

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Rostow to President TS 2 p OPEN 6/21/95 NLJ 94-344	8/29/68	A
#1a memo	Rusk to President TS 1 p open 12-12-94 NLJ 94-342	8/27/68	A
#1c rpt	"Strategic Missile Talks" same sanitization 1-10-95 S 14 p open 1-12-96 NLJ 95-314 NLJ 94-342 [Duplicate of #20d, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Strategic Missile Talks"] [Sanitized NLJ 89-152]	8/24/68	A
#4 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82323) open 9-7-94 NLJ 94-146 S 2 p [Duplicate of #82, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Kosygin," and #2, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Czechoslovakia-1968"]	8/31/68	A
#5 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82319) open 5/27/03 NLJ 02-34 S 3 p [Duplicate of #7, NSF, Country File, Czechoslovakia, "Czech Crisis CAP copies"]	8/31/68	A
#8 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82305) C 1 p open B-001.2001 [Duplicate of #64f, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 94]	8/30/68	A
#10 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82302) open 3/13/03 NLJ 02-31 S 2 p	8/30/68	A
#11 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82309) S 2 p open 8-28-96 NLJ 95-305 [Duplicate of #7, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Rusk-Dobrynin"]	8/30/68	A
#12 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82310) open 10-12-99 NLJ 97-161 TS 1 p sanitized 9-7-94 #6-294-146 [Duplicate of #6, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Rusk-Dobrynin"]	8/30/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, W. Rostow, Vol. 92, August 22-31, 1968

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#15 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82298) C 1 p open 11/8/01	8/30/68	A
#16 memo	Rostow to President C 2 p open 1-18-94 NLS 92-200 [Duplicate of #73, NSF, Country File, China, Vol. 13]	8/30/68	A
#18 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82291) open 3/13/03 NLS 02-30 S 1 p (Dup of #11, WWR: Arab-Israeli Talks, Box 12)	8/30/68	A
#20a memo	Resor to SecDef S 11 p open NLS 019-039-1-1 (5/02)	8/16/68	A
#21 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82279) S 1 p open 11/8/01	8/30/68	A
#23 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82274) S 3 p announced 4/1/03 NLS/RAC 02-17	8/29/68	A
#24 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82273) S 1 p open 11/8/01	8/29/68	A
#26 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82271) C 1 p open 11/8/01 [Duplicate of #191c, NSF, Country File, Panama, Vol. 10]	8/29/68	A
#27 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82268) C 2 p open 11/8/01 [Duplicate of #64g, NSF, Memos to the President, Vol. 94]	8/29/68	A
#31 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82255) C 1 p open 11/8/01	8/29/68	A
#32 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82270) C 1 p open 11/8/01	8/29/68	A

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#33a cable	Saigon 36596 open 3/13/03 NLS 02-31 S 12 p [Duplicate of #31a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "8 B(3)[B] Bunker Weekly Report to President"] [Sanitized NLI CBS 10]	8/29/68	A
#35 cable	Smith to President (CAP 82226) S 1 p <i>open 11/8/01</i>	8/28/68	A
#36 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82250) <i>open 11/17/95</i> C 2 p [Duplicate of #16b, NSF, Country File, Chile, Vol. 5]	8/29/68	A
#38 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82247) <i>Open NLT 97-407 9.21.99</i> S 1 p <i>(dup. #38, NSF, MTP, Vol. 91, Box 39)</i>	8/29/68	A
#39 cable	Smith to President (CAP 82219) TS 2 p <i>open 1-12-94 NLS 92-281</i> [Duplicate of #2b, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Trip to Soviet Union"]	8/28/68	A
#40 cable	Smith to President (CAP 82220) S 3 p <i>open 11/8/01</i> <i>[dup. #100, NSF, CF, WH, "JANUARY 1968: TOWER ... V. 11"]</i>	8/28/68	A
#47 cable	W. Bundy to Temple (CAP 82202) C 1 p <i>open 11/8/01</i>	8/28/68	A
#48 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82201) <i>Open NLT 97-158 11-20-98</i> G 2 p [Duplicate of #8, NSF, Country File, Czechoslovakia, "Czech Crisis CAP copies"]	8/28/68	A
#49 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82200) " " " C 1 p [Duplicate of #9, NSF, Country File, Czechoslovakia, "Czech Crisis CAP copies"]	8/27/68	A
#54 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82194) <i>Open NLT 97-158 11-10-98</i> C 2 p	8/27/68	A

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#55 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82192) <i>Open NLJ 27-158 11-10-98</i> C 2 p [Duplicate of #10, NSF, Country File, Czechoslovakia, "Czech Crisis CAP copies"]	8/27/68	A
#57 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82191) S 2 p <i>Open 11/8/01</i>	8/27/68	A
#60 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82188) C 1 p <i>OPEN 7/26/96 NJ 94-18</i> [Duplicate of #16h, NSF, Country File, Chile, Vol. 5]	8/27/68	A
#68 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82177) S 2 p <i>Open 9-25-98 NLJ 98-162</i> [Duplicate of #11, NSF, Country File, Czechoslovakia, "Czech Crisis CAP copies"]	8/27/68	A
#69 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82176) S 1 p <i>Open 11/8/01</i> [Duplicate of #9 and #69a, NSF, Country File, Rumania, Vol. 3] [Exempt NLJ 88-148]	8/27/68	A
#71 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82163) S 1 p <i>Open 11/8/01</i> [Duplicate of #13, NSF, Country File, Czechoslovakia, "Czech Crisis CAP copies"]	8/26/68	A
#72 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>Open 11/8/01</i> [Duplicate of #164, NSF, Country File, France, Vol. 14]	8/26/68	A
#72a memo	Rusk to President C 2 p <i>Open 11/8/01</i> [Duplicate of #164a, NSF, Country File, France, Vol. 14]	8/21/68	A
#72b rpt	"Draft Note Verbale on Claims" C 4 p <i>Open 11/8/01</i> [Duplicate of #164b, NSF, Country File, France, Vol. 14]	undated	A

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#73 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82164) S 2 p open 11/8/01	8/26/68	A
#76 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82154) S 1 p open 11/8/01	8/26/68	A
#77 memo	Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m. TS 1 p open 9-18-07 NLJ D2-33	8/26/68	A
#77a memo	Taylor to President " TS 2 p	8/9/68	A
#79 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82148) open 9-25-92 NLJ 92-162 C 1 p [Duplicate of #14, NSF, Country File, Czechoslovakia, "Czech Crisis CAP copies"]	8/26/68	A
#80 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82147) S 1 p open 11/8/01	8/26/68	A
#81 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82146) S 2 p open 5-17-95 NLJ 92-199	8/26/68	A
#83 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82131) S 1 p open 11/8/01 [Duplicate of #28 and #28a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "8 B(3)[B] Bunker Weekly Report to President"] [Sanitized NLJ CBS 10]	8/25/68	A
#84 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82130) C 2 p Sanitized 6/5/03 NLJ 02-29	8/25/68	A
#85 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82124) S 1 p Exempt 5/27/03 NLJ 02-34 [Duplicate of #17, NSF, Country File, Czechoslovakia, "Czech Crisis CAP copies"]	8/24/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#86 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82121) S <u>3 p open 8-28-96 NLS 95-305</u> [Duplicate of 5, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Rusk/Dobrynin"]	8/24/68	A
#89 memo	Rostow to President, 2:00 p.m. <u>open RAC 2/12</u> S <u>1 p sanitized 6/10/03 NLS 02-29</u> [Duplicate of #99, NSF, Country File, India, Vol. 11]	8/24/68	A
#89a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 8 p <u>Exempt 4/15/03 NLS 02-32</u> [Duplicate of #99a, NSF, Country File, India, Vol. 11]	8/23/68	A
#90a memcon	Duplicate of #86 <u>open 11/8/01</u>		
#91 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82114) S <u>1 p open 11/8/01</u>	8/24/68	A
#92 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82115) S <u>1 p open 11/8/01</u>	8/24/68	A
#93 cable	Duplicate of #91 <u>open 11/8/01</u>		
#94 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82098) <u>open 4/1/03 NLS/RAC 02-17</u> S <u>1 p</u>	8/23/68	A
#100a cable	Rome 7859- S <u>1 p open 11/8/01</u> [Duplicate of #173a, NSF, Country File, Italy, Vol. 5]	8/23/68	A
#103 memo	Rostow to President, 8:27 a.m. C <u>1 p open 4/1/02 NLS/RAC 02-18</u>	8/23/68	A
#103a cable <u>sanitized 5/3/03</u> <u>NLS/RAC 02-17</u>	Intelligence Report C 2 p	8/22/68	A
#104a cable	Saigon 297 S 1 p <u>sanitized per RAC 11/8/01</u>	8/23/68	A

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#104b cable	Rostow to Bunker (CAP 82084) TS 1 p <i>Sanitized 6/5/03 NLJ 02-29</i>	8/22/68	A
#105 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 82097) <i>open 3/13/03 NLJ 02-30</i> S 2 p	8/23/68	A
#105a memo	Rusk to President C 3 p <i>open 11/8/01</i>	8/22/68	A
#105b rpt	"Message to be conveyed through Australian..." PCI 2 p <i>Open 2-16-01</i>	undated	A
#106 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 11/8/01</i> [Duplicate of #2, NSF, Country File, Rumania, Vol. 3] [Sanitized NLJ 88-148]	8/23/68	A
#112 memo	Rostow to President, 8:50 p.m. S 1 p <i>Sanitized per RAC 11/8/01</i>	8/22/68	A
#112a cable <i>Sanitized 5-13-03 NLJ 02-19</i>	Intelligence Report S 3 p	8/22/68	A
#113 memo	Rostow to President, 8:35 p.m. <i>open 6/5/03 NLJ 02-29</i> S 1 p	8/22/68	A
#114a memo	Smith to Rostow <i>open 9-25-97 NLJ 97-162</i> C 1 p	8/22/68	A
#115c table	"Enemy Initiated Attacks..." C 1 p <i>open 11/8/01</i>	undated	A
#117a cable	Vienna 6125 <i>Open 5.21.98 NLJ 97-193</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #8f, NSF, Country File, Austria, Vol. 1]	8/22/68	A
#119 memo	Rostow to President, 3:40 p.m. <i>open 6/5/03 NLJ 02-29</i> S 1 p	8/22/68	A

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#121 memo	Rostow to President Sanitized 6/15/03 NLT 02-29 NOTE: INFO. RELEASED S 1 p [Duplicate of #81, NSF, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. 4]	8/22/68	A
#121a memo	Read to Rostow S 3 p open 11/8/01 [Duplicate of #81b, NSF, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. 4]	8/21/68	A
#121b memo	Read to Rostow S 2 p open 11/8/01 [Duplicate of #81d, NSF, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. 4]	8/21/68	A
#121e memo	Read to Rostow open 3/13/03 NLT 02-31 S 3 p [Duplicate of #81f, NSF, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. 4]	8/19/68	A
#121d memo	Read to Rostow S 2 p open 11/8/01 [Duplicate of #81h, NSF, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. 4]	8/20/68	A
#121e memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 1 p Sanitized 4/15/03 NLT 02-32 [Duplicate of #81j, NSF, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. 4]	8/20/68	A
#121f memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 2 p Exempt 4/15/03 NLT 02-32 [Duplicate of #81k, NSF, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. 4]	8/20/68	A
#122 memo	Rostow to President open 3/13/03 NLT 02-31 S 2 p [Duplicate of #25, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "8 B(3)[B] Bunker Weekly Report to President"]	8/22/68	A
#122a cable	Saigon 36074 open 3/13/03 NLT 02-31 S 7 p [Duplicate of #25a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "8 B(3)[B] Bunker Weekly Report to President"] [Sanitized NLT CBS 10]	8/22/68	A

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#3 memo	Rostow to the President <i>semi 8-13-69 NLJ/RAC 02-21</i> 1 p S-	8/31/68	A
#13 cable	CAP 82311 <i>open 4/1/03 NLJ/RAC 02-22</i> 1p S- Sanitized, NLJ/CBS-21, 6/26/84	8/31/68	A
#25 cable	CAP 82272 1p TS - <i>sanitized 4/1/03 NLJ/RAC 02-22</i>	8/29/68	A
#56 cable	CAP 82195 <i>semi 8-13-69 NLJ/RAC 02-21</i> 2 pp S-	8/27/68	A
#74 cable	CAP 82153 <i>open 4/1/03 NLJ/RAC</i> 5 pp S-	8/26/68	A
#95 cable	CAP 82100 <i>semi 8-13-69 NLJ/RAC 02-21</i> 1p TS -	8/23/68	A
#96 memo	Rostow to the President - 5:05 p.m. <i>open 4/1/03 NLJ/RAC 02-22</i> 1p TS	8/23/68	A
#96a memo	Nathaniel Davis to Rostow 1p TS - <i>sanitized 4/1/03 NLJ/RAC 02-22</i>	8/23/68	A
#96b cable <i>exempt 5-13-03 NLJ/RAC 02-23</i>	Intelligence Report 2pp TS -	8/23/68	A
#96c cable <i>exempt 5-13-03 NLJ/RAC 02-23</i>	Intelligence Report 1p TS -	8/22/68	A
#96d cable <i>exempt 5-13-03 NLJ/RAC 02-23</i>	Intelligence Report 1p "TS" <i>open</i>	8/22/68	A
#109 note	Rostow to the President <i>semi</i> <i>open 8-13-69 NLJ/RAC 02-21</i> 1p S -	8/23/68	A
#113a cable <i>sanitized 5-13-03 NLJ/RAC 02-23</i>	Intelligence Report 1p S-	8/23/68	A
#117 note	Rostow to the President, 4:00 p.m. 1p S <i>open 4/1/03 NLJ 97-192 & NLJ/RAC 02-22</i>	8/22/68	A

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National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 92, 8/22-31/68

Box 29
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#117b cable Sanitized S-13-03 NLJ/RAC 02-23	Intelligence Report Op-8g, NSF, CF, Austria, Vol. 1, Box 163 1p S -	8/22/68	A
#119a rpt. Sanitized S-13-03 NLJ/RAC 02-23	Intelligence Report 1p S -	8/22/68	A
#125 memo	Rostow to the President 2pp S - anti 8/2-09 NLJ/RAC 02-21	8/22/68	A
#93c cable	USNAFO 4357 S - 1p open 11/8/01	8/24/68	A

National Security File, Memos to the President, Rostow, Vol. 92, 8/22-31/68

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~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~Thursday
August 29, 1968

Mr. President:

Pres file

In the attached memorandum, Sec. Rusk submits for your approval the Initial Presentation (Tab A) of the US position and the Basic Position Paper (instructions for the delegation) (Tab B) for use in the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. These papers have been unanimously agreed upon by the Committee of Principals (Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, Foster, Helms, Tape for Seaborg, Hornig, and myself). The papers are based on the specific proposal, which was previously submitted to you with the unanimous endorsement of the Committee of Principals.

The preparation and agreement on these papers are a further example of the excellent intra-governmental cooperation that has been achieved on this subject.

In view of the great importance of this proposal, I urge you to read the two papers in their entirety.

I call your particular attention to the manner in which the difficult question of verification is dealt with in the Initial Presentation, page 6-7 (para. 12-14) and in the Position Paper, page 2 (para. 7). The basic proposal has been developed on the basis that we could agree to rely exclusively on verification by "national" means, which is now the agreed term to describe all intelligence resources that do not involve direct access to Soviet territory. However, in keeping with the desire of OSD and the JCS that an effort be made to obtain some inspection, the Initial Presentation calls for consideration of procedures for "selective direct observation on US and Soviet territory," which is the new term for "on-site inspection," as a desirable means of increasing the confidence of each side in the agreement. In the Position Paper, the delegation is instructed that "This concept should be pursued during these portions of the negotiation, but not to the extent of prejudicing the negotiations or precluding, if so instructed, reliance solely on national means of verification."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-344

By CB, NARA, Date 6-7-95~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~

2

I also call your attention to the instructions to the delegation in the Position Paper, page 8-9 (para. 4) on how to handle the extremely difficult and important issue of the Tallinn SAM system. The resolution of this problem in the negotiations to our satisfaction is central to the acceptability of the agreement. Moreover, this can establish the necessary precedent for a continuing dialogue on how to deal with suspicious or controversial problems which arise under an agreement.

You should also be aware of the question of the form of the agreement in the Position Paper, page 14 (para. 1). Although there is complete agreement in the instructions to the delegation to defer this issue, this bypasses a substantive issue since the JCS believe that any agreement should be in the form of a treaty while Sec. Rusk wishes to maintain the option for consideration of less formal understandings.

I recommend that you tentatively approve these two papers as the basis for further preparations for the talks.

W. W. Rostow

Att.:

Memorandum fm Sec. Rusk
dtd 8/27/68 with Tabs A & B

Tentatively approve Initial
Presentation and Basic
Position Paper _____

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

SMKeeny:jb:8-28-68/5p

bcc: SMK file & chron

WWR (2)

SMK comeback copy

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~

1a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

August 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Strategic Arms Talks with the Soviets (U)

Recommendation

That you approve the attached Initial Presentation of the U.S. position and Basic Position Paper for use in the discussions with the Soviet Union.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Discussion

The Executive Committee of the Committee of Principals has prepared an initial presentation of the U.S. position and a basic position paper for the strategic arms talks with the Soviets. These papers, which have been concurred in by the Executive Committee, are based on the proposal forwarded to you on August 15. If you concur, these papers will be used as a basis for further preparations for the discussions and would be available at such time as you deem it desirable to initiate talks with the Soviet Union.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Attachments:

1. Tab A - Initial Presentation.
2. Tab B - Basic Position Paper.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-342
By *108*, NARA, Date *12-8-94*

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

GROUP 1

1b



TOP SECRET-NODIS

August 24, 1968

STRATEGIC MISSILE TALKS
INITIAL PRESENTATION OF US POSITION

1. On behalf of my Government, I wish to express deep satisfaction that representatives of the United States and the Soviet Socialist Republics are now meeting to discuss the limitation and eventual reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles.

2. There is perhaps no more important step in the field of foreign relations which our two Governments might take than to reach an agreement of this kind. Such an agreement would enhance the security of both sides, could permit each side to devote to peaceful endeavors substantial resources which could be saved from future military expenditures, and would contribute to world stability overall. It would also constitute a most important step in fulfillment of the obligations undertaken by our Government under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

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Authority 71989-152

By ag/esp, NARA, Date 12-14-92

TOP SECRET-NODIS

Treaty. Thus, early agreement between our two countries would be of great value in increasing the likelihood that other countries would ratify and adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

3. The United States has presented to the Soviet Union over the past year and a half several messages relating to the subject of these talks. It remains the position of the United States Government that our discussions should include both offensive strategic nuclear missile delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles.

4. We believe that it is important, and should be possible, to reach agreement on limited measures curbing the strategic arms race, without resolving all of the difficult problems inevitably involved in a program for general and complete disarmament. We believe that the first step in achieving meaningful strategic arms limitations should be to restrain further increases of strategic missile forces. Such a step would be of value in avoiding a further costly and possibly dangerous upward spiral of strategic missile deployments, and would help pave the way for reduction of strategic arms.

5. It should be possible for our two countries alone to agree on steps to curtail the strategic arms race.

6. The problem we are facing is urgent. As each month goes by, armaments increase and grow more complex on both sides. An agreement should be easier to negotiate today before further deployments take place than it will in the future, and it could result in important savings of resources.

7. We recognize that achieving strategic arms limitations which meet our separately perceived requirements of national security is a complex task, given the nature of contemporary strategic offensive and defensive missile systems and the many factors affecting and determining military capabilities. Our two nations have different levels and kinds of strategic weapons systems and we may not necessarily share identical evaluations regarding the utility and roles of these systems. Moreover, we recognize that in reaching an agreement some adjustments from currently deployed strategic forces may be necessary. However, we believe that equitable and mutually beneficial strategic arms limitations can be attained.

8. We believe that the US and the Soviet Union have the following strategic arms limitation objectives in common:

-- To achieve and maintain a stable US-Soviet strategic deterrent relationship by agreed limitations on the deployment of offensive and defensive strategic missiles.

-- To enhance the credibility and effectiveness of our efforts to prevent the destabilizing actions of other nations by demonstrating US and Soviet willingness to limit their strategic missile forces.

-- To provide assurance to each of us that our security will be maintained, or enhanced, while at the same time avoiding the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race.

-- To improve US-Soviet understanding by establishing a continuing process of meaningful discussion of issues arising from our strategic relationship.

9. With all of the above considerations in mind, the United States proposes an agreement comprising the following basic elements. The U.S. Delegation will be prepared to discuss these elements in greater detail at an appropriate time after hearing the views of the Soviet Government.

10. The United States suggests cessation of the initiation of construction of additional strategic offensive land-based

ballistic missile launchers. This weapon category should include launchers for offensive ballistic missiles of intermediate and medium range (i.e., missiles with ranges greater than 1,000 km), as well as for longer-range intercontinental missiles. There should also be a prohibition on the further construction and deployment of strategic offensive missile-launching submarines, and on installing on surface ships facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles. The difficulties in verifying limitations on specific numbers of deployed mobile land-based strategic offensive missiles and launchers are such that the United States proposes that there be a complete ban on mobile, land-based strategic offensive missile systems.

11. The situation with respect to strategic defensive anti-ballistic missile systems is more complex. It would seem that the most feasible limitation on strategic anti-missile defensive systems would be a set and equivalent number of fixed anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated missiles which each side could deploy. The U.S. also proposes that the deployment of mobile ABM launchers and associated missiles be totally prohibited.

12. There must, of course, be adequate verification of any agreement. In previous discussions leading up to these talks, we have indicated that the United States is prepared to rely to the maximum possible extent on verification by national means available to the two governments in order to verify an agreement limiting the deployment of strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons systems, and we indicated that major steps in limiting the deployment of strategic missile systems should be possible on that basis.

13. An agreement of the scope just outlined may, however, involve certain aspects which will be difficult to verify with full confidence through national means alone. To meet these potential problems the United States believes that consideration should be given to supplementing national means of verification by some mutually arrived at arrangements for reassurance. Such agreed procedures would increase the confidence of each government in the other's compliance with the agreement and could permit a more comprehensive agreement. Therefore, we should explore at an early stage of our discussions what supplementary means of reassurance could be agreed.

14. It would appear that arrangements involving agreed procedures for selective direct observation on U.S. and Soviet territory are the best way of providing this reassurance; there may be other means of contributing to reassurance. The essential point is that each state needs to be able to satisfy itself that the other state is living up to the agreement.

15. The United States Government believes these talks can lead to an agreement beneficial to both sides. By our agreement, we could demonstrate to the world at large that our two nations, each endowed with great military power, can act to limit that power. The U.S. Delegation would welcome hearing your comments on the U.S. proposal and any other views the Soviet Delegation is prepared to advance. We hope the Soviet Delegation will agree that the position we have outlined today provides a sound basis for an agreement.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 95-314
By isp, NARA, Date 1-12-96

August 24, 1968

STRATEGIC MISSILE TALKS

BASIC POSITION PAPER

(Instructions for the Delegation)

General

Introduction

1. This paper presents guidelines governing the U.S. position during the first phase of U.S. - Soviet talks on strategic missile limitations.

2. It is not possible to draw up a detailed scenario covering the talks; much will depend on initial Soviet reaction and how we choose to respond to it. It is also for this reason that, with few exceptions, no attempt has been made to spell out alternate U.S. positions, which will have to be developed later through normal U.S. Government procedures.

Tactics

3. This paper deals with the major issues likely to arise in connection with the presentation of our proposal. A certain amount of discussion and clarification of individual features, in isolation from other factors, will be necessary. However, we wish to stress in the discussions that the U.S. proposal should be viewed as a comprehensive entity. We wish to avoid conceding to the Soviets the advantage of concentrating on the inequities of this or that measure. We should point out that, because of the asymmetries in the respective strategic postures of the U.S. and USSR, it would be unrealistic and unnecessary

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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to strive for equality in each category of strategic weapons. Rather, we should accept existing asymmetries as a point of departure and strive for an agreement which, in its overall effect, would satisfy the security interests of each side.

4. The Delegation should proceed with due caution in presenting the U.S. position. We do not wish to engage in a protracted discussion of generalities, but neither do we wish to show our entire hand without having first obtained at least a general impression of the Soviet approach.

5. After settling on formalities, the Delegation should give the "Initial Presentation of U.S. Position" (see separate paper) which contains, in general skeleton form, the outlines of the U.S. proposal.

6. It should be emphasized that, in the ensuing discussion of the U.S. position, the Delegation is not required to present the totality of the position as it is written below for a particular category of weapons in its initial presentation. It may wish to withhold some of the details, particularly on highly technical matters, until later stages in the negotiations.

7. After an exchange of initial views on the proposed force limitations, the Delegation should explore the problem of verification. The U.S. proposal has been drawn up on the assumption that in each instance we could agree to exclusive reliance on national means of verification. We should first, however, make a concerted effort to gain Soviet agreement to additional means of providing reassurance. Specifically, we should propose that both sides agree to arrangements for supplementary procedures involving agreed procedures for selective direct observation on Soviet and U.S. territory for those restrictions which cannot otherwise be verified with high confidence. The Delegation should concentrate its efforts on those items for which supplementary procedures will be demonstrably useful in increasing the confidence that the agreement is being complied with. This concept should be pursued during these portions of the negotiation, but not to the extent of prejudicing the negotiations or precluding, if so instructed, reliance solely on national means of verification. The Delegation should also explore other means of providing reassurance. (Studies are underway to define these items and procedures, and the results will be made available to the Delegation.)

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- 3 -

U.S. Verification Capability

8. The judgments of the Intelligence Community on our ability to monitor Soviet compliance with the proposed agreement are contained in SNIE 11-13-68 and various supplementary documents which are available to the Delegation.

U.S. and Soviet Forces

9. The Delegation has available to it a series of Intelligence Community reports and DOD official documents showing the currently existing and possible future Soviet and U.S. strategic systems.

Specific Items in Proposal

I. Fixed Land-Based ICBM Launchers

U.S. Position

1. The proposal would require cessation of the initiation of construction of any additional strategic offensive land-based missile launchers as of September 1, 1968. The Soviet Union would be permitted to complete the launchers which it is constructing as of that date. Beyond that date, however, it would not be allowed to initiate further deployment of fixed ICBM launchers. Under no circumstances would either side be permitted to deploy more than 1,200 ICBM launchers. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed, including increasing the hardness of existing silos and deployment of MIRV's, or the retrofitting of existing launchers with new missiles.

Development of U.S. Position

2. In presenting this position, the Delegation will probably wish to withhold discussion of the technical details concerning the issue of technological improvements until a general understanding is reached on the basic proposition.

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3. At some point it should be made clear to the Soviets that the prohibition on additional deployments applies to the deployment of new launchers for partial or multiple orbit strategic missile systems.

II. Fixed Land-Based IRBM/MRBM Launchers

U.S. Position

1. Further construction of fixed land-based launchers for IRBM/MRBM (ranges greater than 1,000 km.) would be prohibited. The retrofiting of existing IRBM/MRBM launchers to accommodate ICBM missiles would be prohibited. The installation of ICBM missiles on IRBM/MRBM launchers would be prohibited as would the conversion of IRBM/MRBM missiles to ICBM missiles. Building of additional silos, enlarging of existing silos, changing basic external configuration of silos and other launchers, further hardening of launchers, and the relocation of launchers would be prohibited. No additional restrictions would be imposed upon technological improvements of launchers or missiles already deployed or the retrofiting of existing launchers with new missiles or intermediate or medium range.

Development of U.S. Position

2. As in the case of ICBM launchers, the Delegation will probably wish to withhold discussion of technological improvements until a general understanding is reached on the basic proposition set forth in the first sentence of the above paragraph.

3. The U.S. Delegation may, at its discretion, point out that the Soviet Union at the present time has deployed a large number of this type of missile which presumably are targetted at Western Europe. The United States has no such missiles at its disposal. Thus, the inclusion of this category of missiles in a mutual "freeze" agreement would concede to the Soviet side a certain advantage. This is one of the asymmetries in the Soviet and U.S. strategic forces which an arms limitation agreement must take into account.

If we are willing to concede an advantage to the Soviets in this category of weapons, they should be prepared to tolerate a certain advantage to the U.S. in another category.

III. Mobile Land-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems

1. The proposal would impose a complete ban on mobile land-based, strategic offensive missile systems (ranges greater than 1,000 km.). Missile systems with such ranges carried by water-borne vehicles on inland waterways would also be prohibited. Any such existing systems would be destroyed.

Development of U.S. Position

2. The Delegation should stress that prohibition should be placed on mobile land-based offensive systems, since under conditions of a ban on further deployment of fixed ICBM launchers, the arms race could be diverted to the deployment of mobile systems, thus negating the value of the agreement.

3. In justifying a total ban, the Delegation should point out that verification by external means of an agreement limiting mobile missile systems to a specific number would be difficult. The possibilities of concealment and redeployment are obvious. However, verification of a total ban would be very much simpler, as the detection of any such system or part thereof clandestinely produced or deployed would be more likely and thus establish a violation.

4. The Delegation should point out, at some appropriate stage, that the ban, in addition to prohibiting production and deployment, also would prohibit the testing of missiles in a mobile system configuration. This ban would otherwise not extend to R&D.

IV. Mobile Sea-Based Strategic Offensive Missile Systems

1. The proposal would ban the construction of additional strategic offensive missile launching submarines or of additional launchers in existing submarines. This prohibition should apply to all submarines with ballistic missile or cruise missile launchers. Such submarines under construction as of September 1, 1968, could be completed, subject to agreement on their number.

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There would be no limitation on the characteristics of SLBM's or SLCM's, or on retrofitting missile submarines with new or larger missiles of the type with which they are equipped, i.e., ballistic or cruise missiles. The fitting out of surface ships with facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles would be prohibited.

Development of U.S. Position

2. In initially presenting the above position, the Delegation should omit any reference to the completion of the construction of submarine starts underway, and refer simply to a "prohibition on the further construction and deployment of strategic offensive missile-launching submarines," as stated in the Initial U.S. Presentation. The reason for this caution is the uncertainty concerning the exact number of such submarines the Soviets have under construction; we wish to avoid leaving them an open field for their making exaggerated claims in this regard which would be difficult to refute with hard evidence.

3. The U.S. can accept the completion of the ballistic missile submarines the Soviets have under construction as of September 1, 1968, provided a satisfactory understanding were reached on the exact number. If the Soviets raise the issue of completing submarines under construction, the U.S. Delegation should ask the Soviets to indicate the number of submarines under construction. The Delegation should seek instructions based on the number indicated by the Soviets.

4. Even with this understanding, Soviet negotiators would almost certainly object to the U.S. proposal on the grounds that it preserved a distinct advantage for the U.S. and cut short a major Soviet weapons expansion program. Our response should be that certain asymmetries are inevitable in an arms limitation agreement of this sort. Just as we accept the preponderance of Soviet IRBM/MRBM launchers, they should accept the imbalance of SLBM forces. We should also point to the substantial Soviet force of submarine-based cruise-type missiles which can be directed at land targets and which have no U.S. equivalent.

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5. The proposal contemplates an understanding concerning the problem of the growing obsolescence of existing submarines over an extended period of time. The proposed form of such an understanding would be to provide that there would be no initiation of construction for replacement of ballistic or cruise missile submarines within the first five years of the agreement. During that period, the two sides would undertake to reach agreement on rules governing subsequent replacement of submarines. In the absence of a supplementary agreement on such rules, each side may replace submarines after five years from the date of the initiation of the agreement provided that replacement does not increase the total number of submarines or of launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles or cruise missiles.

6. The Soviets may raise this issue themselves as, over the short run at least, they would benefit more from a replacement program (many of their missile-launching submarines are obsolescent) than would the U.S. The Delegation, therefore should not initially raise the issue but should await a Soviet initiative. But the Delegation should raise the issue at some point if the Soviets do not.

7. In presenting the U.S. proposal, the Delegation should make clear that we consider strategic ballistic and cruise missiles (launched from submarines) of any range as falling within the definition of offensive strategic weapons whose launchers are subject to the limitation. Antisubmarine weapons would not be considered strategic missiles. New ballistic missiles may be retrofitted in ballistic missile submarines and new cruise missiles but not ballistic missiles in cruise missile submarines.

8. While cruise missiles carried on submarines can be defined as having strategic capabilities, those on surface vessels are more difficult to use for strategic purposes. Therefore, no restrictions would be imposed on cruise missiles aboard surface vessels. The proposal would, however, prohibit the installation of facilities for firing offensive ballistic missiles on surface ships.

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V. ABMs

U.S. Position

1. The proposal would ban the deployment of more than a set and equivalent number of fixed, land-based anti-ballistic missile launchers and associated anti-ballistic missiles, including reload missiles.

A total prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems, both land-based and sea-based, would be imposed. There would be no other constraints on the characteristics of the ABM systems deployed.

Development of U.S. Position

2. For your information, with regard to the numerical limit on ABM launchers, we do not yet have a position. We wish to see if the Soviets accept our proposal in principle, or if they present an alternative proposal. If an understanding is reached on the principle of set and equivalent numbers of anti-ballistic missile launchers and missiles, we would then discuss the precise numerical limit.

3. There are two reasons why we believe this to be the most feasible approach. On the one hand, each side has announced plans to deploy, or is deploying ABMs. These circumstances, as well as the nuclear forces of third countries, must be taken into account. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that an unchecked race between our two countries in the deployment of ABMs would create pressures on both sides to increase their strategic offensive forces, thus making meaningless or impossible any arms limitations in this latter respect.

4. The Soviet Union has been widely deploying a strategic air defense system called the SA-5 or Tallinn system. It is generally agreed in the US Intelligence Community that the Tallinn system does not at present have an ABM capability (except possibly for a limited self-defense capability, such as the Nike-Hercules or any other air-defense missile). However, since it is conceivable that it could be augmented and

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- 9 -

converted to acquire such a capability, a discussion of the capabilities and purposes of this system would be in order. The Delegation should seek to elicit information on the Tallinn system to assure us that it is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system. Our main aim would be to satisfy ourselves that the Tallinn system is not and will not be upgraded into an ABM system without our knowledge. If we cannot satisfy ourselves on this matter, then Tallinn systems must be limited and included in the agreed Soviet ABM level. As a means of gaining assurance regarding Tallinn, we should raise the question of radars and attempt to obtain as part of an understanding that replacement of the Tallinn site radars, for example, would be prohibited if Tallinn is to be treated as air defense.

5. In discussing the equivalence of the U.S. and Soviet ABM limitations, the question of reload would have to be considered. If the Soviets deployed Moscow-type ABM launchers having one reload, they might be limited to a lesser number of launchers than we would deploy. On the other hand, the Soviets could agree to deploy an equal number of non-reloadable launchers.

6. Although we consider that radars for ABM systems are a significant item in dealing with the ABM question, the present proposal does not provide any such limitation because of concern over possible erroneous categorization of radars. The problems of limitations on ABM radars and the relationship of radars to preventing the upgrading of the Tallinn anti-aircraft system to provide it with a significant ABM capability must be studied further and will have to be among the subjects discussed with the Soviets during the negotiations.

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VI. Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft Systems

The U.S. Position

1. The proposal would not include limitations on aircraft or anti-aircraft systems.

Development of U.S. Position

2. Both President Johnson and Premier Kosygin have described the subject of the discussions as concerning both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles. Thus, we cannot exclude a discussion of strategic bombers if the Soviets raise the subject.

3. The U.S. Delegation should not refer to bombers unless the Soviets do so. If they raise the issue, the Delegation should say that the U.S. does not believe that bombers should be limited at this time. The Delegation should explain that there is a wide variety of performance characteristics of the aircraft at the disposal of the US and USSR, and it would be difficult to agree on a definition of "strategic" aircraft. Moreover, the strategic effect of these aircraft depends to a large degree on the missions assigned to them. This is a variable factor, subject to change within a very short period of time, and hence less susceptible to a formal agreement.

4. Bombers have not figured importantly in the increase of either side in strategic nuclear delivery capabilities in recent years. In fact, both US and Soviet intercontinental bomber forces have been decreasing in size even without any agreement or limitation on reduction of bombers. Consideration of bomber limitations would also raise the complex issue of air defense.

5. Thus, the US should seek to persuade the Soviets to restrict initial discussion to land and seabased missile and anti-ballistic missile limitations, excluding or if not, possibly deferring, the question of possible aircraft (including air to surface missiles) limitations. If the Soviets present a specific proposal on bomber limitation, the Delegation

should say that it will refer the proposal to Washington for consideration.

6. Upgrading of Air Defense systems to give them an ABM capability would be prohibited.

VII. Technological Improvements

The U.S. Position

1. There would be no prohibition of technological improvements within the constraints of the agreement.

Development of U.S. Position

2. Technological improvements in the characteristics of ballistic missiles and launchers have--and will have--an effect on the strategic balance. These include, for example, the size of warheads or throw weight of launchers, the accuracy of missiles, the number of warheads carried by a missile, penetration aids, and the hardening of missile warheads.

3. The Soviets may well raise the question of the announced U.S. MIRV programs. They are likely to cite American sources in support of the argument that MIRVs will give the U.S. an advantage, and that they should be prohibited. The Soviets probably will refer to the commencement of U.S. MIRV testing and may demand that the U.S. stop testing immediately. The U.S. should note that this testing was part of a continuing development program which had been planned for a long time and which would continue for several years before the development was complete. Since the Soviets had continued their development and testing of new systems during the year and a half since President Johnson had proposed the talks, we saw no reason why the U.S. should have altered its plans in anticipation of these discussions. Should the Soviets press this issue, the U.S. should respond by inquiring whether the Soviet Union sees a practical way to provide verification for any limitations on MIRVs and other technological

improvements. Any specific Soviet proposal that the U.S. halt MIRV testing or deployment must be referred to Washington for consideration.

VIII. Provisions for Revision and Withdrawal

The U.S. Position

1. Either party may propose revision of the agreement if it believes that conditions affecting the agreement have changed. The two parties shall meet from time to time to discuss the operation of the agreement and possible revisions.

2. Nine years after entry into force of this agreement the two parties shall meet for a formal review of the operation of the agreement with a view to assuring that the purposes of the agreement, with any revisions that may have been made during the period, are being realized. In the absence of agreement by the two parties on the continued operation of the agreement with necessary revisions, either party may withdraw by giving six months' notice prior to 10 years from the day of entry into force of the agreement. Otherwise, the agreement shall be automatically renewed for another ten years, at which time this review procedure shall be repeated.

3. Either party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the agreement at any time if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the agreement have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.

Development of U.S. Position

4. The U.S. Delegation should at an early stage in the discussion indicate that the agreement will have to include provision for revision and withdrawal procedures. The presentation of our specific proposal can await progress in determining areas of agreement on limitations.

