

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, June 22, 1968 - 3:00 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

I thought
Here with you might like to check this draft cable on the possibility of a Cy Vance visit to Saigon and a possible later visit of Clifford and Wheeler.

You might be also interested in an observation made to me this morning after breakfast by Dick Helms. He believes Cy Vance is the best single man we could use to sit down with Ky and try to get him to play ball with Thieu through the present critical phase in Vietnam. Helms is frankly worried about waiting as late as mid-July when Clifford will be there.

W. W. Rostow

Cable cleared _____

Cleared as amended _____

No _____

Call me _____

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-223
By *SJ*, NARA, Date *10/19/01*

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~
Classification

in late July, and we would have to come to some decision on this next week if possible. But neither of these seems to us likely to meet the need that a Vance visit would serve, since both the Clifford and Thieu visits would not have the focus and time for discussion that the Vance visit could provide. Moreover, a Vance visit could help in giving you and Thieu the feel that would be needed in preparing for the Thieu visit here if it materializes.

3. Hence, one thought that has hit us here today, and which I have just discussed with Harriman, is for Cy to come to Saigon following the July 3 session in Paris, staying 2-3 days and then returning. It is possible that Bill Bundy would go to Paris with Harriman on July 1 and then go on with Cy, so that all three of us, so to speak, would be fully in touch with each other's thinking at the same time.

4. Needless to say, we are all fully conscious of the need to do things at the right time and in the right circumstances. We would envisage that the explanation would be simply in terms of the desirability of direct consultation with one of our senior negotiators. Please let us know your frank opinion of this possibility.

5. We of course

BRK

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Classification

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5. We of course have no thought of forcing this visit on you or adding to your burdens unless you believe it would be useful. And we would certainly wish to have full exchanges with you on the topics which should be covered with the GVN in the light of the situation as it develops in the meantime. Our main thought is that it would be useful to have a full and leisurely exchange of views between Vance and you (plus the merit of obvious consultation with the GVN) and we believe that such discussions could be helpful as we look ahead here.

6. The general idea of such a visit had been considered by Cy and Avcrell, but Cy has not thought in terms of the specific dates. Hence, I am repeating this cable to him in Paris. Suggest you mull it over and send us a considered reply after he has confirmed that this schedule is feasible for him, or has suggested any changes.

~~XXXX~~

~~XXXX~~

7. One final thought (developed after the Secretary's departure) is that, in any event, we might need to weigh the effect of intervening developments in Paris. Our best hunch at the moment is that we may get a few more faint inklings along the lines of the XX Jordan/Le dinner, but that a major move on the other side does not repeat not now seem likely. If there should be some real private development in

Paris, it could make the trip more significant; The basic value of a Vance trip to Saigon as we see it would be to impress the GVN with the

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firmness of our stand in Paris and our unwillingness to talk about
the internal affairs of SVN without their presence.
What all this points to, in our judgment, is keeping our
thinking fluid, and in all probability not repeat not announcing the
trip in advance or doing more than sound the GVN out on whether they
would welcome it if it turned out to be feasible. But we would still
like to use this cable to clarify our view of what might be useful,
and specifically to try on these dates.

GP-3.

End.

KATZENBACH

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

44

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

Saturday, June 22, 1968
12:55 p. m.

Mr. President:

You will be interested in Gen. Abrams' assessment of enemy intentions and capabilities over the next several months. The report also includes, para. 4, his own operational plans and tactical approach.

Pres file

Key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

mac 8263

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By je, NARA, Date 5-31-01

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

SENSITIVE *44a*

EYES ONLY

O 220842Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV

TO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH. DC

ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII

ZEM

DISTRIBUTION BY CJCS

MR CLIFFORD
 MR NITZE
 MR WARREN
 MR ROSTON (WHITE HOUSE)
 MR GARVER (CIA)
 MR KATZENBACH (STATE DEPT)
 GEN JOHNSON (CSA)
 GEN MCCONNELL (CSAF)
 ADM MOORER (CNO)
 GEN CHAPMAN (CMB)
 GEN SPIVY (DJS)

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
 NLJ/RAC 01-180
 By *ctm*, NARA, Date *8-10-04*

~~SECRET SAVIN~~ MAC 8263 EYES ONLY

1. THE STAFF HAS JUST COMPLETED A STUDY EXTENDING ENEMY INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES INTO THE NEXT FEW MONTHS. WE EXPECT ENEMY OFFENSIVES TO BE STAGGERED THROUGHOUT THE SUMMER. FIRST, WE SEE ANOTHER GO AT SAIGON WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO. IN MID OR LATE JULY THERE WILL BE A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN I CTZ WITH AN EFFORT MADE TO TAKE DANANG AND THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES. AS FOR THE HIGHLANDS-WE DO NOT SEE ANOTHER OFFENSIVE THERE PRIOR TO THE FIRST PART OF AUGUST. THESE ESTIMATES AS TO ENEMY TIMING ARE PROBABLY ON THE NEAR SIDE. EXCEPT FOR THE TET EXPERIENCE, ENEMY ACTIONS HABITUALLY LAG BEHIND HIS PLANS.
2. FROM THIS LONG RANGE VIEW OF THE ENEMY'S INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES WE ARE ABLE TO PLACE LAST WEEK'S ACTIVITIES IN PERSPECTIVE. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION RECAPITULATES THE ACTIVITY IN THE FOUR CORPS TACTICAL ZONES DURING THE WEEK FROM 140001 TO 202400 JUNE. THE SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS ARE THOSE THAT RESULTED IN FIVE OR MORE FRIENDLY OR ENEMY KIA. ALL PERCENTAGES GIVEN RELATE TO SOUTH VIETNAM ONLY EXCEPT THE TACTICAL AIR AND ARC LIGHT SORTIES. ONE CAVEAT IS INDICATED, THE ENEMY BATTALIONS LISTED INCLUDE THE 304 AND 320

ADM JOHNSON (DJ-5)
 GEN MEYER (DJ-3)
 GEN BROWN (DIAAP)
 ADM VANNOY (ODJ-5)

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

*(now partially
or totally withdrawn)*

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

NVA DIVISIONS FOR I CORPS AND THOSE THAT MAY HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM RVN IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS AREA.

A. I CTZ HAD 92 FRIENDLY MANEUVER BATTALIONS (31 PERCENT), 93 ENEMY (40.6 PERCENT) AND HAD 23 SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS (25.7 PERCENT). THERE WERE 47 FRIENDLY AND 667 ENEMY KIA. THEY WERE SUPPORTED BY 2700 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES (37.5 PERCENT) AND DID NOT RECEIVE ANY ARC LIGHT SUPPORT.

B. II CTZ HAD 63 FRIENDLY (21.3 PERCENT) AND 50 ENEMY (21.8 PERCENT) MANEUVER BATTALIONS AND HAD NINE CONTACTS (10.1 PERCENT). THEY HAD 55 FRIENDLY AND 101 ENEMY KIA, AND WERE SUPPORTED BY 1109 TAC AIR SORTIES (15.5 PERCENT) AND 28 ARC LIGHT SORTIES (6.7 PERCENT).

C. III CTZ HAD 94 FRIENDLY (31.8 PERCENT) AND 60 ENEMY (26.2 PERCENT) MANEUVER BATTALIONS AND HAD 36 SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS (40.5 PERCENT). THEY HAD 116 FRIENDLY AND 678 ENEMY KIA. IN SUPPORT THERE WERE 1324 TAC AIR SORTIES (18.4 PERCENT) AND 331 ARC LIGHT SORTIES (79 PERCENT).

D. IV CTZ HAD 47 FRIENDLY (15.9 PERCENT) AND 26 ENEMY (11.4 PERCENT) MANEUVER BATTALIONS, AND HAD 21 SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS (23.7 PERCENT). THEY HAD 90 FRIENDLY AND 313 ENEMY KIA. IN SUPPORT THEY RECEIVED 525 TAC AIR SORTIES (7.2 PERCENT) AND 30 ARC LIGHT SORTIES (7.15 PERCENT).

E. THERE WERE 1039 TAC AIR SORTIES IN ROUTE PACKAGE ONE OR 14.4 PERCENT OF THE EFFORT. IN LAOS WE USED 505 TAC AIR SORTIES (7 PERCENT) AND 30 ARC LIGHT SORTIES (7.15 PERCENT)

~~SECRET~~ SAVIN **SENSITIVE**

3. (S) AFTER AN ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION AND INDICATIONS, AND IN LIGHT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE WEIGHT OF EFFORT OF AIR SUPPORT FOR LAST WEEK, I HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE A SHIFT. FROM NOW UNTIL THE END OF THE MONTH, EMPHASIS WILL BE PRIMARILY ON PREEMPTING OR BLUNTING THE FORTHCOMING ENEMY ATTACK ON SAIGON. AT THE SAME TIME WE WILL INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON THE INFILTRATION AND LOGISTIC EFFORT IN ROUTE PACKAGE ONE AND LAOTIAN AREAS, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO TALLY NO. SUFFICIENT SUPPORT WILL BE ALLOCATED TO ICTZ TO KEEP THE SITUATION IN HAND IN THE KHE SANH, EASTERN DMZ, QUANG TRI, HUE AND DANANG AREAS. THE TAC AIR IN TALLY NO WILL ALSO BE TARGETED ON THE SAM SITES IN PREPARATION FOR JULY OPERATIONS. TAC AIR WILL BE ALLOCATED AS FOLLOWS: ICTZ 25 PERCENT; II CTZ 10 PERCENT; III CTZ 25 PERCENT; IV CTZ 5 PERCENT; ROUTE PACKAGE ONE AND LAOS 35 PERCENT. THE ARC LIGHT WEIGHT OF EFFORT WILL REMAIN IN III CTZ THROUGH JUNE TO DISRUPT THE ENEMY'S INFILTRATION ROUTES, BASE AREAS AND HARBOR SITES. THIS B-52 CAMPAIGN AROUND SAIGON MAY TAKE 90 TO 100 PERCENT OF AVAILABLE SORTIES.

4. (S) TENTATIVELY, THE WEIGHT OF EFFORT WILL BE SHIFTED TO THE NORTH ON 1 JULY. WE PLAN TO KICK OFF WITH OPERATION THOR, WHICH I HAVE PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED TO YOU. THE OBJECTIVE IS TO SMOTHER THE ENEMY WITH FIREPOWER JUST NORTH OF THE DMZ. THE BOUNDARIES FOR THIS OPERATION RUN FROM THE GULF OF TONKIN TO THE YD00 LINE ON THE WEST, AND

~~SECRET~~ SAVIN SENSITIVE

FROM THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF THE DMZ TO THE YD93 LINE ON THE NORTH. AFTER THIS SIX-DAY OPERATION, WE WILL CONTINUE FOR THE MONTH OF JULY TO WORK OVER RP-1 WITH TACTICAL AIR AND B-52'S. WE INTEND TO SMASH HIS LOC AND INFILTRATION TO THE FULLEST EXTENT POSSIBLE. TO DO SO THE AIR ATTACKS MUST BE INTENSIVE.

5. (SST) THE ABOVE PLANS FOR LATE JUNE AND JULY RELATE DIRECTLY TO THE DISPOSITION OF FORCES IN WESTERN QUANG TRI. OUR ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES AND OUR PLANNED FIRE POWER UTILIZATION ARE INTERWOVEN. SIMILARLY, MY TROOP POSTURE MUST ENABLE ME TO STRIKE THE ENEMY WHEREVER HE CHOOSES TO COMMIT HIMSELF. TO DO SO I MUST GET THE UTMOST EFFECT FROM A FLEXIBLE WEIGHT OF EFFORT. I HAVE THAT IN TACTICAL AIR, B-52'S AND NAVAL GUNFIRE, AND I INTEND TO USE THEM TO THAT END. COUPLED WITH FLEXIBLE FIREPOWER MY TROOP FORMATIONS MUST HAVE THE MOBILITY TO REACT TO OPPORTUNITIES TO ATTACK AND TO THWART ENEMY THREATS. THE PLANS WHICH YOU HAVE APPROVED ARE DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THAT OBJECTIVE. THE SITUATION HAS NOT CHANGED IN THIS RESPECT BY THE APPARENT WITHDRAWAL OF THE 304 AND 320 NVA DIVISIONS. CONSIDER THE HISTORICAL PRECEDENT OF PREVIOUS MOVEMENTS OF TWO OTHER DIVISIONS. IN LATE 1967 ALL THREE REGIMENTS OF THE 325C DIVISION WITHDREW TO THE DONG HOI AREA FOR THREE OR FOUR WEEKS BEFORE RE-DEPLOYING TO KHE SANH. TWO REGIMENTS OF THE 324B DIVISION APPARENTLY DEPLOYED NORTH OF THE DMZ TO REFIT IN OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER 1967. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO SPECIFIC EVIDENCE THAT THEY RETIRED AS FAR NORTH

~~SECRET~~ SAVIN SENSITIVE

AS DONG HOI, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY HAVE DONE SO. THEY RE-
TURNED IN ABOUT FOUR WEEKS.

6. ⁴⁵ I CONSIDER THE REDISPOSITION OF FORCES IN WESTERN QUANG TRI, THE ADOPTION OF A MOBILE POSTURE, TO BE EVEN SOUNDER AS A RESULT OF THE NEW ENEMY DEVELOPMENTS. THEREFORE, I RECOMMEND THAT THERE BE NO CHANGE IN CURRENT PLANS. IN FACT, MY FEELING IS THAT THE PROMPTNESS WITH WHICH MY PROPOSAL WAS HANDLED BY ALL CONCERNED HAS PROVIDED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO BE AHEAD OF THE GAME.

INFORMATION

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Saturday, June 22, 1968
12:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith our Delegation in New York reports the bind they are in with no U. S. position on peaceful use of the seabed.

W. W. Rostow

USUN 5711

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 7-6-92

WWRostow:rln



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 367

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ACTION 10 15

INFO AF 09, ARA 08, EA 10, EUR 15, NEA 13, RSC 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04,
H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, RSR 01,
SCI 05, OST 01, SFW 02, MSC 01, AEC 11, INT 06, ACDA 16, /180 W
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R 212153Z JUN 68
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2356

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USUN 5711

SEA-BEDS--PEACEFUL USES

1. LEGAL WORKING GROUP ADOPTED WORK PROGRAM ESSENTIALLY AS PROPOSED BY CHAIRMAN BENITES PLACING RESERVATION OF SEABED EXCLUSIVELY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES HIGH ON WORKING GROUP'S AGENDA. USSR DID NOT REPEAT NOT OBJECT TO THIS PROCEDURAL ACTION DESPITE PREVIOUS PREFERENCE FOR RESTRICTING SUBJECT TO FULL COMMITTEE, AND MAY BE PLANNING TO POUND AWAY ON PEACEFUL USES IN BOTH FULL COMMITTEE AND LEGAL WORKING GROUP.

2. AT CAUCUS OF FRIENDLIES FOLLOWING MEETING, AUSTRALIA, ITALY, NORWAY, ICELAND, FRANCE, CANADA AND AUSTRIA, IN PARTICULAR, PRESSED US ON ABSENCE OF ANY STATEMENT REGARDING PEACEFUL USES IN DRAFT DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. CONSENSUS SEEMED TO BE THAT IT WAS IMPERATIVE FOR WEST TO HAVE ITS OWN FORMULA ON QUESTION OF PEACEFUL USES. OTHERWISE, IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT AD HOC COMMITTEE AND LATER THE UNGA WOULD ADOPT SOVIET FORMULATION. MOREOVER, ANY CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS WEST MIGHT HAVE ON OTHER ASPECTS, INCLUDING EXPLOITATION OF RESOURCES, WOULD BE OVERSHADOWED BY SILENCE ON WHAT MOST COUNTRIES REGARDED AS DOMINANT ISSUE. NOT LEAST EFFECT WOULD BE TREMENDOUS PROPAGANDA DEFEAT FOR WEST AND CORRESPONDING VICTORY FOR SOVIET BLOC. NORWEGIAN DEL WARNED THAT ANY FORMAL SUBMISSION BY US OF PROPOSED DECLARATION OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES WHICH FAILED TO DEAL WITH ARMS CONTROL COULD MEET WITH VIOLENT REACTION FROM MAJORITY OF COUNTRIES. DAMAGE TO WESTERN POSITION GENERALLY, AND NOT JUST US POSITION, WOULD BE GREAT.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-131
By uo, NARA Date 10-30-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 USUN N 25711 2123512

3. SEVERAL WESTERN DELS IN PRIVATE REMARKS TO DELOFFS IMPLIED THAT US SILENCE ON SEABED ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS AT THIS TIME IS STRANGE CONTRAST WITH PRESIDENT'S NPT STATEMENT LAST WEEK THAT US WOULD PROMPTLY AND VIGOROUSLY PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS ON EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO HALT NUCLEAR ARMS RACE.

GOLDBERG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

46

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Saturday, June 22, 1968 -- 12:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

In disposing of Dr. Hornig's report on bombing, I focused my questions around the 6 technical recommendations which were not essentially controversial.

In responding, Sec. Clifford has taken the occasion to go back into the substance of the report, which he tends to support. Gen. Wheeler does not support the analysis in the report.

But there is no disagreement about the technical recommendations which had been or are being acted upon.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By je, NARA, Date 5-30-01

~~TOP SECRET~~

46a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

21 JUN 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You asked for my views on the six specific recommendations contained in the Report of the President's Science Advisory Committee on the Effectiveness of Air Strikes in North Vietnam and Laos.

I have reviewed the Report and the views of General Wheeler which are also transmitted with this memorandum. My views also take into consideration those of the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force. We all concur in the Report's recommendations. A number of actions related to the recommendations already have been completed or are underway or being evaluated.

My summary views on the six recommendations in the Report are attached.

The Panel concludes that bombing campaigns such as were conducted prior to March 31, 1968, or possible expanded bombing campaigns, can only temporarily disrupt North Vietnam's and its communist suppliers' ability to maintain the flow of combat materiel necessary to support the war in South Vietnam. General Wheeler's comments reflect his disagreement with the conclusions and rationale of the Panel's Report. In spite of recognized shortcomings in the available data, I believe that the Panel's general conclusion is probably valid. This finding is consistent with other bombing studies which have been made from time to time. Also, I agree with the Panel that the increased pain and temporary disruption incident to possible expanded air campaigns still fail to make a convincing case for the institution of such programs and that, in the long run, "factors other than our air campaign in North Vietnam will largely determine the scale of the war in South Vietnam in the future."

It is my intention to ensure that full use is made of the Committee's Report in our continuing efforts to improve the effectiveness of our interdiction programs. I have directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering to follow closely these efforts to effect recommendations 1 through 4 and to keep me advised of our progress.

Earle L. Higgins

- 2 Enclosures
- 1. CM-3402-68 (TS)
- 2. Views of the Secretary of Defense (TS)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-408

By *ij*, NARA, Date 11-1-95

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 1 of 1 Pages

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X-3757

46b



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3402-68
17 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Effect of Air Strikes in North Vietnam and Laos (S)

1. (S) This responds to your request for my views concerning the six recommendations contained in a report on the effects of air strikes in North Vietnam (NVN) and Laos prepared by the Special Subpanel of the President's Science Advisory Committee.

2. (C) I have reviewed the report in detail, and although I do not agree with the rationale and conclusions of the study, I am in accord with the recommendations. I believe you are aware of my views which are shared by the other Chiefs regarding what would constitute the most effective air campaign against NVN and the results expected to be achieved were such a campaign initiated.

3. (TS) The following are my comments on each of the six recommendations contained in the report.

Recommendation #1 - Concur. Integrated operational plans for an effective air interdiction campaign are in existence at the operating level. The lines of communication (LOC) have been identified and are being interdicted as dictated by current intelligence of the efforts achieved, enemy accommodations to these efforts, and as tempered by weather and resources. Adoption of any alternative as suggested by the report requires only a shift in strike emphasis. Interdiction of LOC and associated targets is a dynamic and everchanging pattern. The enemy is not using stereotyped operations, consequently the weight of effort on any particular route requires continuous analysis, evaluation, and adjustment to achieve the most effective results for the effort expended.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 01-222
By no NARA, Date 6-29-04

 of copies

Recommendation #2 - Concur. The process of identifying and procuring equipment to improve air interdiction in NVN and Laos receives constant priority attention at all echelons. This process takes many forms, including: the initiation of Southeast Asia Operational Requirements (SEOR) by operational commanders, continuing analysis of US air operations in Southeast Asia by staff groups in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Pacific Command, and high level Joint Studies. Specific comments on items contained in the recommendations are detailed in the Enclosure.

Recommendation #3 - Concur. As a result of our continuing concern in this area, DIA formed a permanent Logistical Study Group in October 1967 to undertake an in-depth analysis of the total enemy logistics system in Southeast Asia. This group initially published in mid-January 1968 an "Enemy Munitions Expenditure Study" which is currently in the final stages of updating prior to republication in late July. Slated for publication is a complete analysis of all aspects of the enemy's logistic system as of 30 June 1968, that supports their war efforts in Southeast Asia.

Since late 1967, there has been a significant increase in the amount of detailed information available on the subject of the North Vietnamese logistics system, to include personnel infiltration trends. Current reporting should lead to a clearer and more definitive understanding of the magnitude of this effort, but will also provide a better basis for targeting decisions.

Recommendation #4 - Concur. The air supported anti-infiltration system, formerly nicknamed MUSCLE SHOALS, now IGLOO WHITE, became operational on 7 December 1967. It has been constantly reviewed to determine its most effective and efficient employment. The system has evolved from one which initially produced "real time" intelligence on truck targets to one which now provides an in-depth analysis of traffic movement patterns, choke points, truck parks, and bypasses within the Laotian Panhandle transportation complex. This type of intelligence has enabled scheduling of tactical air and B-52 strikes on the most lucrative truck targets in Laos with an attendant increase in truck kills. Other IGLOO WHITE supported interdiction and surveillance operations now in progress include: Route Package I, Khe Sanh, A Shau Valley, and enemy base areas 101 and 114 threatening Hue and Quang Tri.

