles would be found and in peaceful manner; possibilities were many; a way out should be found for us; Our suggestion humiliates no one."

10. [redacted] [redacted]

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[redacted] Mai Van Bo.  
[redacted]

"Bo said that various approaches and means to negotiate remain open. He said the question of the withdrawal of American troops is open for discussion."

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[redacted] [redacted]  
[redacted] Mai Van Bo, [redacted] Dec 65.  
[redacted]

Bo acknowledged both US and Hanoi would have a "face-saving" problem. He gave "impression" that Hanoi would contemplate some de-escalation during preliminary peace talk meetings; with a full cease-fire at time of formal conference. When questioned about the continued presence of US forces during negotiations, he gave no clear response but did not contradict the proposition that US forces would remain at least through preliminary talks. He continued at intervals to repeat that "modalities are negotiable."

A-3

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs<sup>12</sup>.  
(C)

[redacted] MEMO OF  
[redacted] Sec Rusk dinner for Rumanian  
Foreign Minister Manescu, 14 Oct 65.  
[redacted]

"The Rumanians, according to Manescu, have had some contacts with Hanoi. Since Hanoi is no longer insisting on withdrawal of American forces from SVN as a prerequisite to negotiations, it is unfortunate that US cannot consider a bomb halt."

A-4

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ANNEX B

Representative Liberation Front Statements on US  
Troop Withdrawal from South Vietnam

1.

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(C)

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]  
Apr 68 [redacted]

"Hieu stated that the NFLSV would negotiate only with the Americans and only to determine the terms (1) of an American military withdrawal from Vietnam and (2) the recognition of the NFLSV ...the principle of withdrawal is not negotiable. The NFLSV is, however, ready to negotiate the terms of such a withdrawal (timing, etc.)..."

2.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
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[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]  
May 68 [redacted]

"The end of the present situation will come in three phases...The first...unconditional halting of the bombing of North; second...participation of the NFLSV in the negotiations...A cease-fire will probably come in this phase, with the withdrawal of US forces, possibly into enclaves; the third phase will consist of the formation in South Vietnam of a provisional government."

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NLJ/RAC 01-179  
By me, NARA, Date 11-27-02

B-1

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

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(C)

[Redacted] [Redacted]  
[Redacted] Oct 67  
[Redacted] [Redacted]

"The Front representative in Prague, Ha Van Lam,...when asked to clarify what was meant by 'complete withdrawal' of troops, said the NLF had not really defined its position on this point. Lam then commented 'and this you can tell your American friends.'"

4.

[Redacted]  
[Redacted] Mar 67  
[Redacted] Excerpts from article entitled "Interview with NFLSV Official," [Redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

"Hanoi--The Viet Cong's highest representative in North Vietnam hinted today that the Viet Cong would agree to gradual withdrawal of US forces in Vietnam in the event of a peaceful settlement of the war. Nguyen Van Tien...told [Redacted] 'Naturally we do not envisage the departure of US forces from one day to the next, or even within a month. We appreciate the expression... within a reasonable period of time.'"

5.

[Redacted]  
[Redacted] Sep 66  
[Redacted] [Redacted] who has just returned from Phnom Penh where he covered DeGaulle's visit [Redacted] gave [Redacted] [Redacted] rundown of much publicized discussions French

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

held with DRV and NLF reps... Neither reps gave French any indication that DeGaulle's proposal for US announcement of withdrawal from Vietnam according to time schedule would be sufficient for them to accept negotiations...NLF rep did, however, display some interest in idea of timetable for evacuation and asked how it might function..."

6.

[redacted] [redacted]  
[redacted] Feb 66 [redacted]  
[redacted] [redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

[redacted] February 1966 Vo Cong Trung, VC representative in Algiers, said...in other words that the NFLSV does not demand that American troops be withdrawn prior to negotiations although it cannot state this officially because that would make it appear that the five points are negotiable..."

"In discussing whether American troops would have to leave South Vietnam before negotiations, Trung said, 'it is simple enough--the Americans have broken into our house and occupied our premises. If they decide to leave, all they have to do is come to us, the owners, and tell us...When they do this, we can discuss how and when they will leave..."

B-3

No

7.

[redacted] Jan 66  
[redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

[redacted]. Viet Cong  
reps imply (A) that reuni-  
fication is well down on  
their timetable... (B) that  
in exchange for agreement  
to negotiate with them, Viet  
Cong, unlike Hanoi, would  
not pose as prior condition  
withdrawal of US forces; (C)  
that, in event of US-Viet  
Cong political settlement,  
US troop evacuation might  
be spread over considerable  
period of time; (D) give  
impression that they mis-  
trust Hanoi and Chicoms but  
are unable to take independ-  
ent stand unless this would  
pay off in settlement accept-  
able to Viet Cong..."

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

[redacted] in October  
1965, said that he believed  
the Liberation Front was  
quite prepared to discuss  
the modalities of a military  
withdrawal with US repre-  
sentatives.

9.

[redacted] Aug 65  
[redacted]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

[redacted]  
NLFSV rep, Nguyen Van Dong,  
[redacted] conveyed following  
views:

"Settlement must be along  
lines of 1954 Geneva agree-  
ments, with withdrawal of  
US forces from SVN. There  
would be interim period of  
two governments in Vietnam.

Neither two Vietnam govern-  
ments nor subsequent united  
gov't could have any foreign  
military alliances, but in  
interim, they--presumably  
NFLSV--could contemplate a  
symbolic American presence.  
However, large American  
force could create problems  
of control.."

B-5

Pres. file

9

Tuesday, June 25, 1968  
3:15 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Clark did not get to the attached item today:  
proposed MACV item on changed tactics in  
Khe Sanh area (western Quang Tri province).

There is some urgency, because of Baltimore  
San leak.

Clark says Westy approved this shift before  
he left, according to a message from Abrams.

Westy gets into Honolulu tomorrow, I believe.

If we go ahead today we should make sure:

- Westy is informed of this statement;
- he backs it.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

Assure Westy is promptly informed  
at Honolulu and Gen. Wheeler talks  
to him there upon arrival \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988  
By ag, NARA, Date 7-1-92

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988  
By ag, NARA, Date 7-1-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

goulding

6/25/68 9c

DRAFT OF PROPOSED ANNOUNCEMENT TO BE MADE BY MACV

1. The enemy was engaged at Khe Sanh earlier this year in order to combat him in the hinterlands rather than in the populated areas, to take maximum advantage of our air power and artillery, to prevent him from making a logistical base on the Quang Tri plateau and to sit astride the various potential infiltration routes.
2. General Westmoreland achieved all of these goals. He kept two enemy divisions tied down, destroyed more than half of the 20 to 25,000 troops which the enemy had committed, prevented the establishment of the logistical base and helped block the potential infiltration routes.
3. We now intend to reinforce the successes won by General Westmoreland at Khe Sanh.
4. There have been two significant changes in the situation since early this year. One is an increase in friendly strength, mobility and fire power, so that we are now more capable than we were of conducting both a mobile offense and defense in western Quang Tri. The second is the shift in Communist strength and tactics, necessitated because their earlier tactics resulted in disaster at Khe Sanh.
5. They are now confronting us throughout Vietnam with stand-off mortar and artillery attacks and with small ground attacks, attempting to evade our efforts to fix and destroy their large formations. Additionally, they have increased significantly their strength immediately south of the DMZ -- from the equivalent of six divisions in I Corps in January to the equivalent of at least eight divisions today.
6. Because of the increase in our strength, mobility and firepower, and of the change in Communist strength and tactics, we are now in a position to alter our own tactics.
7. During the battle of Khe Sanh, we took maximum advantage of our superior fire power. We now plan to take maximum advantage of our firepower plus our second great asset -- our mobility. The concept of our new disposition will be not linear, but mobile. The initiative in western Quang Tri province has been ours since Operation Pegasus. We are now taking steps to assure that it will continue to be ours.
8. We will use mobile forces, tied to no specific terrain, to attack, intercept, reinforce or take whatever action is most appropriate.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12358, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1958

By 15, NARA, Date 8-19-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

9. To take maximum advantage of the change in the enemy posture, we will close down the base at Kho Sanh. Having suffered one debacle with his earlier tactics at Kho Sanh, it is not logical to assume that the North Vietnamese would repeat that debacle. And it is not logical for us to be inflexible under the changed conditions.

10. I obviously am not going to go into details of precisely how we are deploying our forces or how we will utilize the additional maneuverability that we will gain by inactivating the base.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Pres. file

10

~~SECRET~~

Luncheon with the President  
Tuesday, June 25, 1968, 1:00 p. m.

Agenda

1. Vietnam: Soviet response to President's letter. (Under Sect. Katzenbach)

Ambassador Thompson has a suggestion which will be presented by Katzenbach.

2. Indian Proposal. (Under Sect. Katzenbach; Sect. Clifford)

An agreed proposal or clear points for your decision should be available tomorrow.

3. Sea-bed Proposal. (Under Sect. Katzenbach; Sect. Clifford; Gen. Wheeler)

An agreed proposal should be available or clear points for your decision.

4. Cease-fire Situation: the Pope's Appeal, etc. (Under Sect. Katzenbach)

Sitrep.

5. Middle-East Report. (Under Sect. Katzenbach)

Sitrep, with growing concern that border fighting will increase.

6. Other.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 7-1-84

~~SECRET~~

*no file*

11

Tuesday, June 25, 1968  
12:30 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

General Taylor thought you would like to have available these key questions which he believes should be posed with respect to the Zorin-Shriver talk.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By sl, NARA, Date 7-1-92

11a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 25, 1968

Mr. President:

I have just seen Shriver's cable reporting his conversation with Zorin. There is lack of clarity on several points. For example:

a. Would the U.S. agreement in principle to stop the bombing be made public while discussions of Phase B matters are being kept private?

b. Would the U.S. agreement cover only the bombing or "other acts of war" to include aerial reconnaissance of North Viet-Nam?

c. What is meant by the "circumstances" of Phase B? Shriver suggests that they are "actions" to be carried out presumably by both sides. Zorin seems to have referred to them as "unofficial talks to achieve complete peace."

d. Would we cease our bombing merely on agreement with regard to the nature of the "circumstances" of Phase B discussions?

Without the benefit of answers to these questions, I must say that the proposition seems to be merely the old proposal that we give up our bombing in exchange for a promise to talk about peace at some later date. However, I see no objection to having Vance raise the matter with Thuy if only to try to get answers to the foregoing questions.

*M.D.T.*  
M. D. T.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 92-383  
By iq, NARA, Date 8-12-93

~~SECRET~~

**INFORMATION**

**Tuesday, June 25, 1968 -- 11:40 a.m.**

*Free file*

**Mr. President:**

**There are two additional items Sec. Clifford would like to address himself to at lunch today:**

**1. Sec. Clifford has just had what he described as a "very disturbing" telephone conversation with Senator Richard Russell about U. S. troop withdrawals and the Symington Amendment.**

**Sec. Clifford would like to make an oral report of this conversation at the luncheon to be followed by a discussion of how to handle the developing situation on the Hill, which he views with real concern.**

**2. Sec. Clifford also wants to report on Sentinels.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**P. S. The first item of business, of course, is the instruction to Vance in the wake of the Zerlin talk with Shriver.**

**I hope that Katzenbach and Clifford will have an agreed draft cable for you to study.**

**Item 1 on the agenda is, clearly, overtaken by the Zerlin-Shriver talk.**

**WWRostow:rla**

**W. W. R.**

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Tuesday, June 25, 1968 - 11:30am

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

You may wish to read this account of Averell's conversation with Dobrynin, in which Dobrynin says the North Vietnamese delegates would talk privately with Vance and Harriman.

I have marked other key items.

As you will see, Harriman raised the possibility of his going to Moscow to discuss Vietnam there, including the possibility of Harriman's going on the first PanAm flight to Moscow.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 5-29-01

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 22, 1968  
3038 N Street, N.W.

SUBJECT:

PARTICIPANTS: Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador

W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large *Wally*

Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin had dinner with my wife and myself. We talked informally before dinner and during dinner, and Dobrynin and I alone after dinner. They came about 7:30 and left about 10:30.

The following points were covered:

Dobrynin repeated what he told the Secretary and myself, that he had received word that the North-Vietnamese delegates would talk privately with Vance and myself but had not specified when. In questioning him, he indicated that this had resulted from my talks with Zorin. Zorin is evidently reporting our conversations in detail. For instance, he knew that I had suggested to Zorin that we meet at night at the Soviet Embassy or any place else so that the meeting could be assured secrecy.

Because of Dobrynin's query, I had to explain in some detail why the President could not stop bombing North Vietnam completely without restraint by Hanoi. I explained the increased North Vietnamese infiltration; the massing of troops around the DMZ, the shelling of Saigon, and ways in which Hanoi had arrogantly escalated its military action while the President had taken a major step in de-escalation. He kept saying, "but you have 500,000 troops in Vietnam, why should you be afraid?" I reiterated, of course, the President's March 31st speech and expressed my personal opinion that it would be a mistake for us to end all the bombing unless

there

S/AH:WAHarriman:mw

(Drafting Office and Office)

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

FORM 2-65 05-1254

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *je*, NARA, Date 5-29-01

there were some reasonable indication of good will on the other side, as I feared Hanoi would not take any action of restraint even after full cessation. I said I thought that if we could get together privately with the Hanoi delegates, we might find a way. He then said he thought that the two-phase proposal was a good one. I agreed and indicated that that was the sort of thing we could explore privately but not in public.

I urged him to ask his Government to follow-up with the North Vietnamese representatives the necessity of private talks promptly. He agreed to do so. He firmly reiterated that the Soviets wanted to see the war ended in Vietnam in order that we could get on to other matters. I underlined again, as I had with Zorin, that if these talks in Paris broke up Moscow would lose prestige and Peking would gain. This he did not dispute. He expressed the belief that the Soviet Government would be freer to express its opinions to the North Vietnamese after the bombing had stopped completely. He indicated that Moscow would feel released when a "sister socialist State" was no longer being hit. He said he regretted that the Kosygin letter to the President did not receive a more responsive reply. He told me that since Kosygin had stated, "I and my colleagues... have reason to believe there would be a breakthrough", he had expected the reply would have accepted Kosygin's assurances, acted upon them and then insisted that the Soviet Government produce. Dobrynin said he thought we had missed an opportunity; I commented that the stakes were too serious to take such a risk and felt that the President had made a responsive reply and regretted no further word had been received.

He then spoke about Kosygin's new letter expressing willingness to discuss mutual nuclear restraints and said he felt the reply was good, although he did not know whether his Government would agree to a public statement by July 1st.

I asked him about Cyrus Eaton's visit as I understood Kosygin had seen him. He replied that no doubt Eaton was

received by Kosygin, Brezhnev and others -- they liked him -- but he doubted that Kosygin would send me a specific message through him. I told him that when Zorin had raised the subject of Eaton's visit I explained to him Kosygin's alleged request for information on our ultimate objectives. I asked if Zorin had passed on my statement giving an outline of those objectives. Dobrynin answered in the affirmative.

We discussed the possible desirability of a senior U. S. official visiting Moscow during the course of the summer to talk directly with Soviet leaders about Vietnam and possibly other subjects. He commented that no official of the Government other than myself had been to the Soviet Union since the Secretary's visit to sign the Test Ban Agreement in the summer of 1963 and that a visit could help clarify our mutual positions. I said that we would have to negotiate directly with the NVN their restraints during private talks; that if those could be agreed upon, a number of other subjects would be opened up regarding which the Soviet Government could undoubtedly play a useful role. I pointed out one of the subjects of importance was how the Vietnamese could be induced to talk together their own future problems -- the Saigon Government with both Hanoi and the NLF. I told him that information we had received through third parties indicated the Hanoi representatives in Paris took the Saigon Government more seriously since Luong had become Prime Minister. I filled him in on the details of the strengthening of the Government and its broadened appeal.

He admitted that Zorin was one of the "old school" diplomats but believed he reported accurately. However, he appeared to acquiesce when I asked him to discuss with his colleagues in Moscow the possibility of sending a man from the Foreign Office, familiar with Far Eastern affairs, to talk to us in Paris. Of course he knew Oberemko, Zorin's Minister Counselor, well, and I told him that Vance had had a couple of talks with him which were frank and useful. When I asked him why the Soviet Government did not have a more alert man than Zorin in Paris, he assured me it was one of those administrative questions involved in giving to

Zorin

Zorin a responsible position because of his long status in the Foreign Office. He said he obviously wasn't the best of choices since he did not speak French or, in fact, English, and was rigid. I told him I regretted that someone more "modern" than Zorin was not in Paris but that Zorin had behaved "correctly" towards me. I thought he was slowly becoming more relaxed, particularly since I'd seen him four times and there had been no mention of it in the press. I explained that not only contact with me, but also contact with Hanoi representatives was involved. Zorin had admitted to me that he had seen the North Vietnamese on a number of occasions.

Dobrynin was non-committal on other subjects, such as Berlin and Czechoslovak developments. He agreed when I said that Moscow, Hanoi and Washington had one thing in common -- the desirability of Hanoi's being free from Peking's domination. I suggested this should mean Hanoi's and Moscow's willingness to cooperate with Southeast Asian development in accordance with the President's Johns Hopkins speech. To achieve the primary objective of independence from Peking, Hanoi would have to learn to live peacefully with its neighbors. He did not demur.

Sunday, June 23, 1968  
Soviet Embassy

I stopped in to see Dobrynin for a few minutes Sunday morning. After thinking over my conversation, I wanted to be sure that I had been firm enough in stating that we could not stop all the bombing without an understanding with Hanoi on restraints on their part and that he would report this to his Government. He argued a bit, but I'm satisfied he has accepted my statement. ~~We touched on PanAm's first flight to Moscow as an occasion for a possible visit to Moscow, and he suggested that perhaps I might come.~~

Dobrynin concluded by telling me he did not know how long he would remain in Moscow. His wife and daughter are, of course, staying in Washington.

*Pres file*

14

Tuesday, June 25, 1968  
11:25 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is the first flat report that the interruption of traffic across China to Hanoi is a matter of policy rather than a matter of weather or internal difficulties within China.

If so, it is a fact of major importance bearing on negotiations. They may wish to move fast: we should be prepared to move fast and from a position of some confidence.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Paris 16906 Nodis/Maria Three)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-223  
By SJ, NARA, Date 10-19-01

ACTION

15

Wednesday, June 25, 1968 - 10:30 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

Attached for your approval is a statement which would be issued at the State Department when the French officially announce their emergency trade measures. We expect their announcement today around 1:00 p. m. our time.

It was worked out by Roth, Fred Deming, Tony Solomon, McQuade (Commerce), DeVier Pierson, and Ed Fried. Nick Katzenbach edited it and approves.

The statement makes clear that the U. S. :

- would have to apply countervailing duties to offset subsidies on French exports to the U. S. ;
- would take steps in GATT if French import quotas impair our trade.

The statement is straightforward and factual. It leaves criticism of French measures to others.

I recommend you approve the statement.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

*ERF*

ERF:mst

**DRAFT STATEMENT**

The French Government has announced that it intends to take action to subsidize most French exports and impose import quotas on selected products. The French Government said the measures would be phased out by January 1969.

Whereas the export subsidy could affect the bulk of French exports to this country, it appears that the import restrictions affect primarily imports from France's neighbors.

Our laws and the GATT provide for the use of countervailing duties to offset export subsidies by others. They also provide redress if import quotas impair our trade.

Once we have all the provisions of the French regulation, we will of course take the appropriate steps under our laws and GATT to protect our interest.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

Wednesday - June 25, 1968

10:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith reports from our Ambassadors in Central America on their conversations with the Presidents about your possibly going to San Salvador (Tab A). The reaction in four was a swift and enthusiastic welcome. Ambassador Mein will be seeing the Guatemalan President at noon today. The Guatemalan Foreign Minister thought President Mendez Montenegro would favor the meeting.

The President of Honduras expressed some concern about going to San Salvador because of current boundary problems, but he thought these could be overcome by having the meeting under the sponsorship of ODECA (Organization of Central American States) whose headquarters is in San Salvador.

The next step -- after we get the Guatemalan President's reaction -- would seem to be to stimulate the invitation, suggesting the Central American Presidents may wish to do so through the Secretary General of ODECA. I attach a draft cable (Tab B) for your approval in case you want to proceed this way.

*Walt* Rostow

Approve cable \_\_\_\_\_

Hold up, call me \_\_\_\_\_.

## Attachments

Tab A - Reports from US Ambassadors in Central America on conversations with CA Presidents.

Tab B - Proposed cable for your approval.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *529-01*

*cas. file*  
17

Tues., June 25, 1968  
9:30 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the corrected version of the telegram from Sarge Shriver. I have marked passages that were left out and are worth your attention.

