

**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#7 memo	Rostow to President, 10:40 a.m. <del>open 9/18/01</del> <del>S</del> 1 p [Dup. #106, NSF, CF, VN, "HARUAN, VII" Bx117]	<del>7/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#7a cable	Paris 17406 <del>S</del> 2 p [Dup. #106 as above] <i>open 1-20-98 RAC</i>	<del>7/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#9a cable	Saigon 31701 <del>open 9/18/01</del> <del>S</del> 1 p	<del>7/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#10 memo	Rostow to President, 9:45 a.m. <del>open 9/18/01</del> <del>C</del> 1 p	<del>7/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#10a rpt	Attachment to #10a <del>open 9/18/01</del> <del>PCI</del> 1 p	<del>7/3/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#16a cable	Deptel to Saigon <del>open 9/18/01</del> <del>S</del> 2 p	<del>7/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#17 memo	Rostow to President, 4:15 p.m. ( <i>dup #49, NSF, CF, VN, Hanoi / crocodile</i> ) <del>C</del> 1 p <del>open 9/18/01</del> <i>Indian Proposal Box 134</i>	<del>7/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#17a cable	Hanoi 63 ( <i>dup #49a as above</i> ) <del>open 9/18/01</del> <del>C</del> 4 p	<del>6/27/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#18 memo <i>sanitized 5-12-03 NW/PA 01-236</i>	Rostow to President, 3:30 p.m. TS 2 p [dup. #51a, NSF, CF, USSR, "Vol. 20" Box 226]	7/2/68	A
#18a memo <i>sanitized 6-27-03 NW/PA 01-237</i>	Helms to Rostow TS 1 p	7/1/68	A
#18b memo <i>exempt 6-27-03 NW/PA 01-237</i>	Intelligence Memorandum TS 13 p	7/1/68	A
#18c rpt <i>sanitized 6-27-03 NW/PA 01-237</i>	Intelligence Report TS 52 p	6/28/68	A
#18h memo <i>sanitized 6-27-03 NW/PA 01-237</i>	Intelligence Memorandum TS 2 p	6/28/68	A

FILE LOCATION

**NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 86, July 1-4, 1968 Box 37**

**RESTRICTION CODES**

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**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#20 memo	Rostow to President, 3:10 p.m. open 9-17-95 NLJ 92-179 S 1 p Duplicate of #2, NSF, CF, China, Vol 13	7/2/68	A
#20a memo	Jenkins to Rostow open 1-11-94 NLJ 92-200 S 2 p Duplicate of #2a, NSF, China, Vol 13	7/2/68	A
#20d cable	Intelligence Information Cable sanitized 3/13/03 NLJ 01-285 C 4 p Duplicate of #2d, NSF, CF, China, Vol 13	6/29/68	A
#20e cable	Intelligence Information Cable exempt 9-15-97 NLJ 92-109 S 3 p Duplicate of #2e, NSF, CF, China, Vol 13	6/29/68	A
#20f cable	Intelligence Information Cable sanitized 3/13/03 NLJ 01-285 more info released S 3 p Duplicate of #2f, NSF, CF, China, Vol 13	6/27/68	A
#20g cable	Intelligence Information Cable sanitized 9-17-93 NLJ 92-202 S 3 p Duplicate of #2g, NSF, CF, China, Vol 13	6/24/68	A
#20h cable	Intelligence Information Cable exempt NLJ 92-202 C 3 p Duplicate of #2h, NSF, CF, China, Vol 13	6/26/68	A
#20j cable	Intelligence Information Cable sanitized 9-17-93 NLJ 92-202 C 4 p Duplicate of #2j, NSF, CF, China, Vol 13	6/26/68	A
#20k cable	Intelligence Information Cable exempt NLJ 92-202 S 2 p Duplicate of #2k, NSF, CF, China, Vol 13	6/11/68	A
#21 memo	Rostow to President, 2:00 p.m. open 9/18/01 S 3 p Dup. #2, NSF, IMFT File, "President's Proposed Sighlpru (Admmt)" Vol 13	7/2/68	A
#21a memo	Katzenbach to President open 9/18/01 S 2 p	undated	A
#21b cable	Draft Circular open 9/18/01 S 3 p	6/27/68	A
#21c rpt	"Proposed Schedule for the President..." open 9/18/01 S 1 p	undated	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#21d cable	Bangui 1191 <del>open 9/18/01</del> S 3 p	<del>6/18/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#23 memo	Rostow to President, 12:30 p.m. (dup # 72, NSF, CF, VN <i>Harmon/Crocodile</i> <i>Indochina Program...</i> ) S 1 p <del>open 9/18/01</del>	<del>7/2/68</del>	<del>A</del> <i>Box 134</i>
#23a cable	Deptel to Paris (dup # 72a as above <del>open 9/18/01</del> ) S 2 p	<del>7/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#24 memo <i>sanitized 12-03</i> <i>NSI RAL 01-2340</i>	Rostow to President, 12:15 p.m. S 1 p	7/2/68	A
#25a memo	Taylor to President <i>open 8-12-93 NLS 92-383</i> S 2 p <i>Duplicate of #21a, NSF, CF, VN, "8I-Taylor memo"</i>	<del>7/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#28 memo	Rostow to President, 11:45 a.m. <i>dup # 74, NSF, CF, VN</i> S 1 p <del>open 9/18/01</del> <i>Harmon/Crocodile, Indochina Program...</i> <i>Box 134</i>	<del>7/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#28a cable	Saigon 31593 (dup # 74a as above) <del>open 9/18/01</del> S 4 p	<del>7/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#29 memo	Rostow to President, 11:40 a.m. <del>open 9/18/01</del> S 2 p	<del>7/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#30 memo	Rostow to President, 10:40 a.m. <i>4 in NSF, CF, VN Harmon/Crocodile</i> S 2 p <del>open 9/18/01</del> <i>Indochina Program Box 134</i>	<del>7/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#30b cable	Deptel 194772 to Paris S 4 p <i>[Dup #49, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN, VII" BX 117]</i>	<del>7/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#30c cable	Paris 17324 S 1 p <i>[Dup #114, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN, VII" BX 117]</i>	<del>7/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#30e cable	Paris 17332 S 21 p <i>[Dup #111, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN, VII, " BX 117]</i>	<del>7/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#32 memo	Rostow to President <del>open 9/18/01</del> C 1 p	<del>7/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#32a ltr	Woods to President <i>open 9/18/01</i> <del>C</del> 1 p	<del>7/2/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#32b ltr	Woods to Rostow <i>open 9/18/01</i> <del>C</del> 3 p	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#32d ltr	<del>Woods to President</del> <i>open 9/18/01</i> <del>PCI</del> 1 p	<del>6/14/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#36 memo	Rostow to President, 8 p.m. <i>open 3/99</i> S 2 p	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#36a cable	Paris 17321 <i>open 3/99</i> S 6 p [Dup. # 115, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVAN, VIII" BX 117] <i>NSF, CF, VN, Harvan/Citadel Indian Program Box 134 H 70, Fla</i>	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#40 memo	Rostow to President, 7:30 p.m. <i>open 9/18/01</i> <del>S</del> 1 p	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#42 memo	Rostow to President, 3:55 p.m. <i>open 9/18/01</i> <del>S</del> 1 p	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#42a cable	Moscow 4464 <i>open 9/18/01</i> <del>S</del> 1 p	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#42b cable	Moscow 4463 <i>open 9/18/01</i> <del>S</del> 1 p	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#46a memo	Foster to Rostow <i>open 11/4/03 per NLT 01-286</i> <del>S</del> 1 p	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#47 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 9/18/01</i> <del>C</del> 3 p	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#48 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 9/18/01</i> <del>S</del> 1 p <i>Duplicate of #210, NSF, CF, Israel, Vol X; Sanitized 1984</i>	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#49 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 9/18/01</i> <del>S</del> 1 p <i>Duplicate of #14, NSP, CF, Saudi Arabia, Vol 2</i> <i>sanitized 8-17-93 NLT 01-368</i>	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#49c rpt <i>sanitized S12-03 NW 01-257</i>	Bio Sketch S 2 p <i>(Duplicate of #141c, NSF, CF, Saudi Arabia, Vol 2, Exempt NLJ 91-365)</i>	6/12/68	A
#50 memo	<del>Rostow to President</del> <i>open 9/18/01</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#52a memo	<del>Bowdler to Rostow</del> <i>open 9/18/01</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#54 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 11:10 a.m.</del> <i>open 9/18/01</i> <del>C 1 p</del>	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#54a memo <i>sanitized S12-03 NW 01-238</i>	Toon to Read C 1 p	6/28/68	A
#56a cable	<del>Moscow 4450</del> <i>open 9/18/01</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#58 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 8:20 a.m.</del> <i>open 9/18/01</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#58a cable	<del>Saigon 31488</del> <i>open 9/18/01</i> <del>S 2 p</del>	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

**NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 86, July 1-4, 1968 Box 37**

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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>50a note</del>	<del>Rostow to the President - open 9/18/01; removed per TH</del> <del>1 p - S -</del>	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A &amp; C</del>
<del>55 note</del>	<del>dup. of #50a - open 9/18/01; removed per TH</del>	<del>7/1/68</del>	<del>A &amp; C</del>

## FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 86, July 1-4, 1968, Box 37

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UNCLASSIFIED

July 4, 1968

1  
Sent Ranch  
~~CHP~~  
W#81445

From: Bromley Smith YKS

To: Jim Jones

For the President's approval is the following congratulatory message to the newly-elected President of Iceland, Dr. Kristjan Eldjarn:

"Dear Dr. Eldjarn:

"I extend to you my heartfelt congratulations on your election to the Presidency of Iceland. The American people join me in sending you very best wishes for every success in your new office.

Sincerely,"

Pres file



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, July 3, 1968

Mr. President:

*See file*

Yesterday's Congressional Record bears further witness to the favorable response to the signing of the NPT and the announcement of US-USSR bilateral talks.

Senators Proxmire, Clark, McGee and Yarborough praised the events of Monday in terms of "historic" and "monumental."

Supportive statements in the House came from Representatives Anderson, Nedzi, Rooney, Patten, Frelinghuysen, Fraser and Gallagher. Only Representative Hosmer took a negative position.

W. W. Rostow



3  
ACTION

Wednesday, July 3, 1968, 11:00 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*for file*

SUBJECT: Replies to Fourth of July Messages

We will be receiving hundreds of congratulatory messages from foreign government officials.

We propose responding with the following language, modified to meet special cases:

"My sincere thanks for your message of congratulations on the anniversary of our national independence. The people of the United States share my hope that the relations between our two countries will continue to prosper in the years to come."

Bromley Smith

\_\_\_\_ Approved

\_\_\_\_ Disapproved

BKS:amc



Wednesday, July 3, 1968

4

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your approval is a warm message to Cardinal Dell'Acqua, Vicar General of Rome, replying to his message of appreciation for the many kindnesses shown him during his recent visit to the United States.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

*EW*

MWG:mm

4a

DRAFT REPLY

Your Eminence:

I regret that I was not in Washington at the time of your visit to the United States and that I did not have the pleasure of seeing you. We were all deeply touched by the gesture of His Holiness the Pope in asking you to advance the date of your arrival here so that you could attend the funeral of Senator Robert Kennedy as a personal representative of His Holiness.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Eminence

The Most Reverend

Angelo Cardinal Dell'Acqua,

Vicar General of Rome.



1989 JUN 17 PM 3 53

WA078 PDB 3 EXTRA

FAX RB WASHINGTON DC 17 1147A EDT

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

AS I LEAVE FOR ROME WITH GRATEFUL APPRECIATION FOR THE MANY  
KINDNESSES SHOWN TO ME DURING MY VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES,  
I OFFER TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, MY HEARTFELT SENTIMENTS OF DEEP  
RESPECT AND CORDIAL REGARDS

ANGELO CARDINAL DELL ACQUA VICAR OF ROME.

(7-3-68)

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE

Saturday - July 6

- 7:00 a.m. - Leave Texas
- 8:50 a.m. - Arrive San Salvador
- 8:50 - 9:20 a.m. - Airport Ceremony
- 9:20 - 10:20 a.m. - Motorcade to ODECA Hq.
- 10:30 a.m. - 1:00 p.m. - Working Session of Presidents
- 1:00 - 3:00 p.m. - Lunch hosted by ODECA SYG
- 3:00 - 5:00 p.m. - Rest period
- 5:00 - 6:00 p.m. - Ceremony at LBJ Public School
- 6:00 - 8:00 p.m. - Open
- 8:00 p.m. - State Dinner.

Sunday - July 7

- 9:00 - 10:00 a.m. - Mass at Cathedral or Archbishop's Palace.



Sunday - July 7 - continued

- 12:00 noon - Depart San Salvador for lunch at a plantation in interior.
- 5:00 p.m. - Return San Salvador
- 6:00 - 8:00 p.m. - Return reception at Embassy Residence for Central American Presidents.

Monday - July 8

- 7:00 a.m. - Depart San Salvador
- 9:00 a.m. - Arrive San Jose
- 9:00 - 9:50 a.m. - Airport ceremony
- 9:55 a.m. - Leave San Jose
- 10:40 a.m. - Arrive Managua
- 10:40 - 11:30 a.m. - Airport ceremony
- 11:35 a.m. - Leave Managua
- 12:30 p.m. - Arrive San Pedro Sula
- 12:30 - 1:20 p.m. - Airport ceremony

Monday - July 8 - continued

1:25 p.m.	-	Leave San Pedro Sula
2:10 p.m.	-	Arrive Guatemala City
2:10 - 3:00 p.m.	-	Airport ceremony
3:05 p.m.	-	Leave Guatemala City
9:05 p.m.	-	Arrive Andrews AFB.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

Tuesday - July 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: San Salvador Schedule

*1. [unclear]  
2. Pres file*

Last night I sent you an abbreviated schedule for the San Salvador visit (Tab A) which has you departing on Sunday noon.

The weight of opinion of those on the scene -- Ambassador Castro, Marty Underwood and Bob Sayre -- is that it would be a serious mistake not to adhere to the original schedule of a full day in San Salvador on Sunday and an early Monday departure. They argue:

- The visit would be so short as to be abrupt.
- The other Presidents anticipate a return function from you, and failure to do so would be taken as a discourtesy.
- The airport crowds will be larger on Monday with a national holiday declared than on a Sunday afternoon.
- At this time of year in Central America rain is likely in the afternoon and much less so in the morning.

I believe the success of your trip depends upon your staying on Sunday in Salvador to show your Central American colleagues the courtesy they expect. I strongly urge you to agree to the longer schedule (Tab B). George Christian joins me in making this recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Approve longer schedule (Tab B) ☒ 7/2/68

Approve shorter schedule (Tab A) ☐

Call me \_\_\_\_.

cc - George Christian

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 9-28-92

(7-1-68)

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE **A**

Saturday - July 6

- 7:00 a.m. - Leave Texas
- 8:50 a.m. - Arrive San Salvador
- 8:50 - 9:20 a.m. - Airport Ceremony
- 9:20 - 10:20 a.m. - Motorcade to ODECA Hq.
- 10:30 a.m. - 1:00 p.m. - Working Session of Presidents
- 1:00 - 3:00 p.m. - Lunch hosted by ODECA SYG
- 3:00 - 5:00 p.m. - Rest period.
- 5:00 - 6:00 p.m. - Ceremony at LEJ Public School
- 6:00 - 8:00 p.m. - Open
- 8:00 p.m. - State Dinner

Sunday - July 7

- 9:00 - 10:00 a.m. - Mass at Cathedral or Archbishop's Palace.



Sunday - July 7 - continued

-2-

11:00 a.m.	-	Leave San Salvador
1:00 p.m.	-	Arrive San Jose
1:00 - 1:50 p.m.	-	Airport ceremony
1:55 p.m.	-	Leave San Jose
2:40 p.m.	-	Arrive Managua
2:40 - 3:30 p.m.	-	Airport ceremony
3:35 p.m.	-	Leave Managua
4:25 p.m.	-	Arrive San Pedro Sula
4:25 - 5:15 p.m.	-	Airport ceremony
5:20 p.m.	-	Leave San Pedro Sula
5:55 p.m.	-	Arrive Guatemala City
5:55 - 6:45 p.m.	-	Airport ceremony
6:50 p.m.	-	Leave Guatemala City for US
( 10:40 p.m.	-	Arrive Bergstrom AFB
(		
( or		or
(		
( <u>Monday, July 8</u> 12:50 am-		Arrive Andrews AFB.

(7-1-68)

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE - B

Saturday - July 6

- 7:00 a.m. - Leave Texas
- 8:50 a.m. - Arrive San Salvador
- 8:50 - 9:20 a.m. - Airport Ceremony
- 9:20 - 10:20 a.m. - Motorcade to ODECA Hq.
- 10:30 a.m. - 1:00 p.m. - Working Session of Presidents
- 1:00 - 3:00 p.m. - Lunch hosted by ODECA SYG
- 3:00 - 5:00 p.m. - Rest period.
- 5:00 - 6:00 p.m. - Ceremony at LBJ Public School
- 6:00 - 8:00 p.m. - Open
- 8:00 p.m. - State Dinner

Sunday - July 7

- 9:00 - 10:00 a.m. - Mass at Cathedral or Archbishop's Palace.



Sunday - July 7 - continued

- 12:00 noon - Depart San Salvador for lunch  
at a plantation in interior.
- 5:00 p.m. - Return San Salvador
- 6:00 - 8:00 p.m. - Return reception at Embassy Residence  
for Central American Presidents.

Monday - July 8

- 9:00 a.m. - Depart San Salvador
- 11:00 a.m. - Arrive San José
- 11:00 - 11:50 a.m. - Airport ceremony
- 11:55 a.m. - Leave San Jose
- 12:40 p.m. - Arrive Managua
- 12:40 - 1:30 p.m. - Airport ceremony
- 1:35 p.m. - Leave Nicaragua
- 2:30 p.m. - Arrive San Pedro Sula
- 2:30 - 3:20 p.m. - Airport ceremony

Monday - July 8 - continued

- 3:25 p.m. - Leave San Pedro Sula
- 4:10 p.m. - Arrive Guatemala City
- 4:10 - 5:00 p.m. - Airport ceremony.
- 5:05 p.m. - Leave Guatemala City
- 11:05 p.m. - Arrive Andrews AFB.

2

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, July 3, 1968  
10:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Harriman and Vance briefly summarize the formal part of the meeting which appears to consist of quotations on their side from Arthur Schlesinger, I. F. Stone, etc., and on our side from Senator Brooke. In short, nothing in it.

The tea break will be reported separately.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 17406

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

*Free file*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01





Department of State

7a  
TELEGRAM

~~ACTION COPY~~

~~SECRET~~

REA400

PAGE 01 PARIS 17406 031338Z

7 9 4 Q

1968 JUL 3 AM 9 48

50

ACTION SSO 20

INFO /000 W

Z 031325Z JUL 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3806 FLASH

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 17406

N O D I S / HARVAN

DELTO 374

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

SUBJECT: FLASH SUMMARY - 11TH MEETING, JULY 3, 1968

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 18559  
By ica NARA, Date 1-2-98

1. THUY OPENED. HIS STATEMENT BEGAN WITH DISCUSSION OF GROWING DISSENSION IN US OVER THE VIET-NAM WR. THUY COVERED THE WATERFRONT FROM THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND LINCOLN TO STOKELY CARMICHAEL AND ARTHUR SCHLESINGER.

2. THUY THEN MENTIONED PILOT RELEASE ANNOUNCED EARLIER IN HANOI. HE CONCLUDED WITH REPETITION OF BASIC DRV DEMANDS ON THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THUY'S STATEMENT WAS HIS SHORTEST SO FAR--45 MINUTES.

3. I BEGAN BY SAYING THAT I WAS HAPPY TO HEAR CONFIRMATION OF THE RELEASE OF THE THREE AMERICAN PILOTS. I SAID THAT WE WELCOMED THIS GESTURE, AND HOPED IT INDICATED WILLINGNESS OF NVN TO TAKE STEPS TOWARD PEACE. I QUOTED PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF READINESS TO GO FAR AND FAST TO BUILD A STABLE PEACE.

4. I THEN SAID THAT I REGRETTED THUY'S USE OF CERTAIN QUOTATIONS WHICH LEAD TO MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE US POSITION NOW AND IN THE PAST. I QUOTED EXTENSIVELY FROM SENATOR BROOKE'S SPEECH OF JUNE 18 EXPRESSING THE DETERMINATION OF THE MAJORITY OF THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 17406 031338Z

5. I THEN PROPOSED A TEA BREAK. AFTER THE BREAK, WHICH LASTEDRY MINUTES, I READ MY PREPARED STATEMENT ON THE 1954 ACCORDS.

6. THUY REBUTTED BY REPEATING HIS BASIC POSITION AND SKOWED EXTRAORDINARILY WIDE RESEARCH BY QUOTING FOBRIGHT, CLARK, US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, AND I. F. STONE'S WEEKLY.

7. TEA BREAK IS BEING REPORTED IN SEPTEL.  
HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

8  
/

**ACTION**

**Wednesday - July 3, 1968** - 10:10 AM

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Official Delegation to San Salvador**

*Free file*

**There is no need to make the official delegation to the San Salvador meeting large. I recommend it include:**

**The President  
Assistant Secretary Covey Oliver  
Ambassador Raul Castro  
Special Assistant Walt W. Rostow.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**Approve**      ☐

**Disapprove**      ☐

**Call me**      ☐ ,



9

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, July 3, 1968  
9:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Thieu agrees to July 19-20  
in Honolulu.

His letter will be coming forward  
promptly.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

Salgon 31701

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By cg, NARA, Date 9-1-92

WWRostow:rla



# Department of State

WtH | #5 9a  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

Reston

00 RUEHC  
DE RUNJIR 31701 1851000  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 030945Z JUL 68 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6008  
STATE GRNC

CONTROL: 771Q  
RECEIVED: JULY 3, 1968  
7:36 a.m.