5. The U.S. Delegation should indicate to the Soviets that either side would have the right to withdraw from the agreement unless adequate revisions can be negotiated, and

in the absence of such revisions the United States must be prepared to exercise its right of withdrawal from the agreement. The following are illustrative grounds for revision or withdrawal from the agreement:

- (1) if the capability of any third country reaches the point where either party to the agreement believes that its security is threatened;
- (2) if either side believes that extraordinary events have undermined the stability of the agreement;
- (3) if there is evidence of evasion of the terms of the agreement;
- (4) if either party takes action which interferes significantly with the other's verification capability or otherwise adversely affects the capability of the other party to verify compliance with the agreement.

IX. Reductions

The U.S. Position

1. The proposal is not designed to achieve reductions in existing strategic forces.

Development of U.S. Position

2. The U.S. Delegation should, in its opening statement, express its conviction that agreement now on measures to curb the strategic arms race not only could lead to substantial savings of national resources to both sides in terms of avoidance of future expenditures but also would help pave the way for substantial reductions of forces in being. The U.S. would be prepared, at an appropriate stage, to discuss such reductions. But we must acknowledge that an agreement designed to achieve reductions in strategic forces, involving as it would great uncertainties for both sides, would be more difficult to achieve than an agreement on leveling off the strength of these forces, which we now propose. The U.S. is convinced that the necessary first step is an agreement on restricting the present arms race.

X. Modalities

The U.S. Position

1. Discussion of the form that an agreement might take should be deferred until we have a clearer picture of what such an agreement might cover. Although it is normal practice to embody disarmament agreements in treaty form, other forms of agreement should not be excluded at this time. Should the Soviets raise the subject, the Delegation should seek instructions.

2. The Soviets have already agreed to bilateral discussions, and presumably they will stick to this formula. We should oppose any effort they might make to include British or French forces in an agreement, to shift the discussions into the ENDC, or otherwise to broaden the bilateral discussions and eventual agreement.

3. In addition to the provisions for revision and withdrawal discussed in Section VIII above, the Delegation should make clear the right to call for consultations with respect to developments which may raise the question of possible violation by the other party. Some organizational arrangement such as a standing US-USSR commission would be desirable to provide consultation on a continuous basis.

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ACTION

Friday, August 23, 1968
6:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the letter to Mac Bundy,
redrafted as per instruction -- cut by
more than 25%.

W. W. Rostow

*1. [unclear]
2. Pres file*

(prepared)
8/22

2a

Personal and Confidential

Dear Mac:

I was pleased to get your letter and memorandum of August 15 and to enjoy again the sharpness and clarity of your mind.

I have read and reread what you had to say.

I have recently had occasion to review the documents in the Government reflecting the considerations that led to earlier pauses, including our 37-day pause. There is, I can tell you, a great consistency in the arguments on both sides.

If I had any responsible reasons to believe that a pause at this time would, in fact, move us more rapidly to peace, I would not hesitate to take the step. Indeed, it would be my duty -- including my duty to the men in the field -- to take that step.

But I must tell you that my reading of all that comes before me convinces me that the considerations controlling Hanoi do not depend on a bombing pause. When they are ready to move towards peace they will know how to indicate to us -- in one way or another -- what will follow if we stop the bombing. I have no doubt that -- one day -- they will do so.

Meanwhile, I must take into account what they have done since March 31 and the military meaning of a total bombing cessation.

What they have done is radically to increase the flow of men and supplies and build up a capacity for an offensive roughly on the scale of the Tet offensive. We do not know whether that offensive will take place; but every single intelligence indicator points towards the highest degree of readiness and intent to move in the days ahead. In fact, the activities in the last three or four days have ended what has been called "the lull." Their casualties have been running three or four

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
SERIALS. CANCELLED PER R.O. 10000,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAY 10, 1963.

BY TH/LS ON 11-9-92

times the level of the lull, which was approximately the average level for 1967. Abrams and Westy are convinced that we are already into the first phase of the third offensive.

Now for the military meaning of the bombing. I attach a summary of Abrams' assessment which came to me on Friday morning. Whether his estimates are statistically exact or not, I am convinced from all the evidence that our bombing has considerable military significance. Those trucks we attack contain men, ammunition, and other supplies. The truck movements have only one purpose: to increase the weight of attack against our men and our allies. Bearing the responsibility for these men, I cannot prudently add to the burden they will bear -- and the casualties they will suffer -- if I take action which will expand and accelerate the enemy's logistical effort at a critical moment in the war.

Now there is another argument familiar to us both over the years. It is that tonnages required in the South are small; the enemy gives these highest priority; and they budget for the losses we impose on them and achieve the level of effort in the South they choose to mount. I don't believe that is the way it is. I think they put into the South -- especially in this year of intensive and expanded effort -- every man and every ton that they can get there. There is ample evidence right now that they are making the maximum effort of which they are capable in preparing for this third major offensive.

I cannot, therefore, casually write off at this time as a minor matter the attrition we are imposing on the other side through our bombing.

I am sure history will record that every one of our bombing pauses, on balance, caused some increase in our casualties in the sense that men on our side died or were wounded who would not otherwise have become casualties. A President must be prepared for that kind of risk if its taking will move us significantly towards peace. But at this particular time I must tell you that the evidence does not justify it.

Personal-Confidential

-3-

I know it's hard to believe on the outside, but the simple fact is the other side is not yet ready for a settlement. I do not despair that they might be ready sometime in the weeks and months ahead -- although I am not counting on this.

The length of this letter indicates -- I trust -- the seriousness with which I shall always take your views, and my pleasure at hearing from you at any time.

Lady Bird joins me in warmest greetings to Mary and to yourself.

Sincerely,

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
President
The Ford Foundation
320 East 43rd Street
New York, New York 10017

*signed & mailed from
Ranch on Aug 25, 1968*

LBJ:WWR:mx

SUMMARY OF GENERAL ABRAMS' VIEWS

9/23/69

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What is the effect of our current bombing operations in North Vietnam?

First, we believe we are now destroying or damaging approximately 15% of the trucks believed to be moving into South Vietnam.

Second, it is our conviction that the air interdiction program in the North Vietnam panhandle has been the primary agent which has reduced trucks detected by about 80% between mid-July and the present time.

A third effect is to prevent the enemy from massing artillery and air defense means in the area to the north of the DMZ from which they can attack our forces. Further, we interfere with his ability to concentrate forces and supplies for sudden attacks through the DMZ against our units.

What would the the military effect of a cessation of that bombing?

First, military materiel would be able to reach the DMZ or the borders of Laos unimpeded. We believe the current attrition from truck destruction alone, not to mention truck park storage areas, is running several hundred tons per day on the average in the NVN panhandle. The truck flow could be expected to return to its mid-July level or even higher within as little as a week. We are talking about an increase, repeat increase, in southward movement which could amount to 1,500 tons per day or more. Next, the enemy would be able to mass artillery, air defense means, and ground units freely north of the DMZ for use against our forces. Finally, freed from interdiction north of 17 degrees, the enemy could move reinforcements to the DMZ by truck or rail, thus drastically shortening transit time.

Is there any possibility of your providing even an approximate estimate of the additional casualties we would take if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam?

We would have to expect a several-fold increase in U.S. and allied casualties in the First Corps. With the bombing authority now in effect, I am able with forces available to limit the enemy's capability in South Vietnam by interdicting his roads and destroying substantial amounts of his munitions and supplies before they reach South Vietnam. In addition, I am able to suppress his artillery and air defense north of the Ben Hai so that our positions just south of the DMZ are secure. If the bombing in North Vietnam now authorized were to be suspended, the enemy, in 10 days to two weeks, could develop a capability in the DMZ area in terms of scale, intensity and duration of combat on the order of five times what he now has. I cannot agree to place our forces at the risk which the enemy's capability would then pose.

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*Revised
8-17-68
108*

THE FORD FOUNDATION
320 EAST 43RD STREET
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017

McGEORGE BUNDY
PRESIDENT

August 15, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

In the last few weeks I have been thinking a lot about the question of stopping the remaining bombing in the North. Somewhat to my own surprise I find myself very strongly of the view, after years of thinking the opposite, that the time to stop has come -- though most of my reasons are quite different from those of doves and leftists. I am diffident about sending comments to my President when he has not asked for them and when I am not up-to-date on the in-boxes. But the issue is a grave one, and I think I ought to send you my thoughts for what they may be worth.

The attached memo has been written for your use only, and no one else has a copy. I have kept my name off it so that you can use it (or not) any way you please.

I have omitted the obvious arguments relating to the current political scene. I think they are important, but I'm sure they are very familiar to you -- and anyway they ought not to count at all unless it is right to stop the bombing on the larger ground of our national and international interests. These are the interests I've tried to consider.

My memo may be a little hard on the military, but I must say that the arguments they've been feeding the press just don't impress me at all.

I can see from what a number of Administration people are saying today that you don't currently agree with the view I am expressing. And of course I don't know enough to be sure that this week and not next week is the best time to act. But I do believe my basic points are sound. What I hope for is a decision of imaginative courage, not because of soft-headed pressures from doves, but really in spite of them. I think stopping the bombing is now the right course for those who want to defend the gains we have made in Southeast Asia since 1964.

Respectfully, as ever,

J. Ma

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

2d

A MEMORANDUM ON VIETNAM

This memorandum is directed at the specific question of the bombing in the North. Its argument is that the time has come to stop that bombing. The argument has five parts, as follows:

1. The military value of the bombing is low, so that it can be stopped without serious military disadvantage whenever the U. S. Government so decides.
2. To stop the bombing now would strongly increase the political pressure on Hanoi to reduce its own level of force and to move toward a settlement.
3. To stop the bombing would give a clear and accurate signal to Saigon, with results which might be disquieting at the beginning but should be healthy in the long run.
4. To stop the bombing now would be consistent with dominant opinion in the United States and properly related to the downward movement of U. S. investment and sacrifice which is now inevitable.
5. To stop the bombing now will make it easier, not harder, to do those other things which are still necessary to protect our real achievements in Vietnam and in Southeast Asia. In this respect it is exactly parallel to the President's first limitation of March 31, and is now the right next step.

In summary, stopping the bombing is consistent with our true ends and aims in Vietnam and with the situation on the ground. It is continued bombing which is now inconsistent with our own best interests in Vietnam.

* * *

1. A halt in the bombing is militarily acceptable.

The bombing has never been the most important element in our military effort in Vietnam, and the Administration has never accepted the view of some military men that the bombing campaign could be decisive. The decisive theaters are elsewhere, and in most of those other theaters the bombing now does more harm than good. Since all uses of force are undesirable in themselves -- the bombing has grave human and economic costs to both sides -- it is clear that if it does not now help importantly the bombing should stop.

A halt in the bombing will not be gravely damaging to the anti-communist military position in the South. The present limited bombing is defended on three military grounds: its value against infiltration, its value against forces that directly threaten our northernmost positions, and its value against a possible August-September general offensive. All these claims are weak.

On the value of bombing against infiltration of men and supplies, the logic of the situation is such that it cannot be very significant. Everyone agrees that the Communists in South Vietnam have a net logistical need that is extraordinarily small by conventional standards. Even today the Communists are surely moving only an extremely small fraction of what we move in for ourselves and our friends. No one has ever claimed that the men in Hanoi lack the resources to send South two or three times as much as they expect to use at the far end. It follows that at the very best our air attacks on infiltration do no more than raise the cost of infiltration. They do not control its size.

The second military argument for continued bombing relates to allied positions which are within artillery range of North Vietnam. Military men understandably argue that soldiers subject to this kind of danger are entitled to all the military support they can get. The argument is relevant, but not overwhelming. It should be well within the capacity of our command to match and outmatch enemy artillery without the use of air power. Moreover, the use of forward fixed positions by U. S. forces near the demilitarized zone is open to question on purely military grounds, as the redeployment from Khesanh suggests. Finally, a use of air power strictly limited to active artillery emplacements could well be a legitimate exception to a bombing halt, especially if the level of such reprisal was sharply limited and the justification validated by journalists exposed to the incoming rounds.

More generally, one must remark that in all warfare, and especially in limited warfare, there are bounds to what can be done in the interest of the security of our own soldiers. Otherwise one move can come to require another in an endless cycle of escalation. But the present need, for the sake of our soldiers and of everyone else, is to move the level of combat down, not up. In this larger sense it is not those who would stop the bombing now who are reckless with American lives.

The third military argument against a present bombing halt relates to the possibility of a general offensive by the Communists in the next month or so. This general offensive has been predicted for months and its date has been steadily pushed ahead from May to August or beyond. It may be doubted that it will occur in the form that is now predicted, but if it does, future bombing in the North will have only the most limited relation to the battlefield result. The restriction of our air power to use below

the DMZ will be a very modest handicap to our effectiveness in a battle which will be joined in the South if at all. On the past record and by all published estimates, our commanders should like nothing better than a chance to cope with an open military offensive in the next two months, and the political and diplomatic advantages of punishing such an offensive, without the bombing, would be very great. There is no strong military connection between limited bombing north of the DMZ and the prospect of an early offensive in the South.

The military defenders of the bombing have consistently failed to make a compelling case for their view on military grounds. The initial value of bombing in 1965 was mainly psychological; this value was very great at a critical time. But bombing has never achieved the larger strategic objectives claimed for it by partisans of air power, and the limited bombing of the North is now a card which the USG should feel quite free to play without fear that a decision to stop would have any unacceptable military effects.

2. A halt in the bombing would put heavy pressure on Hanoi to respond by deed and word.

There is persuasive evidence of a marked change in the internal Communist position on the war. The willingness of Hanoi to come to Paris at all, the continuing hints about the meaning of restraint in limited attacks and other activities in the South, the stronger case for pressure through Moscow after a halt in the bombing, the changed balance of world opinion after March 31, and the painful consequences of the Tet offensive for the Communists (as well as for us, of course) -- all of these combine to give a wholly new strength to the argument that a halt in the bombing will put pressure on Hanoi to respond by limiting its own military actions and by serious negotiation on the underlying issues. Until the winter of 1968 the evidence on all these points was much weaker and there was then no good diplomatic case for a halt in the bombing. But the situation on this front has now changed dramatically, and I am not discouraged by the fact that the formal position of Hanoi remains hard; that's the way they are. I think we've had signals which amply justify a change of our posture, signals which meet the standards of San Antonio.

A halt in the bombing would allow us to shift the argument in Paris heavily in our favor, by making the withdrawal of Hanoi's troops (and also our own) the next order of business. Obviously the Communists will have their own preferred subjects ("talk to the NLF;" "get a coalition of peace-loving leaders"), but the topic of Hanoi's troops in the South is a very good one for us, and the record shows clearly that it cannot be made to stand out until the bombing stops. Persistence in the bombing in the present changed situation is beginning to undermine the constructive effects of the President's initiative of March 31.

3. A halt in the bombing would give a good clear signal from Washington to Saigon.

Nothing is more important in the current situation than that our friends in Saigon should clearly understand that the U. S. will not and should not endlessly continue to spend blood and treasure at present levels in Vietnam. Mainly because of the danger of catastrophe in 1965 and after, the American commitment reached a level which cannot be indefinitely supported by American opinion and which for a time seemed to obscure the critical need for action by the Vietnamese themselves. The Tet offensive was followed by a real awakening in the GVN, and the American government has also done its best to convey the increased need for self-reliance to Saigon. But actions speak louder than words, and a halt in the bombing is the clearest, simplest, and least costly action available for this purpose. Conversely, a continuation of the bombing would strengthen the continuing illusion of some in Saigon that the Americans can be forced to carry the main burden indefinitely.

There is evidence in the press that U. S. authorities in Saigon are wary of a present halt in the bombing because of its possible disquieting effect on a government which is neither as stable or strong as we would like. This is a natural but limited view of the matter. The hard job of Ambassador Bunker would be much easier if this government could give him five years to play the hand in his own way. But the blunt fact is that we don't have that kind of time and should not act as if we did. Moreover, there is a heavy weight of evidence that tactical concerns of this sort on the part of the men on the spot are usually exaggerated. Ambassador Bunker was worried before the March 31 speech, and the results were not as bad as he feared. Indeed, after the first shock, the Saigon government successfully began to act on the theme of self-reliance. It is entirely reasonable to hope that a similar result could occur now.

When the bombing began, the government in Saigon was weak and the military presence of the U. S. very small. In those circumstances limited bombing of the North did have a critically important psychological effect. But it flies in the face of reason and reality to suppose that a halt in the bombing 3 1/2 years later, with 500,000 Americans in the area, must be a decisive shock to the much stronger and more experienced government of today. Fortunately, Ambassador Bunker has many times proved his great skill at the determined execution of the decisions of Washington even when he has warned against them. We can properly call upon him for one more effort now.

4. To halt the bombing now would set a course consistent with basic public opinion in the U. S. and rightly related to the future downward movement of U. S. sacrifice and expenditure which is now inevitable.

The most important point in future Vietnamese policy is that we will have to cut its costs in U. S. lives and resources. There is no force on earth that can hold the

American people to more years of the same. The internal strains on our country implied in such a course are unacceptable, and in any case this is not the right way to deal with the problem on the spot from now on; in their interest as well as ours, we now need to shift the burden toward Saigon. Just as the Tet offensive made clear to the Communists that they cannot win a military victory, and to the GVN that it can and should rely increasingly on itself, so that offensive clinched the argument for a change of course in the U. S. All three lessons are correct.

It is possible of course for Washington to maintain its present policy until next January, by relying on the extraordinary strength and personal determination of President Johnson. No one can doubt that the Commander-in-Chief has the will and the power to follow this course if he is persuaded that it would be right. The present point is that continued bombing would be wrong on the merits; it would therefore be doubly wrong to draw on the President's strength and independence this way. No new Administration of either party or of any complexion could continue our present level of effort. This is not what the American people now want, and what they want will be decisive. So there is everything to be gained by moving toward a more modest level of effort -- one which can be sustained for a longer time. A halt in the bombing now is the best available first step in this direction.

5. To stop the bombing now will make it easier, not harder, to continue to do those other things which are still necessary in Vietnam to protect our real achievements there. We have succeeded against heavy odds in preventing a Communist take-over by force, and in reinforcing the will to non-Communist survival throughout South-east Asia. In this wider sense our Southeast Asia policy has been a success, and our strategic objective must be to protect this success in the light of the changes which have occurred in Hanoi, Saigon and at home. There is much still to be done, and there will be a need for sustained effort, both diplomatic and military, though the latter can and should be at a lower level. We have a much better chance of protecting our success if we now move the level of battle down one notch. In this respect a halt in the bombing now would have even greater value than the President's first limitation of March 31. It is the right next step.

In summary, then, to stop the bombing now is consistent with our San Antonio policy, consistent with the current posture of Hanoi, consistent with trends in Saigon, and deeply consistent with our own interests and opinions as a nation. It is continuing bombing of the North which is now in conflict with the true direction and purpose of our long-run policy in Vietnam.

8/15/68

FROM: Walt Rostow

TO: The President

3/
Aug 31, 1968

The Watch Committee is meeting at 7:00 AM this morning and are considering the following items:

- the deployment of Bulgarian Air Force fighters and helicopters into northeastern Bulgaria;
- Bulgarian Army Command and control exercise near the Romanian/Bulgarian border;

3.3 (b)(1)

Pres file

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-21
By id, NARA, Date 1-31-07

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~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82323

1968 AUG 31 18 47

~~SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY~~

AUGUST 31, 1968

Pres file

FROM WALT ROSTOV
FOR THE PRESIDENT

HEREWITH A DRAFT LETTER TO KOSYGIN AS CLEARED BY SEC.
RUSK AND SEC. CLIFFORD.

SEC. RUSK WAS COMFORTABLE WITH THIS DRAFT. HE WONDERED
OUT LOUD WHETHER IT MIGHT BE DELAYED, ESPECIALLY SINCE
THOMPSON AND BOHLEN ARE IN MARYLAND TWO HOURS AWAY AND
HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THEIR GOING OVER IT. I SAID THE
ONLY URGENCY I COULD PERCEIVE WAS:

-- A QUICK FOLLOW-UP TO YOUR SPEECH AND HIS TALK WITH
DOBRYNIN LAST NIGHT, AND

-- THE POSSIBILITY THAT IF ANYTHING WERE TO HAPPEN
IN ROMANIA, IT MIGHT HAPPEN IN THE WEEK BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 2.

I WOULD SUGGEST THAT, FOR THE RECORD, YOU PROCEED WITH
THIS LETTER WHICH SENDS A CLEAR MESSAGE WITHOUT MAKING
MATTERS WORSE BETWEEN US AND THE SOVIET UNION. BUT I
WOULD ALSO SUGGEST YOU MIGHT WISH TO CHAT WITH SEC.
RUSK WHEN YOU HAVE CONSIDERED THE TEXT.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR FRANK AND FRIENDLY TALKS AT
GLASSBORO, I WISH TO UNDERLINE WHAT SECRETARY RUSK
SAID TO AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN LAST NIGHT AND WHAT I
SAID AT SAN ANTONIO.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-146

By *ig*, NARA, Date 9-6-94

THE CONCEPT WE EXPLORED AT GLASSBORO WAS ONE IN WHICH
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION CAREFULLY AVOIDED
PRESSING AGAINST EACH OTHER'S VITAL INTERESTS; AVOIDED
BEING DRAWN INTO CONFLICT BY OTHERS; WORKED TOWARDS
THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS JUDGED BY
EACH NATION TO BE IN ITS INTEREST AND THE COMMON INTEREST;
AND CONSTRUCTED AGREEMENTS -- BILATERAL OR WORKING WITH
OTHERS -- WHICH WOULD REDUCE THE POSSIBILITIES OF CONFLICT
AND DANGER ON THE WORLD SCENE.

LOOKING BACK OVER THE YEAR AFTER GLASSBORO, I BELIEVE
WE HAD REASON TO FEEL WE WERE MAKING SOME PROGRESS.

BUT THE APPLICATION OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER IN CZECHOSLO-
VAKIA AND THE REPORTS WE ARE RECEIVING OF FURTHER MILITARY

MOVEMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE ARE SOURCES OF DEEP DISQUIET. NO EVIDENCE HAS COME TO ME WHICH SUGGESTS THAT EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA OR ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE HAVE IN ANY WAY CONSTITUTED A SECURITY THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION. ON THIS MATTER, THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF OUR NATO ALLIES HAS, MOREOVER, BEEN CLEAR: WE OURSELVES HAVE NO DESIRE OR INTENTION OF TAKING ANY ACTION IN EASTERN EUROPE WHICH MIGHT THREATEN THE SECURITY OF THE SOVIET UNION. ON THE CONTRARY, WE HAVE BEEN WORKING TOWARDS THE POSSIBILITY THAT NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT MIGHT NEGOTIATE MUTUAL TROOP WITHDRAWALS OR REDUCTIONS AND GRADUALLY AMELIORATE THE CONFRONTATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND OPEN THE WAY TOWARDS STABLE PEACE IN THAT CRITICAL AREA.

THEREFORE, I DEEPLY BELIEVE WHAT I SAID LAST NIGHT: I SEE NO ISSUES THAT WE CONFRONT OR THAT THE SOVIET UNION CONFRONTS WHICH CANNOT BE BETTER SETTLED BY PATIENT NEGOTIATION THAN BY THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY POWER. I HOLD THAT VIEW WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST AS WELL AS EUROPE.

IT IS AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND THAT I WISH TO TELL YOU OF THE DEPTH OF THE CONCERN FELT IN OUR GOVERNMENT AND BY OUR PEOPLE ABOUT EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. TWICE IN YOUR LIFETIME AND MINE WORLD WAR HAS COME UPON US, TRIGGERED BY EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. IN 1914 THIS HAPPENED WITHOUT ANYONE REALLY INTENDING IT TO HAPPEN. THE FORCES THAT ARE SET IN MOTION WHEN MILITARY POWER IS APPLIED ARE SOMETIMES EXTREMELY HARD TO CONTROL AND MAY LEAD HUMANITY DOWN PATHS WHICH NO MAN AND NO GOVERNMENT INTENDS.

AT THIS MOMENT, THEREFORE, I URGE YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES TO PAUSE AND CONSIDER WHETHER WE MIGHT NOT TURN BACK TOWARDS THE PATH WE EXPLORED AT GLASSBORO. WHAT HAS ALREADY HAPPENED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAS MADE THIS MORE DIFFICULT. BUT I WOULD HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER NATIONS WHICH JOINED IN BRINGING THEIR FORCES INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WILL PROMPTLY FIND IT POSSIBLE TO WITHDRAW THEM, AS AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN'S ORAL MESSAGE TO ME OF AUGUST 28 INDICATED WOULD HAPPEN. AS SECRETARY RUSK EMPHASIZED TO AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN, I WOULD HOPE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD HOLD ITS HAND, IF IT IS THE CASE THAT A MILITARY MOVEMENT IS CONTEMPLATED AGAINST RUMANIA OR ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN EASTERN EUROPE.

I WOULD ALSO HOPE THAT THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING IN MOSCOW OR ELSEWHERE ABOUT OUR ELECTION PROCESSES AND DEBATES IN THE UNITED STATES. I KNOW THAT SOMETIMES THEY CAN CONVEY TO OTHERS A WRONG IMPRESSION OF DIVISION AND DISTRACTION. BUT THERE IS, I KNOW, A DEEP AND UNITED SENTIMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AGAINST THE MOVEMENT OF ARMS AND MEN ACROSS INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS.

I SEND YOU THIS MESSAGE BECAUSE THE PEACE OF THE WORLD DEPENDS PECULIARLY ON THE POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR. THE FACTS OF LIFE ARE SUCH THAT THIS RESPONSIBILITY IS IMPOSED ON BOTH OF US. THIS RESPONSIBILITY REQUIRES THAT WE BE IN FRANK AND FREQUENT CONTACT ON MATTERS AFFECTING THE PEACE OF THE WORLD.

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 311831Z AUGUST 1968

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DE VTE 3615

~~SECRET~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82319

~~SECRET~~

HERewith MOSCOW'S LINE TO THE U.S. COMMUNIST PARTY ON
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, VIA FBI.

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION
IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET
UNION HAS INFORMED THE COMMUNIST PARTY UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AS FOLLOWS CONCERNING THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN SITUATION:

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERS
ALEXANDER DUBCEK, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE,
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, A "DOUBLE CROSSING
LIAR". BEGINNING SEVEN MONTHS AGO, THE SOVIETS HELD
NUMEROUS MEETINGS WITH THE CZECHS IN WHICH DUBCEK WAS
WARNED BY THE RUSSIANS THAT THERE WAS REASON TO BELIEVE
THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS LOSING
CONTROL AND THAT RIGHT WING COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY
FORCES WERE PREPARING TO TAKE OVER CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
THEY WERE TRAINING FIGHTING FORCES, SMUGGLING IN
WEAPONS ET CETERA. DUBCEK WAS INVITED TO ATTEND THE
WARSAW MEETING IN JULY, NINETEEN SIXTY EIGHT, BUT REFUSED AND
LATER STATED HE DID NOT ATTEND BECAUSE HE WAS NOT INVITED.
THEN AT THE CIERNA MEETING AND AGAIN AT THE BRATISLAVA
MEETING, WHICH DUBCEK ATTENDED, HE WAS INFORMED IN CONCRETE
DETAILS CONCERNING COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES IN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE DETAILS OF WHICH WERE NOT PUBLISHED IN
THE COMMUNIQUEs AND STILL CAN NOT BE DISCUSSED. SOME
OF THESE DETAILS WERE CONFIRMED BY MEMBERS OF THE CZECH-
OSLOVAKIAN COMMUNIST PARTY PRESIDIUm, WHO ATTENDED THE
MEETINGS. DUBCEK GAVE ASSURANCES THAT HE WOULD CORRECT
THESE MATTERS, BUT FAILED TO MAKE ANY EFFORT TO DO SO
AND MATTERS GOT STEADILY WORSE. IN FACT, DUBCEK EVEN
ENTRUSTED SOME DETAILS OF INVESTIGATING THE SITUATION TO
JOSEF PAVEL, CZECH MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, WHO THE
RUSSIANS HAD WARNED WAS COOPERATING WITH THE RIGHT
WING COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES. CONFIRMATION OF PAVEL'S GUILT
IS THE FACT THAT HE DISAPPEARED ON THE DAY OF THE INVASION
OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HAS NOT BEEN SEEN SINCE.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-34
By iso, NARA, Date 4-28-03

PRESERVATION COPY

THE SOVIET UNION, ITS SOCIALIST ALLIES AND "REAL COMMUNISTS" IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA MUST VIEW THIS SITUATION FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE RELATION OF FORCES IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD, AND, THEREFORE, DECIDED THAT ACTION MUST BE TAKEN TO PREVENT CZECHOSLOVAKIA FROM BEING TAKEN FROM THE SOCIALIST CAMP, THUS CHANGING THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD. IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE RIGHT WING FORCES WERE PACKING THE SEPTEMBER NINE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND IF PERMITTED TO BE HELD, THE RESULTS OF THIS CONGRESS WOULD BE "HORRIBLE". THE CONGRESS WOULD GIVE LEGALITY TO BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. ALL REAL COMMUNISTS WOULD BE ELIMINATED. THIS WOULD OPEN THE WESTERN BORDER TO WEST GERMAN REVANCHISTS, AND BECAUSE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S STRATEGIC POSITION, WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF ALL WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. IN SPITE OF REPEATED WARNINGS, DUBCEK DID NOTHING TO CORRECT THE SITUATION, AND, THEREFORE, THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES DECIDED TO INTERVENE MILITARILY AT THAT TIME, BECAUSE IF THEY DELAYED UNTIL THE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY FORCES BECAME ENTRENCHED, IT WOULD BE MANY TIMES MORE DIFFICULT TO DISLODGE THEM.

WHEN THE SOVIET TROOPS REACHED PRAGUE, THEY CONFIRMED THEIR INTELLIGENCE AND UNCOVERED ARMS CACHES IN THE BASEMENTS OF ELEVEN GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES, INCLUDING ANTI TANK GUNS, HEAVY MACHINE GUNS, GRENADE LAUNCHERS, ET CETERA. SOVIET AND ALLIED TROOPS UNCOVERED CACHES OF UNITED STATES AND WEST GERMAN ARMS TALLING MORE THAN FORTY THOUSAND AUTOMATIC WEAPONS IN THE MOUNTAINS, NEAR THE BORDERS, IN BRATISLAVA, BRNO, OSTROVA, ET CETERA. THEY FOUND SECRET PRINTING SHOPS AND MOBILE RADIO STATIONS MOUNTED ON SPECIAL TRUCKS. THESE ITEMS MAY SOON BE EXHIBITED IN A PRAGUE SQUARE. THE SOVIETS KNOW WHERE AND HOW SOME OF THESE ITEMS CROSSED THE BORDERS FROM AUSTRIA AND WEST GERMANY AND WHO IS RESPONSIBLE. THEY KNOW THAT THREE HUNDRED ORGANIZERS WERE BROUGHT IN FROM THE WEST TO LEAD THE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES. OBVIOUSLY, THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE DREW MORE CONCLUSIONS FROM THE COUNTERREVOLUTION IN HUNGARY IN NINETEEN FIFTY SIX, THAN SOME COMMUNISTS DREW. THE "ENEMY" IS OBVIOUSLY SMARTER AND, IN THE CASE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WAS MORE SOPHISTICATED IN PREPARING THE COUNTERREVOLUTION.

AS A RESULT OF THE MOSCOW CONTACTS WITH THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN LEADERSHIP, MEMBERS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN PRESIDIIUM SAW THE TRUE SITUATION AND THEMSELVES REQUESTED THAT THE SOVIET TROOPS REMAIN IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA UNTIL THE LEADERSHIP CONSOLIDATES ITS POSITION. THEY AGREED THAT THE CLANDESTINE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL BE DECLARED ILLEGAL AND STEPS WILL BE TAKEN TO CORRECT THE COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A WIDE STRUGGLE AND THAT THE ENEMY COULD MOBILIZE TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PEOPLE TO FIGHT FOR THE COUNTERREVOLUTION, BUT IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE COUNTERREVOLUTION IS DETERIORATING.

THIS SOURCE ALSO ADVISED THAT THE HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY HAS INFORMED COMMUNIST PARTY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OF SIMILAR INFORMATION INCLUDING THE FACT THAT ITS FIRST SECRETARY, JANOS KADAR, PERSONALLY CALLED DUBCEK AND MET WITH HIM NEAR THE HUNGARIAN BORDER LAST AUGUST EIGHTEENTH, TWO DAYS BEFORE THE INVASION, AND WARNED HIM THAT IF HE DID NOT DO SOMETHING QUICKLY, THE WARSAW PACT NATIONS WOULD HAVE TO ACT. HE PLEADED WITH DUBCEK TO NO AVAIL AND THE INVASION FOLLOWED.

DTG: 311339Z AUG 63

~~SECRET~~

1968 AUG 31 04 25

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH82312

UNCLAS F O U O

60 AUG 31 AM 1130

SATURDAY

Pre. file

HEREWITH MACV'S FULL ACCOUNT OF THE PRISON RIOT.

1. BACKGROUND: A TOTAL OF 718 PRISONERS WERE CONFINED IN STOCKADE WHICH HAS NORMAL CAPACITY OF 550. OVER CROWDED CONDITIONS WERE PROBABLY A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR.
2. IMMEDIATE CAUSE AND SEQUENCE OF EVENTS. TROUBLE STARTED IN DETAINEE AREA. TWELVE TO 15 COLORED PRISONERS WERE BEATING ONE CAUCASIAN. THERE WERE THREE UNARMED GUARDS IN THE AREA, INSIDE THE FENCE. ONE OF THE GUARDS BLEW HIS WHISTLE AND TRIED TO STOP THE FIGHT. PRISONERS OVERPOWERED THE GUARD; PRISONERS FORCED GATES FROM MEDIUM CUSTODY AREA INTO EXERCISE YARD AND THEN INTO ADMINISTRATIVE AREA. CONCURRENTLY, SOME OF THE PRISONERS STARTED FIRING THE TENTS, USING FOLDED MAGAZINES AS TORCHES AND THEN FIRED THE OTHER BUILDINGS INCLUDING THOSE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE AREA. AFTER THE PRISONERS GOT INTO THE ADMIN AREA, THEY SUBDUED THE GUARDS THERE AND RELEASED PRISONERS WHO WERE IN MINIMUM CUSTODY AND ADMIN SEGREGATION.
3. FORCE USED: INCLUDING THE CUSTODIAL PERSONNEL WHO WERE THERE, THE REACTION FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS WHICH WERE PLACED AROUND THE PERIMETER, A TOTAL OF 21 OFFICERS AND 490 ENLISTED MEN WERE EMPLOYED.
4. TYPES OF INJURIES: ONE PRISONER KILLED, INTRACRANIAL INJURIES. 23 INJURED CONSISTING OF TWO CONCUSSION, 6 FRACTURE, AND 15 LACERATION. DECEASED PRISONER HASKETT, EDWARD O., PVT, RA12883272, 173D SUPPORT BN, WAS BEATEN ABOUT THE HEAD WITH A BLUNT INSTRUMENT INSIDE THE COMPOUND BY TWO NEGRO PRISONERS AT THE TIME THE INNER AREA OF THE STOCKADE WAS CONTROLLED BY THE PRISONERS. SUSPECTS HAVE NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED AT THIS TIME. NUMEROUS PRISONERS WERE TREATED AND RELEASED BY THE HOSPITAL. MOST INJURIES WERE CAUSED BY PRISONERS BEATING OTHER PRISONERS. IN MOST INSTANCES, IT A CASE OF THE COLORED PRISONERS GANGING UP ON THE WHITE PRISONERS. AS BEST CAN BE DETERMINED, NO PRISONERS ADMITTED TO THE HOSPITAL WERE INJURED BY GUARDS.
5. CUSTODIAL PERSONNEL INJURED: FIVE CUSTODIAL PERSONNEL INCLUDING THE LTC, CONFINEMENT OFFICER, AND HIS CAPTAIN ASST WERE ADMITTED TO THE HOSPITAL; THREE WITH LACERATIONS AND TWO WITH CONTUSIONS.
6. METHODS EMPLOYED TO SUBDUE: SHOW OF FORCE WHEN REACTION FORCE, PLATOON SIZE, ENTERED THE FACILITY. USE OF RIOT CONTROL FORMATIONS AND SELECTED USE OF CS TO INCLUDE USE OF TWO M3 DISPERSIVES.
7. NINETEEN TENTS, GP MEDIUM, IN MEDIUM CUSTODY DESTROYED. ONE ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDING, A MESS HALL, SUPPLY BUILDING, AND BUILDING HOUSING EMPLOYMENT OFFICE, PERSONAL PROPERTY, AND IN-PROCESSING OFFICE DESTROYED. FIRE TRUCKS AND AMBULANCES RESPONDED WITHOUT DELAY WHICH ASSISTED IN MINIMIZING PROPERTY DAMAGE AND INSURED RAPID TRANSPORT OF INJURED FROM AREA.
7. CONDUCT OF REACTION FORCE: CONDUCTED THEMSELVES IN A DISCIPLINED MANNER AND MINIMUM FORCE USED CONSISTENT WITH SITUATION.
8. FOURTEEN RING LEADERS IN THE DISORDERS HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY IDENTIFIED THROUGH INTERROGATION AND PLACED IN DISCIPLINARY SEGREGATION.
9. PRISONER COUNT AS OF 300800AU: 713. OUT OF 713, 22 ARE IN DISCIPLINARY SEGREGATION.

GP-4

102 AUG 1968

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

QUICK COPY

1968 AUG 30 22 35

68 AUG 30 PM 6:31

FRIDAY

VZCZCEEA438
CO XTE10
DE WTE 3596

FROM VALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH82304

UNCLASSIFIED

AUGUST 30, 1968

TONY CARRILLO FLORES HAS SENT YOU THIS BIRTHDAY GREETING:

"FANNY, MY CHILDREN AND I SEND YOU THIS DAY OUR MOST
CORDIAL AND RESPECTFUL CONGRATULATIONS. ANTONIO
CARRILLO FLORES."

AS YOU KNOW, STATE IS REPLYING TO ALL GREETINGS FROM
RANKING FOREIGN OFFICIALS, BUT YOU MAY WANT TO SEND A
PERSONALIZED REPLY ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES TO ANTONIO
CARRILLO FLORES. WE CAN TRANSMIT IT THROUGH OUR EMBASSY.

"DEAR TONY:

I HAD A HAPPIER 60TH BIRTHDAY BECAUSE OF YOUR THOUGHTFUL
MESSAGE. I AM MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU AND FANNY AND YOUR
FAMILY FOR THINKING OF ME.

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON"

APPROVE ----

DISAPPROVE ----

CALL ME ----.

