

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#3 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 8/3/01</i> S 1 p	7/18/68	A
#4b note	Intelligence Note 487 <i>open 8/3/01</i> C 3 p	6/20/68	A
#5 memo	Duplicate of #3 <i>open 8/3/01</i>		
#6a memo	Taylor to President <i>open 8-12-93 NLJ 92-383</i> S 3 p <i>Duplicate of #15a, NSF, CF, VN, "GI-Taylor memos"</i>	7/17/68	A
#7 memo	Rostow to President, 12:30 p.m. <i>open 8/3/01</i> S 1 p	7/17/68	A
#7a cable	Moscow 4674 <i>open 8/3/01</i> S 1 p	7/17/68	A
#9 memo	Rostow to President, 8:00 a.m. S 1 p <i>dup. #48, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVARD Chron. v. 14, Bx III</i>	7/17/68	A
#9a cable	Paris 18055 C 1 p <i>dup. #48a, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVARD Chron. vol. XIV Bx III</i>	7/16/68	A
#10 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 8/3/01</i> C 1 p <i>[Duplicate of #207, NSF, CF, Israel, Vol 10, Sanitized 1984]</i>	7/17/68	A
#11 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 8/3/01</i> S 2 p <i>(Duplicate of #131, NSF, CF, Africa, Union South, Vol 3, Sanitized 1990)</i>	7/17/68	A
#12 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 8/3/01</i> S 1 p	7/17/68	A
#13 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 8/3/01</i> PCI 1 p	7/17/68	A
#18 memo <i>sanitized 5-13-03 NLJ/RAI 01-217</i>	Rostow to President, 1:20 p.m. S 1 p	7/16/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 88, July 13-20, 1968 Box 37

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#18a memo	Intelligence Memorandum open 8/3/01 S 1 p	7/16/68	A
#18b memo	Intelligence Memorandum sanitized per RAK 8/3/01 S 10 p	7/15/68	A
#23a cable	Clifford to Rostow (dup of #23a, NSF, CF, VN 2H(4), Box 74) S 1 p OPEN 7/22/96 NY 96-125	7/16/68	A
#26 memo	Rostow to President open 8/3/01 S 1 p	7/16/68	A
#26a ltr	Birdsall to President open 8/3/01 PCI 2 p	6/28/68	A
#27 memo	Rostow to President open 8/3/01 C 1 p	7/16/68	A
#27a memo	Rusk to President open 11-5-96 NLJ 95-248 C 2 p Duplicate of #2a, NSF, CF, Nepal	7/10/68	A
#27b rpt	Bio Sketch open 11-5-96 NLJ 95-248 C 2 p Duplicate of #2b, NSF, CF, Nepal	5/9/68	A
#28a telecon	Read and Vance, 7:05 p.m. open 8/3/01 S 1 p	7/15/68	A
#29 memo	Rostow to President, 7:00 p.m. open 1-20-98 RAK C 1 p dup #56, NSF, CF, VN, "HARVARD Chron. v. 14, "B4111	7/15/68	A
#29a cable	Paris 17963 C 2 p dup #56a, as above	7/15/68	A
#31 memo	Rostow to President, 5:35 p.m. open 8/3/01 S 1 p	7/15/68	A
#31a cable	Saigon 5314 open 8/3/01 S 6 p	7/15/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#32 memo	Rostow to President, 5:15 p.m. open 8/3/01 C 1 p	7/15/68	A
#32a memo	Rusk to President open 8/3/01 C 2 p	7/15/68	A
² #30b draft	"Presidential Message for Opening ENDC" open 8/3/01 C 5 p	7/15/68	A
² #30e memo	Johnson to SecDef open 8/3/01 S 2 p	7/12/68	A
#32d ltr	Seaborg to President open 8/3/01 C 1 p	7/13/68	A
#33a cable	Rostow to Clifford sentenced 4-21-99 #105-96-124 S 1 p <i>(dup. of #13, NSP, CHUN, 2H(4), Box 76) open 4-25-98 RAC</i>	7/15/68	A
#35 memo	Rostow to President, 10:45 a.m. <i>Open NLT 77-134 1.21.98</i> C 1 p <i>[dup. #148a, WAgency File, vol 10]</i>	7/15/68	A
#40 memo	Rostow to President, re: Brazil open 8/3/01 C 1 p	7/15/68	A
#40a cable	Rio de Janeiro 9876 open 8/3/01 C 2 p	7/13/68	A
#40b draft	Deptel to Rio de Janeiro open 8/3/01 C 2 p	7/15/68	A
#42 memo	Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m. open 8/3/01 S 1 p	7/14/68	A
#42a draft	President to Kosygin open 8/3/01 S 2 p	7/14/68	A
#42b memo	Rostow to President, 4:15 p.m. open 8/3/01 S 2 p <i>[Duplicate of #4, Vol 82]</i>	7/12/68	A

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#43 memo	Rostow to President, 10:45 a.m. <i>open 8/3/01</i> S 1 p	7/14/68	A
#43a cable	Saigon 32578 <i>open 8/3/01</i> S 2 p	7/14/68	A
#46 memo	Rostow to President, 4:30 p.m. <i>open 8/3/01</i> C 1 p	7/13/68	A
#46a memcon	"Maxwell Rabb's Shirt Sleeve Diplomacy" <i>open 8/3/01</i> C 2 p	7/10/68	A
#47a speech	"US and Changing World" (Rostow) <i>open 6-2-95 NLS 93-120</i> C 25 p <i>[Duplicate of #7a, NSF, Name File, "Rostow Memos"]</i>	5/8/68	A
#48 memo	Rostow to President, 4:10 p.m. <i>NSF</i> S 1 p <i>(Dup. of #11a, H of S Corresp, Pakistan, Ayub, Vol 3) open 8-15-94 NLS 94-82</i>	7/13/68	A
#48a memo	Katzenbach to President <i>open 4-12-96 NLS 94-81</i> S 2 p <i>(Dup. of #11c, see above)</i>	7/13/68	A
#48b draft	President to President Ayub <i>open 3/13/03 NLS 01-272 & #11e, see above</i> S 3 p <i>FRUS Vol. XXV, #503</i>	undated	A
#48c draft	President to President Ayub <i>open 3/13/03 NLS 01-272 & FRUS, Vol. XXV, #503</i> S 3 p <i>(Dup. of #11e, see above) open 3/13/03 NLS 01-272 & FRUS, Vol. XXV, #503</i>	undated	A
#49 memo	Rostow to President, 4 p.m. S 1 p <i>(Duplicate of #95, NSF, CF, Australia, Vol 3)</i>	7/13/68	A
#49a memo	Wright to Rostow <i>open 8/3/01</i> S 1 p <i>(Duplicate of #95a, NSF, CF, Australia, Vol 3)</i>	7/13/68	A
#49b airgram	Canberra A-615 <i>open 5/1/02 NLS 01-259</i> S 13 p <i>(Duplicate of #95b, NSF, CF, Australia, Vol 3)</i>	7/5/68	A
#52 memo	Rostow to President, 1:20 p.m. TS 1 p <i>sanitized 3/13/03 NLS 01-272</i>	7/13/68	A

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#54 memo	Rostow to President, 12:20 p.m. open 8/3/01 S 1 p	7/13/68	A
#54a draft	Deptel to Saigon <i>open 1-20-98 RAC</i> PCI 5 p	undated	A
#54b memo	Leddy to Secretary <i>open 8/3/01</i> C 4 p	7/12/68	A

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17 note	Rostow to the President, 5:10 p.m. open 4/3/03 NLJ/RAC 01-218 1 p S [Sanitized, NLJ-CBS 25, 7/2/84]	7/16/68	A
17a chart	Intelligence Report open 4/3/03 NLJ/RAC 01-219 1 p S [Exempt, NLJ-CBS 4, 12/7/83]	[7/68]	A
17b report	Intelligence Report open 4/3/03 NLJ/RAC 01-219 1 p S [Sanitized, NLJ-CBS 4, 12/7/83]	7/3/68	A
44 note	Rostow to the President, 10:45 a.m. open 3/19/03 NLJ/RAC 01-220 1 p S	7/14/68	A
44a cable	Intelligence Report 1p S Sanitized 5/27/03 NLJ/RAC 01-221	7/14/68	A
45 memo	Rostow to the President 1p TS Sanitized 8/19/03 NLJ/RAC 01-220	7/14/68	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 88, July 13-20, 1968, Box 37

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(includew)

Pres. file
1

Notes for the President's statement, after breakfast, July 20, 1968

1. Immediately upon arrival in Honolulu, I met with Secretary Clifford and General Wheeler. I received their report on the military situation in Vietnam:

-- the progress of Vietnamese mobilization;

-- and the progress of the program to modernize the equipment of the Armed Forces of Vietnam which we announced on March 31.

I also received their assessment of the enemy intentions in the weeks ahead.

2. Against this background, I went over these matters with President Thieu. All of us are in agreement that the other side is rapidly absorbing infiltrators from the North to fill up his units and re-equipping those units for another major series of attacks. None of us could find evidence that the enemy is engaged in an effort to match the de-escalation we began on March 31.

3. President Thieu informed me that in June the armed forces of South Vietnam reached a level of 765,000, 48,000 more than the original goal for this time. It is expected the total will exceed 800,000 by the end of 1968. We agreed that, having carried forward our accelerated schedules of re-equipment of the ARVN, we shall concentrate in the months ahead on upgrading the equipment for paramilitary forces down to the hamlet level.

4. President Thieu told me of the progress made by the new government, including not only mobilization but increased taxes; the unified defense of Saigon; the rapid introduction of the new rice seeds; and other encouraging developments.

5. We are resolutely determined to continue to pursue every avenue that might lead to peace.

6. We are equally determined to defend South Vietnam as these explorations go forward.

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19 July 1968

FOR WALT ROSTOW FROM ED HAMILTON

Below, for President's approval, is proposed message to new President Zinsou of Dahomey. He was inaugurated on July 17.

QTE Mr. President: Please accept my warmest congratulations upon your inauguration. As you take up the burdens of your high office, may I wish you every success, and may all the Dahomean people, with your guidance, enjoy lasting peace and prosperity.

Lyndon B. Johnson. UNQTE

*Free file
CAP 8/659
sent to Honolulu*

Ref Log 2280

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

3
Thursday, July 18, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Your Private Talks with Thieu

The basic talking paper in the black briefing book is sound; although you may wish to go over it with Sects. Rusk and Clifford and Amb. Bunker, before you see Thieu tomorrow (Friday) at 10 a. m.

At that first session, you may wish to encourage him to lay out the problems he wishes to raise with you with maximum frankness. As I reported to you, when Bui Diem called on me before his return to Saigon and asked what President Johnson wished to raise, I said the President:

- 4 -- wished to concentrate on bilateral talks;
- learn with greatest frankness Pres. Thieu's view of his problems.

After the first session, you can consider Thieu's points, consult with your advisers, and leave to later sessions your response.

Three basic general themes for the first session might be:

- we have supported and shall continue to support the constitutional process in South Vietnam. As duly elected President, Thieu can look to us with complete confidence. There is no higher Communist objective than to break up the Constitutional government.
- whether on the battlefield, or in peace initiatives, or in the struggle against corruption, or in economic and social development, we look to increasing assumption of responsibility and leadership by the GVN. That does not mean the U.S. intends to pull out its troops or withdraw its support. But the requirements of rising South Vietnamese nationalism and of U.S. politics require equally a gradual increase in the proportion of Vietnamese effort and leadership. Moreover, no development better guarantees the ultimate frustration of Communist political objectives in the South.
- on the peace talks, we understand the problem for the people of South Vietnam that is raised by our talking bilaterally with Hanoi; but we shall continue to maintain full detailed consultation at every stage and feel our way forward together. It is important that we maintain a certain flexibility in our public positions because we simply do not know the exact form negotiations will assume. But he can be confident that we do not intend to negotiate without the GVN issues which are its vital concern.

W.W.R.

4

INFORMATION

Wednesday, July 17, 1968
2:30 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk believes this
authoritative article in Pravda on U.S. -
Soviet relations will interest you.

It lists the major unresolved
problems between us.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

4a

Article by PRAVDA Political Observer V. Mayevskiy:
"Necessary Reminders"

In several speeches recently U.S. President L. B. Johnson has turned to the theme of Soviet-American relations. In particular he touched on these matters in a speech at the Glassboro State College in Glassboro, New Jersey, and in speeches at a ceremony to mark the exchange of ratification documents for the Soviet-American consular convention. The question of Soviet-American relations was also raised in a speech given by the President in the United Nations on 12 June on the occasion of the General Assembly's approval of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

The President's handling of the theme of Soviet-American relations is in itself highly characteristic. It is a reflection of those deep processes which are rising in the consciousness of the American community.

The celebration of the Soviet state's 50th anniversary demonstrated people's sympathy with and respect for the first socialist country. Despite tendentious propaganda -- crammed with anti-Sovietism and anticommunism -- millions of Americans could not fail to see that the Soviet country, in the process of building communism, is successfully resolving its imposing economic and cultural tasks, is strengthening its industrial and military might, and is consistently implementing a policy of struggle against the threat of a new war and in support of peace and cooperation with all countries. The alignment of forces in the international arena is changing in favor of socialism and the anti-imperialist forces. There are many facts to show that among the broad masses of America -- as also of other capitalist countries -- the desire is growing for normalization and development of relations with the Soviet Union. The leading figures of the United States must take this fact into consideration, and not merely those who now find themselves in power but also those whose names figure in the election campaign.

President Johnson declares that during the past year "several successes were achieved" in relations between the USSR and the United States. By this he is alluding to the conclusion of a treaty on the principles of activities by states in research and utilization of space -- including the moon and other celestial bodies -- to the agreement on rendering assistance to cosmonauts, to the consular convention, and to the agreement on airline routes, and to the preparation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Johnson says: "In some cases and on certain matters we are able -- at least partially -- to come to some agreement."

Yes indeed, in the fields mentioned there was cooperation between the two countries and it gave definite and positive results. Now the President is proposing, in his speeches, to develop cooperation between the United States, the USSR, and other countries on such problems as the carrying out of an international biological program and "the study of mankind's environment," the creation of a worldwide system of satellite communications, deepsea investigation of the ocean bed, underwater oceanological research, and investigation of the Arctic, the Antarctic, and the tropical forests.

Naturally, if we could have the united efforts of countries, including the United States and the USSR, for peaceful purposes, then on these terms we could also find opportunities for the combined work of the USSR and the United States on resolving the problems mentioned by the President in Glassboro. But the essence of the matter is that the chief problems still remain unresolved, and these have the greatest significance for the normalization and development of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

In addition the President admits: "As before, we still have deep and dangerous disagreements with the Soviet Union. But the cause of peace throughout the world is one that is too important for us to allow differences to prevent us from investigating all paths toward more peaceful relations and toward strengthening cooperation." Elsewhere he says: "Peace has to be worked for. And this is a long, continuous process, building peace brick by brick, agreement by agreement."

Strengthening peace is a long and complicated path. First and foremost one cannot violate it. But as we know, it is precisely this rule which is being systematically ignored by those who determine U.S. policy. It is sufficient to recall the events of recent years: U.S. armed provocation against Cuba, American intervention in the Congo, and intervention in the Dominican Republic. The United States' barbarous war against the Vietnamese people has become a concentrated expression of American imperialist policy.

CUBA
CONGO
D.R.
VIETNAM

The American aggression in Vietnam remains the most important obstacle not only in the path of Soviet-American relations, but also on the path to peace in Southeast Asia and the normalization of the international situation as a whole. Despite the fact that the opportunity for official talks between representatives of the DRV and the United States in Paris was opened on the initiative of the DRV, the escalation of the

American aggression in Vietnam continues. Statements in the American press say that the bombing of the North Vietnamese territory is constantly increasing despite the U. S. statement on "limited bombing", and the further increase in American forces in South Vietnam continues. All this testifies to the fact that the Pentagon, as before, is living its fruitless dream of "military victory" in Vietnam with disregard for the victims and the loss.

Meanwhile, in Paris, the American representatives are avoiding the settlement of the priority question -- the cessation of bombing and other acts of aggression against the DRV. The U. S. representatives in Paris are insisting on the discussion of other questions. But the Vietnamese delegation has clearly stated that it is willing to discuss these only after the main question has been settled. This means that once again the viewpoint of the United States is the obstacle on the road to political settlement.

The speech in Glassboro shows that the U. S. Government, as before, is taking an unrealistic approach toward settlement of the Vietnam problem and that it is trying to ignore the powerful protest against the Vietnam war which has developed throughout the world, including in the United States itself. It is perfectly clear that the gulf dividing the American people and certain U. S. politicians on this question, which is of top priority for the destiny of America, is deepening. It is impossible to hide from the American public by any words the fact that continuation of the U. S. aggressive war leaves a serious imprint on the possibility of development of Soviet-American relations and is poisoning the whole international atmosphere.

The other problem which is seriously complicating the international situation and hindering the improvement of Soviet-American relations is the U. S. support for the extremist strivings of Israel, which ^{ISRAEL} is conducting a predatory policy in the Near East. What has the United States done to force Israel to reckon with the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 on the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories? Practically nothing. It is no secret to anyone that Washington has at its disposal considerable means for influence on Tel Aviv.

In addition to this, the U. S. imperialist circles have not rejected the idea of breaking off with the progressive regimes in the Near East.

The United States has an interest in the closing of the Suez Canal: they think there that this would increase political and economic pressure on the UAR and other Arab countries and would increase the dependence of the West European countries on American oil and her tanker fleet. The conclusion is growing stronger that an unspoken alliance exists between the American and Israeli neocolonialists, who are pursuing far-reaching aims.

The third problem, without serious steps toward which it is difficult to hope for a relaxing of tension in the world and for an improvement in Soviet-American relations, is the problem of cessation of the arms race. President Johnson dealt in detail with the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons which was approved by the United Nations, but in emphasizing its importance he could not help acknowledging that "much still remained to be done, apart from this treaty. " ARMS
RACE

The Soviet Union consistently and steadfastly has fought for universal and total disarmament. Johnson says that the United States is "ready to move towards disarmament. "

However, world public opinion cannot ignore the facts of the further militarization of the United States. It is well known that the present military budget of the United States is the highest for the post-war period. It is intended to allot almost 80 billion dollars for military needs in the new fiscal year. This means a further increase in arms and an increase in the number of servicemen. Militarization in the United States is inseparably linked with the militarization of America's NATO allies and other military blocs, which can only strain the international atmosphere.

At a NATO session at the end of last year the United States imposed on the bloc's members the plans for the armed forces right up until 1973, trying in this way to prolong without preliminary permission the length of the treaty's effect, the first period of which expires in 1969. In the same way the United States acted as the initiator of new NATO military efforts. Already an association of naval powers of the bloc, continually operating in the Atlantic, has been formed, and a draft plan has been worked out for an operational association of multinational naval powers in the Mediterranean Sea. The construction of new military bases and the laying of belts of nuclear mines is being planned. According to press reports, the NATO leadership is "studying the NATO

question, " together with the Greek junta, of mining the Greek-Bulgarian frontier with atomic mines.

NATO's present activization acquires an increasingly dangerous character because the United States' main supporter in the bloc has become West Germany, whose revanchist circles are encroaching upon the sovereignty of the GDR and who do not recognize post-war frontiers in Europe. Extraordinary laws have just been passed in the German Federal Republic which are intended for the creation of a "strong rear" for the Bonn revanchists who, under cover of phrases about "a new Eastern policy," are dreaming about the old "drang nach Osten." Surely do not all these occurrences prove that the militarist course steered by the United States is poisoning the atmosphere in Europe and bringing with it a complication in relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, against which are directed the military might of NATO and its strike force -- the Bonn Bundeswehr?

FRG

One can mention still another very important problem which the U. S. President passed over in silence in his speeches, although it, so to speak, hangs in the air of America. It is the problem of the U. S. discriminatory measures in the field of trade and economic relations with the USSR and other socialist states. In some U. S. business circles, judging by all accounts, people understand how important the development of normal economic ties between two countries is for the normalization of relations between them. However, there is another approach to this problem. This can be seen in the example of the discussion on the question of trade with the East in the subcommittee on international financial questions of the American Senate Banking and Currency Committee. To judge by press reports, the majority of participants in the sessions are interested least of all in commerce. They were occupied for the most part with the question of how to make use of trade as a weapon for interference in the internal affairs of socialist countries. One can also bring to mind the whole conglomeration of all the ideological subversive actions which the United States is carrying out against the USSR and other socialist countries. This speaks for itself.

TRADE

The Soviet Union holds unchangingly to Lenin's principles for the development of normal relations and business cooperation with all countries, independent of their socio-political structure, if they are ready to build these relations on the basis of equality, respect for sovereignty, and noninterference.

And this is also the principle of peaceful coexistence, which opens up the possibility for strengthening international cooperation. However, the Soviet Union has not built and does not intend building its relations with other states to the detriment of the interests of socialism, the national liberation movement, and the peace and security of peoples. The Soviet Union keeps to this principle even in relations with the United States. If the United States is really interested in the genuine development of Soviet-American relations, then it will find there are real obstacles on these lines, first and foremost the American aggression in Vietnam. It would not be realistic to suppose that it is possible to improve Soviet-American relations while the solutions to major international questions are shelved.

CC: [redacted]

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence
Note - 487 4b

June 20, 1968

Please return to SOV. *6/21/68* *HTW*

To : The Secretary
Through : S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*

(HT/VT for copy)

Subject : US-USSR Relations -- Two Soviet Pundits Debate the President

Articles by two prominent Soviet journalists -- Izvestia's Matveyev on June 13 and Pravda's Mayevsky on June 19 -- debate recent statements by the President calling for improved US-Soviet relations. The articles seem designed to tone down the atmospherics associated with the consular convention and nonproliferation treaty by highlighting Vietnam and other impediments to any radical improvement in relations with the US. So far as we can see there is nothing at the moment to suggest that the articles mark any change in the broad outlines of Soviet policy. In fact, Moscow probably feels that, to make bilateral dealings with the US possible, a certain amount of polemicizing against the US is necessary or at least desirable in order to offset potential criticism from within the communist movement and perhaps internally.

Vietnam and Relations with the US -- Moscow's Balancing Act. Moscow has for some time engaged in diplomatic sleight-of-hand on the subject of the implications of the war in Vietnam for Soviet relations with the US. The Soviets have insisted there can be no betterment of relations with the US in the face of Vietnam. But while denying that other issues could be compartmentalized from Vietnam, they have in fact done just that, negotiating with the US on a variety of bilateral multilateral issues without regard to Vietnam. For the Soviets, the President's friendly remarks at Glassboro, the consular con-

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *KC*, NARA, Date *8-1-01*

CONFIDENTIAL

vention ceremonies and the UN proceedings on nonproliferation were an embarrassment. The leadership has not replied directly, as Brezhnev did in October 1966, and it has been left to leading propagandists to tone down the mood in the wake of recent agreements.

What Hinders? Both articles start out with the same framework that the popular mood in America favors better relations with the Soviet Union and that consequently American officials and candidates have been under pressure to address the question (neither article specifically addresses the point that the President is not a candidate, and the reader is left with the implication that the campaign figures in the President's calculations).

Matveyev's article bears the title "What Hinders?" And his answer to the question what hinders better relations with the USSR is in a word Vietnam. Mayovsky's later piece (we are reading a TASS summary; the full text is not yet available in Washington) gives a fuller list of problems which create obstacles to better relations:

--Vietnam heads the list, but it is not the only item;

--US support for extremist designs of Israel is a second.

--the arms race is another.

--and the next point is NATO and other military blocs, in part because the principle support for the US in NATO is the FRG whose revenge-seeking forces encroach on GDR sovereignty and refuse to recognize post-war borders in Europe.

--and, finally, Mayevsky mentions "ideological subversions" the US is staging against the USSR and other socialist countries. The ideological subversion theme is one which the Soviets have been developing in the past couple of months -- in part in reaction to developments in Czechoslovakia.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mayevsky assures his readers that if the US is really interested in better relations with the USSR, it will find the USSR responsive. But, as he had said, there are obstacles on the road.

Negotiations with the US. Neither article attempts to go beyond these very broad generalizations and say anything about prospects for any specific negotiations. No specific subjects are made contingent upon any particular actions on the part of the US. And, for the moment, we have no indication of any general change or trend in Soviet attitudes about negotiations with the US. Space and definition of aggression talks in Geneva are going pretty much as one would have anticipated. The cultural exchange negotiations are rather sticky at the moment, but a seemingly unyielding rigidity at this phase of the negotiations has been a typical pattern for exchange talks in the past. Kuznetsov in April and May speeches at the UN reiterated Soviet assent in principle to talks about offensive and defensive weapons, but it remains to be seen if Moscow is in fact moving closer to setting a date to get talks started.

One Soviet official in Washington has suggested to a diplomatic colleague that the Soviets might be less interested in working with a lame-duck administration in the US. The Matveyev and Mayevsky references to the pressure of the electorate for improving relations with the USSR might suggest that the USSR may hope that a new administration might be more responsive to Soviet demands, but the Soviets probably have no firm estimate of the outcome of the elections at this juncture. In any event there is nothing to indicate that the Soviets wish to stand down on negotiations with the US until then.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

Thursday, July 18, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Your Private Talks with Thieu

The basic talking paper in the black briefing book is sound; although you may wish to go over it with Sects. Rusk and Clifford and Amb. Bunker, before you see Thieu tomorrow (Friday) at 10 a.m.

At that first session, you may wish to encourage him to lay out the problems he wishes to raise with you with maximum frankness. As I reported to you, when Bui Diem called on me before his return to Saigon and asked what President Johnson wished to raise, I said the President:

- wished to concentrate on bilateral talks;
- learn with greatest frankness Pres. Thieu's view of his problems.

After the first session, you can consider Thieu's points, consult with your advisers, and leave to later sessions your response.

Three basic general themes for the first session might be:

- we have supported and shall continue to support the constitutional process in South Vietnam. As duly elected President, Thieu can look to us with complete confidence. There is no higher Communist objective than to break up the Constitutional government.
- whether on the battlefield, or in peace initiatives, or in the struggle against corruption, or in economic and social development, we look to increasing assumption of responsibility and leadership by the GVN. That does not mean the U.S. intends to pull out its troops or withdraw its support. But the requirements of rising South Vietnamese nationalism and of U.S. politics require equally a gradual increase in the proportion of Vietnamese effort and leadership. Moreover, no development better guarantees the ultimate frustration of Communist political objectives in the South.
- on the peace talks, we understand the problem for the people of South Vietnam that is raised by our talking bilaterally with Hanoi; but we shall continue to maintain full detailed consultation at every stage and feel our way forward together. It is important that we maintain a certain flexibility in our public positions because we simply do not know the exact form negotiations will assume. But he can be confident that we do not intend to negotiate without the GVN issues which are its vital concern.

W. W. R.

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Wed., July 17, 1968
1:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a reflective memo from Gen. Taylor
on the stalemate in Paris.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 9-2-92

6a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

July 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Stalemate in Paris

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-383

By , NARA, Date 8-12-93

In spite of occasional "straws in the wind", there is very little of substance to show for more than two months of negotiations in Paris. While Vance's meeting with Lau on July 15 produced a very interesting discussion, there is nothing in Lau's response to suggest the likelihood of a quick and favorable reaction. I get the impression that they are going to stand on the "no reciprocity" wicket for a long time in the hope that we will concede this point to the detriment of any subsequent positions for which we might invoke reciprocity.

It would be timely, I think, to ask ourselves how long we should accept this kind of stalemate. Alternatively, the question might be: Which side is favored by a continued stalemate?

To whose advantage a stalemate?

In attempting to answer this question, I find a number of reasons why it is to our interest to break the stalemate as soon as possible. In the first place, the prolongation of fruitless talks is likely to damage our relations with Saigon where suspicions run high as to our motives and behavior in Paris and will continue high as long as GVN representatives do not participate. Suspicions directed at the Americans can also work against the GVN itself and constitute another threat to its stability.

At home, we have to contend both with the national impatience of our people and with the repercussions on the Presidential campaign which will arise from a stalemate.

As long as we continue at least the present limited bombing, I do not feel that the military situation in South Viet-Nam in itself is a cause for concern over stalemated negotiations. Under present conditions, it seems to me that we have considerable pressure on the enemy which, over the long run, may induce him to change his stance in Paris. We can use such time for speeding up the expansion and reequipping of ARVN which are indispensable parts of any plan to terminate hostilities and withdraw our troops.

Looking at the Hanoi side of the question, I can perceive reasons both for and against the acceptance of a continued stalemate of negotiations. In favor of seeking progress in Paris are such factors as the military situation in South Viet-Nam which must be difficult to support at post-TET

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- 2 -

averages of effort. Also, Hanoi must fear that, if the Americans become frustrated in Paris, they may renew the bombing of North Viet-Nam at former levels. In the North, the enemy has given hostages to our bombing in the form of the restored facilities which offer new targets for our bombers. We should play on this fear by occasional reminders that we have not forgotten this option.

Also, one may suspect that Hanoi's relations with the USSR, Communist China and the VC are always delicate and that their maintenance in proper equilibrium may be endangered by a prolonged stalemate in Paris.

However, there are probably more reasons for Hanoi to be content with a stalemate than to oppose one. It gives them time to rebuild and refit their forces in South Viet-Nam and to chip away at the GVN. Likewise, it gives them time to study the reactions of the U.S. domestic front and to reflect on the probable consequences of Presidential alternatives.

Although it is very difficult to evaluate these factors precisely, it seems to me that, on balance, largely for non political reasons we have more cause to wish to break the stalemate than does Hanoi. In any case, we might consider some of the means available to both sides for changing the status quo.

How to break a stalemate?

The options to both sides for breaking the stalemate are roughly parallel. Either may upset the status quo by making a concession, by tabling a new proposal, by taking some diplomatic or military initiative or by walking out.

The quickest way for us to change the game would be to agree to stop the bombing completely in accordance with the Hanoi formula. 'Since this is clearly unacceptable, other proposals which we might consider making could include a move to split the negotiations into military and political packages, or to link the bombing of North Viet-Nam to the level of enemy activities in South Viet-Nam. As a diplomatic move, we might consider reconvening the Manila Pact countries to discuss some of the Paris issues, possibly to get support on the continuation or increase of our bombing. We can try again to get a useful intercession from the USSR.

As a military move, we always have the option of extending the bombing beyond the currently restricted limits. Indeed, this is our most powerful tool and should never be given up without reservation.

Their options for breaking the stalemate seem more limited than ours. In South Viet-Nam, they can try a new offensive on the TET model or renew the harassment of the towns. In Paris, they could accept our Phase I/Phase II proposal or advance the claim that the low level of military activity in South Viet-Nam is a form of de-escalation for which we should respond by stopping the bombing. They, too, could always withdraw from the conference

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- 3 -

but one gets the impression that this is far from their thoughts.

I am far from sure of the validity of some of the points in the foregoing discussion, particularly those bearing on enemy attitudes, but I am certain that we need to make an examination of the viability of a continued stalemate and decide what to do about it. If we can stand a prolonged one (which I doubt), there is no present cause for concern. If we can not, we should make plans now to break it.

In the present circumstance, I suggest that you ask the Secretaries of State and Defense for their views on this subject. Our Mission in Saigon and our negotiators in Paris would have a contribution for such a review. As for the U.S. domestic and political fronts, I am afraid, Mr. President, that only you can evaluate the probable effects of a prolonged stalemate in Paris.

M.D.L.
M. D. T.

Recommendation approved _____

No action now _____

See me _____

~~SECRET~~

7
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, July 17, 1968
12:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the probable Soviet
formula on missile talks.

Looks OK.

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 4674

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01



Department of State

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TELEGRAM 7a

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Rostow

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NODIS

DURING LUNCHEON CONVERSATION TODAY KUZNETSOV EXPRESSED TO BOHLEN, AS A PURELY PERSONAL THOUGHT, THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING FORMAL TALKS ON STRATEGIC MISSILES AND ABM'S TAKE PLACE IN GENEVA BUT WITH PRIVATE TALKS BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS TAKING PLACE IN WASHINGTON OR MOSCOW OR BOTH.
THOMPSON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

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Pres. File

8

SECRET

Wednesday, July 17, 1968
9:00 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You will wish to read this exchange between Clifford and the South Vietnamese team touching on the major issues in the weeks and months ahead.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET/EXDIS attachment (Saigon 32822)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Conference, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 9-2-92

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PAGE 01 SAIGON 32822 01 OF 02 170805Z

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Authority 7C 90-226
By isp/ry, NARA, Date 10-5-92

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6898
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 32822

EXDIS

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DEPARTMENT PASS DEFENSE

1. SECRETARY CLIFFORD AND I HELD A WORKING MEETING WITH TOP GV. OFFICIALS FOR TWO HOURS ON JULY 16, FOLLOWED BY A WORKING LUNCHEON. PRESENT ON GVN SIDE WERE THIEU, KY, HUONG, MINISTERS VY, KHIEU HO, GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN, DEPUTY RD MINISTER LAC, AND PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT NGUYEN PHU DUC. ON US SIDE WERE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL PERSONS: GENERAL WHEELER, BERGER, BUNDY, WARNKE, GOULDING, ABRAMS, KOMER, AND CALHOUN.

2. SECRETARY CLIFFORD OPENED BY NOTING THAT VIET NAM WAR IS POSSIBLY AT ITS MOST CRITICAL STAGE AND IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO MEET AND DISCUSS MUTUAL PROBLEMS. HE SAID THAT NEXT SIX MONTHS MIGHT BE DECISIVE AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS PRIOR TO HONOLULU MEETING. HE THEN ASKED THIEU FOR HIS EVALUATION OF THE WAR SITUATION AND SPECIFICALLY ENEMY INTENTIONS.

3. THIEU SAID 1968 WAS DECISIVE YEAR FOR COMMUNISTS AND THEY HAVE BUILT SUFFICIENT FORCES IN SVN, LAOS AND CAMBODIA TO CREATE STRONG NEGOTIATING POSITION FOR PARIS. HE CONSIDERED LIMITED BOMBING PAUSE AND US PROPOSAL FOR TALKS HAD PUT ENEMY "ON THE SPOT." EM. A-SIZING THAT THEIR TET AND MAY ATTACKS HAD FAILED THIEU THOUGHT THEY
Failed

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 SAIGON 32822 01 OF 02 170805Z

WOULD TRY MAJOR OFFENSIVES IN SEVERAL POINTS IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD--1) I CORPS, ESPECIALLY HUE AND DA NANG; 2) SAIGON; AND 3) II CORPS, POSSIBLY KONTUM. THIEU THOUGHT THAT THEY COULD SUSTAIN AN OFFENSIVE FOR TWO MONTHS, BUT THAT NEITHER FOR MILITARY PURPOSES NOR FOR POLITICAL NEGOTIATING PURPOSES COULD THEY MAINTAIN AN INFLEXIBLE

POSITION FOR NEXT FIVE MONTHS. THEY WOULD STAGE A MILITARY WAVE OF ATTACKS IN THE HOPE THAT THESE WOULD HAVE DECISIVE EFFECT AT CONFERENCE TABLE AND ON US INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION. THIEU CONSIDERED GVN AND US FORCES FULLY PREPARED AND HE HOPED ENEMY WOULD LAUNCH OFFEN-

SIVE SINCE IT OFFERED OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO AGAIN INFLICT HEAVY CASUALTIES ON THEIR MAIN FORCES AND THUS PERHAPS CHANGE THEIR ATTITUDE AT PARIS. HE CONSIDERED THAT HANOI'S INFLEXIBILITY IN TALKS IS WORKING AGAINST ENEMY IN AMERICAN AND WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. VIEN MENTIONED REPORT THAT THERE HAD BEEN A NEW COMMUNIST MEETING ALONG CAMBODIAN BORDER OF NORTHERN SVN, BUT SAID HE HAD NO INFORMATION YET REGARDING DECISIONS ON NEW STRATEGY. *Infiltrators* CONTINUED TO BE MOVED INTO LAOS AND INTO SOUTH VIET NAM.

4. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION FROM CLIFFORD HAS TO WHY ENEMY WOULD LAUNCH OFFENSIVE IN PRESENT MORE DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES WITH EVERY PROSPECT OF ANOTHER DEFEAT, THIEU SAID THAT TO THEM SOME VICTORY--EITHER MILITARY OR POLITICAL--WAS A "MUST" IF THEY WERE TO CONTINUE PARIS TALKS. KY AGREED NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO MAKE A MOVE AND HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DESIGNED PRIMARILY FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES SINCE THEY RECOGNIZE MILITARY VICTORY IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE. HE ALSO SAW

I CORPS AND SAIGON AS DECISIVE AREAS AND SAID HIGHLANDS WOULD BE DIVERSIONARY. KY THOUGHT THEY WOULD TRY TO ISOLATE RATHER THAN OCCUPY SAIGON BUT WOULD ATTEMPT TO TAKE ONE OR MORE SURROUNDING PROVINCIAL CAPITALS AND CREATE VARIETY OF POLITICAL AND SUBVERSIVE PROBLEMS WITHIN SAIGON. THEIR TARGET WOULD BE AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION. KY SAID SHELLING OF SAIGON HAD STOPPED BECAUSE OF BAD PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT INTERNATIONALLY. THIEU ALSO THOUGHT THIS WAS GENERALLY A PERIOD

OF REST, AND RECOVERY FOR ENEMY. HUONG EMPHASIZED IMPROVED ALLIED DEFENSES IN SAIGON AREA INCLUDING (1) UNIFIED COMMAND, (2) INCREASED NIGHT ATTACKS AND OTHER FRIENDLY INITIATIVES, (3) GREATER CONTROL OF INFILTRATION ROUTES, AND (4) B-52 RAIDS AGAINST TROOP CONCENTRATIONS. RESULT, IN HIS VIEW, WAS GREATER POPULAR CONFIDENCE IN GVN AND INCREASED INTELLIGENCE EMANATING FROM THE PEOPLE.

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PAGE 03 SAIGON 32822 01 OF 02 170805Z

Regional Forces: Popular forces

5. CLIFFORD THEN SAID THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON WAS GREATLY INTERESTED IN WHAT WE AND GVN COULD DO JOINTLY TO STRENGTHEN AND MAKE MORE EFFECTIVE RVNAF. HE ASKED WHAT WERE THE MAIN NEEDS. THIEU STRESSED 1) INCREASED STRENGTH, ESPECIALLY FOR RF:PF AND SUPPORTING UNITS, 2) GREATER QUANTITY AND HIGHER QUALITY OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT IN ORDER TO COMPETE EFFECTIVELY WITH ENEMY. (HE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR PLEASURE AT PRIORITY GIVEN TO M-16'S FOR RVNAF.) (3) IMPROVED LIVING CONDITIONS FOR RVNAF AND FAMILIES. KY STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF BETTER EQUIPMENT AND LIVING CONDITIONS IN BRINGING ABOUT IMPROVED FIGHTING SPIRIT. THIEU SAID THAT THEY MUST BE PREPARED TO TAKE OVER RESPONSIBILITIES FROM US ESPECIALLY IN FIELDS OF PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE AND TERRITORIAL SECURITY. THIS MEANT BUILDING INFRA-STRUCTURE,

Republic of Vietnam Armed Force

BASES AND EQUIPMENT, AND BRINGING RF/PF BACK TO PLAY THE TERRITORIAL DEFENSE ROLE ALONG WITH SELF-DEFENSE UNITS. ARVN WOULD THEREBY BE REL-

EASED FOR MAJOR TASKS AGAINST ENEMY MAIN FORCE UNITS. BY 1969-1970 THEY WOULD BE IN POSITION TO TAKE OVER CERTAIN US RESPONSIBILITIES, WHICH WOULD HAVE POLITICAL ADVANTAGE BOTH IN US AND SVN. KY URGED THAT

GREAT EXPENDITURES FOR BOMBING IN LAOS COULD BE MORE EFFECTIVELY SPENT ON GROUND FORCES TO CUT OFF INFILTRATION ROUTE AND DESTROY ENEMY FORCES THERE. HE REITERATED IMPORTANCE OF BETTER LIVING AND PAY CONDITIONS FOR RVNAF FAMILIES AND MAKE A PLEA FOR US TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO IMPROVE THEIR PERSONNEL SYSTEM. THIEU AGREED THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED MOST WAS AID FOR FOOD, HOUSING AND PX GOODS WHICH MIGHT BE PROVIDED OUTSIDE OF REGULAR AID FUNDS.

BUNKER

NOTE: () OMISSION. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 32822

EXDIS

6. CLIFFORD THEN RAISED QUESTION OF RVNAF OFFICER SHORTAGE IN GRADES CAPTAIN THROUGH COLONEL. VIEN CLAIMED THERE WAS NO REAL PROBLEM AND SAID LARGE NUMBERS WERE BEING PROMOTED FROM LIETENANT. THIEU ALSO STATED THEY WERE FILLING THESE GAPS BY STOPPING DISCHARGES AND TRAINING OFFICERS AND WO'S MORE RAPIDLY. WHEELER SUGGESTED PROMOTION CRITERIA MIGHT BE RELAXED, ESPECIALLY TIME IN GRADE, EMPHASIZING OUR WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCE. IT WAS AGREED THAT MACV AND JGS (Joint General Staff) WOULD EXAMINE THIS QUESTION IN ADVANCE OF HONOLULU MEETING.

7. CLIFFORD THEN ASKED FOR VIEWS ON BOTH STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF WAR INCLUDING PACIFICATION. THIEU GAVE HISTORICAL VIEW OF CLASSIC COMMUNIST STRATEGY, NOTING THAT ENEMY HAD BEEN ON VERGE OF SUCCESS IN 1965, WHICH OUR INTERVENTION HAD DENIED THEM. ENEMY HAD CHANGED CLASSIC STRATEGY BY SHIFTING EMPHASIS TO CITIES FOR PURPOSE OF AFFECTING NEGOTIATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL OPINION, BUT WAS ALSO MAINTAINING EFFORTS TO HOLD COUNTRYSIDE. GVN MUST ABOVE ALL PROTECT CITIES BUT COULD NOT NEGLECT COUNTRYSIDE. HE NOTED MEASURES TO SIMPLIFY RD CRITERIA, PROTECT MAIN LOC'S, AND PROTECT CITIES THROUGH ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW LIFE HAMLETS AROUND THEM. WITHIN CITY ORGANIZATION OF SELF-DEFENSE WOULD HAVE HIGH PRIORITY. HE SAID WE MUST MOVE FAST AND BE PREPARED FOR WHATEVER COMES, WHETHER MAJOR OFFENSIVE, PEACE, OR AN ENEMY FADEAWAY. KY ALSO EMPHASIZED DECISIVE NATURE OF NEXT TWO MONTHS SAYING THERE WAS NOT TIME TO CHANGE BASIC STRATEGY AND TACTICS. HE THOUGHT SELF-DEFENSE SHOULD HAVE HIGHEST PRIORITY, NOTING THAT PRIME MINISTER NOW IN CHARGE OF THIS PROGRAM.

8. CLIFFORD NOTED IMPACT IN US OF LEDERER'S NEW BOOK WHICH CHARGED

revolutionary development

Lines of communication

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 SAIGON 32822 02 OF 02 171124Z

WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION IN GVN AND PLACED USG ON DEFENSIVE REGARDING VIET-NAM. HE ASKED WHAT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE AGAINST CORRUPTION. THIEU SAID IT WAS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM WHICH CANNOT BE SOLVED IN ONE YEAR BUT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE. ONE MUST NOT ONLY PUNISH OFFENDERS BUT GET AT ADMINISTRATIVE AND PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES. HE EMPHASIZED NEED FOR EFFECTIVE INSPECTION SYSTEM AND REPLACEMENT OF INCOMPETENT AND CORRUPT OFFICIALS. HE SAID THE JOB WOULD BE HARD AND LONG BUT THEY WERE DETERMINED TO DO IT. HE THEN CALLED ON PRIME MINISTER TO COMMENT.

9. HUONG MADE LONG STATEMENT ABOUT CAUSES FOR CORRUPTION, ESPECIALLY THOSE FROM THE WAR. HIS EMPHASIS WAS ON NEED TO GET AT HIGH OFFICIALS WHO HAD GOTTEN RICH FROM THE WAR AND PROTECTED THEIR CORRUPT FOLLOWERS.

NOTING THAT IT HAD PENETRATED THE SOCIETY AT ALL LEVELS HE SAID THE ROOT CAUSES, SUCH AS INADEQUATE PAY, MUST ALSO BE OVERCOME. CITING DIFFICULTIES WHICH FACE HIM, HE SAID THAT GVN NOW HAS A CONSTITUTION AND LAWS WHICH CANNOT BE PUT ASIDE AND WHICH REQUIRE EVIDENCE TO PROSECUTE. HE SAID THAT DESPITE THIS THEY WILL NOT JUST SIT BACK AND WILL TAKE BOTH FLEXIBLE AND DYNAMIC MEASURES. HE CITED : 1) HIGHER OFFICIALS MUST DEMONSTRATE HONESTY; 2) LIVING

CONDIT-
TIONS FOR LOWER OFFICIALS MUST BE IMPROVED; 3) ADMINISTRATIVE RED TAPE WHICH PROVIDED OPPORTUNITIES FOR CORRUPTION MUST BE CUT ; 4) "BIG FISH" MUST BE FERRETED OUT AS EXAMPLES; 5) THERE MUST BE GREATER ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF HIGHER OFFICIALS FOR ACTS OF THEIR SUBORDINATES. HE SAID THIS FIGHT HAS BEEN STARTED, SOME RESULTS HAVE BEEN OBTAINED, AND THEY ARE DETERMINED TO GO AHEAD. HE CLOSED BY REITERATING THAT HONEST LEADERS AT THE TOP WERE THE MAIN NEED. CLIFFORD EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS STATEMENT, AGREED THAT IT WAS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM, AND WISHED HIM ALL SUCCESS IN HIS EFFORTS.
BUNKER

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

SECRET

7

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, July 17, 1968
8:00 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Le Duc Tho displays an interest in the U. S. elections and suggests the length of the negotiations will be related to their estimate of the outcome.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 18055

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By je, NARA, Date 8-1-01



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 998

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PAGE 01 PARIS 18055 162304Z

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P: 161710Z JUL 68

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS:

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4275

C: O: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS: 18055

EXDIS:

SUBJ: LE DUC THO'S TALK WITH DE GUIRIELLE

DURING FRENCH NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION IN HANOI, FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE DE GUIRIELLE HAD LENGTHY PRIVATE TALK WITH LE DUC THO. QUAI'S INDOCHINA CHIEF GAVE EMBOFFI JULY 16 FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF THAT CONVERSATION:

A. DE GUIRIELLE REPORTS THAT LE DUC THO TOLD HIM THAT HE "PLANNED TO RETURN TO PARIS SOON," BUT NO DATE HAD AS YET BEEN SET. THO SPOKE LITTLE ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS IN PARIS EXCEPT TO STRESS "AMERICAN OBSTINACY." HE SAID THAT SOONER OR LATER THE US WILL HAVE TO STOP ALL BOMBINGS OF DRV BUT EVEN ONCE BOMBINGS HAVE STOPPED, "NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE LONG" BECAUSE PROBLEMS WHICH WILL THEN BE DISCUSSED ARE "THE MOST DIFFICULT ONES" AND ARE "VERY COMPLICATED."

B. LE DUC THO THEN QUERIED DE GUIRIELLE ABOUT THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS. SPECIFICALLY HE WAS INTERESTED TO KNOW WHO THE FRENCH THOUGHT WOULD BE THE REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES AND WHO, IN FRENCH OPINION, WOULD BE ELECTED NEXT NOVEMBER. DE GUIRIELLE SIDESTEPED QUESTION, REPLYING THAT HE WAS IN NO POSITION TO MAKE MEANINGFUL FORECAST.

C. IN HIS COMMENTS ON CONVERSATION WITH LE DUC THO, DE GUIRIELLE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO LE DUC THO'S QUESTION ABOUT US ELECTIONS. DE GUIRIELLE DRAWS CONCLUSION FROM HIS CONTACTS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE THAT THEY CONSIDER "AMERICAN ELECTIONS TO BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN SOLUTION OF VIETNAM PROBLEM."

GP-3. SHRIVER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, July 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Eshkol on Phantoms

Prime Minister Eshkol said publicly a few days ago that, during his January meeting with you, you said you would make up your mind on the Phantoms by the end of the year. He noted that this wasn't a promise to sell planes but "there was reason to hope" your response would be positive. The report of his statement is attached.

Eshkol frequently makes indiscreet remarks like this. That's one reason Hussein is so wary of trying to negotiate secretly. In this case, it may just be Eshkol talking too much, or it may be a calculated effort to put you on the spot.

The question is whether you want to remonstrate mildly or just let this pass unnoticed. I don't think we want to make a fuss, but Harry McPherson or I could let Rabin know that this hadn't gone unnoticed. The Israelis are so quick to complain about our slips--and this kind of slip has broader implications for peace negotiations--that I think it might be worth making a call, but we will naturally be guided by your wishes.

Incidentally, the last paragraph of this report, if true, suggests that Eshkol is confused about the purpose of Israel's increasing its dollar deposits in the U.S. In our view, that was solely to help our balance of payments, not to pre-position money for buying aircraft.

W. W. Rostow

You or Harry call Rabin _____
Let's forget it _____

DECLASSIFIED

Authority PLJ 98-112
By jc/ies NARA, Date 8-1-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

V. 15 Jul 68

I S R A E L

H 1

ESHKOL SAYS ISRAEL 'URGENTLY' NEEDS PHANTOMS

Jerusalem International Service in English 0500 GMT 15 Jul 68 M

[Text] Prime Minister Levi Eshkol has said that Israel is urgently in need of Phantom jet fighters. He expressed the hope that the United States will finally agree to sell Israel the 50 Phantoms it has asked for. Eshkol, who was speaking to a delegation from the Canadian branch of the United Israel Appeal, noted that during his last meeting with President Johnson, the President said that he would make up his mind about the Israeli request by the end of the year. Eshkol said that this did not constitute a promise on President Johnson's behalf but, in view of his friendship and deep understanding, there was reason to hope that his response would be positive.

Referring to the French Mirage jets, the Prime Minister revealed that France has suggested that Israel be reimbursed for the advance payments it made on the Mirage order. However, he said, Israel has decided not to withdraw the money, which remains in France in the hope that the planes will finally be delivered in accordance with the original contract.

[Jerusalem in Arabic to the Arab World at 0430 GMT on 15 July adds: Eshkol said that Israel has deposited 200 million dollars in U.S. banks at the disposal of the U.S. Treasury to assist it in overcoming the U.S. balance of payments crisis. He added that this amount is now ready to pay for the Phantom planes, which cost 4 million dollars each].

11

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Wednesday, July 17, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Gold Negotiations with South Africa

Pres file

At the July Basle meetings the Central Bankers again discussed the question of how to deal with South African gold production. There are still differences but we are moving toward a resolution of this important issue.

These are the positions:

- South Africa is still boycotting the gold market. It wants to get the price up, put pressure on the two-tier system, and eventually force an increase in the official price. Because of a strong balance of payments position this year, South Africa has been able to hold off selling to the market, as it ordinarily would to meet current payment needs.
- We want South African production to be sold on the market. This brings the price down and, therefore, adds stability to the monetary system. We also want to keep close to the concept implicit in the Washington agreement that the monetary system doesn't need any more gold. This would help to activate the Special Drawing Rights. It is also good market psychology -- suggesting we are in control of the gold market rather than the reverse.
- The Germans, Italians and Scandinavians generally support us, but they are nervous about the war of nerves with South Africa. They want to negotiate a settlement so as to get South African gold on the market.
- The Swiss, Dutch and Belgians believe more gold should come into the system. Their deal with South Africa would be to agree to buy regular amounts of new gold production at \$35 an ounce to be added to reserves, if South Africa sold the rest of its production on the free market.
- The UK Treasury supports us. The Bank of England is anxious to make a deal with South Africa.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

- 2 -

We believe we have a strong negotiating position and should capitalize on it. The tax bill is behind us, flight capital from France is coming here, and the sterling package is well along the way.


All your advisers believe we should go for the following kind of package:

- South Africa would sell its new gold production on the free market -- as it needed to -- and would not offer it to other Central Banks or the Fund.
- Should the free market price get down to the official price of \$35 -- and preferably somewhat below this price -- agree to let South Africa sell limited amounts of new gold production to the Fund. (Most of your advisers prefer a trigger price below \$35 but this may not be negotiable in view of the worries of some of the Europeans.)

Reuss and Widnall might argue that this would put a floor under the free market. This is not literally true. Limited purchases by the Fund would provide some support for a \$35 free market price, but it would not prevent it from continuing to fall if the speculators tried to unload.

The main point is that this kind of package would strengthen the two-tier system and hit the gold speculators hard. The press stories on an agreement with South Africa -- while off the mark -- have already caused the gold price to fall. Secretary Fowler's press conference yesterday, indicating a strong but slightly flexible position, has pushed the price down further.

Private talks with the South Africans could now be useful. Bill Martin told his Dutch counterpart, who is the spokesman for the Europeans, that he plans to talk with the head of the South African Central Bank -- not as negotiator for the group but on his own. If we can reach an agreement with the South Africans, the Europeans will probably go along. Bill is now trying to contact his South African colleague to set up a meeting with him in the United States. If a meeting proves possible, it will be very closely held.


ERF:mt:mm

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION ¹²

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ - LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Wednesday, July 17, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here are some points which Cy Vance hopes we will make in Honolulu.
I am making this memo available to Secretary Rusk.

1. We should nail down with Thieu our understanding of the your-side-our-side formula. I have the impression that it is tolerably clear; but we can consult Bunker first. In a subsequent discussion, Cy and I agreed that it is conceivable that rather than your-side-our-side, Hanoi may opt for a political negotiation in South Vietnam itself, after bombing stops, between the GVN and the NLF. In that case, bilateral talks might proceed in Paris on such issues as schedules of mutual withdrawal; the full reinstallation of the DMZ; a Laos settlement; etc., while the political settlement is reached elsewhere.
2. Cy feels it important that we convey to Bunker and Thieu that they should think in terms of fairly rapid movement towards the assumption of GVN responsibility, military and political, rather than in terms of a two- or three-year time horizon. Cy is concerned that Saigon might not be prepared for realities they might have to confront sooner.
3. Depending upon what happens in the next 10 days or two weeks, we should consider proceeding on some version of the San Antonio formula; that is "assuming no advantage."
4. Cy feels strongly that we should not rule out -- or commit ourselves to Saigon to rule out -- token troop withdrawals. He thinks the offer will be turned down by Hanoi, but if it were accepted, it would be good for U.S. morale and bad for NLF morale. It would give the U. S. public hope, but also help make the U. S. public stable for the tough protracted negotiations likely to follow a bombing cessation. He would not, however, recommend this until after the DMZ is re-established.
5. He hopes that Bill Bundy, on his tour after the Honolulu conference, will make it clear to the leaders of the troop-contributing countries, that a stage of substantive negotiation might take place after a bombing cessation in which Paris would be either still bilateral or your-side-our-side. Cy believes that the troop contributors should not come in until a much later stage when the outlines of a settlement are pretty clear and agreed.
6. Cy believes that on his trip Bill Bundy should notify Park, Thanom, and Marcos on a wholly personal basis that private talks have taken place, indicating that they have not gotten beyond the conditions for a bombing cessation. He feels that if there should be a leak before these three men are personally informed, we might have bad trouble.

~~SECRET~~-LITERALLY EYES ONLY

W. W. Rostow

13

Wednesday, July 17, 1968

Free file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is a copy of Prime Minister Trudeau's reply to your message of June 29 congratulating him on his election victory. In delivering the Prime Minister's reply, Ambassador Ritchie said he had also been instructed to say that the Prime Minister "welcomes the President's message on the possibility of a meeting and expects to communicate with him as soon as possible to explore a mutually convenient time."

W. W. Rostow

WWR

MWG:mm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01



13a

Washington, D.C.,
July 12, 1968.

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the following message from Prime Minister Trudeau transmitted to President Johnson in reply to the message of congratulations conveyed by Ambassador Butterworth on June 29:

"Dear President Johnson,

I am deeply grateful to you for your personal message of congratulations and best wishes. In these times of change the friendship and mutual understanding which have so long characterized relations between our Governments take on ever increasing importance. It is my sincere hope that the close ties between our two countries and peoples will grow even stronger in the years ahead.

Yours sincerely,

Pierre Elliott Trudeau"

Yours sincerely,


A. E. Ritchie
Ambassador

The Honourable
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

ACTION

14

Tuesday, July 16, 1968 - 6:55pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres. file

SUBJECT: Recommended Meetings with German Defense
Minister Schroeder and Finance Minister Strauss

Attached is Secretary Rusk's memorandum recommending you meet separately next week with German Defense Minister Schroeder and Finance Minister Strauss.

Schroeder will be here July 22-23 for talks with Secretary Clifford. He is still a potential Chancellor. More immediately, he will influence the German position on the NPT and on the troop and offset issues.

Strauss will be here July 23-24 at the invitation of Secretary Fowler. He is a strong candidate for Chancellor. He is opposed to the NPT and at times has shown distrust of the United States. But he is intelligent and very much a realist and a working politician. This would be a good time to impress on him the critical need for close U. S. -German cooperation along the whole range of financial as well as military issues.

It would be possible to see them together but since they are political rivals this might be awkward.

Both men are very influential in Germany and well worth seeing.

I concur in Secretary Rusk's recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Ask Jim Jones to arrange
separate meetings _____

Arrange meeting with
them together _____

No _____

Call me _____

ENR
ERF:mm

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

14a

July 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit to Washington by FRG Defense
Minister Gerhard Schroeder and
Finance Minister Franz Josef Strauss

Recommendation:

That you see the two German Ministers, separately,
during their stay in Washington.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Schroeder and Strauss will be in Washington July 23-24. They are here at the invitation of Secretaries Clifford and Fowler, respectively. I think it is important that you see them both, preferably separately. You should not invite one and not the other in order to avoid significant resentment. It would be better to see them separately because they are political rivals.

You should see Schroeder not only because he is a key political figure in Germany but also (a) because he is capable of influencing his government's decisions on arms purchases affecting our balance of payments and (b) because his basically pro-Western orientation is well worth cultivating (since he is not out of the running for future appointment as Chancellor or Federal President). As Defense Minister his views on NPT (earlier negative but now more favorable) are important. You met him while he was here as Erhard's Foreign Minister, in September 1966.

Strauss holds an important position in the present government and was Defense Minister under Adenauer. The relatively young, energetic Strauss is a leading contender for future appointment as Chancellor. A direct exposure

to your views would go far to dispel any anxieties Strauss may have about American distrust of him (he is often portrayed as a symbol of renascent German nationalism). Equally important, a talk with you could go far to convince Strauss of the importance of international monetary and financial cooperation, including German neutralization of our military expenditures there and other assistance in our efforts to overcome our balance of payments problem. Strauss has opposed the NPT and his views are important in obtaining ultimate FRG adherence. You might be able to influence him.

The Defense and Treasury Departments concur in the above recommendation.