~~TOP SECRET - COMINT~~

The successful use of sensors during the battle of Khe Sanh resulted in the development of a plan approved by the Secretary of Defense on 6 June for in-country use of IGLOO WHITE assets in support of ground combat operations in SVN. Additionally, it is planned that eight different combat applications will be tested by Army and Marine forces during June-August 1968. The results of these initial tests will indicate how to most effectively integrate IGLOO WHITE surveillance techniques into ongoing ground tactical operations. Preliminary conceptual work has also begun to determine the broader surveillance and monitoring role of IGLOO WHITE assets.

Recommendation #5 - Concur. We are currently flying the following photographic reconnaissance sorties over NVN:

- a. Approximately 20 tactical reconnaissance sorties daily. (South of 19°)
- b. Five low altitude drone sorties per week. (Primarily north of 19°)
- c. Four high altitude drone sorties per week. (Primarily north of 19°)
- d. SR-71 missions as weather permits. (Over entire area of NVN)

~~Photographic resources are available to increase photographic reconnaissance of NVN.~~

Recommendation #6 - Concur. In addition to the electronic surveillance that is being conducted against NVN, cessation or curtailment of bombing would free approximately 10 RB-66C ELINT aircraft for electronic reconnaissance. Additionally, US Navy electronic reconnaissance aircraft would be available if a carrier task force is maintained in the Gulf of Tonkin. The use of these aircraft along the periphery of NVN would materially assist in maintaining a current electronic order of battle.

4. (U) As indicated, the recommendations contained in the report are consistent with actions that are ongoing in the Joint Staff, the Military Departments and Services, and at the operational level.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment
a/s

Copy furnished:
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense

ENCLOSURE

1. The NIGHT SONG Study Group Report, dated 20 March 1967, made specific recommendations in the areas of night-viewing sensors and displays, and weapons of high accuracy. As a result, the Air Force has deployed to Southeast Asia for evaluation, four A-1Es and two B-58s with Low Light Level Television (LLTV) and one AC-130 with Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR). Sixteen B-57s with multiple sensor capability (Radar with Moving Target Indicator, FLIR and LLTV) have an estimated deployment date of CY 4/68. Three Navy AP-2H Trail Reconnaissance Interdiction Multiple Sensor (TRIM) aircraft configured with LLTV and FLIR are now deployed to Southeast Asia. A follow-on program for equipping 12 A-6A aircraft with LLTV and FLIR sensor/weapon systems has been approved by DOD, is partially funded, and is scheduled for completion in February 1970. Considerable progress has also been made in improving the accuracy of both weapons and bomb delivery systems. For example, project PAVE WAY was established in June 1967 for the rapid development, test, and deployment of Laser, Electro-Optical (EO), and Infrared (IR) guided bombs, to improve bombing accuracy. Predeployment testing was completed in April 1968 and Southeast Asia combat evaluation is underway. Development is progressing and deployment is scheduled for July 1968. The first IR bomb is undergoing captive testing. Deployment is scheduled for late 1968.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have supported the efforts of the Services to improve accuracy of all air delivered ordnance and recommended requests by the Services for more funds be favorably considered. Concurrently, the Services have been encouraged to emphasize improved accuracy in munitions R&D.

3. The Priority R&D Objectives for Vietnam Operations Support (Provost) Steering Group continues to place emphasis on improving weapons accuracy. Specifically,

a. The WALLEYE (TV Guided Bomb) is currently being produced at an optimum rate which will result in a monthly total of 650 by March 1969. It would be possible to increase this to 1,000 a month without construction of a new plant facility if funds were allocated. The WALLEYE requires a well defined, comparatively soft target which returns a contrasting image to the receiver. It is the judgment of CINCPAC

that 400 WALLEYES a month are adequate to attack available appropriate targets. The high cost of the WALLEYE (\$15,000) precludes its indiscriminate use against trucks and suspected bivouac areas. The pattern effect of a string of bombs is considered more effective against targets under a jungle cover.

(1) The Laser Guided bomb is under combat evaluation in Southeast Asia. Results to date have been satisfactory. This testing will culminate on 12 August 1968. The current production program will provide 100 Laser bombs per month. This can be expanded subject to final evaluations and determination of target requirements.

(2) Top priority has been given to development of the Laser bomb as well as other comparable precision bombing systems.

b. The improved Mark 75 Mod I adapter kit for the MK-36 weapon will be delivered to CINCPAC on the following schedule:

July -	290
August -	1485
September -	3960
Oct, Nov, Dec -	6930
Jan 69 and subsequent -	13000/MO

This kit will provide selectable time arming (after impact), a probability counter that will permit the passing of a random number of targets before activation and selectable time self-destruct. This increased capability improves the tactical flexibility of the MK-36. It would be possible to increase production to 20,000 without a new plant facility. The schedule cited cannot be accelerated without compromising the quality control of the fuzing system. The CBU-33 with the BLU-45 is in the final stages of R&D and will soon be certified for production which will reach a rate of 200/MO by February 1969. This could be increased to 275/MO with current facilities. Upon final R&D certification and operational evaluation, increased funding and production will be requested as appropriate.

~~TOP SECRET~~

2006

46d

The Views of the Secretary of Defense on the Recommendations of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee on the Effectiveness of Interdiction in North Vietnam and Laos

Recommendation #1. "Integrated operational plans should be developed immediately for effective air interdiction for each alternative campaign."

Comment: Concur. This recommendation has in fact already been fully implemented and existing plans are readily adaptable to changed circumstances if and when they develop.

Recommendation #2. "A more systematic effort should be mounted to identify and procure equipment which would improve air interdiction. High priority should be given to an intensified development and production program to equip aircraft with a system of night-viewing sensors and displays and weapons of high accuracy.

"a. Special attention should be focused on increasing the production rate of new weapons which are particularly effective or promising in the interdiction campaign, e.g., Walleye and laser-guided bombs.

"b. There should be a crash program to improve the capability of the Mark 36 and BLU 45 bomblet land mine by providing for delayed fusing and random counting in order to achieve and maintain interdiction of passes and choke points in the face of countermeasures and bad weather. It is also essential to press the development of new weapons which might be available in 12 to 24 months."

Comment: Concur. On-going projects and programs to implement this recommendation are being pursued with appropriate priority and support. It should be noted that Walleye and laser-guided bombs are neither designed nor expected to contribute significantly to interdiction effectiveness in terms of increasing the destruction of moving targets. When employed against appropriate targets, these weapons are expected to increase the overall effectiveness of the bombing.

Recommendation #3. "An analysis in depth of the total enemy logistic systems should be carried out to determine their vulnerabilities and capabilities. This analysis should serve as an input for the further refinement of alternate operational plans."

Comment: Concur. The recommended analysis is underway and useful results are expected in the near future.

Recommendation #4. "The results to date and present plans for the Muscle Shoals (electronic barrier) program should be reviewed immediately to determine its most effective use as an integral part of future interdiction campaigns. Other applications for Vietnam, including the monitoring of agreements that might be reached, should also be investigated."

Comment: Concur. A program designated as Duck Blind has been authorized to implement this recommendation.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 01-222

By ms NARA, Date 6-29-04

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EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

Recommendation #5. "Aerial photographic reconnaissance of all of North Vietnam should be continued during any period of restricted bombing."

Comment: Concur. We now have an appropriate level of photographic reconnaissance of North Vietnam. Any future reconnaissance programs must, of course, be consistent with and support both our bombing campaign and our negotiating objectives and posture in Paris.

Recommendation #6. "Electronic surveillance of all varieties should be maintained during any period of restricted bombing, with special attention to new collection activities which can be performed with resources freed by the change in bombing policy."

Comment: Concur. This recommendation is also currently being implemented and must compliment any changes to our bombing program and our negotiating objectives and posture.

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INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Pres file

Saturday, June 22, 1968
12:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Clifford presents his response and that of the Joint Chiefs to the 5 questions on the adequacy of our strategic reserve, which I put to him on your behalf on May 7.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *sg*, NARA, Date 7-6-92

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~

2005

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

21 JUN 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Five Questions on the US Strategic Reserve (U)

On May 7 you asked for my views, and those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 5 questions concerning our ability to reinforce Vietnam and on the adequacy of our strategic reserve. Our answers to each question are shown below. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are also enclosed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I are prepared to discuss these questions further with you, if you desire.

1. What can we do to get additional help to COMUSMACV if he becomes involved in another major enemy offensive?

We can send 2-2/3 divisions within 60 days (a Marine Division immediately, the remaining two-thirds of the 82nd Airborne Division in 45 days, our Marine Corps Reserve Division in 60 days), and more ground forces later. However, we would need to recall some reserve forces and temporarily suspend our present personnel rotation policy if we want to deploy such a large force and sustain it.

We can immediately put two additional aircraft carriers in action, providing about 5,000 attack sorties (more than a 25% increase in such sorties in SVN) for 30 days. We could also deploy immediately at least 64 of the 750 Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps fighter/attack aircraft ready on one week's notice (this would add about 2000 sorties). We could also temporarily increase the sortie rates of the forces already in Southeast Asia by at least 7,000 sorties. Thus we could temporarily nearly double our tactical attack sorties in SVN. (Another 90 aircraft can be deployed by December.) Finally, we could quickly more than double our naval gunfire effort in South Vietnam and increase the tempo of operations for the other naval forces. Most of these actions could be sustained for only 30 days. However, emergency conditions would dictate that we apply emergency standards.

Thus the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I believe we are far from having committed all of our available forces to Southeast Asia.

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Authority DOD Dir 5200.10
By Ag, NARA, Date 7-6-74

See Def Cont Nr. X- 3302

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

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Page of Pages

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2

2. What is the status of our plans to strengthen the Strategic Reserve? How can they be further expedited? When do we need to call up additional reserves? Will anything more be required in the way of Congressional action?

I do not believe we need to call up additional reserves, nor do we need additional Congressional action aside from extension of your authority beyond 30 June to call up reserve units and passage of the FY 68 Supplemental Budget. Mr. Nitze already has asked the House Armed Services Committee for extension of the reserve unit recall authority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that 32,000 additional Army and Air Force reservists, including 3 Army reserve brigades, should be alerted for recall immediately. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also believe Congress should be asked to extend your authority to call up reserve units beyond 30 June, grant authority to call individual reservists for up to 24 months (particularly to assist the Navy) and grant authority to extend terms of service for up to 12 months. I believe the value of the authority to call individual reservists and extend terms of service is not worth the political price.

As to the status of our plans to strengthen the Strategic Reserve and our ability to expedite them, as you know, we have now activated 2 Army reserve brigades and other forces totaling 23,288 men. We are taking other steps to bring the Army divisions in the US to full authorized strength as soon as possible. In addition, we would like to eliminate the 6th Infantry Division, which is only partly-built, to reduce the draw-down of key personnel and equipment from other units, thereby speeding their readiness. With proper management, I believe in the next few months that we can have all 6 active Army and Marine divisions in the US (not counting the two-thirds of a division under CINCEUR's control in the REFORGER program) ready to deploy with less than 3 week's notice as against an average of 13 weeks today. If you approve inactivation of the 6th Infantry Division, I can take all the necessary steps to achieve this goal. The key to success here is concentrating our resources on fewer ready divisions rather than spreading them over more unready units. I would like to discuss this with you separately. We have no plans, and need none, to expedite the strengthening of our Naval and Air Forces since these forces are adequate.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that we should not inactivate the 6th Infantry Division unless we call reserves as they recommended. They also believe we should retain the 116 B-52s and 178 F-101s scheduled for phase-out in FY 68-69, and the 3 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft carriers and 35 ASW patrol aircraft now programmed to phase-out in FY 70. Finally, they reaffirm the need for the forces specified in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) 70-77, emphasize the urgency in attaining these levels, and point out "the need to move ahead quickly on re-equipping and modernizing our forces." I will review carefully all these recommendations this summer, but I wish to point out here that the FY 70 budget requirement for the JSOP forces is tentatively estimated at well over \$100 billion.

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3. What is the status of US/GVN plans for expanding the Armed Forces of South Vietnam? What are the target operational dates for the new units? How realistic are the forecasts of operational readiness?

COMUSMACV, CINCPAC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended an FY 69-71 strength goal of 801,215 men for the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). I have approved this goal. As of 30 April, the RVNAF (Regular, Regional, and Popular Forces) had 713,300 men, as compared to 643,100 men as of 31 December 1967. I believe they can probably reach the 801,000 goal, but their ability to sustain that level remains to be determined.

The main new units proposed for FY 69 include no divisions, 3 infantry battalions, 13 artillery battalions, 2 engineer construction battalions, 81 ships and boats, 143 Regional Force companies (28,000 men) and 300 Popular Force platoons (10,500 men). All these units can probably be organized in FY 69, but additional Air Force and Naval units may require until FY 73. The cost of the recommended forces probably will be about \$3.0 billion.

I have not yet approved the detailed force structure and equipment recommended by the JCS, on 23 May, pending scrutiny of the impact of the equipment requirements on US force readiness, the appropriateness of the units and equipment recommended, determination of source of funds, and alternative ways to speed increases in RVNAF effectiveness. I am concerned that adequate steps be taken to prevent the mobilization from disrupting critical sectors of the civilian economy and governmental programs. I also want to assure myself that adequate leadership and equipment exists to enable the new and old forces to increase the contribution of the RVNAF to the war effort. I intend to move quickly to resolve these questions.

4. What are the critical equipment and personnel shortages which must be overcome if the foregoing plans are to be executed on time?

The key personnel shortage is trained leaders. The recall of Vietnamese reserve personnel will help, but more needs to be done. General Abrams is still working on this problem.

The key equipment problems identified by the JCS are: radios, machine-guns, grenade launchers, armored personnel carriers, some types of trucks, helicopters, and some boats. I am reviewing this list, determining if it is complete, and determining whether the shortages are acceptable, should be met at the expense of US forces, or can be met by new production.

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5. Are the...Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff satisfied that we are running no unacceptable risks in this period of reduced strategic capabilities? What happens if the enemy increased pressures in Laos, Thailand, Korea, the Middle East, or elsewhere?

I am satisfied that we are running no unacceptable risks. We are taking the steps necessary to increase the readiness of our land forces, our greatest weakness. We have 22 divisions outside Southeast Asia, including nine reserve divisions. We have over 2,000 fighter/attack aircraft in units in the strategic reserve, 750 of which are ready to deploy on one week's notice. We have 50 non-deployed major fleet escorts and fire support ships, 139 non-deployed ASW escorts and picket ships, and over 100 non-deployed mine counter-measure and amphibious assault ships, all in the active fleet. These forces are better trained and equipped than the forces they would have to fight. I believe these forces are enough to meet our needs in the areas indicated, and other reasonable contingencies. The forces needed in Laos or Thailand would probably be small for counter-insurgency operations or show-of-flag operations. For direct invasion, we might need several divisions, which are available, but we would not be able to maintain the present rotation policies in Vietnam. I believe Korea would need little or no augmentation by US land forces since the Republic of Korea has over 500,000 troops. In the Middle East, it could take 3-6 US divisions to stop a Soviet invasion of Iran, but I do not believe we would need large forces there and we would be able to supply them if needed. Similarly in Europe, the NATO forces are a reasonable match for presently deployed Warsaw Pact forces, and the Soviet Union cannot reinforce enough faster than NATO to gain a decisive advantage. The latest NIE indicates the Soviets have only 9 combat-ready divisions in the western USSR. In brief, I believe our forces match our needs, to the extent we can foresee them, and that the risks are acceptable.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, believe we are taking unacceptable risks. The Joint Chiefs of Staff state that "increased pressures in any area" resulting "in a requirement to commit significant US forces" would require "immediate mobilization of Reserve component forces and/or the redeployment of forces from Southeast Asia." They further state that we have an "extremely limited range of response options" to a Russian, Chinese, or other enemy probe outside SEA. In Korea, they believe that "timely reinforcement would be extremely doubtful" and that you would have to make "an early decision to employ nuclear weapons in order to avert disaster to US and ROK forces and the possible loss of South Korea to communist aggression."

Robert H. Sigard

Enclosure

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~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

2005

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JCSM-315-68

21 MAY 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Adequacy of the Strategic Reserve and Related Matters

1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 13 May 1968, in which you requested answers to five specific questions concerning the adequacy and readiness of our strategic reserve and the status of plans for the expansion and modernization of the Armed Forces of the Government of South Vietnam.

2. The answers to the questions posed in the reference are contained in the Appendix hereto and, for the most part, represent a compilation of information previously provided, updated to insure currency. More detailed answers to questions 3 and 4 will be provided in the response to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 16 April 1968, subject: "RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (U)." The reply by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is expected to be forwarded during the week of 20 May 1968.

3. This memorandum will serve to confirm the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on these matters, as presented during their meeting with you on 20 May. A more detailed overview of the entire worldwide US military posture is contained in JCSM-221-68, dated 10 April 1968.

4. Without attachment, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

Copy 4 of 30 Copies each
of 1 pages series "A"

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X-

3130

Incl no 6-3302

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, June 22, 1968 -- *to room*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Rec file

SUBJECT: Your Questions on the AID Fertilizer Package for India

I have looked into the two questions you raised. Bill Gaud and Charlie Zwick concur in the observations that follow:

1. Would we be criticized for shoveling out money in June?

Gaud doubts that we would. He told the House Appropriations Committee this spring that he would cut corners elsewhere at the end of the year to lessen the \$100 million gap in Indian fertilizer financing caused by last year's aid slash. There was no objection.

In any event, we have a very strong case against any such critic:

- AID's FY 1968 appropriation was signed January 2, 1968, the latest ever. Congressional slowness crammed virtually all the Agency's loan obligations into less than six months.
- Nevertheless, AID will commit a lower percentage of its 1968 Development Loan funds in June than ever before. If you approve the India package and a few other loans now on their way to you, AID will commit only about 23% of its loan money in June, compared to 32% in 1967 and 53% in 1966.
- Including this package, only about 18% of AID loans to India in 1968 would be committed in June.
- Most of this money -- the \$37 million for the fertilizer plant -- will be expended slowly as the construction proceeds. The bulk of it will not be spent for 2 - 3 years and the last of it probably won't be disbursed in less than 4 years. Expenditures from both loans in FY 1968 will be nil, so that it can't be argued that we are trying to spend the money before the \$6 billion cut comes into play.

2. If we don't commit this money now, will we have it for next fiscal year?

Technically these loan funds would remain available next year if we didn't commit them now. In fact, however, unobligated loan money would be Passman's most powerful "evidence" that Congress was right to cut the aid bill to ribbons last year and that it should cut even more deeply this time. This is not to say that he would not push such cuts in any event, but experience suggests that this is the best argument he could have. We may not be able to avoid giving Passman

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White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *ag*, NARA, Date *8-20-92*

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some such ammunition this year. There may be a substantial --\$35 -50 million -- unobligated balance in Alliance for Progress Loan funds. But we should present as small a target as possible.)

You should also consider the following points:

- The fertilizer financing need in India must be met now, in June and July, if the ground is to be prepared for next spring's crops. India should let contracts for at least \$95 million in fertilizer imports by the end of August, \$33 million in June alone. The second of these loans provides some of the foreign exchange necessary to do that. If we don't commit this loan now, yet we want to help get fertilizer on the land before the spring crop, we would need to commit the money very early in FY 1969 -- in July or August.
- This money comes from AID's Development Loan account. Along with the Alliance appropriations, this is the most important development instrument we have. It is also the most vulnerable on the Hill. Last year it was cut nearly in half -- down to \$435 million for loans around the world except Latin America. This is the place we can least afford to give Passman an opening by ending the year with unobligated balances.

Recommendation

Delaying these loans would not save on 1969 expenditures unless AID is to abandon further help to the fertilizer program in India for this crop year. Even then, it would not save more than \$20 - \$30 million in FY 1969. On the other hand it would weaken our support for the most hopeful current advance in the poor world -- the agricultural revolution in India -- and, at the same time, give Passman another potent weapon to beat the aid program.

I recommend you approve the loans.

W. W. Rostow

Loans approved _____

Loans disapproved _____

Call me _____

EKH/vmr

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INFORMATION

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Saturday
June 22, 1968 -- 12:00 noon

Pres file

Mr. President:

You should know we are watching closely Hanoi-Peking relations which appear to have deteriorated since the Paris talks began.

Specifically:

- Evidence of Chicoms demonstrations outside Hanoi consulates in China. (See attached sample report.)
- Evidence of difficulties with deliveries to Hanoi via China; although Cultural Revolution turmoil could account for apparent interruptions.
- June 5 Hanoi restrictions on foreigners travelling into certain areas which could have been aimed against the Chinese -- but equally could have been designed to restrict foreign access to repair and reconstruction of key targets.

Diplomatically, the Chicoms have indicated displeasure at the talks but do not appear to have cut all their bridges to Hanoi or ruled out later participation in a settlement -- if a settlement should emerge.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 16745

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 5-30-01

WWRostow:rla

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 292

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ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00,1070 W

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3354
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AMEMBASSY SAIGON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 16745

LIMDIS

SUBJ: DEMONSTRATIONS BEFORE DRV CONSULATES IN CHINA

MANAC'H SHOWED EMBOFF JUNE 20 TELEGRAM FROM FRENCH EMBASSY PEKING DATED JUNE 18 IN WHICH FRENCH CHARGE REPORTS ON HIS CONVERSATION WITH DRV CHARGE THUY. FRENCH CHARGE REPORTS THAT THUY CONFIRMED TO HIM THAT DEMONSTRATIONS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN FRONT DRV CONSULATES AT NANNING AND CANTON, BUT NORTH VIETNAMESE CHARGE DENIED RUMOR WHICH HAD BEEN MAKING ROUNDS IN PEKING THAT DRV CONSULATES HAVE BEEN OR WOULD BE CLOSED. MANAC'H POINTED OUT THAT UNTIL NOW FRENCH HAD ONLY HEARD ABOUT THESE DEMONSTRATIONS FROM THIRD PARTIES (ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR AND EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS) AND THIS FIRST TIME NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE CONFIRMED DIRECTLY TO FRENCH THIS DEVELOPMENT. GP-3. SHRIVER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By *isl* NLJ/RAC 10-213 (#149a)
NARA, Date 12-14-10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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INFORMATION

Authority RAC 09965
By jclics, NARA, Date 5-30-01

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Saturday, June 22, 1968 -- 11:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

Attached is a further report that the enemy plans to make a third and final effort in the current general offensive during June, after which they will retire for a while to reassess their position and plan for operations after the summer rainy season (end of August).