DTG 302205Z AUG 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 AUG 30 22 30

8
1968 AUG 30 PM 6:34
FRIDAY

EEA437
OO WTE17
DE WTE 3537

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82305

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

YOU ASKED FOR INFORMATION ON THE LEAK ABOUT YOUR ACCEPTING AN INVITATION TO AN OAS DINNER IN YOUR HONOR. I SUBMIT THE FOLLOWING:

1. THE STORY CARRIED BY THE WASHINGTON POST IS A UPI STORY WHICH CARRIES NO INDICATION OF TIME OR PLACE OF FILING. IT ATTRIBUTES THE INFORMATION TO "US OFFICIALS" AND "OTHER SOURCES".

2. THE STORY SAYS YOU WILL ATTEND A DINNER IN YOUR HONOR ON SEPTEMBER 19 AND YOU ARE EXPECTED TO DELIVER A MAJOR LATIN AMERICAN SPEECH REAFFIRMING THE US COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE AND VIGOROUSLY DEFENDING YOUR LATIN AMERICAN POLICY.

3. WE HAVE CHECKED WITH COVEY OLIVER'S SHOP TO SEE WHO MIGHT HAVE SPOKEN TO THE UPI. THOSE WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT DISCLAIM HAVING WITTINGLY OR UNWITTINGLY PASSED THE INFORMATION TO ANY NEWSPAPERMAN.

4. I AM REASONABLY WELL SATISFIED THAT THE LEAK DID NOT COME FROM STATE BUT FROM THE OAS COUNCIL CHAIRMAN.

5. LAST TUESDAY STATE TOLD THE OAS CHAIRMAN CONFIDENTIALLY THAT YOU HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO ATTEND, BUT DETAILS WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT. IN THIS CONVERSATION, THE CHAIRMAN RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF YOUR MAKING A MAJOR SPEECH. THE STATE MAN -- JOHN FORD -- SAID HE HAD NO IDEA OF YOUR WISHES.

6. WE BELIEVE THE OAS CHAIRMAN SUBSEQUENTLY TALKED TO THE UPI MAN WHO COVERS THE PAN AMERICAN UNION (ADOLFO MERINO). MERINO PASSED THE STORY ALONG TO THE UPI LATIN AMERICAN CORRESPONDENT, ART GOLDEN. GOLDEN CALLED STATE LATE TUESDAY TO CHECK OUT THE STORY AND IN THE PROCESS INQUIRED SPECIFICALLY ABOUT A MAJOR LATIN AMERICAN SPEECH. I AM TOLD THAT STATE DECLINED COMMENT.

7. STATE EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN TO THE OAS CHAIRMAN LAST WEDNESDAY MORNING OVER THE LEAK. THAT SAME DAY, THE OAS INFORMED THE PRESS THAT AN INVITATION HAD BEEN EXTENDED, BUT "NO ACCEPTANCE HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE WHITE HOUSE". THIS WAS AN EFFORT TO COVER UP.

8. THIS LEAK IS LAMENTABLE BUT NOT SURPRISING, GIVEN THE PROCLIVITIES OF THE OAS CHAIRMAN.

9. THERE IS FLEXIBILITY ON THE DATE IF YOU PREFER TO CHANGE FROM SEPTEMBER 19.

DTG: 302205Z AUG 68
XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc NARA, Date 11-1-01

9

1968 AUG 30 22 28

ZBBB36
UNW UKDIN
DE WTE 3595

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH82323

UNCLASSIFIED

AUGUST 30, 1968

PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ SENT YOU THIS BIRTHDAY MESSAGE:

"I TAKE THE OCCASION OF YOUR BIRTHDAY TO SEND WARMEST BEST WISHES FOR YOUR PERSONAL WELL-BEING AND PROSPERITY OF YOUR FRIENDLY COUNTRY. CORDIALLY. GUSTAVO DIAZ ORDAZ."

AS YOU KNOW, STATE IS REPLYING TO ALL GREETINGS FROM RANKING FOREIGN OFFICIALS, BUT YOU MAY WANT TO SEND A PERSONALIZED REPLY ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES TO PRESIDENT ORDAZ. WE CAN TRANSMIT IT THROUGH OUR EMBASSY.

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I APPRECIATE YOUR THINKING OF ME ON MY BIRTHDAY. WHEN ONE IS YOUNG, A BIRTHDAY MEANS PRESENTS. IN THE MIDDLE YEARS WE TEND TO FORGET ABOUT THE PASSING OF TIME. AFTER CROSSING THE THREE-SCORE MARK, AS I HAVE JUST DONE, BEING REMEMBERED BY ONE'S FRIENDS BECOMES INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT.

LADY BIRD JOINS ME IN SENDING OUR WARMEST REGARDS TO YOU AND DONA GUADALUPE.

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON".

APPROVE ----

DISAPPROVE ----

CALL ME-----.

DTG 302205Z AUG 1968

68 AUG 30 PM 8:32

FRIDAY

Pre file

~~SECRET~~

EEA435
OO VTE 10
DE VTE 3594

1968 AUG 30 22 23

FRIDAY
AUG 30 PM 6:27

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82302

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: DIGEST OF STATE DEPARTMENT REPORTS FOR AUGUST 30, 1968

E A S T A S I A

PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN VIETNAM

SOUTH VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER THANH TOLD EMBASSY SAIGON YESTERDAY THAT A FINAL PLATFORM ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS NOT YET READY, BUT GAVE HIS CONCEPT OF A FIVE STAGE PROCESS STARTING WITH THE PRESENT PARIS TALKS. THE EMBASSY COMMENTS THAT IT IS EVIDENT SAIGON IS HAVING DIFFICULTY IN FORMULATING THE PLATFORM AND SUSPECTS IT MAY RETURN TO BASIC PRINCIPLES ALREADY ENUNCIATED.

E U R O P E

NATO "NO FORCE REDUCTIONS" PLEDGE

AMBASSADOR CLEVELAND ASKS THAT WE RECONSIDER OUR "BUSINESS-AS-USUAL" APPROACH ON REDEPLOYMENT OF OUR FORCES. A MEMORANDUM FROM THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDS THAT PLANNED FORCE REDUCTIONS BE HELD IN ABEYANCE. HE NOTES OPPORTUNITIES INHERENT IN THE MOOD OF ALLIED COUNTRIES TO HAVE NATO TAKE THIS POLITICALLY SIGNIFICANT AND REASSURING STEP AND TO DELAY AND PERHAPS REVERSE NATO'S DOWNWARD DRIFT.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 02-31

By ms, NARA, Date 2-21-03

N E A R E A S T

CYPRUS NORMALIZATION

TURKISH CHARGE YAVUZALP YESTERDAY TOLD EMBASSY NICOSIA THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT'S REJECTION OF TURKISH NORMALIZATION MEASURES WILL STRENGTHEN THE HARD-LINERS, WHO WILL NOW SAY THE GREEKS ARE ONLY INTERESTED IN WEAKENING THE TURK COMMUNITY'S SECURITY. YAVUZALP EXPRESSED A SENSE OF URGENCY CONCERNING TURK CYPRIOT LEADER DENKTASH'S ABILITY TO STAY ON TOP OF THE COMMUNITY MUCH LONGER.

IRANIAN-LEBANESE RELATIONS

AMBASSADOR MEYER REPORTS THAT THE SHAH, IN A RATHER UGLY MOOD, ASKED WHY THE LEBANESE HAD FAILED TO EXTRADITE TEIMOUR BAKHTIAR -- FORMER HEAD OF THE IRANIAN NATIONAL POLICE AND RECENTLY ARRESTED IN LEBANON FOR ARMS SMUGGLING. THE SHAH COMPLAINED THAT HIS PRESTIGE HAD SUFFERED AND SAID THE LEBANESE WOULD BE TAUGHT A LESSON.

A F R I C A

FIGHTING IN CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)

CONGO (K) FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER BOMBOKO TOLD AMBASSADOR MCBRIDE THAT FIGHTING HAS BEEN IN PROGRESS INTERMITTENTLY SINCE THIS MORNING IN CONGO (B). BOMBOKO SAID THE CONGO (C) ARMY LEADERS NGOUABI, POIGNET AND MOUZABAKANI WILL NOW TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT OUTRIGHT AND PRESIDENT MASSAMBA-DEBAT WILL PRESUMABLY DISAPPEAR. MASSAMBA-DEBAT IS REPORTED TO HAVE APPEALED TO ALL OPPOSING THE ARMY TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS.

NIGERIAN RELIEF

NIGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ARIKPO TOLD AMBASSADOR MATHEWS THAT THE NIGERIAN WARNING ON RELIEF FLIGHTS (I.E. THEY WOULD BE AT RISK OF ICRC AND GOVERNMENTS CONTRIBUTING AIRCRAFT) TO BIAFRA WAS ISSUED FOLLOWING A STATEMENT BY LINDT OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS (ICRC) THAT THE FLIGHTS WOULD BEGIN IMMEDIATELY. THE NIGERIAN AMBASSADOR IN GENEVA TOOK LINDT'S STATEMENT TO MEAN WITH OR WITHOUT NIGERIAN CONCURRENCE. THE EMBASSY COMMENTS THAT THIS IS IN PART A CONSEQUENCE OF THE ICRC'S DECISION TO TREAT RELIEF IN FEDERAL NIGERIA AND BIAFRA AS TWO SEPARATE OPERATIONS.

DTG 302149Z AUG 68

~~SECRET~~

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00 WTE 10-4
DE WTE 3602

1968 AUG 31 04 24

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82309

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 95-305
By ing, NARA Date 8-26-96

60 AUG 31 AM 12:30

SATURDAY

AUGUST 30, 1968

HEREWITH THE ORAL COMMUNICATION FROM AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN TO SECRETARY RUSK, DELIVERED AT 9 PM. AN ACCOUNT OF THEIR CONVERSATION WILL SHORTLY FOLLOW.

ON AUGUST 21 THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT INFORMED THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF A DECISION OF FIVE ALLIED SOCIALIST STATES, ADOPTED IN CONNECTION WITH A REQUEST OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SIDE, TO RENDER IMMEDIATELY THE ASSISTANCE TO THE FRATERNAL CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE IN ITS DEFENSE OF SOCIALIST STATEHOOD, ESTABLISHED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, AND OF ENTERING OF THEIR MILITARY UNITS FOR THIS PURPOSE INTO THE TERRITORY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THIS DECISION OF THE FIVE ALLIED STATES IN NO MEASURE INFRINGES UPON THE STATE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES OR ANY OTHER STATE. IT COMES OUT OF BI-LATERAL AND MULTI-LATERAL OBLIGATIONS, TAKEN BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IN DEFENSE OF THEIR SECURITY, AND HAD AS ITS AIM NOT TO ALLOW SUCH DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS WHICH WOULD SHATTER THE MAINSTAYS OF EUROPEAN PEACE AND WORLD SECURITY.

AS IS KNOWN, DURING THE LAST DAYS NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE IN MOSCOW BETWEEN THE CZECHOSLOVAK DELEGATION WITH PRESIDENT L. SVOBODA AT THE HEAD AND THE LEADERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THERE WAS FRANK AND FRIENDLY DISCUSSION ON THE QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE PRESENT DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION INCLUDING THE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN THE LAST DAYS AND THE QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE TEMPORARY ENTERING OF TROOPS OF FIVE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES INTO THE TERRITORY OF CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC.

THE RESULTS OF THE SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK NEGOTIATIONS ARE STATED IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED ON AUGUST 27, WHICH HAS BEEN PROBABLY STUDIED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

A GREAT SIGNIFICANCE IS BEING ATTACHED IN THE SOVIET UNION TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR FAVORABLE RESULTS. THE SAME HIGH EVALUATION OF THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IS MADE BY THE LEADERSHIP OF ALLIED SOCIALIST COUNTRIES - BULGARIA, HUNGARY, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, POLAND.

ONCE AGAIN A DEEP UNITY OF INTEREST OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE SOVIET UNION WAS CONFIRMED, INCLUDING THE UNITY OF INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, IN THE BASIC QUESTIONS OF ENSURING EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE FACE OF GROWING INTRIGUES OF REVANCHIST, MILITARISTIC AND NEO-NAZI FORCES; WAS CONFIRMED ALSO JOINT DETERMINATION TO STRENGTHEN FRIENDSHIP AND UNITY OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND TO INCREASE THEIR DEFENSIVE CAPACITY, TO GIVE RESOLUTE REBUFF TO COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FORCES, TIED WITH THE EXTERNAL AGGRESSIVE CIRCLES.

PRESERVATION COPY

THE FACT, THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONDUCTED AT THE HIGHEST PARTY AND STATE LEVEL AND THAT IT WAS AGREED TO CONTINUE APPROPRIATE CONTACTS, DEMONSTRATES A BIG STEP FORWARD IN STRENGTHENING, DEVELOPING AND DEEPENING OF THE TRADITIONAL, HISTORIC FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF BOTH COUNTRIES, THE GOVERNMENTS OF BOTH STATES DECLARED OF THEIR DETERMINATION TO DIRECT THEIR JOINT EFFORTS TO THIS NOBLE GOAL, TO BUILD FURTHER THEIR RELATIONS ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL RESPECT, EQUAL RIGHTS, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, INDEPENDENCE AND SOCIALIST SOLIDARITY.

IT WAS AGREED IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS THAT THE SOVIET UNION ON ITS PART WILL GIVE ALL NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN THEIR EFFORTS TOWARDS NORMALIZATION OF LIFE WHICH WAS BROKEN BY THE INTRIGUES OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION ANTI-SOCIALIST FORCES, IN THE SOLUTION OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, ETC.

THOSE WHO BUILT THEIR PLANS ON THE USE OF ALLEGED CONTRADICTIONS AMONG THE SOCIALIST STATES AND COUNTED ON THE FORCES OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION ARE WITNESSING THE COLLAPSE OF THEIR HOPES. NO ONE WILL EVER BE ALLOWED TO TEAR OUT ANY LINK FROM THE FRIENDSHIP OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

AS IT WAS ALREADY STATED IN OUR INFORMATION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AUGUST 21, WE PROCEEDED AND ARE PROCEEDING FROM THE FACT THAT THE EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA SHOULD NOT CAUSE ANY HARM TO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. IT IS NOTED IN MOSCOW THAT ALSO ON THE PART OF THE LEADERS OF THE UNITED STATES THERE WERE MADE STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY ARE INTERESTED IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES.

THE FACT OF APPEALING OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITH THE SO-CALLED CZECHOSLOVAK QUESTION MOREOVER COULD NOT BE INTERPRETED IN THE SOVIET UNION OTHERWISE AS AN UNFRIENDLY ACT ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES. AS IS KNOWN CZECHOSLOVAKIA NOT ONLY DID NOT ASK TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT IT DEMANDED TO WITHDRAW IT FROM THE AGENDA OF THE COUNCIL.

THE APPEAL OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED NATIONS WITH THIS QUESTION AS WELL AS SHARPLY HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET UNION CHARACTER AND TONE OF THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE SPEECHES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL CANNOT, OF COURSE, IN ANY WAY FACILITATE THE TASK OF IMPROVEMENT OF THESE RELATIONS. QUITE THE OPPOSITE.

SO FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT STANDS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET-AMERICA RELATIONS AND IS READY TO MOVE AHEAD IN THIS DIRECTION INCLUDING THE QUESTIONS WHICH WERE THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS LATELY. BUT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO SUPPOSE, HOWEVER, THAT SHOWING ITS CARE IN THIS RESPECT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NEGLECT ITS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY--THE DEFENCE OF THE POSITION OF SOCIALISM WHEREVER AND IN WHATEVER FORM SHOULD A THREAT TO THE FRATERNAL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES EMERGE.

DTG 310241Z AUG 68

~~SECRET~~

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EEA4443
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DE WTE 3603

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82310

1968 AUG 31 03 47
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-161
By C6, NARA Date 9-23-99

68 AUG 30 PM 11:56

12
FRIDAY
Presfile

~~TOP SECRET~~ LITERALLY EYES ONLY

AUGUST 30, 1968

YOU WILL GET FULLER REPORTS LATER, BUT YOU SHOULD KNOW:

1. SECRETARY RUSK HAD DOBRYNIN IN AT ABOUT 9:00 P.M. OUR TIME. HIS COMMUNICATION TURNED OUT TO BE A REBUTTAL OF OUR POSITION ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA. HE RENEWED THE SOVIET JUSTIFICATION BUT WITH NO REFERENCE TO A CZECH GOVERNMENT REQUEST FOR INTERVENTION. HE USED THE PHRASE "REVANCHIST THREATS" TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. HE PROTESTED THE STRENGTH OF THE U.S. REACTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE UNDERLINED A CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS BUT NOTED THE HOSTILE US REACTIONS ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA. HE REPEATED THAT NO "STATE INTERESTS" OF THE U.S. WERE INVOLVED. SECRETARY RUSK REMINDED HIM THAT HE HAD RAISED WITH DOBRYNIN AT THEIR LAST MEETING THE QUESTION OF RUMANIA. HE SAID THAT WE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED A NUMBER OF REPORTS NOT FROM RUMANIA, THAT GAVE US CONSIDERABLE ANXIETY. HE ASKED DOBRYNIN IF HE COULD GIVE US ASSURANCES WITH RESPECT TO RUMANIA. DOBRYNIN SAID THAT HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THAT POINT. HE SAID THAT IT WAS HIS "PERSONAL VIEW" THAT MOSCOW WOULD NOT MOVE AGAINST RUMANIA. SECRETARY RUSK THEN TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE PRESIDENT. HE WISHED DOBRYNIN TO CONVEY TO MOSCOW OUR VIEW THAT IF ANY SUCH MOVE WAS CONTEMPLATED "IN THE NAME OF HUMANITY THEY SHOULD NOT DO IT". HE ADDED THAT "IT WOULD HAVE INCALCULABLE EFFECTS ON THE ENTIRE WORLD SITUATION". HE UNDERLINED THAT THE STATE INTERESTS OF THE U.S. INCLUDED BERLIN AND THAT WE DO NOT TRUST ULBRICHT. ANY MOVE AGAINST BERLIN WOULD BE OF "THE UTMOST GRAVITY".

2. RUFUS TAYLOR AT THE CIA HAS REVIEWED ALL OF THE EVIDENCE AVAILABLE. HIS JUDGMENT IS THAT THERE IS CAUSE FOR "UNEASINESS" ABOUT RUMANIA BUT NO EVIDENCE TO INDICATE AN "IMMINENT SOVIET MOVEMENT AGAINST RUMANIA".

THE STATE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS CONCUR IN THIS CIA JUDGMENT.

3. SECRETARY RUSK THINKS THAT IT MAY BE SIGNIFICANT THAT DOBRYNIN DID NOT ASK TO SEE HIM AT 10:30 TOMORROW; THAT IS, HE BELIEVES THAT DOBRYNIN DELIVERED TONIGHT THE MESSAGE PLANNED FOR 10:30 A.M. TOMORROW.

CHIP BOHLEN AND TOMMY THOMPSON BELIEVE THAT THE ODDS ARE 70-30 AGAINST A SOVIET MOVE INTO RUMANIA.

4. NEW SUBJECT: YOU MAY WISH TO KNOW THAT WE HAVE SEVERAL INDICATIONS THIS EVENING THAT SEPTEMBER 2 MAY BE THE JUMP-OFF DATE FOR MAJOR ATTACKS IN VIETNAM. SEPTEMBER 2 IS A HANOI ANNIVERSARY.

DTG 310258Z AUG 68

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~
TOP SECRET

EEA442
PP VTE18
DS VTE 3684

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82311

1968 AUG 31 03 38

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

THE TENTATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATUS OF INFILTRATION IS WORTH READING IN FULL. TOO SOON TO BE SURE OF ITS MEANING.

THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED DECLINE IN AUGUST IN THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW NORTH VIETNAMESE INFILTRATION GROUPS INTO THE PIPELINE LEADING TO SOUTH VIETNAM.

SO FAR THIS MONTH ONLY SEVEN ADDITIONAL INFILTRATION GROUPS, TOTALING AN ESTIMATED 3,700 PERSONNEL, HAVE BEEN OBSERVED IN INTERCEPTED REAR SERVICES MESSAGES STARTING THEIR DEPLOYMENT. NO NEW GROUP HAS BEEN DETECTED SINCE 8 AUGUST. THIS DECREASE IS PARTICULARLY STRIKING WHEN COMPARED WITH THE LEVEL OF INFILTRATING GROUPS THAT STARTED SOUTH DURING THE PREVIOUS FEW MONTHS. DURING JULY, 35 NEW GROUPS TOTALING AN ESTIMATED 19,000 PERSONNEL WERE DETECTED. DURING JUNE, 41 NEW GROUPS WITH ABOUT 16,000 PERSONNEL WERE NOTED.

IT APPEARS, MOREOVER, THAT MANY OF THE GROUPS DETECTED MOVING SOUTH DURING JUNE AND JULY HAVE SLOWED THE PACE OF THEIR DEPLOYMENT, OR, IN SOME CASES, DO NOT APPEAR TO BE MOVING AT ALL. THIS HAS BEEN EVIDENT, IN PART, IN THE UNUSUALLY LOW NUMBER OF GROUPS WHICH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN THE INTERCEPTED TRAFFIC AS PROGRESSING THROUGH THE INFILTRATION NETWORK. OTHERS HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN THE TRAFFIC AS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN ROAD REPAIR WORK IN LAOS AND NORTH VIETNAM.

THE DROPOFF IN THE SIZE AND PACE OF INFILTRATION DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE THE RESULT OF ANY DIMINUTION OF OUR INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY. IT IS BELIEVED THAT OBSERVATIONS ON THE NUMBER OF INFILTRATORS DETECTED AND THEIR RATE OF MOVEMENT HAVE BEEN AT LEAST AS ACCURATE IN AUGUST AS DURING THE PRECEDING MONTHS THIS YEAR. THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT VARIATIONS IN THE U.S. COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION EFFORT, AND THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE NOT EMPLOYED A DIFFERENT OR MORE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM. THE VOLUME OF INTERCEPTED READABLE TRAFFIC CONCERNING ALL REAR SERVICES MATTERS CONTINUES AT ABOUT THE SAME LEVEL AS THAT OF PREVIOUS MONTHS.

DTG: 310308Z AUG 68

XXXXX FROM QUEENS COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-22
By abm, NARA, Date 3-17-83

~~SECRET~~

68 AUG 30 PM 11:51

FRIDAY

Frankie

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14419
DD WTE13
DE WTE 3398

1968 AUG 30 23 07

FROM WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
SITE VHS2326

UNCLAS

AUGUST 30, 1968

THIS IS ALL WASHINGTON HAS ON THE PRISONER RIOT AT LONG BINH. WE ARE GOING OUT TO SAIGON FOR MORE DETAILS, WHICH I'LL FORWARD TOMORROW.

QUOTE

1. AT 12 NOON ON 29 AUG, US PRISONERS IN A MEDIUM CUSTODY COMPOUND AT THE US ARMY STOCKADE RIOTED. THE PRISON IS LOCATED AT LONG BINH, 15 MILES NORTHEAST OF SAIGON. THE PRISONERS SET FIRE TO SEVERAL BUILDINGS AND TENTS WHICH SPREAD TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPOUND AND NEARLY ALL OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDINGS.

2. A MILITARY POLICE REACTION FORCE USING CHEMICAL AGENT CS QUELLED THE DISTURBANCE IN AN HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTES. CHEMICAL AGENT WAS THE MAXIMUM FORCE USED. FIRE WAS BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL AT 2:30 PM 29 AUG AND ALL PRISONERS RETURNED TO THE COMPOUND.

3. ONE PRISONER WAS KILLED AND 72 PERSONS WERE INJURED. OF THESE SIX CADRE PERSONNEL AND 23 PRISONERS REQUIRED HOSPITALIZATION. THE REMAINDER OF THE INJURED WERE TREATED AND RELEASED FROM THE HOSPITAL.

4. A TOTAL OF 720 PRISONERS WERE CONFINED IN THE COMPOUND AS OF 7:30 PM 29 AUGUST. NEITHER THE SPECIFIC CAUSES OF THE DISTURBANCE NOR THE NUMBER OF PRISONERS RIOTING HAS BEEN DETERMINED AT THIS TIME.

5. THE COMMANDING GENERAL 18TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE HAS APPOINTED A BOARD OF OFFICERS TO INVESTIGATE. INVESTIGATION BY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PERSONNEL IS IN PROGRESS.

END QUOTE

DTG: 302240Z AUG 68

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

14
1968 AUG 30 PM 7:10

FRIDAY

Sample

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 11-1-01

EEA431
OO WTE13
DE WTE 3599

1968 AUG 30 20 53

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP32298

Pres. file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUGUST 30, 1968

YOU WILL WISH TO NOTE LODGE'S VIEW OF BERLIN MORALE AND HIS RECOMMENDATION OF A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT. I SHALL ASSUME SEC. RUSK HAS A RECOMMENDATION UPON YOUR RETURN.

BERLIN 2172

1. WE HAVE REPORTED ON THE DETERIORATING MORALE AMONG THE BERLIN POPULATION COUPLED, AT LEAST IN PART, WITH THE WIDESPREAD IMPRESSION THAT U.S. COMMITMENTS TO BERLIN ARE NO LONGER AS FIRM AS THEY USED TO BE. THIS DETERIORATION OVER THE LAST THREE OR FOUR MONTHS HAS BEEN ACCENTUATED AS A RESULT OF THE CZECH EVENTS.

2. TO COUNTERACT THIS FEELING, WE RECOMMEND THAT AT A SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY (PRESS CONFERENCE OR SPEECH) IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD REITERATE OUR FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE SECURITY OF WEST BERLIN IN STRONG TERMS. IF, FOR INSTANCE, HE WERE ASKED WHETHER OR HOW THE U.S. WOULD REACT IF SOVIET OR EAST GERMAN TROOPS COMMITTED AGGRESSION IN BERLIN AS THEY DID IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, HIS REPLY COULD INCLUDE A STATEMENT THAT WE HAVE A DEFINITE COMMITMENT TO PROTECT--IF NEED BE BY FORCE--THE SECURITY AND FREEDOM OF BERLIN, A COMMITMENT WHICH WAS DEMONSTRATED IN 1943, WHICH HAS BEEN REITERATED BY PRESIDENTS EISENHOWER AND KENNEDY AND WHICH IS AS FIRM AND EXPLICIT TODAY AS IT WAS WHEN IT WAS MADE. THIS SHOULD BE KNOWN IN BERLIN AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

3. SUCH A HIGH-LEVEL STATEMENT WOULD DO MUCH, WE BELIEVE, TO REVITALIZE THE BERLINERS' MORALE. THE LATTER, IN OUR JUDGMENT, HAS BECOME A NECESSITY.

4. THE AMBASSADOR (WHO IS PRESENTLY IN BERLIN) CONCURS IN THIS RECOMMENDATION. MORRIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG 302022Z AUG 68

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, August 30, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: China Mainland: A More Permanent Swing to the Moderates?

In nearly three years of Mao's Cultural Revolution there have been three distinct swings to the extreme left, then back toward more moderates in ascendancy. Each swing to the left has brought costs in economic disruption and social disorder to an extent requiring a swing to the moderates to attempt to restore order. These swings have reflected the exigencies of the power struggle. The extreme left will die hard, for its death would mean nothing less than the failure of Mao's utopian dreams. Nevertheless, the most recent swing to the conservatives (old line, pre-Cultural Revolution, Party-Army "revisionists") appears to be highly significant, in that it is broader in scope, of clearer definition, and likely to prove of greater permanence than any which have preceded.

Supporting this thesis:

-- At last the Army is using the full authority of its hunting license against the disruptive Red Guards. For the first time it is effectively breaking up Red Guard organizations, resorting where necessary to summary executions of fractious elements.

-- Twenty-seven of the 29 major administrative areas of China now have revolutionary committees. (Only Tibet and Sinkiang remain.) Throughout their formation the trend in composition has been toward more and more old-line stalwarts. The last three committees particularly have entailed such a blatant return to power of pre-Cultural Revolution figures, men vigorously attacked only last summer, as to constitute an insult to Mao and all he has stood for.

-- A milestone article in Red Flag of August 25 requires the Red Guards to stand aside in favor of leadership of the workers, as the "most advanced section of the masses." This attempt to rationalize ideologically the swing to the right is arrant twaddle: the workers have been in the vanguard of the revisionists, i.e., favoring growth of private incentives. The thrust of the article is largely a cloak for the re-establishment of authoritarian controls, this time under military instead of Party auspices.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- 2 -

-- Ironically, the author of this article is a leftists' leftist, Yao Wen-yuan, author of the revolutionary article in November 1965 which started the Cultural Revolution! The fact that he, of all people, was chosen as chronicler of the swing to the right seems to underline that it is really meant. To the extent that Mao is still in control, this would seem to mean that at least for now he has decided to bow to the inevitable, cut his losses, bring the Cultural Revolution to an early end if possible, and proclaim his defeat a victory -- in the best Chinese tradition.

Fighting continues in many parts of China, but there is less fighting between factions and more Army action against factions.

It is too early to be sure that the above thesis (a Maoist defeat labelled victory) will be borne out. If Mao simply cannot accommodate to reality, there may yet have to be a more convulsive outcome. The above is the best guess as of now, however, and is in line with the outcome which we have long considered the most probable of the several alternatives.

We now await the manner of the inevitable readjustment in the hierarchy to reflect present power realities in the provinces. We must expect the next act to be in the Capital.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Jorden

AJenkins:mm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file 17

Friday, August 30, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Special Report to the Congress on the Joint Comprehensive Review of the United States-Canada Automotive Products Agreement

At Tab A, for your approval and signature, is a draft letter to the Congress transmitting a Special Report on the Joint Comprehensive Review of the United States-Canada Automotive Products Agreement.

At Tab B, is Secretary Rusk's explanatory memo and a copy of the report. It has been cleared with Commerce, Labor, Treasury and Roth's office.

The joint review was called for under the Agreement. Its purpose is:

- to determine the progress made in achieving the objectives of the agreement;
- to recommend changes, if any, that would speed this progress.

We agreed with the Canadians not to recommend any changes. The key point they wanted was a continued commitment from the Canadian subsidiaries to increase the Canadian content of their production. They had such a commitment during the first three years of the agreement, as a transitional measure. We made it clear this was no longer necessary and that we couldn't go along. The Canadians finally settled for letters by the Canadian companies to the Canadian Government which describe their future plans. The parent companies have publicly said these letters are not commitments.

Publication of the special report may stimulate Senator Hartke and Senator Gore to attack the agreement once again. They are about the only ones who do so. It is possible that Hartke may no longer be as concerned because employment in the industry is up this year.

The Act provides that you report to the Congress on the results of the review by August 31, 1968. The Canadians were delayed in approving the results of the review because of the change in their government. Their Cabinet acted on it this afternoon.

If you approve, we can transmit this report to the Congress when it reconvenes next week.

W. W. Rostow

If you approve, we will need your signature on the attached transmittal letter to the Congress.

No _____ Call me _____

ERF:mst

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress a special report on the joint comprehensive review of the United States-Canada Automotive Products Agreement. This review was undertaken by the Governments of the United States and Canada in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. A report to the Congress on the review is required by the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965.

In reviewing the Agreement, both Governments concluded that:

-- Considerable progress has been made toward achieving the benefits of a broader United States-Canada market for automotive products. Trade between the two countries in automotive products has greatly expanded, cost economies in production have been realized, and employment in the automotive industries in both countries has increased.

-- Not enough experience has been accumulated under the Agreement to recommend changes. Areas of possible improvement were carefully considered and are under further study.

Each Government continues to be able at any time to request consultations on any problem arising under the Agreement.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

VZ OZCEE A424
00 WTE 10
DE WTE 3583

FROM WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP 32291

1968 AUG 30 15 52

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-30
By NSA, NARA, Date 2-28-03

18
FRIDAY
68 AUG 30 PM 12:06

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AUGUST 30, 1968

HERewith FURTHER MILDLY HOPEFUL STRAWS IN THE WIND
ON ISRAEL-JORDAN -- IF THE ISRAELIS DON'T BLOW IT WITH
NEW BIG RAIDS.

Per file

QUOTE SUBJECT: SHAH AND ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM

SUMMARY. ON SUPER-SECRET BASIS, SHAH IS ENCOURAGING
ISRAELIS TO BE MORE CONCILIATORY AND TO WORK OUT PALATABLE
SETTLEMENT WITH KING HUSSEIN.

1. SHAH TWENTY-NINTH IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE DISCLOSED THAT
HE HAD LENGTHY TALK WITH ABBA EBAN IN TEHRAN FEW DAYS
AGO. IT WAS IN ANTICIPATION OF KING HUSSEIN'S ARRIVAL TODAY.

2. SHAH SAID HE PRESSED EBAN FOR ISRAEL TO SHOW MORE
CONCILIATORY ATTITUDE. HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT EBAN MORE
REASONABLE THAN OTHER MEMBERS OF ISRAELI GOVT. EBAN SEEMED
TO ATTACH GREATEST HOPE IN DEAL BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN.

3. SHAH GOT IMPRESSION THAT ISRAELIS WOULD BE WILLING TO:
A) GIVE UP SINAI IF IT DEMILITARIZED; B) GIVE UP WEST BANK
AREA EXCEPT FOR ABOUT TEN PERCENT NEEDED FOR SECURITY
PURPOSES; C) AGREE TO SEE JORDANIAN FLAG FLY OVER SOME
SPOT IN JERUSALEM; AND D) AGREE TO SOME SORT OF ARRANGEMENT FOR
UNSPECIFIED MOSLEM AREAS IN JERUSALEM SIMILAR TO ITALIAN
GOVT AGREEMENT WITH VATICAN.

4. SHAH SAID EBAN INSISTED JERUSALEM MUST BE LAST ITEM IN
ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT AND THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES COULD
ANY ISRAELI GOVT AGREE TO RELINQUISHING WALL. SHAH
SAYS HE COUNTERED THAT ISRAEL COULD DO ITSELF INFINITE AMOUNT
OF GOOD BY MAKING PUBLIC OFFER RE WHAT IT PREPARED TO DO RE
JERUSALEM AS FIRST STEP IN SETTLEMENT. IT COULD, IN SHAH'S
VIEW, HAVE HIGHLY FAVORABLE IMPACT.

5. ACCORDING TO SHAH, NEITHER EBAN NOR JARRING HAVE GIVEN
UP HOPE FOR PROGRESS BY JARRING'S MISSION.

6. SHAH PROMISED TO INFORM US RESULTS HIS TALKS WITH
HUSSEIN, END QUOTE

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DTG 301503Z AUG 68

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 AUG 30 16 54

68 AUG 30 PM 1:45

FRIDAY

VZCZCEEA426
OO: WTE 10
DE: WTE 3584

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82292

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUGUST 30, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

I EXPLAINED TO NAT DAVIS YOUR VIEW ABOUT THIS STAFF STAYING PUT. HE STILL WANTS TO VOLUNTEER FOR THE POST IN GUATEMALA. THEREFORE, I FORWARD HIS PERSONAL NOTE TO YOU.

Pres file

"I HAVE BEEN READING THE REPORTS OF AMBASSADOR MEIN'S ASSASSINATION. COMING AFTER THE KILLING OF OUR TWO SENIOR MILITARY ADVISORS THIS JANUARY. THE BOMBS WE HAVE FOUND, AND THE THREATS OF MORE TO COME, I GATHER GUATEMALA MIGHT BE REGARDED AS A SOMEWHAT HIGH-RISK AND PERHAPS UNGLITTERING ASSIGNMENT. FOR OUR COUNTRY'S RELATIONS WITH GUATEMALA AND THE FACE WE PRESENT TO THE COMMUNISTS, IT MIGHT ALSO BE A GOOD THING TO GET A NEW MAN THERE QUICKLY.

THESE ELEMENTS ENCOURAGE ME TO VOLUNTEER. PERHAPS THIS IS PRESUMPTUOUS, BUT YOU HAVE PLACED THIS CONFIDENCE IN ME BEFORE AND MIGHT AGAIN.

I HAVE CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE WITH COMMUNISTS, IN PRAGUE, MOSCOW, SOFIA, CARACAS AND SANTIAGO. IN CARACAS I MISSED BY A MINUTE OR TWO BEING BLOWN UP BY A BOMB WHICH DESTROYED MUCH OF THE EMBASSY BUILDING. SO I AM NOT A STRANGER TO THESE PROBLEMS. I ALSO HAVE THE LANGUAGE AND LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE."

NATHANIEL DAVIS

DTG 301631A AUG 68

DECLASSIFIED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12333, SEC. 1.5 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 16, 1993

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY 16 ON 9-22

XEROX FROM QUEEN COPY

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INFORMATION

SECRET

Friday, August 30, 1968
10:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

This memorandum from
Stan Resor to Sec. Clifford, on his *Resor's*
recent visit to Vietnam and Korea,
will interest you.

Pres. file

Key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

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EQ 10550 CND 03
WH Guidelines 2/14/83
DA Memo. 00101, 1003
By rg . NARA, Dsic 9-9-92



Walt.
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17 AUG 1968

August 16, 1968

SECURITY INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

This memorandum will summarize the impressions of the situation in Vietnam and Korea which I derived from my recent visits there. I spent nine days in Vietnam where I visited substantially all the major American units, some Vietnamese units, and numerous U.S. Advisory Teams. I also had extended conversations with General Abrams and the major commanders. I spent three days in Korea visiting the major U.S. units and some ROK units, and had extended discussions with General Bonesteel.

A. Vietnam

My overall impression is that from the point of view of the military position in South Vietnam, time is on our side. A second major impression is that we are making progress in the improvement of the ARVN, RF and PF units, that this is a crucial objective and that its accomplishment requires the continued strong emphasis both in country and here in Washington.

1. Improved intelligence has increased the effectiveness of the B-52 and Tactical Air Strikes in South Vietnam

There has been a significant improvement in our intelligence of the enemy in South Vietnam. This has resulted from the development of certain new sources and improved use and integration of information from the many existing intelligence systems. Important information is being obtained from prisoners of war and ralliers, an increasing number of whom have held responsible positions in the enemy forces. We are making increasingly more effective use of our many modern technical devices for collection of information on the enemy, including airborne and ground-mounted doppler radars, infra-red detectors, ammonia and carbon particle detectors (people sniffers), sound and ground-motion sensors, radio interception and direction finding and night vision equipment.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NK 019-039-1-1
By op NARA, Date 5-13-02

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Improved intelligence is contributing particularly to better targeting of B-52 and tactical air strikes. General Abrams is now able to put the weight of air strikes where there are confirmed targets and to achieve greater results. Priority is given to targets for which there is hard intelligence. Consequently field commanders are increasing their intelligence effort in order to support their requests for air support. Recent intelligence confirms the increasing effectiveness of the B-52 strikes.