If you agree to see Schroeder and Strauss, the Department will send you suggested talking points for each meeting.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Pres. file
15

Tuesday, July 16, 1968
6:45 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. PRESIDENT:

We have been asked by the Vietnamese for our official U.S. delegation to Honolulu. State has produced the following 10 names:

1. President Lyndon B. Johnson
2. Secretary of State Dean Rusk
3. Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford
- *4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler
5. Special Asst. to the President, Walt W. Rostow
6. White House Press Secretary, George E. Christian
7. Asst. Secretary of State, William P. Bundy
8. Ambassador to Viet-Nam, Ellsworth Bunker
9. Minister-Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs, John A. Calhoun
10. Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs, Charles A. Cooper

I understand that the Vietnamese official list is only 8. You may wish to consider cutting ours back to 8 also, since we have pressed them hard on the idea that the staffs attending should be small.

I am assured that Ellsworth Bunker's eighth place in the order of precedence is correct by conventional protocol, since he will be an Ambassador outside his country. You may wish to violate conventional protocol by elevating him for these purposes. If you do, this, I ~~will~~ ^{would} suggest slot #4 after Secretary Clifford.

Walt Rostow

Cut our list to 8 as indicated _____ No _____ Call me _____

Elevate Bunker to No. 4 _____ No _____ Call me _____

Pres. file

14

**Tuesday, July 16, 1968
6:30 p. m.**

MR. PRESIDENT:

**Herewith the text of what Gene said
in New York.**

W. W. Reston

Attachment .

16a

Mr. Besedin, ladies and gentlemen:

It is a pleasure for me to help celebrate the opening of regular air service between Moscow and New York. Not many years ago, it would have been news that an airplane could take off in Moscow and, land in New York a few hours later. Today we take such marvels of technology for granted.

We are both reaching for the moon and the great achievements of the Soviet Union in space command the respect and admiration of the American people.

Here, to be sure, you are only in New York and not on the moon, but the distance travelled is perhaps a greater one. For though our bodies can move across many nations in a few hours, our minds travel more slowly. Nations travel across the face of history like glaciers. The way each of us sees the

world is determined not by a few hours of quick travel, but by the centuries of experience which have formed our minds, unhappily, cannot be linked so easily as our great cities.

The dominant purpose of President Johnson's foreign policy is to achieve a fair and honorable meeting of minds between the Soviet Union and the United States -- a meeting of minds not only among government officials, but among our peoples as well.

Together, we bear a great responsibility -- the ultimate responsibility for preventing the unthinkable disaster of general war. That fact determines the special relationship between our nations.

We share a small world, growing smaller every day. As the two leading military powers of this tortured planet, we must learn to live together, as human beings and as responsible

neighbors, within agreed rules of civility and of peace. As President Johnson recently said, our two countries have recently proved, despite all their differences, that they can "behave as responsible members of the family of nations."

We are still divided by differences, by misunderstandings, and by fears. It is President Johnson's purpose to resolve those differences, however difficult, through the quiet processes of reason and restraint, one by one, step by step.

In the last month we have made two great steps forward -- the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the agreement to open preliminary talks on the limitation of nuclear arms. The influence of these two agreements should radiate in areas still clouded by differences between us.

The step we have come together to celebrate today should be seen in this perspective. We are opening not only an air

service, but a new forum in the peaceful dialogue among our peoples.

It is a good day for us both. I can assure you, Mr. Besedin, that you and your colleagues are most welcome guests.

Getting to know each other is not altogether a solemn exercise. You have before you the splendid city of New York, where I am sure you will be received with the warmth and enthusiasm that may make you feel that you are not so far from home after all.

* * * * *

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

17~~SECRET SAVIN~~

Tuesday

July 16, 1968 -- 5:10 p.m.

Free file

Mr. President:

Recent information received on the North Vietnamese infiltration of men to the south indicates that the number of personnel starting southward has decreased significantly in both June and July in comparison with the record level of better than 30,000 men per month reached in March, April, and May. The estimate for June starts was approximately 15,000, and thus far in July it is about 8,500. If the current rate continues for the rest of the month, I would estimate July will be close to the June total.


The effects of this decrease, however, will not be evident in South Vietnam until Fall. Since those starting in March, April, and May will be arriving in July and August, actual infiltration during these two months will be at the highest level ever -- July, 30,700; August, 31,100 -- as shown on the attached chart.

W. Rostow~~SECRET SAVIN~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-218
By *clm*, NARA, Date 3-13-03

(000s)

TOTAL INFILTRATION ESTIMATED ARRIVING SVN BY MONTH - 1968



- ☐ 10% ATTRITION (NOT APPLIED AGAINST COMUSMACV ACCEPTED/POSSIBLE STRENGTHS JAN-MAY)
- ☐ ESTIMATED ARRIVAL STRENGTHS AFTER ATTRITION

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

FIGURE 4

17a

Significant DevelopmentsSpecial Groups Noted

During the period 22-26 June, 14 new group designators were noted in NVA Rear Services communications. They have a N, K, V or Z prefix and a two or three-digit number designator. The groups have 21 to 30 personnel and may be special units, such as medical or logistics teams. These designators and group strengths bear little resemblance to previously observed three and four-digit groups. Some of these groups may be going to Military Region (MR) Tri-Thien-Hue (TTH), the B-3 Front, and MR 5. All of these groups are included in the estimated figures for June.

Movement of Sick and Wounded North Vietnamese

The movement of North Vietnamese groups 3501, 3322, 3323, 3430, 3431, and an unidentified group from south to north was noted in communications during the period 15-26 June. They seemed to consist of cadre and wounded soldiers. The strengths varied from 250 to 650 and included a large number of sick and wounded and stretcher cases. The four-digit designators of five of the groups differed from most of the four-digit groups noted moving south and more closely resembled the designators of groups thought to be elements supporting troop movements in North Vietnam.

This is the first time SIGINT has detected any groups moving north in the pipeline, but prisoners have occasionally mentioned wounded NVA personnel doing so. PW reports suggest that this type of evacuation has probably been taking place at least since May 1964. The PWs have reported meeting groups of 20-100 wounded personnel traveling north in Laos. There is, however, insufficient evidence to assess the actual scope of medical evacuations.

The six groups mentioned above are not included in the June infiltration statistics.

Readjustment of Group Series Destination

The 17 groups (estimated total strength 10,100) in the 7000 series that were originally thought to be possibly heading for 3d Corps in South Vietnam may, in fact, be destined

Franklin
18
INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, July 16, 1968
1:20 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

I asked Dick Helms to make an evaluation of Soviet policy in general, since so much of our work is fragmented and focused on particular issues. The attached paper is worth reading. You will particularly note the relatively hopeful section on Soviet policy in the Middle East (paras. 8-9).

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

I know the author, [] who worked with me on the Policy Planning Council. He is a thoughtful and hardheaded fellow.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY attachment

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-217
By clm, NARA, Date 5-5-03

~~SECRET~~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2253

18a

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

EYES ONLY

16 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

Walt Rostow and I have been discussing the significance of recent Soviet foreign policy moves in an effort to ascertain what coherence there may be when the principal ones are taken together. To this end, the attached paper has been drafted. It is a careful, balanced analysis with which I agree.

Rich
Richard Helms

Attachment - 1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLI 019.037.003/2

By jc NARA, Date 8-1-01

18b

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

15 July 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Some Signs of Change in Soviet Policy

1. Signs have appeared recently that Soviet policy may be moving in new directions on some key issues. Having responded for the last several years to approaches on Vietnam only by a willingness to provide Hanoi's telephone number, the Soviets have now begun some diplomatic activity in the anterooms of the Paris talks. For the first time since the Arab-Israeli war a year ago, there are hints that Moscow's hard pro-Arab line may give way to a more flexible diplomacy and some parallel efforts with the US. And, of course, the American offer of a year and a half ago to discuss the control of strategic weapons has now been taken up. Assuming that these are valid and significant signs, some obvious questions arise: Why? Why now? What range of movement on these or other issues is likely?

2. The considerations that might figure in a shift of Soviet policy on such issues would no doubt be multiple and complex. But more than likely, given their intense preoccupation with tactics, the Soviets have in mind some inter-connection when

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-019-037-003/2

By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

they became active simultaneously in several apparently unrelated matters. There has not been, however, any general improvement in the climate of Soviet-American relations, Moscow's usual way of accenting the positive when it wants to get some diplomatic business done. The harsh attacks on the US which have marked the entire period of the Vietnam war continue. The suggestion is that Moscow is prepared for bargaining, but that the terms will be hard and that there will be no movement on matters important to the US unless it makes concessions sought by the USSR on others. Among the three subjects listed above, the Middle East and strategic arms control are those on which the US has been pressing Moscow to be more accommodating. Presumably the Soviets expect the US to move toward concessions on Vietnam.

Soviet Aims and Tactics on Vietnam

3. Support for Hanoi and its campaign against the South has had a high priority in Soviet policy since the fall of Khrushchev in 1964. While this course may have been entered upon then in the mistaken belief that Hanoi was nearing success, it has been persisted in at some cost and risk. Probably the main motive has been to sustain Moscow's claim to leadership of the Communist movement in the face of China's bitter attacks and deviant tendencies in others. At the same time, it was recognized

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EYES ONLY

that the widespread opposition to the US role in Vietnam provided opportunity for Soviet propaganda and diplomacy to work effectively against US influence in many other areas. Evidently, such possibilities as there might have been for constructive developments in Soviet-American relations did not weigh as heavily in Soviet calculations.

4. The Soviet leaders have probably always believed that the war could only end in a negotiated settlement, and they probably now hope that the Paris talks will develop in such a way as to bring that result at the earliest feasible date. Tactically, Hanoi's move to the negotiating table also frees Moscow to begin at last to talk with the US on Vietnam. That this is happening does not mean that Moscow is now prepared to play a mediating role, however, much less to bring any sort of pressure on Hanoi to settle for less than it wants. Soviet diplomatic activity so far is only parallel and supporting, and appears at every step to be coordinated with the Vietnamese. This will probably continue to be true, for two very substantial reasons. First, the Soviets clearly do not have significant influence on Hanoi's policy. Second, an attempt to put pressure on Hanoi to agree to some "compromise" solution short of its desires would play into China's hands and probably cost Moscow its entire investment and effort in North Vietnam.

- 3 -

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

SECRET

5. Thus the outcome Moscow will be working for will be one satisfactory to the Hanoi leadership. If Hanoi wins control of the South, and perhaps eventually of Laos and Cambodia as well, the Soviets will expect their repute among Vietnamese and other Communists to grow, and they will expect to increase their influence in Southeast Asia generally, at the expense of both the US and China. They do not equate success for Hanoi with an enlarged Chinese threat to that area. On the other hand, if Hanoi feels obliged to accept an unfavorable outcome, the Soviets will accept this also, though in this case they would expect Chinese influence in Hanoi to grow at their expense. The ideal solution from Moscow's point of view would be one favorable to Hanoi, one that resulted from a negotiated settlement the Soviets could claim to have helped bring about, and perhaps also, if Hanoi were willing, a solution phased over some period of time, on the ground that this might limit complications and dangers in Soviet-American relations.

6. The indicated course for the Soviets, therefore, is to induce the US to move toward acceptance of terms agreeable to Hanoi. This has been their line all along, but the fact that negotiations are now in train authorizes them to take initiatives which Hanoi's previously rigid attitude precluded. If the Soviets still cannot bargain on their own account over a Vietnam settlement, Hanoi will have no objection and perhaps even counts on

- 4 -

SECRET

SECRET

the Soviets exercising leverage on the US by opening up other areas of negotiation.

7. It is probably no accident, therefore, that the Soviets chose the present moment to signal an interest in moving with the US on the Middle East and in talking about control of strategic arms. In making this point it does not need to be implied that the Soviets will only make motions on these subjects and will not talk seriously. In fact, in respect of both there are good reasons for believing that the Soviets think the moment has come when there would be advantage to them in trying to deal with the US. The opportunity to bring these subjects together with Vietnam perhaps only gave an added incentive.

Soviet Policy in the Middle East

8. Since the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 the Soviets have aligned themselves rigorously with the Arab cause. They have resupplied the arms lost and in their diplomacy and propaganda have worked for a settlement which would at least deprive Israel of the fruits of its military victory. In some part, this effort was intended to recoup the loss of prestige suffered by the USSR when it encouraged the Arab belligerency prior to June 1967 and when stood idly by as its clients were humiliated. The Soviets probably now think that they have largely reestablished their position in the radical Arab states. But for many complicated

- 3 -

SECRET

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

reasons, some having to do with Soviet interests in Europe, both East and West, Moscow has no desire to align itself with Arab intransigence aimed at the destruction of the Israeli state. Its problem is to preserve its influence with the Arabs while avoiding a full commitment to Arab aims.

9. If the present stalemate continues, the Israelis will simply stand fast on their territorial gains and the Arabs will feel that they have no recourse but to look to another round of war. They will demand more and more arms and probably direct Soviet support as well in an eventual showdown, perspectives which cannot be congenial to Moscow. The Soviets probably now think that they have an interest in joining with the US to bring the Middle East hotbed under some degree of control. What they would want from the US is pressure on Israel to moderate its claims for a settlement. In return, they might hold out the possibility of an agreement the US has long sought -- one limiting arms sales in the region. The Soviets would be particularly pleased if under such an agreement the US could be persuaded to withhold further supply of high performance aircraft to Israel. In any case, they would expect that the prospect of parallel action to contain the dangers in this area would elicit considerable US interest. And, they might think, this could have some bearing on what the US would be willing to do about a settlement in Vietnam.

- 6 -

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

The Soviet Approach to Control of Strategic Arms

10. The long delay in acceptance of the American offer to discuss the control of strategic weapons was probably owing to several reasons. Responses to the repeated American initiatives in the arms control field have always been marked by extreme caution and suspicion, and on so central an issue as the control of strategic weapons the resistance of conservative forces, both within and outside of the military establishment, was probably formidable. Moreover, until very recently the Soviets have been in the position of catching up, at least in numbers of land-based ICBM's. The present moment, when the Soviets have probably come to have real confidence in their possession of an assured destruction capability, and before the US advances to new developments which could unhinge this equilibrium once more, probably seems the most opportune to entertain measures to arrest competition in this field. The Soviets are probably not fully confident of their ability to keep pace should the race continue, and, of course, they must be deeply conscious of the economic burdens of continuing.

11. Moscow's willingness to begin talks does not signify a firm intention to strive for an agreement. In the initial phase, the Soviets will probably confine themselves to probing the US position. If and when they get down to serious dealing, the

- 7 -

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

process, given the critical nature of the issues, will be hard and prolonged. But, because of their intensely political approach to arms control issues, the Soviets will see certain advantages in this very process. For one thing, they are aware that prolonged negotiation about arms control measures is itself a form of arms control, since some inhibition would be imposed on new US programs. For another, they would hope that one result of the negotiations, even if no agreement issues from them, will be that the US concedes in principle that the USSR is and should be recognized as an equal power, with a full right to strategic parity, however that may be defined in detail. This alone the Soviets would see as a considerable political achievement, with favorable implications for the position of the Soviet regime at home, for its claims to leadership in the Communist world, and for its standing and influence as a world power.

12. And, of course, to engage the US in negotiations for a goal -- significant arms control agreements -- to which American opinion and policy are deeply committed, would, the Soviets could calculate, have an influence on how the US appraised what was at stake in one or another form of Vietnam settlement. It is not that there could be any direct trade-offs; this would be too crude. But the belief that Soviet-American relations were at last on a constructive course could have a far-reaching effect, especially

- 3 -

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

on general American opinion, in making concessions in Vietnam seem more acceptable. It is a classic Soviet mode in negotiating close issues to hold out the promise of broader benefits to follow.

12. Summary

13. This reading of the signs which point to some new directions in Soviet policy on certain major issues clearly does not forecast any very deep change. There are good tactical reasons why the Soviets should now move toward some degree of tacit collaboration with the US in the Middle East, and should take up the US offer to discuss the control of strategic weapons. The possibility of influencing the US course in the negotiations on Vietnam by these moves is an added tactical consideration of great weight. In other areas, however, Soviet purposes will require that tension and hostility be sustained. This is particularly true in Eastern Europe where the Soviet hegemony is under challenge and where "the threat of aggressive US imperialism" is more than ever needed. Even in the USSR itself, the leadership apparently feels, certain unwholesome tendencies and a kind of ideological unsteadiness preclude any broad relaxation of tensions with the US. Thus the signs of change considered here presage, in the intentions of the Soviet leaders, no very far-reaching effects for Soviet-American

- 9 -

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

relations. But then the Soviet leaders have not been uniformly successful in forecasting and controlling the consequences of every new turn in the play.

25X1A



Deputy Director
National Estimates

- 10 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

ACTION

19

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, July 16, 1968 -- 1:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

State requests your formal confirmation that:

-- In view of Thieu's request, you host an informal working dinner on July 19;

-- Accept Thieu's invitation to a working lunch on July 20; and

-- Free a special mission aircraft to return Bunker and his party to Saigon on July 21.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

No _____

Call me _____

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 9-28-92

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY

Index

STATE

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Honolulu Meeting

REF: Saigon 32578

1. President agrees to give an informal working dinner on July 19 and accepts invitation to working lunch on Saturday July 20.
2. Special mission aircraft will be provided to take Ambassador Bunker and his party from Honolulu to Saigon on July 21.

GP-3

END

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 86-224

By aply, NARA, Date 10-5-82

Drafted by:

EA/VN:SO Ledogar:bpw 7/16

1st. Ser.

3773

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

EA - Amb. Leonhart

Classified by:

EA/VN - Mr. Burke

O - Mr. Peck

White

118A

DOD - Col. Greenleaf

S/S - Mr. Walsh

2

Tuesday, July 16, 1968
1:10 p. m.

~~SECRET~~*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a draft cable in which suggestions are made to Bunker by Nick for the structure of the meeting between the two delegations as a whole which is scheduled for about 11:00 a. m. Friday morning.

You will recall that you ^{are} ~~were~~ scheduled to talk alone with Thieu starting at 10:00; but Thieu suggested that there be also a meeting between the two delegations as a whole. As you will note, this cable will keep the subject matter and even the time of the session very much at the disposal of the two Presidents.

W. W. Rostow

Cable cleared _____

No _____

Call me _____

SECRET attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *rg*, NARA, Date 9-28-92

~~SECRET~~

2254
20a

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON

PRIORITY

INFO: CINCPAC

STATE

EXDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER

REF: Saigon 32470

1. We have been giving thought to a possible informal agenda for joint discussions following private talks between the President and Thieu during July 19 morning session. We would much appreciate your reactions to these tentative proposals and any indications you have of what Thieu has in mind for this session.
2. We believe general structure of joint discussions should be left fluid and informal in keeping with spirit of meeting. It should, of course, be fully understood that preliminary agenda order or topics may be altered in whole or part in light preceding private talks between the two Presidents.
3. At this point we envision plenary session beginning about 11:00 a.m. July 19 and lasting until lunch. Both official delegations would attend with minimum number of backup personnel as required. The President might open with welcoming remarks and turn floor over to Thieu and GVN delegation for next half hour to 45 minutes. In succeeding half hour US delegation would make appropriate comments, perhaps Secretary commenting

Drafted by: EA:WmLeonhart/pbd 7/16/68

Tel. Ext. 2030

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Under Secretary

White House -

S/S -

DOD -

~~SECRET~~

Classification

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652 Sec. 5(A) (D)
4/10/82
By dcl/aa, NARA, Date 10/5/92

Page 2 of telegram to ACTION: Saigon PRIORITY; INFO: CINCPAC

~~SECRET~~
Classification

briefly on Paris talks and Secretary Clifford reporting his observations on Viet-Nam visit and his views on military aspects of the "key problems" listed by Thieu (refel). US del members might also comment briefly on economic situation and pacification depending on whether these subjects have been addressed by GVN speakers. Plenary might end with summation by the two Presidents.

4. For side talks on July 19 afternoon we think it would be useful for you and Calhoun sit in with the Secretary and Bundy in session with Foreign Minister Thanh and for Cooper to join Rostow-Ho talks.

5. On another subject. We would be grateful for general idea of remarks which Thieu plans for July 18 arrival statement and would appreciate knowing whether advance copies will be available for press.

GP-4

END

~~SECRET~~
Classification

INFORMATION

21

~~SECRET~~ --HARVAN PLUS

Tuesday, July 16, 1968 - 1:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Harriman reports:

1. A conversation with Zorin
after last night's private session;

2. A mildly optimistic
evaluation of the private Vance
conversation.

Free file

W. W. Rostow

Paris 18036 (DELTO 462)

Paris 18035 (DELTO 461)

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 10-5-92



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ PARIS 18036
NO D I S HARVAN PLUS
DELTO 462

FROM HARRIMAN. (DELIVER TO VANCE ON ARRIVAL).

1. I CALLED ON ZORIN THIS MORNING FOR BRIEF REVIEW OF LAST NIGHT'S VANCE/LAU MEETING. I SAID THAT VANCE HAD EXPLAINED HIS PHASE 1/PHASE 2 SUGGESTION, MAKING IT CLEAR PHASE 1 WAS UNILATERAL ON OUR PART, WITH MUTUAL ACTION IN TWO COLUMNS IN PHASE 2.
2. I ASKED HIM TO ENCOURAGE NORTH VIETNAMESE ACCEPTANCE. WHEN HE ASKED FOR DETAILS, I GAVE HIM THE POINTS AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THE DISCUSSION DEVELOPED. I SAID THAT LAU SHOWED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST AND ASKED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS, PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE DMZ. ZORIN ROARED WITH LAUGHTER WHEN I ADDED THAT OF COURSE LAU AS A TRAINED NEGOTIATOR HAD SAID THAT HE COULDN'T REALLY SEE ANYTHING NEW IN THE PROPOSAL BUT WOULD CONSIDER IT CAREFULLY.
3. I POINTED OUT THAT SINCE LAU DID NOT REJECT ANY OF THE POINTS, THE PRINCIPAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM APPEARED TO BE WHETHER PHASE 2 SHOULD BE AGREED UPON IN ADVANCE AS VANCE INSISTED, OR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED PROMPTLY AFTER OUR ACTION UNDER PHASE 1 WAS TAKEN AS LAU SUGGESTED. ZORIN NATURALLY TOOK THE HANOI SIDE, BUT WHEN I STOOD FIRMLY ON OUR POSITION HE DID NOT ARGUE FURTHER. HE SHOWED INTEREST IN THE INFORMATION THAT I GAVE HIM AND I ASSUME WILL DISCUSS THE SUBJECT IN HIS CONTACTS WITH THE HANOI DELEGATION.
HARRIMAN.
BT

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Authority MLG 91-98

By sp/ly, NARA, Date 10-5-92



Department of State

TELEGRAM

14

216

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1968 Jul 16 AM 11 15

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DE RUEFNCR 18035 1981500

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4265

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~~SECRET~~ PARIS 18035

DELTO 461

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

FROM HARRIMAN

SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON VANCE-LAU JULY 15 MEETING

1. I HAVE GONE OVER THE RECORD OF LAST NIGHT'S MEETING AND HAVE DISCUSSED IT IN DETAIL WITH VANCE AND KABIB. THEY WERE MILDLY ENCOURAGED BY THE ATTITUDE OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, AND I AGREE WITH THEIR OPINION. THERE IS AT LEAST SOME EVIDENCE THAT THIS CHANNEL AND THE PHASE 1-PHASE 2 FORMULA ARE PROMISING ENOUGH TO WARRANT FURTHER CONCENTRATED EFFORT AND DEEPER EXPLORATION.

2. ALTHOUGH LAU DID NOT ACCEPT ANYTHING, HE REJECTED NOTHING IN THE PROPOSAL AND EXPLORED ONE ASPECT--THE RESTORATION OF THE DMZ IN DETAIL. HE AGREED TO GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO WHAT HE CALLED OUR "CONCRETE PROPOSALS."

3. WE SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR ANOTHER DISCUSSION IN WHICH LAU MAY WELL WISH TO EXPLORE THE OTHER POINTS IN OUR PHASE 2 PROPOSAL IN SIMILAR DETAIL.

GPI HARRIMAN

BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLJ 91-91

By 40/42, NARA, Date 10-5-92

~~TOP SECRET~~*Pres file*

Tuesday, July 16, 1968 -- 10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to know that General Abrams is studying in detail possible B-52 attacks on certain substantial logistical targets between the DMZ and roughly the 18th parallel.

B-52s have been in this area before but not on the scale contemplated in this plan.

It is understood that no such attacks will be mounted without coming to you for explicit authority, including timing.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 91-131

By cap/ny, NARA, Date 9-2-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, July 16, 1968
9:35 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Clark signals: message
received.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

MAC 009610

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
Authority W.H. Guidelines 7/21/83
By kg, NARA, Date 7-2-92

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FM HON CLARK M. CLIFFORD, SSECDEF, TDY SAIGON

TO WALT ROSTOW, WHITE HOUSE, WASHDC

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ MAC 089610 EYES ONLY

RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE CONCERNING (1) THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FY 1969 EXPENDITURES AND SOUTHEAST ASIA; (2) THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE FY 1970 BUDGET; (3) CONTINGENCIES FOR HANDLING THE MILITARY AID PART OF THE FOREIGN AID BILL; AND (4) PREPARATION FOR DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP. I WILL GIVE THESE MATTERS AS MUCH THOUGHT AS POSSIBLE AND WILL LOOK FORWARD TO THE DISCUSSIONS UPON MY RETURN FROM SOUTH VIETNAM. BEST WISHES.

CLARK M. CLIFFORD

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING OPENING DUTY HOURS

130

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~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-125
By ing, NARA Date 7-18-96

PRESERVATION COPY

Pres. file

29

Tuesday, July 16, 1968
9:30 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Cy Vance's lucid blow-by-blow account of his 2-1/2 hour discussion.

Cy clearly followed his instructions exactly. If there is anything positive, it is paragraph 27:

"Lau said that his remarks tonight were only preliminary in nature, and that he would consider our proposals. Lau concluded by assuring us that our 'concrete' proposals would be considered carefully and DRV would try to see if there was anything new compared with our last meeting."

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 10-5-92



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

10

by Taylor/Sherburne/Wright
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DE RUFNCR 18012/1 1980248
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1968 JUL 16 AM 12:13

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 4 PARIS 18012/1

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 458

FROM VANCE.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71C 91-98

By WPH, NARA, Date 10-5-92

1. I HAD MY SECOND MEETING WITH LAU EVENING JULY 15. WE MET FOR TWO AND ONE HALF HOURS AT SAME LOCATION AS FIRST MEETING. THE SAME PERSONS PARTICIPATED ON BOTH SIDES.

2. WE BEGAN BY SAYING WE WERE GLAD TO MEET AGAIN; IT IS THROUGH THIS TYPE OF PRIVATE DISCUSSION WE CAN EXPLORE OUR RESPECTIVE VIEWS AND PERHAPS OVERCOME THE OBSTACLES PRESENTLY FACING US, AND THUS MAKE PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WE ASKED LAU FOR ANY OBSERVATIONS HE MIGHT WISH TO MAKE. LAU REPLIED THAT HE HAD REEXAMINED WHAT WE HAD TOLD HIM AT OUR FIRST PRIVATE MEETING AND HAD TRIED TO FIND MATTERS TO WHICH THE DRV COULD GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION, BUT THUS FAR HE HAD FOUND NOTHING NEW. LAU THEN RECALLED THAT AT OUR TEA SESSION LAST WEDNESDAY WE HAD SAID WE WANTED TO MEET AGAIN, AND HAD SOMETHING TO TELL THEM. THUS, PERHAPS, WE SHOULD BE THE FIRST TO SPEAK.

3. WE THEN SAID WE HAD SOME NEW THOUGHTS OR VARIATIONS OF OUR PRIOR PROPOSAL. WE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US AND IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT WE BOTH HAVE CLEARLY IN MIND THE CONCEPT THAT WE ARE NOW SUGGESTING. WE THEN OUTLINED THE CONCEPT; THE US IS PREPARED TO STOP THE BOMBING OF NVN ON A SPECIFIED DATE, WITHOUT DEMANDING RECIPROCAL ACTION, IF WE CAN REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE MUTUALLY-RELATED ACTIONS WHICH EACH OF US WOULD TAKE AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. IN EFFECT THIS MEANS THAT WE ENVISAGE TWO SEPARATE AND DISTINCT PHASES; THE TIME INTERVAL BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES SHOULD BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE. BEFORE WE ACTUALLY CEASE THE BOMBING WE WOULD NEED TO HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IN THE SECOND PHASE. THESE SECOND PHASE ACTIONS WOULD INCLUDE APPROPRIATE MEASURES BY BOTH SIDES.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

PAGE 2 SECTION 1 OF 4 PARIS 18012/1 NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

4. WE THEN DESCRIBED THIS SUGGESTION GRAPHICALLY, DRAWING A SKETCH WITH TWO PHASES, A LINE BETWEEN THEM, AND TWO PARALLEL COLUMNS -- ONE HEADED US AND THE OTHER DRV -- FOR THE ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY BOTH SIDES IN PHASE 2. WE WROTE IN FOUR NUMBERS UNDER EACH COLUMN BUT DID NOT PUT IN ANY HEADINGS. WE WROTE IN UNDER PHASE 1 OF THE OUTLINE THAT ON A SPECIFIED DATE THE US WOULD CEASE ALL AIR, NAVAL AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT AND ALL OTHER ACTIVITIES THAT INVOLVE THE USE OF FORCE ON OR WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE DRV.

5. AT THIS POINT WE PAUSED AND ASKED HIM IF HE UNDERSTOOD THE PROPOSAL AND IF HE FOUND THE FORMULA ACCEPTABLE IN PRINCIPLE. HE REPLIED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE PROPOSAL BUT WISHED TO KNOW WHAT KIND OF ACTIONS WE HAD IN MIND IN PHASE 2. WE SAID THAT UNDER PHASE 2 THERE WERE THE FOLLOWING HEADINGS: (A) RESTORE THE DMZ; (B) NO INCREASE IN US OR DRV FORCE LEVELS IN SVN AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING; (AT THIS POINT LAU INTERJECTED ASKING WHAT THE WORD "LEVEL" MEANS. WE REPLIED THAT IT MEANT STRENGTH. VY THEN GAVE AN EXAMPLE WHICH REFLECTED CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROPOSAL.); (C) SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS TO COMMENCE AS SOON AS THE BOMBING STOPS, WITH EITHER SIDE FREE TO RAISE ANY TOPIC RELEVANT TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT; (D) IN THE DISCUSSIONS DESCRIBED IN POINT (C) ABOVE, OUR SIDE WOULD INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GVN AND THE DRV SIDE COULD INCLUDE WHOMEVER THEY WISHED; (E) NO INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS ON POPULATION CENTERS SUCH AS SAIGON, DANANG AND HUE; (F) WE WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSIDER OTHER ACTIONS OF A SIMILAR NATURE WHICH WERE RELEVANT AND WHICH THE DRV MIGHT WANT TO RAISE.

6. WE ASKED LAU'S VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO OUR SUGGESTION. LAU ASKED WHEN THE ITEMS LISTED IN PHASE 2 WOULD BE DISCUSSED. WE REPLIED RIGHT NOW. LAU THEN SAID THAT MEANS BEFORE THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. LAU THEN ASKED IF THE ITEMS IN PHASE 2 WERE TO BE IMPLEMENTED AFTER THE COMPLETION OF PHASE 1. WE REPLIED YES AND IN THE SHORTEST TIME POSSIBLE AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, ALTHOUGH THE TIME INTERVAL MIGHT VARY WITH THE PARTICULAR ITEM UNDER DISCUSSION. LAU THEN ASKED WHAT WE MEANT BY THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME. WE SAID THIS WAS A MATTER WE WOULD HAVE TO DISCUSS. SOME OF THE ACTIONS INVOLVED ARE POSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT PROMPTLY. OTHERS MIGHT TAKE MORE TIME, BUT TIMING WOULD BE A MATTER FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION.

7. VY ASKED FOR THE SPECIFICS OF WHAT WE HAD IN MIND WITH RESPECT TO RESTORATION OF THE DMZ. WE SAID IT WOULD INVOLVE (A) THE RESTORATION OF THE DMZ IN THE FULL SENSE OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS; I.E., NO MILITARY PERSONNEL OR EQUIPMENT OF ANY SORT WOULD BE LOCATED IN OR MOVED THROUGH THE DMZ; (B) BOTH SIDES WOULD INVITE THE ICC TO REESTABLISH AN ENLARGED PRESENCE IN THE DMZ TO INSPECT AND VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH ITS RESTORATION; (C) BOTH SIDES WOULD REFRAIN FROM ARTILLERY OR OTHER FIRE FROM OR ACROSS THE DMZ AND FROM ANY MASSING OF FORCES ON EITHER SIDE OF THE DMZ INSUCH A WAY AS TO CONSTITUTE A DIRECT THREAT TO THE OTHER. WE SAID THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE A MEASURE OF MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. WE ADDED THAT WE ARE NOT PROPOSING THAT THE 17TH PARALLEL BE MADE A PERMANENT BORDER EXCLUDING REUNIFICATION.

8. LAU THEN SAID HE HAD SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS. AT THE HARRIMAN

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 4 PARIS 18012

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 458

FROM VANCE.

PREVIOUS MEETING WE HAD SAID THAT THE US WOULD FIX THE DATE FOR THE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND PRIOR TO THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD DISCUSS THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO SUCH CESSATION. LAU HAD ASKED WHAT WERE THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND WE HAD REPLIED IN A WAY SIMILAR TO TODAY. AT OUR LAST PRIVATE MEETING LAU HAD ALSO ASKED WHETHER THE US WOULD CEASE THE BOMBING IN THE EVENT THAT NO AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND WE HAD SAID NO. LAU HAD CHARACTERIZED THIS AS TANTAMOUNT TO RECIPROCITY, A CONCEPT WHICH HAS BEEN REJECTED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS BY THE DRV. TODAY, LAU SAID, OUR PROPOSAL IS MORE SYSTEMATIC AND ORDERLY, BUT PRESENTS NOTHING NEW IN COMPARISON WITH THE LAST TIME. TODAY WE MENTIONED PHASE 1 AND 2, AND THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE INTERVAL BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES, BUT IT SEEMED TO LAU THAT PHASE 1 CONTINUES TO DEPEND ON THE DISCUSSION OF WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN PHASE 2. LAU THEN REPEATED HIS QUESTION, ASKING WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE DO NOT AGREE ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. WE REPLIED THAT RECIPROCITY IS NOT INVOLVED IN PHASE 1 ACTIONS, BUT AN UNDERSTANDING MUST BE REACHED FIRST ON PHASE 2, AND WE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR LAU'S VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT.

9. VV THEN SAID IF THE US CEASES THE BOMBING, WE COULD THEN PROCEED TO RELATED MATTERS, EACH SIDE RAISING WHATEVER SUBJECTS IT WISHES. ~~DRV CAN'T GO INTO SPECIFICS OF PHASE 2 NOW.~~ WE THEN ASKED WHAT THEIR GENERAL COMMENTS WERE ON PHASE 2. LAU REPLIED THAT DRV HAS HAD OCCASION TO EXPRESS VIEWS ON THEM IN BOTH OFFICIAL SESSIONS AND IN PRIVATE TALKS. WE REPLIED THAT

SECRET

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-2- SECTION 2 OF 4 PARIS 18012, JULY 16. NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

A NUMBER OF THESE ITEMS HAD NOT BEEN RAISED BEFORE, OR WERE RAISED IN A DIFFERENT CONTEXT. BEFORE THEY WERE RAISED IN A CONTEXT OF A RECIPROCAL ACT, DIRECTLY CONNECTED TO THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. NOW THEY WOULD FOLLOW FROM AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WAS TO HAPPEN AFTER WE WOULD CEASE THE BOMBING. LAU'S ANSWER, ON THE OTHER HAND, WAS NOT NEW AT ALL AND IN FACT IDENTICAL TO THAT WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS IN PLENARY SESSIONS. LAU RESPONDED THAT HE HAD NOT MISUNDERSTOOD OUR PROPOSAL, BUT THE CONTENT IS NOT REALLY NEW. WE THEN POINTED OUT THAT THE ITEMS LISTED IN PHASE 2 WERE RECIPROCAL TO EACH OTHER, AND NOT TO THE CESSATION OF THE BOMBING.

10. WE THEN WENT OVER THE SAME POINT SEVERAL TIMES, INCLUDING A DISCUSSION OF THE MEANING OF THE WORD "UNDERSTANDING". LAU CAME BACK TO HIS QUESTION OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE COULD NOT REACH AGREEMENT ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES. WE REPLIED THAT THE BEST APPROACH WOULD BE TO DISCUSS THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, EXPLORE THEM, AND SEE IF WE COULD REACH AGREEMENT. VY INTERJECTED THAT IN THE MEANWHILE THE BOMBING WOULD CONTINUE. LAU ADDED THAT WHAT THE DRV WANTS IS THE CESSATION OF THE BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR FIRST. THEN EACH SIDE CAN RAISE WHATEVER MATTERS IT WANTS TO FOR DISCUSSION. WE ASKED WHAT THE PROBLEM WAS IN DISCUSSING THE CIRCUMSTANCES FIRST. LAU REPLIED "BECAUSE WE CAN'T FORESEE AGREEMENT ON ALL OF THE ITEMS."

11. WE SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT ACTUALLY AGREE ON THE ITEMS IN PHASE 2, AND EVEN IF WE DON'T, WHAT WOULD BE LOST? LAU SAID THAT WE WOULDN'T LOSE ANYTHING, BUT THESE PROPOSALS WOULD NOT MEET THE DRV DEMAND "FOR UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTIVITIES THAT INVOLVE THE USE OF FORCE ON OR WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE DRV." FOR EXAMPLE, WE RAISE QUESTIONS SUCH AS THE DMZ, AND ATTACKS AGAINST CITIES. THESE ARE ITEMS CONCERNING THE SOUTH AND HENCE THE NLF.

12. WE POINTED OUT THAT THE RESTORATION OF THE DMZ DOES NOT INVOLVE THE NLF; IT DOES INVOLVE THE US AND THE DRV. WHAT IS INVOLVED IS A SERIES OF MUTUAL ACTIONS WHICH ARE WITHIN BOTH OUR CAPACITIES TO CARRY OUT.

13. LAU THEN CONTINUED WITH HIS PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. HE SAID THERE WERE A NUMBER OF MATTERS ON WHICH OUR VIEWS DIFFER. FOR INSTANCE, WITH RESPECT TO THE RESTORATION OF THE DMZ, DRV HAS EXPLAINED MANY TIMES THAT IT IS THE US AND ITS "PUPPETS" WHICH HAVE SABOTAGED THE STATUS OF THE DMZ. DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS, DMZ HAS BEEN SABOTAGED BY LAND, AIR AND SEA. THUS IF WE NOW SPEAK OF RESTORING THE DMZ, IT IS THE US WHICH MUST DO SO UNILATERALLY.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-3- SECTION 2 OF 4 PARIS 18012, JULY 16. NODIS/HARVAN/ELUS

IF THE US RESPECTS THE DMZ, THEN AUTOMATICALLY ITS STATUS WILL BE RESTORED. INSTEAD, THE US WANTS TO TURN THE DMZ INTO A NO-MAN'S-LAND, AND NOT A GENUINE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AS CALLED FOR BY THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS. US HAS PLACED ARTILLERY IN CON THIEN AND GIO LINH, FIRING IN AND ACROSS THE DMZ. TENS OF THOUSANDS OF MEN HAVE BEEN SENT IN THE DMZ TO BURN THE VEGETATION, DESTROY THE VILLAGES, AND DISLOCATE THE POPULATION. TOXIC CHEMICALS HAVE BEEN SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE DMZ, AFFECTING MANY LOCAL INHABITANTS. AS FOR AMERICAN AIR ACTIVITIES, THEY ALSO CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE DMZ. PLANES FROM DANANG USE THE DMZ AIR SPACE WHEN THEY CONDUCT BOMBING RAIDS IN THE DMZ, LEAVING VIRTUALLY NO COMMUNITIES IN THAT AREA. SIMILARLY, NAVAL VESSELS AND PATROL BOATS HAVE VIOLATED THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE DMZ, AND FISHERMEN OF THESE WATERS CAN NO LONGER EARN A LIVING. FOREGOING, SAID LAU, WERE HIS IDEAS ON THE DMZ, WHO, THEN, IS RESPONSIBLE FOR RESTORING ITS STATUS? TO SUGGEST THAT REponsIBILITY FOR ITS RESTORATION IS RECIPROCAL IS TO JUSTIFY OUR ACTIONS, AND THAT IS WHY XUAN THUY HAS SPOKEN ON THIS SUBJECT SO EXTENSIVELY.

14. VY THEN INTERJECTED THAT THE QUESTION SHOULD BE POSED IN A DIFFERENT MANNER, ~~THE QUESTION IS ONE OF THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF TROOPS THAT THE US HAS SENT TO VIET-NAM IN VIOLATION OF THE~~

HARRIMAN
BT

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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1968 JUL 16 AM 12 13

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 4 PARIS 18012

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 458

FROM VANCE.

ENTIRE GENEVA ACCORDS. THE DRV LOOKS AT THINGS FROM THIS ANGLE, AND THE FACT THAT WE ARE VIEWING THE SITUATION FROM DIFFERENT ANGLES COMPLICATES THESE TALKS.

15. WE SAID THAT WHILE WE HOLD DIFFERENT VIEWS ON WHO FIRST VIOLATED THE DMZ, WE ARE TRYING TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM FACING US NOW REPEAT NOW. WE ARE PROPOSING THE RESTORATION OF THE DMZ TO THE STATUS PROVIDED IN THE GENEVA ACCORDS. IF SUCH STATUS IS RESTORED, THEN THE ACTS DESCRIBED BY LAU WOULD STOP. WOULD THE DRV TAKE EQUIVALENT STEPS? WE SAID THAT THE DMZ WOULD NOT BECOME A NO-MAN'S-LAND, BUT RATHER A TRULY DEMILITARIZED ZONE WITH EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION. VY THEN REMARKED THAT WE WERE ONLY SPEAKING OF ONE ITEM--THE DMZ. IF DISCUSSIONS PROCEED AT THIS RATE, WE WILL BE GOING ON FOR A LONG TIME.

16. LAU THEN SAID THAT WE COULD BE SURE THAT THE CESSATION OF BOMBING IS A CONDITION WHICH WILL LEAD TO THE SETTLEMENT OF OTHER IMPORTANT QUESTIONS. HE EMPHASIZED "IMPORTANT QUESTIONS." HE SAID EACH SIDE COULD RAISE WHATEVER SUBJECTS IT WANTED TO. AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED ON WHAT QUESTIONS WOULD BE DISCUSSED FIRST, WHICH ONES TO IMPLEMENT FIRST, AND IN SO DOING "WE SHALL ABIDE BY THE AIM OF THE PARIS TALKS." LAU SAID THAT HE HAD NOT COMMENTED ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ITEMS CONTAINED IN OUR PHASE 2 BECAUSE THEY ARE THE PREROGATIVE OF THE NLF, BUT HE DID NOT FEEL THAT OUR PRESENTATION OF THESE CONDITIONS DIFFERED IN ANY WAY FROM PREVIOUS PROPOSALS, IN THAT THEY ARE CONTRARY TO THE DRV DEMAND FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF THE BOMBING. HE BELIEVED THEREFORE THAT WE SHOULD NOT PROLONG THE BOMBING OF NVN BECAUSE IT WILL NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM EITHER ON THE BATTLEFIELD OR AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE. IT WILL, IN FACT, CREATE ADDITIONAL OBSTACLES. MOREOVER, WORLD PUBLIC OPINION DEMANDS AN IMMEDIATE CESSATION OF BOMBING SO THAT THESE TALKS CAN PROGRESS.

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-2- SECTION 3 OF 4 PARIS 18012. JULY 16. NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

17. WE SAID THAT DRV MISREADS PUBLIC OPINION. WE HAVE TAKEN CERTAIN STEPS AND ARE PREPARED TO STOP THE BOMBING, BUT IF WE DID SO WITHOUT AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTERWARDS IT IS ONLY REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THE DANGER TO US AND ALLIED TROOPS WOULD INCREASE. LAU REPLIED THAT OUR PROFFESSED CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF ALLIED TROOPS WAS SIMPLY AN ARGUMENT TO JUSTIFY PROLONGED BOMBING. WE HAVE AFTER ALL ALREADY EVACUATED KHE SANH, WHICH IN EFFECT CANCELS THE VALIDITY OF THAT ARGUMENT. WE SAID THAT IT DOES NOT.

18. WE THEN ASKED LAU WHETHER DRV WOULD STOP FIRING ARTILLERY ACROSS THE DMZ IF WE DID. LAU REPLIED THAT WE SHOULD GO AHEAD AND STOP THE FIRING AND THE DRV WILL KNOW WHAT TO DO. WE ASKED HOW WE COULD DO THIS WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT THE DRV WOULD DO, AND THEN ASKED WHETHER DRV WOULD NOT PUT ITS TROOPS INTO THE DMZ WERE WE TO AGREE TO REFRAIN FROM PUTTING OUR TROOPS INTO THE DMZ.

19. LAU REPLIED THAT WE CHARGED THAT WE HAD BROUGHT OUR TROOPS TO SVN IN RESPONSE TO AGGRESSION FROM NVN. WE SAY WE WILL WITHDRAW OUR TROOPS IF NVN WITHDRAWS. THAT IS THE GENERAL QUESTION. AS FOR THE DMZ, THE US ASKS IF IT STOPS ARTILLERY FIRE AND WITHDRAWS ITS TROOPS FROM THE DMZ, WILL THE DRV DO THE SAME? IF WE PUT THE QUESTION THIS WAY, IT MEANS WE DO NOT SERIOUSLY WANT TO STOP FIRING ACROSS THE DMZ NOR DO WE SERIOUSLY WANT TO WITHDRAW OUR TROOPS. THE US SINSISTS THAT THE DRV WAS THE FIRST TO VIOLATE THE DMZ AND THAT THE DRV IS RESPONSIBLE. THE DRV POSITION IS THAT THE US HAS CAUSED THESE VIOLATIONS AND THAT IT SHOULD STOP THEM. IT HAS FIRST ARTILLERY INTO THE DMZ. IT SHOULD STOP IT. IT SHOULD WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM THE DMZ. FOR ITS PART, IT IS THE CONSISTENT POLICY OF THE DRV TO RESPECT THE GENEVA ACCORDS.

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-3- SECTION 3 OF 4 PARIS 18012, JULY 16. NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

20. WE SAID THAT OUR PROPOSALS WERE SERIOUS AND THAT WE MEANT WHAT WE SAID. WE THEN ASKED WHAT THEIR RESPONSE WOULD BE IF WE REFERRED ONLY TO THE FUTURE AND NOT TO WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN THE PAST. WE ASKED WHETHER THEY WOULD AGREE THAT IN THE FUTURE EACH SIDE WOULD REFRAIN FROM THE ACTIVITIES WE HAD SPECIFIED CONCERNING THE DMZ, WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS ACTIONS. THIS WOULD BE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE ORIGINAL STATUS OF THE DMZ, AND ALSO CONSISTENT WITH THE DRV NOT WANTING TO ADMIT WHAT ITS PRESENT ACTIVITIES ARE IN THAT ZONE.

21. LAU ASKED WHY WE JUST DIDN'T CARRY OUT THESE STEPS UNILATERALLY AND SIMPLY INFORM THE DRV ON WHAT DAY THE BOMBING WOULD STOP AND WHAT DAY THE ARTILLERY WOULD STOP FIRING ACROSS THE DMZ, AND "YOU WILL SEE WHAT WILL HAPPEN BECAUSE OUR GOVERNMENT HAS CONSISTENTLY RESPECTED THE DMZ. REALITY WILL GIVE YOU THE REPLY." THESE ACTIONS, LAU SAID, WOULD CREATE THE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT.

22. WE ADVANCED A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION--IF WE WERE TO TAKE THE ACTIONS OUTLINED REGARDING THE DMZ WITHOUT REQUESTING ANY RELATED ACTION BY DRV, AND THEN CERTAIN ACTIONS WOULD FOLLOW IN THE DMZ ON THE PART OF THE DRV, WOULD THE DRV AGREE TO THE RETURN OF THE ICC TO VERIFY THE DMZ STATUS AS PROVIDED IN THE GENEVA ACCORDS? LAU AVOIDED ANSWERING AND SAID THAT THE ICC HAD LEFT THE DMZ BECAUSE OF OUR MILITARY ACTIVITY. WE SAID THAT REGARDLESS OF WHO FIRST VIOLATED THE DMZ, THE ICC COULD NONETHELESS RETURN AND PERFORM ITS FUNCTION. LAU THEN OBSERVED THAT WE HAD DISCUSSED THIS SPECIFIC QUESTION IN SOME DETAIL, BUT HIS IMPRESSION REMAINED THAT OUR REAL INTENTION IN RESTORING THE DMZ WAS TO RETURN TO THE SITUATION PREVAILING IN 1954 AS PART OF OUR EFFORT

HARRIMAN

BT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION FOUR OF FOUR PARIS 18012

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS:

DELTO 458

FROM VANCE.

TO SEIZE SVN. WE REPLIED EMPHATICALLY THAT THIS WAS NOT OUR PURPOSE. LAU THEN SAID THAT HIS IMPRESSION WAS STRENGTHENED BY RECENT STATEMENTS OF HIGH U.S. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS, SUCH AS CLIFFORD AND RUSK, PREPARATORY TO THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE. DRV FEELS THAT THE US HAS NOT YET GIVEN UP ITS CLAIM TO SVN, THAT IT STILL WANTS TO KEEP TROOPS THERE, AND THAT IT STILL WANTS TO MAINTAIN THE THIEU/KY ADMINISTRATION IN POWER. DRV CONSIDERS THE THIEU/KY CLIQUE MERELY AN INSTRUMENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF US NEO-COLONIALIST POLICY. IF THE US CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THIS CLIQUE, HOW CAN THE DRV BELIEVE IN US SINCERITY?

23. WE REPLIED THAT WE STAND BY OUR COMMITMENT REGARDING TROOP WITHDRAWALS AS FORMULATED IN THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE. WE MEANT WHAT WE SAID IN MANILA, AND WE WILL CARRY OUT THAT COMMITMENT. AS FOR THE FUTURE OF SVN, WE WANT IT TO BE FREE TO DETERMINE ITS OWN FUTURE WITHOUT COERCION OR OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. WE ASSUME THE DRV AGREES. IS THAT A CORRECT ASSUMPTION?

24. LAU SAID THAT THE US CONCEPT OF WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS AS STATED BY SECRETARY CLIFFORD DEPENDS ON THE DEGREE OF MODERNIZATION AND REINFORCEMENT OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY. WE REPLIED THAT THERE IS NOTHING IN SECRETARY CLIFFORD'S STATEMENT WHICH ABROGATES THE MANILA DECLARATION.

25. WE THEN POINTED OUT THAT WE HAVE TAKEN THE DRV STATEMENT THAT THE CESSATION OF BOMBING MUST TAKE PLACE FIRST SERIOUSLY. WE HAVE PROPOSED A FORMULA FOR REACHING THAT STAGE, AND THERE WILL BE MANY THINGS TO RESOLVE AFTERWARDS, BUT THIS IS A FIRST STEP TO WHICH WE CAN TURN OUR VERY PRECISE ATTENTION. LAU AGREED, AND SAID THAT NOT ONLY WAS HE GIVING THE MATTER ATTENTION

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-2- SECTION 4 OF 4 PARIS 18012, JULY 16. NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

BUT THAT HE HAD ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF OUR OVER-ALL OBJECTIVES. LAU THEN REPEATED HIS POINT THAT OUR INSISTENCE ON RESTORATION OF THE DMZ SUGGESTS A DESIRE TO RETURN TO THE SITUATION PREVAILING IN 1954 AT THE TIME OF DIEM, WHO VIOLATED THE DMZ FROM THE VERY BEGINNING. IT WAS THE SAME DIEM WHO SAID THAT THE 17TH PARALLEL WAS A FRONTIER OF THE UNITED STATES. THUS THE DMZ IS AMONG THE SPECIFIC ITEMS TO BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN US, BUT THERE MUST ALSO BE A STATEMENT OF GENERAL US POLICY.

26. WE TOOK STRONG EXCEPTION TO LAU'S REMARKS ABOUT THE GVN, AND EMPHASIZED THAT IT IS THE DULY ELECTED GOVERNMENT. WE SAID WE HAD SUGGESTED A FORMULA WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE CESSATION OF BOMBING; A PULLING APART OF FORCES, THUS STARTING A DE-ESCALATION WHICH COULD LEAD TO PEACE. OUR PROPOSAL WAS SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE, AND WE HOPED THAT DRV WOULD GIVE IT SERIOUS THOUGHT.

27. LAU SAID THAT HIS REMARKS TONIGHT WERE ONLY PRELIMINARY IN NATURE, AND THAT HE WOULD CONSIDER OUR PROPOSALS. LAU CONCLUDED BY ASSURING US THAT OUR "CONCRETE" PROPOSALS WOULD BE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY AND DRV WOULD TRY TO SEE IF THERE WAS ANYTHING NEW COMPARED WITH OUR LAST MEETING.

28. COMMENT: THE MEETING PRODUCED A MORE SOBER EXAMINATION OF OUR PROPOSAL THAN THE PRIOR MEETING. LAU DID NOT REJECT IT. HE SAID THEY WOULD STUDY IT CAREFULLY TO SEE WHETHER IT PRESENTED ANYTHING NEW. THEY SOUGHT DETAILS AND EXPLORED IN SOME DEPTH THE DMZ PROPOSAL IN WHICH THEY WERE QUITE INTERESTED. AT ONE POINT IT APPEARED THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN FINDING OUT WHETHER WE WERE ASKING FOR ALL THE ITEMS IN PHASE 2, BUT WE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN INTO SUCH A DISCUSSION, LEAVING THE IMPLICATION THAT WE WERE ASKING FOR ALL ITEMS. IT IS CLEAR THEY UNDERSTAND THE PHASE 1/ PHASE 2 CONCEPT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS. THE BALL IS NOW IN THEIR COURT AND WE WILL CONSIDER WHAT STEPS TO TAKE NEXT.

HARRIMAN

BT

~~SECRET~~

Limited Official Use

Tuesday - July 16, 1968

23
Free file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Your Interview with Ben Meyer (AP) - Tuesday,
July 16, 6:00 p.m.**

Bill Bowdler talked to Ben Meyer yesterday to see what was on his mind. He is looking for a dramatic peg on which to write a story about Latin America.

He wondered, for example, whether as part of your overall effort to build bridges with the Soviets, you were exploring a rapprochement with Fidel Castro. Another possibility was whether, in view of the tough sledding on Foreign Aid, you were considering breaking out the Alliance for Progress portion for separate action.

Bill gave him no encouragement on either of these, but suggested he focus on your world-wide effort to encourage regionalism, with particular reference to the economic and physical integration dimension you have added to the Alliance for Progress. Bill also suggested he might consider writing about the accomplishments of your Latin American policy. Ben Meyer seemed to be interested.

Attached is a talking points paper on regionalism which you might use with him. You may also wish to consider allowing him to see the paper outlining the achievements of your Latin American policy which Bill recently completed, or have Bill give him a full briefing.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment:

Talking points paper.

152

July 16, 1968

Briefing Paper for President's Meeting

with Ben Meyer (AP)

1. My recent trip to Central America was designed in part to dramatize regional cooperation as the most important contemporary tool for building peace and progress throughout the world.

2. As I pointed out in my San Salvador statement, we have already learned these lessons about regionalism:
 - No country is so large or so rich that it cannot benefit from cooperation with its neighbors.
 - Regional progress may follow many different patterns and schedules -- there is no fixed blueprint.
 - Successful regionalism implies putting aside differences and sharing of costs.
 - Regionalism thrives when it includes a solid economic base.
 - Regional institution-building led by men of goodwill and sound judgment are vital to the process.
 - Regionalism also builds a sense of community teamwork which is man's best hope for peace.

3. A look around the world shows regionalism at work:
 - In Europe, the Common Market.
 - In Africa, an East African Economic Community and an African Development Bank.

- In Asia, the Asian Bank, the Asian and Pacific Council, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Mekong Coordinating Committee.
4. In the Near East, we hope the nations will begin to work on a regional basis.
 5. In our own hemisphere, the American Republics have been trail blazers in regional cooperation:
 - In the political field, there was the Pan American Union and its successor, the Organization of American States.
 - In the security field, there is the Rio Treaty which served as a model for regional security arrangements in other parts of the world.
 - In the development field, there is the Alliance for Progress and all the ancillary institutions: CIAP, the Inter-American Bank, LAFTA, the Central American Common Market, and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration.
 6. The former British colonies of the Caribbean, having failed to follow through with political federation, are moving toward regionalism on a functional basis: The Caribbean Free Trade Association and the Caribbean Development Bank.
 7. We have come to realize in this hemisphere that economic integration must be accompanied by physical integration -- that a common market, to function effectively, must have a network of transportation and communications that will permit rapid movement of goods, services and people.
 8. That is why on April 23 I proposed an overall study of actual and potential physical integration projects throughout Latin America as a first step in accelerating action in this field.

9. The Central Americans have come closest to achieving what we hope will be the pattern for the rest of Latin America -- an effective common market, an increasing network of transport and communications, and a regional approach to common requirements, like higher education and research.
10. It was to support them in their experiment and to dramatize the concept of regionalism that I went to San Salvador:

(Follow talking points on the Central American Trip - copy attached.)

July 9, 1968

256

Talking Points on the Central American Trip

A. Purpose of the Trip

1. To show United States support for economic integration in Central America.
2. To dramatize the success of the Central American Common Market as an example for other areas of the hemisphere and world of what can be accomplished through regional cooperation.
3. To rally increased effort to expand the quantity and quality of education.

B. Direct Accomplishments

1. The meeting took place at a critical time when the Central Americans face important adjustment problems in the Common Market and morale was sagging.
2. My trip to review their achievements and problems with them and offer increased US support recharged their confidence and determination.
3. Before I arrived, they made a frank assessment of their accomplishments, which are impressive:

- almost 700% increase in intraregional trade;
- an average annual growth in GNP of 6%, although it has slowed down in the past 2 years;
- a 65% increase in investment;
- a 50% increase in expenditures for education;
- effective regional institutions under dynamic, young leadership.

But, more importantly, they also measured how much more needs to be done:

- in education, housing, health and population control;
 - in diversifying and increasing exports;
 - in linking the countries with better roads and telecommunications;
 - in perfecting the Common Market institutions.
4. They agreed to redouble their efforts in these fields.
 5. They committed themselves to ratify the protocol imposing a 30% surtax on exports -- an essential first step in the readjustment process.

C. Important Follow-Up

1. The trip convinced me more than ever before that the road to peace and progress lies through regionalism and subregionalism.
2. Central America can be made a microcosm for this process which will be a challenge and stimulus for other areas to follow.
3. I am impressed by the material gains I saw and the human talent available. I saw this particularly in the educational field symbolized by the LBJ School in a poor neighborhood and in the San Andres Normal School which will house the ITV pilot project for Central America.
4. But as I drove through the streets and countryside and saw thousands of children and young people, I realized how much more needs to be done quickly in schooling, housing, health and jobs.

I am asking Walt Rostow to work with Secretary Rusk and Bill Gaud in organizing a working group to bring together resources in private industry, the universities and government to spur a major development effort in Central America.

