

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

186

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 memo	Rostow to President, 8:15 p.m. <i>open 4-13-00</i> S 1 p <i>Subject file, "Sulistul Negotiations"</i> <i>(dup. #8, N.S.F. Memos to the President, Vol. 84)</i>	6/28/68	A
#2a rpt	"Protest to the Soviets on Berlin..." PCI 3 p <i>open 4-13-00</i> <i>(dup. #86, as above)</i>	undated	A
#3 memo	Rostow to President, 6:30 p.m. <i>open 7/13/01</i> S 2 p	6/28/68	A
#3a draft	Deptel Circular <i>open 7/13/01</i> S 2 p	undated	A
#4 memo	Rostow to President, 6 p.m. <i>open 7/13/01</i> S 1 p <i>[Dup. #73, NSF, CF, VN, "HARRAN, VL" Box 134] #85, NSF, CF, VN Harran/Crosshill Indian Proposal Box 134</i>	6/28/68	A
#4a cable	Paris 17226 <i>dup #85a as above)</i> S 6 p <i>[Dup. #73a, as above] Open 2/10/98 KAK</i>	6/28/68	A
#5a memo	Shriver to President C 2 p <i>open 7-16-93 NLS 92-393</i> [Duplicate of #1a, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Shriver, Sargent, Meeting with deGaulle"]	6/21/68	A
#6 memo	Rostow to President, 5:50 p.m. S 1 p <i>OPENS 1203 NW01-241</i>	6/28/68	A
#6a cable	Paris 17180 <i>open 5/9/02 NLS 01-242</i> S 1 p	6/28/68	A
#8 memo	Rostow to President, 4 p.m. <i>open 7/13/01</i> C 2 p	6/28/68	A
#9a cable	Paris 17153 <i>(dup #9a, NSF, CF, VN, Harran - Crosshill - Indian Proposal - " Box 134)</i> S 11 p <i>open 7/13/01</i>	6/28/68	A
#11a memo	Read to Rostow <i>open 7/13/01</i> S 1 p	6/28/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 84, June 26-28, 1968

Box 36

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12358 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

228 b

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#13a memcon	Saunders, Rostow, and Evron <i>open 2/3/01</i> S 3 p [Duplicate of #231a, NSF, Country File, Israel; Vol. X; Sanitized NLJ 84-181]	6/28/68	A
#14a cable	Saigon 31193 S 12 p [Duplicate of #14a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "8B (3)"; Sanitized NLJ/CBS 10]	6/27/68	A
#15 memo	Rostow to President, 7:45 p.m. S 1 p <i>EXAM # NLJ 019-036-3</i> <i>Sanitized 4/17/02 NLO/PAE 01/04</i>	6/27/68	A
#15a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>exam per RAL 9/11/00</i> S 3 p	6/26/68	A
#16a cable	Saigon 31194 <i>open 7/13/01</i> S 4 p	6/27/68	A
#17 memo	Rostow to President, 4:20 p.m. <i>open 7/13/01</i> C 1 p	6/27/68	A
#17a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>open 7/13/01</i> C 1 p	6/27/68	A
#18 memo	Rostow to President, 4 p.m. <i>open 7-8-93</i> S 1 p <i>NLJ 92-280</i> [Duplicate of #69, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Kosygin"]	6/27/68	A
#18a ltr	Kosygin to President <i>open 7-27-93 NLJ 92-234</i> PCI 1 p [Duplicate of #69a, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Kosygin"]	6/27/68	A
#19 memo	Rostow to President, 2:15 p.m. C 1 p <i>open 1-22-97 NLJ 94-472</i>	6/27/68	A
#19a memcon	Kopytin and Rostow <i>Duplicate in Files of WW Rostow, Box 8</i> C 4 p <i>110 refs of speeches, statements" doc 17, 17a</i> <i>open 5-16-95 NLJ 94-472</i>	6/27/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 84, June 26-28, 1968

Box 36

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

384

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#20a memo	Read to Rostow <i>open 7/13/01</i> C 2 p [Duplicate of #5a, NSF, Subject File, "Law of the Sea Conference"]	6/26/68	A
#20b rpt	"Statement of Principles concerning deep ocean floor" <i>open 7/13/01</i> C 5 p [Duplicate of #5c, NSF, Subject File, "Law of the Sea Conference"]	6/26/68	A
#20c cable	USUN 5726 <i>open 7/13/01</i> C 3 p [Duplicate of #5e, NSF, Subject File, "Law of the Sea Conference"]	6/24/68	A
#22 memo	Rostow to President, 1 p.m. <i>Open NLJ 97-12 9.1.98</i> C 1 p <i>[copy #99, CF Tanzania, Vol. 2, Box 100]</i>	6/27/68	A
#22a memo	Zwick to President, re: Tanzania <i>Open NLJ 97-12 9.1.98</i> C 2 p <i>[copy #99, CF, Tanzania Vol. 2, Box 100]</i>	6/22/68	A
#23b cable	Westmoreland to Abrams <i>open 7/13/01</i> S 1 p	6/27/68	A
#24 memo	Rostow to President, 12:55 p.m. S 1 p <i>open RAC 4/9/98</i>	6/27/68	A
#24a cable	Saigon 31163 <i>open 7/13/01</i> TS 2 p	6/27/68	A
#25a rpt	"Ben Read telephoned this additional paragraph..." <i>open 7/13/01</i> PCI 1 p	undated	A
#25e draft	Deptel to Saigon <i>open 7/13/01</i> S 5 p	6/25/68	A
#26 memo	Rostow to President, 10:40 a.m. <i>open 7/13/01</i> C 1 p	6/27/68	A
#26a memo	Jenkins to Rostow C 1 p <i>OPEN S 12-03 NW 01-241</i>	6/27/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 84, June 26-28, 1968

Box 36

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

4076

	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
3 memo (#266)	From Rowe - open 7/13/01 PCI - 1 p	6/25/68	A
#27 memo	Rostow to President, 10:40 a.m. open 7/13/01 C - 1 p	6/27/68	A
#28 memo	Rostow to President, 10:05 a.m. (dup # 104 NSF, LF, UN <i>Alvarez/Crossfield</i> <i>Indian Proposal Box 134</i>) S - 1 p open 7/13/01	6/27/68	A
#28a cable	London 10332 (dup # 104 <i>Asakawa</i>) open 7/13/01 S - 1 p	6/27/68	A
#30 memo	Rostow to President, 9:30 a.m. S 1 p <i>Exempt NFJ 019-036-3</i> <i>sanitized 6/7/02 NFJ RAC 01-189</i>	6/27/68	A
#30a cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Exempt NFJ 019-036-3</i> S 5 p <i>Sanitized 5-9-04 NW/RAC 01-190</i>	6/26/68	A
#32 memo	Rostow to President, 9:10 a.m. <i>Exempt NFJ 019-036-3</i> S 1 p <i>sanitized 6/7/02 NFJ RAC 01-189</i>	6/27/68	A
#34 memo	Rostow to President, 9:05 a.m. <i>Exempt per RAC 9/11/00</i> S 1 p	6/27/68	A
#34a cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Exempt per RAC 9/11/00</i> S 3 p	6/26/68	A
#35a cable	Bonn 13837 C - 5 p open 7-14-94 NL 394-54	6/26/68	A
#36 memo	Rostow to President, 7:05 a.m. <i>sanitized 6/7/02 NFJ RAC 01-189</i> S 1 p <i>Exempt NFJ 019-036-3</i> [Dup. # 57, NSF, CF, Korea, "var. 6"]	6/27/68	A
#36a cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Exempt per RAC 9/11/00</i> S 5 p [Dup. # 57a, see above]	6/26/68	A
#38 memo	Rostow to President, re: Tunisia open 7/13/01 S - 1 p	6/27/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 84, June 26-28, 1968

Box 36

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

59b

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#38a memo	Zwick to President, re: Tunisia open 7/13/01 S 1 p	6/26/68	A
#38b memo	Katzenbach to President, re: Tunisia open 7/18/01 S 4 p	6/21/68	A
#38c memo	President to Under SecState, re: Tunisia open 7/13/01 S 2 p	6/28/68	A
#39 memo	Rostow to President <i>Sanitized 5/13/02 NLS 01-243</i> S 3 p	6/27/68	A
#40a memo	Gaud to President open 7/13/01 C 4 p	6/18/68	A
#40b memo	Zwick to President open 7/13/01 C 2 p	6/22/68	A
#43a memo	Oliver to Bowdler open 7/17/01 S 2 p	6/26/68	A
#46 memo	Rostow to President, 6:15 p.m. <i>Exempt per RAC 9/11/00</i> S 1 p	6/26/68	A
#46a cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Exempt per RAC 9/11/00</i> S 2 p	6/25/68	A
#48 memo	Rostow to President, 5:15 p.m. open 7/17/01 S 1 p	6/26/68	A
#48a cable	Saigon 31058 open 7/17/01 S 6 p	6/26/68	A
#49 memo	Rostow to President, 5:15 p.m. open 7/17/01 C 1 p	6/26/68	A
#49a memcon	Kissinger and Saintenny open 7/17/01 C 2 p	6/23/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 84, June 26-28, 1968

Box 36

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

60/b

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#50 memo <i>Sanitized 5-12-03 NLJ 01-241</i>	Rostow to President, 5 p.m. S 1 p	6/26/68	A
#50a cable	Paris 17019 <i>Open 5/9/02 NLJ 01-242</i> S 2 p	6/26/68	A
#52a cable	Paris 17053 <i>Open 1-20-98 RAC</i> S 8 p [Dup. # 87, NSF, CF, VN, "HAKUAN, VI." Box 117] <i>HE 882, NSF, CF, VN HANNOI / Crocodile Indian Proposal Box 134</i>	6/26/68	A
#53a cable	Deptel to Saigon <i>Open 7/17/01</i> S 5 p	6/25/68	A
#54 memo	Rostow to President, 12:45 p.m. <i>Sanitized per RAC 7/13/01</i> S 1 p	6/26/68	A
#54a cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Sanitized per RAC 7/13/01</i> S 5 p [Duplicate of #80, NSF, CF, VN, "TDCS' and Cables, Vol. 2"]	6/26/68	A
#55a memo	Walsh to Rostow <i>Open 7/17/01</i> S 1 p	6/25/68	A
#55b rpt	"World Attitudes towards Paris Talks" <i>Open 7/17/01</i> S 5 p	undated	A
#55c rpt	"Specific Suggestions for Actions..." <i>Open 7/17/01</i> S 4 p	undated	A
#55d rpt	"Effect of Paris Talks on Attitudes..." <i>Open 7/17/01</i> S 7 p	undated	A
#56 memo	Rostow to President, 11 a.m. <i>(Dup # 89, NSF, CF, VN, HANNOI / Crocodile Indian Proposal Box 134)</i> S 2 p <i>Open 7/17/01</i>	6/26/68	A
#59 memo	Rostow to President <i>Open 7/17/01</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #212, NSF, CF, Israel, Vol. X; Sanitized NLJ 84-181]	6/26/68	A
#60 memo <i>Sanitized 5-12-03 NLJ 01-241</i>	Rostow to President C 2 p	6/26/68	A

FILE LOCATION ~~526 Deptel 190068 to Paris, secret, 3pp~~ 6/25/68 ~~A~~ *Open V.I.*

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 84, June 26-28, 1968 Box 36

- RESTRICTION CODES
- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 - (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 - (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

ACTION

1

Friday, June 28, 1968 - 8:20pm

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Senator Smathers has requested you have a brief meeting with Bahamian Prime Minister Lynden Pindling when he is in the United States on Thursday, July 11. State does not see any foreign policy objections to your meeting with him but there is a problem.

The Bahamas are still a British colony. Negotiations with the UK concerning their future status are expected to begin this fall. Your meeting with Pindling could be mis-interpreted as supporting Bahamian independence.

I suggest we take care of this problem by inviting U. K. Ambassador, Sir Patrick Dean, to accompany Pindling here. This would also be in keeping with normal practice and UK wishes.

W. W. Rostow

Approve meeting, invite Dean to accompany _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

ERF
MWG
MWG:mst

ACTION

2

~~SECRET~~

Friday, June 28, 1968 - 1:15pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Tripartite Legal Note

Pres file

For the past two weeks we have been negotiating in Bonn with the Germans, French and British to work out identical texts for a French-US-UK protest note to the Soviets on Berlin. It would establish our legal position, noting the violation of 1949 Agreements with the Soviets (made at the end of the Berlin Blockade).

Yesterday near-agreement was reached in Bonn, with the only remaining question being the Germans' desire to add the sentence underlined in the text (Tab A). We have no objection to this.

The Secretary wishes you to see the note before we give final agreement and authorization for delivery.

If all Governments agree, we expect to deliver the note next week. If we wish, we could push off delivery time for a day or two, although the Germans and our allies would probably not wish an extensive delay. There is a good deal to be said for getting this essentially legal statement out of the way -- and it is not likely to impinge seriously on the impact of Monday's ceremony and speech.

W. W. Rostow

Text approved _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cb, NARA, Date 4-12-00

~~SECRET~~

PROTEST TO THE SOVIETS ON BERLIN ACCESS PROBLEMS

1. The Embassy of the United States presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, upon instructions of its government, has the honor to direct the attention of the Soviet Government to the situation which has resulted from recent actions taken by the East German authorities.

2. Since June 12, these authorities have been demanding that German citizens travelling to and from Berlin and between the Federal Republic of Germany and East Germany must possess passports and visas. They have also announced that new levies will shortly be imposed on goods traffic entering East Germany.

3. The Government of the United States notes that the East German measures affect access to Berlin and are therefore contrary to the obligations assumed by the Soviet Government in the Four Power Communiqué of 20 June 1949 "to take the measures necessary to ensure the normal functioning and utilization of rail, water and road transport", for the "movement of persons and goods between the eastern zone and the western zone and between the Zones and Berlin." The United States considers that the responsibilities thus assumed by the Soviet Union remain and cannot be affected by any arrangements which the Soviet Union concludes with the East German authorities.

4. The Government of the United States wishes to emphasize that the requirement of passports and visas for the movement of German citizens

within their own country is contrary to the position which the United States has always maintained as regards both the principle of free movement within Germany and that Germany should be regarded as a single unit. There are no state borders within the interior of Germany.

5. Furthermore, the requirement for travel documents imposed by East German authorities in connection with movement between Eastern and Western sectors of Berlin, as well as the requirement imposed upon the residents of the western sectors of Berlin to declare themselves in the visa application forms as "citizens of the independent political entity of Berlin West", are obviously incompatible with the status of the city as it results from international agreements in force. Under the terms of these agreements -- as the Government of the Soviet Union well knows -- there is no independent entity of West Berlin but a special area comprising all four sectors to be administered as a whole. The Government of the United States has always maintained that limitations imposed on freedom of movement within Berlin are in violation of international agreements. The United States wishes to reemphasize that the agreements between the "GDR" and the Soviet Union of September 20, 1955, do not affect in any way the obligations or responsibilities of the Soviet Union under agreements and arrangements between the three powers and the Soviet Union on the subject of Germany and Berlin.

6. The East German passport and visa requirements represent an anachronism in a world moving toward freedom of travel. They also introduce a wholly new element into the situation which has existed hitherto in Germany which the Soviet Government has on many recent occasions declared its interest in maintaining. The Government of the United States notes finally that the recent East German restrictions are in absolute contradiction to the aim of relaxation of tension which inspires the policy of the Government of the United States. Such measures risk bringing about an increase of tension, harming efforts to achieve closer cooperation between eastern and western Europe, efforts to which the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has made very useful contributions.

7. For all of the reasons stated above, the Government of the United States calls upon the Soviet Government to fulfill its international obligation to assure freedom of access to Berlin.

~~SECRET~~

Pres file 3
ACTION

Friday - June 28, 1968 - 6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your San Salvador Trip

All five Central American Presidents have agreed to meet with you on the weekend of July 6-7. The Guatemalan President was a little reluctant on the date because he was thinking in terms of an elaborate agenda and detailed discussions which would require more preparatory lead-time than would be available. But he has come around.

As you authorized us to do, we have sent a follow-up cable asking that the invitation be extended. We expect it to come in tomorrow or Sunday. They understand that whatever announcement is made is contingent on acceptance and working out arrangements for coordinated release.

The Central American Presidents have asked for your ideas on program and whether Mrs. Johnson will be accompanying you. I believe we should let them know our tentative thinking. At Tab A is a suggested message for your approval.

Yes ___ No ___ Call me ___.

I will add a sentence on Mrs. Johnson's participation, based on your decision.

She will go ___ Won't go ___ Call me ___.

Assuming the invitation arrives for San Salvador, July 6 - 7, I recommend the advance party leave early Monday morning, July 1.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___ Call me ___.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 7-3-01

With the advance party in San Salvador, it will be impossible to keep your visit under wraps. George Christian and I recommend that the announcement be made on Monday or Tuesday, July 1 or 2 at the latest.

Approve ___ Disapprove ___ Call me ___.

I have been considering further the proposition that on your return you drop off each President at his capital. I find that Air Force One cannot land at one of the capitals. Were you to switch to a smaller plane there would be serious logistical problems with the press. There is also an important political problem. The Guatemalan President, who is a rather difficult fellow, would probably not like to join the expedition, and it would not look well for you to take the others and not him. In view of all these difficulties, I recommend that we not pursue the idea.

Drop it ___ Keep it ___ Call me ___.

If you decide to go ahead with it, another aircraft will be necessary to fly advance parties and equipment to the four other capitals.

Authorize aircraft ___ Call me ___.

You will be interested to know that the Mexicans are having second thoughts about not going to San Salvador. Ambassador Margain called Covey Oliver to say Tony Carrillo Flores wanted us to know that they were taking another look at it.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Tab A - Suggested draft message for approval.

P.S. As attached indicates, Somoza has jumped the gun in sending his invitation. It increases urgency of getting joint invitation and announcing as soon thereafter as possible.

3a

~~SECRET~~ - DRAFT

CIRCULAR - IMMEDIATE
STATE
EXDIS/OLEANDER

FOR AMBASSADOR.

Following are tentative ideas for San Salvador meeting which you should discuss with President, pointing out President Johnson would welcome their views:

- a. We believe meeting of Presidents should be billed as ODECA function with President Johnson attending as observer/participant. CA Presidents may wish to meet on day before President arrives to discuss CACM and ODECA issues and to agree on topics for discussion with President.
- b. At the end of working session on Saturday afternoon, July 6, Presidents would issue declaration as they did after 1963 meeting. We are prepared to send down in advance high ranking official to work with Foreign Ministers on draft.
- c. President Johnson's program would look something like this:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01

Saturday, July 6

- Noon arrival.
- Motorcade from airport to Presidential Palace.
- Lunch at ODECA headquarters.
- Meeting of Presidents at ODECA headquarters.
- State Dinner given by President of El Salvador.

Sunday, July 7

- Mass at Cathedral.
- Lunch at suitable finca (plantation).
- Visit to an AFP project.
- Return reception offered by President Johnson.

The President [is] / [is not] planning to take Mrs. Johnson.

FYL. Assuming CA Presidents agree on San Salvador as site and extend invitation, advance party expected arrive San Salvador evening of June 30, and announcement would be coordinated for release July 1 or 2. END FYL.

Telegram from President Somoza

I am honored to send Your Excellency a cordial invitation to visit Nicaragua for the purpose of discussing matters of common interest to our countries. In case Your Excellency cannot for the moment visit Nicaragua and makes a trip to Central America, I would be happy to meet with Your Excellency at any place in Central America. With pleasure I reiterate to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest and most distinguished consideration.

A. Somoza

President of the Republic of Nicaragua

4

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN PLUS

Friday, June 28, 1968 - 6:00 p.m

Pres file

Mr. President:

You will wish to have this account of Cy Vance's meeting with Zorin, for the 6:15 p.m. meeting with Sec. Rusk.

Zorin, essentially, proposes this:

- 1. We stop bombing.
- 2. They take de-escalatory steps in the next phase; but we also take further steps.

The key issues are:

- Firmly to negotiate phase 2 before the bombing stops;
- Whether what they do in phase 2 compensates us for the bombing cessation plus the additional actions Zorin suggests.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 17226

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN PLUS

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
 NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
 By JC, NARA, Date 7-3-01



Department of State

4a
TELEGRAM
6

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 18486
By isa, NARA, Date 2-6-98

NNNNVV CRA730
OO RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 17226 1801737
ZNY SSSSS
O 281735Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3677
STATE GRNC

07749

1968 JUN 28 PM 2 17

BT
~~SECRET~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO PARIS 17226

Restow

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 361

1. I CALLED AT SOVIET EMB TODAY AND TALKED WITH AMB ZORIN FOR HOUR AND HALF. BOGOMOLOV INTERPRETED. ZORIN WAS QUITE CORDIAL, AND PROCEEDED IN BUSINESSLIKE MANNER WITH MINIMUM OF PROPAGANDA AND FEW WASTED WORDS.

2. I BEGAN BY TELLING ZORIN WE WANTED TO KEEP HIM FULLY INFORMED ABOUT PROGRESS OF TALKS, AND SAID THAT AFTER HIS TALK WITH AMB SHRIVER I HAD SPOKEN WITH XUAN THUY DURING WEDNESDAY'S TEA BREAK AND PUT SUGGESTION TO HIM IN EXACT FORM DISCUSSED BETWEEN ZORIN AND SHRIVER. I THEN RECOUNTED ARRANGEMENTS FOR MY MEETING WITH HA VAN LAU, TOLD ZORIN MEETING LASTED TWO HOURS, AND DESCRIBED IN GENERAL TERMS COURSE OF MEETING. I SUMMARIZED BY SAYING I BELIEVED HA VAN LAU UNDERSTOOD OUR SUGGESTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS CLEARLY, THAT LAU'S RESPONSE WAS NEGATIVE BUT THAT HE SAID HE WOULD THINK ABOUT IT. I TOLD ZORIN I ASSUMED NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH HIM AND I HOPED WE WOULD SEE IT GOT THE SERIOUS ATTENTION IT DESERVED, SINCE I FELT IT PROVIDED A REALISTIC WAY TO OVERCOME OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IN TALKS.

3. ZORIN SAID THIS PROPOSAL HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO VARIOUS PERSONS IN VARIOUS LANGUAGES, AND HE WANTED TO ASK EXACTLY HOW I PUT IT TO HA VAN LAU. I SAID: "THE US WOULD AGREE TO STOP ALL BOMBING AND BOMBARDMENTS OF THE DRV ON A DAY CERTAIN TO BE COMMUNICATED TO YOU (DRV) BEFORE THAT DAY AN UNDERSTANDING WOULD BE REACHED ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD BE CARRIED OUT FOLLOWING UPON THE CESSATION." I ADDED THAT IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS I TOLD HA VAN LAU THAT AN UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING THE "CIRCUMSTANCES" HAD TO BE REACHED BEFORE BOMBING STOPPED, BUT HIS WOULD BE PRIVATE UNDERSTANDING; AND THAT IF WE COULD NOT AGREE ON "CIRCUMSTANCES", THEN BOMBING WOULD NOT BE STOPPED.