2. Evolving Overall Concept of Operations

There has been a continuing development in the overall concept of operations for our forces in South Vietnam. The first element of this concept is a mobile defense by U.S. forces in the forward areas along the Demilitarized Zone and in the Western areas of I and II Corps. The forward defense is designed to block and attrit enemy main force units attempting to penetrate from border sanctuaries to the population centers. It keeps the destructive fighting away from the heavily populated areas. Because the fighting is conducted in less populated areas, the Free World Forces have greater flexibility in the use of air power and artillery.

The forward defense is conducted from strong points on critical terrain which dominate the enemy approaches into South Vietnam from the border areas. Following his defeat in May, the enemy withdrew the bulk of his depleted main force units to the border areas to recoup. Our forces followed the enemy back, seizing and establishing strong points as they advanced. The typical strong point is a fire support base which consists of a revetted artillery battery position protected by a fortified infantry company perimeter.

The key to the establishment, maintenance and defense of the strong points is our great mobility relative to the enemy. By using helicopters to lift men, equipment and supplies, including 105mm and 155mm howitzers and anti-personnel radars, we are able to establish the fire bases on the highest, steepest hills. We airlift in bulldozers and explosives to clear landing zones and fields of fire and to dig defensive positions. Helicopters provide continuous resupply without the necessity to clear and secure overland lines of communications. Airmobility enables rapid reinforcement of any fire base threatened by an enemy concentration. With this reinforcement capability we can normally man our fire bases with company-size forces and practice economy of force.

From the strong points our forces conduct airmobile and foot reconnaissances over the surrounding terrain and, particularly,

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at night, set ambushes in the intervening avenues of approach to detect and intercept enemy movements. Smaller enemy movements are dealt with by the strong-point forces using preplanned artillery fires. Larger enemy concentrations are attacked both by B-52 and tactical air strikes and by artillery.

The second element of the overall concept is the use of the strong points as bases for clearing operations against enemy base areas within artillery range. With fire bases established in the Western areas, wide coverage is afforded for these clearing operations against the base areas which the enemy has used to support his attacks on the population centers. As our fire bases are established closer to the border, we are able to project our artillery fire power further into enemy base areas and to dominate his lines of communication. Our divisions in I Corps are now operating against the base areas from which the enemy attacked Hue, having located and destroyed the base area formerly occupied by the headquarters of the enemy's Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue, and are using maps found there to locate and clear other enemy base areas, including hospitals and caches of weapons, ammunition and rice.

The forward defense and clearing operations are designed to keep the enemy main force units away from the populated areas and to deprive the local Viet Cong units and infrastructure of main force support. The third element of the overall concept is the systematic clearing of local enemy units and infrastructure from the populated areas by intensive operations district by district, making full use of all available intelligence. Brigade commanders in both the 1st Air Cavalry Division in I Corps and the 25th Infantry Division in III Corps reported successful operations in which they worked with the District Chief, Popular Forces, and police in rooting out the Viet Cong infrastructure. The 101st Air Cavalry Division has been particularly successful in this. However, all of our people in Vietnam recognize that this third step is a slow and difficult process.

The creation of Provisional Corps, Vietnam, has brought about a much better organization of our forces and combat operations in I Corps. This is particularly significant because of the heavy concentration of both enemy and friendly forces in I Corps.

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3. Enemy Trends

MACV J-2, General Weyand in II Field Forces and General Stilwell in the Provisional Corps stated that there had been a decline in quality of the enemy forces. Replacements for losses in the Tet and May offensives have been largely NVA personnel. Viet Cong main force units have also used local forces and guerrillas as replacements. Administrative and support personnel have been assigned to replace losses in combat units. In III Corps the units with NVA fillers lack the advantage of knowing the terrain and being a "force of the people."

Replacements have received significantly less training than formerly -- frequently only one month, and rarely more than three months in lieu of the former norm of 6-8 months. Replacement of officers and cadre appears to be a problem for the NVA. POW's have indicated that their leaders have had little or no combat experience.

4. Night Operations and Rice Denial

Throughout the theater there has been a heavy emphasis on increasing night operations, and it is producing results. II Field Forces (General Weyand) reported some 7,000 night patrols and ambushes of platoon size or larger in the first two weeks of July, an increase of over 40% since April. The Capital Military Assistance Command displayed maps showing several hundred patrols, ambushes, check points, etc., being conducted each night in the greater Saigon area alone. In I Corps, U.S. and ARVN units operating from forward fire bases customarily patrol and ambush by night and rest in the heat of the day. The RF and PF are also now emphasizing night operations, and there were frequent comments as to their increased effectiveness in this respect.

Rice denial operations are much more effective this year than in the past. General Rosson made this a principal point in his briefing as Acting CG of III MAF as did General Stilwell. An estimated 85%-90% of the rice crop from the Northern coast now comes under government control, whereas the VC controlled the rice plains a year ago. General Weyand and others said there was clear evidence of enemy units suffering acutely as the result of food shortages.

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5. Capital Military District Command Reorganization

The reorganization of the Capital Military District under the joint command of General Hay, who will be succeeded by General Mearns, and General Minh has been strikingly successful. For the first time all forces including U.S., ARVN, RF, PF, National Police and Civil Defense forces are operating under a unified command. This has permitted fully integrated operations throughout the Saigon-Gia Dinh Military District.

6. Improvement of ARVN, RF and PF

Many American commanders and advisers commented on improvement in ARVN, RF and PF units and predicted continued improvement provided the United States furnishes adequate support. There has been an improvement in ARVN leadership. In IV Corps the new Corps Commander and Division Commanders are reported by General Eckhardt to be a significant improvement. In II Corps, General Peers and General Stone are pleased with the performance of General Lu Lan as Corps Commander. He is a great improvement over Vin Loc, his predecessor. In the Saigon-Gia Dinh Military District, General Minh has performed most effectively.

The 1st ARVN Division is considerably the best unit and quite comparable to an American unit. It is a very large division having 16 maneuver battalions and currently 3 attached Marine battalions. General Rosson attributes its superiority to other ARVN divisions primarily to the unusual quality of General Truong, its commander. The 3d Regiment of the division has been operating in the field with the 1st Air Cavalry Division continuously for 75 days, many times longer than units of any other ARVN division.

Both General Goodpaster and commanders and advisers in the field were enthusiastic at the success of the MACV Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT's) in improving RF and PF effectiveness. These teams of five U.S. personnel and a Vietnamese interpreter move from unit to unit, ordinarily staying 90 days at each location. They give instruction in such subjects as care and use of weapons, small unit tactics, local security and construction of field fortifications. About 200 of a planned 354 MAT's have been deployed to supplement the U.S. advisory structure throughout South Vietnam.

The total strength of the RF and PF (376,000) is slightly higher than the strength of the ARVN (368,500). Moreover, riflemen constitute a significantly higher proportion of the total RF and PF strength than is the case with the ARVN. For example, the III Corps figures are as follows:

	<u>Riflemen</u>	<u>Total Military Strength</u>
U.S.	18,000	84,000
ARVN	12,000	45,000
RF and PF	60,000	71,000

Since everyone agrees that the first and major problem is providing local security, the program to improve the effectiveness of the RF and PF has tremendous leverage. As General Westmoreland stated in his final advice, improvement of the RF and PF is the area in which "the greatest gain can be made with minimum resources."

There is an increasing number of joint operations of ARVN, RF and PF units with U.S. units. In many cases U.S. commanders commented favorably on performance of the South Vietnamese units in these operations. Such operations constitute an important method for improving the capability and aggressiveness of South Vietnamese units.

General Abrams said that currently his major concern is obtaining promptly adequate equipment for the ARVN, RF and PF. He was pleased that the delivery schedules which I gave him were better than the first estimates that he had received. However, he will still have to divert, on an interim basis, some equipment programmed for U.S. forces in order not to delay activation of RF and PF units. He has requested authority to establish an in-country allocations committee to do this and has asked for DA assistance in setting up the committee. I have discussed the matter with the Army staff, and it will provide the necessary coordination and assistance.

In response to Mr. Nitze's request, General Abrams has sent in a revised list of units to be included in the FY-69 force structure add-on. As requested, the list contains a high proportion of combat and

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combat support units. It is being reviewed by the Army staff and the equipment requirement determined and priced out. I am trying to have this available for review next week. The day I left General Abrams reported that sufficient M-16 rifles (29,000) had been issued to the Capital Military Assistance Command to equip all units assigned to that command, including RF and PF. Next priority for issue of M16's are RF and PF forces in IV Corps.

7. USARV Force Structure and Civilianization

The MACV briefings stated specifically that the Program 6 forces are sufficient to meet our military needs. No one indicated a need for additional deployments.

USARV did report that it will have to give up 9595 military spaces in order to complete the implementation of the civilianization program and stay within the military personnel ceiling. In addition, it must find by trade-off approximately another 4000 military spaces to accommodate high priority requirements. To complete the civilianization program by end of May 1969 USARV is reducing requisitioning authority for military spaces scheduled for civilianization at the rate of 800-900 per month whether or not civilians have been hired to fill these positions.

8. Reduction of Artillery Ammunition Expenditures and Improved Management

Artillery ammunition accountability has been extended to forward supply areas (FSA's). The ammunition in the FSA's has been credited against the 60-day, in-country stockage objective. This will reduce inventory requirements by \$25,000,000.

General Abrams has introduced an artillery ammunition savings plan for five high volume rounds. ASR's for each of these rounds will be reduced 10%, but each major field commander may use one half of the 10% reduction at his discretion. Savings based on the minimum reduction of 5% will be about \$55,000,000 annually including the Koreans.

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Brigadier General Kalergis, the I Field Force Artillery Commander, has developed a computerized analysis of artillery fires which General Abrams plans to introduce in each of the Corps areas. General Kalergis found that the traditional categories of observed fire, unobserved fire and harassing and interdiction (H and I) fires did not provide a basis for meaningful analysis. Therefore, a new classification system was developed and tested. Ammunition expenditures are reported daily by battery, by number of rounds, and by type of mission in seven well-defined functional categories. Each week the expenditures are consolidated by category in a variety of different ways for analysis. Initially, calculations were done manually, but computer programs have now been developed and a weekly printout is distributed down to artillery battalion level. A major contribution of the new analysis is the fact that it makes visible to all echelons of command the type of use being made of artillery ammunition.

Analysis of the printout data has already provided the basis for a number of improvements. For example, the data revealed that ROK forces in Vietnam expend artillery ammunition at a rate substantially greater than U.S. Forces. The ROK Commander has agreed to reduce ROK expenditures of 155mm ammunition to a level comparable to U.S. consumption.

9. Certain Continuing Problems

a. Cambodian sanctuary

There has been a significant increase in construction of facilities in Cambodia and a proliferation of enemy base areas in Cambodia. These of course constitute sanctuaries from air as well as ground attack as contrasted to base areas in Laos and the area north of the DMZ. The enemy base in the Parrot's-Beak Area (Bathu) is about 50 kilometers from Saigon and thus presents a particularly serious problem.

b. GVN's failure to use fully former Vietminh officers

John Vann, the CORDS Director for III Corps, believes that the Vietnamese Senior Commanders (General Officers) are still selected from too small a group and still comprise only those officers

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who fought with the French. Ex-Vietminh officers to date have only progressed as far as Colonels. Many of these are excellent leaders -- still the crying need -- and if promoted further would give the present government a broader base of support.

c. Possible enemy return to protracted war strategy

There is still a question as to whether the enemy can successfully return to a protracted war strategy thereby reducing his casualties and reducing the effectiveness of American military power. The significantly growing proportion of NVA personnel in enemy forces may make this an infeasible course. It also appears that the enemy concluded last summer that he was losing the war while following this strategy.

d. Speedup of ARVN and RF and PF improvement

There is a need for continued emphasis on acceleration of ARVN and RF and PF improvement. Continuing strong emphasis here in DOD on the equipment program is necessary. ARVN's and RF and PF's need for logistics units should not be underestimated as the absence of these units currently has a significantly adverse effect on their capability to conduct sustained operations. More importantly, continuing emphasis on the quality of large unit leadership will be required.

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B. Korea

My overall impression was that the vigorous counterinfiltration program directed by General Bonesteel for both the United States and ROK forces has been successful in bringing this problem under control, but that it will require constant, continuous attention. The critical goal for the immediate future is to maintain the credibility of the U. S. deterrent to limited, as well as all out, attacks so as to minimize the chance of a miscalculation by North Korea. The combined requirement of defending against infiltration through the DMZ and maintaining the security of isolated HAWK batteries and special storage areas puts a heavy burden on the 2nd and 7th Division forces.

1. Effectiveness of counterinfiltration measures

The construction of an improved barrier fence south of the southern boundary of the DMZ, intensive observation of this barrier, the night observation devices and night lighting, and vigorous patrolling forward of the fence have combined to keep incidents north of the fence, and to lessen the incidents in South Korea in 1968 as compared to 1967. The reduction is also due to the effectiveness of measures now being taken to interdict infiltration by sea. Most significantly, the number of infiltration incidents south of Seoul is much less than last year and markedly below predictions for this year.

2. Logistics posture of U. S. forces

There has been a significant improvement in the logistics posture of U. S. forces in Korea. Both the 2nd and 7th Infantry Divisions reported favorably on the replacement of over-age, marginally serviceable vehicles by rebuilt vehicles, contributing to an improvement in logistics REDCON from C4 to C3 (assigned REDCAPE C3). Both the 2nd and 7th Infantry Divisions are at C2 for equipment on hand and equipment serviceability and both have recently improved their equipment deployability to C3.

3. Strength of ROK defense and economy

General Bonesteel and Ambassador Porter confirmed my personal impression that the ROK Army is a first-class fighting

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organization and that the economy of South Korea is booming. Judging from my visits with General Suh, Commanding General of the First ROK Army; General Ro, Commanding General of the ROK III Corps; and General Mun, Commanding General of the Second ROK Army and the newly designated Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff; and my observation of their troops, the Army has vigorous leadership and is a well disciplined, combat ready force.

4. Additional ROK Forces for Vietnam

Former Minister of National Defense Choi, during an office visit and again at supper the day before he submitted his resignation, urged renewal of negotiations aimed at adding 6,000 combat troops to the ROK forces in South Vietnam. This would be achieved by the phased civilianization of 6,000 ROK logistics personnel. General Bonesteel and Ambassador Porter indicated that the civilian wage scale was still the major issue.

5. Certain Continuing Problems

a. Counterinfiltration operations along the DMZ have certain inherent frustrations. The current rules of engagement preclude use of artillery and mortars. The enemy infiltrators are highly trained commando personnel who are effective in removing their own dead and wounded, and even empty cartridge cases; thus after our patrols have had a sharp clash with the enemy, they often can find little evidence of results.

b. Because of the public attention focused on the Vietnam War and the priority given to our forces in Vietnam, there is some feeling in Korea of being a "forgotten front." Thus any steps we can take to recognize their problem without impinging on support of South Vietnam would appear desirable. The recently authorized troop housing program should be very helpful. Delegation to General Bonesteel of the authority to award the Bronze Star for valorous action would permit him to make impact awards which should be helpful. Currently this can be done only with the Army Commendation Ribbon with V.

Stanley R. Resor
Stanley R. Resor
Secretary of the Army

~~SECRET~~

EEA412
00 WTE10
DE WTE 3563

1968 AUG 30 00 05

68 AUG 29 PM 8 06

THURSDAY

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAPS2279

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: STATE DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES REPORT FOR AUGUST 29, 1968

ENDC ADJOURNS; NON-NUCLEAR CONFERENCE BEGINS - THE CURRENT SESSION IN GENEVA OF THE EIGHTEEN NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE CLOSED WEDNESDAY WITH THE UNANIMOUS ADOPTION OF A REPORT TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL.

THE CONFERENCE OF NON-NUCLEAR STATES, AT WHICH AT LEAST 83 STATES (INCLUDING USSR, UK, AND FRANCE, BUT NOT COMMUNIST CHINA) WILL BE REPRESENTED, BEGAN THIS MORNING IN GENEVA.

NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATES DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO VOTE AT THE CONFERENCE, AND THE U.S. DELEGATIONS HAS BEEN GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO RESTRICT ITS PARTICIPATION PRIMARILY TO CORRIDOR EFFORTS TO FORESTALL ACTIONS BY THE CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD UNDERMINE THE NPT OR RESULT IN UNACCEPTABLE PROPOSALS FOR OTHER ARMS CONTROL MEASURES. ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE A SIMILAR ATTITUDE REGARDING THE NPT, THE U.S. DELEGATION HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO USE GREAT DISCRETION IN WORKING WITH THEM.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA - CHIP BOHLEN DISCUSSED THE CZECH SITUATION AT A BACKGROUND OVERSEAS WRITERS LUNCHEON, CONCLUDING:

(A) THE KREMLIN PROBABLY FELT IT HAD TO MOVE, TO KEEP ALL OF EASTERN EUROPE FROM "DOMINOING."

(B) THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF EAST GERMANY -- HENCH ULBRICHT PROBABLY HAD A KEY VOICE IN THE SOVIET DECISION.

(C) THE SOVIETS HAVE MANEUVERED THE DUBCEK REGIME INTO ACCEPTING TACIT RESPONSIBILITY FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS -- HENCE, ITS LONGEVITY IS DOUBTFUL.

(D) FOR OBVIOUS REASONS, THE U.S. CANNOT AND WILL NOT INTERFERE.

(E) WHILE U.S.-SOVIET BILATERALS ARE CURRENTLY ON ICE, WE WILL KEEP OUR OPTIONS OPEN. (HE REFUSED TO DISCUSS A POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL TRIP TO MOSCOW.)

(F) THE U.S. HAS NEVER ENTERED INTO ANY "SPHERE OF INFLUENCE" AGREEMENTS IN THE TRUE SENSE OF THE WORD.

(G) THE LIBERALIZING MOVEMENT IS A FACT IN EASTERN EUROPE. ALTHOUGH ONE CANNOT BE SPECIFIC ABOUT TIME, EVENTUALLY, MAYBE IN TEN OR SO YEARS, THE SAME THING MAY HAPPEN IN THE SOVIET UNION.

ROMANIA - AS A RESULT OF THE CONTINUING CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN ROMANIA, SECRETARY RUSK HAS AUGMENTED THE EXISTING CZECHOSLOVAKIA TASK FORCE TO INCLUDE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING ROMANIA. THE EXPANDED TASK FORCE IS PREPARING APPROPRIATE CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR POSSIBLE USE IN THE EVENT OF SOVIET MILITARY ACTION IN ROMANIA.

DTG: 292324Z AUG 68

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By JC, NARA, Date 11-1-01

FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

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00 WIE18
DE WTE 3565

1968 AUG 29 28 00

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82276

~~SECRET~~

AUGUST 29, 1968

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF AMBASSADOR MEIN

AS THESE TWO CABLES INDICATE, THE COMMUNIST TERRORIST-GUERRILLA APPARATUS (FAR) WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MURDER OF AMBASSADOR MEIN. THEY ALSO TEND TO SHOW THAT THE FAR OBJECTIVE WAS TO KIDNAP HIM AND HOLD HIM HOSTAGE UNTIL ONE OF THEIR TOP LEADERS CAUGHT ON AUGUST 24 WAS RELEASED. WHEN THE AMBASSADOR TRIED TO ESCAPE, THEY CUT HIM DOWN.

GUATEMALA 6228

SUBJ: AMBASSADOR'S DEATH: FAR STATEMENT

1. THE FAR (FUERZAS ARMADAS REBELDES) HAS ISSUED "BULLETIN" STATING AMBASSADOR MEIN KILLED IN REPRISAL FOR ARREST AND DETENTION BY GUATEMALAN SECURITY FORCES OF "COMANDANTE CAMILO SANCHEZ" ALIAS FOR CARLOS FRANCISCO ORDONEZ MONTEAGUDO, WELL-KNOWN FAR LEADER.
2. THE FLYER STATES SECURITY FORCES ARE HOLDING CAMILO INCOMMUNICADO AT FIFTH CORPS HEADQUARTERS.
3. TYPEWRITTEN CARBON COPIES OF FAR BULLETIN WERE SENT TO LOCAL RADIO NEWSCASTER THIS MORNING; HE SENT COPY TO EMBOFF AT NOON. NO REPEAT NO PUBLICITY GIVEN BULLETIN AS YET.
3. FULL TEXT BULLETIN BEING TRANSLATED, WILL FOLLOW IN SEPARATE TELEGRAM.
5. COMMENT: THIS APPEARS CONFIRM OUR SPECULATION FAR INTENT WAS KIDNAP AMBASSADOR FOR PURPOSE EXCHANGE WITH CAMILO. KREBS.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 712 89-200

By ag/lop, IMAA, Date 12-10-92

XEROX FROM QUECK COPY

GUATEMALA 6221

SUBJ: DEATH OF AMBASSADOR MEIN

1. FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY TRANSLATION TEXT FAR BULLETIN:

BEGIN TEXT

FAR-NATIONAL PROPAGANDA SECTION PRESS AND RADIO BULLETIN FAR INFORMS: TODAY, WED., 28, AUG AT 15:25 HOURS AMB. JG MEIN, THE MAXIMUM REPRESENTATIVE OF MURDEROUS, RAPACIOUS IMPERIALISM IN OUR COUNTRY, WAS EXECUTED WHEN HE RESISTED OUR ATTEMPT TO MAKE HIM OBJECT OF POLITICAL KIDNAP, AS REPLY TO CAPTURE OF COMMANDANTE CAMILO SANCHEZ OF FAR ON SATURDAY AUG 24TH AT 8200 IN 8TH AVE AND 12TH STREET, ZONE 12 DURING CONFRONTATION BETWEEN PATROLS OF REPRESSIVE FORCES OF GOG AND TWO OF OUR COMRADES, ONE OF THEM CAMILO.

2. CAPTURE OF COMRADE CAMILO HAS UP TO NOW BEEN WITHHELD FROM PUBLIC. FAR DEMANDS PRESENTATION (IN COURT) OF COMMANDANTE, CURRENTLY HELD AT FIFTH SUBSTATION (OF POLICE) IN ZONE 11, COMMANDED BY THE SADIST NOE VILLEGAS DELGADO, CHIEF OF FASCIST ARMY GROUPS MANO, NOA, CADEG, ETC., AND FORMER CHIEF OF FOURTH CORPS NATIONAL POLICE, LAIR OF REACTION WHERE THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE 6,800 VICTIMS OF TERRORIS REACTION IN GUATEMALA WERE TORTURED, BROKEN, AND ASSASSINATED.

3. THE EXECUTION OF THE YANKEE AMBASSADOR IS ONLY THE FIRST OF A SERIES OF MEASURES (WHICH WILL BE TAKEN) UNTIL THE PRESENTATION (IN COURT) OF COMMANDANTE CAMILO IS ACHIEVED. IN MAKING PUBLIC THIS DENUNCIATION OF THE CAPTURE AND DISAPPEARANCE OF COMMANDANTE, FAR REITERATES ITS IRREVOCABLE DETERMINATION TO FIGHT--UNTIL, TOGETHER WITH THE PEOPLE, THE DEFEAT AND EXPULSION FROM POWER OF THE VORACIOUS, PARASITIC BOURGEOISIE IS ACHIEVED. WE WILL FIGHT TILL (WE) WIN OR DIE FOR GUATEMALA. HEADQUARTERS, FAR, SIERRA DE LAS MINAS.
END TEXT. KREBS

DTG 292204Z AUG 68

~~SECRET~~

V
EEA488
00 WTE10
DE WTE 3563

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82274

~~SECRET~~

1968 AUG 29 23 16

Free file

HEREWITH CIA'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS OF 4:30 PM, AUGUST 29, 1968.

1. [REDACTED]

INCLUDES THESE POINTS:

THE AGREEMENT REPORTEDLY

- A. MOSCOW WILL CONTROL THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CIERNA AND BRATISLAVA AGREEMENTS.
- B. SOVIET ADVISORS WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN ALL
BRANCHES AND BODIES OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY
AND ARMY.
- C. THE SOVIETS WILL STATION FORCES ALONG THE WESTERN
BORDER AND OTHER AREAS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
- D. CZECHOSLOVAKIA WILL HAVE A FREE HAND IN ECONOMIC
AND CULTURAL MATTERS.
- E. PRESS CENSORSHIP WILL BE ESTABLISHED CONCERNING
REPORTING ABOUT THE USSR AND OTHER MEMBERS OF
THE "VARSAW FIVE" AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S RELATIONS
WITH THOSE COUNTRIES.
- F. TROOPS WILL BE WITHDRAWN GRADUALLY AND UNDER
THE SUPERVISION OF A POLITICAL-MILITARY
COMMISSION.
- G. PRAGUE'S FOREIGN POLICY WILL BE COORDINATED WITH
THE "VARSAW FIVE."
- H. THE "VARSAW FIVE" WILL HELP PAY FOR "AGREED"
DAMAGES.
- I. MOSCOW WILL GRANT NOVOTNY ASYLUM, IF HE SO
REQUESTS, AND OTHERS CONNECTED WITH NOVOTNY.

2. [REDACTED] A
SOVIET GENERAL BURISHKIN, AN "ACTING AMBASSADOR" IS IN
THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. THE SOVIETS REPORTEDLY ARE
INSISTING THAT THE SPECIAL 14TH PARTY CONGRESS BE ANNULLED

XEROX FROM QUOTE COPY

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-17
By *me*, NARA, Date *3-8-03*

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1) 25 yrs
(5)

THURSDAY
AUG 29 PM 1:28

AND THAT BILAK, INDRA, BARBIREX AND OTHERS (EXCEPT KOLDER) REMAIN IN THEIR OFFICES. [REDACTED] THE QUESTION OF A GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE IS STILL UNRESOLVED. (S)

EO 12958

3.4(b)(1) > 25Yrs

3. THE REPORT APPEARS PLAUSIBLE FOR THE MOST PART. THE WEST GERMAN NEWS AGENCY, CITING "WELL-INFORMED CIRCLES" HAS ALREADY REPORTED THE EXISTENCE OF A SECRET PROTOCOL TO THE MOSCOW AGREEMENT AND LISTED A NUMBER OF POINTS WHICH ARE VERY SIMILAR [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) > 25Yrs (S)

4. ACCORDING TO UNCONFIRMED WESTERN PRESS REPORTS, DUBCEK AND OTHER PARTY LEADERS MET IN PRAGUE THURSDAY EVENING, STRUGGLING TO WORK OUT A SOLUTION TO THE DILEMMA POSED BY THE EXISTENCE OF THREE CENTRAL COMMITTEES: THE PRE-INVASION COMMITTEE, THE ONE ELECTED BY THE EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS OF 22 AUGUST AND A THIRD REPORTEDLY DRAWN-UP BY THE SOVIETS. WESTERN PRESS SOURCES REPORT TODAY THAT SOVIET LEADERS HAVE HANDPICKED 150 MEMBERS FOR A NEW CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE, TO INCLUDE MANY OF THOSE CZECHOSLOVAKS ACCUSED OF COLLABORATING WITH THE SOVIET INVADERS. THIS SOVIET APPROVED COMMITTEE REPORTEDLY IS MADE UP OF THE PRE-14TH PARTY CONGRESS COMMITTEE PLUS 40 FROM THE 140 MAN COMMITTEE NAMED BY THE CONGRESS OF 22 AUGUST. THE LATTER COMMITTEE, MADE UP ALMOST ENTIRELY OF DUBCEK SUPPORTERS, HAS BEEN TERMED ILLEGAL BY MOSCOW AND EVEN BY SOME CZECHOSLOVAKS.

5. A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE BEING CONSIDERED BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT, [REDACTED] MAY INCLUDE THE REMOVAL OF THE EXTREME CONSERVATIVES, SUCH AS KOLDER, BILAK, INDRA AND SVESTKA (THIS CONTRADICTS THE INFORMATION IN PARAGRAPH 1 AND REFLECTS THE STILL UNSETTLED CONDITIONS IN PRAGUE.) AND ALSO THOSE PROGRESSIVES WHO HAVE PROVED MOST OFFENSIVE TO MOSCOW. THESE LIBERALS--CISAR, KRIEGAL, PELIKAN, HEJZLAR, GOLDSTUECKER AND OTHERS--WOULD "GO ON LEAVE FOR THE TIME BEING." THE CZECHOSLOVAKS REPORTEDLY HAVE CONSIDERED CALLING A SPECIAL CONGRESS TO ELECT A NEW COMMITTEE BUT ARE RELUCTANT TO DO SO UNDER THE EYES OF OCCUPATION TROOPS.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) > 25Yrs (S)

6. CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SMRKOVSKY ADDRESSED THE NATION TODAY AND IMPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE CZECHOSLOVAK NEGOTIATORS WERE UNDER PHYSICAL DURESS WHILE IN MOSCOW. HE EXPLICITLY STATED THAT THE ALTERNATIVE TO A COMPROMISE SOLUTION WAS THE "INSTITUTION OF A LONG-TERM OCCUPATION ADMINISTRATION." OTHER PASSAGES OF HIS SPEECH SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIETS THREATENED TO DEVASTATE THE COUNTRY. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE GRAVE SPEECHES OF DUBCEK, CERNIK AND SVOBODA WERE MORE REVEALING OF THE FINAL AGREEMENT THAN THE COMMUNIQUE--ANOTHER INDICATION THAT SECRET PROTOCOLS MAY EXIST.

7. SMRKOVSKY ECHOED OTHER CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS IN CALLING FOR PATIENCE AND CALMNESS, AND IN STATING THAT THE SOVIET TROOPS WILL REMAIN FOR SOME TIME. IN GENERAL, HIS SPEECH SEEMS DESIGNED TO WARN THE CZECHOSLOVAK NATION THAT PRAGUE'S LEADERS OBTAINED THE MOST THAT COULD BE HOPED FOR AND THAT SOVIET RETRIBUTION MIGHT BE SWIFT AND HARSH IF THERE ARE PROVOCATIONS.

8. SOVIET PRESS REACTION TO EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA CONTINUES TO BE SEVERE. TASS HAS CHARGED THAT "RIGHT-WING COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY FORCES" IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA WERE "BECOMING MORE ACTIVE." THEY CITED THE CZECHOSLOVAK OPPOSITION TO THE MOSCOW AGREEMENT AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE RIGHT-WING FORCES. TASS SAID THAT THE "FIRST CONSTRUCTIVE STEPS OF THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP" IN PRAGUE WERE BEING FRUSTRATED. AMONG THESE "FIRST STEPS" WAS PRIME-MINISTER CERNIK'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON WEDNESDAY NIGHT STATING THAT GOVERNMENT CONTROL WAS TO BE REASSERTED OVER THE UNCENSORED PRESS. A MORE TANGIBLE SOVIET RESPONSE TO THE CONTINUED CZECH OPPOSITION DEVELOPED WHEN RUSSIAN TROOPS TODAY OCCUPIED AND WRECKED THE OFFICES OF LITERARNI LISTY, THE NEWSPAPER OF THE WRITERS UNION, NOT LONG AFTER THE JOURNAL APPEARED TODAY WITH AN ARTICLE CRITICAL OF THE OCCUPATION.

9. AN INDICATION THAT SOME EAST GERMAN OFFICIALS REGARD THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER THE MOSCOW MEETING AS SOMETHING OF A HOAX

[REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) >25Yrs (S)

10. ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS FROM THE SOVIET CARPATHIAN MILITARY DISTRICT MAY BE MOVING INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. ON

[REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1) >25Yrs (S)

11. THERE HAVE BEEN FURTHER UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF RUMANIAN TROOP MOVEMENTS NEAR THE BULGARIAN AND SOVIET BORDERS ON 24-27 AUGUST. THERE ARE STILL NO RELIABLE INDICATIONS OF SOVIET TROOPS MOVING INTO BULGARIA OR HUNGARY.

12. THE SOVIETS HAVE MOUNTED A SIGNIFICANT FUEL RESUPPLY EFFORT PROBABLY FOR THEIR FORCES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. EARLIER TODAY THE

[REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(2) >25Yrs (S)

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1968 AUG 29 22 19

60 AUG 29 PM 6:19

THURSDAY

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82273

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: DIGEST OF STATE DEPARTMENT REPORTS FOR AUGUST 29, 1968

CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS

DUBCEK'S ALTERNATIVES

WITH PARTY AFFAIRS HOPELESSLY TANGLED AND SOME SIGNS OF
WANING POPULAR SUPPORT, EMBASSY PRAGUE SEES TWO GRIM ALTERNATIVES
FOR DUBCEK: 1) A DOWNWARD SPIRAL OF RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOMS
PREVIOUSLY ATTAINED TO THE POINT WHERE THE DUBCEK REGIME IS
ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS OR SO COMPROMISED THAT THE DUBCEK
REGIME CAN BE REMOVED WITHOUT AN EXTREME POPULAR REACTIONS;
OR 2) A GRADUAL BREAKDOWN OF THE MOSCOW AGREEMENTS, THUS REOPENING
THE POSSIBILITY OF THE INSTALLATION BY THE SOVIETS OF A
PUPPET REGIME.

MOSCOW AGREEMENT

THE NETHERLANDS AMBASSADOR TOLD EMBASSY PRAGUE THAT HIS
BEST SOURCE INFORMED HIM THAT THE MOSCOW AGREEMENT INCLUDES,
AMONG OTHER POINTS: 1) SOVIETS TO CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE CIERNA AND BRATISLAVA AGREEMENTS; 2) SOVIET ADVISORS
TO BE ATTACHED TO THE DEFENSE MINISTRY AND THE ARMY; 3) SOVIET
TROOPS TO BE STATIONED ALONG THE WESTERN BORDER AND IN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA; 4) PRESS CENSORSHIP TO BE IMPOSED AS REGARDS
BLOC COUNTRIES.

WESTERN GERMAN POSITION

A FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL TOLD EMBASSY BONN THAT WEST
GERMANY WOULD CONTINUE ITS OVERALL EASTERN POLICY. HE SAID
A SOVIET PROPAGANDA WAVE AGAINST THE GERMANS IS EXPECTED,
BUT THAT SOVIET INVASION IS UNLIKELY. HE NOTED THAT THE
SOVIET ACTION HAD BEEN A SHOCK TO GERMAN MORALE AND THAT ALL
THREE POLITICAL PARTIES ARE NOW OPPOSED TO SIGNATURE OF THE
NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

N E A R E A S T

CYPRUS

EMBASSY NICOSIA SUGGESTS POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS IN CYPRUS
MIGHT INCLUDE: 1) TURKISH RELINQUISHMENT OF THE "RIGHT" OF
INTERVENTION AND THE STATIONING OF TROOPS, IN RETURN FOR
SUBSTANTIAL AUTONOMY FOR TURK CYPRIOTS; 2) SUBMERSION IN
NATO BY CYPRUS BECOMING A NATO MEMBER; 3) SIDESTEPPING
OR POSTPONING THE INTERNATIONAL ISSUES IF SATISFACTORY
CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE NEGOTIATED AND BOTH SIDES
CAN BE PERSUADED TO ACTIVATE A NEW CONSTITUTION AND PRACTICE
COEXISTENCE FOR A GIVEN PERIOD.

E A S T A S I A

SABAH

EMBASSY MANILA REPORTS THAT THE PHILIPPINE CONGRESS HAS
PASSED AND SENT TO PRESIDENT MARCOS A BILL CONTAINING
LANGUAGE ASSERTING SOVEREIGNTY OVER SABAH. THE EMBASSY
THINKS IT IMPROBABLE MARCOS WILL SIGN A BILL WHICH IS
SO DELIBERATELY IRRITATING, BUT THAT HE WILL HAVE TO
WEIGH HIS ACTION AGAINST THE COMFORT IT MIGHT GIVE THE
LIBERALS WHO COULD THUS POSE AS DEFENDERS OF THE
NATIONAL INTEREST.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

EO 12958, Sec. 3.3
State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 11-1-01

WTE: 2021197 AUG 68
FROM QUOTE COPY

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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1968 AUG 29 21 57

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82272

Free file

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-22
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-17-03

XEROX FROM QUOTE COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VZCZCEEA403
OO WTE 18
DE WTE 3568

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO JIM JONES
CITE CAP82271

1968 AUG 29 21 55

68 AUG 29 PM 5:54

THURSDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUGUST 29, 1968

SUBJECT: SPECIAL DELEGATION TO PANAMANIAN PRESIDENTIAL
INAUGURAL

PRESIDENT-ELECT ARIAS IS SCHEDULED TO BE INAUGURATED
ON OCTOBER 1. STATE HAS RECEIVED AN INVITATION FROM
THE PANAMANIAN GOVERNMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES TO SEND
A SPECIAL DELEGATION.

STATE STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE INVITATION BE ACCEPTED.
IT IS IMPORTANT TO OUR GETTING RELATIONS WITH THE ARIAS
GOVERNMENT OFF TO A GOOD START. IF YOU APPROVE, WE WILL
SEND YOU SUGGESTIONS FOR DELEGATION MEMBERS.

APPROVE ----

DISAPPROVE ----

CALL ME ----

DTG 292141Z AUG 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres. file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 11-1-01

27

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 AUG 29 21 12

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OO VTE18 VTE15
DE VTE 3557

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO JIM JONES
GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP82268

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUGUST 29, 1968

YOU HAVE AGREED TO ATTEND A DINNER GIVEN IN YOUR HONOR BY THE COUNCIL OF THE OAS IN MID-SEPTEMBER. YOU MADE ACCEPTANCE CONDITIONAL ON (1) CHECKING IT OUT WITH MRS. JOHNSON, AND (2) MAKING SURE NO PRECEDENT IS SET FOR A LOT OF DINNERS.

OAS COUNCIL CHAIRMAN ORIBE WOULD LIKE TO HOLD THE DINNER ON THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 19. THE DATE IS OK WITH MRS. JOHNSON; JIM JONES TELLS ME YOUR CALENDAR IS OPEN FOR THAT DAY.

ON THE ISSUE OF SETTING A PRECEDENT, WE HAVE SPOKEN TO ANGIE DUKE WHO ANTICIPATES NO TROUBLE ON THIS SCORE.

IF THE SEPTEMBER 19 DATE IS SATISFACTORY TO YOU, I WILL SO INFORM AMBASSADOR ORIBE.

DATE OK ----

CALL ME ----.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 11-1-01

XEROX FROM QUEEN COPY

NO FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DINNER HAS BEEN MADE, ALTHOUGH THE POSSIBILITY HAS BEEN LEAKED TO THE WASHINGTON POST AND APPEARED IN YESTERDAY'S EDITION. IF THE SEPTEMBER 19 DATE MEETS WITH YOUR APPROVAL, I WILL WORK OUT WITH AMBASSADOR ORIBE A SEQUENCE FOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE INVITATION AND YOUR ACCEPTANCE. AMBASSADOR ORIBE WOULD LIKE FIVE MINUTES OF YOUR TIME AFTER YOU RETURN TO WASHINGTON TO EXTEND THE INVITATION PERSONALLY. HE RECOGNIZES THIS MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE, IN WHICH CASE HE WOULD MAKE THE INVITATION IN WRITING, WHICH COULD SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR THE ANNOUNCEMENT AND YOUR ACCEPTANCE.