According to this report -- from the Danang area -- the summer campaign will be terminated at the end of June even though all objectives have not been attained. A maximum effort, therefore, will be made during June.

This corresponds with the report given us by Col. Ngot, the recently captured deputy commander of a subregion near Saigon.

According to Ngot, Phase 3 was to begin approximately June 21-29. He said the beginning date had not been firmly established, but he believes it will take place and last approximately ten days. Upon its completion, he said, the second general offensive will end.

This will also bring to a close the large offensive operation of the enemy until after the rainy season, at which time the third General Offensive will begin.

~~The~~ The present report goes on to say that the primary objectives of the third phase attacks in the Danang region will be the district headquarters of Duy Xuyen, Duc Duc, Thuong Duc and Dai Loc. Secondary objectives are Danang, Hoi An, and some other cities. Except for some minor discrepancies in unit identification, the information he gives on the units involved and their areas of operation are substantially in agreement with our current information.

We have also been following the enemy movements in this area and the recent pattern would suggest that they would try something exactly like this; i. e., moving up through these towns and, once into Dai Loc, moving on to Danang.

The enemy situation around Saigon also suggests another attack. Units which moved out for refitting earlier this month have been contacted again in the past few days and recent communications suggest that these units may be assuming a coordinated offensive posture before starting another round of attacks against Saigon and its environs

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-2-

Our original expectation was a major general offensive:

- in the Highlands;
- against Saigon;
- throughout I Corps.

Our spelling operations may have cut enemy plans back to:

- Danang area;
- Saigon.

But it is too soon to be sure.

In any case, the enemy appears to envisage a quiet period in July-August.

W. W. Rostow

TDCS-314/10119-68, 21 June 1968

WWRostow:rla


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50a



QUANG NAM

AND
DA NANG MUNICIPALITY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 35783

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PAGE 1 OF 8 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	SOO	ONE	CRS
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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

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DATE: NOV 2001

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
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 8 JUNE 1968

SUBJECT ENEMY PLANS FOR THE THIRD PHASE OF THE
SUMMER CAMPAIGN IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE

ACQ EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs (C) VIETNAM, DANANG (11 JUNE 1968)

SOURCE



EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-221
By Chm, NARA, Date 5-30-02

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
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(classification)

(dissem controls)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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SUMMARY: GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN)/U.S. OPERATIONS HAVE DISRUPTED VIET CONG/NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY PLANS IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE AND CAUSED HEAVY CASUALTIES. THE THIRD PHASE OF THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN WILL BE CONDUCTED DURING THE MONTH OF JUNE, AFTER WHICH THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN WILL BE TERMINATED. PRIMARY OBJECTIVES DURING THIS PHASE ARE TO OVERRUN AND DISPEL US/GVN FORCES FROM DISTRICT CAPITALS IN CENTRAL QUANG NAM PROVINCE, WHILE THE SECONDARY OBJECTIVES ARE TO PROBE AND SHELL DANANG, HOI AN, AND THEIR ENVIRONS.

END SUMMARY.

1. DURING THE SECOND PHASE OF THE VIET CONG (VC)/NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) SUMMER CAMPAIGN THE STRENGTH

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IN 35783


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~~SECRET~~ ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

OF THE COMMAND HEADQUARTERS OF THE QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE WAS INCREASED AND THESE FORCES ARE CONSIDERED TO HAVE THE STRENGTH AND CAPABILITY OF CARRYING OUT A PLAN WHICH WAS DRAWN UP BY THE QUANG DA SPECIAL-ZONE COMMAND HEADQUARTERS (QSZH). THE PLAN WILL FULFILL AN URGENT REQUIREMENT TO SUPPORT POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AND TO COORDINATE WITH OTHER ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

2. THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN)/U.S. SWEEP OPERATIONS IN THE GO NOI AREA, QUANG NAM PROVINCE, HAD NOT BEEN ANTICIPATED; THE VC SUFFERED HEAVY CASUALTIES. THE VC HAD TO GO ON THE DEFENSIVE AND THE OFFENSIVE PLANS WERE TEMPORARILY POSTPONED.

3. THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN WILL BE TERMINATED AT THE END OF JUNE EVEN THOUGH ALL OBJECTIVES HAVE NOT BEEN ATTAINED. THEREFORE, THE QSZH WILL MAKE A MAXIMUM EFFORT DURING THE THIRD AND FINAL PHASE OF THIS CAMPAIGN, FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END OF JUNE, TO PREPARE FOR THE RAINY SEASON CAMPAIGN.

4. THE DATE OF TROOP MOVEMENTS FOR THIRD PHASE OPERATIONS HAS BEEN KEPT SECRET. HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON THE QSZH PLANS WAS REVEALED BY TIEN NAM, DISTRICT

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

IN 35783

PAGE 4 OF 8 PAGES

~~SECRET~~ ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

UNIT COMMANDER OF UNIT 75, OF DIEN BAN DISTRICT, WHO RECENTLY RETURNED FROM A MEETING HELD IN THE LOC HIEP AREA.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

(COMMENT: THE LOC HIEP AREA, OR "B AREA" INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING VILLAGES IN DAI LOC AND DUC DUC DISTRICTS: DAI LOC DISTRICT: LOC TAN, LOC HOA, LOC QUANG, LOC PHONG, AND LOC PHUOC. DUC DUC DISTRICT: LOC QUY, LOC THANH, AND LOC SON. IT IS A LEVEL AREA WEST OF THE GO NOI AREA IN DIEN BAN DISTRICT .)

A. THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF THE THIRD PHASE ATTACKS WILL BE THE DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS OF DUY XUYEN, DUC DUC, THUONG DUC, AND DAI LOC, TO GAIN CONTROL OF THESE AREAS. MEANWHILE, A CORRIDOR WILL BE ESTABLISHED TO PROTECT THE LOC HIEP BASE AREA, WHICH IS THE STAGING AREA FROM WHERE ALL QUANG DA SPECIAL-ZONE ACTIVITIES WILL BE LAUNCHED BECAUSE THE GO NOI AREA WAS OVERRUN.

B. THE SECONDARY OBJECTIVES ARE DANANG, HOI AN, DIEN BAN, HIEU DUC, AND HOA VANG. PROBING ATTACKS AND HEAVY SHELLING WILL BE CARRIED OUT AGAINST THE IMPORTANT BASES IN THESE AREAS, PARTICULARLY AGAINST NON NUOC AND THE AREAS SOUTH OF DANANG, TO GAIN CONTROL OF THESE AREAS.

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

C. SABOTAGE ATTACKS OF SQUAD LEVEL WILL BE CARRIED OUT BY SAPPER UNITS IN DANANG AND HOI AN CITIES. IF THE OPPORTUNITY ARISES, THE QSZH REGULAR FORCES WILL BE STRENGTHENED TO CARRY OUT ATTACKS ON THE SUBURBAN AREAS OF DANANG.

D. SAPPER AND GUERRILLA FORCES AND WEAPONS HAVE BEEN INFILTRATED INTO DANANG ON A VERY LARGE SCALE. ALTHOUGH GVN AUTHORITIES HAVE ARRESTED SOME INFILTREES, ONLY ABOUT 20 PERCENT OF THE INFILTREES AND WEAPONS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED.

E. THE FOLLOWING UNITS ARE PREPARING FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS:

(1) THE 36TH REGIMENT, 308TH DIVISION, CONSISTING OF THREE BATTALIONS OF FOUR COMPANIES EACH.

(2) THE 31ST REGIMENT, 341ST DIVISION, CONSISTING OF TWO BATTALIONS, OF WHICH ONE, BATTALION 101, HAS BEEN DETACHED FROM THE 31ST REGIMENT, 2ND DIVISION.

(3) THE 73RD SAPPER BATTALION.

(4) ARTILLERY UNITS 68 AND 368.

F. THE LOCAL MAIN FORCES AVAILABLE ARE:

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~~SECRET~~

IN 35783


PAGE 6 OF 8 PAGES

~~SECRET~~ ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

(1) THE 3RD BATTALION. THIS NEWLY RECONSTITUTED BATTALION IS THE FORMER 7TH BATTALION OF THE 31ST REGIMENT, 2ND DIVISION, WHICH WAS ATTACHED TO THE QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE.

(2) BATTALIONS R.20, T.89, AND T.87.

5. THE 2ND DIVISION HAS ITS UNITS DISPERSED AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE 1ST AND 21ST REGIMENTS MOVED INTO THE BATTLE FOR KHAM DUC ON ABOUT 10 MAY, WHERE THEY SUFFERED HEAVY CASUALTIES. THESE UNITS HAVE DISPERSED AND ARE LOCATED IN THE SOUTHWESTERN AREAS OF HIEP DUC DISTRICT WHERE THEY ARE TO RECEIVE REPLACEMENTS TO RESTORE THEIR STRENGTH.

B. THE 31ST REGIMENT HAS DISPERSED AND IS LOCATED IN THE BORDER AREA OF HIEP DUC DISTRICT AND QUE SON DISTRICT, QUANG NAM PROVINCE. THE MISSION OF THIS REGIMENT IS TO COUNTER SWEEP OPERATIONS.

6. THE 36TH REGIMENT, 308TH DIVISION, ARRIVED AT BINH TRAM (WAY STATION) 21, LOCATED IN QUANG DA SPECIAL ZONE IN ABOUT APRIL 1968, WITH THE MISSION OF REPAIRING THE STRATEGIC ROUTE WHICH LINKS A SAU (A SHAU VALLEY) WITH THE A VUONG RIVER, AND WITH DANANG. THE REGIMENT'S FIRST BATTALION OPERATES INDEPENDENTLY AND IS CONTINUING THE ROAD-REPAIR

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

MISSION. AFTER 10 MAY THE 2ND AND 3RD BATTALIONS OF THE REGIMENT ON ORDERS FROM MILITARY REGION 5 HEADQUARTERS WERE PUT UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE QSZH AND MOVED TO THE GO NOI AREA TO AWAIT OPERATIONAL ORDERS. THERE THEY ENCOUNTERED US/GVN FORCES AND THE 2ND BATTALION WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED, WHILE THE 3RD BATTALION SUFFERED LIGHT CASUALTIES. THE REMAINDER OF THESE UNITS IS NOW LOCATED IN THE MOUNTAINOUS AREAS OF LOC HIEP, WHERE THEY ARE TO RECEIVE REPLACEMENTS AND RECOVER THEIR STRENGTH.

7. TWO COMPANIES SUBORDINATE TO THE COMMAND COMMITTEE OF INTERGROUP Q.82, WHICH IS COMMANDED BY INTERGROUP COMMANDER TIEN NAM, ARE LOCATED IN THE AREA OF THANH MINH AND VINH XUAN VILLAGES, DIEN BAN DISTRICT, WITH THE MISSION OF COUNTERING ALLIED SWEEP OPERATIONS. ON 7 JUNE TIEN NAM ORDERED THE RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENT OF THIS UNIT TO COORDINATE WITH THE RECONNAISSANCE UNITS OF THE QSZH TO STAY CLOSE TO THE THANH QUI AND VINH DIEN AREAS. A COMBAT PLAN TO ATTACK THOSE POSITIONS HAS BEEN PREPARED.

8. ALTHOUGH INTERGROUP Q.82 HAS NOT YET RECEIVED ORDERS TO TAKE PART IN THE THIRD AND FINAL PHASE OF THE

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

SUMMER CAMPAIGN, THIS UNIT MAY BE ASSIGNED TO ATTACK THE VINH DIEN BRIDGE, AND TO ADVANCE AND ATTACK VINH DIEN QUARTER DURING THE COMING DARK PHASE OF THE MOON.

9. THE QSZH AND MILITARY REGION 5 FAVOR REOCCUPYING THE PHU KY AREA (GO NOI AREA) AT ANY COST, AND THE 2ND DIVISION WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS MISSION.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

10. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE UNITS LISTED GENERALLY AGREE WITH CURRENT OB HOLDINGS. HOWEVER, ON 13 JUNE ELEMENTS OF THE 21ST REGIMENT WERE CONTACTED NEAR DAK PEK IN KONTUM PROVINCE, FAR SOUTH OF THE REGIMENT'S USUAL OPERATING AREA.)

11. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE CORDS CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.
REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

51

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Saturday, June 22, 1968 -- 8:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith from intercept material evidence of the enemy morale problem in the Highlands, which we have also gotten from prisoner of war interrogation.

"In northeastern Pleiku Province, Vietnamese Communist morale problems were discussed by the possible NVA 2nd Battalion of the NVA 95B Regiment in messages of 20 June. The battalion reported to its regimental headquarters that Allied psychological warfare tactics had caused difficulties and had influenced the unit 'in many aspects.' The unit indicated that 'a fear of dying' had affected the completion of assignments and stated that cadre had neglected to carry out responsibilities and had failed to conduct themselves meritoriously in combat."

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-178
By cbm, NARA, Date 2-28-03

WWRostow:rln

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

INFORMATION

52

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Saturday, June 22, 1968
8:25 a. m.

For file

Mr. President:

The attached indicates that Kosygin sent a letter to Hanoi on 13 June. Your letter to Kosygin was given Dobrynin on 11 June.

It is likely, therefore, that Kosygin took some sort of initiative with Hanoi on the basis of your letter.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NEJ/RAC 01-178
By chm, NARA, Date 2-28-03

53

Friday, June 21, 1968

7:30 p. m.

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 22000

By us NARA, Date 4-9-98

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith an outline of some of the issues you may wish to raise at tomorrow's breakfast. *I assume you will wish to begin by letting Averell give his evaluation of the Paris talks up to this point*

1. The next Paris meeting, June 26.

Attached at Tab A is Vance's outline for the meeting. It is wholly conventional and does not pick up perhaps the most interesting statement made in the course of the Paris meeting: "There can never be a settlement of military matters without prior agreement on a political solution." Therefore, you may wish to ask: How should we follow up this, the only substantive intervention made in Paris by the Hanoi Politburo member? My own suggestion would be that Vance follow up very hard at the tea-break with these three points:

- Is Tho suggesting we proceed promptly in Paris to discussion of a political solution in South Vietnam?
- If so, we should of course have to introduce the GVN into the talks.
- If Paris is inappropriate, is Tho suggesting informal contacts might be undertaken by their side with the GVN elsewhere?

In any case, our first duty in Paris is to follow up Tho's statement.

You should know that the general feeling about future sessions in Paris is that we shorten our statements; try to limit propaganda; and come up with new proposals. The danger with new proposals is that, in the effort to say something new, we shall simply erode our basic negotiating position. Nevertheless, some new proposals might be possible; for example, Gen. Taylor today suggested that we might urge that the military commanders in the field meet at the DMZ to discuss the technical aspects of demilitarizing the DMZ or -- even -- a cease-fire; although none of us really believe a cease-fire will work unless it is preceded by a political settlement.

2. Antwerp

As you know, the cast of characters involved in Antwerp is extremely suspect. On the other hand, what they have to say is extremely interesting. Therefore, we all agree:

- Bunker should talk with Thieu;

-- We should pursue the matter seriously but skeptically.

There is urgency about clearing the attached cable (Tab B) because we fear that word will get back to Thieu of our contacts before Bunker has discussed the matter with him.

3. The Indian cable

You should know that there is still no proposal agreed between State, Defense, and General Wheeler. It may be that we could clear this up at breakfast.

4. Encouraging Thieu to Establish Informal Contacts with the NLF

We know from good intelligence that Thieu is prepared for informal talks on a southern settlement when the time is right. His ideas about a political solution turn out to be close to ours. The question is this: When Bunker raises with Thieu the Antwerp approach, should he also discuss more generally the desirability of the GVN taking the lead in seeking a southern political negotiation? If Bunker and Thieu decide that the cast of characters involved in Antwerp are not the right contacts, I am sure that Thieu and the South Vietnamese could establish better contacts. For the U. S. the policy issue is: Should we encourage Thieu to move in this direction whether Antwerp is a dry creek or not?

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

~~copy~~
2. Pres file

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~-NODIS

Friday, June 21, 1968 -- 7:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Present Thinking on the Middle East

British Foreign Secretary Stewart has asked to discuss the Middle East with Secretary Rusk at the NATO meeting because he believes we're approaching another crunch point. To pave the way, he sent several officials from London and New York for talks with Nick Katzenbach this morning.

They believe pressures are mounting to throw the whole issue back into the UN Security Council. A big border incident could put it there any time. In addition, the Russians seem to be angling to get it back there, probably to isolate us.

We would probably lose control if the issue goes into the Security Council now. There would be overwhelming support to amend the November 22 resolution and to spell out the terms of an imposed settlement. If Israel refused to accept, the next step would be sanctions. We'd face the demand to cast our first veto, thereby isolating ourselves from the Arabs.

Our main difference with the British is that we think we may have a little more time. They see July as a watershed, after which we start going downhill if we let events and Jarring go on at their present pace. We're not sure the crunch will come quite that soon, but we're not complacent.

Our other difference is that it's not as easy as they think to figure out how to become more active in helping achieve progress toward a settlement. We would have to persuade the Israelis to talk with us about the substance of a peace settlement. So far, they have held out for direct negotiations and refused to talk substance with anyone but the Arabs. Our purpose would be to get for the Arabs a solid Israeli commitment to terms that the Arabs would consider at least reasonable enough to talk about.

The problem is how to appear to the Israelis to be making an honest effort to help and not to be selling them out. Secretary Rusk will only be exploring with Stewart the pros and cons and possible tactics. Obviously, he would wish full discussion with you if and when he has a precise recommendation to make.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 5-30-01

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~-NODIS

Friday, June 21, 1968
6:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Just to be absolutely sure, do I read
the attached to mean that Secretary Rusk
will sign at a White House ceremony?

W. W. Rostow

Yes _____

No _____

MEMORANDUM

ACTION

58a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 20, 1968

Rec'd 555 Jan 21 - 7W

Mr. President:

In connection with arrangements for the signing of the NPT on July 1 in Washington, London, and Moscow, the British have asked for guidance as to who will sign for the United States. Normally, such a treaty would be signed at the SecState/FonMin level although there are rare precedents -- such as the signing of the UN Charter -- for signature by Heads of State. State recommends, therefore, that Sec. Rusk and Amb. Foster sign for the United States and that we so inform the British and the Soviets.

You, of course, have the option of a ceremony at the White House or in the Department of State.

Walt
W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

White House ceremony _____

State Dept. ceremony _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *sg*, NARA, Date 7-6-82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 22010
By is NARA, Date 4-9-98

56
INFORMATION

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

Pres file

Friday, June 21, 1968 - 9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a summary of Vietnam items of interest, as of this morning.

1. There are indications that the 308th division, some units of which have been fighting near Khe Sanh, as well as the 320th division, is moving back into North Vietnam. The obvious reason is to get replacements; although I did not have the impression the 304th division had been fighting intensively enough to justify such a move at this time. Alternatively, the enemy may have decided to concentrate forces at the eastern end of the DMZ for later offensive -- or, even, to pull these two divisions back as part of a de-escalatory move which might permit them to persuade us to stop the rest of the bombing.

I will be asking Bus Wheeler if these moves are likely to alter Abrams' judgment about the redistribution of his forces in I Corps.

2. On ANTWERP, at Tab A is a CIA evaluation of the individuals involved. The direct contact, Dr. Hoach, does not look very persuasive. The alleged ultimate contact, Chau Long, might be of greater interest. Although the Saigon station does not regard the feeler as authentic, I remain convinced that it would be wrong and dangerous not to discuss this matter with Thieu. The Vietnamese judgment is likely to be at least as good as ours. And there is danger if Thieu finds out about it without our having told him. I shall be talking with Nick and Bill Bundy about this matter this morning.

At Tab B is Bob Ginsburgh's evaluation of the substance of what was said. The line taken is wholly consistent with what they might take if they ever were to enter into a discussion of a southern settlement which had some chance of interesting GVN and U.S.

3. Tab C is a further suggestion that the Communists are moving to position themselves to develop a Communist party that might run under a constitutional solution in the South

There is also evidence, Tab D, that the Communists are increasing political activity in rural areas and small towns, which may fit with a strategy of moving towards politics and away from war.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-2-

4. At Tab E is an extremely careful analysis, apparently based on polling of attitudes, morale, and problems in Saigon in the wake of the May attack on the city and the continued shelling. The report indicates that the people do feel greater insecurity; increased hatred of the enemy; and somewhat more criticism of the U. S. Neither the economy nor the morale has broken down; but protracted attacks could bring the Saigon situation somewhat closer to crisis.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

56c

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
June 20, 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~ ANTWERP - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: ANTWERP

1. My own personal conclusion coincides with Ed Lansdale's: "that we have probably heard fairly accurately from the NLF leadership, through this channel. Whether the NLF leadership itself can be believed or what the real reasons are for the NLF leadership putting this forward at this time, are matters for considerable further thought."

2. My reasons for this conclusion are:

A. The basic positions attributed to the NLF leadership are consistent with what we know:

- willingness and ability to dissolve front organizations at the drop of a hat when it serves their purpose
- hatred of the Thieu-Ky clique
- desire to destroy the constitutional basis of the GVN
- stated confidence that the VC are "winning" and confidence in being able to win "honest" elections

B. We know that the enemy - especially the VC - are hurting sufficiently that it is conceivable that they would be willing to negotiate a settlement.

C. At some step in a settlement process the VC would have to make some kind of a deal with the governmental authorities in the South - unless all the VC were to go North. While dealing with a "transitional government" would not be as desirable from their point of view as dealing with a "coalition government" it would be better than dealing with the GVN under Thieu-Ky.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ANTWERP - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-223
By Cbm, NARA, Date 4-9-02

Int B

(June 20, 1968)

SUBJECT: ANTWERP

D. The deal is predicated on full citizenship rights for the VC - which we have always recognized as an essential element in a settlement.

