

~~TOP SECRET~~

AUG 3 1968

FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT

In response to General Taylor's request for information to put into the report which you asked him to do concerning the meaning of the lull in enemy activities in South Vietnam, Ambassador Bunker sent the cable which follows immediately. General Taylor believes that it is so timely and so informative that he asked that it be sent to you. It is a coordinated Saigon Mission response to the questions which General Taylor asked.

(Send attached Saigon 002 cable as revised)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ-CBS 23
By ics, NARS, Date 6-29-84

Note from Bromley Smith

There is a discrepancy in the figures used in Section I. A. (3) and those which you have used publicly. The explanation is as follows:

a. You have said publicly that 30,000 North Vietnamese troops entered South Vietnam in July. Ambassador Bunker's report says the number "exceeds 26,000." The difference results because MACV estimates the arrivals in South Vietnam and then deducts 20-30% for attrition en route. DIA deducts only 10% for attrition.

b. You have said publicly that we estimate that the number of North Vietnamese troops entering South Vietnam during August would be the same number as entered in July, i. e., 30,000 men. The Bunker report says that August level will be the same as that in June, i. e., 18,000 men. We believe this to be a typographic error and are checking with Saigon to confirm our belief that Ambassador Bunker meant to refer to July rather than June. Other messages received from MACV in Washington which use July reinforce our conclusion.

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OK

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS ~~XXXXXXXX~~ PRIORITY

STATE

TODEL

NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

EYES ONLY FOR HARRIMAN AND VANCE FROM THE SECRETARY

Congratulations on your handling of the talk with Zorin particularly his attempt to put us on the defensive about such subjects as the Honolulu Communique, recent press conferences, the so-called lull and whether or not we have had a QUOTE sign. UNQUOTE

The following are comments on points you ^{made} ~~made~~ with Zorin which might come up in your Sunday meeting.

1) If any effort is made to attack the Honolulu Communique or the recent press conferences of the President and myself, you could point out that it is not for each side to try to impose limitations on the public statements of the other. Hanoi has maintained a constant stream of invective throughout the Paris talks and any reasonable outside observer would clearly see that

DR per 10/15

Drafted by: S:DRusk:ml/mk 8/3/68
Tel. Est. 5171
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: The Secretary

Clearances: EA - Mr. Bundy *hrrs* S/S -
White House - Mr. Smith

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NI J-019-038-2-3-8

SANTIZED
Authority NS 019-038-2-3
By Q, NARA, Date 1/20/02

Presidential Library review State Dept. equity required

Classification

Page 2 of telegram to Paris

~~SECRET~~
Classification

what has been said on our side is responsible and moderate. In any event, we assume that what their representatives in Paris say to us is the authoritative expression of the views of the leaders in Hanoi on matters concerning the Paris talks. They must proceed on the same basis with what Harriman and Vance say to them on our behalf. If you think it wise, you could add that highest levels here had noted their questioning of your authority at the last tea break, and were not in the least pleased that any slightest question had been raised on this score.

2. Incidentally Dobrynin told me that he had reported to his government without consultation with us that recent press conferences in Washington reflected no change in the position of the United States. 25X1C



3. On the subject of the so-called lull, we know that July was one of the heaviest months for arrivals in South Viet-Nam and that we expect August to be even higher. This is on the basis of most sensitive but reliable information. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~
Classification

Page 3 of telegram to Paris~~SECRET~~Classification

You can hit them hard on the scale of infiltration during July and August. If they raise with you the recent arrival of 4,000 men of the Fifth Mechanized Brigade, you can point out that this was announced some months ago and represents only a fraction of what they themselves are now moving into South Viet-Nam. FYI Actually this Brigade is being substituted for a Marine element of similar size which was QUOTE loaned UNQUOTE to General Westmoreland in an emergency and which will be withdrawn perhaps by the end of this month. END FYI.

4) I would not take the initiative to ask them whether there is a political significance in the lull, as hinted to Murrey Marder. The trouble with asking the question is that it suggests that if the answer is Yes, that would be enough on which to stop the bombing. As my press conference made clear, we need to get an indication not only that what is happening now is deliberate, but that it foreshadows future behavior, specifically in the areas we have mentioned in the proposals we have put before them. (This is of course what you have already made clear to Zorin, particularly in para 13 of your report.) Hence, what we really need is some serious response to the proposals you have already opened up with them on the Phase One-Phase Two basis. If they themselves take the initiative in suggesting that the lull results from a political

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Page 4 of telegram to Paris

~~SECRET~~

Classification

decision, you might suggest every indication we have is that the lull will not last very long and ask them for their comments on your earlier proposals. The full background for this suggestion can be gone over with Vance in detail in Washington early next week.

5) Finally, as the occasion arises, I believe it is always useful in these private talks to bring home that we mean just what we say about our own withdrawal, and envisage the clear possibility of a phased withdrawal. While we have said this over and over again, in the Manila terms, I think it gains extra weight to say it in the private setting and to convey the clear suggestion that if we were able to reach the necessary degree of understanding on what would follow our stopping the bombing, it could lead on to something in this area.

GP-1.

End.

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Friday, August 2, 1968

FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT

For your approval there follows a draft message of condolence to President Marcos on the substantial losses which appear to have occurred in the Philippine Islands as the result of a severe earthquake.

"Dear Mr. President:

The thoughts and heartfelt sympathy of the American people are with you and the people of the Philippines, and especially with the families who have lost their homes and loved ones in the earthquake. Would you extend my personal condolence to all those who have suffered injury, bereavement, and loss in this tragedy. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson."

BKS:ksb

Lais

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Friday - 3:30 p.m.
August 2, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: The President - INFORMATION
FROM: William G. Bowdler

President Trejos has cabled you this message of appreciation:

"I am deeply grateful for your thoughtful message concerning the devastation caused by the volcano Arenal with resulting high loss of life, injuries and material damage. I am also profoundly grateful for the very important and timely help received from the United States through your active Embassy, which has contributed so much to alleviating the depressing situation in the affected region.

Very sincerely,

Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez
President of Costa Rica"

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By sq, NARA, Date 11-5-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Friday - August 2, 1968 - 3:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Political Crisis in Bolivia

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-31

By inf, NARA, Date 4-24-91

President Barrientos is facing the most serious political crisis of his two years in office. It stems from the publication of the "Che" Guevara diary, a copy of which was surreptitiously furnished to Fidel Castro by someone in Bolivia.

Since the diary was kept under lock and key by the Army, the finger pointed there, bringing into question the loyalty and discipline of the Armed Forces. This produced a political chain reaction of protest by opposition groups, a police crackdown, threats of strikes and student disturbances, unrest in the Armed Forces, and finally, replacement of the civilian cabinet with a mediocre military one.

In the midst of all this, Barrientos' Interior Minister Antonio Arguedas took off for Chile where he announced that he had been the one that passed the Guevara diary to Castro. The circumstances of his "fleeing" Bolivia, his public statements, and his desire to come to the United States rather than go to Cuba which has been desperately trying to get him, all cast serious doubt on the bona fides of the Arguedas story. It sounds to me as though he agreed to be the scapegoat for his old friend Barrientos in order to take the heat off the restive Armed Forces. Incidentally, Arguedas is due to arrive in the United States on Saturday, August 4.

Barrientos still confronts a difficult situation at home. The shift to a military cabinet has not really satisfied the Armed Forces and is being severely criticized by civilian elements. Fearing a congressional investigation of the diary episode if he allows Congress to convene on August 6, Barrientos seems inclined to delay its opening. There are also indications that ambitious officers in the Army would like to use the crisis to dump Barrientos.

Ambassador Henderson talked to Barrientos yesterday about our interest in seeing him complete his constitutional term. He gave him our

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

impression that allowing Congress to convene on schedule and going back quickly to a civilian cabinet would help him hold to this objective. Barrientos agreed, but was vague on the timing.

So far, Barrientos has weathered the storm and probably has a better than even chance to see it through. Given the internal nature of his problems, there is little we can do but give him continued moral support. This we are doing. It is definitely in our interest that he remain in power, because it is doubtful that anyone else could make as good a showing in managing that difficult country.

William G. Bowdler

Friday, August 2, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached for your signature is a Proclamation of the International Grains Arrangement 1967.

The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of this International Agreement on June 13, 1968. You signed the instrument of ratification on June 15. The Arrangement was brought into force as of July 1.

E. R. Fried

If you approve, we will need your signature at Tab A.

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

ERF:mst



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 29, 1968

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1-Fried
2-R.T.
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IN REPLY REFER TO: 10690

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proclamation of the International
Grains Arrangement 1967

I enclose for the President's signature the
proclamation of the International Grains Arrangement 1967.

The Arrangement consists of a Wheat Trade Convention
and a Food Aid Convention with a common preamble and was
open for signature in Washington from October 15 through
November 30, 1967. It was sent to the Senate on January 25,
1968 for advice and consent to ratification. On June 13,
1968 the Senate adopted its resolution advising and
consenting to ratification of the Arrangement. The
instrument of ratification was signed by the President
on June 15, 1968 and was deposited on that same date.


The basic elements of the Arrangement were negotiated
in Geneva during the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations
and were an integral part of the agreements reached at
that time. Both Conventions embodied in the Arrangement
were signed in behalf of all 12 parties to the Kennedy
Round Memorandum of Agreement and the Wheat Trade
Convention was signed also in behalf of 20 other Governments.
The Arrangement is designed to replace the International
Wheat Agreement 1962, as extended and modified, to which
the United States is a party, but the Arrangement is more
comprehensive than the 1962 Agreement.

The Wheat Trade Convention provides new and improved
procedures for stabilizing world wheat prices and
establishes minimum and maximum prices in world trade
for 14 major wheats at levels substantially higher than

under the 1962 Agreement. This Convention also assures that the United States and other exporting member countries will be able to provide a specified minimum share of the import requirements of other members. Procedures to be followed when prices reach minimum or maximum levels are spelled out, as are guidelines regarding concessional transactions.

The Food Aid Convention establishes an important new program under which both wheat exporting and importing countries will provide food grains to less developed countries. The amount programmed is 4.5 million tons annually for a 3-year period beginning July 1, 1968.

The Arrangement, including the Wheat Trade Convention and the Food Aid Convention, was brought into full force and effect in accordance with the provisions of Article 40(3), as indicated in the proclamation.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Proclamation.

INFORMATION

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TOP SECRET

Friday, August 2, 1968

Mr. President:

Here is General Taylor's evaluation of the lull in enemy activities in South Vietnam.

General Taylor plans to send you a separate paper covering recommended actions based on the conclusions he has reached.

If any public use is to be made of this paper, I recommend that you do not use one sentence in the report until we have learned whether the 18,000 figure included in it is agreed within the Intelligence Community. The sentence on page 2 reads:

"In spite of heavy losses, the massive infiltration during the spring and summer has allowed him to raise his current North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Main and Local Force units by about 18,000 over their strength just prior to the TET offensive."

Bremley Smith

BKS:amc

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ-CBS 21
By ics, NARS, Date 6-26-84

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

August 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Evaluation of the Lull in Enemy Activities in South Viet-Nam

At your luncheon on Tuesday, July 30, you asked me as Chairman of your Intelligence Board to examine the available information with regard to the so-called lull in South Viet-Nam and to determine whether, in fact, there was a significant lull and, if so, to evaluate its military and political significance.

In carrying out your instructions, I have discussed the points at issue with Secretaries Rusk and Clifford, Deputy Secretary Nitze, Director Helms and the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General McConnell. Also, I have obtained by cable the views of Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams which you have seen in their entirety. In highly summarized form, the following are the conclusions which I have drawn from my discussions with these officials and from Bunker's most illuminating cable.

Is there a lull?

There has been a very significant lull in the combat activities of the enemy in South Viet-Nam. Since about mid-June, virtually all of the indicators of these combat activities have turned downward. However, concurrently, there have been many indications of intense activity devoted to other forms of military activity such as the refitting, retraining, reorganizing, and repositioning of many of his units. Battle casualties are down in comparison with the first five months of 1968 but our casualties in the so-called lull are higher than in the corresponding period of 1967.

With regard to enemy political activities in South Viet-Nam, there is no detectable lull--indeed political propaganda in support of the NLF and the Alliance has increased. Efforts to proselyte by propaganda are at a high pitch but there seems to be some reduction in the organization of Liberation Committees in the countryside. In Saigon, the Alliance seems to be gaining a measure of support among some of the intelligentsia.

What is the military significance?

As to the military significance of the lull in combat activities, there is unanimity of opinion that it has been imposed upon the enemy largely by military necessity. If there were no political negotiations in progress, there would still be ample reason for the enemy to take time out to replace the severe

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Authority NLS-CBS 21
By ics, NARS, Date 6-26-84

losses of the TET and the May 5 offensives and to assimilate the heavy influx of recruits arriving from the north during the spring and summer. Also, the heavy losses in supplies and equipment must have created logistic problems requiring a period of relative inactivity for resolution. However, the requirements for the reconstitution of units probably do not explain entirely the remarkably low level of current combat activity. It seems likely that, if he wanted, the enemy could be more aggressive now than is presently the case and, at the same time, build up his combat effectiveness.

This regeneration of combat capability is probably both for the purpose of regaining lost strength and also with the objective of developing a renewed capability for another large scale offensive some time this year. While evidence as to the possible timing of a renewed offensive is mixed, several dates have been mentioned in intelligence reports, most of them falling in the period August 3-18. By that time, the newly arrived recruits should be well integrated into their units and ready to take part in an offensive. Also, it will be convention time in the U.S., a fact which may have a bearing on enemy timing.

As to likely places for attack, recent enemy movements and dispositions may be interpreted as threats to the coastal region of I Corps from the DMZ through Danang to Quang Nai, Ban Me Thuot, Loc Ninh, Tay Ninh and Saigon. Estimates of the possible scale of the offensive vary from a country-wide, coordinated effort on the TET pattern to a lesser offensive like the one in May or even something substantially smaller. In spite of heavy losses, the massive infiltration during the spring and summer has allowed him to raise his current North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Main and Local Force units by about 18,000 over their strength just prior to the TET offensive. Thus, in terms of numbers, the enemy appears to be in good shape to strike a powerful blow. However, Abrams has the general initiative and, this time, there should be no possibility of a surprise.

What is the political significance?

With regard to any political motivation for the lull, there is a general feeling that there is no clear evidence to suggest that the lull is primarily for the purpose of influencing the Paris negotiations. There are too many valid military reasons to support such a view. However, there is general agreement that the enemy has the opportunity to make political virtue out of military necessity by exploiting the lull as evidence of an ostensibly sincere desire to lower the level of violence as a tacit, conciliatory gesture. He can not exploit this point officially without giving up his position on

reciprocity but some Hanoi representatives in private conversations have alluded to their current restraint on the battlefield. Unfortunately, U.S. critics of our policy need no prompting and make the case for Hanoi on their own initiative.

Summary

There is an enemy-initiated lull in combat activities in South Viet-Nam accompanied by an intensification of enemy military activities for the purpose of replacing losses, refitting units and creating a renewed offensive capability. That capability may be exercised at any time in a number of places.

There has never been a lessening of enemy political activities in South Viet-Nam--in fact, in this period they have increased.

The combat lull was imposed on the enemy by military necessity but, as a bonus, he has the option of exploiting it for political purposes in relation to the peace talks. There is no evidence to believe that it is a genuine signal of a desire to deescalate in order to facilitate prompt and productive talks in Paris.

M. D. T.

M. D. T.

NOTE: Because of the need for a prompt reply to your directive, I have not been able to consult the other members of your Intelligence Board in preparing this paper. With regard to recommendations of actions as a consequence of the conclusions of this report, I shall prepare and submit a separate paper.

INFORMATION

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, August 2, 1968

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk asked that the attached report on the recent ASPAC Meeting from Foreign Minister Hasluck be forwarded to you at the Ranch.

Brom
Bromley Smith

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

August 2, 1968

Mr. President:

Ambassador Waller brought me in the enclosed message from Paul Hasluck on the recent ASPAC Meeting. I think you will find it interesting to glance through this.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:
Message.

~~SECRET~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a).

BY 19 ON 10-27-92

MESSAGE FOR THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE
FROM THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
DATED 2ND AUGUST, 1968

Third Ministerial Meeting of ASPAC Council met in Canberra from 30th July to 1st August, and I thought you might like to have some personal impressions of my own on it. The Australian Embassy in Washington will have passed to State Department a copy of the Communiqué issued at the end of the meeting.

The meeting went very well. Perhaps the biggest gain from these and other regional organizations is the fact that Foreign Ministers and their senior advisers have come to know one another well and this has contributed to the growth of a sense of community. I felt this sense of community was particularly marked at the gathering which has just concluded.

The Japanese stand has improved from our point of view. Whereas a year ago, the Japanese were trying to avoid political discussions in ASPAC, they now accept it, and Miki himself participated in discussion on political matters. The Japanese still remain the most reluctant of all ASPAC members to take public positions, particularly on questions relating to Communist China, North Korea or North Viet Nam. Miki explains this primarily in terms of the difficulties the Japanese Government has with its domestic opinion, but no doubt the Japanese also wish to maintain the maximum flexibility for the future in relation to the Communist countries.

During the Conference the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Viet Nam had three private meetings with Miki and, according to the Vietnamese, they went very well. The Vietnamese say they found Miki personally much more understanding of their position and sympathetic to them than he was twelve months ago. I think it is useful that Japan put its name to the references to Viet Nam in the Communiqué.

The Vietnamese Minister told me that he discussed with Miki and with Khir Johari from Malaysia possible membership of a new International Control Commission in the event that one was needed to supervise some aspect of a settlement or agreement on cessation of hostilities. He claims that both said their countries would be willing to act. I have some personal doubt whether this is the sort of subject on which Johari could give any undertaking for Malaysia, and possibly the Vietnamese Minister may be over-optimistic. He also speculated about the suitability of Algeria for such a Commission.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 01-259 (1/66)

By jc/sj NARA. Date 12-21-09

It is significant and valuable that Japan has agreed to be the host for the ASPAC Ministers next year, which means that for the next twelve months, the Standing Committee will hold its monthly meetings in Tokyo under the chairmanship of Miki himself. During the past year the Standing Committee has met in Canberra, consisting of the Ambassadors here of the ASPAC countries, meeting under my chairmanship. I have opened each meeting by giving a quite lengthy survey of international situations as seen by the Australian Government. The Ambassadors have then commented with varying degrees of thoroughness and instructions, and the records of the meetings have been given to the Ambassadors to send back to their Governments. I believe that this has had some effect in helping to create a common sense of purpose. The holding of the Standing Committee meetings in Tokyo should exert some effect on Japanese thinking and on Miki himself.

~~SECRET~~

The reference to Korea in the Communiqué gave some trouble in drafting because the Korean Foreign Minister wanted to have the ASPAC Council go further on the record than other members thought wise. The Korean Foreign Minister indeed was rather tiresome in trying to press his points on a number of subjects beyond what was clearly the wish of all other members and I do not think he did his country much good. Unfortunately, while the Koreans were adopting a position at one extreme, the Japanese were on most points the country at the other extreme, and this led to a series of Japanese-Korean differences with face becoming involved on both sides. It was all the more regrettable because often there was not a lot in question as far as substance was concerned. I am afraid that our Korean colleague does not know how and when to yield gracefully when there is nothing much at stake.

The subject of Sabah did not arise at the formal meeting, and as far as I can ascertain, there was no private discussion of Sabah outside the meetings. I expressed the personal hope to both Johari from Malaysia and Ramos from the Philippines that the matter would be settled amicably. Neither seemed to want to discuss it. My personal impression is that Ramos is not at all inclined to take the question any further and that he personally sees the folly of allowing this issue to interfere with regional co-operation.

As usual, Thanat Khoman did very well and played a constructive role. Wei of China filled a quiet part and did nothing to rock the boat. The Vietnamese Foreign Minister did not have a great deal to say at the Meeting but he talked usefully to others behind the scenes. He showed good judgment on how far to press his points. My judgment is that he helped his country by the way he conducted himself at the Meeting.

Best wishes. I am hoping to see you when I go to the General Assembly, unless something intervenes to keep me here.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM BROMLEY SMITH

55
AUG 2 1968

TO THE PRESIDENT

INFO SECRETARY CLIFFORD

In a secure telephone conversation this afternoon Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Vance agreed that Vance would quietly return to New York Monday for personal reasons. On Tuesday he will come down to Washington.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 10-30-72

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

54

~~SECRET~~

Friday, August 2, 1968, 11:25 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dubcek Address to the Czechoslovak Nation


Before flying off to Bratislava for tomorrow's Summit, Dubcek spoke to the Czech people in a hastily arranged mid-day address. **The speech adds little new firm information about the nature of the accommodation reached at Cierna.**

Dubcek said Czechoslovakia's army is strong enough to defend its borders -- and the press is interpreting this to mean that the Czechs did not give the Soviets the right to station troops permanently on Czech soil. On the other hand, Smrkovsky characterized the removal of the remaining Soviet troops on Czechoslovak soil as a "detail", and this transparently defensive reaction to the troops question is not reassuring.

Dubcek emphasized economic cooperation within the Bloc -- as did Svoboda yesterday -- and there is some guessing in the press and in our Intelligence Community that this means a commitment was made to go very slow in breaking out to economic cooperation with the West.

Dubcek explained the Czech concession in agreeing to a conclave rather than a series of bilateral meetings by saying there wasn't time to negotiate bilaterally and prepare for the September Party Congress. This was clearly an effort to put the best face on things.

Ulbricht's departure by plane for Bratislava has already been reported. Speculation has it that Tito's visit is now scheduled for Monday. Our Intelligence People believe there may be 10-20,000 Soviet troops still in Czechoslovakia. There are no indications yet that the troops ringed around the periphery have moved to a lesser state of readiness since the talks -- but it is probably too early to tell from our indicators in any case.

Nathaniel Davis


DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-107
By jis, NARA Date 6-11-97

~~SECRET~~

DUBCEK SPEECH TEXT

PRAGUE DOMESTIC SERVICE IN CZECH 1200 GMT 2 AUG 68 A

(SPEECH BY CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY FIRST SECRETARY ALEXANDER DUBCEK--RECORDED)

(EDITOR'S NOTE: THE ANNOUNCER INTRODUCES DUBCEK'S SPEECH BY SAYING: "SHORTLY AFTER 1200 A SPECIAL PLANE FROM RUZYNE ARRIVED IN BRATISLAVA CARRYING THE MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE HEADED BY ALEXANDER DUBCEK, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC LUDVIK SVOBODA, AND FOREIGN MINISTER PROF DR JIRI HAJEK, WHO WILL ATTEND TOMORROW'S MEETING OF THE LEADING POLITICIANS OF SIX SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. SHORTLY BEFORE DEPARTURE COMRADE DUBCEK ADDRESSED THE FOLLOWING SPEECH TO THE LISTENERS OF CZECHOSLOVAK RADIO")

(TEXT) HONORED FELLOW CITIZENS AND COMRADES: YESTERDAY WE RETURNED FROM NEGOTIATIONS OF SEVERAL DAYS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE. WE WENT THERE WITH YOUR FULL CONFIDENCE AND AWARE OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TASKS WHICH WE HAVE TO SOLVE IN THE INTEREST OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY AND OUR PEOPLE. WE KNEW OF THE HOPES AND FEARS WITH WHICH YOU FOLLOWED OUR TALKS. ALL THE MORE, I CONSIDER IT MY DUTY TO THANK YOU ALL FOR THE WISE AND CIRCUMSPECT ATTITUDE WHICH RECENTLY HAS CULMINATED IN THE MOVEMENT TO SUPPORT BY SELF-SACRIFICING WORK OUR EFFORTS CONCERNING THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE ARISEN AMONG US AND CERTAIN COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE INTEREST OF THE FURTHER DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS AND POST-JANUARY POLICY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY.

ON WEDNESDAY LUDVIK SVOBODA, PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOLIALIST REPUBLIC, SPOKE ABOUT THIS. WE PROMISED YOU TO STAND FIRMLY ON THE POSITIONS OF POST-JANUARY POLICY IN WHICH IT IS OUR AIM TO BUILD IN OUR COUNTRY A SOCIALIST SOCIETY WHICH WILL HAVE A GENUINE IMAGE, SWHICH WILL BE DEMOCRATIC, SOCIALLY JUST, AND OF A MODERN ORIENTATION, IN WHICH SOCIALIST VALUES WILL BE CLOSELY LINKED WITH NATIONAL VALUES, AND IN WHICH, ACCORDING TO THEIR OWN KNOWLEDGE AND CONSCIENCE, OUR CITIZENS WILL SOVEREIGNLY DECIDE THEIR DESTINY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE PROMISED THAT IN THE SPIRIT OF THE TRUST YOU PUT IN US, AS IN THE PAST, WE WILL REMAIN LOYAL TO OUR FRIENDS AND WE WILL NOT BETRAY THE PRINCIPLES OF PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM, THE PRINCIPLES OF COLLABORATION, AND THE COMMON STRUGGLE OF THE PROGRESSIVE FORCES, IN PARTICULAR THE FORCES OF SOCIALISM.

(MORE)

2 AUG 1331Z BE/TM

X X X FORCES OF SOCIALISM.

53/5) WE RIGHTLY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE IDEAS ON WHICH WE BASED OUR (?ALLIANCE) WITH THE SOVIET PEOPLE WILL EMERGE PURIFIED AND STRENGTHENED FROM THESE TESTS. I STATE QUITE FRANKLY THAT IT WAS WITH GREAT RECOGNITION AND APPRECIATION THAT WE ACCEPTED THE FACT THAT WE WERE ABLE TO MEET SO SOON WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CPSU.

THE FEW DAYS DURING WHICH YOU WAITED WERE FILLED WITH INTENSE WORK FOR US. WE EXCHANGED VIEWS IN COMPLETE FRANKNESS WITH THE SOVIET COMRADES ON A VERY BROAD RANGE OF PROBLEMS OF OUR RELATIONS. THE MAIN GUIDELINE IN OUR TALKS WAS OUR POST-JANUARY POLICY AND THE FACT THAT WE WERE NEGOTIATING WITH A FRATERNAL COMMUNIST PARTY OF AN ALLIED COUNTRY OF OURS WITH WHICH WE ARE LINKED BY PROFOUND INTERNATIONAL BONDS.

I STATE FRANKLY: YOU CAN BE COMPLETELY SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS AND THE SPIRIT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE KEPT THE PROMISES WHICH WE HAD GIVEN YOU AND WE RETURNED WITH THE SAME CONVICTION WITH WHICH WE DEPARTED FOR THE TALKS: TO CONTINUE CONSISTENTLY ON THE ROAD WHICH THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY AND ALL OUR PEOPLE TOOK LAST JANUARY. THERE CAN BE NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE FOR OUR NATIONS AND THE WORKING PEOPLE OF OUR CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST FATHERLAND. SPEAKING OF THESE RESULTS, WHICH ARE FOR US SATISFACTORY, ONE MUST FRANKLY POINT TO THE GOOD WILL AND THE EFFORTS OF THE SOVIET FRIENDS TO UNDERSTAND OUR PROBLEMS AND ALSO TO RESPECT OUR SPECIFIC CONDITIONS, AS WELL AS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF ANY PARTY TO SETTLE INDEPENDENTLY ITS AFFAIRS.

THE SOVIET COMRADES WERE ABLE TO SATISFY THEMSELVES DURING THE TALKS THAT WE ARE DEFENDING THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIALISM JOINTLY AND THAT IT IS OUR WISH TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRENGTHENING OF THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT. IT IS OUR INTERNATIONAL DUTY TO CONTINUE TO DEMONSTRATE BY OUR ACTUAL CONDUCT THAT WE ARE NEVER GOING TO DEVIATE FROM THE PATH OF SOCIALISM, FOR SOCIALISM HAS THE SUPPORT OF THE DECISIVE MAJORITY OF OUR PEOPLE, COMMUNISTS AND NONCOMMUNISTS, AND OF THE ENTIRE NATIONAL FRONT.

WE CONVEYED TO OUR SOVIET COMRADES THE OFT-EXPRESSED CONVICTION OF OUR PEOPLE THAT THEY WISH TO BASE THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF OUR COUNTRY ON MUTUAL BROTHERLY BONDS OF ALLIANCE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOCIALIST STATES. WE MAY SAY THAT THE TALKS WERE SUCCESSFUL, THAT WE SHALL AGAIN CONTINUE WITH OUR COOPERATION ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH THE RELATIONS BETWEEN FRATERNAL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES SHOULD BE FOUNDED--ON GENUINE INTERNATIONALISM, WHICH IS COMPRISED BOTH OF UNITY AND COOPERATION AND RESPECT FOR STATE SOVEREIGNTY, AS WELL AS FOR THE PRINCIPLE THAT EACH COMMUNIST PARTY IS CARRYING OUT ITS SOCIALIST POLICY IN ITS COUNTRY FOR THE GOOD OF ITS PEOPLE, TO WHOM, AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY STRESSED, IT IS FULLY RESPONSIBLE.

(MORE)

SECOND ADD 31 (DUBC. . SPEECH TEXT)

X X X IS FULLY RESPONSIBLE.

(TEXT) INTERNATIONALISM WAS NOT A MERE MATTER OF WORDS IN OUR TALKS. OUR TWO PARTIES DECLARED THEMSELVES READY TO UNDERTAKE FURTHER PRACTICAL STEPS WITH A VIEW TO STRENGTHENING OUR MUTUAL COLLABORATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK BOTH OF THE CEMA AGREEMENTS AND THE WARSAW TREATY. OUR COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAS NEVER BEEN UNTRUE TO THESE PRINCIPLES. IN THE FUTURE, TOO, OUR COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL REGARD OBSERVANCE OF THESE TREATIES AS PART AND PARCEL OF ITS POLICY.

IN THIS CONNECTION I WISH TO STRESS THAT OUR ARMY IS NOT ONLY A FIRM COMPONENT IN THE DEFENSE OF OUR SOCIALIST COMMUNITY, BUT ALSO A SUFFICIENT GUARANTEE OF THE DEFENSE OF OUR STATE FRONTIERS AND, BY THE SAME TOKEN, OF THE FRONTIERS OF SOCIALISM.

I WAS ASKED RIGHT UPON MY RETURN TO THE AIRPORT IF OUR SOVEREIGNTY WAS THREATENED. LET ME SAY FRANKLY THAT IT IS NOT. WE NEED FRIENDSHIP AND GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE USSR PRECISELY IN THE INTERESTS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND PRECISELY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION. I WANT TO STRESS THE NEED FOR THE PEOPLE OF OUR COUNTRY TO MAINTAIN THEIR PRUDENT AND STATESMANLIKE ATTITUDE. ~~THERE MUST BE NO MISUSE OF VARIOUS SPONTANEOUS ACTIONS AND MEETINGS FOR EXPRESSIONS OF VARIOUS ANTISOCIALIST AND ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENTS.~~
~~HAVE PULLBACK OF LAST TWO LINES~~

AND STATESMANLIKE ATTITUDE. THERE MUST BE NO MISUSE OF VARIOUS SPONTANEOUS ACTIONS AND MEETINGS FOR EXPRESSIONS OF VARIOUS ANTISOCIALIST AND ANTI-SOVIET SENTIMENTS.

ESTEEMED FRIENDS! I AM CONVINCED THAT ON THE BASIS OF THE RESULTS OF OUR TALKS WE NOT ONLY ARE FULLY ENTITLED, BUT THAT WE EVEN HAVE THE DUTY TO LOOK FORWARD, ABOVE ALL, TO CONCENTRATE OUR FORCES ON THE TASKS WHICH WE HAVE DECIDED TO UNDERTAKE AND WHICH WE HAVE OUTLINED IN THE ACTION PROGRAM OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY AND FOR THE REALIZATION OF WHICH WE HAVE OBTAINED FURTHER ROOM THROUGH OUR NEGOTIATIONS AT CIERNA NAD TISOU.

TOMORROW WE ARE TO HOLD A MEETING WITH THE SAME OBJECT IN BRATISLAVA, WHERE WE HAVE DECIDED, AFTER AGREEMENT WITH THE CPSU, TO INVITE THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES OF BULGARIA, HUNGARY, THE GDR, AND POLAND. DURING OUR TALKS AT CIERNA NAD TISOU GOOD FOUNDATIONS WERE LAID FOR THIS MEETING.

(MORE)

2 AUG 1430Z BE/TM

THIRD AND LAST ADD 31 (DUBCEK SPEECH TEXT)

X X X FOR THIS MEETING.

(TEXT) THE PREPARATION OF THE MEETING, THEREFORE, DOES NOT CALL FOR ANY FURTHER BILATERAL TALKS, SIF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN CONSIDERATIONS OF TIME IN VIEW OF THE IMPENDING 14TH CONGRESS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY.

AT THE BRATISLAVA MEETING WE SHALL CONCENTRATE OUR ATTENTION ON THE COMMON INTERESTS OF THE (?COMMUNIST MOVEMENT) AND WE LOOK ON THIS MEETING AS A PRACTICAL STEP IN THIS DIRECTION IN THE INTERESTS OF INTERNATIONALISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. AFTER THIS STEP, OTHERS WILL FOLLOW.

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THIS MEETING THERE WILL BE TALKS WITH OUR FRIENDS FROM YUGOSLAVIA AND RUMANIA. WE WISH TO SHOW IN OUR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THE SAME PRUDENCE, THE SAME SENSE OF INITIATIVE AS IN OUR INTERNAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST POLICY. WE BELIEVE WE SHALL SUCCEED IN THIS AND THAT BY SO DOING WE SHALL BE HELPING NOT ONLY OUR OWN DEVELOPMENT, BUT THAT WE SHALL ALSO BE MEETING OUR OBLIGATIONS TOWARD THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALISM AND THE CAUSE OF PEACE IN THE WORLD AND, THROUGH OUR CONTRIBUTION, WE SHALL CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT.

ESTEEMED CITIZENS, COMRADES! THANKS ALSO TO YOUR HELP, WE HAVE DONE A PIECE OF HONEST WORK AT CIERNA NAD TISOU TOGETHER WITH OUR SOVIET FRIENDS, TO WHOM WE MUST EXPRESS OUR GRATITUDE AND THANKS FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY APPROACHED OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

I REPEAT AGAIN: ALL OF US, AND ALSO OUR FRIENDS ABROAD, MUST NOW SEE TO IT THAT WE SEEK WAYS--PATIENTLY, CALMLY, AND WITH SUSTAINED ENDEAVOR--OF STRENGTHENING OUR COOPERATION, FRIENDSHIP, AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. BY SO DOING WE SHALL CREATE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL PREPARATION OF THE 14TH CONGRESS OF OUR PARTY FOR THE CREAZION OF ENDURING SAFEGUARDS OF THOSE IDEALS FOR WHICH (WE--ED) FOUGHT AT THE JANUARY PLENUM AND DURING THE POST-JANUARY ERA. LET US, IN THE INTERESTS OF THESE AIMS, DEMONSTRATE AGAIN THE PRUDENCE AND STATESMANLIKE WISDOM OF OUR PEOPLE. LET US WELCOME THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FRATERNAL COMMUNIST PARTIES IN A MANNER BEFITTING THE MATURITY OF OUR PEOPLE, IN A MANNER WORTHY OF OUR CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST HOMELAND.

(ENDALL)

2 AUG 1447Z BE/TM

57

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, August 1, 1968

Breakfast with the President

Friday, August 2, 1968 8:30 A.M.

Pres file

Agenda

1. U.S. Military Response to a North Vietnamese Offensive

General Wheeler will bring to the breakfast his list of specific military actions. (The others present will not have seen this list previously)

2. Cambodia

a. U.S. actions to close down North Vietnamese sanctuaries.

1. Diplomatic efforts - Secretary Rusk

2. Military Plans - Secretary Clifford

b. Diplomatic efforts to free U.S. ship and crew held by Cambodians - Secretary Rusk

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 11-4-92

TOP SECRET

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 89-39

By inf NARA, Date 8-14-89

58
INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, August 1, 1968, 7:45 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Responses to General Taylor's Memorandum on Bombing Policy *Pres file*

Secretary Rusk, Secretary Clifford and General Wheeler have sent in the attached papers giving their views on General Taylor's memorandum to you concerning our bombing policy in North Vietnam.

You will recall that General Taylor discussed three alternatives--

1. Stop the bombing completely
2. Continue our present policy
3. Linking the level of our bombing to that of enemy violence in South Vietnam

General Taylor's memorandum is at Tab D.

In brief, the two Secretaries and General Wheeler oppose linking the level of our bombing to that of enemy violence in South Vietnam.

Secretary Rusk believes it is too complicated to administer and seems to use military resources in a way that does not achieve relatively simple objectives. He defers, however, to his military colleagues on the military aspects of the suggestion. (Tab A)

Secretary Clifford believes the suggestion is unworkable and would be unproductive. Our bombing is now tied to the security of our own forces and should not be tied to other variables. (Tab B)

General Wheeler considers the suggestion not to be in our best interests. He says that the value of having an answer to a possible charge that we fail to deescalate when the enemy does is not worth the cost in reduced military effects of our bombing, a predictable increase in friendly casualties, and the loss of our allies' confidence in the U.S. policy of steadfastly awaiting meaningful deescalation by Hanoi. (Tab C)

Both Secretaries and General Wheeler come out strongly in support of our remaining on our present course in Paris as well as in Vietnam. General Taylor's memorandum makes clear that he also shares this view. I have not given to General Taylor copies of these papers.

BKS:amc

~~TOP SECRET~~

Bromley Smith

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

58a

July 31, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I wish to make the following comment on the memorandum of General Maxwell Taylor in connection with the July 29 editorial of "The New York Times."

I agree essentially with General Taylor's second course of action, namely, remaining on our present course both in Viet-Nam and in Paris pending a better answer from Hanoi than we have thus far had. I also agree that further action should be taken to explain the reasons to the American people.

My concern about General Taylor's ingenious third course of action is that it is too complicated to administer and seems to me to use military resources in a way that does not achieve relatively simple objectives. It would put any bombing of North Viet-Nam on an almost purely political basis and therefore expose us to political charges that it is an obstacle to peace and ought to be eliminated. Our present area limitation has the great value of simplicity. We are trying to give our troops on the battlefield maximum support by interdicting lines of communication and destroying as much as we can of the men and material flowing south to attack our men. I don't quite see that this mission would vary with the number of incidents in the south so much as with the enemy effort to move men and material from North Viet-Nam to South Viet-Nam. If there was a general reduction of incidents in II, III, and IV Corps, it is not clear to me that we would want to reduce our effort to stop enemy action against I Corps.

I defer to my military colleagues on the military aspects but I have a strong predisposition toward a simple rather than a complex arrangement where so many factors have to be taken into account.

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NJ 89-39

By sig NARA, Date 8-14-89

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

58-b

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

August 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: General Taylor's Memorandum of July 30, 1968

General Taylor's memorandum addresses itself first to what he regards as a "drive" to bring about a bombing cessation in response to the present lull in enemy-initiated military activity in South Vietnam. General Taylor properly points out that we should not determine our own conduct on the basis of responding to any attempts to generate public pressures. I agree with his thesis, whether the pressure stems from Communist propoganda or from an American public eager for peace. Instead, we should choose our course of action on the basis of what will most clearly advance our objective of securing peace as rapidly as possible under circumstances that will afford to South Vietnam the right to determine its own political future.

I remain unalterably opposed to a bombing cessation under circumstances which give us no reason to believe that such a cessation will produce substantial restraint on the part of Hanoi and which might make it difficult to justify resumption, however necessary. We have, however, properly indicated our willingness, and in fact our desire, to stop the bombing and move towards resolution of our substantive differences with Hanoi whenever we have assurance that such bombing cessation will not result in our military disadvantage.

General Taylor suggests that the alternatives presently available are, first, to "yield to the pressure and stop our bombing completely"; second, to ignore the pressure and continue on our present course; and third, to link the level of our bombing with that of enemy violence in South Vietnam, removing the geographical limitations and varying its intensity with the incidence of enemy activity and/or friendly casualties in South Vietnam. Other options, of course, remain open to us but need not be developed here.

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By ing, NARA, Date 6-22-90

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Dealing in the first instance with General Taylor's third alternative, I believe that expansion of the bombing in the north in response to the level of enemy activity in the south would be unworkable and unproductive. Our entire experience in the war indicates that we cannot make Hanoi cease its activities in the south by bombing military targets in the north. Our bombing campaign in the north for three years has been unsuccessful in imposing either sufficient physical burden or psychological strain to compel the enemy to cease his military activity in South Vietnam. There is no reason to believe, and no evidence to suggest, that renewal of a bombing campaign against any and all military targets in the north would accomplish now what it has never been able to accomplish before.

In my view, abandoning the present territorial restrictions would not serve our interest in achieving a satisfactory resolution of the Vietnam conflict within the reasonable future. As you will recall, the adoption of the present geographical limitation was characterized in your speech of March 31st as a significant deescalatory move. If we were now to remove the geographical limitation, whatever the sortie level, such action would be regarded as an act of major escalation. In all likelihood it would lead to Hanoi's breaking off the talks in Paris.

I believe we would be blamed for this frustration of the pervasive hopes for peace and we would thus forfeit our present public opinion advantage. The claim would be made, however unfounded, that we were killing civilians in the north in retaliation for enemy military operations in the south.

From the military standpoint, it is my understanding that our commanders have consistently argued against any bombing program involving intermittent attacks in the strongly defended northern areas of North Vietnam. In my opinion, bombing raids that fluctuate with the level of enemy-initiated activity in the south would not achieve results sufficient to compensate for the enormous losses in pilots and aircraft.

As a practical matter, moreover, I believe that the suggested linkage of our bombing of the north to deaths caused by the enemy in the south is unworkable. The amount of fighting in the south, and hence the number of our casualties, is dependent upon our own actions as well as those of the enemy.

~~SECRET~~

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While recently there has been a substantial reduction in the number of enemy-initiated engagements, General Abrams has been seeking to spoil or abort planned enemy attacks by intensive efforts to find the enemy. Our casualty rate will thus rise in accordance with his success in finding and engaging North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces. In my opinion, General Abrams should continue to pursue his present offensive policy. But when he does so, it is not logical to tie our bombing of the north to a level of casualties in the south attributable in large part to our activities.

In your speech of March 31st, you announced that the continuation of bombing in the area immediately north of the DMZ would be controlled by considerations involving the security of our forces. At such time as we could do so without subjecting our forces south of the DMZ to greater risk, you asserted our willingness to discontinue even this limited bombing of North Vietnam in an effort to move closer to peace. I believe it is neither politically sound nor militarily useful for us to abandon this reasoning. Our bombing is now tied to the security of our own forces. We should not tie it to other variables unrelated to the protection of our men and our allies. This could lead to intensification rather than diminution of the overall level of hostilities and would, in my opinion, end all chances of bringing the war to an acceptable conclusion during your term in office.

General Taylor's second alternative is to adhere to our present position, in which we bomb intensively south of the 19th parallel in an effort to interdict the flow of men and supplies to the south while we seek in Paris some assurance that a full bombing cessation would not put us at a military disadvantage. I believe that this position is a sound one and that it will, in time, produce results in Paris. Militarily, I feel no urgency to adopt a different posture. Any decision to move from it toward new initiatives should be based on some solid prospect of progress toward termination of the war. I am totally convinced that a geographical bombing expansion offers no such opportunity, during the next six months or in the foreseeable future.

North Vietnam's politburo member, Le Duc Tho, is expected soon to be back in Paris after his extensive consultations in Moscow and in Hanoi. We do not know whether his return may lead to a breakthrough or possibly even the acceptance of the proposal presented privately by Ambassador Vance to Hanoi's number two man, Ha Van Lau.

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

It is noteworthy that the current lull in enemy activity followed shortly after Tho's stop in Moscow on his first trip to Paris in early June. In any event, I believe we should do nothing at this stage to jeopardize whatever chance there may be of such a development. Our main hope for a satisfactory resolution of the conflict, within a reasonable time span, rests in Paris.

As for General Taylor's first alternative, I agree completely that we should not stop the bombing as a capitulation to pressures of any kind and from any source. For us to stop the bombing, however, would obviously not necessarily involve capitulation. We have constantly asserted our desire to stop the bombing when this would not risk the security of our forces and would not create any other military disadvantage. As the talks proceed, we should continually be seeking to develop initiatives that will provide us with such an opportunity, permit us safely to cease the bombing and to move on to a discussion of mutual withdrawal under circumstances that will give to the South Vietnamese the right of self-determination.

In summary, I agree with General Taylor on his recommendation that we should not now deviate from our present course. I see no reason to let present or prospective public pressures dictate our course of action. We should not allow such pressures to force us to embark on an expansion of the bombing, to a premature cessation of the bombing or to abandonment of our search for a bombing halt under circumstances where such further restraint on our part promises to bring us closer to a satisfactory settlement.

Instead, I believe we should continue to review carefully the status of our negotiations in Paris, the significance of the enemy's conduct in the field and the initiatives on our part that might forestall further costly conflict and facilitate the Paris talks. In this regard, I have been considering a plan which might enable us to cease the bombing in the reasonable certainty that our restraint would not be abused, and under circumstances which would enable you to resume bombing immediately if it were. I would be glad to discuss it with you at your convenience.


Clark M. Clifford

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2400

58c



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CM-3532-68
1 August 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Alternative Bombing Proposals

1. This memorandum responds to your request for my comments on three alternative bombing proposals contained in General Taylor's memorandum to you of 30 July 1968.

2. I agree that **the first alternative of stopping the bombing of North Vietnam completely without deescalation by Hanoi has the attendant disadvantages listed by General Taylor.** My memorandum of 31 July 1968, "Cessation of Bombardment of North Vietnam," provides my views of the military disadvantages of this course of action.

3. The second proposal of continuing our current posture of holding our ground is practical for the time being. At present the pressure appears to be confined to forcing the United States to take additional unilateral deescalation. I agree with General Taylor that this pressure, fed by the spokesmen of Hanoi, will increase. On the other hand, I believe that the current lull is primarily due to military factors in that the enemy had to regroup, resupply and refit after his unsuccessful May offensive, and I note that there is enough recognition of this fact to provide some balance against the pressure for deescalation. If the predicted enemy August offensives materialize, the pressures for deescalation by the U.S. should be further reduced.

4. I consider the third proposal, matching our bombing effort to the level of enemy violence in South Vietnam, not to be in our best interests for the following reasons:

a. The proposal **incorrectly presumes an ability to report all friendly deaths and accurately determine their causes,** which we have thus far been unable to achieve.

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By mp NARA, Date 6-22-90

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b. Past statistics on "incidents," "attacks," "terrorism," etc., have proven a poor measure of the effects of enemy action in South Vietnam. For example, the total incidents reported for February 1968 (3759) and May 1968 (4189), which were undoubtedly the two most violent months of the war, were close to the monthly average of such incidents for the first five months of 1968 (4054). Levels of bombing based on such statistics during the same period would have permitted us only a smaller-than-average bombing effort to respond to the Tet offensive, during which friendly forces and the South Vietnamese population suffered their heaviest casualties.

c. Publicly acceptable justification of bombing increases would be difficult based on such "soft" statistics. We would be caught up in a numbers game with the press.

d. Our bombing would not be geared to military necessity; we would be denied the flexibility to forestall enemy attacks by our spoiling attacks as we have done with increasing effect in recent weeks. Our casualties would increase as a result.

e. The initiative to establish the level of conflict would pass fully to the enemy. After preparing, refitting and massing under the sanctuary of his own inactivity, he could initiate surprise attacks. We could only react.

f. The intensity and duration of our reactions would be subject to public debate on the appropriate trade-offs in "tit-for-tat" operations, measured response and gradualism.

g. Public accusations would be made that our reactive bombing is punitive, not geared to demonstrable military need, and, hence, indiscriminate.

h. We would receive pressure to reduce our air and ground actions in South Vietnam because such operations would raise the statistical indications of "levels of violence."

i. The value of having an answer to a possible charge that we fail to deescalate when the enemy does is not worth the cost in reduced military effects of our bombing, a predictable increase in friendly casualties and the loss of our allies' confidence in the U.S. policy of steadfastly awaiting meaningful deescalation by Hanoi.

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5. I have provided elsewhere my views to you on expanding the present geographical limits of the bombing in North Vietnam. To accompany such an expansion with a reduction in sorties or bomb tonnage would deny us the full advantages of the expansion, which would have been authorized at the cost of much public opposition.

6. With respect to the three alternatives, under the current circumstances I favor the second alternative; however, insofar as that part of it which includes a major public relations campaign is concerned, I am not confident that it would be successful. As dictated by changes in the military situation, the Joint Chiefs and I will make appropriate recommendations regarding future military courses of action.



EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 30, 1968

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The July 29 editorial in the New York Times is the latest in the drive to establish the point that the enemy is deescalating in South Viet-Nam and we are not responding in the spirit of your speech of March 31. It seems safe to forecast that such pressures, fed by the spokesmen of Hanoi, will increase and will require us to give serious consideration to an appropriate response.

It appears to me that we have three alternatives to consider. We could, of course, yield to the pressure and stop our bombing completely. This capitulation has all the disadvantages which we have recognized in the past. If we yield on this point, we will make Hanoi tougher in the subsequent negotiations and will recreate the conditions which contributed to the stalemate at Parmunjom. We will cause serious trouble for ourselves with Saigon where our action will arouse resentment and foment new suspicions of our intentions. The Hawks at home, comparatively quiet of late, will return to the attack and will become particularly violent if, after a cessation of the bombing, the enemy launches the new attack which our military people in Saigon are predicting.

Rather than yielding to the pressure, we could try to ignore it and ride out the ensuing criticism. This course may be possible but, if adopted, it should be accompanied, I think, by a major public-relations campaign to explain to our people the reasons why we can not afford to yield.

If this second alternative can not hold the line, there is a third which has always appealed to me, the linking of the level of our bombing to that of enemy violence in South Viet-Nam. We could establish this linkage through the statistics on enemy major incidents or perhaps on the number of deaths caused by the enemy in South Viet-Nam. If we took this course, we would never give up our bombing of North Viet-Nam for keeps but would achieve a kind of automatic reciprocity independent of Hanoi's veto. At the same time, we would have an effective answer to any charge, now or later, that we do not deescalate when the enemy does.

If we adopted this method, I would hope that, at the first opportunity, we would lift the geographical limitations on the bombing target system. If we are going to reduce materially the number of our sorties flown or the tonnages of munitions dropped, we need complete flexibility in choosing the most remunerative enemy military targets.

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By mf NARA, Date 8-14-89

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- 2 -

Such a change in policy could be made by issuing a statement along the following line:

"Available data indicate that in recent weeks enemy violence in South Viet-Nam, measured in attacks, terrorism, harassment, sabotage, and the resultant military and civilian loss of life on our side, has subsided slightly (or we could indicate an approximate percentage) under that of the period immediately following the President's March 31 speech. U.S. military authorities have been directed to make a comparable reduction in the sortie rates being flown against North Vietnamese military targets for the immediate future."

This language is deliberately imprecise as it would be a mistake to be trapped in another numbers argument with the press. The interpretation of the ebb and flow of action depends on many factors, few of which can be accurately measured statistically.

~~I think we should try the second alternative now but prepare to shift to this last one.~~

M. D. T.
M. D. T.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, August 1, 1968

SECRET/NODIS

Mr. President:

Herewith a capsule of Bunker's 60th weekly report:

*sent to Pres.
8/2/68*A. General

- Honolulu Conference was major event in otherwise calm July; enemy attack plans thwarted by our countermeasures; de-escalation intent unlikely.
- Peace question dominated political activity; inept GVN handling of Dzu case results from pressures to stake out strong position for future negotiations.
- PM Huong puts Saigon Mayor and National Policy Chief on three-month notice to show results in cleaning up corruption.
- Huong believes his drive against corruption is hampered by Ky's alleged involvement in opium and arms traffic.
- Chief corruption fighter M. T. Truyen says task is overwhelming; complaints far outrun capacity to react; new legislation planned.
- GVN uses lull before possible new attacks to advance mobilization, improve army, consolidate Saigon defenses.
- Thieu continues to push Lien Minh front; women's organization effort planned to counter VC exploitation and capitalize on voter increase.

B. Political

- GVN hardens public line on peace; Thieu and Huong seek to avoid confrontation with political foes on peace issue as new NVN attacks loom.
- Huong pushes effort to release persons illegally detained.
- Ky power decline clear. Some capacity for mischief evident in GVN officers' widows' press conference and requiem July 21.
- Hanoi gives Alliance new prominence; Ho Chi Minh lauds it as major accomplishment.
- Alliance refutes US Paris position; seems to offer itself as mediator between US and NLF; calls Huong a "stupid traitor."

C. Military

- MACV intelligence points to all-out series of enemy attacks in mid-August on targets including Saigon, Quang Tri, Hue, eastern DMZ, Danang and Ban Me Thuot.
- US offensive operations, intelligence and B-52 interdiction could again set back enemy timetable.

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D. Pacification

-- Honolulu communique and Thieu interest giving pacification a boost. Some ARVN generals and ministers appear less concerned.

-- Phoenix-Phung Hoang program for fourth month in row neutralized 1100 identifiable enemy infrastructure cadres.

-- Huong and Interior Minister Khiem moved to replace 35 more district chiefs. New training and control programs should increase effectiveness of new chiefs. Hamlet administration also improving.

-- Self-defense program implementation still lacking at province and district level. Khiem pushing hard; others, like Huong, are concerned about risks of arming groups. Thieu has not forced issue.

-- Enemy terror against refugees has increased markedly with recent attacks on seven camps, including Son Tra, in I and II Corps.

E. Urban Recovery

-- Project Recovery close to successful conclusion. Tet and Mini-Tet evacuees down to 97,000 and 37,000. Reconstruction materials widely distributed.

-- Minister Luy and Embassy discussing three-phase plan to provide 100,000 prefabricated homes at about \$100 per unit within year or so.

F. Economic

-- Delta rice shipments to Saigon during July highest since May 1966.

-- Retail and food price indices showed marked rise during July.

-- GVN ordered new 20% surtax on tobacco and carbonated beverages.

Bromley Smith

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By isa, NARS, Date 11-28-83

Thursday, August 1, 1968

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Document # 108

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 34156)

Herewith my sixtieth weekly message:

A. General

By comparison with the first six months of the year, July has been relatively uneventful. The major development was the Honolulu conference; from a Vietnamese viewpoint, most noteworthy because it reaffirmed American determination and signaled no dramatic new departures. Here in Saigon, it has been in many ways a month of waiting: first and foremost for the long expected enemy attack, for some kind of breakthrough which would lead to real peace talks, waiting to see what political developments in the U. S. may mean.

While there were many indications that the enemy planned to attack in July, he has not done so. I think the answer is that his timetable has been upset by our vigorous counteractions. There are some who read this decrease in the level of violence as a signal of a deescalation to match our own. This seems to me unlikely on several counts.

Enemy preparations for an offensive operation have been very much in evidence. Infiltration has held at record rates and may have reached an all time high in July. Interrogations and captured documents are unanimous in predicting another round of attacks. Terrorist activities have been stepped up and now approximate the pre-Tet level.

In the second place, the enemy has not told us he is deliberately showing restraint. As far as we are aware, he has also refrained from saying this to any third party. If he intends the lull in fighting to be a signal, he has been at some pains to conceal it. Certainly the militant tone of his propaganda has not changed.

Thirdly, the enemy probably feels he needs at least one more round of attacks to strengthen his posture in negotiations. Both Thieu and Ky have told me they believe it "inevitable" that Hanoi will attempt to go all out once more in an effort to make an impression on American opinion; that Hanoi believes one more dramatic show of offensive capability will so effect American domestic politics that we will be forced to make the major concessions they seek as their price for ending the war. I also believe that their major objective is opinion in the U. S. For I feel they must be convinced by now they cannot achieve any major military success, but that their hope is to weaken our resolve.

Political activity during the month revolved in large part around the question of the government's position on a peace settlement. Private discussions, both in and out of government, covered a wide range of proposals and alternatives. Particularly noteworthy was the considerable discussion of the possibility of somehow converting the NLF into a legal -- and law abiding -- political party. This heretofore very sensitive subject was even touched on in public, albeit in very vague terms, by two well-known politicians.

For the most part, however, public consideration of a future peace settlement has been confined to the Government of Vietnam line. The Government has tended to harden its public posture both by word and deed. This, I think, springs from two main factors:

A. The Government of Vietnam feels it must enter any future peace talks with a tough maximum position from which it can retreat without too great a loss; and

B. The Government is under heavy pressure from a combination of opportunistic political elements and sincere nationalists to reiterate and demonstrate its firm posture.

The Government of Vietnam's reaction to these pressures was demonstrated in its inept handling of the case of Truong Dinh Dzu. I had warned Thieu before the trial what the reaction would be, but he apparently felt he had to go through with it. The outcry in the U. S. and abroad which has followed on the arrest and sentencing of Dzu is understandable, but to a large degree the action is understandable as well. It has to be judged of war time rather than normal standards; it has to be judged in light of the background of Dzu himself, his known unscrupulous and opportunistic character, and the very real fear that he might in fact lend himself to exploitation by the enemy; it has to be judged in light of apprehensions which existed here about possible shifts in U. S. policy and attempts by opportunists to exploit the resulting uncertainty among the public. In pointing out to Thieu yesterday that the reactions I had predicted had taken place, he replied that the Government felt it had to take this action to protect itself against the very strong possibility that Dzu could be bought or subverted by Hanoi, and in view of the fact that he had abused the Government's goodwill in releasing him from detention by immediately advocating coalition. He said, however, that at an opportune time, perhaps on Independence Day, November 1, he would consider granting him amnesty. He assured me also that he had no intention of taking any similar action against Dr. Dan.

The efforts of the Huong government to root out corruption continued throughout the month. Huong told me that he had given the new mayor of Saigon, Nhieu, and the dirgen of National Police, Col. Hai, three months to present concrete results in cleaning up corruption. We have had reports that both the police and the city administration have made considerable progress in their effort to reduce corrupt activities. And Huong told me this week he felt that some good progress has been achieved.

While determined to press ahead in the attack on corruption, Huong and his supporters have also become aware of some of the difficulties they face. Huong claims that Vice President Ky is personally involved in such things as illegal traffic in opium and arms; and that corruption at such a high level makes it exceedingly difficult to reform the government. Minister Mai Tho Truyen, charged by Huong with chief responsibility for fighting corruption, recently told us that his task is almost overwhelming. Complaints come in faster than his inspectorate can deal with them and it is usually very difficult to get evidence that will stand up in court. The high cost of living and low wages for civil servants encourage petty corruption at the lower levels.

Truyen is working on several measures which he hopes will serve to prevent future corruption as well as reduce present corrupt practices. These include legislation which will require officials to declare their resources, guaranteeing civil servants a minimum standard of living in order to remove the necessity for petty corruption at lower levels, and administrative punishment for officials on whom the Inspectorate cannot collect evidence which would stand up in court.

As I reported to you in Honolulu, the Vietnamese reacted to the Tet and May/June attacks with renewed determination, more self-confidence, and a willingness to carry more of the burden of the war themselves. While July was in many ways a waiting period, this spirit continued and the Vietnamese did not waste this quiet month. They continued to move ahead with general mobilization, expanding and improving their armed forces, consolidating the defense of the Saigon area, and preparing with us for the attacks which they expect the enemy to launch. Our aggressive joint counter-actions undoubtedly have upset the enemy timetable and indeed I think there is the possibility that they may prevent the enemy from getting his attacks off the ground. In this case, I would expect that the enemy may try to make a virtue of necessity, claim that he has reduced the level of violence, and attempt to transform the struggle into a primarily political conflict.

Also during July, Thieu quietly but firmly continued to consolidate his position as constitutional president, while Huong and his cabinet settled into their jobs more effectively. The Lien Minh was officially launched this month; organizational activity has not been as rapid and effective as we had hoped, partly because Tran Van Don has been out of the country, but the Lien Minh is being further developed. As an example, Thieu described to me his plans for creating an effective women's organization as part of it, emphasizing that the Viet Cong have made the working class women a special target and observing in passing, there are more women voters than men in Vietnam. The refugee problem has been much reduced and pacification has registered new gains. July was, in short, a period of unspectacular but good progress.

B. Political

The hard line. As I noted earlier, the Government of Vietnam has in public tended to harden its posture on the various questions concerning a peace settlement. Directly related to this hardening is an increasingly tough attitude toward elements who espouse contrary positions. In part, this Government of Vietnam posture is a reaction to various internal political pressures. Before Honolulu, the Lower House issued a recommendation to Thieu calling for a time limit on the Paris talks, urging that talks be ended if infiltration increased or shelling of cities continued, and rejecting any peace solution involving a coalition government, neutralism, or a buffer zone. Shortly thereafter, the Lower House independence bloc held a press conference to discuss the Huong government's "tolerance of overt propaganda for the NLF." Following Honolulu, Dai Viet Senator Ngai attacked the Prime Minister on the floor of the Senate for allegedly saying that the NLF originally had contained some nationalist elements; he was supported by Catholic Senators as well as his own Dai Viet backers.

Behind the scenes, pressures exerted by military Catholic groups and some military elements contributed to the demand that the Government of Vietnam take a tough position.

Huong responded with several statements and actions. On July 14, he told newsmen the Government would press for "the eradication of elements serving the Communists, even if the Government was criticized." He said, "We must do what must be done even if we have to answer for our acts before the law". Again later, he said that "elements who by their acts or declarations propagandize in favor of the Communists will be severely punished."

These statements were made in defense of Government of Vietnam actions against dissident elements. On July 12, the Government of Vietnam tried the leadership of the Communist alliance in absentia and condemned them to death. On the same day, the leftist student magazine, Sinh Vien, was siezed and its editor ordered arrested, on the ground that the magazine had advocated coalition government. On July 25, the student editor of Sinh Vien was sentenced by the special military court to five years of hard labor. On the following day, Troung Dinh Dzu got the same sentence from the same court.

While from our point of view, some of these statements and actions were ill advised and badly handled (I have already commented on the Dzu trial), I think we have to recognize that there were also some valid reasons for the Government of Vietnam to act as it did. Both Thieu and Huong are reasonable men, and they have made it clear in private talks with me and other members of the mission that they understand very well the full dimensions of the peace problem. To accomplish a settlement, however, requires that they avoid a confrontation at this time with their political opponents, both civilian and military. I think the recent Government of Vietnam actions against dissidents were probably designed primarily to avoid such a confrontation, thus insuring that the Huong government would not now find itself hamstrung or perhaps turned out by its political opponents. The Government may soon need all its energies to meet enemy attacks, and a show of internal disunity now would encourage Hanoi to remain obdurate.

The trial of Dzu should also be viewed in the light of Huong's efforts to release persons under illegal detention although this was clearly a secondary one. More than 1,500 persons have been released recently as a result of reviews of their status by special committees which Huong set up in every province and autonomous city. Nearly 100 others are to be tried, while something over 1,100 await a decision.

Ky's role. As I reported in my half-year roundup, the Thieu-Ky rivalry has been much reduced in importance by the decline of Ky's power. Some continuing capacity for mischief which still resides in the Ky camp -- as well as its ineffectiveness -- was demonstrated by a July 21 combination press conference and requiem service held for the Government of Vietnam officers killed in the June 2 accident in Cholon.

Mimeographed copies of letters from the six widows to President Thieu and me were distributed. The letter addressed to me, which I have never received, expressed the widow's fear of an American betrayal of Vietnam. The letter to Thieu asked the president to demand that the U. S. limit "indiscriminate and destructive acts against innocent Vietnamese" and "behave in a proper and worthy manner" toward the families of the victims of "unintentional or intentional mistakes." The widows also reportedly permitted the press to see a hand-written statement which termed the helicopter accident a "big question aimed at eradicating the anti-Communist fighters of Vietnam and the comrades of Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky". Mrs. Ky attended the service. Shortly after the ceremony, three of the widows withdrew their names from the letters.

In a joint Army of the Republic of Vietnam/Military Assistance Command, Vietnam press conference, the facts of the accident were made clear when the Government of Vietnam, after some prodding from us, acted to release the findings of the investigation. The matter now appears to be closed. While the agitation of this incident may have been the work of some of Ky's associates, the presence of Mrs. Ky raises questions of the extent of his knowledge and responsibility for the affair.

Shortly after the requiem press conference, Ky, in talking to a mission officer, criticized Huong as too old to run the government effectively and predicted that this tenure would be short-lived. He added that he intends to remain aloof from any participation in the government other than that required of the Vice President under the constitution. I think that Ky is still not happy with his reduced status and blames us in part for it. Nevertheless, while he may not be above trying to embarrass us occasionally, I think he also recognized the impossibility of any power play at this time. I anticipate that his power will decline further in the coming months.

The alliance. Hanoi continued to push the alliance during July, giving it more prominence in its propaganda than at any time since the founding of the organization. Ho Chi Minh on July 20 listed the founding of the alliance along with the "general uprising and offensive" and the "shooting down of the three-thousandth plane" as a major accomplishment of the past months.

In mid-July the alliance issued its first major statement since May. Principally devoted to refuting some of the basic themes which we have advanced in the Paris talks, the statement also seems to offer mediation between the U. S. and the NLF. It reads in part, "we have clearly stated that we are ready to talk with the U. S. Government, which is a concerned party in the war, and to contact and talk with the NLF, which is fighting foreign aggression, in order to end the war soon, to re-establish peace and to regain the national independence and sovereignty." This seems a fairly clear indication that Hanoi hopes to use the alliance as some sort of channel or middle party between us and the NLF.

The alliance also bitterly attacked Prime Minister Huong and his government in a July 14 statement. It accused Huong of "many blood-stained crimes" against the Buddhists in his first premiership and calls him stubborn, stupid, and a shameless traitor. The attack suggests that Hanoi may have concluded it cannot deal with Huong, or at least that the trial of alliance leaders has made it impossible for the alliance to play any role vis-a-vis the Huong government.

C. Military

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam now believes that present intelligence indicates enemy intention to launch an all-out series of attacks around the middle of August. Main targets are expected to include Saigon, the Quang Tri City-Hue area, the eastern DMZ, the area southwest of Danang, and Ban Me Thout. Interrogations and captured documents indicate that the enemy believes August will be a month of intense fighting. Most probable date for an attack on Saigon seems to be somewhere between August 10 and August 20.

The three enemy divisions which have threatened Saigon in the past have been pulled well back from the city for the past two weeks and are now located near the Cambodian border. There is evidence that the enemy may attack Tay Ninh, possibly as a diversion to cover a heavy assault on Saigon. B-52 raids have been targeted on these forces. In one case, a [REDACTED] A5

A5

[REDACTED] he gave us the coordinates of these units, and we immediately diverted for the next 36 hours every B-52 available for attacks on those locations.

Action in the First Corps increased a little over last week, but remains relatively light overall. There were numerous attacks by fire around Quang Ngai City and Danang, and one very sharp action north of Khe Sanh. There is evidence of preparations for a major attack on Danang, but this is not considered imminent.

In the Second Corps the first North Vietnamese Army Division has moved into position to threaten Ban Me Thout. General Abrams believes this is a diversionary effort, however, designed to get us to pull forces out of the First or Third Corps. In the Fourth Corps, the enemy is apparently experiencing difficulties. Significant losses of men and material are hindering preparations for attacks, and the enemy is also running into resistance to his extensive recruiting effort.

I should add that it seems to me quite conceivable that our offensive action and interdiction could again set back the enemy's timetable or indeed prevent his attacks from getting off the ground. B-52 strikes combined with excellent intelligence have been an important factor in these efforts.

D. Pacification

Giving pacification a suitable boost in your joint Honolulu communique with Thieu helped to assure its forward momentum. While Thieu understands the importance of pacification, we're not so sure that many Army of the Republic of Vietnam generals and some ministers do. Thus, we are encouraged to hear that Thieu came back from Honolulu saying that he was going to insist on much better central management of pacification programs through the central Revolutionary Development Council; and that he also intends to personally chair monthly pacification seminars in each corps.

June results of the attack against the VC infrastructure show that for the fourth month running about 1100 identifiable members of the enemy's political cadre were neutralized. More important is the large increase in district/province level cadre picked up during June. With Interior Minister Khiem issuing explicit instructions to carry out the President's 1 July decree, field activity should pick up even more in the weeks ahead. In effect, Phung Hoang finally has been fully launched by the Government after a hard year's work.

Huong and Khiem have moved to replace 35 more district chiefs. All newly-appointed chiefs are graduates of the April district/province chiefs course; hence, they are somewhat better prepared for their jobs than most appointees in the past. This brings to 117 the district/province officials removed as a direct result of our efforts to improve local leadership by eliminating corrupt and ineffective officials;

Khiem indicates that more heads will roll. He is organizing a new course for about 100 carefully selected majors and lieutenant colonels who will become district and province chiefs.

One way of measuring the rural situation is to assess the number of Government of Vietnam hamlet administrations that are functioning effectively. Right after Tet, our district advisors noted more than a 30 percent decline in effective hamlet administration. Using an improved questionnaire, we took a closer look as of the end of June. Of about 7,400 hamlets rated (all those in the relatively secure category plus most of the so-called contested hamlets), 5,997, or 81 percent now had relatively effective administrations again. While the criteria used were not very stringent, the results at least show that the trend is up.

Self-defense is reaching the crucial organizational stage. Although Minister Khiem is pushing hard, essential instructions have not gone out to province and district, where program execution takes place. There is some difference between those like Khiem who believe the Government of Vietnam should take a calculated risk of arming self-defense groups, at least partially, and those like Huong who fear that putting arms in the hands of the people (especially religious and political groups) will create more problems than it is worth. Thieu has not chosen to force the issue yet.

Throughout the last month, incidents of VC terror against refugees have increased markedly. Starting with one attack on Son Tra in Quang Ngai on 8 June, the enemy has attacked seven refugee camps in the First and Second Corps, killing almost 100 people and destroying nearly 1,000 houses. In every case, Government response has been prompt, showing a growing concern by the Government in the refugee problem.

E. Urban Recovery

The lull in enemy activity and relaxation of pressure on Saigon and other cities presents a good opportunity to clean up remaining recovery. Tet evacuees are down to manageable -- 97,000; remaining mini-Tet evacuees number only 37,000. About 80 percent of families whose homes were destroyed or heavily damaged have received allowances due. Huong gave provinces a 30 July deadline to make bulk of remaining payments. Plenty of money and materials are available. Although the 30 July goal was not met everywhere, project recovery is close to successful conclusion, a bright feather in the cap of the Government of Vietnam.

Minister Lu-Y, who has brought new vitality to refugee affairs, has taken hold of an idea to provide small prefab houses for refugees. We have been talking with him on a three-phase plan to provide 100,000 homes, costing only about \$100 per unit (frame only), within a year or so. The Government of Vietnam plans to construct most of them locally in order to get a prefabricated housing industry started in Vietnam. We will help out by sharing part of the cost of a 1,000-unit pilot project in Bien Hoa, and then contributing counterpart piasters for follow-on projects.

F. Economic

During the first two weeks of July, 18,150 metric tons of rice arrived in Saigon from the delta. This is the highest monthly rate of rice arrivals since May, 1966.

The Vietnamese Government, as a first step in its new rice program, has called forward for delivery to Saigon 40,000 tons of Government-owned rice now in provincial mills in the delta. Economy Minister Ho has told U. S. AID officials that the Government will purchase 150,000 tons now stored in the delta. Following this initial purchase, the Government will announce a guaranteed purchase price at which it will offer to buy unlimited quantities of rice. Merchants will have the option of selling on the market if the price is better. Later, we expect the Government to raise the wholesale price of U. S. rice.

We have reached agreement with the Government of Vietnam on the need to import another 100,000 tons of U. S. rice in October, November, and December. Half this rice will be purchased through the new U. S. \$50 million rice escrow account and the other half will be the last part of a previous PL 480 agreement.

The Saigon retail price index stood at 350 July 1. This climbed to 367 July 8, dropped slightly to 362 July 15, then rose again to 374 July 22. The index rose again this week, and is up over 6 percent above the July 22 level. The food index rose by 8 percent this week; the non-food index less than one-half of one percent.

The increase in food prices is largely unexplained. U. S. military authorities report no interdiction of major routes into Saigon. It appears likely that increased consumer demand and seasonal factors associated with the rainy season, such as transportation delays and lower river fish catches, were contributory factors. The 8 percent increase occurred despite a 2 percent decline in the price of the heavily weighted rice component in the index.

During the week of July 14-20, the Ministry of National Economy raised the official prices of cigarettes, pipe tobacco, beer and carbonated beverages in order largely to provide the Government of Vietnam with a new 20 percent surtax, but also to compensate producers for rising production costs. The resultant net increase in taxes from these products during the last half of 1968 is estimated at about VN 970, or an annual rate of nearly VN 2 billion.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 1, 1968
Thursday, 5:00 P. M.

Mr. President:

The Viet Cong Colonel captured last June has given to our interrogators additional evidence of how the North Vietnamese view the Paris talks in relation to their military activity in South Vietnam.

Bremley Smith

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SMITH:

Recent interrogation of Col. Ngot, former Deputy Commander of VC Sub-Region 5 in the Saigon area who was captured on June 10, reveals some interesting comments on the Paris Peace Talks. The following are extracts from this interrogation:

According to the Diplomatic Viewpoint of North Vietnam

1. It is necessary to carry out attacks and negotiations at the same time. So far we have carried out the struggle on the military and political field only. Now there is a diplomatic way. Therefore, the negotiations between the U. S. and North Vietnam had been mentioned during the General Offensive and Uprising.
2. The talks consist of a form of struggle.
3. The conference could not replace the military and political activities.
4. The results of the talks depend upon the military and political gains.
5. Avoid an illusory peace. That meant to acquire gains on the battlefield instead of waiting for the results from the initial talks.

Purposes and Reasons for Accepting the Talks with the U. S. at Paris

1. Make President Johnson unable to say that the North Vietnamese had no desire to engage in peace talks and create conditions so that they could blame the U. S. for not stopping the bombing in North Vietnam.
2. Making the world believe that the words of President Johnson for the peace talks were deceptive.

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Pres file

3. Causing differences between the U. S. and the Government of Vietnam. The Government of Vietnam does not recognize the National Liberation Front. All discussions would be conducted between the Government of Vietnam and North Vietnam. In the political field, the Government of Vietnam and North Vietnam were equal, but the U. S. accepted separate negotiations with North Vietnam for peace in Vietnam and to stop the bombing over North Vietnam, without the participation of the Government of Vietnam. That proved that the U. S. raised North Vietnam to a rank equal with them and did not consider the Government of Vietnam on an equal level with North Vietnam. On the other hand, they demonstrated to the world that the U. S. had decisive rights for airstrikes over North Vietnam without Government of Vietnam participation. Facing this situation, the Government of Vietnam and the nationalists would be displeased with the U. S. Therefore, differences existed between the Republic of Vietnam and the U. S.

4. Creating conditions to enable the opposition movement against the Vietnam War in the U. S. and in the world to grow.

Predictions on the Time and Results of the Discussions in Paris

1. ~~Both sides had the intention of dragging out the discussions until the presidential election in the U. S. and awaiting results from the battlefield.~~

2. The Viet Cong would have a decisive attitude when a new U. S. President announced his policy on Vietnam. This attitude also depended on the results of the VC gains in South Vietnam. At that time, true negotiations for peace would take place.


Art McCafferty



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

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Authority RAC 23740

By us NARA, Date 3-24-98



NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BUNKER

REF: STATE 211281; STATE 212096 -

1. ALTHOUGH I CAN APPRECIATE THAT THERE MAY BE A NEED AT SOME POINT FOR A FURTHER MOVE TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK IN PARIS, I FEEL STRONGLY THAT THIS IS NOT THE TIME. FIRST AND FOREMOST, IT COMES TOO SOON AFTER THE HONOLULU MEETING, AT WHICH TIME REPORTS EMANATING FROM HERE THAT AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED BY THE TWO PRESIDENTS ON A TOTAL BOMBING CESSATION WERE FLATLY DENIED. TO UNDERTAKE AN EARLY MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION WOULD CREATE SUSPICION THAT THE HONOLULU COMMUNIQUE DIDN'T MEAN WHAT IT SAID AND DETRACT FROM THE VERY HELPFUL AND ESSENTIAL REASSURANCE THAT MEETING AFFORDED THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. IT WOULD TEND TO STIMULATE SUSPICIONS, WHICH ARE STILL CIRCULATING HERE TO SOME DEGREE, THAT SECRET UNDERSTANDINGS WERE REACHED BETWEEN THIEU AND THE PRESIDENT WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN DISCLOSED. SUCH A MOVE AS THAT PROPOSED BY HARRIMAN AND VANCE COULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE THIEU'S POSITION, WHICH HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY STRENGTHENED BOTH BY HONOLULU AND BY HIS INCREASINGLY MORE VIGOROUS LEADERSHIP.

2. FROM A NEGOTIATING VIEWPOINT, IT ALSO SEEMS TO ME THAT SUCH AN INITIATIVE NOW WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY HANOI AS AN INDICATION OF WEAKNESS ON OUR SIDE RELATED TO OUR OWN DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION. I PERSONALLY BELIEVE THAT OUR PHASE I-PHASE II PROPOSAL IS A SOLID AND REASONABLE BASIS FOR MEANINGFUL PRIVATE TALKS WITH THE DRV DELEGATION. WE SHOULD GIVE THIS PROPOSAL, WHICH ALSO ACCORDED WITH SOVIET SUGGESTIONS, TIME TO BE EXPLORED MORE THOROUGHLY BEFORE JUMPING INTO A NEW INITIATIVE WHICH MIGHT ONLY CREATE MISUNDERSTANDING BY THE OTHER SIDE AS TO THE STRENGTH OF OUR POSITION AND THE FIRMNESS OF OUR INTENTIONS. I CONSIDER THAT OUR POSITION IS STRONG AND BECOMING STRONGER BY THE DAY.

~~SECRET~~

3. I AGREE WITH YOU THAT WE SHOULD NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES ATTEMPT A MOVE OF THIS SORT IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. IN ADDITION TO THE FACTORS NOTED ABOVE, THIS WOULD NOT GIVE US TIME FOR ADEQUATE CONSULTATION WITH THIEU. I CANNOT OVER-EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESENTING ANY NEW NEGOTIATING IDEAS OR PROPOSALS TO THE GVN IN A WAY WHICH WILL NOT ONLY NOT UNDERMINE THIEU'S POSITION BUT WILL IN FACT ELICIT HIS SUPPORT. ALTHOUGH THIEU HAS BEEN TOLD ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS ABOUT THE US/DRV PRIVATE TALKS, I AM CONFIDENT THAT HE WOULD AGREE THAT THE CURRENT PHASE I-PHASE II PROPOSAL SHOULD BE GIVEN A SOLID TRY BEFORE MOVING IN A MORE RADICAL DIRECTION. I SAY THIS WITHOUT KNOWING WHETHER THIS GENERAL SUBJECT WAS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL BY THE TWO PRESIDENTS AT HONOLULU, WHICH WOULD OF COURSE HAVE AN IMPORTANT BEARING ON OUR HANDLING OF IT. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY FURTHER INFORMATION YOU COULD GIVE ME ON THIS POINT.

4. THE PARIS PROPOSAL OFFERS A MEANS FOR ARRIVING AT A FIRM UNDERSTANDING TO MOVE PROMPTLY TO SUBSTANTIVE TALKS WITH FULL GVN PARTICIPATION, WHICH WOULD HAVE SOME ATTRACTION HERE, BUT I ASSUME THAT THIS WOULD ALSO DEMPTIE RESULT OF THE PHASE I-PHASE II PROPOSAL AND UNDER MUCH MODVSADVANTAGEOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. I AM, MOREOVER, CONCERNED AT THE IDEA OF MERELY STATING PRIVATELY A SERIES OF ASSUMPTIONS BASED ON THE EXPECTATION THAT BOMBING WOULD BE RESUMED IF THEY WERE NOT MET. I FIND IT HARD TO ENVISAGE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH WE COULD REALISTICALLY EXPECT TO RESUME BOMBING IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE SHORT OF A MAJOR ENEMY PROVOCATION.

5. FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF OUR EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS ON THESE TALKS, I IMAGINE THEY WOULD ALSO INTERPRET AN EARLY MOVE SUCH AS THIS AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS AND EAGERNESS ON OUR PART, TIMED IN RELATION TO THE AMERICAN POLITICAL CONVENTIONS. THEY ARE PRESUMABLY AWARE THAT WE HAVE MADE THE PHASE I-PHASE II PROPOSAL AND HAVE NOT YET HAD A REAL ANSWER FROM THE DRV. MOREOVER, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, THERE HAS BEEN NO REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S LAST LETTER TO KOSYGIN ON THIS SUBJECT.

6. I HAVE TALKED WITH GENERAL ABRAMS ABOUT THE CURRENT STATE OF MILITARY ACTIVITY AS WELL AS THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED NEW INITIATIVE IN PARIS. HE CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT LULL IS PRIMARILY MOTIVATED BY THE ENEMY'S GENUINE NEED TO REPLENISH AND REORGANIZE HIS MAIN FORCE UNITS AFTER THE TREMENDOUS LOSSES OF THE PAST MONTHS, AND REPRESENTS A CONCENTRATED EFFORT BY THE ENEMY TO PREPARE HIS FORCES FOR ANOTHER ROUND OF ATTACKS. HOWEVER, IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT OUR B-52 AND OTHER OPERATIONS ARE HAVING A MAJOR SPOILING EFFECT ON THE ENEMY'S PLANS AND CAPABILITIES TO DO SO. WE KNOW OF NO

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

3 - SAIGON 34163, AUGUST 1, (NODIS/HARVAN/PLUS)

EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD REGARD THE LULL AS A SIGN OF DELIBERATE DE-ESCALATION ON HIS PART. I AM SURE THAT OUR VIETNAMESE COLLEAGUES WOULD SHARE THIS VIEW. TO THE CONTRARY, ALL INDICATORS TEND TO SHOW THAT HIS INTENTION TO FIGHT WHILE TALKING REMAINS UNCHANGED AND THAT HE CONTINUES HIS PLANS TO LAUNCH ATTACKS, POSSIBLY COUNTRY-WIDE, SOMETIME AROUND THE SECOND WEEK OF AUGUST. THESE INDICATIONS, GENERAL ABRAMS STATES, INCLUDE MOVEMENT PATTERNS IN THE DMZ AREA, PRISONER INFORMATION IN THE DANANG AREA, CONTACTS IN DARLAC PROVINCE, AND NUMEROUS ENEMY ORDEERS AND INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING TIMING OF PREPARATIONS AND RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES AROUND SAIGON. AGENT AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE CONFIRMS HIS ATTACK INTENTIONS IN EACH OF THESE AREAS, AND NEAR HUE AS WELL, ALTHOUGH IN THE LATTER CASE OUR OPERATIONS APPARENTLY CONTINUE TO KEEP HIM OFF BALANCE AND DELAY HIS PREPARATIONS. BECAUSE OF THE ACTIONS ALREADY TAKEN BY OUR FORCES (AS WELL AS THOSE NOW GOING ON AND IN PROSPECT) GENERAL ABRAMS FEELS THAT WE ARE IN A POSITION OF STRENGTH AND INITIATIVE WHILE THE ENEMY IS HAVING DIFFICULTY IN CARRYING THROUGH ALL AS HE PLANNED AND INTENDED TO.

7. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, TO STOP THE BOMBING BETWEEN 17 AND 19 DEGREES SEEMS LIKELY TO HAVE THE MAJOR MILITARY DISADVANTAGE OF RELIEVING THE ATTRITION NOW BEING EFFECTED UPON HIS SUPPLIES OVER AN EXTENSIVE AND VULNERABLE PORTION OF HIS LOC, AND BENEFITING HIS BUILD-UP AND HIS ABILITY TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH ACCORDINGLY. GENERAL ABRAMS IS ALSO STRONGLY IMPRESSED WITH THE RISK THAT THE BOMBING, ONCE STOPPED, WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO START UP AGAIN DESPITE VIOLATION OF ONE OR MORE OF THE "ASSUMPTIONS", THUS FURTHER INCREASING THE ADVERSE EFFECTS.

8. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE WISE AT THIS TIME TO SEEK TRIEN'S VIEWS ON A COMPLETE HALT IN THE BOMBING NOW FOR THE REASONS INDICATED EARLIER IN THIS MESSAGE.

BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
 NLJ 97-107
 By *is*, NARA Date 6-18-97

Thursday, August 1, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Svobda's Speech to the Czech People

At 2:00 p.m. today our time, President Svobda delivered a ten-minute speech to the Czechoslovak people.

Svobda said the Soviets assured the Czechs that they support them in their Action Program -- which is the program of internal liberalization and economic reform upon which the Czechs have embarked. In short, the Soviets appear to be saying they will not try to undo the January revolution.

Svobda also talked about reenforcing the unity of the Socialist countries and the Warsaw Pact, in order to strengthen their defensive against eventual enemy attack. Whether this means the Czechs have agreed to some sort of Soviet military presence in Czechoslovakia is not clear. There has been talk in past days about Soviet observers attached to Czech military units, increased Soviet staff-level participation and other variants short of the actual stationing of Soviet divisions permanently on Czech territory.

Svobda also mentioned CEMA (the Eastern European economic coordinating body). This could be an oblique reference to some Czech assurance that they will try to solve their economic problems within the family so far as possible, and go slow on economic reorientation toward the West.

Svobda included a reference to blood shed in the struggle against German Fascism. It would not be surprising if the Czechs gave some assurance that they would go slow in developing ties or relations with West Germany. They may have assured the Russians that they would refrain from disturbing foreign policy initiatives.

There was no explicit reference to censorship of the press. UPI reports, however, that Dubcek agreed to damp down anti-Russian attacks in the Czech press.

Saturday's meeting of the six powers should produce further clarification and further maneuver. It remains to be seen how far the Russians will want to reopen sensitive questions in order to push the Czechs further back.

ND
 Nathaniel Davis

INFORMATION

66

Thursday, 3:45 P. M.
August 1, 1968

Mr. President:

Here is Ayub's response to your letter about Peshawar.

Pres file

It is dated July 19 but has only just been received here from the Pakistan Embassy-- not through our Ambassador in Rawalpindi.

It is highly negative and calls for immediate talks on the mechanics of dismantling the Peshawar facilities. However, it does appear to relate Peshawar to tanks and possibly economic aid.

We will know Saturday whether the Belgians will go forward with their part of the tank deal.

The State Department is preparing a draft reply.

Bremley Smith

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-145
By ics, NARA Date 8-6-58

~~Lois~~

68

ACTION

Thursday - August 1, 1968
2:00 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

I suggest you send the attached message to President Trejos in response to his interest in having a Smithsonian volcanologist study the eruption pattern of volcano Arenal.

William G. Bowdler

Attachment

Proposed Presidential message to President Trejos.

68a

Suggested Presidential Message
to
President Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez of Costa Rica

Mr. President:

Charge Pringle has informed me of your interest in having experts from the Smithsonian Institution study the pattern of eruption cycles of the volcano Arenal.

I am dispatching a team of distinguished scientists from the Smithsonian Institution and the United States Geological Survey to assist your local scientists in evaluating the effects of the volcanic eruptions.

The first member of this joint team (William Simkin of the Smithsonian Institution) arrives today, August 1. The other members of the team plan to be in San Jose shortly.

I regret to hear that the volcano continues to erupt, adding to the suffering and losses already sustained. You and the people of Costa *Rica* have my sympathy in this hour of national emergency.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez
President of the Republic of Costa Rica
San Jose, Costa Rica

ACTION

69

SECRET

Thursday, August 1, 1968, 2:00 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Dsu Case

Pres file

After you called me this morning, we received here the attached cable from Ambassador Bunker in which he reports on his conversation with President Thieu about the Dsu case.

You may wish to read the cable prior to considering the draft message to Ambassador Bunker, also attached.

Bromley Smith

- _____ approve draft cable but send through CIA channel, Eyes only
- _____ approve cable for dispatch through State Department
- _____ ask Secretary Rusk to review the draft
- _____ call me

BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NRJ 019-038-2-6
By SP, NARA, Date 1/18/02

SECRET

70

25X1

~~TOP SECRET~~ [Redacted]

INFORMATION

Thursday, August 1, 1968
1:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

The attached report gives a good picture of Communist combat preparations for the third offensive in South Vietnam

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

Bromley Smith

Attachment

AMcC:ksb

Presidential library review for NSC equities required.

SANTIZED
Authority NLS-141.022.013/8
By JC, NARA, Date 11-3-09

Communist Preparations in South Vietnam for the Third Offensive

Vietnamese Communist military units in widely separated areas of South Vietnam have been revealed in Communications Intelligence as undertaking combat preparations for the beginning of the Third General Offensive

The projected date(s) for coordinated attacks has not been specifically noted; however, several dates have appeared in Communist messages as times for completion of various actions.

The pace of preparations appears to be uniform from area to area. The predominant trend of resupply and reinforcement is nearing completion

Forces in several parts of the country have started to move in the direction of potential targets. Reconnaissance activity has begun to reappear, as have unit Forward Elements. The intercept of the codename for the Third General Offensive (X3) has been mentioned.

Briefly by area:

Tactical artillery communications imply that ground attacks in the eastern DMZ will be preceded by intense artillery bombardments. The locations of Communist units suggest that their future objectives will be Allied positions near Gio Linh, Cam Lo, Con Thien and Camp Carroll. The threat to the western DMZ appears to have been reduced, with only one unidentified element within the vicinity of the Khe Sanh area.

In the Tri-Thien-Hue area, there is a concentration of Communist elements near Phu Loc, and Hue and Quang Tri City.

In Quang Nam province, Danang and Hoi An appear to be the areas of recent Communist buildup.

A significant concentration of main force units has evolved near Hau Duc in central Quang Tin province.

Further south in First Corps tactical positions are being prepared southwest of Quang Ngai City.


The recent change of B-3 Front attention to the Darlac province area and the subsequent movement of forces appear to constitute the new threat to Ban Me Thuot.

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 141.022.013/9
By ja, NARA, Date 11-3-09

In the Third Corps area, Communist forces appear to be more of an immediate threat to Allied installations in the Tay Ninh province area than to those around Saigon. ~~Communist military intelligence activities which appeared recently in the vicinity of Saigon have ceased;~~

In Binh Long Province, a concentration of forces ~~within striking distance~~ of ~~An Loc~~ has been observed. Military intelligence elements have resumed reporting on Allied activity along main roads in the southern part of the province.



Fais

71

INFORMATION

Thursday, August 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

Here is the unclassified version of the CIA report you used yesterday which summarizes recent activities in North Vietnam south of the 20th Parallel.

It is a cut-and-paste job.

The only Sensitive portion is paragraph 5. We have included the figures but no public comment can be made as to how we got them.

Bromley Smith

Attach.
BKS:ksb

71a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence

30 July 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Recent Activities in North Vietnam
South of the 20th Parallel

Summary

North Vietnam's efforts to expand and diversify its military and logistic capabilities continue unabated. All indicators of traffic movement were at high levels with observed watercraft activity apparently reaching record levels. Flight activity south of the 20th Parallel has increased during recent weeks and days.

More than 1,200 small watercraft were sighted south of the 19th Parallel, four times the weekly average observed since April 1968. Truck sightings were 25 percent above the weekly average since 1 April, and pilot reports of trucks destroyed were 40 percent above average.

Rail Activity

1. Railroad activity at the Thanh Hoa Railroad Yard north of the 19th Parallel continued at a high level, with a total of almost 230 pieces of rolling stock counted in 18 July photography -- the highest count observed in photography since the record high of 380 noted on 27 May 1968. The rolling stock observed in this area included the small meter-gauge tram cars which are in use south of Thanh Hoa.

2. Rail traffic between Thanh Hoa and Vinh continued to be restricted south of the 19th Parallel by air attacks against the Vinh Railroad Yard and the railroad bridges at Dien Chau and Tam Da. As a result of these attacks, the North Vietnamese have had to divert considerable rail traffic to the highway and waterway systems south of the 19th Parallel. Photography of 18 July showed supplies being transshipped in the Thanh Hoa rail yard to trucks and then transported to the Song Mai canal for movement on the waterways. Several truck convoys heading south from Thanh Hoa on Routes 1A and 115 were noted in photography. More recently, water traffic south of the 19th Parallel has reached record levels.

Watercraft

3. Pilots reported one of the highest levels of watercraft activity of the war during the past week. More than 1,200 watercraft were sighted south of the 19th Parallel, and an unquantified concentration of small watercraft, estimated by one pilot at between 800 to 900 small craft, was sighted along the coast of North Vietnam from Ron south to Quang Khe. Only about 350 watercraft per week had been previously reported south of the 19th Parallel since 1 April 1968. Much of the activity was near Quang Khe, an important transshipment area where material can be shipped along the coast toward the DMZ or southwest toward Laos via the Song Troc. The waterways around Vinh were also extremely active where many watercraft were apparently carrying POL, as airstrikes caused numerous POL fires and oil slicks.

Truck Traffic

4. Truck traffic and reported truck losses continued at high levels. As shown in the following tabulation, pilot sightings of trucks were 25 percent above the weekly average noted since 1 April, and pilot reports of trucks destroyed or damaged were 40 percent above the weekly average:

	<u>Sighted</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>	<u>Total Destroyed or Damaged</u>	<u>Effective Losses ^{a/}</u>
This week b/ (22-28 July)	898	186	87	273	162
Last week (15-21 July)	947	209	73	282	175
Weekly average (since 1 April)	717	121	73	194	109

- a. *Effective losses are computed by deflating reports of destroyed and damaged trucks -- by assuming that 75 percent of those reported destroyed and 25 percent of those reported damaged are actually destroyed and not returned to service. This formula allows for the capability of the North Vietnamese, to repair trucks and for inaccuracies in pilot observations caused by high aircraft speeds, poor weather, smoke and dust after attacks, night operations, or intense anti-aircraft fire.*
- b. *Preliminary data.*

Considerable traffic was noted south of the 18th Parallel where convoys of 50 trucks or more were sighted at night on Routes 1A and 101 in the vicinity of Quang Khe. Convoys of this size are infrequent in this area, especially along Route 1A, the last occurrences being in mid-June when similar concentrations were sighted near Mu Gia and along Route 137. The general trend in observed truck traffic since 31 March, although remaining at a relatively high level, has tended to be less concentrated, with reports of large convoys less frequent than during the previous quarters. Heavy traffic was also reported on Route 137, the current prime infiltration route leading into Southern Laos.

Rear Services Traffic

5.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Short Tons per Day</u>
March	107
April	215
May	238
June	274
(1-19) July	320


Storage Areas

6. Storage areas south of the 20th Parallel continued to be expanded. The Tien Luong storage area has been expanded and improved considerably since 31 March. A new transshipment point with large quantities of dispersed open storage, including almost 1,000 crates, was observed at this facility in recent photography. This storage area is located along Route 110 about five miles west of its intersection with Route 1A near the Nguon Nay river, which serves Quang Khe, a key water transshipment facility. Other storage areas along Routes 137 and 15 and around Vinh reveal similar dispersed storage transshipment facilities. The increasing dispersal of supplies, particularly POL, is lessening the impact of the concerted air attack being directed against the larger storage facilities.

Road Repairs

7. Road repairs continued in the Panhandle. Extensive road maintenance along Route 101 near Dong Hoi was noted in 22 July photography. Similar repair and maintenance activity on Routes 137 and several other secondary roads which support truck movements into southern Laos and DMZ areas have also been noted in other recent photography.

NORTH VIETNAM: Logistic Activity South of the 20th Parallel



91548 7-68 CIA

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, August 1, 1968, 12:25 P. M.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


*Pres file*SUBJECT: Czechoslovak Communiqué

The Soviet-Czech communique (at Tab A) has just been issued. In it, both parties speak of a "broad comradely exchange of opinion" and "complete frankness, sincerity and mutual understanding." They also scheduled a meeting with the Poles, East Germans, Hungarians and Bulgarians in Bratislava this Saturday.

It seems pretty clear -- and this view is shared by the Intelligence Community -- that they have stepped one step back from the brink. However, we are moving on to the next chapter in a book which is far from finished.

The fact that the next meeting will be on Czech soil represents some concession to the Czech point of view. On the other hand, the Czechs will be facing a conclave of their critics -- which the Czechs had wanted to avoid by means of a series of bilateral meetings.

Tito is expected in Prague shortly.


Nathaniel DavisAttachment
a/s

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-107
By is, NARA Date 6-11-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FBIS 43

CZECHOSLOVAK-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE

MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1506 GMT 1 AUG 68 L

(JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE MEETING OF CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE
POLITBURO AND PRESIDUM OF CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL
COMMITTEE)

(TEXT) MOSCOW--THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A JOINT COMMUNIQUE
ON THE MEETING OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND
THE PRESIDUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA:

"A MEETING OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND
THE PRESIDUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS HELD IN CIERNA NAD-TISOU FROM 29 JULY TO 1
AUGUST 1968. THE MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY: ON THE SIDE OF THE
CPSU--GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE L.I. BREZHNEV;
MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE G.I.
VORONOV, A.N. KOSYGIN, K.T. MAZUROV, A.YE. PELSHE, N.V.
PODGORNYY, M.A. SUSLOV, A.N. SHELEPIN, P.E. SHELEST; CANDIDATE
MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE P.N.
DEMICHEV AND P.M. MASHEROV; SECRETARIES OF THE CPSU CENTRAL
COMMITTEE K.F. KATUSHEV AND B.N. PONOMAREV;

(MORE)

1 AUG 1530Z BS/GG

FBIS 44

FIRST ADD 4 (CZECHOSLOVAK-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE)

XXX AND B.N. PONDMAREV;

(TEXT) ON THE PART OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA--FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA A. DUBCEK; MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA F. BARBIREK, V. BILAK, O. CERNIK, D. KOLDER, F. KRIEGEL, J. PILLER, E. RIGO, J. SMRKOVSKY, J. SPACEK, AND O. SVESTKA; CANDIDATE MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA A. KAPEK, J. LENART, AND B. SIMON; AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL CONTROL AND AUDITING COMMISSION M. JAKES.

L. SVOBODA, PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, ATTENDED THE MEETING ON THE CZECHOSLOVAK SIDE.

A BROAD COMRADELY EXCHANGE OF OPINION ON QUESTIONS INTERESTING BOTH SIDES WAS HELD AT THE MEETING.

(MORE)

1 AUG 1534Z BS/GG

FBIS 45

SECOND AND LAST ADD 43 (CZECHOSLOVAK-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE)

XXX AT THE MEETING.

(TEXT) THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE MEETING EXCHANGED DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION IN THEIR COUNTRIES.

THE MEETING OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE PRESIDUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS HELD IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF COMPLETE FRANKNESS, SINCERITY, AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, WAS AIMED AT THE SEARCH FOR WAYS OF FURTHER DEVELOPING AND STRENGTHENING THE TRADITIONAL FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR PARTIES AND PEOPLES, RESTING ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MARXISM-LENINISM AND PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM. DURING THE TALKS BOTH DELEGATIONS BY MUTUAL CONSENT RESOLVED TO ADDRESS THE CENTRAL COMMITTEES OF THE COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES OF BULGARIA, HUNGARY, THE GDR, AND POLAND WITH A PROPOSAL OF HOLDING A MULTILATERAL COMRADELY MEETING. THE AFORESAID FRATERNAL PARTIES AGREED WITH THIS PROPOSAL.

THE MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, THE MSZMP, THE SED, THE PZPR, THE CPSU, AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL BE HELD IN BRATISLAVA ON 3 AUGUST.

(ENDALL)

1 AUG 1538Z BS/GG

~~late~~
73
/

ACTION

Thursday, August 1, 1968
10:37 a.m.

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment with Bill Jordan

Bill Jordan is returning to Paris at 4:00 p.m. this afternoon following a few days in Washington.

Jordan has been fully briefed by the State Department. He would be an ideal channel to carry any oral message you have for the negotiators in Paris.

He is in his office here and will be available up to the time of his departure.

Bremley Smith

_____ Ask Jim Jones to fit him into today's schedule.

_____ Regret time does not permit to see him today.

BKS:ksb

10:37 a.m.

Zia

74

ACTION

Thursday, August 1, 1968
10:30 a.m.

Pres. file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for 9 New U. S. Ambassadors

There is attached a list of nine U. S. Ambassadors-designate who will be leaving for their posts in the near future.

Secretary Rusk recommends that if at all possible, you receive them as a group.

One way would be to have them call for a handshake and a picture following the breakfast meeting Friday morning.

Bromley Smith

_____ Ask Jim Jones to set up a meeting with the 9.

_____ Regret schedule does not permit meeting them.

BKS:ksb

S/S 10750

2386

74a



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 31, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for Newly Designated Ambassadors

While I understand several individual appointments have been solicited for your meeting with certain newly designated Ambassadors, in light of your plans for the coming weeks, you may want to consider receiving, as a group, in the course of this week the following Ambassadors:

Mr. ~~Samuel Adams~~, Ambassador-designate to ~~Niger~~

Mr. ~~G. Edward Clark~~, Ambassador-designate to the ~~Mali~~ Republic

Mr. ~~Thomas McElhiney~~, Ambassador-designate to ~~Ghana~~

Mr. ~~George W. Renchard~~, Ambassador-designate to ~~Burundi~~

Mr. ~~Robert M. Sayre~~, Ambassador-designate to ~~Uruguay~~

Mr. ~~Carter L. Burgess~~, Ambassador-designate to ~~Argentina~~

Mr. ~~Raul H. Castro~~, Ambassador-designate to ~~Bolivia~~

Mr. ~~Edson O. Sessions~~, Ambassador-designate to ~~Ecuador~~

Mr. ~~Walter L. Stoessel~~, Ambassador-designate to ~~Poland~~

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk