

INFORMATION

36

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 27, 1968  
7:05 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith some more uneasy noises  
about North Korea.

We continue to watch carefully.

W. W. Rostow



EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

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WWRostow:rln

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 01-189  
By cbm, NARA, Date 5-30-02

ACTION

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Thursday - June 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from President Diaz Ordaz

President Diaz Ordaz sent you the letter at Tab A expressing  
condolence on the death of Senator Kennedy.

You may wish to send a reply along the lines of Tab B.

W. W. Rostow

**Attachments**

Tab A - Letter to the President from Mexican President  
Diaz Ordaz.

Tab B - Suggested Presidential letter in reply.

*Pres file*

President of Mexico

National Palace, June 13, 1968

My dear Mr. President and good friend:

I am writing you just to let you know that I have thought of you often during these last few days, aware of the great concern and sorrow you have been experiencing.

The recent events, which shocked the world, must have been particularly distressing to you and a matter of great anxiety to your country. Believe me, Mr. President, I understand this very well.

I am certain that the people of the United States can weather these difficult times and move forward, drawing upon their traditional values and the democratic practices that have given them strength and vigor as a nation.

I wish you all the required moral courage, as well as personal happiness and good health.

Cordially yours,

[Signed] Gustavo Díaz Ordaz

His Excellency  
Lyndon B. Johnson,  
President of the  
United States of America,  
White House.

tab-

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June 27, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I deeply appreciate your thoughtfulness in writing of your concern over the recent, tragic events which have taken place in this country. Your friendship and reassurance that you share my confidence in the ability of the American people to rise above these difficult times to achieve a better society and a better nation means a great deal to me.

The people of Mexico have also known adversity - and have risen above it to create a modern nation. Both our countries confront difficult problems. But with the support and comprehension of our friends, and the courage which comes from faith in the principles of individual liberty and justice for all the world's people, we shall yet have a better world for our children and grandchildren.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

*15/ Lyndon B. Johnson*

His Excellency  
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz  
President of the United Mexican States  
Mexico, D. F.

LBJ/WGBowler:mm

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Thursday, June 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Military Aid Determination for Tunisia

*Lump*  
*2. Pres file*

The attached determination would permit us to go ahead in FY 1968 with the second slice (\$2.7 million) of our 5-year program for Tunisia. It's a routine determination such as those you've signed in past years for Tunisia--not one of the new Conte-Long determinations. Charlie Zwick's memo (attached) outlines its contents.

You will recall President Bourguiba's understanding of our shortage of funds but his hope that we would help as much as possible. Three years ago, we laid out a \$25 million program over five years designed to do no more than enable the Tunisians to hold off the Algerians for 2-3 days until help could arrive. We had to tell them frankly that they couldn't handle more than that now. After Congressional cuts, we've had to cut even that minimum program in half.

The equipment involved is mainly defensive--anti-aircraft, vehicles, ammo, spares.

We would like to get this out today if you approve in order to get these items on Defense's year-end procurement list.

Attached determination for your signature if you approve. This program has been approved in the Senior Interdepartmental Group and is recommended by Nick Katzenbach with Defense and Budget Bureau concurrence.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

38a

JUN 26 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Determinations Relating to Military Assistance to  
Tunisia, FY 1968

Under Secretary Katzenbach recommends that you sign the attached document to permit military assistance to Tunisia in FY 1968. This document makes essentially three determinations:

- that it is important to U. S. security to provide grant material even though Tunisia has not agreed, as required in the Foreign Assistance Act, to return the material when it is no longer needed,
- that Tunisia would use the material for the defensive strength of the free world, and
- that Tunisia may use the material for its national defense as well as for internal security and civic action purposes.

These determinations are similar to ones you have made in the past for Tunisia.

The Tunisian military assistance program for 1968 totals \$2.7 million and is the second installment of a five year program which will total up to \$26 million. The assistance will help Tunisia to develop a capability to hold off an aggressor until international action could be effected. They are asking other countries to provide assistance also, as we have suggested.

Based on State/AID review, Bill Gaud advises that sanctions under the Conte/Long and Symington amendments are not applicable to Tunisia. An analysis of Tunisia's defense expenditures was provided you in Mr. Gaud's memorandum of May 14 on the \$10 million economic development loan.

I recommend you approve the determinations as requested by the State and Defense Departments.

(signed) Charles J. Zwick  
Charles J. Zwick  
Director

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01

Attachments

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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June 21, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Military Assistance for Tunisia

We propose a small program of up to \$2.7 million for Tunisia in FY 1968 consisting of anti-aircraft artillery, spare parts, vehicles, ammunition, training and other miscellaneous equipment. We recommend that you make certain determinations, including one similar to that approving the FY 1967 program for Tunisia, to allow the current year's program to go forward.

Merits of U. S. Military Grant Program in Tunisia

President Bourguiba and Foreign Minister Bourguiba, Jr., who came on a State Visit to Washington last month, have frequently stressed to us the need for a minimum Tunisian defense capability, i.e., one that would provide for holding off an aggressor for a short time until international action could be brought to bear to stop the aggression. They are particularly concerned with the threat from neighboring Algeria which has received over \$200 million in military assistance from the Soviet Union. We are sympathetic to Tunisia's needs but have also suggested that Tunisia seek to acquire military supplies from other Free World sources as well. In confidential conversations and public statements during his State Visit President Bourguiba expressed appreciation for past U.S. assistance to Tunisia and hope that it would continue.

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Group 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01

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-2-

Our current proposed program of up to \$2.7 million would be a follow-on to the FY 1967 Tunisian program of \$5.2 million. Both are based on a 1965 review by a U.S. Military Survey Team which recommended a five year program of \$26 million composed of training and a small materiel supply, chiefly of air-ground support, air defense and anti-tank equipment. We have not committed ourselves to assist Tunisia over that entire period of time.

The Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) in February had a comprehensive review of policy in North Africa and endorsed this program.

#### Significance of Tunisia for U.S. Interests

The U. S. has broad interests in Tunisia in view of that nation's political orientation, and geographic location. These interests include:

-- Tunisia's moderate and constructive role in African and regional councils.

-- Tunisia's pro-western attitude which has been expressed in strong moral support for our efforts in Viet Nam and in attempts to moderate the viewpoint of other Arab states involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

-- Tunisia's location with respect to the Mediterranean Sea and on NATO's southern flank.

#### Required Determinations

In order to proceed with the grant military assistance program, we need the following Presidential Determinations. We have examined this program for Conte-Long and Symington implications and have concluded that they would not apply.

Currently available intelligence does not indicate that Tunisia has purchased sophisticated weapons systems requiring the withholding of assistance under the Conte-Long Amendment.

~~SECRET~~

With respect to the Symington Amendment Tunisia is not diverting economic assistance to military expenditures or diverting its own resources to unnecessary military outlays in such measure as to materially affect its development.

- Section 614(a) waiver: A 1957 confidential military assistance agreement and a 28 November 1967 agreement meet, in part, the requirements of the Foreign Assistance Act relating to the provision of grant assistance. These agreements do not, however, give us the right (required by Section 505(a) (4)) to require return or approve disposal of equipment, no longer needed. It is not considered practicable at this time to seek Tunisian compliance with this requirement. Section 614(a) of the act permits you to waive this condition if you determine that furnishing this assistance is important to U.S. security.

- Section 505(b) (2) Determination: All but one of the requirements of Section 505(b) were satisfied by Presidential Determination 62-20 dated 22 May 1962, but a determination that Tunisia would utilize the granted defense articles for the defensive strength of the free world (required by Section 505(b) (2) (second part)) has not yet been made. In April 1967 Foreign Minister Bourguiba, Jr. made a formal statement to our Ambassador that "Tunisia is prepared to utilize the arms for the defensive strength of the free world and collective security actions of the United Nations." It is therefore now considered appropriate for you to make the necessary determination. (This determination is only required when a program will exceed \$3 million, and, while the FY 68 program is less than that amount, it may be exceeded in future years.)

- Section 508 Determination: This section restricts military assistance in Africa to internal security and civic action purposes, unless you determine otherwise. We recommend that you exercise your discretionary authority to authorize military grants and sales to Tunisia for national defense purposes. This determination would remain in effect for future years.

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-4-

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you authorize continuation of grant military assistance to Tunisia (up to \$2.7 million in FY 68) and sign the Presidential Determination at Tab A with respect to the provisions of Sections 505(a)(4), 505(b)(2) and 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

The Department of Defense concurs in this memorandum.

  
Under Secretary

~~SECRET~~

38c

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 28, 1968

Presidential Determination  
No. 68-

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Determinations and Authorization  
Permitting Military Assistance  
to the Government of Tunisia

In accordance with the recommendation in your memorandum of June 21, 1968, I hereby:

(1) determine, pursuant to Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (hereafter referred to as "the Act"), that henceforth defense articles and defense services may be furnished to the Government of Tunisia on a grant or sales basis for other than internal security or civic action requirements,

(2) determine, pursuant to Section 505(b)(2) (second requirement) of the Act that defense articles granted to Tunisia will be utilized by that country for the maintenance of the defensive strength of the Free World,

(3) determine, pursuant to Section 614(a) of the Act, that authorization in Fiscal Year 1968 of the use of up to \$2.7 million of funds available for military assistance under the Act for the purpose of providing defense articles to the Government of Tunisia, without regard to the requirements of paragraph (4) of Section 505(a) of the Act is important to the security of the United States, and

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

Group 3

By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01 Downgraded at 12 year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

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-2-

(4) authorize, pursuant to Section 614(a) of the Act, the use of such funds for defense articles without regard to the requirements of paragraph (4) of Section 505(a) of the Act.

You are requested, on my behalf, to give prompt notice of the actions under paragraphs 1, 3 and 4, pursuant to Sections 508 and 634(d) of the Act, to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

*15/ Lyndon B. Johnson*

~~SECRET~~

*The Review Committee*

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~~SECRET RESTRICTED DATA~~

Thursday, June 27, 1968

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: FY 1969 Underground Test Program

The AEC has submitted for your approval the AEC/DoD Underground Nuclear Test Program for FY 1969 (BOWLINE). The Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests has reviewed the program and recommends that you approve the whole test program in principle with the understanding that certain tests be submitted for your specific approval before execution, and the first quarter program for actual execution.

No major or unusual problems have come to the attention of the Review Committee in connection with this proposed FY 1969 program or, more specifically, with the first quarter proposal. Forty-five tests out of a total of 57 are for weapon development. The remaining 12 include 6 tests of peaceful applications of nuclear energy and 6 weapon effects tests sponsored by the Department of Defense.

The size of the proposed program is consistent with the level of our testing in previous years and is fully funded in the AEC and DoD FY 1969 budgets. Our rate of testing continues to be greatly in excess of the Soviet rate. In FY 1967 we tested 33 times as compared with 15 for the Soviets; in FY 1968 we have tested 43 times in contrast with 15 to date for the Soviets.

The BOWLINE program includes one large excavation test (Project SCHOONER) which is scheduled to take place in the second quarter, probably late in November. The Review Committee recommends that this test be approved separately, and the AEC will submit a detailed description and request for approval well in advance of the scheduled date.

The Review Committee also recommends that any large-yield test that might cause domestic problems be submitted for your final approval before execution.

6.1(a)

[Redacted]

You will recall that test was opposed by the Howard Hughes organization. The results of this test appear to prove that their fears were groundless.

~~SECRET RESTRICTED DATA~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-243  
By Sj, NARA, Date 4/30/02

The AEC proposes to conduct certain tests away from the Nevada Test Site. One of these tests is for the purpose of calibrating the Supplemental Test Site on Amchitka Island. The other two or three tests will be experiments in developing peaceful applications of nuclear energy in cooperation with private industry. In view of the special problems that inevitably come up in connection with the conduct of nuclear explosions away from the Nevada test site, the AEC Review Committee recommends that these offsite tests also be submitted for specific Presidential approval well in advance of the scheduled date.

I concur in the recommendation of the Review Committee that you approve this annual program in principle and the specific first quarter authorization subject to the understanding that the above special tests will be submitted for individual approval. If you approve, I will sign the attached memorandum for the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

WWR:CEJ:SK:lw

cc: Mr. Keeny

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman,  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: FY 1969 Underground Test Program

Reference is made to the request contained in your letter to the President of June 11, 1963 on behalf of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense for approval in principle of the Underground Nuclear Testing Program proposed for FY 1969 (BOWLINE) and specific approval of the operations planned for the first quarter (BOWLINE I).

The FY 1969 test program as proposed in your letter is approved in principle with the understanding that specific Presidential approval must be obtained for all nuclear excavation experiments, for all tests to be conducted outside the National Test Site, and for all tests with yields of one megaton or more.

The proposed test program for the first quarter of FY 1969 (BOWLINE I) consisting of 15 AEC weapon development tests, one AEC test for peaceful application, and two DoD weapon effects tests is approved.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:CEJ:SK:lw  
6/27/63

cc: Mr. Keeny

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

*Pres file 40*

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - June 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Education Sector Loan for the Dominican Republic

Under the new commitments procedure, Bill Gaud asks your approval of a \$12 million education sector loan for the Dominican Republic (Tab A). It has been staffed out with BOB and Treasury and has Charlie Zwick and Secretary Fowler's concurrence (Tab B).

This is one of the best loans we have put together for the DR because it gets at a fundamental structural weakness of Dominican society -- an extremely poor educational system, particularly at the secondary school level. The loan is based on a well-conceived plan which integrates construction and equipment with teacher training, curriculum change and administrative improvements, including reorganization of the Education Ministry. More than half of the money will go for development of comprehensive high schools.

The loan calls for a substantial self-help effort, mostly in the form of increased revenue for better teacher pay. There is certain risk in the Dominicans not being able to carry out a program of the magnitude contemplated. But this is one case where we need to mix money with faith.

No Symington or Conte-Long problems arise with this loan.

I recommend approval.

W. W. Rostow

Approve

Disapprove

Call me

Attachments - Tabs A and B.

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989  
By lg, NARA, Date 8-6-92

2047  
40a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

JUN 18 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Loan to the Government of the Dominican Republic  
for the Education Sector

I recommend that you approve the authorization of a loan to the Government of the Dominican Republic in an amount not to exceed \$12,000,000 for educational development purposes, a loan which Ambassador Crimmins describes as "the most significant single development effort we have ever proposed here".

Purpose of the Loan.

The purpose of the loan is to accelerate the basic reform of the Dominican educational system, providing the Balaguer administration with what may become its leading accomplishment in popular reform. Ambassador Crimmins has noted that "one need not labor in Dominican Republic very long to appreciate the pervasive crippling effect on the country of its wholly inadequate educational structure. It is a very rare problem we confront that does not have its roots in ignorance or ineptness", including the "problems of political underdevelopment which have plagued the Dominican Republic throughout its history". He is confident that the objectives and programs of the loan are realistic and manageable, and adds that their realization is a sine qua non of Dominican modernization. He believes that the proposal "can result, in a surprisingly short period of time, in an educational revolution in the Dominican Republic".

Main Elements of the Loan.

- A. Secondary education is the point of greatest leverage for reforming Dominican education at all levels. Without good high schools, there can be neither qualified entrants to the universities nor decent teachers for the elementary schools. The loan will shift the entire philosophy and practice of secondary education to a system of comprehensive high schools. In addition to academic disciplines, career skills and trades will be taught so that those students who do not proceed to a university may graduate from high school trained for a job. The existing pilot projects have proved that the comprehensive high school is so responsive to the needs of the Dominican situation that a great percentage of the young Dominicans who now quit

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01

school may be expected to complete their high school education. These pilot projects have also shown the comprehensive high school to be a more powerful instrument of social mobility than any other Dominican institution.

- B. The loan will also address the reform of elementary education in order that more and better-prepared students will reach the high schools. Elementary feeder schools will be built within the orbit of the comprehensive high schools, and curricula and promotion systems will be revised to allow more pupils to advance to each successive grade.
- C. Provision is also made for upgrading higher education, as the quality of the universities necessarily affects the calibre of the Dominican leaders they produce.
- D. A major effort will be devoted to the problem of quality and number of Dominican teachers at each educational level. Education courses will be offered in the comprehensive high schools to supply teachers for the elementary level. An education faculty will be set up in one of the universities to train teachers for the high schools. In-service training and summer courses will be introduced for teachers at all levels.
- E. For Dominicans past school age, training will be offered to (1) the civilian work force, (2) the armed forces, and (3) other government employees.
- F. To ensure that these reforms will continue, the loan will finance an administrative reorganization of the Secretariat of Education.
- G. Technical assistance to these programs will be provided both by A.I.D. staff and through contracts with U.S. universities. Promising educational leaders and teachers will be sent to the United States for training. The loan will finance construction of educational facilities including libraries, and it will make available textbooks and teaching materials.

Experience to date.

The work of the A.I.D. Mission for the past two and a half years has given a basis for the Mission's confidence that the objectives and programs are realistic. A significant portion of the technical assistance to be funded under the loan is already being provided on a grant basis. School construction programs exceeding \$1 million in size have been implemented by the Mission in 1966 and 1967 using pesos generated by previous loans.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Furthermore the changes which have already been made in Dominican education have the support of both the government and local community groups. Pilot projects introducing fundamental reforms in secondary education have received enthusiastic support from teachers, parents, community members, and from the students themselves. Regional development associations have urged the Secretariat of Education to permit them to adopt the plan for their regions. A program conducted by Peace Corps Volunteers for rural primary teachers has attracted 700 primary teachers to summer courses and weekly seminars during the school year.

Breakdown of project costs, including Dominican contribution.

The \$12,000,000 loan will finance only a portion of the total education reform program, namely technical assistance, participant training, construction, and the purchase of teaching materials and equipment. The Dominican Government will provide during the years 1968, 1969 and 1970, approximately \$15 million of new funds to the Secretariat of Education over and above the 1967 budget level. These new Dominican Government resources will finance the increased teachers salaries to be established as a condition of the loan. They will also finance improved maintenance services, increased allocations to semi-autonomous schools at the secondary level, and the purchase of materials, supplies and equipment.

Local currency financing.

About \$4,000,000 of this loan will be for local currency costs. This is needed to avoid unrealistic demands on the Dominican budget and to promote full governmental acceptance of this basic educational reform. Assuming an even disbursement over three years, \$1.3 million of balance of payments support would be provided per year. This level will not affect our balance of payments strategy. Disbursements for local costs will be by Special Letters of Credit used only to finance U.S. goods and services. A condition precedent to the signing of the loan will be the adoption of an agreed list of eligible commodities, with appropriate incentives for use of the Special Letters of Credit. It is likely that this procedure will provide substantial additionality to U.S. exports.

Interest and terms of repayment.

The Dominican Government will repay the loan to A.I.D. in United States dollars within forty years including a grace period of ten years. The interest rate will be 2% during the grace period and 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ % thereafter.

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Conte-Long Amendment.

The Dominican Republic has not purchased sophisticated weapons systems requiring the withholding of assistance under section 119 (Conte-Long Amendment) of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1968.


Symington Amendment.

State/A.I.D. in consultation with the interagency advisory committee concerned with the implementation of Section 620(s) (the Symington Amendment), of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, has determined (a) that the Dominican Republic's resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development, and (b) that neither U.S. development assistance nor PL-480 sales are diverted by the Dominican Republic to military purposes. Among the principal factors in this determination are the following:

1. Defense expenditures as a percent of GNP for 1966-67 were 3.2%, slightly above the median for the region, and the trend of this defense share has been downward, from 3.9% in 1965 to 2.9% in 1967;
2. Defense expenditures as a percent of central government expenditures for 1966-67 were 16.0%, above the regional median of 10.2%, but the trend has been downward, from 18.0% in 1965 to 15.0% in 1967;
3. No foreign exchange has been spent for defense since before 1963;
4. The Country Team has reported that there is no evidence of U.S. development assistance (or PL-480 sales) being diverted to military expenditures.

Note.

Ambassador Crimmins originally proposed a loan totaling \$17,642,000. However, we have concluded that the level should be reduced for the following reasons: (1) While the program is soundly conceived and planned from a technical standpoint, we were concerned that the Dominicans might not be capable administratively of implementing such a large program. (2) Although the basic reform objectives justify the acceptance of risks, the original proposal might have placed too heavy a burden on the Dominican budget. (3) Finally, we have reduced the local currency element of the loan from \$6,450,000 to about \$4,000,000. The \$12,000,000 level will launch significant reforms. If the program proceeds satisfactorily, we will in future recommend an increase to the loan.

  
William S. Gaud

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JUN 22 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: \$12 million Education Sector Loan for the Dominican Republic

Bill Gaud requests your approval to authorize a \$12 million Education Sector Loan for the Dominican Republic.

This loan will assist the Dominican Government to carry out a fundamental reform of its educational system. The reform program supported by this loan will seek to

- triple the number of high school graduates, and double the number of college graduates by 1972
- improve the quality of education at all levels
- develop the types of skills required for the nation's political and economic development.

The loan is based on a well-conceived plan which integrates construction and equipment of schools with teacher training, curriculum revision, and administrative improvements. The major portion of the loan (\$6.6 million) will support the development of comprehensive high schools.

The administrative and financial ability of the Dominican Government to carry out a program of this magnitude and complexity is uncertain. However, Gaud and Covey Oliver believe the importance of the objectives justify the risks. Gaud notes that the loan was reduced \$5 million below the original request to make the program more consistent with Dominican capabilities. The problem of administrative capability is somewhat offset by the provision of \$3 million for technical assistance and training. Moreover, President Balaguer must agree to increase budget allocations for education by \$15 million over the next three years, mostly for teacher salary increases, before the loan will be signed. Disbursements will be conditioned upon satisfactory performance on specific self-help actions.

The loan will provide about \$1.3 million of balance of payments support to the Dominican Republic in each of the next three years. This small amount is consistent with the strategy you approved in January, when you

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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authorized negotiation of the \$30 million Supporting Assistance/P. L. 480 package, to provide only a minimal level of balance of payments support needed to avoid a crisis.

Balance of Payments - Secretary Fowler agrees that the new procedures to be followed in connection with this loan will minimize its impact on the balance of payments. *x-12 H.R.*

Military Expenditures - Gaud reports that State/AID has determined that sanctions under the Conte-Long and Symington Amendments are not applicable to the Dominican Republic.

Recommendation - I recommend approval of Gaud's request to authorize this loan.

*Charles J. Zwick*  
Charles J. Zwick  
Director

Attachment

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

41

Thursday - June 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Nicaragua: Rural Electrification Loan

*Pres file*

Herewith a request from Bill Gaud that you authorize a \$10.2 million loan to Nicaragua to finance three rural electric cooperatives. It has the full endorsement of Covey Oliver and Charlie Zwick, and Secretary Fowler's approval on the balance of payments aspects.

The projects to be financed are part of Nicaragua's comprehensive plan to modernize and diversify agriculture. It is a sound project and is fully in line with the Punta del Este priorities.

There are no Symington or Conte-Long problems with Nicaragua.

I recommend you approve this loan.

W. W. Rostow

Approve

Disapprove

Call me

**Attachments**

Gaud request for approval to authorize loan (June 19 memo to President), and Zwick recommendation (June 22 to President) for approval.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JUN 22 1968

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Nicaragua Rural Electrification Loan

Bill Gaud requests your approval to authorize a \$10.2 million loan to ENALUF, a Nicaraguan public utility company, to assist in financing the organization and construction of three rural electric cooperatives.

This loan will assist Nicaraguan co-ops to bring electricity to 20 percent of the rural population by 1980. The development of these cooperatives will have a significant grass-roots impact. In addition to residential use, the project will provide low cost power for increasing industrial and agricultural production.

The Government of Nicaragua assigns high priority to this project as an integral part of their comprehensive plan to modernize and diversify the agricultural sector. Other elements of the plan include regional grain storage centers, agricultural credit, land titling, and rural health facilities.

This project is the result of the successful pilot rural electric cooperative financed by an AID loan in 1964. The loan provides for the necessary technical assistance and requires that satisfactory rate schedules be established to insure adequate revenues to operate and maintain the project. The Government of Nicaragua will finance the entire local costs of the project estimated at \$5.7 million.

Balance of Payments. Funds provided under this loan will be used for purchase of goods and services in the United States. Secretary Fowler agrees that tying procedures under this loan will minimize its impact on the U. S. balance of payments. X (L) (K) (I)

Symington and Conte-Long Amendments. Gaud advises that no action under these amendments is necessary with regard to Nicaragua.

Recommendation. I recommend that you approve Gaud's request to authorize this loan.

*Charles J. Zwick*

Charles J. Zwick  
Director

Attachment

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2046

41b

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON

JUN 19 1968

OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Loan for Rural Electric Cooperatives in Nicaragua

On the recommendation of Ambassador Crockett and Deputy U.S. Coordinator Fowler, I am requesting your approval to authorize a loan of \$10.2 million to the National Light and Power Company of Nicaragua (ENALUF), a public electric utility company owned entirely by the Government of Nicaragua (GON), to assist in financing the organization of three rural electric cooperatives and the construction of transmission and distribution facilities for these cooperatives. \$9.771 million of this loan will be for U.S. materials and equipment. The remainder will be for U.S. technical and engineering services and U.S. training.

Nicaragua is basically an agricultural country. Approximately 60 percent of its population is rural and 30 percent of its gross domestic product was directly attributable to agriculture.

The Government of Nicaragua, with the support of the U.S. Government, has embarked on an ambitious and imaginative agricultural expansion and diversification program. The program has a two fold objective: (a) to diversify and increase the efficiency of the modern commercial farm sector; and (b) to increase the productivity and better the life of the traditional farmers composing the great bulk of the rural population. Thus stress is being placed on giving titles to landless "campesinos", expanding rural credit, constructing grain drying and storage facilities, constructing farm to market roads, extending health facilities to rural areas, modifying and expanding the educational system to more adequately meet agricultural needs, and, through this project, on bringing electricity to rural Nicaragua.

The three private cooperatives to be financed should reach approximately 263,000 rural inhabitants by their tenth year of operation or 20 percent of the projected 4,000 sq. miles or 17 percent of the Pacific and Central areas of the country (these areas have 95 percent of the total population). In addition to residential use of electricity, the project should annually provide approximately 21.7 million KWH of power to some 470 industries and small commercial establishments (primarily agricultural processing and farm product distribution) and by the tenth year approximately 33.1 million KWH of energy to some 213 farmers for irrigation. Besides providing inexpensive electricity, the cooperatives should serve as centers of other activities and development programs and help to stimulate grass-roots democratic actions of its members.

The proposed project is a result of the successful experience of the pilot rural electric cooperative financed by an A.I.D. loan signed by you in May, 1964. The project was developed on the basis of a detailed feasibility study prepared by ENALUF with the assistance of the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (N.R.E.C.A.) and will institutionalize the rural electric cooperative efforts in Nicaragua.

The Government of Nicaragua has assigned highest priority to this project; it will contribute all local costs of the project, estimated at \$5,740,000 or 36 per cent of the total cost of the project; the GON will also guarantee the A.I.D. loan.

We are taking special care to assure that ENALUF will have the managerial, technical, and financial capability to successfully implement the project. The A.I.D. loan includes \$220,000 for technical assistance to develop the borrower's institutional capabilities in rural electrification and to specifically develop the three cooperatives. In addition \$40,000 will be provided for short-term training of ENALUF and cooperative personnel in rural electrification in the U.S., and \$165,000 for engineering assistance from U.S. firms experienced in this field.

This project is one portion of an A.I.D. assistance package of three loans for this fiscal year, consisting of: a Basic Crop Production loan - \$9.4 million; a Health Center - Rural Mobile Health loan - \$2.2 million; and the Rural Electric Cooperatives loan - \$10.2 million. This level of \$21.8 million is higher than A.I.D. loans authorized in previous years (FY 1965 - \$14.2 million, FY 1966 - \$14.3 million, FY 1967 - \$9.2 million). This increased level is partly the result of some accidental lumping in one year of projects long in the discussion and planning stage and we anticipate little or no lending in fiscal year 1969. However, we believe that this level of assistance is primarily justified as reward and encouragement to a country which is meeting Alliance for Progress performance standards. As outlined above, Nicaragua has undertaken a concerted agricultural development effort as well as a series of major self-help measures including:

- (a) the reduction of unnecessary administrative expenses in government (30 percent reduction in 1968 from the 1967 budget);
- (b) At the same time a redoubling of efforts to increase tax collections (direct tax collections for the first four months of 1968 increased over the same period in 1967 by 17%).
- (c) A constructive positive attitude towards Central American integration;

(d) the adoption of coordinated fiscal and monetary policies designed to halt the drain on international reserves.

These three loans will directly finance increased U.S. exports to Nicaragua of \$20.83 million with local currency financing only amounting to \$975,000. In this respect, U.S. exports to Nicaragua increased from \$37.7 million in 1960 to \$83.1 million in 1966 while in the same period exports to the U.S. only increased from \$28.1 million to \$32.2 million.

Symington Amendment: State/A.I.D. in connection with the Inter-Agency Advisory Committee concerned with the implementation of Section 620 (s) (the Symington Amendment) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, has determined (a) that Nicaragua's resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to a degree that materially interferes with its development; (b) that neither U.S. development assistance nor P.L. 480 sales are diverted by Nicaragua to military purposes.

Among the principal factors in this determination are the following:

1. Defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP for 1964-67 were 1.56%, and the trend of this defense share has increased very slightly from 1.5% in 1964 to 1.7% in 1967.
2. Defense expenditures as a percentage of Central Government expenditures for 1966 were 10.4% and 10.1% in 1967.
3. Most of Nicaragua's military expenditures are for salaries and current costs, with a relatively small foreign exchange expenditure for equipment.
4. The Country Team has reported that there is no evidence of any U.S. development assistance (or P.L. 480 sales) being diverted to military expenditures.

Conte-Long Amendment: Currently available intelligence does not indicate that Nicaragua has purchased sophisticated weapons systems requiring the withholding of assistance under Section 119 (Conte-Long Amendment) of the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act, 1968.

Recommendation: That you approve the authorization of a \$10.2 million loan for the organization and construction of three rural electric cooperatives in Nicaragua.

*William S. Gaud*

William S. Gaud

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Thursday - June 27, 1968

SUBJECT: Guest Lists for Trip to Hemisfair and Barrientos Luncheon

Protocol advises that 41 Ambassadors, Charges and OAS officials have accepted your offer of transportation to Hemisfair. With the wives the total is about 71 persons.

*free file*

I would like your views on whom you want to invite from State. This involves selecting the people who should be with you for the Barrientos luncheon, which I have marked with an asterisk. State recommends:

- Assistant Secretary Oliver\* Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_.
- Ambassador Linowitz Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_.
- Ambassador Duke\* Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_.
- Deputy Chief of Protocol Sancho-Bonet Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_.
- George Abel (Protocol) Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_.
- David Waters (Protocol) Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_.

In view of your desire to keep the party as small as possible, you probably are not contemplating taking Congressional members. Congressman Gonzalez took the Texas Congressional delegation to Hemisfair last week, so that group is covered. The only request of which we are aware is from Chairman Morgan. Do you wish to take him?

Yes \_\_\_ No \_\_\_.

On the Barrientos lunch, he is bringing a party of six: the Foreign and Finance Ministers, Ambassador Sanjines, two high-level military

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White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1963  
By 18, NARA, Date 8-6-92

officers and an aide-de-camp. On our side, you may consider inviting:

Assistant Secretary Oliver	Yes	_____	No	_____.
Ambassador Douglas Henderson	Yes	_____	No	_____.
Ambassador Ed Clark	Yes	_____	No	_____.
Ambassador Duke	Yes	_____	No	_____.

W. W. Rostow

WGB:mm

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

*Pres file*

Thursday - June 27, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith a memorandum from Covey Oliver giving the itinerary he proposes to follow in his trip to Latin America with Ed Clark. He asks authorization to use one of your special aircraft.

W. W. Rostow

Aircraft authorized \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_.

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 8-6-92

43a

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

June 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO MR. BOWDLER, THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Ambassador Clark's Familiarization Trip to Latin America

Bill:

In accordance with the President's wishes, Ambassador Clark and I have agreed on a tentative itinerary for a visit to the east coast countries of South America from July 8 to July 22.

We both hope that this visit can be aimed at the "inner frontiers" in order to give the Ambassador a good look at development programs and possibilities in that area. We will, of course, have protocolary duties but we hope to keep them to the minimum.

Assuming that the President decides to go to Central America next month, we would start our trip south on July 8 at the end of the Presidential visit. Our tentative itinerary is as follows:

- July 8 To Ciudad Bolivar, Venezuela.
- July 9 Visit dams and development projects in the Ciudad Bolivar-Puerto Ordaz region.
- July 10 To Manaus, Brazil.

GROUP 3  
Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By JC, NARA, Date 7-3-01

- July 11 To Recife, Brazil.
- July 12-13 Visits in the Recife region.
- July 14 Brasilia, Brazil for courtesy calls on the President and Foreign Minister.
- July 15 To Sao Paulo.
- July 16 View industrial development programs in Sao Paulo and Campinas.
- July 17-18 To Porto Alegre, Brazil.
- July 19 To Montevideo, Uruguay.
- July 20 View development programs and call on Uruguayan officials.
- July 21 Rosario, Argentina for a brief look at multilateral Plate River plans.
- July 22 Return to Washington.

In addition to Ambassador Clark and myself, we would be accompanied by Ray Sternfeld, our Alternate Executive Director on the IDB; Hoyt Ware, my Public Affairs advisor; and four newspaper men. Space permitting, I may also want to take one of my staff officers. This would be a total party of eight or nine, depending on the size of the aircraft.

I would appreciate your letting me know if these general plans are agreeable to the President and if he is willing to authorize the use of one of his aircraft for this trip. If this plan is acceptable, we will immediately go forward here and in the field with the final arrangements.

C.T.O.  
Covey T. Oliver

(D)

44

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

You will wish to know that after today's meeting, a representative from the North Vietnam delegation approached a junior member of our delegation and asked if Cy Vance were willing to meet their man LAU at some mutually agreed place for discussion tomorrow of the proposition we put to them today.

He said that if that was <sup>an</sup> impossible situation and informal contact would have to wait until the next formal meeting on Wednesday.

Katzenbach and Vance are inclined to proceed.

We believe that Vance's <sup>standing</sup> instructions are sufficient to handle this contact.

Walt Rostow:pob  
telephone  
6-26-68  
7:10p

INFORMATION

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*Free file*

Wednesday, June 26, 1968  
6:15 p. m.

Mr. President:


This Inter-American Bank  
sponsored study of an Inter-American  
telecommunications network is quite  
exciting.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

# PROPOSED INTER-AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK 1973 - 78

45a





# INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK <sup>45b</sup>

808 17th. ST. N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20577 TELEPHONE, EX 3-4171

NEWS RELEASE

June 19, 1968  
NR-25/68

FOR RELEASE IN A.M. NEWSPAPERS  
THURSDAY, JUNE 20, 1968

## CONSULTATIVE GROUP REVIEWS FEASIBILITY STUDY OF INTER-AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

The Inter-American Bank today announced that a consultative group of the Inter-American Telecommunications Commission (CITEL) has completed a review of a feasibility study of the general requirements to build an Inter-American Telecommunications Network.

The study will be presented to CITEL for final action at a meeting in Rio de Janeiro next July 29. CITEL is a specialized committee of the Organization of American States in which all the telecommunications agencies of Latin America are represented. It was created in 1963 with the aim of expanding intraregional communications in Latin America.

The study, undertaken jointly in April 1967 by the Bank and CITEL, with the cooperation of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), recommends the creation of a regional network consisting of microwave systems, submarine cables and satellite communications. The ITU is the United Nations body which establishes design and specification standards for telecommunications systems throughout the world.

The proposed network would interconnect internationally the domestic telecommunications systems of the Latin American countries and would also link them to the rest of the world.

The network would consist of telephone, telex, telegraph and leased line services, as well as high quality television and radio broadcasting channels.

According to the feasibility study, the attainment of an operational network by 1973 would involve outlays totaling some \$300 million--about \$250 million for terrestrial facilities and \$50 million for satellite communications. These figures include some investments already made or projected by certain Latin American countries within their telecommunications development plans.

The network basically would consist of a 960-channel system of two types of facilities--terrestrial segments of national networks that could be adapted to carry international traffic, and space segments consisting of earth satellite stations, which would be devoted solely to international traffic.

The study notes that much of the network's projected cost involves improvements in national networks which are devoted primarily to handling domestic trunk calls. In effect, it says, of the \$250 million estimated cost of the terrestrial segments, \$210 million represents expenditure requirements in the national systems. The remaining \$40 million is the estimated cost of interconnecting the national segments.

"From this view point," the study adds, "it can readily be seen that the formation of the terrestrial segments of the ITN depends to a great extent upon the development of the national networks, and particularly the backbone routes, of the participating countries. It will be important to bear in mind that unless these national facilities are properly designed

according to appropriate transmission and operating criteria they may not be suitable for the international service."

In regard to space segments, the report says that six of the eight satellite ground stations contemplated in the ITN configuration are now under construction or testing. They are located in Mexico, Panama, Peru, Chile, Argentina and Brazil. In addition, a projected ground station in Colombia is now in the design stage, and a proposal for one in Venezuela is under discussion.

The study adds that in order to cope with a projected 100 per cent increase in international traffic in Latin America between 1973 and 1978, an additional \$343 million would have to be invested, of which sum \$285 million would be devoted to terrestrial systems and \$58 million to space communications facilities.

According to the study's cost and revenue projections for 1973-78, the ITN would be "not only economically feasible but also profitable." It notes that with the installation of the new, more efficient communications systems which the network would require, considerable rate reductions over present levels would be possible.

It adds that implementation of the ITN will entail the negotiation of new rate agreements among the participating countries and recommends that they follow a rate policy consonant with its efficient operation and financial soundness.

In addition, detailed agreements will have to be worked out by the countries to regulate operating procedures, traffic routing, third country transit, maintenance procedures and other factors essential to the efficient operation of the network.

The proposed network would make a significant contribution to Latin America's integration, which is one of the primary goals laid down by the Presidents of America at their meeting in Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 14, 1967, in which they called for the progressive creation of a Latin American Common Market between 1970 and 1985.

The study says that a project which the Bank will initiate later this year involving the preparation of detailed technical-economic feasibility studies for interconnecting a number of national telecommunications networks represents an essential step in bringing the system into reality.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which will participate in this project and has named the Bank as its Executing Agency in association with the ITU for this purpose, will contribute \$955,400 to its financing. The Bank has agreed to provide \$250,000 and the member countries \$475,000.

The general terms under which this project will be carried out were also discussed last week by representatives of CITELE, the ITU and the Bank, and the pertinent report is expected to be submitted to the member countries in the near future for approval.

Felipe Herrera, President of the Bank, said the ITN study "will enable the Bank to intensify its cooperation with its member countries, particularly through the agencies which compose CITELE, in preparing and financing telecommunications projects adapted to each country's internal requirements and to those of the proposed network within its efforts to promote Latin America's economic integration."

Oscar Dietrich, President of CITELE and of Argentina's National Telecommunications Agency, said the study "indicates that the ITN project is at

the threshold of becoming a reality, and leaves no doubt that the idea of uniting the Latin American countries through a telecommunications network will not only foster their economic growth individually but also in a regional context."

Mr. Dietrich headed a group of representatives of CITELE who participated with Bank and ITU officials last week in Washington in the final evaluation of the general feasibility study and in discussions concerning the future preinvestment project.

*Pres file*  
47

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 26, 1968  
5:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I communicated your guidance to Clark Clifford. He has been working with Abrams on the Khe Sanh announcement. This is the result -- considerably shortened, as you can see.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~-attachment

(log 2048)

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 8-6-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1958

By rg, NARA, Date 8-20-92

2048

47a

June 26, 1968

from Defense

by sent George Christian

Clark asked me to send you the text we have agreed upon for Khe Sanh.

This is as sent to us by Abe, after the various messages and telephone calls. There is still no time set for the announcement, which is in their hands. FYI, the Baltimore Sun story has brought about many queries from newspapers who obviously have been alerted by their Saigon correspondents. West Gallagher of AP in New York may very well run the Sun story, although I spent 30 minutes trying to talk him out of it.

So may others very shortly. Text follows:

" MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS

" SUBJECT: INACTIVATION OF THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE

" The Khe Sanh Combat Base in western Quang Tri province has been inactivated, effective \_\_\_\_\_, for the following reasons:

"There have been two significant changes in the military situation in Vietnam since early this year -- an increase in friendly strength, mobility, and fire power, and an increase in the enemy threat due to both a greater flow of replacements and a change in his tactics.

"In I Corps tactical zone, there has also been a net increase in the enemy's strength. In January, the enemy had at least the equivalent of six divisions, today he has at least the equivalent of eight. This gives him the capability of mounting several sizeable attacks concurrently.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

"To meet this significantly increased threat, friendly forces must make maximum advantage of their superior firepower and mobility. Mobile forces, tied to no specific terrain, must be used to the utmost to attack, intercept, reinforce or take whatever action is most appropriate to meet the enemy threats.

"Therefore, we have decided to continue the mobile posture we adopted in western Quang Tri province with operation Pegasus in April. This decision makes the operation of the base at Khe Sanh unnecessary.

"For security reasons we cannot divulge the details of precisely how we are deploying our forces or how we will utilize the additional maneuverability we will gain by inactivation of the base."

Phil G. Goulding

~~TOP SECRET~~

48

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN

Wednesday, June 26, 1968  
5:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read Bunker's account herewith of his briefing of Thieu, Ky, and the new Foreign Minister on the Paris negotiations:

- It was good for Bunker to bring Thieu and Ky together on this occasion;
- The great anxiety about the bombing of Saigon comes through again;
- The "our side, your side" formula is reluctantly accepted.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 31058

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By je, NARA, Date 7-3-01



Department of State

48a-5  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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1968 JUN 26 AM 9 20

OO RUEHC RUFNCR  
DE RUMJIR 31058/1 1781220  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 261200Z JUN 68 ZFF-6  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5528  
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1363  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 31058

NODIS/HARVAN

*Rostow*

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

SUBJECT: CONSULTATION WITH GVN ON NEGOTIATIONS:  
SIXTH MEETING

REF: A) STATE 189011; B) STATE 188995;  
C) STATE 189510

1. WE MET JUNE 25 WITH THE USUAL ATTENDANCE EXCEPT THAT DO WAS REPLACED BY THANH. KY WAS TWENTY MINUTES LATE. I BEGAN BY REVIEWING BRIEFLY WHERE MATTERS NOW STAND IN THE PARIS CONVERSATIONS EMPHASIZING AS INSTRUCTED IN REFTEL A THAT IT IS NORTH VIETNAM'S CONTINUED REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF RESTRAINT OR RECIPROCITY AND THEIR INCREASED INFILTRATION AND ATTACKS THAT ARE PREVENTING ANY PROGRESS.

2. THIEU IN HIS REMARKS STATED WE MUST CONTINUE TO INSIST ON RECIPROCITY FOR A TOTAL HALT TO THE BOMBING IN THE NORTH. HE THEN BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF HOW LONG WE WOULD CONTINUE OUR PARTIAL BOMBING HALT WITH NO RECIPROCAL GESTURE FROM HANOI AND IN FACT ENEMY ESCALATION AND HEAVY ATTACKS OR THREATS OF ATTACKS ON SAIGON. THIEU WAS OBVIOUSLY MORE CONCERNED WITH THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT THIS SITUATION IS HAVING ON THE VIETNAMESE THAN WITH ITS MILITARY COST. HE STATED: "NINETY DAYS WE HAVE BEEN PATIENT AND SHOWN OUR GOOD WILL. THEIR SHELLING HAS AFFECTED OUR PEOPLE'S MORALE. THE PEOPLE THINK WE ARE IN A WEAK POSITION AND THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT DARE TO REACT. THEY DON'T KNOW ABOUT CASUALTIES THE V.C. ARE SUFFERING BUT THEY DO KNOW THEIR HOMES ARE BEING DESTROYED. THE V.C. HAVE EXPLOITED THIS TO CLAIM THAT THEY ARE IN A STRONG POSITION AND WE ARE WEAK. IN TIME THE PEOPLE MAY COME TO BELIEVE THEM."

DECLASSIFIED

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Authority RAC 18501

By Jelico NARA, Date 7-3-01

~~SECRET~~

-2- SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 31058, JUNE 26 (NODIS/HARVAN)

3. IN REPLY TO MY REQUEST FOR THEIR THOUGHTS ON WHY THERE HAS BEEN A REDUCTION OF VC/NVA SHELLING OF SAIGON SINCE GOVERNOR HARRIMAN'S JUNE 12 STATEMENT, THIEU THOUGHT THIS HAD BEEN CAUSED MAINLY BY THE DEFENSIVE MEASURES WE HAD TAKEN. HE ALSO ASSERTED THAT SECRETARY RUSK'S RECENT NEWS CONFERENCE REMARKS IN WHICH HE HAD COMPARED THE SHELLING OF SAIGON TO THE BOMBING IN THE NORTH MAY CAUSE SOME PEOPLE TO BELIEVE THAT A CESSATION OF ATTACKS HERE WOULD CAUSE US TO STOP OUR BOMBING. I ASSURED HIM THIS WAS NOT THE SECRETARY'S INTENTION AND THAT THIS WAS PLAIN FROM THE TEXT OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE WHERE HAD SPOKEN TO THE QUESTION OF SEVERAL ACTIONS HANOI MIGHT TAKE TO CAUSE US TO STOP OUR BOMBING OF ITS TERRITORY.

4. THIEU THEN PREDICTED THAT AFTER A BRIEF RESPITE THE COMMUNISTS WOULD LAUNCH ANOTHER MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN LATE JULY OR EARLY AUGUST. HE THOUGHT THE MAJOR ATTACKS WOULD BE MOUNTED AGAINST SAIGON, THE DMZ, HUE, DANANG AND II CORPS. HE DID NOT THINK THERE WOULD BE ANY CHANGE IN HANOI'S PARIS POSITION UNTIL AFTER THE OFFENSIVE, ALTHOUGH HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE MIGHT BE A SURPRISE MOVE BY THE OTHER SIDE. HE ADDED THAT THE ATTACKS MIGHT ALSO BE KEYED TO THE AMERICAN NATIONAL POLITICAL CONVENTIONS.

5. I THEN MADE THE PRESENTATION ON AN ICC INITIATIVE IN THE DMZ AS INSTRUCTED IN REFTELS A AND C. THIEU ASKED IF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE AWARE THAT WE WANTED TO RESTORE THE DMZ. I REPLIED THAT THEY WERE. HE THEN ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY HOPE THAT HANOI MIGHT AGREE TO RESPECT THE LAOS ACCORDS. I STATED THAT WE WERE NOT OPTIMISTIC IN THAT REGARD, AND LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT WE DID NOT REALISTICALLY EXPECT DRV COMPLIANCE WITH THEM TO BE PART OF A REQUIREMENT FOR TOTAL CESSATION OF BOMBING.

6. THIEU THEN RETURNED TO THE QUESTION OF HOW LONG WE WOULD CONTINUE THE PARTIAL BOMBING HALT. "IF THE V.C. CONTINUE TO DO THE SAME THING FOR ANOTHER MONTH DO WE CONTINUE AS WE ARE DOING?" I REPLIED THAT IF AS HE PREDICTS THEY LAUNCH ANOTHER OFFENSIVE AND ARE BEATEN THEY MAY THEN CHANGE THEIR NEGOTIATING POSTURE. KY THEN INTERJECTED: "THEY HAVE NO CHOICE. THEY MUST LAUNCH THEIR ATTACKS SOON. THE DECISIVE BATTLE WILL BE HERE AT SAIGON AND IN I CORPS, WITH A SUPPORTING FIGHT IN II CORPS. IN SAIGON IT WILL BE A POLITICAL-MILITARY STRUGGLE AND IN I CORPS A SIMPLE MILITARY ONE. WHAT CAN WE DO IN THE MEANTIME; WE CANNOT REST ON OUR PROPAGANDA SUCCESS IN PARIS. HERE WE MUST PREPARE FOR THE NEXT ATTACKS. THEY ARE SENDING TROOPS INTO THIS AREA. TWO BATTALIONS OF THE FAMOUS NVA 304TH DIVISION WHICH FOUGHT AT DIEN BIEN PHU HAVENOW APPEARED NEAR SAIGON. OUR POSITION WILL BE MUCH

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 31058, JUNE 26 (NODIS/HARVAN)

STRONGER AFTER TWO MONTHS WHEN WE WILL HAVE DEFEATED THESE ATTACKS AND THEY WILL HAVE CONTINUED TO SUFFER PROPAGANDA SETBACKS AT PARIS. WE ARE GAINING THE ADVANTAGE FROM THE TALKS NOW." THIEU THEN ASKED, DO WE AGREE TO CONTINUE UNFRUITFUL TALKS AT PARIS, DEFEAT THEM IN THE JULY/AUGUST OFFENSIVE ONLY THEN MAKE A DECISION ON BOMBING? KY REPLIED: "IN MY OPINION WE HAVE NO CHOICE."

7. KY THEN HINTED THAT SOME STRONG CIVIL MEASURES MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO DEFEAT WHAT HE BELIEVED WAS THE MOST DANGEROUS COMMUNIST TACTIC. "THEY ARE NOW PREPARING FOR A POLITICAL STRUGGLE TO COINCIDE WITH THEIR ATTACKS. THEY ARE BUILDING UP SENTIMENT FOR PEACE AT ANY PRICE THROUGH A PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT. THEY WILL STATE THAT IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THE NATIONALIST WHITES AND THE COMMUNIST REDS TO SIDE TOGETHER. THEY WILL THEN PRESENT A ROSE SOLUTION.  
BUNKER  
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

#5

~~SECRET~~

OO RUEHC  
DE RUMJIA 31058/2 QUIQWEP  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 261200Z JUN 68 ZFFG  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5529  
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1364  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 31058

CONTROL: 6911Q  
RECEIVED: June 26, 1968  
10:47 a.m.

NODIS/HARVAN

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

SUBJECT: CONSULTATION WITH GVN ON NEGOTIATIONS: SIXTH MEETING

WE MUST TAKE STEPS TO HEAD OFF THIS POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. WE HAD THIS EXPERIENCE IN 1945 WHEN THE COMMUNISTS SEIZED THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE AT HANOI WITH JUST A FEW PEOPLE AND THEN BY CLEVER TACTICS TOOK OVER CONTROL OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT. IF THEY INFILTRATE THEIR PEOPLE AND HAVE WHAT LOOKS LIKE AN UPRISING IN SAIGON AT THE SAME TIME THEIR LARGE UNITS ATTACK FROM THE OUTSIDE, WE WILL HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY. I AM WORRIED BY WHAT IS GOING ON AMONG SOME OF THE STUDENTS, LABOR GROUPS AND BUDDHISTS. I THINK IT IS BETTER THAT WE DECIDE WHAT MUST BE DONE AND THEN CONTROL IT. IF WE WAIT, WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL IT. THE COMMUNISTS MUST MAKE THEIR GAMBLE NOW." I AGREED THAT WE HAD TO PREPARE FOR SUCH AN ALL-OUT EFFORT AND SHOULD TAKE ALL THE MILITARY PRECAUTIONS NECESSARY IN ADVANCE.

8. THIEU STATED: "WHAT WE HAVE GOT TO DO IS HALT THE SHELLING OF SAIGON AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES WHICH CAN BE USED AS A PRETEXT FOR SUCH A COMMUNIST-INSPIRED MOVEMENT. SUCH A REACTION MIGHT NOT REQUIRE COMMUNIST INSTIGATION. IT COULD EVEN BE THE NATURAL REACTION OF THE PEOPLE." KY ADDED: "WHAT I WORRY ABOUT IS A COLLAPSE, NOT JUST OF THE REGIME, BUT OF ALL THE PEOPLE." THIEU CONTINUED "WE SHOULD TELL THE PEOPLE OF THE PREPARATIONS WE ARE MAKING FOR THESE ATTACKS. BUT IF THE VC CONTINUE TO SHELL, THE POLITICIANS WILL QUESTION THE US ATTITUDE. THE VC WILL ALLEGE THAT THIS IS EVIDENCE OF US WEAKNESS... THEY CANNOT WIN THE OFFENSIVE IN JULY OR AUGUST BUT IF THEY CONTINUE TO SHELL SAIGON AND OTHER CITIES WE WILL NOT COLLAPSE BUT THERE WILL BE A BAD REACTION AMONG THE PEOPLE FIRST AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND THEN AGAINST THE UNITED STATES."

9. KY THEN SAID THAT IT IS BETTER THAT WE STOP THIS ESCALATION ON THE VC'S PART (THE SAIGON SHELLING AND PREDICTED OFFENSIVE)

~~SECRET~~

WITHOUT RESUMING THE BOMBING. "THAT SHOWS REAL STRENGTH. WE MUST STOP THEM VERY QUICKLY." HE AGREED WITH MY OBSERVATION THAT THERE WAS NO DEFEATISM NOW AMONG THE PEOPLE. THIEU WARNED: "THE PEOPLE AND THE ASSEMBLY WILL STAY QUIET AND SUPPORT THE TALKS PROVIDED THERE IS NO MORE SHELLING OF SAIGON. THERE ARE TWO THINGS TO BE DONE: WE HAVE GOT TO PREVENT THE SHELLING BY OUR OWN MEASURES. TWO, WE MUST FORCE THE VC THROUGH PRESSURE IN PARIS NOT TO ATTACK THE CITIES. IF THEY ARE NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT ANY OTHER STEPS OF DE-ESCALATION THEY MUST AT LEAST STOP THE ATTACKS ON THE CITIES IF TALKS ARE TO CONTINUE."

10. I NEXT MADE THE PRESENTATION ON A POSSIBLE EARLY CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE AS SUGGESTED IN REFTEL B. THIEU ASKED WHY VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY HAD MADE HIS JUNE 23 CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE. I REPLIED THAT IT WAS A QUICK RESPONSE TO A QUESTION IN AN INTERVIEW. THE SUBJECT DID NOT COME UP AGAIN. AFTER SOME EXCHANGES IN VIETNAMESE WITH HIS COLLEAGUES, THIEU AGREED THAT TO REJECT CATEGORICALLY A CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL WAS NOT A GOOD IDEA. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE THOUGHT A CEASEFIRE SHOULD ONLY OCCUR AFTER AN AGREEMENT ON ITS CONDITIONS AND AS PART OF A SETTLEMENT. THANH-STATED THAT A CEASEFIRE MUST BE CONSIDERED AS A FIRST-STEP BEFORE WITHDRAWAL AND THAT AREAS WHERE COMMUNIST UNITS ARE STATIONED MUST BE CONSIDERED AS PROVISIONAL REGROUPING AREAS AND NOT ZONES OF ADMINISTRATION. LOGICALLY THE CEASEFIRE LINE SHOULD BE THE 17TH PARALLEL. HE ADDED THAT WE NEED COORDINATED MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC AND PROPAGANDA EFFORTS TO MEET A POSSIBLE CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL. BERGER SUGGESTED THAT THE BEST POSITION FOR THE GVN TO ADOPT WAS IMMEDIATE READINESS TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF A CEASEFIRE AND ANNOUNCE ITS WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS. THIEU AGREED.

11. THE LAST HALF HOUR OF THE MEETING WAS TAKEN UP WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE "OUR SIDE, YOUR SIDE" FORMULA AS IT MIGHT APPLY IN RESPONDING TO A CEASEFIRE APPEAL FROM THE NLF OR IN

~~SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 31058 June 26 (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE PRESENT PARIS CONVERSATIONS. THERE WERE FREQUENT PROTRACTED EXCHANGES IN VIETNAMESE WHILE THE FINER POINTS OF THE ARRANGEMENT WERE APPARENTLY EXPLAINED TO THANK. THE OLD FEAR THAT THIS FORMULA WOULD GRANT THE NLF EQUAL STATUS WITH THE GVN WAS RAISED AGAIN. KY WAS NOT CONTRADICTED BY HIS COLLEAGUES, HOWEVER, WHEN HE CONCLUDED BY STATING: "IF WE WERE MEN OF PRINCIPLE WE WOULD REFUSE SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, BUT AS PRACTICAL MEN AND REALISTS WE MUST ACCEPT." I CONCLUDE, THEREFORE, THAT THE GVN RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTS THE "OUR SIDE, YOUR SIDE" FORMULA FOR REPRESENTATION, WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE GVN WOULD PLAY THE MAJOR ROLE ON "OUR SIDE" AND THAT HANOI WOULD BE PRESENT ON "YOUR SIDE."

12. THIEU AGREED TO OUR SUGGESTION THAT WE SHOULD MEET ON A WEEKLY BASIS. THE MEETINGS WILL BE ON FRIDAYS, SO THAT WE CAN REVIEW THE WEDNESDAY MEETINGS IN PARIS. IN OUR NEXT GATHERING ON JUNE 28 WE AGREED TO DISCUSS ELEMENTS IN THE GENEVA ACCORDS THAT MIGHT APPLY TO A SETTLEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF PEACE SETTLEMENT. PLEASE INFORM US OF ANY SPECIFIC POINTS YOU WISH RAISED AT THAT MEETING.  
BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

*Pres. file*

49

Wed., June 26, 1968  
5:15 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the Kissinger/Sainteny talk.  
The most interesting part is on the second page.

Sainteny tells us that he believes that, in effect, Hanoi is willing to abandon the idea of a coalition government and go for a version of one-man-one-vote.

Knowing Sainteny's professional character, I would guess that he might have been cleared by the North Vietnamese to tell us this as "his own opinion."

On the other hand, it may be something he has deduced.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01

49a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/LIMDIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

June 23, 1968

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Henry Kissinger  
Mr. Joan Saintenny

PLACE: Paris, France

I met with Saintenny at his apartment for dinner. I began the conversation by asking Saintenny what he thought of the apparent impasse in the negotiations on the bombing issue. Saintenny replied that he was following events largely from the newspapers. He had met the members of the North Vietnamese delegation only twice, on both occasions socially. Several months ago he had been in favor of a unilateral end of bombing by the United States. He had thought it was a bet which would almost certainly pay off. Now he believed that a complete cessation without reciprocity would be taken by Hanoi as an American capitulation. He suggested as one possible method to break the impasse a unilateral American reduction of the bomb load and number of sorties over North Viet-Nam but not of the area. This reduction should be communicated privately to Hanoi. If there was no response we should announce the reduction at a negotiating session in Paris. If that failed to elicit a response we should resume bombing. The reduction in bombing would be understood in Hanoi as a determination to retain the option to resume.

As for negotiating tactics, Saintenny was of the view that patience was of the essence. Even if Hanoi was prepared to make concessions it would procrastinate. In order to make sure that the concessions were really necessary he considered private negotiations inevitable. He thought it would be best at these private negotiations to try to get some understanding with Hanoi about long term objectives rather than go at them one item at a time. Given the morbid suspicions of the Vietnamese that was the only promising method. His basic concern was U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam. He simply could not believe that the U.S. really meant to withdraw.

Ho's

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc/rq NARA, Date 7-12-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/LINDIS

-2-

Saintenny thought a possible outline of a long term settlement might involve Hanoi's agreement to an independent position for South Viet-Nam for at least five years. He assumed that the Viet Cong would be less interested in a coalition government than in participation in the political process. Their role in a government should depend on their actual strength in the national assembly. In response to the question what free elections meant in Viet-Nam, he replied that some assurance would have to be given of a certain number of seats say 30%. Asked about what he based these judgments on Saintenny replied that they were based on his instincts and feel for the situation. He added that he had attended a dinner in Paris within the week with some South Vietnamese who were discussing with Thieu means of broadening the government. This was a step in the right direction.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/LINDIS

50

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 26, 1968 - 5:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

I commend to you this [redacted] 3.4(b)(1)  
[redacted] on the feeling of tension between Hanoi  
and Peking, which he senses.

I would emphasize that the evidence is certainly not hard; but, knowing the history of Vietnam and China and Moscow's concern about an extension of Chinese Communist influence in Asia, generally, I am increasingly inclined to feel this tension is a factor working our way in Paris.

W. W. Rostow

[redacted] 3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-241  
By com, NARA, Date 3-17-03

WWRostow:rln



Department of State

WST #7  
50a #7

TELEGRAM

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3535  
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CONTROL: 6931Q

RECEIVED: June 26, 1968  
10:13 a.m.

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 17019

Rostow

N O D I S M A R I A T H R E E

SUBJ: TENSION BETWEEN HANOI AND PEKING

SOURCE SHOWED EMBOFF FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM HANOI DATED JUN 21.

\*THERE EXIST INDICATIONS THAT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN HANOI AND PEKING ARE GOING THROUGH A PHASE OF TENSION AND THAT CHINA REPORTEDLY WILL NO LONGER BE SATISFIED BY SHOWING THROUGH SIMPLE VERBAL DISAPPROVAL ITS HOSTILITY TO THE PARIS CONVERSATIONS.

1. THE INCIDENTS WHICH REPORTEDLY TOOK PLACE BEFORE THE VIETNAM CONSULATES IN CHINA HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED TO ME BY A SOCIALIST EMBASSY. ACCORDING TO THIS SOURCE THE VIETNAMESE CONSULS REPORTEDLY WERE OBLIGED TO SPEAK AGAINST PRINCIPLE OF NEGOTIATIONS (PRENDRE LA PAROLE POUR CONDAMNER).

2. THE RAIL CONNECTIONS WITH VIETNAM, ACCORDING TO ANOTHER SOCIALIST (DIPLOMATIC) MISSION, ALWAYS WELL INFORMED, HAVE BEEN INTERRUPTED FOR THE PAST THREE WEEKS. IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE FOR ME TO FIND OUT EXACTLY WHETHER THIS CESSATION IN TRAFFIC RESULTED FROM INTERIOR DIFFICULTIES OR A DECISION OF THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES.

3. THE RESTRICTIONS AFFECTING CIRCULATION (MY TELEGRAM NR 1,005) HAVE NOT ALWAYS BEEN ADEQUATELY EXPLAINED BUT AN INCREASING NUMBER OF OBSERVERS, DIPLOMATS, AND JOURNALISTS THINK THAT THEY ARE AIMED PRINCIPALLY AT THE CHINESE NATIONALS WHO UP UNTIL NOW WERE ABLE TO CIRCULATE FREELY IN VIETNAM.

4. THE EMBASSIES OF THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE SHOW THEMSELVES TO BE MORE AND MORE PREOCCUPIED BY THE PRESENCE OF CHINESE UNITS IN THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY. THEY ESTIMATE THAT THEIR STRENGTH (EFFECTIFS) CAN BE ESTIMATED BETWEEN 50,000 AND 200,000 MEN. THE CHINESE MILITARY REPORTED CROSS THE FRONTIER FREELY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-242  
By cbm, NARA, Date 4-9-02

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-2- PARIS 17019 Jun 26

WITHOUT EVEN INFORMING THE VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES. ACCORDING TO A HUNGARIAN DIPLOMAT WHO TRAVELLED TOWARDS THE MIDDLE OF THE MONTH OF MAY TO LANGSON, THIS TOWN REPORTEDLY WAS OCCUPIED BY THE PEOPLE'S ARMY. ALONG THE ROAD BETWEEN HANOI AND THE FRONTIER HE SAW CHINESE PROPAGANDA STANDS WHERE INSIGNIA, PAMPHLETS AND THE WORKS OF PRESIDENT MAO WERE DISTRIBUTED TO THE POPULATION.

5. AT THE TIME OF THE TWO FIRST REPAIRS MADE ON THE PAUL DOUËR BRIDGE THE PRESENCE OF CHINESE TECHNICIANS WAS ATTESTED BY POSTERS GLORIFYING PRESIDENT MAO. THE ROUTE WHICH LEADS TO THE AIRPORT HAVING BEEN CHANGED, IT HAS NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO CONFIRM THAT THEY ARE STILL THERE. THE VIETNAMESE HAVE SPREAD THE RUMOR THAT THEY REPORTEDLY CARRIED OUT THE MOST RECENT REPAIRS BY THEIR OWN MEANS AND WITHOUT FOREIGN AID. HOWEVER, THE PRESENCE AT THE HOTEL METROPOLE DURING THE MONTH OF MAY OF A CREW OF ENGINEERS AND CHINESE TECHNICIANS IS CERTAIN. THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THEY LEFT HANOI ARE NOT KNOWN.

6. THE PRESS WHICH FAITHFULLY REFLECTS THE STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAS PUBLISHED ONLY RARE INFORMATION ON CHINA OVER THE LAST TWO MONTHS. THE SUBJECT HAS ONLY BEEN REFERRED TO TEN TIMES IN MAY.

7. WHEREAS ON MAY 30 THE NOTE FROM THE (CHINESE) MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PROTESTING THE UTILIZATION OF HONG KONG AS A BASE FOR AGGRESSION AGAINST VIETNAM HAS BEEN PUBLISHED EXPRESSLY. IT HAS NOT BEEN FOLLOWED UP, FOLLOWING NORMAL PRACTICE, BY A SIMILAR NOTE FROM HANOI AND HAS BEEN MADE THE OBJECT OF ONLY A SIMPLE COMMENTARY.

8. IN JUNE TWO OUT OF FOUR INFORMATION BULLETINS HAVE BEEN DEVOTED TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, ONE REPRODUCED THE LETTER OF THANKS FROM PRESIDENT HO TO MR. CHOU EN LAI FOR THE ARMS WHICH HE HAD SENT AS A PRESENT TO THE ARTISTIC ENSEMBLE OF THE LIBERATION ARM. THE OTHER DEALT WITH THE VISIT OF THE CHIEF OF THE NLF DELEGATION IN CHINA, TO THE "CHINA-VIETNAM" FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY.

9. THE COMMON COMMUNIQUE- CHINA, MALI, GUINEA - WAS THE SUBJECT OF A BRIEF DISPATCH JUNE 4 ENTITLED "CHINA DEMANDS TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS AND THEIR SATELLITES."

10. NO MESSAGE HAS BEEN EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES SINCE THE TELEGRAM OF CONGRATULATIONS ADDRESSED ON MAY 19 TO PRESIDENT HO ON HIS BIRTHDAY FROM PRESIDENT MAO. THE VIETNAMESE REPLY HAS NOT BEEN PUBLISHED. FINALLY NO MENTION OF THE STOPOVER OF XUAN-THUY, LE DUC THO, AND LE-THANH NGHI AT PEKING HAS BEEN MADE. THE WELCOME WHICH THUY AND THO RECEIVED IN MOSCOW HAS BEEN ON THE OTHER HAND REPORTED AT LENGTH."

GP-1 SKRIVER

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 26, 1968

51

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your approval is a message to former Chancellor Erhard replying to his message of condolence on the death of Senator Robert F. Kennedy.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

*WWR*  
*mm*  
MWG:mm

51a

Suggested Reply

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I was touched by your message of condolence on the cruel death of Senator Kennedy and by your hopes for peace which, as you know, I share. Kind thoughts from old friends are especially welcome on such sad occasions.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

51b

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 2727  
T-67/R-12  
German

9096

Professor Dr. Ludwig Erhard

Bonn, June 8, 1968

Dear Mr. President,

My esteemed friend,

It was with great pleasure that I received the photo album. The pictures will always remind me, in grateful remembrance and appreciation, of the many meetings and talks which I had the pleasure and honor of having with you.

I fulfill a sad duty when I express to you, the President of the United States, my sincere condolences on the cruel death of Senator Kennedy. May your country be spared from further disturbances and may you succeed in bringing about peace in Vietnam while still in office.

With deep respect and cordial regards, I am,

Yours truly,

[Signature]

His Excellency  
President of the United States of America,  
Lyndon B. Johnson,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

**SECRET/HARVAN**

**Wednesday, June 26, 1968  
4:06 p. m.**

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

**You will wish to read this extremely lucid  
account of Cy Vance of today's meeting.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**SECRET/HARVAN attachment (Paris 17053 Delto 346)**

**DECLASSIFIED**  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 8-6-92



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3554

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 17053

N O D I S/HARVAN

DELTO 346

FROM VANCE

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC-18507  
By is NARA, Date 1-8-98

SUBJECT: TEA BREAK -- 10TH SESSION, JUNE 26

1. I TOOK THE LEAD IN THE CONVERSATION DURING THE TEA BREAK WITHOUT PRELIMINARY SOCIAL AMENITIES. THUY SEEMED PREPARED FOR BUSINESSLIKE DISCUSSION FROM THE OUTSET,

2. I SAID THAT I HAD READ WITH GREAT CARE HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENTS AS HE HAD ASKED ME TO DO. I SAID THERE WAS A COMMON THEME RUNNING THROUGH THEM, PARTICULARLY EVIDENT IN THEIR INTERPRETATION OF THE HISTORICAL EVENTS IN VIET-NAM, BEGINNING IN 1950. I SAID I READ IN THE WORDS A MISTRUST OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS OBJECTIVES. I ADDED THAT I HOPED AS WE PROCEEDED IN OUR DISCUSSIONS THAT THEY WOULD FIND THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR MISTRUST. I SAID THAT WE WERE SERIOUS AND HAD COME HERE TO SEARCH SERIOUSLY FOR A JUST SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS WHICH FACED US. XUAN THUY NODDED AND SAID THAT THEY WERE EQUALLY SERIOUS BUT THAT THE FIRST ISSUE WHICH LAY BEFORE US REQUIRING RESOLUTION WAS THE CESSATION OF BOMBING.

3. I SAID THAT I WISHED TO ADDRESS MYSELF TO THAT VERY ISSUE. I STATED THAT WE HAD BEEN HERE FOR ALMOST 7 WEEKS AND HAD HELD 10 MEETINGS AND HAD

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PAGE 02 PARIS 17053 01 OF 02 261733Z

NOT MADE ANY PROGRESS. I SAID I HAD GIVEN SERIOUS THOUGHT TO THE PROBLEM AND HAD A SUGGESTION TO MAKE FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION.

4. I THEN OUTLINED OUR PROPOSAL IN THE PRECISE LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN PARA 1, DEPTTEL 190068, WHICH I HAD MEMORIZED. I ADDED THAT OF COURSE THE DISCUSSIONS I HAD IN MIND WOULD NEED TO BE CONDUCTED IN PRIVACY-- VERY PRIVATE, SECRET SESSIONS. I SAID THAT IF OUR CONVERSATIONS WERE TO BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, IT WOULD DESTROY THEIR EFFECTIVENESS. I THEN ASKED: "HOW DOES THIS APPROACH STRIKE YOU IN PRINCIPLE?" BEFORE RESPONDING, XUAN THUY AND HA VAN LAU SPOKE TO EACH OTHER IN VIETNAMESE. XUAN THUY THEN REPLIED THAT HE WOULD TAKE THE SUGGESTION UNDER CONSIDERATION.

5. I THEN SAID THAT I HAD BEEN PUZZLED BY CERTAIN REMARKS MADE BY LE DUC THO AT OUR LAST MEETING. I SAID THAT, AS I RECALLED IT, LE DUC THO HAD SAID: THAT THE MILITARY SITUATION IN VIET-NAM COULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY WHAT HAPPENED HERE IN PARIS; THAT THERE NEVER HAD BEEN A SOLUTION OF MILITARY PROBLEMS WITHOUT AGREEMENT FIRST ON A POLITICAL SOLUTION; AND THAT HE HOPED A GOOD SOLUTION WOULD BE FOUND. I REMINDED HIM THAT I AGREED WE SHOULD FIND A GOOD SOLUTION AND THEN ASKED HIM WHAT LE DUC THO HAD IN MIND WHEN HE MADE THESE STATEMENTS. I ASKED, DID HE HAVE IN MIND THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED TO A DISCUSSION OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BEFORE MILITARY MATTERS ARE SETTLED? HE SAID WHAT LE DUC THO WAS REFERRING TO WERE THE ATTACKS ON SAIGON AND OTHER MILITARY ACTIONS IN THE SOUTH. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE FIRST THING TO DEAL WITH HERE WAS STOPPING THE BOMBING SO THAT WE COULD DISCUSS OTHER MATTERS OF INTEREST TO BOTH PARTIES. I ASKED HIM WHAT HE MEANT. I AID, "WHAT ARE THE OTHER MATTERS?" HE REPLIED THAT THE OTHER MATTERS WOULD INCLUDE: 1) MATTERS CONCERNING A SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH VIET-NAM; 2) RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM; AND 3) RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH VIET-NAM. HE SAID, "OF COURSE THERE ARE MANY MATTERS WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD WISH TO RAISE." HE .

~~SECRET~~

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REPEATED AGAIN THAT DISCUSSION OF THESE MATTERS WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT THE CESSATION OF BOMBING.

6. I THEN ASKED WHETHER HE UNDERSTOOD MY EARLIER SUGGESTION ON CESSATION OF BOMBING AND I SOLICITED ANY QUESTIONS HE MIGHT HAVE TO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CONFUSION AS TO THE NATURE OF MY SUGGESTION. HE REFERRED TO THE JORDEN-LE CONVERSATION AND SAID HE FOUND NOTHING OF INTEREST IN THAT CONVERSATION. I REPLIED THAT WHAT I WAS SUGGESTING WAS SOMETHING DIFFERENT THAN WAS DISCUSSED THERE.

7. HE THEN SAID HA VAN LAU MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY. HA VAN LAU PROCEEDED TO RESTATE MY SUGGESTION. LAU SAID IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT WE WOULD INFORM THEM OF A DATE ON WHICH THE BOMBING WOULD BE STOPPED. THUY INTERJECTED A QUESTION ASKING IF IT WOULD BE PUBLIC. I SAID NO, THAT IT MUST BE PRIVATE. I THEN SAID THAT I WISHED TO REPEAT MY SUGGESTION WHICH I DID, VERBATIM. HA VAN LAU THEN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE SUGGESTION.

8. XUAN THUY THEN ASKED WHEN AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN WOULD BE BACK. I SAID HE WOULD BE BACK ON MONDAY AND WOULD BE HERE FOR NEXT WEDNESDAY'S SESSION. HE THEN SUGGESTED THAT AT NEXT WEDNESDAY'S MEETING HE AND

VANCE

~~SECRET~~

14



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 3555

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N O D I S/HARVAN

DELTO 346

FROM VANCE  
AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN CONDUCT THE FORMAL SESSION AND THAT  
HA VAN LAU AND I, AND ANY OTHERS WHOM WE WANTED  
WITH US, WOULD GO INTO ANOTHER ROOM AT THE MAJESTIC  
TO DISCUSS MY SUGGESTION. I SAID I ACCEPTED THAT  
PROPOSAL. THUY SAID THAT THIS WOULD ALLOW US TO DEPART  
THE MEETING PLACE IN THE NORMAL FASHION AND THUS KEEP  
THE SEPARATE MEETING AWAY FROM THE PRESS. HE THEN  
ASKED IF WE HAD ANY OTHER SUGGESTION--LOOKING UP  
TO THE CEILING AND WALL AND GESTURING AS THOUGH TO INDICATE  
THE ROOM MIGHT BE BUGGED.

9. HABIB SAID THAT ANOTHER POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE A PRIVATE  
MEETING AT A PLACE TO BE AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE TWO  
SIDES, POINTING OUT THAT WE SHOULD NOT CONFINE OURSELVES  
TO PRIVATE MEETINGS ONLY ON THE OCCASION OF THE FORMAL  
MEETINGS. HABIB SAID IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE  
FOR VANCE AND AMBASSADOR LAU TO MEET MORE FREQUENTLY  
AND NOT HAVE TO WAIT FOR THE WEDNESDAY MEETINGS. I  
SAID THAT I FAVORED THE FIRST MEETING BEING HELD NEXT  
WEDNESDAY IN THE MAJESTIC AND THAT THEREAFTER WE SHOULD  
SEEK TO FIND A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE PLACE WHERE WE COULD  
CARRY ON THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS TO THE END THAT WE  
WOULD HAVE DISCUSSIONS IN BETWEEN FORMAL MEETINGS.  
AT THIS POINT THUY SAID: "YOU HAVE MADE A VERY  
INTERESTING PROPOSAL AND WE WILL GIVE IT SERIOUS  
CONSIDERATION."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 17053 261721Z

10. WE THEN ENGAGED IN SOME INCONSEQUENTIAL, LIGHT CONVERSATION FOR ANOTHER 5 MINUTES.

11. COMMENT: XUAN THUY DID NOT SPECIFICALLY AGREE THAT WE WOULD FOLLOW HIS SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR NEXT WEDNESDAY, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS HIS SUGGESTION AND I HAD ACCEPTED IT. IT WAS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT HE WAS SYMPATHETIC TO SUCH DISCUSSIONS TAKING PLACE.

12. I PROPOSE WE INFORM THE RUSSIANS OF MY CONVERSATION WITH THUY. THIS CAN BE DONE THROUGH DOBRYNIN AND ZORIN. I SUGGEST IT SHOULD BE DONE BOTH HERE AND IN WASHINGTON. THIS WOULD ASSURE THAT ZORIN, WHO IS ON THE SPOT AND PRESUMABLY IN TOUCH WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, KNOWS WE HAVE PICKED UP HIS SUGGESTION PRECISELY. PLEASE INFORM US IF THIS IS ACCEPTABLE SO THAT WE CAN ARRANGE TO CALL ON ZORIN.

13. I TOLD THE AUSTRALIAN OBSERVER, ANDERSON, THAT THE TEA BREAK INCLUDED A DISCUSSION OF THE NEED FOR A PRIVATE MEETING TO EXAMINE THE PROSPECTS FOR BRINGING ABOUT A CESSATION OF BOMBING AND RELATED MATTERS. I TOLD HIM THAT THUY HAS THE MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION BUT I DIDN'T KNOW WHEN HE WILL RESPOND OR WHAT HIS ANSWER WILL BE.

14. FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE OBSERVERS, WE WOULD INTEND TO INFORM BUI DIEM ALONE THAT AT THE COFFEE BREAK WE DISCUSSED WITH THUY THE DESIRABILITY OF DISCUSSING BOMBING CESSATION AND RELATED MATTERS PRIVATELY. WE WOULD SAY THAT THUY HAS IT UNDER CONSIDERATION. THIS IS AS FAR AS WE WOULD CARRY IT HERE WITH DIEM. WE SUGGEST THAT ANYTHING FURTHER BE TAKEN UP DIRECTLY WITH PRESIDENT THIEU AND WILL LEAVE IT TO DEPARTMENT TO DECIDE HOW FAR TO GO. PLEASE INFORM US OF YOUR DECISION IN THIS REGARD.

15. FOR OTHER TCC'S WE WILL BE GENERALLY NON-INFORMATIVE ON THE TEA BREAK EXCEPT TO SAY THAT IT FOLLOWED PATTERN OF INFORMAL CONTACT AS BEFORE.

VANCE

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Index

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS IMMEDIATE  
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" MOSCOW PRIORITY  
" SAIGON "

STATE 190068  
PARIS TODEL-*529*

NODIS/HARVAN

Paris 16928 and 16929.

1. We agree that at a tea break you should act on Zorin's suggestion and probe possibilities of private discussion of two-phase approach to bombing and military de-escalation. You should inquire whether they would be interested in private discussions whereby (the US would agree to cease all bombing of the DRV on a day certain to be communicated to them. Before that day, and understanding would be reached on the "circumstances," i.e., actions on Hanoi's part toward de-escalation, which would be carried out following upon the cessation.

2. The main purpose of approach should be to find out whether they are willing to talk in these terms. In this approach, we believe you should avoid specifying the precise "circumstances" we would regard as satisfactory. However, if they show interest and inquire as to what you have in mind, you could indicate that

Dispatched by: *WPK* EA:WPBundy:mki:jmj 6/25/68 4235 *NK-DIA* The Acting Secretary  
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Classification: WH - Mr. *WPK* Boston DOD - Secy Clifford S/AH - Gov *WPK* Harriman S/S - Mr. *WPK* Read

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc* NARA, Date *7-3-01*

~~SECRET~~

Classification

we have already noted the importance of restoration of the DMZ and have expressed our concern (in the terms used by Harriman on June 12) concerning: firing of artillery/and other weapons/ from and across the DMZ launched into SVN; ground attacks/ in the area of the DMZ; and the that massive increase in infiltration/has taken place and continues. Finally, we have made clear our concern about the continuing attacks on the civilian population of Saigon. All these points should be mentioned, but in the sense that these are the kind of topics we would visualize discussing in private talks, avoiding the implication that these are our final and irrevocable "circumstances" but simply saying that these are the kind of topics we have in mind.

3. In your approach, you should avoid the label "Phase A-Phase B."

There have been many formulations in the past to which this label has been attached, and which have been communicated to Hanoi. Some of these have included the possibility of additional US actions-- over and above stopping the bombing--at "Phase B." You should, at least initially, deal with the actions on which understanding would be reached through private talks as wholly those of Hanoi. If they raise the possibility that the US might take additional actions in a second phase, you should state that this is a matter that could be discussed.

~~SECRET~~

Classification



*Handwritten:* Mas'le

53

Wednesday, June 26, 1968  
1:00 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

In this draft cable, for your clearance,  
Nick Katzenbach raises with Bunker the reasons  
for considering a further postponement of Thieu's  
visit to the U. S.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993  
By rg, NARA, Date 8-6-92

## TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS DIVISION

WORK COPY <sup>2036</sup>~~SECRET~~→ WWR  
Cy sent Wright <sup>530</sup>

Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY

INFO: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY

STATE  
NODIS

PARIS TODEL \_\_\_\_\_ For Vance and Habib

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01

Eyes Only for Ambassador from Acting Secretary.

1. We are approaching the time at which you have told Thieu, and we have told Bui Diem, that we would reach a ~~firm~~ final decision on the Thieu visit, with the dates July 23-24--or a week one way or the other--as the last ones mentioned.

2. Unfortunately, a series of developments and evolving judgments here now make us increasingly skeptical that the visit could be held without the kind of ~~possibility~~ demonstrations that would negate its value to both of us. Specifically:

a. The ending of the Poor People's Campaign has still left some edginess in Washington, and that campaign did predictably take on an anti-Viet-Nam aspect toward the end. Certainly we were wise, in hindsight, not to schedule the visit at or near the same time as the final demonstration here last week.

LA:WPBundy:mk 6/25/68

4235

The Acting Secretary

DOD - Secy. Clifford

White House - Mr. Rostow

S/S -

~~SECRET~~

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Saigon Info Paris TODEL

~~SECRET~~

b. We have had a steadily increasing series of incidents--fortunately without much publicity--where small minority groups have acted against visitors and diplomats. The Shah of Iran was heckled in Cambridge and Chicago, and there have been a spate of incidents involving the beating up of a French diplomat, the burning of the Turkish Ambassador's car, and such. Our security people have some indications that the specific nationality groups responsible for these actions are in touch with each other and with the SDS--which is the spearhead of anti-Viet-Nam demonstration effort.

c. In specific terms of a schedule that included New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Honolulu, our security people now have a formidable list of anti-Viet-Nam groups which, in their judgment, would be likely to turn out and try to cause trouble of a significant nature along the line.

d. In general, there is increasing evidence ~~ix~~ that the more extreme anti-Viet-Nam elements are becoming more action-minded and a touch desperate as they see a situation in which their candidate now appears to stand little chance at the Democratic Convention. This is taking the form of suggestions of student and other action at the convention itself. It would be our judgment that, if a Thieu visit were

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Saigon Info Paris TODEL

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announced, these same groups would view that as a heaven-sent occasion to make their point about the strength of opposition to the war in the eyes of the television cameras and against a man who lacks strong popularity here.

3. All these points relate to the specific chance of hostile demonstrations that would set the publicity tone of the occasion. But more broadly, the general state of opinion here is favorable to the Paris talks and somewhat more sympathetic generally on Viet-Nam. We fear that a Thieu visit, far from helping in either direction, would tend to re-kindle passions now dormant and that whatever he might say--on which he would have to take into account his Vietnamese audience--could not be regarded as anything but firm. Specifically, we could see him being hit hard with embarrassing questions about dealing with the NLF, that he is in no position to answer at the present time from a domestic standpoint in the light of the kind of sentiment reflected in the ~~Assembly's~~ Assembly's treatment of Huong yesterday--whatever he might in fact be ready to do privately. Certainly, our present reading is that the chances of a speech to the Congress or of a really favorable and friendly reception there would not be great.

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Saigon Info Paris TODEL

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4. Meanwhile, our reading of the political situation in Saigon suggests considerable doubt whether Thieu would be wise to plan on leaving at this point in any case. We understand and accept the judgments you have stated in your 30844 on the degree of strain between Thieu and Ky, but we also have the feeling that a lot of the hand is not played out and that there may be significant developments that could further strain the relationship. Basically, it seems to us that, if Thieu were to announce a visit here early in July and then make it in ~~xxxx~~ late July, it would to some extent inhibit his actions during this period from any standpoint, and that his absence from Saigon would be edgy in his own mind and open to all sorts of unhappy possibilities at your end. If things had settled down, Ky were reasonably happy, and Huong had moved into a reasonably strong position, that would be a different picture, but we do not see this state of affairs as having any assurance of existing by mid or late July.

uncertain

5. Finally, the military prospects are surely very ~~uncertain~~ as we look to the next month. The possibility still hangs over us of further attacks in Saigon, and <sup>Abrams'</sup> ~~Abrams'~~ judgment--as you know--is that ~~xxxx~~ something against the northern cities could well come toward the end of July. All in all, a continuing worrisome state of affairs on the

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Saigon Info Paris TODEL

~~SECRET~~

military front generally and on the Saigon front in particular seems to be the prospect. Thieu's absence from his country during any military flare-up would certainly not be useful in terms of his own image or in terms of GVN effectiveness.

6. All these negative factors mean that we are now decidedly reserved over the whole value and wisdom of the trip at this point. Hence, we feel the need to give you these thoughts and to get your own views, covering such points as:

- a. How strongly you think Thieu now feels about letting the visit slip;
- b. What kind of argument or discussion would be most helpful in moving the matter in this direction;
- c. Whether further, and in effect indefinite, postponement could be usefully mitigated--particularly as to the appearance of consultation--either by high-level visits from here or Paris, or by a short Thieu trip to Honolulu.

OP-3.

End.

Approved

*Pres file*

54

Wednesday, June 26, 1968  
12:45 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Ky's latest political mood:  
waiting in the wings until Thieu needs him badly  
enough to call him back as Prime Minister  
as well as Vice-President -- which would require  
a constitutional amendment.

W. W. Rostow



25X1A

**SANITIZED**

Authority PLJ.019.036.003/11

By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE 54a  
IN 38277

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SOO ONE CRS  
EXO DDI OER FBIS DCS IRS AID USIA

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

261152Z

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DIST 26 JUNE 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM  
DOI 24 JUNE 1968  
SUBJECT 1. CURRENT RELATIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT  
THIEU AND VICE PRESIDENT KY  
2. VICE PRESIDENT KY'S PLAN TO  
PUBLISH DAILY NEWSPAPER.

*Roston*

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (26 JUNE 1968) 25X1A

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SOURCE

25X1X



(SUMMARY: VICE PRESIDENT KY THINKS THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT  
FACES MANY PROBLEMS AND EXPECTS PRESIDENT THIEU SOONER OR  
LATER TO RECALL HIM (KY) TO FULL POWER TO SAVE THE SITUATION.  
HE HAS OBSERVED THAT IN THE PAST TWO WEEKS THIEU HAS VISIBLY

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SANTIZED

Authority NLJ. 019.036.003/12

By XC, NARA, Date 7301

IN 38277

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PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification)

(dissem controls)

CHANGED HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD HIM AND IS ALSO SPENDING MORE TIME WITH MILITARY OFFICERS. KY PLANS TO BEGIN SPONSORING COVERTLY A DAILY NEWSPAPER, PUBLICATION OF WHICH IS TO BEGIN ON 15 JULY. HE HAS ASKED AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT COLONEL TRAN DO CUNG TO SERVE AS PUBLISHER AND BUSINESS MANAGER AND AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT COLONEL VU DUC VINH TO SERVE AS EDITOR. END SUMMARY.)

1. DURING A DISCUSSION ON 24 JUNE WITH AIR FORCE LIEUTENANT COLONELS TRAN DO CUNG AND VU DUC VINH, WHOM HE HAD SUMMONED TO INDEPENDENCE PALACE, VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY SAID HE SAW HARD TIMES AHEAD FOR THE TRAN VAN HUONG GOVERNMENT AND CITED AS ISSUES AND PROBLEMS FACING IT. (1) THE WEAKNESS AND LACK OF COHESION OF THE HUONG CABINET, (2) THE DISSATISFACTION OF THICH TRI QUANG'S MILITANT BUDDHIST FOLLOWERS, (3) THE UNREST AMONG THE STUDENTS, AND (4) THE PROBABLY THIRD-WAVE VIET CONG ATTACK ON SAIGON. HE RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP AND SAID HIS FORCES AND SUPPORTERS WOULD HAVE TO WAIT FOR D-DAY, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS THE DAY WHEN PRESIDENT THIEU WOULD BE FORCED TO RECALL KY TO FULL POWER, PERHAPS BY AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

IN 38277

25X1A

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification)

(dissem controls)

TO ENABLE KY TO SERVE SIMULTANEOUSLY AS BOTH VICE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER.

2. KY COMMENTED THAT THIEU HAD VISIBLY CHANGED HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD HIM DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS. THIEU, KY CONTINUED, HAS INVITED HIM TO MANY FUNCTIONS AND CEREMONIES HE (KY) HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY ATTENDED AND TOOK SPECIAL EFFORT TO HAVE KY AT THE RECENT PROMOTION OF GENERAL OFFICERS. KY ADDED THAT THIEU SEEMED TO BE MOVING AWAY FROM CIVILIAN POLITICIANS AND TO BE SPENDING MORE TIME WITH MILITARY OFFICERS AND THAT THIEU WAS ALSO INVITING MORE GENERAL OFFICERS TO HIS PRESIDENTIAL FUNCTIONS THAN HE HAS DONE IN THE PAST.

3. KY TOLD THE TWO OFFICERS HE HAS DECIDED IT IS NOW NECESSARY FOR HIM TO SPONSOR COVERTLY A DAILY NEWSPAPER. THE TIME IS RIPE, HE SAID, FOR A "DIGNIFIED" NEWSPAPER WHICH WOULD PROVIDE OBJECTIVE NEWS COVERAGE AND BE ABLE TO DISPEL VICIOUS RUMORS ABOUT SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLITICAL FIGURES AND DAMAGING RUMORS ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR. KY SAID HE WANTS A WELL-WRITTEN NEWSPAPER THE PEOPLE COULD RELY ON, WITH AN EDITORIAL POLICY BASED ON ANTI-COMMUNISM AND SOCIAL

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PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification)

(dissem controls)

REFORM, WHICH WOULD BE INDEPENDENT AND NOT FOR ANY PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL. THE PAPER WOULD BE DESIGNED FOR MASS CIRCULATION AND, ALTHOUGH HE IS NOT INTERESTED IN HAVING IT MAKE A PROFIT, HE WOULD HOPE IT WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL ENOUGH TO BE SELF-SUSTAINING. KY ASKED VINH TO SERVE AS EDITOR AND TO FIND SOME SERIOUS, ABLE JOURNALISTS TO WORK WITH HIM, AND HE OFFERED CUNG THE POSITION OF PUBLISHER AND BUSINESS MANAGER. KY TOLD CUNG TO PURCHASE THE NAME AND FILES OF "NHAN DAN (THE PEOPLE)," WHICH SUSPENDED OPERATION LAST YEAR, AND TO RENT OFFICE SPACE IN GIA LONG, WHERE MANY OTHER NEWSPAPERS HAVE THEIR OFFICES. PUBLICATION, KY SAID IS TO BEGIN ON 15 JULY 1968.

4. CUNG TOLD KY THAT HE (CUNG) MIGHT NEED PROTECTION FROM HIS POLITICAL ADVERSARIES SINCE HE MADE A LOT OF ENEMIES WHILE HE WAS RUNNING THE STATE-OWNED SUPERMARKETS IN HIS CAPACITY AS FORMER CHIEF OF THE SUPPLY DIRECTORATE AND SINCE HE IS STILL ON ACTIVE DUTY. KY RESPONDED THAT CUNG SHOULD ULTIMATELY RESIGN FROM THE AIR FORCE BUT THAT, AS AN INTERIM MEASURE, HE WOULD BE TRANSFERRED QUIETLY TO THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT.

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SECRET EDITIONS

IN 38277

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PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification)

(dissem controls)

25X1A 5. [REDACTED] COMMENT: VINH IS CURRENTLY DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE VIETNAMESE BROADCASTING SYSTEM. CUNG, NOW ASSIGNED TO THE VETERANS MINISTRY, IS ONE OF TWO OFFICERS WHOM PRIME MINISTER HUONG REPORTEDLY WISHES TO PROSECUTE FOR CORRUPTION.

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25X1A 6. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE DIR/JUSPAO (MR. NICKEL ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [REDACTED] REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM.

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INFORMATION

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SECRET

Wednesday, June 26, 1968

11:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Herewith a rather careful State Department summary of world attitudes towards the Paris talks. I have marked key passages.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By RG, NARA, Date 8-6-92



9273

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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Mr. Rostow

June 25, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Summary of World Attitudes Toward  
the Paris Talks

The following summary of responses to State 181228, a request for assessment by all Chiefs of Mission of host country private and public opinion as it relates to the U.S. and North Vietnamese position in Paris, has been prepared from the telegrams received and the summaries prepared by each regional Bureau.

At Tab A there is a list of suggestions of specific ways by which the United States might gain greater attention for the efforts of our Delegation in Paris.

At Tab B there is a summary by region of the effect of the Paris talks on attitudes toward the U.S. in Viet-Nam.

*John P. Walsh*  
John P. Walsh  
Deputy Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

Tab A - List of Suggestions

Tab B - Summary by Region

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 7-3-01

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WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARDS PARIS TALKS

SUMMARY

Our Chiefs of Mission have indicated that they are using the full range of Embassy capabilities to make our position in the Paris Talks known and understood by both officials and the public. Anti-American pressure over Viet-Nam has diminished to an appreciable extent, especially in Europe, since the President's March 31 speech. Our Delegation's patience and obvious sincerity is seen in clear contrast to the propagandistic posture of the Communists. At the same time, our Viet-Nam allies in East Asia have been reassured by the firmness and determination of the United States Delegation to place the talks on a realistic basis. Many of our Ambassadors pointed out that the trend toward more favorable attitudes and understanding of our position would be in danger should the United States stimulate further debate on Viet-Nam in the absence of other dramatic and significant changes in the actual situation in Paris or Viet-Nam.

Present Level of Contact and Method of Presenting the US Position

All our posts replied that they are giving our negotiating position in Paris full emphasis in all contacts with host government officials from Chiefs of State level on down, and to leading personalities outside of government. Different Embassies have used differing techniques tailored to the circumstances in each country. Some posts have established regular weekly briefings of Foreign Ministry officials, others meet with foreign officials each time there is a significant development such as a session of the talks, while others forward speeches by Ambassador Harriman and other materials related

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State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01

to the talks by letter from the Ambassador or by aide memoire. A number of Ambassadors pointed out that they use the subjects of the Paris talks and the situation in Viet-Nam whenever they are called upon to make public addresses.

USIS activities in support of the talks have been extensive, and many special projects have been initiated. The most often used format is the weekly USIS bulletin issued in most countries, which has a mailing list of newspapermen, government officials, professors, public opinion leaders, and others. Some posts have established a selected list for Viet-Nam material of non-government personages influential in opinion molding and mail them specially designed material. One post reported it made up looseleaf booklets on the talks and distributed copies to journalists. As the talks progress, additional material for inclusion in the booklets is sent out. In sum, USIS has used its full range of capabilities to disseminate the materials it has received from USIA Washington or from Paris.

#### Problem of Mobilizing Support for the US Position

The difficulty in mobilizing world-wide support for the US position or against Hanoi intransigence lies in the fact that, with the possible exception of East Asia and the Pacific, world opinion has become satiated with Viet-Nam news and finds the Paris talks boring. Paradoxically, however, many of our Ambassadors indicate that the lack of interest in Viet-Nam is beneficial to our interests and warn that anything that will stimulate a revival of the debate likely would reactivate critics of the US role in Viet-Nam and revive calls for further unilateral concessions.

Just a few months ago the countries of Western Europe were the scene of massive demonstrations against US actions

in Viet-Nam. Beginning at the time of the President's March 31 speech, left-wing agitators in Europe have found that the reasonable U.S. posture has taken the wind out of their sails. ~~The government in Great Britain, for example, finds it much easier to support the US now that Viet-Nam news has been relegated to the back pages.~~ Thus major new moves to focus attention on the talks may actually redound to our disadvantage unless they are carefully conceived and wisely executed. Activities designed by the US to stimulate interest in the talks must be carefully selected to contrast Hanoi's intransigence and military intensification with the constructive, realistic US position of restraint and other measures of de-escalation.

It would appear that most regular lines of contact between governments and USIS capabilities are already being heavily utilized. Further intensification of these activities are not likely to obtain the results desired and may in fact be counter-productive. Of course, there are refinements in our present presentations and programs that can and should be made, but short of another dramatic--perhaps even unorthodox--act such as the March 31 speech, there are few activities which by themselves would turn a significant section of world opinion one way or the other.

Another problem we face is ~~the difficulty we have in reaching the younger, more militant, more politically active groups in many countries.~~ In the great majority of countries, ~~our Embassies have been successful in convincing the government leadership, elite academic and commercial groups, and "establishment" leaders of opinion - the normal targets of our efforts - of the reasonableness of our position in Paris and in Viet-Nam.~~ But ~~our efforts seem not to penetrate below this level.~~ The most obvious effect of our inability to influence grass roots opinion is the ~~apparent reluctance of many national leaders outside of East Asia, because of domestic political repercussions, to follow their own beliefs and fully and publicly to support the US and condemn Hanoi.~~ In Sweden the

push from the younger left-oriented political activists has already caused officials to take a position dead-set against the US in order to hold left-wing support. According to our Charge in Stockholm, the arguments in Paris are not expected to have any effect.

~~Pressure on government leaders from leftists and their reluctance to act on our behalf because of domestic considerations was mentioned by many Ambassadors, especially those in lesser developed countries, with the admonition, sometimes implicit, that our best tactic is to keep the level of interest in the talks about where it is now and let the North Vietnamese Delegation continue its obstructionism.~~

#### Trends in Attitudes

Pre-occupation with other issues such as civil strife in France and the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Bobby Kennedy has tended to reduce the impact of the talks. The most noteworthy trend since the talks began would appear to be that Viet-Nam has greatly diminished as an issue that can be used to motivate anti-American protest, especially in Europe. The talks have also permitted those governments under domestic pressure to pass resolutions against American actions in Viet-Nam to counter by pointing out that it would not be proper to officially take sides while the talks are in progress.

As the talks continue, the patience and obvious sincerity of the US Delegation contrasts very favorably with the intransigence of the North Vietnamese Delegation. Apparently this has convinced most informed opinion world-wide of the propagandistic nature of Hanoi's position. However, ~~much of world opinion feels, as in Great Britain, that somehow everything will work out as long as the talks continue. If the talks continue with~~

~~little evident progress, there is the possibility for an increase in pressure on the US for more concessions.~~

~~In East Asia the view of the situation in Viet-Nam and at Paris tends to be a mirror image of that of Europe. Since the beginning of the talks, much of the press and government leadership, while concerned over the possibility that the United States would not stand firm in the negotiations, had been predicting prolonged talks, possibly with few results. The patience, obvious sincerity, firmness and determination of the United States Delegation to place the talks on a realistic basis have been reassuring.~~

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SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTIONS TO MOBILIZE  
WORLD OPINION AGAINST HANOI'S PARIS POSTURE  
CULLED FROM RESPONSES TO STATE 181228

- A. Suggested actions by President Johnson, the Department of State or our Delegation in Paris.
  - 1. Secretary Rusk could take over as temporary head of Paris Delegation to publicize seriousness of talks.
  - 2. Circular letter from President Johnson to all Heads of State.
  - 3. Department might provide field with a list of possible options, in order of priority, should Hanoi remain intransigent and Chiefs of Mission could call on Heads of State to get their reactions.
  - 4. To make any impact and illustrate our constructive proposals in contrast to negativism of Hanoi will require a dramatic and perhaps unorthodox approach. Perhaps President Johnson might consider a radio and television address utilizing VOA and TELSTAR directed explicitly to America's world-wide constituency. A dignified report and a call for a constructive approach on the part of Hanoi might set forth the issues better than any other effort in recent past.
  - 5. Provide a periodic classified report on progress of talks, originating from Ambassador Harriman, for delivery through Missions to most senior officials of foreign governments.
  - 6. Statement from a high-level non-US source that the world still awaits positive North Vietnamese response to US de-escalation. Also should be done by US spokesmen and in the United Nations.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By plm, NARA, Date 7-12-01

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7. A tour of appropriate capitals by high-level US officials.
8. Meeting of TCC Foreign Ministers on the effort in Paris.
9. Our Embassy in Paris and the Delegation should regularly brief Latin American Ambassadors in Paris, using Vance and Harriman for occasional dramatic effect.
10. Secretary Rusk or Ambassador Harriman could give in Washington a high-level briefing on the talks to either Latin American Ambassadors or Ambassadors to OAS.
11. Stimulate AFL-CIO leadership to develop dialogue with labor counterparts.
12. Pass more CAS material to friendly governments.
13. Keep Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Vance on the spot in Paris as continuing evidence of importance US attaches to talks. Continue to be patient, etc., and Hanoi will continue to demonstrate insincerity.
14. Opinion in the Francophone states is largely influenced by the French press, like Le Monde. Can we get less anti-American AFP and French press coverage?
15. Ambassadors Bunker and Harriman highly thought of in Indonesia. Visit by Bunker on vacation or visit throughout Asia by Harriman to sample opinion would be helpful.

~~SECRET~~

16. Approach nonaligned Asian leaders to ask whether they have any specific thoughts in mind as to how the talks in Paris could be moved to more fruitful phase.
17. Any stress on North Vietnamese activities in Laos is a plus and will serve to increase uneasiness about the North Vietnamese role in South Viet-Nam as only "patriotic."
18. Statement from world-wide national leaders urging North Viet-Nam to respond constructively may be helpful in letting North Viet-Nam know that its negative stand is adversely affecting world opinion.
19. Utilize forum of nonaligned powers, which are having a preliminary meeting in Addis Ababa next month.
20. Unilateral cessation of bombing of the North.
21. Get something from North Viet-Nam that could be represented as a concession, and then stop all bombing of North Viet-Nam.
22. A public appeal by President Thieu to world opinion for an end of Viet Cong inhuman murder of Saigon civilian population which serves no military objective.
23. Briefings for African Ambassadors in Washington and New York. Should be in French for French-speaking group.
24. We should encourage closer contact between African countries and East Asian countries which support the United States.

- B. Suggested actions to improve dissemination of material beneficial to the American position.
1. Accelerate the program to invite Latin American TV, radio and news representatives to Viet-Nam.
  2. USIS to provide daily one-minute film clips on indiscriminate Viet Cong brutality at a time when the United States has been pressured by world opinion to cease bombing the North. Would also include talks.
  3. USIS wireless file should carry more quotes and statements by Chiefs of State and other world leaders in favor of the US position.
  4. USIS wireless file should carry concise summaries of the talks, with columnar format outlining the US position and North Vietnamese response, and the same for the North Vietnamese position.
  5. A half-hour film on the talks by Ambassador Harriman.
  6. USIS material should give greater attention to how peace will affect particular area interests, i.e., Latin America.
  7. Articles under Ambassador Vance's by-line (or Ambassador Harriman's?) for use in Turkey.
  8. Assistant Secretary Leddy suggested an increase in transmission to Eastern Europe of coverage of the talks.

55d

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EFFECT OF PARIS TALKS ON ATTITUDES  
TOWARD US IN VIET-NAM BY AREA

East-Asia

The Paris talks have not significantly changed attitudes toward the US involvement in Viet-Nam among the six troop-contributing and other nations of East Asia and the Pacific, which in general have given strong support. However, the patient but firm position of the US negotiators in the course of the talks has been of significant help in assuring the nations of the area that the United States, in going to the negotiating table, was not preparing to disengage from the war as a prelude to a total reassessment of the US role in East Asia.

There is a feeling that the talks are merely a tactical ploy on the part of Hanoi and that any settlement in Paris will reflect the outcome of the fighting in Viet-Nam. At the same time, there is sympathy with US objectives in having the talks and hope that the talks will not be terminated before Hanoi's intentions have been thoroughly probed. Our allies with troops in Viet-Nam would support a military response to increased Communist military activity in the South. Also, a senior Malaysian official has expressed understanding and acceptance of whatever military response the US would have to make at this time. But large segments of public opinion would be dismayed at a significant escalation in military activity.

Japan presents a special problem in East Asia as the Japanese are most interested in seeing what they view as an irreversible trend toward peaceful resolution of the conflict continue; they pay little heed to the merits of the arguments in Paris. The Japanese public would probably applaud

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By jc, NARA, Date 7-3-01

further unilateral concessions on our part if they should lead to real progress in Paris, although the government and conservatives likely would have misgivings. Conversely, even the leadership would be reluctant to endorse publicly any intensification of the conflict on our part.

Burma's attitude toward the US reportedly has been improved by the fact that we have been able to get North Viet-Nam to the conference table.

### Western Europe

The President's March 31 speech received a generally sympathetic response throughout Europe. It marked a turning point in public and private attitudes toward United States Viet-Nam policy and in the debate surrounding that policy. The President's peace offer (coupled with his own decision not to seek the Presidency in the interest of pursuing that offer) substantially improved the political and public climate existing at the time by making quite clear the genuine resolve of the United States to negotiate an honorable peace with Hanoi.

The subsequent Paris talks have reinforced this view. The United States profited from the general sense of relief most Europeans felt when the talks finally advanced to the conference table. We further profited from the fact that the talks were the result of an American initiative. Beyond that, since the talks have commenced, the positions taken in Paris present to Europeans a rather sharp contrast which also serves our interests. On the one hand there is the reasonable US position and on the other North Vietnamese intransigence.

There is no evidence to be adduced from this which suggests any shift of sympathy since March 31 to the United States on the part of former critics. There continues to be

considerable opposition in Europe to our position in Viet-Nam. It is most vocal in Scandinavia, although it seems to decrease in intensity as one moves south. However, it is clear, that developments since the President's address have created a better understanding of our desire to end the war. In view of the intense criticism the United States faced in various Western European countries some months ago, the fact that many Europeans now discern and accept this fact represents a substantial net gain. Many honest but anguished Europeans, officials, the clergy, students and academicians were previously highly critical of the United States. Many of these same people have now moderated their views. While this is less true for extremist elements, the President's speech and the Paris talks have served, to a large extent, to take the wind out of their sails. At the same time there may be a greater willingness to take a more objective or at least factual view of the fighting. The critical reaction to the rocket attacks on Saigon are a case in point.

There are, of course, other elements in this picture. European preoccupation with student riots, unrest in France and the assassination of Senator Kennedy have, more recently, tended to turn public attention away from the Paris talks. They have increased public concern about violence in today's world but they have also changed the focus of that concern from Viet-Nam alone. Thus the problem looms less large on the international scene.

However, that may be, there is no question that since March 31 our determination to seek a peaceful solution and our sincerity of purpose in this respect is no longer questioned by many Europeans. As a result the United States is in a better position in Western Europe, in terms of public and private opinion, than at any previous time during the last twelve to eighteen months.

Although the initial positive effects of the President's speech and the opening of the talks may tend to dissipate as time goes on, it seems reasonable to conclude that at this juncture, barring a breakdown in the talks or some other unfavorable development of major consequence, there will be no drastic shift in the present attitudes of Western Europeans. Opinion would, of course, change swiftly - and for the worse - if the talks were to break off in stalemate.

One other point should be mentioned here. From first hand experience with communist tactics, Western Europeans generally expect prolonged and difficult negotiations. Western Europeans might be expected to exercise patience since they anticipate no visible results for some time. But the possibility of pressures developing for one-sided concessions by the United States can by no means be excluded, particularly if the negotiations drag on throughout the summer without signs of progress while heavy fighting continues.

#### Eastern Europe and the USSR

There is little to assess as concerns public and private opinion in Eastern Europe and the USSR.

The nations of the Communist East did welcome the beginning of the Paris talks, but they ascribed this to Hanoi's initiative and to US tacit admission of defeat. They showed signs of feeling the same sense of relief as the West that talks were finally underway. Beyond this, there may be some understanding of the United States obligation to defend South Viet-Nam, and, among the more sophisticated leadership, some appreciation of what is at stake in Viet-Nam. But by and large public and private opinion in this area of Europe can only be characterized as negative. In private and public the

position is that the United States is the aggressor in Viet-Nam. Anything less would completely undercut the ideological position of the Communist East.

#### Near East

In general the posts in the Arab states reported, as would be expected, that the officials and public are preoccupied by their own problems, especially the Arab-Israeli situation. However, (except for Southern Yemen) the officials and some of the other opinion leaders seem to fully understand and sympathize with our position at the Paris talks. The press is less sympathetic, but generally balanced, and the man in the street is preoccupied by more sensational recent developments and apparently quite bored with the Paris talks. New Delhi reported that over the last few months, public and private Indian attitudes toward the U.S. position in Viet-Nam have moved considerably in our favor.

#### Western Hemisphere

Most of the nations in this hemisphere tend to see events in Viet-Nam and at the Paris talks from the U.S. point of view. This is due in part to the Latin American press' heavy reliance on the US wire services, AP and UPI. More fundamental perhaps, is the appreciation noted by Embassy Georgetown that the wellbeing of the countries in this hemisphere is somehow tied to that of the United States.

Yet, a consistent theme in many of the Embassies' reports was that the local populace felt remote from the events in Viet-Nam and Paris. General public reactions in the hemisphere seem to vary from apathy coupled with ignorance (in the smaller, less sophisticated countries like Barbados, El Salvador, and Haiti) to an informed awareness, but detachment (in the larger, or more sophisticated countries like

Argentina and Uruguay). Argentina was recently awakened to the brutality of the Viet Cong by the recent murder of a La Nacion reporter whose trip to Saigon was facilitated by USIS.

Several posts, including La Paz, Quito, and Tegucigalpa, found that local concern was related to an awareness that US aid commitments under the Alliance for Progress were likely to suffer from the War's effects.

Embassy Caracas notes that while there is little sympathy with the North Vietnamese position, there is also an uneasiness about the US involvement. Georgetown and Mexico City mentioned that local government leaders, while supporting US policies privately, have sought to avoid public identification with them so as not to draw fire from the Left.

Most Latin American leaders appear to have a realistic view of the difficulties in the negotiations, and anti-American agitation is not a problem. The leaders of at least three countries (Bolivia, Paraguay, and Nicaragua) felt that the US should do more on the battlefield, and in Nicaragua there is a particularly notable cynicism that the Paris talks will succeed.

### Africa

Thirty of the African governments have positions ranging from strong support through neutrality to indifference due to preoccupation with other matters. Our efforts in these cases have been reasonably successful either in confirming a favorable attitude or in maintaining our position in the face of neutrality or indifference. A discernible and in a few cases dramatic improvement in the understanding of our views is implicit in a fair number of the reports.

~~SECRET~~

7

Nine African governments (four of whom have no diplomatic relations with us) remain critical of our position. Current efforts beginning with the President's speech and continuing during the Paris talks have yet to change substantially views which have been deeply and emotionally held by the leadership of these states.

Wednesday, June 26, 1968  
11:00 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a summary of Phil Habib's telephone call about today's Paris meeting, which ended at 9:30 a. m. our time.

1. It ran four hours.
2. The formal statement from the other side was pure boilerplate.
3. The coffee break was "extremely interesting":
  - for the first time, They suggested the coffee break;
  - Vance and Habib were at a table with They and Lau, their No. 3 man. (The was not there. The thought crossed my mind that he might be in Moscow.)
  - Cy covered the two points that we wished to probe. First, the follow-up on Tho's remark of last week that a political settlement should precede military action. They responded that there could of course be talks of a political settlement after a total bombing cessation. Second, the A-B formula.

4. Habib says that it was clear that They was anticipating Vance's raising of this formula. Vance did so in line with the instruction which you cleared yesterday, in general terms. They was obviously much interested but confined himself to stating that they would give it "most careful study."

5. They then made a procedural suggestion. At the next meeting, scheduled for next Wednesday, he urged that he and Harriman carry on the formal discussion, but that Lau and Vance meet separately but concurrently for the whole duration of the meeting rather than merely for a coffee break. This would, of course, substantially expand the opportunities for private exchanges. Cy said we would consider their proposal.

Cy then raised the desirability of more frequent private meetings rather than merely the Wednesday sessions. They was not directly responsive but said this proposal "could be considered."

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By je, NARA, Date 7-3-01

6. In short, we are apparently launched on an exploration directly of the A-B formula.

7. We shall be getting Cy's own report of all this shortly, as well as his recommendations including, apparently, recommendation on how we approach the Russians during the coming week, perhaps via Zoria.

W. W. Rostow

Wednesday, June 26, 1968  
11:00 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith another <sup>w</sup>straw in the wind.<sup>g</sup>

State tells me we will soon have a  
Henry Kissinger-Sainteny conversation in  
the same vein.

Sainteny has hitherto been pretty gloomy  
about a settlement acceptable to us.

I'll forward when received.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

NNNN  
ZCZC EPE 907  
YY NOR

WL 57a

0147: VIET-JOURNALIST:

HONG KONG, JUNE 26 (REUTERS)--THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE PREPARED TO SETTLE FOR A TYPE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST, THE EAST AND THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE, ACCORDING TO AUSTRALIAN JOURNALIST WILFRED BURCHETT.

BURCHETT, WHO IS CLOSE TO NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS, HAS COVERED THE PARIS VIETNAMESE PEACE TALKS BUT IS NOW IN BRITAIN.

"I DON'T THINK THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE INTERESTED IN CREATING THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH IT IS INEVITABLE THAT THERE IS TO BE SOME COMMUNIST-ORIENTED GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM," HE SAID IN AN INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN THIS WEEK'S FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW.

"THIS IS SOMETHING THEY WOULD CERTAINLY PREFER, BUT IN THE INTEREST OF BRINGING ABOUT THE END OF THE LONG STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE, THEY ARE PREPARED TO SETTLE FOR A TYPE OF GOVERNMENT WHICH IS ENTIRELY ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST, TO THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND TO THE EAST AS WELL," BURCHETT SAID.

;; REUTERS CD/EB

Wednesday, June 26, 1968 -- 9:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Clark Clifford called this morning with the following points and questions for you.

1. Gen. Johnson retires at midnight July 2 as Chief of Staff of the Army. Clifford is told that it is customary and traditional for the retiring Chief of Staff to be given a Distinguished Service Medal by the President at the White House. His question is: Would you agree to give Gen. Johnson a DSM at a small White House ceremony on July 2?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

2. Westmoreland takes over as Chief of Staff, Army, on Wednesday, July 3, having arrived in Washington on Monday or Tuesday. It is traditional that the Chief of Staff of the Army be sworn in at the Pentagon. But it would also fit custom if you were to award Westmoreland a DSM for his 4 years of service in Vietnam. Clifford recommends that you do this at a small White House ceremony after you return from your 4th of July weekend; say, July 8 or 9. His question, therefore, is: Do you wish to award Westy a DSM at a White House ceremony on July 8 or 9?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

W. W. Rostow

cc: G. Christian  
J. Jones

WWRostow:rlm

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, June 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*sent to Pres  
Shure 6/27/68*

SUBJECT: Israeli Cabinet Statement

Following up our luncheon conversation and your chat with Evron <sup>2. Pres file</sup> last evening, I wish to bring to your attention a press release authorized by the Israeli Cabinet (attached). It comes in the wake of Dayan's unfortunate statement last week that Israel could not accept the November UN resolution. It puts Dayan in his place and reaffirms Eban's interpretation of the resolution, saying that Israel would negotiate final borders somewhere between the June 4 lines and the present cease-fire lines.

Eppie Evron says we ought to read this three ways. Of course, it's mainly a domestic political document meant to curb Dayan. But it was also written in the knowledge that the Jordanians have asked for a clarification of Israel's position on withdrawal. Finally, it was issued to let the world community know that Israel has not renounced its acquiescence in the UN Security Council resolution.

This will still leave the Arabs skeptical. The other side of the picture Eppie put to you last night is that the Arabs don't believe the Israelis are willing to withdraw under any circumstances. If we sent an emissary to Israel, his first job would be to extract from Eshkol some kind of assurance that Israel would withdraw to reasonable boundaries-- in the context of a general settlement--that we could make credible to Nasser. Even if the Egyptians are just pretending not to believe that Israel will withdraw, we need some sort of unqualified Israeli statement before we can call their bluff.

I don't mean to overrate the position the Cabinet has taken. It's basically a restatement of the familiar line. But since the Israelis will throw it at us from time to time, I thought you should be aware of it-- and of our feeling that it's useful but still not as straightforward as we'd like.

W. W. Rostow

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By JK, NARA, Date 7-3-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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**PRESS RELEASE ISSUED BY  
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTRY FOLLOWING  
CABINET MEETING OF JUNE 23.**

The Israeli Cabinet today gave full and emphatic endorsement to the position taken by Foreign Minister Abba Eban on the problem of Israel's future boundaries and on his interpretation of the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967.

The Government reaffirmed the statements on this subject made to the Security Council and the Knesset by the Foreign Minister and the Israeli delegate to the UN between November 22, 1967, and May 29, 1968.

In these statements Mr. Eban had declared that while the situation of June 4 could not be restored, Israel was willing to negotiate "secure and recognized boundaries" with each Arab state as part of the peacemaking process.

On November 15 the US Representative had explained that the term "secure and recognized boundaries" which appears in two drafts, one American and one British, meant an agreed boundary different from the previous armistice line and from the present cease-fire line.\*

In the Cabinet discussion today, it was made clear that personal views expressed by Ministers in a party meeting could not in any way affect the validity of authorized statements by the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister. Yesterday the Prime Minister made a public statement to this effect.

\* This is an oversimplification of Arthur Goldberg. His language carefully did not exclude any agreed territorial settlement. This makes it appear that he excluded June 4 lines (the "previous armistice line"). We have objected. But the significant point is that this refers back to the time in New York when Goldberg was telling Hussein that we thought he ought to get most of the West Bank back.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Wednesday - June 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: The Barrientos Visit and Economic Assistance

Bolivia had a \$7 million deficit in 1967 and may have an additional \$10 million in 1968. The deficits are due principally to a drop in tin prices, the cost of putting down the Guevara guerrillas, a decline in revenues from the nationalized mines, and delay in implementation of planned revenue measures.

The Bolivians asked us for budgetary help last year, and Covey Oliver reluctantly agreed to continue them on the dole (they were supposed to come off on January 1, 1968) provided they took self-help measures to cover part of the deficit. The deal worked out after months of negotiations has these elements:

1. The US would authorize a \$4.5 million supporting assistance loan for budget support in 1968 and approve standby authority to use up to \$9 million in 1969 and 1970 from PL 480 local currency generations.
2. The Bolivians would implement fiscal reform measures; increase revenues by 25% in 1968; reduce 1968 spending by 12% under planned levels; establish tighter controls over free spending autonomous agencies; and continue IMF drawing eligibility.

By late May, the loan was on the verge of being signed. The Bolivians had taken all the self-help measures except the key revenue-raising 10% import surtax, but seemed ready to do that. Then President Barrientos ran into some political flak with students, teachers and military plotting. He did not want to increase political tensions with the surtax, so postponed action until he had the situation well in hand. But after taking care of his troubles, he continued to delay.

3.4(b)  
(1)

[REDACTED] we have the distinct impression the delay is related to Barrientos' visit to the Ranch. We suspect his advisers have told him that by talking to you, he can probably get the budget support money without imposing the surtax. He may also think he can get you to move three development loans (roads, community development, aviation) which AID is holding back until Bolivia gets its financial house in order because each calls for a sizeable local contribution.

AID has told the Bolivians that the FY 1968 SA money must be obligated by June 30 or it lapses, and the prospects for FY 1969 money are most uncertain. Ambassador Henderson reports that even these facts of life have not persuaded them to move on the surtax.

Unless the Bolivians have a change of heart between now and Sunday, President Barrientos may try to use the Ranch visit to engage in substantive talks. We will try to discourage this.

In reviewing the background, Bill Bowdler concludes that AID's insistence on self-help measures is justified from an economic standpoint, but it does not give due weight to political factors. Bill thinks we should hold firm on the import surtax, but be more forthcoming on the three development loans since they would help to sugar-coat the surtax for Bolivian public opinion.

W. W. Rostow

WGB:mm

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*Pres file*

**INFORMATION**

**Wednesday, June 26, 1968**

**NOTE FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**I thought you might be interested in seeing the column that Peregrine Worst-horne wrote after his interview with you. It is attached.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**Att**

Sunday Telegraph  
June 16, 1968



61a

WASHINGTON, Saturday.

**T**HE assassination of an incumbent President throws history forward, hurrying it on in a brutal, unexpected lurch. The present is forced, before its proper time, to give way precipitately to the future. But the assassination of a leading Presidential aspirant, especially one so celebrated and renowned as Robert Kennedy, has the opposite effect. It throws history backward with a violent lurch, aborting the future and rejuvenating the present. The heir apparent is dead; long live the king.

In this case, long live L.B.J. It is astonishing how the death of the second Kennedy, like the death of the first, has had the effect of summoning Lyndon Johnson from the shadows.

How could it be otherwise? Bobby's death has done more than place a polite moratorium on politicking for a few days. With any other death, that might be all. But the death of Bobby has already become the stuff of which legends are made. When he was alive nobody really believed that he had much chance of winning the Presidency. But in death it is different. Already he is being talked about as if what happened at Los Angeles was the snuffing out of a new Kennedy era which now will never dawn.

This campaign is going to be like "Hamlet" without the Prince of Denmark: it has already, almost at its outset, reached its emotional climax in a death which is likely to be infinitely more memorable than anything that is likely to follow. Out of it will emerge in November a new President, Nixon or Humphrey or possibly Rockefeller or McCarthy, but it is difficult to believe that his inauguration will be as spectacular, or move the millions so much, as the funeral of the man who was shot in June. In other words, the feelings of promise, of expectation, of excitement, of glad, confident morning being about to dawn again, all the feelings which campaigns are meant to engender, are miserably absent today.

L.B.J. is acutely aware of this: acutely aware that the assassination, by transforming the nature of the campaign from a spring-like democratic rite, a kind of maypole

G.1b

# Why L.B.J. sees a hardening on Vietnam

from Peregrine Worsthorne

ritual of rejuvenation, into something more like an autumnal wake, has denied the American body politic something which it desperately needs: and, more important, made it necessary for him to play a far more vigorous part on the national scene than would otherwise have been the case.

Most emphatically, therefore, President Johnson is not a lame duck. That tall, heavy figure, slumped in his Oval Room armchair, long legs outstretched, is still the man in charge, and far from power having begun to ebb away into other hands, the tide seems to be moving in the opposite direction. Once again, as in the aftermath of the earlier tragedy, the people need him: once again fate has singled him out to rally a shocked nation. The assassination, by destroying the promise of the future, has concentrated hopes on the present, given L.B.J. a new lease of life which he is determined to use to the full.

## America's will

Vietnam is still the main area for action, and this reporter can state in the most authoritative manner that L.B.J. has not decided to throw in the sponge and utterly rejects the idea that America's will to carry on the war has been irreparably broken.

Talk in the President's room at the White House today is not about diplomatic concessions. The feeling is that enough of these have already been made, with no results so far. All the North Vietnamese have done to date in Paris is to "read out the telephone book"—a White House euphemism for diplomatic stonewalling—while stepping up the war on the ground. Clearly Hanoi has concluded from all the liberal fainthearts that America has had enough and that L.B.J. is looking desperately for a way out, however humiliating.

The kind of conversation one hears in some American homes might seem to justify these hopes, but this kind of talk is not heard in the Oval Room, and my advice to anybody who holds this view is not even to whisper it between those curving walls. The reaction is terrible to experience, a baleful silence which seems to fill the great room more overpoweringly than the loudest explosion.

For one visitor this silence is broken by the telephone ringing, the sound coming from the footstool. The President leans forward to slide up a panel which reveals a complex of buttons. The receiver is grasped in the mighty hand and a message passes. "Excuse me," the President says, frowning heavily, "I have an important visitor who needs to see me urgently, but you stay right there."

Moments pass in mounting tension until the door swings open, and in toddles Lyndon Junior, aged one, plus his mum to bid the President goodnight. It is a touching scene. The President starts chanting "Pat-a-cake, pat-a-cake," and the infant gurgles delightedly. Then the infant starts lurching towards the President's desk, behind which are the levers of power in the form of red, white and blue telephones.

"Watch out for the telephones!" shouts the President.

But too late. The infant has already delightedly unhooked the red one, and is gurgling into it while shaking the receiver like a rattle. Could it be the hot line? Is Mr. Kosygin at the other end? Or Harold Wilson? Or the strategic Air Force? Could this be the button? Delicious conjectures.

Naughty, naughty Lyndon Junior is recaptured by his adoring grandfather and placed in the presidential chair behind the desk, pen thrust into his hand and a State paper pushed under his nose. "That's what they want, isn't

it, a younger man in the White House? Well, there he is." And there he was, a tiny figure, looking for a moment rather lost in the great chair, frowning, perplexed, as if pondering on peace and war.

It was strangely moving. A baby, symbolic of innocence, in the hot seat from which one day may come the order to destroy the world.

It was bedtime now. The infant and mother departed and the President, before returning to his chair, switched on the radio. The voice of Mrs. Martin Luther King filled the room with a call for the end of the Vietnam war. That was switched off quickly, without comment. How can the war be ended? A nobody who thinks that the American people are going to walk out on their commitment to the South Vietnamese must have been talking to the wrong people, to the fainthearts. The President knew the real American people who would never tolerate such dishonour, and any President who asked them to would spark off such a furious reaction of Righteous indignation that liberal America really would be endangered.

## Sharp questions

Do the liberals realise that? Have they considered the political implications of a humiliated and angry Army returning home convinced that they had been "stabbed in the back"? Can they not realise how the Right wing of the Republican party would exploit such a development, or how it would contribute to swelling the cry for authoritarian leadership?

Do they not see the danger? And cannot Hanoi see the danger of their vicious terror tactics in Saigon, while the Americans have halted the bombing of Hanoi? Did they not realise how quickly popular pressure in America would mount for retaliation, and how diffi-

Appeal for the Kennedy vote, promising to espouse all the radical causes of the dead Senator. Here



Relief from Vietnam: carrying his grandson, Patrick Lyndon Nugent, the President arrives to spend the weekend at the L.B.J. ranch

cult. it would be for the White House to go on resisting that pressure or how much less inclined to resist it a Republican Administration would be, if one was returned in November? Who would really have been the gainer if all the liberal agitation to get rid of L.B.J. only resulted in America getting Richard Nixon?

This is the kind of question which is being asked in the White House. The questions are all the more formidable when put in a slow Texan drawl and combined with a basilisk stare. The President seems convinced that the indiscriminate rocketing of Saigon, which has already killed 132 civilians and wounded more than a thousand, coming after his own speech of March 31 limiting the bombing and announcing his own withdrawal from the electoral race, is bringing about a profound change of heart in America about the Vietnam war. He does not believe that the peace-at-any-price brigade need any longer be taken seriously.

This does not mean that there is any question of breaking off the peace talks. But it does mean that they can be conducted, from the American side, from a much firmer domestic political base than anyone would have deemed possible a few weeks ago.

Before Averell Harriman went

to Paris there was a final briefing of him by the President in which he was told, with the utmost solemnity, to pay no regard whatsoever to the state of American public opinion. It begins to look as if President Johnson may well have known what he was talking about. He himself has never taken the "fainthearts" very seriously, and least seriously of all those who were foolish enough to withdraw their support of the war at the time of the Tet offensive. Such fickleness struck him as dismayingly un-American, and un-British, too.

To one visitor, at any rate, this last reference was all too comprehensible. That visitor did not bat an eyelid, but he felt rather worm-like and wished that President Johnson had more than one grandchild who could come in to break the awkward tension with some further happy bedtime frolics.

President Johnson is an extraordinary man, large in every way. By all the normal rules of the political game he should be beginning slowly to fade away into the wings. Yet it is the candidates who seem somehow to be fading away, wraith-like figures whose voices get ever fainter, even when they try raising them, as Rockefeller did earlier in the week.

His was an extraordinary performance. He made a nation-wide

was a contender for the Republican nomination explicitly promising to do everything which only a few days earlier the most prominent contender for the Democratic nomination had been promising to do.

As for McCarthy he, too, has started campaigning again. But the main point of McCarthy was to act as Robert Kennedy's conscience. That was his role: to act as the Kennedy pace-setter, to push him forward down the liberal paths a little faster than he wanted to go. But now that Kennedy is no more, McCarthy is an actor in search of another role.

Nixon and Humphrey, the two favourites, are still biding their time. No doubt they are working hard behind the scenes. But politics have somehow lost their savour. The taste for battle has been sated by blood. That is why L.B.J., who is not in the lists, seems today the only man in American politics with a clear part to play and a will to play it.

## Strange acts

Finally, a word about Senator Edward Kennedy. Last week I expressed the view that he would be ill-advised to pick up the family's Presidential torch. It seemed to me that the Kennedy style of heroic leadership was injecting a toxic element into the body politic which had become highly dangerous. These fears were confirmed by the spectacular neo-imperial scale of the funeral, which went far beyond what was suitable to honour the memory of the dead man.

It looked very much as if the family were determined to stay at the centre of the public stage. Why, for example, the day after the funeral, did Senator Edward Kennedy and his wife visit the office of CBS to watch a television playback of the entire proceedings? It seemed strange as an act of mourning and only comprehensible in terms of a man concerned with his public image. Again, what was the point of the dead Senator's teenage son walking down the entire length of the funeral train introducing himself to each guest with the words "I am Joe Kennedy," as if he were soliciting votes? It all looked as if another chapter was in the making.

But appearances may have deceived. It is now said that in fact Senator Edward Kennedy is determined not to get involved in another act, and that he is seriously considering devoting his life to bringing up the fatherless children of his dead brothers.

This would be an eloquent and moving gesture. It might even, at this stage, do the American weal greater service in a simple way than all the earlier, more glamorous Kennedy endeavours. This would be in the truest and best American tradition. And it might even have a happy ending.