

20i

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 38113

202

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STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS
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EXO

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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260655Z

CITE

DIST 26 JUNE 1968

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yr
(C)

COUNTRY CHINA

DOI MID - MARCH - 18 MAY 1968

SUBJECT ECONOMIC DISLOCATION IN CHUNGKING
FOLLOWING WEEKS OF SERIOUS FIGHTING.

ACQ

SOURCE

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

(SUMMARY. THE SERIOUS FIGHTING WHICH RAGED IN
CHUNGKING FROM MID-MARCH TO EARLY MAY WAS BROUGHT
UNDER CONTROL WHEN THE PLA INTERVENED AND CONFISCATED
THE WEAPONS PREVIOUSLY SEIZED FROM THE MILITARY BY
THE WARRING FACTIONS. BY 18 MAY, A SEMBLANCE OF
ORDER HAD BEEN RESTORED IN THE CITY, AND WAS BEING
MAINTAINED BY ARMED MILITARY PATROLS. THERE REMAINED,
HOWEVER, THE LEGACY OF THE FIGHTING: DAMAGED PLANTS,
CLOSED SCHOOLS, AND SHORTAGES OF BASIC COMMODITIES.)
END SUMMARY.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-285
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-3-03

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)>25Yrs

(C)

IN 38113

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(classification) (dissem controls)

1.

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

2. SERIOUS FIGHTING BROKE OUT AGAIN IN MID-MARCH. EXPLOITED BY EVIL ELEMENTS, THE TWO FACTIONS SEIZED WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION FROM THE LIBERATION ARMY TROOPS, AND FROM THEN ON THE CITY WAS FILLED WITH THE SOUND OF GUNFIRE. EVEN THE LIBERATION ARMY COULD NOT DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. MARKETS AND SHOPS WERE CLOSED, AND TRAFFIC CAME TO A COMPLETE STANDSTILL IN THE CITY. ANYONE WALKING IN THE STREETS WAS LIABLE TO BE KILLED AT ANY MOMENT. FORTUNATELY, THE LIBERATION ARMY BROUGHT IN THE TWO VITAL COMMODITIES OF RICE AND COAL. AND THUS THE FOUR MILLION PEOPLE OF CHUNGKING DID NOT STARVE-- THOUGHT THE FOOD SITUATION WAS STILL PRETTY TENSE.

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

3. THE MISERABLE SITUATION LASTED UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF MAY, WHEN THE CENTRAL ANNOUNCED IT WAS DETERMINED TO SETTLE THE CHUNGKING SITUATION. THE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

CENTRAL EMPOWERED THE CHUNGKING GARRISON (CHU
CHUN--7465/6511) TO RETRIEVE ALL WEAPONS. AFTER
THAT, THE FIGHTING CAME TO AN ABRUPT HALT.
NONETHELESS, THE WEEKS OF FIGHTING BROUGHT SERIOUS
DAMAGE TO MANY PLANTS, SCHOOLS, AND HOUSES.

4. THERE ARE STILL A LARGE NUMBER OF GUNS
WHICH THE CHUNGKING GARRISON HAS NOT RETRIEVED.
INTERMITTENT GUNFIRE CAN STILL BE HEARD, AND
MURDERS AND ROBBERIES TAKE PLACE FREQUENTLY. HOWEVER,
THE LIBERATION ARMY HAD PUT ON EXTRA SENTRIES AND ARMED

PATROLS, AND THIS HAS MADE THE CITY SOMEWHAT SAFER
FOR THE PEOPLE. ORDER IS GRADUALLY BEING RESTORED.
POSTAL AND TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES ARE RESUMING
SLOWLY, AFTER BEING COMPLETELY CUT OFF SINCE MID-MARCH.
POSTAL EMPLOYEES ARE STILL APPREHENSIVE ABOUT RETURNING
TO WORK.

5. THE MARKET REMAINS TERRIBLE TENSE. AT PRESENT,
ONE CAN ONLY BUY SOME FRESH GREENS FROM THE PEASANTS.
NATURALLY, THE PRICE OF THESE GREENS HAS RISEN SHARPLY.
SUCH ITEMS AS SOAP AND TOOTHPASTE ARE COMPLETELY OUT
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(C)

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

OF STOCK. AS FOR OUR 1968 CLOTH COUPONS, WE GUESS
THEY WILL BE ISSUED IN THE LATTER HALF OF THE
YEAR. WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE CLOTH RATION WILL BE,
BUT I CAN TELL YOU IT WILL NOT BE ERY MUCH.

6. ALL LOCAL SCHOOLS ARE IN A STATE OF
PARALYSIS.

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(C)

IT

IS STILL VERY DIFFICULT TO PREDICT WHETHER SERIOUS
FIGHTING WILL RESUME, BUT I FEEL SURE THAT IF IT DOES,
IT WILL NOT BECOME AS SERIOUS AS IT WAS IN MARCH.
THIS IS BECAUSE THE PEOPLE HAVE A DEEP HATRED OF FIGHTING,
AND THEY ARE ALL FOR THE LIBERATION ARMY TAKING THE
NECESSARY MEASURES TO SAFEGUARD SECURITY.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

7. [] DISSEM. CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 28374 *20k*

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SOO ONE CRS
EXO OER FBIS DCS IRS AID USIA

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GROUP 1
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111214Z

CITE [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs

DIST 11 JUNE 1968

COUNTRY: CHINA

DOI: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: GRAVE ROBBING IN HUNAN, PROSTITUTION IN
KWANGTUNG AND FREE ENTERPRISE IN CHEKIANG.

ACQ: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE VERBATIM TRANSLATIONS OF EXCERPTS
FROM LETTERS WRITTEN BY RESIDENTS IN COMMUNIST CHINA.

2. FROM A MAN IN THE HSAI-MA-YUAN-WAN (0027/7802/0337/
3494) DISTRICT IN CHANGSHA (N 28-12, E 112-58), HUNAN PROVINCE,
19 MAY 1968: "OUR FATHER'S TOMB WAS COMPLETELY ROBBED LATE
LAST YEAR. LUCKILY WE FOUND THAT OUT IN GOOD TIME, AND WE WERE
ABLE TO REBURY THE CORPSE WHICH WAS LEFT LYING IN THE PIT.
GRAVE-DIGGERS ARE SO RAMPANT NOWADAYS THAT PARTICULARLY NOT EVEN
A SINGLE GRAVE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE HAS NOT BEEN DUG UP AND ROBBED.
IN MANY CASES, THE DEAD BODIES WERE LEFT IN THE OPEN AND EVEN-
TUALLY EATEN UP BY HUNGARY DOGS." *still Communist, as always.*

3. FROM A MAN IN CANTON, KWANGTUNG PROVINCE, 4 MAY 1968:

"I HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY LETTER FROM YING-YUAN FOR QUITE SOME

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SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-285

By *clm*, NARA, Date 3-3-03

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

TIME. I HEARD THAT HE HAD BEEN TRAVELLING A LOT BETWEEN CANTON AND SWITOW, AND LIVING A DEGENERATE LIFE. INSTEAD OF TAKING PROPER CARE OF HIS CHILDREN, HE HAS BEEN KEEPING COMPANY WITH MANY PROSTITUTES IN THESE TWO CITIES."

4. FROM A WOMAN IN HUANGYEN (N 28-39, HQ 121-15), CHEKIANG PROVINCE, 15 APRIL 1968: "AS A RESULT OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN TWO FACTIONS OF POWER-HOLDER, RESTRICTIONS HAVE BEEN SLACK AND MANY PEOPLE HAVE FOUND IT PROFITABLE TO ENGAGE IN TRADE. I MYSELF HAVE ALSO BECOME A SMALL TRADER IN ORDER TO EARN SOME EXTRA INCOME TO HELP SUPPORT THE FAMILY."

5. DISSEM: STATE CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, July 2, 1968 -- 2:00 PM

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

For file

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Africa

At Tab A Nick Katzenbach recommends you give the final go ahead for a 9-day trip to Africa in August. We've kept initial planning with our Ambassadors very quiet, but we must now approach the Africans to set up the various festivities. This will almost certainly leak and put a political price on any later decision to cancel. Thus, this is the real point of decision.

You'll want to read Nick's memo and the revised itinerary (Tab B). The schedule remains essentially a series of Presidential meetings according to the various regional groupings in Africa. The stops are largely the same as you tentatively approved June 5. The order of stops has been shifted for logistical reasons -- to start in the north and go around east to west -- but we have held to 9 days. The main changes are:

- addition of a short stop in Liberia, as you requested;
- substitution of Morocco for Tunisia and Niger for the Ivory Coast;
- addition of a 3-hour stop in Kano, a provincial capital in northern Nigeria.

The Nigerian Question

The only outstanding issue raised by the itinerary is the proposed addition of a stop in Kano, Nigeria, despite the Nigerian civil war which is still very much alive. (Kano is not in the war zone.) A Kano stop is not logistically necessary; it is purely a policy decision. Joe Palmer, who has been traveling around Africa these past weeks, is strongly for the stop. His thoughtful cable is at Tab C. His arguments for the stop boil down to the following:

1. We favor Nigerian unity and have a considerable economic stake in the country. A token stop will show our concern without weakening our line that it is not so important who's ahead, but how to stop the bloodshed.
2. Nigerians, already unhappy with us for not selling arms for use against the rebels and suspicious that we have decided to move our West African chips to Ghana, will be most unhappy if the President (like the Vice President, Katzenbach, and other VIP travellers before him) goes to Ghana but skips Nigeria.

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- 2 -

3. The Federal Government was relatively reasonable in the recent (abortive) peace talks with the rebels, but General Gowon has his own hawks who want him to forget talking. A Presidential visit would strengthen Gowon's hand and might encourage a more realistic view by the Biafrans -- again without compromising our hands-off policy.
4. We could play public statements and ceremonial arrangements to strike the right balance between our concern for a peaceful solution on one hand and an awkward endorsement of Gowon's regime on the other.

Against the stop there are the following considerations:

1. No matter how we split hairs in public statements or plead no change in policy, your personal appearance with Gowon is bound to be seen as a more partisan and dramatic U. S. identification with the Federal regime.
2. Nobody can now foresee what turn the civil war may take. The rebel Ibo tribesmen are bottled up in their home territory with no reliable food supply. Recent Nigerian history gives ample cause for worry that there may be hideous tribal massacres as the Feds push into the Ibo heartland. Failing that, there is grave danger of mass starvation traceable to FMG unwillingness to let mercy food missions into the rebel area. In short, closer Presidential identification with Gowon -- along with the benefits Palmer cites -- runs a substantial risk of putting the President into a decidedly unattractive Nigerian picture.
3. The worst of all possible worlds -- as Palmer admits -- would be to schedule a Nigerian stop and then be forced to cancel it because of Federal excesses. This would almost certainly force Gowon to extreme anti-American measures.

This is a close one. Joe Palmer was Ambassador to Nigeria for three years; one should not lightly question his judgment on this matter. I must confess, however, that the risks of a Nigerian stop seem to me to outweigh the benefits. On balance, I would recommend that you not stop in Kano.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

Recommendation

My vote is that you approve the itinerary except for the Nigerian stop.

W. W. Rostow

Itinerary approved with Nigerian stop _____

Itinerary approved without Nigerian stop _____

Hold off _____

Call me _____

EKH/vmr

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

2082

21a

~~SECRET~~-NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Trip to Africa - August 10-19

Recommendation:

That you approve the enclosed telegram authorizing our embassies in Africa to make initial approaches concerning your trip.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

We have circularized our Ambassadors in Africa concerning your proposed trip. On the basis of their replies, we propose to firm up the following schedule: (Detailed schedule enclosed.)

Morocco, August 11-12	Zambia, August 16
Niger, August 12-13	Congo(K), August 16-17
Nigeria, August 13	Ghana, August 17-18
Ethiopia, August 13-14	Liberia, August 18
East Africa, August 14-16	Senegal, August 18-19

1. This is basically the same itinerary as previously approved. It will give you a firsthand view of Africa's diversity and potential. There are, however, a few changes:

--Liberia has been worked into the schedule, per your suggestion.

--Morocco and Niger have been added. Morocco is coming under greater Soviet pressure; your stop

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

~~SECRET~~-NODIS

By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

would help steady the situation and affirm our significant economic and strategic interests in the country. Niger's President Diori is head of the two principal francophone groupings (OCAM and Entente); your stop would dramatize our support for regional efforts. Diori is also helpful on Nigeria and other problems. These countries have therefore been substituted for Tunisia and Ivory Coast.

--For logistical reasons, the order has been changed, i.e. start in Morocco and end in Senegal.

2. This is a tight schedule, which nevertheless manages to work in North, East, Southern and West Africa. It would be politically difficult to make minor cuts. If shortened, we would have to drop one or more of the major areas, curtailing regional consultation and the political benefit of visiting various parts of the continent.

3. In line with our policy emphasis on regional development, we propose that neighboring African leaders be invited to see you at six of these stops. This means two stages to our consultations with African Governments. Once we have worked out arrangements with the "core" group, we will then consult with the secondary group. Once we approach African Governments the news will almost certainly become public. Cancellation at a later date will cause us very serious problems with the Africans. This is therefore the time to decide for sure whether the trip will be taken.

4. Some of the countries present real logistical problems due to limitation on housing, communications and other facilities. We are staffing these problems out, with a view to dealing with them as soon as replies are received from the African Governments.


Under Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Draft telegram
2. Schedule

TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS DIVISION

WORK COPY

216~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

CIRCULAR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By g, NARA, Date 5-22-01

STATE

NODIS/ADROIT

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM UNDER SECRETARY

1. The President has approved the proposed visit to Africa for the period August 10-19 as outlined DEPCIRTEL 188937.
2. The exact dates remain the same as those proposed in the separate messages to individual posts: Morocco, Aug. 11-12; Niger, Aug. 12-13; Nigeria, Aug. 13; Ethiopia, Aug. 13-14; East Africa (Entebbe, Nairobi en route to Arusha) Aug. 14-16; Zambia, Aug. 16; Congo(K), Aug. 16-17; Ghana, Aug. 17-18; Liberia, Aug. 18; Senegal, Aug. 18-19.
3. Using background contained para one DEPCIRTEL 188937, you should approach head of state on most confidential basis repeat most confidential basis re possibility visit to his country. Since schedule will remain tentative until confirmation received from all addressee posts, you should not rpt not discuss full itinerary.
4. You should not rpt not undertake detailed discussion substantive or ceremonial part of visit at this time, since we will wish retain flexibility to consider program as a whole.

AF:FLHadsel:gp 6/27/68

5208

The Under Secretary

AF: Mr. Quinby

O: Mr. Peck

S/S

White House -

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

5. It also recognized that there remain numerous logistical matters to be worked out, such as size of Presidential party, housing and communications, and special problems relating to Arusha as site of East African talks. You should not rpt not initiate local discussion of these matters until replies from this message have been correlated in Washington and you receive further instructions.

6. For Kampala, Nairobi and Dar. We assume all three governments should be approached simultaneously, even though proposal to meet in Arusha places primary meeting in Tanzania territory. Logistical details cannot be worked out at this time. We therefore think that Embassy Kampala should not rpt not make suggestion of picking up Obote, nor should Nairobi propose picking up Kenyatta.

7. It also recognized that question of secondary invitations may be extremely delicate. Suggestions on these matters for individual posts follow. In raising question of secondary invitations you should make absolutely clear that approaches should not rpt not be made to neighboring leaders until you can confirm agreement on schedule as a whole.

a. For Niamey. Suggest you explore with Diori per paragraph two EMBTEL 1916 invitation to other Entente Presidents. Agree full OCAM list would be unmanageable. Diori's suggestions on tactics would be welcome.

b. For Addis. Assume Emperor can easily notify Gardiner and Telli of visit and that Embassy follow up presents no problem. However, since we encouraging regional meetings to extent possible we suggest you ask Emperor if he wants invite (and possibly Shermarke) Egal/ for meeting with President. We recognize that this is tricky problem and do not know if Egal will accept. Alternative of invitation to Shermarke and Egal to

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3

CIRCULAR

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

visit Arusha would put additional strain on already over-burdened facilities there and raise problem of inviting still others. If you feel strongly that invitation to Egal is impossible, inform Department by immediate telegram.

c. For Lusaka. Since we would hope give as many stops as possible a regional complexion, you requested to explore with Kaunda matter of extending invitations to Khama, Jonathan and Banda. We recognize difficulties raised by Lusaka 2136 and your reply from Dar-es-Salaam and leave exact discussion of tactics to you. We would hope that addition of Banda and Jonathan may have advantages for Kaunda as well as complications you mentioned. We would not, of course, insist on invitations to these leaders, but think that if Kaunda seems unable to invite them, then it difficult to single out Khama.

d. For Monrovia. While visit must of necessity be brief, we think that extension of invitation by Tubman to Stevens and Jawara is desirable.

e. For Dakar. In approaching Senghor, request you raise possibility his extending invitation to meet with Senegal River Basin partners.

f. For Kinshasa. We would wish avoid Mobutu inviting Bokassa and Tombalbaye to Kinshasa, since that would involve implied endorsement of UEAC and pointed omission of Ahijdo. If necessary we could shorten time of Kinshasa stop.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

Proposed Schedule for the
President's Trip to Africa
August 10-19, 1968

~~SECRET~~
NODIS/ADROIT

21c

Time in
Ref. to
Wash. Time

Date	Place	Local Time	Flight Time	Mileage	Time in Ref. to Wash. Time
Aug. 10 (Sat.)	Lv. Andrews	10:00 P.M.	7 + 10		+ 4
Aug. 11	Ar. Rabat (Overnight)	9:10 A.M.		3400	
Aug. 12	Lv. Rabat	6:30 A.M.	5 + 40		+ 5
Aug. 12	Ar. Niamey (Overnight)	1:10 P.M.		2470	
Aug. 13	Lv. Niamey	7:00 A.M.	1 + 15	390	+ 5
Aug. 13	Ar. Kano	8:15 A.M.			
Aug. 13	Lv. Kano	11:00 A.M.			
Aug. 13	Ar. Addis Ababa (Overnight)	6:10 P.M.	5 + 10	2280	+ 7
Aug. 14	Lv. Addis Ababa	1:00 P.M.			
Aug. 14	Ar. Entebbe	2:50 P.M.	1 + 50	690	+ 7
Aug. 14	Lv. Entebbe	3:20 P.M.	1	285	+ 7
Aug. 14	Ar. Nairobi	4:20 P.M.			
Aug. 14	Lv. Nairobi	5:00 P.M.			
Aug. 14	Ar. Arusha (Overnight)	6:15 P.M.	1 + 15	?	+ 7
Aug. 15	Arusha (Overnight)				
Aug. 16	Lv. Arusha	7:15 A.M.			
Aug. 16	Ar. Nairobi	8:30 A.M.	1 + 15	?	+ 7
Aug. 16	Lv. Nairobi	9:30 A.M.			
Aug. 16	Ar. Lusaka	11:00 A.M.	2 + 30	1025	+ 6
Aug. 16	Lv. Lusaka	5:00 P.M.			
Aug. 16	Ar. Kinshasa (Overnight)	6:30 P.M.	2 + 30	1025	+ 5
Aug. 17	Lv. Kinshasa	11:00 A.M.			
Aug. 17	Ar. Accra (Overnight)	1:00 P.M.	3	1250	+ 4
Aug. 18 (Sun.)	Lv. Accra	9:00 A.M.			
Aug. 18	Ar. Monrovia	9:56 A.M.	1 + 40	630	+ 3 16 M
Aug. 18	Lv. Monrovia	4:00 P.M.			
Aug. 18	Ar. Dakar (Overnight)	6:30 P.M.	1 + 50	685	+ 4
Aug. 19	Lv. Dakar	2:00 P.M.			
Aug. 19	Ar. Andrews	6:10 P.M.	8 + 10	3500	--

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State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01



Department of State

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

6/18/68
W H 6
21d
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 4 4 2 3 Q
RECD: JUNE 18, 1968
5:08 A.M.

PP RUEHC
DE RUFJCK 1191 1700700
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 180645ZJUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1364
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ BANGUI 1191

CORRECTED COPY

NODIS/ADROIT

REF: STATE 184233

EYES ONLY FOR HAMILTON, WHITE HOUSE, FROM PALMER

1. APPRECIATE CONSIDERATIONS YOU HAVE PUT FORWARD RE PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL ITINERARY. WE BOTH KNOW HOW AGONIZING ANY DECISION IS IN PICKING AND CHOOSING AS AMONGST 40 COUNTRIES. THIS PROBLEM ASSUMES EVEN GREATER PROPORTIONS BY VIRTUE LEVEL OF VISIT.

2. I ORDINARILY WOULD NOT BE IN FAVOR OF PERMITTING POSSIBLE REACTIONS IN ONE COUNTRY TO AFFECT OUR FREEDOM OF ACTION IN DETERMINING VISITS TO OTHER COUNTRIES. MOREOVER, I THINK THAT IN MOST CASES AFRICANS ARE UNDERSTANDING OF SUCH SITUATIONS AND RECOGNIZE THAT WE HAVE TO ASSERT SAME RIGHT OF INDEPENDENCE OF CHOICE AS THEY. IF IT WERE NOT FOR PREVIOUS KATZENBACH AND HUMPHREY VISITS GHANA AND OMISSION NIGERIA I WOULD NOT BE SO CONCERNED. HOWEVER, I THINK THERE IS LIMIT TO WHICH TRAFFIC WILL BEAR REPETITION WITHOUT SERIOUS RISK TO RELATIONSHIP WITH NIGERIA WHICH WE HAVE PAINFULLY SOUGHT TO PRESERVE. BEFORE ANSWERING YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS, I WOULD LIKE MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY TREATED NIGERIA AS FRIENDLY COUNTRY WITH WHICH WE WISH MAINTAIN RELATIONSHIP. ALTHOUGH REGRETTING CIVIL WAR, REFUSING BECOME MILITARILY INVOLVED AND OPENLY FAVORING PEACEFUL SOLUTION, WE HAVE CONTINUED TAKE POSITION FAVORABLE TO NIGERIAN UNITY.

(B) US HAS SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT TO PROTECT IN NIGERIA, AS WELL AS GREAT POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE.

(C) NIGERIA IS UNDERGOING AGONIZING STRUGGLE IN WHICH IT NEEDS HELP AND UNDERSTANDING FROM ITS FRIENDS FOR THOSE THINGS WHICH I IS TRYING TO DO RIGHT AND GOOD AND FRANK COUNSEL FOR THOSE THINGS WHICH IT TENDS TO DO WRONG.

(D) NIGERIA HAS ITS HAWKS AND DOVES. OUR INDICATIONS ARE THAT GOWON IS TRYING BE REASONABLE AND TO RESIST MORE EXTREMIST PRESSURES. O EXTENT WE CAN STRENGTHEN HIM, WE ADVANCE POSSIBILITY OF REASONABLE SETTLEMENT.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- BANGUI 1191, JUNE 18

(E) MY READING OF KAMPALA AND ITS AFTERMATH IS THAT FMG HAS MADE ALMOST ALL OF THE CONCESSIONS AND THAT IT IS INCREASING UNREALISM OF BIAFRAN POINT OF VIEW THAT IS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPEDING PROGRESS TOWARD SETTLEMENT. I BELIEVE PRESIDENTIAL TALK WITH GOWON ON NIGERIAN SOIL COULD BOTH SERVE TO STRENGTHEN GOWON'S HAND AND INDUCE MORE REALISTIC BIAFRAN ATTITUDE WITHOUT COMPRISING BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR WHICH WE HAVE STOOD THROUGHOUT STRUGGLE.

3. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND LET ME DEAL WITH QUESTIONS CONTAINED PARA 4 YOUR MESSAGE:

(A) PRESIDENT ALREADY IDENTIFIED WITH GOWON THROUGH OUR CONTINUED RECOGNITION OF FMG, CONTINUING CONTACTS WITH GOWON THROUGH HIS PERSONAL REP IN LAGOS AND OUR OPEN SUPPORT FOR NIGERIAN UNITY. WHILE PRESIDENTIAL APPEARANCES WITH GOWON WOULD OBVIOUSLY DRAMATIZE THIS IDENTIFICATION, IT WOULD NOT ESSENTIALLY CHANGE FACT THAT IT ALREADY EXISTS.

(B) I THINK WE SHOULD GET AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS' ADVISE BUT MY OWN JUDGMENT IS THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MANAGED VISIT, ARRIVAL REARRKS, ETC., SO THAT US WOULD EMERGE WITH ITS PRESENT POLICY EMPHASIS INTACT. NIGERIANS ARE GENERALLY FRANK AND UNDERSTANDING PEOPLE. THEY RECOGNIZE DEEP CONCERN INCREASINGLY EXPRESSED IN AFRICA AND OTHER SECTIONS OF WORLD RE CONTINUATION OF WAR AND HAVE I BELIEVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT MEET THOSE CONCERNS EVEN THROUGH THEIR PROPAGANDA LEAVES GOOD DEAL TO BE DESIRED. I THINK PRESIDENT CAN BE FRANK AND OPEN RE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND OUR HOPES FOR FUTURE OF COUNTRY WITHOUT EITHER COMPROMISING OUR PRINCIPLES OR AROUSING ADVERS REACTION.

(C) WITH PRESIDENT'S EMPHASIS ON REACHING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT NIGERIAN PROBLEM, I WOULD NOT ANTICIPATE ADVERSE REACTION DAR OR LUSAKA. BOTH GOVTS ALREAY FULLY AWARE OF OUR DIFFERENCES IN ANY EVENT.

(D) THIS IS ADMITTEDLY A RISK AND ASSUME WE WOULD ONLY CANCEL IN EXTREMIS. IF SUBSANTIAL EXCESSES TOOK PLACE, WE WOULD PROBABLY FEEL COMPELLED TO MAKE NEGATIVE COMMENT ON THEM IN ANY EVENT. I THINK NIGERIAN REACTION WOULD BE DOUBLY ADVERSE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, I.E., CRITICAL THAT WE HAD SPOKEN OUT WHILE PRESIDENT IN AREA AND HAD NOT ASFORDED GOWON OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR HIS POINT OF VIEW.

(E) ON RECONSIDERATION, I DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD REPRESENT KANO AS REFUELING STOP BUT RATHER AS FULLY SCHEDULED STOP FOR PRESIDENT TO MEET WITH GOWON. I BELIEVE THIS ARRANGEMENT MUCH PREFERABLE TO FULL-FLEDGED VISIT TO LAGOS FOR NUMBER OF

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- BANGUI 1191, JUNE 18

REASONS. FIRST, IT MORE CONVENIENT AND MANAGEABLE. SECONDLY, SECURITY WOULD BE FAR LESS OF A PROBLEM IN 1800 LONG JOURNEY REQUIRED FROM AIRPORT TO CITY IN LAGOS. THIRDLY, BELIEVE MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE IN CALMER ATMOSPHERE IN KANO. (F) THIS IS A FACTOR THAT YOU CAN BEST JUDGE IN WASHINGTON. HOWEVER, I RECALL SOME DOMESTIC CRITICISM RE PREVIOUS VISIT AS CONCENTRATING ON FAVORABLE SITUATIONS WITH INSUFFICIENT EMPHASIS ON SOME OF TOUGHER PROBLEMS WHICH AFRICA FACES. I WOULD THEREFORE HAVE THOUGHT THAT FRANK AND OPEN SHOW OF CONCERN FOR NIGERIAN SITUATION AT MEETING OF THIS KIND WOULD REBOUND TO PRESIDENT'S ALREADY HIGH REPUTATION FOR COURAGEOUS ACTION.

4. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR GOOD WISHES. I BELIEVE TRIP IS GOING VERY WELL ON WHOLE AND I SHALL HAVE LOTS OF NEW INSIGHTS TO DISCUSS WITH YOU WHEN I RETURN. GP-3. LEWIS
BT

~~SECRET~~

Pres. Sec

22

~~TOP SECRET~~

Lunch with the President
Tuesday, July 2, 1968, 1 p. m.

Agenda

1. Paris Talks: Next Stage. (Sect. Rusk)

Views developed in Monday meeting you instructed us to have.

2. Aircraft Down in the Soviet Kuriles. (Sect. Rusk)

Sitrep.

3. Honolulu Meeting: Clifford Trip. (The President)

- Dates.
- Announcement.
- Should Vance come to Honolulu?

4. Middle East. (Sect. Rusk)

Ball trip to Middle East: timing.

5. Organisation of Bilateral with the USSR (Sects. Rusk and Clifford)

Preliminary thoughts and report on state of staff work.

6. Other.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 2'
By rg, NARA, Date 9-28-92

ACTION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS

Tuesday, July 2, 1968 -- 12:30 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith is the proposed outgoing for your clearance at lunch today.

Essentially it would ask the other side if they would be willing to meet in private on the basis of the Zorin formula, at which time we would be prepared to be concrete.

I think that is all right, notably if they suggest another private session soon.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

23a

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS IMMEDIATE

Date

STATE

TO DEL _____

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

For Harriman and Vance.

DELTO 366.

1. We concur in your revisions to the line we had proposed in State 194772 for the tea break. Specifically, we agree to the omission of the last part of paragraph 2(b) of that suggested line and to not repeat not getting into aerial reconnaissance issue at this time. You should of course continue to use terminology that limits what we would stop to bombing and offensive combat operations.

2. Despite Zorin's suggestion (DELTO 369) we continue to feel that it would be premature at this tea break to table any second-
with
phase package. Bunker is now in/wthk interesting suggestions, and we are repeating his 31593 to you. We are working urgently to mesh all ideas into a consistent opening position, but will

Typed by:

EA:WPBundy:mk 7/2/68

Tel. No.

4235

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

Comments:

DOD - Secretary Clifford

White House - Mr. Rostow

S/S -

~~SECRET~~

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

~~SECRET~~

Classification

almost certainly need further exchanges with you and Saigon in any event.

GP-1.

End.

Pasilla
24

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, July 2, 1968
12:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith an intelligent CIA analysis of the
politics of the Soviet position on talks about
strategic weapons.

Key passages in summary are marked.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

Cy 26 of No.

June 68 Intelligence Memorandum

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-236
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-17-03

INFO. MATION

presfile

25

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, July 2, 1968
12:10 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

General Taylor wishes you to have this
available before lunch.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989

By rg, NARA, Date 9-1-92

25a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

July 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Phase I Agreements

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-383

By ing, NARA, Date 8-12-93

Yesterday in a meeting which Secretary Rusk called to discuss the Phase I/Phase II formula, it was evident that there is considerable difference of opinion among your advisers with regard to the agreements which must be reached in Phase I prior to a cessation of bombing. I would like to present to you a line of reasoning which appeals to me as a reasonable approach to the question.

It seems to me that, at this moment, we have a relatively stable situation in South Vietnam in the sense that it is one which we can live with for some time at our present level of effort. Our military forces seem able to cope with the enemy in spite of the heavy infiltration of recent months. Our limited bombing of North Vietnam continues to be clearly disagreeable to the enemy. The GVN seems able to hold together although, as always, there are recurrent rips at the seams. Unless the enemy resorts to another dramatic military effort like the TET offensive, we would seem able to continue for several months on the present basis while we seek a productive negotiation in Paris.