BT  
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 31701

NODIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO PARIS FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE

REF: STATE 195681

1. THIEU HAS AGREED TO DATES JULY 19 AND 20 FOR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT IN HONOLULU. HE HAS ALREADY DRAFTED LETTER TO PRESIDENT WHICH HE WILL HAVE IN MY HANDS EITHER TONIGHT OR FIRST THING TOMORROW. TEXT OF LETTER SEEMS TO ME QUITE SATISFACTORY INDICATING DESIRE POSTPONE VISIT TO U.S., BUT SUGGESTING URGENCY OF MEETING "SOMEWHERE IN PACIFIC" IN ORDER TO DISCUSS IMPORTANT MATTERS RELATING TO PARIS TALKS AND CURRENT PREPARATIONS OF ENEMY FOR MAJOR ATTACKS AGAINST IMPORTANT CENTERS.

2. I ASKED THIEU WHETHER HE PLANNED TO BRING SAME GROUP, INCLUDING VICE PRESIDENT, WHICH HAS BEEN CONFERRING WITH US ON PARIS TALKS, BUT HE SAID PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT COULD NOT BE OUT OF COUNTRY AT SAME TIME. HE, THEREFORE, PROPOSES TENTATIVELY TO BRING FOREIGN MINISTER THANH, MINISTER OF DEFENSE VY, MINISTER OF ECONOMY HO, CHIEF OF JGS GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN, GENERAL LAC, DEPUTY MINISTER FOR RD, AND AMBASSADOR SUI DIEM. HE AGREES THAT WE SHOULD DO PREPARATORY WORK ON COMMUNIQUE BEFORE HIS ARRIVAL HONOLULU.

3. THIEU AGREES THAT WE SHOULD WORK OUT TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT AS TO

CONTENT AND TIMING OF TRIP IN TERMS OF SUGGESTION COMING FROM HIM. HE FEELS THAT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD NOT BE MADE TOO LONG BEFORE TRIP, BUT SHOULD IN ANY CASE PRECEDE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF CLIFFORD VISIT. THIS IMPORTANT FROM HIS VIEWPOINT IN ORDER THAT INFERENCE NOT BE DRAWN THAT HIS TRIP IS RESULT OF CLIFFORD VISIT. I EXPLAINED TO HIM HOW WE PROPOSED TO HANDLE ANNOUNCEMENT OF CLIFFORD VISIT, WHICH SATISFACTORY TO HIM.  
BUNKER  
BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED PARIS BY OCT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines

By pc NARA, Date 8-22-01

PRESERVATION COPY

10  
*Free file*

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, July 3, 1968  
9:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

In the light of the attached quick report, the key question before us is: Should Vance present a concrete proposal at the next private session or should he lay back and let them come to us? If you decide that he should present a concrete proposal, there is a considerable -- but not impossible -- task of getting a consensus in Washington, Saigon and Paris.

I suspect you will be dealing with this in the course of the trip.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01



10a

7/3/68 0905

Ben Read called in phone report of Paris conversations. It was the shortest yet on record--three hours. It was an absolute boilerplate exchange on both sides. At the tea-break, which lasted 45 minutes, the North Vietnamese told Harriman that there had been nothing new in our private presentations to them, but agreed to another private meeting. However, time and place are not yet set. Vance suggested Friday.

It was all very routine.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By pc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

*Pres file*

**SECRET**

Tuesday, July 2, 1968  
6:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I promised you a professional military appraisal of the Vietnam situation.

While developing it here, Abrams' attached evaluation came in.

The marked passages at the bottom of page 1 and the top of page 2 are an excellent summary.

Key passages marked throughout, if you wish to pursue it.

W. W. Rostow

**SECRET-attachment**

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 9-1-92

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
MESSAGE CENTER

11a

VZCZCJCS365  
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INFO RUMJIR/AMEMB SAIGON  
RUHHHQA/CINCPAC  
RUFNCR/AMEMB PARIS  
BT

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ 18888  
AMEMB PARIS FOR GEN SEIGNIOUS  
AMEMB SAIGON FOR AMB AND DEP AMB ONLY SEC I OF II.  
SUBJ: WEEKLY ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY POSITION(U)  
REF: A. JCS MSG 8007 DTG 092254Z MAY 68 (TS)  
B. MACV MSG 13635 DTG 131148Z MAY 68 (TS)

1. (C) THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES THE WEEKLY ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT ALLIED AND ENEMY MILITARY POSUTRE AS REQUESTED BY REF A FOR THE REPORTING PERIOD ENDING 29 JUNE 1968.

2. (S) PART I (APPRAISAL OF ENEMY AND FRIENDLY SITUATION),

A. ENEMY SITUATION:

(1) SINCE EARLY JUN THERE HAS BEEN A LULL IN THE PATTERN OF ENEMY ACTIVITY. WE SEE A VARIETY OF REASONS TO EXPLAIN IT. IN THE DELTA AND THE COASTAL REGIONS OF II CTZ, ENEMY FORCES ARE DECIDEDLY WEAK. LIKELY TO REMAIN SO, AND CAN CONDUCT LITTLE BUT HARASSMENT. IN III CTZ, THE ENEMY IS WEAKENED BY A COMBINATION OF CONTINUED ATTRITION IN BATTLE AND THE EFFECTS OF THE MASSIVE FIRE POWER OF AIR STRIKES. HOWEVER, HE IS IN A CONTINUING STAGE OF PREPARATION WITH A HEAVY FLOW OF REPLACEMENTS TO SUPPORT RENEWED ATTACKS AGAINST SAIGON. WE EXPECT CONSTANT PRESSURE AGAINST THE CAPITAL AT A HEAVY COST TO HIS FORCES. IN THE B-3 FRONT, WE BELIEVE THE LULL RESULTS FROM PRE-EMPTION OF AMBITIOUS PLANS. AS A RESULT, HIS EFFECTIVENESS IS SIGNIFICANTLY DOWN AND WE EXPECT LITTLE FROM HIM UNTIL AFTER THE MONSOON SEASON. IN SOUTHERN I CTZ, THE LULL IS BEST EXPLAINED BY PREPARATION FOR MAJOR OFFENSIVE ACTION. IN NORTHERN I CTZ, WE SEE A LULL DERIVING FROM BOTH HEAVY LOSSES AND A DECIDED PHASE OF PREPARATION. HIS FORCES HAVE BEEN

ACT: J3-8

INFO: C/JCS-1DJS-3 SJCS-3 J5-2 SACS-3NMCC-1 SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA-9

W/H-4 STATE-1 DIA-15 CIA-4 CSA-1CNO-2 CSAF-1 MC-7

FILE-1(73)/HAT/MY

PAGE 1 OF 6

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3  
DA Mem. Jan. 5, 1988  
By 119 NARA Date 9-78-92

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
MESSAGE CENTER

WEAKENED BUT MAY BE REGENERATING BY TEMPORARY WITHDRAWAL AND POSSIBLE LARGE SCALE REINFORCEMENT.

(2) ALTHOUGH THIS HAS IMPLICATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CURRENT PARIS DIALOGUE, IT IS TOO EARLY TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS OF POLITICAL INTENT. OTHER EVIDENCE INDICATES NO DELIBERATE DE-ESCALATION. IT APPEARS THAT THE PRESENT COUNTRY-WIDE LULL IN ENEMY ACTIVITY IS NOT OF HIS OWN CHOOSING BUT HAS BEEN FORCED UPON HIM BY HIS DETERIORATING FORCE POSTURE AND THE OVERPOWERING STRENGTH OF FRIENDLY COUNTER ACTION AND FIRE POWER. WE CANNOT RULE OUT POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOME OF THE ENEMY'S LACK OF ACTIVITY, BUT IT APPEARS DOUBTFUL THAT WE ARE SEEING DELIBERATE DE-ESCALATION.

(3) IN I CTZ, THE ENEMY CONTROLS 93 MANEUVER BATTALIONS. AT KHE SANH, ACTIVITY HAS BEEN AT A MUCH REDUCED LEVEL. ELEMENTS OF THE 304TH NVA DIVISION HAVE NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED RECENTLY IN CONTACT; THE DIVISION HAS POSSIBLY WITHDRAWN TO REFIT AND RECEIVE REPLACEMENTS, LEAVING ELEMENTS OF THE 308TH NVA DIVISION IN THIS AREA TO TIE DOWN FRIENDLY FORCES. ENEMY FORCES IN THE QUANG TRI CITY AND HUE AREAS REMAIN DISPOSED IN THE VICINITY OF BASE AREAS. MAJOR ENEMY ACTION DOES NOT APPEAR IMMINENT IN THIS AREA, AND HE WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO LIMIT ACTION TO HARASSING ATTACKS, LOGISTIC OPERATIONS, AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IN CENTRAL I CTZ THE ENEMY RETAINS A CONCENTRATION OF FORCE BUT CONTINUING DIFFICULTIES HAVE APPARENTLY CAUSED HIM TO DELAY HIS PLANS. THESE FORCES ARE NOT TACTICALLY DEPLOYED, SUGGESTING NO IMMEDIATE MAJOR OFFENSIVE ACTIVITY. MAJOR ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTION IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN I CTZ SEEMS UNLIKELY BEFORE MID-JULY. IN THE NORTHERNMOST PROVINCES, LATE JULY OR EARLY AUGUST APPEAR AS THE MOST LIKELY PERIODS FOR A RENEWED OFFENSIVE.

(4) IN II CTZ THE ENEMY HAS 55 MANEUVER BATTALIONS. IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS HE HAS CONTINUED TO AVOID CONTACT AND HIS FORCES ARE PROBABLY REGROUPING IN CAMBODIAN BASE AREAS. THERE ARE NO CURRENT INDICATIONS OF OFFENSIVE INTENTIONS IN KONUM PROVINCE. DURING THE 1967 MONSOON SEASON THE ENEMY CONDUCTED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN PLEIKU PROVINCE, AND THE SAME PATTERN MAY BE FOLLOWED IN 1968. SUCH OPERATIONS ARE NOT LIKELY BEFORE EARLY AUGUST, HOWEVER. ACTIVITY ELSEWHERE IN II CTZ HAS BEEN LIMITED TO WIDELY SCATTERED LIGHT CONTACTS. THE ENEMY'S CURRENT PATTERN

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
MESSAGE CENTER

OF SMALL SCALE HARASSMENT ACTIVITY WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE, MAJOR ENEMY ACTION IN THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS APPEARS UNLIKELY FOR AT LEAST THE NEXT MONTH.

(5) IN III CTZ THE ENEMY CONTROLS 55 MANEUVER BATTALIONS, THE ONLY RECENT MAJOR ENEMY INITIATED ACTIONS HAVE BEEN BATTALION SIZE ATTACKS IN LONG KHANH PROVINCE, ALTHOUGH FRIENDLY OPERATIONS HAVE RESULTED IN FREQUENT CONTACTS IN THE PROVINCE SURROUNDING SAIGON. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY HAS ABANDONED HIS PLANS TO CONTINUE HIS GENERAL OFFENSIVE IN THE SAIGON AREA. ON THE CONTRARY, RECENT EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE ENEMY SEES THE RENEWAL OF GROUND PRESSURE ON SAIGON AS MANDATORY, HOWEVER, ANY ATTACKS IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE COULD BE OF ONLY LIMITED INTENSITY BECAUSE OF CURRENT MUNITIONS SHORTAGES AND DISRUPTIONS CAUSED BY FRIENDLY OPERATIONS. WHILE WE STILL EXPECT ANOTHER ATTACK ON SAIGON AT ANY TIME, THE ENEMY APPEARS WEAKENED, PARTIALLY PRE-EMPTED, AND STILL INVOLVED IN PREPARATIONS. DELAYED BY AGGRESSIVE FRIENDLY ACTION.

(6) IN IV CTZ THE ENEMY HAS 27 MANEUVER BATTALIONS. THE NUMBER OF ENEMY INCIDENTS DECREASED FROM THE PREVIOUS WEEK, BUT THE INTENSITY OF ENEMY ATTACKS BY FIRE INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY. THERE IS INCREASING EVIDENCE OF ENEMY DIFFICULTIES IN RECRUITING, AND OF DESPERATE EFFORTS TO MEET HIS MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS. AFTER A BATTLE IN VINH BINH PROVINCE EXAMINATION OF 15 BODIES SHOWED THAT ALL WERE BETWEEN 14 AND 16 YEARS OF AGE. THE ENEMY WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE HIS RECENT PATTERN OF SMALL SCALE ATTACKS, ATTACKS BY FIRE, AND INTERDICTION OF LOGS, WHILE HE CONCENTRATES ON RESUPPLY, TRAINING, AND BUILDING OF HIS FORCES, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS OF MAJOR ATTACKS IN THE NEAR FUTURE, HE MAY LAUNCH LIMITED BATTALION SIZE ATTACKS AND ATTACKS BY FIRE IN COORDINATION WITH ENEMY INITIATIVES IN III CTZ.

B. FRIENDLY SITUATION:

FRIENDLY OPERATIONS DURING THE PAST WEEK WERE CHARACTERIZED BY ACCELERATED OPERATIONS TO INTERDICT THE ENEMY'S INFILTRATION ROUTES FROM LAOS AND CAMBODIA AND TO PENETRATE INTO THE ENEMY'S BASE AREAS IN ORDER TO DISRUPT HIS OFFENSIVE PREPARATIONS. THE REDUCTION OF THE ENEMY THREAT TO MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS RELEASED UNITS COMMITTED TO THE SECURITY OF VITAL INSTALLATIONS AND CITIES AND ENABLED THEM TO RESUME NORMAL COMBAT OPERATIONS. THE FRIENDLY

~~SECRET~~

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

MESSAGE CENTER

COMBAT DEPLOYMENT IS WEIGHTED AGAINST THE TWO PRIME  
THREAT AREAS IN I CTZ AND III CTZ. SIXTY-THREE PERCENT OF THE  
US/FW/RVNAF MANEUVER BATTALIONS ARE LOCATED IN THESE AREAS WITH  
ABOUT NINETY PERCENT OF THE TAC AIR SORTIES FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF  
FORCES IN THE TWO HIGH THREAT CTZS.

(1) I CTZ.

(A) THERE ARE NINETY-TWO MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN I CTZ  
OPERATING AGAINST NINETY-THREE ENEMY BATTALIONS. THE PRESENT  
ENEMY STRENGTH REPRESENTS AN INCREASE OF ONE BATTALION DURING  
THE PAST WEEK.

BT

NNNN

PAGE 4 OF 6

14164

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
MESSAGE CENTER

14164  
SEC 2 OF

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RUHHHQA/CINCPAC  
RUFNCR/AMEMB PARIS  
BT

CALL 53337  
FOR NMCC/MC  
SERVICE

701 10 52Z

~~SECRET~~ 18888

AMEMB PARIS FOR GEN SEIGNIOUS

AMEMB SAIGON FOR AMB AND DEP AMB ONLY FINAL SEC OF II.

(B) THE US/FW/RVNAF FORCES CONTINUE TO PREEMPT ENEMY INITIATIVES THROUGHOUT I CTZ WITH EMPHASIS ON RICE DENIAL OPERATIONS AND RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE INTO ENEMY BASE AREAS. THE PHASE-OUT OF THE KHE SANH COMBAT BASE CONTINUED DURING THE WEEK. MOBILE OPERATIONS WILL CONTINUE IN WESTERN QUANG TRI PROVINCE.

(2) II CTZ.

(A) THERE ARE SIXTY-THREE MANEUVER BATTALIONS AVAILABLE IN II CTZ TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS AGAINST FIFTY-FIVE ENEMY BATTALIONS. (AN INCREASE OF FIVE FROM LAST WEEK'S TOTAL).

(B) THE ENEMY'S APPARENT WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS AND THE COASTAL LOWLANDS HAS AFFORDED FRIENDLY FORCES A GREATER OPPORTUNITY TO PENETRATE THE ENEMY'S BASE AREAS, TO INTENSIFY OPERATIONS IN FORMER ECONOMY OF FORCE AREAS, AND TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON LOCAL VC FORCES. OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE CORPS WERE CHARACTERIZED BY RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE TO LOCATE AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY AND TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF KEY TERRAIN.

(3) III CTZ.

(A) THERE ARE NINETY-SIX MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN III CTZ OPERATING AGAINST FIFTY-FIVE ENEMY BATTALIONS. THIS REPRESENTS AND INCREASE OF TWO FRIENDLY BATTALIONS AND A DECREASE OF VIE ENEMY BATTALIONS FROM LAST WEEK'S TOTAL.

(B) OPERATIONS IN III CTZ WERE CONDUCTED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE ENEMY'S FAILURE TO CARRY OUT HIS PLANNED ATTACK ON SAIGON.

PAGE 5 OF 6

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
MESSAGE CENTER

AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS TO DECISIVELY INTERDICT THE ENEMY'S LOC AND TO SEVER HIS INFILTRATION ROUTES FROM CAMBODIA WERE CARRIED OUT. TWO BRIGADES POSITIONED IN THE NORTH ASTRIDE ENEMY INFILTRATION ROUTES ARE CONDUCTING OPERATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH CIDG FORCES AND LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS TO INTERCEPT ENEMY ELEMENTS REINFORCING FROM CAMBODIA. THE MOBILITY OF THE MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE WAS UTILIZED BY DEPLOYING THIS UNIT FROM IV CTZ TO III CTZ TO REINFORCE FRIENDLY OPERATIONS IN LONG AN PROVINCE. THE DISCOVERY OF LARGE MATERIEL CACHES COUPLED WITH MASSES B-52 STRIKES ON SUSPECTED STAGING, SUPPLY AND REFIT AREAS HAVE EFFECTIVELY DISRUPTED ENEMY OFFENSIVE PREPARATIONS.

(4) IV CTZ.

(A) THERE ARE FORTY-FIVE FRIENDLY MANEUVER BATTALIONS  
(A DECREASE OF TWO FROM LAST WEEK'S TOTAL) OPERATING AGAINST  
TWENTY-SEVEN ENEMY BATTALIONS.

(B) DURING THE PAST WEEK, FRIENDLY FORCES CONTINUED TO  
CONDUCT OFFENSIVE SWEEPS TO KEEP THE ENEMY OFF BALANCE AND TO  
SECURE FRIENDLY LOC. DELTA BLACKHAWK OPERATIONS IN BORDER  
PROVINCES LOCATED AND DESTROYED SEVERAL LARGE ENEMY CACHES.

3. (S) PART II: (ENEMY CAPABILITIES)

ENEMY PERSONNEL INFILTRATION IS NOW ESTIMATED AT AN AVERAGE  
OF 15,000 TO 17,000 ENTERING SVN EACH MONTH FOR THE PERIOD JUNE  
THROUGH SEPTEMBER. THIS SUPERSEDES PREVIOUS ESTIMATES OF PERSONNEL  
INFILTRATION DURING THE PERIOD. OTHER ESTIMATES OF ENEMY  
CAPABILITIES, WEAKNESSES AND VULNERABILITIES CONTAINED IN THE WEEKLY  
ASSESSMENT ENDING 012400H JUNE 68 REMAIN VALID. GP-3.

BT

NNNN

REF A IS OUT 8667(J3)  
REF B IS IN 11032

~~SECRET~~

12

**ACTION**

**Tuesday - July 2, 1968 - 6:35pm**

**Mr. President:**

*Pres file*

**The Brazilian National War College group comes to Washington on July 11-17. It consists of 70 civilian and military members -- the cream of Brazil's younger officialdom.**

**State recommends that you receive them and say a few words. Do you wish to, or do you prefer that I do it?**

**W. W. Rostow**

**I'll do it**                    ☐

**Prefer you do it**        ☐

**Call me**                    ☐



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

13

Tuesday, July 2, 1968

*See file*

Mr. President:

The initial reaction has been overwhelming to yesterday's signing of the NPT and, especially, to your announcement of the upcoming discussions with the Soviet Union.

Yesterday's Congressional Record contains supportive and laudatory comments from 13 Senators: Mansfield, Pastore, Bayh, Brewster, Anderson, Hart, Sparkman, Nelson, McGee, Byrd (W. Va.), Williams (NJ), Mondale and Harris and from 5 Representatives: Albert, Morgan, Holifield, Price and Cohelan.

Senator Thurmond expressed his opposition to the NPT. Congressman Findley questioned the wisdom of secret negotiations with the Soviet Union on disarmament.

Today's newspapers generally carry favorable editorial and columnist comments. We and the Agencies involved (mainly State and ACDA) are making sure that these editorials and columns will be made available to Members of Congress.

*W. Rostow* Rostow

14

ACTION

Tuesday, July 2, 1968

6:34pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Birthday greetings to the King of Tonga

*Pres file*

Tonga is a kingdom in the Polynesian Islands of the Pacific. (We used to call it the Friendly Islands.) As your representatives to the coronation of the King last year, you sent Governor Burns, Pat Brown and Melville Grosvenor. We have a Peace Corps of about 140 people in Tonga. Jack Vaughn, therefore, has urged that you send a message to the King of Tonga recognizing his 50th birthday and the first anniversary of his coronation, both of which fall on July 4. The State Department concurs.

The suggested message follows:

"Dear King Taufa: The 4th of July means much to both of  
us. Accept my best wishes on your fiftieth birthday and  
on the first anniversary of your coronation. Sincerely,  
Lyndon B. Johnson.

