

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#2 memo</del>	Saunders to President, 7:30 p.m. <i>open 2-8-96</i> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>NLS 95-249</i> [Duplicate of #230, NSF, CF, Israel, Vol. X; <del>Sanitized NLS 84-181</del> ]	<del>7/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#4 memo</del>	Smith to President, 6:15 p.m. <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 10-16-96 NLS 95-251</i>	<del>7/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#7a rpt</del>	From San Jose 3393 <del>C 1 p</del> <i>open 9-30-96 NLS 95-248</i>	<del>7/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#8 memo</del>	Bowdler to President, 3:30 p.m. <i>open 12-15-95</i> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>NLS 95-188</i> [Duplicate of #48, NSF, CF, Mexico, Vol. 4]	<del>7/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#8a cable	Mexico 6234 S 2 p <i>sanitized 12-4-95 NLS 95-120</i> [Duplicate of #48a, NSF, CF, Mexico, Vol. 4]	7/30/68	A
<del>#10a rpt</del>	"15th Session--Tea Break" <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 9-30-96 NLS 95-248</i>	<del>7/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#10b cable</del>	Paris 18790 <del>S 3 p</del> (dup. #21, NSF, CF, VN, "HVCIA 10-16") (dup. #54, NSF, CF, VN, "HVCIA 10-16... V. 9")	<del>7/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#11 memo</del>	Smith to President, 1:45 p.m. <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 2-8-96 NLS 95-249</i>	<del>7/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#11a cable</del>	Deptel 212085 to Paris <i>open 9-30-96 NLS 95-248</i> <del>S 2 p</del>	<del>7/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#12 memo</del>	Smith to President, 11:15 a.m. <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 2-8-96 NLS 95-249</i>	<del>7/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#13 memo	Smith to President, 9:10 a.m. <i>Exempt NLS 97-108</i> S 1 p <i>Dup 449 NSF, CF, Czech. vol. 2 Box 179</i> <i>sanitized 2-12-01 NLS/RAC 00-43</i>	7/31/68	A
<del>#14 memo</del>	Smith to President, 9:40 a.m. <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 2-8-96 NLS 95-249</i>	<del>7/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 89, July 21-31, 1968

Box 38

## RESTRICTION CODES

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<del>#14a cable</del>	<del>Deptel to Paris</del> <del>S 3 p</del> <i>open 9-30-96 NLS 95-248</i>	<del>7/13/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#14b cable</del>	<del>Deptel to Paris</del> " <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>7/23/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#20 memo</del>	<del>Smith to President, 6:25 p.m.</del> <i>open 2-8-96 NLS 95-249</i> <del>PCI 1 p</del> [Duplicate of #2, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "2 C (12)--General Military Activity"]	<del>7/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#20a memo</del>	<del>Smith to President</del> <del>PCI 2 p</del> <i>open 10-15-96 NLS 95-249</i> [Duplicate of #2a, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "2 C (12)--General Military Activity"]	<del>7/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#21 memo</del>	<del>Smith to President, 5:20 p.m.</del> <i>open 2-8-96 NLS 95-249</i> <del>TS 1 p</del> <sup>34</sup> [Duplicate of #21, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "2 C (12)--General Military Activity"]	<del>7/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#21a memo</del>	<del>Wheeler to Secretary of Defense</del> <del>TS 2 p</del> <i>open 11-21-96 NLS 95-252</i> [Duplicate of #3a, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "2 C (12)--General Military Activity"]	<del>7/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#22 memo</del>	<del>Bowdler to President, 4:00 p.m.</del> <del>C 1 p</del> <i>open 2-8-96 NLS 95-249</i>	<del>7/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#22a letter</del>	<del>President to Barrientos</del> " <del>PCI 2 p</del>	<del>7/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#22b letter</del>	<del>Barrientos to President</del> " <del>PCI 6 p</del>	<del>7/8/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#28 memo</del>	<del>Bowdler to President</del> <i>open 1-25-93 NLS 91-467</i> <del>C 1 p</del> [Duplicate of #57, NSF, CF, Peru, Vol. 3]	<del>7/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#29a cable</del>	<del>Deptel to Saigon</del> <i>agen 9-30-96 NLS 95-248</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>7/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#31 memo</del>	<del>Smith to President, 6:40 p.m.</del> <del>PCI 1 p</del> <i>agen 2-8-96 NLS 95-249</i>	<del>7/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#31a cable</del>	<del>Paris 18692</del> <i>agen 9-30-96 NLS 95-248</i> <del>S 6 p</del> [dup. #34, NSF, CF, VN, "HV Chron V.16"] [dup. #65a, NSF, CF, VN, "HV Paris 'ROSE'... V.9"]	<del>7/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#32 memo</del>	<del>Smith to President, 6:15 p.m.</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>agen 2-8-96 NLS 95-249</i>	<del>7/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#32a cable</del>	<del>Moscow 4836</del> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>agen 9-30-96 NLS 95-248</i>	<del>7/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#33 memo</del>	<del>Duplicate of #31</del> "		
<del>#33a memo</del>	<del>Duplicate of #31a</del> "		
<del>#34 memo</del>	<del>Smith to President, 5:45 p.m.</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>agen 10-16-96 NLS 95-251</i>	<del>7/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#35a memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, re: Nepal</del> <del>C 1 p</del> <i>agen 2-8-96 NLS 95-249</i> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, "7/30/68"]	<del>7/16/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#35b memo</del>	<del>Rusk to President, re: Nepal</del> <del>C 2 p</del> <i>agen 9-30-96 NLS 95-248</i> [Duplicate of #2a, NSF, CF, Nepal, Vol. 1 and #27a, NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 88]	<del>7/10/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#35c report</del>	<del>Bio-Sketch</del> <i>agen 9-30-96 NLS 95-248</i> <del>C 2 p</del> [Duplicate of #2b, NSF, CF, Nepal, Vol. 1 and #27b, NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 88]	<del>5/9/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#38 memo</del>	<del>Saunders to President, re: Israel</del> <i>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i> <del>C 1 p</del> [Duplicate of #205, NSF, CF, Israel, Vol. X; Sanitized NLJ 84-181]	<del>7/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#45a memo</del>	<del>Rusk to President</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 9-30-96 NLJ 95-248</i>	<del>7/26/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#47 memo</del>	<del>Smith to President, 12:45 p.m.</del> <del>C 1 p</del> <i>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i>	<del>7/26/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#52 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 9:45 p.m.</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 10-16-96 NLJ 95-251</i> [Duplicate of #100, NSF, CF, India, Vol. 11] <i>103</i>	<del>7/26/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#53 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 9:45 p.m.</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 10-16-96 NLJ 95-251</i>	<del>7/26/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#55 memo	Rostow to President, 6:15 p.m. S 1 p <i>sanitized 10-16-96 NLJ 95-251</i> <i>Same Sani NLS 019-038-1-2</i>	7/26/68	A
#55a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 p <i>sanitized 9-30-96 NLJ 95-250</i> <i>Same Sani NLS 019-038-1-3</i>	7/26/68	A
<del>#58 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 5:15 p.m.</del> <del>TS 1 p</del> <i>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i>	<del>7/26/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#58a draft</del>	<del>President to Kosygin</del> <i>open 7-8-93 NLJ 92-280</i> <del>PCI 3 p</del> [Duplicate of #72a, NSF, Files of W. Rostow, "Kosygin"]	<del>7/26/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#58b draft</del>	<del>President to Kosygin</del> <i>open 7-8-93 NLJ 92-280</i> <del>PCI 2 p</del> [Duplicate of #72, NSF, Files of W. Rostow, "Kosygin"]	<del>7/26/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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#58e-memo	Rostow to President, 7:00 p.m. TS 1 p <i>open 9-3-96 NLJ 96-27</i> [Duplicate of #75] [Duplicate of #5c, NSF, Files of W. Rostow, "[Non-Vietnam, July-Sept. 1968]"	7/25/68	A
#58d letter	Kosygin to President <i>open 12-23-09</i> TS 2 p [Duplicate of #75a] [Duplicate of #5d, NSF, Files of W. Rostow, "[Non-Vietnam, July-Sept. 1968]"	7/25/68	A
#61 memo	Rostow to President, 4:30 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i>	7/26/68	A
#62 memo	Rostow to President, 2:45 p.m. C 1 p <i>open 2-23-93 NLJ 91-528</i> [Duplicate of #241, NSF, Country File, Laos, Vol. 18]	7/26/68	A
#63a report	"Briefing to Former VP Nixon" S 2 p <i>open 10-16-96 NLJ 95-251</i>	7/19/68	A
#64a cable	Saigon 33628 <i>open 9-30-96 NLJ 95-248</i> C 3 p [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 10; 1983]	7/26/68	A
#65 memo	Rostow to President, 11:15 a.m. S 2 p <i>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i>	7/26/68	A
#67 memo	Rostow to President, 9:55 a.m. TS 1 p <i>open 10-16-96 NLJ 95-251</i>	7/26/68	A
#68a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 23 p <i>sanitized 9-30-96 NLJ 95-250</i>	7/12/68	A
#71 memo	Rostow to President, 9:45 a.m. S 1 p <i>sanitized 10-16-96 NLJ 95-251</i> <i>same Serial NLJ 019-038-1-4 (1/02)</i>	7/26/68	A

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#71a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 7 p <i>sanitized 9-30-96 NLS 95-250</i> <i>Same San. NLS 019-038-1-5 (1/02)</i>	7/25/68	A
#72 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 2/17/03 NLS 94-174 (#10a)</i> C 2 p [Duplicate of #10a, NSF, Country File, Latin America General, Vol. 8]	<del>7/26/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#72a cable	Santiago 4616 <i>open 3/17/03 NLS 94-275 (#10c)</i> C 2 p [Duplicate of #10c, NSF, Country File, Latin America General, Vol. 8]	<del>7/24/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#72b cable	Deptel 200675 to Bogota <i>open 3/17/03 NLS 94-275 (#10e)</i> C 3 1/2 p [Duplicate of #10e, NSF, Country File, Latin America General, Vol. 8]	<del>7/11/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#73a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 4 p <i>sanitized 9-30-96 NLS 95-250</i> <i>Same San. NLS 019-038-1-6 (1/02)</i>	7/15/68	A
#74a report	"Situation in Czechoslovakia" <i>Open NLS 95-249 10.8.98</i> TS 1 p	<del>7/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#75 memo	Rostow to President, 7:00 p.m. <i>open 2-8-96 NLS 95-249</i> TS 1 p <i>(Dup of #30e, WWF, non-WF 3-6/68)</i>	<del>7/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#75a letter	Duplicate of #58d <i>open 12-23-09</i>		
#78 memcon	President and Finance Minister Strauss C 4 p	7/25/68	A
#81a report	"The Pueblo Case--Talking Points" <i>open 2-8-96</i> S 2 p <i>NLS 95-249</i> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, "7/25/68"]	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#82 memo	Rostow to President, 11:20 a.m. " S 1 p	<del>7/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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#83a cable	<del>same sanitization 3-6-96 RAC</del> Saigon 887 <del>sanitized 9-30-96 NLJ 95-248</del> S 1 p [Duplicate of #19a, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "8 B (3)A" Box 105] [Sanitized NLJ 84-57]	7/25/68	A
#83b memo <del>sanitized 3-10-96</del> NLJ 03-200	Rostow to President, 7:00 p.m. <del>sanitized 10-16-96 NLJ 95-251</del> S 1 p <i>Dup of #14 + Files of WML Arab-Israel TO 102 Box 12</i>	7/24/68	A
#83c memo <del>sanitized 9-24-93</del> NLJ 03-199	Intelligence Memorandum S 5 p <del>exempt 9-30-96 NLJ 95-250</del> <del>exempt 1-00 NLJ 95-251</del>	7/24/68	A
#84 memo	Rusk to President <del>PCI 1 p</del> <del>open 9-30-96 NLJ 95-248</del>	7/25/68	A
#84a letter	Kosygin to President <del>PCI 2 p</del> <del>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</del>	7/25/68	A
#85 memo	Rostow to President " " <del>C 1 p</del> [Duplicate of #6, NSF, Country File, Swaziland, Vol. 1]	7/25/68	A
#85a memo	Rusk to President <del>C 2 p</del> <del>open 9-30-96 NLJ 95-248</del> [Duplicate of #6a, NSF, Country File, Swaziland, Vol. 1]	7/24/68	A
#86 memo	Rostow to President, re: Guyana <del>C 1 p</del> <del>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</del> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, "7/26/68"] [Sanitized NLJ 88-204]	7/25/68	A
#88 memo	Rostow to President, 6:55 p.m. <del>PCI 1 p</del> <del>sanitized 10-16-96 NLJ 95-251</del> <i>dup #66, NSF, CF, IN Harrison/Procodile</i> <i>And Paco Salto-More</i> <i>same soni NY 019-038-1-7 (1/02)</i>	7/24/68	A
#88a cable	Intelligence Information Cable <del>S 8 p</del> <del>sanitized 9-30-96 NLJ 95-250</del> <i>dup #68A as above</i> <i>same soni NY 019-038-1-8 (1/02)</i>	7/24/68	A
#89 memo	Rostow to President, 6:55 p.m. <del>S 2 p</del> <del>open 3/17/03</del>	7/24/68	A

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#91 memo	Rostow to President, 6:15 p.m. S 1 p <i>sanitized 10-16-96 NLJ 95-251</i> <i>same as NLJ 019-038-1-9 (1/02)</i>	7/24/68	A
#91b cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 9 p <i>exempt 9-30-96 NLJ 95-250</i> <i>same NLJ 019-038-1-10 (1/02)</i>	7/24/68	A
<del>#93 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 5:15 p.m.</del> <del>S 1 p <i>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i></del>	<del>7/24/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#93a cable</del>	<del>Paris 18461 <i>open 9-30-96 NLJ 95-248</i></del> <del>S 3 p</del> <del>[dup. # 24, NSF, CF, W, Chron V. 15"]</del> <del>[dup. # 53, NSF, CF, W, "HARVARD Paris TOPEL... V. 15"]</del>	<del>7/24/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#94 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 5:10 p.m.</del> <del>S 1 p <i>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i></del>	<del>7/24/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#94a cable	Prague 2716 <i>sanitized 9-30-96 NLJ 95-248</i> S 3 p <i>same as NLJ 019-038-1-11 (2/02)</i>	7/24/68	A
<i>dupes of 95a-95f in Files of WWR, Box 2, MTGS July-DEC '68, Doc. #s 47A-47F</i> #95a memo	Rostow to President <i>open per RAC 6/8/2017</i> <del>TS "S" 1 p <i>sanitized 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i></del> <i>Downgraded per NLJ 95-249</i> <i>same sanitization 8-16-05</i> <i>NLJ 04195</i>	<del>7/23/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#95b memo	Katzenbach and Nitze to President TS 2 p <i>open per RAC</i> <i>(dup) 08/2017</i>	7/19/68	A
#95c memo	Rusk and Clifford to President S 3 p	3/16/68	A
#95d draft	President to Chancellor <i>open 12-23-09</i> TS "S" 1 p <i>exempt 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i> <i>Downgraded per NLJ 95-249</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#95e draft	Chancellor to President <i>exempt 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i> TS "S" 1 p <i>open 12-23-09</i> <i>Downgraded per NLJ 95-249</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#95f draft	Chancellor to President TS 1 p <i>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#98a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 1 p <i>open 9-30-96 NLJ 95-250</i>	<del>7/24/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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#98b rpt	Intelligence Report <del>PCI</del> 1 p <i>open 9-30-96 NLJ 95-250</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#99a cable	Paris 18436 <i>open 9-30-96 NLJ 95-248</i> <del>S</del> 1 p <i>[dup. # 30, NSF, CF, VN, "HARLAN Chron. V. 15"]</i> <i>[dup. # 59a, NSF, CF, VN, "HARLAN Paris TODEL... V. 9"]</i>	<del>7/24/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#102 memo	Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m. <del>TS</del> 1 p <i>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i>	<del>7/24/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#102 cable	Rawalpindi 334 <i>sanitized 9-30-96 NLJ 95-248</i> TS 2 p <i>same seri: NJ 019-038-1-12 (1/02)</i>	undated	A
#103 memo	Rostow to President, 9:15 a.m. <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i>	<del>7/24/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#104 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 10-15-96 NLJ 95-249</i> <del>S</del> 3 p	<del>7/24/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#104a letter	President to Shah of Iran " <del>PCI</del> 3 p	<del>7/24/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#104b rpt	"Suggested Instructions to Amb. Meyer" S 3 p <i>sanitized 9-30-96 NLJ 95-248; same seri: per RAC 1/06</i>	undated	A
#105 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i> <del>C</del> 2 p [Duplicate in Diary Backup, "7/25/68"]	<del>7/24/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#105a rpt	Bio Sketch PCI 1 p <i>exempt 9-30-96 NLJ 95-250</i>	undated	A
#107 memo	Rostow to President, re: Chile <del>C</del> 1 p <i>OPEN 7/26/95 NJ 94-18</i> [Duplicate of #52, NSF, Country File, Chile, Vol. 5]	<del>7/24/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#107a memo	Zwick to President, re: Chile <del>C</del> 2 p " " " [Duplicate of #52b, NSF, Country File, Chile, Vol. 5]	<del>7/20/68</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 89, July 21-31, 1968

Box 38

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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#107b memo	Gaud to President, re: Chile <del>C</del> 8 p <i>open 1-11-94 NLJ 93-450</i> [Duplicate of #52d, NSF, Country File, Chile, Vol. 5]	7/15/68	A
#110 memo	Rostow to President, 2:30 p.m. <del>C</del> 1 p <i>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i>	7/23/68	A
#110a report	"Second Visit to Hanoi by J.C. Oberg..." <del>C</del> 2 p <i>open 9-30-96 NLJ 95-248</i>	undated	A
#112 memo	Rostow to President, re: Guyana <i>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i> <del>C</del> 1 p [Duplicate of #23, NSF, Country File, Guyana, Vol. 1]	7/23/68	A
#113 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 81731) <del>TS</del> 1 p <i>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i>	7/23/68	A
#114 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 81730) <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 9-30-96 NLJ 95-248</i>	7/23/68	A
#117 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 81718) <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 9-30-96 NLJ 95-248</i>	7/23/68	A
#118 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 81709) <del>C</del> 1 p <i>open 2-9-95 NLJ 94-410</i>	7/22/68	A
#119 memo	Rostow to President, 4:00 p.m. <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i>	7/22/68	A
#119a cable	Oslo 5700 <i>open 9-30-96 NLJ 95-248</i> <del>S</del> 1 p	7/20/68	A
#119b cable	Paris 18302 " <del>S</del> 1 p	7/22/68	A
#120 memo	Rostow to President, 1:50 p.m. <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i>	7/22/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#122 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, re: Brazil</del> <del>C 1 p</del> <i>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i>	<del>7/22/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#122a cable</del>	<del>Rio de Janeiro 9978</del> <del>C 2 p</del> <i>open 9-30-96 NLJ 95-248</i>	<del>7/17/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#122b cable</del>	<del>Rio de Janeiro 9983 "</del> <del>C 3 p</del>	<del>7/17/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#123 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, re: Ecuador</del> <del>C 1 p</del> <i>open 2-8-96 NLJ 95-249</i>	<del>7/22/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#126 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President "</del> <del>TS 1 p</del>	<del>7/22/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#126a memo</del>	<del>Wheeler to President</del> <del>TS 7 p</del> <i>open 11-21-96 NLJ 95-252</i>	<del>7/19/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#127 cable</del>	<del>Rostow to President (CAP 81687)</del> <del>C 1 p</del> <del>[Duplicate of #126 and #126a]</del> <i>open NLJ 95-249 + NLJ 95-252 (1/02)</i>	<del>7/22/68</del>	<del>A</del>

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#4a report	Intelligence report <i>sanitized RAC 3/04</i> 2 pp S	7/31/68	A
#18a report	Intelligence report <i>sanitized per RAC 7/05</i> 2 pp S	7/30/68	a
#34a report	Intelligence report <i>sanitized per RAC 7/05</i> 1 p S	[7/29/68]	A
#40a memo	Nathaniel Davis to the President <i>sanitized per RAC 5/03</i> 1 p S	7/27/68	A
#42a report	Intelligence report <i>exempt per RAC 9/04</i> 3 pp S	7/27/68	A
#46 note <i>sanitized 2-26-04 NW/RAC 03-121</i>	Rostow to the President <del><i>sanitized 3/17/03</i></del> 1 p S <i>Dup. # 53, Czech. vol. 2, Box 179</i>	7/26/68	A
#46a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <del><i>sanitized 3/17/03</i></del> 2 pp S <i>Dup. # 53a, Czech. vol. 2, Box 179</i> <i>More info released 3/16/05 NW/RAC 03-122</i>	7/26/68	A
#54 note <i>sanitized 6-6-03 NW/RAC 03-119</i>	Rostow to the President 1 p TS	7/26/68	A
#54a memo	Nathaniel Davis to Rostow <i>exempt per RAC 5/03</i> 1 p TS	7/26/68	A
#54b memo	Nathaniel Davis to Rostow <i>exempt per RAC 5/03</i> 3 pp TS	7/25/68	A
#61a memo	Art McCafferty to Rostow <i>exempt per RAC 5/03</i> 1 p S	7/26/68	A
#70 note <i>sanitized 6-6-03 NW/RAC 03-119</i>	Rostow to the President <del>1 p TS</del>	<del>7/26/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#70a report <i>sanitized 6-6-03 NW/RAC 03-120</i>	Intelligence report 2 pp TS	7/25/68	A
#77 note	Rostow to the President <i>open 3/17/03</i> <del>1 p S</del>	<del>7/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#77a report	Intelligence report <i>Sanitized 3-16-05 NW/PAC 03-122</i> 3 pp S	7/25/68	A
#79 note <i>Sanitized 2-26-04 NW/PAC 03-121</i>	Rostow to the President 1 p TS ( <del>Sanitized, NLJ CBS 24</del> )	7/25/68	A
#79a rpt	Intelligence report 1 p TS <i>Sanitized 3-16-05 NW/PAC 03-122</i>	7/24/68	A
#91a memo	Intelligence Memorandum 3 pp S <i>Sanitized 3-16-05 NW/PAC 03-122</i>	7/24/68	A
#109 note	Rostow to the President <i>open 31-12-03 NLS-142022-012/19</i> 1 p TS	<del>7/23/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#109a cable	Intelligence Memorandum 1 p TS <i>Sanitized 3-16-05 NW/PAC 03-122</i>	[7/23/68]	A

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INFORMATION

SECRET

Wednesday, 8:00 P. M.  
July 31, 1968

1  
*Free file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Secretary Rusk reports that he gave the Kesygin letter to Ambassador Debrynin at 6:00 P. M. this evening.

The Ambassador read the note, said it was self-explanatory, and made no comments about its substance. He said he would send it at once to Moscow.

Bremley Smith

BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 11-2-92



INFORMATION


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, July 31, 1968  
7:30 P. M.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Mr. President:

You will want to be aware of what Prime Minister Eshkol said to Ambassador Ball about **Phantoms**. The Israeli Embassy here has been relatively quiet on the subject recently, but they do tell us that Eshkol is "upset" about the planes.

  
Harold H. Saunders

Att.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 95-249  
By lig, NARA, Date 1-30-96

~~SECRET/NODIS~~



2a

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

July 15, 1968

SUBJECT: Ball/Sisco Meeting with Prime Minister  
Eshkol - Phantom Aircraft

Toward close of meeting with Ball and Sisco the morning of July 15, Prime Minister Eshkol said he could not conclude without mentioning the Israeli request to purchase Phantom aircraft. The Prime Minister said he knows he does not have a commitment from the USG to sell Phantoms to Israel but did tell the Cabinet when he returned from his visit to the US in January that there were grounds for hope. Eshkol said President Johnson had told him the decision would be made before the end of the year or earlier. The Issue was now becoming of increasing concern to GOI because of French embargo on 50 Mirages which Israel has already paid for and massive Soviet resupply of UAR and Syrian losses which the Prime Minister claimed made Nasser stronger than pre-June 1967, with better tanks and better planes. Israel needs deterrent power and this means F-4's plus Mirages.

Ball said he had discussed this issue with the President before departing on his current trip and knows the President has it very much in mind. USG not idle on matter. Decision will be made by end of year. Ball pointed out however that new element has now entered picture in form of Kosygin statement on limitation on Middle East arms supplies. We do not know what Kosygin had in mind or whether Soviets making serious proposal but are studying statement.

Eshkol noted Soviet proposal made after Russians had already resupplied Arabs. Prime Minister referred to his request to the President to send Israeli pilots and technicians to US for training in operation of Phantoms so as to shorten the time lag in obtaining planes once the decision

SECRET-NODIS

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority 77C984-182

By eg/ice, NARA, Date 10-28-92



SECRET-NODIS

- 2 -

is made. Ball said the President is very mindful of what he had told Eshkol about time not foreclosing Israeli ability to obtain Phantoms when needed. The Prime Minister expressed concern over this point, noting that actual receipt of planes could well drag into the early 1970s.

SECRET-NODIS



*Lois*  
3  
ACTION  
*Pres file*

Wednesday, July 31, 1968, 5:30 P. M.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

The members of the General Advisory Committee to the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will be meeting in Washington Thursday and Friday, August 1 and 2. Acting Director Fisher, in the attached memorandum, says you indicated to the Chairman of the Advisory Committee, John J. McCloy, that you wanted to meet the Committee members sometime this year.

The following times have been suggested:

On Thursday, August 1, Bill Foster is giving a reception for the members of the Committee at the Alibi Club at 7:00 P. M., to be followed by dinner at 8:00 P. M.

On both days, August 1-2, members would be available to call at the White House.

The next meeting of the Committee will be in November.

Secretary Rusk recommends that if at all possible you meet briefly with the group either Thursday or Friday.

Bremley Smith

\_\_\_\_\_ will drop by Alibi Club during reception, 7:00 P. M. Thursday,

\_\_\_\_\_ will drop by during dinner Thursday, 8:00 P. M.,

\_\_\_\_\_ ask Jim Jones to set up appointment in White House either Thursday or Friday,

*3/1/68*  
\_\_\_\_\_ ☒ regret unable to meet with group this month.

BKS:amc



3a

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

July 30, 1968

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM TO MR. BROMLEY SMITH

THE WHITE HOUSE

Some months ago the President informed John J. McCloy, Chairman of our General Advisory Committee, that he would like to have the opportunity of meeting with the Members of the General Advisory Committee some time this year. The next to last meeting of the Committee before January 20, 1969, will be held this Thursday and Friday, August 1 and 2. At 7:00 p.m. on Thursday, August 1, Bill Foster is giving a dinner for the Members of the General Advisory Committee at the Alibi Club, 1806 Eye Street, N.W. (dress is business suit). This might be a pleasant informal occasion for the President to drop in and talk to the Members of the Committee during the reception period. Of course, we would all be greatly honored if the President were able to stay for the dinner which is expected to begin at 7:45 or 8:00 o'clock.

In the event that the President would not be available at 7:00 p.m. August 1, the Members of the Committee could call on the President at the White House at his convenience at any time during the day on August 1 or during the morning of August 2.

The next meeting of the General Advisory Committee will be November 11 and 12, 1968.



Adrian S. Fisher  
Acting Director

Enclosures:

Guest List, Dinner August 1  
List General Advisory Committee  
Members



GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE DINNER  
ALIBI CLUB  
1806 Eye Street  
7:00 p.m.

GUEST LIST

The Secretary of State

Dr. Donald Hornig

The Honorable Richard Helms

The Honorable Leonard Marks

The Honorable James E. Webb

Representative E. Ross Adair

Representative John J. Rooney

Representative Chet Holifield (?)

Representative Thomas E. Morgan (?)

General Advisory Committee Members

Mr. John J. McCloy, Chairman

Mr. Roger Blough

Mr. John Cowles

Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther

Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky

Mr. Dean McGee

The Honorable Maurine Neuberger

Mr. Herman Phleger

Dr. Isidor I. Rabi

Dr. Stephen J. Wright

Dr. Herbert F. York

United States Arms Control  
and Disarmament Agency

Mr. William C. Foster

Mr. Adrian S. Fisher

Mr. Samuel De Palma

Mr. Archibald Alexander (?)

Dr. Herbert Scoville

Mr. Clement E. Conger

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

3c

March, 1968

Mr. John J. McCloy  
Chairman, Milbank, Tweed  
Hadley and McCloy  
One Chase Manhattan Plaza  
New York, New York. 10005  
Tel: AC 212--HA 2-2660

Mr. Roger Blough  
Chairman of the Board  
United States Steel Corporation  
71 Broadway  
New York, New York. 10006  
Tel: AC 212--558-4265

Mr. John Cowles  
Minneapolis Star and Tribune  
Minneapolis, Minnesota. 55415  
Tel: AC 612--372-4102

Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther  
Cathedral Apartments  
4101 Cathedral Avenue  
Washington, D. C. 20416  
Tel: 244-7693

Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky  
Harvard University  
12 Oxford Street  
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138  
Tel: AC 617--UN 8-7600  
Ext. 683

Mr. Dean McGee  
Kerr-McGee Building  
306 N. Robinson Street  
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 73102  
Tel: AC 405--CE 6-1313

Mr. Ralph McGill  
Atlanta Newspapers Inc.  
Atlanta, Georgia. 30303  
Tel: AC 404--522-5050

Mr. George Meany  
AFL-CIO  
815 Sixteenth Street, N.W.,  
Washington, D. C. 20006  
Tel: NA 8-3870

The Honorable  
Maurine Neuberger  
872 Massachusetts Avenue  
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 02139  
Tel: AC 617--547-8408

Dr. James Perkins, President  
Cornell University  
Ithaca, New York. 14850  
Tel: AC 607--275-5201

Mr. Herman Phleger  
One Eleven Sutter Street  
San Francisco, California. 94104  
Tel: AC 415--434-0900

Dr. Isidor I. Rabi  
Columbia University  
116-116th Street & Broadway  
New York, New York. 10027  
Tel: AC 212--280-3368

Mr. Troy V. Post  
President and Chairman of  
the Board  
Greatamerica Corporation  
National Bank of Commerce Bldg.  
Dallas, Texas. 75201  
Tel: AC 214--RI 8-9161

Dr. Stephen J. Wright  
Executive Director  
United Negro College Fund, Inc.  
55 East Fifty-second Street  
New York, New York. 10022  
Tel: AC 212--PL 1-0700

Dr. Herbert F. York  
Department of Physics  
University of California,  
San Diego,  
La Jolla, California. 92038  
Tel: AC 714--453-2000  
Ext. 1817



~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

4

Wednesday, July 31, 1968  
6:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

*Free file*

The Czech government news agency reports that a last-minute disagreement forced the Czech-Soviet leaders to schedule another meeting tomorrow in Cierna.

There is no further authoritative word on Brezhnev's condition.

Attached is the CIA summary.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

N.J. 95-251

Bremley Smith

By ph NARA Date 9-20-96

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4a

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, July 31, 1968

SUBJECT: CIA Situation Report on Czechoslovakia as of 4:00 p.m.

The Soviet-Czech talks in Cierna are still in progress this afternoon. Radio Prague reported it had reason to believe that a final communique was being prepared and that the talks would end soon. However, the Czech News Agency reported that a last minute disagreement forced the leaders to schedule another meeting tomorrow.

The Prague Radio said Brezhnev was taking part in the afternoon session. However, Reuters says the Soviet leader had to leave the talks just before noon and was helped back to his railroad coach by Dubcek and others. [REDACTED]

25X1

There have been some hints from Moscow recently, however, that the pressure of events was taking its toll on Brezhnev's health.

The wife and family of Dubcek left Vienna and crossed into Yugoslavia today. [REDACTED] whether Mrs. Dubcek left Czechoslovakia for safety's sake or is carrying out a thoughtless whim.

25X1

Czechoslovak reporting on the talks in Cierna has been guardedly optimistic. The main party daily Rude Pravo this morning carried its most authoritative statement yet on the atmosphere surrounding the talks, quoting presidium member Smrkovsky as saying that the talks are taking "a promising course".

Widespread Soviet military activity in and around Czechoslovakia continues. [REDACTED] a Soviet force of "division-minus strength", with all its equipment, was seen in central Czechoslovakia headed southwest. However, it may have turned east toward the USSR after reaching a road junction further south.

25X1

Moscow announced today that East German and Polish reserves have been called up to take part in the current rear services "exercises," a move which has increased popular fears throughout Eastern Europe.

25X1

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2004/03/04 : NLJ-141-022-12-1-0

SANTITIZED  
Authority NLJ-141-022-012/1  
By x, NARA, Date 11/3/09



~~SECRET~~


-2-

Weather reports for at least three Czechoslovak airfields have been included in the Soviet Tactical Air Force (Germany) weather summaries. This suggests that the Soviet Air Force is making contingency preparations for operations in Czechoslovakia.

High level officials back in Moscow, at least the military ones, appear to be operating on an indefinite alert status.

25X1

25X1



~~SECRET~~

BKS:ksb

Wednesday, July 31, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a message to President Asgeirsson of Iceland. He retires tomorrow after four four-year terms. You remember he visited you in 1967.

*Pres file*

Nathaniel Davis

Approved ✓ 8/1/68

Disapproved           

Speak to me



5a

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT OF ICELAND

Dear Mr. President:

Your proud legacy will endure for many years to come.

Icelandic-American relations have prospered during your sixteen years as President -- in friendship, in alliance and in mutual respect and cooperation. Upon this foundation will be built, I am confident, future progress towards our shared national goals of peace, justice, and democracy.

Mrs. Johnson joins with me, Mr. President, in extending to you our warmest best wishes for the future.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, July 31, 1968

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Sixty-Fifth Birthday Message for Bourguiba

President Bourguiba will be 65 on August 3. We would not normally send birthday greetings, but on this special anniversary coming so soon after his visit here we feel it would be a nice gesture. State recommends the following:

Mrs. Johnson and I extend our hearty congratulations and every good wish to you and your family on the happy occasion of your birthday. <sup>TIA</sup> American people share our respect for your faithful and inspiring service to the people of Tunisia and would wish me to extend their friendly greetings to you and your people.

  
Harold H. Saunders

Approve ✓ 7/31/68

Disapprove       

Call me       

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ INFORMATION

Wednesday - July 31, 1968  
4:00 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a report on President Trejos' reaction to your offer of assistance on the volcano emergency.

When the volcano "Irazu" erupted five years ago, we sent two volcanologists. State informs me that Inter-American Geodetic Survey volcanologists are prepared to go to Costa Rica. State is also checking the Smithsonian.

*WGB*

William G. Bowdler

Attachment

Report from Embassy San Jose 3393, July 31.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *rg*, NASA, Date 9-3-92

7a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Report from the American Charge in San Jose (no. 3393) of July 31

1. I delivered the President's message to President Trejos who, as Foreign Minister Lara had earlier done, expressed profound gratitude for the aid being provided by the United States. He asked that this be conveyed to President Johnson as soon as possible pending his formal reply to the latter's letter.
  
2. President Trejos said that the Government of Costa Rica was so occupied with present emergency efforts that they had not had time to estimate the economic damage, or undertake longer-range recovery plans, which will depend greatly on how long the volcanic eruptions continue. In this connection, he expressed interest in a possible visit by Smithsonian volcanologists, particularly in the hope that they might be able to make some prediction regarding the probable duration and pattern of eruption cycles. (The President's interest is being passed separately to Mr. Robert Citron, Smithsonian Institution, Cambridge, Mass.).

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 95-248  
By 48, NARA, Date 6-25-96



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

8  
INFORMATION

Wednesday - July 31, 1968 - 3:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Student Disturbances in Mexico City

*Pres file*

Since last Friday Mexico City has been the scene of almost constant student turmoil. The difficulty started when an authorized rally to celebrate the Cuban July 26 anniversary degenerated into vandalism and arson. The police intervened and had to use tough tactics against student participants to bring the situation under control.

The action against the students triggered increasingly violent confrontations between students and security forces in successive days, particularly on Monday and yesterday. The government had to bring in the riot police backed up by paratroopers to restore order.

We do not have an accurate picture of the number killed, injured and arrested. Unconfirmed reports claim four students are dead.

A cable from the Embassy this morning (copy attached) reports a claim by Mexican authorities that the Mexican Communist Party, with Soviet Embassy complicity, engineered the July 26 disturbance. The Embassy does not have independent information to back up this claim, but considers that Moscow may have ordered the militant tactics to counter the impact of events in Czechoslovakia.

There is no reason to think that Mexican security forces cannot control the situation. Events have not reached a point where President Diaz Ordaz has considered it necessary to stop his tour of the interior to return to the capital. What does worry Mexican officials is the image projected by the disturbances and the impact on the Olympics in which they have so heavily invested.

*WGB*  
William G. Bowdler

Attachment

Mexico Embassy's message of July 30 (no. 6234).

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 95-188  
By *118*, NARA, Date *11-4-95*



Department of State

SANITIZED

8a  
TELEGRAM  
46

~~SECRET~~ 673

PAGE 01 MEXICO 06234 301948Z

SUMMARY

87-S

ACTION ARA 16

INFO NSCE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, SAH 02, EUR 15, NIC 01, EU 04,

RSR 01, /106 W

R 301900Z JUL 68  
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7106

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 95-120

By 120, NARA, Date 10-4-95

~~SECRET~~ MEXICO 6234

PASS TO WHITE HOUSE

1.3  
(4)(5) 1. MEXICAN GOVT HAS SOLID EVIDENCE CORROBORATING PUBLIC CHARGES OF MEXICO CITY POLICE CHIEF THAT COMMUNIST PARTY ENGINEERED JULY 26 STUDENT FRACAS. GOVT EVIDENCE ALSO INCLUDES INDICATIONS OF SOVIET EMBASSY COMPLICITY (INCLUDING TAUNT BY A PCM OFFICIAL THAT SECURITY POLICE WOULD FIND NO IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS SINCE THEY WERE ALL IN SOVIET EMBASSY.)

2. MEXICANS OFTEN BLAME FOREIGN ELEMENTS FOR SUCH INCIDENTS AND PCM LATELY HAS STRESSED ITS DESIRE TO PURSUE LEGAL MEANS BUT EMBASSY CONSIDERS THAT STRONG POSSIBILITY EXISTS MOSCOW HAS ORDERED PCM TO ADOPT MORE MILITANT TACTICS. ONE MOTIVE MAY BE SOVIET DESIRE TO COUNTER IMPACT ON PCM OF CZECH EVENTS. PCM PAPER, LA VOZ DE MEXICO, AFTER INITIALLY CARRYING FAVORABLE ARTICLES ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA, COMPLETELY SILENT ON EVENTS IN LAST FEW WEEKS. LINKED TO THIS MAY BE DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL DISCIPLINE OF PCM AS ALSO SUGGESTED BY REFURBISHING AND MORE PROMPT PUBLICATION BY PCM OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST JOURNAL REVISTA INTERNACIONAL.

3. MOSCOW AND PCM MAY BE SEEKING TO TAKE PLAY AWAY FROM PRO-CUBAN EXTREMISTS THOUGH ELEMENTS OF COMPLICITY ALSO SEEM PRESENT. PRO-SOVIET AND PRO-CUBAN STUDENT ELEMENTS JOINED IN JULY 26 CELEBRATION OF CUBAN ANNIVERSARY. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL APRIL ISSUE CONTAINING ARTICLE TAKING MORE FRIENDLY ATTITUDE TO CUBAN TACTICS HAS JUST BEEN ISSUED HERE AND MAY

~~SECRET~~





# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 MEXICO 06234 301948Z

HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED AS SIGNAL FOR STRONGER TACTICS BY PCM. FACT THAT CUBAN AMBASSADOR WENT TO MERIDA INSTEAD OF STAYING IN CAPITAL FOR JULY 26 FIESTA SUGGESTS HE MAY HAVE KNOWN WHAT WAS COMING THOUGH HE WANTED TO AVOID ANY SUGGESTION OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT.

4. WHILE SEEKING TO AVOID DIRECT INVOLVEMENT, SOVIETS MAY BELIEVE THAT MEXICAN ANXIETY TO AVOID ANY DIPLOMATIC CONTRETEMPS WITH COMMUNIST WORLD AS OLYMPICS NEAR GIVES SOVIET EMBASSY MORE ROOM FOR SUBVERSIVE MANEUVER. HOWEVER, THEY KNOW THEY RISK STRONG GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN ON PCM. STATEMENT BY MEXICAN POLICE CHIEF WHO LINKED RECENT RIOTS WITH OLYMPICS BOUND TO RECALL TO PCM AND MOSCOW PRESIDENT'S WARNING ON MAY 7 IN TALK WITH PCM POLITBURO THAT GOVERNMENT WILL CRACK DOWN HARD IF PCM FORMENTS DISORDER IN NEXT FEW MONTHS. BUT PCM USED TO CRACKDOWNS AND MOSCOW MAY BE PROCEEDING BY LENIN'S OLD INJUNCTION "BETTER FEWER BUT BETTER."

5. DEPT MAY WISH TO PASS MOSCOW.  
FREEMAN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

*Lewis*  
*2*  
INFORMATION

Wednesday, July 31, 1968  
5:15 p.m.

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT -- EYES ONLY

Secretary Rusk has called in Ambassador Dobrynin and will hand him the Kosygin letter at 6:00 p.m. today.

Immediately following the interview, Secretary Rusk will report any oral observations the Ambassador makes.

Bremley Smith

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *ig*, NARA, Date *11-2-92*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

BKS:ksb



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

10

**SECRET**

**July 31, 1968  
Wednesday, 3:40 P. M.**

**Mr. President:**

*for file*

**Here are the cables from Paris  
reporting on:**

- a. the 35-minute Tea Break  
conversation today, and**
- b. the regular session.**

**Bremley Smith**

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 9-3-92

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 95-248

By sp, NARA, Date 6-25-96

Wednesday, July 31, 1968

10a

SUBJECT: 15th Session, July 31, 1968 -- Tea Break

During tea break which lasted 35 minutes we sat with Lau and Bo. Practically entire time was directed to substantive matters. We said they had indicated they were considering our Phase I-Phase Z proposal seriously. Did they have anything to tell us today.

Lau replied that they had been giving serious consideration to our proposal but while it was under consideration, there came the Honolulu communique, which talks a lot about peace but what it really says is that the U. S. intends to intensify the war. Furthermore, yesterday Dean Rusk held a press conference, in which he stated flatly that there must be reciprocity, whereas Vance had said there did not have to be direct reciprocity. He therefore wondered whether our proposal had been contradicted.

We said our proposal still stands and that we believed it would be wise to explore it further. We explained in some detail that many of their (DRV) actions indicate that they wanted the war continued. We pointed to the accumulation of evidence that the DRV is preparing for a new offensive. With this evidence before the two presidents, it was quite natural that they would deal with the military situation in the communique. We said that while there had been no shelling of Saigon since June 20th, at the same time sweeps in the area have uncovered many large caches of rockets and other ammunition, indicating preparations for further attack.

We stated there had been no change in President's policies since March 31 and that through private talks it might be possible to overcome the obstacles between us. We stated that there had not been time at the last meeting to explore fully our proposal and that, therefore, we thought it wise to explore our proposal further and to receive from them any suggestions they might have. On the other hand, we added, if they were not prepared to pursue our proposal seriously, we should know this now.

Lau replied that his assessment of the situation of war and peace differed from ours as "black did from white". He said we referred to statements on peace in the Honolulu communique but "we believe in essence that the communique relates to intensifying the war, not seeking peace". He said that assessment was confirmed by the "bellicose" statement yesterday by Mr. Rusk.

~~SECRET~~

Lau continued that we said there had been no change in U. S. policy since March 31. He said they viewed it differently -- that there had been an intensification of the war both in the north and the south -- there had been escalation, not de-escalation. As for our remarks on ammunition discovered, he has repeatedly said that as long as there are U. S. troops in SVN, the people have a right to fight.

Lau said insofar as our proposals were concerned, he had told us the other day they would receive serious consideration. But they could not now overlook the two subsequent events which had taken place: (1) the Honolulu communique and (2) the Rusk press conference.

Lau asked who we represented. Did we speak for our government?

We replied that there could be no question and assured him that what we had proposed was fully authorized and still stands. We added that Lau misconstrued the Honolulu communique. We said the U. S. does not seek to intensify the war and would not unless forced to do so by the action of the DRV or the VC. We said there was a sharp difference of opinion between us on what had happened since March 31 regarding intensification of the war. We said we each knew the others' views and there was no need to repeat our respective views here. We said that we believed if they examined Secretary Rusk's statement, they would not find it bellicose as they had characterized it.

We said the important thing is that we are both seeking a way to find a just settlement. To this end, we have made a proposal -- that proposal still stands -- and in the interest of progress, it should be explored further and explored promptly.

Lau, starting to break off the talk, replied, "Maybe we can exchange views on it on another occasion." He brushed off our question as to when or whether that could take place, saying evasively he would let us know.

Walking out of the room we said we were disappointed about the delay in the release of the three pilots and hoped they would come out on the ICC flight this Friday. Lau said he would let us know if he got any information.





Department of State

TELEGRAM

106

~~SECRET~~

REA769

**ACTION COPY**

8 5 4 7 0

PAGE 01 PARIS 18790 311521Z

47

ACTION SSO 00

1968 JUL 31 AM 11 34

INFO /000 W

Z 311446Z JUL 68  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4742

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 18790

N O D I S / HARVAN

DELTO 530

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

SUBJECT: FLASH SUMMARY - 15TH MEETING, JULY 31

**DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 95-248

By ing, NARA, Date 6-25-96

1. THUY WAS ABSENT AGAIN " ON THE ADVICE OF HIS DOCTORS," AND LAU READ HIS STATEMENT, WHICH HE DIVIDED INTO 3 PARTS.
2. FIRST PART BEGAN WITH A DENUNCIATION OF HONOLULU COMMUNIQUE, IN TERMS ALREADY FAMILIAR TO ANY LISTENER OF RADIO HANOI: HONOLULU WAS NOT RELEVANT TO PEACE, BUT MERELY A CAMOUFLAGE FOR AN INTENSIFICATION OF THE WAR: THE GVN IS NOTHING BUT A PUPPET, ETC.
3. SECOND PART OF LAU'S STATEMENT CONSISTED OF REPE-  
TITION OF DEMANDS OF DRV ON US TO STOP BOMBING AND INCLUDED  
AN INDIRECT ANSWER (IN SAME LANGUAGE USED BY LE IN  
PRESS CONFERENCE RECENTLY AND USED BY RADIO HANOI)  
TO OUR PROBE IN 14TH MEETING ON WORD CHANGE CONCERNING  
THIRD OF DRV'S FOUR POINTS. LAU SAID THAT THIRD POINT  
MEANT THAT FUTURE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM MUST BE DETERMINED  
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPIRIT OF THE PEOPLE OF VIET-NAM,  
AND ACCORDING TO THE NLF PROGRAM. LAU MADE A STRONG  
ATTACK ON THE GVN, IN OBVIOUS RESPONSE TO OUR PRESEN-  
TATION LAST WEEK. HE THEN BUILT UP NLF AND ALLIANCE  
PORTRAYING THEM IN USUAL GLOWING TERMS. LAU REFERRED  
TO WHAT HE TERMED REFUSAL OF US TO TAKE STEPS THE  
WORLD DEMANDED OF IT, AND CALLED SECRETARY RUSK'S PRESS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 18790 311521Z

CONFERENCE OF JULY 30 LATEST BELLICOSE STATEMENT OF US.

4. IN THIRD PART, LAU WENT ON ABOUT US AND WORLD OPINION, CHARGING THAT USG WAS TRYING TO MISLEAD PEOPLE, BUT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT SUCCEED IN MISLEADING THE PEOPLE FOR LONG.

5. LAU ENDED AT NOON, AND I REPLIED WITH SOME COMMENTS ON WHAT I CALLED LAU'S PREPOSTEROUS STATEMENTS. I ADDRESSED LAU'S INTENSIFICATION OF THE WAR ARGUMENT, POINTING OUT THAT MOST OF OUR BOMBARDMENT HAS BEEN IN A LIMITED AREA JUST NORTH OF THE DMZ ON ACCOUNT OF NVN MILITARY ACTIVITY AND BUILDUP IN THAT AREA. I THEN COMMENTED AT LENGTH ON NVN PRESENCE IN THE SOUTH, IN VIOLATION OF GENEVA ACCORDS AND DIRECTED TO TAKEOVER OF SOUTH VIET-NAM BY FORCE. I ALSO QUOTED FROM GENERAL EISENHOWER'S TELEGRAM YESTERDAY TO REPUBLICAN PLATFORM COMMITTEE. I THEN PROPOSED A TEA BREAK, AT 12:45.

6. TEA BREAK LASTED 35 MINUTES. VANCE AND I SAT WITH LAU AND BO, HABIB, KAPLAN AND SEIGNIOUS SAT WITH LE AND VY. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF HONOLULU COMMUNIQUE AND MENTION OF SECRETARY RUSK'S PRESS CONFERENCE, WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE TAKING SAME LINE THAT THEY TOOK IN THE FORMAL REMARKS. LAU SAID HE HAD NO NEW WORD ON RELEASE OF 3 PILOTS FROM HANOI.

7. AFTER THE 35-MINUTE TEA BREAK, I READ MY PREPARED STATEMENT, WHICH EMPHASIZED HANOI'S VIOLATION OF 1962 AGREEMENTS ON LAOS, AND QUOTED EXTENSIVELY FROM THE NEW RLG WHITE PAPER.

8. WHEN I FINISHED, LAU RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT WE HAD AGAIN AVOIDED THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION FOR THESE TALKS--THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. LAU THEN REPEATED SOME OF HIS MORE FAMILIAR ARGUMENTS--THAT THE US WAS THE ONLY AGGRESSOR IN VIET-NAM, THAT THE ARVN TROOPS HAD BEEN RO FORCED INTO SERVICE IN THE "PUPPET ARMY," ETC. HE DISCUSSED LAOS, CITING STATEMENTS OF THE PATHET LAO AND CHARGING US VIOLATION OF THE 1962 AGREEMENTS. AT THE END OF HIM COMENTS, I CHALLENGED HIS REPETITION OF ALREADY FAMILIAR PROPAGANDA AND CORRECTED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 . PARIS 18790 311521Z

HIS ATTEMPTS AND MISREPRESENTATIONS OF MY REMARKS. WE  
ADJOURNED AT 2:35.  
HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, 1:45 P.M.  
July 31, 1968

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk has informed  
Ambassador Harriman of the decision  
reached at the Tuesday Luncheon  
Meeting, i. e., if the North Vietnamese  
launch a major offensive we will  
have to act promptly on a U.S.  
military response.

Bremley Smith

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NY 95-249  
By rig, NARA, Date 1-30-96

11a

212085

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

31 JUL 68 01 31Z

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY

**DECLASSIFIED**

**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**

**NIJ 95-248**

**By [signature], NARA, Date 6-25-96**

Info

STATE 212085

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

TODEL 776

EYES ONLY FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE FROM THE SECRETARY

Although the contingency may not be immediately upon us, there continues to be a considerable variety of evidence that North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces are getting ready for another major offensive. If you have any impressions from any indirect sources bearing upon this point, we would be glad to have it. I understand from Katzenbach that you are getting a good fill-in on such information as we get back here. I would not suggest you raise the matter directly with the North Vietnamese.

If a major offensive does occur, we will have to act promptly on additional military measures. We will be in touch with you about the nature of such measures. It might be necessary for them to be prompt and sharp but not necessarily of the type which would break up the contacts in Paris. The two of you might be giving this some thought as a troublesome contingency with which we might be faced.

In my press conference today I tried to make one point to Hanoi

Drafted by:

S:DRusk:ml 7/30/68

Tel. Ext.

5171

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Shepard

~~SECRET~~

HARVAN/PLUS

CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES  
BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/TIA, Room 6243

Page 2 of telegram to PARIS

~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

without spelling it out in detail, namely, that Hanoi should not rely upon persistent intransigence as a means of forcing us to take another major step on our side without some response from them. It took us a month to move them out of Warsaw to another site. The issues you now have in front of you there are many times more difficult for them and more important to us. I earnestly hope that they will show some interest, at least during the coffee break, in what you and Cy have been saying to them.

RUSK



~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 95-249  
By sig, NARA, Date 1-30-96

12  
INFORMATION

Wednesday, July 31, 1968, 11:15 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Report on Today's Paris Meeting by Secure Telephone  
From Paris

State Department was given the following summary of today's four hour Paris meeting on Vietnam:

1. The meeting can be described as a holding action by the North Vietnamese.
2. During the Tea Break Colonel Lau, who spoke for the North Vietnamese in the absence of Chief Delegate Thuy, said:
  - He would be in contact with our negotiators about a private meeting.
  - Did not answer clearly in response to Ambassador Vance's direct question as to whether the North Vietnamese were seriously considering the private proposal we had made to them. He merely said that serious consideration had been given to the proposal but that then they had been confronted by the Honolulu communique.
  - The North Vietnamese asked whether there had been a change in U.S. policy and whether Ambassadors Harriman and Vance spoke for the U.S. Government.
3. <sup>the regular</sup> In a public session the usual exchange took place. The North Vietnamese attacked the Honolulu communique and described Secretary Rusk's press conference as bellicose. Ambassador Harriman rebutted charges with special emphasis on North Vietnamese troops in the south.
4. Ambassador Harriman stressed the Lao situation in the larger meeting.

~~SECRET~~

Bremley Smith

BKS:dmc

MEMORANDUM

120  
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

13  
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, July 31, 1968

9:10 a.m.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI/RAC 00-43

By cb, NARA Dated 2-5-01

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dubcek's Family Crosses into Austria

Mrs. Dubcek and her two teen-aged children crossed from Czechoslovakia into Austria this morning.

The family is now in Vienna being carefully watched by Austrian police [REDACTED]

Mrs. Dubcek has not so far made hotel arrangements. It is uncertain whether she plans to remain in her car, pending further word.

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

*Prom*  
Bromley Smith

~~SECRET~~

*14*  
*Pres file*  
INFORMATION

Tuesday, July 30, 1968  
9:40 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT -- EYES ONLY

Here are readable copies of the three Sensitive telegrams dealing with the negotiations in Paris:

- The July 13 telegram was sent by Secretary Rusk to Ambassadors Harriman and Vance who had appealed for reconsideration of instructions which they thought were too restrictive. The negotiators wanted to tell the Hanoi delegation more than they had been authorized to do. In essence, Secretary Rusk's cable was an effort to explain to them that we were not prepared to spell out our position until it was clear that Hanoi was serious about discussing the Vietnam problem on a two-way basis.
- The July 23 message from Secretary Rusk to the negotiators says flatly that we should maintain the public position expressed in the Honolulu communique while continuing private explorations. The purpose was to tell Ambassadors Harriman and Vance that we were not ready to box ourselves in by accepting the lull in military operations as a response to your March 31 speech.
- The July 29 cable to the Paris delegation was sent at 9:34 p.m. Monday night following your meeting with Secretaries Rusk and Clifford. The cable clearly stated the decision to stay firmly on our present course and press for a constructive Hanoi response to the proposals we have already made.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-249

By *sig*, NARA, Date *1-30-96*

Bromley Smith

BKS:ksb

*copy of telegrams also to General Taylor,  
per Pres's. request.*



Sent Paris July 13, 1968,  
by the Department of State

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-248

By ig, NARA, Date 6-25-96

~~SECRET~~

Amembassy PARIS IMMEDIATE  
Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

Ref.: Paris 17843  
State 109838

PERSONAL FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE FROM THE SECRETARY

The President and I believe that certain shades of difference which appear in reference cables could be reduced by a fuller exposition of what is really on our minds.

We see little evidence that the Hanoi delegation is prepared seriously to discuss other factors on which there must be an understanding before there is a complete cessation of the bombing. Their delegation may be awaiting the return of Le Duc Tho, they may be awaiting the results of the new offensive which they clearly seem to be preparing, they may be marking time for political developments in the United States, or they may feel that they are under no pressure to get going. Chairman Kossygin just recently wrote Prime Minister Gandhi pressing the point that we stop all of the bombing before anything else could be done and asked her to press this upon the United States. What the Soviets are doing behind the scenes, we just do not know clearly. There has been no further answer to the President's message to Kossygin on this subject.

Under these circumstances we are reluctant to make a full and detailed exposition of our views until it is quite clear that Hanoi is prepared to sit down and seriously discuss the problem on a two-way basis. Otherwise, there would be nothing more than a unilateral exposition to someone who is not really listening. It would put Hanoi in a position to make our views public at any time and in such a way as to inject questions of detail into public debate in this country and to stimulate fears and suspicions among the South Vietnamese and other Asian allies.

It seems to me that the question is basically one of timing. I would think that you have plenty to talk about in your Monday private meeting within the framework of State's 199888. You could begin with a discussion of the concept of the Phase One-Phase Two approach. If they reject this in principle at the outset, this could be pursued at some length on the basis that it is an attempt on our part to meet their problem -- namely, to prepare the way for a stopping of the bombing

~~SECRET~~

by the United States as a first step. If they seem sufficiently interested as to want a sample of what you are talking about, you could go into the DMZ point in considerable detail. At the same time, you could mention the other topics as a sort of agenda for a further discussion of the Phase One-Phase Two concept. It would of course be of great value if you could elicit from them their thoughts on topics Phase Two would have to take into account.

It seems to me that State's 199838 gives you plenty of ammunition for your next private meeting, pending Vance's return on Tuesday for further detailed discussion here.

On your specific question as to whether you are authorized by State's 199838 to put down a complete package, you should not put down what purports to be a complete package until you and we have resolved such questions as the withdrawal of forces by both sides from South Vietnam and the broad questions referred to in Paragraph 13. As indicated above, you are authorized to explore the concept of Phase One-Phase Two fully, explore the DMZ in great detail, and indicate more generally the other topics that you would wish to explore further. It seems to me that this is in itself more than you can possibly cover in a single meeting.

"Indiscriminate attacks" certainly include rocketing and shelling of cities and should include other acts primarily designed for terroristic purposes. We think this should ordinarily include mines and explosive devices used for such purposes and certainly could include use of NVA/VC personnel on the ground in indiscriminate attacks primarily for political purposes. You should use above as illustrative in order to probe any DRV reactions. We would like to get as much as we can in this connection.

Military experts here are concerned that prohibition against alteration and composition of military units could raise technical problems for both sides. It appears to give a certainty and security which is more apparent than real since it is possible to attach large numbers of additional troops to existing units. In any event, it is scarcely necessary for you to make this an initial proposal. If they are interested, we can negotiate the details subsequently.

You need not include proposals with respect to complete withdrawal by each government of its forces from SVN. We think it may interest the other side and you may raise it if as a result of your discussions



~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

this appears to you useful. The principle is obviously an important one and should be of considerable interest to the North Vietnamese but we leave timing to your discretion. We continue to have under consideration your proposal with respect to token withdrawals and appreciate the argumentation you have provided. We are not, however, persuaded this should be an initial proposal on our part but are wont to believe it should await evidence of their seriousness with respect to Phase One-Phase Two proposal. If there is evidence of willingness to negotiate on this basis we will reconsider your recommendation.

You need not raise the broad matters contained in Paragraph 13 of our Reftel. These are discretionary with you and were intended to be responsive to a point in Zorin's original suggestions on which you reported he "attached considerable importance" (Paris 17226, 7.13 Delto 381).

BKS:ksb

~~SECRET~~



146

~~SECRET~~

Amembassy PARIS

EYES ONLY FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE FROM THE SECRETARY

Despite one or two elliptical efforts by Hanoi representatives to suggest that they have de-escalated the fighting on the ground, I believe that we should maintain the public position expressed in the Honolulu communique while continuing private explorations. In the first place, we would look and be silly if we proceeded on the theory that the other side had made a political decision to de-escalate the violence only to find ourselves confronted with new and major attacks which are now in prospect. Only yesterday there were serious bombing incidents in Saigon and the enemy forces in the Saigon area are only twenty-four hours away. Perhaps even more important, if we were to acknowledge, without any assurances from Hanoi, that the present somewhat lower scale of fighting results from Hanoi's "de-escalation," many soft-headed people would take that as a sufficient answer to the President's March 31 speech and call upon us to take another major step of unilateral de-escalation such as a non-reciprocal ending of the bombing.

The purpose of this message is not to foreclose any options whatever but simply to suggest that we not box ourselves in by accepting the present lull as a response to the March 31 speech. I would of course be glad to have any comments you wish to make.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 95-248  
By ing, NARA, Date 6-25-96

~~SECRET~~

Sent 9:34 P.M., July 29, 1968  
to Paris by Dep: ment of State

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

211189

63543

14C

FOR OCIT USE ONLY

30 JUL 68 01 34z

(This is your time)

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy PARIS . IMMEDIATE

Info

STATE: 211189

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-248

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

TODEL 787

By ig, NARA, Date 6-25-96

EYES ONLY FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE FROM THE SECRETARY

1. I have discussed your Delto 524 with the President and the Secretary of Defense. This short message is to let you know as soon as possible, pending a more extensive comment, that ~~we wish to stay firmly on our present course and press for a constructive Hanoi response to the proposals we have already made~~. They have told us ~~that~~ they are "seriously considering" those proposals. We have not yet had a reply and believe that we are entitled to an answer. ~~The proposals we have made, especially in the Phase 1 - Phase 2 framework, are fair and reasonable, firm and generous if there is any interest on the part of Hanoi in a tolerable peace in South East Asia.~~ Such a tolerable peace is our central objective for which we have already made major concessions without significant response from Hanoi.

Drafted by:

S:DRusk:ajg 7/29/68

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

S - The Secretary

Cleancom

S/S - Mr. Shepard

~~SECRET~~

Classification



~~SECRET~~

Classification

2. We have reason to believe that Hanoi, Moscow and others are trying concerted to mount a/~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ campaign to force us to stop all of the bombing without any corresponding action at all from Hanoi. It may be that they are counting on/~~the~~ convention and electoral period to achieve this end. They must be disabused of this idea if there is to be peace. We will continue to give thought to all alternatives but ~~we should not leave the impression that further delay by Hanoi will cause us to make further unilateral concessions.~~

3. In view of the above we believe that Vance should remain in Paris for the ~~pxx~~ present to be available for Hanoi's response and further discussion along that line rather than return at this point and stimulate a lot of speculation that we are about to make new moves in the absence of such a response.

4. I will go over this in detail with Katzenbach upon his return and be in touch with you further. Warm regards.

RUSK

~~SECRET~~

Classification



INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

15

Tuesday, July 30, 1968  
8:55 p. m.

Mr. President:

*for file*

The State Department has sent to our delegation in Paris and to our Embassy in Saigon the underlying telegram containing the text of former President Eisenhower's statement on Vietnam.

Bremley Smith

FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY SAIGON

UNCLAS STATE 212062

TODEL 791

1. IN SPECIAL MESSAGE TO PLATFORM COMMITTEE OF REPUBLICAN PARTY MEETING MIAMI BEACH TODAY, FORMER PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER STATED:

2. QTE WE MUST UNCEASINGLY MAKE IT CLEAR TO HANOI THAT WE DO NOT SEEK NOR WILL WE ACCEPT A CAMOUFLAGED SURRENDER WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY RESULT IN THE UNITED STATES 'WRITING OFF' SOUTHEAST ASIA FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. WE COULD SURVIVE SUCH A CATASTROPHE--BUT OUR CITIZENRY SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT THE WHOLE SECURITY SYSTEM, WHICH HAS MAINTAINED PEACE AND FREEDOM FOR THE PAST GENERATION, WOULD BE ERODED--IF NOT DESTROYED--BY AN AMERICAN RETREAT FROM OUR COMMITMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

3. WE ASK NOTHING FOR OURSELVES AND INSIST UPON NOTHING FOR SOUTH VIETNAM EXCEPT THAT IT BE FREE TO CHART ITS OWN FUTURE, NO MATTER WHAT COURSE IT MAY CHOOSE. SURELY THIS IS A NOBLE AND WORTHY OBJECTIVE CONSISTENT WITH ALL THAT IS BEST IN AMERICAN LIFE AND TRADITION.

4. WE HOPE THAT BOTH GREAT POLITICAL PARTIES WILL MAKE CLEAR TO HANOI AMERICA'S PATIENT DETERMINATION TO OBTAIN SECURITY FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE. UNLESS AND UNTIL HANOI IS CONVINCED OF THAT DETERMINATION, WE CANNOT EXPECT PROGRESS IN THE TALKS AT PARIS OR

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~PAGE 02 STATE 212062~~

A TERMINATION OF THE FIGHTING IN VIETNAM. THE CAUSE OF PEACE WITH FREEDOM AND HONOR IN VIETNAM AND THE CAUSE OF PEACE IN FUTURE YEARS, WILL BE GREATLY INFLUENCED BY THE RESOLUTION SHOWN BY OUR MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES IN MIAMI AND CHICAGO. UNQTE. RUSK

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

43  
Lynch

Free file  
16

Tuesday, July 30, 1968

8:42 p.m.

Mr. President:

This is the re-typed letter containing  
the revisions you suggested in  
paragraph 2.

Bromley Smith



JUL 3 0 1968

16a

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I was much interested in your letter of July 23 on the subject of talks about curbing the strategic arms race. I agree with your remarks about the great importance of this question to both our countries, to other nations as well, and to the general and urgent problem of disarmament.

We agree that Geneva would be a suitable place for the negotiations. You indicate that a period of a month to a month and a half would provide a suitable interval for preparations. This time period of "a month to a month and a half" is acceptable.

As for the level at which the talks might begin, we would be ready to initiate the discussions at the level of Chiefs of Government, Foreign Ministers, or heads of special delegations in Geneva.

We will be glad to have your suggestions as to the exact dates and the level of representation. We should also consult upon when and how an announcement of the meeting should be made. There could be some advantage if the general situation would permit an announcement to be made before the convening of the Non-Nuclear Conference in late August.

I do hope that our forthcoming discussions on the strategic arms race can produce constructive results because I believe that our peoples would join in a common desire for a successful outcome.

We share, of course, your understanding that it is essential for both of us to make every effort to create the most favorable climate for these talks. If problems arise in the general situation which complicate prospects for success, we can of course be in touch with each other.

Sincerely,



His Excellency A. N. Kossygin  
Chairman of the Presidium of the  
USSR Council of Ministers  
Moscow

LBJ:DRusk:ksb

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71C 9 89-70

By jow/ag, NARA, Date 10-30-92

17  
ACTION

Tuesday, July 30, 1968, 7:50 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Public release of text of Thieu-Johnson message to Thai  
Prime Minister Thanom

*Profile*

The Thai Foreign Minister mentioned in a press conference the message sent by you and President Thieu from Honolulu to Prime Minister Thanom. Our Embassy in Bangkok wishes to release the message, the text of which follows:

"As we are meeting in Honolulu, the news has reached us of the departure of the first major contingent of the light division which your government is sending to assist in the defense of South Vietnam.

"We are greatly heartened by this dramatic expression of your government's firm support for our common efforts and purposes -- to defeat aggression and to bring an honorable and secure peace to Vietnam and Southeast Asia. We shall continue to stand together in this cause.

"When we have concluded this conference, we will share our impressions fully with you, in the spirit of complete cooperation and consultation that governs our relationship each with the other. Nguyen Van Thieu - Lyndon B. Johnson"

The GVN, our Saigon Embassy, and George Christian are agreeable.

I recommend you authorize the release of the text.

Marshall Wright

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

cc: George Christian

**INFORMATION**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

18

**Tuesday, July 30, 1968  
7:00 p. m.**

*Pres. file*

**Mr. President:**

**Still no details of the Soviet-Czech  
meeting.**

**Attached is the CIA report as of  
4:00 p. m. this afternoon.**

**Bremley Smith**



~~SECRET~~CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
30 July 1968

SUBJECT: The Situation in Czechoslovakia as of 4:00 p.m. EDT

Speculation on the course and outcome of the talks is coming in from all sides, but none of it seems based on hard information. ~~Both the Czechs and TASS today said only that the meeting was taking place in an atmosphere of "frankness and comradeship" - a phrase which, according to Communist usage, signals tough talk but not total disagreement.~~

[redacted] some elements of the Czechoslovak armed forces may be on a limited alert. TASS announced late yesterday that the rear services exercise which began last week in the western USSR is now continuing in Poland and East Germany with the participation of rear services of the Polish and East German armies. [redacted]

[redacted] Soviet troops have crossed into Poland at several points along the USSR-Polish border.

The Soviets continue to reinforce their ground units in southern East Germany. There are now elements of as many as ten Soviet divisions in the area adjacent to the Czechoslovak border. There has been no significant change in the status of the estimated 250 Soviet combat aircraft which deployed into southern East Germany and southern Poland on 27-28 July. A few aircraft have returned to home bases.

The East German Army's 7th Tank Division, Dresden, and 11th Motorized Rifle Division, Halle, [redacted]

[redacted] East German Defense Minister Hoffmann was received in Moscow this morning by Soviet Defense Minister Grechko.

[redacted] some elements of the four Soviet divisions in Hungary may be moving into the field. [redacted]

[redacted] roadblocks and some convoys moving toward Czechoslovakia on 27-28 July. No unusual Hungarian military activity was observed.

MORI/CDF

MORI/CDF

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ-141-022-012/2  
By jc, NARA, Date 11/3/09

~~SECRET~~

-2-

The Dubcek leadership appears to be taking steps to improve its negotiating position at Cierna. In a move which may be more significant for its timing than its content, the Czechoslovaks yesterday gave the appearance of restoring a limited form of censorship. The Interior Ministry issued a 35-page list of official secrets to chief editors and publishers.

Italian Communist party leaders are keeping the pressure on Moscow, and [REDACTED] Tito is willing to go to Prague at a moment's notice if requested to do so by the Czechoslovaks.

25X1

~~SECRET~~

*19*  
INFORMATION

Tuesday, July 30, 1968

*(sent through G. Christian)*  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Information activity on the "restraint" question *Pres. file*

As a follow-through to Secretary Rusk's press conference today:

1. Secretary Clifford is planning a backgrounder for the press on Friday. He will stress the factual information which belies the New York Times editorial of yesterday, and which leads us to believe that an enemy offensive is in preparation during the current lull in the fighting. (Clifford's schedule is very heavy and he may have to cancel the backgrounder.)
2. We are asking Saigon to arrange for MAC/V intelligence officers to share with the press the specific intelligence which points to an impending offensive (infiltration figures, prisoner interrogations, captured documents and enemy deployments).
3. Bill Bundy is backgrounding the Overseas Writers Club tomorrow. The questions will undoubtedly get deep into the whole subject of what the current lull means, and what our response to it should be. Bundy is getting guidance from Secretary Rusk.

Marshall Wright



*Lee*  
20  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**Tuesday, July 30, 1968  
6:25 p.m.**

**Mr. President:**

**This is the memorandum you requested earlier this afternoon listing samples of enemy military actions in South Vietnam since your March 31 speech.**

**Paragraph 2 on the buildup in Cambodia is classified material and should not be made public unless it is revised to delete the reference to aerial photography.**

**DECLASSIFIED** Bromley Smith  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 95-241  
By *sig*, NARA, Date 1-30-96

Tuesday, July 30, 1968

Pres file

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Examples of Enemy Military Actions in South Vietnam  
Since the March 31 Speech**

**1. Casualties**

In the three months April through June, U. S. casualties were 4,724, compared with 4,847 in the three months prior to March 31. GVN and Third Nation casualties for the same period were 5,910 and 5,782, respectively.

**2. Build-Up of Sanctuary in Cambodia**

Since February, photography of the Parrot's Beak area of Cambodia has revealed a rapid build-up of at least a divisional-size base area. Latest photos reveal over 750 newly-constructed large structures, medium-size structures, and huts have mushroomed within the area, as well as numerous additional bunkers and foxholes. This area is about 30 miles from Saigon.

**3. Recent Mortar/Rocket Attacks**

Nearly 200 rounds of mortar and rocket fire were targeted at the Danang area on July 22.

Also on July 22, a small civilian community near the Nha Trang Airfield was hit by 10 rounds of mortar fire, wounding 6 Vietnamese civilians.

**4. Truck Sightings**

In January-March, truck sightings totalled 24,791; from April-June, it was 29,791.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 95-249  
By inf, NARA Date 8-20-96

## **5. Terrorism**

Statistics show a higher rate of kidnapping than at any other time in eleven years (4,321 abducted in first five months of 1968 compared with a high of 9,500 for the whole of 1962).

Viet Cong have killed 103 refugees so far this month.

Eight persons were killed and 42, including 23 civilians, were wounded at Hoc Mon, 8 kilometers northwest of Tan Son Nhut Airbase, on July 30 by three grenades thrown into a public market.

A Viet Cong company laid down mortar attack and then invaded Phu Da Hamlet near Duc Duc in central Quang Nam province early on July 23, burning down half of the hamlet and rendering 1,400 persons homeless.

Eighteen civilians were killed and 39 wounded in a mortar attack on the Than Tay Refugee Camp, 1 kilometer west of Hoi An early on July 23.

The Viet Cong used mortar and ground attack against a refugee camp in the village of Hui Sua in Son Tinh district of Quang Ngai province at 2 a.m. July 23. One person was killed, 7 wounded, three houses destroyed.

Two Viet Cong platoons burned 100 refugee homes at An Duong Hamlet Refugee Camp in Binh Dinh on July 15, wiping out almost the whole of the camp. Five hundred and fifty-one persons lost their homes. A child and two adult civilians were killed and three civilians wounded.

Bromley Smith



<sup>1-25</sup>  
INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

<sup>21</sup>  
Tuesday, 5:20 P. M.  
July 30, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached is the report which General Wheeler mentioned at today's luncheon indicating that a North Vietnamese headquarters near Saigon was directly hit by a B-52 bomber.

Bromley Smith

*Pres file*  
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 95-249

By lig, NARA, Date 1-30-96



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

21a  
~~SENSITIVE~~

CM-3527-68

30 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: B-52 Effort

1. As further indication of the success of our B-52 effort, I think the following report of recent strikes which I have just received from General Abrams will prove of interest.

"On 28 July an agent of proven reliability stated that B-52 strikes landed directly on COSVN Combined Headquarters in the Boi Loi woods area NW of Saigon and the number of dead is still unknown. Nearly 200 bicycles used to transport wounded were almost completely destroyed. A rumor is presently circulating among high level cadre that the recent B-52 strikes have inflicted heavy casualties and hindered the movement of troops, and contact has been lost with all elements of the Fifth VC Division.

"The agent reported that the offensive was to have begun on 30 July, but the plan was compromised. COSVN was informed by radio from Saigon that the plan was compromised and that U.S. and ARVN forces had taken strong defensive measures. VC personnel are 100 percent restricted to base area. The Commander of the Intelligence Section COSVN is presently conducting an investigation to determine how ~~TOP SECRET~~ plans were compromised enabling the Americans to take such strong defensive measures."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12336, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 95-252

By cb, NARA, Date 10-17-96

~~TOP SECRET~~

27 // of \_\_\_\_\_ copies  
~~SENSITIVE~~

GROUP - 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

~~TOP SECRET~~

2. The Headquarters referred to by the source is probably the forward Headquarters COSVN which has been located periodically in the Boi Loi Woods Area Northwest of Saigon since TET.

*Earle G. Wheeler*

EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

cc: Mr. Rusk  
Mr. Nitze  
Mr. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

Tuesday - July 30, 1968 - 3:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from President Barrientos

*Pres file*

The Bolivian Embassy has delivered to State a long letter (Tab B) from President Barrientos thanking you for the invitation to the Ranch and discussing issues he did not have time to take up with you while there.

The issues boil down to:

- recognition of Bolivia's contribution to hemispheric security by eliminating "Che" Guevara.
- Bolivia's willingness to cooperate in physical integration, but it also desires access to the sea.
- a request that GSA make its 3-month suspension of tin sales indefinite.
- United States approval of a loan to modernize Bolivia's airports and airline.

At Tab A is a suggested reply prepared by State. It compliments President Barrientos on his decision to work toward greater economic integration (i.e., Andean Common Market and the River Plate Basin Development) and his success in dealing with the Guevara guerrillas. On bilateral economic matters, the letter avoids getting into specifics because we do not know what use President Barrientos might make of it. He knows that since the Ranch visit, two loans (roads and agricultural cooperatives) have been approved, and the airport-aircraft loan will be completed when details on the down payment are worked out. We cannot agree to an indefinite suspension of GSA tin sales, but the letter makes clear we will consult fully with Bolivia on any significant actions we might contemplate taking.

I recommend you sign the letter.

W. G. Bowdler

Attachments

Tabs A and B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-249

By *lig*, NARA, Date 1-30-96



22a

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NEJ 95-249**  
**By ig, NARA, Date 1-30-96**

July 30, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I have received, and read with interest, your letter to me of July 8, 1968 in which you outline your views on such important matters as hemispheric security, economic development, and the relationship between the United States and the International Tin Council. Your letter is yet another demonstration of your deep interest in assuring the continued development of Bolivia in a peaceful, democratic manner.

I am particularly pleased that we agree on the need to move forward on multinational enterprises. I have assigned high priority to encouraging projects of regional integration. Bolivia's active participation in the Andean Bloc of LAFTA and in the Rio Plate Basin Group is very important in this regard. The economic benefits of regional cooperation are obvious; also, it is my hope that the economic rewards will be accompanied by a reduction of some political tensions, particularly those involving territorial or border problems.

We share your views with regard for the need for the American Republics to work together to protect themselves from armed aggression and internal subversion. You and your government are to be complimented on the manner in which you have pursued this goal within your own borders and for the positive role you have played in seeking means for future inter-American cooperation in this regard.

My government intends to continue to work actively within the spirit and framework of the Alliance for Progress to help promote economic and social development throughout the hemisphere not only to help each country neutralize

subversion, but also to stimulate an atmosphere in which democratic institutions take root and grow.

In your letter you also deal with several matters in the sphere of bilateral relations between Bolivia and the United States, particularly several pending questions of economic assistance and the question of future United States policy in regard to surplus tin stock disposals. I believe that the former matter is very close to a mutually satisfactory conclusion. On the tin question, as you know, the General Services Administration has withdrawn, temporarily, from the market. We are now studying our tin disposal methods. If we propose any significant changes, we shall consult fully with the governments of the tin producing countries and your views will certainly receive the most careful consideration.

In conclusion, Mr. President, may I say once again that it was a pleasure and an honor to greet you and your distinguished Ministers of Foreign Relations, Finance, and Rural Affairs at my home in Texas. I am sure that our meeting has served to reinforce the close and cordial ties which have traditionally existed between our two countries.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
General Rene Barrientos Ortuno  
Constitutional President of the Republic of Bolivia  
La Paz.

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm



10. 3387  
R-XXXII/R-XX  
Spanish

*original to  
President  
226*

[Coat of arms of Bolivia]

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

New York, July 8, 1968

Excellency:

I do not wish to leave your country without again expressing my admiration and respect for the great American nation of which you are President, and again assuring you of my gratitude and that of the members of my party for the many courtesies and kindnesses extended to us during our visit. The welcome given us by officials, the Governors of Texas, Utah, and Arkansas, Logan University, and all those whom we met and talked with in your country, has left an indelible memory of friendship.

Although the purpose of my visit was to open the Bolivian pavilion at the San Antonio Fair, I was especially happy to accept your invitation to lunch. It was an honor for me and the members of my party to meet Mrs. Johnson and your daughter Linda, as well as your close associates. The experiences we had are unforgettable. They all confirm the conviction that I have held since my years at Randolph Field that the noble human quality of the American people forms the foundation of your nation's greatness and power.

I was particularly pleased to note the spirit of cooperation with which your Government has imbued the relations between our peoples.

His Excellency  
Lyndon B. Johnson,  
President of the United States,  
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 95-249  
By *sig*, NARA, Date 1-30-96

Despite the limitations imposed on Bolivia's development by geography and history, the country is contributing resources and effort to the common endeavor and, when it fell to it to defend the cause of democracy, it contributed with the sacrifice of its people and even the lives of its soldiers to put down the guerrillas that subversive international Communism used in its attempt to seize control of one of the bastions of the Free World.

Extremist armed aggression is, as you are well aware, a system of subjugation that could dangerously weaken the economies of the developing countries. The aim of the guerrillas and subsequent subversion was to break the democratic will, disrupt the institutional process, discourage investment, and thwart the economic efforts in progress; sow confusion among intellectuals, industrialists, and workers; mislead the rural inhabitants whom we are incorporating with such difficulty into a consumer economy; and lastly, spread anarchy among the people, taking away their self-determination, independence, and freedom and postponing their possibilities for progress under the democratic system.

The Castroist invasion failed because of the determination of the people to defend their democratic way of life and because of the action of the armed forces. There is no doubt, however, that Castro will persist in his aim of creating centers of aggression in the heart of the Hemisphere. It behooves the Governments of the American Republics to be aware of these facts and to work out the strategy that will protect them against the common danger.

A social revolution is in progress in Bolivia, aimed at solving critical economic problems through development that will lead to increased production, better utilization of natural resources, and such social measures as fairer wages, education, and social security.

Recognizing their lag behind the highly industrialized countries and taking due note of the aspirations of their peoples, the Governments of the Latin American countries have launched dynamic development programs,

but these individual efforts are encountering the impassable barrier of narrow internal markets. To eliminate that negative aspect, multinational enterprises are being planned that would mobilize the natural resources of the countries concerned, accelerate their rate of industrialization, and thereby ensure expanded economic relations among countries and fair work and compensation relations among men.

The national programs and multinational enterprises can be successful only if they are effectively supported and financed by the developed nations, especially by the United States, whose tradition of freedom and democracy marks its history.

Economic development will not be projected in history unless man progresses at the same time, so that he may overcome poverty, ignorance, and disease. The Latin American, and particularly the Bolivian, produces chiefly for his own consumption and only on a small scale for the market. However, he uses public services--government, roads, schools, hospitals, etc.--without contributing to their support through direct taxes. He must be converted from a "tax-eater" into a "taxpayer."

The foregoing facts point to the need for:

1. Outlining a joint strategy capable of coping with the aggression of subversive international Communism, which would undoubtedly be applied according to a coordinated plan;

2. Strengthening the ability of each country to neutralize subversion through economic and industrial development on bases of social justice, in order to overcome the negative consequences of exploitation motivated solely by profit;

3. Studying a system of priorities in the field of multinational development that could<sup>be</sup> put into operation by a top-level commission, which, without establishing itself as another bureaucratic body, would coordinate the scattered efforts and the utilization of resources by the international organizations.



It was my intention to talk to you, Mr. President, about these matters. I also wanted to mention to you the profound regret of the Bolivian people and the concern we in Bolivia feel over the suspension of diplomatic relations with the Government of Chile. It has been our hope that the people and Government of Chile would understand that our action was not based on hatred but on the need to right the injustice of our having been deprived of access to the Pacific and the natural resources offered by the sea. Now, in view of the process of physical and economic integration in which my country is involved, it is more urgent than ever that it again have access to the sea. Since it appears that the era of armed conflicts in Latin America has ended, I deem it essential that all the nations of Latin America take cognizance of that urgently necessary historical imperative. It is difficult for Bolivia to continue assuming commitments in the area of economic integration unless a permanent solution is found for its problem of being a landlocked nation. How could I, for example, Mr. President, convince my people of the need to establish a multinational petrochemical complex at Arica, supplied by Bolivian oil, without running the risk of being accused of contributing to the aggrandizement of a country that once took the nitrate, principal source of wealth of the Bolivian coastline, away from us? Secretary of State Kellogg in 1929, President Roosevelt in 1943, and President Truman in 1950 publicly acknowledged the historical importance and economic implications of the problem. I wanted to talk to you about that.

I also hoped to have the opportunity to tell you how happy my Government was over the decision of General Services Administration to suspend for the next three months its sales of tin from the strategic reserve of the United States. In this connection, my Government once more recalled the agreement concluded between representatives of the International Tin Council, the Department of State, and General Services Administration, whereby General Services would not sell tin while the price is under US\$1.54 a pound, fine.

I intended to add that the Government of Bolivia would be favorable to an indefinite decision by General Services Administration not to continue selling tin as long as the Third Agreement Stabilization Reserve has five thousand or more tons of metal. This could ensure, among other things, that the Stabilization Reserve would have the tin stock to which it is committed and would freeze the financial resources contributed solely by the producer countries.

Accordingly, it would be useful if the consultations between the International Tin Council, on the one hand, and the Department of State and General Services Administration, on the other hand, were placed on a continuing basis and if they were held, in so far as possible, before the next meeting of the Council scheduled for September, in order to examine jointly the future sale schedules for the United States strategic reserve.

It is essential to Bolivia that the International Tin Council and General Services Administration agree on convergent, timely measures to overcome the current weakness of the market and the drop in prices resulting from the gradual rise in production. In any case, in view of the balance achieved between production and consumption and a visible trend toward overproduction, sales by General Services Administration are not justified.

Bolivian producers, especially the Corporación Minera de Bolivia [Bolivian Mining Corporation], are making all-out efforts to rationalize production and reduce costs. The Government of Bolivia would be very happy if the Government of the United States, in preparing its reserve sale programs, would consider how dependent the Bolivian external economy is on its tin exports and the effect of such exports on its treasury, financial, and currency policy. In this connection, it should be remembered that Bolivia is the sole supplier of tin in the West, and that in critical situations it has made considerable efforts to see that the supply to the industrialized countries of the region were kept normal.

Lastly, since the period of validity of the Third International Tin Agreement of 1965 is just about half over, the Government of Bolivia would be gratified to see the Government of the United States consider its participation in another Agreement and adopt a positive decision on this matter.

I cannot close this letter without expressing in writing my appreciation for the development loans your Government has granted to Bolivia under the Alliance for Progress. One of those loans was the one that had been under negotiation for about three years for Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano and that was recently transferred unilaterally to the Export-Import Bank, to the serious detriment of the above-mentioned company, which must have that loan to enter the jet age. A hard loan such as those that the Eximbank can extend, far from solving its problem, will aggravate it by increasing the costs. I believe that if the United States has made loans to other countries in the form of airplanes, it could do the same for Bolivia, which is its partner in the Alliance for Progress. And so, it is my hope that Your Excellency, having given me the opportunity to go into this matter, will arrange for my country to be accorded treatment similar to that given to other countries.

My associates have reviewed with your associates the status of the negotiations for the other development loans and have been given the assurance that they will be granted shortly. I thank you in advance for this, Mr. President.

I leave the United States with the deep satisfaction of having gone over, with my esteemed and good friend, the common problems of our two countries.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my friendship and my highest consideration.

[Signed] René Barrientos

Constitutional President of Bolivia



Tuesday, July 30, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dachau Memorial Ceremonies

On September 8 a new memorial is to be unveiled at the Dachau concentration camp in Germany.

While Chiefs of State are invited, most countries are sending their Ambassadors in Bonn to the ceremonies. Exceptions are France, which will probably send Minister of State Michelet, and the Netherlands, which may send Prince Bernhard.

Our Embassy in Bonn recommends, and the State Department proposes, that you designate Henry Cabot Lodge as the United States representative.

Nathaniel Davis

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988

By RG, NARA, Date 10-19-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

Tuesday - July 30, 1968  
1:45 p.m.

24

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Volcanic Eruption in Costa Rica

Early this morning a volcano erupted in Costa Rica some 200 kilometers from San Jose. We have only a preliminary report from our Embassy on the casualties and property loss.

The damage appears sufficiently serious for our Charge to ask for AID emergency relief. This is already in motion. Two helicopters from the Canal Zone will help in rescue operations.

I thought you might want to send the message at Tab A to President Trejos.

*WRB*

W. G. Bowdler

Approve ☒

*7/30/68*

Disapprove ☐

Call me ☐

Attachment

Tab A - Suggested Presidential message to President Trejos.

Suggested Presidential Message to Costa Rican President Trejos

Dear Mr. President:

I was distressed to read this morning that a long dormant volcano has erupted in Costa Rica resulting in considerable loss of life, personal injury and material damage.

I am asking our Embassy to work with you on emergency relief measures. Please let us know how we can be of help.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson



~~TOP SECRET~~

25  
REVISED

Tuesday, July 30, 1968

Luncheon with the President  
Tuesday, July 30, 1968 1:00 P.M.

Agenda

1. Czech-Soviet Confrontation -- Secretary Rusk

Report on the current situation. We may have first reports of results of today's meeting in Slovakia.

2. Vietnam Public Information Problems -- Secretary Rusk

Follow-up actions on Secretary Rusk's press conference including the question of Hanoi's "restraint" and intelligence on the current military lull.

3. Strategic Missile Talks with USSR -- Secretary Rusk

Report on staff work being done on substantive positions.

4. Proposed Law of the Sea Conference -- Secretary Rusk

Report on results of private talks with the Russians and discussion of whether we should jointly proceed to an international conference.

5. Cambodia

A. Report by Secretary Clifford on the enemy build-up in the Cambodian sanctuaries.

B. Report by Secretary Rusk of efforts to free U.S. Navy personnel being held following capture off Cambodia.

6. Other

Bremley Smith

BKS:amc

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By lg, NARA, Date 11-4-92

**TOP SECRET**

26  
Monday, July 29, 1968

Lunches with the President  
Tuesday, July 30, 1968 1:00 p.m.

Agenda

1. Czech-Soviet Confrontation -- Secretary Rusk

Report on the current situation. We may have first reports of results of today's meeting in Slovakia.

2. Vietnam -- Secretary Rusk

A. Proposal of Ambassadors Harriman and Vance.  
(Text of cable sent to you in separate memorandum.)

B. Public information problems.

1. Secretary Rusk's press conference is scheduled for 11:00 a.m. Tuesday.

2. Follow-up actions to deal with question of Hanoi's "restraint". Intelligence on military build.

3. Strategic Missile Talks with USSR -- Secretary Rusk

Report on staff work being done on substantive positions.

4. Proposed Law of the Sea Conference -- Secretary Rusk

Report on results of private talks with the Russians and discussion of whether we should jointly proceed to an international conference.

5. Cambodia

A. Report by Secretary Clifford on the enemy build-up in the Cambodian sanctuaries.

**TOP SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By RG, NARA, Date 11-4-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

3. Cambodia (cont'd.)

- B. Report by Secretary Rusk of efforts to free U. S. Navy personnel being held following capture off Cambodia.

6. Other

Bremley Smith

~~TOP SECRET~~



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

27

**Tuesday, 11:30 A. M.  
July 30, 1968**

**Mr. President:**

**Attached is a memorandum from  
General Taylor prompted by the  
editorial in yesterday's New York Times**

**Although written prior to receipt of the  
Paris cable, I share General Taylor's  
view that it would be of interest to  
you.**

**Bromley Smith**

27a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

July 30, 1968

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The July 29 editorial in the New York Times is the latest in the drive to establish the point that the enemy is deescalating in South Viet-Nam and we are not responding in the spirit of your speech of March 31. It seems safe to forecast that such pressures, fed by the spokesmen of Hanoi, will increase and will require us to give serious consideration to an appropriate response.

It appears to me that we have three alternatives to consider. We could, of course, yield to the pressure and stop our bombing completely. This capitulation has all the disadvantages which we have recognized in the past. If we yield on this point, we will make Hanoi tougher in the subsequent negotiations and will recreate the conditions which contributed to the stalemate at Panmunjom. We will cause serious trouble for ourselves with Saigon where our action will arouse resentment and foment new suspicions of our intentions. The Hawks at home, comparatively quiet of late, will return to the attack and will become particularly violent if, after a cessation of the bombing, the enemy launches the new attack which our military people in Saigon are predicting.

Rather than yielding to the pressure, we could try to ignore it and ride out the ensuing criticism. This course may be possible but, if adopted, it should be accompanied, I think, by a major public-relations campaign to explain to our people the reasons why we can not afford to yield.

If this second alternative can not hold the line, there is a third which has always appealed to me, the linking of the level of our bombing to that of enemy violence in South Viet-Nam. We could establish this linkage through the statistics on enemy major incidents or perhaps on the number of deaths caused by the enemy in South Viet-Nam. If we took this course, we would never give up our bombing of North Viet-Nam for keeps but would achieve a kind of automatic reciprocity independent of Hanoi's veto. At the same time, we would have an effective answer to any charge, now or later, that we do not deescalate when the enemy does.

If we adopted this method, I would hope that, at the first opportunity, we would lift the geographical limitations on the bombing target system. If we are going to reduce materially the number of our sorties flown or the tonnages of munitions dropped, we need complete flexibility in choosing the most remunerative enemy military targets.

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Subj: Misc, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *ad/12*, RANA, Date *11-9-92*

SECRET

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- 2 -

Such a change in policy could be made by issuing a statement along the following line:

"Available data indicate that in recent weeks enemy violence in South Viet-Nam, measured in attacks, terrorism, harassment, sabotage, and the resultant military and civilian loss of life on our side, has subsided slightly (or we could indicate an approximate percentage) under that of the period immediately following the President's March 31 speech. U.S. military authorities have been directed to make a comparable reduction in the sortie rates being flown against North Vietnamese military targets for the immediate future."

This language is deliberately imprecise as it would be a mistake to be trapped in another numbers argument with the press. The interpretation of the ebb and flow of action depends on many factors, few of which can be accurately measured statistically.

~~I think we should try the second alternative now but prepare to shift to this last one.~~

*M.D.T.*  
M. D. T.

~~SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

28  
INFORMATION

Tuesday - July 30, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: President Belaunde Announces International Petroleum  
Company Settlement

On Sunday, July 28, in his annual message to the Peruvian Congress, President Belaunde announced settlement of the long-standing dispute with the International Petroleum Company (ESSO-N.J.) over the La Brea-Parinas (LB-P) oil fields.

The settlement is based on a formula proposed to Belaunde by IPC. Agreement so far is only in principle. The detailed agreement remains to be negotiated.

The essential elements of the deal are:

- IPC hands over to the government all subsurface rights in the LB-P oil fields and all surface installations.
- The government gives IPC a quit-claim on past taxes on LB-P operations, agrees to sell at a mutually acceptable price all crude, natural gasoline and gas from LB-P fields to IPC for processing at its Tqlara refinery, and grants IPC the right to explore and produce petroleum in an area outside LB-P.
- IPC will expand its Tqlara refinery.
- The government will grant storage, distribution and marketing concessions to IPC in Peru.

The deal is a statesman-like way out of a difficult problem. I hope it does not founder in the negotiation of the specifics. Until these are completed, and the agreement signed, it would be premature to consider the dispute closed.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ

91-467

By ing, NARA, Date 1-25-93 William G. Bowdler

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**ACTION** *21*

*[Signature]*

**Tuesday, July 30, 1968**

**Mr. President:**

*Profile*

For your approval is the attached draft cable to Ambassador Bunker asking him to get the views of President Thieu and General Abrams on a complete bombing halt. Earlier today, the Ambassador had been asked for his own evaluation.

Secretary Rusk has approved this draft.

**Brenley Smith**

\_\_\_\_ Approved  
\_\_\_\_ Disapproved  
\_\_\_\_ Call Me

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

211071

29a

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

30 JUL 68 21 22Z

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY

Info

STATE

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER FROM THE SECRETARY

Ref: State 211281

If you think it can be done without the inquiry precipitating substantial problems of its own, we would like you to obtain the separate views of General Abrams and Thieu on the advantages and disadvantages for US and GVN interests of a complete halt in the bombing of the North at this time. At least in the case of President Thieu we think it better that you not identify the proposal we have received from Paris which is set forth in reftel as the occasion for the inquiry, and we leave this to your discretion in the case of General Abrams.

END

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-248

By 48, NARA, Date 6-25-96

RUSK

Drafted by

S/S: BH read: jmj 7/30/68

Tel. No.

5381

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by

The Secretary

Circulation

WH - Mr. Bromley Smith

EA - Mr. Bundy

~~SECRET~~

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322



INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

30

Monday, July 29, 1968  
6:55 p. m.

**Mr. President:**

The first report out of the Soviet-Czech meeting states that "the representatives of the two sides exchanged views".

The Prague radio announcement states that the talks are continuing.

As it is now almost midnight in Slovakia, the announcement probably means that the meeting will be continued tomorrow.

Bremley Smith

*Lai*  
*30a*  
          

*Pres file*

FBIS 61

'OFFICIAL REPORT' ON TALKS

PRAGUE DOMESTIC SERVICE IN CZECH 2200 GMT 29 JUL 68 L

(TEXT) A SHORT WHILE AGO WE RECEIVED THE FIRST OFFICIAL  
REPORT ON THE TALKS BETWEEN OURS AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES.  
IT STATES: IN THE COURSE OF THE TALKS BETWEEN THE PRESIDUM  
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA  
AND THE POLITBURO OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AT CIERNA NAD  
TISA, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO SIDES EXCHANGED VIEWS AND  
STANDPOINTS. AT THIS MOMENT THE TALKS ARE CONTINUING.

29 JUL 2228Z JWG/HH

*Lat*  
31  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**Monday, July 29, 1968  
6:40 p. m.**

**Mr. President:**

**Ambassadors Harriman and Vance in the attached cable argue for a cessation of the bombing now based on certain assumptions.**

**Secretary Rusk may raise this cable with you when he calls at 6:45 p. m.**

**You may wish to consider the substance of the cable at tomorrow's luncheon meeting.**

**DECLASSIFIED** **Bromley Smith**  
**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NEJ** 94-249  
By ig, NARA, Date 1-30-96





Department of State

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SECTION 1 OF 3 PARIS 18692/1

NDDIS/HARYAN/PLUS

DELTO 524

FROM HARRIMAN AND VANCE

1. WE HAVE REACHED A STAGE IN THE PARIS TALKS WHICH MAKES IT DESIRABLE TO TAKE STOCK OF WHERE WE ARE AND TO CONSIDER WHERE WE GO FROM HERE.

PART 1 -- WHERE WE ARE

2. THE PRESENT POSITION WE HAVE TAKEN--AS REFLECTED IN THE PHASE 1-PHASE 2 PROPOSAL--IS ONLY IN THE EARLY STAGES OF EXPLORATION. HANOI HAS HAD THIS PROPOSAL BEFORE IT, IN GENERAL FORM SINCE JUNE 26, AND IN FAIRLY DETAILED FORM SINCE JULY 15. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DID NOT PROPOSE A NEW MEETING LAST WEEK, COMMENTING THAT THEY WERE IN THE PROCESS OF EXAMINING THE HONOLULU COMMUNIQUE.

3. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT, IF WE STICK TO OUR PRESENT COURSE, WE WILL IN TIME BE ABLE TO EXTRACT THE UNDERSTANDINGS WE ARE SEEKING FROM HANOI. IN ADDITION TO TAKING A GOOD DEAL OF TIME, ANY UNDERTAKING THEY WILL GIVE US WILL PROBABLY NOT BE EXPLICIT ENOUGH TO ENABLE US TO KNOW WITH CONFIDENCE WHAT THEY WILL DO AFTER WE STOP THE BOMBING. WE ARE LIKELY TO CONFRONT SLOWLY PACED, MODOR AND AMBIGUOUS CONCESSIONS AS HANOI TRIES TO GET A BOMBING CESSATION AT THE LEAST PRICE.

4. WE MAY, OF COURSE, HAVE A FURTHER READING AT THIS WEDNESDAY'S SESSION, BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE ANYTHING SUFFICIENTLY NEW WILL COME OUT OF THIS MEETING, OR OF ANY DISCUSSION IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-248

~~SECRET~~

By 110, NARA, Date 7-1-96

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 18692, JULY 29, SECTION 1 OF 3

5. WE BELIEVE HANOI'S THINKING ABOUT THE PACE AND CONTENT OF THE PARIS TALKS IS INFLUENCED TO SOME EXTENT BY COMING EVENTS IN THE US. THESE EVENTS--CONVENTIONS, ELECTIONS, CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION--SET A TIME FRAME WHICH WE NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AS WE ESTIMATE WHAT THE OTHER SIDE IS LIKELY TO DO.

6. THIS FORCES US TO LOOK AT WHAT HAPPENS IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS WITHOUT CLEAR AND VISIBLE PROGRESS HERE. IF WE DO NOTHING NEW, WE LEAVE THE INITIATIVE AND TIMING TO HANOI. TWO MAJOR FACTORS THEN COME TO BEAR:

A. THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR TAKING ACTION WHICH MAY DETER THE LAUNCHING OF THE EXPECTED ENEMY ATTACKS AND THUS SAVE AMERICAN AND ALLIED LIVES; AND

B. THE PROSPECT THAT THE MONTH OF AUGUST, AND PARTICULARLY THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION, WILL PRODUCE A FURTHER DIVISION OF DOMESTIC US OPINION WHICH WILL SEVERELY WEAKEN THE BASE WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR THE LONG, HARD NEGOTIATIONS REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE A JUST SOLUTION. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS DIVISION MAY BECOME SO DEEP THAT IT WILL FORCE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TO A PRECIPITOUS WITHDRAWAL WITH THE RESULT THAT ALL OUR SACRIFICES TO ACHIEVE US OBJECTIVES WILL HAVE BEEN FOR NAUGHT.

7. IF THE ENEMY MOUNTS HIS EXPECTED MAJOR OFFENSIVE, THE ONLY WAY WE GAIN IS IF THE ATTACKS ARE SHARP AND DECISIVELY DEFEATED IN SHORT ORDER. WE NOTE THAT GENERAL ABRAMS IS CONFIDENT THAT THE ATTACKS WILL BE REPELLED, BUT WE ALSO NOTE THAT ESTIMATES FROM SAIGON ARE THAT THE ENEMY MAY BE ABLE TO SUSTAIN MAJOR ATTACKS FOR UP TO TWO MONTHS. THUS IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE ODDS FOR A QUICK, DECISIVE OUTCOME ARE NOT GREAT. US CASUALTIES WILL HAVE A BAD EFFECT AT HOME AND CIVILIAN DESTRUCTION WILL CREATE PROBLEMS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.

PART II -- A NEW COURSE

8. A MAJOR CHANGE IN THESE PROSPECTS IS POSSIBLE DURING THE MONTH OF AUGUST. IT WOULD NECESSARILY INVOLVE A SPEED-UP OF OUR OWN TIMETABLE AND, ADMITTEDLY, SOME RISKS. ON OUR PART, IT WOULD REQUIRE A RETURN TO THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA IN WHICH WE WOULD MAKE CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING HANOI'S ACTIONS AFTER

HARRIMAN  
BT

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 3 PARIS 18692/2

NOBIS/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 524

THE CESSATION. ON HANOI'S PART, IT WOULD INVOLVE THE ONE THING THAT HANOI HAS BEEN WILLING TO COMMIT ITSELF TO--THAT IS A READINESS TO MOVE INTO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A FULL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTIVITIES INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE ON OR WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE DRV.

9. AS WE LOOK BACK ON MARCH 31, WE CAN SEE THAT OUR INITIATIVE FORESTALLED HANOI'S PLANS AND GREATLY LENGTHENED OUR LEASE ON US PUBLIC OPINION, WHILE ACTUALLY STIMULATING SAIGON FAR MORE THAN IT WAS UPSET. AN AUGUST INITIATIVE BY US WOULD CERTAINLY REPEAT THE FIRST TWO EFFECTS. IT WOULD HAVE RISKS IN SAIGON (AND SOME WITH OUR ALLIES), BUT TRIEU HAS PUT HIMSELF IN A MUCH STRONGER POSITION SINCE APRIL AND OUR MOST SENSITIVE ALLIES--ON BUNDY'S READING--TRUST THIS ADMINISTRATION AND PROBABLY WOULD GIVE US THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT.

10. TO JUSTIFY OUR MOVING IN THIS DIRECTION, WE COULD POINT TO THE LULL IN COMMUNIST MILITARY ACTIVITY IN SAIGON AND ELSEWHERE IN VIET-NAM. A CASE CAN BE MADE THAT THIS HAS NOW CONTINUED LONG ENOUGH TO SERVE AS A PLAUSIBLE RATIONALE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA. IT CAN BE CITED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BRING WORLD OPINION TO BEAR AS A CONSTRAINT ON THE FUTURE ACTIONS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. SUCH A PUBLIC POSITION, COMBINED WITH A CESSATION OF BOMBING, MAY PRE-EMPT A MAJOR NVA/VC OFFENSIVE.

11. IT WOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE IF HANOI PUBLICLY CLAIMED THAT WE HAD STOPPED THE BOMBING WITHOUT RECIPROCAL ACTION ON THEIR PART. THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN IMPLICIT IN THE PHASE 1-PHASE 2 FORMULA; WHAT WILL COUNT WILL BE WHAT THEY DO RATHER THAN WHAT THEY SAY. MOREOVER WE CAN DRAW OUR OWN CONCLUSIONS FOR THE PUBLIC.

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 18692, JULY 29, SECTION TWO OF THREE

13. THE ESSENCE OF THIS COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE THAT, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES, WE WOULD TELL HANOI PRIVATELY THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO STOP THE BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTIVITIES INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE ON OR WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE DRV, AND THE PRESIDENT WILL ANNOUNCE THIS SHORTLY. (WE PROPOSE THAT THIS BE DONE NO MORE THAN TWO DAYS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT, SO THAT HANOI WOULD HAVE INSUFFICIENT TIME TO REACT.) WHEN WE TELL THEM, WE WOULD STATE THE ASSUMPTIONS ON WHICH WE ARE PROCEEDING. THESE ASSUMPTIONS WOULD BE:

A. WITHIN A VERY FEW DAYS FOLLOWING THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, WE EXPECT TO BEGIN SERIOUS, SUBSTANTIVE TALKS (ON AN OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE BASIS) IN WHICH THE GVN WOULD PARTICIPATE AND IN WHICH THE DRV WOULD BE FREE TO BRING TO THE TABLE ANY SOUTH VIETNAMESE ELEMENTS THEY SEE FIT.

B. THE DE-MILITARIZED STATUS OF THE DMZ WOULD BE RESTORED. NO MILITARY PERSONNEL OR EQUIPMENT OF ANY SORT SHOULD BE LOCATED IN, OR MOVED THROUGH THE DMZ. THERE WILL BE NO ARTILLERY OR OTHER FIRE ACROSS THE DMZ AND NO MASSING OF FORCES IN THE AREA OF THE DMZ IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CONSTITUTE A DIRECT MILITARY THREAT.

C. THERE WILL BE NO INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS AGAINST MAJOR CENTERS SUCH AS SAIGON, HUE AND DANANG.

D. THERE WILL BE NO INCREASE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCE LEVELS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. (IT IS WORTH NOTING HERE THAT THE GOOD FLYING WEATHER THAT WILL CONTINUE THROUGH OCTOBER WILL PROVIDE US WITH A GREATER ABILITY TO VERIFY THIS ASSUMPTION BETWEEN NOW AND OCTOBER THAN BETWEEN NOVEMBER AND APRIL.)

13. WE AND OUR ALLIES MUST BE PREPARED TO RESUME THE BOMBING IF HANOI INVALIDATES OUR ASSUMPTIONS. OBVIOUSLY NO THREAT WOULD BE MADE TO HANOI IN THIS REGARD.

14. IN PRESENTING THIS PROPOSAL TO THE GVN AND TCC, WE BELIEVE THAT THREE POINTS SHOULD BE MADE:

A. IF ASSUMPTIONS ARE INVALIDATED, WE WILL RESUME BOMBING;  
HARRIMAN  
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 3 PARIS 18692/3

MODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

DELTO 524

B. WE WILL NOT ENGAGE IN ANY FOLLOW-ON SUBSTANTIVE TALKS WITHOUT NVN PRESENCE ON AN OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE BASIS; AND

C. THIS ACTION MAY DETER NVA/VC FROM MOUNTING THE MAJOR ATTACKS THAT ARE EXPECTED.

15. CONCURRENT WITH THE ACTUAL PRESENTATION TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, A LETTER SHOULD BE SENT TO KOSYGIN RECALLING HIS ASSURANCES IN THE EARLIER EXCHANGE, AND INFORMING HIM OF PRECISELY WHAT WE ARE TELLING HANOI. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE LETTER NOT REQUIRE A SOVIET ANSWER, BUT LEAVE IT OPEN TO THE SOVIETS WHETHER THEY WISH TO REPLY. WE SHOULD INFORM THE SOVIET AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON AND PARIS. THE SOVIET AMBASSADORS IN THESE CAPITALS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE INFORMED OF THE LETTER BY THEIR GOVERNMENT, AS THEY HAVE BEEN IN THE PAST.

PART III-- SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS

16. WE RECOGNIZE THAT OUR SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES IN PARA 12 ABOVE DO NOT ADDRESS A BASIC LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF SECURING NVN WITHDRAWAL FROM SVN. THIS IS A SUBJECT FOR EARLY CONSIDERATION IN THE SUBSTANTIVE TALKS WITH THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF ENDING NVN MOVEMENT OF TROOPS AND SUPPLIES INTO SVN AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF NVN MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES FROM SVN, LAOS AND CAMBODIA.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 18692, JULY 29, SECTION THREE OF THREE

17. WHILE WE CANNOT BE SURE THAT THE COURSE OF ACTION PRESENTED IN PART II WILL FORESTALL A NEW NVN OFFENSIVE, IT MAY WELL DO SO. THUS, IN ADDITION TO MOVING THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD, STOPPING THE BOMBING COULD OVER THE NEAR FUTURE SAVE THE LIVES OF MANY AMERICAN TROOPS WHO MIGHT OTHERWISE BE KILLED IN DEFEATING NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTACKS. MOREOVER, THE PRE-EMPTION OF A MAJOR NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE WOULD FORESTALL HANOI FROM ACHIEVING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES WHICH SECRETARY CLIFFORD, GENERAL WHEELER AND THE US MISSION BELIEVE TO BE THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF SUCH ATTACKS. IF, INDEED,

HANOI LAUNCHED MAJOR ATTACKS ALONG LINES OF TET OR MAY OFFENSIVES AFTER A BOMBING CESSATION, IT WOULD CLEARLY DEMONSTRATE ITS UNWILLINGNESS TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH TO SEEK A NEGOTIATED PEACE. ITS POSITION THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WOULD BE SEVERELY DAMAGED. IN THE US, THE PUBLIC WOULD CLOSE RANKS BEHIND THE ADMINISTRATION AND A RESUMPTION OF THE BOMBING PROGRAM WOULD MEET WITH GENERAL UNDERSTANDING.

18. IF WE ARE TO PURSUE THIS COURSE, WE MUST BE ASSURED THAT THE GVN IS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN AN APPROPRIATE AND PRODUCTIVE MANNER. THE GVN MUST FIELD A DELEGATION WITH AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE AND COMPRISED OF INDIVIDUALS WITH WHOM WE CAN WORK. THE PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED WITHIN "OUR SIDE" SHOULD BE AGREED, INCLUDING AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE EXPECTATION THAT GVN AND US REPRESENTATIVES WOULD ENGAGE SEPARATELY IN PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH THE OTHER SIDE (WITH CLOSE CONSULTATION, OF COURSE).

19. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS IDEA IN GENERAL TERMS WITH UNDER SECRETARY KATZENBACH AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUDNY. WE RECOMMEND THAT AMBASSADOR VANCE, CIRCUMSTANCES IN PARIS PERMITTING, LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON AFTER THE MEETING OF WEDNESDAY, JULY 31, IN ORDER TO PROVIDE SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS AND ADDITIONAL ELABORATION ON THE COURSE OF ACTION OUTLINED IN PART II ABOVE.

HARRIMAN  
BT

~~SECRET~~



INFORMATION

32

~~SECRET~~

Monday, 6:15 P. M.  
July 29, 1968

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

In response to Secretary Rusk's denial to Ambassador Dobrynin last week that we were interfering in the affairs in Czechoslovakia, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko:

- rejected our denial and
- told Ambassador Thompson that the Soviets have more reason to object to the hostile campaign against the USSR now being conducted in the U. S.

Gromyko urged that the U. S. Government do everything possible to prevent a hostile campaign against the Soviet Union which wished to do everything possible to improve relations.

Bremley Smith

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 95-249  
By 40, NARA, Date 1-30-96



Department of State

TELEGRAM

32a

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NODIS

REF: STATE 206972

1. GROMYKO THIS MORNING READ ME THE FOLLOWING ORAL STATEMENT IN REPLY TO YOUR TALK WITH DOBRYNIN: QUOTE INFORMATION HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN MOSCOW ABOUT STATEMENT MADE SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK TO AMBASSADOR OF USSR IN WASHINGTON, A. F. DOBRYNIN, ON JULY 22, 1968, IN CONNECTION WITH EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. SECRETARY OF STATE, REFERRING TO CERTAIN MATERIAL PUBLISHED IN SOVIET PRESS, IN PARTICULAR TO PRAVDA ARTICLE OF JULY 19, EXPRESSED US GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN OVER ALLEGEDLY GROUNDLESS ACCUSATIONS AGAINST PENTAGON AND CIA REGARDING THEIR INTERFERENCE IN AFFAIRS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. ~~PARA~~ IN THIS CONNECTION, IT IS NECESSARY TO SAY AT OUTSET THAT AMERICAN SIDE HAS NO GROUNDS FOR EXPRESSING CONCERN TO SOVIET SIDE. AS REGARDS PRAVDA ARTICLE OF JULY 19 MENTIONED BY SECRETARY OF STATE SPECIFICALLY, IT DEALS WITH DOCUMENTARY DATA AND AMERICAN AUTHORITIES EVIDENTLY ARE AWARE OF THEIR AUTHENTICITY AND ACCURACY.

~~PARA~~ AND GENERALLY SPEAKING, WE HAVE MUCH MORE REASON FOR DRAWING ATTENTION OF US GOVERNMENT TO HOSTILE CAMPAIGN AGAINST USSR NOW CONDUCTED IN USA IN CONNECTION WITH EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. DAY IN AND DAY OUT, VARIOUS REPORTS ARE BEING WIDELY DISSEMINATED ON PAGES OF AMERICAN PRESS, IN RADIO BROADCASTS, AND ON TELEVISION, WHICH ARE DESIGNED, ON ONE HAND, TO ENCOURAGE ANTI-SOCIALIST, COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FORCES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND ON THE OTHER HAND, TO EVOKE AMONG POPULATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA ILL FEELINGS TOWARDS SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND THEREBY TO GENERATE TENSION IN GENERAL SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. SAME OBJECTIVES ARE ALSO BEING PERUSED IN MANY STATEMENTS BY VARIOUS AMERICAN PUBLIC FIGURES, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF US CONGRESS.

~~PARA~~ IN AFOREMENTIONED CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR OF USSR, SECRETARY RUSK STATED THAT EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA ARE AN AFFAIR OF CZECHS THEMSELVES AND OF OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES AND THAT US GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WISH TO BE IN ANY WAY INVOLVED OR DRAWN INTO THESE EVENTS. ~~PARA~~ IT SEEMS TO US THAT

~~SECRET~~

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1968 JUL 29 AM 10 37

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-248

By ip, NARA, Date 6-25-96



~~SECRET~~

-2- MOSCOW 4836 July 29

IF US GOVERNMENT IS NOT INTERESTED IN SHARPENING SITUATION IN CONNECTION WITH EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, IT SHOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE IN ORDER NOT TO HAVE AFOREMENTIONED HOSTILE CAMPAIGN AGAINST SOVIET UNION CONDUCTED IN USA. NATURALLY, SUCH CAMPAIGN CAUSES INDIGNATION ON PART PUBLIC OPINION IN OUR COUNTRY AND CANNOT BUT HAVE NEGATIVE INFLUENCE ON STATE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. AS FAR AS SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS CONCERNED, IT DEEMS IT NECESSARY NOT ONLY NOT TO ALLOW ANYTHING THAT WOULD LEAD TO WORSENING OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES BUT, MORE THAN THAT, AS ALSO STATED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, TO SEEK WAYS FOR IMPROVING SUCH RELATIONS. UNQUOTE.

2. I SAID I WAS SURPRISED AT HIS STATEMENT. HE MUST KNOW THAT THE CONDUCT OF THE US GOVERNMENT IN THIS AFFAIR HAD BEEN SCRUPULOUSLY CORRECT AND I WOULD HAVE EXPECTED A DIFFERENT REPLY. I DID NOT KNOW TO WHAT DOCUMENT HIS STATEMENT REFERRED BUT I REMINDED HIM THAT SECRETARY RUSK HAD CATEGORICALLY DENIED THE CHARGES OF WHICH HE HAD COMPLAINED. AS MR. GROMYKO KNEW, WE DID NOT CONTROL OUR PRESS OR STATEMENTS MADE BY INDIVIDUALS BUT I COULD ASSURE HIM THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WAS IN NO WAY CONDUCTING ANY CAMPAIGN. ON THE OTHER HAND THE SOVIET PRESS DAILY CARRIED A SERIES OF ARTICLES EITHER ATTACKING THE UNITED STATES OR DISTORTING NEWS ABOUT IT.

3. GROMYKO REPLIED THAT IF THE ARTICLES IN THE AMERICAN PRESS UNFAVORABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION WERE COMPARED WITH THOSE IN THE SOVIET PRESS UNFAVORABLE TO THE US, THERE WAS NO QUESTION BUT THAT THE BALANCE WOULD BE ON THE SIDE OF THE US. HE CONCLUDED BY URGING THAT THE US GOVERNMENT DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PREVENT A HOSTILE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION WHICH WISHED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS.

4. I SAID I WOULD PROMPTLY TRANSMIT HIS REMARKS TO THE SECRETARY.

5. AS I WAS LEAVING I INQUIRED ABOUT HIS PLANS FOR A HOLIDAY. HE REPLIED HE HOPED TO GET AWAY IN AUGUST, BUT WOULD STAY NOT FAR FROM MOSCOW AS HE DID NOT LIKE THE HEAT IN THE SOUTH.

THOMPSON

BT

~~SECRET~~



33

7-29-68  
1:45 P

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Monday, July 29, 1968  
6:40 p.m.

Mr. President: (PS)

Ambassadors Harriman and Vance in the attached cable argue for a cessation of the bombing now based on certain assumptions.

Secretary Rusk may raise this cable with you when he calls at 6:45 p.m.

You may wish to consider the substance of the cable at tomorrow's luncheon meeting.

Brom  
Bromley Smith

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NTJ 94-249  
By glip, NARA, Date 1/25/02



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 3 PARIS 18692/1

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~~NO DIS/HANVAN/PLUS~~

~~DELTO 524~~

~~KNOW HANNIMAN AND VANCE~~

1. WE HAVE REACHED A STAGE IN THE PARIS TALKS WHICH MAKES IT DESIRABLE ~~TO TAKE STOCK OF WHERE WE ARE AND TO CONSIDER WHERE WE GO FROM HERE~~

PART I -- ~~WHERE WE ARE~~

2. THE PRESENT POSITION WE HAVE TAKEN--AS REFLECTED IN THE PHASE 1-PHASE 2 PROPOSAL--IS ONLY IN THE EARLY STAGES OF EXPLORATION. HANOI HAS HAD THIS PROPOSAL BEFORE IT IN GENERAL FORM SINCE JUNE 26, AND IN FAIRLY DETAILED FORM SINCE JULY 15. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DID NOT PROPOSE A NEW MEETING LAST WEEK, COMMENTING THAT THEY WERE IN THE PROCESS OF EXAMINING THE HONOLULU COMMUNIQUE.

3. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT, IF WE STICK TO OUR PRESENT COURSE, WE WILL IN TIME BE ABLE TO EXTRACT THE UNDERSTANDINGS WE ARE SEEKING FROM HANOI. IN ADDITION TO TAKING A GOOD DEAL OF TIME, ANY UNDERTAKING THEY WILL GIVE US WILL PROBABLY NOT BE EXPLICIT ENOUGH TO ENABLE US TO KNOW WITH CONFIDENCE WHAT THEY WILL DO AFTER WE STOP THE BOMBING. WE ARE LIKELY TO CONFRONT SLOWLY FACED, MINOR AND AMBIGUOUS CONCESSIONS AS HANOI TRIES TO GET A BOMBING CESSATION AT THE LEAST PRICE.

4. WE MAY, OF COURSE, HAVE A FURTHER READING AT THIS WEDNESDAY'S SESSION, BUT ~~WE DO NOT BELIEVE ANYTHING SUFFICIENTLY NEW WILL COME OUT OF THIS MEETING, OR OF ANY DISCUSSION IN THE NEAR FUTURE~~

DECLASSIFIED

PRESERVATION COPY

Authority DL395-248 (131a)

By *idjc* NARA Date 12-22-09

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-2- PARIS 18692, JULY 29, SECTION 1 OF 3

5. WE BELIEVE HANOI'S THINKING ABOUT THE PACE AND CONTENT OF THE PARIS TALKS IS INFLUENCED TO SOME EXTENT BY COMING EVENTS IN THE US. THESE EVENTS--CONVENTIONS, ELECTIONS, CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION--SET A TIME FRAME WHICH WE NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT AS WE ESTIMATE WHAT THE OTHER SIDE IS LIKELY TO DO.

6. THIS FORCES US TO LOOK AT ~~WHAT HAPPENS IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS WITHOUT CLEAR AND VISIBLE PROGRESS HERE. IF WE DO NOTHING NEW, WE LEAVE THE INITIATIVE AND TIMING TO HANOI.~~ TWO MAJOR FACTORS THEN COME TO BEAR:

A. THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR TAKING ACTION WHICH MAY DETER THE LAUNCHING OF THE EXPECTED ENEMY ATTACKS AND THUS SAVE AMERICAN AND ALLIED LIVES; AND

B. THE PROSPECT THAT THE MONTH OF AUGUST, AND PARTICULARLY THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION, WILL PRODUCE A FURTHER DIVISION OF DOMESTIC US OPINION WHICH WILL SEVERELY WEAKEN THE BASE WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR THE LONG, HARD NEGOTIATIONS REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE A JUST SOLUTION. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS DIVISION MAY BECOME SO DEEP THAT IT WILL FORCE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TO A PRECIPITOUS WITHDRAWAL WITH THE RESULT THAT ALL OUR SACRIFICES TO ACHIEVE US OBJECTIVES WILL HAVE BEEN FOR NAUGHT.

7. ~~IF THE ENEMY MOUNTS HIS EXPECTED MAJOR OFFENSIVE, THE ONLY WAY WE GAIN IS IF THE ATTACKS ARE SHARP AND DECISIVELY DEFEATED IN SHORT ORDER. WE NOTE THAT GENERAL ABRAMS IS CONFIDENT THAT THE ATTACKS WILL BE REPELLED, BUT WE ALSO NOTE THAT ESTIMATES FROM SAIGON ARE THAT THE ENEMY MAY BE ABLE TO SUSTAIN MAJOR ATTACKS FOR UP TO TWO MONTHS. THUS IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE ODDS FOR A QUICK, DECISIVE OUTCOME ARE NOT GREAT.~~ US CASUALTIES WILL HAVE A BAD EFFECT AT HOME AND CIVILIAN DESTRUCTION WILL CREATE PROBLEMS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.

PART II -- ~~A NEW COURSE~~

8. A MAJOR CHANGE IN THESE PROSPECTS IS POSSIBLE DURING THE MONTH OF AUGUST. IT WOULD NECESSARILY INVOLVE A SPEED-UP OF OUR OWN TIMETABLE AND, ADMITTEDLY, SOME RISKS. ON OUR PART, IT WOULD REQUIRE A RETURN TO THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA IN WHICH WE WOULD MAKE CERTAIN ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING HANOI'S ACTIONS AFTER

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PRESERVATION COPY





Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET SECTION 2 OF 3 PARIS 18692/2~~

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~~THE CESSATION.~~ ON HANOI'S PART, IT WOULD INVOLVE THE ONE THING THAT HANOI HAS BEEN WILLING TO COMMIT ITSELF TO--THAT IS A READINESS TO MOVE INTO SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A FULL CESSATION OF BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTIVITIES INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE ON OR WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE DRV.

9. AS WE LOOK BACK ON ~~MARCH 31~~, WE CAN SEE THAT OUR INITIATIVE ~~FORESTALLED HANOI'S PLANS AND GREATLY LENGTHENED OUR LEASE OF~~ US PUBLIC OPINION, ~~WHILE ACTUALLY STIMULATING SAIGON FEAR MORE THAN~~ IT WAS UPON. AN AUGUST INITIATIVE BY US WOULD CERTAINLY REPEAT ~~THE FIRST TWO EFFECTS.~~ IT WOULD HAVE RISKS IN SAIGON ~~AND SOME~~ WITH OUR ALLIES, BUT THIEU HAS PUT HIMSELF IN A MUCH STRONGER POSITION SINCE APRIL AND OUR MOST SENSITIVE ALLIES--ON BUNDY'S READING--TRUST THIS ADMINISTRATION AND PROBABLY WOULD GIVE US THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT.

10. TO JUSTIFY OUR MOVING IN THIS DIRECTION, ~~WE COULD POINT TO~~ ~~THE FALL IN COMMUNIST MILITARY ACTIVITY IN SAIGON AND ELSE-~~ ~~WHERE IN VIET-NAM.~~ A CASE CAN BE MADE THAT THIS HAS NOW CONTINUED LONG ENOUGH TO SERVE AS A PLAUSIBLE RATIONALE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA. IT CAN BE CITED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BRING WORLD OPINION TO BEAR AS A CONSTRAINT ON THE FUTURE ACTIONS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. SUCH A PUBLIC POSITION, COMBINED WITH A CESSATION OF BOMBING, MAY PRE-EMPT A MAJOR NVA/VC OFFENSIVE.

1. IT WOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE IF HANOI PUBLICLY CLAIMED THAT WE HAD STOPPED THE BOMBING WITHOUT RECIPROCAL ACTION ON THEIR PART. THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN IMPLICIT IN THE PHASE 1-PHASE 2 FORMULA; WHAT WILL COUNT WILL BE WHAT THEY DO RATHER THAN WHAT THEY SAY. MOREOVER WE CAN DRAW OUR OWN CONCLUSIONS FOR THE PUBLIC.

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PRESERVATION COPY

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-2- PARIS 18692, JULY 29, SECTION TWO OF THREE

13. ~~THE ESSENCE OF THIS COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE THAT, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES, WE WOULD TELL HANOI PRIVATELY THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO STOP THE BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTIVITIES INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE ON OR WITHIN THE TERRITORY OF THE DRV, AND THE PRESIDENT WILL ANNOUNCE THIS SHORTLY. (WE PROPOSE THAT THIS BE DONE NO MORE THAN TWO DAYS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT, SO THAT HANOI WOULD HAVE INSUFFICIENT TIME TO REACT.) WHEN WE TELL THEM, WE WOULD STATE THE ASSUMPTIONS~~  
~~ON WHICH WE ARE PROCEEDING. THESE ASSUMPTIONS WOULD BE:~~

- A. ~~WITHIN A VERY FEW DAYS FOLLOWING THE CESSATION OF BOMBING, WE EXPECT TO BEGIN SERIOUS, SUBSTANTIVE TALKS TO AN OUR SIDE YOUR SIDE BASIS) IN WHICH THE GVN WOULD PARTICIPATE AND IN WHICH THE DRV WOULD BE FREE TO BRING TO THE TABLE ANY SOUTH VIETNAMESE ELEMENTS THEY SEE FIT.~~
- B. ~~THE DE-MILITARIZED STATUS OF THE DMZ WOULD BE RESTORED. NO MILITARY PERSONNEL OR EQUIPMENT OF ANY SORT SHOULD BE LOCATED IN, OR MOVED THROUGH THE DMZ. THERE WILL BE NO ARTILLERY OR OTHER FIRE ACROSS THE DMZ AND NO MASSING OF FORCES IN THE AREA OF THE DMZ IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CONSTITUTE A DIRECT MILITARY THREAT.~~
- C. ~~THERE WILL BE NO INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS AGAINST MAJOR CENTERS SUCH AS SAIGON, HUE AND DANANG.~~
- D. ~~THERE WILL BE NO INCREASE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCE LEVELS IN SOUTH VIETNAM~~ (IT IS WORTH NOTING HERE THAT THE GOOD FLYING WEATHER THAT WILL CONTINUE THROUGH OCTOBER WILL PROVIDE US WITH A GREATER ABILITY TO VERIFY THIS ASSUMPTION BETWEEN NOW AND OCTOBER THAN BETWEEN NOVEMBER AND APRIL.)

13. WE AND OUR ALLIES MUST BE PREPARED TO RESUME THE BOMBING IF HANOI INVALIDATES OUR ASSUMPTIONS. OBVIOUSLY NO THREAT WOULD BE MADE TO HANOI IN THIS REGARD.

14. IN PRESENTING THIS PROPOSAL TO THE GVN AND ICC, WE BELIEVE THAT THREE POINTS SHOULD BE MADE:

- A. ~~IF ASSUMPTIONS ARE INVALIDATED, WE WILL RESUME BOMBING~~
- HARRIMAN  
BT

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PRESERVATION COPY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SECRET SECTION 3 QF 3 PARIS 18692/3

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B. WE WILL NOT ENGAGE IN ANY FOLLOW-ON SUBSTANTIVE TALKS WITHOUT NVN PRESENCE ON AN OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE BASIS; AND

C. THIS ACTION MAY DETER NVA/VC FROM MOUNTING THE MAJOR ATTACKS THAT ARE EXPECTED.

15. CONCURRENT WITH THE ACTUAL PRESENTATION TO THE NORTH VIET-NAMESE, A LETTER SHOULD BE SENT TO KOSYGIN RECALLING HIS ASS-~~REMARKS~~ IN THE EARLIER EXCHANGE, AND INFORMING HIM OF PRECISELY WHAT WE ARE TELLING HANOI. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE LETTER NOT REQUIRE A SOVIET ANSWER, BUT LEAVE IT OPEN TO THE SOVIETS WHETHER THEY WISH TO REPLY. WE SHOULD INFORM THE SOVIET AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON AND PARIS. THE SOVIET AMBASSADORS IN THESE CAPITALS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE INFORMED OF THE LETTER BY THEIR GOVERNMENT, AS THEY HAVE BEEN IN THE PAST.

PART III-- SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS

16. WE RECOGNIZE THAT OUR ~~SHORT-TERM OBJECTIVES IN PARA 12~~ ABOVE DO NOT ADDRESS A BASIS LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF SECURING NVN ~~WITHDRAWAL FROM SVN.~~ THIS IS A SUBJECT FOR EARLY CONSIDERATION IN THE SUBSTANTIVE TALKS WITH THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF ENDING NVN MOVEMENT OF TROOPS AND SUPPLIES INTO SVN AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF NVN MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES FROM SVN, LAOS AND CAMBODIA.

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PRESERVATION COPY



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-2- PARIS 18692, JULY 29, SECTION THREE OF THREE

17. WHILE ~~WE CANNOT BE SURE THAT THE COURSE OF ACTION PRESENTED~~  
~~IN PART II WILL FORESTALL A NEW NVN OFFENSIVE, IT MAY WELL DO~~  
~~SU.~~ THUS, IN ADDITION TO MOVING THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD,  
STOPPING THE BOMBING COULD OVER THE NEAR FUTURE SAVE THE LIVES  
OF MANY AMERICAN TROOPS WHO MIGHT OTHERWISE BE KILLED IN DE-  
FEATING NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTACKS. MOREOVER, THE PRE-EMPTION  
OF A MAJOR NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE WOULD FORESTALL HANOI  
FROM ACHIEVING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES WHICH  
SECRETARY CLIFFORD, GENERAL WHEELER AND THE US MISSION BELIEVE  
TO BE THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF SUCH ATTACKS. IF, INDEED,

HANOI LAUNCHED MAJOR ATTACKS ALONG LINES OF TET OR MAY OFFEN-  
SIVES AFTER A BOMBING CESSATION, IT WOULD CLEARLY DEMONSTRATE  
ITS UNWILLINGNESS TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH TO SEEK A NEGOTIATED PE CE.  
ITS POSITION THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WOULD BE SEVERELY DAMAGED.  
IN THE US, THE PUBLIC WOULD CLOSE RANKS BEHIND THE ADMINIST-  
RATION AND A RESUMPTION OF THE BOMBING PROGRAM WOULD MEET WITH  
GENERAL UNDERSTANDING.

18. IF WE ARE TO PURSUE THIS COURSE, ~~WE MUST BE ASSURED THAT THE~~  
~~GVN IS PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN AN APPROPRIATE AND PRODUCTIVE~~  
~~MANNER.~~ THE GVN MUST FIELD A DELEGATION WITH AUTHORITY TO  
NEGOTIATE AND COMPRISED OF INDIVIDUALS WITH WHOM WE CAN WORK.  
THE PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED WITHIN "OUR SIDE" SHOULD BE  
AGREED, INCLUDING AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE EXPECTATION THAT GVN  
AND US REPRESENTATIVES WOULD ENGAGE SEPARATELY IN PRIVATE MEETINGS  
WITH THE OTHER SIDE (WITH CLOSE CONSULTATION, OF COURSE).

19. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS IDEA IN GENERAL TERMS WITH UNDER  
SECRETARY KATZENBACH AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY BUDNY. WE RECOMMEND  
THAT AMBASSADOR VANCE, CIRCUMSTANCES IN PARIS PERMITTING,  
LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON AFTER THE MEETING OF WEDNESDAY, JULY 31,  
IN ORDER TO PROVIDE SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS AND ADDITIONAL EL -  
BORATION ON THE COURSE OF ACTION OUTLINED IN PART II ABOVE.  
HARRIMAN  
BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

34  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Monday, 5:45 P. M.  
July 29, 1968

Mr. President:

We have as yet received no word  
as to the outcome of the Czech-  
Soviet Meeting in Slovakia.

Attached is CIA's report as of  
4:00 P. M. this afternoon.

Bromley Smith

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLI 95-251  
By rig, NARA Date 9-20-96

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: The Situation in Czechoslovakia as of 4:00 p.m. EDT

*Pres file*

The confrontation between Czechoslovak and Soviet leaders opened this morning at nine (Czech time) in Cierna nad Tisou (which contrary to AP does not mean "Glassboro") in southeastern Slovakia, just inside the border. All but two of the Soviet politburo -- Kirilenko and Polyaniy, who are tending the store in Moscow -- are participating. The Czechoslovak delegation includes all the presidium members, plus President Svoboda.

There has been no word from the meeting, and the Czechoslovak News Agency does not expect any until late tonight or tomorrow morning.

Although polemics on both sides were toned down somewhat for the occasion, the Czechoslovaks are under immense Soviet psychological-military pressure.



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Approved For Release 2005/07/25 : NLJ-141-022-12-3-8

SANITIZED  
Authority NW-141-022-012/3  
By JS, NARA, Date 11/3/09



Monday, July 29, 1963, 4:46 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Crown Prince Birendra of Nepal,  
Tuesday, July 30, at 12 noon

The Prince wants to pay his respects as he leaves after a year at Harvard. He is just back from a two-month tour of North and South America, and is leaving soon for another year of study in Israel. He will be delighted with a hand-shake and a picture.

Birendra is 22, reasonably serious and intelligent, and first in line for the Nepalese throne. You will recall that his father suffered a heart attack last December. The King is apparently recovering satisfactorily, but our specialist reports that the long-term prognosis is not good. If the Prince succeeds, he will probably keep Nepal reasonably progressive and pro-Western.

If you want to take time for a little conversation, you might:

1. ask the Prince what he thought of his year at Harvard and his recent tour around the country;
2. ask him to pass on your warmest wishes to his father, King Mahendra. As you told the King when he was here in November, we deeply admire him and his forward-looking policies.

Edward K. Hamilton

ACTION

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(9)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, July 16, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith Secretary Rusk renews his recommendation that you have a brief meeting with Crown Prince Birendra of Nepal. You agreed to see Birendra last month but had to cancel because you were out of town.

The situation in Nepal is unchanged; the King is recovering from his heart attack, though the long-range prognosis is not good. If you can spare a 15-minute chat, I still think it's a good idea to receive the Crown Prince.

W Rostow

Okay; set up appointment July 29-31 ☒

No ☐

Call me ☐

11:35 AM 7/26/68  
notified Louis Blum  
& Maurice Foley  
S/S State, copy sent  
in mail 6 PM, 7/30/68  
Jus.

Jim Jones telephoned Mr Rostow 7/22/68  
at about 10 AM.

Mon July 29, at 1 PM  
notified S/S - Jan Jensen;  
also Roger Morris, at about  
10:25 AM. JR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-245

By lip, NARA, Date 1-30-96

old S/S, Jan Jensen  
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 95-248

By lig, NARA, Date 6-25-96 July 10, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Call on You by Crown Prince Birendra of Nepal

Recommendation:

That you receive Crown Prince Birendra of Nepal.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

His Royal Highness Crown Prince Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva of Nepal will be in Washington July 29, 30 and 31, concluding his two-month tour of the United States, Latin America, and Canada. He attended Harvard this year as an undergraduate student in government. He sails for Europe August 1, en route to Israel for further study.

You had agreed to meet with the Crown Prince June 3 at the beginning of his study tour; that call was cancelled when business caused you to be out of Washington.

I believe that it would serve our interests in Nepal for the Crown Prince to have an opportunity for a brief meeting with you on his own (he was a member of King Mahendra's official party during the 1967 State Visit). At 22, Crown Prince Birendra is the proclaimed heir to an absolute monarchy and serves as Regent whenever his father is absent from the Kingdom. A young leader, destined for the position of highest responsibility in his country, the Crown Prince would, I am sure, value the opportunity for a personal meeting with you.

You may recall that his father, King Mahendra, suffered a heart attack on March 15. While the King is recovering nicely, the long-range prognosis given us by Dr. Thomas W. Mattingly is definitely not good. There is, therefore, the prospect that the Crown Prince may ascend the throne in a very few years.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Crown Prince Birendra is a serious-minded young man who appears quite dedicated to the development of his country. Sent abroad in 1967 for a two-year study-tour in Japan, the United States, and Israel, he has spent nearly a year of this time here in the United States. He relaxed and became quite at home in the undergraduate college life at Harvard where he was treated as an ordinary individual and lived in Quincy House, one of the dormitories. His studies were in the field of government with a smattering of economics. We have looked upon his year in the United States as an excellent occasion to explain to the Crown Prince the basic tenets of the American way of life as well as to cultivate in him an understanding of American foreign policy.

A biographic sketch is enclosed of the Crown Prince. Should it be possible for you to receive him, we will provide some suggested talking points.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Biographic sketch

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ROSTOW'S OFFICE

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# BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

BIRENDRA Bir Bikram Shah Deva

Crown Prince of Nepal

**DECLASSIFIED**

**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**

**NIJ 95-248**

By 48, NARA, Date 6-25-96

The next ruler of Nepal, Crown Prince Birendra, is at present studying government under some of America's leading political scientists at Harvard University. The 22-year old Crown Prince is heir to an absolute monarchy, and he normally serves as Regent when his father is absent from the Kingdom.

A serious-minded young man who appears dedicated to the development of his country, Birendra is intelligent and alert, and since his arrival at Harvard in 1967 has taken a newly-found interest in studies. Pleasant and polite, gifted with a sense of humor, he has an outgoing personality, especially in informal situations; and is an easy and comfortable person with whom to be.

The Crown Prince is single, wears glasses, and is about five feet nine inches tall. He smokes and takes an occasional drink of Scotch or of gin and tonic. While in the United States he has displayed an informality of manner which he drops only in the presence of high officials of his own country. For example, Birendra likes to stop in lunch counters and strike up conversations with strangers on almost any subject, will carry his own suitcase (except in Washington where he lets Ambassador Khatri tote it), and enjoys a good nightclub show.

During his year at Harvard the Crown Prince has had an opportunity to visit Forts Bragg and Benning, visit Miami and the Florida Keys (he went fishing with some success), attend a World Series' game in Boston as guest of the Commissioner of Baseball, participate in the King's State Visit in November, visit West Virginia and Appalachia with the help of Jay Rockefeller, and make brief visits around New England.

Born in the Royal Palace in Kathmandu in 1945, Birendra was educated privately by tutors and then sent off to India to study at St. Joseph College, Darjeeling, before spending five years in England where he graduated from Eton in 1964. He is now on a two-year study tour in Japan, the United States, and Israel. From April to August 1967 he studied education, social welfare, and industry at Tokyo University. He arrived here in August 1967 and has spent the 1967-1968 academic year as a special undergraduate student at Harvard where he has studied government and had a smattering of pre-college level economics. (While at Harvard he has lived the normal American under-graduate college life in Quincy House, one of the dormitories, where he is known as "Shah" to the House Master and his fellow students.) After his tour of the United States, Latin America, and Canada during June and July 1968 he expects to study agriculture, administration, and internal defense at Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Despite his comparative youth, the Crown Prince has traveled widely. In 1961 he accompanied the King to Belgrade to the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations; in 1965 he represented Nepal at the Tenth Anniversary celebrations of the Bandung Conference in Indonesia and also visited Burma. While at Eton or returning he visited West Germany, Portugal, Switzerland, the Soviet Union, and India, and made a formal visit to Iran. He made an official visit to Communist China for several weeks in the summer of 1966 and had an interview with Mao Tse-tung.

The Crown Prince's favorite hobby is art, and he has done some works in water color and oils. He is interested in the preservation of the traditional Nepalese craftsmanship, and at one time he experimented with the adaptation of traditional wooden art forms to concrete. Having bagged his first tiger at 14, Birendra has kept up an interest in hunting, likes swimming, hiking, and riding, but has done little, if any, of these pursuits while in the United States. He is especially fond of sports cars and presently drives a Jaguar 2/2.

Conversational subjects with him might include his government studies at Harvard under such mentors as Henry Kissinger, Merle Fainsod, S. Hoffmann, and K. W. Deutsch, his plans for touring the United States this summer (itinerary attached), his visits to Job Corps and VISTA centers in West Virginia, art and artists (his knowledge is not too deep), and impressions of America generally. His views on foreign policy might also be explored as well as his impressions of students and student revolts in the United States as seen from the Harvard "Yard".

NEA/INC:HGwing:maj 5/9/68

36  
Pres file

Monday, July 29, 1968  
4:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT:    **Rebuttal of Attacks by Congressman Reid on  
              Honolulu Communique and Cincinnati Statement**

Congressman Reid made several generalized comments on the floor last Friday about the Honolulu communique and your statement in Cincinnati. With one exception, he did not address himself to specific points in either document. His purpose apparently was to use the two documents as a peg on which to hang a speech restating views on Vietnam he has held for some time. (The text of his remarks is attached.)

There follows a listing of his major points and comments which could be used in rebuttal:

1. Charge: The Honolulu communique not only represents a step backward from peace, validating past mistakes, but also reverses U. S. policy back to the "pre-March 31 hard line on the war".

Rebuttal: Nothing in the communique or the Cincinnati statement is inconsistent with the March 31 speech.

a. The U. S. is prepared to take further steps toward peace when we have an indication that Hanoi is sincere, but the evidence we have is that Hanoi is insincere. Hanoi is:

1. Making preparations for a new offensive.
2. Increasing infiltration of North Vietnamese troops and movement of supplies.
3. Unwilling to talk about restoration of the DMZ or halting of attacks on or near Saigon.

2. Charge: The Honolulu communique reaffirms a veto for President Thieu over U. S. policy.

Rebuttal: President Thieu has never exercised a veto over U. S. policy. But he is an ally with whom we have an obligation to consult in arriving at a common position.

- a. The future of South Vietnam cannot be negotiated without the participation of its elected and legitimate government.
- b. The government in Saigon has far more claim to represent the people of South Vietnam than does the NLF -- which the Congressman says should participate in the negotiations.
- c. Our fundamental position is that the South Vietnamese have a right to determine their own future. We cannot impose a U. S. solution without violating the right we are helping them to uphold.
- d. We are in constant communication with the Vietnam government and we make our views known. However, this delicate process of discussion and consultation is not made easier by demands that the U. S. resort to sledge hammer tactics.

3. Charge: Only the halting of the bombing in all of North Vietnam will overcome the present stalemate in Paris.

Rebuttal:

- a. All intelligence we have from Saigon indicates that the North Vietnamese will launch in the near future a major offensive.
- b. Although not restated in the two documents, our position on the cessation of bombing remains as stated in the March 31 speech -- "If our restraint is matched by restraint in Hanoi". Our negotiators in Paris have waited many weeks for some indication that Hanoi was willing to match our restraint.
- c. Why, on the eve of a probable offensive, should the U. S. unilaterally halt all bombing when Hanoi has been unwilling to respond to our outstanding offer of March 31? (The Congressman acknowledges the validity of this point by saying that in announcing a total bombing halt, the President should state that we assume the parties to the talks would respect our restraint in the interest of substantive negotiations.)



4. Charge: The NLF must be a party to the negotiations if anything is to be accomplished.

Rebuttal: On many occasions, we have indicated that the NLF would have no problem in making its views known. The communique reaffirms that a political solution in the South must be determined by the South Vietnamese. A political solution in the South will be based on the principle of one man-one vote with guarantees for members of the NLF who choose to engage in the political life of the South peacefully rather than by continuing to resort to violence.

Bremley Smith

Attachment

## THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE

(Mr. REID of New York asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, President Johnson's second Honolulu conference with General Thieu represents a step backward for peace, validates past policies and mistakes, and reaffirms a veto for General Thieu over U.S. peace initiatives by explicitly guaranteeing "a leading role" for his government in discussions of a settlement.

The conference communique and the President's statement at Cincinnati—which appears to reverse U.S. policy back to the pre-March 31 hard line on the war—come at a time when the American people have unmistakably said through the ballot box and by their

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

voices that they want an end to the war and a negotiated settlement.

In my judgment, diplomatic progress away from the present stalemate in Paris will only result if the President will call for a halt to the bombing over all of North Vietnam and call for an early cease-fire. He should do so forthwith.

An unconditional halt to the bombing north of the DMZ should place the responsibility for serious peace negotiations squarely with the Soviet Union, Hanoi, and the NLF, all of whom have pledged serious negotiations once this step is taken. Clearly the President in any announcement of a bombing halt should state that we assume that the parties to the talks would respect our restraint in the interest of substantive negotiations.

Further, as I said over 2 years ago, the NLF should be a party to these negotiations and a failure to recognize this constitutes a failure to recognize the lessons of the *paix de la brave* in Algeria—although the situations are not totally similar. Ultimately, both the United States and Saigon must deal with forces and people in the field in interim arrangements looking toward a cease-fire and guarantees of free elections flowing from a negotiated settlement.

An obvious advantage of creating the conditions necessary for serious negotiations would be to require our Government to develop clearly our peace terms and to make Saigon recognize the imperatives and realities of a negotiated settlement. Unless this occurs, Saigon is liable to fail to take major steps to end corruption, meet the horrendous refugee needs, carry out major land reform, and face the fact that neither a military victory nor a narrowly based government will be supported by the people of South Vietnam or by the people of the United States.

In sum, we should not, as a great nation, permit Saigon to have a veto on our policies or pursue a course without diplomatic rationale which is likely to result in protracted fighting and higher American and Vietnamese casualties, and postpone into the future, if not prevent, a negotiated, honorable settlement.

~~SECRET~~

32  
July 29, 1968

Mr. President:

In the attached extract of a back channel message to General Wheeler, General Abrams:

- evaluates the enemy's intentions for the August offensive, and
- indicates the steps he is taking to meet it.

Bromley Smith

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 9-3-92



~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

37a

Free file

FROM GENERAL ABRAMS TO GENERAL WHEELER -- EYES ONLY

I believe that the enemy now realizes that the units in the sub-regions around Saigon cannot seriously threaten the city, and if he is to get the desired psychological effect, he must use his divisions as well against Saigon. My reasons for this view are these. First, the so-called regiments of the sub-regions are weak. They have been hurt, and have never had more than loose control over the separate battalions composing them. Second, the 5 May offensive, in which he used the 9th Division in addition to sub-region forces, must have showed the enemy that he needed more troops. Third, our defenses in and around Saigon are much better coordinated now, and therefore, much stronger. Fourth, we know from agent reports that the enemy is having great difficulty infiltrating men and arms into Saigon. He is going to be hard put to sneak into Saigon, and thus, must attempt to fight his way in with the big units.

We have an interesting report from a reliable agent which states that the 9th Division, the 5th Division, and a couple of local force battalions will attack Tay Ninh City in the near future. What is significant is that the 9th Division is to attack from the west, but is not to enter the town. The 5th Division is to block to the southeast. Only the local units are to attempt to seize the town. Thus, the divisions have in reality secondary roles which will permit them to go to Saigon on short notice. The 7th Division is around Loc Ninh, but it, too, could slip south.

On present evidence we are inclined to view the attacks on the outlying capitals as preliminary and diversionary to the main effort to be made later by maximum forces against Saigon.

I am concerned also about the enemy build-up now going on southwest of Danang. Here the enemy is beginning to get ready for a major attack on that city. While I am less troubled about the enemy situation along the DMZ, in the Quang Tri City-Hue area, and around Ban Me Thout, they also require close watching. Overall, it looks like the enemy is going to make a major attack around the middle of August, and we are planning to anticipate him with a comparable counter-effort.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12355, Sec 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1968

By pg, NARA, Date 11-4-92

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

Along the same line, a message which I sent out yesterday to all US commanders and advisors is quoted in part:

"I intend to accommodate the enemy in seeking battle and in fact to anticipate him wherever possible. If his new offensive is of critical importance to him, it is of equally critical importance to us. We cannot be forced into a position of merely reacting to the enemy. We must anticipate him, fix his major forces as far away as possible from our vital areas, and defeat him decisively. His apparent offensive intent gives us a chance to strike him a crushing blow. To do so, however, will require an all out effort by all hands. I want all hands to get this message.

"We cannot afford to miss any opportunity. Hence from now on, we must make an all out effort in the intelligence/reconnaissance field, day and night; every intelligence section from district, province and battalion to field force and corps must work closely with the COC's, TOC's, DASC's, TADC's and TACC to ensure that we get combat reaction from our intelligence. This means alertness and coordination 24 hours a day so that we can respond to target intelligence with the maximum use of firepower, precision and accuracy.

"We have the combat power, the mobility, and the speed and flexibility of action to crush any enemy attempts to attain his goals. However, this will demand in addition to aggressive direction of intelligence acquisition, close command attention to intelligence leads and decisive employment of our superior capabilities. To this end, we cannot afford to overlook any unsatisfactory combat capabilities or attitudes. Where such conditions exist or crop up in US or allied units -- large or small -- immediate remedial action must be taken or referred upward to the next echelon of command if necessary. Similarly, US advisors with RVNAF forces will make a maximum effort to assist their counterparts in overcoming deficiencies or obstacles that may be encountered. I wish to be personally informed of any which are beyond the capacity of the senior subordinate commanders to rectify. The one unforgivable sin will be to gloss over or ignore shortcomings which demand prompt remedy. This cannot be tolerated from any US commander or advisor.

"We must concentrate every last element of available combat power on the enemy when he is located. You have the resources; and we have additional combat power to support your resources. I have directed CDR 7AF to maintain a flexible posture quickly responsive to your requirements for tactical air support. I have reviewed the arc light employment and am prepared to add its weight to the decisive battles. The commanders who find, fix and engage the enemy will get the priority.

"I am confident that we will repulse these next enemy attacks, even if they are heavier than the last. But we must do more than repulse them. We must defeat his forces, then pursue them and destroy them."

I intend to show a copy of my quoted message to General Vica. The result I am looking for is a conscious, determined effort by all allied forces to seek battle with a will to win.



38

Monday, July 29, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Supplementary PL 480 Sale for Israel

In March you approved a \$30 million PL 480 sale to Israel. We thought that would take care of them for this year.

Now, however, their crop is coming in smaller than either of us estimated because of drought. They have asked for a supplement to the March agreement adding another 70,000 tons of wheat (\$4.6 million). Secretary Freeman, Bill Gaud and Charlie Zwick recommend approval.

The main advantage in the broader US-Israel context is that going ahead shows a general willingness to help them out at a time when they're studying our every move for signs of how firm our support is. We have an interest in moving the grain, and this would be a 100% dollar credit.

Harold H. Saunders

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NY 95-249  
By *ij*, NARA, Date 1-30-96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2360

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

38a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JUL 29 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P. L. 480 proposal for Israel

In the attached memorandum, Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request authority to negotiate a \$4.6 million P. L. 480 agreement with Israel for CY 1968 as a supplement to the agreement signed on March 29, 1968. This supplement would provide an additional 70,000 metric tons of wheat to the 150,000 already programmed and would bring the total CY 1968 program to \$35.0 million, with the following commodity composition:

Feedgrains	300,000 tons
Wheat	220,000 tons
Vegetable Oil	15,000 tons
Tobacco	200 tons

The additional wheat will make up a 55,000 ton shortfall in the Israeli wheat crop which now appears likely because of drought, and will also provide additional carryover stocks. This sale would also help ease our domestic wheat situation.

As in the March agreement, full dollar credit financing is provided in view of Israel's improving economic situation. Self-help provisions call for intensifying the already excellent agricultural development program with emphasis on storage and distribution facilities and adaptation of improved seed varieties.

Military expenditures - In approving the March agreement you concurred in the State/AID finding that Israeli military expenditures, although high (30% of the budget and 15% of GNP), were not unnecessary and do not materially interfere with her development program.

Recommendation - I recommend that you authorize negotiation of this agreement.

*Charles J. Zwick*  
Charles J. Zwick  
Director

Attachment

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 76284-197  
By jes/ky, NARA, Date 10-28-92

38b

CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM

JUL 19 1968

To: The President

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Israel

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 supplementary agreement with Israel to provide approximately 70,000 tons of wheat/wheat flour with a current export market value including certain ocean transportation costs of \$4.6 million. This would be a dollar credit sale payable over 20 years at 2½ percent interest including a 2 year grace period at 2 percent and an initial payment of 5 percent. These terms are identical to those of the current agreement signed March 29, 1968. The State and Treasury Departments concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

The Title I agreement for \$30.4 million signed on March 29, 1968 provided for 300,000 tons of feedgrains and 150,000 tons of wheat along with vegetable oil and tobacco. Drought conditions since the signing of the March agreement, however, reduced the 1968 Israeli wheat crop by about 55,000 tons from the previous estimate while wheat consumption increased somewhat. The additional PL 480 wheat imports would be used to offset the production decline, to meet the increased consumption requirements, and to allow a buildup of carryover stocks.

Self-Help

We are not proposing additional new self-help measures to be included in this proposed agreement. However, we would make reference to the self-help measures contained in the PL 480 agreement signed March 29, 1968.

Synington Amendment

State/AID has determined that Israeli resources are not being diverted to military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development, and that U. S. assistance is not being diverted to military purposes. This determination was made in a PL 480 memorandum signed by you on January 31, 1968, and the basis for it remains unchanged.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71C9 84-198By 160/16 NARA, Date 10-28-92



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Recommendation

That you authorize us to negotiate the PL 480 sales agreement as described above. July 12 1968

JUL 19 1968

William F. Gaud  
Administrator  
Agency for International Development

Quill of Ferman  
Secretary  
Department of Agriculture

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Monday - July 29, 1968

39

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa,  
Monday, July 29, 11:30 a.m.

Tomorrow Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa celebrates his twenty-fifth anniversary as Nicaraguan Ambassador in the United States. Secretary Rusk is giving a luncheon in his honor today.

In connection with the Dean's call on you this morning, I enclose a copy of the letter you signed for inclusion in a special album of photographs which Secretary Rusk will present to him at the luncheon.

*WGB*

William G. Bowdler

Enclosure

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

39a

July 29, 1968

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Tomorrow you celebrate your twenty-fifth anniversary as Ambassador of Nicaragua to the United States. I rejoice with you on this unique accomplishment and extend warmest congratulations.

You have been in Washington almost as long as I have. For both of us this city has been the scene of many proud memories. You have worked with five Presidents, ably representing the interests of your country. You have also applied your diplomatic skills to the inter-American cause during the period of greatest challenge. As Dean of the Diplomatic Corps for the past decade, you have rendered inestimable service to your colleagues and to me personally.


While the affairs of state have dominated our lives, we have also experienced many special personal joys. One of these has been watching our children grow and marry and bring us the added happiness of grandchildren.

I value especially the moments we have shared. In good times and bad, you have been a valued colleague and thoughtful friend. I am grateful for such an associate and to your Government for allowing so eminent a public servant to remain among us.



As you pass this impressive landmark in a distinguished career, I applaud your achievements and wish you many more years of distinguished service.

Sincerely,



His Excellency  
Dr. Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa  
Ambassador E. and P.  
Embassy of Nicaragua  
Washington, D. C.

*Dispatched 7/24/68 No Rept.*

Saturday, 6:30 P. M.  
July 27, 1968

40

Mr. President:

Today's speech to the Czech people by First Secretary Dubcek contained little that is new.

Attached is a summary and the full text.

*Pres. file*

Bremley Smith

~~SECRET~~INFORMATION

Saturday, July 27, 1968, 6:15 P. M.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dubcek Speech and Other Czech Developments


Speaking to the Czech nation, Dubcek reaffirmed Czechoslovakia's new course, but also reiterated Czechoslovakia's loyalty to the USSR and to proletarian internationalism (Text at Tab A).

He began his speech by thanking the citizens who had declared their support in letters and messages of every description. He said that the Czech and Slovak peoples are entitled to decide the Republic's fate . . . . We are advancing firmly on our own road . . . ."

Regarding the five who met in Warsaw, Dubcek said: "I am convinced that our friends will understand, even if not all at once, that the socialist process of revival does not jeopardize the common interests of the socialist countries. But, on the contrary, that it is the only possible way to make our republic a strong component part of the socialist system--to make our border most reliable, a border of socialism."

Dubcek said only that "we shall hold talks with members of the Politburo" and that he believed the talks would contribute to the gradual elimination of misunderstandings. (There are reports that Soviet security officials turned down several sites for the talks. While there is no confirmation that final arrangements have been made, there are stories out of both Prague and Moscow pointing to agreement and a meeting early next week. Dubcek's speech looks like a final preparation for it.)

Our Embassy in Prague characterizes Dubcek's speech as "resolute and confident." Just before Dubcek's speech, the Czech press service published--and then embargoed--a statement repudiating General Priblik's free-wheeling press interview of July 15. The statement denied that the Czech government "had no idea" how many Russian soldiers had entered Czechoslovakia (as Priblik had said) and disavowed Priblik's assault on the Warsaw Pact Command System. The subsequent embargo indicates that signals may be mixed in Prague. Perhaps the progressives were enraged at the apparent sacrifice of Priblik on the eve of talks. On the other hand, there was a lot to be said for removing the biggest Soviet target--as the Czech leadership reportedly is agreed that Priblik went much too far.



ND:ac

SANTIZED  
Authority 443.741.022.012/4  
By           , NARA, Date 11/3/09~~SECRET~~

Nathaniel Davis



DUBCEK RADIO-TV SPE H

PRAGUE DOMESTIC SERVICE IN SLOVAK 1800 GMT 27 JUL 68 L 40 b

(TEXT OF 27 JULY SPEECH BY ALEXANDER DUBCEK OVER RADIO AND TELEVISION--LIVE)

(TEXT) DEAR TELEVISION VIEWERS AND RADIO LISTENERS, DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS I HAVE RECEIVED HUNDREDS OF LETTERS, POSTCARDS, RESOLUTIONS, AND DECLARATIONS. I HAVE READ THEM CAREFULLY, ALTHOUGH NATURALLY IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO READ ALL OF THEM IN GREAT DETAIL. IN READING THEM, HOWEVER, I VISUALIZED THE FACES OF THE PEOPLE WHO SENT THEM. I THOUGHT ABOUT THEIR FEARS AND HOPES AS EXPRESSED IN THE LETTERS, DECLARATIONS, AND RESOLUTIONS. I GRATEFULLY REALIZED THAT ALL OF THEM SUPPORT THE ATTITUDE ADOPTED BY THE PARTY LEADERSHIP. CONCERNING THE PRESENT SITUATION--THE LETTER OF THE FIVE COMMUNIST PARTIES RESULTING FROM THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE WARSAW MEETING. I FELT THAT THESE LETTERS EXPRESSED MORE THAN JUST MERE APPROVAL FOR THE ACTION OF THOSE WHOSE TASK IT IS TO REPRESENT OUR WORKERS.

THE 700,000 COMMUNISTS AND THE 14.5 MILLION CITIZENS TO WHOM THIS REPUBLIC BELONGS ARE THE ONLY ONES ENTITLED TO DECIDE THE REPUBLIC'S FATE. THEY HAVE EXPRESSED THEMSELVES IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, FULL OF HOPE ABOUT THE AIMS WHICH WE HAVE ADOPTED AND WHICH FORMULATE OUR FURTHER SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AS DEFINED BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY IN ITS ACTION PROGRAM. THEY ALSO CONVEYED THEIR BASIC ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PRESENT SITUATION.

THEY ARE DOING ALL OF THIS QUIETLY IN A DIGNIFIED WAY, CONSCIOUS OF THE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR SOCIALIST COUNTRY. SUCH ACTIONS ALONE ARE WORTHY OF A PEOPLE WHO ARE AWARE OF THE JUSTNESS OF THEIR CAUSE AND ARE CONCERNED ABOUT ITS DEFENSE. HENCE IT IS ALL THE MORE SIGNIFICANT THAT ALL OF THEM UNAMBIGUOUSLY EXPRESS THE DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THE POLICY WHICH WE INITIATED IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR AND THAT THEY WANT TO DEVOTE THEIR ABILITIES AND STRENGTH TO THE BUILDING OF A SOCIALIST LIFE, WHICH WE VISUALIZE AS A DEMOCRATIC, SOCIALLY JUST, MODERN SOCIAL SYSTEM.

WE FULLY UNDERSTAND THESE SENTIMENTS AND ALL THE MORE VALUE THE FACT THAT IN THEIR LETTERS AND RESOLUTIONS OUR CITIZENS UNANIMOUSLY YET FREELY OF THEIR OWN HEARTS AND MINDS DECLARE THAT THEY WANT TO BASE THEIR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT ON SINCERE FRATERNAL RELATIONS OF ALLIANCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, THAT IN THIS RESPECT THEY DO NOT WANT TO CHANGE IN THE LEAST THEIR BASIC FOREIGN POLITICAL ORIENTATION, THAT JUST AS IN THE PAST THEY WILL REMAIN LOYAL TO THEIR FRIENDS AND WILL SHARE WITH THEM THE GOOD DAYS AND THE BAD, THAT THEY WILL NEVER BETRAY THE PRINCIPLES OF PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM, AND THAT IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH THESE PRINCIPLES BUT BASED ON THEIR OWN KNOWLEDGE AND CONSCIENCE THEY WANT TO DECIDE THEIR FATE IN A SOVEREIGN MANNER.

(MORE)

27 JUL 1962Z PAK/HM

FBIS 61

FIRST ADD 59 (DUBCEK RADIO-TV SPEECH)

XXX A SOVEREIGN MANNER.

(TEXT) THIS IS THE TRUE MEANING OF THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON THE BASIS OF THE LETTER FROM THE FIVE FRATERNAL COMMUNIST PARTIES. BACKING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, WE ARE ADVANCING FIRMLY ON OUR OWN ROAD. WE WELCOME THE HELP OF THOSE WHO UNDERSTAND US, AND WE WILL GLADLY AND PATIENTLY EXPLAIN OUR ATTITUDE TO THOSE WHO HAVE NOT YET UNDERSTOOD US. HOWEVER, WE WILL NOT ALLOW ANYTHING OR ANYONE TO DEFLECT US FROM THIS ROAD, PARTICULARLY THOSE WHO WOULD LIKE TO SEE DIFFERENCES OR EVEN DISCORD WITH OUR CLOSEST FRIENDS FOR WHATEVER MOTIVES.

HOWEVER, I AM NOT SPEAKING TO YOU TODAY ONLY IN ORDER TO CONFIRM THIS UNANIMOUS ATTITUDE OF OUR WORKING PEOPLE. I ALSO WANT TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONFIDENCE IN AND SUPPORT OF THE POLICY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, AS WAS CONVEYED IN THE LETTER FROM COMRADE (LIPSOVA) ON BEHALF OF MANY OF YOU AND HER ENTIRE FAMILY. SHE WROTE: YOUR PARTY IS ALSO OUR PARTY, ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOT MEMBERS. WE ARE SINCERELY AND HONESTLY FOR SOCIALISM. HAVE FAITH IN US. WE ARE MANY. WE BELIEVE IN YOU. WE HAVE RESPECT FOR YOUR COMMUNIST PARTY. PLEASE ACCEPT THE SINCERE THANKS OF US ALL.

WE VALUE THIS CONFIDENCE. I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE AWARE OF THE GRAVE IMPORTANCE OF THE MANDATE WE ARE AT THIS MOMENT RECEIVING FROM OUR NATIONS. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE SHALL PROCEED IN SUCH A MANNER THAT AT ANY TIME AND WITH CLEAR CONSCIENCE WE CAN ACCOUNT FOR OUR ACTION TO ALL OF YOU WHOM WE REPRESENT. THE CITIZENS OF OUR SOCIALIST COUNTRY--WORKERS, FARMERS, MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA, COMMUNISTS AND NONCOMMUNISTS, AND YOUNG AND OLD--HAVE NOW JUST AS BEFORE EXPRESSED THEIR FEELINGS OF FULL UNITY.

(MORE)

27 JUL 2012Z PAK/HH

XXX OF FULL UNI: .

(TEXT) OUR TURBULENT AND DIFFICULT SIX-MONTH, POST-JANUARY PERIOD HAS NOT BEEN IN VAIN. TODAY WE CAN ALREADY SAY WITH GREATER CERTAINTY THAT A UNITY IS BEING CREATED WHICH HAS NOT EXISTED FOR MANY YEARS, A UNITY WHICH OUR PEOPLES HAVE BEEN WAITING FOR FOR A LONG TIME, A UNITY WORTHY OF OUR SOCIALIST EFFORTS. THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLES, THE WORKING PEOPLE OF ALL STRATA, AND ALSO THE YOUNG FOLLOW THE PARTY AND ITS POLICY IS SIMPLY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARTY'S LEADING ROLE IN OUR SOCIALIST SOCIETY.

IT IS NECESSARY TO REALIZE THAT THIS IS A UNITY CREATED BY AND UNDER PARTY LEADERSHIP AND CREATED ON THE BASIS OF SOCIALIST PRINCIPLES, THE MUTUAL MERGING OF SOCIALIST VALUES WITH THE NATIONAL VALUE, AND ON THE INNER CONNECTION BETWEEN THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY AND THE INTERESTS OF SOCIALISM AND PROGRESS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. IT IS PROOF OF THE WISDOM, PRUDENCE, AND MATURITY OF THE CITIZENS OF OUR CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC. IT IS PROOF OF THEIR GENUINE SOCIALIST CONVICTIONS.

IT HAS BEEN SHOWN ONCE AGAIN THAT THE WORKING PEOPLE AND THE ORGANIZATIONS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT ARE NOT OPPOSED TO THE PARTY'S LEADING ROLE IN OUR SOCIETY BUT ARE OPPOSED TO AN INCORRECT POLICY AND, IN PARTICULAR, TO AN INCORRECT IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT POLICY. WE HAVE POINTED OUT ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION IN PARTY DOCUMENTS AND IN SPEECHES THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL NOT GIVE UP THE LEADING ROLE, AND THAT THERE IS NO ROOM IN THE PARTY OR IN PARTY DISCUSSIONS FOR THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE THE LEADING FORCE OF OUR SOCIETY, WHETHER IT SHOULD (OR SHOULD NOT) PLAY THE LEADING ROLE. THE QUESTION IS SIMPLY HOW ITS LEADING ROLE CAN BE IMPLEMENTED MORE EFFECTIVELY AND IN HARMONY AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERESTS OF OUR ENTIRE WORKING POPULATION.



IN ASSERTING THE PARTY'S LEADING ROLE THERE ARE ALWAYS TWO FACTORS. THOSE WHO LEAD MUST EXERCISE THEIR POLICY IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO INSURE THAT IT IS IN HARMONY WITH THE INTERESTS OF OUR PEOPLE. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA DOES NOT PURSUE A POLICY FOR THE BENEFIT OF ITS MEMBERS. RATHER IT PURSUES IT FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PEOPLE, FOR OUR PEOPLES, FOR THE FULFILLMENT OF THEIR ASPIRATIONS, BECAUSE ONLY THUS AND ONLY THEN DO THOSE WHO ARE LED FOLLOW THE POLICY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY. AND, WHAT IS IMPORTANT, DO SO VOLUNTARILY, OF THEIR OWN FREE WILL, CONSCIOUSLY AND ACTIVELY. THIS IS THE MOST IMPORTANT--THIS IS FOREMOST AND THIS IS WHAT WE ARE CONCERNED WITH IN THE POLICY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

HOWEVER WE ALSO HAVE SHORTCOMINGS IN OUR WORK, IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA; WE DO NOT CONCEAL THIS. BOTH IN THE PARTY APPARATUS AND IN THE ELECTED ORGANS THERE ARE SOME, ALBEIT ISOLATED, SHORTCOMINGS IN THE WORK AND, IN PARTICULAR, IN OUR OWN PROPAGANDA WORK. THERE ARE ALSO INSTANCES OF ANTISOCIALIST TRENDS AS WELL AS CERTAIN ANTI-SOVIET INVECTIVES AND MOODS. THIS WAS POINTED OUT BY THE MAY PLENUM OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND WE ALSO POINTED THIS OUT IN OUR REPLY TO THE WARSAW LETTER FROM THE FIVE COMMUNIST PARTIES. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE AND STRESS DEAR TELEVISION VIEWERS THAT IT IS NOT THIS, NOT THESE INDIVIDUAL INCIDENTS WHICH ARE THE MAIN AND DECISIVE (?FACTORS) IN OUR FUTURE SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT.

IT IS DECISIVE THAT THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY HAVE INCREASINGLY LEANED TOWARD SOCIALISM AND THE POLICY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THIS HAS CERTAINLY RESULTED IN AN ALLIANCE WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND, IN PARTICULAR, WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH NATURALLY HAS BEEN OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO US.

HOWEVER, IT IS NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH THE CAUSES OF THE PREVAILING NEGATIVE PHENOMENA IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES AND IN THE MUTUAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL COMMUNIST PARTIES.

(MORE)

27 JUL 2125Z AL/KH

FBIS 65

THIRD AND LAST ADD 59 (DUBCEK RADIO-TV SPEECH)

XXX INDIVIDUAL COMMUNIST PARTIES.

(TEXT) THEREFORE, MUCH MORE ATTENTION MUST BE PAID TO THEM, NOT TO THE RESULTS, BUT TO THE CAUSES OF CERTAIN PHENOMENA. OUR PRESIDUM OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE WILL BE GUIDED BY THIS.

THE INTERNAL DISCIPLINE WHICH HAS BEEN WITH US IN THESE DAYS SHOULD REMAIN WITH US. IT HAS MADE US REJECT EVERYTHING THAT IS BAD AND SUPERFICIAL, EVERYTHING THAT COULD LEAD TO THE FANNING OF HARMFUL PASSIONS OR THE DRAMATIZATION OF THE MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH HAVE ARISEN.

AS INTERNATIONALISTS, WE MUST TAKE CARE THAT THE SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS AROUND THE WARSAW LETTER BE CONDUCTED IN SUCH A WAY THAT WE WILL NEVER FORGET THAT THE MATTER CONCERNS THE PEOPLE OF COUNTRIES AND COMMUNIST PARTIES WITH WHOM WE ARE BOUND IN FRIENDSHIP. ALL THE MORE SO SINCE OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET PEOPLE HAVE BEEN AND WILL SURELY REMAIN IN THE FUTURE LIVELY AND SINCERE. THIS IS ALSO FELT FROM THE LETTERS WE ARE RECEIVING, SINCE THIS IS REALLY INHERENT IN OUR WORKING PEOPLE.

AS YOU HAVE HEARD AND READ IN THE PRESS, WE SHALL HOLD TALKS WITH MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE. I BELIEVE THAT THESE TALKS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE GRADUAL ELIMINATION OF MANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH HAVE ARISEN IN OUR MUTUAL RELATIONS.

I BELIEVE THAT THE IDEA OF INTERNATIONALISM ON WHICH WE BASED OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET PEOPLE WILL IN THE END EMERGE PURIFIED AND STRENGTHENED. I AM CONVINCED THAT OUR FRIENDS WILL UNDERSTAND, EVEN IF NOT ALL AT ONCE, THAT THE SOCIALIST PROCESS OF REVIVAL DOES NOT JEOPARDIZE THE COMMON INTERESTS OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES., BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, THAT IT IS THE ONLY POSSIBLE WAY TO MAKE OUR REPUBLIC A STRONG COMPONENT PART OF THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM, TO MAKE OUR BORDER MOST RELIABLE, A BORDER OF SOCIALISM.

IN THE INTEREST OF THE SOCIALIST FUTURE OF OUR COUNTRY, IN THE INTEREST OF A FULL AND FREE LIFE FOR OUR PEOPLE, IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR COMMON SOCIALIST CAUSE IN THE WORLD, WE HAVE THE DUTY TO CARRY IT (THE SOCIALIST PROCESS OF REVIVAL--ED) STEP BY STEP TO THE END, AND NOT TAKE ONE STEP ASIDE FROM THE PATH WHICH WE HAVE ENTERED. WE SHALL ENDEAVOR TO MAKE OUR TALKS WITH OUR FRIENDS CONTRIBUTE TO OUR PURPOSE OF CONTINUING IN PEACE TO CARRY OUT AND FULFILL THE REVIVAL PROCESS AND GAIN ALL NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS FOR IT. THIS IS THE WISH OF OUR PEOPLE, WHO, IN JANUARY, ENTERED A PATH WHICH THEY KNEW WOULD NOT BE EASY AND WHICH THEY, IN SPITE OF THIS, CHOSE VOLUNTARILY AND SPONTANEOUSLY. FOR THIS REASON THE POSITIONS OF SOCIALISM ARE TODAY STRONGER THAN EVER IN THE PAST, BECAUSE THE PEOPLE HAVE BECOME DIRECTLY AND URGENTLY CONSCIOUS OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR ITS FATE.

INSPIRED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THEY WANT TO SUCCESSFULLY SOLVE THE MANY DEFORMED OR NEGLECTED PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE DEVELOPED IN OUR COUNTRY AND OUR COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE PRE-JANUARY PERIOD. THEY WANT OUR ECONOMY TO SUPPLY THE MEANS FOR A BETTER AND MORE SECURE LIFE OF OUR WORKING PEOPLE. THEY WANT OUR SOCIALIST REVIVAL SYSTEM TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR EVERY CITIZEN TO HAVE A SHARE IN THE DETERMINATION OF HIS DESTINY. THEY WANT, IN SHORT, TO IMPRESS A HUMAN IMAGE UPON SOCIALISM WHICH IS TRULY ITS OWN.

ESTEEMED FRIENDS, YOUR CONFIDENCE HAS GIVEN US THE MANDATE TO REPRESENT WORKERS, FARMERS, AND INTELLIGENTSIA, WHO KNOW WHAT THEY WANT AND WHO ARE CAPABLE OF PURSUING THEIR AIMS, TO REPRESENT PEOPLES FOR WHOM THE POST-JANUARY PATH OF FURTHER SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION IS BECOMING EVER MORE THEIR OWN. THIS CONFIDENCE TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE STRENGTHENS US IN THE BELIEF THAT WE ARE SERVING A JUST CAUSE.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION.

(ENDALL)

27 JUL 2138Z BE/HH



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

41  
Pres file  
Saturday, July 27, 1968, 4:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S. Relations with Foreign Countries, 1963-1968

Here are the papers prepared by NSC staff members comparing our relations with foreign countries as of today compared with 1963.

Included are summaries by regions, and summaries on each country. A paper on the United Nations is also included.

These summaries may be useful in the historical studies now being prepared covering the years of your Administration. Additionally, we could make a set available to Harry McPherson for the project he is currently working on. They are now classified Confidential and would need editing and updating to cover developments in the last few weeks if they were to be made public.

I believe Mr. Rostow sent these papers to you in somewhat different form, however, Bill Bowdler relayed to me your request as to their current standing.

Bromley Smith

Attachments: Western Europe -- Tab A  
USSR and Eastern Europe -- Tab B  
Middle East and North Africa -- Tab C  
Tropical Africa -- Tab D  
South Asia -- Tab E  
Southeast Asia -- Tab F  
East Asia (including the trust territories) -- Tab G  
Latin America -- Tab H  
United Nations Organizations -- Tab I

BKS:amc

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MATTER CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958,  
SEC. 1.1 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 16, 1993.

BY 19 ON 9-3-92

Saturday, 3:30 P. M.  
July 27, 1968

*Pres file*

42

Mr. President:

Here is CIA's report on the  
situation in Czechoslovakia as of  
1:00 P. M. today.

First Secretary Dubcek is  
scheduled to speak this afternoon.  
We will send you later a summary of  
any significant statements he makes.

Bromley Smith

Saturday, 3:13 P. M.  
July 27, 1968

*Pres files*

43

Mr. President:

We have put on green for your signature the draft letter which Secretary Clifford suggests you may wish to send to President Truman about the press release on the Executive Order desegregating the armed forces.

Bromley Smith



43a

July 27, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

Clark Clifford sent me yesterday a report on the progress that has been made in the armed forces toward desegregation of the individual services and toward providing true equality of opportunity for all men and women without regard to race or national origin.

The issuance of your order on July 26, 1948, was a great and courageous act. Clark's report to me was so heart-warming that I had it released to the press and am sending you a copy.

The armed forces, the Nation, and the Free World are better today for your action, and I salute you again for it.

Sincerely,

Honorable Harry S. Truman  
219 Delaware Street  
Independence, Missouri 64050

LBJ:WWR:CMC:amc

JULY 26, 1968

43b

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSEMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
FROM SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
CLARK M. CLIFFORD

Today marks the 20th anniversary of President Truman's 26 July 1948 order to desegregate the Armed Forces. The program launched 20 years ago has made extraordinary progress.

Twenty years ago, the Army had 1,306 Negro officers, with only one a colonel. Now there are 5,637, of whom 27 are colonels, and one has been nominated to become a brigadier general.

The Navy in 1948 had only 4 Negro officers, now it has 330.

The Marine Corps, which had one Negro officer in 1948, now has 180.

In 1948 the Air Force had 310 Negro officers, with one a colonel. Today it has 2,417 with 19 colonels and a lieutenant general.

There were just 14 Negroes at the Service academies in 1948. Today there are 116, of whom 47 entered as plebes earlier this month.

In the enlisted grades there has been the same kind of heartening breakthrough in opportunity to advance on merit alone.

For example, Negroes made up 10.7% of all Army enlisted men in 1948 but only 5.7% of the top enlisted grade. In 1968 the overall percentage is 12.1%, but now Negroes make up 13.9% of the grade which corresponds to 1948's top grade.

In 1948 there were seven enlisted grades. Today there are nine, which makes comparisons difficult. So we examined the spread of Negroes through all nine grades at the end of 1962 and the end of 1967. In that recent five year period the percentage of Negroes increased -- in some instances more than twofold -- in each of the top four grades in all four of the Military Services. The numbers of Negroes increased in the top five grades of all Services.

Equality of treatment and opportunity without regard to color is a fact in the Armed Forces of the United States. For most of our country's history, the opposite unfortunately was the case.

Piecemeal desegregation started in World War II, but it was not until President Truman's courageous and dedicated order of public commitment to equality in the Armed Forces in 1948 that real change began. By 1955 all formal racial discrimination had been eliminated, although vestiges lingered into the early 1960's.

In 1962 President Kennedy established a Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces. A year later the report of that committee led to the issuance of a Defense Directive which for the first time squarely enunciated a policy against off-base as well as on-base discriminatory treatment of servicemen.

more

By 1967 it was apparent that while many forms of shameful off-base treatment of Negro servicemen had been eliminated or substantially ameliorated, housing discrimination in some communities near military installations continued to have a corrosive and damaging impact on black Americans wearing this country's uniform. As a consequence, military effectiveness was impaired.

In 1963 the Defense Department had stopped accepting rental listings from civilian landlords who refused to treat all men and women in uniform on an equal basis. A year ago commanders were told to seek out landlords and to urge them to rent to all servicemen without regard to color, pointing out that if they refused to deal with all servicemen fairly, then no servicemen would be authorized to deal with them.

Only 30% of the landlords nationwide were on our non-discriminatory housing lists a year ago. Now 84% are. This has meant a gain of nearly 630,000 rental units open to all servicemen in all parts of our nation.

We are determined to push forward with our campaign to achieve 100% housing justice for all servicemen. We have stated that no other goal is acceptable. I announced in June that beginning in August the sanctions which we have imposed in certain areas on discriminatory landlords will be extended throughout the country wherever we have military bases.

The men and women of the Armed Forces have shown over the last twenty years that full equality of opportunity for white and black together is not just a dream, but that it can be made a reality. We shall be unrelenting in preserving and extending that reality.

# # # # #



448

Friday, July 26, 1968 -- 9:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

*Free file*

A final thought before I leave.

To stabilize this growing fever for a commitment to a unilateral bombing cessation, you may find it appropriate in the days ahead to make a statement of these simple elements against the background -- or to be backed up by -- of Abrams and Bunker, Rusk and Clifford:

1. In the course of the talks in Paris, Hanoi has every reason to know that reasonable and fair conditions for a bombing cessation are available.
2. All the indications are that they have assembled forces, by extraordinary efforts, for one more try to influence the outcome of the war by military action.
3. Our men on the spot, the Vietnamese, and our allies are confident that they can deal with such a renewed assault.
4. Moreover, in the period since Tet, in a remarkable effort, the government of Vietnam has strengthened itself and the armed forces. The people of Saigon know all about this impending offensive. They are calm and confident that they can weather it and go forward to better days.
5. It could be that our military actions will make the other side judge that this offensive would be unprofitable; that it would be better to go forward immediately to serious discussions of the circumstances in which a total cessation of bombing would make sense. Right now it does not make sense. The men and supplies are pouring down from the North for this offensive at a very high rate, and our bombing is reducing by a significant percent the men and supplies actually entering the combat zone in the South. Without assurances that this flow would diminish or that the offensive will not take place, no Commander in Chief could responsibly halt the air attacks in the Panhandle.
6. What is required of the American people now is calm, clear heads, and confidence in our armed forces, our allies, the courage of the Vietnamese people.
7. Aside from this build up, the signs are favorable. The constitutional government in South Vietnam is gathering strength and confidence. The armed forces of Vietnam are expanding through a remarkable general mobilization; and we have assured that they are better equipped. Some of the statements from Hanoi are encouraging. They indicate a growing sense of the realities which must be faced if peace is to come to Vietnam and Southeast Asia. These

statements have not yet been translated into negotiations. At the same time, the government of Vietnam, at Honolulu, initiated three substantial proposals looking towards peace.

8. If the American people remain cool and steady -- strengthened by what has happened since Tet as opposed to the fears and alarms during the Tet offensive -- I am confident that we shall come to better days.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

45

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, July 26, 1968 -- 5:20 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's personal memorandum for your 6:00 p. m. appointment with Mr. Nixon.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 9-2-92

WWRostow:rla



2345  
45a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

July 26, 1968

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 95-248

By lip, NARA, Date 6-25-96

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

On July 19, Nick Katzenbach had a wide-ranging discussion with Richard Nixon concerning the Czechoslovak situation, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the troop issue, the Middle East, and Viet-Nam. A substantial part of the discussion focussed on the latter subject. Nixon emphasized his conviction that we must stick it out in Viet-Nam, although he recognized that this will be a severe test of the courage and stamina of the American people. He also expressed considerable interest in Soviet-East Bloc relations and on the need to resist pressures to cut our troop strength in Europe.

Although I assume that he will wish to cover much of the same ground this afternoon with you, you may wish to emphasize the outcome of the Honolulu meeting and your views of our relations with the Soviets. If you concur, I might speak specifically to the Czechoslovak situation and the Paris talks.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

*What you said this morning could  
well be repeated this evening to Nixon.  
DR*

~~SECRET~~

Information

THE WHITE HOUSE .  
WASHINGTON

46

EO 12958  
3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

Friday, July 26, 1968

Mr. President:

Here is the CIA Intelligence report  
on the Czechoslovakian situation.

as of 4:00 pm

W. W. Rostow

~~Secret~~

attachment

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-121  
By us, NARA, Date 11-4-03

46a

Friday, July 26, 1968

CIA INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Czechoslovakia as of 4:00 P.M. EDT

*Free file*

Czechoslovak party leader Dubcek has assured the country's populace today that he does not intend to cave in to Soviet pressure and will retain his freedom of action with Moscow. Addressing a delegation of factory workers, he reportedly said he did not intend to push the differences with Moscow to an open break, but added "we know what we want." He also said that the Czechoslovak presidium is unanimous in its attitude toward the proposed talks with the Soviets.

Prague has taken some steps apparently intended to be half-way responsive to Soviet demands, but also continues to assert its determination to continue its reforms. The party presidium yesterday abolished the central committee's department for military and security affairs, an act which had the effect of removing Lt. Gen. Prchlik, who had become a Soviet bugbear, from his important position as head of this department.

The setting up by the Czechoslovak government of advisory councils for radio and television can also be viewed as a conciliatory step toward Moscow. Although the members of the councils will not be censors per se, the creation of the councils suggests that without actually re-imposing censorship, the Dubcek regime is partially responding to the Soviet demand that it control the news media.

Prague provided further evidence today that it will not bow precipitately to Soviet pressure. The party daily Rude Pravo in effect rebutted the Pravda article of 25 July which linked the Czechoslovak and the Red Chinese "heresies." The Rude Pravo article stressed that the autonomy of each party is indispensable and that "the demand for independence... is not at variance with international solidarity."

Moscow is still denouncing certain Czechoslovak party leaders. Pravda adds the name of Vice-Premier Ota Sik to the growing list of identified "revisionists."

Most of the Soviet leaders continue to be out of public view, but three politburo members -- Premier Kosygin, President Podgorniy, and First Deputy Premier Polyansky -- were officially reported in Moscow yesterday or today.

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 03-122 and NLJ 97-379

By us, NARA, Date 11-30-04

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~


- 2 -

Substantial elements of possibly three Soviet divisions which moved south from the Berlin area on 24-25 July are apparently now located in restricted areas approximately 75 miles south of Berlin.

There has been no change in the status of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia.



No unusual activity has been observed in the Czechoslovak Armed Forces.



~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

47  
INFORMATION

Friday, July 26, 1968  
12: 45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Neither the three American pilots nor their civilian escorts were aboard the ICC plane when it arrived in Vientiane today from Hanoi.

Bromley Smith

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 95-249  
By lig, NARA, Date 1-30-96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, July 26, 1968, 12:40 P. M.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

*Rus file*

**SUBJECT: Your appointment with Governor Wallace today**

Secretary Rusk, is bringing Governor Wallace to the White House and is prepared to do a briefing on the two issues which he says Governor Wallace is interested in--1. e. -- Vietnam  
The Czechoslovakian situation

Secretary Rusk feels that no listing of points to be covered is necessary in view of the fact that responses to the Governor's questions will set the nature of the discussion.

*BKS*

**W. W. Rostow**

**BKS:amc**



INFORMATION

49

Friday - July 26, 1968

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Herewith a letter, with English translation, from President Sanchez replying to your farewell letter of July 8.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

492  
(Official Translation)

PRESIDENT  
OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF EL SALVADOR

San Salvador, July 15, 1968

His Excellency  
Lyndon B. Johnson,  
President of the  
United States of America,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

Mr. President:

I take pleasure in referring to the letter of July 8 that you left for me on your departure for the United States of America, in which you express your gratitude for the courtesies accorded you by the Salvadoran people during your brief stay in this country.

I truly appreciate your words concerning the industrious spirit of the Salvadoran people. I am also happy that you have seen personally the efforts that the peoples of Central America are making to improve their Common Market in order to use it as a means of improving their standard of living.

In acknowledging receipt of your communication, Mr. President, I wish to reiterate the thanks that I expressed to you in person for your visit to El Salvador, as well as the friendship and admiration that we Salvadorans feel for the United States.

My people regarded as a historic event the visit with which you, the President of the United States of America, honored them despite your many duties and responsibilities. Consequently, they hope that your decision will result in important achievements, particularly in the strengthening of the bonds of cooperation, friendship, and faith in the democratic system that unite our country with your great country.

Expressing to Your Excellency and Mrs. Johnson, as well as your daughter, my sincere good wishes and those of my wife and family, I avail myself of the opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my high consideration.

/Signed/ Fidel Sanchez Hernandez



PRESIDENTE  
DE LA  
REPÚBLICA DE EL SALVADOR

SAN SALVADOR, 15 de julio de 1968.

Excelentísimo Señor Lyndon B. Johnson,  
Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América.  
CASA BLANCA,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Señor Presidente:

Pláceme referirme a su atenta carta de julio 8 que me dejó al partir de regreso a los Estados Unidos de América, por la que, entre otras cosas, me expresa su gratitud por las atenciones que recibió del Pueblo Salvadoreño, durante su breve visita a este país.

Me satisfacen, sinceramente, las palabras que dedica al espíritu laborioso del Pueblo Salvadoreño. Igualmente, me agrada que haya conocido, personalmente, los esfuerzos que los pueblos centroamericanos están realizando por perfeccionar su Mercado Común, a fin de utilizarlo como medio para mejorar sus niveles de vida.

Al acusarle recibo de su atenta comunicación, señor Presidente, quiero reiterarle los agradecimientos que le manifesté en persona por su visita a El Salvador, así como también las expresiones de simpatía y admiración que los salvadoreños sentimos por los Estados Unidos.

Para mi pueblo, ha sido un acontecimiento histórico, que el Presidente de los Estados Unidos de América, a pesar de sus múltiples ocupaciones y responsabilidades, le haya honrado con su visita. Por lo mismo, espera que esa decisión, se materialice en realizaciones trascendentales, principalmente en el acrecentamiento de los vínculos de cooperación, de amistad y de fe en el sistema democrático, que le unen con ese gran país.





PRESIDENTE  
DE LA  
REPÚBLICA DE EL SALVADOR

Haciéndole patente tanto a usted, como a la Señora Johnson y a su apreciable hija las mas sinceras expresiones de simpatía mías, de mi esposa y familia, aprovecho la oportunidad para suscribirme con toda consideración.

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, likely belonging to a high-ranking official or the President himself, written over a horizontal line.

INFORMATION

Friday - July 26, 1968

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Herewith a letter from Ambassador Jova thanking you for the family photograph and commenting on the success of your Central American visit.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

rec  
7-25-68  
2:00 P

50a

PS

Tegucigalpa, Honduras, July 18, 1968

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

My wife joins me in expressing deep appreciation to you and Mrs. Johnson for the beautiful autographed color photograph of you and your family. We have it in a place of honor and it will be a treasured remembrance of your visit to Honduras.

The visit here has had a very favorable impact and Hondurans in general, regardless of their political orientation, regard this, the first visit of an American President, as a truly historic moment. Undoubtedly the prisoner exchange would never have been effected so quickly had you not come to Central America.

Please tell Mrs. Nugent that her speech was a real hit.

Permit me to wish you all success in meeting the heavy burdens of your high office.

Faithfully yours,



Joseph John Jova  
Ambassador



57  
ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

Friday - July 26, 1968

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

The Ecuadorean Government has invited us to send a special delegation to the inauguration of President-elect Velasco Ibarra on August 31.

Subject to your approval, Secretary Rusk proposes to accept the invitation with the reply at Tab A.

If you approve, I will ask Jim Jones to send you a list of candidates for the delegation.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Acceptance reply by Secretary Rusk, for Presidential approval.

cc - Bob Faiss

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 9-3-92

Suggested Reply

Excellency:

I am grateful for your kind invitation, extended in the name of President Arosemena, for the Government of the United States to be represented by a special delegation at the inauguration of Doctor Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra as Constitutional President of Ecuador. On behalf of President Johnson, I have the pleasure to inform you that the Government of the United States will deem it an honor to send a special delegation to the inaugural ceremonies and in this way to associate the American people with the people of Ecuador on the proud occasion of the installation of Ecuador's newly-elected government. The United States Embassy in Quito will inform you at a later date of the names of the members of the delegation.

Dean Rusk

His Excellency

Gustavo Larrea Cordova

Minister of Foreign Relations

of Ecuador

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, July 26, 1968  
9:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

If you wish to examine India's  
internal Vietnam -- with which our  
old friend B. K. Nehru has to deal --  
this paper describes it.

9,000 guerrillas are tying up  
70,000 Indian troops.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 95-251  
By sig, NARA Date 9-20-96

Cy 1, SC No. 00780/68A, 26 July 1968  
"India's Troubled Eastern Region"  
Special Report Weekly Review

WWRostow:rla



53  
INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, July 26, 1968  
9:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

This analysis of the Pope's  
problem and probable direction at  
Bogota may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 95-251  
By rip, NARA Date 9-20-96

Cy 1, SC No. 00780/68B, 26 July 1968  
"The Catholic Church in Latin America"  
Special Report Weekly Review

WWRostow:rlh

INFORMATION

*Pres. file*

54

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SENSITIVE~~  
~~LITERALLY EYES~~  
~~ONLY~~

Friday, July 26, 1968  
6:25 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith an analysis -- and text -- of a very  
sensitive intercept [redacted]  
[redacted] on the Czech crisis.

3.3(b)(1)

[redacted]

3.3(b)(1)

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE/GAMMA GUPY~~ attachment

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SENSITIVE~~  
~~LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 03-119  
By SJ, NARA, Date 6-2-03

*Yes. ple*

55

Friday, July 26, 1968  
6:15 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] a rather ominous  
report on Soviet intentions towards Czechoslovakia.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

SANTIZED  
Authority NLJ 019-038-1-1  
By Q, NARA, Date 1/18/02



## Intelligence Information Cable

IN

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS  
 Document # 150 D.D. 1 25X0 OER XBR XCR XPC XPC XCR XCR

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE

DIST 26 JULY 1968

COUNTRY USSR/CZECHOSLOVAKIA/POLAND

1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)

DOI 24 JULY 1968

SUBJECT PREPARATIONS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

ACQ

FIELD NO. 1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)

SOURCE

1. THE USSR HAS DEPLOYED THE 32ND ARMY IN POLAND AS WELL AS LARGE FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF EAST GERMANY. GREAT PRESSURES ARE BEING EXERTED UPON POLAND TO PREPARE FOR AN INTERVENTION. THE FIVE DIVISIONS SUBORDINATE TO THE SILESIA MILITARY DISTRICT IN POLAND ARE IN A STATE OF READINESS.

2. PROPAGANDA IN POLAND IS POINTING TO A CZECHOSLOVAK THREAT AND TO THE NECESSITY OF AIDING THE "HEALTHY" FORCES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. PRESSURE FOR INTERVENTION IS BEING APPLIED BY POLISH POLITICAL ACTIVISTS, HEADED BY POLISH UNITED WORKERS' PARTY (PZPR) FIRST SECRETARY WLADYSLAW GOMULKA. POLISH MILITARY LEADERS HAVE REACTED

Approved for Release 15 JUL 1996

Date

1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : NLJ-019-038-1-2-0

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 019-038-1-2  
 By [signature], NARA, Date 11/19/02

IN

1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)

(classification) (dissem controls)

TO THIS PRESSURE WITH SOME RESERVE. NONETHELESS, ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF PZPR OFFICIALS AND THE USSR, PLANS FOR POLAND'S PARTICIPATION IN AN INTERVENTION HAVE BEEN PREPARED.

3. WEST GERMANY'S DECISION TO CHANGE THE SITE OF THE BLACK LION EXERCISES FROM A BAVARIAN REGION NEAR THE CZECHOSLOVAK FRONTIER TO THE SOUTHWESTERN PART OF WEST GERMANY HAS CREATED AN AWKWARD SITUATION FOR THE PLANNERS OF THE INTERVENTION. A WEST GERMAN EXERCISE ALONG THE FRONTIER COULD HAVE SERVED AS A PRETEXT FOR THE INTERVENTION. IF IT SHOULD BECOME NECESSARY TO SEND FORCES INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND TO USE THEM TO SEAL THE WEST GERMAN BORDER, THIS WILL BE DONE IN EARLY SEPTEMBER OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY (KSC) CONGRESS WHICH OPENS ON 9 SEPTEMBER. AN INTERVENTION WOULD BE NECESSARY IF THE ELECTION OF THE NEW KSC CENTRAL COMMITTEE DID NOT ACCORD WITH SOVIET WISHES.

4. THE POLISH POPULACE IS STRONGLY AGAINST THE ROLE BEING PLAYED BY THE POLISH LEADERS IN THE CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS. MANY LETTERS ARE BEING SENT FROM POLAND TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA REPORTING SOVIET TROOP DEPLOYMENTS IN POLAND.

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: NONE.

1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)

(classification) (dissem controls)

56  
INFORMATION

Pres file  
Friday, July 26, 1968 -- 6:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

I had a long talk on the telephone with Javits in New York. I went through the three constructive initiatives in the communique and emphasized that Thieu was in a most constructive mood with respect to peace initiatives, despite political problems in the Lower House in Saigon. I explained to him that there was no veto but merely the consultations due an ally which was putting a million men into the field for the defense of its own country. I explained the risks involved in a unilateral bombing cessation at this time with a major offensive impending, from all the intelligence available to us. I offered to talk with him further about this when it was convenient to him.

Javits said that he did not wish to join in a partisan attack on the President and he did not regard his speech as partisan.

He was afraid that we would find ourselves in a position where we could negotiate a solution in Vietnam acceptable to us but that the Saigon government would stand in the way. I told him that we generally felt that, if and when the other side was willing to talk seriously about peace, the government in Saigon would be moderate. There were hard-line elements in the Lower House in Saigon but if the possibility of peace became real in that country and we were not arguing abstract points, Thieu could carry the day on a sensible basis.

We agreed that he would come in to see me and chat about these matters during August and that, in the meanwhile, he would consider carefully what I had said and study the communique.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla



DECLASSIFIED

INFORMATION

57

Authority 4289187  
By 18/yp, NARA, Date 9-8-92

*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, July 26, 1968 -- 5:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

There are two public relations problems which, I believe, we ought to address promptly:

-- How do we prepare the U.S. media and public to the facts we know about the impending third offensive; the scale of truck movements through the Panhandle in preparation for that offensive; and the value of the bombing we are now doing. This preparation should include the possibility that the enemy might call off the offensive or that Abrams might abort the offensive; but it should be a candid sharing of the broad lines of the intelligence, so that our people feel that it is prudent for us not to risk a 2 or 3 week free ride for the enemy in terms of men and supplies into South Vietnam on the eve of what all indicators suggest will be the most massive effort since Tet. In the course of this, we should underline that all the evidence we now have -- and it is considerable -- is that the present lull in fighting is an attempt to build forces for an offensive, not to respond to your March 31 act of de-escalation.

-- An effort to suggest, without being too obviously political -- that the biggest success of <sup>communications</sup> military operations since Tet have been ~~not~~ its impact on U.S. public opinion; that the U.S. public reaction to the Tet attacks was excessively pessimistic; that the primary objective of this offensive could be U.S. psychology; and, therefore, it would be helpful for all of us to be prepared to play it cool this time.

If that is the job, we should orchestrate the following elements in some orderly way:

-- Thoroughly professional military briefings in Saigon, preferably by Abrams himself who, I am told by all my present contacts, is very highly regarded at this stage. He would be an ideal man to present the fact and, without guaranteeing full scale offensive, indicate that this is the most realistic hypothesis upon which to operate.

-- Pentagon briefings, perhaps bringing Bus Wheeler as well as Clifford into the act.

-- Sec. Rusk might take the occasion to explain why, in diplomatic terms, it does not appear prudent on the evidence in Paris or the evidence from Saigon, to risk a unilateral bombing halt at this time. Perhaps Senator Russell -- as well as some of our more familiar friends in the Senate -- might stand up and ask Sen. Javits if he is willing to take responsibility for the extra Americans who will be killed if we stop the bombing, opened up the supply flow by 20 or 30%



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

and then the offensive came. In any case, we ought to get some voices outside the Executive Branch operating.

In general, it would be good if, for once, Saigon and Washington relieved the President of the burden of carrying this problem. But, depending on how the intelligence flows and things evolve in the days ahead, you might consider a press conference statement or insert in a speech you are giving, which would deal with these two themes.

W. W. Rostow

cc: George Christian  
Marshall Wright

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*  
58

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SENSITIVE~~  
LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Friday, July 26, 1968  
5:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a draft letter to Chairman Kossygin. I am sending by special messenger a copy of this draft to Secretary Rusk.

As you will see, I turned the last sentence of his letter (attached) ever so slightly around to suggest that he has to keep the Czech business under reasonable control if we are to have the right climate.

I have drafted this with explicit references to Vietnam, the Middle East, and the Pueblo. I myself see no harm -- and some virtue -- in keeping these matters before him and suggesting that the creation of the right international climate is a two-way job.

Nevertheless, wiser heads may prevail and limit the letter to the first four paragraphs and the last paragraph.

I will be in touch with Sect. Rusk as soon as he finishes a meeting which he is now chairing, and tell him:

- that this is only a draft without any Presidential blessing;
- but the President wants his views urgently.

The critical issue is whether you decide to commit us to a summit meeting in September before we know what the outcome of the Czech crisis proves to be. Since the meeting of the Czechs and Soviet leaders has slid into next week we may not know for another week.

Since the offer of a summit constitutes something of a deterrent to the Soviets -- and such a meeting can always be postponed if there is a war on in Central Europe -- I am inclined to gamble a little on a prompt reply to Kossygin. But you will, of course, wish to hear Sect. Rusk and Clifford on this point.

I have not sent a copy of this to Sect. Clifford, and will do so only when you instruct me to do so.

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 95-249  
By sig, NARA, Date 1-30-96

W. W. Rostow

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I welcome your letter of July 25, expressing your views -- and that of your colleagues -- on next steps in curbing the strategic arms race.

I suggest that the bilateral negotiations concerning the limitation and subsequent reduction of both offensive and defensive strategic weapons begin in Geneva on or about Monday, September 2, 1968, if that time is convenient for you.

It would be appropriate and helpful if you and I were present, both to launch the discussions and to take the occasion for conversations on other matters of mutual interest.

I share your conviction that a solution to the problem of curbing the strategic arms race will be found more easily if there is simultaneous movement to reduce tensions in other areas.

In this connection, you know, I am sure, that we have taken the advice of the Soviet Government, transmitted through Ambassador Zorin, with respect to a formula which would involve the total cessation of attacks on North Vietnam, accompanied by a prior understanding of actions to be taken on both sides in a subsequent phase which would promptly follow. Although this proposition has been carefully elaborated to the authorities in Hanoi, we have thus far had no positive response.

I regret to tell you that all the evidence available to us suggests that the other side plans a third major attack on Saigon in the days ahead,

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 92-280  
By WJP, NARA, Date 7-6-93

as well as an offensive in the northern sector of South Vietnam. We would have preferred that the authorities in Hanoi had moved promptly to measures of mutual de-escalation and to serious and substantive negotiation of the issues which must be settled in order to bring peace to South Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

With respect to the Middle East, I believe it is a fact that the Israelis have now moved towards a more flexible position that we have urged on them. I would hope that the United Arab Republic would respond positively through Ambassador Jarring to the questions which, we understand, he will pose. At the moment the major immediate obstacle to progress towards a Middle Eastern settlement we both seek appears to be with the United Arab Republic. I am glad our representatives have been in touch on the Middle East and trust that they will continue.

I greatly regret that we have made no progress in the Pueblo matter, which also remains a dangerous source of international tension. We have put forward a number of wholly reasonable propositions to the North Koreans but have received only the most flat and negative response. Meanwhile, there is some evidence that the issue could become inflamed in the course of the domestic political campaign. It is, in my judgment, most unwise for the North Koreans to let this question remain unresolved.

We hope you will find it possible and convenient to meet with me in September to review these and any other matters of common interest that you may wish to raise, as we launch our negotiating teams into perhaps



the most important negotiation of the postwar years in the field of arms control and disarmament.

We share, of course, your understanding that it is essential for both of us to make every effort to create the most favorable climate for these talks.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
A. N. Kosygin  
Chairman of the Presidium of the  
USSR Council of Ministers  
Moscow

58b

July 26, 1968

*draft*

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I welcome your letter of July 25, expressing your views -- and that of your colleagues -- on next steps in curbing the strategic arms race.

I suggest that the bilateral negotiations concerning the limitation and subsequent reduction of both offensive and defensive strategic weapons begin in Geneva on or about Monday, September 2, 1968, if that time is convenient for you.

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I regret to tell you that all the evidence available to us suggests that the other side plans a third major attack on Saigon in the days ahead, as well as an offensive in the northern sector of South Vietnam. We would have preferred that the authorities in Hanoi had moved promptly to measures of mutual de-escalation and to serious and substantive negotiation of the issues which must be settled in order to bring peace to South Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-280

By 108, NARA, Date 7-6-93

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We hope you will find it possible and convenient to meet with me in September to review these and any other matters of common interest that you may wish to raise, as we launch our negotiating teams into perhaps the most important negotiation of the postwar years in the field of arms control and disarmament.

We share, of course, your understanding that it is essential for both of us to make every effort to create the most favorable climate for these talks.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
A. N. Kossygin  
Chairman of the Presidium of the  
USSR Council of Ministers  
Moscow

Thursday, July 25, 1968  
7:00 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~SENSITIVE~~  
~~LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the official translation of the message to you from Kosygin. You will note that the marked passages give us a chance, in response:

- to propose an alternative to Geneva, if we are so minded;
- to lock up a firm date;
- to make any observations that you might wish to make on other international issues; for example, Vietnam, the Middle East, the PUEBLO, etc.

Until we are a bit surer that we're not going to have a war in Central Europe over Czechoslovakia, however, you may not wish to lock on to a firm date. But we should know in the next several days.

Before leaving tomorrow night, I shall file with you and Sect. Rusk such contribution as I can make to the draft response.

W. W. Rostow

TOP SECRET attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-27  
By ing NARA Date 8-20-96

~~TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE-LITERALLY~~  
~~EYES ONLY~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

58d

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13291, Sec. 3.4  
By SP/CM NARA Date 12-21-99

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO.  
T-103/R-XVIII  
Russian

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

Dear Mr. President:

There is already an understanding between our governments to enter in the near future into discussions on the curbing of the strategic arms race.

My colleagues and I attach great importance to the negotiations on this question. After all, in substance we are dealing with one of the greatest problems of disarmament discussed during the last 20 odd years.

The comprehensive limitation and then also a reduction of both the offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and the systems of defense against ballistic missiles would be in the interest of our two countries, and not of our countries alone. The successful outcome of such negotiations would create favorable conditions for the solution of other major questions in the field of disarmament.

Nor is it a matter of indifference to our two countries, we believe, that strategic arms limitation would result in a great saving of the funds now being expended for such purposes.

We have no doubt that you are now considering, just as we are, all the aspects of this problem. We believe that, within one or one-and-a-half months, representatives of both our countries could begin exchanging views on this question.

In our opinion, Geneva could be a suitable place for the negotiations. A specific date for the negotiations could be agreed upon subsequently and we would welcome receiving your views on this matter.

TOP SECRET/NODIS

- 2 -

Of course, I must tell you frankly that no matter how a solution to the problem of curbing the strategic arms race is approached, it cannot be considered separately from the whole international situation, from the tension in the world today. I think that you also, Mr. President, understand this full well. Therefore, it is essential to make every effort to create the most favorable conditions for the success of negotiations on this exceptionally important problem.

Respectfully,

A. Kosygin

Moscow,  
July 25, 1968

TOP SECRET/NODIS

CERTIFICATION OF TRANSLATION

I hereby certify that the above translation bearing NS No. \_\_\_\_\_ was prepared by the Division of Language Services of the Department of State and that it is a correct translation to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Dated:

JUL 25 1968

Marcelle F. Moorheide

Acting Chief, Translating Branch

the

the

the



## INFORMATION

Friday, July 26, 1968 -- 4:50 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

I believe that Sec. Rusk has suggested Bill Bowdler as one candidate for the San Salvador Ambassadorial post. He would obviously be a first-class ambassador. He could stay with us until November, since Raul Castro is not going to La Paz, I understand, until close to October 1; and a gap of a month or so would be viable in San Salvador.

The case for letting Bill do this is that San Salvador is, I believe, the last open Embassy in Latin America for the foreseeable future.

The case against is obvious. Bill is a first-rate White House officer in every respect.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

## INFORMATION

*For file*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, July 26, 1968 -- 4:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the report on encouraging progress in pacification during June, referred to at Honolulu.

July should also be good, due to low level of military activity.

August may get a bit rough, although the May attacks on Saigon did not prevent some slight over-all progress, with setbacks only in areas close to Saigon.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Conf. Room, Feb. 24, 1993  
By *rg*, NADA, Date *9-8-92*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlm



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12353, Sec 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1938

By sg NARA Date 9-8-92

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RUEAIIA/CIA  
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE  
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BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L 21655 OSD FOR SA; JCS FOR SACSA;  
CINCPAC FOR J555

SUBJECT: PACIFICATION STATUS, JUNE 1968 (U)

1. (C) JUNE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM (HES) DATA INDICATES CONTINUED RECOVERY IN PACIFICATION FROM THE POST TET LOW. WITH SOME NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS, VC/NVA MILITARY ACTIVITY DECLINED WITH A RESULTANT INCREASE IN TERRITORIAL SECURITY. ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRESS IS CLOSELY RELATED TO THIS INCREASED TERRITORIAL SECURITY.
2. (C) THE INCREASE OF 1.3% IN RELATIVELY SECURE POPULATION (HES CATEGORIES A, B AND C) WAS THE GREATEST MONTHLY INCREASE IN 1968.

~~PAGE RUHUNFA 4890 CONFIDENTIAL~~

THIS INCREASE BROUGHT THE RELATIVELY SECURE POPULATION TO A REPORTED 63.3% OF THE COUNTRYWIDE POPULATION OF 17,342,200. TOTAL RECOVERY IN THIS CATEGORY IS 3.5% FROM POST TET LOWS. IT IS STILL 3.9% BELOW THE JANUARY HIGH OF 67.2%.

3. (C) IN JUNE, CONTESTED POPULATION DECLINED (IN A FAVORABLE SENSE) 0.9% TO 19.4% OF THE COUNTRYWIDE POPULATION. CONTESTED POPULATION WAS 16.3% IN JANUARY AND 22% FOLLOWING TET. RECOVERY OF CONTESTED POPULATION TO THE RELATIVELY SECURE CATEGORY DURING THE POST TET PERIOD IS 2.6%.

4. (C) COUNTRY-WIDE VC CONTROLLED POPULATION DECLINED 0.3% TO 17.3% AS OF 30 JUNE. THIS IS A RECOVERY OF 1.0% SINCE THE POST TET HIGH OF 18.3%.

5. (C) GIVEN THE PRESENT TEMPO OF MILITARY AND CIVIC ACTION, IT APPEARS THAT MOMENTUM IS NOW BUILDING IN PACIFICATION. WHILE DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENTS CANNOT BE FORECAST, GVN AND US PACIFICATION PROGRAMS SEEM TO BE EFFECTING DESIRABLE CHANGE.

6. (C) IN ANALYZING PROGRESS ON A CORPS BASIS, IV CORPS ADDED ALMOST 113,000 PEOPLE TO THE RELATIVELY SECURE CATEGORY WHILE VC CONTROLLED POPULATION DECLINED BY ABOUT 28,000. THIS REPRESENTS THE BEST CORPS IMPROVEMENT IN THESE CATEGORIES.

~~PAGE 3 RUMHFA 4893 CONFIDENTIAL~~

7. (C) SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WAS NOTED IN I CORPS WITH ABOUT 67,000 PEOPLE ADDED TO THE RELATIVELY SECURE CATEGORY WHILE VC CONTROLLED POPULATION DECLINED BY MORE THAN 20,000.

8. (C) III CORPS JUNE PACIFICATION PROGRESS APPEARS LESS IMPRESSIVE. THIS IS DUE PRIMARILY TO CONTINUED ENEMY ACTION IN GIA DINH DURING THE FIRST WEEK IN JUNE. NEVERTHELESS, IN GIA DINH ALONE, 53,00 PEOPLE WERE ADDED TO THE RELATIVELY SECURE CATEGORY; A REVERSAL OF LOSSES OF SIMILAR PROPORTIONS IN MAY.

9. (C) IN CONSIDERING SECURITY EVALUATIONS ABOVE, THE EFFECT OF DIMINISHED VC/NVA ACTIVITY DURING JUNE ARE APPARENT. COUNTRY-WIDE ALMOST 350,000 PEOPLE MOVED INTO THE RELATIVELY SECURE CATEGORY FROM CONTESTED.

~~YET MEASURES FOR RURAL POPULATION SEPARATE FROM URBAN ARE NOT~~

11. (C) WHILE SECURITY EVALUATIONS ADDED 1.7% OF SOUTH VIETNAM'S POPULATION TO THE HES A, B, OR C CATEGORIES, DEVELOPMENT EVALUATIONS ADDED ONLY 1.4% TO THESE CATEGORIES. THIS REPRESENTS A GENERALLY SLOWER ACCELERATION OF DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS ARE HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON THE SECURITY OF THE SITUATION AND NORMALLY LAG THE SECURITY INDICATORS IN RATE OF CHANGE.

~~PAGE 4 RUMHFA 4893 CONFIDENTIAL~~

12. (C) THE CONCLUSIONS TO THIS INITIAL ANALYSIS ARE (1) PACIFICATION PROGRESS IS GAINING MOMENTUM, (2) PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION INCREASES WHEN THE TEMPO OF VC/NVA MILITARY ACTIVITY DECLINES, AND (3) CONTINUATION AND REINFORCEMENT OF THE MOMENTUM NOW ACQUIRED DEPENDS LARGELY ON STABILIZATION X (OR AN INCREASE IN) TERRITORIAL SECURITY.

GP-4

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

61

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, July 26, 1968  
4:30 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith evidence that our pilots have been delayed a further week in Hanoi. The next ICC plane to Vientiane is, I believe, Thursday, August 1.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 95-249  
By lig, NARA, Date 1-30-96

WWRostow:rlh

62

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, July 26, 1968 -- 2:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Herewith preliminary facts on Communist terrorist attack on our air base at Udorn.

"Ambassador Unger advises that about 10:30 p.m. local time the air base at Udorn was attacked by Communist terrorists with the following results: one aircraft destroyed, one aircraft damaged, one truck destroyed, four U.S. personnel wounded, one enemy killed. It is impossible to advise just who the attackers were; it is estimated the group was not larger than about ten.

"The incident appears to be all over. Aircraft are dropping flares in an effort to locate terrorists who have dispersed but not much success is expected from this. The other bases have all been alerted and 7th and 13th Air Force informed.

"The Ambassador would appreciate it if Washington 'would stay off their backs' while they get further facts together and report them to us."

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 91-528  
By ju, NARA, Date 2-3-93

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



63

~~SECRET~~

Friday, July 26, 1968, 2:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Free file*

SUBJECT: Appointment with Richard Nixon, Friday, July 26, 6:00 P.M.

Secretary Rusk will join you at 6:00 P.M. when former Vice President Nixon will call. As of now the appointment is "off the record."

Attached is Under Secretary Katzenbach's summary of the briefing given to Mr. Nixon by Government officials last Friday, July 19. It gives significant Nixon reaction to the briefing which you may want to read again before today's appointment even though you saw it in telegraphic form in Honolulu.

At the end of the briefing you may wish to agree with Mr. Nixon as to what, if any, statement is to be made to the Press in the event that the appointment becomes known to reporters.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *rg*, NARA, Date 9-8-92

~~SECRET~~

63a

~~SECRET~~

## BRIEFING OF FORMER VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, JULY 19

Mr. Nixon was briefed by Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach, Acting Secretary of Defense Nitze, Acting Director of CIA Taylor and Air Force Chief of Staff McConnell, Acting for Joint Chief of Staff Chairman Wheeler. The following subjects were covered: a. Czechoslovakian situation; b. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe including U.S. troop level; d. Middle East; e. Vietnam

Significant reactions of Mr. Nixon to the briefing are as follows:

- a. Czechoslovakia --
  - 1. Nixon asked who was pushing liberalization, how far we thought the Soviets would go toward intervention and what the effects of events in Czechoslovakia would be on Eastern Europe and the USSR.
  - 2. Mr. Nixon was surprised when the chances of Soviet intervention were rated at one in four or one in three. He seemed to understand the reasons for our public silence throughout the crisis.
- b. USSR and Eastern Europe--this subject is one of Nixon's primary interests.
- c. Western Europe and Troop Issue--
  - 1. Mr. Nixon asked about the Administration's position on U.S. troops in Europe.
  - 2. Under Secretary Katzenbach said we are standing firm against pressures to cut.
  - 3. Mr. Nixon said he agreed with this position because: -- There were military reasons against reductions;-- we should get something for any cuts. He said, however, "that from a political point of view pressures were clearly on the side of getting the hell out."
- d. Middle East --
  - 1. Mr. Nixon asked what the Soviets wanted out of their involvement in the Middle East. He said he recognized the Soviets were not out to communize the Middle East but that the area always presents

**DECLASSIFIED**

**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLJ 95-251**

~~SECRET~~

By ig, NARA Date 9-20-96

~~SECRET~~

real possibility for Soviet-U.S. confrontation. He also agreed that the presence of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean had increased the risk factor of such confrontation.

- e. Vietnam -- Mr. Nixon was particularly interested in our estimate of the present political and military situation. He asked repeatedly why so many, particularly on the Hill, who had previously supported the war effort were now saying that the war is lost.

Under Secretary Katzenbach felt that the group was able to reassure Mr. Nixon that the war is going well and that the Saigon government is in good political shape.

Mr. Nixon asked if the question of the participation of the Viet Cong in the Government of Vietnam was negotiable at Paris and whether there was any immediate prospect of withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam. He also asked "if we had made any yardage" in the negotiations in Paris. Under Secretary Katzenbach told him that we had not made any yardage but neither had we lost any. Ambassadors Harriman and Vance are not discouraged for prospects of a negotiated settlement.

Mr. Nixon made a forceful statement in support of sticking it out in Vietnam. He said, "you all know my position. I am not a hawk who wants to bring about the overthrow of North Vietnam." He went on to say he felt strongly that if we pulled out, it would "pull the plug" in all of Southeast Asia. He said he was very worried about current attitudes in the U.S., and that there was great danger that in coming campaign both political parties would take positions not in the national interest.

Nixon asked about the Soviet role in Vietnam, and Soviet willingness to let Hanoi's effort in the south fail. He recognized there is a difference between Soviet interest in maintaining the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as an independent state and Soviet willingness to see the Democratic Republic of Vietnam fail in South Vietnam.

He also asked how the Japanese have reacted privately to U.S. efforts in Vietnam.

Speaking to Under Secretary Katzenbach privately, Nixon said Vietnam was "a test of the will and guts of the American people. What troubles me is that I am not certain that we can meet the test, and we must."

~~SECRET~~

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Friday, July 26, 1968  
1:00 p. m.

*Pres. file*

*64*

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

I have marked the key passages in this interesting and heartening account by Bunker of the impact in Vietnam of the Honolulu meeting.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (Saigon 33628)

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *rg*, NARA, Date *9-8-92*



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-248

Friday, July 26, 1968

By lip, NARA, Date 6-25-96

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 33628)

Since the major action of the past week took place in Honolulu preceded by the visit of Secretary Clifford and General Wheeler here (and since the situation here has been relatively calm and uneventful), there is hardly material for my regular weekly message. Instead, I thought it would be useful to send you a brief message giving my estimate of the reaction here to the Honolulu meeting.

Since my return to Saigon I have tried to get a general feel for the reaction here to the Honolulu meeting and the resulting communique. Overall, the reaction appears to be very favorable. Judging from the comments of officials and various opinion leaders as well as local press reports, there was a widespread expectation that Honolulu might produce some important and rather unpalatable changes in our joint policies. The strong and unqualified reaffirmation of our support for South Vietnam, plus the statement about the Government of Vietnam role in the peace negotiations, appear to have come as a very welcome surprise.

I have seen Thieu twice since he returned and on both occasions he observed that the meeting had gone very well, and he was happy with everything about it. He noted that he had called in twenty influential members of the Assembly, committee Chairmen and bloc leaders, just before leaving for Honolulu in order to "ask them what they wanted him to say to President Johnson". On his return he saw them again almost immediately (and before his press conference), and said that their reaction had been one of approval and pleasure. Noting that Vietnamese press comment was almost universally favorable, Thieu said he believes the meeting will put to rest many of the suspicions that have troubled the nationalists here.

Thieu expressed much the same sentiments in a press conference on his return from Honolulu. In opening his remarks, Thieu said that you had agreed with his policies, and he stressed the communique pledge that the U. S. will support and assist the Vietnamese as long as our aid is wanted and needed. He went over the communique in detail, in effect translating it into Vietnamese for his audience; he plainly regarded it as a considerable triumph and wanted everyone to understand what it meant. His manner was confident and relaxed; as one daily paper put it, he had the air of a winner.

Foreign Minister Thanh appeared on TV July 23 to answer questions about the conference and the communique. The first question reflected what has been the foremost fear of many here -- the question being simply, "Will the U. S. force a coalition government on Vietnam?" Thanh quoted directly from the communique, then emphasized that it was the President of the United States who had made that statement, not a Senator or a candidate for office. Thanh stressed the assurance

that the U. S. will continue its support and assistance to the people and government of Vietnam as long as such aid is needed and desired. He also made much of the fact that the U. S. has publicly agreed that the Government of Vietnam should play a major role in the negotiations leading to a settlement. He presented this as a decided success for the Government of Vietnam.

Both in a public statement and in a private conversation I had with him, Senator Huynh Van Cao (Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee) characterized the conference as a great success. Similar remarks were made by Ministers Vu Quoc Thuc and Huynh Van Cao in private conversations with Embassy officers. Prominent Chinese businessmen have told us that they believe Thieu returned from the conference with greater strength and prestige. Several of my diplomatic colleagues have also told me of the widely favorable Vietnamese reaction they have encountered.

With only one important exception, the local press has interpreted the meeting and the communique as an important achievement for Thieu. A number of papers note that the communique and public statements made at Honolulu contain nothing new, but they find great encouragement in the restatement of American support. Tu Do, for example, wrote that "now the Vietnamese people have more confidence in the American leaders, and realize that the disturbing statements of certain U. S. politicians do not affect the basic policy of the United States in Vietnam."

Some Vietnamese find the communique and the meeting literally too good to be true. Senator Tran Van Lam, for example, said privately that the communique is so good that a number of Vietnamese think it can't be true. Former Youth Minister and prominent young southern leader Vo Long Trieu asked bluntly if he could believe in the communique. When one of our officers responded by pointing out that it was signed by two presidents, Trieu said he felt as if someone had given him a very large sum of money -- and he couldn't figure out what might lie behind the gift or even if it was really true.

Some have focused on particular parts of the communique to express reservations. The influential daily Chinh Luan, for example, has expressed grave doubts about the formulation "full participation in political activities to all individuals and members of groups who agreed to renounce force and to abide by the constitution of Vietnam." The editors of the paper see this phrase as a "set-back or, in clearer terms, a major failure" for the policy of the Government of Vietnam. Lower House Deputy Huynh Ngoc Anh told Embassy officers that he is very doubtful about the one man, one vote idea. His concern reflected that of some others who do not entirely understand the formula and are worried about how it may be applied in the future. (Foreign Minister Thanh, in his July 23 TV interview on the conference, explained it primarily in terms of the Chieu Hoi and national reconciliation programs.)

In spite of the doubters -- and Vietnam is a nation of men from Missouri -- I think it is fair to say that the Honolulu meeting and communique were a much appreciated and needed shot in the arm for the Republic. Thieu has been personally strengthened and vindicated in his policy. The wind has been taken out of extremist sails for the

moment; they have nothing to demonstrate about. The nation as a whole is reassured about our intentions and steadfastness. Although this may seem to some quarters in the U. S. as not required, it is most needed psychologically to these people who have been let down before in their long struggle for freedom. While the meeting did not per se solve our problems here, it should make solutions more possible. Thieu's increased prestige and stature should give him somewhat more flexibility and room for maneuver when we get to substantive negotiations for a settlement.



Pres file  
65

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 95-2K9

Friday, July 26, 1968  
11:15 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT: By sig, NARA, Date 1-30-96

You asked me yesterday: Do you think they are serious in Paris?

My short answer was: Yes. But it may be helpful if I set down where I would guess Hanoi now stands with respect to peacemaking -- emphasizing that this is only one man's guess and I could be wrong.

### 1. Military Situation

I do not believe Hanoi regards its military posture as stable for the long pull. If they mount major attacks they must count on taking very high casualties and increasingly North Vietnamese casualties. Although such ~~an~~ <sup>attack</sup> may have political and psychological effects in Saigon and in Washington they cannot count on even a maximum military effort being decisive. On the other hand, if they fall back to low levels of attritional warfare, as in 1967, they must count on a progressive extension of GVN control over the country. It was that fact which led them to abandon attritional warfare and go for broke starting at Tet 1968.

Therefore, I believe they are playing for the best end of the war they can bring about in the next 6-12 months. They regard their best hopes for a substantial achievement of their objectives to be in the politics of Saigon and Washington. They regard their military actions as a means of affecting the politics of Saigon and Washington.

### 2. Politics in Saigon

I do not believe they have abandoned hope that they can break the Thieu government, create a loose or chaotic political situation in Saigon and insert, somehow, men they control into key spots. But I believe they are somewhat discouraged by the relative success of Thieu in moving forward towards a stable government. The critical decision that they must make is whether they finally decide that the only way to end the war is to negotiate with Thieu's government. They have not made that decision. If they make it, they must accept the likelihood that they will not get better terms than those offered in the Honolulu communique and in your TV statement of December 19 just before you went to Canberra. Arguing for an early decision are two possibilities:

- if they delay, it is conceivable that the Thieu government will gather strength, legitimacy, and public support with the passage of time. It could be a substantially stronger government next spring than it is now.



- equally important is the likelihood that the ARVN will be bigger, better equipped, and more confident next spring than it is now. Armed forces of a million men in South Vietnam, with the possibility of further re-equipment with tanks, helicopters, aircraft, etc., is not attractive from a straight North Vietnamese point of view.

Arguing against a decision to accept the Honolulu communique terms and the legitimacy of the GVN are:

- the hope that the Thieu government will break either from the pressures of internal Vietnamese politics or because of strains in the US-GVN relationship.
- but most important of all in postponing a decision is the hope that U.S. political life will either yield a Mendes-France (e.g., McCarthy), or that fears of this trend in the United States will produce a hardline coup in Saigon which would open the way to political turmoil, etc.

Therefore, of the three key elements in Hanoi's equation (the military situation, the politics of Saigon, and the politics of Washington) I believe U. S. politics remains the ultimate focus of their thought and action.

### 3. U. S. Politics

With respect to U. S. politics, they are examining both trends in public opinion and the candidates. I am inclined to think that if McCarthy is not nominated by the Democrats, they will judge that time is running against them in terms of the military situation and developments in South Vietnam and that they had better negotiate seriously. That is why I am inclined to agree with Thieu and Ky that September could be the month in which negotiations get serious. If McCarthy is nominated, I would assume they would await the election in November. If they proceed with the mid-August third offensive it will be, on this view, primarily to try to shake American public opinion and influence the Democratic convention.

Therefore, preparing the American press and media for this mid-August offensive -- and trying to assure that we do not get a reaction like that after Tet -- could be critically important if (I repeat) if this chain of thought is correct.

4. I will do a memorandum during the day setting out my thoughts on how the press and the public might be prepared for the third offensive.

cc: Lusk  
Clifford

W. W. Rostow

Friday, July 26, 1968  
10:00 a. m.

66

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

I have rarely enjoyed a session more than the exposition at lunch yesterday on the LBJ Library and School by yourself, Joe, and Arthur.

May I make a suggestion? At this stage -- especially for money raising -- it is necessary and proper to focus on the direct contribution to be made to quality of public service by the Library and the School.

In fact, I believe two things will happen and should happen:

- the presence of the Library and the School should stimulate throughout the University of Texas greater interest in and expanded recruits for public service; notably from the schools of law, business and social science;
- a higher proportion of University of Texas contribution to public service in top posts (rather than in permanent civil service) will come from the regular graduate schools. If for no other reason, this will be so because elected officials need to have a profession to fall back on if they lose an election; and law remains probably the best platform from which to take the gallant risks of elective office.

In expounding the future of the enterprise, therefore, you may wish to give somewhat more attention to the total effect and total contribution of the Library and School.

I am more than ever convinced that in the years ahead the University of Texas will be one of the really exciting places in the country.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, July 26, 1968 -- 9:55 a.m.

*Free file*

Mr. President:

You may wish to thumb through this recent CIA report of activities in North Vietnam: economic, repair, imports, traffic movements, etc.

On page 4 is a table of truck sightings in recent weeks, with figures for destroyed and damaged. You will note the rather heartening percentage of destroyed and damaged in the past two weeks -- running nearer 30% than 20%.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 95-251  
By 48, NARA Date 9-20-96

~~TOP SECRET~~

Cy 1 -- SC 10308/68, Intelligence Memo: Recent Activities in North Vietnam.  
Cy 1 -- SC 11776/68 -- Memorandum: Preliminary Assessment of Giant Scale Mission Flown on 18 July 1968

WWRostow:rlh

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INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, July 26, 1968 -- 9:55 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

If you have time, this is a cool, well balanced assessment of the gains and losses on both sides in the Communist winter-spring campaign, done by a staff officer of the CIA in Saigon, with a clear head and an ability to write. There is a brief summary on the first two pages.

The report suggests that both sides have gained and lost: the final outcome will be determined by how each side proceeds in the months ahead.

W. W. Rostow

TDCS315/11037-68  
12 July 1968

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Authority NLS-CBS 23

By isa, NARS, Date 6-29-84

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WWRostow:rlm



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IN 48261 *68a*

Case # NLJ *95250*  
Document # *480*

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STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF) JCS ARMY NAVY AIR CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SOO ONE CRS  
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*EXO DD1*

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE *[REDACTED]*

DIST 12 JULY 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

*12 22 15z Jul 68*

DOI 11 JULY 1968

SUBJECT SITUATION APPRAISAL:

*Ristor*  
**1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)**

THE VIET CONG WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON

FIELD NO. *[REDACTED]*

SOURCE A STAFF OFFICER OF THIS ORGANIZATION. THIS *[REDACTED]* APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT SITUATION *[REDACTED]* IS NOT AN OFFICIAL JUDGEMENT BY THIS AGENCY OR ANY COMPONENT. IT REPRESENTS THE OBSERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF A STAFF OFFICER BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO HIM AT THE TIME OF PREPARATION.

SUMMARY. THE ENEMY'S WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN, COVERING, THE PERIOD OCTOBER TO JUNE, CAME TO AN END WITH THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE MOMENTUM BLUNTED AND MOST OF ITS MAJOR OBJECTIVES UNACHIEVED. ITS SHIFT IN STRATEGY FROM A PROTRACTED WAR TO ONE SEEKING A QUICK VICTORY IN THE URBAN AREAS WAS AN

Approved for Release *15* JUL 1998  
Date *[REDACTED]*

**1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)**

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(classification)

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(dissem controls)

SANITIZED

Authority *NLS 019-0381-3*  
By *[Signature]* NARA, Date *1-9-02*

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EFFORT TO REVERSE UNFAVORABLE MILITARY AND POLITICAL TRENDS WHICH HAD DEVELOPED PRIOR TO MID-1967. THE CAMPAIGN, WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE LED TO A DECISIVE VICTORY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED GOVERNMENT, WAS BASED ON A MISCALCULATION BY THE ENEMY OF ITS OWN AND ALLIED MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT IT WOULD GET FROM THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. THE ATTACKS ON THE CITIES, HIGH-LIGHTED BY THE TET OFFENSIVE, WERE DISASTROUS FOR THE ENEMY IN TERMS OF MANPOWER BUT GAVE IT AN IMPRESSIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY. DESPITE THE MILITARY SETBACK, THE CAMPAIGN YIELDED SOME SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL GAINS, INCLUDING AN EXTENSION OF VIET CONG (VC) CONTROL OVER RURAL AREAS AND POPULATION, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A RUDIMENTARY GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE. THE VC APPEAR TO HAVE LOST GROUND IN THE CONTEST FOR THE ALLEGIANCE OF THE PEOPLE, WHILE THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM HAS BEEN STIMULATED TO IMPROVE ITS EFFECTIVENESS AND ITS IMAGE, AND STRENGTHEN AND IMPROVE ITS ARMED FORCES. BOTH SIDES HAVE ACHIEVED SUCCESSES AND FAILURES. INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE ENEMY INTENDS TO PURSUE THE SAME STRATEGY DURING THE FORTH-COMING SUMMER-AUTUMN CAMPAIGN. END SUMMARY.

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1. THE VC WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN, WHICH CAME IN LIKE A LION WITH THE ONSLAUGHTS AGAINST LOC NINH AND DAK TO LAST FALL, WENT OUT LIKE A LAMB AS THE CAMPAIGN ENDED IN JUNE WITH THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE MOMENTUM BLUNTED AND VIETNAM WITNESSING THE LOWEST LEVEL OF ENEMY MILITARY ACTIVITY SO FAR THIS YEAR. THE ENEMY HAD PROMISED ITS CADRES THAT THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN (OCTOBER - JUNE) WAS TO BE THE GREAT FINAL EFFORT THAT WOULD BRING A DECISIVE VICTORY TO THE VC, CAUSE A GENERAL UPRISING AGAINST THE GVN AND RESULT IN NEGOTIATIONS, A COALITION GOVERNMENT DOMINATED BY THE VC, AND PEACE. IT DID ACHIEVE A PARTIAL BOMBING HALT AND NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THEY ARE TAKING PLACE UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH ARE PROBABLY A FAR CRY FROM THOSE THE ENEMY HAD ENVISAGED, THAT IS, THE GVN COLLAPSED, ARVN SUBVERTED, AND THE U.S. READY AND EAGER TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM VIETNAM. YET DESPITE THE FAILURE TO ACHIEVE ITS STATED OBJECTIVES WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM, THE ENEMY SCORED A MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY ABROAD BY IMPARTING AN IMPRESSION OF STRENGTH AND SUPPORT BEYOND THAT WHICH IT ACTUALLY POSSESSES. IT ALSO SUCCEEDED IN DEPRIVING THE GVN OF ITS CONTROL OVER LARGE NUMBERS OF THE RURAL PEOPLE AND IN PLANTING SOME POLITICAL

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SEEDS WHICH MAY YET SPROUT AND JUSTIFY ITS STAGGERING LOSSES IN MILITARY MANPOWER.

2. THE MILITARY SIDE OF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN REMARKABLE FOR ITS AUDACIOUS, GRANDIOSE OBJECTIVES AND THE ENEMY'S ATTEMPTS TO ACCOMPLISH THEM. THE ENEMY'S MILITARY ACTIONS DURING THE CAMPAIGN WERE ROOTED IN THE PLANS LAID BY HANOI LAST YEAR AND WERE BASED, NOT ON A FEELING OF DESPERATION, BUT ON A MISCALCULATION AND MISAPPRECIATION OF ITS OWN AND ALLIED MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND OF THE SUPPORT THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WOULD GIVE IT. ITS DOCUMENTS REVEAL THAT IT OVERESTIMATED ITS BENEFIT FROM THE WAR-WEARINESS OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND AMERICAN PEOPLE, THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE GVN AND THE U.S., AND THE SPLIT IN THE GVN LEADERSHIP. THE ENEMY CITED NUMEROUS OTHER FAVORABLE FACTORS FOR BELIEVING THAT THE WAR COULD BE CONCLUDED WITH A "DECISIVE VICTORY." IT WAS CORRECT IN ITS ASSESSMENT, HOWEVER, THAT ON NEITHER THE POLITICAL NOR THE MILITARY FRONTS WERE THINGS GOING WELL ENOUGH FOR IT AND THAT A CHANGE IN STRATEGY WAS NECESSARY.

3. ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY HAD RECEIVED GLOWING REPORTS OF

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"VICTORIES" IN SOUTH VIETNAM, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ITS ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION WAS BASED SOLELY ON FAVORABLE FACTORS. IT WAS AWARE THAT ITS LOSSES IN THE SOUTH WERE HEAVY AND INCREASING. IT PROBABLY CHANGED ITS STRATEGY WITH THE REALIZATION THAT IT COULD NOT ENDURE THE WAR OF ATTRITION AS IT HAD DEVELOPED SINCE THE SUMMER OF 1965 AND THAT AN EXTRAORDINARY EFFORT HAD TO BE MADE TO REVERSE UNFAVORABLE POLITICAL AND MILITARY TRENDS. THIS REQUIRED A CHANGE IN EARLIER POLICY DIRECTIVES WHICH HAD ASSERTED THAT WHILE THE VC HAD THE CAPABILITY TO EXPLOIT A MASS REVOLT IN PREPARATION FOR THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE, PROTRACTED WAR WAS REALLY THE BY-WORD. A LATER RESOLUTION ALSO CONTAINED THE GUIDELINE OF THE PROTRACTED STRUGGLE WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF A GENERAL OFFENSIVE AND GENERAL UPRISING, THE NEW THEMES OF "FIGHTING WHILE NEGOTIATING" AND "ACHIEVING VICTORY IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME" APPEARED.

4. THE FINAL MILITARY PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN WERE BASED ON A NEW RESOLUTION PROBABLY FORMULATED IN THE SUMMER OF 1967. IT MARKED A RADICAL SHIFT IN STRATEGY AND A DEPARTURE FROM DOCTRINE BY CALLING FOR A "GENERAL OFFENSIVE AND GENERAL

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UPRISING" WITHIN THE TIME FRAME OF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN, AND IT SPELLED OUT THE IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES OF ATTAINING A "CONDITIONED" COALITION GOVERNMENT AND FORCING THE U.S. TO WITHDRAW FROM SOUTH VIETNAM. THE RESOLUTION ORDERED THE "LIBERATION" OF THE URBAN AREAS, GIAP'S PHASE III, WHICH ACCORDING TO DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT BE ATTEMPTED UNTIL THE RURAL AREAS HAD BEEN SECURED AND SUPERIORITY OF FORCES HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. THE ENEMY APPARANTLY HAD DECIDED IN MID-1967 THAT THE TIME WAS RIPE TO BEGIN A DIRECT ATTACK AGAINST THE GVN RATHER THAN CONTINUE THE TIME-CONSUMING, POORLY REWARDING APPLICATION OF THE "PEOPLE'S WAR" DOCTRINE.

5. ONCE THE DECISION WAS MADE, INTENSIVE PREPARATIONS WERE UNDERTAKEN IN ALL FIELDS. EXTENSIVE INDOCTRINATION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE AND DECISIVENESS OF THE CAMPAIGN. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS REFLECT AN ENTHUSIASTIC REACTION TO THE PROSPECT OF THIS BEING THE "LAST CAMPAIGN" AND AN APPARENT BELIEF THAT THE VC WERE CAPABLE OF INFLECTING UNACCEPTABLE LOSSES ON FRIENDLY FORCES, FRUSTRATING THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM, AND GAINING A POSITION OF STRENGTH FROM WHICH TO NEGOTIATE IF A FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED ITSELF.

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THE IMPROVEMENT AND CONSTRUCTION OF ROADS IN LAOS AND THE BORDER AREAS ENLARGED AND SPEEDED THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY TO MOVE MEN AND MATERIEL INTO AND THROUGH SOUTH VIETNAM IN SUPPORT OF ITS FORCES. INTENSIVE RECRUITING COMPLEMENTED INFILTRATION AND, CONCURRENTLY, THE REORGANIZATION OF COMMAND STRUCTURES PROVIDED THE MECHANISM FOR ABSORBING THE NEW RECRUITS, INCOMING INFILTRATORS AND UPGRADED GUERRILLAS. THIS REORGANIZATION ALSO RESULTED IN A CONSOLIDATION OF LOCAL UNITS AND PROVIDED IMPROVED COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION.

6. DURING 1965 AND 1966, ALLIED FORCES HAD BEEN ABLE TO SLOW THE ENEMY'S MOMENTUM OF 1963-65 WHICH HAD NECESSITATED THE LARGE U.S. MILITARY COMMITMENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM. UPON COMPLETION OF THE CONSTRUCTION, CONSOLIDATION AND ORGANIZATION WHICH WAS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE ADDITIONAL FORCES, THE ALLIES WERE ABLE TO MOVE ON THE OFFENSIVE. DURING THE SPRING AND SUMMER OF 1967 CONSTANT PRESSURE WAS MAINTAINED ON THE ENEMY. IN NUMEROUS CASES THE ENEMY'S FORMERLY SACROSANCT BASE AREAS WERE VIOLATED BY AGGRESSIVE ALLIED OPERATIONS. THE ENEMY GENERALLY OBSERVED ECONOMY OF FORCES TACTICS DURING THE PERIOD AS IT AVOIDED MAJOR CONTACTS AND CONCENTRATED ITS EFFORTS

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ON ATTACKS BY FIRE AND HARASSING ACTIVITIES. WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN ITS TACTICS CHANGED AS IT LAUNCHED LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS IN ALL CORPS. ITS ACTIVITIES WERE CONSISTENT WITH ITS CAMPAIGN PLANS AND WERE USUALLY WELL-PLANNED, COORDINATED, AND OFTEN EXECUTED SIMULTANEOUSLY IN WIDELY DISPERSED AREAS, WITH THE NEWLY FORMED COMMAND STRUCTURES ALLOWING FOR BETTER CONTROL OF LOCAL AND MAIN FORCES.

7. ONCE THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN WAS LAUNCHED, A PATTERN OF ATTACKS OF INCREASING SCOPE, INTENSITY AND MAGNITUDE GRADUALLY DEVELOPED. THE ENEMY ATTACKED TARGETS PREVIOUSLY IGNORED, WITH LARGER FORCES AND FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME. IN OCTOBER IT LOST OVER 800 TROOPS WITH NO MILITARY GAIN AT LOC NINH. IN NOVEMBER, ALTHOUGH IT TOOK A LARGER TOLL OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE MOUNTAIN JUNGLES AROUND DAK TO, THE BATTLE COST IT OVER 1,200 KILLED. ITS LOSSES DURING THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF THE CAMPAIGN WERE ABOUT 22,000 KILLED, WHILE THE ALLIES LOST 6,300. ITS MASSING OF FORCES FOR LARGE ATTACKS EMPHASIZED THE ALLIES' GREAT ADVANTAGE IN FIREPOWER. A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF THE ENEMY'S LOSSES RESULTED FROM AIR AND ARTILLERY FIRE, WHICH CONSTANTLY PRE-EMPTED ITS PLANS. IN EX-

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CHANGE FOR ITS LOSSES DURING THIS PERIOD, IT INFLICTED ONLY MODERATE DAMAGE. WITH ITS LIMITED SUCCESSES COMING AT THE EXPENSE OF ISOLATED OUTPOSTS, HAMLETS AND VILLAGES. THESE, OF COURSE, WERE PROPAGANDIZED TO THE FULLEST EXTENT TO ASSIST IN RECRUITING AND IMPROVING MORALE AS THE ENEMY PREPARED FOR THE NEXT PHASE OF THE CAMPAIGN - TET.

8. CAPITALIZING ON THE TET TRUCE TO GAIN THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE THE ENEMY, IN AN UNPRECEDENTED DESECRATION OF THE SACRED HOLIDAYS, LAUNCHED THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE THAT IT BELIEVED, AND HAD SO INFORMED ITS CADRES, WOULD LEAD TO A GENERAL UPRISING, THE TOPPLING OF THE GVN, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT UNDER ITS CONTROL. ITS RELATIVELY WELL-PLANNED, COORDINATED ATTACKS WERE AN IMPRESSIVE DISPLAY OF STRENGTH WHICH TEMPORARILY, AT LEAST, GAVE IT A MAJOR PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY AT HOME AND ABROAD AND CREATED SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR THE ALLIES. FROM A STRAIGHT MILITARY VIEWPOINT THE TET OFFENSIVE WAS A DISASTER FOR THE ENEMY. IT FAILED TO ACHIEVE ITS GOALS AND LOST HEAVILY IN MANPOWER - OVER 72,000 KILLED DURING THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF THE YEAR AGAINST ALLIED LOSSES OF 10,700. THE LOSS OF ITS TRAINED, MIDDLE-LEVEL COMMANDERS

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AND SOME OF ITS POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE WAS A SERIOUS SETBACK. AFTER ITS INITIAL ASSAULTS ON THE CITIES HAD BEEN REPULSED IT CONTINUED TO LOSE HEAVILY FROM AIR AND ARTILLERY ATTACKS AS IT ATTEMPTED TO REMAIN CLOSE TO THE CITIES. ITS POST-TET STRATEGY REQUIRED THAT THE ALLIES REMAIN IN STATIC DEFENSE OF THE URBAN AREAS TO ALLOW THE ENEMY ACCESS TO THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE WHOM IT EXPECTED TO JOIN IN THE GENERAL UPRISING. ITS ENCIRCLING TACTIC WAS EFFECTIVELY AIDED BY VC-INITIATED RUMORS OF IMPENDING ATTACKS ON THE CITIES, WHICH TIED DOWN ALLIED FORCES FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD.

9. AS THE SPRING PROGRESSED, THE ENEMY ATTEMPTED TO MAINTAIN ITS PRESSURE ON THE URBAN AREAS AND IT BECAME MORE AND MORE EVIDENT THAT MAJOR EMPHASIS WAS TO BE PLACED ON SAIGON AS A MAIN OBJECTIVE. THE ENEMY WAS COMMITTED TO AN AGGRESSIVE COURSE OF ACTION AND THE INITIATION OF THE PARIS TALKS MADE IT MORE IMPERATIVE THAN EVER THAT IT EXERT INFLUENCE MILITARILY TO CONVEY AN IMPRESSION OF STRENGTH AND FLEXIBILITY AND TO SHOW AN APPARENT CONTROL OVER THE PEOPLE AND LARGE AREAS OF SOUTH VIETNAM. DURING AND AFTER THE 5 MAY SECOND OFFENSIVE THE ENEMY DEMONSTRATED A CAPABILITY TO INSERT SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF TROOPS INTO THE SAIGON AREA, NOT IN AN ATTEMPT TO

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GAIN CONTROL, BUT TO DISCREDIT THE GVN IN ITS OWN CAPITAL. IN SPITE OF THE PROPAGANDA GAINED BY ITS ACTIONS, THE ENEMY CONTINUED TO LOSE FORCES DURING APRIL, MAY AND JUNE TO THE TUNE OF APPROXIMATELY 45,700 KILLED AS AGAINST ALLIED LOSSES OF 9,500. THERE ARE NUMEROUS INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY PLANS TO SUPPORT ITS PARIS DELEGATION BY FURTHER OFFENSIVES SINCE IT BELIEVES IT MUST FIGHT WHILE THE TALKING CONTINUES IN ORDER TO IMPROVE ITS BARGAINING POSITION.

12. ALL EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT THE ENEMY IS MOVING FROM ITS WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN INTO ITS SUMMER CAMPAIGN WITHOUT PAUSE AND WITHOUT THE MORALE-SHATTERING IMPACT TO ITS FORCES WHICH MIGHT HAVE OCCURRED HAD IT NOT ACHIEVED, IN ITS OWN EYES, SIGNIFICANT RESULTS THIS SPRING. FROM ITS VIEWPOINT, IT HAS BEEN ON THE OFFENSIVE, HAS TAKEN THE WAR TO THE CITIES, HAS FORCED THE ALLIES INTO A DEFENSIVE POSTURE, HAS MAINTAINED PRESSURE THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM, AND HAS FORCED THE U.S. INTO NEGOTIATIONS. IT SEEMS CONFIDENT THAT TIME IS ON ITS SIDE AND THAT THE U.S. WILL EVENTUALLY BE FORCED TO MAKE NEW CONCESSIONS IN THE PARIS TALKS.

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11. THERE IS EXTENSIVE EVIDENCE THAT THE MORALE OF THE ENEMY RANK AND FILE IS LOW AND PROBABLY LOWER THAN BEFORE THE CAMPAIGN BEGAN, BUT THE COMMUNIST INDOCTRINATION AND CONTROL MECHANISMS APPEAR TO HAVE KEPT THIS PROBLEM UNDER CONTROL. IN THE MEANTIME, MASSIVE INFILTRATION EFFORTS ARE INJECTING LARGE NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL INTO SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH WILL PARTIALLY OFFSET HEAVY ENEMY LOSSES AND ALLOW IT TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN NUMEROUS INDICATIONS OF A QUALITATIVE REDUCTION IN ITS FORCES, THE SPEED WITH WHICH IT HAS RECENTLY RETURNED ITS FORCES TO BATTLE HAS SHOWN THAT REDUCED COMBAT CAPABILITY HAS NOT DETERRED IT FROM ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES.

12. THE HEAVY LOSSES OF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN HAVE ONLY TEMPORARILY REDUCED THE ENEMY'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES SINCE THE CONTINUING FLOW OF INFILTRATORS WILL PERMIT IT TO CONTINUE TO MOUNT OFFENSIVES AGAINST STRATEGIC TARGETS. AS IN THE PAST, IT WILL SUFFER SUBSTANTIAL LOSSES, BUT IT IS BELIEVED THAT IT IS WILLING TO ACCEPT SUCH LOSSES FOR POLITICAL REASONS. ALTHOUGH IT MAY NOT BE CAPABLE OF ACHIEVING SIGNIFICANT MILITARY VICTORIES, IT CAN INFLICT SIGNIFICANT LOSSES ON ALLIED PER-

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SONNEL AND PROVIDE GRIST FOR ITS PROPAGANDA MILL. THUS, IT IS EXPECTED THAT IT WILL FOLLOW THE THEME OF COSVN'S 6TH RESOLUTION WHICH DIRECTS VIOLENT ATTACKS TO WEAR DOWN THE ALLIES, LIBERATION OF THE RURAL AREAS, EXPANSION OF GUERRILLA WARFARE, AND HEAVY PRESSURE ON THE CITIES AND TOWNS - THE PRIMARY BATTLEFIELDS. GIVEN THE ENEMY'S RELATIVE SUCCESS IN MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON THE CITIES DURING THE LATTER PORTION OF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN, IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE FUTURE WILL SEE CONTINUED SIMILAR ATTEMPTS AS THE NEW REPLACEMENTS ARRIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND ITS FORCES ARE RECONSTITUTED.

13. ALTHOUGH IN PURELY MILITARY TERMS THE WINTER -SPRING CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN A NEAR DISASTER FOR THE VC, THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE STRUGGLE ARE MORE MIXED. THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE QUESTION BUT THAT THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE (VCI) HAS SUFFERED AT LEAST A TEMPORARY DECLINE IN QUALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS. THE MAIN ROLE OF THE VCI AT TET WAS TO ASSIST THE INFILTRATION OF THE VC FORCES INTO THE CITIES AND ORGANIZE THE GENERAL UPRISING. THE LACK OF SUCCESS IN MAINTAINING A MILITARY HOLD IN MOST CITIES PRECLUDED THE SURFACING OF MUCH OF THE VCI, BUT POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CADRES DID SURFACE IN

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A NUMBER OF CITIES AND SOME WERE KILLED OR CAPTURED. SUBSEQUENT INTERROGATIONS HAVE RESULTED IN THE CAPTURE OR IDENTIFICATION OF NUMEROUS OTHERS. CONSIDERABLE NUMBERS WERE ALSO USED IN A MILITARY ROLE TO FLESH OUT THE UNITS, AND THESE WERE AMONG THE HEAVY TOLL SUFFERED IN THE ATTACKS. THE U.S./GVN PHOENIX/PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM, ALTHOUGH STILL HAMPERED BY A LACK OF COOPERATION ON THE PART OF SOME LOCAL OFFICIALS, IS SHOWING IMPROVEMENT AND SHOULD BE FURTHER STIMULATED BY THE RECENT SIGNING OF A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE WHICH ASSIGNS A HIGHER PRIORITY TO THE PROGRAM. BY THE END OF MAY THE PROGRAM HAD UNCOVERED AND NEUTRALIZED 4,917 MEMBERS OF THE VCI, MORE THAN ONE THIRD OF THE 1968 GOAL OF 12,000. THIS CONSTITUTES ONLY ABOUT FIVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL INFRASTRUCTURE, HOWEVER, AND THE VCI AT PROVINCE LEVEL AND ABOVE HAS REMAINED VIRTUALLY UNTOUCHED.

14. FROM THE ENEMY'S POINT OF VIEW, IT ACHIEVED ONE OF ITS STATED POLITICAL GOALS - THE OPENING OF TALKS - WHICH IT HAS ALWAYS REGARDED AS A TACTIC TO BE EMPLOYED IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARMED STRUGGLE TO ATTAIN ITS POLITICAL ENDS. ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN WAS TO IMPROVE ITS BARGAINING POSITION FOR SUCH TALKS BY ESTABLISHING A SUPERIOR

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MILITARY POSITION. THIS IT FAILED TO DO. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS, WHICH CONSISTENTLY WARN AGAINST THE ILLUSION OF PEACE, CONTINUE TO POINT OUT THAT MILITARY ACTIVITIES ARE STILL THE "DECISIVE FACTOR," AND THAT NEGOTIATING AND FIGHTING MUST PROCEED SIMULTANEOUSLY. ALTHOUGH IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE ENEMY'S FORCES WILL DISINTEGRATE OVER THE COMING MONTHS, IT IS ALSO UNLIKELY TO ACHIEVE THE POSITION OF MILITARY STRENGTH IT SEEKS. THE BEST THAT IT CAN HOPE FOR IS THAT CONTINUED RESISTANCE WILL RESULT IN POLITICAL PRESSURE IN BOTH SOUTH VIETNAM AND IN THE U.S. FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR ON TERMS FAVORABLE TO IT.

15. NEVERTHELESS, THE ENEMY CAN CHALK UP SOME SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL GAINS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. MOST IMPORTANT WAS ITS INCREASED ACCESS TO THE RURAL POPULATION AFTER THE TET OFFENSIVE AS FRIENDLY SECURITY FORCES WERE WITHDRAWN FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE TO PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR THE CITIES. THIS LARGER POPULATION BASE, RESULTING FROM THE LOSS OF GVN CONTROL OVER AN ADDITIONAL 1.3 MILLION PERSONS, PROVIDED THE VC WITH BADLY NEEDED MANPOWER FOR BOTH ITS MILITARY AND LABOR FORCES, AND REVERSED THE PRE-TET DECLINING ECONOMIC FORTUNES OF THE VC BY PROVIDING INCREASED TAXATION REVENUES AND FOOD PROCUREMENT. THE ENCLAVE

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MENTALITY STILL PERSISTS AMONG MANY OF THE GVN PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CHIEFS WHO REACT TO VC PRESSURE BY WITHDRAWING SECURITY FORCES TO THEIR FORTIFIED CAPITALS. RECOVERY, THEREFORE, HAS BEEN SLOW. BY THE END OF MAY, HOWEVER, THE GVN HAD RECOVERED ABOUT A THIRD OF ITS LOST PEOPLE AND REGAINED ITS CONTROL OVER THE MOST IMPORTANT ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION. AS TIME PASSES THE ADVANTAGES TO THE VC OF THEIR ADDED MANPOWER AND TERRITORY WILL PROBABLY ERODE. MEANWHILE, IN THEIR EFFORT TO REPLENISH THEIR MANPOWER AND FINANCIAL BASE, BY FORCED RECRUITMENT, HEAVIER TAXATION, AND TERRORISM, THE VC HAVE CREATED RESENTMENTS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE WHICH TEND TO WEAKEN THEIR HOLD ON THE RURAL POPULATION AND MAY IN THE LONG RUN OFFSET MUCH OF THEIR GAINS.

16. THE FAILURE OF THE URBAN PEOPLE TO RISE UP AND OVERTHROW THE GVN PRECLUDED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT" (EXCEPT IN HUE) AS PLANNED BY THE VC AT THE TIME OF TET. SOMEWHAT BELATEDLY, HOWEVER, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE MANAGED TO LAUNCH A NEW THIRD FORCE MOVEMENT -- THE ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC AND PEACE FORCES -- SUPPOSEDLY UNTAINTED BY COMMUNIST CONTROL. THE EXACT ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE IS STILL UNCLEAR, BUT IT IS APPARENTLY THE VEHICLE THROUGH WHICH THE

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COMMUNISTS HOPE TO ENTER THE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL ARENA IN SOUTH VIETNAM OR TO FORM THE INTENDED COALITION GOVERNMENT DOMINATED BY THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF). ITS LACKLUSTER LEADERSHIP, ITS USE OF RADIO LIBERATION AND RADIO HANOI TO PROMOTE ITSELF, AND ITS LACK OF AN URBAN TERRITORIAL BASE HAVE ALL CONTRIBUTED TO ITS APPARENT FAILURE SO FAR TO ATTRACT SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT FROM ITS PRIMARY TARGET, THE URBAN PEOPLE. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT NLF SUFFERED FROM THE SAME DIFFICULTIES AND STILL MANAGED TO GROW, AND THERE ARE PROBABLY MANY ALLIANCE SYMPATHIZERS WHO HAVE NOT YET BECOME OVERTLY ASSOCIATED WITH IT. THERE IS A GENERAL LONGING FOR PEACE, EVEN IF IT MEANS COMPROMISE WITH THE COMMUNISTS, AND THE APPEAL OF AN ALLEGED NEUTRAL GROUP MIGHT BECOME INCREASINGLY MORE ATTRACTIVE TO A WAR-WEARY PEOPLE. THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY TRUE IF THE ALLIANCE WERE GIVEN A ROLE IN ANY PEACE SETTLEMENT, IF IT WERE TO REPLACE THE NLF, OR IF PROMINENT NON-COMMUNIST PEACE ADVOCATES SUCH AS AU TRUONG THANH OR TRUONG DINH DZU SHOULD BECOME ASSOCIATED WITH IT. MEANWHILE, THE COMMUNISTS ARE PROCEEDING WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY ADMINISTRATIONS AT THE HAMLET AND VIL -

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LAGE LEVEL, POSSIBLY TO LAY CLAIM TO AS MUCH TERRITORY AS POSSIBLE IN THE EVENT OF A CEASEFIRE. THEIR SUCCESS AMONG AN APATHETIC RURAL POPULATION HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN MARGINAL SO FAR. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY ADMINISTRATIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL AND OF THE ALLIANCE AS A CLAIMANT TO NATIONAL AUTHORITY COULD IN TIME TURN OUT TO BE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT COMMUNIST ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN.

17. IN THE CONTEST FOR THE ALLEGIANCE OF THE PEOPLE, THE VIETNAMESE HAVE BEEN BUFFETED BY CONTRARY WINDS, AND EACH PERSON IS NATURALLY AFFECTED BY HIS OWN PERSONAL EXPERIENCES. ON THE WHOLE, HOWEVER, THE VC SEEM TO HAVE LOST GROUND. THE URBAN PEOPLE FAULT THE GVN FOR ITS FAILURE TO PROVIDE COMPLETE SECURITY, FOR EXCESSIVE DESTRUCTION, AND FOR THE MISBEHAVIOR OF ITS FORCES. FAR GREATER NUMBERS, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN ANGERED BY THE VC VIOLATION OF THE SACRED TET HOLIDAY AND THEIR OWN TRUCE, THE INDISCRIMINATE SHELLING OF POPULATED AREAS, THE ATROCITIES, THE DEATHS OF TEENAGERS WHO HAD BEEN IMPRESSED INTO SERVICE, THE FORCED RECRUITMENT OF LABOR, THE UPSETTING OF NORMAL ECONOMIC LIFE, AND THE EXTREMELY HEAVY TAXATION IMPOSED IN RECENT MONTHS. MOREOVER, THE MILITARY

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SUPERIORITY OF THE ALLIES HAS BEEN CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED, AND MOST OF THE URBAN PEOPLE DO NOT, AT LEAST IN SAIGON, SEEM TO BE UNDULY CONCERNED OVER THEIR PERSONAL SECURITY.

18. POLICE AND MILITARY SOURCES REPORT FAR BETTER CO-OPERATION FROM THE PEOPLE IN RECENT MONTHS THAN PRIOR TO TET. A CAPTURED DOCUMENT DATED LATE MAY CONTAINS AN ESTIMATE BY A VC MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CADRE THAT 30-40 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE IN AREAS OF SAIGON WHERE CLASHES HAD OCCURRED, AND 20 PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE IN OTHER PRECINCTS, ARE DETERMINED TO AID THE VC. THIS ESTIMATE IS REMARKABLY CLOSE TO THAT OF AN ASTUTE ARVN FIELD GRADE OFFICER WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED REALISTIC APPRAISALS. HE BELIEVES THAT 80 PERCENT OF THE URBAN PEOPLE NOW ACTIVELY DISLIKE THE VC AS COMPARED WITH LESS THAN 50 PERCENT BEFORE TET, ALTHOUGH HE ADDS THAT MOST PEOPLE ARE STILL PASSIVE TOWARDS THE GVN. ONE STILL UNKNOWN FACTOR IS HOW THE PEOPLE WOULD REACT IF THE VC WERE ABLE TO GAIN AND MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER AN URBAN AREA FOR A SIGNIFICANT PERIOD OF TIME.

19. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, THE GVN HAS DERIVED NUMEROUS INDIRECT BENEFITS FROM THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN. THE TET OFFENSIVE SHOCKED A LACKADAISICAL ADMINISTRATION INTO

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TAKING STEPS TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT. A START HAS BEEN MADE TOWARD REDUCING CORRUPTION TO MORE ACCEPTABLE LEVELS WITH THE REMOVAL OF SOME OF THE MORE BLATANT VIOLATORS. THERE IS NOW A GREATER RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO ESTABLISH VIABLE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND TO ORGANIZE ANTI-COMMUNIST FORCES INTO A UNIFIED FORCE WHICH WILL BE ABLE TO COMPETE WITH AND COUNTER COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTH. THE FIRST FALTERING STEPS TO ESTABLISH A UNIFIED LEGITIMATE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION HAVE BEEN TAKEN, ALTHOUGH IT WILL TAKE PERSEVERANCE, INGENUITY AND A LITTLE LUCK IF THEY ARE TO SURVIVE IN THIS DIVIDED, PAROCHIAL SOCIETY.

20. ALTHOUGH THE THIEU-KY SPLIT HAS NOT BEEN RESOLVED, THIEU HAS MEASURABLY STRENGTHENED HIS PERSONAL POLITICAL POWER POSITION. THE PRESIDENT CAPITALIZED ON THE OCCASION OF LOAN'S TEMPORARY DISABILITY AND THE ACCIDENTAL DEATHS OF A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT KY/LOAN LIEUTENANTS TO REPLACE LOAN, RESTAFF THE NATIONAL POLICE, AND INSTALL A NEW MAYOR OF SAIGON AND A NEW PORT DIRECTOR. THROUGH THESE MOVES THIEU SHARPLY CUT INTO THE VICE PRESIDENT'S POWER BASE. AT THE SAME TIME THIEU ALSO REPLACED OR REASSIGNED SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE KY-ORIENTED

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"YOUNG TURK" MILITARY GROUPING. ALTHOUGH THIEU-KY TENSIONS APPEARED TO WORSEN DURING THIS TIME, KY APPEARS TO HAVE RELUCTANTLY ACCEPTED THE POWER SHIFT AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI AND THE TWO LEADERS ARE WORKING TOGETHER AGAIN, AT LEAST ON A SUPERFICIAL BASIS AND FOR PURPOSES OF PUBLIC APPEARANCES. WHETHER THIEU WILL NOW EXTEND HIS HAND TO KY IN A MORE MEANINGFUL MANNER OR PUSH FOR FURTHER ADVANTAGE IS NOT CLEAR.

21. THE VC OFFENSIVE ALSO SPURRED THE GOVERNMENT TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE ITS ARMED FORCES. WHILE THE PERFORMANCE OF ARVN WAS SPOTTY DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE, AND STILL IS AMONG SOME UNITS, THERE HAS BEEN A NOTICEABLE IMPROVEMENT IN RECENT MONTHS. MOST ENCOURAGING HAS BEEN THE FAILURE OF AN INTENSIFIED VC PROSELYTING EFFORT TO PRODUCE ANY SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF DEFECTIONS. MORALE IS REPORTED TO BE HIGH AS A RESULT OF THE CLEAR-CUT MILITARY DEFEATS AND HEAVY LOSSES INFLICTED ON THE VC DURING THE CAMPAIGN, IMPROVED FIREPOWER WITH THE M-16 RIFLE, AND ADDITIONAL FRINGE BENEFITS WHICH WERE RECENTLY GRANTED. THERE HAS BEEN A NET DECLINE IN DESERTIONS, AND WHERE COMPETENT LEADERSHIP IS PRESENT, AN INCREASED AGGRESSIVENESS. GENERAL MOBILIZATION IS NOW IN EFFECT AND IS PROVIDING

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ADDITIONAL MANPOWER FOR BOTH ARVN AND THE POPULAR FORCES. A PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCE HAS BEEN CREATED, ALTHOUGH IT HAS ONLY A LIMITED CAPABILITY AT PRESENT. THE GVN'S ARMED FORCES STILL HAVE MANY SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES, INCLUDING WEAK LEADERSHIP, A PROMOTION SYSTEM BASED ON INFLUENCE RATHER THAN MERIT, AND POOR MOTIVATION. BUT THEY ARE A BETTER FIGHTING FORCE THAN THEY WERE BEFORE THE TET OFFENSIVE. IN TIME, THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO ASSUME A GREATER SHARE OF THE FIGHTING, ALTHOUGH THIS IS LIKELY TO BE A VERY GRADUAL PROCESS.

22. THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN A "NO DECISION" CONTEST. BOTH SIDES HAVE ACHIEVED SUCCESSES AND FAILURES AND THE FINAL VERDICT CANNOT BE WRITTEN UNTIL THE TRENDS SET IN MOTION BY THE CAMPAIGN HAVE TIME TO RUN THEIR COURSE. IF THE EMPHASIS IN COMING MONTHS SHIFTS AWAY FROM THE MILITARY WHERE THE GVN FREE WORLD MILITARY ARMED FORCES HAVE A DECIDED SUPERIORITY, TO THE POLITICAL, WHERE THE VC EXCEL IN ORGANIZATION, MOTIVATION AND DISCIPLINE, THE VC MAY YET BE ABLE TO CLAIM ACCURATELY THAT THE EFFORT HAS BEEN MORE THAN WORTH THE COST. IT WAS NOTED LAST DECEMBER THAT IF THE WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN FAILED THE ENEMY WOULD BE FACED WITH A DECISION WHETHER TO CUT ITS

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LOSSES BY BACKING DOWN, WITH ALL IT WOULD ENTAIL IN TERMS OF THE REVOLUTION'S FORWARD MOMENTUM, OR PLAY OUT THE GAME AND ACCEPT ITS LOSSES. ITS HEAVY INFILTRATION, ITS CONTINUED CALLS FOR ALL-OUT MILITARY EFFORTS, AND ITS CONSTANT ADMONITIONS TO THE CADRES AGAINST THE "ILLUSIONS OF PEACE" SUGGEST THAT IT HAS CHOSEN THE LATTER COURSE. SO THE ALLIES CAN LOOK FORWARD TO A VC SUMMER-AUTUMN CAMPAIGN WITH ESSENTIALLY THE SAME GOALS, AND ESSENTIALLY THE SAME STRATEGY. NOW THAT THEY KNOW WHAT TO EXPECT, IT SHOULD BE EASIER TO COUNTER.

23. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE DIR/  
JUSPAO (MR. NICKEL ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF [REDACTED]

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INFORMATION

Friday, July 26, 1968  
9:50 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

I don't know whether this summary of U. S. press reaction to your trip to Central America was made available to you by other channels. I find it interesting.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



COMINT, with DRV jets usually operating out of Bai Thuong airfield, located just south of the 20th parallel.

SAM defenses south of this parallel also have been improved by the addition of new sites.

III. The View From Hanoi. Overall DRV capabilities have improved since the bombing limitation, although Hanoi still faces potentially serious problems in the form of unspecified "counter-revolutionary" activities and in a probable continuing intra-Party debate. Nevertheless, as Hanoi looks at the war in the South and at conditions within both the US and the DRV, it probably believes that the current political, military, and diplomatic balance is generally favorable to North Vietnam. Its policies will be designed to exploit this balance while it remains in Hanoi's favor and to attempt to convert it into a settlement on favorable terms.

~~This Hanoi wishes to make progress in settling the war, or at least in obtaining a more advantageous settlement from the South and changes in the South Vietnamese Government. Hanoi, however, does not prefer to reach some kind of agreement with the US by the end of 1968 (a target date mentioned in captured documents), or possibly not later than mid-1969. If a satisfactory settlement can not be reached within this time frame, Hanoi has the assets to continue the war and would almost certainly decide to do so, though not necessarily at present levels.~~

Such a decision, however, would bring to the fore additional

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 03-120  
By SJ NARA, Date 6-2-03

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~~TOP SECRET~~ ☐

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difficulties which Hanoi would have to resolve or to mitigate. Chief among these probably would be a sharp drop in public morale and a loss of confidence in the Party's ability to conduct the war successfully. Hanoi is no longer publicly stressing protracted war but instead is encouraging its Party cadre and the people to believe that victory and peace is now within reach. Thus, it probably would find it hard to disappoint these expectations and to whip up support and efficient cooperation for continuing the war indefinitely.

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U.S. MEDIA REACTION TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S  
CENTRAL AMERICAN TRIP

American press comment was positive to the President's Central American trip. The accomplishments of the trip were noted, but frequently with observations on how much there still is to do in the area. Many editorialists used the trip to comment on our Latin American policy; a number of papers stressed the importance of self help in the development process.

The New York Times stated that "President Johnson could not have picked a better time to go to San Salvador to pay tribute to the Central American Common Market. This organization...has become a 'testament to regionalism' of value to developing countries everywhere." The editorial commented that, "It was an opportune moment" for the President to boost the Common Market's morale and resources and added that the trip "helped restore momentum to a promising development involving thirteen million people in an area of great importance to the United States." A Times analysis by Henry Giniger measured the benefits as "intangible": Central America "was put on the map and its Common Market...was given the best publicity in years", Central American morale was improved by the demonstration of U.S. interest and the Central American Presidents showed they had a "realistic recognition of all that has to be done."

The New York Post remarked that, "The party ended nicely in San Salvador" with everybody receiving "a little present from the American visitor." After listing some negative characteristics of Central America, the Post asks if this isn't "where we came in, from Teddy Roosevelt on up to the great promises...of the Alliance for Progress?"

The News of New York City states that, "We're glad the President and his companions enjoyed the trip, and hope the common market idea may spread throughout Latin America."

However, "the Lord helps those who help themselves...and the sooner a lot of our Latin American friends discover that fact of life, the better off both they and the U.S.A. should be."

The Washington Post headlined "Johnson Greeted by Salvadorans, Reveals New Aid," and stated in an editorial that, although "President Johnson is entitled to savor" the cheers he received on his trip, they "are not...a very accurate index to the real state of hemispheric affairs." The Post stated that the Common Market's impressive statistical growth... conceals an alarming deterioration in the region's balance of payments with its outside trading partners, particularly the United States." The Post believes "more effective international arrangements to support the prices of commodity exports would greatly help these countries." The Post believes that regionalism should not be simply "a method of building markets for American exports" but, "as President Johnson clearly believes, a vital way for a region to help itself achieve important self-sustaining growth."

The Washington Daily News noted that "President Johnson apparently had a great time in El Salvador," and gave a generous offering of the LBJ 'treatment'." The News said the President "was on the mark when he told the Central Americans no amount of outside aid will be helpful 'without the leadership and determination of the Central Americans themselves'." The News felt that, by stressing self help and cooperation with one's neighbors and by emphasizing that there is no "all-powerful keeper of the peace," President Johnson offered "good guidelines for the Central Americans -- and good guidelines for American foreign assistance policies." Virginia Prewett, writing in the News, believes that "President Johnson's Central American visit has helped" calm the tensions that exist among the five countries over "the way the Central American Bank for Economic Integration apportions out its loans," but "the (Central American Common Market) partners, each in difficulties, are still eyeing each other with less than optimum cordiality."



The Sun of Baltimore observed that "President Johnson's warm praise of the Central American Common Market is justified -- within limits." While mentioning that "on the whole (the Common Market) has been a success" the Sun noted that the area "still depends primarily on its agricultural production." The paper believes that the market's current emphasis on internal regional trade must be shifted to a concentration on "the production of exportable goods."

The Baltimore News American said President Johnson's trip "was a dramatic example of the good neighbor policy in practical operation. Once again, by his act of personal diplomacy, he underscored this nation's friendship and concern for the economic well-being of a group of nearby developing countries." The paper believes "the most important boost...was the boost in regional morale and cooperation given by President Johnson's personal good-will tour."

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch editorialized that "the cheers (in Central America) do not signify any kind of final judgment on the Administration's Latin American policy. That has not been a triumph." Despite a moderately successful Common Market, the Post-Dispatch believes Central America still needs considerable aid. However, President Johnson "went to San Salvador with almost empty pockets," and told the Central Americans that self-help is "the foundation for social improvement in all developing countries." According to the Post-Dispatch, the President was "doing more than stating an acceptable generality." He was stating the underlying theme of the Alliance for Progress as it has developed in recent years. The United States has been unwilling to expand its share of the Alliance. Therefore the Latins are being told that their further economic and social progress is largely up to them." The Post-Dispatch believes that, "What is needed is a revival of the spirit of mutual respect with which the Alliance was begun." Instead, under the Johnson Administration, "the (Alliance) program seems to have become another label for all forms of aid, doled out to dictatorships as well as democracies for reasons not decipherable in terms of promoting dynamic and progressive societies."

The Kansas City Star noted, "All those friendly faces and wildly approving crowds -- what a rare, rare treat it must have seemed to Lyndon B. Johnson, who lately has had so very little of it." The editorial stated that, "when Lyndon Johnson is on stage and in good form, he is hard to beat." The Star believes the trip "was tonic for him" and, "from the response the Latins gave him, we would judge that it was tonic for our relations in the hemisphere as well."

The Los Angeles Times believes that President Johnson's trip "was a resounding success from the public relations standpoint, and may have been worthwhile for this reason alone." However, the paper believes that much "depends upon the Central Americans' willingness and capacity to help themselves -- as well as upon the fate of the protectionist drive in the U.S. Congress."

The Miami Herald headlined its account of the trip, "Latin Greeting Moves LBJ Close to Tears" and said that the President's "tour throughout the city (of San Salvador) and the country moved on up from one peak of emotional success to another. The simpatico was total." Another account was headlined "Central Americans Praise LBJ's 'Spiritual' Support and Aid" and reported that the visit left "an indelible impression of support for the Common Market." In an editorial, the Herald stated that "President Johnson's reaffirmation of friendship and offer of financial help thus was well timed."

The Philadelphia Inquirer stated that "the best possible policy for this country is to go far out of its way to keep" the Latin Americans as "our good friends" and that President Johnson's trip "was a commendable gesture" in this direction. However, it is not yet possible to tell whether the President's "hope to counteract the forces which seem to be threatening... cooperation among the Central American nations" was fulfilled.

The Philadelphia Bulletin saw the visit as "a symbol of recognition from which the Common Market drew new status, a sense of dignity."

The Cleveland Plain Dealer believes President Johnson showed "considerable courage in making his goodwill visit to Central America."

The Denver Post remarked that "President Johnson's participation in the...conference...was beneficial for the United States and for the five Central American republics," and added that "it is clear that the United States must continue to play a large role in Central American affairs -- as a helpful good neighbor rather than as a benevolent 'imperialist' power."

"Lyndon Johnson has shown an unusual and continuing concern for the welfare of nations south of the Rio Grande and for our relations with them," states the Louisville Courier-Journal. The paper believes the President's "whirlwind tour of Central America was a demonstration of that concern," though "it is not clear what the Johnson jaunt accomplished." The paper believes the Central American Common Market has "had little impact on the continuing poverty that besets Central America" and "has done nothing to correct the imbalance of trade between Central America and its foreign customers, including its biggest one, the United States." The Courier-Journal believes a change of attitude in Washington is necessary and states that the major problems are a "U.S. trade and tariff policy long influenced by American economic holdings in Latin America" and U.S. willingness to sell or give arms to any Latin nation that asks for them."

The Courant of Hartford, Connecticut, states, "It is probably true that the weekend meeting...produced more rhetoric and resolve than tangible results." The Courant believes the President offered good advice when he said, "There is no mythological benefactor who will appear out of the mists to spread plenty. Nor is there any all-powerful keeper of the peace who can solve family quarrels, or offset the effects of prolonging them." The Courant believes it "was good counsel. And there is an encouraging indication that the little countries want to heed it."

The Des Moines Register wrote that "President Johnson's summit diplomacy acted as a healing balm on (the) abrasions" of internal Common Market disagreements and the border dispute. The paper is sad that "this small, constructive episode is destined to be totally overshadowed by the destructiveness of Vietnam."

The Times-Dispatch of Richmond, Virginia, wrote that President Johnson "was received with great enthusiasm" and that "the trip seems to have been worthwhile, and to have improved our 'image' below the Rio Grande."

It was noted in the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot that President Johnson "presided at a minor summit conference that achieved some major objectives," as well as making "some headway in disengaging the United States from a senior partnership in development programs." The paper noted that President Johnson's "recent breakthroughs on the diplomatic front disprove theories that a lame-duck President cannot make the best of remaining time in office."



INFORMATION

*Pres file*

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Friday, July 26, 1968  
9:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

This State Department intelligence conclusion on "The View From Hanoi" may interest you.

It is not a universally accepted view, but I am inclined to feel the time frame is about right.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 03-119  
By Sj, NARA, Date 6-2-03

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, July 26, 1968 -- 9:45 a.m.


Mr. President:

There is some credibility to this report that, in time, Huong will give way to Vien as Prime Minister.

Vien is one of the best Vietnamese.

Other reports suggest that Khiem -- now the powerful Minister of Interior, on whom Thieu relies -- may move up to be Minister of Defense and Chairman of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff.

W. W. Rostow

  
25 July 1968

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3.4(b)(1)

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SANITIZED  
Authority NJ 019-038-1-4  
By Q, NARA, Date 1/19/02

WWRostow:rlh

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• ROUTINE

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CITE

DIST 25 JULY 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI JULY 1968

SUBJECT

1. POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT OF PRIME MINISTER HUONG BY NGUYEN LUU VIEN IN ABOUT SIX MONTHS
2. POLITICAL PRESSURE BEING PUT ON DGNP HAI BY HUONG'S CLOSE ASSOCIATES

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON

SOURCE

( SUMMARY: POLICE CHIEF COLONEL HAI

TOLD BY LAM VAN GIOI, PRIME MINISTER HUONG'S BROTHER, THAT HUONG PROBABLY WILL RETIRE IN ABOUT SIX MONTHS AND BE REPLACED BY NGUYEN LUU VIEN. HUONG AND MINISTER AT THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE HUYNH VAN DAO ARE AWARE OF AND APPROVE THE PLAN. IN THE MEANTIME, HUONG SUPPORTERS WILL TRY TO PLACE AS MANY OF THEIR

Approved for Release 15 JUL 1996  
Date

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Authority NLS 019-038-1-5  
By GP, NARA, Date 4/19/02

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NUMBER AS POSSIBLE IN KEY GOVERNMENT POSTS. HAI HAS RECENTLY HAD SEVERAL DISAGREEMENTS WITH GIOI OVER THE LATTER'S REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT BY HAI OF "LONG-TIME SECRET HUONG SUPPORTERS" TO IMPORTANT POLICE POSTS. HAI IS ALSO HAVING TROUBLE WITH DAO. AFTER HAI REFUSED TO APPOINT DAO'S BROTHER AS HIS DEPUTY OR CHIEF OF STAFF, DAO PERSUADED HUONG TO SIGN A DECREE WHICH SETS UP THREE DEPUTY DIRECTORS FOR THE NATIONAL POLICE. DAO HAS NOMINATED HIS BROTHER FOR ONE OF THESE POSTS. HAI CONSIDERS DAO TO BE THE MAN WITH THE MOST INFLUENCE ON HUONG, WHILE INTERIOR MINISTER KHIEM HAS THE MOST WITH PRESIDENT THIEU. END SUMMARY.)

1. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE COLONEL TRAN VAN

HAI [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] TOLD [REDACTED] BY LAM VAN GIOI, HUONG'S YOUNGER BROTHER AND CONFIDANT, THAT HUONG PROBABLY WILL RETIRE IN ABOUT SIX MONTHS FOR REASONS OF HEALTH AND WILL PROBABLY BE REPLACED BY NGUYEN LUU VIEN.

[REDACTED] GIOI ALSO SAID THAT VIEN HAS AGREED TO RETAIN [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)



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THE MEMBERS OF THE HUONG TEAM IN THEIR GVN POSTS AND TO CONTINUE THE POLICIES WHICH HUONG HAS INITIATED. GIOI SAID THAT HUONG AND MINSTER AT THE PRIME MINSTER'S OFFICE HUYNH VAN DAO ARE AWARE OF AND APPROVE THE PLAN FOR VIEN TO SUCCEED HUONG. [REDACTED] VIEN HAS REMAINED OUTSIDE THE GVN TO INSURE THAT HE DOES NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN SOME CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE WHICH MIGHT LESSEN HIS AVAILABILITY FOR THE PREMIERSHIP.

1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)

2. HAI [REDACTED] AND GIOI [REDACTED] [REDACTED] HAVE HAD SEVERAL DISAGREEMENTS RECENTLY STEMMING FROM GIOI'S REQUEST THAT HAI REMOVE CERTAIN POLICE OFFICERS, PARTICULARLY PROVINCIAL POLICE CHIEFS IN THE DELTA, AND REPLACE THEM WITH OFFICERS WHO HAVE BEEN "LONG-TIME SECRET SUPPORTERS OF HUONG." HAI [REDACTED] IN A NUMBER OF CASES [REDACTED] HAS REFUSED BECAUSE THE OFFICERS RECOMMENDED BY GIOI HAVE POOR RECORDS, SOME HAVING BEEN INVOLVED IN CORRUPTION AND OTHERS NOT BEING COMPETENT. GIOI HAS STRESSED [REDACTED] THAT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE HUONG FORCES TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES TO STRENGTHEN THEIR BASE OF SUPPORT THROUGHOUT THE GVN. THAT THE "OPEN ARMS" POLICY IN POLITICS COURTS DISASTER, AND

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(dissem controls)

THAT ONE MUST TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO REWARD SUPPORTERS AND WEAKEN OPPONENTS. HAI [REDACTED] DOES NOT THINK THIS REPRESENTS HUONG'S THINKING.

1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)

3. HAI [REDACTED] REFUSAL TO PLAY POLITICS WITH THE NATIONAL POLICE HAS ALSO CREATED PROBLEMS FOR HIM WITH DAO. SINCE HE REFUSED DAO'S ENTREATY ON THE MAJOR NGUYEN HUU TUY CASE [REDACTED] DAO HAS BEEN MAKING A DETERMINED EFFORT TO REORGANIZE THE UPPER ECHELONS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SO THAT HAI WILL BE A FIGUREHEAD CHIEF. [REDACTED] DAO HAS DRAFTED, AND PERSUADED HUONG TO SIGN, A DECREE WHICH SETS UP THREE DEPUTY DIRECTORS FOR THE NATIONAL POLICE. ONE OF THESE WILL BE IN CHARGE OF ORGANIZATION, PLANNING AND MANPOWER; THE SECOND WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE POLICE FIELD FORCES (PFF) AND POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH (PSB) ACTIVITIES; AND THE THIRD WILL HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE JUDICIAL POLICE.

1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)

4. [REDACTED] DAO HAS NOMINATED HIS YOUNGER BROTHER, LIEUTENANT COLONEL HUYNH NGOC DIEP, TO FILL THE POST OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PFF AND PSB ACTIVITIES, ADDING THAT SINCE THESE ARE THE KEY POLICE BRANCHES, THEIR CONTROL BY A SEMI-AUTONOMOUS DEPUTY DIRECTOR WOULD SHARPLY CURTAIL HIS OWN POWER. HE SAID

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HE HAS ALREADY HAD ONE INTERVIEW WITH DIEP, WHO ARRIVED UNANNOUNCED, STATING HE HAD BEEN SENT BY DAO, AND EXPRESSED INTEREST IN BEING EITHER HAI'S DEPUTY OR, AT A MINIMUM, HIS CHIEF OF STAFF.

HAI [REDACTED] TOLD DIEP THAT HE ALREADY HAD A DEPUTY AND THAT UNDER EXISTING STAFFING ARRANGEMENTS HE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A SECOND DEPUTY OR TO A CHIEF OF STAFF. HE OFFERED DIEP INSTEAD A JOB AS A CORPS POLICE CHIEF BUT DIEP REFUSED. SHORTLY THEREAFTER DAO HAD THE NEW DECREE PROMULGATED PROVIDING FOR THREE DEPUTY DIRECTORS. HAI [REDACTED] RAISED THE MATTER OF THE DECREE.

DURING A LONG TALK WITH HUONG [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] HUONG [REDACTED] BRUSHED ASIDE HIS PROTESTS WITH THE COMMENT THAT HAI NEEDED SOME HELP. APPARENTLY HUONG HAS NOT [REDACTED]

1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] APPROVED THE APPOINTMENT OF DIEP TO THE POST FOR WHICH DAO HAS NOMINATED HIM. [REDACTED] ACCORDING TO RUMOR DAO IS GROOMING DIEP TO REPLACE HAI, POSSIBLY AT THE TIME WHEN HUONG RETIRES IN FAVOR OF VIEN. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HAI HAS [REDACTED] TOLD THE [REDACTED] STORY ABOUT DAO AND DIEP TO ONE OF HIS COLLEAGUES.)

1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)

5. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DAO HAS MORE INFLUENCE ON HUONG THAN ANY OTHER OF HUONG'S

1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)

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1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)

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ADVISERS, WITH GIOI AND HUONG'S SON AND PRIVATE SECRETARY, TRAN VAN DINH, BEING THE NEXT MOST INFLUENTIAL.

AS REGARDS PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU, INTERIOR MINISTER GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM HAS THE BEST CHANCE OF BECOMING A "STRONG MAN" IN THE GOVERNMENT SINCE THIEU SEEMS TO HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF CONFIDENCE IN KHIEM AND GIVES HIM GREAT LATITUDE IN MAKING DECISIONS.

1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)

ASKED TO COMMENT ON CURRENT RUMORS KHIEM MIGHT TAKE OVER AS PRIME MINISTER. KHIEM'S REPLY WAS THAT BOTH HE AND HAI ARE RELATIVELY YOUNG AND UNKNOWN TO THE PEOPLE AND, FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, WOULD HAVE TO WORK THROUGH PEOPLE WHO ARE WELL KNOWN. KHIEM ALSO POINTED OUT THAT IN POLITICS ONE DOES NOT HAVE TO HAVE A PRESTIGIOUS TITLE TO BE A POWERFUL MAN. THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO HAVE TRUSTED SUPPORTERS IN KEY POSTS THROUGHOUT THE POWER STRUCTURE.

1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)

6. HUONG

SEEMED VERY ENCOURAGED BY THE OUTCOME OF THE HONOLULU CONFERENCE AND EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE GVN HAD RECEIVED EVERYTHING IT HAD HOPED FOR.

7. DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR

1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)



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1.5(c); 3.4(b)(1)

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BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR  
KOMER, BRIG. GEN. DAVIDSON) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

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Authority PLJ 94-171 (4102)

By grip, NARA, Date 3-4-03

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Friday - July 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Free file*

SUBJECT: Andean Subregional Group and Possible Visit to South America

Another hopeful subregional integration movement in this hemisphere is the Andean Group: Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Chile. President Frei of Chile and President Lleras of Colombia are the spark-plugs.

Over the past few months, these steps have been taken to establish the Andean Common Market:

1. Last April a draft agreement was worked out by the Mixed Commission (the policy group) and submitted to the Presidents of the six countries.
2. Completion of the document aroused the slumbering opposition. As a result, the draft was sent back to the Committee of Experts for reworking and consultation with private sector representatives. The principal problem was programmed tariff cuts over a ten-year period. But there were also differences on other matters, such as "list of exceptions", structure, complementation, escape clause.
3. The experts and private representatives met during June with inconclusive results. The private sector boys, led by Venezuela, raised strong objections to programmed tariff liberalization applicable to existing industries. Our Embassies reported that this opposition was not so much based on specific foreseeable developments as on the uncertainties produced by tariff cuts. They also noted that the governments were doing little to counter this concern by making clear that they will help in studying the adjustment problems and provide financial assistance.
4. To help the Andean Governments to overcome private sector opposition, you authorized us in June to tell President Lleras that we would loan up to \$25 million for immigration adjustment assistance. He welcomed this offer.

5. The Mixed Commission again meets in Cartagena, Colombia on July 29 to try to work out a final draft.
6. Preparatory to this meeting, President Lleras sent his chief Andean Group negotiator, Jorge Valencia, to all the capitals. He asked for an aide memoire from us outlining what we are prepared to do on adjustment assistance which his negotiator could use in his talks. State gave him such a paper (Tab B).
7. In order to reassure the private sector further that they are not being asked to cast off blindly into an uncharted sea, President Lleras suggested that sectoral studies be made of the impact on existing industries and of new economic opportunities. We have agreed to contribute some grant money to this kitty.
8. Valencia's report on his trip to the other Andean capitals is at Tab A. He is encouraged.

One cannot predict the outcome of the Cartagena meeting. I hope it does the trick. If agreement is reached and signature is set for sometime later this year, you might consider making another weekend trip to join your Andean colleagues in Bogota or Lima for the signing ceremony. Then you could fly back via Brasilia to see your friend Costa e Silva to round out the trip.

If we can get the Caribbean countries to agree on the Caribbean Development Bank, this might afford another good weekend trip, with stops in Trinidad, Barbados and Jamaica.

Two quick trips of this nature to reinforce integration movements would further dramatize your support of regionalism.

W. W. Rostow

**Attachments**

- Tab A - Jorge Valencia's report on his trip to Andean capitals.
- Tab B - US Aide Memoire on adjustment assistance.





Department of State

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ACTION ARA 16

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XMB 06, IO 13, RSR 01, /177 W

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FM AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6281  
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
AMEMBASSY LIMA  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SANTIAGO 4616

SUBJECT: ANDEAN GROUP

VALENCIA, CHIEF COLOMBIAN NEGOTIATOR ON ANDEAN GROUP  
VISITED CHILE TUESDAY AS PART OF HIS TRIP TO ALL ANDEAN  
COUNTRIES PREPARATORY TO CARTEGENA MEETING BEGINNING  
JULY 29. PALMER HAD BRIEF TALK WITH VALENCIA WHO STATED  
FOLLOWING:

(1) HE WAS "OPTIMISTIC" THAT CARTEGENA MEETING WOULD  
RESULT IN AGREEMENT BY MOST OF THE COUNTRIES TO PROCEED  
WITH ANDEAN COMMON MARKET.

(2) DURING HIS VISITS, HE HAD BEEN "DEVELOPING NEW  
FORMULAS" FOR RESOLVING PREVIOUS DIFFICULTIES RAISED BY  
SUCH COUNTRIES AS VENEZUELA AND PERU.

(3) HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY LEONI'S BASIC DETERMINATION  
TO BRING VENEZUELA INTO GROUP, DESPITE STRONG OPPOSITION  
OF PRIVATE SECTOR. HE BELIEVED THAT VENEZUELAN DELEGATION  
TO CARTAGENA MEETING WOULD HAVE INSTRUCTIONS PERMITTING  
POSITIVE DECISIONS.

(4) IN ECUADOR, AROSEMENA HAD SHOWN RELUCTANCE TO  
MAKE ANY DECISIONS DURING BRIEF TIME REMAINING IN OFFICE.  
HOWEVER, VALENCIA HAD DISCUSSED ISSUES WITH VELASCO WHO  
CLEARLY UNINFORMED ABOUT ANDEAN PROPOSALS BUT REPORTEDLY

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Authority NLJ 94-275 (40c)

By *js/np* NARA Date 3-4-03





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STATED VIEW THAT ECUADOR MUST PARTICIPATE. UNCLEAR HOW THIS POINT OF VIEW WOULD AFFECT POSITION OF ECUADOREAN DELEGATION.

(5) U.S. WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE \$25 MILLION LOAN FOR INTEGRATION ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE HAD BEEN VERY HELPFUL TO HIM IN HIS TALKS IN THE SEVERAL COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY IN SEEKING TO OVERCOME OPPOSITION OF PRIVATE SECTOR GROUPS.

PS. FROM AMBASSADOR: FREI MUCH MORE OPTIMISTIC WITH ME LAST NIGHT. HE QUOTED VALENCIA AS HAVING TOLD HIM YESTERDAY THAT "FULL AGREEMENT" HAD BEEN REACHED BETWEEN COLUMBIA AND VENEZUELA, AND THAT THIS WOULD MEAN ALL OTHERS WOULD FALL IN LINE. FREI ALLOWED THAT VELASCO'S TOTAL IGNORANCE OF EVEN EXISTENCE OF ANDEAN GROUP MIGHT CREATE SOME PROBLEMS FOR ECUADOR.

KORRY

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DRAFTED BY: ARA/ECP:JASILBERSTEIN  
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AA/LA: MR FOWLER  
E/FOD: MR MUSER

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY  
INFO AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY LIMA  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
AMCONSUL RECIFE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 200675

LIMDIS

RECIFE FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OLIVER

SUBJECT: ANDEAN INTEGRATION

FOR AMBASSADOR CARLSON

1. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED PRESENT FOLLOWING AIDE-MEMOIRE TO GOC:

QUOTE THE EMBASSY CONFIRMS THE INFORMATION GIVEN AMBASSADOR VALENCIA AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS OF THE GOC ORALLY BY AMBASSADOR CARLSON ON JULY 3.

AMBASSADOR CARLSON STATED THAT IT HAD BEEN NOTED BY THE USG THAT AMONG THE OBJECTIVES OF SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION TO BE SET FORTH IN THE ANDEAN SUBREGIONAL AGREEMENT, NOW BEING NEGOTIATED,

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Authority OLJ 94-275 (40e)

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By jkf NARA, Date 3-4-03



# Department of State TELEGRAM

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SPECIAL ATTENTION WILL BE DIRECTED TO THE PROMOTION OF EFFICIENCY AND TRADE EXPANSION IN THE PRIVATE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR. IT IS RECOGNIZED BY THE USG THAT THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION MAY ENTAIL SOME DIFFICULT ADJUSTMENTS. SOME ELEMENTS OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR MAY BE ILL -PREPARED TO CONFRONT THE NEW SITUATIONS THAT WILL ARISE IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD. HENCE THERE MAY BE NEED FOR SOME ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY, WITHIN THE ANDEAN CORPORATION FRAME WORK, FUNDS MAY BE ASSURED TO ASSIST AFFECTED INDUSTRIES OR FIRMS IN MAKING NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS.

ONE SUCH ADJUSTMENT MAY BE THE MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES OR TECHNIQUES TO IMPORVE QUALITY AND REDUCE COSTS, THEREBY INCREASING A FIRM'S COMPETITIVE CAPABILITY IN THE INTE-GRATED MARKET. A SECOND TYPE OF ADJUSTMENT MAY INVOLVE SHIFTING FROM A TRADITIONAL LINE OF PRODUCT TO SOME RELATED LINE WITH MORE ATTRACTIVE PROSPECTS IN THE NEWLY INTEGRATED TRADING SYSTEM.

IT IS THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE USG THAT IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED BY SEVERAL OF THE ANDEAN PARTICIPANTS THAT A SPECIAL INDUSTRIAL FUND BE CREATED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ANDEAN CORPORATION WHICH CAN ASSIST IN FINANCING SOME PORTION OF THESE INDUSTRIAL ADJUSTMENTS. AMBASSADOR CARLSON HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY HIS GOVERNMENT TO INDICATE THAT ONCE THE ANDEAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND NECESSARY RATIFICATIONS OF THE ANDEAN SUBREGIONAL AGREEMENT BY THE RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN DEPOSITED, THE USG IS PREPARED TO RECEIVE A REQUEST FOR SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT TO AN INDUSTRIAL ADJUSTMENT FUND IN THE FORM OF A DOLLAR LOAN OF PERHAPS AS MUCH AS US \$25 MILLION TO FINANCE THE PURCHASE OF GOODS AND SERVICES FROM THE UNITED STATES ON THE SAME TERMS AND CONDITIONS ON WHICH DIRECT BILATERAL LOANS ARE PROVIDED. THE LOAN WOULD OF COURSE BE SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATIONS BY THE US CONGRESS AND WOULD SUPPLEMENT APPROPRIATE CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE MEMBER COUNTRIES. THE US WOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. UNQUOTE

FOR INFO ADDRESSEES:

2. FOREGOING OUTLINES OFFER OF ASSISTANCE TO ANDEAN GROUP WHICH AMBASSADOR CARLSON WAS AUTHORIZED TO EXPRESS TO PRESIDENT LLERAS IN RECENT DAYS. OFFER DESIGNED BOLSTER ANDEAN RESOLVE TO GO FORWARD WITH SUBREGIONAL AGREEMENT, BY HELPING CREATE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE FUND WHICH COULD SERVE TO ALLAY NERVOUSNESS

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OF VENEZUELAN, PERUVIAN AND ECUADOREAN PRIVATE SECTORS OVER POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF LETTING DOWN SUBREGIONAL TRADE BARRIERS

3. FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF INDICATIONS MIGHT BE HELPFUL, OFFER WAS MADE TO PRESIDENT LLERAS CONFIDENTIALLY TO AFFORD HIM MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY IN SURFACING WITH OTHER ANDEANS. AIDE-MEMOIRE IS NOW BEING PROVIDED AT REQUEST OF GOC. PRESIDENT LLERAS HAS COMMISSIONED JORGE VALENCIA, GOC SUPERINTENDENT OF FOREIGN TRADE, WHO IS PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE ON ANDEAN MATTERS AND OFFICIAL GOC REPRESENTATIVE ANDEAN MIXED COMMISSION, TO VISIT OTHER ANDEAN COUNTRIES AS FOLLOW-UP ON EXPERTS MEETING RECENTLY HELD IN BOGOTA. WE UNDERSTAND VALENCIA PLANS BEGIN VISITING OTHER GOVERNMENTS ABOUT JULY 15.

4. IF APPROACHED BY HOST GOVERNMENT RE VALENCIA REPORT OF US OFFER OF ASSISTANCE, YOU MAY CONFIRM IN GENERAL TERMS IF VERSION REPORTED TO YOU SUBSTANTIALLY AS OUTLINED IN AIDE-MEMOIRE. IF REPORT OF US ASSISTANCE OFFER DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY, YOU SHOULD INDICATE YOU WILL HAVE TO SEEK INFORMATION FROM DEPARTMENT AND REPORT HERE PROMPTLY.

5. IF HOST GOVERNMENT QUESTIONS WHY COLOMBIANS USED AS CHANNEL FOR US OFFER, YOU MAY INDICATE OFFER WAS MADE IN RESPONSE TO INDICATIONS FROM GOC THAT THIS TYPE OF ASSISTANCE MIGHT BE DESIRED BY THE GROUP. WAS MADE ON CONFIDENTIAL BASIS TO AFFORD ANDEANS EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO CONSIDER AND TURN DOWN QUIETLY IF DETERMINED THIS ASSISTANCE NOT DESIRED. SINCE BOGOTA SITE OF EXPERTS AND OTHER ANDEAN MEETINGS, GOC DEEMED MOST EXPEDITIOUS CHANNEL FOR MAKING CONFIDENTIAL OFFER TO ALL ANDEAN GOVERNMENTS.  
GP-3. RUSK

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