D. A Political Side-Benefit

1. For the past 13 months relations between Honduras and El Salvador had progressively deteriorated as both sides refused to exchange prisoners seized in a border dispute area.
2. The increased bitterness between the two countries was also poisoning Common Market cooperative relations.
3. My trip prompted the two sides to work out a quick solution announced on the eve of my arrival.

Mr. Rostow

26

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By JC, NARA, Date 8-1-01

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, July 16, 1968

1. susp
2. Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from James Birdsall

You may remember Mr. Birdsall as the fellow who saw you last December to deliver an oral message and a short note from President Nasser. He has now written the attached letter asking your permission to make public the circumstances surrounding his meetings with Nasser and the December message to you.

Birdsall argues that what is required for the resumption of US-UAR relations is an American gesture showing that we are still concerned about the Arabs. He feels the reason we have not made such a gesture is that the American people are so anti-Nasser that our hands are tied. He feels publicizing the fact that Nasser made this early move toward you would help us over that hurdle.

Luke Battle strongly recommends against such publicity. He feels it would make you appear in Nasser's eyes to be guilty of violating a confidential exchange and would damage your ability to rebuild relations. He fears it would put Nasser on the spot and might even force him to deny that this exchange ever took place. Birdsall says "his contacts in Cairo" believe Nasser would not object, but we're skeptical.

We believe from what Nasser has told Robert Anderson and others that he would have difficulty resuming relations with us as long as we seem in Egyptian eyes to be backing Israel's continued occupation of Arab territory. What the Egyptians mean when they talk about a US gesture is really a US effort to force Israel to withdraw.

Luke is also suspicious of Birdsall's motives in seeking this publicity. He has some evidence that Birdsall has tried to use his involvement to business advantage.

Hal Saunders has already talked with Birdsall and got his agreement not to publicize this exchange if that is your wish. If you approve, I would have Hal confirm to Birdsall in a short note that you desire to keep this exchange confidential.

W. W. Rostow

Approve, no publicity _____
Let him do what he wants if Nasser approves _____
Call me _____

~~SECRET~~

26a

JAMES E. BIRDSALL
COUNSELLOR AT LAW
11 BROADWAY
NEW YORK 4, N. Y.
WHITEHALL 4-0900

June 28, 1968

H
Hon. Lyndon B. Johnson
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

I had the honor of meeting with you in December of last year in order to deliver a written message from President Nasser. I had hoped that by this time diplomatic relations would have been resumed between the U. A. R. and this country. As I explained to you, to Mr. Rostow and to Ambassador Battle, my sole interest is to prevent the Middle East from falling under the complete domination of the Soviet Union. President Nasser has repeatedly told me that he too fears the Russian encroachment, but that he is helpless to resist it, unless he is offered some alternative. The first step toward insuring an alternative is obviously the resumption of diplomatic relations.

Since I met with you, I have again, at his request, met with President Nasser. He has once more emphasized his desire for the resumption of relations, but has pointed out the great difficulties facing him because of our purported pro-Israel -- anti-Arab stand.

I am informed that the situation continues to deteriorate, and that the pro-Western forces in the Nasser government are being steadily weakened. I am aware of the fact that the State Department takes the position that the failure to resume relations is attributable to Mr. Nasser and that we have gone as far as our honor permits.

I respectfully submit that as a great nation with vital interest in the Middle East, the burden of re-establishing some position

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State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

JAMES E. BIRDSALL

COUNSELLOR AT LAW

11 BROADWAY

NEW YORK 4, N. Y.

WHITEHALL 4-0900

Hon. Lyndon B. Johnson

June 28, 1968


there is on us, not for Mr. Nasser's sake but for our own.

At my last conference with Mr. Nasser, he indicated that the State Department resented his meeting and speaking with me. As you know, I have been most meticulous in keeping the State Department informed about every conference which I have held with Mr. Nasser, all of which were called at his request and not at mine.

At the time, I met with you and conveyed Mr. Nasser's message, Mr. Rostow asked me to keep this meeting confidential. I feel, however, that the fact that Mr. Nasser was willing to make the first gesture toward resumption of relations with the United States might ameliorate to some degree the hostility which many Americans feel toward the Arabs, in general, and him in particular,

I, therefore, request your permission to make public, at such time as it might be most helpful, the circumstances surrounding my meetings with Mr. Nasser and his December message to you.

Respectfully,


James E. Birdsall

JEB:hd

27

ACTION

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, July 16, 1968 -

Mr. President:

Herewith Secretary Rusk renews his recommendation that you have a brief meeting with Crown Prince Birendra of Nepal. You agreed to see Birendra last month but had to cancel because you were out of town.

The situation in Nepal is unchanged; the King is recovering from his heart attack, though the long-range prognosis is not good. If you can spare a 15-minute chat, I still think it's a good idea to receive the Crown Prince.

W. W. Rostow

Okay; set up appointment July 29-31 _____

No _____

Call me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWR:RM:lw

Att: File #2191

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

S/S 9635

2191

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

27a

July 10, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Call on You by Crown Prince Birendra of Nepal

Recommendation:

That you receive Crown Prince Birendra of Nepal.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

His Royal Highness Crown Prince Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva of Nepal will be in Washington July 29, 30 and 31, concluding his two-month tour of the United States, Latin America, and Canada. He attended Harvard this year as an undergraduate student in government. He sails for Europe August 1, en route to Israel for further study.

You had agreed to meet with the Crown Prince June 3 at the beginning of his study tour; that call was cancelled when business caused you to be out of Washington.

I believe that it would serve our interests in Nepal for the Crown Prince to have an opportunity for a brief meeting with you on his own (he was a member of King Mahendra's official party during the 1967 State Visit). At 22, Crown Prince Birendra is the proclaimed heir to an absolute monarchy and serves as Regent whenever his father is absent from the Kingdom. A young leader, destined for the position of highest responsibility in his country, the Crown Prince would, I am sure, value the opportunity for a personal meeting with you.

You may recall that his father, King Mahendra, suffered a heart attack on March 15. While the King is recovering nicely, the long-range prognosis given us by Dr. Thomas W. Mattingly is definitely not good. There is, therefore, the prospect that the Crown Prince may ascend the throne in a very few years.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-248

By mg, NARA, Date 6-25-96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

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-2-

Crown Prince Birendra is a serious-minded young man who appears quite dedicated to the development of his country. Sent abroad in 1967 for a two-year study-tour in Japan, the United States, and Israel, he has spent nearly a year of this time here in the United States. He relaxed and became quite at home in the undergraduate college life at Harvard where he was treated as an ordinary individual and lived in Quincy House, one of the dormitories. His studies were in the field of government with a smattering of economics. We have looked upon his year in the United States as an excellent occasion to explain to the Crown Prince the basic tenets of the American way of life as well as to cultivate in him an understanding of American foreign policy.

A biographic sketch is enclosed of the Crown Prince. Should it be possible for you to receive him, we will provide some suggested talking points.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Biographic sketch

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2191

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

27b

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 95-248

By 58, NARA, Date 6-25-96

BIRENDRA Bir Bikram Shah Deva

Crown Prince of Nepal

The next ruler of Nepal, Crown Prince Birendra, is at present studying government under some of America's leading political scientists at Harvard University. The 22-year old Crown Prince is heir to an absolute monarchy, and he normally serves as Regent when his father is absent from the Kingdom.

A serious-minded young man who appears dedicated to the development of his country, Birendra is intelligent and alert, and since his arrival at Harvard in 1967 has taken a newly-found interest in studies. Pleasant and polite, gifted with a sense of humor, he has an outgoing personality, especially in informal situations; and is an easy and comfortable person with whom to be.

The Crown Prince is single, wears glasses, and is about five feet nine inches tall. He smokes and takes an occasional drink of Scotch or of gin and tonic. While in the United States he has displayed an informality of manner which he drops only in the presence of high officials of his own country. For example, Birendra likes to stop in lunch counters and strike up conversations with strangers on almost any subject, will carry his own suitcase (except in Washington where he lets Ambassador Khatri tote it), and enjoys a good nightclub show.

During his year at Harvard the Crown Prince has had an opportunity to visit Forts Bragg and Benning, visit Miami and the Florida Keys (he went fishing with some success), attend a World Series' game in Boston as guest of the Commissioner of Baseball, participate in the King's State Visit in November, visit West Virginia and Appalachia with the help of Jay Rockefeller, and make brief visits around New England.

Born in the Royal Palace in Kathmandu in 1945, Birendra was educated privately by tutors and then sent off to India to study at St. Joseph College, Darjeeling, before spending five years in England where he graduated from Eton in 1964. He is now on a two-year study tour in Japan, the United States, and Israel. From April to August 1967 he studied education, social welfare, and industry at Tokyo University. He arrived here in August 1967 and has spent the 1967-1968 academic year as a special undergraduate student at Harvard where he has studied government and had a smattering of pre-college level economics. (While at Harvard he has lived the normal American under-graduate college life in Quincy House, one of the dormitories, where he is known as "Shah" to the House Master and his fellow students.) After his tour of the United States, Latin America, and Canada during June and July 1968 he expects to study agriculture, administration, and internal defense at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Despite his comparative youth, the Crown Prince has traveled widely. In 1961 he accompanied the King to Belgrade to the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations; in 1965 he represented Nepal at the Tenth Anniversary celebrations of the Bandung Conference in Indonesia and also visited Burma. While at Eton or returning he visited West Germany, Portugal, Switzerland, the Soviet Union, and India, and made a formal visit to Iran. He made an official visit to Communist China for several weeks in the summer of 1966 and had an interview with Mao Tse-tung.

The Crown Prince's favorite hobby is art, and he has done some works in water color and oils. He is interested in the preservation of the traditional Nepalese craftsmanship, and at one time he experimented with the adaptation of traditional wooden art forms to concrete. Having bagged his first tiger at 14, Birendra has kept up an interest in hunting, likes swimming, hiking, and riding, but has done little, if any, of these pursuits while in the United States. He is especially fond of sports cars and presently drives a Jaguar 2 1/2.

Conversational subjects with him might include his government studies at Harvard under such mentors as Henry Kissinger, Merle Fainsod, S. Hoffmann, and K. W. Deutsch, his plans for touring the United States this summer (itinerary attached), his visits to Job Corps and VISTA centers in West Virginia, art and artists (his knowledge is not too deep), and impressions of America generally. His views on foreign policy might also be explored as well as his impressions of students and student revolts in the United States as seen from the Harvard "Yard".

NEA/INC:HGwing:maj 5/9/68

Pres file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1968
7:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a summary of Cy Vance's dinner conversation of tonight. It sounds a bit more businesslike. They are probing but not committed to the concept.

W. W. Rostow

NODIS

July 15, 1968

SECRET/MARVAN/PLUS

7:05 p.m.

Cy Vance called on the secure phone. Vance and Habib had spent 2½ hours with Lau and Vy. Vance gave the skeleton of the 2-phase concept, and they expressed interest in exploring the concept and asked for details on Phase 2. Vance then gave them the 5 major subject headings and spent 45 minutes developing the DMZ aspect of Phase 2. They made several "interesting comments" about the DMZ which Vance will include in a cable he will dispatch later tonight. Lau said they did not see anything new in our presentation but he did not reject it, and said that he would study it carefully. Vance felt they had given it "sober examination" in the discussion tonight.

At one stage Lau probed on how many of the five subject headings represented the basic U.S. position and Vance and Habib gave them no information on this inquiry.

Ben. H. Read

Benjamin H. Read

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State Dept. Guidelines
By *PC*, NARA, Date *8-1-01*

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INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, July 15, 1968 - 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

At the July 14 reception everybody was very nice to Sarg Shriver.

Zorin even told Shriver (para 3) "that progress in peace talks now being made and he was pleased with situation and outlook."

We shall get a first report of Cy Vance's dinner some time tonight. If it contains anything of interest, I shall call you.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 17963

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Authority RAC 18659
By is NARA, Date 1-8-98

WWRostow:rlh



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 PARIS 17963 151303Z.

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ACTION SS 70

Rostow

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4221
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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LIMDIS

SUBJ: ELYSEE BASTILLE DAY RECEPTION NOTABLE FOR DE GAULLE.
CORDIALITY

1. IN COURSE TWO SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS AT ELYSEE RECEPTION DE GAULLE MADE FOLLOWING POINTS. FIRST, IN A VERY CORDIAL MANNER, WITH WARMTH AND GESTICULATIONS, HE ASKED THAT HIS PERSONAL GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHES BE CONVEYED TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON. SECOND, HE EXPRESSED HIS VIEW THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND USA MUCH IMPROVED. THIRD, HE STATED HIS DESIRE TO MEET WITH ME SOON TO DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION AND OTHER POSSIBILITIES. FOURTH, HE INQUIRED WHETHER I PLANNED TO LEAVE PARIS IN JULY FOR VACATION AND WHEN TOLD I DID NOT HE STATED THAT HE WOULD INSTRUCT HIS PROTOCOL OFFICE TO CONTACT OURS TO ARRANGE APPOINTMENT FOR ME WITH HIM BEFORE END OF MONTH. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT HE WANTS TO TALK AND APPARENTLY TO TALK SUBSTANCE.

2. DE GAULLE'S FRIENDLY AND FORTHCOMING MANNER TYPICAL OF FRENCH PERSONALITIES AT RECEPTION, ONE OF WHOM, JEAN DE LIPKOWSKI, NEW SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO SAY IN ENGLISH THAT HE HAS ALWAYS BEEN PRO-AMERICAN, THAT CONDITIONS AND ATTITUDES WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT HAVE CHANGED, THAT HE HAS PERSONALLY DISCUSSED POSSIBILITIES FOR NEW DEVELOPMENTS WITH DEBRE AND THAT DEBRE HAS PROVEN RECEPTIVE TO LIPKOWSKI'S IDEAS. LIPKOWSKI SAID WE SHOULD REGARD HIM AS OUR CLOSE FRIEND, ANXIOUS TO HELP, READY TO RESPOND TO INQUIRIES, AND TO DISCUSS OUR IDEAS AT ALL TIMES.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 PARIS 17963. 151303Z.

3. OTHER COMMENTS AT ELYSEE RECEPTION INCLUDED SOVIET AMBASSADOR ZORIN'S STATEMENT WITH AIR OF SATISFACTION THAT PROGRESS IN PEACE TALKS NOW BEING MADE AND HE PLEASED WITH SITUATION AND OUTLOOK. ZORIN ALSO REQUESTED MEETING, WHICH SCHEDULED FOR FRIDAY, JULY 19.

4. COMMENT: DE GAULLE'S INITIATIVE IN SUGGESTING THAT I COME AND TALK WITH HIM IS EXCEPTIONAL AND SIGNIFICANT. I HOPE TO SCHEDULE THIS MEETING FOR LATE JULY AND SUGGEST THAT DEPARTMENT BEGIN THINKING NOW ABOUT HOW TO MAKE BEST USE THIS OPPORTUNITY. WE WILL DO THE SAME.

5. DEPARTMENT REPEAT FURTHER AS DESIRED.

GP-3. SHRIVER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Monday, July 15, 1968

6:20pm

ACTION

30

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

In the attached memo Secretary Rusk recommends you approve sending a delegation led by Secretary Cohen to attend the October 9 dedication of the Berlin Medical Center.

The Berlin Medical Center was constructed by the Benjamin Franklin Foundation, a non-profit organization of prominent Germans and Americans. The U.S. Government contributed \$14.6 million of the total cost of \$75 million for construction of the Center.

Sending a high-level delegation to the Center's dedication will give us an opportunity to underscore our continued interest in Berlin.

The other suggested members of the delegation are:

Ambassador Lodge.

Senator Sparkman, Chairman of the European Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee. (Senators Lausche and Pell, next most senior Democrats, as alternates.)

Senator Carlson, senior Republican. (Senators Williams, Case, or Cooper, the next most senior Republicans as alternates.)

Surgeon General Stewart -- senior U.S. Public Health official.

Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Rimestad.

Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Al Puhon -- one of the senior State Department officials responsible for German Affairs.

Mrs. Eleanor Lansing Dulles -- helped establish the Benjamin Franklin Foundation and the Berlin Medical Center project.

Mr. Leon Chatelain, Jr., Chairman of Benjamin Franklin Foundation.

Mike Manatos recommends adding Senator Lister Hill to the delegation.

I concur in Secretary Rusk's recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Approve sending delegation _____ Add Senator Hill _____

Disapprove _____

ERF:mm Call me _____

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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July 8, 1968

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: United States Delegation to Attend
the Dedication of the Berlin Medical
Center on October 9, 1968

Recommendation:

That you designate the Honorable Wilbur J. Cohen, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, to head the United States delegation to the dedication of the Berlin Medical Center; and that you designate as members of the delegation Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, United States Ambassador to Germany; Senator John J. Sparkman of Alabama (alternatively Senators Lausche or Pell); Senator Frank Carlson of Kansas (alternatively Senators Williams, Case or Cooper); Dr. William H. Stewart, Surgeon General of the United States; Mr. Idar Rimestad, Deputy Under Secretary of State; Mr. Alfred Puhon, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; Mrs. Eleanor Lansing Dulles; and Mr. Leon Chatelain, Jr., architect.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The Berlin Medical Center will be the largest and most modern medical center in Germany and one of the largest in the world. It will contain approximately 1,500 beds, have extensive treatment facilities and will accommodate all of the teaching and research facilities of the Medical Faculty of the Free University of Berlin.

N The Benjamin Franklin Foundation will turn over the Berlin Medical Center to the City of Berlin and the Free University on October 9 at dedication ceremonies in the Congress Hall (also built with American assistance). At a time when Berlin once again feels threatened--by the East German restrictions of June 12--it is important that the people of Berlin and the German press interpret our delegation as a distinguished one. The Berlin Medical Center represents in a very tangible way the

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-2-

results of German-American cooperation. Its dedication ceremony will afford us an excellent opportunity to reaffirm in the eyes of Berliners our dedication to the freedom of Berlin, our solidarity and support and our confidence in the city's future. We have made a number of such gestures recently, including my own trip to Bonn on June 26 where I met with Berlin's Governing Mayor, among others.

The United States Government contributed \$14.6 million toward construction of the Berlin Medical Center (approximately one-fifth of the total cost--an estimated \$75.5 million). The remainder was provided by the German Government and the Berlin city government. (The United States contribution originally represented one-half of the anticipated cost but rising prices during the eight-year period of construction resulted in the German share increasing to four-fifths.) The Berlin Medical Center was constructed by the Benjamin Franklin Foundation, a non-profit organization of prominent Germans and Americans. The Department of State provided the Benjamin Franklin Foundation with the \$14.6 million U.S. share from AID funds.

The German delegation to the dedication will be a distinguished one and will include several members of the Federal Cabinet and the Bundestag. Your designation of Secretary Cohen and the other delegates proposed above will ensure that the United States' representation at the dedication will also be a distinguished one.

Secretary Cohen, the senior United States official responsible for health matters, would be particularly appropriate as head of the delegation. Ambassador Lodge, who also is the senior U.S. official in Germany, would be expected to attend as a delegate. Senator Sparkman, Chairman of the European Sub-Committee of the Foreign Relations Committee, would be a suitable delegate. (The next ranking Democratic members, Senators Lausche and Pell, would be alternates.) Senator Carlson (and alternates Senator Williams, Case, or Cooper, the next most senior) would give the delegation a desirable bipartisan flavor. Surgeon General Stewart, the senior Public Health official of the United States, is an obvious choice as member of the delegation. Deputy Under Secretary of State (for Administration) Rimestad has supported American participation in the Berlin Medical Center project. Mr. Puhan is one of the senior State Department officials whose responsibilities include German Affairs. Mrs. Dulles helped establish the Benjamin Franklin Foundation and the Berlin Medical Center project ten years ago. Finally, Mr. Chatelain, a distinguished Washington architect, is the Chairman of the Benjamin Franklin Foundation.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

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INFORMATION

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Monday, July 15, 1968 -- 5:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

This back channel message from Bunker on how Thieu is building a big national political party will interest you.

He's learning; but the party has a long way to go.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 5314

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WWRostow:rlh

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

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~~SECRET~~

DATE: 15 JULY 68.

RECO: JUL 15 1745Z 68

FROM: SAIGON 5314

TO: DIRECTOR

PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE "EYES ONLY" FROM AMB BUNKER TO SECSTATE AND MR. WALT ROSTOW. PARIS PLEASE PASS TO HARRIMAN, VANCE AND HABIB.

SUBJECT: THIEU ON POLITICAL PARTY FORMATION AND FINANCING.

1. BERGER AND I HAD A LONG AND VERY SATISFACTORY TALK WITH THIEU AFTER DINNER AT THE RESIDENCE ON JULY 13 ON HOW HE VISUALIZED THE PROBLEMS OF BUILDING POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR HIS GOVERNMENT AND WHAT HIS PLANS WERE. I INTRODUCED THE SUBJECT BY REFERRING TO OUR PREVIOUS CONVERSATION ON THIS SOME MONTHS AGO.
2. HE SAID HE HAD WORKED FROM BEHIND THE SCENES TO ENCOURAGE THE FOUNDATION OF LIEN MINH (NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR SOCIAL REVOLUTION), AN ALLIANCE OF NATIONALIST ELEMENTS. AFTER IT WAS SURFACED HE HAD ADDRESSED IT ON JULY 4 AT THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE VCT, AND HE WAS CONTINUING TO WORK QUIETLY WITH ITS LEADERS.
3. ITS THREE MAIN COMPONENTS WERE THE FREE DEMOCRATIC FORCES, HEADED BY NGUYEN VAN HUONG; THE FARMER-WORKER ASSOCIATION (A

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PAGE 2 SAIGON 5314 ~~SECRET~~

CVT-HOA HAO AMALGAM) LED BY TRAN QUOC BUU, HEAD OF THE CVT; AND THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT, UNDER SENATOR (EX-GENERAL) TRAN VAN DON. THE FIRST TWO HAD CADRES IN SAIGON AND IN THE COUNTRY RUNNING INTO SOME THOUSANDS, ALLEGEDLY 30,000 IN THE CASE OF THE CVT. SENATOR DON HAD NO REAL ORGANIZATION, BUT HE HAD MANY FRIENDS, AND HIS EXTRAORDINARY PERSONALITY AND ENERGY, HIS CAPACITY FOR LEADERSHIP AND HIS POLITICAL SENSE MADE HIM AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE. THE FRONT OF ALL RELIGIONS HAD NOT JOINED, BUT WERE NOT UNFRIENDLY AND WERE WATCHING HOW THE LIEN MINH DEVELOPED.

4. IT WAS NOT A REAL POLITICAL PARTY OR ORGANIZATION AT THE PRESENT TIME, BUT A LOOSE ALLIANCE OF GROUPS AND PEOPLE, ALL OF THEM SAW THE NEED TO DEVELOP A POLITICAL PARTY, ONCE PEACE WAS ESTABLISHED, WHEN IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THERE BE A UNITED POLITICAL PARTY TO COMPETE AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS WHEN THE STRUGGLE WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE POLITICAL ARENA. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORM SUCH A PARTY NOW; THERE WERE TOO MANY SUSPICIONS, JEALOUSIES AND DIVISIONS.

5. NOW, HE ASKED RHETORICALLY, CAN SUCH A LOOSE ALLIANCE BE CONVERTED INTO A POLITICAL PARTY WITH SUPPORT IN THE CITIES AND IN THE COUNTRYSIDE? IF IT WAS BUILT NOW AS AN ORGANIZATION IN SUPPORT OF HIM, OR EVEN HIS GOVERNMENT, IT WOULD FAIL - THE PEOPLE WERE DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS

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PAGE 2 SAIGON 5314 S ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OF PERSONAL OR GOVERNMENT PARTIES. LIEN MINH WAS CONCEIVED AS AN ORGANIZATION TO HELP SAVE THE NATION. HE HAD THEREFORE DECIDED THAT THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO DEVELOP ACTUAL PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS OF HELP TO THE PEOPLE. IT COULD BE DONE BY THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS IN THE NAME OF LIEN MINH, AND HE AND THE GOVERNMENT WOULD FINANCIALLY ASSIST THESE PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS. HE HAD ASKED THE LIEN MINH LEADERS TO SUPPLY HIM WITH SUCH A PROGRAM BY THE TIME HE RETURNS FROM HONOLULU.

6. THE FARMER-WORKER ASSOCIATION ALREADY HAD PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS AND COULD EASILY EXPAND THEM, ESPECIALLY IN THE CITIES. IN ADDITION THERE WERE MANY IDEALISTIC AND PATRIOTIC INDIVIDUALS AND SMALL GROUPS IN THE COUNTRY WHO WERE DOING SOMETHING ALREADY, AND THESE COULD BE FINANCED IF THEY WOULD COME IN UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF LIEN MINH. HE MENTIONED A PHARMACIST WHO HAD ORGANIZED A LARGE GROUP OF STUDENTS FOR WORK AMONG THE REFUGEES, BUT WHO WAS RUNNING OUT OF MONEY, AS A SAMPLE OF THE KIND OF ELEMENT THAT HE EXPECTED MIGHT COME INTO LIEN MINH IF HE COULD FIND THE FINANCES FOR THEM.

7. ALL OF THIS WILL REQUIRE MONEY, AND A GOOD DEAL OF IT, AND OBVIOUSLY HE COULD NOT SUPPLY FUNDS ON THE SCALE REQUIRED. THIEU THEREFORE CONCEIVED OF SOLVING THIS PROBLEM IN TWO WAYS. HE NEEDED A COMPARATIVELY SMALL AMOUNT OF CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS TO SUPPLY LIEN MINH AND ITS COMPON-

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PAGE 4 SAIGON 5314 ~~SECRET~~

ENT LEADERS TO HELP THEM DEVELOP CADRES FOR LIEN MINH. THESE WOULD BE THE FUTURE NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEADERSHIP. THE VERY MUCH LARGER FUNDS FOR THE PROJECTS WOULD BE OPENLY AVAILABLE, PUBLICLY ACCOUNTABLE, AND COME OUT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT FUNDS. THE LIEN MINH PROJECTS WOULD BE PERFORMED ON BEHALF OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. HE HOPED WE WOULD BE ABLE TO HELP IN BOTH WAYS.

8. I ASKED IF HE WAS GETTING ANY PRIVATE FUNDS FROM BUSINESS MEN. HE SAID A LITTLE, BUT NOT ENOUGH. IF LIEN MINH GOT OFF THE GROUND AND BEGAN TO SHOW ITSELF AS A SUCCESS HE WOULD GET MORE FROM THAT SOURCE, BUT NEVER ENOUGH FOR THE NEEDS.

9. BERGER ASKED HOW HE INTENDED TO AVOID THE CHARGE OF FAVORING ONE LEADER OVER ANOTHER IN LIEN MINH, IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS, ADDING THERE WAS ALREADY A SUSPICION THAT HE REGARDED THE FREE DEMOCRATIC FORCES AND NGUYEN VAN HUONG AS HIS PREFERRED INSTRUMENT FOR POLITICAL ACTION. HE SAID THIS WAS A REAL PROBLEM--HE CALLED IT "THE PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING AN EQUILIBRIUM"--AND IT WOULD REQUIRE HIS PERSONAL ATTENTION AND EFFORT, AND ALSO WOULD INVOLVE HIM PERSONALLY IN THE DIVISION OF THE CONFIDENTIAL FUNDS.

10. THIEU SAID HE DID NOT RPT NOT INTEND TO SUPPLY LARGE FUNDS AT THE OUTSET--IT WOULD ONLY RISK THE DANGER ~~SSB INT THE FUND WOULD BE POLARIZED~~
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PAGE 6-53 SAIGON 5314 S ~~SECRET~~

BY TOO MANY PEOPLE. HE WOULD DOLE IT OUT FOR SAY, THREE MONTHS, AND THEN SEE HOW MUCH HAD BEEN DONE AND WHO WAS PRODUCING RESULTS. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD TAKE SIX TO NINE MONTHS BEFORE ONE COULD TELL WHETHER LIEN MINH WOULD PROVE A VIABLE AND VITAL ORGANIZATION. IF IT SHOWED IT WAS GOING TO BE A SUCCESS, HE EXPECTED THAT THE "SATELLITE" ORGANIZATIONS--HOA HAO, CAO DAI AND OTHERS--WOULD WANT TO JOIN IN ORDER TO GET HELP FOR THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. THE BUDDHISTS AND CATHOLICS WERE DIVIDED BUT HE EXPECTED SOME OF THEM TOO WOULD WANT TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH LIEN MINH.

11. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY HE SAID HE THOUGHT THE UPPER AND LOWER

HOUSES WOULD FALL IN LINE IN SUPPORT OF LIEN MINH IF IT PROVED A SUCCESS. ALREADY HE HAD GOOD SUPPORT IN BOTH HOUSES AND NEW AND MORE UNI-

FIED BLOCS WERE BEING FORMED IN BOTH HOUSES IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT.

AT SOME STAGE, HE HOPED LIEN MINH WOULD EVOLVE AS A POLITICAL PARTY, OR MORE ACCURATELY A POLITICAL COALITION, BUT IT WOULD BE IN SUPPORT OF HIS GOVERNMENT, NOT OF HIM PERSONALLY. HE REFERRED TO THE MISTAKE OF DIEM, WHO BUILT CAN LAO AS A PERSONAL POLITICAL PARTY, AND SAID HE DID NOT INTEND TO REPEAT DIEM'S MISTAKE.

12. BERGER, WHO WAS AS FASCINATED AS I WAS BY THIS EXPOSITION, ASKED WHERE HE LEARNED HIS POLITICS. "IN THE SCHOOL OF HARD EXPERIENCE,"

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PAGE 6 SAIGON 5314 ~~SECRET~~

HE SAID WITH A SMILE.

13. I TOLD THIEU THAT, AS I HAD EARLIER INDICATED, WE WERE READY TO HELP, AND WE COULD TALK FURTHER AFTER HONOLULU WHEN THE PROGRAM FOR LIEN MINH WAS FURTHER DEVELOPED. HE EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION.

14. COMMENT: THIEU'S CONCEPTIONS AND PLANS ARE, IN MANY ESSENTIAL ASPECTS, VERY CLOSE TO OUR THINKING. WE HAD NOT YET THOUGHT OF THE CONCEPT OF GETTING THE COMPONENT ORGANIZATIONS OF LIEN MINH TO WORK ON PROJECTS UNDER THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, AND I REGARD THIS AS A VERY IMAGINATIVE CONCEPTION. HE NEEDS FINANCIAL HELP, AND WE CAN SUPPLY IT THROUGH CONFIDENTIAL MEANS, AND/OR ARRANGE FOR IT OPENLY THROUGH THE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT FUNDS. HE AND I AGREED THAT WE MUST KEEP CLEAR OF LIEN MINH AND NOT SUFFOCATE IT WITH OUR ATTENTION OR CARESSES. THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY MANY PROBLEMS. ALL WE HAVE AT THE MOMENT IS A CONCEPTION AND THE MERE SKELETON OF AN ORGANIZATION. THIEU HAS A CERTAIN RESERVE ABOUT WHETHER IT WILL SUCCEED. I REGARD THAT AS HEALTHY AND AGREE THAT IT IS TOO EARLY TO HAVE A

PAGE 7 SAIGON 5314 ~~SECRET~~

SOLID JUDGMENT ON ITS LONGER-RUN FUTURE, SINCE THIS WILL DEPEND ON MANY FACTORS THAT ARE LARGELY UNKNOWN NOW.

BT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, July 15, 1968

5:15 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Sect. Rusk and Butch Fisher asked me to convey apologies for the lateness of this draft statement of the President for the opening of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee meeting in Geneva tomorrow, Tuesday, July 16. The reason is that those most concerned with this matter have been deeply engaged on preparations for strategic missile talks. In addition, there has been a major disagreement with the JCS and AEC which Secretary Rusk would resolve by omitting the bracketed language. The substance of the debate was this:

- In the past we have supported a comprehensive test ban and a verified cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons;
- With our commitments to PLOWSHARE under the NPT as well as the requirements for MIRV's for the POSEIDON and MINUTEMAN, plus the commitment to SENTINEL, underground testing remains necessary. It would be, in the view of many, hypocrisy for the President to repeat the old position.
- As for the cut-off of fissionable material, Glenn Seaborg argues (Tab C) that a further careful study beyond the study made in 1964 is required before we can, in good faith, repeat the old proposal.
- On the other hand, ACDA feels that there may be some raising of eyebrows and propaganda if we do not repeat these two old familiar items.

Since a statement by the President at this time is not only conventional -- but appropriate, in view of progress on the NPT and strategic arms talks -- I believe you should proceed, as Secretary Rusk recommends, with the bracketed language deleted.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Statement cleared with bracketed language deleted _____

Statement cleared _____

No _____

Call me _____

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

July 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Presidential Message to the
Resumed Session of the ENDC.

I am transmitting a draft of a proposed Presidential message to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee which is resuming its session on Tuesday, July 16.

The material in brackets on p. 3 contains a statement reiterating two prior statements of U. S. policy which have been put forth at the ENDC -- the comprehensive test ban and the cut off of the production of fissionable material for use in weapons. This portion of the proposed statement is in brackets because the JCS objects to its being reiterated at this time for the reasons in the attached memorandum from the Acting Director of the Joint Staff. The AEC also prefers to have the bracketed language eliminated for reasons contained in the attached memorandum from Chairman Seaborg. With the bracketed language eliminated, however, neither the JCS nor the AEC would have any objection to the proposed Presidential statement.

The elimination of the bracketed language has the disadvantage that it may give the impression that the US is backing away from its support for an adequately verified comprehensive test ban and its support for the cut-off of the production of fissionable material for use in weapons. This could damage the public posture of the US in the disarmament field and might jeopardize the wide acceptability of the NPT by other countries. It would tend to leave the center of the stage at the ENDC to the Kosygin nine-point memorandum. For these reasons, I would prefer to see the bracketed language included.

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- 2 -

Nevertheless, in view of the importance of having a Presidential statement at the opening of the ENDC and the difficulty of resolving conflicting views in the short time available, I recommend that you issue the statement with the bracketed language deleted. At the same time, however, I recommend that you authorize the delegation to the ENDC to reply in the negative if asked by the press or by other delegations whether the lack of any reference to these two items means a basic change in the U. S. position with respect to them.

Dean Rusk

Attachments:

1. Tab A - Proposed Message to the ENDC.
2. Tab B - Memorandum from Acting Director
Joint Staff JCS
3. Tab C - Memorandum from Chairman Seaborg

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July 15, 1968

A

Draft Presidential Message for Opening ENDC

Following is Presidential message you are authorized present to ENDC. Delegation should coordinate timing of release with Washington.

BEGIN TEXT Your Conference has achieved singular success in negotiating the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Treaty is a major step toward a goal which the United States has been seeking since the dawn of the nuclear age. It is a triumph of sanity in international affairs and a testament to man's will to survive.

The world looks today for a beginning of the negotiations called for by the treaty - "negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament . . ."

This is the most pressing task which the treaty lays on its parties. And the nations meeting in Geneva today share a major responsibility in performing it. The United States takes this responsibility with the utmost seriousness.

High on the disarmament agenda of mankind is the need to halt the strategic arms race. Agreement has been reached

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-2-

between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to enter in the nearest future into bilateral discussions on the limitation and the reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. It is expected that the two sides will shortly reach a decision on the time and place for talks.

In the absence of agreement, the nuclear arms race could escalate to new levels. This would only result in higher and higher destructive power on each side and vast diversion of resources from peaceful pursuits - with no increase in security for anyone.

If we can make progress on limiting strategic delivery systems, the United States would be prepared to consider reductions of existing systems. By reducing these systems, we would cut back effectively - and for the first time - on the vast potentials for destruction which each side possesses.

The United States and the Soviet Union have a special responsibility to head off a strategic arms race. The fate of mankind could well depend on the manner in which our two nations discharge that responsibility.

Progress on limiting strategic delivery systems will also

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-3-

facilitate the achievement of various related measures of nuclear arms control and disarmament. A number of such measures has been suggested by the United States. [These include: a comprehensive test ban, based on an agreement providing for adequate on-site inspection; and a verified cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, accompanied by the transfer of large quantities of fissionable material to peaceful purposes, under international safeguards. We have also indicated our willingness to accept step-by-step reductions by halting production for weapons use on a plant-by-plant basis, with appropriate verification. The United States has already shut down seven of its fourteen plutonium production reactors and reduced its uranium-235 production to one-third of its former rate.] Additional measures have been proposed by other nations and recommended by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The United States hopes that your Conference will soon be able to make significant progress on measures which have been the subject of past discussions. But these are not the only subjects of interest to the Conference.

We must soon take up the question of arms limitations on the seabed in the light of the consideration being given by the General Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabeds to a

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-4-

number of proposals for arms limitations on the seabed. Your Conference should begin to define those factors vital to a workable, verifiable and effective international agreement which would prevent the use of this new environment for the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction.

Meaning must soon be given to the language of the Non-Proliferation Treaty dealing with sharing potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. In the view of the United States, the International Atomic Energy Agency is the "appropriate international body" through which the non-nuclear-weapon Parties to the Treaty may obtain these benefits under Article V of the Treaty if they choose to do so. We also believe that the IAEA is the appropriate forum for development of procedures and agreements relating to the furnishing of the peaceful nuclear explosive services obtained through the IAEA.

Finally, we must be alert to opportunities for achieving regional limitations on armaments. We have seen that cooperation at the regional level to limit armaments is not only possible but is in fact a promising path to progress. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is a worthy example of what can be achieved when neighbors collaborate in safeguarding their national security

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-5-

interests and in promoting their common welfare. In signing Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the United States has demonstrated its intention to respect the denuclearized status of Latin America which will be established by that Treaty. We hope that all nuclear powers will respect this great achievement of Latin American diplomacy.

We have also seen the consequences of the failure of nations to effect regional arrangements to inhibit the growth of arsenals of conventional weapons. Resources continue to be diverted from critical human needs to the acquisition of armaments and the maintenance of military establishments that in themselves feed fears and create insecurity among nations.

The United States attaches particular importance to halting non-nuclear arms races. We must achieve regional limitations on conventional armaments.

Representatives of the United States are under standing instructions to search out any initiatives for regional restraints coming from the areas concerned. If arrangements acceptable to the nations involved can be concluded, they will be respected by the United States. We stand ready to support any reasonable measure affecting the activities of the major weapons-producers that would make a regional agreement more effective, including a requirement that suppliers publicize or register their arms shipments to a particular region. END TEXT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DJSM-859-68
12 July 1968

~~SECRET~~

DOD (M.A.N.T.C.) approves ^{revised}

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

with the understanding
that paragraphs 1, c, and
of this memorandum be

Subject: Presidential Message for Opening EMDC (U) called to

the attention
of the President

1. (E) The subject message has been reviewed and no objections are interposed to the contents of the draft message except as indicated in the succeeding paragraphs:

YK
7/17/68

a. In my opinion, that part of paragraph 1 which reads: "through deployment of ABM systems, construction of new and improved offensive missiles to penetrate ABM defenses, followed by further ABM deployments and further offensive deployments in response." should be deleted as being unnecessarily speculative.

b. It is recommended that the penultimate sentence of the first paragraph of the first measure be revised to delete the reference to any increase in security, i.e., delete "with no increase in security for anyone." The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that an effective ABM system would enhance national security.

c. It is recognized that the statements regarding a safeguarded cutoff of the production of fissionable materials for use in making nuclear weapons and the related offer to shut down equivalent facilities on a plant-by-plant basis contained in the second and third proposals have previously been announced as US policy. For the last two years, an interagency working group, established by ACDA, has been studying the impact on US security of a cutoff of production of fissionable materials. The report of this group has not been coordinated nor distributed to the member agencies. This delay in distribution, coupled with the little

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30
By jc NARA, Date 8-1-01

GROUP-3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

1968

~~SECRET~~

interest shown by the USSR in even discussing a cutoff proposal, make it wise to delay reintroducing this subject into the ENDC until appropriate agencies have had a chance to analyze the results of the joint working group endeavor. Such an analysis would provide the basis for a reappraisal by the Committee of Principals of the US position on this matter in light of the present circumstances. Accordingly, it is recommended that the second and third proposals be deleted.

d. Although the United States has previously indicated its willingness to enter into a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) with adequate on-site inspection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned that this position does not reflect consideration of the developments since the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and therefore does not recognize the impact which such an extension would have on the US strategic posture. Continuation of nuclear testing without further restriction is essential to the maintenance of the US deterrent posture and any further restriction is contrary to the national interest. Efforts to achieve a CTBT, a threshold treaty, or any extension of the present limitations of testing should be halted so that the United States will not be confronted by a Soviet acceptance of such a proposal at a most disadvantageous time for the United States. Accordingly, it is recommended that the fourth proposal be eliminated to de-emphasize US interest in this area and that as a more feasible alternative, given the above circumstances, the following be added to the sixth measure: "As a first step toward provision of such services, the United States is prepared to enter into discussion to achieve an amendment to the Limited Test Ban Treaty that would allow nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under the observation of an appropriate international body."

NELS C. JOHNSON
Vice Admiral, USN
Acting Director, Joint Staff

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

32d

July 13, 1968

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 11, #255

By jc NARA, Date 8-1-01

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to comment on the proposed Presidential message recommended by ACDA to Secretary of State Rusk and to you for use at the forthcoming opening of the ENDC.

I and my fellow Commissioners have problems with Presidential reiteration or endorsement at this time of two of the measures which are suggested as part of the disarmament agenda.


We feel that it would be a mistake to reiterate at this time our previously stated aim to "seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time." We feel strongly that this is unrealistic in view of the absolute necessity for underground testing in order to meet our announced commitments in the field of strategic offensive weapons such as Poseidon and Minute Man, and strategic defensive weapons such as the Sentinel (ABM).

Our second item of concern is a Presidential request at this time to reach agreement to halt all production of fissionable material for use in making nuclear weapons. As you know, we have shut down already seven out of fourteen of our plutonium production reactors and reduced our uranium-235 production by two-thirds. At a minimum, this would require further careful study; the last comprehensive study on a government-wide basis was made in 1964. If something needed to be said on this subject at this time, credit could be taken for what we have already done.

Perhaps these measures should be studied by the Committee of Principals before any further public statement is made on them.

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Respectfully,


Glenn T. Seaborg

The President
The White House

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

33

SECRET

**Monday, July 15, 1968
1:40 p. m.**

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is my shot at a draft to Clark.

Approved _____ Disapproved _____ Call me _____

W. W. Rostow

**P.S. I shall be going over to talk with Sect. Rusk
as instructed at 4:00 this afternoon.**

SECRET/LEO draft

DECLASSIFIED
White House Sec'y (L), Feb. 24, 1988
By rg, NARA, Date 9-2-92

33a

VIA CAS CHANNEL

July 15, 1968

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR CLARK CLIFFORD FROM WALT ROSTOW

The President wishes you to review carefully while in Vietnam any reductions in expenditures that we might make out there which would contribute to the \$3 billion Defense cut we face. He wishes you also to consider, in the light of the situation you find, any additions we might have to make in next year's Defense appropriation bill.

You might also be considering how, if no Foreign Aid bill is passed, we bring necessary military aid into a deficiency appropriation for the Defense budget.

Your consideration of these matters with the President in Honolulu and upon your return will, evidently, take us a little time. In the meanwhile, it is the President's hope that Congress will be able to come to grips with certain critical items such as the poverty bill, higher education, the many nominations for the courts which are before it, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, etc.

The President has talked with Mahon about Defense appropriations and the special unresolved problems posed in this message. He hopes that you will be able to meet with him and Mahon and go over these and other issues about the middle of next week, after your return.

The President will be counting on you for your usual resourcefulness.

###

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 10031
By isv NARA, Date 3-20-98

SECRET

Monday, July 15, 1968
11:00 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have had indexes of military activity prepared for Vietnam, by weeks from the week ending January 27 to the week ending July 6.


In all cases, 100 equals the average for the calendar year 1967.

Six factors are charted separately on this basis and an average index then compiled (see second chart).

The nut of it is that from about June 8 the index has moved back to about the 1967 average. In the past two weeks it has been below that average.


W. W. Rostow

Attachments



Average Index, 1968

34b



*Pres. file
Sharon*

35

Monday, July 15, 1968
10:45 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Len Marks just called.

He saw Drew Pearson over the weekend.
Pearson was talking of the President as a Man of
Peace and then "blurted out": "Do you know, he
wants to establish relations with Castro?"

Marks says he counseled caution in publishing
any such item, but fears Pearson may proceed.

He asked me to inform you.

If you wish him to talk further to Pearson about
this, he will. Otherwise this is simply information.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-134
By us, NARA Date 9-21-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, July 15, 1968
9:45 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

State informs me that, from their side, they are prepared to move today on both Harold Linder and Raul Castro as Ambassadors to Canada and Bolivia. With respect to Linder, it looks as though the Senate would be prepared to hold a hearing tomorrow. Therefore, an announcement from the White House this morning, if you wish it, would be wholly in order on both men.

W. W. Rostow

cc: George Christian

37

Pres file

ACTION

Monday, July 15, 1968 -- 9:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

On our trip around the world in December you instructed me always to travel with an assistant.

In addition, I have found that, although your own secretaries and George Christian's have been unfailingly helpful, it is best for me to have a secretary along, not only for drafting but also so I can summarize the cable traffic coming in from Washington.

If you wish to keep the party from Washington, including staff support, very low, I would, of course, understand. Otherwise I would find it helpful in serving you to have along in Honolulu:

-- Brig. Gen. Robert N. Ginsburgh -- Yes _____ no _____ call me _____

-- Miss Mildred Zayac -- Yes _____ no _____ call me _____

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

ACTION

38

Monday, July 15, 1968 - 7:45 am

Mr. President:

Neither McPherson nor Busby appears to be in town as of this morning. I think the proposed statement on the Aid Bill is good as it stands. (I suggest a possible insert at top of page 3.)

But you may wish to assign someone else to go over it this morning.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Free file

38a

W. W. Rostow's suggested insert on page 3.

of the free world.

From hard-won personal experience, every postwar President learned this fact: dollar for dollar, no U.S. expenditures contributed more to U.S. security and world peace than dollars spent in foreign aid.

Nor, if I may add a personal note, (continue on with remainder of page).

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THE AID BILL

The Congress is about to consider a critical piece of legislation--the continuation for another year of the foreign aid program. I want to emphasize to the American people and to all Members of Congress my conviction that passage of this legislation is absolutely essential.

I have just returned from Central America, where I saw and felt at first hand the needs and aspirations of people who look to us for leadership and help. These people, with energy and hope, are hard at work building a new life. They and the millions of others in Asia, in Africa and Latin America who are struggling to better their own lives and the lives of their children, deserve the assurance that they are not alone and friendless.

The world's poor know that there is no moratorium on disease.

They know that there is no moratorium on hunger, starvation or illiteracy.

And they know that there can be no moratorium on their own war against these age-old enemies. Can we do less than offer them a small measure of support and encouragement in this battle?

In the end, each citizen and each member of Congress must make his own judgment of our national priorities. Let me only say that my foreign aid budget request takes into account our critical needs at home as well as those abroad. As the Congress knows, it was the lowest request in history.

The Foreign Affairs Committee has reduced this request by \$600 million--about 20%. I regret this cut, but, in view of our joint concern for our fiscal problems, I will not oppose it.

But with these cuts, the program has been pared to the bone. Below this level the vitality of the regional initiatives we have stimulated in the developing areas would be severely threatened. Countries around the world which have trusted our resolve and heeded our advice would lose the confidence in peaceful progress which distinguishes this era from the long dark centuries of hopelessness which have been their common burden.

This is not, nor should it become, a partisan issue. Every President since Harry Truman has understood the importance of aid to our own security and to the future

From hard-earned personal experience every post-war
president has learned the fact: dollar for dollar
no U.S. expenditures contribute more to U.S. security
and world peace than dollars spent in foreign
aid. -3-

of the free world. Nor, if I may add a personal note,
can I imagine a greater disservice to my successor
than the defeat, or crippling, of this bill. Be he
Democrat or Republican, liberal or conservative, he
will be charged with executing the foreign policy of
the United States. It is our common responsibility to
pass on to him intact the full range of instruments
necessary to the performance of his duties. I speak
from my own experience--and the experience of my three
predecessors--when I say that none is more vital than
foreign aid.

We are now engaged in crucial talks looking toward
the end of the tragic conflict in Viet-Nam. We are about
to begin talks with the Soviet Union on limiting the arms
race. At a time when America's commitment to peace with
security has begun to bear fruit, we must not seem to be
withdrawing from the struggle against the basic causes
of war and unrest.

I call upon the Congress to reaffirm--as it has so
resolutely in the past--America's moral and material
commitment to help others help themselves toward a better
and more peaceful future.

ACTION

Monday - July 15, 1968

Mr. President:

Pres. file

Herewith a letter (Tab A) from the Argentine Ambassador thanking you for the Texas trip, and a reply (Tab B) you may want to consider sending him.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Ambassador Alsogaray's letter to President, July 9.

Tab B - Suggested Presidential reply for signature.

39a-

*Embajador
de la
República Argentina*

Washington, July 9, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I should like to take this opportunity to thank you most sincerely for your cordial invitation to be your guest once again at your ranch in Texas. The three days my colleagues and I spent in your home State were most stimulating and enjoyable.

After returning to Washington I saw Ambassador Burgess and we had a most interesting meeting during which I offered him my full cooperation in relation to his new post in my country.

May I convey my gratitude to you for the book entitled "To Heal and to Build" which deals with the programs carried out by your Administration. Besides reviewing the work that has been done it constitutes a real source of reference and information.

Mr. President, I hope that at some time in the not too distant future you may be able to visit Argentina. I will deem it a pleasure and an honor to assist in every way I can in the organization and success of your trip.

Sincerely yours,

Alvaro C. Alsogaray
Ambassador

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

3.6

July 16, 1968

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

It was most thoughtful of you to write me about your Texas trip. Texas hospitality is like the hospitality of your estancias -- open, generous and sincere.

I am glad you have already met with Ambassador Burgess. You can help him prepare for his important new duties in Buenos Aires.

I appreciate the invitation to visit Argentina and your offer to be of assistance. I would like to see more of Latin America, but this may have to wait until I leave office.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Alvaro C. Alsogaray
Ambassador of Argentina
Embassy of Argentina
Washington, D. C.

LBJ/WGB:mmm
(prep'd. 7 15 68)

Pres file -40

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - July 15, 1968

Mr. President:

At Tab A is a telegram from Ambassador Tuthill asking for guidance on what he should say to President Costa e Silva in his interview tomorrow if the Brazilian President asks about your plans to travel to Brazil.

At Tab B is suggested guidance we would like to send if it meets with your approval.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Attachments

Tab A - Telegram from Ambassador Tuthill, July 13.

Tab B - Suggested guidance for Presidential approval.

cc: Lou Schwartz

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *8-1-01*



Department of State

40a
TELEGRAM

419

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 281

PAGE 01 RIO DE 09876 130158Z

87

ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

R 130005Z JUL 68
FM AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2952

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ A L RIO DE JANEIRO 9876

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE VISIT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO BRAZIL

EXDIS

1. THERE HAS BEEN MUCH SPECULATION IN THE PRESS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO BRAZIL. IN ADDITION, BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR LEITAO DA CUNHA HAS ADVISED FOR MINISTER AND WILL ADVISE PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA ON JULY 15 THAT, UPON THE OCCASION OF HIS FAREWELL CALL ON PRESIDENT JOHNSON, PRESIDENT JOHNSON STATED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO VISIT BRAZIL "IN LATE AUGUST." LEITAO DA CUNHA STATED THAT HE WAS SURE

PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA WOULD WELCOME SUCH A VISIT. HE POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT FREI OF CHILE WILL BE VISITING BRAZIL THE FIRST WEEK OF SEPTEMBER AND WILL TAKE THE SALUTE AT THE NATIONAL DAY PARADE ON SEPTEMBER 7. HE INDICATED AS HIS OWN PERSONAL OPINION THAT IT WOULD BE VERY APPROPRIATE IF PRESIDENT JOHNSON COULD BE IN BRASILIA ON ARMY DAY AUGUST 25 IN ORDER TO BE THE GUEST OF HONOR FOR THE MILITARY PARADE ON THAT OCCASION. SECY GENERAL OF FOREIGN OFFICE HAS ALSO TOLD ME HE IS CONFIDENT THAT PRESIDENT WOULD WELCOME PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S VISIT.

2. EMBASSY TO DATE HAS REFRAINED FROM ANY SPECIFIC COMMENT ON THIS PROSPECT EXCEPT TO REAFFIRM PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S DEEP INTEREST IN BRAZIL AND WARM REGARD FOR PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA. IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT AFTER LEITAO DA CUNHA DISCUSSES MATTER WITH PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA, COSTA E SILVA WILL TAKE INITIATIVE TO URGE A VISIT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER WE WOULD BE CONSULTED FIRST BEFORE SENDING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 RIO DE 09876 130158Z

SUCH A MESSAGE. HOWEVER, TOGETHER WITH ASST SECY OLIVER AND
AMBASSADOR CLARK, I WILL BE CALLING ON PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA
ON JULY 16--THE DAY AFTER HE WILL PRESUMABLY HAVE DISCUSSED POSSIBLE
PRESIDENTIAL VISIT WITH AMBASSADOR LEITAO DA CUNHA. IF THERE IS
ANY MESSAGE OR GUIDANCE THAT I SHOULD MAKE AVAILABLE TO
COSTA E SILVA--IF THE SUBJECT IS RAISED THEN I SHOULD BE ADVISED NOT
LATER THAN 1500 RIO TIME JULY 16. TUTWILL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXDIS
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DRAFT - 7 15 68

Telegram to AmEmbassy Rio de Janeiro - PRIORITY

Subject: Possible Visit of President Johnson to Brazil

- FYI - (1) The President has indicated an interest in travel to South America, but no specific plans or dates have been determined. Whether or not Brazil would be included in any future trip has not been decided, although the President is known to want to visit Brazil.
- (2) Acting as guest of honor for Army Day parade August 15, as suggested by Leitao da Cunha, would seem a most inappropriate occasion for such a visit, given character of Brazilian Government. Furthermore, Democratic National Convention is scheduled to begin August 26. END FYI.
- (3) You should continue to refrain from making any specific comment on a possible visit by the President except to reaffirm his well-known interest in Brazil. Should Costa e Silva on his own initiative decide to invite

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

the President, matter could be considered then.
Should Costa e Silva prefer to take soundings first
as to the President's possible receptivity to such
an invitation, as seems more likely to us, you
could offer to find out and matter could be referred
to the President for his consideration.

- (4) Oliver was present at Leita da Cunha's June 25
meeting with the President.

41

Monday, July 15, 1968

Per file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your signature is a Proclamation of the Income-Tax Convention of July 28, 1967 with France. This is routine business.

You signed the instrument of ratification on June 19, 1968. Instruments of ratification were exchanged by Secretary Rusk and French Ambassador Lacet on July 11, 1968, bringing the Convention into force in accordance with its terms.

W. W. Rostow

If you approve, we
will need your signature at Tab A _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

MWG:mmm

42
INFORMATION

*Literally Eyes Only
For the President*

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, July 14, 1968 -- 11:30 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

With respect to the attached memorandum of July 12th, about which you asked to speak to me on Monday, I have drafted a message to Kossygin so that its operational implications are clear.

There are two major risks:

- we would have to resume bombing if Moscow could not deliver Hanoi, and that might make trouble with Moscow;
- a total cessation -- and then resumption of bombing--- could shake up the U.S. political scene.

(There is a third case; namely, that, after a total bombing cessation, Hanoi resumes the offensive and attacks Saigon and we do not react against the North; but this would be lethal to Saigon's morale and Thieu's government unless Hanoi's military effort was exceedingly feeble and we squelched it easily.)

Nevertheless, if there is no movement on Monday night in Paris, you may wish to discuss this with Sec. Rusk. (I have given him, alone, a copy of my memo to you.) It is conceivable, even, that you might wish to explore it with Thieu.

I repeat -- it's high-risk poker. But the five-week lull gives us a handle, if you judge the risks are worth it.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

42a

DRAFT -- Sunday, July 14, 1968

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I wish to return to the theme of your letter to me of June 5, 1968, and my letter to you of June 11, 1968.

Since June 5 two situations have changed in South Viet-Nam:

- the level of combat initiated by the other side has diminished;
- the shelling of Saigon and other populated areas has ended.

Frankly, we do not understand fully all the factors that have brought about this situation. And, as you know, we have considerable evidence that the recent large-scale infiltration of personnel from the North is flowing into North Vietnamese and Viet Cong military units, in apparent preparation for another major wave of attack.

Nevertheless, I have concluded the factual situation on the ground justifies a positive response to your judgment -- and that of your colleagues -- that complete cessation of the bombing against North Viet-Nam could "contribute to a breakthrough in the situation and produce prospects for a peaceful settlement."

I am, therefore, prepared to order all bombardment of North Viet-Nam to cease as of _____.

The relations between the Soviet Union and the United States are so important at this stage of history, however, that I must share with you, in the greatest frankness, my concerns about undertaking this course and solicit your judgment.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Obviously, bombing of North Viet-Nam would have to resume if, after this step were taken, major attacks were launched by the other side or the shelling of populated centers were again undertaken.

Moreover, we would have to see prompt movement on substantive matters; for example, on the re-installation of the DMZ; the re-installation of the Geneva Accords of 1962; and on other critical matters, where the participation in negotiations of the Government of Viet-Nam is essential.

If, in the light of these concerns, your advice remains as it was on June 5, I am prepared promptly to proceed. It seems to me essential, however, that there be no misunderstanding between us.

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

426

Friday, July 12, 1968
4:15 p.m.~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

I set out the following idea not because I believe it to be correct nor because I recommend it; merely because I think you should have available all the options of which we can conceive.

1. I begin with the fact that both Tommy Thompson and Chip Bohlen feel a certain regret that we did not pick up Kosygin's message, institute a total bombing halt, and then lean very heavily on the Soviet Union to produce results, against the background of a threat to resume bombing if the results did not take place. As old Soviet hands they are impressed that Kosygin should have used the following language in addressing you: "My colleagues and I think -- and we have grounds to do so -- that complete cessation by the United States of bombing and other acts of war with respect to the DRV could contribute to a breakthrough in the situation and produce prospects for a peaceful settlement."

2. The fact is that since June 5 the over-all level of combat in South Vietnam has greatly diminished and the shelling of Saigon has ceased.

3. But also we have every reason to expect in August -- if not earlier -- a major offensive in I Corps and against Saigon.

4. The idea would be for Sect. Rusk to tell Dobrynin or Tommy to tell Kosygin that:

-- We note the de-escalation in the actual fighting in South Vietnam in recent weeks;

-- We note the cessation of shelling of Saigon;

-- We are prepared to stop bombing on Day X;

-- It is, of course, essential after the bombing cessation:

-- that this low level continue;

-- that Saigon not be attacked;

-- that we move promptly to a reinstallation of the DMZ;

-- that the U. S. and the Soviet Union discuss the reinstallation of the Geneva Accords of 1962 (Dobrynin told Sect. Rusk flatly this would be possible after a bombing cessation);

-- and, as Chairman Kosygin told the President, that he and his colleagues had grounds to believe that the DRV would move rapidly towards a "peaceful settlement."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By AC, NARA, Date 8-1-01

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2-

5. Before actually instituting a bombing cessation, we would require from the Soviet Union some broad understanding along these lines.