His Majesty  
King Taufa 'Ahu Tupou IV  
The Palace  
Nuku'Alofa  
Kingdom of Tonga"

I recommend you approve the message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

STATE:MWright:wpt

15

Tuesday, July 2, 1968  
5:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I forward with satisfaction the attached volume of your messages bearing on arms control exchanged with Khrushchev and Kosygin. As you will note, there is a brief summary of the contents of each at the beginning.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment (big black, tabbed book, with index)



16  
ACTION

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Tuesday, July 2, 1968  
5:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a cable for your  
clearance. *on the Thieu*  
*visit*

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 10g, NARA, Date 9-1-92

WWRostow:rln

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE, IF COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~  
 Classification

16a

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

Origin  
 INFO: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE  
 INFO: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY  
 STATE  
 NODIS  
 SAIGON DELIVER BY HAND TO AMBASSADOR  
 PARIS PERSONAL FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE  
 Ref: Saigon 31488

*for clearance*

1. You should reach Thieu as soon as possible to convey suggestion from President that he and Thieu, with appropriate staff, meet in Honolulu on July 19 and 20. If Thieu continues to wish to write letter to the President along lines suggested by para 3 of reftel, this would be entirely appropriate. We would visualize that announcement would be agreed between us as to content and timing, and would be in terms of suggestion coming from Thieu. (For our own purposes, we should also bear in mind desirability of last-minute notice to TCC heads.)

2. We leave it to your entire discretion whether to pursue who he would bring with him. As to agenda, you may tell him our tentative thinking would call for a review of all aspects

*W/B*

EA: WPBundy:bmm 7/2/68	425	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by	The Secretary
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DoD - Secretary Clifford

S/S-

White House - Mr. Rostow

The Under Secretary

~~SECRET~~

Classification

DS-322

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
 State Dept. Guidelines

By *[signature]* NARA, Date *8-22-01*

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

[ of the situation, but with primary emphasis on consultation concerning the Paris talks. You might wish to mention that it would be wise for us to do preparatory work on a communique before he arrives. ]

3. These dates would mean that Clifford visit would take place on presently scheduled dates. We agree that public announcement of this visit should be deferred until after announcement made of Honolulu meeting. We of course intend in any event to depict Clifford visit as normal consultation with GVN and new US command, and first opportunity Clifford will have had for first-hand appraisal ~~etc~~ in his present position.

GP-3

END

~~SECRET~~  
Classification



*Pres. File*

*17*

Tuesday, July 2, 1968  
4:15 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have marked the key passages in this extraordinarily hopeful -- perhaps excessively hopeful -- assessment of the trend and mood in Hanoi. It comes from the British Consul General there.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (telegram No. Pastille 63 27 June 68)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *8-22-01*



FOUCH 054/27

-RR- WASHINGTON 33627

CYBER/CAT A

ROUTINE HANOI

TELEGRAM NO. PASTILLE 63

CONFIDENTIAL.

NOTE: The report of the  
pwn 3A is not confirmed by  
the main office of the  
TO FOREIGN OFFICE  
be sure to get the  
27 JUNE 1968. jls

17a 11/5/21  
J. H. H.  
J. H. H.  
J. H. H.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM PASTILLE NO. 63 OF 25 JUNE

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO SAIGON, POLAD SINGAPORE, MOSCOW, PARIS,  
WASHINGTON. Pastille 63

SOME INDICATORS OF CURRENT DRY DIFFICULTIES AND POSSIBLE  
INTENTIONS.

ALTHOUGH THERE ARE INSUFFICIENT STRAWS IN THE WIND TO MAKE  
ASSESSMENT OF DRY INTENTIONS WITH ANY CERTAINTY THERE SEEM TO BE  
ENOUGH NEW STRAWS TO PROVIDE MATERIAL FOR A FURTHER EXERCISE IN  
HANOI BRICK-MAKING WITH THE USUAL CAVEAT THAT OUR SOURCES ARE  
LAMENTABLY LIMITED. THERE ARE GROWING INDICATIONS THAT THE DRY  
LEADERSHIP IS SERIOUSLY AND PERHAPS WITH SOME DEGREE OF URGENCY  
WAITING FOR THE CESSATION OF THE BOMBING NORTH OF THE DMZ IN ORDER  
THAT THEY MAY BEGIN TO REDUCE THEIR WAR EFFORT, TAKE THE STRAIN  
OFF THEIR PEOPLE, AND REDEPLOY THEIR RESOURCES FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

2. I HAVE ALWAYS SO FAR ESCHewed THE PHRASE WAR WEARINESS IN  
DESCRIBING THE LOCAL SITUATION BUT THE EVIDENCE INCREASES THAT  
THE PEOPLE ARE INCREASINGLY TIRED OF EXHORTATIONS TO WORK HARDER  
AND TO ENDURE ENDLESS PRIVATION WHEN THEY HAVE ALREADY BEEN TOLD  
REPEATEDLY THAT THE WAR IS WON IN THE SOUTH: AND THE CESSATION OF  
BOMBING, WHILE REMOVING IMMEDIATE FEAR HAS ALSO REMOVED THE DIRECT  
EVIDENCE OF ENEMY ACTIVITY: CERTAINLY THE SPRING HARVEST  
PROSPECTS ARE POOR, THE WEATHER CONTINUES TO BE UNSEASONABLE, AND  
THE PRESS IS FULL OF URGENT ADVICE TO EXPLOIT THE MEAK AGRICULTURAL  
SITUATION TO THE FULL.

3. SOME NEW FACTORS IN THE SITUATION HAVE COME TO MY ATTENTION  
THIS WEEK:

A) AS REPORTED ELSEWHERE THE VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS  
TOLD THE NEWLY ARRIVED INDIAN CONSUL GENERAL THAT  
STOPS QUOTE THEY WILL STOP FIGHTING IN THE SOUTH UNQUOTE.

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By g NARA, Date 8-22-01

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B) THE CHINESE PROBLEM SEEMS TO BE INCREASING. ACCORDING TO POLISH AND CZECH SOURCES THERE HAVE BEEN NO TRAINS CROSSING THE BORDER FOR THREE WEEKS AND A U.A.R. SOURCE HAS PERSONALLY EXPERIENCED THE CANCELLATION OF THE TRAIN SERVICE. MY USUAL VIETNAMESE SOURCE CONFIRMS THIS STORY AND ADDS THAT ACCORDING TO HIS INFORMATION CHINESE HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM THE FOUR NORTH EASTERN PROVINCES OF VIET NAM. HE COULD NOT GIVE CHAPTER AND VERSE FOR THIS ASSERTION. THE POLISH EMBASSY STORY HAS IT THAT

THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN SEEN ON THE DRV SIDE OF THE BORDER DISTRIBUTING BADGES AND LITERATURE EXTOLLING MAOISM AND THAT THE CHINESE ARMY IS CROSSING THE BORDER WITHOUT PERMISSION.

C) ANOTHER REFLECTION ON THE CHINESE PROBLEM IS THAT THE DRV HAVE NOW DECREED THAT SHORE LEAVE FOR NON-CHINESE CREWS OF FOREIGN MERCHANT SHIPS WILL ONLY BE ALLOWED ON ALTERNATE DAYS. DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THIS IS BECAUSE OF CHINESE SAILORS' PROVOCATIONS. THIS INFORMATION FITS THE KNOWN FACTS OF CHINESE BEHAVIOUR IN HAIPHONG.

D) AS I HAVE POINTED OUT ELSEWHERE THE ECONOMIC DELEGATION IS TWO MONTHS EARLY THIS YEAR AND APPEAR, CONTRARY TO PRECEDENT, TO HAVE GOT NO AGREEMENT OUT OF CHINA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TOUR.

E) THE CANADIANS REPORT SUDDEN EXTRAORDINARY COURTESY ON THE PART OF THE DRV LIAISON MISSION OFFICERS AND THIS OFFICE AND THE FRENCH ARE ALSO RECEIVING UNPRECEDENTED COOPERATION. VISAS FOR EXAMPLE ARE BEING GRANTED IN LESS THAN HALF THE USUAL TIME AND IMPORT LICENCES ARE BEING GIVEN MORE READILY.

F) ACCORDING TO ANOTHER STORY FROM OUR VIETNAMESE SOURCE THE CHINESE, WHEN ASKED TO REPAIR THE PAUL DOUHER (LONG BIEN) BRIDGE, SAID THAT IT WOULD TAKE SIX MONTHS. THE VIETNAMESE DECLINED THEIR OFFER AND DOING THE JOB THEMSELVES HAVE ALMOST COMPLETED IT IN TWO MONTHS. THE SAME SOURCE REPORTS (IN A SPIRIT OF WISHFUL THINKING, WE THINK) THAT MANY CHINESE WORKERS HAVE NOW RETURNED TO CHINA.

G) STORIES OF DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE DRV CONSULATES IN HANKING, KUNMING AND CANTON ARE STILL CURRENT.

4. THE SOCIALIST CAMP CONTINUES TO FEED ME WITH STORIES OF DRV INTEREST IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POST WAR PLANNING ON THE LINES OF PREVIOUS SCANDINAVIAN AND SOVIET COMMENTARIES HERE. ON THE POLITICAL FRONT BOTH THE CZECH AND THE RUMANIAN COMPLAIN THAT THEY ARE BEING SHUT OUT BY THE DRV. THE ODDEST ECONOMIC TALE OF THE WEEK IS CONCERNED WITH THE SALE OF RICE THROUGH A SINGAPORE DEALER ON THE SOVIET SHIP BEKIN. (THE RICE ORIGINATED FROM CHINA.) THE



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STORY ILLUSTRATES A DRV DESIRE FOR CONVERTABLE FOREIGN EXCHANGE AS WELL AS A TYPICALLY COMMUNIST DISREGARD FOR THE RICE-HUNGRY CITIZENS.

5. THE JUNE ISSUE OF HOC TAP, THE PARTY THEORETICAL JOURNAL, HAS JUST APPEARED. LIKE THE MAY ISSUE IT COMPLETELY OMITTS ANY COMMENT ON THE PARIS PEACE TALKS THUS SUGGESTING AGAIN THAT THE SUBJECT IS TOO DELICATE TO BE ENTRUSTED TO JUNIOR CADRES. TWO CONSECUTIVE EDITORIALS IN NHAN DAN (PEOPLE'S DAILY) EXHORTING THE PARTY TO HARDER IDEOLOGICAL WORK AND LESS GENERAL DISCUSSION CAN PERHAPS BE READ AS REFLECTING COMPLAINT THAT THERE HAS BEEN EXCESSIVE INTEREST IN PEACE PROSPECTS TO THE DETRIMENT OF SELF-CRITICISM AND THE STUDY OF MARXIST IDEOLOGY. IT CAN ALSO OF COURSE BE READ AS A COMPLAINT THAT THE JUNIOR CADRES HAVE BECOME EXPERT AT THE EXPENSE OF THEIR REDNESS. THIS THEME ALSO EMERGED IN THE FEBRUARY HOC TAP.

6. ALL THESE FACTORS POINT TO CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES AND TO A DESIRE TO CREATE A BETTER IMAGE. I AM TOLD BY MY VIETNAMESE SOURCE THAT CONTINUING MOBILISATION OF YOUTH AND WOMEN IS BEING ACCEPTED WITH STEADILY DECREASING ENTHUSIASM.

7. FINALLY TWO TAIL PIECES FROM A VIETNAMESE SOURCE REFLECTING VIETNAMESE COMMENTS:

A) CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED UNDER THE NOVEMBER COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY DECREE AND INDEED THE DECREE WAS PUBLISHED PARTIALLY AS A JUSTIFICATION OF PREVIOUS ARRESTS OF THOSE OPPOSED TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR,

B) A CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER WHEN BEING HARANGUED BY A SENIOR CHINESE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE NEED TO CONTINUE THE FIGHT AGAINST THE U.S. ASKED WHY, IF CHINA WAS SO STRONG, SHE DID NOT ATTACK TAIWAN INSTEAD OF CONSTRUCTING HER OWN ECONOMY WHILE THE VIETNAMESE DID THE FIGHTING.

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8. I HESITATE TO MAKE TOO MUCH OF THESE STRAWS IN THE WIND. THEY MAY NOT ADD UP TO A SUFFICIENT WAR WEARINESS AND COMPLEX OF DIFFICULTIES TO INDUCE SIGNIFICANT COMPROMISE. THEY SUGGEST HOWEVER THAT A COMPLETE CESSATION OF THE BOMBING MIGHT WELL PRODUCE THE DESIRED REACTION BY A LEADERSHIP THAT IS DETERMINED NOT TO GIVE WAY IN PUBLIC BUT IS ANXIOUS TO GET ON WITH THE NEXT STAGE OF THE TALKS. THIS IS CERTAINLY THE VIEW OF MY ROMANIAN AND CZECH COLLEAGUES.

IF.O. PASS PASTILLE U/R TO WASHINGTON.

HACLEHOSE.

SOSFA

GRPS 1000 (A)

SENT AT 27/1900Z LW

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Tuesday, July 2, 1968  
3:30 p. m.

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MR. PRESIDENT:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(S)

Breshnev's address on foreign policy to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in April 1968. The full text is attached, with key passages marked.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(S)

A paper clip marks the beginning of the paragraphs on Communist China (paras. 149-62) which for some reason is referred to only with a phrase

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(S)

The first document, however, [redacted] gets at the high-  
lights in a pretty coherent way.

If you have time, you may wish to get the flavor of all this, which I would summarize as follows:

- Breshnev comforts the faithful with a picture of American disarray and weakness, centering around our Vietnam troubles (paras. 61-69);
- but the bulk of the document is a remarkably candid picture of Soviet problems from one end of the Communist world to the other.

The reason I make the whole document available to you is that if I were a Soviet official, looking back over what has happened to the Communist world in the past 10 years and looking ahead to the next 10 years, I might very well come to the conclusion that the best course of policy for Moscow would be to work with the United States to try to keep some order in the world rather than to try to control it directly.

I do not believe that the Soviet government has yet arrived firmly at any such historic decision. But Breshnev's report could not help but discourage men who only a little while ago were thinking of at least the Communist world as an empire which could be firmly run from Moscow.

Incidentally, there are two specific factual items in Breshnev's report which are of particular interest:

- He flatly states that industrial production in China dropped from 1966-67 by something like 15-20%. This is a bigger drop than our intelligence people have estimated. We know there is a further decline in 1968.

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-- Brezhnev says flatly (page 27, para. 135): "Our Korean comrades have said that they are not planning to solve the problem of unification of North and South Korea by military means or to unleash in this connection a war with the Americans, whose troops, as is known, are stationed in South Korea."

W. W. Rostow

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(S)

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walt Rostow

This is the summary you requested of the lengthy report on the Brezhnev address to the April Plenum of the CC/CPSU. I hope it will give the President what he wants.

*Rich*

Richard Helms

Attachment - 1

3.3(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

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(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

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By *iso*, NARA, Date *5-28-03*

18c

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY USSR

DATE OF  
INFO.

25 April 1968

DATE 28 June 1968

SUBJECT

CPSU Report on the April 1968 Plenum of the  
Central Committee of the Communist Party  
of the Soviet Union

3.3(4)(1)

Following is a translation of the official CPSU report on the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (CC/CPSU) which was held on 9 and 10 April 1968. The report carries a SECRET classification, is dated 25 April 1968, and consists of an analysis of the more important international questions which have occupied the Politburo in recent months, as outlined in an address given at the Plenum by Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CC/CPSU. The speech dealt with problems in the international communist movement, especially as they relate to the convening of an international conference in November, and with problems which have recently arisen in other socialist countries, namely China, Cuba, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. It also addressed itself to questions concerning Vietnam, U.S. domestic problems and the presidential election, the "Pueblo" incident, the non-proliferation treaty, West Germany, and the Near East.

For convenience, the paragraphs of the report have been numbered, although they were unnumbered in the original text. Interpolations in the text are identified by brackets. Underlining is of the original.

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By id, NARA, Date 5-28-03

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GROUP 1  
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downgrading and  
declassification

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URGENT PROBLEMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION  
AND THE STRUGGLE OF THE CPSU FOR THE SOLIDARITY  
OF THE WORLDWIDE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

(Material on the results of the April 1968 Plenum of the  
Central Committee of the CPSU)

1. On 9-10 April of this year, there took place a plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPSU which considered the question of "urgent problems of the international situation and the struggle of the CPSU for the solidarity of the worldwide communist movement." In an address on this question delivered to the Plenum by General Secretary of the CC/CPSU, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in the name of the Politburo of the Central Committee, an analysis of the more important international questions which have occupied the Politburo in recent months was presented. The speech dealt with the results of the Consultative Meeting of communist and workers' parties [held in Budapest 26 February-5 March 1968], with the work of the Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states [held in Sofia on 6 and 7 March 1968], with the meeting of the representatives of the six fraternal parties of socialist countries in Dresden [23-24 March 1968], with several questions relating to the international situation and with problems which have recently arisen in certain socialist countries.

2. Comrade Brezhnev noted that in recent years plenary sessions of the Central Committee have systematically considered the more important questions of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and of the activity of our Party in the worldwide communist movement. The general analysis of the international situation and the revolutionary movement which was presented at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU [March-April 1966], at the December 1966 and June 1967 plenary sessions of the Central Committee, in the address on the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution, and the conclusions made in the documents of these meetings are confirmed by the entire succeeding course of events. Therefore, there was no necessity at this Plenum to return to all the questions which had been examined at the Congress and subsequent plenary sessions. The Central Committee and the Soviet Government are consistently implementing the general line of struggle for peace, against Imperialism, for the solidarity of the socialist countries, for the international communist movement, and for all contemporary revolutionary forces.

3. International relations and the worldwide communist movement are in constant development. Complex and sometimes

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unexpected events are constantly encountered. Therefore, great attention to international problems, rapid and timely reaction to new phenomena and processes, and unceasing improvement in all our foreign policy activity are required from the Central Committee and the Politburo of the Central Committee.

## I

Results of the Consultative Meeting and Problems in the Preparations for the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties

4. In October 1966, our Party posed the question of the possibility of convening an international conference of communist and workers' parties. Since then, much work has been accomplished in bilateral and collective meetings with fraternal parties. The CC/CPSU held not one, but two, three or more meetings with some of them - and even as many as five meetings were held with some of them, devoted to this question.

5. From the beginning of 1967 and up to the beginning of the Consultative Meeting in Budapest, the CC/CPSU held about 100 bilateral consultations with representatives of more than 60 fraternal parties. As a rule, the consultations were conducted by members of the Politburo and Secretaries of the Central Committee.

6. This work was not easy. The problem was that, along with a large number of parties, primarily those of the socialist countries of Europe (except Rumania and Albania), with whom common positions and unity of views were quickly found on the necessity of convening a new conference - there was also a not inconsiderable number of parties which hesitated or even openly opposed the calling of a conference at the time when the question was posed. Many of them justified their position - with various nuances, of course - with the stand that holding the conference without the Communist Party of China and several other parties under its influence would allegedly not further the strengthening of unity of the international communist movement.

7. The Politburo of the Central Committee knew that a number of parties, above all the Chinese, as a result of the schismatic position of the MAO Tse-tung group, would not only not participate in the conference but would take all measures to interfere in its convocation. In the course of

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recent years, the CC/CPSU has perseveringly and consistently followed the fundamental principle of unifying the ranks of the communist movement, and overcoming the consequences of the schismatic activity of the MAO Tse-tung group.

8. The CC/CPSU took into consideration the special position of the Communist Party of Japan and the impossibility for the Communist Party of Indonesia to participate in the Conference in view of the difficult circumstances which have taken shape. The CC/CPSU could not fail to take into consideration the special conditions of the Workers' Party of Vietnam [Lao Dong Party] and, to a certain extent, the Korean Labor Party. Therefore, consultations with these fraternal parties were devoted primarily to explaining the anti-Leninist, chauvinistic course of the MAO Tse-tung group, which is aimed at splitting the communist movement.

9. A meeting between a CPSU delegation and the Communist Party of Japan took place in Tokyo. It laid the basis for the normalization of relations, as reflected in a joint communique. The Politburo is taking further steps to strengthen the improvement in relations which has been achieved between our parties. It is important to emphasize that the Communist Party of Japan at the present time is conducting an active struggle against the policies of the MAO Tse-tung group. And although it did not participate in the Budapest meeting and so far has not agreed to participate in the Conference, it has not come out against it.

10. The Politburo carried out important work in the same direction with the Korean Labor Party and the Workers' Party of Vietnam.

11. Joint, coordinated actions of the fraternal parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia played an important part in the preparations for the Consultative Meeting. They systematically coordinated their actions and carried out not only a common political line but also several joint organizational measures in preparing for the Consultative Meeting in Budapest.

12. Our major goal during this period was to enroll the maximum number of parties to participate in the Consultative Meeting, and to secure their approval to call the Conference. As a result of the intensive work carried

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out by the CPSU and fraternal parties, 70 fraternal parties firmly took a stand in favor of calling a new Conference.

13. During the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution, when the delegations of many fraternal parties were present in Moscow, an agreement was reached whereby 18 parties, including the CPSU, would come out as initiators of the Consultative Meeting. The text of an announcement of its convocation was drafted collectively and published on 25 November of last year.

14. In the course of the consultations, the Politburo took careful account of the moods in the various parties. The position which should be taken at the Consultative Meeting was discussed several times in the Central Committee, and directives were drawn up for our delegation. Their essence was to work in Budapest for the following major goals:

1) To secure to the extent possible a unanimous decision to hold an International Conference this year;

2) To coordinate an agenda for the Conference which would be directed at achievement of unified action by the communist parties with respect to the main thrust of the revolutionary movement - the struggle against imperialism, for peace and national independence, for the interests of the working class and socialism.

15. Delegations from 67 parties participated in the Consultative Meeting, which took place in Budapest from 26 February to 5 March. There were different reasons for the absence of a number of parties from the Meeting.

16. The Communist Party of Indonesia suffered a grave setback, as is known; It has no unified directing center at the present time. But the participants of the Budapest Meeting received two letters from underground communist groups in Indonesia which expressed full support for the Meeting and for the idea of calling a Conference.

17. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of East Pakistan also entirely supported the idea of convoking a Consultative Meeting and Conference, but stated that it could not dispatch its delegation to Budapest because of the difficult conditions of the Party's underground work.

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18. The Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam expressed gratitude for the invitation, but stated that it could not take part in the Consultative Meeting. Previously, our Vietnamese friends told representatives of the CPSU that their participation in the meeting would aggravate their relations with China. It should be noted that the organ of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam, the newspaper "Nhan Dan" ["Nhan Dan"] published in its entirety the message from the Consultative Meeting to the Vietnamese people.

19. In the letter from the Central Committee of the Korean Labor Party it was stated: "We express our gratitude for your invitation and inform you that because of circumstances which have arisen, our Party does not have the possibility to dispatch a delegation to the Budapest Consultative Meeting. We are sure that you will react to this with the necessary understanding." Our Korean comrades are obviously alluding to their relations with China in these words.

20. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Japan declared that it approves in principle the holding of international conferences of communist and workers' parties, but does not consider that conditions have yet matured for the next conference.

21. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba informed us that it would not take part in the Budapest Consultative Meeting of fraternal parties. This position is explained by the general line of the Cuban leadership in foreign affairs, which will be discussed below.

22. The leadership of the Swedish Communist Party decided not to send a delegation to the Consultative Meeting but requested that it be informed of the course of the Meeting and of its decisions so that it could subsequently define its position regarding participation in the Conference.

23. As can be seen, not a single one of the invited parties is taking a position against the Conference in principle.

24. Delivery of invitations to three parties - those of Burma, Malaya and Thailand - whose leadership is in

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Peking could not be made, since the leadership of the Communist Party of China did not permit access to them.

25. The central committees of only two parties - those of China and Albania - refused to accept the letter of invitation. In answer to the request of the Hungarian Ambassador in Peking to provide the means of delivering the letter of invitation to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, a rank and file Chinese bureaucrat transmitted the following ruffian-like statement on the telephone: "The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China does not desire to enter into any sort of contact with a counter-revolutionary black conference of renegades and traitors."

26. The New Zealand Party, in which, incidentally, less than 100 members remain because of the pro-Chinese position of its leadership, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Netherlands, which occupies a nationalistic position, failed to dispatch their delegations to Budapest.

27. The Consultative Meeting in Budapest was the most representative international gathering of communists since the Conference of 1960. Its basic results have been delineated in the published communique. These results reflect completely the positions of our Party. The participants of the Meeting made decisions on the basic questions of the forthcoming International Conference (on its purpose, on the composition of participants, on having the Conference in November-December of this year in Moscow, on the agenda, on the principles and methods of preparation, on the necessity of arriving at agreed documents at the Conference, and on the nature of these documents). Thus, the Consultative Meeting carried out its task.

28. The important success of the Budapest Meeting, which will occupy a merited place in the history of the worldwide communist movement, was attained through struggle with those who attempted to undermine it from within. Specifically, we refer to the position of the Rumanian Communist Party.

29. It must be said that the leadership of the RCP tried to gather all the arguments of the foes of the Conference - the Chinese, the Yugoslav, the Cuban and others. First of all, the Rumanians asserted that an international

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conference of communist parties should not be convoked without the participation of the Chinese. It is clear, that under present circumstances, this would have meant giving up the Conference. They further declared that neither at the Conference nor at other international meetings of communist parties should anyone criticize the policies of other parties, hence, for example, those of the MAO Tse-tung group. It is not difficult to comprehend that this would be a serious concession to nationalistic and other deviations from Marxism-Leninism and would hinder the participants of the Conference from a comprehensive and fundamental examination of the more important problems.

30. The leadership of the RCP was very active in the last months preceding the Consultative Meeting. As recently as January-February of this year, delegations from more than 30 parties were invited to Bucharest. The Rumanians were obviously hoping to create a bloc of parties which in Budapest would speak out with them in concert against the line of the CPSU and other proponents of the Conference.

31. In Budapest, the Rumanians launched a many-houred discussion on the agenda for the Consultative Meeting, trying to reduce its work to the level of conversations about the Conference, without adoption of a resolution to convoke it. But the Rumanians were obliged to listen to some sharp comments addressed to themselves. They were told: say straight out that you are against the Conference; that would be more honest and would save time.

32. The Rumanian delegation saw in the first days of the Meeting that it would not find support from the other delegations. It then used the speech by the head of the Syrian Communist Party delegation, K. Bakdash, containing a criticism of the policies of the Rumanian leadership as an excuse to walk out of the Consultative Meeting.

33. It should be said that the nature of the discussion of the conflict between the Rumanian and the Syrian delegations at the Meeting is one of fundamental significance. It was not only that Comrade Bakdash criticized the erroneous policy of the Rumanian CP leadership in the Near East and its attitude toward the nationalistic

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group of [Shmuel] Mikunis [of the Israeli CP]. In essence, he exposed nationalistic aspects in the entire international policy of the Rumanian CP, including its attitude toward the CPSU and the USSR.

34. After Comrade Bakdash's speech, the Rumanian delegation made a protest and tried to secure the collective condemnation of the position of the Syrian delegation by participants of the Consultative Meeting.

35. The participants of the Meeting spoke out decisively against the demands of the Rumanians. The conduct of the Rumanian delegation and its walk-out evoked general disapproval from all the participants of the Meeting. The walk-out by the Rumanians completed the self-exposure of the Rumanian line to disrupt the Consultative Meeting.

36. However, the position and views of the leadership of the Rumanian CP reflect a nationalistic disease which has infected a number of other parties to a greater or lesser extent. And there are no grounds for hoping that this activity of the Rumanian leadership will slacken in connection with preparation for the International Conference. The contrary is more probable.

37. Divergencies of another nature were also revealed at the Consultative Meeting. Certain parties, specifically the Italian Party, declared itself in favor of inviting representatives of national democratic and left socialist parties to the Conference. Subsequently, in drafting the final communique, the Italian comrades did not insist on this, though in principle they did not withdraw their proposal.

38. Definite divergencies were revealed also in discussion of an agenda for the forthcoming Conference. A number of delegations came out against dealing in any form at the Conference with the question of differences in the international communist movement. Other delegations, on the contrary, spoke out in favor of discussing such questions, considering that they cannot be avoided, and that they should definitely be examined at this Conference.

39. The position of our Party is that the Conference should be devoted to questions of the struggle against

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imperialism in the contemporary era and the unity of action by communists in this struggle. A discussion of these questions presupposes, of course, a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the international situation and a definition of the problems confronting the communist movement. All questions must be examined and resolved at the Conference from the point of view of furthering the solidarity of the worldwide communist movement on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the unity of actions of all anti-imperialist forces. Thus, in the opinion of the CC/CPSU, the way will be paved step by step to restoration of the ideological unity of our movement.

40. The question of the attitude toward the documents approved at the Moscow Conferences of 1957 and 1960 was also dealt with at the Meeting. The view of our Party on this point is clear. We were, and we remain, true to the general line of the international communist movement as delineated in these documents. This line has been confirmed by experience. But this does not mean that the intervening years have not contributed any corrections, or that it is necessary to cling to every letter of the documents which were approved at that time.

41. Our Party proceeds from the assumption that although the document resulting from the new Conference will have the nature of political conclusions, and not of a theoretical program, nevertheless, the ideological direction of the communist movement and its fidelity to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism should be clearly expressed in it.

42. Many delegations posed the question of inviting the League of Communists of Yugoslavia to the Conference. No one at the Meeting objected to having such an invitation sent in the name of the Consultative Meeting. Judging by recent utterances of Comrade Tito and other functionaries of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, they do not exclude the possibility of participation in the forthcoming Conference; however, they continue to insist that the formulations on Yugoslavia contained in the Declaration of 1960 be collectively repudiated.

43. Evaluating the results of the Budapest Meeting, it can be said that it was a solid step in energizing the activity of fraternal parties in strengthening the solidarity of the international communist movement.

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44. Moreover, at this Meeting, standards of equality and comradely cooperation between communist parties were subjected to serious practical verification. This dissipated the doubts of certain parties as to whether conditions had sufficiently matured for the successful discussion and resolution of common problems at an international forum of communists.

45. Together with this, the Meeting again showed that there exist a considerable number of immature, erroneous concepts, manifestations of right and "left" opportunism against which it is necessary to conduct a constant struggle in attaining the solidarity of the worldwide communist movement.

46. It is an indisputable fact that the Budapest Meeting again confirmed the role of the CPSU as the largest and most authoritative force in the communist movement. The representatives of many fraternal parties spoke of this at the Meeting.

47. Now that the question of convoking a Conference has been decided, our Party is faced with problems which are no less complex. It is necessary to realize clearly that the main difficulties are still ahead. Much patience and strength will be required in order to prepare for the Conference well, to attain correct decisions in the face of dozens of nuances of opinions. To prepare the Conference and to conduct it on a high level is the basic political task of our Party during the impending period of struggle for the solidarity of the international communist movement.

48. The commission for the preparation of the Conference is assembling in Budapest on 24 April. It will have to solve serious problems: definitively to decide the composition of the participants at the Conference, to determine the exact date when it will be conducted. The major work of the commission is the preparation of draft documents for the forthcoming Conference.

49. The experience of the Consultative Meeting demonstrated convincingly that the success of the whole affair will depend in no small degree on the initiative of our Party, on its activeness, on the strength of our arguments, on being able to anticipate possible difficulties. The correct direction in the preparation of the

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Conference and the results of the Conference themselves will in large measure depend on how profound, valid, and well-founded on Marxist-Leninist principles is our analysis of the world situation and the problems of revolutionary struggle.

50. Constant communications and contacts with the fraternal parties are important in the preparation of the forthcoming Conference. The experience in preparing the Budapest Meeting demonstrates that systematic preliminary consultations on a bilateral and multilateral basis are an important condition for the success of an international forum. Much work in the preparation of the Conference falls on the shoulders of our Hungarian friends. For its part, the Central Committee of the CPSU will try to help them in the implementation of this responsible mission.

51. In connection with the preparation for the Conference, it is necessary to elevate even higher the level of ideological-theoretical work in our Party. The Party press, the scientific-political journals are called upon systematically to clarify and delineate the problems connected with the agenda of the Conference, to demonstrate the enormous significance which the CPSU attaches to it, to provide a firm, soundly-reasoned rebuff to bourgeois propaganda and the slander of the schismatics.

52. The preparation and conduct of a new Conference is an all-Party matter. The basic idea in the preparation and conduct of the Conference is to unify the communist movement, to unfold before it wider horizons for the organization of the offensive against Imperialism.

53. At the present time we are going through perhaps one of the most responsible stages in the struggle to strengthen and develop international communism. Communists are faced with an important task, to work out a line which under contemporary conditions would assure the development of the communist movement as a genuinely international movement, while respecting the independence and sovereignty of each of its members.

54. The International Conference of communist parties has been summoned to lead the communist movements to a new frontier in the struggle for the final goals of the working class.

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55. Voluminous and intense work by all fraternal parties will be needed for the achievement of this goal.

## II

### Some Urgent Problems in the International Situation

56. The results of the session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, which took place in Sofia on 6 and 7 March, were dealt with in the address by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. A number of the most important problems of the current situation in the world were discussed at this session.

57. At the proposal of the Soviet Union, seven socialist nations of Europe came out in Sofia with a "Declaration on the Threat to Peace, Created as a Result of the Expansion of American Aggression in Vietnam."

58. The Sofia Declaration attracted worldwide attention and was accepted as a serious warning to American aggressors and as a fresh expression of unbending determination by the countries of the Warsaw Pact to render all possible assistance to Vietnam. The leadership of the Workers' Party of Vietnam, the Government, the press and public opinion in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam highly evaluated this statement as very necessary and effective political support.

59. An evaluation of recent events connected with the war in Vietnam was given in the address.

60. The offensive operations of recent months have shown convincingly how great are the forces of national liberation in Vietnam, how unshakeable is the combative spirit of the Vietnamese people.

61. It is becoming clearer to the public and to the ruling circles of many countries, and even to many Americans, that the present American policy in Vietnam is radically faulty and has no prospects for success.

62. The increase in human losses in Vietnam is having a greater and greater influence on American public opinion. And these losses have almost doubled in the last year. The offensive of the patriots, of course, increased the losses of the interventionists even more. Criticism of the Administration's course on the Vietnam question is becoming increasingly widespread in the United States.

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63. The war in Vietnam has seriously complicated the positions of the ruling circles of the United States and of President Johnson personally within the country and abroad. Economic difficulties, caused by a war which is already costing Americans 30 billion dollars a year, are imminent. The gold reserve of the United States has diminished to a critical level. The Johnson Administration is attempting to transfer its economic burdens to the shoulders of its allies. The financial crisis which is developing at the present time in the capitalist world, the currency devaluation in a number of countries and the threatened position in which the American dollar has found itself - all this is connected in large degree with the consequences of the American war in Vietnam.

64. The governments not only of such neutral countries as Sweden and Finland, but also those of Italy, Canada, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, i. e., countries allied with the United States in NATO, came out with an appeal to terminate the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Government of France declared frankly that American troops should leave Vietnam. Only the governments of West Germany and Britain, perhaps, come out with definite support for the American line in Vietnam at present, while the Government of Japan renders practical assistance. But this evokes growing opposition from the popular masses of these countries.

65. All of this has created a quite unfavorable situation for Johnson on the eve of the presidential election and has forced him to maneuver in an attempt to get out of the dead end that has been created.

66. President Johnson's address on American television on the evening of 31 March was such a maneuver - and it must be said, a shrewdly calculated maneuver. In his talk, the President, as is known, announced in dramatic form that as of that date he had ordered the Air Force and naval vessels of the United States "to cease bombing North Vietnam, with the exception of the region north of the demilitarized zone", where troops of the Vietnamese patriots "pose an immediate threat" to the positions of American troops. The region included in the bombing pause, according to Johnson, comprises almost 90 percent of the population of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the greater part of its territory.

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67. Of course, Johnson depicted his decision as evidence of the allegedly peace-loving intentions of the Government of the United States and of his personal desire to terminate the war in Vietnam as soon as possible. American propaganda seized upon and started to inflate the President's statement in precisely this spirit.

68. However, if the substance is examined, there is not really much new in this widely-advertised step of Johnson's. In reality, the United States continues to bomb an important part of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam - from the 17th to the 20th parallels, and refuses unconditional termination of bombing missions and all other acts of war on the entire territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

69. The Government of the DRV published on 3 April a declaration in which it showed the real meaning of Johnson's step and at the same time declared its readiness to appoint a representative for contact with a representative of the United States to discuss the question of unconditional termination of bombings and other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in order that negotiations might be started.

70. The Politburo of the CC/CPSU and the Soviet Government supported this position of our Vietnamese comrades which was based on principle and was at the same time flexible. In connection with this, there was published on 5 April the Declaration of the Soviet Government which is known to you.

71. Thus, some new elements have appeared now in the Vietnamese picture. For its part, the Soviet Union will, of course, undertake everything possible in order to encourage the development of events in the direction of a political settlement of the conflict in Vietnam.

72. It is no secret that one of the decisive factors supporting the struggle of the liberating forces in Vietnam is the fraternal, international assistance of our country. Guided by decisions made previously at the Congress and plenary sessions of the Central Committee of our Party, the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Soviet Government have continued during the entire course of this last period to render all possible assistance, military as

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well as economic, to the Vietnamese people in its struggle against imperialist aggression.

73. Not only friends, but also enemies, bear witness to the effectiveness of this assistance. On 31 March in a conversation with our Ambassador, President Johnson, in speaking of the situation in Vietnam, made precisely the following statement to our Ambassador: "Without Soviet aid, our foe could not hold out for long. Only your aid makes that possible." An entirely clear admission, as is apparent.

74. It is impossible to skirt the question of China's position in connection with the Vietnamese events. Peking's position regarding the Vietnamese question is that of dragging out the war, of undermining any political settlement. The Peking leaders even now continue to maintain such a position and try in every way to influence the Vietnamese in this direction.

75. It should be said that our Vietnamese friends still continue in many ways to construct their policy with reference to the position of China. This is also manifested in some ways in the working relations of Vietnamese authorities with Soviet representatives in Vietnam.

76. On the whole, the Politburo intends to continue in the future to carry out the line articulated in the decisions of the Twenty-third Party Congress and subsequent plenary sessions of the Central Committee on the Vietnam problem. Aid of all possible types to the fraternal Democratic Republic of Vietnam, to the people of Vietnam, must continue and will continue. The impasse which the ruling circles of the United States have gotten into with their aggressive policy in Vietnam confirms quite obviously the correctness of our policy on the Vietnam question.

77. President Johnson's decision announced on 31 March not to become a candidate for President for another term is intimately connected with the war in Vietnam.

78. This announcement of Johnson's was received in America and beyond its borders as a great surprise and a major political event. The American newspapers even wrote that there had not been a more sensational event in the political life of the United States since the assassination of President Kennedy.

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79. How should such a step taken by President Johnson be evaluated?

80. Approaching the question from the narrow point of view of prospects for the election campaign in the United States, it could be said that quite possibly this was a deliberate political step. The calculation was evidently that the leaders of the Democratic Party and some part of public opinion would begin persistently to persuade Johnson to change his decision and agree again to become a candidate for President. If it had turned out that way, then this evidently would have strengthened significantly his political position in the election campaign. Of course, Johnson may have miscalculated, affording great advantage to his opponents, including the Republican Nixon, with his decision not to run.

81. But this is not the most important thing. In the big political picture, the step taken by Johnson without doubt represents one of the symptoms of the critical situation in which American Imperialism and its policies finds itself at the present time. Such steps are not taken lightly.

82. In actuality, the policies of the Government of the United States are undergoing a crisis in many ways, the impasse in Vietnam, the failure of the political calculations of Americans in the Near East, and the unprecedentedly sharp financial crisis and racial conflicts which continue to disturb public life in America.

83. At one time, when he was beginning his Presidential activity, Johnson tried to entice the American people with a beautiful picture of a flourishing and just "Great Society" which he, Johnson, claimed to have started in the United States. Today, everyone sees that this radiant fairy tale has burst like a soap bubble and turns out in practice to be covered with the notorious ulcers and vices of capitalist society, featuring the serious failures of imperialist policies. And now the main author of false promises publicly announces his intention to get out while the getting is good, leaving to others the pleasure of untangling the mess he has made.

84. What has happened in recent weeks in the United States impressively confirms the correctness of the evaluation of the situation in America which was given by the

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Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU and by the international communist movement.

85. The villainous murder by the racists of the universally famous leader of American negroes, Martin Luther King - this eminent fighter for peace, defender of the civil rights of negroes, and fighter against the aggressive war in Vietnam - aroused a mighty explosion of popular protest against the crimes of imperialist reaction. On the streets of Washington and other major cities of America, tens of thousands of soldiers armed to the teeth waged war against the enraged negro population. In a number of cities, entire blocks of homes were burned and destroyed, the number of killed and wounded is in the tens of thousands. Things went so far that the city of Chicago, with a population of many millions, was in a "state of rebellion" according to the releases of the major Western wire services.

86. ~~These clashes in the cities of the United States are a new and acute manifestation of the profound contradictions festering in the womb of American society.~~ This is an explosion of rage of those who are underprivileged, deprived of their rights, worn out by racial and social discrimination and indignant against the criminal war in Vietnam.

87. So this is how the "Great Society", to which the American people have been led by the ruling circles of the United States, headed by President Johnson, looks today.

88. Together with progressive forces of the entire world, the Soviet people raises its voice in support of the struggling democratic forces of America, a voice of angry protest against the brutalities of American reaction, and our propaganda organs must make sure that this voice of the Soviet people resounds the world over.

89. Comrades, another question which was discussed at the Plenary Session in connection with the results of the session of the Political Consultative Committee in Sofia, was the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is a problem of great fundamental importance, which at the present time has become one of the main elements of our struggle in the international arena,

90. The conclusion of an agreement on non-proliferation is viewed by the CC/CPSU and the Soviet Government pri-

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marily as a means of denying West Germany access to nuclear weapons.

91. The prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons also means removing the possibility of creation of such weapons by other nations. The point is that not only West Germany, but also Japan, Israel, Italy, Canada, the Union of South Africa, India, Sweden, Brazil and a number of other nations are ready or almost ready, by virtue of their scientific, technical and industrial level, to commence production of nuclear weapons.

92. The inclusion of new capitalist countries in the nuclear arms race could lead to a situation wherein the nuclear potential of the capitalist camp would probably begin to grow more rapidly than the corresponding potential of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact in the course of 10 to 15 years. It is understandable that this would represent a great danger for peace.

93. In the course of prolonged and difficult negotiations with the United States, the Soviet Union was able to secure substantial concessions.

94. For example, it was possible to include in the agreement a clause which prohibited any types of proliferation of nuclear weapons, any direct or indirect - forms of transfer of this weaponry to anyone whomsoever, as well as transfer of control over such weaponry. This means that neither individual governments nor groups of governments, that is, military blocs, can become the owners of this weaponry. Thus, in essence, the rejection of plans for the creation of multilateral and any other nuclear powers of NATO, for which the Soviet Union, as is known, fought for a number of years, has been reinforced.

95. The United States was obliged in the end to make a concession as well on such an essential question as inspection over adherence to the obligations of the agreement.

96. Upon the insistence of the USSR, there was included in the draft agreement a clause which extended the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency over all governments signatory to the agreement. The procedure and forms of this control were worked out by qualified experts with the participation of scientists from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Representatives of socialist countries are included in the number of control inspectors, which is particularly important.

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97. An analysis of the disposition of forces vis-a-vis the draft agreement indicates that it is possible to bring the matter to a conclusion, although there are a number of obstacles along the way which must be overcome.