APPROVE A 5-MINUTE APPOINTMENT ----

PREFER WRITTEN INVITATION ----

CALL ME ----.

AMBASSADOR ORIBE ASKS IF YOU WOULD INFORMALLY INDICATE WHAT U.S. OFFICIALS YOU WOULD LIKE TO HAVE INVITED. HE IS THINKING OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, COVEY OLIVER, AND POSSIBLY OTHERS. SOL LINOWITZ WILL ALREADY BE THERE AS AN OAS COUNCIL MEMBER. SECRETARY RUSK AND COVEY OLIVER SEEM TO ME LOGICAL INVITEES. I THINK IT WOULD ALSO BE A GOOD GESTURE TO HAVE THE FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARIES WHO HELPED SHAPE YOUR LATIN AMERICAN POLICY -- MANN, VAUGHN AND GORDON -- ALSO PRESENT. IF YOU APPROVE, I WILL PASS THESE SUGGESTIONS ALONG TO ORIBE.

APPROVE ----

DISAPPROVE ----

CALL ME ----.

DTG 292029Z AUG 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

28

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EEA397
OO WIE18
DE WTE 3553

1968 AUG 29 20 07

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82264

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUGUST 29, 1968

Free file

I KNOW YOU HAVE UNDER CONSIDERATION THE NAMING OF A DELEGATION LED BY SECRETARY WILBUR COHEN TO ATTEND THE OCTOBER DEDICATION OF THE BERLIN MEDICAL CENTER.

IF YOU PLAN TO APPROVE A DELEGATION IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO ANNOUNCE IT DURING THIS PERIOD -- WHEN MORALE IN BERLIN IS SAGGING BADLY AS A RESULT OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

THE ORIGINAL MEMO ON THIS SUBJECT FOLLOWS:

MONDAY, JULY 15, 1968

QTE MR. PRESIDENT:

IN THE ATTACHED MEMO SECRETARY RUSK RECOMMENDS YOU APPROVE SENDING A DELEGATION LED BY SECRETARY COHEN TO ATTEND THE OCTOBER 9 DEDICATION OF THE BERLIN MEDICAL CENTER.

THE BERLIN MEDICAL CENTER WAS CONSTRUCTED BY THE BENJAMIN FRANKLIN FOUNDATION, A NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION OF PROMINENT GERMANS AND AMERICANS. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTED \$14.6 MILLION OF THE TOTAL COST OF \$75 MILLION FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE CENTER.

SENDING A HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATION TO THE CENTER'S DEDICATION WILL GIVE US AN OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERScore OUR CONTINUED INTEREST IN BERLIN.

DECLASSIFIED
White House, Dec 22, 1983
By *rg*, 1-13-92

THE OTHER SUGGESTED MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION ARE:

AMBASSADOR LODGE.

SENATOR SPARKMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE EUROPEAN SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. (SENATORS LAUSCHE AND PELL, NEXT MOST SENIOR DEMOCRATS, AS ALTERNATES.)

SENATOR CARLSON, SENIOR REPUBLICAN. (SENATORS WILLIAMS, CASE, OR COOPER, THE NEXT MOST SENIOR REPUBLICANS AS ALTERNATES.)

SURGEON GENERAL STEWART -- SENIOR U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH OFFICIAL.

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ADMINISTRATION RIMESTAD.

ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE AL PUHAN -- ONE OF THE SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR GERMAN AFFAIRS.

MRS. ELEANOR LANSING DULLES -- HELPED ESTABLISH THE BENJAMIN FRANKLIN FOUNDATION AND THE BERLIN MEDICAL CENTER PROJECT.

MR. LEON CHATELAIN, JR., CHAIRMAN OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN FOUNDATION.

MIKE MANATOS RECOMMENDS ADDING SENATOR LISTER HILL TO THE DELEGATION.

I CONCUR IN SECRETARY RUSK'S RECOMMENDATION.

W.V. ROSTON

APPROVE SENDING DELEGATION----- ADD SENATOR HILL-----

DISAPPROVE-----

CALL ME ----- UNQTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 291923Z AUG 68

1968 AUG 29 19 39

VZCZCEEA396
OO WTE18
DE WTE 3552

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH82263

UNCLASSIFIED

AUGUST 29, 1968

SUBJECT: TRANSPORTATION OF REMAINS OF AMBASSADOR MEIN

I HAVE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING INQUIRY FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT:

"THE DEPARTMENT WOULD LIKE TO INQUIRE WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE A PRESIDENTIAL AIRCRAFT BRING THE BODY OF AMBASSADOR MEIN AND THE MEMBERS OF HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY (MRS. MEIN, THREE CHILDREN, AND ONE OR TWO ESCORTS) BACK TO THE UNITED STATES FOR THE INTERMENT.

Pres file

AS AMBASSADOR, HE WAS, OF COURSE, THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT. THEREFORE, THE USE OF SUCH AIRCRAFT FOR THIS PURPOSE WOULD BE A VERY FITTING GESTURE IN HONOR OF THE MEMORY OF THE FIRST UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO BE ASSASSINATED WHILE SERVING ABROAD;

FINAL DETAILS FOR INTERMENT HAVE NOT BEEN DETERMINED BY HIS WIDOW, BUT WE ESTIMATE THAT SUCH AIRCRAFT WILL BE NEEDED SOMETIME DURING THE NEXT TWO DAYS."

DO YOU WISH TO:

- AUTHORIZE A SPECIAL AIRCRAFT -----?
- PREFER NOT -----.
- CALL ME -----.

DTG 291917Z AUG 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S M
VZCZCEEA391
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3550

1968 AUG 29 17 43

FROM: VALT ROSTOV
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82261

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUGUST 29, 1968

YOU ASKED ME TO NOTIFY YOU WHEN I HAD CONVEYED TO SEC.
RUSK YOUR FIRM WISH THAT THIS STAFF NOT BE FURTHER RAIDED.

I HAVE HAD THAT CONVERSATION: THE MESSAGE IS UNDERSTOOD.

DTG291730Z AUGUST 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THURSDAY
1968 AUG 29 PM 1:51

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MATTER. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12358,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 10, 1993.

BY rg ON 9-9-92

EEA398
OO WTE18
DE WTE 3544

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82255

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUGUST 29, 1968

WE HAVE RECEIVED WORD FROM THE CANADIANS THAT PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU WOULD BE HAPPY TO ACCEPT YOUR INVITATION OF JUNE 29 TO VISIT YOU AT THE RANCH. HE REGRETS HIS COMMITMENTS DO NOT PERMIT HIM TO LEAVE OTTAWA BEFORE OCTOBER 7 (WHICH RULES OUT A COMBINED VISIT WITH DIAZ ORDAZ). HIS THOUGHT IS TO MEET WITH YOU EITHER IMMEDIATELY BEFORE OR IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING HIS OFFICIAL VISIT TO MEXICO -- WHICH IS IN THE PLANNING STAGE.

THE CANADIANS ASK WHETHER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVES WOULD BE CONVENIENT FOR YOU.

-- MONDAY, OCTOBER 7, TRUDEAU COULD LEAVE OTTAWA IN THE MORNING FOR SAN ANTONIO (4-HOUR FLIGHT), VISIT HEMISFAIR AND THEN GO TO THE RANCH WHERE HE MIGHT SPEND LATE AFTERNOON AND EVENING OF OCTOBER 7. HE COULD LEAVE FOR MEXICO CITY EITHER MID-MORNING OR EARLY AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 8. (THE CANADIANS UNDERSTAND THAT THE CLOSING DATE FOR HEMISFAIR HAS BEEN HELD OVER TO OCTOBER 7, BUT TRUDEAU HAS NOT YET RECEIVED AN INVITATION FROM HEMISFAIR.)

-- TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8, TRUDEAU COULD FLY DIRECTLY FROM OTTAWA TO THE RANCH FOR AN AFTERNOON AND EVENING PROGRAM, AND LEAVE FOR MEXICO THE FOLLOWING MORNING, WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9.

-- SUNDAY, OCTOBER 13 OR MONDAY, OCTOBER 14, TRUDEAU MIGHT FLY DIRECTLY TO THE RANCH FOLLOWING HIS OFFICIAL VISIT TO MEXICO, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO END SUNDAY, OCTOBER 13, OR MONDAY, OCTOBER 14.

ACCORDING TO THE CANADIAN EMBASSY HERE, THE DETAILS OF TRUDEAU'S OFFICIAL VISIT TO MEXICO ARE NOT YET FINAL, ALTHOUGH SOME DISCUSSIONS HAVE BEEN HELD WITH THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT. TRUDEAU WOULD PROBABLY CALL OFF HIS MEXICAN VISIT IF A MEETING WITH YOU COULD NOT BE WORKED OUT, AND THEREFORE ARE ANXIOUS FOR A RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

START ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEETING WITH TRUDEAU AT THE RANCH:

MONDAY, OCTOBER 7, COMBINED WITH HEMISFAIR VISIT IF IT IS HELD OVER-----

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8-----

SUNDAY/MONDAY, OCTOBER 13-14-----

NO, PREFER ANOTHER ARRANGEMENT-----

CALL ME-----

DTG: 291558Z AUG 68

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc* NARA, Date 11-1-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

32 / THURSDAY
68 AUG 29 PM 8:12

ZEV404

EEA405
OO WTE18
DE WTE 3559

FROM: WALT ROSTON
TO: THE PRESIDENT
SITE: CAP82270

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUGUST 29, 1968

SUBJECT: STUDENT SITUATION IN MEXICO

LATE IN JULY WHEN MEXICO CITY STUDENTS WENT ON A RAMPAGE, THE GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES REACTED STRONGLY TO BRING THEM UNDER CONTROL. FOUR STUDENTS WERE REPORTEDLY KILLED AND MANY INJURED. THIS BROUGHT CRIES OF POLICE BRUTALITY AND INCREASED DEMANDS ON THE PART OF THE STUDENTS.

MEXICAN AUTHORITIES THEN SWITCHED STRATEGY, ALLOWING THE STUDENTS PRETTY MUCH OF A FREE REIN ON DEMONSTRATIONS AND INDICATING A WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE GRIEVANCES. THE AUTHORITIES THOUGHT THIS WOULD QUICKLY DEFUSE STUDENT AGITATION.

THE STRATEGY HAS NOT WORKED. DURING THE PAST TWO DAYS, STUDENT DISTURBANCES HAVE INCREASED. THEY HAVE BEEN DESECRATING PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND DENOUNCING MEXICAN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ.

THE ACCOMPANYING CABLE FROM MEXICO CITY TELLS OF PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ'S DECISION TO SHIFT BACK TO A GET-TOUGH, NON-SENSE POSTURE WITH THE STUDENTS. YESTERDAY THERE WERE CLASHES BETWEEN STUDENTS AND SECURITY FORCES WITH SEVERAL CASUALTIES. THE SLUM DWELLERS HAVE NOW JOINED THE STUDENTS, ADDING AN UGLY NEW DIMENSION TO THE SITUATION. IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS WE MAY SEE AN INCREASED LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN MEXICO CITY.

AT THIS STAGE THE VIOLENCE IS NOT LIKELY TO AFFECT THE STABILITY OF THE DIAZ ORDAZ GOVERNMENT. BUT IT COULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE PRE-OLYMPIC ATMOSPHERE, WHICH IS PROBABLY WHAT THE STUDENTS ARE AFTER TO FORCE PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ TO MEET THEIR DEMANDS.

DTG: 292137Z AUG 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 11-1-01

SECRET/NODIS

Thursday, August 29, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
FROM WALT ROSTOW

Free file

33

*sent Rostow
via wire
CAP 82266*

Herewith a capsule version of Ambassador Bunker's 64th weekly report:

A. General

- Week-long enemy attacks approached May levels but were less effective because of improved Allied performance.
- Pattern of enemy attacks differs from May: now targets are staggered; enemy is trying to hold down casualties; enemy has not penetrated urban areas significantly.
- But his objectives are the same: maximum political and psychological impact in the US and at Paris.
- While he probably hopes to achieve objective through successive periods of intense combat and strikes at population centers, it is doubtful he can get offensive off the ground sufficiently.
- While the enemy may be ready to move toward some form of political contest or settlement after US elections, during the interim he will emphasize military means in hope of extracting greater concessions from us.
- GVN is alert to frustrating enemy's efforts to developing urban cadres.
- GVN is working at political problems expected to follow the end of hostilities.
- Thieu believes GVN leaders, especially himself, must take the lead in talking with the people about negotiations and preparing them for the future political struggle.
- Thieu continues with plans to form an umbrella political body, the Lien Minh, over which he understands he must personally lead if it is to succeed.

B. Political

- Thieu progresses in establishing himself as constitutional president rather than merely the leader of a military clique.
- Thieu seeks to strengthen his political power base by efforts to create Lower House, women's and Lien Minh Front organizations.
- Thieu-Huong alliance has progressed well and has produced most stable government since Diem.
- If Thieu can succeed in forming a genuine national political organization while hanging on to the gains achieved through the constitution and his alliance with Huong, the regime here can confront Hanoi with a degree of strength that will be hard to challenge.
- Thieu and Huong are getting good results from increasing number of public appearances.
- New labor federation is envisioned to counter Communist efforts.

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Authority MLG/CBS 10

By cg/ies, NARA, Date 12-15-92

C. Military

-- ARVN performed well in defense at Dak Seang and at Pleiku; Abrams terms the ARVN and CIDG performance at Duc Lap "magnificent."

D. Pacification

-- Thieu and Huong personally stressed the priority of pacification in III and IV Corps seminars; others planned next week in I and II Corps.

-- Seminars were impressive and highly useful; sparked face-to-face discussion between province chiefs and GVN ministers.

-- Thieu indicates his full support for "one man, one vote" and views pacification as crucial.

-- July results against VC infrastructure up 10 percent over June; 1291 identifiable enemy cadre neutralized.

E. Economic

-- Saigon Retail Price Index up five percent this week.

-- GVN has not yet acted on planned rice purchase program.

-- Mission asks GVN for firm August commitment on prepayment of DLF loans.

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9790

INFO RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1982

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 6 SAIGON 36596

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER

PARIS FOR VIETNAM MISSION

NODIS

HEREWITH MY SIXTY-FOURTH WEEKLY MESSAGE.

A. GENERAL

1. THE INTENSITY OF THE FIGHTING INITIATED BY THE ENEMY'S ATTACKS WHICH BEGAN ON THE NIGHT OF AUGUST 18, WHICH SAW COORDINATED ENEMY EFFORTS IN EACH OF THE FOUR CORPS AREAS, CONTINUED FOR A PERIOD OF SEVEN DAYS. WHILE THE PATTERN IS DIFFERENT IN IMPORTANT RESPECTS, THE LEVEL OF THE FIGHTING APPROACHED THAT WHICH PREVAILED DURING THE MAY ATTACKS. THE ATTACKS, HOWEVER, WERE FAR LESS EFFECTIVE THAN IN MAY. THIS I ASCRIBE PRIMARILY TO THE STEADY IMPROVEMENT WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE IN THE ALLIED FORCES: IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE, BETTER ALL AROUND PERFORMANCE, ESPECIALLY BY THE ARVN, (RF/ PF) AND PARAMILITARY FORCES, BETTER COORDINATION OF ALL UNITS, THE VERY EFFECTIVE INTERDICTION AND SPOILING EFFORTS OF OUR FORCES AND SKILLFUL AND EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF AIR POWER, ESPECIALLY THE B-52S. CONFIDENCE IN THEIR ABILITY TO COPE WITH THE ENEMY PREVAILS THROUGHOUT THE VIETNAMESE AND ALLIED FORCES TO A GREATER DEGREE THAN EVER BEFORE.

2. A COMPARISON WITH THE MAY ATTACKS IS A USEFUL MEANS OF MEASURING AND EVALUATING THE ENEMY EFFORT. DURING THE FIRST WEEK, IT ROUGHLY APPROXIMATED THE MAY ATTACKS IN INTENSITY. IN THE FIRST SEVEN DAYS OF THE MAY OFFENSIVE, THE ENEMY LAUNCHED 103 GROUND ATTACKS AND 145 ATTACKS BY FIRE. FROM AUGUST 18-24, THERE WERE 31 GROUND ATTACKS AND 103 ATTACKS BY FIRE. ENEMY KIA MAY 5-11 WERE 8,450; AUGUST 18-24 THE ENEMY LOST 5,390 MEN.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-31
By 10, NARA, Date 2-21-03

REGIONAL FORCES/POPULAR
FORCE

3. THE PRESENT ATTACKS DIFFER FROM THE MAY ROUND IN THAT THEY WERE STAGGERED, BEGAN SLOWLY, AND BUILT UP OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL DAYS. IN MAY, ALL THE MAIN TARGETS WERE HIT AT THE OUTSET, THE ATTACKS WERE CONCENTRATED IN THE FIRST FEW DAYS AND THEN QUICKLY FELL OFF. ANOTHER INTERESTING DIFFERENCE IN CURRENT ENEMY TACTICS IS THE FACT THAT HE IS NOW TRYING TO HOLD DOWN HIS CASUALTIES WHEREAS IN THE EARLIER ATTACKS THERE SEEMED TO BE LITTLE OR NO CONCERN FOR THE TREMENDOUS LOSSES INCURRED.

4. THE ENEMY HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO PENETRATE URBAN AREAS IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY. I ASCRIBE THIS PRIMARILY TO THE INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VIETNAMESE AND ALLIED FORCES. THERE WAS SOME FIGHTING ON THE FRINGES OF TAY NINH AND SAPPER UNITS GOT INTO DANANG, BUT OTHER THAN THIS, ENEMY THRUSTS HAVE BEEN STOPPED SEVEN OR EIGHT KILOMETERS OUTSIDE OF POPULATION CENTERS. THIS, TOGETHER WITH GREAT CARE IN OUR USE OF AIR AND ARTILLERY, HAS RESULTED IN FAR FEWER CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND PROPERTY DESTRUCTION THAN IN MAY OR DURING TET. THE DESTRUCTION OF HOMES WHICH OCCURRED ON THE SOUTHERN EDGE OF TAY NINH WAS THE RESULT OF ENEMY ACTION, NOT OUR AIR OR ARTILLERY STRIKES. HANOI'S OBJECTIVES, I THINK, ARE THE SAME AS THOSE AT TET OR IN THE MAY/JUNE ATTACKS, TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT IN THE U.S. AND AT PARIS. HE PROBABLY HOPES TO ACHIEVE THIS BY SUCCESSIVE PERIODS OF HIGH INTENSITY COMBAT, INCLUDING UNDOUBTEDLY AT SOME TIME A MAJOR EFFORT TO STRIKE AT THE PRIME TARGETS, CHIEF OF WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY SAIGON. THE EVIDENT EFFORT TO HOLD DOWN CASUALTIES AND STAGGER ATTACKS SUPPORT SUCH AN INTERPRETATION. SUPPORTING SUCH A THESIS ALSO IS A LIBERATION RADIO BROADCAST OF AUGUST 21 WHICH SAID THAT THE TAY NINH ATTACKS "ONCE AGAIN REPUDIATE THE BOASTFUL CONTENTIONS OF THE U.S. AGGRESSORS AND THEIR LACKEYS THAT THERE IS A LULL IN THE FIGHTING AND THAT THE LIBERATION FORCES ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO STAGE LARGE SCALE ATTACKS."

5. WHETHER THE ENEMY CAN CARRY OUT SUCH A STRATEGY IS, I THINK, QUITE ANOTHER QUESTION. WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DEAL SUCCESSFULLY WITH THE RECENT ATTACKS, FRUSTRATING ENEMY EFFORTS TO PENETRATE AND DESTROY URBAN AREAS AND INFLECTING HEAVY LOSSES ON HIM. GENERAL ABRAMS BELIEVES THAT THE ENEMY HAS ALREADY BEEN FORCED TO REVISE HIS PLANS, AND I HAVE EARLIER EXPRESSED DOUBTS AS TO THE ENEMY'S ABILITY TO GET HIS OFFENSIVE OFF THE GROUND TO THE EXTENT HE OBVIOUSLY HOPES TO ACHIEVE, AND I STILL ENTERTAIN THESE DOUBTS.

6. THIEU, WHO EARLIER THOUGHT THE ENEMY COULD SUSTAIN AN OFFENSIVE FOR FOUR OR FIVE WEEKS, TOLD ME AUGUST 24 HE NOW THINKS THE BEST THEY CAN DO IS TO STRIKE IN WAVES OF NOT MORE THAN A WEEK AND THAT SOME CONSIDERABLE PERIOD WILL ELAPSE BETWEEN EACH ATTACK. HE BELIEVES THE ATTACKS WILL BE TIMED TO HAVE MAXIMUM POLITICAL EFFECT IN THE UNITED STATES. AS HE SEES IT, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE TWO BASIC MILITARY PROBLEMS: THEY CANNOT ATTACK WITH WHOLE UNITS AT THE TIME AND PLACE THAT THEY WISH BECAUSE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR SPOILING ACTIONS; AND THEY CANNOT SUSTAIN AN ATTACK OR MAINTAIN POWER OVER A CAPTURED AREA.

BUNKER

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7. THE CURRENT ROUND OF ATTACKS, HANOI'S ALACRITY IN APPLAUDING THE SOVIET MOVE AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ITS RIGIDITY IN PARIS, AND ITS OWN ANNOUNCEMENTS ALL SUGGEST THAT THE DRV LEADERSHIP IS STILL PLACING EMPHASIS ON MILITARY MEANS. IT SEEMS TO ME PROBABLE THAT WHILE THEY MAY BE READY TO MOVE TOWARD SOME FORM OF POLITICAL CONTEST OR SETTLEMENT AFTER OUR ELECTIONS ARE OVER, THEY ARE LIKELY TO PLAY CHIEFLY THEIR MILITARY CARDS IN THE INTERVENING MONTHS IN THE HOPE OF EXTRACTING GREATER CONCESSIONS FROM US.

8. IN THIS CONNECTION, I PARTICULARLY NOTE ON AUGUST 23 HANOI'S BROADCAST WHICH EXTOLLED USE OF VIOLENCE TO ACHIEVE THE REGIME'S ENDS. THE BROADCAST SAID IN PART, "COMRADE TRUONG CHINH STRESSED THAT OUR PARTY HAS ASSERTED THAT THE PATH OF VILENT ~~VIOLENT~~ REVOLUTION IS THE ONLY CORRECT PATH TO TOPPLE THE ENEMY OF THE CLASS AND THE PEOPLE, TO RESTORE POWER TO THE PEOPLE, TO PROTECT THE REVOLUTIONARY POWER, AND TO LEAD THE VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION TO VICTORY. COMRADE TRUONG CHINH POINTED OUT THAT THE BASIC FORM OF REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE IN OUR COUNTRY IS ARMED FORCE COMBINED WITH POLITICAL FORCE AND ARMED STRUGGLE COMBINED WITH POLITICAL STRUGGLE. HE SAID: IN THE PRESENT SOUTHERN REVOLUTION, THIS COMBINATION HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO FULL PLAY SKILLFULLY AND HAS ACHIEVED GREATER AND GREATER SUCCESS."

9. PERHAPS ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FAILURES OF THE ENEMY'S TET OFFENSIVE WAS THE ABSENCE OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE ENEMY FORCES WHICH PENETRATED THE CITIES, SUPPORT WHICH HE HAD EVIDENTLY ANTICIPATED AND COUNTED ON. I EXPECT THAT HE WILL NOW MAKE STRONG EFFORTS TO GENERATE AT LEAST SOME APPEARANCE OF POPULAR SUPPORT WHEN AND IF HE MAKES ANOTHER BID TO ENTER THE CITIES, PARTICULARLY SAIGON. INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THE ENEMY IS TRYING TO INFILTRATE ELEMENTS INTO SAIGON, SOME OF WHICH COULD PLAY THE ROLE OF THE "PEOPLE," RISING TO WELCOME AND SUPPORT COMMUNIST FORCES. STEPPED UP ENEMY EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH LIBERATION COMMITTEES IN THE COUNTRYSIDE ALSO SUGGEST THAT A "SPONTANEOUS" OVERTHROW OF GVN ADMINISTRATION BY "PEOPLES" COMMITTEES COULD BE PART OF HANOI'S HOPED-FOR SCENARIO DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

10. THE GVN AUTHORITIES ARE AWARE OF THESE POSSIBILITIES AND ARE WORKING TO FRUSTRATE THEM. IN SAIGON, THERE IS A CONTINUING AND INTENSE POLICE EFFORT TO PICK UP INFILTRATORS AND ROLL UP COMMUNIST AGENTS. AS I REPORTED IN MY MESSAGE OF AUGUST 7, PRESIDENT THIEU RECENTLY ORDERED AN INCREASED EFFORT TO ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE GVN PRESENCE AND ADMINISTRATION AT THE VILLAGE AND HAMLET LEVELS.

11. WHILE GVN LEADERS ARE HEAVILY OCCUPIED WITH THE IMMEDIATE MILITARY THREAT AND AT THE SAME TIME OPERATING AND TRYING TO STRENGTHEN THEIR NEW CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM, THEY ARE ALSO DEVOTING MUCH EFFORT TO THE PROBLEMS OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND THE POLITICAL COMPETITION WHICH THEY EXPECT TO FOLLOW THE END OF THE FIGHTING. I REPORTED LAST WEEK ON FOREIGN MINISTER THANH'S USEFUL SPEECH AND ON THE COMMITTEE OF TWENTY WHICH THIEU HAS SET UP TO STUDY THE PROBLEM OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THIEU MADE A NUMBER OF CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS IN AN EXCELLENT TELEVISION SPEECH AUGUST 23. HE PROPOSED THAT PEACE BE ESTABLISHED BY A RETURN TO THE SITUATION ESTABLISHED BY THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS OF 1954 AND 1962, WHICH ARE THE BASIS FOR THE POSITION OF THE GVN ON PEACE AS SET FORTH IN THE HONOLULU COMMUNIQUE. HE STATED THAT ONCE PEACE IS RESTORED, THE GVN IS PREPARED TO EXPLORE WITH HANOI THE POSSIBILITY OF REUNIFICATION BY PEACEFUL MEANS, AND IN THE MEANTIME TO EXPLORE NORMALIZATION OF ECONOMIC, FAMILY, AND CULTURAL RELATIONS. HE ALSO REAFFIRMED THAT THOSE NOW ON THE OTHER SIDE WILL HAVE FULL RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP AS SOON AS THEY LAY DOWN THEIR WEAPONS AND ACCEPT THE LAW OF THE LAND.

12. I COMPLIMENTED THIEU ON HIS SPEECH AND NOTED THAT IT MADE A GOOD INTRODUCTION TO THE GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE GVN POSITION ON PEACE ON WHICH HE IS CURRENTLY WORKING. THIEU SAID THIS "PLATFORM" IS COMING ALONG AND HE HOPED THAT IT WOULD SOON BE READY. HE SAID THAT THE GVN LEADERSHIP, AND ESPECIALLY HE AS PRESIDENT, MUST TAKE THE LEAD IN TALKING WITH THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS AND A SETTLEMENT IN ORDER TO PREPARE THEM FOR THE FUTURE POLITICAL STRUGGLE. HE SAID THAT SOME PEOPLE, "A FEW FANATIC CATHOLICS AND DAI VIETS," ACCUSE HIM OF BEING SOFT, BUT HE HAS REPLIED THAT "IF WE GET ORGANIZED AND HAVE THE COURAGE TO FACE THE PROBLEM, THE COMMUNISTS WON'T BE ABLE TO TAKE OVER." HE ADDED THAT THE NATIONALISTS ARE AFTER ALL SOME 15 MILLION AND THERE IS NO REASON WHY THEY SHOULD FEAR THE FEW HUNDRED THOUSAND OR SO COMMUNISTS. HE ADDED AS THEIR LEADER, HE MUST TELL THE PEOPLE TO BE READY TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM, MAYBE EVEN WITHIN ONE YEAR.

13. AS PART OF HIS DRIVE TO PREPARE FOR THE FUTURE POLITICAL CONTEST WITH THE COMMUNISTS, THIEU IS PUSHING AHEAD WITH PLANS TO FORM AN UMBRELLA POLITICAL BODY, THE LIEN MINH, WHICH WILL ATTRACT NATIONALISTS GENERALLY AND HELP THEM TO UNITE AGAINST THE ENEMY. I WILL MENTION LIEN MINH DEVELOPMENTS IN MORE DETAIL IN THE POLITICAL SECTION, BUT I THINK IT IMPORTANT TO NOTE HERE THAT THIEU HAS SAID THAT HE UNDERSTANDS HE MUST HIMSELF TAKE THE LEAD WITH THE LIEN MINH AND EXERCISE PERSONAL SUPERVISION OVER ITS ACTIVITIES IF IT IS TO SUCCEED.

~~BUNKER~~

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B. POLITICAL

14. POLITICAL STABILITY. I HAVE REPORTED IN MY EARLIER MESSAGES THAT MOVES WHICH PRESIDENT THIEU HAS MADE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME TO ESTABLISH HIMSELF AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT RATHER THAN THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A RULING MILITARY CLIQUE. THE PROCESS OF CONSOLIDATING HIS CONSTITUTIONAL POWER INVOLVED THE SPEEDING UP OF BOTH DEMOCRATIZATION AND CIVILIANIZATION IN THE GOVERNMENT. MILITARY ELEMENTS HAVE LOST A SIGNIFICANT PART OF THEIR FORMER POWER. WHILE NOT COMPLETE, THE PROCESS HAS GONE QUITE A LONG WAY, AND THIEU IS FAR MORE THE PRESIDENT OF VIET NAM TODAY THAN HE WAS EVEN A FEW MONTHS AGO. HIS GROWING CONTROL OF THE MILITARY AND THE GOVERNMENT, AND PERHAPS EQUALLY IMPORTANT, HIS ALLIANCE WITH TRAN VAN HUONG, HAVE MOVED HIM WELL ALONG THE ROAD TO ACHIEVING THE FULL DIMENSIONS OF THE POWER THE CONSTITUTION VESTS IN HIM.

15. ONE OF THE IMPORTANT THINGS WHICH HE STILL NEEDS TO DO TO COMPLETE THIS PROCESS IS TO ORGANIZE POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR HIMSELF AS THE PRESIDENT. HE NEEDS A BODY OF LEGISLATORS IN THE ASSEMBLY WHO ARE RESPONSIVE TO HIS DIRECTION. EVEN MORE, HE NEEDS A POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AT THE GRASS ROOTS TO GIVE HIS LEADERSHIP EFFECT OUTSIDE AS WELL AS INSIDE THE ADMINISTRATION. THE TET ATTACKS AND THE EVENTS THAT FOLLOWED MADE IT EASIER FOR THIEU TO PUSH AHEAD RAPIDLY IN ESTABLISHING HIS CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION. SIMILARLY THE PRESENT SITUATION, IN WHICH THE NATION FACES THE LIKELIHOOD OF CRUCIAL NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWED BY POLITICAL COMPETITION WITH THE COMMUNISTS, CAN HELP HIM TO UNITE NATIONALIST ELEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE PRESIDENCY, AND HIMSELF.

16. THIEU UNDERSTANDS THIS, AND HE IS APPARENTLY BENT ON SEIZING THIS OPPORTUNITY AS HE GRASPED THE OPPORTUNITY PROVIDED BY EARLIER EVENTS. HE IS WORKING TO FORM A LOWER HOUSE BLOC, A WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION WITHIN THE LIEN MINH, AND THE LIEN MINH ITSELF AS THE FUTURE UNDERPINNINGS OF HIS POLITICAL POSITION. HE NOW ESTIMATES THAT HE HAS LINED UP ABOUT 25 ASSEMBLYMEN WHO WILL TAKE DIRECTION FROM HIM. HIS LEGISLATIVE LIAISON MAN CLAIMS AS MANY AS 30. WE ALSO HAVE REPORTS THAT PRIME MINISTER HUONG HAS BEEN WOOING SOME DEPUTIES WITH THE INTENTION OF STRENGTHENING THE GOVERNMENT POSITION IN THE ASSEMBLY.

17. WE DO NOT HAVE MUCH INFORMATION YET ON THIEU'S PLANS FOR A WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION, BUT HE TELLS ME THAT HE HAS A PROSPECTIVE LEADER IN MIND FOR IT IN THE PERSON OF A CAPABLE AND EXPERIENCED WOMAN. TRAINING OF THE 40 TOP CADRE OF THE LIEN MINH HAS BEEN COMPLETED, AND FIRST CLASS OF 800 LINE CADRE BEGAN THEIR TRAINING AUGUST 26.

18. THIEU IS NOT UNREALISTIC ABOUT THE LIEN MINH. HE UNDERSTANDS THAT THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP IS DIVIDED AND SOMEWHAT DISORGANIZED. CONSEQUENTLY HE HAS MADE UP HIS MIND TO LEND HIS OWN PRESTIGE AS PRESIDENT TO THE ORGANIZATION, AND HE WILL EXERCISE A DEGREE OF PERSONAL SUPERVISION TO MAKE SURE THAT THE EFFORT MOVES FORWARD.

19. WHILE THIEU EMPHASIZES THE POINT THAT THE LIEN MINH'S GOAL IS BASICALLY POLITICAL, ITS PROGRAM WILL BE COUCHED IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROJECTS. HE SEES ITS PROGRAM AS SUPPLEMENTING GVN EFFORTS, NOT COMPETING WITH THEM. HE HOPES THAT IT WILL SERVE TO UNITE NATIONAL POLITICAL LEADERS WHILE UTILIZING THEIR CADRE TO IMPLEMENT LIEN MINH PROJECTS. WHILE JUST BEGINNING TO TAKE SHAPE THE LIEN MINH, I BELIEVE, IS MUCH THE MOST HOPEFUL EFFORT YET UNDERTAKEN TO BRING TOGETHER THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONALIST ELEMENTS OF THE COUNTRY.

20. THIEU'S ALLIANCE WITH HUONG HAS SO FAR PROVED TO BE ONE OF HIS BEST MOVES. JUONG HAS A DEGREE OF PERSONAL ATTRACTION ENJOYED BY NO OTHER LEADER NOW IN THE GOVERNMENT, AND HE HAS BROUGHT INCREASED POPULAR SUPPORT TO THE GVN AS A RESULT. FROM THE BEGINNING, CRITICS HAVE PREDICTED FRICTIONS AND A SPLIT BETWEEN JUONG AND THIEU. HOWEVER, THEY HAVE IN ACT WORKED WELL TOGETHER. IN THE MATTER OF THE LIEN MINH, FOR EXAMPLE, HUONG EVIDENTLY PREFERS TO STAND ASIDE. HE HAS SAID PRIVATELY THAT THE SOLUTION TO VIET NAM'S TROUBLES IS BETTER ADMINISTRATION, NOT POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. NEVERTHELESS, HUONG HAS DONE NOTHING TO HINDER THE WORK OF THE LIEN MINH. THIEU, FOR HIS PART, HAS NOT TRIED TO PUSH HUONG INTO SUPPORTING THE ORGANIZATION; HE HAS SAID THAT ADMINISTRATION IS JUONG'S FORTE, AND THAT IS WHAT HE WANTS HUONG TO CONCENTRATE ON.

21. CORRUPTION IN THE MILITARY, PARTICULARLY AT HIGH LEVELS, COULD BE AN AREA OF CONFLICT BETWEEN THIEU AND JUONG IF JUONG WANTED TO PUSH HARDER AND FASTER THAN THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES POLITICALLY FEASIBLE. HOWEVER, JUONG IS PROVING HIMSELF JUST AS PRUDENT A POLITICIAN AS THIEU. IT THEREFORE SEEMS LIKELY TO ME THAT HUONG REALIZES THE HAZARDS OF MOVING TOO FAST AGAINST TOP OFFENDERS JUST AS KEENLY AS DOES THIEU, AND I BELIEVE THAT IN ALL PROBABILITY THE TWO ARE IN BROAD AGREEMENT ON HOW TO PROCEED. ~~BUNKER~~

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22. MOST OBSERVERS AGREE THAT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IS MORE STABLE THAN ANY SINCE DIEM. THE BASIS FOR THIS POLITICAL STABILITY IS, FIRST OF ALL, THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAME PLUS OUR OWN PRESENCE. IN THE SECOND PLACE, IT IS DUE TO THIEU'S CAREFUL AND SKILLFUL LEADERSHIP AND HIS ALLIANCE WITH TRAN VAN HUONG. IF THIEU CAN NOW SUCCEED IN FORMING A GENUINE NATIONAL POLITICAL ORGANIZATION WHILE HANGING ON TO THE GAINS ACHIEVED THROUGH THE CONSTITUTION AND HIS ALLIANCE WITH HUONG, THE REGIME HERE WILL BE ABLE TO CONFRONT HANOI WITH A DEGREE OF POLITICAL STRENGTH THAT WILL BE HARD TO CHALLENGE. INDEED THE INCREASING FLEXIBILITY IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE GOVERNMENT TOWARD THE PROBLEM OF NEGOTIATIONS AND PEACE, ONE OF THE MOST ENCOURAGING AND SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS OF RECENT MONTHS, IS, I BELIEVE, A DIRECT RESULT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S GROWING STRENGTH AND SELF-CONFIDENCE. THERE IS A GREAT DEAL STILL TO BE DONE AND TIME IS SHORT, BUT PROGRESS TO DATE IS ENCOURAGING.

23. MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS. WHILE I HAVE NOT REPORTED THEM IN DETAIL, I HAVE FROM TIME TO TIME MENTIONED THE TRAVELS AND PUBLIC APPEARANCES OF BOTH PRESIDENT THIEU AND PRIME MINISTER HUONG. BOTH HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY VISIBLE IN PAST WEEKS, AND I THINK THEIR EXPOSURE TO THE PUBLIC IS A DEFINITE PLUS. HUONG SEEMS TO BE EFFECTIVE IN PROJECTING A POSITIVE IMAGE TO THE PEOPLE AND WINNING THEIR SUPPORT, AND THIEU ALSO HAS HANDLED HIMSELF EXTREMELY WELL.

24. LAST WEEK, FOR EXAMPLE, HUONG MADE WELL PUBLICIZED VISITS TO CHO RAY HOSPITAL, SAIGON POLICE HEADQUARTERS, AND GO CONG PROVINCE. THE LOCAL PRESS NOTED IN PARTICULAR HIS EASY AND INSPIRING MANNER WITH THE LOCAL PEOPLE AT GO CONG, SOMETHING WHICH I HAD ALSO NOTICED IN HUE. WHILE THERE, HE GAVE THE CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM A PUSH, ISSUED LAND TITLES TO A NUMBER OF PEASANTS UNDER THE LAND REFORM PROGRAM, AND LISTENED TO THE COMPLAINTS AND PETITIONS OF THE PEOPLE. ON AUGUST 23, THIEU SPENT THE DAY AT CAN THO IN IV CORPS, CONDUCTING A DAY LONG SEMINAR ON PACIFICATION. ON AUGUST 27 HE WENT TO DUC LAP IN II CORPS TO COMMEND THE DEFENDERS OF THE POST IN THEIR HARDFIGHT AND SUCCESSFUL ACTION, WHICH WAS STILL GOING ON. LAST TUESDAY HE SPENT THE DAY IN III CORPS, CONDUCTING HIS SECOND SEMINAR ON PACIFICATION.

25. WE HAVE HAD SOME RECENT REPORTS THAT INDICATE THE COMMUNISTS ARE WOOLING SOME OF THE SMALL AND RELATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT LABOR GROUPS. THE GVN IS CONCERNED ABOUT THIS ACTIVITY, AND SO APPARENTLY IS CVT LABOR LEADER TRAN QUOC BUU. AS ONE MEANS OF RESPONDING TO THE THREAT, LABOR MINISTER HIEN AND BUU ARE THINKING OF A NEW LABOR FEDERATION WHICH WOULD EMBRACE BOTH THE POWERFUL CVT AND THE SEVERAL SMALL LABOR ORGANIZATIONS WHICH FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER HAVE REMAINED OUTSIDE THE CVT. THE PURPOSE WOULD BE TO REDUCE THE ATTRACTION OF COMMUNIST AND OTHER EXTREMISTS WHO ARE KNOWN TO BE IN CONTACT WITH NON-CVT LEADERS - ANOTHER GVN RESPONSE TO COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO PREPARE FOR A "PEOPLES" UPRISING IN CONNECTION WITH CURRENT OR LATER ATTACKS.

VIETNAMESE
CONFEDERATION
OF LABOR (CVT)

26. THE AN QUANG BUDDHISTS ENDED THEIR CONGRESS THIS WEEK AND ISSUED A RESOLUTION WHICH BY AN QUANG STANDARDS IS QUITE MODERATE IN TONE. IN CONTRAST TO THEIR EARLIER VERY UNHELPFUL PEACE DECLARATION THEY MERELY CALLED FOR AN END TO THE KILLING AND STATED THEIR DETERMINATION "TO CONTINUE TO USE ALL EXISTING CAPABILITIES TO DEMAND THAT THE WARRING PARTIES REALIZE A REASONABLE, FITTING SOLUTION TO END THE WAR."

27. I SUSPECT THAT THE AN QUANG FACTION AND FILE IS TIRED OF THEIR FORMER RADICAL AND WHOLLY UNPROFITABLE OPPOSITION TO ALMOST EVERYTHING. WHATEVER THE REASON, AN QUANG APPEARS TO HAVE AT LEAST TEMPORARILY MOVED AWAY FROM TRI QUANG'S HARSH OPPOSITION POLICY.

28. MOST OF THE OLD AN QUANG LEADERSHIP WAS RE-ELECTED AT THE CONGRESS; THICH THIEN MINH, HOWEVER, WAS ELEVATED TO THE POSITION OF FIRST VICE RECTOR OF THE BUDDHIST INSTITUTE - A CHANGE WHICH PROBABLY REFLECTS HIS ASCENDANCY AND TRI QUANG'S DECLINE WITHIN THE POWER STRUCTURE OF THE AN QUANG FACTION. THE CONGRESS ALSO APPEARED TO RESULT IN A HARDENING OF AN QUANG'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE TAM CHAU FACTION, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR BUDDHIST UNITY THUS APPEAR DIMMER THAN EVER.

29. PRICE SIHANOUK HAS INVITED THE ICC AND FOREIGN PRESS CORPS IN CAMBODIA TO VISIT AN ALLEGED VC BASE CAMP ON THE CAMBODIAN/VIETNAMESE BORDER. THE BASE, 3 BY 5 KMS IN AREA, IS 60 KMS WEST OF SAIGON AND CENTERS ON BA THU VILLAGE (XT 2704). (BA THU VILLAGE IS INHABITED PRIMARILY BY ETHNIC VIETNAMESE.)

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30. THE BA THU REGION IS KNOWN TO BE A MAJOR TRAINING, STAGING, AND ARMS TRANSHIPMENT POINT FOR ATTACKS ON SAIGON AND THE UPPER DELTA. THE BASE COMPLEX CONSISTS OF HOSPITALS, PRINT SHOPS, MUNITIONS SHOPS, AND REST AREAS. BESIDES USING THE HOUSES OF SYMPATHETIC VILLAGERS, THE ENEMY HAS APPARENTLY, DURING THE PERIOD FEBRUARY - MAY 1968 (DRY SEASON ENDED IN MAY), CONSTRUCTED 578 NEW BUILDINGS.

31. WE HAVE PASSED APPROPRIATE MAPS AND DOSSIERS ON BA THU TO THE CAMBODIANS, THE ICC CHAIRMAN AND THE CANADIANS ON THE COMMISSION. AN ICC INSPECTION GROUP WAS EXPECTED TO VIST THE AREA FOR THREE DAYS COMMENCING ON AUGUST 26, ALTHOUGH THERE MAY WELL BE SLIPPAGE IN THESE DATES, AS THERE HAS OFTEN BEEN IN THE PAST.

C. MILITARY

32. I HAVE TO A LARGE EXTENT COVERED THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE OPENING PARAGRAPHS OF THIS REPORT. AGAIN, HOWEVER, I WOULD LIKE TO CALL ATTENTION TO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF ARVN PERFORMANCE WHICH I THINK YOU WILL FIND OF INTEREST.

CIVILIAN IRREGULAR DEFENSE GROUP

33. FIRST, THE DEFENSE OF DAK SEANG BY THE (CIDG) FORCES WAS A VERY CREDITABLE PERFORMANCE. THEY KILLED 39 OF THE ENEMY, DETAINED 12, AND CAPTURED 50 INDIVIDUAL AND 13 CREW SERVED WEAPONS. WE PROVIDED SOME AIR AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT, BUT THE CIDG TOOK THE BRUNT OF THE GROUND ASSAULT WITH NO ASSISTANCE FROM U.S. INFANTRY UNITS. FRIENDLY LOSSES WERE 4 CIDG KILLED AND 2 WOUNDED, PLUS 1 US ADVISOR WOUNDED.

34. ON AUGUST 18 A CONVOY ESCORTED BY THE 3RD TROOP, ARVN 3RD CAVALRY, WAS AMBUSHED BY AN ESTIMATED COMPANY NORTH OF PLEIKU. THE 1ST TROOP IMMEDIATELY REINFORCED, AND AIR AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT WAS PROVIDED. THE AMBUSH WAS BROKEN UP, 39 ENEMY KILLED AND 13 WEAPONS CAPTURED WITH ONLY 9 FRIENDLY WIA. THE COMMANDER OF THE 24TH TACTICAL ZONE, COL. LINH, FOLLOWED UP ON THIS WITH A SCOUT COMPANY OF THE 3RD CAVALRY AND ENGAGED THREE ENEMY BATTALIONS. HE REINFORCED WITH TWO BATTALIONS OF THE 42ND REGIMENT AND ANOTHER SCOUT COMPANY. GENERAL LU LAN, THE CORPS COMMANDER, MOVED A BATTALION FROM THE COASTAL PLAINS (WHERE ACTIVITY REMAINS EXCEPTIONALLY LIGHT) TO KONTUM CITY TO REPLACE ONE OF THE BATTALIONS THAT HAD GONE INTO THE BATTLE FROM THERE. WE SUPPORTED AT A KEY MOMENT WITH ARC LIGHT STRIKES. BUT THE ENTIRE OPERATION FROM BEGINNING TO END WAS CARRIED OUT BY ARVN TROOPS. RESULTS WERE 163 ENEMY KILLED, 25 WEAPONS CAPTURED; FRIENDLY LOSSES 25 KILLED, 92 WOUNDED, 2 WEAPONS LOST.

REGIONAL FORCES — POPULAR FORCES

35. BOTH THE FIRST AND SECOND ARVN DIVISIONS, THE RANGER BATTALIONS AND SOME (RF) AND (PF) TROOPS HAVE HAD HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS DURING THE WEEK IN I CORPS. THE NEW 4TH REGIMENT OF THE FIRST ARVN DIVISION CONTINUES TO LIVE UP TO THE HIGH REPUTATION OF THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE DIVISION.

35. A MAJOR ENEMY ATTACK WAS MADE AGAINST THE DUC LAP SPECIAL FORCES CAMP AND SUB-SECTOR COMPOUND (QUANG DUC PROVINCE). THE ATTACK CONTINUED OVER A FOUR DAY PERIOD (AUGUST 23-26) AND AT ONE POINT THE ENEMY PENETRATED TO THE INNERMOST PERIMETER. HE SUFFERED 445 KIA AND LOST 50 INDIVIDUAL AND 13 CREW SERVED WEAPONS. HE FAILED TOTALLY IN HIS EFFORT TO DIVERT FRIENDLY FORCES FROM BAN ME THUOT, A MAJOR ENEMY OBJECTIVE. GENERAL ABRAMS DESCRIBED THE ARVN AND CIDG PERFORMANCE DURING THIS ACTION AS "MAGNIFICENT". ARVN AND CIDG SUFFERED 61 KILLED AND 162 WOUNDED; U.S. LOSSES WERE 7 KILLED AND 19 WOUNDED. WE PROVIDED ARTILLERY AND AIR SUPPORT.

D. PACIFICATION

36. THIEU'S SUCCESSFUL PACIFICATION SEMINARS IN IV CORPS ON FRIDAY AND III CORPS ON TUESDAY DEMONSTRATED FORCEFULLY TO FIELD OPERATORS THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE WHICH GVN ATTACHES TO PACIFICATION. HUONG LED OFF THE SEMINARS BY ANNOUNCING THAT PACIFICATION WAS A NATIONAL PROGRAM HAVING TOP SECURITY. HE INDICATED THAT THE CENTRAL (RD) COUNCIL, WHICH THE PRESIDENT HEADS AND FOR WHICH HE IS SECRETARY GENERAL, WOULD BECOME MORE ACTIVE. IT WOULD SEEK TO COORDINATE PACIFICATION EFFORTS OF ALL MINISTRIES WHICH SHOULD BE INVOLVED, NOT JUST ACTIVITIES OF THE RD MINISTRY. THE PRESENCE OF THE MINISTERS OF INTERIOR, ECONOMY, AGRICULTURE, HEALTH, SOCIAL WELFARE AND REFUGEES, TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLIC WORKS, AND CHIEU HOI, ALONG WITH THE COMMANDER OF RF/PF, AT THE SEMINARS REINFORCED HIS POINT.

REVOLUTIONARY
DEVELOPMENT

37. EACH PROVINCE CHIEF WAS GIVEN A CHANCE TO STATE HIS PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SAIGON DELEGATION. HEARD MOST OFTEN WERE REQUESTS FOR: (1) VERY SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES IN RF/PF TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE TERRITORIAL SECURITY, (2) RELIEF FROM INROADS BEING MADE INTO PROVINCE AND DISTRICT ADMINISTRATIONS BY MOBILIZATION, AND ACCOMPANYING ATTRACTION OF CIVIL SERVANTS TO HIGHER PAYING JOBS OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT, (3) STRENGTHENED GOVERNMENT AT VILLAGE/HAMLET, AND (4) MORE ARMS FOR SELF-DEFENSE. THE PRESIDENT CALLED UPON THE MINISTERS IN TURN TO ANSWER PUBLICLY THE SUGGESTIONS AND SOLVE THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE FIELD. THIS PUT THE MINISTERS TO TEST AND SERVED NOTICE THAT THIEU EXPECTS THEM TO FOLLOW UP AND MAKE GOOD THEIR PROMISES. THEY HAVE LOTS OF WORK TO DO.

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38. THIEU'S FINAL "INSTRUCTIONS" WERE THE HIGH POINT OF EACH SEMINAR. HE SPOKE FOR OVER AN HOUR FROM BRIEF NOTES URGING GREATER ATTENTION AND EFFORT ON PACIFICATION AS THE ANSWER TO THE ENEMY'S APPARENT SHIFT TO A MORE POLITICAL PHASE. HE STRESSED:

(1) PACIFICATION IS MUCH MORE THAN RD AND INCLUDES EXPANDING TERRITORIAL SECURITY, STEPPING UP THE ATTACK AGAINST THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE, IMPROVING LOCAL GOVERNMENT, REVIVING THE RURAL ECONOMY; (2) ROUND-THE-CLOCK TERRITORIAL SECURITY IN THE VILLAGES AND HAMLETS IS THE FIRST PREREQUISITE OF PACIFICATION -- TO THIS AND EVERY HAMLET MUST HAVE ITS OWN PF UNIT; AND (3) VILLAGE AND HAMLET GOVERNMENT MUST BE IMPROVED BY BETTER TRAINING FOR OFFICIALS, BY GIVING OFFICIALS ENOUGH MEANS (WEAPONS FOR SELF-DEFENSE, CONTROL OF PF UNITS, AND AN ADEQUATE BUDGET). THESE ARE THINGS WHICH WE ALSO HAVE BEEN EMPHASIZING.

39. THIEU INDICATED HIS FULL SUPPORT FOR THE "ONE MAN, ONE VOTE" POLICY. BUT, HE SAID, WE MUST MAKE PACIFICATION WORK SO THAT WE WIN OVER THE POPULATION AND, AS A RESULT, NO COMMUNISTS ARE EVER ELECTED. THIEU'S PRESENTATION PERHAPS SUFFERED SOMEWHAT BY LISTING TOO MANY PRIORITIES - E.G., BUILD UP THE CITIES AS WELL AS THE RURAL AREAS; AND PROTECT THE RURAL PEOPLE BETTER BUT ALSO THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION, THE CITIES, AND IMPORTANT INSTALLATIONS. THE SEMINARS WERE, HOWEVER, IMPRESSIVE AND HIGHLY USEFUL SHOWS. REPEAT PERFORMANCES ARE TENTATIVELY PLANNED NEXT WEEK IN I AND II CORPS. BOTH THIEU AND HUONG SAY THEY EXPECT TO HOLD SIMILAR SESSIONS EVERY TWO MONTHS. EVERYBODY SEEMS TO BE HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION BUT PRODUCING REAL RESULTS IN THE PACIFICATION BUSINESS IS A LONG, TOUGH PROCESS.

40. JULY RESULTS OF THE ATTACK AGAINST THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE SHOW A BETTER THAN 10 PERCENT GAIN OVER JUNE AS 1,291 IDENTIFIABLE ENEMY POLITICAL CADRE WERE NEUTRALIZED. THIS IMPROVEMENT COMES ON THE HEELS OF PRESIDENT THIEU'S 1 JULY DECREE FORMALLY ESTABLISHING THE PHUNG HOANG PROGRAM AND HOPEFULLY PATENDS A GENERALLY UPWARD TREND IN THIS IMPORTANT ASPECT OF PACIFICATION. THIEU AND KHIEM ARE SEIZED WITH ITS ESSENTIAL IMPORTANCE. WITH THEIR BACKING, WHICH WAS REITERATED AT THE PACIFICATION SEMINARS, THE PROGRAM IS GETTING INCREASED ATTENTION FROM CORPS COMMANDERS, PROVINCE CHIEFS, AND POLICE OFFICIALS.

E. ECONOMIC

41. DURING A PERIOD OF RELATIVELY INCREASED VIET CONG ACTIVITY, THE SAIGON RETAIL PRICE INDEX ROSE 5 PERCENT OVER THE PREVIOUS WEEK'S LEVEL. NON-FOOD ITEMS WERE UP ONLY 1 PERCENT, BUT FOODSTUFFS ROSE 6 PERCENT. PORK PRICES ROSE 15 TO 20 PERCENT AND VEGETABLES, OTHER THAN THOSE FROM DALAT, WERE UP 20 TO 30 PERCENT. SOME RICE VARIETIES INCREASED IN PRICE SLIGHTLY. THE DESTRUCTION OF TWO BRIDGES ON ROUTE 4 SOUTH OF MY THO, LINKING SAIGON AND THE DELTA, PROBABLY ACCOUNTS FOR MOST OF THIS INCREASE.

42. THE BLACK MARKET DOLLAR RATE EDGED UP TO AROUND 215 PIASTERS LATE LAST WEEK BUT WAS STEADY AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS WEEK.

43. THE GVN HAS YET TO ACT ON ITS PLANNED RICE PURCHASE PROGRAM. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED ITS INTENTION SEVERAL WEEKS AGO TO PURCHASE LARGE QUANTITIES OF DELTA RICE, IT HAS NOT TAKEN THE SPECIFIC STEPS TO PUT SUCH A PROGRAM INTO EFFECT. IN THE MEANTIME, THE RICE MERCHANTS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO MAKE ADDITIONAL PURCHASES OF PADDY. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT FROM 150,000 TO 200,000 TONS OF PADDY REMAIN UNSOLD ON FARMS. THERE HAS BEEN A SLIGHT FIRMING OF PADDY PRICES IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS, PROBABLY IN ANTICIPATION OF THE GVN'S PURCHASE PROGRAM AS WELL AS THE CALL UP FOR DELIVERY TO SAIGON OF THE 37,000 TONS OF RICE PURCHASED BY THE GVN LAST APRIL.

44. TWO DRAFTS OF A DECREE IMPLEMENTING THE WAR RISK INSURANCE LAW HAVE BEEN ON PRESIDENT THIEU'S DESK FOR DECISION FOR A WEEK. ONE, PREPARED BY THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE, IS RATHER WEAK; THE OTHER, PROPOSED BY US, SEEKS TO STRENGTHEN SEVERAL KEY PROVISIONS.

45. THE MISSION HAS ADDRESSED A NOTE TO THE GVN AGAIN PROPOSING PREPAYMENT OF \$35 MILLION IN DLF LOANS TO BRING GVN FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES BACK TO \$300 MILLION. WE HAVE REPEATED OUR EARLIER PROPOSAL THAT THE GVN MAKE A FIRM COMMITMENT BEFORE THE END OF AUGUST TO PREPAY THE LOANS IN FULL BY SEPTEMBER 30.

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FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82218

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 16, 1983.

BY RA ON 11-9-92

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOLLOWING IS A MESSAGE WHICH WALT HAS DICTATED. I HAVE
SENT IT TO SECRETARY RUSK AND AM AWAITING HIS REACTION
WHICH WILL BE SENT TO YOU AS SOON AS WE HAVE IT.

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT

AUGUST 28, 1968

HEREWITH A DRAFT FOR YOUR POSSIBLE USE, WHATEVER THE
OUTCOME OF THE VOTE. I BELIEVE A STATEMENT BY THE
PRESIDENT IS JUSTIFIED IN THE FACE OF AN INEVITABLY
LARGE MINORITY VOTE -- IF THAT IS THE WAY IT TURNS
OUT. CERTAINLY IT IS REQUIRED IN THE FACE OF A VICTORY
BY THE PEACE PLANK.

"I HAVE NOTED THE VOTE OF THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION
ON OUR PARTY'S VIETNAM PLANK. I HAVE FOUR OBSERVATIONS
TO MAKE.

"FIRST. I DEEPLY UNDERSTAND AND SYMPATHIZE WITH
THE MINORITY'S (MAJORITY'S) DESIRE TO SEE A CESSATION
OF THE BOMBING LEADING US TOWARDS PEACE. I HAVE FELT
THIS STRONGLY ENOUGH TO ORDER A BOMBING HALT ON EIGHT
OCCASIONS IN THE PAST.

"SECOND. I DO NOT BELIEVE A POLITICAL CONVENTION
CAN OR SHOULD ADDRESS ITSELF TO MILITARY OR DIPLOMATIC
TACTICS. THESE MUST CHANGE WITH CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES.
THE CONSTITUTION PLACES THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
DAY-TO-DAY CONDUCT OF MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC AFFAIRS
ON THE PRESIDENT, WHO IS BOTH COMMANDER IN CHIEF AND
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NATION'S FOREIGN RELATIONS.

"THIRD. AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ONE OF THE PRESIDENT'S
DUTIES IS TO PROTECT THE NATION'S MEN IN THE FIELD.
RIGHT NOW THOSE MEN IN VIETNAM ARE DEALING WITH A MAJOR
ENEMY OFFENSIVE PREPARED SINCE EARLY JUNE BY THE
INFILTRATION OF MEN AND SUPPLIES FROM THE NORTH AT LEVELS
HIGHER THAN ANY WE HAVE KNOWN BEFORE IN VIETNAM. THE
ENEMY ATTACKS ARE SUPPORTED BY TRUCK MOVEMENTS THROUGH THE
AREA ABOVE THE DMZ. WE ARE DESTROYING A SIGNIFICANT
PROPORTION OF THOSE SUPPLIES AND REDUCING IN DEGREE THE
BURDEN-BORNE BY OUR MEN AND OUR ALLIES. I RECENTLY
ASKED GENERAL ABRAMS WHAT THE MILITARY EFFECT WOULD BE
OF A TOTAL BOMBING CESSATION AT THE PRESENT TIME.
ALTHOUGH I HAVE WISHED TO AVOID INTERJECTING THE
PRESIDENT OR OUR FIELD COMMANDERS INTO POLITICS DURING
THIS POLITICAL YEAR, I BELIEVE EVERY AMERICAN CITIZEN
NOW HAS THE RIGHT TO KNOW THE ESSENCE OF WHAT GENERAL
ABRAMS HAD TO SAY.

GENERAL ABRAMS HAS INFORMED ME THAT THERE ARE SEVERAL
IMPORTANT EFFECTS OF OUR CURRENT BOMBING OPERATIONS IN
NORTH VIETNAM. "ONE IS THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MATERIEL
ITSELF...SECOND AND OF GREATER IMPORTANCE IS THE REDUCTION

WE HAVE CAUSED IN THE NUMBER OF TRUCKS MOVING. WHILE OTHER FACTORS MAY ALSO BE AT WORK, IT IS OUR CONVICTION THAT THE AIR INTERDICTION PROGRAM IN THE NORTH VIETNAM PANHANDLE HAS BEEN THE PRIMARY AGENT WHICH HAS REDUCED TRUCKS DETECTED...A THIRD EFFECT IS TO PREVENT THE ENEMY FROM MASSING ARTILLERY AND AIR DEFENSE MEANS IN THE AREA TO THE NORTH OF THE DMZ FROM WHICH THEY CAN ATTACK OUR FORCES. FURTHER, WE INTERFERE WITH HIS ABILITY TO CONCENTRATE FORCES AND SUPPLIES FOR SUDDEN ATTACKS THROUGH THE DMZ AGAINST OUR UNITS. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, OTHER EFFECTS SUCH AS PINNING DOWN MANY THOUSANDS OF THE ESSENTIAL AIR DEFENSE AND LOC SUPPORT FORCES".

GENERAL ABRAMS HAS INDICATED THAT THE MILITARY EFFECTS OF STOPPING THE BOMBING ARE AS FOLLOWS: "FIRST, MILITARY MATERIEL (MUCH OF IT POL AND AMMUNITION, AS FIRES AND SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS TESTIFY) WOULD BE ABLE TO REACH THE DMZ OR THE BORDERS OF LAOS UNIMPEDED...SECOND, THE TRUCK FLOW COULD BE EXPECTED TO RETURN TO A HIGH LEVEL WITHIN AS LITTLE AS A WEEK...NEXT, THE ENEMY WOULD BE ABLE TO MASS ARTILLERY, AIR DEFENSE MEANS, AND GROUND UNITS FREELY NORTH OF THE DMZ FOR USE AGAINST OUR FORCES. HE COULD DEPLOY HIS AIR FORCE INTO AREAS NORTH OF 17 DEGREES FROM WHICH TO THREATEN OR ATTACK OUR FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS THROUGHOUT MUCH OF SOUTH VIETNAM. HE WOULD BE ABLE TO REOPEN HIS RAILROAD AS FAR SOUTH AS VINH AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO DONG HOI. HE WOULD THEREBY FREE ADDITIONAL NUMBERS OF TRUCKS TO SUPPORT HIS FORCES IN THE SOUTH. FINALLY, FREED FROM INTERDICTION NORTH OF 17 DEGREES, THE ENEMY COULD MOVE REINFORCEMENTS TO THE DMZ BY TRUCK OR RAIL THUS DRASTICALLY SHORTENING TRANSIT TIME.

GENERAL ABRAMS HAS ALSO ESTIMATED THAT WE ARE DESTROYING OR DAMAGING 15 PERCENT OF THE TRUCKS FLOWING THROUGH THE NORTH VIETNAM PANHANDLE EACH WEEK. HE EMPHASIZES, HOWEVER, THAT HE BELIEVES "THE MAJOR IMPACT OF OUR BOMBING EFFORT IS FOUND IN THE REDUCTION OF TRUCK FLOW RATHER THAN IN THE NUMBERS ACTUALLY DESTROYED."

GENERAL ABRAMS FURTHER STATES THAT "ASSUMING THAT THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WOULD BE REFLECTED IN A SEVERAL-FOLD INCREASE IN THE ENEMY'S LOGISTICAL CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT COMBAT AND IN THE INTENSITY OF COMBAT, WE WOULD HAVE TO EXPECT A SEVERAL-FOLD INCREASE IN U.S. AND ALLIED CASUALTIES IN I CORPS. WITH THE BOMBING AUTHORITY NOW IN EFFECT, I AM ABLE WITH FORCES AVAILABLE TO LIMIT THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY IN SOUTH VIETNAM BY INTERDICTING HIS ROADS AND DESTROYING SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF HIS MUNITIONS AND SUPPLIES BEFORE THEY REACH SOUTH VIETNAM. IN ADDITION, I AM ABLE TO SUPPRESS HIS ARTILLERY AND AIR DEFENSE NORTH OF THE BEN HAI SO THAT OUR POSITIONS JUST SOUTH OF THE DMZ ARE SECURE. IF THE BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM NOW AUTHORIZED WERE TO BE SUSPENDED, THE ENEMY, IN 10 DAYS TO TWO WEEKS, COULD DEVELOP A CAPABILITY IN THE DMZ AREA TERMS OF SCALE, INTENSITY AND DURATION OF COMBAT ON THE ORDER OF FIVE TIMES WHAT HE NOW HAS. IF HE SHOULD DEVELOP THIS, IT WOULD, IN MY JUDGMENT, MAKE OUR POSITIONS IN NORTHERN QUANG TRI (TO INCLUDE DONG HA AND THE CUA VIET) UNTENABLE. I CANNOT AGREE TO PLACE OUR FORCES AT THE RISK WHICH THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITY WOULD THEN POSE."

GENERAL ABRAMS' JUDGMENT REINFORCES AND CONFORMS TO MY OWN, BASED ON ALL THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND ADVICE AVAILABLE TO THE PRESIDENT.

FOURTH. AS I HAVE SAID MANY TIMES, I AM PREPARED TO ORDER A TOTAL BOMBING HALT WHEN I CONCLUDE THAT IT COULD LEAD TO LESS RATHER THAN MORE CASUALTIES TO OURSELVES AND OUR ALLIES AND LEAD US TOWARDS PEACE.

AS I SAID RECENTLY IN DETROIT, I AM PREPARED TO TAKE RISKS IN PURSUIT OF PEACE, BUT NOT FOOLHARDY GAMBLER."

DTG 291635Z AUG 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

VZCZCEEA363
00 WTE10 WTE15
DE WTE 3509

1968 AUG 28 : 22 25

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP82226

~~SECRET~~

FROM BROMLEY SMITH TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: DIGEST OF STATE DEPARTMENT REPORTS

CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS

MOSCOW'S ATTACKS ON CEAUSESCU

EMBASSY MOSCOW REPORTS THAT, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET PRESS HAS BEEN CARRYING OCCASIONAL ARTICLES, INCLUDING QUOTES FROM THE HUNGARIAN PRESS, CRITICAL OF ROMANIA AND PARTY LEADER CEAUSESCU IN PARTICULAR, THEY DO NOT AMOUNT TO A FULL-FLEDGED ANTI-CEAUSESCU CAMPAIGN. ON THE CONTRARY, THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THE SOVIET REACTION TO THE ROMANIAN CRITICISM HAS BEEN RELATIVELY RESTRAINED.

EAST-WEST CONTACTS

THE NATO REPRESENTATIVES AGREED AUGUST 27 THAT POLITICAL CONTACTS WITH THE INVADING COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS HIGH-LEVEL VISITS, SHOULD BE CANCELLED FOR THE SHORT TERM. OUR NATO MISSION REPORTS, HOWEVER, THAT THE REPRESENTATIVES CONSIDERED THAT ECONOMIC AND MINOR CULTURAL CONTACTS SHOULD BE RETAINED AS VALUABLE VEHICLES OF DETENTE.

AFRICA

NIGERIAN PEACE TALKS

ETHIOPIAN MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TEFAYE TOLD AMBASSADOR HALL TODAY HIS GOVERNMENT IS VERY DISCOURAGED BY ITS INABILITY TO GET EITHER NIGERIA OR BIAFRA TO AGREE TO ANY PRACTICAL STEPS TO GET RELIEF SUPPLIES MOVING. HE BELIEVES NEITHER SIDE WANTS RELIEF TO FLOW, AND IF IT WERE NOT FOR THE RESULTING AFFRONT TO THE EMPEROR, ONE OR BOTH OF THE PARTIES WOULD HAVE BROKEN OFF THE TALKS LONG AGO.

NEAR EAST

JORDAN FEARS ATTACK

FOREIGN MINISTER RIFAI AUGUST 27 SUMMONED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE US, UK, FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION TO A MEETING AT WHICH HE AND VICEROY PRINCE MOHAMMED DESCRIBED THE IMMINENT THREAT OF AN ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. IF SUCH AN ATTACK OCCURS, JORDAN COULD NOT CONSIDER IT A LOCAL OPERATION AND WOULD ASK FOR ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. JORDAN HOPES THE FOUR POWERS CAN DISSUADE ISRAEL FROM THIS ACTION.

DTG: 282151Z AUG 68

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 11-1-01

APPROX FROM QUICK COPY

88 AUG 28 PM 6:32

WEDNESDAY

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

1968 AUG 29 14 01

68 AUG 29 PM 12 20
THURSDAY

SEA386
OO WTE13
DE WTE 3557

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP82250

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IT MAY INTEREST YOU THAT
FELIPE HERRERA HAS TOSSED HIS HAT INTO 1970 RING
(SANTIAGO 5112).

1. IN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH EL MERCURIO PUBLISHED
YESTERDAY, FELIPE HERRERA MADE PUBLIC FOR FIRST TIME HIS
AVAILABILITY FOR 1970 PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION. HERRERA
SAID HE HAD IMPRESSION THERE ARE MANY INDEPENDENT-MINDED
CHILEANS ARE READY TO LEAP INTO VOID. IF IN TIME THESE
ELEMENTS GATHER TOGETHER AND ACCOMMODATE TO (CUADRAR)
THE MIDDLE AND POPULAR CLASSES, HERRERA SAID HE WOULD HAVE
NO DIFFICULTY GIVING UP INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
JOB "TO LEAD A MOVEMENT WHICH I THINK COULD ALSO HAVE
THE SPONSORSHIP OF POLITICAL FORCES WHICH WILL NOT
CONSIDER THEMSELVES RIGHTLY UNDERSTOOD BY ANY OF THE
POLITICAL BLOCS WHICH EXIST TODAY OR ARE BEING FORMED."

2. HERRERA SAID POLITICAL PARTIES CONTROL ONLY 40
PERCENT OF CHILEAN ELECTORATE, AND IN PRESENT CONFUSED
PANORAMA, INDEPENDENT CANDIDACIES APPEAR TO HAVE GREAT
POSSIBILITIES. IT SEEMS LOGICAL THAT MORE THAN ONE
SUCH CANDIDACY MIGHT EMERGE, HE SAID, SINCE SOME PERSONS
WILL WISH TO RETURN TO AN OLD POLICY AND OTHER WILL WISH
A NEW PROGRAM "WHOSE CONTENT IS IN ACCORD WITH SOCIAL
ADVANCES AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS WHICH DO NOT HAVE
TO BE NECESSARILY REVOLUTIONARY." HERRERA IDENTIFIED
HIMSELF AS FOLLOWER OF "CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIALISM" WHICH
HE SAID NOW PREDOMINATES THROUGHOUT WORLD POLITICS.
SINCE THERE IS NO DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY WHICH IS NOT MOVING
TOWARD "POLITICS OF MASSES" WHICH ASSURES WELL-BEING OF
GREATEST NUMBER AND AVOIDS PERPETUATION OF PRIVILEGES
WHICH ENDANGER LIBERTIES AND INSTITUTIONAL STABILITY.

Free Press

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *Reg* NARA, Date *11/7/95*

XEROX FROM QUEEN COPY

3. HERRERA INTERVIEW, MOST OF WHICH OSTENSIBLY DEVOTED TO IADB AID TO CHILE, HAD POLITICAL OVERTONES FROM START TO FINISH. ALTHOUGH HE NEVER REFERRED TO JORGE ALESSANDRI BY NAME, HE GAVE ALESSANDRI GOVERNMENT CREDIT FOR BEGINNING VARIOUS STRUCTURAL REFORMS, AND FREI EMERGES MORE AS A CONTINUER OF HIS PREDECESSOR'S WORK RATHER THAN AS INNOVATOR. RE AGRARIAN REFORM, WHICH HE SAID WAS STARTED BY PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT AND INTENSIFIED BY THIS ONE, HERRERA NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT APPRECEIABLY INCREASED PRODUCTION YET AND THERE ARE SOME INHERENT DIFFICULTIES IN ITS EARLY STAGES, IT WILL EVENTUALLY TRANSFORM RURAL LIFE AND ESTABLISH BALANCE BETWEEN RURAL AND URBAN POPULATION. HE ADDED THAT FORESIGHTED POLICY WILL CREATE THOUSANDS OF JOBS TO ABSORB LABOR FREED BY LAND REDISTRIBUTION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE. IMPLICATION IS THAT FREI GOVERNMENT HAS NO SUCH POLICY. HERRERA MADE NO REFERENCE TO PROPOSED IADB LOAN TO CORA. WITH TONGUE JUST BARELY IN CHEEK, HERRERA SAID HE DOES NOT SHARE PESSIMISM RE PRESENT SITUATION IN CHILE AND BELIEVES IT NOT FAIR TO RECOGNIZE CREATIVE LABOR OF FREI GOVERNMENT.

4. COMMENT: HERRERA EVIDENTLY LOOKS TO THE EVENTUALITY OF RUNNING AS A UNITY CANDIDATE OF FORCES RANGING FROM THE MODERATE LEFT TO THE RIGHT OF THE CHILEAN POLITICAL SPECTRUM, PARTICULARLY IN THE EVENT THAT AGAIN JORGE ALESSANDRI SHOULD NOT CHOOSE TO RUN. IN THE LATTER EVENT NATIONAL PARTY FORCES COULD WELL SUPPORT HERRERA, PARTICULARLY IF THEY DEEMED IT NECESSARY TO DEFEAT A TONIC CANDIDACY. HERRERA WOULD ALSO HOPE FOR SUPPORT FROM INDEPENDENTS AND FROM MODERATE AND RIGHT WING ELEMENTS OF THE RADICAL PARTY IF THAT PARTY STILL IN HANDS LEFT WING LEADERSHIP AND SUPPORTING ALLIANCE WITH COMMUNIST PARTY AT TIME OF 1970 ELECTIONS.
KORRY.

DTG: 291455Z AUG 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EEA385
00 WTE15
DE WTE 3535

1968 AUG 29 15 59

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE WH82248

UNCLAS

AUGUST 29, 1968

1968 AUG 29 PM 12 16
THURSDAY

TO: GEORGE CHRISTIAN

FROM: W. W. ROSTOV

FOLLOWING CABLE FROM EMBASSY GUATEMALA CONTAINS STATEMENTS BY THE GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT ON THE DEATH OF AMBASSADOR MEIN. YOU MAY WISH TO MAKE THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE STATEMENTS AVAILABLE TO THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS CORPS:

1. FOLLOWING ARE UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATIONS (WITH UNNECESSARY WORDS OMITTED) OF GOVERNMENT PRESS RELEASE, PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATION OF CONDOLENCE, AND EXCERPT FROM GOVERNMENT DECREE ANNOUNCING STATE OF SIEGE.

BEGIN TEXT

2. PRESS RELEASE OF SECRETARY OF PUBLIC RELATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC CONDEMNS ENERGETICALLY ASSASSINATION THIS AFTERNOON OF HIS EXCELLENCY JOHN GORDON MEIN, AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, A PERSON WIDELY RESPECTED IN ALL SECTORS OUR COUNTRY AND ... (KNOWN) AS A GOOD FRIEND OF GUATEMALA. DEPLORING THIS EXECRABLE EVENT, THE GOVERNMENT SPEAKS FOR SENTIMENTS GUATEMALAN PEOPLE, WHO REPUDIATE VIOLENCE AND BLOODSHED AND WISH TO SEE THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH DAMNABLE CRIME APPREHENDED AND PUNISHED BY THE LAW. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC DECLARES THAT AS SOON AS IT KNEW OF THE EVENT, IT GAVE MOST EMPHATIC ORDERS THAT THE RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES IMMEDIATELY MAKE INVESTIGATIONS IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THIS CASE AND PUT AT THE DISPOSITION OF THE LAW AND JUSTICE THE ACTUAL CRIMINALS AND ACCOMPLICES IN THIS SENSELESS CRIME THAT HAS PUT GUATEMALA IN MOURNING. GUATEMALA, 28 AUGUST 19:15, NUMBER 1759. END TEXT

BEGIN TEXT

3. "MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT, 29 AUGUST 1968, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, CONSIDERING: TRAGIC DEATH OF HIS EXCELLENCY JOHN GORDON MEIN, AMBASSADOR OF USA THIS AFTERNOON HAS CAUSED DEEP CONSTERNATION IN ALL SECTORS OF THE COUNTRY, AND THAT HE WAS A PERSON WHO, BECAUSE OF HIS ABILITY AS A DIPLOMAT, HIS QUALITIES AS A FRIEND OF GUATEMALA, ALWAYS RESPECTFUL OF OUR SOVEREIGNTY, WON THE ESTEEM AND SYMPATHY OF GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF GUATEMALA; THEREFORE, THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED:

1ST TO EXPRESS THE PROFOUND CONDOLENCES OF PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA TO PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF USA FOR SUCH AN IRREPARABLE LOSS.

2ND THAT NATIONAL FLAG, AS A SIGN OF MOURNING, WILL REMAIN AT HALF-MAST FOR THREE DAYS AT NATIONAL PALACE.

3RD THAT MINISTERS OF STATE ATTEND FUNERAL OF THIS DISTINGUISHED DIPLOMAT AND THAT MINISTER FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPRESENTING GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC EXPRESS DEEPEST CONDOLENCES ON BEHALF GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT TO US GOVERNMENT AND FAMILY OF ILLUSTRIOUS DECEASED. SIGNED MENDEZ MONTENEGRO, MINISTER FOREIGN RELATIONS AND MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT. END TEXT.

4. BEGIN TEXT. MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT, DECREE NUMBER 633. JULIO CESAR MENDEZ MONTENEGRO, CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENT OF REPUBLIC AND COMMANDING GENERAL OF ARMED FORCES: CONSIDERING: THAT EARLY THIS AFTERNOON HIS EXCELLENCY, THE AMBASSADOR THE USA IN GUATEMALA, JOHN GORDON MEIN, WAS TREACHEROUSLY KILLED, VICTIM OF A COWARDLY ACT OF AGGRESSION BY DEDICATED ENEMIES OF SOCIAL PEACE. EVENT HAS IMMEDIATELY BEEN REPUDIATED BY POPULACE IN GENERAL AND JUSTIFIES GOVERNMENT IN TAKING URGENT MEASURES THAT CASE REQUIRES SO THAT APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES CAN BE READY TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC ORDER AND FACILITATE CAPTURE OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE SO AS TO APPLY FULL WEIGHT OF LAW FOR THEIR DISGRACEFUL ACTION. END TEXT

(THE REST OF THE DECREE FOLLOWS NORMAL FORMAT IN ESTABLISHING STATE OF SIEGE FOR THIRTY DAYS.)

5. TEXTS WILL BE FORWARDED VIA AIRGRAM.

DTG 291424Z AUG 68

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

EEA381
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3534

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82247

1968 AUG 29 14 59

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-407
By is, NARA Date 9-21-98

68 AUG 29 AM 11:12
THURSDAY
38

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE LITERALLY EYES ONLY

AUGUST 29, 1968

HANOI PROCEEDS TO CRANK UP THE OSLO CHANNEL IN A BUSINESSLIKE WAY, AS FOLLOWING INDICATES. PARAGRAPH 5 IS AS GOOD A SPECULATION AS I KNOW ON THE PURPOSE OF THE ADDITIONAL CHANNEL.

OSLO 6284

1. AMBASSADOR ALGARD PLUS ANSTEENSEN AND VRAALSEN OF FOREIGN OFFICE CAME TO LUNCH AUG 28. NORWEGIANS ARE NOW CRANKING UP FOR CHAN AND VO VAN SUNG VISIT SEPT 20 AND EXPECT DAVIDSON SHORTLY BEFORE THEN AND TO STAND BY IN OSLO AS TALKS UNFOLD.

2. FOREIGN OFFICE IS KEEPING ALGARD ON FOR VISIT, HIS COVER BEING THAT AS OLD CENTRAL EUROPEAN EXPERT HE IS RETAINED FOR CONSULTATION ON CZECH CRISIS.

3. PROBLEM OF SECRECY NOW EVEN MORE ACUTE BECAUSE OF CZECH AFTERMATH. IF CHAN IS RECOGNIZED HERE FROM PREVIOUS SCANDINAVIAN VISIT, IT WOULD NO LONGER BE APPROPRIATE TO SAY THAT NVN REP MOSCOW IS RETURNING ALGARD VISIT TO HANOI SINCE THIS WOULD CREATE PUBLIC UPROAR AND SERIOUS DIFFICULTY FOR GOVT BECAUSE OF POPULAR FEELING ON CZECH CRISIS AND HANOI POSITION THEREON. IN THIS CONTEXT ALGARD AND ANSTEENSEN BOTH MENTIONED WITH SOME ANXIETY QUOTE THIRD PARTY UNQUOTE STORIES ABOUT WHICH PRESS HAS BEEN INQUIRING IN PARIS AND WASHINGTON AND DISCUSSING IN HERALD TRIBUNE.

4. ALGARD REGRETS THAT NGO LOAN WILL NOT BE COMING AS HE HAS GOOD PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM. ALGARD THINKS HANOI WANTS HIM TO REMAIN HERE DURING TALKS ANYWAY AND HIS GUESS IS THAT HANOI MEANS BUSINESS NOT ONLY ON BASIS LONG AND HIGHLY INTERESTING CONVERSATION WITH NGO LOAN IN JULY BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF RAPID AND SERIOUS REPLIES NGO GETS FROM HANOI AND DISPATCH OF VO VAN SUNG LOOSE FLEXIBILITY AND INTELLIGENCE FAVORABLY IMPRESSED ALGARD DURING HANOI VISIT.

5. WHILE FINDING IT DIFFICULT TO JUDGE FROM APPROACHES TO NORWEGIAN CHARGE IN PEKING DURING ALGARD ABSENCE, LATTER THINKS THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE MAY DESIRE USE NORWEGIANS AS CHANNEL TO PASS ANSWERS OR TO ALERT USG TO SUBJECTS OR PROBLEMS WHICH THEY WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS IN PARIS AND WHICH THEY CANNOT BRING UP DIRECTLY IN THAT FORUM WITHOUT LOSING FACE.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

DTG: 291420Z AUG 68

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

1968 AUG 28 17 55

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12556, Sec. 3.4
 NJ 92-281
 By lip, NARA, Date 1-13-94

Free file

VMCZCEEA354
 OO WTE18
 DE WTE 3501

FROM BROMLEY SMITH
 TO THE PRESIDENT
 CITE CAP82219

~~TOP SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENTS EYES ONLY

FOLLOWING IS AMBASSADOR THOMPSON'S REPORT OF HIS
 CONVERSATION, YESTERDAY WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN.

IN THE COURSE OF MY TALK WITH DOBRYNIN, HE RAISED
 THE QUESTION OF THE POSSIBLE VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT TO
 LENINGRAD AND THE MISSILE TALKS. HE SAID IT APPEARED
 CLEAR THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO SEPARATE THE
 TWO MATTERS. HE PERSONALLY HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE
 PRESIDENT WAS INTERESTED IN VISITING THE SOVIET UNION
 AND THAT THIS HAD BEEN A MAXIMUM DESIRE WHEREAS A
 MEETING OF THE CHIEFS OF GOVERNMENT IN GENEVA IN CONNECTION
 WITH THE MISSILE TALKS WOULD HAVE BEEN THE PRESIDENT'S
 MINIMUM DESIRE.

I SAID I WAS NOT HERE AT THE TIME AND DID NOT KNOW
 THE PRESIDENT'S MIND ON THESE MATTERS.

DOBRYNIN SAID HE THOUGHT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAD
 AGREED TO GENEVA AS A LOCALE FOR THE TALKS AS A RESPONSE
 TO OUR WISHES. HE THOUGHT THAT IF WE PREFERRED TO HAVE
 THEM IN MOSCOW, THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM ON THEIR PART.

I SAID I HAD NO IDEA WHAT OUR VIEWS ON THE MATTER WERE.
 I SAID THAT OBVIOUSLY BOTH THESE MATTERS WOULD BE CONTINGENT
 ON WHAT NOW HAPPENED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

I SAID I WAS PERSONALLY OPTIMISTIC THAT MISSILE TALKS COULD SUCCEED AS I WAS CONVINCED THAT IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH OUR COUNTRIES.

HE SAID THAT WHEN HE WAS LAST IN MOSCOW HE HAD SEEN DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE OF SUCH NATURE THAT HE WOULD HAVE BEEN QUITE SATISFIED TO HAVE HEADED THE TALKS ON THE SOVIET SIDE ON THE BASIS OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS. HE SAID THEY WERE LONG AND COMPLEX BUT QUITE SERIOUS. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE SOVIETS ENVISAGED THAT THE TALKS WOULD BE HELD IN SECRET.

I REPLIED THAT I ASSUMED THAT THIS WOULD ALSO BE OUR VIEW ALTHOUGH WE WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE TO LET OUR ALLIES KNOW THE GENERAL TREND OF THE TALKS WHICH INCREASED THE POSSIBILITY OF LEAKS.

HE SAID HE QUITE UNDERSTOOD THE PRESENT SITUATION AND OBSERVED THAT WE HAD A MONTH BEFORE THE MISSILE TALKS WERE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN.

I ASKED WHO HE THOUGHT WOULD HEAD UP THE MISSILE TALKS ON THE SOVIET SIDE IF THEY WERE ON THE LEVEL OF SPECIAL DELEGATIONS. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW BUT WHEN I SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE SOMEONE LIKE KUZNETSOV, HE SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY.

HE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT GROMYKO INTENDED TO COME TO NEW YORK ABOUT THE FIRST OF OCTOBER FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE ASKED ME TO LET HIM KNOW ANYTHING I COULD BEFORE MY DEPARTURE ON OUR ATTITUDE WITH RESPECT TO THE MISSILE TALKS.

IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION, I MADE QUITE CLEAR THAT A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WOULD DEPEND UPON HOW MATTERS ACTUALLY DEVELOPED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THAT IN ANY EVENT SOME IMMEDIATE ISSUES WOULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED. HE INDICATED THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THIS.

DOBRYNIN NOTED THAT THE WEST GERMANS, THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND THE SECRETARY HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF ROMANIA AND HE WONDERED WHY. HE SMILED WHEN HE MENTIONED THE CHINESE. I REPLIED THAT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW IT WAS QUITE SIMPLE. THE DAY THE SECRETARY SPOKE TO HIM, WE HAD RECEIVED A SERIES OF ALARMING REPORTS FROM NON-ROMANIAN SOURCES AND IT WAS QUITE NATURAL FOR THE SECRETARY TO ASK ABOUT THEM.

DTG 281702Z AUG 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

1968 AUG 28 19 28

EEA357
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3503

FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82220

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

PARIS 28034

1968 AUG 28 PM 3:33
WEDNESDAY

Pres file

HEREWITH SUMMARY OF THIS MORNINGS MEETING IN PARIS

1. LE DUC THO WAS NOT PRESENT. THUY OPENED BY STATING THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECH OF AUGUST 19 AND THE VICE-PRESIDENT'S DECLARATION OF SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY ON AUGUST 24 MADE IT NECESSARY FOR HIM TO BRIEFLY REVIEW THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR. THUY SAID THAT WORLD AND US OPINION REGARDS US AS AGGRESSOR AND QUOTED AS SUPPORT FOR THIS THESIS STATEMENTS BY US "LEADERS" DR. SPOCK, SENATOR GRUENING AND OTHERS OF SAME STAMP.
2. THUY BLAMED THE IMPASSE IN PARIS ON US DEMAND FOR RECIPROCITY AND ITS REFUSAL TO CEASE BOMBING TO OPEN WAY TO JUST POLITICAL SOLUTION.
3. THUY SAID US MUST "SOLVE WAR ON BASIS OF DRV FOUR POINTS AND NLF PROGRAM. US MUST RECOGNIZE NLF AND WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS BUT FIRST US MUST STOP BOMBING." THUY THEN ENDED ONE OF HIS SHORTEST PREPARED STATEMENTS (45 MINUTES).
4. IN REBUTAL, I TOLD THUY THAT I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO INFORM HIM THAT HE SHOULD STOP MISCALCULATING OR TRYING TO INTERFERE IN INTERNAL AMERICAN AFFAIRS AND GET DOWN TO THE SERIOUS BUSINESS OF MAKING PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. I SAID THUY WAS WRONG IN SPEAKING OF BELLICOSE US POLICY. IT WAS NORTH VIETNAM WHICH HAD REJECTED OUR OFFER FOR MILITARY DEESCALATION PREFERING TO PREPARE FOR AN OFFENSIVE. IT IS NORTH VIETNAM WHICH HAS CONTINUED TO TRY TO IMPOSE ITS WILL ON SOUTH VIETNAM.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 11-1-01

5. I QUOTED THE PASSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT'S AUGUST 19 SPEECH THAT STATED THAT IT TAKES TWO TO MAKE PEACE AND THAT WE WOULD NOT MOVE FURTHER UNTIL WE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE OTHER SIDE INTENDS SERIOUSLY TO JOIN US IN DEESCALATING THE WAR.

6. I NOTED THAT THUY HAD AGAIN RAISED THE ISSUE OF AGGRESSION AND HAD ONCE AGAIN TRIED TO DISTORT THE FACTS AS TO DRV AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIETNAM. I REFERRED TO SERIES OF LARGE-SCALE MILITARY ATTACKS LAUNCHED BY NVA/VC IN THE PAST WEEK AND NOTED THAT THIS WAS NO SURPRISE -- THAT I HAD PREVIOUSLY EXPOSED THE EVIDENCE POINTING TO IT. I HAD ALSO EXAMINED NLF EIGHTH COMMUNIQUE AND RECENT HANOI STATEMENTS AND NOTED THE BELLICOSE TONE OF THEIR RECENT PROPAGANDA WHICH EMPHASIZED COMPLETE MILITARY VICTORY AND VIOLENCE AS THE ONLY CORRECT PATH. I SAID THE AUGUST 22 ROCKET ATTACK ON CIVILIAN POPULATION OF SAIGON WAS A TRAGIC EXAMPLE OF THAT POLICY. I SAID THAT WHATEVER THE PURPOSE OF THE NEW DRV ATTACKS THEY WOULD SURELY FAIL WITH A SACRIFICE OF THOUSANDS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE LIVES AND WIDESPREAD MISERY AMONG SOUTH VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS. I CONTRASTED THIS WITH THIEU'S STATEMENT OF LAST FRIDAY CALLING FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND RECONCILIATION WITH JUSTICE AND LAW.

7. I URGED THE DRV TO ABANDON ITS FUTILE ATTEMPT AT MILITARY VICTORY AND TO JOIN US IN REDUCING THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE AND BRING PEACE. I THEN SUGGESTED THAT WE TAKE A TEA BREAK BEFORE I DELIVERED MY PREPARED STATEMENT.

8. DURING THE TWENTY-FIVE MINUTE TEA BREAK, THUY EXPLAINED THAT LE DUC THO WAS ABSENT BECAUSE HE WAS TAKING PHYSICAL EXAMINATION. CONVERSATION WAS GENERALLY NON-SUBSTANTIVE WITH SOME REFERENCE TO CURRENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.S.

9. I THEN DELIVERED MY SHORT (20 MINUTE) PREPARED STATEMENT WHICH FOCUSED ON DRV INTRANSIGENCE AND THE NEED, IF PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE IN PARIS TALKS, FOR A SATISFACTORY ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF WHAT WILL HAPPEN ON THE GROUND IF THE BOMBING STOPS.

10. THUY REPLIED THAT HE FOUND OUR ASKING NORTH VIET-NAM NOT TO INTERFERE IN U.S. INTERNAL AFFAIRS LAUGHABLE IN VIEW OF U.S. INTERFERENCE IN VIET-NAM, AND U.S. INTERVENTION IN GUATEMALA, VENEZUELA, CUBA, CAMBODIA, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND OTHERS. THUY THEN RESPONDED TO OUR CHARGES ABOUT HANOI'S POLICY OF VIOLENCE BY SAYING RESORT TO ARMED FORCE NECESSARY TO FIGHT U.S. AND GVN VIOLENCE. HE SAID NO REASON FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE REPEAT NORTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO FOLD ITS ARMS AND LOOK ON WHILE AGGRESSORS MASSACRE OUR COUNTRYMEN AND DESTROY OUR COUNTRY.

11. IN RESPONSE TO OUR CHARGE CONCERNING ROCKET ATTACK ON SAIGON THUY QUOTED AFP REPORT THAT ONLY POLICE AND TROOPS IN STREETS OF SAIGON AND SAID THAT AS VOA AND OTHERS HAD REPORTED VC HAD WARNED POPULATION AGAINST BEING IN AREA THEY INTENDED TO SHELL.

12. THUY RESPONDED TO OUR QUOTING THIEU BY CHARACTERIZING HIM AS DIRTY AGENT OF U.S. AND GVN AS PUPPETS. THUY SAID THAT STATEMENT THAT IT TAKES TWO TO MAKE PEACE IS INTENDED TO MISLEAD SINCE IT IS NOT APPLICABLE FOR IT DOES NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN AGGRESSOR AND VICTIM.

13. THUY DEFENDED THE DEMAND OF UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING AS KEY THAT WILL OPEN WAY TO PEACEFUL SOLUTION. AFTER ONCE MORE "FIRMLY REJECTING" DEMAND FOR RECIPROCITY, THUY SAID THAT AS LONG AS U.S. CONTINUES TO BRING MORE TROOPS TO SOUTH VIET-NAM, TO STRENGTHEN PUPPET ARMY, TO INTENSIFY BOMBING AND TO CONDUCT SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS THE DEMAND THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE LIMIT ITS RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE IS COMPLETELY UNREASONABLE.

14. I TOLD THUY THE U.S. WAS IN VIET-NAM AT THE REQUEST OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO HELP THEM DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST NVN AGGRESSION AND THAT WE HAD NO INTEREST IN STAYING THERE. NO MATTER HOW IT TRIED TO TWIST FACTS, NVN HAD NO RIGHT TO BE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.

15. THUY AGAIN QUOTED SENATOR GRUENING ON AMERICAN AGGRESSION, AND SAID VIET-NAM IS ONE AND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE ONE. HE CHARGED THAT U.S. OBVIOUSLY SEEKS PRETEXT TO STAY PERMANENTLY IN VIET-NAM.

16. I SUGGESTED THAT HE OMIT WORD "PERMANENTLY" SINCE U.S. HAS NO DESIRE TO STAY PERMANENTLY IN ANY PART OF VIET-NAM. THUY SAID U.S. HAD NOT SHOWN THIS, I DISAGREED AND ON THAT NOTE WE ADJOURNED AT 1:25 P.M.

HARRIMAN AND VANCE

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 281815Z AUG 68

Wednesday, August 28, 1968

FROM BROMLEY SMITH

TO THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

Our Charge in Guatemala reports by telephone that the assassination of Ambassador Mein appears not -- REPEAT NOT -- to have been coordinated with any kind of uprising or disturbance in the Guatemalan capital. The City is calm.

Neither the Embassy nor the intelligence community here had any advance information of a planned attempt on the Ambassador's life.

Wednesday, August 28, 1968

FROM BROMLEY SMITH S
TO THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

Following is a suggested message of condolence to Mrs. Mein.

If you approve, we can send it by cable from here through State channels.

✓ "Dear Mrs. Mein:

Mrs. Johnson and I have just learned of the tragic death of your husband this afternoon. Our hearts go out to you and your three children.

We remember so well being with him at San Salvador and Guatemala City last month. He helped to make our trip to Central America such a success.

I know that no words can repair the loss of his having been taken from you. He died as a soldier in the line of duty. I personally, and the nation, are grateful to him for the dedication and courage with which he represented the United States in Guatemala.

We share your grief and pray that God give you strength and comfort.

Sincerely
Lyndon B. Johnson

[Handwritten mark]

Aug. 28, 1968

43

dict. by
Walt Rostow
report (1)
10:00 am.
HLL

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

Herewith a draft for your possible use, whatever the outcome of the vote this afternoon. I believe a statement by the President is justified in the face of an inevitably large minority vote -- if that is the way it turns out. Certainly it is required in the face of a victory by the peace plank.

(Gen
Frisberg
Jernstedt
insert A)

"I have noted the vote of the Democratic Convention on our party's Vietnam plank. I have four observations to make.

"First. I deeply understand and sympathize with the minority's (majority's) desire to see a cessation of the bombing leading us towards peace. I have felt this strongly enough to order a bombing halt on eight occasions in the past.

"Second, I do not believe a political convention can or should address itself to military or diplomatic tactics. These must change with changing circumstances. The Constitution places the responsibility for the day-to-day conduct of military and diplomatic affairs on the President, who is both Commander in Chief and responsible for the nation's foreign relations.

"Third. As Commander in Chief, one of the President's duties is to protect the nation's men in the field. Right now those men in Vietnam are dealing with a major enemy offensive prepared since early June by the infiltration of men and supplies from the North at levels higher than any we have known before in Vietnam. The enemy attacks are

supported by truck movements through the area above the DMZ.

We are destroying a significant proportion of those supplies and reducing in degree the burden borne by our men and our allies. I recently asked General Abrams what the military effect would be of a total bombing cessation at the present time. Although I have wished to avoid interjecting the President or our field commanders into politics during this political year, I believe every American citizen now has the right to know the essence of what General Abrams had to say:

~~(here WWR said to insert Abrams' passage, without numbers)~~

insert H

"General Abrams' judgment reinforces and confirms to my own, based on all the sources of information and advice available to the President.

"Fourth. As I have said many times, I am prepared to order a total bombing halt when I conclude that it could lead to less rather than more casualties to ourselves and our allies and lead us towards peace.

"As I said recently in Detroit, I am prepared to take risks in pursuit of peace, but not foolhardy gambles."

(A)

General Abrams has informed me that there are several important effects of our current bombing operations in North Vietnam.

"One is the destruction of the materiel itself. . . second and of greater importance is the reduction we have caused in the number of trucks moving. While other factors may also be at work, it is our conviction that the air interdiction program in the North Vietnam panhandle has been the primary agent which has reduced trucks detected. . . a third effect is to prevent the enemy from massing artillery and air defense means in the area to the north of the DMZ from which they can attack our forces. Further, we interfere with his ability to concentrate forces and supplies for sudden attacks through the DMZ against our units. There are, of course, other effects such as pinning down many thousands of the essential air defense and LOC support forces".

General Abrams has indicated that the military effects of stopping the bombing are as follows: "First, military materiel (much of it pol and ammunition, as fires and secondary explosions testify) would be able to reach the DMZ or the borders of Laos unimpeded. . . second, the trucksflow could be expected to return to a high level within as little as a week. . . Next, the enemy would be able to mass artillery, air defense means, and ground units freely north of the DMZ for use against

(P)

our forces. He could deploy his air force into areas north of 17 degrees from which to threaten or attack our forces and installations throughout much of South Vietnam. He would be able to reopen his railroad as far south as Vinh and subsequently to Dong Hoi. He would thereby free additional numbers of trucks to support this forces in the South. Finally, freed from interdiction north of 17 degrees, the enemy could move reinforcements to the DMZ by truck or rail thus drastically shortening transit time."

General Abrams has also estimated that we are destroying or damaging 15 percent of the trucks flowing through the North Vietnam panhandle each week. He emphasizes, however, that he believes "the major impact of our bombing effort is found in the reduction of truck flow rather than in the numbers actually destroyed."

General Abrams further states that "assuming that the cessation of bombing would be reflected in a several-fold increase in the enemy's logistical capability to support combat and in the intensity of combat, we would have to expect a several-fold increase in U. S. and allied casualties in I Corps. With the bombing authority now in effect, I am able with forces available to limit the enemy's capability in South Vietnam by interdicting his roads and destroying substantial amounts of

(A)

his munitions and supplies before they reach South Vietnam. In addition, I am able to suppress his artillery and air defense north of the Ben Hai so that our positions just south of the DMZ are secure. If the bombing in North Vietnam now authorized were to be suspended, the enemy, in 10 days to two weeks, could develop a capability in the DMZ area in terms of scale, intensity and duration of combat on the order of five times what he now has. If he should develop this, it would, in my judgment, make our positions in northern Quang Tri (to include Dong Ha and the Cua Viet) untenable. I cannot agree to place our forces at the risk which the enemy's capability would then pose."

Wednesday, August 28, 1968

44

FROM BROMLEY SMITH

TO THE PRESIDENT

A Reuters correspondent who saw the shooting reports that Ambassador Mein was machine-gunned to death as he was being driven back to his Embassy from a luncheon given for the foreign press by the Guatemalan Foreign Minister. The Reuters correspondent was driving a short distance behind the Ambassador's car ~~which~~ and saw a burst of machine-gun fire from another car which moved off at high speed.

Wednesday, August 28, 1968

45

FROM BROMLEY SMITH

TO THE PRESIDENT

A Reuters correspondent who saw the shooting reports that Ambassador Mein was machine-gunned to death as he was being driven back to his Embassy from a luncheon given for the foreign press by the Guatemalan Foreign Minister.

Wednesday, August 28, 1968

46

FROM BROMLEY SMITH

TO THE PRESIDENT

Ambassador John Gordon Mein was shot and killed ~~early~~ this afternoon in Guatemala City. We are waiting further details.

Max Krebs, a senior Foreign Service Officer, has taken charge of the Embassy.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EEA339
00 WTE10
DE WTE 3480

FROM WILLIAM BUNDY
TO LARRY TEMPLE
CITE CAP82202

1968 AUG 28 03 06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AT WALT ROSTOW'S REQUEST, I SEND A DRAFT TEXT THAT MIGHT BE USED FROM THE WHITE HOUSE OR BY THE PRESIDENT, TO COMMENT ON THE STATEMENT YESTERDAY BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SPOKESMAN. MY STRONG RECOMMENDATION, WITH WHICH WALT CONCURS, IS THAT THIS TEXT NOT REPEAT NOT BE USED, AND THE MATTER BE LEFT AT TODAY'S STATE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT AND WHAT HARRIMAN WILL BE SAYING TOMORROW MORNING. BUT I HAVE DONE MY HONEST BEST.

TEXT

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SPOKESMAN IN PARIS HAS SEEN FIT TO REFER AT SOME LENGTH THE STATEMENT BEFORE THE DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM COMMITTEE, AND TO IMPLY THAT THESE STATEMENTS--BY MEN UNIQUELY "ATTACHED TO US HONOR"--MEAN THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL BE NEWLY AROUSED TO OPPOSE OUR VIETNAM POLICY, AND TO FORCE THE GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE ITS POSITION.

REGARDLESS OF THE TRUTH OR FALSETY OF SUCH STATEMENTS--AND THE RESULTS IN CHICAGO SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES--WE BELIEVE ALL AMERICANS WILL RESENT THIS TRANSPARENT ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE IN OUR DOMESTIC POLICY. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD DO WELL TO CEASE RELYING ON WILLFULL MISCALCULATION AND TO ADDRESS THEMSELVES TO THE HOST OF SERIOUS PROPOSALS FOR PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE THAT AMB. HARRIMAN AND AMB. VANCE HAVE PUT FORWARD IN PARIS. THIS IS WHAT WE ARE WAITING FOR AND WHAT WE SHALL CONTINUE TO PURSUE.

END TEXT

COMMENT:

I WOULD RECOMMEND AGAINST USING THIS BECAUSE:

--THE NORTH VIETNAMESE STATEMENT IS STALE AND IT HAS VERY LITTLE REAL PICKUP--IT IS NOT ALL THAT NEW, SINCE THEY HAD REPEATEDLY QUOTED OPPOSITION STATEMENTS IN THE PARIS SESSIONS;

--THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SPOKESMAN SPECIFICALLY WALKED AROUND THE QUESTION WHETHER HIS COMMENT HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE CONVENTION. HE CLAIMED THEY ALWAYS HAD BRIEFINGS ON MONDAYS, WHICH IS INCIDENTALLY TRUE.

--WE HAVE ALREADY ANNOUNCED THAT HARRIMAN IS BEING INSTRUCTED TO TELL THEM TO STOP MISCALCULATING AND TO GET DOWN TO BUSINESS, AND HARRIMAN WILL SAY JUST THAT TOMORROW;

--A WHITE HOUSE COMMENT WOULD ONLY BUILD UP THE WHOLE STATEMENT AND ALSO GET THE PRESS GENERALLY MORE INTERESTED IN WHAT THE SPOKESMAN IS SAYING -- A LIFT HE BADLY NEEDS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIG 280216Z AUG 68

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 11-1-01

XEROXED FROM QUECK COPY

47

68 AUG 27 PM 11:34

TUESDAY

Free file

48

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-158
By us, NARA Date 11-17-98

EEA337
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3479

1968 AUG 26 02 02

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82201

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THIS FURTHER REPORT FROM PRAGUE WILL INTEREST YOU.

PRAGUE 3227

SUBJ: DUBCEK SETS GRIM TONE

1. CZECH LEADERSHIP, BEHIND WHICH PEOPLE HAD RALLIED IMPRESSIVELY IN PAST WEEK, HAS SUCCEEDED IN RE-ESTABLISHING ITSELF, PROBABLY NOT BECAUSE IT HAS ACHIEVED SOVIET CONFIDENCE BUT BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED THAT NO OTHER VIABLE DOMESTIC COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP AVAILABLE.
2. ON OTHER HAND, IT HAS ACCEPTED SOVIET TERMS FOR MOST PART EVEN-THOUGH PRESIDENT SVOBODA AND PARTY LEADER DUBCEK HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY HAVE DONE SO RELUCTANTLY AND, HOPEFULLY, TEMPORARILY.
3. IN SPEECH THIS AFTERNOON MARKED BY OBVIOUS EMOTIONAL AND PHYSICAL EXHAUSTION, DUBCEK GAVE SOMBER AND REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S PLIGHT. HE OFFERED CZECHS LITTLE HOPE FOR QUICKLY GETTING RUSSIANS OFF THEIR BACKS AND COULD ONLY HOLD OUT THE SLENDER PROMISE THAT SITUATION WOULD ONLY BE TEMPORARY.
4. MOST EXPLICITLY OMINOUS WAS HIS WARNING THAT LIMITATIONS ON DEMOCRACY WOULD HAVE TO BE ACCEPTED "FOR THE TIME BEING", PARTICULARLY IN AREA OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. (WE UNDERSTAND LEADERS ARE MEETING WITH EDITORS TONIGHT, PRESUMABLY TO LAY DOWN NEW LINE.)
5. COURSE OF ACTION SPELLED OUT FOR PARTY--
PLENUM OF CC (PRESUMABLY OLD CC) AUGMENTED BY CONGRESS DELEGATES
--SEEMS TO CONFIRM THAT ACTIONS OF 14TH PARTY CONGRESS WILL BE ANNULLED.

68 AUG 27 PM 10:10
TUESDAY

Pres file

6. DUBCEK CLEARLY UNDERLINED PRIORITY WHICH MUST BE ATTACHED TO GETTING SOVIET TROOPS OUT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. HE ADDED INFORMATION THAT TROOPS WHILE HERE ARE SUPPOSED TO BE RESTRICTED TO CAMPS OUTSIDE URBAN AREAS.

7. DUBCEK'S GREATEST EMOTIONAL DIFFICULTIES DURING SPEECH SEEMED TO COME WHEN HE REFERRED TO HIS ENFORCED PRESENCE IN USSR EUPHEMISTICALLY AS PERIOD WHEN "I AND OTHER COMRADES COULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN PARTY WORK."

8. AS CONVEYED BY RADIO, MUCH OF REACTION FOLLOWING DUBCEK SPEECH TURNED TOWARD BLEAKLY REALISTIC VIEW THAT OUTCOME ABOUT BEST THAT COULD REASONABLY HAVE BEEN HOPED. MOST COMMENTS VOICED BITTERNESS AT TERMS AND DURESS OF SETTLEMENT BUT UNDERSTANDING, AND IN MOST CASES ADMIRATION, FOR DUBCEK HIMSELF. HOWEVER, SOME ORGANIZATIONS, AS WELL AS MILITANT YOUTH WEEKLY STUDENT, HAVE ASSERTED VIEW THAT AGREEMENT BETRAYS HEROIC WEEK-LONG RESISTANCE WHICH THUS IN VAIN. MANY RESOLUTIONS, AND RADIO ITSELF REPEATEDLY, HAVE URGED THE CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE REMAIN CALM, "ESPECIALLY TONIGHT," TO AVOID WORSE CALAMITIES. WE WERE TOLD HOWEVER, BY US JOURNALIST SOURCE THAT LARGE CROWD HOSTILE TO AGREEMENT FORMED IN WENCESLAS SQUARE EARLY THIS EVENING TO MARCH ON NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DEMANDING ITS REJECTION. RADIO EARLIER HAD ADVISED PEOPLE ASSEMBLING BEFORE CASTLE TO DESPERSE; THIS APPARENTLY EFFECTIVE.

9. SEVERAL COMMENTATORS ADVISE THINKING THINGS OVER BEFORE REACTING; ONE QUOTED CZECH PROVERB "MORNING IS WISER THAN EVENING." IN LBIS VIEN, NEWSPAPERS REPORTEDLY AGREED VOLUNTARILY NOT TO PUBLISH TOMORROW TO ALLOW MORE TIME TO EVALUATE SITUATION. SOME DID NOT WAIT OVERNIGHT; RADIO NOW CARRYING REPORTS OF ORGANIZATIONS MODIFYING VEHEMENT RESOLUTIONS PASSED IN HEAT OF THE AFTERNOON'S INDIGNATION WHEN COMMUNIQUE FIRST PUBLISHED.
BEAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG 280117Z AUG 68

00 WIE10
DE WTE 3478

1958 AUG 28 01 24

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP 82200

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUGUST 27, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

YOU HAVE HAD SEVERAL ASSESSMENTS THIS AFTERNOON OF THE MEANING OF THE MOSCOW AGREEMENT. I THINK YOU WILL BE INTERESTED IN THIS ASSESSMENT BY A CZECH LEADER WHO HAPPENED TO BE ON VACATION IN YUGOSLAVIA DURING THE EVENTS OF LAST WEEK.

USNATO 4405

SUBJECT: CZECHOSLOVAKIA: CONVERSATION WITH SIK

49
Pres file
TUESDAY
60 AUG 27 PM 9:36
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-158
By is, NARA Date 11-20-98

1. DANISH REP (DYVIG) REPORTED TO NAC AUGUST 27 FOLLOWING COMMENTS OF CZECH DEPUTY PRININ SIK TO DANISH AMBASSADOR IN BELGRADE AUGUST 26 AFTER SIK HAD BEEN INFORMED OF SUBSTANCE OF MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE:

A. SOVIET LEADERS HAD BEEN VICTIMS OF POLITICAL BLACKMAIL BY EAST GERMANS AND POLES, WHO COMPLETELY MISINTERPRETED DIFFERENCES AMONG CZECH LEADERSHIP. BASED ON READINGS FROM CZECH PARTY CONGRESS AND BRATISLAVA AND CIERNA MEETINGS, GDR AND POLISH LEADERS HAD CONCLUDED THERE SERIOUS DISAGREEMENT AMONG CZECHS, AND CZECH QUISLINGS URGED SOVIETS TO INTERVENE ON ASSUMPTION CZECH GOVERNMENT WOULD FALL. INSTEAD, PRESSURE HAD EFFECT OF WELDING TOGETHER CZECH POLITICAL AND NATIONAL FORCES, AND SOVIET OCCUPATION FORCES TRIED IN VAIN TO FIND COLLABORATORS TO SERVE IN PUPPET REGIME.

B. EXTENT OF GENERAL RESISTANCE WAS INDICATED BY FACT THAT SOVIETS WERE FORCED TO USE GDR AND HUNGARIAN ANNOUNCERS ON RADIO STATIONS IN CZECH AND SLOVAK REGIONS AS REVEALED BY THEIR ACCENTS. SOME WOULD-BE COLLABORATORS WERE FORCED TO JOIN RESISTANCE.

C. FACT THAT SOVIET FORCES ARE REMAINING WOULD LEAD TO POPULAR EXPLOSION OF UNFORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES.

D. ATTACK ON RUMANIA UNLIKELY, BUT COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED. SOVIETS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA WHICH HOLDS RISK OF SIMILAR ERROR IN RUMANIA.
CLEVELAND

DTG 280050Z AUG 68

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM BROMLEY SMITH

TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Situation Report on Vietnam Plank

Gale McGee ~~sk~~ reports from Chicago that at 2:00 A. M. this morning *he and his group estimated* there was a majority of 250 hard-nosed votes to sustain the Vietnam plank proposed by the Platform Committee.

The strategy of *Senator McGee and* those working for approval of the majority plank is to stand firm, accept no amendments and move as fast as the convention will permit to a vote. Statements in defense of the majority plank will avoid slugging in the hope that some 50 additional delegates will not be alienated to the extent of changing their present inclination to vote for the majority plank.

Senator McGee believes the opposition will use every device to try to stall off a vote today and even longer if possible. Consideration is being given to a move to suspend the rules to get the convention to vote this afternoon.

Mike Manatos reports there is a margin of 200 votes for the majority plank.

Charlie Murphy reports two estimates. One that the majority plank would win by 200 votes and a more favorable estimate that it would win two to one.

Marvin Watson says 1400 to 1500 delegates will vote for the majority plank.

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARGIN. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR 16, 1993.

BY rg ON 9-9-92

51
Pres file

FROM BROMLEY SMITH
TO THE PRESIDENT

The Michigan delegation is prepared to introduce the following amendment to the majority Vietnam plank in the event the convention votes down the minority plank:

"Stop all remaining bombing of North Vietnam while continuing to provide all necessary air and other support for American troops in the expectation of restraint and reasonable response from Hanoi."

Senator Hart is trying to round up eight other states to second the amendment in order to bring it to a vote.

Earlier I reported that Senator McGee's strategy early this morning was to try to prevent all amendments. If the Michigan delegation gets sufficient backing, it appears that ^{they} the introduction of the Michigan amendment will come before the convention.

From Bradley Smith
TO the Pres

52

Following is Secretary Clifford's memorandum

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ~~CLARK M. Clifford~~

Pres file

You have asked for our comments on the Vietnam Plank advocated by the Minority of the Platform Committee. There are two points presented in this Plank which are of particular significance to the Department of Defense and which we regard as inconsistent with the security of our own and allied forces, contrary to the conduct of sound military operations and inimical to the objective of achieving an honorable settlement.

1. The Minority Plank urges:

"First, an unconditional end to all bombing of North Vietnam, while continuing to provide in the South, all necessary air and other support for American troops."

This would simply call upon the United States to give up much of its side of the war without being given any reason to believe that North Vietnam would do anything other than increase its attacks upon the South. The Plank attempts futilely to cloak this unwarranted concession by referring to the unconnected and unsupported proposition that "all necessary air and other support for American troops" will be provided in the South. There is no basis for believing that the necessary support for our men can be provided by air attacks in the South only. Indeed, without some substantial restraint on the part of North Vietnam, an unconditional end of our bombing North of the DMZ would gradually increase the danger to American troops and those of our allies.

Without some compensating restraint, a cessation of the bombing in North Vietnam would significantly reduce the amount of time and effort

needed for Hanoi to move men and supplies to battle in the South. It would permit Hanoi to establish supply bases in a sanctuary immediately North of the DMZ^{and} to operate its MIGs from air bases within ready striking distance of our men and the cities of South Vietnam. It would permit the installation and operation of artillery and rocket positions within ready range of our forces and South Vietnamese civilians. It would encourage the massing of North Vietnamese forces, immune from air attack, in strengths and with logistic support which would make totally untenable our continued presence in the northern provinces of South Vietnam.

The provision of any such provision in a Plank of the Democratic Platform would irrevocably prejudice our negotiating position in Paris. It is significant to note that the very existence of the Paris Peace Talks is completely ignored in the Plank. In effect, the inclusion of this unwarranted demand for unilateral restraint on the part of the United States would leave Hanoi's representatives in a position where they could wait out our negotiators, without the slightest movement towards the de-escalatory steps that are essential to progress toward peace.