We should not abandon this stable posture unless we are sure of assuming another of at least equal stability. Hence, when we give up the limited bombing and thereby remove an important factor contributing to the present equilibrium, we need to obtain compensation in other areas which will restore the balance. We must be assured of the following points:

- a. ~~The enemy will not escalate the action in South Vietnam nor renewed TET-offensive.~~
- b. ~~The enemy will continue to pay a heavy price in the ground war for his continued aggression against South Vietnam.~~
- c. ~~There will be no harassment of civilian populations at levels dangerous to national morale or the stability of the GVN.~~
- d. ~~The enemy will not engage in infiltration at rates which will result in a net increase of strength in South Vietnam and thus permit him to stockpile manpower for a new offensive.~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

If we accept the foregoing conditions as essential to a stabilized situation which can endure during the coming months of negotiation, we should ask ourselves what are the agreements to achieve these conditions which should be reached in Phase I. My own view of the bedrock minimum (more should be asked at the outset) is the following:

- a. An understanding communicated privately to the other side that we are stopping our bombing on the assumption that enemy activities in South Vietnam will remain approximately at present levels, this being a pragmatic interpretation of taking no advantage of our restraint.
- b. Mutual agreement to restore the DMZ under ICC inspection.
- c. Mutual respect for the 1962 agreements re Laos.
- d. A continuation of US air reconnaissance of North Vietnam without enemy opposition.
- e. Agreement on time, place, representation and agenda of Phase II negotiations.

MD2
M.D.T.

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, July 2, 1968
11:55 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a first report from your new
Ambassador in Manila.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Manila, Philippines

26a

June 25, 1968

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Lyndon:

Again, many thanks - first, for the opportunity of significant public service; second, for the eminently successful Corregidor mission you authorized.

Your kind words about me to Mrs. Marcos have been most important and helpful. I am convinced she is befriending me, and as you and I know, wives are most important.

By way of a progress report let me say I have first emphasized trying to establish a favorable rapport with the Philippine people. In this, I think I have been lucky so far. But as Mrs. Marcos has said, "Ambassador Williams has done well, so far."

Obviously, this solves no problems, but should lay a foundation to do so.

Incidentally, the staff here is very good indeed, and I trust that with their help I can make some progress on the list of priorities we went over together.

Again, many thanks for your kind help in getting my mission off to a good start.

With every good wish to you and Lady Bird.

Respectfully,

G. Mennen Williams

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71C 9 86-141
By Wip/ly, NARA, Date 10-5-92

Pres file

27

**Tuesday, July 2, 1968
11:45 a. m.**

MR. PRESIDENT:

I believe that Ambassador Duke should be invited to the Barrientos lunch. His facility with Spanish will be very helpful in handling the 8-member Bolivian party.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

(dict. by Wm Bowdler: ms)

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN PLUS

Tuesday, July 2, 1968 - 11:45 am

Mr. President:

Herewith our Saigon team comes in with a sensible, practical response to the Zorin formula.

W. A. Rostow

Saigon 31593, 2 sections

*Key problem for Paris
marked in red on p. 2.*

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN PLUS

Pres Lee

28

200
1120



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

28a

~~SECRET~~

00 RUEHC RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 31593/1 1341130 3 8 6Q
ZNY SSSSS ZZH 1968 JUL 2 AM 7 59
O 021100Z JUL 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5921
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1425
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 31593

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

PARIS FOR VIETNAM DELEGATION

REF: PARIS 17153

1. BERGER, GEN ABRAMS, CALHOUN AND I HAVE BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO REFTEL AND THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS THAT WE THINK HANOI MUST MEET IN EXCHANGE FOR A TOTAL CESSATION, AND SUBMIT TO THE FOLLOWING TO BE CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR OWN THINKING.

2. IN PHASE A THE AGREEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING SHOULD EMBRACE THE FOLLOWING INTERCONNECTED CONCEPTIONS:

A. WE AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO ~~FIX A DATE WHEN ALL US BOMBINGS AND OTHER US AND ALLIED MILITARY ATTACKS ON NORTH VIETNAM NORTH OF THE DMZ WILL CEASE.~~

(COMMENT ON 2 A: THIS CONCEPT ASSUMES THAT THERE WILL BE A CESSATION OF NAVAL ATTACKS FROM THE SEA ON NORTH VIETNAMESE TERRITORY. IT DOES NOT ASSUME THAT WE WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE SUPPLY AND MANPOWER MOVEMENTS THROUGH LAOS OR BY SEA INTO SOUTH VIETNAM. IN CONNECTION WITH THE LATTER THE GVN NAVY ENGAGES IN OPERATIONS KNOWN AS PLOWMAN WHICH INVOLVE THE EXAMINATION, INTERCEPTION AND OCCASIONAL SEIZURE OR SINKING OF NORTH VIETNAMESE "FISHING" VESSELS IN WATER UP TO THE 20TH PARALLEL. WE DO NOT RULE OUT THAT THE GVN WILL GO ALONG WITH A TOTAL CESSATION AND HALT THESE OPERATIONS, BUT WE FLAG IT AS AN AREA THAT NEEDS EXAMINATION.)

B. ~~HANOI~~ HANOI AGREES IN PRINCIPLE THAT THERE WILL BE A SHORT INTERVAL BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS START.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority RAC 18564

By jcl/m NARA. Date 8-22-01

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 31593, JULY 2, SECTION ONE OF TWO

C. WE MUST EXACT A COMMITMENT THAT ~~AFTER WE ANNOUNCE THE DATE OF TOTAL CESSATION:~~

1. NO CITY OR MAJOR POPULATED AREA IN THE SOUTH WILL BE SHELLED OR ATTACKED;
2. NO ARTILLERY OR OTHER ATTACK WILL EMANATE FROM ACROSS OR WITHIN THE DMZ; AND
3. THERE WILL BE NO INFILTRATION OF MEN AND SUPPLIES THROUGH THE DMZ.

D. IT IS MADE CLEAR TO HANOI THAT IF SAIGON OR OTHER MAJOR CITIES ARE ATTACKED, OR ATTACKS EMANATE FROM ACROSS OR WITHIN THE DMZ, OR INFILTRATION CONTINUES THROUGH THE DMZ, AFTER WE ANNOUNCE TOTAL CESSATION OR AT ANY TIME AFTER NEGOTIATIONS COMMENCE, THAT WE WILL RESUME BOMBING OF THE NORTH.

E. RECONNAISSANCE WILL CONTINUE UNTIL A FULL SETTLEMENT IS REACHED.

F. ONLY AT THIS POINT SHOULD WE AGREE ON THE PERIOD OF THE INTERVAL, THE DATE OF THE US ANNOUNCES TOTAL CESSATION, AND THE DATE NEGOTIATIONS START.

(COMMENT ON F: OUR ANNOUNCEMENT OF TOTAL CESSATION SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DATE WHEN NEGOTIATIONS WILL COMMENCE. THIS SHOULD PRESENT NO DIFFICULTY TO HANOI SINCE THEY HAVE TIED THE TWO TOGETHER. CLEARLY THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE IN SECRET, BUT THE FACT THAT THEY ARE BEING HELD MUST BE PUBLICIZED. WE CAN DRAW DISCREET ATTENTION TO THE ABSENCE OF ATTACKS ON THE CITIES AND FROM THE AREA OF THE DMZ, AND THE APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS WILL BE DRAWN BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND WORLD OPINION THAT WE HAVE GOTTEN SOMETHING IN EXCHANGE FOR A FULL CESSATION.)

3. I TURN NEXT TO THE STAND WE SHOULD TAKE IN PHASE B WHEN NEGOTIATIONS START. THERE ARE THREE AREAS, WHICH I AM SURE CONCERN WASHINGTON AS MUCH AS THEY DO US, ON WHICH WE MAKE THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS;

A. WE SHOULD INFORM HANOI EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS START THAT SO LONG AS THE VC AND

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 31593, JULY 2, SECTION ONE OF TWO

NORTH VIETNAM FORCES CONTINUE TO ENGAGE IN MURDER AND ASSASSINATION, KIDNAPPING, SABOTAGE, THE MINING OF ROADS, AMBUSH AND INTERDICTION OF MILITARY AND CIVIL MOVEMENTS, ATTACKS ON MILITARY OR CIVIL INSTALLATIONS, OR ANY OTHER ACTS OF WAR OR TERROR. WE AND OUR ALLIES WILL CONTINUE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH. WE AND THE GVN ARE, HOWEVER, PREPARED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS THAT WILL LEAD TO A DIMINUTION AND ULTIMATELY AN END OF THE ~~VIOLENCE~~ VIOLENCE

(COMMENT ON 3 A: THIS IS A DEFENSIBLE PUBLIC POSITION. ALSO THIS GIVES BOTH SIDES FLEXIBILITY TO MOVE GRADUALLY TOWARD A MUTUAL DEESCALATION OR DE FACTO CEASE FIRE, WITHOUT FORMAL AGREEMENT, OR TO NEGOTIATE A MUTUAL DEESCALATION AND CEASE FIRE AS PART OF A GENERAL SETTLEMENT.)
BUNKER

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

3 8 7 Q

1968 JUL 2 AM 8 11

OO RUEHC RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 31593/2 1841150
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021100Z JUL 68 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5922
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1426
STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 31593

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

B. WE SHOULD ALSO INFORM HANOI THAT DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS THE US AND ALLIES ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS AND ARRIVE AT ARRANGEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS ON THE MOVEMENT OF MEN AND SUPPLIES INTO SOUTH VIETNAM BY BOTH SIDES, AND FOR A GRADUAL REDUCTION AND ULTIMATE WITHDRAWAL AS PART OF A GENERAL SETTLEMENT. BUT SO LONG AS THE INFILTRATION OF MEN AND SUPPLIES CONTINUES FROM NORTH VIETNAM THROUGH LAOS AND CAMBODIA OR BY SEA, THE US AND ITS ALLIES WILL INTRODUCE MEN AND SUPPLIES AT WHATEVER LEVEL WE DEEM NECESSARY TO MEET THE LEVELS OF INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH.

(COMMENT ON 3 B: THIS GIVES US A GOOD PUBLIC STANCE AND FLEXIBILITY. ALSO WE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT WE HAVE THAI AND AUSTRALIAN AUGMENTATIONS DUE HERE IN THE NEXT MONTHS, AND THE GVN IS ENGAGED IN A TOTAL MOBILIZATION. THESE SHOULD NOT BE SUSPENDED OR INTERRUPTED UNTIL WE KNOW MORE CLEARLY WHERE WE ARE GOING IN THE SECRET TALKS.)

C. THE NATURE, EXTENT AND TIMING OF GVN PARTICIPATION IN THE SECRET NEGOTIATIONS.

(COMMENT ON 3 C: I REALIZE THE DIFFICULTY THIS MAY CAUSE, AND OUR NEED TO BE FLEXIBLE. BUT IF WE UNDERTAKE BILATERAL SECRET TALKS AFTER A BOMBING CONCESSION, IT WOULD RUN COUNTER TO OUR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COMMITMENTS TO THE GVN AND OUR ALLIES; MOREOVER, IT WOULD AROUSE THE MOST PROFOUND SUSPICIONS HERE OF WHAT WE ARE DISCUSSING AND CREATE POSSIBLY INSUPERABLE DIFFICULTIES FOR THIEU AND US. UNLESS THE PUBLIC IS AWARE THAT THE GVN IS ASSOCIATED WITH THESE TALKS, IT COULD DESTROY THE THIEU GOVERNMENT.)

4. WE SHALL BE COMMENTING SEPARATELY ON STATE 193328.

5. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO HAVE YOUR THINKING ON THE APPROACH TO A TOTAL BOMBING CESSATION SO THAT WE CAN STUDY THIS AND COMMENT IN ADVANCE OF ITS BEING PUT TO THE HANOI NEGOTIATORS.

BUNKER

BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

29

July 2
Tuesday, June 2, 1968 -- 11:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Free file

In your meeting with General Bradley you may wish to make the following points about Vietnam:

Since the partial bombing cessation, the North Vietnamese have successfully recuperated from many effects of the bombing in northern North Vietnam: bridges, roads, and railroads repaired; port construction; all airfields operational, improved air defenses; redirection of manpower to agriculture.

- They have not yet projected this improved posture to the war in the south.

- In fact, in the south the enemy is somewhat worse off than before 31 March -- despite all-time high rates of infiltration (some indications that this rate may now be falling off).

- Enemy still has significant capability as seen by May attacks on Saigon. But the attacks on Saigon expected at end of June didn't come off. These may have been postponed until August.

- Thus, we are in a lull in enemy-initiated activity similar to April lull (U.S. casualties last week half of similar period last year).

-- Potential threats to Hue and Quang Tri in I Corps have not yet materialized.

-- Enemy has been threatening the highlands but has been unable to mount significant attacks since last fall.

-- Activity around Saigon has slackened and enemy may have pulled back.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-- IV Corps relatively quiet; Thang has done a good job; we hope his successor Thanh will be as capable.

- Overall, enemy is suffering from significant problems of manpower, morale, training, leadership, and supply (destruction of arms caches causing him problem). Although no visible indications he is near the breaking point, his losses since 1 January 120,000 men. Much lower casualties in 1967 caused him to revise his strategy. Thus, we look for -- but are not counting on -- a major shift in strategy in the next 6-12 months.

- Meanwhile, in Paris:

-- no progress yet, but
-- we have clearly held edge in propaganda battle.

-- Hopeful signs: Hanoi is anxious to keep talks going; tea breaks getting longer; some apparent thawing in manner and attitudes -- especially in tea breaks which are generally businesslike and devoid of polemics; Tho's visit to Moscow and Hanoi could mean a re-evaluation of Hanoi's position is in progress.

-- We shall continue to insist on getting something meaningful in return for a total bombing cessation.

-- Meanwhile, some indications of a Peking-Hanoi split: anti-North Vietnam demonstrations in front of consulates, Peking opposition to Hanoi's negotiating, and possibility of deliberate interruptions of supply to Hanoi. These hopeful possibilities, however, must not be overemphasized through wishful thinking.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

Pres File
INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

30

Tuesday, July 2, 1968
10:40 a. m.

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS

MR. PRESIDENT:

(Lunch item)

Herewith outgoing to Vance, as a result of yesterday's meeting, and Vance's response (Tab A).

Also attached is a Harriman-Zorin conversation, instigated by the latter (Tab B).

Sect. Rusk will have a draft outgoing cable for you at lunch -- if not earlier.

I have told State I believe it should contain the addition I have inserted on page 2.

But there is a larger issue which we debated amiably yesterday and on which Zorin's cable bears. The issue is this: on the next occasion, should we merely ask the North Vietnamese if they are prepared to sit down with us to work within the Zorin framework, or should we fill in what we want and are prepared to do in Phase 2?

Yesterday I had suggested the latter; Sect. Rusk suggested that we move more cautiously and simply raise the structure in principle -- then proceeding in a private session, if they showed interest, to fill in Phase 2. He argued persuasively that they were probably making critical decisions in Hanoi right now and we should not put in a proposal which might scare them off by being too tough.

Now Zorin tells us: "It was critical that the columns in Phase 2 be filled out in detail. He said without the specific points in Phase 2 the proposal would mean nothing."

The question that you may wish to decide at lunch is, therefore, whether we proceed promptly to lay before them a Phase 1 -- Phase 2 proposal of substance.

We should recall that they have already had in the Jordan dinner, as well as by way of example in other conversations, what we have in mind: the DMZ; reduced infiltration; no shelling of Saigon; continued reconnaissance. It is just barely possible if we frame the proposal in this way, with familiar items but Phase 2 filled in, we could advance the pace of movement.

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS

-2-

At the base of the matter is this judgment: ~~since the biggest~~
~~development in Paris has been the Soviet willingness to get into the middle~~
~~of this -- beginning with Kosygin's letter -- should we be prepared to~~
~~take their advice, so long as we could live with the proposal if it is~~
~~accepted?~~

W. A. R. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS attachments

30a



WH

(2)

306

194772

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS IMMEDIATE

STATE 194772

TODEL 587

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

Deliver Personally to Vance or Habib.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 18568
By is NARA, Date 1-8-98

1. We have considered your most helpful 17321 with care. Our own thinking on elements in a second stage package follows your early headings closely but has some differences with reference to item 2(c) under paragraph 10, and with paragraph 11. We are working urgently and should have further ideas in the next day or two.
2. However, for purposes of your tea-break discussion on Wednesday, we believe it would be premature to table a possible second phase package at that point. At this stage, we lack North Vietnamese agreement to talk in these basic terms, and we believe we need to nail down whether they are willing to do so. Our tentative thinking is that you should put ~~xxxx~~ forward the following oral points at the tea break:

674B

Drafted by
EA:WPBundy:mk 7/1/68

Tel. Ext.
4235

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by EA - William P. Bundy

Clearances:
The Secretary (subs) 674B DOD - Secretary Clifford (subs)
White House - Mr. Rostow (subs) 100B S/S - Mr. Walsh 2PW 100B

Page 2 of telegram to Paris TODEL~~SECRET~~Classification

a. We do insist that, before the bombing actually stops, we must have a clear ~~xxx~~ understanding on actions that would follow in the second phase.

b. In the actions to be clearly understood, we can envisage *actions on the DRV side,* actions on the US side and measures that would be equally applicable to both sides. You should explain frankly that we would thus meet Hanoi's desire to avoid the appearance of reciprocity for the stopping of the bombing in itself, while at the same time meeting our need for clear understanding on a package that would add up to Hanoi not gaining military advantage through the stopping of the bombing.

c. We could envisage a time interval between the stopping of the bombing and the visible coming into effect of the package of actions. But we believe this time interval must be short if a climate of confidence is to be maintained.

d. Nonetheless, we should point out frankly that the key to avoiding the appearance of reciprocity from Hanoi's standpoint lies in the understood package of actions, and not in the time interval. In the face of our past and still firm position that we must have something from Hanoi if we are to stop the bombing, speculation that there was in fact an agreed package of actions would be inevitable,

Page 3 of telegram to Paris TODEL

~~SECRET~~
Classification

and we might not be able to guarantee to avoid leaks that there was such a package. This is another strong reason for the time interval being extremely short.

e. To underscore what we mean, and to put it in the context of the Zorin conversation, you should say that we could envisage a first stage involving the stopping of the bombing on an agreed date, with prior agreement on a following second stage that would include actions on both sides. You should again re-emphasize ^{that} ~~the~~ clear understanding on the second phase actions would have to be reached before the bombing actually stopped.

f. We would need to say that our first stage would be a stopping of the bombing and all other types of offensive combat operations against the DRV. It would not preclude our carrying out aerial reconnaissance. If Hanoi disagrees with this, we had better discuss it as part of the private talks. (This is designed to frame an issue of which we believe Hanoi is fully aware and which was skirted in Vance's last talk with Lau. We are inclined to hit it head on, and at this point, being prepared to explain that Hanoi has ample sources of information in the South and that we would require sources of information on the North.)

Page ⁴ of telegram to Paris TODEL~~SECRET~~*Classification*

g. This is the essential framework we now propose as a basis for kxx private talks. If Hanoi is prepared for such talks, we would like to proceed as soon as they are ready.

h. At a very early stage in such private talks we would be pxx prepared to put forward a list of the actions on both sides that would be appropriate for understanding and to take place in the second phase. We assume that Hanoi would be prepared to propose its own list of actions at the same time.

3. We emphasize that the above is our tentative thinking, not reviewed at highest levels. We would like your comment as early as possible tomorrow morning here, so that final decisions on your instructions could be made in early afternoon here.

GP-1.

End.

RUSKI



Department of State

WMD
TELEGRAM 300
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NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 366

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

REF: STATE 194772

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 18523
By ICA NARA Date 1-8-98

1. WE WILL TRY TO USE TEA BREAK FOR CLARIFICATION ESSENTIAL POINTS REFTEL WITH WHICH WE AGREE. WE HAD NO INTENTION OF TABLING SECOND PHASE PACKAGE AT THAT TIME, PROPOSING INSTEAD TO AWAIT NEXT PRIVATE MEETING WITH LAU. WE ARE FAIRLY SURE TEA BREAK ROOMS ARE BUGGED AND THUY AND LAU APPEAR TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT TALKING TOO FREELY AT THE MAJESTIC.
2. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT PRACTICAL TO REPEAT AGAIN THE ARGUMENT THAT THIS APPROACH AVOIDS THE "APPEARANCE" OF RECIPROCITY (PARA 2(B) REFTEL). WE TRIED THIS ON LAU AT JUNE 27 MEETING AND HE REJECTED IT. ZORIN REACTED THE SAME WAY AND STRESSED THE HEAVY LINE BETWEEN PHASE 1 AND PHASE 2. LAU UNDERSTANDS THE POINT CLEARLY AND WE DON'T BELIEVE IT NEEDS TO BE HAMMERED HOME AGAIN AT NEXT MEETING. WE BELIEVE NORTH VIETNAMESE MAY FIND IT EASIER TO ACCEPT THE ARGUMENT THAT RECIPROCITY OCCURS IN PHASE 2, WHERE THE RECIPROCAL ACTIONS APPEAR TO BE MUTUAL AND THEREFORE NOT RELATED DIRECTLY TO BOMBING CESSATION.
3. AS TO GETTING INTO QUESTION OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AT TEA BREAK (PARA 2(F) REFTEL), WE ARE INCLINED TO WAIT UNTIL WE HAVE A PRIVATE DISCUSSION IN WHICH THE RANGE OF SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED UNDER PHASE 2 CAN BE DISCUSSED. PRESENTING PACKAGE AS A WHOLE-- WITH RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHASES 1 AND 2 AND THE CONTENT OF PHASE 2 MADE CLEAR-- STRIKES US AS MORE LIKELY TO MAKE CLEAR ALL THAT IS INVOLVED RATHER THAN HITTING PIECES OF IT NOW.
4. WE WILL, HOWEVER, ASSURE THAT FRAMEWORK WE PROPOSE FOR PRIVATE TALKS IS CLEAR (SUMMED UP IN REFTEL PARA 2(E)) AND THAT THEY UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE PREPARING TO DISCUSS DETAILS AND ACTIONS INVOLVED AS SOON AS THEY ARE READY.
5. AT ZORIN'S REQUEST, WE WILL BE SEEING HIM AT 10:30 THIS MORNING. WE WILL REPORT FOLLOWING THE MEETING.

HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

30d





Department of State

30e
TELEGRAM

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3759

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~~SECRET~~ PARIS 17332

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 369

FROM HARRIMAN-AND-VANCE

003950

1968 JUL 2 AM 9 00

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 18570

By: NARA Date 1-8-98

1. THIS MORNING WE MET WITH ZORIN FOR ABOUT 1 HOUR AND 15 MINUTES. PERRY AND BOGOMOLOV WERE PRESENT. THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE MEETING WERE AS FOLLOWS. COMPLETE REPORT ON CONVERSATION WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL.

2. ZORIN ASKED WHAT REACTION WE HAD TO THE SUGGESTION HE AND VANCE HAD DISCUSSED LAST WEEK. WE REPLIED THAT WE WERE STILL STUDYING IT BUT THAT OUR INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT IT WAS VERY INTERESTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE. ZORIN SPECIFICALLY ASKED WHAT THE REACTION WAS IN WASHINGTON. GOVERNOR HARRIMAN REPLIED THAT IT WAS WELL RECEIVED, AND THAT IT WAS A CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTION SO LONG AS AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON BOTH STAGES BEFOREHAND.

3. ZORIN SAID THAT HANOI DOES NOT KNOW WHAT HE SAID AND ADDED THAT HE HAD NOT TALKED TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ABOUT THE SUGGESTION. HE LATER SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IF WE MERELY RENEWED THE PROPOSAL VANCE HAD MADE TO LAU IN THE SAME FORM AS VANCE USED ON THURSDAY NIGHT, HANOI WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING IT FURTHER.

4. NEAR THE END OF THE MEETING, WE ASKED ZORIN SPECIFICALLY WHETHER IN HIS OPINION THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD GIVE PROMPT AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONSIDERATION TO A PROPOSAL ALONG THE LINES OF THE ZORIN SUGGESTION. HE REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT THINK THEY WOULD REJECT IT.

5. ZORIN EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS CRITICAL THAT THE COLUMNS IN PHASE 2 BE FILLED OUT IN DETAIL. HE SAID WITHOUT THE SPECIFIC POINTS IN PHASE 2 THE PROPOSAL WOULD MEAN NOTHING.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 17332, JULY 21

6. AT THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING, ZORIN SAID THAT HE KNEW THAT THE NORTH-VIETNAMESE INTENDED TO FREE SEVERAL PILOTS SOON IN ORDER TO CREATE A BETTER ATMOSPHERE. GOVERNOR HARRIMAN SAID THAT HE HAD SENT THE DRV WORD IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO RELEASE 10 PERCENT OF THE POWS. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT ANY NUMBER WOULD BE WELCOME.

7. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THAT ZORIN ASKED FOR MEETING IN ORDER TO FIND OUT CURRENT WASHINGTON THINKING AND TO LET US KNOW ABOUT THE RELEASE OF ADDITIONAL PILOTS. ALTHOUGH HE DENIED IT, WE FEEL HE HAS DISCUSSED HIS PHASE 1-2 SUGGESTION WITH NORTH-VIETNAMESE, BUT WE HAVE NO IDEA HOW THEY REACTED.

8. WE NEED URGENTLY THE DETAILS FOR PHASE 2 ACTIONS WHICH WOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE NORTH-VIETNAMESE AT THE NEXT APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY. WE WOULD, THEREFORE, APPRECIATE RECEIVING FROM YOU FULL DETAILS ON PHASE 2 ACTIONS ALONG THE LINES OF THE SERIES OF ITEMS IN OUR TEL PARIS QUEWOM

HARRIMAN

BT

~~SECRET~~

125 246

31

ACTION

Tuesday - July 2, 1968 - 9:40 A.M.

Mr. President:

You have responded to the general invitation to attend the ODECA meeting of Presidents and to the specific invitation of the host President.

We now should proceed with acceptance of the direct invitations of the four other Presidents.

Attached are the draft letters to the Presidents of Costa Rica (Tab A), Guatemala (Tab B), Honduras (Tab C) and Nicaragua (Tab D).

W. W. ^{all} Rostow

Attachments

Tabs A - D.

31a

July 3, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I very much appreciate your kind invitation to join with you and the Presidents of the other Central American Republics in San Salvador on July 6. I look forward with great pleasure to the opportunity to renew the friendship we formed at Punta del Este last year and to discussions with you and your colleagues on how we can assist to accelerate progress in Central America.

Sincerely,

737

His Excellency
Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro
President of the Republic of Guatemala
Guatemala City, Guatemala

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm

July 3, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your cordial invitation to meet with you in Tegucigalpa. I regret that I will not be able to talk with you in your capital but look forward to our meeting and discussions in San Salvador and aboard my aircraft. I also welcome the opportunity to stand on Honduran soil during the brief time that I will have in San Pedro Sula.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Oswaldo Lopez Arellano
President of the Republic of Honduras
Tegucigalpa
, Honduras

LBJ/WGB:mmm
7/2/68

310

July 3, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I deeply regret that I will be unable to accept your kind invitation to be your guest in San Jose on the night of July 8. I look forward with great pleasure to seeing you in San Salvador and am very pleased that you have found it possible to accept my invitation to return to San Jose aboard my airplane. At least, I will have an opportunity to extend greetings to the people of Costa Rica and to view, however briefly, the famed beauty of your country.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Lic. Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez
President of the Republic of Costa Rica
San Jose, Costa Rica

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm

31d

July 3, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I deeply appreciate your cordial invitation to visit Nicaragua. Although I regret that I cannot at this time accept, I do look forward to seeing you in San Salvador and to the opportunity to set foot on Nicaraguan soil, even if only briefly, on my return journey.

Sincerely,

RB

His Excellency
Anastasio Somoza Debayle
President of the Republic of Nicaragua
Managua, Nicaragua

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~By JC, NARA, Date 8-22-01

Tuesday, July 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Progress Report from George Woods

George has completed his review of previous work on the proposed Israeli desalting plant. His brief letter to you enclosing a more detailed memorandum is attached.

He suggests two lines of action over the next three months:

1. He would like to lay on a couple of further studies because prices this spring in the nuclear desalting field have jumped sharply. At the same time, the price of fuel oil has gone down, making oil-fueled desalting more competitive. Our large planned plant in California is up in the air until we can reconcile problems created by these increased costs. Woods believes we should have the benefit of that analysis before we go any further.

2. He would like to go to Israel later in the summer. The Israelis have taken important new steps to meet their electric power needs with a large oil fuel plant. Woods feels this may change some of the ground rules for the desalting plant, and he would like to hear latest Israeli thinking first hand. *This would not involve negotiations at this stage*

If this is satisfactory to you, he will press ahead with his proposed studies over the next 90 days and, in late August or early September, would go to Israel. I think this is a good idea.

I might say that I have talked to George several times about this project and am happy to say he is fascinated with it and has a positive attitude toward desalting. He is realistic about the unresolved problems but thinks we ought to keep pushing ahead.

I am also attaching a letter just in from Prime Minister Eshkol expressing his appreciation for George's appointment. He would welcome George whenever George is ready. George had a chat last week with his old friend, Israeli Finance Minister Sapir, and asked him to let Eshkol know that he is hard at work.

Approve Woods' course of action ✓

Call me _____

W. W. Rostow

7/3/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

32a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 2, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I very much appreciated your note of May 6 expressing your interest in the further work to be conducted on the Israeli desalting project. I have worked on this for the past sixty days, drawing on the services of the engineering firm which did the original feasibility study and the experts who worked with Ellsworth Bunker. A progress report, a copy of which I enclose, has been made to Walt Rostow. It discusses new developments which, I believe, make another few months of study advisable. The work plans for the next few months are outlined in the enclosure.

Last week, Israeli Finance Minister Sapir, who was visiting here, called on me. He wanted me to know that he was aware I had been named coordinator for the desalting project. As a result of our conversation, Prime Minister Eshkol is being brought up to date on my activities in this matter.

Minister Sapir renewed his invitation, made several times in my World Bank days, that I visit Israel. I think a useful purpose would be served if I were to confer with the Israelis on their own grounds. With your permission, therefore, I will plan to visit Israel later this summer.

Respectfully yours,

George D. Woods

Enclosure:

Letter to Mr. Walt Rostow (copy of)

The President of the United States
The White House

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

326

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By X, NARA, Date 8-22-01

July 1, 1968

The Honorable
Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

Dear Walt:

Over the past two-month period, I have reviewed the available material relevant to the Israeli Power and Desalting Projects, including some additional studies made by the engineering firm which did the original feasibility study and by the experts who worked with Ellsworth Bunker, through the Water for Peace Office. In addition, I have discussed the project with a number of people with competence in these matters here and on the West Coast. Based on these activities, I recommend that we continue to look into various aspects of the projects over the next few months, and reassess our position in the autumn.

There are several reasons for this recommendation:

(1) Results of the experiments on the large module now under test at San Diego by the Office of Saline Water would be most helpful in determining economic and technical parameters more exactly. Further, the uncertainty with regard to proceeding on the Metropolitan Water District plant in California needs to be resolved. A decision on this may well be made within the next three months. The value that Interior and the AEC might place on the new technology of any proposed Israeli plant -- and therefore the amount they might contribute -- depends on whether or not the MWD plans are to be implemented.

(2) The relative costs of water from fossil-fueled and nuclear-fueled plants need further study,

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- 2 -

especially in the light of the 42-inch Elath-Askalon oil pipeline that Israel now has under construction. This facility will bring a large supply of oil virtually to the plant site, at commercial prices that may well be considerably below those assumed in the engineering studies of the oil-fired dual-power desalting plant done so far. For this and other reasons, a fossil-fueled plant has become a much more attractive alternative in the past year.

(3) More research into recent increases in reactor prices is needed. These increases may imply substantial revisions in forecasts of costs of water in 1975, and should be examined in detail for their cause and likelihood of continuance. At my request, Kaiser Engineers completed, in the last two weeks, a very illuminating review of recent cost changes. Messrs. MacAvoy and Peterson, my economist and water expert, have provided a hasty review of the implications of these changes (as shown in the accompanying memorandum). But more needs to be done.

(4) I believe that further studies can be usefully carried on through the summer. These would include:

(a) Review of the optimum size of a single large power unit consistent with the Israeli network, and an analysis of desirable electricity-water product ratios to find minimum cost ratios;

(b) Explore the possibilities for other sources of water primarily by discussion with hydrologic experts having experience in the Eastern Mediterranean;

(c) A preliminary analysis of the economics of a single-purpose fossil-fueled water plant of the size under consideration; and

(d) The estimates of the value of products from the desalted water have to be revised

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- 3 -

for changes in foreign exchange rates and in the Western European markets for Israeli outputs. A fairly extensive review of the earlier MacAvoy-Peterson estimates of value should be undertaken by experts on agriculture in Israel.

The foregoing represents an interim response to the segment of the terms of reference relating to "Economic." Consideration of the segments relating to "Financial" and "Political-Economic" have been deferred until the factual foundations contemplated under "Economic" have been put in place.

Finance Minister Sapir, who is visiting in this country, called on me last week to let me know that he is acquainted with my appointment as coordinator and to renew an invitation, made several times in the past, that I visit Israel. In order to get a better understanding of Israeli views relating to financial and political-economic aspects of the proposed project, I believe this might be desirable. If the President is agreeable, I will plan to go there during mid-summer.

Sincerely yours,

George D. Woods

Enclosure:

Memorandum on Revised Estimates
of the Costs of Desalted Water
in Israel (June, 1968)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



S/S 9419

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Letter to the President
from Prime Minister Eshkol
of Israel

Enclosed is a communication from the Prime Minister of Israel which was received under cover of a Diplomatic Note dated June 27. A suggestion regarding a reply will be forthcoming.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated

2097

32c

1 - *Ramphus*
2 - *Rit*

32d

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, 14 June 1968

Dear Mr. President,

I have received your letter of May 10, 1968, and much appreciate the information that you have appointed Mr. George D. Woods as your representative to continue the joint studies with Israel representatives on a large desalting and power plant.

My representatives are available for meetings with Mr. Woods as soon as he will consider this opportune.

May I say that the appointment of an American of such eminence as Mr. Woods is further evidence of the depth of your interest and dedication to a venture which enshrines such great hope for humanity. I bear with me fond memories of your inspiring words in this connection at our meetings in 1964 and in 1968.

Sincerely yours,



Levi Eshkol

President Lyndon B. Johnson,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

33

ACTION

Tuesday - July 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Statement on Mexican Olympic Cultural Program

Herewith a memorandum from Nick Katzenbach asking your approval of a statement on US participation in the Mexican Olympic Cultural Program. (Tab A).

We are participating in the cultural olympics at the invitation of the Mexican Olympic Organizing Committee.

The performing groups are listed in the Katzenbach memorandum.

In the near future, our Embassy in Mexico will issue a publicity kit describing US participation in the Program. Ambassador Freeman would like to introduce the kit with a statement from you as Honorary President of the U. S. Olympic Committee. Your statement will insure that Mexico and other participating countries understand the importance we attach to the goals of the Olympic Cultural Program.

At Tab B is the suggested statement which I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Tab A - Katzenbach memo of June 22 to President.

Tab B - Suggested Presidential statement for signature.

2012
33a
response to Pres.
the A

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 22, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Statement on Mexican Olympic Cultural Program

Recommendation:

That you sign the enclosed statement on American participation in the Mexican Olympic Cultural Program.

Discussion:

The Mexican Olympic Organizing Committee has invited the United States to participate in the Olympic Cultural Program this year. In response, the following have already been sent to Mexico or will be sent during 1968, under U. S. Government or private auspices:


The Phoenix Singers, La Salle Quartet, Duquesne University Tamburitians, Martha Graham Dancers, Merce Cunningham Dancers, a New Orleans jazz band, Duke Ellington's orchestra, and performers from the Newport Jazz Festival.

Exhibits on nuclear energy, space research, contemporary and traditional American art, Navajo sandpainting and weaving, children's art, philately, architectural design, and the history of the Olympic Games.

Films on the role of youth for the Olympic Film Festival, works of poetry for a poetry seminar, and works of sculpture for display at Olympic sites.

In addition, we understand that selected college and high school students will participate in a World Youth Camp to be held at Olympic Village in Mexico City. The United States may participate in additional events if funds become available.

In the near future, our Embassy in Mexico plans to issue a publicity kit describing American participation in the Olympic Cultural Program. Ambassador Freeman would like to introduce the kit with a statement from you, as Honorary President of the U. S. Olympic Committee, to ensure that Mexico and the other nations participating in the Olympics understand the importance this country gives to the goals of the Olympic Cultural Program. A suggested statement for your signature is enclosed.


Under Secretary

Enclosure:

Suggested Statement

Suggested Statement

On behalf of the American people, I wish to express our warm response to the invitation of the Mexican Olympic Organizing Committee to participate in the Mexican Olympic Cultural Program. It is highly appropriate that Mexico, a country unique in the wealth of its own cultural heritage, should restore to prominence the cultural phase of the Olympiad which has not, since classical times, received more than token recognition. We are delighted to join representatives of Mexico and other nations in celebrating man's intellectual and spiritual growth, as well as his athletic prowess.

In his ~~Third~~ State of the Union Address, on September 1, 1967, President Diaz Ordaz said that the Olympic Cultural Program "will enable the participants to form closer ties through their knowledge of each other's cultures, an area in which man's expression, independent of the color of his skin, his ideology, or degree of development, attains levels of manifest equality." We fully endorse this objective. Our congratulations and best wishes go to the Mexican people and to the Mexican Olympic Organizing Committee, for bringing to the world a new understanding of the meaning of the Olympic spirit.

Lyndon B. Johnson
Honorary President
United States Olympic Committee

If we have never learned it before, we humans would be wise to learn it now: we are brothers, we live in one world, and we will survive in peace on our planet only if we know and appreciate each other.

Accordingly, the revival of the cultural phase of the Olympiad is a significant occurrence. As President Diaz Ordaz has said about the Olympic Cultural Program: "it will enable the participants to form closer ties through their knowledge of each other's cultures, an area in which man's expression, independent of the color of his skin, his ideology, or degree of development, attains levels of manifest equality."

That is a noble goal, and an important one in our era.

It is highly appropriate that Mexico, a country of unique cultural wealth, should be the prime agent in restoring cultural activity to the Olympic agenda.

On behalf of Mexico's Northern neighbor, I want to express America's delight in being able to take part, with other nations of the world, in a great cultural event. May it bring to us all a new understanding of the meaning of the Olympic spirit.

LBJ/WGB:mm
July 2, 1968

Tuesday, July 2, 1968

for file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested Reply to Sato re Bonins Return

At Tab A is a suggested reply to Sato's letter to you (Tab B), expressing satisfaction at the return of the Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands to Japanese administration.

Especially since the Islands are now under Japanese administration, it seems appropriate and courteous for you to use the Japanese name for the Islands, as Sato does in his letter to you.

I recommend that you sign the suggested reply.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

cc: Mr. Jorden

AJenkins:mm

34a

July 2, 1968

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your warm letter on the occasion of the return of the Ogasawara Islands to Japanese administration. The spirit of harmony and cooperation with which this issue was resolved serves both to exemplify and to strengthen the close ties existing between Japan and the United States.

The agreement we have reached on the Ogasawara Islands gives me confidence in the future strength and durability of relations between our two countries.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

**His Excellency
Eisaku Sato
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo**

LBJ:State:AJenkins:mmm 7/2/68

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

35

Tuesday - July 2, 1968

Mr. President:

Since I fully share your conviction that no President of the United States has done more for Latin America than you, and received less credit for it, I decided to try to put the record on paper tersely and graphically for the general reader. I attach the product, with the hope that it tells the story as you would like to have it told.

WGB

W. G. Bowdler

Attachment

Mr. President:

Bill volunteered this:
It's a fine job. I believe
it should be made into a
pamphlet.

WWR

MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, July 1, 1968

8:00 p. m.

~~SECRET/HARVAN~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By 17, NARA, Date 3-2-99

We have just completed a meeting of almost two hours on Viet Nam negotiations of just the kind you wished us to have; General Taylor, as well as Secretary Rusk, Clark Clifford, Bill Bundy, etc., were present.

We:

- reviewed where we are in the negotiation, looking back to the beginning;
- considered what Averell and Cy should do on Wednesday;
- and looked further down the road.

The consensus was that our negotiators limit themselves on Wednesday to asking, essentially, this question: Are you willing to sit down and discuss in private with us a proposition in which:

- we would stop bombing; but before the bombing actually stops we achieved a clear understanding on actions that would follow;
- in the actions that would follow we can envisage some that would be applicable to both sides; some to one side; and some to the other;
- any time interval between the stopping of the bombing and the package of actions would have to be short;
- they would have to understand that aerial reconnaissance must continue after cessation of bombing.

We would tell them that if they were prepared to sit down on this basis we would be prepared at that time to put in concrete proposals.

In short, it was agreed that on Wednesday we would not actually put in concrete proposals, but simply ask them if they are prepared to talk on the basis of this structure which Zorin commended to us.

While we were talking, the attached cable came in to the Secretary from Vance. The general view was that paras. 1-10. A. were on the right track except that we must try to negotiate a delay of less than seven days. Something like 48 hours would be nearer right. There was strong resistance to an early implementation of paras. 10. B. and C. at this time. There was considerable

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN

-2-

discussion of the attacks on urban areas. Secretary Rusk wants them firmly brought into the conditions; Secretary Clifford feels that we can probably do without that assurance, relying on our own military capabilities to keep them from bombing Saigon too heavily.

We are putting our proposition on a quick turnaround to Paris tonight. In the light of what Cy says, we shall present a fairly unified view at lunch tomorrow for your final decision.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN attachment



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

36a

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FJL559

CONTROL: 175Q

RECEIVED: JULY 1, 1968
4:24 P.M.

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3748
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 17321

N O D I S/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 365

EYES ONLY TO THE SECRETARY FROM VANCE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By 14 NARA, Date 3-2-99

1. WE HAVE BEEN GIVING URGENT CONSIDERATION TO THE NEXT STAGE OF PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ON A TWO-PHASED APPROACH TO CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENT IN NVN AND THE RELATED RESTRAINTS.

2. WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT AND DESIRABLE TO PROCEED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSAL BETWEEN VANCE AND HA VAN LAU. AS WE HAVE SUGGESTED IN AN EARLIER CABLE, WE EXPECT THAT THIS DISCUSSION MAY NEED TO AWAIT LE DUC THO'S CONSULTATION IN HANOI (WITH STOPS AT MOSCOW AND PEKING). BUT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND THEREFORE WILL SEEK ANOTHER PRIVATE SESSION NOW IF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE WILLING.

3. WE HAVE ACCEPTED AS A PLANNING PRINCIPLE THE DIVISION OF THE PROPOSAL INTO TWO PARTS WHICH WE CALL PHASE 1 AND PHASE 2. ITS ORIGIN LIES IN THE EARLIER PHASE A-PHASE B PROPOSALS, BUT IT ALSO DRAWS SPECIFICALLY ON THE SUGGESTION PUT FORTH BY ZORIN AS AN ELABORATION OF THE FIRST PROPOSAL PUT TO HA VAN LAU.

4. IN SUM, WE WOULD PROPOSE TO PRESENT TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AN ELABORATION OF OUR FIRST SUGGESTION SO AS TO RELATE NORTH VIETNAMESE RESTRAINTS TO MUTUAL ACTIONS TAKEN IN PHASE 2, RATHER THAN TO OUR BOMBING CESSATION IN PHASE 1.

5. THERE IS PRESENTED BELOW OUR PRELIMINARY THINKING ON AN OUTLINE OF PHASE 2 ACTIONS. THESE ACTIONS ARE DIVIDED INTO FOUR CATEGORIES TO APPROXIMATE THE ZORIN OUTLINE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 17321 SECTION 1 OF 2, JULY 1 .

6. WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING THE DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, INCLUDING VIEWS DEPARTMENT MAY HAVE ON FALL-BACK POSITIONS WITHING THE BROAD OUTLINE OF ACTIONS LISTED BELOW.

OUTLINE BEGINS.

PHASE I .

7. WE PROPOSE THAT THE STATEMENT ON PHASE I BE AS FOLLOWS:
"THE UNITED STATES WOULD AGREE TO CEASE ALL AIR/NAVAL/ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT OR ANY OTHER ACTIVITIES THAT INVOLVE THE USE OF FORCE ON OR WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM ON A DATE TO BE COMMUNICATED TO THE DRV."

8. COMMENT: WE FEEL THE PHRASE, "ANY OTHER ACTIVITIES THAT INVOLVE...", SHOULD BE USED TO REPLACE THEIR PHRASE, "OTHER ACTS OF WAR." WE DOUBTELESSLY WILL HAVE TO THRASH OUT WITH THEM EACH OF THE ITEMS THEY HAVE LISTED AS "OTHER ACTS OF WAR." WE WILL INSIST UPON THE RIGHT OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE.

9. PRIOR TO THE EXECUTION OF PHASE I, A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING MUST BE REACHED ON THE ACTIONS AND COMMITMENTS IN PHASE 2. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE ACTIONS BELOW MAY NOT BE FULLY ATTAINABLE.

PHASE 2.

10. MILITARY ACTIVITIES: IT IS MUTUALLY UNDERSTOOD THAT BOTH SIDES WILL TAKE THE FOLLOQNG DIRECT AND RELATED MILITARY ACTIONS.

A. (1) DIRECT MILITARY ACTIONS BY BOTH SIDES RELATED TO THE DMZ:

(A) REMOVE ALL MILITARY FORCES FROM THE DMZ
(B) NO FIRE INTO/FROM OR ACROSS DMZ
(C) NO GROUND ATTACKS INTO OR ACROSS DMZ
(D) NO SUPPLIES OR EQUIPMENT WILL BE MOVED INTO OR THROUGH THE DMZ

(E) - NO INFILTRATION OR MOVEMENT OF ANY PERSONNEL WHATSOEVER WILL BE PERMITTED INTO/OR THROUGH THE DMZ

(2) RELATED MILITARY ACTIONS CONCERNING THE DMZ

(A) THE DIRECT MILITARY ACTIONS IN (A) THROUGH (E) ABOVE WILL GO INTO EFFECT AT 1200 HOURS ON THE 7TH DAY FOLLOWING EXECUTION OF PHASE I.

(B) BOTH SIDES WILL ACCEPT AN AUGMENTED ICC TO INSPECT AND VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THESE ACTIONS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-3- PARIS 17321 SECTION 1 OF 2, JULY 1

COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THAT THE FOREGOING ARE IN LARGE PART MEASURABLE
THEY WILL IMPEDE, THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY STOP, ALL ENEMY MOVEMENT
INTO AND THROUGH THE DMZ. THEY ARE A REAL TEST OF ENEMY INTENTIONS

AND, IF SUCCESSFULLY VERIFIED, WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH THE
PRESIDENT'S 31 MARCH DECLARATION. CONCURRENTLY, THEY DO NOT
SACRIFICE GVN SOVEREIGNTY. A KEY FACTOR IS AN EFFECTIVE VERI-
FICATION SYSTEM. THROUGH CANADA, WE MUST CAREFULLY PLAN THE ROLE
OF THE ICC TO INSURE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS. THE QUESTION OF
AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF THE DMZ SHOULD NOT BE TREATED
SEPARATELY FROM OVERALL RECONNAISSANCE OF NVN.

BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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OO RUEHC

DE RUFNCR 17321/2 1832005

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 011725Z JUL 68

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3749

STATE GRNC

BT

SECRET FINAL SECTION OF 2 PARIS 17321

N O D I S/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 365

EYES ONLY TO THE SECRETARY FROM VANCE

B. DIRECT MILITARY ACTION RELATING TO LEVEL OF FORCES:

(1) THE US AND DRV AGREE NOT TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF THEIR MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SVN EXISTING AT THE CESSATION OF THE BOMBING. (NO)

(2) NEITHER PARTY WILL ALTER THE DESIGNATION AND OVERALL COMPOSITION OF THEIR MILITARY UNITS IN SVN FROM THAT DATE. (NO)

COMMENT: WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS DEFINITION DOES NOT CONSTRAIN THE LEVEL OF INFILTRATION TO 1967 LEVELS, BUT WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW WE CAN LOGICALLY OR REALISTICALLY ARGUE FOR THE 1967 INFILTRATION LEVEL UNDER THE MUTUAL ASPECTS IMPLICIT IN THE PHASE 2 CONCEPT. THIS WOULD, OF COURSE, FREEZE ICC AT THE LEVELS EXISTING ON THE DATE OF THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THE ABOVE FORMULATION WOULD, HOWEVER, LEAVE THE GVN FREE TO INCREASE ITS FORCE LEVELS.

C. DIRECT MILITARY ACTIONS RELATED TO WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES.

(1) WITHDRAW TOKEN FORCE OF 5,000 SOLDIERS EACH FROM QUANG TRI PROVINCE OUT OF SVN. WITHDRAWAL TO BE VERIFIED BY ICC OR BILATERALLY AND TO BE CONDUCTED WITHIN 7 DAYS AFTER CESSATION (US FORCES OUT OF SVN, NVN FORCES TO NVN).

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-2- PARIS 17321 SECTION 2 OF 2, JULY 1

(2) REPEAT ABOVE EACH WEEK FOR MINIMUM 1 MONTH AS CONTINUING EVIDENCE OF GOOD FAITH.

COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THAT THE ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, EVEN THOUGH AT TOKEN LEVELS, WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP. ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS, IT APPEARS TO BE AN ACCEPTABLE MILITARY COURSE OF ACTION.

OTHER RELATED ACTIONS:

11. THE US ASSUMES THAT THE DRV WILL NOT CONDUCT INDISCRIMINATE ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACKS AGAINST URBAN AREAS OF SVN.

COMMENT: THIS MAY BE DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF NO EXPLICIT TRADE-OFF, BUT WE BELIEVED ITS WORTH TRYING.

12. EXCHANGE OF POW'S

A. EACH SIDE WILL INSURE THAT THE ICRC HAS A CURRENT AND VALID LIST OF ALL PRISONERS OF WAR; AND THAT SUCH LIST WILL BE KEPT CURRENT AND UP TO DATE.

B. EACH SIDE WILL PROMPTLY EXCHANGE SICK AND WOUNDED POW'S.

C. EACH SIDE WILL PERMIT UNRESTRICTED VISITS TO POW'S AND POW CAMPS.

D. EACH SIDE WILL PERMIT AND ASSIST IN THE PROMPT DELIVERY OF MAIL AND PARCELS TO POW'S.

E. EACH SIDE WILL PROMPTLY RETURN BODIES OF DECEASED POW'S.

F. A THROUGH E ABOVE TO BE EFFECTIVE 7 DAYS AFTER CESSATION AND BE COMPLETED WITHIN 21 DAYS AFTER EXECUTION PHASE 1.

COMMENT: THE LEGAL STAFF WILL HAVE TO WRITE IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEFINITION OF POW. WE BELIEVE IT IS PREMATURE IN PHASE 2 TO SEEK EXCHANGE OF ALL POW'S.

13. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.

A. AGREE TO OPEN TALKS WITHOUT DELAY IN WHICH BOTH SIDES ARE FREE TO RAISE ANY ELEMENT OR TOPIC RELEVANT TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. DURING THESE TALKS, OUR SIDE WILL INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM AND THE UNITED STATES.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- PARIS 17321 SECTION 2 OF 2 JULY 1

B. ALTERNATIVELY, WE COULD AGREE THAT BILATERAL TALKS WILL CONTINUE ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTERESTS TO THE TWO PARTIES.

COMMENT: THE ALTERNATIVES ABOVE LEAVE TO THE DEPARTMENT THE DETERMINATION WHETHER WE WISH TO MOVE QUICKLY TO A MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK. WE NEED THE DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE ON THIS QUESTION. WE WOULD NOT SPECIFY WHAT REPRESENTATION THE DRV MAY WANT UNDER THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE. VANCE

BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

37

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - July 1, 1968 - 8:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

With respect to your inquiry about the alleged economic crisis in Central America, these are the facts:

1. The Central Americans recently negotiated a protocol to the Common Market Agreement increasing import duties by 30%.
2. Nicaragua was the first to ratify. Fearing that its importers would take advantage of the slowness of other countries to put the import surcharge into effect, President Somoza instituted a very careful check of trucks crossing the frontier, particularly along the border with Costa Rica.
3. State advises that this problem peaked last weekend and Somoza has begun to relax the strict border check. State also suspects that part of Somoza's tactic was to force the other CACM members to ratify the protocol quickly so that the 30% surcharge would have uniform effect throughout the Common Market.

We will keep a close eye on this matter, and let you know if it appears to deteriorate.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-5
By ju, NARA, Date 5-29-92

38

INFORMATION

Monday, July 1, 1968 - 7:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Clark reports his
good work with the press.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Pres file

38a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1968

The President
The White House


Dear Mr. President:

In furtherance of your request that we spread the gospel, I met with the Overseas Writers for luncheon on Friday. I would estimate there were over one hundred of them present.

I spoke for twenty minutes on Vietnam and answered questions for forty-five minutes. There were two or three questions on the ABM Sentinel System, a personal question or two about the President, and all the rest of the time was devoted to Vietnam. It was interesting to me to note that with this group of writers the question of overriding importance is still Vietnam.

On Wednesday of this week, I am having a backgrounder for the 35 or 40 of the regular Pentagon press corps. I shall endeavor each week to set an additional conference in our continued effort to convert the heathen.

Respectfully yours,


Clark M. Clifford

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - July 1, 1968 -- 7:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached is the list of invitees to the Barrientos luncheon which you approved several days ago. Before passing it on to Bess Abell, I wanted to check whether it still reflected your views.

Walt Rostow

Approve ☐

Disapprove ☐

Call me ☐

Attachment

List of invitees to Barrientos luncheon.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 9-1-92

Luncheon Invitation List

Bolivian Party

President Rene Barrientos

Julio Sanjines-Goytia - Ambassador of Bolivia

Tomas Guillermo Elio - Minister of Foreign Relations

Jose Romero Loza - Minister of Finance

Jorge Solis - Minister of Rural Affairs

Armando Escobar - Mayor of La Paz

Brigadier General - David La Fuente, Chief of the Army

Col. Alberto Guzman - Chief Military Aide.

United States

Assistant Secretary Covey Oliver

Ambassador Douglas Henderson

Ambassador Edward Clark

Walt W. Rostow

William G. Bowdler

40a

(7-1-68)

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE

Saturday - July 6

7:00 a.m.	-	Leave Texas
8:50 a.m.	-	Arrive San Salvador
8:50 - 9:20 a.m.	-	Airport Ceremony
9:20 - 10:20 a.m.	-	Motorcade to ODECA Hq.
10:30 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.	-	Working Session of Presidents
1:00 - 3:00 p.m.	-	Lunch hosted by ODECA SYG
3:00 - 5:00 p.m.	-	Rest period.
5:00 - 6:00 p.m.	-	Ceremony at LBJ Public School
6:00 - 8:00 p.m.	-	Open
8:00 p.m.	-	State Dinner

Sunday - July 7

9:00 - 10:00 a.m.	-	Mass at Cathedral or Archbishop's Palace.
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Sunday - July 7 - continued

-2-

11:00 a.m.	-	Leave San Salvador
1:00 p.m.	-	Arrive San Jose
1:00 - 1:50 p.m.	-	Airport ceremony
1:55 p.m.	-	Leave San Jose
2:40 p.m.	-	Arrive Managua
2:40 - 3:30 p.m.	-	Airport ceremony
3:35 p.m.	-	Leave Managua
4:25 p.m.	-	Arrive San Pedro Sula
4:25 - 5:15 p.m.	-	Airport ceremony
5:20 p.m.	-	Leave San Pedro Sula
5:55 p.m.	-	Arrive Guatemala City
5:55 - 6:45 p.m.	-	Airport ceremony
6:50 p.m.	-	Leave Guatemala City for US
(10:40 p.m.,	-	Arrive Bergstrom AFB
(
(or		or
(
(<u>Monday, July 8</u> 12:50 am-		Arrive Andrews AFB.

40

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday - July 1, 1968 - 7:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

Herewith the schedule for your Central American trip, adjusted to meet the points you made this morning to Bill Bowdler.

We have decided to reverse the order of the airport stops to begin with San Jose, Costa Rica. At this time of year, the San Jose airport is more frequently than not unusable after 1:00 p.m. because of heavy cloud cover.

Bob Sayre advises from San Salvador that the Central Americans will be very disappointed if you do not stay on Sunday and give a return reception. He is sending up their views in more detail, with suggestions for a Sunday schedule, if you decide to spend the whole day and leave on Monday.

Before reaching a decision on the schedule, I suggest you wait until we see his message.

W. W. Rostow

P.S. Amb. Castro called to express his deepest concern over a Sunday departure.

Attachment

Adjusted schedule for trip.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

From J.C.
ACTION

Monday, July 1, 1968
4:45 p. m.

41

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a proposed note of regret to the Soviet Union, designed to achieve the early retrieval of the DC-8.

It has been cleared by Sect. Rusk and Under Sect. Katzenbach.

Attachment

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

41a

The Department of State refers to the note of July 1, 1968, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning a violation of Soviet airspace by an American DC-8 aircraft on July 1, 1968, in the area of the Kurile Islands. The Ministry's note states that the aircraft was intercepted by Soviet aircraft and landed on Iturup Island.

According to information available to the United States Government, a DC-8 airliner, registry No. N8631SB, owned by Seaboard World Airways, en route from Seattle, Washington to Yokota, Japan, inadvertently entered Soviet airspace at approximately the time and place mentioned in the Ministry's note.

The United States Government is unable to explain with any certainty the causes of this violation, in the light of the new and more stringent procedures which were introduced last year in order to prevent inadvertent entry by U. S. aircraft into Soviet airspace along the route from Alaska to Japan where air navigation is difficult. The United States will take every precaution possible to prevent any future violation of Soviet airspace in this area. The United States Government expresses its official regrets to the Soviet Government for this inadvertent entry into Soviet airspace and requests that the passengers, crew and aircraft be ^{released} ~~returned~~ as speedily as possible ~~to the~~ ~~United States~~.

Department of State

Washington

Pres file

42

SECRET

**Monday, July 1, 1968
3:55 p. m.**

MR. PRESIDENT:

These two cables indicate the state of the track on the downed aircraft.

An apology and prompt release of the aircraft seem in order.

I understand State will have a proposed response very soon.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc/cb*, NARA, Date 8-22-01

Davis
42a

~~SECRET~~ ~~LIMDIS~~

RECEIVED
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1968 JUL 1 17 49

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 04464 011733Z

54 42
ACTION SS 70

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CIAE 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, /070 W

Z 011657Z JUL 68
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8890

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 4464

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: KURILE PLANE INCIDENT

REF: MOSCOW 4463

FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION NOTE HANDED ME BY KUZNETSOV THIS
EVENING:

BEGIN QTE MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS USSR ON INSTRUCTION SOVIET
GOVERNMENT FIRMLY PROTESTS TO EMBASSY USA FOR TRANSMITTAL
GOVERNMENT USA CONCERNING THIS NEW FACT OF VIOLATION OF STATE
FRONTIERS OF USSR BY AMERICAN AIRCRAFT.

ACCORDING TO PRECISELY ESTABLISHED DATA, ON JULY ONE AT ONE HOUR
THIRTY-SIX MINUTES MOSCOW TIME AN AIRCRAFT OF USA, TYPE DC-3,
ENTERED THE AIR SPACE OF USSR IN AREA OF KURILE ISLANDS AND
CONTINUED ITS FLIGHT IN THIS AREA FOR A LONG TIME; IN CONNECTION
HEREWITH IT WAS INTERCEPTED BY SOVIET AIRCRAFT GUARDING FRONTIERS
AND WAS LANDED AT TWO HOURS FORTY MINUTES ON THE ISLAND OF ITURUP.

ON BOARD THE AIRCRAFT WERE 230 AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL AND
16 CREW MEMBERS; THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES.

AT PRESENT TIME A FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES
CONNECTED WITH VIOLATION BY THIS AMERICAN AIRCRAFT OF SOVIET
FRONTIERS IS UNDER WAY.

THOMPSON

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~LIMDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc/ab*, NARA, Date *8-22-01*

1950 JUL 1 17 40

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS~~SECRET~~

HCE002

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 04463 011729Z

49

ACTION SS 70

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CIAE 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, /070 W

Z 011655Z JUL 68
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8889~~SECRET~~ 4463

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: KURILE PLANE INCIDENT

1. AT 7 PM KUZNETSOV HANDED ME NOTE ON KURILE PLANE INCIDENT. TRANSLATION IN FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.
2. I REMINDED HIM OF REQUEST I HAD MADE THIS MORNING FOR RELEASE OF CREW AND MEN. I ADDED THAT I WAS SEEN THAT NO VIOLATION OF SOVIET TERRITORY WAS INTENDED AND THAT WE WOULD REGRET ANY THAT HAD OCCURRED.
3. KUZNETSOV SAID HE HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO THE NOTE BUT WENT ON TO SAY THAT SECRETARY RUSK IN TALKING TO DOBRYIN HAD SAID IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT VIOLATION HAD OCCURRED. HE SAID SOVIET INFORMATION WAS EXACT AND THAT THEY EXPECTED REPLY TO THEIR NOTE. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE WAS SURE I REALIZED THEY DID NOT WISH TO DO ANYTHING TO WORSEN OUR RELATIONS.
4. KORNIENKO WHO WAS PRESENT FOLLOWED ME OUT AND SAID IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO HAVE APPROPRIATE REPLY QUICKLY. HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN PREVIOUS MINOR VIOLATIONS OF SOVIET AIRSPACE IN THIS AREA BUT THIS ONE HAD GONE ON FOR A VERY LONG TIME AND COULD NOT BE IGNORED.
5. IT IS CLEAR THAT SOVIETS EXPECT FORMAL APOLOGY. I UNDERSTAND FROM PRESS THAT WE HAVE INFORMATION FROM RADAR STATION IN JAPAN INDICATING VIOLATION. WITH PUEBLO IN MIND I SUGGEST WE TRANSMIT PROMPT EXPRESSION OF REGRET BUT REFER TO SUBSTANTIATING INFORMATION.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By JE/CB, NARA, Date 8-22-01

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 1, 1968
3:50 p. m.