6. This is pretty high-risk poker; and the case is good for waiting to see if in fact Hanoi responds directly to the Zorin suggestion. But the fact is that the Kosygin letter gives us an opening for this gambit if you should decide you would like to force the issue.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

14 July 1968
10:45 A.M.

43

Mr. President:

Herewith Thieu reacts favorably to
our proposed schedule but wants:

Per file

- "working dinner" on Friday 19th

- would like to host "working lunch"
on 20th

- may wish to stay over because of
Mrs. Thieu's shopping list.

WWR

Saigon 32578

Scut

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

43a

RECEIVED
WHCA

WRIGHT

1968 JUL 14 11 44

SECRET

HCE224

PAGE 01 SAIGON 32578 141136Z

16
ACTION SS 30

INFO CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,/030 W

0 140605Z JUL 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6734
CINCPAC IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ 32573

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: HONOLULU MEETING

REF DEPTEL 201992

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-10-1

1. I DISCUSSED REFTEL WITH THIEU LAST NIGHT AND GAVE HIM A COPY OF THE DEPT'S PROPOSED SCHEDULE AND VARIATIONS FROM HIS ORIGINAL PROPOSALS. HE WAS ON THE WHOLE AMENABLE. FOLLOWING KEYED TO YOUR PARAS.
2. RE PARA 17. HE WILL ANNOUNCE EXACT DATES HERE ON THURSDAY MORNING, JULY 19TH, SAIGON TIME. WE DID NOT FIX TIME OF RELEASE, BUT I WILL TRY TO ARRANGE FOR 0900 HOURS LOCAL. (9 p.m. Wednesday, Wash. Time)
3. RE PARAS 7, 10 AND 18. HE AGREES LUNCH FRIDAY, JULY 19, SHOULD BE WORKING LUNCH. HE BELIEVES MORE TIME FOR PRIVATE TALKS WILL BE NEEDED AND HOPES PRESIDENT WOULD AGREE TO GIVE INFORMAL WORKING DINNER THAT NIGHT. HE WILL OFFER WORKING LUNCH ON SATURDAY, JULY 20 AT ROYAL HAWAIIAN. ON THIS BASIS HE THINKS THERE MAY BE NO REPEAT NO NEED FOR AFTERNOON SESSION JULY 20, BUT TIME SHOULD BE HELD OPEN AGAINST THIS CONTINGENCY. HE MAY HAVE HIS PRESS CONFERENCE LATE MORNING AFTER COMMUNIQUE IS ISSUED, OR IN THE AFTERNOON.
4. RE PARA 12. HE IS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER HE WILL LEAVE HAWAII ON THE AFTERNOON OR EVENING OF JULY 20TH OR LEAVE

RESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

SE 02 SAIGON 32578 141136Z

FOLLOWING MORNING. HE ASSUMES PRESIDENT WILL LEAVE IN THE AFTERNOON. HE SAID HE MIGHT WISH TO RELAX FOR A FEW HOURS. (MRS. THIEU HAS GIVEN HIM A SHOPPING LIST AND I THINK HE WOULD LIKE SOME TIME FOR THAT.)

5. I MAY WANT TO STAY ON IN HONOLULU FOR A DAY AFTER MEETING ENDS DEPENDING ON SITUATION HERE. OUTGOING AND RETURN TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS FOR MYSELF AND MY PARTY WILL BE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE TELS.

6. COMMENT: I FELT AFTER TALKING WITH THIEU LAST NIGHT THAT HE IS THOROUGHLY SATISFIED WITH ARRANGEMENTS BEING WORKED OUT AND HIS INITIAL DISAPPOINTMENT THAT STATE VISIT WAS POSTPONED SEEMS TO HAVE VANISHED. BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

REVISION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

44

14 July 10:45 A.M.

Mr. President:

Herewith first tentative indication
that an extra North Vietnamese
division may be headed for I Corps.
We shall follow closely.

Pres file

WWR

Secret Savin

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-220
By SJ NARA, Date 3-14-03

RECEIVED
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3.4(b)(1),(3)
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UNIDENTIFIED 11TH DIVISION POSSIBLY ENROUTE TO MILITA RY
REGION TRI-THIEN-HUE
XXCC

THE APPEARANCE OF AN UNIDENTIFIED 11TH DIVISION
ENROUTE TO BINH TRAM 7 (BT-7), LOCATED IN THE A SHAU
VALLEY, MILITARY REGION TRI-THIEN-HUE (MR TTH) WAS RE-
VEALED IN REAR SERVICES COMMUNICATIONS ON 13 JULY.
IN A MESSAGE PASSED TO AN UNIDENTIFIED 11TH BAT-
TALION ON 13 JULY, IT WAS REPORTED THAT AN 11TH DIVISION
IS CURRENTLY ENROUTE POSSIBLY BETWEEN THE MU GIA PASS
(VICINITY OF 17-20N 105-25E, WE 82 53) AND THE A SHAU
VALEY IN MR TTH. THE 11TH DIVISION REPORTED RY TRAVELLED
FROM T-5 (LOCATED THROUGH COLLATERAL IN NGHIA DONG HAMLET,
HA LONG VILLAGE IN THE VICINITY OF 20-03N 105-30E, WH 88
15, HA TRUNG DISTRICT, THANHSHOA PROVINCE) TO STATION 19B
(PROBABLY LOCATED IN LAOS) DESTINED FOR B45 (LOCATED BY
SIGINT AT A CHIENG, LAOS NEAR 16-01 106-54E, YD 039 1 00).
AT STATION 19B THE TROOPS WERE ISSUED FIVE DAYS RATIONS
AND WERE TO BE ISSUED ADDITIONAL RATIONS AT STATION 27
(UNLOCATED, POSSIBLE IN LAOS) IN ORDER FOR THE DIVISION
TO PROCEED TO BINH TRAM 7 (AN ELEMENT OF THE 559TH TRANS-
PORTATION GROUP LAST LOCATED NEAR 16-13N 107-06E, YD 245
040 ON 13 JULY).

THIS IS THE INITIAL APPEARANCE OF AN 11TH DIVISION,
AS AVAILABLE RECORDS (SIGINT AND COLLATERAL) REVEAL NO
REFLECTION OF AN DIVISION OF THIS NUMBER. FROM AVAIL-
ABLE INFORMATION, AN 11TH DIVISION, POSSIBLY AT FULL
STRENGTH, IS ENROUTE TO MR TTH AND POSSIBLY LESS THAN FIVE
DAYS TRAVEL AWAY. THE APPEARANCE OF AN ADDITIONAL DIVISION
IN RM TTH WOULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE TACTICAL BALANCE
OF POWER IN 1 COMBAT TACTICAL ZONE.

XXXXH
400

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-221
By SJ NARA, Date 5-7-03

45

~~TOP SECRET~~

July 14, 1968


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

The Situation in Czechoslovakia - Sunday, July 14, 11:00 a.m.

Kosygin joined Brezhnev and his other colleagues in Warsaw about six hours ago. The East Germans, Hungarians and Bulgarians have also arrived. The East German and Polish press is running articles attacking the Czechs; the Bulgarians have reprinted the Pravda article likening the Czech situation to Hungary in 1956; but the Hungarian Party paper has commented (according to Reuters) that there is not a parallel between Hungary and Czechoslovakia today. (Hungary has consistently been more sympathetic to the Czechs than the others.)

The Czech press continues to report departures in progress - with friendly good-byes. As the departures are scheduled to last three days, the extent of them may not be known until July 17th at least. The Czechs continue to avoid saying all troops will leave.



3.4(b)(1),(3)

Not surprisingly, our attaches in Moscow have been refused permission to make a trip close to the Czech border. The important piece Izvestia and the East German press was holding space for turned out to be an attack on the West Germans. There is some indication that the Czechs are explaining the activation of the People's Militia as a precautionary measure to insure public order during the troop withdrawals. There are rumors of threatened Trade Union demonstrations in Czechoslovakia - to call for the removal of all Soviet troops. However, the Czech leadership has so far demonstrated a considerable ability to prevent such risky public manifestations - at least in the present crisis.

Walt W. Rostow

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-220
By SJ NARA, Date 8-11-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, July 13, 1968
4:30 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

As instructed, I had Max Rabb in and listened attentively to his account of his East German operation.

I conclude that it succeeded because:

- there were small things the East Germans wanted from us for which they were willing to trade prisoners;
- Rabb conducted himself discreetly and well in the negotiations.

As for application to the PUEBLO crew (which, of course, I did not raise with Rabb) I conclude:

- there are no small things North Korea wants from us;
- Rabb is not well suited for an Asian negotiation;
- there are small things the North Koreans want of the Japanese;
- but they will not now trade the PUEBLO for small change;
- they may let the crew go if they see the Vietnam negotiations become serious;
- if they don't let them go under such circumstances, we might try a Japanese intermediary -- but that's a long shot.

Rabb did a good job. He's pro-Johnson. He'd like commendation from the Executive Branch. Perhaps Sect. Rusk could drop him a note.

W. W. Rostow

Rusk-Rabb note O. K. if Sect. Rusk agrees _____

No _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

46a
July 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Maxwell Rabb's "Shirt Sleeve Diplomacy"

REFERENCE: Mr. Rostow's note to the President of June 27, 1968

Mr. Maxwell M. Rabb, lawyer, President of the United States Committee for Refugees, and a former Presidential assistant, called on Mr. Rostow at the latter's request, from noon to 1:00 p.m. on Tuesday, July 9, 1968. Mr. Rostow asked Mr. Rabb to outline his procedures in securing, over the past two years, the release of seven Americans detained in East Germany.

Mr. Rabb said that he had been asked by several of his clients to visit the Leipzig Trade Fair in 1965 to determine whether an American boycott of the Fair was in the national interest. Mr. Rabb said that after visiting the Fair, he went to the State Department to report that other Western nations were selling machinery and other goods to the detriment of American industry. In the course of his discussions at State, Mr. Rabb had explained that he had developed close personal relations with a number of East German trade officials who had indicated interest in the possibility of improving relations with the United States. State officials, accordingly, asked Mr. Rabb whether he might be able to use these connections to intercede on behalf of John Van Altena, who had been sentenced to eight years in prison for helping East Germans flee to West Berlin. Mr. Rabb agreed to try and returned to Leipzig with his wife. He said this was the second of eleven trips to East Germany made entirely at his own expense in connection with the release of detained Americans.

Mr. Rabb believed that his decision to take along his wife on this second trip was a crucial one. He was convinced that this immediately created a more informal and friendly atmosphere for the talks that were to follow.

Mr. Rabb said that from the outset he made it clear that he was not in a position to offer any commitment. He pointed out, however, that East German willingness to release American prisoners would reduce tensions and might well ease the way to better trade relations with the United States. Mr. Rabb said that, as a matter of fact, he had been of help to the East

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Germans in connection with visas desired by them, and that at one stage in the negotiations he had promised visas when he was not empowered to do so -- in the belief that his promise would be upheld if he obtained the desired prisoner release. This was the case. A side effect of his negotiations has been increase in trade in non-strategic items, including oranges, coal, textiles and some machinery. Mr. Rabb pointed out that this helped our balance of payments problem and prevented our allies from pre-empting the non-communist portion of the East German market. Mr. Rabb interjected that he had learned in 1965 that allied firms were indeed among the top exhibitors at the Fair. West Germany was the second largest, the British fourth, and the French fifth.


Mr. Rabb emphasized throughout his description of his efforts that a basis of mutual personal trust was the key element in his securing the release of all seven Americans detained in East Germany, one of them even before he had been tried.

Mr. Rostow asked whether Mr. Rabb had spoken German in the negotiations. Mr. Rabb said that he was unable to speak German and that this was actually an asset rather than a liability. The East Germans were less suspicious of him because of his inability to understand everything he heard.

Mr. Rabb expressed his belief that the tactics which he used in East Germany might be applicable to similar prisoner problems in other parts of the world.

Mr. Rabb left two items from the Congressional Record which were complimentary of his efforts (attached).

Mr. Rostow expressed his interest in hearing of Mr. Rabb's methods and of their success, and said that he wanted to consult with some of his colleagues concerning Mr. Rabb's account of his efforts.


Alfred Jenkins

Attachments

Distribution

Mr. Rostow
Mr. Davis
Mr. Jorden

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"But in areas like Appalachia, what you get is slick little politicians—in an election year—flying into places like the mountains of Kentucky on whirlwind visits and then going back East to issue statements about the 'pitiful' things they saw.

"What needs to be done to help the poor, and the working man," says Boyle, "is for the Federal government to put an end to expensive trips to the moon and to the further waste of taxpayers' money on atomic experiments and spend this money on jobs and welfare programs."

Boyle said he personally proposed to President Johnson that any spending cuts tied to a proposed tax increase ought to first come from curbing the vast spending on the space program. "We have no quarrel with the nation's needs for atomic weapons or military rockets," says Boyle, "we don't want to interfere with the national defense."

But experiments with atomic energy for production of electric power or for de-salting water are a different matter, according to the UMW president.

He can give numerous examples of what he calls: "The Atomic Energy Commission spending untold millions of dollars of the taxpayers' money to experiment with a dangerous, hazardous, poisonous fuel that they cannot seem to get to work properly.

"Even when and if they get it work, there is no answer to the waste problem," says Boyle. "Atomic plants are polluting our rivers and those underground test blasts are dangerous—nobody knows how far the poisonous radiation may seep through fractures in the ground hundreds of feet below the surface. How does the public know about any atomic dangers when the AEC is the promoter, the judge and the only authority on it? Congress gave the AEC too much power, and Congress ought to take it back."

A "prime example" of both the waste of tax money and the dangers inherent in atomic power plants, says Boyle, is the Fermi plant near Detroit. "This power plant was built at a cost of \$800,000,000—mostly Federal funds—as a 'demon' power plant. Two years ago, they touched off a chain reaction which came dangerously close to destroying the entire city of Detroit. They somehow managed to get in under control but now, two years later, they still don't know what happened and the plant is still idle."

Turning to another favorite topic, Boyle talks with obvious pride about the National Coal Policy Conference—a cooperative organization comprising the UMW, the coal industry, the railroads, the electric power industry and major suppliers of the coal industry.

The idea of the NCP was first offered by John L. Lewis, long-time UMW president, in 1958, as a means for these related interests to work together on mutual problems—like competition with other fuels, air and water pollution and land reclamation. Boyle was recently reelected chairman of the NCP.

Turning back to his role of UMW chieftain, Boyle says a major issue upon which the union is continuing to fight is the need to get "complete elimination of the dust problem in the mines. This can be solved and it ought to be solved," said Boyle.

PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS HAVE BEEN MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN GOVERNMENT

HON. THOMAS B. CURTIS

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 26, 1968

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, there are dramatic examples from time to time

which show how individual Americans and private organizations are more successful than Government programs. All too often the private sector of our economy is not given adequate credit for the initiative it uses in doing quietly and effectively what might take years and vast amounts of money on the part of the Federal Government.

In the past I have spoken of the contribution made by the Society of Friends, the Quakers. Now Maxwell N. Rabb, president of the American Refugee Committee, as an individual and with the committee, managed to do what many in the Government were unable to do, the freeing of Americans out of the jails of East Berlin. This shows that an American father, his wife, and their son can probably do much more than organized expensive Government program. I am delighted that after many months of discreet silence the New York Times and the Associated Press in the Washington Post have told the story of how the secretary of the Cabinet and associate counsel to President Eisenhower managed to free these American citizens.

The American Refugee Committee, a privately supported organization and its voluntary officers have a role to play in creating better human relations. I hope that private individuals and groups will derive some encouragement from the courage, imagination, and integrity shown by the Honorable Maxwell Rabb.

Below, follows the test of the articles: [From the Washington Post, June 13, 1968]

MAX RABB SHOWS NEGOTIATING SKILL WITH REDS

(By Henrietta Leith)

NEW YORK, June 12.—The delicate art of negotiating, which has just brought a young Columbia University instructor out of an East German prison with no deal but "good will," is an old skill for New York attorney Maxwell Milton Rabb.

Rabb, 57, had negotiated the release of six other Americans from jails behind the Iron Curtain before his latest feat—securing the return to West Berlin of art historian Ronald Wiedenhoeft, 31.

MATTER OF PRIDE

Rabb is especially proud of securing the release of Wiedenhoeft, who had not even been tried on his charge of taking pictures of restricted areas.

He won't give details except to say that the men he dealt with were of Cabinet rank and that he used the same technique each time, and paid all his own expenses. "I'm not CIA, with a secret account," he quips.

He adds that he never gave the East Germans any money as ransom for the Americans.

"They won't take it from us," he said. They take it from West Germany, but they don't want to lose face with us.

"What I did is old as the hills—the personal private relationship where you break down the barriers. You have to use two styles—never let your country down but always be frank and honest. Instead of fighting over each word for two months, you trust each other."

A Bostonian and Harvard man, Rabb started his public career in 1937 as an assistant to Henry Cabot Lodge, who was then in the Senate.

He stayed with Lodge, except for Navy service during World War II, until 1951, and worked hard in the campaign to draft Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to run for the presidency. His reward was a job as assistant to Eisenhower's principal assistant, Sherman

Adams, and in 1953 he became associate counsel to the President, with civil rights, immigration and labor as his special responsibilities.

Rabb also served Eisenhower as secretary to the Cabinet. Later he moved to the United Nations, where his old friend Lodge was chief U.S. delegate and ambassador.

But it was as a businessman's lawyer that he got involved in the delicate task of negotiating the release of prisoners.

Rabb had a manufacturing client who suspected that his competitors in England, France and West Germany were doing business with East Germany, and were going to show their products at the Leipzig Fair.

WON PLACE FOR CLIENT

Rabb went to Leipzig and discovered that the major exhibits of products there were those of the U.S.S.R., West Germany, Czechoslovakia, England and France, in that order.

Rabb reported this fact to the State Department, and his client got the previously refused permission to exhibit at the fair.

Some time later, the State Department came to him. All normal diplomatic approaches had been exhausted in the effort to free John Van Altena, 21, of Wisconsin who had served 17 months of an eight-year prison term for trying to help East Germans get out of their country.

"The State Department remembered I'd been there," says Rabb, "and had met people. To the credit of the State Department, they don't like to see Americans rot in foreign jails. Would I take it on? I said 'Fine.'"

Rabb carried out his mission in March, 1966, "to the surprise of the State Department and most of all to the surprise of John Van Altena."

Almost a year later, Rabb secured the release of four more Americans from East Germany—Mary Hellen Battle of Oak Ridge, Tenn.; Frederick Matthews of Pennsylvania; Moses Herrin of Akron, Ohio, and William Lovett of San Francisco.

Lovett had been held on charges growing out of an auto accident. The other three were accused of helping East Germans escape.

Rabb's sixth rescue last May 11 was the release of Peter T. Feinauer, 27, of Providence, R.I., another Columbia instructor who was convicted of spying with a camera.

[From the New York Times, June 16, 1968]

LAWYER RELATES EAST GERMAN TIE—A NEW YORKER HELPED FREE SEVEN U.S. PRISONERS

(By Henry Raymond)

At the crossing point between East and West Berlin on Friedrichstrasse, where West Berlin tour buses pull up for a glimpse into the East, an odd scene took place one recent afternoon.

A bearded young man, looking somewhat bewildered, escorted by a stocky Wall Street lawyer and trailed by two East German security officials, was greeted on the Western side by a United States embassy aide.

The young man was Ronald V. Wiedenhoeft, 30 years old, a Columbia University art history instructor who 20 minutes earlier was released from an East German prison where he spent nine months awaiting trial on espionage charges. His rescuer was Maxwell M. Rabb, a lawyer and president of the United States Committee for Refugees, a private organization at 20 West 40th Street New York.

The quiet crossing at 2:21 P.M. on June 3 ended an unusual three-year campaign to free seven American prisoners in East Germany. Because Washington does not recognize East Germany, the effort was carried out through quiet and informal collaboration between American private citizens and the two governments.

DETAILS ARE RELATED

Mr. Rabb and others involved in the effort related last week the details of the negotia-

tions, indicating the skill, patience and tactful but dogged determination required.

In contrast to past exchanges of spies with the Soviet Union and the ransom payments for Cuban exiles seized by the Havana regime during the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, no quid pro quo was involved.

The campaign was set in motion after the State Department had made a series of futile approaches to the East German Government for the release of a young American, John Van Altena, 22 years old, of Milton Junction, Wis., who had been sentenced to eight years, in January, 1965, for helping East Germans flee to West Berlin.

The East Germans made plain that they would negotiate with Washington only if they obtained diplomatic recognition, a condition unacceptable to the United States, which is still officially committed to the reunification of Germany on the basis of free, democratic elections.

The State Department began to search for other channels to obtain the release of Mr. Van Altena. According to Mr. Rabb, his involvement came almost by accident.

The Boston-born lawyer had been asked by several clients to visit the 1965 Leipzig Trade Fair to determine whether an American boycott of the fair was in the national interest. There he developed close personal relations with a number of East German trade officials who had expressed interest in a normalization of relations.

ENLISTED BY U.S. OFFICIALS

When he subsequently went to Washington to tell the State Department that other Western nations were using the fair to sell machinery and other goods to the detriment of American industry, American officials asked whether he could use his connections in East Germany to intercede on behalf of the young American prisoner. Mr. Rabb agreed to try, and return to Leipzig accompanied by his wife, Ruth.

The decision to take along his wife reflected Mr. Rabb's conviction that personal relationships counted more in international talks than textbooks on diplomacy might be willing to admit. Two years later he repeated the personal touch by enlisting the help of his son Bruce, a 26-year-old lawyer who has joined his father in the Wall Street law firm of Strook & Strook & Lavan, in the negotiations that led to the release of Mr. Wiedenhoef.

"The fact that I returned with Ruth had a startling effect," he recalled during an interview. "It seemed to suggest to the East Germans that we were vaulting the diplomatic wall and were interested in them as human beings. This immediately created a more relaxed and friendly atmosphere for the talks that were to follow."

Mr. Rabb, an affable man of 57 with the ready smile of a practical politician, is a former Presidential assistant and secretary to the Cabinet under the Eisenhower Administration and has held a number of international appointments.

From the outset, the lawyer made it clear that he was not in a position to offer any commitment and that the negotiations had to be based on mutual good faith. He suggested that East German willingness to release American prisoners would help reduce cold war tensions and perhaps ease the way to improved trade relations with the United States.

"They quickly became aware that the release of Mr. Van Altena and the six other prisoners that were to follow amounted to a demonstration of a desire to normalize relations," Mr. Rabb said.

"I believe that it is significant that since the first prisoner was freed more than two years ago there has been a reduction of incidents with the United States military and a palpable increase in trade relations, entirely to our advantage."

The new East German extension of transit-visa and road-toll requirements to West Germans are not viewed as a threat to the American military presence in West Berlin.

The lawyer said the United States had exported oranges, coal, textiles and some machinery totaling \$10-million. He characterized the sales as "clearly helping our balance-of-payments problem."

After the initial meetings in Leipzig, Mr. Rabb made four unpublicized trips to Berlin where he conferred with a Deputy Premier and members of the state police before he obtained the release of Mr. Van Altena. He said he could not disclose the names of the officials.

TWO BERLIN LAWYERS

His command post was a West Berlin hotel. Since there is no direct telephone communication between East and West Berlin, the arrangements were worked out by two lawyers, Jürgen Strangé of West Berlin and Wolfgang Vogel of East Berlin. Mr. Vogel had participated in the trade of Francis Gary Powers, the American U-2 pilot, and Col. Rudolf Abel, the Soviet spy.

Mr. Van Altena was released in 1965 without publicity. By that time four other Americans had been arrested in East Berlin and Mr. Rabb agreed to work for their freedom also.

They were: Mary Ellen Battle of Oak Ridge, Tenn.; Moses Reese Herrin of Akron, Ohio; Frederick Matthews of Ellwood City, Pa., and William W. Lovett of San Francisco. The first three were charged with having helped East Germans escape to the West; Mr. Lovett was arrested in connection with a traffic accident and on charges of carrying a concealed weapon.

Working with Messrs. Stange and Vogel, the two Berlin lawyers, Mr. Rabb obtained the release of the four in February, 1967. He had arranged coded Telex communications between his Wall Street office and Mr. Vogel's office in East Berlin to speed the long and complicated negotiations.

The seventh American released through Mr. Rabb's mediation effort was Peter T. Feinauer of Providence, R.I., who was arrested in October, 1966, on charges of espionage for the Central Intelligence Agency and of helping East Germans to flee to the West. He was freed last month.

Mr. Rabb has received a personal note from Secretary of State Dean Rusk extending "warm appreciation and congratulations" for the effort. The lawyer said he paid for all of his travels to Berlin on his own and accepted no fees from the prisoners.

HOUSE REPUBLICAN URBAN AFFAIRS TASK FORCE

HON. WILLIAM O. COWGER

OF KENTUCKY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 26, 1968

Mr. COWGER. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to announce that the House Republican Urban Affairs Task Force will have as its guest on Thursday the executive director of the Urban League, Whitney Young. The task force hearing will convene at 12 noon in room 202 of the Capitol.

This is the 12th in a series of House Republican Urban Affairs Task Force Hearings. Some of the featured witnesses at earlier hearings were John W. Gardner, President of the Urban Coalition; John V. Lindsay, mayor of New York City; Samuel C. Jackson, of the U.S.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; and Wright Elliott, of the National Association of Manufacturers.

The Urban Affairs Task Force has either sponsored or introduced six items of legislation, including the Manpower Act of 1963, the Community Service Officer Act which is now a part of the omnibus crime bill, and the "human renewal fund."

At the conclusion of the present series of hearings, the task force will issue a summary statement on its activities, including the testimony of witnesses and the legislation introduced and endorsed by the task force.

BARGE LINES PUSH JOINT RATE PLEA

HON. SAMUEL N. FRIEDEL

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 26, 1968

Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Speaker, it has been the longstanding policy of Congress to encourage in the public interest improved coordination of service among truck, water, and rail lines. The public is best served when voluntary cooperation exists among the various modes. It is with pleasure that I call to the attention of my colleagues an article in the New York Times of June 9 describing new efforts to develop improved cooperation between barge and rail carriers.

I insert this article in the Record:

BARGE LINES PUSH JOINT RATE PLEA—INITIATE A NEW APPROACH IN COURTSHIP OF RAILROADS

The love-hate relationship between the two arch rivals for hauling bulk cargoes, the barge lines and the railroads, goes back well over a century to the days when the iron horse challenged the mules that trod the towpaths of the Erie Canal.

The trains have since maintained their superiority in speed, the barges their tempting advantage in lower costs.

The water carriers have for many years courted the cooperation of the railroads in setting joint water-rail rates, pointing to the better deal this would mean for shippers. Every branch of the Federal Government has looked with favor on such arrangements: the Supreme Court, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Congress and the new Department of Transportation, which favors cooperation among the categories of carriers.

EXAMPLES OF SAVINGS

The Water Transport Association has now begun a new approach. Instead of basing its case for joint rates on general principles, it has started offering examples of freight savings that could bring new profits to railroads as well as barge companies.

Floyd H. Blaske, chairman of American Commercial Lines, first sounded this note on behalf of his fellow rivermen at a recent speech in Louisville.

The Texas oil industry annually gets more than 20,000 tons of steel pipe from Pittsburgh he said, costing \$30.80 a ton to move all the way by rail to a central storage point such as Odessa, Tex. He suggested a potential saving of \$6.18 a ton by bringing it down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers by barge as far as Memphis and then completing the journey by rail.

The saving, he said would be \$123,000 a year on that volume of traffic.

EXPENDITURE CONTROL ACT REDUCTION PROVISIONS

The provisions of title II of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 concern reductions in civilian employment, require a reduction of not less than \$10 billion in new budget (obligational) authority for 1969, a reduction of not less than \$6 billion in budgeted 1969 outlays (expenditures and net lending), and specific recommendations for reductions of \$8 billion of previously granted obligational authority. These provisions introduce a new dimension to budgets of the departments and agencies of government in the fiscal year 1969 beginning on July 1 next. They cast something of a shadow over not only the unexpended carryover balances in innumerable accounts across the government but also over many of the specific appropriation and fund amounts now pending consideration at various stages in the legislative process. This underscores and emphasizes the fact that, whereas in previous years departments and agencies operating under a continuing resolution were required to hold obligations and expenditures to not in excess of the lowest of one of two or three rates, those minimums, with the aforementioned title II in the picture, take on something of the nature of "maximum minimums."

In this general connection, section 103 of the joint resolution follows the stereotyped form of previous continuing resolutions in waiving the time periods set forth in 31 U.S.C. 665(d) (2) for the submission and approval of papers on the apportionments of funds. This in nowise waives the basic requirement in the law for the apportionment of funds over the year by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, but merely dispenses with considerable paper work that as a practical matter cannot be usefully applied to 31-day temporary appropriation provisions. But in view of the title II reduction provisions applicable to fiscal 1969, the committee has attached to section 103 a proviso that—

"Nothing herein shall be construed to waive any other provision of law governing the apportionment of funds or to permit the use, including the expenditure, of appropriations, funds or authority in any manner which would contravene the provisions of title II of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968."

The basic law (31 U.S.C. 665) on apportionment of funds reads, in pertinent parts, as follows:

"(c) (1) . . . all appropriations or funds available for obligation for a definite period of time shall be so apportioned as to prevent obligation or expenditure thereof in a manner which would indicate a necessity for deficiency or supplemental appropriations for such period; and all appropriations or funds not limited to a definite period of time, and all authorizations to create obligations by contract in advance of appropriations, shall be so apportioned as to achieve the most effective and economical use thereof. As used hereafter in this section, the term "appropriation" means appropriations, funds, and authorizations to create obligations by contract in advance of appropriation.

"(3) Any appropriation subject to apportionment shall be distributed by months, calendar quarters, operating seasons, or other time periods, or by activities, functions, projects, or objects, or by a combination thereof, as may be deemed appropriate by the officers designated in subsection (d) of this section to make apportionments and reapportionments."

Furthermore, in reference to the \$6 billion expenditure reduction provision in section 202 of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, subsection (b) of that section provides that—

"The President shall reserve from expenditure and net lending, from appropriations

or other obligational authority heretofore or hereafter made available, such amounts as may be necessary to effectuate the provisions of subsection (a)."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If no amendment is to be offered, the question is on the third reading of the joint resolution.

The joint resolution was read the third time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution having been read the third time, the question is, Shall it pass?

The joint resolution (H.J. Res. 1368) was passed.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, without losing my right to the floor or losing any of the time previously allocated to me, I yield to the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN].

FREEING OF SEVEN AMERICAN PRISONERS IN EAST GERMANY

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, one of the most interesting human interest stories of the year relates to the release of seven American prisoners by the East German Government.

An article by Henry Raymont, in the New York Times for Sunday, June 16, 1968, contains the story of how a New York lawyer known to most of us, Maxwell Rabb, personally negotiated with the East German Government for the release of these prisoners.

This story demonstrates quite emphatically, I think, how sometimes you can accomplish more by sitting down to informal discussions person to person in shirtsleeve diplomacy, if you want to call it that, than you can with stiff-shirt, striped-pants formalities, with which we are grossly afflicted, I would say, along with some other countries. It seems to me if we had more negotiations similar to that carried on by Maxwell Rabb in securing the freedom of American prisoners from East Germany, our standing with countries and people of the world would rise considerably. At least, I would like to see it tried.

I ask unanimous consent that the article from the New York Times be inserted in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LAWYER RELATES EAST GERMAN TIE—A NEW YORKER HELPED FREE SEVEN U.S. PRISONERS
(By Henry Raymont)

At the crossing point between East and West Berlin on Friedrichstrasse, where West Berlin tour buses pull up for a glimpse into the East, an odd scene took place one recent afternoon.

A bearded young man, looking somewhat bewildered, escorted by a stocky Wall Street lawyer and trailed by two East German security officials, was greeted on the Western side by a United States embassy aide.

The young man was Ronald V. Wiedenhoef, 30 years old, a Columbia University art history instructor who 20 minutes earlier was released from an East German prison where he spent nine months awaiting trial on espionage charges. His rescuer was Maxwell M. Rabb, a lawyer and president of the United States Committee for Refugees, a pri-

vate organization at 20 West 40th Street, New York.

The quiet crossing at 2:21 P.M. on June 3 ended an unusual three-year campaign to free seven American prisoners in East Germany. Because Washington does not recognize East Germany, the effort was carried out through quiet and informal collaboration between American private citizens and the two governments.

DETAILS ARE RELATED

Mr. Rabb and others involved in the effort related last week the details of the negotiations, indicating the skill, patience and tactfulness but dogged determination required.

In contrast to past exchanges of spies with the Soviet Union and the ransom payments for Cuban exiles seized by the Havana regime during the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, no gold pro quo was involved.

The campaign was set in motion after the State Department had made a series of futile approaches to the East German Government for the lease of a young American, John Van Altena, 22 years old, of Milton Junction, Wis., who had been sentenced to eight years, in January, 1965, for helping East Germans flee to West Berlin.

The East Germans made plain that they would negotiate with Washington only if they obtained diplomatic recognition, a condition unacceptable to the United States, which is still officially committed to the reunification of Germany on the basis of free, democratic elections.

The State Department began to search for other channels to obtain the release of Mr. Van Altena. According to Mr. Rabb, his involvement came almost by accident.

The Boston-born lawyer had been asked by several clients to visit the 1965 Leipzig Trade Fair to determine whether an American boycott of the fair was in the national interest. There he developed close personal relations with a number of East German trade officials who had expressed interest in a normalization of relations.

ENLISTED BY U.S. OFFICIALS

When he subsequently went to Washington to tell the State Department that other Western nations were using the fair to sell machinery and other goods to the detriment of American industry, American officials asked whether he could use his connections in East Germany to intercede on behalf of the young American prisoner. Mr. Rabb agreed to try, and returned to Leipzig accompanied by his wife, Ruth.

The decision to take along his wife reflected Mr. Rabb's conviction that personal relationships counted more in international talks than textbooks on diplomacy might be willing to admit. Two years later he repeated the personal touch by enlisting the help of his son Bruce, 26-year-old lawyer who has joined his father in the Wall Street law firm of Strook & Strook & Lavan, in the negotiations that led to the release of Mr. Wiedenhoef.

"The fact that I returned with Ruth had a startling effect," he recalled during an interview. "It seemed to suggest to the East Germans that we were vaulting the diplomatic wall and were interested in them as human beings. This immediately created a more relaxed and friendly atmosphere for the talks that were to follow."

Mr. Rabb, an affable man of 57 with the ready smile of a practical politician, is a former Presidential assistant and secretary to the Cabinet under the Eisenhower Administration and has held a number of international appointments.

From the outset, the lawyer made it clear that he was not in a position to offer any commitment and that the negotiations had to be based on mutual good faith. He suggested that East German willingness to release American prisoners would help reduce cold war tensions and perhaps ease the way

to improve trade relations with the United States.

"They quickly became aware that the release of Mr. Van Altena and the six other prisoners that were to follow amounted to a demonstration of a desire to normalize relations," Mr. Rabb said.

"I believe that it is significant that since the first prisoner was freed more than two years ago there has been a reduction of incidents with the United States military and a palpable increase in trade relations, entirely to our advantage."

The new East German extension of transit-visa and road-toll requirements to West Germans are not viewed as a threat to the American military presence in West Berlin.

The lawyer said the United States had exported oranges, coal, textiles and some machinery totaling \$10-million. He characterized the sales as "clearly helping our balance-of-payments problem."

After the initial meetings in Leipzig, Mr. Rabb made four unpublished trips to Berlin where he conferred with a Deputy Premier and members of the state police before he obtained the release of Mr. Van Altena. He said he could not disclose the names of the officials.

TWO BERLIN LAWYERS

His command post was a West Berlin hotel. Since there is no direct telephone communication between East and West Berlin, the arrangements were worked out by two lawyers, Jürgen Stange of West Berlin and Wolfgang Vogel of East Berlin. Mr. Vogel had participated in the trade of Francis Gary Powers, the American U-2 pilot, and Col. Rudolf Abel, the Soviet spy.

Mr. Van Altena was released in 1966 without publicity. By that time four other Americans had been arrested in East Berlin and Mr. Rabb agreed to work for their freedom also.

They were: Mary Ellen Battle of Oak Ridge, Tenn.; Moses Reese Herrin of Akron, Ohio; Frederick Matthews of Ellwood City, Pa., and William W. Lovett of San Francisco. The first three were charged with having helped East Germans escape to the West; Mr. Lovett was arrested in connection with a traffic accident and on charges of carrying a concealed weapon.

Working with Messrs. Stange and Vogel, the two Berlin lawyers, Mr. Rabb obtained the release of the four in February, 1967. He had arranged coded Telex communications between his Wall Street Office and Mr. Vogel's office in East Berlin to speed the long and complicated negotiations.

The seventh American released through Mr. Rabb's mediation effort was Peter T. Feinauer of Providence, R.I., who was arrested in October, 1966, on charges of espionage for the Central Intelligence Agency and of helping East Germans to flee to the West. He was freed last month.

Mr. Rabb has received a personal note from Secretary of State Dean Rusk extending "warm appreciation and congratulations" for the effort. The lawyer said he paid for all of his travels to Berlin on his own and accepted no fees from the prisoners.

GROMYKO'S DECLARATION THAT RUSSIANS ARE READY FOR MISSILE TALK

Mr. JACKSON, Mr. President, in the recent Senate debate on our Sentinel ABM system, certain Senators argued that a vote to go forward with the Sentinel system would make more remote the possibility of talks with the Soviets on strategic armaments, and that efforts to secure an agreement on strategic armaments limitations would be seriously prejudiced.

At the same time, a number of newspaper, TV and radio commentators argued that to proceed with the deployment of the Sentinel ABM system was inconsistent with the search for an agreement with Moscow to limit strategic weapons, and that a vote for the Sentinel ABM was a vote to undermine the American diplomatic efforts to persuade Moscow to start talks with us on the mutual limitation of offensive and defensive missile systems.

The Senate, as you know, rejected these suggestions that we must weaken ourselves in order to open talks with Moscow about arms control. On Monday, June 24, by the overwhelming votes of 52-to-34 and 72-to-12 the Senate notified the world that we would continue to maintain a position of strength and that we would proceed with the deployment of the Sentinel ABM system.

This notification to the world was further emphasized a day later in the final 78-to-3 Senate vote on the military construction authorization bill which includes the authorization for starting Sentinel deployment.

The judgment of the Senate on this matter has been proved right. Not only has the Senate's decision to go forward with Sentinel deployment not been a hindrance to the furtherance of discussions: I call your attention to the fact that on Thursday, June 27, 3 days after the Senate ABM votes, Foreign Minister Gromyko announced that "the Soviet Union is ready to enter an exchange of opinions" on "the mutual limitation and later reduction of strategic weapons, both offensive and defensive, including antimissile missiles."

Gromyko's statement came as a welcome surprise to American officials. For more than 18 months the President has been trying to persuade the Soviets to open talks on this critical subject. At last we appear to be seeing some hopeful progress.

This was one of our objectives in the Senate debate which began on Wednesday, June 19. One of the compelling reasons for urging the Senate to vote for the deployment of our ABM system was to strengthen the President's diplomatic hand vis-a-vis the Soviets and to improve the chances that Moscow would start talks with us on the limitation of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive systems.

Here is what I said on the Senate floor on Wednesday, June 19, 1968:

I am not suggesting, of course, that we suspend the effort to reach agreement with Moscow on reciprocal arrangements for the control and limitation of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces. I have long argued for such an effort and I have supported President Johnson in his initiatives to get discussions underway with Moscow on this range of issues. At the same time, it would be the height of irresponsibility for the Congress of the United States to imperil the present or future credibility of our nuclear deterrent.

All of us should have learned by now that the way to encourage a reasonable response from Moscow is not through weakness but through strength. The way to negotiate successfully with Soviet leaders is to have the strong positions to bargain with—and to make negotiated agreements more attractive

to them than continued disagreements—as in the case of the limited nuclear test-ban treaty.

I am confident that the Administration's decision to proceed with Sentinel deployment will strengthen our diplomatic hand—not weaken it—and that this program can actually improve the chances for starting meaningful discussions with Moscow on strategic armaments control and limitation.

Here is what Secretary of Defense Clifford said on Thursday, June 20, 1968:

... If the Soviets are developing an ABM system, and we know they are developing it, and we know that they are deploying it, I believe we are in a better posture to reach agreement with them on an ultimate step toward disarming if we also go about the deployment of a system.

I think our negotiations over the past decades would indicate that this is the better position for us to be in if we hope to achieve some type of resolution of this problem with the Soviets.

What I am saying is that from a psychological standpoint, I believe that if we proceed with the deployment because they are—I think it places us in a better posture in negotiating with them and ultimately, hopefully, reaching a broader arms agreement.

Here is what I said on the Senate floor on Monday, June 24, 1968, just prior to the Senate's overwhelming rejection of the amendments that would have delayed or ended our ABM Sentinel system:

The argument has been made over and over again by the supporters of this amendment that if this country goes ahead with the ABM we will somehow add fuel and fire to the arms race. If we do not go ahead, the argument goes, there is some hope then of getting the Soviet Union to reach an agreement to dispense with the anti-ballistic missile system.

It does not make any sense to say that if we reduce our strength unilaterally, if we decide not to go ahead with the ABM program, the Soviet Union will drop its ABM program. On what basis would we negotiate? Are we assuming that because we do nothing Moscow will suddenly drop its ABM program? It does not add up.

Are the Soviets apt to sit down and talk with us about the ABM if we do not do anything about an ABM system? They are doing very well. I do not know why they would ever want to talk with us on this issue if we do not go ahead with our program. There is nothing about which to bargain. They have it, and they have had one kind of a program deployed since 1955. We have been sitting by for 6 long years without any deployment.

Does the Senate want to send a message to the Soviet Union and say, "Look, you go right ahead with your program, because the United States is not going to bargain on this issue, by their decision here today I cut out the program"? With this approach what do the Senators on the other side of this argument believe they are going to accomplish in the way of negotiations or agreement with Soviet leaders on the control and elimination of strategic weapons?

I am delighted that the Soviets have now flashed a green light to President Johnson's longstanding proposal to discuss limiting strategic nuclear offensive and defensive weapons systems, including the ABM.

Talks on this range of issues, of course will raise fundamental problems of deterrence, relationship of East-West forces, inspection, and compliance. What we are after is a system of limitation and control of arms that will reduce

47

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, July 13, 1968
4:15 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You may be interested in this survey of the world scene and of our Administration's policy presented at the National War College on May 8.

As you can see, it was spoken informally from notes.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ng, NAWA, Date 9-2-92

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 93-120
By CB, NARA, Date 6-2-95

THE UNITED STATES AND THE CHANGING WORLD
Problems and Opportunities Arising From the Diffusion of Power

by

W. W. Rostow

Remarks at The National War College
Washington, D. C.
May 8, 1968

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I. The Diffusion of Power in a World of Change

I shall try to take stock of where we are in history, and share some thoughts on the problems and opportunities that confront us now and in the time ahead.

A profound rearrangement of world affairs has been going on for a long time. This kind of rearrangement, like a military retreat, is most difficult to conduct in good order. It need not be a retreat. In fact, the transition could be a period of advance toward stable peace in the world -- if we cope effectively with the many difficult problems it poses.

A nation can move in tolerably good order with public support at home when it operates -- either internally or abroad -- on a relatively clear, stable, and widely understood pattern. But when a nation faces profound change, from one pattern to another, there is the likelihood of confusion, misunderstanding and even real danger if the transition is not widely perceived and accepted as the environment for action.

The essence of the present transition is, in my judgment, the diffusion of power within the world away from the previous polar centers of Moscow and Washington. There are certain areas of world affairs where the diffusion of power is imperceptible or only slow: it is not a simple, uniform process. But my thesis is that this diffusion of power is central to the understanding and management of world affairs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

I have said the transition is not new. If you will permit a personal recollection, in 1958 I entitled a book, on United States military and foreign policy, "The United States and the Diffusion of Power." The publishers, however, told me no one would understand the title.

I surrendered; and the book came out as "The United States in the World Arena." If I have the chance to write again on the past decade, I suspect I will return to the original title. But my point is that it was not much of a trick to predict as early as 1958 that the diffusion of power would be a central phenomenon in world affairs.

The diffusion of power is now palpable in the Communist world. The split between Communist China and the Soviet Union has created many profound repercussions within both countries, among other nations ruled by Communists, and within Communist parties throughout the world.

Recent events in Eastern Europe have accelerated an old trend towards the assertion of increasing degrees of national independence. Moreover, within those nations, one sees the assertion of what might be called an internal diffusion of power -- a challenge to the political monopoly of the Communist Party. These internal shifts are deeply rooted in forces which are likely to persist rather than diminish, although the process doubtless will be slow and uneven.

Mainland China presents one of the great dramas of contemporary history -- an attempt by the grandfather to evoke the grandsons against

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

his own children. The result is a weakening of the Communist Party apparatus and a complex diffusion of domestic authority, as yet unresolved.

Within the nations of the world that are not Communist one sees also a diffusion of power and an increasing assertiveness -- in part resulting from United States post-war policy. We consciously decided, in the face of the prostrate Europe of 1946-47, not to play it as the British historically had played the Continent. Divide-and-rule in Western Europe could easily have been our policy. We considered it and deliberately opted against it. We threw our strength not only behind Europe's recovery but also behind its coalescence. We were fully aware -- and hopeful -- that this policy would lead to the emergence of a strong Europe which no doubt would be less malleable as its strength grew. We were not looking for satellites; we were looking for partners. And thus we became the strongest and steadiest friends of European unity and integration.

Our policy in Europe was part of a world policy based on the objective, not of empire, but rather of building world order on the basis of diffuse power.

We have used our monetary reserves, our military power, and economic resources to build and strengthen their economic, political, and military independence.

In Latin America we not only support economic and social development but we have lately also placed our full weight behind the movement towards

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

Latin American trade and physical integration.

Similarly, in Asia we have nurtured and supported the concept of a New Asia -- based on mutual cooperation which, over time, will enable Asians to take more of their destiny in their own hands.

Africa, in a much earlier stage of development, has also received our support for its emergent regional and sub-regional institutions. Our goal there, too, is for Africans to manage more of their own affairs.

In other words, we have tried to act abroad on the same principle which governs our society at home; that is, the building of law and order on the basis of diffuse centers of authority and responsibility.

II. American Objectives in a World of Change

As I see it, the objectives of the United States in a world of change can be expressed something like this. First and perhaps most important, the United States wishes to maintain a balance of power within the world that is favorable to us -- favorable not in the sense that we have the capacity to control the nations involved, but merely that a potentially hostile major power does not have the power to control them. We can, therefore, be content if the balance is held by nations free to develop their own national genius and to exist without the threat of outside interference and domination. Our goal is ^{that} neither Europe nor Asia nor the southern continents should fall into the hands of a potentially hostile major power.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-5-

We have been able to achieve and maintain this limited objective in the post-war years -- but only at great effort and cost.

Second, we aim to shift the burden for maintaining the balance of power -- in this sense -- to a more equitable basis whereby the responsibility and resources are more evenly shared by all the beneficiaries. This means we encourage others to do more for themselves whether in military affairs, trade, aid to developing nations, international monetary affairs, and so on. We have deliberately tried to influence events and situations so that our nation is not faced indefinitely with the kind of extreme direct responsibility we inherited or assumed when we filled the post-war power vacuums in Japan, Korea, Germany, and elsewhere. We have purposefully moved toward a shared basis of responsibility on the world scene.

Next, we have attempted to maintain a world in which thrusts aimed at shifting the balance of power do not lead to major war. This has required that we use the full weight of our resources against efforts to change the status quo by force when those efforts are mounted across international frontiers or boundaries. A great deal of post-war history is the chronicle of a succession of such efforts and our responses to them.

A fourth objective is to build towards a stable peace which would ultimately embrace all nations, including those now under Communist rule.

These are the headings under which we pursue our ultimate objective;

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-6-

namely, to build the stable peace which we failed to build after the First World War.

The challenge and test of American policy is our capacity to move forward toward these objectives, in an environment of diffusing power and responsibility.

III. The Pursuit of American Objectives

In real life -- at any particular period -- the pursuit of large objectives takes the form of highly particular -- usually acute -- problems.

First, of course, there is Vietnam and Southeast Asia. There we have faced not only a limited thrust from Hanoi to alter the status quo by force, but also a thrust which, had it succeeded, would have the much more profound effect of leading -- almost certainly -- to our withdrawal from the Southeast Asian mainland. In turn, this would have laid open that area to control -- in one form or another -- by the single national power in that part of the world with both the capacity and the intent to dominate -- Communist China.

The stakes in Vietnam thus exceed the boundaries of that beleaguered nation. The outcome of the struggle in Southeast Asia, in my judgment, will determine not only the future of that Asian subregion but, even more, will affect the capacity of all Asians -- under Communist rule or not -- to shape their own destiny.

At the moment, Saigon presents a microcosm of our problem

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-7-

and our opportunity. Under the pressure of the Tet offensive and the new dimension opened by President Johnson's speech of March 31, the government of South Vietnam is assuming more responsibility, and it is expanding its military forces. It is facing the future and considering the impact of an eventual lessening of American presence and ultimate absence. Regarding the Paris talks, the South Vietnamese have become increasingly lucid, acute, and constructive about the problems and possibilities of negotiation -- if negotiations, in fact, emerge.

Men react to pressure and challenge up to a certain point -- if they have vitality -- by meeting them and doing better. The danger is, of course, that if we let them down or use our relationship or influence over them carelessly we could destroy this hopeful new trend in South Vietnam -- the trend toward their assuming gradually more responsibility for their own destiny.

The situation in Saigon is a microcosm because in other parts of Asia there are versions of the same problem. There are people in Korea, in Japan, and elsewhere who are shaken and uncertain in the face of recent events in Asia; and the art of the months and years ahead is to handle our role in that region so that what is evoked from them is not frozen neutralism or uncertainty, but a willingness to take a larger part in shaping their own fate.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-8-

In Europe -- in the face of the changes going forward in Eastern Europe and, in fact, the whole environment of Europe since the Berlin and Cuba crises of 1962-- there has been a slackness about the need for allocating large resources to defense -- a feeling that, on the one hand, somehow détente is being given to them by history and, on the other hand, that somehow the defense of Europe by the United States is a free good, as economists say, to be taken for granted. It has not been easy to hold the line in NATO. But we have done so; and it is extremely important that we continue to do so for two reasons: first, because the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact are real and in certain important respects enlarging; second, because if there is a chance of moving towards a definitive settlement in Europe (or towards mutual force withdrawals that would help open the way towards a definitive settlement of the German and European problem which is such a large part of the cold war) that possibility clearly requires that we hold the fundamental structure of NATO and the deterrent in good shape.

The problem of Europe has been gravely complicated by the policy of President de Gaulle. The most important aspect of that policy has not, in my judgment, been his anti-Americanism. Our shoulders are broad and a little more or less anti-Americanism we can live with quite comfortably. The most important part of the damage done has not even

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-9-

been the limited and serious but not decisive attenuation of NATO through French force withdrawals.

The most important cost to the world and to our common interests has been de Gaulle's preventing Europe from consolidating. He has forced on the Europeans a protracted phase of continued sibling rivalry among the quasi-major powers of Europe. He has prevented a coalescence of European strength, and thereby rendering Europe almost impotent beyond the boundaries of Europe. Not only has Europe turned its back on the fate of two-thirds of humanity in Asia, it has done very little in an area where it should have done a great deal; namely, in Latin America, during a critical decade of Latin American history.

Even in an area where there are direct vital European interests -- the Middle East -- Europe has been completely ineffectual.

Like a flash of lightning on the horizon, you could see a marginal case of European impotence when we had trouble in the Congo. There were some 10,000 white Europeans who were threatened with slaughter because the white mercenaries had humiliated Mobutu's government. Some white man had to reach out at that moment and do something with Mobutu to make it possible for him to calm his people. We could not raise three C-130's out of all of Europe, although it was their citizens who were in danger. President Johnson had to take yet another lacerating

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 10 -

conflict with the Congress in order to get those three C-130's in there. That kind of European weakness and incapacity is, in some ways, the greatest threat to the stability of our own policy.

I do not believe our country (and I will come back to this) is in a basically isolationist mood. There are isolationist tendencies. But there is a very powerful feeling in the Congress -- reflecting a perhaps less well articulated feeling in the country -- that it is quite wrong, at this stage in post-war history, twenty-odd years after the war, when Europe is rich and comfortable, that the United States should have to bear so high a proportion of the task of being the organizer of the peace and the resister to aggression. As I have told my European friends, if I were they I would not worry about American isolationism; I would worry about the failure of Europe to mobilize itself to play a more effective role on the world scene as a partner to the United States -- on behalf of Europe's own interests and to support the continuity of American policy in the world -- on which Europe's fate depends.

In the Middle East, of course, we have a very searching problem. The question is this: is there any way of bringing from that most unpromising area (unpromising in terms of almost unbearable memories, mutual distrust, and humiliation) a process which could begin to move it towards peace and thus avoid another round of conflict in which, in my

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-11-

judgment, the danger of a U.S. -Soviet military confrontation would be much higher than it was in June of last year?

Then there is Africa, where there are important constructive moderate forces at work, and some very wholesome things have happened. The question is: Can they take hold and persist and make progress and hold the loyalty of the people by producing economic and social progress fast enough and avoid a major white-black and bloody confrontation in Africa?

In Latin America there are important constructive trends going forward. I worked at the White House in 1961. I suppose at that time you could not have gotten fifty-fifty odds that we would not have in the 1960's two or three more Castros somewhere in the Hemisphere. By the dint of Latin American good sense, our own efforts, and one of the great economic tours de force of which I know in the development business, we have managed to reduce Castro to a continuing nuisance -- but a nuisance almost irrelevant to the future of Latin America. The tour de force to which I refer is that he gets more than \$300 million net in Soviet aid (which is a goodly proportion of what we vote for all of Latin America) and he has managed to sterilize it. This is quite a trick. He is pretty dead in the water.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 12 -

I remember that President Kennedy used to worry a great deal about this. He said that Khrushchev has only got this island and "I have 200 million folk; he is sure to make a showpiece there; I don't see how we can help it; then what will we do?" Castro has taken us off that hook.

Nevertheless, we cannot be complacent. The question is: Can these trends persist in Latin America? What can we do to maintain sufficient momentum, sufficient sense of confidence, which is emerging in certain Latin American countries, so that we do not get another dangerous phase of economic and social frustration at a later stage?

IV. The Foreign Policy of President Johnson and President Kennedy

The foreign policy of President Johnson's Administration has been much addressed to exactly this transitional problem. His foreign policy is publicly associated, as indeed it might be when we have half a million men in the field, with Vietnam in Southeast Asia. But the President has been extremely conscious of the transitional process which accelerated after the Berlin and Cuba crises in 1962.

In the Kennedy Administration there were a good many things that were done; but, basically, we came to responsibility at a time of classic direct confrontation with the Soviet Union; and that preoccupied us a good deal. But in President Johnson's time the increased assertiveness in the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-13-

world -- the diffusion of power-- accelerated the organization of diffusing power and assertiveness, an effort which will look much more important in perspective than now when the debate on Vietnam dominates the scene.

It was President Johnson who in 1966 went to Mexico and threw U. S. influence actively behind Latin American integration. He shifted the weight of U. S. policy in the Alliance for Progress from being a senior partner out in front to being the junior partner to Latin Americans who had to take the lead. When I worked in the State Department I had an extra job on CIAP, which was almost the model of what the President was trying to achieve -- a Latin American chairman; six out of seven members Latin American; one North American.

In the summer of 1966 President Johnson threw his weight behind the concept of regionalism and subregionalism in Africa; and that early, developing continent has moved much more rapidly in these directions than any of us would have guessed at the time of the President's OAU speech.

In October 1966 in New York, President Johnson delivered a subtle and modulated speech which reconciled our continued support for NATO and Western European unity with a willingness to move as far as we could, in the common interest, towards improving East-West relations.

In Asia, of course, President Johnson has accompanied our defense

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 14 -

of South Vietnam with strong persistent efforts to encourage cooperation in Asia among Asians -- the first time this has happened in history. His objective is to produce a situation in which we could look to a future in which the United States did not withdraw from Asia, but in which the U. S. played a lesser role as the Asians came to do more. A symbol of the kind of Asia we are trying to build are the capital contributions to the Asian Development Bank -- 20% Japan; 40% the rest of Asia; 20% the rest of the world; and 20% the United States. That is for the Bank's hard capital subscription. In the softer loans we and the Japanese will have to do more.

What President Johnson has been trying to do in one part of the world after another is to build a framework of institutions and arrangements in which the United States has a choice between the extraordinary, direct, and almost overwhelming involvement it had when it filled vacuums after the war -- and isolationism. The concept of partnership -- where we take our due share in a communal effort -- is the way that is done.

V. The Major Exception to the Diffusion of Power: The Strategic Nuclear Balance

I come now to an area of policy in which the concept of diffusion of power is much more ambiguous, namely, with respect to nuclear weapons and the strategic nuclear balance.

There, of course, the minimum condition for stability in the world is that we maintain a nuclear balance which does not tempt the Soviet Union

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 15 -

or anybody else to either nuclear war or, even, to nuclear blackmail. A part of that effort may (or may not) be a negotiation with the Soviet Union with respect to strategic weapons systems, offensive and defensive. That issue remains critical to anything like a successful transition from where we are to where we might be or hope to be in some years; namely, a stable peace.

But there is another aspect of this problem which, in my judgment, has not been well debated in the United States or well understood; that is, the meaning of the non-proliferation treaty. In public discussions, the non-proliferation treaty is often regarded as a kind of follow-on from the atmospheric test ban; that is, an exercise in U. S. -Soviet détente, a good deed in a naughty world. All manner of well-meaning chaps support the treaty in those terms.

In fact, it is an effort in the United States' interest and in Soviet interest to reduce the potential diffusion of power at its most important point; namely, the diffusion of nuclear weapons and the right to fire nuclear weapons.

We have already seen that this effort lays great political issues before the non-nuclear weapons states that could produce them -- Germany, Japan, Italy, India, and others. As they come to the moment when they may have to go to their congresses, parliaments, and peoples,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-16-

they face the problem of explaining why they are accepting what looks like second- or third-class status in the world. This is very difficult political business.

But there is another important element in this and one which is generally missed. If we are going to keep a non-proliferation-treaty world, the nuclear guarantee of the United States must be absolutely reliable. The other side of the medal of non-proliferation is that the U.S. is locking itself into the world -- and into responsibility in the world -- right around the periphery of Communist China and the Soviet Union, on the toughest of all issues.

If you have talked, as I have, with Germans, Italians, Japanese and even (if they are candid) Indians and Israelis, it is clear that, if they accept a non-proliferation treaty, they are going to do so because they believe it preferable to have a U. S. nuclear guarantee -- explicit or implicit -- than to go through the very treacherous and expensive transition to becoming a nuclear weapons power -- and then a minor nuclear power.

I believe some Senators, who express lively support for the non-proliferation treaty but are, at the same time, urging us to get out of Vietnam and pull our troops from Europe, have not the slightest idea how those things relate to one another. If we pulled out of Vietnam,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-17-

it would be a relatively short period of time before India and Japan produced their own nuclear weapons. And the consequences of substantial troop withdrawals from Europe are not likely to be much less profound.