2. Similarly irreconcilable with the conduct both of our military operations and our Paris negotiations is the 4th step set forth in the Minority Plank. This reads: "Fourth, to reduce American casualties and the suffering of Vietnamese civilians we will lower the level of violence by reducing offensive operations in the Vietnamese countryside, thus enabling an early withdrawal of a significant number of our troops. We will, of course, at all times continue to provide all necessary military support in the South for American troops confronted by hostile forces."

This is obviously an effort to dictate military tactics through the processes of a political convention. On the merits, there is no support whatsoever for the assumption that a reduction of our offensive operations in the North Vietnamese countryside would lower the level of violence and hence reduce American casualties and civilian suffering. Nor is there any warrant for the conclusion that our withdrawal from the countryside would enable an early withdrawal of a significant number of our troops.

We are, at the present time, engaged in "spoiling operations" throughout South Vietnam which prevent the massing of enemy forces and interfere greatly with his ability to conduct attacks on our military installations and populated areas. Were these spoiling operations to be abandoned, there is every reason to believe that enemy offensives, even exceeding those that occurred at the time of Tet, would increase the level of violence, add to the suffering of the people of South Vietnam and multiply American casualties. Moreover, the adoption of any such wholly unilateral step as indicated in the Plank would require more rather than less American forces to provide even minimum protection for those civilian and military personnel.

Our present operations in the countryside have done much to put an end to the indiscriminate shelling of populated areas. Were we now to withdraw into the cities, we could only anticipate that our men and the South Vietnamese population would be treated by the enemy as lucrative targets for rockets and mortars launched from relative safety. Such withdrawal would forfeit the countryside to the Viet Cong terrorists.

Their assumption of control over large areas of South Vietnam would ~~in fact~~ in fact jeopardize the chances for the political settlement which the Plank purports to promote.

The abandonment of offensive operations in the ^{South} ~~South~~ Vietnamese countryside would permit in South Vietnam the massing of forces and the mounting of offensives comparable to those which an abandonment of the bombing of North Vietnam, without compensating restraint on the part of Hanoi, would permit in the area immediately north of the DMZ. These twin actions of unilateral abandonment of military effectiveness could only encourage the enemy to prolong the war at greater cost in American lives.

3.) Finally, to grant the enemy privileged positions north of the DMZ and throughout the ^{South} ~~South~~ Vietnamese countryside would badly disserve our objective of encouraging in South Vietnam the development of the political institutions and military capability that will enable the gradual reduction of American participation, in the event that no honorable settlement can be achieved. The increased ability of the enemy to launch attacks on populated areas and even to take over the northern provinces would jeopardize the very existence of the Government of Vietnam. Moreover, the withdrawal of US troops from offensive operations in the countryside would put an end to our carefully planned program of a gradual turn-over of combat operations to the armed forces of Vietnam and would leave them prematurely to face alone the trained and experienced main-line forces which North Vietnam would be able to send South in increased strength.

(END)

Aug. 28, 1968 53

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

*dict. by
WR
from
airport
10:50 a
m.
insert A
furnished
by Gen
Furbush*

Herewith a draft for your possible use, whatever the outcome of the vote this afternoon. I believe a statement by the President is justified in the face of an inevitably large minority vote -- if that is the way it turns out. Certainly it is required in the face of a victory by the peace plank.

"I have noted the vote of the Democratic Convention on our party's Vietnam plank. I have four observations to make.

"First. I deeply understand and sympathize with the minority's (majority's) desire to see a cessation of the bombing leading us towards peace. I have felt this strongly enough to order a bombing halt on eight occasions in the past.

"Second, I do not believe a political convention can or should address itself to military or diplomatic tactics. These must change with changing circumstances. The Constitution places the responsibility for the day-to-day conduct of military and diplomatic affairs on the President, who is both Commander in Chief and responsible for the nation's foreign relations.

"Third. As Commander in Chief, one of the President's duties is to protect the nation's men in the field. Right now those men in Vietnam are dealing with a major enemy offensive prepared since early June by the infiltration of men and supplies from the North at levels higher than any we have known before in Vietnam. The enemy attacks are

supported by truck movements through the area above the DMZ.

We are destroying a significant proportion of those supplies and reducing in degree the burden borne by our men and our allies. I recently asked General Abrams what the military effect would be of a total bombing cessation at the present time. Although I have wished to avoid interjecting the President or our field commanders into politics during this political year, I believe every American citizen now has the right to know the essence of what General Abrams had to say:

(here WWR said to insert Abrams' passage, without numbers)

insert A

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"Fourth. As I have said many times, I am prepared to order a total bombing halt when I conclude that it could lead to less rather than more casualties to ourselves and our allies and lead us towards peace.

"As I said recently in Detroit, I am prepared to take risks in pursuit of peace, but not foolhardy gambles."

(A)

General Abrams has informed me that there are several important effects of our current bombing operations in North Vietnam.

"One is the destruction of the materiel itself. . . second and of greater importance is the reduction we have caused in the number of trucks moving. While other factors may also be at work, it is our conviction that the air interdiction program in the North Vietnam panhandle has been the primary agent which has reduced trucks detected. . . a third effect is to prevent the enemy from massing artillery and air defense means in the area to the north of the DMZ from which they can attack our forces. Further, we interfere with his ability to concentrate forces and supplies for sudden attacks through the DMZ against our units. There are, of course, other effects such as pinning down many thousands of the essential air defense and LOC support forces".

General Abrams has indicated that the military effects of stopping the bombing are as follows: "First, military materiel (much of it pol and ammunition, as fires and secondary explosions testify) would be able to reach the DMZ or the borders of Laos unimpeded. . . second, the trucksflow could be expected to return to a high level within as little as a week. . . Next, the enemy would be able to mass artillery, air defense means, and ground units freely north of the DMZ for use against

(H)

our forces. He could deploy his air force into areas north of 17 degrees from which to threaten or attack our forces and installations throughout much of South Vietnam. He would be able to reopen his railroad as far south as Vinh and subsequently to Dong Hoi. He would thereby free additional numbers of trucks to support his forces in the South. Finally, freed from interdiction north of 17 degrees, the enemy could move reinforcements to the DMZ by truck or rail thus drastically shortening transit time.

General Abrams has also estimated that we are destroying or damaging 15 percent of the trucks flowing through the North Vietnam panhandle each week. He emphasizes, however, that he believes "the major impact of our bombing effort is found in the reduction of truck flow rather than in the numbers actually destroyed."

General Abrams further states that "assuming that the cessation of bombing would be reflected in a several-fold increase in the enemy's logistical capability to support combat and in the intensity of combat, we would have to expect a several-fold increase in U. S. and allied casualties in I Corps. With the bombing authority now in effect, I am able with forces available to limit the enemy's capability in South Vietnam by interdicting his roads and destroying substantial amounts of

his munitions and applies before they reach South Vietnam. In addition, I am able to suppress his artillery and air defense north of the Ben Hai so that our positions just south of the DMZ are secure. If the bombing in North Vietnam now authorized were to be suspended, the enemy, in 10 days to two weeks, could develop a capability in the DMZ area in terms of scale, intensity and duration of combat on the order of five times what he now has. If he should develop this, it would, in my judgment, make our positions in northern Quang Tri (to include Dong Ha and the Cua Viet) untenable. I cannot agree to place our forces at the risk which the enemy's capability would then pose."

(A)

54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 AUG 27 23 31

EEA332
OO WIE10
DE WIE 3472

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82194

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IT MAY LOOK DIFFERENT FROM MOSCOW BUT THE AGREEMENT
LOOKS MIGHTY GLOOMY IN PRAGUE, ACCORDING TO JAKE BEAM.

PRAGUE 3224

1. COMMUNIQUE FROM CZECH-SOVIET TALKS REPRESENTS NEARLY
COMPLETE SOVIET VICTORY, AT LEAST ON PAPER. PRESENCE OF
FIVE COUNTRIES' TROOPS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN EFFECT
SANCTIONED AND CZECHOSLOVAK ARMED FORCES ORDERED TO
COOPERATE WITH OCCUPYING FORCES. CZECHS AGREED TO
DEMAND REMOVAL OF CZECHOSLOVAK SITUATION FROM SECURITY
COUNCIL. ON PARTY SIDE, ACCEPTANCE OF JANUARY AND MAY,
BUT NOT APRIL, PLENUMS IS SIGNIFICANT BLOW AT
PROGRESSIVES FORCES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA PARTICULARLY AS
ACTION PROGRAM ADOPTED AT APRIL SESSION. HERE LISTING
OF BILAK, KOLDER ET AL AS PRESIDUM MEMBERS APPEARS TO
REPRESENT CZECH ACCEPTANCE OF SOVIET ASSERTIONS THAT
14TH PARTY CONGRESS IS ILLEGAL. CONTROL OF MEDIA IS EXPRESSED
IN VAGUE TERMS, WHICH MIGHT BE REGARDED AS SOVIET CONCESSION
(SINCE PREVIOUS SIMILARLY VAGUE AGREEMENT AT CIERNA ON THIS
SUBJECT TURNED OUT TO BE UNSATISFACTORY TO MOSCOW), BUT
MAY COVER MORE PRECISE CONFIDENTIAL AGREEMENT IN DEFERENCE
TO DIFFICULTIES FACED BY CZECHS IN SELLING AGREEMENT
AT HOME. SOVIET COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW MUST BE REGARDED
AS SMALL COMFORT FOR CZECHS IN VIEW ABSENCE OF DATE AND
CONDITION THAT SITUATION MUST HAVE NORMALIZED, WITH DECISION
PRESUMABLY LEFT TO SOVIETS.

1968 AUG 27 PM 7:42
TUESDAY

Pres file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-158
By isa, NARA Date 11-20-98

2. SVOBODA SPEECH THIS AFTERNOON ATTEMPTED TO APPEAL TO PEOPLE NOT TO RISK "DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES" OF LOSING THEIR "DELIBERATION AND DISCIPLINE" IN FACE OF "WELL-EQUIPPED ARMY," WHILE LEADERSHIP CONTINUES TO TRY TO SECURE NATIONAL INTERESTS BUT AT SAME TIME AVOID "SENSELESS BLOOD-SHED." HE SAID HE HAD ACCOMPLISHED FIRST GOAL IN GOING TO MOSCOW: ENABLEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORGANS AND LEADERSHIP TO BEGIN FUNCTIONING AGAIN, WHICH HE SAID IS FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD NORMALIZATION. HE ALSO DELICATELY BUT CLEARLY POINTED OUT THAT WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS IS ALSO PART OF NORMALIZATION, AND THAT UNTIL TROOPS WITHDRAWN "THEIR PRESENCE IS POLITICAL REALITY." UNLIKE COMMUNIQUE HE REFERRED TO "GRADUAL" WITHDRAWAL. SVOBODA ALSO REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO APRIL PLENUM AND TO LEADERSHIP'S INTENTION OF CARRYING OUT ACTION PROGRAM.

3. IN CITY THIS AFTERNOON, WITH SOVIET FORCES LESS EVIDENT, CZECHOSLOVAK PUBLIC EVINced GREAT INDIGNATION TOWARDS OCCUPIER, AND WALLS AGAIN COVERED WITH POSTERS. WHETHER FOR ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF COMMUNIQUE OR DREAD OF SOMETHING SIMILAR, ONE PLACARD CURSED "SO-CALLED 'AGREEMENT'," AND ANOTHER WARNED "BETTER OCCUPATION THAN CAPITULATION." AFTER COMMUNIQUE ANNOUNCED, EMBOFF IN WENCESLAUS SQUARE NOTICED CROWDS LISTENING TO NEWS WITH ATTENTION AND EVIDENT GLOOM.

4. FREE RADIO HAS ERUPTED WITH RESOLUTIONS FROM THROUGHOUT COUNTRY, MAJORITY FROM PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN VARIOUS SECTORS (E.G., MEDIA AND SKODA PLZEN). DOMINANT TENOR IS THAT COMMUNIQUE REPRESENTS CAPITULATION FORCED UPON CZECHOSLOVAK REPRESENTATIVES WHO NEGOTIATING UNDER DURESS AND NOT AS EQUALS. MANY RESOLUTIONS SPECIFICALLY ENDORSE ACTIONS OF 14TH CONGRESS (AND THUS INVALIDATE REPRESENTATIVE ROLE OF SOME CSSR DELEGATES AT MOSCOW); IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS AND REJECTION OF ALL CENSORSHIP CONSTANTLY RECURRING THEME.

5. DUBCEK'S SPEECH JUST CARRIED ON RADIO (SEPTEL) MAY WELL HAVE EVEN MORE DEPRESSING EFFECT ON POPULACE WHICH, AT LEAST AS FIRST REACTION, CLEARLY FEELS THAT ITS PERFORMANCE DURING PAST WEEK-MAGNIFICENT ON VIRTUALLY ALL COUNTS --HAS LARGELY GONE UNREWARDED.

DTG 272205Z AUG 68

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1968 AUG 27 23 24

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EEA331
OO WTE18
DE WTE 3470

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP 82192

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUGUST 27, 1968

THIS STATE DEPARTMENT (TOM HUGHES) ASSESSMENT IS
LESS GLOOMY THAN EMBASSY PRAGUE'S

QUOTE SUBJECT: THE SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAKIA COMMUNIQUE --
PRELIMINARY APPRAISAL

1. ON THE FACE OF IT, THE CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS
PRESERVED CONSIDERABLY MORE OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND
THEIR SKINS IN THE FOUR-DAY MOSCOW NEGOTIATIONS THAN
THEY OR ANY ONE ELSE COULD HAVE EXPECTED AFTER THE
SOVIET INVASION. MOST OF THE DETAILS OF THE UNDERSTANDINGS
REACHED REMAIN UNKNOWN TO US AND MANY HAVE YET TO BE
WORKED OUT; BUT THE CZECHS HAVE COME AWAY WITH SOME NEW
LEASE ON LIFE FOR THEIR POST-NOVOTNY DOMESTIC REFORMS.
UNDOUBTEDLY, HOWEVER, THEY WILL NOW HAVE TO FOREGO
MUCH OF THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION THAT THEY HAD COME TO
SAVOR, AT LEAST ON ISSUES OF GREAT SENSITIVITY TO THE
SOVIETS AND THEIR HARD-LINE ALLIES, AND THERE MAY WELL
BE VARIOUS OTHER LIMITATIONS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE REFORMS. MOREOVER, IT IS CLEAR FROM THE COMMUNIQUE
LANGUAGE AND THE SUBSEQUENT SPEECHES OF THE CZECH LEADERS
THAT SOVIET FORCES WILL REMAIN ON CZECHOSLOVAK SOIL
FOR SOME TIME TO COME, THUS PROVIDING THE SOVIETS WITH SOME
ASSURANCE THAT PRAGUE'S POLICIES UNDER THE NEW ACCORDS WILL
BE IMPLEMENTED MORE NEARLY ALONG SOVIET-PREFERRED LINES THAN
WAS TRUE AFTER CIERNA-BRATISLAVA.

68 AUG 27 PM 1.28
TUESDAY

Pres file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-158
By us, NARA Date 11-20-98

PRESERVATION COPY

2. FOR THE SOVIETS, THE TERMS OF THE COMMUNIQUE ARE LESS THAN THEY PRESUMABLY WANTED TO ACHIEVE BY THEIR INVASION; AND THE TERMS ARE CERTAINLY LESS THAN WHAT ULBRICHT WOULD HAVE WANTED. THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY HOPED TO AVOID MAKING OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA A MILITARY PROTECTORATE WITH QUISLING GOVERNMENT AND THEIR CALCULATION SEEMED TO BE THAT THE EXISTING PRAGUE LEADERSHIP WOULD BEND TO ALL THEIR WISHES (INCLUDING THE FIRING OF THE MOST LIBERAL LEADERS) ONCE THE SOVIET ARMY HAD MARCHED IN. THIS CALCULUS MISFIRED AS LEADERS AND PEOPLE UNITED TO DEFEY THE INVASION. THIS DROVE THE SOVIETS TO BLACKLIST MOST OF THE LIBERAL LEADERSHIP; YET THEY COULD FIND NO CAST OF CHARACTERS FOR A LEADERSHIP THAT COULD COMMAND EVEN MINIMAL AUTHORITY IN THE COUNTRY. THE MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE MAKES CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD TO SWALLOW THE BITTER PILL OF ONCE AGAIN WORKING WITH LEADERS WHOSE CONDUCT THEY DISTRUSTED IN THE PAST, WHO ATTACKED THE SOVIET INVASION AS ILLEGAL, AND MANY OF WHOM WERE BRANDED AS "RIGHT-WINGERS" IN THE SOVIET PRESS.

3. LIKE ANY COMPROMISE ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN CONTENDING PARTIES, THE MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE IS FULL OF POTENTIAL FOR NEW DISAGREEMENT AND FRICTION. THE CZECH LEADERS, TO REASSURE THEIR PEOPLE, WILL UNDOUBTEDLY SEEK TO MAXIMIZE THE FREEDOMS THEY HAVE RETAINED AND TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE MAIN LINES OF THEIR ACTION PROGRAM ARE INTACT. THE SOVIETS ON THE OTHER HAND WILL SEEK TO ENSURE THAT THE SAFEGUARDS FOR THEIR INTERESTS THAT WERE WRITTEN INTO THE COMMUNIQUE WILL BE EFFECTIVELY ENFORCED ACCORDING TO SOVIET INTERPRETATIONS. THUS THE POLITICAL IMPERATIVES AND LINES OF THE TWO SIDES WILL BE IN OPPOSITION ON MANY PARTICULARS AND EVEN A CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SOVIET FORCES -- ITSELF A CONSTANT SOURCE OF FRICTION AND INCIDENTS DESPITE THE COMMUNIQUE'S PROVISIO AGAINST INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS -- IS UNLIKELY TO ENSURE THAT SOVIET VIEWS ALWAYS PREVAIL. SOVIET-CZECH BARGAINING AND MANEUVERING WILL THUS CONTINUE.

4. WHILE THE SOVIET-CZECH CRISIS HAS THUS APPARENTLY MOVED AGAIN INTO AN ESSENTIALLY POLITICAL PHASE, THE COMPROMISE THAT HAS BEEN NEGOTIATED IS HIGHLY TENUOUS. THE SOVIET LEADERS, ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY BY NOW A GOOD DISTANCE AWAY FROM STALINIST VALUES AND HABITS, CONTINUE TO CARRY MUCH STALINIST BAGGAGE. IT IS FAR FROM CLEAR THAT A MOMENT WILL NOT AGAIN COME WHEN THE CZECH EXPERIMENT IN CIVILIZED COMMUNISM WILL SEEM SO INCOMPATIBLE WITH THEIR OWN INTERESTS AS THEY SEE THEM THAT THEY WILL CONSIDER RENEVED RECOURSE TO FORCE A LESSER EVIL OR EVEN THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE.

UNQUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG 272205Z AUG 1968

EEA330
00 WTE10 WTE15
DE WTE 3473

1968 AUG 27 23 09

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: CIA'S REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
AS OF 4:30 PM AUGUST 27, 1968

1. DUBCEK'S ADDRESS TO THE NATION TODAY, LIKE PRESIDENT SVOBODA'S EARLIER, WAS A GRAVE, EMOTION-LADEN APPEAL TO CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE TO UNDERSTAND THAT HE HAD BROUGHT SOME BAD NEWS BACK FROM MOSCOW. SOME ACCOUNTS SAY THAT DUBCEK SHED TEARS DURING HIS DELIVERY. BOTH LEADERS INDICATED THAT SOVIET TROOPS WILL REMAIN IN THE COUNTRY FOR AN INDEFINITE TIME AND THAT TIGHTENED PRESS CONTROL IS IN THE OFFING.
2. THE U.S. EMBASSY IN PRAGUE ASSESSES THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MOSCOW TALKS AS A "NEARLY COMPLETE SOVIET VICTORY, AT LEAST ON PAPER."
3. DUBCEK CALLED FOR UNITY, ORDER, DISCIPLINE, AND UNDERSTANDING. HE SAID THAT SOVIET TROOPS WILL MOVE "IMMEDIATELY" FROM VILLAGES AND CITIES TO "AREAS RESERVED FOR THEM" AND THAT THOSE IN PRAGUE HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO EVACUATE "SOME" AREAS AND BUILDINGS IN THE CITY. IT WAS PRAGUE'S AIM, HE SAID, TO EFFECT THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF THE TROOPS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. HE ALSO URGED THAT NO PROVOCATIONS TAKE PLACE. DUBCEK ALSO STATED THAT IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT SOME "TEMPORARY EXCEPTIONAL MEASURES RESTRICTING...DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION", A CLEAR REFERENCE TO SOME FORM OF CENSORSHIP. HE ALSO REFERRED TO SOME OF THE CLANDESTINE RADIO STATIONS SPREADING "MISTRUST AND DOUBTS" CONCERNING THE MOSCOW AGREEMENT, AND AGAIN WARNED AGAINST INFLAMMATORY WORDS AND ACTIONS.
4. DUBCEK IMPLIED, IN ADDITION, THAT HE MIGHT NOT RECOGNIZE THE RESULTS OF THE EXTRAORDINARY 14TH PARTY CONGRESS, WHICH MET SECRETLY ON 22 AUGUST AND ELECTED A NEW LOYALIST CENTRAL COMMITTEE. HE SAID HE WOULD HOLD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PARTY WORKERS AT ALL LEVELS CONCERNING THE PARTY'S WORK, AND ASKED DELEGATES TO THE CONGRESS TO RESPECT FULLY THE PARTY'S WORK AND THE INSTRUCTIONS HE WILL ISSUE.

SANITIZED
EO 13292, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 02-21
By iol NARA Date 1-31-07

E.O. 12958
3.3 (A)(1); 6.2 (c)

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

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TUESDAY
1968 AUG 27 PM 7:29

5. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, BOTH DUBCEK AND SVOBODA REINDORSED THE PLENUM OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY WHICH RATIFIED THE PARTY'S REFORMIST ACTION PROGRAM AND BROUGHT A NUMBER OF LIBERALS INTO PARTY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICES. A REFERENCE TO THE APRIL PLENUM WAS CONSPICUOUSLY MISSING FROM THE SOVIET-CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIQUE WHICH INVOKED ONLY THE JANUARY AND MAY PLENUMS. IN THIS THERE IS GROUNDS FOR FURTHER CONTENTION BETWEEN PRAGUE AND MOSCOW.

6. THE FIRST OBSERVABLE REACTION ON THE PART OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK PUBLIC TO THE MOSCOW AGREEMENT HAS BEEN NEGATIVE. WESTERN NEWS SERVICES REPORT THAT SEVERAL OF THE CLANDESTINE RADIO STATIONS HAVE CALLED ON THE PEOPLE TO REJECT THE AGREEMENT. ONE STATION, POINTING OUT THAT THE CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS NEGOTIATED "UNDER DURESS," CALLED FOR A NATIONAL REFERENDUM AND THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS. REUTERS REPORTED THIS AFTERNOON THAT THOUSANDS OF CITIZENS IN PRAGUE BEGAN A MARCH FROM WENCESLAS SQUARE TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CHANTING "WE WANT TO KNOW THE WHOLE TRUTH." REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRESS, RADIO, AND TELEVISION IN PRAGUE, HOWEVER, SUBSEQUENTLY ECHOED DUBCEK'S CALL FOR CALMNESS AND CIRCUMSPECTION.

7. THE SOVIETS MAY BE REINFORCING THEIR TROOPS IN SOUTHERN EAST GERMANY AND NORTHWEST CZECHOSLOVAKIA WITH UNITS DRAWN FROM THE BALTIC AREA OF THE USSR. THERE ARE

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 272209Z AUG 68

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57
1968 AUG 27 22 45

EEA328
OO WTE10
DE WTE 3469

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82191

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: DIGEST OF STATE DEPARTMENT REPORTS FOR AUGUST
27, 1968.

CZECHOSLOVAK CRISIS

MOSCOW PRESS ON THE CRISIS

EMBASSY MOSCOW SEES AN OMINOUS THEME IMPLICIT IN INTENSIFIED SOVIET PRESS EFFORTS TO BUILD A STRAW MAN OF THE DANGER OF FOREIGN IMPERIALISM AND TO LINK EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO FOREIGN SOURCES HOSTILE TO THE USSR. THIS COUPLED WITH INCREASED ATTENTION TO THE CZECH RESISTANCE MAY BE AN EFFORT TO PREPARE THE SOVIET PUBLIC FOR MORE BRUTAL MEASURES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HARSHER REPRESSION AT HOME.

YUGOSLAV REACTION

ALTHOUGH THE RESOLUTION ISSUED AFTER THE MEETING OF THE YUGOSLAV PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AUGUST 23 REPEATS MANY OF THE POINTS MADE EARLIER BY PRESIDENT TITO, EMBASSY BELGRADE POINTS OUT IT IS NOTEWORTHY FOR ITS SCATHING DENUNCIATION OF THE SOVIET INTERVENTION AND FOR ITS EXPRESSION OF SERIOUS CONCERN FOR THE FUTURE OF SOCIALISM AS A SYSTEM. MEANWHILE THE EMBASSY NOTES INCREASING NERVOUSNESS IN THE CITY WITH THE ARMED FORCES IN AN ALERT STATUS AS RESERVE CALL-UPS CONTINUE.

EFFECT OF CRISIS IN HUNGARY

WHILE IT WILL TAKE TIME BEFORE THE EFFECTS OF THE CZECH CRISIS ON KEY ASPECTS OF THE HUNGARIAN SCENE WILL BE CLEAR, EMBASSY BUDAPEST REPORTS ONE IS STRUCK BY THE GENERAL POPULAR MOOD OF DISMAY, BY THE SEEMING DISCOMFORT OF MOST OFFICIALS, AND BY THE CLICHE-LADEN ARGUMENTS USED IN JUSTIFICATION. THE ESSENTIALLY SATELLITE CHARACTER OF HUNGARIAN POLICY IN THE CRUNCH IS ALL TOO PAINFULLY CLEAR.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 11-1-01

POLES ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN

EMBASSY WARSAW REPORTS THE POLISH PRESS AUGUST 27 DROPPED ALL PRETENSE REGARDING THE ATMOSPHERE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE RECEPTION ACCORDED THE POLES THERE. BY PLACING THE BLAME FOR THE HOSTILE MANIFESTATIONS ON REACTIONARY, RIGHT-WING OR WESTERN INSPIRED GROUPS, THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THE GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO ALLAY THE DEEP SENSE OF DISMAY AND CONFUSION EXISTING IN POLAND OVER THE EVENTS.

EUROPE

NATO SUMMIT MEETING

WHILE AGREEING NOW IS NOT AN OPPORTUNE TIME FOR THE CHANCELLOR'S SUGGESTED NATO SUMMIT MEETING, EMBASSY BONN BELIEVES THE IDEA OF A HIGH-LEVEL WESTERN POLITICAL MEETING HAS MERIT. IT WOULD TEND TO UNIFY THE ALLIANCE AND RESPOND TO AN APPARENT NEED FOR LEADERSHIP IN WESTERN EUROPE, BESIDES FOCUSING ATTENTION ON TRADITIONAL U.S. POLICY GOALS. IT WOULD ALSO HELP PREVENT THE RISK OF SERIOUS MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN US AND THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS.

NEAR EAST

JORDANIAN APPEAL TO THE UN

THE JORDANIAN UN MISSION HAS ADDRESSED A LETTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT REGARDING THE LATEST ISRAELI ATTACKS AND HAS INDICATED A REQUEST FOR A COUNCIL MEETING WILL FOLLOW. THE JORDANIAN DELEGATION TOLD OUR MISSION IT BELIEVES ISRAEL IS EXPLOITING THE FOCUS OF WORLD ATTENTION ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND IT WONDERS IF THE COUNCIL MEMBERS WILL CONDEMN ISRAEL AS VIGOROUSLY AS THEY DID THE USSR.

CYPRUS SETTLEMENT

WHILE RECOGNIZING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INCIDENT ON CYPRUS WHICH COULD SET OFF ANOTHER CRISIS, AND THUS ARGUES AGAINST A GO-SLOW POLICY, EMBASSY ANKARA BELIEVES PRECIPITATING THE ISSUE, UNLESS PROSPECTS FOR A SETTLEMENT ARE BETTER THAN THEY APPEAR, COULD HAVE THE SAME RESULT. THUS, WITH TURKEY NOT COMPLAINING, THE EMBASSY PREFERS EMPHASIZING NORMALIZATION STEPS WHILE THE TWO COMMUNITIES CAREFULLY SEEK A SETTLEMENT.

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 272204Z AUG 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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EEA327
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DE WTE 3471

1968 AUG 27 22 37

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82193

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUGUST 27, 1968

THREE RECENT CAPTURED DOCUMENTS INDICATE THAT THE PRESENT OFFENSIVE IS PLANNED AS A RELATIVELY LONG-TERM OPERATION, LASTING AS LEAST THROUGH SEPTEMBER AND PERHAPS EVEN LONGER.

A NOTEBOOK OF A NORTH VIETNAMESE PLATOON LEADER CAPTURED IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE CONTAINS AN ENTRY DATED AUGUST 18 INDICATING THAT THE WRITER'S ARTILLERY UNIT WAS PREPARING FOR AN ATTACK WHICH WAS TO MARK THE BEGINNING OF A FOUR MONTH PHASE.

ANOTHER DOCUMENT KEPT BY A CADRE OF COSVN SUB-REGION 3, SAIGON AREA, TALKING ABOUT THE ASSIGNMENT OF MISSIONS FOR UNITS IN THE AREA STATES THAT "NUMEROUS DEFICIENCIES WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED DURING THE FORTHCOMING ONE MONTH OFFENSIVE PHASE BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTIES IN RECRUITING PERSONNEL AND INTENSIVE ENEMY ATTACKS DURING THE REORGANIZATION STAGE."

THE THIRD DOCUMENT WHICH CONTAINS FRAGMENTARY NOTES TAKEN BY A RANKING CADRE DURING A MEETING OF THE BIEN DINH PROVINCE PARTY COMMITTEE STATES THAT UNITS IN BIEN DINH PROVINCE MUST CARRY OUT THREE OR FOUR CLIMAXING PHASES BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER 1968.

THIS DOCUMENT ALSO STATES THAT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PARTY BELIEVED THAT THE VC/NVA UNITS WITH THEIR EXISTING CAPABILITIES SHOULD HAVE DONE BETTER IN THE PAST. THE DOCUMENT GOES ON TO SAY THAT "THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT ENTER INTO SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS ON PEACE UNTIL THEIR FOUR-POINT CONDITIONS ARE MET. WHEN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THE PARIS PEACE TALKS, IT ONLY INTENDED TO SHOW ITS GOODWILL TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE BUT NOT TO THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS."

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993

By 19, NARA, Date 11-9-96

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1993

NARA Date 11-9-96

DTG 272205Z AUG 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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68 AUG 27 PM 6:58
TUESDAY

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68 AUG 27 PM 6:13

59
TUESDAY

EEA325
PP WIE10
DE WIE. 3467

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH82189

UNCLAS

TUESDAY, AUGUST 27, 1968

YOU HAVE RECEIVED BIRTHDAY GREETINGS THUS FAR FROM THE
FOLLOWING HEADS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT:

CHANCELLOR JOSEF KLAUS OF AUSTRIA
KING BAUDOUIN OF BELGIUM
PRESIDENT COSTA E SILVA OF BRAZIL
PRESIDENT CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND PREMIER YEN CHIA-KAN OF CHINA
PRESIDENT LUEBKE, CHANCELLOR KIESINGER, AND VICE CHANCELLOR
WILLY BRANDT OF GERMANY
PRESIDENT ZAKIR HUSAIN AND PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI OF INDIA
CHAIRMAN, STATE COUNCIL MARIAN SPYCHALSKI OF POLAND
PRESIDENT, STATE COUNCIL NICOLAE CEAUSESCU OF ROMANIA
PRESIDENT WILLY SPUEHLER OF SWITZERLAND
QUEEN ELIZABETH II
CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN AND CHAIRMAN PODGORYNI
PRESIDENT TITO

WE ARE HOLDING THE MESSAGES HERE BUT IF YOU WISH TO SEE THEM,
WE CAN POUCH THEM TO YOU.

THERE FOLLOW TWO SENTENCES WHICH YOU APPROVED LAST YEAR AS
A RESPONSE TO CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES. MINOR VARIATIONS
WERE MADE TO FIT SPECIFIC CASES.

"THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS ON MY
BIRTHDAY. I VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTFULNESS AND
EXTEND TO YOU MY WARM PERSONAL REGARDS. SINCERELY,

I RECOMMEND THAT YOU AUTHORIZE US TO USE THIS LANGUAGE TO
REPLY TO THE MESSAGES WE HAVE RECEIVED AND EXPECT TO RECEIVE
FROM HEADS OF STATE, HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND A LIMITED NUMBER
OF OTHER PROMINENT FOREIGN OFFICIALS.

APPROVE-----
DISAPPROVE-----

DTG: 272118Z AUG 68
XEROX FROM QUECK COPY

EEA323

1968 AUG 27 19 50

00 WTE10
DE WTE 3466

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP82188

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file
TUESDAY
AUG 27 PM 4:19

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

27 AUGUST 1968

SUBJECT: \$20 MILLION PROGRAM LOAN FOR CHILE

ON JULY 25 YOU AUTHORIZED NEGOTIATION OF A \$20 MILLION PROGRAM LOAN TO CHILE ON AN AD REFERENDUM BASIS.

BILL GAUD REPORTS NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORILY CONCLUDED. THE CHILEANS ACCEPTED ALL THE SELF-HELP FISCAL AND MONETARY COMMITMENTS CONTAINED IN THE NEGOTIATING INSTRUCTIONS YOU APPROVED. THEY ALSO AGREED TO SEVERAL IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL COMMITMENTS. THESE COMMITMENTS ARE TO BE INCORPORATED IN A LETTER TO CIAP AND A CONFIDENTIAL MEMO TO US.

SECRETARY FOWLER HAS REVIEWED THE NEGOTIATIONS FROM A BALANCE OF PAYMENTS STANDPOINT AND IS SATISFIED.

CHARLIE ZWICK RECOMMENDS YOU AUTHORIZE GOING AHEAD WITH THE LOAN. I CONCUR. THE CONTINUING SEVERE DROUGHT IN CHILE, WHICH AFFECTS NOT ONLY CROPS, BUT ALSO HYDROELECTRIC POWER FOR THE COPPER MINES, MAKES THE PROGRAM LOAN MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER IN PRESIDENT FREI'S ECONOMIC PLANNING.

AUTHORIZE LOAN

DISAPPROVE

CALL ME

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-18

By ing, NARA, Date 5-15-95

DTG 271937Z AUG 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

61

Tuesday, August 27, 1968

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres. file

Attached for your signature is a Full Power authorizing State's Assistant Legal Adviser, James vanR. Springer, to sign on behalf of the United States a Protocol establishing French and Spanish texts for the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

This international treaty has been in force for more than 20 years but its official text is only in the English language. Springer will sign the Protocol establishing French and Spanish language texts at a meeting on civil aviation to be held in Buenos Aires September 9-20.

This is wholly routine business. It comes to you only because of a technicality in our present procedures.

Attachment

W. W. Rostow

If you approve, we will need your signature on the attached Full Power.

No _____

Call me _____

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday, August 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit by New Zealand Prime Minister

Free file

On August 21 Ambassador Henning conveyed your invitation to Prime Minister Holyoake to visit Washington. Your letter suggested October 16-17 "as specific dates toward which our staffs can work."

State informs us that the New Zealand Embassy has now expressed difficulty in fitting these dates into the Prime Minister's schedule which also includes the United Nations General Assembly, a visit to Canada and a Colombo Plan meeting.

The Embassy hopes you may find it convenient to receive Holyoake on October 9-10, or, as second choice, October 15-16.

Both your schedule and that of the First Lady would permit acceptance of either of the proposed dates for the usual official visit routine: 11:30 a.m. arrival ceremony, 12:00 noon office call and 8:00 p.m. black tie dinner on the first day, with possible office call on the second day, perhaps at 1:30 p.m., if needed.

Recommendation:

That you authorize State to indicate your acceptance of the New Zealand first choice, October 9-10.

W. W. Rostow

Approve October 9-10 _____

Prefer October 15-16 _____

Call me _____

cc: Marshall Wright
Lou Schwartz

AJenkins:mm

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
White House Gift Office, Feb. 24, 1983
By sp/llh, NARA, Date 12-14-92

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INFORMATION

Monday, August 26, 1968
10:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Clifford's comments
on the Mansfield letter.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

24 AUG 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Mike Mansfield's Observations on His Visit to Europe

You asked for my comments on Senator Mansfield's August 19, 1968, memorandum containing his impressions gained on a recent visit to Europe. Senator Mansfield's observations were listed under the headings of the various capitals that he visited, and my comments are organized accordingly.

Moscow

As subsequent events have indicated, Senator Mansfield's assessment of the chances of overt intervention in Czechoslovakia was far too optimistic. Obviously, the Soviet leaders were prepared to jeopardize their relationships with us, with the rest of the world outside the Eastern European Bloc and with the members of that Bloc in order to shape the Czechoslovakian internal situation more to their own liking.

Prague

Despite this error in assessing Soviet intentions, I believe Senator Mansfield was correct in suggesting that we should avoid over-enthusiastic support of the Dubcek leadership. I also agree, and the statement you released on August 21 attests, that we should not appear indifferent either to the significant developments in Czechoslovakia or Soviet efforts to suppress them. In my opinion, we should continue to exhibit our concern, while making it clear that we have no responsibility either for generating or for protecting these internal Czechoslovakian developments.

Paris

Senator Mansfield's memorandum records that present dilemma. Many people are prepared to assert that progress in Paris depends on our cessation of the bombing, but no one is prepared to tell us what will happen if the bombing is stopped. As you know, I agree that any significant progress in Paris is very unlikely until we can arrive at a set of circumstances under which we can stop the bombing. At the same time, I believe that the talks continue to serve a useful purpose in providing a forum for the exposition on both sides of over-all conditions for a political settlement.

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I also am in full accord with Senator Mansfield's suggestion that conditions may soon be right for an effort to improve our relations with France.

Other

Senator Mansfield's visit has left him unpersuaded that we should retain substantially our existing forces in Europe.

It may be that his position was influenced in part at least by his misconception of the threat of Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. In any event, I am persuaded that this development confirms the necessity for our retaining a substantial American military presence that will help preserve the strength of the NATO Alliance.

As for his statement that we have almost 100 Generals in Western Europe with private railroad cars and personal planes. I have asked that the full facts be assembled. It may be, however, that his heavy stress on this assertion indicates that some adjustment of our support and overhead facilities in Europe may reduce pressure for a major withdrawal of combat forces.

Carl L. Sigmond