P file
43

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a rundown on those to whom special
press invitations were issued and those who
attended the signing this morning.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

43a

July 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Specially Invited Press

Of the 15 press people specially invited, 4 were present; 3 said they would be there but were not seen; Geyelin said he would try to make it; 4 were abroad or out of the city and 3 were invited but did not commit themselves to come.

The rundown on each is:

Katherine Graham - accepted; said she definitely planned to attend. Police did not check her in as actually coming.

Crosby Noyes - travelling; out of town.

Drew Pearson - Invitation extended through his secretary; did not make commitment.

Joe Kraft - Out of the country.

John Steele - Accepted; we did not see in the East Room.

Jack Sutherland - Present.

Boyd France - Invitation extended through his secretary; did not make commitment.

James Reston - In New York; invitation extended but no commitment.

Russ Wiggins - In Maine; invitation extended.

Philip Geyelin - He said he would try to make it.

Lack Leacacos - Present.

Charles Bartlett - Accepted; we did not see in the East Room.

Joseph Alsop - Present.

Lloyd Norman - Present.

Richard Wilson - Invitation extended; no commitment.

(Some newsmen attended in the East Room but did not go through the Receiving Line or stay for the reception. The Police have no record of newsmen admitted with a White House pass -- so we could not check them on entry record.)


Nathaniel Davis

44

INFORMATION

~~SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

for file

Monday, July 1, 1968 -- 3:30 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith, literally EYES ONLY for
you, Sec. Rusk's conversation today with
Abm. Dobrynin.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 9-28-92

INFORMATION

Monday, July 1, 1968 -- 3:00 p.m.

Per file

Mr. President:

I sent your speech, with a note saying the President wished me to forward it, to the following:

Charles Bartlett
Philip Potter
Boyd France
Tom Lambert
Tom Vall
David Brinkley
Marvin Kalb
Rescoe Drummond
Robert Spivack
Joseph Alsop
Clayton Fritchey
Creeby Noyes
Max Frankel
David Lawrence
Kenneth L. Fox

John Steele
Lloyd Norman
James Reston
Robert Donovan
John Scall
John Hightower
William S. White
William Stringer
Jack Leacacos
Joe Kraft
Phil Geyelin
Carl Rowan
Richard L. Wilson
Drew Pearson

W. W. Rostow

WWRestow:rla

Pres file

46

SECRET

Monday, July 1, 1968
2:55 p. m.

7:30

MR. PRESIDENT:

There's even a little progress on Cyprus,
as the attached indicates.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By mg, NARA, Date 9-28-92

46a

~~SECRET~~

July 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: The Cyprus Situation Improves

This is just to bring you up to date on one of our perennial problems. The situation in Cyprus is the best since inter-communal fighting broke out in December 1963, and we may be seeing some real progress towards a peaceful settlement.

After extended haggling about sites for talks and UN participation, Turkish Communal Chamber President Denktash and House of Representatives President Clerides have settled down to unsupervised substantive discussions in Nicosia. Both negotiators are going out of their way to make friendly gestures, and both sides have made it clear that anything the other wants to bring up will be discussed. So far, they are dealing with symptoms--road blocks and the like--rather than basic issues such as the status of the Turkish Cypriot community.

Neither Athens nor Ankara is trying to manage these negotiations, but they are giving encouragement and working on the international aspects of the problem. Last week, the British, Turkish, Greek and Cypriot foreign ministers agreed that union with Greece is no longer an alternative, and they planned for secret four power talks when the Clerides-Denktash negotiations end. Another encouraging sign is the progress Greece and Turkey are making on the Greco-Turkish difficulties which aren't related to Cyprus.

The picture is hopeful, but we are still a long way from a permanent Cyprus settlement. Working out effective constitutional guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots will be the major difficulty. Violence continues on the island, and another major incident is still possible. The negotiations were arranged despite the murders of Turks by Greek police. In the negotiations themselves, Clerides has been exceeding his instructions, and if Makarios overrules him the Turks will see Greek trickery. On the Turkish side, Denktash feels powerful enough to negotiate without always checking with Vice President Kuchuk and this could lead to an intensification of the power struggle in the Turkish community.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-284
By js, NARA, Date 1-3-03

JW
John W. Foster

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - July 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: San Salvador Preparations

47
✓
2. Per file

This is how substantive preparations are moving forward:

On the Central American side, their Foreign Ministers will meet in San Salvador tomorrow, July 2, to do the overall planning. They will review three aspects of the visit:

1. The program for the visit. (We have sent them our ideas -- Tab A -- and they seem generally acceptable.)
2. The structuring of the one working session. (Our view on how this should be done is at Tab B. Bob Sayre, who went on the advance party, will try to get concurrence of the Foreign Ministers.)
3. The Declaration of San Salvador. (State has given us a preliminary draft -- Tab C -- which has the substance of what we want, although it will need reworking.)

The Central American Economic Ministers meet in San Jose, Costa Rica on Thursday, July 4, to iron out some difference arising from a recent decision to apply a substantial import surtax.

The Central American Presidents meet in San Salvador on Friday, July 5, to go over last minute preparations for your arrival.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

On our side, I am having two major speeches prepared. One will deal with subregionalism and regionalism as building blocks in the movement toward a federal system of world organization. The Central American Common Market (CACM) will serve as the springboard for the speech. The best setting would be the working session on Saturday afternoon with your Central American colleagues who will cover in their statements accomplishments and projections of the CACM by sectors.

The second speech would be on education and the need to make formal training relevant to the aspirations and needs of a changing world. Into this we would weave the pilot project on ETV which will start in El Salvador. The natural forum for this speech would be the Lyndon B. Johnson Public School, built with Alliance for Progress funds, which you will visit on Sunday afternoon.

The Declaration of San Salvador will be divided into three parts:

- CACM accomplishments;
- CACM future action; and
- Pledge of US support.

The US pledge section involves \$76.8 million, of which \$46.8 million represents money in hand for loans authorized, but not announced. The other \$30 million would come from FY 1969 money. The \$76.8 million breaks down into \$30 million for the Central American Integration Fund to accelerate completion of the basic regional road network and to create a Central American Regional Telecommunications System -- i.e., physical integration. The remaining \$46.8 million covers seven loans, primarily for agriculture and education, of which each country receives at least one loan.

The two speeches, plus the Declaration of San Salvador, gives you an attractive and meaningful package for the trip.

We are making arrangements for you to meet with the Central American Ambassadors after the NPT ceremony this morning. I recommend you cover with them:

1. The schedule of Central American preparatory meetings:

 Tuesday - Foreign Ministers at San Salvador.
 Thursday - Economic Ministers at San Jose.
 Friday - Presidents at San Salvador.
2. Our suggested program for the visit -- Tab A.
3. The structuring of the Presidential working session -- Tab B.
4. The outline of the Declaration of San Salvador, without the "happy surprises" -- Tab C.
5. Your plan to stop in each capital on the return trip.
6. Your offer to take them and their wives on Air Force One on Saturday, or put a plane at their disposal if they wish to fly down as a group on Thursday or Friday.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

- Tab A - Program for Presidential visit.
- Tab B - Structuring of working session.
- Tab C - Draft of the Declaration of San Salvador.

47a

A

Tentative Schedule

Saturday, July 6

- Noon arrival.
- Motorcade from airport to Presidential Palace.
- Lunch at ODECA headquarters.
- Meeting of Presidents at ODECA headquarters.
- State Dinner given by President of El Salvador.

Sunday, July 7

- Mass at Cathedral.
- Lunch at suitable finca (plantation).
- Visit to an AFP project.
- Return reception offered by President Johnson.

Monday, July 8

- Depart San Salvador for the US, going via each of the other Central American capitals to return the President and participate in brief airport ceremony.
- The order of stops would be:

Guatemala City
San Pedro Sula
Managua
San Jose.

47c

B

47d

Tab B

Structuring of Single Working Session

of the Presidents

Saturday, July 6 - 3:30 p.m.

(3 hours)

1. Opening Remarks b - ODECA Secretary General.
2. Review of CACM performance - President Sanchez of El Salvador.
3. CACM social accomplishments and projections - President Mendez Montenegro of Guatemala.
4. CACM agricultural accomplishments and projections - President Somoza of Nicaragua.
5. CACM educational accomplishments and projections - President Trejos of Costa Rica.
6. Central American security - President Lopez of Honduras.
7. Subregionalism and regionalism as building blocks in achieving a more stable peace based on social justice and economic progress - President Johnson.

47e

C

DRAFT DECLARATION OF SAN SALVADOR

The Presidents of the Central American States meeting as the Supreme Council of the Organization of Central American States and the President of the United States met in San Salvador, El Salvador,

INSPIRED by the principles of the Alliance for Progress, expressed in the Charter of Punta del Este, and of the General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration of 1960, which created the Central American Common Market,

DETERMINED that the supreme goals of social justice and freedom from want shall be achieved in the shortest possible time,

CONVINCED of the need to attain greater unification of the Central American states,

RECALLED their meeting with President Johnson at Punta del Este in April 1967 at which time they discussed an ACTION PROGRAM to accelerate the economic and social development of the countries of the Central American region,

REVIEWED the progress that the countries of Central America have made in reaching the goals of this ACTION PROGRAM, and

RESOLVED to set forth with renewed dedication specific programs to accelerate the pace of regional cooperation and thereby improve the living standards of the people of Central America.

I. Economic Integration

The Presidents of the Central American countries reviewed the progress and growth of the Central American Common Market, which in a short seven-year period has increased trade between the five member countries by over 600%. They noted, with satisfaction, that the high rates of per capita growth in income, which prevailed up to 1967, were in part the result of the process of economic integration.

large

II. Regional Cooperation for Multinational Infrastructure Projects

THE PRESIDENTS OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REPUBLICS noted the work of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration and expressed satisfaction at the pace of implementation of multinational infrastructure projects which are providing the physical means to bind the economies of Central America more closely together.

The Presidents recalled the special impetus given to this effort by President Johnson who signed the first U.S. loan of \$35 million in July 1965. This loan, augmented by the contributions of the Central American States, created the Central American Integration Fund.

THE CENTRAL AMERICAN INTEGRATION FUND, administered by the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, has made possible the completion of the necessary feasibility and engineering studies for a basic transportation network to connect the Central American States and facilitate access to the important deep-water ports and, in addition, has financed the implementation of 24 projects costing \$81 million.

III. Regional Cooperation for Social and Political Development

THE PRESIDENTS OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN STATES also reviewed the substantial growth in regional institutions and regional cooperation for the social and political betterment of the peoples of the Central American republics.

The Organization of Central American States (ODECA) has sponsored a program which, with United States financial support, has provided over 8.7 million textbooks to school children in each of the five countries.

The Superior Council of Central American Universities (CSUCA) is moving to create a regional university system, and with United States technical assistance has significantly modernized the teaching of the basic sciences in the existing Central American universities.

Under the auspices of ODECA, and with the assistance of the United States, the Ministers of Health of the five countries have cooperated in mounting a coordinated regional attack on malaria.

Under the auspices of ODECA, a regional program has been established to extend basic health services to the rural areas of the member countries and which to date has provided services to more than one million rural families.

Under the auspices of ODECA, a Council of Public Health has been established to coordinate a massive attack on health problems common to the five countries. Programs to establish uniform standards and policies for food and drug control, train health personnel, and control communicable disease are underway.

Through the mechanism of the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration (SIECA), the five Central American countries have moved to carry out an agreement to coordinate and stabilize prices of the basic food grains.

IV. Future Action

The Presidents of the Central American countries proclaimed their determination to take further steps both to perfect the process of economic integration and to accelerate the social, economic and political development of their countries. To this end they pledged themselves to seek to accomplish the following:

1. augment the resources of the Central American Fund for Economic Integration to complete the basic transportation network of the Central American region and establish a Central American Telecommunications System.
2. ratify the protocol of San José in order to provide new budgetary resources to the member states to finance expanded development programs.
3. complete the process of ratification of the protocol concerning fiscal incentives for new industries.

4. provide increased investment resources for programs to expand agricultural productivity and marketing and to modernize the life of the rural populations.
5. embark on substantial new programs to extend educational opportunity to those now lacking such services, with special attention to the improvement and modernization of curricula and the creation of a free secondary and vocational educational service.
6. negotiate, at an early date, a protocol to provide for the free movement of persons throughout the Central American region.

For his part, President Johnson of the United States agreed to support these new efforts, and to this end has authorized the negotiation of new loans totalling \$76.8 million as follows:

- a \$30 million loan to the Central American Integration Fund to accelerate the completion of the basic regional transportation network, and to create a Central American Regional Telecommunications System.
- Seven loans totalling \$46.8 million primarily for agriculture and education projects as follows:
 - a pilot Instructional Television System in El Salvador;
 - a program to improve Guatemala's primary education system and extend it into the rural areas of the country;
 - a program to increase food production and marketing facilities in Honduras;
 - programs to increase food production and expand rural electric cooperatives in Nicaragua, and
 - development of agro-industries in Costa Rica through assistance to the private sector.

Mr. Rostow

48
H. S. S. /
2. P. S. file

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Abe Feinberg--6:15 p.m., Tuesday, July 2.

You may wish to be sure Abe knows about the \$25 million credit you approved over the weekend so Israel wouldn't have to pay cash for the four Hawk missile batteries it's buying.

You might also wish to give him a glimpse of our current concern that the Arab-Israeli issue will soon be thrown back into the UN Security Council. We're not trying to scare anyone. But it might be worth paving the way for whatever talk George Ball may have with the Israelis.

Our main point is that we're not going to repeat 1957. We understand that the Israelis want to hold out for a real agreement this time, and we're not going to push them off that position.

But we do think they have a responsibility to get substantive talks going. We think they could be more flexible about putting some ideas about the terms of a settlement on the table--rather than holding out for direct negotiations with the Egyptians at the outset. We don't want to do their thinking for them, but as I told Eppie Evron, we expect them to "find their own equivalent of March 31st" to break the stalemate.

What's at stake is not just another unpleasant session in the UN, though that could damage our peace-making efforts. The real problem is that our position throughout the Middle East will remain on dead center until we make some progress toward a settlement. Israel depends on our position and has some responsibility to help us maintain it.

You have your own answer on F-4s. Our general feeling is that we'd give the wrong signal to release them except in connection with a serious simultaneous effort to get peace talks started.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68 vol. 21, #311
By jc NARA Date 8-22-01

Monday, July 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Saudi Crown Prince--11:30 a.m. Tuesday, July 2.

Your main reason in seeing Crown Prince Khalid is to reassure King Faisal of our continued friendship. Faisal is disillusioned by what he considers our support for Israel. He fears we have washed our hands of the Middle East.

The Crown Prince is less strong than Faisal. But he is intelligent and can talk substance if you get him going. I suggest the following leads:

1. You have the highest respect for King Faisal. You recall with pleasure his visit here. You continue to regard him as one of your best friends in the Middle East. How is he?
2. You know that the King is deeply concerned about Israel's continued occupation of Arab territory. You want him to know that we are doing everything we can to bring about a settlement that the Arabs as well as the Israelis would find honorable. This hasn't been easy, but a fair settlement remains our objective. Would he like to say anything about this?
3. You have just had a good talk with the Shah of Iran and would like to hear about the Shah's recent stopover in Saudi Arabia. You would be interested in anything the Crown Prince has to say about the future of Saudi Arabian relations in the Persian Gulf.
4. You would like to explain your purposes in South Vietnam and at the Paris talks. (The Saudis are interested because they see our steadfastness in Vietnam as a measure of how seriously we'd stick by the security assurances we have given Saudi Arabia over the years.)
5. You hope the Crown Prince has received all the medical help he wished. (He had a routine medical checkup at Bethesda last week.)

The Crown Prince had dinner at the White House with President Roosevelt in September 1943 when he was here with then Foreign Minister Faisal as an advisor. One ice-breaker might be to ask him about that or to recall yourself a little bit about President Roosevelt at that time.

The Crown Prince speaks only Arabic. An interpreter, Luke Battle, and his Country Director, will be available.

~~SECRET~~



9156

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 22, 1968

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Saudi Crown Prince
Khalid Ibn Abd al-Aziz

The enclosed briefing material contains the lines it is suggested the President use in his meeting with the Saudi Crown Prince.

The Crown Prince is a traditionalist whose habits, customs and attitudes are reminiscent of the older and simpler but disappearing life of the desert-dwelling Arab. He has not had great political responsibilities but is slated to become King, a man with whom we shall want to have close relations. Somewhat shy, the Prince is not voluble in formal conversations but becomes more animated in an atmosphere of friendly, informal talks.

A biographic sketch of Prince Khalid is enclosed.

John F. Walsh
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Briefing Paper
2. Biographic Sketch

SECRET
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7L 9 91-366
By isply, NARA, Date 10-5-92

~~SECRET~~

BRIEFING PAPER

Subject: Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia,
Khalid Ibn Abd al-Aziz

The US interest in the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia was first expressed by President Truman and has been reaffirmed in varying terms and intent by each succeeding administration. Behind these assurances lies our considerable economic and political interest in Saudi Arabia. There are now almost 7,000 Americans living and working in the country and the Aramco oil investment is the largest single private investment outside the US.

Our primary interest in the current visit here of Saudi Crown Prince Khalid is to convey to him, and through him to King Faisal, a sense of the continuing US interest in, and friendship for, Saudi Arabia. In this connection, Khalid himself accompanied Faisal as a senior advisor when the latter visited here as Foreign Minister in September, 1943 and was entertained at dinner by President Roosevelt. In his toast on that occasion, President Roosevelt said: "We have much in common. We both love liberty--both Nations".

Today King Faisal is concerned over what he regards as a US policy of support for Israel without regard for US traditional friendship for some of the Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia. His annoyance with us has recently been manifest in a number of ways, such as ordering Saudi abstention at the UNGA on the NPT issue, apparently in response to our abstention on the Jerusalem resolution. Faisal has also refused so far to release to us a portion of a space capsule which fell on Saudi territory and our Ambassador describes him generally as "in a bad mood due to Arab/Israel developments". Prince Khalid is in close contact with King Faisal and will no doubt report to him promptly his impressions of the warmth of his reception here. Faisal often asserts that he believes the US is becoming increasingly disinterested in the Arab Near East

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
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Authority 7129 91364
By copying NARA, Date 105-12

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2

and is hyper-sensitive to any signs which he might see as evidence of a diminishing regard for Saudi Arabia.

Nevertheless, Faisal still places great value on his relationship with the US despite our role as Israel's closest and most powerful friend. The Saudis need to be reassured of our understanding of their efforts to develop their country and by occasional signs of our sympathy for their legitimate aspirations as the leading power on the Arabian Peninsula.

The Saudi establishment has long given tacit support to US actions in Viet Nam. Ambassador Eilts has discussed the subject with Crown Prince Khalid. The Crown Prince has expressed some concern to our Ambassador that the USG might surrender South Viet Nam by working out a compromise at the Paris talks. Saudi interest in this matter springs from their anxiety over the credibility of the limited security assurances the USG has given Saudi Arabia over the years. These assurances have ranged from general statements of interest in Saudi Arabia's well being to fairly specific declarations of "full support for the maintenance of Saudi Arabia's integrity" as expressed in President Kennedy's letter of October 25, 1962.

On other issues, Crown Prince Khalid has expressed interest in Persian Gulf developments. He has confirmed to us that the Shah had a cordial private meeting with King Faisal in Jidda on June 3 and believes that the two monarchs should be able to work out existing problems. He would be interested in your own comments regarding the Shah's talks here on this subject.

Crown Prince Khalid is having a routine medical checkup at the Bethesda Naval Hospital on June 27. We have also arranged for an examination of his son, Prince Abdullah, at that time. You may wish to inquire regarding the Prince's health and express the hope that our Navy doctors will be able to recommend appropriate private treatment for Abdullah.

~~SECRET~~

49c

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Khalid Ibn 'Abd al-Aziz al-Sa'ud

Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia
Deputy Prime Minister

Khalid ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Sa'ud was appointed Crown Prince on 29 March 1965 and now is in line to succeed King Faisal. He has held the post of Deputy Prime Minister since 31 October 1962. Prince Khalid is the fourth surviving son of the late King 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud and is respected by his brothers for his close contact with the tribal leaders and for his adherence to a more modest, less extravagant mode of life than the majority of the royal family. Before becoming Crown Prince he did not have a reputation for intelligence, decisiveness or other leadership qualities. However the appointment has thrust Prince Khalid into more of a pivot position between the contending factions of the royal family.

Amir Khalid was born about 1913. His mother was a member of the Jiluwi family, governors of the Eastern province. Khalid received the usual private tutoring in Riyadh. During the brief war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 1934 he held the titles of Minister of the Interior and Acting Prime Minister, and was the Saudi representative at the ensuing peace negotiations in Taif. Khalid served as acting viceroy of the Hejaz in Faisal's absence in 1932, 1937 and 1939. He accompanied Faisal to the UK in 1939 and to the US in 1943. Khalid temporarily dropped out of public life after 1944. He devoted his time to the management of his estates and business interests. A farming enthusiast, he was one of the first princes to establish a country estate outside Riyadh. He is a founding member of the Saudi Cement Company. Among his other businesses is the Khalidiyah Company, which provides contracting services to the Arabian-American Oil Company in Riyadh. Khalid has been close to King Faisal for many years. During the 1930's when Faisal was viceroy of the

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~
GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-287
By cbm, NARA, Date 4-25-03

Hejaz, Khalid occasionally acted as his deputy, and in 1960 Faisal attempted to get Khalid designated Deputy Prime Minister, with the power to run the government during Faisal's absence. Khalid has been rumored as a possibility for various Cabinet posts since 1957. In March 1965 King Faisal designated Prince Khalid (his brother and Deputy Prime Minister) Crown Prince and Heir Apparent to the King. Prince Muhammad, Khalid's older brother, agreed to forego the position [REDACTED] 3.4(b)(6)

[REDACTED] The appointment was thus made strictly on the basis of seniority by age and served the second practical aim of selecting a neutral figure who is unlikely to disturb existing balances of power between other royal princes and the bloc of royal full brothers known as the "Sudayri Seven". Much conjecture has arisen concerning Khalid's general abilities and fitness to succeed King Faisal, based mainly upon the Prince's lack of experience and quiet, retiring manner. Whether Prince Khalid would be able to rule effectively and hold contending factions of the Royal Family in check would depend upon which of Prince Khalid's qualities emerge if put to the test. His outward manner could belie a native shrewdness. Prince Muhammad reportedly has regretted his foregoing the appointment as Crown Prince and would like to take Prince Khalid's place.

Khalid has been described as a slightly built man who resembles his uncle 'Abd Allah ibn 'Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'ud more than he does his father. He is a simple man of Bedouin ways and tastes, and a fairly devout Muslim. A personable, unassuming and somewhat reserved individual, he contrasts sharply with his full brother, Muhammad, an outgoing person [REDACTED] 3.4(b)(6)

Khalid is married and has at least two sons. In May 1964 Amir Khalid went to Paris to be treated for high blood pressure and a heart condition, and it was thought that he might undergo a minor operation. [REDACTED] 3.4(b)(6)

June 12, 1968

50

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Monday - July 1, 1968

2. Prov. file

Mr. President:

Now that we have resolved the Sol Linowitz problem, I would appreciate an indication of your desire with respect to Ed Clark. (Tab A).

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

50a

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Monday - July 1, 1968

Mr. President:

Yesterday you told me you wanted Covey Oliver and Bill Bowdler to accompany you to San Salvador. You said nothing about Sol Linowitz. If you don't invite him, there is going to be one sore-head and a lot of wagging tongues. What is your wish?

Put Sol on the list _____

Don't put him on the list _____

Call me _____.

I assume you want Ed Clark to go.

Yes _____ No _____ Call me _____.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file
57

Monday, July 1, 1968
4:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Jack Sutherland tells me that the marked paragraph was the best he could do this week.

Next week, however, they plan a major story on: Is President Johnson a Lame Duck? He has been instructed to write the case for a negative answer. I gave him the material on foreign affairs today. He will be seeing Joe Califano tomorrow or later this afternoon.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

FROM THE
NATION'S
CAPITAL

TOMORROW

5.1a
P.
LOOK
AHEAD

Newsgram

2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

A new Supreme Court, to take shape gradually in the months ahead, is likely to be involved less in controversy, more in the prosaic business of judging.

The "Warren Court," during 15 years, did much legislating, much guiding of the country into paths that the elected Congress would not tread.

Next is to come a "Fortas Court." Probable course: Less pioneering, much less concern with working a revolution.

During the years in which Earl Warren has been Chief Justice of U.S.:

Negro rights in all fields gained sweeping protection of courts.

States and localities saw broad range of powers transferred to Washington.

Cities and suburbs gained, rural areas lost, in forced redistricting.

Police were restricted. Rights of suspects were expanded.

The "Warren Court" has centralized more power over U.S. life in Washington, and concentrated more of Washington's power in hands of the Court.

Abe Fortas, as Chief Justice, is expected by his friends to be much less of an "activist" than Warren, less interested in expanding power of the courts.

Homer Thornberry, as a new Justice and a new vote on a nine-man Court, will add a moderate vote on many issues, his friends say.

Odds at present seem to be that both will be confirmed by the Senate.

Four of nine Justices will be replaced before the turnover in the Court, now started, is completed. Earl Warren is first. Hugo Black is expected to step out in 1969, if not before. William Douglas will be leaving in the foreseeable future. John Harlan is known to have been considering retirement.

Complexion of the Supreme Court in years to come will depend upon the new President. If it's Hubert Humphrey, selection of Justices would be expected to incline to "liberals." If it's Richard Nixon, the probable result would be toward a more "conservative" Court.

At the White House, Mr. Johnson is concentrating his attention and effort on exploring ways to end Vietnam war, relax Middle East tensions, get the world calmed down before leaving office. LBJ's involvement is deep and active.

There's hope at the White House that Russia's agreement to talk about a mutual cutback in offensive and defensive missiles means that Soviet leaders, too, feel it is vital for the world to cool off.

The President is described as acting like anything but a "lame duck."

The choice the country faces seems more than ever: Humphrey vs. Nixon.

(over)

Pres file

52

SECRET

**Monday, July 1, 1968
1:00 p. m.**

MR. PRESIDENT:

**Herewith Bowdler reports Secretary
Rusk's view on a Mexican stop.**

W. W. Rostow

SECRET attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 9-28-91

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

52a

~~SECRET~~

Monday - July 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

Walt -

I asked Secretary Rusk for his views about the President stopping off in Mexico on his return.

He is against it for the following reasons:

1. It would take the edge off the visit with the Central American Presidents. The trip to San Salvador centers the spotlight on Central America and them personally. They would view a stop in Mexico as a dilution of this attention. The Central Americans are so important to us in so many different ways that it is not worth this risk.
2. A stop-over in Mexico City right now would seem anti-climactic in contrast to the visit of two years ago.
3. The two Presidents will be meeting in September anyway.
4. The President has a good many travel plans. He should conserve his time and energy for other visits.

WGBowdler

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

INFORMATION

53

Monday, July 1, 1968 -- 11:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Jack Leacacos, after I briefed him, promised to get an editorial out of Tom Vall. Here it is. We shall try to get it into the Congressional Record.

from file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

THE PLAIN DEALER

Ohio's Largest Newspaper

HERMAN L. VAIL,
President

F. WILLIAM DUGAN,
Vice President and General Manager

THOMAS VAIL,
Publisher and Editor

WILLIAM M. WARE,
Executive Editor

Daily 396,931

Net paid circulation for six
months ended March 31, 1968

Sunday 540,522

As filed with the Audit Bureau of Circulations

Page 10—AA

Sunday, June 30, 1968

Nuclear Talks Credit to LBJ

Russia's announced willingness to enter into talks with the United States on the subject of limiting both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons is a personal triumph for the perseverance of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

Getting the Soviet Union into a meaningful discussion of the need of freeing the world from the awful threat of nuclear war could become one of the greatest accomplishments of Mr. Johnson's administration.

Mr. Johnson will have more to say on the disarmament situation at the nuclear non-proliferation treaty-signing ceremony tomorrow in Washington.

The President, early in his career in the White House, was firm in his belief that the two giant nuclear powers must cooperate—despite other trying differences—in keeping peace in the human family. Ambassadors and state secretaries worked toward this meeting of minds but nothing much happened. Still, the President persisted in

his efforts and the real groundwork finally was laid at Glassboro, N.J., a little over a year ago during his famous confrontation with Soviet Premier Alexei Koseygin.

The process of bringing along the Russians to a point where they would seriously take a long look at the great expenditure of money for a defensive nuclear system—money that could be more productive in social progress—necessarily was delicate. The attitudes and the incidents that lined the path to the eventual decision to hold talks on the nuclear missiles of attack and defense are well delineated today by John P. Leacacos, chief of The Plain Dealer Washington Bureau, in his weekly column in this section of the newspaper.

Statesmanship, to a large degree, is akin to salesmanship and President Johnson, by everlastingly holding the thought that the Soviet Union eventually could be sold on the wisdom of missile prudence, should get credit for his determination in a cause which often seemed hopeless.

See file

54

Monday, July 1, 1968

11:10 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

These Soviet personnel problems and prospects may interest you. It reflects high priority in the future for U. S. - Soviet relations -- if true.

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : S/S - Mr. Benjamin H. Read

DATE: June 28, 1968

FROM : SOV - Malcolm Toon *MS*

SUBJECT: Report on Dobrynin Promotion and Gromyko Retirement - INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM

3.4(c)(1)



SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-238
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-17-03

cc: Amembassy MOSCOW

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

54a *Postow* *Just*
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55

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Monday - July 1, 1968 - 9:15 AM

Mr. President:

Free file

Yesterday you told me you wanted Covey Oliver and Bill Bowdler to accompany you to San Salvador. You said nothing about Sol Linowitz. If you don't invite him, there is going to be one sore-head and a lot of wagging tongues. What is your wish?

Put Sol on the list _____

Don't put him on the list _____

Call me _____.

I assume you want Ed Clark to go.

Yes _____ No _____ Call me _____.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *8-23-01*

Pass file

56

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 1, 1968
9:00 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Kesygin's reaction to Tommy's
intervention on the plane.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Moscow 4450)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 9-28-92

56a

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /030 W

Z 010950Z JULY 68
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8878

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 4450

EXDIS

REF: STATE 194071

I TOOK UP MATTER OF SEABOARD AIRWAYS PLANE WITH KUZNETSOV PRIOR TO NPT SIGNING CEREMONY THIS MORNING. HE SAID HE WAS UNINFORMED OF THE INCIDENT. WHEN KOSYGIN CAME IN, HE IMMEDIATELY RAISED THE MATTER AND SAID THAT THERE WERE SOME 300 AMERICAN SOLDIERS ON THE PLANE, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE UNARMED. HE SAID THEY WERE INVESTIGATING WHY WE HAD SENT THEM THESE MEN. I SAID IT WAS CLEAR THEY WERE OFF COURSE AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THEY WOULD BE PROMPTLY RELEASED. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD THEY WERE ON THEIR WAY TO JAPAN. KOSYGIN REPLIED THAT PROBABLY THEY WERE ON THEIR WAY TO FIGHT IN VIETNAM AND ADDED THAT THE MATTER WAS BEING INVESTIGATED.