98. Of the nuclear powers, besides the Soviet Union, the United States and England are prepared to sign the agreement in its present form. France will most likely not sign the agreement, though it supports the idea itself of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and gives assurance that it will do nothing which might interfere with the conclusion of the agreement or further the proliferation of such weapons.

99. The fifth nuclear power, China, takes a negative position. The MAO Tse-tung group is conducting a vicious campaign against the draft agreement. This line arises out of the over-all course of the MAO Tse-tung group. It is clear that the CPR will not become a party to the agreement. This must be taken into consideration. But if those countries to which the Chinese might give nuclear weapons become participants of the agreement, then this would also be a solution to the problem - from the other side, so to speak.

100. West Germany continues to manifest opposition to the conclusion of the agreement on non-proliferation. Bonn is employing a delaying tactic, trying to undermine the agreement on the pretext that it is allegedly not perfect and should be improved.

101. We of course are employing the necessary measures to influence the Government of West Germany. According to information available to us, the Government of the United States is striving to insure that the Government of West Germany will sign the agreement. We worked on this assumption in coordinating the draft. ~~If it suddenly became clear that the Government of West Germany did not intend to sign the agreement, then, of course, we would be obliged to review our attitude toward this entire question.~~

102. At the moment, the foes of the agreement in West Germany are putting stakes on certain vacillating governments among those which are close to the possibility of creating their own nuclear weapon. Let us take Brazil, for example. It is ruled by a military dictatorship whose leaders do not hide their plans to turn Brazil into a nuclear

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power. Israel, the Union of South Africa and Japan also do not express enthusiasm for conclusion of the agreement.

103. There is a struggle concerning the problem of non-proliferation in Indian ruling circles. There are forces which declare that India must create its own nuclear weapons. It is impossible not to concede that the policy of the MAO Tse-tung group in connection with India facilitates the activity of these circles.

104. In the process of preparing the agreement on non-proliferation, Soviet representatives worked in the most intimate contact with the socialist countries - members of the Warsaw Pact, developed a common position and carried it through at the United Nations as well as in the Committee of Eighteen Nations. All members of the Warsaw Pact, except for Rumania, unanimously support the draft agreement which has been prepared and consider that it should be signed as quickly as possible. Rumania takes a special position. And this manifested itself quite obviously in the course of the work of the Political Consultative Committee in Sofia.

105. The Rumanians proposed a number of amendments to the agreement which were ostensibly for its improvement but in actuality served to undermine the conclusion of an agreement for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

106. Our Rumanian comrades, for example, proposed linking together the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with complete nuclear disarmament. If this Rumanian amendment were accepted, then it is clear that the agreement on non-proliferation would not be concluded in the foreseeable future. Who gains from this? Above all, the West German revanchists and neo-nazis. The nuclear arms race would be intensified, there would appear new capitalist governments possessing nuclear and hydrogen bombs.

107. The Rumanians further proposed including in the agreement an obligation of the nuclear signatories not to use and not to threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear signatories of the agreement at any time and under any circumstances.

108. At first glance it would appear that there is nothing bad about this. But if the content of this amendment is examined carefully, then it is apparent that it discusses

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an obligation not to use nuclear weapons in relation to all non-nuclear countries, that is, including those on whose territory the nuclear weapons of other nations have been deployed. This means that the Soviet Union would be tied by an obligation not to use nuclear weapons, for example, against West Germany, on whose territory is deployed the main nuclear arsenal which the Americans have in Europe. A nuclear attack could be executed from the territory of West Germany, and the Soviet Union - if the Rumanian amendment were accepted - would not be able to carry out a retaliatory nuclear strike.

109. It is understandable that the Warsaw Pact countries cannot accept this. This was stated forthrightly to the Rumanian delegation by all the other participants of the conference in Sofia.

110. The Soviet Union proposed another solution to this problem, the following: simultaneously with the conclusion of an agreement on non-proliferation, a resolution would be made by the Security Council in which it would be clearly stated that aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, would create a situation in which the Security Council, and primarily its permanent members which possess nuclear weapons, would have to act immediately in accordance with its obligation under the UN Charter. In other words, an aggressor would not remain unpunished if he should execute a nuclear attack on non-nuclear countries which are signatories to the non-proliferation agreement.

111. It is characteristic that by and large the Rumanian amendments are strikingly close in content to the "amendments" which Bonn is coming out with at the moment.

112. At the session in Sofia, all the delegations called on the Rumanians to come out in favor of the agreed-upon position and carry to completion the matter of concluding an agreement in the near future. However, our Rumanian comrades refused to go along with the coordinated actions and went ahead and introduced their amendments to the agreement in the Committee of Eighteen.

113. Taking this into consideration, all the remaining participants of the Political Consultative

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Committee - the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia - decided to come out jointly with a clear expression of their common opinion on this question and with full support for the draft agreement proposed by the Soviet Union. And it was done in this way.

114. The draft agreement has now been submitted for study to the UN General Assembly, which will convene shortly [24 April 1968]. The resistance of the foes of the agreement apparently will grow even more at this stage. The Politburo and the Soviet Government will take measures to neutralize resistance to the agreement to the maximum extent possible.

115. Our goal is to unify all forces which are in favor of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This has enormous importance for the future of all humanity. What will it actually mean to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, as envisaged by the agreement, for a quarter of a century or more, for example? This will mean a substantial lessening of the possibility of the outbreak of imperialist wars, including nuclear ones, during a period when further radical changes for the advantage of socialism will be taking place in the world.

116. The constant consideration which the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Soviet Government give to the organization of the Warsaw Pact is natural and comprehensible. They will continue in the future to do everything possible to strengthen this organization, the activity of which has enormous importance for the consolidation of the position of socialism and for guaranteeing peace in Europe.

117. The struggle against the revanchist, militarist policy of West German imperialism as the main threat to peace in Europe constantly plays a major role in the international activity of the Politburo of the Central Committee and of our Government. Problems connected with this struggle were discussed, for example, at the session of the Political Consultative Committee in Sofia, as well as at the meeting of the party-governmental delegations of the six countries in Dresden.

118. As is known, a more subtle and refined tactic which has as its goal the penetration of socialist countries by indirect means, using economic and ideological

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influence, gradually weakening their political unity and above all their ties to the Soviet Union, has been added to the openly aggressive manifestations of West German policies. In conducting this so-called "New Eastern Policy" of Bonn, the right-wing leaders of the West German Social Democratic Party are playing an active part.

119. It is known that recently a number of serious political actions have been undertaken for the purpose of counteracting the political course of West Germany which endangers peace, of unmasking the growing activity of the neo-nazis in West Germany (FRG), as well as of countering the growingly active penetration of the FRG into West Berlin in violation of the special international status of this city.

120. On the initiative of the Soviet Union, a number of measures were also taken to coordinate the positions of the Warsaw Pact countries in connection with the "New Eastern Policy" of FRG.

121. As before, a special place in our European policy is occupied by the defense and reinforcement of the positions of the German Democratic Republic, which in our time has become one of the quite important factors in the security of the socialist countries and of peace in Europe.

122. The Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries of Europe, is exerting an effort to withstand political and economic pressure exerted by West Germany and other imperialist countries. The USSR is striving to render all possible cooperation to the GDR, in strengthening it as a sovereign socialist nation, in enhancing its international authority and influence.

123. It can be noted with great satisfaction that the German Democratic Republic is successfully moving forward on the path of socialist development. After the VIIth congress of the SED, which took place a year ago, our German friends implemented a number of important undertakings directed toward strengthening the Republic and consolidating the position of socialism in it. The most important of these undertakings was the preparation of a draft for a new, socialist constitution for the GDR. Widespread discussion of this draft and its subsequent approval in the course of a national vote, which took place on 6 April of this year,

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were an important step forward in unifying the people around the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the building in the GDR of a developed socialist society.

124. One of the most complex tangles in our conflicts with the Imperialist camp remains the Near East. An intense and drawn-out struggle has flared up there. In the center of it remains the demand for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from seized territories.

125. Israel is leaning on the support of the United States and Britain, who themselves are not above exploiting the fruits of Israeli aggression to turn the Near East again into their political and military bridgehead.

126. The Soviet Union is using a wide range of political and diplomatic means to apply pressure on Israel and its protectors, including public statements of our Government and contacts, at the request of the Arabs, with the Americans, French and British, and direct warnings addressed to Israel, and the possibilities of activity at the UN. At the end of March, the Security Council adopted a resolution, not without our active urging, which warns the Israeli extremists that their piratical activities "cannot be tolerated" and that, in the event they are repeated, the Security Council will be obliged to use sanctions provided for by the UN Charter.

127. The task of achieving a political settlement in the Near East is complicated by the fact that it has to be undertaken in the face of constant internal struggle between progressive and reactionary forces in the Arab countries themselves. This struggle not infrequently takes on a rather acute nature.

128. Everything possible is being done by the USSR to strengthen the progressive regimes in the UAR and Syria, to help the Arab peoples hold out in a critical situation, to gain strength for the further struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism. In this connection, special attention is devoted to the UAR, which stands in the center of the events in the Near East. Constant contacts are maintained with President Nasir who, in spite of his known inconsistency, understands that the vital interests of his country are linked with an orientation toward the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. Useful practical contacts have also been made with the leaders of Syria, Algeria, Iraq and Yemen.

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129. The Soviet Union is continuing to render economic and military assistance to the UAR and other Arab countries. It is understandable that during this period emphasis was put on the most rapid possible restoration and strengthening of the armed forces of the UAR, as well as of Syria. The Soviet Union not only helped the Arabs restore the losses of military equipment, but also granted them an additional quantity of modern weapons.

130. In this complex political situation, it is necessary to search continually for new measures directed toward the settlement of the conflict in the Near East. In the address it was noted that our efforts might be more effective if the Arab countries acted as a common front and held a flexible, realistic position on the question of a political settlement to the conflict. At the moment, perhaps only the leadership of the UAR takes such a position.

131. On the whole, it can be noted with satisfaction that during the last year, the influence of the Soviet Union in the Arab countries, as well as in the entire Mediterranean area, grew substantially. The influence of the United States and Britain, on the other hand, has obviously declined.

132. On the international scene in recent months much attention was attracted by the events in the Far East evoked by the intrusion into Korean waters of the American naval vessel "Pueblo." Despite the limited scale of these events they were significant in principle, both from the point of rebuffing the aggressive actions of the United States, and as regards our attitude toward certain particular features of the policies of our Korean friends.

133. The line of the CPSU on relations with the Korean Labor Party (KLP) and the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic (DPRK) is known to the Plenum. Its essence is, despite differences of approach which we have with the Korean leaders in a number of questions concerning the international communist movement and other matters, to consistently strengthen friendly relations with the KLP and the DPRK.

134. On the whole, during the course of time matters have developed along exactly those lines. Contacts have been established in various areas, particularly in the economic field. Trade and economic cooperation have been

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expanding. Our country has continued to give aid in strengthening the defenses of the DPRK. The Korean press has ceased to print unfriendly articles directed at the CPSU and the Soviet Union.

135. Our Korean comrades have said that they are not planning to solve the problem of unification of North and South Korea by military means or to unleash in this connection a war with the Americans, whose troops, as is known, are stationed in South Korea.

136. However, recently there occurred the well-known incident involving the American vessel "Pueblo."

137. The factual side of the events is known. We are talking about the incursion into the territorial waters of the DPRK on the part of the American naval vessel "Pueblo." On 23 January of this year, while conducting intelligence operations, this vessel was detained by the naval forces of North Korea and after an exchange of fire was led into port, where the crew was subjected to arrest.

138. The reaction in Washington was stormy, crude, and aggressive. The Government of the United States came out with accusations and threats directed at North Korea, significant naval and air forces were brought up off the coast of North Korea, including the flagship of the Seventh Fleet, the nuclear aircraft carrier "Enterprise." In the United States there resounded demands to bomb Korean ports, to recover the "Pueblo" by force, etc. The Americans obviously counted on forcing North Korea to retreat under the barrels of the guns of its vessels. What is more, President Johnson took advantage of this incident to increase still further his military preparations and to whip up military hysteria on an international scale: new categories of reserves were called up in the United States and demonstrative measures to raise combat readiness were taken in Europe.

139. Under these conditions the CC/CPSU and the Soviet Government considered it necessary to speak out publicly in support of North Korea as a socialist country, supporting the right of North Korea to defend its security and condemning the aggressive behavior of the United States.

140. Besides this, the Politburo and the Soviet Government considered it useful to bring direct pressure to

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bear on the leadership of the United States, in order to diminish its ardor and eagerness to kindle provocations in direct proximity to the borders of the USSR and in connection with a country allied to us.

141. On 3 February in a message from the Soviet Government to Johnson attention was drawn to the fact that the United States was conducting a concentration of naval and air forces in the immediate proximity of the Far Eastern regions of the USSR that was unprecedented in scale. The American President was told that, "We, in our actions, must take into account that which is taking place not far from our borders and which involves the security interests of the Soviet Union." At the same time it was emphasized that attempts to deal with North Korea by means of threats and pressure could lead only to an impasse and to further complications fraught with serious consequences.

142. Simultaneously, certain measures were taken to raise the combat readiness of the Soviet armed forces in the Far East in order to secure the country in the event of complications and to let the Americans understand that the Soviet Union is not joking, but takes the matter seriously.

143. All this had its effect. On 6 February Johnson sent a reply in which he attempted to explain the arraying of American armed forces in the Sea of Japan by references to bellicose declarations and actions on the part of North Korea and assured us that "quick settlement is in our common interest." The President's message concluded with the report that he had "given orders to cease all further buildup of our air and naval forces at the present time," and that he had given orders to withdraw from the area of the incident one of the aircraft carriers with its escort vessels. The aircraft carrier "Enterprise" was indeed withdrawn from the coast of North Korea.

144. Concurrently, we persistently advised our Korean comrades, with whom we maintained systematic contacts during all this period, to exercise restraint, not to give the Americans grounds for expanding the provocation, and to settle the incident by political means. When it became clear to the whole world that the attempts of the United States to force North Korea to retreat through blackmail and military threats had failed, when the Government of the United States was forced to enter into negotiations concerning the

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"Pueblo" with representatives of North Korea at Panmunjom, from our side we expressed the opinion that it would now be possible without any loss and even with great political gain to North Korea to settle this matter by the ignominious expulsion from North Korea of the crew of the American spy ship.

145. The "Pueblo" incident, as is known, has not yet been concluded, and the situation could become acute again. However, the tenseness of the atmosphere has been somewhat reduced.

## III

Certain Questions in the Development of Individual Socialist Countries

146. Worldwide socialist cooperation plays a most important part in the activation of the entire anti-imperialist front. During the period that has elapsed since the December 1966 Plenary Session, the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee have been meeting regularly with leaders of fraternal countries and parties, have been discussing with them current problems of international policy, problems of relations between our countries, of further strengthening of socialist cooperation. These same questions are being constantly examined at sessions of the Politburo.

147. The activity of fraternal communist and labor parties, their work relating to the mobilization of workers to carry out the tasks of socialist construction is bringing good results. The socialist countries are moving forward along the main, decisive directions of socio-economic development. They are showing a greater and greater influence on the course of worldwide development.

148. Attention was devoted in the address to certain of the more urgent and acute problems which have arisen in individual socialist countries which are creating definite difficulties at the present stage of development of the socialist system, as well as to the work which is being carried out in this connection by the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Soviet Government.

149. In connection with the situation in China, the more important consequences of the so-called "cultural revolution" were described, and the particularities of the situation which has been created in the CPR at the present moment were noted.

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150. In the economic sphere, the "Cultural Revolution" has led to a significant drop in production; the decrease in the gross value of industrial production in 1967 compared with 1966 was 15 to 20 percent. Economic links between individual regions of China have been seriously disrupted. The material situation of the workers and, above all, the working class, continues to deteriorate.

151. In the political sphere, the main result of the "Cultural Revolution" has been the destruction of constitutional organs of authority and supervision, the dispersal of Party organizations and Party committees, the actual liquidation of the Party as a supervisory force in society.

152. Now, after two years of the "Cultural Revolution", it can be definitely stated that it has struck a serious blow at the socialist structure itself in China.

153. In certifying this fact, it is impossible not to see that MAO Tse-tung and his group have still not been able to carry through their line completely, to liquidate the opposition to the anti-Marxist, anti-socialist course.

154. Suffice it to say, that in spite of the desperate efforts of the Maoists to replace constitutional organs of authority and party committees in all provinces and autonomous regions with so-called "revolutionary committees", they have still not been able to do this. So far, "revolutionary committees" have been created in only three major cities and in 15 out of 26 provinces and autonomous regions.

155. It should be noted that the creation of "revolutionary committees" has by no means led to the cessation of resistance to the policies of the MAO group, nor to the end of internecine strife and clashes, as the Maoists had evidently hoped. A split has already occurred in the Peking capital "revolutionary committee". The "revolutionary committees" in Shanghai and a number of provinces are under the threat of a schism. In spite of the unprecedented scope of repressions, resistance continues. In many regions of the country there occur open clashes between the partisans of MAO and their opponents, which often take a bloody turn.

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156. The "Cultural Revolution" in China has given rise to the growth of anarchistic attitudes. Here, for example, is how the Canton newspaper "Nanfang Jihpao" of 1 March 1968 describes the state of affairs in the communes: "On the eve of spring work in the fields -writes the paper - there are manifested among the peasants numerous incidents of breakdown in discipline, of refusal to submit to leadership. Everyone wants only to attend meetings, but not to participate in collective work. If they are in the mood, they work; if they are not in the mood, they roam from one place to another, go fishing for three days, sun bathe for two days at a time." Such attitudes are even stronger among student youth. Studies at the majority of higher educational institutions have essentially not been resumed, although the students have been cleared off the streets for the most part and with the help of the military are being kept within the walls of the institutes.

157. Under a real threat of losing control over the development of events, fearful of becoming victims of the social chaos they themselves have brought about, the adherents of MAO Tse-tung have recently begun to change tactics. Where previously they summoned to revolt, they now threaten to declare a "punitive campaign" against "anarchism and sectarianism." Where previously they urged "open fire on the staffs", that is, on the personnel of the Party and governmental apparatus, they now have begun to persuade these personnel to "forget injuries and humiliations". A persistent campaign is being waged for the unification of all the so-called "revolutionary groups. According to available information, enterprises and establishments have been given instructions to stop paying salaries to members of opposition groups if they do not stop their struggle and achieve unity by May of this year. In certain organizations where disorder is continuing salaries have been cut to less than half as a temporary measure.

158. The MAO Tse-tung group is undertaking all possible efforts to stabilize the situation. At the same time, it is more and more openly putting its stake on a further strengthening of Army control in the Party and in the country. However, there apparently exist acute differences within the Army and within Army leadership. The unceasing attacks on military personnel attest to this. Quite recently, on 25 March of this year, there were organized mass demonstrations in Peking under the slogan: "Away with the ruling clique of the Army, which is conducting subversive activity!" This time, the Acting Chief

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of the General Staff YANG Cheng-wu, the Chief of the Peking Garrison FU Chung-pi, the Political Commissar of the Air Force YU Li-chin, and other military and political functionaries of the Chinese Army were current objects of persecution by the Maoists and were summarily removed from their posts.

159. Recently, a direction of so-called "regulation and reorganization" of the Party has been taken in China. In practice, this means a radical change in the composition of the Chinese Communist Party, and the inclusion in it of millions of Khunveybin (phon) and tsaofan (phon). Apparently the Maoists hope to create a new Party, which, while preserving its old title, will actually be completely adapted to the role of an instrument of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship of MAO Tse-tung and his entourage as far as the Party's organizational and ideological-political makeup is concerned. In all probability, this will be the essential task of the IXth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, for which preparations are underway, according to certain information.

160. If one speaks of the foreign affairs activity of the MAO Tse-tung group, it can be stated definitely that its plan to place China in the role of the hegemonic power in the worldwide communist movement and in the so-called "Third World" has failed utterly. The present leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Peoples Republic, placing paramount importance on the chauvinistic concept of "Greater China" and rejecting the class approach in foreign policy, is trying as usual in every way to provoke a clash between the USSR and the United States, to exploit problems in the national liberation struggle of peoples, and complications in the development of socialist cooperation. Whichever international conflict we take -- be it the Vietnamese, the Indian-Pakistan, the Near Eastern -- everywhere the MAO Tse-tung group is trying to heat up the situation, to increase tension. All this leads to the further isolation of the MAO Tse-tung group in the international arena.

161. The political crisis in China is continuing. And for the moment it is difficult to say what stages it will go through and how it will end. Under these circumstances, the Politburo considers that it is necessary to consistently carry out the political line which has previously

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been approved by the Central Committee and tried in practice. Not rising to the provocations of the Chinese leaders, unmasking the anti-Leninist views and the great power nationalistic course of the MAO Tse-tung group, we will continue in the future to take measures to preserve the friendship of the Chinese people and the Chinese communists. At the same time, it must be noted that the MAO group is continuing its unbridled anti-Soviet campaign. Peking is waging a genuine propaganda war against our social structure, against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is attempting to discredit our foreign policy. The line of the CPSU in regard to these hostile acts is unchanged - we have given and we will continue to give them a confident and firm rebuff.

162. As long ago as the 1966 Plenary Session, attention was drawn to the fact that there are aspects of the international policies of the Cuban leaders with which it is impossible to agree. Recently, the actions of the Cuban leadership have still further complicated Soviet-Cuban relations. It should be said that the special conceptions on the questions of the construction of socialism, the ways of development of the worldwide revolutionary process, which are now being actively contrasted to the views and policies of the CPSU and other fraternal parties, were already beginning to be advanced by Fidel Castro several years ago. Thus for example, they advance the idea that it is possible to realize simultaneously the building of a socialist and a communist society at a forced tempo, depending solely on revolutionary enthusiasm.

163. In foreign policy matters, Castro has taken the course of "instigating" revolutions in the countries of Africa and particularly Latin America. In connection with this, the slogan "Many Vietnams" was advanced - that is, the creation of hotbeds of war in many regions of the world. Actually, the Cuban leadership is coming out against any constructive steps and proposals whatever by socialist governments for the relaxation of international tensions.

164. The CC/CPSU has more than once undertaken various steps to overcome negative manifestations in the policies of the Cuban leadership, to help the Cuban revolution proceed on a truly socialist path.

165. Soviet communists are aware of the enormous support which the USSR and other socialist countries have

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rendered Cuba in strengthening her defense potential, in the development of her economic structure, in training personnel for the Cuban national economy.

166. In June 1967, in accordance with the decision of the Politburo, Comrade A. N. Kosygin's trip to Cuba took place. All the basic problems of Soviet-Cuban relations were discussed at that time in the course of conversations. Moreover, our Cuban comrades seemed to be inclined to understand the necessity of putting an end to complicating relations with the Soviet Union.

167. However, subsequent actions of the Cuban leadership have taken a different direction. Criticism of the basic tenets of economic policy and foreign policy delineated by the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU has not ceased in Cuba. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba did not even send an official greeting to the CC/CPSU in connection with the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution.

168. Following this, a number of unfriendly speeches against our Party and against the communist parties of Czechoslovakia, the GDR and many parties of Latin America were permitted at a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba in January of this year. The friendly and internationally-minded policy of the USSR vis-a-vis Cuba was publicly subjected to doubt in the materials of this Plenary Session; the materials also contained thinly veiled reproaches of the Soviet Union, hints about some sort of "interference" on the part of the USSR in the internal affairs of Cuba.

169. In February of this year, our Ministry of Foreign Trade received a memorandum on Soviet-Cuban commercial relations from a governmental commercial delegation from Cuba. Drafted in a harsh tone, this memorandum advances against the Soviet Union an accusation of "holding back" the development of the Cuban economy. It contains a demand to increase Soviet deliveries to Cuba of the most varied categories of merchandise: fuel, metallurgical products, fertilizer, agricultural machinery, building material, etc. Moreover, the difficulties which our Cuban comrades are encountering in carrying out plans for the expansion of sugar production are unequivocally linked to the allegation that the Soviet Union is "insufficiently" forthcoming regarding Cuban requirements.

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170. In response to the Cuban memorandum, a letter was sent which demonstrated on the basis of facts that the reproaches from the Cuban side are without any foundation whatever. In the letter it was noted that our policy toward Cuba has always been built on the basis of internationalism, brotherhood, and comradely cooperation, that the volume of Soviet deliveries to Cuba should be viewed in connection with our realistic capabilities and our obligations toward other socialist countries. Insofar as the problems posed in the memorandum go far beyond the question of trade relations, Comrade Castro (or Comrade Dorticos) was invited to the USSR to discuss these problems.

171. In his answering letter, Comrade Fidel Castro in essence repeated the assertions contained in the memorandum and declined the invitation to discuss at a high level the questions which had been raised.

172. As is apparent, there are not a few complications in the relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union. It is thought, however, that there is no need for haste in reaching definite conclusions. Emotions are a poor adviser in politics. The interests of the Cuban people and of socialist development in Cuba are dear to the Soviet Union. Even the very serious mistakes and disjointed actions of the Cuban leaders should not preclude our support of the achievements of the Cuban Revolution and of the work of socialism in that country. It should be kept in mind that strengthening the position of Cuba has a not inconsiderable importance for the development of the revolutionary movement in Latin America. The CC/CPSU will strive to change Soviet-Cuban relations for the better, while remaining cognizant of the fact that successful cooperation and genuine mutual understanding between parties and countries and liquidation of complications that arise are possible only on the basis of mutual efforts. In its own efforts in this direction, the Central Committee will proceed from our Marxist-Leninist line which is founded on principle.

173. At the Plenary Session, the question was also considered concerning our relations with the leadership of the Rumanian Communist Party, whose line in many ways goes contrary to the interests of unity in the communist movement, of solidarity in socialist cooperation.

174. The departure of the Rumanian Communist Party from positions of internationalism began to be noticeable in

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the beginning of the 1960's. In internal policy, this found its expression in the rebirth, though in a veiled form, of the idea of "Greater Rumania", in the uncritical praise of Rumanian historical traditions, in the cultivation of unfriendliness in connection with everything Soviet. In their foreign policy, the Rumanian leaders began to limit the participation of Rumania in multi-faceted economic and political cooperation with the countries of socialism, to refuse in a number of instances to take part in collective, coordinated actions. They took a position of peculiar "neutrality" in the struggle which the communist movement is waging against the anti-Leninist course of the Chinese leaders.

175. The lengths to which certain Rumanian leaders will go can be seen from the following example.

176. A Government delegation from Rumania headed by Maurer was in Finland in the beginning of April. Though he knew perfectly well our attitude toward the person of [Marshal Carl Gustav] Mannerheim, as well as the attitude of the Finnish communists and other democratic circles in Finland toward this reactionary and militarist individual, Maurer found it possible on his own initiative to lay a wreath on Mannerheim's grave.

177. After the October Plenary Session of the Central Committee, the leadership of the CPSU had 12 meetings with the Rumanian leaders. Our evaluations of Rumanian action in restoring diplomatic relations with West Germany, its special position on the non-proliferation agreement and on many other questions were forthrightly expressed to a Rumanian Party-Governmental delegation during a visit to Moscow in December of last year.

178. If the position of the Rumanians is now calling forth more and more criticism and censure in the communist movement and in the socialist community, if the groundlessness of Rumanian declarations on "interference in their internal affairs" has been laid bare, if a significant part of the Rumanian people, Rumanian communists continue to believe in the international fraternal policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, then this is in no small degree the result of the fact that the CC/CPSU has carried out a policy based on principle, while at the same time manifesting maximum restraint and patience.

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179. The Politburo of the CC/CPSU is taking all measures at its disposal to prevent the deterioration of Rumanian-Soviet relations. At the same time, the Politburo considers that our genuinely internationally-minded policy will be well understood by the Rumanian communists and Rumanian people as well as by all fraternal parties. Simultaneously, the leadership of the CPSU is candidly expressing its opinion to our Rumanian comrades concerning their steps which are objectively leading to the worsening of Soviet-Rumanian relations, to the withdrawal of Rumania from the joint actions of socialist governments in the international arena.

180. In spite of the fact that the position of the Rumanian leadership is creating numerous difficulties in the solution of political and other problems of cooperation of Warsaw Pact countries, the CC/CPSU will take measures to strengthen and develop this cooperation, attracting the Rumanians to it when possible, and acting without them when they do not wish to cooperate. This is the only correct line. As regards Soviet-Rumanian relations, the CC/CPSU considers that they should be built with due consideration for the actions and positions of the Rumanian side.

181. Responsible Party officials are aware of the basic features which have characterized the situation in Czechoslovakia since the January Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovakian CP, the facts concerning the activation there of revisionists, anti-socialist forces. Attention was devoted to this at the Plenary Session.

182. Every communist understands how important it is that our friendship, our brotherly relations with such a country as Czechoslovakia, with such a party as the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) remain unshaken. Under these circumstances, it has been impossible to take the position of a detached "observer". Our international duty consists of helping our Czechoslovak friends to stabilize the situation, to cope with the complications created by the activity of forces hostile to socialism. At the same time, it is necessary to act in close contact with the leadership of fraternal parties regarding this problem which is important for socialist countries.

183. On 23 March in Dresden, by mutual agreement, there took place the well-known meeting of the representa-

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tives of the six European socialist countries. In the course of this meeting, as is known, there was an exchange of opinion on the most important problems of political and economic development and cooperation, including the problems of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), the Warsaw Pact, the activization of the anti-imperialist struggle. There also took place an exchange of opinion and information on the situation in the socialist countries. Representatives of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Government of the CSSR informed us of the situation in their country.

184. The Politburo has taken full account of the complexity and the delicacy of the situation which has arisen there. Of course, it was clear that the opponents of socialism would try to interpret the opinions expressed by representatives of fraternal parties as "interference" in the internal affairs of the KSC, irrespective of their content and of our real intentions. But the Politburo was convinced that our Czechoslovak friends would understand everything correctly. Skipping ahead, it can be said that the concern of the CPSU, as well as of other fraternal parties, for strengthening the position of socialism in Czechoslovakia truly met with the understanding of our Czechoslovak comrades.

185. Our evaluation of the situation in Czechoslovakia as presented in the speech of our delegation was candid and based on principle. The seriousness of this situation and the importance of carrying out measures to block the way for emboldened anti-socialist, counter-revolutionary elements, which would also strengthen the position of the leadership of the KSC, was emphasized. It was said that, being faithful to its international duty, realizing its great responsibility for strengthening the forces of socialism, for the solidarity of the socialist camp, the CC/CPSU is striving to do everything possible to render support to its Czechoslovak comrades in the complex situation which has arisen, to help them in the defense of socialist achievements, in rebuffing anti-socialist elements. The Soviet delegation emphasized the special importance, in our opinion, of strengthening the position of the working class of Czechoslovakia, of relying on it in the struggle against reaction and against all forces hostile to socialism.

186. Along with this, our delegation sketched out the vast perspectives of economic cooperation between Czecho-

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slovakia and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Taking into consideration the fact that in Czechoslovakia elements which strive to reorient the economy of the country toward the West have raised their heads, our delegation demonstrated that there are enormous possibilities for mutually advantageous cooperation with socialist countries within the framework of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance and on a bi-lateral basis. A readiness was expressed to examine all these questions on the highest level at the earliest date.

187. All the delegations gave speeches at the meeting. Their evaluations and conclusions coincided with ours. They also spoke out frankly and forthrightly to the representatives of the KSC about their concern and alarm in connection with the state of affairs in Czechoslovakia.

188. Our Czechoslovak comrades noted that the speeches of the delegations from the fraternal parties had great significance for them. Emphasizing that the situation in the country is truly complex, our Czechoslovak comrades assured us that the KSC will not permit the development of events which might lead to counter-revolution, that Czechoslovakia will not deviate from the socialist path, and will continue her policy of friendship with the Soviet Union and with other socialist countries, and will faithfully carry out all her obligations in connection with the Warsaw Pact.

189. The meeting in Dresden, according to the evaluation of all its participants, was timely, necessary and useful.

190. It should be emphasized that the situation in Czechoslovakia remains quite acute. At the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, many comrades who made speeches, primarily the representatives of large factory party organizations, emphasized that the state of affairs in the CSSR has been typified by such manifestations as the mass dismissal from their posts of party workers who, according to the affirmations of newspapers, support the so-called "conservative" line, that is that they favor putting an end to the irresponsible actions of the right-wing [liberal] elements; by the disruption of many central governmental bodies, especially those which direct the Army and the state security service; by the actual escape of mass means of propaganda (radio, press, television) from the control of the Party. The

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comrades emphasized that whereas until recently the revisionist, anti-socialist forces functioned mainly in Prague, they now have started to be active in the provinces.

191. Particular alarm and concern is evoked by the fact that organized subversive activity of open enemies of socialism, tightly linked with the Imperialist West, is more and more visible behind all this. For the moment, they are trying to remain in the shade, to work behind the scenes. Judging by all that has happened, the tactic of the counter-revolutionary underground consists of quietly building up unhealthy attitudes, inflaming passions, putting confusion into the heads of people, and then, having brought chaos to the country and having demoralized the Party from within, openly bringing the matter to a counter-revolutionary overthrow, under the flag of further liberalization.

192. These people are wittingly exploiting the present situation. They count on finding support also among those who have failed to grasp the situation, who are confused by bourgeois propaganda. They appeal also to those, including even old communists, who for various reasons feel themselves "offended".

193. Here it is necessary to take into account one very important peculiarity of Czechoslovakia. After the victory of the socialist revolution, the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie did not emigrate from the country. They remained. Former entrepreneurs, civil servants and other representatives of the bourgeois class remained. Suffice it to say, for example, that as late as 1950 in Czechoslovakia there numbered one and one-half million former members of the 27 dispersed political parties of the bourgeois era. But, while remaining physically in a socialist society, many of them did not part with the hope of a return of the capitalist past. And it is precisely they who are now serving as champions of bourgeois influence. It is precisely they, in an appropriate combination of circumstances, who could serve as mass support for activity of rightist elements. Under such circumstances, relaxation of Party and governmental control over the development of the situation could lead to quite dangerous consequences.

194. Practical experience confirms this. From the information communicated to us by our Czechoslovak comrades, it is apparent that here and there in Czechoslovakia attacks

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on communists, threats against them are already taking place; in the villages, wealthy peasants and churchmen are already raising their heads; the followers of the bourgeois regime are becoming active; here and there can be heard calls for the restoration of private ownership of the means of production, calls for a "return to the republic of Masaryk and Benes".

195. The course of the most recent April Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the KSC demonstrated that such manifestations are beginning to disturb our Czechoslovak comrades more and more. In the speech of Comrade Dubcek, a brief summary of which was published in "Pravda", there was revealed the desire of the leadership of the KSC to control the course of events, to concentrate the attention of the party and of all workers on the conclusion of constructive tasks of building socialism in the CSSR. Comrade Dubcek devoted great attention to the necessity of further elevating the role of the Party in directing the country, noted the importance of the activity of all parts of the Party and governmental apparatus, including the Army and the security bodies. On the whole, his speech revealed, in spite of certain negative aspects, a better understanding on the part of the leadership of the KSC of the necessity to wage a struggle against anti-socialist forces. And this aspect of Comrade Dubcek's speech received a certain amount of support from the Plenum. At the same time, some comrades noted that the situation in the country was depicted in unjustifiably optimistic tones in Comrade Dubcek's address.

196. To a certain extent, the strengthening of Party influence over the development of the situation was felt in the results of the political struggle which recently was conducted in connection with the election of the President of the CSSR. In spite of pressure from rightist forces, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the KSC unanimously recommended the election of Hero of Czechoslovakia and Hero of the Soviet Union, General Ludvik Svoboda, as president of the CSSR.

197. The near future should show the extent to which the decisions of the March-April Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the KSC can direct Czechoslovakian events along the correct course. We, of course, with all our heart, wish success to our Czechoslovak friends in

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their desire to normalize the situation in the Party and in the country. However, it is impossible not to see that the situation still remains very, very complex and will apparently remain so for a significant period. Addressing a conference of the active members of the Prague party organization, which took place after the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the KSC, Comrade Dubcek cautioned the Party against unjustified optimism, emphasizing that negative tendencies in the country are far from being overcome.

198. In making a preliminary evaluation of the meaning and the origin of the events which have taken place in recent months in Czechoslovakia, it must be said that they have a basis, of course, not only in the definite shortcomings in style and method of work of the previous Party leadership in the country. With every passing day it is becoming increasingly clear that one of the main shortcomings which influenced the course of events was the serious lack of emphasis on ideological work in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the insufficient militancy in connection with hostile ideological influences coming from the camp of imperialism, as well as from anti-socialist elements within the country.

199. The Politburo of the Central Committee is in continuing contact with our Czechoslovak comrades, and with the leaders of a number of other fraternal parties, in order to help our Czechoslovak friends. It is known that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has no little revolutionary experience, that the Czechoslovak working class is that force which has determined and will continue to determine the development of the country. Therefore, confidence was expressed in the address that our Czechoslovak comrades will be able to gain control of the situation, that fraternal friendship between our parties and our peoples will remain unshakeable, will be developed and strengthened.

200. At the same time, it is not possible to exclude entirely the possibility of another, undesirable turn of events. Under all conditions and under all circumstances, our position based on principles should be clear - it is necessary to do everything to frustrate the intrigues of the enemies of socialism.

201. From speeches by Comrade Gomulka published in our press, it is known that not so long ago there were

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certain unhealthy manifestations which took place in the public life of fraternal Poland. There a definite group of figures of revisionist persuasion, representatives of ideologically immature and unstable strata of the intelligentsia, which were partially linked to bourgeois and Zionist circles, came out against policies of the Party and in essence against the directing role of the Party. In an attempt to provoke mass anti-Party activity, they were successful for a while in influencing individual groups of Polish students. The origin and the political significance of these events were well explained in the speech of Comrade Gomulka which has been mentioned. It is important to note that in the struggle against the attempt to spread anti-Party, anti-socialist influence in Poland, the avant garde of the workers of this country, the Polish United Workers Party, came out decisively and combatively. The leadership of the Polish United Workers Party was able in a short time to mobilize the activists of the Party against attempts at ideological diversion. The Party organizations of Poland actively came out in a broad front in defense of the policies of the Party and for the cause of socialism in Poland; the working class, to which the Party addressed itself, spoke its piece loudly and decisively. The position of the leadership of the Party, headed by Comrade Gomulka, found complete understanding and support on the part of Party activists, rank and file communists and all workers of the country.

202. Complex manifestations in the life of certain socialist countries indicate that the development of these countries, as well as the development of relations between them, does not always proceed smoothly and probably cannot do so. A struggle is in progress, during the course of which genuinely socialist forces clash with the counteraction of elements which are under the influence of bourgeois and petit bourgeois ideology. This struggle is a complex and sometimes contradictory process, subjected to the influence of a great number of forces, both internal as well as external.

203. There was a time when the imperialists put their main stake on trying to crush socialism on the fields of combat. Now the situation is different. The imperialists will not take on the main forces of socialism in a direct skirmish any more. This situation has come about thanks to the invincible defensive might of the socialist camp and above all, the Soviet Union. A constant concern for further

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strengthening our defense, improving the quality of our weapons, further development of the defense sectors of industry, unswerving militancy, the development of cooperation of fraternal countries in the military sphere, this is the best guarantee that the imperialists will also in the future have no desire to launch a military challenge to the worldwide socialist system.

204. Under these conditions, our class enemies are now directing their main efforts at trying to undermine socialism from within, to weaken and demoralize the socialist camp. The imperialists can see well and wittingly take advantage of both nationalism and the schismatic actions of "left" opportunists, as well as revisionist elements in individual socialist countries. And not only do they take advantage. The imperialists undertake active efforts to kindle, support, and inflate unhealthy moods and tendencies of this type which manifest themselves here and there. And it must be said that these efforts are not always unsuccessful.

205. An implacable struggle with imperialism is now unfolding on the political and particularly on the ideological front. It can be assumed that it will be drawn out and difficult. It will have its own complications. In the end result we, without doubt, will win, will gain victory. But this struggle will demand great organizing skill, the mobilization of economic, political and ideological resources, a class approach to the processes and manifestations of social life which is consistent and based on principle.

206. The CPSU and the fraternal parties of other socialist countries are fighting together to strengthen the worldwide socialist system, to deepen cooperation in economic, political, military and other spheres. In each of these spheres, significant results have already been achieved and there exist great possibilities for further movement ahead.

207. Much work is being carried out with respect to the coordination of national economic plans, specialization and cooperation in production are expanding, the volume of trade between socialist countries is growing. At the moment, the countries participating in the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance are actively preparing to conduct in the near future a conference of leaders of parties and government heads on the basic question of improving economic cooperation.

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-45-

208. The coordination of foreign policy activity of the countries of socialism is of great significance.

209. Everything possible is being done in order that the military-political union of the Warsaw Pact nations may be strengthened.

210. Constant contacts with the leaders of fraternal countries and parties, and the development of a variety of party and governmental channels are directed toward the strengthening of worldwide socialism, a collective rebuff to imperialist reaction, and the intrigues of anti-socialist elements. Our position is unchanged - this is a position of upholding the principles of scientific socialism, of proletarian - socialist internationalism, a decisive struggle against all manifestations of nationalism and opportunism, for the solidarity of communist parties and socialist countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism.

211. Experience shows that the struggle with such a strong and perfidious foe as Imperialism demands from all communists enormous energy, the mobilization of forces on all major fronts of the struggle. Successes do not come of themselves. In all these complex processes which take place in the world, the correct strategy and tactic, which most fully takes into account concrete conditions, must be found and developed. Here, along with decisiveness and readiness for struggle, sober political calculation, restraint and flexibility, knowledge of the concrete situation are necessary.

212. It is understandable that the role of the Soviet Union in the international arena in many ways depends on the foreign policy actions carried out by us in one or another region of the world, what kind of policy we adhere to. The role of our country in the international arena and its authority rest upon the uninterrupted growth of the Soviet economy, on the constant strengthening of the defensive might of the country, on the moral-political unity of the people, united around its Leninist Communist Party, selflessly devoted to the ideals of communism.

213. Being concerned about the further strengthening of the position and the international role of the Soviet Union, this means above all assuring the fulfillment of the plans for socialist construction, developing socialist in-

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dustry on the basis of the latest achievements of scientific-technical progress, achieving a further growth of agriculture, strictly carrying out measures for the improvement of the entire system of management of the national economy indicated by the Party.

214. The force of our example, as the first country of socialism, as the country where communism is being built, has special significance in contemporary circumstances for the development of socialist cooperation, for the successful solution of all our international problems. This is why the unbroken link between the activity of the Party within the country and its activity in the international arena was once again emphasized with such force at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee. The better things go within the country, the higher the political consciousness of the Soviet people, the greater are the possibilities we have to exert influence on worldwide developments, on the international situation.

215. It cannot be forgotten for a moment that we are opposed by a crafty and powerful imperialist opponent, who recognizes only force and is ready to utilize the slightest pretext to inflict damage to the cause of socialism, to the liberation movement, to the interests of the people. Therefore, our paramount obligation, as it has always been, is to strengthen in every possible way our armed forces, equip them with even more perfected combat equipment, unceasingly elevate the combat readiness of the troops. Recently, the Soviet people celebrated the 50th Anniversary of the glorious Soviet Army. In the course of the celebration, the Party gave it an order - defend the achievements of the October Revolution just as heroically and selflessly as it has done in the course of its entire history. There is no doubt that the generals and officers and the entire body of the Armed Forces will carry out this order of the Party with honor.