E. VC unwillingness to hold talks in SVN because of fear of treachery.

F. Stated desire for American presence to guarantee terms of agreement is consistent with hints we have received from time to time from Soviet and East European sources.

G. Statement in the second contact that it might take up to four weeks / attacks on rather than 4 to 7 days seems a more credible opening position. to stop
Saigon

H. Emphasis on "face-saving" for all sides.

I. The pitch for post-war economic aid.

3. There are several factors, however, which could indicate that we may not really be getting the views of the NLF leadership:

- The stated requirement of a "transitional government" was changed suspiciously quickly to a requirement that all that was really required was a new prime minister. However, this swift change is not incredible if (1) they really want to start talking (if not actually settle) in a hurry and (2) they are aware of the extent of the US commitment to the constitutional government of SVN

- Indications in the first contact that the Southern leaders among the VC were fed up with the Northern leadership. The added statement in the second contact was more credible: "Hanoi wants the NLF to settle with the Southern problems, so as to free Hanoi more in its relations with China "

4. Although the Thrush experience should cause us to be wary, there seem to be significant differences. Thrush was basically oriented toward the defection of one individual. ANTWERP is oriented toward a settlement. There seem to be fewer opportunities for individual personal gain - or shakedown - in ANTWERP than in Thrush. After reviewing the Thrush file, it seems to me

(June 20, 1968)

SUBJECT: ANTWERP

that the main lesson to be learned is that when it comes to intrigue, a Vietnamese amateur may be a pretty good match for an American professional.

5. In any event, without conclusive evidence to the contrary, I believe that we must treat the feeler as genuine while being alert to the possibilities of a political-diplomatic ambush.
6. Any program of follow-up should in my view include the following elements:
 - A. Thieu should be informed immediately without waiting for a complete US evaluation because:
 - at some point his cooperation is essential to success and we are better off if we deal with him frankly from the beginning
 - it is conceivable he might already be aware of the feeler
 - if the feeler is really an ambush, the best way of avoiding the trap is to work with Thieu
 - Thieu may be able to evaluate the proposition more accurately than we can
 - Thrush seemed to come perilously close to exposure because it was conducted without knowledge of anyone in the GVN
 - B. Immediate assurance to Thieu of our commitment to the constitutional government & establishment of substantive positions jointly arrived at.
 - C. Around the clock surveillance of the entire cast of characters from the outset.
 - D. Elimination of intermediaries and cut outs as soon as possible.


ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

Alliance Plans to Supplant Liberation Front

5. On 16 June a self-styled spokesman for the Communist-sponsored Vietnamese Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces reportedly said that, after a peace settlement, the National Liberation Front would be disbanded. The Alliance would remain and form the basis of a legal political party.

6. [redacted] Le Si Quy, who has emerged recently as a quasi-official representative of the Alliance, told a group of intellectuals in Saigon that both the Alliance and the Liberation Front would play important roles in negotiations that will eventually be held to discuss a peace settlement in South Vietnam. After a settlement has been reached, Quy predicted, the Alliance would absorb selected Liberation Front members and establish a political party that would compete openly with other parties in postwar South Vietnam.

7. Although Communist spokesmen have never been specific about their plans for the Alliance in a postwar Vietnam, they could see it as a face-saving device for both sides which would permit the Communists to participate in the legitimate political life of South Vietnam. In their own discussions of the Alliance, for example, they have demonstrated a willingness to back off from their original claims for the Liberation Front in favor of the Alliance. And they may hope that they can get around Saigon's stated opposition to the Liberation Front by persuading the allies to allow the Communists to function politically under the framework of the Alliance.

9. Quy is a writer and a former member of the French Socialist Party. The nature of his relationship with and access to the Liberation Front or the Alliance is not known. It is apparent, however, that the Alliance is attempting to further its acceptance in non-Communist circles as a viable political force associated with, but separate from, the Liberation Front. [redacted] the Alliance has been laying the groundwork for establishing a provisional government which would be prepared to negotiate with a counterpart provisional government in Saigon.

V-2

20 June 1968

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-141-022-008/15
By K NARA, Date 11-2-09

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tab C

Communist Political Activities in the Countryside

10. There were few indications two months ago of Communist efforts to establish local "revolutionary administrations" or committees in the countryside. More recently, however, the enemy appears to have accelerated this effort. Now all the provinces of II Corps have reported that the Viet Cong are doing some organizational work in support of revolutionary administrations.

11. Vietnamese police informant reports, captured documents, and seized propaganda leaflets indicate the Viet Cong either have established or are planning to establish revolutionary administrations in the rural hamlets of Phu Bon, Pleiku, and Phu Yen provinces. Such committees reportedly have already been formed--with varying degrees of success--in Tuyen Duc, Binh Thuan, Binh Dinh, Darlac, and Kontum provinces. Some effort seems to have been made to organize committees in the remaining provinces of II Corps--Quang Duc, Lam Dong, Ninh Thuan and Khanh Hoa.

12. Some of the hamlet and village administrations formed by the Viet Cong in areas which they recently gained access to have been easily dissolved when the government re-established its presence. Police operations have reduced the effectiveness of others. In several provinces, government officials claim that the Viet Cong committees have "not been successful enough" to warrant their serious attention.

13. Reports suggest that in many areas of II Corps the Viet Cong move in the countryside with a degree of impunity. Frequent entries by the enemy into hamlets suggest that if the Viet Cong wish to accelerate the pace of this political effort they probably can do so.

14. No formal presence of the new Alliance groups in II Corps has been announced by the Communists, but some local propaganda effort has been apparent. Perhaps noteworthy as an example of flexibility in the enemy's tactics are the instances in II Corps where the Viet Cong do not use the terms "Vietnamese Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces" or "revolutionary administrations," but instead use some variation. In Binh Dinh Province, for example, there have been reports of a Binh Dinh People's Force for Peace and Sovereignty. In Kontum, references to a People's Democratic and Peaceful Alliance Front have recently appeared.

CONFIDENTIAL

The D

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 0198-26-2-21
NAR. Date 12-08-2017
By LJA

~~SECRET~~

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OO YEKADS
DE YSNKQA 48 172224Z
O 202240Z ZYH ZFF-3
FM GEN WHEELER CJCS
INFO WHITE HOUSE ROSTOW
NSTATE KATZENBACK
CIA CARVER
O 191345Z ZYH ZFF-3
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
TO ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII
INFO GEN WHEELER CJCS
ZEM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4
By ispy, NARA, Date 8-17-92

~~SECRET~~ MAC 8128 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF FOUR

- REF: A. MAC 7605 DTG 091112Z JUN 68 (TS)
B. CINCPAC DTG 100618Z JUN 68 (TS)
C. COMUSMACV 16638 DTG 100730Z JUN 68 (S)

- (U) THIS MESSAGE EXTENDS REFERENCE A BY PROVIDING THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENTS REQUESTED IN REFERENCE B.
- (S) THE ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENTS OF THE IMPACT OF CONTINUING ATTACKS ON SAIGON FOLLOW:

A. STABILITY OF THE GVN. SO FAR THE VC ATTACKS ON SAIGON HAVE SERVED TO TURN PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST THE VC, AND STRENGTHEN THE RESOLVE OF CIVIL SERVANTS AND THE PUBLIC IN GENERAL TO SUPPORT THE GVN. MORALE REMAINS HIGH. IMPATIENCE IS GROWING, HOWEVER, AND IF THE ATTACKS CONTINUE OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL MONTHS, CRACKS COULD BEGIN TO SHOW, AFFECTING GOVERNMENTAL STABILITY IN SEVERAL WAYS:

(1) DURING THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE ON THE SECURITY SITUATION, SOME SENATORS CRITICIZED THE GVN FOR FAILURE TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE. CHARGES OF INEFFECTIVENESS WERE LEVELED AT THE DEFENSE MINISTRY ALONG WITH SUGGESTIONS THAT QUOTE RESIGNATIONS OF SOME RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS WOULD BE IN ORDER UNQUOTE. IF THE VC ATTACKS CONTINUE WITH NO INDICATION OF LET-UP AND NO INDICATION OF ARVN/US ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THEM EFFECTIVELY, PRESSURE MIGHT GROW WITHIN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO FORCE CABINET CHANGES, OR EVEN THE REMOVAL OF PRIME MINISTER HUONG. THE HUONG GOVERNMENT IS ABOUT THE BEST THE GVN COULD HOPE TO PULL TOGETHER AT THE PRESENT TIME, AND AN ATTEMPT BY A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF ASSEMBLY MEMBERS TO BRING HIS GOVERNMENT DOWN WOULD BE SERIOUS. AT THE PRESENT TIME THAT DOES NOT SEEM A LIKELY PROSPECT, BUT IT CANNOT BE RULED OUT. ONE THING WHICH SOME ASSEMBLY MEMBERS HELD AGAINST NGUYEN VAN LOC WAS THE FAILURE OF HIS GOVERNMENT TO PROTECT SAIGON AGAINST THE TET ATTACKS. A HINT OF SIMILAR IMPATIENCE DIRECTED AGAINST HUONG HAS ALREADY APPEARED IN AT LEAST ONE SAIGON NEWSPAPER EDITORIAL.

(2) IF DESTRUCTION IN THE CITY CONTINUES, RESIDENTS OF THE DESTROYED AREAS MIGHT AT SOME POINT STAGE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THIS WOULD BE MOST LIKELY IF THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD FALL SHORT ON ITS PROMISES TO THE HOMELESS. IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT THERE ARE VC IN ALL OF THE REFUGEE CAMPS, AND IF THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES CONTINUES TO GROW, THE VC MIGHT BE ABLE TO CAPITALIZE ON THE DESPAIR OF THE REFUGEES TO GENERATE DEMONSTRATIONS.

Jul E

THE IMPACT OF THE VC ATTACKS AND CONTINUATION

GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE SHORT ON THE PROVISIONS TO THE REFUGEE CAMPS, MUST BE ASSUMED THAT THERE ARE VC IN ALL OF THE REFUGEE CAMPS, AND IF THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES CONTINUES TO GROW, THE VC MIGHT BE ABLE TO CAPITALIZE ON THE DESPAIR OF THE REFUGEES TO GENERATE DEMONSTRATIONS.

(3) REPEATED RECURRENCE OF THE VC ATTACKS, AND CONTINUATION OF THE ATMOSPHERE OF UNCERTAINTY OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD, COULD LEAD TO A GENERAL IMPAIRMENT OF MORALE AND WILL TO WORK, RESULTING IN A WEAKENING OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLICE PERFORMANCE TO THE POINT OF PARALYSIS, OR TO A POINT AT WHICH THE MILITARY MIGHT FEEL COMPELLED TO TRY TO TAKE OVER BY A COUP OF ONE SORT OR ANOTHER.

B. CIVILIAN MORALE. THIS ASSESSMENT IS BASED ON GENERAL PURPOSE SURVEYS WHICH INCLUDED QUESTIONS, ANSWERS TO WHICH MIGHT BE REGARDED AS PARTIAL INDICES OF MORALE. ATTITUDINAL DATA ARE AVAILABLE ON THE FOLLOWING FACTORS:

(1) DEGREE OF PHYSICAL SECURITY PERCEIVED. THE MAY ATTACKS TENDED TO DIMINISH THE SENSE OF PHYSICAL SECURITY OF THE MAJORITY OF SAIGON'S RESIDENTS, AS DID THE EARLIER TET OFFENSIVE. HOWEVER, A MAJORITY DID FEEL MORE SECURE THAN THEY FELT DURING TET, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE EXPERIENCE GAINED DURING TET AND THE ENHANCED CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY OF ARVN TO COPE WITH THE SITUATION BASED ON THEIR TET PERFORMANCE. A MINORITY FELT LESS SECURE THAN DURING TET (27 PERCENT) OR ABOUT THE SAME AS DURING TET (13 PERCENT).

(2) DEGREE OF EXPECTATIONS OF FUTURE HARDSHIP AND READINESS TO ENDURE IT. THE TET OFFENSIVE WAS SOMETHING OF A TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCE TO URBAN DWELLERS MOST OF WHOM HAD NEVER HAD THE WAR BROUGHT TO THEIR DOORS. THE MAY ATTACKS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WERE LARGELY EXPECTED. SOON AFTER TET IT WAS COMMONLY EXPECTED THAT THE VC WOULD PERSIST IN MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS IN THE MONTHS TO COME (60 PERCENT) AND SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS FORESAW CONTINUED TERRORISTIC ACTIVITIES (44 PERCENT), ATTEMPTS TO CUT SUPPLY ROUTES (42 PERCENT) AND TO A LESSER EXTENT ATTEMPTS AT GROUND ATTACKS (16 PERCENT). WARNINGS FROM INTELLIGENCE SOURCES REMOVED VIRTUALLY ALL ELEMENT OF SURPRISE FROM THE MAY ATTACKS. THERE WAS NO UNDUE PESSIMISM OR TENDENCY TO PANIC AS SUGGESTED BY THE FACT THAT ONLY FIVE PERCENT THOUGHT THE VC WOULD BE ABLE TO HOLD THE CITY EVEN FOR A SHORT TIME. A SURVEY IN LATE MAY INDICATED THAT SOMEWHAT MORE ANTICIPATED FURTHER MORTARING AND ROCKETING, AND SOMEWHAT LESS ANTICIPATED CUTTING SUPPLY ROUTES. THE VC WERE UNABLE TO INSTILL THE THOUGHT THAT THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO HOLD THE CITY EVEN TEMPORARILY. THAT THE CITIZENS OF SAIGON DID NOT HAVE THEIR RESOLVE SIGNIFICANTLY DIMINISHED AFTER THREE WEEKS OF THE MAY ATTACKS IS SUGGESTED BY THE FACT THAT WHEN ASKED WHAT THEY CONSIDERED THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS FACING THEIR COUNTRY THE CLEAR EMPHASIS WAS ON PROSECUTING THE WAR (41 PERCENT) AS COMPARED TO TERMINATING THE WAR AND FACING THE PEACE TALKS (24 PERCENT).

900

~~SECRET~~

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(3) ATTITUDE TOWARD GVN'S PRESENT EFFORTS TO COPE WITH ITS PROBLEMS. THREE WEEKS AFTER THE MAY ATTACKS A MAJORITY (61 PERCENT) OF SAIGON'S GENERAL PUBLIC INDICATED SATISFACTION WITH THE GVN CIVILIAN RELIEF EFFORTS COMPARED WITH 75 PERCENT SATISFACTION AFTER TET. REFUGEE RELIEF AND THE CHANGE IN CABINET WERE GENERALLY WELL RECEIVED. WHEN ASKED AT THE END OF MAY WHAT THE GVN HAD DONE IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS THAT THEY DID NOT LIKE, THE LEADING CRITICISMS RELATED TO INABILITY TO COPE WITH ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT.

(4) ATTITUDE TOWARD ARVN'S RECENT PERFORMANCE AND ITS ABILITY TO PROVIDE FUTURE PROTECTION. EIGHT IN TEN EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH ARVN'S RESPONSE TO THE MAY ATTACKS AND MORE THAN EIGHT IN TEN CLAIMED THAT AS A RESULT OF ITS PERFORMANCE IN MAY THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY OF ARVN TO PROTECT SAIGON HAD BEEN INCREASED. SIMILARLY SEVEN IN TEN EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THEIR CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY OF THE NATIONAL POLICE TO PROTECT THE CITY HAD ALSO INCREASED. ARVN WAS MOST OFTEN CRITICIZED FOR LOOTING AND CARELESS EXERCISE OF FIREPOWER IN CIVILIAN AREAS, BUT NO MORE THAN SIX PERCENT RAISE THESE PROBLEMS WHEN ASKED WHAT THEY DID NOT LIKE ABOUT THE WAY ARVN FOUGHT OR BEHAVED.

(5) ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ENEMY. THE POST-TET DECLINE OF THE VC IMAGE CONTINUED TO DIMINISH AS A RESULT OF THE MAY ATTACKS. HALF OF THE PEOPLE CLAIMED THAT THEIR OPINION OF THE VC CHANGED AS A RESULT OF THE MAY ATTACKS, MOSTLY IN THE DIRECTION OF STRONGER DISLIKE (42 PERCENT) AND ONLY TO A RELATIVELY SMALL EXTENT IN THE DIRECTION OF GREATER FEAR (FOUR PERCENT.)

C. ARVN MORALE. THE ATTACKS ON SAIGON BY INDIRECT FIRE AND SMALL UNIT PROBES HAVE HAD NO DISCERNIBLE EFFECT ON RVNAF TROOP MORALE. IN THE FIGHTING WITHIN THE CITY THE RVNAF HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL. THEY ARE ACUTELY AWARE, HOWEVER, OF THE INDISCRIMINATE NATURE OF THE ENEMY'S ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACKS AND OF THE GREAT DIFFICULTY WHICH WE ARE HAVING IN STOPPING THEM. IN THE HIGHER ECHELONS OF RVNAF LEADERSHIP THERE IS A NOTICEABLE SENSE OF URGENCY TO DO SOMETHING TO HALT THIS WANTON ASSAULT ON THE PEOPLE OF THE CITY. IT HAS BECOME A FACTOR OF OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE TO THEM. THIS PREOCCUPATION WITH THE ATTACKS ON THE CITY WILL CERTAINLY CREATE A STRAIN ON RVNAF MORALE, IF THE ATTACKS CONTINUE. ALSO, THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ATTACKS COULD CAUSE RECRIMINATION BETWEEN

THE RVNAF AND CIVILIAN ELEMENTS. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY A SITUATION IN WHICH THE US FORCES WILL SHARE A PORTION OF THE CRITICISM.

D. THE CIVILIAN ECONOMY (ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF SAIGON).

(1) THE CONTINUED ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACKS ON SAIGON, COMBINED WITH INTERMITTENT FIGHTING, ARE HAVING CUMULATIVE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMY OF THE CITY AND OF SURROUNDING RURAL AREAS. SO FAR, THESE EFFECTS HAVE BEEN HELD WITHIN BOUNDS, AND RECOVERY WOULD BE RAPID IF THE ATTACKS CEASED. HOWEVER, IF THESE ATTACKS CONTINUE OVER SEVERAL MORE WEEKS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ECONOMY OF THE CITY MIGHT BREAK DOWN IN SOME IMPORTANT RESPECTS. THE ADVERSE EFFECTS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE THE RENEWED ATTACKS CANNOT ALWAYS BE CLEARLY DISTINGUISHED FROM LINGERING EFFECTS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE. INSOFAR AS THEY CAN BE IDENTIFIED, THEY ARE AS FOLLOWS: (1) THE CONFIDENCE OF BUSINESSMEN, WHICH WAS REVIVING RAPIDLY IN APR, HAS RECEIVED A SEVERE SETBACK REFLECTED IN POSTPONEMENT OF NEW INVESTMENTS, STAGNATION IN IMPORT LICENSING, ETC.; (2) CONSUMERS HAVE ALSO AGAIN APPARENTLY RETRENCHED. SALES IN STORES ARE LESS THAN HALF THE PRE-TET RATE, AFTER A REVIVAL IN MAR-APR; (3) A NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL WAREHOUSES AND SMALL INDUSTRIAL PLANTS IN CHOLON HAVE BEEN DAMAGED, OR HAVE CLOSED DOWN BECAUSE OF INSECURITY; (4) DAMAGE TO KEY BRIDGES, SHUTTING OFF OF SOME STREETS, AND CHANNELING OF TRAFFIC THROUGH SECURE PARTS OF THE CITY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO SEVERE TRAFFIC JAMS; (5) THE ACTIVITY OF SECURITY FORCES IN ENFORCEING INSPECTION OF VEHICLES AT CHECK POINTS ENTERING THE CITY, NECESSITATED BY THE RENEWED ATTACKS, HAS TENDED TO RAISE COSTS AND CAUSE LOSSES OF PERISHABLE GOODS. ACTUAL FIGHTING WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE AT OR NEAR THE MAJOR ENTRY POINTS OF ROUTE 4 AT PHU LAM AND ROUTE 1 ON THE BIEN HOA HIGHWAY HAS CAUSED SEVERE DISRUPTION FOR DAYS AT A TIME; (6) INSECURITY OF SUBURBAN AREAS AND CURFEWS IMPOSED FOR SECURITY REASONS HAVE LED TO HIGH ABSENTEE RATES AND CURTAILED HOURS OF WORK IN MANY INDUSTRIES, COMMERCIAL AND GOVERNMENTAL OFFICES, INCLUDING THOSE OF US AGENCIES; AND (7) CREATION OF OVER 100,000 NEW REFUGEES AND LOSS OF OVER 15,000 ADDITIONAL HOUSES HAS IMPOSED RENEWED BURDENS ON MUNICIPAL SERVICES, THE GVN BUDGET, AND ALL RELIEF AGENCIES. IN SUM, THE EVENTS SINCE 5 MAY HAVE TENDED TO CON- STRICT THE ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE CITY, REDUCING ITS PRODUCTIVE VIGOR AND INTERFERING WITH TRADE WITH THE COUNTRY- SIDE.

(2) SO FAR, THESE EFFECTS HAVE BEEN TOLERABLE, AND THE CITY HAS ADAPTED TO THEM IN A VERY RESILIENT WAY. EXCEPT FOR BUSINESSES ACTUALLY DESTROYED, ALMOST ALL INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE CONTINUE TO OPERATE. EXCEPT FOR PEOPLE MADE REFUGEES OR IN- JURED, EVERYONE IS STILL EARNING A LIVING. SUPPLIES OF FOOD - HAVE BEEN ADEQUATE EXCEPT FOR VERY SHORT PERIODS. REMARKABLY, PRICES HAVE INCREASED LITTLE. SO FAR, ALL THE EFFECTS OF THE 5 MAY - 10 JUNE ATTACKS SEEM TO BE OF THE SORT THAT COULD READILY BE REVERSED IF THE ATTACKS DIMINISH.