THOMPSON

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

PRESERVATION COPY

57

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Monday, July 1, 1968 -- 8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

You will have noted and sensed the lull in fighting in Vietnam.

IV Corps -- very quiet.

III Corps -- captured documents suggest attack on Saigon may have been put off until August.

II Corps -- Highlands: enemy forces pulled back to Cambodia or sent towards Saigon; but little contact.

I Corps -- no immediate threat to Danang in sight or Hue or Quang Tri; although large forces still in the whole area. Evidence of enemy desire to keep pressure at the DMZ.

I shall have a more professional military assessment made.

For past seven days (June 24-30) U. S. killed in action 104, averaging 15 per day, as opposed to 26 per day in the year 1967.

As you know, there was a considerable lull ~~before~~ in the second half of April, before the early May attacks on Saigon. This is getting a bit longer and lower.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rs NARA, Date 9-28-92

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1998
By rs NARA, Date 9-28-92

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

58
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 1, 1968 -- 8:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Thieu:

- accepts Honolulu;
- any date from a Saigon departure on July 16 onward;
- he will take initiative via a letter to you;
- wishes Clifford visit announcement deferred until after announcement made of Honolulu meeting.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 31488

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

WWRostow:rlm



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

OO RUEHC
DE RUNJIR 31433 1831050
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011040Z JUL 63 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5871
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 31438

1963 JUL 1 AM 7 16

00045Q

NODIS

DEPT PASS PARIS ; PARIS PERSONAL FOR VANCE AND HABIB

REF: DEPTTEL 194063

SUBJECT: THIEU VISIT TO U.S.

1. WHEN I EXPLAINED TO THIEU THIS AFTERNOON THE REASONING FOR A DEFERMENT OF OFFICIAL VISIT AND OUR PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING IN HONOLULU, HE READILY ASSENTED.
2. HE CANNOT MAKE DATES SUGGESTED BUT CAN LEAVE ON JULY 16, AND ANY DATE AFTER THAT WOULD BE AGREEABLE.
3. HE WOULD LIKE TO HANDLE DEFERMENT OF OFFICIAL VISIT BY WRITING A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT STATING HE CANNOT BE AWAY FROM SAIGON FOR AS LONG AS ELEVEN DAYS, WOULD LIKE TO MEET PRESIDENT, AND ASKING IF MEETING IN HONOLULU WOULD BE AGREEABLE. I AGREED THIS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE.
4. I TOLD HIM OF PLAN FOR SECRETARY CLIFFORD TO VISIT SAIGON JULY 14-18. THIEU ASKED THAT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF CLIFFORD VISIT BE DEFERRED UNTIL AFTER ANNOUNCEMENT MADE OF HONOLULU MEETING.

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By PC, NARA, Date 8-22-01

~~SECRET~~

PAGE -2- SAIGON 31488, July 1, 1968

NODIS

5. HE SAID HIS PARTY WOULD INCLUDE FOREIGN MINISTER, AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, AND CHIEF OF JOINT GENERAL STAFF. HE MAY ALSO BRING MINISTER OF ECONOMY AND OFFICER IN CHARGE OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT, DEPENDING ON AGENDA. HE VISUALIZES TWO DAYS OF MEETINGS.

6. HE WAS A LITTLE WISTFUL THAT STATE VISIT HAD TO BE POSTPONED, AND WONDERED WHETHER IT MIGHT BE SCHEDULED FOR AFTER THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONS OR POSSIBLY AFTER THE ELECTION. I SAID WE WANTED A STATE VISIT, BUT WANTED IT TO TAKE PLACE UNDER MOST AUSPICIOUS CONDITIONS AND WOULD KEEP THE INVITATION OPEN.

7. COMMENT: I DID NOT PRESS INCLUDING KY IN PARTY, BUT AT THAT POINT IN OUR TALK MERELY ASKED WHOM HE THOUGHT HE WOULD TAKE WITH HIM. HE IMMEDIATELY LISTED THOSE IN PARA 5. IT MAY BE THAT BUI DIEM, WHO IS KY'S MAN, WAS HIS WAY OF HANDLING KY, BUT I ALSO THINK HE MAY WELL HAVE THOUGHT THAT TAKING KY MIGHT BE INTERPRETED HERE AND ABROAD NOT AS A SIGN OF UNITY, BUT AS SIGN HE IS FEARFUL OF LEAVING KY IN SAIGON. IT SUGGESTS TO ME THAT HE IS COMPLETELY CONFIDENT THAT POLITICAL SITUATION IN SAIGON IS IN HAND.

8. EVEN IN ADVANCE OF THIEU'S LETTER BELIEVE WE SHOULD WORK OUT DATES.

BUNKER

BT

NOTE : NOT RPT NOT PASSED PARIS BY OC/T.....

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

2082

21a

~~SECRET~~-NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Trip to Africa - August 10-19

Recommendation:

That you approve the enclosed telegram authorizing our embassies in Africa to make initial approaches concerning your trip.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

We have circularized our Ambassadors in Africa concerning your proposed trip. On the basis of their replies, we propose to firm up the following schedule: (Detailed schedule enclosed.)

Morocco, August 11-12	Zambia, August 16
Niger, August 12-13	Congo(K), August 16-17
Nigeria, August 13	Ghana, August 17-18
Ethiopia, August 13-14	Liberia, August 18
East Africa, August 14-16	Senegal, August 18-19

1. This is basically the same itinerary as previously approved. It will give you a firsthand view of Africa's diversity and potential. There are, however, a few changes:

--Liberia has been worked into the schedule, per your suggestion.

--Morocco and Niger have been added. Morocco is coming under greater Soviet pressure; your stop

~~SECRET~~-NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

would help steady the situation and affirm our significant economic and strategic interests in the country. Niger's President Diori is head of the two principal francophone groupings (OCAM and Entente); your stop would dramatize our support for regional efforts. Diori is also helpful on Nigeria and other problems. These countries have therefore been substituted for Tunisia and Ivory Coast.

--For logistical reasons, the order has been changed, i.e. start in Morocco and end in Senegal.

2. This is a tight schedule, which nevertheless manages to work in North, East, Southern and West Africa. It would be politically difficult to make minor cuts. If shortened, we would have to drop one or more of the major areas, curtailing regional consultation and the political benefit of visiting various parts of the continent.

3. In line with our policy emphasis on regional development, we propose that neighboring African leaders be invited to see you at six of these stops. This means two stages to our consultations with African Governments. Once we have worked out arrangements with the "core" group, we will then consult with the secondary group. Once we approach African Governments the news will almost certainly become public. Cancellation at a later date will cause us very serious problems with the Africans. This is therefore the time to decide for sure whether the trip will be taken.

4. Some of the countries present real logistical problems due to limitation on housing, communications and other facilities. We are staffing these problems out, with a view to dealing with them as soon as replies are received from the African Governments.


Under Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Draft telegram
2. Schedule

TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS DIVISION

WORK COPY

216~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

CIRCULAR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By 8, NARA, Date 5-22-01

STATE

NODIS/ADROIT

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM UNDER SECRETARY

1. The President has approved the proposed visit to Africa for the period August 10-19 as outlined DEPCIRTEL 188937.
2. The exact dates remain the same as those proposed in the separate messages to individual posts: Morocco, Aug. 11-12; Niger, Aug. 12-13; Nigeria, Aug. 13; Ethiopia, Aug. 13-14; East Africa (Entebbe, Nairobi en route to Arusha) Aug. 14-16; Zambia, Aug. 16; Congo(K), Aug. 16-17; Ghana, Aug. 17-18; Liberia, Aug. 18; Senegal, Aug. 18-19.
3. Using background contained para one DEPCIRTEL 188937, you should approach head of state on most confidential basis repeat most confidential basis re possibility visit to his country. Since schedule will remain tentative until confirmation received from all addressee posts, you should not rpt not discuss full itinerary.
4. You should not rpt not undertake detailed discussion substantive or ceremonial part of visit at this time, since we will wish retain flexibility to consider program as a whole.

AF:FLHadsel:gp 6/27/68

5208

The Under Secretary

AF: Mr. Quimby

O: Mr. Peck

S/S

White House -

~~SECRET~~/NOFORN

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

5. It also recognized that there remain numerous logistical matters to be worked out, such as size of Presidential party, housing and communications, and special problems relating to Arusha as site of East African talks. You should not rpt not initiate local discussion of these matters until replies from this message have been correlated in Washington and you receive further instructions.

6. For Kampala, Nairobi and Dar. We assume all three governments should be approached simultaneously, even though proposal to meet in Arusha places primary meeting in Tanzania territory. Logistical details cannot be worked out at this time. We therefore think that Embassy Kampala should not rpt not make suggestion of picking up Obote, nor should Nairobi propose picking up Kenyatta.

7. It also recognized that question of secondary invitations may be extremely delicate. Suggestions on these matters for individual posts follow. In raising question of secondary invitations you should make absolutely clear that approaches should not rpt not be made to neighboring leaders until you can confirm agreement on schedule as a whole.

a. For Niamey. Suggest you explore with Diori per paragraph two EMBTEL 1916 invitation to other Entente Presidents. Agree full OCAM list would be unmanageable. Diori's suggestions on tactics would be welcome.

b. For Addis. Assume Emperor can easily notify Gardiner and Telli of visit and that Embassy follow up presents no problem. However, since we encouraging regional meetings to extent possible we suggest you ask Emperor if he wants invite (and possibly Shermarke) Egal/ for meeting with President. We recognize that this is tricky problem and do not know if Egal will accept. Alternative of invitation to Shermarke and Egal to

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

visit Arusha would put additional strain on already over-burdened facilities there and raise problem of inviting still others. If you feel strongly that invitation to Egal is impossible, inform Department by immediate telegram.

c. For Lusaka. Since we would hope give as many stops as possible a regional complexion, you requested to explore with Kaunda matter of extending invitations to Khama, Jonathan and Banda. We recognize difficulties raised by Lusaka 2136 and your reply from Dar-es-Salaam and leave exact discussion of tactics to you. We would hope that addition of Banda and Jonathan may have advantages for Kaunda as well as complications you mentioned. We would not, of course, insist on invitations to these leaders, but think that if Kaunda seems unable to invite them, then it difficult to single out Khama.

d. For Monrovia. While visit must of necessity be brief, we think that extension of invitation by Tubman to Stevens and Jawara is desirable.

e. For Dakar. In approaching Senghor, request you raise possibility his extending invitation to meet with Senegal River Basin partners.

f. For Kinshasa. We would wish avoid Mobutu inviting Bokassa and Tombalbaye to Kinshasa, since that would involve implied endorsement of UEAC and pointed omission of Ahijdo. If necessary we could shorten time of Kinshasa stop.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

Proposed Schedule for the
President's Trip to Africa
August 10-19, 1968

~~SECRET~~
NODIS/ADROIT

21c

Time in
Ref. to

Date	Place	Local Time	Flight Time	Mileage	Wash. Time
Aug. 10 (Sat.)	Lv. Andrews	10:00 P.M.	7 + 10		+ 4
Aug. 11	Ar. Rabat (Overnight)	9:10 A.M.		3400	
Aug. 12	Lv. Rabat	6:30 A.M.	5 + 40		+ 5
Aug. 12	Ar. Niamey (Overnight)	1:10 P.M.		2470	
Aug. 13	Lv. Niamey	7:00 A.M.	1 + 15	390	+ 5
Aug. 13	Ar. Kano	8:15 A.M.			
Aug. 13	Lv. Kano	11:00 A.M.			
Aug. 13	Ar. Addis Ababa (Overnight)	6:10 P.M.	5 + 10	2280	+ 7
Aug. 14	Lv. Addis Ababa	1:00 P.M.			
Aug. 14	Ar. Entebbe	2:50 P.M.	1 + 50	690	+ 7
Aug. 14	Lv. Entebbe	3:20 P.M.	1	285	+ 7
Aug. 14	Ar. Nairobi	4:20 P.M.			
Aug. 14	Lv. Nairobi	5:00 P.M.			
Aug. 14	Ar. Arusha (Overnight)	6:15 P.M.	1 + 15	?	+ 7
Aug. 15	Arusha (Overnight)				
Aug. 16	Lv. Arusha	7:15 A.M.			
Aug. 16	Ar. Nairobi	8:30 A.M.	1 + 15	?	+ 7
Aug. 16	Lv. Nairobi	9:30 A.M.			
Aug. 16	Ar. Lusaka	11:00 A.M.	2 + 30	1025	+ 6
Aug. 16	Lv. Lusaka	5:00 P.M.			
Aug. 16	Ar. Kinshasa (Overnight)	6:30 P.M.	2 + 30	1025	+ 5
Aug. 17	Lv. Kinshasa	11:00 A.M.			
Aug. 17	Ar. Accra (Overnight)	1:00 P.M.	3	1250	+ 4
Aug. 18 (Sun.)	Lv. Accra	9:00 A.M.			
Aug. 18	Ar. Monrovia	9:56 A.M.	1 + 40	630	+ 3 16 M.
Aug. 18	Lv. Monrovia	4:00 P.M.			
Aug. 18	Ar. Dakar (Overnight)	6:30 P.M.	1 + 50	685	+ 4
Aug. 19	Lv. Dakar	2:00 P.M.			
Aug. 19	Ar. Andrews	6:10 P.M.	8 + 10	3500	--

~~SECRET~~
NODIS/ADROIT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01



Department of State

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

6/18/68
W/H 6 21d
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 4 4 2 3 Q
RECD: JUNE 18, 1968
5:08 A.M.

PP RUEHC
DE RUFJCX 1191 1700700
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 180645ZJUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1364
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ BANGUI 1191

NODIS/ADROIT

REF: STATE 184233

EYES ONLY FOR HAMILTON, WHITE HOUSE, FROM PALMER

1. APPRECIATE CONSIDERATIONS YOU HAVE PUT FORWARD RE PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL ITINERARY. WE BOTH KNOW HOW AGONIZING ANY DECISION IS IN PICKING AND CHOOSING AS AMONGST 40 COUNTRIES. THIS PROBLEM ASSUMES EVEN GREATER PROPORTIONS BY VIRTUE LEVEL OF VISIT.

2. I ORDINARILY WOULD NOT BE IN FAVOR OF PERMITTING POSSIBLE REACTIONS IN ONE COUNTRY TO AFFECT OUR FREEDOM OF ACTION IN DETERMINING VISITS TO OTHER COUNTRIES. MOREOVER, I THINK THAT IN MOST CASES AFRICANS ARE UNDERSTANDING OF SUCH SITUATIONS AND RECOGNIZE THAT WE HAVE TO ASSERT SAME RIGHT OF INDEPENDENCE OF CHOICE AS THEY. IF IT WERE NOT FOR PREVIOUS KATZENBACH AND HUMPHREY VISITS GHANA AND OMISSION NIGERIA I WOULD NOT BE SO CONCERNED. HOWEVER, I THINK THERE IS LIMIT TO WHICH TRAFFIC WILL BEAR REPETITION WITHOUT SERIOUS RISK TO RELATIONSHIP WITH NIGERIA WHICH WE HAVE PAINFULLY SOUGHT TO PRESERVE. BEFORE ANSWERING YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS, I WOULD LIKE MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY TREATED NIGERIA AS FRIENDLY COUNTRY WITH WHICH WE WISH MAINTAIN RELATIONSHIP. ALTHOUGH REGRETTING CIVIL WAR, REFUSING BECOME MILITARILY INVOLVED AND OPENLY FAVORING PEACEFUL SOLUTION, WE HAVE CONTINUED TAKE POSITION FAVORABLE TO NIGERIAN UNITY.

(B) US HAS SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT TO PROTECT IN NIGERIA, AS WELL AS GREAT POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE.

(C) NIGERIA IS UNDERGOING AGONIZING STRUGGLE IN WHICH IT NEEDS HELP AND UNDERSTANDING FROM ITS FRIENDS FOR THOSE THINGS WHICH I IS TRYING TO DO RIGHT AND GOOD AND FRANK COUNSEL FOR THOSE THINGS WHICH IT TENDS TO DO WRONG.

(D) NIGERIA HAS ITS HAWKS AND DOVES. OUR INDICATIONS ARE THAT GOWON IS TRYING BE REASONABLE AND TO RESIST MORE EXTREMIST PRESSURES. O EXTENT WE CAN STRENGTHEN HIM, WE ADVANCE POSSIBILITY OF REASONABLE SETTLEMENT.

CORRECTED COPY

African Trip
Palmer comments

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- BANGUI 1191, JUNE 18

(E) MY READING OF KAMPALA AND ITS AFTERMATH IS THAT FMG HAS MADE ALMOST ALL OF THE CONCESSIONS AND THAT IT IS INCREASING UNREALISM OF BIAFRAN POINT OF VIEW THAT IS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPEDING PROGRESS TOWARD SETTLEMENT. I BELIEVE PRESIDENTIAL TALK WITH GOWON ON NIGERIAN SOIL COULD BOTH SERVE TO STRENGTHEN GOWON'S HAND AND INDUCE MORE REALISTIC BIAFRAN ATTITUDE WITHOUT COMPRISING BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR WHICH WE HAVE STOOD THROUGHOUT STRUGGLE.

3. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND LET ME DEAL WITH QUESTIONS CONTAINED PARA 4 YOUR MESSAGE:

(A) PRESIDENT ALREADY IDENTIFIED WITH GOWON THROUGH OUR CONTINUED RECOGNITION OF FMG, CONTINUING CONTACTS WITH GOWON THROUGH HIS PERSONAL REP IN LAGOS AND OUR OPEN SUPPORT FOR NIGERIAN UNITY. WHILE PRESIDENTIAL APPEARANCES WITH GOWON WOULD OBVIOUSLY DRAMATIZE THIS IDENTIFICATION, IT WOULD NOT ESSENTIALLY CHANGE FACT THAT IT ALREADY EXISTS.

(B) I THINK WE SHOULD GET AMBASSADOR MATTHEWS' ADVISE BUT MY OWN JUDGMENT IS THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO MANAGED VISIT, ARRIVAL REARRKS, ETC., SO THAT US WOULD EMERGE WITH ITS PRESENT POLICY EMPHASIS INTACT. NIGERIANS ARE GENERALLY FRANK AND UNDERSTANDING PEOPLE. THEY RECOGNIZE DEEP CONCERN INCREASINGLY EXPRESSED IN AFRICA AND OTHER SECTIONS OF WORLD RE CONTINUATION OF WAR AND HAVE I BELIEVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT MEET THOSE CONCERNS EVEN THROUGH THEIR PROPAGANDA LEAVES GOOD DEAL TO BE DESIRED. I THINK PRESIDENT CAN BE FRANK AND OPEN RE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND OUR HOPES FOR FUTURE OF COUNTRY WITHOUT EITHER COMPROMISING OUR PRINCIPLES OR AROUSING ADVERS REACTION.

(C) WITH PRESIDENT'S EMPHASIS ON REACHING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT NIGERIAN PROBLEM, I WOULD NOT ANTICIPATE ADVERSE REACTION DAR OR LUSAKA. BOTH GOVTS ALREAY FULLY AWARE OF OUR DIFFERENCES IN ANY EVENT.

(D) THIS IS ADMITTEDLY A RISK AND ASSUME WE WOULD ONLY CANCEL IN EXTREMIS. IF SUBSANTIAL EXCESSES TOOK PLACE, WE WOULD PROBABLY FEEL COMPELLED TO MAKE NEGATIVE COMMENT ON THEM IN ANY EVENT. I THINK NIGERIAN REACTION WOULD BE DOUBLY ADVERSE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, I.E., CRITICAL THAT WE HAD SPOKEN OUT WHILE PRESIDENT IN AREA AND HAD NOT ASFORDED GOWON OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR HIS POINT OF VIEW.

(E) ON RECONSIDERATION, I DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD REPRESENT KANO AS REFUELING STOP BUT RATHER AS FULLY SCHEDULED STOP FOR PRESIDENT TO MEET WITH GOWON. I BELIEVE THIS ARRANGEMENT MUCH PREFERABLE TO FULL-FLEDGED VISIT TO LAGOS FOR NUMBER OF

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- BANGUI 1191, JUNE 18

REASONS. FIRST, IT MORE CONVENIENT AND MANAGEABLE. SECONDLY, SECURITY WOULD BE FAR LESS OF A PROBLEM IN 1800 LONG JOURNEY REQUIRED FROM AIRPORT TO CITY IN LAGOS. THIRDLY, BELIEVE MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE IN CALMER ATMOSPHERE IN KANO.

(F) THIS IS A FACTOR THAT YOU CAN BEST JUDGE IN WASHINGTON. HOWEVER, I RECALL SOME DOMESTIC CRITICISM RE PREVIOUS VISITS AS CONCENTRATING ON FAVORABLE SITUATIONS WITH INSUFFICIENT EMPHASIS ON SOME OF TOUGHER PROBLEMS WHICH AFRICA FACES. I WOULD THEREFORE HAVE THOUGHT THAT FRANK AND OPEN SHOW OF CONCERN FOR NIGERIAN SITUATION AT MEETING OF THIS KIND WOULD REBOUND TO PRESIDENT'S ALREADY HIGH REPUTATION FOR COURAGEOUS ACTION.

4. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR GOOD WISHES. I BELIEVE TRIP IS GOING VERY WELL ON WHOLE AND I SHALL HAVE LOTS OF NEW INSIGHTS TO DISCUSS WITH YOU WHEN I RETURN. GP-3. LEWIS
BT

~~SECRET~~

Pres. Side

22

~~TOP SECRET~~

Lunch with the President
Tuesday, July 2, 1968, 1 p. m.

Agenda

1. Paris Talks: Next Stage. (Sect. Rusk)

Views developed in Monday meeting you instructed us to have.

2. Aircraft Down in the Soviet Kuriles. (Sect. Rusk)

Sitrep.

3. Honolulu Meeting: Clifford Trip. (The President)

- Dates.
- Announcement.
- Should Vance come to Honolulu?

4. Middle East. (Sect. Rusk)

Ball trip to Middle East: timing.

5. Organisation of Bilateral with the USSR (Sects. Rusk and Clifford)

Preliminary thoughts and report on state of staff work.

6. Other.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 2'
By rg, NARA, Date 9-28-92

ACTION

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS

Tuesday, July 2, 1968 -- 12:30 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith is the proposed outgoing for your clearance at lunch today.

Essentially it would ask the other side if they would be willing to meet in private on the basis of the Zorin formula, at which time we would be prepared to be concrete.

I think that is all right, notably if they suggest another private session soon.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

23a

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS IMMEDIATE

Date

STATE

TODEL _____

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

For Harriman and Vance.

DELTO 366.

1. We concur in your revisions to the line we had proposed in State 194772 for the tea break. Specifically, we agree to the omission of the last part of paragraph 2(b) of that suggested line and to not repeat not getting into aerial reconnaissance issue at this time. You should of course continue to use terminology that limits what we would stop to bombing and offensive combat operations.

2. Despite Zorin's suggestion (DELTO 369) we continue to feel that it would be premature at this tea break to table any second-
with
phase package. Bunker is now in/with interesting suggestions, and we are repeating his 31593 to you. We are working urgently to mesh all ideas into a consistent opening position, but will

1200

Drafted by:

EA:WPBundy:mk 7/2/68

Tel. No.

4235

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

Comments:

DOD - Secretary Clifford

White House - Mr. Rostow

S/S -

~~SECRET~~

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

~~SECRET~~

Classification

almost certainly need further exchanges with you and Saigon in any event.

GP-1.

End.

Per file
24

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, July 2, 1968
12:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith an intelligent CIA analysis of the
politics of the Soviet position on talks about
strategic weapons.

Key passages in summary are marked.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment Cy 26 of No. June 68 Intelligence Memorandum

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-236
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-17-03

INFO. MATION

presfile

25

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, July 2, 1968
12:10 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

General Taylor wishes you to have this
available before lunch.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989

By ng, NARA, Date 9-1-92

25a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

July 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Phase I Agreements

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-383

By ing, NARA, Date 8-12-93

Yesterday in a meeting which Secretary Rusk called to discuss the Phase I/Phase II formula, it was evident that there is considerable difference of opinion among your advisers with regard to the agreements which must be reached in Phase I prior to a cessation of bombing. I would like to present to you a line of reasoning which appeals to me as a reasonable approach to the question.

It seems to me that, at this moment, we have a relatively stable situation in South Vietnam in the sense that it is one which we can live with for some time at our present level of effort. Our military forces seem able to cope with the enemy in spite of the heavy infiltration of recent months. Our limited bombing of North Vietnam continues to be clearly disagreeable to the enemy. The GVN seems able to hold together although, as always, there are recurrent rips at the seams. Unless the enemy resorts to another dramatic military effort like the TET offensive, we would seem able to continue for several months on the present basis while we seek a productive negotiation in Paris.

We should not abandon this stable posture unless we are sure of assuming another of at least equal stability. Hence, when we give up the limited bombing and thereby remove an important factor contributing to the present equilibrium, we need to obtain compensation in other areas which will restore the balance. We must be assured of the following points:

- a. ~~The enemy will not escalate the action in South Vietnam nor renewed TET-offensive.~~
- b. ~~The enemy will continue to pay a heavy price in the ground war for his continued aggression against South Vietnam.~~
- c. ~~There will be no harassment of civilian populations at levels dangerous to national morale or the stability of the GVN.~~
- d. ~~The enemy will not engage in infiltration at rates which will result in a net increase of strength in South Vietnam and thus permit him to stockpile manpower for a new offensive.~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

If we accept the foregoing conditions as essential to a stabilized situation which can endure during the coming months of negotiation, we should ask ourselves what are the agreements to achieve these conditions which should be reached in Phase I. My own view of the bedrock minimum (more should be asked at the outset) is the following:

- a. An understanding communicated privately to the other side that we are stopping our bombing on the assumption that enemy activities in South Vietnam will remain approximately at present levels, this being a pragmatic interpretation of taking no advantage of our restraint.
- b. Mutual agreement to restore the DMZ under ICC inspection.
- c. Mutual respect for the 1962 agreements re Laos.
- d. A continuation of US air reconnaissance of North Vietnam without enemy opposition.
- e. Agreement on time, place, representation and agenda of Phase II negotiations.

MD2
M.D.T.

~~SECRET~~

Pres. file

26

**Tuesday, July 2, 1968
11:55 a. m.**

MR. PRESIDENT:

**Herewith a first report from your new
Ambassador in Manila.**

W. W. Reston

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Manila, Philippines

26a

June 25, 1968

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Lyndon:

Again, many thanks - first, for the opportunity of significant public service; second, for the eminently successful Corregidor mission you authorized.

Your kind words about me to Mrs. Marcos have been most important and helpful. I am convinced she is befriending me, and as you and I know, wives are most important.

By way of a progress report let me say I have first emphasized trying to establish a favorable rapport with the Philippine people. In this, I think I have been lucky so far. But as Mrs. Marcos has said, "Ambassador Williams has done well, so far."

Obviously, this solves no problems, but should lay a foundation to do so.

Incidentally, the staff here is very good indeed, and I trust that with their help I can make some progress on the list of priorities we went over together.

Again, many thanks for your kind help in getting my mission off to a good start.

With every good wish to you and Lady Bird.

Respectfully,

G. Mennen Williams

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Authority 77C 9 86-141
By up/ly, NARA, Date 10-5-92

Pres file

27

**Tuesday, July 2, 1968
11:45 a. m.**

MR. PRESIDENT:

I believe that Ambassador Dake should be invited to the Barrientos lunch. His facility with Spanish will be very helpful in handling the 8-member Bolivian party.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

(dict. by Wm Bowdler: ms)

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN PLUS

Tuesday, July 2, 1968 - 11:45 am

Mr. President:

Herewith our Saigon team comes in
with a sensible, practical response to
the Zorin formula.

W. A. Rostow

Saigon 31593, 2 sections

*Key problem for Paris
marked in red on p. 2.*

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN PLUS

Pres Lee

28

*Doc. 2
17424*



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

28a

~~SECRET~~

00 RUEHC RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 31593/1 1841130 / 3 8 6Q
ZNY SSSSS ZZH 1968 JUL 2 AM 7 59
O 021100Z JUL 68 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5921
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1425
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 31593

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

PARIS FOR VIETNAM DELEGATION

REF: PARIS 17153

1. BERGER, GEN ABRAMS, CALHOUN AND I HAVE BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO REFTEL AND THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS THAT WE THINK HANOI MUST MEET IN EXCHANGE FOR A TOTAL CESSATION, AND SUBMIT TO THE FOLLOWING TO BE CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR OWN THINKING.

2. IN PHASE A THE AGREEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING SHOULD EMBRACE THE FOLLOWING INTERCONNECTED CONCEPTIONS:

A. WE AGREE IN PRINCIPLE TO ~~FIX A DATE WHEN ALL US BOMBINGS AND OTHER US AND ALLIED MILITARY ATTACKS ON NORTH VIETNAM NORTH OF THE DMZ WILL CEASE.~~

(COMMENT ON 2 A: THIS CONCEPT ASSUMES THAT THERE WILL BE A CESSATION OF NAVAL ATTACKS FROM THE SEA ON NORTH VIETNAMESE TERRITORY. IT DOES NOT ASSUME THAT WE WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE SUPPLY AND MANPOWER MOVEMENTS THROUGH LAOS OR BY SEA INTO SOUTH VIETNAM. IN CONNECTION WITH THE LATTER THE GVN NAVY ENGAGES IN OPERATIONS KNOWN AS PLOWMAN WHICH INVOLVE THE EXAMINATION, INTERCEPTION AND OCCASIONAL SEIZURE OR SINKING OF NORTH VIETNAMESE "FISHING" VESSELS IN WATER UP TO THE 20TH PARALLEL. WE DO NOT RULE OUT THAT THE GVN WILL GO ALONG WITH A TOTAL CESSATION AND HALT THESE OPERATIONS, BUT WE FLAG IT AS AN AREA THAT NEEDS EXAMINATION.)

B. ^{HANOI} ~~HANOI~~ AGREES IN PRINCIPLE THAT THERE WILL BE A ~~SHORT~~ INTERVAL BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS START.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority RAC 18564

By JCL/MS NARA. Date 8-22-01

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 31593, JULY 2, SECTION ONE OF TWO

C. WE MUST EXACT A COMMITMENT THAT ~~AFTER WE ANNOUNCE THE DATE OF TOTAL CESSATION:~~

1. NO CITY OR MAJOR POPULATED AREA IN THE SOUTH WILL BE SHELLED OR ATTACKED;
2. NO ARTILLERY OR OTHER ATTACK WILL EMANATE FROM ACROSS OR WITHIN THE DMZ; AND
3. THERE WILL BE NO INFILTRATION OF MEN AND SUPPLIES THROUGH THE DMZ.