216. In order to accomplish successfully our continually growing internal and international tasks, it is necessary to continue to strengthen the leading role of the Communist Party. The Party is the combat staff of the Soviet people, uniting and directing the efforts of millions of people toward a common goal. The Party is responsible for everything - for the correct course in the building of communism, for the development of the economy and of culture, for an unceasing increase in the welfare of the Soviet people,

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and for the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Growth of the role of the party is a natural process, dictated by the growing complexity of the tasks which stand before Soviet society. The Party can cope with these tasks only by being monolithic and united, intimately linked with the multi-million masses, relying on their support.

217. The working class, the kolkhoz peasantry, and our Soviet intelligentsia warmly support the policies of the Party, which with all its self-sacrificing activity has proved that there is not and cannot be a better defender of the people's interests than the Communist Party. The Soviet people regard the main condition for further victories in the cause of communism to be the strengthening of the leading role of the Party, in its fidelity to Leninist precepts.

218. In order to operate at the level of modern demands, it is necessary to elevate the responsibility of every Party organization, of every communist.

219. Recently there were held party election meetings, rayon, municipal, oblast and kray conferences. This is a great event in the life of the Party and of every Party organization. This is a genuine examination of their work, an inspection of personnel, their link with the masses of communists and non-communists. The meetings and conferences again demonstrated convincingly the indestructible unity of the ranks of our Party, their solidarity with the Central Committee. All Party organizations, the entire multi-million army of communists unanimously approved the foreign and domestic policies worked out by the Twenty-third Congress of the CPSU and by the plenary sessions of the Central Committee, and consistently implemented by the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Soviet Government. This trust should be highly esteemed, should be valued with the support of the Party masses; all forces and knowledge should be directed toward maintaining the Party at a level equal to the tasks before it, so that its role and significance in the life of Soviet society can grow even greater.

220. An absolute condition for the further elevation of the leading role of the Party is improvement in the activity of all its sections, all its organizations. In this connection, the special importance of the work of the central committees of the communist parties of the union republics, the kray committees and the oblast committees

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was emphasized in the address. They stand at the head of major detachments of our Party, numbering tens and hundreds of thousands of communists, they organize and direct the great labor of millions of workers.

221. It is very important that recently we have been successful in achieving a speeding up of the tempo of development of the economy and increasing the welfare of the workers. Having overfulfilled the assignments of the first two years of the Five Year Plan, we have also successfully started the third year. The plan for the first quarter has been significantly overfulfilled by the industry of the nation, the increase in manufacturing output in comparison with the corresponding period of the previous year comprised 9.3 percent.

222. Agricultural workers also started the year well. The first quarter plan for the purchase of animal husbandry produce has been greatly overfulfilled. The collective and state farms of the southern regions of the nation are conducting their spring field work in an organized fashion.

223. Further improvement in the activity of Party, governmental and civic organizations depends directly on our managerial personnel. Precisely because the Party has at its disposal officials who are ideologically steadfast, devoted and know their work, it can successfully accomplish the most complex domestic and foreign political tasks.

224. It can be stated with good reason that the spirit of a respectful attitude toward personnel which has become confirmed in our Party, the trust in them, has completely justified itself and is bringing good results. People are working with assurance, with clarity of purpose, with initiative. In such a situation, the capabilities of the employees are more completely realized, the maturity and stability of personnel is increased. The Central Committee attaches great importance to assuring that we in our Party consistently carry out the principle of combining the use of senior, experienced personnel with the advancement of new, young and capable employees.

225. The necessity for promoting the best representatives of the working class to managerial work was particularly emphasized in the address. This is a matter of great political importance. The working class, as the leading class of our society, is also playing a leading role during the period

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of the building of communism. The contemporary Soviet worker, by his cultural level, approaches the level of engineering-technical employees. Experience demonstrates that the promotion of the most qualified workers to managerial work in Party, governmental and economic organizations completely justifies itself. It goes without saying that along with the promotion of workers, we must find managerial personnel among other categories - from the ranks of collective farm peasants and the Soviet intelligentsia.

226. The Party considers it a duty to strengthen its link with the masses, inform them extensively about our policies, about events within the country and abroad. In this connection, the improvement of our press, television, radio and all our propaganda acquires greater and greater importance.

227. Recently there has been an increase in the good practice of managerial officials making speeches at meetings of Party activists, before the personnel of enterprises and establishments. By informing the workers, explaining to them the essence of the Party's policies, managerial officials appreciate better the mood of the masses, utilize more fully their experience and knowledge in accomplishing the tasks of building communism.

228. It is necessary at the moment to pay particular attention to elevating the level and content of ideological work. The Plenary Session of the Central Committee drew special attention to the fact that the international events of our day are intimately linked with the ideological struggle between the two worldwide social systems.

229. Bourgeois propaganda is currently concentrating its main effort on the organization of a broad ideological offensive against socialism. It is persistently trying by all means possible to penetrate into socialist countries, to exert influence on their development. It is trying to distort and compromise our ideals, to slow down our forward movement. Under these conditions, the most varied forces of reaction join together. Imperialist intelligence services, and Catholics and other churchmen, and the circles of international Zionism and rightist leaders of social democratic parties work together.

230. The answer to the subversive activity of imperialist propaganda and its supporting chorus must be the

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most relentless struggle with hostile ideology, no matter what forms it takes. This is class struggle, and there can be no peaceful co-existence in the sphere of ideology.

231. The enemies count on poisoning the consciousness of a number of unstable elements which are still present in our society. Every Party organization, every communist must be implacable in the Leninist manner in the face of all manifestations of hostile views and everything which advocates such views.

232. In numerous letters and resolutions coming to the CC/CPSU, the Soviet people - workers in factories and plants, collective farm workers, engineering-technical employees, civil servants, scientific workers - angrily censure those who go to the defense of renegades who have been justly sentenced by Soviet courts for anti-Soviet activity - such as [Aleksandr I.] Ginsburg, [Yuriy T.] Galanskov and others of the same ilk. Particular indignation has been aroused by the fact that among these defenders are some, unfortunately, who carry a Party or Komsomol ticket in their pocket.

233. Insistent demands are contained in letters from workers to put an end to statements which are alien to us in the ideological-political sense, appearing from time to time in literature, art, and even in scientific publications.

234. And such manifestations, as is known, actually do occur here, unfortunately. There are people who attempt to depict in a distorted light various stages in the history of our Soviet homeland, particularly such a heroic period as the Great Patriotic War [World War II]. Others write about our present day as if they had made up their minds to use all means to cast a shadow on the life and work of the Soviet people, to smear the radiant ideals which inspire our people. A resolute struggle must be waged against such manifestations.

235. The Plenum emphasized the necessity of strengthening Party and, above all, ideological work. Our Party organizations are competently and persistently mobilizing the masses in order to assure new successes in the economy, in industry and in agriculture, and great achievements have been made in these fields. This is also an important result of the work of the Party in its ideological-political train-

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-51-

ing of the masses. But right now, the situation requires that more, immeasurably more, attention be devoted to ideological work. Evidently it will be necessary not only to strengthen all sections of ideological institutes, but also to increase somewhat the number of ideological workers in the Party apparatus. It is necessary to succeed in having all Party organizations, every communist, working persistently on the ideological front, in order that the forces of the Party are purposefully directed to meeting organizational and political requirements for the task of communist training of the workers.

236. Along with party organs which are responsible from top to bottom for formulating ideological work, enormous responsibility is also placed on governmental bodies - such as the Ministry of Culture, the Committees for Publishing, for Cinematography, for Radio Broadcasting and Television, as well as the creative organizations of writers, cinema workers and artists.

237. It is necessary not only to expose the mendacity of bourgeois propaganda, not only to demonstrate that imperialism is doomed, it is necessary to reveal comprehensively the great truth of communist ideas, to show the successes of the building of communism in our country. The motto for our propaganda is high ideological content, effectiveness, aggressiveness, operational efficiency, clarity for hundreds of millions of people, including those beyond the borders of our homeland.

238. We achieved a great deal on the problems of improving ideological work in connection with the celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution. At present we are preparing for the 150th anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx and the 100th anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin. Relying on the ideas of Marx and Lenin, our theoretical personnel are called upon to propagandize them, to collate all that is new in the struggle for communism, to develop revolutionary theory.

\* \*  
\*

239. As is already known, the Plenary Session of the Central Committee approved wholly and entirely the political line and practical activity of the Politburo of the Central

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Committee in the sphere of international policy and that of the worldwide communist movement.

240. Having noted that the contemporary phase of historic development is characterized by a sharp aggravation of the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism, the Plenum emphasized that under these conditions, a relentless struggle against hostile ideology, a resolute exposure of the intrigues of imperialism, a communist education for the members of the CPSU and all workers, a strengthening of all ideological activity of the Party acquire special significance and are among the principal responsibilities of all Party organizations.

241. In its resolution, the Plenum of the Central Committee called upon all Party organizations to direct all their means of ideological education toward the strengthening of communist conviction, of the feeling of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism in every communist and every Soviet person, toward the strengthening of ideological steadfastness and the ability to resist any and all forms of bourgeois influence.

242. The Plenum demanded that the ideological activity of Party organizations be even more closely linked with the tasks of increasing the working and civic activity of the workers, with a practical contribution by each Soviet person toward the fulfillment of production assignments, toward the successful completion of the Five-Year Plan.

243. The resolution of the Plenum emphasizes that the primary task of the Party and the people is the further strengthening of the political, economic and defensive might of our homeland.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

2068  
18h

[REDACTED]

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

3.3 (b)(1)

1. [REDACTED]

2. As you will note, this is the official report of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Plenum of the Central Committee held on 9 and 10 April 1968. It is an analysis of an address given by Brezhnev.

3. On page 13 begins the commentary on Vietnam and your March 31 speech.

Page 18 - NPT

- 23 - West Germany
- 25 - Middle East
- 26 - PUEBLO
- 29 - Communist China
- 33 - Cuba
- 35 - Rumania
- 37 - Czechoslovakia

Other material of interest is scattered throughout the report.

3.3 (b)(1)

[REDACTED]

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 01-237  
By id NARA, Date 5-28-03

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- 2 -

4. We can only assume that this is an accurate copy of  
the report as described.

*Dick*

Richard Helms  
Director

Attachment - 1  
Copy No. 1 -



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W W R  
ACTION

19

3:15  
Tuesday, July 2, 1968 -- 12:45 PM

Profile

Mr. President:

In the attached, Nick Katzenbach recommends you approve an Air Force plane to fly back to Madagascar the body of the Malagasy Ambassador who died yesterday in New York.

This is a somewhat special case because of the unfortunate circumstances of the Ambassador's death. He was walking along a New York beach two weeks ago when some volleyball players ran into him and broke his collarbone and his leg; he seemed to be on the way to recovery when he suddenly died. It is not clear that he died of his injuries. The hospital is trying to get permission from Madagascar to do an autopsy. However, hard we try, the story may never come out straight. Offering an Air Force plane would be a very useful gesture to quell suspicions and soften feelings here and in Africa.

I know that we just did this for Ambassador Mathews of Botswana, and I would certainly not argue for a blanket rule on returning remains of Ambassadors who die here. But unless you wish now to rule out all such gestures, I recommend you approve this request for an Air Force plane.

W. W. Rostow

Approve plane \_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_

EKH/vmr





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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Plane to Return Remains of  
Malagasy Ambassador Rakotomalala

Recommendation:

That you authorize the use of an Air Force plane to return to the Malagasy Republic the remains of Ambassador Rakotomalala who died this morning.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

Ambassador Rakotomalala died this morning at Ramapo Hospital in New York where he had been ever since he was a victim of an accident on June 16. He sustained injuries, at that time, involving a broken leg and a broken collar bone when some volleyball players accidentally collided with him. It is not yet known whether his death was directly related to the accident.

Ambassador Rakotomalala was the Dean of the African Ambassadors in the United States and was accredited both to this country and to the United Nations. I believe that it would be highly appropriate and desirable, if possible, to offer the use of an Air Force plane for the return of the Ambassador's remains to his homeland.

*W. L. B. K. H. J.*  
Under Secretary

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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Tuesday, July 2, 1968  
3:10 p. m.

*Pres file*

*20*

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have marked the key passages in Al Jenkins' summary of this latest material on China. Attached also, should you have time, are intelligence reports which give a feel for the extraordinary events unfolding in China.

The reason I make these available to you is that it is possible that the disarray in China helps explain the Soviet willingness to proceed with arms control measures with the U. S. and to interject itself so deeply in the Vietnam affair.

I was interested today to find Sullivan quoting the King of Laos on exactly this point, as follows:

"He said that he guessed the Soviets estimated the chaos in China as being pretty complete, since they seemed to be moving forward on a number of projects (such as disarmament) with the U. S. A., without apparent concern re Chicom reaction. He felt this indicated that Soviets thought Chinese too confused to react. He hoped we could use this mood to get Soviets to agree take some action with the Hanoi vis-a-vis Laos and South Vietnam."

*(from Vietnamese 7852)*

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 92-199  
By cb, NARA, Date 5-17-95

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

20a

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July 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: China Mainland Situation

Since the Wuhan episode of last summer, the conservatives in general have had their way more -- often with Army collusion or acquiescence. This has concerned the Maoists and Mao on June 2 issued one of his infrequent delphic "instructions" to the effect that the masses were to be given their rein at all costs. This has resulted, not unexpectedly, in a rise in fighting throughout June. The level has not yet reached that of last summer, but it is well on the way, and we have again a situation which could deteriorate fairly rapidly.

Perhaps the chief difference between last summer and now is that Cultural Revolution dislocations have begun to bring suffering to larger and larger numbers of citizens. Illegal immigrants into Hong Kong give most frequently as reasons for fleeing, unemployment and food shortages. Lack of raw materials, labor troubles and not infrequently sabotage have reduced production in many enterprises to the point where salaries cannot be met. We have reports of both grave robberies (especially in rural areas, valuables are still often buried with the dead) and the sale of children -- both typical phenomena in times of crisis in China. (One woman spoke of being offered the equivalent of about \$45.00 for her son, but she was holding out for more.) Vehicles, even public buses, are being stolen for use in factional fighting, and bicycles are at such a premium in some places where public transportation has ceased to function, that they are being wrested out from under the riders.

Serious floods are reported from six provinces in Southeast China. The early rice crop in Kwangtung may be off as much as 10-15%, and planting of late rice will be delayed.

All three North-South rail lines have had interruptions for considerable periods in June from floods, landslides and fighting around the stations. (We are not sure whether military-manned priority trains are getting through, where "acts of God" are not the cause of the interruptions.) Many letters mention that the writer is stranded away from home or work because of lack of transportation.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-200


By ju, NARA, Date 1-11-94

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- 2 -

No one knows what all this will ultimately mean, of course. However, one is now tempted to alter the British witticism of last fall to the effect that "the situation is excellent, but not hopeless." Things must be beginning to look pretty hopeless to the average Chinese. If the regime could bring itself to give the conservatives their way, things could quiet down, but there are no signs that the regime will do that. Almost anything could happen in coming months, but the best bet still is that a portion of the military will get fed up and take matters into their own hands. If the Maoists' opposition should begin to jell, we should see radio stations taken over. So far, this has happened in only a couple of places very temporarily some months ago. It was premature.



Alfred Jenkins

cc: Mr. Jorden

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Department of State

<sup>206</sup>  
TELEGRAM

41

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PAGE 01 HONG K 07085 280930Z

17

ACTION EA 15

INFO EUR 15, NEA 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AGR 20, EI 15, COM 28,

TRSY 08, NIC 01, AID 28, RSRI 01, /191 W

R 280648Z JUN 68

FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5066

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

UNCLAS HONG KONG 7085

JOINT CONGEN/AGRICULTURE MESSAGE

DEPT PASS AGRICULTURE

SUBJECT: FLOOD IN SOUTH CHINA

WIDESPREAD FLOODING REPORTED IN SOUTH CHINA FOLLOWING  
HEAVY RAIN LATTER PART OF MAY AND CONTINUING INTO JUNE.  
AFFECTED PROVINCES INCLUDE KWANGTUNG, FUKIEN, SOUTHERN  
HUNAN, EASTERN KWANGSI, AND SOUTHERN KIANGSI.

FLOODING SERIOUS WITH EXTENSIVE INUNDATION. PARTS OF  
KWANGTUNG PROVINCE REPORTED BY TRAVELERS. HOWEVER, NO  
MAJOR BREAKS IN DIKES YET REPORTED.

CROP PRODUCTION OBVIOUSLY AFFECTED, BUT DAMAGE DIFFICULT  
TO ASSESS. CROPS REPORTED DESTROYED SOME AREAS. ALTHOUGH  
MAGNITUDE UNKNOWN, EARLY RICE HARVEST DELAYED IN KWANGTUNG

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PAGE 02 HONG K 07085 280930Z

AND LODGING CAUSED BY PROLONGED INUNDATION PROBABLY WILL FURTHER REDUCE YIELDS. PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE YIELD EARLY RICE IN KWANGTUNG WILL BE AT LEAST 10-15 PERCENT BELOW NORMAL.

DELAYED HARVESTING EARLY RICE WILL DISRUPT NORMAL CROPPING SCHEDULE WHICH COULD RESULT IN REDUCED YIELD OF LATE RICE. AMOUNT OF COMMERCIAL GRAIN PROCURED IN KWANGTUNG MAY BE DECREASED CONSIDERABLY SINCE MAIN SURPLUS PRODUCING AREAS OF SWATOW AND PEARL RIVER DELTA AMONG HARDEST HIT.

MARTIN

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

27

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PAGE 01 HONG K 07104 281051Z.

11

ACTION EA 15

INFO EUR 15, DOT 10, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AGR 20, EI 15, COM 08,

TRSY 08, AID 28, SIL 01, LAB 06, RSR 01, NIC 01, /195 W

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R 280838Z JUN 68  
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5075  
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA  
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE  
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
CINCPAC  
FBIS OKINAWA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ HONG KONG 7104

NOFORN

REF: (1) HONGKONG 6882; (2) HKONG 7085 (3) HONG KONG A-666

SUBJ: COMMUNIST CHINA: NEW ECONOMIC DISRUPTIONS

1. MARKED RISE SINCE MAY IN LEVEL OF FACTIONAL STRIFE IS PRODUCING NEW WAVE OF ECONOMIC DISRUPTIONS IN TRANSPORT AND INDUSTRY. KWANGTUNG AND KWANGSI PARTICULARLY HARD-HIT, BUT VIOLENCE AND ATTENDANT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ALSO APPEAR TO HAVE WORSENERD IN CHRONIC PROBLEM AREAS, SUCH AS FUKIEN AND SZECHWAN. ALTHOUGH SITUATION NOT RPT NOT YET AS SERIOUS AS IN SUMMER 1967, IT COULD DETERIORATE RAPIDLY. MOREOVER, IN SOUTH CHINA RECENT FLOODS HAVE COMPOUNDED CULTURAL REVOLUTION PROBLEMS BY ADDING NEW THREAT TO AGRICULTURE (REF 2) AND TRANSPORT.

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Authority 762 92-194

By jw/rg, NARA, Date 10-5-92

27

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PAGE 02 HONG K 07104 281051Z

WM. NUMEROUS REPORTS TELL OF EXTENSIVE FACTORY DISRUPTION IN CANTON, INCLUDING SOME DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS AND EQUIPMENT. CITY'S TRANSPORT ALSO HAMPERED AS RESULT OF COMMANDEERING TRUCKS AND BUSES BY FACTIONAL GROUPS.

3. EVIDENCE FROM ELSEWHERE IN KWANGTUNG AND FROM OTHER PROVINCES SKETCHIER BUT NO LESS PERSUASIVE. RAIL SERVICES FROM CANTON TO HONG KONG DOWN SHARPLY SINCE EARLY JUNE (IE. BEFORE FLOODS) IN CONTRAST TO HISTORIC UPWARD TREND IN THIS MONTH. PRESS AND TRAVELLER REPORTS TELL OF OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE IN RAILWAY STATIONS IN CANTON ON JUNE 18 AND SHANGHAI EARLIER IN MONTH, AND A JUNE 4 LETTER FROM WUHAN REPORTS FIGHTING WHICH AFFECTED RAIL SERVICE. THERE INDIVIDUAL REPORTS TELL OF ARMED STRUGGLES IN FACTORY IN CH'ASCHIANG AND MINE IN HAINAN, AND SEVERAL (REF 1) REPORT RAILWAY PROBLEMS IN KWANGSI AFFECTING TRANSPORT TO DRV. LETTERS FROMSIAN IN SHENSI INDICATE THAT FACTORY PRODUCTION AND RAILWAY SERVICE THERE AFFECTED BY CLASHES.

4. PEKING'S SENSITIVITY TO INCREASING SIGNS OF ECONOMIC DOWNTURN POSSIBLY INDICATED BY CRESCENDO OF RECENT PRESS CLAIMS OF GAINS IN TRANSPORT AND PRODUCTION AS WELL AS OF BOUNTIFUL FOOD AND COMMODITY SUPPLIES IN MAJOR CITIES. SIGNIFICANTLY, THESE CLAIMS OFTEN GIVE SPECIAL STRESS TO LOCALES KNOWN TO BE LONG TROUBLED, SUCH AS DARIEN PORT, AND PRODUCTS WHICH STILL REPORTED IN SHORT SUPPLY IN MANY PARTS OF COUNTRY, SUCH AS SOAP, CIGARETTES, ETC.,

5. PERSISTENCE OF WAGE AND WELFARE PROBLEMS APPEARS TO BEAR DIRECTLY ON INTENSIFIED VIOLENCE. IN ADDITION TO RECENT PEOPLE'S DAILY REPORT ON ABOLITION OF SOME BONUSES FOR RAILROADERS, NUMEROUS REPORTS INDICATE THAT FAILURE TO PAY REGULAR WAGES TO WORKERS IN SOME AREAS, SOMETIMES AS FORM OF PRESSURE AND SOMETIMES BECAUSE ENTERPRISES VERGING ON BANKRUPTCY, ADDING TO UNREST. ALSO, WORKERS IN CANTON, SZECHWAN, AND ELSEWHERE REPORTEDLY RESISTING LABOR POLICIES IMPOSED BY REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES.

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
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291154Z

CITE

DIST 29 JUNE 1968

COUNTRY: CHINA

DOI : 8 - 17 JUNE 1968

SUBJECT: ARMED CLASHES, TRAFFIC DISRUPTIONS AND INCREASED  
TENSIONS IN KWANGTUNG PROVINCE

ACQ :

SOURCE :

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs

(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs

(C)

(SUMMARY. RESIDENTS IN KWANGTUNG AND KIANGSU PROVINCES WRITE OF  
ARMED CLASHES IN CANTON, CH'ANCHIANG AND OTHER AREAS THROUGHOUT  
KWANGTUNG, AND OF DISRUPTIONS IN HIGHWAY TRAFFIC AND DEEPENING  
TENSIONS. IN HIS LETTER OF 17 JUNE A FACTORY WORKER RETURNING  
FROM HOME LEAVE IN SWATOW WRITES FROM SHANGHAI THAT HE IS UNABLE  
TO PROCEED FURTHER TO CH'ANCHIANG BECAUSE OF THE ABNORMAL TRANS-  
PORTATION SITUATION THERE. A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE IN CH'ANCHIANG  
STATES THAT DUE TO THE PRESENT TENSE SITUATION IN HIS AREA MANY  
OF HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE RETURNED HOME. A CORRESPONDENT ON HIS  
WAY TO HSUWEN, KWANGTUNG, WHO HAS JUST ARRIVED IN CH'ANCHIANG  
FROM CANTON, DESCRIBES THE FIGHTING WHICH ERUPTED BETWEEN THE

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SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-285  
By cm, NARA, Date 3-3-03

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(classification) (dissem controls)

TWO FACTIONS IN CHUNGSHAN UNIVERSITY IN CANTON WHEN THE RED FLAG FACTION ATTACKED THE EAST WIND GROUP. HE ADDS THAT THERE ARE STILL DIFFICULTIES AHEAD BECAUSE THE HIGHWAY BETWEEN CH'ANCHIANG AND HSUWEN HAS BEEN COMPLETELY CLOSED DOWN TO TRAFFIC AND ARMED CLASHES HAVE SPREAD FROM THE TOWNS AND CITIES TO THE FARMS AND VILLAGES. END OF SUMMARY.)

1. KIANGSU PROVINCE, SHANGHAI, 17 JUNE 1968. A FACTORY WORKER. ON 11 MAY WE LEFT FOR SWATOW TO VISIT OUR RELATIVES AFTER HAVING BEEN GRANTED HOME LEAVE BY OUR FACTORY IN CH'ANCHIANG, KWANGTUNG. HOWEVER, AFTERWARDS WE WERE UNABLE TO RETURN TO THE FACTORY DUE TO THE DIFFICULTIES IN TRANSPORTATION TO AND FROM CH'ANCHIANG AND SO WE ARE NOW TEMPORARILY STAYING IN SHANGHAI. IT IS EXPECTED THAT IT WILL TAKE AT LEAST ANOTHER MONTH OR TWO BEFORE THE TRANSPORTATION SITUATION IN CH'ANCHIANG CAN BE RESTORED TO NORMAL.

2. KWANGTUNG PROVINCE, CH'ANCHIANG (N 22-54, E 109-49), 10 JUNE 1968. A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE. DUE TO THE PRESENT TENSE SITUATION HERE MANY OF MY COLLEAGUES HAVE RETURNED HOME. I HAVE TO REMAIN HERE BECAUSE OF CERTAIN WORK CONDITIONS WHICH DO NOT PERMIT ME TO LEAVE.

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(C)~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

(classification) (dissem controls)

3. CANTON, 9 JUNE 1968. A FARM WORKER. THE ATMOSPHERE IN CANTON CHANGED SUDDENLY A FEW DAYS AGO WHEN FIGHTING ERUPTED BETWEEN THE TWO FACTIONS IN CHUNGSHAN UNIVERSITY. A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WERE KILLED WHEN THE RED FLAG FACTION ATTACKED THE EAST WIND GROUP AND THE DISPUTE IS NOT YET SETTLED. BOTH SIDES THREATENED TO SEEK OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE. CONSEQUENTLY, TENSION IS HIGH THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE CITY. THE SITUATION IS EVEN WORSE TODAY, SO WE HAVE DECIDED TO LEAVE BEFORE IT BECOMES WORSE. HOWEVER, THERE ARE GOING TO BE TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT TENSION IS HIGH IN BOTH YANGCHIANG (N 21-52, E 111-53) AND CH'ANCHIANG.

CH'ANCHIANG, 11 JUNE. SAME CORRESPONDENT. WE LEFT CANTON FOR THE EAST IS RED FARM NEAR HSUWEN (N 20-25, E 110-07) ON 9 JUNE BECAUSE THE CANTON - CH'ANCHIANG HIGHWAY HAD REOPENED TO TRAFFIC. WE ARRIVED SAFELY IN CH'ANCHIANG ON 10 JUNE. HOWEVER, AS SOON AS GOT HERE WE REALIZED THAT WE WOULD FACE MORE DIFFICULTIES AHEAD BECAUSE THE HIGHWAY BETWEEN CH'ANCHIANG AND HSUWEN HAD COMPLETELY CLOSED DOWN TO TRAFFIC. MOREOVER, ARMED CLASHES HAVE SPREAD FROM THE TOWNS AND CITIES TO THE FARMS AND VILLAGES. SOME FARMS IN HAIK'ANG (N 20-55, E 110-05) WERE ATTACKED AND MANY

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FAMILIES AND CHILDREN WERE FORCED TO FLEE. THE MAY FIRST FARM OF HSUWEN, ON WHICH I USED TO WORK, WAS ALSO BESIEGED BY MORE THAN 1,000 PERSONS SENT FROM THE HSIEN VILLAGE OF HSUWEN. THE MAY FIRST FARM IS ONLY A SHORT DISTANCE FROM OUR FARM. THE EAST IS RED FARM WHICH IS NOW ADMINISTERED BY HAIK'ANG AND IS SITUATED BETWEEN HSUWEN AND HAIK'ANG IS AN IMPORTANT JUNCTION OF COMMUNICATION, SO IT APPEARS THAT WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO PROCEED WITH OUR TRAVEL PLANS.

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT

(ALSO SENT

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
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290755Z

CITE

EO 12958 3.A(h)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

DIST 29 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY CHINA

DOI LATE MAY EARLY JUNE 1968

SUBJECT 1. PURGE IN TEXTILE SCHOOL IN NANTUNG, KIANGSU PROVINCE  
2. FACTIONAL STRUGGLE DISRUPTS RAIL COMMUNICATIONS IN  
SZECHUAN PROVINCE

ACQ

SOURCE

EO 12958 3.A(h)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

(SUMMARY: A PURGE IS GOING ON IN A TEXTILE SCHOOL IN NANT'UNG, KIANGSU, WHERE VICTIMS INCLUDE THE SCHOOL'S THREE FORMER PRESIDENTS. IN TEYANG, SZECHUAN, RAILWAY WORKER HAVE BEEN "INSTIGATED BY WICKED ELEMENTS" INTO DESERTING THEIR POSTS AND SABOTAGING RAILWAY COMMUNICATIONS; AND IN THE NANCHUNG--CHUHSIEN AREA OF SZECHUAN ALL COMMUNICATIONS HAVE BEEN CUT AND THE LIVES OF RAILWAY DESIGNERS WORKING THERE ARE IN CONSTANT DANGER. END SUMMARY.)

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE VERBATIM TRANSLATIONS OF EXCERPTS FROM LETTERS WRITTEN BY RESIDENTS IN COMMUNIST CHINA.

2. FROM A MAN WITH THE NANT'UNG TEXTILE TECHNICAL SCHOOL,

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SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-285  
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-3-03

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(classification) (dissem controls)

NANT'UNG (N32-02, E120-53), KIANGSU PROVINCE, 29 MAY 1968: "LIKE THE CASE IN MANY OTHER UNITS, OUR FACTORY IS NOW CHECKING AND CLEANING THE CLASS RANKS AND CONSOLIDATING AND PURIFYING THE ORGANIZATION. SO FAR WE HAVE ALREADY ARRESTED A LANDLORD WHOM WE OVERLOOKED BEFORE, A BOURGEOIS AND REACTIONARY 'ACADEMIC AUTHORITY', A SENIOR ENGINEER WHO WAS THE FORMER TEACHING PRESIDENT (CHIAO-WU HSIAO-CHANG, 2403/0523/2699/7022) OF THE SCHOOL, A RENEGADE WHO WAS THE FORMER POLITICAL PRESIDENT (PORTION GARBLED) HSIAO-CHANG, 2398/3112/2699/7022) OF THE SCHOOL, A TURNCOAT WHO HAS SURRENDERED HIMSELF AND WHO WAS THE FORMER ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENT (TSUNG-WU HSIAOYUCHANG, 4920/0523/2699/7022 OF THE SCHOOL, AND A THEIF AND SPECULATOR WHO WAS THE FORMER HEAD OF OUR EXPERIMENTAL WORKSHOP."

3. FROM A RAILWAY WORKER AT THE RAILWAY STATION IN TEYANG (N31-08, E104-24), SZECHUAN PROVINCE, 1 JUNE 1968: "DURING THE RECENT PERIOD, AS A RESULT OF THE INSTIGATION BY WICKED ELEMENTS, STAFF MEMBERS AND WORKERS OF THE RAILWAYS AND COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENTS HERE HAVE BEEN FIGHTING AGAINST ONE ANOTHER, DESERTING THEIR WORKING POSTS AND SABOTAGING RAILWAY COMMUNICATIONS. NOW, SOME OF THE SABOTEURS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED RAILWAY COMMUNICATIONS

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ARE IMPROVING RAPIDLY."

4. FROM A MAN WITH THE SECOND DESIGNING ACADEMY OF THE MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS, WHO HAS BEEN WORKING WITH A SURVEY TEAM IN THE AREA BETWEEN NANCHUNG (N30-48, E106-04) AND CHUHSIEN (N30-50, E106-54) IN SZECHUAN PROVINCE, 7 JUNE 1968: "AS ALL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE AREA WHERE OUR TEAM IS LOCATED HAVE BEEN CUT SINCE EARLY MARCH, EVEN LETTERS FROM CHENG TU (N30-40, E104-04) TOOK ONE MONTH TO REACH US, NOT TO MENTION MAIL FROM OTHER PROVINCE. THE ATMOSPHERE HERE STRONGLY SMELLS OF GUNPOWDER, AND OUR LIVES ARE IN CONSTANT DANGER."

5. [ ] DISSEM: STATE CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF. [ ]

[ ]  
REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~

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270847Z

CITE

DIST 27 JUNE 1968 EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

COUNTRY: CHINA

DOI: 10 MAY - 10 JUNE 1968

SUBJECT: INCREASING CIVIL UNREST IN KWANGSI, HUPEH,  
PEKING, FUKIEN AND YUNNAN.

ACQ:

SOURCE:

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

1.

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

2.

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-285  
By chm, NARA, Date 3-3-03

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(classification) (dissem. controls)

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
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3. [ ] WUHAN, HUPEH, [ ] THE SIT -  
UATION IN WUHAN IS FAST BECOMING SERIOUS AND CRITICAL.  
FACTIONAL STRIFE HAS AGAIN INTENSIFIED. ARMED CLASHES  
ARE OCCURRING OFTEN. [ ]

4. [ ] PEKING, [ ]  
[ ] HEAVY ARMED CLASHES ARE  
OCCURRING IN GREAT NUMBERS IN SOME OF THE HIGHER IN-  
STITUTIONS IN THE CITY. THE SUPPLY SITUATION IS AGAIN  
BECOMING CRITICAL, ALTHOUGH IS IS FAR BETTER THAN THAT  
IN [ ] FUKIEN. [ ]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

5. [ ] FU CH'ING, FUKIEN, [ ]  
[ ] THERE WAS AN ARMED CLASH WITHIN THE  
CITY LIMITS AND AT LEAST TEN PERSONS WERE KILLED ON  
THE SPOT.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

6. [ ] KUNMING,  
YUNNAN, [ ] THE SUPPLY SITUATION IN KUNMING HAS  
BECOME WORSE AFTER THE TWO [ ] LARGE ARMED CLASHES [ ]

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
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(classification) (dissem controls)

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BUY ANYTHING ON THE MARKET. SMALL  
ARMED CLASHES SEEM TO HAVE ESCALATED RECENTLY. THERE  
IS EVERY INDICATION THAT THE [ ] THIRD LARGE CLASH [ ] WILL  
TAKE PLACE IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.

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7. [ ] DISSEM: CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT AND PACAF.

(ALSO SENT: [ ])

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CITE

DIST 24 JUNE 1968 (C)

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs

COUNTRY: CHINA

DOI: 19 MAY - JUNE 1968

SUBJECT: CONTINUATION OF LIBERALISM AND ANARCHISM IN SIAN  
(SHENSI).

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-285  
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-3-03

ACQ:

SOURCE:

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

SUMMARY: LIBERALISM AND ANARCHISM CONTINUE TO PREVAIL IN SIAN, SHENSI, WHERE A SERIOUS FACTIONAL CLASH FLARED UP ON 26 MAY IN THE SIAN RAILWAY BUREAU. AS A RESULT, TRAIN SERVICE WAS DISRUPTED FOR TWO DAYS AND RESUMED ONLY AFTER A DIRECT ORDER CAME FROM THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES. COMMODITIES IN THE MARKET REMAIN SCARCE, AND ALMOST ALL DAILY NECESSITIES HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO STRICT RATIONING. WHEAT FLOUR HAS RECENTLY BEEN OUT OF STOCK, AND RICE HAS BEEN UNOBTAINABLE SINCE OCTOBER 1967. THOUGH ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY HAS BEEN RESTORED, FACTORY PRODUCTION HAS NOT BEEN RESUMED; WORKERS ARE DIVIDED IN VIEWS AND SLOPPY IN DISCIPLINE. END SUMMARY.

1.

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EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs  
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(classification) (dissem controls)

EO 12958 3.A(h)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

2. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SIAN IS ABOUT THE SAME AS

EO 12958 3.A(h)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

THE VIOLENT STRUGGLE HAS

NOT DIMINISHED IN INTENSITY; ON THE CONTRARY, A SERIOUS FAC-  
TIONAL CLASH FLARED UP ON 26 MAY IN THE SIAN RAILWAY BUREAU,  
AND CONSEQUENTLY ALL TRAINS CAME TO A STANDSTILL. TRAIN SER-  
VICES WERE RESUMED ONLY AFTER A DIRECT ORDER HAD BEEN RECEIVED  
TWO DAYS LATER FROM THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES. THE POLITICAL  
AND ECONOMIC DAMAGES INCURRED BY SUCH A GRAVE INCIDENT IN SIAN,  
WHICH IS THE PIVOT OF TWO VAST AREAS - THE NORTHWEST AND THE  
SOUTHWEST - CAN WELL BE IMAGINED.

EO 12958 3.A(h)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

SCARCITY OF COMMODITIES IN THE MARKET HAS NOT BEEN RELIEVED.  
THE ONLY CHANGE IS THAT, BEGINNING FROM JUNE, CERTAIN INDUS-  
TRIAL ARTICLES SUCH AS BICYCLES, WATCHES AND SEWING MACHINES  
ARE SUPPLIED AGAINST 'INDUSTRIAL COUPONS;' AND DAILY NECESSITIES  
SUCH AS CIGARETTES, SOAP, SOYSAUCE, VINEGAR AND MATCHES ARE  
SUPPLIED STRICTLY ON A RATION BASIS. CIGARETTES AND  
SOYSAUCE EACH PERSON IS ALLOWED TO BUY 8 PACKS  
AND HALF A CATTY (ONE CATTY EQUALS 1.1 LBS) RESPECTIVELY EACH

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(classification) (dissem controls)

MONTH. THE RATION OF COAL IS STILL 180 CATTIES PER HOUSEHOLD, AND THAT OF GRAIN BASED ON AGE AND THE NATURE OF WORK; BUT THE SUPPLY OF THESE TWO COMMODITIES IS PARTICULARLY SCARCE AT PRESENT. WHEAT FLOUR HAS RECENTLY BEEN OUT OF STOCK, AND RICE HAS BEEN UTTERLY UNOBTAINABLE SINCE OCTOBER 1967. THE COAL YARDS ARE OFTEN EMPTY, TOO. AS TO COTTON CLOTH, NO COUPONS HAVE BEEN ISSUED THIS YEAR AND THERE IS NO NEWS ABOUT THE DATE OF ISSUE.

THOUGH POWER SUPPLY HAS BEEN RESTORED, PRODUCTION HAS NOT BEEN RESUMED; AS THERE IS NO LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE OR PERSONNEL, THERE IS NO WAY TO REVIVE WORK IN ANY RESPECT. THE WORKERS, AS WELL AS THE STAFF MEMBERS, ARE FAR FROM BEING UNITED IN VIEWS OR IN THINKING, AND LABOR DISCIPLINE IS LOOSE AND SLOPPY. ON THE WHOLE, IT IS INDEED A TYPICAL STATE OF LIBERALISM AND ANARCHY."

3. [ ] DISSEM: STATE CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [ ]

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CITE

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

DIST 26 JUNE 1968 (C)

COUNTRY

CHINA

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

DOI

SUBJECT

RESURGENCE OF VIOLENCE IN NANNING.

ACQ

SOURCE

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

(SUMMARY. SERIOUS FIGHTING BROKE OUT AGAIN IN NANNING WITH THE BOMBING OF A LARGE BUILDING IN MID-MAY. MANY RESIDENTS ARE EITHER STAYING OFF THE STREETS OR FLEEING TO RURAL AREAS. BUS SERVICE HAS STOPPED, MOST OF THE STORES ARE CLOSED, FACTORIES ARE SHUT DOWN, AND FOOD SHORTAGES HAVE DEVELOPED.)  
END SUMMARY.

1. FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS OF A TRANSLATION OF A LETTER WRITTEN ON 28 MAY 1968 BY A RESIDENT OF NANNING, KWANGSI PROVINCE, TO A RELATIVE OVERSEAS.

2. FIGHTING HAS BROKEN OUT IN NANNING AGAIN.

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SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-285  
By chm, NARA, Date 3-3-03

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IT STARTED LAST WEEK WHEN A BIG BUILDING IN NANNING WAS BLOWN UP BY A BOMB. DAILY AND NIGHTLY NOW, ONE CAN HEAR GUNSHOTS. VERY FEW PEDESTRIANS CAN BE SEEN IN THE CITY. MANY OF THE RESIDENTS HAVE BEEN FORCED BY EVIL ELEMENTS TO EVACUATE TO THE RURAL DISTRICTS. SOME OF MY SCHOOLMATES' FAMILIES ARE NOW PUTTING UP IN OUR FARM AFTER FLEEING FROM THE CITY. THE 'EVIL WIND OF FIGHTING' IS BLOWING ONCE AGAIN EVERYWHERE. THE CENTRAL IS TAKING STEPS TO ARREST ALL THE "BACKSTAGE BLACKHANDS", BUT FOR THE TIME BEING IT IS STILL NOT KNOWN WHEN THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE OF NANNING OR KWANGSI PROVINCE CAN BE SET UP.

3. OWING TO FREQUENT LOCAL FIGHTS, THE HOSPITALS HERE ARE NOT FUNCTIONING PROPERLY AND ALL THE BUSES HAVE STOPPED RUNNING FOR SOME TIME. IT IS ALLEGED THAT WE MUST WAIT UNTIL JULY BEFORE LOCAL BUSES WILL RESUME RUNNING. THIS IS BECAUSE THE TWO FACTIONS OFTEN FIGHT EACH OTHER ON ROADS, AND WHEN THEY ARE ENGAGED IN A BATTLE BULLETS FLY THICKLY AROUND, RENDERING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR PEOPLE TO TRAVEL AROUND.

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THUS THE MARKET IN NANNING IS NOW TERRIBLY TENSE.  
THERE HAS BEEN NO FRESH MEAT FOR SALE FOR QUITE A  
WHILE NOW. PEOPLE EVEN HAVE TO QUEUE UP FOR A  
LONG TIME TO BUY SALTED PORK.

4. I RETURNED TO THE FARM THERE IN ABOUT THE  
MIDDLE OF MAY. ONLY A FEW WORKERS ARE WORKING OUR  
FARM. MEMBERS OF OUR FACTION ARE NOT DOING ANY WORK  
AT ALL. IN FACT, ONLY ABOUT SEVEN OR EIGHT  
MEMBERS OF THE "UNITED COMMAND" (LIEN CHIH - 5114/  
2172) FACTION ARE WORKING OUR FARM. RIGHT NOW, NO  
ONE HAS ANY CONTROL OVER ANYBODY.

5. IN FACT, OUR WORK NOW IS TO READ BOOKS.  
WITHIN THE CITY, BECAUSE OF FIGHTS, MOST OF THE  
DEPARTMENT STORES, EATING SHOPS, AND SO ON HAVE CLOSED  
DOWN. ALL THE FACTORIES, TOO, HAVE STOPPED WORK. IN  
FACT, THE WHOLE CITY IS IN A STATE OF SEMI-PARALYSIS.  
WE SELDOM VENTURE OUTDOOR NOWADAYS, FOR FEAR OF STRAY  
BULLETS OR PEOPLE SHOOTING AT US AT RANDOM.

6. [ ] DISSEM. CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GP-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~