

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Smith to Rostow PCI 1 p	8/10/68	A
#1a cable	Smith to President (CAP 81918) — <i>Open MLJ 97-409 9.29.98</i> S 1 p	8/9/68	A
#2 cable	Smith to President (CAP 81891) TS 2 p	8/8/68	A
#3a cable	Paris 19294 C 1 p	8/9/68	A
#6 cable	Duplicate of #1a <i>open 12-2309</i> <i>[dup #62a papers of SES, "SES Chron, 8-9, 1968" Box 4]</i>		
#7 memo	Davis to President C 1 p	8/9/68	A
#8 memo	Wright to President PCI 1 p	8/9/68	A
#9a cable	Smith to President (CAP 81904) S 2 p	8/9/68	A
#11a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>Sent. and 8/13/68 NS 01-144</i> S 5 p	8/8/68	A
#12a memo	Hamilton to President, 5:15 p.m. <i>open 12-2309</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #100, NSF, Country File, India, Vol. 11]	8/8/68	A
#12b memo	Katzenbach to President <i>open 12-2309</i> S 3 p [Duplicate of #100a, NSF, Country File, India, Vol. 11]	8/8/68	A
#13 memo	Fried and Bowdler to President C 3 p	8/8/68	A
#15 memo	Smith to President S 1 p	8/8/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 90, August 1-10, 1968

Box 38

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#16 memo	Saunders to President S 2 p SANITIZED 7/14/95 NLS 93-42 (dup. # 19, NSF, Country File, "Middle East, Vol II" Box 104)	8/8/68	A
#16a memo	Ball and Siseo to President and SecState S 12 p " " " (dup # 194 404brrc) open 9-17-07 NLS 25-98	8/6/68	A
#17 memo	Smith to Christian C 1 p	8/8/68	A
#19 memo	Smith to President C 1 p open 9-8-93 NLS 93-58	8/8/68	A
#19a memo	Wheeler to President C 2 p open 10-26-93 NLS 93-59	8/6/68	A
#22 memo	Clifford to President open 12-23-09 S 1 p [Duplicate of #70, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(13)-- General Military Activity"]	8/7/68	A
#22a memo	Clifford to Secretaries of Mlt. Depts.... open 12-23-09 S 1 p [Duplicate of #70a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(13)-- General Military Activity"]	undated	A
#23 memo	Smith to President S 1 p	8/7/68	A
#23a cable	Deptel 216256 to Saigon S 2 p	8/6/68	A
#23b cable	Saigon 34711 S 2 p	8/7/68	A
#24a cable	Saigon 34704 S 6 p	8/7/68	A
#25a cable	Paris 19131 open RAC 3/98 S 2 p [dup. # 16, NSF, CEVN, "HANOI Chron V. 10"] [dup. # 70+700, NSF, CEVN, "HANOI Paris TDEL... V. 10"]	8/7/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#26 memo	Smith to President S 1 p	8/7/68	A
#28 memo	Smith to President <i>open 4-200 NLJ 97-146</i> TS 1 p [Duplicate of #29, NSF, Country File, India, Vol. 11] [" # 156, NSF, " " Pakistan, vol. 9, Box 154]	8/6/68	A
#28a memo	Hamilton to President TS 1 p <i>open 12-7-99 NLJ 97-146</i>	8/6/68	A
#28b report	"Analysis and Recommendation" TS 4 p <i>sanitized 12-7-99 NLJ 97-146</i>	8/6/68	A
#28c cable	From Ambassador Oehlert 5602 TS 8 p <i>OPEN 9-29-98 NLJ 97-142</i>	8/5/68	A
#28d cable	New Delhi 17737 <i>open 2-24-14</i> S 2 p <i>[dup # 29, India, vol. 11, Box 132]</i>	7/31/68	A
#28e cable	President to Ambassador Oehlert TS 1 p <i>open 12-7-99 NLJ 97-146</i>	undated	A
#28f memo	Katzenbach to President S 5 p	7/3/68	A
#29 memo	Saunders to President S 1 p	8/6/68	A
#29a ltr	Eshkol to President C 2 p <i>[dup #19a, NSF 5405, "Israel, 9/1/68-12/12/68" Box 27]</i>	8/5/68	A
#30 memo	Smith to SecState S 1 p	8/6/68	A
#31a memo	Taylor to President <i>open 8-12-93 NLJ 92-383</i> S 4 p [Duplicate of #7a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "8 I--Taylor Memos--General"]	8/5/68	A

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#32a memo	Wheeler to President S 2 p	8/5/68	A
#33a cable	Selassie to President PCI 1 p	8/6/68	A
#34 memo	Davis to President <i>open 12-23-09</i> PCI 2 p [Partial duplicate of #137, NSF, CF, Israel, Vol. X; Sanitized NLJ 84-168]	8/6/68	A
#35 memo	To the President <i>open 12-23-09</i> C 2 p [Duplicate of #13, NSF, CF, India, Vol. 4]	8/5/68	A
#35a memo	Zwick to President <i>open 12-23-09</i> C 2 p [Duplicate of #13b, NSF, CF, India, Vol. 4]	8/3/68	A
#35b memo	Gaud and Freeman to President <i>open 12-23-09</i> C 4 p [Duplicate of #13d, NSF, CF, India, Vol. 4]	7/26/68	A
#36 cable	Smith to President S 2 p	8/5/68	A
#37 cable	Smith to President S 1 p <i>Alami NY 019-038-2-2 (1/02)</i>	8/5/68	A
#38 cable	Smith to President PCI 1 p	8/5/68	A
#39 cable	Smith to President <i>open 12-23-09</i> C 1 p [Partial duplicate of #138, NSF, CF, Israel, Vol. X; Sanitized NLJ 84-168]	8/5/68	A
#42 cable	Smith to President C 1 p	8/3/68	A

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#44 cable	Smith to President S 1 p	8/3/68	A
#45 cable	Smith to President S 1 p	8/3/68	A
#46 cable	Smith to President S 1 p	8/3/68	A
#46a cable	Deptel to Paris S 4 p <i>RMING 0194038-2-3 (1/02)</i>	8/3/68	A
#48 cable	Smith to President S 2 p	8/2/68	A
#53b rpt	"Message for Rusk from Australian Minister..." S 2 p <i>open 12-23-09</i> [Duplicate of #16b, NSF, Country File, Australia, Vol. 3]	8/2/68	A
#54 cable	Smith to President C 1 p	8/2/68	A
#56 cable	Davis to President <i>open 8-14-97 NLJ 97-107</i> S 1 p	8/2/68	A
#58b cable	Clifford to President S 4 p [Sanitized NLJ 89-38; 1990]	8/1/68	A
#59 cable	Smith to President TS 1 p	8/1/68	A
#59a cable	Wheeler to President TS 3 p	7/31/68	A
#60a cable	Saigon 34156 S 9 p [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 10; 1983]	8/1/68	A

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#61 cable	Smith to President C 1 p	8/1/68	A
#63 cable	Smith to President S 1 p	8/1/68	A
#63a cable	Saigon 34163 S 3 p <i>Incl. dtd, NSF, CF, NW, "MARUAN CHRON V. 17"</i>	8/1/68	A
#64 cable	Davis to President C 1 p	8/1/68	A
#66 cable	Smith to President PCI 1 p	8/1/68	A
#66a ltr	Ayub Khan to President PCI 2 p	7/19/68	A
#69 memo	Smith to President S 1 p	8/1/68	A
#69a cable	Saigon 34147 S 3 p	8/1/68	A
#69b cable	Secretary to Bunker S 2 p	8/1/68	A
#72 memo	Davis to President C 1 p	8/1/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#37a rpt	Intelligence report <i>sanc per RAC 6/04</i> 1 p TS	8/4/68	A
#41 note	Bromley Smith to the President <i>exempt per RAC 5/03</i> 1 p TS	8/3/68	A
#41a cable	Intelligence report <i>exempt per RAC 5/03</i> 1p TS	[8/68]	A
#65 note	Bromley Smith to the President <i>exempt per RAC 5/03</i> 1p TS	8/1/68	A
#65a rpt	Intelligence report <i>exempt per RAC 5/03</i> 2 pp TS	7/31/68	A
#67 note	Bromley Smith to the President <i>exempt per RAC 5/03</i> 1p TS	8/1/68	A
#67a rpt	Intelligence report <i>exempt per RAC 5/03</i> 1p TS	7/24/68	A
#70 note	Bromley Smith to the President <i>sanc per RAC 3/04</i> 1p TS	8/1/68	A
#70a rpt	Intelligence report <i>open 11/3/09 RAC</i> 3 pp S	n.d.	A

FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Volume 90, 8/1-10/68, Box 38

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EEA085
03 WTE10
DE WTE 3109

1a

FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81918

SENT
RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 AUG 10 00 42

FS

~~SECRET~~

FRIDAY, AUGUST 9, 1968

INFORMATION

THE CURRENT STATUS OF HANOI'S EFFORT WITH THE NORWEGIANS TO OPEN UP A DIPLOMATIC FRONT IN ADDITION TO THE PARIS TALKS IS AS FOLLOWS:

1. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW, ACCOMPANIED BY A HANOI FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL HAS BEEN INVITED BY THE NORWEGIANS TO COME TO OSLO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY BEFORE AUGUST 15.

2. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVE WILL COME FROM MOSCOW BECAUSE HANOI DECIDED THAT THEIR RELATIONS WITH CHINA WERE SUCH THAT THEIR AMBASSADOR IN PEKING SHOULD NOT GO ON THE TRIP TO OSLO AS HAD BEEN PLANNED ORIGINALLY.

THE FIRST APPROACH TO THE NORWEGIANS WAS MADE LAST MONTH BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR IN PEKING WHO INDICATED THAT HANOI WAS DISSATISFIED WITH THE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS; THAT IT WAS INTERESTED IN A "NEW DEAL" THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS, AND THAT NORWAY WAS CONSIDERED TO BE THE "MOST FAVORABLE" INTERMEDIATE LINK AS A MEMBER OF NATO.

WE HAVE NO MORE INFORMATION ON WHICH TO JUDGE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE APPROACH THROUGH THE NORWEGIANS. AN OFFICER FROM OUR PARIS DELEGATION IS GOING TO OSLO QUIETLY TO TELL THE NORWEGIANS THAT WHILE WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANY PROPOSALS HANOI MIGHT ADVANCE TO TURN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD MORE SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF ISSUES, WE ARE INCLINED TO FEEL THAT MULTIPLE CHANNELS MIGHT CONFUSE HANOI. HOWEVER, IF HANOI WISHES TO TALK WITH US THROUGH A THIRD PARTY, WE WOULD, OF COURSE, LISTEN. THE NORWEGIANS WILL ALSO BE TOLD THAT THE REAL PROBLEM IS NOT ABSENCE OF CHANNELS, BUT HANOI'S UNWILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS REALISTICALLY THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH BOMBING MIGHT STOP.

DTG: 100305Z AUGUST 1968

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-409
By id, NARA Date 9-29-95

SECRET - SENSITIVE

FROM BROMLEY SMITH

TO THE PRESIDENT

Here is Ambassador Shriver's response to Secretary Rusk's query about Paris press leaks which was sent to you earlier today.
(Cap 81904)

Aug 9, 1968

4

3

Pres file

Ambassador Harriman's response

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1989
By 19, NARA, Date 11-5-92

2015

4

Friday, August 9, 1968

**FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT**

Pres file

**Our search up to now has uncovered only the following letter from
Governor Agnew which does not specifically mention Vietnam but does
cover "important positions you have taken for the good of the country".
(See paragraph 2.)**

BKS:ksb

WTE13
WTE 3093

FROM BROWLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH81902

UNCLAS

NO LETTERS FROM NIXON HAVE BEEN FOUND IN YOUR FILES.

OUR SEARCH UP TO NOW HAS UNCOVERED ONLY THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM GOVERNOR AGNEW. IT DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION VIETNAM BUT DOES COVER "IMPORTANT POSITIONS YOU HAVE TAKEN FOR THE GOOD OF THE COUNTRY." (SEE PARAGRAPH 2).

AGNEW'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ARE IN FOLLOWING MESSAGE. YOU WILL NOTE THAT HIS SON IS IN VIETNAM.

JULY 19, 1968

THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

YOUR NAMING ME TO THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS MAKES ME VERY PROUD. TO BE NAMED BY ANY PRESIDENT TO SUCH AN IMPORTANT COMMISSION IS A DISTINCT HONOR, BUT TO BE DESIGNATED BY A PERSON WHOM ONE ADMIRES AND RESPECTS IS DOUBLY SATISFYING.

AS A CLOSE OBSERVER OF THE WASHINGTON SCENE WHO LIVES WITHIN A SIMILAR, EVEN IF SMALLER, POLITICAL ARENA, I HAVE LONG ADMIRERD YOUR PERSONAL COURAGE AND DEVOTION TO THE BURDENS OF THE MOST DEMANDING OFFICE IN THE WORLD, IN A SMALL WAY AND WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS OF MY PARTY AFFILIATION I HAVE TRIED TO SUPPORT IMPORTANT POSITIONS YOU HAVE TAKEN FOR THE GOOD OF THE COUNTRY. I WILL CONTINUE TO BE OF ASSISTANCE TO YOU IN ANY WAY THAT I CAN DURING THE REMAINDER OF YOUR TERM AND AFTER, SHOULD THE OCCASION PRESENT ITSELF.

PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE APPRECIATION FOR THIS HONOR, ALONG WITH MY ASSURANCE THAT I WILL PERFORM IN THIS POSITION TO THE UTMOST OF MY ABILITY.

RESPECTFULLY YOURS,

(S) SPIRO T. AGNEW

DTG: 091557 AUG 1968

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117
UN

ACTION

Friday, August 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You have received a very nice letter from Mary Lawless, who has served the Harold Holt family for 22 years and is now about to retire at 74. Attached is a suggested reply for your signature.

Marshall Wright

Atts

Pres file

5

August 9, 1968

Dear Miss Lawless:

It was very thoughtful and kind of you to write me and enclose your moving poem to the memory of Harold Holt.

Mr. Holt was one of the finest men and ablest statesmen I have ever known. He was a source of great strength to me not only as a faithful colleague but as a close personal friend. Your recollection of Mr. Holt's regard for Mrs. Johnson and me was heartwarming.

I very much appreciate your kind words about my coming retirement from office. Let me reciprocate by wishing you a pleasant retirement after so many faithful years of service with the Holts.

Mrs. Johnson and I hope you will pass on our best wishes to Mrs. Holt.

Sincerely,

Miss Mary E. Lawless
112 St. Georges Road
Toorak 3142
Melbourne, Australia

LBJ:MWright:wpt

Mrs. J. J. ... Bellmore Vic.
 112 ST. GEORGES ROAD
 TOORAK 3142
 May 21st 1968
 President Johnson

Dear Sir, 8/7/68

I have been wanting
 to write a few lines to you
 ever since you first came to
 Australia and to the Lodge
 at Canberra, A.C.T. when the
 late Prime Minister Harold Holt
 was in residence, as I have been
 with the Holt family for over
 22 years now. I came to them
 in 1946 and as Nurse to their
 boys and I did so much
 want to meet you when
 you were here last time
 but was too greived to come
 up from Portsea to Bellmore
 I wanted to tell you how
 I have always admired
 you being President of America
 and am so sorry you are
 retiring the late Prime
 Minister was so kind and

I proud of you and you
both meant so much to
the world, only on that last
Sunday at Portsea he was
showing me pictures of you
he had brought down from
Canberra to put in his
Picture Gallery. For xmas
he was a wonderful man
and I miss him more than
I can tell you he was like
a son to me and he thought
so much of you and your
Wife. I have always been
pleased I met Mrs Johnson in
Canberra outside the Lodge
with other staff. This is one
thing I am very proud of
Mrs Holt is a very wonderful
person and as I am 74 years
of age I will have to retire
soon I am enclosing a Poem
I composed of the late Prime Minister
Harold Holt,

3). I hope I have not
taken up too much of your
time. I remain,
Yours sincerely,

Mary E. Taylor

42 St George Rd

Toronto

Ontario

Canada

1912

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112 ST. GEORGES ROAD

TOORAK 3142

May 21st 1968

PRIME MINISTER

HAROLD HOLT

From the Worlds troubled
times he has vanished
At the height of his zenith
hath fled,
Snatched from our midst
by the unconquered foe.
The Man and the statesman
lies dead
But the work he did and
the truth he meant
The Counsel he gave and the
pains he spent
The time-worn work on his
honest brow
And the heart he left his
people now
Will for ever stand a monument..

M. E. Lawless
M. Lawless

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION 6

Friday, August 9, 1968

FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT

Pres. file

The current status of Hanoi's effort with the Norwegians to open up a diplomatic front in addition to the Paris talks is as follows:

1. The North Vietnamese Ambassador to Moscow, accompanied by a Hanoi foreign ministry official has been invited by the ~~NORWEGIANS~~ Norwegians to come to Oslo as soon as possible, preferably before August 15.

2. The North Vietnamese representative will come from Moscow because Hanoi decided that their relations with China were such that their Ambassador in Peking should not go on the trip to Oslo as had been planned originally.

The first approach to the Norwegians was made last month by the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Peking who indicated that Hanoi was dissatisfied with the Paris negotiations; that it was interested in a "new deal" through other channels, and that Norway was considered to be the "most favorable" intermediate link as a member of NATO.

We have no more information on which to judge the seriousness of the North Vietnamese approach through the Norwegians. An officer from

DECLASSIFIED

Authority PL 597-409 (4/a)

~~SECRET~~

by ip/jc, NARA, Date 12-21-09

~~SECRET~~

-2-

our Paris delegation is going to Oslo quietly to tell the Norwegians that while we would be interested in any proposals Hanoi might advance to turn peace negotiations toward more serious discussion of issues, we are inclined to feel that multiple channels might confuse Hanoi. However, if Hanoi wishes to talk with us through a third party, we would, of course, listen. The Norwegians will also be told that the real problem is not absence of channels, but Hanoi's unwillingness to discuss realistically the circumstances under which bombing might stop.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET SENSITIVE

INFORMATION

Zis

Friday, August 9, 1968

9

FROM BROMLEY SMITH

Pres file

TO THE PRESIDENT

Following is an exchange of sensitive telegrams between Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Harriman concerning press leaks in Paris.

BKS:ksb

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18, NARA, Date 11-5-92

Lio

10

Friday, August 9, 1968 -- 4:30 PM

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ED HAMILTON

Pres. file

You will recall approving a September trip to Japan and other Asian points by Eugene Black in his capacity as your advisor on Asian development. Gene wants to make specific plans, but he wants to be sure that he has your authorization to use a Presidential aircraft. His previous trips have been in Presidential planes and he has found ~~that~~ this is most useful in getting the attention and access he needs.

Black has asked me to check with you on the plane before he nails down the details of his trip.

Black authorized to take Presidential plane _____

No _____

Call me _____

EKH/vmr

cc: BKSmith

INFORMATION //

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, August 8, 1968
6:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Returning from a trip to South Vietnam, George Carver of CIA reports that the political atmosphere in Saigon, at least momentarily, is healthier than it has been in over a decade.

His full report is attached.

Brom
Bromley Smith

~~SECRET~~

2453

~~11a~~
11a

8 August 1968

Profile

MEMORANDUM

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

SUBJECT: Preliminary-Trip Report from [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

As you may know [REDACTED] has been on an observation trip to Saigon for the past few weeks. He has sent a preliminary report on his travels, which may be of interest to you. His report follows.

1. The trip was useful and enlightening, thanks in large measure to invaluable assistance from our Station and other Mission components. I visited, and did some travelling in, I, II and IV Corps, talked with Corps commanders, other ARVN officers, province chiefs, police officers and a broad spectrum of US military and civilian officials. I did not travel in III Corps but had good sessions with our old and new Regional Officers. In Saigon, I saw a wide variety of people including Thieu, Ky, Prime Minister Huong, Interior Minister Khiem, Police Director Hai, right-wing Catholics, left-wing Catholics, intellectuals, in and out politicians, and even Tri Quang. I had a profitable long session with General Abrams on 6 August, a good visit with his J-2, General Davidson, and a wrap-up lunch with Ambassadors Bunker and Berger. The following are my principal impressions.

2. The over-all caliber and performance of our Saigon Station is first class; it is highly thought of by the rest of the Mission, and does CIA great credit. No visitor can fail to be impressed by the high degree of professionalism which marks the Station's personnel, their dedication to duty, and their effective discharge of complex responsibilities in trying and often dangerous circumstances.

3. On political matters, during our conversation President Thieu took up the Lien Minh front, endorsed it, and said he would back it. As the Station has reported, Thieu also asked for US support and said he planned to take this topic up with Bunker at their next meeting. The Station drafted a concrete program which I went over with Bunker and Berger during our 6 August lunch. Bunker approved it and I am bringing a copy back to Washington.

~~SECRET~~

SANTIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 01-144
By SJ, NARA Date 8-8-01

~~SECRET~~

The Lien Minh is a far from perfect vehicle but it can be most useful in Vietnam and, particularly, abroad if we recognize that it is a front and do not expect it to become an instant political party.

4. As for over-all impressions, our adversaries are beset with mounting problems engendered by casualties, General Abrams skillful spoiling operations which are rendered increasingly successful by ever better prior intelligence, ARC LIGHT strikes (ditto on improved effectiveness through better intelligence), somewhat improved ARVN performance (in some areas), popular disaffection with Tet and post-Tet terrorism (plus irritation at increased taxation and impressment), and the strides being made in the attack on at least the lower levels of the infrastructure. All of this has produced Communist performance shortfalls, frustrated plans, and declining morale in at least some areas. Our adversaries are nonetheless still formidable and are almost certainly planning a major upsurge of offensive activity in the very near future. I personally expect Danang to be attacked any time, believe Saigon will be hit hard within the next two weeks, and anticipate ancillary attacks on Chu Lai, Quang Tri and Hoi An in I Corps and Tay Ninh and other exposed province towns in III Corps. I doubt if there will be much besides harassment in II and IV Corps. The VC will certainly be repulsed, but they will make lots of noise and could score some limited successes, particularly in outlying areas. General Lam, the refreshingly perceptive I Corps commander, hit it about right when (speaking for Danang) he said he was certain he could keep the VC from taking the city, but was not certain he could prevent their slipping in small groups capable of causing considerable trouble before they were killed or captured.

5. The people I have talked to seem convinced that the recent downturn in enemy activity was almost certainly dictated by a need for regroupment, refitting and other preparations for a new offensive. They believe that recent Communist activity patterns were not adopted as conciliatory or de-escalating gestures, though Hanoi is doubtless delighted for them to be so interpreted abroad since this improves Hanoi's image and generates political mileage out of a course of action Hanoi actually embarked on as an essential prelude to intensified struggle. Though the attack indicators are rapidly mounting, Hanoi could probably still abort or delay at least the major assaults if changes in the international political climate made this seem advisable. Despite a few counter currents, however, the weight of presently available evidence strongly suggests that major attacks are imminent.

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6. On our side, there is wide variation from locale to locale, but I generally found the provincial picture less bleak than anticipated. In many areas we seem to have recovered substantially from Tet, and in some places are doing rather better than that. Where RD teams are assigned responsibilities bearing some recognizable resemblance to those for which they were trained, their performance is generally adequate or better. Where these teams are used as outer fringe security units, they are understandably not very effective. Always allowing for local variation, the Provincial Reconnaissance Units are performing effectively (often very effectively) countrywide. The Static Census Grievance program is almost everywhere a first class producer of local infrastructure intelligence.

7. Now that the word has come down through GVN channels unmistakably loud and clear, the Phoenix program (attack on the infrastructure) is becoming a bright spot on the provincial scene. Naturally not all of the mushrooming District Intelligence and Operations Centers are yet worthy of the name. But, thanks to all that Phoenix involves and has stimulated, we are now substantially ahead of where we used to be on local, hard infrastructure information, and this vital program is being extended briskly.

8. The critical provincial problem remains,--as always, first and second echelon Vietnamese leadership (PF platoon leader through district and province chief). Where this is good, good things happen; where it is bad, so too is the local situation. The adjoining I Corps provinces of Quang Nam (soft) and Quang Tin (encouraging) provide an excellent parallel illustration of this point. Quang Tin, incidentally, provided a striking example of what one good, gutsy district chief can accomplish in a short span of time (eight months) in a district (Thinh Ban) previously considered hopeless for many reasons (including the frequent presence or proximity of the 2nd NVA Division). My own belief (shared, I found, by province chiefs and others who were themselves good local leaders), is that the local leadership problem is not going to be solved until the GVN begins tapping the pool our adversaries have always drawn on so profitably for just this purpose: bright peasant youths who never darkened the door of any lycée. A systematic GVN exploitation of this talent resource could produce dramatic results in a very short span of time.

9. In Saigon, President Thieu steadily strengthens his position and acts more like an effective President with every passing day. Thieu's increasingly evident primacy has taken at least temporary care of matters such as the former Thieu-Ky problem. The political surface is reasonably calm, but beneath this surface things on which we should keep a watchful eye are beginning to stir. Vietnamese politics are heavily permeated with an air

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of malaise and worried uncertainty which virtually every Vietnamese I talked to said was caused by confusion about American policy and intentions. Honolulu did much to dispel this malaise (at least temporarily) among key leaders themselves. It also helped with Saigon politicians (amateur and professional), but to a considerably lesser extent. Thieu's pattern of recent appointments plus his penchant (I think unconscious) for lapsing into Diem era styles of speech (such as mandarin phrasings) has started many tongues wagging about a return of "Can Laoism," a not so trivial point because the 1963 coup is still a strong (though latent) emotional issue. Tri Quang, naturally, is already convinced that Thieu is "Diem reincarnated," and that he is determined to do in the Buddhists (i. e., Tri Quang) as soon as possible. Militant Buddhist fanaticism on this score constitutes no immediate threat to stability, but that could change if Tri Quang were ever handed a real concrete issue to work on. Many military officers (particularly those who carried out the 1963 coup and benefited the most therefrom) are somewhat edgy about the return of the ancien régime, increasingly concerned about Thieu's constancy in combatting Communism and, of course, quite uneasy about their own future under Thieu's increasingly powerful hands.

10. Not surprisingly, Interior Minister Khiem provides a handy, catalytic symbol for several of the attitudes cited above. I fear he may eventually cause us some other problems as well, despite the fact that he is now on good behavior, busily breaking bureaucratic bottlenecks on programs Americans like, and apparently backing Colonel Hai's anti-corruption drive in the police (more I suspect because this cleans out Loan's men than because of any intrinsic moral antipathy to corruption). As Interior Minister, Khiem has a lot of at least potential power (e. g., nomination of all province chiefs). His ambition is quite imperfectly concealed; the four silver stars beside his office suite's outer door remind all who pass that ARVN's most senior general sits within. From our conversation I got the strong impression that he has learned nothing and forgotten nothing since his ouster in 1964. (For example, he told me that Revolutionary Development is simply the Strategic Hamlet Program under a new name.) His former colleagues (the ones who threw him out) are decidedly edgy about the short list of scores to settle and accounts to square that they are convinced Khiem carries in his pocket, with their names figuring prominently thereon. By no accident, with Khang's replacement by Do Cao Tri in III Corps, none of the leading members of this circle now has a troop command, but they still have friends and are still around. (Incidentally, if we think we have problems with Ky, wait until the US press discovers Tri's penchant for colorful, quotable statements, particularly on the subject of Cambodia.)

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11. Even describing the attitudes outlined in the two preceding paragraphs implicitly exaggerates their present or immediate importance. These are all possible causes of future difficulty, not current concerns. On the whole, despite the real Communist menace and emotional worries about American policy, I found the political atmosphere in Saigon at least momentarily healthier than it has been in over a decade. Vietnamese moods are mercurial, but formerly repressed or taboo thoughts and ideas -- peace, settlement, even hazy notions of victory in a finite time frame -- are now openly talked about. The light of day is helping to dispel at least some of their mystery for the Vietnamese. Thieu's government may be strongly liked by only a few and distrusted (in some measure) by many. It is inclined (I think dangerously but not irremediably so) to approach Vietnam's problems with the same concepts that permitted these problems to reach their present crisis proportions, but for the time being, at least, Thieu's government is governing.

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12

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, August 10, 1968

The President did not approve or disapprove this recommendation. He asked that we hold off for the time being and ask him again near the time of Mrs. Gandhi's arrival.

(Per BKS)

BKS:ksb
cc: Mr. Hamilton

12a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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Thursday, August 8, 1968 -- 5:15 PM

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick Katzenbach's brief report on his trip to
India,

Pres file

On the last page Nick notes that Mrs. Gandhi will be stopping in New York on October 14 after an extended visit to Latin America. He suggests that you invite her to a small lunch at the White House on October 15.

I think you should decide for or against the lunch on its social and ceremonial merits. Mrs. G. isn't likely to press you on specific issues, nor is she normally prepared to do serious listening on international problems. (Katzenbach's session with her in Delhi was almost embarrassingly short on substance.) If your October schedule permits, I think it would be nice -- but not essential -- to invite the lady to lunch.


Ed Hamilton

Set up a small lunch for October 15 _____

I'll send her a welcoming message, but no lunch _____

Hold off _____

Call me _____

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *rlj*, NARA, Date *12-21-09*

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 8, 1968

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Indo-US Talks, July 26-28, 1968

As you know, I have just finished a week in India launching the first in a series of annual planning talks with the Indians. During the week--in addition to three days of talks--I visited the huge Bahra-Naugal Dam, a family planning center and an agricultural research station. In addition, I had private talks with Mrs. Gandhi, President Husain and Deputy Prime Minister Desai.

I came away with the following impressions and conclusions:

-- India is managing its affairs far better than I had suspected. Vast problems remain, but I was continually struck by the spirit of determination and self-confidence of all.

-- There has been a very real and exciting breakthrough in agriculture. The Indians now are giving agricultural production the priority it deserves. Sustained progress will, of course, require sustained Indian effort and both support and policy monitoring by the aid consortium. You can be proud of your personal role in reducing the threat of a massive Indian famine and malnutrition.

The talks themselves went well. The atmosphere was good; the discussions informal and relaxed. By agreement, we both stuck to the larger issues and did not push too hard on touchy subjects.

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Authority FRUS 64-68. 10/25. #509

By JK NARA. Date 12-21-09

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South East Asia

The most significant outcome of the talks was an Indian indication that they have decided to take on a more active role in Southeast Asia. In the short run this means improving their relations with the countries of the region. For the post-Viet-Nam period they suggested that they--with other SEA countries--promote a regional group which would assume greater responsibility for the problems of the area. The Indians hope the neutrality and security of this grouping would be recognized and supported by the US and others.

The idea certainly has not been thought out in detail, but the significant point is India's initiative to involve itself in an area it has long overlooked. We told the Indians to try the idea out on others, including the Russians, with whom they plan similar talks next month.

Surprisingly, the Indians did not exclude Pakistan from this regional grouping. I also was interested to hear that the Indians are now surplus in small arms production. One of the roles they might play in promoting their scheme would be to supply modest military assistance (both equipment and training).

China

I returned with a far better understanding of India's problems with China. The Indians are extremely troubled by Chinese pressures, and have built up a substantial force to cope with any conventional military threat (including Chinese support for insurgents along the northeastern borders). Morale among the Indian armed forces is high and--unlike 1962--they should be able to give a good account of themselves. As we total up our security assets in Asia, I think we can look upon this force as a net plus against China.

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Pakistan


Tanks for Pakistan came up at various times, but the Indians did not belabor the subject as they had earlier threatened to do. This is, as you know, an extremely complicated problem, so I will send you a separate memo on it.

Aid

Not surprisingly, the Indians are troubled about aid cutbacks, but are adjusting to the blow. They were particularly worried about prospects for IDA, since continuation of their import liberalization program is dependent upon IDA funds.

Gandhi Trip

I learned that Mrs. Gandhi will visit South America in September and October. She expects to stop overnight in New York on October 14 on her way back, and would, I suspect, like to see you informally while she is in the US. You may want to invite her to a private lunch at the White House on October 15. I personally believe it would be a useful move.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

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August 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM JONES

SUBJECT: Sir Robert Menzies' visit to the University of Texas

Pres file

I am informed by the Australian Embassy that Sir Robert's schedule is now as follows:

Arrives Austin Sept. 25 - 6:24 p. m. In Austin, residing at the Driscoll Hotel

Sept. 26 - University activities including lunch, lecture and faculty dinner

Sept. 27 - University activities including lecture

Sept. 28 - Hemisfair visit - speech at U. S. Pavilion - tour - lunch. Residence at Oak Court

Sept. 29 - Free

Sept. 30 - Austin - Campus tour - lunch - lecture-dinner with townspeople

Oct. 1 - Free

Oct. 2 - Meet with students - visit to State Capitol and Governor's Mansion - formal farewell dinner hosted by Chancellor Ransome

Oct. 3 - Depart 9:20 a. m. on Trans Texas, Arr. Houston 10:00; depart 11:15 on National Airlines, Arr. San Francisco 1:30 p. m. Depart San Francisco 2:45 on United.

I am told that all this has been worked out with Sir Robert's assent. Everything looks good so far, but there are two loose ends of which you should be aware:

1. The President was very much on people's minds in leaving Sir Robert's schedule free on Sunday, September 29. That appears to be an ideal time for a visit to the Ranch, if such is desired. (Tuesday, October 1, is also free, but Sir Robert hopes to use it to "tie up any loose ends that may arise in connection with his university activities.")

2. Commercial air connections back to San Francisco on October 3 are something less than ideal. I think the Australians would be very glad for an offer of private transportation from Austin to San Francisco to catch the ~~United~~ flight at 2:30 p. m.

Marshall Wright
Marshall Wright

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, August 8, 1968

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 93-42

By cb, NARA, Date 6-16-95

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ambassador Ball's Report on Middle East Trip

We have already described for you the results of Ambassador Ball's Mid-East talks, so you do not need to read his long report (attached). However, you may wish to read the main personal conclusions which are scattered through his report:

1. Some movement on the part of Israel is perceptible. However, without substantial and continuing pressure from the United States on both the Israelis and the Arabs, the Jarring Mission is not going to produce any significant movement toward settlement.
2. Unless compelled to move affirmatively either by events or external pressure the Israeli government is quite ready to live with the present situation of neither peace nor war for an indefinite time.
3. King Hussein desperately wants a settlement since he has lost half his country and is under terrible pressure; however, his freedom of action is severely limited not only by the Palestinian Arabs who constantly threaten him, but by the UAR.
4. Nasser is in a weak position and will almost certainly take no initiative toward a settlement. While the UAR economy is a shambles he continues to live off a dole from the Saudis, Libyans, and the Kuwaitis, which he can probably continue to exact so long as the Canal remains closed.
5. King Faisal is driven by religious passion, and deeply preoccupied with the protection of the Muslim Holy Places in Jerusalem. Hussein must certainly consult Faisal on any Jerusalem settlement, and, if not satisfied, Faisal would try hard to persuade Hussein not to go ahead.

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6. Kosygin told Jarring recently that he wants a political settlement. While the prevailing "no-war, no-peace" situation is not unattractive to the Soviets, we should not take this for granted -- particularly in view of their interest in opening the Suez Canal. It seems doubtful that we can deflect the Soviet Union from its one-sided support of the Arabs, but we should at least make an effort, if for no other reason than that 100 countries will expect us to do so.

In addition, Ambassador Ball reports that the UAR and USSR are under great pressure to see the Suez Canal opened, as are the British, Italians and French to decreasing degrees. Regarding our interest, Ball concludes: "We should make a study in depth to determine our position with regard to the opening of the Canal. If that study should show -- as it well might -- that our interests are best served by keeping the Canal closed -- thus frustrating Soviet strategic ambitions and raising the cost of Soviet supplies to North Vietnam -- then we should be quite tough-minded in not joining in efforts to separate this issue from an overall settlement, in spite of the continuing expense to our British, German and Italian friends. Alternatively, if the study should show that these strategic considerations are only marginally important, we might make a real effort to trade our support for the reopening of the Canal for Soviet support of an acceptable final settlement of the Middle Eastern problem."

Jarring begins his next round of talks by meeting Eban in London August 9. We have urged Eban to show enough new flexibility so that Jarring will tell the Egyptians he is ready to start talking about substantive issues. Our objective is to pave the way for serious talk when the U. N. General Assembly meets in late September.



Harold H. Saunders

Att.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET NODIS~~

August 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM

TO : The President and The Secretary of State

FROM : George W. Ball ^{DWB} and Joseph J. Sisco ^{JJS}

SUBJECT: Report and Comments on Middle East

This is a somewhat delayed report of the impressions we gained from our recent visit to the Middle East.

The comments that follow are based on conversations with political leaders in Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia, as well as London, Paris and Rome. They reflect insights we have gained from conversations with our own missions, reinforced by discussions with other American visitors such as Mac Bundy, who followed substantially our own itinerary a day or two later. They also take account of conversations with Dr. Jarring in New York.

A. The Position of Israel

1. Unless compelled to move affirmatively either by events or external pressure the Israeli government is quite ready to live with the present situation of neither peace nor war for an indefinite time.

2. Israel had a great scare a year ago but today the Israelis have recovered their equilibrium. They are self-confident (to the point of arrogance were it not for a brooding sense of uncertainty) proud of their own valor and determined to exploit their present strategic advantages to the fullest in order to gain enduring security.

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Authority NSA 05-98
By isl, NARA, Date 4-20-06

3. The Israeli position is straightforward and understandable. They feel that their military success has for the first time given them a strong bargaining position. They feel also that they cannot give up any element of this bargaining position unless they first achieve the kind of final solution that will lift the cloud of threat and danger and assure their survival as a nation.

4. The Israeli situation is complicated by internal divisions. Since the members of the government have been unable to agree on a common strategy and a common set of desiderata, they have dug in behind two procedural positions. From the Israeli point of view these positions have an obvious logic, but their particular value at the moment is that they are so clearly unacceptable to the Arabs as to save the Israeli Government from having to formulate their demands in concrete terms. The attitude of certain of the Israelis -- perhaps a majority of the government -- is that the status quo is, after all, not too bad. As Dayan said to us, "Today we have peace, never have we had such peace." Why then should they make any effort to negotiate?

5. Two procedural demands on which the Government is insisting -- in part at least as a cover for its own disarray -- are:

First, a lasting peace can be secured only through direct bilateral negotiations with the Arab governments; thus Israel will not conduct any negotiations through a mediator or any other indirect method or instrumentality.

Second, the peace when achieved must be expressed in a "contractual agreement" between the parties, which most members of the government have thought of as a peace treaty signed by Israel and the Arab states.

6. Obviously, so long as the government of Israel insists upon these two rigid positions no progress is possible, since the Arab states at Khartoum adopted the diametrically opposite doctrinal position of "no peace, no recognition, and no direct negotiations with Israel."

7. Confronted with Israeli obduracy and obfuscation, it was clear that we should concentrate our fire at the most vulnerable point -- the insistence on bilateral negotiations as a pre-condition to making progress toward a settlement. In separate conversations with Eshkol, Dayan, Allon, and Eban, we insisted that this position was untenable, and toward the end of our visit detected a willingness on the part of the government to move slightly away from its rigid insistence on this point. In fact, Mac Bundy, who was in Jerusalem a day later, told us in Beirut that he believed we had "knocked the Israelis off this position."

8. A week before our visit, with Luke Battle's assistance, we had signaled our objection to this Israeli sticking point in a talk with the Israeli Minister in Washington. As a consequence the government in Jerusalem was prepared for an American assault. Shortly after our arrival we were told by Eban that, through Rafael, he had posed the following two substantive questions which he had asked Jarring to transmit to the UAR:

(1) Is Egypt prepared to exchange the state of war that she has maintained for twenty years for a state of peace consecrated by a binding instrument which contractually engages both parties?

(2) What will be the content, quality and status of relations between Israel and Egypt after the two parties will have reached agreement regarding all points mentioned in the Security Council resolution?

9. It became quite clear to us that the Israelis had conceived the putting of these questions as a defensive measure in advance of our visit since, assuming a UAR reply, they could clearly be regarded as the opening move in an indirect exchange (which might even be called an "indirect negotiation") implicitly capable of at least of clearing away the underbrush and clarifying the issues. As Raphael said to Sisco in an off moment, "We knew that you and George Ball were coming, and that we would need to do something."

10. In our conversations with the Israeli government, we strongly urged them to keep alive the process which these questions might initiate. We promised them that we would encourage the Arabs to follow through.

11. At the same time, we expressed agreement with the Israeli view that a final agreement would probably never be possible without some form of direct negotiation or common meeting at some point (either in the presence of Jarring or otherwise). After our departure, Eban made a statement on the radio regarding our visit in which he indicated they would go forward with some indirect exchanges.

12. Although willing to begin a tentative exchange with the UAR, the Israelis definitively do not regard the clearing up of their relations with Egypt as of top priority. They are far more concerned with negotiating a modus vivendi with their Jordanian neighbors than arranging for a re-opening of the Canal or the normalization of arrangements for Sinai.

13. This does not mean that the Israelis have any particular respect or affection for Hussein, since they consider that he foolishly and unnecessarily involved his country in last year's war. Their attitude toward Hussein

is that "we have no interest in the fellow and regard him as expendable, but since he is your friend we will try to work something out with him." They recognize that he is having current difficulties in constraining the Faedayeen raids but say quite contemptuously that if he cannot control his own people, he is not worth bothering with.

14. Nevertheless, we were not surprised that, at the conclusion of our visit in Jerusalem, Eban put to us certain proposals which he asked us to convey to King Hussein. These proposals for the first time suggest to the Jordanians some inkling of the kind of settlement the Israelis have in mind. They envisage that much of the West Bank would be returned to Jordan. Israel would retain Jerusalem, but the Holy Places would be protected and all religions would be allowed full access.

15. The vagueness of Eban's comments reflects the conflict of view in the Israeli government as to how boundary lines with Jordan can be drawn that will provide security, yet not involve the incorporation of a large additional Arab population. Competing solutions have been put forward by contending politicians. Deputy Prime Minister Allon, for example, has devised a plan which calls for an Israeli corridor separating the West Bank and East Jordan that would consist of the channel of the Jordan River and the high ground to the west of the River. Describing this plan to us, Allon contended that it would put only 17,000 additional Arabs in Israeli territory and that this number could be reduced by a Jordanian corridor traversing the Israeli corridor at right angles and uniting the two segments of Jordan. This corridor would be so drawn as to include Jericho.

16. Eban told us that the Allon plan was definitely not a proposal that the Israeli government had adopted, but was merely "a kind of model" of how a solution might be found that provided the maximum security with the minimum accession of additional Arabs to the Israeli population. Dayan made clear on his part that the Allon plan was "completely unworkable."

17. Dayan's own position is uncomplicated and primarily military. The establishment of "secure boundaries", as mentioned in the November 22 declaration, means simply that Israel must occupy the high ground separating her from Jordan. "Unfortunately", he said, "there is only one range of hills; otherwise, the problem might be easy". This range of hills, as he indicated on the map, lies roughly half way between the western edge of the West Bank territories and the Jordan River. To incorporate the area west of these hills into Israel would necessarily involve the accession of a great many Arabs. Ball reminded Dayan that if security were defined simply as the occupation of high ground, one nation's security was another nation's insecurity. Dayan acknowledged this with a shrug.

18. At the same time -- with an unwitting echo of the deep Southern attitude toward negroes -- Dayan made much of the point that he and other Sabras (those born in Israel) "love the Arabs and understand them in a way other people cannot". Later King Faisal was to tell us defensively that "some of my friends are Jews". It was fine weather for clichés.

B. The Position of Jordan

1. We found King Hussein a lonely and beleaguered sovereign, eager to make peace but reconciled to the probability that it would not come quickly. On the morning

of our visit, he had just received news of the Iraqi coup and was preoccupied with its implications.

2. Hussein faces two problems in reaching a solution with the Israelis, one more manageable than the other. In negotiating for new boundaries between Israel and Jordan, he is acting for his own people and thus has a measure of freedom of action subject to the tyranny of Nasser and the high emotional demands of the Palestinian Arabs. In negotiating with regard to Jerusalem, however, he is not acting merely for Jordanians but for the whole Moslem world (Arab and non-Arab alike) and thus is under terrible pressure from other governments.

3. Hussein, in our judgment, is reconciled to the loss of a certain amount of real estate. He knows that the June 4 boundaries will never be restored and, in fact, recognizes that they were unnatural. At the same time, he does not dare yield much Jordanian territory (particularly occupied territory) for fear of a revolt of his own people -- and particularly of the Palestinian elements in the West Bank. However, he is quite frank in suggesting that he would personally like to break free from rigid Arab doctrine and the hard line taken by his own ministers, in an effort to start a negotiating process.

4. He indicated to us that he would be prepared to send Foreign Minister Rifai (who, on the whole, is a sensible and constructive influence) to New York in September with the unspoken qualification that any common meetings or bilateral talks between the Jordanians and Israelis would almost certainly require Nasser's acquiescence.

5. We made clear that we felt some common meetings or joint discussions at some state would be necessary to a final peace, but that such talks at the outset at least might be held under Jarring's chairmanship. We received

no firm agreement from the King that he would be prepared to go this far, but he did say that we had given him "enough to get started on" and his Foreign Minister Rifai later said that on the basis of what we had brought him, they were "entering phase two, and if they could get into this phase", (by which he no doubt meant get past Nasser's objections) "they might be able to do business".

6. We could not determine with any certainty whether the King would be prepared to go ahead with talks if Nasser gives him a dusty answer. From his manner one might conclude that he would, but Jarring, who has lived with the problem for eight months, is quite doubtful.

7. In any event, it is clear that Hussein would like to get something started, since he now fully agrees (we pressed the point very hard) that unless the Israeli government is required by an ongoing negotiating process to make precise decisions as to what it would be prepared to accept, the Israelis will never reconcile their own competing views and define their position in concrete terms. This would create an intolerable situation for Hussein -- since the situation would drift along without the Jordanians ever knowing what the other side wanted.

CONCLUSIONS

We recognize the danger in trying to become ten-day experts on the problems of the Middle East. However, we did talk with a great many people and have checked our reactions with our own missions in the various countries. Our broad conclusions are as follows:

A. General Attitudes

1. Some movement on the part of Israel is perceptible. However, without substantial and continuing pressure from the United States on both the Israelis and the Arabs, the Jarring Mission is not going to produce any significant movement toward settlement.

2. The attitude on each side is emotional and irrational. The Israelis are in an ambivalent mood. They are uncomfortable about their present situation but at the same time deeply enjoying their victory and the temporary sense of security it has given them. Thus they are quite prepared to try to out-wait the Arabs.

3. King Hussein desperately wants a settlement since he has lost half his country and is under terrible pressure; however, his freedom of action is severely limited not only by the Palestinian Arabs who constantly threaten him, but by the UAR.

4. Nasser is in a weak position and will almost certainly take no initiative toward a settlement. While the UAR economy is a shambles he continues to live off a dole from the Saudis, Libyans, and the Kuwaitis, which he can probably continue to exact so long as the Canal remains closed.

5. King Faisal is driven by religious passion, and deeply preoccupied with the protection of the Muslim Holy Places in Jerusalem. Hussein must certainly consult Faisal on any Jerusalem settlement, and, if not satisfied, Faisal would try hard to persuade Hussein not to go ahead. Ambassador Eilts believes, however, that if Hussein were to accept a settlement, even though it fell short of what Faisal would like Faisal would grumble but do nothing about it.

B. The Canal

1. The UAR and the Soviet Union are necessarily under great pressure to see the Canal reopened. The UAR necessarily regards the Canal as a principal source of foreign exchange that, with the advent of the big tankers and the building of pipelines, is rapidly losing its economic value.

2. The Soviet Union is deeply frustrated so long as the Canal remains closed. Not only does this substantially raise the cost of Soviet supplies for North Vietnam, but it hamstringing its efforts to extend its influence into (a) Aden, Yemen and South Arabia (thus threatening Saudi Arabia from the south) and (b) the Indian Ocean, where it is seeking to consolidate its relations with India and Pakistan.

3. The British would like to see the Canal opened because its continued closure costs them money not only for their shipping, but because the ships presently entrapped in the Canal were almost all insured by Lloyds. Yet, to some extent, they are receiving offsetting benefits by orders given their shipyards for jumbo tankers and by their earnings from tanker charters that are presently going at an abnormally high rate.

4. The Italians also have a substantially economic interest in reopening the Canal, as do the French, but to a lesser extent.

5. With the revolution wrought by the jumbo tankers, our economic interests in the Canal are marginal. Our political and security interests in hampering Soviet ambitions in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean are, on the other hand, substantial. We recommend, therefore, that we drag our feet on any effort to separate the Canal issue from the over-all settlement. Certainly we should not encourage the World Bank to interest itself in this project. At the same time, we should carefully study how we might use the Canal issue as leverage on the Soviets to gain their support for a total settlement.

6. Between now and the opening of the General Assembly, we should provide as much support to Jarring as possible. Already there are indications that the UAR may

be prepared to answer the Israeli questions in a manner that could lead to the initiation of an indirect dialogue. At the same time we should give as much encouragement as possible to the Jordanian Government so that when Rifai comes to New York some kind of "joint meeting" if not "direct negotiations" can be arranged with Eban.

7. In preparing the way for intensive consultations at the time of the General Assembly, we should not overlook the Soviets, in addition to other parties. Kosygin told Jarring recently that he wants a political settlement. While the prevailing "no-war, no-peace" situation is not unattractive to the Soviets, we should not take this for granted -- particularly in view of their interest in opening the Suez Canal. It seems doubtful that we can deflect the Soviet Union from its one-sided support of the Arabs, but we should at least make an effort, if for no other reason than that 100 countries will expect us to do so.

8. The French Government made clear to us in Paris that it did not believe the parties would ever be able to agree on a settlement and that the only realistic course was for the four "major" powers -- the U.S., USSR, France and the U.K. -- to concert a solution among themselves which they would impose on the contending parties. Obviously, there is considerable support in past experience for French skepticism concerning the parties' ability to agree, and one can argue that the French proposal reflects the spirit, if not the form, of the type of role envisaged by the drafters of the Charter for the permanent members of the Security Council.

In practical terms, however, it seems clear that any solution acceptable to the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom would be heavily biased in favor of the Arabs.

Thus, were we to start down that road we would not only embark on a journey to nowhere but bring sharply into relief the loneliness of our friendship for Israel.

Within the past few days we have seen some evidence that the French may be re-formulating their position as favoring a four-power effort to give effect to any arrangement agreed between the contending parties. This, of course, is quite a different matter; the question need not now be decided, since the parties are still light years away from agreement.

9. We should make a study in depth to determine our position with regard to the opening of the Canal. If that study should show -- as it well might -- that our interests are best served by keeping the Canal closed -- thus frustrating Soviet strategic ambitions and raising the cost of Soviet supplies to North Vietnam -- then we should be quite tough-minded in not joining in efforts to separate this issue from an overall settlement, in spite of the continuing expense to our British, German and Italian friends. Alternatively, if the study should show that these strategic considerations are only marginally important, we might make a real effort to trade our support for the reopening of the Canal for Soviet support of an acceptable final settlement of the Middle Eastern problem.

Until we know the answers to these questions, we would do well to stop encouraging the World Bank or any other institutions to expedite the clearing of the Canal.

SETP103

VIET NAM TALKS

BY JOHN M. NIGHTOWER
AP SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, Aug. 3 (AP)—U.S. POLICY MAKERS HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN ENGAGED IN SHARP DEBATE OVER HOW MUCH RISK PRESIDENT JOHNSON CAN AFFORD TO TAKE IN DECIDING WHETHER TO END ALL BOMBING AND SHELLING OF NORTH VIETNAM.

THE DEBATE IS UNDERSTOOD TO COVER AT ONE EXTREME POSSIBLE U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF SOME APPARENT ACT OF DE-ESCALATION BY NORTH VIETNAM WITHOUT ANY CLEAR ASSURANCE FOR THE FUTURE.

AT THE OTHER EXTREME, FIRM COMMITMENTS WOULD BE REQUIRED ON WHAT STEPS NORTH VIETNAM WOULD TAKE WHEN THE BOMBING STOPPED.

AMBASSADOR AVERELL HARRIMAN SKETCHED THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM FROM THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW YESTERDAY IN THE 16TH SESSION OF THE PARIS PEACE TALKS. HE TOLD AMBASSADOR HA VAN LAU OF NORTH VIETNAM THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS FOUND "NO BASIS" SO FAR FOR CALLING OFF THE BOMBING.

TP104

THIS CLEARLY GAVE THE ADMINISTRATION'S ASSESSMENT UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE RELATIVE MILITARY LULL IN SOUTH VIETNAM DURING THE PAST SIX WEEKS.

SOME AMERICAN OFFICIALS PUT IT MORE SHARPLY IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION: "THE DANGER THE PRESIDENT HAS TO CONSIDER IS THAT IF HE STOPPED THE BOMBING AND THE COMMUNISTS STARTED A BIG OFFENSIVE AFTERWARD, HE WOULD HAVE MADE A COSTLY MISTAKE. IT WOULD LOOK AS IF HE HAD BEEN TAKEN IN BY A TRICK."

SOME NEUTRAL DIPLOMATS HERE BELIEVE THE TWO POLES IN THE ADMINISTRATION DEBATE MAY BE SECRETARY OF STATE CLARK M. CLIFFORD AND SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK. CLIFFORD WAS AN ARCHITECT OF THE BOMBING LIMITATION POLICY IMPOSED MARCH 31, WHICH LED DIRECTLY TO THE PARIS TALKS. RUSK SAID LAST WEEK THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO KNOW FROM NORTH VIETNAM WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF IT STOPPED THE BOMBING. *defense*

JOHNSON ALSO MADE SEVERAL STATEMENTS ABOUT THE TIME OF THE RUSK CONFERENCE, STRESSING NORTH VIETNAMESE INFILTRATION INTO THE SOUTH AND THE THREAT HIS MILITARY ADVISERS SEE OF A NEW COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTH.

TP105

HOWEVER, THE PRESSURES WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION IN WASHINGTON TO FIND SOME BASIS FOR ENDING THE BOMBING EVEN AT FAIRLY HIGH RISK ARE BELIEVED TO BE PERSISTENT. SOME OFFICIALS ARE KNOWN TO HAVE ARGUED THAT BOMBING THE NORTH ACCOMPLISHES LITTLE THAT CONCENTRATED BOMBING ON INFILTRATION TRAILS IN LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM WOULD NOT ACCOMPLISH.

RUSK SAID LAST WEEK THAT 30 PER CENT OF THE TRUCKS GOING DOWN THE TRAILS ARE BEING DESTROYED. BUT THOSE WHO FAVOR SOME EASING OF U.S. POLICY ARGUE THE REVERSE -- THAT 70 PER CENT OF THE TRUCKS AND, ACCORDING TO JOHNSON, AN ESTIMATED 30,000 MEN IN JULY, HAVE GONE THROUGH IN SPITE OF THE BOMBING.

HARRINAN PUT THE PROBLEM IN TERMS OF THE DEGREE OF RISK. HE SAID "THERE WERE RISKS IN THE STEPS THAT THE PRESIDENT TOOK MARCH 31 AND SINCE," HE ADDED THAT REJECTION OF JOHNSON'S APPEAL FOR WATCHING RESTRAINT BY NORTH VIETNAM AND "THE SIGNS WE SEE ON THE GROUND IN VIETNAM" HAVE FAILED TO GIVE JOHNSON ANY BASIS "TO TAKE THE ADDITIONAL RISKS" A COMPLETE BOMBING HALT WOULD MAKE NECESSARY.

OB 0310GMT AUG 8

Lain

18

Thursday, August 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR GEORGE CHRISTIAN

(INFO JIM JONES)

Pres. file

Attached is an analysis by the State Department of the August 4 Washington Post editorial entitled "Vietnam -- An Unlearned Lesson". It is a useful rebuttal of the Post's argument and contains answers to numerous questions which we will face in the days to come.

Bromley Smith

Attachment

BKE:ksb

Analysis of "Vietnam -- An Unlearned Lesson"
(Washington Post, August 4)

(This analysis takes up ten points that arise in sequence in the text of the editorial. A text marking the precise passages is attached.)

1. The editorial starts from the premise that "North Vietnamese officials actually did suggest (in the Marder interview) there may be some meaning in the present lull in enemy activity."

The statement by the North Vietnamese source simply referred to a drop in the military activity, and asked why the President did not avail himself of it. As Marder's account fails to make clear -- but as we know from having talked to him directly -- the North Vietnamese representative broke off the interview abruptly at just this point, and thus prevented Marder from asking the key question -- whether in fact the lull is a deliberate political act:

Moreover, the North Vietnamese representative also stated that the fighting in the south was the business of the "people of South Vietnam." Thus, by clear implication, he denied Hanoi responsibility for such actions.

It may be argued that this is the indirect way the North Vietnamese would choose to express themselves. However, we are faced with the fact that there have been several other statements by North Vietnamese reported to us, and that some of these are in an exactly contrary sense. (We cannot go into detail on this, but one report -- from a sensitive source that unfortunately cannot well be used -- quotes a North Vietnamese representative as denying that the lull has political significance.)

2. The editorial claims that Administration officials, when they learned of the Marder interview "responded with suspicion and disdain."

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 -

In an accompanying article by Chalmers Roberts, several responses by Administration representatives are quoted. These express suspicion of the report and indicate that we cannot accept it as it stands, as meeting what the Secretary of State had in mind. At the same time, we have made clear on the record we are studying all such reports carefully, from the basic position stated by the President and the Secretary.

3. The editorial accuses the President and the Secretary of "putting the most dismal face on current peace prospects and . . . steadfastly refusing to find anything significant in the slowdown of the war."

This is a complete exaggeration. We have conceded that the pace of military activity has been reduced in recent weeks. What we have insisted is that this is typical of preparation for an offensive, that infiltration continues very high, and that there is multiple evidence that another wave of attacks is in fact being prepared. What we say is that, in the face of this evidence, we need to get some kind of message that the drop in military activity has both present and future significance as to Hanoi's actions. We have deliberately held open the possibility of Hanoi conveying such a message, directly or indirectly.

4. The editorial suggests that we should be "accepting the present high infiltration rate as not much different from our own continuing build-up, viewing the enemy's apparent preparations for an offensive as no more than the sort of prudent cranking up that would be indicated whether Hanoi intended to negotiate or to attack."

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 3 -

The present high infiltration rate (which the editorial apparently accepts) is plainly different from our own present pace of reinforcement. Hanoi's rate of infiltration has been, since March 31, about three times the level of last year--- whereas our own "build up" has gone up only about a little over 5% in terms of total force strength.

Similarly the term "prudent cranking up" falls far short of what Hanoi appears to be doing in its current preparations and infiltration rate. Moreover, we have the plain fact that Hanoi attacked sharply in May and early June, and thus clearly evidenced a strategy of applying military pressure during the negotiations.

5. The editorial claims that the President and the Secretary have "quite plainly gone out of their way to toughen what everybody believed to be our terms for a bombing halt."

The President and the Secretary in no sense toughened our terms.

-- The President said on March 31 we could stop the bombing altogether "if our restraint is matched by restraint in Hanoi," but that we could not do this "so long as to do so would immediately and directly endanger the lives of our men and our allies."

-- In Paris, we have consistently said that we must have an indication, direct or indirect, that Hanoi would not take advantage of a total bombing halt.

What the President and Secretary of State have said is that we cannot read the present pattern of military action as a deliberate "restraint" and that we must have something that indicates what would happen in the future. Hanoi's military behavior compels us to take this position.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-4-

6. The editorial gives the San Antonio formula as the sole basis for our position.

While the March 31 speech did reaffirm the San Antonio formula, its basic point was the quotation under Item 5 above.

Moreover, the key point is that since March 31 we have had extremely high rates of infiltration, a sharp wave of attacks against Saigon, and now apparent preparations for another wave of attacks. As Secretary Rusk put it on July 30: "An assumption has to have some basis for it, and we have been unable to find a basis for a very far-reaching assumption in this matter."

7. The editorial goes on to argue that Hanoi has not been "taking advantage" of our restraint since March 31, that the President has spoken of the need for "some sign (the enemy) will not accelerate his aggression," and that Hanoi has not in fact taken advantage or accelerated since March 31.

The editorial also quotes Secretary Clifford's January statement that we could accept a "normal" rate of infiltration.

The facts refute this line of argument:

-- The rate of infiltration has been steadily high since March 31, far higher than what it was believed to be when Secretary Clifford spoke;

-- In early May, and continuing through mid-June, Hanoi conducted sharp attacks against Saigon -- a clear "acceleration;"

-- Since mid-June, while the level of military activity has dropped, the military indicators point to this being in preparation for still further attacks.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

8. The editorial argues that "the Administration argument for non-compliance with the San Antonio terms rests largely on statistics" on infiltration -- and derides the President for quoting such estimates for August in the face of our previous statements that accurate data on infiltration rates lag by as much as six months.

The President gave the figure of 30,000 as the infiltration rate for July, and said that the evidence suggested at least as high a rate in August. These were given as an estimate and have been described accurately, on background, as based on the much more extensive evidence we now have of truck and barge movement and other indicators of the actual flow. We have made it clear that these more accurate types of evidence permit us to reach at least order of magnitude estimates on a fairly current basis.

The President made the nature of this evidence clear in the specific items he cited in his press conference of July 31.

9. The editorial states that Secretary Rusk, instead of "some sign," now demands "a clear and explicit promise from Hanoi that a full bombing pause would be rewarded by some specific, reciprocal, de-escalatory act."

The Secretary's remarks clearly leave open the possibility of an authoritative "indication" or a "basis for assumption." Moreover, the Secretary suggested certain areas of future restraint, but did not seek to pin down what we would need.

10. The editorial concludes that, while there may be a case for "standing firm on the bombing issue at this time," the Administration is "doing so in terms so inconsistent with past public statements that they can only invite suspicion and shake public confidence."

As the above specific points have shown, the recent press conferences have been consistent with our position

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-6-

since March 31, and we have in fact gone to great lengths to lay out an objective appraisal of the facts, within the limits of security. Only an unsympathetic and distorted reading of what has been said in both Honolulu and Washington could lead to the conclusion of the editorial.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Vietnam—An Unlearned Lesson

① President Johnson had asked for "any sign"; Secretary Rusk had requested some private word; and then, when North Vietnamese officials actually did suggest there may be some meaning in the present lull in enemy activity, as reported by Murrey Marder in this newspaper yesterday, Administration officials responded with suspicion and disdain. ②

Why? A cynic could conclude that the Administration doesn't want a break in the Paris deadlock at this time. Even an optimist, granting the benefit of doubt, would have to figure, at the very least, that the Johnson Administration has yet to learn a central lesson of the conflict in Vietnam: discrepancy, inconsistency, obscurity and scorn for public sensitivities are the enemies of public understanding and support for our effort in the Vietnam war.

③ No doubt the President and Secretary Rusk believe they have good reasons for putting the most dismal face on current peace prospects and for steadfastly refusing to find anything significant in the slowdown of the war. They may be right in arguing that a wholesale enemy offensive is beyond our capacity to deter. There may also be something to the argument that the Saigon government needs time before it can withstand the strain of open bargaining on the future political shape of South Vietnam. A hard line now, while the Republicans are convening, may even be good politics.

Whatever the case, the test of the hard line will be in its results. If Hanoi reads our message right and reacts obligingly, the President may conceivably get back the clear and unequivocal response he now seems to insist upon. And if he doesn't, the Administration, in one sense, will be relatively safe. For nobody will be able to say with any certainty what would have happened if we had played it otherwise—accepting the present high infiltration rate as not much different from our own continuing build-up, viewing the enemy's apparent preparations for an offensive as no more than the sort of prudent cranking up that would be indicated whether Hanoi intended to negotiate or to attack. ④

⑤ But the Administration will not be entirely safe. Should the predicted offensive come off, the argument will remain that it might have been deterred if the President and the Secretary had not quite plainly gone out of their way to toughen what everybody believed to be our terms for a bombing halt.

Whatever the reality, the belief was soundly rooted in the President's San Antonio formula. The United States is willing to stop the bombing, the President said last September, when

this would lead "promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation." ⑥

Granted that the talks have not been very "productive," whatever that precisely means, it must also be noted that the bombing has not been completely halted. The question remains whether the enemy is "taking advantage" of what is going on. Secretary Clifford has defined this one way, to mean that the enemy "will continue to transport the normal amount of goods, munitions, men to South Vietnam." So what's normal? The President amplified this, by indirection, in saying more recently that we could not halt the bombing without "some sign (the enemy) will not accelerate his aggression . . ." ⑦

It would be hard to argue that the enemy has accelerated its military activity since the partial bombing pause, in terms of any steady increase in attacks; quite the reverse has been the case in recent weeks. So the Administration argument for non-compliance with the San Antonio terms rests largely on statistics, trotted out with all the authority of weekly carloadings or the consumer price index, on enemy infiltration, which at best is subject only to the roughest sort of estimate. Most experts will tell you that accurate data on infiltration rates lag by as much as six months; the President trotted out estimates for August the other day. And, meantime, Secretary Rusk was demanding not "some sign," but a clear and explicit promise from Hanoi that a full bombing pause would be rewarded by some specific, reciprocal, de-escalatory act. ⑧

⑨ There will be no particular problem here if Hanoi is prepared to accept the Secretary's latest interpretation of the San Antonio terms. And even if this does not happen, and the anticipated offensive is carried out, it will not be all that easy for second-guessers to prove that the outcome would have been altered had we pursued a different strategy. In these matters, a reasonable amount of leeway must of necessity be accorded to those who are responsible for the conduct of the war. But the conduct of the war isn't everything; how it is explained and presented is very largely the determinant of public support without which this war, more than most, cannot be conducted effectively. Some case can be made for standing firm on the bombing issue at this time; but no case can be made for doing so in terms so inconsistent with past public statements that they can only invite suspicion and shake public confidence. This is a lesson which the Administration, for no apparent reason, seems almost determined not to learn. ⑩

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

19
INFORMATION

Thursday, August 8, 1968

Mr. President:

General Wheeler had an informative conversation on the strategic missile talks with Ambassador Dobrynin, who emphasized that:

- A. The upcoming talks could lead to further improvements in relations and unspecified benefits to all.
- B. The Soviets are unsure as to exactly what we want to achieve.
- C. Results can be achieved if the talks are held on the basis of equality; that is, recognition that we would be dealing with a militarily equal nation and parity of forces.

Bromley Smith

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 93-58
By fw, NARA, Date 8-19-93

BKS:ksb

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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EXDIS



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

CM-3549-68
6 August 1968

11098

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin

09

1. On the evening of 5 August, I attended a dinner at the residence of the Netherlands Ambassador in honor of Mr. and Mrs. Walter Stoessel, Ambassador-designate to Poland. Among the guests were Ambassador and Mrs. Dobrynin. After dinner, when we were joining the ladies, Ambassador Dobrynin took the opportunity to engage me in conversation in company with our former Ambassador to Poland, Mr. Gronouski. Mr. Gronouski moved away after a few moments, leaving Ambassador Dobrynin and me alone until the gathering broke up more than 30 minutes later.

2. The early part of Ambassador Dobrynin's remarks were of a general nature. He commented on the differences in the roles of the top military in the Soviet Union and the United States, citing the fact that I regularly attend the Tuesday White House luncheons while the Soviet military never appear at the weekly meetings of the seven-man top ruling group of the Soviet Union and only attend the Politburo meetings when a specific item of a military nature is on the agenda. He commented also on the composition of the classes at our National War College and said they had nothing of a similar nature in the Soviet Union. After about ten minutes, he switched to the subject of the upcoming talks on limitations of strategic missiles which, because he repeated each point several times during the ensuing 25 minutes or so, I presume was the real purpose of his conversation with me.

3. Ambassador Dobrynin made, several times over, the following points:

a. In a sense the United States has established goals which the Russians are determined to reach or even surpass. (In the context of his remarks, I was persuaded that he was speaking in this instance of non-military matters.)

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 93-59

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By

6

NARA, Date 9-13-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b. The upcoming Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) could be extremely important because they could lead to further improvements in relations and unspecified benefits to all.

c. The Soviets are unsure as to exactly what we want to achieve. Is it a freeze? This doubt has been fertilized by statements by United States officials as to our military superiority in the strategic area. These statements lead to demands for more forces (missile, I assume) - 100, 200, 300 more.

d. The United States and the Soviet Union are both great nations. If we approach the talks on the basis of equality, results can be achieved. (By inference, Ambassador Dobrynin conveyed the impression that any other approach would negate achievement.)

4. Comment: Ambassador Dobrynin's manner throughout our conversation was very friendly and sincere. Obviously he was determined to make his points with me because he twice refused to be persuaded by our hostess from taking a seat with a group of ladies. He emphasized the importance of us approaching the talks on the basis of "equality." From the way in which he used this word, I gained the impression that he meant two things: First, the recognition on our part that we would be dealing with a militarily equal nation. (Of-interest is the fact that the Ambassador said they believed themselves to be ahead of us in certain military areas while recognizing that we were ahead of them in others.) The other meaning which I think he conveyed by his use of the word "equality" was parity of forces; however, he did not at that time elaborate on this aspect nor did he use the word "parity" at any time.

5. As the dinner party broke up, Ambassador Dobrynin said that he had enjoyed very much talking to me and hoped to be able to renew our conversation at an early date.

Distribution by State Department:

S/S G/PM
G ACDA
WH Amembassy, MOSCOW
EUR

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, August 8, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Rice for Indonesia → *Pres file*

The Indonesian aid package that you approved in June included the possible shipment this fall of 100,000 tons of PL-480 rice, as a downpayment on our 1969 aid. This was contingent upon domestic availabilities and Vietnam needs.

We would now like to go ahead with this sale. Our domestic crop is good, and Vietnam's requirements are no problem. Our domestic rice market is a little weak, and Agriculture wants this sale now in order to firm it up.

The extra rice will be very helpful to Indonesia in assuring an adequate food supply during the critical months of January-March. A firm commitment from us now will enable the Indonesian Government to go ahead with arrangements for the commercial rice imports that will be required in addition to our PL-480 assistance.

Attached are memos to you from Bill Gaud, Orville Freeman, and Charles Zwick, all of whom recommend this transaction to you. Zwick affirms that the transaction is within the 1969 budget cutbacks.

I recommend that you approve the sale to Indonesia of 100,000 metric tons of rice (\$20 million) to Indonesia under PL 480 Title I.

Marshall Wright
Marshall Wright

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

Atts

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By *rg*, NARA, Date *9-8-92*

2444

20a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

AUG 6 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P. L. 480 Rice to Indonesia

In the attached memorandum, Bill Gaud and Orville Freeman advise you of the proposed shipment of an additional 100,000 MT of rice (\$20 million) to Indonesia under P. L. 480 Title I. The rice would be shipped this fall, but it would count as part of our share of Inter-Governmental Group aid to Indonesia for CY 1969.

Shipping the rice this fall, rather than waiting until next year, has two advantages.

1. A bumper rice crop in the U. S. and lower requirements in Vietnam will reduce rice prices significantly below last year's level. Early announcement and shipment of an additional 100,000 MT would help to keep prices in the U. S. rice market above the level where the CCC would have to accumulate stocks.
2. While Indonesia has made significant progress, the stabilization program is still fragile. A rapid and large increase in the price of rice during the traditionally rice-short period from December to March could wipe out hard won gains. Availability of an additional 100,000 MT can provide Indonesia with a useful safety margin.

Self-help - The full benefits of this proposal will accrue to the Indonesian economy only if the Suharto Government does not relax its own efforts to procure rice, both from domestic and foreign sources. AID will consult with the Government of Indonesia on their rice stabilization policies, and will sign the proposed agreement only after receiving adequate assurances that the Indonesians will continue their own efforts.

The proposed shipment is within the 1969 budget cutbacks. I concur in providing the additional rice at this time.

Charles J. Zwick
Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 76 J 52-292

By 105/19, NARA, Date 11-2-92

2444

206

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

AUG 2 1968

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Indonesia

In approving the new aid package for Indonesia described in our June 7 memorandum, you authorized us to tell President Suharto and other Inter Governmental Group (IGG) members that about 100,000 MT of additional rice might be committed from our fall crop, depending on Viet Nam needs, and that such additional rice would be treated as a down-payment on our IGG share for CY 1969. Ambassador Green has informed President Suharto of this possibility.

Because Viet Nam's CY 1968 requirements are 100,000 MT or more below earlier estimates and we now estimate our 1968 rice crop will be larger than the 20 percent planned increase, we propose to move now on this commitment.

This will provide Indonesia with additional insurance against a repetition of last winter's quadrupling of rice prices.

It is also badly needed to help maintain a firm structure for our domestic rice prices in view of a larger than expected crop and sharp reductions in planned shipments to Viet Nam.

In addition to a 1968 domestic rice procurement target of 600,000 MT, Indonesia plans to import 600,000 MT, 200,000 of which we have already agreed to provide under Public Law 480. Thus far the Indonesian Government has contracts to import an additional 335,000 MT. After a recent review, the International Monetary Fund and Asian Development Bank agreed that Indonesia's food prospects are precarious and that extraordinary measures are required.

Commitment now of this additional 100,000 MT would enable Indonesia to meet its rice import target while conserving its extremely scarce foreign exchange; any additional rice - including possible commercial imports from the United States or elsewhere - would be highly desirable because of possible miscalculation of total needs, inadequate domestic procurement, and the need to build buffer stocks. We will review with the Indonesian Government its rice procurement, distribution and financing program, especially as it affects rice price stabilization and overall monetary stability.

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Authority 7169 83-47

By rdj, NARA, Date 11-2-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

This rice (valued at about \$20 million) would be counted against our 1969 IGG pledge. Although the Indonesian Government's 1969 aid request will not be known until this fall's IGG meeting, a \$20 million down-payment now would be a small fraction of our share for 1969 and it would be Indonesia's top priority for United States aid.

AUG 1 1968

William S. Bond

Administrator

Agency for International Development

James R. Furman

Secretary

Department of Agriculture

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, August 8, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached, for your signature, is a greeting for visitors to the U. S. Exhibit at the Zagreb Fair in Yugoslavia this September. The exhibit is on "Packaging USA." Your greeting will be translated, enlarged (with your signature) and placed under your picture at the entrance to the exhibit.

Pres file

Nathaniel Davis

21a

PACKAGING USA

Packaging is as old as man's ability to carry more than his hands can hold. It is as new as the newest demand of industry. The abundance of mass production requires that goods go to market in packages that are safe, attractive and convenient.

This exhibition shows some of the imaginative ways in which the packaging industry in America serves the producer and the consumer.

Welcome to this exhibition, where you will see American contributions to the universal art of packaging. I extend the friendly greetings of my nation.

~~SECRET~~

2445

22

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

August 7, 1968

Pres file

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

Bus Wheeler and I have agreed upon a means to insure the improvement of South Vietnam armed forces as rapidly and as efficiently as possible. We have each appointed a representative to devote his primary attention to constant review of the rate of progress made by the ARVN.

I enclose copy of memorandum which I have signed today.

Respectfully yours,

Clark M. Clifford

Clark M. Clifford

~~SECRET~~

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Authority RAC 12033 (#70)

By jc/ics, NARA, Date 12-21-09

~~SECRET~~

2445
22a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretaries of the Military Departments
Director of Defense Research & Engineering
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Secretaries of Defense

SUBJECT: Improvement of the Capabilities and Performance of
GVN Forces

Improving the capabilities and performance of the GVN armed forces is a matter of highest priority in achieving our objective of gradually reducing the US role in the war in Vietnam. In order to ensure that such improvement is achieved as rapidly and as efficiently as possible, I have appointed Mr. Richard C. Steadman and General Wheeler has appointed Rear Admiral W. D. Houser to oversee for our respective offices those actions which are necessary to improve the capabilities and performance of GVN forces. Mr. Steadman and Admiral Houser will report jointly to General Wheeler and me all significant decisions, actions, and activities relating to the capabilities and performance of GVN forces.

Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Steadman will have primary responsibility for all matters relating to US support for GVN forces. I expect Mr. Steadman to assign actions within established channels of authority and to coordinate recommendations and actions with all appropriate elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Richard C. Steadman

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 12034 (*70a)
By je/ico. NARA. Date 12-21-09

See Def Cont Nr. X- 4606

~~SECRET~~

Lai
24

SECRET

INFORMATION

Wednesday, August 7, 1968

FROM BROMLEY SMITH 5
TO THE PRESIDENT

Pres. file

Following is Ambassador Bunker's report of his ninth meeting with President Thieu and Vice President Ky to discuss major problems involved in any settlement of the Vietnam war.

Paragraphs three and four contain an interesting exchange among the participants ^{on} ~~of~~ the ^{meaning of} ~~meetings~~ on the "lull". President Thieu thinks the Communists are willing to launch an offensive but ~~they~~ have not been able to do so because of their military difficulties. Vice President Ky believes the Communists will claim they are de-escalating unless we either let the Communists attack and destroy them or prove to the world that we were strong enough to prevent the attack.

Other subjects discussed included ~~the~~ ^a cease-fire ~~question~~, the re-
~~groupment~~ ^{of} ~~of~~ forces, the efforts of the Communists to undermine local South Vietnamese government units by forming their own local Communist administrations, and ~~the~~ ^{an} international supervisory organization *to monitor the peace.*

President Thieu said it was most important that any future settlement permit the Government of Vietnam to call upon any other country ^{and get} ~~for~~ help in case of attack *automatically.*

(Send attached text)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 729/CBS/10

By 100/14, NARA, Date 11-3-92

~~SECRET~~

Lee
INFORMATION

25

**FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT**

August 7, 1961

**Herewith Ambassador Harriman's summary cable reporting on
today's meeting in Paris.**

Per file

(Send attached draft)

BKS:ks b

DECLASSIFIED
White House Enclosure, Feb. 24, 1983
By *Ng*, NARA, Date *9-8-92*



Department of State TELEGRAM

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N O D I S / HARVAN

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 23700
By ics NARA, Date 3-24-98

~~DELTO 566~~

FROM HARRIMAN

SUBJ: FLASH SUMMARY--16 MEETING, AUGUST 7, 1968

1. THY WAS ABSENT CONTINUED COLD RAIN WEATHER GIVEN AS REASON. I BEGAN WITH MY PREPARED STATEMENT, STRESSING THE CONTINUITY AND CONSTANCY OF PRESIDENTS POSITION SINCE MARCH 31.
2. LAU ANSWERED WITH A HARSH REPLY IN WHICH HE SAID THAT SINCE THE TALKS BEGAN THE US HAD NOT CHANGED ITS POSITION, DESPITE THE DEMANDS OF THE WORLD. HE SAID THAT THE US GOVERNMENT HAD SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT STOP THE BOMBING IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, AND THAT THE US WAS SHAMELESSLY PUTTING NEW CONDITIONS ON THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. HE CITED THE HONOLULU DECLARATION, AND "RECENT STATEMENTS" OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE AS EVIDENCE OF THIS.
3. LAU THEN TURNED TO THE NEW PRESSURES HE SAW IN THE US AGAINST THE USG POSITION. HE QUOTED THE NEW YORK TIMES, WASHINGTON POST EDITORIALS AND OTHER LESS KNOWN SOURCES-- EVEN ONE WHO PROTESTED THAT THE US ENGAGED IN CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. HE REFERRED TO PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS AND MEETINGS ACROSS THE US.
4. LAU CONTINUED IN THIS STERILE AND REPETITIOUS WAY UNTIL 12:05. WHEN HE FINISHED, I PROPOSED A TEA BREAK, WHICH LASTED ABOUT 40 MINUTES. DURING THE BREAK, I

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PAGE 02 PARIS 19131 071427Z

INFORMED LAU OF OUR PLANS FOR RELEASE OF CAPTURED NVN NAVAL PERSONNEL, WHICH IS REPORTED SEPTEL. THE OTHERS SAT WITH LE AND HIEN, WHO TOLD THEM THAT LE DUC THO WOULD RETURN TO PARIS WHEN THE "WEATHER GOT BETTER." LE EXPLAINED THAT THE USG HAD THE POWER TO MAKE THE WEATHER BETTER ANY TIME IT WANTED. WE REMARKED THAT BOTH SIDES HAD TO WORK TOGETHER ON THE "WEATHER PROBLEM".

5. WHEN WE RESUMED, I CHALLENGED LAU TO FIND ANY RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR DRV: (1) INDISCRIMINATE SHELLING OF SAIGON; (2) ACTS OF TERRORISM AND KIDNAPPING; AND (3) RIGHT TO SEND INCREASING NUMBERS OF TROOPS INTO SVN IN DEFIANCE OF 1954 ACCORDS. I COMPLIMENTED LAU ON RESEARCH SO SKILLFUL THAT IT TURNED UP MANY OBSCURE QUOTES FROM SOURCES OF LITTLE OR NO IMPORTANCE. I STRESSED THE SIGNS--INCLUDING INFILTRATION FIGURES--THAT THE ENEMY WAS MAKING PLANS FOR A NEW WAVE OF ATTACKS. I ENDED BY REPEATING THE PRESIDENTS'S MARCH 31 FORMULA, AND SUGGESTED ADJOURMENT.

6. LAU, HOWEVER, WANTED HIS CUSTONARY LAST WORD. HE DECLINED MY OFFER OF COOPERATION IN PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH. HE SAW NOTHING NEW IN MY REMARKS, WHICH HE SAID ARE STILL AN ATTEMPT TO HIDE THE FACT THAT WE ARE DEMANDING CONDITIONS AND RECIPROCITY. THIS, SAID LAU, NVN REJECTS. LAU SAID THAT WE HAD MADE AN ERRONEOUS EVALUATION OF WORLD AND AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION WHO WERE DEMANDING UNCONDITIONAL END OF BOMBING OF NVN BY US. THE US GOVERNMENT HAS NEVER BEEN SO ISOLATED.

7. I CLOSED BY REPEATING MY CHALLENGE TO LAU TO FIND ANY EXPRESSIONS OF RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE THREE SUBJECTS I HAD MENTIONED. WE ADJOURNED AT 1:20 PM.
HARRIMAN

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDU

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

27
INFORMATION

Wednesday - August 7, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith the official translation of President Somoza's letter
responding to your farewell letter to him.

WGB
William G. Bowdler

Attachment

Letter of July 15, 1968 (in translation)
from President Somoza of Nicaragua.

27a

Official Translation

Republic of Nicaragua
Central America

Office of the President
of the Republic.
Managua, D. N.
Nicaragua, Central America

July 15, 1968

Mr. President:

Thank you for the views expressed in your letter in relation to your short visit to our country. We were very happy to learn that you and your family enjoyed your brief stay here.

The trip gave the Nicaraguan people an excellent opportunity to become acquainted with and gain a close appreciation of the great leader of a friendly nation and of the free world.

The enthusiasm of the people of Nicaragua who were at the airport to welcome you and your family was evidence of our admiration and gratitude toward the people of the United States and their leaders who have made such a great contribution to their social and economic progress.

My wife and I deeply appreciated the gift with which we were honored during your stay in Nicaragua. I also wish to express our thanks for your generous words about our Ambassador, Dr. Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps in Washington.

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend very cordial greetings to Your Excellency and to renew to you the assurances of my consideration and esteem.

Your good friend,

[Signed] A. Somoza

A. Somoza

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the
United States of America,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

Tuesday, August 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ambassador Oehlert Eyes Only Message on Tanks for Pakistan

Ed Hamilton has put together the attached package covering all aspects of the question of 200 M-47 tanks for Pakistan.

The draft reply to the Ambassador tells him that we are now trying to work out a tank sale through Turkey which has several advantages over the proposal to get them from Iran. I agree that we should try once more to arrange a tank sale before we follow the Ambassador's second recommendation, i. e., direct U. S. sale of tanks.

We will monitor closely the progress of the arrangements with Turkey and be certain that this suggestion is not used as a way of further delaying the procurement of tanks for Pakistan.

I do not believe you need discuss this matter further at this time. If the Ambassador again expresses his unhappiness, we can make a further recommendation to you.

Bremley Smith

Attachment

BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-146
By is, NARA Date 4-5-00

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

Tuesday, August 6, 1968 -- 4:45 PM

TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Tanks for Pakistan

At Tab A is a long "Eyes Only" message to you from Ben Oehlert urging a crash effort to get President Ayub the 200 M-47 tanks that you and he discussed at the Karachi Airport last December. Ben wants you to instruct us to arrange a sale by Iran, or, if that fails, to change our current arms policy in South Asia and authorize a direct U. S. sale. He is very frustrated -- along with the rest of us -- by last-minute breakdowns in schemes to get the Italians or the Belgians to sell the tanks to Ayub.

At Tab B, for contrast, is Chet Bowles' plea that we drop the tank project in view of Ayub's action on Peshawar and the recent announcement that the Paks will sign their first arms deal with the Russians.

At Tab C is a draft reply to Ben which simply acknowledges his message and tries to calm him without promising him anything. (You may want to discuss Ben's message and the reply with Secretary Rusk or Nick Katzenbach; we have respected Oehlert's wishes and not sent this message to State.)

At Tab D is Nick Katzenbach's memorandum to you summarizing the results of the SIG review of arms policy in India and Pakistan.

As you know, Oehlert's cable is the latest blow in a long battle over military supply policy in South Asia. The analysis in the next few pages tries to put it into perspective. You may want to glance through it as you consider Ben's message.

Message (Tab C) approved _____

Check with Rusk and come back to me _____ Ed Hamilton

Call me _____

EKH/vmr

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-146
By CG, NARA Date 11-16-99

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

SANITIZED

28b

TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY

SANITIZED

ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION

Background

When war broke out between India and Pakistan in 1965, we still had substantial MAP programs in Pakistan and growing programs in India. We had assured the Indians that the Paks would never use our arms against them. We had assured the Congress that the arms we were selling to each country would not be used against the other.

In the wave of bitter disillusion which accompanied the war, we banned military dealings with both countries during the hostilities and for some time thereafter. Both sides promptly found other military suppliers for major new weapons: the Indians went to the Soviets, the Paks to the Chinese and the French. But as Pakistan's American equipment aged -- and after much soul-searching -- we decided that continuation of a flat ban on all arms dealings wouldn't do. Essentially, our reasoning was as follows:

3.4(b)(6)

1. [Redacted]

But a Red-lining Pakistan, particularly a Pakistan allied with the Chicoms, would go far toward spoiling the South Asian soup. It would immensely complicate India's defense problem, maximize tendencies toward an arms race, and divert precious resources from the economic development objectives which are our major long-term goals in both countries.

- 2. Pakistan is incurably paranoid about India and headed by a military regime which will buy some sophisticated weapons and spare parts, however we, the Indians, or anybody else may disapprove. The Paks would (reluctantly) become entirely dependent on the Chicoms for arms if that were the only way to keep some military balance with India. It is important to us that this not happen.
- 3. India will also continue to arm herself to meet the combined threat she sees from Pakistan and China. But she doesn't much need our help. She has dependable suppliers in the Russians and the British, and her own arms-manufacturing capacity is large and growing.
- 4. We need, therefore, a policy that keeps us our chair at Ayub's table by (i) selling spare parts for his old American arms, and (ii) helping him to get modest increments of relatively cheap additional weapons

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-146

TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY

By cb, NARA Date 11-16-99

where we can be sure they are for replacement only. We need to do this without ruffling too many feathers among the liberals in the Congress who were shaken by the Indo-Pak war experience, and without making things impossible for us in Delhi by obvious and lopsided favoritism toward Pindi.

We announced our new policy in April 1967. In brief, we banned all direct U. S. sales of lethal weapons to both India and Pakistan; we said we would make sales of spare parts on a case-by-case basis; and we said that we would approve third-country weapon sales (where our approval is required because of U. S. equity in the weapons) only when we were persuaded that a particular sale would not contribute to an Indo-Pak arms race.

Since April 1967 we have in fact sold modest amounts of spare parts and ammunition to Pakistan and -- in the only third-country sale completed -- we approved a British sale of fighter aircraft to India.

The Tank Deal

Meanwhile, Ayub decided to replace his 500-600 world war II Sherman tanks. In the second half of 1967 he approached us for first 100 and then 200 M-47 (Korean war) Patton tanks. He assured us that they would be one-for-one replacements for the Shermans, that he would tell us what else he was doing with other suppliers with respect to armor, that he wouldn't buy any more Chinese tanks, and that he would not do any major armor buying anywhere without consulting us. We looked into his tank situation, reminded him of our policy against direct sales, pointed out that there are lots of M-47's for sale in Europe, and said that we could not see any reason we would not approve a third-country tank sale if he could arrange one. Your airport meeting in Karachi made it crystal clear that we were friendly to the notion that he should get his tanks.

The first proposed supplier was Italy. On February 29 you approved our telling the Italians we would agree to a sale of U. S. -controlled M-47's to Pakistan. But the deal fell through at the last minute because of the combination of Indian pressure and Italian dissatisfaction that the Paks wanted the tanks "as is" rather than with expensive Italian rehabilitation. Then the Belgians declared themselves willing suppliers. But again months of hard bargaining fell apart at the last minute because of the political fallout from earlier Belgian arms sales to Nigeria.

Ben Oehlert's cable is a reaction to the failure of the Belgian deal. Essentially, he is saying that the 1967 policy is fine in theory but lousy in practice. After a year of effort, Ayub still doesn't have his tanks, the Indians are angry with us for trying to get them for him, and the Soviets are more deeply imbedded in the subcontinent than ever. Bowles' cable (Tab B) is also reaction to the Belgian failure, plus Peshawar and persistent recent intelligence reports which suggest that the Paks have more Chinese tanks than they are telling us about. He would have us get out of the arms business on the subcontinent entirely.

Where we stand

While Ben Oehlert was here a month ago you instructed a full-dress SIG review of the whole arms policy question. That review was duly held. The conclusion, like the conclusion of the previous review a few months before, was that current policy is highly unsatisfactory but all the alternatives are worse. The arguments are spelled out in Nick Katzenbach's memo to you (which you have seen before) at Tab D. I am afraid Ben's memory is failing him on one critical point: there is not agreement in the government -- particularly after the Peshawar cutoff -- that we should make a direct sale to Pakistan if we can't arrange a third-country deal. And I think Chet Bowles' cable makes clear that Ben's estimate of the political costs of a direct sale is somewhat understated.

The upshot, in my judgment, remains that the most sensible course is to try again to make the current policy work.

But there is no disagreement on the thrust of Ben's message -- that we should move as quickly as possible to arrange another third-country transaction. His candidate is Iran which we have heretofore avoided because (i) it would mean the Shan would buy some expensive M-60 tanks which we have been fighting to get him to do without, and (ii) the Indians are more sensitive to Pakistani-Iranian "alliance" than any other combination. The next nominee on the Washington list is Turkey. A message is going out today to see whether that can be arranged. If so, we would meet Ben's objectives without the problems of an Iranian deal.

We may get to a point of real crisis of the kind Ben describes. But we aren't there yet. And, in my judgment, we are not really going to buy much with the tanks in the way of a lessening of Soviet involvement in Pakistan. Ayub will continue to curry all great powers, both as a principle of foreign policy and as a way of assuring a flow of arms. The most we can expect from the tanks is what we expected from the policy in the first place: to maintain some marginal influence and flow of information on Pakistani defense policy.

~~TOP SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

Re commendation:

I vote that you send Oehlert an answer along the lines of Tab C and ask Secretary Rusk to keep you informed of progress in arranging a third-country deal.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Ed Hamilton', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Ed Hamilton

~~TOP SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-142
By isa, NARA Date 7-28-98

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~ 051051Z AUG 68

FM AMBASSADOR OEHLERT 5602

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY THE PRESIDENT, IMMEDIATE

RAWALPINDI EYES ONLY THE AMBASSADOR, ROUTINE

1. WHEN YOU POSTED ME HERE YOU TOLD ME TO FEEL FREE TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH YOU WHEN I BELIEVED THE CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIED IT.

2. IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT I HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT ABUSED THAT PRIVILEGE.

3. THE CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOW REPEAT NOW JUSTIFY IT.

4. OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THIS COUNTRY -- INDEED IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD -- HAVE REACHED A CRISIS.

5. HAVING, UNSUCCESSFULLY, USED EVERY OTHER MEANS AT MY COMMAND TO RESOLVE THIS CRISIS, I HAVE NO REPEAT NO OTHER RESOURCE EXCEPT TO PLACE THE PROBLEM ON YOUR OVERBURDENED BUT BROAD SHOULDERS.

6. WHATEVER ITS TROUBLES MAY BE WITH SOME OF ITS EAST EUROPEAN SATELLITES, THE USSR HAS MADE AND IS MAKING GREAT PROGRESS IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD:

A. IT HAS ATTAINED ITS CENTURY-OLD AMBITION TO REACH

~~TOP SECRET~~

WARM WATERS;

B. THE STRENGTH OF ITS MEDITERRANEAN FLEET GROWS AFACE;

C. IT HAS MADE A CAPTIVE OF THE MORE BELLIGERENT ARAB STATES, ESPECIALLY THE UAR, SYRIA, ALGERIA AND IRAQ;

D. IT HAS OBTAINED A NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, THE ARABIAN SEA AND THE PERSIAN GULF;

E. IT HAS MADE INDIA LARGELY DEPENDENT UPON IT BECAUSE OF MILITARY SUPPLY;

F. IT HAS LARGELY OUTFLANKED THE FRIENDLY ARAB STATES OF JORDAN AND SAUDI ARABIA;

G. IT HAS AT LEAST PARTIALLY OUTFLANKED IRAN AND TURKEY.

7. IT IS CLEARLY CONTRARY TO OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS FOR PAKISTAN TO MOVE INTO THE RUSSIAN ORBIT -- NOT REPEAT NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF PAKISTAN ITSELF BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF THE EFFECT UPON IRAN, TURKEY, AND SAUDI ARABI.

8. THE FOLLOWING HAS HAPPENED WITH RESPECT TO PAKISTAN:

A. OUR LIBERALIZED MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY OF APRIL 1967 HAS NOT REPEAT NOT OBTAINED PAKISTAN ANY END ITEMS:

I. EFFORTS THROUGH GERMANY, ITALY AND NOW BELGIUM HAVE ALL FAILED;

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~~TOP SECRET~~

II. THE FAILURES HAVE BEEN DUE IN LARGE MEASURE TO INDIAN PRESSURE.

B. WE HAVE SEEN THE FIRST VISIT IN HISTORY OF A RUSSIAN HEAD OF STATE TO PAKISTAN.

C. WE HAVE SEEN THE FIRST VISIT OF A RUSSIAN NAVAL VESSEL (A SQUADRON) TO PAKISTAN;

D. WE HAVE RECEIVED THE TERMINATION NOTICE ON PESHAWAR;

E. THE USSR HAS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO SELL LETHAL END ITEMS TO PAKISTAN DESPITE STRONG INDIAN PROTESTS.

9. IF PAKISTAN IS FORCED TO RELY ON RUSSIA FOR ARMS, PESHAWAR IS LOST AND ALL OF OUR OTHER VITAL INTERESTS IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD, INCLUDING IRAN, TURKEY AND SAUDI ARABIA. ARE JEOPARDIZED.

10. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE.

11. PAKISTAN PREFER U.S. MADE ARMS FOR LOGISTICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL REASONS BUT HAS BEEN UNABLE TO REPEAT UNABLE TO COME BY THEM.

12. OUR COMMITMENT TO THIRD PARTY SALES DATES BACK TO APRIL 1967.

13. OUR COMMITMENT OF QUOTE ONE HUNDRED TANKS NOW REPEAT NOW AND ONE HUNDRED LATER UNQUOTE DATES BACK TO MARCH 1, 1968.

14. ALL OF THE HEAT WE MIGHT EXPECT FROM THE CONGRESS, THE PRESS, OR INDIA HAS ALREADY BEEN TAKEN BY OUR DECLARED WILLINGNESS TO SEE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 4 5602 ~~TOP SECRET~~

PAKISTAN GET TANKS FROM ITALY ETC.

15. OUR COMMITMENT OF THOSE TANKS WAS CONDITIONED ON:

- A. NO REPEAT NO FURTHER ACQUISITION OF TANKS OR OTHER LETHAL END ITEMS BY PAKISTAN FROM ANYONE WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH US;
- B. SCRAPPING THE PRESENT TANK INVENTORY ON ONE FOR ONE BASIS;
- C. PURCHASE PRICE AND TERMS ACCEPTABLE TO US.

16. OUR COMMITMENT OF THOSE TANKS WAS NOT REPEAT NOT CONDITIONED UPON ANY PESHAWAR EXTENSION. IN FACT, MY POSITIVE INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT REPEAT NOT TO LINK THE TWO.

17. DURING MY JUNE 1968 WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS ALL RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS TO WHOM I TALKED IN STATE, DEFENSE, JOINT CHIEFS AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AGREED THAT IF THE BELGIAN TANK DEAL FELL THROUGH WE SHOULD SELL THE TANKS DIRECTLY IF NEED BE.

18. THE ONLY RESERVATION TO THE ABOVE WAS ONE OF TIMING BECAUSE OF A CONCERN FOR CONGRESSIONAL REACTION.

19. DURING MY CONSULTATIONS I MET WITH THE GEORGIA DELEGATION,

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PAGE 5 5602 ~~TOP SECRET~~

THE FLORIDA DELEGATION, THE ZADLOCKI SUBCOMMITTEE IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, AND AN INFORMAL GROUP OF MEMBERS OF SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS AND ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE AT THE INVITATION OF DICK RUSSELL.

20. ALL, AND ESPECIALLY RUSSELL AND SENATOR SYNINGTON, WERE STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF A CHANGE IN MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY FOR THE SUBCONTINENT TO ALLOW DIRECT SALES OF LETHAL END ITEMS ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS. SUCH A POLICY MODIFICATION, OR AT LEAST A SPECIAL EXCEPTION TO THE PRESENT POLICY, FOR THE TWO HUNDRED TANKS COMMITTED WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE AN EMBARRASSMENT TO THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION.

21. ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS THE ONLY WAY TO KEEP THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION'S OPTIONS OPEN. WITH ALL THE OTHER PROBLEMS FACING IT, IT WILL BE AT LEAST A YEAR FROM NOW REPEAT NOW BEFORE THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION CAN FIX ON A SUBCONTINENT ARMS POLICY. IT WILL THEN BE TOO LATE. PESHAWAR WILL BE GONE AND THE PAKS WILL BE IN RUSSIAN HANDS. BY MOVING NOW REPEAT NOW WE CAN PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING WITHOUT IN ANY WAY COMMITTING OR BINDING THE POLICY OF THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION.

22. I BESEECH YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, TO MOVE FORCEFULLY AND

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~ 051051Z AUG 68

FM AMBASSADOR OEHLERT 5602

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY THE PRESIDENT, IMMEDIATE
RAWALPINDI EYES ONLY THE AMBASSADOR, ROUTINE

~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 6 ~~TOP SECRET~~

IMMEDIATELY TO GET AYUB HIS TANKS.

23. IT MAY NOT REPEAT NOT EVEN BE NECESSARY TO MAKE A DIRECT SALE. IRAN IS READY, ABLE AND WILLING TO PROVIDE THE TANKS. AYUB KNOWS THIS. IF WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT ALLOW IT, HE WILL CERTAINLY CONCLUDE THAT WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT WANT HIM TO HAVE ANY TANKS AND NEVER REPEAT NEVER DID.

24. AN IRANIAN SALE WOULD BE 100 PERCENT IN ACCORD WITH OUR PRESENT POLICY. IT WOULD NEED NO REPEAT NO MODIFICATION OF OR EXCEPTION TO THAT POLICY. IT WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT REPRESENT THE SLIGHTEST DEVIATION IN PRINCIPLE FROM OUR ALREADY EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO APPROVE A SALE BY GERMANY, ITALY OR BELGIUM.

25. THE ONLY REASON EVER ADVANCED FOR NOT REPEAT NOT APPROVING SUCH A SALE WHEN THE POSSIBILITY FIRST AROSE LAST DECEMBER HAS BEEN THAT IF WE DO APPROVE IT, THE SHAH WILL WANT TO BUY MORE M-60'S FROM US THAN OUR EXPERTS THINK HE SHOULD IN THE INTEREST OF HIS OWN BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

26. IT IS THE SHAH'S OWN MONEY. HE IS NO REPEAT NO LONGER RECEIVING AID.

27. FOR HIM TO BUY MORE M-60'S FROM US IS IN OUR OWN INTERESTS;

- A. EMPLOYMENT-WISE;
- B. PROFIT-WISE;
- C. TAX-WISE;
- D. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS-WISE.

28. IT CAN NOT REPEAT NOT PLEASE THE SHAH TO REFUSE TO ALLOW HIM TO DO THIS.

29. IF THE SHAH WANTS MORE MODERN TANKS HE WILL GET THEM-- IF NOT REPEAT NOT FROM US THEN FROM THE FRENCH OF THE RUSSIANS -- WHICH WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE IN OUR INTERESTS.

30. IF WE LET THE SHAH SELL AYUB THE TANKS OUR BALANCE SHEET WOULD LOOK LIKE THIS:

- A. ASSETS:
 - I. THE SHAH WILL BE PLEASED;
 - II. AYUB WILL BE PLEASED;
 - III. THE RUSSIANS WILL BE SLOWED DOWN IN PAKISTAN AND IN ALL OF SOUTH ASIA AND PARTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST;
 - IV. OUR FINANCIAL INTERESTS WILL HAVE BEEN SERVED;
 - V. PESHAWAR RETENTION WILL BE HELPED;
 - VI. WE WILL HAVE FULFILLED OUR COMMITMENT.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

PAGE 8 5602 ~~TOP SECRET~~

B. LIABILITIES

NONE.

31. MR PRESIDENT, ON DECEMBER 23, 1967, IN KARACHI, IN YOUR PRESENCE I TOLD AYUB THAT PAKISTAN WAS NOT REPEAT NOT MY CLIENT BUT THAT MY ONLY CLIENT WAS THE USG. I TOLD HIM THAT WHILE I HAD GREAT RESPECT FOR HIM AND FOR HIS GOVERNMENT AND FOR THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND HOPED THAT I COULD OFTEN BE OF ASSISTANCE TO HIS GOVERNMENT'S INTERESTS, I HAD COME HERE ONLY TO SERVE MY OWN GOVERNMENT. YOU WILL REMEMBER THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THOSE REMARKS WERE MADE.

32. I HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT CHANGED.

33. I GIVE NOT REPEAT NOT ONE FIG FOR PAKISTAN EXCEPT AS ITS INTERESTS ARE OURS.

34. MY EARNEST REQUEST TO YOU TO APPROVE IRAN AND IF FOR SOME UNFORSEEN REASON THAT SHOULD FAIL THEN TO MAKE A DIRECT SALE, IS BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON OUR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS.

35. I KNOW THAT THE GREATEST AMERICAN I HAVE EVER KNOWN WILL FORGIVE ME FOR PLAGIARIZING HIM -- I AM A FREE MAN, AN AMERICAN AND AN AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THAT ORDER.

36. IT IS IN THOSE THREE CONTEXTS, MR. PRESIDENT, AND ONLY THOSE THREE, THAT I SEEK YOUR ACTION.

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



Hold EKH 28d
Department of State

TELEGRAM
46

~~SECRET~~ 808

PAGE 01 NEW DELHI 17737 312232Z

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, /030 W

R 311458Z JUL 68
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6970

~~SECRET~~ NEW DELHI 17737

EXDIS

TO THE SECRETARY FROM AMB BOWLES:

1. DURING MY TALKS WITH T. N. KAUL JULY 30 AND FONSECY DAYAL JULY 31, CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION WAS GIVEN TO BELGIAN-PAK TANK DEAL.

2. KAUL STATED THAT GERMANS, ITALIANS AND NOW BELGIANS HAVE MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR TO GOI THEY ARE BEING STRONGLY PRESSED BY USG TO PROVIDE TANKS. ACCORDING TO KAUL, EMISSARIES OF ALL THREE COUNTRIES ASSERTED THAT THEY WERE BEING PUSHED INTO A POSITION OF CONFLICT WITH GOI; BELGIAN CHARGE, HE SAID, WAS PARTICULARLY OUTSPOKEN.

3. KAUL STATED THAT A DECISION HAD BEEN MADE WITHIN GOI NOT TO MAKE MAJOR ISSUE OF TANK QUESTION DURING KATZENBACH TALKS SINCE PRIMARY INDIAN PURPOSE AS WELL AS OUR OWN WAS DEVELOPMENT OF BASIC UNDERSTANDING AND HOPEFULLY MAJOR AREAS OF AGREEMENT ON THE BROADER ISSUES. DAYAL MADE MUCH THE SAME POINT, ADDING THE HOPE WE WOULD NOT DRAW CONCLUSION THAT GOI IS NOT GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT IMPACT OF INCREASING PAKISTAN TANK STRENGTH ON MILITARY BALANCE IN SUBCONTINENT.

4. KAUL AND DAYAL ALSO STRESSED THAT SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT OF ARMS TO PAKISTAN AND THE VERY SUCCESSFUL RECENT CONFERENCE PROVIDED EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR USG AND GOI TO RESTORE THE CLOSER RELATIONS WHICH EXISTED IN PAST. THEY STATED THAT WHOLE GOVERNMENT QUOTE INCLUDING PRIME MINISTER UNQUOTE ARE ANXIOUS TO DO ALL THEY CAN TO FOSTER THIS IMPROVEMENT.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: NSA 001R 132.003/3
By: JK, NARA, Date: 2-24-14

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NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 NEW DEI 17737 312232Z

5. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATIONS I ASKED BOTH KAUL AND DAYAL WHETHER GOI COULD PROVIDE US WITH (A) INDIAN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF CHINESE TANKS ALREADY GIVEN TO PAKISTAN AND (B) ANY INFORMATION THAT TANKS ARE TO BE INCLUDED IN SOVIET-PAK AGREEMENT. IN RESPONSE TO FIRST QUESTION, AKUL SAID THAT INDIAN INTELLIGENCE QUOTE KNEW FOR A FACT UNQUOTE CHINESE TANKS IN PAKISTAN ARMED FORCES EXCEED 250. I SAID IF HE HAD SOLID EVIDENCE OF THIS IT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO US. IN REGARD TO SECOND QUESTION, KAUL STATED THAT GOI WAS NOT CERTAIN OF WHAT SOVIETS AGREED TO SEND TO PAKISTAN BUT EXPECTED TO KNOW WITHIN NEXT FEW WEEKS. DAYAL ON OTHER HAND ASSERTED THAT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW WITH PRESIDENT HUSAIN SOVIET FONOFFICIAL TOLD HIM FLATLY THAT TANKS ARE INCLUDED BUT WAS NOT FORTHCOMING IN RESPONSE TO DAYAL'S QUESTION ABOUT PLANES.

6. COMMENT: I BELIEVE IT IS VITAL THAT USG WEIGH ITS VERY IMPORTANT GAINS FROM KATZENBACH TALKS AND OUR IMPROVED LONG-RANGE PROSPECTS (TANKS TO THE OPENING PROVIDED BY USSR DECISION TO FURNISH ARMS TO PAKISTAN) WHILE REASSESSING OUR DECISION TO ADD STILL FURTHER TO TANKS AVAILABLE TO PAKISTAN, EITHER DIRECTLY FROM THE US FOR FROM THIRD COUNTRY SOURCES. INCREASING EVIDENCE THAT PAKISTAN IS IN POSSESSION OF MANY MORE CHINESE TANKS THAN WE WERE LED TO BELIEVE AND THE POSSIBILITY (DAYAL'S ASSERTION) THAT PAKS WILL RECEIVE ADDITIONAL TANK INPUT FROM THE SOVIETS MAKES IT QUESTIONABLE WHETHER OUR OWN INTEREST REQUIRES US DIRECTLY TO UNDERWRITE OR GIVE OUR BLESSINGS TO ANY FURTHER PAK TANK ACQUISITIONS.

7. IF WE ONLY ADD TANKS TO A PAK INVENTORY THAT IS LOADED WITH NEWLY-ARRIVED OR ABOUT-TO-ARRIVE TANKS FROM THE USSR OR CHINA, WE WILL CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO MAJOR ESCALATION OF ARMS BUDGETS IN THE SUBCONTINENT. THE INDIANS, UNFORTUNATELY BUT SURELY, WILL ADD TO THEIR ARMY AT LEAST AN EQUAL NUMBER OF TANKS AND WE WILL HAVE THUS HELPED TO ASSURE THE ESCALATION WE DESIRE TO PREVENT.
GP-3. BOWLES

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~TOP SECRET -- LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

For Ambassador Oehlert from the President

Many thanks for your thoughtful message. I fully understand how important the tank deal has become to our relations with Pakistan and our position in South Asia. You can be sure, Ben, that I will give your views full weight as decisions are made.

For the moment, we are pushing ahead to see whether a tank sale can be arranged through Turkey. This would be preferable to Iran on several counts, and we may be able to sweeten the pot enough to get the Turks to go along fairly quickly. In any event, you can be sure we will give it a good try.

I much appreciate your giving me the story straight as it appears to you. I know it isn't easy out there, but I also know I have the best possible representation.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-146
By CG, NARA Date 11-16-99

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~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

Tuesday, August 6, 1968

Mr. President:

General Taylor has responded to your request of last Friday for suggestions as to better ways and means of defending our Vietnam policy. I have sent a copy of his paper to Secretary Rusk who is working with Secretary Clifford on this public information problem.

I have asked Secretary Rusk to talk with Under Secretary Katzenbach about General Taylor's last recommendation that the Senior Inter-departmental Group organize and implement the Vietnam information program.

Bromley Smith

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By AG, NAFIA, Date 11-4-92

BKS:ksb
Attachment

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-383

By ig, NARA, Date 8-12-93

~~SECRET~~

August 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: A More Vigorous Defense of U.S. Viet-Nam Policy

This paper responds to your instructions of August 2 to suggest new and better ways and means to defend our Viet-Nam policy against its enemies, foreign and domestic, and, in particular, to set forth the case for the continued bombing of North Viet-Nam in the absence of appropriate reciprocal actions or undertaking by the other side. It suggests a number of themes which we should develop and exploit publicly to gain support for our position, to prepare public opinion for a new propaganda drive to compel us to modify our bombing policy, and to neutralize the possible psychological effects of the new military offensive which may occur in South Viet-Nam. The drafting of the argumentation in support of these themes should be carried out as a matter of urgency by our best qualified officials.

The themes which I would recommend to serve as the core of the publicity are limited in number to avoid diffusion of effort but contain the principal points which we need to establish for our purpose. The following constitutes a possible list:

a. The present lull was imposed on the enemy by military necessity and can not be viewed as a conciliatory gesture of restraint.

Bunker's cable of August 2 contains most of the basic material needed to develop this theme. There is no dearth of additional material in CIA and DIA sources. Most of it can be declassified with a little sanitizing here and there.

b. The continued bombing of military targets in North Viet-Nam is necessary in relation to our efforts to obtain prompt and productive peace talks in Paris.

We must repeat this argument again and again to drive home the essentiality of continuing the bombing until the enemy undertakes adequate reciprocal constraints. We must make the point that the bombing is important militarily as a limitation on the enemy logistic activities in support of next month's battle, not of tomorrow's. Hence, before we give it up, we must have an idea of what the enemy will be doing next month, not what he is doing now.

Another argument for the continuation of the bombing is its effect on the course of the Paris negotiations. If we give up the bombing

~~SECRET~~

and the principle of reciprocity, we will create enormous obstacles for subsequent dealings with the Hanoi negotiators. They will be convinced that, if we can be compelled to give up our position on the bombing, we will give up any other position if pressed hard and long enough.

We need to remind our compatriots that the bombing is not a weapon solely of the U.S. It gives protection not only to our forces, but to those of our allies as well. It is a symbol of great importance to the South Vietnamese, military and civilian, who regard it as an essential weapon for carrying the war to the homeland of their aggressors which should not be given up without adequate compensation. We must preserve a common front with our allies if we are to succeed in Paris.

c. The U.S. position on halting or limiting the bombing is consistent with the President's San Antonio and March 31 statements and has not changed.

On both occasions, we expressed our willingness to stop the bombing if prompt and productive talks on substantive issues begin and if Hanoi does not take advantage of our restraint during the talks. Following the unilateral limitation on our bombing after March 31, we offered a complete halt if our restraint were matched by Hanoi. As was clearly indicated in the San Antonio statement, the assumption that no advantage would be taken applies both to a limitation and to a cessation of bombing.

The record is now quite clear that Hanoi has taken advantage of the limited bombing by preparing and carrying out the May 5 offensive, and is now making preparations for a third offensive. Hence, we have ample reason for lifting the limitation on our bombing right now. Even if the so-called lull were a sincere act of deescalation, which it is not, it would constitute nothing more than appropriate response to our act of restraint in limiting the bombing. In the light of the behavior of the enemy following March 31, to stop the bombing now would be an act of irresponsibility toward our own forces, those of our allies and the people of Viet-Nam, and would be inconsistent with our San Antonio and March 31 positions which require that no advantage be taken of our restraints.

That is our present position in Paris today. It has not toughened. It remains firm and consistent with the President's past statements.

d. Reciprocity is the essence of negotiation. Without it, negotiation is impossible.

Hanoi is on an untenable wicket in scoffing at our demands for reciprocity. I think it is time to take off the kid gloves and lambast this absurdity just as we did the claim that there are no North Vietnamese in South Viet-Nam. The Communists are being ridiculous and should be shown up.

g. The South Vietnamese have good reason to be wary of a coalition government proposal.

To most Americans, a coalition government formed of Communist and non-Communists following a free election appears quite a reasonable political solution upon the termination of hostilities in South Viet-Nam. Such coalitions are quite normal in democracies where no single party has a working majority of the legislature.

But this is not the meaning of "coalition government" as it is used in South Viet-Nam. There it means the kind of government which the leaders of the National Liberation Front have announced to be their objective. They would evict the present constitutional government in Saigon and set up one of their own, dominated by NLF representatives who might accept as co-members a selected group of outside politicians of compatible views. This would be in effect a Communist takeover--this is what the South Vietnamese are opposing when they denounce a "coalition government" and refuse to have any part of one.

Program to Exploit the Themes

After producing carefully prepared papers on these themes, we need a coordinated program to exploit them. We should consider taking all or some of the following actions:

- a. Use the position papers for public statements in Washington, Paris and Saigon.
- b. Distribute them to all U.S. Embassies. Have Ambassadors redouble efforts to present the U.S. case to the government and public of their land of accreditation.
- c. Similar instructions to USIB.
- d. Offer help to OVN in Saigon and to OVN embassies abroad in the organization and conduct of a parallel program.
- e. Rally all the Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) to the effort. Get heads of these governments to make public statements in support of the bombing. Give consideration to a new Summit Conference to serve as a sounding board.

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

f. Call on the Douglas Committee (Citizens Committee for Peace with Freedom in Viet-Nam) to organize a nation-wide citizens campaign to present our themes.

g. Send Westmoreland around the country to meet off the record with the policy-makers of press, radio and TV.

h. Get the following before major TV panels:

(1) Wheeler to express JCS views on theme a.

(2) Vance to defend themes b and d.

(3) Bill Bundy to argue the case for themes c and e.

i. Organize a magazine interview of the JCS as a body to discuss theme a.

j. Make the Senior Interdepartmental Group your agent for organizing and implementing this program.

M. D. T.

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

32

SECRET

Tuesday, August 6, 1968

Mr. President:

General Wheeler reports on his meeting with General Eisenhower at Walter Reed last Saturday. He was accompanied by General Westmoreland.

In response to General Eisenhower's comments about how valuable his visits with General Goddaster had been, General Wheeler said either he or General Westmoreland would come to Walter Reed or Gettysburg every three weeks to keep him informed on important military developments, especially Vietnam.

Bremley Smith

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RS, NARA, Date 5-8-92

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**FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT**

August 6, 1968

**Following is Haile Selassie's response to your message
concerning the Nigerian crisis.**

Pres file

August 6, 1968

Pres file

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM NATHANIEL DAVIS

Ad and Broadway Smith

Info: George Chesler

FOR INFORMATION

SUBJECT: UN Security Council on Israeli Raid

*Send to the Ranch
for delivery to Jim
Jones on return*

The main speeches on both sides have now been made in New York, *on the recent air raid against terrorist bases near Salt, Jordan,* and the Security Council is adjourning until tomorrow afternoon to allow time for negotiations on a resolution *which* ~~The negotiations~~ may take most of the week.

We expect almost all ~~of the~~ Security Council members will support condemnation of the Israeli air raids ~~and~~ *Even* the Canadians deplored the Israeli action. We shall work for a resolution which will balance any condemnation of Israel with explicit criticism of the Arab terrorist raids into Israeli-held territories.

We shall do our best to head off any call for sanctions, and are reasonably confident that we shall not be isolated on this issue.

Embassies

Ball and the State Department believe we shall probably have to vote in favor of a resolution condemning Israel if it is balanced by a reference to earlier provocative Arab raids. Otherwise the Soviets could isolate us. *P* The present situation is like the one we had last March after the Israeli attacks in the Karameh area. We did support a balanced condemnatory resolution at that time.

As in the case of the Karameh raid, we expect the Israelis publicly to discount a condemnatory resolution -- so long as it does not involve sanctions.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13282, Sec. 3.4
By *KJE*, NARA, Date *12-21-09*
JNSC 17-430195 (437)

On the other hand, the ^{current} ~~campaign~~ atmosphere in the U. S. makes any action of ours in New York more sensitive than it was even a few months ago.

The situation has not developed far enough to know what resolution language may emerge, ~~or what our alternatives may be. Ambassador Ball and Secretary Rusk expect to make a recommendation to you.~~ When the alternatives are clearer, ~~but did want you to be informed of the situation in a preliminary way.~~

We will be sending to you the recommendations of Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Poall.

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/

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, August 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres. file

SUBJECT: Wheat for India

Herewith Messrs. Freeman, Gaud and Zwick recommend a \$169 million PL-480 agreement with India. Zwick's memorandum (Tab A) is a concise summary of the proposal. The more detailed Freeman/Gaud memorandum is at Tab B.

This agreement would provide for the second half of calendar 1968. Last December you approved a \$216 million bargain providing 3.5 million tons of grain to cover the first half. This agreement will provide another 2.3 million tons of grain, along with small amounts of tallow, milk and tobacco. Total: 5.8 million tons of grain to India in 1968 -- about the same as last year.

The development case for providing the food is strong. The Indians have moved on all the self-help measures called for in the December agreement and are ahead of schedule on the important ones. The new wheat would go primarily to build buffer stocks to back the CCC-type price support operation we have been pushing the Indians to adopt. Taken with India's own bumper grain crop, this will provide the best grain supply situation and outlook in recent Indian history. However, this agreement gives us little new political leverage because the Indians aren't in the dire need of the famine years.

The most compelling argument for the agreement is our domestic wheat situation. Despite reduced acreage the 1968 U. S. crop will be another record, and the wheat price has now dipped under \$1.25 for the first time in a decade. Freeman frankly does not expect to reach our wheat export target of 750 million bushels for this crop year. But this agreement is the core of any fighting chance he may have.

Commercial Purchases

India now plans to acquire 1.5 million tons of grain in 1968 beyond the amounts we provide through PL-480. At least one million tons of this will come in food aid from other donors. This leaves 500 - 700,000 tons to be bought on the world market. We have pushed hard to get the Indians to buy as much as possible from the U. S. So far this year they have bought 146,000 tons from us (and 200,000 tons from others). We hope to get another 200,000 tons or so.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Authority: FRUS, 64-68, vol. 25, #507

By: *J* NARA. Date: 12-21-09

Cuban Problems in the Wings

As you consider this, you should know that we have evidence of a new transaction by an Indian firm in Cuba. An Indian engineering company has contracted with the Castro Government to do the plans for a metal refinery which will probably process products of an expropriated American mine. The Indian involvement is entirely private, so there is no legal restriction on PL-480 or other aid. But it is hard to believe that the aid-haters on the Hill would let this one slip by if it caught their attention. The deal has been in the Indian press but not, so far as we know, in the American papers. It may pass unnoticed, but it may also give us real trouble.

We have made it clear to the Indians that we are unhappy about this, and that the Congress is likely to be more so. They have listened politely and explained that it is a private transaction over which the Government has no control. In fact, of course, the GOI could make it practically impossible for the firm to go ahead. But the Government would take a lot of political heat. State's judgment -- which I share -- is that the Indians aren't about to pay that political price to safeguard wheat they don't really need for immediate consumption. If we push them and make the wheat a condition, my guess is the only effect will be that we won't move the wheat.

Recommendation

I recommend you approve the agreement.

EKH:LLW

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

AUG 3 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P. L. 480 Agreement for India

In the attached, Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your authority to negotiate a \$169 million P. L. 480 sale with India. Forty percent of the value would be repayable in dollars over 40 years, compared with twenty percent in the last two agreements.

This agreement would include 2.3 million tons of wheat, bringing the total provided under P. L. 480 to 5.8 million tons for calendar year 1968. Over half of the balance needed to meet India's total estimated import requirements of 7.5 million tons is expected to come in the form of food aid from other donors, primarily Canada, the EEC, Australia, Japan, and the U.K. India plans to purchase up to 700,000 tons commercially with her own foreign exchange, and we would continue to press her to buy as much as possible in the U.S. In spite of high transportation costs, India bought over 40 percent of her commercial wheat imports from the U.S. in FY 1968.

This agreement, which covers 85 million bushels for six months from a total P. L. 480 target of 370 million bushels this fiscal year, is our only current hope for moving a lot of wheat when it is needed. Freeman describes our expected difficulties in meeting our wheat export targets this year in the face of record crops both here and in other Free World countries. Cash prices are generally below the support price for the first time since the current wheat program was adopted in 1965, and wheat is flooding to CCC under the price support program. The other commodities proposed for this agreement -- tallow, nonfat dry milk, and tobacco -- are also in surplus in the U.S.

Self-Help - The Freeman/Gaud memo describes India's mixed, but on the whole excellent, progress in meeting the self-help conditions we included in the P. L. 480 agreement signed last December. The general measures proposed for this agreement would help to reinforce the progress now under way.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By JHC, NARA, Date 12-21-09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Political Considerations - The facts underlying your determination that it is not necessary to suspend aid under the terms of the Symington amendment have not changed since June. I agree with Gaud that no action is required on this front.

We have recently learned that an Indian engineering firm has apparently contracted with the Government of Cuba to provide the plans for a metal refinery. Worse, the refinery would probably utilize concentrates produced in a plant confiscated by Castro from the U. S. Since the Indian firm is a private one, there is no legal requirement that we penalize them under the terms of P. L. 480. However, the deal could raise problems for us on the Hill. We have expressed our concern to the GOI but, as a practical matter, it would be very difficult politics for them to do anything about it even if they wanted to. Withholding this food aid would almost certainly not get them to reverse course, but it would make it impossible for us to meet our wheat export targets.

Recommendation - I recommend that you authorize negotiation of this P. L. 480 agreement. The CCC would have to take over most of the wheat under the price support program if it did not buy it for export. The agreement is within your 1969 budget, even after taking into account the cutback.

Charles J. Zwick
Charles J. Zwick
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

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JUL 26 1968

To: The President
Subject: PL 480 Program for India

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a FY 1969 Title I, PL 480 agreement with India to provide approximately 2.3 million tons of wheat/wheat flour (covering last half CY 1968 requirements); 90,000 tons of tallow; 4,000 tons of nonfat dry milk; and 700 tons of tobacco with a current export market value, including certain ocean transportation costs, of \$169 million. Forty percent of the commodity value would be provided under Convertible Local Currency Credit terms with payment over 40 years including a 10 year grace period. The interest rate during the grace period would be 2 percent and 2½ percent thereafter. Sixty percent of the commodity value would be provided under Local Currency terms. These are somewhat harder terms than the previous agreement which called for a mix of 20 percent under Convertible Local Currency Credit terms and 80 percent under Local Currency terms.

Need for Program

The Government of India has set its total foodgrain import requirements for CY 1968 at 7.5 million tons. The agreement signed last December provided for 3.5 million tons of foodgrains covering part of India's first half CY 1968 import requirements. The 2.3 million tons included in this proposal would bring the total U. S. grains for CY 1968 to 5.8 million tons leaving a balance of 1.7 million tons. India has indicated that the remaining 1.7 million tons would be made up of a combination of aid imports from other donor countries and commercial purchases.

The tallow would be used for soap making and the milk to help India supplement her nutrition efforts. The tobacco would be for use in the manufacture of certain special brands of cigarettes requiring high-grade U. S. tobacco.

We expect great difficulty in meeting our wheat export target of 750 million bushels for the crop year beginning July 1, 1968. We will be facing sharp competition from other wheat exporting countries for the commercial market while prospects for programing under PL 480 at this time are limited because of large crops in major recipient countries.

Despite reduced acreage, the July Crop Report forecasts production of wheat at a record of just under 1.6 billion bushels, 4 percent above the previous high of 1967. India has been by far the largest outlet for PL 480 wheat exports. The current request for 2.3 million tons (approximately 85 million bushels) is well below previous requests and there is an urgent need to move this quantity as early as possible in the crop year.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *jk*, NARA, Date *12-21-09*

CONFIDENTIAL

Food Aid and Commercial Purchases

In our memorandum of November 22, 1967, we said that we would urge the Indians to make strong efforts to seek contributions from members of the International Grains Arrangement and from the Soviet Union. Indicated imports from other donor countries reflect the Indians' efforts. Their expected Calendar Year 1968 food aid from other countries now includes 500,000 metric tons from Canada; 150,000 metric tons from Australia; 200,000 metric tons from the EEC countries; 50,000 metric tons from the United Kingdom; 50,000 metric tons from Japan; and 50,000 metric tons from The World Food Program.

It is estimated that India's commercial purchases during CY 1968 may go as high as 500,000 to 700,000 tons. We will continue to press the Indians to make a fair share of their commercial wheat purchases in the U. S.

Self-help Progress

India's record 1967/68 foodgrain harvest of 98-100 million tons was the first major payoff from markedly improved self-help efforts. The last crop year alone saw an increase of over 50 percent in fertilizer use, and a five-fold expansion of the acreage planted to high-yielding seed varieties. Further major increases are targeted for next year. In addition, the installation of state and private tubewells is now proceeding at a rate of 41,000 per year.

The 3.5 million ton PL 480 agreement we signed last December was conditional on the following food distribution policy reforms: a major relaxation of the restrictive food zone system starting next fall; a firm incentive procurement price policy; the building of a 3 million ton buffer stock; and wider authority for the Food Corporation of India. On the key issue of food zones, India moved ahead of schedule with a first step toward liberalization in late March. If the 1968 monsoon proves favorable, we would expect India to undertake further liberalization of zones this fall in accordance with the above commitment. Lags in rice procurement for buffer stocks have been largely offset by Indian Government domestic wheat purchases well above original targets. The procurement price policy has generally held up, though the remarkable wheat harvest in northern India has caused some breaks in prices to farmers. The strengthening of the organization of the Food Corporation has not moved as rapidly as desirable, and we are initiating meaningful negotiations on this point.

The self-help provisions we propose for this agreement would build on past achievements and focus on key problems of distribution and storage. Specific provisions would include:

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- 1) An intensive Government of India program to construct additional storage facilities in important interior foodgrain producing areas;
- 2) Continuation of India's commitment to procure foodgrains at incentive price levels;
- 3) Increasing attention to minor irrigation, including exploration of new water sources and strengthening of soil and water research;
- 4) Adapting major irrigation works to improve delivery of water to individual fields;
- 5) Strengthening of agricultural research;
- 6) Exploration of new sources for agricultural credit and credit-related services.

Military Expenditure Review

State/AID has determined that Indian resources are not being diverted to military expenditures to a degree which materially interferes with its development, and that U. S. assistance is not being diverted to military purposes. This determination was made in connection with a program loan approved by you on May 10, 1968, and the basis for it remains unchanged.

Economic Dealings with Cuba

A private Indian firm of consulting engineers has signed a contract to provide the plans and specifications for a non-ferrous metals refinery for the Cuban Government. On the basis of our limited available information, it appears that we have no immediate legal problem under existing PL 480 legislation. We are seeking more detail from New Delhi and will review the legal aspects in light of the new information. However, in any event, we may face a serious Congressional problem, particularly in view of the fact that the refinery is expected to refine concentrates produced in the Nicaro Mine and Plant owned by the U. S. Government but confiscated by Castro without compensation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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4

Recommendation


That you authorize us to negotiate the PL 480 sales agreement as described above.

JUL 26 1968

July 19 1968



Administrator
Agency for International Development



Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

37

SECRET

Aug 5, 1968 *OK*
Pres file

**FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT**

**The following is a summary of the current views of President Thieu
and Vice President Ky on the military and political situation in South Vietnam.
The information comes from conversations of the two South Vietnamese
leaders [REDACTED] in Saigon.**

STATOTHR

(send attached page)

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ 019-038-2-2
By [Signature], NARA, Date 1/20/02

37a

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

P. President Thieu appears to be reasonably confident that South Vietnam can gradually develop the strength to cope with the Communist challenge on the political level. [redacted]

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25X1C

[redacted] he felt the Honolulu conference had done much to dispel public fears that the US might force an undesirable peace settlement on the country although he acknowledged that some South Vietnamese remained suspicious of what he and President Johnson may have discussed in private. Thieu reiterated that his own position was a willingness to talk with Hanoi and to try to develop a dialogue with the Viet Cong Liberation Front, but that any concept of a coalition government remains unacceptable.

2. P. Touching on some of the reasons for his relative optimism, Thieu observed that in recent months the idea of negotiations and peace has become far more acceptable to the South Vietnamese and that urban residents have come to realize their stake in the conflict and the need for unity among non-Communists. Thieu noted that the new progovernment alliance, the Lien Minh, was making "satisfactory progress," but that he will have to provide personal leadership if it is to have a chance of succeeding. He said he planned steps to improve government leadership at the local levels and had already ordered the corps commanders to work closely with the provinces to provide adequate village and hamlet security and to attack the Viet Cong infrastructure so that Communist efforts to organize and control wide areas of the countryside could be defeated.

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25X1C

[redacted] vice President Ky made it clear that he was one of those still harboring suspicions about what may have transpired at Honolulu. He criticized Thieu for not adequately exploiting the results of the conference and for not fully briefing other government leaders on the talks. Ky said he remained confident of allied ability to repel a new Communist military offensive but that he was less sanguine about the political struggle since the government lacked any real program and the people remained confused.

~~4 August 1968~~

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/06/04 : NLJ-141-022-13-1-9

SANTITIZED

Authority NLS-141-022-013/1
By J, NARA, Date 1/3/09

CONFIDENTIAL

August 5, 1968

TO
FOR THE PRESIDENT
Info: George Christian
FROM: BROMLEY SMITH

SUBJECT: Jordan-Israel Issue at UN

The UN Security Council began meeting this afternoon, at Jordan's request, on Israel's air attacks yesterday against terrorist bases in Jordan. No vote is likely today. As usual, we will work for as balanced a resolution as possible, deploring both terrorism and retaliation. However, this is increasingly difficult, given the mood in the Security Council and the fact that Israel has built no serious public record on the terrorist incidents leading to this attack. State will have no recommendation on our vote until we see what kind of wording is possible, but ^{Assistant Secretary} Sisco warns that we have to expect it to be pretty rough on Israel.

Meanwhile, Ambassador Barbour is urging the Israelis to make the most of Eban's meeting with Jarring this Saturday, August 10. The Israeli attack has already increased Arab doubts that Israel wants a settlement. Unless we can persuade Eban to give Jarring evidence that Israel means to follow up on the more flexible position Eban described to Ball with serious substantive talk, the gains of the Ball mission could prove short-lived.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By jcl/jc, NARA, Date 12-21-09

August 5, 1968

Pres. file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Return of the Bikini People

Attached are memoranda from Secretary Udall urging that you announce a governmental decision that the people of Bikini can now be safely relocated to their home island and providing an explanation of why for security reasons we cannot at this time allow the people to return to Eniwetok. The Secretary proposes a draft White House announcement and draft letters for your signature to the Secretaries of Defense and Interior, the AEC and the BoB directing them to carry out the Bikini resettlement.

Secretary Udall's recommendation is endorsed by State, Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. It was also concurred in by Walt Rostow before he went on leave. High Commissioner Norwood has been working on this project with the AEC and the military authorities involved and has been strongly urging its approval at the earliest possible date.

George Christian has reviewed the desirability of releasing this announcement at the ranch and concurs in the Secretary's recommendation. Questions and answers and maps have been provided the Press Office to assist in briefing the White House Press Corps.

Tab A attached contains the documents to be released consisting of the Secretary's memorandum to you, the White House statement and the letters for your signature addressed to the Secretaries of Interior and Defense, the AEC and the Bureau of the Budget.

Bromley Smith

- Approved; letters signed
- Let Interior announce
- Call me

Enclosures

CEJ:mlb (8-5-68)

Dear Mr. Zwick:

The Secretary of the Interior has reported to me that a special analysis of radiological levels of Bikini Atoll has resulted in the conclusion that the major islands of the atoll are now safe for human habitation. The Defense Department has also concluded that security requirements are such that the return of the former Bikini people to their traditional home can be accommodated.

The return of these people cannot, however, be accomplished overnight. There remains the major task of working with the Bikini leadership in planning the return, of removing any remaining sources of radiological contamination, of clearing the land and of replanting it to crops which will sustain human life and which will provide a source of income. New homes and new community facilities must be built with the active participation of the returning people. These tasks require resources beyond the means of the former Bikini people and of the Trust Territory Government. I, therefore, request you to work with the Secretary of the Interior and the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory in planning a comprehensive resettlement program and to assist them in carrying it out with all possible dispatch.

Sincerely,

Honorable Charles J. Zwick
Director, Bureau of the Budget
Washington, D. C. 20425

LBJ:CEJ:mlb (8-5-68)

Dear Dr. Seaborg:

The Secretary of the Interior has reported to me that a special analysis of radiological levels of Bikini Atoll has resulted in the conclusion that the major islands of the atoll are now safe for human habitation. The Defense Department has also concluded that security requirements are such that the return of the former Bikini people to their traditional home can be accommodated.

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Sincerely,

Honorable Glenn T. Seaborg
Chairman, United States
Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

LBJ:CEJ:mlb (8-5-68)

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Secretary of the Interior has reported to me that a special analysis of radiological levels of Bikini Atoll has resulted in the conclusion that the major islands of the atoll are now safe for human habitation. The Defense Department has also concluded that security requirements are such that the return of the former Bikini people to their traditional home can be accommodated.

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Sincerely,

**Honorable Clark M. Clifford
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301**

LBJ:CEJ:mlb (8-5-68)

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have your memorandum regarding Bikini and am pleased that we can now announce the return of these people to their former home. This is an announcement which I have made today. I have also requested the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to cooperate with you and to assist you and the High Commissioner of the Trust Territory to effectuate a resettlement program.

Resettlement will require careful planning and the appropriation of funds if we are to demonstrate to the people of the Trust Territory that we will fulfill our commitments. I urge that you undertake this task immediately. It is our goal to assist the people of Bikini to build on these once desolated islands a new and model community.

Sincerely,

**Honorable Stewart L. Udall
Secretary of the Interior
Washington, D. C. 20240**

LBJ:CEJ:mlb (8-5-68)

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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240

Memorandum

AUG - 1 1968

To: The President
From: Secretary of the Interior
Subject: Bikini - Eniwetok

Attached at Tab A is an unclassified memorandum on the return of the people of Bikini to their home atoll together with a proposed public announcement and draft letters to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Bureau of the Budget, as well as to me, concerning resettlement of the Bikinians.

In anticipation of a desire on the part of former Bikini residents to return to their atoll, I asked the Atomic Energy Commission in December 1966 to conduct a radiation survey to determine whether the islands were safe for habitation. I also asked the Defense Department to determine whether there was any further military requirement for Bikini. As these actions were taking place, considerable news interest began to build on the future of Bikini. Much interest was generated by a petition sent to the UN Trusteeship Council by a Peace Corps volunteer on Kili where most of the former Bikini people live. This was followed by articles on Bikini appearing in Time and Newsweek magazines. Interest in the question has also remained high in the Trust Territory.

Meanwhile, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Defense Department concluded that Bikini could be returned to the natives and we are now working on plans to effect their return. It is probable that an announcement of the Government's decision to return Bikini to its native inhabitants will spur the former Eniwetok natives now residing on Ujelang to press for their return to Eniwetok. The representatives of the former inhabitants of Eniwetok have already sent a petition to the Trusteeship Council. The petition, among other things, complains about conditions on their present atoll and asks that a definite date be set for their return to Eniwetok.

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
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 23
Authority Antoni R. Lopez Letter 11-17-82
By DA, NARA, Date 11-9-92

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However, the two situations are dissimilar. While Bikini has been uninhabitable, Eniwetok has become an intercontinental ballistic missile re-entry vehicle impact and scoring area and the western terminus of the Pacific missile testing range. There are Defense installations on Eniwetok, and there is continuing hazard from missile impacts. These testing requirements with their inherent hazards will not accommodate the return of the former Eniwetok natives. Tab B is a fact sheet outlining current activities on Eniwetok.

We have not included reference to this situation in our proposed Bikini announcement lest it offset the positive features of the Bikini return. However, if questions on Eniwetok are asked, the brief answer at Tab C is recommended.

We have also cleared with the Departments of Defense and State a letter to the High Commissioner which he can pass to the former Eniwetok people advising them that security requirements with respect to Eniwetok are such that their return is not possible at this time.


Secretary of the Interior

Attachments

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UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240

Memorandum

To: The President
From: Secretary of the Interior
Subject: Return of the Bikini People

AUG - 1 1968

In 1946 the United States found it necessary to move the people of Bikini from their atoll in order to permit the area to be used for atomic testing. These people, originally about 150, were ultimately settled on Kili island in the southern Marshalls. They have never adjusted to Kili, which is small and has no lagoon, and have retained an intense desire to return to Bikini.

In early 1967, at my request and that of Trust Territory High Commissioner Norwood, the Atomic Energy Commission made a special survey of the atoll in order to determine whether radiation levels were such as to enable people safely to live on its islands. Following this intensive survey of the atoll and a review by a special committee of consultants, an affirmative conclusion was reached. Attached is a copy of the special committee's report. The committee concluded that Bikini Atoll, site of more than 20 nuclear tests between 1946 and 1958, is once again safe for human habitation.

At my request, the Secretary of Defense has pushed ahead with a special study of security requirements in that part of the Pacific and has advised me that return of the people to Bikini is compatible with those requirements. The Defense Department may wish to install some unarmed devices, such as radar towers, and on a limited scale station personnel on the atoll, but these activities will not prevent resettlement by the Bikinians nor be inconsistent with the re-establishment of their normal life on the atoll.

The 1967 AEC survey team undertook an intensive study of the atoll measuring external radiation levels and the radioactivity content of soil, water and plants and of animal life. The last previous survey had been made in 1964 as a part of continuing studies of the atoll since 1946.

The survey team noted that vegetation on the islands of the atoll is dense and that the populations of birds and the marine life of the lagoon were large. However, the coconut trees which are the basis of human life and the economy of coral atolls had been destroyed during the tests. The density of the new vegetation has largely checked their recovery.

The results of the survey have been analyzed by a special committee of consultants. The consultants concluded that:

"The exposures to radiation that would result from repatriation of the Bikini people do not offer a significant threat to their health and safety."

Although the consultants have judged the radiation levels on the atoll now to be acceptable, they made several recommendations for reducing exposure even further. These recommendations include:

- (1) Restrict living areas to the major islands of Eneu (Enyu) and Bikini for the present and cover the village area with a layer of coral rock to reduce further the low level of radiation from the soil;
- (2) Clean out the present population of strontium 90-bearing coconut crabs, which form a part of the diet of Pacific Islanders;
- (3) Remove the radioactive scrap metal which still remains on some of the islands near the test sites; and
- (4) Maintain a continual monitoring of the islands and the population to assure that they do not, in some unforeseen way, accumulate a greater radiation dose than predicted.

The committee of consultants also recommended that resettlement be initiated on Eneu island because of its very low contamination level. "No radiological precautions will be needed on Eneu," the committee reported.

We would propose to follow the recommendations of the consultants in developing a resettlement program. A copy of their report is attached for your information.


Return of the Bikini people cannot be immediate although we should take immediate steps to begin their return. A comprehensive plan must be developed; any remaining sources of major contamination removed; the overgrowth of uneconomic vegetation cleared; the land planted to productive crops; and new housing and community facilities built. We propose to do this with the active participation of the Bikini people in both the planning and execution stages. It will, however, also require the active cooperation of the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission and, in seeking funds for the resettlement project, the Bureau of the Budget.

Our tentative time table calls for the High Commissioner within the next few weeks to ask the Bikini people to name a group of their leaders to work in the planning stage. The second step is an on-island survey of the atoll to select those sites required by the Defense Department and to plan the location of the new village. At this stage, it is expected that the

preliminary resettlement plan will be drafted with the Bikini leadership participating. The visit to Bikini should take place in the last half of August or in early September. During the fall the plan would be completed and cost estimates presented.

Depending upon the availability of funds, the initial contingent of returnees might be settled within a year. Bikini workers would be engaged in clearing, planting, and building activities. Return of all of the Bikinians now living on Kili might be accomplished within two years. However, resettlement assistance will be required for a much longer period. The atoll is now virtually devoid of edible or economic plants and a feeding program will be required until subsistence foodcrops reach adequate levels and commercial crops come into production. It takes approximately seven years for newly planted coconuts to become fully productive. The coconut is essential to life on a coral atoll, providing food, drink, building materials, and, equally important, virtually the sole source of cash.

There is attached a draft announcement regarding the proposed resettlement of the Bikini people. Bikini and the desire of the people on Kili to return has recently been in the news and there continues to be widespread interest in these people. For these reasons, I request and urge your public announcement of the decision that the Bikini people can and will be relocated on their home atoll of Bikini.


Secretary of the Interior

ANNOUNCEMENT

The President announced today that plans are underway to permit the people of Bikini to return to their home atoll in the Marshall Islands. A special committee of expert consultants has reported to the Atomic Energy Commission that Bikini Atoll, site of more than 20 nuclear tests between 1946 and 1958, is once again safe for human habitation.

The Defense Department has reported after a special study that the return of the people is consistent with security requirements. There will be a continuing requirement for the use of some sites on the atoll and there may be a need for Defense Department personnel to be stationed on the islands from time to time. These uses will not prevent the return of the people nor the re-establishment of their normal way of life.

Bikini Atoll is a ring of 26 coral islands, 25 miles long and 15 miles wide, on the northwestern fringe of the Marshall Islands. Before 1946, when the Bikinians were moved to make way for nuclear tests, about 150 persons lived on the atoll. They moved first to Rongerik Atoll and since 1948 have lived on Kili in the southern Marshall Islands. The Kili population is now about 300 and a total of about 500 people regard Bikini as their traditional home.

Because of the dense overgrowth of the islands and the lack of any substantial quantity of foodstuffs growing on the atoll, an extensive clearing and replanting program will be required. In addition, housing and community facilities, such as a school, dispensary, and a water

collection system, will be needed before the Bikinians can return from Kili.

The Bikini people will actively participate in both the planning and the execution stages of the resettlement program. The High Commissioner of the Trust Territory has been asked to request the Bikini people to name a group of their leaders to work with Trust Territory Government personnel and representatives of the United States Government in developing a comprehensive resettlement plan. This work is scheduled to begin with a visit to the atoll within the next few weeks by a team composed of Bikini representatives, and personnel from the Trust Territory Government, the Defense and Interior Departments and the Atomic Energy Commission.

It is the intent of the United States and the Trust Territory Government to work with the Bikini people in building a modern and model community on their atoll.

4015

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REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE TO EVALUATE THE RADIOLOGICAL HAZARDS OF RESETTLEMENT OF THE BIKINI ATOLL

The Committee was convened to consider the question of whether the Bikini Atoll is safe for human habitation with respect to the radiological hazard. The detailed history of the various relocations of the Bikini natives is described in the appended material provided by Mr. Tobin (Appendix I),

We have examined the documents listed in Appendix II. In addition, we spent one and one-half days in detailed discussions with members of the 1967 Bikini Survey Team and other experts as shown in Appendix III. On the basis of the information provided, we have reached the following conclusions and recommendations:

- 1. The exposures to radiation that would result from the repatriation of the Bikini people do not offer a significant threat to their health and safety.
- 2. Such exposure may and should be further reduced by the following simple measures:
 - a. Restrict rehabilitation for the present to the islands of the Bikini-Eneu complex. (See Appendix IV)
 - b. Establish the first village and immediate food crops on Eneu. No radiological precautions will be needed on Eneu because of its very low contamination level. (See Appendix V)

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- 2 -

- c. Any village construction on Bikini Island should involve the covering of the site with coral rock as is the local custom.
 - d. Radioactive scrap metal should be removed from the islands adjacent to former shot sites.
 - e. The population of land crabs should be sharply reduced because of their high content of ^{90}Sr .
 - f. If pandanus trees which produce edible fruit are planted on Bikini Island, two inches of topsoil should be removed from the planting sites. The area of removal from each site should be equal to the area covered by the crown of mature trees.
3. Determinations should be made of body burdens of ^{137}Cs and ^{90}Sr at the end of the first year of residence on the Atoll and as appropriate thereafter. Baseline surveys prior to relocation would be desirable. Resurveys of environmental radiation levels on the Bikini Atoll and estimates of radio-nuclides in food should be made periodically. These surveys will provide a continual check of the radiation status of the people and environment and will help form a basis for decision as to the time of rehabilitation of islands outside of the Bikini-Eneu complex

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4. Special efforts should be made to ensure a balanced and adequately nutritious diet. For example, a dietary supplement of powdered milk would materially reduce ⁹⁰Sr uptake by relieving the calcium deficiency usually associated with their diet.

Respectfully submitted:

Shields Warren
John C. Bugher
Robert A. Conard
John B. Storer
Paul Tompkins
John H. Harley
Charles L. Dunham
S. Allan Lough

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FACT SHEET

ON

DIFFERENCES IN NATURE OF BIKINI AND ENIWETOK ATOLLS
AND DIFFERING DOD REQUIREMENTS FOR THESE AREAS

At the end of World War II, Bikini and Eniwetok were initially selected by the Department of Defense as sites for the testing of nuclear weapons. The Atomic Energy Commission, established in 1947, made use of the same sites in joint testing operations with the Department of Defense. Bikini was the site of the major atomic tests in 1946, while Eniwetok was used primarily in a supporting capacity and was not subjected to radioactive contamination to the same extent. In later years, major tests were conducted at both locations. After the voluntary nuclear test moratorium went into effect on 1 November 1958, Bikini, which was radioactive and uninhabitable, was unused; but Eniwetok became an intercontinental ballistic missile re-entry vehicle impact and scoring area. The US Navy conducted these operations on Eniwetok as part of the Pacific Missile Range, which on 1 February 1965 was transferred to the Air Force Western Test Range. Eniwetok has thus always been the western terminus of the Pacific missile testing range. There have been no military requirements for Bikini in recent years, and the only foreseeable military requirement may be for installation of one or two unattended radar reflector towers. These would be passive devices which would be used as precise navigation aids for missile-tracking ships.

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The residual radiological hazard on Bikini has been the major factor preventing the former natives from returning to their original homes. Now an AEC evaluation indicates that this danger has subsided.

However, the situation is quite different in regard to Eniwetok. While there has been no problem on Eniwetok with residual radioactivity, there is a continuing hazard from missile impacts. The lagoon, which Eniwetok atoll encloses, is the intercontinental ballistic missile re-entry vehicle impact and scoring area. Further, continuing research and development efforts in the missile field are directed, among other areas, toward multiple re-entry bodies, credible decoys, maneuvering vehicles and more sophisticated re-entry systems. Eniwetok Atoll is instrumented with optical, acoustical, and radar instrumentation for accurately locating ballistic missile impacts, all of which are extremely important in development and refinement of new missile hardware. Thus, the Department of Defense (DOD) has a continuing and long-term requirement for the instrumentation systems located on Eniwetok, and for the Eniwetok impact area itself. In order to satisfy US requirements for accurate impact data, both for research and development, and operational missile tests, Eniwetok will be vital to the national missile program well into the future. Because of these considerations, Eniwetok could not accommodate a return of the native inhabitants.

QUESTION:

Now that Bikini will be returned to the former inhabitants, when do you anticipate taking similar action regarding Eniwetok?

ANSWER:

The situations regarding Bikini and Eniwetok are quite different. Bikini, which has been unused since the voluntary nuclear test moratorium, has only recently been found sufficiently free of radioactivity to permit people to live there. Eniwetok, on the other hand, has for some time been employed as the western terminus of the Pacific Missile Testing Range and thus subject to a continuing hazard from missile impacts. Eniwetok continues to have a high degree of missile test activity and thus constitutes an essential link in our world-wide missile testing system. It thereby contributes to the security of the free world. Because of these considerations, the former inhabitants cannot be returned for the foreseeable future. However, this is a matter which will be given continuing review.