In nuclear matters, then, there is a significant exception to the diffusion of power. In fact we see an attempt to prevent a diffusion of power. When we throw our weight behind the NPT we are taking a position, as a nation, which does not permit us to back away much from the world -- if we mean it.

VI. Can America See It Through?

Now, the question finally arises: Can the political life of the United States and our public opinion sustain the role for the United States I have outlined -- the role we must play if we are to get through this transition without a neo-isolationist breakdown? This is the fear of many people around the world. It is a fear that is raised in Asia now with the President's withdrawal from politics next January; and it is felt elsewhere in the world.

No man can predict what his country is going to do in political life. These are matters of judgment and faith. But I would underline some of the problems that accompany our effort to play a role appropriate to our interests and objectives in this complex period of transition.

First, we now lack a unified Communist enemy. It was a lot easier to mobilize a policy to deal with Stalin. It was even tolerably easy to mobilize a policy to deal with Khrushchev's thrust against Berlin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-18-

or his effort to put missiles in Cuba. It is much more difficult to face a protracted war in Southeast Asia, where the immediate enemy is a small Communist nation; for it is a fairly subtle business to explain that you have a dual problem there; the immediate problem of protecting South Vietnam; the related but further problem of avoiding a U. S. withdrawal from the mainland of Asia, which would leave that area a vacuum into which the Chinese Communists would inevitably move -- or try to move.

Somewhere, viscerally, I think the nation understands this. But with a split in the Communist bloc and the reduced fear of the Soviet Union it is not easy, as anyone can see who has observed our vicissitudes in recent years.

Then there is the balance of payments problem. As other countries have become stronger, our surpluses have been drawn down. We have carried extraordinary financial burdens due to our world military position and commitments. In some cases these have been neutralized, but not, by any means, in all cases, not even in Europe. Some of the strongest arguments for our bringing troops home from Europe are focused on our balance of payments.

Then there are our domestic problems: the problems of race and cities. Some feel strongly that if we were spending less abroad we would spend more at home. I am not sure that is a political fact. The difficulty of generating resources for the cities -- more for education and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-19-

welfare -- may flow from the politics of our country. Put another way, I wish I could be confident that there would be a radical increase in those expenditures after Vietnam. I am not sure that the Congress would vote that way, although I would hope so.

As an economist I know quite well that we have the resources to do both jobs; if there was the national will to use those resources for both purposes.

In any case, the notion that we have searching domestic problems requiring increased allocation of resources leads many to think that we should pull back from the world at this stage. And people abroad are afraid that we will pull back under these pressures; or, if you are Communist, you may be hopeful that we will.

The critical aspect of this transition is that we go through it -- mobilizing the strength of others -- pulling back a bit ourselves -- working towards peace -- while avoiding a traumatic breakdown in some region of the world -- and a phase of isolationism.

Finally, we have a problem of a new generation (or, I should say, a part of a new generation, because one should not generalize about any generation) without historical memory of the roots of our policy.

I spent a most rewarding two hours the other day with some students representing every shade of opinion on Vietnam. It was extremely well managed. They kept the press out. Questions were questions, even if

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-20-

they were hostile and critical. They were not lectures or speeches. There was an honest exchange for two hours. What I found that was most missing from their minds was any sense that our nation's security was related to the balance of power in the world. I took them back all the way to the 19th century and showed we were not nice clean-cut kids who were above the balance of power. We were a shrewd, developing country that scavenged on the fringes of the balance of power. We got our independence and picked up the Louisiana Purchase by playing off the British and the French; picked up Alaska playing the Russians against the British. We were good shrewd operators, just the way every developing country would like to be now. Then, when the balance of power based on the British Navy began to cave in -- with unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917 -- we put aside all the speeches we made and reacted to the implications for security of this nation of the loss of the balance of power in the Atlantic to a power which might dominate all of Europe.

I then recalled to them what the polls looked like in the United States before Paris fell and Britain was embattled; and what they looked like afterwards in the second half of 1940. The balance of opinion shifted quickly around as the threat to the balance of power became real. In the autumn of 1940 people were saying we should aid the allies even at the risk of war; and that was the basis for Lend Lease.

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-21-

I recalled to them that it was the Japanese going into Indochina which triggered the oil embargo which tightened relations with Japan and built up to Pearl Harbor.

And I took them through the other instinctive actions of this nation when the balance of power in Europe or Asia was upset. I said, "I am not arguing with you. I am not saying it is right or wrong; but you live in a country which behaves in this way. And that is the way it conceives of its interests, even if our speeches do not always articulate our behavior when the chips are down."

We have a problem in their understanding that. But it is not a new problem. There is an abiding tendency in the nation as a whole to forget the fundamentals of our security position when we are not in palpable danger.

VII. The Hopeful Background

Now, to sum up. What I am saying is that in many ways this is as hopeful a period as we have seen in the post-war years. If you look at Communism as a doctrine, it is not doing well in the historical test with doctrines of independence and freedom -- politically, economically, socially, and culturally. In parts of the world where they have had a virtual monopoly over education and propaganda for a generation, Communism is dying of boredom and irrelevance.

In terms of power, there is nothing in Communist power that cannot be matched within the non-Communist world; and the diffusion of power in the Communist world is posing most searching problems for them,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-22-

much more searching than for us, because we are a nation which builds its domestic life around the organization of diffuse power. There is a kind of harmony between what we try to do at home and what we are now trying to do in the world in encouraging and supporting the new partnerships.

Communism was based on Lenin's concept of what a unified conspiratorial operation under a dictator could do. The concept was quite clear in Engels' and in aspects of Marx' thought even before Lenin crystallized the doctrines of Communist power and organization. It is a most searching experience for Communists to try to operate in a world of diffuse power. It does not fit their cast of mind, their habits of thought, their experience, their institutions, nearly as well as it fits ours.

And there is another hopeful dimension to the world scene. Many of our post-war troubles centered around men who were radical, ambitious revolutionaries, who carried maps in their heads of how they would like the world to look. Sometimes, quite literally, they drew and circulated maps. Sukarno had one, for example, shaping what he thought the proper expanded racial boundaries of Indonesia should be. Mao distributed hundreds of millions of maps which frightened not only the Southeast Asians but the Russians, because it laps well over into Russian territory. Castro had a map-like vision of the Andes as the great guerrilla base, the Sierra Maestro of Latin America. Nkrumah had one of a sort -- with himself as the Emperor Jones of Black Africa operating out of Accra. Nasser has had one. Ben Bella had one as King of the Maghreb.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-23-

Behind these visions of expansion and regional power were policies of men who were trying to continue, when they had responsibility for a nation, the rhetoric and policies of revolution which had brought them to power. They could not divest themselves of the anticolonial slogans or the phrases from Lenin's Imperialism. So they united their ^{people around} simple aggressive nationalism rather than face the searching tasks of nation-building.

Well, history has not been with these men. Castro, as I say, is dead in the water, and he does not find it satisfactory to try to grow sugar. Ben Bella is gone. Nkrumah is gone. Nasser is in a weakened, difficult position, but still a dangerous factor because of his weakness. Sukarno is gone. Mao is in grave trouble.

Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues belong very much with this generation. They believe they have the right to take over the French colonial empire in Asia. But they are being cut back because they have run into other people's nationalism, backed by the United States. And that has been the story with the others.

We are in a lucky phase now because it is the pragmatists who want to get on with the job who are gathering strength. One of our major challenges is to make sure that these men succeed, whether in Indonesia or in Ghana or in Latin America. If we are callous about helping them to get onto their feet in this rather pragmatic and moderate phase, we could

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-24-

bring on another radical phase; and that comes down to the policies and issues we lump together under the heading of "foreign aid."

So, there is a lot of hopeful raw material about us. But there are all manner of difficult problems in this transition -- the transition in which, hopefully, the role of the United States will diminish relatively, the burdens will diminish relatively as others pick them up. But for the time being, if we falter, we could set back dangerously the whole transitional process and endanger our own national security. And to get us from here to there is a job of subtlety, balance, clarity, persistence. No one can predict the outcome, but I am sure that this will remain the central task of the next Administration, as it has been of this. I happen to believe that there is enough inner wisdom and understanding and accumulated experience in the United States for us to stay with it. But that is what elections and horse races are about.

Thank you.

###

INFORMATION

Pres. file

4/8

Saturday, July 13, 1968
4:10 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Nick K. and Helms present a
draft letter to Ayub.

Max Taylor's desire for a special deal
on one component of the installation is presented
in Tab B -- an argument Nick and Helms do not
accept for reasons stated.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/NODIS attachment (log 2228)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-82
By rip, NARA, Date 7-26-94

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

48a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-81

By 40, NARA, Date 7-5-95

July 13, 1968.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Presidential Message to Ayub on Peshawar

I have drafted the attached letter (Tab A) to Ayub in a way which blends a hard tone with an escape hatch he can use if he chooses. (At best, such a pull back would probably involve no more than to give us a period beyond July 1969 to complete an orderly withdrawal.)

The letter still leaves Ayub in no doubt about your feelings on the substance and the way the Paks have handled the matter. Regardless of whether he loosens up his position, he will be under no illusions that, as a result of his actions, our relationship has changed.

My draft has been cleared by Dick Helms and Paul Nitze. But Max Taylor would prefer to take a somewhat different line. His draft (with the divergent paragraphs marked) is at Tab B.

On the first change (last paragraph of page 2), Dick Helms and I would strongly prefer to leave to Ben Oehlert's presentation any mention of the specific continuing need for a small part of the facility. This is not something we should admit in writing -- particularly at the Presidential level.

Dick and I have two concerns about Max's formulation in the next-to-the-last paragraph:

- It links the timing of the phase-down to our ability to find alternative sites. Since our basic objective is to get Ayub to agree to talk with us, we ought not risk scaring him off by

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

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-2-

imposing conditions now that are better raised by Oehlert at a later date.

- Raising the issue of financial costs detracts from the emphasis in the letter on higher security interests, a far more persuasive argument. In fact, the financial stakes are not high.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

1. Approve draft at Tab A _____
2. Approve draft at Tab B _____
3. No letter _____
4. See me _____

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRESIDENT AYUB

In the spirit of honesty and frankness that has always been at the heart of our relationship, I feel I must tell you of my deep concern over the reports I have received during the past several weeks from Ambassador Oehlert about your Government's attitude toward our communications facility at Peshawar. I have delayed writing to you personally until now because I hoped that some mutually acceptable solution could have been worked out by this time.

I was surprised and disturbed that your Government saw fit publicly to announce its position on the Peshawar facility before any real discussion between our two Governments was possible. And it was particularly distressing to learn that your Government's action may have been taken because of threats and demands by another power.

I had thought that you and I shared a conviction that our own security--as well as the security of many other nations--was well served by our cooperation

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

-2-

in maintaining the Peshawar facility. Accurate technical and scientific information on the intentions and capabilities of others can, as you know, be a stabilizing element in the present uncertain state of the world.

In all frankness, the actions of your Government do not seem to me to be appropriate to the close relationship that has existed for so many years between our two countries and which has been manifested in our contribution of more than \$3½ billion in aid to Pakistan.

I accept, of course, your right to terminate the 1959 Communications Agreement, although I would hope that even now you could reconsider that decision. I do want you to know, simply and unequivocally, that the closing down of the Peshawar facility in July 1969 will give us real problems.

In this connection, I must point out that this facility is a complex one. Some of its elements can be moved relatively easily. Others will take more time. Their hasty removal could result in significant gaps in our understanding of the intentions of others and thereby diminish the sense of security we both seek.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

-3-

If, however, your decision is firm, I would hope and expect that you might allow our representatives to discuss an arrangement whereby the various elements of the facility can be phased down and closed out in an orderly way during a period beyond the formal termination date of July 17, 1969. I have asked Ambassador Oehlert to convey these views to you and to be prepared to enter into full discussion of them at an early date.

I cannot hide from you the fact that the loss of the Peshawar facility will be a real blow to what I believe to be our mutual interests. But I do think that if we can agree to arrangements that will permit a reasonable withdrawal period it will lessen the impact. Such arrangements, if arrived at through imagination and good will on both sides, would make the transition easier to accomplish. I do not think, old friend, this is too much to ask.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRESIDENT AYUB

In the spirit of honesty and frankness that has always been at the heart of our relationship, I feel I must tell you of my deep concern over the reports I have received during the past several weeks from Ambassador Oehlert about your Government's attitude toward our communications facility at Peshawar. I have delayed writing to you personally until now because I hoped that some mutually acceptable solution could have been worked out by this time.

I was surprised and disturbed that your Government saw fit publicly to announce its position on the Peshawar facility before any real discussion between our two Governments was possible. And it was particularly distressing to learn that your Government's action may have been taken because of threats and demands by another power.

I had thought that you and I shared a conviction that our own security--as well as the security of many other nations--was well served by our cooperation

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-272- FRUS, Vol. XXV, #503
By ebm, NARA, Date 3-3-03

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

-2-

in maintaining the Peshawar facility. Accurate technical and scientific information on the intentions and capabilities of others can, as you know, be a stabilizing element in the present uncertain state of the world.

In all frankness, the actions of your Government do not seem to me to be appropriate to the close relationship that has existed for so many years between our two countries and which has been manifested in our contribution of more than \$3½ billion in aid to Pakistan.

I accept, of course, your right to terminate the 1959 Communications Agreement, although I would hope that even now you could reconsider that decision. I do want you to know, simply and unequivocally, that the closing down of the Peshawar facility in July 1969 will give us real problems.

This facility is a complex one. Some of its elements can be moved relatively easily. Others will take more time. For one small element, there is at present no known location elsewhere which will permit the continuance of its mission. Their hasty removal could result in

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~~SECRET/NODIS~~

-3-

significant gaps in our understanding of the intentions of others and thereby diminish the sense of security we both seek.

I would hope that we could reach an arrangement compatible with our past relationship and favorable to its continuation, based upon U.S. acceptance of the termination of tenure on July 17, 1969, with the understanding that the facility would be phased down progressively as relocation sites become available elsewhere and on a schedule which will minimize the heavy financial loss which this move entails for us.

I can not hide the fact that the loss of the Peshawar facility will be a set-back to what I believe are our mutual interests. However, if you can agree to the phased arrangement proposed above, I believe that the adverse impact can be greatly reduced and the transition made with a minimum interruption of important activities. I have asked Ambassador Oehlert to convey these views to you and to be prepared to discuss our proposal in detail. I do not think that it is too much, old friend, to hope for a favorable consideration.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, July 13, 1968
4:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

If you have time -- and if the subject interests you -- herewith a short memo and reports from Canberra on the vicissitudes of Gorton who has clearly not settled down yet.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

(A-615 Canberra 5576 5/13/68)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 27, 240, n.1

By jc NARA, Date 8-1-01

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

49a

July 13, 1968

~~SECRET~~ - LIMDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: The Performance of Prime Minister Gorton

The attached Airgram is a pastiche of memoranda of conversation with knowledgeable Australians about Prime Minister Gorton's performance. If you have the time, I think you will find it interesting reading.

What it amounts to is this:

- (1) Gorton is having an open and bitter feud with the civil servants.
- (2) His difficulties with his Cabinet (principally Paul Hasluck) are getting worse, not better.
- (3) Gorton's personal performance is a subject of increasing criticism among knowledgeable circles.
- (4) His standing with the party has deteriorated sharply, and Hasluck's popularity has risen.

Balanced against all this is the fact that the opposition, the Labor Party, is in total disarray. The ^{Liberal} ~~Labor~~ Party Government, therefore, seems in no danger. But unless Gorton begins to take hold better than he has thus far, there might grow up a real challenge to Gorton's leadership of that Government.

Marshall Wright
Marshall Wright

Att.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 27, #40
By jc NARA, Date 8-1-01

~~SECRET~~ - LIMDIS

5/5-56

AIRGRAM

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FOR RM USE ONLY

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A-615

~~SECRET~~ - LIMDIS

NO.

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : WELLINGTON, CINCPAC FOR POLAD

COPY NO. _____ SERIES B

FROM : Amembassy CANBERRA

DATE: July 5, 1968

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Gorton's Performance to Date

REF : ^{EA}Canberra 5576 of May 13, 1968

The referenced telegram provided an assessment of Prime Minister Gorton's performance through mid-May. Enclosed are a number of memoranda of conversation which largely support that assessment.

The "Len Hewitt" referred to in several of the memoranda is the newly-appointed Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department. He replaced Sir John Bunting, who was made Secretary of the newly-created Cabinet Secretariat. Miss Ainslie Gotto, also referred to in several memoranda, is the Prime Minister's Private Secretary. She is a 21-year-old high school graduate.

CRONK

Regis at
JEC

Jm

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of Conversation, June 17, 1968
2. Memorandum of Conversation, June 18, 1968
3. Memorandum of Conversation, June 19, 1968
4. Memorandum of Conversation, June 21, 1968

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-259
By SJ, NARA, Date 4-26-02

FORM 4-62 DS-323

~~SECRET~~ - LIMDIS

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In☐ Out

Drafted by:

POL:JCDorrance/mj

7/2/68

Contents and Classification Approved
POL:JVMartin

Clearances:

CHARGE:EMCronk (in draft)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Peter Lawler, Deputy Secretary, Cabinet Office
John C. Dorrance, Political Officer, American Embassy,
Canberra

DATE : June 17, 1968

SUBJECT : Prime Minister's Performance

Mr. Lawler was, under Prime Minister Holt, Deputy Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department. When the Cabinet Office was established shortly after Gorton became Prime Minister, Lawler was transferred to that office, along with Sir John Bunting, who has been Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department. Lawler admits that he is embittered toward Prime Minister Gorton by this shift, but claims that his comments on the Prime Minister's performance are "objective." Following are his key remarks during a luncheon meeting.

1. Prime Minister Gorton has established a dangerous precedent by replacing Bunting and himself with personal friends in the Prime Minister's Department. On the British pattern a long and successful tradition of apolitical, objective service to Prime Ministers had been established in the Prime Minister's Department. This was changed by Gorton's "personalization" and "politization" of two of the Public Service's key positions. It is this factor as much as the "miserable" personality of the new Secretary (C.L.S. Hewitt) and Bunting's "popularity" which has caused such intense ill-feeling toward Gorton within the Public Service. Most senior Public Service Officers are fully aware of Gorton's low opinion of the Public Service and they fear that what he has done with Bunting he could do with others.

2. Asked whether Gorton dominates or "leads" the Cabinet to any greater extent than did Harold Holt, Lawler said that Gorton has made no effort to dominate the Cabinet, but he probably does lead more than Holt did. The latter operated more by consensus. Gorton does at times ignore the advice of his Cabinet ministers, even on rather important questions. On the other hand, although frictions between himself and senior members of the Cabinet exist, they have

been over-dramatized by the press. The most serious policy differences are between Gorton and External Affairs Minister Hasluck. The latter "acts as if Holt were still Prime Minister" while Gorton not only questions some of Holt's policies, but also would like "to play at being his own foreign minister." One of the consequences of the feud between Gorton and Hasluck was Gorton's rejection of any advice from the Department of External Affairs on key issues to be discussed during his U.S. visit. Most of the briefs on Southeast Asia were prepared within the Prime Minister's Department rather than by External Affairs, which would be the normal case. Lawler said that senior officers of the Department of External Affairs support their minister and "cordially hate Gorton." Aside from their unhappiness over Gorton's treatment of the Public Service, and his contemptuous treatment of External Affairs, they are genuinely concerned about his judgment with regard to basic foreign and defense policies. Lawler said that an "appalling example" of Gorton's breezy treatment of important questions, and of the Departments concerned with those questions, was his failure to take any advisers from the Departments of Defence, External Affairs, Treasury, or Trade and Industry with him on his U.S. visit. The Asian tour was not much better in that respect. The official party was the same except for the addition of a doctor, and one "middle-ranking External Affairs officer" (Assistant Secretary Osborn).

3. Lawler said that he was also concerned about Gorton's judgment. He claimed that Gorton was contemptuous of expert advice from the Public Service, and was too inclined to take decisions of basic importance with little or no information. In this regard he said that his private secretary, Ainslie Gotto, was of considerable influence. She was hardly a "foreign affairs adviser," as some have described her, but Gorton sometimes does ask for her opinion on issues. He described her as a sounding board (a description offered by other observers). Lawler then cited another example of how Gorton is influenced on policy by rather unusual sources. He said that the only significant policy shift in the Governor-General's annual speech to the Parliament (given on March 12 and personally written by Prime Minister Gorton) was the section on Papua-New Guinea which clarified the Government's intent to develop that territory for independence. Lawler said that this section resulted from an exchange of correspondence and conversations with Tony Voutas. Young Voutas and his family are close friends of the Gortons. Voutas, recently elected to the Papua-New Guinea House of

Assembly, is about 25 years old, was formerly an Administration Patrol Officer, and more recently a founding member of the Pangu Pati, the Territory's most radical group and one which favors "immediate home rule" in preparation for independence. Lawler said he had no quarrel with this particular policy shift and thought it was a good one; but he considered it a bit strange that a 25-year-old political radical should be the key influence on Gorton with respect to that policy. The most concerned government departments, External Territories and External Affairs, were unaware of the policy shift until after the speech was given.

4. Lawler said that perhaps Gorton's greatest problem was his unwillingness to listen to advice from others. He trusted hardly anyone and was basically a "loner." More often than not his advice came from persons whose only qualification to give advice was that they were old and close friends. None of this would be so bad, Lawler said, if Gorton himself were intellectually equipped. "But he is not." He is not even consistent and his views on any issue can change from day to day depending upon his mood and who has talked to him.

5. Lawler said that another concern of his with regard to Gorton's leadership and performance was the latter's conviction that the only thing that counted in this country was public opinion. He treated Parliament and the Public Service with contempt while catering to the electorate. He was trying to be all things to all men, and was attempting to build up an image of a "rather ordinary sort of good mate." He was often so busy cultivating this image, including personal speech-writing for public gatherings, that he gave too little time or attention to the job of being Prime Minister. The above was understandable for the first few months of his Prime Ministership, particularly when the press was willing to give him the benefit of the doubt and assume he was "settling-in." But the press, his fellow Parliamentarians, and the Public Service had seen little improvement, and time is running out with the public. Gorton is, Lawler said, living on "borrowed time." This is particularly evident with regard to the Government's performance in Parliament. Gorton has provided no leadership in that body, and the various Ministers are largely left to their own devices. The "front-bench" has become a collection of individuals rather than a disciplined political team. The consequence has been

an exceptionally inept government performance during the just completed Parliamentary session. There had been one "unnecessary boner after another," and the Government had been defeated in the Senate on the National Service legislation simply because of lack of co-ordination within the Government. The Labor Party opposition had time and again made Gorton and his Government look "like an incompetent collection of uninformed fools." The Government back-benchers were up in arms. They disagree with Gorton's views on foreign and defense policy, and many from marginal districts were worried about keeping their seats at the next election because of the Government's inept performance. Lawler said that it was virtually impossible to find a Government Parliamentarian who had anything good to say about Gorton's performance to date. Those who strongly supported his candidacy for the party leadership will at most offer excuses for his performance: "He needs time to settle in and find his way."

6. Lawler concluded by saying that Gorton appeared to be "playing" at being Prime Minister. He seldom spends more than six hours a day in his office, and the amount of work he performs at home is questionable. Although he is reported to prefer to work out of the Prime Minister's residence (The Lodge), his working sessions often are no more than "bull sessions;" nothing very concrete ever seems to come out of The Lodge.

~~SECRET~~ - LIMDIS

Page 1 of 4
Encl. No. 2
A-615 from Canberra

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Alan Reid, Reporter for Sydney Daily Telegraph
and The Bulletin Magazine
John C. Dorrance, Political Officer, American Embassy,
Canberra

DATE : June 18, 1968

SUBJECT : Prime Minister Gorton's Performance

During a luncheon conversation, Mr. Reid discoursed at length and with frankness on Prime Minister Gorton's performance to date. Reid based his assessment of that performance on frequent and close personal contact with the Prime Minister. The two have been friends for years, and Reid is frequently favored with personal, off-the-record briefings on various important subjects. The Prime Minister has also often used Reid as a sounding board for new ideas, and as an informal public relations and press adviser. Reid accompanied Prime Minister Gorton on the latter's recent U.S. tour. Reid is also Australia's senior and most prominent political pundit. He is considered by the Embassy to be an exceptionally reliable source, and a sensitive observer of Australia's political scene.

Following are the key points made by Mr. Reid during the conversation.

1. Reid said that he and Gorton had been close personal friends for years but that he (Reid) was, as an Australian, "concerned" and even "frightened" for his country because of the nature of Gorton's "immature and rash behavior" as Prime Minister. He felt that, although his public image remains favorable, he was running out of time, and his "performance would catch up with him." Fortunately for Gorton, the constant strife within the opposition Labor Party had caused the public and the press to overlook Gorton's own "shabby" and "dangerous" performance. But, "this is changing." Reid then turned to a number of specifics.

2. Gorton has a fantastic capacity to hate, and the memory of an elephant. He is thin-skinned, and exceptionally sensitive to real

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or imagined slights. He is innately disdainful and distrustful of the Public Service. A combination of all these factors has resulted in a mutual "hate-fest" between himself and virtually the entire Australian Public Service. His inability to trust anyone but a few hand-picked friends resulted in the transfer out of the Prime Minister's Office of Holt's entire staff except for the Press Secretary, Tony Eggleton, and the latter's assistant, Mary Newport. For all practical purposes, Gorton depends almost entirely on his new departmental secretary, Len Hewitt, and his private secretary, Ainslie Gotto, for advice on almost any subject. He ignores or is distrustful of advice from the Defence and External Affairs Departments.

3. His private secretary, Ainslie Gotto (a 21-year-old high school graduate), has a tremendous degree of influence over Gorton. A reporter's recent reference to Gotto as being one of Gorton's two "foreign affairs advisers" (the other being Len Hewitt), was not far off base. Gorton uses her as a "sounding board" for new ideas; She in turn has taken it upon herself to screen official briefs directed to the Prime Minister, and even to summarize them without reference to anyone else. She also has drafted a number of Gorton's speech notes or outlines, including his speech to the National Press Club in Washington. Other Government Ministers have complained that she has taken it upon herself to determine when and if they can see the Prime Minister.

4. Gorton's judgment is often poor and rash. He tends to be impulsive and to act or take important decisions without adequate information. He is unduly influenced "by the last person to see him." He pays too little attention to policy briefs, often not reading them at all. During the visit to Washington, many briefs prepared for the visit were read hurriedly at the last minute, or not at all.

5. Gorton's attitude toward Parliament is one of contempt. This explains in part his shabby performance on the floor of the House to date, where he has made no statements of real import. He considers the electorate to be his audience, and this explains his proclivity to make most of his statements of any importance to public gatherings or the press rather than to Parliament.

6. One of his major problems is that he keeps forgetting that he no longer is a Senator and therefore "can no longer have the luxury of speaking without thinking." Gorton has a tendency to say the first thing that comes into his mind. His stubbornness often prevents him from admitting to an error and backtracking.

7. Asked whether Gorton was giving serious consideration to an early election, Reid said that Gorton had told him during the U.S. visit that he had not yet made up his mind. However, he was preparing next year's budget (which will be tabled in Parliament during August) with the possibility of an election in mind. Gorton had said he probably would not make up his mind until August or September. If he did call an election (Gorton said), it would not be so much to take advantage of disorder in the Labor Party, but rather to permit him to "put my own house in order." Reid said this was a reference to differences between Gorton and members of his Ministry such as Hasluck and Fairhall, and the feuding between Treasurer McMahon and Country Party Leader and Deputy Prime Minister McEwen. Gorton said he would like to "sack the lot."

8. Reid said that the press probably had overplayed some of the policy and personality differences existing between Gorton and his Ministry. But these differences were nevertheless serious and basic. They stem not only from policy differences and dissatisfaction with Gorton's performance, but also from the fact that many of his Cabinet Ministers (not to mention a number of backbenchers) have never reconciled themselves to Gorton's election to the leadership. Reid said that the Liberal caucus vote for Gorton to be Party Leader and Prime Minister had been very close, and not the 51-30 vote reported to the Public. The margin was only several votes, and he made it only because the opposition had split between Hasluck, Bury, and Snedden. If his opposition had rallied behind Hasluck before the caucus, Hasluck would be Prime Minister today. (Embassy comment: Dudley Erwin, the Government Whip in the House of Representatives, said virtually the same thing to Richard Service, the American Consul General in Melbourne, about a week after the caucus. Erwin should know--he counted the votes.) Reid said that a few days ago he did a personal "nose count" among Liberal Parliamentarians and found that Hasluck would become Party Leader and Prime Minister by a landslide if a new caucus were held today.

~~SECRET~~ - LIMDIS

Page 4 of 4

Encl. No. 2

A-615 from Canberra

9. Summing up Gorton's performance and his (Reid's) unhappiness with it, Reid said that the primary problem is that Gorton is too rash and quick to decide, distrustful of his advisers, and too inclined to reject advice or information which is distasteful to him. Often he will act on intuition, supported only by the views of Ainslie Gotto and Len Hewitt.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Miss Ainslie Gotto, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
John C. Dorrance, Political Officer, American Embassy, Canberra

DATE : June 19, 1968

SUBJECT : Prime Minister Gorton's Visit to the U.S.

During a brief conversation following the Prime Minister's return to Australia from his U.S. and Asian tours, Miss Gotto made the following comments about the Prime Minister's U.S. visit.

1. Prime Minister Gorton was tremendously impressed with the treatment he received while in the U.S., but was extremely nervous about Australian public reaction to that treatment. He feared that it would appear he was being "bought." Throughout the trip the Prime Minister was extremely tense and "keyed up." Some nights he would not go to bed before three or four in the morning, and insisted that Miss Gotto and his departmental secretary (Len Hewitt) sit up and chat with him. After several days he was so groggy that his public speaking performances were affected.

2. Miss Gotto claimed that her most difficult task was getting the Prime Minister to focus on the briefing papers brought with the party. She said that he never did read some. Gorton remarked at one point that they "were so much bumph." She also said that none of his speech notes or outlines were prepared until the last moment, although he did put considerable effort into the one given on arrival at the White House. She claimed that she had personally drafted the speech notes that he used at the Washington National Press Club.

SECRET - LIMDIS

Page 1 of 3

Encl. No. 4

A-615 from Canberra

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. A.T. Griffith, Assistant Secretary for Defence
and External Relations, Prime Minister's Department
John C. Dorrance, Political Officer, American Embassy,
Canberra

DATE : June 21, 1968

SUBJECT : Prime Minister's Performance and Visit to U.S.

Griffith is considered by his fellow public servants to be one of the more influential Public Service Officials in the Prime Minister's Department. Described by some as a "backroom boffin," Griffith apparently prepares many of the basic "thinkpiece" briefs for the Prime Minister on defense and external affairs. He also has had a hand in drafting speech notes for the Prime Minister. Following are highlights of a brief conversation.

1. It is taking an inordinately long time for Gorton to settle in and "do business" as Prime Minister. But during recent weeks, he (Griffith) has noticed considerable improvement in both public and private performance. Perhaps Gorton's greatest contribution so far has been to shake up the Prime Minister's Department and get many of those in it to start thinking along fresh lines and new approaches to basic issues. The end result might be continuation of past policies, but at least all alternatives have been examined. On the other hand, Gorton has a rather unfortunate penchant for publicly discussing all of the alternatives that are placed before him.
2. Speaking of Gorton's U.S. visit, Griffith thought it had been "a bit of a disaster." He thought that his public image during and just after his visit to Washington had been at an all-time low. He ascribed this to a number of reasons. One was Gorton's emphasis, before his departure, on his intention to meet all of the Presidential candidates to sound them out. However, virtually no arrangements were made until the last moment, with the consequence that he had to return almost empty-handed on that score. In Australia, it appeared that most of the candidates could not be bothered with receiving the Prime Minister.

SECRET - LIMDIS

3. Furthermore, according to Griffith, Gorton had overplayed his mission of sounding out U.S. intentions in Asia. The press here quickly picked up that the President and others had turned the tables on him by pointing up that it was for Australia and other Asian powers to set the course in Asia; the U.S.'s performance in that area in the future would depend upon Australia and others carrying at least a fair share of the burden. In the end, Gorton came back and reported to Parliament that he now knew the U.S. would stand firm in Asia until the end of President Johnson's term, and that it probably would thereafter. This was no news to anyone and he could have said that without going to Washington. In the Parliamentary debate after Gorton's report on the Washington visit, Labor Leader Gough Whitlam "walked all over Gorton."
4. Gorton's visit to the U.S. had also suffered from his tendency to make policy pronouncements there rather than in his home country. The press quite rightly resented this.
5. On the other hand, Gorton's Asian tour "went off pretty well," and what Gorton lost from the U.S. visit, he has probably regained since then. However, even the Asian tour was badly organized, with consequent unnecessary foul-ups throughout the trip (Griffith did not detail the foul-ups). Part of the problem was Gorton's refusal to delegate authority to anyone. Nothing could be done in arranging the Asian trip while Gorton was in the U.S., and there were only a few days between the two trips. Everything was done at the last moment, and much was left undone.
6. Gorton's report to the nation on the Asian tour (his speech before the National Press Club, Canberra 6305) was his best public performance to date. When asked why he consistently makes his most important statements to the public rather than in Parliament, Griffith said that this stemmed in part from Gorton's belief that he performed better in public than in the give and take of Parliamentary debate. In Parliament, Whitlam could score more points.
7. Griffith said that Gorton still has a lot to learn. He still forgets that he cannot say anything that pops into his head--as he could when he was a Senator. He also has to learn that his government is a team, and others, both ministers and public service officers, have something to contribute. At present he operates as if the Government were a "one-man band." When he seeks

SECRET - LIMDIS

Page 3 of 3
Encl. No. 4
A-615 from Canberra

or takes advice, it can be from some rather strange sources. He then mentioned Gorton's private secretary; Ainslie Gotto--"the most influential little so-in-so in Canberra." With Miss Gotto, it was not just a question of her influence on Gorton, she also controlled to a dangerous extent who else in Government had access to the Prime Minister.

SECRET - LIMDIS

INFORMATION

Pres file

Saturday, July 13, 1968 -- 3:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

You raised, roughly speaking, the following question the other day: How could our society produce at the same time men of the quality of our young Marines and other fighting men and hippies and draft-card burners.

The attached letter to Elspeth from a former student is one answer: If many of the dissidents actually were in Vietnam and faced the reality of the problem, they would change. Of course, the key point about this particular young man is that he had the courage to make the decision to go out and see for himself.

Nevertheless, an interesting story.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Mrs. Rostow,

I am an ex-student of yours at the School of International Service, American University, and a college drop-out. I quit school the first semester of my junior year because too many questions were unanswered. These unanswered questions were, of course, partially related to the Vietnam war, but to a greater degree they were directed towards myself. Of course I was influenced by the mood and temper of my generation, by concepts of direct action and personal involvement -- the whole conceptual context in which SDS and similar organizations germinated -- but somehow I had to know, not just from afar but from inside the whole thing.

The National Teach-In in Washington where your husband debated Hoffman and Morgenthau on "The Formulation of American Foreign Policy" left me in a complete state of "what the hell is really happening here?" If you will remember, that night I was sitting next to you during the debate. Prior to the debate we said a few things of no consequence concerning the topic of debate. But what interested me then and now was your reaction. You had great difficulty in containing yourself in the wake of merciless repeated attacks upon your husband's stated position. There was something you wanted very much to say but of course you were unable to do so. What you wanted to say, I felt then and know now, is what I wanted to discover. It is not what you would have said, but the understanding which you had which would have allowed you to say it that I was in desperate need of. I knew that I could not find what I was looking for at American University or in Washington, D.C. so I decided to become involved.

I quit school, joined the Army, volunteered for Special Forces, underwent approximately 18 months of training, and later got into the field of intelligence. I came to Vietnam approximately 10 months ago, was wounded as an advisor, spent two months in Japan and returned to Vietnam to do strategic political analysis. The cumulative effect of these experiences prepared me well to learn from what I was to find in Saigon in the wake of the Tet offensive. I became involved to a degree far beyond my greatest expectations -- from loving and crying with a pathetically lost and tragic young Vietnamese girl to speaking with captured and disillusioned Communist cadre; from being proselyted by captured and ideological cadre to working daily with a brilliant Vietnamese

nationalist anti-Communist; from becoming good enough friends with a few young University of Saigon law students to discuss Vietnam and America candidly to hunting over half of Saigon to find a girl I had lost during the last attack. From these and many more such experiences or, more accurately, from the total experience of becoming emotionally and intellectually involved in the Vietnam war, I have come to the understanding I needed at the National Teach-In in Washington more than three years ago:

Of course I have my personal opinions on how the war should be run, and opinions about why it isn't being conducted that way, but beyond that and more meaningful, I believe, I have become involved enough to say that this "Open letter to the American People" is an accurate expression of the average Vietnamese plea for understanding and help in an increasingly desperate situation. Only they can fully understand how desperate it is.

I would like to thank you for helping to instill within me the intellectual curiosity and integrity that led me on this personally rewarding journey.

With highest regards,

/s/ William L. Pensinger

(W. L. Pensinger
Hq MACV J2 SRA
APO S. F. 96222)

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An Open Letter To The American

By The American Universities Alumni Association

Dear Friends:

We speak to you today, from this land of prolonged agony, not as members of an interest group pleading for the benefit of their own class above the immense sea of blood and tears that has not stopped rising, but as patriotic men of a war-torn nation who live the woeful life of their fellowmen, know the sorrow that has transcended words, and cherish no greater dream than to see peace and dignity return to their fatherland.

That dream has not materialized after twenty five years of endless struggle and fifteen years of generous assistance that you have lent us in money, technique and men. On the contrary, the conflict has only intensified with time into a horrid nightmare of death and destruction that distresses all men of good will.

A great problem is at stake for our two nations. The future of Vietnam is being put to trial. And the imposing task of making the right decision calls forth America's own pride as a courageous people capable of perpetuating a great tradition in human conduct. A crucial time is approaching, in which momentous acts are being made that will affect the course of history for generations to come. And yet so much is still left unsaid, so many questions unanswered.

A great confusion has clouded over the complex reality of Vietnam for many years. A profusion of words and numbers has not led to a clear grasp of the Vietnamese dream, nor explained the hopeless enigma of succeeding events. And deep in his heart, the common Vietnamese still

lives his daily life in the insatiable of an old dream that has not seen the light of day.

At no other time could efforts at communion be more meaningful. And at no other time could a Vietnamese sense a duty more awesome than to speak out the anguished voice of his fellowmen.

We know the meaning of the commitment. But we dare not shrink from the endeavor. To keep silent would mean a negation that could bring tragic consequences to the lives of millions. And to deny you an unobstructed glimpse at reality from a Vietnamese framework contributes nothing to the efforts towards an honorable solution to the

tragedy.

And so we are writing you today of this unquenchable dream of our people, of the conditions in which it has grown, and of its hope in the future. Let it be known to you that though we may not say well enough, we speak the true voice of our own conscience. And let it be known to the world that though we are separated by half a world in distance, we are united in the same human aspirations and hope for a better future.

With our determination and good will, the hope shall be gratified, and that long cherished dream of the Vietnamese people shall become reality.

What does a simple Vietnamese dream of in the middle of this stupefying reality of war and uncertainty?

The dream is simple and timeless. He wants peace, well-being, and dignity, for him and for his nation.

—PEACE to him is the simple happiness of a day without the sound of cannonfire, without death lurking around the corner or haunting the night, without the frightful apprehension of a mortar shell on a neighbor's roof, a brother killed on the battlefield. Peace is the absence of violence, the harmonious solution to internal conflicts the friendliness between brothers.

WELL BEING means little more than enough food and lodging for the family, impunity from sickness, an occasional joy of drinking with a close friend or watching a classical drama on a public TV.

DIGNITY constitutes freedom from harassment and oppression, the right of being treated as others, the assurance of being able to conduct one's own life and improving one's own well-being. And national dignity means the right of the nation to decide her own destiny and resolve her own conflicts, free from foreign interference and guidance, free from subordination and humiliation.

How have the Communists responded to that dream, and how does the common man react towards them?

The Communists know well the simple man's dream,

and they make sweet promises to soothe his heart. But the common man has been betrayed too often in the past, and no words suffice. Only concrete acts assure the integrity of intentions.

The concrete acts that the Viet Cong have committed since their apparition eight years ago have been acts of war, justified as a struggle against social injustice and foreign domination. Battle broke out all over the countryside and the impoverished people here all the burden in order to carry out the war to a promised final victory, the Communists have drained the people of all their means for livelihood, even taken their lives as a necessary sacrifice. The promises of peace and well-being no longer spelled magic, and hundreds of thousand destitute Vietnamese fled away to refugee camps in a desperate hope for a breach of security.

But the most eloquent acts of justification by the Communists have not manifested themselves until the blustering events since Tet. A deadly blow was dealt on the Vietnamese consciousness when, on the most sacred holiday for the Vietnamese people, the National Liberation Front broke a sacred promise and transformed the few days of anticipated joy and relief into a nightmare of death and destruction.

Unnecessary acts of brutality and terrorism were resorted to in an effort to intimidate the Vietnamese people and cause a political repercussion. Government workers were massacred and mass buried in Hue, missionaries slain in Ban-Me-Thuot, news men executed in Saigon. And everywhere, war fell upon the common man like a plague. Hundreds of thousands of homes were burned down, tens of thousands of families violently separated in death. The Vietnamese people were to know the most horrendous New-Year in their history.

The common man sees all. He knows all. And he reacts. Throughout the mad orgy of death that the Communists began five months ago serious threat to the and perpetuated to security of South Vietnam this very day, the poor after the fall of the Diem regime that America had who called themselves liberators as if they were the incarnation of Death himself. And the men who have been intoxicated with violence paid no heed to their propounded ultimate aim, deluged.

On the eve of Ho-chi-Minh's birthday, rockets fell on heavily populated quarters in Saigon, taking innocent lives and leaving thousands barehanded and homeless. The proletariat has ceased to be the end for the promised revolution.

The insane and desperate acts since Tet by the Viet Cong have confirmed a new truth Communism has counted itself out in the people's mind and heart. The way of violence can never respond to the eternal longing for peace of the Vietnamese people, and will never realize the unfulfilled dream of the common man.

A different alternative must be the answer. Is it the present operating system in South Vietnam?

How have the authorities in South Vietnam responded to the Vietnamese dream in the past fifteen years?

After the partition of Vietnam in 1954, the U.S. began taking an active part in aiding South Vietnam develop into a strong nation capable of resisting the Communist expansion. Money was poured in, advisers despatched. Hope ran high that a new Republic was emerging. But it did not last very long. With all her good intentions, America has in effect helped one man consolidate his own power, regardless of the people's aspirations, and base his strength on an inherited system that is outdated from the outset. The old machinery of French Colonialism, the very object for national liberation, was put back to power with all its techniques and agents. And the old system of free and irresponsible enterprise at the cost of the commune was all but strengthened. The age-old problems of corruption, oppression and injustice were given new force, and the National Liberation Front found no better ground on which to proliferate. That force had become such a serious threat to the security of South Vietnam this very day, the poor after the fall of the Diem regime that America had who called themselves liberators as if they were the incarnation of Death himself. And the men who have been intoxicated with violence paid no heed to their propounded ultimate aim, deluged.

From that time on, America's involvement in Vietnam was deeper than ever before. The overwhelming presence of the Allied forces and tremendous, needed for supporting services, the overflow of money from US spending in all fields of activities, along with the prolongation of an outdated system, the already serious strains on social balance and a deterioration of security situation, all added up to a complete overturn of the social order, a pitiable degradation of values, and an increasing dependence on foreign aid for survival. National dignity has never been so vitally injured, and self determination was a dream out of reach. A bitter sense of despair developed, resulting in dismay, discontent, abandonment and escapism. Vietnam was to know all the humiliation of a people unable to control her own course of events.

What does the Present look like, and what is the prospect for the future?

Developments since the Tet offensive have awakened in the South Vietnamese people a new awareness and a new determination. Communism has uncovered its true inhuman nature, and is forever alienated from the people. There was born a new apprehension that peace could not be sold to violence and terrorism, but must be defended with courage and strong will. Thousands of young men have volunteered to join the Armed forces, students found a new purpose in safeguarding the city, women learned about first aid, young boys and girls helped settle refugees. For the first time in many years, the people are united with the government in the the same purpose and determination. And for the first time, and a painful realization has arrived to the men of good will on the other side of the battlefield. A new doubt has arisen of the futility of violent efforts and the validity of revolutionary motives. Disaffected soldiers and cadres have been returning in greater numbers everyday as morale declined after each battle of blood.

A new time is approaching. A new hope is born for a creative way to solve the Vietnam conflict by peaceful means, in which all Vietnamese

(Continued on page 7)

for the same purpose of rebuilding Vietnam to freedom and dignity, and the Vietnamese dream.

A few lines of fleeting words can never be expected to embrace a complex reality that has eluded all the heroic efforts at understanding in the past. But a voice has been raised from within the conflict, and cannot be in vain.

The Vietnam conflict has developed into a problem of grave import for our two nations which no one has fully anticipated and no one can claim innocent. But no vindication is needed and no resentment justified. Instead, a new spirit of cooperation is required to find an honorable solution to the dismaying predicament.

We know our share in the problem. And we ask no greater chance than to be able to solve our own conflict. The Vietnamese are proud of themselves, and they possess more than enough capacity to overcome obstacles when the initiative is restored which would inspire a new spirit of selfdetermination into this weary land of affliction.

We ask your support in this endeavor. We know America's passionate advocacy for the freedom of man, and her unfailing stand for justice. To fight for her conviction, she has had make the painful sacrifice of losing her best sons and consuming her richest resources. But the task cannot be left undone, and the agony will end only after the tragedy of Vietnam has been resolved.

To change from a tired society ridden with imperfections and threatened by a ruthless enemy into a new one with vitality and purpose, the process will be long and painful. But no efforts can be more meaningful. And if America is firm and wise, then freedom shall prevail, and justice will never be in doubt.

And in helping us build a new society, you will again show the world the kind of idealism and good judgment that has been an inseparable part of your valorous history.

The result will be beneficial to all, and your contribution to the cause of peace and freedom will never be forgotten.

The American Universities Alumni Association,

51

Saturday, July 13, 1968
2:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

In connection with your talk with Sid Davis this afternoon, you might make the following points about the Paris talks.

1. In substance, they are absolutely hung up on the issue of a total bombing cessation; that is, the other side has refused to commit itself in any way to military de-escalation either to match our present bombing cutback or a total bombing cessation. Given the level of infiltration and the evidence of a planned major offensive in the weeks ahead, we simply cannot gamble with the lives of our men and allies and accept a total bombing cessation, foregoing the 20% or so attrition we now ^{run} pose on men and supplies moving south.

2. On the other hand, our team in Paris and those who observe the contacts from here are not hopeless about a true negotiation developing in Paris:

-- the other side seems anxious not to break off the talks;

-- there has been occasion in the tea-breaks for some feeling out of general positions;

-- it was a good sign that Le Duc Tho came to Paris, and it is conceivable that they are now conferring in Hanoi on next steps.

3. In short, while there is absolutely no solid progress to report, it still seems worthwhile to persist in the Paris effort.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, July 13, 1968 - 1:20pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Czechoslovakia Situation Report

The Soviets have announced that Brezhnev and Podgorny are in Warsaw for a meeting with their socialist allies (presumably East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria -- but not the Czechs). Kosygin is still in Sweden, but expected to join the meeting this afternoon.

Soviet and East German newspapers are holding space for an important statement to be issued tonight. We have no confirmation that it relates to Czechoslovakia -- as it could also relate to Germany -- but one can speculate that it will represent a sharp diplomatic escalation and pressure play against the Czechs.

The Czech government has released a detailed description -- including localities -- of the Soviet withdrawal, which the Czechs say has started. We have one inconclusive indication that one or two units may have begun to withdraw.

3.4(b)(1)

The "operation" of the Peoples Militia scheduled to start last night may have been a civil defense drill. We do not know whether the Peoples Militia is presently mobilized or deactivated. (According to General Sejna, it is not a formidable military force in comparison with the Czech army or police.)

Our Embassy in Prague reports a slight abatement of tension in the city. Foreign Minister Hajek's interview (reported in today's New York Times) is inconclusive. Interestingly, Hajek was only willing to say that "he hoped" that there was no chance of Soviet intervention.

The Czech position continues to be that they will be happy to hold bilateral talks with their allies, but are not prepared to be summoned to a conclave like the Dresden Summit.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-272
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-3-03

W. W. Rostow

53

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, July 13, 1968
12:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick produces a statement on the Aid Bill, which he recommends you read before TV sometime on Monday. In a conversation with Sec. Rusk this morning, he thought an opening volunteered statement at a press conference might be the best form for such a statement.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rla

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY rg ON 9-29-92

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Presidential Statement on the Aid Bill

A draft Presidential statement on the Aid Bill is attached. It is basically the same statement as that earlier sent to you as a draft letter to Speaker McCormack.

I continue to urge that you personally read this statement before TV some time on Monday.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Enclosure.

1. I will read the statement before TV. _____
2. No _____
3. See me. _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY AB ON 9-29-92

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THE AID BILL

The Congress is about to consider a critical piece of legislation--the continuation for another year of the foreign aid program. I want to emphasize to the American people and to all Members of Congress my conviction that passage of this legislation is absolutely essential.

I have just returned from Central America, where I saw and felt at first hand the needs and aspirations of people who look to us for leadership and help. These people, with energy and hope, are hard at work building a new life. They and the millions of others in Asia, in Africa and Latin America who are struggling to better their own lives and the lives of their children, deserve the assurance that they are not alone and friendless.

The world's poor know that there is no moratorium on disease.

They know that there is no moratorium on hunger, starvation or illiteracy.

And they know that there can be no moratorium on their own war against these age-old enemies. Can we do less than offer them a small measure of support and encouragement in this battle?

In the end, each citizen and each member of Congress must make his own judgment of our national priorities. Let me only say that my foreign aid budget request takes into account our critical needs at home as well as those abroad. As the Congress knows, it was the lowest request in history.

The Foreign Affairs Committee has reduced this request by \$600 million--about 20%. I regret this cut, but, in view of our joint concern for our fiscal problems, I will not oppose it.

But with these cuts, the program has been pared to the bone. Below this level the vitality of the regional initiatives we have stimulated in the developing areas would be severely threatened. Countries around the world which have trusted our resolve and heeded our advice would lose the confidence in peaceful progress which distinguishes this era from the long dark centuries of hopelessness which have been their common burden.

This is not, nor should it become, a partisan issue. Every President since Harry Truman has understood the importance of aid to our own security and to the future

of the free world. Nor, if I may add a personal note, can I imagine a greater disservice to my successor than the defeat, or crippling, of this bill. Be he Democrat or Republican, liberal or conservative, he will be charged with executing the foreign policy of the United States. It is our common responsibility to pass on to him intact the full range of instruments necessary to the performance of his duties. I speak from my own experience--and the experience of my three predecessors--when I say that none is more vital than foreign aid.

We are now engaged in crucial talks looking toward the end of the tragic conflict in Viet-Nam. We are about to begin talks with the Soviet Union on limiting the arms race. At a time when America's commitment to peace with security has begun to bear fruit, we must not seem to be withdrawing from the struggle against the basic causes of war and unrest.

I call upon the Congress to reaffirm--as it has so resolutely in the past--America's moral and material commitment to help others help themselves toward a better and more peaceful future.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Saturday, July 13, 1968
12:20 p. m.~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith two pieces of business and one piece of information.

1. Tab A. Sect. Rusk has redone the instruction to Harriman and Vance. Present paragraphs 1-6 are a substitute for old paragraph 1. The balance of the cable remains as originally drafted.

2. Tab B. Although not constitutionally required, Sect. Rusk wishes to check with you before the final signature of the Exchange Agreement with the Soviet Union in Moscow. Thompson would like to sign on Monday, July 15, unless the Soviets move troops into Czechoslovakia over the week end. Essentially, Sect. Rusk wished you to be informed that we plan to follow this scenario.

3. Chip Bohlen is going on the PanAm flight as the senior representative of the U. S. Government on Monday. He will probably pay a courtesy call on Gromyko. He is fully briefed if Gromyko raises with him any matters of substance. Neither he nor Sect. Rusk is requesting that you see Bohlen before he goes. But if you wished him to carry any message to Moscow, he will be available until about Monday noon.

W. Rostow

Paris instruction O. K. _____ No _____ Call me _____

Proceed with Monday signing, with Rusk proviso _____ No _____ Call me _____

Wish to see Bohlen _____ No _____ Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 18674
By is NARA, Date 1-8-98

54a

DRAFT

TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE

NODIS/ HARVAN/ PLUS

PERSONAL FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE FROM THE SECRETARY.

(References)

1. The President and I believe that certain shades of difference which appear in reference cables could be reduced by a fuller exposition of what is really on our minds.

2. We see little evidence that the Hanoi delegation is prepared seriously to discuss other factors on which there must be an understanding before there is a complete cessation of the bombing. Their delegation may be awaiting the return of Le Duc Tho, they may be awaiting the results of the new offensive which they clearly seem to be preparing, they may be marking time for political developments in the United States, or they may feel that they are under no pressure to get going. Chairman Kosygin just recently wrote Prime Minister Gandhi pressing the point that we stop all of the bombing before anything else could be done and asked her to press this upon the United States. What the Soviets are doing behind the scenes, we just do not know clearly. There has been no further answer to the President's message to Kosygin on this subject.

3. Under these circumstances we are reluctant to make a full and detailed exposition of our views until it is quite clear that Hanoi is prepared to sit down and seriously discuss the problem on a two-way basis. Otherwise, there would be nothing more than a unilateral exposition to someone who is not really listening. It would put Hanoi in a position to make our views public at any time and in such a way as to inject questions of detail into public debate in this country and to stimulate fears and suspicions among the South Vietnamese and other Asian allies.

4. It seems to me that the question is basically one of timing. I would think that you have plenty to talk about in your Monday private meeting within the framework of State's 199838. You could begin with a discussion of the concept of the Phase One-Phase Two approach. If they reject this in principle at the outset, this could be pursued at some length on the basis that it is an attempt on our part to meet their problem -- namely, to prepare the way for a stopping of the bombing by the United States as a first step. If they seem sufficiently interested as to want a sample of what you are talking about, you could go into the DMZ point in considerable detail. At the same time, you could mention the other topics as a sort of agenda for

a further discussion of the Phase One-Phase Two concept. It would of course be of great value if you could elicit from them their thoughts on topics Phase Two would have to take into account.

5. It seems to me that State's 199838 gives you plenty of ammunition for your next private meeting, pending Vance's return on Tuesday for further detailed discussion here.

6. On your specific question as to whether you are authorized by State's 199838 to put down a complete package, you should not put down what purports to be a complete package until we ^{you and} have resolved such questions as the withdrawal of forces by both sides from South Viet-Nam and the broad questions referred to in Paragraph 13. As indicated above, you are authorized to explore the concept of Phase One-Phase Two fully, explore the DMZ in great detail, and indicate more generally the other topics that you would wish to explore further. It seems to me that this is in itself more than you can possibly cover in a single meeting.

S:DRusk:jmr

7. "Indiscriminate attacks" certainly include rocketing and shelling of cities and should include other acts primarily designed for terroristic purposes. We think this should ordinarily include mines and explosive devices used for such purposes and certainly could include use of NVA/VC personnel on the ground in indiscriminate attacks primarily for political purposes. You should use above as illustrative in order to probe any DRV reactions. We would like to get as much as we can in this connection.

8. Military experts here are concerned that prohibition against alteration and composition of military units could raise technical problems for both sides. It appears to give a certainty and security which is more apparent than real since it is possible to attach large numbers of additional troops to existing units. In any event, it is scarcely necessary for you to make this an initial proposal. If they are interested, we can negotiate the details subsequently.

9. You need not include proposals with respect to complete withdrawal by each government of its forces from SVN. We think it may interest the other side and you may raise it if as a result of your discussions this appears to you useful. The principle is obviously an important one and should be of considerable interest to the North

Vietnamese but we leave timing to your discretion. We continue to have under consideration your proposal with respect to token withdrawals and appreciate the argumentation you have provided. We are not, however, persuaded this should be an initial proposal on our part but are wont to believe it should await evidence of their seriousness with respect to Phase One-Phase Two proposal. If there is evidence of willingness to negotiate on this basis we will reconsider your recommendation.

10. You need not raise the broad matters contained in Paragraph 13 of our Reftel. These ^{are}/discretionary with you and were intended to be responsive to a point in Zorin's original suggestions on which you reported he "attached considerable importance" (Paris 17226, 7.13 Delto 361).



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

546
10019~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUL 12 1968

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: The Under Secretary
S/S *[Signature]* *[Signature]*

FROM: EUR - John M. Leddy

SUBJECT: Request for Authority under Department of
State Circular No. 175 to Sign an Agreement
on Exchanges with the USSR for 1968-1969 --
ACTION MEMORANDUM

DISCUSSION:

Under Department Circular No. 175 on February 20 you authorized negotiation of a new exchanges agreement with the USSR for 1968-69. Pursuant to this authorization, we opened negotiations in Moscow on June 3, which have led to agreement on a text of a new Agreement (Tab A).

The new Agreement is similar in structure to the one for 1966-67, retaining or tightening existing provisions for reciprocity.

The level of exchanges provided in some programs is lower than that provided in the previous agreement although, in some of these cases, it is equal to or higher than actual implementation. In performing arts groups, the Soviets agreed only to a reduction from five to three. In exhibits, they agreed to one exhibit in six cities instead of the previous two in three cities each, thus allowing essentially the same exposure. Overall, the agreement maintains the pre-existing internal balance.

Copies of the following dependent agreements, which were also negotiated in Moscow, are to be

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 8-1-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

appended as annexes to the new intergovernmental agreement once they have been signed by representatives of the institutions involved:

Agreement between the American Academy of Sciences and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences

Agreement between the American Council of Learned Societies and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences

Memorandum on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy between the Atomic Energy Commission and the U.S.S.R. Committee on Utilization of Atomic Energy.

The last of these three represents resumption of activity following a Soviet-initiated lapse since a previous Memorandum expired at the end of 1965.

The new US-USSR Agreement on Exchanges, as in the case of the five previous such agreements, has been carefully drawn to assure that all commitments entered into are subject to the availability of funds and to assure that the undertakings on the part of the United States can be carried out within the authority of the Executive under the Constitution and existing laws.

As most of the exchanges provided for are to be carried out by other Departments and Agencies and private individuals, groups and corporations, each of the parties concerned was consulted prior to and during the negotiations and each has expressed a willingness to participate in the respective exchanges.

Pursuant to the provisions of Circular No. 175, authorization is requested for Ambassador Thompson to sign on behalf of the United States the new US-USSR Agreement on Exchanges for 1968-69. A Memorandum of Law covering this request is attached (Tab B).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- 3 -

The President was consulted before approval of the draft for negotiation and again on June 29, when he authorized completion of the negotiation. However, you may wish to consider our sending the attached Read-Rostow Memorandum which forwards a copy of the agreed text (Tab C).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That you authorize, pursuant to Department Circular No. 175, Ambassador Thompson to sign the US-USSR Agreement on Exchanges for 1968-69.

Approve *DeW Bush*

Disapprove _____

(2) That, if Presidential clearance is desired, you approve transmission of the attached Read-Rostow Memorandum.

Approve *✓ NK per LSE*

Disapprove _____

CONCURRENCES:

<i>RF</i>		L/T - Mr. Bevans <i>ae</i>
<i>RF</i>	SO - Mr. Rimestad <i>B pin</i>	L/CRP - Mr. Teal <i>ae</i>
	CU - Mr. Canter <i>ae</i>	P - Mr. Phillips <i>RF</i>
	H - Ambassador Torbert <i>RF</i>	SCI - Mr. Pollack <i>ms for</i>

USIA, an advisory committee of the intelligence community, the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, Transportation, and Health, Education and Welfare have collaborated in preparing portions of the draft and concur in the pertinent sections.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

Attachments:

- Tab A - Text of new Agreement
- Tab B - Memorandum of Law
- Tab C - Proposed Read-Rostow Memorandum

EUR/SES:AIWortzel:se 7/12/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

54c

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON EXCHANGES IN
THE SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL AND
OTHER FIELDS IN 1968-69.

The Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics;

Believing that the continuation of exchanges
will contribute to the broadening of mutual under-
standing between the American and Soviet peoples;

Have agreed to the following program of exchanges
in scientific, technical, educational, cultural, and
other fields for 1968 and 1969.

SECTION I

General

1. The exchanges and visits provided for herein shall be subject to the Constitution and applicable laws and regulations of the respective countries.

2. The Parties, desirous of having the exchanges and visits between them take place under favorable conditions and without delay, agree that:

a. The programs and itineraries, lengths of stay, dates of arrival, financial and transportation arrangements and other details of the exchanges and visits provided for in this Agreement, except as otherwise herein stated, shall be agreed upon on a mutually acceptable basis, as a rule not less than thirty days in advance, through diplomatic channels or between appropriate organizations requested by the Parties to carry out these exchanges;

b. Applications for visas for visitors under this Agreement shall be submitted, as a rule, not less than twenty days before the estimated time of departure;

c. Each of the Parties shall have the right to include in delegations interpreters or members of its Embassy who shall be considered as within the agreed total membership of such delegations;

d. Unless otherwise provided for in this Agreement, and except where other specific arrangements have been agreed upon, visitors under this Agreement shall arrange to pay their own expenses, including international travel, internal travel and costs of maintenance in the receiving country.

3. The exchanges and visits enumerated in this Agreement shall not preclude other visits and exchanges which may be arranged by the two countries or undertaken by their organizations or individual citizens, it being understood that arrangements for additional visits and exchanges, as appropriate, will be facilitated by prior agreement through diplomatic channels or between appropriate organizations.

SECTION II

Science

1. The Parties will take all appropriate measures in order to encourage and achieve the fulfillment of:

a. The Agreement between the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America and the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a copy of which is appended to this Agreement as Annex No. I;

b. The Agreement between the American Council of Learned Societies and the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a copy of which is appended to this Agreement as Annex No. II;

c. The Memorandum on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy between the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a copy of which is appended to this Agreement as Annex No. III.

2. The Parties take note of the provisions for exchanges in the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Desalination, including the Use of Atomic Energy, signed on November 18, 1964, and subsequently renewed for two years beginning November 18, 1966.

3. The Parties agree that additional visits or exchanges may be agreed upon through diplomatic channels, between the above-mentioned organizations or between other appropriate organizations whose participation in these additional visits and exchanges is approved by the Parties. These visits or exchanges, whether for the purpose of participating in scientific meetings, exchanging experiences, conducting studies or delivering lectures, shall take place as far as possible on a reciprocal basis.

SECTION III

Technology, Scientific-Technical Research, Industry, Transport and Construction

The Parties agree to provide for exchanges of delegations of five to six persons, which number may be increased by agreement, for visits of three to four weeks for the purpose of familiarization and exchange of experience in the following fields:

(1) Engineering Seismology and Construction in Earthquake Zones: study of design, construction and engineering practices in seismic areas, so as to minimize earthquake damage; research on earthquake prediction. (For the United States)

Irrigation Systems: construction of irrigation systems for land reclamation, methods and techniques of irrigating, combatting salting and waterlogging of irrigated soils. (For the Soviet Union)

(2) Weather Modification: current research on weather modification and cloud physics, including instrumentation and statistical evaluation of results, and also visits to weather modification test sites;

(3) Treatment of Water in Industry: treatment of industrial waste water by chemical, biological and other methods to prevent the pollution of water sources and treatment of water for industrial use, including familiarization with the methods, equipment and instruments used;

(4) Air Pollution: study of methods for prevention and control of air pollution from industrial processes, with emphasis on removal of sulphur from fuels and on engines which minimize emission of pollutants. Study of instruments and methods for measuring pollutants and their effects. Current research on effects on humans, animals, vegetation and materials; on air quality criteria; and on diffusion of pollutants;

(5) Ferrous Metallurgy: smelting of ferrous metals, production of hot and cold rolled steel, pipes, metal products, and products of heat-resisting alloys, including visits to research centers for the study of scientific methods in the metallurgical industry and thermo-mechanical processing;

(6) Industrialization of the Building Process: study of the organization of the building process from conversion of raw materials through fabrication, design and erection;

(7) Gas Industry: the design, construction, and exploitation of gas and gas-condensate deposits; construction and operation of storage facilities for gas and gas products;

(8) Management of Scientific and Technological Information: development of standard reference data to meet the needs of science and industry; development of systems for classification, retrieval, and mechanical translation of such data;

(9) Bridge and Tunnel Construction: planning and construction of bridges and tunnels of various types, scientific research work in the field of bridge and tunnel construction;

(10) Investigation of Solar Eclipses: joint scientific observation of two eclipses of the sun, one occurring in the U.S.S.R. in 1968 and one in the United States in 1970, with emphasis on measurement of solar x-rays and observation of the solar corona;

(11) The Technique and Technology of Mining Coal by Open Cast and Underground Methods.

SECTION IV

Agriculture

The Parties agree to provide for exchanges of agricultural scientists and specialists in the following fields:

For the United States:

(1) Insects and related arthropods which feed on certain weeds common to the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (two persons for total of five and one half months: one person for three and one half months and one person for two months);

(2) Micrometeorology and plant physiology (one person for two months);

(3) Techniques for improvement of grasslands in arid and semi-arid regions, including main grazing plants; transformation from natural pastures into cultivated pastures; systems of pasture rotation; and management of grazing lands and livestock (two persons for two months);

(4) Management of wildlife production, including furbearers (one person for two months);

(5) Taxonomy and biological control of plant-parasitic nematodes: Taxonomy of fungi, including exchange of fungal specimens (two persons for total of three months: one person for two months and one person for one month);

(6) Weed control in cotton, grain and sugar beets (one person for one month);

(7) Vegetable diseases, including exchange of pathological specimen and materials (one person for two months).

For the Soviet Union:

(1) Familiarization with methods of sterilizing farm pests by means of irradiation and chemicals (two persons for one month);

(2) Familiarization with selection methods to obtain hybrid corn with a high protein content and biochemical analysis methods (three persons for one month);

(3) Familiarization with experience in the organization and technology of cattle feeding on large specialized farms (five persons for one month);

(4) Familiarization with scientific research in combatting virus and bacteriological infections of farm animals and the organization of veterinary service (four persons for one month);

(5) Collection of seed samples of cultivated agricultural plants and related wild plants and familiarization with techniques of plant introduction (two persons for one month);

(6) Familiarization with methods of synthesis and system of testing biologically active substances; experience with use of antibiotics and biostimulators in feeding livestock and poultry (three persons for one month);

(7) Familiarization with experience in utilization of the biological methods for combatting weeds and collection of "phytophags" (three persons for one month).

If needed, interpreters will be included in the number of man-months established for each agreed exchange.

546

SECTION V

Public Health and Medical Sciences

1. The Parties reaffirm their interest in intensifying the fight against serious diseases and express their agreement to contribute to the further development of contacts and cooperation between the American and Soviet scientific institutions engaged in studying the problems of cancer, cardiovascular diseases, rheumatic diseases, virus diseases, including poliomyelitis, the problems of organ transplantation, and other important problems of medicine.

Details of specific exchanges shall be agreed upon directly between the U.S. Public Health Service and the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health.

2. The U.S. Public Health Service and the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health will facilitate continued cooperation between scientific research organizations and other agreed upon research organizations of the United States and the Soviet Union.

3. The Parties will facilitate the conduct of two joint inter-institute scientific sessions in 1968-69 providing two to four specialists from each side for a period of up to fourteen days for each session.

In the U.S. (in 1969)

Immunological aspects of the trans-
plantation of organs

In the U.S.S.R. (in 1968)

Cardiovascular diseases.

The dates and durations of the above sessions will be agreed subsequently. Each side will inform the other side of its participants at least thirty days in advance of the sessions.

4. The Parties agree to provide for the exchange of three delegations, each to consist of three to six persons, for visits of three to four weeks.

From the U.S.:

- a. Health planning
- b. Organ transplantation
- c. Neurochemistry

From the U.S.S.R.:

- a. Organ transplantation
- b. Treatment of brain traumas
- c. Biochemistry

5. The Parties will exchange specialists, not to exceed 20 persons, for the purpose of studying the work of medical scientific research institutes and establishments of the United States and the Soviet Union, exchanging experience and conducting joint research studies. The length of individual exchanges shall not exceed six months, unless otherwise agreed to by the Parties, while the total volume of exchanges shall amount to no more than 80 man-months from each side over a period of two years.

6. Administrative arrangements for the fulfillment of the provisions of this Section will be established by discussions between the United States Public Health Service and the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health.

SECTION VI

Education

1. The Parties agree to provide for the exchange annually from each side of:-

a. up to 30 college graduates, post-graduates, young researchers, and instructors for study and post-graduate work for a total of not more than 300 man-months, with periods of stay ranging from one semester to a full year, including five-week courses before the beginning of the academic year to improve the participants' competence in the Russian or English language;

b. up to 20 language teachers to participate in summer courses of nine to ten weeks to improve their competence in the Russian or English language (in 1969);

c. up to 10 professors and instructors of universities and other institutions of higher learning to conduct scholarly research and to deliver lectures for periods of up to seven months, the total volume of these exchanges not to exceed 30 man-months for each side;

2. The Parties agree that the exchanges specified above will be implemented by the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants for the United States, and by the USSR Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education for the Soviet Union, in accordance with the provisions of the Annex to this Section.

3. The Parties agree to provide for conditions necessary to fulfill agreed programs, including use of scholarly and scientific materials, and where appropriate and possible, work in laboratories and archives and contacts with scholars of scientific institutions outside the system of higher educational establishments.

4. The Parties agree to encourage the exchange by appropriate organizations of educational and teaching materials, including textbooks, syllabi and curricula, materials on methodology, children's literature, slides, samples of teaching instruments and visual aids.

SECTION VII

Performing Arts

1. The Parties will encourage and support, on a reciprocal basis, appearances of theatrical, musical, choral and choreographic groups, orchestras and individual performers.

2. The Parties agree to facilitate the tours of three major performing arts groups from each side to be exchanged correspondingly during 1968 and 1969.

3. Commercial contracts acceptable to the Parties will be concluded between appropriate organizations or impresarios of the United States and concert organizations of the Soviet Union well in advance and, whenever possible, at least nine months before the beginning of the tours. The receiving Party will seek to satisfy the wishes of the sending Party concerning the timing and duration of the tours as well as the number of cities to be visited.

4. The Parties agree to facilitate the tours of up to twenty individual performers from each side during 1968 and 1969. Suggestions for tours of individual performers may be made by appropriate organizations or impresarios of the United States and concert organizations of the Soviet Union.

5. In the event of additional mutually acceptable exchanges and tours in performing arts, the provisions of Paragraph 2 or Paragraph 3 will apply.

SECTION VIII

Cinematography

1. The Parties agree to encourage practical measures to increase the sale and purchase of motion pictures of their respective film industries, on the basis of equal opportunity and mutually acceptable financial terms, as well as to provide for the widest possible distribution of these films. To this end, representatives of the motion picture industry of the United States approved by the Department of State will negotiate directly with Sovexportfilm for the sale and purchase of films mutually acceptable to the Parties during the period of this Agreement.

2. The Parties agree to encourage appropriate organizations to hold, on the basis of reciprocity, one film premiere annually in each country from among the films purchased. Appropriate delegations to these premieres may be exchanged.

3. The Parties agree to encourage the exchange and to provide for the distribution of documentary films in the fields of science, culture, technology, education, and other fields, in accordance with lists to be agreed upon between the Parties.

4. The Parties will continue to study the possibilities of arranging for the joint production of entertainment, popular science, and educational shorts and feature-length films. The content of the films, as well as the companies or film studios involved in their production, will be agreed upon by the Parties.

5. The Parties agree to facilitate the exchange of delegations of creative and technical specialists.

6. The Parties, when requested by individuals or organizations of their respective countries, agree to discuss other film proposals, and to facilitate, as may be agreed, the exchange of scientific, cultural, technical and educational films produced by film organizations or in the custody of film museums and other film institutions in each country.

54

SECTION IX

Publications, Exhibits, Radio and Television

The Parties agree:

Publications

1. To render practical assistance for the successful distribution of the magazines Amerika in the Soviet Union and Soviet Life in the United States on the basis of reciprocity and to consult as necessary in order to find ways to increase the distribution of these magazines. The Parties agree to distribute free of charge unsold copies of the magazines among visitors to mutually-arranged exhibits on the condition that the issues of the magazines will contain materials devoted to the subject of the exhibit.

2. To encourage the exchange of books, magazines, newspapers and other publications devoted to scientific, technical, cultural, and general educational subjects between the libraries, universities and other organizations of each country, and also through commercial channels.

3. To encourage exchanges and visits of journalists, editors and publishers, as well as their participation in appropriate professional meetings and conferences.

Exhibits

4. To exchange one circulating exhibit from each side during the period covered by this agreement. The subject of the United States exhibit in the Soviet Union will be "Education in the USA." The subject of the Soviet exhibit in the United States will be "The USSR in Artistic Photographs."

5. To show each exhibit in six cities for a period of three to four weeks in each city. The Parties will discuss in a preliminary fashion the nature and general content of each exhibit and will

acquaint each other about the exhibits before their official opening, in particular through the mutual exchange of catalogues, prospectuses and other information pertinent to the exhibits. Other conditions for conducting the exhibits (dates, premises, number of personnel, financial terms, etc.) shall be subject to agreement by the Parties. Discussions on these matters will begin between the representatives of the Parties no later than October 15, 1968.

6. To arrange through diplomatic channels other exhibits and participation in national exhibits which may take place in either country during 1968 and 1969.

Radio and Television

7. To promote exchanges in the field of radio and television.

8. To promote the exchanges of delegations and individuals engaged in radio and television matters.

54

SECTION X

Civic, Social, Cultural and Professional Exchanges

1. The Parties agree to encourage joint undertakings and exchanges between appropriate organizations active in civic and social life, including youth and women's organizations, recognizing that the decision to implement such joint undertakings and exchanges remains a concern of the organizations themselves.

2. The Parties agree to provide for reciprocal exchanges and visits of writers, composers, musicologists, playwrights, theater directors, artists, architects, art historians, museum specialists, specialists in various fields of law, and those in other cultural and professional fields, to familiarize themselves with their respective fields and to participate in meetings and symposia. The Parties agree both to inform each other of proposed visitors and to arrange programs for them well in advance of their arrival.

547

SECTION XI

Sports

1. The Parties agree to encourage reciprocal exchanges of athletes and athletic teams as well as visits of specialists in the fields of physical education and sports.

2. These exchanges and visits will be agreed upon between the appropriate American and Soviet sports organizations.

540

SECTION XII

Tourism

The Parties agree to encourage study of arrangements for tourist travel between the two countries, as well as to encourage reciprocal measures to satisfy the requests of tourists, as individuals or in groups, to acquaint themselves with the life, work and culture of the people of each country.

59p

SECTION XIII

Procedure for a Meeting of the Parties

The Parties agree to hold a meeting of their representatives within one year after the signing of this Agreement, to review the implementation of exchanges and to discuss the details of the program for the second year of the Agreement.

542

SECTION XIV

Entry into Force

This Agreement shall enter into force on signature with effect from January 1, 1968.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this Agreement and thereto have affixed their seals.

DONE at Moscow in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both equally authentic, this day of
one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS:

[SEAL]

[SEAL]

ANNEX TO SECTION VI

Educational Exchanges

Exchanges of College Graduates, Post-Graduates,
Young Instructors and Researchers
(Paragraph 1.a of Section VI)

(1) The Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants of the USA (Committee) and the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education of the USSR (Ministry) will exchange lists of nominees, their programs for the forthcoming academic year and the necessary information about each nominee not later than one day after signing of the agreement in 1968 and by March 1 in 1969 for the next academic year. The programs of study and scientific work must reflect the academic background and the research plan and objectives of the participants. Representatives of the Committee and the Ministry will meet in 1968 no later than July 31 in Moscow and in 1969, as soon after April 20 as possible and no later than May 10 in Bloomington, Indiana, to exchange information concerning placement of the participants for the forthcoming academic year and to discuss details connected with the exchange.

(2) Participants accepted to start their work at the beginning of the academic year will arrive by August 14 for the American participants and by August 12 for the Soviet participants at the universities in each country which will provide the language course. Those accepted for the second semester will arrive during the period February 1-10. If a participant cannot arrive in the receiving country on the requested date, the sending side will inform the receiving side of this fact as far in advance as possible. The new date on which the participant will arrive will be settled by agreement.

(3) Applications for extensions of agreed periods of stay presented during the participant's period of study will be considered by the receiving side only in exceptional cases.

(4) The receiving side will bear the following expenses: tuition and fees for training in universities and other institutions of higher learning, payment for suitable living quarters, and a monthly stipend agreed between the Committee and the Ministry. As a rule, the stipend will be paid in full directly to the participants. In case of a participant's illness or accident, the receiving side will bear medical costs, including hospital expenses, as agreed between the Committee and the Ministry. The sending side will bear all costs for the travel of its participants.

(5) The sides agree to provide for living quarters for the spouses of participants during the academic year or for one visit of up to 30 days. The receiving side will bear no expense for the travel or sojourn of spouses in the country.

Exchanges of Language Teachers
(Paragraph 1.b, Section VI)

(6) The Committee and the Ministry will agree on the dates for the courses and will exchange lists of participants, drafts of the programs for the courses and commentaries on them by an agreed date. Participants in these exchanges may be accompanied by one or two language specialists (leaders). The receiving side will provide the participants, including the leaders, with free tuition, free living quarters (dormitories), stipends and medical services agreed upon between the Committee and the Ministry. As a rule, the stipend will be paid in full directly to the participants. The sending side will bear all travel expenses for its participants.

Exchanges of Professors and Instructors
(Paragraph 1.c, Section VI)

(7) The sides will exchange lists of scholars, the necessary information concerning each of them, and their programs of research, for those proposed by the

sending side for the first semester in 1968 within 30 days after the signing of the Agreement; in 1969, by March 15, 1969; for those proposed for the second semester, by October 15 of each year. The receiving side will inform the sending side of the decision on the scholars by universities and other institutions of higher learning within two months after the above-mentioned documents are received.

(8) The receiving side will provide the participants with free living quarters, medical services and a monthly stipend as agreed between the Committee and the Ministry. The sending side will bear all travel expenses for its participants. Participants may be accompanied by their spouses and minor children, but in the latter case the receiving side will bear no obligations to provide living quarters for spouses with children and also in all cases will bear no expenses for their travel or maintenance.

Visit By Representatives

(9) Each side may send, at its own expense, its representatives to the receiving country to familiarize themselves with the conditions of study and sojourn of its participants in these exchanges.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE LEGAL ADVISER

July 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM OF LAW


Exchanges Agreement Between the United States
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for 1968-1969

Pursuant to Circular No. 175, authority is being requested to sign with the U.S.S.R. an agreement for cooperation in exchanges in the scientific, technical, educational and cultural fields during 1968 and 1969. The agreement is modeled on its predecessors which have been signed biennially since 1958.


In addition to the Constitution, 5 U.S.C. §156, relating to the management of foreign affairs by the Secretary, and section 103 of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, Public Law 87-256, provide authority for entering into such agreements. Other provisions of Public Law 87-256, and provisions of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended (22 U.S.C. §§1431 et seq.), authorize the United States Government to carry out the exchange activities provided for in the agreement.

The agreement provides that the carrying out of the activities provided for is subject to the Constitution and applicable laws and regulations of the two countries.

The text of the agreement to be signed has been approved by L.


Fred T. Teal
Assistant Legal Adviser
for Cultural Relations
and Public Affairs

Clearance:

L/T - Mr. Beyans


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

32d

July 13, 1968

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 11, #255

By jc NARA, Date 8-10-01

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to comment on the proposed Presidential message recommended by ACDA to Secretary of State Rusk and to you for use at the forthcoming opening of the ENDC.

I and my fellow Commissioners have problems with Presidential reiteration or endorsement at this time of two of the measures which are suggested as part of the disarmament agenda.


We feel that it would be a mistake to reiterate at this time our previously stated aim to "seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time." We feel strongly that this is unrealistic in view of the absolute necessity for underground testing in order to meet our announced commitments in the field of strategic offensive weapons such as Poseidon and Minute Man, and strategic defensive weapons such as the Sentinel (ABM).

Our second item of concern is a Presidential request at this time to reach agreement to halt all production of fissionable material for use in making nuclear weapons. As you know, we have shut down already seven out of fourteen of our plutonium production reactors and reduced our uranium-235 production by two-thirds. At a minimum, this would require further careful study; the last comprehensive study on a government-wide basis was made in 1964. If something needed to be said on this subject at this time, credit could be taken for what we have already done.

Perhaps these measures should be studied by the Committee of Principals before any further public statement is made on them.

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

Respectfully,


Glenn T. Seaborg

The President
The White House

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

33

SECRET

**Monday, July 15, 1968
1:40 p. m.**

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is my shot at a draft to Clark.

Approved _____ Disapproved _____ Call me _____

W. W. Rostow

**P. S. I shall be going over to talk with Sect. Rusk
as instructed at 4:00 this afternoon.**

SECRET/LEO draft

DECLASSIFIED
White House Staff, Jan. 24, 1988
By rg, NARA, Date 4-2-92

33a

VIA CAS CHANNEL

July 15, 1968

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR CLARK CLIFFORD FROM WALT ROSTOW

The President wishes you to review carefully while in Vietnam any reductions in expenditures that we might make out there which would contribute to the \$3 billion Defense cut we face. He wishes you also to consider, in the light of the situation you find, any additions we might have to make in next year's Defense appropriation bill.

You might also be considering how, if no Foreign Aid bill is passed, we bring necessary military aid into a deficiency appropriation for the Defense budget.

Your consideration of these matters with the President in Honolulu and upon your return will, evidently, take us a little time. In the meanwhile, it is the President's hope that Congress will be able to come to grips with certain critical items such as the poverty bill, higher education, the many nominations for the courts which are before it, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, etc.

The President has talked with Mahon about Defense appropriations and the special unresolved problems posed in this message. He hopes that you will be able to meet with him and Mahon and go over these and other issues about the middle of next week, after your return.

The President will be counting on you for your usual resourcefulness.

###

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 10031
By is NARA, Date 3-20-99

SECRET

Monday, July 15, 1968
11:00 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have had indexes of military activity prepared for Vietnam, by weeks from the week ending January 27 to the week ending July 6.


In all cases, 100 equals the average for the calendar year 1967.

Six factors are charted separately on this basis and an average index then compiled (see second chart).

The nut of it is that from about June 8 the index has moved back to about the 1967 average. In the past two weeks it has been below that average.


W. W. Rostow

Attachments



Amage Index, 1968

346



*Pres. file
clerk*

35

Monday, July 15, 1968
10:45 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Len Marks just called.

He saw Drew Pearson over the weekend. Pearson was talking of the President as a 'Man of Peace and then "blurted out": "Do you know, he wants to establish relations with Castro?"

Marks says he counseled caution in publishing any such item, but fears Pearson may proceed.

He asked me to inform you.

If you wish him to talk further to Pearson about this, he will. Otherwise this is simply information.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-134
By us, NARA Date 9-21-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, July 15, 1968
9:45 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

State informs me that, from their side, they are prepared to move today on both Harold Linder and Raul Castro as Ambassadors to Canada and Bolivia. With respect to Linder, it looks as though the Senate would be prepared to hold a hearing tomorrow. Therefore, an announcement from the White House this morning, if you wish it, would be wholly in order on both men.

W. W. Rostow

cc: George Christian

37

ACTION

Pres file

Monday, July 15, 1968 -- 9:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

On our trip around the world in December you instructed me always to travel with an assistant.

In addition, I have found that, although your own secretaries and George Christian's have been unfailingly helpful, it is best for me to have a secretary along, not only for drafting but also so I can summarize the cable traffic coming in from Washington.

If you wish to keep the party from Washington, including staff support, very low, I would, of course, understand. Otherwise I would find it helpful in serving you to have along in Honolulu:

-- Brig. Gen. Robert N. Ginsburgh -- Yes _____ no _____ call me _____

-- Miss Mildred Zayac -- Yes _____ no _____ call me _____

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

ACTION

Monday, July 15, 1968 - 7:45 am

Mr. President:

Neither McPherson nor Busby appears to be in town as of this morning. I think the proposed statement on the Aid Bill is good as it stands. (I suggest a possible insert at top of page 3.)

But you may wish to assign someone else to go over it this morning.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

Free file

W. W. Rostow's suggested insert on page 3.

of the free world.

From hard-won personal experience, every postwar President learned this fact: dollar for dollar, no U. S. expenditures contributed more to U. S. security and world peace than dollars spent in foreign aid.

Nor, if I may add a personal note, (continue on with remainder of page).

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THE AID BILL

The Congress is about to consider a critical piece of legislation--the continuation for another year of the foreign aid program. I want to emphasize to the American people and to all Members of Congress my conviction that passage of this legislation is absolutely essential.

I have just returned from Central America, where I saw and felt at first hand the needs and aspirations of people who look to us for leadership and help. These people, with energy and hope, are hard at work building a new life. They and the millions of others in Asia, in Africa and Latin America who are struggling to better their own lives and the lives of their children, deserve the assurance that they are not alone and friendless.

The world's poor know that there is no moratorium on disease.

They know that there is no moratorium on hunger, starvation or illiteracy.

And they know that there can be no moratorium on their own war against these age-old enemies. Can we do less than offer them a small measure of support and encouragement in this battle?

In the end, each citizen and each member of Congress must make his own judgment of our national priorities. Let me only say that my foreign aid budget request takes into account our critical needs at home as well as those abroad. As the Congress knows, it was the lowest request in history.

The Foreign Affairs Committee has reduced this request by \$600 million--about 20%. I regret this cut, but, in view of our joint concern for our fiscal problems, I will not oppose it.

But with these cuts, the program has been pared to the bone. Below this level the vitality of the regional initiatives we have stimulated in the developing areas would be severely threatened. Countries around the world which have trusted our resolve and heeded our advice would lose the confidence in peaceful progress which distinguishes this era from the long dark centuries of hopelessness which have been their common burden.

This is not, nor should it become, a partisan issue. Every President since Harry Truman has understood the importance of aid to our own security and to the future

*From hard-earned money every post-war
Pr. it ~~has been~~ learned this fact: dollar for dollar
no U.S. expenditures contribute more to U.S. security
and world peace than dollars spent in foreign
aid.*

-3-

of the free world. Nor, if I may add a personal note, can I imagine a greater disservice to my successor than the defeat, or crippling, of this bill. Be he Democrat or Republican, liberal or conservative, he will be charged with executing the foreign policy of the United States. It is our common responsibility to pass on to him intact the full range of instruments necessary to the performance of his duties. I speak from my own experience--and the experience of my three predecessors--when I say that none is more vital than foreign aid.

We are now engaged in crucial talks looking toward the end of the tragic conflict in Viet-Nam. We are about to begin talks with the Soviet Union on limiting the arms race. At a time when America's commitment to peace with security has begun to bear fruit, we must not seem to be withdrawing from the struggle against the basic causes of war and unrest.

I call upon the Congress to reaffirm--as it has so resolutely in the past--America's moral and material commitment to help others help themselves toward a better and more peaceful future.

ACTION

Monday - July 15, 1968

Mr. President:

Pres. file

Herewith a letter (Tab A) from the Argentine Ambassador thanking you for the Texas trip, and a reply (Tab B) you may want to consider sending him.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Ambassador Alsogaray's letter to President, July 9.

Tab B - Suggested Presidential reply for signature.

39a

*Embajador
de la
República Argentina*

Washington, July 9, 1968

Dear Mr. President:


I should like to take this opportunity to thank you most sincerely for your cordial invitation to be your guest once again at your ranch in Texas. The three days my colleagues and I spent in your home State were most stimulating and enjoyable.

After returning to Washington I saw Ambassador Burgess and we had a most interesting meeting during which I offered him my full cooperation in relation to his new post in my country.

May I convey my gratitude to you for the book entitled "To Heal and to Build" which deals with the programs carried out by your Administration. Besides reviewing the work that has been done it constitutes a real source of reference and information.

Mr. President, I hope that at some time in the not too distant future you may be able to visit Argentina. I will deem it a pleasure and an honor to assist in every way I can in the organization and success of your trip.

Sincerely yours,


Alvaro C. Alsogaray
Ambassador

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

396

July 16, 1968

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

It was most thoughtful of you to write me about your Texas trip. Texas hospitality is like the hospitality of your estancias -- open, generous and sincere.

I am glad you have already met with Ambassador Burgess. You can help him prepare for his important new duties in Buenos Aires.

I appreciate the invitation to visit Argentina and your offer to be of assistance. I would like to see more of Latin America, but this may have to wait until I leave office.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "LBJ/Lyndon B. Johnson". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

His Excellency
Alvaro C. Alsogaray
Ambassador of Argentina
Embassy of Argentina
Washington, D. C.

LBJ/WGB:mmm
(prep'd. 7/15/68)

Pres file 40

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - July 15, 1968

Mr. President:

At Tab A is a telegram from Ambassador Tuthill asking for guidance on what he should say to President Costa e Silva in his interview tomorrow if the Brazilian President asks about your plans to travel to Brazil.

At Tab B is suggested guidance we would like to send if it meets with your approval.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Attachments

Tab A - Telegram from Ambassador Tuthill, July 13.

Tab B - Suggested guidance for Presidential approval.

cc: Lou Schwartz

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *8-1-01*



Department of State

40a
TELEGRAM

419

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 281

PAGE 01 RIO DE 09876 130158Z

87

ACTION SS 30

INFO /030 W

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

R 130005Z JUL 68
FM AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2952

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ A L RIO DE JANEIRO 9876

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE VISIT OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO BRAZIL

EXDIS

1. THERE HAS BEEN MUCH SPECULATION IN THE PRESS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A VISIT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO BRAZIL. IN ADDITION, BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR LEITAO DA CUNHA HAS ADVISED FOR MINISTER AND WILL ADVISE PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA ON JULY 15 THAT, UPON THE OCCASION OF HIS FAREWELL CALL ON PRESIDENT JOHNSON, PRESIDENT JOHNSON STATED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO VISIT BRAZIL "IN LATE AUGUST." LEITAO DA CUNHA STATED THAT HE WAS SURE

PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA WOULD WELCOME SUCH A VISIT. HE POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT FREI OF CHILE WILL BE VISITING BRAZIL THE FIRST WEEK OF SEPTEMBER AND WILL TAKE THE SALUTE AT THE NATIONAL DAY PARADE ON SEPTEMBER 7. HE INDICATED AS HIS OWN PERSONAL OPINION THAT IT WOULD BE VERY APPROPRIATE IF PRESIDENT JOHNSON COULD BE IN BRASILIA ON ARMY DAY AUGUST 25 IN ORDER TO BE THE GUEST OF HONOR FOR THE MILITARY PARADE ON THAT OCCASION. SECY GENERAL OF FOREIGN OFFICE HAS ALSO TOLD ME HE IS CONFIDENT THAT PRESIDENT WOULD WELCOME PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S VISIT.

2. EMBASSY TO DATE HAS REFRAINED FROM ANY SPECIFIC COMMENT ON THIS PROSPECT EXCEPT TO REAFFIRM PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S DEEP INTEREST IN BRAZIL AND WARM REGARD FOR PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA. IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT AFTER LEITAO DA CUNHA DISCUSSES MATTER WITH PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA, COSTA E SILVA WILL TAKE INITIATIVE TO URGE A VISIT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON. I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER WE WOULD BE CONSULTED FIRST BEFORE SENDING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 RIO DE 09876 130158Z

SUCH A MESSAGE. HOWEVER, TOGETHER WITH ASST SECY OLIVER AND
AMBASSADOR CLARK, I WILL BE CALLING ON PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA
ON JULY 16--THE DAY AFTER HE WILL PRESUMABLY HAVE DISCUSSED POSSIBLE
PRESIDENTIAL VISIT WITH AMBASSADOR LEITAO DA CUNHA. IF THERE IS
ANY MESSAGE OR GUIDANCE THAT I SHOULD MAKE AVAILABLE TO
COSTA E SILVA--IF THE SUBJECT IS RAISED THEN I SHOULD BE ADVISED NOT
LATER THAN 1500 RIO TIME JULY 16. TUTWILL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DRAFT - 7 15 68

Telegram to AmEmbassy Rio de Janeiro - PRIORITY

Subject: Possible Visit of President Johnson to Brazil

- FYI - (1) The President has indicated an interest in travel to South America, but no specific plans or dates have been determined. Whether or not Brazil would be included in any future trip has not been decided, although the President is known to want to visit Brazil.
- (2) Acting as guest of honor for Army Day parade August 25, as suggested by Leita da Cunha, would seem a most inappropriate occasion for such a visit, given character of Brazilian Government. Furthermore, Democratic National Convention is scheduled to begin August 26. END FYI.
- (3) You should continue to refrain from making any specific comment on a possible visit by the President except to reaffirm his well-known interest in Brazil. Should Costa e Silva on his own initiative decide to invite

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

the President, matter could be considered then.
Should Costa e Silva prefer to take soundings first
as to the President's possible receptivity to such
an invitation, as seems more likely to us, you
could offer to find out and matter could be referred
to the President for his consideration.

- (4) Oliver was present at Leitaõ da Cunha's June 25
meeting with the President.

41

Monday, July 15, 1968

Per file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your signature is a Proclamation of the Income-Tax Convention of July 28, 1967 with France. This is routine business.

You signed the instrument of ratification on June 19, 1968. Instruments of ratification were exchanged by Secretary Rusk and French Ambassador Lacet on July 11, 1968, bringing the Convention into force in accordance with its terms.

W. W. Rostow

If you approve, we
will need your signature at Tab A _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

MWG:mm

42
INFORMATION

*Literally Eyes Only
7 the President*

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, July 14, 1968 -- 11:30 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

With respect to the attached memorandum of July 12th, about which you asked to speak to me on Monday, I have drafted a message to Kosygin so that its operational implications are clear.

There are two major risks:

- we would have to resume bombing if Moscow could not deliver Hanoi, and that might make trouble with Moscow;
- a total cessation -- and then resumption of bombing--- could shake up the U.S. political scene.

(There is a third case; namely, that, after a total bombing cessation, Hanoi resumes the offensive and attacks Saigon and we do not react against the North; but this would be lethal to Saigon's morale and Thieu's government unless Hanoi's military effort was exceedingly feeble and we squelched it easily.)

Nevertheless, if there is no movement on Monday night in Paris, you may wish to discuss this with Sec. Rusk. (I have given him, alone, a copy of my memo to you.) It is conceivable, even, that you might wish to explore it with Thieu.

I repeat -- it's high-risk poker. But the five-week lull gives us a handle, if you judge the risks are worth it.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

42a
DRAFT -- Sunday, July 14, 1968

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I wish to return to the theme of your letter to me of June 5, 1968, and my letter to you of June 11, 1968.

Since June 5 two situations have changed in South Viet-Nam:

- the level of combat initiated by the other side has diminished;
- the shelling of Saigon and other populated areas has ended.

Frankly, we do not understand fully all the factors that have brought about this situation. And, as you know, we have considerable evidence that the recent large-scale infiltration of personnel from the North is flowing into North Vietnamese and Viet Cong military units, in apparent preparation for another major wave of attack.

Nevertheless, I have concluded the factual situation on the ground justifies a positive response to your judgment -- and that of your colleagues -- that complete cessation of the bombing against North Viet-Nam could "contribute to a breakthrough in the situation and produce prospects for a peaceful settlement."

I am, therefore, prepared to order all bombardment of North Viet-Nam to cease as of _____.

The relations between the Soviet Union and the United States are so important at this stage of history, however, that I must share with you, in the greatest frankness, my concerns about undertaking this course and solicit your judgment.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Obviously, bombing of North Viet-Nam would have to resume if, after this step were taken, major attacks were launched by the other side or the shelling of populated centers were again undertaken.

Moreover, we would have to see prompt movement on substantive matters; for example, on the re-installation of the DMZ; the re-installation of the Geneva Accords of 1962; and on other critical matters, where the participation in negotiations of the Government of Viet-Nam is essential.

If, in the light of these concerns, your advice remains as it was on June 5, I am prepared promptly to proceed. It seems to me essential, however, that there be no misunderstanding between us.

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, July 12, 1968
4:15 p.m.426~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

I set out the following idea not because I believe it to be correct nor because I recommend it; merely because I think you should have available all the options of which we can conceive.

1. I begin with the fact that both Tommy Thompson and Chip Bohlen feel a certain regret that we did not pick up Kosygin's message, institute a total bombing halt, and then lean very heavily on the Soviet Union to produce results, against the background of a threat to resume bombing if the results did not take place. As old Soviet hands they are impressed that Kosygin should have used the following language in addressing you: "My colleagues and I think -- and we have grounds to do so -- that complete cessation by the United States of bombing and other acts of war with respect to the DRV could contribute to a breakthrough in the situation and produce prospects for a peaceful settlement."

2. The fact is that since June 5 the over-all level of combat in South Vietnam has greatly diminished and the shelling of Saigon has ceased.

3. But also we have every reason to expect in August -- if not earlier -- a major offensive in I Corps and against Saigon.

4. The idea would be for Sect. Rusk to tell Dobrynin or Tommy to tell Kosygin that:

-- We note the de-escalation in the actual fighting in South Vietnam in recent weeks;

-- We note the cessation of shelling of Saigon;

-- We are prepared to stop bombing on Day X;

-- It is, of course, essential after the bombing cessation:

-- that this low level continue;

-- that Saigon not be attacked;

-- that we move promptly to a reinstallation of the DMZ;

-- that the U. S. and the Soviet Union discuss the reinstallation of the Geneva Accords of 1962 (Dobrynin told Sect. Rusk flatly this would be possible after a bombing cessation);

-- and, as Chairman Kosygin told the President, that he and his colleagues had grounds to believe that the DRV would move rapidly towards a "peaceful settlement."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By AC, NARA, Date 8-1-01~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2-

5. Before actually instituting a bombing cessation, we would require from the Soviet Union some broad understanding along these lines.

6. This is pretty high-risk poker; and the case is good for waiting to see if in fact Hanoi responds directly to the Zorin suggestion. But the fact is that the Kosygin letter gives us an opening for this gambit if you should decide you would like to force the issue.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

14 July 1968
10:45 A.M.

43

Mr. President:

Herewith Thieu reacts favorably to
our proposed schedule but wants:

Per file

- "working dinner" on Friday 19th

- would like to host "working lunch"
on 20th

- may wish to stay over because of
Mrs. Thieu's shopping list.

WWR

Saigon 32578

South

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: HONOLULU MEETINGS

REF DEPTTEL 201992

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc NARA, Date 8-10-1

1. I DISCUSSED REFTTEL WITH THIEU LAST NIGHT AND GAVE HIM A COPY OF THE DEPT'S PROPOSED SCHEDULE AND VARIATIONS FROM HIS ORIGINAL PROPOSALS. HE WAS ON THE WHOLE AMENABLE. FOLLOWING KEYED TO YOUR PARAS.

2. RE PARA 17. HE WILL ANNOUNCE EXACT DATES HERE ON THURSDAY MORNING, JULY 18TH, SAIGON TIME. WE DID NOT FIX TIME OF RELEASE, BUT I WILL TRY TO ARRANGE FOR 0900 HOURS LOCAL. (9 p.m. Wednesday, Wash. Time)

3. RE PARAS 7, 10 AND 18. HE AGREES LUNCH FRIDAY, JULY 19, SHOULD BE WORKING LUNCH. HE BELIEVES MORE TIME FOR PRIVATE TALKS WILL BE NEEDED AND HOPES PRESIDENT WOULD AGREE TO GIVE INFORMAL WORKING DINNER THAT NIGHT. HE WILL OFFER WORKING LUNCH ON SATURDAY, JULY 20, AT ROYAL HAWAIIAN. ON THIS BASIS HE THINKS THERE MAY BE NO REPEAT NO NEED FOR AFTERNOON SESSION JULY 20, BUT TIME SHOULD BE HELD OPEN AGAINST THIS CONTINGENCY. HE MAY HAVE HIS PRESS CONFERENCE LATE MORNING AFTER COMMUNIQUE IS ISSUED, OR IN THE AFTERNOON.

4. RE PARA 12. HE IS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER HE WILL LEAVE HAWAII ON THE AFTERNOON OR EVENING OF JULY 20TH OR LEAVE

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FOLLOWING MORNING. HE ASSUMES PRESIDENT WILL LEAVE IN THE AFTERNOON. HE SAID HE MIGHT WISH TO RELAX FOR A FEW HOURS. (MRS. THIEU HAS GIVEN HIM A SHOPPING LIST AND I THINK HE WOULD LIKE SOME TIME FOR THAT.)

5. I MAY WANT TO STAY ON IN HONOLULU FOR A DAY AFTER MEETING ENDS DEPENDING ON SITUATION HERE. OUTGOING AND RETURN TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS FOR MYSELF AND MY PARTY WILL BE SUBJECT OF SEPARATE TELS.

6. COMMENT: I FELT AFTER TALKING WITH THIEU LAST NIGHT THAT HE IS THOROUGHLY SATISFIED WITH ARRANGEMENTS BEING WORKED OUT AND HIS INITIAL DISAPPOINTMENT THAT STATE VISIT WAS POSTPONED SEEMS TO HAVE VANISHED.
BUNKER

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PRESERVATION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

44

14 July 10:45 A.M.

Mr. President:

Herewith first tentative indication
that an extra North Vietnamese
division may be headed for I Corps.
We shall follow closely.

Pres file

WWR

Secret Savin

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-220
By SJ NARA, Date 3/14/03

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UNIDENTIFIED 11TH DIVISION POSSIBLY ENROUTE TO MILITA RY
REGION TRI-THIEN-HUE
XXCC

THE APPEARANCE OF AN UNIDENTIFIED 11TH DIVISION
ENROUTE TO BINH TRAM 7 (BT-7), LOCATED IN THE A SHAU
VALLEY, MILITARY REGION TRI-THIEN-HUE (MR TTH WAS RE-
VEALED IN REAR SERVICES COMMUNICATIONS ON 13 JULY.
IN A MESSAGE PASSED TO AN UNIDENTIFIED 11TH BAT-
TALION ON 13 JULY, IT WAS REPORTED THAT AN 11TH DIVISION
IS CURRENTLY ENROUTE POSSIBLY BETWEEN THE MU GIA PASS
(VICINITY OF 17-20N 105-25E, WE 82 53) AND THE A SHAU
VALEY IN MR TTH. THE 11TH DIVISION REPORTED RY TRAVELLED
FROM T-5 (LOCATED THROUGH COLLATERAL IN NGHIA DONG HAMLET,
HA LONG VILLAGE IN THE VICINITY OF 20-03N 105-30E, WH 88
15, HA TRUNG DISTRICT, THANHSHOA PROVINCE) TO STATION 19B
(PROBABLY LOCATED IN LAOS) DESTINED FOR B45 (LOCATED BY
SIGINT AT A CHIENG, LAOS NEAR 16-01 106-54E, YD 039 1 00).
AT STATION 19B THE TROOPS WERE ISSUED FIVE DAYS RATIONS
AND WERE TO BE ISSUED ADDITIONAL RATIONS AT STATION 27
(UNLOCATED, POSSIBLE IN LAOS) IN ORDER FOR THE DIVISION
TO PROCEED TO BINH TRAM 7 (AN ELEMENT OF THE 559TH TRANS-
PORTATION GROUP LAST LOCATED NEAR 16-18N 107-06E, YD 245
040 ON 13 JULY).

THIS IS THE INITIAL APPEARANCE OF AN 11TH DIVISION,
AS AVAILABLE RECORDS (SIGINT AND COLLATERAL) REVEAL NO
REFLECTION OF AN DIVISION OF THIS NUMBER. FROM AVAIL-
ABLE INFORMATION, AN 11TH DIVISION, POSSIBLY AT FULL
STRENGTH, IS ENROUTE TO MR TTH AND POSSIBLY LESS THAN FIVE
DAYS TRAVEL AWAY. THE APPEARANCE OF AN ADDITIONAL DIVISION
IN RM TTH WOULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE TACTICAL BALANCE
OF POWER IN 1 COMBAT TACTICAL ZONE.

XXHH
400

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-221
By SL NARA, Date 5-7-03

45

~~TOP SECRET~~

July 14, 1968


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

The Situation in Czechoslovakia - Sunday, July 14, 11:00 a.m.

Kosygin joined Brezhnev and his other colleagues in Warsaw about six hours ago. The East Germans, Hungarians and Bulgarians have also arrived. The East German and Polish press is running articles attacking the Czechs; the Bulgarians have reprinted the Pravda article likening the Czech situation to Hungary in 1956; but the Hungarian Party paper has commented (according to Reuters) that there is not a parallel between Hungary and Czechoslovakia today. (Hungary has consistently been more sympathetic to the Czechs than the others.)

The Czech press continues to report departures in progress - with friendly good-byes. As the departures are scheduled to last three days, the extent of them may not be known until July 17th at least. The Czechs continue to avoid saying all troops will leave.



3.4(b)(1),(3)

Not surprisingly, our attaches in Moscow have been refused permission to make a trip close to the Czech border. The important piece Izvestia and the East German press was holding space for turned out to be an attack on the West Germans. There is some indication that the Czechs are explaining the activation of the People's Militia as a precautionary measure to insure public order during the troop withdrawals. There are rumors of threatened Trade Union demonstrations in Czechoslovakia - to call for the removal of all Soviet troops. However, the Czech leadership has so far demonstrated a considerable ability to prevent such risky public manifestations - at least in the present crisis.

Walt W. Rostow

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 01-220
By SJ, NARA, Date 8-11-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, July 13, 1968
4:30 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

As instructed, I had Max Rabb in and listened attentively to his account of his East German operation.

I conclude that it succeeded because:

- there were small things the East Germans wanted from us for which they were willing to trade prisoners;
- Rabb conducted himself discreetly and well in the negotiations.

As for application to the PUEBLO crew (which, of course, I did not raise with Rabb) I conclude:

- there are no small things North Korea wants from us;
- Rabb is not well suited for an Asian negotiation;
- there are small things the North Koreans want of the Japanese;
- but they will not now trade the PUEBLO for small change;
- they may let the crew go if they see the Vietnam negotiations become serious;
- if they don't let them go under such circumstances, we might try a Japanese intermediary -- but that's a long shot.

Rabb did a good job. He's pro-Johnson. He'd like commendation from the Executive Branch. Perhaps Sect. Rusk could drop him a note.

W. W. Rostow

Rusk-Rabb note O. K. if Sect. Rusk agrees _____

No _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

46a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Maxwell Rabb's "Shirt Sleeve Diplomacy"

REFERENCE: Mr. Rostow's note to the President of June 27, 1968

Mr. Maxwell M. Rabb, lawyer, President of the United States Committee for Refugees, and a former Presidential assistant, called on Mr. Rostow at the latter's request, from noon to 1:00 p.m. on Tuesday, July 9, 1968. Mr. Rostow asked Mr. Rabb to outline his procedures in securing, over the past two years, the release of seven Americans detained in East Germany.

Mr. Rabb said that he had been asked by several of his clients to visit the Leipzig Trade Fair in 1965 to determine whether an American boycott of the Fair was in the national interest. Mr. Rabb said that after visiting the Fair, he went to the State Department to report that other Western nations were selling machinery and other goods to the detriment of American industry. In the course of his discussions at State, Mr. Rabb had explained that he had developed close personal relations with a number of East German trade officials who had indicated interest in the possibility of improving relations with the United States. State officials, accordingly, asked Mr. Rabb whether he might be able to use these connections to intercede on behalf of John Van Altena, who had been sentenced to eight years in prison for helping East Germans flee to West Berlin. Mr. Rabb agreed to try and returned to Leipzig with his wife. He said this was the second of eleven trips to East Germany made entirely at his own expense in connection with the release of detained Americans.

Mr. Rabb believed that his decision to take along his wife on this second trip was a crucial one. He was convinced that this immediately created a more informal and friendly atmosphere for the talks that were to follow.

Mr. Rabb said that from the outset he made it clear that he was not in a position to offer any commitment. He pointed out, however, that East German willingness to release American prisoners would reduce tensions and might well ease the way to better trade relations with the United States. Mr. Rabb said that, as a matter of fact, he had been of help to the East

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NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Germans in connection with visas desired by them, and that at one stage in the negotiations he had promised visas when he was not empowered to do so -- in the belief that his promise would be upheld if he obtained the desired prisoner release. This was the case. A side effect of his negotiations has been increase in trade in non-strategic items, including oranges, coal, textiles and some machinery. Mr. Rabb pointed out that this helped our balance of payments problem and prevented our allies from pre-empting the non-communist portion of the East German market. Mr. Rabb interjected that he had learned in 1965 that allied firms were indeed among the top exhibitors at the Fair. West Germany was the second largest, the British fourth, and the French fifth.


Mr. Rabb emphasized throughout his description of his efforts that a basis of mutual personal trust was the key element in his securing the release of all seven Americans detained in East Germany, one of them even before he had been tried.

Mr. Rostow asked whether Mr. Rabb had spoken German in the negotiations. Mr. Rabb said that he was unable to speak German and that this was actually an asset rather than a liability. The East Germans were less suspicious of him because of his inability to understand everything he heard.

Mr. Rabb expressed his belief that the tactics which he used in East Germany might be applicable to similar prisoner problems in other parts of the world.

Mr. Rabb left two items from the Congressional Record which were complimentary of his efforts (attached).

Mr. Rostow expressed his interest in hearing of Mr. Rabb's methods and of their success, and said that he wanted to consult with some of his colleagues concerning Mr. Rabb's account of his efforts.


Alfred Jenkins

Attachments

Distribution

Mr. Rostow
Mr. Davis
Mr. Jorden

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"But in areas like Appalachia, what you get is slick little politicians—in an election year—flying into places like the mountains of Kentucky on whirlwind visits and then going back East to issue statements about the 'pitiful' things they saw.

"What needs to be done to help the poor, and the working man," says Boyle, "is for the Federal government to put an end to expensive trips to the moon and to the further waste of taxpayers' money on atomic experiments and spend this money on jobs and welfare programs."

Boyle said he personally proposed to President Johnson that any spending cuts tied to a proposed tax increase ought to first come from curbing the vast spending on the space program. "We have no quarrel with the nation's needs for atomic weapons or military rockets," says Boyle, "we don't want to interfere with the national defense."

But experiments with atomic energy for production of electric power or for de-salting water are a different matter, according to the UMW president.

He can give numerous examples of what he calls: "The Atomic Energy Commission spending untold millions of dollars of the taxpayers' money to experiment with a dangerous, hazardous, poisonous fuel that they cannot seem to get to work properly.

"Even when and if they get it work, there is no answer to the waste problem," says Boyle. "Atomic plants are polluting our rivers and those underground test blasts are dangerous—nobody knows how far the poisonous radiation may seep through fractures in the ground hundreds of feet below the surface. How does the public know about any atomic dangers when the AEC is the promoter, the judge and the only authority on it? Congress gave the AEC too much power, and Congress ought to take it back."

A "prime example" of both the waste of tax money and the dangers inherent in atomic power plants, says Boyle, is the Fermi plant near Detroit. "This power plant was built at a cost of \$300,000,000—mostly Federal funds—as a 'demon' power plant. Two years ago, they touched off a chain reaction which came dangerously close to destroying the entire city of Detroit. They somehow managed to get in under control but now, two years later, they still don't know what happened and the plant is still idle."

Turning to another favorite topic, Boyle talks with obvious pride about the National Coal Policy Conference—a cooperative organization comprising the UMW, the coal industry, the railroads, the electric power industry and major suppliers of the coal industry.

The idea of the NCPC was first offered by John L. Lewis, long-time UMW president, in 1958, as a means for these related interests to work together on mutual problems—like competition with other fuels, air and water pollution and land reclamation. Boyle was recently reelected chairman of the NCPC.

Turning back to his role of UMW chieftain, Boyle says a major issue upon which the union is continuing to fight is the need to get "complete elimination of the dust problem in the mines. This can be solved and it ought to be solved," said Boyle.

which show how individual Americans and private organizations are more successful than Government programs. All too often the private sector of our economy is not given adequate credit for the initiative it uses in doing quietly and effectively what might take years and vast amounts of money on the part of the Federal Government.

In the past I have spoken of the contribution made by the Society of Friends, the Quakers. Now Maxwell N. Rabb, president of the American Refugee Committee, as an individual and with the committee, managed to do what many in the Government were unable to do, the freeing of Americans out of the jails of East Berlin. This shows that an American father, his wife, and their son can probably do much more than organized expensive Government program. I am delighted that after many months of discreet silence the New York Times and the Associated Press in the Washington Post have told the story of how the secretary of the Cabinet and associate counsel to President Eisenhower managed to free these American citizens.

The American Refugee Committee, a privately supported organization and its voluntary officers have a role to play in creating better human relations. I hope that private individuals and groups will derive some encouragement from the courage, imagination, and integrity shown by the Honorable Maxwell Rabb.

Below, follows the text of the articles: [From the Washington Post, June 13, 1968]

MAX RABB SHOWS NEGOTIATING SKILL WITH REDS

(By Henrietta Leith)

NEW YORK, June 12.—The delicate art of negotiating, which has just brought a young Columbia University instructor out of an East German prison with no deal but "good will," is an old skill for New York attorney Maxwell Milton Rabb.

Rabb, 57, had negotiated the release of six other Americans from jails behind the Iron Curtain before his latest feat—securing the return to West Berlin of art historian Ronald Widenhoef, 31.

MATTER OF PRIDE

Rabb is especially proud of securing the release of Widenhoef, who had not even been tried on his charge of taking pictures of restricted areas.

He won't give details except to say that the men he dealt with were of Cabinet rank and that he used the same technique each time, and paid all his own expenses. "I'm not CIA, with a secret account," he quips.

He adds that he never gave the East Germans any money as ransom for the Americans.

"They won't take it from us," he said. They take it from West Germany, but they don't want to lose face with us.

"What I did is old as the hills—the personal private relationship where you break down the barriers. You have to use two styles—never let your country down but always be frank and honest. Instead of fighting over each word for two months, you trust each other."

A Bostonian and Harvard man, Rabb started his public career in 1937 as an assistant to Henry Cabot Lodge, who was then in the Senate.

He stayed with Lodge, except for Navy service during World War II, until 1951, and worked hard in the campaign to draft Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to run for the presidency. His reward was a job as assistant to Eisenhower's principal assistant, Sherman

Adams, and in 1953 he became associate counsel to the President, with civil rights, immigration and labor as his special responsibilities.

Rabb also served Eisenhower as secretary to the Cabinet. Later he moved to the United Nations, where his old friend Lodge was chief U.S. delegate and ambassador.

But it was as a businessman's lawyer that he got involved in the delicate task of negotiating the release of prisoners.

Rabb had a manufacturing client who suspected that his competitors in England, France and West Germany were doing business with East Germany, and were going to show their products at the Leipzig Fair.

WON PLACE FOR CLIENT

Rabb went to Leipzig and discovered that the major exhibits of products there were those of the U.S.S.R., West Germany, Czechoslovakia, England and France, in that order.

Rabb reported this fact to the State Department, and his client got the previously refused permission to exhibit at the fair.

Some time later, the State Department came to him. All normal diplomatic approaches had been exhausted in the effort to free John Van Altena, 21, of Wisconsin who had served 17 months of an eight-year prison term for trying to help East Germans get out of their country.

"The State Department remembered I'd been there," says Rabb, "and had met people. To the credit of the State Department, they don't like to see Americans rot in foreign jails. Would I take it on? I said 'Fine.'"

Rabb carried out his mission in March, 1966, "to the surprise of the State Department and most of all to the surprise of John Van Altena."

Almost a year later, Rabb secured the release of four more Americans from East Germany—Mary Helen Battle of Oak Ridge, Tenn.; Frederick Matthews of Pennsylvania; Moses Herrin of Akron, Ohio, and William Lovett of San Francisco.

Lovett had been held on charges growing out of an auto accident. The other three were accused of helping East Germans escape.

Rabb's sixth rescue last May 11 was the release of Peter T. Feinauer, 27, of Providence, R.I., another Columbia instructor who was convicted of spying with a camera.

[From the New York Times, June 16, 1968] LAWYER RELATES EAST GERMAN TIE—A NEW YORKER HELPED FREE SEVEN U.S. PRISONERS

(By Henry Raymond)

At the crossing point between East and West Berlin on Friedrichstrasse, where West Berlin tour buses pull up for a glimpse into the East, an odd scene took place one recent afternoon.

A bearded young man, looking somewhat bewildered, escorted by a stocky Wall Street lawyer and trailed by two East German security officials, was greeted on the Western side by a United States embassy aide.

The young man was Ronald V. Widenhoef, 30 years old, a Columbia University art history instructor who 20 minutes earlier was released from an East German prison where he spent nine months awaiting trial on espionage charges. His rescuer was Maxwell M. Rabb, a lawyer and president of the United States Committee for Refugees, a private organization at 20 West 49th Street New York.

The quiet crossing at 2:21 P.M. on June 3 ended an unusual three-year campaign to free seven American prisoners in East Germany. Because Washington does not recognize East Germany, the effort was carried out through quiet and informal collaboration between American private citizens and the two governments.

DETAILS ARE RELATED

Mr. Rabb and others involved in the effort related last week the details of the negotia-

PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS HAVE BEEN MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN GOVERNMENT

HON. THOMAS B. CURTIS

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 26, 1968

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, there are dramatic examples from time to time

tions, indicating the skill, patience and tactful but dogged determination required.

In contrast to past exchanges of spies with the Soviet Union and the ransom payments for Cuban exiles seized by the Havana regime during the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, no quid pro quo was involved.

The campaign was set in motion after the State Department had made a series of futile approaches to the East German Government for the release of a young American, John Van Altena, 22 years old, of Milton Junction, Wis., who had been sentenced to eight years, in January, 1965, for helping East Germans flee to West Berlin.

The East Germans made plain that they would negotiate with Washington only if they obtained diplomatic recognition, a condition unacceptable to the United States, which is still officially committed to the reunification of Germany on the basis of free, democratic elections.

The State Department began to search for other channels to obtain the release of Mr. Van Altena. According to Mr. Rabb, his involvement came almost by accident.

The Boston-born lawyer had been asked by several clients to visit the 1965 Leipzig Trade Fair to determine whether an American boycott of the fair was in the national interest. There he developed close personal relations with a number of East German trade officials who had expressed interest in a normalization of relations.

ENLISTED BY U.S. OFFICIALS

When he subsequently went to Washington to tell the State Department that other Western nations were using the fair to sell machinery and other goods to the detriment of American industry, American officials asked whether he could use his connections in East Germany to intercede on behalf of the young American prisoner. Mr. Rabb agreed to try, and return to Leipzig accompanied by his wife, Ruth.

The decision to take along his wife reflected Mr. Rabb's conviction that personal relationships counted more in international talks than textbooks on diplomacy might be willing to admit. Two years later he repeated the personal touch by enlisting the help of his son Bruce, a 26-year-old lawyer who has joined his father in the Wall Street law firm of Strook & Strook & Lavan, in the negotiations that led to the release of Mr. Wiedenhoeft.

"The fact that I returned with Ruth had a startling effect," he recalled during an interview. "It seemed to suggest to the East Germans that we were vaulting the diplomatic wall and were interested in them as human beings. This immediately created a more relaxed and friendly atmosphere for the talks that were to follow."

Mr. Rabb, an affable man of 57 with the ready smile of a practical politician, is a former Presidential assistant and secretary to the Cabinet under the Eisenhower Administration and has held a number of international appointments.

From the outset, the lawyer made it clear that he was not in a position to offer any commitment and that the negotiations had to be based on mutual good faith. He suggested that East German willingness to release American prisoners would help reduce cold war tensions and perhaps ease the way to improved trade relations with the United States.

"They quickly became aware that the release of Mr. Van Altena and the six other prisoners that were to follow amounted to a demonstration of a desire to normalize relations," Mr. Rabb said.

"I believe that it is significant that since the first prisoner was freed more than two years ago there has been a reduction of incidents with the United States military and a palpable increase in trade relations, entirely to our advantage."

The new East German extension of transit-visa and road-toll requirements to West Germans are not viewed as a threat to the American military presence in West Berlin.

The lawyer said the United States had exported oranges, coal, textiles and some machinery totaling \$10-million. He characterized the sales as "clearly helping our balance-of-payments problem."

After the initial meetings in Leipzig, Mr. Rabb made four unpublicized trips to Berlin where he conferred with a Deputy Premier and members of the state police before he obtained the release of Mr. Van Altena. He said he could not disclose the names of the officials.

TWO BERLIN LAWYERS

His command post was a West Berlin hotel. Since there is no direct telephone communication between East and West Berlin, the arrangements were worked out by two lawyers, Jürgen Stränge of West Berlin and Wolfgang Vogel of East Berlin. Mr. Vogel had participated in the trade of Francis Gary Powers, the American U-2 pilot, and Col. Rudolf Abel, the Soviet spy.

Mr. Van Altena was released in 1966 without publicity. By that time four other Americans had been arrested in East Berlin and Mr. Rabb agreed to work for their freedom also.

They were: Mary Ellen Battle of Oak Ridge, Tenn.; Moses Reese Herrin of Akron, Ohio; Frederick Matthews of Ellwood City, Pa., and William W. Lovett of San Francisco. The first three were charged with having helped East Germans escape to the West; Mr. Lovett was arrested in connection with a traffic accident and on charges of carrying a concealed weapon.

Working with Messrs. Stange and Vogel, the two Berlin lawyers, Mr. Rabb obtained the release of the four in February, 1967. He had arranged coded Telex communications between his Wall Street office and Mr. Vogel's office in East Berlin to speed the long and complicated negotiations.

The seventh American released through Mr. Rabb's mediation effort was Peter T. Feinauer of Providence, R.I., who was arrested in October, 1966, on charges of espionage for the Central Intelligence Agency and of helping East Germans to flee to the West. He was freed last month.

Mr. Rabb has received a personal note from Secretary of State Dean Rusk extending "warm appreciation and congratulations" for the effort. The lawyer said he paid for all of his travels to Berlin on his own and accepted no fees from the prisoners.

HOUSE REPUBLICAN URBAN AFFAIRS TASK FORCE

HON. WILLIAM O. COWGER

OF KENTUCKY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 26, 1968

Mr. COWGER. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to announce that the House Republican Urban Affairs Task Force will have as its guest on Thursday the executive director of the Urban League, Whitney Young. The task force hearing will convene at 12 noon in room 202 of the Capitol.

This is the 12th in a series of House Republican Urban Affairs Task Force Hearings. Some of the featured witnesses at earlier hearings were John W. Gardner, president of the Urban Coalition; John V. Lindsay, mayor of New York City; Samuel C. Jackson, of the U.S.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; and Wright Elliott, of the National Association of Manufacturers.

The Urban Affairs Task Force has either sponsored or introduced six items of legislation, including the Manpower Act of 1963, the Community Service Officer Act which is now a part of the omnibus crime bill, and the "human renewal fund."

At the conclusion of the present series of hearings, the task force will issue a summary statement on its activities, including the testimony of witnesses and the legislation introduced and endorsed by the task force.

BARGE LINES PUSH JOINT RATE PLEA

HON. SAMUEL N. FRIEDEL

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 26, 1968

Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Speaker, it has been the longstanding policy of Congress to encourage in the public interest improved coordination of service among truck, water, and rail lines. The public is best served when voluntary cooperation exists among the various modes. It is with pleasure that I call to the attention of my colleagues an article in the New York Times of June 9 describing new efforts to develop improved cooperation between barge and rail carriers.

I insert this article in the Record:

BARGE LINES PUSH JOINT RATE PLEA—INITIATE A NEW APPROACH IN COURTSHIP OF RAILROADS

The love-hate relationship between the two arch rivals for hauling bulk cargoes, the barge lines and the railroads, goes back well over a century to the days when the iron horse challenged the mules that trod the towpaths of the Erie Canal.

The trains have since maintained their superiority in speed, the barges their tempting advantage in lower costs.

The water carriers have for many years courted the cooperation of the railroads in setting joint water-rail rates, pointing to the better deal this would mean for shippers. Every branch of the Federal Government has looked with favor on such arrangements: the Supreme Court, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Congress and the new Department of Transportation, which favors cooperation among the categories of carriers.

EXAMPLES OF SAVINGS

The Water Transport Association has now begun a new approach. Instead of basing its case for joint rates on general principles, it has started offering examples of freight savings that could bring new profits to railroads as well as barge companies.

Floyd H. Blaske, chairman of American Commercial Lines, first sounded this note on behalf of his fellow rivermen at a recent speech in Louisville.

The Texas oil industry annually gets more than 20,000 tons of steel pipe from Pittsburgh he said, costing \$30.80 a ton to move all the way by rail to a central storage point such as Odessa, Tex. He suggested a potential saving of \$6.18 a ton by bringing it down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers by barge as far as Memphis and then completing the journey by rail.

The saving, he said would be \$123,000 a year on that volume of traffic.

EXPENDITURE CONTROL ACT REDUCTION PROVISIONS

The provisions of title II of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 concern reductions in civilian employment, require a reduction of not less than \$10 billion in new budget (obligational) authority for 1969, a reduction of not less than \$6 billion in budgeted 1969 outlays (expenditures and net lending), and specific recommendations for reductions of \$8 billion of previously granted obligational authority. These provisions introduce a new dimension to budgets of the departments and agencies of government in the fiscal year 1969 beginning on July 1 next. They cast something of a shadow over not only the unexpended carryover balances in innumerable accounts across the government but also over many of the specific appropriation and fund amounts now pending consideration at various stages in the legislative process. This underscores and emphasizes the fact that, whereas in previous years departments and agencies operating under a continuing resolution were required to hold obligations and expenditures to not in excess of the lowest of one of two or three rates, those minimums, with the aforementioned title II in the picture, take on something of the nature of "maximum minimums."

In this general connection, section 103 of the joint resolution follows the stereotyped form of previous continuing resolutions in waiving the time periods set forth in 31 U.S.C. 665(d) (2) for the submission and approval of papers on the apportionments of funds. This in nowise waives the basic requirement in the law for the apportionment of funds over the year by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, but merely dispenses with considerable paper work that as a practical matter cannot be usefully applied to 31-day temporary appropriation provisions. But in view of the title II reduction provisions applicable to fiscal 1969, the committee has attached to section 103 a proviso that—

"Nothing herein shall be construed to waive any other provision of law governing the apportionment of funds or to permit the use, including the expenditure, of appropriations, funds or authority in any manner which would contravene the provisions of title II of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968."

The basic law (31 U.S.C. 665) on apportionment of funds reads, in pertinent parts, as follows:

"(c) (1) * * * all appropriations or funds available for obligation for a definite period of time shall be so apportioned as to prevent obligation or expenditure thereof in a manner which would indicate a necessity for deficiency or supplemental appropriations for such period; and all appropriations or funds not limited to a definite period of time, and all authorizations to create obligations by contract in advance of appropriations, shall be so apportioned as to achieve the most effective and economical use thereof. As used hereafter in this section, the term 'appropriation' means appropriations, funds, and authorizations to create obligations by contract in advance of appropriation."

"(3) Any appropriation subject to apportionment shall be distributed by months, calendar quarters, operating seasons, or other time periods, or by activities, functions, projects, or objects, or by a combination thereof, as may be deemed appropriate by the officers designated in subsection (d) of this section to make apportionments and reapportionments."

Furthermore, in reference to the \$6 billion expenditure reduction provision in section 202 of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, subsection (b) of that section provides that—

"The President shall reserve from expenditure and net lending, from appropriations

or other obligational authority heretofore or hereafter made available, such amounts as may be necessary to effectuate the provisions of subsection (a)."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If no amendment is to be offered, the question is on the third reading of the joint resolution.

The joint resolution was read the third time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution having been read the third time, the question is, Shall it pass?

The joint resolution (H.J. Res. 1368) was passed.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, without losing my right to the floor or losing any of the time previously allocated to me, I yield to the Senator from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN].

FREEING OF SEVEN AMERICAN PRISONERS IN EAST GERMANY

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, one of the most interesting human interest stories of the year relates to the release of seven American prisoners by the East German Government.

An article by Henry Raymont, in the New York Times for Sunday, June 16, 1968, contains the story of how a New York lawyer known to most of us, Maxwell Rabb, personally negotiated with the East German Government for the release of these prisoners.

This story demonstrates quite emphatically, I think, how sometimes you can accomplish more by sitting down to informal discussions person to person in shirt-sleeve diplomacy, if you want to call it that, than you can with stiff-shirt, striped-pants formalities, with which we are grossly afflicted, I would say, along with some other countries. It seems to me if we had more negotiations similar to that carried on by Maxwell Rabb in securing the freedom of American prisoners from East Germany, our standing with countries and people of the world would rise considerably. At least, I would like to see it tried.

I ask unanimous consent that the article from the New York Times be inserted in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

LAWYER RELATES EAST GERMAN TIE—A NEW YORKER HELPED FREE SEVEN U.S. PRISONERS (By Henry Raymont)

At the crossing point between East and West Berlin on Friedrichstrasse, where West Berlin tour buses pull up for a glimpse into the East, an odd scene took place one recent afternoon.

A bearded young man, looking somewhat bewildered, escorted by a stocky Wall Street lawyer and trailed by two East German security officials, was greeted on the Western side by a United States embassy aide.

The young man was Ronald V. Wiedenhoeft, 30 years old, a Columbia University art history instructor who 20 minutes earlier was released from an East German prison where he spent nine months awaiting trial on espionage charges. His rescuer was Maxwell M. Rabb, a lawyer and president of the United States Committee for Refugees, a pri-

vate organization at 20 West 40th Street, New York.

The quiet crossing at 2:21 P.M. on June 3 ended an unusual three-year campaign to free seven American prisoners in East Germany. Because Washington does not recognize East Germany, the effort was carried out through quiet and informal collaboration between American private citizens and the two governments.

DETAILS ARE RELATED

Mr. Rabb and others involved in the effort related last week the details of the negotiations, indicating the skill, patience and tactful but dogged determination required.

In contrast to past exchanges of spies with the Soviet Union and the ransom payments for Cuban exiles seized by the Havana regime during the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, no quid pro quo was involved.

The campaign was set in motion after the State Department had made a series of futile approaches to the East German Government for the lease of a young American, John Van Altena, 22 years old, of Milton Junction, Wis., who had been sentenced to eight years, in January, 1965, for helping East Germans flee to West Berlin.

The East Germans made plain that they would negotiate with Washington only if they obtained diplomatic recognition, a condition unacceptable to the United States, which is still officially committed to the reunification of Germany on the basis of free, democratic elections.

The State Department began to search for other channels to obtain the release of Mr. Van Altena. According to Mr. Rabb, his involvement came almost by accident.

The Boston-born lawyer had been asked by several clients to visit the 1955 Leipzig Trade Fair to determine whether an American boycott of the fair was in the national interest. There he developed close personal relations with a number of East German trade officials who had expressed interest in a normalization of relations.

ENLISTED BY U.S. OFFICIALS

When he subsequently went to Washington to tell the State Department that other Western nations were using the fair to sell machinery and other goods to the detriment of American industry, American officials asked whether he could use his connections in East Germany to intercede on behalf of the young American prisoner. Mr. Rabb agreed to try, and returned to Leipzig accompanied by his wife, Ruth.

The decision to take along his wife reflected Mr. Rabb's conviction that personal relationships counted more in international talks than textbooks on diplomacy might be willing to admit. Two years later he repeated the personal touch by enlisting the help of his son Bruce, 26-year-old lawyer who has joined his father in the Wall Street law firm of Strook & Strook & Lavan, in the negotiations that led to the release of Mr. Wiedenhoeft.

"The fact that I returned with Ruth had a startling effect," he recalled during an interview. "It seemed to suggest to the East Germans that we were vaulting the diplomatic wall and were interested in them as human beings. This immediately created a more relaxed and friendly atmosphere for the talks that were to follow."

Mr. Rabb, an affable man of 57 with the ready smile of a practical politician, is a former Presidential assistant and secretary to the Cabinet under the Eisenhower Administration and has held a number of international appointments.

From the outset, the lawyer made it clear that he was not in a position to offer any commitment and that the negotiations had to be based on mutual good faith. He suggested that East German willingness to release American prisoners would help reduce cold war tensions and perhaps ease the way

to improve trade relations with the United States.

"They quickly became aware that the release of Mr. Van Altena and the six other prisoners that were to follow amounted to a demonstration of a desire to normalize relations," Mr. Rabb said.

"I believe that it is significant that since the first prisoner was freed more than two years ago there has been a reduction of incidents with the United States military and a palpable increase in trade relations, entirely to our advantage."

The new East German extension of transit-visa and road-toll requirements to West Germans are not viewed as a threat to the American military presence in West Berlin.

The lawyer said the United States had exported oranges, coal, textiles and some machinery totaling \$10-million. He characterized the sales as "clearly helping our balance-of-payments problem."

After the initial meetings in Leipzig, Mr. Rabb made four unpublished trips to Berlin where he conferred with a Deputy Premier and members of the state police before he obtained the release of Mr. Van Altena. He said he could not disclose the names of the officials.

TWO BERLIN LAWYERS

His command post was a West Berlin hotel. Since there is no direct telephone communication between East and West Berlin, the arrangements were worked out by two lawyers, Jürgen Stange of West Berlin and Wolfgang Vogel of East Berlin. Mr. Vogel had participated in the trade of Francis Gary Powers, the American U-2 pilot, and Col. Rudolf Abel, the Soviet spy.

Mr. Van Altena was released in 1966 without publicity. By that time four other Americans had been arrested in East Berlin and Mr. Rabb agreed to work for their freedom also.

They were: Mary Ellen Battle of Oak Ridge, Tenn.; Moses Reese Herrin of Akron, Ohio; Frederick Matthews of Ellwood City, Pa.; and William W. Lovett of San Francisco. The first three were charged with having helped East Germans escape to the West; Mr. Lovett was arrested in connection with a traffic accident and on charges of carrying a concealed weapon.

Working with Messrs. Stange and Vogel, the two Berlin lawyers, Mr. Rabb obtained the release of the four in February, 1967. He had arranged coded Telex communications between his Wall Street Office and Mr. Vogel's office in East Berlin to speed the long and complicated negotiations.

The seventh American released through Mr. Rabb's mediation effort was Peter T. Feinauer of Providence, R.I., who was arrested in October, 1966, on charges of espionage for the Central Intelligence Agency and of helping East Germans to flee to the West. He was freed last month.

Mr. Rabb has received a personal note from Secretary of State Dean Rusk extending "warm appreciation and congratulations" for the effort. The lawyer said he paid for all of his travels to Berlin on his own and accepted no fees from the prisoners.

GROMYKO'S DECLARATION THAT RUSSIANS ARE READY FOR MISSILE TALK

Mr. JACKSON, Mr. President, in the recent Senate debate on our Sentinel ABM system, certain Senators argued that a vote to go forward with the Sentinel system would make more remote the possibility of talks with the Soviets on strategic armaments, and that efforts to secure an agreement on strategic armaments limitations would be seriously prejudiced.

At the same time, a number of newspaper, TV and radio commentators argued that to proceed with the deployment of the Sentinel ABM system was inconsistent with the search for an agreement with Moscow to limit strategic weapons, and that a vote for the Sentinel ABM was a vote to undermine the American diplomatic efforts to persuade Moscow to start talks with us on the mutual limitation of offensive and defensive missile systems.

The Senate, as you know, rejected these suggestions that we must weaken ourselves in order to open talks with Moscow about arms control. On Monday, June 24, by the overwhelming votes of 52-to-34 and 72-to-12 the Senate notified the world that we would continue to maintain a position of strength and that we would proceed with the deployment of the Sentinel ABM system.

This notification to the world was further emphasized a day later in the final 78-to-3 Senate vote on the military construction authorization bill which includes the authorization for starting Sentinel deployment.

The judgment of the Senate on this matter has been proved right. Not only has the Senate's decision to go forward with Sentinel deployment not been a hindrance to the furtherance of discussions: I call your attention to the fact that on Thursday, June 27, 3 days after the Senate ABM votes, Foreign Minister Gromyko announced that "the Soviet Union is ready to enter an exchange of opinions" on "the mutual limitation and later reduction of strategic weapons, both offensive and defensive, including antimissile missiles."

Gromyko's statement came as a welcome surprise to American officials. For more than 18 months the President has been trying to persuade the Soviets to open talks on this critical subject. At last we appear to be seeing some hopeful progress.

This was one of our objectives in the Senate debate which began on Wednesday, June 19. One of the compelling reasons for urging the Senate to vote for the deployment of our ABM system was to strengthen the President's diplomatic hand vis-a-vis the Soviets and to improve the chances that Moscow would start talks with us on the limitation of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive systems.

Here is what I said on the Senate floor on Wednesday, June 19, 1968:

I am not suggesting, of course, that we suspend the effort to reach agreement with Moscow on reciprocal arrangements for the control and limitation of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive forces. I have long argued for such an effort and I have supported President Johnson in his initiatives to get discussions underway with Moscow on this range of issues. At the same time, it would be the height of irresponsibility for the Congress of the United States to imperil the present or future credibility of our nuclear deterrent.

All of us should have learned by now that the way to encourage a reasonable response from Moscow is not through weakness but through strength. The way to negotiate successfully with Soviet leaders is to have the strong positions to bargain with—and to make negotiated agreements more attractive

to them than continued disagreements—as in the case of the limited nuclear test-ban treaty.

I am confident that the Administration's decision to proceed with Sentinel deployment will strengthen our diplomatic hand—not weaken it—and that this program can actually improve the chances for starting meaningful discussions with Moscow on strategic armaments control and limitation.

Here is what Secretary of Defense Clifford said on Thursday, June 20, 1968:

... If the Soviets are developing an ABM system, and we know they are developing it, and we know that they are deploying it, I believe we are in a better posture to reach agreement with them on an ultimate step toward denuclearizing if we also go about the deployment of a system.

I think our negotiations over the past decades would indicate that this is the better position for us to be in if we hope to achieve some type of resolution of this problem with the Soviets.

What I am saying is that from a psychological standpoint, I believe that if we proceed with the deployment because they are—I think it places us in a better posture in negotiating with them and ultimately, hopefully reaching a broader arms agreement.

Here is what I said on the Senate floor on Monday, June 24, 1968, just prior to the Senate's overwhelming rejection of the amendments that would have delayed or ended our ABM Sentinel system:

The argument has been made over and over again by the supporters of this amendment that if this country goes ahead with the ABM we will somehow add fuel and fire to the arms race. If we do not go ahead, the argument goes, there is some hope then of getting the Soviet Union to reach an agreement to dispense with the anti-ballistic missile system.

It does not make any sense to say that if we reduce our strength unilaterally, if we decide not to go ahead with the ABM program, the Soviet Union will drop its ABM program. On what basis would we negotiate? Are we assuming that because we do nothing Moscow will suddenly drop its ABM program? It does not add up.

Are the Soviets apt to sit down and talk with us about the ABM if we do not do anything about an ABM system? They are doing very well. I do not know why they would ever want to talk with us on this issue if we do not go ahead with our program. There is nothing about which to bargain. They have it, and they have had one kind of a program deployed since 1959. We have been sitting by for 6 long years without any deployment.

Does the Senate want to send a message to the Soviet Union and say, "Look, you go right ahead with your program, because the United States is not going to bargain on this issue, by their decision here today I cut out the program"? With this approach what do the Senators on the other side of this argument believe they are going to accomplish in the way of negotiations or agreement with Soviet leaders on the control and elimination of strategic weapons?

I am delighted that the Soviets have now flashed a green light to President Johnson's longstanding proposal to discuss limiting strategic nuclear offensive and defensive weapons systems, including the ABM.

Talks on this range of issues, of course will raise fundamental problems of deterrence, relationship of East-West forces, inspection, and compliance. What we are after is a system of limitation and control of arms that will reduce

47

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, July 13, 1968
4:15 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You may be interested in this survey of the world scene and of our Administration's policy presented at the National War College on May 8.

As you can see, it was spoken informally from notes.

W. W. Rostow

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White House Records, Feb. 24, 1983
By ng, LHW, Date 9-2-92

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NLJ 93-120
By Cb, NARA, Date 6-2-95

THE UNITED STATES AND THE CHANGING WORLD
Problems and Opportunities Arising From the Diffusion of Power

by

W. W. Rostow

Remarks at The National War College
Washington, D. C.
May 8, 1968

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I. The Diffusion of Power in a World of Change

I shall try to take stock of where we are in history, and share some thoughts on the problems and opportunities that confront us now and in the time ahead.

A profound rearrangement of world affairs has been going on for a long time. This kind of rearrangement, like a military retreat, is most difficult to conduct in good order. It need not be a retreat. In fact, the transition could be a period of advance toward stable peace in the world -- if we cope effectively with the many difficult problems it poses.

A nation can move in tolerably good order with public support at home when it operates -- either internally or abroad -- on a relatively clear, stable, and widely understood pattern. But when a nation faces profound change, from one pattern to another, there is the likelihood of confusion, misunderstanding and even real danger if the transition is not widely perceived and accepted as the environment for action.

The essence of the present transition is, in my judgment, the diffusion of power within the world away from the previous polar centers of Moscow and Washington. There are certain areas of world affairs where the diffusion of power is imperceptible or only slow: it is not a simple, uniform process. But my thesis is that this diffusion of power is central to the understanding and management of world affairs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

I have said the transition is not new. If you will permit a personal recollection, in 1958 I entitled a book, on United States military and foreign policy, "The United States and the Diffusion of Power." The publishers, however, told me no one would understand the title.

I surrendered; and the book came out as "The United States in the World Arena." If I have the chance to write again on the past decade, I suspect I will return to the original title. But my point is that it was not much of a trick to predict as early as 1958 that the diffusion of power would be a central phenomenon in world affairs.

The diffusion of power is now palpable in the Communist world. The split between Communist China and the Soviet Union has created many profound repercussions within both countries, among other nations ruled by Communists, and within Communist parties throughout the world.

Recent events in Eastern Europe have accelerated an old trend towards the assertion of increasing degrees of national independence. Moreover, within those nations, one sees the assertion of what might be called an internal diffusion of power -- a challenge to the political monopoly of the Communist Party. These internal shifts are deeply rooted in forces which are likely to persist rather than diminish, although the process doubtless will be slow and uneven.

Mainland China presents one of the great dramas of contemporary history -- an attempt by the grandfather to evoke the grandsons against

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

his own children. The result is a weakening of the Communist Party apparatus and a complex diffusion of domestic authority, as yet unresolved.

Within the nations of the world that are not Communist one sees also a diffusion of power and an increasing assertiveness -- in part resulting from United States post-war policy. We consciously decided, in the face of the prostrate Europe of 1946-47, not to play it as the British historically had played the Continent. Divide-and-rule in Western Europe could easily have been our policy. We considered it and deliberately opted against it. We threw our strength not only behind Europe's recovery but also behind its coalescence. We were fully aware -- and hopeful -- that this policy would lead to the emergence of a strong Europe which no doubt would be less malleable as its strength grew. We were not looking for satellites; we were looking for partners. And thus we became the strongest and steadiest friends of European unity and integration.

Our policy in Europe was part of a world policy based on the objective, not of empire, but rather of building world order on the basis of diffuse power.

We have used our monetary reserves, our military power, and economic resources to build and strengthen their economic, political, and military independence.

In Latin America we not only support economic and social development but we have lately also placed our full weight behind the movement towards

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

Latin American trade and physical integration.

Similarly, in Asia we have nurtured and supported the concept of a New Asia -- based on mutual cooperation which, over time, will enable Asians to take more of their destiny in their own hands.

Africa, in a much earlier stage of development, has also received our support for its emergent regional and sub-regional institutions.

Our goal there, too, is for Africans to manage more of their own affairs.

In other words, we have tried to act abroad on the same principle which governs our society at home; that is, the building of law and order on the basis of diffuse centers of authority and responsibility.

II. American Objectives in a World of Change

As I see it, the objectives of the United States in a world of change can be expressed something like this. First and perhaps most important, the United States wishes to maintain a balance of power within the world that is favorable to us -- favorable not in the sense that we have the capacity to control the nations involved, but merely that a potentially hostile major power does not have the power to control them. We can, therefore, be content if the balance is held by nations free to develop their own national genius and to exist without the threat of outside interference and domination. Our goal is ^{that} neither Europe nor Asia nor the southern continents should fall into the hands of a potentially hostile major power.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-5-

We have been able to achieve and maintain this limited objective in the post-war years -- but only at great effort and cost.

Second, we aim to shift the burden for maintaining the balance of power -- in this sense -- to a more equitable basis whereby the responsibility and resources are more evenly shared by all the beneficiaries. This means we encourage others to do more for themselves whether in military affairs, trade, aid to developing nations, international monetary affairs, and so on. We have deliberately tried to influence events and situations so that our nation is not faced indefinitely with the kind of extreme direct responsibility we inherited or assumed when we filled the post-war power vacuums in Japan, Korea, Germany, and elsewhere. We have purposefully moved toward a shared basis of responsibility on the world scene.

Next, we have attempted to maintain a world in which thrusts aimed at shifting the balance of power do not lead to major war. This has required that we use the full weight of our resources against efforts to change the status quo by force when those efforts are mounted across international frontiers or boundaries. A great deal of post-war history is the chronicle of a succession of such efforts and our responses to them.

A fourth objective is to build towards a stable peace which would ultimately embrace all nations, including those now under Communist rule.

These are the headings under which we pursue our ultimate objective;

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-6-

namely, to build the stable peace which we failed to build after the First World War.

The challenge and test of American policy is our capacity to move forward toward these objectives, in an environment of diffusing power and responsibility.

III. The Pursuit of American Objectives

In real life -- at any particular period -- the pursuit of large objectives takes the form of highly particular -- usually acute -- problems.

First, of course, there is Vietnam and Southeast Asia. There we have faced not only a limited thrust from Hanoi to alter the status quo by force, but also a thrust which, had it succeeded, would have the much more profound effect of leading -- almost certainly -- to our withdrawal from the Southeast Asian mainland. In turn, this would have laid open that area to control -- in one form or another -- by the single national power in that part of the world with both the capacity and the intent to dominate -- Communist China.

The stakes in Vietnam thus exceed the boundaries of that beleaguered nation. The outcome of the struggle in Southeast Asia, in my judgment, will determine not only the future of that Asian subregion but, even more, will affect the capacity of all Asians -- under Communist rule or not -- to shape their own destiny.

At the moment, Saigon presents a microcosm of our problem

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-7-

and our opportunity. Under the pressure of the Tet offensive and the new dimension opened by President Johnson's speech of March 31, the government of South Vietnam is assuming more responsibility, and it is expanding its military forces. It is facing the future and considering the impact of an eventual lessening of American presence and ultimate absence. Regarding the Paris talks, the South Vietnamese have become increasingly lucid, acute, and constructive about the problems and possibilities of negotiation -- if negotiations, in fact, emerge.

Men react to pressure and challenge up to a certain point -- if they have vitality -- by meeting them and doing better. The danger is, of course, that if we let them down or use our relationship or influence over them carelessly we could destroy this hopeful new trend in South Vietnam -- the trend toward their assuming gradually more responsibility for their own destiny.

The situation in Saigon is a microcosm because in other parts of Asia there are versions of the same problem. There are people in Korea, in Japan, and elsewhere who are shaken and uncertain in the face of recent events in Asia; and the art of the months and years ahead is to handle our role in that region so that what is evoked from them is not frozen neutralism or uncertainty, but a willingness to take a larger part in shaping their own fate.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-8-

In Europe -- in the face of the changes going forward in Eastern Europe and, in fact, the whole environment of Europe since the Berlin and Cuba crises of 1962-- there has been a slackness about the need for allocating large resources to defense -- a feeling that, on the one hand, somehow détente is being given to them by history and, on the other hand, that somehow the defense of Europe by the United States is a free good, as economists say, to be taken for granted. It has not been easy to hold the line in NATO. But we have done so; and it is extremely important that we continue to do so for two reasons: first, because the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact are real and in certain important respects enlarging; second, because if there is a chance of moving towards a definitive settlement in Europe (or towards mutual force withdrawals that would help open the way towards a definitive settlement of the German and European problem which is such a large part of the cold war) that possibility clearly requires that we hold the fundamental structure of NATO and the deterrent in good shape.

The problem of Europe has been gravely complicated by the policy of President de Gaulle. The most important aspect of that policy has not, in my judgment, been his anti-Americanism. Our shoulders are broad and a little more or less anti-Americanism we can live with quite comfortably. The most important part of the damage done has not even

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-9-

been the limited and serious but not decisive attenuation of NATO through French force withdrawals.

The most important cost to the world and to our common interests has been de Gaulle's preventing Europe from consolidating. He has forced on the Europeans a protracted phase of continued sibling rivalry among the quasi-major powers of Europe. He has prevented a coalescence of European strength, and thereby rendering Europe almost impotent beyond the boundaries of Europe. Not only has Europe turned its back on the fate of two-thirds of humanity in Asia, it has done very little in an area where it should have done a great deal; namely, in Latin America, during a critical decade of Latin American history.

Even in an area where there are direct vital European interests -- the Middle East -- Europe has been completely ineffectual.

Like a flash of lightning on the horizon, you could see a marginal case of European impotence when we had trouble in the Congo. There were some 10,000 white Europeans who were threatened with slaughter because the white mercenaries had humiliated Mobutu's government. Some white man had to reach out at that moment and do something with Mobutu to make it possible for him to calm his people. We could not raise three C-130's out of all of Europe, although it was their citizens who were in danger. President Johnson had to take yet another lacerating

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 10 -

conflict with the Congress in order to get those three C-130's in there. That kind of European weakness and incapacity is, in some ways, the greatest threat to the stability of our own policy.

I do not believe our country (and I will come back to this) is in a basically isolationist mood. There are isolationist tendencies. But there is a very powerful feeling in the Congress -- reflecting a perhaps less well articulated feeling in the country -- that it is quite wrong, at this stage in post-war history, twenty-odd years after the war, when Europe is rich and comfortable, that the United States should have to bear so high a proportion of the task of being the organizer of the peace and the resister to aggression. As I have told my European friends, if I were they I would not worry about American isolationism; I would worry about the failure of Europe to mobilize itself to play a more effective role on the world scene as a partner to the United States -- on behalf of Europe's own interests and to support the continuity of American policy in the world -- on which Europe's fate depends.

In the Middle East, of course, we have a very searching problem. The question is this: is there any way of bringing from that most unpromising area (unpromising in terms of almost unbearable memories, mutual distrust, and humiliation) a process which could begin to move it towards peace and thus avoid another round of conflict in which, in my

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 11 -

judgment, the danger of a U. S. -Soviet military confrontation would be much higher than it was in June of last year?

Then there is Africa, where there are important constructive moderate forces at work, and some very wholesome things have happened. The question is: Can they take hold and persist and make progress and hold the loyalty of the people by producing economic and social progress fast enough and avoid a major white-black and bloody confrontation in Africa?

In Latin America there are important constructive trends going forward. I worked at the White House in 1961. I suppose at that time you could not have gotten fifty-fifty odds that we would not have in the 1960's two or three more Castros somewhere in the Hemisphere. By the dint of Latin American good sense, our own efforts, and one of the great economic tours de force of which I know in the development business, we have managed to reduce Castro to a continuing nuisance -- but a nuisance almost irrelevant to the future of Latin America. The tour de force to which I refer is that he gets more than \$300 million net in Soviet aid (which is a goodly proportion of what we vote for all of Latin America) and he has managed to sterilize it. This is quite a trick. He is pretty dead in the water.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-12-

I remember that President Kennedy used to worry a great deal about this. He said that Khrushchev has only got this island and "I have 200 million folk; he is sure to make a showpiece there; I don't see how we can help it; then what will we do?" Castro has taken us off that hook.

Nevertheless, we cannot be complacent. The question is: Can these trends persist in Latin America? What can we do to maintain sufficient momentum, sufficient sense of confidence, which is emerging in certain Latin American countries, so that we do not get another dangerous phase of economic and social frustration at a later stage?

IV. The Foreign Policy of President Johnson and President Kennedy

The foreign policy of President Johnson's Administration has been much addressed to exactly this transitional problem. His foreign policy is publicly associated, as indeed it might be when we have half a million men in the field, with Vietnam in Southeast Asia. But the President has been extremely conscious of the transitional process which accelerated after the Berlin and Cuba crises in 1962.

In the Kennedy Administration there were a good many things that were done; but, basically, we came to responsibility at a time of classic direct confrontation with the Soviet Union; and that preoccupied us a good deal. But in President Johnson's time the increased assertiveness in the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-13-

world -- the diffusion of power-- accelerated the organization of diffusing power and assertiveness, an effort which will look much more important in perspective than now when the debate on Vietnam dominates the scene.

It was President Johnson who in 1966 went to Mexico and threw U. S. influence actively behind Latin American integration. He shifted the weight of U. S. policy in the Alliance for Progress from being a senior partner out in front to being the junior partner to Latin Americans who had to take the lead. When I worked in the State Department I had an extra job on CIAP, which was almost the model of what the President was trying to achieve -- a Latin American chairman; six out of seven members Latin American; one North American.

In the summer of 1966 President Johnson threw his weight behind the concept of regionalism and subregionalism in Africa; and that early, developing continent has moved much more rapidly in these directions than any of us would have guessed at the time of the President's OAU speech.

In October 1966 in New York, President Johnson delivered a subtle and modulated speech which reconciled our continued support for NATO and Western European unity with a willingness to move as far as we could, in the common interest, towards improving East-West relations.

In Asia, of course, President Johnson has accompanied our defense

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 14 -

of South Vietnam with strong persistent efforts to encourage cooperation in Asia among Asians -- the first time this has happened in history. His objective is to produce a situation in which we could look to a future in which the United States did not withdraw from Asia, but in which the U. S. played a lesser role as the Asians came to do more. A symbol of the kind of Asia we are trying to build are the capital contributions to the Asian Development Bank -- 20% Japan; 40% the rest of Asia; 20% the rest of the world; and 20% the United States. That is for the Bank's hard capital subscription. In the softer loans we and the Japanese will have to do more.

What President Johnson has been trying to do in one part of the world after another is to build a framework of institutions and arrangements in which the United States has a choice between the extraordinary, direct, and almost overwhelming involvement it had when it filled vacuums after the war -- and isolationism. The concept of partnership -- where we take our due share in a communal effort -- is the way that is done.

V. The Major Exception to the Diffusion of Power: The Strategic Nuclear Balance

I come now to an area of policy in which the concept of diffusion of power is much more ambiguous, namely, with respect to nuclear weapons and the strategic nuclear balance.

There, of course, the minimum condition for stability in the world is that we maintain a nuclear balance which does not tempt the Soviet Union

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 15 -

or anybody else to either nuclear war or, even, to nuclear blackmail. A part of that effort may (or may not) be a negotiation with the Soviet Union with respect to strategic weapons systems, offensive and defensive. That issue remains critical to anything like a successful transition from where we are to where we might be or hope to be in some years; namely, a stable peace.

But there is another aspect of this problem which, in my judgment, has not been well debated in the United States or well understood; that is, the meaning of the non-proliferation treaty. In public discussions, the non-proliferation treaty is often regarded as a kind of follow-on from the atmospheric test ban; that is, an exercise in U. S. -Soviet détente, a good deed in a naughty world. All manner of well-meaning chaps support the treaty in those terms.

In fact, it is an effort in the United States' interest and in Soviet interest to reduce the potential diffusion of power at its most important point; namely, the diffusion of nuclear weapons and the right to fire nuclear weapons.

We have already seen that this effort lays great political issues before the non-nuclear weapons states that could produce them -- Germany, Japan, Italy, India, and others. As they come to the moment when they may have to go to their congresses, parliaments, and peoples,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-16-

they face the problem of explaining why they are accepting what looks like second- or third-class status in the world. This is very difficult political business.

But there is another important element in this and one which is generally missed. If we are going to keep a non-proliferation-treaty world, the nuclear guarantee of the United States must be absolutely reliable. The other side of the medal of non-proliferation is that the U.S. is locking itself into the world -- and into responsibility in the world -- right around the periphery of Communist China and the Soviet Union, on the toughest of all issues.

If you have talked, as I have, with Germans, Italians, Japanese and even (if they are candid) Indians and Israelis, it is clear that, if they accept a non-proliferation treaty, they are going to do so because they believe it preferable to have a U. S. nuclear guarantee -- explicit or implicit -- than to go through the very treacherous and expensive transition to becoming a nuclear weapons power -- and then a minor nuclear power.

I believe some Senators, who express lively support for the non-proliferation treaty but are, at the same time, urging us to get out of Vietnam and pull our troops from Europe, have not the slightest idea how those things relate to one another. If we pulled out of Vietnam,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-17-

it would be a relatively short period of time before India and Japan produced their own nuclear weapons. And the consequences of substantial troop withdrawals from Europe are not likely to be much less profound.

In nuclear matters, then, there is a significant exception to the diffusion of power. In fact we see an attempt to prevent a diffusion of power. When we throw our weight behind the NPT we are taking a position, as a nation, which does not permit us to back away much from the world -- if we mean it.

VI. Can America See It Through?

Now, the question finally arises: Can the political life of the United States and our public opinion sustain the role for the United States I have outlined -- the role we must play if we are to get through this transition without a neo-isolationist breakdown? This is the fear of many people around the world. It is a fear that is raised in Asia now with the President's withdrawal from politics next January; and it is felt elsewhere in the world.

No man can predict what his country is going to do in political life. These are matters of judgment and faith. But I would underline some of the problems that accompany our effort to play a role appropriate to our interests and objectives in this complex period of transition.

First, we now lack a unified Communist enemy. It was a lot easier to mobilize a policy to deal with Stalin. It was even tolerably easy to mobilize a policy to deal with Khrushchev's thrust against Berlin

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-18-

or his effort to put missiles in Cuba. It is much more difficult to face a protracted war in Southeast Asia, where the immediate enemy is a small Communist nation; for it is a fairly subtle business to explain that you have a dual problem there; the immediate problem of protecting South Vietnam; the related but further problem of avoiding a U. S. withdrawal from the mainland of Asia, which would leave that area a vacuum into which the Chinese Communists would inevitably move -- or try to move.

Somewhere, viscerally, I think the nation understands this. But with a split in the Communist bloc and the reduced fear of the Soviet Union it is not easy, as anyone can see who has observed our vicissitudes in recent years.

Then there is the balance of payments problem. As other countries have become stronger, our surpluses have been drawn down. We have carried extraordinary financial burdens due to our world military position and commitments. In some cases these have been neutralized, but not, by any means, in all cases, not even in Europe. Some of the strongest arguments for our bringing troops home from Europe are focused on our balance of payments.

Then there are our domestic problems: the problems of race and cities. Some feel strongly that if we were spending less abroad we would spend more at home. I am not sure that is a political fact. The difficulty of generating resources for the cities -- more for education and

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-19-

welfare -- may flow from the politics of our country. Put another way, I wish I could be confident that there would be a radical increase in those expenditures after Vietnam. I am not sure that the Congress would vote that way, although I would hope so.

As an economist I know quite well that we have the resources to do both jobs; if there was the national will to use those resources for both purposes.

In any case, the notion that we have searching domestic problems requiring increased allocation of resources leads many to think that we should pull back from the world at this stage. And people abroad are afraid that we will pull back under these pressures; or, if you are Communist, you may be hopeful that we will.

The critical aspect of this transition is that we go through it -- mobilizing the strength of others -- pulling back a bit ourselves -- working towards peace -- while avoiding a traumatic breakdown in some region of the world -- and a phase of isolationism.

Finally, we have a problem of a new generation (or, I should say, a part of a new generation, because one should not generalize about any generation) without historical memory of the roots of our policy.

I spent a most rewarding two hours the other day with some students representing every shade of opinion on Vietnam. It was extremely well managed. They kept the press out. Questions were questions, even if

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-20-

they were hostile and critical. They were not lectures or speeches. There was an honest exchange for two hours. What I found that was most missing from their minds was any sense that our nation's security was related to the balance of power in the world. I took them back all the way to the 19th century and showed we were not nice clean-cut kids who were above the balance of power. We were a shrewd, developing country that scavenged on the fringes of the balance of power. We got our independence and picked up the Louisiana Purchase by playing off the British and the French; picked up Alaska playing the Russians against the British. We were good shrewd operators, just the way every developing country would like to be now. Then, when the balance of power based on the British Navy began to cave in -- with unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917 -- we put aside all the speeches we made and reacted to the implications for security of this nation of the loss of the balance of power in the Atlantic to a power which might dominate all of Europe.

I then recalled to them what the polls looked like in the United States before Paris fell and Britain was embattled; and what they looked like afterwards in the second half of 1940. The balance of opinion shifted quickly around as the threat to the balance of power became real. In the autumn of 1940 people were saying we should aid the allies even at the risk of war; and that was the basis for Lend Lease.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-21-

I recalled to them that it was the Japanese going into Indochina which triggered the oil embargo which tightened relations with Japan and built up to Pearl Harbor.

And I took them through the other instinctive actions of this nation when the balance of power in Europe or Asia was upset. I said, "I am not arguing with you. I am not saying it is right or wrong; but you live in a country which behaves in this way. And that is the way it conceives of its interests, even if our speeches do not always articulate our behavior when the chips are down."

We have a problem in their understanding that. But it is not a new problem. There is an abiding tendency in the nation as a whole to forget the fundamentals of our security position when we are not in palpable danger.

VII. The Hopeful Background

Now, to sum up. What I am saying is that in many ways this is as hopeful a period as we have seen in the post-war years. If you look at Communism as a doctrine, it is not doing well in the historical test with doctrines of independence and freedom -- politically, economically, socially, and culturally. In parts of the world where they have had a virtual monopoly over education and propaganda for a generation, Communism is dying of boredom and irrelevance.

In terms of power, there is nothing in Communist power that cannot be matched within the non-Communist world; and the diffusion of power in the Communist world is posing most searching problems for them,

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-22-

much more searching than for us, because we are a nation which builds its domestic life around the organization of diffuse power. There is a kind of harmony between what we try to do at home and what we are now trying to do in the world in encouraging and supporting the new partnerships.

Communism was based on Lenin's concept of what a unified conspiratorial operation under a dictator could do. The concept was quite clear in Engels' and in aspects of Marx' thought even before Lenin crystallized the doctrines of Communist power and organization. It is a most searching experience for Communists to try to operate in a world of diffuse power. It does not fit their cast of mind, their habits of thought, their experience, their institutions, nearly as well as it fits ours.

And there is another hopeful dimension to the world scene. Many of our post-war troubles centered around men who were radical, ambitious revolutionaries, who carried maps in their heads of how they would like the world to look. Sometimes, quite literally, they drew and circulated maps. Sukarno had one, for example, shaping what he thought the proper expanded racial boundaries of Indonesia should be. Mao distributed hundreds of millions of maps which frightened not only the Southeast Asians but the Russians, because it laps well over into Russian territory. Castro had a map-like vision of the Andes as the great guerrilla base, the Sierra Maestro of Latin America. Nkrumah had one of a sort -- with himself as the Emperor Jones of Black Africa operating out of Accra. Nasser has had one. Ben Bella had one as King of the Maghreb.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-23-

Behind these visions of expansion and regional power were policies of men who were trying to continue, when they had responsibility for a nation, the rhetoric and policies of revolution which had brought them to power. They could not divest themselves of the anticolonial slogans or the phrases from Lenin's Imperialism. So they united their ^{people around} simple aggressive nationalism rather than face the searching tasks of nation-building.

Well, history has not been with these men. Castro, as I say, is dead in the water, and he does not find it satisfactory to try to grow sugar. Ben Bella is gone. Nkrumah is gone. Nasser is in a weakened, difficult position, but still a dangerous factor because of his weakness. Sukarno is gone. Mao is in grave trouble.

Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues belong very much with this generation. They believe they have the right to take over the French colonial empire in Asia. But they are being cut back because they have run into other people's nationalism, backed by the United States. And that has been the story with the others.

We are in a lucky phase now because it is the pragmatists who want to get on with the job who are gathering strength. One of our major challenges is to make sure that these men succeed, whether in Indonesia or in Ghana or in Latin America. If we are callous about helping them to get onto their feet in this rather pragmatic and moderate phase, we could

bring on another radical phase; and that comes down to the policies and issues we lump together under the heading of "foreign aid."

So, there is a lot of hopeful raw material about us. But there are all manner of difficult problems in this transition -- the transition in which, hopefully, the role of the United States will diminish relatively, the burdens will diminish relatively as others pick them up. But for the time being, if we falter, we could set back dangerously the whole transitional process and endanger our own national security. And to get us from here to there is a job of subtlety, balance, clarity, persistence. No one can predict the outcome, but I am sure that this will remain the central task of the next Administration, as it has been of this. I happen to believe that there is enough inner wisdom and understanding and accumulated experience in the United States for us to stay with it. But that is what elections and horse races are about.

Thank you.

###

INFORMATION

Pres. file

4/8

Saturday, July 13, 1968
4:10 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Nick K. and Helms present a
draft letter to Ayub.

Max Tayler's desire for a special deal
on one component of the installation is presented
in Tab B -- an argument Nick and Helms do not
accept for reasons stated.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/NODIS attachment (log 2228)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-82
By sig, NARA, Date 7-26-94

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

48a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-81

By LP, NARA, Date 7-5-95

July 13, 1968.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Presidential Message to Ayub on Peshawar

I have drafted the attached letter (Tab A) to Ayub in a way which blends a hard tone with an escape hatch he can use if he chooses. (At best, such a pull back would probably involve no more than to give us a period beyond July 1969 to complete an orderly withdrawal.)

The letter still leaves Ayub in no doubt about your feelings on the substance and the way the Paks have handled the matter. Regardless of whether he loosens up his position, he will be under no illusions that, as a result of his actions, our relationship has changed.

My draft has been cleared by Dick Helms and Paul Nitze. But Max Taylor would prefer to take a somewhat different line. His draft (with the divergent paragraphs marked) is at Tab B.

On the first change (last paragraph of page 2), Dick Helms and I would strongly prefer to leave to Ben Oehlert's presentation any mention of the specific continuing need for a small part of the facility. This is not something we should admit in writing -- particularly at the Presidential level.

Dick and I have two concerns about Max's formulation in the next-to-the-last paragraph:

- It links the timing of the phase-down to our ability to find alternative sites. Since our basic objective is to get Ayub to agree to talk with us, we ought not risk scaring him off by

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

-2-

imposing conditions now that are better raised by Oehlert at a later date.

- Raising the issue of financial costs detracts from the emphasis in the letter on higher security interests, a far more persuasive argument. In fact, the financial stakes are not high.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

1. . Approve draft at Tab A _____
2. Approve draft at Tab B _____
3. No letter _____
4. See me _____

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRESIDENT AYUB

In the spirit of honesty and frankness that has always been at the heart of our relationship, I feel I must tell you of my deep concern over the reports I have received during the past several weeks from Ambassador Oehlert about your Government's attitude toward our communications facility at Peshawar. I have delayed writing to you personally until now because I hoped that some mutually acceptable solution could have been worked out by this time.

I was surprised and disturbed that your Government saw fit publicly to announce its position on the Peshawar facility before any real discussion between our two Governments was possible. And it was particularly distressing to learn that your Government's action may have been taken because of threats and demands by another power.

I had thought that you and I shared a conviction that our own security--as well as the security of many other nations--was well served by our cooperation

DECLASSIFIED

EO 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-272 + FRUS Vol. XXV, #503

By chm, NARA, Date 3-3-03

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

-2-

in maintaining the Peshawar facility. Accurate technical and scientific information on the intentions and capabilities of others can, as you know, be a stabilizing element in the present uncertain state of the world.

In all frankness, the actions of your Government do not seem to me to be appropriate to the close relationship that has existed for so many years between our two countries and which has been manifested in our contribution of more than \$3½ billion in aid to Pakistan.

I accept, of course, your right to terminate the 1959 Communications Agreement, although I would hope that even now you could reconsider that decision. I do want you to know, simply and unequivocally, that the closing down of the Peshawar facility in July 1969 will give us real problems.

In this connection, I must point out that this facility is a complex one. Some of its elements can be moved relatively easily. Others will take more time. Their hasty removal could result in significant gaps in our understanding of the intentions of others and thereby diminish the sense of security we both seek.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

-3-

If, however, your decision is firm, I would hope and expect that you might allow our representatives to discuss an arrangement whereby the various elements of the facility can be phased down and closed out in an orderly way during a period beyond the formal termination date of July 17, 1969. I have asked Ambassador Oehlert to convey these views to you and to be prepared to enter into full discussion of them at an early date.

I cannot hide from you the fact that the loss of the Peshawar facility will be a real blow to what I believe to be our mutual interests. But I do think that if we can agree to arrangements that will permit a reasonable withdrawal period it will lessen the impact. Such arrangements, if arrived at through imagination and good will on both sides, would make the transition easier to accomplish. I do not think, old friend, this is too much to ask.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRESIDENT AYUB

In the spirit of honesty and frankness that has always been at the heart of our relationship, I feel I must tell you of my deep concern over the reports I have received during the past several weeks from Ambassador Oehlert about your Government's attitude toward our communications facility at Peshawar. I have delayed writing to you personally until now because I hoped that some mutually acceptable solution could have been worked out by this time.

I was surprised and disturbed that your Government saw fit publicly to announce its position on the Peshawar facility before any real discussion between our two Governments was possible. And it was particularly distressing to learn that your Government's action may have been taken because of threats and demands by another power.

I had thought that you and I shared a conviction that our own security--as well as the security of many other nations--was well served by our cooperation

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-272-1 FRNS 161, XXV, #503
By: ctm, NARA, Date 3-3-03

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

-2-

in maintaining the Peshawar facility. Accurate technical and scientific information on the intentions and capabilities of others can, as you know, be a stabilizing element in the present uncertain state of the world.

In all frankness, the actions of your Government do not seem to me to be appropriate to the close relationship that has existed for so many years between our two countries and which has been manifested in our contribution of more than \$3½ billion in aid to Pakistan.

I accept, of course, your right to terminate the 1959 Communications Agreement, although I would hope that even now you could reconsider that decision. I do want you to know, simply and unequivocally, that the closing down of the Peshawar facility in July 1969 will give us real problems.

This facility is a complex one. Some of its elements can be moved relatively easily. Others will take more time. For one small element, there is at present no known location elsewhere which will permit the continuance of its mission. Their hasty removal could result in

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

-3-

significant gaps in our understanding of the intentions of others and thereby diminish the sense of security we both seek.

I would hope that we could reach an arrangement compatible with our past relationship and favorable to its continuation, based upon U.S. acceptance of the termination of tenure on July 17, 1969, with the understanding that the facility would be phased down progressively as relocation sites become available elsewhere and on a schedule which will minimize the heavy financial loss which this move entails for us.

I can not hide the fact that the loss of the Peshawar facility will be a set-back to what I believe are our mutual interests. However, if you can agree to the phased arrangement proposed above, I believe that the adverse impact can be greatly reduced and the transition made with a minimum interruption of important activities. I have asked Ambassador Oehlert to convey these views to you and to be prepared to discuss our proposal in detail. I do not think that it is too much, old friend, to hope for a favorable consideration.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Pres. Jila

49

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, July 13, 1968
4:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

If you have time -- and if the subject interests you -- herewith a short memo and reports from Canberra on the vicissitudes of Gorton who has clearly not settled down yet.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

(A-615 Canberra 5576 5/13/68)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 27, 240, n.1
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

49a

July 13, 1968

~~SECRET~~ - LIMDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: The Performance of Prime Minister Gorton

The attached Airgram is a pastiche of memoranda of conversation with knowledgeable Australians about Prime Minister Gorton's performance. If you have the time, I think you will find it interesting reading.

What it amounts to is this:

- (1) Gorton is having an open and bitter feud with the civil servants.
- (2) His difficulties with his Cabinet (principally Paul Hasluck) are getting worse, not better.
- (3) Gorton's personal performance is a subject of increasing criticism among knowledgeable circles.
- (4) His standing with the party has deteriorated sharply, and Hasluck's popularity has risen.

Balanced against all this is the fact that the opposition, the Labor Party, is in total disarray. The ^{Liberal} ~~Labor~~ Party Government, therefore, seems in no danger. But unless Gorton begins to take hold better than he has thus far, there might grow up a real challenge to Gorton's leadership of that Government.

Marshall Wright
Marshall Wright

Att.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 27, #40

By jc NARA, Date 8-1-01

~~SECRET~~ - LIMDIS

AIRGRAM

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-615

~~SECRET~~ - LIMDIS

NO.

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : WELLINGTON, CINCPAC FOR POLAD

COPY NO. _____ SERIES B

FROM : Amembassy CANBERRA

DATE: July 5, 1968

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Gorton's Performance to Date

REF : ^{EA}Canberra 5576 of May 13, 1968

The referenced telegram provided an assessment of Prime Minister Gorton's performance through mid-May. Enclosed are a number of memoranda of conversation which largely support that assessment.

The "Len Hewitt" referred to in several of the memoranda is the newly-appointed Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department. He replaced Sir John Bunting, who was made Secretary of the newly-created Cabinet Secretariat. Miss Ainslie Gotto, also referred to in several memoranda, is the Prime Minister's Private Secretary. She is a 21-year-old high school graduate.

CRONK

Enclosures:

1. Memorandum of Conversation, June 17, 1968
2. Memorandum of Conversation, June 18, 1968
3. Memorandum of Conversation, June 19, 1968
4. Memorandum of Conversation, June 21, 1968

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-259
By SJ NARA, Date 42602

~~SECRET~~ - LIMDIS

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

POL:JCDorrance/mj

7/2/68

Contents and Classification Approved
POL:JVMartin

Clearances:

CHARGE:EMCronk (in draft)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Peter Lawler, Deputy Secretary, Cabinet Office
John C. Dorrance, Political Officer, American Embassy,
Canberra

DATE : June 17, 1968

SUBJECT : Prime Minister's Performance

Mr. Lawler was, under Prime Minister Holt, Deputy Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department. When the Cabinet Office was established shortly after Gorton became Prime Minister, Lawler was transferred to that office, along with Sir John Bunting, who has been Secretary of the Prime Minister's Department. Lawler admits that he is embittered toward Prime Minister Gorton by this shift, but claims that his comments on the Prime Minister's performance are "objective." Following are his key remarks during a luncheon meeting.

1. Prime Minister Gorton has established a dangerous precedent by replacing Bunting and himself with personal friends in the Prime Minister's Department. On the British pattern a long and successful tradition of apolitical, objective service to Prime Ministers had been established in the Prime Minister's Department. This was changed by Gorton's "personalization" and "politization" of two of the Public Service's key positions. It is this factor as much as the "miserable" personality of the new Secretary (C.L.S. Hewitt) and Bunting's "popularity" which has caused such intense ill-feeling toward Gorton within the Public Service. Most senior Public Service Officers are fully aware of Gorton's low opinion of the Public Service and they fear that what he has done with Bunting he could do with others.

2. Asked whether Gorton dominates or "leads" the Cabinet to any greater extent than did Harold Holt, Lawler said that Gorton has made no effort to dominate the Cabinet, but he probably does lead more than Holt did. The latter operated more by consensus. Gorton does at times ignore the advice of his Cabinet ministers, even on rather important questions. On the other hand, although frictions between himself and senior members of the Cabinet exist, they have

been over-dramatized by the press. The most serious policy differences are between Gorton and External Affairs Minister Hasluck. The latter "acts as if Holt were still Prime Minister" while Gorton not only questions some of Holt's policies, but also would like "to play at being his own foreign minister." One of the consequences of the feud between Gorton and Hasluck was Gorton's rejection of any advice from the Department of External Affairs on key issues to be discussed during his U.S. visit. Most of the briefs on Southeast Asia were prepared within the Prime Minister's Department rather than by External Affairs, which would be the normal case. Lawler said that senior officers of the Department of External Affairs support their minister and "cordially hate Gorton." Aside from their unhappiness over Gorton's treatment of the Public Service, and his contemptuous treatment of External Affairs, they are genuinely concerned about his judgment with regard to basic foreign and defense policies. Lawler said that an "appalling example" of Gorton's breezy treatment of important questions, and of the Departments concerned with those questions, was his failure to take any advisers from the Departments of Defence, External Affairs, Treasury, or Trade and Industry with him on his U.S. visit. The Asian tour was not much better in that respect. The official party was the same except for the addition of a doctor, and one "middle-ranking External Affairs officer" (Assistant Secretary Osborn).

3. Lawler said that he was also concerned about Gorton's judgment. He claimed that Gorton was contemptuous of expert advice from the Public Service, and was too inclined to take decisions of basic importance with little or no information. In this regard he said that his private secretary, Ainslie Gotto, was of considerable influence. She was hardly a "foreign affairs adviser," as some have described her, but Gorton sometimes does ask for her opinion on issues. He described her as a sounding board (a description offered by other observers). Lawler then cited another example of how Gorton is influenced on policy by rather unusual sources. He said that the only significant policy shift in the Governor-General's annual speech to the Parliament (given on March 12 and personally written by Prime Minister Gorton) was the section on Papua-New Guinea which clarified the Government's intent to develop that territory for independence. Lawler said that this section resulted from an exchange of correspondence and conversations with Tony Voutas. Young Voutas and his family are close friends of the Gortons. Voutas, recently elected to the Papua-New Guinea House of

Assembly, is about 25 years old, was formerly an Administration Patrol Officer, and more recently a founding member of the Pangu Pati, the Territory's most radical group and one which favors "immediate home rule" in preparation for independence. Lawler said he had no quarrel with this particular policy shift and thought it was a good one; but he considered it a bit strange that a 25-year-old political radical should be the key influence on Gorton with respect to that policy. The most concerned government departments, External Territories and External Affairs, were unaware of the policy shift until after the speech was given.

4. Lawler said that perhaps Gorton's greatest problem was his unwillingness to listen to advice from others. He trusted hardly anyone and was basically a "loner." More often than not his advice came from persons whose only qualification to give advice was that they were old and close friends. None of this would be so bad, Lawler said, if Gorton himself were intellectually equipped. "But he is not." He is not even consistent and his views on any issue can change from day to day depending upon his mood and who has talked to him.

5. Lawler said that another concern of his with regard to Gorton's leadership and performance was the latter's conviction that the only thing that counted in this country was public opinion. He treated Parliament and the Public Service with contempt while catering to the electorate. He was trying to be all things to all men, and was attempting to build up an image of a "rather ordinary sort of good mate." He was often so busy cultivating this image, including personal speech-writing for public gatherings, that he gave too little time or attention to the job of being Prime Minister. The above was understandable for the first few months of his Prime Ministership, particularly when the press was willing to give him the benefit of the doubt and assume he was "settling-in." But the press, his fellow Parliamentarians, and the Public Service had seen little improvement, and time is running out with the public. Gorton is, Lawler said, living on "borrowed time." This is particularly evident with regard to the Government's performance in Parliament. Gorton has provided no leadership in that body, and the various Ministers are largely left to their own devices. The "front-bench" has become a collection of individuals rather than a disciplined political team. The consequence has been

an exceptionally inept government performance during the just completed Parliamentary session. There had been one "unnecessary boner after another," and the Government had been defeated in the Senate on the National Service legislation simply because of lack of co-ordination within the Government. The Labor Party opposition had time and again made Gorton and his Government look "like an incompetent collection of uninformed fools." The Government back-benchers were up in arms. They disagree with Gorton's views on foreign and defense policy, and many from marginal districts were worried about keeping their seats at the next election because of the Government's inept performance. Lawler said that it was virtually impossible to find a Government Parliamentarian who had anything good to say about Gorton's performance to date. Those who strongly supported his candidacy for the party leadership will at most offer excuses for his performance: "He needs time to settle in and find his way."

6. Lawler concluded by saying that Gorton appeared to be "playing" at being Prime Minister. He seldom spends more than six hours a day in his office, and the amount of work he performs at home is questionable. Although he is reported to prefer to work out of the Prime Minister's residence (The Lodge), his working sessions often are no more than "bull sessions;" nothing very concrete ever seems to come out of The Lodge.

~~SECRET~~ - LIMDIS

Page 1 of 4
Encl. No. 2
A-615 from Canberra

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Alan Reid, Reporter for Sydney Daily Telegraph
and The Bulletin Magazine
John C. Dorrance, Political Officer, American Embassy,
Canberra

DATE : June 18, 1968

SUBJECT : Prime Minister Gorton's Performance

During a luncheon conversation, Mr. Reid discoursed at length and with frankness on Prime Minister Gorton's performance to date. Reid based his assessment of that performance on frequent and close personal contact with the Prime Minister. The two have been friends for years, and Reid is frequently favored with personal, off-the-record briefings on various important subjects. The Prime Minister has also often used Reid as a sounding board for new ideas, and as an informal public relations and press adviser. Reid accompanied Prime Minister Gorton on the latter's recent U.S. tour. Reid is also Australia's senior and most prominent political pundit. He is considered by the Embassy to be an exceptionally reliable source, and a sensitive observer of Australia's political scene.

Following are the key points made by Mr. Reid during the conversation.

1. Reid said that he and Gorton had been close personal friends for years but that he (Reid) was, as an Australian, "concerned" and even "frightened" for his country because of the nature of Gorton's "immature and rash behavior" as Prime Minister. He felt that, although his public image remains favorable, he was running out of time, and his "performance would catch up with him." Fortunately for Gorton, the constant strife within the opposition Labor Party had caused the public and the press to overlook Gorton's own "shabby" and "dangerous" performance. But, "this is changing." Reid then turned to a number of specifics.

2. Gorton has a fantastic capacity to hate, and the memory of an elephant. He is thin-skinned, and exceptionally sensitive to real

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or imagined slights. He is innately disdainful and distrustful of the Public Service. A combination of all these factors has resulted in a mutual "hate-fest" between himself and virtually the entire Australian Public Service. His inability to trust anyone but a few hand-picked friends resulted in the transfer out of the Prime Minister's Office of Holt's entire staff except for the Press Secretary, Tony Eggleton, and the latter's assistant, Mary Newport. For all practical purposes, Gorton depends almost entirely on his new departmental secretary, Len Hewitt, and his private secretary, Ainslie Gotto, for advice on almost any subject. He ignores or is distrustful of advice from the Defence and External Affairs Departments.

3. His private secretary, Ainslie Gotto (a 21-year-old high school graduate), has a tremendous degree of influence over Gorton. A reporter's recent reference to Gotto as being one of Gorton's two "foreign affairs advisers" (the other being Len Hewitt), was not far off base. Gorton uses her as a "sounding board" for new ideas; She in turn has taken it upon herself to screen official briefs directed to the Prime Minister, and even to summarize them without reference to anyone else. She also has drafted a number of Gorton's speech notes or outlines, including his speech to the National Press Club in Washington. Other Government Ministers have complained that she has taken it upon herself to determine when and if they can see the Prime Minister.

4. Gorton's judgment is often poor and rash. He tends to be impulsive and to act or take important decisions without adequate information. He is unduly influenced "by the last person to see him." He pays too little attention to policy briefs, often not reading them at all. During the visit to Washington, many briefs prepared for the visit were read hurriedly at the last minute, or not at all.

5. Gorton's attitude toward Parliament is one of contempt. This explains in part his shabby performance on the floor of the House to date, where he has made no statements of real import. He considers the electorate to be his audience, and this explains his proclivity to make most of his statements of any importance to public gatherings or the press rather than to Parliament.

6. One of his major problems is that he keeps forgetting that he no longer is a Senator and therefore "can no longer have the luxury of speaking without thinking." Gorton has a tendency to say the first thing that comes into his mind. His stubbornness often prevents him from admitting to an error and backtracking.

7. Asked whether Gorton was giving serious consideration to an early election, Reid said that Gorton had told him during the U.S. visit that he had not yet made up his mind. However, he was preparing next year's budget (which will be tabled in Parliament during August) with the possibility of an election in mind. Gorton had said he probably would not make up his mind until August or September. If he did call an election (Gorton said), it would not be so much to take advantage of disorder in the Labor Party, but rather to permit him to "put my own house in order." Reid said this was a reference to differences between Gorton and members of his Ministry such as Hasluck and Fairhall, and the feuding between Treasurer McMahon and Country Party Leader and Deputy Prime Minister McEwen. Gorton said he would like to "sack the lot."

8. Reid said that the press probably had overplayed some of the policy and personality differences existing between Gorton and his Ministry. But these differences were nevertheless serious and basic. They stem not only from policy differences and dissatisfaction with Gorton's performance, but also from the fact that many of his Cabinet Ministers (not to mention a number of backbenchers) have never reconciled themselves to Gorton's election to the leadership. Reid said that the Liberal caucus vote for Gorton to be Party Leader and Prime Minister had been very close, and not the 51-30 vote reported to the Public. The margin was only several votes, and he made it only because the opposition had split between Hasluck, Bury, and Snedden. If his opposition had rallied behind Hasluck before the caucus, Hasluck would be Prime Minister today. (Embassy comment: Dudley Erwin, the Government Whip in the House of Representatives, said virtually the same thing to Richard Service, the American Consul General in Melbourne, about a week after the caucus. Erwin should know--he counted the votes.) Reid said that a few days ago he did a personal "nose count" among Liberal Parliamentarians and found that Hasluck would become Party Leader and Prime Minister by a landslide if a new caucus were held today.

~~SECRET~~ - LIMDIS

Page 4 of 4

Encl. No. 2

A-615 from Canberra

9. Summing up Gorton's performance and his (Reid's) unhappiness with it, Reid said that the primary problem is that Gorton is too rash and quick to decide, distrustful of his advisers, and too inclined to reject advice or information which is distasteful to him. Often he will act on intuition, supported only by the views of Ainslie Gotto and Len Hewitt.

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Miss Ainslie Gotto, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
John C. Dorrance, Political Officer, American Embassy, Canberra

DATE : June 19, 1968

SUBJECT : Prime Minister Gorton's Visit to the U.S.

During a brief conversation following the Prime Minister's return to Australia from his U.S. and Asian tours, Miss Gotto made the following comments about the Prime Minister's U.S. visit.

1. Prime Minister Gorton was tremendously impressed with the treatment he received while in the U.S., but was extremely nervous about Australian public reaction to that treatment. He feared that it would appear he was being "bought." Throughout the trip the Prime Minister was extremely tense and "keyed up." Some nights he would not go to bed before three or four in the morning, and insisted that Miss Gotto and his departmental secretary (Len Hewitt) sit up and chat with him. After several days he was so groggy that his public speaking performances were affected.

2. Miss Gotto claimed that her most difficult task was getting the Prime Minister to focus on the briefing papers brought with the party. She said that he never did read some. Gorton remarked at one point that they "were so much bumph." She also said that none of his speech notes or outlines were prepared until the last moment, although he did put considerable effort into the one given on arrival at the White House. She claimed that she had personally drafted the speech notes that he used at the Washington National Press Club.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. A.T. Griffith, Assistant Secretary for Defence
and External Relations, Prime Minister's Department
John C. Dorrance, Political Officer, American Embassy,
Canberra

DATE : June 21, 1968

SUBJECT : Prime Minister's Performance and Visit to U.S.

Griffith is considered by his fellow public servants to be one of the more influential Public Service Officials in the Prime Minister's Department. Described by some as a "backroom boffin," Griffith apparently prepares many of the basic "thinkpiece" briefs for the Prime Minister on defense and external affairs. He also has had a hand in drafting speech notes for the Prime Minister. Following are highlights of a brief conversation.

1. It is taking an inordinately long time for Gorton to settle in and "do business" as Prime Minister. But during recent weeks, he (Griffith) has noticed considerable improvement in both public and private performance. Perhaps Gorton's greatest contribution so far has been to shake up the Prime Minister's Department and get many of those in it to start thinking along fresh lines and new approaches to basic issues. The end result might be continuation of past policies, but at least all alternatives have been examined. On the other hand, Gorton has a rather unfortunate penchant for publicly discussing all of the alternatives that are placed before him.
2. Speaking of Gorton's U.S. visit, Griffith thought it had been "a bit of a disaster." He thought that his public image during and just after his visit to Washington had been at an all-time low. He ascribed this to a number of reasons. One was Gorton's emphasis, before his departure, on his intention to meet all of the Presidential candidates to sound them out. However, virtually no arrangements were made until the last moment, with the consequence that he had to return almost empty-handed on that score. In Australia, it appeared that most of the candidates could not be bothered with receiving the Prime Minister.

3. Furthermore, according to Griffith, Gorton had overplayed his mission of sounding out U.S. intentions in Asia. The press here quickly picked up that the President and others had turned the tables on him by pointing up that it was for Australia and other Asian powers to set the course in Asia; the U.S.'s performance in that area in the future would depend upon Australia and others carrying at least a fair share of the burden. In the end, Gorton came back and reported to Parliament that he now knew the U.S. would stand firm in Asia until the end of President Johnson's term, and that it probably would thereafter. This was no news to anyone and he could have said that without going to Washington. In the Parliamentary debate after Gorton's report on the Washington visit, Labor Leader Gough Whitlam "walked all over Gorton."
4. Gorton's visit to the U.S. had also suffered from his tendency to make policy pronouncements there rather than in his home country. The press quite rightly resented this.
5. On the other hand, Gorton's Asian tour "went off pretty well," and what Gorton lost from the U.S. visit, he has probably regained since then. However, even the Asian tour was badly organized, with consequent unnecessary foul-ups throughout the trip (Griffith did not detail the foul-ups). Part of the problem was Gorton's refusal to delegate authority to anyone. Nothing could be done in arranging the Asian trip while Gorton was in the U.S., and there were only a few days between the two trips. Everything was done at the last moment, and much was left undone.
6. Gorton's report to the nation on the Asian tour (his speech before the National Press Club, Canberra 6305) was his best public performance to date. When asked why he consistently makes his most important statements to the public rather than in Parliament, Griffith said that this stemmed in part from Gorton's belief that he performed better in public than in the give and take of Parliamentary debate. In Parliament, Whitlam could score more points.
7. Griffith said that Gorton still has a lot to learn. He still forgets that he cannot say anything that pops into his head--as he could when he was a Senator. He also has to learn that his government is a team, and others, both ministers and public service officers, have something to contribute. At present he operates as if the Government were a "one-man band." When he seeks

~~SECRET~~ - LIMDIS

Page 3 of 3

Encl. No. 4

A-615 from Canberra

or takes advice, it can be from some rather strange sources. He then mentioned Gorton's private secretary; Ainslie Gotto--"the most influential little so-in-so in Canberra." With Miss Gotto, it was not just a question of her influence on Gorton, she also controlled to a dangerous extent who else in Government had access to the Prime Minister.

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INFORMATION

Pres file

Saturday, July 13, 1968 -- 3:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

You raised, roughly speaking, the following question the other day: How could our society produce at the same time men of the quality of our young Marines and other fighting men and hippies and draft-card burners.

The attached letter to Elspeth from a former student is one answer: If many of the dissidents actually were in Vietnam and faced the reality of the problem, they would change. Of course, the key point about this particular young man is that he had the courage to make the decision to go out and see for himself.

Nevertheless, an interesting story.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Mrs. Rostow,

I am an ex-student of yours at the School of International Service, American University, and a college drop-out. I quit school the first semester of my junior year because too many questions were unanswered. These unanswered questions were, of course, partially related to the Vietnam war, but to a greater degree they were directed towards myself. Of course I was influenced by the mood and temper of my generation, by concepts of direct action and personal involvement -- the whole conceptual context in which SDS and similar organizations germinated -- but somehow I had to know, not just from afar but from inside the whole thing.

The National Teach-In in Washington where your husband debated Hoffman and Morgenthau on "The Formulation of American Foreign Policy" left me in a complete state of "what the hell is really happening here?" If you will remember that night I was sitting next to you during the debate. Prior to the debate we said a few things of no consequence concerning the topic of debate. But what interested me then and now was your reaction. You had great difficulty in containing yourself in the wake of merciless repeated attacks upon your husband's stated position. There was something you wanted very much to say but of course you were unable to do so. What you wanted to say, I felt then and know now, is what I wanted to discover. It is not what you would have said, but the understanding which you had which would have allowed you to say it that I was in desperate need of. I knew that I could not find what I was looking for at American University or in Washington, D. C. so I decided to become involved.

I quit school, joined the Army, volunteered for Special Forces, underwent approximately 18 months of training, and later got into the field of intelligence. I came to Vietnam approximately 10 months ago, was wounded as an advisor, spent two months in Japan and returned to Vietnam to do strategic political analysis. The cumulative effect of these experiences prepared me well to learn from what I was to find in Saigon in the wake of the Tet offensive. I became involved to a degree far beyond my greatest expectations -- from loving and crying with a pathetically lost and tragic young Vietnamese girl to speaking with captured and disillusioned Communist cadre; from being proselyted by captured and ideological cadre to working daily with a brilliant Vietnamese

nationalist anti-Communist; from becoming good enough friends with a few young University of Saigon law students to discuss Vietnam and America candidly to hunting over half of Saigon to find a girl I had lost during the last attack. From these and many more such experiences or, more accurately, from the total experience of becoming emotionally and intellectually involved in the Vietnam war, I have come to the understanding I needed at the National Teach-In in Washington more than three years ago:

Of course I have my personal opinions on how the war should be run, and opinions about why it isn't being conducted that way, but beyond that and more meaningful, I believe, I have become involved enough to say that this "Open letter to the American People" is an accurate expression of the average Vietnamese plea for understanding and help in an increasingly desperate situation. Only they can fully understand how desperate it is.

I would like to thank you for helping to instill within me the intellectual curiosity and integrity that led me on this personally rewarding journey.

With highest regards,

/s/ William L. Pensinger

(W. L. Pensinger
Hq MACV J2 SRA
APO S. F. 96222)

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An Open Letter To The American

By The American Universities Alumni Association

Dear Friends,

We speak to you today, from this land of prolonged agony, not as members of an interest group pleading for the benefit of their own class above the immense sea of blood and tears that has not stopped rising, but as patriotic men of a war-torn nation who live the woeful life of their fellowmen, know the sorrow that has transcended words, and cherish no greater dream than to see peace and dignity return to their fatherland.

That dream has not materialized after twenty five years of endless struggle and fifteen years of generous assistance that you have lent us in money, technique and men. On the contrary, the conflict has only intensified with time into a horrid nightmare of death and destruction that distresses all men of good will.

A great problem is at stake for our two nations. The future of Vietnam is being put to trial. And the imposing task of making the right decision calls forth America's own pride as a courageous people capable of perpetuating a great tradition in human conduct. A crucial time is approaching, in which momentous acts are being made that will affect the course of history for generations to come. And yet so much is still left unsaid, so many questions unanswered.

A great confusion has clouded over the complex reality of Vietnam for many years. A profusion of words and numbers has not led to a clear grasp of the Vietnamese dream, nor explained the hopeless enigma of succeeding events. And deep in this heart, the common Vietnamese still

lives a daily life in the frustrated of an old dream that has not seen the light of day.

At no other time could efforts at communion be more meaningful. And at no other time could a Vietnamese sense a duty more awesome than to speak out the anguished voice of his fellowmen.

We know the meaning of the commitment. But we dare not shrink from the endeavor. To keep silent would mean a negation that could bring tragic consequences to the lives of millions. And to deny you an unobstructed glimpse at reality from a Vietnamese framework contributes nothing to the efforts towards an honorable solution to the

tragedy.

And so we are writing you today of this unquenchable dream of our people, of the conditions in which it has grown, and of its hope in the future. Let it be known to you that though we may not say well enough, we speak the true voice of our own conscience. And let it be known to the world that though we are separated by half a world in distance, we are united in the same human aspirations and hope for a better future.

With our determination and good will, the hope shall be gratified, and that long cherished dream of the Vietnamese people shall become reality.

What does a simple Vietnamese dream of in the middle of this stupefying reality of war and uncertainty?

The dream is simple and timeless. He wants peace, well-being, and dignity, for him and for his nation.

—PEACE to him is the simple happiness of a day without the sound of cannonfire, without death lurking around the corner or haunting the night, without the frightful apprehension of a mortar shell on a neighbor's roof, a brother killed on the battlefield. Peace is the absence of violence, the harmonious solution to internal conflicts the friendliness between brothers.

WELL BEING means little more than enough food and lodging for the family, impunity from sickness, an occasional joy of drinking with a close friend, watching a classical drama on a public TV.

DIGNITY constitutes freedom from harassment and oppression, the right of being treated as others, the assurance of able to conduct one's own life and improving one's own welfare. And national dignity means the right of the nation to decide her own destiny and resolve her own conflicts, free from foreign interference and guidance, free from subordination and humiliation.

How have the Communists responded to that dream, and how does the common man react towards them?

The Communists know well the simple man's dream,

and they make sweet promises to soothe his heart. But the common man has been betrayed too often in the past, and no words suffice. Only concrete acts assure the integrity of intentions.

The concrete acts that the Viet Cong have committed since their apparition eight years ago have been acts of war, justified as a struggle against social injustice and foreign domination. Battle broke out all over the countryside and the impoverished people here all the burden in order to carry out the war to a promised final victory, the Communists have drained the people of all their means for livelihood, even taken their lives as a necessary sacrifice. The promises of peace and well-being no longer spelled magic, and hundreds of thousand destitute Vietnamese fled away to refugee camps in a desperate hope for a breach of security.

But the most eloquent acts of justification by the Communists have not manifested themselves until the blustering events since Tet. A deadly blow was dealt on the Vietnamese consciousness when, on the most sacred holiday for the Vietnamese people, the National Liberation Front broke a sacred promise and transformed the few days of anticipated joy and relief into a nightmare of death and destruction.

Unnecessary acts of brutality and terrorism were resorted to in an effort to intimidate the Vietnamese people and cause a political repercussion. Government workers were massacred and mass buried in Hue, missionaries slain in Ban-Me-Thuot, news men executed in Saigon. And everywhere, war fell upon the common man like a plague. Hundreds of thousands of homes were burned down, tens of thousand families violently separated in death. The Vietnamese people were to know the most horrendous New-Year in their history.

The common man sees all. He knows all. And he reacts. Throughout the mad orgy of death that the Communists began five months ago serious threat to the and perpetuated to security of South Vietnam this very day, the poor after the fall of the Diem regime that America had who called themselves liberators as if they were the incarnation of Death himself. And the men who have been intoxicated with violence paid no heed to their propounded ultimate aim, deluged.

On the eve of Ho-chi-Minh's birthday, rockets fell on heavily-populated quarters in Saigon, taking innocent lives and leaving thousands barehanded and homeless. The proletariat has ceased to be the end for the promised revolution.

The insane and desperate acts since Tet by the Viet Cong have confirmed a new truth Communism has counted itself out in the people's mind and heart. The way of violence can never respond to the eternal longing for peace of the Vietnamese people, and will never realize the unfulfilled dream of the common man.

A different alternative must be the answer. Is it the present operating system in South Vietnam?

How have the authorities in South Vietnam responded to the Vietnamese dream in the past fifteen years?

After the partition of Vietnam in 1954, the U.S. began taking an active part in aiding South Vietnam develop into a strong nation, capable of resisting the Communist expansion. Money was poured in, advisers despatched. Hope ran high that a new Republic was emerging. But it did not last very long. With all her good intentions, America has in effect helped one man consolidate his own power, regardless of the people's aspirations, and base his strength on an inherited system that is outdated from the outset. The old machinery of French Colonialism, the very object for national

unrest for ten years, was put back to power with all its techniques and agents. And the old system of free and irresponsible enterprise at the cost of the commune was all but strengthened. The age-old problems of corruption, oppression and injustice were given new force, and the National Liberation Front found no better ground on which to proliferate. That force had become such a serious threat to the security of South Vietnam this very day, the poor after the fall of the Diem regime that America had who called themselves liberators as if they were the significantly. Troops arrived by tens of thousand, weapons and ammunition poured in by thousands of tons money overflowed and advisers

From that time on, America's involvement in Vietnam was deeper than ever before. The overwhelming presence of the Allied forces and tremendous needs for supporting services, the overflow of money from US spending in all fields of activities, along with the prolongation of an outdated system, the already serious strains on social balance and a deterioration of security situation, all added up to a complete overturn of the social order, a pitiable degradation of values, and an increasing dependence on foreign aid for survival. National dignity has never been so vitally injured, and self determination was a dream out of reach. A bitter sense of despair developed, resulting in dismay, discontent, abandonment and escapism. Vietnam was to know all the humiliation of a people unable to control her own course of events.

What does the Present look like, and what is the prospect for the future?

Developments since the Tet offensive have awakened in the South Vietnamese people a new awareness and a new determination. Communism has uncovered its true inhuman nature, and is forever alienated from the people. There was born a new apprehension that peace could not be sold to violence and terrorism, but must be defended with courage and strong will. Thousands of young men have volunteered to join the Armed Forces, students found a new purpose in safeguarding the city, women learned about first aid, young boys and girls helped settle refugees. For the first time in many years, the people are united with the government in the same purpose and determination. And for the first time, and a painful realization has arrived to the men of good will on the other side of the battlefield. A new doubt has arisen of the futility of violent efforts and the validity of revolutionary motives. Disaffected soldiers and cadres have been returning in greater numbers everyday as morale declined after each battle of blood.

A new time is approaching. A new hope is born for a creative way to solve the Vietnam conflict by peaceful means in which all Vietnamese

(Continued on page 7)

for the same purpose of rebuilding Vietnam to freedom and dignity, and achieving the Vietnamese dream.

A few lines of fleeting words can never be expected to embrace a complex reality that has eluded all the heroic efforts at understanding in the past. But a voice has been raised from within the conflict, and cannot be in vain.

The Vietnam conflict has developed into a problem of grave import for our two nations which no one has fully anticipated and no one can claim innocent. But no vindication is needed and no resentment justified. Instead, a new spirit of cooperation is required to find an honorable solution to the dismaying predicament.

We know our share in the problem. And we ask no greater chance than to be able to solve our own conflict. The Vietnamese are proud of themselves, and they possess more than enough capacity to overcome obstacles when the initiative is restored which would inspire a new spirit of selfdetermination into this weary land of affliction.

We ask your support in this endeavor. We know America's passionate advocacy for the freedom of man, and her unfailing stand for justice. To fight for her conviction, she has had make the painful sacrifice of losing her best sons and consuming her richest resources. But the task cannot be left undone, and the agony will end only after the tragedy of Vietnam has been resolved.

To change from a tired society ridden with imperfections and threatened by a ruthless enemy into a new one with vitality and purpose, the process will be long and painful. But no efforts can be more meaningful. And if America is firm and wise, then freedom shall prevail, and justice will never be in doubt.

And in helping us build a new society, you will again show the world the kind of freedom and good judgment that has been an inseparable part of your valorous history.

The result will be beneficial to all, and your contribution to the cause of peace and freedom will never be forgotten.

The American Universities Alumni Association,

51

Saturday, July 13, 1968
2:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

In connection with your talk with Sid Davis this afternoon, you might make the following points about the Paris talks.

1. In substance, they are absolutely hung up on the issue of a total bombing cessation; that is, the other side has refused to commit itself in any way to military de-escalation either to match our present bombing cutback or a total bombing cessation. Given the level of infiltration and the evidence of a planned major offensive in the weeks ahead, we simply cannot gamble with the lives of our men and allies and accept a total bombing cessation, foregoing the 20% or so attrition we now ^{face} pose on men and supplies moving south.

2. On the other hand, our team in Paris and those who observe the contacts from here are not hopeless about a true negotiation developing in Paris:

-- the other side seems anxious not to break off the talks;

-- there has been occasion in the tea-breaks for some feeling out of general positions;

-- it was a good sign that Le Duc Tho came to Paris, and it is conceivable that they are now conferring in Hanoi on next steps.

3. In short, while there is absolutely no solid progress to report, it still seems worthwhile to persist in the Paris effort.

W. W. Rostow

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Saturday, July 13, 1968 - 1:20pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Czechoslovakia Situation Report

The Soviets have announced that Brezhnev and Podgorny are in Warsaw for a meeting with their socialist allies (presumably East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria -- but not the Czechs). Kosygin is still in Sweden, but expected to join the meeting this afternoon.

Soviet and East German newspapers are holding space for an important statement to be issued tonight. We have no confirmation that it relates to Czechoslovakia -- as it could also relate to Germany -- but one can speculate that it will represent a sharp diplomatic escalation and pressure play against the Czechs.

The Czech government has released a detailed description -- including localities -- of the Soviet withdrawal, which the Czechs say has started. We have one inconclusive indication that one or two units may have begun to withdraw.

34(b)(1)

The 'operation' of the Peoples Militia scheduled to start last night may have been a civil defense drill. We do not know whether the Peoples Militia is presently mobilized or deactivated. (According to General Sejna, it is not a formidable military force in comparison with the Czech army or police.)

Our Embassy in Prague reports a slight abatement of tension in the city. Foreign Minister Hajek's interview (reported in today's New York Times) is inconclusive. Interestingly, Hajek was only willing to say that 'he hoped' that there was no chance of Soviet intervention.

The Czech position continues to be that they will be happy to hold bilateral talks with their allies, but are not prepared to be summoned to a conclave like the Dresden Summit.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-272

By cbm, NARA, Date 3-3-03

W. W. Rostow

5 -
ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**Saturday, July 13, 1968
12:45 p.m.**

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick produces a statement on the Aid Bill, which he recommends you read before TV sometime on Monday. In a conversation with Sec. Rusk this morning, he thought an opening volunteered statement at a press conference might be the best form for such a statement.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRestow:rla

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1983

BY rg ON 9-29-92

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Presidential Statement on the Aid Bill

A draft Presidential statement on the Aid Bill is attached. It is basically the same statement as that earlier sent to you as a draft letter to Speaker McCormack.

I continue to urge that you personally read this statement before TV some time on Monday.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Enclosure.

1. I will read the statement before TV. _____
2. No _____
3. See me. _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(h)

BY 18 ON 9-29-92

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THE AID BILL

The Congress is about to consider a critical piece of legislation--the continuation for another year of the foreign aid program. I want to emphasize to the American people and to all Members of Congress my conviction that passage of this legislation is absolutely essential.

I have just returned from Central America, where I saw and felt at first hand the needs and aspirations of people who look to us for leadership and help. These people, with energy and hope, are hard at work building a new life. They and the millions of others in Asia, in Africa and Latin America who are struggling to better their own lives and the lives of their children, deserve the assurance that they are not alone and friendless.

The world's poor know that there is no moratorium on disease.

They know that there is no moratorium on hunger, starvation or illiteracy.

And they know that there can be no moratorium on their own war against these age-old enemies. Can we do less than offer them a small measure of support and encouragement in this battle?

In the end, each citizen and each member of Congress must make his own judgment of our national priorities.

Let me only say that my foreign aid budget request takes into account our critical needs at home as well as those abroad. As the Congress knows, it was the lowest request in history.

The Foreign Affairs Committee has reduced this request by \$600 million--about 20%. I regret this cut, but, in view of our joint concern for our fiscal problems, I will not oppose it.

But with these cuts, the program has been pared to the bone. Below this level the vitality of the regional initiatives we have stimulated in the developing areas would be severely threatened. Countries around the world which have trusted our resolve and heeded our advice would lose the confidence in peaceful progress which distinguishes this era from the long dark centuries of hopelessness which have been their common burden.

This is not, nor should it become, a partisan issue. Every President since Harry Truman has understood the importance of aid to our own security and to the future

of the free world. Nor, if I may add a personal note, can I imagine a greater disservice to my successor than the defeat, or crippling, of this bill. Be he Democrat or Republican, liberal or conservative, he will be charged with executing the foreign policy of the United States. It is our common responsibility to pass on to him intact the full range of instruments necessary to the performance of his duties. I speak from my own experience--and the experience of my three predecessors--when I say that none is more vital than foreign aid.

We are now engaged in crucial talks looking toward the end of the tragic conflict in Viet-Nam. We are about to begin talks with the Soviet Union on limiting the arms race. At a time when America's commitment to peace with security has begun to bear fruit, we must not seem to be withdrawing from the struggle against the basic causes of war and unrest.

I call upon the Congress to reaffirm--as it has so resolutely in the past--America's moral and material commitment to help others help themselves toward a better and more peaceful future.

MEMORANDUM

ACTION

Pres. file
54

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Saturday, July 13, 1968
12:20 p. m.

~~SECRET~~/HARVAN/PLUS

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith two pieces of business and one piece of information.

1. Tab A. Sect. Rusk has redone the instruction to Harriman and Vance. Present paragraphs 1-6 are a substitute for old paragraph 1. The balance of the cable remains as originally drafted.

2. Tab B. Although not constitutionally required, Sect. Rusk wishes to check with you before the final signature of the Exchange Agreement with the Soviet Union in Moscow. Thompson would like to sign on Monday, July 15, unless the Soviets move troops into Czechoslovakia over the week end. Essentially, Sect. Rusk wished you to be informed that we plan to follow this scenario.

3. Chip Bohlen is going on the PanAm flight as the senior representative of the U. S. Government on Monday. He will probably pay a courtesy call on Gromyko. He is fully briefed if Gromyko raises with him any matters of substance. Neither he nor Sect. Rusk is requesting that you see Bohlen before he goes. But if you wished him to carry any message to Moscow, he will be available until about Monday noon.

Walt Rostow

Paris instruction O. K. _____ No _____ Call me _____

Proceed with Monday signing, with Rusk proviso _____ No _____ Call me _____

Wish to see Bohlen _____ No _____ Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 8-1-01

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 18674
By isa NARA, Date 1-8-98

54a

DRAFT

TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE

NODIS/ HARVAN/ PLUS

PERSONAL FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE FROM THE SECRETARY.

(References)

1. The President and I believe that certain shades of difference which appear in reference cables could be reduced by a fuller exposition of what is really on our minds.

2. We see little evidence that the Hanoi delegation is prepared seriously to discuss other factors on which there must be an understanding before there is a complete cessation of the bombing. Their delegation may be awaiting the return of Le Duc Tho, they may be awaiting the results of the new offensive which they clearly seem to be preparing, they may be marking time for political developments in the United States, or they may feel that they are under no pressure to get going. Chairman Kosygin just recently wrote Prime Minister Gandhi pressing the point that we stop all of the bombing before anything else could be done and asked her to press this upon the United States. What the Soviets are doing behind the scenes, we just do not know clearly. There has been no further answer to the President's message to Kosygin on this subject.

3. Under these circumstances we are reluctant to make a full and detailed exposition of our views until it is quite clear that Hanoi is prepared to sit down and seriously discuss the problem on a two-way basis. Otherwise, there would be nothing more than a unilateral exposition to someone who is not really listening. It would put Hanoi in a position to make our views public at any time and in such a way as to inject questions of detail into public debate in this country and to stimulate fears and suspicions among the South Vietnamese and other Asian allies.

4. It seems to me that the question is basically one of timing. I would think that you have plenty to talk about in your Monday private meeting within the framework of State's 199838. You could begin with a discussion of the concept of the Phase One-Phase Two approach. If they reject this in principle at the outset, this could be pursued at some length on the basis that it is an attempt on our part to meet their problem -- namely, to prepare the way for a stopping of the bombing by the United States as a first step. If they seem sufficiently interested as to want a sample of what you are talking about, you could go into the DMZ point in considerable detail. At the same time, you could mention the other topics as a sort of agenda for

a further discussion of the Phase One-Phase Two concept. It would of course be of great value if you could elicit from them their thoughts on topics Phase Two would have to take into account.

5. It seems to me that State's 199838 gives you plenty of ammunition for your next private meeting, pending Vance's return on Tuesday for further detailed discussion here.

6. On your specific question as to whether you are authorized by State's 199838 to put down a complete package, you should not put down what purports to be a complete package until ^{you and} we have resolved such questions as the withdrawal of forces by both sides from South Viet-Nam and the broad questions referred to in Paragraph 13. As indicated above, you are authorized to explore the concept of Phase One-Phase Two fully, explore the DMZ in great detail, and indicate more generally the other topics that you would wish to explore further. It seems to me that this is in itself more than you can possibly cover in a single meeting.

S:DRusk:jmr

7. "Indiscriminate attacks" certainly include rocketing and shelling of cities and should include other acts primarily designed for terroristic purposes. We think this should ordinarily include mines and explosive devices used for such purposes and certainly could include use of NVA/ VC personnel on the ground in indiscriminate attacks primarily for political purposes. You should use above as illustrative in order to probe any DRV reactions. We would like to get as much as we can in this connection.

8. Military experts here are concerned that prohibition against alteration and composition of military units could raise technical problems for both sides. It appears to give a certainty and security which is more apparent than real since it is possible to attach large numbers of additional troops to existing units. In any event, it is scarcely necessary for you to make this an initial proposal. If they are interested, we can negotiate the details subsequently.

9. You need not include proposals with respect to complete withdrawal by each government of its forces from SVN. We think it may interest the other side and you may raise it if as a result of your discussions this appears to you useful. The principle is obviously an important one and should be of considerable interest to the North

Vietnamese but we leave timing to your discretion. We continue to have under consideration your proposal with respect to token withdrawals and appreciate the argumentation you have provided. We are not, however, persuaded this should be an initial proposal on our part but are wont to believe it should await evidence of their seriousness with respect to Phase One-Phase Two proposal. If there is evidence of willingness to negotiate on this basis we will reconsider your recommendation.

10. You need not raise the broad matters contained in Paragraph 13 of our Reftel. These ^{are}/discretionary with you and were intended to be responsive to a point in Zorin's original suggestions on which you reported he "attached considerable importance" (Paris 17226, 7.13 Delto 361).



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

546
10019~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUL 12 1968

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: The Under Secretary
S/S *[Signature]* *[Signature]*

FROM: EUR - John M. Leddy

SUBJECT: Request for Authority under Department of
State Circular No. 175 to Sign an Agreement
on Exchanges with the USSR for 1968-1969 --
ACTION MEMORANDUM

DISCUSSION:

Under Department Circular No. 175 on February 20 you authorized negotiation of a new exchanges agreement with the USSR for 1968-69. Pursuant to this authorization, we opened negotiations in Moscow on June 3, which have led to agreement on a text of a new Agreement (Tab A).

The new Agreement is similar in structure to the one for 1966-67, retaining or tightening existing provisions for reciprocity.

The level of exchanges provided in some programs is lower than that provided in the previous agreement although, in some of these cases, it is equal to or higher than actual implementation. In performing arts groups, the Soviets agreed only to a reduction from five to three. In exhibits, they agreed to one exhibit in six cities instead of the previous two in three cities each, thus allowing essentially the same exposure. Overall, the agreement maintains the pre-existing internal balance.

Copies of the following dependent agreements, which were also negotiated in Moscow, are to be

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 8-1-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

appended as annexes to the new intergovernmental agreement once they have been signed by representatives of the institutions involved:

Agreement between the American Academy of Sciences and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences

Agreement between the American Council of Learned Societies and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences

Memorandum on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy between the Atomic Energy Commission and the U.S.S.R. Committee on Utilization of Atomic Energy.

The last of these three represents resumption of activity following a Soviet-initiated lapse since a previous Memorandum expired at the end of 1965.

The new US-USSR Agreement on Exchanges, as in the case of the five previous such agreements, has been carefully drawn to assure that all commitments entered into are subject to the availability of funds and to assure that the undertakings on the part of the United States can be carried out within the authority of the Executive under the Constitution and existing laws.

As most of the exchanges provided for are to be carried out by other Departments and Agencies and private individuals, groups and corporations, each of the parties concerned was consulted prior to and during the negotiations and each has expressed a willingness to participate in the respective exchanges.

Pursuant to the provisions of Circular No. 175, authorization is requested for Ambassador Thompson to sign on behalf of the United States the new US-USSR Agreement on Exchanges for 1968-69. A Memorandum of Law covering this request is attached (Tab B).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

The President was consulted before approval of the draft for negotiation and again on June 29, when he authorized completion of the negotiation. However, you may wish to consider our sending the attached Read-Rostow Memorandum which forwards a copy of the agreed text (Tab C).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That you authorize, pursuant to Department Circular No. 175, Ambassador Thompson to sign the US-USSR Agreement on Exchanges for 1968-69.

Approve *Deane Bush*

Disapprove _____

(2) That, if Presidential clearance is desired, you approve transmission of the attached Read-Rostow Memorandum.

Approve *✓ NK per LSE*

Disapprove _____

CONCURRENCES:

<i>OK!</i>	L/T - Mr. Bevans <i>ae</i>
<i>OK!</i> - Mr. Rimestad <i>B p 11</i>	L/CRP - Mr. Teal <i>ae</i>
CU - Mr. Canter <i>ae</i>	P - Mr. Phillips <i>RL</i>
H - Ambassador Torbert <i>H.T.</i>	SCI - Mr. Pollack <i>ms for</i>

USIA, an advisory committee of the intelligence community, the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, Commerce, Housing and Urban Development, Transportation, and Health, Education and Welfare have collaborated in preparing portions of the draft and concur in the pertinent sections.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

Attachments:

- Tab A - Text of new Agreement
- Tab B - Memorandum of Law
- Tab C - Proposed Read-Rostow Memorandum

EUR/SES:AIWortzel:se 7/12/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

54c

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON EXCHANGES IN
THE SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL AND
OTHER FIELDS IN 1968-69.

The Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics;

Believing that the continuation of exchanges
will contribute to the broadening of mutual under-
standing between the American and Soviet peoples;

Have agreed to the following program of exchanges
in scientific, technical, educational, cultural, and
other fields for 1968 and 1969.

SECTION I

General

1. The exchanges and visits provided for herein shall be subject to the Constitution and applicable laws and regulations of the respective countries.

2. The Parties, desirous of having the exchanges and visits between them take place under favorable conditions and without delay, agree that:

a. The programs and itineraries, lengths of stay, dates of arrival, financial and transportation arrangements and other details of the exchanges and visits provided for in this Agreement, except as otherwise herein stated, shall be agreed upon on a mutually acceptable basis, as a rule not less than thirty days in advance, through diplomatic channels or between appropriate organizations requested by the Parties to carry out these exchanges;

b. Applications for visas for visitors under this Agreement shall be submitted, as a rule, not less than twenty days before the estimated time of departure;

c. Each of the Parties shall have the right to include in delegations interpreters or members of its Embassy who shall be considered as within the agreed total membership of such delegations;

d. Unless otherwise provided for in this Agreement, and except where other specific arrangements have been agreed upon, visitors under this Agreement shall arrange to pay their own expenses, including international travel, internal travel and costs of maintenance in the receiving country.

3. The exchanges and visits enumerated in this Agreement shall not preclude other visits and exchanges which may be arranged by the two countries or undertaken by their organizations or individual citizens, it being understood that arrangements for additional visits and exchanges, as appropriate, will be facilitated by prior agreement through diplomatic channels or between appropriate organizations.

SECTION II

Science

1. The Parties will take all appropriate measures in order to encourage and achieve the fulfillment of:

a. The Agreement between the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America and the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a copy of which is appended to this Agreement as Annex No. I;

b. The Agreement between the American Council of Learned Societies and the Academy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a copy of which is appended to this Agreement as Annex No. II;

c. The Memorandum on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy between the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a copy of which is appended to this Agreement as Annex No. III.

2. The Parties take note of the provisions for exchanges in the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Desalination, including the Use of Atomic Energy, signed on November 18, 1964, and subsequently renewed for two years beginning November 18, 1966.

3. The Parties agree that additional visits or exchanges may be agreed upon through diplomatic channels, between the above-mentioned organizations or between other appropriate organizations whose participation in these additional visits and exchanges is approved by the Parties. These visits or exchanges, whether for the purpose of participating in scientific meetings, exchanging experiences, conducting studies or delivering lectures, shall take place as far as possible on a reciprocal basis.

SECTION III

Technology, Scientific-Technical Research, Industry, Transport and Construction

The Parties agree to provide for exchanges of delegations of five to six persons, which number may be increased by agreement, for visits of three to four weeks for the purpose of familiarization and exchange of experience in the following fields:

(1) Engineering Seismology and Construction in Earthquake Zones: study of design, construction and engineering practices in seismic areas, so as to minimize earthquake damage; research on earthquake prediction. (For the United States)

Irrigation Systems: construction of irrigation systems for land reclamation, methods and techniques of irrigating, combatting salting and waterlogging of irrigated soils. (For the Soviet Union)

(2) Weather Modification: current research on weather modification and cloud physics, including instrumentation and statistical evaluation of results, and also visits to weather modification test sites;

(3) Treatment of Water in Industry: treatment of industrial waste water by chemical, biological and other methods to prevent the pollution of water sources and treatment of water for industrial use, including familiarization with the methods, equipment and instruments used;

(4) Air Pollution: study of methods for prevention and control of air pollution from industrial processes, with emphasis on removal of sulphur from fuels and on engines which minimize emission of pollutants. Study of instruments and methods for measuring pollutants and their effects. Current research on effects on humans, animals, vegetation and materials; on air quality criteria; and on diffusion of pollutants;

(5) Ferrous Metallurgy: smelting of ferrous metals, production of hot and cold rolled steel, pipes, metal products, and products of heat-resisting alloys, including visits to research centers for the study of scientific methods in the metallurgical industry and thermo-mechanical processing;

(6) Industrialization of the Building Process: study of the organization of the building process from conversion of raw materials through fabrication, design and erection;

(7) Gas Industry: the design, construction, and exploitation of gas and gas-condensate deposits; construction and operation of storage facilities for gas and gas products;

(8) Management of Scientific and Technological Information: development of standard reference data to meet the needs of science and industry; development of systems for classification, retrieval, and mechanical translation of such data;

(9) Bridge and Tunnel Construction: planning and construction of bridges and tunnels of various types, scientific research work in the field of bridge and tunnel construction;

(10) Investigation of Solar Eclipses: joint scientific observation of two eclipses of the sun, one occurring in the U.S.S.R. in 1968 and one in the United States in 1970, with emphasis on measurement of solar x-rays and observation of the solar corona;

(11) The Technique and Technology of Mining Coal by Open Cast and Underground Methods.

SECTION IV

Agriculture

The Parties agree to provide for exchanges of agricultural scientists and specialists in the following fields:

For the United States:

(1) Insects and related arthropods which feed on certain weeds common to the U.S. and U.S.S.R. (two persons for total of five and one half months: one person for three and one half months and one person for two months);

(2) Micrometeorology and plant physiology (one person for two months);

(3) Techniques for improvement of grasslands in arid and semi-arid regions, including main grazing plants; transformation from natural pastures into cultivated pastures; systems of pasture rotation; and management of grazing lands and livestock (two persons for two months);

(4) Management of wildlife production, including furbearers (one person for two months);

(5) Taxonomy and biological control of plant-parasitic nematodes: Taxonomy of fungi, including exchange of fungal specimens (two persons for total of three months: one person for two months and one person for one month);

(6) Weed control in cotton, grain and sugar beets (one person for one month);

(7) Vegetable diseases, including exchange of pathological specimen and materials (one person for two months).

For the Soviet Union:

(1) Familiarization with methods of sterilizing farm pests by means of irradiation and chemicals (two persons for one month);

(2) Familiarization with selection methods to obtain hybrid corn with a high protein content and biochemical analysis methods (three persons for one month);

(3) Familiarization with experience in the organization and technology of cattle feeding on large specialized farms (five persons for one month);

(4) Familiarization with scientific research in combatting virus and bacteriological infections of farm animals and the organization of veterinary service (four persons for one month);

(5) Collection of seed samples of cultivated agricultural plants and related wild plants and familiarization with techniques of plant introduction (two persons for one month);

(6) Familiarization with methods of synthesis and system of testing biologically active substances; experience with use of antibiotics and biostimulators in feeding livestock and poultry (three persons for one month);

(7) Familiarization with experience in utilization of the biological methods for combatting weeds and collection of "phytophags" (three persons for one month);

If needed, interpreters will be included in the number of man-months established for each agreed exchange.

SECTION V

Public Health and Medical Sciences

1. The Parties reaffirm their interest in intensifying the fight against serious diseases and express their agreement to contribute to the further development of contacts and cooperation between the American and Soviet scientific institutions engaged in studying the problems of cancer, cardiovascular diseases, rheumatic diseases, virus diseases, including poliomyelitis, the problems of organ transplantation, and other important problems of medicine.

Details of specific exchanges shall be agreed upon directly between the U.S. Public Health Service and the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health.

2. The U.S. Public Health Service and the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health will facilitate continued cooperation between scientific research organizations and other agreed upon research organizations of the United States and the Soviet Union.

3. The Parties will facilitate the conduct of two joint inter-institute scientific sessions in 1968-69 providing two to four specialists from each side for a period of up to fourteen days for each session.

In the U.S. (in 1969)

Immunological aspects of the transplantation of organs

In the U.S.S.R. (in 1968)

Cardiovascular diseases.

The dates and durations of the above sessions will be agreed subsequently. Each side will inform the other side of its participants at least thirty days in advance of the sessions.

4. The Parties agree to provide for the exchange of three delegations, each to consist of three to six persons, for visits of three to four weeks.

From the U.S.:

- a. Health planning
- b. Organ transplantation
- c. Neurochemistry

From the U.S.S.R.:

- a. Organ transplantation
- b. Treatment of brain traumas
- c. Biochemistry

5. The Parties will exchange specialists, not to exceed 20 persons, for the purpose of studying the work of medical scientific research institutes and establishments of the United States and the Soviet Union, exchanging experience and conducting joint research studies. The length of individual exchanges shall not exceed six months, unless otherwise agreed to by the Parties, while the total volume of exchanges shall amount to no more than 80 man-months from each side over a period of two years.

6. Administrative arrangements for the fulfillment of the provisions of this Section will be established by discussions between the United States Public Health Service and the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Health.

SECTION VI

Education

1. The Parties agree to provide for the exchange annually from each side of:-

a. up to 30 college graduates, post-graduates, young researchers, and instructors for study and post-graduate work for a total of not more than 300 man-months, with periods of stay ranging from one semester to a full year, including five-week courses before the beginning of the academic year to improve the participants' competence in the Russian or English language;

b. up to 20 language teachers to participate in summer courses of nine to ten weeks to improve their competence in the Russian or English language (in 1969);

c. up to 10 professors and instructors of universities and other institutions of higher learning to conduct scholarly research and to deliver lectures for periods of up to seven months, the total volume of these exchanges not to exceed 30 man-months for each side;

2. The Parties agree that the exchanges specified above will be implemented by the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants for the United States, and by the USSR Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education for the Soviet Union, in accordance with the provisions of the Annex to this Section.

3. The Parties agree to provide for conditions necessary to fulfill agreed programs, including use of scholarly and scientific materials, and where appropriate and possible, work in laboratories and archives and contacts with scholars of scientific institutions outside the system of higher educational establishments.

4. The Parties agree to encourage the exchange by appropriate organizations of educational and teaching materials, including textbooks, syllabi and curricula, materials on methodology, children's literature, slides, samples of teaching instruments and visual aids.

SECTION VII

Performing Arts

1. The Parties will encourage and support, on a reciprocal basis, appearances of theatrical, musical, choral and choreographic groups, orchestras and individual performers.

2. The Parties agree to facilitate the tours of three major performing arts groups from each side to be exchanged correspondingly during 1968 and 1969.

3. Commercial contracts acceptable to the Parties will be concluded between appropriate organizations or impresarios of the United States and concert organizations of the Soviet Union well in advance and, whenever possible, at least nine months before the beginning of the tours. The receiving Party will seek to satisfy the wishes of the sending Party concerning the timing and duration of the tours as well as the number of cities to be visited.

4. The Parties agree to facilitate the tours of up to twenty individual performers from each side during 1968 and 1969. Suggestions for tours of individual performers may be made by appropriate organizations or impresarios of the United States and concert organizations of the Soviet Union.

5. In the event of additional mutually acceptable exchanges and tours in performing arts, the provisions of Paragraph 2 or Paragraph 3 will apply.

SECTION VIII

Cinematography

1. The Parties agree to encourage practical measures to increase the sale and purchase of motion pictures of their respective film industries, on the basis of equal opportunity and mutually acceptable financial terms, as well as to provide for the widest possible distribution of these films. To this end, representatives of the motion picture industry of the United States approved by the Department of State will negotiate directly with Sovexportfilm for the sale and purchase of films mutually acceptable to the Parties during the period of this Agreement.

2. The Parties agree to encourage appropriate organizations to hold, on the basis of reciprocity, one film premiere annually in each country from among the films purchased. Appropriate delegations to these premieres may be exchanged.

3. The Parties agree to encourage the exchange and to provide for the distribution of documentary films in the fields of science, culture, technology, education, and other fields, in accordance with lists to be agreed upon between the Parties.

4. The Parties will continue to study the possibilities of arranging for the joint production of entertainment, popular science, and educational shorts and feature-length films. The content of the films, as well as the companies or film studios involved in their production, will be agreed upon by the Parties.

5. The Parties agree to facilitate the exchange of delegations of creative and technical specialists.

6. The Parties, when requested by individuals or organizations of their respective countries, agree to discuss other film proposals, and to facilitate, as may be agreed, the exchange of scientific, cultural, technical and educational films produced by film organizations or in the custody of film museums and other film institutions in each country.

SECTION IX

Publications, Exhibits, Radio and Television

The Parties agree:

Publications

1. To render practical assistance for the successful distribution of the magazines Amerika in the Soviet Union and Soviet Life in the United States on the basis of reciprocity and to consult as necessary in order to find ways to increase the distribution of these magazines. The Parties agree to distribute free of charge unsold copies of the magazines among visitors to mutually-arranged exhibits on the condition that the issues of the magazines will contain materials devoted to the subject of the exhibit.
2. To encourage the exchange of books, magazines, newspapers and other publications devoted to scientific, technical, cultural, and general educational subjects between the libraries, universities and other organizations of each country, and also through commercial channels.
3. To encourage exchanges and visits of journalists, editors and publishers, as well as their participation in appropriate professional meetings and conferences.

Exhibits

4. To exchange one circulating exhibit from each side during the period covered by this agreement. The subject of the United States exhibit in the Soviet Union will be "Education in the USA." The subject of the Soviet exhibit in the United States will be "The USSR in Artistic Photographs."
5. To show each exhibit in six cities for a period of three to four weeks in each city. The Parties will discuss in a preliminary fashion the nature and general content of each exhibit and will

acquaint each other about the exhibits before their official opening, in particular through the mutual exchange of catalogues, prospectuses and other information pertinent to the exhibits. Other conditions for conducting the exhibits (dates, premises, number of personnel, financial terms, etc.) shall be subject to agreement by the Parties. Discussions on these matters will begin between the representatives of the Parties no later than October 15, 1968.

6. To arrange through diplomatic channels other exhibits and participation in national exhibits which may take place in either country during 1968 and 1969.

Radio and Television

7. To promote exchanges in the field of radio and television.

8. To promote the exchanges of delegations and individuals engaged in radio and television matters.

SECTION X

Civic, Social, Cultural and Professional Exchanges

1. The Parties agree to encourage joint undertakings and exchanges between appropriate organizations active in civic and social life, including youth and women's organizations, recognizing that the decision to implement such joint undertakings and exchanges remains a concern of the organizations themselves.

2. The Parties agree to provide for reciprocal exchanges and visits of writers, composers, musicologists, playwrights, theater directors, artists, architects, art historians, museum specialists, specialists in various fields of law, and those in other cultural and professional fields, to familiarize themselves with their respective fields and to participate in meetings and symposia. The Parties agree both to inform each other of proposed visitors and to arrange programs for them well in advance of their arrival.

SECTION XI

Sports

1. The Parties agree to encourage reciprocal exchanges of athletes and athletic teams as well as visits of specialists in the fields of physical education and sports.

2. These exchanges and visits will be agreed upon between the appropriate American and Soviet sports organizations.

SECTION XII

Tourism

The Parties agree to encourage study of arrangements for tourist travel between the two countries, as well as to encourage reciprocal measures to satisfy the requests of tourists, as individuals or in groups, to acquaint themselves with the life, work and culture of the people of each country.

SECTION XIII

Procedure for a Meeting of the Parties

The Parties agree to hold a meeting of their representatives within one year after the signing of this Agreement, to review the implementation of exchanges and to discuss the details of the program for the second year of the Agreement.

SECTION XIV

Entry into Force

This Agreement shall enter into force on signature with effect from January 1, 1968.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this Agreement and thereto have affixed their seals.

DONE at Moscow in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both equally authentic, this day of
one thousand nine hundred sixty-eight.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS:

[SEAL]

[SEAL]

ANNEX TO SECTION VI

Educational Exchanges

Exchanges of College Graduates, Post-Graduates,
Young Instructors and Researchers
(Paragraph 1.a of Section VI)

(1) The Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants of the USA (Committee) and the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education of the USSR (Ministry) will exchange lists of nominees, their programs for the forthcoming academic year and the necessary information about each nominee not later than one day after signing of the agreement in 1968 and by March 1 in 1969 for the next academic year. The programs of study and scientific work must reflect the academic background and the research plan and objectives of the participants. Representatives of the Committee and the Ministry will meet in 1968 no later than July 31 in Moscow and in 1969, as soon after April 20 as possible and no later than May 10 in Bloomington, Indiana, to exchange information concerning placement of the participants for the forthcoming academic year and to discuss details connected with the exchange.

(2) Participants accepted to start their work at the beginning of the academic year will arrive by August 14 for the American participants and by August 12 for the Soviet participants at the universities in each country which will provide the language course. Those accepted for the second semester will arrive during the period February 1-10. If a participant cannot arrive in the receiving country on the requested date, the sending side will inform the receiving side of this fact as far in advance as possible. The new date on which the participant will arrive will be settled by agreement.

(3) Applications for extensions of agreed periods of stay presented during the participant's period of study will be considered by the receiving side only in exceptional cases.

(4) The receiving side will bear the following expenses: tuition and fees for training in universities and other institutions of higher learning, payment for suitable living quarters, and a monthly stipend agreed between the Committee and the Ministry. As a rule, the stipend will be paid in full directly to the participants. In case of a participant's illness or accident, the receiving side will bear medical costs, including hospital expenses, as agreed between the Committee and the Ministry. The sending side will bear all costs for the travel of its participants.

(5) The sides agree to provide for living quarters for the spouses of participants during the academic year or for one visit of up to 30 days. The receiving side will bear no expense for the travel or sojourn of spouses in the country.

Exchanges of Language Teachers
(Paragraph 1.b, Section VI)

(6) The Committee and the Ministry will agree on the dates for the courses and will exchange lists of participants, drafts of the programs for the courses and commentaries on them by an agreed date. Participants in these exchanges may be accompanied by one or two language specialists (leaders). The receiving side will provide the participants, including the leaders, with free tuition, free living quarters (dormitories), stipends and medical services agreed upon between the Committee and the Ministry. As a rule, the stipend will be paid in full directly to the participants. The sending side will bear all travel expenses for its participants.

Exchanges of Professors and Instructors
(Paragraph 1.c, Section VI)

(7) The sides will exchange lists of scholars, the necessary information concerning each of them, and their programs of research, for those proposed by the

sending side for the first semester in 1968 within 30 days after the signing of the Agreement; in 1969, by March 15, 1969; for those proposed for the second semester, by October 15 of each year. The receiving side will inform the sending side of the decision on the scholars by universities and other institutions of higher learning within two months after the above-mentioned documents are received.

(8) The receiving side will provide the participants with free living quarters, medical services and a monthly stipend as agreed between the Committee and the Ministry. The sending side will bear all travel expenses for its participants. Participants may be accompanied by their spouses and minor children, but in the latter case the receiving side will bear no obligations to provide living quarters for spouses with children and also in all cases will bear no expenses for their travel or maintenance.

Visit By Representatives

(9) Each side may send, at its own expense, its representatives to the receiving country to familiarize themselves with the conditions of study and sojourn of its participants in these exchanges.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE LEGAL ADVISER

July 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Exchanges Agreement Between the United States
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for 1968-1969

Pursuant to Circular No. 175, authority is being requested to sign with the U.S.S.R. an agreement for cooperation in exchanges in the scientific, technical, educational and cultural fields during 1968 and 1969. The agreement is modeled on its predecessors which have been signed biennially since 1958.

In addition to the Constitution, 5 U.S.C. §156, relating to the management of foreign affairs by the Secretary, and section 103 of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, Public Law 87-256, provide authority for entering into such agreements. Other provisions of Public Law 87-256, and provisions of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended (22 U.S.C. §§1431 et seq.), authorize the United States Government to carry out the exchange activities provided for in the agreement.

The agreement provides that the carrying out of the activities provided for is subject to the Constitution and applicable laws and regulations of the two countries.

The text of the agreement to be signed has been approved by L.

Fred T. Teal
Fred T. Teal

Assistant Legal Adviser
for Cultural Relations
and Public Affairs

Clearance:

L/T - Mr. Beyans
CD 3.