D. IT IS MADE CLEAR TO HANOI THAT IF SAIGON OR OTHER MAJOR CITIES ARE ATTACKED, OR ATTACKS EMANATE FROM ACROSS OR WITHIN THE DMZ, OR INFILTRATION CONTINUES THROUGH THE DMZ, AFTER WE ANNOUNCE TOTAL CESSATION OR AT ANY TIME AFTER NEGOTIATIONS COMMENCE, THAT WE WILL RESUME BOMBING OF THE NORTH.

E. RECONNAISSANCE WILL CONTINUE UNTIL A FULL SETTLEMENT IS REACHED.

F. ONLY AT THIS POINT SHOULD WE AGREE ON THE PERIOD OF THE INTERVAL, THE DATE OF THE US ANNOUNCES TOTAL CESSATION, AND THE DATE NEGOTIATIONS START.

(COMMENT ON F: OUR ANNOUNCEMENT OF TOTAL CESSATION SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DATE WHEN NEGOTIATIONS WILL COMMENCE. THIS SHOULD PRESENT NO DIFFICULTY TO HANOI SINCE THEY HAVE TIED THE TWO TOGETHER. CLEARLY THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE IN SECRET, BUT THE FACT THAT THEY ARE BEING HELD MUST BE PUBLICIZED. WE CAN DRAW DISCREET ATTENTION TO THE ABSENCE OF ATTACKS ON THE CITIES AND FROM THE AREA OF THE DMZ, AND THE APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS WILL BE DRAWN BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND WORLD OPINION THAT WE HAVE GOTTEN SOMETHING IN EXCHANGE FOR A FULL CESSATION.)

3. I TURN NEXT TO THE STAND WE SHOULD TAKE IN PHASE B WHEN NEGOTIATIONS START. THERE ARE THREE AREAS, WHICH I AM SURE CONCERN WASHINGTON AS MUCH AS THEY DO US, ON WHICH WE MAKE THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS;

A. WE SHOULD INFORM HANOI EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER THE SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS START THAT SO LONG AS THE VC AND

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 31593, JULY 2, SECTION ONE OF TWO

NORTH VIETNAM FORCES CONTINUE TO ENGAGE IN MURDER AND ASSASSINATION, KIDNAPPING, SABOTAGE, THE MINING OF ROADS, AMBUSH AND INTERDICTION OF MILITARY AND CIVIL MOVEMENTS, ATTACKS ON MILITARY OR CIVIL INSTALLATIONS, OR ANY OTHER ACTS OF WAR OR TERROR. WE AND OUR ALLIES WILL CONTINUE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH. WE AND THE GVN ARE, HOWEVER, PREPARED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS THAT WILL LEAD TO A DIMINUTION AND ULTIMATELY AN END OF THE ~~VIETNAM~~ VIOLENCE

(COMMENT ON 3 A: THIS IS A DEFENSIBLE PUBLIC POSITION. ALSO THIS GIVES BOTH SIDES FLEXIBILITY TO MOVE GRADUALLY TOWARD A MUTUAL DEESCALATION OR DE FACTO CEASE FIRE, WITHOUT FORMAL AGREEMENT, OR TO NEGOTIATE A MUTUAL DEESCALATION AND CEASE FIRE AS PART OF A GENERAL SETTLEMENT.)
BUNKER

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

3 8 7 Q

1968 JUL 2 AM 8 11

OO RUEHC RUFNCR
DE RUMJIR 31593/2 1841150
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021100Z JUL 68 ZFF6
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5922
INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1426
STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 31593

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

B. WE SHOULD ALSO INFORM HANOI THAT DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS THE US AND ALLIES ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS AND ARRIVE AT ARRANGEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS ON THE MOVEMENT OF MEN AND SUPPLIES INTO SOUTH VIETNAM BY BOTH SIDES, AND FOR A GRADUAL REDUCTION AND ULTIMATE WITHDRAWAL AS PART OF A GENERAL SETTLEMENT. BUT SO LONG AS THE INFILTRATION OF MEN AND SUPPLIES CONTINUES FROM NORTH VIETNAM THROUGH LAOS AND CAMBODIA OR BY SEA, THE US AND ITS ALLIES WILL INTRODUCE MEN AND SUPPLIES AT WHATEVER LEVEL WE DEEM NECESSARY TO MEET THE LEVELS OF INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH.

(COMMENT ON 3 B: THIS GIVES US A GOOD PUBLIC STANCE AND FLEXIBILITY. ALSO WE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT WE HAVE THAI AND AUSTRALIAN AUGMENTATIONS DUE HERE IN THE NEXT MONTHS, AND THE GVN IS ENGAGED IN A TOTAL MOBILIZATION. THESE SHOULD NOT BE SUSPENDED OR INTERRUPTED UNTIL WE KNOW MORE CLEARLY WHERE WE ARE GOING IN THE SECRET TALKS.)

C. THE NATURE, EXTENT AND TIMING OF GVN PARTICIPATION IN THE SECRET NEGOTIATIONS.

(COMMENT ON 3 C: I REALIZE THE DIFFICULTY THIS MAY CAUSE, AND OUR NEED TO BE FLEXIBLE. BUT IF WE UNDERTAKE BILATERAL SECRET TALKS AFTER A BOMBING CONCESSION, IT WOULD RUN COUNTER TO OUR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COMMITMENTS TO THE GVN AND OUR ALLIES; MOREOVER, IT WOULD AROUSE THE MOST PROFOUND SUSPICIONS HERE OF WHAT WE ARE DISCUSSING AND CREATE POSSIBLY INSUPERABLE DIFFICULTIES FOR THIEU AND US. UNLESS THE PUBLIC IS AWARE THAT THE GVN IS ASSOCIATED WITH THESE TALKS, IT COULD DESTROY THE THIEU GOVERNMENT.)

4. WE SHALL BE COMMENTING SEPARATELY ON STATE 193328.

5. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO HAVE YOUR THINKING ON THE APPROACH TO A TOTAL BOMBING CESSATION SO THAT WE CAN STUDY THIS AND COMMENT IN ADVANCE OF ITS BEING PUT TO THE HANOI NEGOTIATORS.

BUNKER

BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

29

July
Tuesday, June 2, 1968 -- 11:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

In your meeting with General Bradley you may wish to make the following points about Vietnam:

Since the partial bombing cessation, the North Vietnamese have successfully recuperated from many effects of the bombing in northern North Vietnam: bridges, roads, and railroads repaired; port construction; all airfields operational, improved air defenses; redirection of manpower to agriculture.

- They have not yet projected this improved posture to the war in the south.

- In fact, in the south the enemy is somewhat worse off than before 31 March -- despite all-time high rates of infiltration (some indications that this rate may now be falling off).

- Enemy still has significant capability as seen by May attacks on Saigon. But the attacks on Saigon expected at end of June didn't come off. These may have been postponed until August.

- Thus, we are in a lull in enemy-initiated activity similar to April lull (U.S. casualties last week half of similar period last year).

-- Potential threats to Hue and Quang Tri in I Corps have not yet materialized.

-- Enemy has been threatening the highlands but has been unable to mount significant attacks since last fall.

-- Activity around Saigon has slackened and enemy may have pulled back.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-- IV Corps relatively quiet; Thang has done a good job; we hope his successor Thanh will be as capable.

- Overall, enemy is suffering from significant problems of manpower, morale, training, leadership, and supply (destruction of arms caches causing him problem). Although no visible indications he is near the breaking point, his losses since 1 January 120,000 men. Much lower casualties in 1967 caused him to revise his strategy. Thus, we look for -- but are not counting on -- a major shift in strategy in the next 6-12 months.

- Meanwhile, in Paris:

-- no progress yet, but
-- we have clearly held edge in propaganda battle.

-- Hopeful signs: Hanoi is anxious to keep talks going; tea breaks getting longer; some apparent thawing in manner and attitudes -- especially in tea breaks which are generally businesslike and devoid of polemics; Tho's visit to Moscow and Hanoi could mean a re-evaluation of Hanoi's position is in progress.

-- We shall continue to insist on getting something meaningful in return for a total bombing cessation.

-- Meanwhile, some indications of a Peking-Hanoi split: anti-North Vietnam demonstrations in front of consulates, Peking opposition to Hanoi's negotiating, and possibility of deliberate interruptions of supply to Hanoi. These hopeful possibilities, however, must not be overemphasized through wishful thinking.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

30

Tuesday, July 2, 1968
10:40 a. m.~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS

MR. PRESIDENT:

(Lunch item)

Herewith outgoing to Vance, as a result of yesterday's meeting, and Vance's response (Tab A).

Also attached is a Harriman-Zorin conversation, instigated by the latter (Tab B).

Sect. Rusk will have a draft outgoing cable for you at lunch -- if not earlier.

I have told State I believe it should contain the addition I have inserted on page 2.

But there is a larger issue which we debated amiably yesterday and on which Zorin's cable bears. The issue is this: on the next occasion, should we merely ask the North Vietnamese if they are prepared to sit down with us to work within the Zorin framework, or should we fill in what we want and are prepared to do in Phase 2?

Yesterday I had suggested the latter; Sect. Rusk suggested that we move more cautiously and simply raise the structure in principle -- then proceeding in a private session, if they showed interest, to fill in Phase 2. He argued persuasively that they were probably making critical decisions in Hanoi right now and we should not put in a proposal which might scare them off by being too tough.

Now Zorin tells us: "It was critical that the columns in Phase 2 be filled out in detail. He said without the specific points in Phase 2 the proposal would mean nothing."

The question that you may wish to decide at lunch is, therefore, whether we proceed promptly to lay before them a Phase 1--Phase 2 proposal of substance.

We should recall that they have already had in the Jordan dinner, as well as by way of example in other conversations, what we have in mind: the DMZ; reduced infiltration; no shelling of Saigon; continued reconnaissance. It is just barely possible if we frame the proposal in this way, with familiar items but Phase 2 filled in, we could advance the pace of movement.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS

-2-

At the base of the matter is this judgment: ~~since the biggest~~
~~development in Paris has been the Soviet willingness to get into the middle~~
~~of this -- beginning with Kosygin's letter -- should we be prepared to~~
~~take their advice, so long as we could live with the proposal if it is~~
~~accepted?~~

W. A. R. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS attachments

30a



WH (2)
306

194772

[Handwritten signature]

2 JUL 68 00 08

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Origin

Info

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS IMMEDIATE

STATE 194772

TODEL 587

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

Deliver Personally to Vance or Habib.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 18568
By isa NARA, Date 1-8-98

1. We have considered your most helpful 17321 with care. Our own thinking on elements in a second stage package follows your early headings closely but has some differences with reference to item 2(c) under paragraph 10, and with paragraph 11. We are working urgently and should have further ideas in the next day or two.

2. However, for purposes of your tea-break discussion on Wednesday, we believe it would be premature to table a possible second phase package at that point. At this stage, we lack North Vietnamese agreement to talk in these basic terms, and we believe we need to nail down whether they are willing to do so. Our tentative thinking is that you should put ~~xxx~~ forward the following oral points at the tea break:

67713

Drafted by:
EA:WPBundy:mk 7/1/68

Tel. No.
4235

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

EA - William P. Bundy

Clearances:

The Secretary (subs) *67713* DOD - Secretary Clifford (subs)

White House - Mr. Rostow (subs) *67713* S/S - Mr. Walsh

Page 2 of telegram to Paris TODEL~~SECRET~~Classification

a. We do insist that, before the bombing actually stops, we must have a clear ~~mutual~~ understanding on actions that would follow in the second phase.

b. In the actions to be clearly understood, we can envisage actions on the DRV side, actions on the US side and measures that would be equally applicable to both sides. You should explain frankly that we would thus meet Hanoi's desire to avoid the appearance of reciprocity for the stopping of the bombing in itself, while at the same time meeting our need for clear understanding on a package that would add up to Hanoi not gaining military advantage through the stopping of the bombing.

c. We could envisage a time interval between the stopping of the bombing and the visible coming into effect of the package of actions. But we believe this time interval must be short if a climate of confidence is to be maintained.

d. Nonetheless, we should point out frankly that the key to avoiding the appearance of reciprocity from Hanoi's standpoint lies in the understood package of actions, and not in the time interval. In the face of our past and still firm position that we must have something from Hanoi if we are to stop the bombing, speculation that there was in fact an agreed package of actions would be inevitable,

Page 3 of telegram to Paris TODEL

~~SECRET~~
Classification

and we might not be able to guarantee to avoid leaks that there was such a package. This is another strong reason for the time interval being extremely short.

e. To underscore what we mean, and to put it in the context of the Zorin conversation, you should say that we could envisage a first stage involving the stopping of the bombing on an agreed date, with prior agreement on a following second stage that would include actions on both sides. You should again re-emphasize ^{that} ~~the~~ clear understanding on the second phase actions would have to be reached before the bombing actually stopped.

f. We would need to say that our first stage would be a stopping of the bombing and all other types of offensive combat operations against the DRV. It would not preclude our carrying out aerial reconnaissance. If Hanoi disagrees with this, we had better discuss it as part of the private talks. (This is designed to frame an issue of which we believe Hanoi is fully aware and which was skirted in Vance's last talk with Lau. We are inclined to hit it head on, and at this point, being prepared to explain that Hanoi has ample sources of information in the South and that we would require sources of information on the North.)

Page ⁴ of telegram to Paris TODEL

~~SECRET~~

Classification

g. This is the essential framework we now propose as a basis for kpx private talks. If Hanoi is prepared for such talks, we would like to proceed as soon as they are ready.

h. At a very early stage in such private talks we would be pxx prepared to put forward a list of the actions on both sides that would be appropriate for understanding and to take place in the second phase. We assume that Hanoi would be prepared to propose its own list of actions at the same time.

3. We emphasize that the above is our tentative thinking, not reviewed at highest levels. We would like your comment as early as possible tomorrow morning here, so that final decisions on your instructions could be made in early afternoon here.

GP-1.

End.

RUSKI



Department of State

WMD
TELEGRAM 300
2

~~SECRET~~

O 020910Z JUL 68

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3752

STATE GRNC

1968 JUL 2 AM 5 33

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BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 17324

MODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 366

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

REF: STATE 194772

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EAC 18573
By ice NARA, Dwa 1-8-98

1. WE WILL TRY TO USE TEA BREAK FOR CLARIFICATION ESSENTIAL POINTS REFTEL WITH WHICH WE AGREE. WE HAD NO INTENTION OF TABLING SECOND PHASE PACKAGE AT THAT TIME, PROPOSING INSTEAD TO AWAIT NEXT PRIVATE MEETING WITH LAU. WE ARE FAIRLY SURE TEA BREAK ROOMS ARE BUGGED AND THUY AND LAU APPEAR TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT TALKING TOO FREELY AT THE MAJESTIC.

2. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT PRACTICAL TO REPEAT AGAIN THE ARGUMENT THAT THIS APPROACH AVOIDS THE "APPEARANCE" OF RECIPROCITY (PARA 2(B) REFTEL). WE TRIED THIS ON LAU AT JUNE 27 MEETING AND HE REJECTED IT. ZORIN REACTED THE SAME WAY AND STRESSED THE HEAVY LINE BETWEEN PHASE 1 AND PHASE 2. LAU UNDERSTANDS THE POINT CLEARLY AND WE DON'T BELIEVE IT NEEDS TO BE HAMMERED HOME AGAIN AT NEXT MEETING. WE BELIEVE NORTH VIETNAMESE MAY FIND IT EASIER TO ACCEPT THE ARGUMENT THAT RECIPROCITY OCCURS IN PHASE 2, WHERE THE RECIPROCAL ACTIONS APPEAR TO BE MUTUAL AND THEREFORE NOT RELATED DIRECTLY TO BOMBING CESSATION.

3. AS TO GETTING INTO QUESTION OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AT TEA BREAK (PARA 2(F) REFTEL), WE ARE INCLINED TO WAIT UNTIL WE HAVE A PRIVATE DISCUSSION IN WHICH THE RANGE OF SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED UNDER PHASE 2 CAN BE DISCUSSED. PRESENTING PACKAGE AS A WHOLE-- WITH RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHASES 1 AND 2 AND THE CONTENT OF PHASE 2 MADE CLEAR-- STRIKES US AS MORE LIKELY TO MAKE CLEAR ALL THAT IS INVOLVED RATHER THAN HITTING PIECES OF IT NOW.

4. WE WILL, HOWEVER, ASSURE THAT FRAMEWORK WE PROPOSE FOR PRIVATE TALKS IS CLEAR (SUMMED UP IN REFTEL PARA 2(E)) AND THAT THEY UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE PREPARING TO DISCUSS DETAILS AND ACTIONS INVOLVED AS SOON AS THEY ARE READY.

5. AT ZORIN'S REQUEST, WE WILL BE SEEING HIM AT 10:30 THIS MORNING. WE WILL REPORT FOLLOWING THE MEETING.

HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

30d





Department of State

30e2
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

NNNNVV CRA191
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHCR 17332 1841235
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021230Z JUL 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3759
STATE GRNC
BT

003950
1968 JUL 2 AM 9 00

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 17332

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 369

FROM HARRIMAN-AND-VANCE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: RAC 18570
By: NSA NARA, Date 1-8-98

1. THIS MORNING WE MET WITH ZORIN FOR ABOUT 1 HOUR AND 15 MINUTES. PERRY AND BOGOMOLOV WERE PRESENT. THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE MEETING WERE AS FOLLOWS. COMPLETE REPORT ON CONVERSATION WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL.

2. ZORIN ASKED WHAT REACTION WE HAD TO THE SUGGESTION HE AND VANCE HAD DISCUSSED LAST WEEK. WE REPLIED THAT WE WERE STILL STUDYING IT BUT THAT OUR INITIAL REACTION WAS THAT IT WAS VERY INTERESTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE. ZORIN SPECIFICALLY ASKED WHAT THE REACTION WAS IN WASHINGTON. GOVERNOR HARRIMAN REPLIED THAT IT WAS WELL RECEIVED, AND THAT IT WAS A CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTION SO LONG AS AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON BOTH STAGES BEFOREHAND.

3. ZORIN SAID THAT HANOI DOES NOT KNOW WHAT HE SAID AND ADDED THAT HE HAD NOT TALKED TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ABOUT THE SUGGESTION. HE LATER SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IF WE MERELY RENEWED THE PROPOSAL VANCE HAD MADE TO LAU IN THE SAME FORM AS VANCE USED ON THURSDAY NIGHT, HANOI WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING IT FURTHER.

4. NEAR THE END OF THE MEETING, WE ASKED ZORIN SPECIFICALLY WHETHER IN HIS OPINION THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD GIVE PROMPT AND CONSTRUCTIVE CONSIDERATION TO A PROPOSAL ALONG THE LINES OF THE ZORIN SUGGESTION. HE REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT THINK THEY WOULD REJECT IT.

5. ZORIN EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS CRITICAL THAT THE COLUMNS IN PHASE 2 BE FILLED OUT IN DETAIL. HE SAID WITHOUT THE SPECIFIC POINTS IN PHASE 2 THE PROPOSAL WOULD MEAN NOTHING.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 17332, JULY 21

6. AT THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING, ZORIN SAID THAT HE KNEW THAT THE NORTH-VIETNAMESE INTENDED TO FREE SEVERAL PILOTS SOON IN ORDER TO CREATE A BETTER ATMOSPHERE. GOVERNOR HARRIMAN SAID THAT HE HAD SENT THE DRV WORD IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO RELEASE 10 PERCENT OF THE POWS. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT ANY NUMBER WOULD BE WELCOME.

7. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THAT ZORIN ASKED FOR MEETING IN ORDER TO FIND OUT CURRENT WASHINGTON THINKING AND TO LET US KNOW ABOUT THE RELEASE OF ADDITIONAL PILOTS. ALTHOUGH HE DENIED IT, WE FEEL HE HAS DISCUSSED HIS PHASE 1-2 SUGGESTION WITH NORTH-VIETNAMESE, BUT WE HAVE NO IDEA HOW THEY REACTED.

8. WE NEED URGENTLY THE DETAILS FOR PHASE 2 ACTIONS WHICH WOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE NORTH-VIETNAMESE AT THE NEXT APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY. WE WOULD, THEREFORE, APPRECIATE RECEIVING FROM YOU FULL DETAILS ON PHASE 2 ACTIONS ALONG THE LINES OF THE SERIES OF ITEMS IN OUR TEL PARIS QUEWOM

HARRIMAN

BT

~~SECRET~~

1/250 JLE

31

ACTION

Tuesday - July 2, 1968 - 9:40 A.M.

Mr. President:

You have responded to the general invitation to attend the ODECA meeting of Presidents and to the specific invitation of the host President.

We now should proceed with acceptance of the direct invitations of the four other Presidents.

Attached are the draft letters to the Presidents of Costa Rica (Tab A), Guatemala (Tab B), Honduras (Tab C) and Nicaragua (Tab D).

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tabs A - D.

31a

July 3, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I very much appreciate your kind invitation to join with you and the Presidents of the other Central American Republics in San Salvador on July 6. I look forward with great pleasure to the opportunity to renew the friendship we formed at Punta del Este last year and to discussions with you and your colleagues on how we can assist to accelerate progress in Central America.

Sincerely,

737

His Excellency
Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro
President of the Republic of Guatemala
Guatemala City, Guatemala

LBJ/WGBowler:mm

316

July 3, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your cordial invitation to meet with you in Tegucigalpa. I regret that I will not be able to talk with you in your capital but look forward to our meeting and discussions in San Salvador and aboard my aircraft. I also welcome the opportunity to stand on Honduran soil during the brief time that I will have in San Pedro Sula.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Oswaldo Lopez Arellano
President of the Republic of Honduras
Tegucigalpa
, Honduras

LBJ/WGB:mm
7/2/68

31c

July 3, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I deeply regret that I will be unable to accept your kind invitation to be your guest in San Jose on the night of July 8. I look forward with great pleasure to seeing you in San Salvador and am very pleased that you have found it possible to accept my invitation to return to San Jose aboard my airplane. At least, I will have an opportunity to extend greetings to the people of Costa Rica and to view, however briefly, the famed beauty of your country.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Lic. Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez
President of the Republic of Costa Rica
San Jose, Costa Rica

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm

31d

July 3, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I deeply appreciate your cordial invitation to visit Nicaragua. Although I regret that I cannot at this time accept, I do look forward to seeing you in San Salvador and to the opportunity to set foot on Nicaraguan soil, even if only briefly, on my return journey.

Sincerely,

RB)

His Excellency
Anastasio Somoza Debayle
President of the Republic of Nicaragua
Managua, Nicaragua

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

Tuesday, July 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Progress Report from George Woods

George has completed his review of previous work on the proposed Israeli desalting plant. His brief letter to you enclosing a more detailed memorandum is attached.

He suggests two lines of action over the next three months:

1. He would like to lay on a couple of further studies because prices this spring in the nuclear desalting field have jumped sharply. At the same time, the price of fuel oil has gone down, making oil-fueled desalting more competitive. Our large planned plant in California is up in the air until we can reconcile problems created by these increased costs. Woods believes we should have the benefit of that analysis before we go any further.

2. He would like to go to Israel later in the summer. The Israelis have taken important new steps to meet their electric power needs with a large oil fuel plant. Woods feels this may change some of the ground rules for the desalting plant, and he would like to hear latest Israeli thinking first hand. *This would not involve negotiations at this stage*

If this is satisfactory to you, he will press ahead with his proposed studies over the next 90 days and, in late August or early September, would go to Israel. I think this is a good idea.

I might say that I have talked to George several times about this project and am happy to say he is fascinated with it and has a positive attitude toward desalting. He is realistic about the unresolved problems but thinks we ought to keep pushing ahead.

I am also attaching a letter just in from Prime Minister Eshkol expressing his appreciation for George's appointment. He would welcome George whenever George is ready. George had a chat last week with his old friend, Israeli Finance Minister Sapir, and asked him to let Eshkol know that he is hard at work.

Approve Woods' course of action ✓

Call me _____

W. W. Rostow

7/3/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

32a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 2, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I very much appreciated your note of May 6 expressing your interest in the further work to be conducted on the Israeli desalting project. I have worked on this for the past sixty days, drawing on the services of the engineering firm which did the original feasibility study and the experts who worked with Ellsworth Bunker. A progress report, a copy of which I enclose, has been made to Walt Rostow. It discusses new developments which, I believe, make another few months of study advisable. The work plans for the next few months are outlined in the enclosure.

Last week, Israeli Finance Minister Sapir, who was visiting here, called on me. He wanted me to know that he was aware I had been named coordinator for the desalting project. As a result of our conversation, Prime Minister Eshkol is being brought up to date on my activities in this matter.

Minister Sapir renewed his invitation, made several times in my World Bank days, that I visit Israel. I think a useful purpose would be served if I were to confer with the Israelis on their own grounds. With your permission, therefore, I will plan to visit Israel later this summer.

Respectfully yours,

George D. Woods

Enclosure:

Letter to Mr. Walt Rostow (copy of)

The President of the United States
The White House

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 8-22-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

326

July 1, 1968

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By XC, NARA, Date 8-22-01

The Honorable
Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

Dear Walt:

Over the past two-month period, I have reviewed the available material relevant to the Israeli Power and Desalting Projects, including some additional studies made by the engineering firm which did the original feasibility study and by the experts who worked with Ellsworth Bunker, through the Water for Peace Office. In addition, I have discussed the project with a number of people with competence in these matters here and on the West Coast. Based on these activities, I recommend that we continue to look into various aspects of the projects over the next few months, and reassess our position in the autumn.

There are several reasons for this recommendation:

(1) Results of the experiments on the large module now under test at San Diego by the Office of Saline Water would be most helpful in determining economic and technical parameters more exactly. Further, the uncertainty with regard to proceeding on the Metropolitan Water District plant in California needs to be resolved. A decision on this may well be made within the next three months. The value that Interior and the AEC might place on the new technology of any proposed Israeli plant -- and therefore the amount they might contribute -- depends on whether or not the MWD plans are to be implemented.

(2) The relative costs of water from fossil-fueled and nuclear-fueled plants need further study,

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- 2 -

especially in the light of the 42-inch Elath-Askalon oil pipeline that Israel now has under construction. This facility will bring a large supply of oil virtually to the plant site, at commercial prices that may well be considerably below those assumed in the engineering studies of the oil-fired dual-power desalting plant done so far. For this and other reasons, a fossil-fueled plant has become a much more attractive alternative in the past year.

(3) More research into recent increases in reactor prices is needed. These increases may imply substantial revisions in forecasts of costs of water in 1975, and should be examined in detail for their cause and likelihood of continuance. At my request, Kaiser Engineers completed, in the last two weeks, a very illuminating review of recent cost changes. Messrs. MacAvoy and Peterson, my economist and water expert, have provided a hasty review of the implications of these changes (as shown in the accompanying memorandum). But more needs to be done.

(4) I believe that further studies can be usefully carried on through the summer. These would include:

(a) Review of the optimum size of a single large power unit consistent with the Israeli network, and an analysis of desirable electricity-water product ratios to find minimum cost ratios;

(b) Explore the possibilities for other sources of water primarily by discussion with hydrologic experts having experience in the Eastern Mediterranean;

(c) A preliminary analysis of the economics of a single-purpose fossil-fueled water plant of the size under consideration; and

(d) The estimates of the value of products from the desalted water have to be revised

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- 3 -

for changes in foreign exchange rates and in the Western European markets for Israeli outputs. A fairly extensive review of the earlier MacAvoy-Peterson estimates of value should be undertaken by experts on agriculture in Israel.

The foregoing represents an interim response to the segment of the terms of reference relating to "Economic." Consideration of the segments relating to "Financial" and "Political-Economic" have been deferred until the factual foundations contemplated under "Economic" have been put in place.

Finance Minister Sapir, who is visiting in this country, called on me last week to let me know that he is acquainted with my appointment as coordinator and to renew an invitation, made several times in the past, that I visit Israel. In order to get a better understanding of Israeli views relating to financial and political-economic aspects of the proposed project, I believe this might be desirable. If the President is agreeable, I will plan to go there during mid-summer.

Sincerely yours,

George D. Woods

Enclosure:

Memorandum on Revised Estimates
of the Costs of Desalted Water
in Israel (June, 1968)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



S/S 9419

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Letter to the President
from Prime Minister Eshkol
of Israel

Enclosed is a communication from the Prime Minister of Israel which was received under cover of a Diplomatic Note dated June 27. A suggestion regarding a reply will be forthcoming.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated

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2-*Rit*
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32d

ראש הממשלה
THE PRIME MINISTER

Jerusalem, 14 June 1968

Dear Mr. President,

I have received your letter of May 10, 1968, and much appreciate the information that you have appointed Mr. George D. Woods as your representative to continue the joint studies with Israel representatives on a large desalting and power plant.

My representatives are available for meetings with Mr. Woods as soon as he will consider this opportune.

May I say that the appointment of an American of such eminence as Mr. Woods is further evidence of the depth of your interest and dedication to a venture which enshrines such great hope for humanity. I bear with me fond memories of your inspiring words in this connection at our meetings in 1964 and in 1968.

Sincerely yours,



Levi Eshkol

President Lyndon B. Johnson,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

33

ACTION

Tuesday - July 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Statement on Mexican Olympic Cultural Program

Herewith a memorandum from Nick Katzenbach asking your approval of a statement on US participation in the Mexican Olympic Cultural Program. (Tab A).

We are participating in the cultural olympics at the invitation of the Mexican Olympic Organizing Committee.

The performing groups are listed in the Katzenbach memorandum.

In the near future, our Embassy in Mexico will issue a publicity kit describing US participation in the Program. Ambassador Freeman would like to introduce the kit with a statement from you as Honorary President of the U. S. Olympic Committee. Your statement will insure that Mexico and other participating countries understand the importance we attach to the goals of the Olympic Cultural Program.

At Tab B is the suggested statement which I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Tab A - Katzenbach memo of June 22 to President.

Tab B - Suggested Presidential statement for signature.

2012
33a
response to Pres.
the A

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 22, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Statement on Mexican Olympic Cultural Program

Recommendation:

That you sign the enclosed statement on American participation in the Mexican Olympic Cultural Program.

Discussion:

The Mexican Olympic Organizing Committee has invited the United States to participate in the Olympic Cultural Program this year. In response, the following have already been sent to Mexico or will be sent during 1968, under U. S. Government or private auspices:


The Phoenix Singers, La Salle Quartet, Duquesne University Tamburitians, Martha Graham Dancers, Merce Cunningham Dancers, a New Orleans jazz band, Duke Ellington's orchestra, and performers from the Newport Jazz Festival.

Exhibits on nuclear energy, space research, contemporary and traditional American art, Navajo sandpainting and weaving, children's art, philately, architectural design, and the history of the Olympic Games.

Films on the role of youth for the Olympic Film Festival, works of poetry for a poetry seminar, and works of sculpture for display at Olympic sites.

In addition, we understand that selected college and high school students will participate in a World Youth Camp to be held at Olympic Village in Mexico City. The United States may participate in additional events if funds become available.

