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1968 AUG 14 22 31

EEA142
OO VTE 10
DE VTE 3183

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81982

~~SECRET~~

68 AUG 14 PM 7:04
WEDNESDAY

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

AUGUST 14, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

HEREWITH AFTERNOON DIGEST OF STATE DEPARTMENT REPORTS

BRITISH ARMS TO NIGERIA

LORD HUNT, THE SPECIAL BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE ON NIGERIAN RELIEF, INFORMED AMBASSADOR TUBBY IN GENEVA THAT PRIME MINISTER WILSON HAD TOLD HIM BRITAIN WILL STOP ARMS SHIPMENTS TO NIGERIA IF LAGOS RESUMES THE OFFENSIVE. HUNT DID NOT KNOW WHETHER FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HEAD GOWAN HAD BEEN NOTIFIED BUT ASSUMED HE WAS WELL AWARE THIS WOULD HAPPEN.

WEST GERMAN MEETINGS IN BERLIN

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF MISSION BERLIN MORRIS AGREES WITH AMBASSADOR LODGE THAT WE CONSIDER THE SECRETARY'S APPROACHING AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ON MAINTAINING A STABLE SITUATION IN BERLIN. HOWEVER, MORRIS IS CONCERNED BY LODGE'S WARNING ACCOMPANYING THE SUGGESTION THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT REGARD SUCH AN APPROACH AS A "PRECEDENT" ENCOURAGING THEM TO EXPECT US TO ACT TO PREVENT OTHER GERMAN MEETINGS IN BERLIN.

CZECHOSLOVAK-WEST GERMAN RELATIONS

EMBASSY PRAGUE NOTES DIFFERING OFFICIAL OPINIONS OVER PRAGUE'S RELATIONS WITH BONN FOLLOWING THE CIERNA-BRATISLAVA MEETINGS. RECENT PRESS AND FOREIGN MINISTRY EMPHASIS ON ALLEGED "REVANCHIST" ACTIVITIES BY SUDETEN GERMANS ALONG THE CZECH BORDER CONTRAST WITH A CZECH OFFICIAL'S STATEMENT TO AN EMBASSY SOURCE THAT HE EXPECTS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITHIN ONE YEAR.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 3-4-03

JAPANESE PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING

IN RESPONSE TO OUR SUGGESTION THAT JAPAN SUBMIT A WRITTEN STATEMENT TO THE UN ON PREPARATIONS FOR PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS, A FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL TOLD EMBASSY TOKYO THIS WOULD PRESENT DIFFICULT LEGAL PROBLEMS. HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WISHED TO BECOME INVOLVED IN PEACEKEEPING, INCLUDING MAKING A CONTRIBUTION IN VIETNAM, BUT THE PROBLEM IS TO GAIN DOMESTIC POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR SUCH A REVERSAL OF PAST PRACTICE.

INDIA ON PEACE TALKS

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTRY SECRETARY T.N. KAUL TOLD AMBASSADOR BOWLES THAT HANOI HAS CLEARLY IMPLIED TO HIS GOVERNMENT THAT RESTRAINT OF SAIGON MORTAR ATTACKS AND WITHDRAWAL FROM KHE SANH WERE INTENDED AS DE-ESCALATION GESTURES TO PERSUADE US TO STOP BOMBING FROM THE 17TH TO THE 19TH PARALLELS. BOWLES REQUESTS DATA THE INDIANS COULD USE TO REBUT HANOI'S CHARGES OF US ESCALATION.

UAR ON ISRAEL'S GULF OF SUEZ CLAIM

UAR FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD TOLD MINISTER BERGUS AND STANDARD OF INDIANA OFFICIALS THAT HIS GOVERNMENT CONCLUDES THERE IS NO "MEDIAN LINE" AS CLAIMED BY ISRAEL. HE COUNSELED THE COMPANY TO "IGNORE" ISRAEL'S APPROACHES AND TO CONTINUE ITS DRILLING PROGRAM AS AGREED UPON WITH ITS EGYPTIAN PARTNER. RIAD ALSO AGREED THERE SHOULD BE NO PUBLICITY.

ISRAELI USE OF SKYHAWKS IN SALT RAID

ALTHOUGH IT HAS NO OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION, EMBASSY TEL AVIV SEES NO REASON TO DOUBT THAT ISRAEL USED SKYHAWKS IN THE AUGUST 4 RAID. HOWEVER, THE EMBASSY QUESTIONS WHETHER A US APPROACH TO THE EFFECT THAT SUCH USE "EMBARRASSES" US WOULD BE IN OUR INTEREST OR THAT IT WOULD RESULT IN ANY RECONSIDERATION ON USE OF AMERICAN-BUILT AIRCRAFT.

INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS

INDIAN DEFENSE MINISTER SWAREN SINGH ANNOUNCED HE WOULD VISIT RUSSIA ACCOMPANIED BY A MILITARY ADVISORY TEAM IN LATE SEPTEMBER OR EARLY OCTOBER. MEANWHILE, EMBASSY NEW DELHI LEARNED THAT INDIA HAS SUGGESTED EARLY SEPTEMBER TO MOSCOW FOR MINISTERIAL TALKS, THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION USED AT THE RECENT INDO-US MEETING. BOTH MOVES PRESUMABLY REFLECT MOSCOW'S DESIRE TO REASSURE INDIA FOLLOWING THE SOVIET ARMS OFFER TO PAKISTAN.

~~SECRET~~

DTG 142153Z AUG 68

ACTION

74

Wednesday, August 14, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Recommended Meeting with British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart

British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart will be in Washington on Friday, October 11, during the course of his attending the U.N. General Assembly meeting in New York that week. He will meet with Secretary Rusk at noon October 11, followed by a working lunch, and has asked whether it would be possible to see you. You last met him in March 1965 during his previous tenure as Foreign Secretary.

Secretary Rusk recommends you meet with him. Stewart is able and influential, and has defended British support for the U.S. position in Vietnam before the House of Commons. You met with his predecessor, George Brown, during similar visits to the United States.

I concur in Secretary Rusk's recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Arrange meeting October 11 _____

No _____

Call me _____

ERF:mst

75

ACTION

Wednesday, August 14, 1968

Free file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached, for your approval, is a message to President Luebke of the Federal Republic, replying to his letter to you expressing regret over Ambassador McGhee's departure. A translation of President Luebke's letter is enclosed.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

ERF

ERF:mst

75a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Suggested Reply

Dear Mr. President:

I appreciate deeply your generous letter of July 18 expressing regret over the departure of Ambassador McGhee. I share your high esteem for Ambassador McGhee and the work he did in Bonn on behalf of relations between our countries. I look forward with great confidence to the continued further development of cooperation, alliance, and intimate friendship between the Federal Republic and the United States.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

75b

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 3832
R-12/R-16
German

Heinrich Lübke

11027

President of the Federal Republic of Germany

to

His Excellency Lyndon B. Johnson

President of the United States of America

Great and Good Friend:

Your Excellency informed me by letter of April 22, 1968 that you decided to recall your Ambassador accredited here,

Mr.

George C. McGhee

I was sincerely sorry to see Mr. McGhee leave his post here. Thanks to his outstanding qualities and tireless work he succeeded in winning my complete esteem and that of the Federal Government and in cultivating and strengthening the friendly relations that happily exist between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America.

My best wishes for the future go with him.

I avail myself of this opportunity to assure you, Mr. President, of my highest consideration.

Your good friend

[signed] Lübke

The Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs

[Signature]

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

76

EEA135
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3174

08 14 13 80

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81974

Pres file

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

AUGUST 14, 1968

HEREWITH THE FBI INFORMS US THAT NIXON HAS REVIVED HIS PLAN FOR TRAVELLING TO THE SOVIET UNION ON AUGUST 21 OR 22. DOBRYNIN INDICATED THAT HE THOUGHT THE PLAN WAS OFF BUT WILL CABLE MOSCOW.

QUOTE: A LETTER FROM THIS BUREAU DATED AUGUST 9, 1968, ADVISED OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN ROBERT ELLSWORTH, ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT TO REPUBLICAN PARTY PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE RICHARD M. NIXON, AND SOVIET AMBASSADOR ANATOLI F. DOBRYNIN CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF MR. NIXON TRAVELING TO THE SOVIET UNION, TENTATIVELY ON AUGUST 21 OR 22, 1968.

ON AUGUST 12, 1968, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT ELLSWORTH WAS IN CONTACT WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN IF APPROVAL HAD BEEN RECEIVED FOR MR. NIXON'S TRAVEL TO THE USSR ON AUGUST 21 OR 22, 1968. AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN SAID THAT HIS ASSOCIATES IN THE USSR HAD CEASED CONSIDERATION CONCERNING THE TRIP AFTER MR. NIXON'S ANNOUNCEMENT AT A RECENT PRESS CONFERENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT HE WAS NO LONGER CONSIDERING A VISIT TO THE USSR EVEN THOUGH ELLSWORTH DID NOT OFFICIALLY INFORM THEM IN THIS REGARD.

ELLSWORTH INDICATED THERE HAD BEEN A MIX-UP IN COMMUNICATIONS AND SINCE NO OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION OF APPROVAL FOR THE TRAVEL HAD BEEN FORTHCOMING FROM THE SOVIETS, MR. NIXON FELT HE HAD TO CANCEL HIS PLANS FOR THE PROPOSED TRAVEL. ELLSWORTH TOLD AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN THAT UNLESS INFORMATION CONCERNING THE TRAVEL IS RECEIVED FROM HIM DIRECTLY, IT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS OFFICIAL.

ELLSWORTH AGAIN REITERATED MR. NIXON'S DESIRE TO TRAVEL TO THE USSR BUT INDICATED ANY TRIP WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY NATIONAL CONVENTION. AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN SAID HE WOULD TELEGRAPH MOSCOW AND ADVISE ELLSWORTH PROMPTLY OF THE ANSWER HE RECEIVES. END QUOTE:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 03-150
By SJ, NARA, Date 6-3-03

DTG 141318Z AUG 68

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

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EEA134
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3172

1968 AUG 14 13 54

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP81972

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

AUGUST 14, 1968

FOLLOWING STATE-DEFENSE MESSAGE DISPATCHED LAST NIGHT TO SAIGON AND PARIS. I HAVE BRIEFED IN THIS SENSE: JOE ALSOP, JACK LEACACOS, JACK SUTHERLAND, CHALMERS ROBERTS, RUSS WIGGINS, CROSBY NOYES, PLUS STEW ALSOP AND CLAYTON FRITCHEY -- THE LATTER PAIR AFTER A TENNIS MATCH. PLAN TO SEE TIME AND NEWSWEEK MEN, IF POSSIBLE, TODAY.

1. HIGHEST AUTHORITIES WISH ENSURE FULL, PROMPT, AND HARD-HITTING ACTION PLAN FOR INFORMING PRESS AND PUBLIC OF THIRD WAVE ATTACK PROSPECTS AND EFFECTS. IT IS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO AVOID REPETITION OF PROBLEM WHICH DEVELOPED DURING AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER TET OFFENSIVE WHEN PRESS CAUGHT OFF-BALANCE AND OVERPLAYED NEGATIVE ASPECTS.
2. AS WE SEE PROBLEM, TWO PHASES INVOLVED (A) PERIOD OF ENEMY PREPARATION FOR RENEWED OFFENSIVE (B) ACTUAL ATTACK, PARTICULARLY IN INITIAL STAGES WHEN PICTURE WILL BE CONFUSED AND TENDENCY TO SENSATIONALIZE HIGH. ON MILITARY FACTS INVOLVED SAIGON SHOULD TAKE LEAD IN BACKGROUNDING PRESS GENERALLY AND SELECTED CORRESPONDENTS IN CONSIDERABLE DEPTH AND WASHINGTON WILL TAKE SUPPORTING ROLE. ON BROADER POLICY QUESTION OF WHY WE DO NOT INTERPRET THE DROP IN MILITARY ACTIVITY AND SOME RECENT NORTH VIETNAMESE HINTS AS THE "RESTRAINT" WE ARE LOOKING FOR, WASHINGTON WILL LEAD. ON THIS POINT SEPARATE CIRCULAR WILL CONTAIN GUIDANCE TO ALL POSTS. AS WE WISH INCLUDE SOME OF ELEMENTS IN SITUATION TREATED BELOW, NEED YOUR COMMENTS SOONEST.
3. BACKGROUNDING SHOULD BE IN CONTEXT OF STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT, PARTICULARLY JULY 31 PRESS CONFERENCE, BY SECRETARY RUSK ON JULY 30, AND BY SECRETARIES CLIFFORD IN SAIGON AND AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN IN PARIS. IT SHOULD ALSO DRAW ON HONOLULU JOINT COMMUNIQUE'S "REVIEW OF SITUATION" AND ITS DISCUSSION OF PATTERN OF ENEMY MILITARY ACTIVITY INDICATING RENEWED OFFENSIVE ACTION. AS APPROPRIATE, THESE STATEMENT SHOULD BE CITED.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 21
By ics, NARS, Date 6-26-84

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

4. WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT ALL OBSERVE CERTAIN CAUTIONS IN BACKGROUNDING:

A. IN PRE-ATTACK PHASE EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON ENEMY PREPARATIONS RATHER THAN ON PRECISE PREDICTIONS. IN PARTICULAR, WE SHOULD AVOID LOCKING ON TO FIRM DATES OF OFFENSIVE. ENEMY PLANS MAY STILL BE UPSET BY EFFECTIVE SPOILING ACTIONS OR ALTERED TO ACCOMMODATE HANOI'S STRATEGIC PURPOSE. WE DO NOT WISH TO MAKE HANOI'S CASE BY OVERPLAYING SIGNIFICANCE OF ANY DELAY IN THE ATTACKS THAT OUR COUNTER-MEASURES IMPOSE.

B. THERE SHOULD BE NO SPECULATION ON WHAT EFFECT OFFENSIVE, IF IT OCCURS, OR IF IT IS DEFERRED, WILL HAVE ON SUCH MATTERS AS US POSITION IN PARIS TALKS AND US BOMBING POLICY.

C. WE DO NOT WANT TO GIVE IMPRESSION THAT WE KNOW SO MUCH ABOUT ENEMY PLANS FOR OFFENSIVE, AND HAVE MADE SUCH COMPLETE PLANS FOR ALLIED COUNTER-ACTION, THAT ENEMY'S MILITARY MOVES SHOULD BE IMMEDIATELY AND COMPLETELY ROUTED.

D. AT SAME TIME WE WISH AVOID ANY IMPRESSION THAT THIRD WAVE HAS TAKEN US BY SURPRISE OR THAT ITS GENERAL CONTOURS INDICATE MORE RESIDUAL NVN STRENGTH THAN WE HAD ANTICIPATED.

5. WITH THESE THOUGHTS IN MIND, POSSIBLE BASIC OUTLINE FOR BACKGROUNDING FOLLOWS. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS ASAP, INCLUDING DETAILS YOU ARE USING IN YOUR BACKGROUNDING TO FLESH OUT THE GENERAL POINTS (FOR EXAMPLE, EXCERPTS FROM CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND INTERROGATIONS, PARTICULARLY ON ENEMY PLANS AND OBJECTIVES, SPECIFICS ON ENEMY TROOPS DEPLOYMENTS AND HOW THIS COMPARES TO PRE-TET AND PRE-MAY-JUNE OFFENSIVES, SPECIFIC EVIDENCE THAT ALLIED SPOILING ACTIONS MAY HAVE AFFECTED ENEMY TIMETABLE.) ALSO REQUEST THAT YOU KEEP US CURRENTLY INFORMED OF NEW INFORMATION AS YOU USE IT OR NEED IT FROM THIS END.

6. BEGIN OUTLINE:

AS THE TET OFFENSIVE CONCLUDED LAST FEBRUARY, IT WAS LEARNED THAT THE ENEMY WAS PLANNING NEW OFFENSIVES TO CONTINUE THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL PRESSURE. ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN ONLY LIMITED COMMITMENT OF NVA MAIN FORCE UNITS, NORTH VIETNAM WAS CONTINUING TO INFILTRATE REGULAR TROOPS IN RECORD NUMBERS.

AFTER A LULL IN APRIL, THE SECOND OFFENSIVE MATERIALIZED IN EARLY MAY, CYNICALLY TIMED TO FOLLOW AN AGREEMENT ON PARIS AS A SITE FOR THE TALKS AND TO COINCIDE WITH THE OPENING OF THESE TALKS, THUS GIVING CLEAR EVIDENCE OF HANOI'S CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO THE STRATEGY OF FIGHTING WHILE NEGOTIATING. THE SECOND OFFENSIVE WAS NOT AS EXTENSIVE AS THE TET OFFENSIVE, ALTHOUGH SAIGON RECEIVED HEAVY BOMBARDMENT OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME.

SHORTLY AFTER THE SECOND OFFENSIVE IT WAS LEARNED THAT A THIRD OFFENSIVE WAS PLANNED FOR JUNE. IT BECAME READILY APPARENT, HOWEVER, THAT THE ENEMY DOUBTED HIS ABILITY TO MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE OFFENSIVE IN JUNE; AND THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE POSTPONED UNTIL LATE JULY OR AUGUST. THUS, BEGINNING IN LATE JUNE, THE LEVEL OF FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIET-NAME AGAIN DROPPED AND CONTINUED RELATIVELY LOW THROUGH THE CURRENT WEEKS IN COMPARISON WITH THE PREVIOUS HIGH ACTIVITY DURING TET AND DURING THE MAY-JUNE ATTACKS. EVIDENCE CONTINUED, HOWEVER, DURING THIS PERIOD TO SHOW THAT THE ENEMY WAS AVOIDING MILITARY CONTACT PRIMARILY TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE ACTION. SPECIFIC INDICATIONS INCLUDED:

A. THE HIGH RATE OF INFILTRATION FROM APRIL ONWARD AT RATES ROUGHLY THREE TIMES THOSE OF THE SAME PERIOD IN 1967 AND EVEN SOMEWHAT HIGHER THAN THE VERY HIGH RATE WHICH PREVAILED IN DECEMBER-MARCH PERIOD. (PUBLICLY RELEASED ESTIMATES INDICATE APPROXIMATELY 29,000 IN MAY, 20,000 IN JUNE, AND 30,000 IN JULY WITH THE PROSPECTS BEING THAT THE AUGUST FIGURE WILL BE AT LEAST AS HIGH AS THAT IN JULY. THESE FIGURES ARE ORDER OF MAGNITUDE ESTIMATES BASED ON A WIDE VARIETY OF INTELLIGENCE INDICATORS.)

B. MAIN FORCE ENEMY STRENGTH WHICH PROBABLY FELL SOMEWHAT DURING THE JANUARY-MARCH PERIOD BEGAN TO RISE AGAIN BASED ON OUR ESTIMATES OF INFILTRATION VERSUS ATTRITION. ALL OF THE RECENT INCREASES ARE IN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COMPONENTS OF ENEMY STRENGTH WHICH MAY HAVE RISEN AS MUCH AS 20 TO 30 PERCENT SINCE OUR LAST PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED ESTIMATE OF 90,000 IN LATE MAY.

C. ENEMY TROOP MOVEMENTS HAVE FOLLOWED THE PATTERN WHICH PREVAILED BEFORE THE TET AND MAY ATTACKS WITH UNITS MOVING TO AREAS WHERE THEY CAN REST, RE-EQUIP, AND RE-SUPPLY. MANY ENEMY UNITS ARE NOW DEPLOYED IN THREATENING POSITIONS.

D. PRISONER INTERROGATION AND CAPTURED DOCUMENTS SUPPORT THE PRESUMPTION THAT WE HAVE DERIVED FROM THE ABOVE INDICATORS THAT THE ENEMY IS IN FACT PREPARING FOR LARGE-SCALE MILITARY ACTION. MOREOVER, THE CONTINUED HIGH LEVEL OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY, THE DISCOVERY OF STRATEGICALLY PLACED ARMS, CACHES AND OTHER INDICATIONS ALL ARE CONSISTENT WITH SUCH AN ASSESSMENT.

E. PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY HANOI AND VC, AS WELL AS PRIVATE STATEMENTS NOT DESIGNED TO REACH U.S. EARS, ALSO REFER TO FURTHER MAJOR OFFENSIVE ACTION.

F. IN SUM, ALL THESE INDICATORS FORM A PATTERN CONSISTENT WITH CAREFUL AND LENGTHY PREPARATIONS FOR NEW OFFENSIVE. THESE PREPARATIONS ARE FAR ADVANCED, AND WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF HEAVY FIGHTING STARTED SOON, PERHAPS DURING THE NEXT TWO WEEKS, TIMED TO INFLUENCE THE DEMOCRATE CONVENTION. ON THE OTHER HAND WE ARE NOT ATTEMPTING TO PREDICT JUST WHEN IT WILL START, PARTICULARLY SINCE ENEMY'S PLANS COULD BE AFFECTED BY OUR MILITARY SPOILING ACTIONS OR BY BROADER HANOI STRATEGY.

G. SHOULD A MAJOR OFFENSIVE BEGIN IN THIS PERIOD, WE WOULD EXPECT THAT SAIGON WILL REMAIN THE PRIMARY TARGET, AND THERE ARE STRONG INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY WILL ATTEMPT TO WEAKEN SAIGON DEFENSES BY ATTACKING THE PERIPHERAL TARGETS PRIMARILY IN TAY NINH AND BINH LONG PROVINCES. THESE ATTACKS WOULD BE FOLLOWED IN FIVE TO TEN DAYS BY ATTACKS ON SAIGON.

POPULATION CENTERS AND ALLIED INSTALLATIONS NEAR THE DMZ, IN EASTERN I CORPS, THE WESTERN HIGHLANDS AND DELTA AREAS WILL ALSO BE IMPORTANT TARGETS. IN ADDITION TO PRESSURE ON SAIGON, THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT AN ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE TO ATTACK AND SECURE A PROVINCIAL CAPITAL WHICH CAN SERVE AS A PROVISIONAL CAPITAL FOR COALITION BETWEEN THE NLF AND THE ALLIANCE. END OUTLINE

DTG 141294Z AUG 1968

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INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE--EYES ONLY

Pres file

Wednesday, August 14, 1968
2:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Dick Helms reports marital trouble in the Marcos household, with bad effects on Marcos' presidential performance.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-461
By CB, NARA, Date 10-22-95

WWRostow:rln

79a

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

I am sending this report only to you and to Secretary Rusk. I believe it will be of interest, because it adds to other reports we have received that President Marcos is not working as conscientiously as he might dealing with the critical problems of his Government.

Rich
Richard Helms

Attachment - 1

14 August 1968
(DATE)

~~SECRET~~

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-462
By C6, NARA, Date 9-28-95

1 HYB81W
JCILA
C)

ACTION

~~SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

Pres file

Monday, August 13, 1968 - 2:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Dick Helms recommends a successor to Rufus Taylor.

You should know that his nominee does not know that his name is going forward. Therefore, there would be no embarrassment whatsoever if you choose to keep Taylor through January 20.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-461
By CB, NARA, Date 10-22-95

~~SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

802



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

12 August 1968

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-462
By cb, NARA, Date 9-28-95

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

1. You asked me to give you a nomination for successor to Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. I would like to nominate Major General Jack E. Thomas, United States Air Force.

2. As you will note in the attached biographical sketch, General Thomas, age 57, is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, holds a Ph. D. in political science from the University of California, has attended the National War College, and has had a rich experience in military intelligence during his Air Force career. As head of intelligence for the Air Force, he has been a member of the United States Intelligence Board over which I preside. Based on my observations and those of others, he appears to have the intelligence, thoughtfulness, and experience needed for this assignment.

3. In an effort to assure you that this nomination has appropriate clearance from concerned individuals, I have spoken privately with Dean Rusk, Clark Clifford, Paul Nitze, Max Taylor, Bus Wheeler, and J. P. McConnell. There were no dissents although Thomas is not well known to some of these gentlemen. J. P. McConnell told me that

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- 2 -

he was highly regarded both professionally and personally throughout the Air Force.

4. In these conversations, as you can imagine, questions were raised as to whether or not this appointment should be made prior to January 20. My reply to this was: (1) I would prefer to see the number two spot encumbered when the new President takes office since he might want a new Director and there should be some continuity, (2) it did not strike me that the appointment of a regular military officer to this position would be controversial even in an election atmosphere, (3) the Agency must remain out of politics to do its job properly and to keep bipartisan support in Congress.

5. Should you wish, however, to leave this appointment to your successor, Admiral Taylor has expressed a willingness to stay on until January to keep the Agency fully manned to the end of your Administration.

Dick

Richard Helms
Director

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

Major General Jack E. Thomas,
United States Air Force

PART I - Narrative

Jack Eugene Thomas, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, was born in Salt Lake City on 30 November 1910. He is a graduate of the University of Utah and holds both a Master's and a Ph. D. degree in political science from the University of California, Berkeley. Nearly all of his military career has been served in a variety of intelligence assignments.

M. S. was in public admin. (Who's Who 1967 - 68)

He was commissioned a Second Lieutenant, Field Artillery reserve, in 1932 on the basis of ROTC training at the University of Utah, and was a reserve Captain when called to active duty in 1941. In the intervening years he had been a newspaperman in Salt Lake City, then a graduate student and research specialist on the staff of the University of California, Berkeley.

Salt Lake City Telegram '31-38 Reporter & Editor (Who's Who 1967 - 68)

He spent sixteen months in Italy during World War II as intelligence officer of the 47th Bomb Wing, 15th Air Force, and was awarded the Legion of Merit. At the close of the war in Europe he was assigned to Berlin where as a staff officer in the Office of Military Government, US, he participated in quadrupartite discussions with Soviet, British and French representatives.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas returned to the United States in 1946 and was appointed to the regular Air Force. He was promoted to colonel in 1948.

Colonel Thomas was in the Office of the Air Deputy, SHAPE, from 1953 until 1957, and while there obtained much of the material needed for his Ph. D. dissertation on "SACEUR and SHAPE, A Study of Peacetime Preparation for Coalition Defense, 1950-1956."

He returned to the United States in 1957 to attend the National War College, and was assigned from there back to Paris in 1958 as Director of Intelligence on the joint staff of Headquarters, United States European Command.

He was promoted to brigadier general(temporary) in 1961.

He returned to Washington in 1961 to become Commander, Air Force Intelligence Center, and on 1 December 1961 was assigned as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Hq. USAF.

On 15 March 1963 he was named the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Hq. USAF.

General Thomas is the son of Mrs. Mary H. Thomas and the late S. J. Thomas of Tooele, Utah. He married the former Margaret Rohrer of Fresno, California, in 1951.

PART II - Fact Sheet

A. Personal Data

1. Born 30 November 1910, Salt Lake City, Utah; Father - Samuel Joseph Thomas; Mother - Mary Ann Hogan Thomas. Father died in 1957. Mother lives in Tooele, Utah.
2. Married 5 August 1951; Wife - Margaret Jane Rohrer, daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Victor A. Rohrer of Fresno, California.
3. Home town address: 40 Park Avenue, Tooele, Utah.
4. Civilian Organizations:

American Political Science Association
Air Force Association
Phi Beta Kappa and Phi Kappa Phi Scholarship Fraternities
Pi Kappa Alpha, social fraternity

B. Education

Graduate, Tooele High School, Tooele, Utah, 1927
Graduate, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, 1931, BA degree
M.S. degree in public administration, University of California, Berkeley, 1939
Ph. D. degree in political science, University of California, Berkeley, 1959
Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1942
National War College, Fort McNair, Washington, D. C. 1958

C. Service

19 January 1932 Commissioned 2nd Lt., Field Artillery Res. on basis ROTC at University of Utah

6 July 1941 Called to active duty as Captain, F. A. Res.

1941 - 1943 Squadron, group, wing and bomber command intelligence Officer in Second Air Force

1944 - 1945 Intelligence Officer, 47th Bomb Wing, 15th Air Force in Italy

1945 - 1946 Staff Officer, Armed Forces Division, Office of Military Government, US in Berlin

1946 - 1948 Section Chief, Air Intelligence Division, Hq., AAF, Washington, D. C.

1949 - 1953 Section Chief, then Branch Chief, then Division Chief, Intelligence Directorate, Hq USAF

1953 - 1957 Branch Chief, Office of the Air Deputy, SHAPE, Paris, France

1958 - 1961 Director of Intelligence (J-2), Hq US European Command, Paris, France

1961 Commander, Air Force Intelligence Center, Arlington, Va.

1961 - 1963 Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Hq. USAF

1963 to present Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Hq. USAF

D. Decorations and Medals:

Legion of Merit (for wartime duty in Italy, with 47th Bomb Wing, 15th Air Force)

Army Commendation Ribbon with one Oak Leaf Cluster

American Defense Service Medal

American Campaign Medal

European, African, Middle East Campaign Medal with three Bronze Battle Stars for Rome-Arno, Air Offensive-Europe, and Southern France

World War II Victory Medal

Army of Occupation Medal (Germany)

Armed Forces Reserve Medal

National Defense Service Medal

Air Force Longevity Service Award with four Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters

E. Promotions

| <u>Rank</u> | <u>Temporary</u> (date of rank) | <u>Permanent</u> |
|-------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------|
| 2nd Lt., FA Res | | 5 January 1932 |
| 1st Lt., FA Res | | 27 February 1935 |
| Capt., FA Res | | 19 April 1941 |
| Major, AUS | 5 August 1942 | |
| Lt. Colonel, AUS | 9 October 1943 | |
| Captain USAF | | 30 November 1945 |
| Lt. Colonel, USAF | | 1 July 1948 |
| Colonel, USAF | 22 November 1948 | 27 July 1950 |
| Brigadier General, USAF | 17 February 1961 | 20 July 1962 |
| Major General, USAF | 1 July 1959 | |

(Extracted from Air Force files, annotated and 'crossed checked against current edition of Who's Who and Air Force Register of January 1968.)

ACTION
Tuesday, August 13, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Visit to Washington of New Zealand Prime Minister Holyoake

In your exchange of letters with Holyoake last May, he suggested deferring his visit to Washington until a later time. You asked him to let you know when the visit was convenient.

The New Zealand Embassy has now informed us that Holyoake will be in the United States this fall for the UN General Assembly, and wonders if that presents a convenient opportunity for a visit with you. Specifically, would the week of October 13-19 be convenient?

You have no foreign visitors firmly scheduled for October. (There is a possibility of Diaz Ordaz and Trudeau on the 5th of October; and the possibility of a Uruguayan visit on October 23.) The week of the 13th, therefore, looks convenient.

Holyoake is holding, in effect, an open-ended invitation from you. He is also the only head of government providing combat troops in Vietnam whom you have not seen this year. I, therefore, assume you will want to accept this nibble, and extend an invitation to him.

Attached is a suggested letter of invitation for your signature. I recommend you sign the letter.

W. W. Rostow

Letter signed _____

Call me _____

MWright:mm

81a

AUG 16 1968

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am very glad to hear that it may be possible for you to visit Washington this fall. There is much for us to discuss, and I have been looking forward to our next exchange of views.

As I understand it, the middle of October now looks to be the most convenient time for your visit. That would be altogether satisfactory to me, and I suggest October 16 and 17 as specific dates toward which our staffs can work.

Lady Bird joins me in hoping Mrs. Holyoake will be able to accompany you.

Warm personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

(5) Lyndon B. Johnson

The Right Honorable
Keith J. Holyoake
Prime Minister of New Zealand
Wellington

LBJ:MWright:mm:8/13/68

82

ACTION

Tuesday, August 13, 1968

Pres file

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You have no foreign visitors firmly scheduled for October. (There is a possibility of Diaz Ordaz and Trudeau on the 5th of October; and the possibility of a Uruguayan visit on October 23.) The week of the 13th, therefore, looks convenient. I am told Mrs. Johnson's schedule is clear for this period.

Holyoake is holding, in effect, an open-ended invitation from you. He is also the only head of government providing combat troops in Vietnam whom you have not seen this year. I, therefore, assume you will want to accept this nibble, and extend an invitation to him.

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Sincerely yours,

The Right Honorable
Keith J. Holyoake
Prime Minister of New Zealand
Wellington

LBJ:MWright:mm:8/13/68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

83

Free file

1968 AUG 13 21 08

EEA123
CO WTE13
DE WTE 3159

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 03-149
By us, NARA, Date 6-2-03

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81962

68 AUG 13 PM 5:08

TUESDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUGUST 13, 1968

WHAT FOLLOWS IS NOT REQUIRED READING. BUT IT CAME ACROSS MY DESK THIS MORNING ALONG WITH THE HERBLOCK CARTOON ON RUSSIA: IT INDICATES ONE REASON THE CZECH CRISIS IS SO SERIOUS FOR MOSCOW AND WHY A YOUNG RUSSIAN BELIEVES MOSCOW MUST CRUSH IT.

QUOTE

FROM: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW, AUGUST 6, 1968

SUBJECT: YOUNG RUSSIAN'S VIEWS ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA, YOUTH PROBLEM, AND SAKHAROV LETTER

THE ENCLOSED MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION COVERS THE HIGHLIGHTS OF A LENGTHY MIDNIGHT CONVERSATION ON AUGUST 1 BETWEEN AN EMBASSY OFFICER (WAYNE SMITH, SECOND SECRETARY) AND A 28-YEAR-OLD RUSSIAN, VYACHESLAV ALEKSANDROVICH MEDINTSEV (PROTECT), THE DIRECTOR OF DISTRIBUTION IN THE MOSCOW UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING HOUSE. MEDINTSEV FIRST BECAME KNOWN TO THE EMBASSY SOME TWO YEARS AGO IN CONNECTION WITH THE PUBLICATIONS PROCUREMENT PROGRAM. SINCE THEN HE HAS OCCASIONALLY ATTENDED FILM SHOWINGS AND ONCE A FUNCTION AT SPASO HOUSE. HE IS NOT HOWEVER, REGULARLY ENCOUNTERED IN THE MOSCOW DIPLOMATIC CIRCLE. ON THE CONTRARY, HE KNOWS VERY FEW FOREIGNERS. HE SEEMS TYPICAL OF THE CROWD OF YOUNG, EDUCATED, URBAN RUSSIANS WHO THROG TO THE LIBERAL PLAYS, AVIDLY READ THE LIBERAL POETS, AND REGULARLY LISTEN TO FOREIGN BROADCASTS. DURING THE CONVERSATION, HE REPEATEDLY USED THE PHRASES "ALL MY FRIENDS THINK THAT...", OR "ALL THOSE IN MY CROWD SAY..." MOREOVER, HIS VIEWS ON THE YOUTH PROBLEM AT LEAST SEEM TO COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF OTHER EMBASSY CONTACTS. IT CANNOT BE DETERMINED JUST HOW WIDELY THE VIEWS HE EXPRESSED ARE HELD, BUT IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THEY ARE HELD BY AT LEAST MORE THAN A FEW YOUNG URBAN RUSSIANS.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

MEDINTSEV SAID HE AND ALL HIS FRIENDS HAVE A RATHER GOOD IDEA FROM BBC AND VOA AS TO WHAT IS GOING ON IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. HE SYMPATHIZES FULLY WITH THE CZECHS BUT IS EXTREMELY PESSIMISTIC AS TO THEIR CHANCES FOR SUCCESS. "NO MATTER WHAT OUR LEADERS HAVE SAID AT CIERNA, OR WILL SAY AT BRATISLAVA," HE SAID, "SOONER OR LATER THEY WILL HAVE TO CRUSH THIS THING IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA." HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HIMSELF EXPECTS A REPETITION OF THE HUNGARIAN INTERVENTION, AND HE EXPECTS IT TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE YEAR IS OUT, ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SAID, THE MORE TIME THAT PASSES, THE MORE EMBARRASSING IT WILL BE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO USE NAKED FORCE. THE PARTY LEADERS MIGHT THEREFORE RESORT TO MASSIVE ECONOMIC PRESSURES ON THE EXTERNAL FRONT, AND, INSIDE CZECHOSLOVAKIA, TO EFFORTS TO CO-OPT OPPOSITION ELEMENTS AND UNDERMINE THE POSITION OF

THE LIBERALS. BUT HOWEVER THEY CHOOSE TO CRUSH IT, HE WENT ON, THE PRINCIPAL THING TO BEAR IN MIND IS THAT THEY (THE SOVIET LEADERS) SIMPLY CANNOT AND WILL NOT ALLOW THIS MOVEMENT TOWARD "SOCIAL DEMOCRACY" TO GO UNCHECKED--NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE DANGER OF THE CONTAGION SPREADING TO THE OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, BUT, MORE IMPORTANTLY, BECAUSE OF THE DANGER OF ITS SPREADING TO THE SOVIET UNION ITSELF. "AND IN THAT ASSESSMENT," HE SAID, "THE CP LEADERSHIP HERE IS PERFECTLY CORRECT. OUR GENERATION IS WATCHING DEVELOPMENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA WITH INTENSE INTEREST. IF THE CZECHS ARE ABLE TO CARRY OFF THEIR EXPERIMENT WITH THIS NEW TYPE OF 'LIBERAL' COMMUNISM, THEN CERTAINLY WE WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO DEMAND THAT THE PERIMETERS OF OUR OWN LIBERTIES BE EXPANDED." THE THING THAT MUST REALLY DISTURB SOVIET PARTY LEADERS, HE CONTINUED, IS THAT THE PARTY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS ALLOWING ITS LEADING ROLE TO BE CHALLENGED. PERHAPS THERE THE PARTY CAN GET AWAY WITH IT BECAUSE, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, THE PEOPLE WILL UNITE BEHIND THE CZECH PARTY AGAINST SOVIET INTERFERENCE. BUT IN THE SOVIET UNION, HE SAID, THE PARTY COULD NEVER ALLOW ITS POSITION TO BE SO CHALLENGED. THE LEADERSHIP KNEW FULL WELL THAT THEY COULD NEVER RECEIVE ANY SORT OF FREELY EXPRESSED MANDATE FROM THE PEOPLE. THEY MUST RULE BY COERCION. FOR THE CZECHS TO SUGGEST THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO RULE WITHOUT COERCION, CENSORSHIP, ETC., IN EFFECT, THEN, POSED A THREAT TO THE LEADING ROLE OF THE PARTY IN THE SOVIET UNION--A THREAT WHICH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ARE NOT LIKELY TO LONG ABIDE.

MR. SMITH SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THE 1968 CZECH AND THE 1956 HUNGARIAN SITUATIONS WERE NOT ALTOGETHER ANALOGOUS. THE CZECH PARTY WAS STILL IN CONTROL, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, UNLIKE HUNGARY IN 1956, IS NOT TRYING TO LEAVE THE WARSAW PACT. ON THE CONTRARY, IT HAS DECLARED ITS FULL INTENTION TO REMAIN WITHIN THE SOCIALIST CAMP. MOREOVER, THE CZECHS, UNLIKE THE HUNGARIANS IN 1956, HAVE THE SUPPORT OF MANY OTHER CP'S.

MEDINTSEV SAID THAT HE AND ALL HIS FRIENDS KNEW FROM FOREIGN BROADCAST THAT THE BRITISH, THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN CP'S, TO SAY NOTHING OF THE ROMANIANS AND THE YUGOSLAVS, HAVE LINED UP WITH THE CZECHS. THAT, OF COURSE, HE ADMITTED, MAKES IT A MORE COMPLICATED PROBLEM FOR THE SOVIET LEADERS. IF THEY SEND IN TANKS, THEY WILL ENRAGE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AND FURTHER DIVIDE (PERHAPS HOPELESSLY) THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. THAT WOULD BE A SERIOUS LOSS. BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE CZECHS GET AWAY WITH "LIBERALIZATION," THE SOVIET LEADERS WILL SEE IN IT THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF THE CPSU AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED. THEY WILL SEE THEIR OWN POSITIONS THREATENED. "OUR LEADERS ARE NOT GOING TO RISK THAT," HE CONCLUDED. "NO, THERE ARE NO TWO WAYS ABOUT IT. THEY WILL HAVE TO CRUSH THE CZECHS."

SAKHAROV LETTER

IN REPLY TO MR. SMITH'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT HE HAD READ THE SAKHAROV LETTER, MEDINTSEV REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT, BUT THAT HE HAD HEARD ABOUT IT ON THE VOA AND THAT EVERYONE WAS VERY EXCITED BY IT. HE WANTS VERY MUCH TO READ IT, BUT HAS NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO LAY HANDS ON A COPY. HE COMMENTED THAT WHEREAS HE, OF COURSE, SYMPATHIZES WITH WHAT SAKHAROV WAS TRYING TO DO, HE THOUGHT THE MAN HIMSELF MUST BE EITHER A BIT QUIXOTIC--OR ALMOST UNBELIEVABLY COURAGEOUS. EVERYONE, HE SAID, WAS WONDERING WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO HIM SINCE THE LETTER CAME OUT.

YOUTH PROBLEM

SOVIET YOUTH THINK MARXISM-LENINISM IS A JOKE. CERTAINLY TO ONE BELIEVES IN THE INFALLIBILITY OF THE PARTY--OR EVEN THAT IT IS RIGHT MORE OFTEN THAN IT IS WRONG. THAT IS NOT TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT THEY ADMIRE THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM. ON THE CONTRARY, THE SERIOUS SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN THE U. S. SUGGEST THAT "YOURS IS NOT THE WAY EITHER."

EXCLUDED FROM ANY ROLE, OR LIKELIHOOD OF ACHIEVING A ROLE, IN DECISION MAKING, SEEING THAT THERE IS VERY LITTLE CHANCE OF CHANGING THE SYSTEM, SOVIET YOUNG PEOPLE REACT BY SIMPLY IGNORING POLITICS AND CONCENTRATING ON THEIR OWN MATERIAL WELL-BEING. THIS DOES NOT MEAN, HOWEVER, THAT THEY ARE APATHETIC IN THE TRUE MEANING OF THE TERM. "WE ARE VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN EXPANDING THE LIMITS WITHIN WHICH WE ARE ALLOWED TO EXPRESS OURSELVES," HE SAID. AND IF THERE REALLY SEEMED TO BE A CHANCE TO CHANGE ANYTHING, SOVIET YOUTH WOULD REACT WITH VIGOR. "SINCE NOTHING IS GOING TO BE CHANGED, HOWEVER, WE CHOOSE TO STAND ASIDE FROM THE SYSTEM." A FEW YEARS AGO, HE COMMENTED, HE HAD THOUGHT CHANGES WERE IN THE OFFING. IT SEEMED THAT A PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION WAS BEGINNING. BUT HE HAD LONG SINCE GIVEN UP ANY SUCH HOPES. AS LONG AS THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS IN POWER THERE WILL BE NO MEANINGFUL LIBERALIZATION. "AND THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE," HE CONCLUDED, "INURED BY HISTORY TO AUTHORITARIAN RULE, WILL SIMPLY GO ON SUBMITTING."

MR. SMITH COMMENTED THAT ONE MIGHT SAY THINGS SEEMED TO BE CHANGING FOR THE BETTER, ALBEIT VERY SLOWLY. THERE WERE MORE LIBERTIES NOW THAN THIRTY YEARS AGO. PERHAPS FIFTY YEARS IN THE FUTURE, THE SOVIET PEOPLE WILL ENJOY FREEDOMS UNTHOUGHT OF TODAY.

"WHAT HAPPENS THIRTY YEARS FROM NOW DOESN'T EXCITE ME," MEDINTSEV REPLIED. "THAT WILL BE TOO LATE FOR ME". END QUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG 131936Z AUG 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1968 AUG 13 17 25

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DE WTE 3155

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-171

By , NARA, Date 8-9-96

Pres file

68 AUG 13 PM 1:31

TUESDAY

84

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP81956

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUGUST 13, 1968

HEREWITH A MESSAGE I AM PLEASED TO FORWARD TO YOU.

YOU MAY REMEMBER THAT IN EARLY 1966 WHEN YOU SENT ME TO PERU, BELAUNDE COMMITTED HIMSELF TO TWO PROPOSITIONS:

--IN HIS ADMINISTRATION THE IPC POSITION WOULD "NOT BE IMPAIRED";

--HE WOULD TRY--BUT HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE--TO GET A FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE IPC PROBLEM AND REMOVE THIS DANGEROUS MATTER FROM U.S.-PERUVIAN RELATIONS ONCE AND FOR ALL.

THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM INDICATES THAT HE HAS APPARENTLY DELIVERED ON THE SECOND PROPOSITION, HAVING REMAINED LOYAL OVER THE PAST TWO AND ONE-HALF YEARS TO THE FIRST.

Lima 6724

1. PRESIDENT BELAUNDE LEFT FOR TALARA THIS MORNING AT 7:39 TO TAKE POSSESSION OF LA BREA Y PARINAS. REPRESENTATIVES OF GOP AND COMPANY NEGOTIATED ALL NIGHT TO ARRIVE AT FINAL SETTLEMENT. PRIME MINISTER TELEPHONED ME AT FOUR O'CLOCK THIS MORNING TO REPORT THAT ESPINOSA, COMPANY MANAGER, HAD BROKEN OFF NEGOTIATIONS OVER MISUNDERSTANDING ON CRUDE PRICE TO BE PAID FOR LA BREA Y PARINAS PRODUCTION AND HAD REFUSED TO COME TO PALACE EVEN THOUGH CABINET MINISTERS AND PRESIDENT HIMSELF WERE STILL AWAKE AND WORKING. HERCELLES SAID GOVT HAD NO OPTION BUT TO EXPROPRIATE IPC'S HOLDINGS SINCE PRESIDENT HAD ALREADY ANNOUNCED TO PRESS THAT HE WAS GOING TO TALARA TODAY TO TAKE POSSESSION. I AGREED TO TELEPHONE ESPINOSA WHICH I DID. ESPINOSA SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO MISUNDERSTANDING OVER CRUDE PRICE, THAT GOP WAS RENEGING AT LAST MOMENT BUT THAT HE MEANT NO DISRESPECT AND WOULD TELEPHONE PRIME MINISTER PROMPTLY. I SPOKE WITH PRIME MINISTER BY TELEPHONE APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR LATER AND HE ASSURED ME THAT ESPINOSA WAS BACK AT PALACE AND THEY WERE CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS.

2. AT 7:15 AM ESPINOSA TELEPHONED ME FROM AIRPORT TO REPORT THAT HE AND GOP HAD "PATCHED THINGS UP" AND THAT HE WAS ENROUTE TO TALARA ON PRESIDENTIAL PLANE TO PARTICIPATE IN HANDOVER OF LA BREA Y PARINAS FIELD TODAY - A REAL CLIFF-HANGER BUT A HAPPY ENDING.

3. WE WILL REPORT DETAILS OF FINAL SETTLEMENT WHEN KNOWN.
JONES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 131658Z AUG 68

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-249
By , NARA, Date 12-17-93

~~SECRET~~

85
1968 AUG 13 PM 1:29

TUESDAY

EEA120
OO WTE13
DE WTE 3153

1968 AUG 13 17 19

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP81954

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

AUGUST 13, 1968

HEREWITH BERGER'S REPORT ON JACK WALSH STORY OUT OF SAIGON ON "BOMBING HALT."

QUOTE

1. GENERAL ABRAMS HAS CHECKED MACV AND CORDS, AND I HAVE CHECKED EMBASSY AND OUR OTHER AGENCIES HERE, AND WE ARE UNABLE FIND ANY OFFICER WHO HAS TALKED TO UPI, OR ADMITS TO HAVING TALKED TO UPI, ON THIS SUBJECT. ONLY CONTACT WITH UPI WAS YESTERDAY ON ANOTHER SUBJECT.
2. ON AUGUST 12 GENERAL SIDLE'S DEPUTY, COLONEL CROOKS, WAS QUERIED BY NY DAILY NEWS AND AP ABOUT REPORTS THAT U.S. HAD HALTED BOMBING OF THE NORTH THAT DAY, AND THEY ANSWERED THAT BOMBING HAD TAKEN PLACE. AP (ESPER) ASKED IF HE HAD ANY INFORMATION THAT THERE WILL BE A BOMBING HALT IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AND WAS TOLD "WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THIS."
3. I SUBSEQUENTLY ASKED WALSH TO COME TO SEE ME. I SAID OUR CHECKS SHOW THAT NO RPT NO AMERICAN OFFICIAL IN ANY AGENCY OF THIS MISSION HAS SPOKEN TO UPI ON THIS SUBJECT, AND THAT WE FIND INCOMPREHENSIBLE THE ATTRIBUTION IN THIS STORY TO U.S. MISSION SOURCES, WHICH BY IMPLICATION PUTS AN OFFICIAL INPRIMATUR ON THE STATEMENT. WALSH SAID HE DID NOT GET THE STORY HIMSELF, BUT IS INFORMED BY HIS STAFF MEMBER WHO PREPARED REPORT THAT AN AMERICAN OFFICIAL HAD MADE THE OBSERVATION CARRIED IN THE STORY, AND SINCE IT CONFIRMED RUMORS CIRCULATING HERE AND COMING OUT OF WASHINGTON IN LAST FEW DAYS, HE USED IT. I SAID NO RPT NO AMERICAN OFFICIAL IN ANY POSITION TO KNOW WHAT WAS GOING ON ON THIS WHOLE SUBJECT COULD HAVE MADE THAT STATEMENT, AND IF ANY OFFICIAL DID MAKE THE REMARK, AND I WAS NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT HIS WORD OVER WHAT OUR OFFICERS HAVE TOLD US, HE WAS NOT SPEAKING AS A "U.S. MISSION SOURCE," BUT MAKING A CASUAL, UNINFORMED OBSERVATION. I WAS SURPRISED THAT ANY RESPONSIBLE CORRESPONDENT WOULD HAVE MADE THE ATTRIBUTION IN THESE WORDS AND IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.
4. WALSH WAS VISIBLY EMBARRASSED, AND FRANKLY I DID NOT BELIEVE HIS ACCOUNT, BUT I HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER HE IS LYING. A FAVORITE DEVICE AROUND HERE IS FOR A REPORTER TO PUT HIS VIEW TO AN OFFICIAL IN THE FORM OF A QUESTION, AND THEN TO ASSUME FROM THE EMBARRASSED NONCOMMITAL REPLY THAT IT HAS BEEN CONFIRMED.
5. I AM TAKING STEPS TO SEE THAT ALL PRESS CONTACTS ARE BETTER MONITORED, AND TO AGAIN INSTRUCT ALL OFFICERS IN THE LANGUAGE TO BE USED TO FIELD SENSITIVE QUESTIONS. END QUOTE

DTG: 131643Z AUG 68

~~SECRET~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

VZCZCEEA119
00 WTE10 WTE15
DE WTE 3152

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP81953

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 AUG 13 16 41

AUGUST 13, 1968

Free file
68 AUG 13 PM 1:00
TUESDAY

HEREWITH BERGER REPORTS ON THE SAIGON STORY YOU QUESTIONED YESTERDAY.

QUOTE:

1. AP STORY REFERRED TO WAS WRITTEN BY MICHAEL GOLDSMITH AND REFERRED TO ALLEGED BRIEFING OF DIPLOMATS BY MISSION OFFICIALS LAST WEEK. NO SUCH BRIEFING TOOK PLACE.
2. ONE POSSIBILITY IS MONTHLY BRIEFING OF MILITARY ATTACHES. LAST ONE TOOK PLACE JULY 18 AT MACV, BUT THIS DEALT ONLY WITH PREVIOUS MONTH'S OPERATIONS. ARVN JOINT GENERAL STAFF HOLDS MONTHLY BRIEFING FOR ATTACHES, LAST ONE ON AUGUST 6. THIS ONE DEALS BOTH WITH PAST OPERATIONS AND SOME INTELLIGENCE FACTORS, INCLUDING PREDICTIONS OF POSSIBLE ENEMY ACTIONS AND SOUNDS LIKE KIND OF THING LEAK MIGHT HAVE COME FROM.
3. EDUCATED GUESS IS THAT LEAK IS ITALIAN ATTACHE, LT. COL. FRANCO BOSCHI, WHO HAS BEEN KNOWN IN PAST AS BOTH CRITICAL OF U.S. EFFORT HERE AND EASY MARK FOR INQUISITIVE JOURNALISTS. GOLDSMITH, WITH LONG-TIME EUROPEAN BACKGROUND, PROBABLY CULTIVATES BOSCHI. THIS CONFIRMED BY VEILED TIP FROM INSIDE AP OFFICE HERE. BOSCHI HAS OCCASIONALLY EXPRESSED CONCERN TO MILITARY COLLEAGUES THAT HE IS NOT GIVEN ACCESS TO MORE INFORMATION SINCE HE IS REPRESENTING NATO ALLY.
4. GOLDSMITH HAS MADE NO SECRET OF HIS OPPOSITION TO U.S. ROLE HERE AND INVARIABLY LOOKS FOR ANGLES, FROM ANY SOURCE, WHICH COULD EMBARRASS OR DOWNGRADE OUR POSITION OR METHODS. THIS NOT UNIQUE HERE, BUT HIS STYLE OF QUESTIONING, PERHAPS REFLECTING HIS SPECIAL TECHNIQUE, IS MOST ABRASIVE.
5. ATTACHES WHO ATTEND MONTHLY MACV BRIEFINGS INCLUDE MILITARY REPS FROM AUSTRALIA, REPUBLIC OF CHINA, WEST GERMANY, UK, ITALY, JAPAN, KOREA, NETHERLANDS, PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND.
6. WE ROUTINELY SEE OTHER EMBASSY OFFICIALS WHO HAVE ASKED OUR VIEWS ABOUT LULL AND ATTACKS, TO WHICH STANDARD REPLY IS GIVEN THAT INFILTRATION REMAINS HIGH, INTELLIGENCE, CAPTURED PRISONERS AND DOCUMENTS, AND RALLIERS GIVE MANY INDICATIONS OF AN ATTACK, THAT OUR SPOILING OPERATIONS MAY HAVE AFFECTED TIMETABLE, BUT ALL OUR INDICATIONS POINT TO RENEWED ATTACKS, SOONER OR LATER. WE HAVE AVOIDED ANY REFERENCE TO SPECIFIC TIMES (ALTHOUGH VIETNAMESE SOURCES HAVE NOT). WHEN DOUBTS ARE CAST ON RENEWED ATTACK AND REFERENCE IS MADE TO LULL, OUR STANDARD REPLY IS THAT WE CAN ONLY GO ON BASIS OF WHAT WE KNOW AND CANNOT SPECULATE ON BASIS OF THE LULL.
7. THERE IS NO RPT NO STOPPING THIS KIND OF STORY, OR SPECULATION BY OTHERS. WE ARE DOING THE BEST WE CAN. END OF QUOTE

BERGER

DTG: 131612Z AUG 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-249
By *ju*, NARA, Date 12-17-93

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OO WTE10
DE WTE 3151

1968 AUG 13 14 00

87

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81952

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 91-343

free file

1968 AUG 13 AM 10:21

TUESDAY

By *ju*, NARA, Date *2-1-93*

~~SECRET~~

AUGUST 13, 1968

HEREWITH THE SHAH RESPONDS WARMLY TO YOUR LETTER INDICATING WHAT WE COULD AND COULD NOT DO FOR HIM.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I THANK YOU MOST SINCERELY FOR YOUR DETAILED LETTER OF 24TH JULY, IN WHICH YOU HAVE STATED YOUR OPINIONS AND ENLARGED UPON VARIOUS TOPICS THAT I HAD THE PLEASURE OF DISCUSSING WITH YOU DURING MY RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

ONCE AGAIN, I WOULD LIKE YOU TO KNOW HOW GLAD I WAS TO HAVE HAD THE BENEFIT OF A FRANK AND VALUABLE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH YOU ON MATTERS AFFECTING THE INTERESTS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

I, TOO, AM HIGHLY GRATIFIED TO OBSERVE THE AMICABLE RELATIONS AND THE GOOD UNDERSTANDING THAT EXIST BETWEEN IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WHICH I TRUST WILL CONTINUE TO BE FURTHER CONSOLIDATED TO OUR MUTUAL ADVANTAGE IN THE YEARS THAT LIE AHEAD.

AS YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, ARE NO DOUBT AWARE WE HAVE ALREADY DRAWN UP OUR MILITARY DEFENSE PLANS WHICH, AS YOU WILL AGREE, ARE ABSOLUTELY VITAL AND OF PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO THE MAINTENANCE AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF THE INTERESTS OF AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE. YOU WILL ALSO CONCUR WITH ME THAT WE CANNOT RELY ON ONE-YEAR MILITARY PROGRAMMES, BUT MUST ENVISAGE EFFECTIVE LONG-RANGE PLANS FOR OUR DEFENSE. IT IS MY HOPE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS AS BEFORE. I LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING, AS SOON AS IS CONVENIENT, THE RESULTS OF THE DETAILED TECHNICAL EVALUATION WHICH YOUR EXPERTS ARE CARRYING OUT ON THE PROJECT FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ.

I HAD ALSO HOPED THAT BY SELLING IRANIAN OIL ON THE AMERICAN MARKET ON A BARTER BASIS, THIS WOULD HAVE FACILITATED OUR PURCHASE OF AMERICAN GOODS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME ENABLING US TO INVEST PART OF OUR CAPITAL IN THE UNITED STATES. BUT, TO MY REGRET, THIS DOES NOT, OWING TO CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES THAT YOU HAVE INDICATED IN YOUR COMMUNICATION, SEEM FEASIBLE AT THE PRESENT TIME.

THE MATTER CONCERNING THE SHIFTING OF A PORTION OF MY COUNTRY'S DOLLAR RESERVES INTO LONG-TERM UNITED STATES ASSETS IS UNDER CAREFUL STUDY AND SERIOUS CONSIDERATION AT THE MOMENT, AND I SHALL BE PLEASED TO APPRISE YOU OF THE OUTCOME IN DUE COURSE.

I WISH TO EXPRESS MY GRATITUDE FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL OFFER OF UP TO 50 ADDITIONAL UNITED STATES AIR FORCE PERSONNEL AS ADVISORS FOR IRAN'S F-4 AIRCRAFT ON A REIMBURSABLE BASIS. THIS, I AM CONVINCED WILL BE OF GREAT ASSISTANCE TO US.

IN CONVEYING MY DEEP APPRECIATION OF THE KIND AND FRIENDLY SENTIMENTS THAT YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, HAVE EXPRESSED ON YOUR PERSONAL BEHALF AND ON THAT OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN REGARD TO MY COUNTRY AND MYSELF, I SEND YOU MY CORDIAL AND HEARTFELT GOOD WISHES FOR YOUR CONTINUED SUCCESS IN THE GREAT TASK THAT LIES ON YOUR SHOULDERS OF LEADING YOUR NATION TOWARDS AN EVER BRIGHTER AND MORE PROSPEROUS FUTURE.

WITH KINDEST REGARDS TO YOU AND MRS. JOHNSON FROM THE EMPRESS AND MYSELF, SINCERELY, MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLEVI. UNQUOTE.

DTG: 131319Z AUG 68

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

88

0500

EEA111
OO WTE 13
DE WTE 3142

1968 AUG 12 23 32

AUG 12 PM 7:43
MONDAY

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP31945

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: STATE DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES REPORT

BIAFRA - DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS
C. ROBERT MOORE IS DEPARTING TONIGHT FOR GENEVA IN ORDER TO
CONSULT WITH THE ICRC ON THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAYS OF GETTING
RELIEF SUPPLIES INTO BIAFRA AND TO DETERMINE WHAT FURTHER
ASSISTANCE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND VOLUNTARY
AGENCIES CAN USEFULLY PROVIDE.

Pres file

AMBASSADOR LINDT OF THE ICRC HAS INFORMED AMBASSADOR HALL
IN ADDIS THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO OBTAIN TWO NON-MILITARY
C-130'S FROM THE U.S. RED CROSS FOR THE RELIEF EFFORT.
WE ARE NOW CHECKING THE AVAILABILITY OF THE AIRCRAFT FROM
U.S. NON-MILITARY SOURCES.

AS A RESULT OF GROUND FIRE BY FEDERAL TROOPS, THE
ICRC HAS CURRENTLY DISCONTINUED RELIEF FLIGHTS INTO
BIAFRA.

CHILE - CHILEAN AMBASSADOR SANTA MARIA WAS CALLED
IN TODAY TO DISCUSS THE FISHERIES PROBLEM AND THE NEED
TO SCHEDULE A CONFERENCE TO DEMONSTRATE PROGRESS TOWARDS
SOLUTION. THE AMBASSADORS OF ECUADOR AND PERU WERE CALLED
IN LAST WEEK ON THE SAME SUBJECT. GENE ROSTOW IMPRESSED
UPON AMBASSADOR SANTA MARIA OUR WISH TO SEEK A SOLUTION TO
THIS PROBLEM AND THE IMPACT IT WAS HAVING ON THE U.S.
CONGRESS AND ITS ATTITUDE TOWARDS U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.
NOTING THAT THE LATEST ECUADORIAN SEIZURE OF U.S. TUNA
BOATS HAS HEIGHTENED THE CRISIS, MR. ROSTOW TOLD THE
AMBASSADOR OUR GOVERNMENT IS AGAIN SEEKING CHILEAN
ASSISTANCE IN THE EFFORT TO BRING ALL THE COUNTRIES
CONCERNED TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE.

NON-NUCLEAR CONFERENCE - THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS
BEEN ADVISED THAT THE U.S. WILL ATTEND THE CONFERENCE
OF THE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES WHICH BEGINS AUGUST 29
IN GENEVA.

DTG: 122250Z AUG 68

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 3-4-03

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

89

1968 AUG 12 23 04

VZCZCEEA109
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3140

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81943

1968 AUG 12 PM 7:27
FILED
MONDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUGUST 12, 1968

SUBJECT: GENE BLACK'S TRIP TO ASIA

GENE BLACK VERY MUCH HOPES THAT MARSHALL WRIGHT OF OUR NSC STAFF CAN ACCOMPANY HIM ON THE UPCOMING ASIA TRIP.

THE ARGUMENTS FOR ARE:

BLACK ALWAYS TAKES ALONG ONE PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMAT. WRIGHT WOULD SERVE THIS PURPOSE, AND STATE AND AID HAVE BLESSED BLACK'S CHOICE. AS A WHITE HOUSE STAFFER, MARSHALL'S PRESENCE WOULD ALSO UNDERLINE YOUR INTEREST IN BLACK'S ACTIVITIES. FINALLY, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A FELLOW ON OUR STAFF WITH FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF BLACK'S ATTEMPTS TO BREATHE LIFE INTO THE JOHNS HOPKINS PLEDGE.

THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST ARE:

MARSHALL HANDLES SOUTHEAST ASIA FOR US, AND WITH BILL JORDEN AWAY CARRIES A GOOD PART OF BILL'S NORMAL LOAD ON VIETNAM. THERE ARE OTHERS WHO COULD PICK UP THESE FUNCTIONS FOR THE TWO WEEKS INVOLVED, BUT NOT, PERHAPS, WITH THE SAME FACILITY. MARSHALL PLAYS AN ACTIVE ROLE IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS ON VIETNAM, AND THERE WOULD BE A GAP IN THAT DEPARTMENT WHILE HE WAS AWAY.

IF YOU PERMIT WRIGHT TO ACCOMPANY BLACK, HE WOULD BE GONE 13 DAYS, SEPTEMBER 12-25. THE TRIP WOULD BE A NICE THING FOR MARSHALL, BUT HE IS PREPARED TO FOREGO IT CHEERFULLY IF THAT IS YOUR WISH.

WHAT SHALL I TELL BLACK?

LET HIM GO

KEEP HIM HERE

CALL ME

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958 SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR 16, 1993

BY RB ON 9-9-92

DTG: 122237Z AUG 68

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

90

RECEIVED
WHA

1968 AUG 12 23 22

Aug 12 PM 7 43

MONDAY

VZCCZCEEA110
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3138

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP81941

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ML 9-CBS 7
By is/hg, NARA, Date 11-6-92

~~SECRET~~

AUGUST 12, 1968

HERE WITH GENERAL MCCONNELL SUMMARIZES GENERAL ABRAMS' LATEST ASSESSMENT OF ENEMY PREPARATIONS FOR COUNTRY WIDE OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. I WILL SEND A COPY WITH ACCOMPANYING MAPS IN THE NEXT POUCH.

1. ON 10 AUGUST 1968 WE RECEIVED A COMPREHENSIVE MESSAGE FROM GENERAL ABRAMS DETAILING ALL-SOURCE INDICATIONS THAT ENEMY PREPARATIONS FOR A COUNTRY-WIDE OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) ARE VIRTUALLY COMPLETE. SUMMARY OF GENERAL ABRAMS' ESTIMATE FOLLOWS.

2. GENERAL ABRAMS EXPECTS ATTACKS ON CENTRAL DMZ (ROCK PILE, CAMP CARROLL AREAS) WITHIN NEXT FIVE DAYS BY ELEMENTS OF SIX TO SEVEN NVA REGIMENTS UNLESS ENEMY DELAYS TO COORDINATE HIS EFFORTS WITH OTHERS TO THE SOUTH.

3. IN THE MILITARY REGION TRI THIEN HUE, THREAT CONTINUES TO DIMINISH; HUE NO LONGER REMAINS A PRIMARY TARGET AT THIS TIME.

4. IN NORTHERN MR-5, 2D NVA DIVISION IS BEING DIRECTED AGAINST CHU LAI, TAM KY, AND QUANG NGAI CITY. THREE REGIMENTS MENACE DANANG, SUPPORTED BY ROCKET ARTILLERY ELEMENTS AND SAPPERS IN THE CITY. GENERAL ABRAMS EXPECTS THESE ATTACKS BETWEEN 13-15 AUGUST.

5. IN II CTZ GENERAL ABRAMS CONSIDERS A MAJOR EFFORT AGAINST BAN ME THOUT APPEARS LIKELY IN NEXT FIVE DAYS; A TWO WEEK ENEMY RECON EFFORT THERE IS REPORTED (BY A PW) TO BE COMPLETE.

6. IN III CTZ ATTACKS ON OUTER PROVINCES ARE EXPECTED TO BEGIN IN NEXT 2-3 DAYS. ELEMENTS OF THREE DIVISIONS ARE DEPLOYED SO THEY COULD ATTACK TAY NINH CITY, LOC NING, AN LOC OR XUAN LOC WITHIN TWO DAYS.

7. IN SAIGON, ATTACKS ARE NOT LIKELY BEFORE 15 AUGUST BUT INFILTRATION ATTEMPTS, INCREASE IN TERRORISM AND ENEMY RECON OF SPECIFIC TARGETS HAVE BEGUN.

8. THE ENEMY MAY HOLD BACK IN AREAS WHERE PREPARATIONS ARE MOST ADVANCED TO OBTAIN FULL IMPACT OF COORDINATED COUNTRY-WIDE OFFENSIVE. THE HARD INDICATORS, COUNTRY-WIDE, USUALLY SEEN 1-3 DAYS BEFORE A MAJOR OFFENSIVE, HAVE NOT BEEN SEEN. FURTHER, THE MOON PHASE FAVORS ATTACKS LATER, WHEN IT WILL GIVE LEAST ILLUMINATION, BETWEEN 16-24 AUGUST. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING, THE INDICATORS SUGGEST WE MAY NOT SEE A COUNTRY-WIDE OFFENSIVE BEFORE 15 AUGUST 1968.

9. SINCE MID-JUNE, WHEN THE THREAT AGAINST III CTZ WAS HIGH, MACV OPERATIONS HAVE AIMED AT SPOILING ENEMY PREPARATIONS:

A. ON 14 JUNE, AN ARC LIGHT CAMPAIGN IN III CORPS BEGAN, COUPLED WITH ALL-OUT AIR AND GROUND RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT TO DEVELOP ARC LIGHT TARGETS. THE RESULT CLEARLY PRE-EMPTED ATTACKS; THE ENEMY RETIRED TO BASE AREAS AND DELIBERATELY LOWERED HIS OPERATION TEMPO.

B. 1-7 JULY, OPERATION THOR, JUST NORTH OF THE DMZ IN CAP MUI LAY AREA, COMBINED ARC LIGHT, INTENSIVE TACTICAL AIR, HEAVY AND MEDIUM ARTILLERY AND STEPPED UP NAVAL GUNFIRE. IT PARTIALLY ACHIEVED THE OBJECTIVE OF DESTROYING THE ENEMY'S ARTILLERY AND AMMUNITION SUPPLIES IN THAT AREA.

C. THE ARC LIGHT EMPHASIS WAS THEN SHIFTED BACK TO III CORPS WITH SOME TALLY HO AND I CTZ TARGETS, GRADUAL INCREASES OF ARC LIGHT SORTIES IN IV CTZ AND ELEVEN STRIKES AROUND BAN ME THUOT IN II CTZ TO RESPOND TO 1ST NVA DIVISION'S ARRIVAL IN DARLAC PROVINCE. CONCENTRATION IS NOW IN III CTZ AND I CTZ. ARC LIGHT STRIKE CONCENTRATION IS IMPROVING TARGETING BY FIELD COMMANDERS USING GROUND RECON, AIR CAVALRY, SENSORS AND GROUND FOLLOW-UP TO DEVELOP AND EXPLOIT TARGETS. PW REPORTS AND VISUAL OBSERVATIONS OF SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS CONFIRM INCREASED ARC LIGHT EFFECTIVENESS.

10. TACTICAL AIR HAS BEEN APPLIED WITH EMPHASIS ON THE EXTENDED BATTLE AREA, I CTZ AND III CTZ IN CONCERT WITH ARC LIGHT AND GROUND OPERATIONS.

11. ON THE GROUND IN I CTZ:

A. 3 MAR DIVISION NEAR THE DMZ DISRUPTED ENEMY PREPARATIONS BY CAPTURING WORTHWHILE ARMS CACHE.

B. IN A SHAU, A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE BEGAN 4 AUGUST WITH 3 U.S. AND 2 ARVN BATTALIONS.

C. 101 AIR CAVALRY IS LIVING IN BASE AREA 101; AN ARVN REGIMENT HAS BEEN IN BASE AREA 114 SINCE 16 MAY.

D. ENEMY DESIGNS ON HUE AREA HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY FRUSTRATED.

E. FURTHER SOUTH, 1ST MAR DIVISION AND AMERICAL APPEAR TO HAVE KEPT ENEMY OFF BALANCE.

12. IN II CTZ, RAPID REDEPLOYMENT TO BAN ME THUOT CONFRONTED THE 1ST NVA UNEXPECTEDLY. II FFV HAS SHOWN FLEXIBILITY IN EMPLOYING U.S., ARVN, ROK AND CIDG TROOPS.

13. IN III CORPS, SAIGON DEFENSES HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED, THE CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT REORGANIZED AND A COMPANION ARVN COMMAND FORMED. THE "ROCKET BELT" AROUND SAIGON IS BEING PATROLLED; GROUND TARGETING FOR B-52S HAS BEEN MOST PRODUCTIVE. IN OUTER PROVINCES, UNITS HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN INTERCEPTING, BLOCKING ENTRY ROUTES AND SPOILING ENEMY PREPARATIONS FOR OFFENSIVE COMBAT.

14. IN IV CORPS THE ARVN HAVE BUILT UP A DEGREE OF MOMENTUM, MAKING FORAYS INTO AREAS FORMERLY CONSIDERED AS IMPENETRABLE VIET CONG REFUGES.

15. A BONUS FROM INTENSIFIED RECONNAISSANCE HAS BEEN UNCOVERING 118 CACHES IN THE PERIOD 15 JUNE-19 AUGUST, TO INCLUDE ONE CACHE 550,000 PIASTERS AND 150,000 U.S. DOLLARS IN 550 BILLS.

16. GENERAL ABRAMS FINAL PARAGRAPH IS QUOTED:

"TO COPE WITH THE PRESENT ENEMY THREAT, I HAVE COME TO CERTAIN CONCLUSIONS. THE CURRENT DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES IS SATISFACTORY, AT LEAST UNTIL WE SEE HOW THE ENEMY ATTACKS DEVELOP. I MAY SEE FIT TO TERMINATE THE A SHAU OPERATION TO ENABLE PCV AND III MAF TO REACT MORE QUICKLY TO THE SITUATION AS IT DEVELOPS. I AM PREPARED TO SPLIT THE ARC LIGHTS BETWEEN I CORPS AND III CORPS, RESPONDING TO THE IMMEDIATE THREAT AND GOOD TARGETS. THE 7TH AF IS ALERTED TO INCREASE THE SUPPORT OF GROUND FORCES AND DECREASE THE INTERDICTION PROGRAM IN THE E3A. WE HAVE STRENGTH, APPROPRIATE READINESS, AND ARE CONFIDENT OF OUR ABILITY. WE ARE DETERMINED TO KEEP AFTER THE ENEMY BY OFFENSIVE ACTION AT EACH OPPORTUNITY AND EXPLOIT HIS VULNERABILITIES AS HE ASSEMBLES AND MOVES OUT OF HIS BASE AREAS BY APPLYING MASSED FIREPOWER TO HIS FORMATIONS."

17. WE WILL KEEP YOU PROMPTLY ADVISED OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS SITUATION.

DTG 122209Z AUG 68

~~SECRET~~

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OO WTE18 WTE15
DE WTE 3139

AUG 12 22 51

68 AUG 12 PM 7 28

Free file
MONDAY

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE WH81942

UNCLAS

AUGUST 12, 1968

THE REPORT REFERRED TO BY BOB PIERPONT IN GEORGE CHRISTIAN'S BRIEFING THIS MORNING ABOUT A BOMBING HALT IS A UPI ITEM DATED SAIGON AND WRITTEN BY JACK WALSH. WE ARE TRYING TO REACH EMBASSY SAIGON BY TELEPHONE TO FIND OUT WHETHER ANYONE IN OUR MISSION IS PUTTING OUT THIS LINE.

THE WALSH STORY READS:

"IN SAIGON THERE WAS SOME SPECULATION--BUT NO CONFIRMATION-- THAT THE HEAVY (B-52) STRIKE COULD BE A MAJOR BLOW DELIVERED BEFORE A COMPLETE U.S. BOMBING PAUSE OVER THE COMMUNIST NATION."

REWRITING THE STORY A FEW HOURS LATER, UPI SAID:

"IN SAIGON, THE U.S. MILITARY COMMAND DECLINED TO COMMENT ON SPECULATION THE B52 RAIDING WAS A FINAL THRUST IN ANTICIPATION OF AN ORDER HALTING ALL BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM. BUT U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT MISSION SOURCES SAID THE WHITE HOUSE IS UNDER CONSIDERABLE 'PRESSURE' TO HALT THE AIR RAIDS IN RETURN FOR WHAT SOME OBSERVERS CALL A RELATIVE LULL IN COMMUNIST GROUND FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM. PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON MARCH 31 LIMITED U.S. BOMBING OF THE NORTH TO THE SOUTHERN PANHANDLE OF NORTH VIETNAM. A HALT TO ALL BOMBING OF THE NORTH HAS BEEN A KEY NORTH VIETNAM DEMAND IN PARIS TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES ON COOLING DOWN THE WAR.

"THERE WAS NO COMMENT ON A BOMBING PAUSE FROM U.S. MILITARY SPOKESMEN. THEY DECLINED EVEN TO COMMENT ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A HALT."

DTG: 122224Z AUG 68

MEMORANDUM

ACTION

Pres file

92

THE WHITE HOUSE

VIA POUCH

WASHINGTON

Monday, August 12, 1968
7:00 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Sect. Rusk's Recommended Assignment of Alfred Jenkins

The attached memorandum from Secretary Rusk recommends that you release Alfred Jenkins, who has served for a little over two years as our China specialist on the NSC staff, for assignment as Deputy Chief of Mission at Taipei. The position is vacant because of Art Hummel's going to Burma as Ambassador.

In addition to the qualifications for the job as set forth in the Secretary's memo, State considers it necessary to have a senior FSO-1 in the job, in view of the need to supervise and deal with very senior military and other officials in the Embassy or attached to it. Those concerned at State believe that Al is particularly well qualified to meet this as well as other rather exacting requirements.

I have told Ambassador Brown (Bundy was on leave) of your general desire to keep your staff intact for the remainder of your Administration. It is true, however, that we have very few senior China specialists, and Al is State's unanimous first choice for the Taipei post.

Al, for his part, is fully content to follow your wishes in the matter. I have been comforted by his presence on the staff, but I am also impressed by State's expressed need. From the standpoint of Al's career, while this assignment would not be a really clear step up for him (he has served as Deputy in Stockholm) it is a flattering proposal in that the job is one of only three really senior China positions in the field today.

On balance, I am inclined to think that our overall interests may best be served by allowing Al to take the Taipei job, at such time as a suitable replacement for him comes on duty.

CONFIDENTIAL attachment

W. W. Rostow

Let Jenkins be released for assignment as Deputy
Chief of Mission at Taipei, at such time as a
suitable replacement arrives _____

No _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 3-4-03

7-11-68
92a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 1, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Assignment of Alfred Jenkins

Recommendation:

That you release Alfred Jenkins for assignment as Deputy Chief of Mission to Taipei.

Discussion:

The position of Deputy Chief of Mission in Taipei has become vacant with the assignment of Arthur Hummel as Ambassador to Burma.

Under current conditions and those which we foresee as likely to prevail in the future, Taipei is one of the most important posts in the Far East, involving as it does one of the major sources of possible conflict with Communist China. It is essential that senior officers there be not only of high professional competence, but equipped with the language, experienced in the area, and endowed with the capacity for imaginative thinking.

Our unanimous first choice for this position is Alfred Jenkins of your staff. Mr. Rostow has said that while he would regret the loss of Mr. Jenkins' services, which he values highly, he could, if you agree, make do without him if the interests of the Service and of Mr. Jenkins' career should require his assignment to Taipei.

I would appreciate it if you would be willing to release Mr. Jenkins for what I consider to be a very important assignment. The timing of his actual transfer could be subject to considerable flexibility.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *3-4-03*

Pres file

93

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

Monday, Aug. 12, 1968
6:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the latest Dick Helms account of the frustrated efforts to bring about a secret Israel/Jordan negotiation.

The next chance appears to be London in early September.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET-EYES ONLY attachment (Richard Helms memo 12 Aug 68 "Israel-Jordan Secret Negotiations)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NETO 19-038-3-9
By SP, NARA, Date 1/19/02

94

INFORMATION

SECRET

Monday, August 12, 1968 - 6:30 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith the text and maps of
Gen. McConnell's summary of
Gen. Abrams' appreciation of enemy
offensive preparations.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 9.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1998
By rg, NARA, Date 9-9-92

2014

94a

~~SECRET~~



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

CM-3573-68
12 August 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Enemy Preparations for Country Wide Offensive
in South Vietnam

1. On 10 August 1968 we received a comprehensive message from General Abrams detailing all-source indications that enemy preparations for a country-wide offensive in South Vietnam (SVN) are virtually complete. Summary of General Abrams' estimate follows.

2. General Abrams expects attacks on Central DMZ (ROCK PILE, Camp Carroll areas) within next five days by elements of six to seven NVA regiments unless enemy delays to coordinate his efforts with others to the south.

3. In the Military Region Tri Thien Hue, threat continues to diminish; Hue no longer remains a primary target at this time.

4. In Northern MR-5, 2d NVA Division is being directed against Chu Lai, Tam Ky, and Quang Ngai City. Three regiments menace DaNang, supported by rocket artillery elements and sappers in the city. General Abrams expects these attacks between 13-15 August.

5. In II CTZ General Abrams considers a major effort against Ban Me Thout appears likely in next five days; a two week enemy recon effort there is reported (by a PW) to be complete.

6. In III CTZ attacks on outer provinces are expected to begin in next 2-3 days. Elements of three divisions are deployed so they could attack Tay Ninh City, Loc Ninh, An Loc or Xuan Loc within two days.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 719-CBS 7

By ag/ics, NARA, Date 10-28-92

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7. In Saigon, attacks are not likely before 15 August but infiltration attempts, increase in terrorism and enemy recon of specific targets have begun.

8. The enemy may hold back in areas where preparations are most advanced to obtain full impact of coordinated country-wide offensive. The hard indicators, country-wide, usually seen 1-3 days before a major offensive, have not been seen. Further, the moon phase favors attacks later, when it will give least illumination, between 16-24 August. In accordance with the foregoing, the indicators suggest we may not see a country-wide offensive before 15 August 1968.

9. Since mid-June, when the threat against III CTZ was high, MACV operations have aimed at spoiling enemy preparations:

a. On 14 June, an ARC LIGHT campaign in III Corps began, coupled with all-out air and ground reconnaissance effort to develop ARC LIGHT targets. The result clearly pre-empted attacks; the enemy retired to base areas and deliberately lowered his operation tempo.

b. 1-7 July, Operation THOR, just north of the DMZ in Cap Mui Lay area, combined ARC LIGHT, intensive tactical air, heavy and medium artillery and stepped up naval gunfire. It partially achieved the objective of destroying the enemy's artillery and ammunition supplies in that area.

c. The ARC LIGHT emphasis was then shifted back to III Corps with some TALLY HO and I CTZ targets, gradual increases of ARC LIGHT sorties in IV CTZ and eleven strikes around Ban Me Thuot in II CTZ to respond to 1st NVA Division's arrival in Darlac Province. Concentration is now in III CTZ and I CTZ. ARC LIGHT strike concentration is improving targeting by field commanders using ground recon, air cavalry, sensors and ground follow-up to develop and exploit targets. PW reports and visual observations of secondary explosions confirm increased ARC LIGHT effectiveness.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

10. Tactical air has been applied with emphasis on the Extended Battle Area, I CTZ and III CTZ in concert with ARC LIGHT and ground operations.

11. On the ground in I CTZ:

a. 3 MAR Division near the DMZ disrupted enemy preparations by capturing worthwhile arms cache.

b. In A Chau, a reconnaissance in force began 4 August with 3 US and 2 ARVN battalions.

c. 101 Air Cavalry is living in Base Area 101; an ARVN regiment has been in Base Area 114 since 16 May.

d. Enemy designs on Hue area have been thoroughly frustrated.

e. Further south, 1st MAR Division and Americal appear to have kept enemy off balance.

12. In II CTZ, rapid redeployment to Ban Me Thuot confronted the 1st NVA unexpectedly. II FFV has shown flexibility in employing US, ARVN, ROK and CIDG troops.

13. In III Corps, Saigon defenses have been strengthened, the Capital Military District reorganized and a companion ARVN command formed. The "rocket belt" around Saigon is being patrolled; ground targeting for B-52s has been most productive. In outer provinces, units have been engaged in intercepting, blocking entry routes and spoiling enemy preparations for offensive combat.

14. In IV Corps the ARVN have built up a degree of momentum, making forays into areas formerly considered as impenetrable Viet Cong refuges.

15. A bonus from intensified reconnaissance has been uncovering 118 caches in the period 15 June-19 August, to include one cache 550,000 piasters and 150,000 US dollars in \$50 bills.


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16. General Abrams final paragraph is quoted:

"To cope with the present enemy threat, I have come to certain conclusions. The current deployment of ground forces is satisfactory, at least until we see how the enemy attacks develop. I may see fit to terminate the A Shau operation to enable PCV and III MAF to react more quickly to the situation as it develops. I am prepared to split the ARC LIGHTS between I Corps and III Corps, responding to the immediate threat and good targets. The 7th AF is alerted to increase the support of ground forces and decrease the interdiction program in the EBA. We have strength, appropriate readiness, and are confident of our ability. We are determined to keep after the enemy by offensive action at each opportunity and exploit his vulnerabilities as he assembles and moves out of his base areas by applying massed firepower to his formations."


17. We will keep you promptly advised of any developments in this situation.


JOHN P. McCONNELL
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~SECRET~~


Atch # 2

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: U.S. MI. 022-0148
By: [signature], NARA, Date: 11-30-09



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~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Atch #4


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Authority PLS-141-022-01M/8
By xx, NARA, Date 11-3-09

016953

Map # 5

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Authority: 25.141.022.014/8
By: [signature], NARA, Date: 11-3-09

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TOP SECRET


17° 10' ← THOR

DISTRIBUTION OF ARC LIGHT SORTIES

15 JUNE 68 - 10 JULY 68

| | <u>SORTIES</u> | <u>PERCENTAGE</u> |
|---------|----------------|-------------------|
| LAOS | 217 | (7%) |
| I CTZ | 284 | (8%) |
| II CTZ | 260 | (8%) |
| III CTZ | 2011 | (60%) |
| IV CTZ | 224 | (7%) |

(1840 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS)



TOP SECRET

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

▲ U. S. UNITS/INSTALLATIONS

0 25 100 MILES

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS. 019.038.003/11

je NARA. Date 12-21-09

076953

Atch # 7

~~SECRET~~

95

1968 AUG 12 15 15
MONDAY
11:20
Pre file

EEA104
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3134

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO JIM JONES
CITE CAP81937

~~SECRET~~

AUGUST 12, 1968

PLEASE HOLD THIS HAL SAUNDERS MEMO TO ME, BUT SHOW TO THE PRESIDENT IF, IN FACT, ROBERT ANDERSON OR ANY OTHER PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL SHOULD SEEK TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE PRESIDENT ON THIS SENSITIVE ISSUE.

BEGIN QUOTE.

I WOULD NOT BOTHER YOU WITH THIS EXCEPT THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY BE APPROACHED ON THIS SUBJECT. THE AMERICAN COMPANY INVOLVED HAS ENGAGED ROBERT ANDERSON AS A "CONSULTANT."

THE ISRAELIS ARE TRYING TO PRESS STANDARD OIL OF INDIANA TO CUT BACK OPERATIONS IN UAR OIL FIELDS IN THE GULF OF SUEZ OFF THE SINAI OR TO TAKE ISRAEL INTO PARTNERSHIP ON ANY EXPANSION OF PRODUCTION. PRODUCTION IN THIS MAJOR FIELD IS INCREASING STEADILY, SO THE ISRAELI REQUEST AMOUNTS TO PRESSURE TO DEAL ISRAEL IN OR STOP NORMAL GROWTH.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER SAYS ISRAELI OCCUPATION EXTENDS TO THE WATER'S EDGE OF THE SINAI BUT NOT INTO THE GULF OF SUEZ. HE SAYS THERE IS LITTLE QUESTION ABOUT CONTINUED UAR SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE GULF'S UNDERWATER OIL. MORE IMPORTANT, OIL ADVISERS ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR OIL INTERESTS THROUGHOUT THE AREA -- NOT TO MENTION OUR POLITICAL POSITION -- IF ARAB GOVERNMENTS FELT THAT WE WERE NOW WILLING TO STAND ASIDE AND LET ISRAEL USE AN AMERICAN COMPANY TO CONSOLIDATE ITS CONQUEST OF THE SINAI.

STATE BELIEVES THE ISRAELIS ARE JUST SEEING HOW MUCH THEY CAN GET AWAY WITH AND INTENDS TO ADVISE ISRAELIS STRONGLY TO DROP THE IDEA. BUT WE PROBABLY HAVE NOT HEARD THE LAST OF THIS.

END QUOTE.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4
By *pl/c* NARA Date *12-21-09*

DTG: 121444Z AUG 68

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1968 AUG 12 13 23

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP81935

~~TOP SECRET~~

Profile

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

AUGUST 12, 1968

HEREWITH A DETAILED SUMMARY OF PREPARATIONS FOR THE ENEMY ATTACK.

IT NOW LOOKS COUNTRYWIDE, INCLUDING SOME ATTACKS IN THE DELTA, THE HIGHLANDS (BAN ME THUOT), AND EVEN AT HUE, WITH MAIN THRUSTS AT DMZ AND SAIGON.

KICK-OFF ANYTIME AFTER MID-WEEK RUNNING OVER THE SUBSEQUENT TEN DAYS TO TWO WEEKS.

I AM ARRANGING TODAY A COORDINATED HISTORY OF THIS OFFENSIVE SO THAT PRESS BRIEFINGS HERE AND IN SAIGON CAN:

- PUT IT INTO PERSPECTIVE FROM THE BEGINNING;
- TRY TO KEEP THE U.S. REACTIONS COOL AND WELL POISED.

QUOTE

I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE THAT COMMUNIST FORCES INTEND TO INITIATE WIDESPREAD ATTACKS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

2. RECENT ENEMY TROOP MOVEMENTS, UNUSUALLY HIGH COMMUNICATION LEVELS, THE TEXTS OF CERTAIN INTERCEPTED MESSAGES, AND COLLATERAL SOURCES ALL POINT TO A PERIOD OF RENEWED HEAVY FIGHTING.

3. IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT THE INITIAL THRUST OF AN OFFENSIVE WILL BE DIRECTED AT TARGETS IN OUTLYING AREAS--ALLIED BASES JUST BELOW THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, PROVINCIAL CITIES AND ALLIED OUTPOSTS IN NORTHWEST III CORPS, POSSIBLY BAN ME THUOT IN THE HIGHLANDS--AND AGAINST POPULATION CENTERS IN THE SOUTHERN HALF OF I CORPS. SELECTED CITIES IN THE DELTA COULD ALSO BE STRUCK.

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MONDAY

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 265-141-022.014/9
By *yc*, NARA, Date 11-3-09

4. WHILE SAIGON REMAINS A PRIME COMMUNIST TARGET, AVAILABLE INDICATORS SUGGEST THAT ANY LARGE-SCALE EFFORT AGAINST THE CITY WILL FOLLOW THE INITIAL ATTACKS BY FIVE TO TEN DAYS. SEVERAL AGENTS WHO HAVE REPORTED RELIABLY IN THE PAST HAVE RECENTLY DESCRIBED THE ENEMY'S INTENT TO FIRST WEAKEN ALLIED DEFENSES AROUND SAIGON BY PRELIMINARY ATTACKS ON PERIPHERAL TARGETS.

5. SOME KIND OF ATTACK MAY ALSO BE PLANNED FOR HUE, ALTHOUGH ENEMY FORCES ARE NOW OUT OF POSITION TO CONDUCT A MAJOR OFFENSIVE AGAINST THAT CITY. INTERCEPTED MESSAGES REVEALED ON 11 AUGUST THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE 803RD REGIMENT, NOW LOCATED WEST OF HUE, HAS BEEN ASSIGNED AN "N-DAY" MISSION, POSSIBLY TO TAKE PLACE BETWEEN 20 AND 25 AUGUST.

ENEMY TROOP MOVEMENTS IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE

6. ELEMENTS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE 320TH AND 338TH DIVISIONS CONTINUE TO SHIFT SOUTHWARD ACROSS THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE. SOME UNITS HAVE REACHED POSITIONS FROM WHICH THEY COULD STRIKE AT ALLIED BASES AT ANY TIME.

7. IN THE LATEST DEPLOYMENT, THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 320TH DIVISION MOVED SOME SIX MILES SOUTHWEST IN THE CENTRAL DMZ AREA ON 9 AUGUST, PLACING IT WITHIN SIX MILES OF THE US MARINE OUTPOST KNOWN AS THE "ROCKPILE." TWO REGIMENTS OF THE 320TH DIVISION ALSO MADE SOUTHWARD SHIFTS IN THIS GENERAL AREA ON 7 AND 8 AUGUST. ONE UNIT MOVED SOUTHWARD TO A POINT APPROXIMATELY SIX MILES NORTHWEST OF CON THIEN. THE OTHER WAS TENUOUSLY LOCATED ABOVE FIVE MILES EAST OF THE "ROCKPILE," NEAR CAMP CARROLL. US MARINE PATROLS HAVE UNCOVERED SEVERAL EXTENSIVE ENEMY BUNKER COMPLEXES AND AMMUNITION CACHES IN THE AREA NORTHEAST OF THE "ROCKPILE" SINCE 6 AUGUST.

8. FARTHER EAST IN THE COASTAL AREA, ELEMENTS OF THE 138TH REGIMENT, NORTH VIETNAMESE 338TH DIVISION, AND THE 27TH INDEPENDENT REGIMENT HAVE MADE SOUTHWARD SHIFTS IN RECENT DAYS. IN NORTHWEST QUANG TRI ALLIED SENSOR DEVICES HAVE DETECTED HEAVY COMMUNIST TROOP MOVEMENTS. THE ENEMY UNIT INVOLVED IN THE LATTER AREA IS PROBABLY THE 246TH REGIMENT, 338TH DIVISION.

9. INTERCEPTED REAR SERVICES MESSAGES REVEAL THAT THE ENEMY HAS RECENTLY STOCKPILED LARGE AMOUNTS OF ARTILLERY AMMUNITION IN THE DMZ AREA AND THAT A COMMUNICATIONS BATTLE PLAN WOULD BE DISSEMINATED BY 11 AUGUST.

THE SOUTHERN HALF OF I CORPS

10. THE DEVELOPING ENEMY ATTACK PREPARATIONS NOTED IN SOUTHERN I CORPS IN RECENT WEEKS MAY NOW BE IN THE FINAL STAGES. DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS UNUSUALLY LARGE NUMBERS OF MESSAGES HAVE BEEN EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE HEADQUARTERS OF COMMUNIST-MILITARY REGION 5 (THE OVER-ALL CONTROL AUTHORITY IN THIS AREA) AND FRONT 4, AND ALSO BETWEEN THE 2ND AND 3RD NORTH VIETNAMESE DIVISIONS. INTERCEPTED COMMUNICATIONS INDICATE THAT THE 31ST, 36TH, AND 38TH REGIMENTS UNDER FRONT 4 ARE IN A TACTICAL POSTURE AND COULD ATTACK IN THE DA NANG - HOI AN AREA AT ANY TIME.

11. IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE TO THE SOUTH THE REGIMENTS OF THE 2ND DIVISION HAVE ALL INDICATED THAT THEY ARE ON THE MOVE. PART OF THE 2ND DIVISION IS APPARENTLY EN ROUTE TO THE VICINITY OF THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL, TAM KY, WHERE A FORWARD COMMAND ELEMENT OF THE DIVISION HAS BEEN LOCATED BY RADIO DIRECTION FINDING. THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 3RD DIVISION WAS LOCATED 13 MILES SOUTHWEST OF QUANG NGAI CITY ON 9 AUGUST, SIX MILES CLOSER TO THE CITY THAN ITS 6 AUGUST POSITION. OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE 3RD DIVISION AS WELL AS VIET CONG UNITS IN QUANG NGAI HAVE ALSO INDICATED THAT THEY ARE MOVING.

ATTACK ON BAN ME THUOT PREDICTED BY PRISONER

12. A SENIOR NORTH VIETNAMESE SERGEANT, CAPTURED ON 9 AUGUST SOME 13 MILES NORTHWEST OF BAN ME THUOT, STATES THAT HE WAS A MEMBER OF A 200-MAN GROUP FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE 1ST DIVISION WHICH HAS ALREADY COMPLETED RECONNAISSANCE AROUND BAN ME THUOT. ACCORDING TO THE SERGEANT, THE 1ST DIVISION WILL FINISH PREPARATIONS FOR A STRONG ATTACK AGAINST BAN ME THUOT BY 15 AUGUST. THE SERGEANT SAYS THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW THE PLANNED DATE FOR THE ACTUAL ASSAULT, BUT IF HIS TESTIMONY CONCERNING PREPARATIONS IS ACCURATE, THE ATTACK COULD COME SOON AFTER THE 15TH.

13. EARLIER THIS WEEK SEVERAL ENEMY MOVEMENTS AWAY FROM BAN ME THUOT SUGGESTED THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAD DELAYED OR POSTPONED PLANS TO ATTACK THE CITY. THE CAPTURE OF THIS NORTH VIETNAMESE SERGEANT AND INCREASING COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITY BY 1ST DIVISION INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS DURING THE WEEK NOW INDICATE THAT THE ENEMY IS GOING FORWARD WITH OFFENSIVE PLANS IN THE AREA. THE 1ST DIVISION IS BELIEVED TO CONTROL THREE INFANTRY REGIMENTS -- THE 24TH, 66TH, AND 320TH -- AND IT PROBABLY HAS SOME SUPPORTING MORTAR AND ROCKET UNITS.

14. TO THE NORTH IN KONTUM PROVINCE, INTERCEPTED MESSAGES REVEAL COMMUNIST PLANS TO LAUNCH MORTAR OR ROCKET ATTACKS AND POSSIBLY GROUND PROBES IN THE DAK TO AREA. ONE OF THE ACTIONS APPEARS SET FOR 14 AUGUST. ELEMENTS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE 325C DIVISION ARE KNOWN TO BE IN THIS SECTOR. ALONG THE COAST OF II CORPS, UNUSUALLY HEAVY ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITY HAS BEEN NOTED DURING THE PAST FOUR DAYS. MAJOR ATTACKS ARE NOT ANTICIPATED IN THIS REGION, BUT THE MESSAGES COULD REFLECT ENEMY PREPARATIONS TO MOUNT SOME KIND OF OFFENSIVE ACTION.

NORTHWEST III CORPS

15. IN NORTHWEST III CORPS, WHERE A HEAVY BUILD-UP OF COMMUNIST FORCES HAS DEVELOPPED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, THE MOST PERSUASIVE EVIDENCE OF IMMINENT ATTACKS IS NOTED IN TAY NINH PROVINCE. IN THIS OUTLYING AREA INTERCEPTED ENEMY MESSAGES REVEAL THAT THE BATTALIONS OF THE 96TH ARTILLERY REGIMENT RECEIVED NEW MISSIONS ON 5 AUGUST, RELOCATED ON 5 AND 6 AUGUST, AND RESUPPLIED WITH ROCKETS AND OTHER AMMUNITION ON 9 AUGUST.

16. OTHER RECENTLY INTERCEPTED MESSAGES INDICATE THAT THE 96TH REGIMENT IS SUPPORTING THE COMMUNIST 9TH DIVISION, AT LEAST ONE REGIMENT OF WHICH WAS LOCATED WITHIN STRIKING DISTANCE OF TAY NINH CITY ON 8 AUGUST. THE 96TH REGIMENT RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED SUBORDINATE ON THE 9TH STATING THAT THE CADRE HAD INVESTIGATED THE PLAN FOR "COMBAT ALL AROUND".

17. JUST EAST OF TAY NINH IN BINH LONG PROVINCE, ELEMENTS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE 7TH DIVISION REMAIN CLOSE TO AN LOC AND LOC NINH. HIGH MESSAGE VOLUMES BETWEEN THE CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (COSVN) AND THE 7TH DIVISION WERE NOTED FROM 2 TO 4 AUGUST AND AGAIN ON 7 AUGUST. NEW TACTICAL RADIO NETS HAVE ALSO BEEN ACTIVATED IN THE DIVISION'S INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM, INDICATING THAT OFFENSIVE PREPARATIONS BY ELEMENTS OF THE FORCE ARE PROBABLY WELL ADVANCED.

18. THE COMMUNISTS 5TH DIVISION REPORTEDLY HAS BEEN GIVEN THE MISSION OF BLOCKING ALLIED REINFORCEMENTS WHICH MIGHT ATTEMPT TO REACH TAY NINH AND BINH LONG FROM THE GENERAL VICINITY OF SAIGON. THE CURRENT LOCATION OF THE DIVISION, WITH THE 275TH, 33RD, AND 174TH REGIMENTS, IN EASTERN TAY NINH WOULD ENABLE IT TO UNDERTAKE THAT MISSION.

CURRENT ACTIVITY

19. THE LEVEL OF FIGHTING CONTINUED AT A GENERALLY LOW LEVEL OVER THE WEEKEND EXCEPT FOR A SHARP CLASH 12 MILES SOUTHWEST OF DA NANG. EIGHT U.S. MARINES AND 22 NORTH VIETNAMESE REGULARS WERE KILLED IN THE BATTLE WHICH BROKE OUT WHEN A MARINE PATROL CAME ACROSS A WELL ENTRENCHED ENEMY FORCE ESTIMATED TO BE COMPANY SIZE.

20. A NUMBER OF OTHER SMALL UNIT ACTIONS WERE REPORTED IN EACH OF THE CORPS ZONES BUT NO HEAVY FIGHTING DEVELOPED. IN THE SOUTHERNMOST DELTA TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE REGIMENTAL FORCE COMPANIES FOUND A VIET CONG CACHE CONTAINING OVER 200 WEAPONS AND AN ESTIMATED TEN TONS OF ASSORTED MUNIFIONS.

END QUOTE

~~TOP SECRET~~

DTG: 121217Z AUG 68

~~SECRET~~

August 12, 1968

Pres. file

97

FROM Walt Rostow

FOR Jim Jones

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By *jc/jc*, NARA, Date *12-21-09*

Please hold this Hal Saunders memo to me, but show to the President if, in fact, Robert Anderson *or any other private individual* should seek to get in touch with the President on this sensitive issue.

Begin quote.

I would not bother you with this except that the President may be approached on this subject. The American company involved has engaged Robert Anderson as a 'consultant'.

The Israelis are trying to press Standard Oil of Indiana to cut back operations in UAR oil fields in the Gulf of Suez off the Sinai or to take Israel into partnership on any expansion of production. Production in this major field is increasing steadily, so the Israeli request amounts to pressure to deal Israel in or stop normal growth.

The State Department legal adviser says Israeli occupation extends to the water's edge of the Sinai but not into the Gulf of Suez. He says there is little question about continued UAR sovereignty over the Gulf's underwater oil. More important, oil advisers are seriously concerned about the implications for our oil interests throughout the area -- not to mention our political position -- if Arab governments felt that we were now willing to stand aside and let Israel use an American company to consolidate its conquest of the Sinai.

State believes the Israelis are just seeing how much they can get away with and intends to advise Israelis strongly to drop the idea. But we probably

~~SECRET~~

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have not heard the last of this. End quote.