(3) THE ECONOMY OF SAIGON CAN TAKE FURTHER POUNDING-- MORE BUSINESS DESTROYED, MORE REFUGEES, MORE PEOPLE KILLED AND IN- JURED--BEFORE ANY VERY DRAMATIC CHANGES TAKE PLACE. BUT THIS CANNOT GO ON INDEFINITELY. IF THE ATTACKS CONTINUE FOR A NUMBER OF WEEKS, ARE OF THE SAME DEGREE OF INTENSITY AS IN RECENT WEEKS, AND DO NOT RESULT IN ANY UNIQUELY DISASTROUS SINGLE ACTS OF

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DESTRUCTION, SUCH AS TAKING OUT THE MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY, WE WOULD EXPECT A GRADUAL BREAKDOWN OF ECONOMIC FUNCTIONING. SUCH A BREAKDOWN MIGHT APPEAR FIRST IN SOME OF THE MUNICIPAL SERVICES, SUCH AS REFUSE COLLECTION, OR COMMERCIAL SERVICES, SUCH AS BANKING. IN ANY CASE, A BREAKDOWN ONCE STARTED WOULD TEND TO SPREAD AS THE RESULT OF INTERDEPENDENCY WITHIN THE ECONOMY OF THE CITY, E.G., PRODUCE MARKETING DEPENDS ON TRUCKING, TRUCKING DEPENDS ON PLAS, ETC. IF THIS KIND OF BREAKDOWN REACHED LARGE INDUSTRIES, SUCH AS TEXTILES, WE WOULD HAVE LARGE NUMBERS OF UNEMPLOYED TO DEAL WITH. IF IT REACHED INDUSTRIES ON WHICH FOOD SUPPLIES DEPEND, WE COULD VERY QUICKLY HAVE AN ACUTE ECONOMIC PARALYSIS.

(4) THERE IS NO WAY OF PREDICTING A TIME SCHEDULE FOR EVENTS SUCH AS THOSE JUST DESCRIBED. THE TOLERANCE TO ATTACK DEPENDS IN GREAT PART ON INTANGIBLES SUCH AS THE MORALE OF THE GENERAL POPULACE AND THE STABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS. IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO ASSUME THAT THE ECONOMY COULD CONTINUE TO FUNCTION NORMALLY FOR MORE THAN A MONTH TO SIX WEEKS OF CONTINUED SUSTAINED ATTACK WHICH INCLUDED BOTH HARASSING ROCKET-MORTAR FIRE AND SPORADIC INFILTRATION.

(5) WITHIN THE URBAN ECONOMY THERE ARE A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC INDUSTRIES AND LOCATIONS WHOSE DESTRUCTION OR EXPOSURE TO PROLONGED INSECURITY COULD ACCELERATE THE BREAKDOWN DANGEROUSLY. THESE INCLUDE: MUNICIPAL UTILITIES: WATER, ELECTRICITY, TELEPHONES, ETC.; PRINCIPAL FOOD MARKETS, BOTH WHOLESALE AND RETAIL; MAJOR FOOD-PROCESSING PLANTS, E.G., FOREMOST DAIRIES IN TU DUC; MAJOR FOOD WAREHOUSES; BRIDGES CONTROLLING ACCESS OF FOOD SUPPLIES TO THE CITY, ESPECIALLY NEWPORT BRIDGE AND BRIDGES ON ROUTE 4 BETWEEN SAIGON AND TAN AN; PETROLEUM STORAGE AREAS, NHA BE IN PARTICULAR; AND THE SAIGON SHIP CHANNEL AND PORT.

E. THE MILITARY EFFORT.

(1) FROM A MILITARY VIEWPOINT, THE ENEMY ABILITY TO CONTINUE HIS RANDOM, INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS BY FIRE ON, AND HIS SMALL SCALE GROUND PROBES WITHIN SAIGON CAUSES THE ALLOCATION OF AN INORDINATE AMOUNT OF COMBAT ASSETS TO THE DEFENSE OF THE CMD. THE ATTACKS THEMSELVES ARE HARASSING IN NATURE. NEVERTHELESS, THE POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF SAIGON AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL GAINS THE ENEMY CAN ACHIEVE BY MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON THE CITY FORCE US TO SEEK MEANS TO COUNTER THESE TACTICS AND TO CONTINUE COMMITTING ALLIED RESOURCES TO THE TASK UNTIL A SOLUTION IS FOUND. TO THIS END, THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN DONE:

(A) ~~TWENTY-SEVEN US/RVNAF BATTALIONS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED TO~~

(A) TWENTY-SEVEN US/RVNAF BATTALIONS HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED TO GIA DINH PROVINCE TO DEFEND AGAINST SMALL SCALE ATTACKS AND TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE ROCKET BELT. IF FORCES COMMITTED TO INTERDICT ENEMY INFILTRATION ROUTES TO THE CITY AND TO SEARCH HIM OUT AND DESTROY HIM IN HIS REST AND REFIT AREAS ARE INCLUDED, OVER 50 PERCENT OF ALLIED MANEUVER BATTALION ASSETS ARE INVOLVED IN THE DEFENSE OF SAIGON/CHOLON.

(B) FOUR AIR CAVALRY TROOPS ARE TIED TO THE MISSION OF COUNTER MORTAR/ROCKET OPERATIONS IN THE GIA DINH AREA.

(C) THE DELTA FORCE (LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE AND REACTION FORCE) HAS BEEN MOVED TO SAIGON FROM NHA TRANG TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR SPECIAL SKILLS IN INFILTRATION AND CLOSE COMBAT TO COUNTER ENEMY MOVEMENT INTO THE CITY.

(D) OTHER MEASURES UNDERTAKEN ARE ENUMERATED IN REFERENCE C.

(2) ALLOCATING RESOURCES TO THE DEFENSE OF THE SAIGON/CHOLON AREA OF THE MAGNITUDE ENUMERATED ABOVE DEGRADES OUR FLEXIBILITY AND OUR POTENTIAL TO ACCOMPLISH OTHER MISSIONS. OUR TROOP DENSITY IS DECREASED IN THE COUNTRYSIDE THUS DETRACTING FROM THE SECURITY MANTLE NEEDED FOR PACIFICATION. OUR ABILITY TO INTERCEPT ENEMY REPLACEMENT PACKETS NEAR THE CAMBODIAN BORDER BEFORE THEY CAN JOIN THEIR UNITS IS ALSO DEGRADED. HIGHLY TRAINED DELTA FORCE ASSETS ARE TAKEN AWAY FROM THEIR PRIME MISSION OF RECONNAISSANCE AND QUICK REACTION OPERATIONS IN PERIPHERAL AREAS OF RVN.

(3) IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT US/FW/RVN ASSETS IN III CTZ ARE ADEQUATE TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY SHOULD HE INITIATE A COORDINATED OFFENSIVE. OPERATION TOAN THANG CONTINUES THROUGHOUT III CTZ WITH THE MISSION OF DISPERSING ENEMY FORCES AND INTERDICTING HIS LOC, SOURCES OF SUPPLY AND BASE AREAS. THE PROBABLE INCREASE IN ENEMY COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS IN III CTZ OVER THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS AS A RESULT OF THE HEAVY FLOW OF REPLACEMENT PERSONNEL AND THE MOVES OR POSSIBLE MOVES OF SOME UNITS FROM ADJACENT CTZS HAS BEEN COUNTERED BY THE FOLLOWING:

(A) ONE BATTALION FROM THE 9TH INF DIV IN THE DELTA HAS DEPLOYED TO THE CMD AREA.

(B) THE 3D ARVN ABN BDE WITH THREE BATTALIONS HAS REDEPLOYED FROM I CTZ TO III CTZ.

(CA

)7 THE 3D BDE, 101ST ABN DIV HAS REDEPLOYED FROM KONTUM PROVINCE TO III CTZ.

F. OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE.

(1) THERE HAS BEEN EVIDENCE OF SOME DETERIORATION IN THE REGARD WITH WHICH AMERICANS HAVE BEEN HELD BY THE VIETNAMESE

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(2) AS OF THE END OF MAY AFTER THE LOCAL POPULATION HAD BEEN SUBJECTED TO THREE WEEKS OF SPORADIC FIGHTING AND INTERMITTENT SHELLING, BUT PRIOR TO THE MOST INTENSIVE PHASE OF SHELLING DURING THE FIRST TEN DAYS OF JUN, IT APPEARED THAT THE US STILL POSSESSED A FAVORABLE IMAGE. WHEN ASKED WHETHER THEY WERE SATISFIED WITH THE WAY THE US ARMED FORCES RESPONDED TO THE MAY ATTACK, 53 PERCENT INDICATED SATISFACTION AND ONLY NINE PERCENT DISSATISFACTION, AS COMPARED TO 37 AND 19 PERCENT RESPECTIVELY WITH REGARD TO TET. THE CHIEF PUBLIC RELATIONS LOSS SUFFERED BY THE US AS A RESULT OF THE MAY-JUN FIGHTING RELATED TO THE CHARGE OF CARELESS BOMBING IN CIVILIAN AREAS. THIS WAS MAGNIFIED BY THE ACCIDENT INVOLVING HIGH-LEVEL VIETNAMESE IN EARLY JUN. ASKED AT THE END OF MAY WHO THEY THOUGHT BORE SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DAMAGE CAUSED IN SAIGON DURING THE FIGHTING IN MAY, 23 PERCENT MENTIONED THE US FORCES AS COMPARED TO SIX PERCENT FOR ARVN. THE RATIO WITH RESPECT TO TET WAS 17 AND 16 RESPECTIVELY. IMPORTANT TO NOTE IS THAT 79 PERCENT PLACED SOME BLAME ON THE VC FOR THE MAY DAMAGE IN SAIGON COMPARED TO 75 PERCENT DURING TET.

(3) FINALLY, IN MID-JUN EDITORIAL REACTION SUGGESTS SOME TENDENCY TO FURTHER SUSPECT US RESOLVE TO TOTALLY SUPPORT THE VIETNAMESE EFFORT. THIS IS DUE TO IMPATIENCE AMONG SOME OF THE EDITORIALISTS WITH WHAT THEY REGARD AS TOO MUCH PATIENCE ON THE PART OF THE US REGARDING THE SHELLING OF SAIGON. THIS HAS ONCE AGAIN RAISED QUESTIONS, AT LEAST AT THE EDITORIAL LEVEL, ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF EXCESSIVE US COMPROMISE, IF NOT SELL OUT AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIS FEELING WILL PERMEATE THE GENERAL PUBLIC REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

3. (S) AN EVALUATION OF THE ENEMY'S CURRENT TACTICS AS THEY RELATE TO THE FUTURE FOLLOWS:

A. ~~THE ENEMY HAS TWO STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES FOR THE NEAR~~

VIETNAMESE EFFORT. THIS IS DUE TO IMPATIENCE AMONG SOME OF THE EDITORIALISTS WITH WHAT THEY REGARD AS TOO MUCH PATIENCE ON THE PART OF THE US REGARDING THE SHELLING OF SAIGON. THIS HAS ONCE AGAIN RAISED QUESTIONS, AT LEAST AT THE EDITORIAL LEVEL, ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF EXCESSIVE US COMPROMISE, IF NOT SELL OUT AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIS FEELING WILL PERMEATE THE GENERAL PUBLIC REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

3. (S) AN EVALUATION OF THE ENEMY'S CURRENT TACTICS AS THEY RELATE TO THE FUTURE FOLLOWS:

A. THE ENEMY HAS TWO STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES FOR THE NEAR FUTURE - TO OVERTHROW THE SVN GOVERNMENT THROUGH POPULAR UP-RISING AND TO ERODE US WILL TO CONTINUE THE WAR. THE RECENTLY CAPTURED COSVN 6TH RESOLUTION STATES QUOTE WE CAN CREATE CONDITIONS FOR THE PACIFIST MOVEMENTS IN THE USA TO EXPAND AND THE DOVES TO ASSAIL THE HAWKS THEREBY FORCING THE USA TO RADICALLY CHANGE THE VIETNAMESE POLICY UNQUOTE. SUCCESS IN EITHER OBJECTIVE WILL SERVE TO REINFORCE AND ACCELERATE THE OTHER.

B. ENEMY TACTICS TOWARDS THESE ENDS WILL HAVE SEVERAL MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS DESIGNED TO REFLECT AN AURA OF FLEXIBILITY AND STRENGTH. HE WILL TRY TO WEAR DOWN US FORCES BY INFLECTING GROWING CASUALTIES AND MATERIEL LOSS, THUS RAISING THE EMOTIONAL AS WELL AS INTRINSIC COST TO THE US. HE WILL ATTEMPT A MULTIPLICITY OF OBJECTIVES AND OPTIONS TO GAIN LEVERAGE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, CONCENTRATING HIS EFFORTS ON KEY TARGET AREAS INCLUDING THE DMZ AND NORTHERN MR-5, THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS AND SAIGON. THE IMPRESSION OF HAVING SEIZED AREA CONTROL IN REMOTE REGIONS OR AN EXPLOITABLE MILITARY VICTORY MIGHT BE USED BY THE ENEMY TO CLAIM TERRITORIAL REPRESENTATIVES IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT OR TO ATTEMPT THE ANNEXATION OF THE NORTHERN TWO PROVINCES OF I CTZ. SAIGON WILL RECEIVE HIS SPECIAL EMPHASIS. IN HIS OWN WORDS QUOTE THE ONE WHO HOLDS SAIGON WILL GAIN THE WHOLE COUNTRY UNQUOTE. THE ENEMY WILL CONTINUE TO HANG ON AROUND THE CAPITAL, CONDUCTING STANDOFF SHELLING AND SMALL UNIT PROBES TO ERODE VIETNAMESE FAITH IN THE GVN AND IN ALLIED CAPABILITY OF DEFENDING THE CITY.

C. THESE MILITARY TACTICS DESIGNED TO WEAKEN US WILL TO CONTINUE THE WAR AND UNDERMINE SOUTH VIETNAMESE WILL TO SUPPORT THEIR GOVERNMENT WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN CONCERT WITH A GROWING INTENSITY OF NON-MILITARY ACTIVITY - POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL. PRESSURES TO INDUCE LARGE SCALE ARVN DEFECTIONS WILL BE INTENSE.

D. TIMING WILL BE IMPORTANT TO THE ENEMY. WITH HIS ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE US POLITICAL CLIMATE THE TEMPO OF HIS ACTIVITY SHOULD INCREASE WITH THE APPROACHING NOMINATING CONVENTIONS. THUS, JUL AND AUG WILL BE THE MOST CRITICAL PERIOD OF 1968.

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EYES ONLY

Friday, June 21, 1968

Pres file

Mr. President:

At Tab A, for your signature, is a proposed reply to Paul Hoffman who wrote you (Tab B) to emphasize the importance of getting the Congress to appropriate all the foreign aid money in the budget earmarked for contributions to his UN Development Program (\$80 million).

The odds are that our contribution to the UNDP will eventually be trimmed along with the rest of the Aid request. But the authorization bill reported Wednesday by the House Foreign Affairs Committee actually added \$1 million to your request. Thus, the proposed reply tells Hoffman we are hoping and working for the best -- and so far, so good.

W. W. Rostow

57a

June 31, 1968

Dear Paul:

Many thanks for your thoughtful letter. Dean Rusk and Bill Gaud keep me posted on the good work of the United Nations Development Program. I know the record you and your colleagues are building fully justifies the U.S. contribution requested in my 1969 budget.

Although I am disturbed at the other cuts recommended in the foreign aid bill reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, I was pleased to see that the UNDP request emerged intact. You can be sure, Paul, that we will continue to do all we can to persuade the Congress to give the foreign aid program support commensurate with its importance to world peace. I know you will do the same.

Warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Paul G. Hoffman
Administrator, United Nations
Development Programme
United Nations
New York, N. Y.

LBJ:WWR:EKM:RM:lw

Friday, June 21, 1968

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Mr. President:

Attached, for your signature,
is a draft reply to Thant's
letter (at Tab A) thanking you
for your address to the General
Assembly on the NPT.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

58a

June 24, 1968

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of June 14.

You know how important I believe the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be. I greatly hope it will lead to further measures to curb the senseless continuation of the arms race.

It was a pleasure for me to meet with you again. I appreciate the courtesies you and your staff extended to us.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending warm regards.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

**His Excellency
U Thant
Secretary General of the
United Nations
New York, New York 10016**

LBJ:ND:gg



THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

586

14 June 1968

Mr. President,

I wish to express to you my very great appreciation of your decision to visit the United Nations and to address the General Assembly on the occasion of the adoption by the Assembly of its historic resolution on the draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Your presence gave heightened significance to an outstanding occasion and dramatized in a most fitting manner this important step forward in the field of disarmament. The greeting which the Assembly gave you and the reception accorded to your most inspiring statement must have clearly demonstrated to you the gratification of the members at your presence, but I wanted to add to that general sentiment the personal expression of my own pleasure and satisfaction in having you here again. I was happy also to welcome your daughter, Mrs. Nugent.

With warm regards to you, Mr. President, and to Mrs. Johnson,

I am,

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'U Thant', with a horizontal line underneath it.
U Thant

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

Friday, June 21, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~By *J*, NARA, Date 5-30-01~~9:00~~ a. m.

8:30

59

MR. PRESIDENT:

Eugene Black came in yesterday to report the following to me.

1. In the wake of the earlier 7 to 7 vote on the Special Fund of the Asian Development Bank, he went to work on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He now believes the following will vote for the authorization:

Fulbright
Sparkman
Hickenlooper
McCarthy
Aiken
Cooper
Dodd
Carlson
Pell

Total: 9

Possible, after recent talks with Black:

Lausche
Case
Church

Total: 3

Firmly against:

Williams
Mundt
Morse
Gore
Symington

Total: 5

2. He says that in this effort he has received no support from the Treasury. Fowler and Barr have been lobbying for IDA but not the ADB.

3. He feels that some of the positive votes may not hold up unless there is an indication of serious united Administration support for the authorization.

4. It is his hope that you would ask Fowler to get behind the ADB Special Fund after the tax bill is passed. It would also be immensely helpful if you could tell Sparkman firmly that you would like to have this moved forward on an authorization basis even though there will be no appropriations for some time.

5. Black says that whether the ADB Special Fund moves forward in the Congress has some bearing on two enterprises in which he might otherwise wish to engage and which might be helpful to the government. In each case he would feel somewhat embarrassed if he had to perform against the background of a failure to move the ADB bill forward.

6. The first of these concerns Cambodia. Next ^{to} the potential donors for the Prekh Thanat dam are meeting in Bangkok. There are some problems ~~about~~ administration, but it looks not impossible that the money can be rounded up without U. S. participation (you will recall that we decided not to put the question of U. S. contribution up to Congress because of the Cambodian tie to the war in Vietnam). If the donors agree, he would like to go out to Asia to talk with the Cambodians about the project and the further development of the Mekong River enterprise. In the course of this trip, he would like to be present at the dedication of the first transmission line in Laos from the Nham Gum dam to Vientiane. If we wished him to raise any non-Mekong issues with Sihanouk, he would be glad to do it. He would be equally glad simply to stick to his Mekong business.

7. He has been strongly urged by Alexis Johnson to come to Japan in September to speak to an audience of some 5,000 Japanese leaders. It would be a good occasion for him to engage the Japanese further in the aid business. He would, however, feel awkward going out if he were in a position where the Japanese had committed themselves to \$100 million for the ADB Special Fund and we had not been able to move it at all in the Congress.

My own reflection on the problem is this:

- Gene Black has been a good and effective soldier on the ADB business. That, in itself, should not, however, determine whether or not you urge Fowler and Sparkman to move forward in this matter.
- The reason I should like to see the ADB move forward is because it represents a substantial achievement of your Administration, and I would like to see the institution left in the best possible shape at the close of this Administration.

W. W. Rostow

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 21, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In the attached memorandum the Secretary of State outlines nine principles (concerning the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor) that he authorized our representative at the UN to propose for ultimate adoption by the 23rd General Assembly. He also described the extent of cooperation within the Government, with industry and with appropriate committees of Congress.

Mr. Meeker used the principles yesterday morning in a statement before the Legal Working Group of the UN Ad hoc Committee on the Seabeds. By and large the statement was well received. The only critical note was from the Soviet representative who, although generally complimentary, drew attention to the fact that the U. S. did not recommend a principle calling for the reservation of the seabed exclusively for peaceful purposes.

W. W. Rostow

Noted _____

Speak to me _____

cc: Mr. Keeny
Mr. Davis

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 5-30-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT

Enclosure 1
June 11, 1968

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606

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE DEEP OCEAN FLOOR

The General Assembly

Desiring to encourage the exploration, use and development of the deep ocean floor to the fullest extent possible for the benefit, and in the interest of all mankind,

Believing that such exploration and use of the deep ocean floor will contribute to international cooperation and understanding,

Convinced that no nation, regardless of geographical location, level of economic development, or technological capability; should be denied the opportunity to participate in the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor,

Conscious of the importance of promoting the general welfare of all peoples, and of furthering scientific study and the conservation of natural resources,

Reaffirming the traditional freedoms of the high seas under international law,

(Additional preambular paragraphs will be added referring to previous UN resolutions on this subject)

Solemnly declares that the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor (the ocean floor beyond the continental shelf) shall be guided by the following principles:

1. The exploration and use of the deep ocean floor shall be open to all States and their nationals without

discrimination and in accordance with international law.

2. No State may claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the deep ocean floor.

3. Taking into account the Geneva Convention of 1958 on the Continental Shelf, there should be established as soon as practicable an internationally agreed precise boundary between the deep ocean floor and the "continental shelf," the area of the ocean floor over which coastal states may exercise sovereign rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of its natural resources.

Exploitation of the natural resources of the ocean floor that occurs prior to establishment of the boundary shall be understood not to prejudice its location, regardless of whether the coastal state considers the exploitation to have occurred on its "continental shelf".

4. States and their nationals shall conduct their activities on the deep ocean floor in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation, scientific knowledge, and economic development.

5. In order to further international cooperation in the scientific investigation of the deep ocean floor, States shall:

- (a) disseminate, in a timely fashion, plans for and results of national scientific programs concerning the deep ocean floor;
- (b) encourage their nationals to follow similar practices concerning dissemination of such information;
- (c) encourage cooperative scientific activities regarding the deep ocean floor by personnel of different states.

6. In the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor States and their nationals:

- (a) shall have reasonable regard for the interests of other states and their nationals;
- (b) shall avoid unjustifiable interference with the exercise of the freedoms of the high seas by other states and their nationals, or with the conservation of the living resources of the seas, and any interference with fundamental scientific research carried out with the intention of open publication;
- (c) shall adopt appropriate safeguards so as to minimize pollution of the seas and disturbance of the existing biological, chemical and physical processes and balances.

Each State shall provide timely announcement and any necessary amplifying information of any marine activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals that could harmfully interfere with the activities of any other State or its nationals in the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor. A State which has reason to believe that a marine activity or experiment planned by another State or its nationals could harmfully interfere with its activities or those of its nationals in the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor, may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.

7. States and their nationals shall render all possible assistance to one another in the event of accident, distress or emergency arising out of activities on the deep ocean floor.

8. Where the owner of facilities and equipment found on the deep ocean floor can be identified, he shall not be deemed to have abandoned his interest in the property until he does so explicitly. This rule shall not affect the international law of salvage or any rights under international law to move unused property whose presence unreasonably interferes with the interests of others.

9. There shall be established, as soon as practicable, internationally agreed arrangements governing the exploitation of resources of the deep ocean floor. These arrangements shall reflect the other Principles contained in the Statement of Principles Concerning the Deep Ocean Floor and shall include provision for:

- (a) the orderly development of resources of the deep ocean floor in a manner reflecting the interest of the world community in the development of these resources;
- (b) conditions conducive to the making of investments necessary for the exploration and exploitation of resources of the deep ocean floor;
- (c) dedication to the extent feasible and practicable of a portion of the value of the resources recovered from the deep ocean floor to world or regional community purposes; and
- (d) accommodation among the commercial and other uses of the deep ocean floor and marine environment.

Enclosure 2

CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS

On Tuesday, June 18, briefings were arranged on the ninth point in the Statement of Principles Concerning the Deep Ocean Floor with the House Foreign Affairs Committee in the late afternoon. The Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign Affairs invited all members of that subcommittee and all members of the Subcommittee on Oceanography. The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, Mr. Fascell, and Messrs, Fountain and Roybal attended. The briefing was conducted by Messrs. Meeker and Pollack. Later that afternoon a briefing was held with Senator Pell, Chairman, Consultative Subcommittee on Oceanography, of the Foreign Relations Committee, attended by staff members of the Committee.

Prior to these briefings, on June 12 sessions were held with the Fascell Subcommittee, Foreign Affairs Committee and the Lennon Subcommittee on Oceanography of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee at which there was substantial attendance from both committees. Also, on June 13 a similar briefing on the other eight points was given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, attended by Senators Pell and Clark.

The Department also offered briefings to the Senate Commerce Committee and the Senate and House Interior Committees, through the Staff Directors of each of those Committees, none of which availed themselves of the offer.

The reaction of all members of Congress attending our briefing session was uniformly favorable.

Several members, such as Representative Fascell and Senators Pell and Clark, said that they were much encouraged that progress was being made in this field and that the U.S. was moving along in this field. No member was critical of efforts or our tentative position. All expressed appreciation of the Department's efforts to keep them currently informed on developments in the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee.

~~SECRET~~

Bunker 6/1
Pres file
ACTION

Friday - June 21, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Central American Visit

You said you wanted to wait until after the Poor People's Rally to make a final decision on going ahead with the Central American visit (July 6-7).

If you decide to proceed with the trip, these are the next steps requiring your decision:

1. Have Ambassador Freeman personally sound out President Diaz Ordaz on our inquiring of the Central Americans if they plan to invite him to a meeting of Presidents on July 6-7.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____ Call me ____.

2. Have our Ambassadors in the Central American countries inform the Central American Presidents you would welcome an invitation to a meeting at a place of their choosing (which we would hope would be San Salvador.)

Our Ambassador would also inquire about their intention to invite President Diaz Ordaz.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____ Call me ____.

3. As soon as the invitation is extended, send an advance party to make arrangements. Communications represent a special problem in this area, requiring as much lead time as possible.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____ Call me ____.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1997
By *RG*, NARA, Date *7-6-92*

4. You may wish to consider this novel idea: on the return journey, go via each capital city to return the President of the country and participate in a short airport ceremony. This would involve four stops: Managua, San Jose, Tegucigalpa and Guatemala City. * Distances between capitals are short and you could do it in about 6-7 hours. It would require spending a second night in San Salvador in order to make the round-robin trip on Monday, July 8. Covey Oliver thinks the Central Americans would welcome this gesture. It would give you the chance to see some of the spectacular scenery of the isthmus and set feet in each country. If you approve the idea, our Ambassadors should try it out on the Presidents and the advance party should also look into airport ceremonies.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____.

W. W. Rostow

** The communications people are against this.*

Cc - Jim Jones

Pres file
62

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~NODIS-ANTWERP~~

Friday, June 21, 1968
3:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Your clearance requested on this draft cable to Bunker on the Antwerp contact.

It would empower Bunker to take it up with Thieu.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

No _____

Call me _____

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS-ANTWERP~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc/fdw* NARA, Date 3-4-03

62a~~TOP SECRET~~

Ambassador SAIGON PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 21999By *plics* NARA. Date 3-4-03

STATE

NODIS/ANTWERP

Ref: State 186656; Saigon 30600.

1. THRUSH file already pouched through CAS channels and should reach you in another day or two.
2. Calhoun's conversation adds considerably to the picture and also, in our judgment, makes it urgently important that Ambassador ~~inform~~ inform Thieu personally just as soon as possible. This would follow the pattern of our handling of the THRUSH matter, and seems to us absolutely required in view of the clear possibility that reports of the luncheon on June 20 would get out through any one of the Vietnamese participants.
3. Our own tentative evaluation is extremely reserved. On the basis of the original Lansdale reports, it seemed at least possible that Long was a key figure in his own right, and we were particularly struck by his claim to be in direct touch with Phat of the NLF. However, the luncheon now makes it appear that the major

EA:WPBundy:mk 6/21/68

4235

The Secretary

DOD - Secretary Clifford
U - The Under Secretary

White House - Mr. Rostow

S/S -

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

Saigon

~~TOP SECRET~~

contact with Phat is Hoach himself, and this brings back all the doubts aroused by the THRUSH operation, Hoach's activities in mid-1967, the CAS report of another similar approach by him in January of this year, and our general reading that he is a semi-senile schemer who is out to promote a high place for himself in some new set-up. We suspect that Thieu, knowing of THRUSH and possibly of other episodes, shares this evaluation--which we believe to be general among sophisticated Vietnamese political figures.

4. At the same time, we would not repeat not rule out some further direct contact solely with Long, to explore what his own personal contacts with the NLF may be--and whether they are in any way distinguished from those of Hoach. This could be our next move, but we believe should be taken only after the Ambassador has fully discussed the matter with Thieu and asked his judgment. If your Buddhist sources suggesting that Long is close to Nguyen Van/^{Kieu}~~Thieu~~ permit it, Ambassador might mention that Thieu may know about Long through his brother and have some feeling whether there could be any substance to his having useful contacts of his own.

5. In sum, we believe that Ambassador should see Thieu alone as soon as possible to report this approach, making clear that we have played only

~~TOP SECRET~~

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

3

Saigon

~~TOP SECRET~~

a listening role. Since second Lansdale contact with Phuoc and Calhoun luncheon both back away from any idea of changing the present GVN, our own judgment would be that this aspect of the approach could be omitted, and that the whole summary could be of a general character in your discretion. After informing Thieu along these lines, Ambassador might ask for his judgment and in the light of this decide whether to put forward the suggestion that some discreet American make direct contact with Long.

6. Please advise if you have ~~any~~ any difficulty with these instructions. Otherwise we hope you can proceed soonest on these lines.

7. In view of Calhoun's visibility, we would like your thoughts on whether there is some less visible American who could make the approach to Long if that does become the next move.

GP-1.

End.

630
WRIGHT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 000 15681

By je/cb, NARA: Date 5-30-01

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

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HCE957

1968 JUN 21 13 15

PAGE 01 SAIGON 30631 01 OF 02 211252Z

44
ACTION SS 30

INFO CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,/030 V

O 211202Z JUN 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5169
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
CINCPAC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 30631

EXDIS

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJ: THIEU ON POLITICAL SITUATION

REF: DEPTTEL 186870

Rattaw

1. IN COURSE OF YESTERDAY'S CALL ON THIEU, SAID REPORTS OF RESIGNATIONS OF GENERALS KHANG AND THANG, AND RUMORS THAT PRIMIN AND MINDEF VY WERE RESIGNING WERE CREATING CONCERN IN WASHINGTON AND IN PARIS, AS WELL AS HERE, ABOUT STABILITY AND UNITY OF HIS GOVERNMENT. I SAID PRESS, HERE AND ABROAD, WAS PUTTING OUT RUMORS OF ALL KINDS WHICH WERE CREATING AN IMPRESSION THAT HIS GOVT WAS IN THE THROES OF ANOTHER CRISIS. I SAID I DID NOT BELIEVE ALL THESE RUMORS, NOR DID I REGARD THE GOVT AS IN ANY CRISIS, BUT I WISHED HIM TO KNOW HOW OTHERS VIEWED THE SITUATION HERE, AND TO GIVE ME HIS FRANK VIEWS OF WHAT WAS GOING ON.

2. THIEU SAID THE REPORTS THAT THE PRIMIN WAS RESIGNING, OR HAD THREATENED TO RESIGN, WERE NOT TRUE. HUONG WAS VERY "SAD" OVER THE FAILURE OF VICE PRES KY, GEN VIEN (CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF) AND GEN KHANG (III CORPS COMMANDER) TO ATTEND THE CEREMONY INSTALLING MAJ GEN MINH AS GOVERNOR AND COMMANDER OF THE CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT. HUONG HAD INVITED THEM, BUT KY WAS OUT OF TOWN, AND THE TWO GENERALS

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 30631 01 OF 02 211252Z

REFUSED TO ATTEND ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS WAS A POLITICAL AFFAIR. THIS WAS NONSENSE. THIEU SAID THESE ACTS WERE ACTS OF "SABOTAGE," AND SHOWED A LACK OF DISCIPLINE. THEY WERE DELIBERATELY DONE AS "OVERT SIGNS OF DISPLEASURE" OVER THE REPLACEMENT OF LOAN AND CUA. BOTH HE AND HUONG WERE VERY IRRITATED, HE IMPLIED.

3. I SAID HE HAD MADE A VERY FINE SPEECH ON JUNE 18, CALLING FOR NATIONAL UNITY, CALLING FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT, CALLING ON THE POLITICAL "FRONTS" TO UNITE, EITHER IN SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENT OR AS A LOYAL OPPOSITION, TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY, ETC. THIS WAS EXCELLENT, BUT UNITY OF THE GOVT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT, AND THERE TOO MANY SIGN OF DISUNITY. IN THIS CONNECTION GEN KHIEM, THEN NEW MIN OF THE INTERIOR, WAS MAKING SO MANY CHANGES AND MOVING SO SWIFTLY THAT IT WAS HAVING AN UNSETTLING EFFECT AND IMPAIRING UNITY AT THE TOP OF HIS GOVT.

4. THIEU SAID THAT HE HAD A SERIOUS PROBLEM TO DEAL WITH. HE AFFECTED SAIGON AND THE SECURITY OF THREE MILLION PEOPLE. GEN LOAN AND MAYOR CUA WERE WOUNDED AND UNABLE TO CARRY ON. THE COLONEL IN COMMAND OF THE CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT HAD BEEN TOO JUNIOR TO COMMAND AND HAD NO AUTHORITY OVER THE POLICE. THERE WAS POOR COORDINATION BETWEEN THE POLICE AND MILITARY FORCES, AND BETWEEN THE CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT AND THE III CORPS COMMAND.

5. ALL THIS WAS WELL KNOWN TO EVERYONE AS A RESULT OF WHICH THERE WAS FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY, AND GROWING CRITICISM OF THE GOVT. HE HAD TO MOVE SWIFTLY. NO ONE COULD FIND FAULT WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF MAJOR MINH, AND BRINGING ALL THE FORCES UNDER HIS COMMAND. AS FOR THE NEW MAYOR, COL NHIEU, THERE WERE ACCUSATIONS OF CORRUPTION AFTER HE WAS APPOINTED. HHE AND HUONG HAD GONE OVER THE FILE AND HAD FOUND

R
ONLY ONE MINOR INFRACTION SOME YEARS BACK, WHICH THEY DECIDED TO IGNORE. NOW MINDEF VY HAD COME TO HIM TO SAY NHIEU WAS VERY CORRUPT. HE HAD ASKED VY WHY THIS WAS NOT IN HIS FILE AND TO BRING HIM THE EVIDENCE. IF IT WAS TRUE HE WOULD REPLACE NHIEU.

6. THIEU THEN SAID GRIMLY, "SOMETHING IS BEHIND ALL THESE

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PAGE 03 SAIGON 30631 01 OF 02 211252Z

RUMORS, AND ALLEGATIONS AND RESIGNATIONS, WHICH IS PUSHING THESE MEN TO REACT AS THEY ARE." (THIS WAS A CLEAR REFERENCE TO KY.)

7. THIEU THEN WENT OVER THE LIST OF HIS PROBLEMS;

A. GEN THANG: THANG HAD WRITTEN HIM SAYING HE HAD CORRECTED MATTERS IN IV CORPS AND HE NOW WANTED A TRANSFER TO POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AND THE GENERAL STAFF. THIEU HAD GIVEN THANG A THIRD STAR TO SHOW HIS APPRECIATION OF HIS WORK AND HAD WRITTEN HIM A LETTER IN REPLY. (THIEU THEN WENT TO HIS DESK FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE AND READ FROM IT.) "I PRAISED HIS WORK IN THE IV CORPS DURING ~~THE~~ THE LAST FOUR MONTHS AND SAID THE WORK WAS NOT YET FINISHED, AND HE MUST REMAIN. THE NEXT THING I KNOW IS THAT THANG SENDS A LETTER TO GEN VIEN SAYING HE WAS IN NEED OF REST, AND GEN VIEN GAVE HIM LEAVE. NGUYEN VAN LA HAS BEEN SENT TO IV CORPS AS A TEMPORARY REPLACEMENT.
BUNKER

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1968 JUN 21 13 23

PAGE 01 SAIGON 30631 02 OF 02 211304Z

52
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

O 211202Z JUN 68 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5170
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
CINCPAC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 30631

EXDIS

B. "GEN THANG IS NOT AN HONEST MAN. PERSONALLY I THINK HE IS THE ABLEST OF THE CORPS COMMANDERS, AND IF HE CONTINUED TO DO A GOOD JOB I HAD HIM IN MIND FOR CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF. BUT THANG IS VERY TEMPERAMENTAL, AND HE IS ALWAYS RESIGNING OR THREATENING TO, WHATEVER JOB YOU GIVE HIM. I HAVE REFUSED TO ACCEPT HIS RESIGNATION AND WANT HIM TO GO BACK TO IV CORPS."

C. MIN. OF DEF. VY; THIEU SAID HE REGARDED BY AS AN HONEST MAN, AND A RESPONBILE MILITARY MAN. HE IS NOT INTERESTED IN POLITICS AND DOES HIS HOB. THIEU DOES NOT THINK HE WILL RESIGN.

D. GEN KHANG: THIEU HAS HIS LETTER OF RESIGNATION BUT HAS "NOT YET MADE A DECISION TO ACCEPT." THE FACT THAT KHANG ANNOUNCED HIS RESIGNATION MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR KHANG TO WITHDRAW, AND HAS ALSO PUT THIEU IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. KHANG HAS BEEN LESS THAN COOPERATIVE WITH GEN MINH, NOT ONLY OVER THE CEREMONY, BUT IN TERMS OF COMMAND RELATIONS. MINH IS UNDER GEN KHANG, AND THE CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT, FOR WHICH MINH IS RESPONSIBLE, IS SURROUNDED BY III CORPS, WHICH GEN KHANG COMMANDS. THERE MUST BE THE CLOSEST COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO AND THEIR FORCES, BUT KHANG HAS "SABOTAGED" MINH, MINH IS THE ABLEST DIVCOMMANDER IN THE COUNTRY, BUT KHANG IS INTENIONALLY AND DELIBERATELY WITHHOLDING COOPERATION. THIS CANNOT GO ON. (COMMENT: GEN ABRAMS TOLD ME HE HAS HEARD NOTHING OF THIS, AND WILL ENDEAVOR TO FIND OUT.) THIEU ENDED

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 30631 02 OF 02 211304Z

ON KHANG WITH A QUESTION, "IS HE GOING TO SUPPORT MINH OR NOT?" HE INTENDS TO TALK TO KHANG.

E. GEN VIEN: THIEU THEN SAID VIEN HAS ALSO ASKED TO BE RELIEVED AS CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, SAYING HE WAS TIRED AFTER 2-1/2 YEARS, IN NEED OF REST, AND WOULD LIKE AN AMBASSADORSHIP. THIEU SAID MANY OF HIS TROUBLES STEM FROM VIEN'S FAULTS. VIEN IS AN "HONEST" MAN, AND "CORRECT," BUT HIS WEAKNESS IS THAT HE DOES NOT LIKE TO MAKE TOUGH DECISIONS. MOREOVER, VIEN SUFFERS FROM PUBLIC CRITICISM OF HIS WIFE'S CORRUPTION. THIEU SAID HE HAS NO ONE TO PUT IN VIEN'S PLACE, AND IT MAY BE A YEAR FROM NOW BEFORE ANYONE WILL BE ABLE TO HANDLE THIS JOB. HE DID NOT SAY, BUT IMPLIED THAT VIEN MUST STAY.

8. THIEU THEN SAID HE WAS BEING ACCUSED OF REPLACING NORTHERNERS WITH SOUTHERNERS. THIS WAS JUST NOT TRUE, AS ANYONE COULD SEE IF HE LOOKED OVER THE LIST OF RECENT CHANGES. BUT THE RUMORS PERSIST.

9. THIEU SAID WITH BITTERNESS THAT THE NEW PORT DIRECTOR, KHIEM'S BROTHER, TRAN THIEN PHUONG, WAS BEING CRITICIZED FOR CORRUPTION, THOUGH HIS REPUTATION FOR HONESTY WAS WELL-KNOWN TO EVERYONE. THIS EFFORT TO DISCREDIT PHUONG IS COMING FROM THOSE WHOSE OWN RECORDS DO NOT STAND EXAMINATION. (COMMENT: OUR PEOPLE WHO KNOW PHUONG HAVE A VERY HIGH REGARD FOR HIS COMPETENCE, AND KNOW NOTHING DEROGATORY ABOUT HIM.)

10. I ASKED HIM WHEN HE WAS GOING TO START THE SMALL WAR CABINET MEETINGS WITH KY AND HUONG. HE SAID HE WAS RESERVING THIS FOR MAJOR DECISIONS. HE HAD CALLED ONE MEETING, BUT KY WAS OUT OF TOWN. HE INTENDED TO MEET SOON AGAIN, BUT WAS VAGUE ABOUT WHEN OR ON WHAT.

11. I ASKED IF HE WOULD COME FOR DINNER ONE EVENING WHEN WE COULD TALK AWAY FROM THE OFFICE, WITH MORE TIME TO GO INTO THESE MATTERS. HE SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO COME, AND HE WISHED ALSO TO RESUME THE WEEKLY LUNCH WITH ME, BERGER, KOMER AND ABRAMS, AND KY AND HUONG ON HIS SIDE.

12. COMMENT: I AM SENDING THIS TEL FOR FACTUAL BACKGROUND, AND WILL SEND MY OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS IN A SEPARATE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 SAIGON 30631 02 OF 02 211304Z

TEL.
BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

65

INFORMATION

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Friday, June 21, 1968 -- 12:00 noon

Proc file

Mr. President:

Our hopes for peace in Vietnam have been so often disappointed and so long deferred that it may be difficult for us to recognize why the approach undertaken via ANTWERP could be serious. The attached chart, amplified from one brought home by Westy, indicates why the NLF might want peace now and Hanoi might not oppose peace now. If you compare January 1967 with April 1968, the following emerges:

-- Main force VC and North Vietnamese units have been sustained and even slightly increased. Taken together, there were 116,000 in January 1967 (50+66), 123,000 in April 1968 (72+51).

-- But the proportion of Northerners has greatly increased from 43% of all main force units in January 1967 to 60% in April 1968. If one takes into account the North Vietnamese ~~and~~ VC main force units, the figure is not 60% but between 70 and 80% of all main force units now being North Vietnamese.

-- In the meanwhile, to maintain the VC component of the main force units in the face of very heavy casualties, they have had to cannibalize their guerrilla forces which are the main military-political base for the NLF in the South. As you see, guerrilla forces are estimated to have fallen over this period to one-half their strength in January 1967. (126,000 to 61,000)

-- Therefore, from the point of view of Communists in the South, they are seeing a rapid erosion of their own strength and an increased dominance of their activities by Northerners.

From the point of view of Hanoi, the maintenance of main force units capable of turning significant military and political pressure on the South, has required the pouring in on a massive scale of North Vietnamese manpower. In terms of population and demography, they can do this. But it is a military and political deadend if the U. S. and the GVN are not going to buckle and quit.

We must, of course, not base our hopes or plans on an early end of the war. But we should keep our minds open to the possibility.


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Authority NLS-CBS 21
By ics, NARS, Date 6-26-84

W. W. Rostow

65a

ENEMY COMBAT STRENGTH
(thousands)



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REF: MIA
REF: MIA

66

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~/ANTWERP/SENSITIVE

Friday, June 21, 1968 -- 11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith another ANTWERP contact. This time including Chau Long himself who claims to be in touch with Huyah Tan Phat, number 2 or number 1 in the NLF. I conclude:

- We must inform Thieu;
- We must take this very seriously even if, in the end, it runs off into the sand.

I have marked in red the statement that "elements in Hanoi also wanted the U. S. to remain in the South." This is a strand of thought -- unlikely as it may at first sight appear ---which we have picked up from Communist sources a number of times. The reason is exactly the reason suggested here; namely, that Hanoi may not feel it could maintain its independence for the long pull against the Chinese Communists if we were out of the area militarily.

The argument that the NLF would want us to stay in the South, I would guess, stems from the possibility that they have concluded that if war stops only a U. S. presence would guarantee that they would not be mopped up like the Indonesian Communists.

In any case, this is well worth reading.

Key passages are marked.

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Authority RAC 22006
By jc/ics, NARA, Date 3-4-03
Saigon 30600

W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

67
Pres file

Friday, June 21, 1968
11:20 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

More on Cyrus Eaton.

He called Carol Fortas today, who called me. Eaton has found out that Kuznetsov (as well as Debrynin) is returning hurriedly to Moscow. Eaton would like to talk to Kuznetsov and to convey via him to Kosygin what U. S. terms are for a settlement in Viet Nam.

I told Carol that there is some importance in Eaton's not being put in a position where he could even imply that he was conveying a message from the U. S. Government to Kuznetsov. I added that our general terms were well known in Moscow, and the Soviet Union can seek amplification of them by direct inquiry.

Carol said that Eaton reported to her that the Vice President had spoken to him on the telephone. Eaton said the Vice President:

- agreed with Ambassador Harriman that Eaton's contact with Kosygin was "important";
- when informed that Eaton had spoken to Justice Fortas, the Vice President said that that was good. He was sure the President was always interested in Fortas' views.

We left it at that.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-4-03

68

INFORMATION

Pres file

Friday, June 21, 1968 -- 9:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

You should know that Bill Jorden is back and is returning to Paris Monday night.

If you should like to see him and get a direct feel for the Paris talks, he is, of course, available.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

69

ACTION

Pres file

Thursday, June 20, 1968 - 6:30 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your approval is a message to the new Belgian Prime Minister Eyskens, congratulating him on becoming Prime Minister.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

MWG:mst

69a

MESSAGE TO BELGIAN PRIME MINISTER EYSKENS

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Warmest congratulations and best wishes as you assume the office of Prime Minister. I look forward with great pleasure to working closely with you in furthering the causes of freedom and peace in the world.

Lyndon B. Johnson

*Pres file**70*

Thursday, June 20, 1968
6:20 p. m.

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~
~~LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

I discreetly checked with Nick Katzenbach about whether Senator Mansfield or "anyone at State" was doing anything to get closer to Castro at this time. Nick responded promptly and as follows:

- he knows nothing about Senator Mansfield's activities in this field;
- he himself has taken only one step with respect to Castro:
two men came to our base at Guantanamo; told our people that they planned to assassinate Castro; and they left to return to Cuba. CIA, Defense, and State agreed that, should an assassination or an assassination attempt take place, the U. S. skirts should be clean. Therefore, Nick empowered State to inform the Swiss that they might tell Cuban authorities that there had been recent reports coming to us of a Castro assassination attempt.

Nick says that exhausts his policy connection with Cuban matters.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE- LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 019-036-2-5
By J, NARA, Date 1/19/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 20, 1968

Pres. file

Mr. President:

In connection with arrangements for the signing of the NPT on July 1 in Washington, London, and Moscow, the British have asked for guidance as to who will sign for the United States. Normally, such a treaty would be signed at the SecState/FonMin level although there are rare precedents -- such as the signing of the UN Charter -- for signature by Heads of State. State recommends, therefore, that Sec. Rusk and Amb. Foster sign for the United States and that we so inform the British and the Soviets.

You, of course, have the option of a ceremony at the White House or in the Department of State.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____
Disapprove _____
Call me _____
White House ceremony _____
State Dept ceremony _____
Call me _____
SMK:eny:jb:6-20-68/8p
bcc: SMK file and chron
 >WWR (2)
 SMK comeback copy

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989
By *ag*, NARA, Date *7-7-92*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

72

Pres file

INFORMATION

**Thursday, June 20, 1968
5:55 p. m.**

Mr. President:

**This North Vietnamese Colonel's
assessment of ARVN and U. S. forces
will interest you.**

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 20, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: ARVN Performance

During his interrogation Colonel Dac gave an interesting assessment of ARVN forces. He stated that during his assignment to Military Region IV, Sub-Region 1, he encountered several operations in which ARVN and US forces coordinated. Through these battles, the enemy acquired a knowledge of countermeasures that could be used to provide security. The Viet Cong theorized that ARVN morale in general was very poor. They dared not face attacking forces, had poor endurance, relied on air support when withdrawing, and were easy to disrupt while on attack.

~~He stated, however, that the recent offensive opened the eyes of the Viet Cong. The ARVN did not only show a brave and stubborn fighting attitude, but also proved their progress in combat techniques. They turned from a defensive posture to an aggressive posture. These factors blunted the combat spirit of the Viet Cong and finally caused their complete failure.~~

According to Dac the main determining factor in the battles conducted in South Vietnam was the morale of the ARVN troops. When he was in North Vietnam, he assumed that the ARVN forces were hired by the US and thus had bad morale. Little by little, through the battles with the ARVN, he began to reconsider. He stated that after the failure of the general offensive, he received the following report from different units and agencies in his capacity as a command cadre:

1. ~~The ARVN were very conscientious and had a high combat attitude.~~
2. ~~Being efficient in combat, the ARVN knew the enemy's capabilities and their own capabilities. At the same time, they knew their terrain well.~~

He stated that in brief, the Viet Cong defeat was inevitable during the recent general offensive because the Viet Cong had underestimated the ARVN. The Viet Cong had paid dearly for their erroneous judgment of the ARVN.

He pointed out such weaknesses as

- A. Poor security, both personnel and communications.
- B. Slow movement during operation gave the enemy time to take countermeasures.
- C. Moving in spread formation during combat, they became too dispersed and disorganized.
- D. Lack of thoroughness in sweeping the area.
- E. Poor perimeter defense while in night defense positions.

He also had the following comments about US forces:

The US forces possessed strong mechanized equipment, great artillery firepower, and versatile transportation facilities. They were capable of overcoming the enemy without much difficulty. They understood and knew how to deploy deceptive troops to counter guerrilla tactics. They utilized their superior power sometimes very adroitly to overpower the enemy.

When US forces were preparing for an attack, they took too much time. They took possibly 10 days, and in the meantime recon planes and helicopters were constantly flying over the area to be attacked. After these planes flew over the area a few times, the Viet Cong knew an attack was coming. Right before the attack, gunships blasted the area and artillery pounded the forest. With all this happening the Viet Cong moved out. When the US forces got there, they only found a few snipers in the area. Also, the US forces moved directly to the objective without making a thorough search.


Art McCafferty

~~Amstler~~

Pres file 73

ACTION

Limited Official Use Thursday - June 20, 1968 - 5:50 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Departure of Brazilian Ambassador

Ambassador Vasco Leitao da Cunha has reached mandatory retirement age and will be returning to Brazil by the end of this month.

He is the outstanding member of the Brazilian Foreign Office. He has been Ambassador to London, Moscow and Washington and Foreign Minister during the Castelo Branco period. As you know, he is a staunch friend of the United States.

If you have the time I recommend you receive him for a short farewell call next week.

W. W. Rostow

- Approve ___
- Disapprove ___
- Call me ___.

Cc - Jim Jones

WGB: mm

74

ACTION

**Thursday, June 20, 1968
5:45 p. m.**

Per file

Mr. President:

**Herewith, as requested, a draft
letter to Harold Linder for your
signature.**

W. W. Rostow

rla

74a

June 20, 1968

Dear Harold:

I am glad your conversation with Dean Rusk was satisfactory.

I believe you know how greatly I have valued your services to the Nation -- and to the President.

Only those who work within the Executive Branch can understand how critical it is for the country's welfare and security that men like Harold Linder are prepared to give their heart and mind, wisdom and experience to the public service.

Sincerely,

Honorable Harold F. Linder
President and Chairman
Export-Import Bank of the United States
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWRostow:rln

75

INFORMATION

Pres file

Thursday, June 20, 1968 -- 2:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to know that Sec. Rusk, despite his progress in the hospital in the past few days, is willing to contemplate taking some serious leave after he returns from Reykjavik and the NATO meeting.

The background is that some of those who work closest to him feel that he is fighting progressive fatigue which may -- or may not -- have something to do with the recurrence of his infection. They (for example, Ben Read and Gene Rostow) believe the Secretary needs a rest if his health and his work are not to suffer.

Against this background, I asked casually if he had thought some of a vacation, and he replied that he might think of doing it after Reykjavik; although he doesn't like the idea of being away when Congress is in session.

Depending on your view and judgment, you may wish to encourage or discourage the idea of Sec. Rusk's taking some leave in the time ahead.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

76

INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, June 20, 1968, 1:30 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: FBI Review of Staff Members of U.S. Delegation to Paris Talks

The FBI has completed full-field investigation of staff members with the U.S. Delegation to the Paris Talks.

The FBI investigation has turned up no derogatory information with respect to loyalty or security.

You will recall that earlier we had reported to you that Defense and State Department security files on the staff members had been thoroughly reviewed.

A list of the staff members investigated is attached. The FBI investigations are available in my office should you wish to see them.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

BKS:amc

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING, CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR 16, 1983.

RS ON 8-21-92

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Daniel I. Davidson, Special Assistant to the Ambassador at Large, Secretary to the Delegation
2. Colonel Andrew B. Anderson, Jr., USAF, Executive Assistant to General Goodpaster
3. Miss Nancy Clark, Secretary S/S-S
4. Miss Elizabeth Ghisu, Secretary S/AH
5. Warrant Officer James C. Jensen, USN, Stenographer
6. John D. Negrofonte, Interpreter
7. Daniel A. O'Donohue, Secretariat Staff Officer
8. Mrs. Hildegard B. Shishkin, Personal Assistant S/AM
9. Peter B. Swiers, Staff Assistant S/AH
10. Alec. G. Toumayan, Interpreter

77

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 20, 1968 - 12:45 pm

Mr. President:

This account of what Gen. Abrams and the Vietnamese are doing about the attacks on Saigon may interest you.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 7-7-92



~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

77a

CM 3401-68
15 June 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Enemy Attacks on the Civilian Population
of Saigon (U)

1. (S) This is in reply to your memorandum of 14 June in which you requested information concerning military measures to counter enemy mortar and rocket attacks around urban areas, especially Saigon, plus an estimate of the enemy capability to continue to mount such attacks.

2. (S) Military actions to counter the mortar and rocket attacks on urban areas can include measures from improved civil defense training in the urban areas of South Vietnam to punitive air operations against major North Vietnamese cities in retribution for the attacks. About 300 mortar and rocket rounds have impacted in the Saigon area since 4 May - an average of about eight per day. The enemy uses crude firing techniques, including bamboo bipods, to launch the rockets which are fired indiscriminately and only in the general direction of Saigon from areas outside the city.

3. (S) Although the problems of prevention of such firings are great, in that the enemy can conceal and launch the weapons from anywhere in a 300 square mile area, General Abrams is deeply cognizant of the problems which the firings are causing. Among the actions to counter the attacks which have been or are being taken by General Abrams in coordination with the RVNAF Joint General Staff (JGS) are:

a. The defense of Saigon has been designated as the first priority task for US and RVNAF forces in III CTZ. Command arrangements for defense of the Saigon/Gia Dinh area have been facilitated by the designation of a RVNAF

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Group 4
By ng, NARA, Date 7-7-92

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years.

Military Governor for the area and the establishment of a forward headquarters of II Field Force, USARV, collocated with the headquarters of the military governor.

b. The general areas from which rocket attacks are being made have been identified, and these areas are kept under 24-hour aerial surveillance. Within the Gia Dinh area two teams of an air cavalry troop, each consisting of one reconnaissance helicopter and one gunship with flares, will be constantly orbiting the area during hours of darkness. Eight 60-foot flash-ranging towers are being constructed for improved observation into the firing areas. Ground surveillance responsibilities have been assigned to units operating in the areas.

c. Aerial photos of sensitive areas are being taken.

d. Investigations are being conducted to determine possible use of the Saigon sewer system by the enemy.

e. Increased operations are being undertaken to intercept and engage enemy forces before they reach the urban areas. Current examples are operations in western Hau Nghia Province and in the saddle area in Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces. These operations near the Cambodian border are being undertaken to disrupt the enemy LOC and infiltration routes to the Saigon area.

f. Clearance procedures for rapid counterfire have been reviewed and every effort is being made to reduce reaction time without endangering friendly forces or civilians.

g. MACV, the JGS, and the Government of Vietnam (GVN) are initiating a psychological operations program directed at the civilian populace of South Vietnam concerning protective measures, refugee guidance, resistance against the enemy and support of the government.

h. The JGS and GVN are developing an active civilian self-defense program designed to augment warning nets, control points on routes of access, monitor curfew violations, and report VC/NVA covert activities.

4. (S) In providing an estimate as to the measure of success that military efforts have had in precluding or countering the attacks, it is obvious that the attacks have not been precluded. The possibility of completely eliminating the enemy capability to undertake such indiscriminate standoff attacks by fire in the Saigon area is remote. The enemy has paid heavily for his recent operations around Saigon, however, as over 9,500 VC/NVA troops have been killed or captured in the III CTZ alone since 4 May. In addition, over 425 enemy rockets and more than 1,600 rounds of high explosive ammunition have been captured by US/FW/ARVN forces in III CTZ during the period.

5. (S) I believe that the actions being taken by General Abrams and by the Joint General Staff and Government of Vietnam are proper and constitute those measures within their capability which should assist in countering the enemy rocket and mortar attacks on Saigon. However, the small logistic effort required by the enemy to sustain this harassment is well within his capability to maintain for an extended period, and on a surge basis he could substantially increase his effort for a limited period of time in furtherance of his political objectives.

Earle G. Wheeler

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, June 20, 1968
11:15 a. m.~~SECRET~~ / sensitive

DECLASSIFIED

MR. PRESIDENT:

Authority RAC 22018By js NARA, Date 4-9-98

You ask: where do I think we should go from here?

1. At tea-break, during the next talk, Harriman or Vance should pick up Tho's statement: "there can never be a settlement of military matters without prior agreement on a political solution." He should ask:

- Is Tho suggesting we proceed promptly in Paris to discussion of a political solution? If so, we should have to introduce the GVN into the talks.
- If Paris is inappropriate, perhaps informal contacts might be undertaken by their side with the GVN elsewhere.

If we get no rise from Tho at tea-time, we should try again at the next informal dinner meeting.

2. We should discuss Tho's statement and its implications with Thieu promptly and promptly inform him of the ambiguous NLF probe in Saigon of which I informed you yesterday. (Code name: Antwerp) We should urge Thieu to take the initiative in seeking contact with the Communists to explore a one-man-one-vote constitutional solution.

3. Jointly with Thieu we should pursue the Antwerp contact.

4. I doubt that Hanoi will accept Paris talks on this matter, with the GVN, so long as bombing continues. Therefore, private informal contacts in Viet Nam or elsewhere between the GVN and the NLF seem the logical route to progress. If such talks are undertaken, Paris could devote itself quietly to certain legitimately bilateral U. S. -Hanoi issues:

- contingent plans and scheduled for withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from the South; U. S. forces to base areas, before departure on the Manila formula;
- plans to re-establish the DMZ;
- plans to re-establish the Laos Accords of 1962.

5. Behind all this, Mr. President, is a hunch, rather than a judgment, that Hanoi is having the same kind of problem with its generals we have with the JCS. For example, when the North Vietnamese are told we wish to re-establish

June 20, 1968

the DMZ in return for a total cessation of bombing, they tell their diplomats: 'Don't you realize that with the bad weather in Laos that means virtually cutting off our forces in the South? Impossible.' In all conscience, well-balanced mutual de-escalation is very tough to negotiate in a war of this kind, without a fixed front. They may, therefore, be moving to the conclusion that a fight-and-talk strategy will have to persist on about present terms until a southern political solution is negotiated. Then the war could be rolled up briskly.

6. Of course, I could be wrong on one of two counts:

- Kosygin may come back with an acceptable mutual de-escalation formula;
- Hanoi may not be interested in coming to grips with serious negotiating problems until the next Administration is installed.

W. W. Rostow

attachment

1
INFORMATION

78a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

Wednesday, June 19, 1968 - 3:00 p.m.

Rec'd
3/3

Mr. President:

It is true Gen. Taylor and I have worked together on Vietnam for our sins since May 1961; but I thought you might be interested in seeing his thoroughly independent reaction to the statement made in Paris by the North Vietnamese during the tea break.

Walt Rostow

W
What do you suggest
We do from here on
C

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 7-7-92

~~SECRET~~

78b

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

19 June 1968

~~SECRET~~

Walt:

Reference Paris 16568. There is an interesting statement by Tho in paragraph 2 of reference cable in which ~~he indicates that there can never be a settlement of military matters without prior agreement on a political solution.~~

This is what you and I have been saying all along--namely that before talking about a cease -fire we should deal with the political problems such as the conditions for stopping reinforcements by both sides, for the eventual withdrawal of foreign troops, for the disposition of military bases and for the political and the economic arrangements affecting the Viet Cong. However, the discussion of such topics should be in the presence of the GVN representatives.

Do you see any possibility of our picking up Tho's statement and pressing for a discussion of such topics on the grounds that the bombing and cease fire arrangements are military matters to follow agreement on the political points?

MD2
M. D. T.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-27
By ijp, NARA, Date 4-26-95

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

79

Thursday, June 20, 1968

10:40 AM

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your approval is a message to Prime Minister Moro of Italy replying to his condolence message on the loss of the "SCORPION".

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

MWG:mm



8471

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

1. *Final*
2. *Ret.*
79a


June 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Reply to Condolence Message from
Italian Prime Minister Moro on the
Loss of the "SCORPION"

In response to Mr. Smith's request of June 8, there is enclosed a suggested reply to Prime Minister Moro's condolence message on the loss of the "SCORPION". The Prime Minister's message was transmitted to the President by the Italian Ambassador on June 6.

Ambassador Duke will reply to Ambassador Ortona's letter enclosing a copy of the President's reply to Prime Minister Moro.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

1. Suggested Reply.
2. Letter from Ambassador Ortona, dated June 6, 1968.

79b

Suggested Reply

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I deeply appreciate your thoughtful expression of sympathy on the loss of the submarine "SCORPION". The officers and men who served aboard her are very much in the hearts and minds of all of us. As you requested, I am asking the Department of the Navy to convey your sympathy to the relatives of these men.

Sincerely,

His Excellency

Aldo Moro,

President of the Council of

Ministers of the Italian Republic,

Rome.

8471

Mr. President:

I have the sad duty to convey to you the following message of the Italian Premier, Mr. Aldo Moro:

"I wholeheartedly share the deep sorrow of the United States for the announced loss - after long hours of anxious waiting - of the nuclear submarine "SCORPIO" and its entire crew.


"On behalf of my Government, and myself, I wish to express to you, Mr. President, the feelings of deepest participation in the mourning of your nation for the disappearance of one of the most modern units of the United States Navy, while returning home after having completed its maneuvers in the Mediterranean.

"I beg you, Mr. President, to convey these feelings also to the families of the departed".

Permit me, Mr. President, to extend to you my deepest sympathy for this tragic accident.

With warmest regards,

Sincerely yours,



Egidio Ortona
Ambassador of Italy

The President of the United States
The White House

7:45 pm

80a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 19, 1968 -- 7:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith language on the Seabed question for the UN, which has been approved by Sec. Clifford, Nitze and Katzenbach.

I have confirmed with Gen. Wheeler that the JCS, as a body, remains opposed; but Gen. Wheeler understands the decision. The JCS proposed language is at Tab A.

In a long talk with Gen. Wheeler, the following emerged:

-- He feels reasonably comfortable with the Clifford-Katzenbach language given the reservation about "the appropriate means of verification and the width of this narrow band."

-- He is frankly worried that in Geneva the Arms Control people will press ahead hard under the circumstances where no one at the present time can envisage an effective verification system.

-- Moreover, any serious discussion of verification could get into sensitive intelligence matters.

Everyone agrees that if we took the JCS position in the UN, we would have an embarrassing time and might get out-voted. Therefore, I recommend:

- Approval of the proposed language for the UN;
- Extremely tight instructions, to be checked with the President, on how in fact this issue is dealt with in Geneva.

Walt. Rostow

Approval of proposed language _____

No _____

Call me _____

Not until I can understand JCS position & reasons -

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Guidelines
By *Rg/jw* NARA, Date *11/5/05*

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 19, 1968

1967

806

For Clearance

FOR: Mr. Walt W. Rostow ←
The White House

FROM: Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary BHR

The attached revised language on Seabeds has been approved by Secretaries Clifford, Nitze and Katzenbach. Paul Nitze tells me that the JCS remains opposed but General Wheeler understands the decision which has been made in favor of this language by the Secretary of Defense.

Please let me have your approval as soon as possible because New York pressures and the need to advise key Hill figures is becoming urgent.

~~SECRET~~ Attachment

80c 196

~~SECRET~~

Arms Control and the Ocean Floor

The United States is prepared to enter into serious discussions on arms control and the ocean floor at an international forum such as the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference. In these discussions the United States would be prepared to consider the possibility of an appropriate international agreement pursuant to which each party would agree not to emplace or fix nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on, within, beneath or to the seabed beyond a narrow band along its coast and up to the coast of any other State. The appropriate means of verification and the width of this narrow band would have to be the subjects of agreement as well. The prohibition on emplacement or fixing should be aimed not only at the weapons themselves but also at launching platforms or delivery systems for such weapons.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By *ngjm* NARA, Date *11/6/05*

SECRET

TAB A

1968
80d

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In summarizing the work schedule for the Ad Hoc Committee this summer, its Chairman specifically noted that the Ad Hoc Committee will wish to consider the Soviet proposal for "a recommendation to the GA to favor in principle the prohibition of the military use of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."

US Position

1. The US should continue to acknowledge the importance of arms control questions and to indicate a willingness to participate in discussions of them in the Ad Hoc Committee and in the ENDC. Questions of arms control, however, being an aspect of broader political and military relations between nations, have to be given careful thought and arms control measures undertaken only after thorough consideration.
2. With respect to the three general categories of arms control proposals thus far mentioned, the US Delegation should take the following position:

a. Demilitarization of the Seabed. The US cannot accept such a concept except as part of a comprehensive agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Given the nature of today's world and its political and military rivalries, and in particular the continuing threats

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TAB A

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
State Dept. Guidelines
By RA/jw NAR Date: 11/6/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

which some nations pose to the security of the US and its allies, the US cannot concur in a total prohibition on military activity in an area covering most of the world's surface.

b. Prohibition on Emplacement of Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Ocean Seabed. US Delegation should maintain position set forth in para 1. FYI USG is preparing a proposal in this area, but further work has to be done before any initiative can be made. If pressure to move ahead in this area becomes very great, the Delegation should request additional instructions. END FYI.

c. Reservation of the Ocean Seabed for Peaceful Purposes. In discussions of the concept of peaceful purposes, the US Delegation should seek to clarify how others would apply it to the seabed. The US, however, is not yet prepared to discuss the application of this concept to the seabed. Additional instructions should be requested if the Delegation believes it necessary in light of developments in the Ad Hoc Committee.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TAB A

Mr. Rostow 81

~~Lang~~
2. Pres file

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Thursday, June 20, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Response to Condolence Messages on USS Scorpion

We recommend the following replies to brief messages from President Sunay, President Shazar and Prime Minister Eshkol:

To Sunay: " I am most grateful for your thoughtful message of condolence for the victims of the submarine USS Scorpion and for the families which must bear their loss. My fellow Americans share my grief that the lives of so many young men who are serving the cause of freedom should meet such an untimely end. "

To Shazar: "Thank you on behalf of the American people and the bereaved families of the men on the Scorpion for your thoughtful expression of condolence. Our loss is painful, and we know that your understanding is heightened by your own tragic loss of the submarine Dakar. "

To Eshkol: "Thank you for your kind message of condolence on the loss of the submarine Scorpion. Our grief is deep for the families of the men who were lost, and we are grateful for the comfort extended by you and all the people of Israel. "

W. W. Rostow

Approve 6/20/68

Disapprove

Call me

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, June 20, 1968

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Mr. President:

Herewith a capsule of Bunker's 56th weekly report:

A. General

- Ky in June 17 speech repudiated coup rumors and explained resignation from Civil Defense.
- Thieu in speech next day stressed development of SVN responsibilities, and pledged help in forming: pro-government front, and a loyal opposition.
- Apprehension and impatience with Paris talks sharpened by apparent all-out effort by Hanoi to achieve politico-military victory.
- Calls of firmness from Ky, Information Minister Thien and Lower House and dismissal of conciliatory Dr. Dan dramatized growing concern on negotiations issues.
- Thieu taking harder public than private line on possible GVN talks with NLF.
- Thieu's civilianization of GVN prompts resignations of Generals Khang (III Corps) and Thang (IV Corps); and maybe General Vy, Defense Minister.
- Joint RVNAF/US defense plans for Saigon being implemented.
- Over 119, including NVA, defect from VC unit near Saigon this week.

B. Political

- Assembly passes imperfect but adequate mobilization bill.
- GVN popularity up in IV Corps from VC harrassment and regard for Thang.
- Corruption still felt widespread at all GVN levels but some improvement from appointment of PM Huong who is viewed as honest and energetic.
- Concern in urban delta areas that US will force coalition government to facilitate retreat.

C. Military

- Continued shelling of Saigon, main enemy target.
- Enemy building up forces in Northern IC corps.
- Enemy helicopters and fixed wing aircraft reported within DMZ.

D. Pacification

- Slow post-Tet trend continues up; relatively secure hamlets up to 62%.
- Regression in Saigon-Gia Dinh from enemy harrassment.
- New Saigon mayor and police chief cooperating closely with Mission.
- Komer pressing new Cabinet hard on pacification; cultivating new Interior Minister Khiem to revitalize attack on VC infrastructure.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

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 NLT/CBS 10
 White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
 By ws/rg, NARA, Date 9-20-92

82

Pres file

E. Urban Recovery

-- Huong pushing ministries harder on evacuee and recovery efforts.

F. Economic

-- New Cabinet discussing economic matters; decisions on rice needs expected next week.

-- GVN appears willing to accept US proposals on rice escrow account and debt prepayment.

W. W. R.

Thursday, June 20, 1968

82a

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 30500)

Herewith my fifty-sixth message:

A. General

The past week saw continuing emphasis on the problem of negotiations and interest in the Paris talks; on the problems related to the continuing evolution of constitutional government and its increasing civilianization; on the need for greater assumption by the Vietnamese of responsibility for the defense of the country and their own destiny; on the need for greater unity among the nationalist elements and for the development of political organization to give effect to this unity; and finally increasing attention to organization of the defense of Saigon.

Many of these matters were referred to in two important speeches, one by Vice Presidency Ky on June 17, and the other by President Thieu the following evening. Despite some negative developments in recent days, I think the sum of the two speeches distinctly encouraging. After explaining at length his decision to turn back the direction of civil defense to the Cabinet (where I think it properly belongs), Ky referred to Communist rumors of an impending coup. He observed flatly that "no responsible person could approve of a coup d'etat at present. to engage in fighting and killing one another at this time is tantamount to assisting and colluding with the Communist gangsters. Moreover, I have repeatedly affirmed that the armed forces and police must be considered national forces whose task is to serve the fatherland, and nobody has the right to use them for his personal interests."

Thieu's speech was positive and at the same time realistic. He spoke of the need for the Vietnamese people to assume full responsibility for their own defense and to take over the burden from their allies, saying that the destiny of Vietnam is up to the Vietnamese themselves. He noted the passage of the general mobilization bill as a further step in this assumption of responsibility (the bill was promulgated in a ceremony at Hue on June 19, Armed Forces Day.)

Thieu termed the constitutional and the elected government the necessary framework of democracy and noted progress in the establishment of democratic institutions. But he also emphasized the fact that the substance of democracy in the form of political party organization had not yet been created. He stressed the urgent need for this and pledged government assistance in the formation of a pro-government group and a loyal opposition to which those who did not wish to support the government could adhere. Thieu has discussed the problem with both Vice President Ky and Sen Tran Van Don and with Thieu's encouragement Don has taken preliminary steps toward the creation of a new front of fronts which will include both his own national

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 5-30-01

NLS/GBS-10 #101 (#13a)

SECRET/NODIS

Salvation Front and Nguyen Van Huong's Free Democratic Force. Thieu, I think, will now be taking a more direct hand in encouraging this and other groups to move toward political unity.

Thieu also emphasized several times in his speech the need for continuing trust and cooperation between the legislative and executive branches of the government as well as the army and the people.

The net impression of the two speeches is that Ky, while not very happy in the restricted constitutional role of Vice President, is nevertheless determined to avoid actions that will harm the national interests at this critical stage. Thieu's speech conveys the impression of increasingly stronger leadership directed toward building the institutions of democracy and broadening the base of government support while rallying the forces of the nation to defend its sovereignty and vital interests.

The problem of peace negotiations: the dominant theme continues to be one of firmness in the face of what is generally believed to be an all-out effort by Hanoi to achieve a politico-military victory during what is considered to be a climatic year. Continued attacks on Saigon and other centers of population, stepped up infiltration and evidence derived from prisoner interrogations and captured documents indicating that Hanoi intends to step up military pressure in the coming months have tended to strengthen this attitude. It is strengthened also by the continuing apprehension among many South Vietnamese leaders, civilian as well as military, that the U. S. will be tempted to compromise their vital interests in dealing with Hanoi. The result has been reflected in a growing sentiment of many South Vietnamese leaders, civilian as well as military, for retaliation and against the continuation of the Paris talks so long as the enemy continues to shell Saigon and other population centers without regard for civilian life and property.

For example, in his June 17 speech, Ky said there should be no compromise with the enemy. "The more we make concessions, the more opportunities we create to allow the war to continue. The more conciliatory an attitude we take, the more aggressive and reckless the enemy becomes." Last week Information Minister Ton That Thien said in Honolulu that restricting the bombing "may have been responsible for the murder of women and children in Saigon." In the Lower House, the democratic bloc asked the government and the allies to resume bombing of North Vietnam; the statement warns that "we cannot continue the Paris talks with North Vietnam, which is trying to exert political pressure on the talks by ruthlessly killing innocent Vietnamese." There is also the usual kind of ugly rumor going around Saigon that the U. S. is deliberately permitting the shelling of the city in order to pressure the Government of Vietnam into concessions.

The fear of any concessions to the enemy was dramatized by the reaction to Dr. Phan Quang Dan's statement in the U. S., reportedly calling for a Government of Vietnam initiative to open talks with the National Liberation Front. Reaction in political circles, the press, the Assembly, and the military was so strong that the Cabinet felt compelled to ask Thieu to dismiss Dan from the government, which he did.

Thieu has privately expressed to me his own concern about the reaction to the continuing stalemate in Paris, coupled with continued terror attacks on population centers. He noted that we have been showing restraint and patience for two and one-half months with no sign of give on the other side. He has said there is a widespread feeling among the Vietnamese people that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam continues to attack Saigon as a test of our determination and to demonstrate that the U. S. does not dare to retaliate; and the man in the street is asking, why does the U. S. let this go on without retaliation?

Publicly, Thieu is taking a reassuring but hard line. He said in his speech on June 18 that both the enemy shelling of Saigon and Hanoi's agreement to the Paris talks demonstrate their weakness; that the Communists only negotiate when they have no hope of military victory. In calling for increased efforts to strengthen the nation, he also said that the solution to the war lies on the battlefield; that peace conferences can only confirm what has already taken place on the battlefield.

Yet Thieu has also confirmed in private talks with us what he said to me as long ago as last August; namely, that at some point in time his government would not be adverse to private contact with the National Liberation Front or the Viet Cong; that there are men in the Cabinet who have had contact in the past with men who are not Viet Cong or members of the National Liberation Front. Contacts would have to be secret because emotions and feelings of the South Vietnamese people would not allow them to understand that talking with the National Liberation Front and Viet Cong does not mean surrender. The rocketing of Saigon by the Viet Cong precludes any talks, even secret ones, with the National Liberation Front or the Viet Cong at this time. But he also understands that there will come a time when the position members of the National Liberation Front and the Viet Cong occupying a peaceful Vietnam will have to be considered.

Thieu's moves toward greater civilianization of the government have brought some problems in their wake, particularly with some of the senior generals. I reported last week General Khang's submission of his resignation, using the excuse of his feeling of responsibility for the accident which caused the death of six senior Government officials. General Thang has asked to be relieved as Commander of the Fourth Corps and requested assignment as Head of Political Warfare. General Vy is reportedly to have threatened to resign over the appointment of Colonel Nhieu as Mayor of Saigon, claiming to be in possession of a dossier of the latter's corruption while serving as Province Chief. Each has his own personal motives for wanting to quit, but I think the basic reason for their moves is the important shift in power relations which I described in my last report. Thieu has allied himself not only with Huong and other civilian leaders but is also installing military leaders loyal to him. This is being done in a way that curtails the influence of Ky and the military council and it is clear that Thieu is trying to assert his independence of the military council. This has further reduced Ky's authority in the government. In increasing his own authority and in moving toward a better military-civilian balance in the government, both of which were necessary, Thieu has at the same time created potential difficulties for himself and for his government in the future. Thieu has expressed a desire to create unity in the country in support of the government and the war effort and has taken steps to this end; he must also bring about unity with the Ky forces and the initiative must come from him.

The trend toward greater civilian participation in the government is one we have stimulated and nourished for many years, beginning with our support for the election of a constituent assembly. Certainly it is desirable that Thieu play the role of a constitutional President rather than serve merely as a representative of a military clique which tries to run the government from behind the scenes. It is nevertheless regrettable that movement toward these goals may involve the loss to the government of the skills and leadership of several of the more able military leaders. But I am also strongly of the view that the ostensible reasons for these resignations or requests for transfer do not justify the individuals concerned opting out of the war effort.

Defense of Saigon: Efforts to secure the Saigon population are moving ahead. General Minh has accepted a plan for population control drawn up by General Hay. The Joint Command arrangements are being rapidly implemented and I believe we shall have an effective team.

Thieu and General Abrams have told me that they are pleased with the way in which General Minh is taking hold in his new post. Thieu also outlined his thinking on the best way to defend Saigon: There would be two defense rings, with the outer ring consisting of fortified strategic hamlets and the inner ring of fortified New Life hamlets. Thieu also commented that he has been pleased with the performance of the new Director of National Police Col. Hai, the Saigon Police Chief Sat, and Mayor Nhieu.

Some indications of enemy intentions: A senior North Vietnamese Army Colonel, Le Van Ngot, a member of the Lao Dong Party for 21 years has, under interrogation, given some explanations of Hanoi's strategy. He believes that the Paris talks are part of a two-prong strategy aimed at frustrating the U.S. to the point where we will withdraw from Vietnam. The offensive against Saigon is to provide the necessary military victory. According to Ngot, Hanoi also counts on our domestic peace movement and economic difficulties to convince us that we cannot bear the cost of the Vietnam war.

Ngot also noted that talk about the Paris talks is discouraged among enemy forces because it is feared that it will hurt morale. The troops are told that success of the talks depends on military victories.

While Ngot claimed morale was good among the troops in his areas, several recent instances of mass defections or surrenders by enemy units have been encouraging. The most recent and dramatic took place June 18 about noon when large numbers of the Viet Cong Quyet Thang (Resolve to Win) Regiment began surrendering to the government in the Gia Dinh-Go Vap areas of suburban Saigon. Their actions came in response to broadcast appeals from their former Executive Officer, Captain Phan Van Xuong, who had rallied the day before, but they were running out of food and ammunition. There were confirmed reports indicating 119 men were involved; unconfirmed reports say 148. They are reported to have brought in 96 weapons. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam and press sources have claimed virtually the entire group is North Vietnamese Army, but this is not confirmed, although apparently a considerable number are North Vietnamese Army.

B. Political

General mobilization: The Assembly was unable to override any of the executive amendments to the general mobilization bill. The measure thus was promulgated by the President June 19. It provides, in effect, that all male citizens from age 17 to age 43 may be required to serve in the armed forces. All males 18 to 38 are immediately subject to the draft, while those from 39 to 50 and those 17 to 57 must be at once enrolled in the people's self-defense forces. If the military situation requires, members of the people's self-defense forces aged 39 to 43 and age 17 can be transferred from the self-defense forces to the regular army. The law provides for deferments for men with critical skills, and for National Police personnel and Revolutionary Development cadre.

While not perfect, the bill is quite adequate and gives President Thieu broad authority to mobilize the nation's manpower resources. As Thieu himself observed in his speech yesterday, the law is also a victory for democracy because ^{of} the strains and hazards of the wartime situation. Its usefulness is psychological as well as legal. The nation is now officially on a war footing, with virtually all adult males subject to some kind of service to the nation.

Some reports from the provinces: According to our provincial reporters, popular attitudes toward the government in the Fourth Corps improved last month. This does not mean that there was a sudden surge of popular support and mobilization of effort behind the government. There are still many critics, and the attitude of most of the Delta still is one of cautious waiting to see if future performance measures up to past promises. Still, there was a decided improvement over past negative attitudes toward the government.

One reason for this change is the increasingly onerous demands of the Viet Cong on the population. Taxation, from all reports, continues to be extremely heavy. Recruitment of teenagers is going on at a high rate, and rural parents are increasingly dubious of Viet Cong promises to return the youth to their homes after a few months. In addition, there seems to be growing resentment at Viet Cong terrorist tactics. The mining of a Tri-Lambretta in Chuong Thien Province resulted in a 300 person anti-Viet Cong demonstration.

General Thang continues to be held in high regard, benefiting from relative economic and military normalcy. Also contributing to the favorable attitudes toward the government during the month were some good performances by the new province and district chiefs. Some of the latter, especially, are young, vigorous men who present a favorable contrast to their older, more lethargic predecessors.

On the issue of corruption, there was still the feeling on the part of most that the system of covert payments from bottom to top government levels remains unchanged. The comment began to be heard somewhat more frequently, however, that there is some improvement, thanks to the appointment of an honest Corps Commander. Such

people say that because General Thang is honest (and they often add the name of Prime Minister Huong), his subordinates are more reluctant to engage in corrupt practices.

The appointment of Tran Van Huong to the position of Prime Minister has met with approval in the Delta. The fact that he is a native of Vinh Long does not, of course, detract from his support. More important, however, is his reputation for incorruptibility and energy. Many people mentioned these two characteristics, and commented that Huong is a far better man for the position than his predecessor, Nguyen Van Loc, whom most dismissed as weak and ineffective.

While supporting Huong, many people predict that he will have a very difficult time in the months to come. They praise his initial goals of reducing press censorship, restoring the old government work schedule (and thus the siestas) and his promise to combat corruption. His intentions are good, say these people, but he is such a direct, honest man that he may irritate and make enemies of those he must work with.

As in previous months, many urban delta residents remain worried and suspicious about U. S. intentions in Vietnam. As could have been expected, this concern has been heightened by the Paris talks. These Vietnamese are encouraged by the fact that there have been no concessions by the U. S. to date, but they remain pessimistic about the durability of American determination. The feeling is still widely held that the United States means to get out of Vietnam and is prepared to force a coalition government on Vietnam in order to facilitate retreat. There is little hope here Hanoi will negotiate in good faith.

C. Military

The main enemy target still appears to be Saigon, although ground action was light this week in the surrounding areas. Indiscriminate shelling of the city outskirts continued, and there are numerous indications that preparations are continuing for another coordinated offensive against Saigon. Attacks could be launched at regimental strength at any time.

In addition to the threat against Saigon, the enemy appears to be building up his forces for action in northern First Corps. Enemy strength is increased in the Khe Sanh area in particular.

Also of interest are reports of enemy helicopters to the north of and within the DMZ. In several instances, fixed wing aircraft were reported escorting the enemy helicopters.

A third major target, considered under a reduced threat at this time, is the Kontum Province area.

Action in the Fourth Corps is confined to a pattern of harassing attacks by fire on friendly outposts and installations; the enemy seems to be avoiding major contact in this area.

D. Pacification

The end-May hamlet evaluation system report shows continuation of the slow upward trend since the post-Tet February low. Relatively secure population (ABC categories) increased by 64,000 to 62.1 percent of total. Viet Cong controlled population dropped to 17.6 percent from 17.9 percent.

Improvement would have been greater except for the large regression in the Saigon/Gia Dinh area, where 140,000 people dropped from relatively secure to contested because of the enemy's May/June offensive. This was offset by modest gains elsewhere especially a substantial gain in the Fourth Corps (79,000), reflecting continued improvement of security under General Thang.

The new Director General of National Police and the Saigon Mayor are working more closely with US advisors than their predecessors. The Police Chief, former Ranger Commander Lt. Hai, is pushing removal of corrupt and ineffective police officials. We provided him a list of 50 names and already the axe has begun to fall. New Saigon Mayor Nhieu worked closely with us on the Central Recovery Committee, and has already asked for greater American staff support in meeting Saigon's problems.

Meanwhile, Bob Komer is pressing the new Huong Cabinet hard to get moving faster on pacification. He briefed Thieu, Ky and Huong at length, and has been cultivating General Khiem, the powerful new Interior Minister. We are hopeful that Khiem will breathe new life into the critical attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure.

E. Urban Recovery

With continued disruption from rocket/mortar attacks, urban recovery will be with us for some time. In Saigon and vicinity, evacuees and damage from the May-June offensive continues to climb. With still incomplete figures, houses destroyed in Saigon/Gia Dinh number 18,800. Evacuees climbed to 176,000 -- 15,000 more than a week ago. But relief supplies are flowing adequately and resettlement allowances are being distributed. Curfew has been relaxed throughout the city. Huong, who sees the need for wrapping up recovery so he can get on to other pressing tasks, is pushing the ministries harder than Loc did.

Our joint Army of the Republic of Vietnam/Military Assistance Command in Vietnam operation, to clear and help rebuild in Saigon, is making good progress. We have offered the government an additional month's production of about 400 prefab buildings, with space in a pinch for 4,000 families, for permanent relief shelters in Saigon.

Meanwhile, I visited a very well-managed refugee center at Petrus Ky, where 2,600 people already have been moved into adequate temporary homes. In all, 1,090 units (enough for more than 12,000 people) will be completed shortly. In Lam Son Stadium, 463 units have also been completed and occupied. Another 468 units are under construction at the medical center.

F. Economic

Retail prices in Saigon fell again this week, with food prices down 4 percent, non-food prices even, and the index as a whole down 3 percent. Pork, fish, vegetables and fruit were all down in price, with rice unchanged. The latest index figure gives us a 20 percent increase over the beginning of the year.

During the first five months of 1968, money supply rose by 31.8 percent, while during the same period of last year, the increase was only 9.3 percent. It is evident that the money supply increase this year has not reacted on prices as forcibly as might have been expected. The main part of the explanation seems to be that people have changed their spending patterns and are holding larger cash reserves this year.

Formal discussion of economic matters with the new Cabinet was launched in a meeting held June 15, with a wide range of topics covered. The new Minister of Economics, Mr. Au Ngoic Ho, and Minister of State, Vu Quoc Thuc, gave every indication of being ready and able to make decisions. A large part of the discussion concerned rice, where the attitude of the new government is good. We should have decisions by next week on rice requirements for the remainder of the year. But the government has still not been able to agree on a policy to improve the price peasants receive for their rice and to stimulate rice movement out of the Delta..

With regard to the Government foreign exchange level, we believe that the Government will accept our proposals for a rice-purchase escrow account and debt pre-payments that will cut the Government reserve back to the \$300 million level or below, and keep it in that range through the summer. Minister Ho also pointed out that Government of Vietnam financed import licensing from the U. S. during the first five months of 1968 was around \$23.4 million, not counting the \$13 million purchase of two Boeing aircraft. This compares with \$26.3 million in all of 1967 and is very encouraging.