In the near future, our Embassy in Mexico plans to issue a publicity kit describing American participation in the Olympic Cultural Program. Ambassador Freeman would like to introduce the kit with a statement from you, as Honorary President of the U. S. Olympic Committee, to ensure that Mexico and the other nations participating in the Olympics understand the importance this country gives to the goals of the Olympic Cultural Program. A suggested statement for your signature is enclosed.


Under Secretary

Enclosure:

Suggested Statement

Suggested Statement

On behalf of the American people, I wish to express our warm response to the invitation of the Mexican Olympic Organizing Committee to participate in the Mexican Olympic Cultural Program. It is highly appropriate that Mexico, a country unique in the wealth of its own cultural heritage, should restore to prominence the cultural phase of the Olympiad which has not, since classical times, received more than token recognition. We are delighted to join representatives of Mexico and other nations in celebrating man's intellectual and spiritual growth, as well as his athletic prowess.

In his ~~Third~~ State of the Union Address, on September 1, 1967, President Diaz Ordaz said that the Olympic Cultural Program "will enable the participants to form closer ties through their knowledge of each other's cultures, an area in which man's expression, independent of the color of his skin, his ideology, or degree of development, attains levels of manifest equality." We fully endorse this objective. Our congratulations and best wishes go to the Mexican people and to the Mexican Olympic Organizing Committee, for bringing to the world a new understanding of the meaning of the Olympic spirit.

Lyndon B. Johnson
Honorary President
United States Olympic Committee

If we have never learned it before, we humans would be wise to learn it now: we are brothers, we live in one world, and we will survive in peace on our planet only if we know and appreciate each other.

Accordingly, the revival of the cultural phase of the Olympiad is a significant occurrence. As President Diaz Ordaz has said about the Olympic Cultural Program: "It will enable the participants to form closer ties through their knowledge of each other's cultures, an area in which man's expression, independent of the color of his skin, his ideology, or degree of development, attains levels of manifest equality."

That is a noble goal, and an important one in our era.

It is highly appropriate that Mexico, a country of unique cultural wealth, should be the prime agent in restoring cultural activity to the Olympic agenda.

On behalf of Mexico's Northern neighbor, I want to express America's delight in being able to take part, with other nations of the world, in a great cultural event. May it bring to us all a new understanding of the meaning of the Olympic spirit.

LBJ/WGB:mmm
July 2, 1968

Tuesday, July 2, 1968

for file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested Reply to Sato re Bonins Return

At Tab A is a suggested reply to Sato's letter to you (Tab B), expressing satisfaction at the return of the Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands to Japanese administration.

Especially since the Islands are now under Japanese administration, it seems appropriate and courteous for you to use the Japanese name for the Islands, as Sato does in his letter to you.

I recommend that you sign the suggested reply.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

cc: Mr. Jorden

AJenkins:mm

34a

July 2, 1968

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your warm letter on the occasion of the return of the Ogasawara Islands to Japanese administration. The spirit of harmony and cooperation with which this issue was resolved serves both to exemplify and to strengthen the close ties existing between Japan and the United States.

The agreement we have reached on the Ogasawara Islands gives me confidence in the future strength and durability of relations between our two countries.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

**His Excellency
Eisaku Sato
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo**

LBJ:State:AJenkins:mm 7/2/68

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

35

Tuesday - July 2, 1968

Mr. President:

Since I fully share your conviction that no President of the United States has done more for Latin America than you, and received less credit for it, I decided to try to put the record on paper tersely and graphically for the general reader. I attach the product, with the hope that it tells the story as you would like to have it told.

WGB

W. G. Bowdler

Attachment

Mr. President:
Bill volunteered this.
It's a fine job. I believe
it should be made into a
pamphlet.

WWR

MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, July 1, 1968

8:00 p. m.

~~SECRET/HARVAN~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By 17, NARA, Date 3-2-99

We have just completed a meeting of almost two hours on Viet Nam negotiations of just the kind you wished us to have; General Taylor, as well as Secretary Rusk, Clark Clifford, Bill Bundy, etc., were present.

We:

- reviewed where we are in the negotiation, looking back to the beginning;
- considered what Averell and Cy should do on Wednesday;
- and looked further down the road.

The consensus was that our negotiators limit themselves on Wednesday to asking, essentially, this question: Are you willing to sit down and discuss in private with us a proposition in which:

- we would stop bombing; but before the bombing actually stops we achieved a clear understanding on actions that would follow;
- in the actions that would follow we can envisage some that would be applicable to both sides; some to one side; and some to the other;
- any time interval between the stopping of the bombing and the package of actions would have to be short;
- they would have to understand that aerial reconnaissance must continue after cessation of bombing.

We would tell them that if they were prepared to sit down on this basis we would be prepared at that time to put in concrete proposals.

In short, it was agreed that on Wednesday we would not actually put in concrete proposals, but simply ask them if they are prepared to talk on the basis of this structure which Zorin commended to us.

While we were talking, the attached cable came in to the Secretary from Vance. The general view was that paras. 1-10. A. were on the right track except that we must try to negotiate a delay of less than seven days. Something like 48 hours would be nearer right. There was strong resistance to an early implementation of paras. 10. B. and C. at this time. There was considerable

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN

-2-

discussion of the attacks on urban areas. Secretary Rusk wants them firmly brought into the conditions; Secretary Clifford feels that we can probably do without that assurance, relying on our own military capabilities to keep them from bombing Saigon too heavily.

We are putting our proposition on a quick turnaround to Paris tonight. In the light of what Cy says, we shall present a fairly unified view at lunch tomorrow for your final decision.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN attachment



Department of State

TELEGRAM

36a

~~SECRET~~

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CONTROL: 175Q

RECEIVED: JULY 1, 1968
4:24 P.M.

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 17321

N O D I S/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 365

EYES ONLY TO THE SECRETARY FROM VANCE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By 14 NARA, Date 3-2-99

1. WE HAVE BEEN GIVING URGENT CONSIDERATION TO THE NEXT STAGE OF PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ON A TWO-PHASED APPROACH TO CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENT IN NVN AND THE RELATED RESTRAINTS.

2. WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT AND DESIRABLE TO PROCEED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSAL BETWEEN VANCE AND HA VAN LAU. AS WE HAVE SUGGESTED IN AN EARLIER CABLE, WE EXPECT THAT THIS DISCUSSION MAY NEED TO AWAIT LE DUC THO'S CONSULTATION IN HANOI (WITH STOPS AT MOSCOW AND PEKING). BUT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR IT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND THEREFORE WILL SEEK ANOTHER PRIVATE SESSION NOW IF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE WILLING.

3. WE HAVE ACCEPTED AS A PLANNING PRINCIPLE THE DIVISION OF THE PROPOSAL INTO TWO PARTS WHICH WE CALL PHASE 1 AND PHASE 2. ITS ORIGIN LIES IN THE EARLIER PHASE A-PHASE B PROPOSALS, BUT IT ALSO DRAWS SPECIFICALLY ON THE SUGGESTION PUT FORTH BY ZORIN AS AN ELABORATION OF THE FIRST PROPOSAL PUT TO HA VAN LAU.

4. IN SUM, WE WOULD PROPOSE TO PRESENT TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AN ELABORATION OF OUR FIRST SUGGESTION SO AS TO RELATE NORTH VIETNAMESE RESTRAINTS TO MUTUAL ACTIONS TAKEN IN PHASE 2, RATHER THAN TO OUR BOMBING CESSATION IN PHASE 1.

5. THERE IS PRESENTED BELOW OUR PRELIMINARY THINKING ON AN OUTLINE OF PHASE 2 ACTIONS. THESE ACTIONS ARE DIVIDED INTO FOUR CATEGORIES TO APPROXIMATE THE ZORIN OUTLINE.

~~SECRET~~

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-2- PARIS 17321 SECTION 1 OF 2, JULY 1 .

6. WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING THE DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, INCLUDING VIEWS DEPARTMENT MAY HAVE ON FALL-BACK POSITIONS WITHIN THE BROAD OUTLINE OF ACTIONS LISTED BELOW.

OUTLINE BEGINS.

PHASE 1 .

7. WE PROPOSE THAT THE STATEMENT ON PHASE 1 BE AS FOLLOWS:
"THE UNITED STATES WOULD AGREE TO CEASE ALL AIR/NAVAL/ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT OR ANY OTHER ACTIVITIES THAT INVOLVE THE USE OF FORCE ON OR WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ON A DATE TO BE COMMUNICATED TO THE DRV."

8. COMMENT: WE FEEL THE PHRASE, "ANY OTHER ACTIVITIES THAT INVOLVE...", SHOULD BE USED TO REPLACE THEIR PHRASE, "OTHER ACTS OF WAR." WE DOUBTLESSLY WILL HAVE TO THRASH OUT WITH THEM EACH OF THE ITEMS THEY HAVE LISTED AS "OTHER ACTS OF WAR." WE WILL INSIST UPON THE RIGHT OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE.

9. PRIOR TO THE EXECUTION OF PHASE 1, A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING MUST BE REACHED ON THE ACTIONS AND COMMITMENTS IN PHASE 2. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE ACTIONS BELOW MAY NOT BE FULLY ATTAINABLE.

PHASE 2.

10. MILITARY ACTIVITIES: IT IS MUTUALLY UNDERSTOOD THAT BOTH SIDES WILL TAKE THE FOLLOWING DIRECT AND RELATED MILITARY ACTIONS.

A. (1) DIRECT MILITARY ACTIONS BY BOTH SIDES RELATED TO THE DMZ:

(A) REMOVE ALL MILITARY FORCES FROM THE DMZ
(B) NO FIRE INTO/FROM OR ACROSS DMZ
(C) NO GROUND ATTACKS INTO OR ACROSS DMZ
(D) NO SUPPLIES OR EQUIPMENT WILL BE MOVED INTO OR THROUGH THE DMZ

(E) NO INFILTRATION OR MOVEMENT OF ANY PERSONNEL WHATSOEVER WILL BE PERMITTED INTO/OR THROUGH THE DMZ

(2) RELATED MILITARY ACTIONS CONCERNING THE DMZ

(A) THE DIRECT MILITARY ACTIONS IN (A) THROUGH (E) ABOVE WILL GO INTO EFFECT AT 1200 HOURS ON THE 7TH DAY FOLLOWING EXECUTION OF PHASE 1.

(B) BOTH SIDES WILL ACCEPT AN AUGMENTED ICC TO INSPECT AND VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THESE ACTIONS.

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SECRET

-3- PARIS 17321 SECTION 1 OF 2, JULY 1

COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THAT THE FOREGOING ARE IN LARGE PART MEASURABLE
THEY WILL IMPEDE, THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY STOP, ALL ENEMY MOVEMENT
INTO AND THROUGH THE DMZ. THEY ARE A REAL TEST OF ENEMY INTENTIONS

AND, IF SUCCESSFULLY VERIFIED, WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH THE
PRESIDENT'S 31 MARCH DECLARATION. CONCURRENTLY, THEY DO NOT
SACRIFICE GVN SOVEREIGNTY. A KEY FACTOR IS AN EFFECTIVE VERI-
FICATION SYSTEM. THROUGH CANADA, WE MUST CAREFULLY PLAN THE ROLE
OF THE ICC TO INSURE MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS. THE QUESTION OF
AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF THE DMZ SHOULD NOT BE TREATED
SEPARATELY FROM OVERALL RECONNAISSANCE OF NVN.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SECRET FINAL SECTION OF 2 PARIS 17321

N O D I S/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 365

EYES ONLY TO THE SECRETARY FROM VANCE

B. DIRECT MILITARY ACTION RELATING TO LEVEL OF FORCES:

(1) THE US AND DRV AGREE NOT TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF THEIR MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SVN EXISTING AT THE CESSATION OF THE BOMBING. (NO)

(2) NEITHER PARTY WILL ALTER THE DESIGNATION AND OVERALL COMPOSITION OF THEIR MILITARY UNITS IN SVN FROM THAT DATE. (NO)

COMMENT: WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS DEFINITION DOES NOT CONSTRAIN THE LEVEL OF INFILTRATION TO 1967 LEVELS, BUT WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW WE CAN LOGICALLY OR REALISTICALLY ARGUE FOR THE 1967 INFILTRATION LEVEL UNDER THE MUTUAL ASPECTS IMPLICIT IN THE PHASE 2 CONCEPT. THIS WOULD, OF COURSE, FREEZE ICC AT THE LEVELS EXISTING ON THE DATE OF THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. THE ABOVE FORMULATION WOULD, HOWEVER, LEAVE THE GVN FREE TO INCREASE ITS FORCE LEVELS.

C. DIRECT MILITARY ACTIONS RELATED TO WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES.

(1) WITHDRAW TOKEN FORCE OF 5,000 SOLDIERS EACH FROM QUANG TRI PROVINCE OUT OF SVN. WITHDRAWAL TO BE VERIFIED BY ICC OR BILATERALLY AND TO BE CONDUCTED WITHIN 7 DAYS AFTER CESSATION (US FORCES OUT OF SVN, NVN FORCES TO NVN).

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-2- PARIS 17321 SECTION 2 OF 2, JULY 1

(2) REPEAT ABOVE EACH WEEK FOR MINIMUM 1 MONTH AS CONTINUING EVIDENCE OF GOOD FAITH.

COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THAT THE ACTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES, EVEN THOUGH AT TOKEN LEVELS, WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP. ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS, IT APPEARS TO BE AN ACCEPTABLE MILITARY COURSE OF ACTION.

OTHER RELATED ACTIONS:

11. THE US ASSUMES THAT THE DRV WILL NOT CONDUCT INDISCRIMINATE ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACKS AGAINST URBAN AREAS OF SVN.

COMMENT: THIS MAY BE DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF NO EXPLICIT TRADE-OFF, BUT WE BELIEVE ITS WORTH TRYING.

12. EXCHANGE OF POW'S

A. EACH SIDE WILL INSURE THAT THE ICRC HAS A CURRENT AND VALID LIST OF ALL PRISONERS OF WAR; AND THAT SUCH LIST WILL BE KEPT CURRENT AND UP TO DATE.

B. EACH SIDE WILL PROMPTLY EXCHANGE SICK AND WOUNDED POW'S.

C. EACH SIDE WILL PERMIT UNRESTRICTED VISITS TO POW'S AND POW CAMPS.

D. EACH SIDE WILL PERMIT AND ASSIST IN THE PROMPT DELIVERY OF MAIL AND PARCELS TO POW'S.

E. EACH SIDE WILL PROMPTLY RETURN BODIES OF DECEASED POW'S.

F. A THROUGH E ABOVE TO BE EFFECTIVE 7 DAYS AFTER CESSATION AND BE COMPLETED WITHIN 21 DAYS AFTER EXECUTION PHASE 1.

COMMENT: THE LEGAL STAFF WILL HAVE TO WRITE IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEFINITION OF POW. WE BELIEVE IT IS PREMATURE IN PHASE 2 TO SEEK EXCHANGE OF ALL POW'S.

13. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.

A. AGREE TO OPEN TALKS WITHOUT DELAY IN WHICH BOTH SIDES ARE FREE TO RAISE ANY ELEMENT OR TOPIC RELEVANT TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. DURING THESE TALKS, OUR SIDE WILL INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM AND THE UNITED STATES.

SECRET

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~~SECRET~~

-3- PARIS 17321 SECTION 2 OF 2 JULY 1

B. ALTERNATIVELY, WE COULD AGREE THAT BILATERAL TALKS WILL CONTINUE ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTERESTS TO THE TWO PARTIES.

COMMENT: THE ALTERNATIVES ABOVE LEAVE TO THE DEPARTMENT THE DETERMINATION WHETHER WE WISH TO MOVE QUICKLY TO A MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK. WE NEED THE DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE ON THIS QUESTION. WE WOULD NOT SPECIFY WHAT REPRESENTATION THE DRV MAY WANT UNDER THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE. VANCE

BT

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INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - July 1, 1968 - 8:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

With respect to your inquiry about the alleged economic crisis in Central America, these are the facts:

1. The Central Americans recently negotiated a protocol to the Common Market Agreement increasing import duties by 30%.
2. Nicaragua was the first to ratify. Fearing that its importers would take advantage of the slowness of other countries to put the import surcharge into effect, President Somoza instituted a very careful check of trucks crossing the frontier, particularly along the border with Costa Rica.
3. State advises that this problem peaked last weekend and Somoza has begun to relax the strict border check. State also suspects that part of Somoza's tactic was to force the other CACM members to ratify the protocol quickly so that the 30% surcharge would have uniform effect throughout the Common Market.

We will keep a close eye on this matter, and let you know if it appears to deteriorate.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-5
By ju, NARA, Date 5-29-92

38

INFORMATION

Monday, July 1, 1968 - 7:45 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Clark reports his
good work with the press.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

38a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

July 1, 1968

The President
The White House


Dear Mr. President:

In furtherance of your request that we spread the gospel, I met with the Overseas Writers for luncheon on Friday. I would estimate there were over one hundred of them present.

I spoke for twenty minutes on Vietnam and answered questions for forty-five minutes. There were two or three questions on the ABM Sentinel System, a personal question or two about the President, and all the rest of the time was devoted to Vietnam. It was interesting to me to note that with this group of writers the question of overriding importance is still Vietnam.

On Wednesday of this week, I am having a backgrounder for the 35 or 40 of the regular Pentagon press corps. I shall endeavor each week to set an additional conference in our continued effort to convert the heathen.

Respectfully yours,


Clark M. Clifford

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - July 1, 1968 -- 7:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

Attached is the list of invitees to the Barrientos luncheon which you approved several days ago. Before passing it on to Bess Abell, I wanted to check whether it still reflected your views.

Walt Rostow

Approve _____
Disapprove _____
Call me _____.

Attachment

List of invitees to Barrientos luncheon.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 9-1-92

Luncheon Invitation List

Bolivian Party

President René Barrientos

Julio Sanjines-Goytia - Ambassador of Bolivia

Tomas Guillermo Elio - Minister of Foreign Relations

Jose Romero Lozá - Minister of Finance

Jorge Solis - Minister of Rural Affairs

Armando Escobar - Mayor of La Paz

Brigadier General - David La Fuente, Chief of the Army

Col. Alberto Guzman - Chief Military Aide.

United States

Assistant Secretary Covey Oliver

Ambassador Douglas Henderson

Ambassador Edward Clark

Walt W. Rostow

William G. Bowdler

40a

(7-1-68)

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE

Saturday - July 6

7:00 a.m.	-	Leave Texas
8:50 a.m.	-	Arrive San Salvador
8:50 - 9:20 a.m.	-	Airport Ceremony
9:20 - 10:20 a.m.	-	Motorcade to ODECA Hq.
10:30 a.m. - 1:00 p.m.	-	Working Session of Presidents
1:00 - 3:00 p.m.	-	Lunch hosted by ODECA SYG
3:00 - 5:00 p.m.	-	Rest period.
5:00 - 6:00 p.m.	-	Ceremony at LBJ Public School
6:00 - 8:00 p.m.	-	Open
8:00 p.m.	-	State Dinner

Sunday - July 7

9:00 - 10:00 a.m.	-	Mass at Cathedral or Archbishop's Palace.
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Sunday - July 7 - continued

-2-

11:00 a.m.	-	Leave San Salvador
1:00 p.m.	-	Arrive San Jose
1:00 - 1:50 p.m.	-	Airport ceremony
1:55 p.m.	-	Leave San Jose
2:40 p.m.	-	Arrive Managua
2:40 - 3:30 p.m.	-	Airport ceremony
3:35 p.m.	-	Leave Managua
4:25 p.m.	-	Arrive San Pedro Sula
4:25 - 5:15 p.m.	-	Airport ceremony
5:20 p.m.	-	Leave San Pedro Sula
5:55 p.m.	-	Arrive Guatemala City
5:55 - 6:45 p.m.	-	Airport ceremony
6:50 p.m.	-	Leave Guatemala City for US
(10:40 p.m.,	-	Arrive Bergstrom AFB
(
(or		or
(
(<u>Monday, July 8</u> 12:50 am-		Arrive Andrews AFB.

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday - July 1, 1968 - 7:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

Herewith the schedule for your Central American trip, adjusted to meet the points you made this morning to Bill Bowdler.

We have decided to reverse the order of the airport stops to begin with San Jose, Costa Rica. At this time of year, the San Jose airport is more frequently than not unusable after 1:00 p.m. because of heavy cloud cover.

Bob Sayre advises from San Salvador that the Central Americans will be very disappointed if you do not stay on Sunday and give a return reception. He is sending up their views in more detail, with suggestions for a Sunday schedule, if you decide to spend the whole day and leave on Monday.

Before reaching a decision on the schedule, I suggest you wait until we see his message.

W. W. Rostow

P.S. Amb. Castro called to express his deepest concern over a Sunday departure.

Attachment

Adjusted schedule for trip.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

Handwritten: 4/20/68
ACTION

Monday, July 1, 1968
4:45 p. m.

41

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a proposed note of regret to the Soviet Union, designed to achieve the early retrieval of the DC-8.

It has been cleared by Sect. Rusk and Under Sect. Katzenbach.

Attachment

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

41a

The Department of State refers to the note of July 1, 1968, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning a violation of Soviet airspace by an American DC-8 aircraft on July 1, 1968, in the area of the Kurile Islands. The Ministry's note states that the aircraft was intercepted by Soviet aircraft and landed on Iturup Island.

According to information available to the United States Government, a DC-8 airliner, registry No. N8631SB, owned by Seaboard World Airways, on route from Seattle, Washington to Yokota, Japan, inadvertently entered Soviet airspace at approximately the time and place mentioned in the Ministry's note.

The United States Government is unable to explain with any certainty the causes of this violation, in the light of the new and more stringent procedures which were introduced last year in order to prevent inadvertent entry by U. S. aircraft into Soviet airspace along the route from Alaska to Japan where air navigation is difficult. The United States will take every precaution possible to prevent any future violation of Soviet airspace in this area. The United States Government expresses its official regrets to the Soviet Government for this inadvertent entry into Soviet airspace and requests that the passengers, crew and aircraft be ^{released} ~~returned~~ as speedily as possible ~~to the~~ ~~United States~~.

Department of State

Washington

Pres file

42

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 1, 1968
3:55 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

These two cables indicate the state of the track on the downed aircraft.

An apology and prompt release of the aircraft seem in order.

I understand State will have a proposed response very soon.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc/cb, NARA, Date 8-22-01

~~SECRET~~ ~~LIMDIS~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

Davis
42a

~~SECRET~~ HCE004

1968 JUL 1 17 49

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 04464 011733Z

54 42
ACTION SS 70

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CIAE 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, /070 W

Z 011657Z JUL 68
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8890

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 4464

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: KURILE PLANE INCIDENT

REF: MOSCOW 4463

FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION NOTE HANDED ME BY KUZNETSOV THIS
EVENING:

BEGIN QTE MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS USSR ON INSTRUCTION SOVIET
GOVERNMENT FIRMLY PROTESTS TO EMBASSY USA FOR TRANSMITTAL
GOVERNMENT USA CONCERNING THIS NEW FACT OF VIOLATION OF STATE
FRONTIERS OF USSR BY AMERICAN AIRCRAFT.

ACCORDING TO PRECISELY ESTABLISHED DATA, ON JULY ONE AT ONE HOUR
THIRTY-SIX MINUTES MOSCOW TIME AN AIRCRAFT OF USA, TYPE DC-3,
ENTERED THE AIR SPACE OF USSR IN AREA OF KURILE ISLANDS AND
CONTINUED ITS FLIGHT IN THIS AREA FOR A LONG TIME; IN CONNECTION
HEREWITH IT WAS INTERCEPTED BY SOVIET AIRCRAFT GUARDING FRONTIERS
AND WAS LANDED AT TWO HOURS FORTY MINUTES ON THE ISLAND OF ITURUP.

ON BOARD THE AIRCRAFT WERE 230 AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL AND
16 CREW MEMBERS; THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES.

AT PRESENT TIME A FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES
CONNECTED WITH VIOLATION BY THIS AMERICAN AIRCRAFT OF SOVIET
FRONTIERS IS UNDER WAY.

THOMPSON

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ ~~LIMDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc/ab*, NARA, Date *8-22-01*

1955 JUL 1 17 40

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS~~SECRET~~

HCE002

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 04463 011729Z

49

ACTION SS 70

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CIAE 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, /070 W
-----Z 011655Z JUL 68
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8889~~SECRET~~ 4463

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: KURILE PLANE INCIDENT

1. AT 7 PM KUZNETSOV HANDED ME NOTE ON KURILE PLANE INCIDENT. TRANSLATION IN FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.
2. I REMINDED HIM OF REQUEST I HAD MADE THIS MORNING FOR RELEASE OF CREW AND MEN. I ADDED THAT I WAS SEEN THAT NO VIOLATION OF SOVIET TERRITORY WAS INTENDED AND THAT WE WOULD REGRET ANY THAT HAD OCCURRED.
3. KUZNETSOV SAID HE HAD NOTHING TO ADD TO THE NOTE BUT WENT ON TO SAY THAT SECRETARY RUSK IN TALKING TO DOBRYIN HAD SAID IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT VIOLATION HAD OCCURRED. HE SAID SOVIET INFORMATION WAS EXACT AND THAT THEY EXPECTED REPLY TO THEIR NOTE. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE WAS SURE I REALIZED THEY DID NOT WISH TO DO ANYTHING TO WORSEN OUR RELATIONS.
4. KORNIENKO WHO WAS PRESENT FOLLOWED ME OUT AND SAID IT WAS MOST IMPORTANT TO HAVE APPROPRIATE REPLY QUICKLY. HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN PREVIOUS MINOR VIOLATIONS OF SOVIET AIRSPACE IN THIS AREA BUT THIS ONE HAD GONE ON FOR A VERY LONG TIME AND COULD NOT BE IGNORED.
5. IT IS CLEAR THAT SOVIETS EXPECT FORMAL APOLOGY. I UNDERSTAND FROM PRESS THAT WE HAVE INFORMATION FROM RADAR STATION IN JAPAN INDICATING VIOLATION. WITH PUEBLO IN MIND I SUGGEST WE TRANSMIT PROMPT EXPRESSION OF REGRET BUT REFER TO SUBSTANTIATING INFORMATION.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By JE/CB, NARA, Date 8-22-01

Monday, July 1, 1968
3:50 p. m.

P file
43

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a rundown on those to whom special
press invitations were issued and those who
attended the signing this morning.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

43a

July 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Specially Invited Press

Of the 15 press people specially invited, 4 were present; 3 said they would be there but were not seen; Geyelin said he would try to make it; 4 were abroad or out of the city and 3 were invited but did not commit themselves to come.

The rundown on each is:

Katherine Graham - accepted; said she definitely planned to attend. Police did not check her in as actually coming.

Crosby Noyes - travelling; out of town.

Drew Pearson - Invitation extended through his secretary; did not make commitment.

Joe Kraft - Out of the country.

John Steele - Accepted; we did not see in the East Room.

Jack Sutherland - Present.

Boyd France - Invitation extended through his secretary; did not make commitment.

James Reston - In New York; invitation extended but no commitment.

Russ Wiggins - In Maine; invitation extended.

Philip Geyelin - He said he would try to make it.

Lack Leacacos - Present.


Charles Bartlett - Accepted; we did not see in the East Room.

Joseph Alsop - Present.

Lloyd Norman - Present.

Richard Wilson - Invitation extended; no commitment.

(Some newsmen attended in the East Room but did not go through the Receiving Line or stay for the reception. The Police have no record of newsmen admitted with a White House pass -- so we could not check them on entry record.)


Nathaniel Davis

44

INFORMATION

~~SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

free file

Monday, July 1, 1968 -- 3:30 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith, literally EYES ONLY for
you, Sec. Rusk's conversation today with
Abm. Dobrynin.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 9-28-92

INFORMATION

Monday, July 1, 1968 -- 3:00 p.m.

Per file

Mr. President:

I sent your speech, with a note saying the President wished me to forward it, to the following:

Charles Bartlett
Philip Potter
Boyd France
Tom Lambert
Tom Vall
David Brinkley
Marvin Kalb
Roscoe Drummond
Robert Spivack
Joseph Alsop
Clayton Fritchey
Cresby Noyes
Max Frankel
David Lawrence
Kenneth L. Fox

John Steele
Lloyd Norman
James Reston
Robert Donovan
John Scall
John Hightower
William S. White
William Stringer
Jack Leacacos
Joe Kraft
Phil Geyelin
Carl Rowan
Richard L. Wilson
Drew Pearson

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

Pres file

46

SECRET

Monday, July 1, 1968
2:55 p. m.

7:30

MR. PRESIDENT:

There's even a little progress on Cyprus,
as the attached indicates.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By mg, NARA, Date 9-28-92

46a

~~SECRET~~

July 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: The Cyprus Situation Improves

This is just to bring you up to date on one of our perennial problems. The situation in Cyprus is the best since inter-communal fighting broke out in December 1963, and we may be seeing some real progress towards a peaceful settlement.

After extended haggling about sites for talks and UN participation, Turkish Communal Chamber President Denktash and House of Representatives President Clerides have settled down to unsupervised substantive discussions in Nicosia. Both negotiators are going out of their way to make friendly gestures, and both sides have made it clear that anything the other wants to bring up will be discussed. So far, they are dealing with symptoms--road blocks and the like--rather than basic issues such as the status of the Turkish Cypriot community.

Neither Athens nor Ankara is trying to manage these negotiations, but they are giving encouragement and working on the international aspects of the problem. Last week, the British, Turkish, Greek and Cypriot foreign ministers agreed that union with Greece is no longer an alternative, and they planned for secret four power talks when the Clerides-Denktash negotiations end. Another encouraging sign is the progress Greece and Turkey are making on the Greco-Turkish difficulties which aren't related to Cyprus.

The picture is hopeful, but we are still a long way from a permanent Cyprus settlement. Working out effective constitutional guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots will be the major difficulty. Violence continues on the island, and another major incident is still possible. The negotiations were arranged despite the murders of Turks by Greek police. In the negotiations themselves, Clerides has been exceeding his instructions, and if Makarios overrules him the Turks will see Greek trickery. On the Turkish side, Denktash feels powerful enough to negotiate without always checking with Vice President Kuchuk and this could lead to an intensification of the power struggle in the Turkish community.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-286
By isa, NARA, Date 1-3-03

John W. Foster
John W. Foster

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - July 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: San Salvador Preparations

*1. P
2. P. file*

This is how substantive preparations are moving forward:

On the Central American side, their Foreign Ministers will meet in San Salvador tomorrow, July 2, to do the overall planning. They will review three aspects of the visit:

1. The program for the visit. (We have sent them our ideas -- Tab A -- and they seem generally acceptable.)
2. The structuring of the one working session. (Our view on how this should be done is at Tab B. Bob Sayre, who went on the advance party, will try to get concurrence of the Foreign Ministers.)
3. The Declaration of San Salvador. (State has given us a preliminary draft -- Tab C -- which has the substance of what we want, although it will need reworking.)

The Central American Economic Ministers meet in San Jose, Costa Rica on Thursday, July 4, to iron out some difference arising from a recent decision to apply a substantial import surtax.