4. ZORIN REPLIED THAT I HAD PUT PROPOSITION IN FORM HARD FOR HANOI TO ACCEPT, FOR I WAS STILL POSING CONDITIONS AND DEMANDING

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 17226, JUNE 28, SECTION 1 OF 2, (NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS)

RECIPROCITY, WHICH HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE DRV COULD NOT ACCEPT. HERE HE THUMPED TABLE TO EMPHASIZE HIS STATEMENT THAT DRV WOULD NEVER ACCEPT DEMAND FOR RECIPROCITY, "NO MATTER HOW IT WAS DRESSED UP." ZORIN THEN SAID HE HAD ENVISAGED A TWO PHASE PROPOSAL WITH A TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES. THE FIRST PHASE WOULD INVOLVE A CESSATION OF BOMBING AND THE SECOND PHASE WOULD INVOLVE CARRYING OUT RECIPROCAL ACTIONS ON BOTH SIDES. HE ASKED WHETHER OUR SUGGESTION INVOLVED TWO PHASES WITH A TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN. I SAID WE ENVISAGED, AS FAR AS PUBLIC WAS CONCERNED, TWO PHASES, WITH TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN, WHICH MUST BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE, BUT BETWEEN US AND DRV, IN PRIVATE, WE HAD TO HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE SECOND PHASE BEFORE WE CEASED BOMBING. I SAID WE COULD NOT JEOPARDIZE THE SAFETY OF OUR TROOPS AND OTHER ALLIED FORCES AND THEREFORE WE MUST KNOW WITH ABSOLUTE CLARITY WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE SECOND PHASE. I MENTIONED THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE DMZ, AND SAID IT WOULD APPEAR TO WORLD US AND DRV ACTIONS IN DMZ WERE RECIPROCAL STEPS AND NOT CONNECTED WITH BOMBING CESSATION. I SAID I HAD MENTIONED OTHER SPECIFIC "CIRCUMSTANCES TO HA VAN LAU WHICH WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE THRASHED OUT BETWEEN US. KEY POINT, I REPEATED, WAS THAT WE HAD TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE STOPPED BOMBING, AND NO ONE HAD TOLD US THIS YET.

5. AFTER PROPOSING TOAST ZORIN HAD MORE TO SAY. HE STATED THAT WE HAD FEWER TROOPS IN VIET-NAM BEFORE WE STARTED TO BOMB THAN WE DID NOW SO WHY WAS IT NECESSARY TO BOMB WHEN WE HAD 500,000 TROOPS THERE. I POINTED OUT HIS NON SEQUITUR AND STRESSED THE FACT THAT DRV HAD ESCALATED THE FIGHTING AND INFILTRATION AND THUS THE DANGER TO OUR TROOPS SINCE MARCH 31ST. I SAID WE COULD ONLY ASSUME UNLESS WE GOT SOME ASSURANCE TO THE CONTRARY THAT THEY WOULD TAKE FURTHER ADVANTAGE IF WE STOPPED ALL THE BOMBING. ZORIN THEN SAID WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE WHEN THE MEASURES OF RESTRAINT ARE TAKEN BY THEM. HE SAID IF THERE WERE A TIME INTERVAL THE MEASURES COULD BE AGREED TO THEN. I REPEATED THAT WAS UNACCEPTABLE, AND THAT WE HAD TO KNOW IN ADVANCE WHAT MEASURES OF RESTRAINT THEY WOULD TAKE IF THE BOMBING WERE TO BE STOPPED. I REPEATED AGAIN THAT WE COULD NOT JEOPARDIZE OUR FORCES AND THOSE OF OUR ALLIES.

6. ZORIN NOW BEGAN TO WARM TO HIS SUBJECT, AND REFERRED TO A CONVERSATION BETWEEN A MEMBER US DELEGATION AND DRV DELEGATION ABOUT POSSIBLE STEPS IN REDUCING TROOPS, RETIRING CERTAIN DIVISIONS, ETC. HE SAID THIS WAS ALREADY SECOND PHASE TALK. ZORIN THEN TRIED TO EXPLAIN VERY SPECIFICALLY WHAT HE MEANT BY THE TWO PHASES. WHEN HE ENCOUNTERED DIFFICULTY IN MAKING HIMSELF AS CLEAR AS HE WISHED, HE WENT OVER TO HIS DESK, GOT PAPER AND PENCIL, AND SPENT SOME FIVE MINUTES WRITING OUT DIAGRAM ON SINGLE SHEET OF PAPER. AT TOP WAS PHASE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- PARIS 17226, JUNE 28, SECTION 1 OF 2, (NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS)

1. CESSATION OF BOMBING, WITH HEAVY BLACK LINE SEPARATING IT FROM PHASE II. PHASE II WAS COMPOSED OF PARALLEL COLUMNS WITH SEVERAL POINTS IN EACH COLUMN. ONE COLUMN WAS US AND THE OTHER DRV.

7. ZORIN SAID WITH ELABORATE EMPHASIS THAT HE WAS NOT PROPOSING ANYTHING, BUT MERELY GIVING HIS "PERSONAL" THOUGHTS -- AS A RESULT OF LISTENING TO BOTH SIDES -- AS TO WHAT MIGHT GIVE BEST RESULTS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. (HE REPEATED THIS CAUTION AT END OF MEETING).

VANCE

BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

6

VV CRC848
OO RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 17226 1801737
ZNY SSSSS
O 281735Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3678
STATE GRNC
BT

1968 JUN 20 PM 2 16

07748

~~SECRET~~ SECTION TWO OF TWO PARIS 17226

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 361

HE THEN EXPLAINED HIS DIAGRAM WITH GREAT EARNESTNESS, GETTING AHEAD OF INTERPRETATION IN HIS EAGERNESS TO GET HIS IDEAS ACROSS. FIRST PHASE WAS BOMBING CESSATION, WITH NO RECIPROCITY "FORMALLY", EMPHASIS ON "FORMALLY". SECOND PHASE, US AND DRV WOULD UNDERTAKE TWO OR THREE MEASURES EACH. (1) US WOULD SUGGEST PULL-BACK OF CERTAIN TROOPS OR DIVISIONS OR CLOSING OF CERTAIN BASES (HE CITED CLOSING OF KHE SANH AS EXAMPLE) BY US, AT SAME TIME SUGGESTING CERTAIN PARALLEL MEASURES TO BE TAKEN BY DRV. (2) SECOND POINT, TO SUGGEST CERTAIN MEASURES THAT WOULD HELP GUARANTEE SECURITY OF US AND ALLIED TROOPS ("SINCE THIS WAS PURPOSE OF OUR ASKING RECIPROCAL MEASURES FOR BOMBING CESSATION"). E.G., HE SAID REDUCING MILITARY ACTIVITY IN VARIOUS AREAS, AND WHEN I ASKED IF HE HAD IN MIND DMZ AS A POSSIBILITY HE REPLIED IT WAS GOOD POSSIBILITY. (3) THIRD POINT (HE STRESSED THIS AND IT WAS OBVIOUS HE ATTACHED CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO IT), DISCUSS SOME POLITICAL STEP THAT COULD BE TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY, SO THAT US PROPOSALS WOULD INCLUDE BOTH MILITARY AND POLITICAL STEPS. HIS DESCRIPTION OF POSSIBLE POLITICAL STEPS WAS VAGUE. (LATER I QUESTIONED HIM SPECIFICALLY ON THIS AND ASKED WHETHER HE WAS SUGGESTING THAT A TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION BE LISTED OR DID HE MEAN THAT ACTION TO BE TAKEN SHOULD BE LISTED. HE SMILED AND SAID HE RECOGNIZED US PROBLEM, THAT WE HAD SAIGON STANDING AT OUR BACKS, BUT HE HAD IN MIND SOMETHING VAGUE, SOME SUGGESTED STEP "ON PRINCIPLE" THAT WOULD NOT TOUCH DIRECTLY ON INTERESTS OF SAIGON OR FLN.) FINALLY, ZORIN SAID THIS LIST OF STEPS TO BE TAKEN WOULD BE OPEN-ENDED, THAT IS WE WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO DRV THAT FURTHER CONCRETE STEPS WOULD ALSO BE NEGOTIATED HE DID NOT MAKE IT CLEAR WHETHER HE WAS SUGGESTING A FOURTH POINT ON EACH SIDE OF HIS LIST SAYING JUST THAT.

8. PICKING UP HIS SHEET OF PAPER, ZORIN SAID WE SHOULD DRAW UP "THIS LIST", INCLUDING SPECIFIC STEPS FOR EACH SIDE. HE SAID HE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 17226, JUNE 28, SECTION 2 OF 2, (NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS)

WAS UNABLE TO ADVISE US ON CONCRETE STEPS WE MIGHT WISH INCLUDE. US SHOULD "PROPOSE THIS NOW". US WOULD AGREE TO STOP BOMBINGS ON CERTAIN DATE, AND BOTH SIDES WOULD "AGREE TO DISC SS" SPECIFIC POINTS LISTED, WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE BEGINNING OF SECOND PHASE -- TO START SAY TWO OR THREE WEEKS AFTER BOMBING CESSATION. THUS US WOULD AVOID ASKING DIRECT RECIPROCITY (POINTING TO DIAGRAM TO SHOW THAT RECIPROCITY CAME ONLY IN PHASE TWO) BUT WOULD ACHIEVE WHAT US WANTED, NAMELY MEASURES TO PROTECT US AND ALLIED TROOPS. THEN HE STRESSED THAT IF US WANTED IT MADE CLEAR WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN PHASE TWO, THEN IT MUST PROPOSE CONCRETE MEASURES FOR BOTH SIDES; OTHERWISE HANOI WOULD NOT PROVIDE CLEAR PICTURE OF WHAT IT WOULD DO. ZORIN SAID HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE DRV WOULD ACCEPT CONCRETE STEPS US PROPOSED, BUT HE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THEY WOULD AGREE TO TALK ON THIS BASIS, IF IT WAS PRESENTED AS REASONABLE MINIMUM MEASURE, AND IF DRV SAW US WILLING TO REDUCE LEVEL OF MILITARY ACTIVITY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY INCLUDE SOMETHING FROM POLITICAL SPHERE.

9. I ASKED SEVERAL QUESTIONS TO CLARIFY HIS POSITION, INCLUDING WHAT WOULD HAPPEN DURING INTERVAL BETWEEN PHASE ONE AND PHASE TWO -- THAT IS HOW DID WE KNOW DRV WOULD NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE. ZORIN REPLIED HIS IDEA WAS THAT "NOW, AT THIS STAGE", WE WOULD ALREADY AGREE ON ONE OR TWO OF POINTS IN PHASE TWO. I ASKED IF HE THOUGHT POINTS IN PHASE TWO WOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY DRV. ZORIN SAID IF DRV AGREED, THEY WOULD ABIDE BY AGREEMENT, THEY WERE AS RESPONSIBLE AS US. I ASKED WHY HIS DIAGRAM DID NOT CONSTITUTE "RECIPROCITY" IN DRV EYES. HE POINTED TO HEAVY LINE BETWEEN PHASE ONE AND TWO AND SAID RECIPROCITY WAS BELOW LINE BUT NOT ABOVE IT. I AGAIN TRIED TO GET A CLEAR ANSWER BY ASKING WHETHER DRV WOULD AGREE TO THIS PLAN BEFORE BOMBING CEASED. ZORIN REPLIED HE THOUGHT THERE WERE GROUNDS FOR CONCRETE CONVERSATIONS AND THIS PLAN WOULD NOT BE REJECTED.

10. AT THIS STAGE WE HAD TO CLOSE HURRIEDLY SINCE ZORIN SAID HE WAS OVERDUE FOR APPOINTMENT. I PROMISED TO STUDY WHAT HE HAD SAID.

11. COMMENT- I HAD THE IMPRESSION REPEAT IMPRESSION FROM TWO REMARKS OF ZORIN THAT ZORIN OR A MEMBER OF HIS STAFF HAD TALKED TO THE NORTH-VIETNAMESE SINCE OUR MEETING OF LAST NIGHT. ZORIN HAD OBVIOUSLY THOUGHT ABOUT THE PROPOSAL HE ADVANCED AND WHEN HE HAD TROUBLE FINDING THE RIGHT WORD, SKETCHED OUT HIS PLAN ON PAPER WITHOUT UNDUE HESITATION. UNFORTUNATELY, I COULD NOT GET A CLEAR STATEMENT FROM HIM ON WHETHER THE PROPOSED RECIPROCAL ACTIONS IN PHASE TWO OF HIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE AGREED TO BEFORE THE BOMBING WAS STOPPED. HIS EMPHASIS ON THE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- PARIS 17226, JUNE 28, SECTION 2 OF 2, (NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS)

WORD "FORMALLY" IN PARAGRAPH SEVEN ABOVE SUGGESTS HE WAS SAYING THAT. HOWEVER, IN PARAGRAPH FIVE HE IMPLIED THE MEASURES WOULD BE AGREED UPON IN THE INTERVAL FOLLOWING THE BOMBING CESSATION. AT THE END OF OUR TALK WHEN I TRIED TO GET A CLEAR ANSWER (PARAGRAPH NINE), HE FUZZED THE ISSUE.

12. I WILL BE CONSIDERING THIS CONVERSATION IN LIGHT OF OUR TALK WITH LAU AND WILL SUBMIT MY SUGGESTIONS FOR FOLLOW UP.
VANCE
BT

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

5

Presfile

Friday, June 28, 1968 - 5:50 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith our Ambassador to France comes up with a somewhat ghoulsh planning suggestion.

He may be right but I would rather he wait.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

5a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-393
By ju, NARA, Date 7-13-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 21, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

General Eisenhower is the last of the "great men" of the war-days, historical figures whom de Gaulle associates closely with himself. Roosevelt, Churchill, Adenauer and Stalin are gone.

Newspaper reports indicate the Ike's heart is again in trouble.

Should Ike die this year, it seems certain that General de Gaulle will consider attendance at the funeral ceremonies. This would obviously be an opportunity to help Franco-American relations.

Fortunately there are signs of change here:

- A. Frenchmen are tired of bad relations and think it will improve - that in effect was what Pompidou told me yesterday;
- B. The student riots and strikes show them that they don't have all the answers, internally or externally;
- C. France will need economic friends now;
- D. De Gaulle has identified the Communists as his principal enemy in his elections at home and has

pushed his

The President

THE WHITE HOUSE

pushed his pro-Soviet policy abroad about as far as it will go; .

- E. He and all Frenchmen are delighted that Viet Nam talks are in Paris; for the first time they are being almost impartial, and de Gaulle is silent.

Thus I think it is the right time for you to have a special chat with de Gaulle, if this opportunity presents itself.

Sincerely,

Robert Sargent Shriver

6
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, June 28, 1968 - 5:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith more on Hanoi-Chinese tensions.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Paris 17180 MARIA THREE

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-241
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-17-03



Department of State

ka wt
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

6

NNNN ZCZCFJL442
RR RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 17180 1801640
ZNY SSSSS
R 281516Z JUN 68
FM ANEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3655
STATE GRNC
BT

07699

1968 JUN 28 AM 11 51

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 17180

Restow

N O D I S

MARIA THREE

SUBJ: HAIPHONG RESTRICTIONS ON CHINESE SAILORS

SOURCE GAVE EMBOFFICER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM HANOI DATED JUNE 24.

1. " I HAVE JUST RECEIVED A NEW PIECE OF INFORMATION ON THE UNREST WHICH PEKING IS STRIVING TO CREATE (S'EFFORCE DE CREER) IN VIETNAM INTSELF.
 2. FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT PROVOKED BY CHINESE SAILORS, THE AUTHORITIES OF THE PORT OF HAIPHONG HAVE DECIDED THAT THE CREWS OF CHINESE SHIPS AND THOSE OF OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO GO ASHORE ON ALTERNATE DAYS. THE EMBASSIES OF EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE PROTESTED IN VAIN AGAINST THIS MEASURE WHICH THEY CONSIDER TO BE HARASSING ("VEXATOIRE").
- GP-1. WALLNER
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-242
By *cbm*, NARA, Date 4-9-02

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

Pres file

Friday, June 28, 1968 - 4:45pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

On Monday, July 1, The Common Market will abolish the last of its national tariffs. This will complete their Customs Union. The six countries will then have a single external tariff for outside countries and no tariffs for trade among themselves.

On the same day, the Common Market will make the first of its scheduled Kennedy Round reductions in its external tariff.

Attached is a message from you to President Rey congratulating him on the completion of the Customs Union.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

ERF
ERF:mst

7a

**SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REY OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES**

The completion of your Customs Union today fulfills the dream of a decade. History will record this achievement as a landmark on the road to European unity.

The movement toward unity responds to a deep desire of the people of Europe. It enhances the partnership between America and Europe dedicated to the cause of world peace and prosperity.

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~1. Summary~~
2. Pres. File

8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

Friday - June 28, 1968
4 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Barrientos Visit and Economic Assistance

I have looked further into the stymied assistance package for Bolivia which President Barrientos may try to raise with you.

The package consists of:

Budget support	\$ 4.5 million
Roads	2.4 "
Community development	2.1 "
Airports and aircraft	13.5 "
Total	\$ 22.5 million.

The AID-BOB-Treasury strategy was to offer the budget support loan right away, but held off on the others until the end of the year to see whether Bolivia delivers on the self-help conditions attached to SA loan. The only self-help condition not taken is the 10% import surtax.

The Bolivians consider the surtax measure politically hard to impose unless they have something more than a \$4.5 million SA loan tied to 100% US procurement to point to. The project loans -- which are sound loans and badly needed by Bolivia -- would provide the necessary sugar-coating.

But we are caught in the vicious circle of: no budget support without the import surtax; imposition of the import tax being politically risky without the sugar-coating of the project loans; and no project loans unless Bolivia generates the additional revenue, which it cannot do without the import surtax. The surtax, therefore, is not only an essential precondition for the budgetary support loan, but also for the important project loans.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

It will be more in keeping with our sense of responsible cooperation and Bolivian realities to tell the Bolivians that if they put through the import surcharge, we will move forward right away with the SA and project loans.

I request your authorization to tell AID that is the way we want it played. You would not get involved in your discussions with Barrientos, but Covey Oliver can reopen the bidding with the Finance Minister who is also coming.

W. W. Rostow

Approve
Disapprove
Call me

WGB:mm

Pres file

9

~~SECRET/HARVAN~~

^{mi}
Thursday, June 28, 1968
1:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Cy Vance's report on his informal meeting last night. I agree with his net evaluation (paras. 37-40 on the last page).

As you will see from Hanoi's point of view, the purpose was to get clarification without giving anything away at this stage.

W. W. Reston

~~SECRET/HARVAN attachment~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 9/17/92



Department of State
~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM

9a

O 280448Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3638 IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 17153 SECTION 1 OF 4

N O D I S/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 355

FROM VANCE

rough copy
1968
1. *Pol. Off.*
2. *Habib. Secy*
3.

1968 JUN 07 05:10:42 Q

1. I MET WITH HA VAN LAU FROM 10:30 TO 12:40 NIGHT OF JUNE 27/28 AT HOUSE IN VITRY SUR SEINE NOT FAR FROM DRV DELEGATION HEADQUARTERS. THE LOCATION WAS PROPOSED BY THE DRV AND APPARENTLY ONCE SERVED A COMMUNICATIONS CENTER FROM THEM. ALSO ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE HABIB AND KEGROPONTE ON OUR SIDE, AND ON DRV SIDE, NGUYEN MINH VY, INTERPRETER NGUYEN DINH PHUONG AND TRAN QUANG CO, WHO TOOK NOTES.
2. I OPENED BY ASKING LAU IF HE HAD HAD CHANCE TO THINK OVER THE SUGGESTION I HAD PUT TO HIM AND XUAN THUY AT WEDNESDAY'S COFFEE BREAK. LAU SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN PUT IN RATHER SIMPLE TERMS AND THUS HE AS YET HAD NO BASIS ON WHICH FOR FORM A JUDGMENT.
3. WE REPEATED THE PROPOSAL SAYING THAT THE US WOULD AGREE TO CEASE ALL BOMBARDMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM ON A DAY TO BE COMMUNICATED TO THE DRV. BEFORE THAT DAY, AN UNDERSTANDING WOULD BE REACHED ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE CARRIED OUT FOLLOWING UPON THE CESSATION. I REPEATED THE PROPOSAL TO BE SURE THAT IT WAS UNDERSTOOD. I COMMENTED THAT THIS SEEMED TO ME A WAY TO MAKE PROGRESS AND OVERCOME THE OBSTACLES TO OUR DISCUSSIONS. I SAID IT WOULD MEET THE SUGGESTIONS MADE BY THE DRV AND NOT JEOPARDIZE OUR FORCES IN VIETNAM. I THEN EMPHASIZED THE VALUE OF DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS PRIVATELY AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO MAINTAINING THE UTMOST SECRECY.
4. LAU THEN SAID HE HAD SOME QUESTIONS. HE REMINDED US THAT THE DRV DEMANDS THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST ALL OF ITS TERRITORY AND THAT THIS HAS BEEN FORMULATED IN A 3-POINT PROPOSAL BY XUAN THEUY. LAU WONDERED WHETHER OTHER ACTS OF WAR WERE INCLUDED IN OUR PROPOSAL OR NOT. I REPLIED THAT ONE OF THE QUESTIONS WE WOULD HVE TO DICUSSS WAS WHAT CONSTITUTED OTHER ACTS OF WAR.
5. LAU ASKED FOR EXAMPLES OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES WE HAD IN MIND. I SAID THAT WE HAD SPOKEN OFTEN OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REESTABLISHMENT

DECLASSIFIED
State and Times &

Authority RAC18490

By *K. L. L.* NARA. Date 7-3-01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 17153 SECTION 1 of 4 NODIS HARVAN PLUS 7560Q

OF THE DMZ, AND ADDED THAT WE HAD INDICATED OUR CONCERN REGARDING SUCH MATTERS AS: ARTILLERY FIRE FROM AND ACROSS THE DMZ; THE LAUNCHING OF ATTACKS ACROSS OR IN THE AREA OF THE DMZ; INCREASED INFILTRATION OF TROOPS INTO THE SOUTH; AND CONTINUING ATTACKS ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE CITIES IN THE SOUTH. I SAID THESE WOULD BE THE KINDS OF THINGS WE SHOULD TALK ABOUT IN DISCUSSING THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD FOLLOW THE CESSATION OF BOMBING.

6. LAU ASKED IF THE DISCUSSION OF CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD COME BEFORE OR AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. I REPLIED BEFORE. I THEN REITERATED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD MEET THE DRV DEMANDS, YET AT THE SAME TIME PROVIDE THE PROTECTION FOR OUR FORCES AND THOSE OF OUR ALLIES--A MATTER WHICH CONCERNS US GREATLY.

7. LAU THEN SAID THAT HE WOULD THINK IT OVER BUT COMMENTED BY WAY OF PRELIMINARY OBSERVATION, THAT HE SAW NOTHING NEW IN WHAT WE WERE SAYING WHEN COMPARED WITH WHAT WE HAD SAID IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS BETWEEN THE FULL DELEGATIONS OR IN THE MEETING BETWEEN JORDEN AND LE.