As you can see, Sarge got into domestic politics; but Zorin obviously had a bit of that on his mind, too.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Paris 16928)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 5-29-01

*Pres file*

18

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SENSITIVE~~  
LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Tues., June 25, 1968  
9:25 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Secretary Rusk's reply to the  
back channel I sent at your instruction last night.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET-EYES ONLY~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 7-7-92

18a

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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1968 JUN 25 11 37

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~~TOP SECRET~~ 251015Z LITERALLY EYES ONLY VIA [REDACTED]

25X1A

FROM SECRETARY RUSK TO WALT ROSTOW  
THE LOSS OF CY VANCE ON HIS PRESENT ASSIGNMENT WOULD BE QUITE SERIOUS. HE WOULD BE HARD TO REPLACE, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE OF THE EXCELLENT RELATIONS BETWEEN HIMSELF AND AVERELL HARRIMAN. IN THE LONGER RUN, IT WOULD BE A PITY TO LOSE CY VANCE FROM THE TYPE OF ACTIVITY REFLECTED IN HIS PRESENT MISSION IN PARIS AND HIS SUPERB JOB IN STOPPING A GREEK-TURKISH WAR. WE ARE LOSING THROUGH AGE AN ENTIRE GENERATION OF PEOPLE WITH THAT KIND OF ABILITY AND EXPERIENCE AND VANCE IS CLEARLY A TOP MEMBER OF A NEW GENERATION OF SUCH TALENT.

WHAT I AM SAYING IS, OF COURSE, A STRONG RECOMMENDATION OF VANCE FOR ANY OTHER POST AS WELL. THINKING OF ALTERNATIVES, I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT GOLDBERG COULD DO THE JOB VERY WELL IF HE WERE WILLING AT THIS STAGE TO TAKE IT ON. HE IS A SUPERB NEGOTIATOR. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO ASK GEORGE BALL TO DO IT WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT HE MIGHT HAVE TO COME BACK TO NEW YORK FOR A DAY OR TWO AT A TIME IF SOME URGENT SECURITY COUNCIL BUSINESS INTERVENES. I HAD HOPED HE WOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE ALMOST FULL TIME TO THE MIDDLE EAST. OTHER POSSIBILITIES WORTH CONSIDERING ARE AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN (WHO COULD BE SPARED FROM LAOS DURING THE MONSOON SEASON), BILL BUNDY, GEORGE MCGHEE, BETH WEBSTER AND (A VERY SOUND PERSON WHO HANDLED THE BRITISH-HONDURAN MEDIATION VERY WELL INDEED.)

320

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

NNNN

SANTITIZED  
Authority NLJ 019-036-2-1  
By [Signature] NARA, Date 1/20/02

18b

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

1968 JUN 25 01 38

VZCZCDSI718 .....  
OO YEKADLC  
DE YEKADS 2377 1770114  
O 250110Z ZYH  
FM WHITE HOUSE  
TO REYKJAVIK ICELAND  
ZEN

25X1A

~~TOP SECRET~~ LITERALLY EYES ONLY VIA ██████████ CHANNELS CAPB1369  
FOR SECRETARY RUSK FROM WALT ROSTOW

IF PRESIDENT SHOULD DECIDE TO ASK VANCE TO RETURN TO  
WASHINGTON ON PERMANENT ASSIGNMENT, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO  
REPLACE HIM IN PARIS IN A SATISFACTORY WAY? HOW SERIOUS A LOSS  
WOULD IT BE?

COULD GOLDBERG DO THE JOB?  
OR SOMEONE ELSE?;

090

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

NNNN

SANITIZED  
Authority NLJ 019-036-2-2  
By [Signature], NARA, Date 1/20/02

19

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

Tuesday, June 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You might be amused by the attached cable from Mennen Williams. Obviously, the Corregidor ceremony came off nicely. Thanks to your airplane and blessing.

W. W. Rostow

Att

MWright:wpt

19a

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM MANILA 11955 (Williams)

1. President Johnson's Corregidor mission had significant and favorable impact, revivifying and renewing ties of history and sentiment.
2. Airport greetings included warm individual embraces and handlettered signs of welcome carried by veteran organizations.
3. During Corregidor ceremonies Pres and Mrs. Marcos mingled and were photographed with American Congressional, veteran and citizen groups. They lunched on deck Presidential yacht with Congressman and Mrs. Teague, Governor and Mrs. Pat Brown, Judge and Mrs. Edwards, and Embassy Official Rafferty and his wife. When Mrs. Edwards said her husband interested in showing her volcano, President Marcos laid on Philippine helicopter for sightseeing trip.
4. Sunday papers flooded with first page favorable stories and pictures emphasizing President Marcos' words of "The monument to the American and Filipino alliance" and "to that partnership."
5. Mrs. Marcos gave each member of Presidential party gift of Philippine embroidery. President Marcos assured Congressman Teague of action on vexing "U.S. textile remnants" problem.
6. Each member of presidential party seemed hard-working ambassador of goodwill deserving Presidential letter of commendation. President Johnson wins first Manila Embassy award for promotion of Filipino-American relations.

21

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday - June 25, 1968

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

You will be interested in this report from Ed Kerry on his most recent conversation with President Frei.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 7-1-92



Department of State

21a  
**TELEGRAM**

47

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 898

PAGE 01 SANTIAGO 04187 242035Z

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NJ 94-15**  
By ju, NARA, Date 7-28-94

45  
ACTION AKA 16

INFO EUR 15, EA 1, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,  
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, AID 28, IGA 02, IO 13, ACDA 16,  
RSR 01, /168 W

R 241630Z JUN 68  
FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5995  
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SANTIAGO 4187

1. PRESIDENT FREJ, WITH WHOM I SPENT LAST EVENING, WAS TREMENDOUSLY IMPRESSED AND DELIGHTED BY DE GAULLE'S VICTORY. HE SAID THAT HAD THE LEFT TRIUMPHED IN FRANCE, IT WOULD HAVE CAUSED IMMEDIATE AND PROFOUND DIFFICULTIES IN THE CHILEAN SITUATION, IMPELLING A PUSH TOWARDS A POPULAR FRONT.
2. HE ALSO STRESSED THE POINT REPEATEDLY AND VOLUNTARILY THAT THE US HAD BEEN "MASTERLY" AND "BRILLIANT" IN HIS HANDLING OF DE GAULLE IN RECENT YEARS AND IN THE CURRENT SITUATION. SINCE HIS FRANCOPHILIC FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO WAS PRESENT, HAS A PROCLIVITY FOR MAKING INVIDIOUS PRIVATE COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE SMOOTH DEXTERITY OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AS CONTRASTED WITH THE US, THIS GRATUITOUS OBSERVATION BY THE PRESIDENT, IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER BI-LATERAL PROBLEMS UNDER DISCUSSION, WAS PARTICULARLY PERTINENT AND USEFUL-- AND MIGHT EVEN HAVE BEEN DELIBERATE.
3. BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER VOICED THEIR APPROVAL AND ADMIRATION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MARCH 31 SPEECH AND STATED THAT THIS, TAKEN WITH THE INDISCRIMINATE BOMBING OF SAIGON, HAS CREATED A SYMPATHETIC ATTITUDE FOR THE ALLIES. I TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE OCCASION AND OF THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



*Department of State*

**TELEGRAM**

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 SANTIA 04187 242035Z

PRESENCE OF THE NEW AMBASSADOR TO THE US  
TO MAKE A PRESENTATION OF THE US POSITION.

KORRY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

---

INFORMATION

22

*Pres file*

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Monday, June 24, 1968 -- 7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith evidence that Moscow is arranging the shipment of consumers goods to Hanoi by sea because of "railroad transportation difficulties."

This indicates real concern in Moscow that transport difficulties may not soon be cleared up.

Also attached is a CIA evaluation of the problem in general.

We simply do not know yet whether it is Chinese policy or Cultural Revolution.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 01-178  
By cbm, NARA, Date 2-28-03

WWRostow:rln

TOP SECRET 25X1

TOP SECRET

206

Item : <sup>Chinese</sup> Communist-China-North Vietnam <sup>org</sup> Relations Subjected to Increasing Stress

Relations between Peiping and Hanoi, which have cooled over the Paris negotiations, are probably becoming even more strained because of disruptions in rail traffic to North Vietnam and demonstrations outside its consular offices in southern China.

Numerous reports in recent weeks have indicated that traffic along the major rail line between Communist China and North Vietnam has been interrupted. Cultural Revolution struggles in Kwangsi Chuang Autonomous Region have probably been the primary cause.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

A North Vietnamese in Kwangsi informed Army Headquarters in Hanoi on 14 June that personnel who had completed their training in China could not go home because no "vehicles" were available.

Mass demonstrations were reportedly protesting the peace talks held recently outside North Vietnamese consular offices in Nanning, Kunming, and Canton. North Vietnamese

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

SANTIZED  
Authority NLJ-141-022-0787  
By jc, NARA, Date 11-2-09

25X1  
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25X1C  
25X1

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

25X1C

Charge Thuy admitted [Redacted] that the demonstrations had taken place but denied rumors that the consulates would be closed.

These recent problems between Communist China and North Vietnam are probably temporary in nature, but the broader issue of the talks in Paris will continue to have an adverse effect on their relations. Furthermore, although they may be of short duration, the rail difficulties and protest demonstrations could affect the thinking of North Vietnamese leaders concerning Communist China's dependability as an ally. [Redacted]

25X1D

[Redacted]

25X1D

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

25X1

22c

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

Bolivia: There is considerable resistance to the conditions attached to the \$4.5-million special assistance loan now being negotiated with the US.

Finance Minister Romero Loza has said he would resign rather than sign this loan, which is intended to help finance the budget deficit. He believes the conditions--such as the additional ten-percent tax on imports--are too stringent and would have serious political repercussions. Understanding, however, that future loans depend on the successful conclusion of this one

25X1C

[Redacted]

25X1

The government apparently believes the political consequences of the "humiliating" conditions attached to this loan are of more immediate importance than the serious economic effects of a failure to take steps now. Whether or not an agreement is reached before the 30 June deadline, President Barrientos will probably discuss this and other economic problems with President Johnson and other US officials when he visits here next week.

25X1D

[Redacted]

25X1D

27 Jun 68

11

SANTITIZED  
Authority NLJ.141.022.008/8  
By jc, NARA, Date 11-2-09

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

25X1

ACTION

23

*from file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, June 24, 1968 -- 4:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Mac Bundy was called by Robert Nathan, who is working for the Vice President.

Nathan wants Mac to do a Middle East position paper for the Vice President. Mac wanted to check with you before doing any such thing, since, formally, he is still a consultant with us.

Moreover, he would, on the whole, prefer not to undertake the assignment since he will be away in the next several weeks.

Incidentally, Mac is going next week to Cairo - Beirut - and later Jerusalem as President of the Ford Foundation. He will be in tomorrow morning at about 12:15 p.m. to catch up on our Middle East concerns.

W. W. Rostow

Position paper okay \_\_\_\_\_

Re \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 7-1-94

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

EYES ONLY

Monday, June 24, 1968 - 4:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith His Holiness regrets  
he cannot visit us on the way to  
Bogota.

W. W. Rostow

EYES ONLY

WWRostow:rlh

24

*Pres file*



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

24a  
3300 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE  
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

Nº 1449/68

THIS NO. SHOULD BE PREFIXED TO THE ANSWER

June 24, 1968

Mr. President:

I have the honor to forward the enclosed letter from His Holiness, Pope Paul VI, which is in reply to your gracious invitation to consider the possibility of visiting the United States.

Accept, Mr. President, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

*Luigi Ravinondi*  
Apostolic Delegate

The President

The White House



To Lyndon B. Johnson  
President of the United States of America

Your kind invitation to consider the possibility of a visit to Washington in the course of Our journey to Bogotá is most welcome, but We deeply regret that it will not be possible because of the nature of Our journeys.

We recall with great satisfaction and consolation the warm and sincere reception accorded Us when We visited the United Nations in New York, and We wish that another visit to the United States were possible at this time.

We pray that Our brief and rapid visit to Latin America will help to bring about a closer relationship among peoples based on a mutual respect, on understanding and on cooperation.

We thank you, Mr. President, for your kind invitation, and as We give assurance of Our highest consideration and esteem, We ask Almighty God to bless you, in your quest for peace, and the grand nation of the United States with His choicest heavenly favors.

From the Vatican, June 5, 1968

Paulus P.P. VI-



Department of State

15  
25a  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ PARIS 16929

DELTO 340

N O D I S / HARVAN

FROM VANCE

REF PARIS 16928

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 21944  
By is NARA, Date 2-6-98

I HAVE READ AMBASSADOR SHRIVERS REPORT OF CONVERSATION WITH ZORIN. I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO OPEN UP THE PHASE A- PHASE B CONCEPT WITH THUY AT WEDNESDAY COFFEE BREAK AND TEST HIS REACTION. WOULD APPRECIATE DEPTS VIEWS AND COMMENTS. VANCE

~~SECRET~~

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Monday - June 24, 1968

26

*Free file*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Your Appointment with Brazilian Ambassador Vasco da Cunha, Tuesday, June 25, 11:45 a.m.**

Ambassador da Cunha's call is to say goodbye. He is scheduled to leave Washington June 30. He has reached mandatory retirement age, so will be leaving the Brazilian Foreign Service after a distinguished 40-year career.

The Ambassador is one of the few statesmen worthy of the name in Latin America. He is smart and urbane. But more important, he is a man of vision. He has recognized and acted on the premise that close cooperation between the US and Brazil is essential to peace and progress in this hemisphere. As Foreign Minister of Brazil, he chaired the Meeting of Foreign Ministers which cut all ties with Cuba. He also helped shape the decision to send Brazilian troops to the Dominican Republic.

His feeling toward you is best described in the personal note he sent you after your March 31 speech (Tab A).

There are no substantive issues to take up. I recommend you make these points in farewell:

1. We are very sorry to lose him and are deeply grateful for his stewardship as Ambassador during the past two years and for his counsel and support in previous years.
2. We are pleased that a successor has already been named (another distinguished career diplomat -- Mario GIBSON Barboza) and you look forward to working with him.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-223  
By SJ, NARA, Date 10-19-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

3. You send warm personal regards to President Costa e Silva.
4. You also send a special greeting to Mrs. da Cunha. (She has a serious heart condition and has remained in Rio since last fall.)
5. You are sorry he is leaving before the trip to Hemisfair.

W. W. Rostow

**Attachment**

**Tab A - Letter from Ambassador Vasco da Cunha to President, dated April 2.**

26a

Washington, D. C.  
April 2, 1968

His Excellency  
Lyndon B. Johnson  
President of the United States of America  
Washington, D. C.

*Dear Mr. President,*

I was deeply struck by Your Excellency's speech on television on Sunday night and feel it my duty as a citizen of this Continent - to the development and welfare of which you are so powerfully contributing - to express my admiration for your great gesture and generous approach towards the re-establishment of peace against aggression and the upholding of unity in your great country.

I trust you will not mind, Sir, if I trespass somewhat on the boundary of your national politics, by addressing you on this subject. However, what happens in, or is done by, the United States of America has such far reaching effects on the lives and welfare of men all over the world, that I feel entitled to send you the expression of my warmest wishes for the success of your disinterested initiative and of my personal admiration for your most high-minded statemanship.

*Respectfully yours  
Károly Kiss*

~~1. copy~~  
2. Press file

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Monday, June 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Short Message to Eshkol

This Wednesday, June 26, is the fifth anniversary of Eshkol's becoming Prime Minister.

We often use such anniversaries as the occasion for a message from you. There is no special reason for one to Eshkol beyond our desire to reassure the Israelis regularly of our friendship. As the time nears when we may wish to discuss tactics seriously with them, it may be marginally helpful to have this sort of attentiveness in the background.

The only possible disadvantage I see is in your appearing to support Eshkol in the coming leadership struggle. However, I've reworded State's language enough to avoid that. I would also suggest we label this a private message from you to Eshkol since we have no interest in its being published around the Arab world.

If you would like to send such a message, I recommend this language:

"I send my heartiest congratulations to you as you complete your fifth year as Prime Minister. We admire the patience, the skill and the wisdom with which you have guided Israel through a challenging but dangerous and turbulent period of her history. Our prayers are with you and your government in your efforts to attain the secure and lasting peace which we all so ardently desire."

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓ 6/25/68

Let's not send one \_\_\_\_\_

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Monday, June 24, 1968

*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

At Tab A, for your approval, is a message to a Danish July 4 celebration (the Rebild Festival). The Danes have celebrated our Independence Day at Rebild every year since 1912 (except during the war).

You have sent similar messages since 1965. Ambassador White has read your messages at the end of her own speeches and would like to do so again this year.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

*mwg*

MWG:mst

**PROPOSED MESSAGE TO REBILD FESTIVAL**

For over <sup>fifty</sup>~~five~~ years Danes and Americans have been gathering at Rebild to celebrate America's Independence Day. Our world has witnessed many changes since that first celebration but the ideals and truths that Danes and Americans hold to be self evident remain constant guides to our consciences and enterprises.

We are proud that the people of Denmark have chosen to join with us in marking our annual rededication to these ideals and truths. The Rebild celebration is proof that free men everywhere share a common purpose.

All Americans join me in sending the people of Denmark our warmest greetings and best wishes.

**Lyndon B. Johnson**

ACTION

29

~~SECRET~~

June 24, 1968

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

President Dias Ordaz says he thinks it unwise for him to join you at San Salvador because of the impression it might give that we are forming a bloc within the hemisphere.

We are now proceeding with a cable to our Central American Ambassadors. Hopefully, we may be able to get them to agree on the invitation and select the site by Thursday, June 27. Since it is going to be hard to keep the trip from leaking once the Central American Presidents start consulting, George Christian and I strongly recommend that you announce the trip as soon as the invitation has been extended, say on Thursday or Friday. Otherwise we will be in the embarrassing position of trying to keep the lid on something which is general knowledge. Our posture will also cause misunderstandings with the other Presidents.

I will let you know as soon as we hear from the Central American Presidents.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:WGB:feg

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 5-30-01

ACTION

Monday - June 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*from file*

SUBJECT: Implementation of Punta del Este Science Program

You asked for my views on Don Hornig's memorandum (Tab B) endorsing the National Science Foundation's recommendation that:

- 1. NSF, rather than State or AID, serve as liaison between the scientific staff of the new OAS science program and the US scientific community.
- 2. NSF step up its scientific activities in Latin America using AID money.

The Punta del Este Science and Education Programs are about to get underway. At the Maracay Conference last February, programs in the two sectors were approved and \$25 million pledged to carry them out during the first year. We promised to put up \$16.5 million in FY 1968 and FY 1969 money, and ten Latin Americans matched us on a 2:1 ratio with \$8.5 million. OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza has picked men to head each program. Now he is waiting for payments against pledges to launch operations. We have given him some money to prime the pump.

NSF's recommendation that they, rather than State or AID, be designated by Presidential decision as liaison between OAS staff scientists and the US scientific community is not the way to proceed. NSF has an important technical role to play, but they should work out the modalities with State which must coordinate working relationships of US agencies with the OAS. Otherwise, we have confusion, or worse.

The other recommendation about additional funds from AID to step up NSF activities in Latin America would be nice if there were money. NSF is already carrying on some programs with AID funds. Any expansion depends on what happens with the Foreign Aid Bill. The prospects are not good.

Don Hornig suggests he reply to the NSF letter on your behalf. I think this is the way to handle it. We have prepared a draft of the letter he would send (Tab A) subject to your approval. I recommend you authorize the letter.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

**Attachments**

Tab A - Draft letter, for Presidential approval, to be sent by Don Hornig to NSF.

Tab B - Hornig memorandum to the President of April 26.

Dear Dr. Haworth:

The President has asked me to reply on his behalf to the letter of April 8 to him from you and Dr. Handler, and to thank you for responding to his request to outline the contribution NSF could make in carrying out the Punta del Este program for science and technology.

The support of the National Science Foundation for the new OAS science and technology program will be valuable. The Foundation has a key role to play in enlisting the technical advice and support of the U. S. scientific community for this important new program. It is important that matters of scientific substance be considered by those who know the problems, the organizations and the people involved. The Department of State, of course, is responsible for our overall relations with the OAS and will coordinate the activities of U.S. agencies with the OAS. I am sure that Assistant Secretary Oliver and Ambassador Linowitz will look to NSF as a major source of scientific support and guidance. I am sure they will also want to inform the OAS staff of the Foundation's willingness to assist and support their efforts. I recommend that you work out with them the modalities for your cooperation with the OAS staff at a technical level.

I have noted your program proposals. They are potentially capable of contributing in a major way to the goals set for science and technology at Punta del Este. This is particularly true of the activities which can have a strong multiplier effect by reason of their multinational character. However, at this time I do not foresee the opportunity for any significant increase in funding for these proposals. Over the next few months, we will want to consider their relationships to the OAS program which is being developed.

Sincerely yours,

Donald F. Hornig  
Special Assistant to the President  
for Science and Technology

Dr. Leland J. Haworth  
Director  
National Science Foundation  
Washington, D. C. 20550

cc: Honorable Dean Rusk  
Honorable Covey Oliver  
Honorable Sol Linowitz

(6-24-68)

5/1/68

Mr Bowdler

Please act = see  
President's note below.

WWR

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MEMORANDU

2/

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

30c

Friday, April 26, 1968

4:45 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Subject: NSF Assistance in Implementing the Punta del Este Science Program

The attached letter to you from the National Science Foundation makes two main points:

1. NSF rather than State or AID should serve as liaison between the scientific staff of the new OAS science program and the U. S. scientific community.

My view is that this makes sense and NSF should be a major scientific link, of course under the general guidance of the Secretary of State and recognizing the responsibility of AID as the major funding agency of the new OAS program.

2. NSF is prepared to assist generally by encouraging its scientific activities in Latin America, particularly those of a cooperative nature. My reaction is:

NSF is highly regarded in Latin America and it should be encouraged to foster increased scientific relations between U. S. and Latin American scientists. This should be possible without significant new dollar requirements and without impairing the multinational programs under the auspices of the Declaration of Punta del Este.

Since the NSF letter to you does not raise issues warranting a reply from you, I recommend that I send the attached letter, which makes the points noted above.

*Donald F. Hornig*  
Donald F. Hornig

Draft reply by Hornig approved \_\_\_\_\_

Other action \_\_\_\_\_

*Walt*  
*Review & Submit*  
*V. Lewis*  
*C*

30d

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION  
NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20550

April 8, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

In your letter of November 29, 1967 you asked the National Science Board and the Director of the National Science Foundation to consider and report to you how the National Science Foundation could help in the implementation of the Punta del Este Agreements and contribute effectively to programs designed to improve science and science education in Latin America.

Role of the National Science Foundation. We believe that a technically oriented operating agency of our Government, rather than the Department of State or AID, should serve as immediate liaison between the international scientific staff managing the Punta del Este Programs and scientists and organizations in our country who will participate. We recommend that you designate the National Science Foundation to accomplish this function.

General Programs. The National Science Foundation has had seven years of experience in assisting science and science education programs in Latin America. The activities we here propose are based on that experience--and parallel recent experience of shorter duration but of greater intensity in India. They are aimed at the need, expressed

at Punta del Este and emphasized by President Frei, to develop manpower--scientists and engineers--with the ultimate goal of improving the economy and well-being of our southern neighbors.

We here propose several programs of general applicability and relatively moderate cost, as well as specific recommendations for programs in Chile and Brazil, where favorable circumstances today present unique opportunities for developing pilot programs of potential significance.

Funding. Under its present statute, the National Science Foundation can fund only those projects which contribute directly to strengthening science and science education in the United States. Present budgetary limitations and gold outflow problems constrain us, as well. Of the programs listed below, the National Science Foundation could fund a few modest projects under items 2, 3, 4, and 5. AID funds (including the Educational Sector Loan funds) would be necessary for Program 1 and for meaningful augmentation of all the others.

1. Improvement of Science Education. In our own country, dramatic improvements in the teaching of science have been brought about by National Science Foundation programs, particularly summer institutes for high school and college teachers and course content improvement activities which have provided a wealth of modern teaching materials, many of which have been translated. In 1963, a

start was made in introducing these programs into Latin America by NSF using Agency for International Development funds. Just as the program was gaining momentum, three years later, unfortunately, the necessary programmatic funds were withdrawn by AID. Enough was done, however, to make us feel certain that the fires could readily be re-kindled. A strong program to improve teachers, teaching, and teacher-training methods using translations of available materials and the institute technique should be launched as soon as possible, utilizing funds from AID, particularly the Educational Sector Loan fund already available. This would be welcomed by the many Latin American scientists who are now attempting to move in that direction, and would certainly have long term benefits.

2. Science Exchange Programs. A program which was supported by the National Science Foundation, through the Organization of American States from 1960 to 1966, should be reactivated. North and South American scientists were sent to each other's countries for a few months to teach and to do research. In the new program, emphasis should be on upgrading capabilities for teaching and training. A significant portion of the cost should be paid by the host institution or country in each instance. We envision an exchange involving at least 25 North and Latin American scientists each year.

3. Cooperative Research Projects involve selected research performed concurrently in two (or more) universities in two countries, with each country supplying the major financial support for its own nationals. Exchanges of professors and students between the participating universities so engaged are an important feature. These programs have proved to be particularly effective in teaching and training students in research methods, while producing significant research results. NSF can support several projects of this sort every year, if the proposals are scientifically meritorious. Such projects could also be a particularly attractive feature of our national support for the International Biological Program.

4. Building Major Research Centers in Latin America. Several potentially important research centers have already been identified by Punta del Este task forces. Building some of these into productive institutions will require extensive cooperative efforts by many distinguished scientists of the Americas. The National Science Foundation is willing and able to help in this effort by sending U. S. scientists to advise, consult and do research in these centers.

5. Special Programs in Certain Countries. Not all Latin American countries are equally ready for or responsive to stimuli of scientific

and technological development. A blanket approach to all countries would not only be impossible but would foolishly spread our available resources too thinly.

The National Science Foundation already has a substantial investment in Chile, viz. , the Inter-American Observatory at Cerro Tololo; Chilean officials and institutions have cooperated in our Antarctic research program in many important ways; and a beginning has been made in programs to upgrade science education there.

In addition to undertaking the general programs listed above, we should, in Chile:

- a. Aid in the current planning of their National Marine Science Program, including the already established major marine biology station. When that station and Program are truly functional, we should help make them productive by providing
  - (1) selected grants to U. S. institutions for cooperative research projects;
  - (2) assistance to U. S. students and investigators to participate in the programs;
  - (3) arrangements whereby qualified Chilean scientists can receive appropriate training in this country,
  - (4) encouragement and assistance to U. S. oceanographic vessels doing research in southern waters.

- b. Serve as a communications channel, where necessary or desirable, between the Chilean and U. S. scientific communities.

These proposals have been discussed with Ambassador Korry who offered his enthusiastic support. In sum, they could constitute a vivid demonstration of effective American assistance to a developing nation at only modest cost to our country.

In addition, we believe that there is an appropriate role for NSF in our broad assistance programs in Latin America, more generally.


In Brazil, NSF has excellent contacts with the scientific and university communities. With AID funds, we supported several projects for the improvement of science education. Several cooperative research projects are presently directly supported with NSF funds.

Discussions have been conducted with the Brazilian Government with respect to a bilateral science project, patterned after the U. S. - Japan and U. S. - Italy models. We recommend that these discussions be continued. As in the case of Chile, NSF should also respond to anticipated Brazilian requests for help in developing teachers, new courses and curricula for use at the secondary school, college, and university levels.


Science is advanced in many fields in both Mexico and Argentina, and the National Science Foundation has had many contacts in both countries. Special attention should be given to maintaining old and making new scientific contacts here, along the lines suggested earlier in this paper.

Finally, let us say that the National Science Board and the staff of the Foundation recognize the challenge and opportunities in Latin America presented by the Punta del Este Document. We would be pleased to have the opportunity to do our utmost to bring the goals of these programs to a successful realization.

Sincerely yours,



Philip Wandler  
Chairman, National Science Board



Leland J. Haworth  
Director

President Lyndon B. Johnson  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

DRAFT

Dear Dr. Haworth:

The President has asked me to reply on his behalf to the letter of April 8 to him from you and Dr. Handler, and to thank you for responding to his request to outline the contribution NSF could make in carrying out the Punta del Este program for science and technology.

The support of the National Science Foundation for the new OAS science and technology program will be valuable. The Foundation is especially equipped to enlist the technical advice and support of the U. S. scientific community for this important new program. It is important that matters of scientific substance be considered by those who know the problems, the organizations and the people involved. The Secretary of State, of course, is responsible for our overall dealings with the OAS and will coordinate the activities of our U. S. agencies as appropriate. I am sure that he, Assistant Secretary Oliver and Ambassador Linowitz will look to NSF as a major source of scientific support and guidance. I am sure they will also want to inform the OAS staff of the Foundation's willingness to assist and support their efforts.

I have noted your program proposals. They are potentially capable of contributing in a major way to the goals set for science and technology at Punta del Este. This is particularly true of the activities which can

have a strong multiplier effect by reason of their multinational character. However, at this time I do not foresee the opportunity for any significant increase in funding for these proposals. Over the next few months, we will want to consider their relationships to the OAS program which is being developed.

Sincerely yours,

Donald F. Hornig  
Special Assistant to the President  
for Science and Technology

Dr. Leland J. Haworth  
Director  
National Science Foundation  
Washington, D. C. 20550

cc: Honorable Dean Rusk  
Honorable Covey Oliver  
Honorable Sol Linowitz

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, June 24, 1968

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. Relations with Foreign Countries -- 1963-1968

As one way of looking at the progress we have made in the last five years, I have pulled together the replies of NSC staff members to a question I asked: "How do our relations with individual foreign countries in 1968 compare with our relations when you became President?"

A judgment as to whether our relations are better now than they were in 1963 is at best arbitrary and is entirely dependent on criteria which vary widely. With these words of caution, there is at Tab A a table listing those countries with which our relations are (1) better now than they were in 1963; (2) about the same, and (3) less satisfactory. The table does not include Western European countries because it is not possible to make meaningful judgments.

53  
36  
26  
93

Several "box scores" have been compiled in an effort to summarize developments during the five-year period. They are included in the regional summaries and are useful but are so simplified as to be somewhat misleading.

I am sending this staff study to you to let you know that work is being done. We can decide later how best to use this worthwhile beginning.

The country-by-country replies, including summaries by regions and one on the United Nations, are attached:

1. Western Europe -- Tab B
2. USSR and Eastern Europe -- Tab C
3. Middle East and North Africa -- Tab D
4. Tropical Africa -- Tab E
5. South Asia -- Tab F
6. Southeast Asia -- Tab G
7. East Asia (including the trust territories) -- Tab H
8. Latin America -- Tab I
9. United Nations Organizations -- Tab J

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 6-30-92

CONFIDENTIAL

W. W. Rostow

32

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, June 24, 1968 - 2:00 pm

Mr. President:

The attached memorandum suggests why our Middle East experts (and the British) are examining the possibility of new initiatives.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 7-2-92

32a

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-223  
By SJ, NARA, Date 10/19/01

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

June 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: ~~Increasing Arab-Israeli Tension~~

One of the main elements in the British presentation to Nick Katzenbach Friday was our inability to control the timing of return to the UN Security Council. Not only is the last Jerusalem resolution hanging unimplemented for the Arabs to use as an excuse whenever they wish, ~~any~~ major border incident could put us back there any time, and Lord Caradon ~~noted~~ noted that tension seems to be rising:

1. The Jordan valley is still the most dangerous area. In addition to the "normal" brief daily exchanges of fire, there has been an increase of heavy shelling from the East Bank in some areas. The Israelis suspect that the Jordanian army is involved and are talking about major retaliation. Jordanian soldiers probably are taking part, but almost certainly against explicit orders from Amman.

2. ~~There~~ There have been several terrorist raids from Lebanon, and the Israelis have retaliated for each to prevent Lebanon from becoming another Jordan. (You'll recall your talk with Foreign Minister Boutros.)

3. ~~There have~~ There been a few minor incidents on the Syrian ~~cease~~ fire line, but neither side appears to regard these as serious.

4. In Gaza and the West Bank the local Arabs are becoming harder to deal with. They aren't capable of doing anything the occupation forces can't suppress easily, but unrest among the Palestinians is another irritant.

5. In Sinai, the Egyptians are extending their patrols southeast of Port Said into an area which the Israelis claim is on the Israeli side of the line. Five Egyptians were killed in a clash there last week. (Last June, the Israelis stopped when they reached swamps in the area instead of pushing on to the canal as they did in the rest of Sinai.)

6. The Israelis are secretly trying to start the Iraqi-Kurdish war again. The Arabs are probably unaware of this, and Barzani hasn't done anything yet but this could make things more difficult.

7. Moshe Dayan recently rejected the November 22 UN Resolution which is the basis for the Jarring Mission. Although Eshkol and Eban quickly pointed out that the Defense Minister does not speak for the government, the Arabs still think he does.

Put these all together, and the trend clearly goes the wrong way.

*JWF*  
John W. Foster

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Monday, June 24, 1968 -- 1:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a bold negotiating proposal from Gen. Taylor.

Hanoi probably would not accept it while bombing continued; but it has great merit -- should Hanoi ever prove serious.

May I send it to State and Defense?

W. W. Rostow

Send to State and Defense \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By ky, NARA, Date 7-2-92

~~SECRET~~

June 24, 1968

33a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: A Possible Negotiation Proposal for Paris

In response to your invitation at breakfast last Saturday to suggest new approaches for use in Paris, I see one possibility which may be worth considering at this time. It is suggested by the comment of Hanoi delegate Tho reported in Paris 16568 and mentioned by Walt Rostow at your breakfast. The Tho statement reads: "That underscores what I said about the objective military facts being beyond our control here. There has never been a settlement of military matters without agreement first on a political solution."

The idea appeals to me of picking up this suggestion and of making a formal proposal to divide the negotiations into a political and a military component. The political negotiations would continue in Paris with the present cast of negotiators. The military negotiations might go on concurrently in Paris but I would favor suggesting the DMZ for the site and the field commanders of both sides as the negotiators.

The topics to be dealt with in the political negotiation would include the following:

- a. Cessation by both sides of reinforcements from outside South Viet-Nam.
- b. The principles to govern the withdrawal of the foreign forces of both sides.
- c. Arrangements for international supervision of the execution of agreements and international guarantees of the final settlement.
- d. The principles governing the treatment of the Viet Cong.
- e. Plans for the eventual economic development of Southeast Asia.

The interested parties in such a political negotiation would vary somewhat with the different topics. The cessation of foreign reinforcements would affect primarily the DRV, the United States and the Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) whereas a discussion of the withdrawal of foreign forces would additionally require the representation of the Viet Cong and of the GVN. The international supervision and international guarantees would

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-383

By *hig*, NARA, Date 8-12-53

~~SECRET~~

interest not only the belligerent countries but also the ICC countries, the USSR, Red China and possibly other third powers.

The disposition of the Viet Cong will inevitably be one of the most difficult items on such a negotiation agenda, with the primary responsibility falling upon the South Vietnamese to work out a settlement; but Hanoi and Washington would be highly interested bystanders. The inclusion of a discussion of the eventual economic development of Southeast Asia would be pertinent as a carrot to both North and South Viet-Nam, the attractiveness of which might facilitate agreement over some of the knotty questions on the agenda.

The military discussions, as I would envisage them, would concern themselves primarily with the conditions of a cease-fire and the detailed plans for the withdrawal of foreign forces, the resettlement of individuals, and the logistical arrangements to support these activities. The cease-fire conditions should cover both the bombing of North Viet-Nam and all military and guerrilla activities taking place in South Viet-Nam. The interested parties in these discussions will be the military commanders of North Viet-Nam and of the Viet Cong on one side and the military commanders of GVN, U.S., and ROC on the other.

If such a proposal for dividing the negotiations into two parts were made and accepted, what would be the advantages and disadvantages from our point of view?

Among the advantages accruing from this proposal would be the elimination of the need for agreement to a complete cessation of bombing as a prerequisite to serious discussions of political problems. It would bring all interested parties promptly to the conference table and make them face up to the many serious problems which must be resolved before a truce peace can be established in Viet-Nam. One of the most important advantages is that a successful termination of the political discussions would show both sides how they would come out in the end and thereby facilitate a settlement of the military points at issue which, otherwise, may be as troublesome and time-consuming as the political points. Finally, our side would retain the valuable "blue chip", the bombing of the North, until the very end.

The only disadvantages which I can see are by-products of the advantages. There may be considerable difficulty in coordinating two shows going on at the same time, possibly in widely separated localities. There will be many problems on both sides of the table in reaching understandings between allies, but inevitably they must be resolved at some point if we are ever to attain a binding settlement.

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

As to overall feasibility of this proposal, I have no qualified opinion but I think it is worth submitting to your principal advisors for comment.

M. D. T.

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, June 24, 1968  
1:45 a. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Bus Wheeler concludes,  
post-March 31:

- our position in South Vietnam relatively improved;
- enemy position in North Vietnam sharply improved;
- "I would expect the rapidly recuperating North Vietnam to make substantial impacts on us in late summer and fall."

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

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Authority NLS-CBS 21  
By icw, NARS, Date 6-26-84

~~TOP SECRET~~

34a



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 6  
By isa, NARS, Date 8-28-84

CM-3423-68  
24 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Military Posture Comparisons in Vietnam (U)

1. On Saturday you asked for my assessment of our present military position as compared with 31 March 1968. The following paragraphs amplify my remarks Saturday.

2. In South Vietnam, the enemy's overall position has deteriorated. Since 31 March the seige of Khe Sanh has been broken; enemy forces have received a sharp setback in the A Shau Valley; his May offensive was unsuccessful; and he currently appears to be attempting to avoid contact with our forces. There has been a marked deterioration in the quality of the enemy's fighting forces. Replacements are being committed to battle with minimum training. Battlefield discipline has also deteriorated; and there is evidence of increased use of young and older men, and even women in enemy combat units. Kill rates and weapon loss rates have been increasingly favorable to friendly forces. There are also indications that the enemy is experiencing increasing morale problems as indicated by sizeable surrenders, in some cases in large groups, higher ranking defectors, and larger numbers of desertions. The enemy has recently been putting pressure on the GVN through urban attacks. These efforts have met with only minimal success. The early June rocket raids on Saigon have been disrupted and the "100 rocket a day" campaign has not materialized. In the central highlands, Khe Sanh, and along the DMZ where there has been a buildup over the past two months for what appeared to be an imminent large-scale offensive, this offensive has not been launched. Instead, there is now an apparent pull-back into the border sanctuaries.

3. The enemy's overall position in North Vietnam has been enhanced since 31 March. His air defense system has improved significantly with the appearance of more and newer model MIG-21s, the doubling of his in-country corps of fighter pilots, the use of new or

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~~TOP SECRET~~

long idle airfields such as Bai Thuong for MIG operations, and the extension of fighter operations south into the panhandle of North Vietnam. Additional SAM and AAA defense systems have been moved into the area south of 20°. As the enemy is given more time to recuperate, reinforce and expand his air defense system, air strikes south of 19° N are increasingly threatened. His war-supporting capabilities have also improved. Roads throughout North Vietnam have been restored, improved, and extended. The port of Haiphong is now handling more cargo than ever before. Waterways, roads and rails converging at the logistics complex of Thanh Hoa near the 20th parallel are handling a two-fold increase in southbound supplies. Power plants and industrial facilities are being restored. The number of troops on the move south has reached unprecedented levels over the past several months with about 80,000 detected in transit since 31 March.

4. On balance we have gained ground to date on the enemy since 31 March. His Winter-Spring Campaign was disrupted, his casualty rates are high and his overall offensive capability appears to be declining. However, the greatly increased war-supporting activities in the north are not yet being fully felt in South Vietnam. I would expect the output of the rapidly recuperating North Vietnam to make substantial impacts on us in late summer and fall.



EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

130-0157 21 11 20

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Page 2 of 2 Pages

Monday, June 24, 1968  
12:35 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a ticker item indicating  
a Hanoi delegation has arrived in Moscow.  
This suggests that the return of Debrynia  
and Kusnetsov could be related to major  
decisions in Moscow about Vietnam; but that  
is purely speculative.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

35a

*Ristor*

FBIS 20

MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1115 GMT 24 JUN 68 L

(TEXT) MOSCOW--THE DRV GOVERNMENT DELEGATION ARRIVED IN MOSCOW TODAY. IT IS LED BY LE THANH NGHI, MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE VIETNAM WORKERS PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND DEPUTY PREMIER.

24 JUN 1249Z BJ/EAM

*Pres file*

36

~~SECRET~~

Monday, June 24, 1968  
12:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is Ambassador Bunker's lucid and vivid picture of the Thieu/Ky problem: how it evolved; where it stands; and what he proposes to do about it.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Saigon 30844)

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 7-2-92

36a

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Authority RAC 00015671

By jc NARA. Date 5-30-01

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PAGE 01 SAIGON 30844 01 OF 02 241152Z

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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5350  
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS  
CINCPAC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 30844

EXDIS

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF: A. SAIGON 30631 B. STATE 188955

1. I AM DEEPLY CONSCIOUS OF WASHINGTON'S CONCERN OVER THE REPORTS AND EVIDENCE OF STRAINS BETWEEN THIEU AND KY AND BETWEEN THIEU AND SOME OF THE SENIOR MILITARY. I DO NOT THINK, HOWEVER, THAT THESE STRAINS ARE AS SEVERE, OR THE POTENTIAL DANGER PRESENTLY AS GREAT AS INDICATED IN REFTEL B.
2. IN MY LAST CONVERSATION WITH THIEU (REF A) HE REVEALED CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEMS AS VIEWED FROM HIS POSITION AS PRESIDENT, SOME OF THE FOIBLES OF SOME OF HIS SENIOR MILITARY COLLEAGUES, AND PRODUCED SUBSTANTIAL AND VALID REASONS WHY HE HAD MOVED AS HE DID. I AM AWARE THAT HE WAS NOT FULLY FORTHCOMING, AND I AM NOT COMPLETELY SATISFIED WITH THE WAY HE HAS ACTED IN THESE MATTERS, FOR IN THE PROCESS OF SOLVING SOME PROBLEMS, HE HAS CREATED, OR FINDS HIMSELF CONFRONTED BY, NEW ONES, WHICH ARE PUTTING MORE STRAINS ON HIS RELATIONS WITH KY AND COMPANY.
3. THE MAIN CRITICISM DIRECTED AT THIEU BY KY AND HIS COTERIE FROM TET TO THE CHANGE OF CABINET, WAS THAT THIEU WAS INDECISIVE, THAT THE LOC CABINET LACKED DIRECTION AND CLEAR ORDERS, AND THAT THEY DID NOT KNOW THIEU'S PLANS. IT WAS THIS THAT GAVE RISE TO NASTY REMARKS ABOUT THE INADEQUACY AND DRIFTING CHARACTER OF THIEU AND HIS GOVERN-

Rostow

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 SAIGON 30844 01 OF 02 241152Z

MENT, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THE NEED TO ELIMINATE THIEU BY A COUP OR OTHER MEANS, OR FOR KY TO BECOME PRIME MINISTER.

4. AS THIEU SAW THE GATHERING STORM HE FOUND HIMSELF WITH A WEAK CABINET, WHICH WAS MAINLY KY'S CHOICE; WITH LOAN WHO WAS RESPONSIVE TO NO ONE'S DIRECTION, CERTAINLY NOT HIS; WITH CORRUPTION IN HIGH PLACES (NOT ONLY IN THE POLICE, PORT, CUSTOMS, AND MILITARY, BUT GENERALLY); WITH POOR COORDINATION BETWEEN THE POLICE AND MILITARY IN THE DEFENSE OF THE CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT; WITH AN INABILITY TO MOVE GENERAL VIEN, CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF, TO PROVIDE EITHER A PLAN FOR BETTEC COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT OR A MORE SENIOR OFFICER IN CHARGE; WITH AN INABILITY TO GET FULL COOPERATION FROM GENERAL KHANG, THE III CORPS COMMANDER, IN THE DEFENSE OF SAIGON; AND WITH CRITICISM OF HIS REPLACEMENT OF INADEQUATE, INCOMPETENT, OR CORRUPT DISTRICT CHIEFS.

5. THIS SITUATION, I THINK, IMPELLED THIEU TO MOVE MORE RAPIDLY ON THE COURSE WHICH HE HAD ALREADY MAPPED OUT FOR HIMSELF, NAMELY TO FILL THE POSITION OF PRESIDENT CREATED BY THE CONSTITUTION, THUS TRY TO BECOME THE LEADER OF ALL THE PEOPLE AND THE CHAMPION OF A MEANINGFUL DIVISION OF POWER BETWEEN THE CIVILIANS AND THE MILITARY. MORE THAN ONCE, HE HAD SAID TO ME THAT THE "WAR LORD" POWERS OF THE CORPS COMMANDERS WOULD HAVE TO BE CURTAILED. THIEU IS STILL IN THE PROCESS OF BECOMING A CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT, BUT I THINK THE RECENT MOVES HE HAS MADE, BEGINNING WITH THE INSTALLATION OF THE HUONG GOVERNMENT, MAKE IT CLEAR THAT HE HAS CHOSEN THAT ROLE. THIS FACT PRESUPPOSED A DECISION BY THIEU TO IGNORE THE AGREEMENT HE IS PURPORTED BY KY TO HAVE SIGNED TO CONSULT THE MILITARY COUNCIL ON MAJOR DECISIONS. HE ALSO EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO COMPLETE THE REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT BEFORE STARTING OUT ON HIS VCSIT TO THE US.

6. THIEU ALSO FELT IN SOME PERSONAL DANGER, FOR HE DID NOT FULLY TRUST KY, KHANG, OR LOAN, AND WAS NOT SURE THAT THEY MIGHT NOT TRY TO MOVE AGAINST HIM.

7. THIEU WAS AWARE OF THE MOUNTING CRITICISM OF THE PEOPLE OF SAIGON; OF THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN HIS GOVERNMENT, AND START BUILDING A POLITICAL SUPPORT STRUCTURE IN VIEW OF THE PARIS TALKS AND

~~SECRET~~

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PAGE 03 SAIGON 30844 01 OF 02 241152Z

THE POSSIBILITY OF PEACE.

8. IN MAY AND JUNE THIEU BEGAN HIS MOVES. THE DEATH OF THE TAN SON NHUT AIRBASE COMMANDER, AND THE PORT DIRECTOR (KY MEN), THE FORTUITOUS WOUNDING OF LOAN AND THE MAYOR OF SAIGON, THE ACCIDENTAL KILLING OR WOUNDING OF OTHER KY MEN BY OUR MALFUNCTIONING ROCKET GAVE HIM AN UNPRECEDENTED OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE CHANGES.

9. INSTALLING THE HUONG GOVERNMENT GAVE THIEU THE CHANCE TO BROADEN THE BASE OF HIS GOVERNMENT AND ANNOUNCE HIS CAMPAIGN AGAINST CORRUPTION; REPLACE THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR (VIEN, WHO IS CLOSE TO KY), WITH KHIEM, WHOM THIEU TRUSTS; RECONSTITUTE THE DEFENSE AND TOP PERSONNEL OF THE SAIGON AREA, AND DECLARE HIS EFFORT TO BUILD A SUPPORTING POLITICAL STRUCTURE.

10. ALL THESE WERE DECISIVE ACTS, AND PUT THE LIE TO THE CHARGE OF KY AND OTHERS THAT THIEU IS A WAFFLER.

11. THIEU DID NOT CONFER WITH THE SECRET MILITARY COUNCIL ON THESE MATTERS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT HE IS PURPORTED BY KY TO HAVE SIGNED AS A CONDITION OF THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENCY. AS I HAVE MENTIONED, THIEU HAS IGNORED THAT AGREEMENT. WHY HE WAS NOT FORTHCOMING ON THIS, AND WHY HE DID NOT CONSULT WITH KY AND THE OTHERS IN GREATER FRANKNESS--HE WAS OBLIQUE IN SUCH CONSULTATIONS AS TOOK PLACE--I DO NOT KNOW. IN ANY EVENT HE AVOIDED A DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THEM, AND SOME ARE NOW REACTING BY WITHHOLDING THEIR FULL SUPPORT OR DRAGGING THEIR FEET, NO DOUBT SPURRED BY KY.

12. I HAD HOPED THAT THE WAR CABINET IDEA, WHICH WOULD UNIFY THIEU, KY AND HUONG, WOULD BE THE MEANS OF OVERCOMING THE MAIN DIFFICULTIES, BUT IT WAS CLEAR FROM MY LAST CONVERSATION WITH THIEU THAT HE IS LUKEWARM ABOUT THE USE OF THIS INSTRUMENT. BUNKER

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INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 30844

EXDIS

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

13. KY'S POSITION HAS GREATLY WEAKENED, BUT HE IS NOT WITHOUT MEANS OF RETALIATING. HE CAN EMBARRASS THIEU AND HUONG OVER ANY PEACE SETTLEMENT. HE CAN ATTEMPT TO SABOTAGE THIEU AND HUONG IN THEIR EFFORTS TO PRODUCE A MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY. HE CAN PEDDLE RUMORS-- HE HAS ALREADY--AGAINST THIEU AND AGAINST US, AND SOW SUSPICION. HE COULD TRY A COUP, THOUGH I DOUBT HE WILL NOW, FOR HE KNOWS THE DANGER IN TERMS OF THE COMMUNIST THREAT, AND HE IS IN NO DOUBT AS TO OUR POSITION ON A COUP. HE MAY BE THINKING IN TERMS OF TRYING TO DESCREDIT THIEU. ONE DEVICE HE MAY BE TOYING WITH IS TO REVEAL THE SECRET AGREEMENT WITH THE MILITARY COUNCIL THAT HE SAYS THIEU SIGNED. I DOUBT THAT WILL WORK, FOR THE AGREEMENT IS OBVIOUSLY ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND ITS DISCLOSURE WOULD DESTROY KY AND THE OTHER GENERALS (AND MIGHT ENDANGER THIEU AS WELL). I HAVE A FEELING THAT KY IS WELL AWARE OF THIS.

14. KY AND SOME OF THE MILITARY SMART UNDER LEGISLATIVE OR PRESS CRITICISM. THEY WANT TO BE FREE TO PURSUE THEIR COURSE WITH NO RESTRAINT FROM ANYONE--WHICH IS DANGEROUS TO THE COUNTRY AND TO US. THEY THINK IN THE CRUEST TERMS OF AN AUTHORITARIAN MILITARY REGIME. THEY IGNORE WHAT IS SO OBVIOUS TO ALL THAT MILITARY MEN ALREADY RUN MOST OF THE

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 30844 02 OF 02 241418Z

COUNTRY. THEY HAVE CONTEMPT FOR SHARING POWER WITH CIVILIANS. THEY HAVE NO CONCEPTION OF A GENUINE MILITARY-CIVILIAN COALITION, OF THE NEED TO BROADEN THE BASE OF GOVERNMENT, OF THE WAY TO BUILD A POLITICAL SUPPORT STRUCTURE FOR THE GOVERNMENT. THEY THINK OF THE GOVERNMENT AS THEIR PRIVATE PRESERVE, AND THEIR SECTORS OF POWER AS PRIVATE FIEFS. MOST ARE NORTHERNERS, AND ARE LESS THAN DEFT IN HANDLING THE PRICKLY PROBLEMS OF SECTIONAL FEELINGS.

15. ON MOST COUNTS, THIEU IS WAY AHEAD OF KY, BUT THE HARD FACT REMAINS THAT KY CAN CREATE TROUBLE FOR THIEU AND THIEU HAS EXPOSED HIS FLANKS BY THE WAY HE HAS HANDLED KY. THIS IN MY VIEW HAS BEEN UNNECESSARY AND UNFORTUNATE, AND I HAVE SAID SO TO THIEU.

16. I DO NOT THINK THERE IS A GOVERNMENT CRISIS HERE, BUT THERE IS STRAIN IN THE TOP POWER STRUCTURE OF THE COUNTRY, WITH A POTENTIAL FOR SERIOUS TROUBLE IN THE FUTURE. I THINK KY WILL BE RESTRAINED BY A RECOGNITION OF THE DANGER OF PRECIPITATING A CRISIS. HE THINKS THAT THIEU IS ACTING INDEPENDENTLY OF HIM BECAUSE WE HAVE PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY MADE CLEAR OUR SUPPORT OF THIEU.

17. WE SHALL HAVE TO WORK AT THIS--ON THIEU, ON KY, ON HUONG, AND ON KHIEM, WHO IS A NEW FACTOR IN THE BALANCE OF POWER. ALL THIS WE WILL DO. THE WAR CABINET IS PIVOTAL AND ASSOCIATING KY WITH THE PEACE TALKS MAY BE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF NEUTRALIZING HIM AND ENLISTING HIM IN BEHALF OF A SETTLEMENT, THOUGH I RECOGNIZE THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENT DIFFICULTIES. THIEU WILL NEED TO BE CAUTIONED THAT OUR SUPPORT DOES NOT GIVE HIM CARTE BLANCHE.

18. I DOUBT THAT FRIENDLY, TRUSTING RELATIONS BETWEEN THIEU AND KY ARE POSSIBLE. DIFFERENCES OF TEMPERAMENT, OF AMBITION, OF OUTLOOK, REGIONAL DIFFERENCES, ALL PLAY A PART. BUT THIS DOES NOT PRECLUDE A MODUS VIVENDI AND MODUS OPERANDI, IF EACH WILL GIVE A LITTLE. THERE WILL BE GLORY AND HONOR AND OPPORTUNITY FOR BOTH IF THEY HOLD TOGETHER. THERE WILL ONLY BE FAILURE, AND POSSIBLY DISASTER, IF THEY BREAK. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, I THINK BOTH REALIZE THIS AND WILL NOT LET IT COME TO THIS. WE SHALL DO WHAT WE CAN TO KEEP THE SITUATION ON AN EVEN KEEL, AND I THINK WE CAN.  
BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, June 24, 1968 -- 8:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Walther Casper called me Saturday P. M., June 23, 1968, from Germany. He asked me to pass to you the following personal message from Chancellor Kiesinger, with whom he had just talked at length.

1. The Chancellor was "most grateful" for your message on Berlin.
2. The Chancellor was "not in the slightest worried" about basic U. S. support for Berlin. Unlike the situation in the past, there is "no nervousness" between the German Chancellor and the American President. There will be no requests for "new guarantees."
3. In the light of some reports that U. S. circles regard the Bonn reaction to East German measures as "lukewarm," he wishes you to know:
  - The German government takes the measures against Berlin "most seriously."
  - The "moderate" German reaction and the avoidance of "spectacular" moves is the result of a considered policy arrived at in the light of "the world situation." Kiesinger does not want Germany to do things which would interfere with East-West detente, Vietnam negotiations, or any other constructive possibilities.
  - Kiesinger does not feel he is acting from domestic political weakness. The German people and the citizens of West Berlin are "purposeful and steady." They would support stronger measures. The recent student trouble in Berlin should not be taken as a measure of any basic weakening of fiber there.
4. Although the pressure on Berlin was instigated by Ulbricht, it was clearly permitted and supported by Moscow. Moscow, as well as Ulbricht, will be watching closely what Germany, the U. S., and Germany's other allies do -- or fail to do. If our reaction and mood are weak, there will be further "turns of the screw" which could either change the status of Berlin or the status of the Eastern zone of Germany. Therefore, we must all stand up firmly at the beginning of the campaign of pressure. We must head this off before they decide "salami tactics" could yield them major results.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

5. The Chancellor is pleased with steps taken by NATO and hopeful that the NATO meeting will increase the sense of solidarity on this issue -- sending a helpful signal to Moscow and Ulbricht.

6. In addition -- because of U. S. influence in Moscow -- he hopes we will instruct our Embassies around the world that:

- The U. S. takes the pressure on Berlin most seriously.
- We shall resist further pressures.
- We are watching the situation closely.
- This attitude should "eaze out" into diplomatic circles so that word gets back to Moscow.

7. Our strategy should be to convince Moscow that it has more to lose than to gain by letting Ulbricht go further down the road of pressure on access to Berlin.

8. With respect to the NPT, Kiesinger does not wish to raise an explicit threat that Germany will not sign in the face of these pressures on Berlin. But he does think it wise for us to state what is the political fact in Germany; namely, the pressure on Berlin is creating an "atmosphere" in which the acceptance of the NPT will be "more difficult."

W. W. Rostow

*cc: Ed Fried  
State - Katzenbach*

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

Monday, June 24, 1968 -- 8:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

The attached indicates that, indeed, rail service through China to Hanoi has been interrupted during June.

The question is: Is this Chicom policy or is it a result of internal trouble on the mainland?

We do not know; but it could be a significant factor in the equation of negotiations if the interruption persists.

We shall, of course, watch it closely.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 01-178  
By cbm, NARA, Date 2-26-03

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/MARIA THREE

Monday, June 24, 1968 -- 7:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

The first two of these three telegrams -- [redacted] -- indicate that the Chicoms are opposing a Vietnam peace settlement. The third indicates continued serious trouble inside China.

3.4(b)(1)

*Per file*

W. W. Rostow

Paris 16851  
Paris 16850  
Paris 16849

~~SECRET~~

SANTITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-223  
By *Sj*, NARA, Date 10/19/01

WWRostow:rla

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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*Pres file*  
23 June 1968  
11:55 AM

Mr. President;

Herewith Bill Bundy's suggested  
State Dept. statement.

The questions are:

-- Should we volunteer it and  
put it on the wires this afternoon.

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

-- Should we use it to respond to  
questions.

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

-- Should we make it available for  
use in Paris where Murray Marder  
and others may raise the question.

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

-- Should we simply wait until  
regular press briefing tomorrow.

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

WWR

Kostow 2010  
Wright  
Jordan 40a  
Taylor  
Ginsburgh

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 23, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Press Handling of Vice President's Remarks  
on a Cease-Fire

1. Procedure. We believe the comment should come from the State Department spokesman, rather than the White House. Aside from the political implications of a direct White House comment, this is the way we handled the Vice President's remarks in Maine, and seems a sounder basic practice for all possible cases from other Presidential candidates. (If anything, it would be more applicable to the Vice President. We may want to wheel up White House guns on some of the others.)

2. Possible Text of Comment. We believe the Department's comment could be on the record and could be issued this afternoon. It is almost entirely a list of citations from the record and will not be taken to break new ground that we believe could disturb Saigon.

3. A draft text is at Tab A.

*W.P.B.*  
William P. Bundy  
Assistant Secretary

Attachment:

Tab A - Draft Department Statement.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *je*, NARA, Date 5-30-01

Draft Text of Statement by Department of State  
Spokesman

We have been asked to comment on the question of a cease-fire in Viet-Nam.

The US position on this question has been consistently stated in the terms used in point 5 of the 14 Points for Peace originally made public in early 1966 and amplified in early and mid-1967. (Text below is from the Department's "Viet-Nam Information Notes, No. 2, June 1967")

"5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference or could be the subject of preliminary discussions:

"--We have attempted, many times, to engage the other side in a discussion of a mutual deescalation of the level of violence, and we remain prepared to engage in such a mutual deescalation.

"--We stand ready to cooperate fully in getting discussions which could lead to a cessation of hostilities started promptly and brought to a successful completion."

On March 14, 1967 Secretary General U Thant made a three-step proposal envisaging "a general standstill truce," preliminary talks, and a re-convening of the Geneva Conference.

On March 18, 1967, after consultation with the South Vietnamese Government, the USG replied to the Secretary General that the US was prepared to enter into discussions of an

effective cessation of hostilities, "immediately and constructively." The South Vietnamese Government replied in the same sense to the Secretary General, and specifically proposed discussions of the necessary/<sup>details</sup>between the armed forces of South Viet-Nam and of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

The basic US position is further reflected in the President's State of the Union Message of January 18, 1968, which referred to our desire, if peace talks could take place," to see if a complete cessation of hostilities, a really true cease-fire, could be made the first order of business."

In line with this long-standing position, Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Vance have been pressing at every stage of the Paris talks for a reduction in the level of hostilities that would permit movement toward discussions of other topics, including a cessation of hostilities. To date, there has been no Hanoi response either in the talks or through their actions on the ground.

Most recently, the Prime Minister of the South Vietnamese Government, Tran Van Huong, appealed on Saturday, June 22, for an immediate cease-fire and peace talks between South Viet-Nam and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

Thus, we believe that the position of the South Vietnamese and American Governments on this question has been made fully clear over a long period of time.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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*Free file*

June 23, 1968  
10:50 AM

Mr. President;

Herewith two messages for  
your clearance:

1. Instructing Cy to probe  
Tho's remark of last Wednesday on the priority  
of a political over a military solution.
2. The other an instruction  
to Bunker on briefing the GVN on the Paris  
talks Tuesday.

The latter is reasonably  
urgent because Bunker may wish to raise  
certain points with us between now and Tuesday.

All hands in town plus Averell,  
are on board.

*WWR*  
WWR

1. Approved  
No \_\_\_\_\_  
Call Me \_\_\_\_\_
2. Approved  
No \_\_\_\_\_  
Call Me \_\_\_\_\_

6/22/68  
5:20 pm

ACTION 42

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Pres file*

June 22, 1968  
Saturday 5:15pm

Mr. President:

This cable instructs Ambassador Bunker to discuss with South Vietnamese leaders how to respond if Hanoi or the NLF suddenly proposed a cease-fire.

We need to know Saigon's current views on this subject and we want to tell them ours. Ambassador Bunker would reaffirm to President Thieu our firmly held position that a general cease-fire would be impractical and undesirable especially if it left the military forces of the other side "in place".

*Bromley Smith*

Bromley Smith

- Approved  
 Disapproved  
 Have Rostow call me

S/S informed BKS

6:15 p.m.