The Central American Presidents meet in San Salvador on Friday, July 5, to go over last minute preparations for your arrival.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

On our side, I am having two major speeches prepared. One will deal with subregionalism and regionalism as building blocks in the movement toward a federal system of world organization. The Central American Common Market (CACM) will serve as the springboard for the speech. The best setting would be the working session on Saturday afternoon with your Central American colleagues who will cover in their statements accomplishments and projections of the CACM by sectors.

The second speech would be on education and the need to make formal training relevant to the aspirations and needs of a changing world. Into this we would weave the pilot project on ETV which will start in El Salvador. The natural forum for this speech would be the Lyndon B. Johnson Public School, built with Alliance for Progress funds, which you will visit on Sunday afternoon.

The Declaration of San Salvador will be divided into three parts:

- CACM accomplishments;
- CACM future action; and
- Pledge of US support.

The US pledge section involves \$76.8 million, of which \$46.8 million represents money in hand for loans authorized, but not announced. The other \$30 million would come from FY 1969 money. The \$76.8 million breaks down into \$30 million for the Central American Integration Fund to accelerate completion of the basic regional road network and to create a Central American Regional Telecommunications System -- i.e., physical integration. The remaining \$46.8 million covers seven loans, primarily for agriculture and education, of which each country receives at least one loan.

The two speeches, plus the Declaration of San Salvador, gives you an attractive and meaningful package for the trip.

We are making arrangements for you to meet with the Central American Ambassadors after the NPT ceremony this morning. I recommend you cover with them:

1. The schedule of Central American preparatory meetings:
 - Tuesday - Foreign Ministers at San Salvador.
 - Thursday - Economic Ministers at San Jose.
 - Friday - Presidents at San Salvador.
2. Our suggested program for the visit -- Tab A.
3. The structuring of the Presidential working session -- Tab B.
4. The outline of the Declaration of San Salvador, without the "happy surprises" -- Tab C.
5. Your plan to stop in each capital on the return trip.
6. Your offer to take them and their wives on Air Force One on Saturday, or put a plane at their disposal if they wish to fly down as a group on Thursday or Friday.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

- Tab A - Program for Presidential visit.
- Tab B - Structuring of working session.
- Tab C - Draft of the Declaration of San Salvador.

47a

A

Tentative Schedule

Saturday, July 6

- Noon arrival.
- Motorcade from airport to Presidential Palace.
- Lunch at ODECA headquarters.
- Meeting of Presidents at ODECA headquarters.
- State Dinner given by President of El Salvador.

Sunday, July 7

- Mass at Cathedral.
- Lunch at suitable finca (plantation).
- Visit to an AFP project.
- Return reception offered by President Johnson.

Monday, July 8

- Depart San Salvador for the US, going via each of
the other Central American capitals to return the
Presidents and participate in brief airport ceremony.
- The order of stops would be:

Guatemala City
San Pedro Sula
Managua
San Jose.

47c

B

47d

Tab B

Structuring of Single Working Session

of the Presidents

Saturday, July 6 - 3:30 p.m.

(3 hours)

1. Opening Remarks b - ODECA Secretary General.
2. Review of CACM performance - President Sanchez of El Salvador.
3. CACM social accomplishments and projections - President Mendez Montenegro of Guatemala.
4. CACM agricultural accomplishments and projections - President Somoza of Nicaragua.
5. CACM educational accomplishments and projections - President Trejos of Costa Rica.
6. Central American security - President Lopez of Honduras.
7. Subregionalism and regionalism as building blocks in achieving a more stable peace based on social justice and economic progress - President Johnson.

47e

C

DRAFT DECLARATION OF SAN SALVADOR

The Presidents of the Central American States meeting as the Supreme Council of the Organization of Central American States and the President of the United States met in San Salvador, El Salvador,

INSPIRED by the principles of the Alliance for Progress, expressed in the Charter of Punta del Este, and of the General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration of 1960, which created the Central American Common Market,

DETERMINED that the supreme goals of social justice and freedom from want shall be achieved in the shortest possible time,

CONVINCED of the need to attain greater unification of the Central American states,

RECALLED their meeting with President Johnson at Punta del Este in April 1967 at which time they discussed an ACTION PROGRAM to accelerate the economic and social development of the countries of the Central American region,

REVIEWED the progress that the countries of Central America have made in reaching the goals of this ACTION PROGRAM, and

RESOLVED to set forth with renewed dedication specific programs to accelerate the pace of regional cooperation and thereby improve the living standards of the people of Central America.

I. Economic Integration

The Presidents of the Central American countries reviewed the progress and growth of the Central American Common Market, which in a short seven-year period has increased trade between the five member countries by over 600%. They noted, with satisfaction, that the high rates of per capita growth in income, which prevailed up to 1967, were in part the result of the process of economic integration.

large

II. Regional Cooperation for Multinational Infrastructure Projects

THE PRESIDENTS OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REPUBLICS noted the work of the Central American Bank for Economic Integration and expressed satisfaction at the pace of implementation of multinational infrastructure projects which are providing the physical means to bind the economies of Central America more closely together.

The Presidents recalled the special impetus given to this effort by President Johnson who signed the first U.S. loan of \$35 million in July 1965. This loan, augmented by the contributions of the Central American States, created the Central American Integration Fund.

THE CENTRAL AMERICAN INTEGRATION FUND, administered by the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, has made possible the completion of the necessary feasibility and engineering studies for a basic transportation network to connect the Central American States and facilitate access to the important deep-water ports and, in addition, has financed the implementation of 24 projects costing \$81 million.

III. Regional Cooperation for Social and Political Development

THE PRESIDENTS OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN STATES also reviewed the substantial growth in regional institutions and regional cooperation for the social and political betterment of the peoples of the Central American republics.

The Organization of Central American States (ODECA) has sponsored a program which, with United States financial support, has provided over 8.7 million textbooks to school children in each of the five countries.

The Superior Council of Central American Universities (CSUCA) is moving to create a regional university system, and with United States technical assistance has significantly modernized the teaching of the basic sciences in the existing Central American universities.

Under the auspices of ODECA, and with the assistance of the United States, the Ministers of Health of the five countries have cooperated in mounting a coordinated regional attack on malaria.

Under the auspices of ODECA, a regional program has been established to extend basic health services to the rural areas of the member countries and which to date has provided services to more than one million rural families.

Under the auspices of ODECA, a Council of Public Health has been established to coordinate a massive attack on health problems common to the five countries. Programs to establish uniform standards and policies for food and drug control, train health personnel, and control communicable disease are underway.

Through the mechanism of the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration (SIECA), the five Central American countries have moved to carry out an agreement to coordinate and stabilize prices of the basic food grains.

IV. Future Action

The Presidents of the Central American countries proclaimed their determination to take further steps both to perfect the process of economic integration and to accelerate the social, economic and political development of their countries. To this end they pledged themselves to seek to accomplish the following:

1. augment the resources of the Central American Fund for Economic Integration to complete the basic transportation network of the Central American region and establish a Central American Telecommunications System.
2. ratify the protocol of San José in order to provide new budgetary resources to the member states to finance expanded development programs.
3. complete the process of ratification of the protocol concerning fiscal incentives for new industries.

4. provide increased investment resources for programs to expand agricultural productivity and marketing and to modernize the life of the rural populations.
5. embark on substantial new programs to extend educational opportunity to those now lacking such services, with special attention to the improvement and modernization of curricula and the creation of a free secondary and vocational educational service.
6. negotiate, at an early date, a protocol to provide for the free movement of persons throughout the Central American region.

For his part, President Johnson of the United States agreed to support these new efforts, and to this end has authorized the negotiation of new loans totalling \$76.8 million as follows:

- a \$30 million loan to the Central American Integration Fund to accelerate the completion of the basic regional transportation network, and to create a Central American Regional Telecommunications System.
- Seven loans totalling \$46.8 million primarily for agriculture and education projects as follows:
 - a pilot Instructional Television System in El Salvador;
 - a program to improve Guatemala's primary education system and extend it into the rural areas of the country;
 - a program to increase food production and marketing facilities in Honduras;
 - programs to increase food production and expand rural electric cooperatives in Nicaragua, and
 - development of agro-industries in Costa Rica through assistance to the private sector.

Mr. Rostow

48
2. Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Abe Feinberg--6:15 p.m., Tuesday, July 2.

You may wish to be sure Abe knows about the \$25 million credit you approved over the weekend so Israel wouldn't have to pay cash for the four Hawk missile batteries it's buying.

You might also wish to give him a glimpse of our current concern that the Arab-Israeli issue will soon be thrown back into the UN Security Council. We're not trying to scare anyone. But it might be worth paving the way for whatever talk George Ball may have with the Israelis.

Our main point is that we're not going to repeat 1957. We understand that the Israelis want to hold out for a real agreement this time, and we're not going to push them off that position.

But we do think they have a responsibility to get substantive talks going. We think they could be more flexible about putting some ideas about the terms of a settlement on the table--rather than holding out for direct negotiations with the Egyptians at the outset. We don't want to do their thinking for them, but as I told Eppie Evron, we expect them to "find their own equivalent of March 31st" to break the stalemate.

What's at stake is not just another unpleasant session in the UN, though that could damage our peace-making efforts. The real problem is that our position throughout the Middle East will remain on dead center until we make some progress toward a settlement. Israel depends on our position and has some responsibility to help us maintain it.

You have your own answer on F-4s. Our general feeling is that we'd give the wrong signal to release them except in connection with a serious simultaneous effort to get peace talks started.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *8-22-01*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 21, #311
By jc NARA. Date 8-22-01

Monday, July 1, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Saudi Crown Prince--11:30 a.m. Tuesday, July 2.

Your main reason in seeing Crown Prince Khalid is to reassure King Faisal of our continued friendship. Faisal is disillusioned by what he considers our support for Israel. He fears we have washed our hands of the Middle East.

The Crown Prince is less strong than Faisal. But he is intelligent and can talk substance if you get him going. I suggest the following leads:

1. You have the highest respect for King Faisal. You recall with pleasure his visit here. You continue to regard him as one of your best friends in the Middle East. How is he?
2. You know that the King is deeply concerned about Israel's continued occupation of Arab territory. You want him to know that we are doing everything we can to bring about a settlement that the Arabs as well as the Israelis would find honorable. This hasn't been easy, but a fair settlement remains our objective. Would he like to say anything about this?
3. You have just had a good talk with the Shah of Iran and would like to hear about the Shah's recent stopover in Saudi Arabia. You would be interested in anything the Crown Prince has to say about the future of Saudi Arabian relations in the Persian Gulf.
4. You would like to explain your purposes in South Vietnam and at the Paris talks. (The Saudis are interested because they see our steadfastness in Vietnam as a measure of how seriously we'd stick by the security assurances we have given Saudi Arabia over the years.)
5. You hope the Crown Prince has received all the medical help he wished. (He had a routine medical checkup at Bethesda last week.)

The Crown Prince had dinner at the White House with President Roosevelt in September 1943 when he was here with then Foreign Minister Faisal as an advisor. One ice-breaker might be to ask him about that or to recall yourself a little bit about President Roosevelt at that time.

The Crown Prince speaks only Arabic. An interpreter, Luke Battle, and his Country Director, will be available.



9156

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 22, 1968

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Saudi Crown Prince
Khalid Ibn Abd al-Aziz

The enclosed briefing material contains the lines it is suggested the President use in his meeting with the Saudi Crown Prince.

The Crown Prince is a traditionalist whose habits, customs and attitudes are reminiscent of the older and simpler but disappearing life of the desert-dwelling Arab. He has not had great political responsibilities but is slated to become King, a man with whom we shall want to have close relations. Somewhat shy, the Prince is not voluble in formal conversations but becomes more animated in an atmosphere of friendly, informal talks.

A biographic sketch of Prince Khalid is enclosed.

John F. Walsh
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Briefing Paper
2. Biographic Sketch

SECRET
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 76 9 91-366

By isplaf, NARA, Date 10-5-92

~~SECRET~~

BRIEFING PAPER

Subject: Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia,
Khalid Ibn Abd al-Aziz

The US interest in the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia was first expressed by President Truman and has been reaffirmed in varying terms and intent by each succeeding administration. Behind these assurances lies our considerable economic and political interest in Saudi Arabia. There are now almost 7,000 Americans living and working in the country and the Aramco oil investment is the largest single private investment outside the US.

Our primary interest in the current visit here of Saudi Crown Prince Khalid is to convey to him, and through him to King Faisal, a sense of the continuing US interest in, and friendship for, Saudi Arabia. In this connection, Khalid himself accompanied Faisal as a senior advisor when the latter visited here as Foreign Minister in September, 1943 and was entertained at dinner by President Roosevelt. In his toast on that occasion, President Roosevelt said: "We have much in common. We both love liberty--both Nations".

Today King Faisal is concerned over what he regards as a US policy of support for Israel without regard for US traditional friendship for some of the Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia. His annoyance with us has recently been manifest in a number of ways, such as ordering Saudi abstention at the UNGA on the NPT issue, apparently in response to our abstention on the Jerusalem resolution. Faisal has also refused so far to release to us a portion of a space capsule which fell on Saudi territory and our Ambassador describes him generally as "in a bad mood due to Arab/Israel developments". Prince Khalid is in close contact with King Faisal and will no doubt report to him promptly his impressions of the warmth of his reception here. Faisal often asserts that he believes the US is becoming increasingly disinterested in the Arab Near East

~~SECRET~~
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7129 91364
By copying NARA, Date 10512

~~SECRET~~

2

and is hyper-sensitive to any signs which he might see as evidence of a diminishing regard for Saudi Arabia.

Nevertheless, Faisal still places great value on his relationship with the US despite our role as Israel's closest and most powerful friend. The Saudis need to be reassured of our understanding of their efforts to develop their country and by occasional signs of our sympathy for their legitimate aspirations as the leading power on the Arabian Peninsula.

The Saudi establishment has long given tacit support to US actions in Viet Nam. Ambassador Eilts has discussed the subject with Crown Prince Khalid. The Crown Prince has expressed some concern to our Ambassador that the USG might surrender South Viet Nam by working out a compromise at the Paris talks. Saudi interest in this matter springs from their anxiety over the credibility of the limited security assurances the USG has given Saudi Arabia over the years. These assurances have ranged from general statements of interest in Saudi Arabia's well being to fairly specific declarations of "full support for the maintenance of Saudi Arabia's integrity" as expressed in President Kennedy's letter of October 25, 1962.

On other issues, Crown Prince Khalid has expressed interest in Persian Gulf developments. He has confirmed to us that the Shah had a cordial private meeting with King Faisal in Jidda on June 3 and believes that the two monarchs should be able to work out existing problems. He would be interested in your own comments regarding the Shah's talks here on this subject.

Crown Prince Khalid is having a routine medical checkup at the Bethesda Naval Hospital on June 27. We have also arranged for an examination of his son, Prince Abdullah, at that time. You may wish to inquire regarding the Prince's health and express the hope that our Navy doctors will be able to recommend appropriate private treatment for Abdullah.

~~SECRET~~

49c

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Khalid Ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Sa'ud

Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia
Deputy Prime Minister

Khalid ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Sa'ud was appointed Crown Prince on 29 March 1965 and now is in line to succeed King Faisal. He has held the post of Deputy Prime Minister since 31 October 1962. Prince Khalid is the fourth surviving son of the late King 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud and is respected by his brothers for his close contact with the tribal leaders and for his adherence to a more modest, less extravagant mode of life than the majority of the royal family. Before becoming Crown Prince he did not have a reputation for intelligence, decisiveness or other leadership qualities. However the appointment has thrust Prince Khalid into more of a pivot position between the contending factions of the royal family.

Amir Khalid was born about 1913. His mother was a member of the Jiluwi family, governors of the Eastern province. Khalid received the usual private tutoring in Riyadh. During the brief war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 1934 he held the titles of Minister of the Interior and Acting Prime Minister, and was the Saudi representative at the ensuing peace negotiations in Taif. Khalid served as acting viceroy of the Hejaz in Faisal's absence in 1932, 1937 and 1939. He accompanied Faisal to the UK in 1939 and to the US in 1943. Khalid temporarily dropped out of public life after 1944. He devoted his time to the management of his estates and business interests. A farming enthusiast, he was one of the first princes to establish a country estate outside Riyadh. He is a founding member of the Saudi Cement Company. Among his other businesses is the Khalidiyah Company, which provides contracting services to the Arabian-American Oil Company in Riyadh. Khalid has been close to King Faisal for many years. During the 1930's when Faisal was viceroy of the

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-287
By cbm, NARA, Date 4-25-03

Hejaz, Khalid occasionally acted as his deputy, and in 1960 Faisal attempted to get Khalid designated Deputy Prime Minister, with the power to run the government during Faisal's absence. Khalid has been rumored as a possibility for various Cabinet posts since 1957. In March 1965 King Faisal designated Prince Khalid (his brother and Deputy Prime Minister) Crown Prince and Heir Apparent to the King. Prince Muhammad, Khalid's older brother, agreed to forego the position [REDACTED] 3.4(b)(6)

[REDACTED] The appointment was thus made strictly on the basis of seniority by age and served the second practical aim of selecting a neutral figure who is unlikely to disturb existing balances of power between other royal princes and the bloc of royal full brothers known as the "Sudayri Seven". Much conjecture has arisen concerning Khalid's general abilities and fitness to succeed King Faisal, based mainly upon the Prince's lack of experience and quiet, retiring manner. Whether Prince Khalid would be able to rule effectively and hold contending factions of the Royal Family in check would depend upon which of Prince Khalid's qualities emerge if put to the test. His outward manner could belie a native shrewdness. Prince Muhammad reportedly has regretted his foregoing the appointment as Crown Prince and would like to take Prince Khalid's place.

Khalid has been described as a slightly built man who resembles his uncle 'Abd Allah ibn 'Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'ud more than he does his father. He is a simple man of Bedouin ways and tastes, and a fairly devout Muslim. A personable, unassuming and somewhat reserved individual, he contrasts sharply with his full brother, Muhammad, an outgoing person [REDACTED] 3.4(b)(6)

Khalid is married and has at least two sons. In May 1964 Amir Khalid went to Paris to be treated for high blood pressure and a heart condition, and it was thought that he might undergo a minor operation. [REDACTED] 3.4(b)(6)

June 12, 1968

50

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Monday - July 1, 1968

~~Handwritten~~
2. Pro. file

Mr. President:

Now that we have resolved the Sol Linowitz problem, I would appreciate an indication of your desire with respect to Ed Clark. (Tab A).

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By pc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

50a

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Monday - July 1, 1968

Mr. President:

Yesterday you told me you wanted Covey Oliver and Bill Bowdler to accompany you to San Salvador. You said nothing about Sol Linowitz. If you don't invite him, there is going to be one sore-head and a lot of wagging tongues. What is your wish?

Put Sol on the list _____

Don't put him on the list _____

Call me _____.

I assume you want Ed Clark to go.

Yes _____ No _____ Call me _____.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file
51

Monday, July 1, 1968
4:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Jack Sutherland tells me that the marked paragraph was the best he could do this week.

Next week, however, they plan a major story on: Is President Johnson a Lame Duck? He has been instructed to write the case for a negative answer. I gave him the material on foreign affairs today. He will be seeing Joe Califano tomorrow or later this afternoon.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

FROM THE
NATION'S
CAPITAL

TOMORROW[®]

5.1a
P.
LOOK
AHEAD

Newsgram[®]

2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

A new Supreme Court, to take shape gradually in the months ahead, is likely to be involved less in controversy, more in the prosaic business of judging.

The "Warren Court," during 15 years, did much legislating, much guiding of the country into paths that the elected Congress would not tread.

Next is to come a "Fortas Court." Probable course: Less pioneering, much less concern with working a revolution.

During the years in which Earl Warren has been Chief Justice of U.S.:

Negro rights in all fields gained sweeping protection of courts.

States and localities saw broad range of powers transferred to Washington.

Cities and suburbs gained, rural areas lost, in forced redistricting.

Police were restricted. Rights of suspects were expanded.

The "Warren Court" has centralized more power over U.S. life in Washington, and concentrated more of Washington's power in hands of the Court.

Abe Fortas, as Chief Justice, is expected by his friends to be much less of an "activist" than Warren, less interested in expanding power of the courts.

Homer Thornberry, as a new Justice and a new vote on a nine-man Court, will add a moderate vote on many issues, his friends say.

Odds at present seem to be that both will be confirmed by the Senate.

Four of nine Justices will be replaced before the turnover in the Court, now started, is completed. Earl Warren is first. Hugo Black is expected to step out in 1969, if not before. William Douglas will be leaving in the foreseeable future. John Harlan is known to have been considering retirement.

Complexion of the Supreme Court in years to come will depend upon the new President. If it's Hubert Humphrey, selection of Justices would be expected to incline to "liberals." If it's Richard Nixon, the probable result would be toward a more "conservative" Court.

At the White House, Mr. Johnson is concentrating his attention and effort on exploring ways to end Vietnam war, relax Middle East tensions, get the world calmed down before leaving office. LBJ's involvement is deep and active.

There's hope at the White House that Russia's agreement to talk about a mutual cutback in offensive and defensive missiles means that Soviet leaders, too, feel it is vital for the world to cool off.

The President is described as acting like anything but a "lame duck."

The choice the country faces seems more than ever: Humphrey vs. Nixon.

(over)

Pres file

52

SECRET

**Monday, July 1, 1968
1:00 p. m.**

MR. PRESIDENT:

**Herewith Bowdler reports Secretary
Rusk's view on a Mexican stop.**

W. W. Rostow

SECRET attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 9-28-91

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

52a

~~SECRET~~

Monday - July 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

Walt -

I asked Secretary Rusk for his views about the President stopping off in Mexico on his return.

He is against it for the following reasons:

1. It would take the edge off the visit with the Central American Presidents. The trip to San Salvador centers the spotlight on Central America and them personally. They would view a stop in Mexico as a dilution of this attention. The Central Americans are so important to us in so many different ways that it is not worth this risk.
2. A stop-over in Mexico City right now would seem anti-climactic in contrast to the visit of two years ago.
3. The two Presidents will be meeting in September anyway.
4. The President has a good many travel plans. He should conserve his time and energy for other visits.

WGB
WGBowdler

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

INFORMATION

53

Monday, July 1, 1968 -- 11:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Jack Leacacos, after I briefed him, promised to get an editorial out of Tom Vall. Here it is. We shall try to get it into the Congressional Record.

Per file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

THE PLAIN DEALER

Ohio's Largest Newspaper

HERMAN L. VAIL,
President

F. WILLIAM DUGAN,
Vice President and General Manager

THOMAS VAIL,
Publisher and Editor

WILLIAM M. WARE,
Executive Editor

Daily 396,931

Net paid circulation for six
months ended March 31, 1968

Sunday 540,522

As filed with the Audit Bureau of Circulations

Page 10—AA

Sunday, June 30, 1968

Nuclear Talks Credit to LBJ

Russia's announced willingness to enter into talks with the United States on the subject of limiting both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons is a personal triumph for the perseverance of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

Getting the Soviet Union into a meaningful discussion of the need of freeing the world from the awful threat of nuclear war could become one of the greatest accomplishments of Mr. Johnson's administration.

Mr. Johnson will have more to say on the disarmament situation at the nuclear non-proliferation treaty-signing ceremony tomorrow in Washington.

The President, early in his career in the White House, was firm in his belief that the two giant nuclear powers must cooperate—despite other trying differences—in keeping peace in the human family. Ambassadors and state secretaries worked toward this meeting of minds but nothing much happened. Still, the President persisted in

his efforts and the real groundwork finally was laid at Glassboro, N.J., a little over a year ago during his famous confrontation with Soviet Premier Alexei Koseygin.

The process of bringing along the Russians to a point where they would seriously take a long look at the great expenditure of money for a defensive nuclear system—money that could be more productive in social progress—necessarily was delicate. The attitudes and the incidents that lined the path to the eventual decision to hold talks on the nuclear missiles of attack and defense are well delineated today by John P. Leacacos, chief of The Plain Dealer Washington Bureau, in his weekly column in this section of the newspaper.

Statesmanship, to a large degree, is akin to salesmanship and President Johnson, by everlastingly holding the thought that the Soviet Union eventually could be sold on the wisdom of missile prudence, should get credit for his determination in a cause, which often seemed hopeless.

Law Jee

54

Monday, July 1, 1968
11:10 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

These Soviet personnel problems and prospects may interest you. It reflects high priority in the future for U. S. - Soviet relations -- if true.

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

54a
Rostow
S
u
M
G

TO : S/S - Mr. Benjamin H. Read

DATE: June 28, 1968

FROM : SOV - Malcolm Toon *MS*

Seeded
DCI HLM

SUBJECT: Report on Dobrynin Promotion and Gromyko Retirement - INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM

3-4(b)(1)



SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NIJ/RAC 01-238
By *cbm*, NARA, Date 3-17-03

cc: Amembassy MOSCOW

EUR/SOV/CHWoods:mal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

55

ACTION

~~SECRET~~

Monday - July 1, 1968 - 9:15 AM

Free file

Mr. President:

Yesterday you told me you wanted Covey Oliver and Bill Bowdler to accompany you to San Salvador. You said nothing about Sol Linowitz. If you don't invite him, there is going to be one sore-head and a lot of wagging tongues. What is your wish?

- Put Sol on the list _____
- Don't put him on the list _____
- Call me _____.

I assume you want Ed Clark to go.

Yes ____ No ____ Call me ____.

W. W. Rostow

Profile

56

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 1, 1968
9:00 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Kesygin's reaction to Tommy's
intervention on the plans.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Moscow 4450)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 9-28-92

56a

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 04450 011036Z

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ACTION SS 30

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Z 010950Z JULY 68
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8878

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 4450

EXDIS

REF: STATE 194071

I TOOK UP MATTER OF SEABOARD AIRWAYS PLANE WITH KUZNETSOV PRIOR TO NPT SIGNING CEREMONY THIS MORNING. HE SAID HE WAS UNINFORMED OF THE INCIDENT. WHEN KOSYGIN CAME IN, HE IMMEDIATELY RAISED THE MATTER AND SAID THAT THERE WERE SOME 300 AMERICAN SOLDIERS ON THE PLANE, ALTHOUGH THEY WERE UNARMED. HE SAID THEY WERE INVESTIGATING WHY WE HAD SENT THEM THESE MEN. I SAID IT WAS CLEAR THEY WERE OFF COURSE AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THEY WOULD BE PROMPTLY RELEASED. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD THEY WERE ON THEIR WAY TO JAPAN. KOSYGIN REPLIED THAT PROBABLY THEY WERE ON THEIR WAY TO FIGHT IN VIETNAM AND ADDED THAT THE MATTER WAS BEING INVESTIGATED.

THOMPSON

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

PRESERVATION COPY

57

INFORMATION

SECRET

Pres file

Monday, July 1, 1968 -- 8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

You will have noted and sensed the lull in fighting in Vietnam.

IV Corps -- very quiet.

III Corps -- captured documents suggest attack on Saigon may have been put off until August.

II Corps -- Highlands: enemy forces pulled back to Cambodia or sent towards Saigon; but little contact.

I Corps -- no immediate threat to Danang in sight or Hue or Quang Tri; although large forces still in the whole area. Evidence of enemy desire to keep pressure at the DMZ.

I shall have a more professional military assessment made.

For past seven days (June 24-30) U. S. killed in action 104, averaging 15 per day, as opposed to 26 per day in the year 1967.

As you know, there was a considerable lull ~~before~~ in the second half of April, before the early May attacks on Saigon. This is getting a bit longer and lower.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rs NARA, Date 9-28-92

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1998
By rs NARA, Date 9-28-92

WWRostow:rlm

SECRET

58
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 1, 1968 -- 8:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Thieu:

- accepts Honolulu;
- any date from a Saigon departure on July 16 onward;
- he will take initiative via a letter to you;
- wishes Clifford visit announcement deferred until after announcement made of Honolulu meeting.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 31488

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-22-01

WWRostow:rlp



Department of State

TELEGRAM

58a

~~SECRET~~

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DE RUNJIR 31433 1831050
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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5871
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1963 JUL 1 AM 7 16

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NODIS

DEPT PASS PARIS ; PARIS PERSONAL FOR VANCE AND HABIB

REF: DEPTTEL 194063

SUBJECT: THIEU VISIT TO U.S.

1. WHEN I EXPLAINED TO THIEU THIS AFTERNOON THE REASONING FOR A DEFERMENT OF OFFICIAL VISIT AND OUR PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING IN HONOLULU, HE READILY ASSENTED.

2. HE CANNOT MAKE DATES SUGGESTED BUT CAN LEAVE ON JULY 16, AND ANY DATE AFTER THAT WOULD BE AGREEABLE.

3. HE WOULD LIKE TO HANDLE DEFERMENT OF OFFICIAL VISIT BY WRITING A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT STATING HE CANNOT BE AWAY FROM SAIGON FOR AS LONG AS ELEVEN DAYS, WOULD LIKE TO MEET PRESIDENT, AND ASKING IF MEETING IN HONOLULU WOULD BE AGREEABLE. I AGREED THIS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE.

4. I TOLD HIM OF PLAN FOR SECRETARY CLIFFORD TO VISIT SAIGON JULY 14-18. THIEU ASKED THAT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF CLIFFORD VISIT BE DEFERRED UNTIL AFTER ANNOUNCEMENT MADE OF HONOLULU MEETING.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By f, NARA, Date 8-22-01

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

PAGE -2- SAIGON 31488, July 1, 1968

NODIS

5. HE SAID HIS PARTY WOULD INCLUDE FOREIGN MINISTER, AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, AND CHIEF OF JOINT GENERAL STAFF. HE MAY ALSO BRING MINISTER OF ECONOMY AND OFFICER IN CHARGE OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT, DEPENDING ON AGENDA. HE VISUALIZES TWO DAYS OF MEETINGS.

6. HE WAS A LITTLE WISTFUL THAT STATE VISIT HAD TO BE POSTPONED, AND WONDERED WHETHER IT MIGHT BE SCHEDULED FOR AFTER THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONS OR POSSIBLY AFTER THE ELECTION. I SAID WE WANTED A STATE VISIT, BUT WANTED IT TO TAKE PLACE UNDER MOST AUSPICIOUS CONDITIONS AND WOULD KEEP THE INVITATION OPEN.

7. COMMENT: I DID NOT PRESS INCLUDING KY IN PARTY, BUT AT THAT POINT IN OUR TALK MERELY ASKED WHOM HE THOUGHT HE WOULD TAKE WITH HIM. HE IMMEDIATELY LISTED THOSE IN PARA 5. IT MAY BE THAT BUI DIEM, WHO IS KY'S MAN, WAS HIS WAY OF HANDLING KY, BUT I ALSO THINK HE MAY WELL HAVE THOUGHT THAT TAKING KY MIGHT BE INTERPRETED HERE AND ABROAD NOT AS A SIGN OF UNITY, BUT AS SIGN HE IS FEARFUL OF LEAVING KY IN SAIGON. IT SUGGESTS TO ME THAT HE IS COMPLETELY CONFIDENT THAT POLITICAL SITUATION IN SAIGON IS IN HAND.

8. EVEN IN ADVANCE OF THIEU'S LETTER BELIEVE WE SHOULD WORK OUT DATES.

BUNKER

BT

NOTE : NOT RPT NOT PASSED PARIS BY OC/T.....

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION