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August 21, 11:45 p.m.

Memorandum for the President

Subject: Security Council Meeting of August 21

Pres file

After considerable sparring, the Czech Crisis was inscribed on the agenda by a vote of 13-2 (USSR and Hungary opposed).

The acting Czech representative, Jan Mazik, protested the presence of Soviet troops in his country, called for their withdrawal, and read a series of statements under instructions from Foreign Minister Hajek (who is in Yugoslavia). It was an impressive performance.

George Ball made a strong speech denouncing the Soviet action. Malik intervened several times in remarks that almost approached a filibuster in length and irrelevancy.

The French representative, Bernard, spoke straightforwardly against the Soviet invasion. The Canadian, Dane and Brazilian did the same.

Lord Caradon appealed for a speedy decision -- hopefully a vote on a resolution calling for the withdrawal of occupying forces as early as tomorrow. The Security Council then adjourned until 10:30 a.m. tomorrow. (Even with our best efforts, we are not likely to be able to push through to a vote tomorrow.)

For Walt W. Rostow

Nathaniel Davis

2
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INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, August 21, 1968
7:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

At my request the CIA looked back and made the attached interim evaluation of the Soviet Decision to Intervene.

Pres file

Key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 97-160 (#45)
By jelics, NARA, Date 3-4-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
21 August 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Soviet Decision to Intervene

1. Between the end of the Cierna-Bratislava meetings and yesterday's invasion nothing happened inside Czechoslovakia to support Moscow's claim that these meetings were a great victory for Communist orthodoxy. Neither was there a notable recrudescence in Czechoslovakia of the "anti-socialist" trends which brought on the Warsaw meeting and its harsh ultimatum. Thus, we doubt that a rising sense of alarm in Moscow is the essential explanation for Soviet intervention.

2. The Soviet politburo on its return to Moscow did not summon the Central Committee to report on the Cierna and Bratislava meetings, but instead issued a communique in the name of the entire politburo saying that those meetings were a good piece of work. The Soviet leaders seem shortly thereafter to have scattered for their usual summer holidays. The Soviet press stood down its attacks on Czechoslovakia. The appearance given was that Moscow was willing at last to give the Czechs--presumably chastened by the nearness of their approach to the brink--a respite. What went on in Czechoslovakia during the short span of time since Cierna proved only that the Czechs had not understood Cierna to mean that they should put their reform movement into reverse.

3. It is not likely that the Soviets, even though they have persistently underestimated the strength of reformist spirit in Czechoslovakia, expected miracles to be done by Dubcek in three weeks' time. Even if Dubcek had promised them, there was no chance he could deliver. What, then, brought the Russians, after they had decided to

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-276

By is, NARA Date 1-20-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

step back at Cierna, to give the signal yesterday to crush the Czechoslovaks?

4. It may be some time before we can answer this question with any assurance. On the strength of what we know now, the most likely explanation, appears to be that, under the impact of internal pressures within the leadership and of importuning from its anxious allies in Eastern Europe, the Soviet decision at Cierna to give Dubcek and company more time became unravelled. This would suppose--as there seems some reason to suppose--that the Soviet politburo when it went to Cierna was divided in mind, and that the standoff reached there derived mostly from Soviet irresolution. The fragile balance in the Soviet leadership which produced the Cierna agreement has, in the space of less than three weeks, been upset in favor of those who may all along have wanted the toughest kind of policy and have made use of the time and developments since Cierna to undo the agreement.

5. If, indeed, the political scales in Moscow have been in such precarious balance, it would not have needed a great shock to upset them, but only the absence of solid signs that developments in Prague were going Moscow's way. There were few of these. In the short time available to Dubcek his efforts to demonstrate that he could insure the unquestioned domination of the Communist party had not been impressive. Czechoslovak information media remained unruly and unrepentant. There was no indication that non-Communist political elements--for example, the Club of Committed Non-Party People and the revised Socialist party--were being forced to take cover. Despite the renewed pledges of fidelity to CEMA given at Cierna, there continued to be much talk in Prague of broader economic ties with the West.

6. The visits to Prague of Tito and Ceausescu were all too visible reminders that the ranks of independent Communist states were swelling. And, finally, with preparations moving ahead rapidly for the party congress scheduled to open on 9 September, it was becoming clear that the congress

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might sound the death knell over the Czechoslovak party conservatives, Moscow's last hope for a brake on reformism in Prague. The congress would have meant not a check on the momentum of the Czechoslovak reform movement, but its confirmation. In addition, the cost of maintaining the mobilization of massive intervention forces may have created pressures in the leadership to use these forces or disband them.

7. Despite the smoothness of the Soviet military operation in Czechoslovakia, a number of Soviet political actions suggest that the decision to execute the plan of intervention came at a fairly late stage. Among these were Dobrynin's approach to the President, the convening of the Central Committee in the midst of the top leaders' vacation, the flimsiness of the legal base for Soviet action, and the failure to surface quickly an alternative leadership in Prague. Thus it would appear that Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia did not follow naturally from the Cierna meeting but represents, instead, a scrapping of the position arrived at there.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, August 21, 1968
7:00 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith an intelligence report
that de Gaulle and Debre will come
if General Eisenhower dies.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ-001.174.002/17
By jcl/rq, NARA, Date 12-21-09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, August 21, 1968, 7:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Situation in New York

Pres file

George Ball has spent the day in New York working out a majority for inscription of the Czechoslovak item. The meeting was requested by the British, Canadians, Danes, Paraguayans, ourselves---and notably the French. We have the vote of the Brazilian who is President of the Council and of China and believe Senegal and Ethiopia will generally support us.

India and Pakistan say they have no instructions. The USSR, Hungary, and probably Algeria, are the hard core of the opposition.

Malik opened the debate by reading the official Soviet version of events presented to you by Dobrynin. We expect speeches through the evening including--probably--a statement by the Czechoslovak representative branding the Soviet action as invasion.

There has been some talk of a resolution which would call on the Soviets and their allies to withdraw their troops from Czechoslovakia--but serious negotiations on a resolution have not yet begun. Almost any conceivable, acceptable resolution will be vetoed by the Soviets if we forge a nine-vote majority.

W. W. Rostow

ND:ac

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-162
By is, NARA Date 9-8-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5
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INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, August 21, 1968
6:50 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Communist reactions
to the Soviet occupation of Czecho-
slovakia.

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988
By sg, NARA, Date 10-27-92

No. 0614/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
21 August 1968

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Reactions of Communist States and Parties to
the Military Entry into Czechoslovakia
(as of 1630 hours)

1. The reactions of European Communist states and parties were as expected. The Eastern European participants in the military move echoed the Soviet rationale for intervention. The first Polish announcement said the intervention was at the request of Czechoslovak "party and government leadership." This was later altered to read "party and state activists."

2. In Rumania, a joint session of party and government officials and representatives of mass organizations issued a communiqué on 21 August which expressed full solidarity with the Czechoslovak people and the Czechoslovak Communist party. The communiqué bluntly stated that "nothing can justify" armed intervention against Czechoslovakia which it described as a "flagrant violation of national sovereignty."

3. Following the joint session, Rumanian party and state chief Nicolae Ceausescu made a highly nationalistic speech and condemned the action of the Warsaw Pact five. Ceausescu appealed to the populace to be calm and firm but vigilant, and ready "at any moment to defend our socialist fatherland, Rumania." Ceausescu announced the establishment of Worker-Peasant Guard units.

Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NCJ 1017-038-3-1
By JP, NARA, Date 4/20/02

CONFIDENTIAL

4. In Yugoslavia, Tito spoke more softly than Ceausescu, probably because of concern that unrest might be sparked in Yugoslavia by the Russian action. Tito merely expressed "concern" over the violation of Czechoslovakia's sovereignty. The details of the Yugoslav position probably will be developed tonight during a meeting at Tito's vacation headquarters on Brioni Island.

5. The Italian and French Communist parties lost no time in denouncing the invasion. The Politburo of the Italian party issued a communiqué which was broadcast over Rome domestic service at 7:00 AM EDT on 21 August. It said that the leading bodies of the Italian Communist Party had received the decisions of Cierna and Bratislava with great satisfaction and "the Politburo now finds it incomprehensible that the grave decision of a military intervention was taken. The Politburo expresses the emotion and the very great concern which, at this moment, besets the workers' movement and reaffirms its solidarity with the actions of renovation carried out by the Czechoslovak Communist Party."

6. French Communist Party leaders issued a statement expressing "surprise and censure" of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. It noted that the party had advocated that problems arising between Communist parties should be examined and solved by means of "fraternal discussions during bilateral and multilateral meetings which respect each country's sovereignty and each party's self-determination." The statement pointed out that the party had already expressed its opposition to any military intervention from outside. In a sop to Moscow, however, the French Communists also indicated that the Czechs should take action against "anti-Socialist elements" in order to protect Socialist gains. The party Politburo is convening an emergency session of the Central Committee.

7. Of the Asian Communists, only the North Vietnamese have reacted publicly. A statement on Hanoi's domestic radio service on 21 August was an unequivocal and usually prompt endorsement. It described the Soviet move as a "noble effort" in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

response to a request from the "party faithful" in Czechoslovakia. The action, it said was sanctioned by recent agreements among the six Communist countries at Bratislava, and was necessitated by domestically inspired "counterrevolutionary" activities in Czechoslovakia.

8. This reaction is in marked contrast to Hanoi's heretofore neutral propaganda treatment of Soviet-Czech differences and was obviously dictated by North Vietnam's heavy dependence on Soviet supply.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, Aug. 21, 1968
6:10 p. m.

Pres file

4

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a fuller report on the
rocket attacks in Vietnam.

W. W. Reston

Attachment

6a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, August 21, 1968
6:00 PM

Mr. Rostow:

More on the rocket/mortar attack against Saigon.

Between 4:43 PM and 5:25 PM this evening the enemy fired a total of 11 rounds of rocket/mortar fire into the city.

Six of the 11 rounds impacted within the 1, 2 and 3rd precincts. (four rounds into the dock area, one round near US barracks and one round near the USO building).

Additionally at 1:00 PM this afternoon the enemy fired a total of 50 rounds of rocket fire into the Bien Hoa Airbase.

At present we have no reports on extent of damage or casualties resulting from these latest attacks.


Ray Wotring

Pres file INFORMATION

Wednesday, August 21, 1968 -- 5:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith MACV confirmation of the radio report:

MACV reports eleven rounds of unknown type were fired into the Cholon area of Saigon this morning.

W. W. Rostow

Wednesday, August 21, 1968
5:25 p. m.

Pres file
8
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MR. PRESIDENT:

This cable from Prague is the first official comment on the dilemma the Soviets face. They have the troops in the country, but they still have the problem of dealing with the Czech government and the Czech people. And whatever their plan was, it did not immediately throttle all Czech communications and capacity for political expression.

The critical issue in the days ahead will be how they move from military tourism to the political result they want.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (Prague 3057)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

KCD003

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1968 AUG 21 19 50

PAGE 01 PRAGUE 03057 211844Z

ACTION EUR 20

INFO IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00, USUE 00,
SS 25, SCS 04, AID 28, CCO 00, FBO 01, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NIC 01,
NSC 10, O 02, OC 06, OPR 02, P 04, PER 02, RSC 01, SAK 02, SCA 02, SP 02,
SY 03, E 15, SAL 01, SA 01, ACDA 16, SCI 05, RSR 01, /183 W

0 211645Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4589
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE
USMISSION BERLIN
USMISSION BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONGEN MUNICH
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY SOFIA IMMEDIATE
RUDKRW/AMEMBASSY WARSAW 429
USMISSION USUN NY

Rostow

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-158

By *isa*, NARA Date 11-17-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PRAGUE 3057

1. SOVIET TACTICS IN PRESENT SITUATION DIFFICULT TO FATHOM. SOVIETS HAVE SUFFICIENT MILITARY POWER HERE TO DO AS THEY WISH, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW CZECH POLICY OF NONRESISTANCE. HOWEVER THEY HAVE INEXPLICABLY FAILED AS YET TO KNOCK RADIO OFF AIR AND PERMITTED TELEVISION TO CONTINUE TRANSMITTING FOR SUPPRISINGLY LONG PERIODS. MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, SOVIETS DID NOT SIMPLY INSTALL READYMADE QUISLING GOVERNMENT AND HAVE LET MATTER OF WHO IS IN CHARGE DRAG ON.
2. MIGHT BE SPECULATED THAT SOVIETS IN ATTEMPT TO PUT BEST POSSIBLE FACE ON THEIR INTERVENTION ARE PRESSURING CAPTIVE CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP TO ACCEPT SOVIET DEMANDS AND REMAIN MORE-OR-LESS INTACT, MINUS THOSE INDIVIDUALS MOST DISTASTEFUL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 02 PRAGUE 03057 211844Z

TO SOVIETS AND WITH POSSIBLE PROMISE TO WITHDRAW BULK OF
OCCUPYING FORCE. IF SOVIETS DO NOT QUICKLY PRODUCE "THEIR"
REGIME, HOWEVER, THEY MAY FACE STICKY SITUATION AS LEGALLY
CONSTITUTED
ORGANS MEET AND TAKE STANDS AGAINST SOVIET ACTION. THIRTEEN CABINET
MINISTERS
WHO ~~REPLY~~ ISSUED DECLARATION SUPPORTING DUSCEK REGIME AND WHO
COULD SERVE AS STAND-IN GOVERNMENT ILLUSTRATE DIFFICULTIES
ENGENDERED BY DELAY WHICH LETS CZECHS GET THEMSELVES ORGANIZED.
CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM, WHICH SUMMONED TO MEET YET TODAY ~~FOR~~
TOMORROW,
COULD POSE DIFFICULT PROBLEMS FOR SOVIETS EVEN IF CC IS STRIPPED
OF ITS TOP LEADERSHIP. SOVIETS MAY BE FINDING IT DIFFICULT

COPE WITH NONPROVOCATIVE YET APPARENTLY FIRM ATTITUDE OF
LEADERSHIP AND WITH CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED REJECTION BY POPULATION,
WHICH AT SAME TIME IS HOLDING ITS INDIGNATION WITHIN BOUNDS
(EXCEPT FOR SOME GROUPS OF STUDENTS WHO ARE STRETCHING THEIR LUCK).
BEAN

COPY TO CCO.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

Wednesday, Aug. 21, 1968
5:00 p. m.

Pres. file

9

Mr. President:

Herewith the memorandum to
Clark Clifford to which I referred.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET attachment

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 9-8-92

~~SECRET~~

August 19, 1968

clon
9a

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY CLIFFORD

Clark:

As I told you the other day, I think that your press conference hit precisely the right tone in relating the current lull to the enemy's expected third offensive.

I was troubled, however, by some of your remarks on the bombing.

I would agree that before March 31st the enemy had decided to increase substantially his infiltration. Furthermore, there is certainly no evidence -- and I have no reason to argue -- that the restriction of the bombing has had any effect whatsoever on his decision to engage in this massive infiltration effort.

However, I cannot agree that

- the restriction on the bombing has had no effect on the number of infiltrators arriving in SVN,
- the enemy will move the men and materiel they choose to, and
- if their losses go up in the process of moving, then apparently they just move more men and supplies.

In my view, we simply do not have enough information to make a net judgment of the impact of the bombing restriction on the number of infiltrators.

On the plus side, we do not know that

- the restricted bombing campaign is much less costly to us in terms of aircraft and crew losses;
- we have been killing many more trucks and a larger percentage of the trucks moving south.

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~~SECRET~~

Authority NLS-CBS 21

By ics, NARS, Date 6-26-84

cc: Gen Juisburgh

On the negative side, however, we know that

- greater numbers of trucks and people than ever before are getting through;
- the elapsed time for movement of men and supplies has probably been substantially decreased because they enjoy a free ride down to 19 degrees. (A decrease in transit time, of say 30 to 50 percent, decreases the enemy's pipeline requirement by a corresponding amount.)

We simply do not know:

- to what extent the greater efficiency in killing trucks results from greater concentration of effort or from improved techniques of detection and attack;
- whether attacking trucks north as well as south of 19 degrees would have the net result of more or less supplies getting to the south;
- how the level and rate of flow of men and supplies would be affected by attacks on targets other than trucks north of 19 degrees.

The major uncertainty in any of our evaluations of the bombing is that we have no way of knowing what the enemy would really like to do. Hence, we have no way of evaluating the restraints which the bombing places on the fulfillment of his desires.

I understand -- and have lived for many years now in amiable disagreement with -- the argument which states that:

- enemy requirements in SVN are limited (although I personally believe the intelligence experts have consistently underestimated the magnitude of these requirements);
- enemy inputs to meet these requirements are relatively small in comparison with their total requirements and in any event are easily supplied by outside sources without cost to NVN;
- therefore, it is an easy matter for the enemy to budget for whatever level of effort he desires in the south.

There is a fundamental fallacy in this notion that the enemy has necessarily achieved what he desires.

In any real war, the net thrust in the field results from a balancing of all the factors rather than from the subordination of all else to a single absolute priority. This rule holds for every war of which I know, in my own experience or from history. In government -- even totalitarian government -- there is never an absolute priority. In this case the enemy's activity must be considered against a background of the total constraints upon him. Hanoi has to budget not just for its activities in SVN but for its total war effort: feeding, clothing, and housing their people; air defense; repair; recruitment and training.

For example, I do not doubt for a moment that the enemy would have wished to mount an even larger offensive at TET. In their current efforts to get ready for a third crack at us, I do not doubt that they would want to put in as much as they could against us to make this effort decisive.

Therefore, I must conclude that there were effective constraints on the enemy's level of effort at TET just as there are constraints which affect his third offensive.

The major constraint acting against him is, of course, our forces and allied forces in the field in the south. One of the other constraints has been and remains our bombing of the north.

You will find that arguments which begin with the notion that the enemy is putting in all he "chooses to" shift -- at a certain point -- to: in any case, "bombing is not decisive." Of course it is not decisive. But our action in SVN has not been decisive yet either. No one constraint is, in itself, decisive. Our task is to build all these constraints to the point where he decides to accept as his best realistic option what we mean by an honorable peace.

The bombing is, then, simply one of the constraints operating against the enemy. Any reduction of our bombing effort enables him to increase the weight of his effort against us in the field.

One way to put the question is this: If we stop bombing, would Hanoi cancel the shipment of supplies to the south or send fewer men?

~~SECRET~~

-4-

The answer obviously is no. With the battle in its present intence and perhaps critical stago, Hanoi is trying to got the maximum possible impact within limits set by all its constraints.

In any case, Clark, that is my reaction to: "they will move the men and material that they choose to". Life and war are just not like that.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Wednesday, August 21, 1968
12:45 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA summary of
Czech situation as of 11:00 a. m.

No surprises.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NSA 019-038-3-2
By sp, NARA, Date 1/20/02

10a

~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
21 August 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Czechoslovakia
(As of 1100 EDT)

1. There have been no reports of Czechoslovak military resistance to the occupying forces. Some reports say, however, that civilians are attempting to block their movement. Casualties seem so far to have been few. Radio Prague has put the number at 25. At about the same time, the radio reported that a Soviet tank was on fire in the street outside the station.

2. Czechoslovak radio stations [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] are reporting Soviet troop movements throughout the country. Hungarian tanks have been reported in Slovakia and Polish troops are said to be in northeastern Bohemia. The associated Press reports that troops from five Warsaw Pact countries are holding key positions in Bratislava, near the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border. [redacted]

25X1

3. As of 0800, some radio stations, including Radio Prague, were still in the hands of loyalist Czechoslovaks.

25X1

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ-141-022-014/1
NARA, Date 11-2-09

~~SECRET~~

25X1

A broadcast from an unidentified Czechoslovak station, also at 0800 EDT, said, however, that the occupying forces had ordered all radio stations to stop transmitting or they would be forcibly silenced.

4. Other key party and government installations in major centers are evidently surrounded by occupying forces. Soviet forces may have taken over the Czechoslovak Defense Ministry in Prague early today.

25X1

25X1

5. Dubcek and presidium member Kriogal and Spacek were, at Radio Prague's last report, confined to the Central Committee building in Prague. The Radio has reported that President Svoboda is also under detention.

25X1

~~SECRET~~

25X1

25X1

8. A report that Premier Kosygin and Minister of Defense Marshal Grochko had resigned, which was carried in a Czech broadcast from Prague in the early morning hours, has been emphatically denied by the Soviet Foreign Ministry. According to AP, one spokesman labeled it "a provocation," and another described it as "nonsense that should not be spread."

9. There has been no hard information on the whereabouts of any of the Soviet leaders since 16 August and there has been no further information on the Central Committee plenum reported by UPI and AFP on 20 August.

10. Alone among Warsaw Pact states, Rumania convened a plenary session on 21 August of party, government, and mass organizations and unanimously supported in extremely strong language the Czechoslovak party, government, and people. Rumanian party and state chief Ceausescu even declared in a speech that "there is no justification whatsoever" for the military intervention.

25X1

Pres file

11

Wednesday, Aug. 21, 1968
12:05 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a proposed message from you
to Wilson in response to his attached message of
last night.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachments

Yes _____

No _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
White House Records, Feb. 24, 1983
By *rg*, NND, Date 9-8-92

Pres file
12
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Wednesday, Aug. 21, 1968
~~SECRET~~HARVAN/PLUS 12:00 noon

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the account of today's Paris
tea break. Tho was present.

Chat relatively relaxed, but inconsequential.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Paris 19703 Deltop 635)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 94, 1989
By sg, NARA, Date 10-27-94

INFORMATION

Wednesday, August 21, 1968
10:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

The marked passages indicate that Senator Mansfield's crystal ball was a little cloudy.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Senator Mansfield's memo to the President, Aug 19, 1968,
"Observations on a Recent Visit to Europe -- East and West."

WWRostow:rln

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

August 19, 1968

TO: The President
FROM: Mike Mansfield
SUBJECT: Observations on a Recent Visit to Europe--East and West

I spent the last two weeks in Europe. Included in the itinerary were stops in Moscow, Prague, Bucharest, Paris, Frankfurt, and briefly, Budapest and London. I am submitting herewith certain personal observations and comments in connection with these visits for whatever use they may be to you.

Moscow

1. As always, China remains in the background of Soviet anxieties. However, the primary Soviet concern at the present time is the internal progress of the Soviet Union, the adhesiveness of the Eastern European bloc and the general development of economic relationships with the rest of the world. The Soviet Union is run by cautious and deliberate men, who see steady progress both at home and abroad, are not likely to jeopardize that progress by a tempest over the Czechoslovak crisis.

2. To put it another way, the Czechoslovak crisis may be of great importance in Communist ideology but as a practical matter, the actual Soviet approach to it is likely to be tempered by the pragmatism of the current Soviet administration. Quite apart from words, it is not likely that the Soviet government will move directly in a military sense to upset the Czechoslovak revision unless Dubcek is forced to an extreme anti-Russian position--a position which he has heretofore avoided.

3. The detente with the United States is not presently on the front burner of Soviet interests and is not likely to be given a great deal of attention in Moscow so long as the military conflict in Viet Nam continues.

4. There is no serious inclination in Moscow to believe that the Czechoslovak revision derives from U. S. machinations; Kosygin is said to have rejected any such interpretation.

Prague

5. The Dubcek leadership is confident that it has succeeded in its ideological coup. The confidence seems well founded. Popular opinion appears heavily with the Dubcek government and prevailing public pressure is against backtracking. The final word, however, will not come until the party congress which opens on September 9. That will be the occasion of maximum pressure on the Dubcek group but the prevailing view is that they are going to be able to stand up under it.

6. Your discreet handling of our relationship with the Czechoslovakian government at this critical junction has been outstandingly effective. An over-enthusiastic support by us would have hurt Dubcek. On the other hand, an abrupt dismissal of the significance of the changes which he has fostered would have had the same effect. It is most fortunate that you have managed to steer a course between these twin pitfalls.

7. Any unilateral actions in the way of loans and grants of assistance to Czechoslovakia at this time should be avoided like the plague. Although my personal feelings would be to help the Czechoslovakians, an ostentatious eagerness on our part could be disastrous. That is not to say that the Czechoslovaks do not need help or are not seeking it. On the contrary, they do need help, particularly in commercial and industrial modernization. In my judgment, the proper channel for that help, at this time, however, is the World Bank or other multilateral organizations in which Czechoslovakia may have membership.

For our part, we could consider the extension of most-favored nation treatment if it can be done by Executive action and, hence, not lead to a prolonged emotional debate in the Congress. Preferably, the extension of most-favored nation treatment might well be taken simultaneously for several of the countries in Eastern Europe, thereby, avoiding a singling out of Czechoslovakia.

Insofar as the Czechoslovak gold question is concerned, it seems to me appropriate to make clear that the situation is being reexamined but it is best to put off decisions until next year, because when they are made, they may be expected to arouse a hue and cry from the Czechoslovak claims seekers in this country.

8. The odds are on the survival of the Dubcek government (barring an assassination or some such extremist act). As noted, the people are with Dubcek and his reforms. At the same time, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will be able to find a believable alternative in Czechoslovakia to which it might throw support. Without a realistic political alternative to Dubcek, a Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia does not appear in the cards.

Paris

9. Within the limits of his directives, Averill Harriman is doing a most creditable job in the negotiations. However, there is no reason to expect any tangible progress in the negotiations on the basis of his directives. To be sure, there is some desire on both sides to keep the talks going; an occasional act of conciliation (i.e., the recent exchange of prisoners) take place and that is all to the good. But insofar as making peace is concerned, what is now in progress in Paris amounts to two monologues proceeding separately, at the same time, without drawing the positions any closer. This procedure could go on indefinitely and there are stories to the effect that some members of the negotiating team are, in fact, taking long term leases on apartments in anticipation thereof.

10. All knowledgeable sources, Communist and non-Communist, hold to the view that there will be no further progress in Paris--no negotiations on substance--unless and until there is a complete cessation of the bombing of the North. Regretably, no one is willing to go out on a limb and conjecture what will happen if the bombing is stopped but all seem to agree that stopping it will be a productive step towards peace.

11. Your personal handling of de Gaulle (and, I stress, the word personal) has been most effective and may well be fruitful in terms of our future relations with France. In this connection, Couve de Murville was most emphatic in giving me assurances that if the U. S. stopped the bombing of the North entirely and the North Vietnamese then proceeded to escalate the military conflict, France "would not like it and would say so."

Other

12. Throughout Eastern Europe, the immediate problems and interests are economic. Most of the nations are encouraging contacts with the West, including tourism (the repair and restoration of ancient churches is a widespread preoccupation in the Eastern European countries). U. S. investment is welcomed in Prague, Bucharest, and elsewhere and on not unfavorable terms.

13. The cold war is largely over insofar as some Eastern European countries are concerned. They are prepared for a diminution in the significance of both the Warsaw Pact and the NATO Pact. I come home, more than ever, persuaded that (1) while our military commitment under the NATO Treaty must remain inviolate, (2) our assignment of forces under the NATO organization can and should be sharply reduced. The two are in no way incompatible. Assignment in Europe has become a kind of military homesteading for hundreds of thousands of Americans in recent years. If I am correctly informed, it is about time to ask ourselves what on earth we are doing with almost 100 generals in Western Europe (~~many~~ with private railroad cars and personal planes), especially at a time of budget difficulties and balance-of-payments embarrassment.

DEC. CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-334

By isa, NARA Date 8-20-98

Wednesday, August 21, 1968
9:30 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Ben Read informs me that the Danish Government has approached us with an indication that they are likely to wish to take the lead in the Security Council in New York on the Czech question. The Danish Cabinet is now meeting and their decision as a government on this initiative should be known to us soon.

Read tells me Sect. Rusk's response was that they should go ahead -- but we wish to leave open the option that we might join them in sponsoring a Security Council Resolution of condemnation.

In addition to the question of a movement in New York, there are two issues which ought to be decided today:

-- Should a statement on this matter be made by the President, by the Secretary of State, or by George Ball in New York? I am inclined to believe that there ought to be a statement from our Government. The people have been absorbing the facts on radio and TV this morning. I believe they will expect something from us during the day.

-- What should we say? Since, thus far, this is not a sanguinary crisis, I believe our tone should be not inflammatory but political. The central theme should be that this is a profoundly reactionary move counter not merely to the United Nations Charter but to all the trends on which mankind is now basing its hopes. Everywhere men and nations are moving towards freedom and responsible nationalism. This is a serious setback. Everywhere men hope for cooperation across the lines of the Cold War. This pushes us in the other direction. In Eastern Europe or Western Europe -- or in all the other continents -- this move will be regarded as a major and tragic backward step. Men will also recognize that the cause of freedom and responsible nationalism will not be denied -- nor the cause of peace. The voice of the Czechoslovak people -- and others in the world community -- will be heard.

You may wish to call a meeting later this morning, when we have definitive word on the Danish Cabinet decision, to consider our UN posture and other aspects of the situation.

Just to turn over in your mind, Brzezinski just called me with the idea of a Heads of Government meeting of the Western Alliance in Europe. It would be designed to dramatize not merely the unity of the West but its association with constructive principles and objectives for the long run. He suggested this, in part, on U. S. domestic political grounds to help avoid a simple negative reaction back to pure Cold War attitudes.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Wednesday, August 21, 1968
8:10 a. m.

Mr. President:

There is little in this CIA summary you do not already have; but I thought you ought to have it available as the best round up as of 7:00 a. m.

You will note (pp. 2-3) a radio broadcast -- unconfirmed -- that the Soviets have occupied the Central Committee headquarters where Dubcek is believed to have been.

Free file

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-336
By CG, NARA Date 7-27-99

~~1 copy~~
2. Pres file

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday, August 21, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment with Israeli Deputy Prime Minister

Ambassador Rabin has asked whether you would receive Deputy Prime Minister Allon while he is in Washington on a private visit. He will be in the US September 9-14, and we understand September 9-10 or 12 would be the best days for him. Secretary Rusk will see him and recommends that you talk with him too.

Since Eshkol has just appointed Allon as his Deputy, there is no question of political sensitivity. Rabin has assured us of this. We understand informally that Dayan, Allon's principal rival, may again be planning a private visit later in the year, so there would be a chance to balance the books if you wished.

The main purpose from our end would be to give one of the most influential Israeli leaders a first hand picture of our reservations about current Israeli policy. Changing Israeli minds requires steady prodding, and the only way to go at it is to take advantage of every opportunity to make our viewpoint known.

I see this as a major opportunity for you to weigh in. If we are to make any progress toward a peace settlement this could be an important stepping stone. I recommend you see him.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓
Disapprove _____
Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By pk/cb, NARA, Date 12-21-09

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

2552
16a

August 20, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment with Israeli Deputy
Prime Minister Yigal Allon

Recommendation:

That you receive Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon during his visit to Washington September 9-14.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Background:

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Immigrant Absorption Yigal Allon plans to visit Washington during the period September 9-14 and has asked for an appointment with you. A long-time Labor Minister and a famous General during the 1948 Arab-Israel conflict, Mr. Allon is an able and ambitious politician whose recent appointment as Deputy Prime Minister highlights him as one of the serious candidates to succeed Prime Minister Eshkol. Moderately "hawkish" in his foreign policy pronouncements, he is the architect of a "plan" proposing a negotiated Israeli withdrawal from the heavily Arab-populated areas on the West Bank of the Jordan coupled with continued Israeli occupation of and settlement in the Jordan Valley.

I presume that Mr. Allon wishes to discuss the Middle East situation with you, with particular emphasis upon Israel's security needs, including Phantom aircraft. Such a discussion could prove an apt occasion to re-emphasize to a ranking Israeli the great importance we attach to the Jarring Mission and our expectation that Israel will make a positive contribution thereto. Mr. Allon speaks English fluently.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *je/c* NARA, Date 12-21-09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GROUP-3

~~SECRET~~

August 21, 1968

Per file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Czechoslovakia Seen from Europe

In Britain, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary interrupted their holidays and returned to London. The Cabinet Meeting is scheduled tomorrow and Parliament is being scheduled for August 26. Our Charge joined a meeting in the cabinet room at 10 Downing Street to discuss next steps with the Acting Foreign Minister. The British strongly favor primary reliance on the UN. Foreign Secretary Stewart is considering attending the Security Council meeting in New York personally and wonders whether Secretary Rusk might participate.

In France, DeGaulle remains in the country. Debre called in Shriver to state view Soviet could not allow Czech deviation, that Yalta had given Eastern Europe to Soviet domination and that there is "nothing anyone could do." Debre opposed three-power consultation, saying it would only produce a meaningless declaration. Nevertheless, Debre reported that DeGaulle had approved the idea of "taking distance" from the USSR in bilateral relations.

From Moscow, our Charge reports the invasion took all friendly diplomats by surprise (Amb. Thompson is due in Washington tomorrow). Our Charge speculates that there was a shift in the politburo majority, and passes along an unconfirmed report that Kosygin and Podgorny were summoned hastily from vacation on August 19 to be confronted with a fait accompli. Our Charge estimates that many countries will find the Soviet action so repugnant that their bilateral relations with the USSR will suffer at all levels. November Conference of Communist Parties faces virtually insuperable odds and third-world countries are having second thoughts about the Soviets. Apparently the Soviets have started jamming VOA and BBC on at least some channels.

From Prague, you may have seen in the latest Sit-Rep that Amb. Beam believes the continuing delay of the Soviets in establishing a puppet government may force the Soviets into an increasingly "sticky situation" legally conducted Czech organs take stands against the invasion. The National Assembly met in rump session today and President Svoboda either sent or spirited out an address to the Nation calling for calm and fortitude. Automatic weapons fire is being heard from the center of Prague this evening. Tad Szulc will report in tomorrow's New York Times that intensive negotiations are going on between the Czech's and Soviets to try to work out the membership of a new government but Dubcek's fantastic popularity is making the formation of such a regime doubtful.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 3-4-03*Walt* Rostow

SANITIZED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, August 21, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

swj

SUBJECT: Call on You by Ambassador Williams

Ambassador G. Mennen Williams is calling on you at 2:00 p. m. tomorrow, August 22. He is in Washington for consultations with State and Defense on the question of jurisdiction to try one of our sentries at Sangley Naval Base, who shot a Philippine teenager trying to escape with stolen property. This is the only subject which the Ambassador is expected to raise with you.

As you know, this sort of case, both in the Philippines and elsewhere, has previously given rise to considerable Congressional interest. The Ambassador will have with him a list of senators and congressmen who have made inquiries concerning our handling of this one.

State and Defense have reached agreement on a talking paper for the Ambassador's use when he returns. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1.3
(6)
(5)

] Obviously the outcome of these negotiations will be important for the future of our Status of Forces stance in the Philippines.

I do not recommend that you raise any other subject with Ambassador Williams.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Marshall Wright

AJenkins:mm

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-140
By *swj*, NARA, Date 10-26-88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

19

**LITERALLY
TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY**

Pres file

**Tuesday, August 20, 1968
6:55 p. m.**

Mr. President:

**Attached are the notes for the
background briefing, which I have
prepared for Sec. Rusk and me for
tomorrow.**

I await your guidance.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- LITERALLY EYES ONLY

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993
By *ry*, NARA, Date 9-8-92

19a

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY RUSK

Herewith some notes for your and my backgrounders tomorrow.

1. The agreement announced this morning that the President will confer with leaders within the Soviet Union in early October is the outcome of a long process.

- it began in early 1964 when President Johnson first addressed himself to Moscow on a range of major substantive issues;
- it is a natural follow-on from the two intensive meetings at Glassboro in June of last year;
- it is also natural that the Chiefs of Government of the two countries should meet in the light of the intense negotiating efforts undertaken over the 14 months since the Glassboro meetings.

2. President Johnson's first major substantive message to the Soviet leaders was in mid-January 1964. It proposed, among other things, that the two nations address themselves to the following objectives which would move the world towards peace:

- to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons;
- to end the production of fissionable material for weapons;
- to transfer large amounts of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes;
- to ban all nuclear weapons tests;
- to place limitations on nuclear weapons systems;
- to reduce the risk of war by accident or design;
- to move toward general disarmament.

In general, President Johnson urged that the two nations work on "specific problems" -- such as these -- rather than on "vague declarations of principle" that might be agreed. That has been the President's approach to U. S. -Soviet relations since then.

~~TOP SECRET~~ - LITERALLY EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-281

By , NARA, Date 1-13-94

3. Progress was slow, but in the autumn of 1966, as a result of discussions between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Rusk, the outlines of a feasible Non-Proliferation Treaty began to fall into place and work intensified in that field. In November, 1966, the U. S. -Soviet Civil Air Agreement was signed. In late January, 1967, the U. S. initiated with the Soviet Union exchanges on the possibility of limiting both offensive and defensive strategic weapons; and, on the basis of a letter from Kossygin of late February, the President announced on March 2 the willingness of the Soviet Government to discuss this subject. During the Middle East war of June, 1967, the Soviets initiated the use of the hot line; and a cease-fire was achieved in New York on the basis of intensive exchanges over that line (and otherwise) between the two governments.

4. Against this background it was natural that Chairman Kossygin and President Johnson should find an occasion to meet when Kossygin came to the United Nations meetings in New York on the Middle East late in June. At Glassboro the two leaders took the occasion for two days of exchanges covering a very wide range of topics, notably:

- the Middle East;
- Vietnam;
- the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and
- the possibility of a U. S. -Soviet agreement on the limitation and subsequent reduction of offensive and defensive nuclear arms.

The President sought at that time a firm date and place for the opening of strategic arms talks; but the Soviet Government was not yet prepared for a decision.

5. Since Glassboro, U. S. -Soviet cooperation has helped yield some striking results -- great and small:

- The Non-Proliferation Treaty has moved forward and been signed by 77 nations;
- At the July 1, 1968, signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the two nations agreed to hold talks on strategic arms limitation in the near future. We expect a time and place to be set before too long.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

- Between September, 1967, and April, 1968, a treaty on the return of astronauts was negotiated and signed;
- In August, 1968, with U. S. -Soviet cooperation, a UN conference was inaugurated on the future of the sea beds;
- In November, 1967, the U. S. and the Soviet Union joined in support of a Security Council resolution on the Middle East which is the basis of Ambassador Jarring's mission;
- In July, 1968, the first flights took place under the U. S. -Soviet bilateral Air Agreement;
- In June, 1968, the Consular Convention was ratified and went into effect in July;
- In July, 1968, bilateral U. S. -Soviet discussions were inaugurated on the Law of the Sea;
- In addition, progress was made in such other bilateral matters as the Cultural Exchange Agreement, Renewal of Atomic Energy Exchange Agreement, and the negotiation to improve Embassy sites.

In short, the year since Glassboro has been, certainly, the most intensive and successful post-war year in U. S. -Soviet relations despite failure to achieve full and effective agreement on two great unresolved issues:

- the Middle East; and
- Southeast Asia.

President Johnson has steadily emphasized both the reality of the progress achieved and the reality of the dangerous unresolved issues that remain between the two nations.

6. On March 31, when President Johnson withdrew from the presidential nomination, he had very much in mind a desire to devote himself as fully as possible to movement towards peace. He, therefore, was pleased when, after preliminary exploration by both sides, it was agreed that a meeting this autumn of the Chiefs of Government of the Soviet Union and the United States made sense. Before Glassboro, at Glassboro, and since Glassboro

he has worked to make the strategic missile talks a reality. The question of time and place was dealt with in a number of exchanges at the highest level, notably since the NPT moved towards reality in June. If any one factor crystallized the decision in both governments to move to a summit meeting it was probably the agreement to proceed to strategic missile talks. We felt it might be helpful if the Chiefs of Government could meet in roughly the same period as these talks were inaugurated, because of the importance, the sensitivity, and the complexity of negotiations on this matter -- which President Johnson has often emphasized. We have no announcement to make at the present time; but, as indicated earlier, we expect to be in a position to make an announcement soon on the time, place, and level of the strategic missile talks.

7. Although the opening of the strategic missile talks was probably the catalyst that led to this decision by the two Governments, the meeting of President Johnson with Chairman Kossygin will undoubtedly be the occasion to consult on:

- a variety of bilateral matters;
- next steps in the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;
- the possibilities of bringing our positions closer on the Middle East and on Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

P file
20

Tuesday, August 20, 1968
4:00 p. m.

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. PRESIDENT:

You should know that Pat's base at Phan Rang
was attacked with mortars -- no injuries; no damage.

W. W. Restow

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

CONFIDENTIAL
White House, Feb. 24, 1983
By ng, (NSA), Date 9-8-92

Flash

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

202

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JPCCO/JOPREP JIFFY 08-022/35TFW/OPREP-3
INACLE 001. ENEMY MORTAR ATTACK ON PHAN RANG AB, RVN 20 AUG 1968.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
APPROXIMATELY 20/1600 10 ROUNDS OF SUSPECTED 82 MM MORTAR
IMPACTED IN C123 DEVIATION AREA. 1 C123B, SN 54639 RECEIVED
INTE, EXTENT UNKNOWN AT PRESENT. NEGATIVE INJURIES TO
PERSONNEL. AT 20/1643 APPROX 9 ADDITIONAL ROUNDS IMPACTED VICINITY
POL AND MAIN GATE. NO DAMAGE OR INJURIES. ALL BASE FACILITIES
NORMAL. NO ASSISTANCE REQUIRED.

4

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec 3.3
DA Memo, Jan 5, 1993
By rg NARA Date 9842

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

T.J.
INFORMATION

~~SECRET NODIS~~--OHIO

Tuesday, August 20, 1968 -- 12:55 p. m.

Mr. President:

For some reason which seems somewhat obscure, Hanoi seems serious about opening up another channel of discussions on Vietnam via Oslo -- with the Norwegians operating as an intermediary. They appear to propose the opening of such a channel on September 20.

You may wish to discuss this with Sec. Rusk after the lunch -- or at lunch.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Oslo 6141

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-334
By us, NARA Date 8-20-98

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

21a
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

16

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5 9 3 2 Q
August 20, 1968
11:38AM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-407
By us, NARA Date 9-21-78

NODIS-OHIO

REF: OSLO 6088 AND 6051 AND 5997

1. FONOFF (POLDIRECTOR ANSTEENSEN AND VRAALSEN) HAS JUST GIVEN ME FOLLOWING TWO MESSAGES FROM NORWEGIAN CHARGE TANGERAAS IN PEKING. A. MESSAGE DATED AUG 17 QUOTE NGO STILL EXPECTING INFORMATION FROM HANOI REGARDING SUITABLE TIME FOR CONVERSATIONS. NGO IS HOWEVER INTERESTED IN BEING INFORMED WHAT TIME AFTER FIRST SEPTEMBER SUITS NORWEGIAN SIDE BEST. UNQUOTE. B. MESSAGE DATED AUG 20 QUOTE NGO'S INTERPRETER TODAY SOUGHT OUT TANGERAAS AND INFORMED HIM THAT HANOI PROPOSES TALKS IN OSLO BEGINNING SEPT 20 ACCOMPANYING MOSCOW AMBASSADOR WILL BE DIRECTOR SUNG RPT SUNG FROM HANOI PLUS ENGLISH SPEAKING INTERPRETER FROM MOSCOW OR HANOI. SUNG AND POSSIBLE INTERPRETER WILL TRAVEL VIA PEKING DASH MOSCOW. PROPOSE VISA BE GIVEN IN MOSCOW. FLIGHT NUMBER AND ARRIVAL TIME WILL BE GIVEN LATER. REQUEST IMMEDIATE REPLY WHETHER TIME ACCEPTABLE. END QUOTE.

2. ANSTEENSEN SAID FONOFF ANXIOUS REPLY SOONEST TO NGO RE DATE PROPOSED. HE THEREFORE ASKED ME TO CHECK URGENTLY WHETHER USG STILL APPROVES OPERATION AND WHETHER LOGISTICALLY FEASIBLE FOR US FOLLOW PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED SCENARIO: I.E. DAVIDSON TO BE AVAILABLE SHORTLY BEFORE SEPT 20 AND THEN STAND BY IN OSLO WHILE TALKS UNFOLD.

3. IF ABOVE DATE AND ARRANGEMENTS SUITABLE AMB ALGARD WILL REMAIN NORWAY FOR TALKS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE.

4. FONOFF BELIEVES SUNG HAS BEEN DEPUTY DIRECTOR WESTERN EUROPE IN NVN FONOFF AND PRECEDED MAI VAN BO AS CHIEF NVN DELEGATION PARIS. FONOFF WOULD APPRECIATE ANY BIO INFO WE MAY HAVE.

5. I AM SENDING BY SEPTTEL COPY OF TANGERAAS LETTER DATED AUG 13 WHICH ELABORATES ON CONVERSATION THIRD REFTEL IN WHICH NGO POSTPONED OSLO VISIT.

6. APPRECIATE IMMEDIATE REPLY PARA TWO.

OP- L. BOVEY

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Tuesday, August 20, 1968 -- 11:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Abrams' personal assessment.

Summary in last paragraph.

Still not clear whether enemy can -- or will --
mount a full-fledged third wave.

from file

W. W. Rostow

MAC 11266

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 12073 (#97)
By J/ics, NARA, Date 12-21-09

IN III CTZ, CONTACTS WITH ENEMY FORCES INITIATED ON 13 AUG 68 NW AND EAST OF TAY NINH CITY CONTINUE SPORADICALLY. PRELIMINARY INTERROGATION OF A PW CAPTURED NW OF TAY NINH REVEALS THAT THE 271ST AND 273RD VC REGTS, 9TH VC DIV, THE UNITS IN CONTACT, PLAN TO ATTACK TAY NINH CITY AGAIN TONIGHT. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THIS PLAN CAN BE CARRIED OUT UNTIL THE ENEMY UNITS BREAK CONTACT.

THE ENEMY CONDUCTED FOUR MORTAR ATTACKS AND TWO LIGHT PROBES OF THE SF CAMP AT LOC NINH ON 18, 19 AND 20 AUG 68 CAUSING LIGHT CASUALTIES AND DAMAGE. FRIENDLY ELEMENTS ENCOUNTERED ENEMY FORCES SOUTH OF LOC NINH THROUGHOUT THE 19TH; HOWEVER, THIS CONTACT HAS NOW CEASED.

THE SF CAMPS AT TRANG SUP AND KATUM RECEIVED MORTAR ATTACKS ON 19 AUG 68 CAUSING NO DAMAGE.

US FORCES MAINTAIN SPORADIC CONTACT IN NE LONG AN PROV. A B-52 STRIKE IN THE PROVINCE RESULTED IN 13 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS, 22 STRUCTURES DESTROYED, 23 DAMAGED AND TWO LARGE FIREBALLS.

ON 17 AUG 68, THE FE, HQ 7TH NVA DIV WAS TENTATIVELY FIXED IN SOUTHERN BINH LONG PROV INDICATING A POSSIBLE SUBSTANTIAL SOUTHWARD MOVE FROM THE CAMBODIAN BORDER AREA.

NO SIGNIFICANT ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY OCCURRED IN IV CTZ ON THE NIGHT OF 19-20 AUG 68 AND NO ADDITIONAL INDICATIONS OF IMMINENT ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTION HAVE BEEN NOTED.

IN SUMMARY, THE ENEMY CONTINUES HIS LAST MINUTE OFFENSIVE PREPARATIONS WHILE HARASSING SECONDARY TARGETS AND OBJECTIVES THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE COUNTRY. THESE ATTACKS MAY HAVE SEVERAL PURPOSES: TO ATTRACT OUR FORCES TO AREAS OF SECONDARY SIGNIFICANCE, TO GIVE HIS TROOPS - MANY OF THEM GREEN - SOME COMBAT EXPERIENCE; OR TO DRAW OUR ATTENTION TO THE OUTLYING AREAS WHILE HE ATTEMPTS TO MOVE INTO AREAS CLOSER TO PRIME OBJECTIVES.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

PRESERVATION COPY

Tuesday, August 20, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

~~4-10-68~~
2. Pres file

SUBJECT: Letter of Sympathy to the Belgium Ambassador

At noon today, the only son of Belgium Ambassador Scheyven died at 26 years old in George Washington Hospital of a lingering cancer condition.

You may wish to send the attached letter of sympathy along with flowers.

W. W. Rostow

Schwartz 8/20

August 20, 1968

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

It was with great sadness that I learned of the loss of your son, Baudouin.

We, who in moments of national loss have so often found comfort in your warm support, extend to you and your family our deepest sympathy during this time of personal sorrow.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Baron Louis Scheyven
Ambassador of Belgium
2300 Foxhall Road, Northwest
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:State:cjf

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

August 20, 1968

*1 sup
2 p w jw*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Atomic Energy Act has a requirement for an annual Presidential authorization to the Atomic Energy Commission to manufacture and deliver atomic weapons to the Department of Defense.

Attached for your signature is a letter containing the annual authorization to implement nuclear weapons programs during FY 1969. This authorization has been reviewed by the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget and is consistent with substantive program decisions already made.

In addition to the annual authorization for the FY 1969 program, the letter contains a directive to the Atomic Energy Commission to produce those atomic weapon parts during fiscal years 1969 and 1970 which are necessary to prepare for weapons production in FY 1971. This authorization is essential to provide the long-lead time parts, particularly electrical component parts for which orders must be placed twenty-four months or more in advance of weapon assembly.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____
Letter signed _____
Speak to me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 00-147
By sj, NARA, Date 11-24-04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, August 20, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Opening of Consulates in the USSR
and the U. S.

At Tab A is Secretary Rusk's memorandum recommending you authorize him to check with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on opening an American Consulate General in Leningrad in exchange for a Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco.

The Russians, on August 13, proposed that we begin negotiations as soon as possible. Secretary Rusk believes the exchange would be in our interest and sees no insurmountable problems in the way.* He therefore wants to begin consultations with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the leadership, and the members of the California Congressional Delegation.

I concur in his recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Approve consultations _____

No _____

Call me _____

** But note his query about Gov. Reagan*

ERF
ERF:mst

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *jw/rq* NARA, Date 7-22-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 19, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Opening of Consulates in the U.S.S.R.
and the U.S.

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to ascertain the views of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the question of opening an American Consulate General in Leningrad in exchange for a Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The Soviets proposed formally to us on August 13 that we begin negotiations as soon as possible with the aim of opening a Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco in exchange for an American Consulate General in Leningrad. This proposal followed informal approaches to Ambassador Thompson by various Soviet officials, including Ambassador Dobrynin.

I suggest that we respond favorably to the Soviet proposal. A Consulate General in Leningrad would provide us with a valuable listening post in one of the most important urban political and cultural centers in the Soviet Union. It would also enable us to maintain better contact with American students at Leningrad University, to be of greater service to United States citizens traveling in northern Russia, and to handle more effectively other consular matters such as shipping, estate cases, citizenship and visa issuance. Finally, it would be a positive and useful step forward in support of your policy of promoting closer ties and understanding between our two countries.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-335
By ice, NARA Date 9.18.98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

We estimate the cost of establishing a post in Leningrad at approximately \$250,000 for the first year, with an annual cost thereafter of roughly \$159,000.

We see no insurmountable problem with the Soviet wish to have a Consulate General in San Francisco. Mayor Joseph Alioto has already requested our assistance in encouraging the Soviets to choose his city. Thus, local cooperation appears assured.*

During the ratification debate on the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention on July 30, 1965, I promised to consult with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee before we considered opening negotiations with the Soviets on establishing any consular posts. (We will, of course, also consult the leadership and members of the California Congressional Delegation.) Before proceeding to ascertain the Committee's views on this matter, I would like to obtain your concurrence.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

* gov. Reagan could present a problem.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, August 19, 1968 -- 7:50 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You should be aware we had prepared on a contingency basis draft statements by yourself and/or the Secretary of State should the third wave offensive begin. The two attached have been cleared by Sec. Rusk.

Our general notion is that the first statements should come from Saigon. Unless the situation is one into which you wish to move promptly, perhaps Sec. Clifford should take the lead in Washington. I have arranged with his staff that they should prepare for this contingency.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-248
By 06, NARA, Date 5-25-85

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

2535

25a

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

As anticipated, Hanoi has launched another offensive in South Viet-Nam. Its preparations have long been in evidence. We have observed its peak infiltration rates of recent months. We have seen its steady deployment of forces to forward attack positions. We have had confirmation from prisoners we have taken and enemy documents we have captured.

We know also that their timetable has been disrupted by the military counter-actions we have taken. We believe that the force of the attack they can launch will be much less than they have counted on because of the brave efforts of our men on the ground and in the air. Reports reaching us from Saigon confirm that during the last _____ hours, enemy units have attacked Vietnamese and allied positions throughout the country (or at and). Our units were braced and ready for these attacks, and though they are still in progress in some areas, Vietnamese and allied troops have given a good account of themselves, and have taken a heavy toll of the enemy.

By mounting and launching this third attack since Tet, what has Hanoi hoped to gain? It seems clear that they again wanted to try to establish in American opinion an impression of their undaunted will and power, their ability to strike in many places, their capacity to create new civilian refugees and to destroy dwellings and generally wreak havoc. They would like to have Americans throw up their hands in despair and decry the "hopelessness" of the conflict. They want, too, to bring heavy pressure on the newly-elected government

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 93-248
By 06, NARA, Date 5-25-95

~~SECRET~~

-2-

of Viet-Nam in hopes of causing its collapse. They would like to generate a climate of hopelessness in Viet-Nam which might drive the people to despair.

But Hanoi is not going to succeed. The elected government of South Viet-Nam has actually derived new strength since Tet from its ability to repulse and recover from the worst Hanoi could throw against it. The elements of that government have learned to work together in adversity in an atmosphere which no free government has been asked to tolerate in modern history.

As for our own people, we have not been stampeded nor do we intend to be stampeded. We will continue to defend our men and our allies by whatever means are required. We continue to honor our commitment to the South Vietnamese people while at the same time earnestly seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict. We have continued to talk seriously in Paris with the representatives of Hanoi though we have been disheartened by their intransigence. We realize that their position in Paris is directly related to and influenced by their policy of "fighting while negotiating" -- nevertheless, we were prepared and are prepared to continue in our efforts to find an honorable and peaceful solution through these talks. We would now hope that in the wake of the failure of their latest offensive, they will abandon their delaying tactics at the conference table, their tactics of bombast and propaganda, and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

begin seriously to move toward a genuine settlement. They should be now convinced that the will of the South Vietnamese people and their allies will not be broken.

I would now hope that the peoples of the world will focus their moral force on Hanoi and cause them to seek seriously that peaceful, solution for which all men yearn. The leaders in Hanoi must be convinced that their outworn policies of aggression and terror have no place in the world of today. They must abandon them and help shape a world in which men can decide their future without coercion or external interference.

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 93-248
By cb, NARA, Date 5-25-93

These new communist attacks come as no military surprise. They are nonetheless a severe disappointment to all of us here and throughout the world who have been earnestly seeking an honorable and peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam. Once again those on the other side have chosen further violence and bloodshed over restraint and reasonable discussion, just as they did last May while the Paris talks were being prepared. Now as then, their attacks flaunt world opinion and call into question their professed desire for a just solution through negotiations. It seems clear that force, not peaceful adjustment, remains their preferred method of solving this problem, regardless of the cost in lives so callously and carelessly expended.

We are confident that our own forces and those of our allies will contain this new aggression. We are also confident that the Vietnamese government and people will withstand the military, economic, and psychological pressures these ruthless new attacks place upon them. We have noted with admiration how they have responded to such tests before. Our will and courage are no less than theirs. We stand prepared to assist them fully in the steps they are already purposefully undertaking to defend their lives, their homes, and their country.

These new attacks go beyond the battlefield, They are aimed at undermining the will and the sense of purpose of ourselves, our allies in Viet-Nam, and the Free World. They represent a brutal attempt to exploit the hopes for peace which the Paris talks

~~SECRET~~

-2-

have engendered. They raise doubts about Hanoi's seriousness and purpose at these discussions. Nevertheless, despite our disappointment and deep concern over this renewed use of force and violence, we are determined to continue our efforts at Paris and elsewhere in the search for peace in Viet-Nam.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

24

Pres file

Lunch Meeting With the President
Tuesday, August 19, 1968 - 1:00 p.m.

AGENDA

1. Sec. Rusk's Testimony Before the Democratic Platform Committee
This Evening, Tuesday, Aug. 19. (The President)

2. Soviet Agreement to Talk About Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions.
(Sec. Rusk)

Tab A, attached, contains the Soviet acceptance. Before the announcement is made, there are certain issues which are being cleared up by between Bill Foster and Amb. Debrynin, at Sec. Rusk's direction. You may wish to consider at lunch the timing of an announcement.

3. Strategic Missile Talks. (The President, Sec. Rusk and Sec. Clifford)

You may wish to give your initial reaction to the proposal forwarded to you at the Ranch. Attached at Tab B is a rather responsible Soviet official suggesting:

- We shall hear officially by the end of this week;
 - ~~AM~~ Soviets envisage the opening of the talks at mid-September.
- The*

4. The Third Wave? (Sec. Clifford, Mr. Helms)

5. Other.

Note: You may wish to encourage the group to speculate about basic Soviet strategy in U. S. -Soviet relations at this stage, including the relationship to possible moves against Czechoslovakia or to recovery from the setback with Czechoslovakia, if they accept it.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By RG, NARA, Date 11-4-92

W. W. Reston

WWReston:rla

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, August 19, 1968

~~Long~~
2. Per file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached at Tab A is a letter of acknowledgment to President Trejos on his two recent thank-you messages to you:

-- His July 29 letter of thanks following your Central American visit (Tab B).

-- His August 12 message of appreciation for your concern over the suffering caused by the eruption of the volcano Arenal (Tab C).

W. W. Rostow

August 20, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your very kind letter of July 29 and for your message forwarded telegraphically by our Embassy in San Jose last week.

I deeply appreciate your comments and your good wishes. I, too, am especially pleased that over these past two years you and I have had the opportunity to develop a personal friendship which reinforces the traditional bonds uniting two nations of the Hemisphere who enjoy a similar heritage of devotion to democratic institutions.

Mrs. Johnson and I extend our very best wishes to you and Mrs. Trejos -- and to the Costa Rican people -- for happiness and prosperity and for continued progress toward the attainment of your national goals.

Sincerely,

(S) Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez
President of the Republic of Costa Rica
San Jose

LBJ:State:cjf

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, August 19, 1968

~~to [unclear]~~
2. Profile

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I support Secretary Rusk's recommendation (Tab A) that you acknowledge President Arias' recent letter (Tab B) which endorses your April 23 statement on Latin American physical integration.

If you approve, a letter for signature is attached (Tab C).

Secretary Rusk points out a letter from you could be sent directly to Panama or be held for delivery by Ambassador Anderson if President Arias visits him in New York later this month.

Letter to Panama _____

Let Covey Oliver determine best means of delivery _____

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13282, Sec. 3.4
By plg NARA, Date 12-21-09

286

August 20, 1968

Dear Dr. Arias:

I wish to express my appreciation for the warm message of greetings you sent to me on the occasion of the recent visit to Washington of Ambassador Charles W. Adair, Jr.

I have read with great interest your thoughtful comments on the need for physical integration within Latin America. I am pleased to know that you share my conviction, expressed in my statement of April 23, 1968, that we must begin now the preparation of a comprehensive, multi-national plan for new communication and transportation links uniting the American continents. Your support of this objective gives me renewed assurance that the nations of our Hemisphere, working together within the framework of the Alliance for Progress, can move forward to overcome the geographic barriers to the social and economic advancement of their peoples.

With cordial best wishes.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Dr. Arnulfo Arias M.
President-Elect of the Republic of Panama

Panama

LBJ:State; cjf

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *ju/rq*, NARA, Date 11-13-96

Swap
29

FOR THE PRESIDENT

August 19, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW

Info Tom Johnson

Herewith an alternative to the passage that now begins "This is a time for clarity" and ends "let them say so plainly."

New Passage:

(begin quote)

1) This is a time when Americans have to face certain hard questions and keep certain facts clearly before them.

First, are we Americans prepared to say to Hanoi that we are ready to have their men and supplies pour against the DMZ against our men and our allies without obstruction, whether or not Hanoi takes action to de-escalate the conflict? That is what is involved in an immediate halt to all bombing of North Vietnam.

Second, are we Americans ready to let the Communist forces assemble without interference around Saigon, Danang, Hue, and other cities and deliver their attacks at times and places of their choice? That is what is involved in giving up search-and-destroy operations.

Third, let us all remember that it is a long-established policy of the Government of the United States and the Government of Viet Nam that the political future of that country be decided by free elections based on the principle of one-man-one-vote. It is the Communists who have refused to discuss elections. It is the Communists who ~~have refused to~~ seek a solution by bullet rather than by ballot.

ALT
Fourth, let us all remember that ^{with} the encouragement of the American people

these gallant people have created their Constitution and created their Government by:

- voting freely;
- often at the risk of their lives;
- in elections as closely observed as any in modern times;
- in which 60 percent of the total electorate participated.

act

The people of South Vietnam and their Government have demonstrated -- in action -- a willingness and an ability to let the people speak -- peacefully -- by democratic means. It is not they, but the other side, who must be persuaded that this is the road to peace in Vietnam. " ~~End quote.~~

Herewith a proposed peroration:

"In our great democracy -- from the American Revolution to the war in Vietnam -- struggles on the battlefield have been accompanied by contention and debate at home.

peroration

But always our nation has produced men like yourselves -- men ready to do their duty -- in your case, ready to go abroad and fight for their nation and for the cause of freedom.

You Veterans of Foreign Wars did your job -- in your time -- in far away places; and you brought home your nation's flag in honor -- unstained. Now your buddies in Vietnam ~~are~~ are doing the same. In time -- and I pray that time will be short -- they will join you. The debates will pass. They -- and the American people -- will look back on what we have done with the same pride we feel in our other efforts in the cause of freedom.

And we all shall know that those who do not come back will

not have died in vain.

Every day I read ~~the~~ reports of the courage of Americans in battle in Vietnam. Every day I read ~~the~~ reports of our civil efforts to help the South Vietnamese build a nation -- expand education -- plant new rice seeds -- strengthen their constitutional government.

Behind these military and civil efforts are as fine a generation of young Americans as we have ever produced.

And so I am of good heart. Let no one tell you that patriotism is dead in our land. ^u ~~End quote.~~

###

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 19, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith Ben Read's brief report of a classified telephone call from Cy Vance at about 7:00 p.m. our time after his private session with the North Vietnamese.

No give.

"Vance called at about 7:00 p.m. He reported 'no give at all' in a 2-1/2 hour discussion. They refused to give an answer to what they would do if we stopped the bombing and gave only the most marginal sort of hints about which aspects of phase 2 they found more or less interesting. Over-all posture of unwillingness to explore things fully until we stop bombing. Hardnosed. No threats, no references to actions on the ground."

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-334
By ics, NARA Date 8-20-98

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EEA231
OO WTE10 WTE15
DE WTE 3296

1968 AUG 19 16 22

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO TOM JOHNSON
CITE WH82076

Free file

UNCLAS

AUGUST 19, 1968

HEREWITH AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE PASSAGE THAT NOW BEGINS
"THIS IS A TIME FOR CLARITY" AND ENDS "LET THEM SAY SO
PLAINLY."

NEW PASSAGE:

"THIS IS A TIME WHEN AMERICANS HAVE TO FACE CERTAIN
HARD QUESTIONS AND KEEP CERTAIN FACTS CLEARLY BEFORE THEM.

FIRST, ARE WE AMERICANS PREPARED TO SAY TO HANOI THAT
WE ARE READY TO HAVE THEIR MEN AND SUPPLIES POUR
AGAINST THE DMZ AGAINST OUR MEN AND OUR ALLIES WITHOUT
OBSTRUCTION, WHETHER OR NOT HANOI TAKES ACTION TO DE-
ESCALATE THE CONFLICT? THAT IS WHAT IS INVOLVED IN AN
IMMEDIATE HALT TO ALL BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM.

SECOND, ARE WE AMERICANS READY TO LET THE COMMUNIST
FORCES ASSEMBLE WITHOUT INTERFERENCE AROUND SAIGON,
DANANG, HUE, AND OTHER CITIES AND DELIVER THEIR ATTACKS
AT TIMES AND PLACES OF THEIR CHOICE? THAT IS WHAT IS
INVOLVED IN GIVING UP SEARCH-AND-DESTROY OPERATIONS.

THIRD, LET US ALL REMEMBER THAT IT IS A LONG-
ESTABLISHED POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIET NAM THAT THE POLITICAL FUTURE
OF THAT COUNTRY BE DECIDED BY FREE ELECTIONS BASED ON
THE PRINCIPLE OF ONE-MAN-ONE-VOTE. IT IS THE COMMUNISTS
WHO HAVE REFUSED TO DISCUSS ELECTIONS. IT IS THE
COMMUNISTS WHO SEEK A SOLUTION BY BULLET RATHER THAN BY
BALLOT.

FOURTH, LET US ALL REMEMBER THAT WITH THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THESE GALLANT PEOPLE HAVE CREATED THEIR CONSTITUTION AND CREATED THEIR GOVERNMENT BY:

- VOTING FREELY;
- OFTEN AT THE RISK OF THEIR LIVES;
- IN ELECTIONS AS CLOSELY OBSERVED AS ANY IN MODERN TIMES;
- IN WHICH 68 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL ELECTORATE PARTICIPATED.

THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND THEIR GOVERNMENT HAVE DEMONSTRATED -- IN ACTION -- A WILLINGNESS AND AN ABILITY TO LET THE PEOPLE SPEAK -- PEACEFULLY -- BY DEMOCRATIC MEANS. IT IS NOT THEY, BUT THE OTHER SIDE, WHO MUST BE PERSUADED THAT THIS IS THE ROAD TO PEACE IN VIETNAM."

HEREWITH PROPOSED PERORATION:

"IN OUR GREAT DEMOCRACY -- FROM THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO THE WAR IN VIETNAM -- STRUGGLES ON THE BATTLEFIELD HAVE BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY CONTENTION AND DEBATE AT HOME.

BUT ALWAYS OUR NATION HAS PRODUCED MEN LIKE YOURSELVES -- MEN READY TO DO THEIR DUTY -- IN YOUR CASE, READY TO GO ABROAD AND FIGHT FOR THEIR NATION AND FOR THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM.

YOU VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS DID YOUR JOB -- IN YOUR TIME -- IN FAR AWAY PLACES; AND YOU BROUGHT HOME YOUR NATION'S FLAG IN HONOR -- UNSTAINED. NOW YOUR BUDDIES IN VIETNAM ARE DOING THE SAME. IN TIME -- AND I PRAY THAT TIME WILL BE SHORT -- THEY WILL JOIN YOU. THE DEBATES WILL PASS. THEY -- AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE -- WILL LOOK BACK ON WHAT WE HAVE DONE WITH THE SAME PRIDE WE FEEL IN OUR OTHER EFFORTS IN THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM.

AND WE ALL SHALL KNOW THAT THOSE WHO DO NOT COME BACK WILL NOT HAVE DIED IN VAIN.

EVERY DAY I READ REPORTS OF THE COURAGE OF AMERICANS IN BATTLE IN VIETNAM. EVERY DAY I READ REPORTS OF OUR CIVIL EFFORTS TO HELP THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE BUILD A NATION -- EXPAND EDUCATION -- PLANT NEW RICE SEEDS -- STRENGTHEN THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.

BEHIND THESE MILITARY AND CIVIL EFFORTS ARE AS FINE A GENERATION OF YOUNG AMERICANS AS WE HAVE EVER PRODUCED.

AND SO I AM OF GOOD HEART. LET NO ONE TELL YOU THAT PATRIOTISM IS DEAD IN OUR LAND."

DTG: 191534Z AUG 1968

(1.0x'd to my Clifford)

Ches file
32

FOR THE PRESIDENT

August 19, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW

Herewith an alternative to the passage that now begins "This is a time for clarity" and ends "let them say so plainly."

New Passage:

(begin quote)

1) This is a time when Americans have to face certain hard questions and keep certain facts clearly before them.

First, are we Americans prepared to say to Hanoi that we are ready to have their men and supplies pour against the DMZ against our men and our allies without obstruction, whether or not Hanoi takes action to de-escalate the conflict? That is what is involved in an immediate halt to all bombing of North Vietnam.

Second, are we Americans ready to let the Communist forces assemble without interference around Saigon, Danang, Hue, and other cities and deliver their attacks at times and places of their choice? That is what is involved in giving up search-and-destroy operations.

Third, let us all remember that it is a long-established policy of the Government of the United States and the Government of Viet Nam that the political future of that country be decided by free elections based on the principle of one-man-one-vote. It is the Communists who have refused to discuss elections. It is the Communists who ~~have refused to~~ seek a solution by bullet rather than by ballot.

Fourth,
Let us all remember that *with* the encouragement of the American people

these gallant people have created their Constitution and created their Government by:

- voting freely;
- often at the risk of their lives;
- in elections as closely observed as any in modern times;
- in which 60 percent of the total electorate participated.

Vietnamese

Candidates who received 56% of the popular vote in their presidential elections.

In that government - or closely associated with it in the Senate - are

The people of South Vietnam and their Government have demonstrated

-- in action -- a willingness and an ability to let the people speak -- peacefully -- by democratic means. It is not they, but the other side, who must be persuaded that this is the road to peace in Vietnam. " End quote.

Herewith a proposed peroration:

"In our great democracy -- from the American Revolution to the war in Vietnam -- struggles on the battlefield have been accompanied by contention and debate at home.

But always our nation has produced men like yourselves -- men ready to do their duty -- in your case, ready to go abroad and fight for their nation and for the cause of freedom.

You Veterans of Foreign Wars did your job -- in your time -- in far away places; and you brought home your nation's flag in honor -- unstained. Now your buddies in Vietnam ~~are~~ are doing the same. In time -- and I pray that time will be short -- they will join you. The debates will pass. They -- and the American people -- will look back on what we have done with the same pride we feel in our other efforts in the cause of freedom.

And we all shall know that those who do not come back will

not have died in vain.

Every day I read ~~the~~ reports of the courage of Americans in battle in Vietnam. Every day I read ~~the~~ reports of our civil efforts to help the South Vietnamese build a nation -- expand education -- plant new rice seeds -- strengthen their constitutional government.

Behind these military and civil efforts are as fine a generation of young Americans as we have ever produced.

And so I am of good heart. Let no one tell you that patriotism is dead in our land. End quote.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

1968 AUG 19 13 24

55A229
00 WTE10
DE WTE 3288

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82073

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

THIS CIA WASHINGTON-SAIGON TELECON IS THE BEST WRAP-UP THIS MORNING; QUIET BUT THE ENEMY IS IN A VERY ADVANCED STATE OF READINESS FOR A COUNTRY-WIDE JUMP-OFF.

ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY DROPPED ALMOST TO ZERO LAST NIGHT (18/19 AUGUST SAIGON TIME), SUGGESTING THAT SUNDAY MORNING'S ACTION WAS ONE-SHOT HARASSMENT. MORE OF THIS KIND OF THING MAY OCCUR BEFORE THE MAIN EVENT FOR WHICH WE DO NOT HAVE A FIRM DATE. SINCE MANY REPORTS HAVE MENTIONED THE DATE OF AUGUST 20 FOR PREPARATIONS TO BE COMPLETED, ATTACKS AGAINST MAJOR CITIES COULD COME ANY TIME AFTER THAT DATE. MEANWHILE, THE ENEMY IS REACHING A HIGH STATE OF READINESS. ONLY ADDITIONAL ACTION REPORTED THIS MORNING'S INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING IN I CORPS WAS 18 AUGUST MORTAR ATTACK ON US MARINES 4 MILES EAST OF PHU LOC (THUA THIEN PROV.). II CORPS WAS NEGATIVE.

IN III CORPS ABOUT MIDNIGHT PHU KHUONG DISTRICT OF TAY BINH CITY RECEIVED 100 ROUNDS OF MORTAR. UPDATE OF RESULT OF ATTACKS IN NORTHERN III CORPS SUNDAY MORNING SHOWS CASUALTIES WERE LIGHT. A TOTAL OF ONLY 12 FRIENDLY KILLED AND 133 WOUNDED WHILE THE ENEMY LOST AT LEAST 242 KIA.

NO VC INCIDENTS OR ACTIVITY HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN SAIGON AS OF THIS TELECON. CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT MONDAY AM BRIEFING REPORTED ONLY SOME MINOR CONTACTS IN LONG AN PROVINCE. NO SIGNIFICANT VC INITIATED ACTION REPORTED IN CMD. YESTERDAY (SUNDAY), HOWEVER, CACHE OF 16 137MM ROCKETS, ASSEMBLED AND IN PLACE NO MORE THAN A WEEK, WERE FOUND IN BOXES ON NORTHWEST EDGE OF GIA DINH PROVINCE BOUNDARY INDICATING ENEMY CONTINUES ATTEMPTS TO POSITION WEAPONS FOR SHELLING CAPITAL AREA. CMD ON DULL ALERT. STATION HAS CHECKED OUT CONTINGENCY PLANS AND OPERATIONS.

IN IV CORPS, ONLY ACTION REPORTED WAS A RIVERINE FORCE CONTACT IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE YESTERDAY WHICH HAD LIGHT CASUALTIES.

Presidential library review for NSC equities required

SANITIZED
Authority PLS 141-022-014/4
By J, NARA, Date 11/3/09

33
180 AUG 19 AM 9:30
MONDAY
Pres file

25X1D

25X1D

25X1D

25X1D

ON 17 AUGUST, IN GO CONG, A DOCUMENT FOUND ON THE BODY OF A VC DIRECTED HIM TO VISIT THE DISTRICTS AND INFORM THEM THAT THE THIRD OFFENSIVE WILL LAST FROM 28-30 AUGUST.

ADDITIONAL CHIEF OF STATION SAIGON COMMENTS MADE IN SAME TELECON:

1. SAPPER ACTIVITY NEGATIVE IN GIA DINH AND SAIGON. NO INFILTRATION OF SAPPERS INTO SAIGON REPORTED DURING LAST 24 HOURS.

2. WASHINGTON QUERY: DO YOU CONSIDER TAY NINH ATTACKS DIVERSIONARY OR POSSIBLY INTENDED TO SCREEN MOVEMENT OF TROOPS INTO SAIGON AREA?

SAIGON ANSWER: SINCE ENEMY FORCES STRUCTURE PERMITS OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST PROVINCES AND AGAINST SAIGON, IT NOT CLEAR EXTENT TO WHICH TAY NINH ACTION PRIMARILY DIVERSIONARY. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF "SCREENING" IN ACTIONS WE HAVE SO FAR SEEN IN NORTHERN III CTZ PROVINCES. REPORTS IN PAST HAVE INDICATED ATTACKS WOULD BE MADE AGAINST OUTLAYING PROVINCES IN EFFORT TO WEAKEN DEFENSES AROUND SAIGON.

3. WASHINGTON QUERY: WHAT IS YOUR OVERALL ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY'S NEAR TERM INTENTIONS?

SAIGON ANSWERS: IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL WHAT WILL HAPPEN. WE ARE NOT SURE THAT POLITICAL DECISION HAS BEEN MADE BY HANOI AS TO INTENSITY AND NATURE OF ATTACKS. WE ASSUME WE WILL SEE MORE OF THE SAME TYPE OF HARRASSMENT ATTACKS BEFORE LARGE SCALE ATTACKS AGAINST MAJOR CITIES WOULD OCCUR. WE HAVE A FEW REPORTS SUGGESTING THAT THE MAIN EVENT WILL NOT OCCUR UNTIL EARLY SEPTEMBER, BUT THE POSTURE OF ENEMY FORCES SUGGESTS IT WILL PROBABLY COME SOONER.

DTG: 191215Z AUG 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MONDAY
180 AUG 19 PM 12:17

08 19 68

EA230
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3295

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82075

from file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEREWITH THREE INDEPENDENT DELTA REPORTS THAT THE IV CORPS KICK-OFF IS AT 2:45 P.M. THIS AFTERNOON, OUR TIME - AS THE CIA NOTES THIS IS EITHER BAD SECURITY OR WELL-COORDINATED DECEPTION TACTICS.

1. AS OF 2000 HOURS 19 AUGUST THE VC HAVE NOT INITIATED ANY MAJOR ATTACKS IN IV CORPS.
2. A VC PRISONER CAPTURED IN KIEN PHONG PROVINCE THE MORNING OF 19 AUGUST STATED THAT THERE WILL BE AN ATTACK ON CAO LANK CITY, CAPITAL OF KIEN PHONG, BEGINNING 0245 HOURS 20 AUGUST.
3. THE 9TH ARVN DIVISION REPORTED ON THE AFTERNOON OF 19 AUGUST TO IV CORPS HEADQUARTERS THAT A "B-2 SOURCE" CLAIMED THE VC THIRD OFFENSIVE WILL BEGIN 0245 HOURS 20 AUGUST.
4. AN AMERICAN OBSERVER IN CA MAU, CAPITAL OF AN XUYEN PROVINCE, REPORTED AT 1930 HOURS 19 AUGUST THAT HE HAS INFORMATION INDICATING CA MAU WILL BE ATTACKED AT 0245 HOURS 20 AUGUST.
5. WHILE THERE ARE MANY INDICATIONS THAT A VC ATTACK IS IMMINENT, THE SHEER COINCIDENCE OF VARYING SOURCES FROM THREE DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE DELTA REPORTING 0245 HOURS 20 AUGUST AS THE TIME FOR AN ATTACK INDICATES EITHER UNUSUALLY POOR SECURITY ON THE PART OF THE VC OR WELL COORDINATED DECEPTION TACTICS.

DTG: 191517Z AUG 1968

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NJ 019 038-3-4
By Q NARA, Date 1/20/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

EEA232
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3294

1968 AUG 19 16 24

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-337
By us, NARA Date 9-28-98

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82074

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

Pres file

AUGUST 19, 1968

HEREWITH MCCAIN AT CINCPAC EXPRESSES A FEAR THAT, HAVING PREPARED FOR THE THIRD WAVE OFFENSIVE, THE ENEMY WILL NOT JUMP OFF--AND SIMPLY LET THE PRESSURE MOUNT ON US TO UNDERTAKE AN UNREQUITED TOTAL BOMBING CESSATION.

1. THERE ARE NUMEROUS INDICATORS THAT THE ENEMY HAS RECONSTITUTED HIS FORCES AND IMPROVED HIS LOGISTICS CASE TO THE POINT THAT HE CAN LAUNCH A THIRD OFFENSIVE AT ANY TIME. IN FACT, ACTIONS DESCRIBED EARLIER COULD INDICATE THAT HE MAY HAVE ELECTED TO RESUME THE OFFENSIVE. IF SO HE WILL BE CONFRONTED BY A FORCE WHOSE DETERMINATION AND COMBAT CAPABILITY SURPASS ANYTHING HE HAS HERETOFORE ENCOUNTERED.
2. I AM CONFIDENT THAT IF THE THIRD OFFENSIVE HAS BEEN LAUNCHED IT CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY CONTAINED AND THE ENEMY DECISIVELY DEFEATED. FURTHER, AN ALL-OUT ATTACK BY THE NVA/VC PLAYS RIGHT INTO OUR HAND, NOT ONLY BY ALLOWING US TO ENGAGE AND CHOP UP HIS MAJOR UNITS, BUT BY MAKING IT EASIER, BOTH POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY, TO REMOVE THE RESTRAINTS WHICH HAVE MILITATED AGAINST APPLICATION OF FULL MILITARY PRESSURES AGAINST THE NORTH.
3. THE COMMUNISTS ARE EQUALLY AWARE OF THE FOREGOING, WHICH RAISES THE QUESTION OF WHAT DO WE DO IF THEY ELECT NOT TO PURSUE THE THIRD OFFENSIVE. IF HE CONTINUES TO LIMIT HIS ACTIVITIES TO SMALL SCALE ATTACKS FOR LIMITED OBJECTIVES, THERE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE INCREASING PRESSURES FOR A CESSATION OF BOMBING THROUGHOUT NVN. SHOULD WE DO SO WITHOUT ANY AGREEMENT ON THE PART OF NVN TO RECIPROCATE, WE WOULD HAVE GIVEN UP OUR MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF APPLYING NECESSARY PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY.

4. ONE OF THE THINGS WE LEARNED IN THE KOREAN NEGOTIATIONS WAS THAT THE COMMUNISTS REGARD ANY CONCESSION AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS. THE U.S. HAS PUBLICIZED THE CONDITIONS WITH WHICH THE NVA/VC MUST COMPLY BEFORE WE WILL FURTHER LIMIT THE BOMBING OF NVN. TO BACK OFF THIS POSITION SIMPLY BECAUSE THE ENEMY GAVE THE APPEARANCE OF DEESCALATING THE WAR WOULD, IN MY OPINION, GIVE HANOI A TREMENDOUS PROPAGANDA VICTORY. OUR ALLIES WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY CONSIDER THE U.S. IRRESOLUTE IN ITS DETERMINATION TO FORCE HANOI TO STOP SUPPORTING THE INSURGENCY.

5. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT HAVING ARRIVED AT THE MILITARY POSTURE NOW ATTAINED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE THEY ARE IN A POSITION TO TAKE ONE OF SEVERAL ALTERNATE COURSES OF ACTION DESCRIBED IN PREVIOUS MESSAGES. THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE POSSIBILITIES RESTS MORE IN THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS THAN IN MILITARY FACTORS. IF THE ENEMY CONTINUES TO LIMIT HIS ACTIVITIES TO ABOUT THE CURRENT LEVEL, THERE WILL BE TREMENDOUS PRESSURES EXERTED TO FURTHER LIMIT OUR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS BY SOME WHO WOULD JUMP AT ANY OPPORTUNITY TO END THE WAR. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WHAT IS NEEDED TO COUNTER THOSE PRESSURES IS A CONTINUING EFFORT AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO EDUCATE THE U.S. PUBLIC ON THE COMMUNIST USE OF NEGOTIATIONS TO GAIN OBJECTIVES WHICH THEY CANNOT ACHIEVE ON THE BATTLEFIELD. I WILL PROVIDE SUGGESTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT ON A CONTINUING BASIS. ABOVE ALL, THERE IS THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES TO CONTINUE FULL MILITARY PRESSURES UNTIL NVN AGREES TO RECIPROCAL ACTION IN RETURN FOR A LESSENING OF OUR PRESSURES.

6. IN SUMMATION, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE ARRIVED AT A MILITARY POSTURE FROM WHICH THEY ARE IN A POSITION TO EMBARK ON SEVERAL COURSES OF ACTION. THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE POSSIBLE COURSES RESTS MORE IN THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS RATHER THAN IN THE MILITARY.

DTG: 191510Z AUG 68

~~TOP SECRET~~

August 18, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

The draft which follows incorporates the particular changes suggested by Horace Busby and by Secretary Rusk.

Sec. Rusk and I believe the new final section would strengthen the speech. Horace Busby has not seen it.

Busby had only minor reservations on the draft ~~as~~ a draft ~~but~~ substantial questions about the wisdom of the President's making any such speech at this time. I told him that it would be better for him to convey his views directly to the Ranch rather than through me. He did this through Larry Temple.

Sec. Rusk and I ~~xxxx~~ discussed Busby's views. Neither of us feels that we have the knowledge or competence to render advice on the political situation within the Platform Committee or the Democratic convention.

With respect to his Tuesday press conference, the Secretary will cheerfully do what you think is wise. He will lay out our position firmly. He does have some concern that the Platform Committee might regard his press conference statements as an intervention in their business. He feels that the Vice President may regard him as something of an albatross around his neck. On the other hand, he will, of course, follow whatever guidance you give him. He may want to chat with you late tomorrow morning about the press conference on Tuesday.

Revised full text follows.

for 11 app. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear]

36a

-19-

~~DRAFT -- August 18, 1968~~

I want to say a few words to you about Vietnam.

We are in the midst of a national political campaign. It is ~~understandable~~

~~at this time proper~~
at this time proper

that there should be a great deal of discussion and speculation about a war in which a half million Americans are engaged.

But these things are clear:

-- Those half million American men are not out in Southeast Asia

as Republicans or Democrats. They are out there as Americans fighting to

protect the ^{vital} interests of this nation, as those interests have been determined by more than one President and more than one Congress.

-- Until January 20, 1969, ^I ~~we~~ bear the responsibility of the

Presidency; ~~and there is only one national policy -- the policy of this Administration~~
~~of the policy of this nation towards Vietnam~~
and of the policy of this nation towards Vietnam

~~Administration~~
a policy fashioned over many years on a bipartisan basis.

The interests of the Nation and the interests of peace are not advanced

by ambiguity ^{about} concerning that policy.

Therefore, I want to lay out a few fundamentals for you tonight.

* * *

X First, our objective in Southeast Asia is peace, and the essentials of what we mean by peace have, for long, been clear. To repeat them briefly:

-- Reinstall the demilitarized zone at the 17th parallel, as the Geneva Accords of 1954 require, and let the matter of Vietnamese unity be decided in peace by the people of North Vietnam and the people of South Vietnam in the future;

~~Remove all~~ ~~from~~ ~~from~~
-- ~~Remove all~~ foreign forces ~~out of~~ Laos and reinstall and make

~~Remove all~~
effective the Geneva Accords of 1962 on Laos;

-- Withdraw U. S. forces from South Vietnam under the

X circumstances described in the Manila communique;

Encourage
~~Encourage~~

-- ~~Let~~ the people of South Vietnam exercise their rights of

self-determination. ~~Let~~ them ~~decide~~ to decide in peace without coercion of any kind --

their own political future on a one-man one-vote basis -- in the spirit of

reconciliation reaffirmed by President Thieu at Honolulu. He said all can

vote in Vietnam, all can run for office if they foresake violence and live by the Constitution. We agree.

That is what I mean by an honorable peace. I doubt that any American President will take a substantially different view when he bears the burdens of office and has available to him all the information that flows to the

President, *and is responsible to our people for all the consequences of the alternatives before him.*

*(The United States) ****
Second, ~~we~~ took a major initiative towards peace on March 31. We

not only made an offer, but we acted. We took a first ^{dramatic} step to de-escalate

the conflict. I ordered our aircraft and our naval vessels to make no attacks

on North Vietnam north of the 20th parallel. This excluded from bombing

almost 90 percent of the North Vietnamese population and almost 80 percent

of its territory.

~~We~~ ^I then added these words: "I cannot in good conscience stop all

bombing so long as to do so would immediately and directly endanger the

lives of our men and our allies. Whether a complete bombing halt becomes

possible in the future will be determined by events."

Thus far Hanoi's response has been:

-- To reject every suggestion made by ourselves or others to de-escalate the conflict;

-- To proceed since March 31 with the highest level of infiltration that we have observed during the war in Vietnam; the highest level of southward movement of military supplies; and preparations for the third major wave of attack of 1968.

I do not know whether or when such a new major attack will, in fact, take place. IT may already have begun. But I do know that they have rejected our offer for prompt de-escalation and movement towards peace in favor of massive military preparations for intensified battle.

JK ← The next move must be theirs. In human affairs there is no — and to make a peace. more basic lesson than that it takes two to make a bargain. We have made a reasonable offer and have taken a major first step. That offer has not yet been accepted. This Administration does not intend to move further until it

has reason to believe that the other side intends seriously to join with us

in de-escalating the war and moving seriously towards peace. We are willing

to take chances for peace but ~~not foolhardy gambles.~~ *can not make foolhardy gestures to which our fighting men must pay the price.*

Ask yourselves: Where would the position of this Nation and its allies

be if, having taken a major step towards de-escalation and peace, we responded

now to their hostility with still another unilateral step. If you were in Hanoi,

would you then de-escalate ~~or~~ *and* negotiate? *Or* would you not demand yet another

unilateral step, until the whole foundation ~~of Southeast Asia~~ *of* ~~was~~ *for* freedom

for in the nations of Southeast Asia was gone beyond repair. *?*

This President -- this Administration -- will not move down that

slippery slope.



This is a time for clarity and plain speaking. Let every man say what

he means:

-- Let those who would immediately halt all bombing of North

Vietnam say: I am prepared to have the men and supplies pour across the

DMZ against our men and our allies without obstruction, whether or not

See alt.

Hanoi takes action to de-escalate the conflict.

-- Let those who ^{advocate a} ~~say~~ stop all search-and-destroy operations say:

Let the Communist forces assemble without interference around Saigon, Danang, and Hue and deliver their attacks at times and places of their choice.

-- Let those who advocate self-determination by free elections in South Vietnam remember that this is the long established policy of the government of the United States and of the government of Vietnam. It is the Communists who have refused to discuss elections. It is the Communists who seek a solution by bullet rather than ballot.

-- Let those who would impose a coalition government on the South Vietnamese people against their will -- on the threat of our withdrawal -- remember that these gallant people have created their constitution and created their government by:

-- voting freely,

-- often at the risk of their lives;

See
all

Why...

Why...

- in elections as closely observed as ^(any) in modern times;
- in which 60% of the total electorate participated.

If those who would impose an unwanted coalition on the South Vietnamese

people are searching for ^{a pretext} an excuse for us to throw in our hand and turn Southeast Asia over to the Communists -- let them say so plainly.

* * *

I believe peace will come -- and, if we are steady, it will come on

honorable terms. I do not know when it will come. But I believe it will

come because:

- Military victory is beyond their ^(emph) grasp;
- ^{because} The South Vietnamese are gathering political and military strength and confidence day by day;
- And because I believe in America. However great our anxiety

for peace; however great our concern for the war in Vietnam; however great

our passionate desire that the killing shall stop, the American people are

not going to walk away from this struggle unless they walk away on honorable

terms.

See
alt

When I sent our negotiating team off to Paris I told them two things:

- Put aside all considerations of domestic politics;
- Work for a genuine peace — the peace which is a vital settlement in the interests of the United States, now and ten years from now.

I did not take myself out of politics on March 31st in order to permit our pursuit of peace to be colored in the slightest degree by domestic political considerations. I want peace in Vietnam perhaps more than any single American. But the pursuit of peace in this Administration will be governed wholly by the nation's abiding interests as we see them.

And I have faith -- a faith that strengthened me on March 31st -- that when the political campaign is over -- and another man takes up the responsibility of the Presidency -- he will take a similar view.

And I am sure we are doing all that diplomacy can do to

I shall do everything I possibly can between now and January to bring an honorable peace to Southeast Asia. I hope that it can be possible. But if not, I have faith that the next President -- faced with all the consequences

Send the war through the talks in Paris. And we shall continue.

to our own people and to the peace of the world -- will insist upon an
honorable peace.

* * *

WWR-8/18/68

These are my views on Vietnam, this is my faith.

But let me add a word about why we came to commit ourselves as a nation to the security of Southeast Asia and about Asia itself.

Almost two-thirds of the men, women and children on this planet now live in Asia. In the year 2000 that proportion will be even higher. It is as certain as anything can be in the world of modern technology and communications that the ~~prosperity~~ prosperity and security of the United States will, with the passage of time, be more bound up with the fate of Asia -- not less.

This nation -- not this Administration, but this nation -- has three times in the past thirty years instinctively reacted when one power or another sought by aggression to enlarge its power in Asia: in 1941; in 1950; and then in 1954. ^{the} And ~~then~~ SEATO Treaty went to the Senate. That treaty was accepted by the Senate ^{for one simple reason --} because in their hearts and minds ^{the} members of the Senate knew that this nation could not and would not stand idly by and see the countries of Southeast Asia taken over by aggression. They hoped that the warning represented by that treaty would avoid aggression.

But the men in Hanoi believed they commanded a method of aggression that would succeed in the face of our commitment. ~~By~~ They have been supported by others who felt that Hanoi's success would drive the United States out of Asia and leave it open to take-over.

There is no serious and responsible leader in Asia who does not know that the struggle now taking place in Vietnam is the hinge on which the fate of Asia will swing -- one way or the other -- for many years, far into the future.

When we insist on an honorable peace in Vietnam, we are insisting on a solution to the struggle which has the promise of permitting the independent nations of Asia to go forward in confidence: to build, in freedom, a life consistent with their own traditions and their own ambitions. We are talking now not about the seventeen million people of South Vietnam but about nations which contain hundreds of millions of people.

There are some among us who appear to be searching for a formula which would somehow get us out of Vietnam and Asia, leaving the people of South Vietnam and Laos and Thailand -- and all the others -- to an uncertain fate.

I profoundly believe this course to be disastrous to our nation and for the world -- now and in the years to come.

On the other hand, I am equally confident that if we see this through in Vietnam to an honorable peace, the way will be open for ~~sub~~ better times:--

-- For a period of relative tranquility in which the forces of moderation, of national independence, freedom and regional cooperation will assert themselves in Asia as they are in other parts of the world;

-- Permitting the United States not to return to isolation but to work as a partner with a vital region of the world which will more and more assume responsibility for its own destiny.

This is the ultimate stake in Vietnam -- for Americans, Asians, and the world.

This is why three Presidents have taken and held the position they have taken.

This is why the American people will hold steady and see it through.

August 18, 1968

*sent Rusk
via wire
WH 82066*

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

Sec. Rusk and Horace Busby are now considering the draft you have plus the following insert after the phrase: "will not move down that slippery slope," Insert: "This is a time for clarity and plain speaking. Let every man say what he means:

"-- Let those who would immediately halt all bombing of North Vietnam say: I am prepared to have the men and supplies pour across the DMZ against our men and our allies without obstruction, whether or not Hanoi takes action to de-escalate the conflict.

"-- Let those who advocate a stop to all search-and-destroy operations say: Let the Communist forces assemble without interference around Saigon, Danang, and Hue and deliver their attacks at times and places of their choice.

"-- Let those who advocate self-determination by free elections in South Vietnam remember that this is the long established policy of the government of the United States and of the government of Vietnam. It is the Communists who have refused to discuss elections. It is the Communists who seek a solution by bullet rather than ballot.

"-- Let those who would impose a coalition government on the South Vietnamese people against their will -- on the threat of our withdrawal -- remember that these gallant people have created their constitution and created their government by:

"--voting freely;

"--often at the risk of their lives;

"--in elections as closely observed as any in modern times;

"--in which 60% of the total electorate participated.

"If those who would impose an unwanted coalition on the South Vietnamese people are searching for an excuse for us to throw in our hand and turn Southeast Asia over to the Communists -- let them say so plainly."

Sec. Rusk will be coming to my office to discuss this draft at 8:30 p. m. our time. I shall be getting Busby's reflections by telephone since he is not free to leave his house with his wife ill.

We shall be grateful for any guidance that you have to ^a ^{additional} elements that might be introduced.

~~SECRET~~

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DE WTE 3272

FROM VALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP82053

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *J*, NARA, Date 3-4-03

~~SECRET~~

AUGUST 18, 1968

IT IS POSSIBLE YOU MAY WISH TO READ THESE NOTES OF MANSFIELD'S BRIEFING IN MOSCOW, TO GET HIS (RATHER PREDICTABLE) LINE OF QUESTIONING. BUT NOT REQUIRED READING.

NOTES ON THE BRIEFING OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD BY MINISTER EMORY C. SWANK (AUGUST 7, 1968)

Sample file

VIETNAM

THE MINISTER SAID THAT, ACCORDING TO WASHINGTON'S ESTIMATES, THE USSR SUPPLIED IN 1967 SOME 715 MILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF AID TO HANOI, OF WHICH 515 WAS MILITARY AID. WHILE THIS AID PROVIDES THE SOVIET UNION WITH SOME LEVERAGE IN DEALING WITH HANOI, IT IS OUR OPINION THAT THE LEVERAGE IS STILL VERY LIMITED. FURTHERMORE, THE SOVIETS ARE MOST RELUCTANT TO USE IT BECAUSE OF THEIR COMPETITION WITH THE CHINESE FOR INFLUENCE IN NORTH VIETNAM AND ALSO BECAUSE IT IS POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO TURN THEIR BACK ON A SOCIALIST COUNTRY UNDER FIRE.

HANOI IS APPARENTLY WALKING A VERY TIGHT ROPE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA, SEEKING TO AVOID OFFENDING EITHER OF THEM. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT HANOI MAKES ITS OWN DECISIONS. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT HANOI CONSULTED WITH EITHER PEKING OR MOSCOW BEFORE RESPONDING TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECH OF MARCH 31. APPARENTLY THESE GOVERNMENTS WERE MERELY INFORMED OF HANOI'S DECISION TO START TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES. AN INDICATION OF SOVIET UNCERTAINTY AS TO HOW HANOI WOULD RESPOND WAS THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET PRESS FAILED TO REACT TO THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH IMMEDIATELY, AND WHEN IT DID REACT IT MERELY FOLLOWED HANOI'S LEAD. IT EVEN SEEMS THAT THE SOVIETS WERE SURPRISED BY HANOI'S RESPONSE. AS TO SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, THESE ARE PRESENTLY AS COLD AS EVER.

THE MINISTER CONTINUED THAT IN AMBASSADOR THOMPSON'S VIEW, WE COULD NOT EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION TO PRESS HANOI REGARDING THE PARIS TALKS. THE AMBASSADOR FELT, HOWEVER, THAT IF THE US SHOULD EVENTUALLY DECIDE TO STOP ALL BOMBINGS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM, THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE WILLING TO USE SOME OF ITS LEVERAGE TO INFLUENCE HANOI TO "DE-ESCALATE" THE WAR. SENATOR MANSFIELD EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH THIS POINT OF VIEW.

THE MINISTER SAID THAT IT WAS THE EMBASSY'S VIEW THAT THE SOVIETS FEEL THAT THEY WOULD GAIN MORE FROM A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN VIETNAM THAN FROM THEIR CONTINUATION. ALTHOUGH THE POINT COULD BE MADE THAT THE SOVIETS DERIVE ADVANTAGES FROM THE DEEP MILITARY INVOLVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM AND FROM THE RESULTING POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND DIVERSION OF RESOURCES, IT IS THE EMBASSY'S VIEW THAT ON BALANCE THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE HOSTILITIES STOPPED. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY FEAR THAT A CONTINUATION OF THE WAR MIGHT RESULT IN A CONFRONTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THEY ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE HIGH COST OF THEIR AID TO NORTH VIETNAM. PUBLICLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE WELCOMED THE PARIS TALKS AND WE HAVE SEEN NO SIGN THAT THEY WOULD WANT THEM DISCONTINUED.

AS REGARDS SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, IT APPEARS THAT AT MINIMUM THEY ARE CONTAINMENT OF CHINA AND NEUTRALIZATION OF US INTERESTS IN THE AREA. THUS, THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE WILLING TO ACCEPT A NEUTRAL SOUTHEAST ASIA. OF COURSE, THEY WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO TURN SOUTHEAST ASIA INTO A SOVIET PRESERVE, BUT THEY PROBABLY REALIZE THAT THIS MAXIMUM OBJECTIVE IS NOT REALISTIC.

TURNING TO SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON VIETNAM, THE MINISTER NOTED THAT WHILE IT HAS BEEN VERY ACTIVE, IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT IT HAS NOT BEEN VERY EFFECTIVE ON THE SOVIET POPULATION. IN FACT, THE VIETNAM ISSUE SEEMS TO HAVE AFFECTED THE SOVIET POPULATION MUCH LESS THAN THE POPULATION IN SOME WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. DESPITE A DAILY STREAM OF NASTY ANTI-US PROPAGANDA IN SOVIET MEDIA, THE AVERAGE SOVIET'S VIEWS REGARDING THE UNITED STATES HAVE NOT CHANGED APPRECIABLY. PART OF THE REASON MAY BE THE FACT THAT VIETNAM IS A REMOTE AREA AND OF LITTLE CONCERN TO THE MAN IN THE STREET. EMBASSY OFFICERS TRAVELLING AROUND THE COUNTRY HAVE BEEN QUESTIONED AS TO WHY THE UNITED STATES IS IN VIETNAM AND WHAT ITS INTERESTS ARE IN PURSUING THE WAR, BUT THEY HAVE NOT ENCOUNTERED THE EMOTIONAL INDIGNATION THAT MIGHT BE EXPECTED IN LIGHT OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA ALLEGING US AGGRESSION, ATROCITIES, ETC.

THE MINISTER FELT THAT SHOULD SENATOR MANSFIELD SEE PREMIER KOSYGIN, THE LATTER WOULD PROBABLY AGAIN STRONGLY STRESS THE NEED FOR A COMPLETE CESSATION OF BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM. KOSYGIN WOULD PROBABLY NOT COMMIT HIMSELF AS TO WHAT WOULD HAPPEN SHOULD OUR BOMBING CEASE, BUT HE WOULD PROBABLY INDICATE THAT SUCH ACTION ON OUR PART WOULD PRODUCE POSITIVE RESULTS.

WARSAW PACT/NATO

SENATOR MANSFIELD INQUIRED ABOUT THE CURRENT SOVIET TROOP LEVELS IN EASTERN EUROPE. ACCORDING TO ESTIMATES AVAILABLE TO THE EMBASSY'S DEFENSE ATTACHE, THESE LEVELS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

GROUND FORCES

EAST GERMANY - 250,000 TO 350,000
HUNGARY - 50,000
POLAND - 25,000

THESE FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO AIR DEFENSE FORCES, COMMAND AND GENERAL SUPPORT, OR MILITARIZED SECURITY FORCES. IN ADDITION TO THE GROUND FORCES, ACCORDING TO THE ESTIMATES AVAILABLE TO THE EMBASSY, THE SOVIETS NOW HAVE THE FOLLOWING NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT, MOSTLY FIGHTERS AND LIGHT BOMBERS, IN EASTERN EUROPE:

EAST GERMANY - 882
HUNGARY - 260
POLAND - 332

NOTING THE SENATOR'S INTEREST IN THE QUESTION OF MUTUAL TROOP REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE (THE SENATOR INTERJECTED THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS AS WELL), THE MINISTER POINTED OUT THAT THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE RECENT NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING AT ROYKJAVIK REGARDING A POSSIBLE MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTION HAD BEEN REJECTED BY THE SOVIET PRESS, WHICH ALLEGED THAT IT WAS MERELY AN ATTEMPT TO DECEIVE PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE "AGGRESSIVE" INTENTIONS OF NATO. WHILE WE HAVE HAD NO RECENT OFFICIAL REACTION FROM THE SOVIETS ON THIS MATTER, IT APPEARED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT PRESENTLY INTERESTED IN EITHER UNILATERAL OR MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND BECAUSE OF SOVIET FEARS FOR THE STABILITY OF THE REGIMES IN EAST GERMANY AND POLAND. IF THERE WERE PEOPLE IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT FAVORING A REDUCTION OF SOVIET FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE, THE HARDLINERS WERE MORE LIKELY TO PREVAIL FOLLOWING THE CZECH EVENTS. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE MINISTER NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN CONFLICTING REPORTS ON WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIETS HAD SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED PERMISSION TO STATION SOVIET TROOPS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. HE NOTED ALSO THAT THE CZECH DEFENSE MINISTER HAD STATED THAT ALL SOVIET TROOPS WHICH HAD PARTICIPATED IN WARSAW PACT EXERCISE HAD LEFT THE COUNTRY. THIS WORDING COULD SUGGEST THAT SUCH SOVIET TROOPS AS HAD NOT PARTICIPATED IN THE EXERCISE (IF ANY) ARE STILL IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

SENATOR MANSFIELD OBSERVED THAT, CONTRARY TO NATO, THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS HAD REDUCED ITS FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE. IT HAD REMOVED ITS TROOPS FROM ROMANIA AND PRESUMABLY ALSO FROM CZECHOSLOVAKIA. SOVIET FORCE LEVELS IN HUNGARY AND POLAND HAD BEEN REDUCED CONSIDERABLY, WITH THESE IN EAST GERMANY BEING THE ONLY ONES REMAINING CONSTANT. NATURALLY, HE ADDED, BECAUSE OF GEOGRAPHY IT WAS MUCH EASIER FOR THE SOVIETS THAN FOR US TO MAKE TROOP REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

REGARDING THE BRATISLAVA AND CIERNA MEETINGS, THE MINISTER SAID IT WAS THE CONSENSUS AMONG WESTERN DIPLOMATS IN MOSCOW THAT THEY HAD RESULTED IN COMPROMISES BY BOTH THE SOVIETS AND THE CZECHS. AT THE SAME TIME, IT APPEARED THAT THOSE MEETINGS HAD RESULTED IN MORE OF A SOVIET THAN A CZECH RETREAT. WHILE THE WARSAW LETTER CONTAINED SOME VERY SPECIFIC DEMANDS, THE BRATISLAVA DECLARATION WAS FULL OF OLD CLICHES, THE CZECHS WERE NOT MENTIONED, AND LOCAL CONDITIONS WERE ACKNOWLEDGED AS A FACTOR RELEVANT TO THE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

OF WARSAW PACT MEMBERS. THE SOVIET PRESS, IN COMMENTING ON THE TWO MEETINGS, HAD STATED THAT CALM, THOUGHTFUL, AND PATIENT DISCUSSIONS WERE THE STANDARD FOR RELATIONS AMONG COMMUNIST PARTIES AND SOCIALIST STATES. ON THE CZECH SIDE, CONCESSIONS MAY HAVE BEEN MADE CONCERNING THE PRESS, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO ANTI-SOVIET ARTICLES. THE CZECHS MAY ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN VOLUNTARY RESTRAINT FROM THEIR PRESS, BUT WE WONDER IF THIS CAN REALLY WORK. DUBCEK HAD INDICATED THAT NO SOVIET TROOPS WOULD BE STATIONED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND, AS NOTED EARLIER, HIS MINISTER OF DEFENSE HAD ANNOUNCED THE DEPARTURE OF ALL SOVIET TROOPS INVOLVED IN THE WARSAW PACT EXERCISE. HOWEVER, SEVERAL DAYS AGO OUR MILITARY ATTACHES IN PRAGUE SAW A SOVIET MILITARY CONVOY INCLUDING SOME 1,000 TRUCKS MOVING NORTH TO SOUTH IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, PERHAPS FROM POLAND INTO HUNGARY. THUS, WE DO NOT HAVE A CLEAR PICTURE OF WHAT, IF ANY, DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE CONCERNING THE STATIONING OF SOVIET TROOPS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

THE MINISTER SAID THAT THE STATUS OF ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE USSR ALSO REMAINS UNCLEAR. THE BRATISLAVA DECLARATION REAFFIRMED THE URGENCY EXPRESSED AT THE DRESDEN MEETING OF A CEMA SUMMIT CONFERENCE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CEMA AS WELL AS BILATERALLY, MIGHT TRY TO HELP CZECHOSLOVAKIA THROUGH ITS PRESENT ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES IN ORDER TO KEEP THE CZECHS FROM TURNING TO THE WEST FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

SENATOR MANSFIELD ASKED IF THERE WAS AN ECONOMIC CRISIS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AT THIS TIME. THE MINISTER REPLIED THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA APPARENTLY DOES EXPERIENCE SERIOUS ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, STEMMING PRIMARILY FROM INDUSTRIAL OBSOLESCENCE. MR. KALOVSKY NOTED THAT AFTER WORLD WAR II CZECHOSLOVAKIA EMERGED PRACTICALLY UNSCATHED FROM WAR DAMAGE AND PROFITED FROM ITS SPECIAL POSITION, ESPECIALLY WITH ITS EASTERN EUROPEAN NEIGHBORS. HOWEVER, THE CZECH ECONOMY HAD BEEN STAGNATING SINCE, WHILE THAT OF THE OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAD MOVED AHEAD. THUS, CZECHOSLOVAKIA FINDS ITSELF TODAY LAGGING BEHIND THE OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY, OF COURSE, THOSE IN WESTERN EUROPE.

SENATOR MANSFIELD ASKED ABOUT THE PLANNED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES TO BE HELD IN MOSCOW IN NOVEMBER. THE MINISTER REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS EVIDENTLY INTEND TO GO THROUGH WITH THE MEETING, BUT NOTED AMBASSADOR THOMPSON'S FEELING THAT ANY PROSPECTS FOR ITS SUCCESS HAD BEEN BADLY DAMAGED BY CZECH DEVELOPMENTS.

THE MINISTER SAID THAT WHILE WE OF COURSE DO NOT KNOW THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP REGARDING THE CZECH SITUATION, THERE WERE UNDOUBTEDLY VARYING, AND POSSIBLY EVEN STRONGLY DIFFERING, OPINIONS. THE RECENT TALKS WITH THE CZECHS WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL FROM THE SOVIET STANDPOINT. THEREFORE, THERE MIGHT BE REPERCUSSIONS WITHIN THE HIERARCHY, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE YET TO SEE ANY SIGNS OF SUCH A DEVELOPMENT. THE LEADERSHIP IS APPARENTLY UNUSUALLY ANXIOUS TO SHOW UNITY AT THIS TIME. FOR EXAMPLE, THE POLITBURO MET ON AUGUST 6 TO APPROVE FORMALLY THE CIERNA AND BRATISLAVA STATEMENTS EVEN THOUGH THE FORMER MEETING HAD IN FACT BEEN ATTENDED BY ALMOST ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO AND FORMAL APPROVAL WOULD SEEM SUPERFLUOUS.

IT WAS OUR VIEW, THE MINISTER CONTINUED, THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA WOULD REMAIN A CONTINUING PROBLEM FOR THE SOVIETS. HOWEVER, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT MOSCOW HAD DECIDED AGAINST MILITARY INTERVENTION AND THAT REASON HAD PREVAILED. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE ADDED THAT AT THE HEIGHT OF THE CRISIS, AMBASSADOR THOMPSON AND MANY OTHER INFORMED OBSERVERS WERE GENUINELY CONCERNED THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT RESORT TO MILITARY INTERVENTION. SENATOR MANSFIELD OBSERVED THAT AMBASSADOR BOHLEN HAD EXPRESSED A SIMILAR CONCERN IN A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH HIM. THE MINISTER POINTED OUT THAT THE WARSAW LETTER CAME VERY CLOSE TO BEING AN ULTIMATUM AND THAT CONCURRENT TROOP MOVEMENTS COULD HAVE BEEN EITHER A FORM OF PRESSURE ON THE CZECH GOVERNMENT, OR PREPARATIONS FOR INTERVENTION, OR BOTH.

SENATOR MANSFIELD INQUIRED IF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP REALLY BELIEVED THE UNITED STATES HAD A HAND IN CZECH DEVELOPMENTS. THE MINISTER REPLIED THAT, ON BALANCE, THE EMBASSY THOUGHT THE SOVIETS DID NOT BELIEVE THIS. INDEED, SEVERAL SOVIET INDIVIDUALS HAD INTIMATED TO US PRIVATELY THAT THEY REGARDED OUR POSITION AS A CORRECT ONE. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS ARE GENERALLY VERY SUSPICIOUS OF THE WEST GERMANS AND MAY HAVE BELIEVED SOVIET PRESS ACCUSATIONS OF WEST GERMAN INTERFERENCE.

THE MINISTER THEN SAID THAT THE SOVIETS MAY HAVE OVER-REACTED TO THE CZECH SITUATION BECAUSE OF THEIR CONCERN THAT INTERNAL REFORMS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA MIGHT SPREAD TO OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND EVEN TO THE SOVIET UNION. INTELLECTUALLY DISSATISFACTION IS WIDESPREAD IN THE SOVIET UNION, BUT WE DO NOT THINK THAT IT IS ABOUT TO DEVELOP INTO A SERIOUS PROBLEM AFFECTING THE STABILITY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, THE REGIME IS FACED WITH A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS. YOUNG PEOPLE ARE DISINTERESTED IN IDEOLOGY; IF THEY DO NOT REJECT COMMUNIST DOGMA, THEY ARE INDIFFERENT TO IT. FIGURING OUT THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THIS SITUATION IS PRESENTLY ONE OF THE KEY ISSUES FACING THE LEADERSHIP. IN ADDITION, DESPITE ALL THE MISSILES AND SPUTNIKS, A TECHNOLOGICAL GAP EXISTS HERE IN MANY FOLDS, E.G., COMPUTERS. THE ECONOMIC REFORM CURRENTLY UNDER WAY IS NOT REALLY A REFORM BUT RATHER AN "ADJUSTMENT" OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM. THE ADJUSTMENT IS INADEQUATE TO RESOLVE BASIC PROBLEMS. THE MAJOR QUESTION TODAY IS WHETHER THE SOVIET POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS CAN BE ACCOMMODATED TO THE GREAT CHANGES WHICH SEEM NECESSARY WITHOUT A COUNTER REVOLUTION.

MR. VALEO ASKED IF THE SOVIET UNION CLEARLY WANTED TO STATION ITS TROOPS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE MINISTER REPLIED THAT IT PRESUMABLY DID BUT NOTED THAT THE EMBASSY HAS NO FIRM EVIDENCE OF SUCH A SOVIET REQUEST TO THE CZECHS. (THE MINISTER LATER SUGGESTED THIS POINT BE FURTHER CHECKED WHEN THE SENATOR IS IN PRAGUE.) MR. VALEO ALSO INQUIRED WHETHER IN RECENT YEARS THE SOVIET UNION HAD PRESSED US REGARDING US FORCES IN WESTERN EUROPE. THE MINISTER REPLIED THAT WHILE SOVIET PROPAGANDA HAD OF COURSE ATTACKED THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA, THERE HAD BEEN NO REAL PRESSURE FOR OUR WITHDRAWAL. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE MINISTER SPECULATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT REGARD US FORCES IN WEST GERMANY AS A MEANS OF CONTROLLING THE FRG AND THEREFORE MIGHT EVEN WELCOME THEIR CONTINUED PRESENCE THERE.

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1968 AUG 18 13 07

Pres file
68 AUG 18 AM 9:18

SUNDAY

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OO WTE 12 WTE 15
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FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP82056

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

HEREWITH IS A SPECIAL EFFORT BY CIA GIVING A WRAP UP OF THE SITUATION AS OF THIS MORNING. IT IS THE BEST OF ALL AVAILABLE REPORTS.

1. A SERIES OF SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS WERE STAGED BY COMMUNIST FORCES AGAINST SELECTED US AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE INSTALLATIONS AND FIELD POSITIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM'S II AND III CORPS EARLY ON 18 AUGUST.

2. THE BULK OF THESE ATTACKS, WHICH INCLUDED HEAVY SHELLINGS AND GROUND ASSAULTS, OCCURRED IN TAY NINH PROVINCE TO THE NORTHWEST OF SAIGON. OTHER MAJOR COMMUNIST ACTIONS TOOK PLACE IN ADJACENT BINH LONG PROVINCE, WHERE A PRE-DAWN ATTACK BY AN ESTIMATED REGIMENT REPORTEDLY OVERRAN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE COMPOUND AT LOC NINH. TO THE NORTH, IN THE WESTERN HIGHLAND PROVINCE OF KONTUM, THE SPECIAL FORCES CAMP AT DAK SEANG WAS THE TARGET OF A HEAVY ENEMY MORTAR AND GROUND ATTACK.

3. WHILE DETAILS OF THE INDIVIDUAL ATTACKS ARE STILL SKETCHY, IT IS APPARENT THAT A WELL-COORDINATED ENEMY EFFORT IN NORTHERN III CORPS AND KONTUM PROVINCE WAS DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT US AND ALLIED FIELD POSITIONS RATHER THAN AT URBAN AREAS SUCH AS PROVINCIAL CAPITALS AND DISTRICT TOWNS. PRELIMINARY REPORTS FROM THE REMAINING SECTIONS OF THE COUNTRY INDICATE THAT ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY HAS THE POTENTIAL TO MOUNT SIMILIAR ATTACKS ELSEWHERE, NO OTHER SIGNIFICANT ATTACKS TOOK PLACE. SAIGON REMAINS QUIET.

4. NO POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ATTACKING FORCES HAS YET BEEN MADE, HOWEVER, ELEMENTS OF THE COMMUNISTS 5TH, 7TH, AND 9TH DIVISIONS-- AS WELL AS INDIVIDUAL ARTILLERY UNITS AND LOCAL FORCES--HAVE RECENTLY BEEN COMPLETING BATTLE PREPARATIONS IN NORTHERN III CORPS. THE ACTION IN KONTUM PROVINCE WAS MOST LIKELY STAGED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE 325C DIVISION'S SUBORDINATE 121D REGIMENT WHICH HAS BEEN GEARING UP FOR OFFENSIVE ACTION IN RECENT WEEKS.

5. SIMILIAR ATTACKS BY COMMUNIST MAIN AND LOCAL FORCE UNITS IN OTHER KEY SECTIONS OF THE COUNTRY COULD OCCUR AT ANY TIME. COMMUNICATIONS PATTERNS, TACTICAL ACTIVITY, AS WELL AS A MULTITUDE OF OTHER INTELLIGENCE REPORTS SUGGEST THAT PREPARATIONS FOR COMBAT ARE VIRTUALLY COMPLETE IN MANY AREAS OF THE COUNTRY.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 03-137
By 110, NARA, Date 9-25-03

DTG: 181239Z AUG 1968
XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

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SECRET
EYES ONLY

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1968 AUG 18 27 46

68 AUG 18 PM 2:01

SUNDAY

EEA213
OO VIE 18
DE VIE 3274

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82263

DECLASSIFIED
EO 12356, Sec 3.3
w/ H. Giuseliero and
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1993
By NARA Date 10-29-92 *for file*

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

HEREWITH GEN. ABRAMS EVALUATION: IT LOOKS LIKE THE THIRD WAVE, BUT WAIT ANOTHER DAY BEFORE DECIDING. LAST PARAGRAPH CONTAINS HIS NET EVALUATION.

1. DURING THE NIGHT OF 17-18 AUGUST THE ENEMY LAUNCHED ATTACKS OF VARYING INTENSITY IN SEVERAL AREAS OF SOUTH VIETNAM. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EACH ATTACK BY CTZ FOLLOWS:

A. I CTZ

(1) ON 18 AUG, 20 KM SE OF PHU BAI, ENEMY SAPPERS PENETRATED THE POSITION OF W/1/13 (USMC). THE ENEMY FORCE ATTEMPTED TO DESTROY THE 155S AND 4.2S THERE. THE 155S AND 4.2S ARE STILL OPERABLE. INITIAL RESULTS: FRD: 12 KIA, 25 WIA; EN: SEVEN KIA. THE ENEMY FORCE HAS NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED, BUT MAY BE ELEMENTS OF THE 4TH NVA REGT.

(2) WHILE NOT CLEAR, THERE MAY HAVE BEEN A PREMATURE ATTACK IN I CTZ ON 16 REPEAT 16 AUGUST. AT 0100H 16 AUG, TWO COMPANIES OF 1/12TH CAV IN NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITIONS 16 KM SSE OF QUANG TRI CITY, RECEIVED AN ESTIMATED 100-200 ROUNDS OF 82MM MORTAR FIRE FOLLOWED BY A GROUND ATTACK. APPROXIMATELY 15 SAPPERS PENETRATED THE CAV PERIMETER AND PLACED SATCHEL CHARGES AGAINST BUNKERS AND VEHICLES. RESULTS: FRD: 13 KIA, 56 WIA; EN: 17 KIA, TWO PW. THE PWS IDENTIFIED THEIR UNIT AS THE 10TH SAPPER BN, 7TH FRONT. ELEMENTS OF THE 812TH REGT 7TH FRONT MAY ALSO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK.

B. II CTZ

(1) AT 0325 HOURS ON 18 AUG THE DAK SEANG SF CAMP CAME UNDER A MORTAR AND GROUND ATTACK. THE ENCOUNTER TERMINATED 2 1/2 HOURS LATER WHEN THE ENEMY WITHDREW. RESULTS: FRD: THREE WIA: ENEMY; 20 KILLED AND 6 DETAINED. THE ENEMY FORCE HAS NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED.

(2) AT 0600 HOURS ON 18 AUG, THE 26TH PF PLATOON, LOCATED TEN KM NE OF BAN ME THUOT WAS ATTACKED BY AN UNKNOWN SIZE ENEMY FORCE. INITIAL RESULTS: FRD: TWO KILLED; ENEMY: THREE KILLED. THE ENEMY FORCE WAS NOT IDENTIFIED.

(3) AT 0225 HOURS ON 18 AUG A PF PLATOON AND A TD TEAM, LOCATED 12 KM ESE OF PHU MY WERE ATTACKED BY AN ESTIMATED ENEMY COMPANY. INITIAL RESULTS: FRD: TWO KIA, EIGHT WIA AND ONE MIA; EN: EIGHT KIA. THE ENEMY UNIT WAS NOT IDENTIFIED.

C. III CTZ

(1) AT 180113 AUG THE ENEMY LAUNCHED AN ATTACK ON LOC NINH DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS, THE NEARBY SPECIAL FORCES CAMP, AND ON THE CITY ITSELF. THE ENEMY FORCE IS ESTIMATED TO BE ABOUT ONE BATTALION, PROBABLY FROM THE 141ST REGIMENT. ENEMY CASUALTIES ARE 40 KIA. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES WERE: US-9

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

VIA; ARVN - 4 KIA, 20 WIA. THE TOWN IS CLEAR OF THE ENEMY AND THE SITUATION IS STABLE. FRIENDLY FORCES IN LOC NINH ARE 1 US CAVALRY TROOP, 5 COMPANIES OF RF/PF/CIDG. AN ARVN RCN TROOP FROM THE ARVN 5TH DIVISION IS ENROUTE.

(2) QUAN LOI RECEIVED 25 ROUNDS OF 75MM RECOILLESS RIFLE FIRE. A US INFANTRY BATTALION IS HERE.

(3) THE SIGNAL INSTALLATION AT NUI BA DEN WAS ATTACKED. CASUALTIES: US-7 KIA, 30 WIA; ENEMY: UNKNOWN.

(4) A US UNIT MADE CONTACT TODAY JUST WEST OF DAU TIENG, AN ENEMY BODY COUNT OF 50 WAS OBTAINED.

(5) TAY NINH CITY WAS THE LOCATION OF THE MOST SERIOUS OF ALL ATTACKS LAUNCHED LAST NIGHT. ELEMENTS OF THE 275TH REGIMENT (5TH DIV), 273D REGIMENT (9TH DIV), AND THE D-14 AND D-16 BATTALIONS PARTICIPATED. THE ATTACK HERE WAS FORECAST BY THE PROVINCE CHIEF ON 17 AUG. THE ATTACKS WERE SUCCESSFULLY CONTAINED EXCEPT ON THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF TAY NINH CITY. HERE THE ENEMY OVERRAN A PF OUTPOST AND HAS PENETRATED INTO THE SOUTHWESTERN AND SOUTHEASTERN PARTS OF THE CITY. AS OF 1600 TODAY, THE PROVINCE CHIEF ESTIMATES THAT THE ENEMY HAS ABOUT A BATTALION IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE TOWN, AND JUST OUTSIDE TAY NINH CITY TO THE WEST FROM TOWN. FOUR RF COMPANIES AT 181230 AUG (LOCAL) BEGAN A CLEARING OPERATION WHICH PROGRESSED ONLY A SHORT DISTANCE. THESE COMPANIES HAVE NOW BEEN REPLACED BY A US COMPANY FOR THE NIGHT. THE PROVINCE CHIEF FORECASTS AN EVEN STRONGER ENEMY ATTACK TO BE LAUNCHED TONIGHT (18-19 AUGUST). THE US 25TH DIV HAS POSITION 2 BNS EACH MINUS A COMPANY AT THE SOUTHEASTERN AND SOUTHWESTERN ENDS OF THE CITY. EN CASUALTIES HERE WERE 150 KIA AND 13 POW'S. THE 25TH LOST 1 KIA AND 31 WIA.

(6) KATUM WAS ATTACKED BY FIRE AT 180145. THE COMPOUND WAS PENETRATED BY 180345. THE ENEMY WAS REPELLED AND BY 181100 THE CAMP WAS CLEAR. CASUALTIES- FRIENDLY 28 KIA-ENEMY 35 KIA.

D. IV CTZ: AT 172130H AUG, IN PHONG DINH PROVINCE, SIX KM SOUTH OF CAN THO, AN ESTIMATED COMPANY ATTACKED THE CAI NAI OP WITH SMALL ARMS FIRE AND 30 RDS OF B-40 ROCKET FIRE. CONTACT WAS BROKEN BY THE ENEMY AFTER THE OP WAS REINFORCED. RESULTS: FRIENDLY: THREE WOUNDED; ENEMY: UNKNOWN.

2. MY ANALYSIS OF THESE ENEMY ACTIONS FOLLOW:

A. THE ENEMY HAS MADE AN ABRUPT CHANGE IN THE PATTERN OF HIS ACTIVITY. THE "LULL" HAS ENDED FOR THE PRESENT. CONSIDERING FORCES COMMITTED TO ATTACK AND THE VARIETY OF ATTACKS IT IS MY VIEW THAT THE THIRD OFFENSIVE HAS BEEN INITIATED. HOWEVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PRUDENT PUBLICLY TO IDENTIFY HIS ATTACKS AS HIS "THIRD OFFENSIVE" UNTIL WE HAVE AT LEAST ANOTHER DAY OR SO TO OBSERVE THEM.

B. WE ARE IN GOOD SHAPE EVERYWHERE IN THE COUNTRY EXCEPT IN TAY NINH CITY. WE HAVE GOT TO GET THE ENEMY OUT OF THIS TOWN AND PROMPTLY. I HAVE SO INSTRUCTED GENERAL KERWIN.

C. IN OUR VIEW AN IMPORTANT PURPOSE OF THE ATTACKS OF LAST NIGHT- AND THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN III CTZ- IS TO ATTRACT OUR FORCES FROM CRITICAL AREAS TO LESS CRITICAL AREAS. WE ANTICIPATE FURTHER ATTACKS ON SECONDARY OBJECTIVES TONIGHT OR TOMORROW IN SEVERAL PLACES IN THE COUNTRY.

0616: 181643Z AUGUST 1968

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

44

1968 AUG 18 16 56

free file

EEA217
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3273

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82059

1968 AUG 18 PM 1:58

SUNDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEREWITH A SUMMARY OF A CIA REPORT ON ENEMY ACTIVITY IN III CORPS UP TO 6 A.M. OUR TIME.

FIGHTING CONTINUES IN LONG HOA MARKET IN TAY NINH PROVINCE WHERE THE ENEMY IS REPORTED BURNING PARTS OF THE SURROUNDING TOWN.

FRIENDLY FORCES ARE IN CONTROL OF LOC NINH DISTRICT TOWN IN BINH LONG PROVINCE, BUT SNIPERS ARE STILL IN THE TOWN. TWO CONTACTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN LONG AN PROVINCE, BUT THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THE PROVINCE CAPITAL WILL BE ATTACKED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THE G-2 III CORPS ESTIMATES THAT THE CURRENT ACTIVITY IS THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE THIRD PHASE ENEMY OFFENSIVE, WHICH HE BELIEVES IN AN ATTEMPT TO DRAW ALLIED FORCES AWAY FROM THE SAIGON AREA. HE, HOWEVER, BELIEVES THAT ALLIED FORCES ALREADY IN THE AREAS OF ACTIVITY ARE CAPABLE OF CONTAINING THE CURRENT THREAT. VIETNAMESE CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE IN III CORPS ALSO STATED THAT THE VC ATTACKS ON TAY NINH WERE DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE CAO DAI OPINION. SHOULD U.S./GOVERNMENT OR VIETNAM (GVN) FORCES SUFFER HIGH CASUALTIES, HE SPECULATED THAT CAO DAI WOULD POSSIBLY BE SWAYED TO THE VC CAUSE. BUT IF THE CURRENT TREND OF VC LOSSES, WHICH HE PLACED AT MORE THAN 300 KIA IN THE CURRENT ROUND OF ACTIONS, CONTINUED, THE CAO DAI WOULD LEAN TO THE GVN.

DTG: 181632Z AUG 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NIJDA-038-3-5
By SP, NARA, Date 1/20/02

1968 AUG 18 17 42

42

EEA219
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3276

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82061

~~SECRET~~

18 AUGUST 1968 2517A

HEREWITH A SUMMARY OF TELECON BETWEEN [REDACTED] CHIEF, CIA
STATION, SAIGON, AND [REDACTED] AT 09:00 HOURS EDT, 18
AUGUST 1968

THERE ARE NO NEW DEVELOPMENTS, INCIDENTS, OR VC ACTIVITY IN SAIGON UP TO 21:00 HOURS, 18 AUGUST. ALL EVIDENCE INDICATES THE ENEMY IS IN A TACTICAL COMBAT POSTURE IN SEVERAL AREAS THROUGHOUT SVN AND WE EXPECT FOLLOW-UP OFFENSIVE ACTION TO BE FORTHCOMING SHORTLY. ATTACKS AGAINST TAY NINH CITY ARE DUE 18/19 AUGUST. EXTENSIVE ENEMY PREPARATIONS IN DMZ AREA POINT TO MAJOR OFFENSIVE AGAINST EASTERN-FLANK. PATTERN OF SUNDAY MORNING (SAIGON) ATTACKS REFLECTS SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON SPECIAL FORCES AND FIRE SUPPORT BASES. BELIEVE THIS A PRELIMINARY SET-UP FOR FURTHER ACTION AGAINST PRIMARY TARGETS. WE CANNOT SAY NOW HOW SCENARIO MAY RUN -- WHETHER IN FORM OF "ROLLING", SEQUENTIAL OPERATIONS OR A SIMULTANEOUS KICK-OFF. WE ARE MORE INCLINED, HOWEVER, TOWARD AN EVOLVING AND SUSTAINED OFFENSIVE OPERATION DEVELOPING IN CLOSELY-LINKED STAGES. ON THE BASIS OF CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE OF THE PAST TWO MONTHS, WE DEFINITELY CONSIDER THE ENEMY HAS PLANNED AND PROGRAMMED FOR A MAJOR EFFORT. CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT HAS BEEN ACTIVE IN SEARCH AND CORDON OPERATIONS IN COUNTRYSIDE DURING THE PAST WEEKS. POLICE AREA SEARCHES ARE CONDUCTED DAILY, RIVER PATROLS ARE ACTIVELY CHECKING, THE CMD IS ALSO HITTING CHECK POINT INSPECTIONS ON THE OUTER PERIPHERY. SO FAR ALL THIS HAS NOT TURNED UP ANY SIGNIFICANT CATCHES. WE ASSUME THIS IS AN IMPORTANT ENEMY OBJECTIVE -- TO INCREASE HIS SAPPER-TERRORIST CAPABILITIES IN SAIGON BUT SO FAR WE HAVE FEW FACTS TO GO ON. DURING THE PAST WEEK THE VC HAVE CLEARLY BEEN "STANDING DOWN" IN SAIGON. INDIC CENTER HAS SEEN NO RECENT REPORTS OF ANY UPSURGE IN ALLIANCE ACTIVITY IN CITY. WE UNDERSTAND THE BUDDHISTS WERE TO HOLD A PRESS-INVITED DEMONSTRATION AT 15:00 THIS AFTERNOON (SUNDAY). INDIC CENTER HAS NO INFO ON THIS OTHER THAN A ROUTINE PROTEST SESSION.

68 AUG 18 PM 2:01

SUNDAY

Profile

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43

EEA220
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DE WIE 3277

1968 AUG 18 17 48

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP 82062

68 AUG 18 PM 1:58

SUNDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

for file

AUGUST 18, 1968

HEREWITH SEC. RUSK'S COMMENTS ON MCCARTHY PLATFORM.
I WOULD ADD HE'S IN A GREAT FIGHTING MOOD AND YOU MAY
WISH TO UNLEASH HIM AT THE RIGHT TIME.

1. SOME COMMENTS ON THE MCCARTHY PLATFORM SHOULD BE FOUND IN THE DRAFT SPEECH WHICH IS NOW BEFORE THE PRESIDENT.
2. IS THIS PLANK BEING SUBMITTED AS AN ULTIMATUM TO THE PLATFORM COMMITTEE? "ADOPT IT OR ACCEPT FLOOR FIGHT"? WHAT ULTIMATUM HAVE THE PROPONENTS IN MIND FOR THE CONVENTION ITSELF? "SURRENDER TO US ON VIETNAM OR WE WILL BOLT THE PARTY"? IS NOT ALL THIS CONTEMPT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS?
3. WHY DO THE PROPONENTS NOT SAY WHAT THEY MEAN? FOR EXAMPLE, INSTEAD OF "HALT THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM," WHY DON'T THEY SAY "YOU SHOULD STOP BOMBING MEN AND ARMS MOVING SOUTHWARD ACROSS THE DMZ TO KILL U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES," WHETHER OR NOT NORTH VIETNAM TAKES ANY ACTION TO DE-ESCALATE. INSTEAD OF SAYING: "HALT THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM AND ALL OTHER ATTACKS," WHY NOT SAY: "ALLOW NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES TO ASSEMBLE WITHOUT INTERRUPTION IN THE ENVIRONS OF SAIGON, DA NANG, AND HUE AND DELIVER THEIR ASSAULTS AT TIMES AND PLACES OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING."
4. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO IMPOSE A COALITION GOVERNMENT ON SOUTH VIETNAM WHEN ITS PROPONENTS KNOW, AS THEY MUST, THAT THIS IS WHOLLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE -- IS NOT THE REAL OBJECT OF THE PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE A PRETEXT FOR THE MAIN PURPOSE; NAMELY, THE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES, WHATEVER THE CONSEQUENCES FOR VIETNAM OR SOUTHEAST ASIA.
5. IF THERE IS ANY INTEREST IN PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, WHY DOES THE PROPOSAL NOT INCLUDE (A) COMPLETE COMPLIANCE WITH THE GENEVA ACCORDS ON LAOS OF 1962, (B) CESSATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE GUERRILLA ACTION AGAINST THAILAND, (C) RESPECT BY THE FORCES OF BOTH SIDES FOR THE NEUTRALITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF CAMBODIA.
6. WHY DOES THE PROPOSAL NOT UNDERLINE THE NECESSITY FOR TALKS BETWEEN HANOI AND THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM?
7. DOES THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY NOW WANT TO SAY TO HANOI: "DON'T MAKE PEACE WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON. CONTINUE THE WAR AND SEE WHETHER THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY CAN ELECT A MENDES FRANCE WHO COULD GIVE THEM SOUTH VIETNAM, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA."

DTG: 181706Z AUGUST 1968

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12333,
SEC. 1.1(a).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY RA ON 11-9-92

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

EEA205
OO WTE13
DE WTE 3259

~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP32047

RECEIVED
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P. H.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

1968 AUG 17 17 40
AUGUST 17, 1968

68 AUG 17 PM 1:54

SATURDAY

YOU MAY WISH TO KNOW ABRAMS PLANS ANOTHER SPORTING ACTION IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF THE DMZ.

QUOTE

1. ON 19 AUGUST, ONE BATTALION OF THE 3D MARINE DIVISION WILL EXECUTE A BRIEF OPERATION NORTH OF CON THIEN WITH A VIEW TO UPSETTING THE ENEMY'S PLANS IN THAT AREA. INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT THE NVA ARE STOCKPILING SUPPLIES IN THE TARGET AREA AND POSSIBLY CONCENTRATING FORCES THERE.

2. CONCEPT:

A. ON 18 AUGUST, FIVE B-52 STRIKES WILL BE MADE ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE TARGET AREA DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS. ON 19 AUGUST, FIVE B-52 STRIKES WILL BE FLOWN ON A COMPRESSED TIME OVER TARGET BASIS IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS IN THE CENTER OF THE TARGET. THE LAST STRIKE IS SCHEDULED TO BE COMPLETED BY APPROXIMATELY 8:20 A.M. SAIGON TIME 19 AUG (8:30 P.M. EDT 18 AUG).

B. ONE BATTALION, REINFORCED, 9TH MARINES, 3D MARINE DIVISION, WILL CONDUCT AN AIRMOBILE RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE INTO THE AREA OF OPERATIONS. THE BATTALION WILL STAGE AT CAM LO AND COMBAT ASSULT INTO THE AREA AS SOON AS THE SITUATION PERMITS AFTER THE ARC LIGHT STRIKES HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.

C. ESTIMATED DURATION OF THE OPERATION IS 24 - 28 HOURS.

END QUOTE

DTG: 171541Z AUG 68

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 1916

By isa NARA, Date 11-21-97

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

45

1968 AUG 17 PM 8:45
SATURDAY

Flash

1968 AUG 17 22 34

EEA211
*****ZZ WTE10
DE WTE 3263

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAPS2053

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THERE HAS BEEN A TELEPHONE CALL FROM MACV TO THE FOLLOWING EFFECT:

--VC HAVE OVERRUN A CIDG CAMP IN TAY NINH AREA (50 MILES NW OF SAIGON).

--VC HAVE OVERRUN A RF/PF COMPOUND IN BINH LONG AREA (50 MILES NORTH OF SAIGON).

--MACV HAS REPORTED 5 ATTACKS IN THE III CORPS AREA AND 1 IN THE II CORPS AREA.

--THERE IS NO REPORT YET OF CASUALTIES OR INTENSITY OF ATTACKS.

AS I REPORTED BY TELEPHONE THIS MORNING, THE TAY NINH AREA IS ONE PLACE WHERE WE EXPECT THEM TO BEGIN. THEY MAY HAVE BEGUN BUT WE ARE NOT CERTAIN. WE SHALL BE FOLLOWING IT CLOSELY.

DTG 172222Z AUG 68

DECLASSIFIED
White House, Dec 21, 1983
By mg NARA Date 9-8-92

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1998
By mg NARA Date 9-8-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT DESIGNED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12333, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 16, 1983.

BY ng ON 10-27-92

EEA210
OO VTE10
DE VTE 3263

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAPS2051

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUGUST 17, 1968

free file

68 AUG 17 PM 5:49
68 AUG 17 PM 5:49
SATURDAY

HEREWITH A DRAFT AS REQUESTED BY YOU VIA TOM JOHNSON.

I HAVE BRACKETED THE PASSAGE ON SAN ANTONIO BECAUSE; UNLESS YOU WISH TO REAFFIRM SAN ANTONIO EXPLICITLY, I THINK THE PASSAGE SHOULD BE DROPPED; AND, ON THE WHOLE, I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD STICK WITH MARCH 31 OR YOU WILL REVIVE ENDLESS SPECULATION AS TO WHY THE PRESIDENT AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME CHOSE TO RAISE SAN ANTONIO AGAIN.

I WILL NOT SEND THIS DRAFT TO SECRETARY RUSK BECAUSE I DOUBT THAT IT IS ANYWHERE NEAR FINAL STATUS. I AM SURE YOU WILL WISH TO HAVE HIM AND SECRETARY CLIFFORD CAST THEIR EYES OVER YOUR FINAL DRAFT BEFORE DELIVERY.

DRAFT PASSAGE FOR VFW SPEECH, DETROIT

I WANT TO SAY A FEW WORDS TO YOU ABOUT VIETNAM.

WE ARE IN THE MIDST OF A NATIONAL POLITICAL CAMPAIGN. IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A GREAT DEAL OF DISCUSSION AND SPECULATION ABOUT A WAR IN WHICH A HALF MILLION AMERICANS ARE ENGAGED.

BUT THESE THINGS ARE CLEAR:

-- THOSE HALF MILLION AMERICAN MEN ARE NOT OUT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AS REPUBLICANS OR DEMOCRATS. THEY ARE OUT THERE AS AMERICANS FIGHTING TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF THIS NATION AS THOSE INTERESTS HAVE BEEN DETERMINED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS.

-- UNTIL JANUARY 20, 1969, WE BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENCY; AND THERE IS ONLY ONE NATIONAL POLICY -- THE POLICY OF THIS ADMINISTRATION.

THE INTERESTS OF THE NATION AND THE INTERESTS OF PEACE ARE NOT ADVANCED BY DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY CONCERNING THAT POLICY.

THEREFORE, I WANT TO LAY OUT A FEW FUNDAMENTALS FOR YOU TONIGHT.

FIRST, OUR OBJECTIVE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS PEACE, AND THE ESSENTIALS OF WHAT WE MEAN BY PEACE HAVE, FOR LONG, BEEN CLEAR. TO REPEAT THEM BRIEFLY:

-- REINSTALL THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AT THE 17TH PARALLEL, AS THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954 REQUIRE, AND LET THE MATTER OF VIETNAMESE UNITY BE DECIDED IN PEACE BY THE PEOPLE OF NORTH VIETNAM AND THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM IN THE FUTURE;

-- GET ALL FOREIGN FORCES OUT OF LAOS AND REINSTALL AND MAKE EFFECTIVE THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1962 ON LAOS;

-- WITHDRAW U.S. FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED IN THE MANILA COMMUNIQUE;

-- LET THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM EXERCISE THEIR RIGHTS OF SELF-DETERMINATION. LET THEM DECIDE IN PEACE WITHOUT COERCION OF ANY KIND -- THEIR OWN POLITICAL FUTURE ON A ONE-MAN ONE-VOLE BASIS -- WITH SPIRIT OF RECONCILIATION RE-AFFIRMED BY PRESIDENT THIEU AT HONOLULU.

THAT IS WHAT I MEAN BY AN HONORABLE PEACE. I DOUBT THAT ANY AMERICAN PRESIDENT WILL TAKE A SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT VIEW WHEN HE BEARS THE BURDENS OF OFFICE AND HAS AVAILABLE TO HIM ALL THE INFORMATION THAT FLOWS TO THE PRESIDENT.

SECOND, WE TOOK A MAJOR INITIATIVE TOWARDS PEACE ON MARCH 31. (EARLIER, ON OCTOBER 6, 1967, AT SAN ANTONIO, I MADE A PROPOSAL THAT WE WERE "WILLING TO STOP ALL AERIAL AND NAVAL BOMBARDMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM WHEN THIS WILL LEAD PROMPTLY TO PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS. WE, OF COURSE, ASSUME THAT WHILE DISCUSSIONS PROCEED, NORTH VIETNAM WOULD NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE BOMBING CESSATION OR LIMITATION." PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY THAT OFFER WAS REJECTED BY HANOI. THAT OFFER STILL STANDS.)

(ON MARCH 31 OF THIS YEAR) WE NOT ONLY MADE AN OFFER, BUT WE ACTED. WE TOOK A FIRST STEP TO DE-ESCALATE THE CONFLICT. I ORDERED OUR AIRCRAFT AND OUR NAVAL VESSELS TO MAKE NO ATTACKS ON NORTH VIETNAM NORTH OF THE 20TH PARALLEL. THIS EXCLUDED FROM BOMBING ALMOST 90 PERCENT OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POPULATION AND ALMOST 80 PERCENT OF ITS TERRITORY.

WE THEN ADDED THESE WORDS: "I CANNOT IN GOOD CONSCIENCE STOP ALL BOMBING SO LONG AS TO DO SO WOULD IMMEDIATELY AND DIRECTLY ENDANGER THE LIVES OF OUR MEN AND OUR ALLIES. WHETHER A COMPLETE BOMBING HALT BECOMES POSSIBLE IN THE FUTURE WILL BE DETERMINED BY EVENTS."

THUS FAR HANOI'S RESPONSE HAS BEEN:

-- TO REJECT THE PROPOSITION IN PUBLIC AND IN PRIVATE EXCHANGES;

-- TO PROCEED SINCE MARCH 31 WITH THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF INFILTRATION THAT WE HAVE OBSERVED DURING THE WAR IN VIETNAM; THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF SOUTHWARD MOVEMENT OF MILITARY SUPPLIES; AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE THIRD MAJOR WAVE OF ATTACK OF 1968.

I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER OR WHEN SUCH A NEW MAJOR ATTACK WILL, IN FACT, TAKE PLACE. I DO KNOW THAT THEY HAVE REJECTED OUR OFFER FOR PROMPT DE-ESCALATION AND MOVEMENT TOWARDS PEACE IN FAVOR OF MASSIVE MILITARY PREPARATIONS FOR INTENSIFIED BATTLE.

-- THE NEXT MOVE MUST BE THEIRS. IN HUMAN AFFAIRS THERE IS NO MORE BASIC LESSON THAN THAT IT TAKES TWO TO MAKE A BARGAIN. WE HAVE MADE A REASONABLE OFFER AND HAVE TAKEN A MAJOR FIRST STEP. THAT OFFER HAS NOT YET BEEN ACCEPTED. THIS ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT INTEND TO MOVE FURTHER UNTIL IT HAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE OTHER SIDE INTENDS SERIOUSLY TO JOIN WITH US IN DE-ESCALATING THE WAR AND MOVING SERIOUSLY TOWARDS PEACE. WE ARE WILLING TO TAKE CHANCES FOR PEACE BUT NOT FOOLHARDY GAMBLES.

ASK YOURSELVES: WHERE WOULD THE POSITION OF THIS NATION AND ITS ALLIES BE IF, HAVING TAKEN A MAJOR STEP TOWARDS DE-ESCALATION AND PEACE, WE RESPONDED NOW TO THEIR REJECTION WITH STILL ANOTHER UNILATERAL STEP. IF YOU WERE IN HANOI, WOULD YOU THEN NEGOTIATE OR WOULD YOU NOT WAIT FOR YET ANOTHER UNILATERAL STEP, UNTIL THE WHOLE FOUNDATION OF OUR POSITION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA - AND THE POSITION OF OUR ALLIES - WAS GONE BEYOND REPAIR.

THIS PRESIDENT -- THIS ADMINISTRATION -- WILL NOT MOVE DOWN THAT SLIPPERY SLOPE.

-- I BELIEVE PEACE WILL COME -- AND, IF WE ARE STEADY, IT WILL COME ON HONORABLE TERMS. I DO NOT KNOW WHEN IT WILL COME. BUT I BELIEVE IT WILL COME BECAUSE:

-- MILITARY VICTORY IS BEYOND THEIR GRASP;

-- THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARE GATHERING POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRENGTH AND CONFIDENCE DAY BY DAY;

-- AND BECAUSE I BELIEVE IN AMERICA. HOWEVER GREAT OUR ANXIETY FOR PEACE; HOWEVER GREAT OUR CONCERN FOR THE WAR IN VIETNAM; HOWEVER GREAT OUR PASSIONATE DESIRE THAT THE KILLING SHALL STOP, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE NOT GOING TO WALK AWAY FROM THIS STRUGGLE UNLESS THEY WALK AWAY ON HONORABLE TERMS.

WHEN I SENT OUR NEGOTIATING TEAM OFF TO PARIS I TOLD THEM TWO THINGS:

-- PUT ASIDE ALL CONSIDERATIONS OF DOMESTIC POLITICS;

-- WORK FOR A SETTLEMENT IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, NOW AND TEN YEARS FROM NOW.

I DID NOT TAKE MYSELF OUT OF POLITICS ON MARCH 31ST IN ORDER TO PERMIT OUR PURSUIT OF PEACE TO BE COLORED IN THE SLIGHTEST DEGREE BY DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. I WANT PEACE IN VIETNAM PERHAPS MORE THAN ANY SINGLE AMERICAN. BUT THE PURSUIT OF PEACE IN THIS ADMINISTRATION WILL BE GOVERNED WHOLLY BY THE NATION'S ABIDING INTERESTS AS WE SEE THEM.

AND I HAVE FAITH -- A FAITH THAT STRENGTHENED ME ON MARCH 31ST -- THAT WHEN THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN IS OVER -- AND ANOTHER MAN TAKES UP THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENCY - HE WILL TAKE A SIMILAR VIEW.

DTG 172022Z AUG 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1968 AUG 17 13 22

~~SECRET~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP32043

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 3-4-03

Pres file
68 AUG 17 AM 9:34

SATURDAY

~~SECRET~~

AUGUST 17, 1968

HEREWITH A REPORT, PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF COVEY OLIVER WHICH BRINGS US UP-TO-DATE ON A NUMBER OF KEY SITUATIONS THAT ARE DEVELOPING IN LATIN AMERICA.

1. FISHERMEN'S PROTECTIVE ACT CAUSES ADVERSE REACTION IN PERU AND ECUADOR.

A. THERE HAS BEEN ANGRY OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC REACTION IN PERU AND ECUADOR TO THE FISHERMEN'S PROTECTIVE ACT. AN INCORRECT AP STORY PLAYED IN BOTH COUNTRIES RESULTED IN BANNER HEADLINES THAT AID WOULD BE SUSPENDED, RATHER THAN REDUCED, IF ANOTHER U.S. TUNA BOAT IS SEIZED. THE ECUADOREAN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES ANGRILY DENOUNCED THE UNITED STATES AND DIRECTED THE GOE TO ENFORCE SCRUPULOUSLY THE 200-MILE TERRITORIAL SEA CLAIM. ECUADOR'S FOREIGN MINISTER PUBLICLY CORRECTED THE NEWS STORY BUT CONDEMNED THE BILL AS "AN INSTRUMENT OF PRESSURE." ON AUGUST 8 THE ECUADOREANS SEIZED FOUR U.S. TUNA BOATS ABOUT 25 MILES OFF-SHORE AND FINED THEM A TOTAL OF \$202,000. NO PERUVIAN SEIZURES HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN RECENT MONTHS; PERU IS AWARE THAT THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO DEMAND THE RETURN OF AN AMERICAN DESTROYER NOW ON LOAN IF A U.S. TUNA BOAT IS SEIZED.

3. WE HAVE PRESSED ECUADOR, PERU AND CHILE TO AGREE TO A FISHERIES CONFERENCE DATE. ECUADOR WISHED TO DEFER A DECISION UNTIL PRESIDENT-ELECT VELASCO TAKES OFFICE AUGUST 31. THE PERUVIANS SHOW LITTLE INTEREST. THE CHILEANS ARE READY WHENEVER PERU AND ECUADOR AGREE TO A DATE. THE EMOTIONAL REACTIONS IN THE LATTER TWO COUNTRIES TO THE PELLY AMENDMENT MAY HAVE TEMPORARILY HINDERED OUR EFFORT TO BRING THEM TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT SHOULD DRAMATIZE TO BOTH ECUADOR AND PERU THE ADVANTAGES OF REACHING AN AGREEMENT AND AVOIDING PROLONGED AND FRUITLESS PROBLEMS WHICH, BECAUSE OF THE HIGHLY EMOTIONAL PUBLIC RESPONSE ON ALL SIDES, CAN ONLY SPILL OVER INTO OUR GENERAL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS.

2. STUDENT UNREST

STUDENT DISORDERS OF CONSIDERABLE FEROCITY HAVE OCCURRED IN SEVERAL LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES DURING THE PAST FEW MONTHS. BRAZIL, MEXICO AND URUGUAY IN PARTICULAR HAVE BEEN THE SCENES OF VIOLENT POLICE-STUDENT CLASHES IN WHICH DEATHS AND INJURIES HAVE RESULTED IN HEIGHTENED POLITICAL TENSIONS.

3. BRAZIL

SINCE APRIL THERE HAVE BEEN CONTINUING STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS THROUGHOUT BRAZIL CAUSED BY DISSATISFACTION WITH THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AND THE AUTHORITARIAN CHARACTER OF THE GOVERNMENT. IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT SERIOUS PUBLIC DISORDERS WILL RE-OCCUR IN THE NATION'S MAJOR CITIES IN THE MONTHS TO COME. THE GOVERNMENT HAS RECENTLY BANNED UNAUTHORIZED DEMONSTRATIONS BY THE STUDENTS. A SERIES OF WILDCAT STRIKES IN KEY BRAZILIAN INDUSTRIES HAS FURTHER HEIGHTENED THE TENSION. LABOR IS GENERALLY UNHAPPY WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S WAGE POLICIES AND HAS MANAGED TO GAIN THE SYMPATHY OF AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE BRAZILIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE STRUGGLE FOR BETTER WAGES AND LIVING CONDITIONS. THE SITUATION IS CONSEQUENTLY QUITE VOLATILE AND WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE COULD ERUPT OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS WITH LITTLE OR NO WARNING. AT THIS POINT, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT EVEN THIS EVENTUALITY WOULD SERIOUSLY THREATEN THE TENURE OF THE COSTA E SILVA ADMINISTRATION, WHICH CONTINUES TO BE BACKED BY A UNITED MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND SUPPORTED BY STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES.

4. MEXICO

THE DEMONSTRATION IN MEXICO CITY ON AUGUST 13 BY 50-80,000 STUDENT WAS PEACEFUL. RADICAL ELEMENTS, HOWEVER, ARE TRYING TO WIDEN THE SCOPE OF THE PROTESTS THAT BEGAN JULY 26 TO INCLUDE DISSATISFACTION WITH LABOR AND HOUSING CONDITIONS. THE STUDENT'S CONTINUING SUCCESS IN MAINTAINING THE MOMENTUM OF THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS PRESENTS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM TO THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT, BUT WE EXPECT EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO SETTLE THE CRISIS WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES, OCTOBER 12-26. THERE IS NO INDICATION THE STUDENT PROBLEM WILL AFFECT PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ'S SEPTEMBER PLANS.

5. URUGUAY

THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN URUGUAY WHICH BEGAN IN MARCH ARE NOW OCCURRING WITH UNPRECEDENTED FREQUENCY AND VIOLENCE. THE POLICE RAID ON THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY AUGUST 9 IN SEARCH FOR CLUES OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES SPARKED CLASHES WHICH RESULTED IN ONE DEATH. SINCE THE DEAD STUDENT BELONGED TO THE COMMUNIST YOUTH ORGANIZATION, BOTH THE STUDENTS AND THE COMMUNISTS NOW HAVE A "MARTYR" WHICH THEY MAY EXPLOIT TO ENLARGE THEIR DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE DAYS AHEAD. THE LARGE MOSCOW-LINE COMMUNIST PARTY HAS AVOIDED A CONFRONTATION WITH THE GOU, ALTHOUGH MILITANT FRINGE GROUPS AND LABOR ARE URGING THAT IT TAKE A TOUGHER LINE. URUGUAYAN AMBASSADOR YRIAT, JUST RETURNED FROM CONSULTATIONS IN MONTEVIDEO, TOLD ASSISTANT SECRETARY OLIVER THAT THE GOU BELIEVES THE STUDENT UNREST MAY INCREASE AND CONVEYED PRESIDENT PACHECO'S REQUEST FOR ANTI-RIOT EQUIPMENT. WE BELIEVE THE GOU FACES A DIFFICULT PERIOD OF SOCIAL AGITATION, PERHAPS UNTIL PARLIAMENT ADJOURNS IN DECEMBER, BUT ARE CONFIDENT THE PRESIDENT WILL REMAIN FIRM AND THAT HE CAN HANDLE THE SITUATION CONSTITUTIONALLY. WE HAVE ASKED EMBASSY MONTEVIDEO FOR A FRESH APPRAISAL OF THE SECURITY SITUATION TO BE DISCUSSED AT AN IRG/ARA MEETING AUGUST 17.

6. BOLIVIA

THE UNSTEADY POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN BOLIVIA, FOLLOWING THE PUBLICATION IN CUBA OF CHE GUEVARA'S DIARY, MAY BE AGAIN THREATENED BY THE ANNOUNCEMENT AUGUST 15 OF ANTONIO ARGUEDAS, THE PURVEYOR OF THE DIARY, THAT HE PLANS TO RETURN TO LA PAZ AUGUST 17 TO TELL THE TRUTH AND AWAIT JUSTICE. HIS ANNOUNCEMENT MAKES VAGUE CHARGES AGAINST CIA, NAMING TWO "AGENTS", NICHOLAS LEONDIRIS AND A CUBAN, GABRIEL GARCIA. PRESIDENT BARRIENTOS HAD JUST STRENGTHENED HIS POSITION BY REMOVING HIS PRINCIPAL MILITARY OPPONENT FROM HIS POST WHILE RETAINING THE SUPPORT OF THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES. WHETHER BARRIENTOS WILL ALSO BE ABLE TO DEFUSE THE VOLATILE SITUATION THAT MIGHT BE CREATED BY THE RETURN AND ARREST OF ARGUEDAS WILL DEPEND NOT ONLY ON HIS CALM DETERMINATION BUT ALSO ON A MEASURE OF RESTRAINT BY OPPOSITION POLITICIANS. BOTH BARRIENTOS AND ARMY COMMANDER OVANDO HAVE SHOWN A DETERMINATION TO PURSUE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, BUT THE OUTLOOK IS UNCERTAIN.

7. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

THERE IS NO CRISIS LOOMING IN THE COMING MONTHS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ALTHOUGH AN EXTREMIST ELEMENT HAS THREATENED TO DISRUPT THE AUGUST 16 CHANGEOVER OF SANTO DOMINGO'S MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT. DISTURBINGLY, PRESIDENT BALAGUER, INSTEAD OF CONSOLIDATING HIS POSITION AFTER HIS MAY ELECTION SUCCESS, HAS EXERTED LESS LEADERSHIP THAN BEFORE AND HAS FALLEN INTO A DEFENSIVE POSTURE IN THE FACE OF HIS OPPOSITION. HIS RELATIVELY LISTLESS PERFORMANCE HAS RESULTED IN AN ACCUMULATION OF ANNOYING PROBLEMS, AND IF HE DOES NOT REASSERT FIRM DIRECTION, HIS GOVERNMENT WILL BE INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE TO ATTACK.

8. PANAMA

ARNULFO ARIAS, WINNER OF THE MAY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, WILL TAKE OFFICE OCTOBER 1. ALL INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE TRANSFER OF POWER WILL TAKE PLACE SMOOTHLY AND PEACEFULLY. ARIAS SUCCESSFULLY OVERCAME EFFORTS OF HIS OPPONENTS TO HAVE HIS CREDENTIALS AS PRESIDENT-ELECT INVALIDATED. THERE IS STILL POTENTIAL FOR FRICTION BETWEEN ARIAS AND OTHER POLITICALLY POWERFUL ELEMENTS. ARIAS IS TRYING TO GAIN BY WHATEVER MEANS POSSIBLE A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. ALSO, HE HAS SAID HE INTENDS TO REMOVE THE NATIONAL GUARD COMMANDANT VALLARINO AND THIS COULD PROVOKE AN EARLY CONFRONTATION WITH THE GUARD. AT PRESENT, HOWEVER, IT SEEMS THAT THE CONTEST OVER THESE ISSUES WILL NOT REACH CRISIS PROPORTIONS. ARIAS HOPES TO CONFER WITH AMBASSADOR ANDERSON ON CANAL NEGOTIATIONS IN NEW YORK PRIOR TO ASSUMING OFFICE BUT HAS INDICATED HE DOES NOT EXPECT FORMAL TALKS TO RESUME BEFORE EARLY 1969.

9. PERU-IPC AGREEMENT EMBODIED IN "ACT OF TALARA"

THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY TURNED OVER ITS LA BREA Y PARINAS OILFIELD PROPERTIES TO THE GOP ON AUGUST 13 IN RETURN FOR A QUIT-CLAIM AGAINST ALL BACK DEBTS, THE RIGHT TO PURCHASE UP TO 80 PER CENT OF THE CRUDE PRODUCTION OF THE FIELD FOR SIX YEARS AT AN AGREED PRICE, PERMISSION TO EXPAND ITS TALARA REFINERY AND IMPORT NEEDED ADDITIONAL CRUDE, AND THE RIGHT TO STORE AND DISTRIBUTE PETROLEUM PRODUCTS IN PERU. A NEW EXPLORATION CONCESSION WAS NOT INCLUDED BUT IPC WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK SUCH A CONCESSION. WHILE MINOR DIFFICULTIES OF IMPLEMENTATION ARE TO BE EXPECTED, THE ACT OF TALARA FORMALLY MARKS THE END OF A PROLONGED AND ACUTE DISPUTE THAT HAS SERIOUSLY AFFECTED OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH PERU.

10. VENEZUELA-GUYANA BORDER DISPUTE

A FLURRY OF DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY FOLLOWED THE VENEZUELAN DECREE OF JULY 9 CLAIMING AN AREA OF THE HIGH SEAS OFF THE PORTION OF WESTERN GUYANA WHICH IS IN DISPUTE BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS. THE DECREE IMPLIED THAT VENEZUELA WOULD IMMEDIATELY EXERCISE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WATERS IN QUESTION, PERHAPS BY INSTITUTING NAVAL PATROLS. VENEZUELA HAS NOT ATTEMPTED TO ENFORCE ITS DECREE BUT HAS REFUSED TO GIVE US ASSURANCE IT WOULD NOT PATROL THE AREA IN THE EVENT OF FUTURE GUYANESE "INTRANSIGENCE." SINCE GUYANA IS HARDLY DISPOSED TO SIGN AWAY ANY OF ITS TERRITORY, THE POSSIBILITY REMAINS OF NEW VENEZUELAN EFFORTS TO PRESSURE HER NEIGHBOR. SHOULD ANY SERIOUS INCIDENT OCCUR, WE EXPECT THAT GUYANA WOULD TAKE ITS CASE TO THE OAS AND/OR THE UNITED NATIONS.

11. POPE TO MEET WITH LATIN AMERICAN BISHOPS

POPE PAUL VI WILL ARRIVE IN COLOMBIA AUGUST 22 TO ATTEND A EUCHARISTIC CONFERENCE AND TO INAUGURATE THE SECOND MEETING OF THE LATIN AMERICAN BISHOPS CONFERENCE. THIS FIRST VISIT OF A POPE TO LATIN AMERICA COMES AT A TIME OF CHANGE AND STRESS THERE WITHIN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. THE POPE CAN BE EXPECTED TO PUSH THE CHURCH'S CONSERVATIVES TO SUPPORT SOCIAL CHANGE WHILE SEEKING TO PLACE LIMITS ON THOSE CLERGY WHO ARE URGING RADICAL SOCIAL CHANGE. IN PUBLIC, LATIN AMERICAN LEADERS HAVE GENERALLY PRAISED THE POPE'S RECENT ENCYCLICAL AFFIRMING THE BAN ON ARTIFICIAL BIRTH CONTROL, ALTHOUGH PRIVATELY MANY HAVE EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS CONCERNING THE DOCUMENT AND ITS TIMING. SOME BELIEVE THAT THE ENCYCLICAL AND OTHER CONSERVATIVE STATEMENTS ON DOCTRINE BY THE POPE ARE AIMED AT RETURNING THE CHURCH TO GREATER DISCIPLINE. THE POPE'S MAJOR TASK WILL BE TO SET NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIS CHURCH WITHOUT CREATING GREATER DIVISIONS WITHIN IT.

(S YOU KNOW, WE ARE PROVIDING HELICOPTER SUPPORT TO THE PONTIFF).

DTG: 171153Z AUG 1968

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

48

EAA201
OO WTE12
DE WTE 3253

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO TOM JOHNSON
CITE CAP82044

Pres file

68 AUG 17 AM 8:34
SATURDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUGUST 17, 1968

I RECOMMEND YOU AGREE TO SEC. RUSK'S FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION.
RECOMMENDATION:

THAT YOU AGREE TO THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
HOLDING A DINNER FOR YOU IN MID-SEPTEMBER.

APPROVE ----- DISAPPROVE -----

DISCUSSION:

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OAS COUNCIL, AMBASSADOR ORIBE OF URUGUAY, HAS INFORMED OUR REPRESENTATIVE, AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ, THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD LIKE TO OFFER YOU AND MRS. JOHNSON A FORMAL DINNER AT THE PAN AMERICAN UNION IN MID-SEPTEMBER WHICH WOULD BE ATTENDED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, THE OAS SECRETARY GENERAL, AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS AND THEIR WIVES. THE PURPOSE OF THE DINNER, AMBASSADOR ORIBE STATES, IS TO HONOR YOU BECAUSE OF YOUR FRIENDSHIP TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA AND YOUR DEDICATION TO THE CAUSE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. IF YOU ARE ABLE TO ACCEPT, AMBASSADOR LINOWITZ WILL HELP WORK OUT A SUITABLE DATE WITH YOUR STAFF.

I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HIGHLY FITTING IF YOU COULD ACCEPT AN INVITATION TO THE PROPOSED DINNER.

DEAN RUSK

DTG: 171154Z AUG 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 3-4-03

49

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET~~

August 17, 1968

Mr. President:

The Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee plans to release the attached report on the status of US strategic power later this month after appropriate security review.

In general, the report is a relatively straightforward analysis of the situation. The approach is statesmanlike and the tone remarkably mild. The principal message in the report is that, although our present strategic nuclear forces appear adequate, the Subcommittee is concerned that we might be in trouble in the future if we do not take proper steps to upgrade our capabilities.

Although it does contain a great deal of information on US and Soviet forces, most of this will presumably be eliminated during the security review judging by the deletions (in brackets) already proposed by the Pentagon.

I do not believe the report will be a factor in the political campaign. Although it is critical of some Administration policies and decisions, it does not constitute a broad attack on the Administration's defense policy such as that contained in the Republican platform.

I suggest you read the summary on pages 44-45, possibly the concluding statement on pages 47-52, and the introduction.

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

Att.: Draft Report (*Ly 2500*)

SME:sen;jb:8-16-68/8:30p
bcc: SMK file and chron
> WR (2)
SMK comeback cy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-4-03

~~TOP SECRET~~

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