8. I POINTED OUT THAT OUR PROPOSAL CONTAINED SOMETHING VERY NEW. LAU REMARKED THAT THERE WAS INDEED SOMETHING NEW, THE DATE OF CESSATION OF BOMBING WOULD BE FIXED BEFOREHAND. HABIB THEN ADDED THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING ELSE, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CONDITIONS FOLLOW RATHER THAN PRECEDE THE CESSATION, THUS THEY ARE NOT CONDITIONS IN THE TRUE SENSE OF THE WORD. IN FACT, THE PROPOSAL ALLOWS THE DRV TO MEET THEIR REQUEST OF NO PRIOR CONDITIONS AND AT THE SAME TIME ALLOWS US TO MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR WHAT WILL FOLLOW. MOREOVER WHAT FOLLOWS WILL NOT BE LINKED WITH THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AS FAR AS THE PUBLIC IS CONCERNED. (X)

9. LAU REPLIED THAT THESE IDEAS WERE ONLY SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT FROM ONES WE HAD ADVANCED PREVIOUSLY--DIFFERENT IN TERMS OF SEQUENCE BUT AS AFAR AS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER WAS CONCERNED HE SAID THERE WAS NOTHING NEW, AND WHAT WE WERE ASKING IS STILL TANTAMOUNT TO RECIPROCITY. LAU SAID SUPPOSE THE DISCUSSION OF CIRCUMSTANCES TO FOLLOW THE CESSATION OF BOMBING DOES NOT ACHIEVE ANY RESULTS--THEN WHAT WILL HAPPEN? HE SAID OUR PROPOSAL STILL INVOLVED THE ELEMENT OF RECIPROCITY, AND HE SURE WE RECALLED THAT XUAN THUY HAD ALREADY REJECTED THIS ON MUNEROUS OCCASIONS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- PARIS 17153 SECTION 1 of 4 NODIS HARVAN PLUS 7560Q

10. I SAID I WAS AWARE OF THIS AND THAT I HAD READ AND REREAD XUAN THUY'S STATEMENTS MANY TIMES. I SAID THAT I HAD TRIED TO FIND A WAY TO OVERCOME THE OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IN THESE DISCUSSIONS---A WAY IN WHICH WE COULD MEET THE DRV DEMANDS AND AT THE SAME TIME PROVIDE THE NECESSARY PROTECTION OF OUR FORCES. I SAID THAT BY TALKING OF TIME SEQUENCE THE QUESTION OF TIME DEVELOPS INTO ONE OF SUBSTANCE. AT THIS POINT I EMPHASIZED THAT I DID NOT WANT TO MISLEAD LAU. I SAID THAT BEFORE THE BOMBING WAS STOPPED, WE WOULD HAVE TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD FOLLOW THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. I SAID I DID NOT WANT ANY MISUNDERSTANDING ON THIS POINT.

11. HABIB THEN COMMENTED THAT THE QUESTION OF PRIOR CONDITIONS IS NOT APPARENT IN OUR PROPOSAL BECAUSE WE ARE TAKING A STEP FIRST AND WHAT THE DRV DOES WILL FOLLOW UPON THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. I THEN POINTED OUT THAT SOME OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD FOLLOW UPON THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WOULD BE ACTS OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT SUCH AS THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE DMZ AND AS SUCH WOULD APPEAR RELATED TO EACH OTHER AND NOT TO THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE BEFORE.
VANCE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

0 280448Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3639
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION TWO OF FOUR PARIS 17153

NODIS/KARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 355

FROM VANCE

12. LAU RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT IN SUBSTANCE THERE IS STILL A DEMAND FOR RECIPROCITY. HE THEN REITERATED THE DRV POSITION THAT WE MUST CEASE ALL BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR UNCONDITIONALLY, AND WHETHER THE CONDITIONS ARE IMPOSED BEFORE, AT THE SAME TIME, OR AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, IT WAS TANTAMOUNT TO RECIPROCITY. LAU SAID THAT IF THE DRV DISCUSSES THESE PROPOSALS BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING OR SIMULTANEOUSLY IT WOULD BE CONTRADICTING ITS PREVIOUS POSITION. LAU SAID HE WANTED TO THINK THAT THE U.S. IS INTERESTED IN SEEKING A SOLUTION BUT HE REGRETTED THAT OUR SUGGESTIONS OFFERED NOTHING NEW AND SUGGESTED WE SPEAK OF SUBSTANCE RATHER THAN APPEARANCES.

13. LAU THEN SAID WE HAD NOT ANSWERED HIS QUESTION. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE DISAGREE ON CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH SHOULD FOLLOW THE CESSATION OF BOMBING? I REPLIED THAT UNLESS WE AGREE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE BOMBING WILL NOT STOP. I ALSO SAID THAT OUR PROPOSAL WOULD MEET THE BASIC NEED OF THE DRV SINCE THE BOMBING WOULD BE STOPPED, THE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE REASONABLE, AND THEY WOULD LEAD TO A LESSENING OF THE CONFLICT PERMITTING US TO GO ON TO THE DISCUSSION OF OTHER MATTERS LEADING TO PEACE. I SAID THAT I BELIEVED THAT OUR OBJECTIVE AS WELL AS THAT OF THE DRV WAS TO FIND AN HONORABLE SOLUTION WHICH WOULD PERMIT PEACE TO RETURN TO VIET-NAM AND PERMIT IT TO DEVELOP ALONG LINES OF ITS OWN CHOOSING.

14. LAU THEN PLUNGED INTO A LONG AND SOMEWHAT EMOTIONAL MONOLOGUE. HE SAID THAT HIS PEOPLE WOULD PROGRESS, IT WAS JUST A QUESTION OF TIME AND AS LONG AS THE PEOPLE WERE DETERMINED TO GO FORWARD NO ONE COULD HINDER THIS PROGRESS. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE ATTACHED TO PEACE, WHICH IN THEIR VIEW MUST BE IN INDEPENDENCE AND IN FREEDOM. THE DRV IS AN INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN COUNTRY AND YET THE U.S.

~~SECRET~~

SENDS PLANES TO BOMB IT. THE U.S. REPEATEDLY CHANGES ITS REASONS FOR BOMBING THE NORTH VIETNAM AND HAS ALSO REPEATEDLY ADMITTED THAT SUCH BOMBINGS HAVE NOT BEEN EFFECTIVE AND PERHAPS EVEN HAD THE RESULTS OPPOSITE TO THOSE INTENDED. THE LONGER THE U.S. PROLONGS THESE BOMBARDMENTS THE GREATER THE RESISTANCE FROM THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM. THE DRV DEMANDS THAT THE U.S. UNCONDITIONALLY CEASE THE BOMBING OF ITS TERRITORY. THIS IS A VERY LEGITIMATE DEMAND AND IF IT CANNOT BE MET THEN OUR TALKS WILL NOT PROGRESS. THE DRV BELIEVES ITS DEMAND IS MOTIVATED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF ITS COUNTRY. AS FOR THE U.S. REASONS FOR BOMBING, ONE DAY THEY ARE THIS, ONE DAY THEY ARE THAT, AND NONE OF THE REASONS STAND UP TO SCRUTINY. THE U.S. HAS NO REASON TO BOMB VIETNAM AND NO RIGHT TO DESTROY IT.

15. THE U.S., LAU CONTINUED, HAS RAISED THE QUESTION OF RESTRAINT AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WE HAVE RAISED ARE ACTUALLY DEMANDS FOR RECIPROCITY--DEMANDS WHICH THE DRV HAS REPEATEDLY REJECTED. THE DRV CANNOT ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF RESTRAINT AND IF THE U.S. WANTS TO FIND A SOLUTION IT MUST MANIFEST THIS DESIRE BY SOME ACT OF GOOD WILL--THAT IS THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. AFTER THAT WE CAN DISCUSS OTHER MATTERS. THE VIETNAMESE DO NOT WANT TO DESTROY THE PRESTIGE OF OTHER PEOPLE--THEY WANT FRIENDSHIP ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL RESPECT BUT THEY CANNOT ACCEPT AN INFRINGEMENT ON THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY. WE HAVE SAID THE CONFLICT SHOULD END IN ORDER TO STOP THE SUFFERING OF OUR TWO PEOPLES. HOW? TO END THE CONFLICT WE MUST GO BACK TO THE ORIGIN OF THE SITUATION WHICH IN SUBSTANCE IS AGGRESSION BY A COUNTRY WHICH HAS COME FROM FAR ACROSS THE SEA. THE U.S. ARGUMENT THAT NORTH VIETNAM IS AGGRESSING AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM IS WRONG AND LAU SAID HE WAS SURE THAT EVEN IN THE U.S. MANY PEOPLE DID NOT BELIEVE THIS TO BE THE CASE.

16. I REPLIED THAT I DID NOT THINK WE COULD MAKE PROGRESS BY TALKING ABOUT WHO IS THE AGGRESSOR. I THEN EMPHASIZED THAT BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM IS PURELY FOR MILITARY REASONS AND THAT AS A MILITARY MAN LAU SHOULD UNDERSTAND THIS. I SAID THE BOMBING IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO PROTECT OUR TROOPS AND THOSE OF OUR ALLIES. I SAID, MOREOVER, WE HAVE ALREADY TAKEN CERTAIN ACTIONS UNILATERALLY; WE HAVE STOPPED BOMBING OVER A GREAT PART OF THE DRV AND SINCE EARLY APRIL HAVE UP TO NOW--NOT BOMBED BEYOND THE 19TH PARALLEL ALTHOUGH THIS HAS NOT BEEN PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED; AND THAT SINCE EARLY APRIL THERE HAVE BEEN NO ALLIED TROOPS OPERATING IN THE DMZ, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS HAVE USED THE DMZ AS A BASE TO MOVE TROOPS INTO SOUTH VIETNAM AND TO CONDUCT ATTACKS AGAINST ALLIED FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

~~SECRET~~

-3- SECTION 2 of 4 PARIS 17153 NODIS HARVAN PLUS Q7558Q

17. I SAID AS FAR AS VIETNAMESE INDEPENDENCE WAS CONCERNED WE RESPECT IT AND HAVE SAID WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF OVERTHROWING OR HARMING THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM. I STATED WHAT WE WANT TO ASSURE IS THE RIGHT OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND NORTH VIETNAMESE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FUTURE WITHOUT FORCE OR OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. I REMINDED LAU THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW OUR TROOPS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM AS STATED IN THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE IF NORTH VIETNAM REMOVED THEIRS.

18. AT THIS POINT VY INTERJECTED THAT IF WE KEPT RESTAGING OUR POSITION IT WOULD COMPEL LAU TO FURTHER RESTATE HIS. HAB REPLIED THAT EACH SIDE KNEW THE OTHER'S GENERAL

GP-1 HARRIMAN

BT



Department of State

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM

16

O 280448Z JUN 68
FM ANEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3640

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 17153 SECTION 3 OF 4

N O D I S/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 355

FROM VANCE

07559Q

1968 JUN 27 AM 1 39

POSITION BUT WE WERE ADDRESSING OURSELVES TO A VERY SPECIFIC QUESTION AND THE BEST THING THW LAU COULD DO IS TO THINK ABOUT OUR PROPOSAL WITH GREAT CARE. I AGAIN SAID I THOUGHT OUR SUGGESTION MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF BOTH SIDES AND WITHOUT LOSS OF FACE FOR EITHER SIDE.

19 LAU SAID THAT WAS A MATTER OF OPINION. HE REPEATED HIS VIEW THAT WE WERE JUST TALKING ABOUT APPEARANCES AND NOT SUBSTANCE. HE AGAIN ASKED WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF WE COULD NOT AGREE ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO FOLLOW THE BOMBING CESSATION, STATING THAT IF AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REACHED THEN THERE WOULD BE NO CESSATION, BRINGING US BACK FULL CIRCLE TO THE OLD QUESTION OF RECIPROCITY.

20. WE THEN WENT OVER THE SAME POINTS SEVERAL MORE TIMES. I EMPHASIZED AGAIN THE NEED FOR PROTECTING THE SECURITY OF OUR FORCES IN I CORPS. LAU REFERRED ME TO THUY'S COMMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT; VY THEN SAID COMPLETE CESSATION OF BOMBING IS THE MOST LOGICAL FIRST STEP, AND THEN THERE WOULD BE DISCUSSION OF OTHER MATTERS.

21. LAU THEN REFERRED TO THUY'S ARGUMENTS AT THE 9TH SESSION TO THE EFFECT THAT RATHER THAN SHOWING RESTRAINT WE HAD INTENSIFIED THE WAR IN NORTH AND SOUTH SINCE MARCH 31. LAU SAID WE HAD NOT ANSWERED THIS CHARGE: I REPLIED THAT WE HAD. HE THEN SAID THAT, FRANKLY SPEAKING, HE COULD NOT STOMACH OUR CLAIM THAT WE HAD CEASED BOMBING OVER DRV TERRITORY CONTAINING 90 PERCENT OF POPULATION. THIS NOT TRUE, HE SAID, MAINTAINING THAT THERE ARE 4-1/2 MILLION PEOPLE IN AREA WE ARE BOMBING.

2. AS FOR THE BOMBING, IT HAS INTENSIFIED AT VERY SAME TIME U.S. SPEAKS OF RESTRAINT. WHAT DRV DEMANDS IS THAT ALL BOMBING STOP. AS FOR SOUTH VIETNAM, LAU CONTINUED, HE HAD JUST READ IN NEWSPAPERS THAT ALL AREAS AROUND SAIGON HAD BEEN DECLARED FREE BOMB ZONES; BUT THESE ARE DENSELY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 17153 SECTION 3 of 4 Q 7559 NODIS HARVAN PLUS

POPULATED AREAS WITH COUNTLESS HAMLETS AND VILLAGES. WHAT RIGHT DOES U.S. HAVE TO DECLARE THESE AREAS FREE BOMB ZONES? NEVER HAVE P-52S BOMBED SO HEAVILY, SO INDISCRIMINATELY. THE INDIGNATION OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IS AROUSED.

23. WHILE THE US TALKS OF SAFETY OF ITS TROOPS, LAU CONTINUED, IT IS MASSACRING VIETNAMESE PEOPLE DAILY, NOT TO MENTION THE ACTIVITIES OF PUPPET TROOPS, NOW US INTENDS TO RAISE THEIR NUMBER TO ONE MILLION; US PLANS TO BRING TROOPS FROM THAILAND; AND IT HAS JUST ADDED BILLIONS TO ITS WAR BUDGET. LAU SAID HE WAS CITING THESE FIGURES NOT FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES BUT BECAUSE THEY WERE THE FACTS. US MUST MATCH ITS WORDS WITH ITS DEEDS, IF NOT, WORDS ARE MEANINGLESS.

24. I REPLIED THAT AS FAR AS THE DRV POPULATION LIVING SOUTH OF 20TH PARALLEL IS CONCERNED, THE FIGURES WE HAD USED WERE BASED ON THE BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US AND THERE HAD BEEN NO INTENT TO FALSIFY OR DECEIVE. AS FOR THE BOMBING, I SAID THAT COMPARED TO FIRST THREE MONTHS OF YEAR IT HAD IN FACT INCREASED BUT THIS WAS IN LARGE MEASURE DUE TO WEATHER AND THE INCREASE IN MILITARY MOVEMENT BY THE DRV SOUTHWARDS SINCE MARCH. I SAID THAT AS HE WELL KNEW, THE INFILTRATION RATE IN MAY WAS THE HIGHEST EVER AND IT WAS CONTINUING AT AN ABNORMALLY HIGH RATE IN JUNE.

25. AS FOR OUR ACTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THERE HAVE BEEN INDISCRIMINATE ROCKET ATTACKS BY THE VIETCONG AND NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY TROOPS AGAINST SAIGON. WE HAVE RESPONDED TO THEM. WE WILL DEFEND SAIGON. REGARDING THE NUMBER OF OUR TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, WE DONT KEEP IT SECRET. AS FOR NUMBER OF GVN TROOPS, THATS FOR THE GVN TO DECIDE. THE DRV REFERS TO THEM AS PUPPETS. HERE WE HAVE DIFFERENCE OF VIEW. WE BELIEVE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE HAVE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR FUTURE. IF THEY WERENT BEING ATTACKED THEY WOULD NOT NEED TO INCREASE THEIR TROOP STRENGTH OR SEEK ALLIED HELP. NO ONE HAS RIGHT TO IMPOSE ANOTHERS FUTURE BY FORCE. THESE ARENT WORDS, THIS IS SOMETHING WE BELIEVE DEEPLY.

26. HABIB THEN ASKED IF WE STOPPED BOMBING WHAT MILITARY ACTION WILL THE DRV TAKE? VY REPLIED THAT DRV WOULD THEN TALK ABOUT RELATED MATTERS.

27. PAU THEN REMARKED THAT HE AGREED WITH MY STATEMENT THAT SOUTH VIETNAM PEOPLE SHOULD HAVE RIGHT TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST USE OF FORCE, BUT THIS DID NOT APPLY TOUS PUPPETS WHO DO NOT REPERESENT THE PEOPLE. US PUPPET AND SATELLITE TROOPS NUMBER MORE THAN 1 MILLION; THEY ARE EQUIPPED WITH BEST OF WEAPONS; AND YET WHAT HAVE THEY BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE? THE TURTH IS THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE HAVE THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION BY UNITING BEHIND THE NLD.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3- APRIS 17153 SECTION 3 of 4 Q7559 NODIS HARVAN PLUS

28. AGAIN DISPLAYING SOME EMOTION, LAU ASKED, "REMEMBER BEN SUC? YOU RAZED IT. REMEMBER CU CHI DISTRICT? YOU RAZED IT." THESE WERE ONLY EXAMPLES HE SAID. VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IN THE SOUTH WOULD RATHER DIE THAN LIVE IN SLAVERY. AS LONG AS US AGGRESSION CONTINUES, THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WILL STRUGGLE UNTIL FUNDAMENTAL NATIONAL OBJECTIVES ARE ATTAINED. THESE WORDS ARE NOT PROPAGANDA, LAU SAID; THEY ARE SPOKEN FROM THE HEART.

29. AS FOR US CONTINUATION OF BOMBING TO PROTECT ITS TROOPS, LAU WENT ON, IT IS ABSURD AND NOT NEW. THE US HAS ADVANCED THESE IDEAS AT PREVIOUS MEETINGS. THE US PROPOSES FIXING A DATE FOR BOMBING CESSATION BEFOREHAND BUT ONLY AFTER AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. THIS IS NOTING NEW.
VANCE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

13

~~SECRET~~

NNNNZCZCFJL426
OO RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 17153/4 1800505
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 280448Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3641
STATE GRNC
BT

1968 JUN 27 5570
133

~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF 4. PARIS 17153

N O D I S/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 355

FROM VANCE

30. I SAID THAT I REJECTED HIS STATEMENT THAT CONTINUATION OF BOMBING TO PROTECT OUR TROOPS WAS ABSURD. I SAID IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THEIR PROTECTION. AS FOR SELF DETERMINATION, I SAID WE HAD DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW. I THEN SAID THAT WHILE WE MAY HAVE COVERED MUCH OF SAME OLD GROUND THIS EVENING, I DID NOT AGREE THAT THERE HAD BEEN NOTHING NEW IN OUR SUGGESTION AND ASKED HIM TO REFLECT SERIOUSLY ON IT.

31. HABIB THEN SAID WE DIFFER ON WHAT "GREAT MAJORITY WANT IN SOUTH VIETNAM. WE ARE PREPARED TO LEAVE SOUTH VIETNAM. IS DRV? THEY SPOKE OF WEAPONS WE HAD BROUGHT TO VIETNAM BUT WHAT OF WEAPONS DRV HAD BROUGHT THERE. NATIONALISTS IN SAIGON ARE NOT PUPPETS. THEY WISHED TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE. THEY WANT NORTH VIETNAMESE OUT. THEY WANT OUR FORCES OUT EVENTUALLY. WE AGREE COMPLETE CESSATION OF BOMBING IN DRV IS A POSSIBLE FIRST STEP IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. WHAT WILL DRV DO IF WE STOP THE BOMBING? NEITHER THEY NOR ANYONE ELSE HAS BEEN ABLE TO TELL US WHAT MILITARY ACTIONS THEY WOULD TAKE FOLLOWING A CESSATION.

32. LAU REPLIED THAT THE PEOPLE IN SAIGON WE CALL NATIONALISTS ARE MORE AMERICAN THAN WE ARE. IN THE U.S. THERE ARE PEOPLE WHO CALL FOR A COMPLETE CESSATION OF BOMBING WHILE THE NATIONALISTS IN SAIGON WANT TO RESUME THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM AND BOMB HANOI. "WE KNOW THEM VERY WELL," LAU SAID, "AND IF YOU CONTINUE TO RELY ON THEM YOU WILL NEVER FIND YOUR WAY OUT OF VIETNAM."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 17153 SECTION 4 of 4 NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS 7557Q

33. AS FOR OUR PROPOSAL, LAU SAID HE WOULD THINK ABOUT IT. HE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO DEAL IN RECRIMINATIONS BUT A VIETNAMESE SOLUTION MUST BE BASED ON AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PAST AND PRESENT. IF WE DON'T AGREE ON AT LEAST ESSENTIAL POINTS OF THE PAST, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO FIND A SOLUTION FOR THE FUTURE. THIS WAS THE FIRST TALK BETWEEN US. LAU SAID HE HAD PAID SERIOUS ATTENTION TO MY REMARKS AND HOPED THAT I WOULD REFLECT FURTHER ON HIS.

34. I SAID I THOUGHT THAT THROUGH FRANK DISCUSSION WE MIGHT SOLVE OUR PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT MEET AGAIN.

35. LAU CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT DRV WAS CONVINCED ITS POINT OF VIEW IS CORRECT AND TRUE. WE MAY BE CONVINCED OF OUR POSITION. THAT IS OUR PRIVILEGE. BUT THERE'S ONLY ONE TRUTH. DRV CANNOT ACCEPT ANYTHING CONTRARY TO TRUTH OR ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE.

36. I ASKED LAU WHETHER WE SHOULD FIX A DATE FOR ANOTHER MEETING OR WHETHER WE SHOULD LEAVE IT OPEN. LAU REPLIED THAT THEY WOULD NEED SOME TIME TO THINK THINGS OVER. I SAID PERHAPS WE COULD HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSION AT THE FORMAL WEDNESDAY MEETING. LAU NODDED.

COMMENT:

37. I GAVE MY PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON THIS MEETING IN THE TELECON WITH WALSH OF S/S.

38. THE MEETING DID NOT PRODUCE ANY PROGRESS. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DID, HOWEVER, GET A PRECISE EXPOSITION OF OUR PROPOSAL. THEY UNDERSTAND ITS CONTENT AND THEY ARE FULLY AWARE OF ITS IMPLICATIONS. THEY ONLY AGREED TO STUDY IT. THEY SAID THEY FOUND NOTHING NEW IN IT. WE POINTED OUT THERE WAS SOMETHING NEW AND EMPHASIZED THE CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF THE PROPOSAL WHICH COULD OPEN THE WAY TO PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. LAU SAID THEY WOULD SLEEP ON IT TO SEE IF THERE WAS ANYTHING NEW.

39. NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING THE MEETING WAS USEFUL. IT WAS A NECESSARY FIRST STEP IN THIS DIALOGUE AND IT PROCEEDED ABOUT AS WE COULD EXPECT. THEY ARE DELIBERATE AND PERSISTENT AND THERE WAS MORE OF THE STANDARD PARTY LINE THAN WE ANTICIPATED. WE LIMITED OUR RESPONSE IN THIS REGARD TO THE MINIMUM POSSIBLE, AND WE SOUGHT TO KEEP THEIR ATTENTION ON THE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL. IN THE NEXT EPISODE WE WILL HOPEFULLY FIND IT POSSIBLE TO KEEP THEIR ATTENTION CONCENTRATED ON THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM, NOW THAT WE HAVE WORKED OUR WAY THROUGH A GOOD DEAL OF THE POLEMICS THEY SEEM TO REQUIRE.

40. I WILL BE SEEING ZORIN THE MORNING OF JUNE 28 TO INFORM HIM OK WHAT WE HAVE DONE SUBSEQUENT TO HIS SUGGESTION. WE WILL WISH TO CONSIDER WHAT SHOULD BE DONE IN THE RUSSIAN CHANNEL TO FOLLOW ON. VANCE

BT

~~SECRET~~

Pres file
10

file
Thursday, June 28, 1968
1:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I gave the word to:

- Roston
- Steele (TIME)
- Sutherland (U. S. News)
- Boyd France (Business Week)
- Lloyd Norman (Newsweek)
- Bill White
- Drew Pearson
- Jack Leacaces
- Dick Wilson
- Crosby Noyes
- Joe Kraft

W. W. Rostow

cc: George Christian

11

ACTION

SECRET

Pres file

Friday, June 28, 1968 -- 11:25 am

Mr. President:

Secretaries Rusk and Clifford
desire your urgent approval for the
attached language and scenario.

W. W. Rostow

Approved ✓ *That's all right*

Approved as amended _____

Call me _____

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 7-7-92

WWRostow:rlh



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 28, 1968

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Secretaries Rusk and Clifford have agreed, subject to White House approval, that we should inform the Soviets that we would plan to make the following statement on July 1 in response to Chairman Kosygin's June 27 letter:

An arrangement has been reached between the Governments of the USSR and the USA to enter in the nearest future into discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles.

If this language is approved by the White House, the Under Secretary will call in the Soviet Chargé and advise him of our intent and suggest that the announcements be made simultaneously at 11:30 a.m. Monday Washington time and 6:30 p.m. Moscow time.

DWR
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 7-3-01

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

ACTION

12

Friday, June 28, 1968 - 12:35pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

Free file

Attached for your approval is a message to Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau congratulating him on his recent election victory.

Trudeau's liberal party won a clear majority in the Canadian Parliament -- the first time any party has had a majority since 1962. As a result, he will have a freer hand than Pearson and Canada will have a more stable government.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

EWG
MWG:mm

SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU

Warm congratulations and best wishes on your recent election victory. I am confident that under your leadership the close ties which have always existed between our two governments and the friendship between our peoples will continue to flourish.

June 28, 1968

13*Pres file*SECRET-NODIS

Mr. President:

You asked Eppie Evron the other night to have a final go-round with me. Attached is the report of that conversation.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET-NODIS~~**DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 12456, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *rg*, NARA, Date 7-10-92

~~SECRET~~-NODIS

June 28, 1968

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ephraim Evron, Minister of the Israeli Embassy
W. W. Rostow
Harold H. Saunders

In a wide-ranging final conversation with Mr. Evron, Mr. Rostow and he made the following points relevant to the situation in the Middle East:

Mr. Rostow began by saying that the situation in the Middle East is unstable. This Administration will continue to do everything possible to help reach a more stable arrangement, but Israel also has a major responsibility to try to move the situation closer to that arrangement. He said we understand how difficult it is to move into a negotiation when the other side won't talk, but we succeeded in Vietnam. We feel that Israel must find "its own equivalent of March 31st."

Mr. Rostow felt that Israel must somehow give the Arabs and the world a glimpse of the kind of settlement a negotiation might bring. The Arabs are persuaded that Israel means only to sit on its conquered territory, and Israel must persuade them that this is not true. Both Arabs and Israelis see the others' positions in black and white. Neither picture is true, and the job is to give the most moderate elements on each side the best possible chance to operate. Giving them something concrete to focus on can serve this purpose. The virtue of negotiation is that it unleashes forces that come to have lives of their own.

Mr. Rostow suggested that there are two ways to negotiate. One is to state your rock-bottom position and hold to it. This is what we have done on Vietnam. The other is to state a maximum position and then back off from it under pressure. We believe the former approach is often the more defensible. We might find ourselves in a better position in the United Nations if Israel were standing on a rock-bottom position that anyone would have to judge as fair.

Mr. Evron said that maybe a great power like the US could negotiate this way but Israel's experience had proved that it could not. Time after time in the United Nations, Israel had been pushed from one supposedly rock-bottom position to even further compromise.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

~~SECRET~~-NODIS

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By cljw, NARA, Date 7-3-01

On Mr. Rostow's more general point about finding "an Israeli equivalent to March 31st," Mr. Evron said he understood and would be exploring this idea with Israeli leaders when he went home. The problem for Israel, however, is that Nasser now feels that the pendulum is swinging in his favor. Any Israeli gesture would be read as a further sign that he is right. He suggested--though admitting his uncertainty--that a US veto in the UN would help turn the pendulum back.

Mr. Rostow said the debate in the UN could come in one of two settings. If it were in the context of the UAR's having taken a responsible position and Israel's having stood fast on direct negotiations or nothing, we would have a hard time holding the line. If, on the other hand, Israel had held out a glimpse of what a serious peace might look like, we might be on wholly different ground.

Shifting to particulars, Evron said that he had not raised the question of F-4 aircraft in his talk with the President Tuesday night. He hoped, however, that Mr. Rostow might report to the President his personal view that the way to get the most flexibility from the Israeli leadership would be to go ahead with the Phantom decision now:

a. Basically, he felt this is the best way to deal with the Israeli mentality--to show support and then to ask flexibility rather than bargaining security for compromise.

b. He also noted that, if the President allows the decision to slip into the fall, the Israelis will discount it as something he had to do anyway for domestic US political purposes.

He said he couldn't state his feelings strongly enough that now is the time to move. When we asked what form Israeli flexibility might take, he said only that he was not sure and would be exploring this when he returned to Israel.

Continuing on practical matters, he said the President had mentioned the possibility of his sending Cyrus Vance or George McGhee to Israel. With all due respect to both men, he did not feel these were the best men for this particular job. Someone is required (he mentioned Harry McPherson or Walt Rostow) who is known to speak for the President and to share the President's basic sympathies for Israel. In later conversation, he feared that Arthur Goldberg might not be the best man for the job because of reports in the press that he is no longer close to the President.

~~SECRET~~-NODIS

- 3 -

He felt that McGeorge Bundy would have some advantages but he feared that his coming meeting with Arab leaders might make him less acceptable. His main point was that anyone who goes to seek changes in the Israeli position must speak from a position of known sympathy for Israel. "Israel trusts President Johnson, and whoever comes must be felt to speak with the President's voice."

Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~-NODIS

Friday, June 28, 1968 14

Mr. President:

Herewith a capsule of Bunker's 57th weekly report:

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Ag, NARA, Date 8-20-92

A. General

- GVN attitude toward peace settlement hardens; following Assembly heckling PM Huong issues strong anti-coalition statements.
- Lower House rejects coalition, urges Paris Talks time limit and demands break-off if Saigon shelling is renewed.
- Small Labor, Student and Buddhist groups issue simplistic peace appeals reflecting possible Communist influence.
- Lull in Saigon shelling may stem from improved defense, Hanoi orders, or preparation for new attacks.
- Thieu and Ky say any new shelling must bring retaliation to maintain public morale.
- Vietnam Alliance still alive in minds of local politicians as escape route for intellectuals, military and GVN officials if U.S. will erodes.
- Recent mass surrenders reflect variety of enemy problems.
- Thieu pursuit of constitutional path irritates generals; informal war cabinet still planned as attempt to restore harmony.

B. Political

- Assembly nears end of session; record quite good.
- Sweeping new mobilization law explained in press conference.

C. Military

- Saigon, Northern Provinces and Western Highlands remain enemy's main targets.
- Possibility of renewed ground and rocket attacks against Saigon, followed by offensive in I Corps.
- Increasing enemy attacks in IV Corps despite problems for VC caused by Paris Talks.

D. Pacification

- New Interior Minister Khiem advances Program to attack VC infrastructures; May results encouraging.
- Self-Defense program has many problems including question of new chief.

E. Urban Recovery

- Despite U.S. prodding, recovery going slowly; remains only 54% complete.

F. Economic

- If present retail price drop continues, price effects of events since Tet will be wiped out.

SECRET/NODIS

-2-

-- GVN takes several encouraging steps toward increasing tax revenues.

W. W. R.

SECRET/NODIS

SANITIZED

14a

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Thursday, June 27, 1968

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ/CBS 10
By ms, NARS, Date 11-28-83

LBJ LIBRARY
CBS Subpoena
Case # NLJ/CBS 10
Document # 102

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon, 31193)

Herewith my fifty-seventh weekly message.

A. General

Developments during the past week included what appeared to be some hardening of the Government's position on peace; at the same time, several small groups representing fringes of labor, students, and Buddhists issued peace appeals. Communists shelling of Saigon fell off sharply, but there are indications that they intend to renew their attack on the city. There is also evidence that the enemy is still placing primary stress on his military effort in order to gain his political objectives. All local indications are that the present lull in activity is due to enemy efforts to replace his losses, reinforce his troops, accumulate weapons and ammunition, in order to undertake more ground attacks on Saigon, and to initiate heavy action in other areas.

Attitudes toward peace: The attitudes of the Assembly and the Government toward a peace settlement seemed to be hardening. I reported last week the firm public statements by both Thieu and Ky on this subject. This week, the Assembly demonstrated its feeling about the NLF and the subject of negotiations in general.

On June 24, at the Assembly's request, Prime Minister Huong appeared before the Assembly to discuss the question of Saigon security. In describing the Communist movement in South Vietnam, in response to a question, Huong made the observation that it had attracted some genuine nationalists during the colonial period and under the Diem regime. Before he could go on to say that these nationalists had since either been eliminated or brainwashed, Huong was silenced by shouts of protest from the floor. A majority of the legislators registered loud and long their disapproval of the idea that the NLF is anything else but a tool of Hanoi. When order was finally restored, Huong went on to make a strong statement on the Government

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

position regarding the NLF, which converted the jeers into an ovation. He followed this up with an official interview in the Vietnam press in which he is quoted as saying: "Once again, I reiterate my standpoint: A) not to recognize, B) not to negotiate, C) not to have a coalition with the so-called National Liberation Front of South Vietnam."

The Lower House discussed the question of peace and negotiations efforts, ninety Deputies having signed the petition to place the item on the agenda. Although the debate was generally calm and constructive, it was clear from the debate that the Lower House remains uncertain about the U.S. position. They decided to recommend to the Executive that the GVN seek clarification on a number of points, and they also apparently intend to send a letter to the U.S. Congress.

The House approved a number of points "in principle" for inclusion in these two documents. The most important from their point of view seemed to include the absolute rejection of a coalition government, the need for a time limit on the Paris Talks, and a demand that the talks be stopped if the enemy attacks on the cities of South Vietnam continue. The House also wants the GVN to request the U.S.: A) to affirm that any elections in South Vietnam should be carried out by the legally elected GVN according to the Constitution; B) declare that it will continue to support the GVN against Communist aggression; C) make clear that the Paris Talks are only preliminary, that the GVN will play the principal role when peace talks occur; and D) the U.S. understands that the GVN will not accept an imposed, unacceptable solution to the war.

Prime Minister Huong also addressed the problem in a television speech June 22. He accused the Communists of "abusing our Allies' good will in restricting the bombing of North Vietnam to increase the infiltration of cadres, troops, and deadly weapons." This is occurring just when "the enemy is talking peace in a foreign capital." In an obvious if indirect reference to the Paris Talks, Huong concluded, "Although there is nothing in the domestic or foreign situation which allows us to be optimistic, we must determine our own fate. No power can determine our fate against our will, no country -- no matter how friendly it is -- can force us to accept a solution contrary to our will and to our Constitution."

While the Government was reaffirming its stand on the problem of peace and negotiations, several small groups representing labor, students, and Buddhists issued appeals. On June 13, the Saigon Student Union called for negotiations to end the war promptly, urging the Huong Government to

fulfill its promises of peace. A week later, the militant An Quang Buddhists appealed for a "cessation of killing," blaming both sides for indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population on June 24. A new labor group with no following, the Action Labor Force in South Vietnam, expressed support for the Saigon Student Union statement and demanded a political solution to the war.

These appeals do not distinguish between the two sides to the conflict. There are no conditions specified for peace, no reference to the need to insure the freedom and independence of the South Vietnamese people, and no condemnation of Communist aggression.

These simplistic peace appeals could conceivably weaken the will of the Vietnamese people to continue their resistance to Communist attack, particularly if the latter should succeed in creating heavy civilian casualties and damage. The appeals are certainly not calculated to support the Allied effort to achieve a just and honorable peace. While we do not have hard evidence of it, there is reason to suspect these appeals reflect Communist influence. There are links between the groups concerned, which suggest their actions could be part of a concerted effort. Over the past several years, the An Quang Buddhists have consistently taken actions that assisted the Communists; many Vietnamese are persuaded that the An Quang leadership is deeply infiltrated if not outright Communist directed. The Saigon Student Union is now dominated by professional student leaders who are often described by knowledgeable Vietnamese as An Quang oriented and pro-Communist. The Action Labor Force is new and relatively unknown, but its leadership appears to have a rather dubious background.

A fourth group, the Tam Chau Buddhist faction, has also issued a peace appeal which is clearly anti-Communist. It condemns the indiscriminate shelling of Saigon and their spokesman said at a press conference that "no religious group can exist together with the Communists."

The groups involved in these peace appeals have neither effective organization nor mass following, yet the call for peace could produce echoes here simply because of the depth of the desire for peace among the Vietnamese people. The mass of the people do not want a Communist regime, morale in Saigon remains high despite the shelling, and there is much willingness to make more sacrifices -- but there is also a great longing for peace. The Communists will try to exploit this longing; we must try to mobilize it in support of our efforts to achieve an honorable peace. Our handling of the Paris Talks will be critical to the success of this effort.

Defense of Saigon: During the past week, Saigon was shelled only one night, June 20, when eight rounds landed in the city, killing two children and injuring twenty civilians. (The total number of rounds to fall on the city from May 5 to June 25 is over 417, with 115 civilians killed and more than 528 injured.) Last week was the quietest since May 5. The lull may be due to improved defense arrangements; it may also be due to Hanoi's sensitivity to international opinion and our pressures at Paris; or it may be due to the enemy's decision to build up his resources for a combined heavy ground and fire attack on Saigon in the future. While the shelling has fallen off, reaction to it continues strong in Saigon. Many families have constructed shelters and sandbags bring a premium price. Huong addressed himself to the problem in his June 22 television speech. He outlined Government efforts to stop the shelling, pointing out changes in personnel and organizational structure, and said, "We have succeeded in foiling the enemy guns for the past few days."

When I discussed the matter of attacks on Saigon with Thieu and Ky on June 25, they agreed that morale in the city is high. However, they also felt continued shelling of the city without retaliatory action on our part could cause a break in morale and add to the Government's problems.

Both our military and the Vietnamese have been working hard to improve the defense of the city. General Hay has set up a unified command of the American forces involved in Saigon defense closely coordinated to that of General Minh. American police advisers are now working with all Saigon District Chiefs and CORDS has set up a special advisory office at City Hall to help the Mayor.

Improved surveillance of the areas surrounding Saigon and greatly reduced reaction time for counter-fire has been effective. The surveillance and counter-fire system employs both ground and air units, including radar towers. The optimum time for counter-battery fire has now been reduced to one minute. Secondary explosions and discovery of enemy bodies along with unused rockets and mortar shells testify to the growing effectiveness of these tactics. They are still being improved.

Enemy intentions: All indications are that the enemy intends to undertake ground and rocket attacks on Saigon, and to initiate heavy action in other areas. He has reportedly made street fighting tactics a basic part of the training of infiltrators, and the Viet Cong are stressing preparation for urban operations. Enemy propaganda continues to hail the rocket attacks on the city, both predicting and demanding an intensification.

I have noted the possibility that the recent peace appeals here were in part Communist inspired. I think it also important that the Vietnam Alliance continues to be put forth as a stalking horse. Doubts about our intentions have helped to keep it alive, and while it is widely regarded as a tool of Hanoi, the Alliance is not rejected out of hand by all. We have a recent report [REDACTED] which strongly suggests that Tran Van Tuyen sees the Alliance as an escape route for those intellectuals, GVN officials, and military personnel who may want to leave the Government side in the future. AS

Tuyen expects the Huong Government to fall, and though he does not say so, he also apparently expects the Communists to prevail in the end. Thus he calculates that many people will have to avail themselves of the Alliance in order to "leave a sinking ship" with some shred of dignity. I think Tuyen's attitude is heavily influenced by the belief, perhaps engendered by his visit to the U. S. earlier this year, that the United States is no longer determined to defend the freedom and independence of South Vietnam.

Enemy intentions are not always consonant with his resources. While infiltration has made up many of the fearful losses incurred by the Communist forces since Tet, the new troops are often green and inadequately trained. This is believed to be an important reason for the recent mass surrenders. (There have been four recent instances of mass surrenders: A. May 1, ninety-five enemy surrendered about ten miles northwest of Hue; B. Between May 30 and June 4, sixty enemy personnel surrendered about seven miles northeast of Phu Bai in Thua Thien Province; C. June 9, thirty-one members of an enemy unit surrendered in Cholon; D. June 18, 150 - 160 enemy personnel surrendered in Gia Dinh.) It is true that in every case the enemy was also surrounded, subject to heavy fire, short on leadership, and subject to psychological operations. Some units were low on ammunition and food supplies. MACV believes, however, that these factors do not fully explain the surrenders; rather, they believe that the spirit and quality of some units are no longer adequate to support the unlimited use of "pitched battle" tactics.

Thieu and the General: I reported in, 30844 and 30631 developments concerning the present relationship between President Thieu, Vice President Ky, and some of the other Generals. As I said in those messages, Thieu has clearly chosen the role of Constitutional President rather than that of the Representative of a Military Clique. Some of Thieu's moves consequent on this fact have caused some disquiet and dissatisfaction among some of the Generals, notably, Ky, Khang, Thang, and Vy.

In my talk with Thieu yesterday, however, he indicated that he believed that these problems were on the way to solution. He said definitely that Vy would not resign, that Vien would continue as Chief of the Joint Generals Staff, and that he would be meeting with Khang and Thang after our talks to try to work out their problems. He praised Thang's ability and honesty and said that he wanted him to return to IV Corps as Commander there, but noted his propensity to resign, generally when he felt his work had reached a peak of success.

He repeated that Khang had been trying to hold down too many assignments at one time with a result that none of them were being carried out with sufficient effectiveness. He proposed to ask Khang if he wished to retain command of the Marine Division which is where Khang's career started and which has always been his favorite division, and give up III Corps, or hold both jobs, in which case he must show more cooperation with General Minh.

Thieu said that he proposed to go ahead with the War Cabinet though, since this was not provided for in the Constitution, it would be set up on an informal basis. He will thus endeavor to bring Ky, Huong, the Interior Minister, and probably the Defense Minister together frequently for discussion of major political problems. He also agreed to institute next week the joint meetings which I had previously suggested to him between top GVN officials and our side. It was agreed beginning next week we would hold the meetings on the first and third Wednesdays of each month starting at 10:00 a. m. and going on through lunch. I believe this should give us the opportunity to work out more effectively the important mutual problems with which we are both concerned.

B. Political

Assembly Developments: The Assembly is nearing the end of its regular session, and I think that on balance it is fair to say that its record is quite good. This is especially true when one considers the newness of the Constitutional Institutions and the difficulties of the present war situation. Since its inception, the Assembly has organized itself and has passed and promulgated two major measures, the National Budget and the General Mobilization Law. In addition the Assembly asserted its constitutional prerogatives by investigating various aspects of the government's performance. It also played an important role in the moves which resulted in the formation of the Huong Government.

Business now under way in the Assembly includes the Political Party Law, the Press Law, the Supreme Court Law, the War Risk Insurance Law, and the War Reconstruction Surtax. The first three have been passed by the Lower House and await action in the Senate. The War Reconstruction Surtax has been passed by both Houses, but differences in the two versions have yet to be ironed out. War Risk Insurance is due to be considered on the floor of the Lower House this week.

Both Houses are planning a recess next month, the Lower House for the entire month, the Senate for only ten days. However, Thieu has told us that if necessary to keep essential legislation moving through the Assembly, he will cut short the recess by convening a special session.

Faster Justice: Prime Minister Huong has ordered the formation of special committees to speed up the consideration of the cases of persons under provisional detention. Huong gave the committees two weeks to go over all pending cases, following which those persons under provisional detention will presumably be freed or bound over for trial. The committees are to be set up at Province level, with special committees for the autonomous cities and Saigon.

General Mobilization: General Vy held a press conference June 25 to explain the implementation of the general mobilization law. He told reporters that by the end of the year, thanks to the new law, the armed forces of the nation will number 800,000. General Vy said that manpower resources from 18 to 33 years of age will be completely utilized before the calling up of people of a more advanced age. However, he added, the majority of people falling in this age category have all been mobilized under the partial mobilization law except (a) individuals who have enjoyed draft deferment, mostly school boys and students (now, more restrictive deferment criteria will be applied); (b) officials of private and public services, being successively mobilized from now to the end of the year according to a fixed schedule (the first mobilization wave has already taken place on May 15, 1968); and (c) school teachers who will be mobilized during this summer vacation.

According to General Vy, people from 34 to 38 years of age without prior military service will be mobilized, first the younger, than the older.

C. Military

The enemy's main targets continue to be Saigon, the northern provinces of First Corps and the Western Highlands. While the enemy might wish to launch another country-wide offensive, he does not appear to have the capability for it at this time. He is, nevertheless, engaged in replacement, reinforcement and re-equipment of his troops for future offensive action. There is a possibility of ground attacks on Saigon by the end of the month or early July, followed in several weeks by an offensive in First Corps.

In First Corps there is no evidence that large scale action is imminent. Enemy forces in the Quang Tri City and Hue areas have withdrawn deeper into their base areas and are not engaged in offensive actions probably because they are occupied with rice collection. The enemy has also shelled First Corps population centers in the same indiscriminate manner as Saigon. Quang Tri and Dong Ha cities were hit this week.

In Second Corps the combination of friendly operations and weather has apparently caused the enemy to cancel his offensive in Kontum. There are movements that may threaten Pleiku, but probably not until late July.

Fourth Corps activity continues to be marked by essentially harassing operations, but during the past week there were ground attacks against friendly positions for the first time in more than two months. Also in Fourth Corps there were reports of Viet Cong units being required to send reinforcements to the Saigon area, and there are indications that the Paris talks are troublesome for the Viet Cong because some cadre and troops look to the talks to provide a diplomatic solution to the war.

D. Pacification

New Interior Minister Khiem has taken intense interest in Phung Honang--the program for attacking the Viet Cong infrastructure. Since getting Bob Komer's briefing on program outline and objectives, Khiem has called for several additional briefings and discussions on components. He has ordered Police Special Branch to organize small staff elements from district level up to coordinate anti-infrastructure activities. Its issuance indicates Khiem intends to act decisively on anti-infrastructure matters--rather a change from the former Minister whose biggest fault was failure to move at all. Khiem has also agreed with his staff's proposal (which we encouraged) to assign one platoon of 14 to 44 Special Police to each district to be used against the infrastructure.

We arranged a day's trip for Khiem to visit [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 176 are operational now. Khiem visited five in five different provinces coming away educated and convinced that stronger, clearer central direction in the form of a Presidential decree is needed. AS

Phung Hoang results for May are encouraging. 1,271 identifiable, quality members of the enemy's political-military organization were neutralized--146 killed, 1,028 captured and 97 rallied as Hoi Chanh. This compares with an all-time high of 1,295 in April. However, proportion of district-province level cadre neutralized increased to 201 out of a total of 1,271. Most notable progress was made in Gia Dinh surrounding Saigon where increased attention on anti-infrastructure measures resulted in neutralization of 144 Viet Cong Infrastructure in May compared to only 22 in April.

Decision this week by Government of Vietnam to keep responsibility for prisons under Interior rather than transferring it to Justice Ministry, as proposed by Huong, has eased our concern that Viet Cong Infrastructure picked up by increasingly productive Phung Hoang Program would be let out the back door. Undoubtedly, Huong with his compunction for honesty and justice felt a shift to be desirable. In normal times it would be.

Much more serious thought is beginning to be turned on details of self-defense program which so far has not jelled. Now that Ky has abdicated interest, question of who runs self-defense is raised again. Typically, Government of Vietnam seems to favor Inter-Ministerial Committee solution. We have been arguing that one ministry with already functioning elements at each administrative level, Viz Moi, can administer the program more efficiently than any Inter-Ministerial Committee without any funds or personnel and hope that the decision will fall this way.

Biggest problem now is arming self-defense groups once formed and trained. Sources of arms is not clear. Defense has plenty of M-1 carbines made excess by issue of automatic M-2. Carbines and M-16 rifles to Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, shotguns left over from strategic hamlet program, and assorted other weapons suitable for self-defense forces. But, there is as yet no Presidential Directive making Ministry of Defense responsible for furnishing them. Also, local leaders are often reluctant to issue weapons because they are accountable that none fall into wrong hands. Because of past experience there is an aversion to arming religious and political groups, often the people best able to organize themselves and the most highly motivated. There is need for a strong, clear directive in handling the essential question of furnishing arms to self-defense forces.

E. Urban Recovery

It takes constant prodding to keep recovery going now that most evacuees in cities have been cared for and remaining evacuees are less visible in more remote districts and villages. Despite repeated efforts by inspection teams from Central Recovery Committee, allocation of sufficient funds and institution of simplified procedures to help place money and materials needed for resettlement in hands of Tet victims, overall recovery is only 54% complete. Resettlement payments (61% complete) are rather far ahead of payment by indemnification for death, injury or loss of property (43% complete). We continue to find the Central Recovery Committee the most useful means for bringing figures like these before the Government of Vietnam leaders and proposing means for improving performance.

Number of Tet evacuees continues to dwindle as total declined 16,000 during week to 205,000 -- only 40,000 of whom are living in temporary shelters. Registered May-June evacuees in Saigon/Gia Dinh also dropped by 8,000 to 171,000. Now that May-June group of victims is beginning to receive allowances, resettlement should quicken. Moreover, good progress is being made on ARVN-US Military Reconstruction Projects in districts 6 and 8. About 200 units -- with space for 1,000 families -- have already been completed.

We are continuing to stress to GVN the need for a war risk insurance plan to speed economic recovery. Also, since the unusually long curfew is having an adverse effect on small businessmen throughout Saigon/Gia Dinh, we are advocating relaxing it district-by-district as security improves.

F. Economic

Retail prices in Saigon continued their decline this week, bringing our index down another 3%, to a level only 3% above that of April 8, just before the May offensive, 11% above January 24, just before tet, and 17% above the beginning of the year. Most food prices have been declining due to improving deliveries from the Delta. If the trend continues for another two or three weeks, we will be in a position to say that the price effects of events since Tet have been wiped out.

Members of the Mission met with the Minister of Economy on June 25 to discuss rice problems. Minister Ho agrees that the price of imported rice needs to be raised and additional measures to raise the price received by peasants need to be undertaken, but are not yet worked out. Minister Ho is taking a two-day trip to the Delta this week after which he plans to effect the necessary actions. Getting the rice trade moving is the number one economic problem now. The new Cabinet's attitude on this is good; it remains to be seen how well it will follow through.

Action on taxes: The GVN has already this year taken two concrete steps to raise tax revenues. On April 1 austerity tax rates on imports were raised approximately 10% across the board. This should increase customs revenues by about 25%, or two billion piasters in 1968.

The second step was taken June 1 when the detailed Brussels tariff nomenclature was adopted for official use. This measure should enhance revenues by even more than the above increase in customs rates.

In addition to these steps both Houses of the Legislature have passed -- in slightly different versions -- a bill providing for a 20% surcharge on most domestic taxes, which should add some two billion piasters of revenues this year. After this is passed, we understand that attention will again be focused on raising the tax

on petroleum products. Finally, a review of tariff rates is nearly finished. If the recommended new rate structure is accepted by the Legislature, it will improve the distribution of the tax burden and increase revenues substantially.

Along with better administration, the above measures represent a constructive effort by the GVN to meet its tax problem. It is noteworthy that April and May domestic tax revenues were the highest ever for any two months and that so far this year more taxes have been collected than at the same time last year -- in spite of the security problem and the sluggishness of the economy. More still needs to be done but once all of the above listed measures have been put into effect the GVN will need some time to digest them before moving on to new fields.

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 27, 1968
7:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Whether we take a Middle East initiative depends, in fact, on whether Israel-Jordan bilateral talks work out.

I asked [redacted] where they stand. Here is his memo.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

The answer thus far: not hopeful; but not yet broken off.

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-189
By cbm, NARA, Date 5-30-02

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Profile

Thursday, June 27, 1968
4:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, in a bold and sensitive conversation, Amb. Bunker gets to the heart of Thieu's political problem and Berger suggests a compromise on the war cabinet, which may be very helpful.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 31194

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *ag*, NARA, Date 7-10-92

Saigon 31194, June 27, 1968

SUBJECT: Conversation with Thieu on June 26

I opened this meeting, which was at my instigation, by asking Thieu about his trip the previous day to Fourth Corps.

Thieu said his main interest was to obtain a picture of South Vietnamese Army activity and extent of Viet Cong control. He was satisfied that Major General Thang had done a good job in arousing South Vietnamese Army forces and putting pressure on Communists. Lt. General La (Deputy to General Vien on Joint General Staff) is temporarily acting as Fourth Corps Commander, but La couldn't stay long. He suffers from rheumatism and the humidity in the Delta accentuates his condition. He was, in fact, in bed during Thieu's visit.

Thieu was seeing General Thang and Lt. General Khang (Third Corps Commander) on their future after meeting with me. Thieu said he was going to make another effort to persuade General Thang to return to Fourth Corps, but he was not sanguine. Thang had told General Vien on June 24 that he will not go back and wants another assignment. "I cannot order him to go back, and, indeed, there is no point in sending him back if he is not whole-hearted. More and more people are fed up with General Thang, because whatever job he has, he is always resigning. He is now called here 'the Resigner' like Nixon is called 'the Loser.'"

Thieu then turned to the problem of Viet Cong control of the Delta. He did not think that they had extended their control very much since Tet, if at all. In some places where the regional and popular forces have withdrawn there seems to be a vacuum. The Viet Cong has not filled it, nor can the Government claim it is in control. It is very important that the Fourth Corps make every effort to reestablish control over these villages and extend it further.

I then said I wished to speak to him again and frankly of my concern over the resignations and threatened resignations of a number of senior military officers and other evidence of internal strains. He had done a great deal in recent weeks to produce a stronger and more effective government. I was getting favorable reports from senior members of the mission that the Huong Cabinet was settling down quickly. Decisions were being made on policy and personnel, there was an air of purpose and seriousness such as they had never seen and evidence of stronger direction and organization. He and Ky and Huong had spoken to the nation calling for unity, sacrifice and support of the Government in these critical times. The general mobilization bill was passed. He was trying to produce a coalition of forces on behalf of the Government.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

Authority RAC 18492
By jc/ics NARA, Date 7-3-01

All of this was excellent, but it was clouded over by reports of dissension in the top military echelons, reports of coup plots, which Ky had to deny on TV, of reports of a split between him and Vice President Ky. The local press and international press were reporting on these rumors almost every day. And there was enough open evidence of difficulty to make people here and abroad wonder how stable his government was. Hanoi was trying to capitalize on this in Paris, in the U.S., and it was clouding our propaganda success in Paris and our military progress here. The image of his government abroad was not good because of these signs of dissension and disunity in the top military leadership where unity was as essential as it was in the government and in the country. I then handed him a clipping from the local press headed "The Hard Choice." It referred to Thieu's dilemma: whether to move in a constitutional way or to abide by the secret written agreement he had entered into with the Military Council on June 30, 1967, to confer and consult on all policy matters and appointments.

Thieu listened thoughtfully and with animation as I spelled out the foregoing, nodding approval as each point came through. He then said I had touched on subjects which were delicate, and sensitive, and, because they were so internal and involved personalities, it was not easy to discuss them. However, he would speak to me with complete candor.

He started by saying Minister of Defense Vy would not resign. He has told General Vien that he must stay as Chief of the Joint General Staff for another year at least. General Vien did not really want to resign but found himself in great difficulty. Vice President Ky had a dossier on Mrs. Vien's corrupt activities and Vien, who was honest but weak, felt himself subject to pressures from Ky. He wanted to escape, hence his desire to go abroad as an Ambassador. Vien was not a Ky man. He, Thieu, felt sympathy for Vien's position, and would help him, and meanwhile try to find and groom a replacement a year from now. General Thang would have made a good successor if he was more stable and mature, but he is not, so Thieu must look elsewhere.

General Khang was a different problem. He was trying to do too much, but would not relinquish some of his commands (and power, he implied), and Vien refused to order him. Khang was now relieved as Commander and Governor of the Capital Military District and he would have to choose. If he wished to stay as Commander of the marines that was fine. Even as Third Corps Commander. But he must cooperate.

Thieu said he had made a whole series of moves to produce a stronger and more effective government. Huong was turning out well. Moreover, "He is not the same Huong as when he was Mayor and Prime Minister before. He is now very political. He is not rigid, but flexible. He knows the need to move carefully. I am very pleased. In a few months I hope we will be able to show the country that we have a good, honest, and effective Government."

Thieu then said most of the Commanders and military leaders side with him and with what he is trying to do. He is not worried about the broad support of the military leadership, even though efforts are being made and rumors circulated to hurt and embarrass him. It involves only a few military leaders, but he, as President, can go only one way.

I said the alleged military agreement has no constitutional basis and if it was used in an effort to discredit him, it would fail. I was, however, concerned with appearances. There was an impression here and abroad of serious dissension in the military at the top. Would not the formation and announcement of the War Cabinet help to allay fears and create the impression that he and Ky were working together. Berger added foreign press correspondents are filing stories daily of dissension and strife, Time and Newsweek were carrying features, and we were constantly being asked about the divisions and dangers of disunity. If the War Cabinet was formed, he and we could point to its functioning as a demonstration of unity and cooperation at the top.

Thieu said people were already speaking with derision that Vietnam was governed by a "triumvirate," Thieu, Ky, and Huong. (Comment: And, presumably, all going in different directions.) Thieu was therefore most reluctant to confirm this by announcing the War Cabinet, and preferred to keep this informal and loose. Berger suggested that if he added Khiem and Vy, held a weekly meeting, and brought in an occasional additional Minister, it would deal with the criticism. I added that I felt the need for a regular meeting with him and his senior people in order to expedite our business with his government at the top. We were often having to go from one top Minister to another to deal with problems which involved him and cut across several Ministries. Most of these problems had to do with Defense and Interior.

Thieu immediately agreed, suggested a meeting every two weeks, with the first tentatively set for Wednesday, July 3, at 1000 hours. I plan to bring Berger, Komer and Abrams.

Comment: I think we have moved Thieu well toward the War Cabinet idea. I have been struck again and again in our meetings on the Paris negotiations how easily and normally Thieu and Ky talk and work together when we put a problem to them. Ky does not have enough to do and chafes because Thieu is not altogether forthcoming because he does not trust Ky. Moreover, Ky is embarrassed in front of his colleagues and friends because he does not know what is going on.

My idea is to use the first meeting to put before them serious matters on which we need to have an exchange, and to engage them collectively in order to envelop Ky in responsibility and in the hope that this will gradually produce some degree of trust and cooperation between Thieu and Ky. Ky can be very good in these meetings because he has a knack for going to the crux of a problem.

Thieu, meantime, is acquiring more and more self-confidence, and more and more confidence in his dealings with Ky. Up to now Thieu has dealt with Ky by out maneuvering him, and Ky has reacted by calling Thieu devious. If Ky is engaged in decision-making in a forum such as I have in mind, it will blunt and may draw the teeth of Ky's protestations that he is not informed, involved or responsible. I have good reason to believe Ky is well aware of what we are up to. I do not expect Ky to become a reformed character and devoted supporter of Thieu as a result of this device, but I think there is a chance he may be domesticated, or at least deprived of some of the grounds of his complaints.

Bunker

17

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 27, 1968 - 4:20 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith, from a British source, more on Peking-Hanoi troubles.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01

17a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 27, 1968

The following is the text of a British message received from their Consulate in Hanoi, dated June 21.

SUBJECT: China - Vietnam

The French Delegate General told me yesterday that he had heard rumors of disturbances and demonstrations taking place at the end of May in several provinces of China and particularly where the North Vietnamese have representation (I believe there are three, including Peking) against the Paris Peace Talks. In at least one of the demonstrations which were apparently Government-sponsored, the North Vietnamese representative was forced to take part.

He has also heard that the railway bridge between China and North Vietnam has been blown up. His sources say that this part of the exercise was not planned by the authorities. He has not so far been able to get any official confirmation of these reports.

I appreciate that you may already have this information from Peking. If not, you may wish to distribute further.

I have just heard that the North Vietnamese Ambassador to Peking who has been on an official tour including Pakistan has not returned to Peking as had been intended, but has come to Hanoi. No official announcement or reason has been given for this and it is not known how long he will stay here. He has confirmed to the French Delegate General the above information. I have been asked to exercise care in passing this information.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

18

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, June 27, 1968
4:00 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Kosygin bought the July 1st announcement of bilateral talks on strategic weapons systems, as the attached indicates.

Nick thinks the language suggested is good.

This is a hasty translation. I will send you an official one when we have it.

Walt Rostow

Attachment

I'd kind of nice to send up occasional good news

W.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-280
By WJ, NARA, Date 7-6-93

18a

(June 27, 1968)

Dear Mr. President:

My colleagues and myself have carefully considered your letter of June 22, 1968 concerning the talks on strategic offensive and defensive nuclear weapons delivery systems. We are ready to announce in the Soviet press and over the radio on July 1st the following statement of the Soviet government:

" On the forthcoming talks on the question of curbing
the strategic arms race

An arrangement has been reached between the Government of the USSR and the USA to enter in the near future into the negotiations on a complete limitation and reduction of both the offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and the systems of defense against ballistic missiles. "

We have no doubt that these statements in that spirit made by our governments should, undoubtedly, further as well the task of drawing the widest possible number of states to the non-proliferation treaty.

Sincerely,

A. Kosygin

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-234
By lip, NARA, Date 7-27-93

Pres. file

19

Thurs., June 27, 1963
2:15 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

My Soviet TV sparring partner turned up this morning, at his suggestion.

He was sure wired for sound. It was a thoroughly instructed professional performance. I have checked with our intelligence people. He is KGB and used for political contacts.

The most interesting item was his raising the question of whether you wished to meet with the Soviet leaders (marked in red).

As you can see, I was friendly but cautious.

If you wish me to go back to him and say I have the impression such a meeting would be welcomed, I can easily do so.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-472
By h-p, NARA, Date 9-5-96

Pres file

19a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Mr. Victor Kopytin of Tass called on me today. He had suggested this when we squared off in a television show last week.

He first made clear that he intended to write nothing about what I said but was simply talking to me for his "personal background."

After pleasantries about what I planned to do when I left government, he turned to Viet Nam. He said it was his "impression" that Hanoi would take de-escalatory action if we stopped the bombing. He asked why we could not accept this "impression" as a basis for action. I took him through:

- our experience with other "impressions," including the 37-day bombing pause;
- the problem of resuming bombing once the hopes of the peoples of the world were elevated by a cessation;
- the high level of infiltration and the responsibilities of the President for the position of his men and his allies, notably in I Corps.

He said: What would you expect Hanoi to do if you stopped bombing? I told him that I was not in a position to give him an exact formula, but mentioned by way of example the level of infiltration; shelling across the DMZ; troop movements across the DMZ; the shelling of Saigon.

He then said: Perhaps you could stop bombing if they returned some of your fliers and stopped the shelling of Saigon. I again said that I was in no position to give him precise terms, but the bombing in the North Vietnamese panhandle was imposing a significant military tax on Hanoi and we must see serious military de-escalation if the bombing were to be stopped. He tried once more: Then you are asking for the whole list of things that you mentioned?

I reminded him once again that I was not in a position to tell him precisely what de-escalatory action on the other side was required.

He then asked: If Moscow were to tell you precisely what the other side would do if you stopped bombing, would that be sufficient?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-472
By sig, NARA, Date 4-5-95

(Ldx'd to 505)

I said that what we needed were explicit arrangements that we could trust. It would be "interesting" for us if Moscow felt confident enough of how Hanoi would behave to give us a clear picture of the military consequences from the other side of our bombing cessation.

I observed that it would be extremely important after a total bombing cessation that there be very rapid progress toward a settlement. I recalled "prompt" and "productive" from the San Antonio formula. He asked: What about the NLF? I said that our position was based on the President's concept of one-man-one-vote, indicating that the Vietnamese have a good record with respect to free elections.

He then asked promptly: Would the government in Saigon let the NLF operate as a political party? I said that I could not speak for the government in Saigon, but it was my personal impression that they would be "reasonable" in any serious negotiation based on their constitution and the one-man-one-vote principle. I pointed out that one could not expect them to be making forthcoming political statements when Saigon was being bombed and the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops were at their throat.

He then asked: Would the President like to meet with Soviet leaders before his term is over? I said that it was clear from the President's statements that he felt there were many important matters which the U. S. and USSR should try to move forward. The question of a meeting had simply not arisen. If it were of interest to the Soviet leadership, such interest might be indicated through regular diplomatic channels.

Kopytin then turned to the ABM-ICBM. He said there were two views in the United States: one, for example, the Stennis Committee's, was that the U. S. required "supremacy" over the Soviet Union; the other was that an even balance was all that was required. Which did I think was the policy of the U. S. Government? I said that the President had explained that an ABM-ICBM race could go on to much higher levels, at great cost to both countries, with no increase in security to either. The details of a precise agreement were complex and would have to be worked out, but, clearly, it was the President's objective to see the security interests of both countries satisfied without a further escalation in strategic missiles.

Kopytin then brought up a somewhat unexpected subject. He asked: If President Johnson should meet with Soviet leaders, could they agree to a doctrine of non-intervention in developing nations? I said that this was interesting but difficult. I explained at some length why American interests were satisfied if each nation was permitted to develop in its own way

without external interference. Our problems arose because of the interference of others. I pointed out that Che Guevara was not a Bolivian; that those who tried to obstruct the Venezuelan elections of 1963 did not get their money and arms from Venezuela; that the war in Viet Nam was caused by infiltration via Laos from North Viet Nam. In short, there was interference to which we have had to respond; and that interference did not always come from the Soviet Union. He said: Yes, there is a problem of third parties. I said the matter was worth some thought because he had raised it; there was no question that U. S. policy was to let nations find their own destiny without external interference; but there were clearly operational problems which would have to be faced.

He then put to me the following proposition: "I am often asked in the United States why the Soviet Union does not do more to bring peace in Southeast Asia. You know our problems in the Socialist camp and especially our troubles with China. Knowing all these troubles and limitations, how do you think we should use our influence on Hanoi?" I said that I doubted very much that anyone outside could give Moscow advice on this matter. The Soviet leaders knew better than we what their limitations were and what they could and could not do to bring peace to Southeast Asia. Right now the question was: how could we make the Paris talks succeed and bring an early peace? More generally, I would hope Moscow would advise Hanoi along the following lines:

- they should cease to pursue their objectives in Laos and South Viet Nam by military means;
- they should take their chances on a one-man-one-vote proposition in South Viet Nam;
- they should look to unification of Viet Nam by peaceful means over the long pull;
- more fundamentally, they should turn to developing North Viet Nam which had suffered greatly in its economic and social development because of their expansionist ambitions;
- they should build their foreign policy on what will be historically their central problem; that is, their independence of China. they should try to achieve this independence by working constructively with their neighbors in Southeast Asia while maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union and, even, the United States.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

At the latter point, Kopytia grabbed firmly. He said: I agree absolutely. Their problem is independence of China. After a few more pleasantries, he departed.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 27, 1968 - 1:20 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Principles for the Ocean Floor

The attached State Department memorandum supplements the Secretary's report to you last Friday dealing with the development in the Government and initial presentation to the UN Ad Hoc Committee's Legal Working Group of certain general principles relating to the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor. These principles were put forward for the purpose of consultation and to attract support for certain concepts we consider to be important.

The attached State Department memorandum reports the results of the initial round of consultations and attaches a clean draft of the principles as they now stand. The revised version has been cleared by the responsible agencies and it is now planned that the principles will be tabled on Friday afternoon as a formal U.S. proposal.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *rg*, NARA, Date 8-17-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



9335
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

2055
1-Johnson
2-Ret.
20a

June 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Principles for the Ocean Floor

On the basis of their consultations in New York our Delegation to the Legal Subcommittee of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Oceans has recommended certain drafting changes in the Statement of Principles. We have circulated these proposals to interested agencies and have secured approval of all concerned.

1. Principles 1 and 2 would be combined into a new principle 1. This change would make it clearer that our proposal is not to establish a "free for all" in the exploration and exploitation of the ocean floor as has been feared by some of the governments with which we have consulted about the principles.

2. We would move principle 9 forward to become a new principle 2 in order to provide balance at an early point in the principles.

3. We would delete principle 8 which deals with facilities and equipment found on the deep ocean floor. This principle was inserted largely to take care of information-gathering equipment left on the floors in conjunction with scientific projects. We are deleting it because it is too detailed for the highly generalized Statement of Principles. The deletion does not constitute a change in our substantive position on the issue.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc/ra, NARA, Date 7-3-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

We are proceeding with consultations with a number of members of the Legal Subcommittee on the basis of this Statement of Principles.

Attached are a clean draft of the principles, as amended, and a copy of the reporting cable from USUN.

BHR

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Draft Principles.
2. Reporting Cable.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 26, 1968

206

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE DEEP OCEAN FLOOR

The General Assembly

Desiring to encourage the exploration, use and development of the deep ocean floor to the fullest extent possible for the benefit and in the interest of all mankind,

Believing that such exploration and use of the deep ocean floor will contribute to international cooperation and understanding,

Convinced that no nation, regardless of geographical location, level of economic development, or technological capability, should be denied the opportunity to participate in the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor,

Conscious of the importance of promoting the general welfare of all peoples, and of furthering scientific study and the conservation of natural resources,

Reaffirming the traditional freedoms of the high seas under international law,

(Additional preambular paragraphs will be added referring to previous UN resolutions on this subject)

Commends to states for their guidance the following principles concerning the deep ocean floor:

1. No state may claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the deep ocean floor. There shall be

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ycg, NARA, Date 7-3-01

no discrimination in the availability of the deep ocean floor to exploration and use by all states and their nationals in accordance with international law.

2. There shall be established, as soon as practicable, internationally agreed arrangements governing the exploitation of resources of the deep ocean floor. These arrangements shall reflect the other principles contained in this statement of principles concerning the deep ocean floor and shall include provision for:

(a) the orderly development of resources of the deep ocean floor in a manner reflecting the interest of the international community in the development of these resources;

(b) conditions conducive to the making of investments necessary for the exploration and exploitation of resources of the deep ocean floor;

(c) dedication as feasible and practicable of a portion of the value of the resources recovered from the deep ocean floor to international community purposes; and

(d) accommodation among the commercial and other uses of the deep ocean floor and marine environment.

3. Taking into account the Geneva Convention of 1958 on the Continental Shelf, there shall be established as soon as

practicable, an internationally agreed precise boundary for the deep ocean floor, the area of the ocean floor beyond that over which coastal states may exercise sovereign rights for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of its natural resources.

Exploitation of the natural resources of the ocean floor that occurs prior to establishment of the boundary shall be understood not to prejudice its location, regardless of whether the coastal state considers the exploitation to have occurred on its "continental shelf".

4. States and their nationals shall conduct their activities on the deep ocean floor in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation, scientific knowledge, and economic development.

5. In order to further international cooperation in the scientific investigation of the deep ocean floor, States shall:

(a) disseminate, in a timely fashion, plans for and results of national scientific programs concerning the deep ocean floor;

(b) encourage their nationals to follow similar practices concerning dissemination of such information;

(c) encourage cooperative scientific activities regarding the deep ocean floor by personnel of different states.

6. In the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor States and their nationals:

(a) shall have reasonable regard for the interests of other states and their nationals;

(b) shall avoid unjustifiable interference with the exercise of the freedoms of the high seas by other states and their nationals, or with the conservation of the living resources of the seas, and any interference with fundamental scientific research carried out with the intention of open publication;

(c) shall adopt appropriate safeguards so as to minimize pollution of the seas and disturbance of the existing biological, chemical and physical process and balances.

Each State shall provide timely announcement and any necessary amplifying information of any marine activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals that could harmfully interfere with the activities of any other State or its nationals in the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor.

A State which has reason to believe that a marine activity or experiment planned by another State or its nationals could harmfully interfere with its activities or those of its nationals in the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor, may request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.

7. States and their nationals shall render all possible assistance to one another in the event of accident, distress or emergency arising out of activities on the deep ocean floor.



Department of State

TELEGRAM

20c

28

out
44
JC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 320

PAGE 01 USUN N. 5726 250158Z

18
ACTION IO 15

INFO: CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02,
SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, RSR 01, SFW 02, MSC 01, INT 06, SCI 05, OST 01,
AEC 11, ACDA 16, AFI 09, ARA 08, EA 10, EUR 15, NEA 13, 180 W

R 242105Z JUN 68
FM USMISSION USUN NEWYORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2371

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LI USUN 5726

SEABEDS: REVISION OF DRAFT PRINCIPLES

REF: USUN 5717 AND 5652

1. AS RESULT OF CONSULTATIONS WITH GROUP OF FRIENDLIES,
WE BELIEVE NON-SUBSTANTIVE DRAFTING CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE
IN DRAFT STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES BEFORE SUBMISSION OF FORMAL
PROPOSAL. WE WOULD REVISE LAST PREAMBULAR STATEMENT, FIRST
TWO PRINCIPLES, AND FIRST SENTENCE OF PRINCIPLE 3 AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE (BEGIN UNDERLINE) COMMENDS TO STATES FOR THEIR GUIDANCE
THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE DEEP OCEAN FLOOR (END
UNDERLINE).

1. NO STATE MAY CLAIM OR EXERCISE SOVEREIGNTY OR SOVEREIGN
RIGHTS OVER ANY PART OF THE DEEP OCEAN FLOOR. (BEGIN UNDERLINE)
THERE SHALL BE NO DISCRIMINATION IN THE AVAILABILITY OF THE
DEEP OCEAN FLOOR TO EXPLORATION AND USE BY ALL STATES AND
THEIR NATIONALS IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW. (END
UNDERLINE)

2. THERE SHALL BE ESTABLISHED, AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE,
INTERNATIONALLY AGREED ARRANGEMENTS GOVERNING THE
EXPLOITATION OF RESOURCES OF THE DEEP OCEAN FLOOR. THESE
ARRANGEMENTS SHALL REFLECT THE OTHER PRINCIPLES CONTAINED
IN THIS STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE DEEP OCEAN
FLOOR. IT SHALL INCLUDE PROVISION FOR:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By g/g NARA, Date 7-3-01



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 USUN N: 05726 250158Z

(A) THE ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT OF RESOURCES OF THE DEEP OCEAN FLOOR IN A MANNER REFLECTING THE INTEREST OF THE (BEGIN UNDERLINE) INTERNATIONAL (END UNDERLINE) COMMUNITY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE RESOURCES;

(B) CONDITIONS CONDUCTIVE TO THE MAKING OF INVESTMENTS NECESSARY FOR THE EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION OF RESOURCES OF THE DEEP OCEAN FLOOR;

(C) DEDICATION AS FEASIBLE AND PRACTICABLE OF A PORTION OF THE VALUE OF THE RESOURCES RECOVERED FROM THE DEEP OCEAN FLOOR TO (BEGIN UNDERLINE) INTERNATIONAL (END UNDERLINE) COMMUNITY PURPOSES; AND

(D) ACCOMMODATION AMONG THE COMMERCIAL AND OTHER USES OF THE DEEP OCEAN FLOOR AND MARINE ENVIRONMENT.

3. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1958 ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, THERE SHALL BE ESTABLISHED AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE, AN INTERNATIONALLY AGREED PRECISE BOUNDARY (BEGIN UNDERLINE) FOR (END UNDERLINE) THE DEEP OCEAN FLOOR. UNQUOTE

2. SECOND SENTENCE OF PRINCIPLE 3, AND 4TH, 5TH, 6TH AND 7TH PRINCIPLES WOULD REMAIN INTACT. EIGHTH PRINCIPLE, DEALING WITH FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT FOUND ON DEEP OCEAN FLOOR, WOULD BE DELETED. CONSENSUS OF FRIENDLIES IS THAT 8 IS TOO DETAILED FOR GENERAL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES. PRINCIPLE 9 WOULD BE THE NEW PRINCIPLE 2.

3. WE BELIEVE GREATER POSITIVE EFFECT ON OTHER DELEGATIONS AND FEWER MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF OUR INTENTIONS WILL RESULT FROM STARTING STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES WITH PRINCIPLE OF NO SOVEREIGN CLAIMS AND FOLLOWING THIS WITH COROLLARY PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION. NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD PREVIOUS WORDING OF PRINCIPLE 1 AS INTENDED TO ESTABLISH BASIS FOR "FREE-FOR-ALL", AS REPORTED REFTELS.

4. RENUMBERING PRINCIPLE 9 AS PRINCIPLE 2 DIRECTLY RESPONSIVE TO SUGGESTION MADE BY NUMBER FRIENDLY DELEGATIONS. SUBSTITUTION OF TERM "INTERNATIONAL" FOR TERM "WORLD OR REGIONAL" IN SUBSECTIONS (A) AND (C), RESPONSIVE TO ITALIAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

25

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 USUN N. 25726 250158Z

SUGGESTION. WE AGREE MORE GENERAL FORMULATION PREFERABLE AT THIS STAGE IN ORDER AVOID EXAGGERATED REGIONAL EXPECTATIONS OR CLAIMS.

5. DRAFTING CHANGE IN PRINCIPLE 3 PURELY STYLISTIC IN RESPONSE TO BRITISH SUGGESTION.

6. REVISION OF LAST PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH INTENDED TO ACCOMMODATE TWO DIFFERENT TYPES OF STATEMENTS BEING MADE IN PRINCIPLES, I.E., ON ONE HAND STATEMENTS OF RULES PRESENTLY APPLICABLE TO DEEP OCEAN FLOOR, AND ON OTHER HAND STATEMENTS CONCERNING FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS.

7. WE DO NOT PLAN TABLE PROPOSED STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES BEFORE END THIS WEEK. HOWEVER, WE WOULD WISH ENGAGE IN FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH FRIENDLIES ON DRAFTING CHANGES BEFORE THAT TIME. UNLESS OBJECTION RECEIVED BY WEDNESDAY, JUNE 26, WE WILL CONSULT FRIENDLIES REGARDING THESE CHANGES ON THAT DATE.

GP-3
BUFFUM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

21
INFORMATION

Pres file

Thursday, June 27, 1968 -- 1:05 p. m.

Mr. President:

I have been informed the Soviet Charge' will be delivering to Nick Katzenbach this afternoon a letter from Kosygin to you.

I will arrange to get it to you promptly.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

CT/ON

22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 27, 1968 - 1:00pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Development Loan for Tanzania

Pres file

In the attached, Messrs. Gaud and Zwick recommend a \$13-million AID loan for Tanzania to help finance improvement of the Great North Road from the Zambian copper mines to the seaport of Dar es Salaam. Joe Fowler concurs.

The Great North Road -- 1300 miles long and improved to carry a normal flow of commercial traffic -- will be an economic lifeline in East Africa.

-- It ties together Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia.

-- It is a key to Zambia's economic independence because it is an alternative to the rail route through Rhodesia which has been the principal channel for Zambian copper.

This loan fits in perfectly with our new aid strategy for Africa. It will benefit several countries and help tie together one of the most important and promising regional groupings on the Continent. It will be jointly financed by the World Bank, Sweden, the U.K., Tanzania, Zambia, and the U.S. Our share is about 16%.

There are no immediate problems with the Symington or Coats-Leag Amendments. Zambia, which would benefit from our share of the construction, is talking about buying surface-to-air missiles from the British for defense against the Rhodesians. But that deal, if made, won't come this fiscal year. Thus, we'd be free to move ahead with this loan.

The Great North Road is one of the most promising projects in Africa. I recommend you approve the loan.

WWR:EKH:RM:lw
attached: File #2044

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-12
By us, NARA Date 9-1-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2043

22a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JUN 22 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: \$13 million Development Loan to Tanzania for a section of the "Great North Road"

Bill Gaud requests your approval to negotiate a \$13 million loan with the Government of Tanzania for the improved construction of a section of road running from the copper fields of Western Zambia to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.

The section of road to be improved is part of the Great North Road which ties together Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia. The World Bank has coordinated the studies and financing of the road for Zambia, Tanzania, the U.S., the Bank, and other donors.

The total cost of the Great North Road program is estimated at \$91 million. AID will finance 16 percent, the Bank and other donor countries about 46 percent, and the countries themselves about 38 percent.

Prior to Southern Rhodesia's break with the United Kingdom, Zambian copper was shipped through Rhodesia and Mozambique. This alternative route through Tanzania is essential to Zambia's economic independence.

Y - 6 447
The loan will be used to purchase U.S. equipment and supplies. Secretary Fowler agrees that the procedures proposed will minimize the impact on the U.S. balance of payments.

Defense Expenditures

With respect to the Symington amendment, Bill Gaud finds that Zambia and Tanzania are not diverting resources to unnecessary military expenditures. It is reported that Zambia, which would benefit from this

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-12
By is, NARA Date 9-1-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

road in Tanzania, is considering purchasing Rapier missiles from the United Kingdom. However, such purchases would not be made this fiscal year and AID would not be required under the provisions of the Conte-Long amendment to reduce the loan.

I recommend you approve this loan.

Charles J. Zwick
Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

JUN 19 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: New Project Approval
Great North Road in Tanzania

I recommend that you authorize me to proceed with a Development Loan of \$13.0 million to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania. The loan will assist in financing the construction of a 150-mile section of the Great North Road from the Tanzania-Zambia border to Central Tanzania, and the design of two additional sections closer to Dar es Salaam, in Tanzania. The proposed loan was approved by the Inter-Agency Development Loan Committee on June 3, 1968.

The total project consists of the engineering and construction of the Great North Road, running 1,300 miles northeast from Lusaka, Zambia to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The project is part of a major Central and East African regional effort to upgrade a number of sections of the road to a standard required to meet current and projected levels of traffic.

The overall improvement of the Great North Road is being financed within a multilateral framework. The following breakdown is relevant in this regard.

A.I.D. Loan (FY 67)	\$ 1,600,000
A.I.D. Loan (Proposed FY 68)	13,000,000
IBRD Loans and Credits (Estimated)	33,500,000
Swedish Loan	5,000,000
United Kingdom Loan	3,500,000
Tanzania Contribution (Estimated)	19,500,000
Zambia Contribution (Estimated)	<u>15,000,000</u>
	\$91,000,000

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4
By lg, NARA, Date 7-15-92

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 30 years

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

It has been proposed that A.I.D. would finance U. S. costs up to \$13.0 million and would not finance any local costs. The Government of Tanzania will finance all local costs and any foreign exchange requirements in excess of the proposed \$13.0 million loan. The loan should have no significant adverse impact on the U. S. balance of payments since the total amount of the loan is for procurement of services in the United States. Further, U. S. financing will insure the use of U. S. contractors on those sections of the road which would not have been competitive without U. S. financing, and U. S. contractors selected for the A.I.D. project may later find themselves with comparative advantage in bidding on other sections of the road.

Zambia's long-range policy to diversify its trading and transport pattern and the recent impetus to accelerate that policy due to Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence have had important implications for transport investment in East Africa, particularly in Tanzania. In its attempts to create and improve a series of alternate routes through Malawi, the Congo, Angola and most importantly Tanzania, Zambia has initiated various transport projects. These include road transport over the Great North Road to Dar es Salaam, an air cargo operation, a petroleum pipeline and increased utilization of existing minor routes by rail, lake and road.

Indications are that Zambia will concentrate on four major routes: The Great North Road to Dar es Salaam; the rail route to the Port of Lobito in Angola; the road and rail route through Malawi to the Port of Beira in Mozambique; and a proposed railway along a route similar to that of the Great North Road. The latter rail link would provide a 1,300-mile route from the Copper Belt in Zambia to the Indian Ocean Port of Dar es Salaam. The estimated cost of the rail link and related port expansion amounts to \$400 million. The People's Republic of China has proposed financing to the Governments of Tanzania and Zambia for this purpose. Tanzania and Zambia appear determined to press ahead with both the construction of the railroad and the upgrading of the Great North Road.

The Great North Road will provide Zambia with an important alternate route to the sea. The improvement and construction of the other major routes were assumed in establishing the economic justification for the road. In addition, the sections to be constructed and designed with A.I.D. assistance serve areas in Tanzania with considerable promise for economic development.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

One year ago, A.I.D. revised its African strategy to improve the effectiveness of U. S. policies and programs for African development. The new policy provides for more selective concentration of bilateral aid to selected countries, and regional projects involving cooperation by two or more African states. This interstate or regional emphasis seeks to strengthen African efforts to surmount national problems of limited resources, markets and economic prospects. Important aspects of this regional cooperation in Central and East Africa consist of public services in the fields of transportation, communications, taxation and research. Further, emphasis has been placed on the coordination of A.I.D. assistance throughout Africa in multilateral framework, through arrangements under the leadership of the IBRD or the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

A.I.D. and its predecessor agencies have provided more than \$50 million in assistance to Tanzania in loans, grants and Food for Peace programs. Approximately \$8.2 million of this aid was extended from 1952 to 1955, in U. S.-owned United Kingdom sterling counterpart through the U. S. Mission in London. These funds were used for several projects, including the improvement of another section of the Great North Road. During Fiscal Years 1962-1967, A.I.D. assistance per annum, including financing from regional programs, averaged around \$10 million. Increased attention is now being given to projects which will contribute toward an early expansion of production, particularly in the agricultural field.

Tanzania has been one African country which has given a great deal of serious attention to planning for development. It has attempted to establish valid priorities and has been basically concerned with using a goodly portion of its scarce local resources for sensible development objectives. The Tanzanian record on self-help has been impressive. Austerity and self-reliance were dominant themes in the Arusha Declaration of 1967, and it is a tribute to Tanzania's capacity for self-help that domestic savings have yielded an amount exceeding that provided through external aid to help meet the Government's development expenditures for three consecutive years. With regard to financing construction of the Great North Road itself, Tanzania's participation has been significant. In addition, the major donors and the Government have carefully reviewed together the transport industry in Tanzania, and substantial progress in restructuring the transport licensing procedures has been but one achievement made possible by influence of the major donors.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

State/A.I.D., in consultation with the inter-agency advisory committee concerned with the implementation of Section 620(s) (the Symington Amendment), of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, has determined (i) that Tanzania's and Zambia's resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with their development, and (ii) that neither U. S. development assistance nor PL 480 sales are diverted by Tanzania or Zambia to military purposes. Among the principal factors of this determination are the following:

1. Defense expenditures for Tanzania as a percent of GNP for 1966 and 1967 were 0.9%, among the lowest for the Africa Region; and Zambian expenditures of 2.1% in 1967 were also low.
2. Defense expenditures for Tanzania as a percent of central government expenditures for 1967 were 6.4%; and Zambian expenditures for 1968 are 4.4%, among the lowest for the Region.
3. Foreign exchange spent for defense as a percent of import of goods and services cannot be accurately calculated for Tanzania and Zambia because of the incomplete nature of trade statistics; but since the Governments have not been engaged in foreign exchange purchases for defense to any significant extent, the percentages must be minimal.
4. The Country Teams have reported that there is no evidence of U. S. development assistance or PL 480 sales being diverted to military expenditures.

Further, currently available intelligence does not indicate that Tanzania or Zambia has purchased sophisticated weapons systems requiring the withholding of assistance under Section 119 (Conte-Long Amendment) of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1968. There are recent reports that Zambia may enter into contracts for the purchase of Rapier Missiles. It has not been determined whether such purchases by Zambia would affect the loan to Tanzania under the Conte-Long Amendment. Since payments are not expected to be made prior to June 30, 1968, this possible purchase does not raise a Conte-Long issue in this fiscal year, in any case.

Recommendation: That you authorize me to approve this loan.

William S. Gaud

William S. Gaud

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

23

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, June 27, 1968 - 1:00pm

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy supports Abrams' proposals on Khe Sanh and the replies to the press which Abrams suggests Westy make.

W. W. Rostow

MAC 8394
HWA 2153

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Security, Pub. 06, 1993
By sq, NARA, Date 7-15-92

WWRostow:rln

23a

RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 JUN 27 14 26

ZCZCQAR435
PP, YEKADS
DE YSNKCA 24 1791417
P 271411Z ZFF-2
FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC
INFO MR ROSTON WHITE HOUSE WASH DC.
O 250002Z ZYH ZFF-3
FM GEN ABRAMS COMUSMACV
TO YSNKORC/GEN WESTMORELAND TDY CINCPAC
INFO GEN WHEELER CJCS
ADM SHARP CINCPAC
ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAC 2394 EYES ONLY

1. YOU SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED ON ARRIVAL IN HONOLULU THE EXCHANGE OF BACK CHANNELS BETWEEN GENERAL WHEELER AND ME CONCERNING OUR PLANS TO SWITCH TO A MOBILE OFFENSE IN THE KHE SANH AREA AND ELIMINATE THE COMBAT BASE.

2. WHEN THIS CHANGE BECOMES KNOWN TO THE PRESS, PROBABLY ABOUT THE TIME YOU ASSUME YOUR NEW DUTIES, WE SHALL UNDOUBTEDLY BE ASKED SUCH QUESTIONS AS, "IS THIS A CHANGE OF GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S STRATEGY," OR "GENERAL WESTMORELAND ONCE SAID THAT KHE SANH MUST BE HELD, IF HE WAS CORRECT, WHY THE CHANGE?"

3. WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO DO IS TO HAVE YOUR CONCURRENCE IN REPLYING TO SUCH QUESTIONS SUBSTANTIALLY AS FOLLOWS:

"A. SOME WEEKS BEFORE HE DEPARTED FOR HIS NEW ASSIGNMENT, GENERAL WESTMORELAND REQUESTED THAT, IN VIEW OF THE ANTICIPATED THREAT IN I CORPS, GENERAL CUSHMAN REVIEW HIS DEPLOYMENTS IN NORTHERN I CTZ, INCLUDING KHE SANH AND MAKE ANY RECOMMENDATIONS HE THOUGHT APPROPRIATE TO IMPROVE HIS TROOP DISPOSITIONS.

"B. GENERAL CUSHMAN MADE CERTAIN RECOMMENDATIONS IN OUTLINE FORM, TO INCLUDE THE CHANGE AT KHE SANH.

"C. GENERAL WESTMORELAND AFTER WEIGHING THE PROS AND CONS INSTRUCTED THAT THIS OUTLINE BE DEVELOPED IN DETAIL. HE DID NOT SEE THE DETAILED PLAN PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM VIETNAM."

SSG NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS
300

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.3
DA Memo, Jan 8, 1998
By *mg* PARA Date 7-15-92

24

Thursday, June 27, 1968
12:55 p. m.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Thieu's comments on ANTWERP:

Pres file

- he is skeptical;
- he believes any such approach should be followed up;
- it should be followed up by the U. S. outside Viet Nam with "great care and secrecy";
- he fears that any such contact by himself or Huong at the present stage could destroy the government.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 21987
By is NARA, Date 4-9-98



Department of State

24a/0
TELEGRAM

~~TOP SECRET~~

7 2 8 0 Q

1968 JUN 27 AM 9 50

OO RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 31163 0791050
ZNY TTTT ZZH
O 271045Z JUN 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5603
STATE GRNC
BT

T O P S E C R E T SAIGON 31163

NODIS/ANTWERP

REF: STATE 188977

1. BERGER AND I SAW THIEU YESTERDAY. AFTER REFERRING TO SIMILAR 1966 APPROACH, I GAVE HIM GENERAL ACCOUNT OF APPROACHES TO LANSDALE, AND ASKED HIS VIEWS ON WHAT HE THINKS THIS MEANS AND WHETHER HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD FOLLOW UP.

2. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY HIS REPLIES.

A. HE KNOWS HOACH SLIGHTLY, BUT NEVER HEARD OF CHAU LONG. HE THOUGHT IT A PSEUDONYM OR CAMBODIAN NAME AND MADE A NOTE TO MAKE INQUIRIES ABOUT HIM.

B. WHILE POSSIBLE HOACH MAY HAVE CONTACTS WITH NLF PRIME MINISTER HUONG KNOWS MANY OF THEM, AND INTIMATELY. IF THIS WAS SERIOUS APPROACH, HE WONDERED WHY NLF DID NOT CONTACT HUONG.

C. HE AND HUONG HAVE TALKED MOST CONFIDENTIALLY ABOUT CONTACTS WITH NLF OR MEMBERS OF IT. BOTH AGREE THAT GOVT CANNOT TAKE INITIATIVE FOR SECRET TALKS, BUT IF ENDEAVOR TO ESTABLISH CONTACT ORIGINATES WITH NLF, IT MUST BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION, AND AT SAME TIME HANDLED WITH GREATEST CAUTION LEST FACT OF CONTACT BE REVEALED AND DESTROY BOTH THIEU AND HUONG. IN THIS RESPECT GOVT WOULD BE IN MUCH STRONGER POSITION TO HANDLE ANY SECRET TALKS "TWO OR THREE MONTHS FROM NOW". BY THEN HUONG GOVT WOULD BE WELL SETTLED IN, HOPEFULLY SOME OF THE "VERBAL BOMBARDMENT" OF PAST FEW WEEKS WILL HAVE DIED DOWN, AND POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION STABILIZED.

MEANTIME, HUONG HAD TO BE VERY CAREFUL IN HOW HE HANDLED ANY MATTER CONNECTED WITH NLF.

D. THIEU DOES NOT RPT NOT THINK THERE IS ANY REAL SUBSTANCE BEHIND HOACH APPROACH, BUT BELIEVES IT IS WORTH TESTING. THIS CAN BEST BE DONE BY US OUTSIDE VIETNAM, AND HE SAID WE COULD GO AHEAD IF WE WISHED. HE CAUTIONED US EXERCISE GREAT CARE AND SECRECY AND CONSIDER THIS MAY

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By 8/15, NARA, Date 7-12-01

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 31163, JUNE 27

BE BOOBY TRAP THAT COULD BE REVEALED BY OTHER SIDE IN ORDER TO CREATE TROUBLE BETWEEN US AND SOUTH VIETNAM, SOW SUSPICION OF US SECRET AND DOUBLE DEALING AND TO DISCREDIT THIEU AND HUONG. I SAID WE WERE VERY CONSCIOUS OF THIS DANGER.

3. THIEU DOES NOT RPT NOT WANT ME TO REVEAL MATTER TO KY OR TO HUONG. IF ANY POSITIVE RESULT THEN HE WILL TAKE THEM INTO HIS CONFIDENCE. HE DID NOT EXPLAIN WHY BUT IT WAS EVIDENT FROM EARLY PART OF CONVERSATION, WHICH I AM REPORTING SEPARATELY, THAT HE FEARS KY MIGHT USE THIS TO EMBARRASS HIM AND HUONG BY SPREADING RUMORS THAT THEY ARE SECRETLY IN TOUCH WITH OR TRY TO CONTACT NLF.

4. COMMENT: WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT RECEIVED FULL THRUSS FILE AND THEREFORE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO GIVE FURTHER EVALUATION BASED THE THE MATTER IS TO BE PURSUED FURTHER HER WE BELIEVE THAT NEXT MOVE WOULD BE FOR CALHOUN TO SEE PHUOC DISCREETLY AND INFORM HIM OF WHAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO. IT COULD THEN BE ARRANGED THAT FURTHER CONTACT, PRESUMABLY WITH LONG, WOULD BE WORKED OUT WITH SOME OTHER AMERICAN TO HANDLE IT. WE COULD INFORM PHUOC THAT THIS WOULD BE OUR WAY OF PROCEEDING FURTHER WITH THE CASE AND ALLOW HIM TO MAKE THE ARRANGEENT WITH LONG. WE AWAIT DEPT'S FURTHER THOUGHTS AND INSTRUCTIONS.

WITH REFERENCE TO PARA 10 REFTTEL, THERE IS CERTAINLY NO QUESTION AT THIS STAGE OF ANY PUBLIC REITERATION BY THIEU OF HIS REMARKS LAST FALL ABOUT DEALING WITH ELEMENTS OF THE NLF. THIEU'S COMMENTS TO ME REPORTED ABOVE MAKE QUITE CLEAR THE DELICACY OF HIS POSITION AND I AGREE WITH HIM.
BUNKER
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

25

SECRET

Pres file

Thursday, June 27, 1968 -- 12:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

I informed the State Department of your question about Honolulu. They propose the attached final paragraph on the Honolulu possibility.

One question you may wish to consider is whether the Honolulu meeting might precede the Clifford-Wheeler visit. For example, Clifford and Wheeler could proceed from a Honolulu meeting to Saigon.

W. W. Rostow

Para. 7 approved _____

Approved as amended _____

No _____

Call me _____

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 8-6-92

WWRostow:rln

Ben Read telephoned this additional paragraph -- the the telegram you were talking together about.

7. On the Honolulu possibility, you should know that highest levels believe there would be real usefulness in a serious consultation at Honolulu. We are, of course, well aware that Thieu's heart has hitherto been fixed on a mainland visit in style, but you see from the above what the problems are -- and, of course, the time required to get to Honolulu and back would be much less from the SVN standpoint. As to timing, we would like your thoughts if you consider this feasible matter to put to Thieu. The possibility continues to exist about Clifford/Wheeler visit in mid-July, and perhaps a Honolulu meeting a suitable interval after that would be one conceivable way of doing things.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01

ACTION

25b

*rec'd
6/26/68
1:04P*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, June 26, 1968
1:00 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

(4)

*Rec'd
12P*

MR. PRESIDENT:

In this draft cable, for your clearance,
Nick Katzenbach raises with Bunker the reasons
for considering a further postponement of Thieu's
visit to the U. S.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

Wait Rostow

Approved ✓

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 8-6-92

252

→ *WUR*
By sent Wright

~~SECRET~~

Ambassy SAIGON PRIORITY

INFO: Embassy PARIS PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *J*, NARA, Date 7-3-01

STATE
NODES

PARIS TOBRL _____ For Vance and Habib

Eyes Only for Ambassador from Acting Secretary.

1. We are approaching the time at which you have told Thieu, and we have told Bui Dien, that we would reach a final decision on the Thieu visit, with the dates July 23-24--or a week end way or the other--as the last ones mentioned.

2. Unfortunately, a series of developments and evolving judgments here now make us increasingly skeptical that the visit could be held without the kind of ~~possible~~ demonstrations that would negate its value to both of us. Specifically:

a. The ending of the Poor People's Campaign has still some some cogence in Washington, and that campaign did probably take on an anti-Viet-Nam aspect toward the end. Certainly we were wise, in hindsight, not to schedule the visit at or near the same time as the final demonstration here last week.

247000/1000 3/25/68

4235

The Acting Secretary

DOB - Macy. Clifford

White House - Mr. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

2

Saigon Info Paris TODZL

~~SECRET~~

b. We have had a steadily increasing series of incidents--fortunately without much publicity--where small minority groups have acted against visitors and diplomats. The Shah of Iran was heckled in Cambridge and Chicago, and there have been a spate of incidents involving the beating up of a French diplomat, the burning of the Turkish Ambassador's car, and such. Our security people have some indications that the specific nationality groups responsible for these actions are in touch with each other and with the SDS--which is the spearhead of anti-Viet-Nam demonstration effort.

c. In specific terms of a schedule that included New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Honolulu, our security people now have a formidable list of anti-Viet-Nam groups which, in their judgment, would be likely to turn out and try to cause trouble of a significant nature along the line.

d. In general, there is increasing evidence that the more extreme anti-Viet-Nam elements are becoming more action-minded and a touch desperate as they see a situation in which their candidate now appears to stand little chance at the Democratic Convention. This is taking the form of suggestions of student and other action at the convention itself. It would be our judgment that, if a Thieu visit were

3

Saigon Info Paris TODEL
~~SECRET~~

announced, these same groups would view that as a heaven-sent occasion to make their point about the strength of opposition to the war in the eyes of the television cameras and against a man who lacks strong popularity here.

3. All these points relate to the specific chance of hostile demonstrations that would set the publicity tone of the occasion. But more broadly, the general state of opinion here is favorable to the Paris talks and somewhat more sympathetic generally on Viet-Nam. We fear that a Thieu visit, far from helping in either direction, would tend to re-kindle passions now dormant and that whatever he might say--on which he would have to take into account his Vietnamese audience--could not be regarded as anything but firm. Specifically, we could see him being hit hard with embarrassing questions about dealing with the NLF, that he is in no position to answer at the present time from a domestic standpoint in the light of the kind of sentiment reflected in the ~~Assembly's~~ Assembly's treatment of Huong yesterday--whatever he might in fact be ready to do privately. Certainly, our present reading is that the chances of a speech to the Congress or of a really favorable and friendly reception there would not be great.

~~SECRET~~

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other
Timely work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

4

Saigon Info Paris TODEL

~~SECRET~~

4. Meanwhile, our reading of the political situation in Saigon suggests considerable doubt whether Thieu would be wise to plan on leaving at this point in any case. We understand and accept the judgments you have stated in your S0844 on the degree of strain between Thieu and Ky, but we also have the feeling that a lot of the hand is not played out and that there may be significant developments that could further strain the relationship. Basically, it seems to us that, if Thieu were to announce a visit here early in July and then make it in ~~late~~ late July, it would to some extent inhibit his actions during this period from any standpoint, and that his absence from Saigon would be edgy in his own mind and open to all sorts of unhappy possibilities at your end. If things had settled down, Ky were reasonably happy, and Huong had moved into a reasonably strong position, that would be a different picture, but we do not see this state of affairs as having any assurance of existing by mid or late July.

uncertain

5. Finally, the military prospects are surely very ~~uncertain~~ as we look to the next month. The possibility still hangs over us of further ~~attacks~~ ^{Abrams'} attacks in Saigon, and ~~Abrams'~~ judgment--as you know--is that ~~something~~ something against the northern cities could well come toward the end of July. All in all, a continuing worrisome state of affairs on the

5

Saigon Info Paris TODEL

~~SECRET~~

military front generally and on the Saigon front in particular seems to be the prospect. Thieu's absence from his country during any military flare-up would certainly not be useful in terms of his own image or in terms of GVN effectiveness.

6. All these negative factors mean that we are now decidedly reserved over the whole value and wisdom of the trip at this point. Hence, we feel the need to give you these thoughts and to get your own views, covering such points as:

- a. How strongly you think Thieu now feels about letting the visit slip;
- b. What kind of argument or discussion would be most helpful in moving the matter in this direction;
- c. Whether further, and in effect indefinite, postponement could be usefully mitigated--particularly as to the appearance of consultation--either by high-level visits from here or Paris, or by a short Thieu trip to Honolulu.

GP-9.

Enc.

Could we all meet
in Honolulu?

Pres file

26

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thurs., June 27, 1968
10:40 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

On Max Rabb, I agree with the attached somewhat cautious memo of Al Jenkins.

He has followed the PUEBLO for us.

Attachments

W. W. Rostow

P.S. I am quietly stepping out the possibility of Rabb's working on the Pueblo quietly via the USSR. Very difficult, but we're getting nowhere via conventional diplomacy.

W

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *7-3-01*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

26a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Max Rabb Call on the President

I see no reason why it would not be appropriate and possibly useful for the President to hear Max Rabb's story of his efforts in East Germany. Those efforts might have some carry-over value at a later stage in our negotiations on the PUEBLO, if present efforts are un-availing. It is important, however, to remember that the cases are quite different.

There were leverages available in the East German case which are not available to us with respect to North Korea. Perhaps the most immediate leverage in the East German case was our manipulation of East German travel documents to their discomfort. A second concerned the licensing of certain U.S. manufacturing processes in which the East Germans were very interested at the time. A third factor, which may have affected the case, was the East German desire to have its skirts clean with the Western powers at a time when it put the screws on the West Germans.

From all reports, Mr. Rabb did a splendid job of negotiating, given these leverages which came along more or less in concert. He has not been averse to publicity after the fact, but he seems to have been the soul of discretion during the negotiations.

It is important that any such visit not be associated in public with the PUEBLO problem. This would signal anxiety concerning present efforts, to the detriment of those efforts.


Alfred Jenkins

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-24)
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-17-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 25, 1968
12:45 P.M.

26b

TO: The President

AN & ROWE
W.
1005

FROM: Larry Temple L.T

Is the President interested in seeing Max Rabb
in accordance with Jim Rowe's suggestion.

CABLES
FOLYN
CORCORAN
YOUNGMAN

Yes _____ Not Now _____ Call Me _____

ask Rabb to refer & call me - J

During our discussions about the Max Rabb appointment, I suggested it might be dramatically useful both for the President and for Rabb (who was very active for the President in 1964 and has been criticized by the Republicans, who also tell him the President did nothing for him) if the President could have Rabb in to tell him about his private negotiations in East Germany rescuing American prisoners there.


He has had a number of successes and there has been, so far as I know, no quid pro quo.

The advantage is, once again, the President's interest in every minor step that might lead to an accommodation with the Soviet states.

I am unable to weigh how my recommendation would fit in with the present Berlin "tightening", but it would seem this kind of conversation might be useful as a pawn in that particular problem.

Rabb tells me he thinks he can carry on this kind of negotiation in any of the Satellite states, particularly Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia which are easier than the others. He believes the Soviet states are more malleable to discussion with private individuals than with formal government emissaries.

In any event, it would seem to me a discussion with Rabb which the President could then casually and publicly refer to would enhance the President's image of attempting to do something in this area.



James Rowe

I am attaching the story from the New York Times and other papers.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *J*, NARA, Date 7/30/01

1 TION

27

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 27, 1968 - 10:40 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Development Loan for Cameroon

Herewith Messrs. Gaud and Zwick recommend a \$10-million AID loan for our share in the financing of a railroad across Cameroon. Joe Fowler concurs.

This is the second stage of a project jointly financed by the French, the EEC, Cameroon, and the U.S. Our share is less than 25%. We helped to finance the first stage with a \$9-million loan in 1962.

As you may remember from his visit here, President Ahidjo of Cameroon has had a tough job unifying a country deeply split by tribal and regional divisions. He's fought off Communist-armed insurgents and is trying to make some progress on health and education. But he's counting heavily on this railroad to cement his nation-building and to encourage agriculture in backward areas.

I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve loan _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

WWR:EKH:RM:lw

Att: File #2043

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JUN 22 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: \$10 million loan to Cameroon

Bill Gaud requests your approval to negotiate a \$10 million loan with the Cameroon Government for construction of a new section of the Transcameroon Railroad. This would be our second loan to Cameroon for this railroad in participation with the French and the European Economic Community. Phase I, started in 1962, will be completed early next year.

The total cost of the proposed railroad extension is estimated at \$43 million. In addition to the \$10 million AID loan, France will put in \$8 million, the Cameroon Government \$5 million, and the EEC -- through the European Development Fund -- will put in \$20 million. It is this kind of joint financing that AID is trying to encourage in its African programs.

The proposed extension will promote agricultural development in the northern part of Cameroon tying the region to the capital and the ocean port. It is the top priority project in the Government's development program.

VC 6/1/68

The loan will be used to purchase U.S. equipment, materials and technical services. Secretary Fowler agrees that the procedures proposed will minimize the impact on the U.S. balance of payments.

Based on a State/AID review, Gaud advises that sanctions under the Conte-Long and Symington amendments are not applicable to Cameroon.

I recommend you approve this loan.

Charles J. Zwick
Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

JUN 18 1968

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Development Loan of \$10,000,000 to the Government of the Federal Republic of Cameroon for the Phase II Extension of the Transcameroon Railroad

Action Requested

I request your authorization to conclude with the Government of the Federal Republic of Cameroon a loan for \$10,000,000 from Development Assistance Funds to assist in the construction of the Phase II extension of the Transcameroon Railroad. The other members of the Development Loan Committee, the Treasury, the Export-Import Bank and the Department of State, also support this loan.

The Loan

The loan will be used to finance the procurement of United States technical services, construction equipment and materials. It is believed that FY 1968 Development Loan Funds for Africa may be available for this project. If, however, funds do not become available in FY 1968, this loan can be authorized in FY 1969. The total cost of the Phase II extension is estimated at \$43,000,000. In addition to the A.I.D. contribution, financing will be provided by the European Economic Community (\$20,000,000), the Government of France (\$7,900,000) and the Government of the Federal Republic of Cameroon (\$5,100,000).

The Transcameroon Railroad is the Federal Republic of Cameroon's (GFRC) top priority development project. A vital step in Cameroon's nation-building, it will facilitate agricultural diversification and tie the diverse areas of the country together. In particular, the Phase II extension of this railroad (207 miles from Belabo to Ngaoundere) will make accessible areas of Northern Cameroon where economic development heretofore has been impeded by the lack of an adequate transport link to Yaounde, the capital city and to Douala, the main ocean port.

The request for A.I.D. assistance in financing this project results from our participation in 1962-1963 with the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Government of France in the Phase I extension of the same railroad. Construction of that phase, running 183 miles north from Yaounde to Belabo, is expected to be completed by January 1969.

The Phase I extension represents an initial effort at cooperation between the United States, France and the EEC in joint financing of an African development project. The United States has a strong interest in continuing this successful arrangement. The EEC's European Development Fund has become a leading source of aid funds for Africa and we wish to encourage the expansion of its activities in coordination with our own. Moreover, the Korry Report strongly recommends A.I.D. participation in multilateral projects in Africa.

Financing of Phase I and Phase II is set forth in Annex A. The financial arrangements for Phase II were completed at a November 12, 1967 meeting of the donors in Brussels. At this meeting A.I.D. proposed to finance, subject to the necessary approvals, a \$10,000,000 loan for the project. This course of action had been agreed to by the Bureau of the Budget in July of 1966.

The existing railway system of the Cameroon is owned and operated by a semi-autonomous railway authority which has a competent staff of local and expatriate personnel.

Effects on United States Balance of Payments

The \$10,000,000 A.I.D. loan will only be used to finance goods and services of United States source and origin and will not have an adverse effect on the United States Balance of Payments. Unlike the previous \$9,200,000 A.I.D. loan for Phase I, no local costs will be financed under the new loan.

The proposed loan will benefit United States manufacturers of heavy construction machinery, culverting material, structural steel, steel rails and other construction materials. Without the tied A.I.D. loan funds, it is not probable that a contractor would purchase the construction material from the United States because United States

prices are about 7% higher than the prices of similar materials purchased in Europe. Similarly, because a European contractor probably will be low bidder and because European contractors tend to purchase equipment outside of the United States, little United States source and origin equipment would be purchased without the tied A.I.D. loan. Therefore, the \$10,000,000 of United States equipment and materials financed under the A.I.D. loan represent additional United States exports.

Self Help

Under the leadership of President Ahidjo, Cameroon has achieved nationhood in spite of active Communist-supported terrorism, tribal, religious and political diversity, and the necessity of building on two different colonial traditions (British and French). Having achieved a large measure of political success, the GFRC is now overridingly concerned with economic development. With a significant development potential, Cameroon has progressed in agriculture, industrialization and the expansion of economic and social infrastructure with a policy known as "planned liberalism", i.e. encouragement of private investment, judicious Cameroonization and sound fiscal policies.

Over the past several years, the Cameroon gross national product has been increasing at a rate of 4-5% (at present prices). In spite of the necessity to protect the country against the threat of insurgency, the government has been able to increase its non-defense expenditures by about 12% per annum during the period 1962-1963 through 1966-1967. Most of these increases have gone into the fields of health and education.


In the last two years the government has taken vigorous action to increase agricultural export production, cut imports of consumer goods and increase imports of producer goods. This has resulted in a reduction of the trade deficit from \$13,000,000 in 1965 to \$1,000,000 in 1966.

No difficulties exist with the Symington and Conte - Long Amendments. A more complete statement is contained in Annex B.

CONCLUSION: Our shift in emphasis away from bilateral aid last year raised serious fears on the part of our Cameroonian friends that we might abandon them. Your assurance to President Ahidjo

during his visit last October, of continued United States interest in his country, effectively calmed those fears. Our participation in Phase II of the railroad will provide graphic evidence of this interest.

RECOMMENDATION: That you authorize me to approve this loan. The Department of State concurs.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "William S. Gaud". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

William S. Gaud

ANNEX A

Financing of the Transcameroon Railroad

<u>Source</u>	<u>Amount of Phase I</u>		<u>Amount of Phase II</u>	
A.I.D.	\$ 9.2	Loan	\$10.0	Loan
European Development Fund	17.25	Grant	15.0	Grant
			5.0	Loan
Gov't of France	7.2	Grant	4.9	Grant
	1.2	Loan	3.0	Loan
GFRC	<u>2.0</u>		<u>5.1</u>	
Total	\$36.85		\$43.0	

ANNEX B

Symington and Conte - Long Amendments

State/A.I.D. in consultation with the inter-agency advisory committee concerned with the implementation of Section 620(s) (The Symington Amendment) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, have determined (a) that Cameroon's resources are not being diverted to military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development, and (b) that neither United States development assistance nor PL 480 Sales are diverted by Cameroon to military purposes. Among the principal factors of this determination are the following:

1. Defense expenditures for Cameroon as a percent of GNP for 1967 were 2.2%.
2. Defense expenditures for Cameroon as a percent of consolidated government expenditures for 1967 were 11.7%.
3. Foreign exchange spent for defense as a percent of import of goods and services is less than 1%.
4. The Country Team have reported that there is no evidence of U.S. development assistance funds or PL 480 voluntary agency commodities being diverted to military expenditures.

There is evidence that the Cameroon is achieving a sustained real growth rate of GNP of 4 or 5%. Further, the growth of the agricultural output is double that of Africa and the 11% rate of growth of the industrial value added is at least at and probably much above the average for Africa. Furthermore, the Cameroon trade account has returned to approximate balance due to government action, while the deficit on services is being covered by normal long-term transfers and investment. Foreign exchange spent on military imports is negligible.

Although the recent increase in Cameroon's investment budget has resulted in a budgetary deficit, revenues have increased substantially over the five-year interval while defense expenditures have risen modestly. It has a serious Communist-supported insurgency problem. The Cameroonian military effort appears to be the minimal response necessary to preserve the law, order and security prerequisite for economic progress.

Further, current available intelligence does not indicate that the GFRC has purchased sophisticated weapons systems requiring the withholding of assistance under Section 199 (Conte - Long Amendment) of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1968.

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~ -- CROCODILE

Thursday, June 27, 1968
10:05 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the Indian Consul
General in Hanoi -- always the optimist --
produces a quite extraordinary formula
for mutual de-escalation.

It may be, however, that it
foreshadows a Hanoi proposal of a U. S.
cease-fire in place in order to preserve
for negotiations their present military
and population control situation.

W. W. Rostow
London 10332

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01



Department of State

#14
28a
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 7254Q

RECEIVED: June 27, 1968
7:27 a.m.

DE RUDTCR 10332 1791110
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 271058Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4458
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ LONDON 10332

NODIS CROCODILE

1. BELOW IS TEXT OF TELEGRAM FROM UK CONSULATE HANOI
DATED JUNE 25.

QTE: THE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS TOLD THE NEWLY
ARRIVED INDIAN CONSUL GENERAL THAT IF THE BOMBING STOPS
QTE THEY WILL STOP FIGHTING IN THE SOUTH UNQTE. THIS IS
I BELIEVE THE FIRST TIME THAT THIS POINT HAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY
MADE TO ANY DIPLOMAT HERE AND OF COURSE IT CONTRADICTS
CATEGORICALLY THE PUBLIC LINE ABOUT RECIPROCITY. UNQTE.

2. FONOFF HAS SENT FOLLOWING TELEGRAM IN REPLY:

QTE: WE SHALL TELL THE AMERICANS, WITH ALL
RESERVE AND ASKING FOR SOURCE TO BE PROTECTED. BUT IS YOUR
INDIAN COLLEAGUE ABSOLUTELY SURE OF HIS FACTS, I.E. THERE IS
NO MISUNDERSTANDING? AND HAS HE TOLD DELHI? UNQTE. BRUCE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

29

Thursday, June 27, 1968 - 9:30 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Clark Clifford forwards
the text of the press conference he had
on the Hill yesterday.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford
Interviewed by Press
Following Appearance before
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
June 26, 1968, 12:30 p. m.

29a

Secretary Clifford: I have just concluded some two hours of testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Administration's Military Sales Bill. It provides briefly for some \$300 million that can be used during the coming fiscal year for making credit sales to those countries whom the United States feels need credit in their purchases. Our sales to other countries are limited to those articles which we believe contribute to their defense and and at the same time we believe make a substantial contribution to maintaining peace in the world. The passage of this legislation would be valuable in the carrying out of our basic foreign policy in the world. This can be considered an arm of our foreign policy.

Question: Is this in addition to your direct military grants to other countries?

Secretary Clifford: That is correct. This is in addition not only to grants --that comes under what is known as our Military Assistance Program-- this is also in addition to cash sales that are made to other countries. Keep in mind, however, that every piece of military equipment that is bought in this country by another country must receive the approval of this government, so we maintain the tightest kind of control over it.

Question: Mr. Secretary, is this figure higher or lower than previous amounts?

Secretary Clifford: It is a new figure this year, because last year there was not a separate bill for military sales. It was included in the MAP program, but it would be less than has been devoted for this purpose in past years.

Question: Mr. Secretary, the Senate yesterday passed a military construction authorization bill including a start on the ABM system. Are you pretty well satisfied with the result of that?

Secretary Clifford: Yes. I believe the subject was debated at length. The Senate had the opportunity to hear the various arguments, and they chose to accept the Administration's construction bill. I was well pleased with the result.

Question: Mr. Secretary, at the time that Peru was negotiating for the purchase of French fighters, which I believe she has since decided on, there were reported to be five other countries that were considering a similar

(MORE)

purchase of jet planes from France. I wonder if you know the status--are they still talking about it or have they decided against it? Do you know what has happened on those?

Secretary Clifford: I do not know the answer to the status of the other countries involved. I know that we attempted to persuade Peru to purchase a much more reasonably priced plane, one that we felt was entirely useful from their standpoint. They chose, however, to get the much more expensive and more sophisticated Mirage from France. We were sorry that they made that decision.

Question: Mr. Secretary, we are getting intelligence reports from South Vietnam that the North Vietnamese apparently are preparing a new large offensive aimed directly at Saigon. Can you amplify anything--can you tell us anything about that at all?

Secretary Clifford: I have nothing to add to the statement that you have made in any detail. The level of combat has been higher in South Vietnam these recent weeks because the enemy has chosen to raise the level. We know that they have additional forces in I Corps in substantial number. We know that they have additional forces in the Saigon area. Just what their plans are in this regard are obviously a matter of great sensitivity.

Question: Do you feel it is a propaganda effort, or it's a real attempt to take Saigon, or what? Is it concerned with the Paris peace talks?

Secretary Clifford: My personal opinion in that regard is that this effort on the part of the enemy is to attempt to raise the level of combat in an effort to influence the negotiations that are going on in Paris.

Question: Is Saigon in any real danger, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Clifford: I do not believe that it is. Thank you very much.

Press: Thank you, sir.

Thursday, June 27, 1968
9:30 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

These thoughts on a political settlement from Thieu's Special Assistant are worth reading. They indicate much flexibility on a political settlement, if we get to serious negotiations on that subject.

I have marked (pp. 3-4) the recurring thought -- now penetrated to Saigon -- that Hanoi may want a continuing U. S. military presence in South Viet Nam as a protection against China.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~



EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-189
By ebm, NARA, Date 5-30-02

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE 30a
IN 38497

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/DIR NIC(HENDRICKSON ONLY) EXO DD1 D/NE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

~~SECRET~~

261847Z

CITE TDCSDB-315/02185-68

DIST 26 JUNE 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 24 JUNE 1968
SUBJECT VIEWS OF PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT ON POSSIBLE
ACCOMMODATION WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (25 JUNE 1968)
SOURCE (SEE PAGE 2.)

FIELD NO.

[Empty box for Field No.]

TO STATE: NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO THOMAS L. HUGHES
TO DIA: EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARROLL
TO NMCC/MC: EXCLUSIVE FOR ARMY ACSI, GENERAL YARBOROUGH;
NAVY DNI, ADMIRAL FLUCKEY;
AIR FORCE AFCIN, GENERAL THOMAS
TO NSA: EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARTER

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 01-150
By ino, NARA, Date 2-26-04

5
4
3
2
1

5
4
3
2
1

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
(foreign section) (dissem controls)

IN 38497

TDCS DB-315/02185-68

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

~~SECRET~~ ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM / CONTROLLED DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD / BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 24 JUNE 1968

SUBJECT VIEWS OF PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT ON POSSIBLE
ACCOMMODATION WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (25 JUNE 1968) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, FROM NGUYEN DUY XUAN, WHO
WAS PROBABLY AWARE HIS REMARKS WOULD REACH
UNITED STATES OFFICIALS.

SUMMARY: PRESIDENTIAL SPECIAL ASSISTANT NGUYEN DUY XUAN
BELIEVES THAT ATTAINMENT OF PEACE WILL REQUIRE THE GOVERNMENT OF
VIETNAM TO "ACCOMMODATE" THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF SV) BY
PERMITTING IT AND ITS COMMUNIST LEADERS TO PARTICIPATE IN
ELECTIONS WHICH WOULD FOLLOW A CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH
VIETNAMESE AND U.S. TROOPS. BEFORE THE ELECTIONS, HOWEVER,
THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH THE SOUTH
VIETNAMESE COULD ORGANIZE POLITICALLY. XUAN IS FAIRLY CONFIDENT

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM / CONTROLLED DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD / BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

IN 38497

TDCS DB-7.5.02.33-58

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

~~SECRET~~ ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

THAT NON-COMMUNISTS COULD WIN SUCH AN ELECTION. HE IS EVEN PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE POSSIBILITY OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT. XUAN IS CONFIDENT THAT PRIME MINISTER HUONG'S REAL VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT ARE NOT TOO DIFFERENT FROM HIS OWN AND THAT PRESIDENT THIEU IS FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO ACCEPT EVENTUALLY A SETTLEMENT ALONG THESE LINES. HE THINKS VICE PRESIDENT KY IS MUCH MORE RIGID. END SUMMARY.

1. NGUYEN DUY XUAN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT THIEU FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, SAID ON 24 JUNE 1968 THAT HE EXPECTS PEACE BY THE END OF 1968, ALTHOUGH THERE WILL PROBABLY BE HEAVY FIGHTING AROUND SAIGON DURING JULY. XUAN BELIEVES THAT ATTAINMENT OF PEACE WILL REQUIRE "ACCOMMODATING" THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF/SV) BY PERMITTING IT AND ITS COMMUNIST LEADERS TO PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS WHICH WOULD BE HELD AFTER A CEASEFIRE FOLLOWED BY WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AND U.S. TROOPS. ~~THE U.S. AND OTHER POWERS ACCEPTABLE TO NORTH VIETNAM (DRV) WOULD HAVE TO GUARANTEE THE HONESTY OF THE ELECTIONS AND PREVENT A SUBSEQUENT COMMUNIST TAKEOVER BY FORCE.~~ THUS, THE U.S. SHOULD MAINTAIN SUCH BASES AS CAM RANH. ~~XUAN SAID HE THOUGHT THE DRV MIGHT AGREE TO THE EXISTENCE OF U.S. BASES FOR THE SAKE OF ITS OWN.~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM / CONTROLLED DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD / BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

IN 38497

TDCS DB-315/02185-68

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

~~SECRET~~ ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

~~PROTECTION AGAINST CHINA~~

2. XUAN SAID HE THINKS ELECTIONS SHOULD NOT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOW A CEASEFIRE. INSTEAD, THERE SHOULD FIRST BE A PERIOD DURING WHICH NON-COMMUNIST ELEMENTS, NOTABLY THE HOA HAO, CAO DAI, BUDDHISTS AND CATHOLICS, COULD IMPROVE THEIR POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. XUAN BELIEVES THAT, GIVEN THE PAUCITY OF REAL COMMUNISTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THE NON-COMMUNISTS WOULD WIN SUCH AN ELECTION, DESPITE THE SUPERIOR COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION. HE THINKS THAT THIS IS THE GOAL TO WORK FOR AND THAT SOME RISK OF COMMUNIST VICTORY WILL HAVE TO BE ACCEPTED. HE SAID HE EVEN ACCEPTED THE POSSIBILITY OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT, OBSERVING THAT THE NATIONALIST PARTIES STILL SUFFER FROM A "CZECHOSLOVAK COMPLEX." HE ADDED THAT HE BELIEVES SOUTH VIETNAM SHOULD EVENTUALLY BECOME NEUTRAL, SOMEWHAT LIKE CAMBODIA.

3. XUAN, WHO SERVED IN PRIME MINISTER TRAN VAN HUONG'S 1964 CABINET AS MINISTER OF ECONOMY, EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT HUONG'S REAL VIEWS ABOUT A SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR ARE NOT VERY DIFFERENT FROM HIS OWN. HE SAID HUONG WANTS A "DIALOGUE" WITH THE NLF/SV BUT BELIEVES THE TIME IS NOT YET RIPE. HE COMMENTED THAT DR. PHAN QUANG DAN HAD CHOSEN THE WRONG MOMENT FOR HIS STATEMENT.

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM / CONTROLLED DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD / BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

IN 38497

TDCS DB-315/02185-68

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

(classification) (dissem controls)

HE SAID THAT, AT AGE 65, HUONG IS MOST ANXIOUS TO SEE PEACE AGAIN IN VIETNAM AND, IN XUAN'S OPINION, IS MORE FLEXIBLE AND WISER THAN IN 1964, ALTHOUGH ALSO PROUDER BECAUSE OF HIS BEING THE FIRST PERSON TO SERVE TWICE AS PRIME MINISTER. XUAN SAID HE THINKS PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU IS SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE TO ACCEPT EVENTUALLY A PEACE ALONG THE LINES HE DESCRIBED, WHILE VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY IS MUCH MORE RIGID, BEING INFLUENCED BY "AMERICAN HAWKS."

4. XUAN SAID HE CONSIDERS AU TRUONG THANH TO BE A VERY COMPETENT ECONOMIST WITH LOTS OF "GUTS" WHO MAY SOME DAY ACHIEVE HIS AMBITION TO BECOME PRIME MINISTER, AT WHICH TIME HE WOULD SEEK TO APPLY HIS SOCIALIST IDEAS. HE SAID HE CONSIDERS FORMER DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TRAN VAN TUYEN, WHOM HE HAS MET ONLY TWO OR THREE TIMES, TO BE A VERY INTELLIGENT MAN WHO WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY. AS FOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH ("BIG MINH"), XUAN SAID HE THINKS MINH MIGHT STILL BE USEFUL AS A FIGUREHEAD WITH VERY LITTLE AUTHORITY, ALTHOUGH HE IS OUTDATED IN MANY RESPECTS AND NO LONGER SUITED TO SERVE AS, FOR EXAMPLE, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMY.

5. DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOEYER) CINCPAC (EXCLUSIVE FOR CINCPAC AND POLAD)

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM / CONTROLLED DISSEM / NO DISSEM ABROAD / BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

31

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 27, 1968
9:15 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

The Soviets have now surfaced for the first time in print the demonstrations outside Hanoi Consulates in mainland China. They did so in the context of an anti-Chinese article in the Literary Gazette put out by Tass, on 25 June.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 8-6-92

32

Thursday, June 27, 1968
9:10 a. m.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

MR. PRESIDENT:

The following information is to be read in the light of Thay's raising with Vance the possibility of meeting outside the Hotel Majestic during yesterday's tea break: "He then asked if we had any other suggestion -- looking up to the ceiling and wall and gesturing as though to indicate the room might be bugged."

We received a telephone call this morning indicating the contact had been made with the North Vietnamese delegation. They accepted our proposed meeting place for private talks; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The private meeting will take place at 8 p. m. tonight Paris time, or 10 p. m. tomorrow. They will let us know during the day which time is more acceptable.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-189
By cbm, NARA, Date 5-30-02

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

INFORMATION

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Thursday, June 27, 1968
9:10 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Here is what the Bolivian loan problem looks like at Barrientos' end of the line.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 8-6-92

WWRostow:rln

INFORMATION

35

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 27, 1968
9:00 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Rusk-Klesinger exchange
in Bonn.

W. W. Rostow

Bonn 13837

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 8-6-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

Ly to Fried
35a

1968 JUN 26 22 46

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HCE510

PAGE 01 BONN 13857 262054Z

87
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO PPN/030 W

0 261915Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8892
INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BONN 13857

FOR THE SECRETARY

MADRID FOR MR. LEDDY

EXDIS

SUBJECT: REPORT OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN KIESINGER AND RUSK AT BONN. ALSO PRESENT: BRANDT AND LODGE

1. KIESINGER BEGAN BY EXTENDING THE SECRETARY A HEARTY WELCOME. HE WAS GRATEFUL THAT, ALTHOUGH THE SECRETARY HAD NOT BEEN WELL AND HAD TO MAKE A LONG TRIP FROM ICELAND, HE HAD NONETHELESS COME. HIS VISIT HAD GREAT VALUE BECAUSE IT SHOWED THE GERMAN PEOPLE THEY COULD COUNT ON AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP.

2. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS GLAD TO COME BECAUSE HE WANTED TO BRING BACK TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON KIESINGER'S THINKING.

3. KIESINGER EXPRESSED HIS GRATITUDE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FOR THE MESSAGE WHICH HE HAD SENT CONCERNING BERLIN AND SAID HE WANTED TO THANK THE PRESIDENT ONCE AGAIN. HE DID NOT WANT TO REPEAT HIMSELF, BUT THERE WAS ONE THING HE WANTED TO SAY VERY CLEARLY WHICH WAS THAT THERE WAS NO DESIRE UNDULY TO DRAMATIZE THE BERLIN SITUATION AND THERE WAS AT PRESENT NO SIGN THAT A CRISIS WOULD ARISE. BUT A CRISIS COULD OCCUR SOON IF WE DID NOT JOIN TOGETHER TO RESIST SUCH MEASURES. WE ARE IN A VERY EVIL SITUATION IN WHICH THEIR SIDE TRIES TO ACHIEVE THEIR PURPOSES BY PIECEMEAL PROCESSES WHICH THEY COULD NOT EXPECT TO ACHIEVE ALL AT ONCE.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-54
By *WJ*, NARA, Date 7-13-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 32 ~~DCNN 138373 262254Z~~

4. THE GRAVEST DANGER IS THAT THERE WOULD BE A CRISIS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE GERMAN GOVT AND IN GERMANY'S ALLIES. PEOPLE THEREFORE ASK WHAT WILL BE THE NEXT STEP? IF THERE IS A NEXT STEP, WILL THERE BE ONLY VERBAL PROTESTS?

5. THERE IS A TWO-FOLD ANTI-AMERICANISM IN GERMANY: (A) ON THE EXTREME LEFT ARE THE STUDENTS AND THE ANTI-VIETNAM GROUP. THEY ARE UNIMPORTANT. IT IS NOT AT ALL COMPARABLE TO FRENCH STUDENT UNREST. BUT THEY DO POISON THE SITUATION IN BERLIN AND THEIR CONTINUED UNREST HAS CHANGED THE FACT OF BERLIN. (B) THE OTHER ANTI-AMERICANISM IS RIGHT-WING NEO-NAZI. THEY WERE ABLE TO OBTAIN ALMOST 10 PERCENT OF THE VOTE IN BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG. IT IS A SMALL MINORITY CONTAINING FARMERS, SMALL BUSINESS PEOPLE, AND FOOLISH NATIONALISTS. CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES COULD MAKE THEM DANGEROUS TOO.

6. THERE IS UNREST EVERYWHERE IN THE WORLD AND THE ALLIES MUST STAND TOGETHER. THE CHANCELLOR SAID HE KNEW THAT THE SECRETARY AS AN EXPERIENCED STATESMAN IS UNDER NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT COMMUNISM. WE GERMANS, ON OUR SIDE, FAVOR DETENTE, BUT MOSCOW DOES NOT LIKE THE TURN OF EVENTS WHEREBY GERMANY IS NO LONGER ATTACHED AS SHE USED TO BE IN ROMANIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, EAST GERMANY, YUGOSLAVIA AND HUNGARY. THIS GOVT MUST TRY EVERYTHING TO GIVE PEOPLE FAITH IN THE STRENGTH OF THE WEST. THIS SHOULD NOT BE HARD TO DO. PEOPLE HERE ARE CONTENTED. WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS, THERE IS A HIGH LIVING STANDARD. I CAN GIVE YOU MY WORD THAT WHAT HAPPENED IN FRANCE COULD NOT HAPPEN HERE. WHILE EVERYTHING CAN BE IMPROVED AND SINCERE COMPLAINTS MUST BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY, WE HAVE, BY AND LARGE, 52 MILLION STABLE PEOPLE READY TO CARRY THEIR SHARE OF THE LOAD. IT IS THEREFORE BETTER TO MEET THIS CRISIS AND THE SOONER WE DO IT THE MORE PEOPLE WILL SIDE WITH THE US--WHETHER IN OR OUT OF NATO.

7. SECRETARY RUSK SAID THAT HE COULD UNDERSTAND THE ANTI-AMERICANISM CAUSED BY THE VIETNAM WAR AND OTHER PROBLEMS. BUT THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN WAS THE GROWTH OF ISOLATIONISM IN AMERICA WHICH, HE SAID, HIS SUCCESSOR WILL HAVE AS HIS NO. 1 PROBLEM. HE WILL ALSO HAVE TO FACE A BIG DEBATE ON A SHARP REDUCTION OF FORCES IN EUROPE.

8. HE SAID HE WAS NOT SURPRISED THAT THERE WAS PRESSURE ON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE -23- BONN T3637-262454Z

BERLIN. HE HAD EXPECTED IT. WHEN YOU CONSIDER WHAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS DOING IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND WHAT IS HAPPENING TO VIETNAM, LAOS AND SOUTH KOREA; WHEN YOU KNOW THAT THE SOVIET ATTITUDE IS GETTING MORE AND MORE IDEOLOGICAL WITH MORE OF COLD WAR FLAVOR AND WITH INCREASED OPPOSITION TO BRIDGE-BUILDING; WHEN YOU TAKE NOTE OF SOVIET PROBLEMS WITH PEKING AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, YOU MUST THEN RECOGNIZE THAT IT ALL ADDS UP TO A SOVIET DESIRE TO PUT PRESSURE ON BERLIN.

9. THE HARASSMENT OF ACCESS ROUTES IN BERLIN IS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER. IF IT SHOULD BE ACCELERATED IT WOULD BECOME MORE SO. OUR PRIMARY EFFORT MUST BE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AS WE HAVE NO LEVERAGE ON EAST GERMANY. IT IS NOT EASY TO CHANGE THE SOVIET UNION. THE NEW GROUP IS DIFFERENT FROM KHRUSHCHEV. THE SECRETARY SAID WE WOULD FOLLOW UP HARD AND THAT THE FOUR WESTERN POWERS MUST HAVE SOLIDARITY. IF THE FOUR CAN BE UNITED THEN THERE COULD BE PROGRESS.

10. THEY MUST ALSO HELP THE ECONOMIC LIVELIHOOD OF BERLIN ITSELF. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, BE INSTANTLY INVOLVED IN ANY PHYSICAL VIOLENCE THERE. IT LOOKED LIKE A HARD SUMMER. THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE A LITTLE FRIGHTENED (TO WHICH KIESINGER COMMENTED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE). THE SIGHT OF ROMANIA WALKING OUT OF THE WARSAW PACT, THE EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND EAST GERMANY--THESE THINGS MUST CAUSE CONCERN. BUT WITH FULL CONSULTATION AND A COMMON POINT OF VIEW, OUR SIDE COULD BE CONFIDENT.

11. KIESINGER AGREED THAT KHRUSHCHEV SHOWED HIS HAND MORE THAN THE PRESENT GROUP AND WONDERED WHETHER THE PRESENT GROUP WAS ACTUALLY STRONGER OR WHETHER THEY FELT UNCERTAIN.

12. THE SECRETARY REFERRED TO THE INERTIA OF COMMITTEE OPERATIONS. IT IS HARD TO TAKE A FORWARD STEP. ONCE IT IS TAKEN, IT IS HARD TO TAKE A BACKWARD ONE.

13. KIESINGER SAID HE WOULD MEET DE GAULLE IN SEPTEMBER AND SAW MERIT IN TAKING UP BERLIN WITH HIM BEFORE THAT TIME. KIESINGER QUOTED DE GAULLE AS SAYING "WE ARE MORE FOR GERMAN REUNIFICATION THAN ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT. REUNIFICATION IS VITAL TO THE INTERESTS OF FRANCE." KIESINGER SAID HE HAD HEARD THAT THE FRENCH ATTITUDE AT REYKJAVIK HAD NOT BEEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~PAGE 04 BONN 13837 262054Z~~

"TOO GOOD". HE RECALLED THAT DE GAULLE HAD SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS THE REAL DANGER AND NOT THE SOVIET UNION. WHISKY WAS MORE DANGEROUS THAN VODKA. THE SOVIET THREAT WAS ONLY "MILITARY", WHEREAS THE U.S., BY ITS VERY NATURE, WAS CONSTRAINED TO DOMINATE. KIESINGER SAID HE THOUGHT DE GAULLE DID NOT INTEND TO LEAVE NATO.

14. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT SOLIDARITY AMONG THE FOUR WAS VERY IMPORTANT IF WE WERE TO IMPRESS THE RUSSIANS. IN THE 1961-62 CRISIS WHEN WE SAID "IF YOU DO THIS, IT MEANS WAR.", DE GAULLE HAD STOOD ASIDE. THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT KIESINGER MIGHT FIND IN THE NATO COMMUNIQUE A BASIS FOR SENDING DE GAULLE A MESSAGE.

15. KIESINGER SAID THAT IS A GOOD IDEA, PERHAPS WE CAN DO IT.

16. THE SECRETARY SAID IT WOULD IMPRESS THE RUSSIANS.

17. BRANDT SAID IT SHOULD BE DONE SOON.

18. KIESINGER ASKED WHETHER THE SECRETARY WAS EXPECTING TROUBLE IN KOREA.

19. THE SECRETARY SAID WE WERE WATCHING KOREA. THERE HAD BEEN SOME INCREASED INFILTRATION BY NORTH KOREA, BUT HE SAW NO LARGE INFILTRATION BY KOREA. THE U.S. HAD BEEN VERY PLAIN WITH RUSSIA. IT WOULD NOT TOLERATE THE INVASION OF SOUTH KOREA. THE NEXT TIME IT WOULD NOT BE A LONG WAR WITH 130,000 CASUALTIES, BUT A VERY VIOLENT SHORT WAR. THERE IS UNREST ALL THROUGH SOUTHEAST ASIA.

20. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IN PARIS EVEN WHEN THE TALKS ARE BEHIND THE SCENES, EVERYTHING IS KNOWN TO THE PRESS. PRIVATE TALKS WILL COME BUT NO YET.

21. KIESINGER SAID THE STRONGER YOU ADMONISH THE RUSSIANS, THE MORE SUCCESS WE WILL HAVE. PERHAPS THEY WON'T TAKE BACK THE MEASURES THEY HAVE ALREADY TAKEN BUT OUR WARNING WOULD PREVENT THEM FROM GOING AHEAD.

22. EAST GERMANY, HE SAID, WANTS INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION AS A SOVEREIGN STATE. THEY MUST BE MADE TO FEEL THEY HAVE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 05 BONN 13637 262654Z

HAD A SETBACK.

23. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT GOVERNMENTS LOOK AT THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY DIFFERENTLY FROM THE WAY IN WHICH PUBLIC OPINION LOOKS AT IT. AFTER ALL, WE ARE TALKING TO HANOI AND PEKING AND DO NOT RECOGNIZE EITHER.

24. KIESINGER SAID HE LIKED THE NATO COMMUNIQUE AS REGARDS NON-RECOGNITION.
LODGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~